U.S. and Japan: New Policies for the New Korean Situations
Richard Weitz
Hudson Institute1
Abstract
The new national security leaders in Japan, the United States, China andthe two Koreas have assumed office at a precarious time. Despite therecent relaxation of tensions, conditions are ripe for further conflict inNortheast Asia. The new DPRK leadership is as determined as its
predecessor to possess nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles while
resisting unification or reconciliation with South Korea and its allies.
The new government in Tokyo is also augmenting its militarycapabilities. Meanwhile, despite Chinese efforts to restart the Six-Party
Talks, the Obama administration has refused to engage with the DPRK
until it demonstrates a willingness to end its nuclear weapons programand improving intra-Korean ties. But this policy of patiently waiting forverifiable changes in DPRK policies may be too passive in the face ofNorth Korea’ s growing military capabilities, leading the new South
Korean government, striving to maneuver between Beijing andWashington, to consider new initiatives to restart a dialogue with theNorth even while reinforcing its own military capabilities.
Keywords: Japan, Obama. ROK, DPRK, missile, nuclear, provocation,
Tokyo, Washington, BMD
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has notfundamentally changed since the death of Kim Jong-il in December 2011and his replacement by his young and inexperienced son, Kim Jong-un.
Since then, we have seen the usual pattern of rising threats and tensions
followed by an abrupt change of tone in Pyongyang towards a softer line,
which never quite leads to enduring concessions or a resolution of key
problems. The 2012-2013 crises likely resulted from Kim Jong-un’sefforts to demonstrate his fitness to lead his country at a time when someof his father’s colleagues, particularly the military leadership, might havefelt uneasy placing the reins of power in such an unproven leader. If weare lucky, after consolidating his power, Kim will pursue a less

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confrontationist policy. The fear is that he will take overly strong actions
that lead to a major crisis.
Today on the Korean Peninsula are again in decline following therenewed DPRK peace offensive, which has seen resumed intra-Koreanties and a standing down of various DPRK nuclear and missile
capabilities. Nevertheless, the on-again, off-again crises, termed by thePentagon the “provocation pause,” remains disturbing due to recentchanges in the regional security environment. First, North Korea has
demonstrated a capacity to launch long-range missiles and detonate
nuclear devices. Second, the Republic of Korea (ROK) has adopted amuch sterner planned response toward future provocations. Third, the
DPRK-Iran nexus is weighing more heavily on the minds of U.S. policy
makers, who worry that a soft stand in Korea might encourage hardliners
in Tehran, already emboldened by the U.S. back down in Syria.
A final complication is that the DPRK, Japan, China, and the ROK
all have new leaders who have little or no experience playing these
escalation games. They could easily miscalculate and precipitate a major
conflict, as happened in 1950. Nobody in Washington expected North
Korea to invade the South that summer, while the leaders in Pyongyang
and Moscow were caught by surprise when the United States thenintervened to defeat the invasion, even after the U.S. State Department
had declared the Korean Peninsula outside the U.S. defensive perimeterin the Asia-Pacific region. Since then, the DPRK has repeatedly caught
the United States and other countries off-guard by its bizarre but bold
actions. It was almost one hundred years ago that Europe plunged into
its First World War because its leaders could not contain a minor Balkan
incident that rapidly escalated out of control. At the time, alliancedynamics and technology (railroad timetables) drove the escalatory
process. Today, we still have allies fearful of abandonment, while
nuclear weapons have their own technological imperatives favoring earlyuse (especially the vulnerable systems in North Korea).
Japan
North Korea
Despite fears of China’s growing military potential and threatening
behavior, Japanese policy makers identify the DPRK as the mostimmediate military threat to Japan.
They are concerned with
Pyongyang’s continued development of ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons.
North Korea possesses longer-range missiles like theInternational Journal of Korean Studies • Vol. XVII, No. 2

