Imagined land? The state and southern violence in Thailand

edited by
Chaiwat Satha-AnandIslam in Southeast Asia: Dynamics of Local Contexts and Transnational Networks (ISEA) Series No.1
The Research and Educational Project for Middle East and Islamic Studies (MEIS) Series No.11

Imagined Land? The State and Southern Violence in Thailand
First electronic edition 2019edited by Chaiwat Satha-Anand
Copyright © 2009 Chaiwat Satha-Anand & Individual Contributors

ISBN 978-4-86337-315-0
This is an electronic publication in PDF format.
This publication is offered under Creative Commons International License
Attribution 4.0.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The first printed edition was published in 2009 [ISBN: 978-4-86337-021-0]
Imtiyaz Yusuf’s research originally commissioned by the Senior Research
Scholar Project of Thailand Research Fund which appears as chapter 9 of thisvolume, was earlier published as “The Southern Thailand Conflict and the Muslim World,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 27:2 (2007), pp. 319-339(Taylor & Francis Ltd.), http://www.informaworld.com. It is reprinted herewith permission of the publisher.

Published by
Research Institute for
Languages and Cultures ofAsia and Africa (ILCAA)
Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
3-11-1, Asahi-cho, Fuchu-shi,
183-8534, Tokyo, JAPANhttps://publication.aa-ken.jp/

The Peninsulaiii

The three southern border provinces regioniv

Contents
List of maps, figures, and tables ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ vi
Preface by the Thailand Research Fund ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ vii
Editor’s preface ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ ix
Contributors ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ xi
Introduction: Imagined land? The state and southern violence in Thailand
Chaiwat Satha-Anand ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 1
1 National security policies on the southern border provinces, 1974–2003
Mark Tamthai and Somkiat Boonchoo ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 17
2 The body of knowledge on the south over twenty-six years
Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 45
3 The security forces and human rights violations in Thailand’s insurgencywracked south ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 73
Rungrawee Chaloemsripinyorat
4 The internal culture of military units and its impact on the conflict resolution in
Thailand’s far south
Pimonpan Ukoskit ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 93
5 Reading “Bureaucrat Manuals,” writing cultural space: the Thai state’s cultural
discourses and the Thai–Malay in-between spaces
Decha Tangseefa ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖121
6 “New” relations: Buddhists and Muslims in the three southernmost provinces
Rattiya Saleh ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 145
7 Migration and the violence in the far south
Zakee Phithakkumpol ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖165
8 The USA, the war on terror, and the violence in southernmost Thailand
Matthew Wheeler ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 179
9 The south Thailand conflict and the Muslim ummah
Imtiyaz Yusuf ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 207
Glossary ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 229
Abbreviations ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 231v

List of maps, figures, and tables
Maps

Page

1

The peninsulaiii

2

The three southern border provinces region

iv

Figures2-1

Number of research works, 1978–2003 ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖

48

2-2

Number of incidents in the southern border provinces,1987–2003) ̖̖̖̖̖̖ 49

2-3

Research papers and theses on the south, 1978–2003 ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 50

3-1

Sri Sunthorn Task Force  ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 76

3-2

Santisuk Task Force ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 76

3-3

National Police Bureau’s Forward Command ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 79

6-1

Hierarchical and lateral relations ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖156

Tables2-1

Research works and theses on education ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 50

2-2

Theses and research papers on political and socio-cultural issues ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 54

4-1

Trend of incidents in areas of units from the central region ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 94

4-2

Trend of incidents in areas of units from the northeast region ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 95

4-3

Trend of incidents in areas of units from the south ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 96

4-4

Incidents under PRCK-251 by type ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 96

7-1

Background of the sample of migrants ̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖̖ 166vi

Preface by the Thailand Research FundFor many years both government and various other parties have been interested infinding ways to solve the problem of violence in Thailand’s southern border provinces.
Some believe that Thai society “knows” too little about the southern border provinces,while others feel that the violence flared up so badly because government had no policy
capable of dealing with it.
This set of research is the result of the first year of a project under the Thailand
Research Fund’s Senior Research Scholar program on “Nonviolence and violence in Thai
society.” This project began by questioning widespread beliefs that the reasons why
Thailand cannot solve the southern problem are because there is a lack of knowledge, or
because there is no solution, or because there has been no attempt to propose a solution.
This project studies the basic data and knowledge underlying government policy on
security in the southern border provinces, paying attention to the barriers facing theefforts to re-establish peace. The project also examines how relations between people ofdifferent cultures have been impacted by policy and implementation in the current
context of violence. And against the background of the war against terror in which the
U.S. is the main player, the project looks at the “image” of violence in the Thai south in
the imaginations of the U.S. and the Muslim world.
In recognition of the importance of this project on “Nonviolence, violence and Thai
society,” the Thailand Research Fund has provided support from 2006 to 2009. In the firstyear, nine sub-projects were brought to a successful conclusion by the efforts of theresearch team. Matichon Press saw the value of publishing the results in Thai in a bookthat appeared in early 2008. TRF is very pleased that Research Institute for Languages
and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA), Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, has seen
the value of making these results available to a wider international audience. TRF
sincerely hopes that the dissemination of the results of this research will prompt new
directions in the southern border provinces, based on a foundation of knowledge, for the
benefit of Thai society as a whole.
Professor Piyawat Boon-long
Director, The Thailand Research Fundvii

Editor’s preface
If a book has a life, someone very wise told me that a preface is like a biography ofa book. To write about a book’s life is to recount how it has come into being, how it has
grown up, and what it took to bring it into the present shape and form. Needless to say,there are numerous people and institutions involved in the life of a book such as
Imagined land.
Imagined land is the fruit of the first year’s research under the Senior Research
Scholar project entitled “Nonviolence and violence in Thai society,” funded by theThailand Research Fund. I remember that the first meeting of the three-year project
involved more than twenty researchers. The first year researchers were enthusiastic about
conducting serious research on perhaps the then most urgent and puzzling problem ofThai society, the violence in the south. The focus was born out of a blend of kindness andwisdom of people and organizations who saw the importance of research-basedknowledge and were willing to provide the necessary resources. After the researchers
agreed to be a part of the project, and conducted their research with help from theirassistants, colleagues, and informants in the field, their drafts were sent to critics whose
constructive criticisms during the research seminar were incorporated into this book.
Then there was the process of finding publishers for the works. I was very happy that
Matichon published this book in Thai in February 2008. But when we thought about
putting this book out also in English, I had to explore the possibilities of translating all
but two of the chapters into English, and finding a publisher. This would have been
impossible without guidance and support from my friends and colleagues around theworld, as well as my editor for this book, perhaps one of the best in the field I have beenprivileged to work with. In addition to the software of the book, those who areresponsible for its production in Tokyo are no less gracious. I must also acknowledge
Matichon’s Press for kindly agree to see this book published in English. It could be said
that the life of a book such as Imagined Land is made possible because of the hearts, theminds, and the hands of so many.
All contributors to this volume wish to thank Professor Piyawat Boon-Long andProfessor Vichai Boonsaeng from the Thailand Research Fund whose support for the
Senior Research Scholar project made it possible to do research with full understandingof the nature and problems of social science research in Thailand. We are also grateful for
helpful comments from General Prathompong Kesornsuk, Dr Uthai Dulyakasem, Dr Niti
Pawakapan, Colonel Anuchart Bunnag, Assistant Professor Chidchanok Rahimmula,
Professor Amara Pongsapich, Assistant Professor Suchart Sethamalinee, Dr Sukree
Langputeh, and Mr Supalak Ganjankhundee during the research seminar held at the
Sirindorn Anthropology Center on August 18-19, 2006 with the kind arrangements andorganization of Professor Kaisri Sriaroon and Dr Paritta Chalermpow Ko-anantakul. For
turning the book into English, we are grateful to our translators, Khun Sudina Paungpetch,
Sutharin Koonphor, Oranuch Anusaksathien, Nissara Horayangura, and Nualnoi
Thammasathien for chapters 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7 respectively. We are honored to have Dr
Chris Baker to help as the English editor. His knowledge, speed, thoroughness, andattitude made it a delightful experience to have a chance to work with him. I have tothank Professor Garry Rodan of the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University forixconnecting me with some publishers. Importantly, it was the decision of Dr Ryoko Nishii
and Islam in Southeast Asia (ISEA) project, The Research and Educational Project for
Middle East and Islamic Studies (MEIS): the Research Institute for the Languages andCultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies to provide funding forthe translation, and editing, and above all to publish this work in English which gives it arare opportunity to reach a wider audience. Finally, I must thank Dr Suwanna SathaAnand whose understanding and wisdom I have been privileged to enjoy; Ajarn Chayanit
Poonyarat, director of my Senior Research Scholar project, for her effective
administrative skills; Khun Janjira Sombutpoonsiri, Julaluck Damrongviteetham, andThanyatorn Saipanya from Peace Information Center, Foundation for Democracy andDevelopment Studies for their engaging work at different phases of the project; as well as
my colleagues, the administrators and staff at the Faculty of Political Science,
Thammasat University for their continued support over the years.
.
Chaiwat Satha-Anand
August 2008x

Contributors
Chaiwat Satha-Anand teaches “Violence and nonviolence in politics” and “Politicalphilosophy for the twenty-first century” at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat
University. His most recent books include: The Life of this World (Marshall Cavendish,2005) and Violence and “Truth” Management (Thammasat University Press, 2008, inThai). He is now leading a multi-layered three-year research project as a
Thailand Research Fund Senior Research Scholar on “Nonviolence and violence in Thai
Society.”
Decha Tangseefa was a director of the PhD Program, Faculty of Political Science,
Thammasat University, Bangkok. His research and teaching interests are political theory
and philosophy, critical international studies, and cultural studies, especially relating todisplaced peoples. He has contributed to several major anthologies and journals in Thaiand English, including Alternatives: Global, Local, Political.
Imtiyaz Yusuf is currently head of Department of Religion, Graduate School ofPhilosophy and Religion, Assumption University, Bangkok. His academic specialization
focuses on Islam in Thailand and Southeast Asia, and Muslim-Buddhist dialogue. His
recent publications include Understanding Conflict and Approaching Peace in Southern
Thailand (Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006); Faces of Islam in Southern
Thailand (East-West Center, Washington, Working Paper no. 7, 2007) and Doing CrossCultural Dawah in Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur: A. S. Noordeen, 2007).
Mark Tamthai is a former head of the Philosophy Department, Chulalongkorn
University, where he taught for thirty years. He teaches and writes in the fields ofphilosophy of science, ethics, social philosophy, and peace-conflict studies. Some of his
recent papers are “Democracy with a heart”, “The democratic-peace hypothesis andbuilding a culture of peace in Southeast Asia”, and “Citizenship and the struggle forrights in fledgling democracies”. Presently he is director of the Institute of Religion,
Culture and Peace, Payap University, Chiang Mai; a former deputy chair, committee on
strategic nonviolence, National Security Council; and a former member of Thailand’s
National Reconciliation Commission.
Matthew Wheeler is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of New South Wales,
working on the problem of administration and violence in southernmost Thailand. He
was educated at Sarah Lawrence College, the University of Hawaii, and Harvard
University, where he earned a master’s degree in Asian studies. He was a fellow of theInstitute of Current World Affairs, based in Bangkok, and studied Thai as a Blakemore
Foundation fellow.
Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng is a lecturer in the Anthropology Department, Faculty ofArchaeology, Silpakorn University. Her thesis is on “Inter-ethnic relations between the
Chinese and Muslims in Yala province.” She has done three studies on the southernmost
provinces of Thailand since 2005. Her latest work is a cultural fluency handbook of thexipeople in the three southernmost provinces funded by the Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn
Anthropology Center.
Pimonpan Ukoskit is a colonel in the Royal Thai Army and an assistant professor ofsociology at the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy. Her current interests are insocial development and military roles, especially in conflict resolution in Thailand’s far
south. Her publications include Moral development and a solution to drug abuse (2003,
in Thai), and Factors impacting Thai military operations on the humanitarian mission in
Iraq (2005, in Thai).
Rattiya Saleh is associate professor specializing in Malay language at the
Department of Thai and Oriental Languages, Thaksin University in Songkhla. She wasborn in a wholly Muslim village in Pattani province. She is a consulting member of theSouthern Border Provinces Administrative Center, a former commissioner on the
National Reconciliation Commission, and an Ambassador for Peace for Inter-religion andFederation for World Peace, Thailand (2005).
Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat is currently working as an analyst on Thailand's
insurgency for the International Crisis Group, an independent security think-tank working
to prevent conflicts. She previously worked as a journalist for the Associated Press and
The Nation after obtaining an MA in Southeast Asian studies from the National
University of Singapore and a BA in journalism from Bangkok’s Thammasat University.
Somkiat Boonchoo has been working as a policy and planning analyst for the
National Security Council for over 27 years, assessing threats to national security andproviding recommendations on security policies for the southern border provinces. He iscurrently a senior expert on strategic security, and a former member and assistantsecretary of the NSC’s committee on strategic nonviolence.
Zakee Phithakkumpol has an MA in Public Administration from the University ofCanberra, Australia, and is currently a lecturer at the Institute for Peace Studies, Prince ofSongkhla University. His interests lie in the study of conflict, especially ethnic conflict,peace, and nonviolence.

xii

Introduction: Imagined land? The state and southern
violence in Thailand
Chaiwat Satha-AnandIn late July 2007, the Thai army spokesperson told the press that since June
2007, the combined force of Civilian-Police-Military 47 had moved in to arrest some
1,930 terror suspects in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. Thai security officials believedthat though most of the people arrested were fronts for the insurgents, some threehundred among them were the real thing. The military believed that the situation had
significantly improved because there had been no resistance to the arrests, nor had any
relative of those taken come out to protest.1
Around the same period, Supara Janchitfah, an award-winning investigative
journalist who has long followed violence in the area, traveled with the Committee on
Justice and Peace to examine several cases of unexplained violence in the south,
including the case of one Kayariya Paomani from Bannang Sata who was arrested by
the Thai authorities and later shot to death. In the official record, this man was killedby the insurgents while being taken to a military camp. But empirical evidence
suggests otherwise since none of the officials who guarded the prisoner was injured inany way while later forensic examination concluded that the cause of death wassomething very heavy crushing his lungs before shooting started. Talking with theman’s family, Supara reported that they did not want to reopen the case. The deadman’s wife was worried about how to carry on raising her children alone, while thesecond daughter’s concern was about the family’s safety, if they chose to bring thiscase before the court of law. 2This Thai journalist also recalled her experience while on a recent visit to probe“the truth” about violence in southern Thailand. On the way out of a particular
troubled area, some ten armed officers stopped her group, and searched both theluggage in the car’s trunk as well as what they were carrying. The group informed theofficers that they had earlier obtained proper clearance from the authorities. She tried
to be rational with them, asking why they would not let the group out of the area after
they had permitted the group to enter? There was no answer.3 Though the point is notmade explicitly, her readers could sense the journalist’s feeling that what had
happened to her and her colleagues was incomprehensible because the officials’ actseemed irrational. When asked, the question was met with silence. More importantly,“this incomprehensibility” has co-existed with violence since the day the new rounderupted with the attack against the military armory on 4 January 2004. In her own
Violence in the mist, Supara wrote in the introduction that a lot of people asked who
were behind the recent violence in southern Thailand. She pointed out that there is noclear-cut answer as to “who are the villains?” in the many stories told about violencein Muslim-dominated southern Thailand. Part of the reason for this is because“southern Thailand” today is not unlike a “land in the mist” which makes it next to
impossible to see things at any distance with a sense of clarity.4
Yet when people—both civilians and officials, Buddhists and Muslims—have
fallen like leaves as victims of violence, a question can be raised as to what theauthorities, tasked with protecting the lives of the country’s citizens, have been doing?
Can’t they solve anything? There are many who attempt to come up with answers.

1

Surachart Bamrungsuk, a noted academic specializing on military and security affairs,
believes that the main problem is a lack of uniformity of thought between “the hawks
and the doves” in the Thai security community which results in a lack of concrete andintegrated policy and practices by Thai officials. There is also a discrepancy between
policy and practice in solving southern violence.5 Another security specialist, now adeputy secretary general of Prime Minister Abhisit, Panithan Wattanayakorn, believes
that the Thai state cannot solve this problem because instead of relying on “existing”
Thai strategy, it has imported “other people’s strategy,” especially that of the solesuper power, and this strategy is inflexible, based on a completely different rationality,
and at times self-contradictory.6 By contrast, some local Malay Muslim academics
maintain that the government has been unable to solve the problem of southern
violence because of its lack of understanding of how Muslim society in the south has
evolved through time and how it is connected with global society at present. 7
These are some academics’ opinions on southern violence in Thailand. They are
not really based on research. Recently the Institute of Public Policy Development
under the Prime Minister’s Office published its own research on solutions to violencein the south. After pointing out that previous governments’ assimilation policies werebased on different paradigms and contrasted understandings of Thai political history,
the Institute argues that the state has not tried to understand the problem, and has
refused to accept the reality of cultural diversity in the area. The state can get awaywith this because Thai society is weak in knowledge and understanding. 8 Anothersignificant research project on government policies in relation to the present southern
violence was led by Uthai Dulyakasem and funded by the National Research Council.
This project questioned whether government policies on southern Thailand had been
“good policies”; to what degree had policy implementations been in line with changesof the time; and how have policies been evaluated during the past decade. The
researchers found that government policies, formulated at the national level without
much understanding of local specificities, have been part of the problem since they
have engendered conflict, mistrust, and fear.9
Nidhi Eoseewong and the academics of Midnight University have written muchabout the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand since the re-emergence of “unrest” in
2004. They argue that the continued escalation of violence has resulted from “thegovernment’s naïve management, dedicated unwillingness to learn, and use ofincompetent officials.” These factors are the product of “Thai society’s ignorance andunwillingness to learn,” accumulated through “studying distorted national history,
constructing a national culture with unequal space for diverse peoples, jingoistic
nationalism, development policies that have always been prejudiced against themarginalized in the country, media and education that lull the majority into ignoring
injustice, governments that allow officials to use their authority at will, and so on.”10
I am curious to know whether policy and implementation in southern Thailand
have been this pathological. This research is an attempt to raise several questions. Has
the Thai state always faced southern violence, and especially the new escalation,
without any comprehensive policy? Has it worked in ignorance, without any
willingness to learn about the Malay Muslims, their ways of life and history? Or havethose who have to deal with the issue of southern violence, especially on the side of
the Thai state, imagined this land and its people as a “special space,” and thentranslated this imagination into policies and practices that “do not go far enough, nor
see things with clarity”? Have both the insurgents and ordinary people become
victims of this failure of understanding?
My introduction begins by pointing out connections between main research2questions and the nine projects that constitute the nine chapters in this book. Then I
underscore the key research findings, especially those which have surprised me inrelation to governments’ attempts to solve the problems. Finally, I discuss sometheoretical issues that have a bearing on the solution of the southern violence and on
further research.
I would argue that any examination of the Thai state’s understanding, policy
making, and implementation needs to be based on knowledge gained from field anddocumentary research, and not mere general opinion. Through knowledge, it might bepossible for the Thai state to find new directions for overcoming the southern violenceby moving beyond the dominant myths clouding Thai society.

Research questions and researchers
This research project begins with questions common among critics of how theThai state has tried to “solve” the problems of violence in southern Thailand. I havetransformed these common, and seemingly plain, questions into the following
research questions.
Does the Thai state have any security policy designed to deal with problems ofviolence in southern Thailand? If these policies do exist, to what degree are theycapable of responding to changing conditions? More importantly, have thesesecurity policies been formulated with some knowledge about the southern
provinces? If, as some academics have criticized, Thai society is mired in“ignorance” about the land and peoples of the southernmost provinces, then on
what grounds have these security policies been based?
Are there discrepancies between these policies and their implementation? If so,
how do such gaps persist? If the Thai state is aware of them, has anything been
done to curtail this problem in the future?
It is said that, since the dramatic explosion in 2004, not only has the new
violence robbed ordinary people of their lives and properties, but has also
adversely affected the once normal relationship between the majority Malay
Muslims and the minority Buddhists in the area. Apart from rumor and hearsay
to that effect, has this relationship been radically changed? Has it soured so badlythat people have to leave their houses to find new homes elsewhere as generally
believed?
The southern violence exists in a global context of conflicts and violence in anage when the American empire has unilaterally declared war against terrorism
and has tried to reshape the world in its own image. It is important then tounderstand the place of Thailand’s southern violence in the American
imagination. Due to the geographical nexus between the Thai south and maritime
Southeast Asia where Islam and Malay culture are dominant, it is also importantto understand the geopolitical location of southern violence in the imagination of
the Muslim world.

The researchers who worked on these projects transformed these questions into
their own more focused research agendas in accordance with each researcher’s
expertise and specific circumstances. The researchers who come together in thisproject include: Mark Tamthai, a renowned philosopher, who traces the evolution of
government policy; Rattiya Saleh, an authority on the Malay language in the south,
who looks at relations between Muslims and Buddhists; Zakee Phithakkumpol, ayoung Muslim researcher from Hat Yai, who studies migration away from thetroubled area; Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng, a Silpakorn University anthropologist from3Yala who conducted a rather thorough survey of the literature; Decha Tangseefa, aThammasat University political scientist who approaches government officials’manuals from a freshly unusual theoretical perspective; Matthew Wheeler, an
American researcher formerly at the Rand Corporation who places the southern
problem in the context of US policy; the Islamic scholar, Imtiyaz Yusuf, an IndianMuslim born in Tanzania and educated in the North America, who looks at thesouthern problem in the context of the Muslim world; Somkiat Boonchu from the
National Security Council who appropriately studies security policy with Mark
Tamthai; Colonel Pimonpan Ukoskit from the Chulachomklao Military Academy who
explores how different military units in the area performed their functions; andRungrawee Chaloemsripinyorat, formerly with Associated Press, who used her accessto local officials to study human rights violations. It is evident that researchers in thisproject come from diverse backgrounds. Some are from the capital and others fromthe south. Some are Thai, others foreign, some senior academics and others first time
researchers. Some work in the universities, while others do not. Some have previous
experience in this field, while others come fresh to the area. They come from various
disciplines: philosophy, anthropology, language studies, communication, Islamicstudies, and political science. It is perhaps this fantastic diversity that has led todifferent and exciting answers to the research questions.

Addressing the research questions: nine studies, data, and findings
The first chapter is a comparative study of national security policies. Mark andSomkiat found that there have been several security policies since 1978. Each has adifferent emphasis, but central to most is a shared understanding of security as“territorial defense” and an attempt at “consolidating state power.” Both policy
formulation and evaluation have been Bangkok-centric. The most distinctive policy,
however, was that in force from 1999 to 2003 because there was public participationin the process of policy formation, and because the policy adopted a comprehensive
notion of security covering how the Thai people’s ways of life could be protected.11
This policy attempted to broaden “ownership” of national security work to include theordinary citizens of the country. But when there was a discrepancy between how“national security” was understood at the policy level and its definition in the hearts
and minds of those working in the field, there was an escalation of violence in the lastyears of this most unique security policy.
Mark and Somkiat argue that, despite a common belief that there was a lack ofpolicy uniformity in solving problems in the south, there was indeed a “strong
uniformity” about the use of violence and the priority of defending the state’s power.
The problem therefore is not a lack of uniformity. Rather, it is unfortunate that thisuniformity is not about pursuing ways for ordinary people to lead normal and peaceful
lives which should be the state’s most important goal. Pursuing a goal of peace
through violent means never bears fruit.
Chapter two is an attempt to assess whether Thai society has any “knowledge”
concerning the southern provinces. Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng’s survey of literature
covers theses and research reports written in Thai and English between 1978 and 2004,
beginning with the year of launching the first southern security policy discussed inchapter one, and ending with the year of the dramatic rise in violence. During thesetwenty-six years, there were 337 pieces of academic writing on the subject, of which
ninety-two focus on private Islamic schools and pondoks (traditional Islamic boarding
schools), while the rest are on politics, government, and culture.
4

Phrae points out that research on southern Thailand lags behind other regions,particularly the action research on community development in the north, especially interms of participation from problem formulation through analysis to evaluation. Muchknowledge that might contribute to national policy is missing. There has been little
study of the international context and international relations of the south.12 There isalmost no study on the effects of economic development on the local population.
Patani history was studied only in the context of national Siamese history, not as alocation with its own specific identity and past. While the southern border provinces,always in the margin of the cultural, exist at the margins of national history,
Narathiwat is at the margin of the margin. It has no place either in the Thai national
history nor in local Patani history. There seems to be no place for a history of Patanithat does not conform to the plot of dominant national history. It simply cannot
emerge in the context of the nation-state historiography whose main plot has been
compiled almost wholly by state institutions.
Chapter Three begins the process of addressing the problem of discrepancy
between government policy and implementation. Rungrawee is interested in thecriteria used to recruit security officials, the implementation of policy on the ground,and the trends in human rights violations. She finds that the violation of human rights
exists both at the structural and policy levels. For example, violations occurred underthe 2005 Emergency Law, under Thaksin Shinawatra’s earlier policy of forcefulapprehension which at times led to arrests of ordinary citizens without sufficientevidence, and under a judicial system which is still unfair to suspects.
Most important, perhaps, is Rungrawee’s finding that some official practices
remain outside the law, despite rules and regulations stipulated by the Southern
Border Provinces Peace-Building Command such as an instruction that search andarrest that must be done “gently” in accordance with rule of law, religious principles,
local beliefs, and culture. She found that commanding officers working in the fieldseem to understand the problems facing them well. They have given thought to whatkind of officials would be best for the job under such circumstances. A police general
remarked: “The problem of violence results from belief and ideology, so people’s
ideology and thinking need to be changed, by altering the behavior of government
officials, because problems have been created by what officials did in the past.”13 The“Defense and Resource Development Force,” for example, was very particular about
this. Officers coming to serve in the area had to agree to stay at least three years toensure continuity. Personal histories were carefully scrutinized. Those with heavy
debts, drinking problems, or other bad behavior were not to be recruited because theForce believes that local people’s satisfaction is crucial for their operations in this area.
If the policies and attitudes of these commanding officers have been this goodand carefully thought out, some with ties to local people in the south might wonder
why there have been news and rumors about human rights violations by government
officials?14 Rungrawee also reports that some policemen told Buddhist youths in Yalathat they could shoot suspicious people and the police would protect them.
Perhaps such discrepancy between policy and practice depends on several
factors. First, there are different recruitment criteria used by different units in the area.
The rangers, for example, prefer to recruit those with “vengeful minds against theterrorists who have slaughtered their families and friends.” 15
Second, the organizations tasked with solving the southern violence have notprepared themselves for this complex responsibility. The army’s prime objective is toprepare soldiers to fight conventional wars to defend the country. Most policemen andwomen have been trained to fight criminals. They have problems dealing with5

something not unlike guerrilla warfare. The army spokesperson once said that “ Allthis war needs is a Sri Thanonchai, but the soldiers are Panthai Norasingh.” 16
Third, the desire to take vengeance for fallen colleagues was important. A juniorofficer sought permission from his commanding officer to shoot at a suspect whom hebelieved to be an insurgent. His superior objected to his request by saying, “We arepolicemen with duties. Death comes. It will never end if they shoot us and we shootthem back. We have to think how to turn people to like us, to love us.” While
impressive, the problem is whether such reasonable and honorable words,
encouraging the men to be tolerant and to solve the political problem with nonviolence, are adequate to pacify the policemen and soldiers working in the field who
are under immense pressures arising from losses of their friends’ lives. They may
have not only a desire for revenge, but also a feeling that respect for human rights has
become an obstacle to carrying out their duty in the three southern provinces.
Chapter four continues the issues raised in the previous chapter. Pimonpan
Ukoskit describes a soldier asking local children a simple question after the Tak Bai
incident on 25 October 2004: “What do you want to be when you’re grown up?” Thesoldier told the researcher that: “If you ask a Buddhist boy, he will say he wants to bea policeman or a soldier. But a Muslim boy will say he wants to be a bandit. Why? It’s
because he wants to kill policemen and soldiers.” The answer reflects how profoundthe problem in the south has become, both in terms of differences between Buddhist
and Muslim children, and contrasting feelings towards soldiers, police, and insurgents.
I wonder about the future of a society where such contrasts can exist in the minds of
its young members.
This issue indicates that how people approach their work in this area depends on
how they construe the problem of violence and how sensitive they are to matters ofdetail. These factors lead back not only to the recruitment process discussed in
Chapter Three, but also to operational procedures that themselves stem fromorganizational differences.
Chapter four is important because it is based on an understanding of theresearcher, a military officer herself, that different military units perform their duties
with different levels of efficiency. Though they are all soldiers within a similar
military culture, various units have their own organizational cultures. The way thatpolicy is translated into practice depends on the commanding officers’ ideas andexperience. Many have served in regions other than the three southern borderprovinces. Pimonpan finds that the King’s Private Guards from Bangkok carried out
their duty with the highest degree of success. As the “King’s Private Guards” or the“King’s Men”, they could change people’s attitudes and make their work more
acceptable. Their organizational culture binds them to observe the Royal Guards’
codes of honor very strictly, inhibiting them from any conduct unbecoming while
trying to dutifully serve the people.
In addition, Pimonpan insist that all units must be fully aware that “a military
operation does not constitute a war.” As a result, the main weapons are not guns but
communication. Crucial for a successful undertaking of their tasks is the military’s
own organizational culture that needs to cultivate humility and rein in the soldiers’
own egos.
Chapter five is a study of Thai officials’ training manuals in order to examine
the ways in which the Thai state has prepared its personnel for working in the violent
context of southern Thailand. Decha analyzed fourteen government officials’ training
manuals developed over the past eighty-three years from the time of King Rama VI.
Three important questions were raised: what kinds of discourse of the Thai state have6

been reproduced by these manuals; if these discourses themselves have been
responsible for the southern violence, what have been the “prices” paid by the Thaistate and society for preserving them; and what are the dangerous implications oftreating this area as “special.”
Only one of the fourteen manuals, Working with Muslim communities, wasproduced by something other than a security-related state agency. Of the remaining
thirteen, nine were orientation materials for those beginning to work in the southernborder provinces, and all appear to be based on two “originals,” one compiled in 1923,
and the other in 2000. The rest reproduce similar contents with minor language
modifications, or used the whole text unchanged with additional contents.
Upon closer reading, Decha found some traces of alteration. But these changes
suggest a decline in the Thai state’s ability to re-imagine its relationship to different
peoples, and to accord proper respect and dignity. The 2004 manual advises Thai
officials to try to get to know Muslim teachers and religious leaders by engaging inconversation or calling a meeting “just for ceremony.” This is interesting not only
because it recommends such superficial contact with Muslim religious leaders, butalso because it was copied from the 1923 manual published eighty-three years earlier.
Yet there is a slight difference. The 1923 manual recommended calling a meeting“with suitable ceremony,” not “just for ceremony.” The difference in tone reflected achange in the Thai state’s discourse. Perhaps the new breed of officials who prepared
the manual had insufficient knowledge of Thai and therefore failed to see the subtle
difference between “with suitable ceremony” and “just for ceremony.” Or perhaps theconsciousness that this relationship needed special care no longer exists. Whatever thereason, this discourse helps reproduce the insignificance of the “Others” living in thisspecific space in the eyes of Thai government officials.
Put another way, the fact that there was little change in these manuals
demonstrates the persistence of ways of preparing officials for duty in the southernborder provinces despite the basic fact that the local, national, regional, and global
contexts have undergone spectacular change over almost a century. The manuals
reproduce a dominant discourse of the Thai state with Bangkok as its center, and of anation-state that is determined to “terminate the historical existence of those who havebeen made into ‘the others’.” Such persistence indicates that no matter what changes
have taken place, the Thai state has not altered its “way of thinking about” thesouthern border provinces as a strange land at the margin that needs to beaccommodated or annexed into the state’s preferred form of imagined community.
The report of the National Reconciliation Commission maintains that therelationship among different peoples is more important than the relationship between
state and people because it is the cradle of sustainable national security.17 Many seemto believe that the strong ties that once bound different peoples have been dangerously
weakened because of the violence. Pian in Saba Yoi district, Songkhla, for example, isa community with 10,000 Buddhists and Muslims. They once lived in a cordial
relationship, going to one another’s traditional feasts because many believed that bothpeoples shared the same “grandparents.” But today they are no longer close as they
once were, whether trading rice or selling liquid rubber or playing sports together.
Even the tea shop has ceased to be a common space.18
Chapter six is an attempt to discuss the effects of violence on local Buddhist–
Muslim relations. Is it true that these relations have soured so badly as many seem tobelieve? In this chapter, Rattiya Saleh returned to four villages in the three provinces
where she had studied such relationships a decade earlier. In her previous study, shefound that local Buddhist–Muslim relations were cordial because both sides accepted7

“value differences” and co-existed by depending on what she calls “the crystal of
productive friendship”—a kind of friendship, born from the womb of the patron-clientsystem and crystallized through time, essential for fostering strong ties among peoples
with different religions. 19 This time, however, she found a heightened degree of
mistrust among the villagers. They were afraid to deal with strangers. When asked
about the surrounding violence, they refused to talk about it. Violent incidents
involving both state actors and ordinary people lay beyond the sphere of acceptable
conversation. Those who dared to speak at all told the researchers that they wanted tohelp the government but “hated” the fact that the authorities only listened to someinfluential people. They were prepared to shame even village leaders who had become
unpopular. Not only did they not cooperate with the authorities in apprehending theinsurgents, some disenfranchised villagers also chose to side with the insurgents.
Although the researcher, who is a Malay Muslim woman with excellent language
skills, was very familiar with local informants and those who live in these researchsites, she faced immense problems in collecting data because of the fear and lack ofsafety in the area.
Yet in cases where relationships between Buddhists and Muslims remained
strong, she found several factors responsible. They included religiosity, kinship that
could be traced long into the past, traditional elites who continued to be respected, andolder generations who still possessed a communal memory that bound different
peoples in some kind of cultural web.
She also found that Buddhists who earned their living from tapping rubber in Si
Sakhon, Narathiwat, had no problem whatsoever. They claimed that Muslim villagers
took good care of them because, “We are both poor people so we must help one
another. Luckily we both speak Malay, so we can become friends more easily.”
Rattiya argues that for those who have a similar level of social power and are able tocommunicate in the local language, the ties continue to be strong. Using local Malay
to communicate between Buddhists and Muslims in everyday life has been common
in Thai society since the Ayutthaya period when court officials used Malay tocommunicate with the Dutch East India company in Batavia (Jakarta today). The useof Malay as an international language in the court was later replaced by Chinese in theThonburi period.
Rattiya searches hard for those cultural elements, such as the acceptance ofdiversity of “values” and the patron-client system, that can foster strong ties between
the Buddhists and Malay Muslims. But the difficulties she herself encountered in
conducting this research, the silence of the informants, and the lack of cooperation
among the villagers speak volumes about how the violence has corroded local interreligious relations. By emphasizing the cultural power of the older generation to holdthe communities together, she implies that relations are bound to change with thepassing of the old generation and the coming of the new. The violence that at times
seems to target older people has not only taken human lives but also weakened theties that have helped sustain these communities, with their rich cultural differences,
for so long.
Common wisdom suggests that with the increase in violence, people will
migrate out of the area. In late 2006, a mass daily reported that violence had pressured
so many to leave their homes that the number of Buddhist had dwindled from 300,000
to “less than half” of that number.20 Prior to 2003–4, the number of Thai Buddhists inthe area had already decreased despite the fact that their fertility rate was higher thantheir mortality rate. This would mean that the Buddhists had migrated out of the areaeven before the new wave of violence exploded in early 2004, and therefore violence

8

alone could not explain the migration. Possibly economic opportunities outside thearea were luring the better educated Buddhists away.21
In chapter seven, Zakee Phithakkumpol studies violence-related migration in thethree southern provinces including its after-effects on the migrants. His researchquestions include: “if violent incidents impact upon people generally, why is it that
only some people choose to migrate?” Using migration theory and data collected in
Hat Yai, he found that violence is only one of the reasons for migration. Economic
factors and employment opportunities have been significant as reasons for both
Buddhists and Muslims to migrate. Moreover, there are times when official data is
misleading, such as when all of a family leaves except the household head and yet thehouse registration remained unchanged. In cases like this, there is no migration
officially, but in reality many people have moved.
It is generally accepted that the southern violence has been an internal problem
caused by insurgents who had little chance of receiving “direct assistance” frominternational terrorist organizations such as JI (Jemaah Islamiyah) or al-Qaeda due inpart to pressures coming from the American and Singaporean governments as well assome Muslim countries caught between “aversion to the terrorist groups and an
intense dislike of the US.”22 But it goes without saying that the southern violence hasinternational and global dimensions, partly due to the geo-cultural connection with the“Malay world” or “Malay civilization” (Tamadun Melayu) which is by and large
responsible for the production of “Malay identity” through the use of Malay
language,23 and partly through the ties that bind southern Muslims as Muslims withthe broader Islamic communities of faith.
The last two chapters in this volume try to situate the southern violence in theimagination of the U.S. and of the Muslim world respectively. Local Muslims as well
as some security analysts believe that the U.S. has somehow been connected with thesituation in southern Thailand since the new violence erupted in 2004 due perhaps to
President Bush’s global war against terror. Matthew Wheeler deals with this problem
in chapter eight by arguing that the (official) American position is based primarily on
defending American interests in the region. More importantly, he delineates thefollowing criteria that inform the American basic understanding of the situation:
Violence in southern Thailand is domestic both in terms of its causes and forms.
The causes of violence have been aggravated through the ages, in part by thelack of good governance.
There has been no direct and clear foreign involvement in this conflict.
The use of repressive measures and the violation of human rights will increase
the risks that violence will become more intensive, expansive, and protracted.
The expansion, intensity and protraction of this deadly conflict will increase thechance of foreign involvement by international terrorist organizations.

The American government finds it counterproductive to directly intervene in the
problem of the southern violence. In fear of being misunderstood, the American
government carefully screens its official stances and activities. As a result, all
security-related projects designed to assist Thailand have to go through the “label andlocation test.” There must be no label indicating any direct American involvement insuppressing southern insurgency. These projects therefore take such forms as
vocational support for Muslim women in the area, and disseminating information
about the lives and rights of Muslims in America. However, Wheeler also points outthat some American analysts or international studies institutions maintain that the U.S.

9

government should be more active in helping Thailand deal with this problem. Somehave even advocated sending “special forces” to southern Thailand to provide
consultancy aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the Thai security agencies.
Wheeler concludes his chapter with the American trepidation about the Muslim
world, and especially about the process whereby activists become militants before
finally turning to be terrorists. Many factors contributed to this process including
injustices suffered by Muslim minorities that generate vengeful political anger. The
American government has been worried about southern Thailand precisely because it
believes that these conditions do exist in the area.
In the last chapter, Imtiyaz Yusuf locates the southern violence within theimagination of the Muslim world. He argues that the root of the southern conflict is
ethnic rather than religious. He examines how the southern violence impacts upon
relations between Thailand and the Muslim world, both within a long-term historicalperspective of the relations between Buddhism and Islam, and within a narrower
geographical perspective of Thailand’s relations with her Muslim neighbors and otherparts of the Muslim world.
Both the strength and weakness of this chapter stem from the fact that the
Muslim world is vast, and incorporates many local cultural worlds with their own
civilizational specificities. Besides the theological differences between Sunni and Shia, Islam has emerged historically from the soils of different civilizations. The notionof “the Muslim world” itself encompasses Arab, Turkish, Persian, and Malay, among
others. Yusuf points out that in Thailand there are “two types of Islams.” First,
Muslims who try to integrate into Thai society are scattered from Chiang Rai in thenorth to the upper south. These Muslims see themselves as members of a minority
religion in a country with different faiths yet a dominant Buddhism. Second, theMuslims of lower southern Thailand resist integration and see Islam as constitutive of
their ethnic identity as inhabitants of an area forcefully annexed into the modern
nation-state only a century ago.24
It goes without saying that to cover the whole “Muslim world” in a chapter is
impossible. Yusuf therefore chooses only the cases of Pakistan and Iran to elaborateon the educational links between Thailand and the “Muslim world.” Importantly,
however, this chapter discusses two significant issues: past Muslim thinkers’ views on
Buddhism, an extremely rare topic even among Muslims in Thailand; and anaffirmation of the diversity of Muslims in Thailand in terms of their backgrounds,
sources, and streams of faith that glide through the changing religious contexts andglobal politics.
Yusuf also tries to analyze how the “Muslim world” perceives the southern
violence. He distinguishes between the official perspectives of Muslim diplomats andMuslim international organizations on the one hand, and the views in the Muslim
print and electronic media on the other. Cyberspace has echoed with sympathy andanger over Muslim brothers and sisters suffering under a repressive non-Muslim
regime, while the official discourses—the product of intense negotiation, sometimes
involving the Thai Foreign Ministry—consist of carefully chosen words.
While Wheeler in chapter eight focuses on the “official” relationship between
the U.S. and Thailand, Yusuf in chapter nine underscores the “civil society ties”
between Muslims in Thai society and the Muslim world. Though less visible, therelations between Muslims in Thailand and those in the Muslim world, based onmembership in a community of faith, have been quite strong. This reality might
increase the Thai authorities’ apprehension that such strong ties fostered by theexistence of an imagined community of faith have sometimes contributed to events in 10 

the south.

New thoughts and strange findings
Apart from these analyses and answers discussed above, these researches havethrown up some findings that are new and thought-provoking. Consider the following.
Some of the pondok owners refused to register for fear that the government
would take over their schools. The document also indicated the government’s
concerns about foreign interference in the pondoks. The behavior of the principalof a pondok in Yaha district of Yala province raised some suspicion. He was a
Malaysian who, unlike other teachers, never stayed permanently in one place, buttraveled throughout the four Southern provinces to teach at different pondoks.
Moreover, during the seizure of the… insurgents’ camp in Betong district of Yala
… the authorities found student identification cards issued by a suspected
pondok. In addition, according to the report a common characteristic of the
pondoks was the insertion of political teaching in the curriculum.

Many might readily believe this was an official opinion on pondoks in late 2004.
But in fact it is taken from note by an assistant secretary general of the Thai National
Security Council in February 1967! Only the word “communist” (before “insurgents”)
and the year 1966 have been excised. It seems to me that some problems in the south
have changed very little, judging from the state’s attitudes and actions.
It is often said that those with authority do not understand the problems andhence fail to overcome them because they don’t have “knowledge” about the area. But
the literature survey in chapter two uncovered that General Kitti Ratanachaya, former
commander of the Fourth Regional Army responsible for the south, wrote a thesis on
relations between Muslims and Buddhists, both officials and civilians, in 1989. He
found that the relationship was negative due to misunderstanding and mistrust. In
1999, General Kwanchart Klaharn, another commander of the Fourth Regional Armyfrom 2004 onwards and a member of the National Reconciliation Commission,
studied relations in southern Thailand with a focus on the factors conducive to coexistence in a plural society. He found that Buddhists and Muslims could co-exist
peacefully, and it was “corrupted government officials” who had caused violence insouthern Thailand. A former secretary general of the National Security Council, Prakij
Prajonpajjanuek, conducted research on “Southern border provinces: engendering
sustainable peace and security” in 1992. Many of those who have served the Thaistate in the corridors of power have some knowledge about the problem of southern
violence. In fact the nexus between “knowledge” and the formulation andimplementation of security policy might surprise critics who faulted Thai policy
makers on their lack of knowledge.
But it is the relationship between “knowledge” and government officials’
operations in the field that matters. Chapters three and five discuss the recruitment
criteria and training procedures for officials based in the troubled area. When
Americans came to train Thai soldiers and civilians on “Legal perspectives on antiterrorism” in March 2006, they found the Thai participants lacked even basic
understanding on the principles of “Rules of Engagement,” a set of guidelines for theuse of force by armed state personnel in combat situations. A seminar report publishedin an American agency’s journal pointed out that the American trainers had to insert alecture on “Rules of Engagement” before they could proceed as planned.25 Not only
do Thai officials lack “knowledge” pertaining to local society, culture, and history, butalso lack “knowledge” of rules governing acutely dangerous situations. But the fact
 11 

that the American trainers found Thai officials in the field did not understand “Rules
of Engagement” does not mean that there are no rules of engagement currently in use.
In fact, the Army has its own “Ten Commandments” on how soldiers should conduct
themselves in the field, including rules about not abusing the villagers, and about not
exercising discrimination. These commandments became the army’s directives underformer Supreme Commander, General Surayud Chulanont, who later became prime
minister after the 19 September 2006 coup d’etat.
Some government officials perceive Malaysia as a threat to Thai national
security. But people in the southern border provinces are connected to Malaysia
because of geographical proximity. In chapter six, Rattiya discusses the case ofRamong in Betong, Yala, a village with a population of one thousand and only 10 per
cent Buddhist. Muslims and Buddhists in the village have been living peacefully side
by side but they have a closer relationship with Malaysia than Thailand. For Ramong
villagers, it is easier to go to Malaysia than to the town of Yala.
Besides territorial connection, geo-cultures also weave Malays into acommunity spanning Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, and southern Thailand. But it isfascinating to find that “Malayness” does not have to be defined from outside theprovince of Pattani. There was a time when it was Patani that defined “Malayness” asevident in the case of a Malaysian who came to southern Thailand in order to fulfill
his father’s admonition that “If you want to ‘know’ the Malays, go to live in Pataniand learn about their society’s traditions.”
These strange realities and analyses beg a more profound question of how thiswonderland should be re-imagined?

Conclusion: imagined land?
The contributions in this volume suggest that the area plagued with violence atpresent is a “special space.” As a result, there have always existed specific security
policies designed for this particular area under the name “National security policy(for) southern border provinces.” Thai society has produced a vast amount of“knowledge” on this specific area. Because it suffers from “security problems,”
civilian and military officials must go through special recruitment processes and beoriented by a set of “manuals” specifically prepared to help them perform their duties
in just such a context. The gaze of the American empire is fixed on southern Thailand
because the area has become a part of the Southeast Asian anti-terrorism war front,
and the gaze of the Muslim world is drawn because a Muslim minority is seen as
suffering at the hands of an unjust non-Muslim government. Victims of violence, both
Buddhists and Muslims, ordinary people and civil servants, lose their lives, families,
and livelihood, while others just decide to leave.
When the contributors of this volume presented their findings at an academic
seminar organized by the Senior Research Scholar Project, Thailand Research Fund,at the Sirindhorn Anthropology Center on 18–19 August 2006, there were highexpectations that the research would have direct practical application, particularly
Decha’s work on official manuals. But Decha’s presentation generated muchfrustration among the audience. Many were working in the field and hoped forpractical answers they could try to implement. But his framing of the study, usingsophisticated theoretical apparatus peppered with postcolonial language, is extremely
important for opened up new ways to view the problem with borrowing from“Borderland Studies.” From this theoretical perspective, the “space” itself influences
the relationship between cultures and the state, and this relationship in turn shapes and 12 

contributes to the escalation of violence.
I would argue that no matter how a space or territory is imagined, or bywhomsoever, problems of violence could arise. In the final analysis, though land,
space, and territory are geographical concepts, they are also part of a juridico-political
geography, permeated with power. For those who are in control of the land, it seems
normal and logical to exercise the power that has been in their possession for so longthat the traces of pre-existing freedoms are hard to find.26
The main problem is how to prevent this land that is imagined as “special” indifferent senses of the term by so many involved, from descending into greater
violence that will bring about further destruction to lives and the cultural ties that havebound different peoples together.
Violence, especially war, not only causes casualties but also destroys existingcollective integrity. War, and other forms of extreme political violence, are carried out“to destroy the very way the enemy perceives itself, the way it forms its identity.”27
Among ethnic groups with clear spatial distinctions from “the Others”, ethnic
identities become connected with the lands where they were born. The land is nolonger a mere physical entity but a site of symbolic power. When the ties binding
people to their lands are undercut by violence, the lives that derive meanings fromsuch ties simply end. A Palestinian woman told a remarkable story from the WestBank. She saw her elder brother collapse and die before her very eyes when he wastold that his land had been occupied by the Israelis to build a new settlement. For suchpeople, “land is all they have,” it is the very thing that connects them together.28 When
this connection is nurtured by historical consciousness and constantly drummed up by
the pain of unending violence, it means more than mere ethnic identity in a material
sense because it endows the natural geography with a sense of the sacred, giving birth
to sacred geography.29 Perhaps this is why in so many cases, struggles for freedom
from foreign occupation stress the connection of people to land, and then chain thisconnection to their struggle. This is what has happened in the case of Palestinians allover Israel and the occupied territories. In this sense, it could be argued that the “land”
occupied by Israel helps produce the Palestinian identity since it has become a“space” for the Palestinians to preserve and lead their lives. The land has become anemblem of Palestinian existence, and the theft of this land is “the sign of the Israeli
will to efface the Palestinians.”30
To prevent the “land” from becoming a legitimizing space for violence among
different peoples with histories of pain is not easy. It is even more difficult when thistask has to be undertaken in the context of violence used by all sides. The researchfindings in this volume, however, indicate traces of ways for this imagined land toexist within an imagined community that is the modern Thai nation state. These traces
include past security policies based on the reality of cultural diversity with respect for“otherness”; the awareness of some commanding officers working in the field who
have tried to issue rules and regulations conducive to rights, liberty and humandignity; and a residuum of cultural ties binding Buddhists and Muslims.
But to empower this knowledge to the degree that it could halt future violence
depends on the capacity of the Thai people to re-imagine their community with
sufficient space to allow the different peoples who were here before the modern
nation-state, and who were perhaps born from a different imagination, to be able tolive side by side with dignity.

 13 

Endnotes
1 Bangkok Post, 30 July 2007.
2 Supara Janchitfah, ‘Living in the crossfire,’ Bangkok Post, 29 July 2007.
3 Supara, ‘Living in the crossfire.’
4 Supara Janchitfah, Violence in the mist: reporting on the presence of pain in southern
Thailand (Bangkok: Kobfai, 2004), p. 15.
5 Surachart Bamrungsuk, Wikrit tai! su duai yutthasat lae panya (Southern crisis: fighting withstrategy and wisdom) (Bangkok: Animate Group Publishers, 2004), pp. 158–65.
6 Panithan Wattanayakorn, ‘Botbat lae itthiphon khong maha-amnat nai thai’ (The role andinfluence of super powers on Thailand), in Kaew Withoonthien et al., ed., Khwam ru lae khwam
mai ru 3 changwat chaidaen tai (Knowledge and ignorance of the three southernmost provinces)(Bangkok: Health Promotion Cooperative Study Project for Three Southern Provinces, Social
Agenda Committee, and Health Promotion Support Funds, 2006), p. 124.
7 Worawit Bahru, ‘Kan ko kanrai kap kan sang santiphap khong prachachon’ (Terrorism andpeople’s peace-building) in Kaew, Khwam ru lae khwam mai ru, p. 139.
8 Saowaluck Kittiprapasr et al., Naeothang dan nayobai nai kan kaekhai panha nai 3changwat chaidaen phak tai (Policy directions for solving southern border provinces problems)(Bangkok: Public Policy Development Institute, 2006), pp. 58–9.
9 Uthai Dulhyakasem et al., Nayobai khong rat lae kan nam nayobai khong rat su kan pathipat
kap kan kaekhai panha khwam khatyaeng nai changwat chaidaen phak tai yang yangyuen (State
policy and policy implementation and sustainable conflict resolution in southern border provinces:a research report) (Bangkok: National Research Council, 2007).
10 Nidhi Eoseewong, ‘Kamnam bannathikan’ (Editorial introduction), in Nidhi, ed., Malayu
sueksa: khwam ru phuenthan kieo kap prachachon malayu muslim nai phak tai) (Melayu studies:basic knowledge about Malay Muslims in the south) (Bangkok: Amarin Printing and Midnight
University, 2007), pp. 8–9.
11 Some scholars believe that this particular security policy contains “the best understandingof the different peoples and the land in the southern border provinces.” See Uthai, Nayobai khongrat, p. 71.
12 To the best of my knowledge, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee has completed its
report on Raingan kan wichai rueang panha khwam runraeng nai changwat chaidaen phak tai laephon katop to khwam samphan rawang prathet khong thai (Violence in the southern borderprovinces and its impact on Thailand’s foreign relations) (Bangkok: Research and Development
Committee, the Thai Senate, 2006). But because this report appeared in 2006, it lies outside thescope of the research discussed in chapter two of this volume.
13 Interview with Police Major General Worapong Siewpreecha, deputy commander, Police
Bureau Operation Front and Deputy Metropolitan Police Commander, 21 April 2006, by
Rungrawee in chapter three of this volume.
14 For example, the villagers believe that it was the Thai authorities who shot at their cars
killing two people at Pondok Taseh in Yala on 9 March 2007; or the case of a ranger killing four
Malay Muslims in Patae, Yaha District, Yala in the evening of 22 May 2007. These incidents aresome of the cases which the student protesters (the network of people’s protection students) at theCentral Mosque in Pattani from 31 May to 4 June 2007, put forward and called for further
investigation by the government.
15 See http://www.geocities.com/taharnpran4/dna.htm.
16 Rungrawee’s interview with Colonel Akra Thipyaroj, the Army spokesperson on 26
December 2005 in chapter three of this volume. Sri Thanonchai is a mischievous trickster in local
Thai folktales, while Panthai Norasingh is a historical figure from the Ayutthaya period who
sacrificed his life out of loyalty to the king.
17 National Reconciliation Commission, Overcoming violence with the power of reconciliation(Bangkok: National Reconciliation Commission, 2006), pp. 40–1.
18 Chayanit Poonyarat, ‘Changwat chaidaen phak tai kap khwam pen pai dai khong kan

 14 

samanchan’ (The southern border provinces and reconciliation possibilities), unpublishedmanuscript, Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, 3 August 2007, pp. 10–1.
19 Rattiya Saleh, Kan pathisamphan rawang sasanik thi prakot nai changwat pattani yala lae
narathiwat (Inter-religious relations in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) (Bangkok: Thailand
Research Fund, 2001).
20 Daily News, 25 December 2006.
21 Ammar Siamwalla, ‘Panha chak “kan phatthana” lae “kan mai phatthana”’ (Problems from“development” and “maldevelopment”), in Kaew, Khwam ru lae khwam mai ru, p. 114.
22 Lieutenant General Nanthadej Meksawasdi, Pathipat kan lap dap fai tai (Dousing southern
fire: covert operations) (Bangkok: Ruamduay Chuai Kan Publishers, 2006), pp. 152–4. The authorof this book is a long time intelligence officer and was very close to prime minister Surayud
Chulanont. It is interesting to note that there are some foreign scholars who firmly believe that
there have been concerted efforts on the Thai side to claim that southern violence is a domestic
problem and thus conceal the role of foreign involvement. I understand that Zachary Abuza, whowrites on terrorism and the Muslim world, has written on this “conspiracy of silence” among Thai
officials and academics on international terrorist organization involvement in southern Thailand.
23 Nidhi, ‘Kamnam bannathikan,’ p. 18.
24 Imtiyaz Yusuf, Faces of Islam in southern Thailand (Washington D.C.: East-West Center
Washington Working Papers, No.7, March 2007).
25 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, ‘Rules of Engagement discussed,’ Partners, April
2005, p. 6; available at http://www.dsca.mil/newsletter/E-Partners%200406v2.pdf.
26 Michael J. Shapiro, Violent cartographies (Minneapolis and London: University of
Minneasota Press, 1997), pp. 15–6.
27 Renata Saleci, ‘The fantasy structure of nationalist discourse,’ (1993) cited in Shapiro,
Violent cartographies, p. 13.
28 Geoffrey Aronson, Israel, Palestinians and the Intifada: creating facts on the West Bank
(1990) cited in Glenn Bowman, ‘A country of words: conceiving the Palestinian nation from theposition of exile,’ in Ernesto Laclau, ed., The making of political identities (London and New
York: Verso, 1994), p. 169, fn. 45.
29 See similar opinion in Anthony D. Smith, ‘The ethnic sources of nationalism,’ in Michael E.
Brown, ed., Ethnic conflict and international security (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1993), p. 30.
30 Aronson, Israel, Palestinians and the Intifada cited in Bowman, ‘A country of words,’ p.
169.

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1
National security policies on the southern border provinces,
1974–2003
Mark Tamthai and Somkiat BoonchooThis chapter studies the development of national security policies on the southernborder provinces over thirty years (1974–2003). The technique of the study is to analyze
policy in each period from four dimensions: the meaning of “national security” in that
period; the process of devising policy; the contents of policy; and the methods ofevaluating that policy. 1 Ideally the study would also cover the intentions behind thepolicy in each period, but this information is not explicit in the documents on which thestudy is based. The study ends in 2003 as the subsequent outbreak of violence
represented a major change.
The chapter begins with some background on the problem of the southern borderprovinces, and a review of policies over 1959–73, the period prior to this study. The studyof policy over thirty years is divided into three sub-periods—1974–77, 1978–98, and
1999–2003—based on the differences in the thinking process, analysis of the situation,
process of policy-making, and policy characteristics. The chapter ends with acomparative analysis of policies over the thirty year period, highlighting the significanceof changes in 1999.

Background to the problem of the southern border provinces
Political violence can occur in any country where minorities feel as if they do notbelong in the mainstream society or are disrespected by a government policy aimed at
assimilation and destruction of their cultural identities. This is the case of Thailand’ssouthern border provinces. The perceptions of the ethnic Malay population in the area aretied to the historical fact that their territory was under the Thai state’s domination.
Throughout history, there have been continuous struggles to gain independence. In theearly Rattanakosin period, Pattani, which had been subdivided into the seven provinces ofPattani, Nong Chik, Yala, Yaring, Ra-ngae, Raman, and Sai Buri, made several attempts
to break away from Bangkok. Some of the important reasons, according to Rattiya Saleh
in her article, “Pattani Darussalam,” were2
the settlement of the Buddhist Thais in the seven provinces as a means to create abalance of power and prevent insurrections by the local people who were dissatisfied
with the government, and the constant conflicts between the citizens of the sevenprovinces and the government. Some of the province governors were secretly
stocking up weapons and recruiting men to fight the government.

During the reign of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V), political reforms aimed at

 17 

centralizing power instituted the thesaphiban system (territorial control from the capital)
as the main mechanism to allow Bangkok to exercise tighter control over tributary states.
Resenting their diminished power, the governors of the seven provinces rebelled, only tobe crushed by the Bangkok government. Following the 1932 political revolution in Siam,the thesaphiban government was replaced with the provincial administration, which
subsequently reorganized the seven provinces and other Malay territories into thesouthern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla, and Satun. Bangkok’s
centralization of power through the thesaphiban system that eroded the authority of theprovinces’ rulers occurred at a time when British policy in the Malay states was geared
towards elevating the local rulers or Sultans. The British created disunity between rulers
and ruled by emphasizing the higher status of the former vis-à-vis the latter, and also
encouraged the Chinese to seize economic control for the convenience of the government.
During the Second World War, when the Japanese occupied Malaya, an independence
movement formed. The struggles for independence of the Malays continued after the war
and had an impact on Thais of Malay descent, who in 1947 built a stronger organization
which has been in operation ever since.
Factors contributing to the structure of violence
In the view of the Thai government, the independence movement of the Malay
states, also known as the Pattani states, represented an act of rebellion. However, when
considering the fundamental characteristics of the southern border provinces, it is clearthat there were other factors, in addition to history, contributing to the formation of the
independence movement and its continued support by the people.
Located in the remote part of the country amidst jungles and mountains, thesouthern border provinces do not allow easy access and communications with Bangkok.
The Thais of Malay descent usually prefer Malaysia to Bangkok as a traveling destination
because of the convenience of the ground and water transportation connecting thesouthern provinces and Malaysia. This geographical factor draws the Malay Thais closer
to Malaysia than to Bangkok.
Like the rest of the country, the southern border provinces are governed through thecentral authority in Bangkok. However, for the Malay Thais, who have their own
distinctive culture, way of life, and historical perceptions, the regulations and policies
handed down by the Bangkok government with no regard to these characteristics or the
citizens’ participation are seen as more beneficial to the center than to their area.
Moreover, most of the governing officials are Buddhists who have little or no knowledgeof the local language. A key issue is that this poor understanding of the local culture andtraditions creates wide gaps in communication and political control.
The Thai Malays are devout Muslims whose way of life does not blend with thesociety of Buddhist Thais and ethnic Chinese. Although there was no major conflict orcomplete separation between the Thai Muslims and Buddhists, their different cultural andreligious identities kept them apart. The Thai Muslims did not interact in a way topromote unity with the community of Thai Buddhists, who were a minority in the area.
As a result, the Buddhist population and public officials were largely indifferent to thegrievances of the Thai Muslims. A study by Piyanart Bunnag indicates that,3

 18 

Islam was the most important variant or factor that alienated the Malays in thisregion from the majority of the population in Thailand…. The Islamic influencecaused the Thai Muslims to feel alienated, believing that they were not Thais, but
Malays, like their cousins in Malaysia.

The Thai Muslims in the southern border provinces live in a sufficient economy
where they depend on natural resources for their livelihood. Because wealth remained in
the hands of non-Muslims, there was a widespread feeling among the Muslim populationthat the region’s natural resources were being exploited by outsiders to the Muslims’
disadvantage. Furthermore, the southern border provinces lagged far behind the rest of
the country in terms of development. The stark contrast with the economic growth innearby Malaysian villages led Thai Muslims to resent the Thai government’s neglect of
their well-being, which further alienated them from the rest of the nation.
Policies prior to the 1932 political revolution
As tributary states, the southern border provinces, then called the Malay states,
were allowed self-government, but were required to pay tribute to the Thai capital every
three years in the form of Bu-ngamas, the Malay term for trees adorned with gold andsilver. When the capital was at war, the states also had to provide assistance by sending
troops, weapons, and supplies. Nevertheless, wartime also created an opportunity for thestates to revolt. After a series of periodic rebellions that the capital put down successfully,
the government in the early Rattanakosin period decided to divide the Malay states into
smaller tertiary provinces under the control of Songkhla province. Bangkok thenappointed the governors of these provinces. This policy of “divide and rule” resulted
from several rebellions by the Pattani rulers. Considering the large size of Pattani a threat,
King Rama I ordered that it be broken down into the seven provinces of Pattani, Yaring,
Sai Buri, Ra-ngae, Raman, Yala, and Nong Chik, all placed under the authority ofSongkhla province. The king also appointed the province governors from the ranks ofThais and Malays who had assisted in quelling the revolts and gave them the title ofPhraya. Although these provinces could collectively be considered a state, they were
officially referred to as a “territory” because of their dependency to Songkhla province.
However, Bangkok took into account the delicate feelings of the Malays. During
the reign of King Rama V, policy makers were careful to avoid a policy that might further
antagonize the Malays. The new regulations were based on three principles, which can besummarized as follows:4
No change in taxation, but an end to monopoly.
The use of the Islamic judicial system known as to-kali courts should not beabolished, but reformed by selecting well-respected teachers of Islam to serve as the“Dato Yuttitham” (judges). For cases involving Muslims or when a Muslim
defendant had to be tried under Islamic law, such as family cases, each side could
select one or more Datos to be the bench in the Thai court.
The current governors were to receive pensions.

The policy regarding the seven provinces was clearly specified in the “Regulations
for the governing of the seven provinces of 1897.” These regulations placed greatemphasis on the selection of officials for the posts in the area by stipulating that 19 

candidates must possess sufficient knowledge of the local Malay language to be able tocommunicate with the people and understand their religious beliefs and practices.
Moreover, the regulations allowed the application of the customary Islamic laws in cases
involving families and inheritance, which would be adjudicated by the to-kali who were
well-respected and knowledgeable in Islamic law.
On 6 July 1923, King Rama VI approved a “Protocol in the policy making for thegoverning of the Pattani territory,” which put an end to regulations or practices
disrespectful of Islam. Moreover, under the new protocol officials had to exercise fairness
in tax collection and justice in their treatment of the people. Any officials guilty ofwrongdoings would be punished by law. The citizens should not have to waste time that
could be spent towards their livelihoods on contacting the officials. The candidates forgovernment positions in the area had to have good character and receive training in thelocal culture and customs before starting work. Finally, the protocol mandated that any
new regulations affecting the well-being of the people had to be based on carefulconsideration.
Policies after the political revolution
Piyanart Bunnag’s study on the governing policies for the Thai Muslims in thesouthern border provinces (1932–1973) summarizes development of policy between thepolitical revolution of 1932 and the political crisis of 1973 as follows:5
The policies of the period between 1932 and 1973 were aimed at creating harmony
by raising awareness among the Thai Muslims that they were citizens of Thailand.
At the same time, these policies were based on compromise, acceptance, andendorsement of the Thai Muslims’ uniqueness in terms of religion, society, andculture. This could be characterized as a policy of integration. However, whenever a
movement posed threats to the country’s stability and autonomy, the government
also had a policy to put down the movement and restore the situation to normal as
quickly as possible.

Policy development, 1959–1973
In 1959, an act established the National Security Council as the main body toadvise and give policy recommendations on security to the prime minister and the cabinet.
In fact, the National Security Council evolved from the Council on the Defense of theKingdom, which was formed in 1910 at the beginning of King Rama VI’s reign.
Following the enactment of the National Security Act, the Office of the National Security
Council was created to support the tasks of the National Security Council byrecommending policies, guidelines, and measures regarding national security issues. The
work of the National Security Council is closely related to the intelligence and strategic
and psychological operation services. Between 1959 and 1973, counter-communist
insurgency remained the most important issue on the government’s national security
agenda, with problems in the south listed among the top priorities.
The process of making national security policies
Before discussing national security policies on the southern border provinces, theprocess involved in the making of the policies must be understood. The perception of 20 

national security at a given time shapes the analysis of the problem which in turn guides
the process of making policy. National security policy is approved by all the cabinet
members and serves as the guidelines for their work. The policy-making process begins
with the analyses of the situation, threats, and future trends. In the past, policy makers
relied on the intelligence, strategic operation service, and analysis by the officers at the
Office of the National Security Council for policy prescriptions. At present, academic
works and data from private developmental organizations are increasingly incorporated
into policy decisions. Policy proposals are then discussed in the policy committee of the
National Security Council. The council then meets to decide on recommendations to thecabinet.
There is a significant difference between national security policy and the policies ofadministrative departments. The ability of a department to deal with a wide-ranging issue
is usually limited by the scope of its responsibility and conditioned by the cooperation ofother departments. In contrast, national security policy requires the coordination andcooperation of all government agencies for power and efficiency in solving problems.
Policy from 1966
Piyanart Bunnag cited the statement of a deputy secretary of the National Security
Council on 20 March 1987 regarding the roles of the Council in recommending policies
for the southern border provinces as follows:6
In the period between 1959 and 1966, there was no clarity yet in the formulation ofnational security policy. The National Security Act established the National Security
Council in 1959, but the Office of the National Security Council, which was a
supporting organization, was created in 1962. The guidelines for security policies on
the southern border provinces proposed by the Office of the National Security
Council and approved by the government in 1964 entrusted the Ministry of
Education with language-related tasks and the Ministry of Interior with counterinsurgency. Due to the situation at that time, the policy focused on the sociopsychological aspect and problems with various insurgent groups.

The Office of the National Security Council holds documents on security policies
for the southern border provinces dating back to 1966. There is no record of security
policies prior to that year, but it can be assumed that the policy mentioned in the above
quotation came into operation in 1964. Before that, security policies were devised at the
departmental level.
The directions of security policies in the southern border provinces reflect theanalysis of the situation in each period. National security documents from 1966 to 1973
demonstrate that the government had separate policies to target different issues. In 1966,
there were two security policies regarding the southern border provinces, both of which
focused on education.
The first policy concerned the pondok schools.7 In essence, the creation of new
pondok schools was prohibited, while existing pondok schools had to apply for permits
and register within six months. After that, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry ofInterior would oversee the step-by-step transformation of pondok schools into private
schools within a specified period of time.
The second policy addressed the fact that “Thai Muslims in the four southern
provinces increasingly received their education in Jeddah or Cairo.”8 On the whole, the 21 

situation was not considered to be threatening enough to warrant a special measure for
remedy. However, the policy called for rules regarding the documentation andqualifications of those wishing to make pilgrimage to Mecca.
A report in February 1967 by the Office of the National Security Council on the 12day field trip of the council’s deputy secretary (in charge of policy) to study the situationand living conditions of the citizens in the south illuminated the views on the problems inthe south at the time. The policy concerning the pondok schools was set out as follows:9
Pondoks, institutions for religious education, can be breeding grounds for ideologies
that are dangerous to national security. Therefore, they must be placed under stricter
oversight by government officers. The policy mandating the registration of pondoks
in 1966 has not achieved its intended results mainly due to the lack ofcommunication and understanding between officials and the owners of the pondoks.
Some of the pondok owners refused to register for fear that the government would
take over their schools. The document also indicated the government’s concerns
about foreign interference in the pondoks. The behavior of some principals of
pondoks in Yaha district of Yala province raised some suspicion. These principals
were Malays who, unlike other teachers, never stayed permanently in one place but
traveled throughout the four southern provinces to teach at different pondoks.
Moreover, during the seizure of the communist insurgents’ camp in Betong district of
Yala in late 1966, the authorities found a student identification card issued by asuspected pondok. In addition, according to the report a common characteristic of the
pondoks was the insertion of political teaching in the curriculum.

Regarding the popularity of education in the Middle East among Thai Muslims inthe southern provinces, the Ministry of Interior informed the National Security Council
about the progress in implementing policy regarding Muslim students in January 1967 as
follows:10
The fact that Thai Muslims in the southern provinces have increasingly gone to study
in Jeddah or Cairo may have resulted from scholarships from the Arab countries tosponsor young Thai Muslims to pursue secondary and college education in thesecountries. Some Thai Muslim children who accompanied their parents on theirreligious trips to Mecca also used the opportunity to seek their parents’ permission tocontinue their studies in the Arab countries. In response to these cases, the Ministryof Interior has proposed measures to limit scholarships from Arab countries. These
measures were approved by the cabinet in November 1967. The matter is placed
under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which will work in
conjunction with other government agencies on implementing and overseeing thefollowing measures:
1. All embassies and consulates must be informed of the new rule that requires themto report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the offering of scholarships to Thai
students and the importation of instructors to teach in Thailand;
2. Any associations or private organizations applying for scholarships from foreignsources must seek approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
3. When an individual applies for or receives a foreign scholarship that may carry
political implications, the Office of the Civil Service Commission and theDepartment of Technical and Economic Cooperation must bring the case to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for consultation; and 22 

4. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requires Thai embassies and consulates to oversee
Thai scholarship students and report to the department’s news office. Regarding Thai
Muslim children remaining in the Middle East for school after accompanying theirparents to Mecca, the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with the Police Department,
requires those wishing to travel to Mecca to meet certain qualifications as apreventative measure.

The above report by the Ministry of Interior demonstrates that the policy prescribedby the National Security Council was implemented by the related departments throughmeasures devised in accordance with the cabinet’s resolution.
In 1969, the National Security Council and the government approved a policy thatwould remain in effect until 1973. This policy, by drawing connections between the
military and educational dimensions, marked the beginning of the multi-faceted
consideration of problems in the south. Before going into the details of the policy of 1969,
it is important to understand the perspectives on the southern problems and theapproaches in analyzing the situation prior to the formulation of this policy. In 1967, agroup of directors and officials in the Office of the National Security Council traveled tothe southern provinces to study the situation. The report from the trip suggests that the
government agencies at the policy level began to view the problems in the southernborder provinces as stemming from a multitude of factors. In contrast to the past where
the problems had been tackled separately, this shift led to a perception of the problems in
broader, interrelated dimensions. The following excerpt from the report reveals the viewson the security problems in the south, which influenced the directions of subsequent
policies.11
Critical spots in the south
The citizens residing in southern Thailand can be categorized into three main groups,
namely Chinese, Malay Muslims, and Buddhist Thais. There are also some Chinese
Muslims, Buddhist Chinese, and Thai Muslims. The Thai government considers
these people Thai citizens because they live in Thailand. A survey shows that the
Malay-speaking Muslims in Thailand’s southern provinces account for more than 80
per cent of the population in the area. This has caused some socio-psychologicalproblems with respect to ethnicity, language, and religion in the region. Moreover,these people live far away from the center of Thai culture and government. Almost
all of the names of the districts, sub-districts, and villages are in the Malay language,
while the Thai authorities in the area are Thai-speaking Buddhists. Suchcontradictory characteristics remain an obstacle to unifying the citizens.
Some observations
Government officials have not made serious and consistent efforts to reach out to thecitizens in the four southern provinces who are of Malay descent and hardly speak
Thai, especially those in the rural areas. The government’s advertisements andcampaigns on psychological warfare have not spread as widely as they should. The
focus should be turned towards the local newspapers or the printed media producedby the government. There should be an increase in the circulation of printed
materials in the villages to counter the current propaganda of enemies, even if thematerials have to be handed out free of charge. Anti-communist messages broadcast
on the radio in this area should not be the same as those in the central region because
the population in this area does not yet have much understanding of the issue. The

 23 

matter concerning the local radio station broadcasting in the Malay language should
be given further consideration….
The implementation of development programs in the south under the Central
Directing Center for National Security has been effective in reaching the rural
population, but should be expanded to target the sensitive area. After a certain periodof time, the job should be handed over to the local authorities. It is not advisable forthe taskforce of the Central Directing Center for National Security to remain in one
place for a long time because that can lead to the ineffectiveness and boredom of themembers of the taskforce who have less duties to perform….
The speedy and effective implementation of the programs to improve the well-beingof the people, the communications, especially between the rural and urban areas, thenumber of elementary schools and teachers, and the public health is necessary.
Moreover, there should be measures to enhance the efficiency and qualifications of
the local authorities.

Policy on stability and security, 1969
In late 1969, the National Security Council and the cabinet approved anothersecurity policy on the southern border provinces after the two issue-based policies of1966. The “Policy on the stability and security of the southern border provinces” marked
the beginning of referring to the problematic areas as “the southern border provinces,”
instead of just “the southern provinces” used in previous policies. This change indicatedthat the security agencies had narrowed down the scope of the policy to address problems
in the areas adjacent to the Malaysian border.
There were two consecutive policies on the stability and security of the southernborder provinces. The first went into effect following the cabinet’s approval on 18
November 1969, and remained in use until early 1974, when it was replaced by thesecond. The contents of the 1969 policy focused on three aspects, as follows:12
Suppression. The number of soldiers and police will be raised to the same level asthat of the counter-insurgent force in the northeast. The focus is on the prevention offoreign-supported insurgencies and infiltrations and the more efficient use of news
and intelligence to target the separatist movement, communist terrorists, and Malay
communist guerillas. In the area of government, it is imperative to improve theperformance of public officials and punish those whose conduct has caused
grievances among the people. In addition, the authorities must instill a sense of
loyalty to the nation and the king into the Thai Muslims….
Development. Due to the lack of foreign assistance (unlike other regions) and theinadequate budget for development projects proposed by the Committee to Develop
the South, it is advisable to give priority to development programs that have direct
political impact on the people….
Education. It is crucial to have a project aimed at reforming education in the four
southern border provinces. A study must be conducted to determine why the majorityof the people in the area prefer not to speak or learn the Thai language, and find asolution immediately. The prevailing attitude is based on a misconception thatlearning and speaking Thai is a form of religious misconduct. Other issues include
the lack of schools and teachers in the rural areas, lack of support for the education

 24 

of adults, the Thai Muslims’ preference to send their children to pursue religious
studies abroad, and the effective dissemination of information in the area.

The contents of the 1969 policy show that the government directed efforts on
counter-communism and counter-terrorism in areas close to the Thai-Malaysian border.
For areas further from the border, emphasis was on the development of infrastructure thatwould have a direct impact on the population and on the presence of government officials
in the areas. At the same time, the government also stressed the importance of the cultural
assimilation of Thai Muslims through learning and speaking the Thai language.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee in the Office of the Prime Minister held ameeting in September 1972 to evaluate the implementation of the government’s policy on
the southern border provinces. 13 The report from the meeting assessed the situation
regarding the separatist movement and the implementation of the government’s policies
on the security in the southern border provinces between 1966 and 1969. The important
points of the document are as follows:14
The policy to transform the pondoks into private schools. Since 1966, the conversionof pondoks into private schools that teach the Islamic religion has not been very
successful. The reason was the lack of coordination between local officials of the
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Education, who avoided taking responsibility
by passing the buck to each other. The fact that senior local officials did not give
much attention to the problem made junior officials who were aware of the issue dothe same. Moreover, the owners of the pondoks were not willing to convert theirschools into private schools because doing so would affect their income andinfluence. Some owners feared that once their schools were placed under thesupervision of the authorities, their freedom in running their own schools would be
reduced. As a result, these owners often stood in the way of the assistant teachers
sent by the government to teach the Thai language. They also refused to appear atmeetings with government authorities and ignored the teaching of mandatory generalsubjects. These problems illustrated the ineffectiveness of the policy. New pondoks
are established illegally all the time, especially in remote areas. As for theregistration of the existing pondoks, the majority of them have not yet registered in
1970.
The policy to steer the Thai Muslim children away from going to study in theneighboring countries and the Middle East. The establishment of the teacher’scollege in Yala province and the founding of Songkhla Nakharin University campus
in Pattani province have boosted the interest in education among the Thai Muslims.
This also has contributed to an increase in the enrollments of Thai Muslim children
in elementary and secondary schools. Moreover, the government offers special
privileges for Thai Muslims who wish to enroll in public institutions. They are notrequired to take the entrance examination and are eligible for scholarships. The
purpose of these privileges is to encourage the learning and speaking of Thai among
Muslims. However, there are some important factors behind the Thai Muslims’
inclination to send their children to study in Kelantan state, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
These factors include religious and nationalistic considerations, propaganda by theseparatist movement and foreign countries, and the underdeveloped educational
management in the four southern border provinces.

In addition, the report also indicated that once Thai Muslims began sending theirchildren to study in government institutions, they were faced with the problem of 25 

insufficient Thai teachers and facilities to support the increase in the enrollment of
Muslim students.
Reform in government. Bribery is a main cause for citizens, both Buddhists andMuslims, distancing themselves from public authorities. It also has led to the
Muslims’ resentment and rejection of the Thai state. The operations in counterinsurgency have not been very effective due to the lack of manpower and equipment.
Information is difficult to obtain because the people are not willing to cooperate withthe authorities….
Economic improvement. The main source of income for the population in the area
comes from rubber plantations. A fall in the price of rubber results in a decrease inpeople’s income. In contrast to the Malaysian government’s immediate response, theThai government has not been able to take care of this problem. Furthermore, inspite of the considerable improvements in local roads, the insufficient network ofservice roads and inconvenient transportation system remain a problem. The people
in the area have been using these two issues to compare their situation with those of
the Malaysians and the other regions in Thailand….
Socio-psychological improvements. The policy to promote knowledge of the Thai
language among Thai Muslims has not been very effective. In spite of the policy, thestaff at the local public radio station still broadcast programs in Malay without muchsupervision. The Malaysian television network also has more influence on Thai
Muslims compared to its Thai counterpart in terms of the quality of the programsand the language, which most people understand….
Prevention of foreign-supported infiltrations and subversion. It is still difficult toprevent infiltration and subversion instigated by foreigners. Located by the sea andadjacent to the Thai-Malaysian border, the area can be accessed easily by infiltrators.
In addition, the scope of the operations of the Thai Intelligence Agency is not wideranging. The lack of coordination between the staff at the operational level also has
resulted in the failure to detect the movement of enemies in a timely fashion….
Religious reform. The “Thammajarik Islam” project carried out by the Ministry ofInterior according to the cabinet’s resolution of May 1970 has achieved somepositive results in providing correct religious knowledge to the Thai Muslims.

