Regionalism and Business
Tomoo Marukawa (Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo)
Introduction
There are plenty of economic forecasts suggesting that regional economic integration
will bring about positive economic gains to its participants. Tsutsumi and Kiyota (2002),
for example, estimate that Japan’s cumulative GDP growth rate during the period from1995 to 2010 will rise by 0.07 percentage point if the Economic Partnership Agreement(EPA) between Japan and Singapore is realized, and will rise by 1.02 percentage point if
Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia andthe Philippines will join the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). According to their estimation,
no country or region except for Hong Kong will suffer a negative impact on its GDP byjoining the FTA or EPA. Why, then, the development of regional economic integration
between Japan and Asian countries seems so slow?
The reason for the reluctance on the Japanese side is obvious; Japan’s
agriculture will be negatively affected by regional economic integration with Asian
countries which generally have more competitive agriculture than that of Japan’s. Even
though the loss of production in agriculture by regional integration will be more thancompensated by gains in other sectors, Japanese farmers resist suffering such loss. In
more generalized terms, the adjustment cost among the producers consists a stumbling
block to regional economic integration albeit the mutual gains of the participants’national economies. Therefore, we can infer that not only the participant countries’
national interests but also the interests of the relevant producers, especially thepolitically powerful ones, will have a major impact on the success/failure and thecontents of regional economic integration. The case of European economic integration
supports this point. According to Sandholtz and Zysman (1989), European business
firms supported European integration in order to face the rise of Japanese industry.
After the failure of the policy by European countries to develop national champions inelectronics and telecommunications industries during the 1970s, European firms acrossnational borders moved towards collaboration in order to take advantage of scaleeconomy. One example of such collaboration is the European Strategic Programme for
Research and Development in Information Technology (ESPRIT), initiated by twelve
European electronics firms. In the background of European economic integration there
were spontaneous movements for collaboration among European firms. The reason that
the European electronics firms aimed for collaboration was that they had a common

interest in coping with the rise of Japanese electronics industry.
Such spontaneous movements among private enterprises across national
borders are lacking in East Asia. Private enterprises in Japan, for example, do support
East Asian regional economic integration, but they have never tried to join hands with
Korean, Chinese, nor with ASEAN enterprises to influence governments. The reason forthe contrast of business firms’ attitude towards regional integration between Europe
and East Asia can be attributed to the difference in the distribution of interests amongfirms of different countries. Japanese electronics firms, for example, share many
common interests among them, but they share little with Korean, Chinese and ASEAN
electronics firms.
More than ten years have passed since European integration. Has the attempt
to reverse the trend of declining Europe and rising Japan born fruit? At least in one
sector there was a clear trend of Europe’s rise and Japan’s decline: the mobile
telecommunications hardware industry.
In this paper, we will discuss how the distribution of producers’ interests
among relevant countries will affect the formation of regional economic integration by
examining the mobile telecommunications hardware sector.
The Rise and Fall of Mobile Phone Industry in Japan and Europe
Japan is not a latecomer in mobile telecommunications. In fact, mobile phone services
started earlier in Japan (1979) than Europe (1981 in Nordic countries) and the UnitedStates (1984). Although having more experience in the industry, Japanese mobile
telecommunications hardware vendors (including mobile phone handsets and basestations) have been lagging behind European competitors since the latter half of 1990s,
and have even been taken over by Korea’s Samsung, a latecomer in the industry. Fig. 1
shows the changes of the sales of Nokia, the world’s largest mobile phone vendor, NEC
Network and Matsushita Telecommunications, the top two mobile phone vendors ofJapan: Nokia’s lead over NEC and Matsushita is opening wider and wider since 1998.
Table 1 shows the market share of various firms in the world mobile phone market.
Japanese mobile phone vendors’ shares are stagnating around two to five percent. Theirshares are correlated with the relative size of Japanese mobile phone market in theworld, because Japanese mobile phone market is virtually dominated by Japanesevendors and the Japanese vendors sell few mobile phone handsets outside of Japan.
Domestic sales of Matsushita Communications, for example, account for 73 percent of
its total sales, which stands in sharp contrast with the case of Nokia, which sells only

1.1 percent of its total sales in their homeland, Finland. Japanese vendors have little
presence even in East Asia, where they have enjoyed high reputation and high market
share in consumer electronics in the past. In the Chinese market, six Japanese mobile
phone vendors have established plants catering for the domestic market, but none ofthem appear in the top ten mobile phone vendor ranking (Table 2). They not only lag
behind the European, American and Korean vendors but also the Chinese ones.