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Taepodong and even the hundreds of shorter-range Nodong missiles thatcan reach Tokyo and other Japanese cities. They can carry carry nuclear
warheads, though even conventional payloads could cause much damage.
The DPRK can also threaten to send biological weapons into Japan
simply by passing them on balloons and having them sail across the sea
and deposit their dangerous agents when they land on Japanese territory.2
The Japanese government has taken a number of steps to impede andreverse North Korea’s nuclear ambitions short of launching its own
nuclear weapons program. A favorite tool has been diplomacy.
Japanese officials have repeatedly joined with their U.S. and South
Korean counterparts to demand that North Korea dismantle its nuclear
weapons program “in a prompt and verifiable manner.”3 Tokyo has
stated that, “Japan cannot accept, by any means, any development,
acquisition or possession, test and transfer of nuclear weapons by North
Korea.”4 Japanese representatives have also participated since August
2003 in the Six Party Talks that have sought to achieve thedenuclearization and security of the Korean Peninsula. Japanese officials
launched their last genuine bilateral engagement initiative toward
Pyongyang in the early 2000s. Its apogee occurred in September 2002,
when then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited North Korea. The
so-called Pyongyang Declaration, signed during Koizumi’s visit,
established the requirements for a genuine Japanese-DPRK
reconciliation.5 However, the gesture backfired when DPRK leader Kim
Jong-il admitted to Koizumi that Pyongyang had kidnapped more than adozen Japanese citizens between 1977 and 1983 to serve as language
instructors for the DPRK intelligence community. Although North
Koreans attributed the seizures to overzealous secret agents, theacknowledgement, which followed years of DPRK denials, enraged theJapanese public, who demanded more information about the issue than
the secretive North Korean leadership proved willing to provide.
Since the abduction issue arose in 2002, it has presented aninsurmountable and resolving mutual disagreement between Japan andNorth Korea.6 Japanese officials regularly lobby their U.S. counterparts
not to make major concessions to the DPRK until North Korea clarifies
the status of the abducted Japanese. For example, Tokyo andWashington required lengthy bilateral negotiations to resolve theirdifferences over whether to remove the DPRK from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism. More recently, Japanese legislators have pressed
the United States not to provide substantial food aid to the DPRK until

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the abductee issue is solved.7
Despite Japanese threats and pleas, North Korea resumed testlaunching ballistic missiles over the Pacific Ocean in July 2006, ending
the moratorium the DPRK had maintained regarding such tests since
September 1999. North Korea’s subsequent test of a nuclear explosive in
October 2006 constituted the first technological step toward developing a
nuclear warhead sufficiently small for delivery aboard a ballistic
missile.8 After North Korea test-fired several missiles in July 2006 andthen a nuclear explosive device a few months later, the Japanese
government progressively expanded its range of sanctions on North
Korea and strongly supported punitive UN Security Council resolutions
that condemned the actions and called for trade restrictions.9 In addition,
Japan adopted a “dialogue and pressure” approach by imposing unilateralsanctions that were more stringent than those found in UNSC
resolutions, including a ban on all North Korean ships in Japanese ports,
restrictions on imports and on most North Koreans entering Japan, and afreeze on bank remittances to North Korea from the ethnic Korean
community in Japan.10 In April 2007, Yuriko Koike, the first person
appointed to the new post of national security adviser, called North
Korea an “enormous” threat to Japan. Koike explained that Tokyo
would insist that the DPRK take concrete action to end its nuclear
program because its “missiles, with a nuclear warhead maybe, may reachthe territory of Japan in about seven or eight minutes.”11 Following the
DPRK’s May 2009 nuclear test, Japan adopted additional sanctions andeffectively ceased dealing with the regime in Pyongyang. Whereas
Japan was one of North Korea’s leading trading partners at the end of theCold War, the waves of sanctions adopted by Tokyo have reduced
economic ties to minimal levels.12
Besides diplomatic measures and economic sanctions against
Pyongyang for its nuclear activities (including suspending heavy fuel oil
shipments in November 2002), Japan has also participated in the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which aims to prevent North
Korea and other countries from importing or exporting materials related
to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery.
Despite restrictive laws and regulations that limit Japan’s direct
engagement in WMD interdiction activities, the Japanese military has
participated in several PSI exercises and has helped other Asian countries
interdict illegal transfers of WMD and missile-related materials.13

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North Korea’s October 2006 detonation of a nuclear explosive
device prompted the Japanese government to review once more its
longstanding decision to refrain from developing an independent nuclear
deterrent. Although the Cabinet reaffirmed the existing policy of nuclear
weapons abstention, they insisted on their right and responsibility to
discuss national nuclear operations in light of the transformation in
Japan’s security environment.14 Experts note that younger Japanese also
evince less innate aversion to acquiring nuclear weapons than theirparents’ generation, who better remember the traumas of Hiroshima andNagasaki.15 The 2010 nuclear accident at Fukishima may have reduced
support for nuclear power, but its long-term impact on potential Japaneseinterest in nuclear weapons is unclear.
For a short period in early 2011, Japan’s new left-wing coalition
government relaxed the policies of past LDP administrations andexpressed an interest in reaching a compromise with Pyongyang.
Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara endorsed a direct dialogue with
Pyongyang instead of relying on the Six-Party format or through U.S. or
PRC mediation. In Maehara’s view, it was “important to establish asituation where dialogue between the two countries is possible, rather
than leaving North Korea issues for other countries to deal with orhandling them through multilateral meetings.”16 In contrast withprevious LDP policy, the eight-point guidelines issued by the newforeign minister omitted references to sanctions on North Korea andpunishing those responsible for abducting Japanese citizens. Instead it
stressed the need to ensure the “fulfillment of the August 2008 North
Korea-Japan agreement” and “thorough investigations into victims of
abductions,” a move that drew some attention.17 But Maehara and hisSouth Korean counterpart, Kim Sung Hwan, agreed that before directtalks could take place between Tokyo and Pyongyang to address theNorth's past abductions of Japanese nationals, inter-Korean dialogue
should be held to repair ties between Seoul and Pyongyang; and othersteps should also be taken to defuse tensions and build confidence on thepeninsula. "Generally speaking, I believe dialogue between Japan andNorth Korea can be held separately from the six-party talks" ondenuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, Maehara said. "But at the sametime, the timing of such bilateral talks should be based on movements
related to the six-way dialogue and held under appropriate conditions.”18
But North Korea’s failure to respond to these overtures, political
infighting in Tokyo, and Japanese preoccupation with territorial disputes

