Bilateral US-Japan Task Force on Command Relationships for New Challenges
Dialogue Summary #3, prepared by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

On Wednesday, December 21, 2022, Sasakawa USA’s “US-Japan NEXT Alliance Initiative” convened a bilateral
Track 2 dialogue focused on Japan’s new National Defense Strategy, implications for future alliance security
cooperation, and options for more integrated planning and operational activities. One goal was to begin todevelop a Task Force work plan for the remainder of this fiscal year that can usefully support Track 1 dialogue onthese issues in 2023. The group considered these issues in the context of possible future adjustments to help
improve the effectiveness of US-Japan C2 arrangements amid evolving security threats, advancing Japanesemilitary capabilities, and continued technological change. This not-for-attribution hybrid event (in person and via
video conference) involved 23 experts from think tanks, universities, and former government officials and military
officers. Jim Schoff, Sr. Director of Sasakawa USA’s “US-Japan NEXT Alliance Initiative” moderated the dialogue,
which is part of a longer-term series of mostly bilateral discussions planned by NEXT for 2022-23.

Background and Introduction
This Task Force project was launched in 2022 by NEXT on the premise that two trends areworking to complicate current US-Japan command and control (C2) arrangements in ways that
could undermine their effectiveness, while a third is creating opportunities for closer bilateral
security cooperation. The first trend involves a shifting regional military balance that makes
integration of allied forces more vital to sustaining deterrence or repelling any attack. The
second trend includes a combination of technological advances and operational needs that are
driving toward more integrated and combined force concepts. These go beyond “multi-domain”
models of operating in parallel and lead to a deeply interconnected operating system influenced
by digital transformation. Additionally, Japan’s own consideration of new capabilities, including
long-range precision strike, will call into question the longstanding alliance division of labor inroles and missions—the so-called shield and spear construct—and support a reconsideration ofalliance C2. At the same time, Japan is focused on improving military “jointness” and moving tocreate a permanent joint headquarters for the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in the next few years.
All this suggests that a reexamination of US-Japan command relationships is needed, to considerpractical and useful adjustments to SDF connections with US Forces Japan (USFJ) and US IndoPacific Command (INDOPACOM) so that bilateral arrangements can align effectively with national
reforms. It can also help with timely decision making on defense policy and deployment issues, asJapanese territory (and US bases therein) are more connected with regional military operations.
Task Force participation is flexible and involves a wide range of specialists with different
expertise. The purpose of the Task Force is to engage the US and Japanese defense communities
in discussions about the dual challenge to the existing command structures (described above),
and to consider elements in potential design of a more integrated alliance C2 system that offers
the operational benefits of a more unified command while respecting Japan’s legal and politicallimits. We began with a small Track 1.5 US-only group to test the project premise and chart a
course for the remainder of research and dialogue. This was the first bilateral meeting.

By James L. Schoff, Sr. Director, Sasakawa USA

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Bilateral US-Japan Task Force on Command Relationships for New Challenges
Dialogue Summary #3, prepared by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

Opening Remarks/Recap of Previous Roundtables:
The moderator summarized for the group highlights of project research and dialogue to date.
Overall, participants believe that the alliance has a good foundation from which to build an
adapted C2 configuration. This includes:•

Strong trust, good personal and institutional relationships, lots of exercise opportunities,
and a high level of potential interoperability;•

Existing mechanisms for policy and operational coordination including the “2+2 Process,”
Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD), Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM), and therelated Bilateral Operations Coordination Center (BOCC) and Component Coordination
Centers (CCCs) when needed, plus specific mechanisms & facilities for missile defense
including the Bilateral Joint Operations Coordination Center (BJOCC) at Yokota Air Base, as
well as the multilateral Enforcement Coordination Cell (ECC) sharing intelligence andcoordinating activity related to North Korea sanctions enforcement utilizing the USS Blue
Ridge stationed in Japan; and•Common approaches to national security and national defense strategies.

