The Rise of China and theChanging Trends of Middle
Power’s China Policy

Co-organized by
Institute of International Affairs, Graduate School of International Studies, SNU
Institute of East Asian Studies, Keio University
With the Participation of
ANU-MacArthur Asia Security Initiative Partnership, the Australian National University
Sponsored by Institute of International Affairs

Program Schedule
March 15
18:00 ~

DinnerDay 1: March 16
09:00~09:20

Introduction and Overview of the Project
Speakers: Yoshihide Soeya and Geun Lee

09:20~09:35
09:35~09:50
09:50~10:00
10:00~10:30

Session 1 Domestic Politics (Public Diplomacy) Sphere
Moderator: Geun Lee
Cheol-Hee Park,
Yoshihide Soeya
David Envall
General Discussion (open to all participants)

10:30~10:40

Break

10:40~10:55
10:55~11:10
11:10~11:20
11:20~11:50

Session 2 Socio-Cultural (Soft Power) Sphere
Moderator: Geun Lee
Jong-Ho Jeong
Masahuki Tadokoro
Rikki Kersten
General Discussion (open to all participants)

11:50~12:50

Lunch

12:50~13:05
13:05~13:20
13:20~13:30
13:30~14:00

Session 3 Economics and Regionalism Sphere
Moderator: Yoshihide Soeya
Geun Lee
Takashi Terada
Brendan Taylor
General Discussion (open to all participants)

14:00~14:15
14:15~14:30
14:30~14:40
14:40~15:10

Session 4 Security Sphere
Moderator: Yoshihide Soeya
Seong-Ho Sheen
Tomohiko Satake
Amy Catalinac and Andrew O`Neli
General Discussion (open to all participants)

15:10~15:30

Break

2

Live Telecast ANU Panel Session
15:45~16:30

Session 1: Middle Powers and “The China Factor”
Moderator: William Tow
Brenden Taylor
Yoshihide Soeya
Geun Lee

16:30~17:15

Session 2: Stability on the Korean Peninsula and Alliance Strategies
Moderator: William Tow
Andrew O`Neli
Tomohiko Satake
Seong-Ho Sheen

17:00~17:15
17:15~17:30
17:30~17:45

Closing Comments and Closing Discussion
Geun Lee
Yoshihide Soeya
William Tow

18:30~

DinnerDay 2: March 17
10:00-12:00

Planning for the Next Conference

12:00~

Farewell Luncheon

3Summary and Policy Recommendations
The Rise of China and the Changing Trends of Middle Power’s China Policy
Introduction
This workshop is a continuation of the discussions which had started at the first JapanKorea-Australia workshop at Keio University last year. This second workshop on the rise of
China and changing trends of middle power’s China policy will particularly hone on South
Korea’s soul-searching in security affairs in the changing era of regional power transformation.
The workshop aims to produce policy-relevant analyses of how the three regional middle power
partners, South Korea, Japan, and Australia, can facilitate deeper level of cooperation in the
midst of rising regional rivalries between traditional superpowers - the United States, China, andRussia.
Session 1: Domestic Politics (Public Diplomacy) Sphere“The Rise of China and Cooperation among the Like-minded”
Cheol Hee Park (Seoul National University)
The rise of China has domestic implications in South Korea, as more Koreans havestarted to gradually recognize China’s military and economic presence in close proximity. China
maintains a “smiley face” toward the United States and toward international community, but it
has become more assertive and less accommodating in its regional interactions toward its close
neighbours when it comes to its “core interests.”
In the past, during the Kim Yong-sam administration, for example, South Korea did notregard “China issue” as serious in South Korea’s foreign policy priority. Although the following
administrations changed this trend somewhat, there is still a lack of focus on China in the South
Korean government and the bureaucracy. In the future, however, heated domestic debate on how
to deal with China is likely to occur, as a number of “hot spots” in South Korea-China bilateralrelations have emerged recently. These questions are: whether the China issue can be handledindependently by South Korea; whether China will help resolve conflict in the Korean Peninsula;and whether China will cooperate with other middle powers for regional order building.
As a middle power, South Korea’s dealing with China, like Japan and Australia, isdifferent from that of hegemonic powers or of small powers. The middle powers are “hedging”
in the presence of rising China, as they prefer to benefit from China’s economy and not make
China feel isolated. However, at the same time, the loose network of middle powers mustcollectively warn China for its intense nationalism. Likeminded middle powers must cooperate4to promote a defensive posture, while working closely with China on economic and socialcultural fields.