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with China, Russia and South Korea have since led the new Japanese
government to resume Tokyo’s traditional hardline policies towards theNorth.
Japanese leaders remain skeptical that the DPRK will ever relinquish
its nuclear weapons program, even if all the parties remove the abductees
issue from the negotiating table. If North Korea were to eliminate its
nuclear arsenal to satisfy the United States, the DPRK would still possess
hundreds of shorter-range Nodong-1 missiles that could strike Japan’smajor cities with conventional warheads.
Japanese intelligenceconcluded from the July 2006 Nodong launch series that the DPRK had
developed the capacity to employ these mobile missiles withconsiderable accuracy against potential targets in Japan.19 Japanese
officials have complained to their U.S. counterparts that the UnitedStates and the other parties to the Six-Party Talks do not pay sufficientattention to the DPRK’s missile capabilities. Yet, Japanese leaders have
not offered new initiatives to address these issues or break the current
stalemate in the talks, which have remained in abeyance since December
2008. Since Tokyo has ceased formally engaging in direct talks with
Pyongyang, Japan depends on the talks to have influence on theoutcome; without them, Japan risks having its interests regarding the
DPRK, and related regional security issues, ignored. Since the Koreas
are a key element in the security balance between China and Japan, it isimportant for both Tokyo and Beijing to have their interests in any Korea
settlement respected or the Korean Peninsula could again exacerbate
their overall relationship, something it has not done recently only
because the two countries have been focused on other more contentious
issues. Thus far, the DPRKs confrontational negotiating stance, its
provocations against all three governments, and its generally belligerent
policies have helped paper over potential divisions between Washington,
Tokyo, and Seoul regarding the North Korean issue. Nonetheless, one
cannot forever count on inept DPRK diplomacy to hold the three
countries together, especially given the widening rift between Tokyo andSeoul on other matters.
During his successful election campaign for prime minister, Shinzo
Abe emphasized economic recovery in an attempt to end Japan’s
deflation-driven long-term recession. Even so, the LDP promised tostrengthen Japan’s military capabilities, to revise Japan’s pacifist
constitution to enable Japan to participate in collective self-defense, andto make fewer apologies regarding war atrocities such as the “comfort

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women.” These stated intentions have raised concerns over a shift ofJapan to the right. Considering intensive criticism from other countries,
Abe has toned down his nationalistic rhetoric so far, but his stance onamending the pacifist clause in Japan’s constitution worries many
foreigner countries, especially South Korea and China. On the other
hand, Abe may launch a diplomatic initiative regarding North Korea,
following the path established by his mentor, former Prime Minister
Koizumi. In May, Abe sent one of his closest political aides, Isao Iijima,
on an unannounced mission to Pyongyang. Abe’s government did notinform the Obama or Park administrations in advance of the trip.20
Although nothing came of the initiative, the special envoy’s visit
suggests the two governments’ interest in resuming formal talks,suspended since the December 2002 missile test, over resuming
diplomatic relations.21
Abe’s government might take additional
initiatives to strengthen Tokyo’s leverage vis-à-vis the other major
players, including China, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
Toward the same end, Abe also may be introducing additional flexibility
in Japan’s policy toward Russia regarding their disputed island (Northern
Territories/Southern Kuriles). Abe made a high-profile visit to Moscow
soon after his inauguration, one of several indications of renewed interestin Tokyo and Russia settling the issue.
South Korea
Japan’s policy towards South Korea ebbs and flows, depending on
which administrations are in charge in both countries. For example, theprevious ROK government of President Roh Moo-hyun, who waspresident from 2002 to 2008, declined to support Japan’s position on theabductee issue. Although the DPRK has apparently kidnapped many
more South Korean than Japanese citizens, Roh strove to improve ties
with the DPRK and resisted Japanese and American efforts to add
conditions to any settlement. Chinese and Russian representatives
openly criticized Tokyo’s stern posture on the abductee issue. Koizumi’sannual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors some 2.5 million ofJapan’s fallen soldiers but also enshrines the remains of several
prominent war criminals, outraged Asian countries that were invaded andoccupied by Japan. Responding to intensive criticism from othercountries, Abe has not visited the controversial shrine since taking office,but some of his cabinet members have. Koreans and Chinese see thevisits as a Japanese refusal to atone for past crimes. Abe has made50