In addition, previous roundtable dialogues have revealed a broadly held perception by US
specialists that the alliance needs to grow beyond simple military coordination anddeconflicting in time & space so that it can more effectively share information, plan, andmanage mission, functions, and tasks. When considering alliance C2 requirements for surging
forces to the same geographic space, many thought that the alliance should move toward moreof a combined or integrated staff arrangement (of some kind).
An early favorite of previous dialogue participants is a combined staff arrangement that would
not have forces assigned to it (until needed), but can facilitate planning, communications,
reporting, info sharing, and other staff activities.
Participants in the first two roundtables have also underscored the need to be sufficiently
sensitive to political and legal considerations in Japan, when it comes to adapting current C2
arrangements. The allies will also have to account for differing authorities vested in defense
leadership “counterparts” that might not be completely equivalent. Moreover, these defense
authorities often relate to calibrations of operational (or defense condition) phasing that are
different for each partner, and the two military cultures differ as well. Participants have alsoemphasized that it is important to avoid consuming the readiness of forces when consideringsome kind of joint or combined staff set up.
Roundtable participants have also highlighted important C2 arrangement considerations in theprevious dialogues:

By James L. Schoff, Sr. Director, Sasakawa USA

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Bilateral US-Japan Task Force on Command Relationships for New Challenges
Dialogue Summary #3, prepared by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA•

Purpose - What is the operational problem to organize around? This will be a criticalquestion for US and Japanese officials as they consider priorities for future security
cooperation. Will it be focused on a particular mission or domain, or will it involve
multiple domains and an integrated set of missions? Will it be focused on a limited area of
operations? Etc.

•

Location(s) - Where will it be located? How many supporting locations?

•

Functions - What will it do day-to-day? What contingencies is it built for?

•

Agility - Can it expand and adapt?

•

Readiness - Does it enhance or consume readiness of alliance forces?

•

Timeline - What are the aspirational timelines for implementation?

Answers to these questions can help determine the proper size and shape of a combined orcoalition C2 model, and they provide a reference point for the agenda of future roundtables.
Japan Perspective Update Following Release of New National Defense Strategy:
The group then heard from three different retired Japanese government and military officials
with extensive alliance experience regarding Japan’s new National Defense Strategy (NDS) and
how it might relate to the Task Force’s future agenda. An opening presenter emphasized
several key points on strategy implementation:•

Japan’s defense buildup commitment to address growing security risks is laudable, but thegoals for this buildup (as currently articulated) are relatively vague and should be clarified.
Otherwise, the measurement for achievement over time will be ambiguous as well.

•

The concept of “security” should not be diluted. The National Security Strategy (NSS) has
to some extent become a “catchall document” to cover a wide range of policy issues witha label of security. While it is true that various issues can affect national security (i.e., notjust military warfighting, but economic and other components as well), it is important toremember that the main driver for updating the NSS and NDS is the intensifying
geopolitical rivalry amid a deteriorating balance of military power, and this gap must be
defined and the balance restored. The speaker cautioned against complacency in the
military buildup, which could happen if policy makers convince themselves that they havemade sufficient progress under a broad and shallow definition of “security.”•

Serious efforts to muster the combined capabilities of the SDF, Police and Japan Coast
Guard (JCG) should be promoted. This will likely require legal and operational
adjustments, and the JCG should be encouraged to coordinate more closely with otherservices and with US entities. The NSS addresses this, but it must be implemented
thoroughly.

By James L. Schoff, Sr. Director, Sasakawa USA

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Bilateral US-Japan Task Force on Command Relationships for New Challenges
Dialogue Summary #3, prepared by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA•

Establishment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) should be established as soon
as possible and be accompanied by human resource development. To some extent,
insufficient human resources were long cited as a reason to forgo establishment of a
PJHQ, and this underscores the need to address this point as Japan moves forward with a
PJHQ.

•

A new definition of roles and missions and division of labor between Japan and the US
should be carried out immediately. If integrated deterrence is a key word to align the
defense strategies of the two countries, then a whole-of-government approach should be
adopted, and other countries could also be included in this effort.

Another presenter offered his views about establishment of a PJHQ in Japan and the challenges
faced in the past. Although some policy makers and SDF officers had been promoting the ideaof a PJHQ since after the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsumani disaster, the idea languisheduntil Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (according to this retired officer), as policy makers felt
more acutely the risks of weakened deterrence stemming from not being sufficiently preparedfor military conflict. Now, the Kishida government has decided to establish a PJHQ as soon as
possible, but the details are still under discussion in the Defense Ministry.
The presenter expects that the scope of US-Japan military cooperation will expand in the
future, to include cross-domain operations, counterattack operations, flexible deterrent options(FDO), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, among others. The
NSS clearly states to strengthen Japan’s Joint operational structure in a comprehensive manner.
The scope of Joint Operations includes not only “cross-domain operational capabilities,” butalso the newly introduced “standoff defense capabilities” and “operations of unmanned assets”
and others. He provided a list of cooperation areas and priorities for the alliance, as outlined in
the NSS and NDS:•

