Japan-Korea-Taiwan Trilateral Dialogue
on Northeast Asian Security

Taipei, Taiwan AGORA GARDEN
4 July 2011

Program Schedule
Hosts:
Institute of international Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei
East Asia Institute, Seoul
Keio University, Tokyo
8:30-8:45 Registration
8:45-9:15 Opening Remarks and Introductory
Fu-Kuo Liu Research Fellow, IIR,NCCU Executive Director, MCSS
Yoshihide Soeya

Director, Institute of East Asian Studies, Keio University

Chaesung Chun Chair of MacArthur Asia Security Initiative Research Center of the
EAI, Seoul National University
9:15-9:30 break
9:30-11:30 Session One Impact on Northeast Asian Security

Paper Writer
Jaewoo Choo(KyungHee University)
Chaesung Chun(Seoul National University)
DiscussantsKorean Perspective
Seungjoo Lee(Chungang University)
Japanese Perspective:
Hiroshi Nakanishi(Kyoto University)
Taiwanese Perspective:
Tuan-Yao Cheng(National Chengchi University)
11:30-13:00 lunch
13:00-15:00 Session Two

Changing U.S.-China Relations and Japan's ResponsePaper Writer
Yoshihide Soeya(Keio University)
DiscussantsKorean Perspective: Korea’s position between China and the US
Seungjoo Lee(Chungang University)
Japanese Perspective: US-Japan Security alliance remaining viable?
Ken Jinbo(Keio University)
Taiwanese Perspective: US-China and the cross-strait prospects
Ming Lee(National Chengchi University)
15:00-15:30 break
15:30-17:30 Session Three

US-China Relations and the cross-strait prospects
Paper Writer
Cheng-Yi Lin(Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica)
DiscussantsKorean Perspective
Jaewoo Choo(KyungHee University)
Japanese Perspective
Masayuki Tadokoro(Keio University)
Taiwanese Perspective
Francis Yi-hua Kan(National Chengchi University)
17:30-18:00 Wrap-up Session
Yoshihide Soeya(Keio University)
Chaesung Chun(Seoul National University)
Fu-Kuo Liu(National Chengchi University)

List of Participants
Japan
JINBO Ken, Associate Professor of Policy Management, Keio University
NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor of Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University
SOEYA Yoshihide, Director of Institute of East Asian Studies / Professor of Keio University
TADOKORO Masayuki, Professor of Political Science, Keio University
Korea
CHOO Jaewoo, Professor of Department of Chinese Studies, Kyung Hee University
CHUN Chaesung, Professor of International Relations, Seoul National University /Chair of MacArthur Asia Security Initiative Research Center, East Asia Institute
LEE Seungjoo, Professor of Department of Political Science and International Relations,
Chung-Ang University
TaiwanCHAN Mignonne Man-jung, Executive Director of the Chinese Taipei APEC Study
Center
CHANG Chung-Young, Professor of Department of Public Affairs, Fo Guang University
CHENG Tuan-Yao, Research Fellow of the Institute of International Relations, National
Chengchi University
FAN Hou-Lou, Section Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China
KAN Francis Yi-hua, Associate Research Fellow of the Institute of International
Relations, National Chengchi University
LEE Ming, Professor of Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University
LIN Cheng-Yi, Research Fellow of the Institute of European and American Studies,
Academia Sinica
Capt. LIN Laurence, Instructor of Naval Command & Staff College, National Defense
University
LIN Wei-Yang, Deputy Chief on Home Assignment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of China
LIU Fu-Kuo, Research Fellow of the Institute of International Relations, National
Chengchi University / Chief Executive Director of MacArthur Center for Security Studies,
National Chengchi University
SHEN Ming-Shih, Associate Research Fellow of Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies,
National Defense University
SUNG Shen-Wu, Section Chief of the Foreign Service Institute, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of China

TSAO Hsiung-Yuan, Chief of Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defense
University
TZEN Louis Wen-Hua, Chairman of the Prospect Foundation
YANG Yu-Ling, Assistant Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republicof China
YEN Tiehlin, Deputy Executive Director of MacArthur Center for Security Studies,
National Chengchi University

Summary and Recommendations
The Trilateral Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security was prepared by three
institutions from South Korea, Taiwan and Japan to utilize the track II format ofexchanging ideas on regional security issues. On July 4, 2011, scholars and experts fromthe East Asia Institute (EAI) of Korea, MacArthur Center for Security Studies (MCSS) of
Taiwan, and the Institute of East Asian Studies of Keio University (KIEAS) of Japan
gathered in Taipei and discussed the security challenges in the region derived mainly fromthe rise of China and the following changes in the U.S.-China relations.
Consisted of three sessions covering the issue-specific area of concern for eachcountry, the Dialogue rendered an opportunity to better understand the current position
and the desired future direction presented from the different perspectives. The participantsalso shared the ideas and visions on the cooperative and collaborative measures to deal
with the regional security issues.
The following is a summary of the presentations and discussions by leading
scholars and experts from three institutions.

