the rise of “State-nations”
Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav

Alfred Stepan is Wallace S. Sayre Professor of Government at Columbia University. Juan J. Linz is Sterling Professor Emeritus of Politicaland Social Science at Yale University. Yogendra Yadav is senior fellow
at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi. The following essay is adapted from their forthcoming book Crafting StateNations: India and Other Multinational Democracies.

One of the most urgent conceptual, normative, and political tasks ofour day is to think anew about how polities that aspire to be democracies
can accommodate great sociocultural and even multinational diversity
within one state. The need to think anew arises from a mismatch between the political realities of the world we live in and an old political
wisdom that we have inherited. The old wisdom holds that the territorialboundaries of a state must coincide with the perceived cultural boundaries of a nation. Thus, this understanding requires that every state must
contain within itself one and not more than one culturally homogenous
nation, that every state should be a nation, and that every nation should
be a state. Given the reality of sociocultural diversity in many of theworld’s polities, this widespread belief seems to us to be misguided andindeed dangerous since, as we shall argue, many successful democratic
states in the world today do not conform to this expectation.
All independent democratic states have a degree of cultural diversity,
but for comparative purposes we can say that states may be divided into
three broad categories:
1) States that have strong cultural diversity, some of which is territorially based and politically articulated by significant groups withleaders who advance claims of independence in the name of nationalism and self-determination.
2) States that are culturally quite diverse, but whose diversity is nowhere organized by territorially based, politically significant groups
that mobilize nationalist demands for independence.
Journal of Democracy Volume 21, Number 3 July 2010
© 2010 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press

Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav

513) States in which a community that is culturally homogeneousenough to consider itself a nation dominates the state, and no other significant group articulates similar claims.
We call countries in the first category “robustly multinational” societies. Canada (owing to Quebec), Spain (especially owing to the BasqueCountry and Catalonia), and Belgium (owing to Flanders) are all “robustly multinational.” India, owing to the Kashmir Valley alone, merits
classification in this category. The Sikh-led Khalistan movement in the
Punjab, the Mizo independence movement in the northeast, and the Dravidian secessionist movement in southern India strengthen the multinational dimension of the Indian polity.
Switzerland and the United States are both sociologically diverse andmulticultural. Yet since neither has significant territorially based groups
mobilizing claims for independence, both countries clearly fall into thesecond and not the first category.
Finally, Japan, Portugal, and most of the Scandinavian countries fall
into the third category.
What political implications do these three very different situations
have for reconciling democracy with diversity? If a polity has only one
significant group which sees itself as a nation, and there exists a relatively common sense of history and religion and a shared language
throughout the territory, the building of a nation-state and the buildingof democracy can reinforce each other.
Yet if competitive elections are inaugurated under conditions that are
already “robustly multinational,” the logic of nation-state building and thelogic of democracy building will come into conflict. This is so because
only one of the polity’s “nations” will be privileged in the state-building
effort, while the other “nations” will go unrecognized and may even be
marginalized. But before examining alternatives to the nation-state, wefirst need to attempt to explain its normative and political power.
The belief that every state should be a nation reflects perhaps themost widely accepted normative vision of a modern democratic state—that is, the “nation-state.” After the French Revolution, and especially in the latter part of the nineteenth century, France pursued many
policies devoted to creating a unitary nation-state in which all French
citizens would have only one cultural and political identity. These
policies included a package of incentives and disincentives to ensurethat French increasingly became the only acceptable language in thestate. Political mechanisms to allow the recognition and expression ofregional cultural differences were so unacceptable to French nationstate builders that advocacy of federalism was at one time a capitaloffense. Throughout France, state schools at any given hour were famously teaching the same curriculum with identical syllabi by teachers
who had been trained and certified by the same Ministry of Education.
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designed to create a common French identity and a country that was
robustly assimilationist.1
Some very successful contemporary democracies such as Sweden,
Japan, and Portugal are close to the ideal type of a unitary nation-state.
Some federal states such as Germany and Australia have also become
nation-states. In our view, if at the time a polity adopts a state-directed
program of “nation-state” building sociocultural differences have notacquired political salience, and if most politically aware citizens have astrong sense of shared history, policies designed to build a nation-stateshould not create problems for the achievement of an inclusive democracy. In fact, the creation of such a national identity and relative homogeneity in the nineteenth century was identified with democratization
and was possible in consolidated states.
In the twentieth century, however, attempts to create nation-states via
state policies encountered growing difficulties, even in such old statesas Spain. Thus if a polity has significant and politically salient culturalor linguistic diversity (as a large number of polities do), then its leadersneed to think about, craft, and normatively legitimate a type of polity
with the characteristics of a “state-nation.”

