State building and nation building
Juan J. Linz*

This essay discusses, from a historical and contemporary
perspective, the processes of state and nation building. The
difficulties of making every nation a state and every state anation, and the fact that people live intermingled within theborders of states and have different and often dual identity
leads to arguments for multi-national states, states which
abandon the dream of becoming nation states and ' nations'
willing to live in a multi-national democratic liberal state.

The difference between state building
and nation building
It can be said that state building and nation building
are two overlapping but conceptually different
processes. To the extent that they are overlapping
they are largely inseparable but if the overlap is
not total (as we well know it is not) they are also
different processes. xf It is this aspect on which I
intend to focus. Both are historical processes, bothwere initially West European and modern* Department of Sociology, P.O. Box 208265, New Haven, CT
06520-8265, USA.
t Bendix states the problem very well: 'The terms state andnation and their cognates state-building and nation-building aretroublesome, but unavoidable. Slate refers to the sphere ofhighest governmental authority and administration, but that is
its modern meaning. In the kingdoms discussed in Part I theruler possessed the highest authority but controlled only his
own domains; as yet no central executive existed. The emergenceof the modern state is synonymous with the gradualconcentration of administrative functions in the hands of thecentral government. Nation refers to at least two phenomena:(1) an historically developed community with a distinctive
culture and language in common; (2) the juxtaposition of thecentral government and a citizenry which consists of individuals
who are equal under the law, a principle of government
introduced by the French revolution. Since there are national
movements which transcend the boundaries of several states,
nation-states with dissident national minorities, states whichlack the capacity to appeal to a national community, states inwhich the French principle of nationhood is practised but inthe absence of an historically developed community, and soon, even a careful use of the terms cannot achieve consistency.
As an approximation, I shall refer to states and state-building in
the period before 1500 while confining the terms nation andnation-fcmilding (and sometimes nation-state) to the period sincethen.'

1062-7987/93/040355-15 $12.50© 1993 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

developments which have spread from the Westto the entire world with different, and sometimes
very limited, successes elsewhere.2 They are also
processes which have not always been successful
and unchallenged on the European scene.
In the European context, state building historically preceded nation building. In fact, in somecountries, state building was extensive before
nation building became dominant. Some years ago,
stimulated by Stein Rokkan, I wrote an essay on
Spain entitled, 'Early State Building and Late
Peripheral Nationalisms Against the State.'3
Ideally, at least from some points of view,
both processes—either simultaneously or successively—should lead to what we call nation states.
However, the full success of that dual process has
been largely the exception. We can probably countthe true nation states on the fingers of two hands.
Living in a world of states, a few of them are true
nation states, while others are successful states
which, in some cases, are multinational or basedon a dominant nation, but are questioned (to agreater or lesser extent) by other nationalisms. And
there are nations without a state. If all the potential
nations were to develop the distinctive national
identity that would lead all of them to a nationbuilding process, which would go on more or lesssuccessfully, many of the states in the world would
be challenged in their existence.
Faced with that fact, it could be argued—and it
has been by those sympathetic to nationalism andwho consider self-determination as the highest
value—that all nations should aim at building fortheir culture and identity the 'roof of statehood.
EUROPEAN REVIEW, Vol. 1, No. 4, 355-369 (1993)

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356

Juan J. Linz

Even further, that those people who still do not
aspire to a national identity should be awakened
and struggle for statehood, that the world should
be a world of nations, that no state not identicalwith a nation should survive and that no nation
should be without a state. Unfortunately, as weknow, the number of potential nations is manytimes larger than the present number of nations
with or without a state, and infinitely larger than
the number of states in the world.
Although we speak of the United Nations of theWorld, we are really dealing with the united statesof the world. The UN, if the trademark US had
not been pre-empted by the United States ofAmerica, should have been called the US. There
are few, particularly among intellectuals, who havetaken up the idea that, if possible, we should beengaged in a process of state building (even if thatmeans not building nation states) and that it should
be possible to build what has been called 'statenations'; that is, states endowed by their citizens
with the loyalty which the nationalists believe only
the nation deserves. As we shall see later, this isfar from impossible although it might require
relinquishing the idea that every state should strive
to be a nation state (in the classical sense).
It is from this later perspective, that I intend toraise a number of questions that might bestimulating for future research. It might be argued
that state building and nation building can be separated only conceptually but that both processes
have gone and are going hand in hand. I would
say, however, that in the historical reality ofsocieties these have been and are distinct processes.
First of all, state building started with the crisisof feudalism, the Renaissance and the Reformation. It was the result of the crisis of the Christian
empire and the rivalries between emerging
monarchies in Western, and later Northern
Europe. The state, as the great historian Burckhardt 4
noted, was 'a work of art' and since its beginnings
had an artificial quality. It is no accident that, in
describing that process, architectonic terms andimages were invoked, and that with the development of modern physics it came to be seen as amachine. The state building process does not havethe connotations of an organic growth and it is notseen with a biological imagery that would prevailin the discussion of nationalism. The state notassociated with the idea of nature, of being born,
but rather of being created. The state building

process goes on for several centuries before theidea of the nation fires the imagination of
intellectuals and the people. In fact, it contributed
decisively to the slow reduction from the hundredsof political entities we see on a historical map ofEurope in 1500, to some 25 by 1900. Until the
French Revolution, and the support by the French
Republic of republican independence in its
periphery and later the support by Napoleon ofsome nationalist movements, the state building
process went on without being based on a national
sentiment, identity or consciousness. (The French
revolution did not export nationalism since therepublics it created in Batavia and Helvetia werean instrument of exploitative armies and the French
occupation. If there is a relation between nationalism and the Revolution it is the arousal ofcounter-revolutionary popular responses, sometime after the failure of the dynastic rulers,
politicians and diplomats, to defend the people
who take sovereignty into their own hands (as in
the Spanish resistance to Napoleon). Nor was theaim of gaining the French ' natural borders' in any
way based on our conceptions of the nation but
the interests of the French state. Napoleon I, in
redrawing the map of Europe did not endeavour
to create nation states to be ruled by his brothers
and generals but assigned to them old states—
kingdoms—like Spain, Naples or created them like
Westphalia. However, there can be little doubtthat the identification with a state by the subjects,
or the loyalty to a common king of people livingin the different units comprising the modernmonarchies, was accompanied by a proto-national
sentiment. 5 Sooner or later, in many of the states,
the state generated a' state nation' building process.
Historically, 'nations' started appearing in the
19th century; mostly in the second half of the
century. Only a few serve as a basis for statebuilding processes: Italy, Germany, Greece and, ina unique way, Hungary within its dual monarchy.
Belgium is a particularly interesting case; a state
gaining independence from the Netherlands in 1830
(although with a political distinctiveness sincethe 16th century) might, at some point, haveseemed to engage in a nation-building process, but
in the 20th century, challenged by Flemish nationalism, it led to a multinational state. Hungariannationalism is among the strongest of the 19th
century, but the crown of St Stephen extends its
authority over a multinational state. Historians ofDownloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Delaware, on 01 Apr 2019 at 19:11:11, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available athttps://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798700000776