“DPJ’s China Policy: Lack of Public Diplomacy and Its Implications”
Yoshihide Soeya (Keio University)
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)’s DPJ’s regional foreign policy, especially during
the Hatoyama Cabinet, is characterized by amateurism. The DPJ has projected its assertive
diplomacy externally for the sake of being assertive, and it has consequently raised significant
misperception both within and without Japan that the country is turning into a “normal” state.
The root of the assertiveness originated in the 1990s, when the Japanese government tried
to resolve chronic history issues with China and Korea. Rejection of Japanese efforts by Chineseand Koreans, then became a “trauma” in Japanese domestic context. Anxiety over Japan’s
neighbours’ lack of appreciation of the Japanese effort turned into an acute frustration andfatigue. From this point on, Japanese approach toward its neighbours has become more “inwardlooking,” and talking negative about China (and to a lesser extent, South Korea as well) became
politically safer within Japan.
But if we look at the actual policies rather than domestic rhetoric, it becomes clear thatthe apparent assertiveness is not necessarily a sign of Japan’s grand strategy shift. Assertive
discursive rhetoric and political promises that are popular domestically cannot be delivered toJapanese people unless there’s a fundamental shift in regional order. The DPJ’s policy toward
China is no exception. Although there is a psychological element among many Japanese seeing
their country to be too “soft” and thus demand concrete action against China, it is frustration thana symbol of a new fundamental policy shift, as misconceived in China. This mutual
misperception and frustration could be ameliorated by focusing on public diplomacy, but it is not
given sufficient attention at this point in the region.

“Domestic Politics and China Policy in Australia: From Chaos to Cutbacks?”
H.D.P. Envall (The Australian National University)
Australia, a middle power traditionally allied to the United States for its security, iscurrently facing a dilemma with the economic rise of China. In order to understand future
prospect of Australian policies vis-à-vis China and the United States, it is crucial to understandthat the direction Australia takes in security and economic strategies is heavily influenced bydomestic politics.
Australian defence community perceives China as a major challenge (especially in its
2009 Defence White Paper) and proposes Australia’s self-reliance on security and strengthened
maritime capability. However, the Labor Party under Julia Gillard is pressured to focus on5domestic economic management, and it entails securing national budget surplus. Budget surplus
and economic management calls for a closer economic engagement with China. Thus, two
ambitions of the two Australian government branches – the Cabinet vs. defense community – arelikely to clash in the future. It has already resulted in a worsening relation between the military
and the Labor Party, and the trend will continue unless they reach a difficult, but necessary,compromise.

Q&A Session:
Two main themes were discussed in the first Q&A session. The first was the role of
China factor in South Korean policies toward North Korea, and in South Korean domestic
politics. What is important in analyzing South Korea’s foreign policy vis-à-vis both China andNorth Korea is not China’s actual policy posture or military might itself, but how China’s
dealing with North Korea is interpreted in South Korean policy community. China’s increasing“advocacy” of North Korea’s position in recent years has caused the undercurrents of Sino-South
Korean relations to be turbulent, and it will continue to promote debates about dealing with
China within South Korean policy circles. The second theme for discussion was Professor
Soeya’s notion of Japan’s public diplomacy. It is hard to exactly pinpoint “how” Japan canbecome an effective entrepreneur of public diplomacy. What is more important is that all relatedparties recognize and appreciate the nature of rhetorical issues damaging the relations between
Japan, South Korea, and China, as a result of the misunderstanding that Japan is become an
assertive hegemonic state. Having discussions and workshops at multiple levels is crucial for
promoting middle power networking, which can then aid in the implementation of public
diplomacy within the region.