Identities and Boundaries
Two of the authors of the present essay, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan,
introduced the concept of the state-nation in 1996, but only in a paragraph (and one figure), citing states that “are multicultural, and [which]sometimes even have significant multinational components, [but] which
nonetheless still manage to engender strong identification and loyalty
from their citizens, an identification and loyalty that proponents of homogeneous nation states perceive that only nation states can engender.”They went on to say that neither Switzerland nor India wasstrictly speaking [in the French sense] a nation state, but we believe both
can now be called state nations. Under Jawaharlal Nehru, India made significant gains in managing multinational tensions through skillful and consensual usage of numerous consociational practices. Through this process
India became in the 1950s and the early 1960s a democratic state-nation.2“Nation-state” policies stand for a political-institutional approachthat tries to make the political boundaries of the state and the presumed
cultural boundaries of the nation match. Needless to say, the cultural
boundaries are far from obvious in most cases. Thus the creation of anation-state involves privileging one sociocultural identity over otherpotential or actual sociocultural cleavages that can be politically mobilized. “Nation-state” policies have been pursued historically by following a variety of routes that range from relatively soft to downrightbrutal. These may include: 1) creating or arousing a special kind of al-Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav

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legiance or common cultural identity among those living in a state; 2)encouraging the voluntary assimilation into the nation-state’s identityof those who do not share that initial allegiance or cultural identity; 3)various forms of social pressure and coercion to achieve this and to prevent the emergence of alternative cultural identities or to erode them ifthey exist; and 4) coercion that might, in the more extreme cases, eveninvolve ethnic cleansing.
By contrast, “state-nation” policies stand for a political-institutional
approach that respects and protects multiple but complementary sociocultural identities. “State-nation” policies recognize the legitimate public andeven political expression of active sociocultural cleavages, and they include mechanisms to accommodate competing or conflicting claims without imposing or privileging in a discriminatory way any one claim. “Statenation” policies involve creating a sense of belonging (or “we-feeling”)
with respect to the statewide political community, while simultaneously
creating institutional safeguards for respecting and protecting politicallysalient sociocultural diversities. The “we-feeling” may take the form ofdefining a tradition, history, and shared culture in an inclusive manner,with all citizens encouraged to feel a sense of attachment to common symbols of the state and some form of “constitutional patriotism.”
In democratic societies, the institutional safeguards constitutive of“state-nation” policies will most likely take the form of federalism, andoften specifically asymmetrical federalism, possibly combined with consociational practices.3 Virtually every longstanding and relatively peaceful contemporary democracy with more than one territorially concentrated, politically mobilized, linguistic-cultural group forming a majority
in some significant part of its territory is not only federal, but “asymmetrically federal” (Belgium, Canada, India) or is a unitary nation-statewith a “federacy.”4 As we discuss later, a federacy is a distinct culturalpolitical unit within an otherwise unitary state that relates to the central
government via a set of asymmetrical federal arrangements. This meansthat such a polity, at a certain point in its history, decided that it could“hold together” within a single democratic system only by constitutionally embedding special cultural and historical prerogatives for some of
the member units—prerogatives that respond to those units’ distinct linguistic-cultural aspirations, security situations, or historical identities.
We believe that if political leaders in India, Belgium, Spain, andCanada had attempted to force one language and culture on their respective countries, and had insisted on imposing homogenizing nation-statepolicies reminiscent of the French Third Republic, the cause of social
peace, inclusionary democracy, and individual rights would have beenpoorly served. For in each of these countries, more than one territorially based, linguistic-cultural cleavage had already been activated. The
strategic question, therefore, was whether to attempt to repress or toaccommodate this preexisting, politically activated diversity.

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Journal of Democracy“State-nation” is a term that we introduce to help us think about democratic states that do not—and cannot—fit well into the classic Frenchstyle “nation-state” model based on a “we-feeling” resulting from an existing or forged homogeneity. For a summary of the difference between
the “nation-state” and “state-nation” as opposing ideal types that shapepolicies, norms, and institutions for recognizing and accommodating diversity, see Table 1 below.
As a diverse polity approximates the state-nation ideal type, we expect it to have the following four empirically verifiable patterns: First,
despite multiple cultural identities among its citizens, there will be ahigh degree of positive identification with the state and pride in being
citizens of that state. Second, citizens will have multiple but complementary political identities and loyalties. Third, there will be a highdegree of institutional trust in the most important constitutional, legal,
and administrative components of the state. Fourth, by world standards,
there will be a comparatively high degree of positive support for democracy among all the diverse groups of citizens in the country, and thiswill include support for the specific statewide democratic institutions
through which the polity is governed.
To be sure, these patterns do not simply exist right from the beginning. It all depends on crafting and is very much an outcome of deliberate policies and designs. We turn now to the question of how such“state-nation” behavior and values can be crafted and supported.

State-Nation Policies
On both theoretical and empirical grounds, we contend that there canbe a nested set of policy and institutional choices which reinforce eachother and help to facilitate the emergence and persistence of a statenation. This set includes:
1) An asymmetrical, “holding-together” federal state, but not a symmetrical, “coming-together” federal state or a unitary state;2) Both individual rights and collective recognition;3) Parliamentary instead of presidential or semipresidential government;
4) Polity-wide and “centric-regional” parties and careers;5) Politically integrated but not culturally assimilated populations;6) Cultural nationalists in power mobilizing against secessionist nationalists;
7) A pattern of multiple but complementary identities..
We describe these policies as “nested” because each one tends todepend for its success on the adoption of the ones preceding it. Thus thesecond policy, “group recognition,” is normally nested within the first,
federalism (especially asymmetrical federalism). The fourth policy,
which has to do with having the kinds of parties and politicians who areAlfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav

55

Table 1—Two Contrasting Ideal Types:“Nation-State” and “State-Nation”
NATION-STATE

STATE-NATION

Preexisting Conditions
Sense ofbelonging or“we-ness”

There is general attachment
to one major cultural civilizational tradition. This cultural identity corresponds
to existing state boundaries
with minor exceptions.

Culturalpolicies

There are homogenizing
attempts to foster one corecultural identity, particularly one official language.
Multiplicity of cultures is
not recognized. The goal isunity in oneness.

