Trilateral Workshop on“Bilateral Alliance Politics and Intra-spoke
Relations in Asia”

September 15-16, 2011 , Keio University, Tokyo

Co-sponsored by
The Center for Contemporary Korean Studies, Keio University, and
The ANU-MacArthur Asia Security Initiative Partnership, with the collaboration of
The Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University

Program ScheduleThursday, 15 September, 20119:15 Meet in the Lobby of the Celestine Hotel (Australian and Korean participants)
9:30 - 9:45 Registration
9:45 - 10:00 Welcome and Introduction
Yoshihide Soeya, Keio University
William Tow, Australian National University
Cheolhee Park, Seoul National University
10:00 -11:45 Session 1: “Cross-Comparing Existing Bilateral Relationships with the
U.S.: Relating Traditional Alliances to New Challenges”
Chair: William Tow
Presenters:
Ken Jimbo (Keio University), “Japan-U.S. Alliance: Adjusting to the Power Shift in Asia”
Beomcheol Shin (KIDA), “ROK-U.S. Alliance: Relating Traditional Alliance to New
Challenges”
Hugh White (ANU) on “the Australia-U.S. Alliance”
Discussant: Jeffrey McCausland (U.S. Army War College)
12:00-13:00 Lunch
13:15 – 15:00 Session 2: “From Bilateralism to Minilateralism”
Chair: Yoshihide Soeya
Presenters:
Tomohiko Satake (NIDS), “TSD as an Instrument to Provide a Public Good”
Cheolhee Park (SNU), “Minilateralism in East Asia under the U.S. Security Hegemony”
William Tow and David Envall (ANU), “Realising ‘Convergent Security’ Through the
Back Door?”
Discussant: Douglas Stuart (Dickinson College)
15:00-15:30 – Tea Break
15:30 – 17:00 Session 3: “Comparing Intra-Spoke Security Relations”
Chair: Cheolhee Park
Yusuke Ishihara (NIDS), “Comparing Japan-Australia-U.S. and Japan-ROK-U.S.
Triangles”
Seongho Sheen (SNU), "ROK-Australian Cooperation: Forging a 'Hot' Partnership?"2

Rikki Kersten (ANU), “Australia-Japan Security Relations: Why US and Why Now”
Discussant: David Lai (U.S. Army War College)
19:00 – Reception at the Residence of the Australian Ambassador
Friday, 16 September, 2011
9:00 Meet in the Lobby of the Celestine Hotel (Australian and Korean participants)
9:15-9:30 – Coffee
9:30-11:15 Session 4: “The China Factor and ‘Middle Power’ Responses: AllianceManagement and Regional Security Cooperation”
Chair: John Garofano (U.S. Naval War College)
Yoshihide Soeya (Keio University), “Shifting U.S.-China Relations and Japan’s
Response”
Heungkyu Kim (Seongshin Women's University), “Strategic Stability and Middle-Power
Cooperation in Northeast Asia: A Korean Perspective”
Brendan Taylor (ANU), “Japan, South Korea, Australia: Partners in Asia?”
Discussant: Russell Trood (ANU)
11:15-11:30 Coffee Break
11:30 – 12:30: Session 5: Concluding Discussions and Future Agenda
Co-Chairs: Yoshihide Soeya and William Tow
12:30-13:30: Lunch and farewell3