State building and nation building
Italy disagree to what extent the Risorgimento andthe unification was more a process of state building
under the leadership of Cavour than of nationbuilding led by Mazzini and Garibaldi. 6 Althoughin Germany there was a strong nationalist
movement behind the unification process, theGerman Reich was more the product of the statebuilding by Bismarck than by the nationalists.
Even when the peace treaties after World War I
represented a high point of nation building, withthe proclamation by Wilson of the principle ofself-determination, the new states were not all
nation states (Czechs and Slovaks were 64.8% of
the population of the new republic, the Germans
23.6%: in Poland the Poles were 69.2%, theUkrainians 14-3%, the Jews 7.8%, the Germans
3.9% and the Russians 3.9%: in Latvia the titular
nationality 73.4 (the Russians 10.3%), in Lithuania
80.1%, in Estonia 87.6%) and certainly thedistintegration of four empires into a number of
new states and the redrawing of boundaries
between states were not directly the result of theefforts of nation-building movements. Of the newstates emerging from the Paris peace treaties, or
those whose territories were expanded, it is difficult
to argue that they were nation-states. Listingthem should make it obvious: Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, the enlarged Romania, thethree Baltic Republics. Only in Finland, was thistrue where the Swedish minority was a realminority and, in addition, easily developed aloyalty to the new state which, on its part, granted
the Swedish speakers extensive rights.
The dominant 'nations' in those new states:
Serbs, Czechs, Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians,
Estonians, could feel 'liberated,' but not thosesubjected to them, like the Croats, Slovenians,
Sudeten Germans, and the many Slovaks, Germans,
Ukrainians and Jews in Poland, or even the
different minorities in the Baltic countries. The
degree of respect or repression for the minorities
varied, and the idea of multinational states was
sometimes advocated, although rarely implemented, due to the appeal of the idea of 'nationbuilding.' Indeed, the difficulty faced by the newstates was that of successful state building and evenmore difficult nation building. One could historically analyse how, in a number of cases, the priority
given to nation building in the new states
contributed to the instability, crisis, and sometimes
demise in later decades of those states. 7 Of the357eight new states in Europe after World War I only
three: Finland, Czechoslovakia and Ireland werestable democracies compared with nine of the 15
older states and none of the successor states of thethree defeated empires.
A question to which we shall turn later iswhether the crises of empires and states created in
the past was the result of nationalism, or whether
nationalism was a result of the crises of those
empires and states that had failed in one way or
another to make adjustments to modernity,
democratization, or failed in the tasks that they
had set for themselves. In the case of the Dual
Monarchy after the Ausgleich the Emperor and his
ministers made reform attempts that would havere-established the Bohemian Kingdom and haveFranz Joseph crowned in Prague. The Hungarians
and the German nationalists immediately opposed
the idea. Earlier, Frantisek Palacky refused toattend the Frankfurt 1848 Vorparlament because
he considered himself a member of the Czech
nation and not of the German nation, while hesaid: 'When I look behind the Bohemian frontiers,
then natural and historical reasons make me turnnot to Frankfurt but to Vienna to seek there thecenter which is fitted and destined to ensure anddefend the peace, the liberty, and the right of mynation:' 8
Looking at the processes involved in statebuilding and crises of state building might help us
to understand better why so many potential nations
that we find on the ethnographic and linguistic
maps did not succeed, and why in certain historicalmoments, irrespective of the strength of some of
the nationalist movements and identities, newnation states were, or were not, born.
The importance of territorial boundaries createdby states irrespective of any ethnographic basis forthe building of nations did not change in the second
half of the century. African states were created on
the basis of colonial boundaries and the complexityof building nations on the homogeneous ethnic,
linguistic and tribal basis has led African politicians
to agree to defend the inviolability of stateboundaries. The new national states presumably
being founded now in the former Yugoslavia andSoviet Union are based on the substrate divisions
inherited from history or designed by Stalin,
although these boundaries are leading to endlessconflicts. There is agreement on everyone's part,
particularly among the international community,

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358

Juan J. Linz

to base the new 'nation states' on sub-units andon 'state' boundaries which are fiercely defended.
In spite of the saliency of the idea of the nation,
the reality of statehood, old or new, is still
dominant. The question is, can we build states
without the ambition that they should also benation states and generate the kind of identificationthat makes democracy possible within those states,in spite of the checkered map of nations.f
Let us now turn briefly to a discussion of thestate as a starting point for analysis of state building
in an effort to highlight some of the differenceswith nation building. Let us remember thedefinition of the state, by Max Weber: 9 'A
compulsory political organization with continuous
operations will be called a state in so far as its
administrative staff successfully uphold the claim
to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force inthe enforcement of its order' and his subsequent
statement,' It, the state, possesses an administrativeand legal order subject to change by legislation towhich the organized activities of the administrative
staff, which are also controlled by legislation, areoriented', referring to the modern state based on
legal rational domination.
Or to take a more recent formulation, that oft The compatibility of state and nation without becoming anation state naturally concerned the Austrians after thefounding of the German empire. The work by Ignaz Seipel(1916) Nation und Stasr, Wilhelm Braunmuller, Vienna, argued
that cultural nationalism did not imply political nationalism
and advocated a liberalized multinational state.
It is interesting to note that at the turn of the 19th century
politicians in Vienna, like prime ministers Taafe and Baron
Beck, saw democratization as a way to divert politics fromnationalist strife to fruitful social reforms. The introduction of
manhood suffrage in 1906 by prime minister Baron Beck withthe support of Emperor Franz Joseph led to a decrease of the
Nationalist votes and an increase in strength of Socialist,
Christian Social and Agrarian parties. In 1908 Edward Benes,
later the co-founder and president of Czechoslovakia, wrotethat the breakup of Austria-Hungary was not inevitable. In Le
probleme Aiarichien et la question Tcheque (1908) he said: 'People
have often spoken of a dismemberment of Austria. I do notbelieve in it at all. The historical and economic bonds between
the Austrian nations are too powerful to make such adismemberment possible. The introduction of the general
franchise and the democratization of Austria, especially of
Bohemia, prepare the soil for national appeasement.'
It was not so much the nationalism of the 'little,' theoppressed nations, but intransigence of the dominantnationalities the Germans and the Hungarians, and theirnation-building efforts, that contributed most to the crisis of
the imperial political system.