Figure 1 The Sales Amount of Nokia, Matsushita Telecom and NEC Network
40000

35000

30000

Million US$

25000
Nokia
Matsushita Telecom
NEC Network

20000

15000

10000

5000

0
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

(Source) Annual Reports of the Firms

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Table 1 Market shares of major vendors in the world mobile phone market
Nokia
Motorola
Samsung
Ericsson
Siemens
LG Electronics
Matsushita
Mitsubishi Electric
NEC
ArcatelKyoseraOthers

1996
20.4
26.0

1997
19.1
23.5

1998
22.4
19.8

1999
26.9
16.9

12.3

14.8

14.6

10.5

2001
36.0
11.0
5.0
7.0

6.0

8.2

2.4

4.3

42.6

43.2

45.7

5.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
16.0

41.3

2003
33.6
14.1
9.9
9.0
8.5
5.2

28.6

Base
Units
Units
Units
Units
Units
Units
World Production
66000000 107810000 162850000 284000000 374040000 533356522
Source311324(Source)
１ Nikkei Sangyo Shinbun Feb 10, 1999
2 Nikkei Market Access Yearbook, IT Basic Data
３ Nokia, Sekai saidai no keitai denwa meka
4 IDC Press release

Table 2 Market share of Top ten vendors in China’s mobile phone market
VendorMarket share (%)

Nokia

17.0

Motorola

14.8

Samsung

8.3

Bird

7.8

TCL

6.8

Amoi

4.6

Konka

3.9

SonyEricsson

3.9

DBTEL

3.7

Philips

2.8(Source) Kimura (2005)
The small presence of Japanese mobile phone vendors outside of Japan cannot
be attributed to their technological weakness. In fact, Japanese vendors were leading
ahead of Nokia, Ericsson and Samsung at least until 1995 in developing mobile phone
technology.

Fig.

2

shows

the

cumulative

numberofpatents

relatedtotelecommunications acquired in the United States by Matsushita, NEC, and otherworld’s leading mobile phone vendors. As it is usual for vendors to acquire patents

mainly in their home grounds, it is natural that US-based Motorola has always been theleading patent holder. For Japanese, Korean, and European vendors the US market is aforeign market, hence the number of patents in the United States may reveal theirrelative technological capabilities.
Figure 2 Cumulative Number of Patents Acquired in United States

3500

3000

2500

2000

Motorola

1500

Ericsson

1000

Nokia
Matsushita

NEC

500

20
02

19
98

19
96

19
94

19
92

19
90

19
88

19
86

19
84

19
82

19
80

19
78

19
76

20
00

Samsung0

NEC had more patents than Ericsson until 1996, and Matsushita had more
patents than Nokia until 1995. Both NEC and Matsushita had more patents thanSamsung as of 2003. These facts suggest that NEC and Matsushita were leading
European vendors until 1995 in mobile communications technology, but they have beentaken over by the Europeans, and caught up by Samsung since then. The relative
decline of NEC and Matsushita is not the reason but rather the result of their decline in
the US market.
The Impact of Mobile Phone Standards
If not the technological capability, then what brought about the rise of the European
vendors and the fall of Japanese vendors in world mobile phone market? The mostplausible answer to this question is the success and failure of mobile phone standards
that originate in Europe and Japan. Funk (1998) argues that the market shares of thevendors of mobile phone terminals, base stations and infrastructures are influenced by
the success/failure of the mobile phone standards that originate in the vendors’ homecountry. Hence, when AMPS and TACS, standards which originate in the United States,
had the largest number of mobile phone subscribers in the world, Motorola was thelargest mobile phone hardware vendor in the world. When GSM, the standard which
originated in Europe, attracted the largest number of subscribers in the world,
European firms, including Nokia, Ericsson, Siemens, and Alcatel, have become theleaders in the world market. Japanese vendors’ failure to penetrate the markets outsideof Japan, on the other hand, can be explained by the fact that the Japanese standard,
PDC, failed to be adopted by other countries. PDC remains to be the dominant standard
in the Japanese market, which explains the little presence of European and American
vendors in the Japanese market. Table 3 summarizes the various standards adopted by
the major mobile phone markets in different periods.
The reason why the national standard’s competitiveness affects thecompetitiveness of national vendors can be explained as follows; First, it is natural formobile phone vendors to try to enter their domestic market before trying to enter
foreign markets, for it is usually easier to acquire information on the former than that of
the latter. National telecommunications authorities may also favor the domestic
vendors in providing information. Secondly, it is not easy for a firm to succeed indifferent standards at the same time, because firms must incur the cost of developing
mobile phone terminals for different standards separately---for example, a firm cannot
simply double the output of the mobile phone handsets catered for the Japanese market
and sell them in Europe. Not only the circuits and software must be redesigned in orderto adapt to different frequencies and telecommunications protocols but also the size ofthe handsets may change because the required transmission power is different. Hencefirms can economize on development costs if their domestic standard becomes the world
standard.

