IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
MASON W. GOODKNIGHT, an individual,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 6:24-cv-00088-MCv.

OPINION AND ORDER

COUNTY OF DOUGLAS, an Oregon
Public Body,
Defendant.
_____________________________MCSHANE, Judge:
Plaintiff Mason W. Goodknight brings this religious discrimination action against hisformer employer, Defendant Douglas County. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth andsixth claims, each brought under the First Amendment. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 9.
Defendant does not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims brought under Title VII and ORS
659A.030(1)(a). Because Plaintiff’s allegations conclusively establish that (1) he spoke as apublic employee and not as a private citizen; and (2) the challenged policy is a neutral policy
applying to all jail employees, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND1

At the motion to dismiss stage, this Court takes all of Plaintiff’s allegations as true. See Burget v. Lokelani Bernice
Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000).
1

1 – OPINION AND ORDER

In 1996, Defendant hired Plaintiff as a Deputy Sheriff and guard at the Douglas County
Jail. First Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 7 (“FAC”). Plaintiff’s job duties at the jail require him towork with adults in custody of all genders and all sexual preferences. FAC ¶ 12. Working withsuch a population is no small matter for the Plaintiff, who identifies as “a practicing Christian
who cannot ‘affirm’ conduct he believes the Bible condemns. Such conduct, in Plaintiff’s view,
include [sic] homosexual acts and cross-dressing.” FAC ¶ 2. Plaintiff’s beliefs are rooted in what
he holds as “traditional biblical view[s] of gender and sexuality:”
Concerning gender, Plaintiff believes (1) God created all persons male andfemale; (2) a person’s gender is determined by biology (DNA, genitalia, internalorgans, etc.), not by how a person “self-identifies”; (3) gender is an immutablecharacteristic that cannot be changed regardless of what artificial attempts tochange it a person undergoes, be it hormone treatments or surgical procedures;and (4) any “gender expression” – clothing, behaviors, that is inconsistent withthe gender God created a person to be before birth is sinful. In other words, inPlaintiff’s view, consistent with God’s supreme authority as the author of
creation, there is no such thing as a “transgender,” “non‐binary,” or“genderqueer” person – there are only male and female people, and God neverputs a male in a female’s body, or vice versa.
Concerning sexuality, Plaintiff believes all sex engaged in outside of marriage,
which the Bible defines to be the exclusive lifelong union between one man and
one woman, is sin. In Plaintiff’s view sex “outside of marriage” includes
homosexual conduct.
FAC ¶ 14.
In January 2023, Defendant instituted Jail Policy 620 (“JP620”) which required all jailemployees, including Plaintiff, to:Use terms that [Defendant] considered LGBQI+ friendly and avoid using terms
that [Defendant] deemed offensive to LGBQI+[] persons when dealing with
AIC’s who self-identified as LGBTQI+;
House male AICs who self-identified as “female” with truly female AICs, or viceversa; andConduct non-emergency pat-downs or strip searches of female AICs who selfidentified as “male.”2 – OPINION AND ORDERFAC ¶ 18 (citing JP620 at ex. A of FAC).
As to pat-downs and strip searches, Plaintiff’s religious beliefs prevent him fromtouching “the private parts of any woman other than his wife.” FAC ¶ 16. Given his beliefs,
Plaintiff “could not . . . participate in strip searches or pat-downs of female AICs – not evenfemale AICs who self-identified as ‘male.’” FAC ¶ 16. Plaintiff’s religious beliefs did however
permit Plaintiff to conduct strip searches or pat-downs of female AICs in emergency situations,even when such searches involved “touching the private parts” of the female AICs.2 FAC ¶ 17.
Defendant initiated JP620 “in accordance with the then-recently enacted federal Prison
Rape Elimination Act (‘PREA’)[.]” FAC ¶ 18. Pursuant to JP620, Defendant required its
employees to complete “LGBTQI Community Training” (the “Training”). FAC ¶ 19. Plaintiff
alleges this Training required employees “to affirm and validate homosexual unions and the selfproclaimed ‘transgender,’ ‘non-binary,’ or ‘genderqueer’ identities of AICs and fellow
employees.” FAC ¶ 19. Amongst other requirements, the Training required employees to:
Avoid using terms like “gay marriage” or “same-sex marriage” – which in[Defendant’s] view, “suggest marriage for same-sex couples is somehow different
than other marriages”;
Avoid using terms like “pre-op,” “post-op,” or “non-op,” which concern whether
an individual who self-identifies as “transgender” has undergone surgery to
remove or change certain body parts (genitalia in particular), when referring totransgender persons. [Defendant] deemed the use of such terms offensive and aninvasion of AIC’s privacy;
Use only those preferred terms that LGBTQI+ persons would purportedly deem
acceptable;
Use the self-selected names, prefixes (“Mr.,” “Ms.,” “Mx.” Etc.), and pronouns of
AICs who self-identified as “transgender,” “non-binary,” or “genderqueer”;