Charles Tilly: 10'An organization which controls the population
occupying a definite territory is a state in so faras; (1) it is differentiated from other organizations
operating in the same territory; (2) it isautonomous; (3) it is centralized and (4) its
divisions are formally coordinated with one
another.'
The state involves a system of roles, a series ofrules and access to certain resources. Those roles
involve a series of offices which have become highly
differentiated and structured in modern bureaucracies, armies, courts of justice, legislatures, etc. In
the modern state the actions of officials are boundmore or less by rules, constitutions, laws, customs
and, in the past, traditions. In fact, the ruler in amodern state, in principle, is himself bound by
those rules although originally he was sovereign,that is, legibus solutos. The state, in principle, has
the monopoly of legitimate violence. Violence,
which is bound by rules, is therefore different fromviolence by individuals and, as such, allows thestate apparatus to enforce its rules by coercion.
The state also enjoys economic resources thanks
to the capacity to exact taxes. The state exercises
its control over the people, subjects, citizens andeven foreigners living in its territory. It has thepower to enact laws and binding rules, which it
can enforce through its courts and its coercive
agents. Those laws might be considered just or
unjust but even in the late case can still be enforced.
With progress in state building, the idea of the
Rechtsstaat, a state bound by law and excluding
arbitrary decisions not based on rules, has become
the norm. With the more recent process of
democratization the notion of citizenship characterizes the modern state, granting those who are notforeigners rights in the polity and imposing onthem duties."
Not all the states fit into this ideal model. There
are states which do not enjoy the monopoly of
legitimate violence—when it is challenged by theguerrilla leaders that control part of the territory,or fascist squadristi in Italy after World War I,
for example. Some states are almost unable tocollect adequate taxes. Officials might exercise theirpower not for the collective purposes but mainly
for their own personal benefit. The laws it enacts
may be largely disregarded. There are, therefore,

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State building and nation building
levels of stateness and states in the process ofbreakdown.
Let us emphasize that there are states that pursue
desirable collective goals and contribute to thewelfare of their citizens and that there are also
oppressive and evil states ready to sacrifice theircitizens either to some Utopian goal set by the rulers
or to personal interests. The totalitarian states andthe sultanistic regimes are evidence of this.12
States are characterized by being artificial
creations, having considerable impersonality andby enforcing uniformities in a society. The modern
state has, in its liberal democratic form, achieved
credit in moderating violence, including the
reduction of private violence, the creation of space
for the development of the individual byrecognizing basic rights, the protection of property
and all the conditions that have made the modern
market economy possible. There is also an
extensive debit side to the modern state,particularly in some regimes.13
The people living within the boundaries of a state
are bound by a common rule of law and subject
to one and the same sovereign body, irrespectiveof their culture, language, religion and subjective
identification with that sovereign body. Still, Abbe
Sieyes used some of that same formulation, startingwith the expression a 'union of people bound by
a common rule of law', to define the nation.14
The modern state is based on citizenship, implying
rights and duties, including a certain loyalty—but
not always a strong emotional identification,
language, religion, or set of values, etc. Certainly,
however, people in states which are fully nation
states additionally share all or some of thosecharacteristics.
In contrast, a nation, as Weber writes: 'means
above all that it is proper to expect from certain
groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the faceof other groups';15 thus, the concept belongs to
the sphere of values. As he also notes, there is noagreement on how these groups should bedelimited or about what concerted action should
result from such solidarity. In ordinary language anation is not necessarily identical with the peopleof the state, that is, with the membership in a given
polity.
That does not mean that it cannot be identical,
but it does not have to be. The situation before
the recent German unification illustrates thedifference quite clearly. There were two states,359

although there was a claim shared by many people,
andfinallyexpressed in the breakdown of the DDR
and in the expression Wir sind ein Volk, that there
was a German nation divided between two states.16
Let us now turn to some of the more significant
differences between states and nations. A nation
does not have officials, and there are no definedroles, although there are individuals who act as
carriers in the Weberian sense 'Trager' of thenational sentiment, movement, leaders of nationalistic organizations, etc. There are no clear rules
about membership in a nation and there are no
defined rights and duties that can be legitimately
enforced, although nationalists certainly enforce
behaviour on the part of those who identify with
the nation or who they claim should identify with
it. However, without control of the state, withoutestablishing a national state or without thedelegation of a non-national state, these behaviours
cannot be legally or even legitimately enforced. A
nation does not have resources like coercive
powers or taxes to demand obedience, only thenation state or the state supporting the aspirationsof a nation can enforce behaviour, and provide
resources to achieve national goals.
It can be argued that a nation crystallizing out
of a national movement, even if it does not controla state, can exercise power, use violence, exact
contributions without having yet gained statehood.
But in a world system of states this means that the
movement is taking over some of the functions of
the state, subverting its order, and that the state isbreaking down in the process. Nationalists cancreate private armies to enforce their aspirations
and challenge the authority of the state, which insome cases can lose control over a territory andcannot coercively implement its decisions. In thatcase we are facing a situation of civil war, or anational liberation struggle which might end in thecreation of a new state. In the process, however,people lose many of the positive aspects that canbe associated with a modern and particularly aliberal democratic state. In fact, that challenge tothe state by nationalists almost inevitably involves
a very large degree of arbitrary power, violence andabsence of a predictable legal order. However, weshould not identify nations with those nationalist
movements which result from a nationalist
sentiment. The nation, as such, does not have anyorganizational characteristics comparable withthose of the state. It has no autonomy, no agents,

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360

Juan J. Linz

no rules but only the resources derived from thepsychological identification of the people that
constitute it. A state can exist on the basis ofexternal conformity with its rules. A nation
requires some internal identification.
We all live under the jurisdiction of a state.
There is no space in the world free from theauthority, or the claim to authority, of a state.
With the exception of a few stateless peoples,originally defined by the League of Nations, andholding the so-called Nansen passport, everybody
is a citizen or subject of a state—but there areprobably millions which have no consciousness of
being members of a particular nation. If asked, theymight be able to say in which country they live but
be unable to think in terms of a nation. Many of
those who, by the criteria of ethnologists, linguists,
political scientists and the leaders of nationalist
movements, should be considered members of aparticular nation do not feel that way and, in fact,
might have no such identity or, they might even,perhaps, identify with another nation.
Nationalist ideologists like the Catalan, Prat dela Riba were sensitive to the difference between
state and nation. He wrote:' The state remained fundamentally differentiatedfrom the nation because the state was a politicalorganization, a power independent externally,
supreme in the interior with material force ofmen and monies to maintain its independence
and authority.'
Contrast this with a nation, defined as a:'Live, organic, natural entity. It existed in face ofthe laws that did not recognize it and by the factof being natural it distinguished itself clearly
from the artificial creations of man, among them,
fundamentally the state. 17 'The Capucine monk Evangelista de Ibero in1906, in a nationalist catechism for the Basques,
expressed the same feeling in more emotional
language.18 He wrote: 'The nation is something
natural, that is something created by nature itself;
the state is something artificial dependent on
human will.' For a more extensive quote see
Reference 3.
Nationalist thinkers constantly emphasize thenatural rather than artificial character of the nation.