In 1973, the cabinet agreed on the National Security Council’s recommendations
regarding the Ministry of Education’s proposal for educational reform, namely an
extension of the policy to convert the pondoks into Islamic private schools. The policy
proposal called for close cooperation between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of
Education in overseeing the registration of pondoks as well as a sufficient budget to
upgrade Islamic private schools. The Ministry of Education was entrusted with
implementing the reform, which would be carried out on a three-year or five-year plan in
conjunction with the educational reform project of the Ministry of Interior, the National
Social and Economic Development Plan, and the National Education Plan.
It can be concluded that the security policies on the southern border provinces
between 1966 and 1973 placed great emphasis on education and socio-psychologicalwork. This can be seen in the efforts to create a sense of belonging to the Thai nation
among the Muslims through learning and understanding Thai, which were undertaken
concurrently with the suppression of terrorist groups, prevention of infiltration andsubversion, and economic development. Nevertheless, what was missing in these policies, 26 

but had figured most prominently during the reigns of Kings Rama V and VI as seen in
the Regulations for the Governing of the Seven Provinces of 1897, was the respect forreligious and cultural identities. The acceptance, honoring, and non-discriminatory
treatment of Thai Muslims did not form the basis of policies in the period between 1966
and 1973. Instead, policies were geared towards strengthening the state’s power throughthe strict regulation of religious education, prevention of foreign influence on thereligious beliefs and ideology of the local people, especially youth, and the suppressionof terrorist and separatist groups.

First phase, 1974–7
During the four years between 1974 and 1977, the National Security Council issued
three national security policies with regards to the southern border provinces. Comparedto other periods, this phase witnessed the highest number of policies in use. Moreover,there were also executive orders and attempts by the prime minister to form dialogues
with the Malaysian leader on the problems. This flurry of policy-making came aboutbecause the southern border provinces and other regions of the country were underwidespread communist attacks. In the case of the southern border provinces, the nature of
the violence was complicated by proximity to Malaysia. The major players included
Malay communist insurgents, southern communist insurgents, and terrorist or separatistgroups.
National policy on stability and security in the southern border provinces (1974)
The policy of 1974 was a continuation of the policy in 1969 that went by the same
name. On the whole, the two policies shared similar contents and points of emphasis. Oneof the new features in the 1974 policy was the promotion of unity in the problem-solving
operations of the government agencies by putting the officials in charge under the sameunit. Another important feature was the attempt to persuade key members of theinsurgencies to cooperate with the authorities. The policy also recommended an initiative
to form good rapport with foreign governments as a means to dissuade them from lending
assistance to insurgent and terrorist groups. The main points of the policy included:15
Speed up the suppression of insurgent and terrorist groups. Increase the number ofofficers and use immediate and decisive measures in executing tasks in order tosupport the goals of development work.
Induce the key players who are involved in the unrest like Pohsu16 to cooperate withthe authorities. Make every effort to weaken the force and influence of terroristgroups.…
Form an understanding with governments of nations that have provided support tothe terrorist groups in the area. This is because some might have misunderstood theThai government’s treatment of the Muslims. At the same time, keep track ofstudents and pilgrims traveling overseas as well as use psychological publicity togive them a correct understanding.

In 1975, the prime minister M.R. Kukrit Pramoj issued an executive order toestablish the Peace-Keeping Division for the Southern Border Provinces. He appointed
Lieutenant General San Jitpatima, Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Army Division, as 27 

director of the new division. Under the director’s command were the deputy commanderof the Provincial Police, the deputy commander of the Border Patrol Police, thegovernors of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces, the commander of the Fourth
Division of the Border Patrol Police, and the commander of the Ninth Division of theProvincial Police. The executive order provided the director with authority to deploy
civilian, police, and military forces to solve problems related to the security of Yala,
Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces. The director also had the power to recommend theappointment and transfer of public officials in these provinces for the prime minister’s
approval. The new peace-keeping division served as a mechanism to unify the operationsof the various government agencies under the same taskforce and leadership. Prior to thisexecutive order, the government body responsible for suppression was the Office ofInternal Security. The decision to form a separate peace-keeping division for the southernborder provinces probably reflected the intensified situation in the area and the lack ofunity among local agencies in charge of the operations.
Shortly after the creation of the Peace-Keeping Division for the Southern Border
Provinces on 6 October 1975, the National Security Council on 17 October agreed onpolicy specifically designed to tackle terrorism in the southern border provinces and put
the director of the Division in charge of implementation.
Policy on terrorism in the southern border provinces, 1975
The main points of the policy are as follows:17
Immediate and complete suppression is required as a measure of expediency because
if the situation is left unresolved, it will become more difficult to find a solution. It isnecessary to increase the number of soldiers to complement the efforts of the police
and administrative officials, all of which will be under the command of the directorof the Peace-Keeping Division in the Southern Border Provinces. The budget mustbe raised in response to the deficiencies in weapons, equipment, and transportation
vehicles, as well as the delay in the payment of the officers’ salaries. The officers
working in the hostile areas also should be paid at a higher rate than those in normal
areas that have no incidents.

In addition to the use of force in controlling terrorism and the creation of unity
between civilians, police, and soldiers, this policy was the first to take into account the
morale of officers operating in the dangerous environment. The salary incentive hascontinued to the present, but remains a contentious subject for officers who feel that they
are risking their lives and deserve the pay increment. The issue has had some adverse
effects on cooperation between officers in the area.
The outcome of the Policy on the Stability and Security of the Southern Border
Provinces of 1974, which paved the way for contact with key players in the terroristgroups, resulted from the collective effort of several individuals. Most prominent was thedeputy minister of interior, Police Lieutenant Colonel Boonlert Lertpreecha, who took thelead role in convincing Pohsu Medisa and his men to give in to the authorities. In late1975, the National Security Council responded to an inquiry made by the director of thePeace-Keeping Division in the Southern Border Provinces about the guidelines forprosecuting those who had negotiated with Boonlert. This response demonstrates thatpolicy was aimed at aggressively destroying the structure of terrorist groups. In thisdocument, prime minister Kukrit established the ground rules as follows:18

 28 

- No problem for individuals without incriminating evidence (do notprosecute)- The individuals with arrest warrants must be prosecuted by law, but given thelightest sentence if found guilty. This is to show compassion towards those who haverepented and turned themselves over to the authorities.

Policy to solve the security problems in the southern border provinces, 1975
In late 1975, the secretary general of the National Security Council and hiscolleagues made a trip to study the situation in the southern border provinces. The reporton the trip, submitted to prime minister Kukrit in early December of that year,
illuminated the perspectives of officials in the policy units on security problems in thearea. Thanks to the report, the prime minister ordered that the matter be discussed in themeeting of the National Security Council, which led to the launch of another policy three
weeks later.
The views of the National Security Council officials in the report had a direct
impact on the new policy:19
Problems related to the misconduct of police and administrative officials such as
corruption, trade in contraband, and oppression have caused the people’s sufferingand provided conditions for the communist terrorists to attack the government andsolicit support from the people. Those found guilty of misconduct must be relocatedout of the area and punished severely.
The intelligence system of the area is not effective enough to benefit the
government’s operations, and must be improved immediately.
At present, coordination between the administrative branch, police, and army is at alow level. Mostly, operations are carried out separately in different directions. This
must be changed.
Another important issue to report here, based on the statements of several highranking officials in their conversations with the secretary of the National Security
Council, is that the personnel of every agency in the provinces as well as the citizens
are looking up to Bangkok as the center and model in performing their jobs,
especially in terms of law enforcement. These people believe that Bangkok’scommitment will reassure and encourage them to keep the provinces safe and secureaccording to the law. This matter deserves the attention of government departments
in Bangkok, which should consider appropriate measures to set and maintain a good
example.

The seven issues covered by the policy to solve the security problems in thesouthern border provinces of 1975 are as follows:20
Relocate and severely punish officers and officials engaged in corruption, trade incontraband, oppression, and causing suffering to the people.
Rethink the preventive and corrective measures to meet the situation where
communist terrorists have exerted increasing influence in the villages in the south.
Switch from the use of large forces to undertake operations to continuous use ofsmall patrolling units to pursue and eradicate the terrorists.
Upgrade the intelligence system to make it more effective.

 29 

Promote more coordination between the administrative branch, police, and army.
Have the Committee on the Thai-Malaysian Border meet with the Malaysian
authorities for assistance and cooperation with regard to terrorists smuggling in andout of Malaysia. Expand the agreement on cooperation in preventing andsuppressing crimes in the border area. Use a gentle approach in dealing with
Malaysia, and aim at the high politics. Convince the Malaysians that their future
security also depends on the security of Thailand.
Prioritize the urgency of projects in social and economic development. Consider thepriorities along with timing of the work in the area of suppression.
Appoint an official from the Department of Public Relations to the Committee on the
Security of the Southern Border Provinces for the purpose of accurate, immediate,and consistent public relations.

After the policy of 1975 took effect, prime minister Kukrit went on a tour ofinspection in the south from 29 January to 1 February 1976. He gave several speeches on
the policy to administrative officials and soldiers in Pattani, Narathiwat, and Songkhla
provinces. Kukrit also spoke to the citizens via radio and television broadcast on Channel
10 Hat Yai on eight occasions. The Office of Task Coordination, Department of
Administration, produced a summary of the prime minister’s speeches on his
government’s public administration policy. The key points are as follows:21
Peace-keeping
The Kingdom of Thailand is a united entity that cannot be separated.
The government wants peace in the southern border provinces. The soldiers assigned
to the area are considered the keepers of peace, territorial integrity, and power of theking. Therefore, the government will not withdraw troops from the area.
The methods used in suppression should not be exceedingly violent or out of
proportion to the acts of crime (oppression of the citizens). Otherwise, there will be
more dangers in the forms of secret assistance from Islamic countries that
sympathize with the terrorists or the investigation of the matter by the United
Nations. Exercise caution.
Beware of the influence and interference of international communist movements that
could complicate the problems in the southern border provinces and cause unrest.
Social aspects
All sides must face and accept the reality that the population in the southern borderprovinces consists of two different demographic groups, namely Thai Muslims andThai Buddhists. Each group has its own unique identity.
All sides, including the government, must respect one another’s differences.
With the differences in mind, the government should avoid any attempt to lessen
these differences. Failure to do so can result in disunity and retaliation because thepeople do not want to give up their identities (such as language and dress code).
It is essential to make the two sides appreciate each other’s differences and realizethat these differences should not be a divisive issue.
The government will treat all citizens in the country equally and will not grant any
special privileges to any provinces or the south in particular, but the citizens of 30 

Thailand in general (nobody is above anybody else). This means that everyone has
equal rights in education, and that the government will not endorse a special
treatment of anyone and will put an end to existing privileges to ensure equality. At
the same time, the government will compensate for the loss of special privileges in
education through the improvement of all pre-college institutions to extend
opportunities for all citizens in the south regardless of ethnicity or religion.
The government will adhere to freedom of religion as guaranteed by the constitution.
Citizens are free to choose their religion, and the government will not restrict that
freedom, or induce them to do anything against their religious beliefs and customs.
As for the religious schools or pondoks, the government will not get involved,
influence, modify, or interfere to the effect of turning them into private or other typesof schools. When the purpose of the pondoks is for religious education, thegovernment will support them to focus only on religious teaching. For all other areasof education, whether secondary or vocational studies, the government will establish
separate schools.
The government will promote pre-college education in the southern border provincesby expanding and raising the standard of both the secondary and vocational
institutions. This will create opportunities for youths to receive education and work
their way into college and employment after graduation.
Economic aspects
The government, through the administrative agencies, will speed up the social andeconomic development in the southern border provinces immediately by targeting
goals that can be achieved in a relatively short period.
Economic development will focus on the citizens’ livelihood by supporting existingjobs and creating new ones in the areas of agriculture, fishery, and industry.
Government
The people in the southern border provinces who were born in Thailand, whether
they are minorities, majorities, or of any religious and ethnic backgrounds, areconsidered Thai nationals and entitled to all the rights and freedom described in theconstitution.
Civil servants
The selection criteria for civil servants will be based on integrity, morality,
compassion, and ability to work efficiently for the benefit of the people in the area.
A major problem is the civil servants who are transferred from the center to the area.
Their attitudes should be adjusted accordingly.
Efforts must be made to encourage citizens to cooperate with the authorities and thegovernment in the public interest.

On the issues concerning Malaysia in the policy of 1975, prime minister Kukrit met
with Malaysian prime minister, Dato Hussein Onn, on 12 February 1976, at Rincome
Hotel in Chiang Mai. Although the meeting covered several other important subjects,
only those related to the problems in the southern border provinces will be discussed
here:22
Prime minister Kukrit said that regarding the problems of the minorities, the Thaigovernment did not suspect any involvement of the Malaysian government. However, 31 

the local authorities speculated that there might have been some forms of support
from certain members of the Malaysian government, which could have been more of
moral support rather than direct support. It was necessary for all the authorities
involved to have correct understanding of this issue.
The problems with the Chinese communist insurgents should be deliberated
separately in the forum of the Committee on the Thai-Malaysian Border. Thailand
had some incidents with minorities along its borders with Myanmar, Laos, andCambodia, where some minorities and authorities had been involved without theknowledge of the Thai government. Out of concern over the situation, the Thaigovernment arranged for the departure of former prime minister of Myanmar, U Nu,
from Thailand. Regarding Cambodia, the Thai government did the same for In Tam.
Several Laotian leaders who had been in exile in Thailand were also asked to leave
the country or to move away from the Thai-Laotian border. Although the situation
had improved, the Thai government still had to deal with problems of refugees fromneighboring countries from time to time….
Prime minister Dato Hussein Onn stated that Malaysia pledged through words andactions that it would not interfere with the internal affairs of Thailand. While there
was a strong commitment to this pledge at the government level, it was still difficult
to achieve that at lower levels because some people showed their sympathy towards
the minorities. Nevertheless, the Malaysian government would do everything in its
power to exercise control over the matter and pacify the situation in the event ofunrest. Malaysia did not wish to cause any worries for Thailand or for itself overthese problems. It was therefore necessary to consider the mechanism to solve them.
Malaysia had nothing to hide; and all the issues would be brought eventually to theirconclusions….
Prime minister Kukrit said that Thailand had faith in the good will and honor of
Malaysia and would not do anything that could lead to a misunderstanding between
the two countries.

The exchange between the two leaders illustrates their open and sincere
conversation on the issues. The close relationship between the two yielded some positive
results. Thailand subsequently played an important role in peacefully resolving andending the problems of the Malay communists through the three-way negotiations
consisting of representatives from Malaysia, the Malay communist insurgents, andThailand. It was not surprising that in 1993 Tansri Rahim, Commissioner of the
Malaysian Police Department, met with high-ranking officials in Thailand to offer
assistance in solving problems of terrorism in the southern border provinces in return forThai help with problems of the Malay communists. The offer was accepted by the Thais,but the work progressed slowly due to the subsequent change in the policy of the army incharge of the south.
The policy to solve the problems in the southern border provinces of 1975 remainedin effect until 1977, when a new policy was launched.

Second phase, 1978–98
There were three national security policies on the southern border provinces in the
period between 1978 and 1998. In contrast to those in the first phase, the policies in thesecond phase contained clear objectives, tackled security problems in broader dimensions,and promoted the coordination of the work of local government agencies. It was also the 32 

first time that the administration of the southern border provinces was delegated to twolevels, namely the national and local levels. At the national level, the prime minister took
direct responsibility and was assisted by the Office of the National Security Council,
which prepared the details for the prime minister and coordinated policy tasks. At the
local level, the commander of the Fourth Army Division was in charge. The Southern
Border Provinces Administration Center was established to oversee the civilian work andcoordinate local administrative tasks. The Directing Center for the Forty-Third Combined
Police and Army Forces was entrusted with the suppression of all forms of terrorism.
National policy on the southern border provinces of 1978
Approved by the cabinet on 24 January 1978, the policy’s objectives and main
focus were as follows:23
Objectives
Encourage the local citizens, especially youths, to learn and speak Thai. Build up the
people’s confidence in the government and the main institutions of the nation anddissuade them from using religious differences as a divisive issue.
Raise the income level of the local citizens to prevent crime and all kinds of threats.
Form a better rapport with Islamic nations regarding the current conditions of Thai
Muslims. Provide these countries with information about government policy and ask
them not to support terrorists. Increase the efficiency of operations to solve theproblems in the southern border provinces….
Policy prescriptions
Socio-psychological aspect: Quicken the pace of work to popularize the learning andspeaking of Thai among young Muslims. Encourage them to enroll in secondary andvocational schools by offering them special quotas to these institutions. Increase thestudy of general subjects in the private schools that were converted from pondoks.
Build up trust between the government and the people to steer youths away fromjoining the movement, with particular attention to those going to Islamic countries
for study or pilgrimage.
Local politics: Encourage Thai Muslims to participate in local government and voice
their opinions on problems. Carefully select officials to work in the area and makesure that they treat Thai Muslims with fairness. Persuade key persons involved in theunrest to cooperate with the government. Improve local administration throughnational and local mechanisms, which will work together to oversee the coordinationof the policy tasks.
Foreign relations: Work with Malaysia, Indonesia, and other Islamic countries toprevent terrorism through international politics. Form a good rapport with Islamic
countries in order to bring about solutions to problems in the southern borderprovinces.
Economic aspect: Speed up the broadening of the economic base by increasing
production, expanding the job market, and raising the income level of Thai Muslims.
Extend the provincial highways and rural roads and maintain them in good condition
in all seasons for economic and counter-terrorist purposes.

 33 

National defense: Increase the forces of the Fourth Army Division to suppress
terrorism with a focus on large local operations and support the organization ofparamilitary forces. Encourage citizens to cooperate with the authorities in collecting
news and information and preventing terrorist attacks.

It can be concluded that the policy of 1978 put great weight on counter-terrorism
and peace-keeping. It began to promote the participation of Thai Muslims in terms ofproblem-solving and economic and infrastructural developments. The policy also aimed
at building up a positive attitude and attachment to Thai citizenship among local people.
To implement the policy, the prime minister, General Prem Tinsulanonda, signed
Executive Order No. 8/2524 on the improvement of administration in the southern borderprovinces. The executive order resulted in the founding of the Southern Border Provinces
Administration Center and the Directing Center for the Forty-third Combined Police andArmy Forces described above. This policy remained in use for ten years before a newpolicy came into effect in 1988. During the ten years of the policy’s implementation, theobvious strengths of the policy lay in the operations carried out by the Southern Border
Provinces Administration Center and the Directing Center for the Forty-third Combined
Police and Army Forces. The two agencies helped bridge the gap in the coordination of
local government operations and had an emotional impact on Thai Muslims. This isparticularly true because the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center gavepriority to the participation of religious and local leaders as well as Thai Muslim scholars
in the development of problem-solving approaches in the southern border provinces.
National security policy on the southern border provinces of 1988
The cabinet approved the policy on 8 November 1988. The timeframe for thispolicy was set for five years (1988–1992) as a result of the revision of the policy of 1978
and the changed circumstances. In fact the policy was not superseded until 1994.
The objectives and contents of the policy of 1988 were as follows:24
Objectives. Spread the learning and speaking of Thai among Muslims. Increase theopenness of the Muslims’ society and make all sides appreciate cultural differences.
Include the Muslims’ leaders in the problem-solving process. Work with moderate
Islamic countries in stemming the influence of fundamentalists. Raise the standard ofliving of the people. Keep the area safe from all forms of terrorist acts and threats….
Policy prescriptions. Policies can be divided into six categories. The main points ofthese policies are to some extent the continuation of the policy in 1978.
Socio-psychological aspect: The focus still remains the learning and speaking ofThai as well as secondary and vocational education.
Politics: Take into account Muslim leaders in government efforts to solve problems
and bring about social development. Enhance cooperation with moderate Muslims.
Respect peaceful demands for rights but reject the use of violence or threats indemands. Contain the spread of divisive ideology. Improve the civil service system
as well as the civil servants in order to maximize efficiency and reach more people.
The civil servants must understand the social conditions and religious beliefs of the
population in the area.

 34 

Foreign relations: Work with friendly countries, especially Malaysia and Indonesia,
to contain the terrorist movements and the spread of radical ideology at theinternational level.
Economic aspect: Channel efforts into expanding the economic bases in industry andservices. Coordinate development plans among all the agencies. Support the
openness of society.
Peace-keeping: Focus on aggressive political work and put military pressure on
targeted terrorist groups and Malay communists. Persuade the terrorists to surrenderand join the effort in developing the Thai nation instead. Maintain the prevention andsuppression of terrorism. Cut the support from both inside and outside of the country
to isolate terrorists.

The implementation of the policy during the period 1988–94 succeeded in creating
understanding and reducing the distrust between public officials and Thai Muslims to asatisfactory degree. The major strength still lay in the Southern Border Provinces
Administration Center, which achieved concrete results in enhancing the people’s
participation in the development and problem-solving processes through the creation of
the Advisory Committee. The membership of the committee included religious leadersand scholars whom the local people respected. As for the suppression of terrorist groups,
the government managed to weaken terrorist groups to the point where they lost thecapacity to initiate any large attacks on government forces. Nevertheless, the problems ofterrorism remained. The portion of the policy that did not see much progress was the aim
to bring about unity in the thinking of officials in charge of the operations.
National security policy on the southern border provinces of 1994
Approved by the cabinet on 7 June 1994, this policy also was set for a five-year
timeframe. This time the emphasis was on the economic development in the area because
it was determined that the economy was a powerful tool for solving the problems andstrengthening society. The objectives and the important issues included:25
Objectives. Stress the importance of development in the economy and other areas,
which must be balanced with the promotion of local cultural identity. Build good
relations between officials and citizens. Allow the people to participate more insolving their problems. Keep the citizens safe from terrorist threats. Make Muslim
nations understand and cooperate with Thailand in finding constructive solutions toproblems….
Policy prescriptions. Policies are devised to meet fifteen objectives. In economic
development, promote and facilitate trade and investment in the area, especially by
improving transportation, communication, and government services. In the sociopsychological area, increase the participation of religious organizations, scholars,
and local political sector in the planning of human resources and improvement ofquality of life and livelihood. Narrow the gap in the use of language incommunication between citizens and government agencies by supporting thelearning of each other’s languages. In terms of government and administration,
reform the civil service in order to make it dependable for the citizens instead ofbeing an institution that creates conditions for social conflict. Promote cooperation
between the government sector and the people, especially in local administration.
Focus on upgrading the whole intelligence system to provide for the immediate and 35 

timely use of information for peace-keeping. Improve border defense, suppression ofterrorism, and mechanisms to defend rural communities. Use tactics to pressure andsuppress along with political measures to allow the terrorists to return to live
peacefully in society. In the area of foreign relations, enhance the degree of relations
and cooperation in politics, economics, and society with Islamic nations. Increase theefficiency of local working units in communicating and cooperating withneighboring countries for the development of the area.

In 1996, there was a proposal to reorganize the structure of the agencies responsiblefor directing and coordinating policies at the local level. This was the result of theabrogation of the Internal Peace-Keeping Act of 1974, which ended the authority of the
Commander of the Fourth Army Division as the Director of Internal Peace-Keeping. The
government then issued Executive Order No. 36/2537 on reforming the administration of
the southern border provinces. The order divided the administration of the area into twoparts, namely the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center, responsible forcivilian development work, and the Directing Center for the Forty-third Combined Policeand Army Forces, in charge of suppressing all kinds of terrorism. During the period of
this policy, when the focus was on economic development as the driving force behind thesolutions to the problems, the concrete achievement was the joint economic development
project between Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, known as the Indonesia-MalaysiaThailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT). The project enjoyed some success in stimulating
investment and development before it slowed down as a result of the Asian economiccrisis of 1997. Since then, the IMT-GT has not made any impressive progress. The newissue that was added to the agenda for the southern border provinces during this time wasnarcotics. Terrorism was controlled to some extent, but remained a problem.

Third phase, 1999–2003
This phase saw the most recent national security policy on the southern borderprovinces. After this policy’s expiry in 2003, the southern border provinces along withsome portions of Songkhla province have been the targets of periodic unrests and violent
attacks well into the present. In light of these circumstances, the government has assumed
direct responsibility in dealing with the issue and bypassed the mechanisms of the
National Security Council in contrast to the practice in previous periods. As aconsequence, there has not been any new proposal on national security policy for thesouthern border provinces other than policy directly designed by the government.
The policy between 1999 and 2003 differed from the previous policies in terms of
the process in devising the policy, which emphasized participation and a vision forcollective efforts and aspirations in creating stability in the area. The contents of thepolicy are as follows:26
Vision of the solutions to the problems in the southern border provinces: Everyone in
the area is able to live peacefully in accordance with their religious and cultural
identities. This should be especially true for the majority of the population in the area,
the Thai Muslims, who will “live as Muslims in Thai society.”
Everyone appreciates cultural diversity as a force and source of wisdom for peace,stability, and sustainable development. The powerful impact of diversity also
provides the path to the constructive relations and joint efforts in the area ofdevelopment with neighboring countries and Muslim communities.

 36 

The citizens in the area have the opportunity to take part in the problem-solving
process and development. All sides work together to safeguard the way of life of themembers of the society against external pressure.

In addition, the perspectives on the problems and the thinking process in theformulation of the policy were distinctive. They can be summarized as follows.
Thought process
All the previous proposals of the national security policy for the southern borderprovinces emphasized problem analysis and approached the problems based on theirpriorities. Policies were designed for coordinated and mutually supportive solutions to allof the problems.
The thought process behind the policy of 1999–2003 originated from theconclusion of everyone involved that the strategy in formulating the policy should be
integrated, considering all the factors as interrelated and tackling all the problems at thesame time in a coordinated and consistent manner for permanent results.
Policy-devising process
The Office of the National Security Council compiled information including
follow-ups and evaluations of government agencies responsible for implementation ofpolicies, suggestions from all local agencies in charge of operations, and results ofseminars held by public, private, and citizen sectors to assess and examine policy issues.
The Office stressed the importance of broad participation by all segments in expressing
their opinions and critiques on policy issues in all stages of policy formulation.
The policy of 1999-2003 consisted of three main objectives and nineteen policy
prescriptions. The main points are as follows:27
Objectives
Develop the capacities of society and its members to cope with social changes.
Emphasize human equality, coexistence amidst cultural diversity, and the ability touse diversity as the driving force in solving problems. Create an environment
conducive to the development of the people’s and society’s capacities by improving
all aspects of the environment to pave the way for such development. Cultural
diversity and local wisdom must be taken into account to enable people’s
participation in problem-solving and development. Use cultural dynamics as aconstructive force in dealing with social conflicts and keeping the society safe,
peaceful, and free of violence….
Contents of the policy
The policy to develop the capacities of society and its people focuses on improving
the knowledge and understanding of all segments so that they can appreciate thevalue of cultural diversity and local wisdom, and cooperate with one another.
Scholars and youths should be the main actors in problem-solving and development.
Improve the quality of personnel to make them suitable for the tasks in the southernborder provinces.
The policy to create an environment conducive to the development of the society andits people emphasizes the protection and promotion of the people’s way of life, 37 

livelihood, religious practices, and good relations with neighboring countries and theMuslim world. The official rules and regulations must be adjusted in accordancewith the way of life of citizens. Efforts must be made to produce educational
curricula, including at university level, that suit the people’s way of life.
The policy to enhance participation in problem-solving and development stresses thesignificance of the roles and cooperation of all social segments in areas such as
natural resources management and environment. It also promotes the strengths andefforts of families and communities in working together. Drug problems must be
solved by creating immunity for youths and setting up a network of cooperation
between homes, schools, and mosques to prevent drug use and assist the addictedwith rehabilitation.

The policy received a favorable response from local people because they had taken
part in its formulation and felt that they owned it. Moreover, the policy was translated
into Jawi-scripted Malay, standard Malay (Rumi), and English for public distribution.
During the policy period between 1999 and 2002, conditions in the southern borderprovinces were relatively peaceful. Although there were some incidents of terrorism,
these were not as violent or damaging as before. However, the situation became more
intense elsewhere in the region, especially in the Philippines and Indonesia. At the sametime, regional terrorist groups had spread into Singapore, Malaysia, and southern
Thailand. Nevertheless, this had not yet caused any rise of violence in the southern borderprovinces.
A major change in the administration of the southern border provinces took place in
2002, when the Southern Border Provinces Administration Center was dissolved by thegovernment so that the provinces would be administered through the regularadministrative channels. The work of the Center was delegated to the provinces’administrative bodies. Operations to suppress the terrorist groups and keep peace weretransferred to the Commanding Division of the Ninth Provincial Police. The Fourth Army
Division remained in charge of defending the border and the territory. In January 2004, a
gun robbery took place in the army camp of a Development Soldier Unit in Narathiwat
province and snowballed into a series of violent acts. The government formed the
Directing Committee on Policy and Peace-Keeping, which was an organization at thenational level. The new body was entrusted with devising new policies as well as setting
guidelines and measures to reach solutions. The Directing Bureau of Peace-Keeping in
the Southern Border Provinces was also established to oversee and coordinate all related
work of government agencies in the area. It still remains in operation.

Comparative analysis over the past thirty years
Through all periods, security meant the “defense of the territory,” and the“preservation of the state’s authority,” with Bangkok playing a central role in formulating
and assessing these policies. In the policy of 1999, a change was made to expand themeaning of security to cover the people’s way of life and their participation in policy
making. While the change extended the “ownership” of national security policy to thecitizens, the meaning of “national security” as prescribed in the policy was not always
consistent with what the citizens involved had in mind. This was a factor behind theincrease in violence in the southern border provinces towards the end of the 1999–2003
policy.

 38 

Policies on the southern border provinces prior to 1999 were devised to overcome
the perceived causes of violence in the area. Some policies were designed to overcome aperceived lack of development, and therefore allocated budgets for economic
development and construction of roads. However, problems persisted after muchdevelopment had taken place. As a result, the perceived cause of the problem shifted toexternal influences brought into the area by Thai Muslims who had been educated in the
Middle East and returned home to build up their power and cause trouble. In response,
the policy prescribed several measures to tackle this problem. While each policy was
based on its own rationale, all of them stemmed from the same underlying assumptionthat what was at stake was “the preservation of the state’s power” or “the ability tocontrol violence.”
In 1995, Thailand was in the midst of a fast-paced political reform anddemocratization, which spawned fears of unrest and violence caused by popular protests
against authority. Out of this concern arose an attempt to redefine the meaning of security.
This new perspective on security came at the time of drafting the National Security
Policy on the Southern Border Provinces of 1999–2003. A peace strategy was proposed
as an experimental way to deal with social conflicts in the south. Policy-makers reached
two conclusions on why previous policies had not achieved their intended outcome. The
first failure was “misconception of the problems.” Instead of aiming at “preservation of
the security of local people’s lives,” policies were founded upon an attempt “to preserve
the state’s power.” The second reason for failure was the fact that the policies weredirected from the center.
When the goal was changed to “how to keep the local people’s lives secure,” theprocess in formulating national security policy had to be adjusted accordingly. In order tofind out what caused people in the area to feel insecure, afraid, uncomfortable, anddistrustful of the authorities, the people had to be consulted. Therefore, a new process thatinvolved the people in the policy decision was added, resulting in meetings between
officials and the people, and joint efforts to draft policy proposals.
The new approach concluded there were two main reasons for people’s insecurity
and fear. First, some actions by government agents were seen as unfair by citizens in thearea. In the face of injustice, people felt helpless because they could not respond without
putting themselves at risk of being seen as instigating trouble in the area and challenging
the state’s authority. If they filed a complaint, they would be accused of causing trouble
and suspected of being separatists. The preoccupation with the separatist movement gave
the authorities great latitude in dealing with the people. As a consequence, people felt
oppressed by the unfair treatment of the authorities.
Second, because of their deep-rooted fear of communism, the authorities’ way of
thinking proved difficult to change. Some officials considered the people’s demand fortheir rights and complaints on unfair treatment as evidence of their sympathy with theseparatist movement in spite of the fact that these actions represented politicalparticipation in the democratic system.
At present, ideological conflict at the global level has changed from democracy
versus communism to the West versus the terrorist movements. This has led to a
misconception that people in the southern border provinces have been influenced byexternal factors. For those, especially foreigners, who do not know the history of the areaor understand its issues with the Thai state, the situation in the south as seen in the news 39 

is readily interpreted as related to the international terrorist movement.
The National Security Policy on the Southern Border Provinces of 1999 expressed
concern for youth. The first concern was over their fear caused by the feeling of
helplessness in the face of injustice. The second concern was religion. People in the area
assumed that Thai society did not consider them part of the Thai citizenry because someThais did not accept the different religion and culture of the area.
The policy of 1999 contained three major suggestions. First, stability could beachieved in the south only when Muslims were able to “live as Muslims in Thai society,”
and accepted as equal to any other Thais. This idea had a profound meaning. It assured
them that they had a place to stand in Thai society. The second suggestion was to “turnthe fear of differences into stability based on difference.” It was suggested that thestability of the country would be better bolstered by the appreciation of cultural diversity
rather than assimilation that aimed at making everyone similar. The explanation for thisidea was the fact that diversity provided society with more options to solve its problems
successfully. The third suggestion was that “stability comes from the participation of thepeople.” The people’s sector should be involved in decisions on stability. The issue was
not just the government’s responsibility.
In the follow-up of the policy of 1999, two observations were made. First, someofficials had thought along the same lines as this policy, but had not spoken up because
their opinions were incompatible with mainstream ideas. With the new policy in effect,these officials were able to carry out their tasks more easily. This contributed to thesuccessful implementation of the policy to some extent. Second, at the same time there
were a number of officials who disagreed with this policy and considered it dangerous to
the state’s power. It took some time to convince some of them to change their minds.
However, quite a few maintained their position and refused to comply because there wasno enforcement. The result was a situation where two groups of officials with different
views on policy worked along parallel paths. One group followed the new policy in theirjobs while the other followed the old one. The citizens were the ones to suffer from thisdiscrepancy because they had no way of knowing which group of officials they would be
dealing with. As a consequence, the fear that these people had towards authority persisted.
A lack of unity in solving problems has often been cited as a cause of policy failurein the south. However, when perceived from a different angle, there has been unity in theuse of force and unity of belief about the priority attached to the preservation of thestate’s power. Therefore, the real issue was not a lack of unity, but the fact that unity did
not translate into efforts to enable people to live in peace, which should be the state’s goal.
Using violence to create peace has never succeeded.
There were two factors behind the deteriorating situation in the south from 2003
onwards.
First, some officials disagreed with the National Security Policy because theirdefinition of “national security” was different from that of the policy. As a result, they
deliberately carried out their jobs in direct opposition to the policy.
Second, throughout the five years of the 1999–2003 policy, violence in the south
stemmed from personal conflicts. The use of violence became legitimate in dealing withproblems like narcotics. The position of the state was that the end justified the means,with disregard for the actual impact. It was short-sighted to shoot for a goal without
considering the negative consequences. Concern about drug addiction among youth 40 

warranted some measures to deal with the matter. But it did not warrant the use ofviolence in the society in which the children lived and grew up. If the concern was overyouth in the long run, some serious thought should have been devoted to considering
what kind of society could be created within the framework of the stability strategy.
If the resort to violence is made legitimate, it creates a social environment where
violence becomes the only way to settle conflicts. For example, opinions of people
reported by the media, especially after the “Krue Ze incident,” demonstrated
unprecedented approval of the use of violence. Such approval raised the question whether
Thais were really supportive of violence or there were certain groups trying to create
propaganda by publishing this approval in the media. There is a formula generally used todescribe “Thainess.” This rigid prescription makes the population in the south feel thatthey share no quality of Thainess even though they are citizens of Thailand. Some Thais
are indifferent towards the use of violence against people whom they consider “notThai.” The Thai state perceives itself as a unitary state with ethnic homogeneity, eventhough this is patently not true. In fact, Thailand is a unitary state consisting of different
ethnicities. Several small groups reside along the borders. The largest of these is the
Malay Muslim group in the southern border provinces. In the mid twentieth century, anattempt was begun to unify and assimilate all the various groups. The change of thecountry’s name from Siam to Thailand was emblematic of this policy. At that time somebelieved that national safety and collective defense required all peoples to be united. This
was an attempt to make “other truths” disappear. As a result, people questioned why thosein the south wanted to dress differently and have a different education system. There wasa conviction that everyone in the state had to be the same in order to coexist.
Endnotes
1

The study was based on documents, not interviews. The study of the policy content isstraightforward; the meaning of “national security” in each period has to be inferred; the process ofpolicy-making is difficult to track because of limited data; and evaluations were very unsystematic.
Despite these limitations, this approach helps to explain why policies have failed. The research wasdifficult because the problem is ongoing. Officials were reluctant to talk. Getting access to documents,
even those that are technically declassified, was not simple. The quality and usefulness of suchresearch will improve only when Thai society has greater appreciation of truth and knowledge, when
officials are more willing to discuss their work with outsiders, and when agencies are prepared to
employ researchers who might come up with something new.
2
Rattiya Saleh, ‘Patani darussalam su khwam pen changwat pattani yal lae Narathiwat’ (Pattani
Darusalam: creating the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat), in Silapa watthanatham chabap
phiset History of 3 Southern Border Provinces (Art and Culture Magazine, special edition)(Bangkok:
Matichon, 2004), p. 250.
3
Piyanart Bunnag, Nayobai kan pokkhrong khong rathaban to chao muslim nai changwat
chaidaen phak tai (Policy for governing the Thai Muslims in the southern border provinces, 1932–
1973) (Bangkok: Research Center, Chulalongkorn University, 1991), p. 44.
4
Ministry of Interior, Prarachahatthalekha rachakan thi 5 thi kieo kap pharakit khong krasuang
mahatthai (Royal letters of the Fifth Reign regarding the work of the Ministry of Interior), pp. 419–
420.
5
Piyanart, Nayobai, pp. 283–291.
6
Piyanart, Nayobai, pp. 218–221.

 41 

7

Office of the National Security Council, ‘Ekkasan nayobai khwam mankhong haeng chat rueangnayobai kieo kap pono’ (Document on national security policy regarding pondoks), Cabinet Resolution, 14
June 1966.
8
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Nayobai khwam mankhong haeng chat rueang nayobai
rueang khon thai islam nai 4 changwat phak tai niyom ook pai rian thi jettha ruea khairo mak yingkhuen’ (National security policy regarding the fact that the Thai Muslims in the southern borderprovinces increasingly prefer to study in Jeddah and Cairo), Cabinet Resolution, 14 June 1966.
9
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Raingan kan doenthang pai sueksa sathanakan lae
saphap khwam pen yu doi tua pai khong prachachon nai phak tai’ (Report on the field trip to study thesituation and living conditions of the people living in the south), 21 February 1967.
10
Ministry of Interior, ‘Rueang nayobai khwam mankhong haeng chat’ (Memorandum regarding
the national security policy), to the Office of the National Security Council, 26 January 1967, pp. 1–2.
11
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Raingan kan doenthang.’
12
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Nayobai khwam mankhong plotphai nai changwat
chaidaen phak tai’ (Policy on the stability and security in the southern border provinces), Cabinet
Resolution, 18 November 1969.
13
The Intelligence Advisory Committee undertakes high-level intelligence analysis. The body waschaired by the Director of the National Intelligence Office and comprised of the heads of the security
and news units in the civilian, police, and army sectors. It was replaced by the National Intelligence
Coordinating Center, which has continued the work to the present.
14Intelligence Advisory Committee, Office of the Prime Minister, ‘Kan praman sathanakan rueang
khabuankan bang yaek dindaen’ (Evaluations of the situation regarding the separatist movement),
addendum to ‘Report on the Implementation of the Government Policy,’ pp. 39–44.
15
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Nayobai khwam mankhong haeng chat rueang khwam
mankhong plotphai khong phuen thi changwat chaidaen phak tai’ (National security policy on thestability and security of the southern border provinces), Cabinet Resolution, 9 April 1974.
16
The nom de guerre of a prominent militant at that time.
17
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Nayobai kieo kap sathanakan jon ko kanrai nai
chagwat chaidaen phak tai’ (Policy regarding the terrorist situation in the southern border provinces),
National Security Council Resolution, 17 October 1975.
18
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Panha kieo kap klum jon khao mop tua’ (Problems
regarding the surrendered terrorists), document no. 0404/10513, 14 November 1975.
19
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Rainngan kan doen thang pai sueksa sathanakan naichangwat phak tai’ (Report on the field trip to study the situation in the southern border provinces),
memorandum, document no. 0402/11003, 1 December 1975.
20
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Nayobai kaekhai panha khwam mankhong naichangwat phak tai’ (Policy to solve the security problems in the southern provinces), National Security
Council Resolution, 29 December 1975.
21
Office of Task Coordination, Department of Administration, ‘Ekkasan srup kham prasrai khongphan nayok rathamontri nai okat doen thang pai truat rachakan phak tai’ (Summary of the prime
minister’s speeches during his trip to the south) between 29 January and 1 February 1976.
22
Transcripts of the conversations between prime minister M.R. Kukrit Pramoj and Malaysian
prime minister, Dato Hussein Onn at Rincome Hotel, Mueang district, Chiang Mai province, 12February 1976.
23
Office of National Security Council, ‘Nayobai khwam mankhong haeng chat kieoo kapchangwat chaidaen phak tai (National security policy on the southern border provinces)’, Cabinet
Resolution, 24 January 1978.

 42 

24

Office of the National Security Council, ‘Nayobai khwam mankhong haeng chat kieo kapchangwat chaidaen phak tai pho so 2531–2537’ (National security policy on the southern borderprovinces, 1988–1994).
25
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Nayobai khwam mankhong haeng chat kieo kapchangwat chaidaen phak tai’ (National policy on the southern border provinces), Cabinet Resolution, 7
June 1994.
26
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Nayobai khwam mankhong haeng chat kieo kapchangwat chaidaen phak tai’ (National security policy on the southern border provinces), Cabinet
Resolution, 7 September 1999.
27
Office of the National Security Council, ‘Nayobai khwam mankhong haeng chat kieo kapchangwat chaidaen phak tai’ (National security policy on the southern border provinces), Cabinet
Resolution, 7 September 1999.

 43 

2
The body of knowledge on the south over twenty-six years
Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng

The southern border provinces have been heavily studied in various disciplines
due to the perception that they pose a “threat” to national security for different reasons.
After the arms raid in Narathiwat in early 2004, the number of incidents increased tentimes over the previous year, and in 2005 rose to around two thousand. 1 These
incidents seem to reiterate the perception that the southern border provinces are a landof conflict and violence, hence one of the clear and present threats to Thailand’snational security.
Designated a special zone for decades, the southern border provinces have beenstudied by a number of academics in order to gain knowledge and insights into thearea and its people. These studies search for the roots of unrest in order to overcome it
for the sake of national security. Yet Chaiwat Satha-Anand, who has been following
the situation in the south for almost thirty years, thinks that one of the shortfalls of theresearch on Pattani is the lack of literature review.2
This chapter asks the question, “How much did Thai society know about thesouth prior to the upsurge of violence in 2004?” through a review of theses andresearch papers on the region, both in Thai and English.
Research on the south has been closely related to issues of national security.
From 1978 to 2003, the government issued four successive national security policies
relating to the south.3 The National Security Council (NSC) has been in charge of
security policy in the southern border provinces since 1966, and initially placed themain priority on education. In 1974, NSC expanded its policy to target three
individual problems.4 Only in 1978 did it adopt a comprehensive ‘National security
policy on the southern border provinces’ to deal with all aspects of the problem.5 The
NSC policy went through four phases. The first two, which ran for fifteen years,
aimed to convince Muslims, especially the young, to learn the Thai language. These
policies dealt mainly with educational institutes, particularly the private Islamic
schools and the pondoks. The other two policy areas focused on political andeconomic aspects, including international relations and national security issues. This
research therefore divides the literature review into two main categories: those on
education, and those dealing with politics, administration, and socio-cultural issues.
The first section below surveys earlier reviews of literature on the south. The
second contains an overview of research trends across the twenty-six years of thestudy from 1978 to 2003. The third section looks at works on education, and thefourth at works on political and socio-cultural issues. The fifth examines the trends ofresearch in relationship to the changing policy on national security. The conclusion
reviews the whole period with observations and recommendations for future research.

Reviews of literature
In the past twenty-six years, there have been seven reviews of the state ofknowledge on the south—three in English, two in Japanese, and two in Thai.

 45 

Ratchanee Kalyanakunawut from Prince of Songkhla University surveyed theliterature in 1990 under the title, ‘A survey of literature on problems in the southernborder provinces, 1986–1995.’ The research was funded by the Southern Border
Province Administration Center (SBPAC) in order to serve as a database for decisionmaking by executives and responsible officials. The study reviewed ninety-seven
items. Ratchanee concluded that problems were on the decrease because government
policies had been successful in all aspects except the economy. Ratchanee also
remarked that most of the literature studied the problems of Muslim communities,
while hardly any scrutinized problems among Buddhist communities living in thesame area. Ratchanee recommended that there should be further research to collectbaseline data on Thai Buddhist communities in the south to help formulate
appropriate development policies.
In 1992, Chaiwat Satha-Anand wrote an article, ‘Pattani in the 1980s: academic
literature and political stories,’ examining literature as a “narrative” on Pattani.
Chaiwat reviewed six doctoral theses, four research papers, and twenty-threeacademic articles from the period 1980–9. Chaiwat analyzed the politics of the words
used for the area and its people, especially the difference between “Patani” and“Pattani,” and between “Malay Muslims” and “Thai Muslims,” in works written byinsiders on the one hand and outsiders on the other. Chaiwat pointed out that these
two sets of words came up constantly in the literature and that most authors appeared
to realize the implications of their choice of word. Most importantly, these two sets ofwords play a part in defining the historical framework of the relationship between
Bangkok and Pattani, which in turn determines who are the heroes and villains in eachnarrative.
Chaiwat made a second survey covering the subsequent decade in ‘The study ofPattani: a decade in academic landscape 1991–2000,’ in chapter 2 of ‘Violence and“truth”management: Half century of Pattani.’ In this work, Chaiwat reviewed several
reviews of literature—in English, Japanese, Thai, and Malay—on a century ofPattani’s history after annexation by Siam. Omar Farouk Bajunid (1999) studied theliterature in English on Muslims in Thailand, concluding that most of the studies
concentrate on Muslims in the south and neglect other Muslim communities inThailand. 6 Mitsuo Nakamura (2000) surveyed the body of knowledge in Japanese
about Islam in Southeast Asia, while Atsushi Kitahara and Osamu Akagi made an
overview of Thai Studies in Japan. Both Japanese reviews point out that Japaneselanguage studies on the Pattani Malays, both in Islamic Studies and Thai Studies,
focus on changes within Muslim communities as a result of media influence or theinterrelationship between groups in local politics.7
Srisompob Jitpiromsri, a local researcher from Prince of Songkhla University,
reviewed Thai-language theses and research papers on the Pattani Malays from hisuniversity in the disciplines of social sciences and anthropology from 1988 to 2000.
Srisomphob found that almost all of the theses came from the Faculty of Education or
the Faculty of Social Sciences and Anthropology. Most studied the south from thepoint of view of government officials, government agencies, and the impacts ofgovernment development projects on local communities, using quantitative methods.
Research papers by lecturers were more varied as a result of the shifting focus ofvarious funding agencies. Chaiwat commented that while the researchers from Princeof Songkhla University focused on community studies and diverse cultural practices,
researchers from other universities and institutions concentrated on understanding theroots of conflict in the south.8
Reviews of “local” Malay-language research on Pattani point out that these 46 

works focus on Malay Muslims in Pattani as an ethnic minority within Thai society,especially from a historical angle, highlighting the history of the Malay uprising. In‘Violence and “truth” management,’ Chaiwat concludes that the bulk of academic
works on the south belong to two different schools of historiography. International
research on the one hand, and local research on the other, tend to select different
historical events to study, in order to justify either Siamese rule or Pattani resistance,
resulting in a “gap” of interpretation over the history of the south.9
Alexander Horstmann’s article on ‘Ethnohistorical Perspectives on Buddhist–
Muslim relations and coexistence in southern Thailand: from shared cosmos to theemergence of hatred?’ reviewed English-language ethnographic studies on the southof Thailand and on the Malay Peninsula, in order to portray the development of therelationship between Muslim and Buddhist communities from 1969 to 2002.
Horstmann not only looked at the inter-ethnic relationship in the three southern
provinces, but also presented a comparative study of the relationship between Malay
Muslims in the south, Malay Muslims in the state of Kelantan of Malaysia, and Thai
Muslims in the north of Thailand. The author pointed out that literature about thesouth tends to present the Muslims as if they were homogenous, and that the main
research question often concerns the various extents to which Muslim minorities havebeen integrated into Thai Buddhist society. Horstmann found that over the thirty-three
years of his review, studies on the south had shifted focus from analyzing social
structure to cultural interpretation and to more complex aspects of social transition.
Horstmann indicated that local academics, meaning Thai academics, place a rather
heavy emphasis on the study of ethnic identity, and that as this line of research isoften framed by the nationalistic policy of the Thai state, they portray the relationshipbetween Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims as harmonious, united, andcompromising, to the extent that it becomes overly romanticized.
Each of these reviews of literature has a specific focus. Ratchanee’s work
concentrated on studies about problems in the three southern provinces. Chaiwat’s
first piece of research chose to review only doctoral theses, research works, andarticles in English, while the second piece of research was a review of reviews. Omar
Farouk focused on Muslims as a minority, while Alexander Horstmann took an ethnohistorical perspective. Srisompob Jitpiromsri limited himself to theses and researchworks from Prince of Songkhla University. The present survey aims to build on thesesurveys by extending the scope more widely to include works from various academic
institutions and agencies both in Thai and in English, in order to provide a morecomprehensive overview on the body of knowledge regarding the south.

Time, trends and types of literatureThis survey covers theses and research works from universities and official
agencies. The main survey includes works from universities across the country,
including Chiang Mai, Thammasat, Srinakarintarawirote-Prasarnmit, Silpakorn,
Mahidol, Burapa (Srinakarintarawirote, Bang Saen), Thaksin (Srinakarintarawirote,
Songkhla), Prince of Songkhla, National Institute of Development Administration(NIDA), Rajabhat Yala, and the National Defence College of Thailand. The review
also includes nine doctoral theses from universities abroad, including University of
Hawaii, Stanford University, Harvard University, State University of New York,
Australian National University, and University of Bielefeld in Germany. The survey
also covers research works from official institutions such as the Office of the National
Research Council of Thailand, the Thailand Research Fund, the Office of National 47 Culture, the SBPAC, and Provincial Educational Bureau 2.
The survey found 337 works on the south. From 1978 to 1987, there were ten
items per year on average, rising to fifteen over 1988 to 1997 (see Figure 2-1). The
peak was in 1998, when there were forty-four items, half of which came from NIDA,
and twelve from Prince of Songkhla University. Most of them were supported byresearch funds within the universities. Over 1999–2003, the number declined fromthis peak but at fifteen per year was still higher than before 1998.
50
44
40

31

30
26
20

20
13

8

7

3

7

9

9

10

1989

5

6

1988

10

1987

12

11 12 11 11

16

15

13 14

13

8

3

0
2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

Figure 2-1 Number of research works, 1978–2003
The peak in 1998 may have resulted from two major factors. First, the third
phase of the national security plan for the south came to an end, resulting inevaluation reports on the educational schemes and on the impact of several projects
such as community self-help and the project to establish an economic triangle in thesouthern border provinces. Second, during the period of 1996–8, unrest had been on
the increase. The number of incidents rose from twenty-seven in 1995, to forty-two in
1996, eighty-two in 1997, and 139 in 1998—the highest figure over the whole period
from 1978 to 2003.
The trend of increase in research output across the 1978–2003 period may result
from three reasons. The first reason was policy failure. A cabinet resolution on 24
January 1978 instigated the policy to make more Malay Muslims speak Thai. Yet ten
years later, the target had not been achieved. The cabinet therefore passed another
resolution to revise this policy in February 1987. This resolution identified the lack ofcontinuous monitoring and evaluation as a key reason for failure. It wasrecommended that Prince of Songkhla University be responsible for the monitoringand evaluation. The subcommittee of the Steering Committee on the Southern Border
Province agreed to use findings by Prince of Songkhla University as a tool to“identify targets and loopholes in order to adjust the annual work plan.”10
Second, more institutions began to contribute to the research. In the first ten
years (1978–87), several students of the National Defence College worked in the fieldin the south. They produced fourteen research works in this decade (and over the restof the period). Lecturers from Prince of Songkhla University, especially those in thefaculties of education, social sciences, and anthropology, were another groupcontributing greatly to the increase of field research on the south in this period. But

 48 

until 1987, no university in the southern border provinces had a postgraduate program,hence all masters theses on the south came from universities in Bangkok such as
Chulalongkorn, Thammasat, Srinakarintarawirote-Prasarnmit, Mahidol, Kasetsart, andSilpakorn. From 1987 onwards, there were masters programs in Prince of Songkhla
University, Thaksin University, and NIDA. The Faculty of Education of Prince ofSongkhla University established a masters program on educational administration in
1988, and the College of Islamic Studies followed suit in 1989. Academics from these
two institutions contributed greatly to the production of literature on the south. In thesame year, Thaksin University launched masters programs on educational
administration and Thai Studies. Then in 1994, NIDA branched out to the region, bysetting up a course on social development in Yala.11 The launch of several masters
programs contributed to the increase in research works on the southern borderprovinces.
The third factor is related to the situation on the ground, and especially the trendof increase in the number of incidents over 1998–2003 compared to the earlier period(see Figure 2-2). Particularly in 1998, 1999, and 2000, there were more than ahundred incidents. This increase could be one of the reasons why several agencies
including academic institutions became more interested in the southern borderprovinces.

160
139
120

114

107
83

80
40

42

32
2

0

13

1

0

84

82

32

27

7

5

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

Figure 2-2 Number of violent incidents in the southern border provinces,1987–
2003


The total of 337 works includes 210 theses and 127 research studies. In the
period of 1978–1987, there were more research studies than theses because theuniversities in the south did not yet have masters programs. Most of the researchworks came from the National Defence College of Thailand and Prince of Songkhla
University. Those from the College tended to focus on politics and administration, andoften perceived the south as a threat to national security. Examples include Banjob
Pongsophon on ‘Separatist movements, regions, and administration in the south’(1979); Phaluek Srawasi on ‘Suppressing unrest in the south’ (1981); Linpitch
Satjaphan on ‘Measures to prevent and suppress instigators in the southern provinces’(1982); and Songserm Waisopha on ‘Concepts of fighting terrorism in the southernborder provinces’ (1986). The research from Prince of Songkhla University in thisperiod focused on socio-economic analysis, livelihood, and the migration patterns ofMuslims in Pattani.

 49 

40

30

20

10

0
2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

1984

1983

1982

1981

1980

1979

1978

Research

ThesesFigure 2-3 Research papers and theses on the south, 1978–2003
Among the 337 works, 92 dealt with education, with a particular focus on
private Islamic schools, while 245 were on politics, administration, and socio-culturalissues. The works on education are considered as a separate category because they
comprise one third of all works done in the past twenty-six years, and they have somesignificant implications on security policies concerning the southern border provinces.

Works on education
As government security policy focused on private Islamic schools and pondoks,
so did the research.
These works came from universities or institutes with faculties of education.
Prince of Songkhla produced the highest number of thirty-seven, including nineteen
research papers and eighteen theses (see Table 2-1).
Table 2-1 Research works and theses on education
Institutes
Prince of Songkhla University
Government agencies
Chulalongkorn University
Srinakarintarawirote (Prasarnmit)
Thaksin University
Kasetsart University
National Defence College of Thailand
NIDA
Chiang Mai University
Thammasat University
Ratchabhat Yala University
Srinakarintarawirote (Bang Saen)
Silpakorn University
Ramkhamhaeng University
Mahasarakham University
Total

 50 

Numbers
37
10
9
8
6
3
4
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
92

All but three of the ninety-seven works in the education category focused on
private Islamic schools. The most popular topic was teaching and learning methods,
and academic development, including educational tools in general subjects such asThai, maths, sciences, and English. The second most popular topic was the perception
and participation of teachers, executives, and students on various issues as well as on
the management of private Islamic schools. The trend of these works differed acrossthe four sub-periods corresponding to the phases of national security policy in thesouth.
1978 to 1987
Most of the twenty-three works in this decade were surveys on opinions andneeds of school executives and teachers on educational management, personnel,
supports on academic development, and physical education. Surveys on students’opinions and values focused on their plans for tertiary education and theiroccupational preference. Surveys also focused on students’ comments about Home
Room activities, and sex education. In addition, a certain number of works analyzed
the management of private Islamic schools and evaluated the teaching quality ingeneral subjects, especially Thai, maths, and sciences.
The research by Samoer Nakphong from the National Defence College ofThailand is an exception in this period. His research on ‘Private Islamic schools in
Educational District 2 and national security’ looked at the development of private
Islamic schools in a historical framework. He pointed out that these schools
developed from the pondoks that played an important role in the Muslim way of life
and that the pondoks were “where those who have ill-intentions towards Thailand take
opportunities to persuade Thai Muslims to have negative attitudes towards the country,
which could lead to problems concerning national security.”12
1988 to 1993
Works of this period are more interesting than those from the previous andfollowing periods. Of the total of twenty-nine works, twelve focused on thedevelopment of the curriculum and of learning and teaching tools on general subjects
including Thai, maths, sciences, and English. Many of these studies were completed
in 1988 or 1989. They include a study, carried out by a masters degree student fromthe Faculty of Education of Chulalongkorn University, comparing mathematicalability between junior high school students from state schools and those from private
Islamic schools. Other examples include research on capacity-building in English
teaching, and on models to evaluate the standard of Thai teaching.
Rung Kaewdaeng examined the policy process on Thai teaching in private
Islamic schools. His work sheds light on why there are many research on theevaluation and development of curriculum and teaching tools in the period 1987–8. At
the time policy-makers believed that “encouraging Thai Muslims to speak, read, andwrite in Thai, while maintaining their culture, could be the first step to createawareness of Thai identity.” In 1988, the government set up a subcommittee tomonitor and evaluate this policy, especially the promotion of education in the Thai
language among Malay Muslims. Prince of Songkhla University was the main
institution responsible.13
There were also four works on using a curriculum of Islamic Studies at the
primary level, and on the development of teaching tools in religious studies in private
Islamic schools. In addition, there were surveys of students’ opinions and needs about 51 

continuing their education, as well as their attitudes towards school management,
including the evaluation of schools and teachers in private Islamic schools.
There are three outstanding pieces of work from the National Defence College
in this period: the work of Chuphan Trachu on ‘The roles of private Islamic schools inthe development of young Muslims in the southern provinces’; Rung Kaewdaeng’s
research on ‘Educational development, religious and cultural promotion for national
security in the southern border provinces’; and the work of Winit Krajangson on‘Educational problems in the three southern provinces and their effects on national
security’. Although the works of Chuphan Trachu and Rung Kaewdaeng focus on
different issues, both found that Muslims prefer to send their children to Islamic
schools rather than state schools because Islam is a way of life, and therefore Muslims
need to learn about their religion to have proper conduct in their daily life. Educationin state schools does not correspond with the beliefs and cultural values of local
people. These two research works also pointed out that encouraging Malay Muslims
to learn Thai is key to security building in the south.
Chuphan’s work also discusses about the pondok system along the same lines as
Samoer Nakphong’s work. He comments that pondok schools do not have a standard
curriculum, and as a result “some religious teachers could inculcate nationalistic
sentiments among the students, making them believe that Thai Muslims are Malays
because they speak Malay and follow Islam, while the Thai Buddhists belong toanother nation.”14 At the same time, Chuphan sees the potential role of private Islamic
schools in linking religious and worldly studies, and recommends that the government
take special care of these schools.15
1994 to 1998
There were nineteen works in this period. In 1994, there was no study on private
Islamic schools or pondok schools. Over 1995–8, most of the research focused on
evaluation, including the evaluation of English teaching, of reading and understanding,
speed, effectiveness of small group learning in science subjects, and problems inusing an Islamic curriculum. In addition, there were works on the perception ofteachers regarding internal monitoring and management in private Islamic schools, aswell as studies on human resource management by school executives.
Two interesting works of this period are Annop Niamkong’s research on ‘The
educational policies of the Thai state for the Malay Muslims in the four southern
provinces, 1957–1973’; and Somphong Pankla’s work on ‘The educational
management policy of the Thai state in Thai Muslim communities in the southernborder provinces, 1932–1992’. These two pieces of research showed that Muslims inthe southern provinces want their children to take religious studies. Most of them
prefer to send their children to pondok schools where Malay and Arabic are the mainteaching languages. The government, by contrast, wants Muslims to learn Thai andgeneral subjects. The mismatch of demands has created obstacles in pursuing
education policies in the southern border provinces. Past governments had all tried toadjust the education policies for these provinces. One major policy had been to
upgrade the status of pondok schools to private schools for religious studies. But after
such upgrading, there were problems over shortage of teachers on general subjects,
lack of teaching tools, as well as a need to change the curriculum to suit students wholearn Thai as their second language. There was another policy to provide incentives
for Muslims to send their children to state schools by providing Islamic Studies forhigh school students in schools where over 50 per cent of students are Muslim; and by
allocating special quotas for Muslim high school students to attttend universities,
 52 

especially Prince of Songkhla University.
1999 to 2003
In this period, there was a change. In the first two periods, works focused on
private Islamic schools, and especially on their curriculum on general subjects and theevaluation of academic and administrative capacity. This trend continued in the third
period, but there were also two research papers on the traditional pondok schools.
Nanthakarn Bendem-ali’s study of ‘Factors affecting the continuation of traditional
pondok schools in the southern border provinces’ asked why the traditional pondok
system still exists in the area, and concluded that pondoks are popular because parents
and students are keen to preserve their religious and cultural identity, and because
Muslims in the south “do not see any benefits in sending their children to stateschools because it does not do them any good. But if their children have religious
education, they will be highly respected in the society.”16
Bongkot Naphaphong’s study of ‘The socio-cultural aspect of social security
arrangements: a case study of a traditional pondok school in Ban Buerami, Yaring
District, Pattani’ looked into the pondok school system as an institution for Islamicstudies which provides social capital for Muslim communities. This social capital
includes enhancing peace, ethics, and social concerns by following the model set by
the religious teachers (toh-kru). Pondok schools were nurtured as centers of goodvalues.
Other works on private Islamic schools also displayed a different focus
compared to studies in the previous periods. Archawin Chaisuwan’s work on ‘The
participation of teachers in private Islamic schools in setting up the Pattani riverconservation network’ examined teachers’ roles in communities. Jiraporn
Mansatewit’s ‘The development of teaching approach to create multi-culturalawareness in pre-school children in the southern border provinces’ emphasized themulti-cultural nature of the south.
Winit Sangkarat’s ‘Past, present, and future of private Islamic schools in thesouthern border provinces’ analyzed the government’s policy on education in the
Muslim communities in the south over 1889–1996. Like Annop Niamkong’s work,
this study used Chai-anan Samudavanija’s idea of the triple characteristic of the Thaistate (trilaksana rattha). These two studies have very similar findings that Thai
Muslim communities have strong identity, culture, and sense of community whichempower them to negotiate with the state; and any intervention or change in the
educational system can be done with the involvement of the monarchy.
Most works on the educational standard of private Islamic Schools and pondok
schools were theses from faculties of education; while works on curriculum
evaluation and the development of academic capacity of these two institutions weremainly produced by Prince of Songkhla University which took the lead in this area of
research over 1982–2003. Other agencies involved in evaluation research were the
Bureau of Education District 2 and Chulalongkorn University. Srinakarintarawirote
University also had a number of students researching in the field on issues similar to
those adopted by Prince of Songkhla University.

Research on politics, society, economy, and culture
There were 245 works on political and socio-cultural issues. Most of thememerged from faculties of political science, social anthropology, social sciences and 53 

humanities, Thai studies, social and community development, as well as religious andcomparative religious studies from thirteen major academic institutes.


Table 2-2 Theses and research papers on political and socio-cultural issues
Institutes
Numbers
NIDA
62
Prince of Songkhla University
59
Thaksin University
30
Government Agencies
26
National Defence College of Thailand
19
Chulalongkorn University
12
Thammasat University
11
Foreign universities (PhD theses)
9
Mahidol University
7
Chiang Mai Unversity
4
Silpakorn University
2
Ratchapat Yala
2
Kasetsart University
1
Srinakarintarawirote Prasarnmit
1
Total
245


NIDA accounted for the highest numbers of research works on the south, sixtytwo in total (see Table 2-2). This was because NIDA’s Faculty of Social Development,
established in 1989, set up a regional branch in Yala in 1994 in collaboration withSirindhorn Public Health College. The regional expansion provided more
opportunities for government officials and employees in both public and private
sectors in the south to pursue masters degrees. Most students in this course weregovernment officials, and as a result most of the works focused on public
administration, or the attitudes of government officials and of the public towards
government development projects. Other works studied the quality of life of different
groups of people from the angle of family, health, and economics, as well as the rolesof religious and political leaders in communities.
Prince of Songkhla University produced fifty-nine works, the second highest in
this period, with a range of different focuses. There were works on community
economy and livelihood, such as studies on fishing communities; on women’s roles;
on socio-economic changes; on local development; and on the effects ofenvironmental degradation. Works from Prince of Songkhla University did not focus
on politics or administrative issues.
After Thaksin University established a masters program in 1989, it also
contributed to the output. Most of the works from this university looked into therituals and customs of Muslims, Buddhists, and Chinese in the three southern
provinces. Examples include studies on the annual celebration of the Thais in Pattani(1994), the Chak phra Festival (pulling decorated boats carrying Buddha images
along the river) in Pattani (1994), food in the rituals of the Thai Chinese (1996),
wedding traditions of the Thai Muslims in Sai Buri District (1998), the roles ofreligious places such as the Chang Hai Temple in Pattani (1999) and Tuyong Temple(2001), and studies on local handicrafts such as kolae boats, Thai Muslim dances(2001), and the production of Pattani kris (2003).

 54 

Most of the works from the National Defence College focused on strategic
matters or socio-psychological aspects of politics and administration. Some of theworks are not in the public domain for reasons of national security. However, judging
from the titles, most of the research papers questioned whether the south is a“problem” for national security, and what policies were needed to address the problem
in various aspects.
Theses and research papers from Chulalongkorn University can be categorizedunder three headings. First, six studies are about government. Two of them examine
government policies on the south; and the other four are on the attitudes of people in
the four southern-border provinces towards Malaysia (1979), the elites and power
structure (1988), political participation of Muslim leaders (1989), and politicalinteractions between mosques and government agencies (2001). Second, five works
are in sociology and anthropology. Two of them focus on the relationships between
ethnic groups in the south, while others are on acceptance of the role of Muslim
women in modern professions (1987), the preservation of pondok traditions (1999),
and the conservation of Muslim ethnic identities (2000). Third, works from theHistory Department looked at government policies towards Thai Muslims (1988), andthe relationship between Chinese and Muslims viewed through a case study of the
Lim Kor Niew Shrine (2000).
Thammasat University contributed thirteen works including four theses from theSocial Administration Faculty; five from the Faculty of Political Science; one fromthe Faculty of Sociology and Anthropology; and three research papers from the Thai
Studies Institute. The theses from the Faculty of Political Science focus on policy,
while those from the Faculty of Social Administration study the welfare of the
Muslims communities, working conditions in factories, and factors affecting decisions
over continuing higher education. The first research paper from the Thai Studies
Institute studied the kinship system through local literature within a framework ofreligion and politics. The second paper was the transcript of a seminar in which threeprominent scholars on the south participated, and the third was a compilation ofresearch by Surin Pitsuwan and Chaiwat Satha-Anand.
In addition, there were nine doctoral theses from overseas universities, all ineither political science or sociology-anthropology. Five were written by Thai
academics, and four by foreigners. They differ from theses produced in Thai
universities. The Thai products tend to emphasize primary data collection andquantitative approaches, while the overseas works have more rigorous theoreticalgrounding and place more emphasis on qualitative approaches, especiallyanthropological field work.
On politics, government, and administration
There is a body of work that focuses on the south as a “problem” as a result of
the existence of an ethnic minority that is Malay Muslim rather than Buddhist Thaiand that has greater geographical and cultural affinity with Malaysian Malays thanwith other Thais. 17 The Malay Muslims are different from the Thais in history,
religion, language, traditions, norms, education, and economic background, and thesebasic differences create problems for the Thai state.18 The feeling of alienation of the
Muslims in the south, combined with the infiltration of separatist ideology, hasresulted in insurgency movements.19 Once the problems are seen as stemming fromthe difference between the Malays in the south and the rest of the Thais in the country,
the solutions that follow are homogenizing policies to create unity. The government
thus opted for an approach of integration and cultural harmonization.
 55 

Policy studies have been produced continuously from 1982 to 2003, mostly by
the National Defence College, but also from the Faculties of Political Science at
Thammasat and Chulalongkorn Universities. There are also three doctoral theses inthis area.
The first research paper in this area emerged from the National Defence College
in 1982 on ‘Measures to prevent and suppress insurgencies in the southern borderprovinces,’ followed by Thanin Pha-aem’s ‘Policy on security problems in thesouthern border provinces’ in 1984, and the doctoral thesis of Panomporn Anurugsa
on ‘Political integration policy in Thailand: the case of the Malay Muslim minority’ inthe same year.
Surin Pitsuwan’s thesis came out in 1982, and his research paper on ‘Politicalconditions leading to human rights violation in the southern border provinces’ waspublished in 1984 as part of a book on human rights problems in the four southernborder provinces published by Thammasat University’s Thai Khadi Research Institute.
In addition, there was Jetsada Urupipatthanaphong’s 1986 study on ‘Policy
implementation for the southern border provinces: a case study of Narathiwat
province’; Piyanart Bunnag’s much cited 1988 work on ‘Policies of the Thaigovernment towards the Thai Muslims in the southern border provinces, 1932–1973’;
Prakit Kanyaban from the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University on‘Policies to solve problems in the southern border provinces: a case study on policy
implementation related to socio-psychology’ in 1988; and Suparuek Hongphakdi’s‘Policy implementation in the three southern border provinces,’ a public
administration thesis from Thammasat University.
Almost all policy studies on the south point to the fact that Thai governments
have always treated this region as a special case. Jetsada Urupipatthanaphong wrote,“when considering government policies from the Sukhothai, Ayutthaya, andRattnakosin eras through the abolition of absolute monarchy in 1932 until the present,
it is clear that the Thai state always has special policies on governing the southernborder provinces.”20Piyanart Bunnag stressed that the Thai government had always
been aware of a southern problem, and that since before 1932, the government had
aimed to achieve integration through policies inducing cultural changes among people
that the government viewed as different from the majority in the country. These
policies targeted the pondok schools which are important social institutions for
Muslims to preserve their language, religious and cultural identities. The government
was successful in changing a certain number of pondok schools into private Islamic
schools teaching general subjects according to the national curriculum of 1982.
Yet these studies reach differing conclusions. Some see integration policies asunproblematic, while others think these policies have created conflict. Piyanart
Bunnag concluded that “the problems are not caused by government policies but by
the implementation work of officials in the areas. The government therefore needs toconstantly monitor and evaluate policy implementation.” 21 Pichet Thongsrinoon,
however, pointed out that the government’s integration policies did not correspondwith the socio-cultural structure of the Thai Muslim communities and that there werealso problems over corrupt officials. Pichet suggested that there should be more
public participation in policy making and implementation.22
These works begin from the proposition that people in the south are an “ethnic
minority” because of difference in history, religion, and culture. Chaiwat SathaAnand’s research on ‘Islam and violence: a case study of violent events in the four
southern border provinces, 1976–1981’ suggested that such conflicts are merely “arepresentation of the structural complications which enhance the unrest. Conflicts

 56 

between the Malays and the Thai state result from social injustice and poverty. In thissense, problems in the south do not differ from those in the rural areas of the northeastof Thailand, but the conflicts in the south appear more acute because of the difference
in religion, language, ethnicity, and historical imposition.” 23 Chaiwat’s conclusion
was in line with that of Surin Pitsuwan, namely that human rights violations in thesouthern border provinces are caused by the injustice of government officials towards
Muslim communities. Muslims received more severe punishment for crimes
committed. 24 From these two research papers, Chaiwat concluded that “any policy
formulated with misunderstanding and distrust cannot solve the problems in the longrun.” 25 If the findings of these two papers had been used to frame the southern
problem in a new way, the policy approach in the south might have taken a different
course since 1984.
Literature in the policy category also includes a number of works on educational
policies. Uthai Dulyakasem’s ‘Education and ethnic nationalism: a study of the
Muslim Malays in southern Siam’ looked into the educational policies of the Thaistate towards Malay Muslims as part of the policy on integration. Panomporn
Anurugsa analyzed the integration measures implemented by the Thai state, including
the educational integration focusing on the pondok schools in 1982.
Four works examined the reactions and attitudes of local leaders andgovernment officials towards government policies. The most cited works in thiscategory are Chalermkiat Khunthongpetch’s 1986 thesis on ‘The opposition to
government policies in the four southern border provinces of Thailand, under theleadership of Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir, 1939–1954,’ and Pornphan Khemkhunasai’s‘A study of Thai Muslims’ attitudes towards government integration policies’ (1990),
supported by the Office of National Cultural Committee. Two years later, Pornphan
also received funding from the Office to carry out a study on ‘The attitudes ofgovernment officials in Narathiwat towards government cultural policies.’ These threeworks focused on elites in the south. Chalermkiat’s thesis emphasized the role of theimportant Muslim leader of his time, Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir, while Pornphan’swork surveyed the attitudes of imam, koteb, and bilan, the three highest religious
leaders in Muslim communities, and the attitudes of local government officials, who
are also considered elites in the context of the southern border provinces.
In this period there were no research works that looked into ordinary people’s
attitudes towards government policies. However, one research paper studied the social
characteristics of Thai Muslims and their reactions to government policies. Surapong
Sothanasathien’s research reviewed beliefs about this ethnic minority in order to makepolicy suggestions which correspond with the needs of local Muslims.26 This research
painted a different picture of the Thai Muslims from other works. While most of theworks tend to see the Muslim communities as introvert and extremely devout, thisstudy pointed out that Muslims are “sociable, and open to new initiatives fromoutside,” especially when they have to accept new discourses and policies fromgovernment. They are willing to follow policies as long as these do not “infringe on
their religious belief too much.” Fraternity in the Islamic tradition encourages theMuslims to accommodate others with understanding and good human relationships.
The government’s perception that Muslim communities are not open to outside
interactions is therefore suspect. If the government was not fixated with the conceptthat this ethnic minority is different from the majority, it would realize that they are
actually similar to villagers in other regions of Thailand. Differences in language anddress can be found in other regions too.27 Surapong’s work is interesting in that it
portrays Muslim society in the southern border provinces as dynamic, unlike other 57 

works on politics and government that see the problem as static over the two decades.
On religion
Works in this group study religions in terms of social beliefs and their roles insociety, rather than focusing on theological debates. Some examples include Lamom
Khomapat on traditional beliefs about mother and child health of Muslim women in
the four southern border provinces (1993), Khaneung Senathammachak on the Lim
Kor Niew Shrine (1995), Kamalas Bunpetch on ‘Roles and effects of Ratburana(Chang Hai) temple’ (1999), Yanin Petchsueant on the history of beliefs surrounding
the famous amulet of the Chang Hai Temple (2001), and Sakda Sewiset’s work on‘Islam and self-development: a case study of Muslim student organizations in fivesouthern border provinces’ (2003).
On customs, rituals, and handicrafts
This group includes general studies on customs and rituals, including thoseusing structuralist-functionalist approaches. They deal with various cultures in thesouth, not only the Muslims, and include comparative studies on Muslim andBuddhist rituals, as well as cultural intermingling between the two communities.
Prime examples are Soonthorn Nawakawin on the cultural mix in Yala (1994),
Wattana Chantornrojana on the Chak phra Festival (1994), Ismae Salae on ritual foodand the wedding tradition of the Thai Muslims in Sai Buri and Pattani (1998), andSuwit Thinnakorn’s work on the production of kris in Pattani (2003). Almost all ofthese works are from Thaksin University.
These studies clearly reflect the cultural diversity of the south. While studies on
religion tend to focus on each religion separately, the studies on traditions and rituals
usually present comparative views on the religions and cultures that coexist in thethree southern border provinces.
On Muslim women
There are thirteen works on this theme, two in English, and eleven in Thai. Mostof them focus on Muslim women or provide a comparative view of Muslim womenand their Thai Buddhist counterparts. This survey includes only some of the works inthis theme, to convey an overview of Muslim women in the south.
The first work on this theme is the doctoral thesis of Chavivun Prachuabmoh,
written in 1980 on ‘The role of women in maintaining ethnic identity and boundaries:
a case study of Thai Muslims (the Malay-speaking group) in southern Thailand.’ This
thesis analyzed the role of Muslim women in maintaining ethnic identity throughmotherhood. It pointed out that Thai Muslims in the southern provinces maintain theiridentity through historical practice, familial ties, community activities, and religious
and educational institutions. Their identity is formed partly by the interactions
between their culture and the Thai Buddhist culture. Women play an important role inpreserving the Malay Muslim identity.
The next piece of research written by Dolmanaj Baka and Wae-useng Madaehoh
in 1986 compared the roles of Muslim women in urban and rural areas, and found thatin both areas Muslim women maintain their status according to Islamic principles.
In 1991, Parichat Priyanond received funding from the National ResearchCouncil of Thailand to conduct a study on women participation in rural development
projects, comparing Muslim women’s groups with Thai Buddhist women’s groups in
the three southern border provinces. The study found that women who already 58 

participate in social and political activities are more interested in joining ruraldevelopment projects. Other factors affecting women’s participation are theirhusbands, numbers of children they have, and religions. Parichat found that Muslim
women tend to have less participation in rural development projects than their
Buddhist counterparts.
Like other societies in Thailand, Pattani has gone through different phases ofsocio-economic change. In 1982, there was a master plan to create an industrial estate,
which resulted in many seafood manufacturers appearing in the area. In 1991, thecabinet established a committee on a special economic zone in the southern borderprovinces, and in 1992 a budget of 267 million baht was allocated to build thecapacity of the industrial zone. The Department of Local Administration administered
two phases of development for the industrial zone. These policies generated sociocultural changes in the south, especially with regards to the roles and duties ofMuslim women.
These changes are reflected in Sawang Lertrit’s 1992 research on ‘Thai Muslim
women and factory work in Pattani: a case study of the impact on livelihoods.’ The
research explained the process of adaptation of Muslim women to new lifestyles.
Sawang found that the role of women in the household changes when they have to go
out to work. In addition, they have to adjust the language used, and the choice ofentertainment, becoming more receptive to urban culture. However, these women still
uphold Islamic traditions such as Hari Raya (celebrity the end of Ramadan), thefasting period (Ramadan), wedding traditions, and funeral practices. All in all, thechanging lifestyle of Muslim women who work in factories does not cause conflicts
or serious effects to the communities, because it does not contradict religious norms.
Suthat Silapawisarn’s 1995 thesis on ‘Thai Muslim women’s adoption ofmodern work: a case study of Thai Muslim women in factories in Pattani’ comparedattitudes between devout and less devout Muslims. It found that both groups worked
in factories due to economic needs, and had to forego some of the duties required ofthem according to Islamic principles because rituals hindered their work in factories.28
In 1993, academics from Prince of Songkhla University collaborated withcounterparts from Northern Illinois University in a research project on ‘Women inrural southern Thailand: a study of roles, attitudes and ethno-religious differences.’
The research compared Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists. It found out that womenin the south, especially the Muslims, had low levels of education, but householdincomes showed no significant difference between the two groups. Women from bothgroups have dominant economic roles, and are aware of their power and ability as thefinancial managers of the household. The study suggested that there should be arevision of the perception that women are dependent and have only a domestic role.
Thai Buddhist women have more social chance to become business owners than their
Muslim counterparts. This may be owing to the matrilineal culture of the Thai. Bothgroups of women have prominent roles in electoral politics, but lesser roles in local
administration.
The last piece of work included in the survey under this theme is Dolmanaj
Baka’s 1999 study on the socio-economic and political roles of Muslim women in thesouthern border provinces. The study points out that Muslim women’s social roles
include being wives, daughters, and mothers, which they perform according to theIslamic principles. Muslim women in the south are able to choose their study
according to their academic interests. Most of them prefer to enroll in private Islamic
schools; and some of the parents encourage their daughters to pursue education at theuniversity level. Moreover, Muslim women in the south set up various activity groups 59 

in the villages. They all dress according to traditional Islamic principles, no matter
what professions they follow. Muslim women can choose their own husbands. They
also play an important economic role in supporting the family. Working outside does
not contradict with Islamic principles as long as the women still perform theirdomestic duties. Muslim women have a role in electoral campaigns and providing
financial support, indicating the increasing role of women in politics. None of theseroles contradict Islamic principles.
Taken together, these studies chart the changing role of Muslim women over thetwenty years since Raweewan Cha-oompreuk’s 1982 work on the role of Thai Muslim
women in Rusamilae village. Raweewan found that women had very few roles in thevillage, and could not travel outside the village without chaperons. Married women
were confined to looking after the household, their husbands, and children, with some
additional duty to help their husbands raise income by selling the seafood produce
their husbands caught. In most cases, they sold the produce to middlemen rather thantaking it to markets themselves. Women did not have any prominent roles in politics
and religions.
The roles of Muslim women in the villages have changed drastically because of
economic changes. More women work outside the home and become more active inpolitics. Muslim academics seem interested in examining whether women still adhere
to Islamic traditions despite the socio-economic changes. Dolmanaj, for example,
conducted two researches on this theme within the period of thirteen years.
On economy
Research in this category tends to focus on income generation, and socialchanges that affect livelihoods, occupations, consumption, and the economic structureof these provinces. Most works are conducted by academics at Prince of Songkhla
University, including Suthiphong Prompaijit’s work on ‘Poverty among Thai Muslims
in the rural areas of the southern border provinces’ (1985), and Dolmanaj Baka’s
study on ‘Some potential effects of the development of the economic triangle (IMTGT) in the south: a case study of Pattani’ (1998). Ar-wang Lanui’s work on ‘Muslim
communities and economic change’ (1998) found that once roads and electricity reachthe villages, the mode of production changes from self-sufficiency to market-driven,
with effects on the socio-cultural characteristics of the community. Villagers who still
adhere to traditional ways of life in which religion plays a central role have a simple
but poor life, while those who pursue economic advancement have a better standardof living but more problems in life. Wattana Sugunnasil’s 2000 work on ‘Consumer
culture among hired laborers in Tak Bai District of Narathiwat’ portrayed coastal
fishing communities struggling against the expansion of commercial fishingbusinesses, leading to conflicts between these two groups. Peerayos Rahimullah’s
2001 study of ‘Development of the political economy of the five southern borderprovinces to serve the economic triangle of Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand’ pointed outthat people would like to develop local investment rather than drawing in big
investment from outside. Arkom Jaikaew studied ‘The impact of the economic slump
on the livelihoods of Thai Muslims and Thai Buddhists: a comparison between ruraland urban communities in the five southern border provinces’ in 2001.
All of the works on economics are research papers. Most of them are from
Prince of Songkhla University, except the work of Arwang Lanui which received
funding from the Office of the National Cultural Commission, and that of Wattana
Sugunnasil which was supported by the Thailand Research Fund.

