Collection of Critical
Situations during Flood
Emergency Response(Main Content:
Local Government Response)

June 2020
International Center for Water Hazard and Risk Management(ICHARM) under the auspices of UNESCO,
Public Works Research Institute (PWRI), Japan

Introduction
In Japan, floods and landslides have been increasingly frequent in recent years. Of all themunicipalities around the country, 97% suffered damage from floods and landslides at least once
during the decade from 2009 to 2018. In particular, those in mountainous areas have been
seriously affected by such events repeatedly.
In these circumstances, deliberate efforts have been made at the national level in Japan. For
example, in July 2019, the disaster management section of the Cabinet Office published a guidefor municipalities instructing what actions they should take at the onset of flooding. Even before
that, in December 2015, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)
produced a disaster management policy calling for cooperation in rebuilding a risk-conscious
society with increased preparedness for water-related disasters. Based on the policy,
municipalities sharing the same river basin have jointly organized a council for mitigating thedamage of water-related disasters. Under the leadership of the councils, various structural andnon-structural measures have been implemented nationwide.
In the meantime, municipalities have been doing their part. They review their actions during adisaster afterward, produce a after-action review report, and, in some cases, even post the reporton their websites for public purposes. These reports often contain many valuable opinions frommunicipal personnel, including lessons and ideas for improvement, regarding unsuccessful
practices (what we call “cases of critical situations during the emergency response” in this book).
Such voices are often found very useful for other municipalities, too, to double-check their actions
and plans. In addition, many municipalities report similar cases of critical situations. In other words,
municipal personnel often comes across similar troublesome situations, but they can avoid themby learning lessons from other people’s experiences. There have been quite a few incidents fromwhich we regrettably thought those people could have been able to escape if they had known
about that case.
To address this issue, the International Centre for Water Hazard and Risk Management(ICHARM) decided to publish a booklet style of publication that is easy for municipal personnel toread and learn about critical situations collected from after-action review reports produced bymunicipalities. The project was led by Senior Research OHARA Miho under the supervision ofChief Researcher FUJIKANE Masakazu. They first read review reports published by municipalities
that suffered significant damage from a flood disaster in the last 20 years and selected about 500
cases with valuable lessons from about 30 publications totaling some 2,000 pages. Those 500
cases were then categorized into 28 situations that municipal personnel is likely to face in case ofa disaster. Each situation is accompanied by advice and actions considered appropriate to copewith the situation. The 28 situations are compiled into a handy booklet for individuals and groups
to use as learning material about possible situations that may arise in a future disaster.
In planning effective disaster management, we think it is very important for people to see
disasters not someone else’s problem but their own problem. It would be our great pleasure if thisbooklet can be a strong reminder for disaster management officers in municipalities to re-realizethat important mentality and a useful source of information for them to increase their individual
preparedness for disasters, so that, in turn, they can contribute to strengthening the preparednessof their municipalities.
Finally, please note that the contents of this booklet are subject to change, for we are planning
to review it from time to time to update and improve the contents.
June 2020
Toshio Koike, Executive Director,
International Center for Water Hazard and Risk Management(ICHARM) under the auspices of UNESCO,
Public Works Research Institute (PWRI), Japan

1

Chapter

Theme

Page

1
InitialResponse

1.1 Flooding in government buildings
1.2 No experienced responders
1.3 Establishing disaster control headquarters
1.4 Assembling local personnel members

10
12
14
16

2
Headquarters
Management

2.1 Location of disaster control headquarters
2.2 Equipment for disaster control headquarters
2.3 Management of disaster control headquarters
2.4 Collecting, compiling & analyzing info
2.5 Responding to inquiries by phone
2.6 Backup & loaned staff

20
22
24
26
28
30

3
Structure in
Government
Office3.1 Info sharing in local government office
3.2 Personnel management

34
36

4
Collecting
Info40
4.1 Collecting water level info
4.2 Collecting info about onsite situation & level of damage 42

This Booklet’s Definition of Critical Situation●To smoothly respond to disasters, local governments must learn from past disasters and must improve thecapabilities of personnel members to enable them to predict in advance the kinds of difficulties that may
occur in order to take the necessary advance measures.
●In the field of occupational hazards and accidents, we have gathered critical situations in areas where
accidents look likely to occur, putting the details to good use to protect against/prevent reoccurrence of suchdamage and/or accidents. Whereas, local government disaster managers are tasked with the duty ofcontinuing their response to a disaster even if the situation is descending into “difficulties, panic, confusion,indecision and worries”.
●With this booklet, we newly define examples of situations that descend into “difficulties, panic, confusion,indecision and worries” faced by disaster managers as critical situations in disaster response, extracting andintroducing typical examples from the verification materials (After action review reports(Post-disaster review
reports), etc.) on past flood response actions published by local governments in Japan. With regard to caseextraction, we referred to Yotaro Hatamura’s book “Learning from Failure” (Kodansha Bunko, 2005). And, thetargeted damage phase goes up to establishment of shelters, but does not deal with livelihood reconstruction
support or recovery.
●The backdrop to actual critical situations in disaster response includes multiple factors, such as human skills,
facilities and procedures, all of which must be addressed in multilayered approaches in advance tooptimistically prevent reoccurrence of similar close calls. To that end, as a riposte to the typical cases
introduced, we compiled and present in this booklet, in case form, the lessons to be learned from after action
review reports published by local authorities and examples of later improvements made by them.
●If these kinds of situations can be predicted in advance in disaster management departments, there is hopethat the necessary advance measures can be implemented and the capabilities of personnel members
improved to make smooth disaster response.
●Please note that the cases in this booklet are based on disaster knowledge at time of publishing – hence, thecontents of this booklet must be updated as needed.
Definitions of Critical Situations during Disaster Response in this Booklet

5
Collaboratingwith
Stakeholder
Bodies6
Issuing
Evacuation
Advisory etc.

5.1 Collaborating with disaster prevention bodies
5.2 Sharing (Disseminating) info with prefectures

46
48

Work is started

Industrial
hazard/accident

52
54
56

Work cannot be
continued

Occurrence of event(has not progressed to accident)
Work is continued
Work is started

Critical situations infield of industrial
hazards/accidents

6.1 Criteria for issuing evacuation advisory, etc.
6.2 Issuing timing of evacuation advisory, etc.
6.3 Coping with widespread evacuations

Accident
occurs

Critical situation
Occurrence of
Occurrence
disasterof(hazard) Commence
Response continued
response to disaster difficulties in midst of difficulties

Critical situations in
disaster response(as defined by this booklet)

Critical situation occurs in response to disaster

7
DisseminatingInfo

8
Shelters

7.1 Disseminating info to residents
7.2 Emergency broadcast system
7.3 Disseminating info to elderly & disabled
7.4 Disseminating info to foreigners
7.5 Dealing with news media
8.1 Locations of shelters
8.2 Establishing shelters
8.3 Evacuation routes
8.4 Gathering info on shelters

60
62
64
66
68
72
74
76
78

Factors behind Critical Situations during Disaster Response
Factors related to human skills
Other external
environment factors

Area situation

Personnel’s
stakeholder body,etc.

Lack of knowledge

Lack of knowledge

Weather/climate

Lack of experience/perception

Lack of experience/
perception

Defect(s) in system
Defect(s) in manual/plan, etc.
Factor(s) related
to setup(s)2Managing department
inside local government
office and personnel
members themselves

Critical situation case(example)
Problem(s) with facilities
Problem(s) withequipment
Factor(s) related tofacilities/equipment

3How to Make Use of This Booklet

Configuration of This Booklet●This booklet is divided into 28 themes in eight chapters that explain actual criticalsituations of past flooding damage in individually themed double-page spreads.
●The left page provides the close call compilation depicting the disaster case and theclose call that occurred at that time, while the right page shows the responsecompilation depicting lessons to be learned, pointers and relevant guidelines gleaned
from after action review reports on past flood disaster responses.

Configured of 28 Themes in Eight Chapters
Individual Themes Explained Across Double-Page Spread
Left Page

Right Page

Critical Situation Compilation

Response Compilation

Lessons to be learned

Disaster case

Introducing lessons learned from thecase on the left page and othersimilar cases.

Introducing an outline of the disasteras the precondition to the criticalsituation occurring.
Pointers
Critical situation

Introducing the critical situationand ensuing results.

Introducing the latest info onchanges to social environment
and amendments to laws, etc.

●We propose that this booklet should be used in two ways by local governments in preparations
to smoothly combat disasters.

1. Using it as training material for individual personnel(1) By reading the left pages of the 28 themes (eight chapters) on Critical Situations during Flood
Emergency Response, individual personnel members can envisage whether similar criticalsituations might occur in his/her own department and/or the work he/she is tasked with at timeof disaster.
(2) If he/she deems that such cases could occur, then reading about the ”facilities”, “procedure”
and “human skills” in the right page of the theme concerned should be his/her next step, sothat he/she can think about what initiatives should be undertaken in advance and what he/sheshould pay attention to in the midst of responding to a disaster.

2. Using it as training material for group work and disaster imagination games(1) Bring members of the department or disaster response unit together, and, depending on
circumstances and hour of the day of gathered members, pick one or more of the cases fromacross the 28 themes and use it/them in combination with the worksheet provided at the end of
the booklet to create an image of a disaster situation.
(2) Regarding the chosen case(s), first, print out copies of just the left page, hand them out, andget the gathered members to read the page together.
(3) Once read, each member should think about the following five questions and then write down
his/her answers on the worksheet.
(4) Once the answers have been written down, each member should given his/her thoughts oneach question, and those thoughts should be debated.
(5) Next, look at the lessons to be learned in after action review reports on past flood disaster
responses shown on the right page, and discuss the excesses and deficiencies of the debate in
item
(4).
In doing this, remember that the left page only renders the natural parameters (such as past
rainfall), the terrain controlled by the local government in question and the circumstances at thetime of disaster, thus debates need to be conducted with the left page being used to provide
pointers as to whether the lessons to be learned are applicable to participant’s own local
government or department, etc.
(6) Lastly, draw together measures that are conceivably needed from here on in areas such as“human skills”, “facilities” and “procedure”.

Five questions for critical situations in responding to flood disaster(1) Could a similar situation occur in your local authority/department?

Introduction ofsimilar cases
Introducing similar cases compiled fromlocal governments.

(2) In particular, are there any conditions that could trigger the same kind of
situation?
Related guidelines, etc.
Introducing latest info on changes tosocial environment and amendments
to laws.

Points to be aware of at time of disaster and advanced measures configured in a flowfor easy comprehension
4(3) Are necessary measures (facilities and equipment, etc.) in place to avoid thesituation occurring?
(4) Are necessary measures (structures, manuals and plans, etc.) in place to avoid
the situation occurring?
(5) Are necessary measures (for improving skills) in place to avoid the situation
occurring?

5Sources(1) After action review report pertaining to typhoon No. 23 (Miyazu, July 2005)(2) Record of damage caused by 2005 typhoon No. 23 (Kyoto prefecture, October 2005)(3) After action review report on damage of typhoon No. 23 (Hyogo prefecture verificationcommittee on damage of typhoon No. 23, December 2005)(4) After action review report by verification committee working on Niigata heavy rainfall
disaster on 7/13/2004 and 2004 Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake (Niigata
heavy rainfall disaster on 7/13/2004 and 2004 Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake
verification committee, January 2006)(5) After action review report on damage of typhoon No. 9 (Sayo typhoon No. 9 damage
verification committee, July 2010)(6) After action review report on damage of 2009 typhoon No. 9 (Hyogo prefecture
typhoon No. 9 damage verification committee, 5 August 2010)(7) After action review report on damage from heavy rain on 7.15 (Gifu prefecture heavy
rain damage verification committee, 21 September 2010)(8) After action review report on heavy rainfall on 16 July 2010 (Tottori prefecture,
September 2010)(9) After action review report on damage of torrential rain on 7.15 (Kani, 4 November
2010)(10) After action review report on damage of heavy rainfall in Hofu (Hofu heavy rainfall
damage verification committee, December 2010)(11) After action review report on damage of heavy rainfall in Amami in October 2010
(Amami, Kagoshima prefecture, March 2013)(12) After action review report on response to damage from 2011 typhoon No. 12 (Shingu
anti-disaster headquarters, October 2012)(13) 13 and 14 August 2012 heavy rainfall damage records for southern part of Kyoto
prefecture (Uji, March 2014)(14) After action review report on damage by localized downpour of short duration on 14
August 2012 (Neyagawa, Osaka prefecture, December 2012)(15) After action review report on response to widespread flood disaster in Kumamoto(Risk management & disaster prevention section, Kumamoto governor’s office,December 2012)6(16) After action review report on damage of heavy rainfall on 28 July 2013 (Yamaguchi
verification/study report related to damage of heavy rainfall on 28 July 2013, November
2013)(17) After action review report on response to localized heavy rain in July and August 2013
(Risk management control section, Tottori prefecture risk management bureau,
November 2013)(18) After action review report on response to damage from heavy rain due to typhoon No.
18 in 2013 (Kusatsu, February 2014)(19) After action review report on response to urban damage caused by typhoon No. 18(Disaster prevention & risk management office, Kyoto administration and public financebureau, December 2013)(20) Table of verification results on response to damage from typhoon No. 11 (Suzuka
disaster risk management department, September 2014)(21) After action review report for 2014 typhoon No. 11 (Council for promotion of risk
management in Yokkaichi, 2015)(22) After action review report on evacuation measures for heavy rainfall on 20 August(Evacuation measures verification subcommittee on heavy rain on 8.20, January 2015)(23) After action review report on flooding of Kinugawa River, Joso in 2015 (Joso flood
control verification committee, 13 June 2016)(24) After action review report on response to Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall in September
2015 (Ibaraki prefecture, 2016)(25) We will not forget! Support & restoration record for Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall disasterin September 2015 (Ibaraki, August 2016)(26) After action review report on response to heavy rainfall in Sapporo on 9.11 (Sapporo,
March 2015)(27) After action review report on response to Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall in September
2015 and work to reflect report in disaster prevention measures (Risk management
section, prefectural inhabitants’ livelihood department, Ibaraki prefecture, 28 March
2016)(28) After action review report on response to damage from heavy rainfall in northern partof Kyushu in July 2017 (Fukuoka prefecture, March 2018)
7

Initial
Response

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

1. Initial Response > 1.1 Flooding in government buildings

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

Even though it was known that the local government office
is in a flood-assumed area, there were cries of: “It looks
like the town hall is going to get flooded!”

Countermeasure

1. Initial Response > 1.1 Flooding in government buildings

Install equipment, such as emergency power supply andinternet server, as high up of the ground as possible.

~ Headquarter functions lost due to flooding of local government office ~Case

Lessons to be learned● Local government

Sayo, Hyogo pref.

● Disaster2009 Typhoon No. 9 (Sayo-cho typhoon No. 9 disaster)● Date9 & 10 August 2009

Facilities

Formed from a tropical low over the South Sea of Japan, typhoon No. 9 caused incredibly unstable weather in
Hyogo prefecture at 21:00 on 9 August 2009, with rain falling at 89mm/hr in the Sayo area of Sayo-cho, recording
a daily precipitation of 326.5mm. The death toll reached 18, plus two more people missing, while widespreadflooding caused major damage, with more than 1,700 residences affected. This disaster was due to the Sayogawa
River bursting its banks, damaging nearby properties and flooding the 1st floor (ground floor) of the town hall,halting its function as a disaster prevention base. Furthermore, close to half of the victims of this disaster diedwhile evacuating toward a shelter at nighttime after receiving an evacuation advisory message.

Disaster Outline

Sayo waterlevel station

Overflow caution water level 3.00-

Improvement example: At Shingu, Wakayama prefecture, all communication devices, including
emergency wireless equipment, were moved from 2nd floor to 4th floor (top floor) in April 2012. (12)-Highest water level
Rainfall-Rainfall over time at Sayo rain gauge station and water level at Sayo water level station(Hyogo prefecture: From After action review report (6) on 2009 typhoon No. 9
disaster)-Flooded local
government
office carpark-

Critical Situations
The local government office (the area’s disaster prevention base) was marked on the local hazard map as being in aflood-assumed area, but it did not get flooded during a disaster in September 2004, so measures for flooding of the office
were insufficient.

Criticalsituation
point

The Kozuki branch office is in the Obiyamagawa River basin, an area excluded from flooding simulation calculations, andas it did not get flooded during a disaster in September 2004, the office was not expected to become flooded.

-

Result 1 The local government office began flooding from about 21:15, after that, the entrance doors became damaged andwater rapidly flowed in, flooding the 1st floor (ground floor), approximately one meter deep. At Kozuki branch office,flooding began at about 21:40, inundating the 1st floor.

10-

Flooding of local government office (disaster response base), so emergency power supply equipment could not
be used because it was installed outdoors. (23)
Flooding reached 2nd floor of local government office, so communication was interrupted because equipment,such as local government wireless system, was submerged. (12)Fresh consideration needs to be given to the provision of alternative facilities for disaster control
headquarters. The local government office also functions as a headquarters, so, as needs dictate, anotherfacility, such as the fire department office or a branch office, should be set up as a substitute facility. (5)In accordance with amendments to the flood prevention law in 2015, not only estimating flooding but also
estimating flooding that takes into account assumed maximum scale of rainfall and high tide is to be
calculated, and the work to do that is being reflected in hazard maps in municipalities. Thus, when
responding to above lessons learned, this info needs to be referred to establish desirable countermeasures.

Related guidelines-*Sources: After action review report on damage of typhoon No. 9 (5), p47-48, July 2010

Similar cases atother local
government
offices

Consideration of alternative facilities for role of disaster control headquarters

Pointers-

Result 2 The river monitoring/warning system, emergency phone lines and various electronic office appliances at both the local
government office and branch offices were submerged, becoming unusable. Also, a power outage meant that
unaffected equipment, such as Hyogo prefecture’s satellite communication network system, phone switchboard, fax
machines, copiers and internet server, all became inoperable.

Implement measures to prevent power outages, so that power is available
even if flooding occurs despite of advance measures taken

In readiness for flooding in extraordinary situations (even if government office has been made flood proof inadvance), it is a good idea to make sure equipment, such as lights and communication devices, willfunction even if there is a power outage.
Improvement example: At Shingu, Wakayama prefecture, in June 2012, lighting equipment at the branch
office of the local government office was set up with power from an electric generator supply to maintainlighting as the area disaster prevention base even during power outages. (12)Improvement example: At Joso, Ibaraki prefecture, concrete walls were built around the emergency power
supply facilities.