Session 2: Socio-cultural (Soft Power) Sphere“Korea’s Response to the Rise of China: A Socio-cultural Perspective”
Jong Ho Jeong (Seoul National University)
The rising interaction between South Korea and China from the 1990s at socio-culturallevel can be analyzed in three “scapes”: ethnoscape; mediascape; and ideoscape. These threescapes provide us with the framework for understanding both positive interaction and conflicts
that have made bilateral social interactions more complex in recent years.
From the ethnoscape perspective, there has been a significant increase in the populationexchange, resulting in Chinese residences in a number of parts in Korea as Chinese workers haveprovided South Korea with cheap but skilled labour. Concerning the mediascape, the mostprominent feature is the Korean Wave in China. But there has also been a growing Korean
6interest in the Chinese language, and the number of Korean students studying in China hasconsequently increased. On ideological scape, both states have engaged in discursive exchanges
about political democratization, economic development strategy, and Asian values.
The interactions at the three scape-level, however, have also produced sources ofconflicts. It is essential that Korea incrementally remove regulations limiting the legal flow ofChinese into Korea, and eliminate discriminatory aspects of the domestic market fortransnational migrants. Concerning the media, Korea must use the Korean wave as a medium –public goods - for a common Asian culture. Finally, on ideoscape, Korea must pursue “Seoul
Consensus” and “Asian Consensus” as a middle power, as an alternative model to both the USled Western neoliberal economic development (“Washington Consensus”) or the developmental
state model (“Beijing Consensus”). To achieve this goal, academic/civil society exchange of
opinion leaders is crucial.

“Talking Points on Japan-Korea Socio-cultural Influences over China”
Masayuki Tadokoro (Keio University)
Chinese society is becoming more resonant to liberal values, as its economic growthinevitably changes value system. However, the influence of liberal values in China’s sociocultural sector cannot be a substitute for careful management of traditional interstate relationshipbased upon national interests.
Moreover, even if the “soft power” of liberalism introduced by Japanese and South
Korean societies is certainly not a “coercive power”, China will also be suspicious oftransformative transnational influences from outside.
Therefore, Japanese and South Korean socio-economic influences over China must be
geared more toward showing alternative attractive models setting examples for China’s social
developments. During this process, it is essential that outsiders do not alienate or antagonize
those Chinese who are potentially sympathetic to liberal principles, since we may be able toestablish durable cooperative relationship with them.

“Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance: Soft Power in the Asian Century”
Rikki Kersten (The Australian National University)
The Great East Japan Earthquake of March 11 has demonstrated the effect of a particulardimension of a state’s “soft power,” and it is Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief(HADR). HADR can be understood as a bridge between military power and civil society, andthus hard capability is utilized in HADR as a social good.
HADR can be a “mutually reinforcing mechanism” for both middle and super powers, as
it is an area where hard military capability is connected to soft power and state credibility. It
7promotes confident building measures (CBM) and scrutinizes hard power capabilities of great
powers for their actual capability to promote regional cooperation and welfare on equal footingwith middle powers, by their particular use of military power.
As the Asia Pacific is a region with not only traditional security competition but also
rising non-traditional transnational security concerns, regional cooperation in HADR promotes
healthy competition for soft power, demonstrate competence, and provide normative significancefor winning hearts and minds of regional states and citizens, as we have witness in the examplesof the Operation Tomodachi (US-Japan), Operation Pacific Assist (AU-Japan), and Exercise
Cooperation Spirit (AU-China).