The FAC does not clarify whether Plaintiff’s religious beliefs permitted such touching in emergency situations or,instead, whether Defendant would only accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs in non-emergency situations and,
consequently, Plaintiff only begrudgingly performed such searches in emergency situations. Regardless, any
distinction is immaterial to resolving the pending motion.
2

3 – OPINION AND ORDERHouse AICs in accordance with their self-proclaimed “gender identity” rather
than their biological sex; andTake a multiple-choice test in which the “correct” answers aligned with the terms
the [Defendant] deemed acceptable.
FAC ¶ 20.
Plaintiff alerted his supervisor, Lt. Clayton K. Ruble, to Plaintiff’s religious objections to
the Training. FAC ¶ 21 (citing Plaintiff’s letter to Lt. Ruble at Ex. B of the FAC). Specifically,
Plaintiff objected that the Training required Plaintiff to “effectively affirm[], in writing, what hebelieves the Bible clearly condemns[.]” FAC ¶ 21. Lt. Ruble explained that “all departmental
staff are required to complete training as directed to ensure that we meet operational standards
and compliance with state and federal regulations.” FAC ex. C. In Defendant’s view, theTraining was designed to “satisfy the regulatory requirements of PREA, the expectation that all
corrections staff have a baseline of knowledge about the LGBTQ community to effectively
house this population in our jail[.]” FAC ex. C.
The parties then went back and forth on proposed accommodations. For example,
Defendant suggested Plaintiff review the Training (without answering the multiple-choicequestions) and acknowledge that while he disagreed with much of the material in the Training,
he recognized “that it is essential for law enforcement officers to communicate respectfully,
courteously, and effectively with a diverse population of individuals, including persons whose
beliefs and practices with regard to sexuality and gender differ from their own.” FAC ex. C.
Plaintiff refused the proposed accommodation because Defendant’s “records would
reflect that he had completed [Defendant’s] Training when, in fact, he had not. For Plaintiff toallow himself to be recorded as having completed [Defendant’s] Training, when he had notwould make him a party to a lie, which the Bible prohibits.” FAC ¶ 23 (internal citation omitted).
Additionally, Defendant’s record of Plaintiff completing the Training would, in Plaintiff’s view,
4 – OPINION AND ORDER

indicate that Plaintiff agreed to comply with “affirming” LGBTQI+ AICs at the jail. “To ‘affirm’
LGBTQI+ AICs in his care at the Jail would, in Plaintiff’s view, be to ‘call evil good and goodevil’ and thereby invite a curse, or ‘woe,’ upon himself in accordance with biblical teachings.”
FAC ¶ 24.
Plaintiff then “asked [Defendant] if he could undergo some equivalent training thataligned with his Christian beliefs.” FAC ¶ 25. “Plaintiff devised his own training (the‘Alternative Training’) that he felt aligned with biblical principles.”3 FAC ¶ 26 (citing ex. E to
FAC). Defendant, however, “continued to demand that Plaintiff affix his signature to a copy ofJP620, thereby indicating his willingness to be bound by its terms, and comply with JP620.”
FAC ¶ 29. Plaintiff refused, describing JP620 policies as “wicked standards I will have no part inmeeting.” FAC ex. G, 1. Plaintiff provided additional, specific objections which generally havelittle relevance to the pending motion. However, for context, here is Plaintiff’s first specific,
written objection to JP620:
Transgender Booking/Custody – “…as well as respect the sexual orientation orgender identity of any person in custody,” – I categorically refuse to, “respect”
what God in His word calls sin. All stances within the LGBTQ+ movement are
sinful stances that to respect is to violate my sincerely held religious beliefs. I do
respect the actual gender identity of all people. Which of course corresponds with
their sex as determined by God and identified at birth.
FAC ex. G, 1 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff’s proposed training consists of a heavily redacted and redlined copy of Defendant’s Jail Procedure for“Transgender Booking/Custody.” FAC ex. G. Plaintiff’s edits generally consist of removing or altering any languagethat contrasts with Plaintiff’s “traditional biblical views of sexuality or gender.” For instance, Plaintiff proposed
inserting “professed” before any instances of “transgender” and adding “sinful” before any use of “homosexuality”
or “bisexuality.” FAC ex. G, 4-7. Plaintiff proposed removing any procedure where a transgender AIC could
indicate a strip search preference. Generally, Plaintiff indicated his strong preference that Defendant’s policies
should overlap with his own traditional biblical views while rejecting any contrary view. For example, the policy
contained this definition of “Transgender person – An umbrella term for people whose gender identity (i.e., internalsense of feeling male or female) and/or gender expression differs from the sex they were assigned at birth. This may
include transsexuals, cross-dressers, gender-queer, and other gender-non-conforming people. Transgender people
may identify in a variety of ways, including male, female, and female-to-male (FTM), male-to-female (MTF),
genderqueer, or otherwise. A transgender identified person may or may not choose to alter their bodies hormonally
and/or surgically.” FAC ex. G, 2-3. Plaintiff proposed a different definition: “Professed Transgender person – anumbrella term for people who live in rebellion against their God assigned gender as male or female. FAC ex. G, 4-5.
3