Session 1: The Rise of China and Its Impacts on Northeast Asian Security
The first presentation by Korean participant focused on how to interpret
Chinese security intention in the Northeast Asian region. Rather than analyzing thereason or the background of China’s behavior, it is better to look into the consequence or
the probableend state of its action to understand Chinese intention. The influence andthe limitation of Chinese recent security behaviors shown in the cases of sinking ofCheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong island present four patterns in China’s restrained
reactions – failure to extend condolence, prompting suspicion on China’s good neighbor
policy; aversion from security case associated with North Korea; maintaining the cold
peace and the status quo in the region; and aggressiveness in employing countermeasures
after it finds itself isolated. Professor Choo states that these limitation on Chinese
strategic security behaviors leads to security dilemma causing the sense of insecurity of
its own, while it has failed to provide an alternative security structure for the region.
In the following presentation by another Korean participant, more elaborated
policy suggestions to Seoul under such circumstance were noted. Professor Chunevaluated the differences of China’s rise – re-rise of Chinese civilization; soft rise in thefield of soft power; post-Westphalian rise with networked governance; and engaged risewith global and regional structures. Then he proposed the future China strategy that
South Korea should rightly theorize pre-modern history and experiences; set thestandards for regional leadership, overcoming the pressure on soft balancing; promote
civil society networks; and manage the U.S.-China relations with the role of middle power
initiatives. Strategy of hedging is too situation-dependent, and strategy of engagement
and cooperation than that of balancing would suit South Korea better. Focus on thecomplex and networked regional architecture is also important.
The Rise of China The discussion began with the warning that we should be
careful in using the expression, the “rise” of China. This is a new challenge we face, a
global super power that is still growing, but China seems not ready to takeinternational responsibility as a global power because it is mainly concentrating on thedomestic issues. China does not yet have the power or the vision to lead the region or toorganize the region. So the middle power like Korea, Taiwan and Japan might havesomething to contribute.
Still, the rise of China has been the most significant change withfull-dimension influence, and it brought about three challenges: strategic divergence
between security and economy; rise of geopolitics in Asia, as the gravity of geopolitics ismoving toward China again as American presence in Asia weakened; challenge to
American alliance system. It is a transitional period for Northeast Asia security andunder such environment, there is a strong need to establish a regional mechanism toconsult and cooperate particularly in security issues.
From Japan’s perspective, growth in economic relations with China is given
but Tokyo should reconsider the constraints on dealing with the pending security
situation. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance as well as broadening the security
relations with the other states such as Korea and/or Taiwan is also discussed
domestically. In Japanese interpretation on Chinese security behavior, there are four
possible hypothesis: China becoming economic power leading to it becoming a hegemon,
recent position of China towards North Korea would be one case; displacement theory ofdomestic tension as nationalist agenda raises domestic conflicts; rivalry theory in theprocess of succession from Hu to Xi; and weakening of the civilian control of Chinese
military.
Regional Security Architecture The rise of China and rapidly shifting situation
do pose limitations on the behaviors of middle and small powers so they need to draw up
more sophisticated and complex strategy. They need to find a room not to stay stuck
between the great powers, so institutionalized cooperation among the middle and small
powers is required. In East Asia, there is a clear discrepancy and divergence in security
and economic architecture and East Asian states’ interest on the regional integration is
growing while most of them are dependent on China particularly after the financial
crisis. Against this backdrop, FTAs could play a crucial role though it is an economic tool,
it could bring about political achievement to the related parties. Lining economic andpolitical nexus is one of the Chinese strategies as well.
The basic security architecture has not changed much since the Cold War in
Northeast Asia. However, it is getting loose since the U.S. influence has been weakened,
not any more dominant as it was before, since it is concentrating on the war on
terrorism. Due to its domestic and financial problem, it would be difficult for the U.S. to
be involved into the regional issues of Asia. The U.S. perception on the dominance in theregion is different what we the regional actors might think. This is a critical juncture
where the great powers compete with each other in the region for the dominance, andthe middle powers are striving to develop their own roles and establish regional architecture.
Regional strategic environment and impact of China on it is very complicated.
Chinese foreign policy goal of growing peacefully was not realized as expected. While
trading with mainland China, Taiwan also is going through careful consideration on
security strategy dealing with the rise of China. Last year’s Chinese behavior is only
temporary and as they grow more dominant, their behavior could become more
assertive in the future. So can we shape Chinese behavior as middle powers? Can wehave impact on the Chinese public as they are more open now than ever? What is thealternative to keep China developing as a stable power? There are the questions to
consider when designing a common Asian strategy.
Session 2: Changing U.S.-China Relations and Japan’s Response
Professor Soeya presented on the Japan’s position in the midst of thecircumstance where the rise of China entails a mix of two scenarios – China seeking analternative (China-centered) international order and China staying within the liberalinternational order. In spite of discourses on an eventual clash between the United States
and China, the two countries will be cooperative for strategic coexistence. In this context,
Japan is a “middle power” that integrates alliance with the U.S. and security cooperation
with regional countries in face of China’s rise and changing U.S.-China relations. Notably,
security ties will increase between Japan and South Korea, especially in the domain of
non-traditional security cooperation. Taiwan is a natural partner to Japan and South Ko
rea in “middle power” security cooperation and Korea would play an important role inbringing Japan-Taiwan cooperation in a trilateral context.
Defining the U.S.-China Relations Whether it is a power shift or transition
has been a key question in defining the U.S.-China relations. The implications rise of
China has are interpreted in many ways like peaceful and harmonious rise, eventual
compliance with liberal international order, or G2 rivalry. After analyzing the economic
growth in GDP and military expenditure projection on future China, it seems that