Examine constantly the US-Japan roles, missions, and capabilities;•

Further development of coordination functions such as the Alliance Coordination
Mechanism (ACM);•

Coordination of operations, including cross-domain operations, counterattack operations,
missile defense, etc.;•

Improve interoperability;•

Deepen cooperation in the cyber and space domain;•

Cooperation in equipment and technology to incorporate advanced technology;•

More advanced and practical joint training;

By James L. Schoff, Sr. Director, Sasakawa USA

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Bilateral US-Japan Task Force on Command Relationships for New Challenges
Dialogue Summary #3, prepared by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA•

US-Japan joint FDO;•

Joint intelligence, ISR activities, and coordination on information warfare;•

Joint use of US and Japanese base facilities; and•Enhanced infrastructure for information security and cyber security.

According to Japan’s new Defense Program, the employment of standoff missiles,
counterattack capability will be conducted under centralized command and control based on
the premise of joint operations. And in order to strengthen joint operation effectively, it was
decided to establish a PJHQ in order to build a posture capable of seamlessly conducting crossdomain operations at all stages from peacetime to contingency. The Japanese government
intends to centralize the SDF's operations under the PJHQ, and the commander of the PJHQ will
also be in charge of Japan-US joint operations.
He highlighted two issues regarding the PJHQ that need to be considered: 1) the scope ofoperations conducted by the PJHQ, and 2) the geographic location of the PJHQ. On the latter,
he thought that a critical factor would be the geographical/physical distance between the PJHQ
and the Prime Minister, and that the headquarters should be located in a position suitable forJapan's unique political-military relationship. By this he meant that the closer PJHQ’s location is
to politics, the better, and that a location near the Prime Minister’s office would be mostsuitable.
He explained that the Self-Defense Force law switches the authority of the SDF in peacetime
and in contingency. In a gray zone where there is neither pure peace nor war, the switch frompeacetime to an armed attack contingency is quite critical, and it could escalate a situation, so
the government’s decision making must be more sensitive and controlled than in othercountries. The Japanese Governments will be particularly cautious about decisions regarding
the use of counterattack capabilities and active cyberattacks, and legal requirements for a“minimum necessary level” of response could mean that operations are closely calibrated andpossibly even starting and then stopping. Also, in selecting targets for counterattacks, thegovernment would inevitably give priority to political rationality due to the exclusively defenseoriented national security policy.

A third Japanese commentator echoed some comments made by the first, emphasizing theimportance of rigorous implementation of the new NDS, as well as the need to enhance
operational integration among the SDF, JCG, and police forces for certain contingencies. He
noted that although the NDS will likely drive significant change within the SDF (including theacquisition of new capabilities), there is no mention of expected change among the existingroles and missions for the alliance. This will need to be discussed carefully, as someBy James L. Schoff, Sr. Director, Sasakawa USA

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Bilateral US-Japan Task Force on Command Relationships for New Challenges
Dialogue Summary #3, prepared by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

adjustments to roles and missions would seem inevitable. Some of this might be discussed in
the context of trying to improve extended deterrence. Also, he thought that it might benecessary for Japan’s Ministry of Defense and SDF to develop their own National Military
Strategy and Joint Defense Strategy.
The presenter noted that the PJHQ will assume an important role for the execution of orders,and he used this schematic for how the PJHQ will fit into the SDF command structure:iDefenseMinister
Joint Chief

Service Chiefs

Permanent Joint HQ

Ground Units

Maritime Units

Air Units

Joint Task Force(ad hoc)

His schematic for how the bilateral C2 relationship might look was as follows:

By James L. Schoff, Sr. Director, Sasakawa USA

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Bilateral US-Japan Task Force on Command Relationships for New Challenges
Dialogue Summary #3, prepared by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

The presenter also noted that the bulk of the US C2 structure for the region is located in Hawaii
at US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), and bridging this gap effectively and efficiently will
be another topic for the allies to discuss. Noting the example of INDOPACOM, he differed inopinion from the previous commentator regarding geographic location of Japan’s PJHQ. He
thought that the political component/liaison related to military decision making could be
handled by the Chief of Staff (Joint Staff) of the SDF (in Tokyo), but because the Joint
Commander (PJHQ) is responsible only for the execution of orders given, the PJHQ location
should be considered from the perspective of how that role can be best fulfilled, regardless ofthe proximity to Tokyo.