5 – OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff concluded by confirming his believe that “PREA standards demands [sic] wedeny, [sic] God, science, and the common sense verified by our very eyes. This is a Pandora’s
box of perversion I refuse to help open. I appeal to you one last time, please repent of this sinful
path for the sake of the county, inmates, and my fellow deputies.” FAC ex. G, 3.
Given Plaintiff’s refusal to affirm that he would abide by JP620, Lt. Ruble recommended
that Plaintiff be suspended for one week without pay. FAC ¶ 33. Following a hearing, the Sherifffound Plaintiff violated Defendant’s policies regarding insubordination (for refusing to sign aform stating he read JP620 and understands the policy) and ethical standards (for “refus[ing] tosign off on any policy that defines and recognizes ‘transgender’ as an identity.”). FAC ex. H, 12. On March 27, 2023, upon returning from the one-week suspension, Defendant “immediately
placed [Plaintiff] on paid administrative leave for refusing to sign and adhere to JP620.” FAC ¶34. After another hearing, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. FAC ¶ 36.
After exhausting administrative remedies, Plaintiff timely filed this action bringing six
state and federal claims for religious discrimination. As noted, Defendant moves to dismiss only
Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims (i.e., Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth claims).
STANDARDS
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must containsufficient factual matter that “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the factual
allegations allow the court to infer the defendant’s liability based on the alleged conduct.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). The factual allegations must present more than “themere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 678.

6 – OPINION AND ORDER

When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of material
fact as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Burgert v.
Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Tr., 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000). But the court is “notbound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. If the complaint is dismissed, leave to amend should be granted unless “the pleading could
not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497(9th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSIONI.

FREE SPEECH CLAIM
Plaintiff alleges Defendant “violated Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected freedom ofspeech by attempting to compel Plaintiff to use terminology that the [Defendant] deemed
acceptable – rather than terms that aligned with his sincerely held religious beliefs – when
dealing with LGBTQI+ AICs housed at the Jail, then punishing him for declining to do so.” FAC¶ 82. In Plaintiff’s view, his “refusal to use terms the [Defendant] deemed acceptable when
dealing with AICs at the Jail who identified as LGBTQI+ - including using those AICs’ selfselected names and pronouns – was a constitutionally protected activity, as the First Amendment
prohibits government entities from compelling employees from speaking messages they disagree
with, on religious grounds or otherwise.” FAC ¶ 83. Stated differently, Plaintiff’s Free Speechclaim is based on Defendant’s alleged retaliation for Plaintiff’s refusal, based on sincerely held
religious beliefs, to use terminology Defendant determined best fit its charge of respecting theConstitutional rights of all AICs in its custody.
As Plaintiff alleges that he suffered retaliation after exercising his First Amendment
rights, he must establish three elements: (1) that he spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) that

