Sept. 11 & U.S. Nonproliferation Policy - Juster Speech 2/26/02

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The
Potential Threat
U.S. Nonproliferation
StrategySpecific Export
Control Initiatives.
Enforcement
Transshipment
Initiatives
Conclusion

Remarks ofKenneth I. Juster
Under Secretary of Commerce
For Export Administration
at The Ninth Asian Export Control SeminarFebruary 26, 2002
Tokyo, JapanI am pleased to be here in Tokyo at the Ninth Asian Export Control Seminar. I wantto thank the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economics,
Trade, and Industry for hosting this event. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, the issues that this Conference will address are as important as ever.
The attacks of September 11 have had a profound effect on all of us. Although theattacks took place on American soil, the damage and fallout were not confined to theUnited States. People from over 80 different countries were killed in the attacks on
the World Trade Center. But beyond the immediate physical and human toll, theevents of September 11 were an assault on our shared values of freedom, tolerance,social diversity, political pluralism, and modernization.
Within the U.S. Government, September 11 has caused a widespread reevaluation ofpolicies and practices related to the protection of our national security. One key
element of this process has been our heightened focus on stemming the proliferationof weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them, as well as theproliferation of advanced conventional weapons. Indeed, with the end of the Cold
War, weapons proliferation has become the most significant challenge not only toU.S. national security, but to world stability.
I would like briefly to discuss the proliferation threat that we all face today and thenonproliferation policy that the United States is pursuing in response to this threat. I
also will highlight some of the specific nonproliferation initiatives in which the U.S.
government will be directly involved during this next year. We are hopeful that wecan build upon the support that your countries have provided in response to theevents of September 11 to achieve a significant strengthening of international efforts
to stop terrorists and countries of concern from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction and advanced conventional weapons.

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The Proliferation Threat
I do not believe that the nature of the proliferation threat facing the world
fundamentally changed as a result of September 11. Rather, its is our perception ofthat threat and its immediacy that changed significantly. There can be no question
now that the threat posed by proliferation is diverse, unpredictable, dangerous, andincreasingly difficult to counter.
During the Cold War, our primary proliferation concerns were state-sponsoredweapons programs. Although serious, such programs were limited to a relatively
small number of states and, hopefully, could be addressed among sovereign nationsin the international system, with countries held accountable for their actions.
In recent years, however, the proliferation threat has become much more diverse.
Although state-sponsored weapons programs remain an important concern, an
equally significant concern is the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by
non-state actors and terrorist groups. Such groups often are difficult to identify andoften are not subject to pressure exerted through diplomatic or economic channels.
Yet, intelligence reports confirm that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda actively were –and still are – seeking nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons for use in attacks
on the United States and elsewhere. Indeed, plans for a rudimentary nuclear weapon
were found on a computer located in an al-Qaeda safehouse in Kabul.
The threat currently posed by proliferation also is much less predictable than everbefore. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and advances in information
technology, the know-how required for the development and production of weaponsof mass destruction has become increasingly available to those who seek it. And weare very concerned that several countries that have been actively seeking weapons ofmass destruction are now becoming "secondary proliferators" by providing sensitivetechnology and assistance to other states or terrorist groups, and thereby adding toregional and, potentially, global instability.
September 11 also opened our eyes to the dangers posed by a new breed of terrorists
who are motivated not just by political goals, but by religious extremism. Theseterrorists do not identify themselves or seek credit for their actions. They make nodemands and seek no negotiations. They recognize no red lines and they have noreservations about taking their own lives as they inflict their terror. This level ofviolence and depravity far exceeds that of previous terrorists, and has scuttled any
doubts that such terrorists would use weapons of mass destruction were they to havethe opportunity to do so.
Finally, the proliferation threat facing the world is becoming increasingly difficult tocounter. As a result of increased economic interaction and advances in informationand communications technology, it is now easier than ever to transfer sensitivetechnology and know-how to the far reaches of the globe, and more difficult thanever to monitor or control such transfers. Changes in the nature of technologicaldevelopment also are contributing to the increased difficulty of stemming weapons
proliferation. Militaries around the world are increasingly relying on the commercial
sector for technological innovation, and weapons systems often incorporate

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Sept. 11 & U.S. Nonproliferation Policy - Juster Speech 2/26/02"commercial off-the-shelf" components. As a result, technologies with sensitive
military applications frequently have legitimate commercial applications as well.
In light of all of these considerations, the international community faces theenormous challenge of devising a nonproliferation agenda designed to keep sensitivetechnologies out of the hands of adversaries and potential adversaries, while also
supporting legitimate international trade. Yet that is precisely what we must do if weare to preserve global security.