There is attachment to more than
one cultural civilizational tradition within the existing boundaries.
However, these attachments do notpreclude identification with a common state.

State Policy
There is recognition and support ofmore than one cultural identity (andmore than one official language)
within a frame of some common
polity-wide symbols. The goal isunity in diversity.

Institutions
Territorial division of power

The state is unitary or, if
a federation, it is mononational and symmetrical.

There is normally a federal system,
and it is often asymmetrical. The
state can be unitary if aggressive
nation-state policies are not pursued
and de facto multilingualism is accepted. Federacies are possible.

Politics
Ethnoculturalor territorial
cleavages

Such splits are not too salient.

Such splits are salient, but are recognized as such and democraticallymanaged.

Autonomist orsecessionist
partiesAutonomist parties are normally not “coalitionable.”
Secessionist parties are outlawed or marginalized indemocratic electoral politics.

Autonomist parties can govern infederal units and are “coalitionable”
at the center. Nonviolent secessionist parties can sometimes participate
in democratic political processes.

Citizen Orientation
Political
identity

Citizens feel that they belong to the state and to thesame cultural nation at thesame time.

Many citizens have multiple but
complementary identities.

Obedience andloyalty

Citizens believe in obedience to the state and loyalty
to the nation.

Citizens feel obedience to the stateand identification with its institutions; none of this is based on asingle national identity.

ready to form coalitions, is greatly facilitated if the choice of the third
policy is parliamentarism because under that form of government theexecutive is a “shareable good.” And the success of the seventh policy,
multiple but complementary identities, relies heavily on the prior success of the previous six.
Each of the recommended choices requires some explanation. To be-

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gin with, a federal as opposed to a unitary state is appropriate for astate-nation because federal structures will allow a large and territoriallyconcentrated cultural group with serious nationalist aspirations to attainself-governance within that territory. But why do these federal arrangements need to be asymmetrical? In a symmetrical federal system, allunits have identical rights and obligations. It is possible, however, that some
culturally distinct and territorially conIf almost all parties
centrated groups might have acquired
draw the vast bulk of
prerogatives that they wish to retain or
their votes from theirreacquire. It is also possible, for examown respective ethnople, that some tribal groups controlling
territorial units, thelarge territories (such as the Mizos insense of trust in and iden- India’s northeast) would agree to jointification with the center the federation only if some of theirwill probably be low.
unique land-use laws were respected.
Bargains and compromises on theseissues, which might be necessary forpeace and voluntary membership in the political community, are negotiable in an asymmetrical system, but are normally unacceptable in asymmetrical system.
Second, why does a state-nation need both individual rights and collective recognition? A polity cannot be democratic unless throughout
its whole extent the rights of individuals are constitutionally inviolable
and protected by the state. This necessary function of central government cannot be devolved. But certain territorially concentrated culturalgroups, even nations, may need some collective recognition for rightsthat go beyond classic liberal rights (or what Michael Walzer calls “Liberalism 2”) in order for members of those groups to be able to thrive culturally or even possibly to exercise fully their classic individual liberalrights.5 Walzer argues that Liberalism 2 “allows for a state committed tothe survival and flourishing of . . . a (limited) set of nations, cultures andreligions—so long as the basic rights of citizens who have different commitments or no such commitments are protected.”6 There may well beconcrete moments in the crafting of a democracy when individuals cannot develop and exercise their full rights until they are active members ofa group that struggles and wins some collective goods common to mostmembers of the group. These group rights might be most easily accommodated by a federal system that is asymmetrical. For example, if a large
territorially concentrated group speaks a distinct language, some official
recognition of the privileged right of that language to be used in government institutions, schools, and the media might be necessary to enable
the members of this group to act upon their own individual rights.
If there are territorially concentrated minority religions in the polity,
the identification of their practitioners with the center may well be reducedAlfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav

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if there is only one established religion throughout the territory. In suchcases, identity with the state-nation may be encouraged if, instead, all religions are officially recognized and possibly even financially supported.
The financial support of religions, majority and minority, is of course a
violation of classic U.S. or French doctrines of separation of church andstate, but it is not a violation of any person’s individual human rights.7
Third, why the need for parliamentarism? In a presidential or semipresidential system, the highest executive office is an “indivisiblegood”—it can only be held by one person, from one nationality, for a
fixed term. A parliamentary system, by contrast, creates the possibilityof a “shareable good.” That is, there is a possibility that other parties,
composed of other nationalities, could help to constitute the ruling coalition. If no single party has a majority, parliamentarism is coalition-requiring. Also, because the government may collapse unless it constantly
bargains to retain the support of its coalition partners, parliamentarism
often displays coalition-sustaining qualities as well. These “shareable”
and “coalition-friendly” aspects of a parliamentary executive might beuseful in a robustly multinational society.
If almost all parties draw the vast bulk of their votes from their own
respective ethnoterritorial units, the sense of trust in and identification withthe center will probably be low. Many analysts would call such parties “regional-secessionist.” Yet if there are major polity-wide parties that regularly need allies from regional parties to help form a government at the center,and if the polity-wide parties often help their regional-party allies to form amajority in their own ethnofederal units, then the logic of incentives makesthese allegedly “regional-secessionist” parties actually “centric-regional”
parties, because they regularly share in rule at the center. This coalitional
pattern is possible only if both the polity-wide and the regional parties are“nested” in a system that is both federal and parliamentary.
The importance of “polity-wide careers” can be grasped by considering India as an example. There, English serves as an all-India lingua
franca that makes it possible for educated members of regional groups
who do not speak the majority language (Hindi) to pursue careers in law,communications, business, and the federal civil service. Citizens whose
careers are “polity-wide” rather than regional will likely feel strong incentives not to “exit” from the polity-wide networks that such careersopen up for them, and upon which their careers in turn depend.8
Fifth, it is important that political integration be able to go forward
independent of cultural integration. In a state-nation, many cultural andespecially ethnonational groups will be educated and self-governing intheir own language. They will thus probably never be fully culturally
assimilated to the dominant culture in the polity. This is a reality of“state-nations.” If the ethnofederal group sees the polity-wide state as
having helped to put a “roof of rights” over its head, however, and if the“centric-regional” parties are “coalitionable” with polity-wide parties