 60 

On history
Works on the history of the south are very rare. There was one thesis bySomchote Ongsakul in 1978 on ‘Administrative reform in Pattani, 1906–1931,’ andtwo research papers—Sunan Chaimay on ‘Politics, administration, and economics ofYala during the reign of King Rama V’ from Rajaphat Yala University in 1991, andKrongchai Hatta on ‘Pattani: politics and trade in the past’ in 2001.
The works of Somchote and Sunan are quite similar in that they study history
from the point of view of Siam, and place local history in the framework of themainstream historical perspective of the nation-state. Somchote focuses on theadministrative reforms from the establishment of Monthon Pattani until its abolitionin 1931, pointing out that Pattani posed three major challenges for the Thai state. First,
the state was too large to govern effectively, given a lack of capable officials, andshortage of budgets. Second, there were external threats from Western powers. Third,
the local governors and local people had different ethnicity, religion, language,
tradition, and culture from the majority of the country, and were badly disposed
towards the central government.
Sunan Chaimay studied the socio-economic and political conditions of Yala in
the time of King Rama V, focusing on the period of transition before and after theadministrative reform. People in Yala during that time made a living from agriculture,mining, gathering non-timber forest products, and trading with neighboring territories,
especially through Tha Sap on the route between Yala to Pattani Bay. Taxation at thetime included taxes on opium, tin, imports, and exports.
Krongchai Hattha studied the history of Pattani from a local perspective, using
historical records of foreigners on Pattani as an important port on the Malay Peninsula.
Krongchai described the rise and fall of the kingdoms of Langkasuka and Patani
Darusalam. Krongchai did not study Pattani as part of the Siamese kingdom, but as aterritory in its own right. His is one of very few works presenting the history from thisangle. Most research on Pattani history, such as Somchote Ongsakul’s work, remains
within the framework of mainstream historical study with Siam at the center.
These three studies, and articles in Rusamilae journal, have two common
characteristics worth noting. First, all of these works emphasize Pattani as the centreof the history of the southernmost provinces. By contrast, Narathiwat seems to be in
oblivion, both in the national or local history, existing on the margin of Pattani’s
sphere of power. Second, studies on the political history of Pattani, which are notwithin the framework of mainstream historical studies, cannot appear as theses or
research papers within the national historiography. Such works are mostly publishedin the form of books rather than as theses or research papers. One of the mostimportant books in this genre is the History of the Malay kingdom of Patani, written
by Ibrahim Syukri in Malay. The book was translated into Thai by Hasan Mudman
and Mahamasaki Jaeha, as part of a project for translating and editing textbooks by
the Institute for the Southeast Asian Maritime States Studies, Prince of Songkhla
University. Ibrahim Syukri’s book examines the history of the relationship between
Pattani, Thailand, and Kelantan. The author gathered information from written recordsof the elders in “Patani,” so the history was told from the point of view of Pattani
people. Similar works can be found in the Rusamilae journal. Academics from Princeof Songkhla University have translated several works on the political history ofPattani’s rulers and published them in this journal. One example is Wan Marohbut’s
Thai-language translation of Hikayat Pattani: story of Pattani under the title Laorueang mueang Pattani, published as a series of articles in the journal from the end of
1984 to mid 1986. Another example is W. W. Skeat’s article on ‘Reminiscences of the 61 

Cambridge University expedition to the northeastern Malay States, 1899–1900,’
translated into Thai by Seni Mudman. The foreign observers described the Pattani
Kingdom during that era, including royal rituals in which the mission had a chance toparticipate.
On inter-ethnic relations
There has been little research on the interrelationship among various ethnic
groups in the southernmost provinces. Ten works will be reviewed in chronologicalorder.
Chawiwan Wannaprasert, Peerayos Rahimullah, and Manop Jitphusa’s work on
Customs that encourage social cohesion between Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims(1981) argued that these two religious groups tend to participate in each other’s social
activities, but carry out their religious ceremonies and rituals separately. Common
participation in social activities is encouraged by friendship—either friendshipbetween community leaders or between villagers—by mutual dependency, bycommon language, and by the fact that both groups are sharing public infrastructure
and utilities. Therefore, the government should promote the revival of social
ceremonies between Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims.
Palit Phongphaew’s 1985 thesis at the Department of Sociology andAnthropology, Chulalongkorn University studied social distance in the relationshipbetween Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims in Narathiwat. At the generalcommunication level, the relationship is good; in the aspect of religious acceptance,
the relationship is moderate; and the Thai Muslims are more willing to accept the
Chinese than the Thai Buddhists and vice versa.
Kitti Rattanachaya’s 1989 research focused on problems in the relationshipbetween Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims, both among civil servants and people ingeneral, in relation to national security. He concluded that the two groups have mutual
distrust and misunderstanding, resulting in political, economic, and sociopsychological problems. The government’s efforts to solve the problems have been
misinformed and piecemeal.
Chutinthara Wattanakul’s 1994 masters thesis on ‘Krue Ze Mosque: inter-ethnic
relationship, myths, and rituals’ examined the legend of Lim Kor Niew and the Malay
Muslims’ legend of the origin of Pattani as representations of the inter-ethnic
relationship. Chutinthara proposed that the two legends are often cited to justify
ethnic predominance. Malay Muslims emphasize their long historical roots, while theChinese use the Lim Kor Niew legend and rituals to compete for space in the society.
At the same time, the tourism industry capitalizes on the myth of Lim Kor Niew, andrelates it to the curse of Krue Ze Mosque. This external influence has a tendency tointroduce extra tension into the relationship between the Malay Muslims and theChinese.
Andrew Cornish’s 1997 doctoral thesis on ‘Whose place is this? Malay rubber
producers and Thai government officials in Yala’ examined interactions between
Malay rubber producers and Thai government officials at the local level, highlighting
the ethnic conflicts and power plays between the two groups. The Malay Muslims
produce rubber, one of the most valuable exports of Thailand, but local government
officials benefit from the rubber market under the 1909 treaty which was notrecognized by the ancestors of the Malay Muslims who owned the rubber. Cornish
argued that government development policies in Yala are contradictory. His
comparative study of two rubber-producing Muslim communities shows that one
community benefited from the government’s promotion of the rubber market, while 62 

the other community did not. Both communities are concerned to protect their sourceof income, and both resent the government’s attempts to impose control.
Kwanchart Klaharn’s 1999 research studied the pattern of relationships in themulticultural society of the south, including factors which promote and obstruct social
cohesion. The study also made policy recommendations to promote peacefulcoexistence. People of different religions had been living together in harmony, andmost problems are caused by “the misbehavior of the government officials,” while
Thai Buddhists feel threatened by terrorism.
Nanthiya Phimolsiripol traced the relationship between the Chinese and theMuslim communities in Pattani from 1958 to 1990 through the beliefs, legends, andrituals of the Lim Kor Niew shrine. Chinese and Malays live in relative harmony,
without any serious conflicts. As a result of inter-ethnic marriage, there is a group ofChinese Muslims in Pattani who follow a Muslim way of life and have a good attitude
towards the Chinese. The Thai government’s promotion of the Lim Kor Niew shrine
as a major tourist destination, and its registration of the Krue Ze Mosque as a historicbuilding, created dissatisfaction amongst the Malay Muslims to the extent that theystaged protests, but the incidents did not harm the relationship between the Chinese
and the Muslims in the area.
Rattiya Saleh’s 2001 study on Interactions between Buddhists and Muslims in
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat portrayed a close relationship and mutual
understanding between the two groups. Each accepts the difference in values andsocial hierarchy of the other. The belief and culture of the Muslims are major factors
shaping the interactions of the villagers in the three southernmost provinces, to theextent that Buddhist traditions and ceremonies do not seem to have any significant
roles in local interactions, and Muslims do not participate in them. How might thisaffect Buddhists’ attitude to their Muslim neighbors?
Saroja Dorairajoo’s 2002 doctoral thesis, ‘“No fish in the sea”: Thai Malaytactics of negotiation in a time of scarcity’ and an article entitled ‘Thai-icizing the
Malays: a local response to an environment crisis,’ partly derived from the thesis,
focused on the livelihoods of Muslims as an ethnic minority that has to adjust to theexistence of the modern nation-state. Her work looks into everyday strategies andnegotiations between these groups and those in positions of power. The expansion ofcommercial fishing has left no fish in the sea for small-scale fishermen who have tofind ways to survive by using culture as a negotiating strategy. On the one hand, theMuslim fishermen face class and ethnic discrimination; on the other, the crisis
prompts them to interact with Thai Buddhist NGOs to the extent that the two groups
developed mutual trust and respect through their collaboration to save the fishingindustry and coastal natural resources. These interactions cut across ethnic, religious,and language boundaries.
Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng’s 2004 thesis looked into the interactions between
Malay Muslims and Chinese in the market areas of the city of Yala, where the twogroups live side by side and interact closely, resulting in the creation of ethnic
consciousness. Malay Muslims and Chinese have developed processes of selfactualization and identification in order to distinguish their ethnicity against eachother. In the market areas where these two groups coexist closely, they have adopted
common values and mechanisms to accommodate differences and overcome tension.
To promote harmony with the Chinese, the Malay Muslims now claim that they have
Chinese blood.
The literature on ethnic interactions points to two dimensions: vertical
relationships between the rulers and the ruled, and horizontal relationships among 63 

people living together in each locality. The vertical relationship between Thai
Buddhist government officials and Malay Muslims is portrayed as conflicting rather
than harmonious. Most works on unrest in the south argue that problems are createdby the government’s administrative and economic policies, or by separatist
movements. Only a few works point to problematic relationships between government
officials and the people in the south from the past until the present.
Several works argue that horizontal relationships between Thai Buddhists andMalay Muslims have always been healthy, as a result of communication, support, andmutual dependency in everyday life, as well as during special occasions such as in
ceremonies and rituals. Similarly, relations between Malay Muslims and Chinese havealso been harmonious because of inter-ethnic marriage, economic relations acrossethnic boundaries, and friendships.
The relationship between Thai government officials and Malay Muslim people,
however, is marked by tension and mutual mistrust to the extent that it is considered acause of the unrest. Although there are some barriers and biases in the horizontal
relations between Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists, and between Malay Muslims
and Chinese, these have never led to serious conflicts. Their interactions exhibit aprocess of learning to accept differences, to avoid conflicts, and to find ways of living
together in harmony.

Research and national security policies
The volume of research work has fluctuated from period to period as a result ofchanging national security policies. This section divides up the period according to
the time-span of the successive security plans for the region.
1978 to 1987
Most works that appeared in the decade 1978–87, both research papers andtheses, focused on “problems” in the southern border provinces and the policies tosolve them. Probably this was a consequence of massive protests by the Malay
Muslims in Pattani, sparked by the killings at Kor Tor Bridge in 1975. After theprotests died away in early 1976, the political tension remained and became a“problem” for study. In addition, students from the National Defence College had along-term interest in the issues of the south, and produced research papers on the issue
almost every year. These papers looked into measures to quell unrest, and to reduce
conflicts and tension in the area, in line with national policy which emphasized theimportance of eradicating insurgency.
In 1980, the cabinet resolved to establish two special organizations tocoordinate work for solving conflict in the southernmost provinces: the Southern
Border Province Administration Center (SBPAC) and the Civilian-Police-Military
Task Force (CPM) 43. Subsequently in 1982 and 1984, there were studies to evaluate theperformance of SBPAC.
In this decade, there were relatively few studies on economic issues. The
exceptions were Pattaya Saihoo’s 1978 work on ‘The socio-cultural characteristics ofthe rubber tapping economy’, Dolmanaj Baka’s ‘Comparative study on religious
beliefs and way of life of Thai Buddhists and Muslims in the south’, Suthipong
Prompaijit’s 1982 study on ‘Poverty among Thai Muslims in the rural areas’, andRaman Wongwit’s 1985 survey on ‘The socio-economic characteristics of the villagesaround Pattani Bay’. All of these were baseline studies on the socio-economic

 64 

structure of the region rather than assessments of development policy.
There was no research on the internal and external security policies in thisperiod, but there were two works that criticized government’s policies towards thesouth—Surin Pitsuwan and Chaiwat Satha-Anand’s works on the four southern
provinces and human rights problems, and Chalermkiat Thongkhunpetch’s researchon the opposition movement led by Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir. These works argued
that ethnicity, religion, and culture are not the reasons for Muslim opposition to theThai government, and that the assimilation policies of the Thai state had at times“intruded into the everyday practice of the Malay Muslims in the four southern
provinces.” 29
1988 to 1992
A new security plan was in operation from 1988 to 1992, and works which
emerged over these years and the immediate aftermath can be seen in the context of
this plan.
Policy studies continued to emerge through these six years, including Piyanart
Bunnag’s 1988 historical survey, and Arkon Jaikaew’s 1990 assessment of past policy
achievements. But compared to the previous period, the number of research on
government policies and political problems declined. At the same time, there was anincrease in works on the needs, attitudes, and political participation of local leaders.
This reflected the second national security plan, which aimed to convince Muslim
leaders to join hands with government to solve problems in the south and help withsocial development. Research assessing the results of government projects included
Manop Jitphusa’s 1998 study on development projects in rural communities, theInternal Security Operation Command’s 1989 work on ‘New Hope’ development
projects, and Parichart Priyanont’s 1990 study on the role of women in ruraldevelopment, funded by the Department of Social Welfare.
The National Defence College continued to produce works on national security,
including Seree Kleabchan’s 1991 study on national security problems in the fivesouthernmost provinces, Prakij Prajonpatjanuek’s 1992 work on ‘Ways to create longlasting security and peace in the south’. Pichet Thongsrinoon’s 1993 research from
Chiang Mai University also analyzed problems and factors affecting national security.
In the last three years of the second national security plan for the south, there werefour research works on national security.
Two works in this period had no obvious bearing on security policy. These werestudies of environmental conservation by schools and communities around Pattani
Bay, and of local artists. Both were written by academics from Prince of Songkhla
University.
In sum, in this period there were research related to national security coveringsocio-psychological, political, and economic issues, but none looked at international
politics.
1994 to 1998
The output increased in this period, largely because NIDA provided courses in
Yala, giving local government officials, staff, and businessmen a chance to pursue
their studies and produce research works. NIDA aims to produce graduates who willbe leaders in the society, and places emphasis on organizational management andhuman resource development. Most research from this university was in accordancewith the third national security plan on the south which took a socio-psychological 65 

approach to promote participation by religious institutions, local academics, and local
politicians to generate development strategies on human resources, quality of life, andincome-generating activities.
Several NIDA theses in this period related to the policy on socio-psychology,
including studies on personnel administration in the southern border provinces (1994),
the structure of public and personnel administration in the south (1994), the trainingof provincial policemen in the south (1995), the role of SBPAC from the point of viewof the executives of local government bodies (1996), the quality of life of Thai
Muslim students in private Islamic schools (1997), the quality of family life andcommunity life of Thai Muslims in the rural areas (1998), and the participation ofvillage committees in poverty eradication projects (1999).
Development policy in this period stressed the promotion of investment.
Government drew up a master plan for the five southern border provinces, covering
the period of 1999–2006, and including the tripartite economic development project
involving Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (IMT-GT). A group of academics from
Prince of Songkhla University conducted a research on the potential effects of the
IMT-GT, using Pattani as a case study. The IMT-GT project was halted during the1997 economic crisis and has not been restarted.30
During this third national security plan, there were increasing drug problems inthe south. Therefore, in the last two years of the plan, there were five researches on
drug problems, including studies on young drug addicts and studies on ways to use
religion in rehabilitation.
In this period, there were fewer works on “problems” in the south. However,there were still no research on relations between the Muslims in the south and thoseoverseas, nor studies that related to the foreign aspect of the national security plan forthe south.
1999 to 2003
Violence increased over 1999–2003, and the number of research works
increased in parallel. The fourth national security plan focused on the multiculturalcharacter of the south.
Works in this five-year period diverged from the earlier output in two interesting
ways. First, the south was no longer portrayed as a “problem” for national security,
Second, there was only one research from the National Defence College—Kwanchart
Klaharn’s 2003 study of peaceful co-existence in the multicultural society in the south.
Over the previous twenty years, most research from the National Defence College
emphasized national security and homogeneity. Only this last piece of research in2003 highlighted a multicultural society, in line with the perspective of the fourth
security plan.
The largest output was again from NIDA, and reflected its institutional bias
towards organizational and personnel administration, as well as on drug problems.
Works from Prince of Songkhla University in this period focused increasingly onsocio-economic changes. In 2001, Peerayos Rahimullah conducted research on theeconomic development of the five southernmost provinces for the IMT-GT project.,
and there were five studies on inter-ethnic relationships.
In sum, this review of literature against the timeframe of the national security
plans for the south shows that some works are in line with security policy, providing
baseline information or assessments of policy performance. Such works mostly camefrom NIDA. The direction of some works is determined, directly or indirectly, by 66 

national security policies.
However, some other works do not appear to be associated with national
security policies. These are works on socio-cultural aspects, mostly in the form of
theses. This review revealed two major gaps in research coverage: the international
dimension, and the effects of economic development on the local people.

Conclusion
In his review of two decades of literature on the south, Chaiwat Satha-Anandportrayed research studies as “narratives” with pre-determined plots. This review
confirms that perspective, and shows that most of the plots were determined by state
institutions. Many works follow the plot of the current national security policy,
including research on the problems of the Malay Muslims, on the assessment andreview of government policies in the region, on the assessment of related projects on
education, development, and on socio-psychology. These works were produced byacademics from outside the southern provinces. Research by local academics wasoften framed by the concerns of funding agencies, most of which were searching forpolicy recommendations. The plots of the studies on the south have been predetermined by outsiders’ points of view. It does not really matter whether theseresearches become government’s policies or not. The fact that they were referred to,
reproduced, and perpetuated contributed to the general perception of the south, withno sensitivity nor distinction between the points of view of outsiders and insiders. It istherefore not surprising that in this literature review, the problems in the south appear
more or less the same, and that while attempts to solve the conflicts have beensuccessful to a certain extent, violence continues.
As the “protagonists” in the stories of the south, the Malay Muslims are
portrayed as “heroes” and “villains” intermittently. However, in the research papers
and theses on politics and administration, the Malay Muslims are always seen as“problems” that require solutions. The terms “Malay Muslims” and “Thai Muslims”
have different political connotations. Only three Thai theses use the term “Malay
Muslims,” while all the nine doctoral theses from overseas universities use this term.
The choice of term reflects the perception of the researchers. Seeing the Muslims inthe south as Malays shows awareness that Muslim communities in Thailand arediverse, and that the Muslims in the south differ from those in other parts of thecountry. This awareness in turn suggests greater sensitivity towards the communities
under study.
Works by local researchers from the south have not tended to give emphasis topolitics and administrative problems. This could be because local academics do not
see the Muslims in the south as “problems,” unlike the state and outsider researchers.
The focus of works by local institutions has often been determined by the academic
bias of the institution. For example, theses from the Social Development Departmentof NIDA focus on human resource development and organizational administration,
while those from the Thai Studies Institute of Thaksin University prioritize local
culture including beliefs, customs, rituals, and handicrafts, as well as languages.
Prince of Songkhla University is considered the leading local institution forresearch and the production of researchers. The university has many different faculties
and departments, including Islamic theology, sociology and anthropology, education,
political science, geography, public administration, and archaeology. Academics ineach discipline have conducted research on various aspects of the region, not in one
single direction as in the case of NIDA and Thaksin University. Srisompob Jitpiromsri
 67 

argued that the research by academics at Prince of Songkhla University has changedin accordance with research funding and shifting issues. 31 The research of theseacademics has reflected the social changes in the south, especially the impact of
economic development on the livelihoods and culture of the local communities.
Changes brought about by government policies, the spread of the capitalist economy,
and globalization have prompted the Buddhists, Chinese, and especially the Muslims
to adjust their ways of life to survive in changing circumstances.
There are two distinctive differences between the research done by local
universities and those by institutions in Bangkok. First, the works on politics andadministration conducted by researchers from outside tend to overlook the diversity
within the south. The “outsiders” only see and give importance to the Malay Muslims.
Very few works from outside look into other ethnic groups in the southernmost
provinces, and then within a framework of comparison with the Muslims—between
the Thai Buddhists and the Muslims and between the Chinese and the Muslims.
Research from local institutions, by contrast, gives emphasis to the diversity ofcustoms, cultures, and beliefs in the area.
Second, works from local institutions reflect attempts to understand the thoughts
and needs of local people, even though most of the researchers use quantitative
approaches, which may not effectively reflect the needs of the locals due to limitation
in methodologies. Even so, the research by local academics conveys the diversity ofthe south better than works written by outside researchers.
Observations and recommendations
1. Research questions and “problems.” Most works in the past fifteen years see
the southern border provinces as “problems” or pose questions about the south andnational security. Such research questions imply some biases which could lead theresearch to find data or information in support of the hypotheses. These works portraythe south only in terms of conflict, without considering the good relationship among
different groups of people in the area.
2. Quantitative and qualitative research. Ninety per cent of the research works
reviewed here are quantitative and limited to a narrow set of questions. They tend torequire simple answers—yes or no, good or bad, satisfied or not, appropriate or not.
Such surveys are useful only in ascertaining the attitudes of a big group of people on aparticular issue or situation at a certain time. More qualitative research is needed toelicit information that is missed by such survey methods, and to refine researchquestions before such surveys are launched. These are answers to the questions of thewhy and the how. For example, in a study on people’s needs from government’s
development policies, the questioning needs to cover not only what is needed but also
why such needs exist and how these needs can be met by projects or provisions which
are in accordance with the diverse beliefs and cultures of the people in the south.
3. Studies by outsiders and action research. Although there have been morestudies on the opinions and attitudes of the local people on different issues in the pastten years, the research questions are still usually framed by the perspective ofoutsiders. This review of literature in the past twenty-six years suggests that researchon the south is not as advanced as in other regions. In the north, for example,
researchers have cultivated an action approach in which communities are involved in
the whole process of research, from setting the research questions, to conducting the
research, making the analysis, evaluating the process, and applying the findings todevelop their own communities. This action research has not been applied in the south
prior to 2003. This may be because the continuing unrest has hindered community
 68 

participation in the research process.
4. Studies on others’ attitudes towards the south. In 1984, Chaiwat Satha-Anandreferred to the work of Arong Sutthasarn which points out that understanding the
problems of ethnic minorities requires a realization that minorities are constructed by
the majority, and that the majority is also constructed by the minority. The behavior ofa minority reflects that of the majority. Thus, there is a need to study the majority as
well as the minorities. Chaiwat concluded that problems associated with ethnic
minorities often arise because the majority does not understand how to deal with othergroups. 32 From this perspective, there should be research on the perceptions andattitudes of Thai people in general towards the south. This kind of research may help
the majority to understand themselves better in relation to the people in the threesouthern border provinces, and could lead to solutions at the national level.
5. Studies on culture. Most studies on socio-cultural issues in the past havetended to look at the patterns and roles of customs and rituals, rather than studying
them in terms of power relations. The approach of power relations could lead to better
understanding of the dynamics within the society of the south, highlighting thenegotiations of power. Moreover, unlike research from universities abroad, works onsocio-cultural topics by Thai academics still lack theoretical grounding. Where there
is some solid theoretical framework, it tends to be always structural-functionalist in
approach. There is a need to incorporate political and social anthropological theories
to substantiate the analyses, and employ a wider variety of theoretical approaches tolook at the south from diverse angles.
6. Relationship between ethnic groups, and between old and new groups ofpeople. There is still little research interest in inter-ethnic relationships, especiallybetween different groups of people in the locality. Most studies focus on conflicts inthe vertical relationship between the rulers and the ruled, though such works havedeclined over the past decade. There has been few works which assessed policies
designed to solve problems arising between government officials and the people, or to
examine how relationships change as a result of shifts in social status and power
relations. For example, Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims may go to the same school,
but when they grow up, the Buddhists become civil servants and thus change theirsocial status. Does the change affect their horizontal relationship as friends? If so,
how? There is also no research on the relationship between old settlers and new
migrants, such as between Malay Muslims and Thai Muslims, between Pattani
villagers and fishing entrepreneurs from central Thailand, and between different
groups of migrant laborers.
7. Studies on economic aspects. There are still very few studies on conflicts overnatural resources between the outsiders and the locals, and how such conflicts affectthe socio-economic and cultural well-being of the people.
8. Studies on the role of men. There have been several studies on the roles ofMuslim women and women of other ethnic groups in the south, but very few on theroles of men. There should be studies on the roles of men, especially in the changing
Muslim world.
The upsurge in violence in the south since 2004 has prompted an upsurge in
research. The volume of output, and the variety of approaches, has certainly increased.
Government policy has become more dynamic in trying to respond to the situation.
More agencies and institutions have become interested in the issues of the south.
Further reviews of research will be needed. The most significant point is that
academics and indeed Thai society as a whole should look back and question to what

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extent the existing body of knowledge on the south has been practically applied tohelp allay the ongoing conflict in the southernmost provinces.
Endnotes
1

Krittiya Archawanijkul, ‘Cha yuti khwam runraeng khwam tai nai sam changwat chaidaen
phak tai tong reng songsoem khwam yutthitham lae yomrap khwam laklai than phasa laechatiphan’ (To end conflicts and deaths in the three southern provinces, there needs to bepromotion of justice and acceptance of language and ethnic diversity), Prachakon lae kan
patthana (Population and development) 26, 6 (2009), p. 2.
2
Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘Khwam runraeng kap kan chatkan “khwam jing”: pattani nai rop
kueng satthawat’ (Violence and “truth”management: half a century of Pattani), research paper,
Thailand Research Fund, 2002, p. 42. This work has been published as a book under the same title
by Thammasat University Press in 2008.
3
Mark Tamthai and Somkiat Boonchu, Chapter 1 in this volume.
4
Mark Tamthai and Somkiat Boonchu, Chapter 1 in this volume.
5
The Southern Border Province Administration Center (SBPAC), Ekkasan prakop
kanpathomnithet: khrongkan pathomnithet kharatchakan phanakngan suan thongthin lae
phanakngan ratwisahakit changwat chaidaen phaktai prachampi 2544 (Document for theorientation of government officials, local administrative officials, and state-enterprise officials inthe southern border provinces, 2001), p. 15.
6
Chaiwat, ‘Khwam runraeng,’ p. 50.
7
Chaiwat, ‘Khwam runraeng,’ p. 50.
8Chaiwat, ‘Khwam runraeng,’ p. 59
9Chaiwat, ‘Khwam runraeng,’ p. 56
10Rung Kaewdaeng, ‘Kan phatthana kan sueksa kan songsoem sasana lae watthanatham kap
khwam mankhong khong changwat chaidaen phak tai’ (Educational development, religious andcultural promotion for the security in the southern border provinces), personal research document,
Social Psychology, National Defence College of Thailand, year 33, 1991, p. 81.
11
On Prince of Songkhla University see http://eduit.pn.psu.ac.th; on Thaksin University,
http://www.lib.tsu.ac.th/archives/history.htm; and on NIDA, http://www.nida.ac.th/th/academic/.
12
Samoer Nakphong, ‘Rongrian ekkachon son sasana islam nai khet kan sueksa 2 kap khwam
mankhong haeng chat’ (Private Islamic schools in education district 2 and national security),
National Defence College of Thailand, 1987, abstract.
13
Rung, ‘Kan phatthana kan sueksa,’ pp. 74–5.
14Chuphan Trachu, ‘Botbat khong rongrian ekkachon son sasana islam nai kan phatthana
yaowachon muslim changwat chaidaen phak tai’ (The roles of private Islamic schools on thedevelopment of young Muslims in the southern provinces), Social Psychology Research, National
Defence College, year 34, 1992, p. 3.
15Chuphan, ‘Botbat khong rongrian,’ pp. a–c.
16
Nanthakarn Bendem-ali, ‘Patchai thi mi phon to kan khong saphap rabop kao khongrongrian pono nai khet changwat chaidaen phak tai’ (Factors affecting the continuation of
traditional pondok schools in the southern border provinces), sociology thesis, Chulalongkorn
University, 1999, p. 157.
17
Nantawan Poosawang, ‘Panha chao thai muslim nai changwat phak tai’ (Problems of Thai
Muslims in four southern provinces), research report, Social Science Association of Thailand,
1978, p. 1; Thanin Pha-aem, ‘Nayobai kan kaekhai panha khwam mankhong nai phuenthichangwat chaidaen phak tai’ (Policy on security problems in the southern border provinces), thesis,
Department of Government, Thammasat University, 1984; Chuphan, ‘Roles,’ p. 112.
18
Somchote Ongsakul, ‘Kan pathirup kan pokkhrong monthon pattani (pho so 2449–2474)’(Administrative reform of Pattani, 1906–1931), thesis, Department of History,

 70 

Srinakarintarawirote–Prasarnmit University, 1978, p. 227; Samoer, ‘Rongrian ekkachon,’ p. 2;
Piyanart Bunnag, ‘Nayobai kan pokkhrong khong ratthaban thai to chao muslim nai changwat
chaidaen phak tai’ (Policies of the Thai government towards the Thai Muslims in the southernborder provinces, 1932–1973), research paper, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, 1988, p.
206; Methi Thammarangsi, ‘Chao thai muslim 4 changwat chaidaen phak tai kap khwam
mankhong haeng chat’ (Thai Muslims in the four southern border provinces and national security),
research paper, National Defence College of Thailand, 1989, p. 83; Chuphan, ‘Roles,’ p. 1.
19
Piyanart, ‘Nayobai kan pokkhrong’, p. 206; Samoer, ‘Rongrian ekkachon,’ pp. 2, 4; Chuphan,‘Botbat,’ p. 1.
20
Jetsada Urupipatthanaphong, ‘Kan pathipat nayobai samrap changwat chaidaen phak tai:sueksa chapho korani changwat narathiwat’ (Policy implementation for the southern borderprovinces: a case study of Narathiwat province), thesis, Department of Government,
Chulalongkorn University, 1986, p. 1.
21
Piyanart, ‘Nayobai kan pokkhrong,’ abstract.
22
Pichet Thongsrinoon, ‘Thai muslim kap khwam mankhong haeng chat: sueksa korani chaothai muslim nai amphoe raman changwat yala’ (Thai Muslims and national security: a case studyof the Thai Muslims in Raman District, Yala Province), thesis, Faculty of Political Science,
Chiang Mai University, 1993, p. kho rakhang
23
Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘Islam kap khwam runraeng: kan sueksa chapho korani hetkan
runraeng nai changwat phak tai prathet thai 2519–2524’ (Islam and violence: a case study of theviolence in the four southern border provinces, 1976–1981), in Si changwat phak tai kap panha
sitthi manusyachon (Four southern provinces and human rights problems), Bangkok: Thai Khadi
Institute, Thammasat University, 1984), p. 136.
24
Chaiwat, ‘Islam kap khwam runraeng,’ p. 66
25
Chaiwat, ‘Islam kap khwam runraeng,’ p. 136
26
Surapong Sothanasathien, ‘Khunnalaksana thang sangkhom khong chao thai muslim lae kansanong topto rathaban’ (The social characteristics of the Thai Muslims and their reactions togovernment policies), research paper, Social Science Club of the South and the Southern Border
Province Administration Center, 1988, p. 2.
27
Surapong, ‘Khunnalaksana thang sangkhom,’ pp. 173–5
28
Suthat Silapawisarn, ‘Kan yomrap rabop tham ngan samai mai khong satri thai muslim
sueksa korani satri thai muslim thi tham ngan nai rongngan utsahakam changwat pattani’ (The
acceptance of modern work systems among Thai Muslim women: a case study of the Thai Muslim
women in factory work in Pattani), thesis, Department of Sociology and Anthropology,
Chulalongkorn University. 1995, p. 154.
29
Chalermkiat Thongkhunpetch, Khabot ruea wiraburut haeng si changwat phak tai (Rebel orhero of the four southern provinces) (Bangkok: Matichon, 2004), p. 219.
30
Mark Tamthai and Somkiat Boonchu, Chapter 1 in this volume, p. 36.
31
Srisomphob Jitphiomsri, 2000, cited in Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘Khwam runraeng,’ p. 51.
32
Chaiwat, ‘Islam kap khwam runraeng,’ p. 136.

 71 

3
The security forces and human rights violations in Thailand’s
insurgency-wracked south
Rungrawee Chalermsripinyorat

The raid on the Narathiwat Rachanakarin army depot on 4 January 2004 marked theresurgence of violence in the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, andparts of Songkhla. The violent insurgency claimed more than 2,600 lives in four years.
Violence is no stranger to the southernmost provinces, where 1.3 million Muslims form amajority in the population. The region was once a prosperous Islamic kingdom prior to its
annexation to Siam, Thailand’s old name, as a result of the 1909 treaty between Siam andGreat Britain, colonial rulers of Malaya at the time. The treaty acknowledged Siamesesovereignty over the Patani principality and established the present border demarcation
between Thailand and Malaysia. Difference in ethnicity, religion, culture, and language
alienates southern Muslims from the rest of the predominantly Buddhist country. The
southern Muslims often complain about being treated as second-class citizens. The senseof alienation and discrimination has bred separatist movements which began soon after
the annexation.
One of the key factors that sparked insurgency in the southernmost provinces is thegovernment’s abuse of power. In the past, some officials were dispatched to the south aspart of punishment. Others were second-rate officials who failed to win other morecompetitive posts. The repeated abuse of power exacerbates existing issues resulting fromthe sense of religious, ethnic and cultural alienation. Silent abduction and killing ofMuslim leaders from time to time has caused deep-seated hatred against government
officials among the Malay Muslims.
This chapter examines how the structure, operations, and recruitment of the security
forces in the deep south, along with the legal framework under which they operate, haveconsequences for human rights. The chapter is divided into two parts. First, I explain the
structure, operations, and recruitment process of security forces working in Pattani, Yala,
Narathiwat, and some part of Songkhla. Second, I discuss human rights violations arisingfrom the security forces’ operations under the provision of the Emergency Decree.
I argue that military operations lack continuity because most soldiers work inrotation, making it difficult to develop their knowledge on human rights. Following the
Narathiwat Rachanakarin depot raid, thousands of soldiers from the northeast and central
region were rapidly dispatched to the south to tackle the upsurge of violence. They arerotated on a one-year basis. The government later approved the establishment of a new
Fifteenth Infantry Division in Pattani which, once in place, should improve the continuityof military operations in the region.
Police officials from outside the region were also dispatched to help the regularforces throughout the southernmost region following the armory raid. The National
Police Bureau later recruited some one thousand non-commissioned police officials to 73 

work for at least five years in the south. The new recruitment has a good prospect for
improving the quality of police officials because those who applied under this scheme
made their own choice to work in the area, unlike in the past when many officials weresent south against their will.
Human rights violation is not only the result of bad behavior on the part of someindividuals, but also stems from the overall government policy and legal framework forthe security forces’ operations. Under the provision of the Emergency Decree, officials
are allowed to carry out certain actions which violate basic rights and spark outrage
among southern Muslims. Moreover, there is some evidence that security officials or
government-sponsored militias may be involved in some unlawful acts such as executing
suspected Muslim insurgents.

Structure, operations, and recruitment of security forces in the south
Muslim insurgency in the country’s southernmost region petered out in the early
1990s following the collapse of the Communist Party of Thailand. Although bombingsand arson attacks against government installations occasionally took place, the Thaigovernment largely deemed them to be “ordinary crimes” organized by “small-timebandits.” 1 In 2002, prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra dissolved the Forty-third joint
Civilian-Police-Military Command (CPM43), the central agency that handled security
matters in the south, and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC),
a consultative forum between the government and local people to solve security, political,
economic, and social problems. After these two key agencies were dissolved, thegovernment handed over security matters to the police from May 2002 onwards. The
police reportedly took the opportunity to crack down on insurgents by executing peoplesuspected of being involved in the insurgency.2 The dissolution of CPM43 and SBPAC
contributed to the resurgence of Muslim insurgency in early 2004 because the lack of any
consultative forum between the government and people gave the insurgents more
freedom to carry out their underground movements.3
In the raid on Narathiwat Rachanakarin army depot in Narathiwat’s Cho-airong
district on 4 January 2004, four soldiers died and over four hundred weapons were stolen.
The incident, which marked the resurgence of Muslim insurgency, prompted thegovernment to react urgently by dispatching some 30,000 soldiers and police to the
Muslim-dominated south. Since the SBPAC was already dissolved, on 4 March 2004 theThaksin government established a new agency called the Southern Border Provinces
Peace Building Command (SBPPBC) to coordinate work among the military, police, andcivil servants. 4 It subsequently established a committee to oversee policies on peacebuilding in the southern border provinces, headed by General Chitchai Wannasathit,
deputy prime minister and justice minister. There were several adjustments in positions at
the policy and on-the-ground levels in a bid to streamline security operation which lacked
coherence and unity.
The position of the Fourth Army commander in charge of the south was changed
five times between January 2004 and September 2006. General Pongsak Aekbannasingh
was sacked in March 2004 and replaced by Lieutenant General Pisan Wattanawongkiri.
Pisan was transferred out of the region following the death of eighty-five Muslims in the
Tak Bai incident on 25 October 2004. The incident began when villagers organized a

 74 

protest in front of Tak Bai police station in Narathiwat to call for the release of six
Muslim villagers who were accused of handing government-issued guns to insurgents.
Security forces cracked down on protesters and shot seven Muslims dead. A further
seventy-eight protesters died while they were piled on top of one another in military
trucks for transfer to detention in a military camp in Pattani. After the Tak Bai incident,
Lieutenant General Khwanchart Klaharn, then deputy commander of the Fourth Armyregion, replaced Pisarn as the commander. In October 2005, Lieutenant General Ongkorn
Thongprasom, deputy commander of the Fourth Army, replaced Khwanchart. Ongkorn,
who rose up from the Special Warfare Unit, was appointed at about the same time that
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the former commander of the Special Warfare Unit, wasappointed as overall army commander. In the following year, Lieutenant General Wirot
Buacharun, who had spent several years of his military career working in the deep south,
became a new Fourth Army commander.
Several senior military officials who were given key positions in the south werefrom the Special Warfare Unit. Army officials interviewed by the author said that they
were given the job because military officials from the unit had been trained to fight in“unconventional” warfare. The little-known Special Warfare Unit carried out undercover
missions at the time the army was fighting against communists. After the collapse of thecommunist movement, the Unit was in charge of the crackdown on drugs trafficking,mostly in the north. The Special Warfare Unit tends to have better experience than otherregular forces in working with people in areas which have ideological conflicts.5 Colonel
Akara Thiprot, the army spokesman, admitted that “the army produces personnel to servein conventional warfare and to defend the country. It doesn’t produce personnel to fight inguerrilla warfare.” 6 The fact that the Special Warfare Unit was chosen to lead theoperation could be deemed a turning point, suggesting that the government had come torealize that this war could not be won by force but only by gaining the hearts and mindsof the people. The violence carried out by Muslim insurgents, like that of the communists,
is political in nature, despite the two movements’ differing ideological underpinning andstrategies. An army official said, “communists are gentlemen because they don’t kill
innocent people.”7 Some army officials accept that it is “the first war against terrorism”
that Thailand is facing. The army believes that “the fight over information and over thehearts and minds” of local people is key to the success of this war, and hence it has tocreate a good perception of the government among the local and international
community.8
Structure of military operation in the south
Military operations in the southernmost provinces fall under the Fourth Region’s
Forward Command, which is based in Ingkhayuth-Borihan Camp in Pattani’s Nong Chik
district. The structure is constantly changing. In October 2005, there were two major
forces, Sri Sunthorn and Santisuk Task Force, which carried out operations in the south.

 75 

Sri Sunthorn Force

Task Force I (Yala)

TF11

TF12

Task Force II (Pattani)

TF14

TF13
BPP 43/44

Support Force

TF22

Task Force III (Narathiwat)

TF34

Support Force

Ranger Unit.41
Ranger Unit. 42
Ranger Unit 43

TF37

TF38

TF25

Task Force IV (Songkhla)

TF39

BPP

TF.Phetcharavut

TF35

TF Marine

TF32

TF24

TF23

TF36
BPP 41

BPP 42

TF33

Figure 3-1 Sri Sunthorn Task ForceThe Sri Sunthorn Task Force oversees the operation of some 14,000 soldiers
stationed throughout the three southernmost provinces and four districts of Songkhla. The
force was led by Major General Samret and tasked to patrol the area, gather intelligence,and provide security to civilians, particularly teachers and monks. The force consists of
security officials from the army, navy, paramilitary rangers, and Border Patrol Police. It
divides the area of responsibility into four task forces: Task Force I is in charge of Yala,
Task Force II Pattani, Task Force III Narathiwat, and Task Force IV the Chana, Thepha,
Na Thawi and Saba Yoi districts of Songkhla. Each task force breaks down into smaller
units called by a two-digit number, for example, Task Force11 (TF11). There are a total oftwenty-seven units in all four task forces. The army oversees most of the violenceplagued zone. Its manpower is largely transferred from the northeast and central region
and works on a one-year rotation.9 Five districts in Narathiwat—namely Mueang, Yi-ngo,
Bacho, Si Sakhon, and Rueso—are under the navy’s responsibility. Four districts inSongkhla are under Border Patrol Police unit 43. And the Yala districts of Ka Bang andYaha are under Border Patrol Police unit 44.10 The navy, which has some 3,000 troops in
the area, has its base in Narathiwat because the province is adjacent to the sea. The
Border Patrol Police, which has about 2,000 police officers in the region, has bases in
Songkhla and Yala.
Santisuk Force

Administrative CommandControl Force

Village Defense Volunteer

Figure 3-2 Santisuk Task Force

 76 

Santisuk Task Force, which consists of some one thousand soldiers from theSpecial Warfare Unit, focuses on the hearts and minds campaign.11 Lieutenant General
Malai Kiewthiang, who led the force in 2006–7, said that while the regular force istrained to “fight and kill,” the Special Warfare Unit is trained to carry out psychological
warfare and to work with the people. A unit of twelve soldiers is dispatched to one village
to familiarize themselves with villagers, learn their thinking, and convince them to join
the government sponsored village defense volunteers project. There are two major groupsof village defense volunteers; Chut raksa muban (Cho Ror Bor) organized by the Interior
Ministry and Asasamak raksa muban (Or Ror Bor) organized by the royal aide-de-campunder the support of Queen Sirikit. The latter is a predominantly Buddhist self-defense
organization. Each 12-member unit is divided into three groups. The first is a “special
force unit” which focuses on gathering intelligence and organizing villagers; the second
specializes in psychological warfare; and the third is a strike force. Santisuk Task Force
has no permanent force in the south, and soldiers from the unit based in the central
province of Lopburi take turns to rotate to the region.
Apart from the Sri Sunthorn and Santisuk Task Forces, there is a supporting forceof some 5,000 paramilitary rangers (thahan pran) who are permanently stationed in thearea. The rangers are mainly involved in gathering information and carrying out search
and arrest. Half of the rangers are newly recruited from local Buddhists and Muslims whobegan work in early 2007. The majority of new rangers are Buddhists, some of whom
have had family members killed by suspected insurgents and harbor a sense of anger andrevenge. The numbers of ranger units increased from three to seven; these are Tho Pho 41
to 47. Each unit is led by a career soldier as commander. The ranger force was set up in
1978 during the period when Thailand battled against the communists, particularly along
the Cambodian border. 12 The military has recruited new rangers to help gather
intelligence, and some of these rangers are those who have had relatives killed bysuspected insurgents. 13 Rangers have a higher tendency to commit human rights
violations than career soldiers because they receive much less professional training.
Rangers are required to complete at least lower secondary school, and be adept atworking in a jungle environment or capable of gathering intelligence. 14 The army
employs new rangers because it needs personnel who are familiar with the geography andculture of local people, unlike soldiers from outside the region. General Sonthi
Boonyaratglin had a policy to set up thirty additional ranger regiments, which would haveroughly doubled the current complement of three thousand rangers. The project wasapproved after General Sonthi successfully led a coup to oust prime minister Thaksin on
19 September 2006. Problems with paramilitary rangers are covered below.
The military regularly rotates soldiers to work in the violence-plagued south
because of manpower shortage. The troops receive training on Muslim culture before
being dispatched to the south on a one-year basis. The continuous rotation disrupts thecontinuity and effectiveness of operations. Another factor which affects the effectivenessof military operations is the use of conscript soldiers for about 60 per cent of the overall
force. Although this is a standard practice, it can have severe ramifications in a politicallysensitive area. Conscript soldiers, who serve for two years, have a low level of maturity
and may conduct themselves inappropriately. A case in point concerns conscript soldiers
who were sexually involved with Muslim girls and sparked anger among their family
members and neighbors.

 77 

The government approved the establishment of the Fifteenth Infantry in February2005 because it foresaw that the conflict was likely to continue for decades. It will takethree years for the Fifteenth Infantry to be fully established, when it will consist of about
13,000 soldiers. The army plans to recruit 60 per cent of each year’s intake of conscript
soldiers for this division among local Muslims in a bid to win loyalty from the localities.
Lieutenant General Samret said, “if they are with us, their relatives will also be withus.”15 It is expected that the rotation of soldiers will be significantly reduced after the
Fifteenth Infantry is completely set up. Ideally, all military officers in the region would bepermanent, but in reality that is unachievable because it would require a sacrifice for all
the family members to migrate there and would be costly to provide housing. Careersoldiers who are recruited for the Fifteenth Infantry are required to stay for at least three
years. The army is screening recruits carefully to avoid those with problematic behavior
such as addiction to alcohol or heavy debts, as such recruits have a high tendency tocreate problems with villagers.16
The army has issued “ten commandments” for soldiers working on the ground as a
guideline to win the hearts and minds of local people.17
1. Soldiers must not act as if they are the people’s boss and they should treat people
with politeness.
2. Soldiers should not take advantage from villagers. If they want anything, theyshould buy it.
3. Soldiers should not engage in premarital sex.
4. Soldiers should not drink alcohol when they are working.
5. Soldiers should not abuse their power or violate laws.
6. Soldiers should not use impolite words and look down on people.
7. Soldiers should not neglect to help people.
8. Soldiers should uphold good morality.
9. Soldiers should not do anything against people’s culture, beliefs, and religion.
10. Soldiers should not discriminate against anyone on racial grounds and should
respect human dignity.

It is difficult to gauge how many soldiers uphold these ten commandants. Major
General Samret said that the army had taken disciplinary action against only a few
soldiers since he became the Sri Sunthorn Task Force commander. Disciplinary actions
range from warning through detention or deduction of salary to transfer of the person outof the region. Major General Samret said that there seem to be few opportunities forsoldiers to behave inappropriately in the south. They dare not drink alcohol in therestaurants because they are afraid of bombings.18
Structure of police operation in the south
In interviews, lawyers, journalists and local people claim that police are more prone
to human rights violation than soldiers, partly because their job has to deal directly withpeople. They carry out arrests, interrogations, and prosecutions. Many local Muslims
have a negative perception of the police, and some believe that the police might have a 78 

hand in abductions and murders of Muslim leaders. A high-profile case was the 1954
disappearance of Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir, a prominent cleric who led the “Patani
People’s Movement” to demand autonomy for the Muslim-dominated southern region.
He was imprisoned for almost five years for that campaign and later mysteriously
disappeared, reportedly drowned by the Thai police. The deep-seated mistrust was
manifested in the “ninja bandit incident” in 2003. Villagers beat two Border Patrol Police
officers to death because they believed that the police disguised themselves in order toassassinate Muslim leaders in the village. A recent case is the disappearance of aprominent Muslim lawyer Somchai Neelapaichit on 12 March 2004. Somchai was known
to have defended several suspected Muslim insurgents over decades. A mid-level police
officer is the only person who has been penalized for taking part in the abduction but the
culprits, whom some believe are high-ranking police officers, are still at large.19
After the army depot raid in January 2004, the National Police Bureau established a
Forward Command based in Yala. Police Major General Woraphong Siewpricha, who
was the Command’s deputy commander for investigation in 2006, said that it was
ideology that underlines the instigation of violence and therefore the government has tochange the thinking of those joining the insurgency. This will require changes in the
behavior of government officials because many problems were a result of past injustice.
Respect for human rights is therefore an integral part of the battle to win the hearts andminds of local Muslims.20

National Police Bureau’s
Forward Command

Admin &
Supportinvestigation

manpoweradmin &
information

intelligence

investigationonimportant cases

policy andplanning

supplycivilian affairs

investigation &arrest warrant
interrogationonimportant cases

forensic
examination

training

admin

training, region 9

Phitak Santi
Centreadmin
sceneinspection

forensic exam

autopsy

data systemon-the-groundstaffers

admin

on-the-groundcommandspecialoperations
company

admingovernment

specialoperations

control &security

Immigration
bureaucommando
unit

academics

service &supportwork to change
behavior/
perception

paratrooper
trainers

special branch
unitcommand ofpoliceon the ground

Yala commandon-the-groundforensic officebomb squadunitpublic relations

data analysis

financeborder patrol
policeother agencies

supportevaluation &coordination
war room

security

Yala
PattaniNarathiwat
SongkhlapoliceFigure 3-3 National Police Bureau’s Forward Command
There are about 10,000 police officers in the violence-wracked south. About two or
three hundred police are based in the Command’s office in Yala’s Mueang District and the 79 

rest are stationed in police stations throughout the region. There has been shortage ofmanpower because the workload increased after the 4 January raid on the army depot.
Besides, more police officials have been transferred out of the region than those moving
in. In Yala, only 2,300 out of 3,300 posts were filled. In the 2004 fiscal year, there were
119 police officers transferred out but only nineteen moved in.21 In Pattani, only 2,581
out of 3,023 positions were filled. 22 There was an attempt to alleviate problems of
manpower shortage by bringing in 2,000 police from sixty-one provinces as a special
operations unit.23 The unit was withdrawn in December 2005 after completing a one-yearrotation, and replaced by a thousand Border Patrol Police.
In an effort to reduce the shortage of manpower, the National Police Bureau also
recruited 1,170 non-commissioned police officers to work in the southernmost region.
The newly recruited police officers are affiliated to the Ninth Region which oversees theseven southernmost provinces, namely Songkhla, Satun, Trang, Phatthalung, Pattani, Yala,and Narathiwat. The application was opened to all Thais and there was no special quota
for local people from the southernmost provinces. The new officers received one year of
training, including a course on “way of life, language, and culture of southern Muslims.”
However, there was no particular course on human rights. The new officials began theirwork in the southernmost provinces in 2007 and are required to stay in the region for atleast five years before being allowed to transfer to other provinces.24 New police recruits
are normally allocated to all nine regions. However, all police officers recruited in the2005 fiscal year were allocated to the Ninth Region because of the urgent need for
manpower.25 This recruitment process has a good prospect for improving the quality ofpolice officers because the recruits are likely to be more prepared and willing to work in
the region, unlike in the past when police were sent to the region as a punishment or
because they were unable to get other posts which were more competitive. Moreover, thefact that they will stay for at least five years should mean more continuity in their work.
Shortage of manpower is not the only problem. Police on the ground are also slack,inefficient, and sometimes have little understanding of the government’s overall policies
on tackling the insurgency. When the author walked into the office of the police’s
Forward Command, there was a banner posted on a wall saying “the enemy is not thatstrong, but we ourselves are weak.” Since late 2005, the National Police Bureau has
provided anti-terrorism training to strengthen the police force in the deep south. Normally,
police are not trained to fight with guerrillas in unconventional warfare but are trained todeal with ordinary criminal cases in peaceful situations.26 Therefore, it is necessary togive them anti-terrorism training and to teach them how to win the hearts and minds ofthe population. Major General Woraphong said that it was important to “tune the thinkingof high-ranking and low-ranking officials,” because police on the ground sometimes
misinterpret the policies of their supervisors.
Police are aware that misconduct and human rights abuse are key problems thatcause deep-seated mistrust and hatred towards them among local Muslims. Senior police
insisted that silent abductions and killings, which were done by officials in the past, have“ended.” However, villagers believe otherwise. Some think that the practices havecontinued in a different form—disguised as ordinary daily shootings and blamed them on
Muslim insurgents. Some suspect that Buddhist self-defense groups, such as the Ruam
Thai group,27 might turn themselves into vigilantes and take justice into their own handsby executing Muslims to retaliate against the killing of their co-religionists by suspected 80 

Muslim insurgents. However, senior official like Major General Woraphong denied suchallegations. He said “one policeman wanted to take revenge for his colleagues and asked
me if I wanted him to do it. I told him that we are doing our duty. If he dies, we should
accept it. It will never end, if we shoot back. Instead, we should think about what to do inorder to earn love and respect (from the people).” However, Major General Woraphongaccepted that some police are still responsible for misconduct such as extortion, though
he had explained to his men the dangers this might cause. Villagers will not protect
policemen if insurgents want to harm them. By contrast, insurgents will lose mass support
if they kill officials who are loved and respected by villagers. The Bureau penalizes
inefficient officials by transferring them to the Forward Command but there is no policy
to move them out of the region. The Bureau also provides incentives to attract capable
officials to work in the violence-plagued region by increasing per diem and promotion
opportunities.28
In this section I have discussed the structure of operations and recruitment processof security officials and would like to draw the following conclusions. First, there is a
general understanding among military and police that military solutions and heavyhanded tactics cannot end the violent insurgency. The fact that several military and police
officials who had experience dealing with communists during the Cold War have beenchosen to lead the security operation in the south suggests that the government realizes
that this war can only be won by winning the hearts and minds of local Muslims. Humanrights protection is at the heart of such an effort. This fact should discourage humanrights violation on the part of the government. However, the problem lies in thetranslation of policy into practice. Some officials on the ground still believe that respectfor human rights is an obstacle to the crackdown on insurgents.
Second, the rotation of army officials on a one-year basis has negative effects on
the continuity and effectiveness of security operations. There is virtually no screening
process for soldiers rotated from other regions, and there is no information about their
human rights records. However, this problem should be reduced to some extent after theestablishment of the Fifteenth Infantry Division is completed in 2009. On the part of thepolice, the recruitment of some one thousand non-commissioned officers holds a goodprospect for improvement in the respect for human rights because the new officials havemore willingness to work in the south than those in the past who mostly did not choose to
be posted there. The five-year period of their stay should improve the continuity andquality of their work. The offer of incentives should also attract more capable security
officials to work in the region.

The Emergency Decree and human rights violations
It is not only the inappropriate behavior of individuals that causes human rights
abuse. The problem lies in the very structure of the state. In other words, laws andgovernment policies provide the framework which allows officials to carry out acts that
violate human rights. After the 4 January raid on the Narathiwat Rachanakarin depot, themilitary declared martial law in the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, andNarathiwat in order to provide a legal framework for the army to carry out its duty. Undermartial law, the military is allowed to conduct searches without warrants and detain
suspects without charges for seven days, renewable to a maximum of fourteen days.

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Because different agencies operate under different laws, officials on the groundurged the government to harmonize several laws related to government’s operations inthe south in order to prevent confusion. The government of Thaksin Shinawatra, therefore,
promulgated an “Executive Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations”
on 19 July 2005 to replace the martial law imposed in the three southernmost provinces.29
The provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat were declared “an area of serious
emergency.” There were widespread criticisms after the government imposed the state ofserious emergency in the south. The law was deemed to give sweeping power to thegovernment. Officials are allowed to make arrests with court consent,30 and detain people
in a place other than prison for seven days, extendable for a maximum period of thirty
days.31 Officials can call suspected persons for questioning.32 The government can censor
news, and bar the printing or sale of media items which could cause misunderstanding or
undermine national security and the public peace.33 The decree also allows officials to tap
phones and search documents “to stop serious incidents.” 34 These sections directly
undermine the people’s rights to communicate and express their opinions as stipulated in
the constitution. Besides, this law also exempts officials from any civil, criminal, anddisciplinary penalties “if such act was performed in good faith, non-discriminatory, and was
not unreasonable in the circumstances or did not exceed the extent of necessity.”35 This clause
was included at the request of officials on the ground because they are afraid of being penalized
for carrying out acts in the line of duty.36 The concern had increased after three high-ranking
military officials were transferred following the Tak Bai incident which resulted in thedeath of eighty-five protesters. Anand Panyarachun, chairman of the governmentsponsored National Reconciliation Commission, expressed concern that the imposition of
the Emergency Decree, which he called “a license to kill,” would exacerbate thesituation.37
There have been several cases of human rights violation, mostly related to arrestand detention of suspected Muslim insurgents. In order to understand these operations, I
will briefly explain how the security forces classify insurgents based on their level ofinvolvement.
Group I, suspected persons with arrest warrant, includes those for whom theauthorities have solid evidence of being involved in shootings, bombings, or arson attacks.
They will be dealt with by the police in accordance with the criminal law.
Group II, suspected persons without arrest warrant, includes those whom theauthorities strongly suspect of being involved in shootings, bombings or arson attacks but
have no solid evidence to apply for an arrest warrant. The military deals with this groupusing section 11(1) of the Emergency Decree. In practice, a district chief, a police officerof colonel rank, and a military officer of lieutenant-colonel rank heading a provincial task
force need to agree among themselves before requesting a warrant from the court. This isdesigned to create a check-and-balance system to prevent officials from abusing theirpower and filing groundless charges. Suspects are detained and interrogated either in
Ingkhayuth-Borihan military camp or the National Police Bureau’s Forward Command in
Yala. They may be sent for re-education under the “Peace Building School” project
operated by the military.38
Group III, rank and file members, includes those who have secondary and noncriminal roles, such as throwing metal spikes on roads, distributing leaflets, mobilizing
mass support, or finding financial support. According to section 11(2) of the Emergency

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Decree, the authorities can call them in for questioning by issuing a “warrant forquestioning.” This requires approval by police, military and interior officials, as in thecase of Group II. This group may also be sent for re-education.
Group IV, sympathizers, are those who support the insurgents but have taken nopart in the movement. They may have become involved because they have beenpressured by the insurgents. The authorities invite them, in some case with the consent of
their parents, to attend classes in the Peace Building School.39
The detention guidelines of the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building
Command state that “officials must carry out searches with sensitivity and uphold therule of law. They should try their utmost not to cause any problems for innocent people.
They should be particularly sensitive to religious beliefs and local culture, and try tobuild unity among people of all religions.” Relatives can visit suspected persons in GroupII and III three days after the arrest. The visiting hours are 9.00–10.00 am. and 2.30–3.30
pm. and a maximum of 30 minutes per day. The authorities may file charges against thesuspected persons if the evidence is solid, or send them for re-education for at least ten
days.40
Security operations under this framework create problems of human rights
violations which I would like to discuss as follows.
1. The arrest of suspects in Groups II and III under the provision of the Emergency
Decree has been carried out on the basis of weak evidence. A case in point is the arrest ofnineteen Muslim teachers of Thammawittaya Mulniti private Islamic school in Yala on
25–6 March 2006. The teachers were arrested after they traveled to Sam Island in Satun
province for a seminar. They were accused of plotting to instigate violent attacks. Theirlawyers submitted a petition to the provincial court calling for the teachers to be released
as the accusation was groundless. After fourteen days in detention, the court ordered theirrelease.41 Lieutenant General Ongkorn Thongprasom, the Fourth Army commander, told
reporters that… it was doubtful why they have to hold a meeting there since there is nobody livingon that island. And Satun is a route to go to Aceh which security force and marine
police have long been keeping an eye on. So, they deserve to be arrested. Besides,
Thammawittaya (Mulniti) School is on the watch list of schools involved in theinsurgency. The school’s former headmaster was Sapae-ing Baso, and the police has
set an award of 10 million Baht for any tip-off that lead to his arrest. He has an arrest
warrant and is believed to have fled to Malaysia. However, there is no solid evidence
and the school (teachers) insist that they held a meeting to plan their teaching. We
42have to let them go because we don’t want to create problems.

This case shows that police arrested the teachers without having any solid evidence.
Although the police’s action came under the provisions of the Emergency Decree, itcaused outrage among southern Muslims for unfair treatment by the security forces.
The “blacklist” system can also be counterproductive. Each security unit treats its
blacklist as confidential and normally will not share the list with other government
agencies. Hence, there are loopholes and inaccuracies in the blacklist because of the lackof cross-checking among agencies. The blacklist then becomes a convenient tool for
retaliation. Those who want to taint their enemies’ reputation can simply supply
misinformation that such persons have taken part in the violent insurgency. People whoare arrested and released may face difficulties in living in their home village because

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neighbors view them as a possible government spies. In the case of religious leaders,arrest may mean very serious embarrassment.
The tactic of pressuring suspected insurgents to surrender to the authorities canhave negative consequences. Security officials threaten to issue arrest warrants for thoserefusing to obey invitations to meet with the authorities or be summoned for questioning.
If someone persistently resists such summonses, they may be upgraded from Group IV toGroup III or Group II. Such tactics force some Muslims to flee and seek refuge with theirrelatives in the neighboring country of Malaysia. A case in point is the 131 Muslims who
fled to Malaysia in August 2005 and have not returned to their homeland (as of February2008), citing concern for their safety. If more Muslims flee to Malaysia, it will exacerbate
bilateral problems between Thailand and Malaysia.
2. The security forces conduct searches and arrests with heavy-handedness and do
not abide by the law. In some instances, officials round up suspected insurgents withoutarrest warrants. A case in point is the arrest of Ama Sueme on 17 September 2005 while
he was riding a motorcycle to pick up his wife in Pattani’s Mae Lan district. The police
who approached him only had a copy of his identity card.43 Moreover, there are cases inwhich the security forces detain suspected insurgents longer than thirty days, themaximum period of detention without charges allowed under the Emergency Decree. A
military official in Narathiwat held a suspect for more than the maximum period because
he was afraid that the person would return to the area to stage violent attacks.44
3. Suspected persons arrested under the provision of the Emergency Decree are
denied access to lawyers—a basic right of the accused. Detainees in Group II and III are
not allowed to have lawyers because the authorities claim that they are not “charged
suspects” . Shortly after the enactment of the Emergency Decree, the National
Reconciliation Commission proposed to government that suspected persons should haveaccess to lawyers within forty-eight hours but the proposal was dismissed. Police Major
General Woraphong said that suspected persons have a tendency to confess if they don’t
have a lawyer. He admitted that such regulations may undermine the suspected persons’rights, but the police are certain that they “round up the right men.”45
4. Relatives are not allowed to visit suspected persons during the detention period.
Police Major General Woraphong said that detainees are generally allowed to meet
visitors. However, police made some exceptions if they are concerned that relatives might
try to mislead suspected persons into refusing to confess their wrongdoing. He said that if
suspected persons are sons of Muslim teachers, they may not be allowed to meet
visitors. 46 In some cases, the authorities fail to inform relatives where the suspected
persons are held, leaving them wandering around from one police station to another to get
this very basic information. Some villagers travel for several hours by public buses only
to be told that the visiting time is up and they have to come back on the following day.
The traveling cost is a big burden for poor villagers.
5. Police continue to use torture as a method to force suspects into confession.
Shortly after the 4 January 2004 raid, police widely used this method to force detainees toconfess, partly driven by the pressure from the government for an all-out manhunt.47 A
defendant in the depot raid case testified to the court that police covered his head with aplastic bag, beat him and then shorted his genitals with electrical currents. 48 Muslim
lawyers interviewed by the author think that police investigation procedures are generally
better than in the past. However, torture of suspects continues to occur. A recent case was 84 

the arrest of Ashari Samaae and four other suspects on 21 July 2007. Security forces
arrested five Muslim men from a hut in Yala’s Krong Pinang district, claiming that they
were members of the “RKK” or military unit of the insurgent movement. Ashari received
a severe brain injury and later died at Yala Hospital. Colonel Shinnawat Maendej,
commander of Task Force I, explained that the injury was caused by fighting whensecurity forces attempted to arrest him. Medical doctors were unable to perform a brain
operation because his identity was unknown at the time and his relatives could not bereached to give consent to the operation—a requirement for brain surgery.49
Moreover, the police used other psychological methods to pressure suspected
persons into confession, such as turning on bright lights in interrogation rooms aroundthe-clock, conducting interrogation for extremely long hours, and keeping suspected
persons in extremely cold conditions.50
6. Government agencies compete with their counterparts to get Muslims who are
categorized as Group IV or sympathizers to “report” themselves to the government so as
to show the agency’s “achievement” in winning the hearts and minds of the Muslims. A
villager Masobuelee Jehyae, 37, appealed to the interior minister, Kongsak Wantana,
during a ceremony to welcome 137 sympathizers at Yala provincial hall on 10 December
2005, saying that he had been coerced to come. Masoluelee, a resident of Yala’s Raman
district, said that he recently received a letter inviting him to join this activity and district
officials had tried to convince him to come. He said “there is a severe flooding at myhouse and I have to relocate 5,000 chickens in my farm from the flooded area. I didn’t
sleep the whole night but the district officials forced me to report myself. I have not done
anything wrong. I’m very sad that my name is on the government’s blacklist.” Other
villagers told similar stories. Ma, who goes by one name, said that the district chief ofBetong asked him and other villagers to attend a meeting to explain about the Emergency
Decree about two months earlier and asked him to sign his name. On 9 December, a subdistrict chief showed him a letter and said that he had to report himself at the Yalaprovincial hall. If he attended the ceremony and the 20-day training, his name would be
erased from the list. Ma said, “I was also confused why I have to come because I have notdone anything wrong. My house has never been searched and I have never beeninterrogated. But, the deputy district chief said that I have to come and so I come.”51
Innocent Muslims, who face similar experiences of finding their names mistakenly
included in the blacklists and being forced to report themselves to the government, may
feel that they are treated unfairly. It may seem to be a quick and quantifiable achievement
to get as many Muslims as possible to report themselves and to show loyalty to the state,but it will be counterproductive in the government’s effort to win the hearts and minds of
Malay Muslims in the long run.
7. Extrajudicial killing, especially silent abduction and murder, has continued for
decades in the southernmost provinces. The state is still unable to clarify several cases ofdisappearance. A sub-committee to coordinate efforts to trace disappeared people andheal victims of violence in the southernmost provinces calculated that at least twenty-two
people had disappeared since 2002.52 Two were taken away by people wearing official
uniforms; three had their house searched prior to their disappearance; three disappeared
after going to see officials; three were taken away by unidentified people; and noinformation was available for eleven others. A recent case was the disappearance of fouryoung Muslims in Pattani’s Mueang district on 1 November 2005. One of them had just 85 

been acquitted of the murder of a university student at Prince of Songkhla University at
Pattani.53
Moreover, there seem to be increasing numbers of silent killing of suspected
insurgents, despite the government’s denial. It is a tedious and time-consuming process togather evidence to prove someone’s guilt in the court, and some officials choose the
kangaroo court instead. Information from military officials and journalists suggest thatthose on the blacklists have been executed in circumstances similar to daily shootings forwhich no culprits are found. There are suspicions that those carrying out such acts are
low-ranking officials or semi-officials such as paramilitary rangers.
Paramilitary rangers have been notorious for being state-sponsored killers in thesouthernmost region before the 4 January raid. They are paid by the numbers of “heads”
that they execute.54 Only a handful of their immediate colleagues are informed. In someinstances, the ranger unit’s commander might issue an order to “get rid of” people whoare believed to be insurgent leaders but for whom there is no solid evidence to prosecute.
A deputy commander of a ranger unit said in interview that extrajudicial killings occurred
after the raid of 4 January 2004. However, the trend seemed to decline because superior
officers were not willing to take responsibility or protect their subordinates for carrying
out unlawful acts.55 However, some human rights observers think otherwise.
There are concerns that emerging armed self-defense groups sponsored by thegovernment may turn themselves into vigilante groups and take justice into their own
hands. There is a fear that communal violence might break out if the situation continues
to exacerbate. Several government agencies began to arm and mobilize civilian forces,
particularly among the Buddhist minority, including Chut raksa muban (Cho Ror Bor)
under the Interior Ministry and Asasamak raksa muban (Or Ror Bor) under the royal aidde-camp. There is also a predominantly Buddhist self-defense group called Ruam Thai,
which is supported by Police Colonel Phitak Eadkiew. The military believes the Ruam
Thai group might have been behind shootings of Muslims, although Colonel Phitak
insists that he only trained Buddhists to use guns for self-defense and to be the eyes andears of the authorities. He did not encourage them to shoot innocent Muslims.56 A young
Buddhist who joined the Ruam Thai group said that “police told me that if you think thatany person is an insurgent, (you) just shoot him. And they will try to help me escape any
penalties.”57 Colonel Phitak was accused of malfeasance and ordered to be transferred outof the region in June 2007. However, the order was abruptly halted after hundreds of
Buddhists staged a protest against the transfer. He was finally transferred to an
insurgency-free district in Songkhla in the 2007 annual reshuffle in November. Allegationsof state-sponsored killing have been used by insurgents to wage propaganda warfare andsow seeds of hatred against the Thai government. Incidents include the killing of three
Muslim teachers during an evening praying in Pattani,58 the assassination of an imam in
Lahan village,59 the killing of two Muslims in Tanyonglimo village,60 and the slaughter ofnine Awaebuesa family members in Kathong village in Narathiwat. 61 It is sometimes
difficult to prove whether such allegations have any grounds. However, it is vital for
security forces to try their utmost to ensure that no official commits any unlawful acts inorder to prevent insurgents from exploiting such mistakes in their political propaganda.

 86 Conclusion
The interim government of Surayud Chulanont (October 2006 to January 2008)
publicly stated that the authorities will strictly uphold the rule of law in dealing with
Muslim insurgency, and vowed not to use heavy-handed methods to crack down on
insurgents, as did the Thaksin government. Although the policy reversal won a great dealof praise, it has not been effectively translated into practice. Human rights violation has
continued, including disappearance, torture, and state-sponsored silent killings. It is apositive step for the government to have set up a committee to investigate some of thesecases. However, the investigation should be carried out with transparency and efficiency,
and the results should be made public. This will help build confidence in government
among southern Muslims in the long run.
There will be an increase in the proportion of the security forces who arepermanently in place rather than subject to rotation. This is a positive development thatwill help increase continuity and improve efficiency in the security forces’ operations,and enable officials to learn more about the culture and beliefs of local Muslims. The
recruitment process for the security forces holds out good prospects for getting betterquality officials to work in the violence-plagued zones, unlike in the past when mostofficials did not choose to work there or were sent there as a punishment. The policy tofind 60 per cent of conscripts each year among local Muslims will allow the military to
be more acquainted with local people. The security forces have learned that this war
cannot be won by force but by winning the hearts and minds of southern Muslims who
have long felt alienated from Thai society.
The legal framework under the Emergency Decree violates the rights of the accused.
The Decree allows the security forces to hold suspected persons without charge for up to
thirty days during which time they are denied access to lawyer. Moreover, thegovernment is inclined to enact more draconian laws to deal with the security threat. The
Internal Security Act was passed in December 2007, a few days before the militaryinstalled interim parliament was dissolved, despite strong public criticism. The law grants
more power to the military to control security matters in the country.
The government’s inability to curtail violence, the delay of judicial process, and theheightened tension between Buddhists and Muslims accumulated over the past four years
has the potential to lead to all-out communal violence. Many might opt for summary
processes to settle conflicts rather than awaiting court verdicts. The emergence of
Buddhist vigilantes and allegations of tit-for-tat killings is a worrying trend. If thesituation worsens to the point that it becomes a war of “an eye for an eye”, human rights
may mean nothing more than who is fastest on the trigger.