Procedure
Criticalsituation
point

Implement measures to prevent flooding of local government office

The disaster control headquarters is the cornerstone for dealing with disasters, so establish it in a locationthat is not susceptible to damage. (5)Ideally, the local government office should be moved out of flood-assumed area, but if that is not possible,
renovation should be considered, to make the structure flood proof. (5)Facilities

RainfallHighest water level

Overflow danger water level 3.80

Flood fighting corps standby water level 2.50

Install equipment on 2nd floor or higher to prevent submerging during flooding of local government office,and, if possible, use earthquake-resistant installation method. (5)Facilities

Flooded local
government office

Water level

Evacuation judgement water level3.00--(Sayo water level station: Sayokawa River) (Sayo rainfall[Meteorological Agency])
2009 typhoon No. 9 (9 to 10 August)Install emergency equipment high up-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)
Guide for creating business continuation plan for municipalities(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, May 2015)(In particular, Chapter 5: Specifics on alternative government office when local government officecan no longer be used, etc.)
Business continuation guideline for local public bodies at times of large-scale disaster(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, February 2016)(In particular, Chapter 2.2.3: Predicting damage status of local government office [equivalentfacility] and vicinity, etc.)111. Initial Response > 1.2 No experienced responders

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

No-one has come to help, so responding to the disaster isout of the question!
What should we do?!

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

1. Initial Response > 1.2 No experienced responders

Create a structure to enable the dispatching of personnel todisaster sites and that makes use of retired disaster veterans.

~ There are limits to what untrained personnel can do ~Case

Lessons to be learned● Local government Miyazu, Kyoto pref.
● Disaster2004 typhoon No. 23 (2004 Miyazu typhoon disaster)● DateMorning of 20th to afternoon of 21st of October 2004

On 20 October 2004, a rarely seen super typhoon (typhoon No. 23) passed through the south of
Kyoto prefecture, and the strong winds and rain it unleashed on Miyazu left four people dead, 11
properties totally destroyed and many properties severely damaged by flooding below and above
floor line due to rivers, such as Otegawa, bursting their banks.

Disaster Outline

Water level (m)5Rainfall (mm)
60
50

-

Procedure

3

-

2
20

Deploy specialist personnel

Consider the importance of the role of primary responsibility in responding to disasters, and, likewise, work
to strengthen disaster prevention system by taking actions such as deploying disaster prevention specialists,
etc. (3)Procedure

Produce disaster response manual

1

10

-

0
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 2 4 6 8 10 12 140Time →

Water level at Kyoguchi Bridge and rainfall at Iwato(From children’s supplementary reader “repairing Otegawa River”, Kyoto pref. homepage)

Debris-avalanche that hit the Takiba area (Kanabiki
housing development)

To enable personnel to take smooth initial action in responding to disasters, draw up a personnel responsemanual, making clear the division of duties and action details for each personnel member, and make suretraining is conducted regularly even during normal times. (5)Procedure-

Critical Situations
The division of duties for personnel (each unit) had not been determined in detail.

Result 1

Criticalsituation
point

There seemed to be some incidences where initial response did not gosmoothly.

Personnel were not well versed in the use of communication equipment for disasteremergency control.
Result 2-- Regarding training for secretariat members, only newly appointed personnel received training, which wasinsufficient, thus there were only a few members well acquainted with disaster response tasks. (24)- As no-one had experienced a major disaster in recent years, there was a shortage of disaster response
experience among personnel, so, in some cases, the initial response seemed to take time. (13)- Personnel tried to respond based on flood experiences of the past. (5)- Only a very few personnel members with experience of responding to disasters, which led to confusion. (2)Make use of retired veterans

Take into account that there will be a shortage of manpower during a disaster, so consider using retired
veterans and information volunteers, etc. (3)Procedure

Amidst power outage that disabled phones, personnel failed to make useof government emergency radio installed in the local contact office.

*Sources: After action review report pertaining to typhoon No. 23 (1), p3 and p6, July 2005

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices-

Summon veterans to disaster response headquarters

Create a structure that enables personnel with past experience in responding to disasters to gather at thedisaster response headquarters whenever there is a major disaster. (24)Procedure
Criticalsituation
point

12

Improve the quality of personnel via support from local government

If disaster control headquarters is based in the local government, initiatives should be taken to improve
quality of personnel, such as training disaster managers to provide assistance in emergencies. (24)430Change personnel members way of thinking via drilling and training

An effort must be made to change the way of thinking and ability to take action among personnel members
by conducting practical drilling and training. (2)

Skill
-

40
Elevation of land in vicinity 2.61m

Skill

Assistance from prefectures

To assist municipalities that cannot transmit info due to large-scale damage, prefectures should dispatch liaison
officers and support teams to gather info and coordinate, etc. (3)To enable municipalities to improve disaster response capability, prefectures should provide advice, such as
disaster response knowledge that suits the needs of the municipality concerned, and hold meaningful
workshops (visiting lectures, etc.) (3)Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July
2019)

-

The book of secrets for responding to disasters in municipalities - Protecting citizens attimes of disaster (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, August 2015)-

Guidelines for local public body support systems at times of disasters(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2017)13

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

1. Initial Response > 1.3 Establishing disaster control headquarters (switching over to the systemused during disasters)

The rain is getting really heavy!
When should we switch over to the disaster control
headquarters?

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

1. Initial Response > 1.3 Establishing disaster control headquarters (switching over to the systemused during disasters)

The disaster control headquarters must be quickly establishedin line with criteria, and the headquarters’ chief must declarethat the city is in emergency mode.

~ The difficulty in deciding when to switch over to the system used during disasters ~Case● Local government

Joso, Ibaraki pref.

● Disaster

September 2015 Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall disaster

Lessons to be learned(Kinugawa River, Joso, 2015)● DateSkill

Afternoon of 9th to 11th of September 2015-

Disaster Outline

Hourly rainfall

Early morning on the 10th, several parts of Kinugawa River began
to overflow and banks to leak. By 12:50, one section of the bankcollapsed at Missaka-cho in the city, causing massive damage, withwidespread flooding in the area between Kinugawa and Kokaigawa
rivers, the deaths of two people, 40 or more people injured and5,000 or more properties partially or fully destroyed. The city hall,
completed in 2014 and featuring the lessons learned from theGreat East Japan Earthquake (2011), was inundated with flood
water, some 4,300 citizens were rescued, with 1,339 people
winched to safety by helicopters.

Flood, September 2015

Rainfall change over time (“Kinugawa River flood damage and recovery
circumstances”, Kanto Regional Development Bureau) →The relevant personnel members should become skillful at discerning the danger from weather info, such as that presented
in weather forecasts and radar images. (9)Cumulative rainfall

Procedure-Time (h)Improvement example: In Gifu prefecture, the criteria is set so that the disaster control headquarters is automaticallyset up at times such as when heavy rain, flooding and high winds are all announced, when landslide alert info isannounced, when river water level reaches burst danger level and when evacuation advisory is officially announced,
etc.

There were no clear rules about the task of the chief of the disaster control headquarters
declaring a switch from normal system to emergency system.

In response to the time, disaster location and external force by type and outbreak of disaster(including the fear of an outbreak), the preparations were not in place for a clear response
between organizational and personnel deployment for action that ought to be taken at times of
emergency and the organizational and personnel deployment to be taken at normal times(detailed response that makes it possible to instruct each personnel member on redeployment).

*Sources: After action review report on flooding of Kinugawa River, Joso in 2015 (23), p57-58, 13 June 2016

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

14-

In the case of storm and flood damage, the switchover from general work in the flood control systemof the river division to a disaster alert system or disaster control system with tasks undertaken by therisk management division is difficult. (18)
For switchover to flood control headquarters/disaster control headquarters system, the system
involved needs to be efficiently strengthened. (16)At the time of the disaster, there was no clear criteria for setting deployment system and deployment
period at time of storm and flood damage, so, although the setting of a disaster alert headquarters
and disaster control headquarters were considered, ultimately the action to set these headquarters
was not taken. (14)Establish a system for times of emergency that can cope with multiple disaster patterns

Across an estimable range, establish in detail the patterns, such as disaster type (flooding, earthquake, etc.),
occurrence time, location and extent of damage, and define an emergency system that can actually function inaccordance with those patterns. And, to make it function, prepare switchover plan to shift from normal system toemergency system. (23)Procedure-Work system switchover is declared by chief of headquarters

The chief of headquarters must clearly declare the switchover of personnel work system from normal time toemergency time, with the work content that the personnel must familiarize themselves with clearly defined in the local
disaster prevention plan. (23)Procedure-

Result Those responsible were not able to switch without delay from the organizational andpersonnel deployment geared to providing public services in normal times to the emergency
organizational and personnel deployment geared to providing public services necessary intimes of emergency (operation of disaster control headquarters, dissemination of info, suchas evacuation advisories/orders, and operation of shelters, etc.)

Clarify criteria for setting up headquarters

Review establishing criteria to ensure that the disaster control headquarters is automatically set up in certain cases. (7)Procedure

Criticalsituation
point

Increase the number of personnel gathering information

Increase the number of personnel involved in gathering (reception/transmission), and make this system a thorough one in
the control headquarters. (25)Procedure-

Sharing weather information with personnel members

Share weather information, such as weather forecasts, on bulletin boards, via email and in-house broadcasts at the local
government office.
Inform all personnel of homepage(s) handling weather forecasts, so that they themselves can judge how to gather weather
information. (9)Procedure

Critical Situations

Criticalsituation
point

Personnel must gain proficiency in understanding weather information

Implement training that has a high level of reality

Implement disaster training with a high level of reality imaginable in emergencies, where actions, such as information
gathering, analysis and decision-making skills, taken by departments, units and individual personnel members can beverified. (23)

Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guidelines on evacuation advisory, etc. (2) (official announcement criteria/disaster prevention system
edition, Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)(In particular, Chapter 8.2: Disaster prevention systems for local public bodies for assumable natural
disasters, etc.)15

1. Initial Response > 1.4 Assembling local personnel members

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

Hardly any personnel members are gathering even thougha disaster looks imminent!

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

1. Initial Response > 1.4 Assembling local personnel members

Assembly rules and multiple forms of communication need to
be implemented thoroughly to enable nighttime and holiday
assembly.

~ Personnel shortages and response tardiness due to difficulty in or slowness in gathering ~Case● Local government Kani, Gifu pref.
7.15 heavy rainfall (2010 Kani, Gifu prefecture)● Disaster
Afternoon of 15th to early dawn of 16th of July 2010
● DateRain started to fall from around 16:00 on 15 July, turning into a thunderstorm that recorded 20mm of rain in a ten
minute period on the city hall’s rain gauge from 16:20. Thereafter, rain continued to fall intermittently, recordingsome 270mm of precipitation at the city hall over seven hours from rainfall commencement, making it a record
rainfall unmatched in recent years. The style of rainfall varied greatly by area. Kanigawa River burst its banks.
Roads were flooded in various areas, properties inundated with water and damage caused by landslides.

Disaster Outline

Lessons to be learned
Facilities-

Make definite contact with personnel to request assembly by using diverse forms of communication, such as a local
government wireless system and email functions on mobile phones. (5)-Establish a communication system that enables mass broadcast of info, making use of a disaster prevention
information broadcast system. (26)Procedure

90
Imawatari

70

Kamo civil engineering office

Rainfall [mm/hr]

80

Mitake60

Kurokawa (weather office)40

Tajimi (weather office)30
20

On the premise that there will absenteeism among personnel due to the late hour or transport blocks, etc., every effort
must be made to ensure that the initial system covers in advance the assembly criteria, such as the need for
substitute leaders, first responders and substitute responders as well as assembly points and response work forpersonnel when there are transport blocks. (2)-Consider the time required for personnel members to assemble, and establish a system for enabling personnel toassemble quickly by making a deployment organization chart and setting rules to cope with situations where people
cannot be reached by phone, and then making all personnel members aware of the deployment organization chartand other measures for assembly. (26)

10
0
16 17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1

Produce a plan that reflects the premise that personnel members will be late or absent.

-

Maruyama

50

Ensure multiple forms of communication

2

Time (15/07/2010)
Amount of rainfall over time at gauge locations

A scene from in the city-

Critical Situations
Criticalsituation
point

Criticalsituation
point

Criticalsituation
point

There were no instruction to be on standby or precautionary heads up made across entire local
government office, and, as rain stopped at 23:00, the personnel in some departments weredismissed at 24:00.
There had been a call from April for personnel members to register for staff assembly email alerts,
but, at the time of the disaster, registration remained at approximately 200 people. In disastertraining held from September onward, the plan is to make this registration fully functional.
Also, managerial judgements meant that some departments were not contacted – for example,
people forgot to make contact via contact network and there was no sense of responsibility torespond to flooding.
Some personnel members could not assemble because of family or transport issues.
Some personnel members also waited at home in readiness for work the following day.
Result-16-

The personnel mobilization concept did not envisage the impact of personnel assemblinglate at night or how personnel should travel in heavy rain. (22)Personnel members were contacted at an early stage with orders to assemble, but contact
was difficult because of the late hour, so it took time. (13)An emergency contact network had been created, but contacting personnel members did
not go smoothly. (5)Ensure leeway in staffing

From the outset, appropriate staffing that accommodates the amount of work in the disaster control headquarters isneeded, making sure to have staffing leeway to deal with any unexpected work that emerges. Also, as it may be hardfor deployed personnel members to reach their scheduled departments, it is desirable that multiple personnel
members are deployed to deal with one task. (5)Procedure

Produce an assembly criteria manual-

Produce a clear-cut assembly criteria manual and make all personnel members fully aware of its contents. (27)-Rules should be laid down for responses when there is an emergency warning, such as automatic assembly of prenominated personnel members, and personnel must be made aware of those rules.(19)

Skill
-

Some 20 minutes were needed for the 1st unit of support personnel to assemble in response to the
instruction to open community center shelters. In one case, a liaison chief had to run a shelter
single-handedly until support personnel arrived.
*Sources: After action review report on damage of torrential rain on 7.15 (9), p40, 4 November 2010

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

Procedure

Foster risk awareness among unit members

On a daily basis, work to foster risk awareness among members of all units, instructing them so that they respond todisasters appropriately, and, at the same time, review and overhaul contact network. (18)

Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guide for creating business continuation plan for municipalities (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office,May 2015)(In particular, Chapter 5-1: Clear substitute hierarchy to cope with times when leader is absent andassembly system for personnel, etc.)-

Business continuation guideline for local public bodies at times of large-scale disaster(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, February 2016)(In particular, Chapter 2.4.3: Establishing assembly system for personnel, etc.)

17

Headquarters
Management

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

2. Headquarters Management > 2.1 Location of disaster control headquarters

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

What is happening - right now - at that
cramped, far-off headquarters?

2. Headquarters Management > 2.1 Location of disaster control headquarters

Make sure in normal times that you have a reasonably
independent, spacious office available as a disaster control
headquarters.

~ Disaster control headquarters failing to function because of a lack of space ~Case● Local government

Joso, Ibaraki pref.

● Disaster

September 2015 Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall

Lessons to be learned(2015 Flooding of Kinugawa River, Joso)● DateFacilities

Afternoon of 9th to 11th of September 2015-

Disaster Outline

Hourly rainfall

Early morning on the 10th, several parts of Kinugawa River began tooverflow and banks to leak. By 12:50, one section of the bank collapsed at
Missaka-cho in the city, causing widespread flooding in the area between
Kinugawa and Kokaigawa rivers, the deaths of two people, 40 or more
people injured and 5,000 or more properties partially or fully destroyed. The
city hall, completed in 2014 and featuring the lessons learned from theGreat East Japan Earthquake (2011), was inundated with flood water, andsome 4,300 citizens were rescued, with up to 1,339 people winched tosafety by helicopters.

Flood, September 2015
14:00 September 9

Cumulative rainfall

4:00 September 10

14 hours

Rainfall change over time (“Kinugawa River flood damage and recovery circumstances”,
Kanto Regional Development Bureau)

It is desirable for disaster control headquarters and disaster prevention department to be placed in the same local
government building to enable sharing of disaster updates for swift and precise decision making. (1)-The members of the disaster control headquarters should be placed together with or in adjacent spaces to thesecretariat units (general supervision, information and public relations units, etc.), to enable them to share informationand smoothly communicate. (23)

Not only did this consume the time and energy of personnel, it also became a breeding ground forinaccuracies in transmitting information, including content omissions, confusion andmisunderstandings, which impeded the sharing of information and mutual communication
between the safety & security section and the disaster control headquarters.

Facilities

For urgent response to a disaster, liaison officers from stakeholder bodies (police, fire, SDF, prefecture and MLIT,etc.) must be in the information sharing loop to enable close collaboration, so space should also be made available toliaison officers from those bodies to facilitate information sharing and smooth communicating between disaster control
headquarters and those stakeholder bodies. (23)-

Improvement example: In Joso, Ibaraki prefecture, the disaster control headquarters are set up with office spaceensured for liaison officers and support teams.

Pointers

For a few days in the initial period, liaison officers from stakeholder bodies (police, fire, SDF,
Ibaraki prefecture and MLIT, etc.) were unable to participate in meetings held by the disaster
control headquarters, making close collaboration difficult based on the information being sharedwith those bodies.
*Sources: After action review report on flooding of Kinugawa River, Joso in 2015 (23), p18, 13 June 2016

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices-20

It took up valuable time to attend meetings at the disaster control headquarters located in a separate
government building, away from the local government office. (20)
Meeting space was cramped, and information display and collaboration with external bodies was
unsuitable. (12)The locations and floors differed for disaster prevention manager offices and disaster prevention
information system office, so managers had to frequently to-and-fro between offices. (5)As the chief and secretariat of disaster control headquarters were in different local governmentbuildings, there looked like there were problems with pooling and sharing information. (1)Ensure office space for stakeholder bodies and others-

Result 2

Coordinate deployment space for disaster prevention department-

Designed for council meetings, the conference room lacked sufficient space for
personnel from the disaster control headquarters to pursue work and for liaison
officers from stakeholder bodies to participate in meetings.

Criticalsituation
point

Use a spacious main conference room as the site for disaster control headquarters. (23)

Facilities

Oral messaging by phone and toing and froing was needed because of theexcessive distance between the safety & security section (2nd floor on east side of
local government building) and the conference room serving as disaster control
headquarters (3rd floor on west side of local government building).
Result 1

Ensure spacious office for disaster control headquarters

Time (h)Critical Situations
Criticalsituation
point

When a disaster hits, risk management personnel members are expected to work in extremely difficult circumstances
to gather and analyze information, enabling the resulting response to be swift and precise. For that reason, personnel
supervising roles must be cut off from their routine work, and, as much as possible, provided with independent rooms
serving as disaster control headquarters or disaster work office. In doing this, consideration must be given to the usual
ways in which those rooms (offices) are used. (5)Facilities-

Ensure independent office room for disaster control headquarters

In considering the location of a disaster prevention headquarters, if you envisage the local government officebecoming unusable because of flooding or collapse, then advance consideration must be given to an alternative
facility to house the disaster control headquarters.

Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items (Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-1: Installation and operation of disaster control headquarters)-

Toward strengthening the functions of municipal disaster control headquarters ~Case studies on
disaster prevention information system~,(Civil Protection and Disaster Management Department, Fire and Disaster Management Agency, July
2017)

21

2. Headquarters Management > 2.2 Equipment for disaster control headquarters

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

Even though it’s headquarters, there’s nowireless or TV!

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

2. Headquarters Management > 2.2 Equipment for disaster control headquarters

Also envisage power outages as you develop yourprocedure for gathering, pooling and sharing information.

~ Delay in response due to lack of information tools in the room used as disaster control
headquarters ~Case

Disaster Outline

Lessons to be learned● Local government

Hofu, Yamaguchi pref.

● Disaster2009 Hofu heavy rainfall (2009 Hofu heavy rainfall)● DateEarly morning to late at night on 21st of July 2009

Facilities

From morning to late at night on the 21st of July 2009, widespread heavy rainfall was recorded mainly in
the Chugoku region, with numerous landslides occurring in various areas. In Yamaguchi prefecture,
there were 159 landslides. In the cities of Hofu and Yamaguchi, mudslides began to flow at about noonon the 21st, causing 14 deaths in Hofu, of which 13 were elderly people of 65 or older. Among damaged
properties was a special-care elderly nursing home in the landslide damage potential zone.
Debris flow outbreak(around noon)

Hourly rainfall (mm)Cumulative rainfall (mm)Disaster control headquarters established at
8:30 on 21st

Ishiharagawa
River

Lifted at
8:15 on 22nd-

For disaster control headquarters, prepare facilities that are capable of handling the disaster prevention informationthat ought to be acquired.
Prepare facilities in a planned manner, including the installation of TVs and projectors and set up of an intercom
system, e-maps and disaster-dedicated external information system. (10)-Install a base station for a mobile government disaster prevention radio system in the headquarters. (10)Facilities-

Total rainfall

Hourly rainfall

Mudslide alert information (Hofu) announced
7:40 on 21st
Evacuation
advisory
14:10

Chronological order of rainfall situation and disaster response

A damage scene

Disaster control headquarters were set up in the general affairs section (equipment)
and river harbor section (consumables), but when a heavy rainfall alert wasannounced at 4:18 on 21 July, damage reports began to come in from early morning
into the river harbor section, and personnel members headed to damage sites to
respond; meanwhile, as damage reports started to come into the general affairs
section at just after 7:00, that section became the only disaster control headquarters.

Criticalsituation
point

Result 1

Criticalsituation
point

The disaster control headquarters got underway with uneven stocks of necessary
equipment and consumables.

-

Citizens gathered information from TV broadcasts, but the headquarters did not havea TV, so the situation could not be grasped, so information gathered at headquarters
lagged behind.
As there was no wireless station in the disaster control headquarters on the 3rd floor(the base station was in the general affairs section on the 2nd floor), the mobile
disaster prevention radio was not fully used.

Criticalsituation
point

Result 2

The disaster control headquarters was not able to gather the disaster prevention
information it ought to have collected.

22-

A spacious operation room is needed to share information and smoothly respond to disasters;
however, hardly any body involved managed to secure sufficient space. Moreover, there were lotsof other problems, such as disaster prevention equipment being stored in different locations in thelocal government building. (2)The system when establishing the disaster control headquarters

The task of establishing the headquarters belongs to personnel members, excluding those who are already busy
gathering disaster prevention information. (10)Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guide for creating business continuation plan for municipalities (Disaster Management, Cabinet
Office, Japan, May 2015)(In particular, Chapter 5-4: Ensuring various forms of communication that can be easily
maintained/kept connected during disasters, etc.)-

Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items (Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-1: Installation and operation of disaster control headquarters)-

Toward strengthening the functions of municipal disaster control headquarters ~Case studies on
disaster prevention information system~,
Civil Protection and Disaster Management Department, Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
July 2017*Sources: After action review report on damage of heavy rainfall in Hofu (10), p20 and p27, December 2010

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

Equip the disaster control headquarters with the necessary commodities attime of establishment

To swiftly establish the headquarters, reconsider the necessary commodities, and store them in a warehouse near theheadquarters; whereas, a system should be set up for commodities that cannot be stored (big goods and leased
equipment, etc.) with pre-arranged responsibility placed with personnel members or units that will assemble at theheadquarters in a crisis, so that the headquarters can be quickly equipped/stocked and ready to function. (10)Procedure-

Servicing and maintaining on a regular basis

Communication equipment, etc., must be serviced and inspected on a regular basis to ensure that it functions properly.
(5)

Facilities

Critical Situations

Consider what needs to be done at times of power outages

At times of power outages, the use of all forms of communication equipment, starting with phones and officeautomation appliances, will not be possible, which will interfere with the gathering and transmission of information, so
set up an emergency power supply (generator) in a location that will not become flooded to enable the use of electricalequipment during power outages, and make sure that the generator is serviced and inspected on a regular basis. (5)Facilities

5hr 40min elapsed from establishment of
headquarters to announcement ofevacuation advisory

Prepare facilities in a planned manner23

2. Headquarters Management > 2.3 Management of disaster control headquarters

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

What should my unit do?
What’s that unit doing?

2. Headquarters Management > 2.3 Management of disaster control headquarters

Establish a “disaster response manual” that makes clear indetail “when and what” each person should be doing.

~ Inadequate rules and roles in operating disaster control headquarters will make it dysfunctional ~Case● Local government

Joso, Ibaraki pref.

● Disaster

September 2015 Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall (September

Lessons to be learned2015 major flooding on Kinugawa River, Joso)

Procedure

Afternoon of 9th to 11th of September 2015

● DateDisaster Outline

Hourly rainfall

Early morning on the 10th, several parts of Kinugawa River began tooverflow and banks to leak. By 12:50, one section of the bank collapsed at
Missaka-cho in the city, causing widespread flooding in the area between
Kinugawa and Kokaigawa rivers, two people died, 40 or more were injured
and 5,000 or more properties were partially or fully destroyed. The city hall,
completed in 2014 and featuring the lessons learned from the Great East
Japan Earthquake (2011), was inundated with flood water, and some 4,300
citizens were rescued, with up to 1,339 people winched to safety byhelicopters.

Flood, September 2015
14:00 September 9

Cumulative rainfall-

Prepare a manual for efficiently handling emergency work in the disaster control headquarters even with a limited number ofpeople. (19)-

Produce duties for each unit and manuals for individual units, correct them accordingly, and make personnel members fully
aware of contents in April each year when personnel transfers are made. (18)4:00 September 10

14 hours

Rainfall change over time (“Kinugawa River flood damage and recovery circumstances”,
Kanto Regional Development Bureau)

Procedure--

In response to the time, disaster location and external force by type and outbreakof disaster, the preparations were not in place for a clear response between
organizational and personnel deployment for action that ought to be taken attimes of emergency and the organizational and personnel deployment to be taken
at normal times.

Criticalsituation
point

Realistic training was not undertaken to check response skills, such as howeach department, each unit and each personnel member at the disaster control
headquarters gathers and analyzes information, and uses it in decision making.

Criticalsituation
point

Result

The general affairs unit of the disaster control headquarters secretariat, cored aroundthe security & safety section, was overrun with phone calls from citizens and news
media, making it impossible for the secretariat to fulfill its conventional responsibilities.
Despite this, many of the personnel members had not switched their minds toemergency mode, so, overall, their time was not used effectively.

-

24

-

The division of duties among each unit was arbitrary, leading to big differences in the work to be
tackled and the personnel system used, depending on the unit in question. (13)The organization is such that the chief of headquarters is the head of the unit system, but therelationship between personnel members and units was not made clear. (13)Implement management imagination games for disaster control headquarters

Use operation diagram of disaster control headquarters to play management imagination games, while also setting towork sequentially the information gathering unit and public relations unit under the normal flood prevention system, sothat the units build up experience during normal duties and learn how to respond to large-scale disasters. (18)

Related guidelines*Sources: After action review report on flooding of Kinugawa River, Joso in 2015 (23), p57, 13 June 2016

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

Ensure leeway in system

To respond flexibly to the emergence of work (special provisions) not originally envisaged, or consideration of a newmeasure/system, the work system drawn up must have leeway in terms of the personnel members deployed in thesecretariat. (3)Procedure-

Let public relation officer and related bodies be present at headquarters

Keep the public relations officer who provides news to the public and deals with the news media present at thedisaster control headquarters, as moves made by the headquarters need to be grasped for dissemination. Also,
liaison officers for stakeholder bodies (police, fire, SDF, prefecture and MLIT, etc.) must be allowed to participate as
well. (23)Procedure-

The disaster prevention section dedicates itself to secretariat and staff functions

As the general affairs unit in the disaster control headquarters, the role of the personnel members in the disasterprevention section must be dedicated to secretariat and staff functions. Namely, support staff from another department
must handle phone calls with inquiries aimed at the disaster prevention section. (23)Procedure
There was no clear plan for switching over from normal organizational andpersonnel deployment to the emergency organizational and personnel
deployment.

Not everybody should respond. There needs to be a division of roles.

In the disaster control headquarters, roles ought to be clearly divided into “information analysis”, “countermeasureplanning” and “checking & approving”. By dividing roles like this, the overall situation must be comprehensively
grasped and sufficient checks implemented to find deficiencies in countermeasure details. (23)Procedure-

Inform all personnel members about any switchover to disaster mode

At the appropriate stage after the disaster control headquarters has been established, the chief of the headquarters will
declare a switchover from the normal work system to “emergency response mode”, and all local government personnel must
be made aware of that switchover. (23)ProcedureTime (h)Critical Situations
Criticalsituation
point

Produce manual and get personnel members to familiarize themselves with the contents-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Toward strengthening the functions of municipal disaster control headquarters ~Case studies on
disaster prevention information system~,(Civil Protection and Disaster Management Department, Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
July 2017)(In particular, Chapter 4-2: Clarifying division of roles in disaster control headquarters)

25

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

2. Headquarters Management > 2.4 Collecting, compiling & analyzing info

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

There’s a mountain of information coming!
Which is the important info?

Countermeasure

2. Headquarters Management > 2.4 Collecting, compiling & analyzing info

First, start by creating a system to handle
immense amounts of information.

~ Decision-making delays due to inefficient gathering, compiling and analyzing of information ~Case

Lessons to be learned● Local government

Hofu, Yamaguchi pref.

● Disaster2009 Hofu heavy rainfall (2009 Hofu heavy rainfall)● DateEarly morning to late at night on 21st of July 2009

Procedure-

Disaster Outline

Debris flow outbreak(around noon)

Hourly rainfall (mm)Cumulative rainfall (mm)Chronological order of rainfall situation and disaster
response→

Disaster control headquarters established at
8:30 on 21st

Total rainfall

Evacuation
advisory
14:10

In advance, set the information classification standard and the procedures to deal with that standard, then carry out a precheck of all that, so that you can smoothly classify information when a disaster occurs, and get on with the task ofgrasping an overall image of the disaster. (13)-The greater the damage is the more likely information will not come in swiftly, so consider creating a structure that cangenerally analyze fragmentary damage reports and rain amounts and water levels to enable you to join the dots to makedamage forecasts and policy decisions. (3)Procedure
5hr 40min elapsed from establishment of
headquarters to announcement ofevacuation advisory

Because there were so many disaster checklist form reports with data about onsite situation
and response being received (onsite situation), the staff could not handle all of them
individually, which meant there was information that could not be reported to the headquarters.
Result 1 After personnel from stakeholder sections investigated disaster sites using checklist form
reports, there were some personnel who are unable to file reports to the disaster control
headquarters, which meant the headquarters did not have the full picture about thesituations at disaster sites.

Criticalsituation
point

Disaster information came into the disaster control headquarters and fire department
headquarters separately, causing congestion because it was not centralized.

The necessary hotline was in place to transmit information to the national government, but it
did not work.
Result 3 The latest weather information could not be passed on to the staff in the headquarters.

Consider ways of improving how information is reported and processed as well as how information formats can be
integrated. Making use of systems such as GIS as an information sharing system is a essential. (2)-As much as possible, reports should be accompanied by photos or video clips (make use of smartphone photos, etc.).
(12)

Procedure

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices--

26

There were cases where general damage information and information provided by police and fireservices were not shared by prefectural stakeholder bodies and municipalities. (17)The amount of damage information was immense and required a great effort to aggregate andcompile. Also, regarding decisions and information at the disaster control headquarters, sometransmission confusion surfaced because of insufficient sharing of decisions and information withordinary personnel members. (13)Various types of information exacerbated the situation and caused conflict, so scrutiny of required
information was necessary. (12)There was a need for a reception desk at the outset to gather information. (11)Centrally manage and share information in the disaster control headquarters-

Establish an information processing system to ensure accuracy and centralized management, so that information that ishandled is the kind that ought to be gathered and ought to be known about. And, to make the most of the latest
information, swiftly document it (produce a disaster compendium, etc.). (12)-Display the chronological order on a whiteboard for each information source, for say information from the prefectural
office and information from the volunteer fire corps, etc., and then, at fixed times, that information should be shared withpersonnel members. (9)-Improvement example: In Tottori prefecture, as soon as the contents of general damage reports have been compiled,they are uploaded to a homepage for public viewing, in an effort to let stakeholders share information.

Procedure

Make good use of hotlines and agreements-

Improvement example: In times of emergency in Hofu, Yamaguchi prefecture, hotlines are established between the national
government, prefectural government, city mayor and the director of disaster risk management.

-

Consider entering into disaster agreements to receive information from companies, such as construction firms. (10)

Skill
-

*Sources: After action review report on damage of heavy rainfall in Hofu (10), p22, p27 and P29, December 2010-

Improve how information is reported and processed, and make use of the geographic information system (GIS).

-

Result 2 Information could not be centralized, and so confusion emerged about the latest information.
Criticalsituation
point

Set information classification standard-

Critical Situations
Criticalsituation
point

Establish a unit to deal with information analysis and strategy planning and another one to deal with information gatheringand broadcasting in order to strengthen information analysis function. (3)Procedure

Lifted at
8:15 on 22nd

Mudslide alert information (Hofu) announced
7:40 on 21st

Hourly rainfall

From morning to late at night on the 21st of July 2009,
widespread heavy rainfall was recorded mainly in the
Chugoku region, with numerous landslides occurringin various areas. In Yamaguchi prefecture, there were
159 landslides. In the cities of Hofu and Yamaguchi,
mudslides began to flow at about noon on the 21st,causing 14 deaths in Hofu, of which 13 were elderly
people of 65 or older. Among damaged properties
was a special-care elderly nursing home in thelandslide damage potential zone.

Set up units that specialize in gathering and analyzing information

Improve personnel skills in gathering and processing information

Many pieces of available disaster information will be transmitted via the internet, yet the work environment for thattends to prompt the overlooking of important information. Therefore, planned maintenance of facilities and training of
personnel members capable of doing that work needs to be undertaken, so establish a specialist unit to gather andprocess information coming into the disaster control headquarters, to improve gathering and transmission functions.
(10)

Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guideline on how to make use of hotlines for small-to-medium-sized rivers (river environment section,
Water and Disaster Management Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism(MLIT) , February 2017)27

2. Headquarters Management > 2.5 Responding to inquiries by phone

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

I can’t get my disaster control headquarters work
done because I have to keep answering the phone!

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

2. Headquarters Management > 2.5 Responding to inquiries by phone

Phone calls are handled by system for entire local government.
So, in-house information must be shared, too.

~ Staff & lines monopolized due to phone inquiry jam ~Case● Local governmentUji, Kyoto pref.

● Disaster13 & 14 August 2012 heavy rainfall for southern part ofLessons to be learned

Kyoto prefecture (heavy rainfall, Uji, 2014)
Afternoon of 9th to 11th of September 2015

● DateFrom 13 to 14 August 2012, a total of 311mm of rain at a maximum hourly rate of 78.5mm fell in Uji,causing the Midajirogawa River to burst its banks and other rivers, such as Shizugawa, Ikusagawa
and Niidagawa, to overflow. The damage was immense, with two people dead, more than 2,000
properties damaged, numerous roads and rivers damaged by landslides and debris flows, andagricultural and forestry land, such as tea and rice fields, damaged by debris flows. In particular,
mountainous areas, such as Sumiyama, were left isolated after roads and lifelines were cut off.

Disaster Outline

Rainfall observed at Uji City Hall

Hourly rainfall

Facilities-

To prevent the adverse effect of phone line congestion, dedicated lines (with notification of priority phone numbers forstakeholder bodies, etc.) should be set up in tandem with the establishment of the disaster control headquarters. (13)Procedure-

Total rainfall

Ensure dedicated phone lines for stakeholders

Prepare a system that enables swift set up of dedicated phone lines

Prepare a system that will swiftly establish dedicated direct dial phone lines in cases of disaster. (14)Procedure

Build up a phone system that covers the entire local government

Hourly rainfall
Total rainfall

Amount of rainfall at Uji city hall (13 & 14 August)The burst Mitajirogawa River (morning of 14th of August 2012)-

Change public awareness to direct disaster-information-related phone calls to the disaster prevention section, as asystem that covers the entire local government must be set up to deal with external contact/inquiries at times ofdisaster. (23)-Appoint personnel to refer phone calls to section handling external calls and others to handle phone calls, and makesure that calls are dealt with concisely to enable a greater influx of information. (9)Procedure-

Critical Situations
From the outset, personnel members were overwhelmed by phone calls from the public,
detailing various issues from requests for rescue to situation updates; hence, it was a struggle torespond given the different levels of priority and importance.

Criticalsituation
point

Result 1

Criticalsituation
point

The important information needed to conduct initial onsite investigations could not be
distinguished, so it took time to grasp an overall image of the disaster, which hindered
any attempts at swift disaster response that followed.

The checklist card (for asking about onsite situation, etc.) prepared for phone inquiries had numerous
checklist questions, so each individual call took too much time.
Result 2

Criticalsituation
point

Reports could not be made to the headquarters, so there were cases where
information was not shared among everyone.

Phone calls to the disaster control headquarters all went through a city hall
representative number, so when calls were at their peak, the line was always engaged.
Result 3

There were delays in transmission of emergency information and making
contact with personnel members.