List of Participants
Australia and the USA
1 Prof. William Tow (The Australian National University)
2 Prof. Rikki Kersten (The Australian National University)
3 Prof. Hugh White (The Australian National University)
4 Dr. Brendan Taylor (The Australian National University)
5 Dr. David Envall (The Australian National University)
6 Dr. Russell Trood (The Australian National University, Former Senator)
7 Prof. Douglas Stuart (Dickinson College)
8 Dr. David Lai (Strategic Studies Institute, United States, Army War College)
9 Prof. Jeffrey McCausland (Strategic Studies Institute, United States, Army War
College)
10 Dr. John Garofano (U.S. Naval War College)
11 Ms. Kana Moy (The Australian National University)
Korea
1. Prof. Cheolhee Park (GSIS, Seoul National University)
2. Prof. Seongho Sheen (GSIS, Seoul National University)
3. Prof. Heungkyu Kim (Seongshin Women's University)
4. Dr. Beomcheol Shin (KIDA, Former assistant to Defense Minister)Japan
1 Prof. Yoshihide Soeya (Keio University)
2 Prof. Ken Jimbo (Keio University)
3 Dr. Tomohiko Satake (National Institute for Defense Studies)
4 Mr. Yusuke Ishihara (National Institute for Defense Studies)
Observers
1. Mr.Richard Andrews (Minister-Counsellor, Australian Embassy)
2. Mr. Peter Roberts (Counsellor, Australian Embassy)
3. Dr, Lori Snowden (First Secretary, Australian Embassy)
4. Mr. Tomm Ben-David (Second Secretary, Australian Embassy)
5, Mr. Osamu Izawa (Director, National Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau
MOFA)
6. Mr. Hitoshi Kozaki (Oceania Division, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, MOFA)
Rapporteur
Dr. Seunghyok Lee (University of Toronto)4Summary and Policy Recommendations
Trilateral Workshop on“Bilateral Alliance Politics and Intra-spoke Relations in Asia”
Postwar security politics in the Asia-Pacific region has featured the United States
projecting dominant geopolitical influence through its military commitments and diplomatic
support for key bilateral allies.

In recent years, American security strategists are

increasingly concerned with the management of relations with a rising China and North
Korean contingencies. Facing these changing circumstances, the three “middle power” statesin the Asia-Pacific – Japan, Australia, and South Korea – are moving closer toward achieving
security cooperation among themselves while maintaining close alliances with the U.S. The
co-existence of bilateral and multilateral security politics in the region is characterized bysome as “convergent security” or “variegated patchwork.” This workshop anticipate that thecommon experience of the three nations working within the U.S. regional security framework
will facilitate their direct collaboration in a more complex and demanding contemporary
regional security environment.
Session 1: “Cross-Comparing Existing Bilateral Relationships with the U.S.: Relating
Traditional Alliances to New Challenges”
Ken Jimbo (Keio University): “Japan-U.S. Alliance: Adjusting to the Power Shift in Asia”
Japan-U.S. alliance, as a “hub-spoke” collaboration, has provided three functions in
the post-Cold War period: 1) America’s “extended deterrence” against North Korea and themaintenance of regional status quo against China; 2) Non-traditional security deterrence inanti-terrorism, counter-proliferation measures, WMD, PSI, maritime security, energy, andenvironment; 3) Promotion of security among other American allies in the region.
These functions are currently being challenged by the rise of China and the WMD of
North Korea. North Korea, with its new nuclear capability, has provoked South Korea andJapan to cause the failure in the extended deterrence of the United States, but it has so far
succeeded in “escalation control.” Concerning China, its increasing military capability has
facilitated concerns in the region that it is pursuing to be a “game changer.”
Under the circumstances, “spoke to spoke” collaborations among American allies,
such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, appear to be tilting toward ensuring continued
American engagement in the region. In order to maintain the American presence inside theregional “chain,” coordination among the spokes to enhance their regional supporting
functions for the U.S. forces is essential. Moreover, the capability of the Japanese Self

5

Defense Forces (SDF), with its new “dynamic deterrence” design for projecting its assets
abroad to support American operations, must be improved as well.
Beomcheol Shin (KIDA): “ROK-U.S. Alliance: Relating Traditional Alliance to New
Challenges”
The Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. alliance has contributed to overcoming thecatastrophe inflicted during the Korean War and modernizing the war-torn nation, but it has
not always been a smooth process. It is because of the changing perception of North Korea’s
threats between these two allies and South Korean public demand for a more independent
voice in accordance with its increased national power. The bilateral relation, however, never
got to the point of undermining the fundamental basis of the alliance, and it greatly
improved after President Lee Myong-bak took office in 2008.
While the South Korean government still has to meet both domestic demand that thealliance must be more “equal,” and external pressure from the U.S. that it contribute more incost-sharing, more fundamental challenge for the alliance is arising from the views about
China and North Korean threats. South Korea recognizes the potential threats from China,
but it does not address the China issue on its own. Toward the North, South Korea’s recent“proactive deterrence” design is met with caution in the U.S., as it could escalate regional
tension. Although there are such areas of disagreements in the bilateral relations, it must be
noted that these are not a serious conflict of ideas undermining the solid basis of the alliance.
Hugh White (The Australian National University): “The Australia-U.S. Alliance”
The key issue for the U.S. alliances in the region is to cope with contested U.S.
primacy by the rise of China.