Discussion Theme 1: How Do the Bilateral Defense Guidelines Fit into the C2 Discussion?
The discussion started with a question about how urgent it was for the allies to reconsider theircurrent bilateral Defense Guidelines, and how that task might (or might not) relate to thelonger-term adaptations to alliance C2 mechanisms. Views among the group were somewhat
mixed, although most believed that a formal and time-consuming Guideline revision process
should be avoided at this time, given other priorities for the alliance to sort out.
For example, one Japanese participant expressed a sense of urgency for C2 adaptations (or to
improvise something) that can help the alliance deal more effectively with a regional or
defense-of-Japan crisis that could emerge in the very near term (e.g., within weeks or months).
In parallel, discussions could continue in Japan regarding establishment of the PJHQ and be
carried out bilaterally regarding the Guidelines and a longer-term alliance C2 solution. He said
that it would be dangerous to launch a Defense Guidelines revision process in such a way that it
delayed quick considerations of these other pressing issues. He thought the Guidelines should
be revised eventually, but that we should not spend too much time on them in the near term.
Another Japanese participant agreed in a way, expressing his view that the current Guidelines(even the current 2+2 structure) was too narrow to deal with the threats facing the alliance, sothat some broader framework should be considered. In this sense, revising the Guidelines might
be less important than devising a new and broader framework for alliance management withregard to national security (that incorporates the broader interagency). Another Japaneseparticipant concurred with this view.
An American participant said he expected that the Biden administration also will not be eager
to launch a formal Guideline revision process because of how much bureaucratic time it canconsume, but he emphasized that down the line various important alliance conversations needto take place on operationalizing Japan’s counterstrike mission, for example, and othercombined activities. So, something like a Guidelines review will eventually be necessary, but it
By James L. Schoff, Sr. Director, Sasakawa USA

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Bilateral US-Japan Task Force on Command Relationships for New Challenges
Dialogue Summary #3, prepared by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

is not the immediate task at hand. Another Japanese participant agreed, saying that we should
prioritize the “homework” that is in front of us now, meaning both at a domestic level carryingout our individual defense strategies and bilaterally to improve alliance readiness in the shortterm.
Still, another Japanese participant emphasized the significance of change represented by
Japan’s new NDS, along with the increasingly complex realm of cross-domain operations
including cyber and space, so it is inescapable for the allies to address Guideline revision atsome point in the not-too-distant future. Overall, participants recognized the need toreconsider the Guidelines through an iterative process that addresses pressing alliancecoordination needs and at the same time looks at longer-term issues surrounding roles andmissions, enhancing information sharing, and improving joint operations.
Participants also highlighted the need to keep the public informed about alliance moves andhelp them understand and support these new developments. The process needs legitimacy,
and it is possible that the efforts to revise the Defense Guidelines will produce the momentum
to enhance alliance security cooperation in a legitimate way. The shift of capabilities of theJapan side will likely affect the division of labor between the two countries, and therefore thedocument to define the roles and missions should be renewed.
Overall, there appeared to be a consensus that the US and Japan could try to improve alliance
C2 within the context of current guidelines but be mindful of potential work by others toconsider adjusting those guidelines. This would create political and bureaucratic space for the
allies to move ahead with the C2 discussion independent of (but still informed by) a Guideline
review process (and vice versa).

Discussion Theme 2: Agenda Building for the Alliance C2 Discussion
Another theme of the dialogue was a brainstorming process of sorts that identified various
issues that the Task Force will need to consider as we develop an agenda for a March Track 1.5
workshop. This can be summarized by a series of questions or comments made by participants:•

Need to move beyond just coordination of activity and get to a point where we canintegrate our activities. We are facing a peer competitor that is completely integrated.

•

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY23 contains language that requires the
Secretary of Defense to establish a Joint Force Headquarters in the INDOPACOM area of
operations by October 2024 (as an initial target), with planning to begin in the first half of
this year. Guam is already slated to host a future C2 center funded by the Missile Defense
Agency. So, if we eventually have a permanent joint force HQ in Japan (the PJHQ) and astanding joint force HQ (of some kind) under INDOPACOM, then this can possibly provide

By James L. Schoff, Sr. Director, Sasakawa USA

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Bilateral US-Japan Task Force on Command Relationships for New Challenges
Dialogue Summary #3, prepared by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA

structure to the bilateral dialogue on future C2 arrangements (i.e., what should these HQs
look like and how can we integrate them seamlessly to be prepared to respond to a crisis).
•

Related to this, one participant asked whether a new alliance C2 structure might beneeded to enable the kinds of joint and combine operations that we envision for the
future, or can the existing structure simply be adapted or tweaked slightly to handle this.
This is an open question.