If we think about it, however, the nation resultsfrom the development of a culture, and an identity
based on it is as much an artificial creation as a state.
State building and nation building, therefore, areboth works of art, results of conscious efforts byleaders. The question then, is to analyse better thedifficulties and successes in both processes and thedegree to which they are complementary or inconflict. The task of building successful states isfar from easy but the building of nations,particularly simultaneously with state building,may probably be even more difficult. Paradoxically,
the building of nations when the state is in crisis
or undergoing a breakdown is much easier. In fact,
in the absence of a complex and structured civilsociety, nation building—in some senses of theterm—is particularly easy. The building of states
supposes a somewhat complex civil society. It
requires, for example, a legal culture which
depends on the quality of legal scholarship in theuniversities, and without it, it is almost impossible
to create the minimally efficient bureaucracy which
the modern state requires. It demands a productive
and largely monetary economy to be able to collecttaxes. These considerations will be very important
for a discussion of the developments in the former
Soviet Union where we find the state in crisis orin the process of breakdown, a delegitimacy of theparty that took the place of the state, and a weak
civil society. In such a context, the building of anation seems an easy way out of the crisis. 19 From
this perspective it is understandable that nationalism should have become so powerful, or at least
relatively powerful, in the present crisis.
In a number of European countries, the processof state building went on for centuries on the basisof the more successful mediaeval monarchies
through the period of estates, the absolutemonarchies, and (after the French revolution)
constitutional monarchies, and finally the processof democratization. This long process was theresult of dynastic wars and marriages, adding or
losing territories in the process and creating thestate for the different crown lands under the sameking—lands which later came under a central royalauthority and bureaucracy and, in the constitutional monarchies, under a central legislature. The
process led to the building of an army with moreor less success, a single system of taxation andtreasury, growing legal uniformity, clear definitionof borders, and finally the transition from subjects

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State building and nation building
to citizens of the state. For a long time there waslittle effort to impose a common culture and evenless a common language, although the cujus regio
ejus religio (except in the mixed countries which
accepted the idea of toleration, at least for somereligious diversity) created a basic common value
system. The allegiance of noblemen, clergymen
and, even more, the common people was to a ruler.
When this ruler lost or gained a territory most of
the people shifted their allegiance without too
much difficulty. In fact, many noblemen chose theking they were ready to serve irrespective of their
origin. Preradovich, in his study of the elites of theAustro-Hungarian Empire has shown the heterogeneous origin of its ruling aristocracy. 20
The monarchies of Western Europe whoseboundaries were defined relatively early, Portugal,
Spain, England and Wales, Scotland, France and,to a lesser extent, the Nordic monarchies, generated
among their officials and subjects a sense of identityand pride which we might call proto-nationalistic.
That sentiment also existed with the component
kingdoms and territories but was not based on acommon language. When that sentiment camecloser to what we could call today a nation isdifficult to define. It certainly happened after the
French Revolution, in some cases as a result of the
expansion of Jacobin republicanism, in others dueto the resistance to Napoleon.
With the process of defining egalitarian citizenship and incipient democratization those states
became increasingly nation states. Republicanism
was undoubtedly associated with the emergence ofnationalism but we should not forget that there
were very few republics in Europe before the 20th
century. The processes of unification of thelanguage used in the courts and administration (forreasons of efficiency) sometimes even anticipatedthe enactment of rules. There was a natural
expansion of the use of the most successful variantsof the literary language, but until the late 19th
century, those changes were not part of a deliberate
nation building process. A slow and largely
unplanned process of nation building took placein those Western European states.
It could be argued that the state builders, if they
had been more aware of the implications of nationbuilding, could have carried the process muchfurther before the 20th century. Western Europe
is therefore a world of states which became, moreor less, successful nation states before the ideas

361

associated with nation building became dominant.
As a consequence, in spite of the emergence of
peripheral nationalisms in Spain, France, theUnited Kingdom (with the exception of Ireland),these states have continued being a powerful social
reality to this day. Indeed, in Spain, when the crisisof the Franco regime led to a questioning of Spanish
nationalism and the eruption of intense nationalism in its periphery, almost all the leaders of thenationalist movements, in order to avoid the word
Spain, talked about 'that state' or the Estado
espanol. They rejected, more or less intensely or
rhetorically, the Spanish nation but not the Spanish
state.
The 19th century appears as the time of nationbuilding and of the dream of nation building among
the oppressed nationalities. But a more careful lookat the events leads to a somewhat different
perspective. It is no accident that after Italianunification, Massimo D'Azeglio, the Piedmontese
liberal politician in 1860 would say: 'Italy is made,now we must make Italians,' suggesting that thestate building had been achieved, using largely
traditional methods, and that the task of nationbuilding was still pending. Although nationalism
was strong in Germany since the early part of the
19th century, the German confederation createdby Bismarck was part of a state building process
under the leadership of Prussia, whose elites were,to a large extent, ambivalent about a nationbuilding process that threatened them withdemocratization of the state. 21 After unification,nationalism and efforts of nation building became
stronger and stronger, but the second Reich did
not fully do away with cultural linguistic diversity
nor with the representation in the Reichstag ofminority nationalities.
In fact, the rise of Pan-Germanism in Austria
and, to some extent, in Germany was based on
hostility to a state that did not want to pursue theradical nation building process. It is no accident
that Hitler in Mein Kampf should express his
hostility to the German Staatsgldubigkeit.22
It was the existence of core states, Prussia andPiedmont, with their bureaucrats, diplomats andmilitary officers, that made possible nation building
by intellectuals, professors, teachers, economists
and businessmen advocating protectionism, and so
developed nation building, which later led to
extreme nationalism.
The situation was very different for the 'little