At present, natural expectation is that it will draw thealliances together into a structure that resembles a NATO-style multilateral alliance against
the common threat.
This scenario, however, albeit plausible, is far from inevitable.

China is not as

threatening to its neighbors as the Soviet Union had been, and the interests of the U.S. andits regional allies are not as aligned as that of the Western allies in the Cold War.
Concerning Australia, both its physical distance and economic dependence to China makes ittake a lukewarm stance to align itself against China. Australia must avoid making a choice
between American primacy against China, or Chinese supremacy with the U.S. leaving Asia.
The real choice for Australia is to avoid the emergence of a NATO-type alliance as a “selffulfilling prophesy,” and to pursue a “third way” that will maximize the U.S. role in theregion while minimizing regional competition and the risk of conflict.

6

Discussion
Discussion started with the nature of the “Chinese threat.” Some panel members
asserted that China and the USSR are different, as China has been linked economically with
the United States and it has not actively sought to weaken America’s alliances with its
neighbors.

It is, therefore, necessary for the regional states to concede to China’s newleadership status as a necessary fact. Others voiced their concerns that strategic competition
between the two superpowers is already unfolding despite the interdependence, and that wemust not overlook the fact that interdependence does not guarantee the avoidance of conflict,although it surely raises the cost and the risk of strategic competition.
The second topic of the discussion concerned the status of Japan and South Korea’s
alliances with the United States, and the true motive of the two new “deterrence” strategies
recently declared by Japan and South Korea. In Japan, the Okinawa issue (concerning the
U.S. bases on the island) is still complicated and deeply rooted, but there has been a growing
confidence in the SDF and in the bilateral security relations with the U.S. especially after
the Tohoku Earthquake. Japan’s new “dynamic deterrence” positions the role of the SDF at
the core. Although Japan will continue to rely on the alliance in large scale contingencies,
the new strategic design asserts that the SDF must be sufficient to deter low-level situations,thus complementing the alliance at operational level.

In the case of South Korea, thebilateral alliance with the U.S. is also still strong, as more Koreans are raising concerns
about China as a future threat. Finally, South Korea’s new “proactive deterrence” is a movefrom a defensive deterrence by “denial” to the one by “punishment.”
Session 2: “From Bilateralism to Minilateralism”
Tomohiko Satake (NIDS): “TSD as an Instrument to Provide a Public Good”
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) between the U.S., Japan, and Australia haspromoted security cooperation between the three countries.

The U.S. has called for its

regional allies’ greater burden-sharing for America’s provision of credible extended
deterrence and continuous military presence in the region – a “public good” for the
maintenance of regional security - and TSD has become one of the most successfully
institutionalized “mini-lateralism” for both Tokyo and Canberra to answer the U.S. demand.
TSD can work as the best instrument to provide public good in the Asia-Pacific, as
neither Japan nor Australia have a will, as well as capacity, to independently confront therising China due to their normative and material constraints. Also, the two states
contributing to the provision of the public good in less controversial low-key issues such as
peacekeeping operations and humanitarian aid/disaster relief within the framework of the7TSD can indirectly check or balance China by keeping the U.S. strategic engagement in theregion.
Cheolhee Park (Seoul National University): “Minilateralism in East Asia under the U.S.
Security Hegemony”
From 2008, the United States has shifted its global strategy focus from particularregional threats (such as China and North Korea) to the maintenance of broader
international security.