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and regularly help to form the government at the center, and if many
individuals from the ethnofederal group enjoy polity-wide careers, thenit is a good bet that the ethnofederal group and its members will be politically well-integrated into the state-nation.
Sixth, what do we mean by saying that cultural nationalists in power
will mobilize against nationalists who embrace secession? Ernest Gellner forcefully articulated the position of many theorists of the nationstate when he famously asserted: “Nationalism is primarily a politicalprinciple, which holds that the political and the national unit should be
congruent . . . Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by
the violation of the principle . . . A nationalist movement is one actuatedby a sentiment of this kind.”9Thus, we are constantly admonished not to advocate state-nation
policies because all nationalism inevitably becomes “secessionist nationalism,” with eventual demands for independence. Yet there can bea situation in which a “cultural nationalist” movement, nested within
an asymmetrically federal and parliamentary system, wins democratic
political control of a federal territorial unit; educates the citizens of thisterritory in the language, culture, and history of their own nation; andalso stands ready to join coalitions at the center. If such a cultural nationalist group in power is challenged by secessionist nationalists who use
force or threaten its use to pursue independence, the ruling nationalist
group faces the loss of treasured resources. Under such circumstances,
the “cultural nationalists” will likely mobilize the political and security
resources under their control to defeat the “secessionist nationalists.”10
Finally, what do we mean by talking about multiple but complementary identities? In the polity-wide system produced by the six nested
policies and norms that we have just discussed, it is possible that citizens could strongly identify with and be loyal to both their culturally
powerful ethnofederal unit and the polity-wide center. They would havethese complementary identities because the center has recognized anddefended many of their cultural demands and, in addition, has helped
to structure and protect their full participation in the larger political lifeof the country. Such citizens are also likely to have strong trust in thecenter because they see it (or the institutions historically associated withit) as having helped to deliver some valued collective goods such as independence from a colonial power, security from threatening neighbors,or possibly even a large and growing common market. Thus the patternof multiple but complementary identities that is likely to obtain is no accident, but an outcome earned by deliberately crafted policies.

The Case of India
India would seem to present one of the most difficult tests for ourargument that multiple and complementary identities, as well as demo-Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav

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cratic state-nation loyalties, are possible even in a polity with robustly
multinational dimensions and a plethora of intense linguistic and religious differences. Let us briefly document how extensive these diversities actually are.
One of the greatest points of conflict in multicultural and multinational polities, whether federal or not, is language. When India gained
independence in 1947, it had in addition to its most widely spoken
single language (Hindi), ten additional languages that were used byat least 13 million people each. Many had their own unique scripts.11
Added to this linguistic complexity was an enormous diversity of religious beliefs and practices that alone would make the country a caseof special interest to students of comparative democratization. India
has large communities of almost every world religion, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Christianity, and Islam. In 2009, India’sMuslim minority amounted to about 161 million people, the world’s
third-largest Islamic population, exceeded only by those of Indonesia
and Pakistan.12 At a time when too many scholars and political activists see Islam as being in deep cultural conflict with democracy, it isworth pausing to reflect that the world’s largest Islamic community
with extensive democratic experience is in multicultural, multinational,
federal, and consociational India.
India’s longstanding democracy enhances the “scope value” of thestate-nation concept by showing that the model can be applied not only
to rich but also to very poor countries. Of the world’s four longstanding multinational federal democracies—Belgium, Canada, and Spain are
the others—only India lacks an advanced industrial economy. To put it
in rough terms, in 2008 Belgium, Canada, and Spain all had purchasing-power parity (PPP) per capita Gross National Income of more than
US$30,000 per year. The comparable figure for India was a bit less thana tenth of that.13 Given its extraordinarily deep diversity, India could
never have created a French-style democratic nation-state. But it has
managed to craft a democratic state-nation, supported by all religions,
all socioeconomic groups, and many states that once experienced secessionist movements. In our forthcoming book, we devote the better
part of three chapters to showing how Indians imagined, negotiated, andcrafted their longstanding democratic state-nation. What follows here isan abbreviated discussion of three key paths followed by India’s emerging democratic communities; their long and creative political, ethical,
and constitutional search for policy formulas more appropriate than theclassical nation-state model for reconciling deep diversity and democracy; their choice of asymmetrical federalism to help them solve theproblem of self-governance in the context of many languages and thespecial needs of tribal populations; and their creation of a new model ofsecularism as a way of accommodating India’s religious heterogeneityand its great intensity of religious practice.