Table 3 Mobile phone standards of the major markets
Country

1st Generation

2nd Generation

UnitedAMPS

DAMPS,

States

3rd Generation Low Mobility

GSM, CDMA2000

None

CDMA,

Japan

NTT,TACSPDC,CDMA

WCDMA

PHS

Nordic

NMT

GSM

WCDMA

None

TACS

GSM

WCDMA

CT1

Italy

RTMS, TACS

GSM

WCDMA

DECT

FranceRC2000､NMT

GSM

WCDMA

None

Germany

CNETZ

GSM

WCDMA

PHS,DECT

Korea

TACS

CDMA

CDMA2000

None

China

TACS

GSM, CDMAWCDMA,PHSCountries
UnitedKingdom

CDMA2000,
TD-SCDMA(Source) Funk(1998), the author.

Figure 3 The Distribution of Mobile Phone Subscribers
among OECD Countries
100%
80%

Other OECD

60%
40%

FranceGermany
United States

20%
0%
1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

Japan
Nordic Countries

Mobile phone service in the United States started a few years later than in
Nordic countries and Japan, but since the United States had larger demand for mobile
communications than the others, the size of its market had quickly took over thepreceding countries (Fig. 3). From 1985 until 1994, the United States accounted foraround 50 percent of the OECD market as a whole, which was almost the same with thesize of the world market. This period corresponds to the 1st Generation of mobile phonetechnology. The American standard, AMPS, was the most widespread standard during
the 1st generation mainly because it had become the standard of the largest mobile
phone market in the world. Other advanced countries in mobile phone technology,
namely Japan, Nordic countries, Germany, France, and Italy, adopted their own
national standard. It was natural for latecomers in mobile phone services, including theUnited Kingdom, China, and Korea, to adopt the most successful standard in the world
at that time, AMPS, which is also known as TACS, because they can take advantage oflow hardware costs that were brought about by scale economy.
The United States and Motorola, the champion of AMPS, even tried topenetrate the markets which already had their own standards. One of such markets
was Japan. The United States succeeded in persuading Japan to open the mobile phonemarket to new service providers and in having the new service provider to adopt AMPS.
Then in 1987, 1989, and 1994, the US government, using the threat of retaliatory tariffs,
forced Japan to expand the frequency allocated to the service provider using AMPS.
This measure would open up the Japanese market for Motorola’s mobile phone
terminals. Japan had been protecting domestic vendors by adopting a different
standard with the United States. Without such protection, many Japanese vendors
would not be able to survive in the face of Motorola’s competition.
Figure 4 The Distribution of Subscribers of Different Mobile Phone Standards
100%
80%