At the time when the disaster control headquarters is established, personnel from a different department should
handle phone calls for the disaster prevention section, so that the latter can dedicate themselves to the role of being ageneral affairs unit to handle the tasks of the secretariat and staff functions for the disaster control headquarters. (23)Procedure-Augment personnel deployment in stages in accordance with weather information

To handle a disaster outbreak, it is essential to swiftly gather and prepare information, to then implement initialdisaster response, so deploy personnel from the moment an official warning is given, further augment them whenalerts are given, and task them with the jobs of gathering and preparing weather information, etc. (10)Procedure-

Dedicate disaster prevention section to the tasks of secretariat and staff functions

Make use of designated format from normal times

Use the everyday common phoning format to deal smoothly with phone calls during disasters. (9)Skill

Improve personnel skills through training-

Continuously train personnel to improve their knowledge and response capabilities. (21)-Improvement example: In Yokkaichi, Mie prefecture, training for the operation of a disaster control headquarters(storm/flood/earthquake) is held twice a year, to improve staff knowledge and response capabilities.

:*Sources: 13 and 14 August 2012 heavy rainfall damage records for southern part of Kyoto prefecture (13), p11, March 2014-

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

28-

Supervising unit were overwhelmed by the task of responding to phone calls, which meant the disaster
control headquarters’ secretariat/staff hardly managed to get done any of the work they ought to do. (23)We were overwhelmed by phone calls from the public, which meant, at the outset, we could not
appropriately attend to meetings in the disaster control headquarters or manage the risk management
center. (21)We were overwhelmed by phone calls at night. The calls were so numerous that the supervising section
could not handle them all. (9)Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guide for creating business continuation plan for municipalities (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office,Japan, May 2015)(In particular, Chapter 5-4: Ensuring various forms of communication that can be easily
maintained/kept connected during disasters, etc.)

29

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

2. Headquarters Management > 2.6 Backup & loaned staff

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

I’ve come to help, but what should I do?

2. Headquarters Management > 2.6 Backup & loaned staff

Make support contents clear in agreements, etc.
Also implement mutual training.

~ As the roles of and procedures for support personnel are not sufficiently laid out inmanuals, there is confusion as to what they should do ~● Local government Ibaraki pref.

Case● Disaster

Lessons to be learned

September 2015 Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall(heavy rainfall, Ibaraki pref., 2015)● DateProcedure

Afternoon of 8th to afternoon of 10th of September 2015-

Disaster Outline

Time

According to the Meteorological Agency, theimpact of moist air coming in from the south
due to typhoon No. 18 (and when it changed toa low pressure front) caused heavy rainfall
across a widespread area from west to northJapan – in particular, it brought record rainfalls
to the Kanto and Tohoku regions. In Ibaraki
prefecture, a special heavy rain warning wasannounced at 7:45 on the 10th. The water levelof Kinugawa River rose on the 10th, overflowing
in the Wakamiyado area of Joso and thenbursting its bank at Missaka in Joso, leading towidespread flooding in Joso. According to
Ibaraki prefecture’s summary of the damage inthe prefecture, there were 5,000 or more
properties partially or fully destroyed.

Water level

ItemStandard
value

Flood fighting corps
standby water level

Overflow cautionEvacuation judgement
water level
water level

Overflow danger
water level

Water level

Procedure

Flood fighting corps
standby water level

Overflow caution
water level

Evacuation
judgement waterlevel

Overflow danger
water level

Changing water level at Kawashima water level monitoring station(river disaster prevention information homepage, MLIT)

Critical Situations

Criticalsituation
point

Specific tasks to be undertaken by personnel dispatched to Joso
from prefectural office were not arranged in advance.

Criticalsituation
point

A support structure at prefectural level needs to be established, so that when a large-scale disaster has occurred, theprefectural and municipal personnel who are dispatched have the knowledge and experience to respond to disasters
in order to help damaged municipalities that are in a state of confusion when it comes to swiftly and precisely
implementing initial emergency response because they have problems, such as a lack disaster-response know how,
are short on experts or their local government building is damaged. (6)-Improvement example: From lessons learned in Hyogo prefecture, in September 2010, the Hyogo emergency
support taskforce was formed to offer emergency assistance to local authorities that experience disaster. Up to now,
the taskforce has helped out in local disasters, such as the 2014 Tamba heavy rainfall, and in disaster areas coveredby the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Procedure

Result 2

There was a shortage of personnel at nighttime and weekends,
making division of roles difficult*Sources: After action review report onresponse to Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall in September 2015 (24), p7

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

30-

Regarding the dispatch of liaison personnel from prefectural disaster control headquarters to thedamaged municipality, the personnel had not been trained, and they were not prepared because
they were dispatched urgently. (15)As prefectural disaster control headquarters’ office space was cramped, the liaison officers from the
Cabinet Office, Fire and Disaster Management Agency, SDF, Kyushu Regional Development
Bureau, Police and other prefectures could only be offered meagre space to work in. (15)We asked for support personnel from all agencies; however, as they came for just a day and rotated,disaster response moved ahead without us being able to accumulate knowledge from our responseto the public’s needs. (14)Create rules and manual for support personnel-

Create fixed rules and a manual for a support personnel deployment system that takes into account the contents ofsupport work and the amount of work. (14)-Periodically visit the city, and make the gathering of information on municipalities a task of the prefectural onsite
headquarters, and create a manual. (24)Procedure

The prefectural personnel were not briefed on who (specificpersonnel) to support before being dispatched.

Local authority support personnel could mostly only help for half a
day or during daytime.

Prefectures should establish support systems to help damaged municipalities--

Result 1

Consider in advance the roles of the assisting side and the assistance-receiving side

Regarding the dispatching of personnel to damaged municipalities, rules need to be laid down, such as coordinating in
advance with the municipalities in question, including the work content of dispatched personnel, as well as briefing
dispatched personnel at the onsite headquarters or by the municipality in question. (24)

Presumably, deployment may be prolonged, so a takeover method for substitutions (takeover time, transmission
method, contact format, etc.) must be established, including meticulous rotation of personnel and creation of job
sheets. (3)

Skill
-

Improve personnel skills through training

Thoroughly train personnel for a support personnel deployment system that takes into account the contents of support
work and the amount of work. (14)Facilities-

Take into consideration the rotation of personnel

Prepare items to be carried by support personnel

In advance, implement workshop and prepare the items to be carried. (15)Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guidelines for local public body support systems at times of disasters(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2017)31

Structure in
Government
OfficeCritical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

3. Structure in Government Office > 3.1 Info sharing in local government office

Please explain the current situation!

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

3. Structure in Government Office > 3.1 Info sharing in local government office

Establish a structure that enables sharing of information in
local government office, such as in-house broadcasting andin-house LAN.

~ Confused response due to insufficient sharing of information in the local
government office ~Case● Local government

Kusatsu, Shiga pref.

● Disaster2013 typhoon No. 18 heavy rainfall

Lessons to be learned(2013 heavy rainfall, Kusatsu)

Disaster Outline

Procedure

15 to 16 September 2013

● DateA disaster control headquarters was set up to tackle the heavy rainfall from typhoon No. 18
of 15 and 16 September 2013. In the city, two residences were inundated with water under
the floor, 53 mudslides occurred, sewers overflowed, arable land was damaged, but no firstclass river succumbed to overflows or bank bursts, and there was no human damage.

After a meeting at headquarters ends, unit leaders in departments should hold a meeting, in particular to meticulously
share the important points of available information. (18)-Regarding the items of decisions made by the disaster control headquarters, the local government office broadcasting
system, etc., should be used to make personnel outside of the disaster control headquarters periodically aware of thedetailed individual instructions and key points of the information passed onto subordinates from the managers of themembers in the headquarters. (23)-

Use local government in-house email to send response status to all personnel so that it is shared among all personnel,
to enable them to respond and mobilize swiftly to the various tasks. (16)Total rainfall from 00:00 on 15/09 to 24:00 on 16/09
Kusatsu rainfall

Procedure
Kamitoyama rainfall

Kusatsu rainfall observation station
Hourly maximum rainfall

hour Hourly maximum rainfall

24hr rainfall

24hr rainfall
Total rainfall

hour

Rainfall graphs from Kusatsu rain gauge station (Kamitoyama, Kusatsu)-

Decide on a structure for sharing information from in the secretariat, such as holding periodic meetings for unit leaders.
(24)-

Consider making rules for the provision of advance weather information from the weather station to the stakeholder
departments in the local government office. (26)Procedure
Overflow in the city

Critical Situations

Criticalsituation
point

The contents of meetings held at headquarters, such as damage
status and response status in the city, was not shared as far
down the chain of command as each unit in the departments.
In particular, personnel who sequentially turned up for work
thanks to the augmentation of personnel did not know about thedamage status or response status in the city.

Display the chronological order on a whiteboard for each information source, for say information from the prefectural
office and information from the volunteer fire corps, etc., and then at fixed times that information should be shared withpersonnel members. (9)-Establish a system to appropriately keep a record of activities, such as setting up a “recording unit” in theheadquarters secretariat, and compile a manual for that system. (24)-Make templates for headquarters’ meeting materials and publication materials, and also determine the compilation
rules and lay them down in a manual. (24)

Facilities-*Sources: Summary & After action review report on response to damage from heavy rain due to typhoon No. 18 in 2013 (18), p8, February 201434

- The personnel outside of the local government meeting room were told very little about the considerations anddecisions being made by the disaster control headquarters, creating an information and awareness disparity
between personnel on the inside and those on the outside of the local government meeting room. (23)- Due to multiple incidents of damage, we were unable to share information in the local government office by swift
gathering, reporting and contacting, and there were some delays in responding to the needs of the public. (19)- As information sharing was insufficient, there was a lack of information given to the public and onsite responders,which led to onsite confusion. (12)- Damage information that entered the disaster control headquarters did not get shared in the local government office.
(9)- The contents of decisions made in meetings in the disaster control headquarters were not processed andtransmitted to personnel, so a disparity in information awareness emerged between personnel (units), which led toconfusion in dealing with the public. (1)Systemize the compiling and recording of information to facilitate the sharing of it-

Result Response was implemented without important items of information being
shared among the personnel in the local government office.

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

Make rules for sharing information

Kamitoyama rainfall observation station

Total rainfall

Criticalsituation
point

Make all personnel aware of information-

Strengthen the disaster prevention information sharing system

Manage the latest disaster response situation, and consider introducing a disaster information management system to
aid the sharing of information to all personnel. Also, until that introduction is made, express information in the typicalway by utilizing the existing system, such as posting the material from meetings at headquarters on an electronicbulletin board. Other such actions could include the timely sharing of advance information on approaching typhoons,etc. (18)

Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items (Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-1: Installation and operation of disaster control headquarters)-

Toward strengthening the functions of municipal disaster control headquarters ~Case studies on
disaster prevention information system~,(Civil Protection and Disaster Management Department, Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
July 2017)35

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

3. Structure in Government Office > 3.1 Personnel management

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

Why am I the only one who is this busy!
That unit look like they’ve got nothing to do.

Countermeasure

3. Structure in Government Office > 3.1 Personnel management

Allocate work appropriately based on workloads that take
into consideration several disaster response scenarios.

~ The difficulty of maintaining a disaster response system due to bias in workload ~● Local government Suzuka, Mie pref.

Case● Disaster

Lessons to be learned

August 2014 typhoon No. 11 disaster(2014 Suzuka heavy rainfall)● DateDisaster Outline

Afternoon of 9th to early dawn next day of August 2014

Procedure

Typhoon No. 11 passed through Mie prefecture, causing a record-breaking downpour, so that a
special warning for heavy rainfall was announced on 9 August Damage included flooding from heavy
rain and stripping of roof tiles by high winds, while the combination of high winds and heavy rain
seriously effected transportation, such as railways, air travel and expressways.

-

With regard to the deployment system in the operating manual of the disaster control headquarters, consider
separating deployment for storm/flood disaster and earthquake disasters. (20)-

In particular, the initial response to storm/flood disasters sees a concentration of work in the construction department,so consideration should be given to adding substitution personnel to the mobilization system or providing personnel
from other departments. (18)Hourlyprecipitation

Total
precipitation

Tsu, Tsu City

Procedure

9th

Time

When establishing the disaster control headquarters, the number of people to be deployed from each department should
be reported to the disaster control headquarters and, if support is needed, the number of personnel required should bereported to headquarters, with the a clear record of the strengthening of the support system made in the manual. (21)-Improvement example: In Yokkaichi, Mie prefecture, personnel reports, etc., made when the disaster control
headquarters is established are clearly listed in the manual.

-As voluntary cooperation is difficult during periods of uncertainty about the situation, if support is required, thedepartment with primary responsibility should make a request to other departments in a meeting held in the disaster
control headquarters. Also, even after the headquarters is disbanded, the department with primary responsibility should
encourage stakeholder departments to set about making the necessary adjustments. (18)-

Depending on the situation, the timing of system strengthening for the secretariat in the headquarters should be brought
forward, and the judgement criteria and division of duties for that should be clearly listed in the response manual for theheadquarters. (19)10thTransition of rainfall (Mie pref. weather flash from Tsu weather station related to typhoon No. 11 in 2014)

Critical Situations
With the official announcement of an evacuation advisory for Ota-cho, the construction
unit was tasked with checking the evacuation situation and finding out the water level ofrivers, but they were so busy with the emergency response that they did not have theleeway to fulfill those tasks.

Criticalsituation
point

Result 1 As the construction unit was so busy, consideration needed to be given tofinding another unit to carry out the tasks.
The repair unit assesses and repairs damaged public facilities, but as there was minimal
damage to public facilities during the heavy rainfall, some members of the repair unit
supported the work of the construction unit but the majority were left on standby.

Criticalsituation
point

Result 2 As a surplus of personnel occurred, the deployment system needs to bereviewed in accordance with situations.

Strengthen support system based on understanding of and situation related to number of people deployed-(Time)

8th

Consider deployment system based on attributes of disaster

Procedure-

If disaster response looks likely to drag on for some time, full consideration must be given to managing health,including psychological aspects, of personnel engaged in disaster response, and arrangements for substitutepersonnel must be made and their acquisition carried out, and measures taken to ensure that takeover protocols in
substitutions are observed, such as the thorough making of records in job sheet, while reviews and rotations ofdeployed personnel must be made with the workload taken into consideration. (5)

Skill
-

Consider rotating personnel

Improve risk awareness among personnel from normal times

Even during normal times, thorough efforts must be taken to be ready for disasters, and, as risk awareness to be carriedout by personnel on their own, personnel notebooks and disaster manuals should be provided to make them aware ofwhat they need to prepare for. (18)*Sources: Table of verification results on response to damage from typhoon No. 11 (20), p3, September 2014

Related guidelines-

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

36-

The work rotation was not decided for personnel in the secretariat. (24)
The number of participating personnel was greatly increased, but as there were issues with clarifying division ofroles pertaining to efficient deployment and emergency response work, a disparity in workload emerged among
personnel. (19)The division of duties for each unit was haphazard, leading to massive disparities in workload and personnel
configurations, depending on the unit in charge. (13)The work of each unit diversified, lengthened in time and had to be done by a small number of people, so astrenuous period of work continued for some time. Furthermore, due to application of the disaster relief act andact concerning support for reconstructing livelihoods of disaster victims, work converged on certain units, whichcaused disparity in workloads between different groups. (12)- Guide for municipality flood response(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)- Guidelines for local public body support systems at times of disasters(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2017)37

Collecting
InfoCritical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

4. Collecting Info > 4.1 Collecting water level info

It looks like the water level gauge isbroken, what should I do?

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

4. Collecting Info > 4.1 Collecting water level info

Do not rely on just one piece of information, gather
various pieces to grasp the situation.

~ Delay in gathering water level information due to breakdown in monitoring equipment ~Case● Local government Sayo, Hyogo pref.
● Disaster2009 typhoon No. 9 disaster (Sayo-cho typhoon No. 9 disaster)● Date9 to 10 August 2009

Disaster Outline

Sayo (Meteorological Agency) rainfall observation bureau

RainfallFormed from a tropical low over the South Sea
Maximum rainfall over 24hr
of Japan, typhoon No. 9 caused incredibly
unstable weather in Hyogo prefecture at 21:00
Maximum rainfall over 60min
on 9 August 2009, with rain falling at 89mm/hr in*89.0mmthe Sayo area of Sayo-cho, recording a daily(Hourly maximum rainfall *81.5mm)
precipitation of 326.5mm. The death toll reached18, plus two more people missing, whilewidespread flooding caused major damage, withmore than 1,700 residences affected.
This disaster was due to the Sayogawa Riverbursting its banks, damaging nearby properties
and flooding the 1st floor (ground floor) of thetown hall, halting its function as a disasterprevention base. Furthermore, close to half ofthe victims of this disaster died while evacuating
9 August 2009 10 August 2009
toward a shelter at nighttime after receiving anevacuation advisory message.
Rainfall over time at Sayo rain gauge station and water level at Sayo water level station

Lessons to be learned
Facilities-

It is a good idea to install more river monitoring cameras and water gauges. (5)-Regarding areas where monitoring equipment, such as cameras and water gauges, is not installed, organize local
residents to gather information using their own eyes – for instance, making use of the simple ruler-like markings on
bridge footings that indicate water level. (5)Facilities-

Procedure-With the earliest flooding starting at Enkoji on the Sayogawa River and the
Chikusagawa River in the Kuzaki area in September 2004’s disaster, thegreatest attention was paid to their water levels. The water level at Enkoji
continued to rise, but water gauge data for the Chikusagawa River in Kuzaki
held at 2.88m (below the overflow alert level) from 15:50 onward with nofurther rise seen.

Criticalsituation
point*Sources: After action review report on damage of typhoon No. 9 (5), p117, July 2010

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices40-

Unforeseeable issues piled up, such as sudden rise in river water levels and a broken
water gauge. (9)Gather observation information using various information instruments

Gather information related to the current situations and forecasts for weather and water levels, making effective use ofvarious information instruments and systems, such as river monitoring cameras, river water level forecasting systems
and “river disaster prevention information” on the internet. (5)Systemize the gathering of information-

For the gathering and compiling of information, designate a supervisor(s) to prevent gaps and delays in the items
gathered. (5)-Concerning the gathering of information for areas, work to grasp onsite information by considering how to systemize
efforts to understand situations in each area, including the selection of not only area units but also area personnel
who are conversant with the local geography. (13)Procedure-

Result Later, the broken gauge was discovered, but no-one realized the breakdown
during the emergency.
The area’s dedicated river monitoring & warning system (only for the Kuzaki
section of Chikusagawa River and the Enkoji section of Sayogawa River) wasused to find out when water levels became excessive, requiring an evacuation
decision, which was made by government emergency radio to the residents of
the areas concerned.

