The Nanjing Incident: Japanese Eyewitness Accounts
ARA Ken’ich
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Facts, 2020
Review by Tadashi HAMAOn December 13, 1937, the capital city of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s empire,
Nanjing, fell into the hands of the Japanese military. This should have been the pivotal
moment in the undeclared war between the Republic of China and Japan—“foreigndevils” took the Nationalists’ sacred capital. About a week earlier, on December 7,
Chiang and his staff quietly abandoned Nanjing (and its defenseless Chinese residents) inexchange for space and time, hoping to draw the Japanese into a war of attrition within
the vastness of China. (Designated Nanjing Garrison Commander Tang Shengzhi, andother top military officers, abandoned Nanjing on December 12, leaving remaining
conscripts to fend for themselves.) Like a Hollywood film, America and its allies would
arrive in time to save Chiang and his cronies from the clutches of the dastardly Japanese.
The Chinese nationalist narrative has us believe that the Japanese treated Nanjing as theBritish did with Washington, D.C. during the War of 1812: systematic sacking. Unlike theBritish, however, the Japanese had no such plan for Nanking. In fact, Chinese Communist
Party leader Mao Tse-tung, vying with Chiang for domination of China, in his 1938 On
Protracted War, chided Japan for its “five errors” including not being aggressive enoughto “annihilate” the Nationalists.
Events leading up to the capture of Nanjing have been exquisitely elaborated elsewhere(e.g. Higashinakano, S., 2005, The Nanking Massacre. Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan). Readers
should also be aware of Chinese Communist infiltration of the Nationalist leadership. TheNationalists goals were to secure international aid, for Chiang and his cronies, and toexpel the Japanese barbarians from China (Higashinakano, S., 2008, Top-Secret Chinese
Nationalist Documents Reveal the Truth about the Nanking Incident. Tokyo: SekaiShuppan). Having a broad understanding of the background to the so-called “NanjingMassacre” will give readers much needed context for the current book.
Author and freelance historian Ara Ken’ich interviewed Japanese who ended up in andaround Nanjing before, during and after its fall. When they were interviewed, many werein their 70s and 80s—a few were in their 90s—yet they were generally lucid and healthy
enough to recall their days in Nanjing. Nonetheless, readers should be aware thatmemories, even of traumatic experiences, are fluid over time. Ara mentions that a few of
the interviewees’ memories were not entirely clear or confused. Witnesses can also bemade to “remember” a past event that is either entirely made-up (“false” or “implanted”memory) or distorted. One of Ara’s interviewees, reporter Suzuki Jiro of the Tokyo
Nichinhich Shimbun, claimed to have seen a “massacre”, and based solely on hisrecollections, Suzuki asks us to believe him. While eyewitness accounts aid in bringing
the past to life, it should be remembered that the mind is not a video recorder andphysical evidence should be used to corroborate eyewitness accounts. A few of Ara’s
interviewees did have photographs from their days in Nanjing, but none showed anythingsuggestive of a massacre or any “war crime”.

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The interviewees were mainly Japanese military personnel and journalists attached tomilitary units (particularly to headquarters). Japanese civilians, such as Japanese businessowners, were not included, as most likely left Nanjing: with news of the massacre ofabout 200 Japanese in Tongzhuo in July, the beginning of an undeclared state of war inAugust in Shanghai and the November 27 statement by Nanjing garrison Commander
Tang calling for foreign residents to leave.
With the fall of Nanjing on December 13, the most striking observation was the absenceof people, either soldiers or civilians, within the walled portion of Nanjing, the “castle”,
except for Chinese civilians in the so-called international safety zone. (While theInternational Safety Zone Committee claimed 200,000 refugees within the safety zone,
numbers in Ara’s book ranges from 20,000 to 300,000.) Interviewees said that the castle
was “empty and quite,” that there was “no gunfire,” “the town and the streets lookedclean” and there were “no abandoned bodies”.
Within the castle, reporters used abandoned buildings for their headquarters as well as forlodging. Around the time of the Japanese military ceremonial entrance on December 17,
interviewees noted that Chinese residents opened businesses throughout the castle. Theseobservations contrasts with the orthodox history, that endless waves of Japanese soldiersmassacred civilians and raped tens of thousands for the next two months.
The overall commander of Japanese forces, General Matsui Iwane, previously sent orders
to all field commanders to maintain “strict military discipline” and authorized limited
numbers of troops into the castle; about 8,000 were eventually allowed in. As for most of
the units that participated in the capture of Nanjing, by the end of December, they moved
on to areas of operation, beyond Nanjing.
Not all interviewees were able to access all areas of the castle, as Japanese sentries wereposted to keep order, especially of the safety zone. (One reported “Chinese guards” at theentrance of the safety zone.) Indeed, many of the interviewees, including former soldiers,
were concerned of guerillas, stragglers and deserters among the civilians within the safetyzone. Okada Takashi, assistant to Commander Matsui, saw Chinese military uniforms“scattered around the town.” On first entering Nanjing, reporter Minami Masayoshi ofthe Shin-Aichi Shimbun stated that he saw “two to three” corpses of partially burnedJapanese soldier hanging from plane trees on Zhongshan East Road. In terms of the“massacre” claimed by the Chinese, it is likely that guerilla corpses were mistakenly
identified as those of civilians. Adachi Kazuo of the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun, suggested thatthe “several thousand” (he was not sure) guerrillas were killed both inside and outside ofthe castle. It should not be forgotten that urban warfare is not a “cakewalk,” as blithely
stated by a self-righteous Assistant Secretary of Defense Kenneth Lee Adelman before
the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. With a few corpses of non-uniformed terrorists lying in thestreet, perhaps it should not be surprising that liberal democracies today wail the loudest
in protest of alleged “war crimes”.
In general, reporters are a rich source of massacre stories. “Stories” is used in the sensethat reporters neither witnessed first-hand nor bothered to verify massacres. For example,