3GSM*
TDMA
PDC
IDEN
GSM
CDMA

60%
40%
20%

03

02

01

00

04
20

20

20

20

20

98

97

96

99
19

19

19

19

95
19

19

94

0%

(Source) GSMA Statistics
The bitter experiences with the United States and Motorola might be one ofreasons why Japan insisted upon having its own standard in the 2nd generation, whichbegan around 1993. While Europe created a common standard for 2nd generation mobile
phone, namely GSM, Japan adopted its own standard, PDC. The success of GSM andthe failure of PDC are too obvious: PDC remains to be a domestic standard until today,while GSM has almost become a world standard, with 210 countries and regions
adopting it as of 2004 and occupying 75 percent of the world mobile phone subscribers.
The initial rapid growth of PDC and the decline after that in the market shares ofvarious standards (Fig. 4) reflects the changes in the relative size of the Japanese
mobile phone market in the world.
Then, why GSM succeeded in becoming a virtual world standard while PDC did
not? Was GSM more advanced than PDC technologically? Although, both GSM and PDC
belong to TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) technology, PDC can utilize
frequencies several times more efficiently than GSM, according to Nihon Keizai
Shinbun (1999). If this is so, many countries adopted inferior technology even though
they had the chance to adopt PDC. Funk(1998) insists that the early introduction ofservice, rapid growth of subscribers in the initial stage, and openness are the key factorsthat determine the success/failure of a mobile phone standard to become a world
standard. But in the case of GSM, we must note that the standard was designed as aworld standard from the very beginning. The inception of GSM dates back to theEuropean Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administration (CEPT) in 1982,
which decided to form a common digital mobile phone standard by 26 European
countries. CEPT formed a group to push forward the standardization, Group Special
Mobile, and later on the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
established in 1989 contributed to the establishment of GSM (Steinbock [2002]). Hence,
when the operation of GSM service started in 1992, it was already a European standard,with 48 countries adopting GSM by the end of 1993. After the operation of PDC had
started in Japan in 1994, Japanese telecommunications authorities tried to disseminate
the technology in ASEAN countries, but they found that many countries were alreadyadopting GSM. What the latecomer countries value most is the fact that GSM is themost likely to become the world standard. Adopting the world standard, the subscribersof these countries can take advantage of low hardware costs and internationalroaming---that is, to be able to use mobile phones in other countries---with othercountries sharing the same standard. This explains why the share of GSM is still
growing in the face of competition with other standards, such as PDC and CDMA, which
may be more sophisticated than GSM.
Mobile Phone Standards in East Asia
The establishment of a common mobile phone standard in Europe was closely
related to the European regional integration. The free mobility of people among

European countries necessitates a common mobile phone standard that allows mobile
phone users to use their phones in any EU country.
In East Asia, on the contrary, mobile phone standards are different between
nations, making international roaming only partially available. Japan adopted its own
national standard, PDC, and its second largest mobile phone career adopted CDMA, astandard that originated in the United States. China’s largest career adopted GSM,
while its second career adopted both GSM and CDMA. Korea adopted CDMA. Japan,
China, and Korea, albeit having CDMA in common, are far from creating a common
standard. No discussion on the integration of mobile phone standards seemed to takeplace among the three countries. Even in the 3rd generation, the three countries are
pursuing their own standards; Japan has already started operation of WCDMA, which
is a standard created by NTT Docomo and European vendors including Nokia andEricsson. Korea will join CDMA2000, a standard created by US firms and Korean firms.
China is expected to give licenses to both WCDMA and CDMA2000 careers, but themost favored by the authorities is TD-SCDMA, a national standard which has beendeveloped for the most part by domestic enterprises with the collaboration of Siemens.
The authorities will allocate the largest frequency range to TD-SCDMA, which will
promote the development of TD-SCDMA careers. The reason why Chinese authorities
pursue an original standard is because they want to expand the market opportunities ofdomestic vendors, which have advantages over foreign vendors in the TD-SCDMA
hardware and software markets.
Many people, including Watanabe (2004), argue that de facto economic
integration has already been realized in East Asia. The expansion of trade and foreign
direct investment among East Asian countries may lead to such impression, but once wetake the case of standards into account, we have a completely different picture. East
Asian telecommunication authorities are setting up non-tariff barriers against eachother by adopting different mobile phone standards, sacrificing the convenience ofmobile phone users by disabling international roaming. Firms of different countries
seem to be supportive or indifferent to such segregation of markets among East Asian
countries. At least, they are not joining hands---like the European firms---to create acommon standard.
International collaboration for East Asian integration remains in the academic
and bureaucratic circles, and no similar movements are taking place in the business
community. Ogita (2004) points out that Japan’s FTA strategy has been driven by policy
makers and not by the business community. Taniguchi (2004), a Japanese diplomat,
stresses the strengthening the political and diplomatic ties among participants as themain positive impact of regional integration, while providing only poor examples of its
economic advantages. According to Marugami et als. (2005), what the Japanesemanufacturing enterprises except by signing FTAs with Asian countries are: first, theinvigorating of trade and investment, and secondly, the strengthening of the protectionof intellectual property rights. In other words, Japanese firms expect that FTAs will
help them cope with the infringement of intellectual property rights by Asian firms. The
most prominent reason for Japanese firms to support the creation of FTAs or EPAs with
Asian countries is that, “if East Asian countries should enter into FTAs with Europe
and the United States (earlier than with Japan), we will be handicapped against theEuropean and American firms in conducting business with East Asia.”(Nihon
Keidanren [2003])
The above indicates that Japanese business community never saw East Asian
economic integration as an opportunity to improve the global positions of East Asianfirms as a whole, but rather an opportunity to better cope with Asian copycats and tobetter compete with European and American rivals.
ConclusionThe

