Propriety of the Missile Defense Advocacy AllianceMISSILE DEFENSEROLES ANDRESPONSIBILITIESPROPRIETARY INFORMATION OF
MISSILE DEFENSE ADVOCACY ALLIANCEAPRIL 2022

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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... 4
INTRODUCTION:.....................................................................................................................10
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: .....................................................................................................10
ORIGINS OF MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE START OF THE ROLES AND MISSIONS DEBATE......................10
KEY WEST AGREEMENT:......................................................................................................131950 GUIDED MISSILE MEMORANDUM: .............................................................................141956 SECDEF WILSON MEMORANDUM: ..............................................................................16
1958 SECDEF MCELROY MEMORANDUM: ..........................................................................21
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY ............................................................................22
MCNAMARA INITIATES ARGUMENTS AGAINST MISSILE DEFENSE THAT PERSISTTODAY ...............................................................................................................................................31
SAFEGUARD: ...........................................................................................................................39
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: .....................................................................................44
CREATION OF THE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY: .............................................................53
RECOMMENDATIONS: ...........................................................................................................58
SPECIFIC MISSILE DEFENSE ROLES AND MISSIONS: .............................................................................60
HISTORICAL CHRONOLOGY: ..............................................................................................64
APPENDIX: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS..............................................................................72
KEY WEST MEMORANDUM ..................................................................................................................72
GUIDED MISSILE MEMORANDUM .......................................................................................................166

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SECDEF WILSON MEMORANDUM.....................................................................................................218
SECDEDF MCELROY MEMORANDUM .................................................................................................. 1
STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION CHARTER.................................................................. 1
SDI PROGRAM MANAGEMENT .................................................................................................................. 4
MANAGEMENT APPROACH .......................................................................................................................... 4
7. 3
PROGRAMMATIC AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT ............................................................................. 8
Work Package Directives................................................................................................................. 8
Financial Management Board........................................................................................................10
Defense Acquisition Review Team ............................................................................................10
4
INTERNAL MANAGEMENT CONTROLS ................................................................................................11
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTER: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION......................................13
SECDEF RUMSFELD MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM DIRECTION DOCUMENTS ........................................................20
Missile Defense Program Direction ...............................................................................................24
COORDINATION SUMMARY ...........................................................................................................47

Executive Summary
Missile defense remains an extraordinarily challenging military mission, and its
importance has only grown as adversaries continue to develop new and dynamic
capabilities intended to threaten the U.S. and to decouple us from our allies andpartners. The advent of Russian and Chinese hypersonic missile threats, in addition toboth countries growing arsenals of increasingly complex ballistic and cruise missile
capabilities, clearly demonstrates the importance our adversaries place on long-range
strike capabilities. In response to these advances, the U.S. must ensure that the missile
defense enterprise is properly organized, resourced, and managed for success in thisnew and demanding threat environment.
Stated more directly, our adversaries – sensing the strategic advantage it gives them –are heavily investing in hypersonic capabilities to hold that which is most precious to
us at risk. Our adversaries are also investing in large numbers of missiles for which
the United States and our allies have not invested in sufficient numbers of missile
defense assets to counter, as demonstrated by the heavy Russian use of missiles in its
invasion of Ukraine and the heavy use of missiles by the Iranian-backed Houthis
4during attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. must now invest to ensure that
we can defend what is most precious and remove any perceived strategic advantage
from our adversary’s calculus.
Unfortunately, as the missile threat has evolved, the roles and missions for missile
defense have not. In fact, these roles and missions – rapidly created in the past toaddress what are now legacy threats – are often unclear and overlap multiple
stakeholders. Combatant Commands (both geographic and functional), the Joint Staff,
the Services, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and other Office of Secretary of
Defense (OSD) components all have intersecting equities in missile defense. The
addition of the U.S. Space Force (USSF), U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM),
and Space Development Agency (SDA) has only further complicated this issue by
introducing additional potential seams and redundancies and placing mission successat risk.
As one can imagine, this is not the first time the U.S. military has encountered thistype of situation. In fact, the introduction of the Space Force has created issues similar
to the debate and friction on roles and missions that occurred after the founding of the
Air Force in 1947. In the late 1940s, the Army and Navy were reluctant to part withlong-standing forces and capabilities (and roles and responsibilities) that they had
developed during World War II. As a result, a series of successive compromises werereached to accommodate the Army and Navy, which unfortunately increased costs andslowed progress in the development of the Air Force.
History also demonstrates how to achieve success in dealing with challenging military
missions by providing an integrating organization with lead responsibility and theauthorities to push the boundaries of innovation rapidly. In our history, the periods ofgreatest technical progress have come when authorities were given to stand-alone,
focused organizations like Naval Reactors, the Advanced Research Projects Agency(ARPA), the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO), and the initial instantiation of
the MDA. Because of these organizations, the U.S. has been able to develop – withgreater consistency and over longer periods – much more capable systems, and more
rapidly deploy those systems to the warfighter. In the absence of such “integrator”
organizations, the Services tend to focus on more parochial and near-term solutions,
resulting in much slower technical innovation for the game-changing capabilities thewarfighter also needs.

5Thankfully, the introduction of USSF, USSPACECOM, and the SDA provides anopportunity for a review of missile defense roles and missions by the Joint
Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) in the Joint Capabilities Integration andDevelopment System (JCIDS) process, and by the Joint Staff in the next Unified
Command Plan (UCP) revision. Hopefully, we can learn from our history and avoid
repeating the parochial mistakes made in the 1940s and 1950s.
Overall, any missile defense roles and responsibility review should inform, and be
informed by, the Department’s parallel efforts to update the National Defense Strategy
and the Missile Defense Review, the development of a new Joint Warfighting
Concept, and any update to existing operational plans. A critical fault would be to
conduct strategic planning in stovepipes, causing inefficiencies in both unity of effort
and application of limited resources. As such, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF),
with support from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P), the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities (SPC), the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (CJCS), the Combatant Commanders, and the Service chiefs, should make fully
informed decisions on missile defense (MD) roles and missions, and ensure each
Service and the MDA are resourced appropriately. With that in mind there are several
key missile defense roles and responsibilities changes that this review should addressand establish (recommended new or adjusted guidance is in italics):
1. OSD should utilize MDA and key tools such as the JROC and the JCIDS
process, to ensure that the joint force can address existing gaps in ground based
cruise missile defense and develop solutions for the emerging hypersonic missile
threat.
• This will require increased requests for missile defense funding. Given the
rapid pace of the growth in the missile threat and the increasingly large rolethat such capabilities are playing in the military plans and combat operationsof our adversaries, the missile defense mission is under-resourced.
• SECDEF should direct the Services to treat missile defense capabilities as acore mission area and budget accordingly, to reflect the changed security
environment we now face where missiles are a primary method of warfare
being employed by our adversaries.
• SECDEF should disestablish the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB).
The MDEB is highly bureaucratic with numerous subgroups and committees.
The MDEB replicates the complex and cumbersome DoD acquisition and6requirements process that the original DoD Directive establishing MDA
intended to replace with a rapid and empowered central organization to leadMD development, initial production and fielding

2. MDA should be made as efficient and agile as possible to ensure it develops,
acquires, and fields the system architecture required to prepare for existing andemerging hypersonic threats. MDA is the lead system architect for MD across all
domains and should be fully resourced and authorized to rapidly and efficiently
develop and acquire MD systems to defend against ballistic missiles, hypersonicglide missiles, and complex hypersonic and long-range land-attack cruise
missiles.
• SECDEF should return the original rapid acquisition authorities to MDA thatexisted at its founding in 2002, to allow for more efficient and rapid
deployment of capabilities, including the ability to set detailed performancerequirements without approval by the JROC and relief from strict adherence
to the DoD 5000 series acquisition regulations.
o This includes restoring the MDA Director’s authorities to function as a
Component Acquisition Executive.
• MDA should focus its resources on MD RDT&E and S&T for defense against
ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide missiles, and complex hypersonic and longrange land-attack cruise missiles.
o MDA should develop MD systems through Low-Rate Initial Production(LRIP) and then transfer the systems to the Services for full rate
production as originally envisioned at its founding. The Services
should be required to budget for production, fielding, employment, andsustainment of these systems. The MDA budget, which resourced only
the capability development of the system, will not be transferred to theServices.
▪ As MDA transfers a missile defense system that has completed
RDT&E to a Service, the MDA resources previously associatedwith that system should shift to the next highest priority MD
capability development.
▪ MDA should remain responsible for development of capability
upgrades to existing fielded systems in coordination with theServices. Once RDT&E is complete for the capability upgrade,7sustainment remains the responsibility of the Service employing
the system.
o MDA should be directed to develop a program to supplement andleverage the directed energy (DE) work of the Services. MDA should
develop systems that can leverage the cost and advantages of speed oflight weapons to deal with the hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missile
threats.
▪ DoD’s DE efforts have been underfunded and the newchallenge of large numbers of sophisticated missiles operating
at unprecedented speed in large numbers is well suited to DE
solutions such as lasers and high-powered micro-waves.
3. DOD must clarify each of the Services’ specific responsibilities for air andmissile defense and require the Services to fully resource the deployment,sustainment, and operation of their MD forces.
• The Army has played a central role in the MD enterprise. The Army has also
consistently under-resourced the MD mission area by placing other mission
requirements at a higher priority. Especially in light of the current and projected
threat environment in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, this practice by the Armymust cease immediately. In the absence of a significant, near-term effort by the
Army to comprehensively resource MD priorities, the Secretary of Defense
should direct realignment of internal Army resources to MD and initiate a study
to assess transition of Army MD forces to the Air Force in order to ensure
optimum MD capability and capacity for the Joint Force.
• Within this understanding, the Army should continue with overall responsibility
for providing theater and fixed-site MD capabilities in support of CombatantCommand MD plans, to include the defense of forward operating locations suchas: key communications sites; command and control nodes; and air, ground andmaritime staging and logistics locations.
o The Army must prioritize delivery of the Indirect Fire Protection
Capability (Increment 2) - a cost effective cruise missile defense system,that is long overdue.
• The Army and Navy should retain responsibility for MD of their maneuver
forces and ships. Both Services should remain responsible for development of
MD capabilities for which MDA is not designated as lead.
• The Air Force should be given similar authority to procure and field MD
systems to protect its maneuver forces which will not otherwise be defended by
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•

•

•

•

available Army or Navy capabilities. A prime example for use of this authority
would be to defend forward expeditionary dispersed operating locations
executing Agile Combat Employment.
The Services will be responsible for full rate production and sustainment (man,train, equip) of all MD forces in accordance with these clarified MD
requirements, to include lifecycle support, employment, sustainment, andlogistics of assigned MD systems.
The Services will continue to develop, acquire and sustain (man, train, equip)
multi-domain offensive strike capabilities to degrade and reduce opponent
missile capabilities in order to produce a more effective and efficient overall
defense.
The Space Force will be responsible for the overall sensor architecture in thespace domain, to include sensors contributing to the MD mission. In design ofthat architecture, the Space Force must coordinate with all affected agencies. In
particular, MDA, as the missile defense system architect, will play a critical rolein ensuring sensor architecture supports MD requirements.
The National Guard will man, train, and operate U.S. homeland defense MD
sites for sensors, interceptors, and command and control, in accordance with
OSD’s posture and deployment guidance, to include fixed systems defending
Guam and Hawaii as additional capabilities are fielded.

4. OSD must clarify each of the Combatant Command’s specific responsibilities
in the MD enterprise and support the deployment and operation of their MD
forces.
• OSD will solicit, validate, and prioritize Combatant Command (CCMD) MD
requirements, and then direct deployment of Service MD forces to CCMDs.
• USSPACECOM should have lead responsibility for synchronizing theoperational MD efforts of the geographic and functional CCMDs, to include
adjudicating issues related to operational cooperation between the CCMDs on
MD.
o USSPACECOM would replace USSTRATCOM in this role. Theseauthorities should be reflected in the next UCP revision.
• USSPACECOM should be responsible for the MD early-warning andbattlespace awareness mission.
• USSPACECOM should replace USSTRATCOM in command of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCCIMD).
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Introduction:
The United States must maintain our long-term capacity to meet our strategic
challenges, including those posed by Russia and China. Commensurate with this longterm outlook is a need for clearly defined roles for each Service and a coherent set of
authorities for an organization to lead and integrate disparate efforts to ensure thatbudget-motivated fights over roles and missions do not jeopardize warfighting
capabilities as they did to the air and missile defense mission in the Cold War period.
We all have a vested interest in a robust, operationally capable missile defense
enterprise.
This is a particularly relevant historical comparison due to multiple similarities
between the early Cold War period and present day; the emergence of great-powercompetition and the buildup of the Space Force will bring new challenges and newopportunities.
This document provides a detailed historical review of missile defense roles andmissions – where the Department of Defense has both succeeded and fallen short– andrecommendations for a way forward.

Historical Overview:
Origins of Missile Defense and the Start of the Roles and Missions Debate
In the late 1940s, the United States Military, including the newly independent Air
Force, faced a strategic and technological crossroads. World War II (WWII) ushered
in a new era, where air power proved decisive and overturned decades of military
thinking. In addition, WWII saw the invention and combat use of the world’s firstcruise and ballistic missiles, the German V-1 and V-2, respectively. These missiles
devastated European cities during the war and threatened U.S. and Allied forces10

across the continent. During the war, over 1,000 V-2’s struck Great Britain and werealso used against targets in Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 1
Nazi Germany’s missile program and ambitions were the start of thinking about how
to defend against these new weapons. According to the Missile Defense Agency
historian:
When the war in Europe ended, Germany’s most ambitious plan to surpass theV-2 involved an intercontinental-range missile still on the drawing board. It
was a two-stage 3,350-mile range missile called the A-9/A-10… Some
Germans believed that had the war lasted another six months, they would havebeen able to produce the A-9/A-10 and strike targets in the United States, suchas New York City. Some also believed that if the war had lasted another two
years, they could have developed a 15,000-mile range intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM).2
Studies were undertaken by the U.S. and British armies, yet by the end of World War
II, the technology didn’t exist to effectively defend against ballistic missiles.
World War II also brought to the forefront a debate on the roles and missions of theArmed Forces that continues today. Prior to that conflict, roles and missions were nota problem, with the Army fighting on land, the Navy fighting at sea, and the two
efforts rarely overlapping. In World War II that changed dramatically with Army andNavy forces (including the Marine Corps) regularly operating under joint theatercommands in campaigns. Distinctions blurred as the conflict progressed. For example,
while the Marine Corps enjoyed storied success in amphibious landings and battles
throughout the Pacific, the largest amphibious operation and landing of the war on DDay was conducted by the Army. Yet perhaps the greatest dynamic that blurred roles
and missions was the emergence of military aviation over both land and sea.
Following World War II, Congress passed the 1947 National Security Act, which
combined the Army and Navy under a unified military organization called the
National Military Establishment, which was renamed the Department of Defense in1949, headed by the new Secretary of Defense position. The Act also established the1

Missile Defense: The First 70 Years, publication of Missile Defense Agency historian, 8August 2013.
2
Ibid

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Air Force as a third Service and created the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff.
For the next several decades, the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs, President, andCongress would struggle to map out clearly defined roles and missions for theServices in major areas. These interservice rivalries played out against the backdrop
of a new great-power competition with the Soviet Union, and to a lesser degree,
China. Service rivalries in the early post-war years were perhaps most intense over the
air domain. The Air Force sought to assume full responsibility for the domain, and the
Navy hoped to preserve its role in military aviation that had become central to naval
operations as the aircraft carrier replaced the battleship as the principal ship in the
fleet.
These Service rivalries also played out in the arena of air and missile defense.
Unfortunately, these disputes, the lack of an organization with clearly defined
responsibilities and authorities to lead and integrate development and deployment, andweakly enforced Secretary of Defense Directives all combined to limit the military’s
ability to respond effectively to Soviet missile technology advancements, jeopardizing
the security of the United States and its allies.
Several key historical events or decisions stand out as “turning points'' that affected
the Military’s current division of labor for the air and missile defense mission. Amongthese are multiple Secretary of Defense Memoranda, which had a significant impact,
either by including definitive assignment of responsibilities, by the notable omission
thereof, or by accommodating solutions born of a stubborn, parochial desire of theServices to buck Secretary of Defense decisions that would have produced more
optimal results at a national level, but that would have resulted in the loss of funding
or a mission for an individual Service.
These turning points are: the 1948 Key West Agreement, the 1950 Guided Missile
Memorandum, the 1956 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson
detailing missile defense responsibilities for each Service, the 1958 SecDef
Memorandum assigning anti-ballistic missile responsibilities to the Army, the failureof SAFEGUARD and signing of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, theStrategic Defense Initiative, and the establishment of the Missile Defense Agency in
2001.

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In particular, the 1958 SecDef Memorandum occurred after a decade of jostling
between the Services and endorsed a compromise between the programs of theServices that was thought to be temporary, but resulted in the loss of organizational
effectiveness and the cancellation of more promising solutions. The effects of thisdecision would culminate some two decades later with the failure and cancellation of
the SAFEGUARD system and signature of the 1972 ABM Treaty that prohibited U.S.
national missile defense for 30 years until U.S. withdrawal from this agreement.
This decision contradicted several previous orders establishing the Air Force as theprimary CONUS air defense authority and capped Army efforts, begun at the birth of
the Air Force in 1947, to prevent the newly established Service from taking the leadrole on air defense and instead preserve a leading role for the Army. The 1958
Memorandum was issued in the midst of a fierce interservice debate shortly after
Russia’s Sputnik launch and appears in hindsight to have been a short-sighted attempt
to resolve an interservice conflict.

Key West Agreement:
In an attempt to resolve the contentious issue of roles and missions, the first Secretaryof Defense James Forrestal gathered the Service Chiefs in Key West from March 1114, 1948. It is perhaps ironic that Forrestal had convened the group, as he had recently
served as Secretary of the Navy, which had opposed the National Security Act andcreation of the Air Force, fearing it would result in the loss of carrier aviation.
At its formation in 1947, the U.S. Air Force assumed the missions of strategic
bombing, ground operations support, air transport, and air defense. The destruction
wrought by German missiles in WWII underscored the importance of effective air
defense not only for protecting civilians and military assets, but for defending
maneuvering land-, sea-, and air-based assets and forces. During the war, Army
Ground Forces and the Army Air Force (AAF) jointly executed air defense
responsibilities, divided between ground-based anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) andairborne fighter interceptors. In Operation Antwerp X, with the AAF providing earlywarning radar support to ground-based anti-aircraft fires, U.S. and British AAA units
were able to achieve a 70% kill-rate on engaged German V-1 cruise missiles, enabling
the Allies to defend Antwerp and maintain its strategic port role for the remainder ofthe war.
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At Key West, key agreements were reached on Service responsibilities. President
Truman revoked a previously issued Executive Order that defined Service
responsibilities, and in its place, Secretary Forrestal issued the “functions paper” thatdefined roles and missions.
In the dispute over the air domain, the Air Force was given primary responsibility forthe domain, after a compromise in which the Navy was permitted to retain carrier
aviation after agreeing not to pursue its own strategic air force. An agreement wasreached to rebuff an Army and Air Force attempt to severely limit the Marine Corps,
by establishing the principle that the Army should furnish land forces for any
amphibious or airborne operation larger than a division. Eventually, all agreed to thecompromise that the Marine Corps would not become “a second land army.”
In the area of air defense, the Air Force received the majority of functions, including
primary responsibility for defense of the United States against air attack as well as“land-based air defense” in coordination with the other Services. A compromise wasreached, however, under which the Army would retain the responsibility to “organize,train, and equip Army anti-aircraft artillery units”, after the Army argued this was
required to provide defense of point locations and maneuver forces like in WWII.
Similarly, the Navy received the tasking to “provide sea-based air defense.”
With the Soviet Union’s successful 1949 nuclear test, the U.S. Air Force’s strategic
mission as a nuclear deterrent continued to grow. This led to a diminished strategicrole for the Army’s traditional functions, prompting them to pursue more
responsibility for the nuclear deterrence and air defense mission. Facilitating thispursuit was the USAF’s low prioritization of their Air Defense Command; thismarginalization rendered the command without sufficient funding or manpower toadequately defend against hostile air attack as revealed in multiple exercises.

1950 Guided Missile Memorandum:
The agreements reached at Key West in 1948 quickly came under strain from theServices’ continued jostling over roles and missions and lack of clarity about theauthority of the newly established role of Secretary of Defense. For example, despite
agreeing not to pursue its own strategic air force, the Navy steamed ahead with
development of a supercarrier to carry nuclear bombers able to challenge the Air
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Force B-36 for the strategic bombing mission. This situation was improved by
Congress in 1949, which clarified in law that the Secretaries of the Army and Navy
were subordinate to the Secretary of Defense.
By 1950, the emerging technology of guided missiles was also complicating efforts toimplement the compromises on air defense roles and missions reached at Key West.
All three Services were developing guided missiles. In the Army and Navy, surfaceto-air missiles were seen as providing an addition or replacement to AAA, while the
Air Force had been given the responsibility for “land-based air defense” at Key West.
In March 1950, in an effort to rationalize missile and air defense development
programs and avoid duplication, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson issued the
Guided Missile Memorandum, which stated that guided missiles would be employedby each Service according to assigned functions. Most notably, the Army and Navyreceived responsibility for surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that “supplement, extend
the capability of, or replace anti-aircraft artillery (AAA).” Simultaneously, the Air
Force received the portfolio for guided missiles that “supplement, extend thecapabilities of, or replace Air Force aircraft.” The memo required each Service to“invite” other Services to participate in missile development projects: “A Service
charged with primary responsibility for development of a weapon shall invite theparticipation of any other Service having an operational interest in the weapon”.
However, this made no requirement for real collaboration and did not reduce conflict.
Notably, SecDef Johnson authorized the continuation of two specific surface-to-air
missile programs: NIKE and WIZARD. Since the late 1940s, the Air Force had beenintermittently researching and developing their WIZARD system, which eventuallybecame the long-range SAM, BOMARC. Simultaneously, the Army had begun to
slowly study the feasibility of progressing their NIKE anti-aircraft system to develop aballistic missile interceptor.
These programs would be the subject of national controversy and multiple SecDef
memoranda throughout the 1950s. Interservice rivalries during this period led to
redundancies in offensive missile systems as well, such as the Jupiter-Thor episode.
As the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, led by former German rocket scientist
Wernher von Braun, progressed in its development of the Jupiter intermediate range
ballistic missile (IRBM), the Air Force began development of the nearly identical

15

Thor, fearing an expanded Army strategic role that would encroach on the Air Force’s
mission.
Friction between Air Force and Army air defense efforts continued with periodic
refinements to attempt to demarcate the respective roles and missions of the Services.
Under an agreement worked out by the JCS in 1954, the Army received responsibility
for "point" defense of cities and installations against hostile aircraft, using surface-toair missiles with a range of 50 miles or less; the Air Force for "area" defense, using
missiles with longer ranges.
By 1955, a combination of factors led to new interest in the U.S. Ballistic Missile
Defense (BMD) program. In 1953, The Soviet demonstration of a thermo-nuclear
device led to the prioritization of the U.S.’s own ICBM capability. Furthermore, the
New York Times circulated details of the Soviet “ultimate weapon,” alluding to thedevelopment of Soviet ICBMs in 1954. These developments moved ICBM defense
capabilities from a fringe concern to a main focus of CONUS – the 48 contiguous
states and the District of Columbia – defense. To integrate and coordinate homeland
air and missile defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created the joint Continental Air
Defense Command (CONAD) in 1954, to be placed under the executive agency of the
Air Force. However, the interservice rivalry continued unabated, with the Army’s
NIKE a particular point of tension; the Air Force felt that the system transcended apurely AAA role and constituted an encroachment on their air defense mandate.