U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy
Stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains one of the top
national security priorities of the United States. President Bush strongly reinforced
this point recently when he declared in his State of the Union Address that theUnited States would "work closely with our coalition to deny terrorists and theirstate sponsors the materials, technology, and expertise to make and deliver weaponsof mass destruction." To halt proliferation in this changing environment, we mustbring to bear a wide array of diplomatic, political, economic, and legal tools.
First, we are using diplomatic and economic tools to engage with countries involvedin proliferation activities and urge them to constrain, halt, or reverse those activities.
This includes, for example, efforts to persuade India and Pakistan to constrain their
nuclear and missile competition.
Second, the United States is pursuing cooperative threat reduction programs tosecure or eliminate sensitive weapons materials and technologies. These programs
are increasingly important in Russia, which still has a substantial amount of nuclear
materials, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles that are not properly
secured and, thus, are vulnerable to theft or sale on the black market. These threat
reduction programs also strive to provide economic incentives to prevent scientists
and others with technical know-how from transferring their knowledge to terrorists
or countries of concern.
Third, we are working to strengthen existing international nonproliferation treaties,
support new instruments that promote our interests, and strive to upgrade the means
to verify treaty compliance. This includes efforts to strengthen compliance with theverification requirements of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the ChemicalWeapons Convention, as well as work to implement a series of new measures thatwould strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention.
Fourth, the United States is intensifying its work to deny proliferators access tonecessary equipment, materials, or technology and to constrain transfers of advanced
conventional weapons to countries of concern. We do this primarily through export
controls. You might think that controls on exports are the antithesis of free trade.
Export controls are – to be sure – a form of limited government intervention in themarketplace. But rather than viewing export controls as imposing restrictions on thefree flow of goods, I would suggest that they be viewed as supporting conditions fora safe and secure global economy – conditions that are an important ingredient tosustaining free trade. The events of September 11 – and the concern that the nextterrorist attack might involve weapons of mass destruction – leave no doubt that
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effective export controls are vital to the preservation of the international tradingsystem. Effective export controls help insure that markets are not destabilized byregional arms races or by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
We are working hard to enact a new, comprehensive Export Administration Act inthe United States that would address the rapid pace of technological change intoday’s world and enhance our own export control and enforcement authorities. We
also are continuing to provide export control cooperation on a bilateral basis to assist
other countries in strengthening their export control laws and regulations and theirenforcement efforts. In addition, we are taking steps to strengthen the administrationand effective enforcement of export controls on a multilateral basis through thenonproliferation regimes – an issue on which I would like to expand a bit.