Under this shift, regional security of the Asia-Pacific is alsotransforming itself into more integrated regional “mini-lateral” ties among the “spokes” while
traditional bilateral alliances with the United States (“hub”) are still maintained. Under thisAmerican-led “Hub and Spokes System,” South Korea and Japan has worked as a virtual ally
without a formal security tie, as the U.S. demand for more burden and responsibility sharing
by its allies has grown.
“Mini-lateralism” we are currently developing in the region must not go against
already-existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks.

And mini-lateral ties must be

extended to areas where imminent benefits are not secured, such as in the provision of public
goods.

Finally, dividing sides as “we versus China” and building a Cold War stylecontainment wall targeting a specific country must be avoided, since it is still too early to tellwhether China – a beneficiary of the current U.S.-led liberal global order - is a serious
challenger and revisionist to the status quo of the region.
William Tow and Doctor David Envall (The Australian National University): “Realising‘Convergent Security’ Through the Back Door?”
Regional multilateral frameworks such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are
examples of breathing space needed by the states of the Asia-Pacific and the U.S. forpursuing a regional security order predicated on multilateral norms, but temporarily
underwritten by a credible, American-led bilateral security network. Such approach has
been labeled as “convergent security.” The current situation in the Asia-Pacific is, therefore,characterized by both the U.S. and its allies searching for more judicious approaches to new
regional order-building in a subtle process of concurrent bilateral-multilateral coexistence.
At this crucial juncture, what we need is a transparent and an open geopolitical
approach – a “front door” approach - for implementing our regional order-building; what wemust avoid is “containment through the back door,” in the guise of “convergent security” - as
it will be picked up by China soon one way or another.

8

Discussion
The main topic of the discussion for this session concerned the extent to which thethree middle powers in the Asia-Pacific are willing to strengthen their intra-spoke, minilateral cooperation. While some panel members suggested that the trilateral relation should
focus on ad hoc cooperation rather than formally institutionalizing the structure, others
pointed out that the intra-spoke relation is already beyond that stage.
In the end, the consensus of the panel was that although the trilateral, minilateralism at this point is largely targeted toward non-traditional, small-scale contingencies
without a concrete institutionalization of the intra-spoke relations, it could eventuallydevelop into a structure replacing the bilateral alliances with the U.S. for the management of
conventional contingencies. However, the three spokes will first have to agree on coherent
topics/themes for their cooperation. For example, they will have to decide whether the minilateral cooperation will prioritize the issue of North Korea, or the broader theme of providing
regional public good. In the case of the latter, it should be also clear to China that thetrilateral mini-lateralism does not necessarily constitute a threat to itself.
Session 3: “Comparing Intra-Spoke Security Relations”
Yusuke Ishihara (NIDS): “Comparing Japan-Australia-U.S. and Japan-ROK-U.S. Triangles”
Japan-US-Australia and Japan-ROK-US triangles share identical strategic rationale
in that they support the U.S. strategic engagement in Asia. The two trilateral partnerships
also emphasize cooperation in non-traditional security areas.

However, we must notoverlook the fact that beneath these similarities are also some differing logics at work.
The Japan-Australia-US cooperation is centered on non-traditional security areas aswell as conventional defense cooperation. Through them, both Japan and Australia support
U.S. strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific and contribute to the burden-sharing.

In

addition, for Australia, it is a crucial engagement strategy vis-à-vis Japan, in that it helps toassure Japan of the existence of reliable regional ally (thus preventing its rashremilitarization), and deter China.
Compared to Japan-US-Australia, China factor plays a different role in the JapanKorea-US trilateralism, mainly because of the ROK’s sensitivity. Moreover, unlike Australia,
ROK is also sensitive to Japan taking larger security roles in the region.

Therefore,

cooperation on agenda other than North Korea, and in non-traditional security areas such as
humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and peacekeeping outside the Asia-Pacific, may be ofhelp to achieve greater trust in Japan-Korea-US relations.

9Seongho Sheen (Seoul National University): “ROK-Australian Cooperation: Forging a ‘Hot’
Partnership?”
Korea and Australia are genuine middle powers in the Asia-Pacific with a long list ofsimilarities in economy, defense spending, political structure, and the alliance ties with theUnited States.