1956 SecDef Wilson Memorandum:
The following discussion of the events in 1956-57 is drawn from the official history of
the Secretary of Defense, “Into the Missile Age”, written by Robert J. Watson.
In March 1956, Assistant Secretary for Research and Development Clifford Furnas, atSecretary of Defense Charles Wilson's direction, established a committee, headed by
Hector R. Skifter, to study the feasibility of an anti-ICBM. The committee concluded
that a system to detect approaching missiles was feasible and could provide 8-25
minutes' warning time. An active defense to intercept the missiles presented muchgreater difficulty and the committee recommended that it be studied carefully in thelight of probable costs.
16

The report went to a higher-level committee, which was chaired by the Special
Assistant for Guided Missiles, Eger V. Murphree and included Army and Air Force
representatives. The members recommended proceeding on a research basis, with the
Air Force to develop the early warning system, and the Army to develop the weapon
with associated equipment. This division would accord the ultimate operational rolesof the two Services. Wilson approved these recommendations and directed the twoServices to proceed with the research program, to be monitored by the Office of theSecretary of Defense (OSD).
An Army study completed in October 1956 showed that NIKE ZEUS, already indevelopment as an improvement on AJAX and HERCULES, could be adapted for
missile defense. The Army at once began developing "hardware." By that time the Air
Force had begun studies of "forward acquisition" radars which would form theoutermost defensive ring.
Facing a fierce Army-Air Force dispute in a period of defense spending cuts,
Secretary Wilson attempted to clearly demarcate air and missile defense
responsibilities across the Military Services. In a Memorandum issued by Wilson on
26 November 1956, he assigned to the Air Force responsibility for air defense ofareas, defined as "the concept of locating defense units to intercept enemy attacks
remote from and without reference to individual vital installations, industrial
complexes or population centers." The Army received “developmental, procurement,
and manning” responsibilities for point defense systems, defined as “the defense of
specified geographical areas, cities and vital installations."
SecDef Wilson acknowledged that distinguishing between point and area defense
required an “arbitrary range limitation” for anti-aircraft missiles, which he set at ahorizontal range of 100 miles, relaxing the previous limitation of 50 miles. Thisappears to have been based on a recommendation from Air Force Secretary Donald
Quarles to Wilson that the Air Force should be given full responsibility for all antiaircraft missiles, or at the minimum, those with a range of over 100 miles. The Navyremained responsible, in cooperation with the other Services, for developing shipbased air defense weapons.
While this Memorandum was aimed at remedying the growing interservice rivalries
around air and missile defense, little changed in practice. The Army simply labeled
the NIKE project as “point defense”, while the Air Force described WIZARD, later17

renamed BOMARC, as “long-range area defense” and both continued development
efforts. Therefore, the dispute between the Army and Air Force continued with little
interruption and periodically burst into public view, such as when the Air Force wentso far as to call the Army “unfit to guard the nation” on the front page of the New
York Times.
Of the operational military commands, the "joint" Continental Air Defense Command(CONAD), established in 1954, had responsibility for air defense of the entire North
American continent except for Alaska and Northeastern North America, which wereassigned respectively to Alaska Command(ALCOM) and the U.S. Northeast
Command. The Secretary of the Air Force served as executive agent for all three ofthese commands. Later, on 21 June 1956, acting on unanimous Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) recommendations, Wilson abolished the U.S. Northeast Command and assigned
its responsibilities to CONAD, which would also take over air defense of Alaska(leaving ALCOM with sharply reduced responsibilities). CONAD was also
responsible for stating requirements for air defense weapons.
The Commander in Chief, CONAD (CINCONAD) was also Commander of the Air
Defense Command (ADC), CONAD’s Air Force component command. The staff of
ADC served as the CONAD staff, augmented by representation from all of theServices. The other components were the Army's Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command(ARAACOM) and a Navy command designated NAVFORCONAD.
The authorities and role of CONAD also became the subject of intense Service
rivalry, with the Army seeking to preserve the autonomy of its AAA fieldcommanders as separate from CONAD. In May 1956, CINCONAD General Earle E.
Partridge, took the initiative to clarify the authority of CONAD leading the JCS toaddress the question.
The JCS agreed that CINCONAD should exercise operational control over allcontinental defense forces, but they disagreed as to the extent of this control. Four ofthe five members believed that it should include responsibility for determining
methods for conducting the tactical air battle and authority to centralize operational
control of all assigned forces, including the assignment of individual anti-aircraft
batteries to designated targets. Army Chief of Staff General Taylor strongly dissented.
The disagreement was based on different operational concepts of anti-aircraft defense.
The Air Force favored close centralized control of the air defense battle, which was
the purpose of the Air Force's Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE)
18

computer network. The Army believed that the initiative must rest with individual
battery commanders, under the coordination of the local anti-aircraft defense
commander, subject only to procedures prescribed by CINCONAD.
The Army was developing its own electronic device, known as Missile Master, forcontrolling and directing SAM launches. After a study in June 1956, the integration of
SAGE and Missile Master was found to be technically feasible, and SecDef Wilson
ruled in favor of the JCS majority. At Wilson's direction, CINCONAD drew up a plan
to integrate Missile Master with the Air Force manual control system and ultimately
with SAGE that was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Before 1957, cooperation with Canada in air defense was confined to planning,
constructing, and operating the various early warning and control facilities. The next
step, operational integration of active defense forces followed naturally after all U.S.
forces, including those in Alaska and the Northeast, came under the control of
CONAD.
The JCS took the initiative to create joint operational control of the two nations'defenses. In December 1955, they approved it in principle and approached theCanadian Chiefs of Staff, who agreed. The JCS recommended creation of such acommand to Secretary Wilson on 7 February 1957. After clearing the matter with
President Eisenhower, Wilson gave his approval on 16 March 1957.
Subsequent negotiations between the U.S. and Canada proceeded rapidly, and on 1
August 1957, the two governments announced the formation of an integrated
headquarters in Colorado Springs, Colorado, to control the defense forces of the twonations in the Continental United States, Canada, and Alaska, called the North
American Air Defense Command (NORAD). On 19 August 1958, President
Eisenhower formally confirmed the appointment of Air Force General Earle E.
Partridge as CINCNORAD and of Air Marshal C. Roy Siemon, RCAF, as his deputy.
The reorganization of DoD in 1958 altered the status of CONAD and with it,
NORAD. CONAD lost its anomalous status as a "joint" command and became one of
the unified commands, which had legislatively received legal recognition in 1958 andthe authority to exercise "full operational command" over assigned forces. Armedwith this authority, CINCNORAD established its own structure of subordinate
commands. Four NORAD regions were established in the United States and one in
Canada, the latter coterminous with the RCAF Air Defense Command, which became
a component command under NORAD.
19

Throughout 1956 and 1957, the DoD had three land-based air defense missiles underdevelopment. The most important of these in terms of their future were NIKEHERCULES and BOMARC B. The third was TALOS, started by the Navy for
shipboard use but being developed by the Army in a ground-based version. Compared
to NIKE HERCULES, TALOS had a slightly longer horizontal range (100 miles vs.
80 miles). NIKE HERCULES did, however, have a higher altitude range (100,000
feet compared to 80,000); it carried a heavier payload and was further advanced thanTALOS. In early 1958, the TALOS program was rejected as a possible interim antimissile defense system for Strategic Air Command bases, and OSD canceled theprogram.
Following SecDef Wilson’s 1956 Memorandum, the Army’s development effort for
the NIKE point defense system progressed to its second generation, NIKE ZEUS. The
Air Force lobbied aggressively against NIKE ZEUS, criticizing its novel technology
and rising costs, and campaigned for a more offensive-focused approach. Despite the
Air Force’s criticism of the general missile defense mission, the branch continued todevelop WIZARD, later renamed BOMARC, which was itself a missile defense
program.
Murphree's anti-ICBM committee recommended, on 21 March 1957, a further
delineation of responsibilities. Wilson approved its recommendations that the Air
Force, besides developing the forward acquisition radars, should be responsible fortransmission of information to the active defense system, that the Army should
develop the radars for local acquisition and target tracking, and that a joint Army-Air
Force committee should be established to coordinate the effort.
The Soviet Union’s successful test flight of an ICBM in August 1957, and launch of
Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite on October 4, 1957, demonstrated theSoviets’ technological prowess, provoking U.S. fears about American homeland
defense capabilities. In December 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower received the
Security Resources Panel Report, the “Gaither Report”, which highlighted theinadequacy of “active defense” programs against the Soviet threat. Several
Congressional Committees in the late 1950s blamed developmental delays in U.S.
defense capabilities on interservice rivalries, leading to yet another SecDef
intervention.

20

1958 SecDef McElroy Memorandum:
The following discussion of the events in 1958 is drawn from the official history of
the Secretary of Defense, “Into the Missile Age”, written by Robert J. Watson.
As the missile-age and technology advanced, the difficulty of continuing thecompromise reached at the founding of the Air Force in 1947, in which the Air Forcewas given responsibility for air defense, including land-based air defense, and the
Army retained the responsibility to “organize, train, and equip Army anti-aircraft
artillery units”, had become more pronounced. In his 1956 Directive, SecDef Wilson
sought to continue a distinction based on area vs. point defense. Yet by 1958, this
distinction was becoming harder to define. For example, during hearings before theHouse Committee on Armed Services in January 1958, SecDef Neil H. McElroy
asked rhetorically: "Who says where a point is and who says where an area is, andwho particularly says where [an] area is when something is coming along at the speedof an ICBM?"
The difficulty of distinguishing between point and area defense was enhanced by thegrowing destructiveness of warheads. In September 1958, test flights of NIKEHERCULES reportedly demonstrated that an entire formation of jet aircraft could bedestroyed with six nuclear-armed missiles. Therefore, a weapon intended for "point"
defense could also defend a large "area.”Congress and President Eisenhower placed pressure on DoD and Secretary McElroy
to curb the growing rivalry between Army and Air Force systems, which eventually
spilled into the public. Congress also acted to reduce the funding requested for the
Army’s NIKE HERCULES and the Air Force BOMARC, sparking an even more
intense Service rivalry.
As the official history of the Secretary of Defense states:
Army and Air Force partisans defended their own system while denigratingthat of the other. In the argument, the Air Force seemed to have the better of it:
BOMARC B was expected to have a horizontal range of 400 miles (NIKEHERCULES being bound to the 100-mile limit established by Wilson); it
would have a low-level capability lacking in NIKE HERCULES (the Army
had designed a separate missile, Hawk, for this purpose); and a BOMARC
squadron required only 80 acres of ground, compared with 200 for a NIKE
21

battalion. NIKE HERCULES had the principal advantage of being alreadyoperational.
NORAD's concept of operations envisioned a layered defense for ground-based
defenses and fighter aircraft interceptors to defend against the large Soviet long-range
bomber threat. Fighter interceptors would strike first at incoming aircraft, then land on
northern bases (rather than returning to their initial bases) in order to clear the way for
missiles. BOMARC, with its longer range, was expected to come into action first.
NIKE HERCULES would then follow, with another system called Hawk which would
fill in as needed against low-flying aircraft. The SAGE command and control system
would integrate these efforts.
Secretary of Defense McElroy would ultimately approve the Fiscal Year (FY) 1960
budget request to Congress, implementing NORAD’s concept of operations. In
Congressional testimony in 1959, in response to skeptical questioning, McElroy
explained NORAD’s concept of operations and said earlier duplication in siting
between NIKE HERCULES and BOMARC had been eliminated. In response to aquestion from Senator John Stennis about how DoD had looked at duplication of thesesystems, Secretary McElroy gave a somewhat rambling response, in which hewelcomed Congress holding DoD’s “feet to the fire” on this. This remark caught theattention of President Eisenhower, who remarked at a press conference nine days laterthat he viewed this decision as an Executive Branch responsibility.
While the planning for a layered, air defense system to address the “bomber gap” with
the Soviet Union was maturing, the nature of the threat was changing. In 1957 it
seemed increasingly clear that the massive Soviet fleet of 700 heavy bombers by mid1959, predicted by U.S. intelligence in August 1956, was not materializing. CIA
Director Allen Dulles told the National Security Council on 10 October 1957 that the
number of Soviet heavy bombers observed by U.S. intelligence was smaller than
expected, and that he thought the Soviets might be de-emphasizing the role of theheavy bomber. In the ensuing months, this judgment was vindicated. The first
intelligence estimate following Sputnik credited the Soviets with 90-150 heavy
bombers as of mid-1957; the August 1956 estimate had forecast 220 by that date.

ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

22

President Eisenhower believed strongly in the need for greater unity in defense
organization. He had previously served as Chief of Staff of the Army, and based on
his extensive military experience, was deeply familiar with interservice rivalries,
which he believed led to duplication and waste in defense spending. As President, hefelt it was critical to keep defense spending in check, as he saw a strong economy asvital to national security. In the development of new technologies like missiles, he
saw an example of a function requiring centralized control.
Missiles already far along the road to development might continue under individual
Services, but newer and more esoteric projects cutting across Service lines seemed tocall for new organizational arrangements. On 11 October 1957, in one of his first
conferences with his new Secretary of Defense, the President suggested the possibilityof a "fourth Service" to handle the "whole missiles activity." McElroy suggested a
Manhattan-type project for the anti-missile program. In the end, however, theManhattan model was rejected, probably as too sweeping. Instead, Eisenhower andMcElroy opted for the "single manager" approach.
McElroy intended that a new agency would have jurisdiction over new weapons thatwere "not anything like as far down the road as the missile program", such as the antimissile weapon and "perhaps some other very upstream types of weapons projects." It
would develop new weapons to the point of operational capability when they would
then be turned over to one of the Services.
Some Service spokesmen opposed the new agency. The most prominent, Air Force
Secretary James H. Douglas, considered it unnecessary and intrusive and believed that
weapons systems, from their inception, should remain under the user Service.
Secretary McElroy ignored these objections and moved to establish the neworganization, eventually named the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) andtoday known as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Fromthe beginning, it had been understood that ARPA would take over responsibility forthe development of missile defense and military satellite projects.
On 10 January 1958, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Guided Missiles,
William Holaday, informed Secretary of Defense McElroy that the Air Force haddiverted some FY 1958 money to a full-fledged anti-missile project (BOMARC),
which overlapped the Army's work. Holaday recommended immediate action, without
awaiting the organization of ARPA, to reaffirm the division of responsibilities23

prescribed earlier: The Air Force would limit its effort to long-range detection, theArmy would develop the actual weapon. SecDef McElroy agreed. On 16 January, heinformed both Service secretaries that the direction of the anti-ICBM program would
eventually be assigned to ARPA, but in the meantime, the two Services were tocontinue their current lines of development.
McElroy assigned the Army primary operational responsibility for ABM, as their
NIKE ZEUS interceptor (a more-capable successor to the NIKE HERCULES) had
progressed further in development than the Air Force’s BOMARC. NIKE ZEUS was
almost starting initial testing and indeed would successfully intercept an ICBM in
1962. However, while BOMARC was canceled, the Air Force maintained
responsibility for the development of “early-warning radars, tracking and acquisition
radars, and communications links” for integration with NIKE ZEUS. Days later, theNational Security Council assigned NIKE ZEUS a rating of “S-Priority”, the highest
national priority rating.
McElroy’s intervention on this dispute confirmed the Army’s role as principal
custodian of national ballistic missile defense operations and effectively terminated
the Air Force’s role in BMD interceptor development, stating that “the Air Force
program will be limited at this time to the work in the above areas.” Notably, in asituation that has implications for present day roles and missions, the Air Force used
its position as the supplier of NIKE ZEUS’s command and control electronics toclaim a primary warning role; the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS),
originally designed for BOMARC and adapted to NIKE ZEUS after SecDef
McElroy’s order, became the first operational early-warning missile radar.
During 1958, intelligence estimates of Soviet heavy bombers dropped further to 100125 aircraft as of mid-1958, and the number was not expected to rise above 200 until
mid-1960. The actual number believed to exist as of the latter date, according to 1960
estimates, was 135. This was a far cry from the 1956 forecast, though it should be
noted that strength in medium bombers was believed to be higher than expected, atapproximately 1,000.
The "bomber gap" had disappeared, but a "missile gap" now loomed, at least in theminds of many. The estimated initial operating capability (IOC) for Soviet ICBMs(assuming a force of 10 prototype models) was first scheduled for 1959, then moved
back to 1 January 1960. As of February 1960, some in the intelligence community
believed that the Soviets might have 140-200 ICBMs on launchers by mid-1961, and24

350-450 by 1963. Though the Intelligence Advisory Committee debated vigorously
over the accuracy of these estimates, even the lower figures signified an ability tomount a dangerous attack against the United States and perhaps a "crippling" blow.
To officials in the OSD and elsewhere in the Administration, these two trends inSoviet military preparation - the de-emphasis of manned bombers and the increase inlong-range missiles - pointed to an obvious conclusion. Defense against conventional
aircraft assumed less importance; thus BOMARC, which had not yet been deployed,
could be cut back. The money saved could be used to accelerate early warning against
missiles and enlarge the U.S. strategic deterrent force. These conclusions underlie therevisions in the FY 1961 budget that the Administration submitted to Congress inearly 1960.
The FY 1962 budget provided money to continue the expansion of SAGE, Missile
Master, and the gap-filler radar system, and to complete the NIKE HERCULES
program. It included no money for BOMARC or additional fighter interceptors. In
sending the budget to Congress, President Eisenhower devoted most of his message todefense against ballistic missiles, stating: "The advent of nuclear-armed
intercontinental ballistic missiles in the hands of a potential adversary has confronted
this Nation with a problem entirely new to its experience," noting that work on the
ground-based radar missile warning system "has been greatly accelerated and isproceeding as fast as practicable." Development of the NIKE ZEUS missile for active
defense against the ICBM "is proceeding under the highest national priority”, he said.
Eisenhower’s message to Congress with the FY 1962 budget emphasized the need for
missile defense of the Continental United States, but the need and potential for missile
defense had been recognized by the Services since World War II. The Army and the
Air Force undertook serious research in the field. As the official history of theSecretary of Defense states: “Apparently by coincidence, they pursued
complementary lines of research. The Army focused on developing a missile (one of
the NIKE "family"), while the Air Force concentrated on long-range radar detection of
hostile missiles”.
The following discussion of events from 1961-65 is drawn from the official history of
the Secretary of Defense, “The McNamara Ascendancy”, written by Lawrence
Kaplan, Ronald Landa, and Edward Drea and other sources as noted.

25

As President John F. Kennedy was preparing to take office in January 1961, the Armywasted no time in advocating for its ABM system, sending a memo to the incoming
Deputy Secretary of Defense-designate Roswell Gilpatric on 17 January 1961,
arguing that NIKE ZEUS would provide early warning and an active defense in urban
areas against Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Moreover, the Armyargued that the very existence of an ABM weapon would establish "a stable andcreditable deterrence." The Army recommended a limited production and deployment
using $73.3 million in FY 1961 funds and an additional $313.5 million for FY 1962.
The Army would go on to complete installation of the full NIKE ZEUS system (4launch cells, 7 radars and battery control equipment and target intercept computer) on
Kwajalein Atoll in June 1961. 3
In the early months of 1961, however, the JCS was divided on the NIKE ZEUS issue.
Terming ABM "an indispensable element in deterrence," the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, Army General Lyman Lemnitzer, won support for limited production from
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke and Army Chief of Staff
General George H. Decker. With the decision by SecDef McElroy to give the Army
the lead on ABM defenses and cancellation of the Air Force BOMARC air andmissile defense system, Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas White, argued infavor of building ICBMs operated by the Air Force instead of ABM development.
SecDef Robert McNamara did not recommend to the President the full amount the
Army requested, instead proposing an additional $82.8 million in FY 1962 funds for
NIKE ZEUS to provide the capability to begin production of long-Iead items. This
would allow completion of the first NIKE ZEUS installations about October 1965.
The Bureau of Budget opposed this funding and ultimately President Kennedy
decided to defer a decision on beginning NIKE ZEUS production and did not fund it
in his initial budget for FY 1962. This was a significant policy change from President
Eisenhower’s last statements on the urgency of missile defenses to deal with thegrowing Soviet missile threat.
In a decision that bears on the discussion of Military Service roles and missions, in his
first weeks after taking office, Secretary McNamara directed his initial attention to theinterservice rivalry as it related to space and made a clear decision in less than twomonths. On 6 March 1961 he issued DoD Directive 5160.32, declaring that "research,
3

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command Historical Office, First ABM Site in theFree World26

development, test, and engineering of Department of Defense space development
programs or projects, which are approved hereafter, will be the responsibility of the
Department of the Air Force."
In the initial wake of the SecDef decision to give the Air Force the lead on space,
USAF leaders sought to be gracious and sensitive to the needs of the other Services.
For example, in Congressional testimony on 18 March, Air Force Chief of Staff
General Thomas D. White said, "I might say I pontificated, again, to my commanders... the Air Force would bend over backward to meet the requirements of the Army and
the Navy as prescribed by the directive."
The Army and Navy had opposed consolidation of responsibility for space within the
Air Force even though President-elect Kennedy had appointed a special task force toaddress this question and had come to much the same conclusion. Under thechairmanship of Jerome B. Wiesner, his chief science adviser, the Ad Hoc Committeeon Space on 12 January 1961 recommended that Kennedy centralize control of all
military space development. Given that the Air Force already had responsibility forover 90% of the total defense effort in space development activities, that seemed likea natural decision. The Air Force also argued it had responsibility for the aerospacedomain.
In mid-February, before McNamara had issued his Directive, the point man for the
Army's opposition to the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, chief of Army
research and development, had testified to Congress that "the military use of space is
too vital to be entrusted to any one Service." VADM John T. Hayward, the Navy's top
research director, joined General Trudeau in opposition to giving responsibility forspace to the Air Force.
Army opposition was particularly significant. Even after SecDef McNamara issued
his Directive, Army Secretary Elvis J. Stahr pushed back against the order as well as
the downgrading of the civilian secretaries to be clearly subordinate to the Secretaryof Defense. Eventually, 15 months later, for other reasons as well, he resigned at theend of June 1962.
In explaining the reasons for the Army’s opposition to the Air Force leading spaceefforts, the authors of the official DoD history of the Secretary of Defense, Lawrence
S. Kaplan, Ronald D. Landa, and Edward J. Drea stated: “Desirous of expanding its
air defense mission beyond its point defense role, the Army particularly suffered
distress because it believed itself on the verge of a breakthrough with the NIKE ZEUS
27

anti-missile missile that would convert it into an anti-satellite weapon with a muchbroader mission than originally anticipated. If space connected to air, it also connected
to Earth.”
In fact, despite the Secretary of Defense Directive in 1961 giving the Air Force
responsibility for space research, development, test, and engineering, the Armycontinued to advocate that the NIKE ZEUS system could perform the anti-satellite
mission in addition to its ABM role. In April 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara
approved adding the satellite interception mission to the NIKE ZEUS program. 4 Armyanti-satellite weapon development work with the NIKE ZEUS system continued andthe system successfully intercepted an Agena-D satellite in May 1963. 5 This followed
the first successful intercept of an ICBM warhead by the NIKE ZEUS system six
months earlier in December 1962. 6 The Army went on to deploy the anti-satellite
system, which it called Mudflap, on Kwajalein Atoll in August 1963.7 The Army also
successfully argued for transfer of responsibility of the Kwajalein Test Site, later
renamed the Kwajalein Missile Range, from the Navy in July 1964.8 (The Army’s
initial use of the Kwajalein site had been governed by an MOU with the Navy signed
in September 1959).9
In addition to the work performed by the Army and Air Force in the fields of spaceand missile defense, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) had been hard
at work in these fields since its establishment in the Eisenhower Administration todrive cutting-edge research and development (R&D) for later transition to the MilitaryServices. In the area of missile defense, ARPA conducted a program called Project
DEFENDER. This research contributed to improvements in both the U.S. Air ForceICBM programs, as well as the missile defense tracking and defense efforts of the Air
Force and Army. It was clear from the beginning of Project DEFENDER that fieldmeasurements of ICBM re-entry vehicles would play a major role for decisions about