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362

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people' in eastern and southeastern Europe under
the domination of the dual monarchy and Czarist
Empire. There, different groups throughout
different phases (so well described by Miroslav
Hroch23) undertook the task of nation building
outside and against the state. This was the case of
the Czechs, Lithuanians, Estonians, Slovaks andthe Flemish. The initial' carriers'—Trager—of thenational idea did not think of the possibility ofbuilding a state, and only slowly did the dream ofstatehood became central. The case was somewhat
different in Norway where a quasi-state allowed thebreaking of the union with Sweden in 1905. Evenin the Grand Duchy of Finland, its quasi-state
institutions could be used for the purpose of nationbuilding without challenging the Czarist state,
except when the Czars turned to a policy ofRussification. Only the defeat in World War I of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the crisis
generated by the 1917 revolutions in Russia madethe building of new nation states possible. The
disintegration of the Czarist empire in addition to
the full independence of Finland, of the three Baltic
republics, the unity of Poland and the incorporation of Bessarabia into Rumania, led to a numberof cases of incipient statehood from 1 to 3 or 4
years; that is, Bukhara, Khiva, Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaidzhan and the Ukraine. A number attained
statehood for less than one year: Belorussia, theCrimea, Bashkiria, the Volga Tatar region andKazakh-Kirgiz Steppe.24 The success of that effort
largely depended on international factors outsideof the area and, indirectly, on the western concern
about the Bolshevik Revolution. In a number ofcases, the nation and the nationalist movement
were weak and the Soviets could regain central
control, even when making some concessions to
the emerging nations, some of which were soon
withdrawn in practice. The borders of those newstates were largely uncertain and did not necessarily
correspond to the ethnic linguistic borders. Their
populations were largely multi-national and multilingual making for irredentism of neighbouring
nations and states. The result was a strong
commitment to nation building which contributed
to the instability of those states. The nationbuilding effort made the loyalty of large numbersof citizens in those societies doubtful and later
contributed to their disintegration or vulnerability,
for example the cases of Czechoslovakia, Poland
and the Serbian dominated Yugoslavia.

We are now living in a period seen by some as
one in which nationalisms are breaking up the
Yugoslav and the Soviet states. But we tend toforget that the new independent states are, in manycases, the result of the action of the incumbents
of state power, attempting to mobilize a sentimentof nationhood while, at the same time, holding onto the state structure (and sometimes also the offices
they already have) and defending the stateboundaries irrespective of ethnic, linguistic, andcultural borders. The Baltic states are to someextent an exception to this. The question to beanswered in the near future is if a process of
democratic state building will be undertaken
incorporating all those living in the territories ofthe former Soviet republics, now independent
states, or if the emphasis on nation building will
make the living together of people of different
backgrounds and cultural identities impossible.

Difficulties in nation building:difficulties in state building
The starting point of our discussion will be that,
contrary to the simplifications of the defenders ofself-determination (the right of every nation to
become a state, or the natural primordial characterof nations) the building of nations in most partsof the world is difficult and sometimes extremely
costly in human well-being. In addition, I will argue
that it is not always necessary to protect or toachieve the cultural diversity that we value. I shallalso argue that, in the 20th century, in contrast to
the 19th century it is increasingly difficult to makeevery existing state a nation state. In fact, that effort
might contribute to make, in many parts of theworld, the process of state building shaky if not
impossible.
Should we be able to prove those two arguments,
the task would be to show that we can havelegitimate democratic states that are not, strictly
speaking, nation states, and where the state might
receive some of the loyalty and emotional support
that some argue only nations can achieve.
On the other hand, we shall argue that those
who identify with a nation do not have to build
nation states if multinational states can offer a'roof to their culture and identity without

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State building and nation building
pursuing the exclusiveness identified with thetraditional nation-state building process. We
shall encounter some trouble in our analysis
because we need a new terminology that will
distinguish nations within a state without theaspiration to become nation states, and states thatwill be endowed with some of the characteristics
of a nation state without proceeding to a policy ofnation building. States, which we could call'state-nations', would be multinational or at least
multicultural. But we are getting ahead of ourargument and, before developing it, we have tolook at some basic facts that are frequently ignoredin the intellectual (and even more so in the political)
debate on nationalism.
Contrary to the nationalist ideologies, nations
are not a natural phenomenon which arises to claim
statehood at the touch of a magic wand. This point
has been made strongly by Ernst Gellner 25 and is
supported indirectly by the solid research of Hrochon the enormous effort and time that it has taken
to awaken the nationalist sentiment of the smallergroups of people, and by the failure to arousenationalism and, even more, the claims to anysecessionist struggle, in the nations within theestablished solid states of the advanced west.
There is evidence that primordialism, in thesense of Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils, does
not translate easily into 'nation nationalism,'
although it might into a 'nation identity.' 26 In fact,
I have analysed contemporary Spain and the French
Basque country and been able to show that theprimordial identity based on language and descentcan be strong, but without generating an exclusive
national identity and, even less, a demand for thebuilding of a nation state. It seems more as if the extreme nationalists had attempted to abandon theprimordial markers as a basis of national identity
in order to claim a territorial basis, which would
include those not sharing those primordial
characteristics. A shift that transforms the national
identity into a voluntary choice irrespective ofprimordial characteristics implies a rejection by thenationalists of those who, while sharing theprimordial marks, do not support the nationalist
movement. Nationalism is not just a translation
into politics of distinctive primordial characteristics, a point that has been made, for example in
Max Weber's 2 7 excellent page on nationalism.
Ideologists tend to ignore this when they talk about
the number of speakers of the language or members363

of the religion that serves as a basis for a nationalist
movement, without any inquiry into how many
perceive that characteristic as a basis for thebuilding of a nation and, even more, of a nation
state. On the other hand, the nationalists, inmaking their claim, often count all the people in aparticular territory as members of the nation
claiming to become a state, irrespective of their
sharing the primordial characteristics or even thewish to achieve nationhood and a nation state. The
analysis of all these facts (which has not been madein most countries where there is a nationalist
conflict and which cannot be studied once theconflict erupts) would seriously deflate the claims
made in the name of nationalism.
Another problem that both social scientists andpoliticians ignore is that identities in the modern
world are not exclusive. People do not identify
either as Catalan or Spanish, although if forced
to that dichotomy, might, more or less reluctantly,
have to say they are one or the other. People arecapable of having multiple identities. In fact, thereis evidence that they may feel equally strongly
towards two presumed national identities, that theymight consider themselves equally Catalan andSpanish, Slovak and Czechoslovak, and perhaps
Croatian and Yugoslav if allowed to express sucha dual identity. Obviously, some of them mightfeel one or the other more strongly and thenationalists have a task to generate a polar choice
between being one or the other and weaken (byconversion or by generating a violent conflict inwhich there is no choice) the support of those who
would like to see a society based on more than one
identity. It is that dual identity that makes possible
the survival or the building of multi-national states.
This is a complexity which I could document at
length as I have already done. 2 8 ' 2 9 ' 3 0 (In 1982, in
Catalonia, 32% identified as either Spanish or more
Spanish than Catalan, 40% as equally Spanish as
Catalan, 17% more Catalan than Spanish and 9%
Catalan. Among those whose two parents wereborn in Catalonia the proportions were respectively 11%, 48%, 26.5%, and 14% and among thesons and daughters of two immigrant parrents 34%,
37.5%, 12%, and 11%, and the immigrants
themselves 64%, 26%, 4% and 2%.) This is aninconvenient fact to all nationalists. There are those
who claim that the state is a nation state anddemand complete identification with it and thedominant nationality in it, and those who claim