But since they have not shared any substantial threat perception, thebilateral relations has been long characterized as “economically hot” but “politically cool.” At
this point, Korea is expanding its role as a contributor to regional and global peace andsecurity, and Australia figures prominently in Korea’s initiatives.
Close connection between ROK and Australia in economic sphere can surely be
replicated in military sector. In contrast to Japan, cooperation between Korea and Australia
does not involve any burden of history; for Korea, Australia makes an ideal partner as aformer ally during the Korean War. In addition, the two states are free from domestic legal
barriers for taking part in global military roles, and they also share a more balanced
strategic interest with regard to the rise of China, compared to Japan. The two countries,
therefore, could play positive roles in mitigating power rivalry and tension between China
and Japan-US alliances.
Rikki Kersten (The Australian National Univeristy): “Australia-Japan Security Relations:
Why US and Why Now”
Japan’s decision to take a more proactive security policy is being driven by concerns
over “the deterioration of international public goods” by the rise of China.

And thecombination of this threat perception, along with the view that the U.S. is in relative decline,
has provided the momentum to the enhancement of security relations between Japan andAustralia.
The bilateral security relationship is considered by many as a joint hedging strategy
by the two U.S. allies. They desire to keep the U.S. engaged, while addressing potential gaps
in security contingencies that cannot be dealt with in traditional bilateral alliance system.
While the two countries emphasize that their partnership is natural as they have “sharedvalues,” it is a shared strategic outlook that is driving them toward a deeper security
relationship.
And while the China factor is the main driving force behind the Japan-Australia
security relations, it is not, however, in Australia’s national interest to support crude “China
containment;” Australia-Japan security relationship should rather serve its primary purpose
as a signal to China that its possible challenge to U.S. dominance will not be easy.
Discussion

10

The main theme of the discussion for this session was the question of whether China
actually possesses any alternative regional order to offer to the Asia-Pacific. The panel
members agreed that since China does not, it is, therefore, not seeking to change the existingorder even if it does not endorse clear U.S. hegemony in the region.
The question then shifted to whether the three middle powers then have any
alternative order that could invite China. The consensus of the panel was that the minilateral cooperation was not geared toward offering any alternative to the U.S. leadership, but
in fact toward reinforcing it. Although the trilateral cooperation does constitute a type of“contingency plan” in case the U.S. cannot provide its allies necessary protection, theprimary goal of the mini-lateralism, nevertheless, is to keep the U.S. engaged in the AsiaPacific, rather than coming up with an alternative grand strategy.
Session 4: “The China Factor and ‘Middle Power’ Responses: Alliance Management andRegional Security Cooperation”
Yoshihide Soeya (Keio University): “Shifting U.S.-China Relations and Japan’s Response”
The current regional momentum caused by the rise of China has created a clash
between the U.S.-led liberal international order on one hand, and the increasing selfassertion against these premises by China on the other.

Under this trend, two futurescenarios are plausible. One is a power transition where the rise of China would lead to theemergence of a China-centered order; another is a power shift in which China attempts tomodify the existing rules and institutional arrangement from within.

China’s behavior

indicates that its rise entails elements of both of these trends.
For Japan, South Korea, and Australia, the challenge is to encourage the future
course of China toward the second trend while firmly dealing with its unilateralism backed
by its military might in the first scenario.

It is crucial that the three “middle-power”

countries first consolidate security relations both with the United States and among
themselves as part of the hedging strategy in the midst of the Chinese assertiveness.
Secondly, they need to build networks of functional regional cooperation that include China
as a critical engine of growth as well as complex transformation of the regional order.
Finally, in the worst case where deterrence against Chinese unilateralism does not bear fruit,
the three middle powers should cooperatively engage in a persistent and patient “civil society
strategy” in order to persuade Chinese public to say “no” to a collision course with the rest of
the world.