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The building of a state-nation in India was no accident or afterthought. The state-nation model was implicit in the idea of India forgedby modern Indian political thinkers, nurtured by the freedom movement,enshrined in the Indian Constitution, sustained by the first generation of
postindependence leadership, and institutionalized in competitive politics. In that sense, our “state-nation” model is best seen not only as a
new analytic ideal type, but also as a theoretical defense of what political thinkers and practitioners in India knew for more than a century.
Here we can only illustrate this with reference to an early episode in
India’s long and creative search for institutional designs more appropriate than the classical nation-state model for reconciling deep diversity
with democracy.
By the mid-1920s, more than two decades before independence, theIndian National Congress (INC) had already begun to look in detail atthe question of which political institutions and practices would best
serve a self-governing India. The INC rejected the British-drafted Simon Commission Report, and appointed its own committee under theleadership of Motilal Nehru, the father of Jawaharlal Nehru, to outline
a constitution for a free India. The Nehru Report, approved by the All
Parties Conference in Lucknow in 1928, foreshadowed many provisionsof the Indian Constitution of 1950. The definition of citizenship in the
Nehru Report was very state-nation–friendly in that it was absolutely
inclusive and territorial: “The word ‘citizen,’ wherever it occurs in thisconstitution, means every person who was born, or whose father waseither born or naturalized, within the territorial limits of the commonwealth” (Article 3). The Nehru Report also laid down that independent
India would have parliamentary government (Article 5) and a bicameral,
federal system (Articles 8 and 9). All this was incorporated into theIndian Constitution. As we argued above, a parliamentary federal system is the most supportive combination for the emergence of “centricregional” parties that may be a useful alternative to “exit” for parties
with different linguistic majorities.
The radical “state-nation” reconfiguration of India that allowed eachlarge linguistic community to have a state of its own and to govern itself
in its local majority language did not fully occur until 1957; however,it was strongly supported at the 1921 INC meeting in Madras and endorsed in the Nehru Report, which held that “the redistribution of provinces should take place on a linguistic basis on the demand of the majority of the population of the area concerned” (Article 86). This formula
allowed independent India to respond democratically to the presence
within its borders of numerous territorially based linguistic majorities.
(At present, 22 languages enjoy “official” constitutional status.) This isa classic feature of the state-nation style of “holding-together” federalism, and by that token unthinkable in a U.S.-style “coming-together”
federation. Also supportive of a relatively strong “holding-together”

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federalism (and again, quite unlike U.S. practice) was the Nehru Committee provision (Article 49) that gave the Supreme Court of the Union“original jurisdiction” in almost all matters. The choice of asymmetricalfederalism also allowed for the creation of some small states with tribal
majorities, like Mizoram, to preserve tribal cultures by means of special,constitutionally embedded prerogatives that allowed only Mizos to votein local elections or to buy land. These prerogatives were crucial to the1986 Mizo Accord that not only helped to end a secessionist war but
contributed as well to the building of the “multiple and complementary”
identities that our surveys reveal.
On the all-important question of religion, the Nehru Report wasalso supportive of state-nation policies. Under the section on “Fundamental Rights,” it clearly ruled out an established religion and supported a religiously impartial state, but unlike the U.S. Constitution,it also implied the admissibility of state aid for religious educational
establishments (Article 4). The Indian Constitution duly reflected thisspirit. The relationship between religion and the state that the IndianConstituent Assembly crafted later was a highly original creation withstrong affinities to our state-nation model. All religious communities
were recognized and respected by the state. All religious communities,
for example, could run schools, organizations, and charities eligible
for state financial support. The norms and practices of this model are
now so pervasive that even when the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), theparty of Hindu nationalism, headed the government coalition, it did
not dare break with the tradition of paying extensive state subsidies
to help Muslim citizens make the hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca. Every
single nation-state in Western Europe has some paid compulsory public holidays for the majority Christian religion (Sweden, Denmark,Norway, and Germany alone have 39) but none of them has a single
compulsory public holiday for a non-Christian minority religion. India
has five such holidays for the majority Hindu religion, but ten for minority religions, including five for Islam.14
Thus, when the Constituent Assembly formally set about its tasks in
1946, there was little doubt that it would adopt provisions for the protection of linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity. The institutional
structures and norms that the Constituent Assembly agreed upon facilitated a broad set of policies conducive to the crafting of a robust statenation on the Indian subcontinent.

India’s Experience: Examining the Evidence
Was the “idea of India” described above confined merely to the hightraditions of political theory and legal constitutional texts? Or did thisidea find resonance among ordinary Indian citizens across different religions, regions, communities, and classes? Fortunately, we can begin