Endnotes
1

Surachart Bumrungsuk, Nawatthakam khwam mankhong: rabob ngan khwam mankhong mai
khong thai (Innovation in Security: New Security System in Thailand), (Bangkok: Animate Group,2004), pp. 23–4.
2
I have obtained such information from personal communication with several academics andMuslim politicians. General Panlop Pinmanee, former deputy commander of the Internal Security

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Operations Command, said in an interview with Matichon daily (12 November 2006) that “the prime
minister [Thaksin Shinawatra] asked Sant [Sarutanond, police chief] how many insurgents are left.
Sant said that there were about fifteen to sixteen people. The prime minister gave Sant a hand signal
and said that’s easy. After that, Sant dispatched ‘killer’ police Major General Kamronwit Thupkrajang
to the south and that’s why problems are happening nowadays.”
3
Author’s interview with Kitti Kitichokwattana, former SBPAC deputy director in charge of
security affairs and former Yala governor, 4 November 2006.
4
The interim government of prime minister Surayud Chulanont, which took office after a military
coup which ousted Thaksin Shinawatra, made significant changes in the structure of government
agencies handling problems in the southernmost provinces. He revived the SBPAC and CPM43,
which were dissolved by Thaksin. He empowered the Internal Security Operations Command, which
was a key counter-insurgency organization during the Cold War era. The ISOC oversees overall
policies towards the deep south. Surayud dissolved the SBPPBC. I do not discuss the new structure
because there is no clear detail at the time of writing.
5
Interview with Colonel Chawalit Srisilphanan, deputy commander of the Sri Sunthorn Task Force,on 28 December 2005. Colonel Chawalit is also from the Special Warfare Unit.
6
Interview with Colonel Akara Thiprot, army spokesman, 26 December 2005.
7
Interview with Colonel Chawalit Srisilphanan, 28 December 2005.
8
Interview with Colonel Akara Thiprot, 26 December 2005.
9
The army does not use troops from the Third Army which is in charge of the north because it isoverwhelmed with work to crack down on drug trafficking along the Thai-Myanmar border.
10
There are three units of Border Patrol Police in charge of the south. First, BPP 43 is in charge ofSongkhla, Phatthalung, Trang, and Satun and therefore is responsible for the four violence-ravaged
districts in Songkhla. BPP 43 has mobilized some 1,500 police to work in the four restive districts.
The second is BPP 44 unit which comprises some 800 men and is in charge of Yaha and Kabang
districts. The last consisting of some 1,000 police has replaced the National Police Bureau’s special
operation unit which completed their one-year rotation. Interview with Police Colonel Somphong
Khonkaen, TF 4 commander, 29 December 2005.
11
Interview with Lieutenant-General Malai Kiewthiang, commander of Santisuk Task Forcebetween October 2005 and April 2006.
12
See http://www.geocities.com/taharnpran4/history.htm.
13Interview with Colonel Somchat Premchit, commander of the Forty-third Ranger Regiment, 30
December 2005.
14
Interview with Colonel Somchat Premchit, 30 December 2005.
15
Interview with Major General Samret Srirai, commander of the Sri Sunthorn Task Force, 20
April 2006.
16
Interview with Major General Samret Srirai by telephone, 14 October 2006.
17
The Bangkok Post’s military beat reporter Wassana Nanuam wrote in her book that it was
General Surayud Chulanont who issued the ten commandments when he was supreme commander.
See Wassana Nanuam, Saen thang lek: phon aek surayud chulanont chak luk communit su pho bo thobo (Path of Iron: General Surayud Chulanont from the son of a communist to army commander)(Bangkok: Matichon, 2004), p. 151.
18
Interview with Major General Samret Srirai, 20 April 2006.
19
Somchai was taken into a car by several men, including plainclothes police, on a road in
Bangkok. Nobody has seen him since. He disappeared after submitting a letter to the Interior Ministry,
the National Human Rights Commission and other government agencies to call for investigations on
police torture. He accused police officers of torturing five suspected Muslim insurgents alleged tohave been involved in the depot raid on 4 January 2004. He wrote that police used electric shocks on

 88 

the suspects’ sexual organs, covered their heads with plastic bags, and poured urine into their mouths.
Five police officers were arrested in connection with Somchai’s disappearance and charged withillegal detention and robbery. The Criminal Court sentenced Police Major Nguen Thongsuk to three
years in prison. He was found to have forced Somchai into the car. Four others were acquitted forlacking of evidence. The Department of Special Investigations resumed the investigation but there has
been no tangible progress. Thaksin Shinawatra told reporters shortly after the court ruling that there
was solid evidence to believe that Somchai was dead.
20
Interview with Police Major General Woraphong Siewpricha on 21 April 2006. He was latertransferred out of the region and became the commander of the Seventh Region overseeing the upper
south.
21
Interview with Yala police commissioner Major General Paithoon Chuchaiya, 26 December
2005
22Interview with Pattani police commissioner Major General Kokiat Wongworachat, 28 December
2005.
23
There is one Special Operations Unit in each province, in charge of providing help in case of
emergency. There are twelve police officers in one squad and three squads in one platoon. The Unit
has been trained for anti-terrorist operations.
24
Announcement of the Ninth Region on the recruitment of non-commissioned officers in 2006.
25
Interview with Police Colonel Noppadol Pueksomon, who was in charge of the Ninth Region’s
manpower management, on 14 May 2006. He later became deputy police commissioner in Narathiwat.
He was transferred back to the Ninth Region’s office and became deputy commissioner after he wasseriously injured and lost one leg in a bombing.
26
Interview with Police Colonel Noppadol Pueksomon, 14 May 2006.
27
The Ruam Thai (Thai unity) group was set up in late 2005 by Police Colonel Phitak Eadkiew,superintendent for investigation in Yala. Phitak said that he set up the self-defense group to enable local
people to assist police in maintaining security. I discuss his activities later in more details.
28
Interview with Police Major General Woraphong Siewpricha, 21 April 2006.
29
After the army commander, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, led a military coup to depose Thaksin
Shinawatra on 19 September 2006, martial law was imposed throughout the country. Both martial law
and the Emergency Decree have been used concurrently in the violence-plagued south. Although themilitary-installed interim government lifted martial law in most parts of the country, it remained in
effect in the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat and five districts inSongkhla even after a civilian government was installed (as of February 2008). This article focuses on
the period before martial law was imposed after the coup.
30
Under Section 11 (1), the prime minister has the power “to issue a Notification that a competent
official shall have the power of arrest and detention over persons suspected of having a role in causing
the emergency situation, or being an instigator, a propagator, a supporter of such act or concealing
relevant information relating to the act which caused the emergency situation, provided that thisshould be done to the extent that is necessary to prevent such person from committing an act orparticipating in the commission of any act which may cause a serious situation or to foster cooperationin the termination of the serious situation.”
31
Section 12: “In arresting and taking suspected persons into custody under section 11(1), thecompetent official shall apply for leave of a court of competent jurisdiction or the Criminal Court.
Upon obtaining leave of the court, the competent official shall be empowered to arrest and take thesuspected persons into custody for a period not exceeding seven days. The suspected persons shall betaken into custody at a designated place which is not a police station, detention centre, penal
institution or prisons and shall not be treated as a convict. In case where it is necessary to continue thedetention in order to remedy the emergency situation, the competent official shall apply for the leaveof the court to extend such detention period by seven days at a time, provided that the total period

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shall not exceed thirty days. Upon the expiration of such period, if the detention is still required, thecompetent official shall proceed under the Criminal Procedure Code.”32
Under Section 11 (2), the prime minister has the power “to issue a Notification that a competent
official shall have the power to summon any person to report to the competent official or to give an
oral statement or submit any documents or evidence relating to the emergency situation.”
33
Under Section 9 (3), the prime minister has the power to issue regulations “to prohibit the press
release, distribution or dissemination of letters, publications or any means of communication
containing texts which may instigate fear amongst the people or is intended to distort information
which misleads understanding of the emergency situation to the extent of affecting the security of stateor public order or good moral of the people both in the area or locality where an emergency situation
has been declared or the entire Kingdom.”
34
Under Section 11 (5), the prime minister has the power “to issue a Notification that a competent
official shall have the power to issue an order to inspect letters, books, printed matters, telegraphictransmissions, telephone communications or any other means of communication as well as to cancel
or suspend any contact or communication in order to prevent or terminate the serious incident
provided that the rules prescribed in the law on special investigation are complied with mutatis
mutandis.”35
Section 17: “A competent official and a person having identical powers and duties as acompetent official under this Emergency Decree shall not be subject to civil, criminal or disciplinary
liabilities arising from the performance of functions for the termination or prevention of an illegal act
if such act was performed in good faith, non-discriminatory, and was not unreasonable in thecircumstances or exceed[ed] the extent of necessity, but [this] does not preclude the right of a victim
to seek compensation from a government agency under the law on liability for wrongful act ofofficials.”
36
Deputy prime minister Wisanu Krua-ngam in a press conference on 19 July 2005.
37
The National Reconciliation Commission was set up by the government of Thaksin Shinawatra
to lay out long-term strategies to quell violence in the south. Anand made this remark on a televised
discussion with Thaksin on how to tackle violence in the south, 28 July 2005.
38
The Peace Building School re-educates suspects in Group II, III and IV on “how to live in a
democratic society which has the king as the head of the state.” The training is organized not in thethree southernmost provinces but other areas, including Bangkok and Lopburi (where the Special
Warfare Unit is located). Concern has been raised how much this re-education is useful for changing
the minds of young militant Muslims.
39
See ‘Guidelines on how to handle target groups according to the Emergency Decree,’ adocument of the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command.
40‘Guidelines of the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command on government
operations in accordance with section 11 of the Emergency Decree,’ 12 August 2005.
41
Interview with Adilan Ali Ishak of the Society of Muslim Lawyers, 21 April 2006.
42
See ‘Reflection on the Emergency Decree as seen through the arrest of 19 Thammawittaya
Ustazs,’ in Isara News Agency, www.tjanews.org, 19 April 2006.
43
Information made available from Pornphen Kongkachornkiet, a staffer of Amnesty International
who visited a prison in Pattani on 13 December 2005.
44
Colonel Surasak Kanchanarat, deputy chief of the army’s Civilian Affairs Department, said
during a conference on the Peace Building School project, 26 April 2006.
45
Interview with Police Major General Woraphong Siewpricha, 21 April 2006.
46
Interview with Police Major General Woraphong Siewpricha, 21 April 2006.
47
Interview with several lawyers defending suspects in security-related cases.
48
Makata Harong, one of the five suspects in the depot raid case, testified to the court that police

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arrested him and covered his head with a plastic bag for two days. He found himself at the Narathiwat
airport when police took off the bag. The five suspects were flown to the Bangkok Remand Prison.
Police brought a document for him to sign in the prison, which he did without reading. He wasblindfolded, beaten, and shorted with electrical current at his genitals. Another suspect, Sukri Maming,
said that four officials tried to convince him to confess that he had stolen the weapons and been
involved in school arson. While he was denying the charges, they shorted his genitals with electricalcurrent, blindfolded him, hit his head with a chair, and pouring urine into his mouth. Somchai
Neelaphaichit, their lawyer, wrote an appeal to the Interior Ministry and other relevant government
agencies. Somchai disappeared shortly after he submitted the petition. The Criminal Court later
acquitted the five Muslim suspects.
49Interview with Colonel Shinnawat Maendej by telephone, 28 July 2007.
50
Interview with Adilan Ali Ishak of the Society of Muslim Lawyers, 21 April 2006.
51“News which has not been announced to the press about those who have reported themselves tohelp build peace,” Isara News Agency, www.tjanews.org, 10 December 2005.
52
This subcommittee is under the committee to oversee policy and manage the healing of victimsof violence in the southernmost provinces which was established by the prime minister’s order dated 3
May 2005. The committee was headed by deputy prime minister Chaturon Chaisaeng.
53
Document of the committee to oversee policy and manage the healing of victims of violence inthe southernmost provinces, dated 11 May 2006.
54
Interview of a paramilitary ranger who was involved in five killings and murdered fourteen
suspected insurgents in the late 1990s by local journalists in November 2005, made available to theauthor.
55
Interview with deputy commander of a ranger unit, who wanted his name to be withheld, 23
April 2006.
56
Interview with Colonel Phitak Eadkiew, 21 April 2006.
57
Interview with a Ruam Thai member, who wanted his name to be withheld, 29 October 2006.
58
Three religious teachers were shot dead during evening prayers in Pattani on 20 July 2005, a day
after the Emergency Decree was promulgated. One of the slain teachers was Riduan Waemanor, agraduate from Ramkhamhaeng University and a son of the headmaster of Jihad Wittaya private
Islamic school. The school was closed down after it was raided by security forces and alleged to be anarmed training ground for insurgents. Riduan’s father fled because he was accused of being a key
insurgent leader. There were suspicions that the three might have been killed by security forces
because they were shot by a gun fitted with a silencer. It was unlikely that ordinary people would havesuch a weapon. However, there is no solid proof that the security forces did it.
59
Satopa Usoh, an imam in Lahan village in Narathiwat’s Su-ngai Padi, was shot dead on 29
August 2005. According to villagers’ accounts, the imam was shot by a man in military uniform while
he was walking home after the evening prayers. He told his family before he died that a soldier shot
him. Villagers blocked the entrance into the village and barred officials from entering. No one outside
the village saw the imam’s body and the authorities were unable to perform an autopsy because his
body was buried within twenty-four hours according to Islamic practice. Although the military denied
involvement in the shooting, villagers believed otherwise. This incident partly sparked the flight to
Malaysia of 131 Muslims, some of whom told Malaysian media that they feared the security forces
would threaten their lives.
60
The shooting spree at a teashop in Tanyonglimo village in Narathiwat’s Ra-ngae district on 21
September 2005 killed two and injured three Muslims. Gunmen on a motorcycle opened fire at the
teashop and fled away. Shortly after, police came to investigate the incident, followed by a few plainclothes marines. As the crowd began to gather, officials felt the danger and immediately fled. Twomarines, however, were held hostage overnight and villagers believed that they were involved in theshooting. The authorities held negotiations with villagers on the following day to demand release of

 91 

the two marines. The government heeded a call to bring in Malaysian media to witness the release of
the two marines. However, the marines were beaten to death under confusing circumstance shortly
before the Malaysian media arrived.
61
On 16 November 2005, Sudeng Awaebuesa and eight family members, including an eight monthold baby, were shot dead in their house in the middle of the night in Narathiwat’s Ra-ngae district. The
military claimed that it was the work of insurgents. However, Malaysia’s Berita Harian Newspaper
reported, citing a resident in Katong village, that the shooting was carried out by the military. See‘Victims’ relatives and Katong villagers go across the border to meet Malaysian media, telling thetruth about the family’s slaughter,’ Isara News Agency, www.tjanews.org, 21 November 2005.

 92 

4
The internal culture of military units and its impact on theconflict resolution in Thailand’s far south
Col. Pimonpan Ukoskit

The growing insurgency in the three southern provinces since the raid on the
Narathiwat armory on 4 January 2004 has serious ramifications for Thailand’s national
security. Local residents fear for their safety while government officials and public
facilities have become prime targets for militants in the separatist insurgency. The
continuing violence has clearly disrupted economic activities, divided the community,and undermined the political life and security of the region. In response, the governmenthas been trying every avenue to restore peace and stability. The government hasannounced major investment and development programs, one of which is a plan to turnthe southern region into a center for halal food production. Several job creation projects
have been launched to increase employment opportunities and household income. On thesocial front, the traditional educational system has been reorganized, and religious
schools integrated into the mainstream. Politically, a number of special administrative
bodies have been convened including the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building
Command and the National Reconciliation Commission to encourage political dialogue.
At the same time, the army has mobilized a large number of troops to the troubled region
to enforce law and order. These measures indicate that the government has adopted amultifaceted approach to tackle the southern insurgency.
Crucially, the army has been a key agent in this effort. Troops are deployed fromother localities such as from the First, Second, and Fourth Army Regions. As a result,forces from various units serve in the three southernmost provinces on a rotating basis,
with each unit stationed for a year.
The operation of each military unit is directed by the central command. Yet, each
unit has its own culture. This chapter investigates whether the variety of cultures ofindividual military units stationed in the south on a rotating basis affects the efforts tocombat the insurgency. What is the military’s strategy to defuse the situation in the south?
What are the characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses of the internal cultures of various
military units? How might these military cultures affect security operations in the south?
How do military units with differing cultures execute their duties?
This chapter focuses on the operational staffs of army units stationed in the south
during the period from October 2004 to September 2005. Two units were selected fromeach of the First, Second, and Fourth Regional Armies. These six units were stationed in
all three provinces where most incidents took place namely Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat.
The units were as follows.
Two units from the First Regional Army, headquartered in Bangkok and responsible
for the country's western and central provinces including the capital city: 93 

the Eleventh Infantry Regiment, Royal Guards, which goes by the code name ofPetcharavudh Task Force (CK-36), operating in Tak Bai and Su-ngai Kolok districtsof Narathiwat Province;
the Second Infantry Regiment, Royal Guards, which is referred to as the 201st
Infantry Battalion Special Task Force (PR-201), operating in Waeng and Sukhirin
districts of Narathiwat Province.

Two units from the Second Regional Army, headquartered in Nakhon Ratchasima
and responsible for the northeast:
the Thirteenth Infantry Regiment, known in the south as PRCK-132, operating inChanae district of Narathiwat Province;
the Twenty-third Infantry Regiment, known in the south as PRCK-231, operating in
Mueang and Nong Chik districts of Pattani Province.

Two units from the Fourth Regional Army, headquartered in Nakhon Si Thammarat
and responsible for southern Thailand:
the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment known in the south as CK-12, operating in Bannang
Sata, Raman, and Krong Pinang districts of Yala;
the Twenty-Fifth Infantry Regiment known in the south as PRCK-251 operating in
Cho-airong and Su-ngai Padi districts of Narathiwat Province, and Yaring, Panare,and Mayo districts of Pattani Province.

The first section of the chapter summarizes each unit’s performance, measured by
the trends in the number of incidents during their term of duty. The three following
sections analyze the internal culture and operating tactics of the units from the central
region, northeast, and south respectively. The final section draws some conclusions andmakes some recommendations.

The operational performance of military units in the far southOver the period from October 2004 to September 2005, the trend in the number ofincidents per month varied among the various units. Some units saw the number ofattacks fall while other experienced a drastic increase.
For both the units from the central region, the number of incidents fell.
Table 4-1 Trend of incidents in areas of units from the central region
CK36

PR20

Tak BaiSu-ngai
Kolok
Waeng

Oct
04
5
-

Sukhirin

Nov
04
4

Dec
Jan
Feb
Mar
04
05
05
05
8
4
7
11
average 6.5/month
1
1
4
6
1
average 2.3/month1
3
3
average 1.75/month2
average 0.50/month

Source: CK-36 and PR-201

 94 

Apr
05
5
2
2
1

May
Jun
Jul
Aug
05
05
05
05
2
1
2
1
average 3.1/month12
41
average, 2.0/month1
41
1
average 1.75month1
average 0.25/monthIn Tak Bai district, the average number of incidents was 6.5 in the first six months,
and 3.1 in the following five months. During January–August 2005, seventeen incidents
of shootings and seven bombings were reported.
In Su-ngai Kolok district, the average number of incidents was 2.3 in the first six
months, and 2.0 in the following five months. During January–August 2005, a total of ten
shootings and seven bomb attacks were reported.
In Sukhirin district, the averages were 0.50 in the first four months and 0.25 in thesubsequent four. During January–August 2005, three shootings and one bomb attack took
place.
In Waeng district, the average was 1.75 in both periods, but the nature of theincidents changed. In the first four months there were five shootings and three arson. In
the final four months there were two shootings and two arson attacks, but also four bomb
attacks.
Table 4-2 Trend of incidents in areas of units from the northeast region
PRCK132

ChanaePRCK231

Mueang

Dec
04
2

Jan
Feb
Mar
05
05
05
1
11
6
average 4.6/month

Apr
05
3

May
05
8

8
average 2.0/month

Jun
Jul
Aug
05
05
05
7
7
6
average 6.8/month

Sept
05
6

8
average 2.0/month

Nong Chik12
av. 6.0/month44
average 11.0/month

Source: PRCK-132 and PRCK-231

The units from the northeast were unable to reduce the number of incidents in theareas under their responsibility. There were more attacks in the second half of theiroperations than in the first half in all areas except Mueang district where the number ofincidents appeared unchanged.
In Chanae district of Narathiwat, the averages were 4.6 in the first five months and6.8 incidents in the following five months. During the first period, there were twentythree incidents in total—ten shootings, nine cases of arson, and four bomb attacks. In thesecond period the total rose to thirty-four—twenty-one shootings, one arson attempt, andtwelve bomb attacks.
In Mueang district of Pattani, the average was 2.0 incidents a month in both periods.
In the first period, there were seven shooting incidents with eight people dead, and one
bomb attack. In the latter period, there were five shooting incidents with three dead andeight seriously wounded, plus three arson attacks.
In Nong Chik district, the number of attacks almost doubled from 6.0 to 11.0 amonth. In the first two months, twelve incidents were reported including two shootings
with one person killed and one seriously injured, and ten arson attacks. In the following
four months, forty-four incidents were reported including eight shootings with threepeople killed and eight more wounded, plus thirteen arson attacks and six bombings. On
top, there were seventeen minor incidents involving graffiti, burning of rubber tires andnational flags, as well as scattering spikes on the road.

 95 

Table 4-3 Trend of incidents in areas of units from the south
Bannang
Sata

Oct
04
3

Nov
04
4

Dec
04
13

Jan
05
10

Feb
05
10

Mar
05
6

average 8/month

CK-12

May
05
29

Jun
05
3

Jul
05
1

Aug
05
4

5

8
12
11
average 9/month

9

7
14
30
9
4
5
average 8.6/month (excluding May)

Krong
Pinang

1

1

-

-

7

2

Choairong
Su-ngai
Padi

2

2

4

4

12

4

2

average 8.3/month

6

2

1

4

6

average 7.3/month17

1average 1.6/month (excluding May)average 2.6/month
4

Sept
05

average 4/month (excluding May)

Raman

average 2.2/month

PRCK251

Apr
05
6

3

3

average 2.6/month

Yaring8812
average 2.6/month

8
15
8
av. 10.6/month

Panarae4
3
4
average 3.6/month4
11
average 2.0/month

Mayo

2
12
11
average 8.3/month2
12
average 1.6/month

Source: CK-12 and PR-251

The CK-12 unit had been operating in the area for some time, and was generally
successful in reducing the number of incidents, with the exception of May 2005. But thehigh figures for this month are misleading. While most of the incidents in other months
involved attempts to kill or injure, those in May were more minor disturbances caused byscattering spikes on roads, burning rubber tires and national flags, spraying graffiti on
public buildings, and issuing hoax bomb warnings.
The PRCK-251 unit arrived only in the latter part of the period of study. It managed
to reduce incidents in two areas, but witnessed a large increase in Yaring.
Table 4-4 Incidents under PRCK-251 by type
Shootings
Bombings
Arson attacks
Vandalism
KilledInjuredSu-ngai
Padi
26
3
3
9
17

PanareMayo

Cho-airong

Yaring

12
2
2
5
8

17
7
6
6
11

18
5
4
4
5
38

37
2
9
15
11
37

All units reported increased levels of trust and cooperation from villagers whereonce there was only mistrust and suspicion. At the start, local residents were afraid andsuspicious of military personnel, but after the first three months, the attitudes seemed tochange for the better. Some villagers had become friendly and sympathetic while others

 96 

cooperated with the authorities and gave information about goings-on in their villages.
Some of the information proved to be useful in counter-insurgency operations.
The units from the central provinces appeared more successful than others incontaining and reducing the number of violent incidents. Those from the southern
provinces were successful in some areas but not in others. In the areas assigned to units
from the northeast, violence escalated. These variations may be due to a number offactors including the nature and the severity of conflict in each local area, the duration ofeach unit’s stay, the unit’s internal culture, and its operational strengths.

Military culture and security operations
The culture of a military unit consists of core and subsidiary values. The corecultural values have been instilled and nurtured through years of formal education andprofessional training in cadet and officer academies. Each soldier is taught to strive for
perseverance and self-discipline while embracing patriotism and showing absoluteloyalty to the monarchy. Such has been the long-held tradition within the military
establishment. There may be some who misbehave but they are few in number. In anysocial grouping, there are always good and bad people. The subsidiary values aredeveloped through the collective experience of each unit—its missions, the environment
in which it operates, and its leadership. These factors influence the soldiers’ attitudes asmuch as the core values and culture.
Military units coming from different geographical locations and backgrounds may
have different approaches toward the southern problem although they operate under thesame command structure and are subject to the same policy direction. The Southern
Border Provinces Peace Building Command instructed all units to pursue a nonviolent
approach, with political measures taking precedence over military means. The military
units were told to “win over villages” and be guided by the advice of the King “tounderstand, to reach out (to the people), and (to step up) development.”
The strategy is to win the battle at the village level. Officials were told toreestablish state power over the villages peacefully by persuading local residents to crossover to the government side. In carrying out this strategy, the rank and file on the groundmust understand, reach out, and help the people develop. In the performance of their duty,
they must show respect for Islam and local customs in order to gain people’s trust andcooperation.
As part of this policy, the main mission has been to strengthen community relations
by establishing ties with the local people. At the same time, the soldiers have to enforce
security in the area and pursue those committing violent acts. Shortcomings in one area
might frustrate efforts in another, especially the effort to win people’s trust without whicha lasting peace in the region would not be possible. As long as people in the threesouthern provinces continued to see members of the security forces abusing their power
and mistreating local Muslims, the military would not get people to cooperate. In fact,
they might become more sympathetic toward the insurgents and could be targeted as
possible recruits.
The work of the military units from the central provinces
Although both units from the central region are from the same geographical 97 

location and belong to the Royal Guard Units, their official missions and operational
experiences are different. Thus, each has its own approach to the assignment in the far
south.
Both units had received extensive briefings and training beforehand to ensure thatthey were knowledgeable about the local terrain and sensitive to the local culture andIslam. It was believed that if the troops were able to conduct themselves properly,
conflicts with villagers would be minimized.
Efforts to improve community relations, especially at the beginning of theoperations, were undermined by the negative attitudes of local people towards soldiers.
This was particularly true right after the violent crackdown of demonstrators at Tak Bai
district on 25 October 2004 when eighty-five people died. This incident fuelled the anger
and mistrust of local residents toward the security forces. A soldier recalled his
conversations with boys in his assigned area:
If you ask a Buddhist boy, he will say he wants to be a policeman or a soldier. But a
Muslim boy will say he wants to be a bandit. Why? It’s because he wants to killpolicemen and soldiers.

It was, therefore, extremely difficult for the security forces to improve theunderstanding and strengthen relationships with local people. Nevertheless, the military
units from the central provinces were able to use the fact that they served as Royal
Guards or “the king’s soldiers,” to explain that their mission was well-intentioned.
When we told them we served the king, that we were members of HM’s Royal
Guards, it sounded as if His Majesty the King has sent us to protect them and to takecare of their well-being. They understood. If the villagers understood, we’d be safe
and accepted. Then we could work to extend the goodwill to other units like therangers. They might look fierce and aggressive but we’d tell the villagers that therangers meant no harm. I then volunteered to talk to the rangers and clear up any
misunderstanding.
I’d say I’m a soldier of Their Majesties. We were sent here to improve the standardof living. Things like this meant we came here as friends. So they relaxed and nolonger feared us. Gradually, they cooperated. We’d repeat our visits after finishing
our survey for the day.

Being members of the Royal Guards facilitated the soldiers’ attempts to win trust,and even to act as intermediaries for other security forces, such as the rangers. At thesame time, the troops had to conduct themselves well in order to ensure no disrepute wasbrought to their units. The military units from the central region carried out their mission
in strict accordance with the ten basic rules of the army. Those violating the rules were
punished. There were supplementary codes of conduct for soldiers operating in the south.
They were more disciplined and closely supervised as they were bound to follow the
king’s advice. Each Royal Guard has to swear, “I will uphold and protect the honor of themonarch.” Such honorable commitment led to exceptional conduct and enabled membersof the Royal Guards to win confidence of the villagers in a short time.
In addition, the military units were involved in fund raising and distributing relief
supplies to families of those killed or injured in the Tak Bai tragedy and to the generalpublic. The CK-36 was actively engaged with religious and civic leaders, women andyouth groups that were viewed as vulnerable to persuasion by the militants. Many people

 98 

were employed under emergency job creation projects to be kept under the authorities’
watchful eyes, and some were hired as local informants.
In their relations with the communities, the units used a carrot-and-stick approachto convince people that cooperation with the authorities would bring concrete benefits. A
solider explained how he approached religious leaders.
Every time I go in, I focus on a substantive issue in order to improve ourunderstanding of one another. For instance, there are eight pondoks in [Su-ngai]
Kolok. We will provide sports equipment for any pondok on the condition that when
I’m there they will teach me about Islam for an hour in Thai. So the religious leaders
will brief us on what to do and what to avoid. When they see that we are serious,
they understand, and we then approach other community leaders to deepen theunderstanding.

A commanding officer explained about negotiating with hired motorcycle drivers:
I had a meeting with hired motorcycle taxi drivers along the border and asked them
what they wanted or what they were short of. They told me that the motorcycle
stands were so dilapidated that they could not park their vehicles. I then gave themmoney and ordered my unit to repair the stands. One of my subordinates took themoney and bought corrugated iron sheets. These drivers joined in. They were happy
to have proper shades and parking stands. Whenever they got news, they would pass
it on to us.

A soldier explained about working day laborers:
We would negotiate with them. They would said, “Captain, we are day labourers.
Can you help us? We earn only 50 baht a day. If there is no job, I don’t know what
I’ll do.” So we tried to talk with them and help as much as we could. We told themthat if they helped us with intelligence gathering, we would pay them back. In fact,
they helped us immensely.

Humanitarian effort linked with negotiation was effective. Negotiation alone
worked only when it was of mutual interest. It could backfire, however, when both sides
could not agree on the terms. Humanitarian assistance was seen as a more sincere andeffective approach that showed the units were paying attention to the well-being of thelocal people without them demanding it. For instance, one unit won trust by reacting toan appeal for help from a village hit by a severe storm.
At one time, there was a power blackout in the whole district. It was at the height of
insurgent activities, so we were on high alert at our base. While the storm was raging,a village leader called me and said, “Captain, the village was hit badly by the storm.
Our homes were completely destroyed.” It was close to midnight. My subordinates
warned me but I thought that if we managed to render assistance here, the village
would be ours. I then decided to send my staff for the relief operation. We drove tothe village and were greeted by one of the leaders in Tak Bai. Villagers in theirthousands were praying and their leaders took us around the village and showed us
the damage. Over sixty homes were completely destroyed. The troops weredispatched to rebuild the houses. It made such a good impression on the villagers. I
knew we had to weigh the risk of such a daring move, but it was a real turning point.
It might have cost me my life but it could give us a rare opportunity to win hearts. I
could have been shot dead by militants. But I believe we made the right decision.
Our courage paid off in the end because soon after that the villagers were more 99 

sympathetic to the soldiers. Such an understanding contributed to our effort ofbuilding a peaceful village in the future.

The operations of the military units from the central region succeeded in winningthe hearts and minds of the people, and inducing more positive attitudes towards soldiers.
When a large number of villagers gathered for prayer, they condemned the use ofviolence after every bombing incident. Many of them expressed good will and showedmoral support to the military personnel injured in the counter-insurgency operations.
Every time a violent incident took place, a large number of people would congregate.
In one such incident, my men were hurt in an explosion at Saeng Tham School.1 One
lost a leg and another was killed. Voluntarily, many residents came to visit and give
moral support to the wounded soldier at the hospital. This showed goodwill towards
the soldier.

Once the people had a positive attitude towards the soldiers, they helped gather
intelligence such as alerting the authorities about the arrival of strangers in the village,
informing the authorities of suspected militants who disguised themselves as traveling
missionaries (dawah), or reporting suspected bomb attempts. Several bombs weresuccessfully defused because of such timely warning. Information from local residents
enhanced the effectiveness of military operations and enabled the soldiers to control thesituation in the assigned area. Subsequently, the villagers were more confident of theirsafety. Initially, very few festivities were held for fear of becoming targets for militantattacks, but subsequently Buddhists held Songkran celebrations with water pouring,building sand chedi, and presenting robes to the monks, while Muslims organized annual
sporting events, Hulu dance theatre, Mayong traditional folk dance, and Maulid-al-Nabicelebrations.
Despite their successes for the most part in changing the local people’s attitudes,
the military units from the central region were hampered by a lack of cooperation fromother local administrative and security agencies. Prior to being deployed in the south, thePR-201 was working in the eastern region where martial law was declared. There, theunit had full authority and overall control. It could ask for cooperation from any agencies
and create a unified command structure. In the south, however, the unit was unable to
make similar requests for cooperation from other agencies as it did not have overallcommand.
There were Volunteer Defence Corps, district heads, police, and Village Defence
Volunteers in the area and I was not in a position to control these forces or tell them
what to do. Their superiors were of higher rank than me or were my senior when wewere at the Cadet School so they would refuse to do my bidding. They saw
everything as being the responsibility of the military.

CK-36, by contrast, placed more emphasis on coordination with other local stateagencies. Because it could not operate on its own, it had to work closely with othergovernment agencies in the locality which in normal circumstances would have been in
charge of public safety and well-being, such as the police, immigration police,administrative officials, and customs personnel.
To enforce internal security, we used the military and the Border Patrol Police. In
some areas, we were the core force, supplemented by police officers. But in terms ofcommunity relations, the military unit coordinated with civilian administrators. What 100 

we wanted to achieve was to restore state power and hand over the administration tocivilians. We were there to help revive state control so that we could leave andcivilian administrators would carry on the work.

CK-36 managed to secure cooperation for the most part from other government
agencies. Its success could be attributed to the fact that its operations and the conduct of
its officers were honorable and proper in strict accordance with the military code of
conduct. Members of the unit were not drawn into any particular interest groups, norwere they engaged in activities that were deemed offensive to local sensitivities.
Moreover, the unit promoted good relations with other agencies through sporting eventsand other social functions.
The counter-insurgency operations were targeted at militant groups and perpetratorsof violent acts. They were not sweeping orders that would hurt the general public. In
some cases where the public had to be affected, the approach was to be friendly to thegeneral public. In other cases, where core militant leaders were accused but little
evidence was found, the unit tried to convince them to cooperate with the authorities. But
the unit was prepared to respond aggressively to insurgent attacks in order to deter future
incidents. Several precautionary measures were taken such as setting up checkpoints,
regular patrols, and emergency raids on suspected targets. PR-201 had experience fromoperating in the eastern border area. To disrupt planned attacks and prevent movement ofillegal goods, the unit placed emphasis on restricting the mobility of the enemy andlimiting the opportunities for the militants to launch successful operations. Ensuring thesafety and security of those involved was considered a top priority. The unit set up 24hour checkpoints and patrolled the assigned areas heavily. CK-36, meanwhile,
supplemented strict military tactics with applying pressure on former militant leaders
who had pledged cooperation with the authorities. They were seen as key to the politicaldimension of bringing about peace and transforming an armed struggle into a political
dialogue.
Our strategy was that if they fled, we did not pursue. Meanwhile, we put pressure onthem by sending our doctors into the villages. We would not use violent means.
These people were already feeling guilty and suspicious of authorities. So when ourdoctors asked their names, they became fearful and fled immediately for fear of stateprosecution. We let them escape and experience hardship for a bit. In Malaysia, theywould find it hard to earn a living. They would have to be in hiding because the
Malaysian police would arrest them. After a while, we sent the village head or theirparents to talk with them and ask them to turn themselves in. Suspected militants
who had turned themselves in served as examples because they had not beenprosecuted by the authorities. In fact, the military helped secure them employment
and earn income. Their criminal records were also wiped clean. This was the last
trigger in convincing them to return and lend the state a helping hand.

Summary of the internal culture of the military units from the central region
1. Their strength lies in being Royal Guards. They make use of this superior statuswhen meeting with villagers to win their trust. With the status as the king’s soldiers, theyfind it easier to explain their duty and mission. Villagers are less suspicious of them. It
proves the most effective permit for gaining access to villages.
2. They are highly disciplined. Although the military in general adheres to strict
rules and regulations, members of Royal Guard units are required to uphold even stricter

 101 discipline and higher standards of honesty. They must live up to the honor and integrityof their units. The rank and file are required to follow the ten army rules to the letter. Any
officer found to be in violation of these rules is severely punished. On top, there are
additional codes of conduct. These units are dedicated to promoting development projects
under the queen’s initiative. The Royal Guards must always bear in mind the supreme
importance of the king’s advice which must be obeyed at all costs.
3. Soldiers from the central region especially those from Bangkok are, as a rule,better educated and more acquainted with communication technology and computer skills.
The more educated troops choose to be stationed in Bangkok where they can further theirstudies easily, and this contributes to their effectiveness in carrying out their duties. A
commanding officer explained,
We are lucky that most of the lads here are very intelligent. Sitting here upfront arethose among the top ten in their class because normally the best in each class sign up
for Bangkok. They have more brain although they may not be good as those fromupcountry when it comes to fighting skills and techniques. But they areintellectually-oriented, just the kind of people we need for this task as this conflict isideological warfare.

4. The two units from the central region have skill and experience from similar
operations in the eastern border area. These have proved valuable in restricting the
movements of suspected militants. Their expertise in patrolling, manning of checkpoints,
and rounding up suspected militants has sharply enhanced the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operations.
5. Being accustomed to working under martial law on the eastern border means thatsome units from the central provinces are not as effective as others in mobilizing support
and cooperation from other state agencies.

The operations of the military units from the northeast
All units under the Second Regional Army in the northeast had experience fighting
against the communist insurgency by using a policy of engaging with the civilian
population in order to change people’s attitudes toward the authorities, improve theintelligence gathering capability of military personnel, and contribute to better tacticalplanning of operations. A unit commander explained this nonviolent approach to bringing
an end to the insurgency as follows:
We believe that water dropping on a stone will sooner or later lead to the erosion of
the stone. In other words, if we develop personal and friendly relationship withvillagers, the friendship will be able to cool the fever of the conflict. When we
understand each other, we can solve problems together. It doesn’t mean that we haveto bow to Muslims, but we must understand what may constitute the problem.
What we have to defeat is the prejudice of some villagers. Our troops come from the
PRCK-132 and people of old might still think—we must admit that such an
impression exists—that members of the unit in the past were involved in shooting
and killings some villagers. Some officers might have intimidated them or stirred up
trouble here. We want to show that this is no longer the case. We are a newgeneration of professional soldiers.

 102 

Apart from introducing the idea of promoting civilian affairs in working with
communities, the PRCK-132 also adopted the king’s advice “to understand, to reach out(to the people) and (to step up) development.” To reverse the negative image of soldiersand create a more positive attitude toward officials working in the conflict zones, the unit
launched an initiative called “changing the camouflage into a floral pattern” which aimed
at reducing the villagers’ mistrust and anxiety towards soldiers. Recommended practices
include friendly greetings and a smile at meetings, pleasant manners and helpful services
at checkpoints such as providing free drinking water, shady areas, and toys for children.
Due to the enormous geographical and cultural differences between the northeast
and the southernmost region, the military units from the northeast had to undergo anumber of training courses to familiarize themselves with local customs and cultural
practices of the Muslim dominated south. Besides preparation for routine operations suchas setting up checkpoints and carrying out searches, they prepared plans for civilian
affairs. PRCK-132 had experience in developing strong communities in the upper
northeast and on peace-keeping mission in East Timor. These experiences provided
invaluable insight and practical skills for the unit before they embarked on the mission in
the south. The unit had started preparing its personnel since the beginning of 1994 byselecting only those qualified and experienced to be engaged in civilian affairs andcommunity relations. Many of them had worked as trainers for the “strong community”
operation at Surasakmontri Command. The deputy chairman of the Udon Thani IslamicCommittee was invited to brief all personnel about the teaching of Islam and the unique
way of life in the deep south. The unit had also produced Malay-language teachingmaterials and textbooks and distributed them to the troops. Teachers from the south wereinvited to teach the correct pronunciation of the far south dialect. A group of trainers wassent to spend time in villages surrounding the military camp and a few other target
villages in the south to identify the weaknesses of their operations and procedures.
A seminar was held on a proposed “Happy Family” initiative to be introduced in
the three southern border provinces. Several local academics were invited to give theirviews on the proposed plans, and changes were made accordingly. The plan was further
refined after the first ten days of actual implementation in the assigned area in Chanae
district of Narathiwat by holding a seminar to identify problems and obstacles. These
efforts built confidence among the academics and communities. Soldiers were given
additional lessons in the local Malay dialect. It was clear that the forces had undergone
considerable training and preparation before being stationed in the deep South.
Community relations work of the military units from the northeast
Soldiers from the northeast had considerable experiences in working with
communities and in civilian operations. Moreover, the local people were known to befriendly, generous, easy-going, and adaptable. Despite these strengths, the operations inthe south proved a tough assignment given the differences in ethnicity, language, culture,religion, and terrain, and the prevalent attitudes of the local people toward men inuniform. In carrying out their duties, these units had to demonstrate a higher level ofperseverance, determination, and sincerity in order to win the hearts and minds of thelocal people.
Initially, both the villagers and the troops were suspicious of each other because
they were not acquainted. Besides, the assigned areas were highly sensitive and the 103 security risk was high. The villagers had extremely negative views about soldiers; they
were terribly afraid and suspicious of the security forces, since the timing was right after
the violent crackdowns at Krue Ze Mosque and Tak Bai. The mobilization of forces into
the area further undermined people’s confidence and was seen as another threat to theirwell-being. Moreover, the good relationship between people representing state authority
and local villagers had been ignored for such a long time that the two sides were very
alienated from each other. Moreover, the soldiers were nervous about a different andunfamiliar religion and culture.
When we got there, there were no temples, only mosques. I felt a bit lonely. You
looked around and there were only mosques. In a village, there might be two or threemosques so you heard the call to prayer five times a day. It sounded scary. Moreover,people dressed in a different way, making me feel as if I were in a foreign country. Insuch a situation, it was hard not to be afraid, not to be suspicious.

Because of the hostile attitude of the local people and the unfamiliar environment,
the soldiers had to gather their courage and pool their efforts in order to be accepted by
the local community. However, their first-hand experience in civilian affairs and thefriendliness of the troops had positive effects on establishing a relationship between the
military units and the villages. The “Hand and Smile” campaign was well received.
Troops going into villages were told to greet villagers with a smile and be mindful of
their manners especially when they approached village elders or community leaders.
Humility, respect, and discipline were core values that the military units prioritized.
Members of the units were told they had to serve the people because the people paid thesoldier’s salaries through taxes.
What we ask our troops to do is to show respect to the villagers because we are paidby the taxes from our brothers and sisters. Our salaries come from the people so wehave to be here to protect them, to provide security. These are the three main
messages we always stressed during our meetings.

Yet some soldiers could not give up the hierarchical culture of the military andcontinued to act as if they were superior to the people they were supposed to serve. Many
failed to strike up good relations with local communities. They were told to change their
behavior and attitudes.
Initially, I found it hard to swallow my self importance. I graduated from theprestigious military cadet institute; therefore I thought I was somebody. I had been
appointed a lieutenant and wherever I went, people would greet me. I issued orders
to my subordinates and everyone had to follow them unless they were senior to me.
So when I was sent to work here, everything was against the grain. I had to fight myown feelings in order to wai villagers such as the assistant village headman. I used tothink it worked this way: we invited them for talks, and if they refused to cooperate,
we’d manhandle them. But it did not work like that here. A different area required adifferent approach. For a soldier, duty comes first. If we succeed in carrying out ourduty, we feel proud. So when we realized that our tactics didn’t work, we had toadjust them. We had to scale back our ego. We had to think that we were working
here for them, for the people, before we could do so.

Hard work, dedication, and sincerity finally paid off. The local communities started
to show acceptance and trust. Medical services were the most effective element inwinning over the villagers because most villagers were poor and did not have access to 104 government medical services. A soldier from PRCK-132 wrote in ‘My experiences’2 asfollows.
A team of trainers who went to survey a village found a man named Dolah Masao
had been bitten by a poisonous snake. His leg and foot were seriously infected; one
could see the bone sticking out and the smell was so horrible that villagers did not
dare to approach him. He was extremely sick; he couldn’t walk and was taken careof by his children. He had been to the district hospital in Chanae but the doctor told
him that he would have to amputate the leg, so he went to the central hospital in
Narathiwat, and again, the doctor told him that his leg had to come off because theinfection had damaged it beyond rescue. Because he was fearful of the amputation,
he fled and told his wife and children that he would rather go back home to die thango through with the operation. The military trainers’ team, led by a nurse sergeant,helped clean up the wound and treat him. They paid him a visit every day and tried
to give him encouragement. The wound gradually healed after a month. The patient
was able to walk by himself and regained his physical strength. Many villagers
called the nurse sergeant a “miracle doctor” although they were Muslims. Now they
all ask for Doctor Yao when they fall ill. People heed whatever Doctor Yao says. The
medicine he prescribes for most people is generally a dose or two of paracetamol.
Many are cured that way; so the illnesses basically have to do with the mind rather
than the body.

The unit was serious in providing assistance to those who have been affected by theevent at Krue Ze. The PRCK-231 expressed their sincerity and took good care of familiesof those who died or were injured in the incident.
We treat them as if they are our own relatives. We address the elder ladies as
grandma. We usually ask them to come and get the medicines. If they can’t come bythemselves, then some adults in the household or in the village will be asked toaccompany them. Or we send our doctor to treat them at home. If they are seriously
ill, we refer them to the hospital at Camp Ingkhayuth in Pattani. If they need an
appointment, we make an appointment with the doctor at the hospital for them.

It took about three months to build trust and acceptance between the military units
from the northeast and the local communities. The goodwill was expressed through apublic invitation from religious leaders to the unit commanders as well as theirsubordinates to take part in the Hayat prayer for peace.3 A soldier said that,
We attended a Hayat prayer and during the ceremony, water was blessed. My colonel
and I were given some of the blessed water to drink. We told the villagers that wewere there to bring about development. Please consider us part of your families.
They told us we were accepted as their families and they would not let anybody hurt
us. They prayed for us in the mosque. After the prayer, the imam, the colonel, and I
shared the blessed water, an act which was taken to mean that we were accepted.

The acceptance and goodwill were instrumental in preventing a situation fromdeveloping into a confrontation. A soldier was helped by a local community leader toresolve a dispute because of some misunderstanding between him and a villager.
The captain in question went to visit and took along some fruit and money as a gift.
He went with a Muslim kamnan. Another village head in charge of the area around
Krue Ze went along too. If we had been abusing and mistreating the villagers, theywould not have helped us. So the misunderstanding did not cause any trouble.… It 105 was March or April. We’d been there since December the year before. So thisincident took place when we had been there for about three months.

The military units from the northeast also initiated other projects to improve
relations such as cultural exchanges, vocational training, and other humanitarianassistance.
Cultural exchanges as a means to strengthen relations received much attention fromlocal communities. Villagers were interested in Isan music and food. A traditional ponglang band playing Isan folk music was popular with the crowd because of the upbeat
tunes and funny lyrics. Although they might not understand the verses, the cheerful soundand the rhythm created a party atmosphere and people joined in. At village festivities like
New Year and Children’s Day, people would ask the military personnel to play Isan folk
music on the stage alongside the Hulu Likae performance, typical of the southernmost
region. Food was another attraction. Isan food such as sticky rice and papaya salad were
popular, often taken with local budu sauce. Sometimes, the military units also held
Buddhist festivals such as Songkran and invited Muslim village elders to join the
ceremony to pay respects to older relatives. Many Muslims attended such festivals which
helped bring people from the Buddhist and Muslim communities together. Despite thepositive feedback from community leaders and villagers themselves, the introduction ofIsan culture and tradition into the Muslim dominated region was a sensitive matterbecause it touched on culture, tradition, and way of life. Attempting to introduce change
into such matters could easily provoke conflict among those of conservative bent.
In terms of vocational training and job creation initiatives, the PRCK-231 was
unable to make any headway because the unit was transferred out of the areas before it
could witness any real progress. By contrast, the PRCK-132 was more successful. It
introduced the “Happy Family” project in the three southernmost provinces. The project
was revised to take into account local sensitivities and promoted under the slogan “Withreligion as the basis, develop a good career, healthy living free of disease, and virtuous
children, bringing about peace.”
In implementing the “Happy Family” project, the unit encountered a number of
obstacles despite having been well prepared. As outsiders, most members of the unit wereunable to gain insight into the way of life of the local population. Certain elements in the
project did not correspond to the local way of life and were rejected by the villagers. For
instance, meetings were scheduled during the rest period after early-morning rubber
tapping, resulting in people not attending, or arriving late, or not paying much attention to
the training.
The way of the people posed another challenge in implementing projects in thesouth, as one soldier pointed out.
If it were in Isan, a project like this would take only five days to complete. But here
it took us thirty-six days. Each day after two hours or so, they would lose interest.
We had to break often for prayer; and after the prayers at the mosque, we had torepeat what went on the last time before we could build on what had been discussed.

The PRCK-132 encountered several difficulties in this new area. In the northeast,
the language, the way of life and the friendly attitude of the people were more conduciveto their operations. Moreover, they were usually stationed in an assigned area for a longtime, making it possible to establish long term relations with the communities. In thesouth, the situation was almost the opposite. Any military unit that attempted to promote 106 

vocational training and development had to stay in the assigned area for some time inorder to sustain any progress. Or, the vocational training and development should beviewed as a tool in forming a working relationship with the villagers or simply as a
byproduct. This concept may be applicable to those units deployed for a limited period.
Women tended to be more involved and interested in taking part in the “Happy
Family” project. Many groups of housewives were formed; one group sewed
headscarves; another produced organic dish-washing liquid; another made fish sauce; andthe last was involved in aromatherapy. Teenagers were the least cooperative. They
resisted any attempts by the authorities to reach out to them. This was one of the mostserious weaknesses of the project, since youth was obviously a key target group that theinsurgents were trying to recruit.
The military units reportedly received little cooperation from local civilian officials
because most officials were Buddhist and extremely concerned about their personalsafety if they went to work in the assigned areas.
Most of the counter-insurgency operations were aimed at improving security andprotecting civilians and their properties. Some operations were planned to disrupt
militants’ networks and prevent their planned attacks. Many tactics were deployedincluding regular patrols, road blockades, rounding up suspects, searches, restricting themobility of insurgents, and pressuring suspected militants.
Permanent checkpoints, road barriers, and laying siege to suspected villages to
conduct searches were some of the operations that affected civilians indiscriminately andseriously disrupted their normal lives. However, these missions were carried out withsensitivity and respect under the guidelines of the initiative called “changing the
camouflage into a floral pattern.” Recommended practices include friendly greetings andsmiles, pleasant manners, and offering public services at checkpoints such as providing
free drinking water, shady areas, and toys for children. The change in the stance of thesoldiers from an aggressive approach to a softer approach won them trust and cooperationfrom the villagers. As a result of the PRCK-132’s performance, sixty-two suspected
militants turned themselves in and forty-one others fled from the villages. In general,
innocent civilians were more willing to cooperate with the military despite the continuing
and escalating violence.
Summary of the internal culture of the military units from the northeast
1. The approach is for politics to take priority over military operations. The
northeastern military units had used this strategy in the successful operation against
communist insurgency. The strong belief in the effectiveness of the concept has led theunits to highlight civilian affairs in their work to regain people’s trust and cooperation in
the three southern border provinces. They believe this approach is more likely to yieldpositive results than the harsh military clampdowns of the past.
2. Initiatives used in the northeast have to be localized to suit the far south. In
carrying out their work in the south, the concept of building “strong communities” is used,
but with necessary localization. The military units have introduced a series of community
activities such as developing the environment, vocational training, and agricultural
promotion. These activities have been used as a means of gaining trust and approachingvillagers who might be skeptical of the military presence in the area. However, these
activities have to be promoted and implemented with sincerity and seriousness by 107 subsequent units to yield any long term results. The military units under study were
stationed in the assigned locations for only a year and hence success depends largely on
whether subsequent units will continue the work.
3. The military units are able to blend in with the local people using their cultural
heritage from the northeast as a strength. They have introduced Isan traditional music likepong-lang bands and Isan food to the local communities. Nevertheless, the approachshould be implemented with care and sensitivity because the local Muslim people
observe their own religious practices strictly. Any outside elements must be introducedwith respect for the local way of life. Cultural exchanges may be appropriate as long as
they do not come into conflict with or question the local way of life, belief, and religious
observance. Otherwise, they may cause friction with the communities.
4. The personality of the troops is an asset. The troops from the northeastern units
have good manners, and are humble, friendly, and kind. Their personality coupled with
their ability and experience in civilian activities gained acceptance from the local
communities. The units have used their social assets in promoting community relations.
Under the “Hand and Smile” campaign, troops were instructed to greet people with asmile, and to be humble and respectful towards the local people. They are also told toconsider themselves the servants of the people, for their salaries are paid with thepeople’s taxes.
5. The line of command is clear and orders by the commanding officers are wellrespected. It is apparent that the military units from the northeast are well disciplined.
The superior officers pay close attention to their subordinates and are open to their views
and suggestions. At the same time, those not following orders are punished and nodisrespect towards the commanding officers is tolerated. The units have proved to beunited and highly disciplined.

The operations of the military units from the southern region
After the raid on an army camp in Narathiwat on 4 January 2004, the first batch ofmilitary units sent to hunt for the perpetrators and the stolen weapons were from thesouth. As violence subsequently escalated in the three southernmost provinces, theSouthern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPBC) was created on 4
October 2004 to restore peace and order using a peaceful approach. The military units
operating in the three southernmost provinces thereafter came under the command of the
SBPPBC. The southern units were diverted from the search for the stolen weapons to thetask of using peaceful means to bring an end to the violence. The two sample units fromthe south took a roughly similar approach. Their familiarity with the culture, traditions,and way of the life of the people in the far south were an advantage. They were able toleverage their understanding of the local culture to win acceptance by local communities
without need to focus on community development or vocational training. A unit leader
said:
Some local Muslims who are close to me said they don’t necessarily wantdevelopment. What they want is trust. How can the people trust the military? If themilitary are able to win people’s trust, then we can talk development. So when myunit was sent to work there, we didn’t emphasize development projects. We didn’t
normally do agriculture projects. Besides, we had no money for them. The local

 108 agricultural promotion office was better prepared and more qualified to carry out
these projects, so we encouraged that office to be more active. What we as a military
unit could do was to help talk to the local community. That’s our strength, our job.

In their efforts to bring about understanding and win people’ hearts and minds, themilitary units from the south encountered similar problems as other units. Most people
viewed the military and government officials in a negative light. For instance there had
never been a military unit stationed in Yaring district of Pattani previously. When the unit
was sent there, leaders of the militant movement, who did not want a military unit
stationed in the area as it would complicate their operations, stirred up dissatisfaction
against the military. The soldiers became anxious about their own safety as they wereunable to identify the leaders of the unrest in the localities. But they also recognized thatthe majority of people were not involved in the armed conflict and wished for an end of
the trouble, while the militants were in a minority. The misconception that Muslims ingeneral were disposed to violence arose because the militants concealed themselves in thetowns and villages, making it difficult to distinguish the militants from ordinary people.
I’d say that Muslims are good. The fact of the matter is that Muslims love peace.
I’ve been working here in the three southernmost provinces and I know that Muslims
do not want this to happen.… There are more good than bad people. If I have to put
a figure on it, I’d say in my opinion that there may be five bandits out of a hundred
people. That’s why I can continue to work here unconcerned.
There are Muslims in every southern province. And we have only heard good things
about them like their delicious food, lovely roti, and rice dishes. We never associatethem with terrorism. I have Muslim friends and we get along fine. It was only
recently that there has been suspicion and skepticism.

In carrying out their duties to wipe away the negative feelings and suspicion toward
the military establishment, the units needed to understand the people before they could
hope to gain acceptance and trust. In the three southernmost provinces, the majority lives
in poverty without adequate access to government services. Health problems are
numerous and therefore free or low-cost medical services are of interest to the local
communities. This is a way for the military to forge a closer relationship with the people.
Besides, the military units were familiar with the way of life, culture, tradition, andMuslim teachings. Several of the soldiers had been recruited locally.
During the one year that CK-12 operated in the assigned area, the unit was able toimplement several civilian activities in order to disrupt and neutralize the leadership of
the insurgency and to persuade those sympathetic to the militant cause to support the
government instead.
These projects were initiated by the unit itself; we wanted to give priority to politicalsolutions. The question we posed ourselves was straightforward. How could we
reduce the number of violent incidents in the area? We had to change our tactics. For
instance, if people saw soldiers carrying guns, they might then complain. So we put
the priority on political solutions … and we initiated fifteen principal projects.

The fifteen projects were all designed to be in line with the culture, traditions, andway of life of the local people, as follows.
1. Home visits. These visits are part of the efforts to start a meaningful dialogue
with villagers. Troops pay regular visits to households in the area.

 109 

2. Public information. Dissemination of government information is crucial incountering misinformation and rumors spread by suspected militants. In the far south,
rumors tend to spread quickly and many are deceived by them.
3. Sports events. Competitive sports have been promoted among young people,
both male and female, so that they spend their free time constructively and do not fallvictim to the insurgents’ recruitment efforts. Troops play sports with local youth. Soccer
is the most popular game.
4. Pondok relations. As part of psychological operations, the military try to build
relations with traditional religious schools or pondoks. Soldiers or police officers either
teach in pondoks or donate teaching and sports equipment to religious schools.
The pondok relations project is an attempt to go to the heart of the matter. We want
to instill in young people the correct ideas about the state. It’s an operation thatdemands a high level of social and persuasive skills as it relies principally on
dialogue.

5. Villagers’ forums. Such forums provide a platform for community leaders andlocal residents to share their views about challenges, problems, and needs over which theunits may be able to help directly or induce other agencies to assist.
Several forums have been held to gather and update information from the ground.
This is an important activity that has brought the military and the people closer.
These meetings are held in mosques or other religious buildings. It took time before
permission to organize such forums at important religious venues was granted; we
couldn’t just go in and expect to get the permission. We had to be close and havelong standing relations with people there.

6. Mosques or temples as military bases. This project is aimed at giving the military
personnel access to the mosques and temples that play a central role in Buddhist andMuslim village life. Militants are suspected of using mosques as meeting places. It ismuch easier to get the abbot’s permission to set up a base at a temple. Before using amosque as a base, the unit must get a green light from the religious leaders. They havemanaged to convince religious leaders that they are there for a good purpose such as todevelop the mosque. They usually have to spend a week in the village before they could
set up a base there.
I’d tell them that the troops would like to set up a base in the mosque and we would
help develop the facility. We’d build this or that. We had to talk to the religious
leaders, the community leaders, and the natural leaders in the village. Once they
were informed, they were quick to spread the news to other villagers. The mosque isthe center of village life; Muslims pray here five times a day. They congregate there
for prayers; it’s like a meeting place. So we needed to present our case. If we did thattoday, we might be able to move in the next day. But we had to gauge the mood rightand present our case accordingly.

Soldiers who were stationed at the mosque put their lives and their safety at risk
because a mosque is often not walled. Soldiers had to take a risk in order to show theirsincerity.
It’s a matter of risk taking in order to reveal one’s true position. “Today I’m staying
with you so in a sense you are our protector. We will be safe here.” Sometimes we 110 have to pretend we really believe it even though we are on guard. But we want toshow them, “We really trust you. You are good; you are not bandits.”

7. Mobile political education units. This is a project aimed at adults and teenagers
who are interested in politics. It is widely known that people in the south are morepolitically active and engaged than those in other regions. A by-election was called at thetime in a nearby province so the military considered it appropriate to discuss politics withthe local communities through the mobile political school.
Adults here don’t like small talk. They prefer to discuss politics. We have to find out
what they like to talk about in a café or a teashop. Once we know for sure, we canbroach the subject of politics and make suggestions such as on how to cast a vote.
While I was there, many elections were held. We could advise them accordingly, forinstance that they had to bring an official ID with them to the polling station andcheck whether their names appeared on the electoral list. We told them the correct
procedure and how to exercise their voting rights.

The mobile political education project stirred up a lot of interest and a large crowd
turned up at each session held at public places such as a mosque or tea shop. The project
was in line with the way of life of the people in the area.
You have to understand the traditional way of life. Things like what time do people
pray. They pray five times a day and the one in the evening is about 7.30 to 8.00 pm.
We take advantage of the fact that people already congregate at the mosque forprayer, so there is no need to make a special appointment or arrangement if we holdthe meeting at the mosque instead of at somebody’s house. It is also easier to call ameeting this way instead of asking people to come to see us when they often do notturn up. So we have to understand their way of life and adapt our strategy
accordingly.

8. Making friends project. This is an attempt to establish relationships with the
public by introducing members of the public to members of the armed forces who sharethe same birthdays and encouraging them to become friends.
9. Return kids to the family bosom. This project was adopted after finding thatmany young people in the area have been lured into drugs. The project is part of themilitary attempt to offer help to juvenile drug users and provide an opportunity for themto start a new life. It was hoped that the project would demonstrate that the military wason the same side as the people.
We have set up road blocks and checkpoints. Sometimes we are able to capture those
involved in the marijuana and methamphetamine trade. One of the people arrested
was a 13 year old boy. We could have handed him to the police but because we
wanted to show our goodwill we invited the village headman, local police officers,
his teacher, an uztaz, and a community leader—all the people the boy respected—
and told them the boy was arrested on a drug charge. He could have been convicted
but the military staff working in the area was prepared to apply leniency. We madean exception and handed the kid back to his family. Our message was that we were
here to help; we were on your side. We made it explicit that we were here to help andwe wanted people to spread the word that the military had a good intention and thisgroup of soldiers was really helpful to the young. We wanted the word of our goodwork to spread around here.

10. Morning meeting project. Regular meeting and chatting with villagers at tea

 111 shops in the morning creates familiarity between the troops and the local people.
11. Five-minute teaching project. This is an important psychological operation
before the start of field operations in a village. Soldiers are sent to public, private, andreligious schools to work as teachers. They teach kids military drills such as standing toattention and the kids get a lot of fun out of playing soldiers. These exercises are given toschool children so that they tell their parents about the enjoyment they receive from sucha simple practice. It is geared toward winning recognition from the parents.
The 5-minute teaching program allows us to come into contact with young students
every morning. We want to convey a message through the kids so that when they gohome they can relate what they’ve done at school to their parents.

12. The Tadika military teacher project is a project aimed at instilling the correct
ideology in religious schools. Military personnel teach about religious diversity, living inpeace, Thainess, the Thai nation’s head of state, the duties of children, Thai language, andhaving a bright future. The project is well received by the students because the locallyrecruited soldiers are able to teach and read the Qur’an to young children.
13. Retraining people’s forces. This is a project to strengthen the village defence
force and the defence volunteers so that people may ensure security within their own
communities.
14. Meeting relatives of the dead. As many families lost members in the Krue Ze
and Tak Bai incidents. the military units have met and assisted the relatives in order toundermine the militants’ efforts to recruit them.
This came about because I was posted to an area which suffered heavy casualties asa result of the April 28 incident when a group of teenagers attacked the military andpolice. Many were shot dead. At least eighty-three people were killed. Then came
the Tak Bai incident and 106 more were killed. Up to twenty of the victims comefrom this area. So I asked what we were supposed to do. The villagers were saying,“Soldiers killed their children.” They were angry. What were we to do.… The local
people did not have separatist ideas, but because their children were killed by state
officials, the enemy had a chance to recruit them.

Home visits were conducted and assistance given in strict compliance withreligious observance and the Muslim way of life. It was the fasting season.
At the start of the fasting season, we paid a visit after sunset, bearing gifts like green
beans and milled rice. At the end of the fasting period, we went back again at night
bringing things like sugar and coffee to give to them. We know their way of life.
During the fasting season, people feast on special food. We knew and brought themas a goodwill gesture.

15. Help the people project. This is a project to provide emergency relief including
medical services to people affected by flooding, fire, or other disasters. The project also
donates money to support occupational groups and mobile clinics.
The fifteen projects show that the military units placed an emphasis on
psychological operations rather than development work with each project respecting theway of life, culture, and religion of people in the area. The projects were implemented
with an aim to establish familiarity, confidence, and trust while creating a positive
attitude toward the military and enhancing cooperation between the two sides.
Moreover, the strategy of civilian affairs required greater cooperation among 112 various government offices to ensure success as was the case in the past when the Fortythird Civilian-Police-Military Joint Task Force (CPM43) was still in operation.
PRCK-251 placed a high priority on joint operations with local agencies because
the unit recognized that these agencies would have to work with and assist the people in
the future once the unit had completed its assignment. Moreover, each agency had abudget for its work. Combining their resources and manpower would be more effective
than if the military worked on its own. But in working together, respect for each otherwas a prerequisite.
If we did it all alone without taking civil administrative agencies on board, theproject would not have been sustainable. When the troops pull out, the local civil
servants will stay on. I have been trying to convince district chiefs of the need tocooperate but it is more difficult with the older officials. Young and progressive
district chiefs tend to get our point quickly and they have encouraged district
agricultural officials to help. We must not be boastful or act as if soldiers are the big
bosses. If we don’t brag about ourselves, they don’t brag about themselves either.

Nevertheless, the unit did not receive the cooperation it wanted from local agencies
because most local officials were concerned about their safety.
The commanding officer of CK-12 formed a joint task force comprising police,
military officers, and members of the territorial volunteer force responsible for working
in targeted villages. The rationale was that joint operations would lead to a moresustainable solution because local government officials would continue to be stationed in
the area long after the soldiers have been withdrawn. It was therefore important tocooperate.
The joint military civilian units were assigned to operate in so called red zones orareas of concern. But in other areas, conventional forces were deployed.
The territorial volunteers join us in red zones only where the insurgent are active.
Key militant figures are present in large number so it is necessary to penetrate theircells. The joint task force has a special feature; it combines the three forces and isused in priority areas. Other areas are patrolled by conventional forces.

Operations carried out by the tripartite forces draw not only on the strengths of theindividual units, but also increase the available security personnel in the area. Civilian
administrators are more familiar with the local community. They act as translators andbackup. They also help in identification, intelligence gathering, and administrative affairs.
The police are knowledgeable about law and act as the main law enforcement officers,
and assistant administrators. The military staff, which is the largest in number, form thecore of the security unit, putting pressure on suspected militants hiding in villages andforest areas around villages. They also assist civilian administrators in law and order.
The police are the main law enforcement agency. It is appropriate to involve them.
And when something goes wrong, we can say with confidence that we have thought
the plan through together. It’s not the military doing it alone. I had experience beforeof being blamed when things went wrong. It was said at the time that the soldiers did
it all by themselves without consultation. We were there to help them, but we got
blamed all the time.

The joint task force was able to function well without any major conflict because
the commanding officer explicitly demonstrated that the military recognize the role and 113 the importance of local civilian officials in achieving success One of the commanding
officers said:
Forget your ego. Forget the ethos that only soldiers can do that. That’s a terribly
wrong idea. If the commanding officer or members of the task force do not have agood relationship with local administrators and the police or the local administrative
bodies, if we are not unified or do not cooperate, I can guarantee that we’ll lose.
Why do I allow policemen and territorial volunteers in the task force? It is because
we soldiers cannot be there all the time. We have to withdraw at some point but thepolice and volunteers will continue to work there. They have inside information
about the villages, their residents, and the insurgent movements. They can continue
our mission. If we let our ego get in the way, all of us will have to pull out and thebandits will win.

Although the military units from the southern region have experience and expertisein counter-communist insurgency operations, and are familiar with the mountainous andforested terrains, the insurgency in the three southernmost provinces is different. It is hardto mount operations against the militants because they live among the villagers. The
operational tactics deployed by the units from the southern region are similar to those
deployed by units from other regions; namely, they use both military methods and legalmeans. Checkpoints, patrols, body searches and sealing off suspected villages are some of
the tactics used. However, the CK-12 unit has also adopted a five-point strategy indealing with suspected militant in red zones:
1. Disrupt the people’s support for the militant groups.
2. Seize and destroy the militants’ bases or shelters.
3. Restrict the mobility of militant groups.
4. Disrupt the militants’ financial and intelligence networks.
5. Maintain a strong will to defeat the militants.
CK-12 adopted the slogan “arrest the right person, search the right place, never be
defeated.” The unit relies on accurate information especially information gained frompsychological and civilian operations in the area. The unit sets up checkpoints, increases
patrols, applies pressure, seals off suspicious villages, and carries out searches to disrupt
the rebels.
Operations targeted against militants in the red zone have reduced the number ofviolent incidents in the area, restricted the movement of the militant groups, anddisrupted their supply systems. Many more people have cooperated with the authorities.
In response, the insurgents intensified their efforts and mounted several attacks aswitnessed in the sharp increase in the number of violent incidents in May 2005. The
authorities called the revenge attacks by the insurgents “Bannang Sata disease.”
Summary of the internal culture of the military units from the south
1. The military units from the south understand the way of life, culture, andtraditions of the people in the three southern border provinces well.
The units’ operations are geared toward improving access to the general public.
They focus on operations that establish relationships and familiarity with villagers basedon cultural and religious insights. They aim at creating a feeling that the soldiers belong
to the people and that they are there to assist the people. The military units focus onbuilding strong relations with the local communities because they understand the social

 114 and cultural conditions of people in the area. Although perceived as impoverished anddeprived, people in the three southernmost provinces in fact are content with theirsituation. They are the living testimony of the sufficiency economy and have enough tofeed on. Most of their time is spent observing religious teaching. They pray five times aday. It is not convenient for the majority of the people to undertake other economic
activities. Moreover, the units lack expertise in occupational training unlike those fromthe northeast. They may provide support for royally sponsored projects such as building
infrastructure. But the units are well trained in psychological operations and disaster
relief operations. Therefore, the military units from the southern provinces focused theirefforts on securing better relations with local communities and responding to their needs.
They have initiated a variety of projects to gain access to the local communities inaccordance with the local way of life, culture, and tradition. Fifteen projects were
implemented including the mobile political education school, “the mosque as the militarybase,” the pondok relations project, returning kids to their parents, and the friendshipproject.
2. The units from the south concentrate on working with other government agencies
to enhance security. Their model is the Forty-third Civilian-Police-Military Joint Task
Force which had representatives of the military, police, and civilian agencies. They areable to draw on the strengths of other units such as the village defence volunteers who arerecruited from the local communities, know the people, can speak the local dialect, andso help liaise with the villagers and improve communications. The police are wellinformed about the law and act as the law enforcement agent while the troops provide
security. The three parties work together with unity and their operations have been very
effective as a result.
3. The units have had experience of working in the three southern border provinces
and many of the soldiers are familiar with the local culture. Some of the forces are also
recruited from the three southernmost provinces. This is a strong point for the units
because local soldiers can operate with efficiency and in line with the traditional way oflife and culture. The troops are also familiar with the terrain.

Conclusions and recommendations
If you ask a Buddhist boy, he will say he wants to be a policeman or a soldier. But a
Muslim boy will say he wants to be a bandit. Why? It’s because he wants to killpolicemen and soldiers.

This statement provides a vital clue to the continuing conflict in the threesouthernmost provinces. As long as the answer given by young people remains
unchanged—that they want to become bandits so that they can kill policemen andsoldiers—the efforts to bring an end to the insurgency will be fraught with difficulties.
Why do boys want to be bandits?
Why do boys want to shoot police and soldiers?
These questions have no easy answers. There is an underlying complexity that willtake time to untangle but it is a question that urgently needs to be addressed. Guided by
the king’s advice “to understand, to reach out (to the people) and (to step up)
development,” the Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command has to formulate
a coherent strategy for units operating in the three southernmost provinces to implement.

 115 The battle has to be fought at village level and the people must be won over. Those who
do not sympathize with the militants have to be separated from those who do. The policy
must be able to address the root causes of the conflict and avoid the use of force. It has tobe “politics-led.”
However, the implementation of policy may vary across units depending on theircommanding officers’ interpretation of the policy and the units’ previous operational
experiences. These variations affect the efforts to resolve the conflict. Understanding thatthe way of life, culture, and customs of the three southernmost provinces are different
from the rest of Thailand is a prerequisite for all units working in the area. They have to
make accommodation for the differences. Moreover, it is crucial for officers to bedisciplined, sincere, and committed to solving problems through peaceful means. This
will ensure success in the long run. Although some units have not been able to reduce theincidents of violence, every unit has been able to improve people’s attitudes toward themilitary and convince people to cooperate more with the authorities.
Based on this study, the author would like to make recommendations about the
military’s approach toward resolving the insurgency in the three southern borderprovinces.
1. The deployment of appropriate military units in the area is crucial. Military units
operating in the area must truly understand the situation and the way of life and culture ofpeople there. Units from either the Fourth Army Region or others must be fully briefed
and trained before being dispatched to the assigned areas. Importantly, all units must be
fully aware that “a military operation does not constitute a war.” The weapon needed inthis case is “the word” rather than “the gun.” This poses a real challenge for professionalsoldiers who may see this as a deviation from the norm. Even more important perhaps isawareness of ways in which the military’s own culture, values, and norms impacts on
their mission. Soldiers have to rein in their own ego and their ideas of dignity and honor.
Moreover, they may have to adopt a softer approach, be polite and humble toward local
villagers, and make sure this changed attitude is well understood by the local
communities through outward demonstrations such as turning checkpoints into places
that are friendly and attractive. All these require the troops to adjust both theirpersonalities and their tactics.
2. In order to gain acceptance from the local communities, the operations must be
sustained for a reasonable period and supported by troops on the ground in adequate
number. A fixed one-year term means each unit has to start over again when it is rotatedto a new assigned area, wasting valuable opportunities to make headway in bringing theconflict to an end. At the same time, it is crucial to consider the morale of the soldiers
who are stationed for long stretches. Special incentives and rewards have to beconsidered to maintain the troops’ morale.
3. Regional and local government officials including police, administrative officials,
and local elected politicians such as members of the Tambon Administrative
Organizations and Provincial Administrative Organizations are crucial to solving theconflict in the south both in the short and the long terms. At the “understanding” stage,
the military units draw on information from various government agencies in the province
to aid planning. In the next stage of reaching out, the assistance of local people such as
territorial defence volunteers or district officials is valuable in communicating with local
people as the volunteers and local officials usually speak the local dialect and have a 116 

deeper knowledge of the culture. They can help establish the trust between military
personnel and the villagers, enabling the soldiers to work more effectively. In the final
stage when “development” is stepped up, the military units also need those with local
knowledge and expertise and budgetary backup. Since government agencies have theirown budgets, it is wise to involve them and let them lead in certain areas of development
work where the military lacks the skills and expertise. To ensure cooperation, those
involved in the operations should be invited for discussion or briefing sessions so thatthey can share knowledge with the troops, and get to know one another before going into
the field. This will also smooth out coordination among related agencies later on.
4. Community leaders such as village heads, kamnan, imams, religious teachers,
and natural leaders in the communities are key figures in the war to win over the people
because their opinions are heeded by local people. Commanding officers of units mustask for a meeting with these key figures, showing respect and regard for them. Their
opinions and suggestions should be listened to because they indicate what the local
communities want. Moreover, the units should involve these figures and accord them aprominent role in planning and organizing community relations activities. If possible, theunit heads must try to establish close personal relations with these individuals.
5. The public can be divided into many subgroups, namely children and youth,
teenagers, occupational groups, and women. The approach toward these groups should becourteous, friendly, and polite. The military units must bear in mind the norms and valuesof the local communities. They are a proud people who will not stand insults. Moreover,they take promises seriously so the unit heads must be mindful of their own words andavoid making promises unless they are certain that these can be kept, otherwise trust andconfidence in the military will not be achieved. The military should make use of themedia especially radio and TV with due respect to the way of life of the communities inquestion. People tend to congregate at tea shops, pondok schools, and mosques so thesevenues may be utilized as natural meeting places where useful and accurate information
can be publicized. Moreover, a targeted approach should be developed to establish
relations with these different groups.
5.1 Children and youth are the most accessible group and may serve as a bridge toother groups. The appropriate approach is to extend friendly greetings, to give sweets andtoys, and to get them involved in games and activities so that they have a positive attitude
toward the military and side with the authorities. This kind of approach has proved
successful in peace-keeping missions in East Timor and Iraq where it provided a link toparents and other community leaders. If it works in the three southernmost provinces, thearmy may adopt it as a standard procedure in military-civil relations and peace-keeping
missions.
5.2 Teenagers are the group most at risk of being recruited by the militants. In orderto undermine these recruitment efforts, the authorities need to see teenagers as a priority
group. Those interviewed for this paper said the most effective way to approach thisgroup proved to be the project to assist families affected by the Tak Bai incident. Other
activities that received positive response include informal talks at tea shops, special
employment schemes, music and sports events, and field trips. For young offenders in
drug-related offences and minor crimes, the authorities have given them opportunities tointegrate back into their communities by having their sentences dropped. The military
units have confirmed that these methods have proved effective in converting 117 

sympathizers.
5.3 The three southern border provinces are richly endowed with natural resources.
The long border with Malaysia means that smuggling and legal trade are both boomingwith many interest groups and criminal gangs operating in the area. Moreover, an
overwhelming majority of people have minimum formal education and thus are unable tosecure long term employment. Their job opportunities are further affected by some of the
security measures in place. The combination of such factors may lead some occupationalgroups to sympathize with the insurgents’ cause, and provide support—material, financial,and otherwise—to the insurgent movement. The authorities must co-opt these groups
through “bargaining and trade-offs.” Without undermining their capability to earn a living,
the authorities may exchange rewards and special treatments for tip-offs and intelligence.
This method has yielded satisfactory results.
5.4 Women are the most complex and interesting group. Evidence shows that they
feel unhappy about the role and status of women in Muslim society. They have to accept
inequality without question, especially in regards to polygamy where men are allowed tohave four wives even though most of the women do not approve. They also have to be
responsible for raising the family. Any development or change affecting this group must
be carefully and thoroughly thought through since a relatively small change may havewidespread repercussions on the society as a whole. This point deserves further scrutiny.
5.5 The insurgents themselves have been politicized over a long period to an extent
that it will be difficult to change their worldview. The authorities should deploy any
measures at their disposal to pressure them including face-to-face talks, surveillance, andre-education. These measures are aimed at raising awareness among members of theinsurgent movements that if they do not change their behavior, legal measures may beconsidered to detain them to ensure the peace and order of the society. At the same time,some members could be approached to seek a peaceful solution through political dialogue.
It is worth pointing out that former student leaders who joined the Communist Party ofThailand now take part in national politics.

Works consulted
Chaiwat Satha-Anand. Thathai than luek: khwam runraeng lae kan mai chai khwam
runraeng (Challenging alternatives: violence and nonviolence). Bangkok: Komol
Keemthong Foundation Publishing House, 1990.
Chalermphol Thammasunthorn, Colonel. ‘Patchai thi mi phon krathop to kan soemsang
phawa phu nam khong nakrian nai roi’ (Factors affecting the leadership of Royal
Military Academy Students). Royal Thai Army War College’s research paper,
Institute of Army Academy, 2004.
Defence Research and Development Office. ‘Ekkasan wichai kan sang ongkhwamru nai
kan kaekhai panha sam changwat chaidaen phak tai yang yangyuen’ (Research
paper on building the knowledge for solving the conflict in the three southernborder provinces). Ministry of Defence project to promote and support defense
research and development, 2001–2.
Joan Bondurant, Conquest of violence: the Gandhian philosophy of conflict, translated
into Thai by Paisan Wongwoavisith and Anitra Puangsuwan. Bangkok: Komol

 118 

Foundation Publishing House, 1990.
Kwanchart Klaharn, Major General. ‘Naeothang kan sangsoem kan yu ruam kan yangsanti nai phahusangkhom: sueksa chapho korani sam changwat chaidaen phak tai(yala pattani narathiwat)’ (Guidelines for the promotion of peaceful coexistence in apluralistic society: a case study in three southern border provinces, Yala, Pattani,
Narathiwat). National Defence College’s research paper, 1999–2000.
Nipat Tabmongkol, Major General. ‘Botbat khong kongthap kap kan phatthana: sueksa
chapho korani thi kieo khong kap khrongkan phrarachadamri nai phuenthi
kongthap phak thi 4’ (The role of the military and development: a case study on theRoyal Projects in areas under the Fourth Army Region’s command). National
Defence College research paper, 1999-2000.
Noppadol Inthapanya, Major General. ‘Kongthap kap kan phatthana prathet sueksa
chapho korani kan thon nuai kamlangrop ook chak kan phatthana prathet doi hai
kongphon phatthana khao pathipat ngan thaen’ (The Royal Thai Army and national
development: a case study of replacing forces command with development divisionin national development). National Defence College research paper, 1997–8 .
Prawit Wongsuwan, Major General. ‘Kan chat rabiap muban bongkan chaidaen phuea
khwam mankhong khong prathet sueksa korani nai khet rap-phitchop khong
kongthap phak thi 1’ (The organization of border defence villages for national
security: the First Army Region: a case study). National Defence College research
paper, 1997–8.
Royal Thai Army, Adjutant General’s Department. Pramuan winai thahan (The military
disciplinary code), fourth edition, 1992.
Royal Thai Army, Adjutant General’s Department. Pramuan winai thahan (The military
disciplinary code), fifth edition, 1992.
Siriwan Sereerat, et al. Ongkan lae kan chatkan (Organization and management).
Bangkok: Thammasarn, 2002.
Sujitr Sittiprabha, Major General. ‘Botbat khong thahan nai kan soemsang khwam
khemkhaeng hai kap muban tam naeo chaidaen sueksa chapho korani phak tawan
ook chiang nuea ton bon’ (The role of the military in strengthening villages along
the border: a case study in the upper northeast region). National Defence College
research paper, 2002–3.
Supreme Command Headquarters, Office of the Supreme Commander’s General Staff.
Khumu nai thahan (Military officers’ handbook). Bangkok: Rungruangrat Printing,
1983.
Uthai Dulyakasem and Lerthai Sirichai, eds. Khwam ru kap kan kaekhai panha khwam
khatyaeng korani wikhritkan chaidaen phak tai (Knowledge and conflict resolution:
the crisis in the southern border area). Bangkok: Edison Press, 2005
Wattana Wongkiatirat, et al. Kan wang phaen kolayut: silapa kan wang phaen ongkon su
khwam pen loet (Strategy planning: the art of corporate planning for excellence).
Bangkok: C-Ed Communication, 2005.
Wiboonsak Niepal, Major General. ‘Kan chat rabiap phuenthi chaidaen thai-kamphucha
boriwen phuenthi isan ton lang’ (Establishing order along the Thai-Cambodian
border in the lower Isan region). National Defence College research paper, 2001–2.

 119 Websites
Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command(http://www.southpeace. go.th/vision.htm).
Richard W. Scholl, Organizational Culture-The Social Inducement System(http://www.cba.uri.edu/scholl/ Notes/Culture.html).
Carter McNamara, Organizational culture(http://www.managementhelp.org/org_thry/culture/culture.htm).
Edgar H Schein, Organizational culture and leadership(http://www.tnellen.com/ted/tc/schein.html)

Endnotes
1

The bombing in front of Saen Thamma Withaya School in Su-ngai Kolok District of Narathiwat
took place on 11 August 2005 at 0805, killing one person and seriously injuring another.
2
Trainers from PCRK-132 recounting their direct experience with the “Happy Family” project,
2004–2005.
3
The Hayat prayer is an Islamic prayer and blessing ceremony whereby an imam will lead the
Hayat prayer and the Duah chant and share the blessed water with the congregation and the soldiers as
a gesture of well-wishing.

 120 

5
Reading “Bureaucrat Manuals,” writing cultural space: theThai state’s cultural discourses and the Thai–Malay inbetween spaces1
Decha Tangseefa
In this chapter I analyze documents called “Bureaucrat Manuals.” They were
produced by various organizations for personnel working with Muslims in Thailand’s“southern border provinces.” Conceptually, I weave together space, culture, and violence.
I treat the “southern border provinces” as spaces in-between: not only spaces in between
nation-states, but also political, economic, cultural and violent spaces in-between. I argue
that the crises in the border provinces are constituted by space and culture, creating a
dynamism that not only disrupts the Thai nation-state’s sovereignty as well as its
containment strategies, but also finally becomes violent. The cultural map and juridical
map are not congruent. The cultural map is drawn partly by historical allegiances andpartly by the realities of border trade, neither of which accepts the state boundary as ademarcation. The juridical map, on the other hand, intransigently entrenches the nationstate’s sovereignty and territorial integrity through its control of space and managementof peoples in a certain area. Tensions between these two maps have the potential to
explode, especially when the nation-state insists on being the only legitimate politicalactor, and attempts to oppress, conceal, and smother other voices and memories—only tobe haunted by those voices and memories that explode when the time is ripe. Within thisframework of cultural politics, what discourses are produced and reproduced in“Bureaucrat Manuals”? And what is the price that the Thai state and society have to pay
for maintaining the values pronounced by these discourses?