Regularly maintain and inspect pieces of equipment

The installation sites of all the types of monitoring equipment must be rechecked and the equipment regularly
maintained and inspected to prevent gaps in water level and rainfall information data (needed for disaster response)
due to breakdowns or other impediments during an emergency. (6)Procedure

Critical Situations

Install more river monitoring cameras and water gauges

Create a manual containing data such as procedures on operating instruments and pointers (what to do if abreakdown is suspected, etc.). (5)Procedure-

Create water level observation manual

Make use of hotlines

Even in normal times, fine tune the approach to hotlines, determining in advance the types of information to comeinto the headquarters, etc., to enable better use of hotlines connected to parties such as weather stations and rivermanagers. (22)Related guidelines- Guide for municipality flood response(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)- Guideline on how to make use of hotlines for small-to-medium-sized rivers (riverenvironment section, Water and Disaster Management Bureau, the Ministry ofLand, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) , Japan, February 2017)41

4. Collecting Info > 4.2 Collecting info about onsite situation & level of damage

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

Who said the district’s flooded?
It’s dark, how would I know!

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

4. Collecting Info > 4.2 Collecting info about onsite situation & level of damage

Create a structure that enables not only the personnel but alsopresidents of neighborhood associations, flood fighting corps
and others to find out and share onsite information.

~ The difficulty of gathering damage information due to nighttime flooding, road cutoffs
and community isolation ~Case● Local government

Tochigi, Tochigi pref.

● Disaster

September 2015 Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall(2015 Ibaraki flooding)● DateAfternoon of 9th to 11th of September 2015

From the 9th and all through the 10th of September 2015, heavy rain (daily rainfall of 299.0mm, hourly
rate of 49.5mm) fell, causing Uzumagawa, Akazugawa and Naganokawa rivers to overflow andgreatly damage various locations in the city. This disaster left a massive trail of destruction, including
one person dead, more than 2,700 properties damaged, while landslides and overflow water cut off
numerous roads and damaged rivers, and mudslides damaged agriculture by blocking wastewater
channels and smothering fields.

Disaster Outline

Precipitation
19:00

1:00

7:00

13:00

7th

8th

19:00

1:00

7:00

13:00

9th

Precipitation transition

19:00

1:00

7:00

Procedure

When a typhoon, etc., looks like it will approach at nighttime, open up shelters during daylight hours, and call on the
public to voluntarily evacuate to those shelters. (25)-

Improvement example: In Tochigi, Tochigi prefecture, shelters are opened early and calls made for voluntaryevacuation, in order to prevent situations where people have to evacuate in stormy weather at night.

Prepare a system that enables collaboration with presidents of neighborhood associations to swiftly grasp situations.
(14)-

Make calls for damage information from citizens using the internet, etc., and aggregate that information. Get
presidents of neighborhood associations to appoint disaster damage liaison officers for districts, so that they canprovide damage information. (25)-

Improvement example: In Sayo, Hyogo prefecture, citizens who can see the water levels in rivers from their homes
were asked to be monitors in a disaster monitoring system that only requires the monitors to check and notify about
the water level when contacted.

13:00

10th

Overflow from Uzumagawa River

Procedure

Critical Situations
Even as the number of damaged locations increased, it was difficult
to grasp information about damaged and flooded locations because
the disaster was at night.

Criticalsituation
point

The area around the local government building flooded, making it
impossible to get vehicles out, so patrols could not be implemented.
As areas that normally do not flood became flooded, there were notenough patrolling personnel members to prevent delays in orders
for road closures.

Criticalsituation
point

Grasp the situation through collaborations with presidents of neighborhood associations and citizens-*Sources: After action review report related to Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall in September 2015 (summary edition), Reflecting erudition from on verification results infuture disaster prevention measures, March 2016

Criticalsituation
point

Call on public to evacuate early-

Procedure

Total precipitation

Tochigi (Tochigi City, Tochigi Pref.)Lessons to be learned

Result 1 It took time to find out the damage situation, so immediate aggregation of
information was not possible.
*Sources: We will not forget! Support & restoration record for Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall disaster in September 2015 (25), p100 and p102,
August 2016-

Grasp the situation known through collaborations with organizations

Systemize cooperation and strengthen collaboration with organizations, such as the construction industry union. (25)

Facilities

Measures for isolated communities-

Ensure secure methods of mutual communication with communities that could become isolated. Also, work tostockpile emergency power generators. (11)-Train citizens to be proficient in the use of communication equipment. (11)Procedure-Prepare in advance the movement routes to be used at times of emergency. Take into consideration the situation if
flooding occurs, and review deployment locations for official vehicles. (25)Procedure-Prepare movement routes for times of emergency

Safety measures for nighttime patrols

If water levels rise at night, equip official vehicles with lighting equipment, such as floodlights. (25)

Related guidelines
Similar cases
at other local
government
offices42-

Concerning isolated mountainous areas, with power outages also having an impact, there was atemporary situation where information could not be obtained. (13)Patrol area was vast and roads were flooded, so the gathered information was insufficient. (5)There was a power outage at city hall and shelters, so phones were not working, which meant thegathering and transmission of information were insufficient. (1)-Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items (Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 3-1: Gathering and analyzing monitoring and damage information)

43

Collaboratingwith Stakeholder
Bodies5. Collaborating with Stakeholder Bodies > 5.1 Collaborating with disaster prevention bodies

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

How should I pass on this info tostakeholder bodies?

5. Collaborating with Stakeholder Bodies > 5.1 Collaborating with disaster prevention bodies

Use joint training to check the contents and timing of
information to be passed on or received.

~ Delays in response due to deficiencies in collaboration with stakeholder bodies(river office, weather station, fire department, etc.) ~Case● Local government

Joso, Ibaraki pref.

● Disaster

September 2015 Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall

Lessons to be learned(2015 Kinugawa River Flooding, Joso)

Procedure

Afternoon of 9th to 11th of September 2015

● Date-Disaster Outline
Early morning on the 10th, several parts of Kinugawa River began
to overflow and banks to leak. By 12:50, one section of the bankcollapsed at Missaka-cho in the city, causing massive damage, withwidespread flooding in the area between Kinugawa and Kokaigawa
rivers, two people died, 40 or more people were injured and 5,000
or more properties were partially or fully destroyed. The city hall,
completed in 2014 and featuring the lessons learned from theGreat East Japan Earthquake (2011), was inundated with flood
water, some 4,300 citizens were rescued, with 1,339 people
winched to safety by helicopters.

Hourly rainfall

Flood, September 2015
14:00 September 9

Cumulative rainfall

4:00 September 10

Procedure

14 hours

Rainfall change over time (“Kinugawa River flood damage and recovery circumstances”, Kanto
Regional Development Bureau) →Disaster prevention unit, primarily tasked with the role of secretariat/staffing
function for the disaster control headquarters, was overwhelmed by the surge inphone calls.

Criticalsituation
point

Result 1

The unit did not have time to grasp the activity status of each stakeholder body and thenshare that information.

Information on a hotline directly linked to the mobile phone of the city mayor was
not transmitted from the disaster control headquarters to the disaster prevention
unit.

Criticalsituation
point

Result 2

Criticalsituation
point

The hotline information was not shared (not even with stakeholder
departments), leading to the fire department headquarters finding out about
the Kinugawa River bank bursting on TV and emergency government radio.

It was not envisaged that liaison officers from stakeholder bodies should participate
in meetings at the disaster control headquarters.

Result 3

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices-

46

From normal times, base collaboration on “face-to-face” relationships, so that cooperation can be requested andinformation can be shared speedily and accurately at times of disaster. (6)-Get road operators, police and fire departments to patrol together and share information in a meeting held every year
before the flood season, so that they can share information on how to more effectively develop facilities andinspections as well as check and strengthen their contact systems. (7)-From normal times, request periodic participation from all stakeholder bodies in disaster imagination games andpractical training, as it is necessary to check mutual roles and specific methods for sharing information. (23)Procedure-

Sharing information (about issues such as areas being issued with evacuation advisories andopening of shelters) between the disaster control headquarters and fire department
headquarters and volunteer fire corps was not possible. (25)Information about the well-being of people checked by bodies, such as the city, fire department
and prefecture, did not get shared; moreover, due to a lack of integration of items, checks on
well-being of people were made numerous times to local residents and local leaders. (12)There was a hotline connected to the national government, but it did not function, so the latest
weather information did not reach the personnel in the headquarters. (10)Mutually dispatch liaison officers between stakeholder bodies

During disaster response, liaison officers should be mutually dispatched between stakeholder bodies as an effective
way of gathering information at each destination. (23)Procedure-

Clarify the confirmation method to be used when liaison officers of stakeholder bodies
assemble.

Clarify the confirmation method (body name, liaison officer name(s), number of people, etc.) to be used when liaison
officers of stakeholder bodies assemble. (24)Procedure-

Use hotlines effectively

Improvement example: In Hofu, Yamaguchi prefecture, hotlines for times of emergency have been established with thenational government, prefecture, city mayor and disaster risk management chief.

Procedure-

It was not possible to share information with stakeholder bodies.

*Sources: After action review report on flooding of Kinugawa River, Joso in 2015 (23), p33-34, 13 June 2016

Develop “face-to-face relationships” with stakeholder bodies by holding information
sharing meetings and/or running training programs, etc.

-

Time (h)Critical Situations

Clarify division of roles among stakeholder bodies

Depending on the type of disaster, scale and area damaged, there are a variety of stakeholders (national government,
prefectures, nearby local authorities, companies, volunteers, etc.) that can take action, so list up in detail the divisionof duties for stakeholders in the local disaster prevention plan, and make those division of duties thoroughly known to
the stakeholders. (23)Standardize terminology pertaining to disaster response

Work to mutually deepen the understanding of response capabilities and work undertaken by disaster prevention
bodies, and standardize the terminology used during emergencies. (2)Pointers-

The 2017 amendment to the flood prevention law denotes the founding of a council system for reducing large-scale
flooding, in order to develop a collaborative system for various stakeholders, such as local public bodies, river
operators and flood prevention managers, as path toward making sure everyone escapes when a disaster hits.

Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)
Guideline on how to make use of hotlines for small-to-medium-sized rivers(river environment section, Water and Disaster Management Bureau, Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) , Japan, February 2017)47

5. Collaborating with Stakeholder Bodies > 5.2 Sharing (Disseminating) info with prefectures

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

The press releases for the prefecture andcity are carrying different details!

5. Collaborating with Stakeholder Bodies > 5.2 Sharing (Disseminating) info with prefectures

Prefectures must make the effort to assertively go and get
information without waiting for it come in from municipalities.

~ Insufficient sharing of information between prefectures and municipalities ~● Local government Hyogo pref.

Case

Lessons to be learned

Hyogo pref. typhoon No. 23 disaster● Disaster(2004 typhoon No. 23 disaster)ProcedureNight of 19th to end of 20th of October 2004

● Date-Disaster Outline
Observation station name
Total rainfall
24hr maximum rainfall
12hr maximum rainfall
Hourly maximum rainfall

Wadayama (Meteorological
Agency)Right bank breach at Tateno

Highest observed water level

Right bank breach height
Left bank breach heightLandside water
pump stopped

Dangerous
water level

Facilities

Hourly maximum rainfall
Alert water
level

Water level

rainfallTyphoon No. 23 brought
massive devastation to mostly
the Awaji and Tajima areas,
with 26 deaths, 130 injured,some 7,500 properties
partially or fully destroyed andsome 11,000 properties
inundated with water below or
above the floor line, etc.
Rainfall exceeded 300350mm/24h in widespreadparts of Awaji, with aconcentrated downpour
between 6:00 and 18:00 on
the 20th. In Tajima, along thetotal length of the Maruyama
River, rainfall exceeded
200mm/24h, withconcentrated downpour
between 8:00 and 22:00 on
the 20th.

Designatedwater level

Validate operation of the terminals (PCs) in the disaster prevention information system, to bring the information
infrastructure between prefecture and municipalities up to scratch. (6)-Promote development of rules to encourage labor-saving information aggregation in prefectures. (4)Date/time
20 October

21 OctoberTotal rainfall-

There were differences in the press releases from the prefecture
and the municipalities.

-

There were some discrepancies between figures given inannouncements by the prefecture and municipalities.

-*Sources: After action review report on damage of typhoon No. 23 (3), p36, December 2005

Coordinate on contents to be announced

Prefectures and municipalities must consider the timing of their press releases, carefully coordinating on contents, so
as to avoid discrepancies in figures and other data announced. (3)Procedure
ResultDecide who will be responsible for gathering/aggregating/transmitting information in municipalities

Decide who will be responsible for gathering/aggregating/transmitting information, and deploy specialist personnel
members to undertake those tasks (including the input of processed data into the damage information aggregation
system) so that information can be provided swiftly and accurately for municipalities, especially important information(official evacuation advisories and roll call information). (7)Procedure

Criticalsituation
point

Improve personnel skills by holding workshops on disaster prevention information system

Thoroughly implement workshops hosted by prefectures, including efforts to increase the number of workshops held,in order to increase the number of personnel who can operate terminals (PCs, etc.) running the disaster prevention
information system in municipalities. (27)Procedure

Rainfall and water level on Maruyama River (at Tatsuno) in Tajima

Critical Situations

Strengthen the disaster prevention information network between prefecture and municipalities

-

Skill

19 October

Dispatch prefectural personnel to municipalities

Depending on the damage status, prefectural support personnel and/or headquarters personnel should be
dispatched/stationed at the disaster control headquarters in municipalities to directly gather information from as near as
possible to the disaster site(s), while also serving as the portal for coordinating other things, to strengthen the systems forgathering information and collaborating. (7)Improvement example: In Gifu prefecture, based on lessons learned, a decision has been made to dispatch liaison
officers to disaster sites to grasp the needs pertaining to damage information in and support of damaged municipalities,
with the liaison officers to be dispatched to each municipality already named.

Introduce rules for creation of damage reports

Newly set standards for the typical creation cycle when creating a damage report. And, at times of disaster, show thereport creation schedule based on those standards to the municipalities and fire department headquarters in advance.
(27)

Related guidelines-

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices-48

Regarding the number of people not yet contacted (to confirm wellbeing) reported by the city, theprefecture, without sufficiently confirming/coordinating the content, publicly announced the city’s
figure as the figure for people missing, which led to a misunderstanding about who had not been
contacted and who was missing. (24)Regarding a historical site damaged in the disaster, the city announced it as damage to cultural
assets, while the prefecture did not announce it as such, exposing a discrepancy in the publicannouncements of the city and prefecture. (19)As municipalities were so busy responding to the disaster, they failed in some cases to answer
phone calls from the prefecture providing warnings. (15)Due to lightning strike damage to prefecture’s system, the message that the flood warning had been
lifted did not reach the city, exposing a glitch in information sharing between prefecture and city. (14)-Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items (Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-1: Installation and operation of disaster control headquarters)-

Toward strengthening the functions of municipal disaster control headquarters ~Case studies on
disaster prevention information system~,(Civil Protection and Disaster Management Department, Fire and Disaster Management Agency, July
2017)

49

Issuing
Evacuation
Advisory, etc.

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

6. Issuing Evacuation Advisory, etc. > 6.1 Criteria for issuing evacuation advisory, etc.

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

When do we issue the alert level 4
evacuation advisory?

6. Issuing Evacuation Advisory, etc. > 6.1 Criteria for issuing evacuation advisory, etc.

Referring also to existing manuals, create criteria for
officially announcing evacuation information.

~ Delays in issuing evacuation advisories and orders due to a lack of specific decisionmaking criteria ~Case

Disaster Outline● Local government

Gifu pref.

● Disaster7.15 heavy rainfall (2010 heavy rainfall, Gifu pref.)● DateJust after noon of 15th to early hours of 16th of July 2010

Lessons to be learned
Procedure

Between 15 and 16 July 2010, localized torrential rain, brought on by a seasonal rain front, caused massive
damage to various districts in the prefecture, including four deaths, two missing, one seriously injured, 15
properties partially or fully destroyed, 75 properties flooded above floor line and 380 properties flooded below floor
line. From just after noon until very late at night on the 15th, extremely heavy localized rain fell at about 60mm/hr
across the areas of Chuno and Tono, with rainfall analysis showing locations suffering in excess of 300mm ofrainfall in areas from Yaotsucho to Mitakecho in the vicinity of Kani, where the Kanigawa River burst its banks andthe Tsuchida area where overflow damage occurred both upstream and downstream of Tohashiri Bridge.

Garan, Yaotsucho (AMeDAS)

mm-

Any municipality that has yet to create judgement criteria for officially announcing evacuation advisories/orders(urgent), etc., should be guided to do so quickly, while municipalities that have drawn up such criteria should berequested to review the contents, so that criteria are thoroughly in place as provisions for communities that ought toevacuate. (6)-Clarify criteria (rainfall, water level, etc.) in accordance with emergency faced to create a new manual that denotes the
specific judgement criteria for announcing evacuation information. (10)Procedure

Burst bank location

Create or update criteria for judging when to officially announce alert level 4 evacuation advisory

Establish a manual operation system

Flooded area
JR Taita Line-

Establish a system (timing of and system for conferencing to consider officially announcing evacuation advisory as
well as who should participate in that decision-making, etc.) for securely operating the manual even during short,
localized bursts of torrential rainfall. (7)Kani River

Procedure

Burst bank location
JR Taita Line
Kani RiverTime

Automated Meteorological Data Acquisition System(AMeDAS) rainfall every hour in Garan, Yaotsucho

Criticalsituation
point

There were municipalities where the contents of the “criteria for officiallyannouncing evacuation advisories” complicated the decision-making process forannouncements.
Result 1

Criticalsituation
point

Some municipalities found it difficult to decide when to make announcements
such as the evacuation advisory.

-

52

-

-

To enhance effectiveness of evacuation advisories, the dangers that have to be present for evacuation must be
accurately grasped, so as to narrow down the target areas to be considered for such official announcements. (7)--There were no predictive circumstances and indexes set as criteria for officiallyadvising/ordering evacuation. Also, the “Joso flooding hazard map” was hardly made use of in
deciding and executing evacuation response in areas impacted. (23)No specific judgement criteria for official announcement of evacuation information had been
decided upon. (10)Objective decision-making criteria for officially announcing evacuation information needed tohave been drawn up (in advance). (6)Review the timing (opportunity) for officially announcing alert level 4 evacuation advisory

In considering evacuation advisories, do not be afraid of making an unnecessary call, and make sure to announce
evacuation advisories as much as possible in advance of the danger bearing down on the communities concerned bytaking into account the amount of time it will take to finish evacuation of citizens. (8)Procedure

It took time to grasp whether water levels were rising and whether there werepredictive phenomena to aid judgement calls on official evacuation advisories.