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Sato Shinju of the Tokyo Nichinhich Shimbun heard that “3,000 Chinese prisoners” werecaught, lined up and “shot with a heavy machine gun” at Xiaguan, a port town outside ofthe castle, to the northwest. (It was also through this town that the Chinese militaryleadership fled from Nanjing before the Japanese arrived.) Sato later visited Xiaguan andsaw no bodies. Reporter Suzuki claimed to have seen “more than 1,000” bodies atXiaguan. Hosonami Takashi of the Domei Tsushin claimed to have seen about “100 or soChinese prisoners” being burned to death at Xiaguan. He also “heard around 20,000”
prisoners were killed, with “10,000 or fewer” killed at Xiaguan. Hosonami mentioned acolleague who would be a good reference to interview concerning Nanjing around thetime of the so-called “massacre”. However, Hosonami had forgotten that his colleague
passed away. Mori Hiroshi of the Yomiuri Shimbun heard that “many” Chinese prisoners
were taken to the Yangtze River (presumably to Xiaguan) and shot. Mori also “heard”
that the “shore was full of bodies.” However, reporter Taguchi Risuke of the Hochi
Shimbun, also went to Xiaguan and “saw nothing”.
There were stories of “massacres” within the castle as well. Reporter Suzuki was adamantthat he witnessed a massacre—Japanese soldiers threw “smiling” and “laughing” Chinese
prisoners down a rampart and survivors were killed with a pickax. He heard of bodies
piled up at the Guanghua Gate entrance to the castle—there were so many corpses thatJapanese tanks ran over them. Ara notes that Suzuki was confident that he saw“massacres”. However, Suzuki does not clearly remember when he entered the castle. Healso took for granted as true of the two Japanese officers who claimed to be in a “100man killing contest”. However, because of his story, the Nationalists executed these men
as war criminals after the end of the war. On reading Ara’s interview, Suzuki appeared
rather blasé about it all. (Asami Kazuio, reporter for the Tokyo Nichinich Shimbun, one ofthe originators of the “100-man killing contest” story, stated to Ara that he has “no clear
memory of the time” but fervently believes in the Nanjing “massacre of the century.”)
Aside from the ugliness of war, reporters spoke of normal life following their entry intothe castle. After the Japanese military ceremonial entrance, reporters such as Higuchi
Tetsuo, cameraman for the Yomiuri Shimbun, frequented the red-light district in the castle.
Higuchi was in Nanjing for about a month after the ceremonial entrance. As far as
Higuchi could tell, Japanese solders were not allowed to enter the red light district.
Reporter Minami concurred. When asked, Higuchi said he did not know if there weremilitary “comfort stations” near Nanjing. That Japanese military personnel were notallowed into civilian brothels has been mentioned elsewhere (Hata, I., 2018. Comfort
Women and Sex in the Battle Zone. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield). In fact, a staff
officer with the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, Captain Onishi Hajime, confirmed that acomfort station for soldiers was set up (either within or outside the castle).
Unlike the soldiers who left the immediate area to chase the retreating Nationalist army, afew reporters were in Nanjing during the period of the “massacres” and “mass rapes”. For
example, Mitoma Mikinosuke, of the Fukuoka Nichinichi Shimbun lived in Nanjing for 6years after the capture of Nanjing and then, after the end of the war. another half year
near Nanjing with “10,000 Japanese residents”. He did not hear of a “massacre”, at all,during his time in Nanjing.

3The soldiers interviewed by Ara also have enlightening first hand observations of war,that it is an extremely dirty and morally and physically demanding task. Indeed, several
reporters empathize with the military’s point of view—as they had to share limited
rations, sleep wherever there was shelter during a cold December while avoiding enemy
fire. The current book does bring the past to the present—but rebukes claims of the past,in that that the Japanese deliberately sought Chinese in Nanjing to murder.

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