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Juan J. Linz

that their nation exists and is incompatible with anylarger and different identity. Fortunately, there arealso politicians who accept this basic fact and build
their political programme on the basis of thecompatibility of two identities, that of a statenation and that of a nation that does not aspire tonation statehood—although in our world theyoccasionally slip into the nationalist demand ofcreating a separate nation state.
Indeed, it is perfectly possible to conceive of asociety in which people would have more than two
identities. They would feel that they are, to a greateror lesser extent, members of a nation, members ofa state-nation or just state, and members of a larger
community like Europe, and that these threeidentities have different implications for the lives.
Different identities which are fundamentallycompatible and valuable to them.
When asked: to what extent are you proud of
being a Spaniard? (with four responses), in
Catalonia 33% said 'very proud' and 40% 'fairly
proud' (compared to a Spanish average of 45% and
40% respectively). When asked the same question
about being Catalan, 36% 'very proud' and 48%'fairly proud.' This means that a large number of
respondents must be proud of both identities andthat a number of immigrants from other parts of
Spain feel proud to be Catalans (given the fact thatthey are over 30% of the population.) 31
In view of these facts, we can talk about adeliberate crafting of nations and states and adeliberate crafting of the destruction of nations andstates. 32 The first two processes require a
constructive moderate leadership that realizes thecomplexities of social reality and does not thinkin zero sum terms. The second inevitably involves
conflict, and often violence and oppression, either
in the name of the state or the nation that wants
to gain statehood. In some cases, it is the state thatwants to destroy an existing primordial identity(which some conceive as a nation) by a policy of
denationalization, cultural repression and, if
necessary, the use of the coercive resources of thestate. In others, the crafting of destruction of thecomplex bonds existing in a complex multi-culturalsociety is made in the name of the nation. The
success of these policies ultimately depends on thereadiness to use force and the international context
which allows that use of force or gives its support
to one or another side in the conflict by recognizing
its legitimate use of force. After such a conflict,the construction of a civilized society in whichpeople of different identities and degrees ofidentification with a nation can live together in astate becomes difficult, if not impossible. Exodus
and refugees are the outcome of such a process.
Our idea of crafting implies that such an
outcome is by no means necessary and puts us, associal scientists, on the spot of thinking much more
about how it can be avoided. Unfortunately, manyof the social scientists who deal with these
problems, particularly in societies that do not facesuch conflicts, have simplistic views about the rightof self-determination and the right or morality ofsecession, and feel emotional sympathies withthose who, in fact or in their view, have been
oppressed. 33 Nation building against the state orby a state in the 20th century could be the sourceof terrible conflicts.
It could be argued that the existing states whichhave achieved nation statehood, or at least became
state nations, were successful in that endeavour inthe 19th century. Remember an outstanding
monograph by Eugene Weber From Peasants into
Frenchmen on how the French state, inspired by
the Jacobin idea of the nation unie et indivisible,
succeeded in overcoming the cultural and linguistic
heterogeneity of France. 34 The purposeful processof nation building by the French state was anincredible success, which contrasts with the more
limited success of the Spanish 19th century liberal
centralist state in the same endeavour, although weshould not ignore how far Spain and the Spanish
state succeeded in its effort to create a Spanish
identity over the centuries, particularly in the first75 years of the 19th century. From today's
perspective those endeavours of modern states
appear as far from admirable and represent a costthat many of us would not like to pay.
However, it is not just a question of how weevaluate such efforts of state-based nation building
but how feasible they are in the contemporary
context. Our answer on the basis of a sociologicalanalysis is that, independent of the desirabilityof such a process (which involves a value
judgement), such an effort is today doomed to
failure in most societies, and certainly in liberal
democratic societies. We could go into an analysisof why this is so, but we have to limit ourselves
to a few points.
In the modern world, even in the less developed
peripheral or marginal ethnic cultural linguistic

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State building and nation building
minorities, every society produces an intellectual
elite which, for emotional reasons and (let us notforget) self-interest, will defend the primordial
values and characteristics. Such elites did not exist,
as Gellner has rightly stressed, in an agrarian
pre-industrial society. Today they exist even insuch agrarian societies.
Although I do not share the emphasis, in theliterature on nationalism, on the role of intellectuals, artists and writers in articulating nationalism
as the only or dominant factor, since even such
elites might fail in their efforts, they constitute animportant factor. Today, they enjoy the availabilityof a broad and diffuse ideological legacy as a basis
on which to argue their case. We should not thinkthat only well-developed rationalized ideologies
appeal to intellectuals. We have seen enough cases
in which ideology, unstructured, unelaborated,
could appeal to sentiments and emotions ofotherwise highly rational people. The principles ofnationalism can be applied in any society—they areavailable now in a way they were not before the19th and 20th century. Powerful ideologies, like
communism or fascism in the recent past, findsupport in an international climate of opinion
created and shared by people who know little ornothing about the societies in which the ideology
of nationalism is being implemented, and which
are often in conflict with their own liberal andprogressive values. Let us not be fooled with thetalk about the end of ideology in the world. In thevacuum left by the demise of many other
ideologies, the one of nationalism is more powerfulthan ever.
In addition, those intellectual elites have aready-made audience in a literate society and in asociety which is open to a wide range of mass media
that did not exist in earlier times. In that context,
an educational and cultural policy like that of theFrench Third Republic is difficult to conceive.
We are living in an era in which the liberal
democratic principles of legitimacy, the institutions of the Rechtsstaat, are being loudly
proclaimed by everyone, even when they might beconstantly violated. That legitimacy formula makes
it impossible in many countries needing the respectof the world community to pursue oppressive anddiscriminatory policies against those asserting
primordial identities, cultural and linguistic rights,
and also the articulation of nationalist sentiments,
even of extreme nationalists. This is a reality that365