Q&A Session
The first theme of the Q&A session dealt with whether China would consider JapanSouth Korea model as a viable alternative for its social and economic development. Since China
prefers economic development without the introduction of Western-style liberal democracy, it isstill an open ended question. In fact, to some countries that longs for development without
political liberalization, Chinese - not Japanese or South Korean - model of development would
be even more attractive, since China’s strategy is fundamentally different. China is aware of thisfact and thus it is promoting its own values through institutions such as the Confucius Institute.
The second major theme was the nature of how “soft power” is understood andimplemented in the region. In Japan, soft power is mainly discussed in terms of what ishappening within Japan and not about projection of this potential outward. South Korea seems
to be doing this better. Concerning the implementation of soft power, it must be noted that wealready has regional structures for projecting soft powers of concerned states with better control
on specific issue areas, so that they can draw back from long-term engagement when the needarises. Such institutional structure is also a testing ground for China to engage itself in a “softpower competition” with other middle powers in the region, since we equate this type of powerwith zealous and timely state response on particular issue areas.

Session 3: Economics and Regionalism Sphere“Korea’s Policy toward China and East Asian Regionalism”
Geun Lee (Seoul National University)
South Korea’s current relations with China must be understood in the backdrop of thefollowing three questions that the Korean policymakers are increasingly asking themselves: 1) Is
China regional or global power?; 2) Does South Korea have regional and global policy toward
China?; and 3) Can regional middle powers cooperate to effectively respond to China?
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Needless to say, China’s importance is rising in South Korea. However, there are bothcosts and benefits for Korea by the rise of China. Koreans must face security threat for China’s
proximity to the Korean Peninsula, China’s likely influence in the case of contingencies in North
Korea, and South Korea’s economic overdependence on China (Cost). However, South Korea isalso benefiting from trade with the largest market in the world, as well as from using Chinese
influence to push North Korea for reform and the security stabilization of the peninsula.
South Korea’s regional policy for engaging China is to bind China into Asia, by utilizing
the ASEAN plus Three (APT) and promote the rise of Asia as a whole by riding on the rise of
China. However, at the global level, checking and balancing of China on the basis of “universal
values” is also considered crucial by South Korea, by using institutional frameworks such as theEast Asia Summit (EAS) as its platform. In the end, South Korea must “ride the back of thetiger.” Korea must engage China with APT regionally for its benefit, but also participate in APT
and EAS for balancing and checking China with other middle powers at the global level.

“China-Japan Power Struggles for East Asian Financial Regionalism”
Takashi Terada (Doshisha University) – Paper presented on behalf of Professor Terada byProfessor Yoshihide Soeya
Rising China’s influence in both political and economic sphere on a global scale isbacked by China’s continuous high economic growth. The economic rise is mainly due to its
huge trade surpluses to exports to the United States as well as Europe, as well as the world’s
largest foreign currency reserves China maintains. The recent global financial crisis, furthermore,
highlighted mutual economic interdependence between China and the United States, proving to
the world that the two superpowers are bound to govern the global financial politics bilaterally inthe near future and bypass other major players, such as Japan.
The global financial crisis also highlighted the rise of China in terms of financial
cooperation within East Asia, where Japan has been long considered the most significant player.
Regional financial cooperation entails financial contributions, and there is currently a battle
between China and Japan over “which country pays more” in order to reflect their power in East
Asian politics. Not limited to contributions, the two states are also battling over the usage of
their currencies in East Asia. 70 percent of regional trades are settled in US dollars, and it is theregion’s common interest to create a stable business environment by creating its own new
currency mechanism led by either Yen or Renminbi.
However, despite Japan’s concern over China’s rise and its policies in relation to East
Asian regionalism for maintaining its status, it can be still asserted that overall, Japan has not
moved beyond its traditional status as a “reactive state.”“The Dog That Hasn’t Barked: Asian Multilateralism and Australia’s China Debate”
9Brendan Taylor (The Australian National University)
Australia is currently in the midst of a debate over its China policy. What is interesting in
the debate is that there is an absence of any reference to the role of regional multilateralprocesses in engaging China’s rise. This lack of attention to regional multilateralism isparticularly puzzling, since multilateralism is a “great equalizer” for small and middle powers such as Australia – in dealing with rising hegemonic powers such as China.
The lack of interest on the part of the Australian academia and policymakers toward
regional multilateralism suggests that Australia does not have much confidence in regional
institutions in addressing pressing challenges. The distrust stems from Australian evaluations of
the effectiveness of multilateral institutions in terms of their capacity to deliver outcomes, rather
than as a process for building trust and confidence. Consequently, we can predict that Canberra
will continue to rely on bilateral modes of cooperation in responding to China’s rise, and only
take part in already-existing multilateral frameworks as “institutional follower,” limiting its
commitment only to highly practical and relatively uncontroversial initiatives. However,irrespective of the China factor, Canberra is not likely to wholly abandon its engagement with
Asian multilateralism, as it is driven by larger fears of possible regional marginalization.