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equivocal statements about whether Japan engaged in aggression in the
1930s and 1940s against its Asian neighbors. Koreans retain bitter
memories of Japan’s invasion and occupation of their peninsula during
the first half of the 20th century and anti-Japanese sentiment has becomea part of Korean nationalism in the South as well as the North.
The Obama administration has sought to reconcile Tokyo and Seoul.
Japan sent observers to the February-April 2011 Foal Eagle exercises towatch ROK land and naval operations.22 The January 2011 summit
between ROK and Japanese defense ministers saw the exchange ofbilateral views on the dangers posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons
program and worked out details for a planned pact to exchange military
goods and services during peacetime.23 South Korea was one of theleading contributors of humanitarian aid to Japan after the March 2011
Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. South Korea’s one-hundred strong
search-and-rescue unit also represented one of the largest international
contributions to relief efforts in Japan.24 However, long-held historicalsuspicions and resentments were evident when South Koreans protested
the venting of radioactive water into the ocean from the crippled
Fukushima power plant.25 They also expressed fears about the safety of
all Japanese seafood, including those from the unaffected west coast.26
Less than a month after the accident, Japan released a textbook again
laying claim to the Takeshima Islets. On April 7, 2011, ROK Prime
Minister Kim Hwang-sik suggested that South Korea station troops on
the disputed Dokdo Islands to supplement the existing police force.27
South Korea is also building an ocean station there. The United States
played a positive role in inducing Japan and the ROK to participate intrilateral naval drills in June 2012. But the revival of ROK-Japanesetensions over the islands have scuttled attempts to implement planned
defense agreements such as the General Security of Military Information
Agreement (GSOMIA), which would permit Seoul and Tokyo to share
more intelligence regarding North Korea, and the Acquisition and CrossServicing Agreement (ACSA), which would enhance the sharing ofmilitary supplies. President Lee, who previously had helped dampen
bilateral tensions, unhelpfully escalated the conflict by visiting thecontested islets before leaving office.
If Seoul and Tokyo continue to vie for the islands, it will hurt theircooperation and leverage on issues such as North Korean
denuclearization. Unfortunately, there is little Washington or outsiders
can do to end such tensions. At best, U.S. diplomats can help manage

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them by stressing the importance of these countries’ focusing on theircommon challenges and discouraging their leaders from engaging inprovocative actions, such as visiting controversial shrines or the disputed
Dokdo/Takeshima islands.
The United States
ROK-U.S. differences could arise regarding Seoul’s need for
Beijing’s backing against North Korea, differences over the ROK’s
civilian nuclear policies and host nation support of U.S. troops, and U.S.
efforts under the Asian Pivot to shape China’s overall foreign policy
toward many high-priority issues, including Iran and contested maritime
boundaries.
North Korea
All U.S. administrations have refused to accept North Korea as alegitimate nuclear weapons state. The new U.S. Secretary of Defense,
Chuck Hagel, reaffirmed this position at the annual Shangri-la regional
security forum, run by the International Institute for Strategic Studies,
telling the audience that, “The United States has been committed toensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula for sixty years.
That means deterring North Korean aggression and protecting our allies,
and achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
The United States will not stand by while North Korea seeks to develop a
nuclear-armed missile that can target the United States.” Elaborating,Hagel added that, “The United States has been clear that we will take allnecessary steps to protect our homeland and our allies from dangerous
provocations, including significantly bolstering our missile defense
throughout the Pacific. No country should conduct “business as usual”
with a North Korea that threatens its neighbors. We are working closelywith our ROK and Japanese allies to strengthen our posture and ability torespond to threats from North Korea. The prospects for a peacefulresolution also will require close U.S. coordination with China.”28
Hagel’s comments were not idle chatter. The Pentagon has bolstered
U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities, reaffirmed the U.S.
extended nuclear guarantees, and increased funding for other Asiacentered capabilities in its FY14 Defense Department budget request.
Following North Korea’s surprisingly successful long-range missile testin December 2012 and its detonation of a third nuclear device inFebruary, Hagel announced on March 15 a major restructuring in the