Introduction
When Chaiwat Satha-Anand asked me to conduct this research, the issue assigned
was to explore and analyze manuals for Thai Buddhist bureaucrats2 working with Malay
Muslims in Thailand’s “southern border provinces.” These manuals are books or booklets
that had been produced by government agencies such as the Ministry of Interior, or thePrime Minister’s Secretariat. The main emphasis of the study is to examine how the Thaistate situates its cultural relations with the Malay Muslim “minority,”3 as manifested in
the text of these “Bureaucrat Manuals” used by the Thai state as guidelines for officials to
relate with Muslim communities in the southern border provinces. Has the southernborderland violence been stimulated and vitiated by the cultural relations embedded in
the manuals? If yes, a conundrum arises: instead of helping to alleviate violence, thesebureaucrats have become agents of cultural violence, at the state’s behest, from the
beginning. As a result, there is already established a continuum from cultural violence to 121 the production of a violent subject.
There are at least two essential problems with this line of questioning. It assumes
that, first, these manuals are kept near at hand and readily available; and second and more
importantly, the manuals are influential in forming the ideas, consciousness, and practicesof state personnel, and hence in shaping their decisions to act. These two assumptions
cast those state personnel as robots programmed to act according to the cultural relations
between the Thai state and the “minority” inscribed in those texts.
In this research, I not only follow the line of questioning which the “intellectual
sovereign” of this grand research project set for me, but also use this opportunity to view
the violence in the southern border provinces from a perspective of borderland studies, afield that has gradually gained currency for a little over a decade. Instead of giving
priority to the state and culture4 together as the most important pair of “variables” informing, retaining, and fanning the wind of violence, as assumed by Chaiwat’s line ofquestioning, which by-the-by also locates the state as an unquestionable political actor, I
propose that both the state and culture are greatly determined by geography. In otherwords, the physical situatedness determines the locations of both state and culture, andhence determines the cultural relations between the state and “minorities” within the state.
Thus, I propose space as the definitive “variable” that determines relations between
culture and state; and I suggest these relations form, retain, and fan violence to the pointof becoming a crisis that to date defies solution.
My proposal is to change the “main variable” from the state to space, and to
redraft the equation of violence in a way that enables us to come to better terms with theglobal dynamism that ever rapidly changes, ever violently blasts, and ever unavoidably
penetrates into the multiple domains of the social fabric. I propose this equation ofviolence by beginning with a discussion of the relation between “Bureaucrat Manuals”
and “Manual Studies.” Then I “read” the location and characteristics of the studied“manuals,” as well as the cultural relations between the Thai state and Malay Muslims
embedded within these “manuals.” Next, I discuss a nexus between the notion of“southern border provinces” and the concept of “the Others” by introducing a notion of“in-between spaces,” as special zones and border zones. I end by urging readers to pay
attention to the politics of now-time.

“Bureaucrat Manuals” and “Manual Studies”“Manuals” in the “southern border provinces” and the daily lives of state personnel
The idea of having manuals for non-Muslim bureaucrats working in the southernborder provinces thus should be considered as a correct policy because at least
bureaucrats who work in this area will have knowledge, understanding, and an
ability to use that knowledge for practical ends. If [those bureaucrats] perform
according to the intentions [of the policies], [they] will create good understanding
between people and bureaucrats as well as create confidence and faith toward theirwork, which will [in turn] create good results both for the government’s policy
implementation as well as for the whole country.5

This idea of the Chularachamontri (the official head of the Muslim community in
Thailand) in a document published in a Manual for bureaucrats in the southern borderprovinces echoes many peoples’ understanding about the essentiality of “Bureaucrat

 122 

Manuals” in spaces called the “southern border provinces.” These special zones require
special understanding and special practices, different from those that the Thai state’s
personnel exercise in other parts of the country. These zones have unique cultural politics
because of two important conditions that must both be present. First, in the zones, thereligion of most people differs from that of the majority of people in Thailand. Second,
these zones are located at the margin of the Thai state. Hence, I use four criteria to selectthe booklets known as “manuals” for this study. First, they must be used only in thesouthern border provinces. Second, although they are called “Bureaucrat Manuals,” the“practices” they describe may be relevant to other personnel, such as state enterprise
workers, or researchers (who may or may not be bureaucrats). Third, they are manuals
designed for personnel to consult in their daily life practices, as this research is about theeffects of these “manuals” on their readers’ worldviews and everyday life—theireffectiveness in “socializing” personnel to become docile bodies according to thedominant discourses pervading the society, as revealed through the organizations to whichthese personnel belong.6 Finally, any document that meets these criteria, even without theword “manual” attached, qualifies for inclusion. For example, there is an annual series ofDocuments for orientation of bureaucrats, local government personnel, and state
enterprise personnel in the southern border provinces7 that are vital as they are materials
that “open the door” of cultural politics for personnel sent to work in these special zones,
knowingly or not.8
A question must nonetheless be raised: do these people live their daily lives,“manual” in hand?9 If yes, do they read them? And when they go to the annual orientation,
do they pay attention to the content? From an informal interview with some trainers, I wastold that the content of these orientations has changed hardly at all. Moreover, by talking
to some personnel (civilian, police, and military), I learnt that quite a number of them did
not want to attend these orientations; and when they did attend, they mostly sat waiting
for the coffee break or lunch. The package distributed at the orientation would be kept in afiling cabinet afterwards and often go missing should someone ask to look at it. In
addition, when I was searching for materials at some organizations (both governmental
and non-governmental), I was told that since the Southern Border Provinces
Administrative Center (SBPAC) had been dissolved,10 all the documents had been thrownaway (before the SBPAC was resurrected by the Surayud government). If these materials
are so weighty, before assessing the role of these “manuals” in shaping the mentality ofstate personnel, we should first explore “Manual Studies.”“Manual Studies” and research questions
Research on documents considered as “manuals” is quite common.11 Such researchtends to suggest that these documents have more significance in the life of society thanmost people would imagine. One reason is that manuals “open… a window on theunderlying conflicts of their age.”12 Each manual is situated in a cultural milieu where
dominant values are hegemonic, and in turn legitimize the existence of such manuals. For
instance, Judy Hilkey studies 144 manuals published between 1870 and 1910 for people
who wanted to be successful during the U.S.’s Gilded Age of emerging industrial
capitalism. 13 Hilkey treats these manual as “part of the cultural apparatus that helped
legitimize and establish the hegemony of the new industrial order.”14
Nonetheless, although most manuals reinforce the society’s dominant discourses,

 123 every manual has to encounter counter-discourses that vie to define socio-cultural life.15
Many scholars who study manuals state that they are interested in manuals not because
those manuals “tame dissent, but how their doing so changes social life.”16 Though thisissue is not directly related to this research, it helps guide this study’s three questions.
The first question is: what discourses of the Thai state were being reinforced during the
83-year period from 1923 to 2006 when these fourteen manuals were developed? If these
discourses are a main cause of the southern crises, what is the price the Thai state andsociety has to pay? The third question is implied in these first two: What are the political
implications of the special relations between the Thai state and Malay Muslims in these
special spaces? Before answering these questions, we must first “read” these “manuals.”

Locations of the text and cultural relations
Locations of the text
 The fourteen “bureaucrat manuals” studied in this research in order of publication
are as follows:17
1) Phra Rangsan Sarakit (Tiam Kanjanaprakan). 1923. Samut khumu samrap
kharatchakan krasuang mahatthai thi rap ratchakan nai monthon sung miphonlamuang napthu satsana itsalam (Manual for the Ministry of Interior’s
bureaucrats working in the territory that has believers in Islam).182) Administration Center for Southern Border Provinces (ACSBP). 1993. Ekkasan
prakop kanpathomnithet: khrongkan pathomnithet kharatchakan phanakngan
thetsaban phanakngan ratwisahakit nai changwat chaidaen phaktai prachampi
2536 (Document for orientation: orientation project for bureaucrats, municipal
personnel, state enterprise personnel in the southern border provinces, 1993) (n.p.:
ACSBP).
3) ACSBP. 1994. Ekkasan prakop kanpathomnithet: khrongkan pathomnithet
kharatchakan phanakngan thetsaban phanakngan ratwisahakit nai changwat
chaidaen phaktai prachampi 2537 (Document for orientation: orientation projectfor bureaucrats, municipal personnel, state enterprise personnel in the southernborder provinces, 1994) (n.p.: ACSBP).
4) ACSBP. 1995. Ekkasan prakop kanpathomnithet prachampi 2538: khrongkan
pathomnithet kharatchakan phanakngan thetsaban lae phanakngan ratwisahakitchangwat chaidaen phaktai (Document for orientation in 1995: orientation projectfor bureaucrats, municipal personnel, state enterprise personnel in the southernborder provinces) (n.p.: ACSBP).
5) ACSBP. 1998. Ekkasan prakop kanpathomnithet: khrongkan pathomnithet
kharatchakan phanakngan thetsaban lae phanakngan ratwisahakit changwat
chaidaen phaktai prachampi 2541 (Document for orientation: orientation projectfor bureaucrats, municipal personnel, and state enterprise personnel in the southernborder provinces, 1998) (Yala: Serm Printing).
6) ACSBP. 1999. Ekkasan prakop kanpathomnithet: khrongkan pathomnithet
kharatchakan phanakngan suan thongthin lae phanakngan ratwisahakit changwat
chaidaen phaktai prachampi 2542 (Document for orientation: orientation projectfor bureaucrats, local personnel, and state enterprise personnel in the southernborder provinces, 1999) (Yala: Serm Printing).

 124 7) ACSBP. 2000. Laksut lae ekkasan prakop kanpathomnithet kharatchakan
phanakngan suan thongthin lae phanakngan ratwisahakit changwat chaidaen
phaktai prachampi 2543 (Curriculum and document for orientating bureaucrats,
local personnel, and state enterprise personnel in the southern border provinces,
2000) (Yala: Serm Printing).
8) ACSBP. 2001. Ekkasan prakop kanpathomnithet kharatchakan phanakngan suanthongthin lae phanakngan ratwisahakit changwat chaidaen phaktai prachampi
2544 (Document for orientating bureaucrats, local personnel, and state enterprisepersonnel in the southern border province, 2001) (n.p.: Personnel Development
Division, ACSBP).
9) Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC). 2002(?). 19 Khumu
kanpathibat ratchakan nai changwat chaidaen phaktai (Manual for government
operations in the southern border provinces) (Bangkok: Department of Provincial
Administration, Ministry of Interior).
10) Office of the Prime Minister. 2002(?). 20 Khumu kharatchakan nai phunthichangwat chaidaen phaktai (Manual for bureaucrats in the southern borderprovince area) (Bangkok: Office of the Prime Minister).
11) Research Coordination Unit for the Lower South. 2003(?). 21 Kanthamngan kap
chumchon mutsalim (Working with Muslim communities) (Pattani: Research
Coordination Unit for the Lower South).
12) Secretariat of the Prime Minister. 2004. Khumu samrap kharatchakan thi prachamkhetchangwat chaidaen phaktai sung mi phonlamuang napthu satsana itsalam(Manual for bureaucrats working in the southern border provinces with people
believing in Islam) (Bangkok: Prime Minister’s Secretariat).
13) Ministry of Interior, Front Office, Yala. 2005. Ekkasan prakop kanpathomnithet:khrongkan pathomnithet kharatchakan phanakngan suan thongthin lae
phanakngan ratwisahakit changwat chaidaen phaktai prachampi 2548.
(Document for orientation: orientation project for bureaucrats, local government
personnel, and state enterprise personnel in the southern border provinces, 2005)(Yala: Yala Printing).
14)
Ministry of Interior, Front Office, Yala. 2006. Ekkasan prakop kanpathomnithet:khrongkan pathomnithet kharatchakan phanakngan suan thongthin lae
phanakngan ratvisahakit changwat chaidaen phaktai prachampi 2549. (Documentfor orientation: orientation project for bureaucrats, local government personnel,
and state enterprise personnel in the southern border provinces, 2006) (Yala: Yala
Printing).22
The content of the fourteen manuals can be categorized into two types:23a) Cultural knowledge and instructions for non-Muslim personnel on proper conduct
with Muslim communities:- on the Qur’an;- Islamic cultures;- Muslim communities’ ways of life in the southern border provinces;- local language;- ‘Answers and suggestions from the Chularachamontri (Prasert Mahamad) with

 125 practical guidelines for proper conduct regarding issues of conflict in Islam’;- principles for performing duty in the southern border province area;- dos and don’ts for non-Muslim bureaucrats in the southern border provinces.
b) The Thai state’s policies, laws, and plans:- ‘Principles of public policy and administration for Monthon24 Pattani’ (by King
Rama VI);- Principles of governance in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, andSatun;- national security policies regarding the southern border provinces, such as thePrime Minister’s Orders, “Ten Commandments,” tactics for total security;- major strategies, plans, and development projects in the southern borderprovinces;- Act on the Administration of Islamic Organizations
Of all the fourteen “manuals,” only the eleventh, Working with Muslim communities
was not produced by a state security agency. Of the remaining thirteen, nine are
documents for orientating new contingents sent to work in the southern border provinces.
Of these thirteen, all those except the 1923 and 2004 publications have virtually the samecontent as the seventh. These thirteen manuals are based on two “originals”: the 1923
edition and the 2000 edition. The others were reproduced with a little editing or with theincorporation of a small amount of new information.
If we believe that reproduction confirms the content’s significance, then we shouldnote that only two passages are exactly the same in the latest editions of 2004 and 2006
(numbers 12 and 14). They are: ‘Understanding Muslim communities’ cultural ethos,’ and‘Dos and don’ts: guidelines for state personnel in the southern border provinces.’ 25
Similarly, the only manual not published by a government agency (number 11, by
Research Coordination Unit for the Lower South) mainly focuses on proper
understanding and sensitivity toward cultural difference, and on the importance of not
disparaging Muslim people or communities.26
The reproduction of “manuals”: from “culture” to security discourse
I will “read” the two “original manuals,” namely the 1923 edition (double-checkedagainst the 2004 version which is almost the same), and the 2000 edition. The two“originals” give similar accounts of cultural relations between the Thai state, Thai
Buddhist society, and the Muslim communities in the southern border area, though each
employs the language of its era. Both pay attention to cultural difference and present animage of a conciliatory atmosphere between the two communities of different religions.27
Yet, there are two issues: the question of culture, and the question of the reproduction of
the content of these “manuals.” Together, these two issues display how the Thai state
situates its cultural relations with the southern Muslim communities. In short, the Thaistate has not paid attention to the dynamism of cultural relations, which have immenselychanged between the first publication in 1923 and the latest in 2006. Moreover, the imageof conciliation portrayed in both “manuals” raises a question: How have the Muslim
communities of the southern border area been positioned as a “minority” in the equationof government and administration in the name of “security”?

 126 The previous section showed that after the reproduction of these manuals up to the2004 and 2006 editions, what remained common to both “manuals” was only a)understanding about cultural aspects of Muslim communities, and b) guidelines for state
officials in the southern border provinces. These contents can be categorized into twoparts: on the ideological foundation of Islam, and on the cultural ethos of Muslim
communities.28 The first category contains some essential principles of Islam which thereader must understand, such as the meanings of “Islam” and “Allah.” The second
category contains applications of the first category in the daily lives of the Muslims. The
implication is that the social and cultural context of the Muslim communities is importantin framing the second category, and the two categories combined constitute Islamic
culture in a broad sense. Yet, the way that the government agencies producing the“manuals” have compiled materials of these two categories tends to fix Islamic culture
with no attention to the passage of time. For example, most of the fourteen “manuals”
produced between 1998 and 2007 have a section called ‘Answers and suggestions by the
Chularachamontri (Prasert Mahamad) with practical guidelines for proper conduct
regarding issues of conflict in Islam,’ based on a conversation recorded in 1982. This
exemplifies the representation of Muslim culture as static. Muslim ways of life are thus
“frozen” like relics in museum. Over time, government agencies are museumizing Islamic
culture.
This museumization of culture in most “manuals” becomes more complex whenreaders find traces of the nexus between “bureaucrat manual” and the nation-state in two
dimensions: bureaucratic inefficiency and the discourse of “security.” When the first“original” of 1923 was reproduced as the 2004 edition, the Prime Minister’s Secretariat
paid no attention to the lapse of eighty-one years between the “original” and the“reproduction.” In addition, the compiler paid no attention to the difference between
foundations of Islamic ideology and the cultural ethos of Muslim communities. Thoughannounced as a “new edition”, in fact the 2004 volume is virtually the same as 1923
except for “updating the language for the present time.”29 The compiler not only writes
that “the content of this manual is still useable at present,” but also states:
Since this manual was published in 1923 until now (2004), it has been more thaneighty years. But it seems all the advice for bureaucrats contained herein is not
outdated at all. To carry out official duties in the southern border provinces today
still requires sensitivity to the socio-cultural character, the understanding of which isno different. 30

Even those who pay scant attention to the crisis of cultural politics in the deep
south, where violence and death have become part of daily life, should be able to graspthat after these eighty years, the “socio-cultural character” is drastically different. In 1923,
the knowledge on Islam and Muslim communities on the part of the Thai state andsociety was very limited—incomparable to our present understanding in the current
context in which worldwide militant networks traverse state boundaries.31 And yet thecompiler of this “manual” writes:…hence, if we look at the problem that occurred on 4 January 2004, it may be a“signal” warning us to finally wake up from ignorance and lack of understanding
about the socio-cultural differences existing within the Thai state.32

This passage assumes that the crises in the southern border provinces in the past

 127 could not serve as “signals” at all. In the ‘Principles of public policy and administration
for Monthon Pattani,’33 bestowed by King Rama VI on 6 July 1923, the monarch clearlyurged his personnel sent to the deep south to heed the socio-cultural differences. “We”
must have woken up a long time ago, not just after the “Gun Stealing Incident” on 4
January 2004.
 The inefficiency continues. Comparing the language between the 1923 and 2004
editions reveals an instrumental utilitarianism towards Muslim communities, solely forthe sake of governance and the security of the state:
Likewise, with teachers, toh-kru, and imams in the southern border provinces. If webuild good relations with knowledgeable and respected teachers and Imams, bycompiling separate registers of teachers and imams, and then gradually building
good relations with them, such as engaging them in conversation or organizing somespecial meeting just for ceremony, such as a meeting to enquire about some pastwork, whether there was anything that offended religion or government, whether
there was anything that needed to be changed or pursued. If the teachers and imams
cooperate, it will be very expedient for the government.34

The 1923 edition did not contain the problematic phrase:
Likewise, with teachers in Monthon Pattani. If we select those that areknowledgeable and respected, compile a special district register, and then follow up
by engaging them in conversation or organizing some meeting with suitableceremony, such as a meeting to enquire about some past work, whether there wasanything that offended religion or government, whether there were any customs thatneeded to be changed, or anything about taxation. If the teachers are on our side, itwill be very expedient for the government.35

Juxtaposing the two passages shows the carelessness involved in “reproducing” thecontent of the “manuals.” Suggesting officials should interact with imams “just for show”(where the earlier version implied due respect) not only encourages state personnel tohave no respect for people who are revered within Muslim communities, but also
demonstrates how a state agency (the Prime Minister’s Secretariat, no less) forms andconfirms the relations between the Thai state apparatus and a “minority.” It demonstrates
a lack of respect for communities with a different cultural ethos from mainstream Thai
society.36
A question then arises: When the Thai state “takes care of” (du lae in Thai) the
southern border provinces, is this a matter of pokkhrong (government), or pok + khrong,“cover over” + “take possession”, extending hegemony over the bodies and lives ofpeoples in an area? 37 If so, another question follows: do communities in the borderprovinces wish to be taken as possessions without concern for their own voices? What isthe price that Thai society has to pay, when the Thai state’s “governing” is not a form ofadministration that opens opportunities for people to participate in setting the political
agenda and determining their own fates? The “manuals” for the southern border attest to
the efforts to understand Islam and Muslim cultures, showing that the “drafters” deem
such efforts to be crucial for the effective “administration” of the three border provinces.
Yet this study of the “manuals” shows that even after eighty-plus years, parts of the Thaistate apparatus still have an attitude toward Muslim communities in the southern borderprovinces that is much more disturbing than the attitude of those drafting the “manuals”
in the past. When these problematic “manuals” fall into the hands of various peoples with

 128 varying degrees of cultural concern and sensitivity, what attitudes do they help tocultivate, what ways of speaking about Muslim communities do they encourage, andwhat kind of interactions with the communities do they shape? How worrying is this?
Let me sum up the argument thus far. For the Thai state, the Muslim communities
in the deep south have become merely a group of people known to exist, mainly for the
benefit of the Thai state, while their well-being is a by-product. These people haveundergone inclusive exclusion under the governance of the Thai state.38 The Thai stateand nation classify their relations with the Muslim communities under the heading of“security.” Given the meaning of “government” (pokkhrong) considered above,“security” here scarcely means the security of the Muslims in these border provinces.
As a discourse, “security” is a technology of power that sovereign authorities—bethey nation-state, absolute monarchy, community leaders, or even family heads— deploy
to govern, control, and command peoples within a certain space. The discourse of
security is not equally subtle and seamless in every space. It varies from the direct
exercise of violence to the tender yet profound control of education. Whatever othereffects it may have, the discourse of security determines the ways of talking about otherrelated matters, such as the importance of social order, the need to use violence atappropriate times, the definition of the “Others” who are not one of “Us” (including
Muslims) as “disquieting elements” or even “separatists.” Usually such statements passwithout any scrutiny of the complexities they mask. Most importantly, “security”
becomes something natural, an undeniable and unquestionable truth. In any family,community, or nation-state, there is no room for “insecurity.” Whoever challenges“security” becomes a deviant in the family or a traitor to the community or nation-state.
As discursive practice, the “Bureaucrat Manuals” are an example of a disciplinary
regime in the Foucauldian sense, with a double meaning. First, they aim to discipline thepersonnel that act as representatives of the state in negotiations with Muslims who are the“Others” of the Thai. Second, in these negotiations, the Thai state aims to produce
Muslims as docile bodies,39 transforming them from otherness to “sameness” as much as
possible. This sameness must at the very least conform to the consciousness and practices
mandated by the Thai state such as paying respect to the royal family members who visit
the southern border provinces. But the fact that a “manual” containing such problems has
survived for over eighty years suggests that this transformation of “Them” into “Us” (ifthat is the aim) is just too difficult. The problematic “manual” produced by the Prime
Minister’s Secretariat raises a question: Is the Thai state too crude to deal with something
requiring tolerance and sensitivity like culture?
“Bureaucratic Manuals” are a discursive practice that weaves multiple discourses
into a single cultural milieu, which in turn produces dominant values that are, by andlarge, unquestionable. Yet, the effectiveness of the “manuals” to subtly produce andmanage the spaces of the southern border provinces is still not visible. The only thingvisible at the moment is that, because these documents are “Bureaucrat Manuals,” thestate personnel who read them need not question whether they believe the contents or not.
Their duty is to believe and follow. The “Bureaucrat Manuals” make those obliged to readthem into agents of the state. State power is thus enforced, confirmed, and sustained
because these agents are merely the mediums of the state’s sovereign power.
Yet whether “Bureaucrat Manuals” are effective depends on the cultural politics
and geographical environment of the southern border provinces which envelop these 129 “manuals.” Hence it is necessary to understand the cultural politics of “otherness” and“sameness” by examining the location of “the Others” and the specialness of the southernborder provinces.

“The Others” and the “southern border provinces”: special spaces,
border spaces, and in-between spaces
Muslims, “jek”40 and “Communists”: “otherness in sameness” and “the Others
Within”
Reading the “Bureaucrat Manuals” made me aware of the processes of treating
Muslims in the south as “Others” not as “Us.” The projects to “understand” and “reachout to”41 Muslim communities by the Thai state apparatuses, then or now, have generally
been attempts to understand “the Others Within,” 42 under the logic of instrumentally
utilitarian governance, amounting to an inclusive exclusion of the others, not including
them as “one of us.” This is different from the way the Thai state treated the “Chinese,”
who finally became part of the discourse of “khon thai” (Thai people). In that case, thedifference between the Chinese and the Thai was only in the ethnic dimension. Once
Thailand thrived economically and the Chinese played an instrumental part in thissuccess, the Chinese became Thai, shared the same “imagined community,” turned into“one of us,” with only faint lingering traces of difference. The Chinese could enter ashared imagination because material conditions were powerful enough to overcome
ethnic difference.
From this material perspective, one of the most acutely powerful examples in thehistory of confrontation between “the Thai” and “the Others” was the battle with theCommunist Party of Thailand (CPT). We must not forget that in communism, theemphasis is on material conditions determining consciousness and social change. Hence,at the end of the day, ethnic and religious differences are not definitive dimensions. Thisideological condition based on material factors was more easily managed by the Thaistate than the confrontation with “the Muslim Others.” The Thai state engaged with the
CPT under the 66/23 policy of 1980, using a political strategy to defuse differences andfight both an ideological and military war.43 Yet, we must not forget also that thriving
economic conditions from the early 1980s onwards, as well as the easing of tension
between the liberal world and the communist world at the global level, undermined acommunist mass-mobilization based on material conditions.
As for Muslim communities, how has the inclusive exclusion by both the Thaistate and society affected the peoples and the special cultural zones in the southern borderprovinces? Or, is it the case that the Thai state and society consider such communities andzones as barren cultural spaces, not worthy of attention, until the violence explodes, andonly then does the mind turn to seeking a solution? 44 The next section answers thesequestions.
“Southern border provinces”: special spaces, border spaces, and in-between spaces45
Many books and documents produced by state security agencies, academics (bothwithin and without the state’s security fold), non-governmental organizations, private
sector bodies, media, and other autonomous agencies all mention the cultural uniqueness 130 of peoples in the southern border provinces, and the history of the Buddhist majority’s
relations with the majority of peoples in the deep south whose faith is Islam.46 Yet, thisuniqueness results not only from ethnic and religious differences, but also from the factthat these Muslims’ are situated in a borderland.
The report by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), entitled Overcoming
violence through the power of reconciliation, mentioned the “border geography” as asocial-structural factor, namely that the southern border provinces are geographicallyadjacent to Malaysia with only the Ko-lok River (which some say “is only drainage
during the wet season”) as a natural state boundary. This fact, the report continues,
generates two problems: pervasive dual citizenship, and migration to Malaysia. Hence,
any solution to the southern problem depends on cooperation from the neighboring
country, and we must not “treat Malaysia as the bad guy.”47
 Yet, the borderland-ness of the southern border provinces is much more complex
than this, and inevitably those who search for solutions to problems arising in this spacemust confront this complexity and the anxiety it generates. Often such people have to
distance themselves from the state-centric paradigm48 in order to understand the historiesof the various forces— peoples, cultures, and capitals—that existed prior to the creationof either the Thai or Malay nation-states. These forces were the result of normal contact
between communities for exchange, communication, and trade. A villager along the U.S.–
Mexico border once said: “We did not cross border, border crossed us.”49 Once a nationstate has established a juridical map, it usually (or always?) disregards the socio-cultural
fabric, histories, and people’s memories of the space that existed prior to the creation of
the nation-state.50 The border subjects, who had been there long before the nation-state,
threaten both the territorial integrity as well as the narrative of nationhood of bothThailand and Malaysia—their “imagined communities,”51 as it were.
Moreover, when a state-boundary is cut through the socio-cultural fabric of peoples,
separating them into membership of different nation-states, incongruence of membershipensues. The sense of belonging of communities is divided and managed by more than one
nation-state. In the case of the southern border provinces, the separation becomes moreacute due to the distance between the cultural milieu and ethos of the borderland andthose of the Thai nation-state. The narratives of the past and collective memories of the
Muslim communities differ from (and many times are alienated from) those of “Thainationhood.” The sense of estrangement that southern Muslims have towards the Thaination-state is hence a rule not an exception. And it is not outlandish for them to have asense of allegiance to transnational communities rather than to the national society.52
Problems arise when a nation-state, not just Thailand, attempts to “manage” bordercommunities by controlling and homogenizing them (often by violence), and theboundary of the state becomes a boundary of violence.53 The fact that a state boundary isboth a site and a claim by the dominant geopolitical discourse generates both conflict andrepresentations of violence, determining those who do and do not belong to a state. These
processes of identity formation “privilege the nation-state as the venue for politicalcontest and change,”54 while peoples (especially those whose cultures differ from that of
the mainstream) have far less legitimacy in political action than the nation-state (and insome case, have none at all). Yet every nation-state from the past to the present
encounters traces of the past that are ready to assert themselves or explode. Time andagain, nation-states have hidden, forgotten, glossed over, or erased the histories and 131 memories of people in their territories,55 especially along border zones where stand-offs,
negotiations, and compromises are the law not the exception. Attempts to homogenize
border zones, shaping them in the image of the center, have been futile, and even the useof force to this effect fails to deliver lasting results.
Borderlands thus not only symbolize nation-states’ powers and their limits, but alsoengender conflict and accommodation. Because these spaces are filled with the cultural
practice of many peoples with histories of migration and displacement, any attempt toimpose “what culture signifies or what is signified by culture” becomes complicated.
(The mistakes by the compilers of the manuals are a good example.) The center of theThai state must be aware that the borderlands are zones strewn with cultural translations
and negotiations.56 As Kwame Anthony Appiah once stated, in every encounter there is
not only contamination but also nourishment.57 Every nation-state’s borderland affirms
this thought. In other words, this generation of Thai people is unlikely to witness thestable establishment of “Thai national identity” in the southern border provinces. The
explosion of violence after the “Gun Stealing Incident” of 4 January 2004 supports thisprognosis. Yet Muslim communities in this borderland cannot retain their identities
amidst the fast and (at times) furious changes of the world around and far away fromthem, especially, in the context of a global “war against terrorism” that in many ways
fuels the fires of differences in the southern border provinces.
Philosophically speaking, the discussion thus far is based on Giorgio Agamben’s
conception of sovereign power. Inspired by Agamben, I contend that the idea of a “Thai–
Malay state boundary” is problematic. In the Agambenian topology of sovereign power,
borderlands are zones of irreducible indistinction between what is outside and what is
inside a sovereign jurisdiction—between violence and law, or between law and life. In
these spaces, exception and rule flow through one another to the point of literalindistinction.58 In practice, more and more “illegal” goods are smuggled, more and more
“illegal” peoples traverse through many “doorways” along the border zones, and more
and more weaponry, both simple and complex, is smuggled across. Consequently, it isimperative to understand the transnational59 together with all the forces that rupture theterritorial integrity of the nation-state. The transnational is not only state-to-state
cooperation (in which nation-states are the main actors), but also movements of capital,
peoples, and cultures which do not conform to nation-state rules, especiallytransgressions of state boundaries that are “illegal” in the state-centric discourses, such as“illegal” border trade and “illegal” migration. In other words, borderlands are spaces inbetween where dimensions of culture, politics, economics, and violence are woven
together in such a complex pattern that often the strands are indistinguishable. These
spaces are contact zones of heterogeneity amidst the attempts at homogenization by thenation-state.60 As for the Thai–Malay in-between spaces, since the creation of Thailand
and Malaysia, the two nation-states have attempted to achieve the “amnesiac ‘suspensionof historical time’”61 among peoples who have been converted into “others” (in the same
way as happened in other in-between spaces), without realizing that “there is always atrace of non-presence in presence” and that the historical existence of the two nationstates has “debts to other times.”62
Yet alongside the amnesia of the two nation-states, the histories and memories ofthe southern Muslim communities have been part of temporalities produced by global
economic forces, part of “capital times,” resulting from the “sovereignty of money”63 and 132 the geography of capital. 64 Such capital times produce various dramas of various
subjectivities,65 because “money turns value into a flow that tends to escape the juridical
frame of political territoriality,”66 often disrupting the territorial integrity of nation-states.
Furthermore, capital times disrupt the nation-state’s management of ideas about the past,present, and future, 67 generating anxiety about nationhood. Driven by market
mechanisms, capital times often disrupt any attempt to unify memories of the past, selfunderstanding in the present, and anticipation of the nation-state’s future. By being partof capital times, some disquieting Muslims have been able to disrupt the Thai state’s
ideational management of their past, present, and future.68 They have also competed with
the Thai state’s production of space, resulting in confrontations between the cultural mapsof the Muslim “Others” and the juridical maps of the Thai nation-state.
As the disquieting Muslims do not share a sense of belonging with the Thaination-state, their cultural maps have often been forced to negotiate with the Thai state’s
juridical map in extreme ways. Moreover, the translations of their “culture” have been
more ubiquitous than the “national culture” of the Thai state. Hence, the peoples of the
Muslim communities in the southern border provinces have to re-enact their cultural
identities in their attempt to survive. This is part of “living on the borderlines.”69 Many
Muslim communities find that their identity as a political community has to be fought for,and that their cultural identity is far more vulnerable than the Thai “national culture.”
Unlike the concept of a national culture with a claim to “continuity of an authentic‘past’ and a living ‘present,’” the culture of marginal communities depends more on
strategies for survival. 70 However, there have been times when some Muslim
communities located in the Thai-Malay in-between spaces were able to grasp the past andmake the present of Thailand appeared bizarre—creating the times of the now 71 —because history is “the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time,
but time filled by the presence of the now [Jetztzeit].”72
From time to time, marginal communities are blasted out of the homogenous
continuum of Thailand’s national time, creating another time belonging to “Others,” afull-time when they can articulate their pain and their hope of exerting themselves andgaining recognition as political subjects qualified to “express themselves” in public spacein the Thai–Malay in-between spaces. Yet, such full-time of self-assertion has often been
seen as a time of “insurgents,” “rebels,” “criminals,” or “terrorists.” 73 Their struggles
recall many past attempts to disrupt74 the Thai state’s normalization of the present state ofaffairs in which Muslim communities have little opportunity to make themselves heard.
They evoke the pasts that undermine the normalized present, exploding Thailand’s
hegemonic history and temporalities. The “Gun Stealing Incident,” “Krue Ze Tragedy,”and “Tak Bai Killing” are just some in a lengthening list. These are attempts to makethemselves visible and transfigure the field of experience of life at the margins, but withhorrible cost for both many Muslim communities and the Thai state, right down to thepresent with no end in sight.
The three modalities underpinning both the symbolic and material conditions ofdaily life in the border zones are cultural encounters, capital-electronic circuits,75 and thestate’s territory (and hence sovereign power). Of these, the first two are more prominent
than the third. Yet the state’s territory/sovereign power is firmly and at times insidiously
entrenched. Capital-electronic circuits and cultural encounters can weaken the sovereign
power, diminishing the authority of the nation-state in the border zones where the 133 borderline ought to symbolize the nation-state’s power. Performing terror in theborderlands is one way for the nation-state to signify its jurisdiction. We must not forget,
as William Connolly emphasizes, that to “occupy territory… is both to receive sustenanceand to exercise violence.” There are strains of terror embedded in the logic ofterritorialization.
When necessary, the sovereign power performs terror in order to maintain the
territorial integrity of the nation-state. Again, the “Krue Ze Tragedy,” and the “Tak Bai
Killing” were stark examples. According to Connolly, the Oxford English Dictionary
derives territory “from terrere, meaning to frighten, to terrorize, to exclude.” Andterritorium is “a place from which people are warned.”76 The disquieting elements in thesouthern border provinces are “the Others” that must be warned to leave Thai soil.
The Thai–Malay in-between spaces are where we witness a real state of
exception,77 ready to erupt every now and then. They are not neutral spaces, but places
where the nation-state attempts to achieve the “amnesiac suspension of historical time” of“the Others.” The histories and memories of the Muslim “Others” in these spaces areforgotten; their voices are not heard; their practices of space and identity aredelegitimated by the state-centric paradigm. The geographical imaginary of this paradigm
ignores the contest to define the past, determine the present, and develop a foundation for
the future. And how do the Thai state’s practices in this regard figure in the “Bureaucrat
Manuals”?

Politics of “now-time”: from “Bureaucrat Manuals” to the Thai stateand society
Before we have learned to deal with things in a given position, they have alreadychanged several times. Thus, we always perceive events too late, and politics always
needs to foresee, so to speak, the present. (Anne Robert Turgot, Oeuvres)78

Since the dawn of the “new millennium” (according to the Christian calendar) theworld has encountered an unceasing series of violent events. The daily lives of theworld’s citizens have increasingly become lives under a “state of exception.” There is along list of violent events involving transnational subjects traversing state boundaries. In
Thailand, it started with the Ratchaburi Hospital siege along the Thai-Burmese border atthe dawn of the “new millennium”—an event which shook the country to its “core,” ifever there was one. By the end of the same year, a group of “illegal” laborers had escapedfrom a prison in a fishing-industry province, only to be executed on a “killing road” close
to the Thai–Burmese state boundary. At the global level, the destruction of 9/11 was soon
followed by the Bali, Cairo, and London bombings.79 In 2004, in the Muslim-majority far
south of Thailand, the atrocious killings at the Krue Ze Mosque in April were followed by
the equally, if not more, atrocious Tak Bai killings in October, leading to a generally
higher level of violence in the area. In 2005, the world witnessed the rage of thedescendants of Africa in France. Through 2006, southern Thailand’s violence continued
to escalate. Among the incidents were: fifty simultaneous bombs on 15 June; 118 violent
coordinated incidents in twenty-seven districts of four provinces on the night of 1
August;80 twenty-two banks bombed in five districts on 31 August; and bombs in Hat Yai,the economic center of the lower south, on 16 September. Obviously, we must not forgetthe liquid bomb in London in August. There has been no convincing sign that this list will

 134 not be lengthened.
After reading all the “Bureaucrat Manuals” in this global context of violence, I ask
myself, as a student of violence, what do I make of them? For me, the “Bureaucrat
Manuals” are surveys of the cultural spaces of otherness. They did not pay adequate
attention to the dynamism of the cultural geography of these special zones. Various
cultural markers are mentioned—such as streams of religious teachings, brooks of social
fabrics of Muslims, hills of prohibitions and traditions of Muslim cultures—but withoutawareness that these markers have met with rapid, violent, and penetrating changes
among the Thai Malay from the in-between spaces to the global level. These markers
were left after each survey. Each time that another survey was conducted, another“manual” produced, there was almost nothing to confirm that the producers really went
“into the field” to understand the confrontations between streams of teaching and oceansof global change; the brooks of Muslims’ social fabric swept away by the Thai state’s
giant waves; the hills of prohibitions and traditions of Muslim cultures bombed byviolence in many areas. On the contrary, later surveys just copied the results of old
surveys, without being attentive to social contexts or locations or interactions between theever-changing Muslim and Buddhist communities. 81 Consequently, to say that a darkcloud of violence has cloaked the southern border provinces since 4 January 2004 (again,
the “Gun Stealing Incident”) is to talk about violence only after its impact is intense andwidespread. But if we had paid attention to voices from the border provinces, we would
have learnt that the violence erupted a long time ago. I would like to end this article withthree remarks.
1) Listening to voices of difference. As a researcher who studies atrocities
committed against common people along the Thai-Burmese in-between spaces, I havebecome convinced that learning from other border zones and from other suppressed or
oppressed peoples will enable Thai society to understand the complex reality of violence.
One of the Thai society’s most crucial problems (not unique to Thailand) is the inability
to tolerate voices of differences, and allow those differences to play out in the theatre ofpolitics. When I first conducted fieldwork in the Thai–Burmese border zones in 2000–1
for my doctoral dissertation, I had an opportunity to interview a leader of a group
opposing the Burmese junta. I asked whether he had anything to tell Thai society. “Don’tpressure us,” he said.
The Dusun-nyor,82 Krue Ze, and Ratchaburi Hospital incidents, as well as manyother events occurring along the margins of Thai society, demonstrate how poor both theThai state and society are at accepting differences that are revealed through historicalindications, yet usually pass by without sufficient attention. In a way, this isunderstandable because it is the nature of the state to control and dissolve differences. But
to suppress differences in the present, to suppress memories and narratives, puts the state
itself in danger, as my next concluding remark explains.
2) The intertwining three geographies. After my fieldwork along the Thai–Burmese
in-between spaces in 2000–1, and after developing theoretical strategies to understand thepolitical entanglements in the forcible displacement of peoples in those zones, I was not
surprised by the crisis of 9/11, or the bombings in London, Cairo, Bali, and Jordan. Afterthe Krue Ze tragedy on 28 April 2004, I gave an interview to one of the two national 135 English-language newspapers, the Bangkok Post, saying I saw dark clouds at the horizon
and they were moving towards us, because of the way the Thai state “managed” thetragedy, and because Thai society allowed its anxiety to legitimize state violence, as was
the case in the Ratchaburi Hospital siege in 2000 and the execution of prisoners in
Kanchanaburi at the end of the same year. After the Krue Ze tragedy, I spoke in various
venues that I would not be surprised if there was a simultaneous bombing in various areasof Thailand. Peoples, cultures, and capitals traverse state boundaries beyond the capacityof the nation-state to control. Both simple and complex weaponry are part of this traffic.
3) Histories of “the Others” and attentiveness to signs of crisis. I would like to end
this article with Walter Benjamin’s concept that history must “blast the epoch out of thereified ‘continuity of history,’”83 that allows no space for the disruptive narratives of “theOthers.” Moreover, it must also “explode the homogeneity of the epoch, interspersing itwith ruins—that is, with the present.”84 Such “ruins” are the traces of the existence ofpeoples who have been suppressed or oppressed. His conception of history opens atheoretical space for these peoples. By paying attention to their existence, we realize that“the ‘state of exception’ in which we live is the rule.”85 For Benjamin, the true subject ofhistorical knowledge is “the struggling, oppressed class itself.” 86 Only by paying
attention of the present before being attentive to history can we be cognizant of the ruins.
It is to pay attention to now-time, which is “a revolutionary chance in the fight for the
oppressed past,” as now-time “comprises that entire history of mankind in an enormous
abridgment.”87 The historian’s task is thus to be aware that the present state of affairs
contains indications into history that may be imperceptible. Historians must be able toread the present, and “to ignite the explosive materials that are latent in what has been,”
namely suppression or oppression. In this way, to approach “‘what has been’ means totreat it not historiographically, as heretofore, but politically, in political categories.”88
Historians must grasp the vivid images blasting out of the daily life of “the oppressed”(not just those of the state), because these images are enactments of their present, rupturesin the normal continuity of the hegemonic narrative that has dominated society, chances
to grasp the past of the oppressed and fill the present of the hegemons (the state andsovereign powers) with oddity and anxiety—just like Thai society since the day of “GunStealing” by “petty thieves.”89
Endnotes1

I would like to pay homage to those who have died from crises in the southern border provinces
since the Thai nation-state was established. This research is also written to pay respect to my teacher,
Professor Sombat Chanthornwong, for his sixtieth birthday in 2005. I would like to express mygratitude to a few persons who helped make this research in the form it is now (with apologies to those
I forget to mention), especially Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Chayanit Poonyarat, Janjira Sombutpoonsiri,
Surat Kompot (my hard-working research assistant), Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng, Warapree Tangseefa, all
the three discussants of this paper, especially, Chidchanok Rahimmulah, Niti Pawakapan, Colonel
Anuchat Bunnak, Pratsanee Matman, Atchara Ditthaphong, Kamonwan Atkarunpan, Police Major
Narong Ruvicha, Ayup Patan, librarians at the libraries of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry ofInterior and last but not least, Chris Baker for his English editing.
2
As will be clear to readers, the ‘manuals’ used in this research are not only for bureaucrats, nor
are they only for Buddhists, neither are they all called manuals, hence “manual” or “Bureaucrat

 136 

Manual” appears in quotation marks.
3
I put “minority” in quotation marks to problematize the state-centric paradigm, as the concept ofminority “belongs to the narrative of state forms.” See Michael J. Shapiro, For moral ambiguity:
national culture and the politics of the family (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p.
137. As Etienne Balibar puts it: “The very existence of minorities, together with their more of lessinferior status, was a state construct, a strict correlate of the nation-form.” See Etienne Balibar,‘Ambiguous universality,’ differences: a journal of feminist cultural studies 7, 1 (Spring 1995) p. 53.
Hence, when a nation is a hegemon in a state and determines the state’s narrative about the nation, thenarratives of other nations or ethnicities are marginalized. This has happened to Malay Muslims’
narrative(s) in the southern border provinces.
4
See George Steinmetz, ed., State/culture: state-formation after the cultural turn (Ithaca andLondon: Cornell University Press, 1999).
5
Office of the Prime Minister. 2002(?), Khumu kharatchakan nai phunthi changwat chaidaen
phaktai (Manual for bureaucrats in the southern border province area) (Bangkok: Office of the Prime
Minister, 2002?).
6
Michel Foucault, Discipline and punish: the birth of the prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
We should, however, be prepared for the fact that many “manuals” will fail to produce docile bodies inthe southern border zones for various reasons beyond the scope of this project; as Foucault states,“where there is power, there is resistant.” See The history of sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (NewYork: Vintage Books, 1978), p.95.
7
On 2 January 1965, the cabinet set up the Administrative Center for the Southern Border
Provinces (ACSBP). One of its main duties was to orientate bureaucrats of all level and all
departments sent to work in the southern border provinces, by organizing a ‘Project for orientation of
bureaucrats, local municipal personnel, and state enterprise personnel’ from 1965. See number 3 in thelist of manuals.
8This research covers “manuals” used in civilian affairs together with those used in military
operation. For the former, I was informed by some security personnel that they generally used“manuals” produced by the Ministry of Interior or the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. As for the latter,an army captain said he could not provide them as they were military secrets that might let “theenemy” know our military operations. Example of the latter are: ‘Manual for practice of prevention
and suppression of unrest: extinguishing the southern fire’ and ‘Manual for preparation of field
operation in the three southern border provinces.’ Institute of Advanced Military Study, Royal Thai
Army, 2005, Botrian lae naeothang kae panha kanko khwam maisangop nai phuenthi sam changwat
chaidaen phaktai (Lessons and guidelines for solving the unrest in the southern border province area)(Bangkok: Committee for Drafting Lessons and Guidelines for Solving the Unrest in the Southern
Border Province Area, cho-15). The same soldier said, “You can see them, but can’t take them.”(Informal talk, July 2006).
9This question brings up the issue of size. Of all the fourteen manuals other than the 1923 edition
for which no original has been found, only two are pocket-size. These are numbers 10 and 11 in thelist below. The two are about the same size as Khumue kanpathibatngan khong kharatchakan tamruat(Manual for police operation) (Police Education Bureau, Royal Thai Police, Bangkok: Police Printing
House, 2005), which is, according to an informal interview with a supervisor of a police training
department, always in a policeman’s pocket. Nonetheless, number 12 on the list, though a bit bigger
than a typical adult Thai male’s palm, is just twenty plus pages. 
10However, the organization was re-established during the administration of prime minister
Surayud Chulanont.
11
Some interesting works on “manual studies” are: Lisa Maruca, ‘Bodies of type: the work of
textual production in English printers’ manuals,’ Eighteenth-Century Studies 36, 3 (2003), pp. 321–43;
Martin Brückner and Kristen Poole, ‘The plot thickens: surveying manuals, drama, and the materialityof narrative form in modern England,’ English Literary History 69 (2002), pp. 617–48; Judy Hilkey,

 137 Character is capital: success manuals and manhood in Gilded Age America (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press, 1997). See also Daniel H. Borus, ‘Success and the single man,’ Reviews in
American History 26, 3 (1998), pp. 581–6, which reviews Hilkey’s work; and Alistair Black, ‘The
library as clinic: a Foucauldian interpretation of British public library attitudes to social and physicaldisease, ca. 1850–1950.’ Libraries and Culture 40, 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 416–34, which studies
manual as a minor issue.
12
Hilkey, Character is capital, p. 6, cited in Borus, ‘Success,’ p. 584. In Thai the word khumuemeans both manual and directions (for example, for use of an electric appliance). The second meaning
is beyond the scope of this study, and also is not so interesting as there is little room for debate over
how you use an electrical appliance.
13
Mark Twain wrote in 1871: “What is the chief end of man?—to get rich. In what way?—dishonestly if we can; honestly if we must.” The website of the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)
states that in the Gilded Age, everyone has potential to be Andrew Carnegie,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carnegie/gildedage.html, accessed June 2006.
14
Hilkey, Character is capital, p. 7, cited in Borus, ‘Success,’ p. 582.
15
Deploying the language of “ideology” to talk about the confrontation between dominant andcounter discourses, Borus writes “ideology naturalizes and legitimizes by recognizing, if only toefface, that which opposes it” (Borus, ‘Success,’ p. 584).
16
Borus, ‘Success,’ p. 584.
17
Some do not have exact publication dates, and I have estimated from the content. Because thisresearch was designated from the beginning by Chaiwat Satha-Anand, the head of the grand project, tobe documentary research, interviewing was not a main method of this research.
18
Published in “Matrakan soemsang khwam mankhong nai changwat chaidaen phaktai”(Measures for entrenching security in southern border provinces) by Students of Psychological
Practice Curriculum, Directorial Department, Batch No. 82, Group 3. Applied Psychology Institute,
National Defense Studies Institute, Supreme Command Headquarter, 9 February 1998, pp. 93–109.
19
This publication date is from the date of the ‘Order of the Office of the Prime Minster(123/2002),’ dated 30 April 2002, which is included in this “manual.”
20
This publication date is from the date of the ‘Letter from the Office of the King’s Secretariat,’
dated 16 November 2003 (sent to the permanent secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister), whichis included in this “manual.”
21
This publication date is estimated from the ‘Meeting of village researchers in three southernborder provinces,’ dated 31 January to 2 February 2003, to which this “manual” is referred.
22
In addition, I consulted three police manuals for comparison: Khumue kanpathibatngan khong
kharatchakan tamruat (Manual for police operation) (2005, see note 9 above); Police Education
Bureau, Royal Thai Police, Khumue tamruat lem 6: muat wicha pongkan prabpram atchayakam(Police manual vol. 6: crime prevention and suppression) (2006) (Bangkok: Police Printing House,2006); Police Education Bureau, Royal Thai Police, Khumue tamruat lem 7: muat wicha yutthavithi
tamruat (Police manual vol. 7: police tactics) (2006), (Bangkok: Police Printing House, 2006).
23
This categorization is made for general understanding. Theoretically speaking, the two sets neednot be sharply separated because law, policy, and the state’s plans all are kinds of cultural practice; see
Steinmetz, State/culture.
24
A territorial division introduced in the late nineteenth century and subsequently replaced by themodern provinces.
25
The content of numbers 10 and 14 do not differ much; some parts of both were copied from thesame earlier document. 
26
Some of the studied “manuals” compile governmental policies as well as the Prime Minster’sOrder. Even though these documents are important (for analyzing changes of policy content, helping

 138 to understand the Thai state’s stance toward changing circumstances), they are beyond this research’s
scope. For further information see the chapter by Mark Tamthai and Somkiat Bunchoo in this volume.
27
Although the 1923 “manual” (number 1 on the list) details problems regarding Islam and theMuslim community, these were corrected and edited twice: first by Professor Klomnan Baga, andsecond (in 2004) by an anonymous editor who followed the direction set by Klomnan. Whether or not
Klomnan’s view is correct is beyond my present knowledge. 28This categorization is influenced by the work of Hammudah Abdalati, Islam in focus(Indianapolis, Indiana: American Trust Publications, 1975); Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and realities
of Islam (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1988).
29
See manual number 9 on the list.
30
See manual number 9 on the list, emphasis added.
31
On 5 August 2007, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, army commander in chief, stated that among
the three critical inner problems at the present, namely political problem, disasters, and violence in thethree southern border provinces, the last one was the hardest to solve because “leaders of thedisquieting elements live outside Thailand, while the ones fighting are petty soldiers. Even though it ishard, we have to try to solve.” See ‘C-in-C admits southern problem hard, as leaders are outside,’
Bangkobiznews
online,at
http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/2006/08/05/w001_126551.php?news_id=126551.
32
See manual number 9 on the list.
33
King Rama VI, ‘Principles of public policy and administration for Monthon Pattani,’ (1923) in
Khaochai khaothueng phatthana (Understand, reach out to and develop) (Bangkok: Office of thePermanent Secretary for Interior, Ministry of Interior, 1923), pp. 25–6.
34
See manual number 9 on the list, pp. 14–5, emphasis added.
35
See manual number 9 on the list, p. 106.
36
When this research was presented on 18 August 2006, one of the three discussants, Chidchanok
Rahimmula, provided some information on this issue: Religious leaders in the south were upset by thisvery same passage. One of the leaders once said to her, “Changing commander again? That’s o.k. If hewants to meet us, then we will go just for the sake of it. New one comes, but nothing is new, just achange of style. If we don’t go, they will think that we are defiant. If a provincial governor invites us,
we will go. Deputy prime minister invites us, we will go. But if they want us to say anything, we will
just say something for the sake of it because they themselves are not sincere to us anyway. We have tolearn to live.”37
For the meaning of pok and khrong, see Royal Academy, Dictionary: Royal Academy edition(Bangkok: Aksorncharoenthat, 2000); Nawawan Pantumeta, Khlang kham (Bangkok: Amarin Printing,2001).
38
This notion is enlarged from Giorgio Agamben’s concept of inclusive exclusion within the nexus
of sovereignty and human life, in Homo Sacer: sovereign power and bare life, trans. Daniel HellerRoazen (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1998). Compare my treatment of forcibly displaced
peoples in the Thai-Burmese border zones, Decha Tangseefa, ‘Imperceptible naked-lives andatrocities: forcibly displaced peoples and the Thai-Burmese in-between spaces,’ Ph.D. diss. Universityof Hawai’i at Manoa, 2003; Decha Tangseefa, ‘Taking flight in condemned grounds: forcibly
displaced Karens and the Thai-Burmese in-between spaces,’ Alternatives: global, local, political 31, 4(October 2006), pp. 405–30; Decha Tangseefa, ‘“Temporary shelter areas” and paradox ofperceptibility: imperceptible naked-Karens in the Thai-Burmese border zones,’ in Borderscapes:
geographies and politics at territory’s edge, ed. Prem Kumar Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), pp. 231–62.
39
Nonetheless, being “docile bodies” here is more subtle than the Foucauldian “docile body” (seeDiscipline and punish), in which the cultural dimension is not the main angle in his nexus of power
and violence.  139 40

Jek is a derogatory word that Thai people used to call Chinese people in Thailand.
“Khaochai khaothueng phatthana” (Understand, reach out to, and develop), advice given to all
the state apparatuses by King Bhumibol, which has since become a famous and much cited motto.
42
The notion of “the Others Within” is influenced by Jacques Derrida, see The other heading:reflections on today’s Europe, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas (Bloomington, Ind.:
Indiana University Press, 1992) as well as his corresponding notion of “self-differentiating identity” in
Derrida et al., ‘The Villanova roundtable: a conversation with Jacques Derrida,’ in Deconstruction in anutshell: a conversation with Jacques Derrida, ed. John D. Caputo (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1997), pp. 1–28. See also a historical treatment in the development of the Thai nation-state inThongchai Winichakul, ‘The Other Within: travel and ethno-spatial differentiation of Siamese subjects
1885–1910,’ in Civility and savagery: social identity in Tai states, ed. Andrew Turton (Richmond:RoutledgeCurzon, 2000), pp. 38–63. 
43
See Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Khamsang 66/43?: rat panha watthanatham khong rat kap
kanchatkan khwamkhatyaeng nai sattawat mai (Order 66/43?: State, state’s cultural problem, andconflict management in the new century) (Bangkok: Strategic Institute, Office of the National Security
Council, 2000). Inspired by the 66/23 policy, this work proposed an “Order 66/43” to cope withconflicts in Thailand in the 2000s.
44
Either the Thai state or disquieting elements can carry on this violence. If it is the former, thisviolence would be either bio-ethnically instituted violence or bio-ethnically orchestrated state terror;
see Haiping Yan, ‘Other transnational: an introductory essay,’ Modern Drama 48, 2 (2005), pp. 225–
48. See a treatment of state terror in Decha, ‘Imperceptible naked-lives,’ and Decha, ‘Taking flight.’
45
During the last decade, works on borderlands have gained more currency, see Rajaram andGrundy-Warr, Borderscape; Decha, ‘“Temporary Shelter Areas”‘; Decha, ‘Taking Flight’; Decha,‘Imperceptble naked-lives’; Seyla Benhabib, ‘Borders, boundaries, and citizenship,’ PS (October2005), pp. 673–7; Alexander Horstmann, ‘Incorporation and resistance: borderlands, transnational
communityandsocialchangeinSoutheast
Asia,’
athttp://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/WPTC-02-04%20Horstmann.pdf;
Hastings
Donnan and Thomas M. Wilson, Borders: frontiers of identity, nation and state (Oxford: Berg, 1999);
Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, ‘Beyond “culture”: space, identity and the politics of difference,’ inCulture power place: explorations in critical anthropology, ed. Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson(Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 33–51.
46
Apart from the fourteen “bureaucrat manuals,” see National Reconciliation Commission, Ao
chana khwam runraeng duai phalang samannachan (Overcoming violence through the power ofreconciliation), (Bangkok: The Secretariat of the Cabinet Printing House, 2006), pp. 28–34; Phrae
Sirisakdamkoeng’s chapter in this volume; Institute of Advanced Military Study, ‘Manual forpractice,’ ch. 2; Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘Pattani in the 1980s: academic literature as political stories,’ in
The life of this world: negotiated Muslim lives in Thai society (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish
Academic, 2005), pp. 29–59; Supara Janchitfah, Violence in the mist: reporting on the presence of
pain in southern Thailand (Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing Project, 2005).
47
National Reconciliation Commission, Ao chana, pp. 27–8.
48
See an example of the Royal Thai Armed Forces’ view of “border security” in Taisasang,‘Kansammana thang wichakan ro ro so tho tho bo so bo so rueang yutthasat khwammankhong
chaidaen’ (Seminar at the Command and General Staff College, Institute of Advanced Military Study,
Royal Thai Army, on strategy for border security) Warasan senathipat 52, 3 (Sep–Dec, 2003), pp.
100–3. At this seminar, there were three issues that affected Thailand’s border security: state-boundary
conflict; drug trafficking; and illegal labor migrants.
49
Quoted in Nevzat Soguk, ‘Border’s capture: insurrectional politics, border crossing humans andthe new political,’ in Borderscapes, ed. Rajaram and Grundy-Warr.
50
See Etienne Balibar, ‘The nation form: history and ideology,’ trans. Chris Turner, in Race, nation,41

 140 class: ambiguous identities, ed. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (London: Verso, 1991), pp.
86–106.
51
Benedict R. O’G Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread ofnationalism, revised edition (London: Verso, 1991).
52
For works on the issue of “sense of belonging,” see Barbara Bender and Margot Winder, ed.,Contested landscapes: movement, exile and place (Oxford: Berg, 2001); George Robertson et al., ed.,Travellers’ tales: narratives of home and displacement (London: Routledge, 1994); Marc Robinson,
Altogether elsewhere: writers on exile (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1994); Hannah Arendt, ‘We
refugees,’ in Altogether Elsewhere, ed. Robinson, pp. 110–9; Edward Said, ‘Reflections on exile,’ in
Altogether Elsewhere, ed. Robinson, pp. 137–49. For “map of allegiance,” see Arjun Appadurai,‘Sovereignty without territory: notes for a postnational geography,’ in The geography of identity, ed.
Patricia Yaeger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 40–58; Arjun Appadurai,
Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1996); see also Gupta and Ferguson, ‘Beyond “culture.”‘Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Chularatchamontri stated in 1982, echoing the Muslim
community’s attempt to be a part of “Thai society,” as follows: “The term ‘Thai culture’ should not be
confined to culture known and practiced only in the society with Buddhism. It should also include
culture known and practiced in Muslim society. This is because Muslims have been a part of the Thai
society since the Sukhothai Kingdom until today. Neither does the term ‘Thai People’ according to theconstitution designated by religion, language, or other cultures as well as socially different conditions.
For Muslims to practice Islamic cultures, therefore, is not considered as destroying Thai culture at all.
On the contrary, it even enhances Thai culture to be so unique that foreigners trust [sic]. A part of Thai
culture is to accept all religious cultures, which corresponds to a provision in the constitution, giving
right and freedom to faiths and practices.” See number 5 on the list of manuals, p. 104.
53
Michael J. Shapiro, Violent cartographies: mapping cultures of war (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1997).
54
Jennifer Hyndman, Managing displacement: refugees and the politics of humanitarianism(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p. 27.
55
See Decha Tangseefa, ‘Death at a margin: death of the margins?’ paper presented at ‘What keeps
us apart, what keeps us together: international order, justice values,’ second global international
studies conference, at University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 23–6 July 2008 and ‘Building sustainable
futures: enacting peace and development’, organized by International Peace Research Association(IPRA), at University of Leuven, Belgium, 15–19 July 2008.
56
Homi K. Bhabha, The location of cultures (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 172, 38; compare
James Clifford, Routes: travel and translation in the late twentieth century (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard
University Press, 1997).
57
Kwame Anthony Appiah, ‘Is the “post” in “postcolonial” the “post” in “postmodern”?’ inDangerous liaisons: gender, nation, and postcolonial perspectives, ed. Anne McClintock, Aamir Mufti,
and Ella Shohat (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 420–44.
58
See Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Messiah and the Sovereign: the problem of law in Walter
Benjamin,’ in Potentialities: collected essays in philosophy, ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen(Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 160–74; Agamben, Homo sacer; Decha
Tangseefa, ‘Imperceptible naked-lives: constructing a theoretical space to account for “non-statist”
subjectivities,’ in Margins, peripheries and excluded bodies: international relations and states of
exception, ed. Shampa Biswas and Sheila Nair (London and New York: Routledge, forthcoming);
Decha, ‘“Temporary Shelter Areas”‘; Decha, ‘Taking Flight’; Decha , ‘Imperceptible naked-lives.’
59
Works on the transnational have pervasively gained more currency in the 2000s. See Decha
Tangseefa, Laksana khamchat (The transnational) (Bangkok: National Research Council,
forthcoming); Colin Mcfarlane, ‘Transnational development networks: bringing development andpostcolonial approaches into dialogue,’ The Geographical Journal 172, 1 (March 2006), pp. 35–49;

 141 

Pinkaew Laungaramsri, ‘Imagining nation: women’s rights and the transnational movement of Shan
women in Thailand and Burma, Focaal, European Journal of Anthropology 47 (2006), pp. 48–61;
Clifford Bob, The marketing of rebellion: insurgents, media, and international activism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Charli R. Carpenter, ‘“Women, children, and other vulnerable
groups”: gender, strategic frames and the protection of civilians as a transnational issue,’ International
Studies Quarterly 49 (2005), pp. 295–334; Patricia Clavin, ‘Defining transnationalism,’ Contemporary
European History 14, 4 (2005), pp. 421–39; Wayne A. Cornelius and Marc R Rosenblum,‘Immigration and politics,’ Annual Review of Political Science 8 (2005), pp. 99–119; Laila Farah,‘Dancing on the hyphen: performing diasporic subjectivity,’ Modern Drama, 48, 2 (Summer 2005), pp.
316–43; Christian Joerges and Christine Godt,’Free trade: the erosion of national, and the birth oftransnational governance,’ European Review 13, Sup. 1 (2005), pp. 93–117; Lauren Langman, ‘From
virtual public spheres to global justice: a critical theory of internetworked social movement,’
Sociological Theory 23, 1 (March 2005), pp 42–74; Francoise Lionnet and Shu-mei Shih, ed., Minortransnationalism (Durham and London: Duke U. P., 2005); Thomas Olesen, ‘Transnational publics:
new spaces of social movement activism and the problem of global long-sightedness,’ Current
Sociology 53, 3 (May 2005), pp. 419–40; William I Robinson, ‘Global capitalism: the newtransnationalism and the folly of conventional thinking,’ Science and Society 69, 3 (July 2005), pp.
316–28; Ronen Shamir, ‘Without borders? notes on globalization as a mobility regime,’ Sociology
Theory 23, 2 (June 2005), pp. 197–217; Leslie Sklair, ‘The transnational capitalist class andcontemporary architecture in globalizing cities,’ International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research 29, 3 (September 2005), pp. 485–500; Sidney Tarrow, The new transnational activism(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Ban Wang, ‘Reimagining political community:
diaspora, nation-state, and the struggle for recognition,’ Modern Drama 48, 2 (Summer 2005), pp.
249–71; Yan ‘Other transnational’; Thomas Faist, ‘Towards a political sociology oftransnationalization: the state of the art in migration research,’ Arch. Europ. Sociol. 45, 3 (2004), pp.
331–66.
60
Here is a Rancièrian move. In Rancière’s conception of the political, the in-between spaces arespaces of a meeting among the heterogeneous amidst the confrontation between two sets of logic:“police” and “politics.” The “police” logic attempts to maintain the existing power relations bydetermining not only the members’ perceptions regarding the existing political society, but also
whether or not one is a member of such society. On the contrary, the logic of “politics” is embedded in
all practices that aim to disrupt the “police” logic. See Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: politics andphilosophy, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 28–42; Jacques
Rancière, ‘Ten theses on politics,’ Theory and Events 5, 3 (2001); Decha (everything previously cited).
61
Michael J. Shapiro, ‘Moral geographies and the ethics of post-sovereignty,’ Public Culture 6, 3
(1994), p. 493; the phrase “suspension of historical time” is from Lauren Berlant, The anatomy ofnational fantasy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 32.
62
Shapiro, For moral ambiguity, p. 121. For the nexus between history and time see Giorgio
Agamben, ‘Time and history: critique of the instant and the continuum,’ in Infancy and history: thedestruction of experience, trans. Ritz Heron (New York: Verso, 1993), pp. 89–105; Decha, ‘Death at amargin’; Decha, ‘Imperceptible naked-lives.’
63
Eric Alliez, Capital times: tales from the conquest of time (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1996), p. 6.
64
Cf. M. Coleman, 2002, ‘Thinking about the World Bank’s “accordion” geography of financial
globalization,’ Political Geography 21 (2002), pp. 495–524.
65
Cf. Shapiro, For moral ambiguity, pp. 124–5; Yan, ‘Other transnational’; Farah, ‘Dancing on thehyphen’; Decha, Laksana khamchat.
66
Alliez, Capital times.
67
Shapiro, For moral ambiguity, p. 124.
68
The National Reconciliation Commission’s report states that most people’s material well-being

 142 in the southern border provinces is somewhat low (NRC, Ao chana, pp. 23–25). However, when
considering the macro picture of “legal” border trade between 2002 and 2005 as well as comparing
trade volume between Jan-Apr 2005 with that of Jan-Apr 2006, one witnesses the steady increase of
the overall trade volume amidst continuous violence eruption along the Thai-Malay in-between spaces
since the “Gun Stealing Incident” in January 2004 (Source: Dept. of Foreign Trade, Ministry ofCommerce http://www.dft.moc.go.th/index.asp?solution=1024, accessed July 2006).
69
Bhabha, Location of cultures, p. 227.
70
Bhabha, Location of cultures, p. 172.
71
Walter Benjamin, ‘Theses on the philosophy of history,’ trans. Harry Zohn, in Illumination, ed.
Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), p. 263.
72
Benjamin, ‘Theses on the philosophy of history.’73
Diane Rubenstein, ‘Did you pack your bags yourself?: governmentality after 9/11,’ CR: The New
Centennial Review 3, 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 303–31.
74
See Chaiwat, ‘Pattani in the 1980s.’
75
The capital-electronic circuits are forms of practices of space that have capital andcommunication technology as the main components, no matter through mobile phone and/or computer.
Such communication technology is based on unceasing technological development that renders areversal relation between a microchip’s tremendous capacity and its size (for relations between
communication technology, capital and globalization, undermining nation-state’s sovereign power, see
Heather Horst, ‘The blessings and burdens of communication: cell phones in Jamaican transnationalsocial fields,’ Global Networks 6, 2 (2006), pp. 143–59; Robinson, ‘Global capitalism.’ Because of
these capital-electronic circuits, I commented (at a conference co-organized by the Thai Khadi
Research Institute, Thammasat University together with Thailand’s National Reconciliation
Commission on 16 November 2005), a few days after the Thai government had ordered that all simcards used in the southern border provinces must be registered, that the order would fail to stop thedisquieting elements’ exploitation of these circuits.
76
William E. Connolly, The ethos of pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1995), p. xxii.
77
This concept of ‘real state of exception’ follows Walter Benjamin who wrote: “The tradition of
the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of exception’ in which we live is the rule. We must arrive at aconcept of history that corresponds to this fact. Then we will have the production of a real state of
exception before us as a task.” Quoted in Agamben, ‘The Messiah,’ p. 160, n. 24. This translation
belongs to Daniel Heller-Roazen. See Harry Zohn’s translation in Benjamin, ‘Theses.’
78
Turgot, vol. 2 (Paris, 1844), p. 673 (‘Pensées et fragments’), quoted in Walter Benjamin, The
Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin Mclaughlin (Cambridge, Ma.: The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 1999), pp. 477—8 (N12a,1). Hereafter, the numbers in parentheses after
page numbers are numbers of the Theses or entries from the Arcades Project.
79
The London incident may not qualify as “transnational” if the perpetrators were British.
80“Kongthap phak thi 4 sarup koethet 7 changwat ruam 118 chut” (The Fourth Army region
concluded: Violence erupted in four provinces altogether 118 spots), Bangkokbiznews, 2 August 2006,
at http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/2006/08/02/c001_125530.php?news_id=125530.
81
My writing of this paragraph until this line has been inspired by works such as Brückner andPoole, ‘The plot thickens.’82
A protracted confrontation in the far south in April 1948.
83
Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 474 (N9a, 6).
84
Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 474 (N9a, 6).
85
Benjamin, ‘Theses,’ p. 257 (VII).
86
Benjamin, ‘Theses,’ p. 262 (XII). To be sure, following Marxism, the ‘oppressed,’ in Benjamin’s 143 

works, are primarily referred to as the proletariat. See also Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 364 (J77,1);
Benjamin, ‘Surrealism: the last snapshot of the European intelligentsia,’ trans. Edmund Jephcott, in
Walter Benjamin: selected writings volume 2 1927–1934, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland,and Gary Smith (Cambridge, Ma: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1999), p. 217. I
extend the idea of the oppressed to also include the marginal Others, who have been both other-ed andmarginalized. 
87
Benjamin, ‘Theses,’ p. 263 (XIV), p. 265 (XVII, XVIII).
88
Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 392 (K2,3).
89
This was the phrase uttered at the time by prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

 144 6“New” relations: Buddhists and Muslims in the threesouthernmost provinces
Rattiya Saleh

Since the violence escalated in 2004, the southernmost provinces have been
swamped by security personnel, and the area now resembles an armory. The hospitals
teem with patients and visitors. Commercial centers, fresh markets, and weekend markets
have all become unsafe. Rubber plantations are quiet or abandoned. Even though latex
prices are high, there is a shortage of labor because of the risks of working in theplantations. Some stands of trees have been destroyed by unidentified persons. Someowners have sold their plantations at low prices. Many mosques are quiet because people
will not enter on their own. Some wat (Buddhist temples) have been turned into military
camps and headquarters for security officers.
The current violence between Muslims and Buddhists is bewildering. There wasno prior indication of such deep hatred and religious division. The majority of people
prefer a peaceful life. Yet, the violence against Buddhist Thais continues unabated.
In this chapter, I examine what impact the violence and the government’s responseto the violence has had on relations between Buddhists and Muslims in the three southern
provinces. In 2001, I completed a project on ‘Relations between religious groups in
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat’1 using four villages as a sample of the region, displaying
both commonalities and differences. The main findings were as follows.
First, for Muslims, religion provides an overarching framework for their life,
including their interactions with people of the same faith as well as people ofdifferent religions.
Second, harmonious relations between Muslims and Buddhists in the threesouthernmost provinces is based on friendships developed over time leading tomutual acceptance of their differing systems of values.
Third, the customs and religious ceremonies of the Muslims provide some
opportunities for interaction between Buddhists and Muslims, but those of the
Buddhists do not.
Fourth, interaction between Muslims and Buddhists is a constant part of life, and as
the feelings and values of people differ, some conflict is inevitable, yet conflict may
or may not be rooted in religion.

The 2001 research project concluded that, “religion is not always the main cause of
the violence in the three southernmost provinces.”
In this project, I returned to the same villages2 I studied earlier to review changes
over the period from 2001 to mid 2006. The main questions of the research were: Has
this new form of violence really changed relations between Buddhists and Muslims as 145 commonly believed or not? In what contexts has it changed or not changed? What are thefactors causing change (or no change) in the relations between Buddhists and Muslims in
the three southernmost provinces?
The research was based on observation and interviews. It was hampered by theviolence. Some areas were unsafe. People were reluctant to be seen talking with outsiders,or reluctant to talk about the unrest directly or about such matters as the role of officials.
In this chapter, I first present a short background on the area, its peoples, religions,languages, and cultures. In the second section, I summarize some 2001 findings before
proceeding to the results of the second survey.

The three southernmost provinces: land and people
The three southern provinces of Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani or Patani3 are richly
endowed with natural resources. The shape of Thailand is sometimes likened to a golden
axe, with the peninsula as its handle, and this handle is traditionally described as“diamond-studded” 4 in recognition of the richness of the peninsula’s resources. Fromearliest history, these resources have attracted the attention of seafarers, settlers, andrulers. An old Narathiwat resident said,
Our land is rich, we have a wealth of resources in the land and sea. Everyone wants
this land. So they come and fight over it, making it like the stage of a play. They
fight over being the director and play out so many dramas. Everyone fights overbeing the star until the viewers have no time to make a living. Religious teachers
have no time to teach, always being called to go join a meeting, held in hotels, notsafe at all. There is only danger. Now, we don’t know who we can depend on. It’s
our good fortune we have our king. He gives us some hope. Aside from him, wedon’t trust anyone because they have all come to deceive us far too many times.5

Peoples
The peoples of the three southernmost provinces are descendants of manydifferent peoples who have migrated to the area from all points of the compass, attracted
by its abundant resources. Evidence of coastal trading settlements and rich kingdoms
stretches far back into history. There are traces of animist, Hindu, and Buddhist ritual
centers. By the seventeenth century, Pattani had become a rich port and seat of a rulingdynasty of queens, as testified by several European visitors.
In the fifteenth century CE, the king of Pattani was converted to Islam by Sheikh
Sa’id or Sheikh Safiyuddin.6 The area became a well-known center of Islamic learning
honored with the title “Fathoni Darussalam,” meaning the land of peace and the learned.7
Islamic thinkers and philosophers composed Qutub (Muslim religious treatises) both in
Malay with Jawi script8 and in Arabic script.9 Fathoni gained a reputation throughout theIslamic world as a repository of Islamic knowledge, dubbed as Suerambi Meukah (thebalcony of Mecca).10
Later Pattani’s trade declined, the dynasty fell into internal dispute, and the state
fell within the ambit of Kelantan. Ultimately in 1909, the area was annexed by Siam, andsubsequently divided into the three provinces.
Even so, several cultural practices of Malay origin are preserved in the south.
These include the practice of presenting tribute in the form of gold and silver flowers, the 146 royal ceremony of raising the royal cradle, the water blessing for bride and groom, andthe use of old royal titles, still maintained among the descendants of former governors ofPatani. While these practices are maintained, other practices have been absorbed fromother cultures, contributing to the diversity of the area.
The legacy of this history is a highly diverse population in which Muslims of
Malay ethnicity form a majority. According to official statistics, the three provinces in2003 had a combined population of 1,748,681 persons, of which 79.3 per cent were
Muslim and 57.1 per cent used Malay language within the household. In the local Pattani
Malay dialect, the people are divided into three groups: ogae melayu or nanayu (Malay),ogae siyae (Siamese), and ogae jino (Chinese). Those classified as Thai include people ofvaried origins. Several Thai and Chinese have recently converted to Christianity. Besides
these three main groups, there are also minorities of Javanese, Arab, Indian, Burmese,
Khmer, Laotian, Bangladeshi, and Mani (a local derivation from Brahman meaning
Indian).
Identity, religion, language
For all peoples in the area, their identity is a complex matter composed of several
layers. First, they have an element of their identity related to religion, religious practice,and place of worship. Second they are descendants of some ethnic group which has its
own distinctive cultural practices. Third, they are citizens of Thailand and governed byThai law, while those who are Muslim also abide by the additional provisions of shar’iah
law. Fourth, they are citizens of the world and open to some aspects of contemporary
culture flooding in from the outside in accordance with their individual taste.
The majority of the Muslims in the area try very hard to live within theframework of the Islamic faith, while reconciling this with being born with Thainationality. They are proud to be Thai, and love their country no less than the Thai or
Chinese of Buddhist faith or any other people. The difference between Muslim andBuddhist lies in personal matters of belief, religious practice, and everyday behavior.
Some families practice their own ethnic or cultural activities that are considered not incontradictory to Islam.
All residents of the three southernmost provinces, of every religion and ethnicity,
try to learn the central Thai dialect that is the official national language. Most Thai
Muslims of Malay ethnicity prefer to use the Patani Malay dialect.11 Other Buddhist ofvarious ethnicities use central Thai dialect and southern Thai dialect, together with theirown ethnic dialects such as Chinese, Arabic, Khmer, Mani, Burmese, and Laotian. Most
Buddhists of Chinese or Thai ethnicity who reside in areas with a very high proportion ofMuslims in the population are fluent in the Patani Malay dialect.12 In Si Sakhon district in
Narathiwat, for instance, the Buddhist workers who collect latex or clear bushes canspeak Patani Malay dialect. These Buddhists are well-taken care of by the Muslims.
When they go to the rubber plantations, the two groups will make appointments to go andreturn together. They speak the Patani Malay dialect with each other. They say, “We areboth poor people so we must help one another. Luckily we both speak Malay, so we canbecome friends more easily.”
Thai Muslims of Malay ethnicity in the three southernmost provinces use Patani
Malay dialect or standard Malay to convey their feelings, thoughts, and wisdom. They
hold that the Malay language is an inextricable part of Malay ethnicity, and a tool to 147 preserve the Malay ethnicity from extinction. This is captured in their sayings: Bahasa
adalah jiwa bangsa, hilang bahasa hilang bangsa (Language is the life of Malay, the lossof language is the death of Malay); and Bahasa tidak boleh dijual beli (Language cannot
be traded). These sayings indicate that Malay language and ethnicity are one and thesame. The language has existed for as long as the history of the culture of the Malay
people. The Siamese also knew Malay in the past. Charnvit Kasetsiri confirms that the
Ayutthaya court used Malay in communications with other states in the region, and evenwith the Dutch in Batavia (Jakarta).13 It is thus puzzling that present-day Thai society is
still unclear about the word “Jawi ” and talks about the “Jawi language” when in fact thelanguage is Malay, while it is the script which is Jawi .
For Muslims in the deep south who use the Patani Malay dialect as their mothertongue, the word bah so (language) also means ethnicity and etiquette. If someone is said
not to have bah so, it means that person does not have language, birthplace, etiquette, orroots. Pattani has long been a center of Malay literature. This was recorded by C. O.
Blagden who visited in 1906, and Stewart Wavell who made a survey in 1964.14
Politics
The people of the southernmost provinces are highly interested in politics at alllevels. Elections are fiercely contested. Some people have grown very rich from politics,
while other have fallen deeply in debt. Political allegiances and alliances cross religiouslines. A young man from Si Sakhon district, Narathiwat, told me, “Sister, there are threegroups of people making trouble in our area. The first are the politicians, the second are
the influential people, and the third are the separatists.” When asked if there was any
religious factor involved, he replied “No, whether they are Buddhists or Muslims, they
are one and the same. If they join together, they will not separate.” I pressed him, “Then,in what group are state officials? Are they involved?” He responded at once, “Oh yes,
especially them. I’m sorry, I don’t mean every one of them. But if they are good people,
they cannot stay here for long. Their bosses will not like them very much.” I stopped myquestioning but he continued, “Sister, they quarrel among themselves and put the blameon us.”On the southern side of these three provinces, the border with Malaysia stretches
647 kilometers. This border is both beneficial and problematic. Young people go to workin Malaysia. Criminals from both sides use the border forests as sanctuary. Security
incidents happen constantly. In 2003, Thai soldiers captured four armed Malaysians in theforests of Yala. Later it appeared they were Malaysian soldiers who claimed to have got
lost. In August 2005, 131 Narathiwat villagers fled illegally across the border into
Malaysia after hearing that Stopa Yuso Imam had been gunned down.
Many violent incidents go unsolved. Government blames the people for notcooperating, but one local villager in Betong said:
We are ready to cooperate with state officials. We want to tell the truth. We want to
identify the true killers. But we hate some officials who believe influential people.
The villagers themselves are also not so simple. If they don’t accept a village head,sometimes they will not help catch a killer and will even side with a killer in order todiscredit and embarrass the village head so he will not be re-elected.

This kind of thinking may also be why those causing the violence are able to draw
more villagers to support them and are able to instigate violence in more varied ways.