middle powers’ collaboration might be able to balance against the rise of China. Not justan autonomous diplomacy, but collective hard and soft balancing through innovative
coordination with the other middle powers is required. Japan’s emphasis on the more
dynamic and operational self-defense force and high deterrence capability could
contribute as well.
China has been cautious in pursuing its national interest – harmonious world:
consistent peace and reciprocal prosperity. It also promotes grass-root participation to
the international relations, calling it the democratization of international relations.
In addition, liberal international order has been firmly established for many
years with the supports from many major powers so China cannot fundamentallychange it, let along single-handedly modify it. No matter how powerful China would bein the future, middle power cooperation will be able to pose strong constraints to
Chinese behavior. The most realist objective China could achieve would be to become abenign regional hegemon. In that case, practical and realistic China’s interest would be
to minimize the U.S. influence in the region.
For example, Taiwan issue, Tibet issue, trade, technology, treatment ofdissidents, and sense of external threats are the issues that the U.S. and China could
cooperate since both sides understand that it is better to avoid disputes between thetwo.
On the other hand, there was also a cautions voice among the discussants
about the rise of China. Basic assumption of this dialogue is the rise of China but weneed to be more flexible on the future projection. If there would be some technology
innovation in the production sector, it would be in the U.S., not China. Demographic
projection in East Asia is peculiar and the aging of the population is rapidly ongoing. By
assuming certain type of future, we tend to limit the behavior of today, so when
projecting the future of China’s growth, we should also think about the challenges
China now faces.
Middle Power Strategy Middle power networking strategy is needed and there
should be pre-conditions set for the middle power diplomacy to be more workable.
Domestic political stability matters and within the middle powers, issue priorities
should be coordinated. Geographical scope of regional cooperation must be also agreed
upon. In order to come up with the effective middle power diplomacy, sophisticatedstrategy is required such as collaboration, soft balancing, or deterrence, and these three
are not mutually exclusive.
Under the circumstance, Japan’s role should be more than that of middle
power and lead the other regional actors to cooperate in dealing with the issue of therise of China. Certain initiative for the security coordination needs to be taken andJapanese willingness to propose a future vision is very much anticipated.