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to answer this question about ordinary citizens’ attitudes because India
has been included in all four rounds of the World Values Survey. In
addition, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in
Delhi regularly carries out some of the world’s largest social-scientificsurveys of political opinions and attitudes. The latest such survey, theNational Election Study of 2009, had a nationwide sample of 36,169
people.15
In our book, we present in detail and in comparative perspective theIndian evidence on diversity and democracy as seen in the mirror of
public opinion. In particular, we look at the four empirical attributes
mentioned above that we expect from a successful state-nation: thedegree of positive identification with the state and pride in being its
citizens; the existence of multiple but complementary political identities
and loyalties; the degree of institutional trust in the most important constitutional, legal, and administrative components of the state; and the degree of positive support for democracy and for polity-wide democratic
institutions among all the diverse groups of citizens in the country.
We do not shy away from many of the continuing problems of India’s
development that can and must be better addressed: Nearly half of India’s women are illiterate, and half its children are underweight; a quarter or more of the population lives below the official “poverty line,” withthis proportion being higher among Muslims. We analyze human-rights
violations and the still unresolved secessionist conflicts in Kashmir andNagaland. We discuss the lethal Hindu-nationalist pogrom that swept
the state of Gujarat in 2002, and we consider the Naxalite movement.
Notwithstanding these failures on the developmental and human-rights
fronts, the evidence regarding the four measures of state-nation successis highly impressive indeed. A large majority of citizens, despite theirgreat linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity, positively identify withand trust the Indian central state while supporting India’s democracy.
For example, let us compare the level of national pride in India withthe attitudes of the citizens of the other ten longstanding federal democracies (Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States). The World Values Survey routinely asks citizens whether they feel “great,” “some,” “little,”
or “no” pride in being a member of their country. In 2002, 67 percent
of Indians expressed “great pride,” a figure exceeded only in the UnitedStates (71 percent) and Australia (70 percent). Another important statenation indicator is whether citizens, despite a possible strong sense ofidentification with an ethnic, linguistic, or cultural minority unit of thefederation, nonetheless still trust the central government. Only Switzerland recorded a higher level of trust in the central government (50percent) than did India (48 percent). It is crucial in a multinational, multilingual, multicultural polity that citizens trust the overall legal system;
the three countries in our set of eleven whose citizens were most proneAlfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav

63

to express trust in the legal system were India (67 percent), Switzerland(65 percent), and Austria (58 percent).16

A Few Questions
A classic and frequently used battery of questions concerning democracy asks respondents which of the following three statements is closest
to their own opinion: 1) “Democracy is preferable to any other kind ofgovernment”; 2) “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one”; or 3) “For people like me,it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime.” If a respondent opts for the second or third statement, it is coded
as an explicitly authoritarianism-accepting response. The percentage of
respondents who gave such a response in India (12) is far lower than thecomparable figure from five other countries that feature prominently
in the democratization literature: Brazil (47), Chile (46), South Korea(38), Uruguay (18), and Spain (17).17 Using the National Election Studyof 2004, which had more than three-thousand Muslim respondents, wewere able to evaluate how similar or dissimilar Muslims were from Hindus in this respect. The shares of Indian Muslims and Hindus who choseas their response “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” were virtually the same at 87 and 88 percent, respectively.18
Some political observers fear that growing religiosity among Hindus
and Muslims alike will create new challenges for democracy in India.
We tested this by creating a low-medium-high index of “the intensityof religious practice” that we could place alongside an index measuring “support for democracy.” We found that for Hindus and Muslims
alike, the greater the reported intensity of religious practice, the greater
the professed support for democracy.19 This evidence not only robustly
disconfirms the proposition that religious intensity threatens Indian democracy, but also suggests that the Indian state-nation is currently holding its own even in the arena of the greatest contestation of our times,
religion.
Let us now shift from surveys and attitudes to policies and outcomes.
Let us specifically contrast how India, following state-nation policies,
politically integrated its Tamil population in the south, and how nearby
Sri Lanka, which pursued nation-state policies toward the Tamil population in its own northeast, barely avoided state disintegration and has
just terminated by force a civil war in which approximately a hundredthousand people were killed.
Sri Lanka provides a counterfactual example that we analyze at lengthin our book. The main point can be summarized here. India arguably
started in a more difficult position in this nearly “matched pair” because
the Indian Tamils were involved with the Dravidian movement, which
briefly flirted with the idea of secession from India. Indeed, there had

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been a long series of conflicts between Brahmins and non-Brahmins inwhat is now the state of Tamil Nadu at India’s southern tip. We can thus
say that there was a robust multinational dimension to politics in Tamil
Nadu, although many Tamils felt great attachment to the polity-wide
independence movement led by the INC.20
In comparative terms, Sri Lanka actually started in an easier position vis-`a-vis its Tamil minority. For a century before independence
in 1948, there had been no politically significant riots between Sinhalese, who were largely Buddhists, and the Tamils, who were primarily
Hindu. In fact, the first president of the Ceylon Congress Party was a
Tamil. Tamils had done well in English-language civil-service exams
in Ceylon, and though they were interested in greater power-sharing,
it is still true to say that at independence there had been no Tamil demands for devolution or federalism, much less independence. Ceylon
also had a much higher per capita income than India, and could havemade modest side payments to some Sinhalese groups, especially the
Buddhists, who had been marginalized during the period of Britishcolonial rule.
Yet 35 years after independence, the potential issue of Tamil separatism in India had become a nonissue, while the Sri-Lankan nonissue had
become a bloody civil war for secession that raged for a quarter of acentury. What explains such sharply different outcomes?
Much of the explanation, we believe, is related to the radically differential application of the nested policies that we discussed earlier. Table
2 highlights the state-integrating state-nation policies followed by India
and the state-disintegrating nation-state policies followed by Sri Lanka.

Extending the Argument
Let us conclude by touching upon three questions that we have not
yet addressed. First, can some state-nation policies be of use in unitarystates that are not nation-states? We believe that this is quite possible,
for we can imagine geopolitical and domestic contexts where neither
full state-nation policies nor full nation-state policies offer plausible
ways to manage the multinational dimensions of a polity. Why?
There may be some geopolitical contexts, especially in a country
bordering a powerful state that has some irredentist tendencies toward
said country, in which asymmetrical federalism (or indeed any type offederalism) would present dangers for the nurturing of a new democratic
political community via this classic state-nation policy. The safest solution might be a unitary state. At the same time, if the domestic context
includes politically significant populations deeply divided over cultural
policies (for example, large territorially concentrated parts of the state
where most of the populace hews to a distinct language and culture), it
would be democratically dangerous and politically implausible to try toIndiaThe constituent assembly creates an asymmetrical federal system thatenables state boundaries to be redrawn and eventually allows regional
cultural majorities to rule these states in their own languages. A Tamilspeaking state called Tamil Nadu is carved out of Madras State.