4

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command Historical Office, First ABM Site in theFree World
5
Ibid
6
Ibid
7
Ibid
8
Ibid
9
Ibid

28

enhancement to preserve the continued credibility of the U.S. deterrent against Soviet
ABM efforts, and about the development of U.S. missile defenses. 10
In 1958-59, due to advantages of polar orbits for satellite launches, the Air Force
constructed its main ICBM launch complex at Cooke Air Force Base (AFB), later
named Vandenberg AFB. 11 In the same time period, the Army had selected Kwajalein
Atoll as a test site for the NIKE ZEUS system. 12
The Air Force planned to test launch ICBMs from its new complex, towards
Kwajalein. interservice rivalry however continued. The Army preferred an “organic”
operation under its control instead of observing re-entry vehicles launched by Air
Force ICBMs.13
To provide RVs for test of NIKE ZEUS, the Army proposed to launch its JUPITER
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) from Johnson Island, with rockets toaugment downward reentry velocity to simulate ICBM reentry. 14 When he becameaware of this plan, Dr. Herbert York, the first Director of Defense Research andEngineering (DDR&E) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense decided in early
1960 that only real ICBM RVs would be shot into the
Kwajalein area. 15 ARPA would play the role of honest
broker providing information on RV observations to both
the Air Force and Army. 16
In response, ARPA began a companion effort to Project
DEFENDER in the early 1960s called Project PRESS(Pacific Range Electromagnetic Signature Studies) todevelop instrumentation and characterize the flight tests of
newly-developed long-range missiles and missile defense

10

ARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II, An Historical Review of Selected DARPA
Projects, April 1991
11

Ibid
Ibid
13
Ibid
14
Ibid
15
Ibid
16
Ibid
12

29

systems.17 ARPA selected MIT Lincoln Laboratory to serve as the Chief Technical
Director of the project.18 The Laboratory selected the island of Roi-Namur on the
Kwajalein Atoll as an ideal location to build this instrumentation because its
remoteness from land and populated areas enabled a safe testing environment. 19 The
first radar developed under Project PRESS was the Target Resolution andDiscrimination Experiment (TRADEX) system which became operational
in 1962.20
Figure:TRADEX

An upgrade to the radar in 1995 enabled TRADEX to assess thespace debris population at low latitudes. This mode was used to collect space-debris
data for NASA. In 1998, TRADEX became a contributing sensor to the U.S. Space
Surveillance Network, with a primary focus on tracking foreign launches, deep-spacesatellites, and low-Earth-orbit satellites.21
The second system developed and deployed at
Kwajalein under Project PRESS was called the
ARPA Long-Range Tracking and Instrumentation
Radar (ALTAIR) and became operational in1969.22
ALTAIR was designed to give a view of how
ICBMs appear to missile defense radars.23
ALTAIR joined the Space Surveillance Network
in 1982.24 Like TRADEX, ALTAIR is
responsible for tracking foreign launches, andFigure: ALTAIR

near-Earth-orbit and deep-space satellites. 25

17

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory history
Ibid
19
Ibid
20
Ibid
21
Ibid
22
Ibid
23
Ibid
24
Ibid
25
Ibid
18

30

In March 1968, Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering(DDR&E) in the OSD, transferred ARPA’s missile defense program Project
DEFENDER, and the Project PRESS complex, to the U.S. Army, including transfer ofthe budget for Project DEFENDER beginning with the fiscal year 1969 budget. 26
After the transfer of most of Project DEFENDER, ARPA formed its Strategic
Technology Office (STO), which continued to support optical and IR research until
the early 1970s. This research provided much of the basis for sensor developments
later undertaken in the Reagan Administration by the Strategic Defense Initiative(SDI).27
MCNAMARA INITIATES ARGUMENTS AGAINST MISSILE DEFENSE
THAT PERSIST TODAY
Throughout his tenure as Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara put forward manyof the arguments against missile defense that persist today. For example, he argued
repeatedly that the threat from Soviet and Chinese missile programs did not warrant
such defenses and would only drive major advances in missile and nuclear technology
by both countries. McNamara argued that missile defenses would prompt an arms race
and argued in favor of restraint in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Both steps, he felt,
would restrain the Soviet Union from increasing its offensive and defense strategic
forces. Yet, despite later forgoing deployment of ABM defenses and limiting plans forstrategic offensive forces to lower levels, the Soviets pursued large scale deploymentsof thousands of nuclear-tipped ICBMs and deployment of ABM defenses. They also
rejected McNamara’s arguments about “assured destruction.”
According to the official history of the Secretary of Defense, McNamara argued infavor of a definition of “assured destruction” that was far less than Eisenhower’s
doctrine of massive retaliation for a nuclear strike on the United States. McNamara
pursued numerical formulas and systems analysis aimed at quantifying the needs forsuch “assured destruction.” For example, the original criteria for assured destruction
consisted of a capability to retaliate after a Soviet first strike and to destroy 30% of the
USSR’s population, 50% of its industrial capacity, and 150 of its cities. McNamara
26

U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command Historical Office, First ABM Site in theFree World, Department of the Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year 1969, and ARPA
Technical Accomplishments Volume II, An Historical Review of Selected DARPA Projects,
April 1991
27
ARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II, An Historical Review of Selected DARPA
Projects, April 1991

31

argued that damage beyond these levels was simply gratuitous and not cost-effective.
McNamara had similar approaches to conventional warfare, including the more costeffective involvement early in counter-insurgency efforts to avoid larger scale
conflicts later that led to U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
As the official DoD history of the Secretary of Defense points out, McNamara
engaged in “mirror imaging” to explain how the Soviets would think about the issues
the same way he did despite their statements to the contrary, adding that, “The illogic
of asking the Soviets to accept permanent strategic second place, to swallow OSD’schosen strategy of assured destruction, and to bank on the good intentions of theUnited States not to exploit its nuclear superiority also seemed to escape him.”
McNamara also pioneered arguments against the value of more limited defenses of the
U.S. population coupled with offensive deterrence, arguing against initial aims put
forward by the Eisenhower Administration and the JCS towards protecting a majorityof the U.S. population. For example, McNamara argued against pursuit of a defense
for 75% of the U.S. population, estimated to cost $35 billion, calling into question its
value. To attain McNamara’s objective of defending 90% of the U.S. population was
estimated at over $60 billion, thus being cost prohibitive. He also argued that theSoviets could offset the U.S. defensive improvements at increasingly less relative
cost, because ICBMs were easier and cheaper to build than ABM systems.
By late 1964, the controversy over lack of funding for an ABM system joined the listof major JCS-OSD disagreements. In Congressional testimony in early 1965,
McNamara denied the need to deploy an ABM system by downplaying the possibilityof the Soviets increasing offensive strategic forces as fast as previously anticipated,pointing to a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations, and questioning indications of the Soviets
deploying an ABM system.
Yet, McNamara’s efforts to downplay the growing missile threat reflected his belief inassured destruction. As the official DoD history of the Secretary of Defense points
out:
The November 1964 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) had forecast 400 to
700 Soviet ICBMs deployed by mid-1970 against 1,000 U.S. ICBMs; theactual count of Russian missiles in 1970 was 1,292. The 1966 forecast
estimated between 800 and 1,120 for mid-1972; the count was 1,527. Also
unpredicted, there appeared in 1967 the first Soviet Y-class nuclear submarine,32

a vessel capable of launching nuclear missiles from underwater; 21 wereoperational by 1971, more than double the 1966 U.S. estimate of 10.
In 1965, an Army study recommended a combination area and point defense against a
Chinese ICBM attack, that would be capable of growth to meet larger threats fromany quarter. The study proposed to field, by 1970, a “light” ABM system capable ofoffering area anti-ballistic missile coverage of the Continental United States andHawaii plus point or terminal protection for 25 American cities. Phases I and II had anestimated cost of $9.4 billion and completion date of June 1975. Expansion in Phases
III and IV would provide point defense for another 26 cities and improved defenses at
all 51 cities. To meet the Phase I schedule, the Army requested initial pre-production
funding of $188 million for FY 1967 as well as authorization of the NIKE X
deployment. Following a briefing by Army leaders on 8 October 1965, McNamara
directed continued NIKE X development, but did not authorize moves to deploy thesystem. McNamara continued to argue his belief that ABM defenses could lead to anarms race with the Soviet Union.
In late 1965, an operationally effective ABM system was still in question. Although
the Army was making advances with exoatmospheric interceptions (above an altitudeof 300,000 feet) as well as interceptions at lower altitudes, many unansweredquestions persisted about design and performance of the system, and warhead testing
was still ongoing. In March 1966, McNamara testified to a joint Congressional
Committee that the initially planned NIKE X would not protect the nation from alarge-scale Soviet attack that could saturate or confuse it, but it might successfully
fend off a “non-sophisticated” attack of perhaps 100 Chinese ICBMs.
In 1966, the Soviet offensive and defensive strategic arsenal expanded rapidly.
Moscow continued building hardened ICBM silos at a faster than expected rate, toshelter the SS-11, a new, smaller, and more accurate missile. The Soviets deployed far
more ICBM launchers during 1966 than U.S. intelligence had estimated the previous
year. Analysts also believed the Soviets were developing multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) for their SS-9 missiles.
As for defensive weapons, by early 1966, the Soviets’ construction of six confirmed
ABM complexes employing the advanced Galosh missile caused panic within thePentagon.
As the official DoD history of the Secretary of Defense states:
33

Meantime another pillar of McNamara’s opposition to NIKE X was giving
way. He conceded during House hearings in early 1966 that technologicalimprovements in warhead design had reached a stage where there was a
possibility that an ABM system could prevent substantial damage to theUnited States from a Chinese attack. The breakthrough had occurred with theplanned addition of long range, exoatmospheric anti-missile missiles to thesystem. Attacking large numbers of objects at altitudes well above theatmosphere with improved nuclear warheads could increase the ABM’s radiiof destruction from a few thousand feet to as much as 10 miles for hardened
incoming reentry vehicles and 10 to 100 miles for unhardened ones.
The dramatic enlargement of NIKE X’s kill-zone seemed to make possible afeasible and cost-effective ABM area defense. Whereas the initial ABM
network would have required dozens of sites and thousands of short-range
missiles for point defense, later computer-aided studies showed that a systemof 4 long-range acquisition radars, 16 missile site radars, and 400 interceptor
missiles at a relatively cheap price tag of $3 billion could theoretically offer athin defense over the entire United States against a Chinese nuclear attack.
As if to reinforce the need to protect against large-scale attack, in May 1966,
China exploded a device containing thermonuclear material, further
diminishing the force of McNamara’s argument that China presented no
immediate threat. By October 1966, the Chinese had tested a nuclear-tippedintermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The Soviets simultaneously
appeared intent on constructing a Galosh-equipped ABM ring around Moscow
and perhaps elsewhere. How, proponents wondered, could Washington notfield an ABM defense when the Soviets were now building one as well as
numerous ICBM missile launchers? The JCS proposal for ABM preproduction
funding found growing support in Congress as NIKE X became a hot politicalissue that isolated McNamara and left President Johnson with the unhappy
prospect of campaigning for reelection in 1968 open to charges of an “ABMGap”.
Yet, McNamara was unmoved, circulating a memo 17 November 1966 citing his“fixed belief” that the United States and the Soviet Union both shared the“fundamental objective” of assured destruction. He faced opposition to his views on
missile defense from senior DoD officials. As the official DoD history of his tenurestates:34

On 30 September 1966, DDR&E John Foster voiced his concern that theSoviets could destroy the Minuteman force if they modified their SS-9 and SS11 missile forces, using basic technology they already possessed. To counter
this possibility, Foster suggested deployment of ABMs to protect Minutemansites. Critical of Foster’s “imbalanced analysis” and lack of hard evidence forhis contentions, McNamara relied on the more benign assessment of Systems
Analysis that no recent evidence confirmed any Soviet attempt either toimprove missile accuracy or develop MIRVs.
On 6 December, McNamara and the JCS met with President Lyndon Johnson in
Austin, Texas, to finalize the FY 1968 DoD budget request. The Joint Chiefs
reaffirmed their previous position supporting their damage-limiting argument andchallenging OSD’s assumptions that a Soviet reaction to NIKE X deployment would
be “equal, opposite, feasible and possible.” Even the Air Force Chief of Staff now
favored deployment to protect Minuteman sites.
Surprised by the united front from the JCS, McNamara argued vigorously against
deploying a NIKE X on a scale capable of defending 25 major American cities. He
believed the Soviet nuclear defense policy had been wrongheaded for a decade,allowing spending of vast sums on defenses “not worth a damn” as it exceeded theneeds of “assured destruction.”
Saying he recognized the “terrible dilemma” the President faced, McNamara
suggested a fallback position, in which he would ask for initial NIKE X deployment
money in the January budget submission, announcing at the same time that DoD
would not use the money if the Soviets indicated willingness to consider talks on
ABM limitations.
McNamara worked with the State Department and President Johnson intently sought asummit meeting with the Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. After six months of U.S.
effort to overcome Soviet reluctance, President Johnson and Premier Kosygin met in
Glassboro, New Jersey in June 1967.
Prior to the Glassboro summit, the Soviet leader had made clear his disagreement with
McNamara’s concept of assured destruction, claims of missile defenses asdestabilizing, and desire for arms control negotiations to limit missile defenses.
35

As the official DoD history of McNamara’s tenure states:
Kosygin, however, appeared preoccupied with the ABM issue, believing as hedid that ABM systems were designed to save lives, ‘and no negotiations wereneeded to prove it.’ During his early February meeting with British leaders in
London, for example, the Soviet premier, seeking to appropriate the higher
moral ground, castigated the American position as one that preferred cheaper
offensive weapons to more expensive defensive ones. Which was more
conducive to peace, he asked rhetorically, a country that based itself on
offensive or defensive systems?
According to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin’s version of events, at President Johnson’s
direction, McNamara provided Kosygin an impromptu discourse on his theory ofassured destruction and need to prevent a costly arms race through arms control limits
on offensive forces and ABM. Aware of McNamara’s numerous public statements on
cost-effectiveness of weapon systems, an emotional Kosygin declared this“commercial approach” immoral. As the weekend summit progressed, the Soviet
positions only hardened. During subsequent private meetings with Johnson, Kosygin
repeatedly implied that the Americans were only interested in limiting defensive
weapons like ABMs.
The President and his Defense Secretary left Glassboro disappointed and Soviet
participants later recalled their grave disappointment with McNamara’s ABM
presentation, describing it as little more than a rehash of the Secretary’s previous
public statements. Within 10 days of the summit, McNamara decided to recommend
deployment of a thin ABM system, instructing his staff to prepare estimates for its
initial components, lead times, and costs. McNamara would announce deployment of
the SENTINEL system on 18 September 1967.
While McNamara could reject many JCS demands for more strategic weapons, he felt
compelled to deploy a light ABM system, although he thought it unnecessary and too
costly. The initial aims of the system were to defend against China’s ICBM force.
McNamara’s concept of assured destruction and arms control altered the debate overstrategic nuclear weapons. Yet as the official DoD history of his tenure points out:
“His single-minded certitude that assured destruction was the only nuclear strategy
that made sense alienated the Soviet leaders, whom he could not convince of its
validity.”
36

McNamara’s successor as Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, opposed the NIKE X,
doubting that it could protect cities against large-scale Soviet ICBM attacks. Unlike
his predecessor, however, Clifford proved a hardline advocate of SENTINEL
deployment. SENTINEL had evolved from the NIKE X program and used many of
the components developed for that system. 28 Clifford believed SENTINEL wasnecessary to protect the United States against a Chinese or an accidental Soviet
ballistic missile attack, defend Minuteman silos, improve the bargaining leverage inarms talks with the Soviets, and gain valuable experience from the construction itself.
The Chief of Staff of the Army directed the formation of a major command known as
U.S. Army SENTINEL System Command (SENSCOM) to produce and field theSENTINEL system. 29
A history of the system by Greg Bowen 30 describes the operation of the system toprovide a layered defense:
Threat re-entry vehicles (RVs) were detected by satellites, then picked up andtracked by the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR), a phased-array system withmulti-megawatt output. The PAR characterized the threat attack and provided
track information for the intercept solution. This information was relayed to
the Ballistic Missile Defense Center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. Oncethe threat RV’s came within range, the tracks were “handed off” to anotherphased-array radar, the Missile Site Radar (MSR), which provided the final
fire control solutions for the system and guided the interceptors toward theirtargets.
The system provided a layered defense, using the Spartan missiles for longrange exoatmospheric intercepts and the Sprint missiles for close-in,endoatmospheric intercepts. Spartans were fired first at long range, with thegoal of detonating their large warhead close to, and destroying a number of,
RV’s while they were still above the atmosphere. Surviving RV’s would
continue on their ballistic path. Once they began to reenter the atmosphere, theatmospheric drag would quickly separate the decoys and debris from the RV,
making the actual targets easier to track. They would then be engaged at short
SAFEGUARD: North Dakota’s Front Line in the Cold War by Greg Bowen, 2004
Ibid
30
SAFEGUARD: North Dakota’s Front Line in the Cold War by Greg Bowen, 2004
28
29

37

range with the Sprint, which would intercept them within about 25 miles of thelaunch site. Both missiles were nuclear-armed, using nuclear weapons effects
such as blast, heat, radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to destroy theirtargets. Command and control of the system was exercised at the MSR
Complex and from the Ballistic Missile Defense Center (BMDC) locatedwithin the Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado.
The planned initial SENTINEL deployment consisted of 6 Perimeter
Acquisition Radars (PARs), 17 Missile Site Radars (MSR), 480 Spartan
interceptor missiles, and 192 Sprint interceptor missiles at 17 sites in theContinental U.S. An additional MSR and 28 Sprint interceptor missiles wereplanned for Hawaii.
SENTINEL deployment did not proceed smoothly, however. The Army vacillated
over site selection, anticipating the program funding would be cut due to the
President’s mandated reductions in defense spending. In early September 1968,
Clifford insisted deployment adhere “as closely as possible” to the approved
milestones; later he resisted White House attempts to slip the system schedule byseveral months to save $250 million. Of the 17 sites planned for SENTINEL,
construction at only one—Boston, Massachusetts—was under way by early December
1968.
There were also objections to scheduled underground nuclear tests deemed necessary
for SENTINEL warhead design. Residents in California, Nevada, and other Westernstates voiced concern that such tests might possibly trigger earthquakes. In early
December, Clifford argued strongly and successfully against any testing delays,
claiming that they would only increase costs, retard ABM deployment, and potentiallylead some Congressional opponents of the program to again attempt to kill the
program. A one-megaton test went off at the Nevada test site on 19 December 1968 inwhat turned out to be a major milestone in the short-lived SENTINEL project.
By 1969, the conflict in Vietnam had led to a major change in public opinion of themilitary and growing anti-nuclear sentiments. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
conducted a series of public relations meetings to inform the local population about
the SENTINEL construction and to address concerns, including about the potential for
nuclear interceptions high over major cities.31 One such meeting was held in Reading,31

SAFEGUARD: North Dakota’s Front Line in the Cold War by Greg Bowen, 2004

38

Massachusetts on January 29, 1969 to discuss plans for construction in the Boston
area. Unlike previous meetings, the Reading meeting deteriorated from a civil
discourse into a series of shout-downs, prolonged applause, and cat calls. 32
Immediately after the meeting, former Kennedy presidential advisors George
Rathjens, who attended the meeting, along with Jerome Wiesner and Richard
Goodwin contacted the former President’s brother, Senator Edward Kennedy, andurged him to join the opposition movement. 33
Edward Kennedy did, and the next day sent a strongly worded letter to the new
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird who had taken office only a week earlier. In theletter, Senator Kennedy described the SENTINEL system as “technically deficient,dangerously sited, unduly costly, and deleterious to domestic priorities as well as toprospects for an arms agreement with the Soviet Union.” The Kennedy letter touched
off extensive Congressional debate, culminating in the House Armed Services
Committee threatening to cut off funding for SENTINEL unless the Nixon
Administration conducted a review of the entire program. 34

SAFEGUARD:
In response to public and Congressional pressure, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird
initiated a review of the SENTINEL program, and how it could deal with Soviet andChinese missile capabilities. Greatly concerned about the magnitude of the Soviet
effort, he placed Deputy Secretary David Packard in charge of a review panel. With
his science and engineering background, Packard was well suited to lead the review.
The Soviets had outspent the U.S. on anti-missile defenses by a ratio of almost 4 to 1
during the past two years and had also increased the pace of offensive missile
deployments.
After the review identified options, SecDef Laird, Deputy Secretary Packard, and the
JCS endorsed a modified version of SENTINEL that protected Minuteman ICBM
installations, Strategic Air Command bomber bases, and the national capital area froma Soviet strike. It would also defend some heavily populated areas from the emerging
Chinese missile threat and provide defense against accidental launches.

32

Ibid
Ibid
34
Ibid
33

39

The modified system, built in stages, would reorient President Johnson’s SENTINEL
program from defending U.S. cities, to protection of military forces. The first phasewould see construction of two sites, one at Malmstrom AFB in Montana and the otherat Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota, with possible expansion in later phases to 12
sites.
On 14 March 1969, President Richard Nixon announced his decision to proceed witha modified ABM system, renaming it SAFEGUARD to emphasize its role inprotecting the United States, stating the system was:A safeguard against any attack by the Chinese Communists that we canforesee over the next 10 years. It is a safeguard of our deterrent system, whichis increasingly vulnerable due to the advances that have been made by theSoviet Union since the year 1967 when the SENTINEL program was first laidout. It is a safeguard also against any irrational or accidental attack that mightoccur of less than massive magnitude which might be launched from theSoviet Union.35
In short, SAFEGUARD was not intended to completely stop an all-out Soviet missile
attack or defend cities, but it could help ensure the United States could mount a
credible retaliatory strike. Above all, Nixon was convinced that an ABM system was anecessary bargaining chip in nuclear arms control negotiations with the Soviets.
Over the next three years the Nixon Administration would pursue arms control
negotiations with the Soviets. These talks would culminate on 26 May 1972, with
President Nixon and the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signing the 1972 ABM Treaty
and the SALT I interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms. In the ABM
Treaty, the parties agreed to limit ABM systems to two sites for defense of thenational capital and one ICBM site.
Each of the two sites was allowed a maximum of 100 launchers and 100 missiles. The
Treaty also prohibited either side from establishing a nationwide defense. In 1974, theU.S. and Soviet Union signed a protocol to the Treaty, limiting each country to just
one site and reducing the total number of interceptors allowed from 200 to 100. The
35

James H. Kitchens, III. A History of the Huntsville Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
1967-1976 (Huntsville: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1978) p 33.