 148 

Buddhist–Muslim relations before 2001
Here I present some selected statements from the research completed in 2001.
These statements capture the feelings, thinking, and the mode of interaction between
Muslims and Buddhists in the four sample villages before the onset of the current phaseof violence.
Muslim and Thai Buddhists here normally have no problems. Most come to assume
various government offices, migrating from other places. On a personal basis, we aregood to each other. We greet each other, then we buy packed food, sit, and chat. If
we have some problems, it is when we are drunk. This is true for all households.
When a drinking party starts up, then voices become loud, disturbing otherhouseholds. If one raises a dog, it should be well-taken care of, and should not beallowed to roam around.
(from Ban Bu Mae, Yi-ngo subdistrict, Narathiwat)
When I have a party, I invite my brothers and sisters as well as friends to join.
Muslims will cook their food in their quarters. The housewives of Thai Buddhists
will prepare their own food. We do not use the same water. We clean our utensils
separately in different corners. The Muslim people gave me the honor of calling me‘Po Teh’ (with po meaning father) so we are not strangers. Muslim or Thai Buddhist
are all people. If they are good people, they have good things to talk about or to do.
If they are bad people, nothing can be good. It’s really up to the behavior of thepeople. We have to consider officials separately.
(from Ban Bu Mae, Yi-ngo subdistrict, Narathiwat)
When important days such as Hari Raya come… mother will give glutinous rice andfan palm (kapho) leaves to our Muslim relatives in order to boil the glutinous rice
and we eat together merrily. We will not forget to give glutinous rice or any othersweets that we might have to our neighbors. If we are going to be noisy, we will letthem know, to gain their understanding. In the fruit-bearing season, we will bringfruits to them. If someone is sick, we shall visit him or her. However, we will do this
only with close friends. If it is a funeral, we will attempt to go. When we go, we will
give them some money such as we can, but we need not dress in black.
(from Palat, Khuan subdistrict, Pattani)
We live here. Our mind focuses on making a living. I don’t really have time to see if
someone is Muslim or Buddhist. Buddhists live among Buddhists. They work in theirfields. As for us, we work in our fields too.
(from Ban Ramong, Yarom subdistrict, Betong district, Yala)
I don’t see any problems. Everyone who comes here wants to earn a living and tohave security. Religion is a different matter. When Muslim brothers want to organizea party and invite me, then I join them. They are nice to me and consider me one of
their own. So we can be friends.
(from Ban Tan Mali, Aiyoeweng subdistrict, Betong district, Yala)

Every word of these good friends is meaningful as it conveys a soothing message toThai society at large that the people in the area understand the difference in religions andknow how to behave so that every party can live peacefully together in the society.
Indeed, they have lived together for a long time, and have never quarreled due to 149 religious reasons.
This former research on relations between Buddhists and Muslims was basic
research undertaken in order to understand the meaning of events and the relations
between people during the events in the way people in the area understood them. This
research is based on the concept of phenomenology which purports that there are several
levels of facts, most of which are made up and real only in the thoughts of people andtherefore intangible. This research therefore concentrates on real facts in the society thatare reflected through symbolic actions. These actions result from and are shaped by theprocesses of thinking, beliefs, and values which are the practice of life of both Buddhists
and Muslims, both everyday and on special occasions, both within and outside one’s own
village, and both on one’s private land or on public land where Buddhist and Islamic
people undertake their activities. The important point here is that I try to present a
selective picture of relationships that have potential to promote good understanding
between Buddhist and Muslims in the study area, in order to show that emphasizing
values and accepting the tastes and patron-client system of people in the local area arevery important factors in cultivating relations between diverse cultural groups.
This project studied four villages, each representatives of a province, as follows.
Ban Bu Mae
Ban Bu Mae is one of the seven villages of Yi-ngo subdistrict, Yi-ngo district,
Narathiwat. It is a very old village whose name came from the Bu Mae or khla tree,according to grandma Hayi Yaena Dueramae.15 It is the home of the last descendents ofroyalty from Saiburi, Yaring, Pattani, Yalo, and Rangae, who are bound together throughmarriage ties. This village contains a wat, mosque, Islamic mosque school (tadika), andgovernment offices that offer services to people at the village, subdistrict, and districtlevel. Everyone in the village can lead their life in keeping with their beliefs without fearof danger from strangers. The family of Ms Akom Phatthanakun16 confirmed that “People
in Bu Mae, both Muslim and Buddhist Thai, have always lived peacefully together
without any conflict over religious matters. When Muslim people have a feast, they eveninvite Buddhist monks to join. They invite the monks as fellow villagers. When the
Buddhist temples have fairs with shadow puppet performances, Muslim friends also join
the audience.” Mrs Rachanikon Phatthanakun17 added that “At my home, we have an
assistant housekeeper who is a Muslim lady. She is the wife of my student. She works
well and is very honest. She is with us for six or seven years now. As I have a Muslim
assistant housekeeper, I never bring pork into the house. If we want to eat pork, we eat it
outside the house. We respect each other. My cushion on the sofa is a gift from my
Muslim friend who brought it from Mecca. That beautiful teapot too.”In Bu Mae village, 97 per cent of the people are Muslim, but they have various
opportunities to engage with Buddhist Thais, such as by being relatives, school mates,
office mates, student-teacher, employer-employee, supervisor-subordinate, service
provider-receiver in both the private and public sectors. There are no problems in therelations between those of different religions. If there are any, it is due to individual
causes. But this has never been a problem for Uncle Phoem18 who likes to call himself“Po Teh.” Uncle Phoem confirmed in the Patani Malay dialect that “Po Teh and Muslim
people are one flesh. The past conflict occurred because certain government officials used
to think that Muslim people are stupid. So they have to demonstrate clearly that they 150 actually know what is going on.”Ban Palat
Ban Palat is one of the five villages of Khuan subdistrict, Panare district, Pattani.
The word “Palat” is a standard Malay word equivalent to the Patani Malay dialect word
“Palah” which means the mangrove fan palm (kapho). It is a village with a Muslim
majority and Buddhist minority. It is the only village of the five villages in the subdistrictin the middle of Buddhist society that has a Muslim leader. The oldest family of the Palat
villagers is the Susaro family. The senior man of the family, called Jaeli, is a good friendof Mr Rung na Rangsi,19 a Buddhist. Nowadays, the offspring of these two families still
maintain good relations and serve as the power base, both old and new, in the locality.
The Palat people are respectful of both administrative leaders as well as religious leaders.
Some Buddhist and Muslim families are related through marriage ties, and have noproblems over religion. Buddhists who were born as natives of Palat or who come to dobusiness tend to use the Patani Malay dialect. For instance, Mother Phum20 spoke more
Patani dialect than Thai with me. This is possibly due to her desire to avoid using central
Thai dialect. Mother Phum said her son’s family had converted to the Islamic faith, andshe had no problem with that as many of her relatives are already Muslim. One of her
daughters became sick and did not recover. After changing her name to Fatima 21 andmaking a vow to elder Muslim relatives, she recovered.
Ban Ramong
Ban Ramong is an old village located in Yarom subdistrict, Betong district, Yala.
The population is 90 per cent Muslim and 10 per cent Buddhist. It was one of the
problem areas during the movement of the Malay-Chinese communists in Thailand. Most
Ramong people use Patani Malay dialect and central Thai dialect in their daily life. The
name of Ramong village, which means banyan tree, appeared in Perak state documents
more than one hundred years ago, in relation to a violent affair in which the army
commander of Perak by the name of Raja Sahid died under mysterious circumstances,
triggering the outbreak of war between the people of Raman and Perak during 1852–4.22
It is understood that this village came into existence before 1852, with the first settlers
being people who escaped arrest by the Siamese authorities in the Pattani-Siamese war.
This made Ramong a patron-client society based on ties of friendship and kinship.
In 2001, I made the following conclusions on this area.23
Ramong village has changed making it different from yesterday in both a good andbad sense. This is not different from other villages suffering from the threat of Malay
communist guerillas.… Children growing up during the period…had to suffer fromlack of education.… Many fell prey to capitalists.… Many were drawn into helping
illegal groups. They became drug traders or were pulled into entertainment venues ofvarious types that made them risk their lives. It became difficult to extricate
themselves in order to live a normal life.

A Yarom subdistrict chief said,
Our society is very confused now. A good man is accused of being a bad guy. Many
bad people are in the disguise of gentlemen. Muslim youth hate pork more thanspirits, beer, and prostitutes. Some Buddhist Thais are afraid to be friends of 151 Muslims as they do not understand us. We want everyone to work together and makea living for a better economy so that children have a better chance to study and help
the country develop so we don’t have to be embarrassed in front of other people.
There is no quarrel because of differences in religion. I have many non-Muslim
friends. But as for the issue of people not liking government officials, it is a separate
matter. It must have its own reasons!24

Ban Tan Mali
Ban Tan Mali, formerly called Ban Aiyoe Muelo, is in Aiyoeweng subdistrict,
Betong district, Yala. It is a settlement of Buddhist and Muslim families from othervillages in the southernmost provinces and other provinces of the south and northeast
who came to make a living from forest resources. It is also a stage for politicalconfrontation and economic rivalry between villagers led by village headman Ban Dor
Lor Yama25 and powerful groups both within and outside the system. When the issue of
relations between Buddhists and Muslims was raised with him, the headman replied,Those without religion to guide them are dangerous. Even one who tells others that
he has a religion but does not know the words ‘sin’ and ‘merit,’ then he is also
dangerous. To avoid having relations with these two types of people would be thebest option. Nowadays, Muslim people in the area want development andimprovement in the strictness of their religious faith so that they are safe from thecultural invasion that Islam shuns. We want the new generation of youth to havebetter opportunities to study religion deeply instead of just worldly knowledge which
may misguide them, as that is very dangerous for them and for society as a whole.

Banthoeng La-ongphan,26 a Buddhist Thai who used to be a teacher in Tan Mali
School, said, “The difference in religions is not a big matter for people whom I used toknow in Tan Mali.… All Tan Mali brothers are Muslim. They all helped carry me in ahammock made of a Palikat sarong27 from the village by foot to the main road to bringme for treatment at the hospital.”28
Uncle Saeng, another Buddhist Thai and a 59-year old native of Buriram, said “We
are not interested in the difference in religions here. We are friends, we go to parties
together. If people quarrel here, it is not because of religion but personal matters andinterests.”
Evidence from the 2001 study showed that Buddhists and Muslims in the far south
had a tendency to compromise as they were involved in common activities and in apatron-client system of support. However, neither Buddhist nor Muslim would state
whether relations between official and the people were good or bad.
The anthropologist Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng made this comment on the 2001 study:
The work provides a picture of relations and good understanding between the local
peoples of both religions. The key factors are accepting the differences in values and thepatron-client system in the local area. The work of Rattiya emphasizes the study ofMuslim faith and culture as the main factor in the relations between people in Yala,
Pattani, and Narathiwat rural society, to the extent that Buddhist faith and practices haveno important role in the relations between the peoples in the area. It seems to reflect that
Muslim people cannot take part in Buddhist culture and practices. When Buddhist culture
and practices do not have a major role in inter-ethnic relations, what impact does thishave on Buddhists’ attitude toward Muslims? 29

 152 This observation shows sensitivity and concern about the state of relations between
Buddhists and Muslims in the three southernmost provinces in the future. When theculture and practices of Buddhists have little or no role in the relations between
ethnic groups, what kind of attitude will Buddhists have towards their Muslim
counterparts?

Buddhist–Muslim relations under conditions of violence
At noon one day in mid November 2003 in Panare district, Pattani, a monk highly
regarded by the people advised me as follows.
It is a fight between two elephants. It is not a question of people who havedifferences in religion. We have been here for a long, long time, without having any
quarrels about religion. I have many Muslim friends—imams, teachers, district
chiefs, village headmen. They were friends, and still are friends. We help oversee thewelfare of the people. There are no problems because we understand each other.

On 15 October 2003, I met the family of a Pattani person who migrated from
Pattani to work in the rubber plantation in Saba Yoi district, Songkhla province. One
elderly person talked in a Patani Malay accent about the unrest that occurred on 28 April
2004 in the Saba Yoi area, “I felt so helpless over our destiny here.… Nowadays it is sodifficult even just to be alive.… It is a kind of psychological warfare (buepuegae
samanga).”
In this person’s thinking, there was not one word that linked the religious
dimension to the causes of violence in the far south. What worried him most was making
an honest living even if it involved moving away; he asked only that the new place offer
him a job and safety in life.
The unclear situation in the three southernmost provinces was flagged before
2001. From 1 August 1992 onwards, a total of thirty-six schools30 were burned down. In
the same year, “ninja bandit” incidents—rumors of black-clad thieves on the roam,sometimes leading to attacks on security personnel—occurred for the first time in Rueso,
Si Sakhon, Ra-ngae, and Yi-ngo districts in Narathiwat province. The phenomenon thenspread across all three southernmost provinces ending at Ban Boenae Goebo, Mu 5,
Tanyongmat subdistrict, Narathiwat. Since 1994, violent incidents have occurred
continuously, including killings to silence those who knew or happened to know about
the illegal activities of certain influential people, so that these will not become known tothe authorities. Innocent people have been beaten up in the course of seizing benefits
from land, trading areas, drug trading, smuggling, and illegal logging in protected areas.
Government officials who tried to block the illegal activities of influential people were
harmed. These provinces are rich in both land-based and marine natural resources. Evenseawater can be processed into salt.
The area has been restive since the “ninja bandit” incidents in 1993. But theviolence increased at an alarming rate in recent years. Many incidents have hidden andcomplex agendas. Some incidents are designed to send a signal to Thai society that
Muslims and Buddhists are in conflict because Thai Muslims with Malay ethnicity want
to set up the Fathoni independent state. If Buddhists are confused into believing this, thenthe good relations between Buddhist and Muslim would definitely suffer. This is a very
interesting scenario and is the source of the initial concept for framing this study.

 153 Ban Bu Mae
Before the Krue Ze incident affected Ban Bu Mae, the Bu Mae people led apeaceful and comfortable life. They did not worry about any danger that might come at
the hand of strangers. But after a bomb incident at the grocery store of Ms Akom and Ms
Rachanikon Phatthanakun in mid August 2003, many Bu Mae people were constantly
troubled by fear and uncertainty. If there were social activities, they tried to avoid holding
any events at night. The people of Yi-ngo were even more scared when Mr Kei Sae Sim,aged 65 residing at No. 73, Mu 7, Yi-ngo subdistrict, Yi-ngo district, Narathiwat was
attacked around the head by a teenager with a Sparta knife. This incident made many Yingo people think of migrating to other areas. Even those who caused the incident might
think likewise.
Wat Ratsawiryaram, which was formerly a peaceful and gentle place, has now
turned into a small army barracks with a warlike air. Buddhists of Ban Bu Mae still makemerit together at Wat Thungkha in a village that has more Buddhists than Muslims.
Muslims can still use the services at their mosques normally. The general education
schools such as Ban Yi-ngo School and Phiphat Thaksin School still serve children in Yingo. These two schools are still open venues providing opportunities for Muslim andBuddhist children to interact regularly. Moreover, the people of Bu Mae are highly
involved in politics and local administrative affairs. The local leaders and administration
officials of this village, both Buddhist and Muslim, are eager to think and work together.
In Yi-ngo village there is a district health station that provides good services to thepeople. It has also taken on the burden of treating the father of a victim of the Tak Bai
incident.
Ban Palat
Ban Palat is a patron-client society comprising relatives and friends. According to
the health center of Ban Khuan, on 1 October 2003, Ban Palat had a total population of
1,508 persons with 35 per cent Buddhist and 65 per cent Muslim. The officials of thisgovernment unit still have to use Patani Malay when talking to Muslim people who cometo use the health service. In the period of two years with constant violence, Buddhist andMuslims in Palat have suffered as in other places.
There was a fire at a grocery and a rubber sheet buying shop in a two-story, fiveunit shophouse, whose owner is a Buddhist Thai of Chinese ethnicity.
A Palat family lost relatives due to gunfire and arson. It was said, “No one cansolve this problem.… I will help to go pick up the pieces of wood and other materials totidy things up… it’s such a pity. It’s really because of a misunderstanding that they
became victims. It’s not a question of Muslims who are unhappy with Buddhists. It’s
more likely just an accident. We have to come to terms with it.”A policeman in Ban Palat was wounded by gunfire, but not fatally. The captain of
Border Patrol Police unit 444 in Yaring subdistrict, Pattani was shot at while praying in
Ban Dan Darussalam mosque, Ban Don Village, Mu 5, La-nga subdistrict.31
A youth used a plantation knife to slit the throat of an old Buddhist Thai man while
he was tending his herd of cattle in La-nga subdistrict which is beside Ban Palat.32 In
general, the people of Palat and Khuan villages are against any form of violence.
Ban Palat has a mosque and school, but no wat. Thai Buddhists perform theirreligious rituals at Wat Khuan in another village. This wat has been turned into an army

 154 

camp. Some Palat Muslims send their children to the school beside Wat Khuan every
school day. The school has a 50:50 ratio of Buddhists and Muslims which is an indicationthat both groups can still live together. The Wat Khuan school allows Buddhists andMuslims to engage with each other. Ban Palat people also meet people from othervillages in a cock-fighting field every Thursday, and at the fresh market and farmer’s
market every Sunday and Wednesday.
Ban Ramong
According to the Yarom health station, on 17 May 2006, Ban Ramong had a total
population of 989 of which 90 per cent are Muslim and 10 per cent Buddhist. It is apatron-client society comprising kin and friends. Ramong people find it closer and moreconvenient to travel to Malaysia rather than Yala. Ramong Muslims have opportunities tointeract with Buddhists of Chinese ethnicity or Thai ancestry in and outside Ramong intheir daily life and on special occasions.
Ramong people are interested in political movements and local administration.
They follow various elections at the national and local levels. Two and a half years after
the escalation of political violence in the southernmost provinces, no one from Ramong
had been targeted directly, but some had relatives or acquaintances who had become
involved. For instance, Hayi Karing Luding, the 64-year old imam of Ban Nangsinae
Mosque in Yarom subdistrict, and Mr Asman Duding, 40 years old of the same village,33
were arrested on suspicion of involvement in a shooting incident at a police station in
Aiyoeweng subdistrict, Betong district, Yala on the night of 7 January 2004.
Ban Tan Mali
Ban Tan Mali is a settlement of Buddhist and Muslim families from the threesouthernmost provinces and other provinces from the south and northeast. Currently, Ban
Tan Mali has a total population of 908 persons, of which 83.3 per cent are Muslim and16.7 per cent are Buddhist. Buddhists are clustered at Yom Ban Sam Roi Rai bordering
Mu 5, Ban Wang Mai, Aiyoeweng subdistrict, which is a 100 per cent Buddhist
community.
Mr Dolo Yama used to be the village head. Since his death in 2003, the post hasgone to his son. Tan Mali village is still quiet. Access to the village has improved with a
new asphalt road, and outsiders come to buy and sell food and farm products. Ban Tan
Mali School, a tadika, and the mosque are looked after well by the people. But Tan Mali
still does not have a health station so the villagers rely on the health station at Aiyoeweng
subdistrict or the Ban Krapong health station, Mae Wat subdistrict, Than To district. Tan
Mali people have not been directly affected by the violence. The only incident was adrunken quarrel with Buddhists from Ban Wang Mai at the Songkran festival.

Analyzing “new” relations
This study focuses on the religious distance between Muslims and Buddhists in thein the southernmost provinces. Two factors come into play (see Figures 5-1 and 5-2).
First, there are hierarchical relations between state officials (Buddhist or Muslim) andpeople (Buddhist or Muslim). Second, there are lateral relations between groups ofpeoples (Buddhist and Muslim).

 155 Hierarchical relations: officials and people
Officials
MuslimBuddhist

Buddhist

MuslimPeopleLateral relations: people to people
MuslimMuslimBuddhist

Buddhist

MuslimMuslimBuddhist

Buddhist

MuslimMuslimBuddhist

Buddhistmutual caution
mutual distrust
mutual trust

Figure 6-1 Hierarchical and lateral relations
In the context of the severe unrest, relations between state officials (civilian, soldier,
police) and people have been strained on both sides. Anyone known to be a state official,whether Muslim or Buddhist, is considered to be a sympathizer and supporter of thegovernment. All such persons are lumped together as enemies of the insurgents and are at
risk of being attacked. People fearful of such attacks, despite having good feelings
towards state officials, will not dare to have relationships with them as they are afraid of
being accused of being a secret agent of a state agency. People in some villages feel wary
if a state official visits their home as they are afraid that neighbors may suspect them ofbeing agents of the state. If someone in the village is found to have been visited by an
official or any outsider to the village, that villager will come under suspicion. Even if an
official and ordinary person, of whatever religions, have no suspicions about each otherand have had good relations in the past, it may not be possible to display their 156 relationship in public. Such relationships can continue only if they have proven to one
another that they can guard their secrets well or have shared a common experience that
cements mutual trust. If they are not well acquainted, they may suspect each other andnot trust each other.
Nowadays, both Muslims and Buddhists try not to get close to state officials suchas police, soldiers, or civilians. This gives opportunities to the insurgents to recruit
support. The relations between ill-intentioned people on one side and policemen, soldiers,
volunteers under the Southern Border Provinces Peace-building Command, and otherofficials has deteriorated with consequences for religious practice. Border Patrol Police
were shot and killed while praying at a mosque on a Friday, and two old men were
injured. A former district officer was shot on his way home from Friday prayers. A village
headman was shot at the entrance to a mosque in the evening after I-sa prayers.
Relations between Buddhists and Muslims on a people-to-people basis still rest to alarge degree on old foundations of thinking and understanding. Some conflicts havearisen and sometimes become violent due to competition for illegal business
opportunities or competition for political power. But in many cases, such conflicts can be
settled because there are people with good religious faith, a spirit of familial relations,and the authority of belonging to traditionally powerful lineages that still work tocoordinate good relations between Buddhists and Muslims, as happened in the past.
People-to-people relationships between Buddhists and Muslims living in the samevillages are not really problematic as they know one another well. But people have been
attacked while outside their own village, or attacked at home by outsiders. Often suchattacks relate to some form of self-interest. A Muslim villager in Yaha district said, “I
have a problem with (name) about public property.… Those of us who do not havefriends in high positions seldom get our fair share. We are taken advantage of because wehave no power, no big-shot relatives. We do not feel safe.”
At times of violent incidents, or rumors of such incidents, people have to be
especially careful about their own safety. Even communities that are totally Muslim must
be on guard. One local leader said, “Nowadays, nothing is certain. A few days ago
someone brought a plastic bag filled with one liter of rice, two eggs, 20 baht, and a pieceof white cloth on which was written a message in Malay language, in Jawi script, to stop
trading on Friday mornings. It was hung over the door of the shop.” There truly havebeen threats made to stop trading on Fridays. They even reach the level of death threats.
The contents of the plastic bag are items that sponsors of Muslim funerals in somevillages in the three southernmost provinces commonly give to those who come to thefuneral service.
Several cruel incidents took place between 2001 and mid 2006, for example, thekilling of three monks and novices; the killing of monks and burning of Wat Phromprasit
in Panare district, Pattani; the slitting of the throats of two Laotian workers, husband andwife; the killing and burning of the homes of Thai Buddhists in Yaring district; thecapture and killing of two marines in Tanyonglimo village, Tanyongmat district; the useof war weapons to destroy the house and kill an entire Muslim family of nine in Ban
Kathong, Bo-ngo subdistrict; the capture and physical assault of two female teachers in
Kuchingluepa village, Chaloem subdistrict, Ra-ngae, Narathiwat; the ambush and killingof government officials and innocent people, both Buddhist and Muslim, both religious
leaders and lay people, regardless of sex and age; the destruction of religious places, 157 private property, and public offices. These were seen and heard daily. Some cases wereunbelievably cruel. Those who are directly responsible for solving the unrest are at a loss
and feel helpless to stop such incidents.
Meetings, mobilization of people, brainwashing in separatist ideas, sniping, secret
bombing, and leaflet distribution have continued throughout. The trend is worsening. Still,
the authorities believe the situation can be resolved even though it may take some time.34
For whatever reasons, the insurgents have made many gains. They havesuccessfully mobilized and attracted certain groups in certain areas to join the movement
and participate in violence of various forms. They have incited some Malay Muslims,
both male and female, to attack officials and obstruct their activities. Today in the threesouthernmost provinces both Buddhists and Muslims who love peace and oppose
violence are angry and frustrated. But many Muslims do not share this view and blame
people in uniform for intimidating people in their homes. These people hate state officials,
will not cooperate with them, and feel unhappy at seeing soldiers and policemen in theirvillage.
Because of the frequent violence, the three southernmost provinces have been
dubbed as a site of “Southern Fire” that challenges the power of the state. Several
prominent military figures have tried to extinguish this fire. Both Buddhist and Muslim
residents are very scared. Some families soothe themselves with sayings like, “Whatever
will be, will be. We cannot rely on anybody now. It is up to the stars.” Most Muslims say,
“It is up to Allah’s will. Most incidents are the work of a small minority. Most people
don’t want this. We cannot move elsewhere as there are many difficulties.”
This is matter for each individual. But, it is of great concern that no solution is insight. In October 2005, a Thai newspaper carried this report.
General Panlop Pinmanee, deputy director of internal security, was chairman for the
training program of the armed forces at Hotel Thaksin, Klang subdistrict, Mueang
district, Nakhon Si Thammarat before being sent to the field in FY2006. He said,“The south is now facing guerilla warfare. It involves violence of all forms,
inflicting savage injuries on government officials and people, not even sparingmonks and novices. The situation is getting closer to that in Iraq…. Today the south
is becoming a war zone but we cannot do anything. We need to take the initiative, by
taking longer strides than they do. The masses should get involved. We need toseparate the criminals from the people. In short, at present the criminals have more
power than the state. To achieve harmony, the state must be strong first…. I do notwant to let slip the diamond handle of the axe. As for the case of stolen fire-arms
retrieved from the house of Mr Masae U-Seng, the last operation of 2006, he had
tried to amass 5,000 machine guns. He was not quite ready in terms of fire-arms or
manpower. Even though I am now old, I am ready to go down south. Since I used tolive in Pattani for four years, I know the monks, Thai Buddhists, and Muslims.”35

These days no one can stop anyone from making a blanket statement that all thepeople in the three southernmost provinces are good people or all are criminals. But if all
the Muslims are really criminals or enemies of Buddhists, it would not be possible tohave any wat or mosque still standing. It is a part of human nature to think ill of fellow
human beings, to feel hatred, and to hurt others’ feelings. An innocent person can be hurt
as in the case of a student from Yala who boarded a minibus from Bangkok. While sitting
on the bus, his mobile phone rang. It was a call from a Muslim friend. He talked in Patani
Malay dialect. The bus driver asked where he came from. When he responded that he 158 came from Yala, the driver pulled the bus over and asked the student to get out
immediately, saying, “Your people kill Thai Buddhists!” This is an example of aninteraction between a Buddhist from outside the region and a Muslim man from Yala in
the context of the ongoing violence.
At a provincial hospital, I was queuing up to pay for dry foodstuffs at the welfare
shop. A Muslim lady placed a few items on the counter in front of the cashier and tried to
ask their price in Patani Malay dialect. The cashier was a Buddhist Thai and did notunderstand the dialect. Instead of getting assistance from nearby people, she rapped theitems on the counter and told the Muslim lady in a very rough tone, “Don’t understand,
don’t understand. No need to buy.” It is good that the customer did not understand what
the cashier said, but she could still interpret the cashier’s unpleasant facial expression.
At a restaurant on the Yala–Bannang Sata road, when I stood up to walk out of therestaurant, a middle-aged woman who owned the shop extended her two hands in a
gesture of respect (salam) and said thank you. She held my hands very tightly as if togive a signal. When questioned, tears ran down her face, and she said that she now had toraise her child alone as her husband passed away on 24 February 2004, four days before
the Krue Se incident. Her husband was gunned down on the balcony of a house. Asked
whether she had noticed when these types of violent incidents started happening, she
responded immediately “When prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra declared war on the
drug dealers and influential people.” Her husband was killed because he had helped in theeffort to crack down on drugs in his village.
These examples are cited here to complement information in the study. I am
convinced that relations between Buddhists and Muslims in the three southernmost
provinces and other places are entirely a matter of individuals’ conduct. Thai societyneeds to open its mind and encourage young people to have a fair attitude, with the elder
generation leading the way. The various violent incidents in the far south are not due toreligious differences, and are not reflections of a Muslim hatred of Buddhists. If two cars
coming from opposite directions collide on a street, and one is driven by a Muslim andthe other by a Buddhist, it is an accident, and no-one should rush to conclude that there isconflict between Muslims and Buddhists.

Epilogue: crisis of faith or crisis of truth
The diamond-studded golden handle of the axe is now too hot to grasp. The generalpublic throughout Thailand has very little information about what is going on, and as aresult they are confused. People in the region have to live their lives on constant alert,
uncertain of their personal safety and their possessions. Trust has been destroyed, evenbetween people who were once close. This is the fate of Buddhist and Muslim, man andwoman, young and old. Deaths occur almost daily. Those who love peace are smothered
by a climate of fear.
Information is spread that events are hatched by Muslims who want to get rid of
Buddhists. People who want to create division in society advocate conclusions about thecauses of the unrest based on their own preconceived negative attitudes. They want tomislead others into believing that the unrest is caused by religious differences. There is arisk that the general public will be snared by this trap, leading to rifts between Muslims
and Buddhists in the society as a whole.

 159 In reality, all human beings, whether Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, or Muslim,
whether from west, east, north, or south, whether black, white, tan, or yellow, have to beinterdependent in this age of advanced information technology, for man cannot live alone.
The foundations of a culture of interdependence must be found in friendship and good,
constructive ways of dealing with one another. But most humans are susceptible toconditioning by their environment. They risk acting in ways that provoke a crisis of“faith” among friends. They may become slaves of “faith” and “truth” to such a degree
that they become confused in their views. In the end, it can result in a crisis of wisdomand spirit that no one can heal.
Between 2001 and mid 2006, Buddhists and Muslims in the three southernmost
provinces were still able to interact to a large degree within the framework of the
traditional socio-cultural structure. Many Buddhists and Muslims understand the same
meanings of “faith” and “truth.” If there has been change, it probably results from somegroups, either Buddhist or Muslim, who were already predisposed against the other, orfrom people forced to act against their own beliefs because of their professional duty. In
this type of selective interaction, one side is not disposed to act in a good way, causing
the other side to feel unhappy and distrustful. The people of two religious group canaccumulate feelings of mutual suspicion that destroy former ties of friendship and trust.
Nowadays both Buddhists and Muslim have to exercise great caution. They try to
distance themselves from people they do not know well, and from state officials of every
type, including policemen, soldiers, and civilians. But in the course of daily life in society,
it is not possible to avoid all contact with these people. Moreover, there are reasons basedon economics, politics, religion, education, and public health which require some dealing
with state officials. As a result, part of relations between Buddhists and Muslims in thethree southernmost provinces is in the form of dependent interactions which conform to apatron-client system that places importance on relatives, friends, and intimates, and thathas private benefit as its main “vehicle.” This type of interaction allows the dominantparty to take advantage of junior participants, and may lead to a decline of humanist
values. In the elections of political leaders or religious leaders in the villages, any trick ortactic is used to garner votes with very little attention given to ethics. Examples abound in
the elections of various positions such as village head, district council member, provincial
council member, municipal council member, senator, member of parliament, provincial
Islamic councilor, and member of the Central Islam Committee of Thailand. People are
distressed to witness behavior that diverges from their own moral and ethical values.
Thai society is fortunate in that many elderly people, of the generation of greatgrandparents and grandparents, who have a lot of charisma and virtue, are living in somevillages. Some are descendants of old lineages, both Buddhist and Muslim, with longexperience of overcoming problems and building their communities. Some fought
external enemies such as the Malay Communist guerillas. Some fought to defend their
homeland. Shared memories of good and bad times form a powerful communal spirit to
support and protect their communities with true love and concern. This spirit is valuable
social capital, more valuable than later constructions. Despite some suggestions to thecontrary, this spirit still has the power to bind people together. People in the threesouthernmost provinces have to live with the situation facing them. They have to help
and protect one another, and elude the influence of outsiders coming to interfere in thelocal way of life. At base, Muslims and Buddhists do not set great store by religious

 160 difference. They do not find that religion is a major “problem” or “obstacle” to living
together in society.
Some conclusions can be made about the incidence of violence. First, theincidence is a gauge of the strength of religious leadership of both the Buddhists andMuslims. Second, the religious faith of Buddhists and Muslims in the three southernmost
provinces is still pure enough for them to understand the truth behind the violence. Third,
the scale of unrest can be used to evaluate the true potential of state power in the threesouthernmost provinces over political and security matters. Fourth, the incidents indicate
how religious difference is being exploited by certain groups of people. There are groupsof people who try to use “religion” as a vehicle to gain benefits at the expense of others incomplex and nefarious ways.
It is difficult to answer such questions as “Who instigated the violence?” and “Whywas it instigated?” Buddhists and Muslims have to use their own good judgment. They
have to filter information about each case of violence. The unrest has spread widely andincreased unstoppably. Each incident is a social phenomenon that has arisen because of a
failure in human relations, and because of confusion over the meanings of “faith” and“truth.” People’s attitudes to human society change with the times. Many now accept thatpolitics and economics are more powerful than religion. People thus dare to adapt and use“religion” (belief) to create a “new faith” for use as a reference in maintaining a “truth”
which has more falsehood than fact but which can be used to build political, economic,
ideological, and individual power without any concern for righteousness. Luckily, there
are still some people of the two religions in the three southernmost provinces who truly
understand the meaning of the words “faith” and “truth.” Hence the relations between
Buddhists and Muslims have not deteriorated too far.
Recommendations
The time has come for due attention to be paid to the present and future of thethree southernmost provinces, to the business of solving the violence, rehabilitating thecommunities, and healing the people spiritually, together with serious development in theareas of education, politics, and the economy under “religious principles” that are correct
for both Buddhists and Muslims. The present population of the deep south already pay
great attention to education, politics, and the economy, so the government should do its
duty in providing adequate support and correct information. The government should also
move swiftly to erase the negative image that the local people have of government
officials. Someone summed up the situation to me as follows:This land [Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat] is but a public football field that is open to
all football players from the local, national, and international levels and all age
groups to come and compete to their heart’s content. Meanwhile, people like us, both
Buddhist and Muslim Thais who are less fortunate, are merely one species of “grass”
that happens to have sprouted and grown in that field. I guess we just have to face
the normal fate of grass on a football field that rarely receives as much care as itshould. To survive, it relies merely on rainfall, except on special occasions whensome groups want to use the field for a particular match. The field would then be
prepared for use, such as by planting new grass seedlings to replace the parts where
the grass had withered and died.

 161 At that point, “the grass” may receive some fertilizer and water. But this grass cannot
grow tall and graceful as under natural conditions, for the grass needs to be trimmed
to a certain level as grass that is too tall can prick the legs of the well-trained andcarefully-selected football players who come to play, which can become a real
obstacle to playing football.
When the game starts, the spectators focus all attention on the players and the ballitself. Nobody pays attention to the grass being stepped on. Some patches of grass
are scuffed and even uprooted. The ball is also kicked mercilessly. Everyone fights
over the ball to win one or two goals that are the difference between “defeat” and“victory.” Only the winners get the reward and admiration. The ball may be pickedup and embraced. But the “grass” will be left neglected in the field as before. Some“grass plants” may survive. Others may die… It is only the grass on a football
field.”36

This statement makes no distinction among Thai people based on religion but tries
to convey that all Thai people in the three southernmost provinces, both Buddhists andMuslims, are exploited and disadvantaged in the same way. Thus if Thai society in every
region pays attention to the above message and interprets its metaphor in the same way, I
am deeply convinced that the present Thai society in the three southernmost provinces,both Buddhists and Muslims, will have a better tomorrow than today. When that day
comes, every diamond stud in the handle of this golden axe will have the opportunity toshine brightly and be an important force in building a stable Thai society far into the
future.
Endnotes
1
Rattiya Saleh, Kan pathisamphan rawang sasanik thi prakot nai changwat pattani yala lae
narathiwat (Relations of various religious groups in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) (Bangkok:
Thailand Research Fund, 2001).
2
These villages are: Ban Bu Mae, Tambon Yi-ngo, Amphoe Yi-ngo, Narathiwat; Ban Palat,Tambon Khuan, Amphoe Panare, Pattani; Ban Ramong, Tambon Yarom, Amphoe Betong, Yala; Ban
Tan Mali, Tambon Aiyoeweng, Amphoe Betong, Yala.
3“Patani” is the name of the areas covering Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and the Thepha, Chana, Saba
Yoi, and Na Thawi districts of Songkhla. It is a word derived from Fathoni in Arabic, which means
philosopher or learned person. It is a word with a good meaning and hence many philosophers born inPatani use the word “al-Fathoni” as a suffix to their name (see Rattiya Saleh, Kan pathisamphan, pp.
25–7).
4
General Panlop Pinmanee in Matichon Raiwan, 30 October 2003, p.13.
5Interview with a senior citizen at a village in Bo Ngo subdistrict, Ra-ngae district, Narathiwat,
March 2006, conducted in Patani Malay.
6
Wan Mohd. Shaghir Abdullah, Hubungan Ulama Patani dan Kedah: Kekeluargaan, Pertalian
Ilmu dan Karya. Dlm. Md.Noor Salleh dan Abdul Halim Haji Salleh (pny.), Islam di Kedah Darul
Aman, 1998, p. 95. This edition of Tarikh Fathani was translated into Malay with explanations by
Syeikh Faqih Ali (grandson of Sheikh Safiyuddin [1400 AD], owner of the work Tarikh Fathani in
Arabic, which Wan Mohd. Shaghir bin Abdullah said could not be found) which Syeikh Daud bin
Abdullah al-Fathani copied in 1813 CE and Wan Mohd. Shaghir bin Abdullah had transcribed from
Jawi into Rumi script using the modern spelling system in Khazanah Fathaniyah, 1 (1990), pp. 6–27.
This document is important as it tells us that Kedah was the center of Langkasuka and had Fathoni as 162 

its main port. Moreover, Wan Mohd. Shaghir bin Abdullah says Syeikh Faqih Ali bin Wan Muhammad
bin Syeikh Safiyuddin is the same person as the owner of the high rank Dato’ Maharajalela who fled to
Bugis. See Wan Mohd. Shaghir Abdullah, ‘Peranan Orang-orang Patani di Dunia Perantau,’ paper
presented at Simposium Wilayah Perbatasan Malaysia-Thailand, organized by the History Department,
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 16 May 1996, pp. 3–4.
7
Rattiya Saleh, Kan pathisamphan, pp. 26–7.
8
Jawi script is Arabic script adapted by Malay people to phoneticize the Malay language.
Indonesians call this type of script “Melayu Script”. “Jawi” (or Yawi) is a word adapted from jaway(al-jaway) in Arabic which means “tinder.” It is the same as the standard Malay word damar or damaused in the deep south or al-jawat in Arabic. Thus when an Arab calls the people from the Malay
islands ogae jawi (Jawi people), he means the islanders who possess tinder, and does not necessarilymean Yawa (Java) island or mainland Yawadwipa. In fact, the word Jawi or Jaway is often on the lips
or on the pen tips of those who use one kind of Malay script adapted from Arabic, Jawi script or as
Indonesian linguists call it, Arabic-Malay script; see Nabilah Lubis, Naskah, Teks, dan Metode
Penelitian Filologi (Jakarta: Yayasan Media Alo Indonesia, 2001), p. 80. This script was widely usedin Sumatra; see Slamet Muljana, Kuntala, Sriwajaya dan Suwarnabhumi (Jakarta: Yayasan IDAYA,
1981), pp. 58–9. In the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries, Malay writers used the word Jawi for“Melayu,” (Malay) giving the impression that Jawi is the same language as Malay. Syed Muhammad
Naguib Al-Attas explained that this was due to political reasons, in order to reduce tension between
the Javanese and Malay people after the Malay Muslims of the Mataram Kingdom conquered Java
(Majapahit), whose people observed Shaivite Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism. The people in
Mataram used Malay as the official language instead of Javanese, which had flourished earlier. See
Syed Muhammad Naguib Al-Attas, Islam dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu (Kuala Lumpur:
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1972), p. 43. On 22 January 2005, Professor Yusny Saby from the
Aceh special administrative region, Indonesia, translated Jawi (jawi) as “bawah angin” (beneath thewind), so Jawi is the language used by the people in the area beneath the wind.
9
Rattiya Saleh, Kan pathisamphan, pp. 253–7; Ahmad Fathil Al-Fathoni, Ulama Besar dariFathoni, Malayu Edition, Jawi script, (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2001).
10
Abdul Rahman Al-Ahmadi, ‘Kedatangan dan Perkembangan Islam di Kelantan dan Patani,’
papers from a seminar on Islamic Civilization in the Malay World, Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam,
1–5 June 1980, p. 3.
11
S. T. Alisjahbana, Dari Perjuangan dan Pertumbuhan Bahasa Indonesia: kumpulan esei 1932–
1937 (Jakarta, Dian Rakyat, 1978), p. 166.
12
Rattiya Saleh, Phasa malayu thin pak tai khong prathet thai (Malayu language in southern
Thailand), second printing, revised edition (Songkhla: Srinakarinwirote-Songkhla University, 1992).
13
Charnvit Kasetsiri, ‘Kan sang wiraburut (lae/rue wirasatri) khong chat’ (The creation of national
heroes, and/or heroines), Silapa Watthanatham (Art and Culture) 24, 21, 1 (1999), p. 93.
14
Mohd. Zamberi A Malek, Patani dalam Tamadun Melayu (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan
Pustaka, 1994), p. 11; Rattiya Saleh, ‘Hikayat Carang Kulina: Analisis Teks dan Kesinambungandalam Kehidupan Masyarakat Melayu Muslim Patani,’ Ph.D thesis, Fakulti Sains Kemasyarakatan dan
Kemanusiaan, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Selangor, 2002, pp. 412–22.
15
Mrs Yaena Khueramae, formerly a resident of Ban Kuleng, which was the old site of the town ofYi-ngo. In 2000, she was 99 years old. Currently (2006) she is still alive but her memory is failing.
16
Mr Akom Phatthanakun and Mrs Rachanikon Patthanakun are Buddhist Thais who have retired
from the civil service. They opened a grocery shop at 12/1 Ramkomut, Mu 1, Ban Bu Mae, Yi-ngo,
Yi-ngo district, Narathiwat. In early 2006, the front of the shop was bombed. It was fortunate that bothwere not hurt, but three customers were injured.
17
Mrs Rachanikon Phatthanakun (see previous note).
18
Mr Phoem Manimat or Po Teh, a Buddhist and supporter of Wat Ratsawiriyaram (Wat Yi-ngo), is 163 a resident of Yi-ngo from birth and has excellent command of the Malay language. In 2000, he was 86
years old. He has since passed away due to old age.
19This family is related to a Buddhist Thai family that met with violence, including killing andburning of the house, at Ban Cha-o, Taliai subdistrict, Yaring district, Pattani.
20
Mrs Phum Maansakun (maiden name Na Rangsi). In 1998, her son and his wife and twochildren (one girl and one boy) converted from Buddhism to Islam. In 1998, Phum was 67 years old,
residing at number 4/1, Mu 1, Ban Palat, Khuan subdistrict, Panare district, Pattani. Phum’’s motherwas named Chan Na Rangsi. The Muslim villagers in Palat knew her by the name of Maeteh.
21
The word “Fatima” derives from the Arabic word “Fatimah.” According to Islamic history,
Fatimah was a daughter of Rauzul Muhammad (May the mercy of Allah the Pure and Virtuous andpeace be with you).
22
See Tok Muda Raja Razman bin Raja Abdul Hamid and Tok Muda Haji Meor Yahya dan Husin
Mahmud, Hulu Perak dalam Sejarah (Ipoh: Regina Press, 1963).
23
Rattiya Saleh, Kan pathisamphan, pp. 109–10.
24
Rattiya Saleh, Kan pathisamphan, p. 110.
25
The village headman Dolo Yama has gone back to the mercy of Allah (the Pure and Virtuous).
26
Interview with the principal of Ban Ramong School.
27
The sarongs of Muslim males are checkered-patterned.
28
Rattiya Saleh, Kan pathisamphan, pp. 117–8.
29
See Phrae Sirisakdamkoeng, chapter 2 in this volume, p. 63.
30
General Kitti Ratanachaya, Dap fai tai kap rat thai (Extinguishing the Southern Fire by the Thaistate) (Bangkok: Than Press, 2003), p. 42.
31
Additional prayer after prayers on Friday for this dead person, Matichon Raiwan, 7 May 2006, p.
13.
32
It was discovered later that this was a teenage drug addict who needed money. This youth knewthat the old man always carried a big sum of money as he dared not keep money at home for fear of
losing it. This was the cause of this incident.
33
Thai Rath, 25 January 2004, p. 15.
34
Matichon Raiwan, 20 February 2005, p. 2.
35
Matichon Raiwan, 30 October 2005, p. 13.
36Interview with a senior Muslim religious leader at a village in Pattani in April 2005, conductedin Patani Malay dialect.

 164 

7
Migration and the violence in the far south
Zakee Phithakkumpol

Muslims in (the three provinces in) the south now live in their own home place
as if they were migrants. They have no power to change anything that ishappening. They do not dare facing the officials and at the same time, they dare1
not tell the militants to stop what they are doing.

The violence that escalated in the three southernmost provinces from January
2004 onwards has been much more severe than anything in the past.2 Earlier unrest
had been largely focused against the state, its machinery and personnel. But in thisnew phase, the violence has engulfed ordinary people, both Buddhist and Muslim.
More and more ordinary people were targeted, something unprecedented. This hascreated a climate of insecurity and fear. It has also depressed an already weakeconomy.3
One strategy people may use to counter the impact on their safety and theirlivelihood is to migrate. Ever since the violence became worse, there have beenreports of migration away from the affected area. This chapter examines thisphenomenon of migration.

The approach
Most earlier studies of migration were based on quantitative approaches, andmuch of the theoretical work underpinning these studies involved a debate over which“factors” influenced the decisions over migration. More recently, the trend has been to
take a more qualitative approach, and to study the experience of migration and its
meaning for the subjects in order to understand the behavior, beliefs, and values
involved. 4 This study adopts this qualitative approach. The aim of the study is to
explore what factors influenced the decision to migrate, what difficulties wereencountered, and in what ways people felt the move had improved their life chances
or affected their lives in other ways.
For practical reasons, I chose to limit the study to movements of people afterJanuary 2004 from the three southernmost provinces into the city of Hat Yai, the maincommercial and education center of the far south sub-region. I planned to interview
in-depth a small sample of migrants recruited at the destination in Hat Yai5 using
informal and loosely structured interviews coupled with personal observation. Theinterview covered these subjects: reasons for migration; the nature of the migration;
the people who influenced the decision to migrate; the consequences of the migration;and the migrant’s assessments of the gains and losses by the move.
In practice, recruitment of respondents was difficult. Because of the backgroundof violence and trauma, many people were reluctant to be interviewed and talk of theirexperiences. Even when they agreed, they insisted on having others present forassurance. This made the process long and cumbersome.6
 165 I recruited respondents who had originated from different parts of the threeprovinces, and who came from different backgrounds—student, official, trader,businessman, and daily hired employee. The fieldwork was conducted between
December 2005 and May 2006. In total, I recruited and interviewed ten respondents,
but for reporting I have concentrated on only seven in order to reduce duplication in
the respondents’ experiences.

Migrating out of the far south
Quantitative data
At the request of the National Reconciliation Commission, the Institute ofPopulation Studies, Chulalongkorn University, analyzed the statistic of migration in
and out of the three southern provinces in the 30-year period of 1976–2005. Between
1976 and 1987, more people moved out of the area than into it, while over 1989 to
2003 the net movement was inward. In 2004, there was a net outward movement fromall three provinces, but in 2005 the movement returned to net inward, but in small
numbers. 7
These data seem to disprove the reports of large-scale out-migration. However,this was a purely statistical study based on secondary, official information of uncertain
accuracy. Moreover the study does not draw any connection between the violence andthe trends in migration.
The survey
My sample included four men and three women, all but one aged 31 and over,
and all with education up to high school or higher.
Table 7-1 Background of the sample of migrants
Background
sex
male
femaleage
15-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
marital status
singlemarriedprofession
official
employed
traderbusiness
student

N
4
3
1
3
3
1
6
2
2
1
1
1

Backgroundchildrenyesnonumber of children
1-2
3-4
education
primaryhigh school
certificate
B.A
higher than B.A
status in family
head
wife
child
religion
Buddhist
Muslim

N
6
1
5
2
2
1
4
-
5
1
1
5
2

The sample falls into two parts. First, there were those directly affected by theviolence. They had experienced violence themselves, or had members of their families

 166 directly affected, and had suffered loss of lives or assets. Second, there were thoseindirectly affected, meaning they did not suffer directly from any violent incident but
still felt they could not continue to live in the area.
Directly affected
Somphong, 8 was born in Su-ngai Kolok, Narathiwat and moved to Mueang 9
district. His wife was from Songkhla. They have two children, a son and a daughter.
Somphong worked as an insurance salesman and then as a direct sales representative.
Before the escalation of the violence, his routine started by leaving the house early inthe morning to meet with his customers in the villages. After the violence flared up in
2004, his family was hit hard. His older brother was shot dead at the end of 2004, andSomphong himself narrowly escaped a bomb attack at the Angmo restaurant in
Mueang district, Narathiwat, having left the restaurant only about half an hour before
it exploded. Because of the violence, Somphong and his family decided to sell theirhouse and move to Hat Yai.
Somphong’s case is a clear example of the direct effect of the violence. He andhis family were also affected psychologically. In the early days of their living in Hat
Yai, they chose to visit only restaurants where there were no soldiers or policeman.
They would not park their car near any belonging to officials for fear of attack.
Somphong said, “Until now I still feel very nervous when I see cars with registration
plates from the three provinces and will try to get everyone away from those cars.”
The violence also affected his direct sales business. Somphong was too afraid totravel to areas he thought were not safe. He said, “When it was peaceful, I could
travel to see my customers wherever they were. I could visit any village. I can’t dothat now. We dare not visit the villages because we just don’t know who’s who.”
Previously, safety had not been an issue.
A second reason for moving concerned his son. After the violence escalated in
Narathiwat, Somphong’s son felt uneasy with his Muslim friends. Somphong said,“My son didn’t want to study in Narathiwat anymore. He told me he wanted to moveto another place. He took the tests in several schools including Hat Yai Wittayalai.”His son’s success in gaining admission was another reason Somphong decided tochoose Hat Yai as his destination.
Another reason for moving was the effect of the violence on members of thefamily. Two bombs exploded near their Narathiwat home. Somphong said, “My wife
was so afraid she stayed indoor all the time and would not go out unless necessary.
Sometime I had to do the shopping for her. If I could not manage it, she went herself
but the trip was very brief.”
Somjai, 10 from Hat Yai, studied at Palasueksa College in Yala and, after
completing her degree, worked as a teacher in Yala and then Pattani for eighteen years.
Somjai was married to Bunyuen from Khok Pho, Pattani. They have two sons, aged 9
and 6 years old. Her husband, who worked as a engineering supervisor for a
subdistrict council (TAO) in Nong Chik, Pattani, was shot and killed in February 2004
while driving his motorcycle back home. Before the incident, Boonyuen was warned
by a friend in the police that subdistrict council officials in the three provinces would
be targets of the militants. Bunyuen did not pay much attention, believing he had no
enemies. After his death, Somjai moved to work at Ban Khuanlanga, Khok Pho
district, nearer to her home, and then on secondment at the Wat Prang Kaeo school in
Khlong Hoi Khong district, Songkhla.
The family was traumatized. Somjai told me, “After my husband died I was so 167 stressed I threw up every night. After throwing up I could then get some sleep. It
happened like that for months.” Somjai’s mother-in-law became very quiet and would
not speak to anyone, even those in her own family. Somjai’s mother came from Hat
Yai to stay with them. The two sons were also affected. “My elder son said to me hedidn’t want to stay there anymore. He wanted to move to Hat Yai and to live with his
grandmother. His brother asked about his father all the time, making me cry every
time. He suffered so much. One day I had the television on with the news. There wasa piece about a bomb in the south. He came to me, hugged me, shaking and crying,
and told me to change the channel because he didn’t want to watch it.”Rumors spread locally that teachers would be targeted, next to the soldiers andpolice. Somjai had to travel some distance to school every day. “When I drove towork, I had to be on guard and alert all the time and was always so worried. I kept
looking at the rear and side mirrors. We also had to go out in groups.”
She wanted to move away but was hampered by having to take care of her
traumatized mother-in-law. She also needed some time to replace their old, wooden,
and dilapidated house with something that would afford more protection. But
eventually the mother-in-law decided to take control of the assets and earnings of afarm which had earlier come to Somjai’s husband. At that point, Somjai decided toreturn to her family home in Hat Yai. She said, “Once he died, everything given to
him was taken back. The earnings from the farm were gone. I was so stressed I
thought there was no good reason for me to stay. I thought I’d better go back home.”
Indirectly affectedPiyamon11 was born in Mueang district, Pattani, as the youngest daughter ofApinan, a government teacher working at Prachan School, Yarang district. Piyamon
studied at Decha Pattanayanukun School in Mueang district.
Although Piyamon and her family were not directly affected by the violence, thefamily was concerned about the quality and continuity of Piyamon’s education.
Piyamon said, “The school closed down so often that my family asked me if I wanted
to move to study in Hat Yai. I told my father I’d do whatever he wanted me to.” Herfather added, “We could see that she might not get a proper education because, whenthe violence escalated, the school had to close down or let the students go home early.
Also we were worried about her safety. We consulted my sister about moving her toschool in Hat Yai.” She moved to Hat Yai Wittayalai School.
Piyamon said she did not think much about the violence. Her relations with
Muslim friends at school were unchanged. “It was normal. Nobody talked about theviolence. My Muslim friends from Pattani even came to study with me in Hat Yai.”
As a teacher, her father Apinan was also affected. When the violence flared up,
he was working inside the “red zone.” He applied for a transfer out of the area. “Ateacher friend… told me not to leave, as I had been here for a long time and also that I
would be fine. He said to me that whenever it was my turn, he would tell me to move.
What he said made me lost for words and simply stunned.… Also my wife doesn’twant me to move either. She wants to stay here because her parents live here and they
are old. She herself was born here. We have quite a number of belongings here so wehaven’t moved but let our junior members leave first.” The reassurance from a friend
was a guarantee of safety from someone well respected in the community. But Apinanalso took precautions. He varied the time of leaving home each day, and took different
routes between home and work. He also suspected he would have to leave in the end.
“I don’t think I will be here until retirement. I have sent my children away first. The
older child is studying at Walailak University and the other is now at Hat Yai. For me, 168 it’s only a matter of time.” Asked about the possibility of the conflict being solved andviolence subsiding, he said, “I think it’s going to be very difficult. This thing goesdeep and it’s now in the minds of the children. That’s why I told you I won’t bearound until retirement.”
Apinan also talked about the effect the violence had on teaching. “It takes theteachers until 8 or 9 a.m. to reach school because they have to travel in groups andwait for the soldiers to accompany them. The classes stop about 2 p.m. because theteachers don’t want the soldiers to wait for too long.” However, he did not feel thesoldiers had to protect the school itself. “At my school there were no soldiers toprotect the teachers. Having the soldiers was both good and bad. Some may think it
guarantees their safety but sometime it attracts danger to the teachers and they also
become targets. Look at what happened at Bra-o. A bomb was planted at the spot
where soldiers meet the teachers. When it exploded, many teachers were injured.
Moreover, in Yarang district, a man who is expected to be a minister of Pattani once
they achieve separation said he would not guarantee the safety of anyone if soldiers
are involved.”
Apinan said, “There’s no problem between the teachers and the community. At
the village tea shop I won’t talk about the violence or the situation. The villagers saythey will warn me about any strangers coming into the village.” Apinan alsocommented on the attitude of students towards the unrest. “When I asked the prathom
6 (elementary level) students if there was recruitment for suicide fighters would
anyone want to do it, all the male students in the room put up their hands. I was
stunned. I could not say anything. I asked them why they wanted to do it. They said tobe God’s fighters is a good thing. I think what I have taught them for eight years—
two years at the kindergarten level and another six years at elementary level—did not
help at all.”Somruedi12 came from Thepha district, Songkhla. After completing high school
she moved to Yala province and later married a husband from Phatthalung. They both
worked in a rubber production plant, and lived in the workers’ housing at the plant.
Yala became their home. Somruedi has two sons.
Because of the violence, people were afraid to work in the rubber plantations.
The quantity of latex received at the plant declined, with the result that Somruedi andher husband worked less and earned less. While once they had had to work overtime,
the working days per month were eventually cut to fifteen.
The reduced earnings and the prospect of prolonged violence made them thinkof the future. Somruedi suggested to her husband that they should move to find workin Hat Yai. Her sister, who lived in Hat Yai, had urged them to move. But her husband
refused. He had always worked at the rubber plant and was nervous about his chancesof finding any other kind of work. He was not worried about safety as they spent theirtime inside the plant. He preferred to economize and get by.
Somruedi said, “Our income was reduced. I said to my husband we can’t live
like this but he said it would be alright, that we would stay only in the factory and if
we were short of money we could always pick some vegetables and find some fish in
the canal.”
Their elder son studied at Kanarat School on a scholarship from Sukhothai
Thammathirat University, while the younger one studied at a primary school in
Mueang district, Yala. Somruedi said, “Because of the violence, the school had toclose quite often. Sometimes they called and asked us to collect them before thenormal closing time. We were worried my elder son might not do well in the exams,

 169 and that could result in him losing the scholarship. The cost of his education would
then fall on us.” She had to take her children to their schools and collect them everyday. “Everyday I was afraid something would happen to us because the route we used
was quiet and deserted and it was such a long distance too. Although it hadn’t
happened but it could, any time.”
Because of the problem concerning the education of the two children, Somruedi
again tried to convince her husband to move to Hat Yai. Eventually he agreed after her
brother-in-law gave him a job in his construction business.
Abdulloh 13 was born in Yala and educated there up to university level. He
married a nurse from Su-ngai Kolok. They lived in Bangkok for a time but moved
back to be with her parents. Working in a government hospital in Su-ngai Kolok, sheearned much less than she had in a private hospital in Bangkok. She decided to move
to Hat Yai.
Abdulloh said, “My wife actually wanted to move some time ago, even before
the violence escalated. She once worked for a private hospital in Bangkok and waswell paid so she wanted to find similar work with a private hospital in Hat Yai. The
violence may have had some influence on her decision, because I was worried about
her safety when traveling to work.... Sometime she had to work the late-night shift
and someone had to give her a lift. I was worried for the safety both for her and those
who took her there.”At first after his wife moved to Hat Yai, Abdulloh stayed in Su-ngai Kolok andran a tour business. The border town usually relied on tourists from Malaysia. But the
numbers declined once the violence started. Many hotels and tour operators had toclose down. After the Krue Ze and Tak Bai incidents, the slump deepened. Abdulloh
had to close down his company, move to join his wife in Hat Yai, and look for a newjob. Their two daughters remained in Su-ngai Kolok with their grandparents..
Abdulloh made several trips to visit his daughters. ”Each time I visited myhometown to see my daughters I felt it was not a good place to live, especially when
there were car bombs. I felt very nervous. Every morning before I left home I had tocheck if there was any bomb underneath my car.”I asked him why he had not moved the two daughters to Hat Yai. He said, “My
wife’s parents are lonely. They want them to be there. Also her father is a principal attheir school so the children go to school with him and I don’t have to worry about
their safety. Moreover, we have only an apartment in Hat Yai which is not very
accommodating. So it was better to leave them there.” However, the two children
came to stay during school vacations.
Chae-useng14 was born in Pattani. He worked as a controller in a construction
subcontracting business, and his wife had an evening restaurant selling rice porridge
near the Pattani river.
Due to the violence, the construction business in Pattani slumped dramatically.
Chae-useng said, “Construction work in Pattani declined from the normal level which
was not that much anyway. So the effect was heavy. I thought I would soon have tofind work somewhere else. I was lucky the company got work in Hat Yai.”
His wife’s business was affected too. “There were fewer people once theviolence started. My restaurant, next to the river, used to get a lot of customers but
once the violence flared up they were all gone, especially after the Krue Ze incident.
The roads were deserted. There were no people, only the police and soldiers driving
by. By 8 p.m. people did not go out. It was all very quiet. Who would buy my 170 porridge?” But she continued selling it and sometime had to throw unsold porridge
away.
They had four children studying at a school in Pattani. She had to drive them toand from school, and was constantly afraid of being present when the militants
attacked a checkpoint. “One day… there was a rumor that people were being told not
to go out. The roads in town were all deserted, no car, not even one. There were only
soldiers and police cars. I had to go and collect my children…. I had to pass so many
checkpoints where there were so many police and soldiers and I feared they would
attack these people and that I would get caught in between. It was not worth it.”
School closures were also a problem. She said, “The school closed quite often
especially when there were rumors about bombs here and there. I wasn’t that afraid.
But the teachers must have been afraid about the children and so closed the school. I
fully understand that. But I thought it was not good so I spoke to my husband that weshould find a similar school in Hat Yai, and perhaps move there.” Chae-useng added,“I was in Hat Yai then, renting a house in Khuanlang. I tried to find school nearby but
couldn’t. I asked my friends and heard from them that there was one in Ban Kao-mi(Khlong Hae subdistrict). I immediately called and told my wife about it. So wemoved here.”
Chukiat15 was born in Yala. His father was a former police officer at Mueang
district police station in Yala while his mother was from Songkhla. His family made aliving selling fruits in the market in Mueang district. His parents had been living in
Yala for more than forty years and they felt they had a strong bond with the place. His
mother and her sister-in-law could speak Malay though Chukiat knew only a few
words.
After education at the Yala Teachers’ College, Chukiat worked for the Rural
Development Department in Pattani. After the civil service reforms in 2002, Chukiat
asked for a transfer to the Water Resources Department, and got a post in Hat Yai. He
got a secondment to work in Yala so he could be with his family. Chukiat said, “Theday the Krue Ze incident occurred, I was exploring the areas for water sources. I got acall from my boss who ordered me back to the office immediately.”
Chukiat’s job was developing small and medium sized water sources for use ofcommunities in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Chukiat told me, “In the old days when
I went into the villages there was no suspicious feeling. After the violence flared up, I
had to be very careful and on the look-out all the time. If there was any motorcycle
coming by, I would stop what I was doing, watch to see who it was, and wait until that
person passed before I could resume my work.… When we entered villages in the redzone we had to inform the village heads so that they would get people to protect us.
They know the villagers well, especially the teenagers and can identify strangers. It
was helpful.”
The violence changed the way he lived in Yala. He said, “I used to go about
freely and went out to the teashops talking to my friends till late almost every night.
Now I have to hurry home every time I go out especially after 8 p.m.. I don’t go out at
all unless it’s absolutely necessary. Then I make it quick and try to return home assoon as I can.”Chukiat and members of his family used to go to the park in Yala for exercise
almost every evening. During weekends, he and his wife and their children often went
shopping in the department store there. But all these activities had to stop after theviolence flared up. The grandparents repeatedly told the children not to go and playoutside the house in the evenings.

 171 The violence left the whole family feeling very fearful. Chukiat said, “My father
told me that this time the incidents are very different from what happened in the past.
From his longterm experience serving as a policeman, he thinks it will be hard to
suppress the violence.”
Chukiat decided to move to Hat Yai, partly in order to move upwards in his
career, but largely because of the violence. His parents decided to go with him.

Evaluating the experience of migration
The experience of migration
In some of these cases, the migrants planned to move temporarily and later
return to their place of origin,16 while in others the intention was to make a permanent
move. Chae-useng and Somjai intended to make only temporary moves.
Chae-useng’s family planned a temporary move. He moved to Hat Yai first, andthen his wife followed after the violence got worse. His wife also explained, “We
think we will be here for a while, maybe five years or more. We will work and if wemanage to make a saving then we will return to Pattani.… We can make some savings
here because the economy is better than where we were. But I don’t think we will behere permanently because there’s no other place like home.”
Somjai sent her son to Hat Yai first, and then followed him. She also planned toreturn to Pattani but was constantly deterred by the continuing violence. Her return
trips to the three provinces reinforced this fear. She determined to return only if her
mother-in-law died and she inherited the family property. Even though it would be
dangerous, she felt a duty to reclaim the property for the sake of her children. Sheeven thought of buying more farming land there. She explained that she missed herhusband and their past together. She said, “I think of the trees we planted together.”
She added that she wanted the children to know their father’s relatives, and so she had
to go back.
All the other cases intended to make a permanent move.
Somphong and his family moved altogether to Hat Yai in May 2005. Somphongsaid, “Our move is permanent…. I don’t believe the problems will be solved in thenear future. The person able to solve it will have to be a well-respected national figure
able to command acceptance from all sides involved.” He sold his house in
Narathiwat and intended to stay in Hat Yai because both the business prospects andthe schooling were better.
Piyamon had moved her house registration to Hat Yai. Only her motherremained in Pattani to look after the grandparents who did not want to move. The
family had no plan to return to Pattani because they could not foresee any end to theviolence.
Somruedi admitted that she was more at home in Yala than in Hat Yai, but
insisted her move was permanent. She said, “The violence this time is worse than any
in the past. I asked my Muslim friend in the factory if it would be contained but the
reply was that it wouldn’t be easy.”
Abdulloh and his wife aimed to move permanently. He had bought a piece ofland and built a house in Hat Yai. “Hat Yai offers better business opportunities thanany other province in the southern border area. I have not completely ruled out the
chance of going back into the tour operating business and am now looking for a way
to do it here. My wife also wants to find work here so I decided to buy the land andbuild the house.” His children had not yet joined them. Abdulloh said, “I will have to 172 leave them with their grandparents for a while. The grandparents are lonely. If we takethe children away with us, it would affect them a lot.... But I think we’ll move themhere to live together one day.”
Chukiat had also built a house in Hat Yai. “After talking to my father I started
the process of transferring myself back to Hat Yai, to the same post I used to work in.
Once back in Hat Yai I bought the house because I decided I intend to live here now.”
His family will gradually follow him. Chukiat said, “I don’t think I will go back andlive there again. My parents will follow me in the next five to six months. They havebought a second-hand house which is under repair. Once that is finished, they will
move.” His wife and son remain in Yala, but he aimed to move them to Hat Yai
eventually because of concern over their safety.
The effect on daily life
Somphong’s family had adapted well to the new environment, “Hat Yai is abusiness centre for the south and it’s a big town so life here is always more of a rush
than what we had in Narathiwat. But after being here for a while members of thefamily were able to adjust to it.”Piyamon was already accustomed to Hat Yai from short sojourns during her
student days. But she found it difficult living on her own and having to look after
everything herself. “At first I missed home quite a lot but that was not much of aproblem. The bigger problem came from the school. As I was new, other students
didn’t pay much attention to me and most of them were not very interested instudying so I ended up having only a few friends who are newcomers as well. We
grouped together. Some of them came from Su-ngai Kolok. Now everything is fine.”
The teaching at Hat Yai Wittayalai School however took some getting used to. “I feelthat the teachers here do it in a different ways than at Decha School. They go througheverything so quickly as if the students already knew it all or the students would haveextra tuition on top of what they teach anyway. The teachers at Decha School
explained everything so thoroughly.”
Chukiat felt his life had been greatly affected. “First, my spending has increased
because I now live in two houses. Second, I have to be far from my wife and mychildren. My family is a big one. My house and those of my parents and otherrelatives are close to each other so we usually did things together. Getting together
and chatting at my parents’ house after dinner has now gone. I meet them only twodays in a week.”
Chae-useng also felt greatly affected by the move. “When I first arrived, Irented a house in Khuanlang, an area packed with Buddhists. When I learned that myfamily was coming to live with me I decided to find a new place among Muslims. It
feels much better.”
Abdulloh felt less affected. “My wife and I do not feel that we have to adjust alot. We lived in Su-ngai Kolok, a big town itself and my wife has the experience ofliving in Bangkok. Living here is not so much different from those places.”
Somruedi said everyone in her family had to adapt to the new life in Hat Yai,especially to the higher cost of living. Her husband felt that life in Hat Yai was chaotic.
He could no longer forage for food like vegetables. Somruedi was disorientated by thescale of Hat Yai. “I can’t find my way even with my motorcycle. The roads are
confusing unlike those in Yala where I could drive even with my eyes closed.” Thechildren had to look after themselves more since both parents left the home early forwork.

 173 

Adapting to a new environment
Chukiat found it easy to adjust to a new environment. “I don’t think I need toadapt much to Hat Yai. I actually am quite accustomed to Songkhla. My mother hasquite a number of relatives living here. Also, I don’t think we need to adapt much forother things such as language because it’s the same as we use.” When asked if theneighbors knew if he had moved from the three provinces, he said, “I’m not sure but I
think some of them may know. I myself am not home that much. I have to work andwhen at home I take a rest. On the weekends I return to Yala so I haven’t met a lot of
people. But I chat with them.”
Somphong met a warm welcome in Hat Yai. “When I first moved to this area,
things were just normal. They all knew we came from Narathiwat. The neighbors
came and talked to us. They asked about the situation, some gave us things such as
food.”
Abdulloh and his wife initially rented an apartment and had little contact withneighbors. After they built a house in a village with a rural atmosphere, they had morecontact and found no difficulty over differences of language and culture. Abdulloh
said, “My wife and I have no problem on this issue. I myself speak the southerndialect. That even makes things easier.”
Chae-useng and his family had more difficulty as they moved into a Muslim
community that used southern dialect. His children had to adapt at school, but his wife
had earlier worked in several places and found it easy to adjust.
Somjai moved back to her old home areas. As it was in a rural area, news
traveled fast. Many people came to express their sympathy and enquire how she andher children were coping.
Somruedi and her husband worked all day and had little contact with neighbors.
Most of their social contacts were with her sister’s family over the weekends.
The impact on career and life prospects
Chukiat felt the move might benefit his career as a civil servant. “I feel that it
won’t affect my career, but might make it better for me in a way. Here I can work
closely with my supervisors which might result in me getting promotion.” He also felt
much safer on the job than when he had been traveling in the southernmost provinces.
“Working here, I don’t feel I have to be on the watch all the time like when I was inthose areas. I think it make such a lot of difference. Living there, whenever I was out
to work, I prayed for safety.” The move also pleased his parents, for whom he was the
only child. “My parents were very happy that I moved back to this place (Hat Yai).
They said they now don’t have to worry all the time what will happen to me when I
go to work.”
Somphong had also prospered. His direct-selling business did well in Hat Yai
because the market was larger, and his wife had opened a beauty salon in part of theirhouse. For his wife, moving out of the violence zone has given her a better state ofmind. She also was able to charge well in the beauty salon because people in Hat Yai
had higher purchasing power.
For Piyamon, moving to Hat Yai gave her a better chance in term of extra
education. Besides the school, there were many places offering extra tuition for thosepursuing university entrance. Piyamon availed herself of this evening tuition on adaily basis.
Abdulloh had had to abandon his tour business and get by selling food outside a
local restaurant. “When I came here at first I was on my motorcycle looking for some 174 location for some sort of business. I found this place, I came in and had tea and asked
them if anyone sold any food there in the mornings. The restaurant itself opens fromevening till late into the night. They said no and so I asked if I could do it. They
rented me the space to sell food in the mornings…. When I lived in Su-ngai Kolok, I
made around 100,000 to 150,000 baht from each tour trip. I could make enoughmoney for the whole year from a month’s work. Many Malaysian tourists visited
between December and April. But after coming here I have to sell food. I have to do
everything myself and do it every day too. Of course there’s no way to compare themoney that I make here to the old business, and it’s very tiring. But I have to hang in
there, buying time, and wait for a better opportunity when I get to know more people.
Then I will go back to the tour business.” Abdulloh was happy to be living with hiswife. He knew he might earn more in the tourism business if he settled in Phuket, but
he preferred Hat Yai. “First, Hat Yai is close to our home so we can visit our children
anytime we want. Second, most of my former customers were Malaysians. Phuket is a
destination for westerners. I would be at a disadvantage over language.”
Chae-useng still works as a construction supervisor as he did in Pattani. Apartfrom overseeing and supervising the construction work, he now subcontracted someworks from the employer which meant that he now earned more. But his wife had
been affected. “When I first arrived I went to work for my husband as a construction
worker. But then I had to take the children to schools and they are quite far away solater I could not work anymore.” She earned a little from subcontract work, but over
all their earnings had been affected. Chae-useng had been faced with a new problem:“When my wife and I went to work, some of my colleagues who might have been
jealous of me went around with the story that I was a militant and that I had had toflee to Hat Yai. He himself is a Muslim. He went around telling people I was a
militant. He also told the boss. But I will bear it.” Still the couple were optimistic thatthe move had increased their opportunities. Their children benefited from undisrupted
education, and the parents looked forward to relying on them once they had grown up.
Somruedi and her husband had been nervous about moving because they had noexperience at any work other than a rubber factory. Both initially found work as
construction laborers, but she found it too tough and switched to a job as a cleaner in acanteen. In general, she was optimistic over the move. “I feel safer and I don’t feelthat tense about the situation. But I think, for me, the most important thing is mychildren’s education. I am poor. I cannot support them in higher education on myown.”
Somjai received job training from a queen’s project to help victims of theviolence. She had begun to get over her the shock of her husband’s death, and felt
optimistic about living a more normal life in Hat Yai. Her two sons enjoyed thefreedom of moving around easily and playing with friends. They had brightened up
considerably, but still became depressed when viewing news of the violence on
television.
Opportunities lostMoving to Hat Yai, although beneficial to the migrants in many ways, may also
take away opportunities.
Somruedi felt she had lost the chance to live a simple lifestyle. Moreover, both
she and her husband had to change to an unfamiliar occupation and work harder than
before to earn a living.
Somphong felt he had lost the chance to be close to relatives who were still
living in Narathiwat, but treated this with equanimity. “I don’t think the problem is 175 that big because we can still call them on the telephone, and if I want to see myparents it is only a half day trip.”
Chae-useng also lost the opportunity to be close to relatives living in Pattani.
His wife said, “Here I have to spend more time taking care of the children myself
because we have no one who we can trust to leave the children with. In Pattani, I wentout to sell in the evenings, but here I cannot.”Chukiat missed his young children. “We are worried about them and the factthat they will not be able to have a proper education. They also won’t be able to leave
the house, especially after dark. However, here there would be no one to take care ofthem while I’m at work.” Chukiat also faced the extra costs of running a second home,
and traveling back to Yala at the weekends.
Somjai regretted the deterioration in the relationship with her mother-in-law
over the family property, but was determined to maintain her claims for the sake ofher children.
Abdulloh regretted losing a close relationship with his two children who wereleft under the care of his wife’s parents. He and his wife worried about them whenever
there were reports of violence in Su-ngai Kolok.
Piyamon had lost the warmth of living with her parents. Her father visited every
weekend to soothe her loneliness, and she visited other relatives who lived in andaround Hat Yai.
In sum, though each case is different, there were some general trends. Most of
the migrants aimed to stay permanently in Hat Yai. For most, the move was notdifficult because the distance and the cultural distance were not great. Generally theyreceived a warm welcome in their new environment, though there were cases of
suspicion because they came from the three provinces. Generally speaking, mostmigrants found better opportunities in their work, business, or education and were
optimistic of their future prospects, but there was a significant minority who faceddifficulty because of their lack of appropriate skills and experience. Almost all ofthem felt they had lost some warmth and intimacy by the rupture of family and kin
ties.

Conclusion
Violence in the three provinces resulted in deep distrust between the people andthe government, and between the Buddhists and the majority Muslims in the area. It
undermined people’s confidence in the state’s ability to protect their lives and property.
The Thaksin Shinawatra government tried to suppress the violence using primarily
military rather than political measures, and the militants were able to exploit theopportunities thus created. Officials’ abuse of human rights such as kidnapping,murder, and intimidation helped the militants to rally people to support their cause
and to resist the state in any form possible.
In this situation, a number of people came to believe that violence is the best
weapon to counter the state. Meanwhile, the government is trapped into a situation
where violence breeds violence. The more force the state employs, the more violence
it provokes in response. It is not surprising, therefore, that violence is now spreadingout of control in the three provinces. Ultimately, this violence has driven some people
out of the area. Hat Yai has become a destination for several victims of the violence.
Hat Yai is a center of business, tourism, and education for the lower south
region. Once the violence began in the three provinces, Hat Yai was a natural
 176 destination for migrants. Hat Yai also is a multicultural society where people ofdifferent races, languages, and beliefs co-exist, while retaining their own identity.
Good relations have been maintained between different groups of people.
According to this study, migrants choose Hat Yai as their destination for several
reasons. First, it is close by, and the cost of travel is low. Second, it is an expanding
commercial center and thus offers good opportunities for making a living. Third, it
has good educational institutions where children can study without fear of danger.
Fourth, several of the subjects of this study had some personal connections in Hat
Yai—either through relatives or having spent sometime there as a student. Others
could get to know the place from friends or relatives who had experience of living
there.
The violence since early 2004 has a different pattern from the past. Chaiwat
Satha-Anand believes there are efforts to expand a conflict between state and people
to a conflict among the people themselves.17 Examples of such efforts are attacks onmonks in Yala and Pattani, attempted arson of a wat in Pattani, and the arson of a
Buddhist settlement in Pattani.
The targeting of attacks has changed. Previously, the targets were mainly
government officials such as soldiers, police, and teachers. This has expanded toinclude other government employees, and also others who “assist the state.” Only the
public healthcare workers such as doctors and nurses are excluded. Besides, theattacks have become less discriminating, more random. Even infants may fall victim.
Tactics such as hiding bombs in public places have been borrowed from international
terrorism in order to shake people’s confidence in their security on a daily basis.
Ordinary people have fallen victim to the violence.
Many Buddhist residents of the area feel terrorized. As they no longer feelsecure about life and property, some have resolved to move away.
In the past, relations between Buddhists and Muslims were generally cordial.
Though sometimes relations might become more strained, the strain was never too
severe. As Rattiya Saleh argued, the two groups used to perceive themselves as
products of the same society and the same Malay ethnicity, with religion as the only
difference between them, and hence the conflict was not too difficult to deal withthrough negotiation and compromise. Both sides understood and respected the other’scustoms, culture, and religious belief. 18
Has the eruption of violence since early 2004 disrupted this close relationship,
destroyed the sense of commonality, and made the Buddhists into “others” in the eyesof the Muslims, and vice versa? The attempts to incite religious conflict between thecommunities are unprecedented. Migration is one response to the rupture of therelationship. The community is no longer able to take care of all its members as it
once did.
Endnotes
1

Abdulrauman Abdulsamad, the former president of the Narathiwat Islamic Committee,
quoted in, Sisomphop Jitpiromsri, ‘Nueng pi nueng sattawat khwam runraeng chai daen pak tai:pritsana khong phanha lae tang ok’ (One year one decade of violence in the three southern
provinces: the riddle of the problem and the solution), Journal of Political Science 26, 1 (2005), p
89. (in Thai)
2
Sisomphop estimated there was an average of 65.6 incidents a year over 1997–2004, but thismultiplied 19 times to 1,843 in 2004. And in 2004–5, according to the National Reconciliation

 177 Commission, there were 3,546 incidents, resulting in 1,175 deaths and 1,765 injuries. See
Sisomphop, ‘Nueng pi nueng sattawat,’ p. 83; National Reconciliation Commission, Ao chanakhwam runraeng duai khwam samannachan (Overcoming violence with reconciliation) (Bangkok:
National Reconciliation Commission, 2006).
3
According to Prapan Musikapan, GDP growth in the three provinces that had averaged
around 5.8 to 5.9 per cent fell to 1.4 per cent in 2004. According to Rauseeda Raden-ahmad, theprimary sector of agriculture and fisheries was worst hit, followed by hotels (i.e., tourism),
property and construction, and services. See Midnight University ‘Sethasat kan mueang kap samchangwat chaidaen pak tai’ (Political economy and the three southern provinces), at
http://midnightuniv.org/midnight2545/do cu ment95 0 72.html.
4
A. V. Lawson, ‘Arguments within geographies of movement: the theoretical potential of
migrants’ stories,’ Progress in Human Geography 24, 2 (2000); Helen J. Streubert and Dona R.
Carpenter, Qualitative research in nursing: advancing the humanistic imperative (Philadelphia:
Lippincott Williams and Wilkins, 1995), pp. 88–124; Phonsak Pongpaeo, Kan wichai choeng
khunaphap, naeo tritsadi lae kunnalaksana (Qualitative research, theories and characteritics),(Bangkok: Piyasan Printing, 1987), p. 15.
5
I contacted Hat Yai Wittayalai School, Hat Yai Somboon Kulkallya School, the Hat Yai Land
Registration Office, and local community leaders in order to locate respondents.
6
I started by introducing myself to the migrants, telling them the purpose of the research andasked for cooperation for information. I informed them about the length of the interview and asked
their permission to use a tape recorder and to take notes. Once the migrants agreed to give theinformation, I then told them that during the interview, they could tell me if they felt they were notready to give information and then cancel the interview. I also told them that the information given
would be kept confidential and used only for academic purposes. If I needed to refer to themigrants, I would use false names.
7
See Suwani Surasi-engsang, et al, ‘“Phaenti” phaenti kon koet dai yai thin lae chep buai nai
sam changwat chaidaen pak tai (Mapping of birth, death, migration, and sickness in the threesouthern border provinces) (Bangkok: Institute of Population Studies, Chulalongkorn University
for the National Reconciliation Commission, 2006).
8
Interviewed 12 January 2006.
9
In every province, the district containing the provincial capital is called the Mueang district.
10
Interviewed 25 March 2006.
11
Interviewed 22 February 2006.
12
Interviewed 2 April 2006.
13
Interviewed 7 March 2006.
14
Interviewed 10 March 2006.
15
Interviewed 5 May 2006.
16
J. Bale, and D. Smith, Population movement and the Third World, (New York: Routledge,1993), p. 89.
17
See Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘Prachathiphathai amnatniyom phon kan chai khwam runraeng
nai sam changwat chaidaen pak tai,’ (Fostering violence in Southern Border Provinces of Thailand
Authoritarian Democracy) in Uthai Dulyakasem et al., Khwam ru kap kan kaekhai khwam
khatyaeng korani wikrit kan chaidaen tai (Knowledge and the solution to the crisis on thesouthern border) (Bangkok: Edison Press Products, 2005).
18
Rattiya Saleh, Kan pathisamphan rawang sasanik thi prakot nai changwat pattani yala lae
narathiwat (Relations between religious groups in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) (Bangkok,
Thailand Research Fund, 1997), pp. 123–84 .