7 – OPINION AND ORDER

he spoke as a private citizen and not as a public employee; and (3) that his protected speech wasa substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s adverse employment actions. Eng v. Cooley,
552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009). The failure to meet any of these elements “is fatal to thePlaintiff’s case.” Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1067 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Here,
Plaintiff’s allegations confirm that he spoke not as a private citizen, but as a public employee.
“Statements are made in the speaker’s capacity as citizen if the speaker had no official
duty to make the questioned statements, or if the speech was not the product of performing thetasks the employee was paid to perform.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071 (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff’s brief ignores the fact that unlike the cases he cites in support, he was a public
employee and thus was subject to certain restrictions on his speech; at least to the extent thatspeech occurred in his role as a public employee. This is fatal to Plaintiff’s Free Speech claim.
Plaintiff’s argument—again, focused on cases involving private citizens—ignores black‐letterlaw recognizing that “[a] public employer ‘may impose restraints on the job-related speech of
public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.’”
Roberts v. Springfield Util. Bd., 68 F.4th 470, 474 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Nat’lTreasury Emps. Bd., 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995)). Critically, “[a] public employee’s speech is notprotected by the First Amendment when it is made pursuant to the employee’s official job
responsibilities.” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006)).
Although Plaintiff chooses not to address, let alone even mention Garcetti, the case is on
point and largely controls the outcome here. Like Plaintiff, Ceballos (the Plaintiff in Garcetti)
was a public employee (albeit as a deputy district attorney rather than a jail guard). Ceballos
found “serious misrepresentations” in an officer’s affidavit in support of a warrant and relayed

8 – OPINION AND ORDER

those concerns to his supervisors. After receiving discipline, Ceballos filed an action based on
retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights.
The Court confirmed that “the First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, incertain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 417. The Court then emphasized the need to balance the public employee’s First
Amendment rights with the government employer’s right to manage the workplace through its
employees. “A government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its roleas employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential toaffect the entity’s operations.” Id. at 418. Ultimately, the Court “h[e]ld that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate theircommunications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421. The Court further explained its rationale:
Our holding likewise is supported by the emphasis of our precedents on affording
government employers’ sufficient discretion to manage their operations.
Employers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an employee
in his or her professional capacity. Official communications have official
consequences, creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity. Supervisors
must ensure that their employees’ official communications are accurate,
demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s mission. Ceballos’
memo is illustrative. It demanded the attention of his supervisors and led to aheated meeting with employees from the sheriff’s department. If Ceballos’
superiors thought his memo was inflammatory or misguided, they had theauthority to take proper corrective action.
Ceballos’ proposed contrary rule, adopted by the Court of Appeals, would commit
state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating
judicial oversight of communications between and among government employees
and their superiors in the course of official business. This displacement ofmanagerial discretion by judicial supervision finds no support in our precedents.
When an employee speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern, theFirst Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing interests
surrounding the speech and its consequences. When however, the employee issimply performing his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar degree of
scrutiny. To hold otherwise would be to demand permanent judicial intervention

9 – OPINION AND ORDER

in the conduct of governmental operations to a degree inconsistent with soundprinciples of federalism and the separation of powers.
****
Proper application of our precedents thus leads to the conclusion that the First
Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s
expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities. Because Ceballos’ memo
falls into this category, his allegation of unconstitutional retaliation must fail.
****We reject, however, the notion that the First Amendment shields from discipline
the expressions employees make pursuant to their professional duties. Our
precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of action behind
every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.
Id. at 422–26.
Given the apparent application of Garcetti to the facts alleged here, the Court was rather
surprised that Plaintiff chose not to address it. The cases Plaintiff chose to rely upon are, forvarious reasons, inapplicable. For instance, after acknowledging Eng’s requirement that he must
demonstrate he spoke as a private citizen rather than a public employee, Plaintiff argues
Defendant “ignores one of the cardinal rules of free speech jurisprudence: The government ‘may
not compel affirmance of belief with which the speaker disagrees.’ Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Grp. Of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 563 (1995).” Pl.’s Opp. 8.
One need not go far, however, to conclude Hurley is not applicable to the facts alleged here. In
fact, the first two sentences in Hurley state, “The issue in this case is whether Massachusetts may
require private citizens who organize a parade to include among the marchers a group impartinga message the organizers do not wish to convey. We hold that such a mandate violates the First
Amendment.” 515 U.S. at 559. Of course, Plaintiff brings this action not as a private citizen, but
in his role as a public employee. And as the Ninth Circuit confirmed just last year, “[a] public
employer ‘may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees that would be