*Sources: After action review report on damage from heavy rain on 7.15 (7), p32, 21 September 2010

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

Listing the areas that ought to be evacuated in the manual should be based on the actual results of evacuation
training and the consideration of areas to be officially issued with evacuation advisories based on reference topertinent hazard maps to enable a more effective approach to evacuation advisories, etc., with all such considerations
reflected in the manual. (7)Procedure

As heavy rain fell in a short period of time at night, it was difficult for patrols, etc.,
to grasp the sudden rises in water levels and the predictive phenomena.
Result 2-

Widespread flooding in Kani

Critical Situations

Review areas covered by alert level 4 evacuation advisories

Prepare gathering and processing system for disaster prevention information

Obtaining information is indispensable to the making of official announcements on evacuation information, so for
information coming into the disaster control headquarters set up a unit to gather and process information and ageneral affairs unit to analyze that information. (10)Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guidelines on evacuation advisory, etc. (2) (official announcement criteria/disaster prevention system edition,
Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)-

Guidelines on sediment disaster warning evacuation, Sediment control department, Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) , Japan, April 2015
(In particular, Chapter 5: Officially announcing/lifting evacuation advisories, etc.)-

Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items (Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Ministry ofInternal Affairs and Communications, Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-2: Drawing up of official announcement criteria for evacuation advisories, etc.)53

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

6. Issuing Evacuation Advisory, etc. > 6.2 Issuing timing of evacuation advisory, etc.

Is it okay to put out an evacuation advisory (alertlevel 4 ) even though the shelters are not open yet?

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

6. Issuing Evacuation Advisory, etc. > 6.2 Issuing timing of evacuation advisory, etc.

Evacuation information is vital for making citizens aware ofpressing danger, so follow the criteria to swiftly announce evacuation.

~ Delay in opening shelters impacted official announcement of evacuation advisory ~Case

Lessons to be learned● Local government

Hiroshima, Hiroshima pref.

● Disaster8.20 heavy rainfall (2014 mudslide, Hiroshima)● DateEarly dawn to morning of 20 August 2014

Procedure-

Disaster Outline
Hourly rainfall

Eastern part of Kabe, Asakita-ku
Effective rainfall

On 20 August 2014, two hours of unparalleled torrential rain in excess of
200mm between 2:00 and 4:00 in Hiroshima caused mudslides and landslides
across widespread foothills and valleys, causing immense damage, including
77 deaths in Asaminami-ku and Asakita-ku (plus three deaths related to thedisaster). The city authorities officially announced evacuation advisories at 4:15
in Asaminami-ku and 4:30 in Asakita-ku, both after large-scale landslides had
occurred.

-

Skill
-

← Rain-damaged area

Critical Situations
Official announcement of evacuation advisory and opening ofshelters were carried out simultaneously irrespective of situation.

The decision to implement evacuation advisories was made at
3:55, but then time was needed to contact shelter managers andautonomous disaster prevention group leaders as well as
dispatch personnel to open shelters and find alternative facilities
for unusable flooded shelters.

Criticalsituation
point

Strive to further inform residents of the types of evacuation information and make them aware of the increase inpotential danger (loss of life) that is incumbent when an evacuation information is announced. (22)-To ensure swift, appropriate behavior from residents at times of disaster, push to make them aware of the meaningsof landslide alert information, record short-period downpour information and special alerts, etc. (17)Collaborate with disaster prevention coordinators (commissioned by local village leaders and police department) to
encourage local residents to autonomously evacuate at early opportunities. (11)-For opening (unlocking) shelters, multiple people ought to be able to do the opening (even in autonomous disasterprevention groups). (22)Procedure

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices54-

As a prerequisite to officially ordering evacuation, authorities were fixated on procedures requiring
shelters to be opened and reception preparation checked, which delayed official evacuation orders
and was a factor in hindering orders going out in one go to evacuate a widespread area. (23)When sounding a landslide alert information, time was needed to grasp areas, populations andnumber of households to be targeted by evacuation advisory, so the timely opportunity forannouncing the evacuation advisory was lost. (20)Create and share database info on areas vulnerable to disaster and the number of residents-

Create a database of areas predictably prone to flooding, locations at risk of landslide, the number of households andthe number of residents. (20)-Also, list up these pieces of data in a manual used to decide upon/transmit evacuation advisories, etc., sharing thedatabase across the entire local government office. (20)-Implement training on making official announcements of evacuation information

Disaster control headquarters’ personnel should proactively participate in disaster prevention training, such as imagine
games where the ideas is to imagine a disaster from local messages and the telltale signs, that will help them toquickly determine areas that should be issued with evacuation information (13)Related guidelines*Sources: After action review report on evacuation measures for heavy rainfall on 20 August 2014 (22), p45, January 2015-

Collaborate with local residents-

Procedure
Result Despite the pressing need, and even though the decision had
been taken to implement evacuation advisories, the various
preparations to open the shelters took time (evacuation advisories
went out at 4:15 in Asaminami-ku and 4:30 in Asakita-ku).

Promote public understanding of information contents-

Procedure

Criticalsituation
point

Foment a common understanding with residents

It is extremely important that residents and municipalities have a common understanding from normal times about
dangers in each local area (landslide and flooding dangers, etc.) and know where shelters are and the evacuationroutes to be taken (including the safety measures to be taken when sheltering at home). (17)Skill
Hourly rainfall & effective rainfall(16:00 on 19th to 6:00 on 20th) →Announce alert level 4 evacuation advisories without waiting for shelters to be opened

When officially announcing evacuation advisories, use the emergency broadcast system to make the announcement,
without waiting for all the secondary shelters to be opened. (9)Improvement example: In Hiroshima, Hiroshima prefecture, during the 8.20 heavy rainfall disaster, official
announcement of evacuation advisory and opening of shelters were carried out simultaneously irrespective of situation– so, after that, the local disaster prevention plan was revised to enable official evacuation announcements without
hesitation or consideration for the time of day (nighttime, early morning) and/or whether designated emergency
evacuation sites are open, when evacuation advisories/orders are deemed necessary (are urgently needed).

-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guidelines on evacuation advisory, etc. (2) (official announcement criteria/disaster prevention system
edition, Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)-“Guidelines on sediment disaster warning evacuation”, Sediment control department, Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) , Japan, April 2015
(In particular, Chapter 5: Officially announcing/lifting evacuation advisories, etc.)55

6. Issuing Evacuation Advisory, etc. > 6.3 Coping with widespread evacuations

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

We need to evacuate to a wider area outside of
the city, but how!?

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

6. Issuing Evacuation Advisory, etc. > 6.3 Coping with widespread evacuations

Collaborate with adjacent municipalities to also ensure safe
evacuation destinations outside of your own municipalities.

~ Lack of awareness about evacuating to wider area caused response delay ~Case● Local government

Joso, Ibaraki pref.

● Disaster

September 2015 Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall(2015 Kinugawa River major flood, Joso)
Afternoon of 9th to 11th of September 2015

● DateEarly morning on the 10th, several parts of Kinugawa River began to overflow and banks to leak. By
12:50, one section of the bank collapsed at Missaka-cho in the city, causing massive damage, withwidespread flooding in the area between Kinugawa and Kokaigawa rivers, two people died, 40 or
more people were injured and 5,000 or more properties partially or fully destroyed. The city hall,
completed in 2014 and featuring the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake (2011),
was inundated with flood water, some 4,300 citizens were rescued, with 1,339 people winched tosafety by helicopters.

Disaster Outline

Hourly rainfall

Flood, September 2015
14:00 September 9

Lessons to be learned
Procedure

Cooperation with the prefecture and nearby local governments ought to be sought to develop a mutual support system
for wider area evacuation during flooding and earthquakes. (23)-

Although the words “wider area” are being used here, they represent the meaning of a evacuation to the nearest safe
place for evacuees. In that process, a distinction between evacuation and sheltering is made, which is best thought ofas, first, giving priority to the development of an evacuation cooperation system, whereas, at the shelter-operatingstage for sheltering, shelterers will be asked at some point to move to shelters in their residential areas. (23)

Cumulative rainfall

Procedure

4:00 September 10

14 hours

Time (h)Rainfall change over time (“Kinugawa River flood damage andrecovery circumstances”, Kanto Regional Development Bureau)

Enter into disaster agreements with adjacent municipalities, to enable use of shelters in other municipalities. (25)-

Improvement example: In Tochigi, Tochigi prefecture, disaster agreements have been entered into with adjacentmunicipalities, enabling the mutual use of shelters.

River overflow

Inadvertently, getting everyone evacuated in the city became the priority, withefforts to evacuate to wider areas left for later.

After the Kinugawa River burst at Missaka-cho, citizens on the east side of
Kinugawa were ordered to evacuate to the west side, but, at that time, thedisaster control headquarters omitted from the outset the option of evacuating
to areas outside of the city.

Criticalsituation
point

56

-

Municipalities are not set up to evacuate across wider areas, so among municipalities there wasinsufficient understanding of the range of support available for wider area evacuation or the costs
involved. (24)
It was difficult to evacuate expansively because the damage status of destination municipalities
was unknown. (24)When calling for wider area evacuation, municipalities should take into account the time required to evacuate,
announcing evacuation advisories early. (24)-

The 2017 amendment to the flood prevention law denotes the founding of a council system for reducing large-scale
flooding, in order to develop a collaborative system for various stakeholders, such as local public bodies, river
operators and flood prevention managers, as a path toward making sure everyone escapes when a disaster hits.

-

Also, the Central Disaster Prevention Council’s working group for considering large-scale, wider area evacuation fromflooding and high-tide overflows shows the way of thinking needed to consider wider area evacuation, with the basic
approach to large-scale, wider area evacuation from flooding and high-tide overflow and a method for quantitative
calculations as well as specific considerations for Koto-5-Ku (the five eastern wards of Tokyo).

Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

The basic approach to large-scale, wider area evacuation from flooding and high-tide overflow
and a method for quantitative calculations as well as specific considerations for the five easternwards of Tokyo (summary version/detailed version), March 2018, Central Disaster Prevention
Council’s working group for considering large-scale, wider area evacuation from flooding andhigh-tide overflows-

Guideline on designating designated evacuation shelters, March 2017, Disaster Management,
Cabinet Office(In particular, Chapter 5(2): Designations beyond municipality areas, etc.)*Sources: After action review report on flooding of Kinugawa River, Joso in 2015 (23), p45,13 June 2016

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

Officially announcing alert level 4 evacuation advisory which takes into account wider area evacuation

Pointers

Result 1 Regarding the contents of this evacuation order, after it was made, the propriety of thedecision drew controversy because it was realized that crossing the river from the east
would be dangerous for citizens, and predictably bridges would become jammed with
evacuation traffic, further increasing dangers.
Result 2 Actually, many residents opted to head to shelters in other municipalities beyond theboundaries of the city, and Joso city authorities ended up following in the wake of thatsmart proactive action by residents to get people to evacuate outside of the city.

Give specific consideration to wider area evacuation

Municipalities should consider shelter facilities for wider area evacuation within the existing agreements they have withadjacent municipalities. (24)Procedure

Critical Situations

Enter into disaster agreements with adjacent municipalities-

Procedure

Criticalsituation
point

Develop a mutual support system with nearby municipalities-

57

Disseminating
InfoCritical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

7. Disseminating Info > 7.1 Disseminating info to residents

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

We put out the info, but it doesn’t seem tohave gotten through to the public!

Countermeasure

7. Disseminating Info > 7.1 Disseminating info to residents

Use multiple methods to transmit information.
Citizens must also make the effort to go and collect information.

~ Information not reaching public because of message contents and insufficienttransmission methods ~Case● Local government

Sapporo, Hokkaido● Disaster

Sapporo 9.11 heavy rainfall (2014 Sapporo heavy rainfall)● DateNight of 10th to end of 11th of September 2014

Disaster Outline
With rain falling continuously from before
daybreak on 11 September, the Sapporo
authorities declared a heavy rain special
warning (flooding, landslides), firstly within
Hokkaido. To implement this, the Sapporo
disaster control headquarters and disaster
control headquarters for each ward were set up,
with evacuation advisories announced andshelters opened to ensure the safety of citizens.
On this occasion, the 24-hour rainfall exceeded
200mm, a record-breaking downpour. There
was no risk to life, but physical damage reached
187 cases across the city, with damage
including flooding of properties (below andabove floor line), landslides and river overflows.

Lessons to be learned
Procedure

Progress of water level and rainfall on
Motsukisamukawa River (upstream)

Water level
Water level exceeding danger ofoverflow at 3:50

Overflow danger
water level
Evacuation judgement
water level
Flood fighting corps
standby water level

Evacuation advisory officiallyannounced at 4:08

Heavy rain special
warning (flooding)lifted at 13:10-

While it is important to have multiple transmission methods, such as audio transmissions (outdoor loudspeakers, local
FM radio, city/volunteer fire corps broadcasting vehicles, etc.) and written transmissions (municipality disasterprevention emails, mobile phone mail messages, homepages, SNS, TV terrestrial digital broadcasting, etc.), the public
needs to know in advance about those methods and make a concerted effort to gather information. (18)-Public awareness through publicity needs to be implemented thoroughly to inform people about the methods ofinformation transmission used. (18)HourlyrainfallEvacuation advisory lifted at
17:12

Flood warning
lifted at 16:10
Overflow caution
water level

Procedure:Water level

To cope with the extra alerts and access demand, new functions should be introduced to enable a switchover to datalight homepage versions, where top pages focus on disaster information in text-centric formats at times of disaster.
(27)-

To improve access, the capacities of communication lines for pertinent websites should be increased. (27):Hourlyrainfall

Water level and rainfall progress on Motsukisamukawa River(upstream) between 22:00 on 10/9 and 18:00 11/9

Procedure-

Critical Situations

Criticalsituation
point

Information provided on homepages was used appropriately, but supervising
personnel did not manage to assemble straightaway, so it took some time before
information started to be provided, and there was a spell of time when there was anoverload of users trying to access the landslide hazard map, which made viewing
difficult.

Criticalsituation
point

Some wards did not have systems for public broadcasts – for example, there wereno vehicles available for mobile broadcasting,.

Procedure--

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

60-

Some homepage sites were difficult to connect to. (27)
In some cases, door-to-door visits by village heads or volunteer fire corps were not possible
because of flooded roads and other dangers that made going outside risky. Also, there was somecases where area email was not used in a timely manner to effectively warn people because
everyone was in such a rush to respond to the disaster. (15)There were difficulties in checking river information provided on the internet because some citizens(the elderly, etc.) who do not own computers or mobile phones could not access the internet. (6)Transmit information to visitors, such as travelers and tourists

Evacuation information must be shared swiftly and accurately with not just local citizens but with visitors (out-of-town
drivers and tourists, etc.) via radio broadcasts and emergency newsflash emails, etc. (6)Train personnel to be proficient in information transmission methods

As some municipalities seem to be unable to put out or are slow at putting out emergency newsflash emails fromcomputers, personnel members must become proficient at sending out messages, such as emergency newsflash
emails. (15)Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guideline (1) related to evacuation advisories (evacuation behavior/information transmission edition),(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)(In particular, Chapter 3: What information provision ought to be from the perspective of people
receiving an evacuation advisory, etc.)-

Guidelines on evacuation advisory, etc. (2) (official announcement criteria/disaster prevention system
edition, Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)-

Guidelines on sediment disaster warning evacuation, Sediment control department, Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) , Japan, April 2015
(In particular, Chapter 4: transmission of information, etc.)-

Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items (Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-3: Methods of transmitting evacuation advisories, etc.)*Sources: After action review report on response to heavy rainfall in Sapporo on 9.11(26), p13, March 2015-

Review notations for areas targeted for alert level 4 evacuation advisories

To make things easy to understand for the public, write down each district targeted by evacuation advisory, showing
detailed addresses on TV and homepages, as well as inducing the public to act via emergency newsflash emails. (26)

Skill

Result 2 Apart from emergency newsflash emails, the city lacked ways of informing citizens; thus,
people whose mobile phones could not receive the emergency newsflash email, people
who do not own mobile phones and people who do not normally use email did not
realize that evacuation advisories had been announced.

Improve functions of homepages-(Motsukisamukawa)(Motsukisamukawa)

Use various ways to transmit and inform people about disaster and evacuation

61

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

7. Disseminating Info > 7.2 Emergency broadcast system

I can’t make out the message fromgovernment emergency radio!

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

7. Disseminating Info > 7.2 Emergency broadcast system / sirens

Express a sense of danger using sirens and alike, as
doing so will also encourage people to look for the details.

~ Information broadcasts missed due to power outages, overflows and/or poor
audio from the government emergency radio ~Case

Disaster Outline● Local government

Fukuoka pref.

● Disaster

July 2017 northern Kyushu heavy rainfall● Date5 to 7 July 2017

Lessons to be learned
Procedure

From 5th to 6th of July 2017, a rainy season front hovering over Tsushima Channel drew in warm andextremely moist air, forming a linear precipitation front that produced record downpours in Fukuoka
and Oita prefectures. At 17:51 on the 5th, the Meteorological Agency announced for the first time in
Kyushu a heavy rain special warning for Fukuoka prefecture. The human cost of this downpour was
39 dead or missing, while physical damage amounted to more than 1,000 properties partially or fully
destroyed and more than 600 properties flooded below or above floor line.

744mm of rain measured
over 9hr2017 heavy rainfall
Asakura (Kitakoji community center)-

Establish a Procedure for multiple methods of transmitting information, including government emergency radio, bosai-mail(emergency newsflash email), internet homepages, etc., and public address vehicles. (23)-

Also consider introducing indoor notification equipment, such as home receivers for government emergency radio andactual portable emergency radios. In addition, make use of free-dial calling services, email distribution, fax distribution
and phone voice messaging services. (12)Procedure

Cumulative rainfall 896 mm

Consider how to multiply and diversify the ways of disseminating information

Approximately 1.5
times greater

Make use of new warning sounds

Consider warning sounds that could be used solely to urge evacuation in a straightforward way that anyone canunderstand, such as siren or alarm bell that raises the alarm of danger due to rising water level. The public must be
made fully aware of the warning sound to be used. (6)2012 heavy rainfall
Yame (Ikenoyama)[1st day]Procedure

Cumulative precipitation

Precipitation

Cumulative rainfall 613 mm-

Change of rainfall over time

Landslide damage (photo by ICHARM)

Besides some outdoor speakers for government emergency radio not
functioning because of power outages and overflows, there were some cases ofpeople not being able make out what was being said from outdoor speakers.