different

attitudes

betweenthe

Europeanbusiness

firms

and

telecommunication authorities and those of East Asia can be attributed to the differenceof the distribution of firms’ interest. In early 1990s, European firms, such as Nokia,
Ericsson, Siemens, and Alcatel, although being competitors, were in similar positions in
the world market, facing the common threat of Japanese and American firms. East
Asian firms, on the other hand, are very different from each other. Chinese hardware
vendors are no match for Korean and Japanese vendors in technological capability.
Japanese vendors may suffer from the influx of Korean mobile phones once thenon-tariff barrier of Japan is removed. In some other industries, such as clothing andhouse ware, the Chinese may win, and in the automobile industry, the Japanese may
win. In sum, the relationship among Japanese, Korean, and Chinese firms are vertical,
by which I mean that there is a wide gap of competitiveness among the firms in
different countries, while the relationship among European firms are more horizontal,
by which I mean that firms of different countries have similar levels of competitiveness.
The vertical and horizontal relationship can easily be detected by checking the flow offoreign direct investment, which usually flows from the more advantageous to the lessadvantageous.
The fact that the relationship among East Asian firms is vertical must be a

good reason to push forward regional integration. Because it means that thecomparative advantage of each sector is obvious and the gain of free trade is large. But
in Japan, Korea, and China many people do not want to lose even the comparatively
disadvantageous industries. China and Korea believe that they can catch up Japan in
the industries which are underdeveloped at the moment. Japan’s comparatively
disadvantageous industries are often the politically influential sectors. With vertical
relationships and the less competitive believing that they can overcome someday themore competitive, business firms across the borders cannot easily unite together topress the governments towards regional integration in East Asia.
Reference
Funk, Jeffrey L. “Competition between Regional Standards and the Success andFailure

of

Firms

in

the

World-wide

MobileCommunication

Market, ”

Telecommunications Policy, Vol.22, No.4/5 1998. pp.419-441.
GSM World Website (www.gsmworld.com)
Marugami, Takashi et. als. 丸上貴史他(2005）「わが国製造業企業の海外事業展開に関する調査報告」『開発金融研究所報』第 22 号
Nihon Keizai Shinbun 日本経済新聞（社説）(1999）「日本発の世界標準を作る方法」『日本経済新聞』1999 年 3 月 29 日
Nihon Keidanren 日本経済団体連合会編(2003）『活力と魅力溢れる日本をめざして』
Ogita, Tatsufumi 荻田竜史(2004）「『超大国』米国と『遅れて来た国』日本の FTA 戦略」（渡
辺編[2004]所収）
Sandholtz, Wayne and John Zysman (1989), “1992: Recasting the European Bargain”,

World Politics, Vol.42, No.1.
Shimizu,Takao, Toshio Inomata and Kenichi Matsuda (2005), ” An Analysis ofMacroeconomic Effects of the East Asian FTA,” mimeo.
Steinbock,Dan (2003) Wireless Horizon, American Management Association.
Suda, Yuko 須田祐子「日本の電気通信政策をめぐる外圧と国内政治」『国際政治』第 122号、1999 年 9 月
Taniguchi, Makoto 谷口誠『東アジア共同体』岩波書店

2004 年

Tsutsumi Masahiko and Kozo Kiyota 堤雅彦・清田耕造(2002)「日本を巡る自由貿易協定の効果:CGE モデルによる計測」JCER Discussion Paper No.74.
Watanabe, Toshio 渡辺利夫(2004）「経済統合を進める東アジア」（渡辺利夫編『東アジア経済統合への道』勁草書房）