Specific Export Control Initiatives
In order to be effective, we firmly believe that export controls must be maintained
multilaterally. Sensitive dual-use items and technologies simply cannot be controlled
effectively unless there is broad cooperation among exporting and transit countries.
Without such cooperation, foreign purchasers denied a critical item by one country
often are able to obtain the same item from another country that does not control its
exports as stringently. In order to put in place effective export controls that
accomplish their intended purpose of denying sensitive items to known or suspected
proliferators or terrorists, all countries possessing such items must work together.
It is for this reason that the multilateral export control regimes are vital to thesuccess of our nonproliferation efforts, and we will continue to take steps to increase
the effectiveness of the various multilateral regimes. I realize that not all of yourcountries are members of these regimes. However, many of your countries adhere to
the principles and control lists established in the regimes, and any steps to increase
the effectiveness of the regimes are likely to have a positive effect on stemming
proliferation and increasing security for all countries, not just regime members.
In our view, the multilateral regime that is in most need of strengthening is theWassenaar Arrangement. As you know, Wassenaar was created to prevent thedestabilizing effects caused by the spread of advanced conventional weapons tocountries or regions of concern. Although Wassenaar is not focused on weapons ofmass destruction, it plays an important role in U.S. nonproliferation strategy. We
were successful last December in achieving consensus to change the Initial Elements
so that all members commit to avoid transfers of controlled items to terrorists. We
hope to achieve other important changes this year.
We will push again this year for the adoption of a formal denial consultation
procedure in Wassenaar. Such a procedure would allow for bilateral consultations
prior to a proposed export in situations where one member already has denied alicense for essentially an identical export. Denial consultation procedures alreadyexist in the other multilateral regimes, and are essential for preventing proliferators
or terrorists from "shopping" among various countries until they can find one that iswilling to export sensitive items or technologies that others will not.
To be frank, I can see no rational basis for any country to oppose the adoption of
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formal denial consultation procedures. Such procedures do not impose upon or
restrict the "national discretion" upon which the regime is based. All that would berequired is the opportunity to discuss a potential export and, possibly, share
information before one member undercuts another member’s denial. In many
instances, it may be that the undercutting member would not approve the license if it
had access to the same information as the denying member. Greater cooperation andinformation exchange are essential to the effective operation of Wassenaar, andthese are the very ideals that denial consultation procedures would facilitate.
In addition to a denial consultation procedure, we will renew our efforts to secureconsensus within Wassenaar for a conventional arms "catch-all" control. Such acontrol would impose an export licensing requirement based on the known orsuspected end-use of an item for military purposes rather than its identification on
the Wassenaar control list. In our view, "catch-all" controls are vital to ensure theeffectiveness of an export control regime because they can be targeted directly atend-users involved in proliferation or other activities of concern. "Catch-all" controls
provide a legal basis for countries to license the export of items that may fall justoutside of control list parameters, but that still would make a material contribution toproliferation activities or other activities of concern.
During the 2001 Plenary, there appeared to be widespread support for adoption of a"catch-all" control within Wassenaar. In order to secure consensus on a "catch-all"control at the 2002 Plenary, we will continue to build upon this support, and lookforward to working with other countries to address particular issues that may beconnected to "catch-all" controls, such as the lack of domestic legislation authorizingthese controls,.
Finally, we will continue our push on other proposals, such as improving thetimeliness and content of required reporting and seeking mandatory reporting of alltransfers of small arms and light weapons to non-members. To the extent that
resistance to our denial consultation and "catch-all" proposals is based on aperceived need for more transparency in arms transfers, we are willing to entertain
proposals that would strengthen the arms pillar of the regime. In the aftermath of
September 11, we see no good reason why any country that claims to be serious
about nonproliferation and anti-terrorism would not support these proposals tostrengthen the credibility and effectiveness of the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Enforcement and Transshipment Initiatives
In addition to efforts to stem proliferation through the multilateral regimes, we will
be seeking to strengthen the enforcement of export controls laws. The multilateralregime principles and control lists are meaningless unless licensing requirements areeffectively and vigorously enforced by all member countries. Accordingly, we will
be taking steps to expand and enhance our international enforcement efforts,
particularly with regard to transshipment countries.
The U.S. government is leading an initiative to ensure that major transshipment
points are not being used to circumvent export controls and aid proliferation efforts.
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acquire sensitive items and technologies for weapons programs. Our goal, therefore,
is to encourage major transshipment centers to establish procedures for examining
cargo, to administer licensing requirements that meet the standards of themultilateral regimes, and to enforce strategic trade control laws to prevent illegal
diversion of sensitive items and technologies. We will be working closely withtransshipment countries to raise the level of compliance with export control
requirements and avoid a race to the bottom with respect to export control standards.
In November 2000, many of your countries met in the United States and agreed to aset of export control and enforcement principles for transshipment countries. As aresult of September 11, it is now even more important that we all take steps toimplement these principles as soon as possible.

Conclusion
Although September 11 has not altered the fundamental orientation of U.S.
nonproliferation efforts, it has underscored the importance of being vigilant andtaking the necessary steps to halt the proliferation of deadly weapons. By
undertaking several policy initiatives – some of which I have highlighted – we hopeto enhance global security by denying terrorists and countries of concern access tosensitive technology required for the development or production of advanced
conventional weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction and the missiles todeliver them.
As you know, however, we cannot accomplish this goal alone. All countries that aresuppliers of sensitive technologies, or that are key transshipment points, must work
together to stem proliferation. It is clearly in everyone’s best interest to prevent
terrorists and others from acquiring the means to launch devastating attacks that
could kill hundreds or thousands of innocent civilians. The cooperation andassistance that each of your countries has provided in the campaign against terrorism
in Afghanistan has been tremendous and is much appreciated. We now hope to move
forward by building on that cooperation and obtaining your assistance instrengthening multilateral nonproliferation efforts in order to protect global security
and prevent the type of terrorism that we witnessed on September 11.
Thank you very much.

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