40

Soviets chose to keep their ABM site around Moscow and the U.S. kept the nearlycompleted Safeguard site in North Dakota near an ICBM field.
On the day the ABM treaty was signed in 1972, SecDef Laird directed Army
Secretary Robert F. Froehlke to suspend construction of SAFEGUARD at Malmstrom
AFB, halt future work at the remaining SAFEGUARD sites, and kill all R&D
programs prohibited by the treaty. At the same time, Laird wanted the planning for thenational capital site to proceed as quickly as possible, and the deployment of theGrand Forks site to continue.
When the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, the Grand Forks site was 85% complete,
while the Malmstrom site was only 10% complete. Since the treaty only allowed one
ICBM field to be protected, construction of the Malmstrom site was halted. 36 Work on
the Grand Forks site proceeded rapidly, and the site reached initial operational
capability (IOC) with the deployment of 28 Sprint and 8 Spartan missiles on April 1,
1975. The site reached full operational capability on September 28, 1975. 37
The Grand Forks site complex consisted of three major elements: The Perimeter
Acquisition Radar (PAR) located near Concrete, ND; the Missile Site Radar (MSR)
complex located 12 miles south of Langdon, ND; and the four Remote Sprint Launch(RSL) sites clustered within 20 miles of the MSR. The Ballistic Missile Defense
Center (BMDC) in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado integrated SAFEGUARD within
NORAD and allowed the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) to exercise
operational command and nuclear release authority for the SAFEGUARD system.
The Grand Forks site had 30 Spartan and 70 Sprint missiles when completed. 38
The Ballistic Missile Defense Program Manager (BMDPM) was the senior Army
officer who exercised command, less “operational command”, over the
SAFEGUARD system. Operational command of the system resided with the
CINCONAD, who also commanded NORAD from the Cheyenne Mountain
Operations Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado. 39

SAFEGUARD: North Dakota’s Front Line in the Cold War by Greg Bowen, 2004
Ibid
38
Ibid
39
Ibid
36
37

41

The BMDPM was responsible for discipline, internal organization, administration,
logistics, and unit training for Army BMD Forces. He also served an advisor to
CINCONAD on BMD matters, and as the Army Component Commander toContinental Aerospace Defense Command, he was an intermediary between
CINCONAD and SAFEGUARD Command (SAFCMD), the operational Army unitthat manned and operated the Grand Forks site. The authority to fire a Sprint orSpartan missile resided with the President, since both types of the missiles were
nuclear-armed.40
In 1974, the Army’s Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) was formed todevelop, deploy, and operate the SAFEGUARD system, as well as conduct advanced
ballistic missile defense technology development. In 1975, a field operating agency in
the Army called the Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center was
created to formulate and execute approved ballistic missile defense programs of
exploratory and advanced development in ballistic missile defense technology within
the guidance and direction of the Ballistic Missile Defense Program Manager. 41
Despite spending billions of dollars to deploy the SAFEGUARD program at Grand
Forks, the Army believed that a single site would be overwhelmed in a large-scaleattack. However, it decided anyway to maintain the Grand Forks site for a year, togain operational experience for potential future missile defense systems. When the
Army’s plan to cease operations after a year reached Congress, it moved quickly to
cut appropriations. On October 2, 1975, the House voted to deactivate the system, due
to the high operating costs and its limited effectiveness. On February 10, 1976, theJoint Chiefs of Staff ordered the termination of the mission. With that, the only U.S.
ABM system was shut down after less than five months of operation. 42
The cancellation of SAFEGUARD ended the Army’s NIKE lineage that had begun in
the late 1940s. Components of SAFEGUARD were deactivated or transferred to othermission areas; the Sprint and Spartan missiles were canceled, and PAR shifted to awarning role under the Air Force. The 1972 ABM Treaty solidified the theory of
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as the primary strategic deterrent for bothsides.

40

Ibid
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) Study on the Mission, Roles, and Structure of theMissile Defense Agency, 2008.
42
SAFEGUARD: North Dakota’s Front Line in the Cold War by Greg Bowen, 2004
41

42

In the early 1970s, even while it was deploying the SAFEGUARD system, the Armybegan working on concepts and components for new systems to defend the
Minuteman ICBM bases and counter a larger and more sophisticated Soviet force than
SAFEGUARD could address. This program, called HARDSITE, would supplement or
replace SAFEGUARD with a larger number of defense modules, each defending asmall portion of the Minuteman force. The radars of this system would be smaller,
simpler, and cheaper than the SAFEGUARD radars, and the system would be lesscostly than the proliferation of SAFEGUARD components.43
Over the next 10 years, the Army studied and experimented with a wide range of
missile defense technologies. Some of the technologies stemmed from theSAFEGUARD program, while others were completely new in areas like radarsystems, missile development, optical systems, data processing, discrimination
technology, re-entry physics, and nuclear effects. 44 For example, according to the
U.S. Army Center for Military History, during the Carter Administration:
The Systems Technology Program in fiscal year 1978 centered on reducing
system cost, improving effectiveness, and reducing lead time in the face of a
growing and increasingly sophisticated threat. Analysis progressed of thelayered defense system and the Low-Altitude Defense (LoAD) System. A
contract was let for the homing overlay experiment interceptor; and thesystems technology testing program went forward at the Kwajalein Missile
Range.
Layered defense is a defense system with two layers operating cooperatively
and selectively. It is a cost-effective source of exoatmospheric andendoatmospheric protection against Soviet reentry vehicles andsophisticated multiple target reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The system began
early in fiscal year 1978, following an analysis in fiscal year 1977. The
analysis showed that layered defense would be more robust and costeffective than any of the other options available to counter the advancing
Soviet threat to U.S. inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) forces.4543

Department of the Army Historical Summary, FY 1970, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 1973, pp. 126-127.)44
Department of the Army Historical Summary, FY 1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 1973, pp.31-33, 89-90.)
45
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1978, pp. 25-28, 126, 140.)43

During the Carter Administration, in 1977, the Army began development of the
Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), and in 1984, HOE became the first system tosuccessfully conduct a hit-to-kill interception outside the Earth’s atmosphere. The
Army would then use guidance system technology from HOE in its Exoatmospheric
Reentry-vehicle Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS). Eventually tested in 1991, the ERIS
system’s effectiveness far surpassed HOE with a significantly improved accuracy indistinguishing ICBMs from decoy targets.

Strategic Defense Initiative:
After taking office on January 20, 1981, newly elected President Ronald Reagan was
searching for a way to move away from Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) with
the Soviet Union. He began seeking advice on creating a workable ballistic missile
defense. Acting on the advice of Dr. Edward Teller, the father of the American HBomb, and others, in March 1983 President Reagan gave an address to the nation
stating his intent to "create a nationwide defense shield against ballistic missiles thatwould make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."
Reagan called his new concept the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which Senator
Edward Kennedy promptly dubbed "Star Wars", a name that would also be adopted
by the media. To direct the program, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger createdthe Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO): a joint Service, independent
development organization that reported directly to him, headed by U.S. Air Force
Lieutenant General James Abrahamson.
Although SDI was established as a research and technology development program in
January 1984, the SDIO was not chartered to manage the Department of Defense's
efforts in ballistic missile defense until three months later. The SDI program, designed
to take advantage of expertise in the Armed Forces, private industry, universities, andthe national laboratories, was created to explore advanced non-nuclear technologies
associated with strategic defenses.46 The ultimate deployment of the technologies
undergoing research and development under SDI would have required withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty.

46

Guide to International Participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative, May 9, 1991

44

SDIO was chartered as a Defense Agency within OSD but served as an integrator andoverall manager of efforts that were largely executed by the Military Services. As an
SDI publication from 1990 stated:
While SDIO is the focal point for policy and program formulation, theoperational aspects of SDI work are performed through the SDI Executive
Agents and their research facilities, Service commands, and other installations
at various locations throughout the United States.
Money appropriated by Congress for SDI flows through DoD to SDIO. The
Director, SDIO, determines the overall program budget and allocates themoney to his program managers within SDIO. These program managers
provide money to the Military Services and other agencies who actually
execute most of the programs. The majority of research and related work is
pursued through contracts awarded on a competitive basis by the SDI Agentsto private industry, universities, and other research organizations.
In FY 1990, SDIO retained about one-fifth of the annual budget for SDI.
Approximately one-third went to the Army, one-third to the Air Force, and theremainder to the Navy, the Department of Energy, and other defense
agencies.47

48

47
48

Ibid
Ibid

45

The Army's missile defense expertise formed the backbone of the SDIO, and in July
1985, the new U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command (USADC) replaced the
Army’s BMDO. Working together, researchers from the SDIO, the Army, Air Force,national labs, and allies developed new approaches.
By 1990, USASDC’s principal focus areas were: Advanced research and developmentin the fields of interceptors, active and passive sensors, discrimination, and signal/dataprocessing. Some major elements of the Army’s efforts as an SDI Executive Agent in1990 were: Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Directed Energy Weapons (DEW),
Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEW), Exoatmospheric Reentry-Vehicle Interceptor
Subsystem (ERIS) which later was renamed as Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC3), Ground Based Interceptor (GBI), and High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor(HEDI) Sensors.49
In its role as an SDI Executive Agent, the Air Force conducted work through its
respective commands like the Air Force Systems Command and its respective Spaceand Electronic Systems Divisions, the Air Force Space Technology Center andWeapons Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base, and the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research. Major SDI Program Elements executed by the Air Force were theSpace-Based Surveillance & Tracking System (Brilliant Eyes), Space-Based
Interceptor (SBI), and Advanced Launch System (ALS).50
Some of the new technologies the SDIO planned to use included space- and groundbased lasers, space-based interceptors, and a neutral particle beam weapon. The
technology was immature, expensive, and the program became a major partisan
political issue. The Soviet Union, as well as some of the United States' European
allies, were harshly critical of SDI, claiming it would upset the balance of power.
President Reagan, however, was unmoved by controversy and remained an ardent
proponent of missile defense. With Reagan's support, SD1 funding grew rapidly,
increasing from $1.4 billion in fiscal year 1985 to $4.5 billion in 1989.
SDI also included work with allies. In March 1985, Secretary of Defense Weinberger
formally invited the NATO Allies and other friendly nations to directly participate instrategic defense research. Several countries signed Memoranda of Understanding(MOUs) or Memoranda of Agreements including the United Kingdom, Germany,

49
50

Ibid
Ibid

46

Israel, Italy, Japan, France, and the Netherlands. SDIO's first contracts with non-U.S.
firms were awarded in late 1985. By November 1990, 268 contracts worth more than
$479 million had been awarded to foreign partners, including to Israel for the Arrowmissile defense program.

In July 1983, the United States announced that it had detected a Soviet early-warningradar near the town of Krasnoyarsk, the location of which constituted a violation of
the ABM Treaty. During the beginning stages of the SDI, a substantial debate took
place regarding the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Supporters of the“broad” interpretation believed that the testing and development of space- and mobilebased components that utilize “other physical principles” (e.g., lasers) was permitted,
while those of the “narrow” view believed that development and testing of thesecomponents should be limited to fixed, land-based systems.
SDIO focused on large-scale defense against massive Soviet strikes. By 1986, SDIO
had determined that this was feasible and created the concept of the Strategic Defense
System. According to the Missile Defense Agency historian:47

By the autumn of 1987, SDIO had developed a national missile defense
concept called the Strategic Defense System (SDS) Phase I Architecture,composed of a space-based interceptor; a ground-based interceptor; a groundbased sensor; two space-based sensors; and a battle management system.
Using hit-to-kill interceptors, the architecture’s goal was to destroy a given
percentage of warheads in a massive Soviet missile attack against the UnitedStates, while improvements in its later phases would increase the system’s
operational effectiveness. From the outset, however, the architecture fueled
controversy since its adoption would require withdrawing from the ABM
Treaty, and because its space-based component had two major shortcomings:
its expense, and vulnerability to Soviet anti-satellite weapons.
In 1990, a new hit-to-kill interceptor concept called Brilliant Pebbles offeredpotential solutions to the space-based interceptor’s cost and survivability
issues. Brilliant Pebbles was based on many small, autonomous, space-based
interceptors and replaced the original space-based interceptor concept in the
SDS Phase I architecture.51
During the 1980’s, SDIO also developed a concept for a constellation of manysatellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), called Brilliant Eyes.52 While the United States
operated satellites capable of detecting the launch of ballistic missiles using infrared
sensors, like the Defense Satellite Program (DSP) system first launched in 1970,
SDIO identified the challenge of tracking the missile after its booster burns out andthe missile ejects its warhead, decoys, and penetration aids onto a ballistic flight paththrough space. Brilliant Eyes was intended to address this capability gap bydetermining the location of the warhead and its destination to enable ground-based
interceptors to successfully destroy the incoming warhead. Tracking would begin
below the horizon and with hand-offs from DSP sensors and to ground-based sensors,
would enable birth-to-death tracking of attacking missies and their warheads.53
With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact in the late 1980s, the threat of a massive
Soviet ICBM attack decreased. As noted by the Missile Defense Agency historian:
51

Missile Defense: The First 70 Years, publication of Missile Defense Agency historian, 8August 2013.
52
Congressional Research Service report to Congress, “Military Space Programs: Issues
Concerning DOD’s SBIRS and STSS Programs”, Jan. 30, 2006, by Marcia S. Smith.
53
Ibid and Air Force Magazine, “Space Watch, High and Low,” by Richard Newman, July
2001.

48

Following the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, which signaled
the ending of the Cold War, President George H.W. Bush ordered a review of
the SDI program. The review, completed in March 1990, recommended
reorienting the program to develop strategic defenses against limited attacks
on the United States and theater defense against attacks by short-range ballistic
missiles on overseas forces.
The President formally announced this new system, Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes (GPALS), in his January 1991 State of the Union Address. Its
principal goal was to defend America against limited missile attacks andprotect deployed United States forces and America’s friends and allies against
shorter-range ballistic missiles. GPALS was an integrated architecture withthree components: a global, space-based system of Brilliant Pebbles
interceptors; a force of ground- and sea-based theater missile defenses; and alimited, ground-based national missile defense element.
GPALS was managed under the purview of SDIO, and also contained the objective ofdefeating an accidental launch from the Soviet Union. The threshold requirement for
GPALS was to protect against ballistic missile threats of up to a few tens of warheads.
The 1991 Missile Defense Act, driven by the use of Scud missiles by Iraq against theUnited States and its allies in the first Gulf War, called for “an anti-ballistic missile
system… capable of providing a highly effective defense of the United States against
limited attacks of ballistic missiles.” The Act also required “highly effective theater
missile defenses'' for the protection of allies and deployed assets.
The United States held a series of discussions with the Russians regarding post-Soviet
defense doctrines. In January 1992 at the UN, Russian President Boris Yeltsin
proposed that SDI be reoriented to integrate Russian technology and that the UnitedStates and Russia build a Joint Global Defense to protect the world community,
stating: “I think the time has come to consider creating a global system for protectionof the world community. It could be based on a reorientation of the U.S. Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) to make use of high technologies developed in Russia’s
defense complex.”54
54

Stubborn Things, A Decade of Facts About Missile Defense, A Report by Senator Thad
Cochran, September 2000.

49

President George H.W. Bush and Russian President Yeltsin would discuss
cooperation on GPALS at Camp David and agree at the Washington Summit on June
17, 1992 on a “Joint Statement on a Global Protection System'', to pursue ballistic
missile defense cooperation on a priority basis. The agreement to cooperate in thedevelopment of ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies was also
incorporated into another summit document – a “Charter for American-RussianPartnership and Friendship.”55
Upon taking office in January 1993, President Bill Clinton sharply curtailed andreoriented U.S. missile defense efforts to emphasize compliance with the ABM
Treaty, which his administration called the “cornerstone of strategic stability”,
utilizing the arguments first made by Robert McNamara that viewed missile defenses
as destabilizing. Arms control was referred to as the first line of defense during the
Clinton Administration.
The Clinton Administration terminated the Strategic Defense Initiative. The SDIO
was renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), with a new charter
listing as its first priority development of TMD systems.
The Director of BMDO reported to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology (A&T) as opposed to reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense as
the Director of SDIO had done. BMDO was chartered with managing the integrated
ballistic missile defense program (BMDP).
BMDO interfaced with the Services and other DoD organizations through the BMD
Acquisition Review Council (BMDARC), with representatives from the Service
Acquisition Executives (SAEs), Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Services, Vice Chairmanof the JCS, and the Combatant Commands. The BMDARC was charged withdetermining specific program direction and resolving programmatic and technicalissues.56
In his announcement of the new BMDO organization, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
stated, “we are here to observe... the end of the Star Wars era” and “these changes
55

Ibid
Department of Defense Directive 5134.9 establishing BMDO signed by Deputy Secretary
John Deutch, June 14, 1994
56

50

represent a shift away from a crash program for deployment of space-based weapons
designed to meet a threat that has receded to the vanishing point.”
The Clinton Administration broke up the GPALS architecture into separate
components and cancelled the Brilliant Pebbles program. In the first year of the
Clinton Administration, the budget for national missile defense was reduced by 60%
and overall missile defense funding slashed by 41%. 57
In one of the first acts of the Clinton Administration, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
returned unopened bids that had been submitted by contractors to develop groundbased interceptors for national missile defense of the U.S. Secretary Aspin
commented that he had taken this step to “take the stars out of Star Wars.” 58
Instead, emphasis was given to TMD programs. These included improvements in the
Army’s PATRIOT missile, known as PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3); a
new Army missile the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); the Air Force’s
Airborne Laser program; and the lower-tier Navy Area Defense and upper-tier Navy
Theater Wide programs, both of which were based upon significant modifications tothe shipborne Aegis air defense system and Standard Missile (SM) interceptor.
The Clinton Administration also ended the GPALS cooperation with Russia. Notably,
President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin met in Vancouver in early 1993.
Yeltsin wanted to continue the cooperative efforts, but his request was rejected by
Clinton, who sought to emphasize arms control and the ABM Treaty. 59
The Clinton Administration justified this focus on tactical BMD in part by acontroversial 1995 National Intelligence Estimate which stated that, for at least thenext 15 years, no U.S. adversary except Russia and China would be capable ofdeveloping missiles that could reach the Continental United States.
Congressional partisan bickering over the validity of this report lasted until 1998,
when the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,
known also as the Rumsfeld Commission, convened. The Rumsfeld Commission
issued a report warning that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea could all relatively quickly
57

Stubborn Things, A Decade of Facts About Missile Defense, A Report by Senator Thad
Cochran, September 2000.
58
Ibid
59
Ibid

51

develop missiles capable of hitting the United States, and that the U.S. may have little
warning of foreign missile development. The Rumsfeld Commission report was
validated weeks later when North Korea tested a new ballistic missile, which overflew
Japan before landing in the Pacific Ocean.
This was one of several factors that prompted the 1999 National Missile Defense Act,signed into law by President Clinton, that stated the United States’ intent to "deploy assoon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense systemcapable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile
attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) ...."In another decision on roles and responsibilities for missile defense, following a 1994
DOD study on how best to meet the nation’s early warning needs, Brilliant Eyes wastransferred to the Air Force, which was given responsibility to build an integrated
Space-Based InfraRed System (SBIRS) with satellites in several orbits. Brilliant Eyes
was renamed the Space and Missile Tracking System and became the low Earth orbit
component of SBIRS. Later it was renamed SBIRS-Low.60 SBIRS would consist of
two sets of satellites. The so-called SBIRS High constellation, consisting of four
satellites in geosynchronous Earth orbits and two sensors in elliptical high Earthorbits, would primarily provide early warning of missile launches and track rockets
until their heat-generating boosters burn out. SBIRS-High would be a replacement for
DSP satellites providing early-warning of missile launches with much improved
detection of the source of such launches and impact point prediction.
SBIRS Low, would consist of about two dozen satellites in low Earth orbit, which
would then track the warheads from their point of separation from a booster until theyneared re-entry. Combined with powerful ground-based radars, SBIRS-High and Low
were intended to provide “birth-to-death tracking” of ballistic missiles.61 The Air
Force struggled with development of both the SBIRS-High and Low systems.
SBIRS-High would go through repeated delays in development and major cost growth
before eventually placing its first satellite in Geostationary orbit in 2011, about 15
years after the program began.
The SBIRS-Low system would go through many redefinitions and changes inacquisition approach. The original 1995 schedule for the system called for (1) alaunch of a two-satellite flight demonstration in fiscal year 1999; (2) a deployment
60

Congressional Research Service report to Congress, “Military Space Programs: Issues
Concerning DOD’s SBIRS and STSS Programs”, Jan. 30, 2006, by Marcia S. Smith.
61
Ibid and Air Force Magazine, “Space Watch, High and Low,” by Richard Newman, July
2001.

52

decision in fiscal year 2000 after key technologies and operating concepts werevalidated by the demonstration satellites; and (3) launches of SBIRS-low satellites,with three satellites per launch vehicle, beginning in fiscal year 2006.62

Creation of the Missile Defense Agency:
President George W. Bush took office in 2001, naming Donald Rumsfeld as his
Secretary of Defense. President Bush came to office strongly supportive of missile
defenses to deal with growing missile threat from rogue states like North Korea. His
first major national security address, in May 2001, was devoted to the need for missile
defenses to counter this growing threat, his desire to move beyond the 1972 ABM
Treaty, and to create a new framework for U.S relations with Russia that were nolonger based on mutually assured destruction.
On December 13, 2001, President Bush announced that the United States had decided
to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty and had given the formal 6-month noticerequired under the Treaty to Russia. Withdrawal from the Treaty would take effect onJune 13, 2002.
On January 2, 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld renamed BMDO to its presentday name, Missile Defense Agency (MDA). In his Directive establishing MDA,
Secretary Rumsfeld invested the Agency with special authorities for rapid acquisition
and instructed the Services on their responsibilities for assuming responsibility forbudgeting for missile defense systems developed by MDA once they enteredproduction and sustainment.
Similar to BMDO, the Director of MDA reported to the Under Secretary for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD/AT&L).
The Secretary of Defense Directive stated:
The special nature of missile defense development, operations, and support
calls for non-standard approaches to both acquisition and requirements
generation. As a development activity, the Missile Defense Agency will
require some expanded responsibility and authority. I therefore direct thefollowing:
62

Global Security Organization, https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sbirs-low.htm

53

To rapidly carry out my direction, streamlined executive oversight andreporting will be Implemented. The Senior Executive Council (SEC), chairedby the Deputy Secretary of Defense, will, in addition to other responsibilities,
provide policy, planning and programming guidance; oversee the Department's
missile defense activities; and approve BMDS fielding recommendations. The
USD (AT&L) will establish a Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG) of
appointed department officials to advise the Director, MDA, and support SEC
decision-making. The chairman of the MDSG will report to USD (AT&L).
Management of the BMDS elements will consist of three phases:
development, transition, and procurement and operations. The
recommendation by Director, MDA, for a BMDS element to move to thetransition phase; and by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) to enter the
procurement phase will be approved by the SEC along with budget and force
structure levels.
To encourage flexible acquisition practices, I delegate to the Director, MDA,
authority to use transactions other than contracts, grants, and cooperative
agreements to carry out basic, applied, and advanced research.
The Secretary, with input from the SEC, will decide whether to use Research
Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) assets for emergency orcontingency deployment, based on assessment of military utility, progress indevelopment and recommendation by the Director, MDA and MilitaryServices.
The Director, MDA, will manage the BMDS through the development andtransition phases, and baseline the capability and configuration of its capability
blocks and BMDS elements. The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force will procure the BMDS elements and provide, with the Defense
Agencies, for their operation and support.
Production quantities and operational force levels will be settled early enoughin the development for an effective transition of responsibility. BMDS
elements will enter the formal DoD acquisition cycle at Milestone C,
concurrent with Service procurement responsibility transfer. USD (AT&L)
will oversee all Service missile defense procurement phase activity.