Criticalsituation
point

-

-

62

Many citizens affected by the disaster were unable to make sense of government emergency
radio broadcasts although they could tell that a broadcast was being made. Also, some of thegovernment emergency radio speakers’ peripheral devices became submerged because offlooding, causing them to stop functioning. (23)Due to aging of equipment for government emergency radio, and difficulty in increasing
equipment, etc., there are many areas where radio broadcasts cannot be heard clearly. (12)Some people could not hear the siren sounding due to downpour noise, while others did notknow what the siren sounding meant. (6)Make effective use of images and video footage-

To provide hazard information swiftly and accurately to help local residents to judge whether evacuation is necessary
themselves, web cameras and alike must be used to show the status of rivers on the internet and/or TV, etc. (6)-Improvement example: In Hyogo prefecture, river monitoring cameras (19 cameras on 14 rivers) are used to provide visual
information to the NHK Kobe broadcasting station, with footage being used in real time on news and data broadcasts.
Moreover, Hyogo uses river monitoring cameras (134 cameras on 95 rivers) to provide footage on the internet. Also, sinceJune 2018, the Yahoo weather and emergency website has been providing river monitoring camera footage.

-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guideline (1) related to evacuation advisories (evacuation behavior/information transmission edition),(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)(In particular, Chapter 3: What information provision ought to be from the perspective of people
receiving an evacuation advisory, etc.)-

Guidelines on evacuation advisory, etc. (2) (official announcement criteria/disaster prevention system
edition, Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)-

Guidelines on sediment disaster warning evacuation, Sediment control department, Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) , Japan, April 2015
(In particular, Chapter 4: transmission of information, etc.)-

Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items (Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan,March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-3: Methods of transmitting evacuation advisories, etc.)

Result Disaster prevention information was not securely transmitted to the public.

*Sources: After action review report on response to damage from heavy rainfall in northern part of Kyushu in July 2017 (28), p25, March 2018

Systemize cooperation with areas

To swiftly and accurately transmit hazard information to the public about storms and flooding, the local residents andlocal government must unite in efforts from normal times to regularly undertake evacuation training and imagination
games that envisage wind and water damage, etc. (6)Facilities

Critical Situations

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

Make sure that all areas are provided with information (no community should be left without info) by checking out thesituation for providing information, and, if necessary, contriving ways to transmit different types of information. (6)Procedure[2nd day]

Make sure all areas are provided with information

Related guidelines

63

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

7. Disseminating Info > 7.3 Disseminating info to elderly & disabled

Is this information getting to facilities forpeople requiring attention?

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

7. Disseminating Info > 7.3 Disseminating info to elderly & disabled

Make people thoroughly aware at the announcement stage ofalert level 3 for evacuation preparations/begin evacuation of
the elderly.

~ Delay in evacuation due to facilities for people requiring attention not being informed ~Case● Local government

Sapporo, Hokkaido● Disaster

Sapporo 9.11 heavy rainfall (2014 Sapporo heavy rainfall)● DateNight of 10th to end of 11th of September 2014

Lessons to be learned

With rain falling continuously from before daybreak on 11 September, the Sapporo authorities
declared a heavy rain special warning (flooding, landslides), firstly within Hokkaido. To implement this,the Sapporo disaster control headquarters and disaster control headquarters for each ward were set
up, with evacuation advisories announced and shelters opened to ensure the safety of citizens. On
this occasion, the 24-hour rainfall exceeded 200mm, a record-breaking downpour. There was no risk
to life, but physical damage reached 187 cases across the city, with damage including flooding ofproperties (below and above floor line), landslides and river overflows.

Disaster Outline

Progress of water level and rainfall on
Motsukisamukawa River (upstream)

Water level
Water level exceeding danger ofoverflow at 3:50
Overflow danger
water level

Evacuation advisory officiallyannounced at 4:08

Heavy rain special
warning (flooding)lifted at 13:10

Evacuation judgement
water level

Structure-

Review how information is transmitted to facilities for people requiring attention, and create a structure that enables
early-stage ongoing transmissions of information about weather and updates on disaster situations in nearby areas,
etc. (10)-Also consider making such information available by fax and the disaster information distribution system. (26)Procedure-

HourlyrainfallProcedure

Overflow caution
water level

Flood fighting corps
standby water level

Start audio and fax distribution service to provide evacuation information to strengthen the functions of the multi-media
distribution system targeting people requiring attention at times of disaster who do not own a mobile phone and live
alone. (19)-Local communities, starting with autonomous disaster prevention associations and social welfare councils, should
strengthen the system used to contact people requiring attention during disasters. (19)(Motsukisamukawa)(Motsukisamukawa)

Water level and rainfall progress on Motsukisamugawa River(upstream) between 22:00 on 10/9 and 18:00 11/9

Damagecaused→Critical Situations*Sources: After action review report on response to heavy rainfall in Sapporo on 9.11(26), p13, March 2015

-

64

-

Passing on hazard information to facilities for people requiring
attention was forgotten because of confusion at the time.

Result Information did not get transmitted to facilities such as those for people
requiring attention.

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

Pointers-

Criticalsituation
point-

Regarding the provision of information to social welfare facilities located in areas assumed to be atrisk from landslides and flooding, there were many municipalities that did not provide information
because they judged that there was no damage. (17)As the local government was in the midst of securely grasping information about areas at risk andother information, landslide warning information was not provided to people who needed to know in
facilities. (10)Expand the methods used to provide information to people requiring attention-:Water level:Hourlyrainfall

Produce training program and a manual for facilities for people requiring attention

Training program and manual on predicted storm and flooding issues connected to facilities for people requiring
attention must be produced. (11)Evacuation advisory lifted at
17:12

Flood warning
lifted at 16:10

Improve the system for disseminating information to facilities for people requiring attention

The 2017 amendment to the flood prevention law denotes that the managers of facilities for people requiring attention
located in areas assumed to be vulnerable to flooding and/or landslides are obliged to produce plans to ensure
evacuation as well as conduct evacuation training. The definition of a facility for people requiring attention includes
social welfare facilities, schools, medical facilities and any other facility used by people who require attention at timesof disaster.
When producing or altering plans to ensure evacuation, facility managers must inform municipality leaders about plans
without delay.

Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guideline (1) related to evacuation advisories (evacuation behavior/information transmission edition),(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)(In particular, Chapter 3: What information provision ought to be from the perspective of people receiving anevacuation advisory, Chapter 5: Ensure effectiveness of evacuation of people requiring attention, etc.)-

Guideline (flooding/run-off/high tide edition) on production of plan ensuring evacuation pertaining to facilities
for people requiring attention (excluding medical facilities, etc.), Flood Risk Reduction Policy Planning Office,River Environment Division, Water and Disaster Management Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism (MLIT) , Japan, June 2017-

Evacuation plan inspection manual for facilities for people requiring attention in relation to flooding andlandslide disasters, MHLW and MLIT, June 2017-

Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items (Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Ministry ofInternal Affairs and Communications, Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-5: Evacuation of people requiring attention and their carers, etc.)65

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

7. Disseminating Info > 7.4 Disseminating info to foreigners

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

I wonder if foreigners will be able tounderstand this information?

7. Disseminating Info > 7.4 Disseminating info to foreigners

Collaborate with international communication associations, etc.,
to systemize multi-lingual transmissions of information.

~ Delay in providing information to foreigners ~Case● Local government

Ibaraki pref.

● Disaster

September 2015 Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall (2015

Lessons to be learned

Ibaraki flooding)● DateProcedure

Afternoon of 9th to afternoon of 10th of September 2015

Disaster Outline
Time

According to the Meteorological Agency, theimpact of moist air coming in from the south
due to typhoon No. 18 (and when it changed toa low pressure front) caused heavy rainfall
across a widespread area from west to northJapan – in particular, bringing record rainfalls to
the Kanto and Tohoku regions. In Ibaraki
prefecture, a special heavy rain warning wasannounced at 7:45 on the 10th. The water levelof Kinugawa River rose on the 10th, overflowing
in the Wakamiyado area of Joso and thenbursting its bank at Misaka in Joso, leading towidespread flooding in Joso. According to
Ibaraki prefecture’s summary of the damage inthe prefecture, there were 5,000 or more
properties partially or fully destroyed.

Water level-

Consider how to transmit information in multiple languages at times of emergency by collaborating across widespreadareas at times of disaster, such as working with international communication associations in your prefecture and/or
municipality to secure linguist volunteers at times of disaster. (24)-Securely collaborate with bodies such as local FM radio stations to transmit disaster information in multiple languages. (19)ItemStandard
value

Flood fighting corps
standby water level

Overflow cautionEvacuation judgement
water level
water level

Collaborate with stakeholder bodies and promote transmission of information to foreigners

Overflow danger
water level

Water level

Procedure

Flood fighting corps
standby water level

Overflow caution
water level

Evacuation
judgement waterlevel

Overflow danger
water level

Changing water level at Kawashima water level monitoring station(river disaster prevention information homepage, MLIT)

Promote method for providing multi-lingual information-

Strive to get more foreigners to participate on Facebook pages run for international students and/or to sign up for mailmagazines from international communication associations. (19)-Introduce a multi-lingual machine translation system to homepages. (20)Procedure-

Critical Situations

Produce educational material, such as a handbook, for foreigners

Tackle disaster prevention measures across a broad perspective of issues, including the producing of disasterprevention handbooks for foreigners. (18)

Pointers
Amidst the responses being made by the headquarters and local headquarters, theneed emerged for personnel to be secured to transmit emergency information in
multiple languages and to deal with foreign residents.

Criticalsituation
point

Result 1

Criticalsituation
point

Related guidelines

It was a troublesome task to secure the personnel who could transmit the informationand deal with the needs of foreigners.
-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Guideline (1) related to evacuation advisories (evacuation behavior/information transmission edition), (Disaster
Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)(In particular, Chapter 3: What information provision ought to be from the perspective of people receiving anevacuation advisory, etc.)-

Guidelines on transmission of disaster information and evacuation guidance in facilities used by foreigner visitors
and the disabled, etc., working group for methods of evacuation guidance in facilities used by foreign visitors, Fireand Disaster Management Agency, MIC, March 2018-

Guideline for ensuring safety of foreign travelers visiting Japan (Guiding principles for listing responses to foreignertravelers visiting Japan), Japan Tourism Agency, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) ,Japan, October 2014-

Guideline for drawing up manual for initial response at times of disaster to foreign travelers visiting Japan (foreveryone involved in tourism and accommodation facilities), Japan Tourism Agency, MLIT, October 2014-

Emergency information app: Safety tips, Japan Tourism Agency, MLIT, 2018 update

There were only a few linguist volunteers for lesser-known languages.

Result 2

There were limits to what kind of information could be provided in multiple languages.

The comprehensive policy on accepting and coexisting with foreign human resources (decided by Cabinet on 25
December 2018) advocates the promotion of specific measures to create easy access to disaster prevention andweather information deemed necessary for foreigners (living in Japan).

*Sources: After action review report on response to Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall in September 2015(24), p10, 2016

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

66-

Foreigners could not understand the situation because homepage information was only inJapanese. (20)Regarding the transmission of information to foreigners, based on broadcasting agreements,
requests to broadcasting bodies were insufficient. (19)67

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

7. Disseminating Info > 7.5 Dealing with news media

We can’t get anything done with the media blitz
out in the corridor!

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

7. Disseminating Info > 7.5 Dealing with news media

Hold periodic press releases but do not allow
individual interviews.

~ Confusion due to inconsistent rules on providing information to the press ~Case

Disaster Outline● Local government

Shingu, Wakayama pref.

● Disaster

Kii Peninsula flooding (2011 Shingu heavy rainfall)● DateBefore daybreak on 2nd to night of 4th of September 2011

Lessons to be learned

Rain brought about by typhoon No. 12 fell for three days from 2 to 4 September. Before daybreak on the 4th, arecord rainfall exceeding 100mm/hr was falling across nearly all areas of the city. Landslides, flooding and burst
river banks led to human damage, including the deaths of 13 people, and one missing, while property damage
extended to 2,964 properties, including 81 properties destroyed or washed away. There were power outages,suspensions of water supply and communication disruptions in all areas, all of which seriously impacted lifeline
resources. Coupled with Kumanogawa River and city-managed rivers bursting their banks as well as the limits of
inner drainage facilities (draining behind levees) being exceeded, causing riverbed scouring and bank protection
collapses, etc., roads, starting with national route 168, were destroyed, enveloped in mudslides, exposed to slope
failures and collapse of road shoulders (verges), leaving local citizens isolated in many places.

Procedure-Media outlets, such as TV, radio and newspapers, provide effective ways of spreading information to the public; so,when making press releases about a disaster situation, be sure to enthusiastically add any issues that yourmunicipality would like to get across to the public, and ask for cooperation from all media outlets in releasing suchinformation. (12)Procedure-

Shingu Rainfall observation data (Unit: mm/h)

2 Sept. 4:00
5:00
6:00
7:00
8:00
9:00
10:00
11:00
12:00
13:00
14:00
15:00
16:00
17:00
18:00
19:00
20:00
21:00
22:00
23:00
24:00
3 Sept. 1:00
2:00
3:00
4:00
5:00
6:00
7:00
8:00
9:00
10:00
11:00
12:00
13:00
14:00
15:00
16:00
17:00
18:00
19:00
20:00
21:00
22:00
23:00
24:00
4 Sept. 1:00
2:00
3:00
4:00
5:00

Flood water surging over Kumano-ohashi Bridge

Criticalsituation
point

Various media companies (journalists) reported from each of the disaster sites(including phone interviews) because the city’s information provision system
had not been established.
Result 1

Criticalsituation
point

While it is important to provide information to news outlets, a burden was placedon onsite personnel.

There were no specific regulating of entrance to restricted areas set for news
outlets, even though personal information was being frequently handled overthe phone on written down on memos.
Result 2

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices68

Establish a zone specifically for media outlets and at the same time form a communications unit to deal with media
outlets. Periodically hold news conferences to transmit information to the public, making sure that your media response
does not pose a hinderance to disaster response work. (10)-In principle, do not allow disaster site interviews – instead, provide joint news conferences one to two times a day (withchief of communications section or, if necessary, the chief of the disaster control headquarters conducting them). (12)Procedure- There was no clear response for news outlets. (26)- The press officer was unable to assemble journalists directly after the announcement of the evacuation
advisory, which meant that it took time for news outlets to respond sufficiently to that news. (26)- As a press officer was not appointed in the disaster control headquarters, media reporters were asking
questions everywhere, which hindered disaster relief work. (10)- We were unable to respond to media outlets sufficiently because there is no press unit during normal
times; moreover, personnel members are not used to talking to journalists as there is no need during
normal times. (5)Restrict areas where media outlets can enter

During a disaster, getting to the disaster site(s) is a priority, and government workplaces will only have a skeleton staff –so, from the perspective of private information and security as well, designate the areas that are off limits to all but
authorized personnel. (12)ProcedureCompile media materials-

The communications unit should gather information at all times from the disaster prevention department and create
media materials from it to help in making press releases to media outlets. (13)-List up frequently asked question, and consider ways of providing information, such as releases (of answers to listed
questions). (13)Procedure

Produce a communications plan and a manual, and implement training-

Regarding news releases during a disaster, turn specific contents into a manual that can be used in response to thepress. (13)-For training in the disaster control headquarters, implement training for response to media outlets, such as holding
mock news conferences. (10)There were lingering issues of security, such as the risk of information leaking.

*Sources: After action review report on response to damage from 2011 typhoon No. 12 (12), p31, October 2012

Periodically hold news conferences--

Critical Situations

Appoint a press officer

To provide information to media outlets, integrate all efforts into your communications section, and periodically holdpress releases. (12)Procedure

Precipitation data from Shingu weather station

Provide information that media outlets can make use ofRelated guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items (Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-1: Installation and operation of disaster control headquarters)

69

Shelters(Designated emergency evacuation
shelters and sites, etc.)

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

8. Shelters (designated emergency evacuation shelters and sites, etc.) > 8.1 Locations of shelters

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

Might this shelter flood too?

8. Shelters (designated emergency evacuation shelters and sites, etc.) > 8.1 Locations of shelters

Check prediction results for floods and landslides, and specify
shelters (designated emergency evacuation shelters and sites,etc.).

～Shelter unusable due to flooding, etc. ～Case● Local government

Kumamoto pref.

● Disaster

July 2012 north Kyushu heavy rainfall (widespread

Lessons to be learned

flooding in Kumamoto)

Procedure

Before daybreak to noon on 12th of July 2012

● DateDisaster Outline- Due to sudden heavy rain late at night, the situation was such that surroundings could
not be checked, especially around midnight- Due to an hourly rainfall in excess of 100mm and lightning, the situation was suchthat the thought of going outside was stifling, to the extent of make me feel in physicaldanger- Road was flooded, so evacuating on foot or by vehicle would have been difficult- The heavy rainfall and the lightning noise made it impossible to hear people’s voices

11thHourly rainfall

Amidst heavy rain and lightning late at night, local citizens found it
difficult to take actual evacuation action, they feared accidents intrying to evacuate, so the housing cooperative was hesitant toofficially announce evacuation advisory in accordance with the criteria
for making such predetermined announcements.

What the public said about thesituation on 12 July-

As some facilities not designated in municipality disaster prevention plans and other facilities inside landslide and/or
flood warning zones were used as shelters during previous disasters, efforts should be taken to promote advancedesignation of shelters and to review shelter usage in accordance with the type of disaster expected. (15)-Furthermore, some facilities yet to be earthquake-proofed were used as shelters, so facilities should be reviewed andearthquake-proofing promoted. (15)(Fig. 4)Aso-otohime

Accumulative rainfall forthe period (mm)[Situation on 12 July] (Survey in Minamiasomura, Aso)

“This heavy rain was unlike any I have experienced previously” [6:45 on
12/7 at Kumamoto regional weather station]

Hourly rainfall (mm)In the widespread flooding of Kumamoto on 12 July 2012,
cumulonimbus clouds repeatedly formed from before
daybreak and through the morning in the back-building
phenomenon, leading to record rainfall that caused extremely
extensive damage in various locations across the prefecture,such as landslides, rivers burst banks, 25 dead or missing,and homes, public civil engineering facilities and lifelines
severely damaged.