Language: In 1965, after intense mobilizations and political negotiations,plans for implementing Hindi as the official language of the Indian Union
are abandoned. Education becomes the domain of a “three-language” formula. Tamil becomes the official language of Tamil Nadu, and the state is
not obliged to use Hindi in its communications with the Union.
Religion: All major religions are constitutionally recognized, and minority institutions are eligible for state funds.

Parliamentarism makes the executive a “shareable good,” which allows
regional, even potentially secessionist, parties to help form ruling coalitions at the center. Since the late 1970s, the ruling coalition at the centerhas included one of the Dravidian parties from Tamil Nadu.

Tamil-centric regional parties, due to their great coalitional ability with
polity-wide parties, enjoy substantial presence in the Indian parliamentand a disproportionate share of powerful ministries. After the mid-1970s,
no significant “regional-separatist” parties exist, and all Tamil parties become “centric regional.”

Tamils integrate politically into the Indian polity but maintain strong
pride in Tamil culture. Different governments in Tamil Nadu aggressively take up the promotion of Tamil language and culture, including instate schools and educational curricula.

Cultural nationalists achieve many of their goals. Territorial nationalists,
advocating separatist goals, virtually disappear.

Strong Tamil identities remain, but polity-wide Indian identity grows.
Trust in the central government is higher in the state of Tamil Nadu than
it is in the rest of the country.

Policy1. An AsymmetricallyFederal, but not a Unitary
or Symmetrically Federal
State

2. Individual Rights andCollective Recognition

3. Parliamentary insteadof Semipresidential or
Presidential Systems

4. Polity-Wide and“Centric-Regional” Parties(and Careers)

5. Politically Integrated
but not Culturally Assimilated Minorities

6. Cultural Nationalists vs.
Territorial Nationalists

7. Earned Pattern ofComplementary and Multiple Identities

Marginalized in electoral politics, and facing growing state discrimination and repression, Tamils in the northeast opt for conflict. The ensuing
civil war kills 100,000 (most of them Tamils) before ending with theTamils’ defeat in 2009.

By the late 1970s, violent nationalist guerrillas with explicitly separatist goals become the leaders of the Tamil community in the northeast.

In 1948, “Indian Tamils” are disenfranchised. In 1983, all membersof pro-autonomist Tamil parties must leave parliament. By the mid1980s, Sri Lanka is “politically multinational” with Tamil guerrillaleaders beyond hope of integration.

Tamils, especially after 1956, lose virtually all their coalitional ability
in polity-wide politics and government formation. No elected Tamilfrom the north becomes a federal minister after 1957. After the mid1970s, no major “centric-regional” Tamil parties exist, and all subsequent major Tamil parties are “regional separatist.”

In 1978, Sri Lanka creates a semipresidential system in which thepresident has more powers than in France. From then until now, nonorthern-based Tamil party joins any coalition at the center.

Language: In 1956, Sinhalese is made the only official language andEnglish and Tamil are no longer accepted.
Religion: Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution assigns Buddhism “theforemost place” among religions. State subsidies favor Buddhists.

No constituent assembly is held, but the parliament approves a constitution that declares Sri Lanka a unitary state. After 1956, the SinhaleseBuddhist majority increasingly advances majoritarian state policies. No
significant devolutionary policies are ever implemented.

Sri Lanka

Table 2—Contrasting Strategies of India and Sri Lanka Toward Their Respective Tamil Minorities

Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav
65

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Journal of Democracy

impose such classic nation-state policies as a single language. Trouble,
even violence, would be the likely result.
If such a combination of geopolitical and domestic factors exists,
classic state-nation federal policies will not work. Yet some elementsof state-nation policies nonetheless seem a must. But is it possible tofollow state-nation policies in a unitary state? We believe that somesuch policies can be employed. In the hypothetical example above, a key
state-nation policy that might be appropriate would be to allow the different cultural or linguistic zones to use their own respective languages
at the start of the democratization process.
In our book we analyze the case of Ukraine, which upon its independence from the USSR in 1991 found itself a multinational society, but
not a robustly multinational polity. If it had pursued aggressive nationstate policies, such as legally permitting only the Ukrainian language
to be used in schools or communications with public officials, Russophones in eastern Ukraine who self-identified as Russians—and especially some of their political leaders—would most likely have become
secessionists (much as the Tamils had in Sri Lanka). Some Russians in
the east and Crimea could well have requested, and received, Russian
military backing for their breakaway efforts.
A second question asks if a democratic, unitary nation-state can use
constitutionally embedded federal guarantees in order to respond to thepresence of a territorially concentrated minority that has radical culturaldifferences with the majority population. We propose a revised theoryof federacy to tackle this situation. Our new ideal-type definition of afederacy holds it to be a political-administrative unit in an independent
unitary state with exclusive power (including some legislative power)
in certain areas that is constitutionally or quasi-constitutionally embedded and cannot be changed unilaterally, but whose inhabitants have fullcitizenship rights in the otherwise unitary state.
In the penultimate chapter of our forthcoming book, we examine how
this formula has actually been applied to the democratic management ofrobustly multinational problems by the otherwise unitary nation-statesof Finland (in the case of the Åland Islands) and Denmark (in the casesof both Greenland and the Faroe Islands). We also show that the “scope
value” of these kinds of arrangements has extended to the postwar reconstruction of Italy with regard to the once-separatist South Tyrol region (with an 86 percent German-speaking population), as well as to therevolutionary context of 1975 Portugal and its efforts to deal with an
emerging secessionist movement in the Azores. The federacy formula
also proved useful in negotiating the August 2005 Helsinki Agreementthat brought a relatively consensual, peaceful, and inclusionary end tothe civil war in Aceh in Indonesia. We also argue that if China ever were
to become democratic, a federacy formula could conceivably be of use
with regard to Tibet, Hong Kong, and possibly even Taiwan.