54

Budgeting for RDT&E is the responsibility of MDA; budgeting forprocurement is the responsibility of the Services.
To reinforce the single-system focus, and to implement a successful transition
to capability-based management, the BMDS program will not be subject to the
traditional requirements generation process of CJCSI 3170. The current
Service missile defense Operational Requirements Documents are notconsistent with the proposed BMDS development program objectives and are
hereby cancelled. However, the Director, MDA will establish a process thatsets initial capability standards, engages the participation of future users early
and throughout development, and permits capability trades across all BMDS
elements.
MDA will manage through System Technical Objectives and Goals and during
the transition phase will baseline capabilities and configurations. Duringtransition, the Services will develop a capability-based Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) that will become operative upon transfer ofcapabilities to the Services.
Throughout development, the Military Departments and the Joint Staff will
provide guidance and advice on desired capabilities, operational approaches,and suitability and supportability features.
The Military Departments will provide forces, as needed, to support thefielding of early and/or contingency capability and will budget the resources toprocure and operate the planned force structure.
The Director, MDA will retain management responsibility for defining theoverall BMDS and the interoperability standards for programs that transfer tothe Services.63

After continued program struggles, redefinitions, and starts of more limited
demonstration programs as part of the SBIRS-Low effort, in 2001, SBIRS-Low was
shifted back to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), which was

63

Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Missile Defense Program
Direction, January 2, 2002

55

SDIO’s successor and preceded the Missile Defense Agency.64 In 2002, MDA scaled
back the SBIRS-Low program to a two satellite demonstration called Space Tracking
and Surveillance System (STSS). The two STSS satellites were launched in 2009 andprovided valuable experience and refinement of techniques for distinguishing missile
boosters and warheads from the plume from a rocket’s exhaust. The two STSS
satellites completed tracking operations in September 2021.65
On December 16, 2002, President Bush signed a Directive (NSPD-23) which
reaffirmed that it was U.S. policy to develop and deploy, at the earliest possible date,ballistic missile defenses drawing on the best technologies available.
The Presidential Directive instructed DoD to deploy an initial set of missile defenses
to protect the United States, its forces, friends, and allies beginning in 2004 utilizing
the rapid acquisition authorities provided to MDA. The President called for these
initial capabilities to be improved and expanded upon in an evolutionary approach thatwould keep pace with the threat.
Because of the expanded authorities provided by President Bush and the Secretary of
Defense, in less than two years following President Bush’s Directive, the initial
deployment of the first operational hit-to-kill Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) at
Fort Greely, AK and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA began along with the necessary
sensors such as the Sea-Based X-Band Radar, and command and control provided by
the Battle Management, Command and Control system operated by the National
Guard.
Over the course of the next four years, MDA would rapidly field other capabilities
such as initial deployments of Patriot PAC-3, SM-3 Block 1A interceptors on Aegis
ships, and the THAAD system, as well as additional ground-based interceptors andsensors.
Despite rapid progress developing and fielding capabilities, the Services resisted
budgeting for procurement and sustainment of missile defense capabilities despite
being instructed to do so by the Secretary of Defense in 2002. As an Institute for
Defense Analysis (IDA) study in 2008 led by General (retired) Larry Welch
Congressional Research Service report to Congress, “Military Space Programs: Issues
Concerning DOD’s SBIRS and STSS Programs”, Jan. 30, 2006, by Marcia S. Smith.
65“Missile Defense Agency Retires Two Missile Tracking Satellites,” March 16, 2022,
https://news.satnews.com/2022/03/16/missile-defense-agency-retires-two-missile-trackingsatellites/
64

56

concluded, “The Military Departments were charged with budgeting for and executing
procurement and sustainment. In most cases, however, the MDA has procured andsustained elements of the BMDS, and the Military Departments have not adequately
planned or prepared for procurement or sustainment.”
In 2007, the Missile Defense Support Group was replaced by the Missile Defense
Executive Board (MDEB). The principal function of the MDEB is to review and makeappropriate recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding theimplementation of strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and investment
options. It was initially chaired by the USD(AT&L) and encompasses relevant senior
officials from OSD (Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Policy,
Intelligence, DOT&E, and Program Analysis and Evaluation) and representation fromthe Services, Joint Staff, USSTRATCOM, Department of State, and the Director,
MDA. The MDEB began to establish Standing Committees. 66 Over the next 14 years,
the MDEB has grown more bureaucratic and established more processes that haveundermined the rapid acquisition authorities originally provided to MDA.
Upon taking office in January 2009, President Obama and his administration were lesssupportive of missile defense than the Bush Administration. In particular, like theClinton Administration, the Obama Administration sought to return the focus of
missile defense efforts to theater defenses and to curtail or cap all national missile
defense efforts.
The Obama Administration cancelled planned production of additional ground-based
interceptors for planned deployment in Ft. Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg AFB,
California, initially capping the number to be deployed at the sites at 40 and 4
respectively. (The Obama Administration later requested supplemental emergency
funding in its last year in office to increase the number of ground-based interceptors to
64 following North Korea’s test launch of a more advanced ICBM, but thoseinterceptors were not deployed due to technical issues encountered with developmentof a new kill vehicle used on the interceptor).
The Obama Administration announced the cancellation of the Bush Administration’splan, negotiated with Poland, to deploy a site of GBIs in that country and to place alarge X-band radar in the Czech Republic. This plan was intended to improve defenseof the U.S. and allies from long-range missiles. The Obama Administration cancelled
66

Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) Study on the Mission, Roles, and Structure of theMissile Defense Agency, 2008.

57

the Kinetic Energy Interceptor NMD program and substantially reduced total funding
for missile defense.
In place of a National Missile Defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, theObama Administration negotiated the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA)
to defend Europe from the Iranian ballistic missiles. The EPAA included Aegis
Ashore sites in Poland and Romania and deployment of Aegis destroyers to Rota,
Spain. The EPAA allowed the Navy to play a wider role in European BMD, as it
relies heavily on the Aegis platform at sea and on land and the SM-3 Interceptor.
Throughout the remainder of the Obama Administration and during the Trump
Administration, the basic roles and missions of the Services and MDA did not change.
The main changes that occurred were a series of steps culminating in a Directive
signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Norquist in March 2020 that largely returned
MDA to the same requirements and acquisition processes used on other DoD
programs as opposed to the rapid acquisition authorities used successfully by MDA to
rapidly develop and field missile defense systems.
Transition of missile defense systems to the Services remains an issue despite periodic
efforts to establish transition rules and begin budgeting for procurement andsustainment by the Services. Despite several Directives from the Secretary of Defense
and other senior officials, MDA continues to procure and sustain missile defense
systems operated by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, and National Guard.

Recommendations:
Missile defense remains extraordinarily challenging and complex and is becoming
more so with the advent of hypersonic missile threats, being developed and fielded by
Russia and China. There are parallels between the advent of hypersonic missiles to theuse of the world’s first cruise and ballistic missiles, the V-1 and V-2 by Nazi Germany
in World War II that presented unprecedented challenges to U.S. and Allied forcesthat took decades to address.
While the threat is becoming more challenging, today, the roles and missions formissile defense are often unclear, and overlap multiple stakeholders: CombatantCommands (both geographic and functional), the Joint Staff, the Services, the Missile
Defense Agency and other OSD Components. With the addition of the U.S. Space
Force and USSPACECOM, the roles and responsibilities have become even more58

confusing, introducing more seams and redundancies, and placing mission success at
risk. Here too, our experience with the Space Force is similar to the debate andfriction on roles and missions that occurred after the founding of the Air Force in
1947. In the late 1940s, the Army and Navy were reluctant to part with long-standing
forces and capabilities that they had developed during World War II in order to takeadvantage of, and deal with new threats, borne of the advent of air power as a decisive
element on the battlefield.
History is instructive, and as with the introduction of the U.S. Air Force in 1947, theadditions of U.S. Space Force and USSPACECOM provides an opportunity for areview of missile defense roles and missions for delineation in the next Unified
Command Plan (UCP) revision, and more importantly, rapid implementation. In theyears following 1947, successive compromises were reached to accommodate Service
frictions that ended up costing more money and stunted the progress that would haveotherwise occurred. These compromises were made to accommodate Service rivalries,
and we should avoid repeating such mistakes in the wake of creation of the Space
Force.
History also demonstrates the benefit of providing an integrating organization withlead responsibility and the authorities to push the boundaries of innovation rapidly. In
our history, the periods of greatest technical progress on longer-term, more capablesystems have come when authorities and focus were given to stand-alone, focusedorganizations like ARPA, the SDIO, and the initial instance of the MDA before its
rapid acquisition authorities and uniqueness were rolled back. In the absence of suchan “integrator,” the Services tend to focus on more parochial and near-term solutions
and technical innovation is not as rapid.
Additionally, a flattening defense budget resulting from COVID-19 response
measures increases the urgency to complete and implement a comprehensive review
of missile defense roles and missions to ensure fiscal efficiency.
This review must inform and be informed by the Department’s parallel efforts to
update the National Defense Strategy, Missile Defense Review and at a more practicallevel, develop a new Joint Warfighting Concept and update current contingency plans.
The worst outcome is to conduct strategic planning in stovepipes, which the
Department is prone to do, causing gross inefficiencies in both unity of effort andapplication of limited resources. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, in particular59

the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy supported by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities (SPC), with full consideration of militaryadvice from the Chairman of the JCS and the Service chiefs, are key to ensure proper
civilian oversight is applied, allowing the Secretary of Defense to make fully
informed final decisions on Missile Defense roles and missions, and ensure each areresourced appropriately.

Specific Missile Defense Roles and Missions:Overall, any missile defense roles and responsibility review should inform, and be
informed by, the Department’s parallel efforts to update the National Defense Strategy
and the Missile Defense Review, the development of a new Joint Warfighting
Concept, and any update to existing operational plans. A critical fault would be to
conduct strategic planning in stovepipes, causing inefficiencies in both unity of effort
and application of limited resources. As such, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF),
with support from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P), the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities (SPC), the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff (CJCS), the Combatant Commanders, and the Service chiefs, should make fully
informed decisions on missile defense roles and missions, and ensure each Service
and MDA are resourced appropriately. With that in mind there are several key missile
defense (MD) roles and responsibilities changes that this review should address andestablish (recommended new or adjusted guidance is in italics):
1. OSD should utilize MDA and key tools such as the JROC and the JCIDS
process, to ensure that the joint force can address existing gaps in ground based
cruise missile defense and develop solutions for the emerging hypersonic missile
threat.
• This will require increased requests for missile defense funding. Given the
rapid pace of the growth in adversary missile threat and the increasingly largerole that missile defense capabilities are playing in the military plans andcombat operations of our adversaries, the missile defense mission is underresourced.
• SECDEF should direct the Services to treat missile defense capabilities as acore mission area and budget accordingly to reflect the changed security
environment we now face where missiles are a primary method of warfare
being employed by our adversaries.
60

•

SECDEF should disestablish the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB).
The MDEB is highly bureaucratic with numerous subgroups and committees.
The MDEB replicates the complex and cumbersome DoD acquisition andrequirements process that the original DoD Directive establishing MDA
intended to replace with a rapid and empowered central organization to leadMD development, initial production and fielding

2. MDA should be made as efficient and agile as possible to ensure it develops,
acquires, and fields the system architecture required to prepare for existing andemerging hypersonic threats. MDA is the lead system architect for MD across all
domains and should be fully resourced and authorized to rapidly and efficiently
develop and acquire MD systems to defend against ballistic missiles, hypersonicglide missiles, and complex hypersonic and long-range land-attack cruise
missiles.
• SECDEF should return the original rapid acquisition authorities to MDA thatexisted at its founding in 2002, to allow for more efficient and rapid
deployment of capabilities, including the ability to set detailed performancerequirements without approval by the JROC and relief from strict adherence
to the DoD 5000 series acquisition regulations.
o This includes restoring the MDA Director’s authorities to function as a
Component Acquisition Executive.
• MDA should focus its resources on MD RDT&E and S&T for defense against
ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide missiles, and complex hypersonic and longrange land-attack cruise missiles.
o MDA should develop MD systems through Low-Rate Initial Production(LRIP) and then transfer the systems to the Services for full rate
production as originally envisioned at its founding. The Services
should be required to budget for production, fielding, employment, andsustainment of these systems. The MDA budget, which resourced only
the capability development of the system, will not be transferred to theServices.
▪ As MDA transfers a missile defense system that has completed
RDT&E to a Service, the MDA resources previously associatedwith that system should shift to the next highest priority MD
capability development.

61

▪

MDA should remain responsible for development of capability
upgrades to existing fielded systems in coordination with theServices. Once RDT&E is complete for the capability upgrade,sustainment remains the responsibility of the Service employing
the system.
o MDA should be directed to develop a program to supplement andleverage the directed energy (DE) work of the Services. MDA should
develop systems that can leverage the cost and advantages of speed oflight weapons to deal with the hypersonic, ballistic, and cruise missile
threats.
▪ DoD’s DE efforts have been underfunded and the newchallenge of large numbers of sophisticated missiles operating
at unprecedented speed in large numbers is well suited to DE
solutions such as lasers and high-powered micro-waves.
3. DOD must clarify each of the Services’ specific responsibilities for air andmissile defense and require the Services to fully resource the deployment,sustainment, and operation of their MD forces.
• The Army has played a central role in the MD enterprise. The Army has also
consistently under-resourced the MD mission area by placing other mission
requirements at a higher priority. Especially in light of the current and projected
threat environment in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, this practice by the Armymust cease immediately. In the absence of a significant, near-term effort by the
Army to comprehensively resource MD priorities, the Secretary of Defense
should direct realignment of internal Army resources to MD and initiate a study
to assess transition Army MD forces to the Air Force in order to ensure
optimum MD capability and capacity for the Joint Force.
o At the founding of the U.S. Air Force in 1947, the President andSecretary of Defense had made the Air Force responsible for air andmissile defense, but through a series of compromises and Service rivalry,
the Army played a greater and greater role and eventually took
responsibility for the ground-based air and missile defense mission.
o Most countries have given lead responsibility for air defense to their Air
Forces given the synergies that are available for utilizing a combinationof airborne, elevated, and ground-based radars and interception system
to combine for effective defense against air, cruise, and ballistic missile
threats. An important consideration that this study, once directed to be
62

•

•

•









initiated, should examine is the inherent limitations and difficulty indetecting and intercepting low flying cruise missiles using ground-based
radars and interceptors by the Army as opposed to the advantages ofairborne sensing and defense from unmanned and manned aircraft andlofted sensors.
Within this understanding, the Army should continue with overall responsibility
for providing theater and fixed-site MD capabilities in support of CombatantCommand MD plans, to include the defense of forward operating locations suchas: key communications sites; command and control nodes; and air, ground andmaritime staging and logistics locations.
o The Army must prioritize delivery of the Indirect Fire Protection
Capability (Increment 2) - a cost effective cruise missile defense system,that is long overdue.
The Army and Navy should retain responsibility for MD of their maneuver
forces and ships. Both Services should remain responsible for development of
MD capabilities for which MDA is not designated as lead.
The Air Force should be given similar authority to procure and field MD
systems to protect its maneuver forces which will not otherwise be defended byavailable Army or navy capabilities. A prime example for use of this authority
would be to defend forward expeditionary dispersed operating locations
executing Agile Combat Employment.
Services will be responsible for full rate production and sustainment (man, train,equip) of all MD forces in accordance with these clarified MD requirements, toinclude lifecycle support, employment, sustainment, and logistics of assigned
MD systems.
Services will continue to develop, acquire and sustain (man, train, equip) multidomain offensive strike capabilities to degrade and reduce opponent missile
capabilities in order to produce a more effective and efficient overall defense.
The Space Force will be responsible for the overall sensor architecture in thespace domain, to include sensors contributing to the MD mission. In design ofthat architecture, the Space Force must coordinate with all affected agencies. In
particular, MDA, as the missile defense systemarchitect,https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/roles-and-responsibilities/ will playa critical role in ensuring sensor architecture supports MD requirements.
The National Guard will man, train, and operate U.S. homeland defense MD
sites for sensors, interceptors, and command and control. in accordance with63

OSD’s posture and deployment guidance, to include fixed systems defending
Guam and Hawaii as additional capabilities are fielded.
4. DOD must clarify each of the Combatant Command’s specific responsibilities
in the MD enterprise and support the deployment and operation of their MD
forces.
• OSD will solicit, validate, and prioritize Combatant Command (CCMD) MD
requirements, and then direct deployment of Service MD forces to CCMDs.
• USSPACECOM should have lead responsibility for synchronizing theoperational MD efforts of the geographic and functional CCMDs, to include
adjudicating issues related to operational cooperation between the CCMDs on
MD.
o USSPACECOM would replace USSTRATCOM in this role. Theseauthorities should be reflected in the next UCP revision.
• USSPACECOM should be responsible for the MD early-warning andbattlespace awareness mission.
• USSPACECOM should replace USSTRATCOM in command of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCCIMD).

Historical Chronology:
1944: Generals Patton and Bradley rely heavily on air and missile defense to
create defended “corridors” for troop movement.
April 1946: The Army and subordinate Army Air Force begin research anddevelopment for NIKE and THUMPER. The NIKE systems would stay underthe Army’s control, while THUMPER would be merged into the Air Force’s
WIZARD.
September 1947: The National Security Act of 1947 reorganizes the U.S.
military; among other actions, the Act created the Department of Defense andestablished the U.S. Air Force as an independent branch.

64April 1948: The Services sign the Key West Agreement, an attempt to create adetailed codification of air defense responsibilities across the military branches.
August 1949: The Soviet Union successfully explodes its first nuclear weapon.
March 1950: SecDef Louis Johnson issues the Guided Missile Memorandum,
attempting to allocate responsibilities for offensive and defensive guided
missile development. This memo specifically authorizes continued
development of both the Army’s NIKE and the Air Force’s WIZARD.
August 1950: The Army and Air Force sign the Vandenberg-Collins
Agreement, formalizing air defense responsibilities for the U.S. homeland.
October 1950: The Truman Administration appoints Kauffman Keller as thefirst Director of Guided Weapons to speed up NIKE development. Keller
favors the NIKE AJAX, a short-range anti-aircraft missile. This system waslater deployed across the U.S. and Europe, serving until 1960.
August 1953: The Soviet Union successfully detonates a thermonuclear device.
This marks the beginning of a greater emphasis on U.S. BMD; previously,
defense against air breathing threats was considered far more pressing and
BMD was not a particularly strong policy or research focus.
September 1954: The Joint Chiefs of Staff establish Continental Air Defense
Command (CONAD), establishing a joint, unified command for U.S. air
defense under the executive agency of the Air Force. This effort establishes
unity of command and unity of effort between the Services in support ofoperational control of air defense assets but does little to settle the longstanding conflict between the Services as to roles and missions for developmentof new systems.
February 1956: The Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) is formed at
Redstone Arsenal, AL, with former WWII German rocket scientist Wehrner
von Braun as technical director. The ABMA begins work on the Jupiter IRBM,
while the Air Force initiates the Thor, a nearly identical missile.

65

November 1956: SecDef Charles Wilson issues a Memorandum, dividing air
defense by point and area defense systems.
March 1957: Army Anti-Aircraft Command is re-designated as Army Air
Defense Command, reflecting its transition from anti-aircraft artillery to missile
batteries.
October 1957: The Soviets launch Sputnik I, the first artificial satellite,
displaying Soviet scientific prowess and provoking fears of technologicalinferiority and military weakness in the U.S.
December 1957: President Dwight Eisenhower receives the Security
Resources Panel Report, commonly called Gaither Report, highlighting theinadequacy of “active defense” programs against the Soviet threat.
January 1958: SecDef Neil McElroy intervenes in the Army-Air Force BMD
dispute, conclusively giving the primary BMD role to the Army.
January 1958: The National Security Council assigns the maximum priority to
NIKE ZEUS.
May 1958: The U.S. and Canada formalize the creation of North American
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
August 1959: NIKE ZEUS is first tested.
September 1959: SecDef Neil McElroy assigns nearly all military spacefunctions to the Air Force.
December 1962: NIKE ZEUS successfully intercepts an ICBM for the firsttime.
February 1964: NIKE X Project Office replaces the NIKE ZEUS Project
OfficeOctober 1964: The People’s Republic of China explodes a nuclear device.