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Obama administration’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) program. First,
the Pentagon deployed a mobile, land-based BMD system Terminal
High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to Guam.29 Second, the UnitedStates and Japan accelerated bilateral research and development ofadvanced BMD capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region, while at the same
deploying additional Patriot-Missile batteries in Japan. Third, thedeployment of a SBX-1 sea-based X-band radar extends the immediate
capability of tracking and potentially intercepting a potential missile
launched from the DPRK.30 The U.S. Defense Department alsoannounced that it would be deploying an additional 14 Ground–Based
Mid-Course Interceptors in Alaska to hit any long-range DPRK missiles
launched toward the continental United States.31 As part of the Asia
rebalance (“Pivot”), the Pentagon is expanding military ties andcooperation with the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia. The Defense
Department FY2014 budget proposal further develops U.S. BMD
capabilities, adds rotary-wing aircraft in the ROK, and expands U.S.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in the Asia-Pacificregion. Furthermore, the budget provides development funding for along-range bomber and conventional strike systems to counter emerging
threats (primarily from the DPRK as well as China) and investing in basemodernization programs in Guam, Australia and the Philippines.32
The reason for this comprehensive response is that U.S. policy
makers worry that North Korea’s growing nuclear and ballistic missile
capabilities could soon threaten the continental United States with direct
strikes.33 No U.S. government would accept a mutual deterrent
relationship with an aggressive, congenitally anti-American andunpredictable DPRK regime. Furthermore, many American experts fearthat that Tehran is watching and weighing how the new U.S.
administration is responding to the DPRK’s overt challenge when
determining its own nuclear policies. U.S. policy makers want to avoid
making such generous concessions to Pyongyang as to encourage Tehran
and other countries to seek WMD primarily as a means to pry similar
rewards from Washington. Another consideration affecting U.S. policy
toward the DPRK nuclear issue is that U.S. policy makers also do notwant U.S. allies in the Pacific to perceive Washington is neglecting theirsecurity interests. The DPRK’s improving nuclear weapons and ballistic
missile capacities have already affected East Asian regional security
across many dimensions, calling into question U.S. security guarantees toJapan and South Korea. The United States still demands the complete

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denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
The main problem confronting the United States is that, while
Americans believe that enduring peace requires a Korean Peninsula freeof nuclear weapons, North Korean leaders believe they need nuclear
weapons to deter U.S. threats and achieve political and strategic
autonomy from China and other states. Even under its new leadership,
North Korea has made clear its desire to achieve the same status as India,
Israel, and Pakistan—having a nuclear deterrent that is accepted, if
reluctantly, by the outside community, even though these countries are
not recognized by the NPT as legitimate nuclear weapons powers. In
return, the DPRK might refrain from transferring nuclear technologies toother countries-at least for a while. The DPRK has crossed the Obamaadministration’s earlier Red Lines of no further nuclear weapons orballistic missile testing, and may not be held back by the Red Lineagainst transferring nuclear weapons or materials and technologies toother countries or even terrorists in return for enough cash.
Under its policy of “strategic patience,” designed not to reward the
DPRK for bad behavior, the Obama administration has demanded thatthe DPRK give some concrete indication, before Washington agrees toresume the Six-Party Talks, that the DPRK is committed to making
progress toward ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program,including its newly confirmed uranium enrichment program, andimproving intra-Korean ties. Washington has been willing to negotiate
nuclear and other issues directly with the DPRK, but only within the SixParty framework. The administration has pledged not to negotiatebilateral deals with Pyongyang without the consent of U.S. allies, namely
South Korea and Japan, though it has affirmed its willingness to offer
Pyongyang generous substantive terms for abandoning its nuclear
program.34 This policy of patiently waiting for verifiable changes in
DPRK policies entails several risks. For one, it provides North Koreans
with additional time to develop nuclear and missile programs and risks
allowing a minor incident to escalate.
North Korea was a major topic of conversation at the June 7-8, 2013,
informal summit between President Obama and Chinese President Xi in
California. Then NSC Advisor Thomas Donilon told the media that the
Chinese were forthcoming about their fears surrounding the DRPK’s
nuclear activities and that both leaders “agreed that North Korea has todenuclearize, that neither country will accept North Korea as a nucleararmed state and that we work together to deepen cooperation and