Q&A Session:
The main topic for discussion during this session was alliance politics, particularly thosebetween South Korea and the United States, and the potential of a strengthened South KoreaJapan security cooperation in the same context. Although the previous Kim Dae-jung and Roh
Moo-hyun administrations actively sought Korea’s part in regional cooperation, the current
administration has re-shifted its focus on the alliance with the United States, and therefore interms of South Korea’s priority, the bilateral alliance – and not regionalism – is central to South
Korea’s security calculations at present.
Concerning the possibility of a formal South Korea-Japan alliance, panelists agreed thatdomestic politics and popular opinion would be the main deciding factor, and the process would
entail a high cost. The bilateral security tie could reaffirm the old understanding in South
Korean society that the Northeast Asia is divided between “sea powers” (the United States, Japan,
and South Korea) and the “land power” (China, Russia, and North Korea), and the formal
alliance, many in South Korea would argue, would facilitate the actual realization of suchpotentially-devastating division. However, lower technical level cooperation between Japan andSouth Korea is possible, and one area in the category would be information-sharing. For higher
degree of security cooperation, the two states require more confidence building measures bydesigning a multiple-stage process for upgrading the bilateral security ties.

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Session 4: Security Sphere“Japan’s Multilayered Security Strategy”
Tomohiko Satake (National Institute of Defense Studies, Japan)
Japan’s current approach toward China can be best described as the “multilayered
security strategy” with four components: 1) Defense of Japan; 2) The US-Japan Alliance; 3)
Cooperation with regional countries; and 4) Contribution to global security. Japan’s Dynamic
Defense Force Concept introduced in 2010 is the major driving force which promoted thissecurity design, and it emphasizes that indirect, rather than direct, balancing vis-à-vis China isimportant.
Concerning the first component of the multilayered security strategy – the defense ofJapan – the current direction Japan is taking can be described as “four Ss”—“swift and seamless”,“sustainable”, and “smart”. Concerning the US-Japan Alliance part, despite the mismanagementof base relocation issue by the DPJ government, the bilateral tie is showing the signs ofrevitalization. Furthermore, Japan is engaging in cooperation with regional countries in all threelevels of bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral settings. In addition, Prime Minister Noda haspromised that in order to contribute to global security, Japan would continue to commit itself tosuch issues as counter-piracy, the eradication of terrorism, peace-building, and non-proliferationand disarmament, as well as planning to dispatch the Self Defense Forces to the newlyindependent South Sudan.
Japan’s security strategy, therefore, is a multi-level approach not solely targeting China,
but it can indirectly manage the rise of China by Japan’s active contribution to the regional andglobal stability on a wider scope.

“Middle Power’s China Policy: South Korea’s China Policy”
Seongho Sheen (Seoul National University)
South Korea currently has no concrete security strategy toward China, but it is facing afundamental dilemma in dealing with the China issue. As a middle power situated in the midstof the US-China rivalry, South Korea’s approach toward China is further aggravated by China’s
increasing leverage vis-à-vis South Korea by its influence over North Korean affairs.
Therefore, without any coherent or comprehensive policy toward China, what we arewitnessing in South Korea’s strategy in general is a “little bit of everything.” Similar to the 19th
century Chinese diplomat Huang Jun-shen’s advice to Korea in 1880, South Korea is currently
linking itself to all regional countries in a “Complex Diplomacy.” There are five components ofthe complex diplomacy: 1) Balancing, as characterized by the South Korea-US alliance, Jeju
Island naval bases, and South Korea-Japan cooperation; 2) Engagement, conducted by strategic
partnership, military exchanges, and Korea-China FTA; 3) Binding, which encourages regional
11states into the Six-Party Talks and trilateral summit; 4) Shaping, which promotes initiative suchas Campus Asia in which young leaders of universities from the three East Asian states engage
themselves in triple talks; and 5) Inducing, in which South Korea protest to China the deportationof North Korean defectors.
Any direct US-China rivalry is not likely at this point, but middle powers such as South
Korea, nevertheless, need to play their part for lessening the tension in trouble spots in East Asia,
as these spots (such as the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait) could lead to heavy involvementof the United States and China with unwanted consequences. Therefore, South Korea must takethe ownership of its own security design as a “conducive power” by engaging Pyongyang tostabilize the Korean Peninsula and “Koreanize” Korean security.