討論要旨
討論者 1（コメント(C)と質問(Q)、丸川氏返答(M)）
・ C：ここでの「規格」の問題に同感である。特に日本の場合、その導入が極めて政治的・外交的に決定され、携帯に関しては日本の負けである。
ここでもう少し「Standard（標準）」という観点へと話を広げてみると、イギリスの国際会計基準はアメリカでも採用され、世界へ広まっている。こう考えると、欧州の世界標
準発信力はすごい。では、なぜすごいのかについて、丸川氏の（欧州企業の競争・協力関係からの）説明だけではまだ不十分なように思える。
・ Q：生産者の利害配置の類型化について、欧州企業の競争・協力関係から欧州統合（EU）
がもたらされたとの指摘は説得力があるが、携帯の端末メーカーについてはそれが当てはまるのか？携帯端末メーカーのなかでノキアが一人勝ちの現状では、そのように言えるのか？
・ M：結果的に現在はノキアの一人勝ちのようになっている。しかし、全てのメーカーとはいえないが、EU により成功・復活した企業も多い。例えば、スウェーデンのエリク
ソンは、1980 年代初めごろには、消費財における競争では日本に負けることを覚悟し、資本財への生産に集中しようかと悲観視していたほどであったが、EU により復活した。
討論者 2
・ Q1：日本が規格競争に敗れたという認識には違和感を抱く。第一・第二世代においては国内需要が大きいため、規格を統一する必要がなかった。すなわち、国内市場を目標にしていたために、世界で勝負するつもりがなかったということではないか。
そうして、これから地域主義に関して言える事は日本市場の厄介さである。戦後日本（企業）は輸出依存度が極めて低く、企業の戦略が国内志向である。そのような国が地域統合の一員になることをどう考えていくべきか？
・ M1：その通りだと思う。通信業界において各国とも当初は国内向けであったが、第一世代から第二、第三世代まで約 10 年の間であっという間にグローバル化してしまった。
その間、日本企業は国内市場に一生懸命であったために、気がついたら世界が GSM 規格、つまりグローバル化されていた。ただし、私はその規格がグローバル化する過程における EU の役割を注目している。
・ Q2：規格と端末メーカーのシェアが直結しないのではないか。一般的には資本輸出、すなわち海外で提携や買収を行えばシェアの拡大は可能である。例えば、ネットワーク外部性の問題となった VHS や DVD では、東芝やソニーが世界市場で各国の企業と競争している。携帯メーカーの一部が電電ファミリーだったことを考慮すると、携帯（通信）産業の議論の場合には留保が必要である。
・ M2：論理的にはその通りだと思う。ただし、規格作りに最初から参画した先発企業と後発参入企業との間に特許利用の差（ハンデ）があることを指摘したい。最初から参画していた企業間ではクロス・ライセリングをしているだろうが、日本企業の場合には特許料を支払わなければならないだろう。これがある国の企業発の規格でその地場企業のシェアが大きいという理屈付けである。

討論者 3
・ C1：当初は民間メーカーと政府（郵政）との間に認識の「ズレ」があったが、第三世代に関しては欧州規格への統合に動いた。
・ C2：先の（企業の国内市場志向についての）質問と関連するが、日本における東アジア
経済統合の話は、海外に進出して活動している企業はそれを望んでいるが、国内市場を対象に活動している企業は日本市場が伸びていれば良いと思っている。そういう意味で、
海外進出企業と国内企業との間にも認識の「ズレ」があると思う。
討論者 4
・ C：欧州統合は政治学から見れば成功した。しかし経済学から見れば、欧州統合というregionalization は独占とカルテルのケースで、コストが高く消費者にとっては好ましくない。日本やアメリカでは企業間に競争がありコストが安く、第三世代では参入のチャンスがあると思う。
・ M：欧州統合で独占にするつもりはなかったと思う。欧州統合により欧州企業が有利になる根拠としては、拡大した市場に先に参入して規模の経済を確保すれば日本企業の参入が難しいというのが私の認識である。ただその場合でも、欧州企業間の競争があったはずである。
討論者 5
・ Q：丸川氏は、統合による各国の利益配置の類型化を EU、北米（NAFTA）、東アジアの三つに分類した。EU は、対等な競争が成り立ち、日本・米国に対する共通の対抗意識を持つことからも、経済界から経済統合への動きが進んだ。他方北米では、傍から見ても米国の一人勝ちが明らかで、米国の都合のよい経済統合となった。東アジアは、NAFTA
型に進みそうだが、韓国、中国などは垂直的な関係になることに 0 反発が予想される。
先の（日本企業のなかでも東アジア統合に意見の相違があるという）議論にもあったよ
うに、同じ日系企業のなかでも韓国に進出している企業、バンコクに進出している企業の間では意見が異なると思う。そうすると、東アジア共同体は形成されないのではない
か？
・ M：北米の場合でもあらゆる産業で米国が勝つということはないが、それぞれの産業を政治力でウェイト付けできるとすれば、政治力の強い産業では最初から勝負が決まっていて、後発国はこれに挑戦するつもりがないということ。日本・中国間、韓国・中国間
では、どちらの国が勝つか予想できるが、日本・韓国間ではとどちらが勝つか分からな