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dialogue to achieve denuclearization.”35 PRC State Councilor Yang
Jiechi confirmed that China and the United States were "the same in theirpositions and objectives" on the North Korean nuclear issue.36 Park thenwent on her own very successful visits to China. She impressed her
Chinese hosts with her knowledge of their language and culture andmanaged to secure greater access to China’s western regions for South
Korean investors. While China is South Korea’s leading trade partner,
their mutual investment remains lower than that between South Korea
and the United States. Although China has tempered UN sanctions
targeting North Korea, over fears all-out economic collapse could
threaten its own security, Beijing has grown increasingly impatient with
Pyongyang’s erratic behavior and nuclear threats and has voted for
additional UN sanctions against the DPRK and ended DPRK banks
access to the state-owned Bank of China.37 However, it remains to be
seen whether China will incentivize or press Kim’s regime hard enoughto cooperate with international expectations, since many Chinese stillfear that the DPRK regime’s collapse will leave China in a worst-off
security situation. Although Chinese scholars and media continue todebate the wisdom of supporting Pyongyang, Beijing’s official policies
towards North Korea have changed a lot less than its rhetoric.
South Korea
Although South Korea and the United States have reaffirmed theirintent to continue restructuring their command relationships, with the
ROK gaining operational control (OPCON) of ROK forces in wartime aswell as peacetime, South Korea’s new government has stated it prefers todelay the transition beyond the scheduled December 2015 handover.
During his October visit to Seoul, Secretary Hagel said that the UnitedStates would work with South Korea to develop an acceptable solution.
The two governments have established a special panel to investigate theissue. The United States has reaffirmed its commitment to defend South
Korea with all its capabilities while the ROK armed forces continue toacquire new capabilities and, to include longer-range strike weapons
such as ballistic missiles and stealth fighter planes. Whatever the newarrangement, both sides have stressed the importance of keeping theirforces interoperable, including any missile defense systems.
Furthermore, the parties have agreed to create a working group to
develop plans for a new joint command structure within the structure of
the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure military efficiency after a “strong

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and seamless” transition. The United States and South Korea arecontemplating how to extend their security partnership into even newer
realms, such as cyber and outer space.38
The ROK-U.S. alliance remains focused on defending South Korea
from external attack, but the alliance has also evolved to address broader
geographic and functional issues shared by the two countries. Their June2009 Joint Vision statement expressed support for expanding the global
role of the ROK-U.S. alliance and partnering in economic development,
democratization, and other non-defense issues. The new vision aligns
well with the Asian Pivot and reflects the 21st century reality that South
Korea has become a global player. Despite her rhetoric of seeking
greater engagement with Beijing, President Park’s foreign policy is atleast equally focused on sustaining a strong U.S.-South Korean alliance.
Indeed, strengthening the Washington-Seoul alliance is a key aspect ofPark’s strategy of promoting progress on the North Korea issue andenhancing regional security by building trilateral trust and cooperation
between China, the United States, and South Korea. Her 2013 visit to
Washington demonstrated unity and strength in the face of Pyongyang’s
recent threats and provocations and sent a signal of resolve to the North
Korean regime and other parties, including the Chinese government.
U.S. officials have made clear that they support Park’s goal of reengaging with the North as long as Pyongyang reciprocates by curbing
its provocations. Meanwhile, Park has reciprocated by demanding an
end to North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile testing.
Washington has been willing to negotiate nuclear and other issues
directly with the DPRK, but only within the Six-Party framework. The
DPRK has been unable to use a detained U.S. citizen, Kenneth Bae, whoworked as a Christian missionary in North Korea, as a hostage to force
the U.S. government to begin bartering with it in direct bilateral talks.39
The DPRK was hoping to repeat the same scenario it used in 2009, whenformer president Bill Clinton met Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang to secure
the release of two American hostages.
Still, there are sources of tension in the alliance. The Obamaadministration, faced with sequestration at home and the need todiversify its Asia-Pacific security programs beyond Northeast Asia, ispressing South Korea on the cost-sharing negotiations over the Special
Measures Agreement (SMA) between the two sides. Facing its own
budgetary problems, the Park administration is resisting increasing its
share of the cost to 50% and wants the USFK to cover the costs of its

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relocation plans to bases further south in the Peninsula. ROK-U.S.
disagreements also persist regarding missile defense. The South Koreansinsist on going their own way and building architecture independent of
the broader missile dense network that the Pentagon is constructing withJapan and other Asian partners. Although Chinese opposition plays arole, the main reason for ROK reluctance to spend more on missile
defense is that ROK commanders face more serious threats in the form of
ROK artillery and conventional forces and are seeking to develop
preemptive options to destroy DPRK missiles before they can even belaunched.
Beyond defense issues, South Korea has shown little interest in
joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), since the recently negotiated
KORUS FTA has only recently begun to take effect. There is little
enthusiasm in Seoul to negotiate and ratify another major trade deal
within such a short time frame, especially given domestic opposition tofurther trade liberalization and the hostility of China, South Korea’s
major trading partner, toward the TPP.
Another divisive issue that remains unresolved is the U.S.-South
Korean disagreement over what kinds of civil nuclear activities South
Korea can undertake—which both sides are treating as a strategic,
economic, and even mutual trust issue. The existing ROK-U.S. nuclear
cooperation agreement, also known as a 123 agreement (based on section
123 of the 1974 Atomic Energy Act), is expiring and the two sides
cannot agree on an acceptable replacement. South Koreans are pressing
for advanced consent to enrich uranium for use in light-water reactors
and to reprocess spent nuclear fuel of U.S. origin, specifically to pursue a
new pyro-processing reprocessing technology that South Koreans claim
is less proliferation-prone than other means of separating plutonium fromspent fuel. The United States is reluctant to grant such permission on
non-proliferation grounds, fearing that other countries will also demand
the right to sensitive nuclear technologies, which can be used to makenuclear weapons. Fears about justifying North Korea’s nuclear weapons
program also worry U.S. lawmakers, who can veto any new agreement
though congressional action. One complicating factor is that the UnitedStates has already granted the Japanese many of the same privileges that
the South Koreans are now demanding—leading many Koreans to ask
why the United States trusts them less than Tokyo as a nonproliferation
partner.40