10 – OPINION AND ORDER

plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.’” Roberts, 68 F.4th at 474 (quoting Nat’lTreasury Emps. Bd., 513 U.S. at 465).
Plaintiff next argues that Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2021):
is instructive here. In Meriwether, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuitrecognized that “the First Amendment protects the free speech rights ofprofessors” at state universities “when they are teaching.” Id. at 505. The Court ofappeals for the Ninth Circuit [] has likewise recognized this. See Demers v.
Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 412 (9th Cir. 2014) [holding that the First Amendment
protects ‘teaching and academic writing that are performed pursuant to the official
duties of a teacher and professor” (internal quotation marks omitted)]. Surely, thesame principle applies, at least to some degree, in the context of law
enforcement[.]Pl.’s Opp. 8 (second bracket in original).
In the Ninth Circuit, at least, Plaintiff is surely mistaken. See Sullivan v. Univ.
Washington, 60 F.4th 574, 582 n.6 (9th Cir. 2023) (rejecting university employees’ argument that
Demers applies “because, in performing the official work of the Committee, the members are notthereby engaged in ‘teaching and academic writing.’”) (quoting Demers, 746 F.3d at 412).
Plaintiff was a jailhouse guard, not a university professor.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that his “situation is akin to that of the appellant in BoldenHardge v. Off. Of the Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215 (9th Cir. 2023). . . . Just as the Ninth
Circuit found the existence of at least a possibility that the California State Controller could havereasonably accommodated the Jehovah’s Witness in Bolden-Hardge, 63 F.4th at 1226, Plaintiff’s
Complaint reflects that it was possible for the [Defendant] to accommodate Plaintiff here.” Pl.’s
Opp. 10. Once again, Plaintiff is mistaken. As relevant here, the court in Bolden-Hardge only
reached the merits in discussing that plaintiff’s Title VII claim alleging her sincerely held
religious belief conflicted with her employer’s requirement that she swear to a loyalty oath. Id. at
1222–28. Defendant here does not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. Although theplaintiff in Bolden-Hardge brought a free exercise claim, the court expressly held that given her
11 – OPINION AND ORDER

“lack of standing for her free-exercise claim, we lack jurisdiction to reach that claim’s merits andcannot do more than conclude that it is possible that she could state a claim by amending.” Id. at1221 n.1 (emphasis added).
Despite Plaintiff’s attempt, intentionally or otherwise, to conflate private citizen caseswith public employee cases, the fact that the dispute here concerned training regarding how
Defendant processed and housed LGBTQI+ individuals—i.e., that the Training concerned how
Defendant wanted Plaintiff to perform his basic job duties—demonstrates Plaintiff’s free speechclaim necessarily fails. “[G]enerally, ‘when a public employee raises complaints or concerns up
the chain of command at his workplace about his job duties, that speech is undertaken in thecourse of performing his job.” Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d
304, 313 (5th Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff’s specific factual allegations, along with the Court’s own
common sense, confirm that the speech here concerned nothing more than Plaintiff’s disputewith his supervisors over how to perform his job when dealing with certain AICs. Plaintiff
acknowledges, as he must, that his employment “duties involved working with” LGBTQI+ AICs.
FAC ¶ 12. Plaintiff concedes JP620 involved Defendant’s attempts to process and protect AICs,
including LGBTQI+ AICs. FAC ¶ 18. Plaintiff acknowledges that the compelled speech at issue
concerned speech Defendant “deemed acceptable . . . when dealing with LGBTQI+ AICs housed
at the jail[.]” FAC ¶ 82. That Plaintiff had religious objections to the compelled speech—which
only involved Defendant’s policies concerning how to safely and respectfully address and housecertain AIC’s in custody—does not somehow remove those objections from Plaintiff’s
employment duties.
Because Plaintiff’s alleged protected speech clearly relates to his official employment
duties, “such speech is categorically denied First Amendment protection.” Dahlia, 735 F.3d at

12 – OPINION AND ORDER

1070 n.7; see Eng, 552 F.3d at 1070 n.7 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426) (“A public employee’s
speech is not protected by the First Amendment when it is made pursuant to the employee’s
official job responsibilities.”)). Plaintiff’s First Amendment Free Speech claim is DISMISSED,with prejudice.
II.

FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated his rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise

clause when Defendant “lent it’s power to one side in a controversy over religious dogma –specifically, the controversy over whether what [sic] constitutes respectful treatment of persons
who self-identify as LGBTQI+.” FAC ¶ 94. This argument is meritless.
The Free Exercise clause “provides that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free
exercise of religion. The right to freely exercise one’s religion freely, however, does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (orproscribes).” Stormans, Inc. v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations
omitted) (cleaned up). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations confirm that JP620 is a neutral law of generalapplicability. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim necessarily fails.
Defendant instituted JP620 “in accordance with the then-recently enacted federal Prison
Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”)[.]” FAC ¶ 18. Plaintiff acknowledges the policy involved
Defendant’s attempt to process and house certain AICs. FAC ¶ 18 (noting policy consists of
Defendant’s attempt to: have employees use terms that Defendant deemed inoffensive to
LGBQI+ AICs; refrain from using terms Defendant deemed offensive to LGBQI+ AICs; house
AICs according to the AIC self-identified gender; and conduct pat-downs of AICs). Thisacknowledgment comes as no surprise, as JP620 expressly provides:

13 – OPINION AND ORDERTransgender Booking/Custody
The policy of the Douglas County Corrections Division is to ensure the respectful,courteous and professional treatment of transgender Adults in Custody (AIC), as
well as respect the sexual orientation or gender identity of any person in custody,
while maintaining the safety, security and orderly operation of all correctional
facilities.
PURPOSETo provide guidelines for the appropriate accommodations of all AICs who
identify as or have been determined to be transgender. This policy is intended toaddress the requirements as outlined in the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA)
standards, which require zero tolerance for discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity.
FAC ex. A, 1.
JP620 never mentions religion. It is a standard prison policy intended to formalize how
the prison will house and treat certain AICs (while complying with the constitutional rights of
those AICs). One would be somewhat surprised if a prison failed to formalize how it would
process and house AICs. Additionally, one would be shocked if all employees of every prison
agreed with each and every policy of their employer related to the treatment of AICs. Plaintiff
attempts to turn such a disagreement into a constitutional violation, arguing the fact that JP620
conflicted with some of his religious beliefs demonstrates the policy is not neutral:
JP620 is not neutral given the actions it demanded of Plaintiff: JP620 required[Defendant’s] employees to treat female AICs at the Jail who self-identify as“male” even though they truly are male. This presented a problem for Plaintiff: A
married man, Plaintiff has a religious conviction that he must not touch the private
parts of a woman other than his wife—even women who self-identify as “male”—
absent a job-related emergency that requires him to do so. Not only would such
touching be the ultimate “affirmance” of a transgender-identifying AIC’s selfproclaimed “gender identity,” it would require Plaintiff to violate his religious
calling to sexual purity – in other words, to commit what he considers an act ofadultery, which the Bible condemns as sin. The Free Exercise Clause prohibits
government employers from forcing their employees “to confess by word or act”
their agreement with the government’s orthodoxy on a given subject. [W. Va.
State Bd. Educ. v.] Barnette, 319 U.S. [624], 642 [1943] (emphasis added).
Pl.’s Opp. 14–15.

14 – OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s argument once again cherry picks language Plaintiff finds useful while
ignoring, purposefully or not, the context of the quoted language. For example, in the quote
above, Plaintiff omits the text immediately preceding the quoted text in Barnette. The full
sentence provides:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff’s attempt to conflate ‘government employers forcing their employees’ with “thegovernment forcing its citizens’ ignores longstanding, black‐letter law recognizing that “[a]public employer ‘may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public employees thatwould be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large.’” Roberts, 68 F.4th at 474(quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Bd., 513 U.S. at 465). The only similarity Barnette has with thisaction is that both cases involve claims of religious freedom. Plaintiff chose to take a job with agovernment employer, knowing he would be required to follow his employer’s policies regarding
housing AICs. These facts are not analogous to Jehovah’s Witnesses being compelled to salutethe flag and pledge allegiance as a condition of accessing their right to a free appropriate public
education.
Additionally, other than Plaintiff’s argument that because he disagrees with the policy it
must not be a neutral policy, there is no indication, at all, that the policy is anything other than aneutral policy of general applicability. The policy, i.e., the Training, applies to all jail employees.
FAC ¶ 19 (“Via JP620, [Defendant] imposed on all of its employees a requirement that they
complete . . . the Training.”). As demonstrated above, the stated “PURPOSE” of JP620 was “[t]oprovide guidelines for the appropriate accommodations of all AICs who identify as or have been