66

November 1965: First guided Sprint flight test took place at White Sands
Missile Range, NM.
27 October 1966: The People's Republic of China announces a successful test
flight of a guided missile with a nuclear warhead.
November 1966: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announces that theSoviet Union had deployed an ABM system, consisting of 64 launchers
deployed around Moscow.
September 1967: Secretary of Defense McNamara announces the decision to
deploy the SENTINEL ABM system, to provide protection for urban areas
against possible ICBM attacks by the People’s Republic of China. It would also
serve as a defense against accidental launch with an option to defend the Air
Force’s MINUTEMAN missile sites.
January 1969: President Richard Nixon assumes office and initiates a DoD
review of strategic offensive and defensive priorities.
March 1969: President Richard Nixon redirects the BMD program.
Components remained unchanged but deployment concepts were redrawn.
Nixon specifies three defense objectives: "Protection of our land-based
retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union"; "Defense of theAmerican people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China islikely to be able to mount within the decade"; and "Protection against thepossibility of accidental attacks from any source."
March 1969: The SENTINEL System is re-designated as SAFEGUARD. The
primary new focus for the program is the defense of twelve U.S. land-based
ICBM sites. Authorization was subsequently given for only two
MINUTEMAN bases, Grand Forks AFB, ND, and Malmstrom AFB, MT.
January 1970: President Nixon announces his decision to extend thedeployment of SAFEGUARD, beyond the initial two-site Phase I program. The
recommendation included a third site (Whiteman AFB, MO) and advance
preparation for five additional sites (in the NE, NW, Washington, D.C., Warren
67

AFB, WY, and in the Michigan-Ohio area). There was no deployment
commitment for the latter sites.
August 1970: A Spartan missile successfully intercepts an ICBM for the firsttime.
December 1970: The Sprint missile system intercepts its first ICBM.
December 1971: Construction begins on the BMD Center located in
NORAD’s Cheyenne Mountain Complex, to be the command-and-control
element of SAFEGUARD.
May 1972: President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnevof the Soviet Union sign the ABM Treaty. Both nations agree to a limit of two
ABM sites each. In addition, the treaty regulates the type of radars for the ABM
site. Finally, the treaty prevented each country from defending its entire
territory, thereby negating the deterrent effect. An interim accord, signed at thesame time, sets maximum limits for each country's ICBM and sea-launchedballistic missiles (SLBMs) for five years. The treaty is ratified by the Senate on
3 August 1972 and signed in Washington by President Nixon on 3 October.
August 1973: The Secretary of Defense signs an Amended Program Decision,
placing funding and operational constraints on the SAFEGUARD program.
October 1973: The nearly disastrous 1973 Arab-Israeli War between
American-aligned Israel and Soviet-aligned Syria and Egypt showcases
potential U.S. military shortcomings, prompting a period of unprecedented
cooperation between the Army and Air Force.
July 1974: President Nixon and First Secretary Brezhnev meet at Yalta andagree to expand the 1972 ABM Treaty. The protocol further limits each country
to one ABM site and is signed by President Nixon and General Secretary
Brezhnev at the second Moscow summit.
September 1975: The House Appropriations Committee recommends
deactivation of the SAFEGUARD site by the end of the fiscal year.
68October 1975: The Army formally transfers PAR to the U.S. Air Force as the
PAR Attack Characterization System.
February 1976: The Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the deactivation of
SAFEGUARD, as per the Congressional decision (Public Law 94-212, dated 9
February 1976). Radiation for the MSR and the missile launch capability were
terminated and the warhead withdrawal commenced.
May 1976: The PAR begins tracking operations against known satellites. The
PAR is capable of deep space tracking.
August 1976: The U.S. Army SAFEGUARD Command is inactivated.
January 1978: At the request of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense
Research and Engineering (Strategic and Space Systems), the BMD Program
initiates a Minuteman Defense (MDS) II study “to define and rate the mostfeasible systems (or concepts) for defending the Minuteman.”June 1978: The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Research & Engineering(Strategic and Space Systems) directs that “emphasis in the program be placedon near-term defense concepts and technologies applicable to defense of ourland-based missile forces in the 1980s.”
March 1983: President Ronald Reagan announces the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), wishing to render nuclear weapons obsolete.
April 1984: The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization is created, under the
direction of Air Force Lt. Gen. James Alan Abrahamson.
May 1984: After a long cooperative period, the Army and Air Force Chiefs ofStaff release the “31 Initiatives”, a joint Memorandum regarding both Services’roles in several areas. Among others, the initiatives include expanding the roleof the Air Force in air defense, including greater involvement in therequirement and development phases for SAMs as well as assuming control
over the Patriot missile systems. To resolve this question, a study is issued todetermine the feasibility and benefits of such a transfer. The study conclusively
69determines that while the transfer is feasible, the organizational overhaul isenough to outweigh any potential benefits.
1986: Project Excalibur, a space-based laser BMD system that forms thecornerstone of the SDI, fails numerous tests. It is replaced by Smart Rocks.
March 1988: Brilliant Pebbles, the successor to Smart Rocks, becomes themain project of the SDI.
January-February 1991: U.S. tactical BMD systems, including Patriot, areused in Gulf War operations to protect Saudi Arabia and Israel. The exact
quality of Patriot’s performance is controversial, but among otherachievements, the protection of American ABM systems kept Israel fromentering the war.
March 1991: The Missile Defense Act of 1991 calls for the DoD to“immediately undertake the development and testing of systems andcomponents designed to defend the United States and its Armed Forces,
wherever deployed, from strategic and tactical ballistic missiles.”December 1991: The Soviet Union collapses, signifying the end of the Cold
War.
January 1992: Russian President Boris Yeltsin, while speaking at the United
Nations, suggests a global SDI, to protect all nations from missile attack.
February 1993: Newly inaugurated President Bill Clinton downgrades
Brilliant Pebbles, reducing its budget allocation.
May 1993: The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization is renamed theBallistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), reflecting the new deemphasizing of strategic missile defense in favor of localized tactical BMD.
This marks the de facto end of the SDI.

70

November 1995: A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) states that noadversary, except Russia or China, could feasibly develop the capability to hit
the Continental United States with a ballistic missile in the next 15 years.
July 1998: The Rumsfeld Report is released, refuting the findings of the 1995
NIE. Rumsfeld’s commission finds that Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or Libya could
all develop offensive capabilities relatively quickly.
August 1998: North Korea test-fires a ballistic missile that overflies Japan.
July 1999: President Bill Clinton signs the National Missile Defense Act,
clarifying the United States intent to deploy, as soon as feasible, a national
BMD system.
Jan 2002: The George W. Bush Administration renames the BMDO to theMissile Defense Agency, promoting it to “agency” level.
June 2002: The United States withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty
announced in December 2001 becomes effective.
2004: The Missile Defense Agency successfully completes initial deploymentof Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) at Ft. Greely, AK and activation of the
U.S. Missile Defense System for the first time, just two years after beingordered to rapidly deploy such a system by President Bush.
September 2009: The Obama Administration cancels the previous
Administration’s plans for Europe-based GBIs, favoring the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA), with both land- and sea-based interceptors,
including the Navy’s Aegis system. This is an approach focused on defending
Europe from Iranian ballistic missile threats.
January 2019: The Trump Administration publishes the 2019 Missile Defense
Review (MDR), in which it advocates for a layered BMD system against
missile attack from any nation to include Russia and China.
71

APPENDIX: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

Key West Memorandum72THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
21 April 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Secretary of The Army
The Secretary of the NavyThe Secretary of The Air Force
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attached is a signed copy of the paper defining the functionsof the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Attached also is a photostatic copy of President Truman's
letter, approving this paper.
The only change in the paper, as executed, occurs in thethird line from the bottom of page 1 where the words "by directionof the President" have been added.
/s/ James Forrestal

73

THE WHITE HOUSE

DOCUMENT
7
April 21, 1948

Honorable James Forrestal
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
In reply to your letter of March 27, 1948, I have today issued
an Executive Order revoking Executive Order 9877, of July 26,
1947. In its stead, I wish you to issue the statement of functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff which has
been drawn up by you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Very sincerely yours,/s/ Harry S. Truman
21 April 1948
Functions of the Armed Forces
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Index
Introduction
Section!--Principles
Section II--Common Functions of the Armed Forces
Section III--Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Section IV--Functions of the United States Army
SectionV--Functions of the United States Navy and Marine Corps
Section VI--Functions of the United States Air Force
Section VII--Glossary of Terms and Definitions
Introduction
Congress, in the National Security Act of 1947, has described
the basic policy embodied in the Act in the following terms:"In enacting this,legislation, it is the intent of Congressto provide a comprehensive program for the future security of theUnited States; to provide for the establishment of integrated
policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the government relating to the national security; to pro154

DOCUMENT
vide three military departments for the operation and 7
administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation andthe United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with theirassigned combat and service components; to provide for theirauthoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian
control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation underunified control and for their integration into an efficient teamof land, naval and air forces."
In accordance with the policy declared by Congress, and inaccordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of1947, and to provide guidance for the departments and the joint
agencies of the National Military Establishment, the Secretary of
Defense, by direction of the President, hereby promulgates thefollowing statement of the functions of the Armed Forces and the
Joint Chi fs of Staff.
Section !--Principles
1. There shall be the maximum practicable integration of thepolicies andprocedures of the departments and agencies of the National Military Establishment. This
does not imply a merging ofArmed Forces, but does demand a consonance and correlationof policies and procedures throughout the National Military Establishment in order toproduce an effective, economical, har- monious and businesslike organization which will
insure the mili-tary security of the United States.
2. The functions stated herein shall be carried out in sucha manner as toachieve the following:a. Effective strategic direction of the Armed Forces.
b. Operation of Armed Forces under unified command, whereversuch unified
command is in the best interest of national security.
c. Integration of the Armed Forces into an efficient team ofland, naval, and airforces.
d. Prevention of unnecessary duplication or overlapping among the Services,
by utilization of the personnel, intelligence,facilities, equipment, supplies and services ofany or all Services in all cases where military effectiveness and economy ofresources will
thereby be increased.
e. Coordination of Armed Forces operations to promote effi-ciency andeconomy and to prevent gaps in responsibility.
3. It is essential that there be full utilization and exploitation of the weapons,
techniques, and intrinsic capabili- ties of each of the Services in any military situation
where this will contribute effectively to the attainment of over-all militaryobjectives. In effecting
this, collateral as well as primary155

DOCUMENT
7
functions will be assigned. It is recognized that assignment ofcollateral functions may
establish further justification for stated force requirements, but such assignment shallnot be usedas the basis for establishing additional force requirements.
4. Doctrines, procedures, and plans covering joint opera- tions and joint
exercises shall be jointly prepared. Primary responsibility for development of certain
doctrines and proceduresis hereinafter assigned.
5. Technological developments, variations in the availabi-lity of manpower andnatural resources, changing economic con- ditions, and changes in the world politico-militarysituation may dictate the desirability of changes in the present assignment ofspecificfunctions and responsibilities to the individual Services. This determination and theinitiation of implementing action are the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.
Section II--Common Functions of the Armed Forces
A. General
As prescribed by higher authority and under the general direc-tion of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the armed forces shall conduct operations wherever and whenevernecessary for the following purposes:
1. To support and defend the Constitution of the UnitedStates against all
enemies, foreign or domestic.
2. To maintain, by timely and effective military action, the security of the UnitedStates, its possessions and areas vital to its interest.
3. To uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United States.
B. Specific
1. In accordance with guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to prepare forces
and to establish reserves of equipment and supplies for the effective prosecution of war
and to plan forthe expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war.
2. To maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properlyorganized, trained,
and equipped for employment in emergency.
3. To provide adequate, timely, and reliable intelligence foruse within the
National Military Establishment.
4. To organize, train, and equip forces for joint operations.
5. To conduct research, to develop tactics, techniques and organization, and to
qevelop and procure weapons, equipment, andsupplies essential to the fulfillment of thefunctions hereinafterassigned, each Service coordinating with the others in all mattersof
joint concern.
6. To develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases

156

DOCUMENT
7
and other installations, to include lines of communication, and toprovide administrativeandlogistical support of all forces and bases.
7. To provide, as directed by proper authority, such forces, military missions, anddetachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national
interests ofthe United States.
8. As directed by proper authority, to assist in training andequipping the militaryforces of foreign nations.
9. Each Service to assist the others in the accomplishment oftheir functions,
including the provision of personnel, intelli- gence, training, facilities, equipment supplies,
and services as may be determined by proper authority.
.
10. Each Service to support operations of the others.
11. Each Service to coordinate operations (including admi-nistrative, logistical,
training, and combat) with those of theother Services as necessary in the bestinterests of the UnitedStates.
12. Each Service to determine and provide the means of com-munications bywhich command within the Service is to be exer-cised.
13. To refer all matters of strategic significance to theJoint Chiefs of Staff.
Section III--Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
A. General
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S.Air Force; and theChief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, if there be one, are the principal military advisers
to the President and to the Secretary of Defense.
B. SpecificSubject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of
Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefsof Staff:
1. To prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strate-gic direction of theArmed Forces, to include the general direc- tion of all combat operations.
2. To prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the mili- tary Services logistic
responsibilities in accordance with such plans.
3. To prepare integrated joint plans for military mobiliza-tion, and to review
major material requirements and personnel qualifications and requirements of the Armed
Forces in the lightof strategic and logistic plans.

157

DOCUMENT
7
4. To promulgate to the individual departments of the National Military
Establishment general policies and doctrines inorder to provide guidance in the preparationof their respective detailed plans.
5. As directed by proper authority, to participate in the preparation of combinedplans for military action in conjunction with the armed forces of other nations.
6. To establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified
commands are in the interest of national security,and to authorize commanders thereof
to establish such subordinateunified commands as may be necessary.
,
7. To designate, as necessary, one of their members as theirexecutive agent
for:a. A unified command;b. Certain operations, and specified commands;c. The development of special tactics, technique, and equip-ment, except asotherwise provided herein; andd. The conduct of joint training, except as otherwise pro-vided herein.
8. To determine what means are required for the exercise ofunified command,and to assign to individual members the respon- sibility of providing such means.
9. To approve policies and doctrines for:a. Joint operations, including joint amphibious and airborneoperations, and for joint
training.
b. Coordinating the education of members of the ArmedForces.
10. To recommend to the Secretary of Defense the assignmentof primary
responsibility for any function of the Armed Forces requiring such determination.
11. To prepare and submit to the Secretary of Defense, for his information andconsideration in furnishing guidance to the Departments for preparation of their annual
budgetary estimates and in coordinating these budgets, a statement of military requirements
which is based upon agreed strategic considerations,joint outline war plans, and current
national security commit- ments. This statement of requirements shall include: tasks, priorityof tasks, force requirements, and general strategic guidance concerning development ofmilitary installations and bases, equipping and maintaining the military forces, andresearch and development and industrial mobilization programs.
12. To provide United States representation on the MilitaryStaff Committee•of theUnited Nations, in accordance with the pro-visions of the Charter of the United Nations
and representation on other properly authorized military staffs, boards, councils, and missions.

158

Section IV--Functions of the United States Army

DOCUMENT
7The United States Army includes land combat and service for-ces and such aviation
and water transport as may be organic therein. It is organized, trained, and equipped
primarily for prompt and sustained combat operations on land. Of the three major
Services, the Army has primary interest in all operations onland, except in those
operations otherwise assigned herein.
A. Primary Functions
1. To organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conductof prompt andsustained combat operations on land. Specifically:a. To defeat enemy land forces.
b. To seize, occupy, and defend land areas.
2. To organize, train, and equip Army antiaircraft artilleryunits.
3. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Services, and to provide
Army forces for joint amphibious and airborne operations, and to provide for the trainingof such for-ces in accordance with policies and doctrines of the Joint Chiefsof Staff.
4. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, tac-tics, technique, andequipment of interest to the Army for amphi- bious operations and not provided for in
Section V, paragraph A 4 and paragraph A 11 c.
5. To provide an organization capable of furnishing ade-quate, timely, andreliable intelligence for the Army.
6. To provide Army forces as required for the defense of the United States against air
attack, in accordance with joint doctri- nes and procedures approved by the Joint Chiefs ofStaff.
7. To provide forces, as directed by proper authority, for occupation of territories
abroad, to include initial establishmentof military government pending transfer of this
responsibility to other authority.
8. To develop, in coordination with the Navy, the Air Force,and the Marine
Corps, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army and Marine forces inairborne operations. The Army shall have primary interest in the development of these airborne doctrines, procedures and equipment which are of common interest to the Army andthe Marine Corps.
9. To formulate doctrines and procedures for the organiza- tion, equipping, training,and employment of forces operating on land, at division level and above, including
division corps, army,and general reserve troops, except that the formulation of doctri-nes
and procedures for the organization, equipping, training, and employment of Marine Corps
units for amphibious operations shallbe a function of the Department of the Navy,
coordinating as

159

DOCUMENT
required by paragraph A 11 c, Section V.
7
10. To provide support, as directed by higher authority, forthe following
activities.
a. The administration and operation of the Panama Canal.
b. River and harbor projects in the United States, itsterritories, andpossessions.
c. Certain other civil activities prescribed by law.
B. Collateral Functions. The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions
set forth above shall be employed tosupport and supplement the other Services in carrying out
their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result in increased
effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff member of the Service having primary respon- sibility for a function shallbe the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to that body the requirements for andplans for the employment of all forces to carry out the function. He shall also be responsible
for presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for final decision any disagreement within the fieldof his pri- mary responsibility which has not been resolved. This shall notbe construed toprevent any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting unilaterally any issueof disagreement with another Service. Certain specific collateral functions of the Army
are listed below:
1. To interdict enemy sea and air power and communications
through operations on or from land.
2. To provide forces and eq ipment for and to conductcontrolled minefield operations.
Section V--Functions of the United States Navy and Marine Corps
Within the Department of the Navy, assigned forces include
the entire operating forces of the United States Navy, including
naval aviation, and the United States Marine Corps. These forces
are organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt andsustained combat operations at sea, and for air and land operations incident thereto. Of the three major Services, the Navy has
primary interest in all operations at sea, except in those operations otherwise assigned herein.
A. Primary Functions
1. To organize, train, and equip Navy and Marine Forces forthe conduct ofRrompt and sustained combat operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft
and their land-based!This collateral function was transferred from the Army to the
Navy by the direction of the Secretary of Defense on 24 May 1949.

160

DOCUMENT
7naval air components. Specifically:a. To seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and tosuppress
enemy sea commerce.
b. To ain and maintain general sea supremacy.
c. To control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea linesof communication.
d. To establish and maintain local superiority (includingair) in an area ofnaval operations.
e. To seize and defend advanced naval bases and to conduct such land operations
as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.
2. To conduct air operations as necessary for theaccomplishmentof objectives in a naval campaign.
.
3. To organize and equip, in coordination with the other Services, and to provide
Naval forces, including Naval close air support forces, for the conduct of joint amphibious
operations, and to be responsible for the amphibious training of all forces asassigned for joint
amphibious operations in accordance with thepolicies and doctrines of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff.
4. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, thedoctrines,
procedures, and equipment of naval forces for amphi-bious operations, and the doctrinesand procedures for joint amphibious operations.
5. To furnish adequate, timely, and reliable intelligencefor the Navy andMarine Corps.
6. To be responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarinewarfare, theprotection of shippin , and for mine laying, including the air aspects thereof.
7. To provide air transport essential for naval operations.
8. To provide sea-based air defense and the sea-based meansfor coordinating
control for defense against air attack, coor- dinating with the other Services in matters of
joint concern.
9. To provide naval (including naval air) forces as requiredfor the defense of theUnited States against air attac , in accor-dance with joint doctrines and procedures
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
10. To furnish aerial photography as necessary for naval andMarine Corps
operations.
11. To maintain the United States Marine Corps, which shall include land combat
and service forces and such aviation as may beorganic therein. Its specific functions are:a. To provide F leet Marine Forces of combined arms, together•
2The words "and controlled mine field operations" were added to this paragraph bydirection of the Secretary of Defense on 24 May1949.

161

DOCUMENT
7
with supporting air components, for service with the FJeet in the
seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the·conduct ofsuch land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of anaval campaign. These functions do not contemplate the creationof a second land army.
b. To provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of theNavy, and security detachments for the pro- tection of naval property at naval stations andbases.
c. To develop, in coordination with the Army, the Navy, andthe Air Force, thetactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces in amphibious operations.
The Marine Corps shall have primary interest in the development of those landing force
tactics, technique, and equipment which are of common interest tothe Army and theMarine Corps.
·
d. To train and equip, as required, Marine Forces for air- borne operations, incoordination with the Army, the Navy, and theAir Force in accordance with policies anddoctrines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
e. To develop, in coordination with the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,
doctrines, procedures, and equipment of interest tothe Marine Corps for airborne operations
and not provided for in Section IV, paragraph A 8.
12. To provide forces, as directed by proper authority for the establishment ofmilitary government, pending transfer of thisresponsibility to other authority.
B. Collateral Functions. The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions
set forth above shall be employed tosupport and supplement the other Services in carrying out
their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result in increased
effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff member of the service having primary respon- sibility for a function
shall be the agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present to that body the requirements forand plans for the employment of all forces to carry out the function. He shall also be
responsible for presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Stafffor final decision any disagreement
within the field of his pri- mary responsibility which has not been resolved. This shall not
be construed to prevent any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting
unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another Service. Certain specific collateralfunctions of the Navy and Marine Corps are listed below:
1. To interdict enemy land and air power and communicationsthroughoperation at sea.
2. To conduct close air support for land operations.
3. To furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes.

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DOCUMENT
4. To be prepared to participate in the over-all air effortas directed 7 by the
Joint Chiefs of staff.
Section Vl--Functions of the United States Air ForceThe United States Air Force includes air combat and service
forces. It is organized, trained, and equipped primarily for
prompt and sustained combat operations in the air. Of the threemajor Services, the Air Force has primary interest in all operations in the air, except in those operations otherwise assigned
herein.
A. Primary Functions
1. To organize, train and equip Air Force forces for theconduct of promptand sustained combat operations in the air.Specifically:a. To be responsible for defense of the United States against air attack inaccordance with the policies and proceduresof the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
b. To gain and maintain general air supremacy.
c. To defeat enemy air forces.
d. To control vital air areas.
e. To establish local air superiority except as otherwiseassigned herein.
2. To formulate joint doctrines and procedures, in coor-dination with the otherServices, for the defense of the UnitedStates against air attack, and to provide the
Air Force units, facilities, and equipment required therefor.
3. To be responsible for strategic air warfare.
4. To organize and equip Air Force forces for joint amphi-bious and airborne
operations, in coordination with the other Services, and to provide for their training inaccordance with policies and doctrines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
5. To furnish close combat and logistical air support to theArmy, to include air lift,
support, and resupply of airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical reconnaissance, andinterdiction of enemy land power and communications.
6. To provide air transport for the Armed Forces except asotherwise assigned.
7. To provide Air Force forces for land-based air defense, coordinating with theother Services in matters of joint concern.
8. To develop, in coordination with the other Services,doctrines, procedures,and equipment for air defense from landareas, including the ontinental UnitedStates.
9. To provide an organization capable of furnishing ade-quate, timely, andreliable intelligence for the Air Force.
10. To furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes.

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7
11. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, tac- tics, technique, andequipment of interest to the Air Force for amphibious operations and not provided for in
Section V, paragraphA 4 and paragraph A 11 c.
12. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, procedures,and equipment employed by Air Force forcesin airborne operations.
B. Collateral Functions. The forces developed and trained to perform the primaryfunctions set forth above shall be employed tosupport and supplement the other Services incarrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result inincreased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military
objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff member of the Service having primary respon- sibility
for a function shall be the agent of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff to present to that body therequirements for and plans for the employment of all forces to carry out the function. He
shall also be responsible for presenting to the Joint Chiefs of Stafffor final decision any
disagreement within the field of his pri- mary responsibility which has not been resolved.
This shall not be construed to prevent any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff frompresenting unilaterally any issue of disagreement with another Service. Certain specificcollateral functions of the AirForce are listed below:
1. To interdict enemy sea power through air operations.
2. To conduct antisubmarine warfare and to protect shipping.
3. To conduct aerial minelaying operations.
Section VII--Glossary of Terms and Definitions
The usual and accepted definitions and interpretations of theEnglish language, as
contained in Webster's New International Dictionary (Unabridged), are applicable to thisdocument, except that for purposes of clarity and to ensure a common understanding of its
intent, certain words and phrases are defined specifically as follows:
Air Defense--All measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of theattack of hostile aircraft or guided missilesafter they are airborne.
Air Superiority--That degree of capability (preponderance inmorale and material) of
one air force over another which permits the conduct of ir operations by the former at agiven time andplace without prohibitive interference by the opposing air force.
Air Supremacy--That degree of air superiority wherein theopposing air force isincapable of effective interference.
Amphibious Operation--An attack launched from the sea by

164

DOCUMENT
7 anaval and landing forces embarked in ships or craft involving
landing on a hostile shore. An amphibious operation includes
final preparation of the objective area for the landing and operations of naval, air and ground elements in over water movements,
assault, and mutual support. An amphibious operation may precedea large-scale land operation in which case it becomes the amphibious phase of a joint amphibious operation. After the troops arelanded and firmly established ashore the operation becomes a land
operation.
Antisubmarine Operations-Operations contributing to the conduct of antisubmarine warfare.
Antisubmarine Warfare--Operations conducted against submarines, their supporting forces, and operating bases.
Base--A locality from which operations are projected or supported. May be preceded by a descriptive word such as "air" or"submarine," which indicates primary purpose.
Close Air Support--The attack by aircraft of hostile groundor naval targets which are so close to friendly forces as torequire detailed integration of each air mission with the fire andmovement of those forces.
Functions--Responsibilities, missions and tasks.
In coordination with--In consultation with. This expression
means that agencies "coordinated with" shall participate
actively; their concurrence shall be sought; and that if concurrence is not obtained, the disputed matter shall be referred to
the next higher authority in which all participants have a voice.
Joint--As used in this paper, and generally among the Armed
Forces, connotes activities, operations organizations, etc., inwhich elements of more than one Service of the National Military
Establishment participate.
Military--A term used in its broadest sense meaning of or
pertaining to war or the affairs of war, whether Army, Navy or Air
Force.
Naval Campaign--An operation or a connected series of operations conducted essentially by naval forces including all surface,subsurface, air, amphibious, and Marines, for the purpose of gaining,extending, or maintaining control of the sea.
Operation--A military action, or the carrying out of a military mission, strategic, tactical, service, training, or
administrative; the process of carrying on combat on land, on sea,or in the air, including movement, supply, attack, defense, andmaneuvers needed to ain the objectives of any battle or campaign.
Strategic Air Operations--Air operations contributing to the
conduct of strategic air warfare.
Strategic Air Warfare--Air combat and supporting operations
designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to165

a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction
and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point
where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war.
Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources ofraw material, critical material, stock piles, power systems,
transportation systems, communications facilities, concentrationsof uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agriculturalareas, and other such target systems.
/s/ James Forrestal

Guided Missile Memorandum
J.C.S. 1620/12
7 November 1949
Pages 136-139, incl.
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to theJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR GUIDED MISSILES
Reference: J.C.S. 1620 Series
On 17 November 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to forward the memorandum in the Enclosure hereto to the Secretary of
Defense.