12th

13th

Specify/review shelters according to type of disaster expected

Procedure-

Take into consideration situations at times of disaster, and reflect that consideration in setting/reviewing
evacuation routes

Shelters and evacuation routes are vital to the safety of the public in a disaster situation, but that does not mean thatthey are in the best locations for all disasters, so review and set safe shelters and evacuation routes. (6)Procedure

Implement measures on the assumption of a nighttime disasterAccumulative rainfall for the period

Largest rainfall observed in history
Aso-otohime (Aso City)
1 hour: 108mm 3 hours: 288.5mm 24 hours 507.5mm[Reference] Rainfall at Asootohime
Annual rainfall: Approx. 2,800mm(within rainy season: )Hourly rainfall and transition of accumulated rainfall at
Aso-otohime AMeDAS observation station-

As people may have to evacuate at night, make sure they undergo thorough evacuation training, and implement
safety measures for evacuation at night, such as providing lights and safe facilities. (6)Procedure-

Strive to get neighborhood associations to implement evacuation training and to inspect evacuation routes

Strive to get neighborhood associations to implement evacuation training and to inspect dangerous locations on
evacuation routes in normal times. (25)

Critical Situations
Skill
Most of the shelters used were facilities outside of landslide and flood
warning zones designated in advance in the disaster prevention plans ofmunicipalities, but there were some that were not designated in advanceor ended up being inside landslide and/or flood warning zones. Moreover,some shelters were in facilities that had yet to be earthquake-proofed.

Criticalsituation
point-

Improve evacuation skills among the public by raising awareness about evacuation methods dependent on
the type of disaster.

Regarding evacuation methods for different types of disaster, make the public aware of them, and denote evacuationroutes on hazard maps. (25)

Related guidelines- Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)

ResultFacilities inside landslide and/or flood warning zones wereused as shelters, putting evacuees at risk.

*Sources: After action review report on response to widespread flood disaster in Kumamoto (15), p29, December 2012

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices72-

The roads near an opened shelter were flooded, which meant that some people could not evacuate
to that shelter – thus, the situation should have been grasped before the shelter was opened. (25)Among the opened shelters, there were some that were in unsuitable locations in terms of storms
and flooding – thus, in accordance with the type of disaster, shelters able to cope with theconditions should have been opened. (20)Most attention is given to earthquake disaster response – therefore, in cases of storms and flooding,there were not documents covering criteria for setting up shelters, guidelines on what to do if ashelter floods, or the dangers on evacuation routes. (6)- Guideline (1) related to evacuation advisories (evacuation behavior/information transmission
edition), (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)(In particular, Chapter 3: What information provision ought to be from the perspective of people
receiving an evacuation advisory, etc.)- Guidelines on sediment disaster warning evacuation,
Sediment control department, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) ,Japan, April 2015
(In particular, Chapter 4: transmission of information, etc.)- Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items(Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications,Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-3: Preparing for Evacuation of Residents, etc.)73

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

8. Shelters (designated emergency evacuation shelters and sites, etc.) > 8.2 Establishing shelters

Are staff members going to open all of theseshelters from here on?

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

8. Shelters (designated emergency evacuation shelters and sites, etc.) > 8.2 Establishing shelters

Let local citizens have the authority to open shelters（designated emergency evacuation shelters and sites).

~ Delays in opening shelters due to centralized jurisdiction over unlocking ~● Local government Tochigi, Tochigi pref.
● Disaster
September 2015 Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall (2015
Ibaraki flooding)● DateAfternoon of 9th to 11th of September 2015

Case

From the 9th and all through the 10th of September 2015, heavy rain (daily rainfall of 299.0mm,
hourly rate of 49.5mm) fell, causing Uzumagawa, Akazugawa and Naganokawa rivers to
overflow and greatly damage various locations in the city. This disaster left a massive trail ofdestruction, including one person dead, more than 2,700 properties damaged, while landslides
and overflow water cut off numerous roads and damaged rivers, and mudslides damaged
agriculture by blocking wastewater channels and smothering fields.

Precipitation

Total precipitation

Tochigi (Tochigi City, Tochigi Pref.)1:00

Procedure-

Disaster Outline

19:00

Lessons to be learned

7:00

13:00

7th

8th

19:00

1:00

7:00

13:00

19:00

9th

1:00

7:00

-

Name in advance the personnel members charged with the task of going from their home to designated shelters toopen them up at night or holidays (weekends). Personnel members named to do this job must collaborate withmanagers at local citizen centers, branch offices and other facilities to grasp the layout of designated shelters andwhere the emergency supplies are stored. (21)-Improvement example: In Yokkaichi, Mie prefecture, the personnel members to supervise all designated shelters are
named at the beginning of the fiscal year, and they then undergo training, familiarize themselves with layouts andemergency supplies stores in the shelters as well as participate in local disaster prevention training.

Overflow from Uzumagawa River

Procedure-

Criticalsituationpoint

It took time to open shelters because facility keys had to be
retrieved from the local government office after hours.

Criticalsituation
point

Roads were flooded and in a dangerous condition at the point at
which shelters were to be opened.
The shelter unit on its own was not able to swiftly open all
the shelters laid down in the local disaster prevention plan.

*Sources: We will not forget! Support & restoration record for Kanto-Tohoku heavy rainfall disaster in September 2015 (25), p69, August 2016

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices-

74

Being a holiday, managers of facilities were not on duty, so it took time to open the designated shelters in thosefacilities. (21)Only half the required number of vehicles needed when opening shelters were available, so opening the shelters
took time. (20)Some shelters took time to open, and, in the midst of the hustle and bustle of disaster response, safety checks
were not carried out on some shelters, while, in other cases, there were delays in making the opening report tothe disaster control headquarters. (15)
In cases where local units supervising shelters had to assemble to open shelters, opening up took time. (13)Improve the methods for providing information to the managers of facilities

Consider providing managers of facilities with advance information on the weather status to enable them to assemble
quicker. Also consider making use of a disaster information distribution system to contact them quickly. (26)ProcedureConsider methods for sharing keys-

Apart from managers of facilities, to facilitate the opening of shelters, consider getting elementary and junior highschools (often used as shelters) to deposit spare keys with their local ward offices or installing number combination
locks on the gymnasiums of those schools. (26)-Regarding the opening of shelters, even when entrusted to autonomous disaster prevention associations, there ought
to be multiple people who can carry out the opening task. (22)Procedure-Name in advance the personnel members to open shelters, etc.

13:00

Critical Situations

ResultProduce a shelter management manual that assumes cooperation with local citizens

A manual related to managing shelters is needed. And, in producing that manual, making cooperation with local
citizens a prerequisite is one kind of policy for responding to a disaster that stretches the human resources(personnel) of the city. (23)Procedure

10th

Precipitation transition

Consider letting neighborhood associations and autonomous disaster prevention organizations open shelters because
letting them being involved from the time such facilities are opened is the ideal approach. (26)Procedure-

Opening of shelters, etc., by autonomous disaster prevention organizations-

Draw up a plan that gives consideration to non-designated shelters

Do not rely on just designated shelters to provide evacuation cover – instead, produce a manual that always assumes
non-designated shelters are going to be needed as well. (23)

Related guidelines- Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan,
July 2019)- Shelter management guideline, Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, April
2016- The ideal way for schools to handle disasters well (strengthening disaster preventionfunctions to respond to tsunamis and serve as shelters), facility policy planning
division, MEXT, 7 March 201475

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

8. Shelters (designated emergency evacuation shelters and sites, etc.) > 8.3 Evacuation routes

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

Apparently the road to the shelter is flooding!

8. Shelters (designated emergency evacuation shelters and sites, etc.) > 8.3 Evacuation routes

Make people aware that they have no option but to shelter
upstairs (vertical evacuation) in their own homes if going outside isdangerous.

~ Difficulties in evacuating due to damage of evacuation route ~Case● Local government● Disaster● DateDisaster Outline

Kyoto, Kyoto pref.
2013 typhoon No. 18 heavy rainfall(2013 heavy rainfall, Kyoto)
15 to 16 September 2013

Typhoon No. 18 (15 to 16 September 2013) brought about the first ever official
announcement of the “emergency heavy rain warning”, with record rainfall in allareas of Kyoto. In response, people from the volunteer fire corps, flood fighting
corps, neighborhood associations, autonomous disaster prevention associations
and social welfare council as well as many local residents collaborated closely withward offices, the fire department and others in a spirit of self-help and cooperation,
working fervently around the clock to provide disaster relief.

KeihokuLessons to be learned
Procedure-

Set evacuation routes, and get local citizens to familiarize themselves with hazard maps, etc. (25)Procedure

Strive to get communities to create local neighborhood association hazard maps based on official hazard maps inorder for residents to know the danger spots in their neighborhoods, and what routes they should use to evacuate. (9)-Strive to get neighborhood associations to implement evacuation training from normal times, including the checking of
evacuation routes and the highlighting of dangerous sections on those routes. (25)

Criticalsituation
point

Shelters located on low ground were at risk of flooding.

Criticalsituation
point

The timing for officially announcing the evacuation advisories was
too slow.

Get the public to familiarize themselves with vertical evacuation (upstairs evacuation in sturdy properties)-

Get the public to familiarize themselves with vertical evacuation, which involves taking refuge upstairs in homes or intall buildings in areas where there is no risk of buildings collapsing and flood water level is predicted to be less than
five meters. (25)-

Improvement example: In Tochigi, Tochigi prefecture, the public was made aware of the effectiveneass of verticalevacuation. Also, Tochigi intends to tell the public that there is no need to go to a shelter if they are in a safe place,and that they can opt to shelter in a relative’s or friend’s home.

Procedure-

Critical Situations

Encourage autonomous disaster prevention associations to draw up their own disaster prevention measures-

Procedure

Precipitation over time at Keihoku AMeDAS base, Kyoto(2013 typhoon 18 heavy rainfall [Kyoto local weather station])

Make the public aware of hazard maps

Specify local middle-to-high-rise buildings as designated emergency evacuation sites

Promote initiatives to develop support cooperation systems between communities and businesses for times of disaster,and, based on the disaster countermeasures basic law, specify local middle-to-high-rise buildings as designatedemergency evacuation sites at times of flooding. (19)Procedure

Review procedures to enable earlier calls for evacuation-

Review procedures to enable earlier issuing of messages for opening shelters and evacuation information. (19)-

If it looks like the evacuation advisory will be announced at night due to approaching typhoon, open shelters during
daylight hours and call on the public to evacuate of their own free will. (25)

Related guidelines- Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)

Result Some shelters could not be accessed dues to flooding ofroads.

*Sources: Summary pertaining to response to urban damage caused by typhoon No. 18 (19), p18, December 2013

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices

76-

Some people could not evacuate to shelters because they would have had to crossswollen rivers. (25)
It was difficult to access shelters because nearby areas were flooded. (25)The safety of routes to shelters could not be confirmed. (9)- Guideline (1) related to evacuation advisories (evacuation behavior/information transmission edition),(Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, March 2019)(In particular, Chapter 3: What information provision ought to be from the perspective of people receiving
an evacuation advisory, etc.)- Guidelines on sediment disaster warning evacuation,
Sediment control department, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) ,Japan, April Japan, 2015
(In particular, Chapter 4: transmission of information, etc.)- Disaster prevention & risk management self-check items(Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications,Japan, March 2017)(In particular, Chapter 2-3: Preparing for Evacuation of Residents, etc.)77

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response

8. Shelters (designated emergency evacuation shelters and sites, etc.) > 8.4 Gathering info on shelters

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency ResponseCountermeasure

Does the shelter have TV or the internet?

8. Shelters (designated emergency evacuation shelters and sites, etc.) > 8.4 Gathering info on shelters

Ensure that shelters (designated emergency evacuation sites)
have equipment (TVs, government emergency radios, etc.) for
acquiring at least the bare minimum in information.

~ Lack of ways to gather information in shelters ~Case● Local government

Kani, Gifu pref.

● Disaster7.15 heavy rainfall (2010 heavy rainfall, Kani, Gifu pref.)● DateAfternoon of 15th to before daybreak on 16th of July 2010

Lessons to be learned
Facilities

Rain started to fall from around 16:00 on 15 July, turning into a thunderstorm that recorded
20mm of rain in a ten minute period on the city hallʼs rain gauge from 16:20. Thereafter, rain
continued to fall intermittently, recording some 270mm of precipitation at the city hall overseven hours from rainfall commencement, making it a record rainfall unmatched in recent
years. The style of rainfall varied greatly by area. Kanigawa River burst its banks. Roads were
flooded in various areas, properties inundated with water and damage caused by landslides.

Disaster Outline

Install computers and other such devices (that provide email and internet connection) to smoothly provide information to
citizens. (10)-Consider placing TVs and radios in shelters to provide evacuees with local weather information and damage status in thecity concerned. (20)

Facilities

As many facilities do not have the fixtures that enable smooth operation as a shelter (emergency power supply,
government emergency radio, satellite mobile phone, etc.), it is recommended that such necessary fixtures beorganized (made available to facilities). (15)-

Items needed to run shelters, such as radios and torches, must be ready and available at all times in designatedemergency evacuation sites. (21)-Consider actions such as a thorough review of how to use semi-fixed wireless devices, increasing the number ofmobile wireless devices and redeploying wireless devices kept in the local government office. (20)--Result Absolutely no information reached the shelter.

Similar cases
at other local
government
offices--

78

The shelter was not set up for people to view the internet, so necessary information could not be
quickly passed on to evacuees. (24)There were no TVs or radios in the shelter, so disaster information was not available. (21)Orders came from disaster control headquarters to move semi-fixed wireless devices from staff rooms
to the gymnasiums; however, as the method (disconnecting/connecting) was not known, some schools(shelters) were unable to carry out this task. For this reason, private mobile phones had to be used tocommunicate with headquarters. (20)There were some shelters that did not have government emergency radios and/or satellite mobile
phones. (15)Shelters did not have information terminals, such as computers, so forms of communication with thedisaster control headquarters were limited, which meant we could not provide evacuees with sufficient
information. (10)Organize the methods for providing information to shelters-

Whenever necessary, use government emergency radio, disaster prevention email and other forms of communication toprovide information about damage status, shelter opening status and weather conditions, etc., from the disaster control
headquarters to designated emergency evacuation sites. (21)-Consider making use of a disaster information distribution system, etc., in order to quickly make contact with managers
of facilities (that will become shelters). (26)-Improvement example: In Yokkaichi, Mie prefecture, designated emergency evacuation sites have been equipped with
MCA wireless devices and radios to provide information.

*Sources: After action review report on damage of torrential rain on 7.15 (9), p41, 4 November 2010-

Make people aware of what items they need to bring when evacuating (evacuation materials)

Use public information activities to inform citizens of what evacuation materials (radio, etc.) they need to have ready inan emergency bag. (21)Procedure

In a gymnasium serving as a shelter, there were no phones, nocomputers and no TVs.

Become familiar with operating methods of fixtures/equipment

Regarding the operation and handling of government emergency radio equipment, implement workshops and training
to enable people to become thoroughly familiarized with such equipment. (20)Procedure

Critical Situations
Criticalsituation
point

Organize shelter operating fixtures

-

Skill

A scene in the city

Organize methods for providing information to evacuees-

Related guidelines-

Guide for municipality flood response (Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, July 2019)-

Shelter management guideline, Disaster Management, Cabinet Office, Japan, April 2016-

The ideal way for schools to handle disasters well (strengthening disaster prevention functions to
respond to tsunamis and serve as shelters), facility policy planning division, MEXT, 7 March 2014-

Toward strengthening the functions of municipal disaster control headquarters ~Case studies on
disaster prevention information system~,(Civil Protection and Disaster Management Department, Fire and Disaster Management Agency,
July 2017)79Training Worksheet for Critical Situations in Response to Flooding

Postscript●Target and example of this worksheet
No.

Example●Five questions for chosen example(1) Could a similar situation occur in your local authority/department?

(2) In particular, are there any conditions that could trigger the samekind of situation?

To smoothly respond to disasters, local governments must learn from past disasters
and must improve the capabilities of personnel members to enable them to predict inadvance the kinds of difficulties that may occur in order to take the necessary advancemeasures.
In this case study booklet, as reference material for making use of examples of criticalsituations (scary mishaps), where an accident could easily occur in fields related tooccupational hazards and accidents, I show typical examples drawn from verification data
(After-action review reports, etc.) of past responses to flooding published by local
governments to freshly define critical situations that occur in disaster response.
I hope that this booklet will serve to provide hints on what measures need to be
implemented in advance and what needs to be considered by local governments toimprove the capabilities of personnel members, and, in so doing, will serve as a link tosmoothly combatting disasters when future flooding occurs.
Keeping in mind the stages that need to be worked through before wide-area support
personnel arrive, please note that the disaster phase that this booklet deals with is theperiod from before the disaster outbreak up to the opening of shelters, it does not include
life rebuilding assistance and recovery work.

(3) Are necessary measures (facilities and equipment, etc.) in place to
avoid the situation occurring?

(4) Are necessary measures (procedures, manuals and plans, etc.) inplace to avoid the situation occurring?

(5) Are necessary measures (for improving skills) in place to avoid thesituation occurring?

Further, the cases in this booklet are based on disaster knowledge in Japan at time of
publishing – hence, the contents of this booklet must be updated as needed.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of the following for their help.
Concerning extracts in this booklet, I referred to Yotaro Hatamura’s book “Learning from
Failure” (Kodansha Bunko, 2005). I also received cooperation in the tasks of compilingand editing this booklet from Daisuke Kuribayashi (former Senior Researcher) and Naoko
Nagumo (Research Specialist) of the Public Works Research Institute (PWRI) as well as
the Research Center for Sustainable Communities in the Tokyo headquarters of CTI
Engineering Co., Ltd., and Yachiyo Engineering Co., Ltd. Furthermore, I received
invaluable advice from Hiroji Kuroda (Chief Researcher) of the Institute of ScientificApproaches for Fire & Disaster.
Senior Researcher Miho Ohara (author of this booklet)
International Center for Water Hazard and Risk
Management (ICHARM) under the auspices of UNESCO,
Public Works Research Institute (PWRI), Japan
June 2020

Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response(Main Content: Local Government Response)
Contact:

Affiliation (organization)：

Name：

Tel: +81-29-879-6809
E-mail: icharm@pwri.go.jp
81Collection of Critical Situations during Flood Emergency Response(Main Content: Local Government Response)
Published by International Center for Water Hazard and Risk Management (ICHARM)
under the auspices of UNESCO,
Public Works Research Institute (PWRI), Japan
Publication date: June 2020
Inquiries about this booklet:
Tel: +81-29-879-6809
E-mail: icharm@pwri.go.jp