modern states cannot ignore except by turning toauthoritarianism, a choice that often is also notlegitimate for those who do not share a sympathy
with, or tolerance for, the nationalists questioning
the idea of nation-state building by the state.
In this context, it is necessary to turn to different
and new methods of state integration other thanthose based on nation building. However, noteverything in the development of modern literateindustrial and even tertiary economy societies
works in favour of nationalists questioning thestate. We should not forget the market and withit the need for larger economic spaces and freemovement of persons and capital as a great
integrator within states that still have some
economic boundaries with other states. Although,as Gellner has stressed, language becomes anessential resource and basis for power andopportunity in modern industrial societies and,
therefore, demands for recognition of previously
parochial languages are growing: the more
important and widely used languages represent anasset in the wider market economy. There is thetemptation of using an international lingua franca
like English rather than the language of the larger
state or culture area and its standard. The
temptation is to use English in international
business transactions and Swiss-German in thedaily life of the society rather than standard
German. However, we should not be too optimisticthat rational economic considerations in favour oflarger political units will always prevail. Certainly,
in Yugoslavia in 1991 nobody was so concerned
about the tourist market as to postpone thenationalistic conflicts until after the summer. Oneof the problems in the break-up of the Soviet
Union into presumably new nation states is that
although the planned economy generated economic ties across the republic boundaries, the ideaof a common Soviet market and its value to themember republics probably was not, and is not,part of their calculations. One of the costs of the
new nationalism might be the difficulty in creatingwider markets and thereby economic development.
In that context the idea of joining the European
Common Market as an alternative to state-widelarger markets creates a new and very often false
illusion for the new nationalist states.
I could go on arguing about the difficulty, today,of using state power to create a Jacobin-type ofnation states, as I could have gone more

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extensively into the arguments of why, in
multicultural societies (particularly when the
territorial basis of primordial and national
characteristics is far from homogeneous and welldefined) the peaceful building of nations is difficult,particularly in the short term. All this accounts forthe violence associated with the efforts of nationbuilding either by the state from above, or by thepeople and the activists of nationalism from below.
Some would like to argue that democracy offers
an answer to the problem, particularly after its
success in weakening and channelling class conflict,which only a few decades ago seemed so destructive
in modern industrial societies. I think that
democracy can contribute to solve these problems,
but only by largely giving up the identification of
democratic processes with undisputed majority
rule. What is more debatable is that theidentification of plebiscitarianism with democracy,the. use of voting to decide aspirations ofself-determination will avoid the problems we haveraised. If we assume that there are multiple
identities of different intensity in our societies, thatwithin any territorial unit there are both majorities
and minorities in terms of cultural identities,
the plebiscitarian principle applied to selfdetermination introduces a zero-sum choice which
does not correspond to the complex social andcultural reality of many societies. Already, at the
Versailles Peace Conference, idealist advocates ofself-determination of nations encountered the
problem that to let the people decide was notworkable since 'first one had to decide who thepeople were to be called on to decide, and thatdecision largely pre-empted the outcome and was
not necessarily acceptable to all the people called
to decide.' Sir Ivor Jennings in The Approach toSelf-Qovernment formulated it very well: 'On thesurface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide.
It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot
decide until somebody decides who are thepeople.'35 For the democrat it seems easy to say'let the people decide', but that is true only at thelevel of abstract principles, and enormously
complex in reality. Social scientists have theobligation to study that complexity. Public opinion
research intelligently used can be an important
instrument in that process while if badly used cancontribute to simplification. In my own work I
have tried to reveal the complexity of the national
phenomenon by asking questions which go beyond

a simple dualism, allowing people to express theirdual identities when confronted with the choice of'nationality.'
The paradox of nation building is that after theprocess of awakening or creating a national consciousness, creating cultural institutions, standardizing the language, organizing a nationalist movement, demonstrating for statehood, and so on,
the moment comes for the leadership to opt
for pressing the issue either by institutional andpeaceful means or by violence, the creation of
militias and, if the state is strong enough, eventerrorist acts. At that point nation builders arelikely to split, unless the state is disintegrating or
the nationalists receive international support, andsome will opt for working within the politicalsystem. This option is most immediate when atransition to democracy takes place in a formerly
authoritarian regime that repressed the nationalists' aspirations.
In the transition to democracy, there are two
possibilities. If there are already autonomous
sub-government institutions, fictitious or real in
the authoritarian setting, even if they have notsupported democracy before, the incumbents arelikely to choose to appeal to the national identity
against the weak or crumbling centre. Unless alegitimate democratic central authority and a
representative body are created soon to negotiate
a new compact within the limits of the state, which
requires state-wide elections to precede elections
at the sub-unit level, the option will be demands
for independence.19 In that situation the incumbents are likely to transform the sub-unit of thelarger state into a new state and initiate a processof state building and nation building. They will
sooner or later encounter the great problems
derived from the difficulties of nation building, andthe new states might be overwhelmed by thosedifficulties. This is likely to be the pattern in theformer Soviet republics and territories, compounded in this case by the fact that the incumbents
who have become nationalists have little understanding of what democratic institutions andliberalism means.
When the transition takes place, as it did in
Spain, without disintegration of the state because
it was possible to make a distinction between theregime and the state, and when it is initiated by
the regime leading to the formula of reforma
pactada-ruptura pactada, the nationalists will face

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State building and nation building
the problem of participating in the elections or torefuse any participation in the existing state. The
strategies to be followed—participation with acontinuing demand for independence, gaining
representation to negotiate a new state compact
providing for either secession or autonomy andfederal or confederal institutions—are likely to
divide the nationalist movement. The nationalist
movement, when it has no prospect of sharing
power within a democratic framework, can easily
retain its unity and its radical positions. With
democracy, it is likely to split between those whowant to continue the struggle for independence
sometimes supporting violence and a terrorist
movement, and those who want to participate in
the system to make the maximum possible gains
for the nation building process.
The latter, in turn, are likely to split between
those who would like to advance that process
rapidly and who after participating in the electoral
process and the institutions of the state, like thelegislature, are ready to continue the process ofnegotiation and pressure for independence, andthose who, once certain new constitutionalarrangements have been achieved, will be putting
off the nationalist's goals ad calendas graecas. The
latter, without giving up the nationalist dreams, areready to participate in governing the territory, thesub-unit recognized by the state as belonging to thenation. There are those who will continue a
principled but peaceful opposition within the
democratic institutions and those who, unable toachieve their goals democratically, will opt forother means.
What the nationalist movement and the politicalparties that will represent it in a democratic context
face is the alternative of continuing the process ofnation building within a non-national state or tocontinue the fight without making any immediate
gains. Only if the nationalist movement represents
a majority in a territorially significant sub-unit, andif it does not split on the tactics to be pursued,
will the state face a crisis that it might not be able
to resolve, except by the use of force. In the context
of our time, the use of force against a large
democratically represented majority will delegitimatize the state and is likely in many cases to end
in the break-up of the state. In the case that thenationalist movement has split between extremists
and various shades of moderates, the assertion of
the nation by its leaders might end in a compromise367