166

W. G. Lalor,J. H. Ives,
Joint Secretariat

167

ENCLOSURE

DOCUMENT13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Assignment of Responsibility for
Guided Missiles.
Reference: Your memorandum of 25 May 1949,
same subject
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after having studied for the past several months the
problem outlined in the reference memoran-dum, have reached the conclusion that it isimpracticable at this time to assign to the several Services, in accordance with their assigned
functions, responsibilities for the entire guided missilefield.
2. As a general rule, guided missiles will be employed by the Services in the mannerand to the extent required to accomplish their assigned functions. Undesirable duplications
in research and development should be avoided by careful screening of projectsand
assignment of research responsibility by the Research and Development Board whereappropriate.
3. Development of guided missiles of certain categories has progressed to a point where
the fields of their normal employment may be recognized. Subject to a periodic review,
responsibilitiesare assigned as follows:.!· Surface-to-air.

(1) Guided missiles which supplement, extend the capabi-lities of, or
replace antiaircraft artillery will be a responsibility of the U.S. Army and the U.S.
Navy as required by their assigned functions.
(2) Guided missiles which supplement or replace fighter interceptors will bea responsibility of the U.S. Air Forceand the U.S. Navy as required by theirassigned functions.
b. Surface-to-Surface.
(1) Surface launched guided missiles which supplement orextend the capabilitiesof, or replace the fire of artilleryor naval guns will be the responsibility of the U.S.
Army and U.S. Navy as required by their functions.

210

DOCUMENT
13(2) Surface-launched guided missiles which supplement orextend thecapabilities of, or replace, support aircraft will be the responsibility of the U.S. Air
Force and U.S. Army, as required by their functions.
(3) Ship-launched guided missiles which supplement, extend thecapabilities of, or replace naval aircraft willbe a responsibility of the U.S. Navy,as required by its functions.
(4) Surface-launched guided missiles which supplement, extend thecapabilities of, or replace Air Force aircraft (other than support aircraft) will be a
responsibility of the U.S. Air Force, as required by its functions.
(5) Unnecessary duplication will be avoided by the periodic review to beaccomplished by the Joint Chiefs ofStaff.
c. Air-to-Air.
Guided missiles which are used for air-to-air combat willbe a responsibility of
the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy as required by their functions.

E.· Air-to-surface.
Guided missiles which are used by aircraft against sur- face objectives will bea responsibility of the U.S. Air Force andthe U.S. Navy as required by their functions.
e. In connection with the requirements of the various Services for guided missiles,
the needs of the Marine Corps willbe met from the Service having appropriate
responsibility.
4. In order to establish a firm basis for the development and employment of new
weapons or improved existing weapons, the JointChiefs of Staff recommend that you
approve and issue the following statement of policy to the Department of Defense:"Employment of new or improved weapons, and related equip-ment, resulting fromresearch and development will not be restricted by reason of the interest or responsibilityof a particular Service in the development of a weapon. On the contrary, newweapons developed by the programs of the severalServices will be consideredavailable for employment by any

211

DOCUMENT
13
Service which requires them in the discharge of its assigned functions as determinedby the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the structure of the approved •functions of theArmed Forces and the JCS1 •The initial determination of such requirement shallbe made by individual Services, subject to final appro- val by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on the basis of its contri- bution to the over-all war effort in any case where conflictsof functions or economy may arise. A Service charged with primary responsibility fordevelopment of a weapon shall invite the participation of any other Service having
an opera-tional interest in the weapon. This policy in no way alters the existing
responsibilities of the Research and Development Board for the allocation of researchand development respon- sibility to the various Services."212

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DOCUMENT
13

Washington
21 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT:

Department of Defense Guided Missiles Program

I approve the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as presented to me orally on 20 March 1950, with one proviso: namely,that the Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group, whichis to be established pursuant to the recommendations, will advise
the Joint Chiefs of Staff every ninety days as to requirements forthe guided missiles program.
I understand that the recommendations referred to above are identical with those set forth in a memorandum to me from the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject, "Department of Defense
Guided Missiles Program", dated 15 March 1950. [Enclosure to JCS
1620/ll](added)
signedLouis A. Johnson

213

DOCUMENT
13

BASIC DOCUMENTS

E N CL OSU R E
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

15 March 1950

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the report of the Special Interdepartmental
Guided Missiles Board, dated 3 February 1950* and have also reviev,ed the Joint Chiefs ofStaff rec2mmen- dations made to you in a memorandum dated 17 November 1949 * onthe assignment of responsibility for guided missiles. With respect to the projects or
guided missiles which are at present being pursued by the three Departments, therecommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are listed below:
Project

Responsibility

Recommendation

Air-to-Air Missiles
Air Force
Navy
Navy

(1) FALCON(2) SPARROW(3) METEOR

Continue
Continue
Continue

Air-to-Surface Missiles
Navy
Navy
Air Force(4) DOVE(5) PETREL(6) RASCAL

Continue
Continue
Continue
Systems Study

Land-to-Air Missiles
Army
Air Force( 7) NIKE(8) WIZARD

Continue
Continue

Ship-to-Air Missiles(9) TERRIER-TALOS(10) ZEUS

Navy
Navy

Continue
Discontinue* Appendix "D" to JCS 1620/13** Enclosure to JCS 1620/12

214Project

Responsibility

DOCUMENT
Recommendation
13

Land-to-Surface Missiles(11) HERMES (A-1)

Army(12) HERMES (A-3, C-1)
(13) HERMES (B-1)

Army
Army

(14) HERMES (B-2)(15) HERMES (A-2)(16) HERMES II

Army
Army
Army

(17) CORPORAL E(18) $NARK

Army
Air Force(19) *NAVAHO (A-2)(
20) LACROSSE

Air Force
Navy

Discontinue as aweaponContinue
Discanti nue as aweaponDiscontinue
Continue
Discanti nue as aweapon. Continue
as a ce11 ul ar
ram jet development.
Discontinue
Discontinue as aweapon. Continue
the project as
development of
missile guidance system only
and test vehicle
therefor.
Continue
Transfer responsibility to Armyand continue.
Marine Corps continue close liaison in connection
with amphibious
applications.

Ship-to-Surface Missiles(21) REGULUS(22) RIGEL

Navy
Navy

Continue
Continue*Design study and development of components of NAVAHO (A-6) tocontinue. NAVAHO may be land- or air-launched215

( 23) GREBE

Navy( 24) TRITONNavy

DOCUMENT
Limit development
to 3-mil 13e range
version for thepresent, but continue design
studies forlonger range
adaptation.
Continue as a research and design
project, insuring
integration of results from NAVAHO

2. With reference to the recommendations by the Special Interdepartmental Guided
Missiles Board with respect to operationand utilization of flight test facilities, General
Bradley informed you by memorandum dated 24 February 1950* that the JointChiefs of Staff
agree that there is a requirement for three ranges, and further agree that the assignmentof responsibility for these ranges should beWhite Sands/Holloman - Department of the Army
Point Mugu
- Department of the Navy
Banana River- Department of the Air Force.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that, with the one
amendment to recommendation a of the Special Interdepartmental
Guided Missiles Board as indTcated herein, you approve the recommendations of that board as outlined in Enclosure 3 of its report.
These recommendations, with the one amendment referred to above,
are that:_!. The present White Sands Proving Ground and Holloman
Air Force Base be consolidated into a single facility under
the command and management of the Department of the Army,.!.
11-p-rovided the Wheny ll011sing Bill commitme11ts can be wo,·ked(This amendment
recommended since the Air Force has cancelled the Wherry Bill housing at
Holloman
Air Force Base.
11b. Subject to approval of the foregoing, the threeguided missile proving grounds be assigned to Departments
as indicated below, the indicated Department to have-e11t to the satisfaction of all conce, ned.

* Enclosure to JCS 1620/14

216

command, management, operational and budgetary responsi-bility.
White Sands/Holloman
Point Mugu
Banana River

DOCUMENT
13- Department of the Army
- Department of the Navy
- Department of the Air Force.

"c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff revoke its recommendation for a 'Joint LongRange Proving Ground Command.' (This refers to the Banana River Range
which the Joint Chiefsof Staff previously recommended be a joint command.)"d. Each of theseproving grounds be available toall three Services for appropriate flight testing; thecost of any special
instrumentation required to be borneby the Department cognizant of themissile project undertest.
"e. An Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Groupfor Guided Missiles ••. be charged with formulation andinitiation of suchcommon policies as may be necessary, for issuance by the respective
Departments, to insure
the integrated and efficient operation of all guided mis- sile proving grounds
and ranges in such a manner as to serve all three Departments. Such policies
shall not conflict with the policies of the Research and DevelopmentBoard."
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the proposal of the Special Interdepartmental
Guided Missiles Board contained in Enclosure 4 of its report to the effect that an
Interdepartmental Operational Requirements Group be established for the purpose of advisingon the coordinating and integrating of the operational features of the three Services guided
missiles program, with the proviso that the Group will be responsible for advising the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as well as the Military Departments. As one of its first tasks the Groupwould formulate and recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a requirements program for
guided missiles research and development, and for production of operational guidedmissiles,
for their first annual review of the program in September. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will
provide the necessary guidance as to priorities.
4. With reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum of17 November
1949 on the subject of assignment of responsibilityfor guided missiles, the Joint Chiefsof Staff recommend that paragraph 3 b of that memorandum be deleted and that the following be substituted therefor:

217

DOCUMENT"b. Surface-to-Surface13"(l} Surface-launched guided missiles which supplement
or extend the capabilities of, or replace the fire of artillery or naval guns will be the responsibility of the U.S.
Army and U.S. Navy as required by their functions.
"(2) Surface-launched guided missiles which supplement
or extend the capabilities of, or replace, support aircraft
will be the responsibility of the U.S. Air Force and U.S.
Army, as required by their functions.
"(3} Ship-launched guided missiles which supplement,
extend the capabilities of, or replace naval aircraft will
be a responsibility of the U.S. Navy, as required by its
functions.
·"(4} Surface-launched guided missiles which supplement,
extend the capabilities of, or replace Air Force aircraft(other than support aircraft) will be a responsibility of the
U.S. Air Force, as required by its functions.
"(5} Unnecessary duplication will be avoided by theperiodic review to be accomplished by the Joint Chiefs ofStaff."
5. Subject to your approval of the recommendations contained inparagraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4
above, it is the intention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review annually from the military
point of viewthe entire guided missiles program. The first annual review will be initiatedabout 1 September 1950

SECDEF Wilson Memorandum
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington
November 26, 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council

SUBJECT: Clarification of Roles and Missions to Improve theEffectiveness of Operation of the Department of Defense.
Important changes in organization and in roles andmissions are not easily decided upon or effected. It is not as
though we were starting fresh with a clean sheet of paper, so to
speak, or could set up a theoretically perfect organization anddivision of responsibilities between the Military Departments.
Assignment of responsibilities must continue to recognize the pre- 218

DOCUMENT
cedents of the past and the availability of men and facilities
forcarrying out assigned missions. Problems of this nature wouldbe13
easier to solve if there were always complete unanimity of opinion
among all responsible executives of the Defense Department, bothmilitary and civilian. The very nature of the problems, however,and the varying background and experience of the individuals
serving in responsible positions make some differences of opinion
normal and to be expected.
In spite of the differences of opinion which may exist,
there are times when conditions require that changes should bemade in administrative responsibilities and at such times decisions are mandatory. That is the situation now.
The National Security Act of 1947 states:"Declaration of Policy"Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent ofCongress to provide a comprehensive program for the future
security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to
the national security; to provide three military departments, separately administered, for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviationand the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with
their assigned combat and service components; to provide for219

DOCUMENT
21 undertheir authoritative coordination and unified direction
civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not tomerge them; to provide for the effective strategic directionof the armed forces and for their operation under unified
control and for their integration into an efficient team ofland, naval and air forces but not to establish a single
Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces
general staff (but this is not to be interpreted asapplying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Staff)."
Nine years of experience operating under the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended, have proved the soundness of
this comprehensive program for national security.
The statement of roles and missions recommended by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West and Newport and approved bySecretary of Defense James Forrestal, and as codified in 1953,
have also proved to be sound and effectively to implement theintent of Congress as expressed in the National Security Act.
No basic changes in the present roles and missions of
the armed services are necessary but the development of new
weapons and of new strategic concepts, together with the nine
years operating experience by the Department of Defense havepointed up the need for some clarification and clearer interpretation of the roles and missions of the armed services. We haverecognized the need for a review of these matters and from time totime certain steps have been taken and we are now taking others to
improve the effectiveness of our overall military establishment,
to avoid unnecessary duplication of activities and functions, andto utilize most effectively the funds made available by the people
through Congress.
I would like to point out that clarification andinterpretation of roles and missions does not in itself predetermine the weapons to be used by each of the armed services andtheir numbers, nor the numbers of men to be trained in various
fields. It should be clearly understood that the approval ofroles and missions of the armed services for guidance in peacetime
does not predetermine the weapons or forces which a commander inthe field would be permitted to use in the event of war. Also,
the development of a weapon by a particular military department
does not in itself predetermine its use. Such determinations restwith the Secretary of Defense after considering the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of theMilitary Departments.
220

DOCUMENT21
The recent clarification of command responsibilitiesforcommanders should be most helpful in determining weapons and forces to be employed in various missions and should assist the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in making recommendations in this regard to theSecretary of Defense in order to determine approved requirements
for each of the armed services.
We have recently reviewed five important problem areas
which need to be cleared up. ·· The recommendations of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in regard to these matters have been carefully
considered and their differences of opinion carefully weighed. In
addition, I have given consideration to the opinions in theseareas of responsible officials, both military and civilian, in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. These matters are being
resolved as follows:
1. Use of Aircraft by U.S. Army.
In matters affecting the use of aircraft by the U.S.
Army, the combat zone is defined as extending not more than 100
miles forward of the general line of contact between U.S. andenemy ground forces. Its extension to the rear of the generalline of contact will be designated by the appropriate field commander, and normally extends back of the frontlines about 100
mil es.
The Army Aviat.ion Progr.am will consist of those
types of aircraft required to carry out the following Army functions envisaged within the combat zone:
a. Command, liaison, and communications.
b. Observation, visual and photographic reconnaissance,fire adjustment,
and topographical survey.
c. Airlift of Army personnel and materiel.
d. Aeromedical evacuation.
The Army Aircraft Program to carry out these functions will be subject to.the following limitations:a. Fixed wing aircraft, convertiplanes, and vertical/shorttake-off and landing
aircraft will have an empty weight not to exceed 5,000 pounds. Rotary wing aircraft will
have an empty weight not to exceed 20,000 pounds. Specific exceptions to weight
295

DOCUMENT
limitations for specific aircraft for specific purposes 21
may begranted by the Secretary of Defense after consideration of Armyrequirements and appropriate Air Force functions and capabilities.
(For example, the Secretary of Defense has just approved thepurchase by the Army of five DeHavilland DHC-4 airplanes, "TwinOtter", for test and evaluation and is giving consideration toanother project involving a plane in the development stage.)b. The provision of a limited airlift capability within theArmy Aviation Program shallnot serve as a basis for increasing ordecreasing Air Force forces necessary to support orprotect the Army airlift forces. Provision of this limited airlift capability will apply only tosmall combat units and limited quantities of materiel to improve local mobility, and not to theprovision of anairlift capability sufficient for the large-scale movement of sizeable Army
combat units which would infringe on the missionof the Air Force.
c. As limited Army Aviation airlift capability becomes available to active Army
forces, provision should be made for com-pensating reductions in other forms of Armytransportation designed to operate within the combat zone.
d. The Army Aviation Program will not provide for aircraftto perform thefollowing functions:(1) Strategic and tactical airlift.
(a) Airlift of Army supplies, equipment, personnel andunits from exterior
points to points within Army combat zone.
zone.

(b) Airlift for evacuation of personnel and materielfrom Army combat(c) Airlift for air movement of troops, supplies and equipment in the initialand subsequent phases of airborne opera-tions.
(d) Aeromedical evacuation from Air Force operating locations within the
combat zone through Air Force casualty staging units to hospital facilities outside combat
zone, and aeromedical evacuation from an airhead or an airborne objective area where
airborne operation includes air landed logistic supportby Air Force.
(2) Tactical reconnaissance.

(3) Interdiction of the battlefield.

DOCUMENT
21(4) Close combat air support.
e. The Army will not maintain unilateral aviation researchfacilities but will confine
itself to development and deter- mination of specific requirements peculiar to Army needs, toeva-luation of proposals, and to user testing of equipment. The Army will make maximum
use of Air Force and Navy aircraft research and development facilities. The Air Force andthe Navy will be responsive to Army needs in such research activities on a reimbur-sablebasis.
f. The Army will use existing types of Navy, Air Force or civilian aircraft when they
are suitable, or may be suitably modified, to meet Army requirements, rather than attempt
to deve-lop and procure new types.
With regard to the 4 November 1952 Pace-Finletter
Memorandum of Understanding, I am directing my staff to prepare an
appropriate technical and detailed directive for coordination andissuance. Until this directive is approved, the Memorandum of.
Understanding will remain applicable except as specificallyamended herein or by subsequent Secretary of Defense direction.
2. Adequacy of Airlift.
There has been a great deal of discussion and consideration given to the requirements for the airlift of tacticalunits and supplies examined, and it appears that it presently provides adequate airborne lift in the light of currently approved
strategic concepts.
3. Air Defense
Consideration has been given to distinguishing between Air Force and Army responsibility for surface-to-air guided
missile systems for defense of the Continental United States on
the basis of area defense and point defense, as well as the criterion of an arbitrary range limitation.
Area and point defense systems cannot be defined with
precision. Area defense involves the concept of locating defense
units to intercept enemy attacks remote from and without reference
to individual vital installations, industrial complexes or population centers. For such a defense system to be effective, exten-

DOCUMENT
21
sive information gathering networks such as the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment(SAGE) system are required to trace con- tinuously the enemy attack and transmit andpresent the data in usable form for guiding the defense weapons to counter the attack.As
applied to surface-to-air missiles, this means that area defense missiles, because of theirmore widespread sitings, will normally receive their guidance information from the network
system rather than from acquisition and tracking radars located inthe vicinity of themissile launching site.
Point defense has as its purpose the defense of spe-cified geographicalareas, cities and vital installations. Onedistinguishing feature of point defense missiles isthat theirguidance information is received from radar located near the launching sites.
The present state of the art justifies development ofpoint defense surface-toair missile systems for use against airtargets at expected altitudes out to a horizontal rangeof the order of 100 nautical miles.
It must be clearly understood that the Commander-in- Chief, Continental Air
Defense Command, who has been given the responsibility for the Air Defense of theContinental United States, Alaska, and the United States area of responsibility in the
North East, also has the authority and duty for stating his operational need for new or
improved weapon systems and for recom-mending to the Joint Chiefs of Staff all new
installations of any type. Therefore, no Service shall unilaterally plan for additional missile
installations of either category (point or area defense)in support of CINCONAD 1 s
responsibilities until and unless they have been recommended by CINCONAD to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and approved by that body.
In conformance with the above:a. The Army is assigned responsibility for the development, procurement andmanning of land-based surface-to-air missile systems for point defense. Currently, missile
systems in the pointdefense category are the NIKE I, NIKE B, and land-based TALOS.
b. The Air Force is assigned responsibility for the develop- ment, procurement andmanning of land-based surface-to-air missilesystems for area defense. Currently, the missile
system in the area defense category is the BOMARC.

DOCUMENT
21
c. The Navy, in close coordination with the Army and Air Force, is assigned
responsibility for the development, procurement and employment of ship-based air defense
weapon systems for the accomplishment of its assigned functions.
d. The Marine Corps is authorized to adapt to its organic use, such surface-to-air
weapons systems developed by the other Services as may be required for the accomplishmentof its assignedfunctions.
e. In overseas areas, the U.S. theater commander should normally assign
responsibility for air defense to an air componentcommander, with appropriate participation byother components. Under this arrangement, Army units in the combat zone should continue to be responsible for their own local defense, employing organic means. Other Army
air defense units should carry out point defense missions under the air component
commander. Air Force units should carry out the area defense missions. Special emphasisshould be given to simplicity, flexibility and mobilityof weapon systems employed in air
defense in overseas areas. Navyforces should continue to be responsible for their own
air defenseat sea, employing organic means. As approved by the theater com- mander, theair component commander should establish such proce- dures for coordinating Army,
Navy, and Air Force air defense forces as may be required to carry out his
responsibilities, and, in addition, should establish such detailed procedures as are necessary
for proper coordination with national air defense com- manders of allied countries.
4. Air Force Tactical Support of the Army.
The Army will continue its development of surface-tosurface missiles for close support of Army field operations withthe following limitations:a. That such missiles be designed and programmed for use against tacticaltargets within the zone of operations, defined asextending not more than 100 miles beyond
the front lines. As suchmissiles would presumably be deployed behind the combat zone normally extending back of the front lines about 100 miles, this pla-ces a range limitation of
about 200 miles on the design criteria for such weapons.
b. That the tactical air support functions beyond those thatcan be provided byArmy surface-to-surface missiles as above defined remain the responsibility of the Air
Force.