•

Information sharing (both in terms of hardware interoperability and software or
information security practices) is a critical enabler of joint planning and operations, andthis will need to be addressed.

•

On the Japan side, a participant encouraged members to think beyond just a PJHQ but
also consider joint regional mechanisms or functional mechanisms that can facilitate
combined alliance operations at a narrower tactical level. Alliance C2 might need to be
improved up and down the chain of command, and he noted, for example, that Japan’s
NDS is aiming to raise the Extended Deterrence Dialogue up to a minister level in somecases.

•One American participant noted Australia’s experience establishing a Joint Force HQ andhighlighted the alliance benefit of working together to develop effective bilateral routines
for sharing information, reporting, and planning at a military tactical level, but just withstaffs. This includes the political-military component. Then the allies benefit fromexercising these plans and adjusting. This experience could be useful for the allies toreview. Another American participant agreed that exercises were important, but too often
our exercises are not sufficiently realistic (“too pedestrian”) and we need to push thelimits of what we think we can handle.

•

Another American participant recalled US-Japan actions in the 1990s when they firstlooked at North Korea contingencies in detail and fleshed out coordination for Situations
in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ). This is an alliance experience that can be leveraged.

•

We will have to consider the geographic scope for combined or joint operations (i.e.,
whether or not this is only for defense-of-Japan situations or could also respond to aregional crisis). Some aspects will be difficult to separate if Japan-based US forces respondto a regional crisis, but the alliance has options for how closely integrated Japan’s SDF will
be in those situations, and this will affect C2 arrangements. Another participant thoughtthat there would be little appetite among the Japanese public for a truly “regional
alliance,” but certain scenarios might be acceptable. The C2 structure will need to be able
to manage this ambiguity. An American added that the geographic question needs to behandled deliberately and carefully, with a balance of commitment to defend Japan andthe flexibility to provide regional security.

By James L. Schoff, Sr. Director, Sasakawa USA

9Bilateral US-Japan Task Force on Command Relationships for New Challenges
Dialogue Summary #3, prepared by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA•

An American participant was concerned that any effort to get too specific in terms ofregional applicability (e.g., East China Sea, South China Sea, etc.) could cause morepolitical tension or public disagreement than necessary. In this sense, framing the new C2applicability in the context of SIASJ might be the most legitimate and comfortable way toapproach this, because of the precedent that exists.

Next Steps
The project will expand this dialogue to include government and military participants at its next
meeting, so that some of the ideas and observations generated so far can be shared in a Track
1.5 format. One more virtual bilateral roundtable will be organized (this time probably by Chris
Johnstone at CSIS) in February, and then we can continue the bilateral Track 1.5 conversation ina deeper way at a 2-day bilateral Track 1.5 workshop in Japan in March 2023. This will befollowed by additional Task Force meetings in 2023, culminating in a bilateral Track 1.5
conference in Annapolis, MD in the Fall of 2023 (including a public event).
---------------------------------------------------------Please note that this summary is not a consensus document of the Task Force. It is a summary
prepared by Jim Schoff based on notes from the dialogue and from subsequent follow-up
discussions with participants. If you have any comments or questions regarding this summary,please contact Jim Schoff at jschoff@spfusa.org___________________________________________________________________________________The US-Japan NEXT Alliance Initiative is a forum for bilateral dialogue, networking, and the development
of joint recommendations involving a wide range of policy and technical specialists (in and out ofgovernment) to stimulate new alliance connections across foreign, security, and technology policy areas.
Established by Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA with support from the Nippon Foundation, the goal is tohelp improve the alliance and how it serves shared interests, preparing it for emerging challenges within
an increasingly complex and dynamic geostrategic environment. Launched in 2021, the Initiative includes
two overlapping lines of effort: 1) Foreign & Security Policy, and 2) Technology & Innovation Connections.
The Initiative is led by Sr. Director Jim Schoff.
_____________________________________________________________________________________i

The source for this graphic is pg. 220, Koichi Isobe,Tomodachi-sakusen no Saizensen: Fukushima-Gempatsujiko ni
miru Nichibei-domei Renkei no Kyokun (“Operation Tomodachi: Process and Recommendations – The U.S.-Japan
Alliance after Fukushima Nuclear Accident-,” Sairyu-sha, August 2019, which was awarded the INOKI Masamichi
Special Prize in November 2019.

By James L. Schoff, Sr. Director, Sasakawa USA

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