in which the nation-building goals would be
pursued within the context of a state, which in theprocess might have become democratically legitimate. This latter outcome is possible and likely
when there are large segments in the populationthat share a dual national identity. The appeal tothat dual identity will make possible new formulasof democratic state building. It is, in my view, afluid situation, one in which much depends on the
choices made by the leadership of the national
movement and of the representatives of the state.
Much depends also on the support for thoseturning to violence and their success or failure in
generating the spiral of terrorism, repression,
reinforced terrorism and, consequently, repression
leading to a broadly based confrontation. The
Spanish experience in the Basque country isinteresting from this point of view.
In this context, leadership becomes decisive. In
a transition, demands and rhetoric can escalate
rapidly in confrontation, destroying moderationand the ability to negotiate to peaceful anddemocratic solutions. The building of a new typeof democratic liberal state that incorporates thenation that challenged its former centralized nation
state conception might generate a new state-nationcompatible with nations under its rule. A
democratic, multinational, multicultural, multilingual state is possible.
However, this does not mean that there will not
be continuous conflicts and that the arrangements
reached during the transition, the constitution
making process, the delimitation of competences
between the central and the regional autonomous
governments will not be subject to continuous
debate and probably revisions over time. A
democratic liberal constitutional state with instruments like a constitutional court to resolve thoseconflicts, the participation in power at the
periphery or preferably even at the centre of thenationalists, their success in pursuing some of theirgoals, might make possible a new type of state. The
Spanish experience of the Estado de las Autonomias
has been a surprising, and in many ways an
unexpected, success of such a process.* The failure* I have wondered sometimes why the memory of the Spanish
civil war was used by everybody, constructively, to say 'neveragain' and achieve a peaceful transition after Franco, and why
the memory of civil war bloodshed in Yugoslavia did not leadpoliticians to such a response. Perhaps the difference is that
Continued on page 368

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Juan J. Linz

of undertaking such a road is exemplified by thecase of Yugoslavia. The comparison of the way inwhich the political system was able to process thenationalist demands in both cases would beilluminating for our subject. The building ofmulti-national states is complicated but not
impossible if the two dominant ideas (thatevery state should strive to become a nation state
and that every nation should aspire to become astate) are abandoned. As Francesc Cambo the great
Catalan leader and politician reminds us 36 it iscomplicated, as everything is in life, but it may
save us from the great 'terribles simplificateurs.'37

10. C. Tilly (1975) Reflections on the history of
european statetnaking. In Tlie Formation of National Statesin Western Europe, C. Tilly, Ed. Princeton, NJ, Princeton
University Press, p. 70.
11. G. Poggi (1978) The Development of the Modern State.
A Sociological Introduction, Stanford, CA., Stanford.
12. J. J. Linz (1975) Totalitarian and Authoritarian
Regimes. In Handbook of Political Science, F. Greensteinand N. Polsby, vol. Ill, Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley,pp. 175-411.
13. G. Poggi (1990) The State, Its Nature; Development
and Prospects, Cambridge University Press, Polity Press,
pp. 70-85.
14. E. Sieyes(l789)Qu'est-cequeleTiersEtat?Chapter 1.

ideological and class conflicts do not leave a permanent mark on
the following generation that can change their ideas andmove them socially upward or geographically withoutcarrying with them an identity, as in the case of ethnicity,
language, or religion. An identity that might allow leaders toarouse more easily ancient hatreds and memories than what
happened three decades ago when brothers—in some cases
literally—fought on opposite sides in the Spanish civil war.

16. M. Rainer Lepsius (1990) 'Ethnos' und 'Demos.' In
Jnteressen, ldeen und Institutionen, R. Lepsius, Opladen,
Westdeutscher Verlag, see pp. 250-251, also pp.
232-246.

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17. Enric Prat de la Riba, quoted by Jordi Sole-Tura(1967) Catalanisme i revolucio burgesa. La sintesi de Pratde la Riba, Barcelona, Edicions 62, pp. 180-181.

1. R. Bendix (1978) Kings or People. Power and the
Mandate to Rule. Berkeley, University of California
Press.
2. B. Badie (1992) L'Etat importe. Essai sur I 'occidentalisation de I 'ordre polkique. Paris, Fayard.
3. J. Linz (1973) Early state-building and late peripheral
nationalisms against the state: the case of Spain. In
Building States and Nations, Analyses by Region, S. Rokkan
and S. N. Eisenstadt, Eds, Vol. II, Beverly Hills, Sage,
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15. M. Weber (1968) Economy and Society, Vol. 2,
pp. 921-926.

18. Evangelista de Ibero (1906) Ami Vasco.
19. J. J. Linz and A. Stepan (1992) Political identities
and electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, andYugoslavia. Daedalus, 121, 2, 123-139.
20. N. von Preradovich (1955) Die Fti'fvrungsscliichten in
Osterreich und Preussen (1804-I9I8). Mit einem Ausblickbis zum Jahre 1945, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag.
21. O. Pflanze (1963) Bismarck and t/ie Development of
Qermany. The Period of Unification, Princeton, NJ,
Princeton University Press, 4-13, also 113, 123—124-

4. J. Burckhardt (1943) Die Kultur der Renaissance inhalien. Bern, Hallwag (first published in 1860). The work
starts with a section entitled: Der Staat als Kunstwerk,
pp. 11-144.

22. A. Hitler (1943) Ein Monstrum von menschlichen
Mechanismus. Vol. II, Chapter 2, (The State) in Mein
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State building and nation building
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Author's biography:
Juan Linz is Sterling Professor of Political and Social
Science, Yale University. He is a Spanish Citizen and in1987 was awarded the Premio Principe de Asturias deCiencias Sociales. He has honorary degrees from
Madrid, Georgetown, Granada and Marburg. He has
written many books including Breakdown of Democratic
Regimes, Conflicto en Eusocadi and contributed to The
Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, Who Were theFascists? and Authoritarian Brazil.

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