“Domestic Determinants of Security Policy: Politicians’ Incentives”
Amy L. Catalinac (The Australian National University)
In International Relations discipline, politicians are not seen as causal agent and mostresearch in the past have regarded politicians as merely following the preference of public.
However, politicians are strategic actors who implement policies for their political benefit, and indemocracies, the most important reward they seek is re-election.
Therefore, it could be argued that rather than being mere reflection of public opinion,
politicians decide policies based on their own cost-benefit calculation within the institutionalframework in which they are situated. And if the highest benefit for politicians is re-election,
analyzing how their calculation for adopting particular security policies shift when theyexperience drastic electoral reforms domestically would prove the causality of such argument.
If we look into Japan’s case, there was an electoral reform in 1994. Prior to 1994,
politicians generally ignored national security policies, since their political fate depended more
on dealing directly with local constituents concerned with local issues. However, in the post1994 era, we witness that “party platforms” and politicians’ popularity across nation became
more important factor in elections. In order to mobilize wider support nationwide, politicians
understandably started to pay more attention to national security which concerned Japan as awhole.
Current Japanese security policy change, therefore, should be understood in this light.
Rather than simply observing what is going on externally, looking into domestic variables –politicians’ incentive structure under a given electoral system - should be given more focus.

“Australia’s Relations with China and the United States: ‘The Agony of Choice’?”Andrew O’neil (Griffith Asia Institute)

12

Talk of Australia being “caught between two rival powers” has once again surfaced inAustralia’s public debate. The ‘choice’ between economic interests (China) and security
concerns (US) has become a fixation of sorts for Australians. Some have argued that Australia
must avoid dependence on China to preserve its alliance with the US, while for others the US
alliance must be degraded to preserve the economic lifeline to China. Australian government isthus walking on a geo-strategic tight rope in balancing relations with the United States and China.
But in the end, many believe that Australia will be forced to make a hard choice between
Washington and Beijing.
An increasing challenge for Australia at this point is how it hedges against China’s rise in
the security sphere, while avoiding entrapment in a US-led containment strategy, since theAmerican administrations will seek to shift the burden to allies to promote America’s strategy of
preventing China from emerging as a great power challenger. But since alliances arecharacterized not only by the fear of entrapment, but also of abandonment, Australia is facedwith the security dilemma in which it must find the right balance in its relations with the UnitedStates to avoid both entrapment and abandonment, while making sure that its continuous linkage
with the United States does not look like an offensive strategy in Beijing’s eyes.

Q&A Session:
The main discussion of this session was related to Dr. Catalinac’s presentation. The
increase of Japanese politician’s public statements on foreign policy in recent years, rather than aproduct of the electoral reform of 1994, could be equally explained by the fact that the rise of
crucial foreign policy issues in recent years forced politicians to react. Also, politicians’
increasing interest in foreign policy is actually normal in a democratic state, and thus it could beequally argued that previous Japanese politicians were abnormal from international standard.
Finally, it must also be noted that politicians’ increasing statements do not necessarily translate
to actual policy outcome, since there are significant gap and debate between politicians andbureaucratic decision-makers. But it was agreed among the panelists that we need to look deeper
into such unit-level domestic dynamics in order to understand actual decision-making process.
Moreover, it must be also emphasized that US-China relations is not only about rivalry,since there are also cooperative elements in the bilateral relations. US-China interaction isalways a mix of cooperation and competition.