 178 8
The USA, the war on terror, and the violence insouthernmost Thailand
Matthew Wheeler

In November, 2005, a young American journalist in Pattani interviewed the
Chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission, former prime minister Anand
Panyarachun. When the journalist asked what role the U.S. might play in bringing
about a solution to the unrest in the southernmost provinces, the statesman said, “Tellthem to stay the hell out of here.” 1 Anand’s emphatic command encapsulates aparticular but not uncommon perception within Thailand that the U.S. is unable toplay a constructive role in attenuating the violence in the Malay Muslim-majority
provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala. There are a variety of reasons for holding
such a view, from suspicion of U.S. intentions to a recognition that more harm than
good would likely result from a direct U.S. role. Indeed, suspicion of U.S. policies
and intentions with respect to the conflict in southern Thailand are prevalent amongsome Thais, including elites and Malay Muslims. An extreme view is that the U.S.,and specifically the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is fomenting the violence inorder to advance U.S. interests by expanding a market for arms sales or as a pretext
for military intervention.2 A related, and probably more common, view is that the U.S.
has encouraged or directed the Thai government’s hard-line approach to security inthe south as a complement to its own “Global War on Terror,” or “GWOT” as it was
known in Washington, D.C.3
In the case of the southern Thailand conflict, however, the Americans do notneed to be told to stay out. The U.S. position4 on the conflict has been characterized
above all by caution and circumspection. Although the U.S. is concerned about theconflict, there is neither rationale nor appetite among U.S. policymakers for directintervention in southernmost Thailand. U.S. officials maintain that the problem isdomestic and they refuse to conflate violence by Muslim separatists with the global“jihadist” insurgency championed by al-Qaeda and like-minded terrorist groups
against which the U.S. claims to be waging a global war. However, the U.S. isconcerned that the conflict in southernmost Thailand may present an opportunity forthe spread of extremist ideology and active intervention by international terroristgroups. Moreover, U.S. officials are cognizant that in the highly charged environmentof a “Global War on Terror” U.S. statements and actions may be misconstrued in waysthat harm U.S. and allied interests. Indeed, this concern about misperception appears
to be a key reason that the U.S. has adopted a cautious, even fastidious, approach tothe issue of violence in southernmost Thailand.
This paper examines the U.S. position on the conflict in southernmost Thailand
in the context of the War on Terror, beginning with a consideration of perceptions of
the U.S. in Thailand. The paper then briefly reviews Thailand’s role in the U.S.-led
War on Terror, which appears to be the major factor influencing perceptions of the
U.S. in the southernmost provinces. I describe the U.S. position with respect to theconflict by examining statements of U.S. officials, analysts, and observers and U.S.

 179 programs that have a bearing on the South. Finally, I examine how the U.S. approach
to southernmost Thailand comports with prevailing analyses of the terrorist threat inSoutheast Asia that advance a discourse of “radicalization.” I maintain that the U.S.
approach to the conflict is consistent with the logic of these analyses, even as the
Global War on Terror produces conditions in which radicalization may take place.

The problem of perceptions
How prevalent are negative perceptions of the U.S. position on the south? This
researcher is not aware of any survey research of Thai Muslim attitudes toward the
U.S., but anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that suspicion is widespread,particularly in the southernmost provinces. Certainly, large numbers of Muslims haveprotested against U.S. policies, particularly the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.5 As
the U.S. prepared to invade Iraq in the spring of 2003, the Islamic Committees of thefive southernmost provinces urged that parliament append the words “terrorist state”
to all references to the U.S. 6 In 2004, as the violence in southernmost Thailand
reached unprecedented levels, Narathiwat senator Fadruddin Boto explained that,“Local people believe the CIA has played a role in what’s happening here.”7 In an
article about some of the Muslim attackers killed on 28 April 2004, Alan Sipress
wrote that, “militancy has been shaped and sharpened by what [local people] call
oppressive U.S. policies in Iraq and elsewhere.”8 A villager interviewed by Sipress
observed, “Some people in the village say the way the Thai government treats
Muslims is the same way Americans treat Muslims.” According to Ahmad Somboon
Bualang, a retired lecturer at Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani (PSU-Pattani),“Whatever way people in Afghanistan or Iraq or Palestine have been treated, it is thesame way people here have been treated.… The extent may be different, but it has
become symbolic of the same kind of treatment. The point is injustice.”9 My own
experience in speaking to people in Pattani province indicates that some perceive
covert U.S. involvement in the south as fact.10
Survey research by the U.S. government indicates that comfortable majorities ofurban Thais have a generally favorable view of the U.S., which they see as a valuable
partner in maintaining Thailand’s security.11 However, as Anand’s comment to theAmerican journalist indicates, suspicion of the U.S. does circulate among the
educated, governing elite in Bangkok. In April 2005, following three bombings in
Songkhla province, including a fatal attack at Hat Yai airport, Matichon newspaper
cited Bangkok senator Sophon Supapong to the effect that the U.S. may have been
behind the attacks. The article also quotes Democrat party-list MP and former PSUPattani academic Perayot Rahimulla suggesting that the interest evinced by U.S.
graduate students and diplomats in the southern conflict lends credence to Sophon’s
hypothesis. According to Perayot, the steady stream of U.S. Ph.D. students to Pattani
and the presence of U.S. diplomats at a joint session of Parliament to discuss theconflict—when no other foreign diplomats showed up—are “reason enough to suspectthat the CIA may be involved in the turmoil in the south.”12
Why would efforts by American scholars and diplomats to understand thesouthern conflict excite the suspicion of Thai academics and politicians? It is tempting
to dismiss suspicion of covert U.S. involvement in the south as a conspiracy theory.
One might add, moreover, that by projecting responsibility for the violence onto a
powerful foreign entity, one runs the risk of encouraging complacency by obviating
the need to come to grips with the conflict’s complex domestic causes.
On the other hand, such perceptions do not emerge from the ether. In order to 180 

understand the context in which the U.S. approaches the conflict in southernmost
Thailand, it is useful to acknowledge some factors that may contribute to negative
Thai perceptions of U.S. actions and intentions. The reasons are manifold andcomplicated, but three factors are key: anti-Americanism, the history of USintervention in the region, and the unprecedented circumstances of the Global War on
Terror.
First, and most broadly, perceptions that the U.S. is meddling in the south likely
constitute a subset of views of the U.S.—not confined to Thailand or Southeast
Asia—as an arrogant superpower, able and determined to control events in all cornersof the globe. Resentment of the world’s sole superpower spurs opposition not only to
specific policies but to U.S. culture and values, which, by virtue of the preponderanceof U.S. economic power, are extensively reproduced and propagated in the process ofglobalization. 13 A study of U.S. public diplomacy after September 11 found that,“stereotypes of Americans as arrogant, self-indulgent, hypocritical, inattentive andunwilling or unable to engage in cross-cultural dialogue are pervasive and deeply
rooted.”14
Second, the history of U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia, particularly during
the Second Indochina War, and the extensive U.S. military presence in Thailand
during the 1960s and 1970s have also conditioned Thai perceptions of U.S. foreign
policy and the U.S. role in Thailand. It is worth remembering that revelations of CIA
meddling in Thailand’s domestic affairs sparked the first major protest against the
U.S., on 4 July 1974.15 More recently, perceptions that the U.S. was responsible forthe harsh conditions of the International Monetary Fund bailout following the 1997
financial crisis stoked anti-American feeling. This resentment against the U.S. served
as a “subliminal source” of opposition to Thai participation in the war on terror.16
Above all, however, it is the war on terror that now shapes how the U.S. isperceived abroad. More specifically, the implementation of the Bush Doctrine, which
maintains that the U.S. has the means and duty to “spread freedom” by maintaining“strength beyond challenge,” acting alone and using force in preventive wars if
necessary, has caused apprehension even among U.S. allies. The rhetoric of “aconflict between good and evil” waged with the goal of “ending tyranny in our world”
indicates an unsettlingly open-ended war.17 However, failure to bring security to Iraq
and revelations of detainee abuse, torture, secret prisons, and atrocities committed by
U.S. troops have undermined the credibility of U.S. claims that it acts in the name ofpeace, freedom, and human dignity. Unsurprisingly, U.S. policies in the Middle East
have led to an increase in anti-American sentiment. Andrew Kohut of the Pew
Research Center noted that after the invasion of Iraq, “the opinion many Muslims
have of the United States has gone beyond mere loathing.”18 The most recent Pew
survey shows, “the Iraq war continues to exact a toll on America’s overall image andon support for the struggle against terrorism. Majorities in 10 of 14 foreign countries
surveyed say that the war in Iraq has made the world a more dangerous place.”19
Meanwhile, as the Bush Doctrine has faltered in the face of “an international
environment… unresponsive to the instruments of national power,”20 Washington’s
purported values and ideology are “being dragged under international scrutiny, to its
detriment.”21This broader context is important in understanding why the U.S. approach toconflict in southern Thailand is cautious and circumspect. I wish to emphasize therelationship between the U.S. position vis-à-vis southern Thailand and Thai
perceptions of U.S. policy more generally. Although the U.S., particularly under the
Bush administration, has acquired a reputation for acting unilaterally, U.S. policies in 181 Southeast Asia are shaped in part by concern for how they will be perceived byparticular audiences. This is not to say that Thai perceptions of the U.S. somehow
determine the U.S. position. It must be said plainly that the U.S. position on southern
Thailand is determined by policymakers based on analysis of U.S. interests. In thiscase, the U.S. recognizes that its interests would not be served by a direct role insouthernmost Thailand. The well-founded concern that U.S. statements or actions will
be misperceived is an important factor shaping the U.S. position vis-à-vis the conflictin southernmost Thailand.

Prologue to insurgency: Thailand, the war on terror, and the far south
June 2003 represented a turning point for Thailand with respect to the U.S.-led
Global War on Terror. After almost two years of balancing quiet cooperation with
Washington and strident denials that Thailand faced a terrorism problem, prime
minister Thaksin Shinawatra shed his ambiguous stance. This shift was symbolized by
the arrest in Narathiwat province of three alleged members of the Indonesian-based
terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), just hours before Thaksin met with
President George Bush in the White House. Police accused the suspects—Maisuri
Haji Abdulloh, the owner of an Islamic school; his son Muyahi; and Dr. Waemahadi
Wae-dao, a physician, philanthropist and community leader—of plotting to bomb
Western embassies in Bangkok, as well as the tourist destinations of Pattaya andPhuket.22
The suspects were Malay Muslims, all respected members of their community.
Local people met the arrests with skepticism and anger. To many observers, the timing
suggested that the arrests were orchestrated to please Washington. In spite of initialreports that the suspects had confessed to the bomb plots, their lawyer, Somchai
Neelapaichit, declared that his clients had not confessed and were innocent. 23
Suspicion about the alleged “JI” arrests intensified with Somchai’s abduction andpresumed murder in March 2004,24 and was vindicated on 1 June 2005, when thesuspects were acquitted of all charges.25 In June 2003, however, the revelation that
Thai “JI members” in southern Thailand were actively plotting attacks against
Western targets signified a striking turnaround in Thaksin’s approach to the war on
terror. The “JI” arrests represent an intersection of Thai–U.S. bilateral relations, thewar on terror, and the Muslim south.
Days after the September 11 attacks, President Bush challenged the world tochoose between the U.S. and its enemies, declaring that “Every nation, in every
region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with theterrorists.”26 This was a choice that Thaksin preferred not to make in a public fashion.
Vocal support for the world’s lone superpower was problematic for Thaksin, who had
come to office on a wave of nationalist sentiment in the wake of the economic crisis.
Thaksin was also constrained by concern about the sentiment of Thai Muslims, who
overwhelmingly opposed the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. Moreover, Thaksin may
have been concerned that overt support for the U.S. might mark Thailand as a target
for al-Qaeda or other anti-U.S. terrorist organizations. Indeed, Thaksin’s initial
reaction to the looming U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was to proclaim that Thailand
would be “strictly neutral” in any conflict. 27 However, given the long-standing
security relationship and formal alliance between Thailand and the U.S., Thaksin did
cooperate with the U.S., granting over-flight rights and access to U-Tapao airbase anddeploying a contingent of army engineers to Afghanistan. Indeed, U.S. officials
praised Thailand’s cooperation. Thaksin nonetheless preferred low-key collaboration.
 182 In addition to this overt but quiet support to the U.S., The New York Times
reported in March 2003 that Thailand had agreed to allow the U.S. to hold al-Qaeda
suspects at an airbase in Thailand. According to the initial report, which cited
anonymous American officials, the installation was run by the CIA. 28 Subsequent
reports, based on information from “retired American intelligence officials,” indicatedthat the al-Qaeda prisoners may have been held at U-Tapao airbase.29 A later article
indicated that Thailand had been one of eight countries in which the CIA operated
secret prisons, or so-called “black sites,” where al-Qaeda suspects have been detained.
According to the Washington Post, an agreement for such a facility had been workedout between the U.S. and Thailand in mid 2002. Following the initial New York Times
article, Thai authorities reportedly insisted that the site be shut down and its two
inmates were transferred out of Thailand. 30 Thai and U.S. officials denied theexistence of any CIA detention facility in Thailand.31
Thaksin’s ambivalence in supporting the GWOT persisted through the run up to
the invasion of Iraq. Following the first Bali bombings in October 2002, Thaksin
strongly criticized the media for reporting on the alleged presence of international
terrorists in Thailand, and railed against Western governments for issuing travel
warnings based on the threat of terrorism. While Washington led the War on Terror,
Thaksin began 2003 by declaring a War on Drugs.32 As the U.S. prepared to invade
Iraq in early 2003, the Thai government reportedly insisted that Thailand be left off alist of countries supporting the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.33
This ambivalence would not have satisfied Washington; as one U.S. official inSoutheast Asia explained, “It is not enough to be with us in the war on terrorism, but
you have to trumpet it.”34 Indeed, as Thaksin prepared for a visit to Washington inJune 2003, the bilateral relationship appeared strained. Thaksin’s string of
nationalistic outbursts, including the assertion that Thailand is not a U.S. “lackey,” didnothing to foster prospects for a productive visit. 35 News reports suggested that
Thailand was among those countries slated for “punishment” by Washington for
failing to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March.36 Under these circumstances, it
was reported that Washington might not consent to a meeting between Bush andThaksin.
In the event, however, Thaksin met with President Bush at the White House on
10 June 2003. Whether by design or by coincidence, the supposed “JI” arrests
preceded Thaksin’s arrival at the White House by a matter of hours.37 The arrests werean unambiguous signal that Thaksin was at last prepared to be seen to embrace therationale of the U.S.-led “Global War on Terror.”
The arrest of the alleged “JI suspects” was only the most striking and symbolicof several measures that served to align Thailand more publicly with the U.S. and torehabilitate Thaksin in the eyes of a U.S. administration narrowly focused on fighting
a war on terror. During his 2003 visit to Washington, Thaksin reportedly signed a
Bilateral Immunity Agreement, also known as an Article 98 agreement, consenting
not to extradite U.S. citizens accused of war crimes to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) in The Hague.38 In early August 2003, Thaksin committed Thailand tosend soldiers to participate in reconstruction efforts in Iraq. 39 As Michael Connors
notes, the decision to send troops to Iraq was a reversal of Thailand’s previous
position, and “must be interpreted as a consequence of increased U.S. pressure.”40
On 14 August 2003, Thaksin issued two executive anti-terrorism decrees giving
security officials expanded authority to conduct wire-taps and detain terrorist suspects,
alarming Muslims in the south who feared that the new power would be used against
them.41 “Muslim religious teachers warned that the laws would have an adverse effect 183 on their confidence and trust in the government because they granted the authorities
wide-ranging powers to issue arrest warrants and question suspected terrorists.” 42 On
11 August 2003, Thai security forces, acting on U.S. intelligence, captured Indonesian
JI leader Riduan Isamuddin, alias Hambali, in Ayutthaya; these decrees “served as thelegal basis for placing Hambali in U.S. custody.”43 While Hambali’s capture marks the
apex of Thai-U.S. counter-terrorism cooperation to date, Thailand’s decision to hand
him to the U.S. was controversial. Hambali was allegedly planning attacks in
Thailand, so presumably should have been charged and tried in Thailand. The U.S.
claim on Hambali was “seen as an example of bullying and support of arbitrary andextra-legal means.”44
Thaksin’s public support for the war on terror appeared to pay a number ofdividends. Most immediately, Thaksin avoided immediate public reproach for the
campaign of extra-judicial killings.45 In the joint statement issued after the meeting,President Bush indicated that the U.S. would consider granting Thailand status as a
Major Non-Nato Ally (MNNA).46 Although MNNA status had little practical import
given that Thailand has been a treaty ally and close security partner for more than fifty
years, it served as an affirmation of the improved relations between the two countries
and certified that Thaksin was “with us” in the GWOT. 47 The Bush administration
also agreed to seek a free trade agreement with Thailand.
It is worth remembering that the arrest of the three alleged JI suspects came one
month after Bush, in a dramatic and elaborate photo opportunity aboard the aircraft
carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, proclaimed “mission accomplished” in Iraq. The
insurgency that would characterize the “post-combat” Iraq had not yet started inearnest. For this brief period, it appeared that the Bush Doctrine, based on a belief inthe universality of American values and the efficacy of military force, might bevalidated. Although Thaksin avowed that Thailand would remain neutral and not takepart in the war well into March 2003, the apparent U.S. victory demanded a change intone. According to Thammasat University professor Prapat Thepchatree, “Iraq showed[Thaksin] that the U.S. carried a big stick and anyone not falling into line would bepunished.… He had to do something to mend ties with the U.S.” 48 Thaksin later
admitted, “You will get no cooperation, assistance or dialogue with the US if you
refuse to talk of cooperation to suppress terrorism.”49
However, Thaksin’s embrace of the GWOT, and especially the “JI” arrests,
caused disquiet among Muslims in the south. The timing smacked of a ploy byThaksin to prove his fidelity to the U.S. anti-terrorism agenda, and the U.S. shared in
the blame. According to Fudruddin Boto, then a senator from Narathiwat, “They weresocial activists, not terrorists.… This is the government’s way of trying to please theUnited States at the expense of our peoples’ rights.” 50 Reacting to the arrests,
Abdullah Hapbru, a lecturer in Islamic studies at PSU-Pattani, said, “They (theAmericans) once told us how ugly and loathsome communists were and taught us tohate China and Russia when the communists were its main opponent. We no longer
have a threat from communists but the U.S. makes a new monster to serve its
interest.”51 According to Shawn Crispin, it was following the arrest of the alleged JI
suspects that suspicions of CIA involvement in the southern violence “took root.”52
It is worth noting that Thaksin’s turnabout on the war on terror followed his war
on drugs, which, in spite of rampant human rights abuses and disrespect for the rule oflaw, was overwhelmingly popular with Thai people.53 The drug war took a heavy toolin the southern border area, a haven for smuggling and other criminal enterprises.
According to Duncan McCargo, “the war on drugs that Thaksin declared in February
2003 gave the police carte blanche to target selected locals for extra-judicial

 184 execution.”54 McCargo writes that there were at least twenty disappearances in 2002–
3, and as many as fifty by March 2005.55 Other reports suggest as many as a hundred
Muslims disappeared in the first four months of 2004 alone, abducted by masked
gunmen. 56 The disappearance of Somchai Neelapaichit contributed to a sense of
injustice and fear among Malay Muslims, epitomizing the rise “of a moreauthoritarian tendency in Thai society, accepting violence as a dominant strategy insolving conflicts.”57
Meanwhile, the heightened level of militant violence, described by Thaksin andmembers of his cabinet as common criminality, slowly escalated during 2002 and2003.58 The raid on an army base in Cho-airong district, Narathiwat province, on 4
January 2004, marked the beginning of a heightened level of violence. According to
Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri of PSU-Pattani, from the beginning of 2004 to mid 2005,
the frequency of violent incidents in the region increased to twenty-seven times theaverage rate of the preceding decade.59
Although we cannot be certain of a correlation between the Thai government’s
belated support for the war on terror and the surge in violence in Thailand’ssouthernmost provinces, the coincidence of the two phenomena has not goneunnoticed. Chulalongkorn University’s Surat Horachaikul noted that the “special tie”
between the U.S. and Thailand in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, “help[s]explain why the Thai Muslim community feels more isolated from the center.”60 Kavi
Chongkittavorn wrote in 2004 that, “[Thaksin’s] pro-U.S. policy on terrorism
deepened suspicion among young Thai Muslims.”61 According to Wattana Sugunnasil,“The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and the continuing presence of foreign
troops in many Muslim societies have further radicalized many Muslims in Thailand
and increased their awareness of global Muslim grievances.”62
Although U.S. policies may have contributed to perceptions that the Muslim
community is threatened by the West and the U.S. there is no evidence that opposition
to the U.S. is motivating the insurgency in southernmost Thailand. Certainly, it would
be a mistake to equate opposition to U.S. policies with support for separatism or
extremist violence. However, the possibility that the dichotomous world view fosteredby the war on terror has served to alienate Malay Muslims from Bangkok cannot be
discounted. As we will see, the U.S. is worried about the prospect that foreign terrorist
organizations such as JI or al-Qaeda will exploit this alienation.
U.S. perceptions of the violence in southernmost Thailand
It is often difficult to speak in general terms about “U.S. perceptions” or “U.S.
views” of any given issue due to the variety of agencies, organizations, andindividuals that may be construed as representing the United States of America.
Moreover, the conflict in southern Thailand does not rank high on the security andforeign policy agenda in Washington, so the pool of available information is small. It
is also the case that the judgments of some analysts have changed over time, whichadds to the complexity of depicting the U.S. point of view. However, to the extent that
U.S. officials speak about and report on the situation in southernmost Thailand, thepronouncements are remarkably uniform. This uniformity allows a reasonably
accurate assessment of how the conflict in southern Thailand is perceived by U.S.
officials, policymakers, and analysts. Given the largely homogeneous perception of
the causes and nature of the conflict, prescriptions about what the U.S. should andshould not do are also broadly similar.
The basic elements of official U.S. understanding of the conflict are:

 185 xxxx

the violence is domestic in its causes and form;
the causes are historical, and relate to poor governance;
there is no significant, direct foreign involvement in the conflict;the heavy-handed response of the Thai government and human-rights
abuses risk expanding, prolonging, and intensifying the violence;x an expanded, prolonged, or intensified conflict increases the risk that
foreign terrorists organizations may become directly involved.
It is also possible to ascribe to the U.S. the view that a small minority of
extremists are to blame for most of the violence.
The U.S. approach to the conflict is guided by these perceptions. The U.S.
shares with the Thai government an appreciation of the fact that a direct U.S. role inthe southernmost provinces would be counterproductive on several levels. First, theThai government envisions no role for the U.S. or other foreign countries and thus has
not invited the U.S. to become involved.63 Second, internationalizing the conflict risks
further alienating Malay Muslims from the Thai government and encouraging support
for (or acquiescence to) the insurgents. Third, U.S. involvement would serve to
confirm popular perceptions of a conspiracy by the U.S. to foment unrest in
southernmost Thailand to serve its interests. Finally, a direct U.S. role could
encourage the active intervention of international jihadist organizations, whose role insouthern Thailand has thus far been immaterial to the course of the insurgency. 64
According to Fourth Army commander Lieutenant General Ongkorn Thongprasong,“This is an internal matter with its roots in local history,” and the involvement ofWestern countries would serve to exacerbate the conflict.65
Given the domestic nature of the conflict, the U.S. sees the problem as one thatmust be solved by the Thai government and Thai people. However, the U.S. is deeply
concerned that the violence may lead to sectarian divisions and the erosion of stateauthority, which could in turn be exploited by international terrorist groups with an
explicitly anti-Western or anti-U.S. agenda, such as JI or al-Qaeda. Therefore, the U.S.
desires an end to the violence and a swift, peaceful resolution of the conflict.
In order to substantiate this characterization of the U.S. position on the south, a
representative sample of statements on the conflict by U.S. officials and agencies
follows. The views of non-government experts and analysts are also consulted to offer
a more complete picture of prevailing U.S. perceptions.66
Domestic nature of the conflict
During a brief visit to Phuket in July 2005, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice
told reporters that the southern violence “is a domestic issue for Thailand from ourpoint of view.” She also indicated U.S support for the National Reconciliation
Commission, which she described as “a positive step” in dealing with the problem.67
U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, Ralph Boyce, stated on many occasions that theconflict in the far south is a domestic issue. Speaking to reporters after a meeting withdeputy prime minister Chidchai Wannasathit in October 2005, Boyce affirmed that the
security situation in the south is a domestic affair.68 In a televised interview conductedin Thai with Suthichai Yoon on Jeepajornlok in February 2006, Boyce said, “As far as
we know, the southern situation is a domestic issue. It is an issue that concerns Thai
history and the culture of the area. It is a problem that Thais must solve, not othercountries. We don’t see any influence from foreign terrorists.”69
The State Department’s Country reports on terrorism 2005 states, “There are no
indications that transnational terrorist groups are directly involved in the violence, and 186 

there is no current evidence of direct operational links between southern Thai
separatist groups and regional terror networks.” The report acknowledges that
although the Malay Muslim militants may share, “the basic ideology and generalrejection of Western influence held by international Islamic terrorists,” their agenda
appears to be domestic, focusing on autonomy or independence for the southernborder provinces.70
The U.S. intelligence community appears to share this view. In a 2003 briefing
to the Senate, the CIA stated, “We are uncertain whether Muslim separatist groups—
possibly with ties to international terrorists—or local criminal networks have been
responsible for the violence.”71 Director of central intelligence Porter Goss noted in2005 that, “Thailand is plagued with an increasingly volatile Muslim separatist threat
in its southeastern [sic] provinces, and the risk of escalation remains high.”72 In 2006
testimony before the Senate, director of national intelligence John Negroponte
reported that, “Thailand is searching for a formula to contain violence instigated by
ethnic-Malay Muslim separatist groups in the far southern provinces.”73
Early in 2005, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacificaffairs Marie Huhtala explained during a seminar at the Council on Foreign Relationsin Washington, D.C., that the U.S. did not see any evidence of outside involvement in
the southern Thailand conflict. In describing the causes of the violence, Huhtala cited
a combination of factors:
You have a separatist movement that has never really gone away in the hundredyears that those provinces have been annexed by Thailand. You haveextraordinarily poor governance on the part of some of the local officials here insouthern Thailand, who are almost exclusively Buddhist and from other regionsof Thailand. And you had an incident on January 4th of last year…. And thereaction of the Bangkok government to that was quite a process. And so,
unfortunately, the events snowballed during the year.74

Dr. Anthony L. Smith, a senior research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies, a U.S. Department of Defense educational institute, wrote in late2004 that the violence grows out of discontent arising from the belief that Malay
Muslim identity is under threat. Dr. Smith is a New Zealander and although his reportreflects his personal views, his argument is consonant with the statements of US
officials cited above. Smith writes:
Although there is a real danger that international terrorist groups will exploit thesituation in southern Thailand, separatism in the southern provinces rests on
different goals. For Malay speaking peoples in southern Thailand, there is astrong perception that their ethno-religious identity is under siege. Poor
administration and a host of social problems have exacerbated discontent. …
These background factors suggest that the key to stability in Thailand’s southern
provinces lies in addressing factors that contribute to social tension.75

Concern about human rights abuses
Concern about human rights is a common element of U.S. pronouncements on
the southern Thailand situation. This concern, reflected in official U.S. statements
critical of Thailand’s human rights record, is linked with the unease about the Thaigovernment approach to the violence. The heavy-handedness of the Thai security
response, especially in 2004, and the disappearance of Somchai Neelapaichit hascaused dismay among U.S. officials and observers who worry that human rights
abuses serve to exacerbate the conflict and invite the attention of foreign terrorists.
In 2005 and 2006, the State Department’s annual reports on human rights
 187 detailed abuses by security forces in southernmost Thailand, noting in particular theattack on Krue Ze Mosque in April 2004 and the deaths of seventy-eight men in army
custody following the Tak Bai protest in October 2004. In addition to official
expressions of concern by Marie T. Huhtala to Thailand’s ambassador to the UnitedStates and by Ambassador Boyce to other senior Thai officials,76 the U.S. continues tocall for appropriate legal action to punish officials responsible for those incidents.77
According to the two recent State Department human rights reports, “security forces
continued to use excessive, lethal force against criminal suspects and committed orwere connected to numerous extra-judicial, arbitrary, and unlawful killings.”78 The
report released in March 2006 observes that, “there were instances in which elementsof the security forces acted independently of government authority.” The list of humanrights violations includes unlawful killings by security force personnel and insurgents
as well as deaths in police custody; torture and excessive use of force by police;
arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without charge; and impunity for humanrights abusers.79 The latest report also notes the death of Satopa Yushoh, an imam in
Narathiwat province who was killed by unknown gunmen, and who claimed before hedied that he had been shot by soldiers.
Some expressions of concern about human rights are general, whereas others
assign responsibility to prime minister Thaksin. As deputy assistant secretary of state
Huhtala stated in February 2005, “[Thaksin] clearly doesn’t understand what he’s up
against. I think that’s the real problem.” Huhtala described Thaksin’s administrativechanges, such as dismantling the Southern Border Provinces Adminsitrative Center in2002 and the decision to place the police, rather than the army, in charge of security,
as factors that may have triggered the renewed violence. Huhtala concluded by saying,“[Thaksin is] a smart man. I think he will find his way to the answer down there. But
it is very distressing for all of us who consider ourselves friends of Thailand to see
this playing out so painfully.”80 At the same seminar, Dr. Zachary Abuza, a prominent
U.S. expert on terrorism in Southeast Asia, said, “In Thailand, you could make thecase that you do have a democracy there, but heavy-handed government response is
the reason for the unrest.”81
In November 2005, Thomas Sanderson, deputy director of the Transnational
Threats Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington,
D.C., and a consultant to the U.S. government, spoke about transnational crime andterrorism at Chulalongkorn University; the U.S. Embassy sponsored his visit. In
elaborating measures to curb support for violent extremism in the southernmost
provinces, Sanderson urged the Thai government to respect basic human rights and toaccord the Muslim community greater respect and freedom of expression. The aim, hesaid, should be to integrate Malay Muslims into the economic and social processes of
the country. According to Sanderson, those who are unable to choose their own
leaders or to speak freely are more receptive to extremist ideology.82
Human rights have been a particular concern in the U.S. Congress. Somelegislators have voiced alarm about the deteriorating human rights situation in
Thailand. Senator Russ Feingold, Democrat from Wisconsin, visited Thailand in
February 2006 and in his meetings with Thaksin and other officials, “stressed the needfor the Thai government to respect human rights and the rule of law as it addresses
unrest in the country’s southern provinces.” 83 Congressman Dennis Kucinich,
Democrat from Ohio, wrote in a 2004 letter to fellow legislators urging opposition tofree trade negotiations, that “Thailand is no longer the most democratic, open and freepartner of the United States in Southeast Asia that it once was.”84 Congress passed
authorization of free trade negotiations with Thailand by a single vote, partly as a

 188 consequence of concern about Thailand’s human rights record.85
Dana Dillon, senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative
think tank in Washington, D.C., has also voiced concern about the negative
consequences of human rights abuses. Dillon said, “It appears that the brutal treatmentof the Thai Muslims by the security forces, either through negligence or lack oftraining or some other reasons, seems to contribute to the insurgency.”86 In a brief
memo on the subject of the insurgency in Thailand, Dillon argues that if the U.S.
wants to prevent southern Thailand from becoming an international conflict, it must
confront the Thai government about abuses by its security forces:
The United States cannot stand by while heavy-handed Thai security forces
create an international terrorist problem where there was not one before. The
United States has a deep and sophisticated military-to-military relationship withThailand’s security forces, and it is time to use that leverage to bring morediscipline to the Thai military. Pentagon officials must closely review thisrelationship and convince Thailand to emphasize human rights and the rule oflaw. Furthermore, when Pentagon officials meet with their Thai counterparts, theexcessive force issue must not be ignored or glossed over but underscored as aserious national security problem for both countries. Members of Congressshould emphasize the issue with their counterparts in Parliament, and the Bush
Administration should stress human rights to Prime Minister Thaksin.87

Concern about foreign involvement and “jihadist” extremism
Although there is no evidence to suggest foreign involvement in the conflict, theprospect of involvement by outside Islamist extremists such as JI or al-Qaeda is thegreatest concern for the U.S. This concern is closely related to U.S. concern abouthuman rights issues, as further abuses are perceived as a catalyst for violent
extremism. A report by the Congressional Research Service, the public policy
research arm of the U.S. Congress, explains the consensus view:
Most analysts stress that there is no convincing evidence to date of serious JI
involvement in the attacks in the southern provinces. Many experts concur,
however, that sectarian violence involving local Muslim grievances provides aripe environment for JI to become more engaged in the struggle. Such experts
have warned that outside groups, including JI and other militant Indonesia-based
groups, may attempt to exploit public outrage with events like the [Tak Bai]
deaths to forge alliances between local separatists and regional Islamic
militants.88

As the respected terrorism analyst Sydney Jones observed in late 2004, anotherincident like that at Tak Bai would likely attract the involvement of Indonesian
militants.89
In October 2005, Ambassador Boyce remarked that, “Both Thailand and the US
have concerns that the situation will develop in such a way [i.e., influenced by foreign
terrorist organizations], but today we still see the situation as an internal problem.”90
At the Council on Foreign Relations seminar, Huhtala said that the U.S. is “watching[southern Thailand] closely, because when you have a long-simmering, violent
problem like that in a primarily Muslim area, it’s like an engraved invitation for thebad guys to come in. And we do worry about that.”91 According to Abuza, there is noevidence yet of significant involvement by JI. However, the situation is “tailor-made”
for JI, which in the past has sought out sectarian conflicts, such as those in Poso andthe Moloccas, in order to deepen the “Manichean worldview” and garner new recruits.
For Abuza, if the conflict is not resolved and the violence brought under control, JI’s

 189 

involvement is “a matter of time.”92
More recently, however, Abuza has argued that alien forms of Islamic
extremism are propelling the violence. At a seminar at the Foreign Correspondents’
Club of Thailand early in 2006, Abuza declared, “Very simply the militants are
ideologically and religiously motivated; they are trying to impose a very austere andintolerant form of Islam on their society and they countenance no opposition tothis.”93 As evidence for the proposition, Abuza noted militant demands that Muslims
refrain from working on Fridays and avoid state-run schools, and that imams refuse to
conduct funeral rites for civil servants. He also cited the increasing proportion ofMuslim victims of the violence.
A few other non-government observers offer similarly alarming assessments ofthe extent of “jihadi” influence in southernmost Thailand. Stephen Ulph, editor of theJamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Focus, sees in southernmost Thailand “an Islamist
insurgency that is about to overflow.” He cites an Associated Press interview with
Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) spokesman Lukman Lima, whoboasted of financial support for Thai militants from “Islamic sympathizers in
Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.” For Ulph, this raises the specter of “foreign mujahidintervention” and “extreme Islamist influence.” Ulph sees the increasing numbers ofMuslim victims of violence as evidence that Muslim “extremists” are retaliating
against Muslim “moderates.” Under such circumstances, there is a danger of theinsurgency, “succumbing to austere ‘Wahabi’ influences, useful in providing agroundwork for exporting jihadi culture.”94
Writing in the conservative journal The National Interest, Australian journalist
Greg Sheridan also detected the influence of international “jihadist” ideology at work.
It is the timing of the upsurge in violence in southern Thailand that is mostsuggestive of JI and Al-Qaeda influence. It coincides with an increase in Islamist
terrorist violence in other parts of Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Muslim
world. This indicates that Al-Qaeda is now as important as an ideology as it is as
an organization. As an ideology it offers disgruntled Muslim populations a prism
through which to interpret their grievances and a way to respond to them. Theinterpretive prism centers on Western and infidel imperialism and the operational
response is terrorism.95

Sheridan is more willing than most U.S. observers to ascribe the violence to theal-Qaeda ideology, but he notes, “No one thinks that the Thai terrorist and criminalgroups in the south are being directed by Al-Qaeda, or even JI.” However, concern
about such a development is universal among U.S. observers.
Concerning solutions and the appropriate U.S. role
Besides the uniformity in U.S. perceptions about the nature of the violence,
there is also general agreement about how best to deal with the conflict and theappropriate role for the U.S. Consonant with the view that human rights abuses
exacerbate the conflict and that prolonged conflict increases the odds of foreign
terrorist involvement, the U.S. supports efforts to resolve the conflict, prevent humanrights abuses, and address the grievances fueling opposition to the Thai government.
To that end, the U.S. seeks to improve Thai military and law-enforcement capabilities
and improve the quality of the judicial system through training, exchanges, and otherforms of cooperation.
The U.S. has repeatedly emphasized its support for a peaceful approach toresolving the conflict in the south, such as that embodied by the National
Reconciliation Commission. In testimony before Congress in September 2005, deputy
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assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Eric John stated that,“With respect to the situation in Southern Thailand, we continue to closely follow theviolence and other developments in that region. We are encouraged by the work of the
National Reconciliation Commission and their efforts to protect human rights.”96 The
typically anodyne joint statement issued following prime minister Thaksin’s meetingwith President Bush on 19 September 2005 notes that Thaksin briefed Bush on,“efforts to deal with the violence in southern Thailand while preserving the
democratic freedom that has made Thailand a leader in Southeast Asia.” Bush,meanwhile, commended the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission,“aimed at developing a broad-based approach to the South that combines security,
equitable development, and protection for basic rights.”97 As noted above, Secretaryof State Rice also described the National Reconciliation Commission as the best way
forward. To the extent that U.S. law-makers are aware of the problem, the NRC also
has support among legislators.98
U.S.-based analysts have emphasized that any lasting solution must address the“root causes” or grievances within the Malay Muslim community. Anthony Smith
writes that, “The key to settlement of Thailand’s upheavals in the south relies onsocial, economic, and political initiatives that tackle the immediate concerns of the
Muslim population.… Fixing the problem of southern Thailand rests in Bangkok’s
hands, and Washington should be cautious about being dragged into this conflict.”99
Aurel Croissant, assistant professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, likewise insiststhat a solution to the conflict must begin with “a broad recognition in government of
the need to address Muslim disaffection from which both radical Islam tendencies andseparatism have been drawing strength.”100
Jonathan Ross-Harrington, a private-sector anti-terrorism consultant to the U.S.
government, offered this assessment of the southern Thailand conflict:
The current situation in Thailand underscores the importance of finding…
solutions to these autonomy/identity/economic grievances.… If Thailand isserious about being a partner in the “war on terror” its first actions should not be
the repression of Malay-Muslims in the hopes of locating isolated (yetdangerous) Salafist militants that may or may not be operating in Pattani, it
should be the initiation of a peace process with those willing to seek politicalsolutions. 101

One may quibble with the notion of negotiating with an insurgent movementthat has yet to establish an overt presence, but it is worth noting that Ross-Harrington
advocates addressing the range of grievances fueling Malay Muslim alienation fromthe Thai state.
An exception to the consensus on what the U.S. should do with respect tosouthern Thailand is an article written by J. C. Lumbaca, a U.S. Army captain,
published in the newsletter of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’
Pacific Forum. Writing in his capacity as a private citizen, Lumbaca, a Special Forces
officer, argued that small numbers of U.S. Special Forces should be deployed tosouthernmost Thailand in an advisory capacity to help Thai security forces better
control the insurgency. However, even as Lumbaca advocates a direct role for U.S.
Special Forces, he insists that military force alone will not quell the violence.
Lumbaca writes, “The key to counterinsurgency is understanding the population andits motivations to either support or reject violence.” Lumbaca concludes, “In an
environment that involves an active insurgency, military initiatives are one small partin a complex interrelationship of social, political, military, and economic concernsthat must be addressed.”102

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Significantly, Lumbaca’s view on the utility of a direct role for U.S. Special
Forces has evolved. In his master’s thesis for the Naval Postgraduate School,
completed subsequent to his CSIS article, Lumbaca gives greater weight to thepossibility that the introduction of U.S. forces would be counter to U.S. interests.
Lumbaca believes strongly in the ability of U.S. Special Forces to contribute to
Thailand’s security by developing the capabilities and professionalism of the Thai
military. However, Lumbaca notes the prevalence of conspiracy theories suggestingthat “US agencies—the CIA and Special Forces, among others—are somehow
inciting the violence in order to justify bringing the War on Terror to southern
Thailand.” Recognizing that such a theory is “quite effective” for the insurgents,
Lumabaca concedes that, “If US agencies are overtly introduced to the south, suchaction reinforces the conspiracy theory.”103
Lumbaca goes on to cite personal correspondence from another Special Forces
officer, Colonel Barry Shapiro, who explains that the introduction of U.S. soldiers into
the conflict would be counter-productive given the particularity of the southern Thaisituation:[A]n effort [such as introduction of US Army Special Forces] in the Southern
three provinces is more likely to achieve the opposite effect of what [the US]
hope[s] for. The complex problems that combine to create the conditions inSouthern Thailand have been around a long time. What is new is the dimensionof globalization: the connections between a militant Muslim extremist in Pattani
and Riyadh may be debatable, but that their actions and concerns are seen andfelt by Muslims across the world in real-time is undeniable. Direct involvementof U.S. forces would only enhance the dangerously popular perception of a U.S.led war on Islam, a perception we urgently need to turn around. … I spent a year
in Afghanistan where the direct approach was and remains necessary, but thesituation in Southern Thailand is far removed from that set of circumstances.104

Lumbaca concludes that a direct role for US troops in southern Thailand is not
appropriate at this time. Lumbaca suggests programs to improve: the police force andjudicial system; intelligence; immigration and anti-money laundering laws;
transparency; human rights; regional (ASEAN) cooperation; information operations;and maritime security. This list of recommendations tracks closely with the aims ofexisting U.S. assistance to Thailand.
U.S. programs relevant to the SouthThe perceptions of the violence in southern Thailand outlined above guide theU.S. approach to the conflict. It would be an exaggeration to describe U.S. programs
that bear on the south as constituting a discrete policy. Rather, the U.S. has tailoredsome elements of existing security assistance in an effort to advance U.S. goals. The
immediate U.S. aim is to prevent the conflict from worsening. The optimum outcome
for the U.S. is a peaceful resolution to the conflict, which requires respect for humanrights, effective security forces, and a transparent judicial system. On a completely
separate track from security assistance is the U.S. public diplomacy effort. These
information programs are not specifically related to the southern conflict, but rather
aim to increase understanding among Thais of U.S. policies and culture.
The U.S. has traditionally been Thailand’s foremost security partner, withsecurity cooperation going back to 1950. The U.S. provides assistance through avariety of programs administered by the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice.
In general terms, U.S. assistance seeks to enhance interoperability between Thai and
US forces, develop Thai capabilities, and enhance U.S. access and influence in 192 

Thailand. The level of U.S. funding to Thailand has remained largely steady since2001, with declines in funding for some programs and increases for others.105
Since the escalation of the violence in the southernmost provinces in 2004, theU.S. has been concerned that its security assistance to Thailand should not be directly
associated with the conflict. The U.S. is keen to avoid the appearance of interveningor otherwise impinging on Thai sovereignty. Therefore, according to U.S. officials, all
security-assistance programs must meet the “label and location” test. That is, theprograms must not be labeled in a way that indicates a direct counter-terrorism role inthe southern conflict. Second, all training involving U.S. soldiers or law-enforcement
officers must take place outside of the southernmost provinces. U.S. security
assistance programs, such as peacekeeping, drug interdiction, crowd control, andhumanitarian assistance, emphasize capabilities that may be employed by Thai
security forces in the southernmost provinces
The conflict in the south has also influenced the content of some U.S. security
assistance by highlighting weaknesses or problems that the U.S. believes it can help toaddress. Most prominently, following the incidents at Krue Ze mosque in April 2004
and Tak Bai in October 2004, the U.S. identified human rights training as a toppriority. The U.S. has renewed emphasis on human rights training, which is acomponent of all combined training that the U.S. military conducts with Thai security
forces. In March 2006, a team from the U.S. Defense Institute of International Legal
Studies (DIILS), in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, arrived in Bangkok to
conduct a week-long seminar for fifty-two civilian and military officials on “Legal
aspects combating terrorism.” The instructors immediately recognized that the Thai
participants lacked an understanding of the concept of “Rules of Engagement,” whichgovern when and how soldiers or police may use force. According to an account in the
DIILS journal, the instructors adjusted the seminar program to address Rules ofEngagement before proceeding to the planned agenda.106 After the Tak Bai incident,
the U.S. established a course on crowd control operations, with separate components
for enlisted men, mid level officers, and senior officers. With senior officers, the U.S.
officials emphasize the potential costs associated with large-scale human rights abuses
and point to the suspension of U.S. military assistance to Indonesia as an example ofwhat can happen when foreign security forces run afoul of the U.S. Congress. 107
According to one U.S. official, “We try to emphasize that extra-judicial killings havethe potential to jeopardize the whole [security] relationship, to everyone’s
detriment.”108
Another area that the U.S. has targeted for assistance is forensic investigation
capabilities and judicial transparency. As a State Department counter-terrorism reportnotes, “Police forensics and ballistics work often failed to produce evidence that led toarrests following insurgent attacks, and government prosecutors struggled to develop
cases that could stand up in court.”109 The International Law Enforcement Academy(ILEA) in Bangkok aims to develop skills relevant to these needs. Established in 1998,
ILEA is a U.S.-funded regional training center for police, immigration, customs, andother law enforcement officials that aims to build regional capacity to deal withtransnational criminal threats. All ILEA courses “address support for democratic
institutions, the importance of impartiality and integrity in criminal law enforcement,
and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 110 Funds from theState Department’s Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism and Related Programs, “will be
used to familiarize senior police officials with modern investigative and interdiction
methodologies aimed at terrorist organizational structures, as well as the flow ofterrorist financing and information transfer,” and to establish a “modest program to 193 fight corruption in the criminal justice system in order to enhance judicial ethics.” 111
The State Department is also emphasizing “basic law enforcement training” in severalof its counter-narcotics training events in Thailand, while “additional crime-fighting
skills and forensic training programs will be developed for Thai participants inrecognition of the new law enforcement challenges faced by Thailand.”112
Intelligence cooperation is another element of the Thai-U.S. security
relationship, though little credible or authoritative information is available. Media
attention has focused on the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center, or CTIC, a U.S.funded joint operations center established in early 2001.113 The Thailand CTIC is oneof about two dozen such centers around the world and brings together U.S.
intelligence officers with Thai police, military, and National Intelligence Agency
officials. The U.S. rationale for CTIC is to encourage cooperation and information
sharing among Thailand’s rivalry-prone intelligence agencies while providing aplatform to gather intelligence about international terrorist activities in the region.
According to the Washington Post reporter Dana Priest, CTICs are unrelated to thealleged CIA network of secret prisons: “The CTICs, by contrast, are an expansion of
the hidden intelligence cooperation that has been a staple of foreign policy for
decades.” 114 CTIC was instrumental in the capture of Hambali in 2003. Journalist
Shawn Crispin maintains that the CTIC shifted its attention to southernmost Thailand
following the 4 January 2004 raid; citing an anonymous Thai intelligence official, he
writes, “‘The U.S. is monitoring Thai Muslims and helping us X-ray who is who,’ thatis, sorting common criminals from ‘ideologically driven terrorists.’”115
U.S. public diplomacy efforts also bear on southernmost Thailand. Public
diplomacy refers to programs that aim to, “understand, inform, engage, and influence
the attitudes and behavior of global audiences in ways that support the United States’
strategic interests.”116 After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. recognized the need to
improve its public diplomacy in the Muslim world and stepped up its efforts tocommunicate with Muslim audiences, including those in Thailand. Particularly after
the U.S. Consulate in Songkhla was closed in 1993 and the U.S. Information Agency
dissolved in 1999, U.S. channels of communication with southern Thai Muslims had
been allowed to wither. U.S. efforts to boost information programs in southern
Thailand are part of its broader policy.
U.S. officials emphasize that information and cultural programs implemented insouthernmost Thailand are not specifically related to the conflict. Nonetheless, they
concede that the violence has impinged on U.S. public diplomacy efforts, especiallyin imposing restrictions on travel in the southernmost provinces. For example, inJanuary 2004, renewed violence forced the cancellation of a planned visit by theambassador to Pattani to preside over the opening of a new “American Corner” at
Prince of Songkhla University.
In recent years the U.S. has configured a number of information and cultural
programs to reach Thai Muslims, particularly those in southernmost Thailand. Chiefamong them are the International Visitors Program, which sends prospective Thai
leaders to the U.S. for two or three weeks on thematic study trips. The U.S. isparticularly interested in selecting Muslims from southern Thailand for the program;in 2004, eight of eleven participants were Muslim while in 2005, nine of twenty-fivewere from southern Thailand. The U.S. also seeks to encourage Thai Muslims to study
in the U.S., and offers funding specifically for Muslim students. Funding for afterschool English-language instruction helps prepare students for exchange opportunities.
Two of the five “American Corners” in Thailand are in the south, one at PSU-Pattani
and one at Nakhon Si Thammarat Rajabhat University. These centers offer

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information about the U.S., cultural and speaking programs, digital-videoconferencing, and Internet access.
Embassy-sponsored speaker programs have also reflected U.S. efforts to reachThai Muslims.117 In 2004, Imam Rahmat Phyome Phyakul, a Thai-American Muslim
cleric, spoke at an embassy-sponsored conference on “Civil liberties, rights andresponsibilities” at PSU–Pattani, as well as at Yala Rajabhat University, Saiburi
School in Narathiwat, and PSU–Hat Yai. Elmer Ransom, a veteran of the U.S. civilrights movement, spoke to Thai audiences about change by peaceful means.
The embassy has also produced several publications in Thai, English, and Jawi,
including a magazine titled Muslim life in America and rights of the people:
individual freedom and the Bill of Rights. In 2004, the Embassy funded a PataniMalay-speaking journalist, producer, and cameraman to film a 12-part series about therole of U.S. Muslims in the U.S. general election; the ten-minute segments aired on
Channel 11’s Malay-language program. In November 2005, the U.S. donated 1,200
sewing machines to Muslim women in six southern provinces. In collaboration with alocal non-government organization, the sewing machines were distributed along withtraining designed to provide resources for establishing micro-enterprises.
Of moderates, radicals, and the war on terror
The U.S. approach to the conflict in southernmost Thailand, rooted in concernthat prolonged violence may serve to radicalize Malay Muslims and attract foreign
terrorists, is consonant with prevailing conceptions of the terrorist threat in Southeast
Asia found in much of the post-September 11 academic literature. The need toappreciate the variety of social and political views, attitudes, and activities
encompassed by Islam is a recurring theme. In fighting terrorism, we are told, it isimperative to distinguish between “moderate” and “radical” or “extremist” tendencies
in “political Islam.”118 Although a variety of labels are employed to identify thesetendencies, the imperative is to distinguish between legitimate political activity andviolent extremism. 119 The price of failing to make such distinctions is to risk
radicalizing moderate Muslims, thus fueling the terrorist threat.
The essence of this argument is that Southeast Asia’s Muslims are at risk of aprocess of radicalization, whereby extremists capitalize on social problems andlegitimate grievances to proselytize for the “jihadist” worldview. Rohan Gunarantna
writes, “Although al-Qaeda does not enjoy widespread support among the Muslim
masses worldwide, it seeks to exploit the anger, suffering and the resentment of
Muslims against the United States.”120 RAND Corporation analyst Angel Rabasa, whoclassifies Islamic “tendencies or orientations” by categories such as “radical
fundamentalist” and “liberal secularists,” 121 notes that, “Extremist movements canevolve into moderate ones and moderate movements can become radicalized.”122 With
respect to Southeast Asia, Rabasa notes the “different agendas and strategies” between
international terrorists and domestic extremists: “The international terrorist networks
focus on US and international targets, while domestic extremists are driven largely byinternal factors and pursue domestic goals.”123
David Wright-Neville offers a typology of Islamist political groups—classified
as “activist,” “militant,” and “terrorist”—reflecting degrees of social and politicalalienation. Citing the Israeli terrorism scholar Ehud Sprinzak, he writes, “terrorists arealmost always the product of a complex process of social and political embittermentthat transforms a handful of political activists into terrorists or, in Sprinzak’s words,‘sane human beings into brutal and indiscriminate killers.’” 124 Wright-Neville’s
typology describes a “transformative process” whereby “accumulated frustration with
 195 the political and social status quo has led some activists to become militants andmilitants to become terrorists.”125 The lesson is that efforts must be made to check thistransformative process by addressing grievances so that activists do not become
further alienated and embittered and thus susceptible to violent extremism.
For Wright-Neville, the U.S. War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia fails toadequately appreciate the distinctions between “moderate” and “extremists.” Hewarned in 2004:… unless the US begins to calibrate its counter-terrorist initiatives in Southeast
Asia to take account of the important differences that divide Islamist groups,
then it risks generating unintended consequences that will see more activists to[sic] become militants, and more militants become terrorists. There is a particularneed to resist the temptation to pigeonhole all Islamist groups in Southeast Asia
as vehemently anti-US and as anti-democratic. 126

Others have criticized the U.S. for entertaining a “rather undifferentiated viewof the supposed threat posed by Islamist groups across the region,” and therefore
failing to make important distinctions between moderates with local agendas andviolent extremists with transnational goals.127
However, in the case of southernmost Thailand, it appears that such criticism ismisplaced. U.S. officials have refused to generalize about those responsible for theviolence in the South and have been careful to distinguish between militancy there
and the global “jihadist” phenomenon. U.S. officials have also noted that Malay
Muslims’ grievances are driving the conflict in the far south. Indeed, the U.S.
approach to the conflict in southernmost Thailand is motivated by a desire to curb any
radicalizing process and to avert hostility being directed at the U.S. Although U.S.
circumspection may partly be a function of Washington’s preoccupation with the
Middle East, U.S. officials recognize that even the impression of U.S. involvement in
the conflict carries a risk of “blowback,” or unintended and negative consequences.128
There are legitimate criticisms to be made about understanding terrorism as theresult of a transformative, radicalizing process. The theory that Muslims are atheightened risk of being radicalized is based on what Rizal Sukma calls a “geographic
and religious profiling factor,” by which the concentration of Muslims in Southeast
Asia, combined with “economic deprivation, social ills, and bad governance”
allegedly results in a population prone to support or engage in terrorism. 129 As Sukma
observes:
The hidden… assumption behind this line of analysis is that Muslims, especiallywhen they are poor, are potential terrorists. Within such a context… it is notdifficult to see why the American-led war on terror is generally perceived by the
public as another pretext of the West in their attempt to discredit and subjugate
the Muslim world, including Muslims in Southeast Asia.130

The prevalence of this kind of “profiling” contributes to the perception that the
U.S. sees all conflicts involving Muslims through the lens of “terrorism.” Natasha
Hamilton-Hart likewise argues against the causal association between Islam andterrorism evident in many studies of terrorism in Southeast Asia. She cites two main
problems: the way Islam “is used as a framing device to create an implicit, nonspecific association between Islam and violence; and the way almost all studies
dichotomize ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ versions of Islam.”131 Hamilton-Hart writes that
although most studies acknowledge the peaceful and moderate nature of Southeast
Asian Islam, structuring analysis around the terms “moderate” and “radical” serves to“obscure political grievances.” 132 The result is that legitimate activities such as 196 

opposing U.S. policies or espousing Islamic law become expressions of “radicalism”
that signal “imminent transgression into the fundamentalist/terrorist category.”133
However, a more generous interpretation of the “radicalization” theory may betenable. Rather than obscuring political grievances, the emphasis on social andpolitical causes of alienation should encourage greater sensitivity to discourses ofgrievance and “root causes.” In order to prevent the transformation of moderates into
radicals or reformers into revolutionaries, it is necessary to broaden politicalparticipation and provide opportunities for economic and social development.
Addressing socio-political problems is a means to prevent the evolution of moderates
into extremists. According to Rabasa, in Thailand as in the Philippines, national
reconciliation is the key to resolving the problem of separatist violence: “The successof such efforts is likely to hinge on the ability of central governments to address
discontent by opening up political, social and economic opportunities for minority
populations.… [I]mproving the political opportunities and socio-economic conditionsin potentially disaffected regions reduces potential popular support for extremist
movements.”134
Another corollary of the “radicalization” theory is the recognition that the “waron terror” is essentially an ideological struggle that must be conducted at the level of“hearts and minds.” In theory, the Bush administration appreciates this fact. In 2004,
national security advisor Condoleeza Rice said, “We are engaged primarily in a war ofideas, not of armies. It will be won by visionaries who can look past the moment.”135
The recent Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review asserts, “Victory will
come when the enemy’s extremist ideologies are discredited in the eyes of their hostpopulations and tacit supporters, becoming unfashionable, and following otherdiscredited creeds, such as Communism and Nazism, into oblivion.” 136 Given that
control of the relevant hearts and minds is beyond U.S. capabilities, it has been argued
that, “The challenge for the United States is to merely hold its ground in the eyes ofthe moderate Muslim World and avoid any disastrous public relation nightmares.”137
In practice, however, U.S efforts to fight a war of ideas have been poorly
gauged and implemented and have all too often given rise to nightmares. These efforts
have generally been either “too little, too late,” such as undersecretary of state forpublic diplomacy and public affairs Karen Hughes’ “disastrous ‘listening tour’” ofMuslim nations, 138 or far too grandiose, such as the effort to recast the politics of the
Middle East by force. Washington is aware of the problem. A 2004 study by the
Defense Science Board, which advises the Department of Defense, described this“larger strategic context” as “acutely uncomfortable” for the U.S.:
U.S. policies and actions are increasingly seen by the overwhelming majority ofMuslims as a threat to the survival of Islam itself. Three recent polls of Muslims
show an overwhelming conviction that the U.S. seeks to “dominate” and“weaken” the Muslim World. Not only is every American initiative andcommitment in the Muslim World enmeshed in the larger dynamic of intraIslamic hostilities—[sic] but Americans have inserted themselves into this intraIslamic struggle in ways that have made us an enemy to most Muslims.139

One consequence of these perceptions is that U.S. efforts to wage a “war ofideas” are not merely failing, but “may also have achieved the opposite of what they
intended.” The report finds that U.S. public diplomacy directed toward the Muslim
world faces a “fundamental problem of credibility. Simply, there is none—the U.S. is
without a working channel of communication to the world of Muslims and Islam.”140
This lack of credibility afflicts U.S. policy in Southeast Asia as it does
elsewhere. Indeed, the problem is exacerbated by an understandable tendency to 197 conflate U.S. policies in the Middle East with those pursued within the region.
Incongruity between the measured response to terrorism implemented in Southeast
Asia and the ambitious, sweeping rhetoric of the Bush Doctrine results in a kind of
cognitive dissonance. As Renato Cruz De Castro observed in 2003:
US counter-terrorism efforts in Southeast Asia appear bereft of actual andunilateral American military involvement and crusading rhetoric as Washington
has taken into account the complexity of neutralizing Islamic militants in aregion with a significant Muslim population. The US campaign againstinternational terrorism in Southeast Asia has been conducted in a very pragmaticmanner.141

However, De Castro sees in the 2002 National Security Strategy, “the Bushadministration’s intention to wage a total and disproportionate war against
asymmetrical opponents.”142 De Castro continues:
The prerogative implies a sort of American anti-terrorism ultimatum, which is
high-handed, permits arbitrary application of American power in Southeast Asia,and amounts to an unprecedented assertion of US freedom of action and adefinitive statement of new American unilateralism in the region.143

A report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service maintains that, “Whilethese perceptions of an overly militaristic U.S. response in Southeast Asia may beoverblown—particularly by being colored by U.S. politics in the Middle East—they
may indicate a disconnect between the United States approach to the war on terror andits regional friends and allies.”144 Although this “disconnect” between the U.S. and its
friends and allies is important, it is secondary; it grows out of the more basic anddamaging discontinuity between ends and means in the U.S. strategy to counter the
threat of extremist violence.
U.S. policy in Southeast Asia is not marked by the extreme hubris that has
characterized the Bush Doctrine in the Middle East. For some, however, perhaps
particularly Muslims who strongly identify with a transnational community of faith,
this may be a distinction too fine to be meaningful. As Wright-Neville observes:
The festering of Muslim anger builds on a widely held image of the UnitedStates as the main prop to an international system that denies Muslims theircultural, economic and political rights. At a practical level it is irrelevant that thisview might be naïvely simplistic or that its prevalence often results fromdeliberate disinformation spread by the political elites in these countries as a wayof deflecting critical attention from their own administrative malfeasance. Whatmatters is that the myth is believed and that in so being it is for many a reality.145

The notion that beliefs may constitute one level of reality is helpful inunderstanding the U.S. approach to the conflict in southernmost Thailand as well as
the way it is perceived by some within Thailand. The incongruity between
Washington’s moderate approach to the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia and its
radical policies in the Middle East may help to explain why even a patently
reasonable U.S. position arouses suspicion. Meanwhile, the rationale for a cautious
position vis-à-vis southernmost Thailand is reinforced by concern that misperceptionsof the U.S. role will result in outcomes that the U.S. seeks to avoid.
Endnotes
1

Benjamin Pauker, ‘A fire this time,’ World Policy Journal , Winter 2005/6, p. 85.

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2

Michael Connors, ‘The war on error and the southern fire: how terrorism analysts get it
wrong: review essay,’ Critical Asian Studies 38, 1 (2006), p. 160; ‘CIA-backed unit “may be
involved in violence”,’ The Nation, 19 April 2004.
3
The term “Global War on Terror” fell out of favor in 2005. After a brief flirtation with the“Global Struggle Against Violent Extremism” (GSAVE), the Department of Defense has settled on“the Long War,” which is used throughout the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. “GWOT” may
no longer be preferred, but after almost five years in circulation, the term is still commonly used.
4
I use “position” rather than “policy” in order to convey a concept broader than formal plans
for a course of action. “Position” is meant to include “attitude” or “point of view.”
5‘Thai Muslims react: boycott of goods from West, Israel,’ The Nation, 14 October 2001;
Kittipong Soonprasert, ‘Thai Muslims protest at US war,’ BBC News, 21 March 2003.
6
Don Pathan, ‘Thaksin sails uncharted foreign-policy waters,’ The Nation, 19 April 2003.
7
Shawn Crispin, ‘Thailand’s war zone,’ Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 March 2004, p. 12.
8
Alan Sipress, ‘Inspired by anger a world away,’ Washington Post, 15 May 2004.
9
Sipress, ‘Inspired.’10
Author interviews, Pattani, September 2004, November 2005, and May 2006.
11
Personal communication, US official, May, 2006; survey report viewed by author.
12‘So so po cho po cheua “tang chat” mi suan saek saeng’ (Democrat MP believes ‘foreigners’
have a hand), Matichon, 7 April 2005 at http://www.rakbankerd.com/hotnews.html?nid=1751,
posted and translated by Tom Vamvanij, ‘Bomb mastermind,’ Sara sonthe, 7 April 2005, at
http://sanpaworn.vissaventure.com/?id=104.
13
See discussion of anti-Americanism in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft power: the means to successin world politics (New York: Public Affairs 2004), pp. 35–44.
14Peter G. Peterson, ‘Public diplomacy and the war on terrorism,’ Foreign Affairs,
September/October 2002, at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020901faessay9734/peter-gpeterson/public-diplomacy-and-the-war-on-terrorism.html.
15
A CIA officer in Nakhon Phanom sent a fake letter to the Thai government purporting to befrom a member of the Communist Party of Thailand. The letter was quickly traced to its source
and its author revealed. U.S. ambassador William Kintner was obliged to pledge to prime minster
Sanya Dhammasakdi that the U.S. would not interfere in Thai domestic politics. Surachart
Bamrungsuk, United States foreign policy and Thai military rule, 1947–1977 (Bangkok:
Duangkamol, 1988), p. 174.
16
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, ‘Thailand cannot afford not to join coalition,’ Bangkok Post, 26
September 2001.
17
The White House, ‘Bush delivers graduation speech at West Point,’ 1 June 2002, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html; White House, ‘President
sworn
in
to
secondterm,’
20
January2005,athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html.
18
Andrew Kohut, ‘Anti-Americanism: causes and characteristics,’ Pew Research Center for the
PeopleandthePress,
10
December
2003,
p.
1,
at
http://peoplepress.org/commentary/display.php3?AnalysisID=77.
19
Pew Research Center, ‘No global warming alarm in U.S., China,’ 13 June 2006, p. 3, at
http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/252.pdf.
20
Thomas H. Johnson and James A. Russell, ‘A hard day’s night? The United States and theglobal war on terrorism,’ Comparative Strategy 24 (2005), p. 128.
21
Evelyn Goh, ‘Hegemonic constraints: the implications of 11 September for American
power,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, 1 (2003), p. 81.
22
A fourth suspect, alleged bomb-maker Samarn Waekaji, turned himself in to police on 8 July
2003.
23
Agence France-Presse, ‘JI arrests “may cause unrest”,’ The Star (Malaysia), 18 June 2003.

 199 24

It appears that Somchai’s abduction was prompted by his allegation that police had tortured
suspects in the 4 January 2004 arms raid, rather than his defense of the “JI” suspects. Fivepolicemen were tried for the crime of coercion; murder charges were not brought because
Somchai’s body has not been recovered. On 12 January 2006, four of the policemen wereacquitted due to lack of evidence and one, Police Major Ngern Thongsuk, was found guilty ofcoercion. He was sentenced to three years and released on Baht 1.5 million bail. The day
following the end of the policemen’s trial, Thaksin announced, “I know that Somchai is dead andmore than four government officials were involved, but witnesses and evidence are still being
collected.” Thomas Fuller, ‘Thaksin sees possible role of officials in lawyer’s death,’ International
Herald Tribune, 13 January 2006.
25
The arrests came as a result of information supplied by Singaporean Arifin bin Ali, an
ethnic-Chinese convert to Islam who was arrested in May 2003 in Bangkok and handed over toSingapore. Thai authorities had no evidence against the suspects aside from Arifin’s testimony.
The judge explained that the prosecution failed to produce evidence to support the claims that themen were members of JI or had planned bombing attacks. Moreover, the Department of Special
Investigations was found to have fabricated documents as evidence. Don Pathan, ‘Muslims
acquitted of JI bomb plot charges,’ The Nation, 2 June 2005. Dr. Wae is currently a senator, having
won the election in Narathiwat in April 2006.
26
George W. Bush, ‘Address to a joint session of Congress and the American people,’ 20
September 2001, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
27‘Thailand will be strictly neutral,’ The Nation, 17 September 2001. On the following day, theMinistry of Foreign Affairs declared that Thailand was willing to, “render all possible assistance tothe United States as Thailand has done consistently in the past.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Royal
Thai
Government,‘Thai
Position,’
17
September
2001,
athttp://www.thaiembdc.org/pressctr/pr/thaiposition0911.html.
28
Don Van Natta, Jr., ‘Questioning terror suspects in a dark and surreal world,’ The New YorkTimes, 9 March 2003.
29
Raymond Bonner, ‘Thailand tiptoes in step with the American anti-terror effort,’ The New
York Times, 8 June 2003. At least two al-Qaeda suspects were reported to have been held in
Thailand: Abu Zubaydah, an alleged operations chief, and Ramzi bin al-Shiba, an alleged 9/11attack planner. Both were captured in Pakistan. The US refuses to discuss the issue. Thailand
denied it, and the story died out until further revelations of a “hidden global internment network”
was reported in the Washington Post by Dana Priest in November 2005. According to the accountin The One Percent Doctrine by Ron Suskind, American interrogators discovered that Zubaydah
was mentally ill and had limited knowledge of al-Qaeda operations. Having been described byPresident Bush as a key al-Qaeda figure, however, interrogators were obliged to extract“intelligence” from Zubaydah. Under torture, Zubaydah revealed a number of spurious plots,
sending thousands of U.S. agents on pointless missions. Thus, writes Suskind, “the United States
would torture a mentally disturbed man and then leap, screaming, at every word he uttered.” Cited
in Barton Gellman, ‘The shadow war, in a surprising new light,’ Washington Post, 20 June 2006.
30
Dana Priest, ‘CIA holds terror suspects in secret prisons,’ Washington Post, 2 November
2005.
31‘PM denies Thai knowledge of, connection with reported CIA secret prison,’ TNA, 3
November 2005, at http://etna.mcot.net/query.php?nid=17280, ‘US gov’t: no hidden jail in
Thailandfor
al-Qaeda
suspects,’
TNA,
4November
2005,athttp://etna.mcot.net/query.php?nid=17306.
32
Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘Evaluating western media perceptions of Thailand after the Bali
bombing,’ in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, eds., After Bali: the threat of terrorism inSoutheast Asia (Singapore: World Scientific and the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies,2003), p. 193.
33
Bonner, ‘Thailand tiptoes.’
34
Bonner, ‘Thailand tiptoes.’
35
Yuwadee Tunyasiri, ‘We are no lackey of US, says PM,’ Bangkok Post, 3 April 2003.

 200 

36

Barry Wain, ‘Washington begins to reward Asian backers of Iraq invasion,’ Wall Street
Journal, 28 April 2003.
37
John Funston, ‘Terrorism in Thailand: how serious is it?’ in Thailand’s economic recovery,ed. Cavan Hogue (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. 96.
38
The American Service member’s Protection Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 2002,
prohibits provision of U.S. military aid to countries that have ratified the Rome Statute that
established the ICC. The U.S. has cut security and development assistance to at least eighteencountries that have not signed Article 98 agreements, including Brazil and South Africa. As of
May 2006, 100 countries had signed Bilateral Immunity Agreements with the U.S., including
Cambodia, East Timor, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore and (possibly) Brunei.
39
When Parliament declined to fully fund the deployment, the U.S. agreed to cover remaining
costs. Following the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad in August, 2003, theinitial contingent of 900 troops was halved. Thailand sent 447 troops, mostly engineers, to serve atCamp Lima, near the city of Karbala. Two Thai soldiers were killed in a truck bomb attack atCamp Lima in December 2003. Sheldon Simon, ‘U.S.-Southeast Asia relations: terrorism
perpetrated and terrorists apprehended,’ Comparative Connections, Pacific Forum CSIS 3rd quarter,
2003, p. 69, at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0303q.pdf
40Michael K. Connors, ‘Thailand and the United States of America: beyond hegemony?’ inBush and Asia: the US's evolving relationships with East Asia, ed. Mark Beeson (London:
Routledge, forthcoming), at http://www.latrobe.edu.au/socsci/staff/connors/connors-pub.htm.
41
See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘Interstate and intrastate dynamics in Southeast
Asia’s war on terror,’ SAIS Review 24, 1 (Winter/Spring 2004), p. 98.
42
Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘Thailand: international terrorism and the Muslim south,’ in Southeast
Asian Affairs 2004 ed. Daljit Singh and Chin Kin Wah (Singapore: Institute of Southeast AsianStudies, 2004), p. 270.
43
Simon, ‘U.S.-Southeast Asia relations.’
44
Philip Bowring, ‘Behind Hambali hype, tension rises,’ International Herald Tribune, 19
August 2003.
45
After the June 10 White House meeting Thaksin’s spokesman Sita Divari told a Thai reporter,“Please note that the president did not voice concern or complain about extra-judicial killings and‘silencings’ during the three-month campaign.” Supalak Ganjanakhundee, ‘Thailand “to become a
Major Non-NATO Ally”,’ The Nation, 12 June 2003.
46
The White House, ‘Joint Statement between the United States of America and the Kingdomof Thailand,’ 11 June 2003, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/200306111.html.
47
Among other things, MNNA status confers eligibility to bid on certain US government
contracts; participate in certain research and development projects; host a War Reserve Stockpile(the U.S. closed such a stockpile in 2002); and to receive priority for U.S. Excess Defense Articles.
‘Fact
sheet:
Major
Non-Nato
statusfor
Thailand,’http://bangkok.usembassy.gov/apec2003/factsheetmnna.htm. Bush publicly announced his
intention to make Thailand a Major Non-NATO Ally on 19 October 2003, during his visit toThailand for the APEC summit. Bush issued the order granting MNNA status to Thailand on 30
December 2003.
48
Andrew Perrin, ‘The hard cell?’ Time Asia, 16 June 2003.
49
Surath Jinakul, ‘No end in sight,’ Bangkok Post, 4 April 2004.
50
Shawn Crispin, ‘Targets of a new anti-terror war,’ Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 July
2003, p. 14.
51
Sermsuk Kasitipradit, ‘US accused of setting up arrests of trio,’ Bangkok Post, 22 June 2003.
52
Crispin, ‘Thailand’s war zone.’
53
Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘Fostering “authoritarian democracy” with violence: the effect ofviolent solutions to southern violence in Thailand,’ paper prepared for the Empire Conference,
National University of Singapore, 23–24 September 2004, p. 8.

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54

Duncan McCargo, ‘Thaksin and the resurgence of violence in the Thai South: network
monarchy strikes back?’ Critical Asian Studies 38, 1 (2006), p. 53.
55
McCargo, ‘Thaksin,’ p. 56.
56
Shawn W. Crispin, ‘U.S. ally may have crossed line in terror fight,’ Asian Wall Street
Journal, 21 April 2004.
57
Chaiwat, ‘Fostering,’ p. 7.
58
The current phase of violence in the southernmost provinces may be traced to 24 December
2001, when militants staged near-simultaneous attacks on five police checkpoints acrossNarathiwat, Pattani, and Yala provinces, killing five policemen and a defence volunteer.
59
Srisompob Jitpiromsri, with Panyasak Sobhonvasu, ‘Unpacking Thailand’s southern
conflict: the poverty of structural explanations,’ Critical Asian Studies 38, 1 (2006), p. 99.
60
Surat Horachaikul, ‘The far south of Thailand in the era of the American empire, 9/11
version, and Thaksin’s ‘cash and gung-ho’ premiership,’ Asian Review 16 (2003), p. 141.
61
Kavi, ‘International Terrorism and the Muslim South,’ p. 270.
62
Wattana Sugunnasil, ‘Islam, radicalism and violence in southern Thailand,’ Critical AsianStudies 38, 1 (2006), pp. 132–3; see also Srisompob, ‘Unpacking,’ p. 97, and International Crisis
Group, Thailand’s Emergency Decree: No Solution, Asia Report No. 105, November 2005, p. 32.
63
Agence France-Presse, ‘US warns Thailand insurgency may become regional,’ 14 October
2005.
64
There are persistent but uncorroborated reports that Indonesian militants are involved in theinsurgency, primarily as trainers. It is likely that some Thai militants received training in Indonesia,
probably while studying. ‘Premier fingers Indonesians,’ The Nation, 19 December 2004; ‘Thai
separatists stockpiled thousands of weapons,’ Associated Press, 4 July 2005; Wassana Nanuam,‘RKK insurgents admit they trained in Indonesia, says army,’ Bangkok Post, 28 November 2005;
Maximilian Wechsler, ‘Closing the net on terror,’ Bangkok Post, 28 May 2006. Following the 15
June 2006 bombings across the southernmost provinces, police in Narathiwat arrested an
Indonesian man who had been living in Thailand with his Thai wife for the past two years. A
month after the arrest, his connection to the bombings, if any, has not been made public.
‘Narathiwat police nab Indonesian bomb suspect,’ The Nation, 16 June 2006.
65
Tony Davis, ‘Interview, Lt Gen Ongkorn Thongprasong,’ Jane’s Defense Weekly, 31 May
2006, p. 34.
66
Given the limited number of available sources, I have included the views of some non-U.S.
observers who have published in U.S. journals or work at U.S. institutions, as these views
presumably have a primarily American audience.
67
U.S. State Department, ‘Joint press availability with Thailand foreign minister Khantathi
Suphamongkhon,’press
release,
11
July
2005,
at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/49292.htm.
68‘US expresses concern on security situation in southern Thailand,’ Xinhua, 14 October 2005,
69
Ambassador Ralph Boyce, interview with Sutichai Yoon, Jeepajornlok, Channel 9, (in Thai)
broadcast 13 February 2006, at http://hiptv.mcot.net/hipPlay.php?id=4785.
70
U.S. Department of State, Country reports on terrorism 2005, April 2006, at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65469.pdf.
71
Central Intelligence Agency, ‘SSCI (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence) questions forthe record regarding 11 February 2003 DCI worldwide threat briefing,’ p. 159, at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_hr/021103qfr-cia.pdf.
72
Porter Goss, hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, ‘Current andprojected national security threats to the United States,’ 19 February 2005, at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/shrg109-61.html.
73
John D. Negroponte, hearing before the Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate,‘Annual threat assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate SelectCommittee
onIntelligence,’2
February2006,
at 202 http://intelligence.senate.gov/0602hrg/060202/negroponte.pdf.
74
Transcript of seminar, ‘Islam around the world, session 4: Islam in Southeast Asia,’ Council
on
Foreign
Relations,
Washington,
D.C.,
8
February2005,athttp://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=7789.
75Anthony L. Smith, ‘Trouble in Thailand’s Muslim south: separatism not global jihad,’ Asia
Pacific Security Studies 3, 10 (December 2004), p. 2.
76
U.S. Department of State, Supporting human rights and democracy: the U.S. record 2004–
2005, 28 March 2005, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2004/43109.htm.
77
U.S. Department of State, Supporting human rights and democracy: the U.S. record 2005–
2006, 5 April 2006, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2005/63945.htm.
78
U.S. Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices 2004, 28 February
2005, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41661.htm, and U.S. Department of State,
Countryreportsonhumanrightspractices
2005,
8
March
2006,
at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61628.htm.
79
U.S. Department of State, Country reports on human rights practices 2005, 8 March 2006, at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61628.htm.
80
Transcript of seminar, ‘Islam around the world.’
81
Transcript of seminar, ‘Islam around the world.’
82‘US expert: do more before it gets worse,’ Bangkok Post, 15 November 2005.
83‘Feingold discusses human rights, counter-terrorism issues during visit to Thailand,’ press
release, 22 February 2006, at http://feingold.senate.gov/~feingold/releases/06/02/20060222.html.
84
Don Pathan, ‘Leading Congressman's letter slams Thaksin’s “repression” of freedom,’ The
Nation, 3 April 2004.
85
Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘“Thaksinisation” strains Thai-US relations,’ The Nation, 23 January
2006.
86‘US warns Thailand insurgency may become regional,’ Agence France-Presse, 14 October
2005.
87
Dana R. Dillon, ‘Thai troubles: combating terror or creating insurgency?’ WebMemo #716 8April 2005, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm716.cfm.
88
Bruce Vaughn, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Richard Cronin, Mark Manyin and Larry Niksch,‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia,’ (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library ofCongress), 7 February 2005, p. 25.
89
Patrick Walters, ‘Thailand “the next battleground”,’ The Australian, 1 December 2004.
90‘Thai militants “trained in Libya”,’ BBC News Online, 13 October 2005, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4337498.stm.
91
Transcript of seminar, ‘Islam around the world.’
92
Transcript of seminar, ‘Islam around the world.’
93
Zachary Abuza, ‘The Thai insurgency two years on,’ presentation to Foreign
Correspondent’s
Clubof
Thailand,11
January2006,athttp://counterterror.typepad.com/the_counterterrorism_blog/2006/01/the_thai_insurg.html.
94
Stephen Ulph, ‘Thailand’s Islamist insurgency on the brink,’ Terrorism Focus 2, 18, 4October 2005, at http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369795.
95
Greg Sheridan, ‘The Jihad archipelago,’ The National Interest 78 (Winter 2004), p. 77.
96
Eric John, deputy assistant secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, testimony
before the subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, House Committee on International relations, 21
September 2005, at http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/23608.pdf.
97
The White House, ‘Joint statement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister
Thaksin
Shinawatra,’19
September
2005,
athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050919-3.html.
98
Personal correspondence, Frank Januzzi, aide to Senator Joseph Biden, May, 2006.