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During her visit to Washington, Park and Obama probably discussed
behind the scenes how to dampen South Korea-Japan tensions, inflamedby recent visits of Japanese cabinet members to the controversial
Yasukuni Shrine. The sharp deterioration in their bilateral ties, whichbegan more than a year ago, has been extremely unwelcome in
Washington. Not only does it make it harder to present a united trilateralfront against Pyongyang’s provocations, but the poor relations between
the two most important U.S allies in East Asia pose a major obstacle to
U.S. efforts to transform Washington’s traditional hub-and-spokes
alliance network into a more flexible multilateral structure. Park has
indicated that she will not repeat Lee’s visit to the islands that South
Korea disputes with Japan, but expects Tokyo to make the first
diplomatic move toward reconciliation.41 Neither Park nor Abe seems
prepared to make important concessions on their disputed islands
anytime soon. However, since Park and Abe are strong leaders who will
likely remain in office for years, possibilities exist for a compromise on
their territorial dispute and selling it domestically.
Notes:
1

The author would like to thank Hudson interns Matthew Popkin, David Lee,
Susie Kang, Man Ching Lam, and Hanjoo Kim for their research assistance on
this paper. He would also like to thank the International Council on KoreanStudies (ICKS) as well as MacArthur Foundation of Chicago for supporting his
research and writing in this area. The statements and views expressed are solely
the responsibility of the author.

2

Bruce W. Bennett, “The Challenge of North Korean Biological Weapons,”
testimony presented before the House Armed Services Subcommittee onIntelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities on October 11, 2013, RAND
Office of External Affairs, October 2013, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/
AS26/20131011/101394/HHRG-113-AS26-Wstate-BennettB-20131011.pdf.
3

U.S. Department of State, “Joint U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Statement on
North Korea,” October 26, 2002, http://usinfo.state/gov/topical/pol/arms/02102
603.htm.
4“Speech by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi to the Conference
on Disarmament,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. September 4, 2003,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/conference/speech0309.html.

5

Hiramatsu Kenji, “Lead up to the Signing of the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang
Declaration,” Gaiko Forum (Winter 2003), pp. 1- 30, http://www.gaikoforum.

58

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com/P20_30_122.pdf.
6David C. Knag, “Japan: U.S. partner or focused on abductees?,” The
Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 4 (2005), pp. 107-117.
7“Key U.S. lawmakers oppose U.S. food aid to N. Korea: Japan legislator,”
Kyodo News Agency, July 14, 2011,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Key+U.S.+lawmakers+oppose+U.S.+food+aid+t
o+N.+Korea%3A+Japan+legislator.-a0261623443.

8David Albright and Paul Brannan, “The North Korean Plutonium Stock,
February 2007,” Institute for Science and International Security, February 20,
2007, www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKplutoniumFEB.pdf.

9

For a detailed description of the sanctions, see “Japan–North Korea Relations,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea.
10

Diplomatic Bluebook 2006 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,2006), p. 10, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2006/02.pdf.
11

John Brinsley, “North Korea Presents an ‘Enormous’ Threat to Japan, Koike
Says,” Bloomberg, April 25, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601101&sid=a7Ifg3ceAiEw&ref
er=japan.
12

Yuki Tatsumi, “Has Japan’s DPRK Policy Reached a Dead End?,” 38 North,
April 22, 2013, http://38north.org/2013/04/ytatsumi042213/.
13

Yomiuri Shimbun, “Koizumi to Ask for Anti-MD Vigilance,” Daily Yomiuri,
October 7, 2003.

14

See for example Glenn Kessler, “Japan, Acting to Calm U.S. Worries, Rules
Out Building Nuclear Arms,” Washington Post, October 18, 2006; Bennett
Richardson, “Nuclear Question Still Nags at Japan,” Christian Science Monitor,
November 6, 2006; Thom Shanker and Nortimitsu Onishi, “Japan Assures Ricethat it Has No Nuclear Intentions,” New York Times, October 21, 2006; andAssociated Press, “Japan Says it Could Build a Nuclear Bomb,” November 29,
2006.
15

Elizabeth D. Bakanic, “The End of Japan's Nuclear Taboo,” Bulletin ofAtomic Scientists Online, June 9, 2008, http://www.thebulletin.org/webedition/features/the-end-of-japans-nuclear-taboo..