Live Telecast SNU-ANU Panel Session
1. Middle Powers and the China Factor

13South Korea and Japan are similarly facing their region characterized by the rising China
and the comparative weakening of the US influence. The two US allies fear the prospect of theUnited States leaving the region, in the midst of China becoming more assertive in territorial andeconomic issues. The two countries are heavily depended on the United States for security,
while their dependence on China economically is becoming more extensive as well. In the
backdrop of such circumstances, middle powers in the region are increasingly realizing thenecessity for cooperation in order to tackle their fear by finding an “issue-oriented balance.” No
single state can deal with the security challenges brought by the Chinese preoccupation withtraditional security areas. However, at the same time, we must also recognize that rise of China
is a challenging for everyone, including China, as the phenomenon is ultimately a result ofchanges at the international relations level. Australia is in a similar situation as South Korea andJapan, but there is a difference of geographical proximity and the existence of a real and viablechoice. What it means is that Australia, in case the United States and China falls into
confrontation, does not have a room to maneuver and is certainly going to side with the UnitedStates.
One of the aspects this workshop has highlighted is that we must recognize how the
middle powers’ actions are viewed and interpreted by China. China’s value system anddecision-making process are not necessarily the same as those of the middle powers. For
example, when the Western, liberal democracies use the term “confidence building measures(CBM),” their understanding is that CBM will result in “trust.” In the Chinese case, however,
the order is the opposite, meaning that China insists on trust first, CBM later. Also, while themiddle powers perceive the rise of China as a new security challenge, the Chinese see their riseas a natural step toward going back to its historical “normalcy.” From this perspective, China is
not the object which must be “socialized” by the middle powers, but the main power which“socializes” them. Viewing the current regional dynamics from both sides, therefore, is crucial.
Another topic that was discussed concerned the definition of “middle power.” Is theconcept dealing with capability and power of a particular state, or the nature of its behavior or
actions? Professor Soeya elaborated the term by arguing that it is a strategic concept used for
gauging the nature of a particular state’s way of dealing with foreign policy issues; thus, it is lessimportant to categorize a given state as a middle power, than to understand whether the state’s
external behavior conforms to the characteristics of a non-hegemonic power. Japan clearly falls
under the category of a middle power, since there is a gap between outsiders’ interpretation ofJapan intending to become a super power, versus the actual foreign policy behavior of Japan,
which is guided by the “invisible hand of Japan” as suggested by Professor Soeya.
2. The Korean Peninsula and the Alliance Politics
The two Koreas are going through regime transitions, and the fate of North Korea,
particularly the prospect of the new Kim Jung-un regime’s survival and power consolidation, is
still an open-ended question. Under the current circumstances, the utility and the commitment14

level of the US-South Korea alliance has become a significant topic among Korean policymakers.
But if we go beyond the US-South Korea bilateral alliance, other middle powers in the region
must also realize that the alliance web the United States has formulated in the region with Japanand Australia is clearly not only targeted against North Korea. Middle powers in the region must
be prepared to face future situation in which the United States asks its allies the extent they arewilling to commit themselves to America’s counter-China strategy, and thus the alliance with theUnited States could turn out to be more costly than expected.
The workshop has highlighted the fact that any regional issue – including alliances – isheavily influenced by domestic politics, particularly in Japan and South Korea. All regional
middle powers are concerned with North Korea and China, but their cooperation is often
hindered by domestic factors. For example, Japanese stance toward North Korea cannot be
purely strategic, as a result of the abductions issue still angering Japanese public. And South
Korea’s level of security cooperation with Japan – and even with the United States – often turns
to an unexpected direction as a result of domestic polarization on those topics. Professor Soeya
concluded the session by emphasizing that the United States forces in Japan are stationed there
for contingencies abroad, and thus Japan is sustaining the US forces directly linked to Korean
security. Such contribution on Japan’s part for the peace of the Korean Peninsula must be
discussed in more detail.

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