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67

Finally, why have we had so little to say about the still-influential
federal model presented by the United States? The founders of the United States did not see that country as a multinational polity, and crafted
a constitution for what they saw as an emerging nation-state. Indeed,
they constitutionally embedded features that make the U.S. model particularly ill-suited to the flexible policy management of robustly multinational societies. Symmetrical U.S.-style federalism would be of nohelp in managing small, territorially concentrated religious or linguistic
minorities such as those found in the Indian state of Mizoram. And U.S.style presidentialism lacks the coalition-facilitating qualities of parliamentarism, which have often been crucial, as in Tamil Nadu, in helping
to promote the evolution of regional-separatist parties into “centric-regional” parties that can join polity-wide coalitions.
Symmetrical federalism and presidentialism have been enormously
successful in maintaining stable democratic rule in the United States,
a country that, although composed of immigrants from many lands, is
not robustly multinational: For all its diversity, the United States does
not contain territorially based, politically significant groups mobilizing
nationalist demands for independence. But many of the world’s democracies are unavoidably confronted with the task of governing robustly
multinational societies, and these countries have much more to learn
from the experience of India than from that of the United States.
NOTES
1. See the classic account of these policies in Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen:
The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1976). Most nineteenth-century progressives and democrats, particularly those associatedwith the French Revolution, were profoundly opposed to federalism.
2. See the chapter titled “Stateness, Nationalism, and Democratization,” in Juan J. Linz
and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1996), 34, as well as Figure 2.1.
3. We accept Robert A. Dahl’s definition of federalism as “a system in which somematters are exclusively within the competence of certain local units—cantons, states,
provinces—and are constitutionally beyond the scope of the authority of the national government; and where certain other matters are constitutionally outside the scope of theauthority of the smaller units.” Robert A. Dahl, “Federalism and the Democratic Process,”
in Democracy, Liberty, and Equality (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), 114.
4. For more details on “asymmetrical” and “holding-together” federalism, see Alfred
Stepan,”Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model,” Journal of Democracy 10(October 1999): 19–34.
5. See Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1994).
6. The quote from Michael Walzer is from Gutmann, Multiculturalism, 99.

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7. See Alfred Stepan, “The World’s Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the‘Twin Tolerations’” in his Arguing Comparative Politics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 213–54.
8. However, the systematic effort by an ethnocultural group to monopolize access tocareers, even in their own ethnofederal unit, runs counter to the nurturing and preservationof a state-nation.
9. All quotes are from the influential opening paragraphs of Ernest Gellner’s Nations
and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. Emphasis in the original.
10. At the same time, a convergence between cultural and secessionist nationalists onsome issues cannot be ruled out if the secessionists come into conflict with the central
state over the use of force.
11. For an analytic discussion of these figures, see Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Language
Conflict and National Development: Group Politics and National Language Policy inIndia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 31–68.
12. Pew Forum on Religion in Public Life, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A
Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Population,” 7 October 2009,
14. Available at http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=450.
13. See the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database.
14. For the Indian model in comparative perspective and the question of paid holidays,
see Alfred Stepan, “Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democratic and Non-Democratic
Regimes,” in Craig Calhoun and Mark Juergensmeyer, eds., Rethinking Secularism (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2010).
15. Survey archives at the CSDS go back to 1965. Yogendra Yadav, one of the authors,
has been involved with directing, designing, and analyzing these surveys, including the
National Election Study series. Since 2003, the other two authors have worked with the
CSDS team to design some questions for the surveys. For an overview of the CSDS tradition of survey research, see Lokniti Team, “National Election Study 2004: An Introduction,” Economic and Political Weekly, 18 December 2004, 5373–82.
16. All the data for these 11 longstanding federal democracies come from various
rounds of the World Values Survey coordinated by Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues at
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan.
17. Data on Latin America come from the 2008 Latinobarómetro, on Spain from the
1992 Eurobarometer, on Korea from the 2004 Korea Democracy Barometer, and on India
from the previously cited 2004 National Election Study.
18. According to a Pearson’s chi-square test, the findings for all religious communities are statistically significant (p-value < .001). Thus, the probability of this occurring by
chance is less than one in a thousand.
19. Full methodological details will appear in the forthcoming book from which thepresent essay is adapted. Our regression indicates that a one-unit increase in the index ofreligiosity (controlling for other factors) predicts approximately a 3.5 percent increase in
the probability of support for democracy.
20. For excellent discussions of some secessionist tendencies in what is now Tamil
Nadu, see Narendra Subramanian, Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties,
Citizens and Democracy in South India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

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