15 – OPINION AND ORDER

determined to be transgender.” FAC ex. A, 1. Plaintiff specifically alleges the policy is designed
to conform with the PREA. FAC ¶ 18. The purpose of the PREA, as indicated in that Act’s title,
is to eliminate prison rape. Additional purposes of the PREA include: to “establish a zerotolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States” and to “makethe prevention of prison rape a top priority in each prison system.” 34 U.S.C. § 30302(1)–(2).
Any religious burden the policy imposes on jail employees is purely incidental.
JP620 is much like the Student Safety Plan challenged in Parents for Privacy v. Barr,
949 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2020). There, plaintiffs raised Free Exercise challenges (amongst otherchallenges) to the Plan that “allow[ed] transgender students to use school bathrooms, locker
rooms, and showers that match their gender identity rather than the biological sex they wereassigned at birth.” Id. at 1217. Like Plaintiff here, plaintiffs in Parents for Privacy:
claim that the Student Safety Plan violates their First Amendment rights to freely
exercise their religion because the Student Safety Plan forces them to be exposed
to an environment in school bathrooms and locker facilities that conflicts with,and prevents them from practicing, their religious beliefs. Specifically, thecomplaint alleges that many Student Plaintiffs and some Parent Plaintiffs “havethe sincere religious belief” that children “must not undress, or use the restroom,in the presence of a member of the opposite biological sex, and also that theymust not be in the presence of the opposite biological sex while the opposite
biological sex is undressing or using the restroom.”
Id. at 1233–34.
Much like JP620, the Student Safety Plan made no mention of any religious belief orpractice, or even any mention of religion at all. Id. at 1235. The Student Safety Plan was not
adopted “with the object of suppressing the exercise of religion.” Id. Because no evidence
indicated the Student Safety Plan “was adopted with the specific purpose of infringing on
Plaintiffs’ religious practices or suppressing Plaintiffs’ religion, . . . the Student Safety Plan isneutral for purposes of analyzing the free exercise claim.” Id. So too with JP620.

16 – OPINION AND ORDERThe court next noted “the question of general applicability addresses whether a law treats
religious observers unequally.” Id. In finding the challenged policy generally applicable, thecourt concluded:
Here, the Student Safety Plan is not underinclusive, because it does not require
only religious students to share a locker room with a transgender student who was
assigned the opposite sex at birth, nor does the Plan require only religious
teachers and staff to receive training or to teach about anti-bullying andharassment. In other words, the Student Safety Plan affects all students andstaff—it does not place demands on exclusively religious persons or conduct. . . .
The correct inquiry here is whether, in seeking to create a safe, nondiscriminatory school environment for transgender students, the Student Safety
Plan selectively imposes certain conditions or restrictions only on religious
conduct. Because Plaintiffs have not made any showing that the Plan does so, thedistrict court correctly determined that the Plan is generally applicable forpurposes of the free exercise analysis.
Id. 1236.
Parents for Privacy is on point and Plaintiff’s specific factual allegations require theconclusion that JP620 is neutral and generally applicable.4 That the policy may impose adisproportionate burden on jail employees who subscribe to “traditional biblical views of genderand sexuality” does not alter that conclusion. Stormans, Inc., 794 F.3d at 1077. Plaintiff
acknowledges Defendant instituted JP620 to comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act. FAC¶ 18. Because the allegations confirm that JP620 is “rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose,” Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim fails. Id. at 1084.
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For this reason, amongst a host of others, Plaintiff’s citations to Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507(2022) do not help Plaintiff. There, “[b]y its own admission, the District sought to restrict Mr. Kennedy’s actions atleast in part because of their religious character.” Id. at 526. Additionally, the District conceded “that its challenged
directives were not ‘generally applicable.’” Id. at 527. Because the policy there was neither neutral nor generally
applicable, it was subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 526. Unlike the situation in Kennedy, Defendant did not single out
Plaintiff in enforcing JP620.
4

17 – OPINION AND ORDERCONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED.
Because the First Amended Complaint demonstrates amendment would be futile, claims five andsix are DISMISSED, with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 6th day of August, 2024.
_____/s/ Michael McShane______
Michael J. McShane
United States District Judge

18 – OPINION AND ORDER