11

Heungkyu Kim (Sungshin Women’s University): “Strategic Stability and Middle-Power
Cooperation in Northeast Asia: A Korean Perspective”
Although the U.S. is currently seeking “strategic stability” with China, we must firstquestion whether the concept of strategic stability is deciphered in a same manner between
the two countries. While the American notion of “strategic” is mainly military, the Chineseconcept is comprehensive and political.

This difference could bring a clash of politicalobjectives between the two superpowers.

Although China is not likely to challenge theAmerican strategic stability as long as it pursues a gradual adjustment of its international
status vis-à-vis the U.S., the long-term future prospect is uncertain.
What we must avoid at this complex security environment is to establish future
strategy without coordinating with China. Regional players must establish institutions topromote issue-based, mini- and multi-lateral dialogues in order to avoid bi-polarization of theregional security. In this regard, the three middle-powers can play a crucial role of helping
the U.S. and China reaching a strategic compromise.
Brendan Taylor (The Australian National University): “Japan, South Korea, Australia:
Partners in Asia?”
In 1967, the late ANU Professor J.D.B. Miller examined the prospects for partnership
between Japan, India, and Australia by laying out his five “conditions for cooperation.” How
would the current regional dynamics between Japan, Korea, and Australia measure up tothese same conditions?
First, although the three countries share “similarity of cultural background” asdemocracies, the commonalities do not run deep outside political realm. Second, economic
disparities between Japan, South Korea and Australia are not significant, and all threeshare the similarity of highly depending on the Chinese economy. Third, in the field of“habits of association,” Japan-Australia bilateral cooperation appears to be stronger than theother two sides of the triangle, although the overall security collaboration involving all three
is subtly intensifying. Fourth, all three have become increasingly preoccupied with China’s
rise in the “sense of common danger,” but it is also apparent that Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra
each view the “threat” in different ways. Finally, the three countries are increasingly getting“power pressure” from the United States, as Washington expects the inter-spoke
collaboration between its alliance partners to result in their increasing share of American
burden.
The result of the analysis is somewhat mixed, but the contemporary outlook for
greater convergence between Japan, South Korea and Australia is still not as dire as it wasin the case of Japan, Australia, and India. But the most significant obstacles for developing

12

deeper security relations at present are the still deep-seated historical tensions between
Japan and South Korea, as well as different perceptions regarding the potential threat posedby the rising China.
Discussion
The session returned to the same question that was raised in the beginning of theworkshop, that concerning the nature of the “China threat.” Since it is apparent that China
is indeed pursuing to change its role within the existing security order of the Asia-Pacific, thequestion that cannot be avoided is the extent to which the regional players are willing toaccept China’s intention. The panel members agreed that although the United States and its
regional allies must carefully manage China’s intention of expanding its role within thecurrent system, they must cooperate to send a clear message that but China will not get a“free-hand ticket.”
The participants also agreed that although mini-lateral cooperation at this point ismainly focused on non-traditional domain, it will eventually be linked to traditional security
area.

In order to prepare for this eventuality, the trilateral cooperation could include

drafting an “operating principle” in order to persuade the United States’ continuous
engagement.
Session 5: Concluding Discussions and Future Agenda
The first trilateral workshop showed that traditional security issues such as burdensharing, extended deterrence, etc., are still very relevant in the Asia-Pacific region. The
sessions also offered the Asia-Pacific’s viewpoint to the United States on how Washington isperceived by its allies in the new strategic environment. While the main theme of all thesessions was to discuss how Japan, Australia, and South Korea could work together under
the United States’ security umbrella in the new regional environment characterized by therise of China, it was reasonable and prudent that “containment” was not proposed
throughout the workshop.
The participants suggested that the following points should be further discussed in
the next workshop. First, the true “value” of this workshop must be clarified. In other words,
we must be clear of the demand for such mini-lateralism, as it must be the basis of ouranalytical justification. Second, future discussions must clarify the functional definitions of anumber of crucial terminologies such as “order,” “mini-,” and “spoke.” Third, the issue ofNorth Korea - and not only China - must be incorporated in more detail.

13

Finally, theinfluence of domestic public opinion and other societal factors in facilitating regional
cooperation (or conflict) should be considered.

14