い。また、後発国、すなわち中国や韓国の自動車産業において、今は発展途上だがこれからキャッチ・アップして将来は逆転したいという政治的発言力を強く持っていれば、統合に賛成しないかもしれない。
討論者 6・ Q：必ずしも技術力の分布だけの問題ではなく、技術力の分布と市場の分布が一致してくるかどうかではないかと思う。北米の場合でも、中南米諸国は技術力が劣っていても米国の大きな市場に参入できるというメリットがあるので、米国の一人勝ちを許しているのかもしれない。日本は技術力があるが、中国の市場が圧倒的に大きい。中国側からみれば開放して日本企業の進出により利益を得られるはずであり、日本側も結局は利益を得られるはず。貿易の相互利益というのは必ずある。
・ M：経済界のみに注目しているので、統合が難しいと話したが、その他を考慮すれば、そう言い切ることはできない。ただし、日本・中国が手と手を取って統合しようという機運にはならないと思う。企業間の関係を示している直接投資の流れをみれば、EU では双方向であり、他方、日本対中国、韓国は一方向であり、それが企業間の力関係を示していると思う。
討論者７
・ C：私は多国籍企業の工程間分業が地域主義（協力）を牽引すると考えている。例えば、日本から部品を輸出して東南アジアで組み立てるというような電子・電器産業における分業が挙げられる。そのため、障害があったら企業は積極的に政府に働きかけるのでは？実際に ASEAN では、自動車の部品相互補完スキーム：BBC（Brand to Brand
Complementation）や AICO (ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme) が企業の働きかけにより受け入れられ、進行している。これらを踏まえると、多国籍企業の活動が地域協力に影響を与え、逆に地域協力体からも企業へのアシストという相互作用があると思う。
・ M：日本企業が東南アジアで自動車を作りやすくするために ASEAN が地域統合を進めているかのように聞こえるが、韓国と中国ではそうはいかないのではないか。
討論者 8
・ Q：技術的な制約に伴う最適な通信圏は存在するのか？そうだとすると、EU、北米、東アジアなどそれぞれに規格があっても良いのではないか？企業の利益 (profit)と経済全体の効率性 (efficiency)は別に考えるべき。
・ M：企業の利益配置転換が統合形態を決定するという仮説を立てたが、消費者の利便性をもっと考えるべきかもしれない。一般論として、人がよく移動する範囲内では規格が同じ方が望ましい。
討論者 9・ Q：企業（端末メーカー）と standard（規格）の話を区別すべきだ。丸川氏は、企業が日本市場を目標にしていたと言っていたが、技術が良ければ、企業は世界へ発信したいのではないか？例えば電器産業（ビデオ等）では、企業による新しい技術が発明され、

世界市場でいくつかの standard 間の競争が起こり、最終的に市場が拡大した方が勝つ（その企業の standard へ統合される）。
・ M：通信産業と電器産業との間には政府の規制の有無といった相違があることに注意が必要である。通信では、どのようなニーズがあるか政府がある程度コントロールせざるを得ない。
討論者 10・ Q：上記の議論では、端末メーカーと政府という 2 プレイヤー（player）のみに議論が絞られていた。規格作りの話として、通信キャリアがプレイヤーとして議論に出てくる必要がある。そして、このキャリアの役割を見直すことでこれまでの議論がかみ合うのではないか？
・ M：通信キャリアが海外事業展開を規制されていたこともあり、発表では意図的にその部分を抜いた。
（討論記録

二階堂有子）