 203 

99

Smith, ‘Trouble in Thailand’s Muslim south,’ p. 4.
Aurel Croissant, ‘Unrest in southern Thailand: contours, causes and consequences since2001,’
Strategic
Insights
4,2(February2005),
athttp://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Feb/croissantfeb05.asp.
101
Jonathan Ross-Harrington, ‘Taming terror the Southeast Asian way,’ Asia Times Online, 2September 2005, at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GI02Ae01.html. RossHarrington is an analyst at the Intelligence and Terrorism Analysis Group, Applied Marine
Technologies Inc.
102
Jeremiah C. Lumbaca, ‘Use Special Forces in Thailand’s troubled south,’ PacNet
Newsletter, Number 35A, 20 August 2004, at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0435a.pdf.
103
Jeremiah C. Lumbaca, Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorism in Thailand: analysis
and recommended solution strategy, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005,
p.
85,
at
http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA435529&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
104
Personal correspondence from Colonel Barry Shapiro to Captain Jeramiah Lumbaca, 24
August 2004, cited in Lumabaca, Islamic insurgency, pp. 85–6.
105Thailand has long been one of the main recipients of Department of Defense International
Military Exchange and Training program funds; more than 23,000 Thai officers have trained andstudied in the U.S. under IMET auspices since 1950. IMET funding for Thailand increased
significantly in 2004, to US$2.5 million from $1.7 million in 2003, and held steady in 2005. State
Department funds administered through the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs(INCLE), which supports law enforcement investigation and suppression of drug trafficking,amounted to $13.8 million between 2001 and 2004, but has declined sharply, from $4 million in2002 to request for $900,000 for Fiscal year 2007. However, other State Department funds arebeing increased, such as Anti-Terrorism Assistance, which is estimated at $2.3 million for 2006.
See Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, for fiscal years 2003–7, at
http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/cbj/. The U.S. spent more than $5 million of JCET in Thailand
between 2001 and 2004. Government Accountability Office, ‘Southeast Asia: better human rights
and strategic planning needed for U.S. assistance to foreign security forces,’ July 2005, at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05793.pdf.
106
Defense Security Cooperation Agency, ‘Rules of engagement discussed,’ Partners, April
2005, p. 6, at http://www.dsca.mil/newsletter/E-Partners%200406v2.pdf.
107
The U.S. suspended all military and economic aid to Indonesia after the widespread humanrights abuses by the Indonesian army following the independence plebiscite in East Timor in 1999.
In March 2006, the U.S. lifted restrictions on military assistance to Indonesia.
108
Author interview, Bangkok, April 2006.
109
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, ‘Thailand,’ inCountry reports on terrorism, 28 April 2006, at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64336.htm.
110
U.S. Department of State, Supporting human rights and democracy: the U.S. record 2005–
2006.
111
U.S. Department of State, ‘Congressional budget justification: foreign operations, fiscal
year 2007,’ p. 375, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/60652.pdf.
112
U.S. Department of State, International narcotics control strategy report 2006, March 2006,
p. 294, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/62388.pdf.
113‘CIA, Thai agencies unite to root out al Qaeda,’ CSIS Transnational Threats Update 1, 2,
October 2003, p. 3.
114
Dana Priest, ‘Foreign network at front of CIA’s terror fight,’ Washington Post, 18 November
2005.
115
Crispin, ‘Thailand’s war zone.’
116
Government Accountability Office, ‘U.S. public diplomacy: state department efforts toengage Muslim audiences lack certain communication elements and face significant challenges,’
May 2006, p. 5, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06535.pdf.
100

 204 

117

Embassy-sponsored speakers do not always make a good impression on their audiences. Dr.
Hediah Miramadi, Director of Public Affairs for the Islamic Supreme Council of America,
reportedly walked out of one speaking engagement following criticism from the audience, and at
another event threatened to “go after” Muslim bombers. See Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘Praying in
the rain: the politics of engaged Muslims in anti-war protest in Thai society,’ Global Change,
Peace & Security 16, 2 (June 2004), pp. 158–9.
118
See, for example, Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘Forging an indirect strategy inSoutheast Asia,’ The Washington Quartlerly 25, 2 (Spring 2002), pp. 171–3; Kumar Ramakrishna,‘US strategy in Southeast Asia: counter-terrorist or counter-terrorism?’ in Kumar Ramakrishna and
See Seng Tan, eds., After Bali: the threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Worlds
Scientific and IDSS, 2003), pp. 326–9; David Wright-Neville, ‘Dangerous dynamics: activists,
militants and terrorists in Southeast Asia,’ The Pacific Review 17, 1 (March 2004), pp. 27–46;
Barry Desker and Arabinda Acharya, ‘Targeting Islamist terrorism in Asia Pacific: an unending
war,’ Asia-Pacific Review 11, 2 (November 2004), pp. 69–70; Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna,‘Interstate and intrastate dynamics in Southeast Asia’s war on terror,’ SAIS Review 24, 1(Winter/Spring 2004), pp. 92–3.
119
A U.S. Government Accountability Office report notes the variety of terms used by U.S.
agencies to refer to “a form of Islam that promotes hatred, intolerance, and, in some cases,
violence,” including “Islamic extremism,” “militant Islam,” “radicalism,” “fundamentalism,”“jihadism,” “Wahhabism,” and “Salafism.” Government Accountability Office, ‘Information on
U.S. agencies’ efforts to address Islamic extremism,’ September 2005, pp. 14–5, at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05852.pdf. The Brussels-based International Crisis Groupidentifies political, missionary and jihadi forms of Sunni Islam. International Crisis Group, ‘Islam,violence and reform,’ at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2969&l=1 .
120Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Ideology in terrorism and counter terrorism: lessons from combating alQaeda and Al Jemaah Al Islamiyah in Southeast Asia,’ Conflict Studies Research Centre
discussion
paper,
September
2005,
p.
2,
at
http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Special/csrc_mpf.2005-1017.5799702381/05%2853%29.pdf
121Angel M. Rabasa, ‘Overview,’ in The Muslim world after 9/11 (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND
2004), pp. 5–25.
122
Rabasa, ‘Overview,’ p. 14.
123
Angel M. Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: moderates, radicals and terrorists,
Adelphi Paper 358 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 68.
124
Wright-Neville, ‘Dangerous dynamics,’ p. 31.
125Wright-Neville, ‘Dangerous dynamics,’ p. 42.
126
Wright-Neville, ‘Dangerous dynamics,’ p. 42.
127
Mark Beeson, ‘U.S. hegemony and Southeast Asia,’ Critical Asian Studies 36, 2 (2004), p.
452.
128
Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: the costs and consequences of American empire (New York:Henry Holt, 2000), p. 8.
129
Rizal Sukma, ‘War on terror, Islam and the imperative of democracy,’ Asia Europe Journal
2 (Spring 2004), p. 89.
130
Sukma, ‘War on terror,’ p. 90.
131
Natasha Hamilton-Hart, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia: expert analysis, myopia and fantasy,’
The Pacific Review 18, 3 (September 2005), p. 310.
132
Hamilton-Hart, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia,’ p. 312.
133
Hamilton-Hart, ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia,’ p. 313.
134
Rabasa, Political Islam, p. 71.
135‘U.S. needs new energy in public diplomacy campaign, Rice says,’ Washington File,
Department of State, 11 March 2004, at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile- 205 english&y=2004&m=March&x=200403110947332xtkcolluB0.2205469&t=xarchives/xarchitem.html.
136
U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial defense review report, 6 February 2006, p. 21, at
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf. See also U.S. Department of Defense,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National military strategic plan for the war on terrorism, 1
February 2006, p. 30, at http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/docs/2005-01-25-Strategic-Plan.pdf
137
Johnson and Russell, ‘A hard day’s night,’ p. 142.
138
Hughes took up her post six months after her appointment. She is the third person to holdthe post since the end of 2001. Jonathan Stevenson, ‘Demilitarising the ”war on terror”,’ Survival
48, 2 (Summer 2006), p. 50.
139
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, U.S.
Department of Defense, September 2004), pp. 35–6.
140
Report of the Defense Science Board, p. 41.
141
Renato Cruz De Castro, ‘Addressing international terrorism in Southeast Asia: a matter ofstrategic or functional approach?’ Contemporary Southeast Asia 26, 2 (2004), p. 199.
142
De Castro, ‘Addressing international terrorism,’ p. 207.
143
De Castro, ‘Addressing international terrorism,’ p. 209.
144
Bruce Vaughn, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Richard Cronin, Mark Manyin and Larry Niksch,‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia,’ (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library ofCongress), 7 February 2005, p. 40, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31672.pdf.
145
David Wright-Neville, ‘Losing the democratic moment: Southeast Asia and the war on
terror,’ Asia Research Center, Murdoch University, Working Paper No. 110, October 2004, p. 13,
at http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp110.pdf.

 206 9
The southern Thailand conflict and the Muslim ummah
Imtiyaz Yusuf1

The Muslim world of around 1.3 billion people is spread over Asia, Africa,
Europe, and North American. Muslims live in various countries both as majority andminority populations. The Muslim world sees itself as an ummah, a worldwide
community bound by the fraternal spirit of ikhwah, brotherhood related by faith andpractice of Islam as religion.
The Muslim world is made up of various ethnic groups, including minorities,
speaking various languages. The Muslim world can be divided into the following
linguistic-cultural zones: Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Central Asian, Urdu, Sindhi,
Punjabi, Bengali, Malay, Javanese, Maghribi, West African, and Swahili. In spite ofthis, the adherents of Islam see themselves as a brotherhood with strong emotional
attachment, a composite entity united by faith.
Muslim related international conflicts such as those in Palestine, Kashmir,Chechnya, and southern Thailand have drawn the attention of the worldwide Muslim
community. These are generally interpreted by the worldwide Muslim community as
instances of victimization on account of religion, or subjugation as a minority in a
non-Muslim state. The Muslim world views these conflicts through the lens of panIslamism, an ideology of worldwide Muslim unity proposed by Jamaluddin alAfghani (1838–97) during the colonial era of Muslim history. 2 The southern Thai
conflict is also viewed from the perspective of pan-Malayness referring to the regional
ethnic fraternity of the Malay race. Hence, Muslim conflicts are viewed from theperspectives of religion as well as ethnic identity.
The conflict in southern Thailand has been viewed from different angles by
various analysts. A majority of the foreign security analysts have tried to discern aconnection between the conflict and international jihadist movements such as alQaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).3 Within the Muslim world, most analyses view theconflict as religious—between an oppressive Thai Buddhist state and its repressed
Muslim minority. This chapter contends that the conflict in southern Thailand islargely a local conflict rooted in a clash between the two ethno-religiosities of Thai
Buddhism and Malay Islam with the latter taking a Malay Muslim nationalist andseparatist stance. The southern Thai episode demonstrates that ethno-religious identity
is a large factor in shaping the conflict. Yet the Muslim world views the on-going
conflict as being purely religious.
The approach of this chapter is rooted in the field of religious studies with afocus on intra-religious relations within the Islamic world. It looks at how the conflictin southern Thailand affects Thailand’s relations with the Muslim world—from theangles of both the history of relations between Islam and Buddhism as religions, andThailand’s relations with the larger Muslim world and Muslim countries in theneighborhood.
The first paper of the chapter discusses the Muslim view of religious
brotherhood from the perspective of Islamic sources of the Qur’an and hadith or the 207 traditions of Muhammad. The second, third, and fourth parts of this paper discuss thehistory of relations between Thailand and the Muslim world including the historicalreligious interaction between Islam and Buddhism. The fifth part of the paper
analyzes the unique ethno-religious dimension of Islam as practiced in southern
Thailand. The sixth part of the paper traces the educational links between Thai
Muslims and the wider Muslim world, especially Iran and Pakistan, two statesfounded on Islamic politico-religious ideology. 4 The seventh part of the paper
analyzes reportage about the southern Thai conflict in Muslim media. And the eighthpart of the paper looks at the roles played in the conflict by international Muslim
organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and Thailand’s
ASEAN Muslim neighbors of Indonesia, and especially Malaysia due to the ethnic
and religious commonality with the southern Thai population. These various
perspectives and approaches show that the conflict has drawn a concerned interest
from the Muslim world at large.
A point before we proceed further. The nature of conflict in southern Thailand is
evolving under the influence of local politics within Thailand which are now entering
a post-Thaksin era. The Thai state’s approach to the resolution of the conflict ischanging. The military authorities are more open to dialogue with the insurgents than
the Thaksin government which was intent on the use of force. This in turn has
magnified the expected role of Malaysia in the negotiation process. Some aspects ofthis are discussed below.

The concept of ikhwah, brotherhood in the Qur’an and hadith
The Qur’an states that Muslims are a brotherhood (ikhwah) united like a humanbody. When there is a single pain, the whole body suffers. Similarly, if a single
Muslim is oppressed, the whole body of Muslims suffers. Hence, international
conflicts concerning Muslim communities such as those in Palestine, Chechnya,
Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and now southern Thailand have become
the concern of the ummah.
The Qur’an describes the Muslim fraternity as follows:
The believers are but a single brotherhood: So make peace and reconciliation
between your two (contending) brothers; and fear Allah, that ye may receive
Mercy. (Qur’an 49:10)
And (moreover) He hath put affection between their hearts: not if thou had spent
all that is in the earth, could thou have produced that affection, but Allah hathdone it: for He is Exalted in might, Wise. (Qur’an 8:63)
And hold fast, all together, by the rope which Allah (stretches out for you), andbe not divided among yourselves; and remember with gratitude Allah’s favor onyou; for you were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His
Grace, ye became brethren; and ye were on the brink of the pit of Fire, and He
saved you from it. Thus doth Allah make His Signs clear to you: That ye may be
guided.
Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining
what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity.
(Qur’an 3:103–104)

The hadith literature, which consists of sayings of the prophet Muhammad, also
discusses the nature and character of the Muslim community. The following hadiths
are taken from the collections of Sahih Muslim and Sahih Bukhari, the two 208 authenticated sources of hadith.
Abu Musa reported Allah’s Messenger as saying,“A believer is like a brick for another believer, the one supporting the other.”(Sahih Muslim)

Nu’man b. Bashir reported Allah’s Messenger as saying,“The similitude of believers in regard to mutual love, affection, fellow-feeling isthat of one body; when any limb of it aches, the whole body aches, because of
sleeplessness and fever.” (Sahih Muslim)

Abu Huraira reported Allah’s Messenger as saying,“Verily, Allah, the Exalted and Glorious, would say on the Day of Resurrection:
O son of Adam, I was sick but you did not visit Me. He would say: O my Lord;
how could I visit Thee whereas Thou art the Lord of the worlds? Thereupon He
would say: Didn’t you know that such and such servant of Mine was sick but you
did not visit him and were you not aware of this that if you had visited him, you
would have found Me by him? O son of Adam, I asked food from you but you
did not feed Me. He would say: My Lord, how could I feed Thee whereas Thouart the Lord of the worlds? He said: Didn’t you know that such and such servantof Mine asked food from you but you did not feed him, and were you not awarethat if you had fed him you would have found him by My side? (The Lord would
again say: ) O son of Adam, I asked drink from you but you did not provide Me.
He would say: My Lord, how could I provide Thee whereas Thou art the Lord of
the worlds? Thereupon He would say: Such and such of servant of Mine asked
you for a drink but you did not provide him, and had you provided him drink you
would have found him near Me.” (Sahih Muslim)

A hadith in Sahih al-Bukhari collection states that: “A Muslim is a brother ofanother Muslim.” Other hadiths in the same collection report that, a Muslim should
not oppress another Muslim and screen him from other oppressors.
Abdullah bin Umar reported Allah’s Apostle saying,“A Muslim is a brother of another Muslim, so he should not oppress him, norshould he hand him over to an oppressor. Whoever fulfilled the needs of his
brother, Allah will fulfill his needs; whoever brought his (Muslim) brother out of
a discomfort, Allah will bring him out of the discomforts of the Day of
Resurrection, and whoever screened a Muslim, Allah will screen him on the Day
of Resurrection.” (Sahih al-Bukhari)

Furthermore, a Muslim’s faith is dependent upon his attitude towards other
Muslims. A Muslim should always wish good for his fellow Muslim. It is an evil deed
for one Muslim to abuse his brother in the faith. And it is unbelief for one Muslim tomurder a fellow Muslim.
Anas narrated, “The Prophet said, ‘None of you will have faith till he wishes forhis (Muslim) brother what he likes for himself.’” (Sahih al-Bukhari)

Thailand’s relations with the Muslim world
Thailand has been successful in building dynamic and cooperative relations
with several Muslim countries in the region and beyond. Presently, seventeen Muslim
countries have established diplomatic relations with Thailand.5 Meanwhile, Thailand
has an observer status at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) headquarteredin Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Thailand also has extensive trade and commercial relations

 209 with several Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian Muslim countries.
The ongoing conflict in southern Thailand, now around a century old, has
attracted the attention of the Muslim world in different ways depending upon various
factors such as ethno-religious similarity with neighbors such as Malaysia andIndonesia and religious similarity with the Muslim world in general. Thus the Muslim
world’s attention toward the unrest in the south is influenced by the sentiments of panMalayness and pan-Islamism. A glance at the media reports on the events in the southreflects these two types of interests in the Muslim world.
At the religious and communal levels, Thai Muslims have established extensive
relations with Muslim countries in the areas of educational and socio-religious
relations, both public and private. Thousands of Thai Muslims have obtained theirreligious and general education at institutions in the Muslim world in South Asia,
Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Hence, there is a two-tired relationship between
Thailand and the Muslim world. The first tier is conducted at the official level and thesecond at the level of inter-Muslim community relations.

Religious relations between Islam and Buddhism6
Religious encounters between Islam and Buddhism are as old as Islam.7 The
first encounter between Islam and ashab al-Bidada or the Buddhist community took
place in the middle of the seventh century CE in the regions of East Persia,
Transoxiana, Afghanistan, and Sindh.8 Historical evidence suggests that some earlyMuslims extended the Qur’anic category of ahl al-Kitab, people of the book orrevealed religion, to include Hindus and Buddhists.9 The second encounter took placein Southeast Asia beginning around the twelfth or thirteenth century CE.
During the second century of Islam or the eighth century CE, Central Asian
Muslims translated many Buddhist works into Arabic. We come across Arabic titles
such as Bilawar wa Budhasaf and Kitab al-Budd, as evidence of Muslim learning
about Buddhism.10
In spite of being aware of the idol-worship of the Buddha, Ibn al-Nadim (d. 995
CE), the author of al-Firhist, commented:
These people (Buddhists of Khurasan) are the most generous of all the
inhabitants of the earth and of all the religionists. This is because their prophet
Budhasaf (Bodhisattva) has taught them that the greatest sin, which should neverbe thought of or committed is the utterance of ‘No.’ Hence they act upon thisadvice; they regard the uttering of ‘No’ as an act of Satan. And it is their very
religion to banish Satan.11

There is evidence of Buddhist survivals in the succeeding Muslim era of thisregion, for example, the Barmak family of Buddhist monks who played a powerfuladministrative role in the early Abbasid dynasty. The Abbasids ruled from Baghdad
during 750–1258 CE, governing most of the Islamic world. The Barmakids controlled
the Buddhist monastery of Naw Bahar near Balkh and other Iranian monasteries.12
Several Buddhist beliefs and practices survived among the Muslims of Central
Asia. For example, the Samanid dynasty which ruled Persia during the ninth and tenthcenturies CE modelled the madrasah or Muslim religious schools, devoted toadvanced studies in the Islamic religious sciences, after Buddhist schools in eastern
Iran.13 Similar may have been the case with pondoks or pesanterens, Muslim religious
schools of Southeast Asia.
Muslim religious scholar and historian, Abu Ja`far Muhammad ibn Jarir 210 

al-Tabari (839–923 CE), who was born at Amul in Tabaristan, northern Persia,
mentions that Buddhist idols were brought from Kabul, Afghanistan to Baghdad in the
ninth century. It is also reported that Buddhist idols were sold in a Buddhist temple
next to the Makh mosque in the market of the city of Bukhara in present Uzbekistan.14
A classical Muslim scholar of comparative religion, al-Shahrastani (1086–1153
CE), in the passage on ’Ara’ al-hind’ (The Views of the Indians) in his magnum opus,
Kitab al-Milal wan-Nihal (Book of religious and philosophical sects), pays highspiritual respect to Buddhism by identifying the Buddha with the Qur’anic figure of
al-Khidr, as a seeker of enlightenment.15
More recently, the late Professor Muhammad Hamidullah observed that in linewith the Qur’anic view of prophethood, the Buddha can be regarded as one among theprevious prophets. According to Hamidullah, the symbolic mention of the fig tree inchapter 95, verse 1 of the Qur’an alludes to the prophethood of the Buddha. He
concludes that since Buddha is said to have received nirvana, enlightenment, under awild fig tree and that a fig tree does not figure prominently in the life of any of theprophets mentioned in the Qur’an, hence the Qur’anic verse refers to Gautama
Buddha.16
By the fig and the olive,
By Mount Sinai,
And by this land made safe;
Surely We created man of the best stature
Then We reduced him to the lowest of the low,
Save those who believe and do good works, and theirs is a reward unfailing.
So who henceforth will give the lie to thee about the judgment?
Is not Allah the most conclusive of all judges? (Qur’an 95:1–8)
And indeed, [O Muhammad], We have sent forth apostles before your time;some of them We have mentioned to thee, and some of them We have notmentioned to thee. (Qur’an 40:78. See also Qur’an 4:164)
And never have We sent forth any apostle otherwise than [with a message] inown people’s tongue... (Qur’an 14:4)

Hence, Islam’s position toward other religions is that of religious pluralism
recognizing the existence of different religions including Buddhism. The Qur’anstates that:
To each among you have We prescribed a Law and an Open Way. If Allah had sowilled He would have made you a single people but (His plan is) to test you inwhat He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all isto God; it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute.
(Qur’an 5:48)

Islam in Thailand
Islam, like all world religions, operates at global and local levels. The global
identity of Islam is constructed in pan-Islamist terms as the ummah or worldwide
Muslim community, while most local Muslim identities are construed in tribal or
ethnic terms as seen in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.
Islam spread to Thailand from various directions—the Malay-Indonesianarchipelago, Yemen (Hadhramawt), Persia, India, Burma, China, and Cambodia. Just
as with other Muslim communities of Southeast Asia, the Thai Muslim community ismade up of two groups: the “native/local Muslims” and the “immigrant settler

 211 Muslims.” Hence, there is ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and political variety within theThai Muslim community.
The “immigrant Muslims” of Thailand belong to different sectarian and ethnic
backgrounds. For example, Persian Muslims belonging to the Shia sect served at the
court of the Ayudhaya Kingdom in different official capacities.17 The majority of Thai
Muslims belong to the Sunni sect. There is also a small Shia community belonging to
the Imami and Bohras/Mustali Ismailis sub-groups within the Shia sect.18
Overall, the Thai Muslims make up the largest minority religious group in the
country constituting “a national minority rather than a border minority.”19
Muslims in Thailand may be divided into three groups defined by history andlocation. First, there are Muslims of Malay ethnicity and language in the provinces ofPattani, Yala, and Narathiwat of the deep south. These southern Muslims make up
about 80 per cent of the total Thai Muslim population of about 5 to 7 million. Second,
there are Thai-speaking ethnic Malays in the province of Satun and parts of the upper
south such as Songkhla, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Phuket, Krabi, and Phangnga. Third,
there are Thai-speaking Muslims of myriad ethnic origins in the central provinces of
Bangkok and Ayutthaya and also in north and northeast Thailand. This third group
includes Muslims of Persian, Malay, Cham, Indonesian, Indian, Bengali, Pathan, andChinese ethnic backgrounds.20 These migrant Muslims from neighboring and distantcountries came to settle in Thailand for economic and political reasons. Some fled
religious persecution at the hands of the communists in China and the nationalists in
Burma. There are also Thai converts to Islam either through marriage or religious
conversions.
The first group has largely resisted integration into the Thai polity while thesecond and third groups have accepted integration.
The history of Islam in Thailand has two key dates. First, non-Malay Muslims
such as the Persians, Chams, Indians, and others began to arrive at the courts andcities of the Ayutthaya kingdom from the fourteenth century CE onwards. Second, theIslamization of Patani began around the 1520s. Both these groups were merged within
the single nation-state in 1939, when Siam became Thailand.
The general Thai Muslim attitude towards Buddhism is that of “live and let
live,” drawing on the Qur’anic verse, “Unto you, your religion (moral law), and untome mine.” (Qur’an 109: 6)
Educated Thai Muslims view the Buddhist concept of dukkha, suffering, and thequest for nirvana, enlightenment as a philosophy and way of life. At the same time,they view the widespread Thai beliefs in spirits as strange, irrational, and unwise. Inturn, educated Buddhists view their own religion as philosophically and scientificallysuperior to Islam, and see Islam’s belief in monotheism as philosophically andscientifically inferior.
At the popular level, Thai Muslims see Buddhism as kufr, disbelief in God, andshirk, polytheism. They view Thai Buddhists as kafirs, unbelievers and infidels, andmushrik, polytheists.21 These two ways of thinking are scorned by the Qur’an andopposed vehemently by the prophet Muhammad. Thai Muslims adopt and apply aliteral understanding of Qur’anic passages which talk of the conflict between tauhid,monotheism, and kufr and shirk in the Thai context, without analyzing the historicalbackground. Hence, in situations of political conflict, Thai Muslims view the Thai
Buddhists as najis (unclean, immoral, and faithless) engaged in kufr and shirk andhence to be opposed by engaging in jihad. This view arises because of a lack ofunderstanding of the true position of Islam towards Buddhism, and gives rise to
greater conflict and religious division.

 212 

Ethnicity and Islam in southern Thailand
The ongoing violence in southern Thailand is a result of ethnicity and religion.
Hence it is first necessary to understand how the Malay Muslims in the area view
ethnicity and religion.
In truth, the Malay Muslims place strong emphasis on their ethnicity which istied to their religion. For them, their ethnicity is of prime importance, at the same timeas they conduct a way of life in keeping with Islam as practiced in the locality. Thus
the mythic/narrative, experiential/emotional, ritual, ethical, social, legal, material, andpolitical aspects of life are all interpreted and perceived through the lens of ethnic
identity. Here ethnicity and religion are intermixed resulting in the formation of an
ethnicized view of Islam.
In such a perspective, ethnicity is the defining characteristic of a group’s
identity which sets it apart from others in its own and others’ eyes. It serves also as thefoundation for the community’s interpretation of nationalism and religion. Religion
becomes a tool for displaying ethnic identity. For this reason, the conflict on thesouthern border has an ethnic dimension which is inseparable from religion. This issimilar to the conflicts in the Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tibet, Kashmir, Rwanda, Nigeria,
Lebanon, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland.
The combination of ethnicity and religion often results in explosive conflicts inthe political arena to which solutions are not easy to be found.
Religion and ethnicity, as social and political concepts, have many similarities.
While ethnicity is not always congruent with a framework of belief, it is often
associated with nationalism, which does provide such a framework. This
framework can include rules and standards of behavior such as the requirement
or at least the desirability of forming or maintaining a state for one’s ethnic
group. Even for ethnic groups which do not express such national sentiments,
ethnicity is a basis for identity that can influence beliefs and behavior. Ethnicity,
both in its nationalist and other manifestation, can provide legitimacy for a wide
variety of activities and policies and ethnic symbols can be as potent a politicaland social mobilizing force as religious symbols.22

Such ethno-religiosity which gives primacy to ethnicity in religion is not
exclusive to the Malays. A similar tendency is also found in other ethnic groups ofSoutheast Asia such as the Thai, Filipino, and Chinese.
The Malay Muslims of southern Thailand view national integration as
destructive of their own culture because Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims havedifferent cosmologies.23 “They do not want to be integrated into the Thai state. They
do not want to lose their religious and cultural autonomy. If the Thai state is the
manifestation of the Buddhist cosmology, the Malay-Muslim do not want to be a partof it.” 24 The two large groups of Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims have been
described as “closed systems.”25
The Malay Muslims recoil from outsiders (even other Muslims) unless they are
members of the same ethnic group or speak the Melayu language. Simlarly, mere
religious conversion to Islam is not enough. Rather one has to masuk Melayu, become
a Malay, to be accepted as a Muslim. This process is reinforced through loyalty to thehistorical memory and the role played by the ‘ulama or toh-kru in asserting andmaintaining the ethno-religious identity of the Malay Muslim community.
The network of the ‘ulama and their role as custodians of religion and ethnicity
makes them important players in the conflict as custodians of the Malay culture andlocal Islam. An example is Haji Sulong who in 1947 made seven demands to the 213 central government on the issues of political freedom for the Malays, preservation of
Malay-ness in terms of both language and religion, and use of Islamic law in thelocality.26
Since 1980, the Thai government has made several efforts to accommodate theMuslim population into the mainstream with some success, as shown by the numberof people who identify themselves as “Thai Muslims.” But there are still sections whosees themselves as different from the majority of society for ethno-religious reasons.
Those who resist assimilation have been influenced by the contemporary
politicization of religion which is associated with the “politicization of ethnicity” and“ethno-religious nationalism.” They engage in what has been called “regional or
subnational reactions and resistances to what is seen as an over centralized andhegemonic state... to achieve their own regional and local sociopolitical formations.”27
In this particular case, “Religion is not purely a matter of belief and worship; it also
has social and political resonances and communitarian associations. Likewise,
language is not merely a communicative device but has implications for cultural
identity and literary creation, educational advantage, occupation, and historicallegitimation of social precedence. Similarly, territory has multiple implications, which
go beyond spatial location to include charged claims about “homelands’ and “sons[and daughters] of the soil.”28
Dr. Ismae Alee, director of the College of Islamic Studies at Prince of Songkhla
University, an expert on Islam in the southern border provinces, suggested that
ignorance about the Malay way of life and the role of religion is a cause of conflict.
The beliefs and way of life of Muslims in the southern border provinces differ fromthose of other Muslims in Thailand because their identity, ethnicity, and history are
deeply rooted deeply in their psyche.29
The recent events in southern Thailand show that the intertwining of religion
and ethnicity has destroying social relations between the Thai Buddhists and Muslims
who have been living as neighbors for centuries. At present, both Muslims andBuddhists are being killed, not sparing even monks.30 Muslim-Buddhist relations havereached a low point, with distrust and alienation on both sides.

Educational links between Thailand and the Muslim world
As a religious minority, Thai Muslims have always been concerned aboutmaintaining their religious identity within a largely Buddhist nation. The need tomaintain and reinforce both ethnic and religious identity has been an important factor
in determining their educational paths.
Southern Thai Muslims who are ethnically Malay have cross-border ethnic andreligious relations with the Muslims of Kelantan in Malaysia and also Indonesia. In
fact, Islam in southern Thailand shares strong intellectual and cultural roots andrelations with Islam in Kelantan from the past until today.31
Many young Thai Muslims travel to neighboring Muslim countries of Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Brunei or to India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran, andEgypt for seeking education that will reinforce their religious and ethnic identities.
Presently, there are about two hundred Thai Muslim students studying in Saudi Arabia,
about two thousand in Egypt, and one hundred in Iran. Such educational sojourns
contribute toward the production of trans-border and transnational versions of Islam
with “cross-cutting interpretations which produce and reproduce various
understandings of this religion across an equally diverse range of socioculturalcontexts.”32
 214 

Educational sojourns by Thai Muslims in countries mentioned above haveresulted in the production of a variety of interpretations of Islam in Thailand. Someemphasize the ethno-religious dimension of being Malay, with or without stress on
Islamic religious purity. Others combine ethnic identity and religious purity. The term
“purity” here refers to the practice of Islam in countries where Muslims are in a
majority. For example, Thais educated in Egypt may stress their ethnic Malay identity
in nationalist terms without stressing the puritanical practice of Islam. Those educatedin the Wahhabi theological seminaries and universities in Pakistan and the Middle
East may stress the pure practice of Islam, either combined or not combined withstress on Malay ethnicity. Those educated in Iran may stress the political theology
associated with the Shiite interpretation of Islamic history. Hence, educational links
between Thai Muslims and the Muslim world have important ramifications for theinternal discourse on practice within Thai Islam.
Travel to Muslim countries for education may induce some Thai Muslims toemphasize certain elements of their ethno-religious identity which are salient in theirlocal context. However, it would be wrong to assume that acquiring education in
Muslim countries naturally leads to sympathies for the cause of insurgency. Many
returnee Thai students have engaged in promoting Islamic reform within the Thai
Muslim community along purist and also sectarian lines. Yet, not all such reformists
are insurgents.
The overseas-educated Muslims have also played a significant role in weaning
local Muslims, whose religious practice is inflected by local ethnicity and culture, topractice a purer form of Islam. This can be seen from the success of Salafi-Wahhabi
Islamic reformers in turning Thai Muslims to adopt stricter practice, resulting in
marginalization of the traditional strain in contemporary Thailand.
Yet, Islam-related global events such as the wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan,
Palestine, and Iraq do arouse pan-Islamist sympathies among local Thai Muslims.33
Overseas Muslim foundations also contribute to the building of mosques,pondok, and madrasas (religious schools) in Thailand. For example, Yala Islamic
College received support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. The Saudi-basedInternational Islamic Relief Organisation has been the biggest donor to Islamic social
projects in southern Thailand. Such support, along with import of education from theMuslim world, has provoked suspicion against Thai Muslims, especially against imamand pondok teachers who were educated in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan,
Sudan, Indonesia, and Pakistan. They are suspected of supporting separatism eventhough there is no adequate proof to connect these people with separatism or anti-state
activities in the southern border provinces over a long history, even though suchsuspicion cannot be totally discounted.34 At the same time, one cannot measure thelevel of sympathy among local Muslims for those causing the unrest.
In political terms, the Salafi-Wahhabi religious trend within Thai Islam favors
an integrationist approach towards the Thai polity in the spirit of “live and let live,”
while some inspired by Salafi-Jihadist radicalism opt for a confrontational stance.
Pakistan
Diplomatic relations between Thailand and Pakistan were established on 1
October 1951 as a result of both countries’ membership in the Southeast Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO). Initially, the relations were based on defense cooperation.
Later, political relations started to develop. A landmark of this relationship was a 12day visit by the Thai king and queen to Pakistan in 1962. General Prem Tinsulanonda
visited Pakistan in 1983, General Zia-ul-Haq visited Thailand in 1985, and the Thai 215 crown prince visited Pakistan in 1991 and 1998.35
Until recently, the relationship was not much developed, but has expanded
substantially over the past four years with not only growing political but also
economic and social relations.
In the wake of 9/11, Pakistan sent a representative to the Thai parliament in
October 2001 to strengthen relations. Subsequently, a Thai parliamentary delegation
visited Pakistan for the first time in January–February 2002. This was followed byexchange visits by foreign ministers, by prime minister Thaksin’s visit to Pakistan in
July 2002, and by the Pakistan prime minister’s visits to Thailand in 2004, 2005, and2006. Thailand invited Pakistan to be a founding member of the Asia Cooperation
Dialogue at ministerial level. This was in keeping with Pakistan’s initiation of an“East Asian Vision Policy” which lays stress on building economic relations with
ASEAN. The trade volume between Thailand and Pakistan now exceeds US$ 500
million a year, and there are major Thai investments in infrastructure development inPakistan.
Islam occupies an important place in Pakistan’s foreign policy with stress on
bettering relations with the Muslim world but without discrimination toward nonMuslim countries. Pakistan was created as a country on the basis of Islamic ideology
and its constitution is founded on Islamic principles, though the government does nothold to a radical line in any way.
Pakistan is well known for Islamic education, hence many Thai Muslim
students go to Pakistan to acquire Islamic education. Islamic education is offered atmadrasas (religious seminaries) and also at university level through the International
Islamic University at Islamabad. The madrasas follow regulations set by the Ministryof Education.
In the past three years, entry into these institutions has become more regulated.
When a Thai student applies for a student visa, the case is sent to Pakistan for
approval. Once the visa is granted, the Thai government is informed that the Thai
student has been accepted by Pakistan. Upon arrival in Pakistan, the student mustregister with the Thai embassy. Although some suspect these educational institutionsof nurturing terrorists, there is no evidence of any Thai Muslim student who studied inPakistan having taken part in any violent activity.
Pakistan views the conflict in the south as an internal Thai problem and issatisfied with the measures taken by the Thai government. Pakistan appreciates that
Thailand welcomed a fact-finding mission from the Organization of Islamic
Conference, and that Thailand established the National Reconciliation Commission asa mechanism to help resolve the conflict. However, Pakistan believes that two factors
prolonging the conflict area a lack of well planned strategy and rapid changes in
implementation. In addition, some groups attempt to exploit youth who feel excluded
and deprived to undertake subversive activities. There is a need for the Thaigovernment to adopt a well planned strategy to address a deep rooted problem andthis will need time.
In addition, Pakistan believes that the international community should trust theThai government to manage the problem, and should help the government to bridge
the gap between Muslims in the central region and those in the south. One
contribution made by Pakistan was to offer fifty scholarships for Thai Muslim
students from the south to acquire higher education in non-religious subjects such as
science, social science, and professional subjects. Pakistan also offers twenty-fivescholarships for Thai Muslim teachers from the south to study in Pakistan at
postgraduate level in the fields of education, languages, and business administration.

 216 Hence, Pakistan is helping in various ways to alleviate the problems in southern
Thailand.
Iran
Diplomatic relations between Iran and Thailand were established on 25
November 1955. Though there had been an Iranian community in Siam since the
Ayutthaya period that made important contributions to the development of Thai
culture, prior to the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979, relations were mostly restricted
to the usual matters of trade and commerce, and a strong relationship between theroyal families of the two countries.36
After 1979, Thailand was among the first countries to recognize the Islamic
revolution of Iran, and relations restarted with an exchange of ambassadors in 1983.
The main aspect of the relationship revolves around energy as Thailand needs toimport oil and gas. The Thai petroleum company PTT has invested in petrochemical
projects in Iran and also opened a office in Tehran. Hence, Iran–Thai relations are ona good footing.
Iran recognizes that Thailand welcomed the OIC fact finding mission. Iran and
Thailand place importance on human rights and non-violence. Iran supports peacefulnegotiations concerning southern Thailand and does not endorse separatism. Iranbelieves that southerners should negotiate with the government and not resort toviolent means, while the Thai government should respect Muslim religion and culture.
There are currently about a hundred Thai students studying in Iranianeducational institutions both in religious and general educational faculties. They comefrom different parts of Thailand. Those in religious institutions study religious
subjects such as Quranic studies, Hadith studies, Islamic philosophy, and mysticism.
They have full freedom to increase their knowledge without any bias. Thus the overall
state of relations between Iran and Thailand, both in the areas of international andbilateral relations, are in an excellent state.

Reportage on southern Thailand in Muslim media
Today news travels in a flash, and news about events in southern Thailand has
been reported in nearly all Muslim media. The presentation of news by eachorganization has its own character depending on the medium and the audience.
The Thai press reports events in southern Thailand as an internal matter. But
since the conflict takes place in the area of greatest Muslim concentration in Thailand,
many international Muslim media present the same news as a religious conflict
between a Buddhist state and local Muslims. A general survey of the print, radio,
television, and online media reports in the Muslim world about events in the southern
Thailand displays this trend.
The conflict in southern Thailand is largely viewed in the Muslim media in panIslamist terms. The worldwide Muslim community views the conflict as persecutionof Muslims in a Buddhist majority country.
The Malay press tends to view the conflict in terms of pan-Malayness. After the
Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents, there were demonstrations in front of the Thai
embassy and a raging debate in parliament. A Malaysian commentator, Farish Noor,
wrote articles with a pan-Malay sentiment entitled, ‘Southern Thailand: a bloody messabout to get bloodier,’ and ‘The killings in southern Thailand: a long history ofpersecution unrecorded.’37 Such sentiment pervades the Malay press reporting on the 217 southern Thai unrest.
Similar pan-Malay and pan-Islamic sentiments were expressed by the Malaysianforeign minister Hamid Albar who was reported in the Pakistani daily Dawn
remarking,
Malaysia is the chairman of the OIC (Organisation of the Islamic Countries) and
one of the roles of the OIC is to ensure the safety of Muslim minorities living in
non-Muslims countries are guaranteed and their security not threatened. Thailand
is not very far from Malaysia and what happens in south Thailand has direct
impact upon us, so we just cannot keep quiet.

The same news report carried comments by Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the Kelantan
chief minister and leader of PAS (Parti Islam Malaysia), that the Bangkok government
was insensitive and dictatorial in its policy towards the south. Other PAS leadersstated that the southern Thai provinces belong to Muslim Malaysia and not Buddhist
Thailand.38
The Jakarta Post of Indonesia urged prime minister Thaksin to learn fromIndonesia’s experience in dealing with the Free Aceh Movement, and called for talks
to be held with separatists in the south to forge a peace agreement. The report
informed its readers, “The fact is that the discontent among Muslim Thais in the south
has been fed by the poor economic opportunities in the region; their distinct culture,
history, language and religion from the Buddhist Thai majority; and the human rights
violations they have been subject to by Thai troops and police.” 39
Beyond the region, trends in the Muslim media are similar. The Canadian based
Muslimedia International, an online edition of the pro-Iranian print magazine
Crescent International which calls itself the news magazine of the Islamic movement,
reported about the southern Thai conflict in pan-Islamist terms. It talked of culturalimperialism being imposed on the southern Muslim by the regime in Bangkok
through suppression of the local Malay identity and language. It also mentioned that
the Muslims of southern Thailand, like those in Mindanao, have sought moral andmaterial support from Arab governments but to no avail. It also hoped that the Thaigovernment would not end up like those of Indonesia and the Philippines whichbecame entangled in protracted wars which they could neither afford nor win.40
A report in the same magazine after the Tak Bai incident referred to Thaksin as
the “Butcher of Bangkok” who avoided use of democratic means to resolve theconflict. It remarked that the Thaksin government was more interested in showing theBush administration that it was an ally in the latter’s global “War against Terror.”41
The reportage in the Crescent views the southern conflict as a high-handed war
against defenseless Muslims by the Thaksin government which refuses to employ
democratic means.
A popular Muslim website, islamonline.net, has also reported on the southern
conflict regularly with such headlines as ’Thailand buys US arms for war in Muslim
south’ 42 and ‘Thai Muslim massacred… What lies beneath.’ The site has also
discussed the historical past of the Patani sultanate and the movement for separatismsparked by discrimination in jobs, education, and economic neglect.43
A report titled, ‘Thailand perpetuating the taming of Islam in Patani’ talked
about the long war perpetuated by Siam against Islam and Muslims in Patani, where
the freedom fighters are fighting for the birthrights of Muslim in their own
motherland.44
Commenting on the Krue Se incident, a report on the same website called upon
Muslims to familiarize themselves “with the struggle of our brothers in Pattani” which
is currently occupied by outsiders. 45 It also called upon worldwide Muslims to 218 familiarize themselves with the case of Pattani for this case is similar to those in
Chechnya, Kashmir, Aceh, and Uzbekistan.
Another article talked of the history of Siamese rule over the Muslim south andits insensitivity to local culture and religion combined with economic neglect andimposition of Thai language and Buddhist culture. It remarked that the repression of
the “Pattanese” people “is part and parcel of a global campaign aimed at suppressing
Muslims worldwide.”46 It also remarked that the “crackdown on Pattanese Muslims
may also have an impact throughout Southeast Asia due to multiple ideological andlogistical linkages between Muslims separatists operating in the region.”47
On 1 July 2004, islamonline.net conducted a live dialogue about the “Struggle
in Pattani.” The transcript of the dialogue illustrates how the conflict is understood by
Muslims internationally. An anonymous respondent to various questions from aroundthe world called for a united Muslim stand against attempts by the Thai state toeradicate “Muslims’ cultural identity.”
The same respondent welcomed the change in the stance of the Malaysian
government since Abdullah Badawi came to power and took a “pro-Muslim
approach,” marking a difference from that of former prime minister Mahathir.
The respondent also talked of the close history between Malaysia and Pattani
and the close ethnic relations between the people in the two locations, and suggested
that the problem is now moving towards a state of conflict between Thailand andMalaysia. The respondent also noted the strong support for Pattani Muslims inIndonesia. Calling the unrest a Muslim–Buddhist conflict, the respondent also said
that the conflict in Pattani is in line with Muslim conflicts in Palestine, Chechnya,
Aceh, and Mindanao, and could be interpreted as a jihad as indicated in the text ofBerjihad di Patani, which some Thai Muslim scholars and the Chularachamontri
claim is not an Islamic text. The respondent said that the current strategy adopted in
the struggle of Pattani was that of “tactical retreat,” similar to that practiced by theprophet Muhammad in the famous treaty of Hudaybbiyah when the prophet agreed tohumiliating terms of being denied entry to Mecca for ten years but subsequently
gained entry only a few years later because the opponents failed to observe the termsof the treaty.

Muslim international organization, Muslim neighbors,and the conflict
The ethno-religious dimension of the conflict in southern Thailand has also
become a matter of foreign policy affecting relations between the Muslim world andThailand. Though the foreign policies of most Muslim countries are based on theirnational interest, all of them also refer to Islam due to the convergence of internationaland domestic Muslim concerns.
The OIC, the neighboring Muslim countries of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei,
and the Muslim world in general have expressed concern at the plight of southern
Thai Muslims. For the most part, Muslim countries and the OIC view the conflict as adomestic political issue unrelated to religion, and they expect that Thailand will beable to restore peace in the south with respect for the ethnic and cultural identity of
the Thai Muslim minority. However, there is also a view in the Muslim world that theconflict has a religious dimension. Hence, there are two readings of the conflict inMuslim opinion.

 219 

Organization of Islamic Conference
The OIC is an inter-governmental organization grouping fifty-seven Muslim
countries. It was established in 1969 through the efforts of King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia. The goals of the OIC are to work for solidarity and build cooperation amongits Muslim member states. It is also committed to stand up for the national rights,
dignity, and independence of all Muslim peoples in different countries of the world
including those in non-Muslim states. Thailand joined the OIC in 1998 in the capacityof an observer.
Since the aggravation of the conflict in 2004 following the Krue Se and Tak Bai
incidents, the OIC has issued several press releases in regard to southern Thailand.
These press releases condemned the continuation of violence resulting in loss of life,and called for negotiations and peaceful dialogue to resolve all problems faced by
Muslims in Thailand. They also called for the Thai government to safeguard the rightsof Thai Muslims and build confidence that Muslims in Thailand would be treated onequal footing with other citizens, and assisted to achieve a good standard of economic
and social life. 48
The OIC stressed that it is not enough to deal with the problems in the southfrom an exclusively security perspective for such an approach will lead to continued
violence and deterioration of the situation.
The secretary general of the OIC, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, sent a highlevel delegation to Thailand, led by ambassador Syed Qasim al-Masri, formerly
assistant secretary general and international human rights expert of the OIC. The
delegation received an official invitation from the Thai government. The objective ofthe delegation was to observe and evaluate the conditions of Muslims in southern
Thailand and report its finding to the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in
San’aa, Yemen at the end of June 2005.
At the start of the visit, ambassador al-Masri remarked that his delegation would
use “the good offices with the Thai government to ease the obstacles facing
negotiations on allowing Thai Muslims to enjoy their acquired rights as citizens. It
would also aim at halting security authorities’ acts of violence and oppression against
them, so as to support the efforts to enthrone peace and stability in Thailand, within
the framework of respect for the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Ambassador al-Masri also announced, “that the delegation would stress the needto take the necessary measures to punish those involved in the tragic events which
took place recently in southern Thailand, to compensate the victims, and to preventthe recurrence of such violations and disproportionate use of power.” 49
During his visit ambassador al-Masri remarked that mere transfer of military
personnel to inactive posts following the Krue Se and Tak Bai incidents was notenough, and called for the payment of adequate compensation to the victims and theirfamilies.50 However, the delegation concluded that the unrest in the south was not theresult of religious discrimination against the Muslims nor was it rooted in religion, but
in culture and in the past neglect of the area.51 Thailand was successful in creating
confidence in the Muslim world over the southern issue, and repeated this stance at
the OIC ministers meeting in San’aa, Yemen on 30 June 2005.52 Yet, in his report to
the San’aa meeting ambassador al-Masri of the OIC remarked that, though religion
was not a factor in the conflict, that did not mean there was no problem in the south.
He remarked that Thailand should allow the southern Muslims to have more say inmanaging their affairs and the ability to practice their culture and language.53
Meanwhile the secretary general of the OIC, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu,
continued to watch the southern situation. In October 2005, he issued another press
 220 release calling for attention to the roots of the problem “to settle it through dialogue
and positive handling of the legitimate aspirations of the population of the South sothat they may maintain and express their cultural identity, and manage their local
affairs through participation guaranteed by the Thai constitution, within theframework of respect for the territorial integrity of Thailand.” The release also stated
that, “The Secretary General expresses regret over the causalities among innocent
civilians. He reiterates his strong condemnation of the operations aimed at civilians
whatever their motive may be. He also underlines the importance of respecting humanrights in all circumstances and the adoption of legal measures against all those proved
to be involved in such acts.” 54 This statement irked prime minister Thaksin, whoremarked that Islam requires all Muslims to respect the law of the countries in which
they reside and live peacefully with others, and that the OIC should express regret for
the killings of both Buddhist monks as well as Muslims. Some believe that the OIC islistening to both the Thai government and separatist groups outside Thailand, andwants to see more being done to resolve the conflict.55
A subsequent OIC reference to the southern Thai conflict was made byProfessor Ihsanoglu in his report at the opening of the 33rd Session of the Islamic
Conference of Foreign Ministers in Baku, Azerbaijan on 19–22 June 2006. He again
urged Thailand to respect cultural differences in order to resolve the conflict byremarking that, “The situation remains a matter of serious concern, and in solving the
problem [the Thai government] should take into account the cultural characteristics ofthe region.”56 On this occasion the OIC also released a five page report on the Thaisituation.
Malaysia
The concept of ummah, the worldwide Muslim community, is significant inshaping the direction of Malaysian foreign policy in relation to both Muslim-majority
and Muslim-minority countries. Additionally, the pan-Malay concept also plays animportant sentimental role in shaping Malaysian public opinion about the southern
Thai conflict and the involvement of their country in resolving the matter.
At the same time, Thailand is always suspicious about Malaysian aid andsupport for the southern Thai separatists. Thailand suspects that many rebels takerefuge in Malaysia in order to convert an internal issue into an international cause.
Thus while regional cooperation in the spirit of ASEAN draws the two countries to acommon platform, the separatist issue makes both countries careful in talking about
national security and ethno-religious matters. For these reasons, the Mahathiradministration was “reluctant to allow any international Islamic recognition of thematter as a just cause, due to sensitivity towards the principle of territorial integrity.”57
Malaysia has shown concern for Muslim minorities in various places and given
assistance, for example in Bosnia, Palestine, and southern Thailand, citing
humanitarian considerations. The tendency of Thai Muslims to flee across the border
into Malaysia has regularly strained relations between the two countries. In both 1981
and 2005, Malaysia refused to repatriate refugees. Malay lobbies in Malaysia havepressured their government to take a pro-Malay and pro-Muslim stand toward theissue of refugees, as earlier in the case of 100,000 Kampuchean Muslim refugees in1978 and those from southern Thailand.58
Malaysian politicians and political parties were critical of Thailand’s handlingof the Tak Bai incident, calling it a massacre of Muslims, and blaming prime minister
Thaksin for the poor handling of the incident.59 Comparing the southern Thai conflictwith the Israel–Palestine conflict, the former prime minister Mahathir Mohammad
 221 called upon the Thai government to give autonomy to the south as a way of resolving
the conflict. He also remarked that independence was not possible.60 This attitude
irked the Thai government.
The issue of how to treat those fleeing across the Thai-Malay border into
Malaysia surfaced once again following the Tanyonglimo incident, when 131 Thai
Muslims fled to the neighboring Malaysian state of Kelantan in October 2005.
Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the chief minister of Kelantan of the PAS party, stated thatpeople on both sides of the border have family ties as well as ethnic, linguistic, andreligious links.61 He urged the Thai government to negotiate with the local Muslim
population instead of resorting to military force.62
The Malaysian government decided to return the 131 people. Malaysian deputy
prime minister Najib Razak said that, “We will not release them to Thailand except if
we have assurance that their human rights are not being infringed upon by the Thaigovernment.”63 The Malaysian government also allowed the UN high commissioner
for refugees to interview the group. The stalemate over this matter led to a row
between Malaysia and Thailand and the matter remains unresolved.
Meanwhile, the former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir visited Bangkok on
22–23 November to hold private talks with prime minister Thaksin, ending themegaphone shouting match between the two countries. Malaysia agreed to refrainfrom the using the word “autonomy” in reference to the south.64
The overthrow of the Thaksin government by the military under General Sonthi
Boonyaratglin’s leadership may be a positive factor in the resolution of the conflict.
Sonthi was the first to propose talking with the insurgents, even during the period of
the Thaksin regime, but he was ignored. On coming to power, Sonthi and the interim
prime minister Surayud Chulanont recognized the role of the former Malaysian prime
minister Mahathir in contacting the separatist leaders for peace talks with the Thai
officials.65
As an ASEAN member and a Muslim neighbor sharing ethnic relations with the
Malay Muslims of the south, Malaysia has a role that is crucial and complex and vitalin negotiation for peace. Malaysia does not want to get involved uninvited. 66 The
Malaysian government gives encouragement for peace talks between the Thai
officials and the separatists, and insists that it will not interfere in the process.67 Thismay be due to the political tension between the Malaysian government of Ahmed
Badawi and former prime minister Mahathir, both of whom want a clear role in theprocess.
Indonesia
Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country in the world. Itsforeign policy is based on the spirit of Indonesian nationalism, with Islam as asecondary factor. Yet, in light of various international events related to Islam,domestic Muslim groups and political parties have put pressure for foreign policy to
pay heed to worldwide Islamic considerations.
The governments of presidents Suharto, Habibie, Wahid, Megawati, andYudhoyono have often had to accommodate Islamic concerns in dealing with thecountry’s foreign affairs.68 Various Indonesian groups protested over the Krue Se and
Tak Bai incidents, sometimes referring to them as massacres of Muslims.
Diplomatic relations between Thailand and Indonesia were first established in
1950. As close neighbors, relations span a full range of politics, security, social
matters, culture, and economy, and are constantly expanding. These relations also
focus on regional security under ASEAN. Indonesian foreign policy is shaped by 222 nationalism and anti-colonialism, not religious factors. The Indonesian ambassador to
Thailand, Ibrahim Yusuk, stated that Indonesia is a member of the OIC and has good
relations with the Muslim world, but pays more attention to ASEAN regional interests
rather than matters of religion or ethnicity. At the same time, within Indonesia thegovernment wants to empower Muslim moderates to fight against terrorism, by suchmeasures as providing support for inter-religious dialogue.69
The ambassador also remarked that Indonesia does not have special relations
with the Muslims of southern Thailand, and officially Indonesia considers thesouthern area as an integral part of Thailand. Presently, there are about 120 Thai
students studying in Indonesian religious institutions such as the Islamic madrasah
and also secular universities. They are both Buddhists and Muslims, some of whom
have been awarded government scholarships. The Thai Muslim students at madrasah
are self-financed. Some of them attend religious schools managed by the largest
Indonesian Muslim religious organization known as Nahdatul Ulama or NU whilesome attend educational institutions managed by religious organizations such as the
Muhammadiyah. There are also Thai Muslim students studying at universities ofreligious study such as Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidyatullah in Jakarta or
various state Institutes of Islamic Studies, known as IAIN, in different parts of thecountry. There is little chance of these students coming under the influence of radical
Islamist organizations such as Front Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam Front),
Ikhwan al-Muslmin Indonesia, Hizb ul-Tahrir Indonesia, or militia groups such as
Laskar Mujahidin (paramilitary wing of Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia), Laskar
Jundullah (paramilitary wing of Komite Persiapan Pemberlakuan Syariat Islam), andLaskar Pembela Islam (paramilitary wing of Front Pembela Islam).
Concerning southern Thailand, the ambassador said that Indonesia adheres to
the ASEAN principle of non-interference in Thailand’s domestic affairs unless invitedby Thai authorities. The Thai government invited an Indonesian Muslim delegation
led by Hasyim Muzadi, leader of the Nahdatul Ulama and comprising members from
the Muhammadiyah, to visit the south, to mediate between the government and theinsurgents, and to remove misperceptions about Thailand’s treatment of its Muslim
religious minority. 70 After the visit, the Indonesian delegation advised the Thaigovernment to deal with the conflict in a civilian way using legal means, similar to theway Indonesia dealt with its Bali bombers, as the resort to military means and use ofexcessive force will further escalate the situation and draw condemnation from theMuslim world and international human rights groups. The Indonesian delegation alsooffered exchange of ulama or Muslim religious scholars between the two countries
and opportunities for Thai Muslim scholars to study in Indonesia.
Overall the Indonesian Muslim public has expressed concern about the southern
Thai conflict within the spirit of Islamic religious fraternity, while the Indonesian
government has offered to help Thailand in dealing with the restive south in the spiritof neighborly relations.

Conclusion
The Islamic concepts of ikhwah, Muslim religious fraternity, and ummah, aMuslim world community, have played an important role in drawing the Muslim
world’s attention to the southern Thai conflict at various levels in spite of the fact that
it is largely a local domestic conflict
The problems in southern Thailand are the results of decades of economic
neglect, lack of employment opportunities for the local Muslims in both public and 223 private sectors, cultural insensitivity of the bureaucracy, and failure to recognize
religious, linguistic, and cultural diversity within the Thai polity. Any solution
requires greater efforts by the Thai government to respond to the demands of the local
Muslim population in order to build peace and stability within Thailand. Otherwise,
the Muslim world both in the neighborhood and farther afield will be misinformed
about the problems in the south and perceive them as being directed against a part of
the Muslim ummah residing in Thailand, similar to the events taking place inPalestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and so on.
The southern Thai conflict has drawn the attention of Muslims worldwide,
including the international and regional jihadists, ideological militant Islamic groups
engaged in armed struggle against Muslim and non-Muslim nation states. Lacking
proper information, they view the southern Thai conflict as a religious affair in which
their brothers are being oppressed. However, as the International Crisis Group
reported on southern Thailand, the conflict remains local and has not involved theglobal or regional jihadists.71
The southern conflict has to be understood in its cosmological and ethnocultural context as an ethno-religious conflict between two exclusive ethno-religious
worldviews of Thai sasana and Malay agama, which needs more than political andsecurity measures as the solution. Malay identity has to be accorded status equal tothat of Thai identity in Thai society. Solutions to the southern problem will require a
new social formation, by reviving efficient administration. Since the fall of Thaksin,
the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) has been reinstated.
This joint civilian-military-police task force played a crucial role as a forum for
dialogue between local people and the authorities until it was dissolved by Thaksin.72
The revived SBPAC under its new name of Southern Border Provinces Development
Center (SBPDC) will play a crucial and a newly designed role towards resolving thesouthern conflict. It should work toward changing the prevalent hostile attitudes
between Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims to one of mutual acceptance and trust bybuilding cooperation in managing their political and social affairs together.
From the perspective of the Muslim world observing the southern Thai conflict,any resolution requires not only efforts at reconciliation but also proper delivery ofjustice in various ways, both symbolic and real. Confession, atonement, andforgiveness will help to nurture reconciliation both psychologically and politically.
Though Thailand prefers to handle the conflict on its own without outside
assistance, reality shows this is not possible. Neighboring Muslim countries andinternational Muslim organization such as the OIC cannot be excluded from thesolution. Thus, Thailand should concentrate on shaping a solution, and giveimportance to the stance of the OIC as it will have a part in developing relations
between Thailand and the Muslim world. The Thai government understands that it
cannot neglect the diplomatic aspect, and hence invited the OIC, Indonesia, andformer Malaysian prime minister Mahathir to participate in the search for solutions.
This role became clearer when General Sonthi visited Middle Eastern countries andperform the Hajj pilgrimage in December 2006 with the intention of explaining theThai government’s efforts in resolving the southern conflict in a peaceful manner.73
Finally on the internal front, the resolution of the conflict requires the Malay
Muslims of Thailand to distinguish between Islam which arises from ethnicity andtends to separate them from others, and international Islam which supports andnurtures coexistence, dialogue, and cooperation with those of other religions, cultures,
ethnicities, and nationalities, as is written in the following verse of the Qur’an.

 224 O mankind! We created you out of a male and a female and have made you into
nations and tribes, so that you might come to know one another (not that you
may despise each other). Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one
is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all-aware.
(Qur’an 49:13)

Geography and history have yoked the destinies of Thai Muslims and Thai
Buddhists to live together, thus it bears on both of them to live in a spirit ofcooperation. It is time that both these communities became pluralist about religion.
Endnotes
1

An earlier version of this article appeared as ‘The southern Thailand conflict and the Muslim
world,’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 27, 2 (August 2007), pp. 319–39.
2
Jacob L. Landau, The Politics of pan-Islam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 13–21.
3
Joseph Chinyong Liow, ‘The security situation in southern Thailand: toward anunderstanding of domestic and international dimensions,’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27(2004), pp. 531–48; Peter Chalk, ‘Separatism and Southeast Asia; the Islamic factor in southern
Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,’ Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24 (2001), pp. 241–69; Rohan
Gunartana, Arabinda Acharya, and Sabrina Chua, Conflict and terrorism in southern Thailand(Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005).
4
I requested interviews with various Muslim embassies in Thailand concerning the topic of
this paper. Only the embassies of Pakistan, Iran, and Indonesia responded. The embassy of Saudi
Arabia declined the request while that of Egypt did not respond at all.
5
These are: Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalaam, Egypt, Qatar, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan,
Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UAE, and Uzbekistan.
6This discussion expands upon Imtiyaz Yusuf, ‘Religious diversity in a Buddhist majority
country: the case of Islam in Thailand,’ International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture 3(September 2003), pp. 131–43.
7
Islam was founded in 611 CE when the Prophet Muhammad received the first revelation of
the Qur’an in Mecca.
8
Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Balkh.’ Encyclopaedia Iranica, s.v. ‘Buddhism.‘
9
The term “Ahl al-Kitab” or “the People of Book” is a Qur’anic and Muhammad’s reference tothe followers of Christianity and Judaism as religions that possess divine books of revelation(Torah, Psalter, Gospel) which gives them a privileged position above followers of other religions.
See Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Ahl al-Kitab.‘
10
Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic theology and law, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1981) p. 141.
11
Quoted in S. M. Yusuf, ‘The early contacts between Islam and Buddhism,’ in University of
Ceylon Review 13 (1955), p. 28.
12Richard C. Foltz, Religions of the Silk Road (New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1999), p. 100.
Also Richard Bulliet, ‘Naw Bahar and the survival of Iranian Buddhism,’ Iran 14 (1976), pp. 140–
145.
13
Foltz, Religions, pp. 100–1. See also Encyclopedia of religion (Mircea Eliade, General
Editor), s.v. ‘Madrasah.‘
14
Foltz, Religions, p. 100.
15
Qur’an 18:64. See also Bruce B. Lawrence, Shahrastani on the Indian Religions (The
Hague: Mouton, 1976), pp. 113–4.
16
Muhammad Hamidullah, Muhammad Rasullah, (Hyderabad: Habib, 1974), pp. 27, 107. See
also David Scott, ‘Buddhism and Islam: past to present encounters and interfaith lessons,’ Numen
42 (1995), pp. 141–155.

 225 

17

Raymond Scupin, ‘Islam in Thailand before the Bangkok period,’ Journal of the Siam
Society 68 (1980), pp. 55–71.
18
See Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Ismailiya’ and ‘Shi’a.’ And Moojan Momen, An
introduction to Shi’i Islam (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1987).
19
Omar Farouk ‘The Muslims of Thailand’ in Lutfi Ibrahim, ed. Islamika (Kuala Lampur:
Sarjana Enterprise, 1981), pp. 97–121.
20
Raymond Scupin, ‘Cham Muslims of Thailand: a haven of security in Southeast Asian,’
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 10 (1989), pp. 486–91. Also Seddik Taouti, ‘The forgotten
Muslims of Kampuchea and Vietnam,’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 4 (1982), pp. 3–13. See
also Suthep Soonthornpasuch, ‘Islamic identity in Chiengmai city: a historical and structuralcomparison of two communities,’ Ph.D dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1977. Also
David Wilson and David Henley, ‘Northern comfort: the contented Muslims of Chiang Mai,’
Bangkok Post Outlook Section, 4 January 1995, pp. 33, 40.
21This is different from a learned Muslim view about kufr and mushrik. Muhammad Asad, atranslator and an exegete of the Qur’an, comments that the meaning of the terms kufr and kafir in
the Qur’an are determined by the meanings these terms had in Arabic language during pre-Islamictimes and their meanings cannot be equated to “unbeliever” or “infidel” in the restricted sense as
referring to one who rejects the doctrine of the Qur’an and teaching of Muhammad as is being
done by Muslim theologians of the post-classical times and also Western translators of the Qur’an.
Rather, “a kafir is ‘one who denies [or “refuses to acknowledge”] the truth’ in the widest, spiritual
sense … irrespective of whether it relates to a cognition of the supreme truth—namely, theexistence of God—or to a doctrine or ordinance enunciated in the divine writ, or to a self-evident
moral proposition, or to an acknowledgement of, and therefore gratitude for, favours received.”
Muhammad Asad, The message of the Qur’an (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), p. 907.
The term shirk means the ascribing of divinity to anything besides God and “is not confined toa worship of other ‘deities’, but implies also the attribution of divine or quasi-divine powers topersons or objects not regarded as deities: in other words, it embraces also saint-worship, etc.” Or,through “overstepping the bounds of truth.” Muhammad Asad, The message, pp. 110, 160. In thecase of Buddhism it would imply overstepping the Dhamma.
22
Jonathan Fox, Ethnoreligious conflict in the late twentieth century: a general theory(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), p. 26.
23
Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay nationalism: a case study of Malay-Muslims of southern
Thailand (Bangkok : Thai Khadi Research Institute, Thammasat University, 1985), p. 8, 12.
24
Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay nationalism, p. 13.
25
Donald Tugby and Elise Tugby, ‘Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist relations in the Pattani
region: an interpretation,’ in Forbes, ed., The Muslims of Thailand, Vol. 2 (Gaya, India: Center
For South East Asian Studies, 1989), p. 73.
26
M. Ladd Thomas, ‘Thai Muslim separatism in south Thailand,’ in Forbes, Muslims ofThailand, Vol. 2, p. 21.
27
Stanley J. Tambiah, Levelling crowds: ethnonationalist conflicts and collective violence inSouth Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 16.
28
Tambiah, Levelling crowd, p. 22.
29‘Ignorance “cause of unrest”,’ Bangkok Post, 12 May 2006, p. 2.
30‘Buddhists, Muslims on path to mistrust and fear,’ The Nation, 13 March 2004, p. 6A;
Sanitsuda Ekachai, ‘What can the generals have been thinking,’ Bangkok Post, 5 August 2004, p.
11; ‘Buddhists tell PM they live in fear,’ Bangkok Post, 8 November 2004, p. 1; ‘Violence doesn’tspare even peace-loving Buddhist monks,’ Bangkok Post, 4 January 2005, p. 4.
31
William Roff, Kelantan (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974); Mohd. Taib Osman,
Islamic civilization in the Malay world (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka and The
Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 1997); Hasan Madmarn, Azyumardi Azra,
The origins of Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004);

 226 

Shamsul A. B. ‘Islam embedded: religion and plurality in Southeast Asia as a mirror for Europe,’
in Asia Europe Journal 3 (2005), pp. 159–78.
32
Peter Mandaville, Transnational Muslim politics (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 55.
33
Chaiwat Satha-Anand, ‘Praying in the rain: the politics of engaged Muslims in anti-war
protest in Thai society,’ Global Change, Peace and Security 16, 2 (2004), pp. 151–67.
34
Alisa Tang, ‘Arab education of Thai Muslims under fire,’ 14 April 2004, at
http://www.boston.com.
35
Interview with Mr Mohammed Nafis Zakariyya, deputy head of mission, Embassy of
Pakistan, Bangkok, 25 October 2005.
36
Interview with Mr Mohsen Pakain, Iranian ambassador to Thailand, 15 September 2005.
37
Farish Noor, ‘Southern Thailand: A bloody mess about to get bloodier,’ and ‘The killings insouthern Thailand: a long history of persecution unrecorded,’ at: www.muslimwakeup.com.
38
Baradan Kuppusamy, ‘Thai unrest a serious problem for Malaysia,’ Dawn, 7 September
2005, at: www.dawn.com.
39
Thang D. Nguyen, ‘Thaksin can learn from Indonesia,’ The Jakarta Post, 26 September
2005, at: www.thejakartapost.com.
40‘Plight of Pattani Muslims highlighted by violence in southern Thailand,’ February 2004, at:www.muslimedia.com.
41‘Thailand’s Thaksin unfazed by condemnations after latest massacre of Muslims,’
December 2004, at: www.muslimedia.com.
42‘Thailand
buys
US
arms
for
war
in
Muslimsouth,’
at:http://islamonline.net/English/News/2005-07/14/article03.shtml.
43
Mohamed Gamal Arafa, ‘Thai Muslim massacred…what lies beneath,’ at:
http://islamonline.net.
44
Kazi Mahmood, ‘Thailand perpetuating the taming of Islam in Patani,’ 13 March 2002, at:
http://islamonline.net.
45‘Pattani erupts,’ 28 April 2004, at: http://islamonline.net.
46
Kareem Kamel, ‘Shock and awe in Pattani: Muslims under attack in Thailand,’ 12 May 2004,
at: http://islamonline.net.
47
Kamel, ‘Shock and awe.’48
http://www.oic-oci.org/press/english/2005-activity.htm, press release of 10 April 2005.
49
http://www.oic-oci.org/press/english/2005-activity.htm, press release of 1 June 2005.
50‘OIC doubts transfers were enough,’ Bangkok Post, 4 June 2005, p. 2; Anuraj Manibandhu,‘OIC team here to ferret out the truth,’ Bangkok Post, 7 June 2005, p. 11.
51‘Bid to keep south off the OIC agenda,’ Bangkok Post, 9 June 2005, p. 4.
52
Achara Ashayagachat, ‘OIC panel says unrest local issue—Surakiart,’ Bangkok Post, 10 June
2005, p. 3. Kantathi Suphamongkhon, ‘Govt keen to promote Muslim community,’ Bangkok Post,
2 July 2005, p. 8.
53
Achara Ashayagachat, ‘An internal issue of keen interest to outsiders,‘ Bangkok Post, 5 July
2005, p. 11.
54
http://www.oic-oci.org/press/english/2005-activity.htm, press release of 18 October 2005.
55‘Thaksin tells OIC sec-gen to read Koran,’ The Nation, 20 October 2005; ‘OIC slight: loaded
remarks strain relations,’ The Nation, 21 October 2005.
56‘Army chief given full power over far south—OIC chief urges govt to heed Islamic culture,’
Bangkok Post, 20 June 2006, p. 4.
57
Shanti Nair, Islam in Malaysian foreign policy (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 182.
58
Nair, Islam, p. 176.
59
‘Thailand faces Malay criticism,’ 10 November 2004, at: http://english.aljazeera.net.

 227 60

‘Mahathir urges autonomy for south Thailand,’ 29 October 2004, at: http://islamonline.net.
Vaudine England, ‘Malays reject accusations they aid Thai separatists,’ 6 May 2005, at:
http://www.iht.com.
62‘Malaysian party urges Thai-south talks,’ 3 September 2005, at: http://english.aljazeera.net .
63‘Diplomatic stalemate: KL says it won’t release “refugees”,’ 29 September 2005, at:
http://www.nationmultimedia.com; ‘KL’s envoy summoned for protest,’ Bangkok Post, 8 October
2005, p. 1; ‘Thaksin sees no need for talks with KL,’ Bangkok Post, 10 October 2005, p. 1; ‘ThaiM’sian war of words heats up,’ Bangkok Post, 19 October 2005, p. 2; ‘M’sia, Thailand still atodds,’ Bangkok Post, 28 October 2005, p. 3.
64‘“Autonomy” not a good world, both sides agree,’ The Nation, 23 November 2005.
65‘Rebels signal they may talk to end unrest,’ Bangkok Post, 5 October 2006, p. 1; ‘KL
promises not to interfere in south,’ Bangkok Post, 8 October 2006, p. 3; ‘Authorities seek two key
rebel leaders,’ Bangkok Post, 12 October 2006, p. 2; ‘KL may host negotiations with militants,’
Bangkok Post, 14 October 2006, p. 4.
66
Omar Farouk Bajunid, ‘The Malaysian factor in the prospects for peace in southern
Thailand’ in Imtiyaz Yusuf and Lars Peter Schmidt, ed., Understanding conflict and approachingpeace in southern Thailand (Bangkok: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2006), p. 235.
67
“KL backs ‘peace’ for far south,’ Bangkok Post, 19 October 2006, p. 1.
68
Michael Leifer, ‘The Islamic factor in Indonesia’s foreign policy: a case of functional
ambiguity,’ in Adeed Dawisha, ed., Islam in foreign policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), p. 144; Rizal Sukma, Islam in Indonesia foreign policy (London: RoutledgeCurzon,
2003).
69
Interview with Mr. Ibrahim Yusuf, Indonesian ambassador to Thailand, 20 October 2005.
70‘World’s largest Islamic group ends peace mission to Thailand,’ The Nation, 1 April 2005.
71
International Crisis Group, ‘Southern Thailand: insurgency, not jihad,’ Asia Report No. 98,
18 May 2005, pp. 37–8.
72‘SBPAC successor name agreed,’ Bangkok Post, 17 October 2006, p. 3.
73‘Sonthi plans to visit Muslim countries,’ Bangkok Post, 18 October 2006, p. 2.
61

 228 Glossary
agama
bilan

religion (a Malay word)a person whose duty is to call the faithful to the mosque for prayers fivetimes a day, from the Arabic word, “bilal”
budu
a type of fish sauce from Malaysia and southern Thailandchedi
stupa, a Buddhist building to enshrine a relic
Chularachamontri
royally appointed state counselor for Islamic affairs, officiallyrecognized as the spiritual leader of Muslims in Thailand
hadithrecords of sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad
hajj
pilgrimage (to Mecca)
halal“permissible”; for example, food prepared according to Islamic law iscalled “halal food”
ikhwahbrotherhood
imam
Islamic leader of a mosque whose primary duty is to lead the community
at prayers and who thus is generally regarded as a Muslim community
leaderIsan
the northeast region of Thailand
Jawi(or Yawi) a Malay word for the Arabic script used for writing Malay,
often incorrectly used in Thailand as a synonym for the Malay language
jihad“struggle for the cause of Islam,” often used especially for struggle
against its perceived enemies
kafir
non-believer
kamnanthe head of a subdistrict
koteb(khateb) a person whose duty is to give sermons on Fridays during theweekly Islamic congregation at the mosquekris
a dagger with a distinctive curved blade, typical of the Malay world
Krue Ze(Krue-se) historic unfinished mosque in Pattani, site of an incident on 28
April 2004 when, after a coordinated series of attacks on government
targets, thirty-two militants took refuge in the mosque and were all
subsequently killed by security forceskufr
disbelief in God
Lim Kor Niew (Lim Kun Yew) a Chinese shrine in Pattani, believed to be
mythologically connected to Krue Se mosquemadrasahMuslim religious seminary
pondok(or ponoh), boarding school teaching Islamic subjects
pong-langa wooden xylophone played by two players
roti
a wheatflour pancake, originally from South Asia
Rumi
Malay language written in the Latin alphabet 229 sasanashari’ahshirk
SongkrantadikaTak Baitambonthesaphiban
toh-kru
toh-kali
ulama
ummah
uztaz
wai
wat

religion, often meaning Buddhism
the body of revealed laws found both in the Qur’an and the Prophetic
Traditions (Sunnah)
polytheism
Thai new year (mid April)religious school for small Muslim children (abbreviation of Taman
Didikan Kanak-kanak)subdistrict town in Narathiwat, site of an incident on 25 October 2004
when security forces attacked a demonstration, resulting in seven deaths
by gunshot, and a further seventy-eight died from suffocation duringtransportation to a detention centera subdistrict“rule over territory,” an administrative system introduced in the latenineteenth century
religious teacher, religious leader of a pondok
judge in an Islamic court, from the Arabic word qa-di
Muslim religious scholars
the worldwide Muslim community
an Arabic term for a male teacher
a gesture of greeting or respect, with hands placed palms together in frontof the chest or facea Buddhist temple

 230 Abbreviations
ACSBP
ASEAN
BPP
CE
CIA
CPM
CPT
CSIS
CTIC
DIILS
GWOT
ICC
ILEA
IMF
IMT-GT
ISOC
JI
MNNA
MP
NATO
NIDA
NRC
NSC
OIC
PAS
PSU
PULO
SBPAC
SBPPBC
SEATO
TNA

Administration Center for Southern Border Provinces
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Border Patrol Police
common era (= AD)Central Intelligence Agency
Civilian-Police-Military Task Force
Communist Party of Thailand
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
Global War on Terror
International Criminal Court
International Law Enforcement Academy
International Monetary Fund
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand Growth Triangle
Internal Security Operation Command
Jemaah Islamiyah
Major Non-NATO Ally
member of parliament
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
National Institute of Development Administration
National Reconciliation Commission
National Security Council
Organization of Islamic Conference
Parti Islam Malaysia
Prince of Songkhla University
Patani United Liberation Organization
Southern Border Provinces Administration Center
Southern Border Provinces Peace Building CommandSoutheast Asian Treaty Organization
Thai News Agency

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