16

Lee Jong-won “The comeback of North Korea-Japan negotiations?” The
Hankyoreh, January 8, 2011,
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_opinion/457855.html

17

Ibid.

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59

18

“No North Meeting Prior to Inter-Korean Talks,” The Japan Times, January
16 2011.

19

Christopher Griffen, “A Blossoming Relationship,” Armed Forces Journal(February 2007), http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/02/2418751.

20

Peter Lee, “Japan Seeks to Mend ties with North Korea,” International Policy
Digest, May 22, 2013, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/archives/75594
21“Shinzo Abe is returning to the emotional issue of abductees,” The Economist,
May 25, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21578436-shinzo-abereturning-emotional-issue-abductees-frogman-cometh.

22

Wang Yan, “South Korea-U.S. military drills get different interpretations”
Xinhua, March 3, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/201103/03/c_13759892.htm

23“South Korea, Japan upgrade ties in face of North Korean threat,” Reuters,
January 10, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/10/us-korea-japanidUSTRE70926J20110110

24

J.S. Chang, “S. Korea’s 102 member rescue team heads to quake devastatedregion in Japan”, Yonhap News Agency, March 14, 2011,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/03/14/18/0301000000AEN20110
314008600315F.HTML; and “S Korea’s quake donation campaign to Japanexceeds $52 million”, Kyodo News, Japan Today, March 23, 2011,
http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/s-koreas-quake-donationcampaign-to-japan-exceeds-52-million

25“South Koreans protest against Japan’s dumping of radioactive water intosea,” NTD Television, April 8, 2011,
http://english.ntdtv.com/ntdtv_en/news_asia/2011-04-08/south-koreans-protestagainst-japan-s-dumping-of-radioactive-water-into-sea.html.

26

Donald Kirk, “Japan riles Korea with textbook timing,” Asia Times, April 6,
2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MD06Dg01.html.

27“S. Korea mulls stationing troops on Dokdo: PM,” Yonhap April 8, 2011,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/04/08/34/0301000000AEN20110
408001800315F.HTML.
28

Chuck Hagel, speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies(Shangri-La Dialogue), June 1, 2013,
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1785.
29

Kevin Baron. “Forget the B-2s over Seoul, worry more that the Pentagon sent
THAADS to Guam.” Foreign Policy. April 3. 2013, http://e-60

International Journal of Korean Studies • Fall 2013

ring.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/03/forget_the_b_2s_over_seoul_worry_m
ore_the_pentagon_sent_thaads_to_guam?wpisrc=obinsite.
30“Pentagon: Mega Radar Not Tied to North Korea Threat.” USNI News, April
3, 2013, http://news.usni.org/2013/04/03/pentagon-mega-radar-not-tied-tonorth-korea-threat.

31

Rachel Oswald. “Hagel Says U.S. Won’t Remain Idle as North Korea Seeks
Nuclear-Armed Missile,” Global Security Newswire. June 3, 2013,
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/hagel-says-us-will-not-stand-while-n-koreaacquires-nuke-armed-missile/.

32“Fact Sheet: The Fiscal Year 2014 Federal Budget and the Asia-Pacific.” The
White House,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/asia_pacific_rebalance_facts
heet_20130412.pdf.
33

Tom Mahnken, “North Korea’s Growing Missile Threat,” FP: Foreign Policy,
April 22, 2013,
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/22/north_korea_s_growing_miss
ile_threat.

34“Remarks by Ambassador Glyn T. Davies, Special Representative for North
Korea Policy,” 2013 Washington Forum on Korea, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars Friday, June 14, 2013.
35“Obama, Xi Agree North Korea Must Denuclearize,” American Forces Press
Service, June 9, 2013,
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120245.

36“Denuclearization of peninsula: N. Korea must know that it holds the key topeace,” Korea Times, June 9, 2013,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2013/08/202_137183.html.
37

Keith Bradsher and Nick C. Bruce, "China Cuts Ties With Key North KoreanBank," New York Times, May 8, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/world/asia/china-cuts-ties-with-northkorean-bank.html.

38

Cheryl Pellerin, “Panetta: U.S., South Korea Strengthen Alliance,” American
Forces Press Service, October 24, 2012,
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118324.
39

Sang-Hun Choe, "At 11th Hour, North Korea Cancels Visit By U.S. Envoy,"
New York Times, August 30, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/world/asia/north-korea-rescindspermission-for-us-envoy-visit.html?_r=0.

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40

Mark Holt, “U.S. and South Korean Cooperation in the World Nuclear Energy
Market: Major Policy Considerations,” Congressional Research Service, June25, 2013.
41

Robert A. Manning, "Park–Obama summit bolsters US–ROK alliance," East
Asia Forum, May 16, 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/16/parkobama-summit-bolsters-us-rok-alliance/.

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