Cooperation in crisis managementsuch as dealing with North Korea’s regimechange is another issue area of cooperation in terms of preparing for the contingency
scenario. Military conflicts including maritime disputes in the region, changes ofpolitical leadership, or/and economic crisis could be considered as issues for security
cooperation among the middle powers as well.
Session 3: U.S.-China Relations and the Cross-Strait Prospects
The United States and China maintain a comprehensive and complex
relationship, especially in military relations. One of the most critical issues is U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan. Beijing denounces the Taiwan Relations Act while Taipei criticizes
China’s missile deployment in the coastal areas. Since 2008, however, tensions between
Taiwan and China eased as negotiations on military confidence-building measures andthe Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) were concluded. In the mood
towards rapprochement, the U.S. is caught in a dilemma. Improved Cross-Strait
relations involve risks, including regional instability and threat to American security.
The U.S. finds fewer roles for it to play and is concerned over the possible ramificationsof arms sales to Taiwan.
Developments in the Cross-Strait Economic Relations Since the Kuomintang(KMT) came to power in 2008, cross-strait relations has been significantly eased asincoming Chinese tourists and investment to the island greatly benefited Taiwan
economy. Furthermore, in order to boost the chances of reelection for President Ma
Ying-jeou, whose China policy has quickened the pace of rapprochement with Chi na,
Beijing is likely to reduce the number of missiles targeting Taiwan. Increase ineconomic interdependence also contributed to the security and military field as China
encourages meetings of retired generals of both sides of the strait to deal with topics
related to military confidence building measures (CBMS).
Upcoming Presidential Election and its impact on the Cross-Strait Détente
Since domestic economic benefit, particularly of the private business increased
massively in the recent days, it is difficult for any administration to underestimate thevitality of economic cooperation between mainland China and Taiwan. The Cross-Strait
détente is not reversible no matter which party comes to power since it has beensignificantly beneficial and publicly supported. Even the fear of Chinese military option
toward Taiwan could be eliminated by keeping the trend of increasing the exchanges
across the strait.
Unlike in the inter-Korean relations where China and the U.S. are the major
variables, in the cross-strait relations, the one external variable is the U.S. While theU.S. influence in Taiwan decreases following the pressure from China, Washington isbeing cautious in endorsing the reconciliation between China and Taiwan. Sino-U.S.
relations and those of the cross-strait, the two relations are not militarily exclusive. One
Taiwan discussant suggested that the above-mentioned peace process of the cross-strait
relations could provide an example to pacify growing China.
The overall conclusion of the Trilateral Dialogue was that spontaneous
consultations among middle powers on strategic choices for regional security are crucial.
Now the remaining issues for the future discussion are: defining of middle power since
it is not power-based concept but rather a strategy-based concept; how to design middle
power security architecture in the region; political economic issues concerning therelations with China; viability question on the collective action among middle powers
and their division of roles; probable decline of the U.S.; usefulness of Chinese economic
power as a policy measure toward the other regional powers; and what the strategies ofthe other middle powers such as India and Australia are.

List of Participants
Japan
JINBO Ken, Associate Professor of Policy Management, Keio University
NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor of Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University
SOEYA Yoshihide, Director of Institute of East Asian Studies / Professor of Keio University
TADOKORO Masayuki, Professor of Political Science, Keio University
Korea
CHOO Jaewoo, Professor of Department of Chinese Studies, Kyung Hee University
CHUN Chaesung, Professor of International Relations, Seoul National University /Chair of MacArthur Asia Security Initiative Research Center, East Asia Institute
LEE Seungjoo, Professor of Department of Political Science and International Relations,
Chung-Ang University
TaiwanCHAN Mignonne Man-jung, Executive Director of the Chinese Taipei APEC Study
Center
CHANG Chung-Young, Professor of Department of Public Affairs, Fo Guang University
CHENG Tuan-Yao, Research Fellow of the Institute of International Relations, National
Chengchi University
FAN Hou-Lou, Section Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China
KAN Francis Yi-hua, Associate Research Fellow of the Institute of International

Relations, National Chengchi University
LEE Ming, Professor of Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University
LIN Cheng-Yi, Research Fellow of the Institute of European and American Studies,
Academia Sinica
Capt. LIN Laurence, Instructor of Naval Command & Staff College, National Defense
University
LIN Wei-Yang, Deputy Chief on Home Assignment, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of China
LIU Fu-Kuo, Research Fellow of the Institute of International Relations, National
Chengchi University / Chief Executive Director of MacArthur Center for Security Studies,
National Chengchi University
SHEN Ming-Shih, Associate Research Fellow of Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies,
National Defense University
SUNG Shen-Wu, Section Chief of the Foreign Service Institute, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of China
TSAO Hsiung-Yuan, Chief of Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defense
University
TZEN Louis Wen-Hua, Chairman of the Prospect Foundation
YANG Yu-Ling, Assistant Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republicof China
YEN Tiehlin, Deputy Executive Director of MacArthur Center for Security Studies,
National Chengchi University