DOCUMENT21
It is evident that the tactical air forces programmedfor Army support should be reconsidered and the Joint Chiefs ofStaff have been requested to furnish me with their recommendations
for specific adjustments as to the number and types of planned
Army guided missile and unguided rocket units and with the numberof Air Force tactical wings which may be eliminated as a result of
these decisions.
In preparing these recommendations, the development ofbalanced and interrelated Army and Air Force tactical support forces for the accomplishment of overall U.S. national security
objectives must be considered, rather than the development ofcompletely independent Army and Air Force forces to accomplish
tactical support tasks. In developing force recommendations inthis area, as well as for other U.S. military forces, it should berecognized that all operations in which our forces will be
employed will be conducted under the command of the designatedcommanders who will have the necessary forces assigned to them forthe conduct of their missions by higher authority.
5. Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)
In regard to the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles:
a. Operational employment of the land-based Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
system will be the sole responsibility ofthe U.S. Air Force.
b. Operational employment of the ship-based Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missile system will be the sole responsibility ofthe U.S. Navy.
c. The U.S. Army will not plan at this time for the opera-tional employment of
the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile or for any other missiles with ranges beyond
200 miles. This does not, however, prohibit the Army from making limited feasibility studies inthis area.
(The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile has previously
been assigned for operational employment to the U.S. Air Force.)
There are a number of other matters relating toresearch and development of particular weapons that will affectthe choice of weapons to be used for various missions in the armed
services. These choices can only be made after a careful technical review of the capabilities of the various weapons under300

DOCUMENTdevelopment. I refer particularly to weapons systems such21 as the
NIKE and TALOS and the multiple approach (JUPITER-THOR) to developments such as the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. This
memorandum does not attempt to answer those questions which can
only be decided after studies now in progress are completed, andshould not be so interpreted.
In the meantime, these competing weapons systems will
be continued with support from Fiscal Year 1 57 funds until thecompletion of the technical evaluation referred to above. Budget
support in Fiscal Year 58 for the land-based TALOS, as required,
will be provided by the U.S. Army. Budget support in Fiscal Year 1
58 for the land-based Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
Program, as required, will be provided by the U.S. Air Force.
1

In view of the great interest in these matters in theCongress, copies of this memorandum are being sent to theappropriate Congressional Committees. In addition, in order that
there can be full understanding of these decisions within the
Military Departments and by the public, copies of this memorandum
are being made available to the press.
Distribution:
Members of the Armed Forces Policy Council:
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
Commandant, Marine Corps
Assistant Secretaries of Defense
General Counsel(signed)C. E. Wilson

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SECDEDF McElroy Memorandum
351. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McElroy) to the Secretary of the Navy (Gates)1
Washington, October 29, 1957.
SUBJECT
Vanguard Program
REFERENCE(a) Sec/Navy Memo to Sec/Def, dtd 22 Oct 1957, subj: Earth Satellite Program2Your memorandum of 22 October expressed concern that the Presidential statement of 9 October on the U.S.
satellite program has committed the Navy to meet the December 1957 launching of a test vehicle and a March
1958 launching of an instrumented satellite.
Subsequent to the above, I have received a confirmation from the President that he expects the Department of
Defense to meet these commitments.
At the time the U.S. satellite program responsibility was assigned to the Navy, the atmosphere of a completely
scientific effort in the framework of the International Geophysical Year prevailed. The Soviet’s success with
their satellite has changed the situation. We now have the added burden of not only launching a successful
satellite but doing it as per our current schedule. The psychological factors in this matter have obviously
received a new emphasis. If necessary, a back-up program to insure success will be initiated.
We must, therefore, go forward with deliberate speed in this program and meet the above dates if at all
possible.
Requests for assistance to maintain this schedule should be called to the attention of the Assistant for Guided
Missiles. We are attempting to obtain an additional launching stand for you.
Neil McElroy

Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Charter
Found in: "Chapter 7: SDI Program Management “Strategic Defense Initiative, 1989. Report to the Congress. UnitedStates: N. p., 1989. Web.

Chapter 7
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SDI Program Management

The SD/O management team discusses program strategy.

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Chapter 7

SDI Program Management
When the SDI Program formally entered the defense acquisition process inJune 1987, it was required to meet all of the major DOD acquisition milestones,
including continuous extensive review by the Defense Acquisition Executive(DAE) and his review mechanism, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). To meetattendant technical and management challenges, SDIO has taken steps toimprove the management structure and develop new management tools to
guide and direct the Program. These management tools are designed
particularly to promote coordination and cooperation within the SDIO and withexternal organizations. The overall emphasis is to do the best job possible withthe resources available and to hold individuals accountable in the pursuit of theProgram goals.

Management Approach
The current charter of the SDIO (as specified in DODD 5141.5, Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization, dated 4 June 1987) states:
SDIO shall manage and direct the conduct of a vigorous
research program, including advanced technologies, that will
provide the basis for an informed decision regarding thefeasibility of eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic
missiles of all ranges, and of increasing the contribution of
defensive systems to
U.S. and allied security. The program shall protect options
for near-term deployment of limited ballistic missile
defenses. The program shall be carried out in fullconsultation and, where appropriate, with participation of
our allies. The program shall be conducted in compliancewith all existing treaty obligations and will emphasize nonnuclear technologies.
Key to success of the Program is strong central directive authority vested
in the Director, SDIO. The Director has been given the authority andresponsibility, and is accountable to the Secretary of Defense, for the
successful execution of a robust research program balanced with the systemdevelopment activities. The Director has also been designated the SDI
Acquisition Executive (SDIAE). While the Program is centrally managed by
SDIO, execution of the individual element technology and development
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efforts are delegated to and executed by the Services and other participating
agencies. Therefore, effective communications and teamwork among all
Program participants-SDIO, the Services, the JCS, the user, and otheragencies-are essential. The Director's centralized oversight of all SDI workand resources, and his direct interaction with the Acquisition Executive of each
Service, ensure that the Program is properly focused and successfully
integrated at all levels.

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To ensure that SOJO establishes and maintains the capability to
manage ef ectively the full scope of the Program, the following set of management
guidelines and activities has been implemented:



SDI Program authority and the programmatic decision process will flow fromthe Defense Acquisition Executive (OSD, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition) to the SDIAE to the Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs).

oAll Program activity is under the broad direction and control of
the Director, who will direct the use, as appropriate, of
existing management and technical expertise of the SOJO,
the Services, and other participating agencies.



The acquisition strategy for the strategic defense system(SOS) will follow a phased development approach (Phase I
has entered the Dem/Val stage of the defense acquisition
process).

Internal SOJO offices have been established to manage
effectively the acquisition, the definition of follow-on phases,
and the continuing research necessary for future planning ofPhase I. As part of the SOS Phase I effort, an SOS Program
Executive Officer (PEO) (the Deputy for Systems) and an
SOS Phase I Program Manager (PM) have been designated.

External to SOJO, Service and agency responsibilities have·been identified in coordination with the appropriate DOD
officials. These responsibilities will continue to evolve as theProgram matures and progresses through the acquisition
process. The Services have designated PEOs and PMs forthe individual element programs they are assigned to executefor SDIO. The Service element PMs plan and execute theirdesignated element program in consonance with SDIOapproved plans and guidance from the SOS Phase I PM.

Technical and program direction and funding cover both
systems development and continuing research necessary to
carry out Service- managed element programs and otheragencies' SDI activities to the element PMs in accordance withagreements between the Director and the SAEs and appropriate
agency directors.

A systems engineering and integration (SE&I) contractor has
been selected to support the SOS Phase I PM and theServices in accomplishing the Phase I activities.

Organizational Structure

The SDI program management structure provides for balanced emphasison system development and technology research, effective SOJO control andcoordination

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of Service and other agency-managed programs, and accountability of all PMs for
project execution. Also, it provides the Director the means to direct and integrate
all SDI Program activities.
The SDIO completed an internal realignment on 1 October 1988 (seeFigure 7-1). Principal factors that led to the realignment were the Dire ctor's desire
to create a better management structure for Phase I, plus a general desire to
support internal common needs better and provide SDIO the focus it needs tosuccessfully develop the strategic defense system. In explaining the organizational
realignment, the Director stated... a major objective of the realignment is to concentrate the concept
definition, system trade-offs, and integration and management of the six
Phase I elements into the Phase I Program Office of the Systems
Deputate. Threat projections, architectural effectiveness, and launch
concepts will be centralized in the new Architectures and Analysis
Directorate, also in the Systems Deputate. The technology base that
supports both Phase I and follow-on system concepts will now beconcentrated according to technology discipline in the Technology
Deputate. In addition, resource management functions will be combined
to obtain maximum utilization of limited manpower spaces and to reduce
the span of control over staff offices.
The realignment moved some of SDIO's technical functions and programs awayfrom the previous matrix structure and into a more streamlined organization. This
move will enable increased accountability for program performance within SDIO
and among its many executing agents. Also, the realigned SDIO management
structure effectively parallels the Services' own program management.
The realignment did not suggest a change to either the immediate or longterm objectives of SDI nor did it change total budget submissions or total staffing
requirements. What this reorganization did was to streamline management of abalanced technology evolution and greatly improve responsiveness to theSecretary of Defense.
A Chief of Staff position has been added to better coordinate traditional staff
functions with line management in the System and Technology Deputates. A Chief
Engineer position also has been added to provide top-level oversight of, andvisibility to, the variety of engineering tasks and analyses to be accomplished.
An important feature of the SDI management network is the special role that
the Command Center (CC) element and System Operation and Integration
Functions (SOIF) play in the overall system development program. Because
CC/SOIF is expected to link all the SOS elements into a cohesive ballistic missile
defense, SOJO intends to maintain direct control over related technology research,system development, and system integration activities. However, within CC/SOIF
specific projects are delegated to the Services and other key agencies toaccomplish program objectives. The management network for accomplishing future
CC/SOIF projects is still evolving.

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Figure 7-1
Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization
Chief

Engineer

Chief

Scientist

GeneralPrograms

Cot.n1alAffairs

Test&
Systems

Sensor&Technologl
eeSpecial

7. 3

Science&

Programmatic and Financial Management

This section discusses work package directives (WPDs), information
resources management, the Financial Management Board (FMB), and the
Defense Acquisition Review Team (DART).

Work Package Directives
To achieve centralized planning, programming, budgeting, and executionof the SDI Program, WPDs are used to provide formal guidance and directions
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monitoring of program execution by providing information on approved research
efforts. Development of WPDs is a coordinated effort between the SDIO WPD
manager and the Service or agency program manager. Once a WPD has been
defined, staffed, and determined to be within SDI Program resource constraints, it issigned by a senior executing agent official and the Director, SDIO. The approved
WPD becomes an agreement for program execution. The WPDs have been andcontinue to be evaluated. They are evaluated when the respective programs areaudited by either the General Accounting Office (GAO), DOD, the Inspector
General (IG), the Military Service audit teams (e.g., Army Audit Agency), or the
Military Service IG and internal review teams. In addition, SDIO holds semiannual
budget execution reviews where selected WPDs are reviewed to evaluate execution.

Information Resources Management
The SDIO is establishing a full information resources management (IRM)
program. Work associated with this program include the development of a 5-year
automated information systems plan, the development of a management
information system, the establishment of SDI-wide IRM policy and procedures, andthe review and coordination of SDI-wide efforts associated with the development ofcomputer and telecommunication systems. The results of this activity will
significantly enhance the ability of the SDIO and its executing agents to effectively
manage the many projects associated with the SDI Program.

Financial Management Board
The FMB reviews proposed program and budget guidance, SDI
programming and budgeting actions, and fiscal performance during the year,
and makes recommendations to the Director on issues related to these
activities. The FMB is chaired by the Deputy Director, SDIO. Primary members
include the Deputies for Technology and Systems; the Director, Resource
Management; and the Director, Program Planning. Other SDIO offices may
provide representatives to act in an advisory capacity. The Services and otheragencies may send representatives to FMB meetings at the request of thechairman.

Defense Acquisition Review TeamThe DART was established in September 1987 to guide and oversee
planning and preparation for the first annual Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)
review. On 29 February 1988, the Director established the DART as a permanent
SDIO activity under the direction of the Deputy for Programs and Systems (nowDeputy for Systems). At the same time, the DART's role was expanded to provide
a central mechanism to integrate all SDIO Directorates in accomplishing shortnotice tasks, special projects, and information dissemination related to strategic
defense system efforts. The DART continues to guide and oversee planning andpreparation for the annual DAB reviews, which require the participation andcooperation of the OJCS, DOD staff, the Services, and the Space Command.

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Internal Management Controls

A directive system has been established to provide for effective communication
among all SDI Program participants funded by SDIO. Management directives on
SDI standards, guidance, and implementing procedures have been created for awide range of topics. SDIO management directives are closely tied to and areconsistent with work identified in the WPDs approved by the Director.
Using the tools described above, the SDIO has this past year significantly
strengthened its internal management control (IMC) program. The focus has beenin three key areas: senior management involvement and direction, the performanceof internal control evaluations, and the tracking of all corrective actions identified
through the internal control evaluation process. During FY 1988, the SDIO
successfully completed all of the steps of the IMC process as outlined in DOD
Directive 5010.38. Some of the FY 1988 initiatives included the following:o

An increase in the number of Management and Oversight
Division personnel from two to four (this staff is dedicated todeveloping internal control processes, ensuring organizational
accountability, and coordinating immediate audit resolution andaudit follow-up).
oDevelopment of an SDIO Internal Management Control
Review (IMCR) Manual for conducting necessary reviews.

o Completion of IMCR evaluations for scheduled internal
control revie s, including agency briefings to all SDIO
Directors.
oDevelopment of many new agency policy directives outlining
streamlined procedures and internal controls to improve
management effectiveness. New directives include the small
business innovative research program, contracted advisory
and assistance services, employment of experts andconsultants by personnel appointment, committee
management program, and contracting requirement process.

o Completion of management oversight visits of the IMC
program implementation by the SDIO executing agents (i.e.,Army, Navy, Air Force, DARPA, DNA, and DOE).
oDevelopment of an audit follow-up tracking system toschedule corrective milestones for agency deficiencies
discovered through any review process (i.e., GAO/IO audits
and surveys; DOD Reorganization Act surveys; risk
assessments or internal management control reviews;
Congressional hearings; and agency management reviews).

oDevelopment of the FY 1989 Management Control Plan forscheduling management reviews over a 5-year period.

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As a result of these efforts, the DOD Inspector General conducted an evaluation of the SDI Program in
August 1988 and concluded that the framework is in place to ensure compliance with the Federal Manager's
Financial Integrity Act.

Organizational Charter: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
32 CFR Part 388[DoD Directive 5134.9]

Organizational Charter; Ballistic Missile Defense Organization(BMDO)
AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, DoD.
ACTION: Final rule.
----------------------------------------------------------------------SUMMARY: In accordance with the authority granted to the Secretary of
Defense under title 10, United States Code, this DoD organization
change has been issued to establish the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization and reflect its responsibilities, functions, andorganization. The BMDO replaces the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization (SDIO).
EFFECTIVE DATE: June 14, 1994.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:Mr. R. Kennedy, Organizational and Management Planning, 703-697-1142.
List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 388
Organization and functions (government agencies).
Accordingly, 32 CFR part 388 is revised to read as follows:
PART 388--BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION (BMDO)
Sec.
388.1
388.2
388.3
388.4
388.5
388.6
388.7
388.8

Purpose.
Applicability.
Mission.
Organization and management.
Functions and responsibilities.
Relationships.
Authorities.
Administration.
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Authority: 10 U.S.C. 113.
Sec. 388.1

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Purpose.

Under the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by 10 U.S.C.
113, this part establishes the BMDO as an agency of the Department of
Defense with the responsibilities, functions, relationships, andauthorities as prescribed herein.
Sec. 388.2

Applicability.

This part applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),
the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Unified Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of
the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, and the DoD Field
Activities (hereafter referred to collectively as ``the DoD
Components'').
Sec. 388.3

Mission.

(a) BMDO shall manage, direct, and execute the Ballistic Missile
Defense Program (BMDP) to achieve the following objectives:(1) Enable deployment of an effective and rapidly relocatableadvanced theater missile defense capability to protect forward-deployed
and expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United States aswell as friends and allies of the United States;(2) Develop options for, and deploy when directed, an antiballistic
missile (ABM) system that is capable of providing effective defense of
the U.S. homeland against limited attacks of ballistic missiles,
including accidental, unauthorized launches or deliberate attacks;(3) Demonstrate advanced technologies--as options for enhancing
initial BMD systems--such as space-based defenses and their associatedsensors that could provide an overlay to ground-based interceptors; and(4) Continue programs of basic and applied research to develop
follow-on technologies for both near-term and future technology
insertion options and new system options to sustain a highly effective
missile defense capability.
(b) The BMDP shall provide the basis for informed decisions
regarding development, production, and deployment milestones, and shallbe carried out in full consultation and, where appropriate, withparticipation of our allies. The program shall be conducted incompliance with all existing international agreements and treaty
obligations and shall utilize nonnuclear weapon technologies to achieve
the deployments in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section. The
BMDP shall focus on the development, acquisition, and integration oftheater missile defenses and strategic defenses against ballistic
missile threats to the United States.
Sec. 388.4

Organization and management.

(a) BMDO shall consist of a Director and such subordinate
organizational elements as are established by the Director withinresources authorized by the Secretary of Defense. The Director, BMDO,
shall serve also as the BMD Acquisition Executive (BMDAE) for BMDOfunded programs and/or projects.
(b) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology(USD(A&T)), as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), shall provide
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conduct formal reviews, including Defense Acquisition Board milestone
reviews, for BMDPs. All such reviews shall emphasize streamlined
21 theacquisition strategies. The USD(A&T) shall provide oversight for
BMD technology base activities contained in the BMDP.
(c) A BMD Acquisition Review Council (BMDARC) may be established by
the BMDAE to assist the BMDAE to:(1) Review BMDP progress in preparation for acquisition milestone
decisions;(2) Resolve critical programmatic and technical issues; and(3) Determine specific program directions.
(4) The Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) and Vice Chiefs ofStaff of the Services shall provide representatives to the BMDARC.
Membership shall also include representatives of the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commanders of the Unified CombatantCommands, as necessary.
Sec. 388.5

Functions and responsibilities.

The Director, BMDO, is responsible for BMD programmatic policy,
requirements, priorities, systems, resources, and programs, and is
responsible and accountable for the research, development, andtransition of BMD systems to the Military Departments and operations by
the Combatant Commands. The Director shall:(a) Organize, direct, and manage BMDO and all assigned resources
and activities; provide for the procurement and fielding of assigned
systems; and administer and supervise all programs, services, and items
under the BMDP to include but not be limited to:(1) Theater missile defense systems;(2) The U.S. ballistic missile defense systems; and(3) Other antiballistic missile systems or upgrades as may be
assigned by the USD(A&T).
(b) Develop programmatic policies and issue program guidance anddirection to the DoD Components consistent with U.S. national security
policy.
(c) Establish the BMD management network including BMDO, theServices, and other Agencies to execute all program activities; anddelegate appropriate authority to key individuals to ensure successfulprogram execution and integration.
(d) Establish the systems and procedures necessary to coordinate
integration into the overall BMDP of the major BMD acquisition programs
and other acquisition programs that directly relate to the BMDP's
objectives for development and deployment.
(e) Develop systems' standards and procedures for theadministration and management of approved BMD plans and programs;
establish program goals and objectives; set priorities; and evaluate
BMDP activities of DoD Components and, as appropriate, those of other
Federal Agencies.
(f) Prepare the BMDP objectives memoranda and budget submissions incoordination with appropriate DoD Components; make determinations
regarding priorities and resources; provide recommendations on program
budget decisions to the USD(A&T), Comptroller of the Department of
Defense, and Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, forincorporation into the planning, programming, and budgeting systemprocess; and initiate and implement congressional reprogramming
actions.
(g) Make such determinations regarding priorities and resources incoordination with appropriate DoD Components to include the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council, as may be required to achieve approved
program objectives and to enable the incremental development anddeployment of BMD systems for U.S. Forces, the United States, andallies.
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officials, identify Military Department, Defense Agency, and BMDO
responsibilities for program execution, and in such cases where source21
selection is not delegated to the Military Departments and Defense
Agencies, retain that authority within BMDO.
(i) Develop mechanisms for coordinating BMDPs with other DoD
research, development, test, and evaluation efforts.
(j) Oversee, in coordination with appropriate DoD Components, theparticipation of U.S. allies and friends in the BMD technicalcooperation programs.
(k) Provide periodic program reviews and milestone decision
information to the DAE, as well as to the BMDARC.
(l) Serve as principal DoD official responsible for presenting the
BMDP budget to the Congress.
(m) Ensure that jointly funded programs have been reviewed byappropriate SAEs prior to initiating programmatic discussions with the
USD(A&T).
(n) Serve as principal public spokesperson for the BMDP.
(o) Promote coordination, cooperation, and mutual understanding
within the Department of Defense and between the Department of Defense
and other Federal Agencies, and the civilian community with respect to
BMD matters.
(p) Serve on boards, committees, and other groups pertaining to BMD
activities, functions, and responsibilities.
(q) Establish internal procedures for compliance with the ABM
Treaty and other Arms Control Agreements, pursuant to DoD Directive
2060.1.
(r) Perform such other duties as the USD(A&T) may prescribe.
Sec. 388.6

Relationships.

(a) In the performance of assigned functions, the Director, BMDO,
shall:(1) Serve under the authority, direction, and control of them
USD(A&T).
(2) Serve as a member of the Defense Planning and Resources Board,when BMD matters are under consideration, and Chairman of the BMDARC.
(3) Consult with the Secretaries of the Military Departments,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy when addressing issues under their respective purview, toinclude the strategy and policy implications of defensive capabilities.
(4) Operate within the DoD Acquisition System, as defined in DoD
Directive 5000.1\1\ and DoD Instruction 500.2,\2\ taking direction fromthe USD(A&T); and work directly with appropriate OSD committees andoffices.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------\1\Copies may be obtained, at cost, from the National Technical
Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
\2\See footnote 1 to Sec. 388.6(a)(4).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------(5) Establish, in consultation with the USD(A&T), mechanisms for
coordination of BMDPs with other DoD technical efforts; and coordinate
and exchange information with other DoD officials having collateral or
related functions.
(6) Establish procedures for streamlined communication with each
Military Department and Defense Agency involved in the BMDP.
(7) Maintain active liaison for the exchange of information andadvice in the field of assigned responsibility with all the DoD
Components, other U.S. Government activities, and non-DoD research
institutions (including private business entities and educational
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DOCUMENT(8) Through the USD(A&T), keep the Secretary of Defense, theDeputySecretary of Defense, the DoD Components, and non-DoD U.S. Government
Agencies informed, as appropriate, on schedules, status, and 21
significant new developments, breakthroughs, and technological advances
within assigned projects.
(9) Use existing facilities and services of the Department of
Defense and other Federal Agencies, whenever practicable, to avoid
duplication and to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.
(b) The Heads of the DoD Components shall:(1) Provide support within their respective fields of
responsibilities, to the Director, BMDO, as required, to carry out the
responsibilities and functions assigned to BMDO.
(2) Provide information, as necessary, to the Director, BMDO, on
all programs and activities that include, or are related to, BMD
research, technology, and the BMDP.
(c) The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of
Defense Agencies shall:(1) Execute BMD element programs and BMD technology development
efforts as recommended by the Director, BMDO, and approved by the
Secretary of Defense.
(2) Provide the personnel (to include a BMD Program Executive
Officer and Element Program Managers) and the infrastructure necessary
to support all Service BMD activities.
(3) Provide program recommendations and advice to the Director,
BMDO on budgeting, resources, and program execution.
(4) Provide advice on BMD activities, including readiness foradvancing through the acquisition process, technical and programmatic
issues, and general program guidance.
(5) Submit program documentation and reports required by the
Director, BMDO, in support of DAE reviews and milestone decisions.
Sec. 388.7

Authorities.

The Director, BMDO, is hereby delegated authority to:(a) Communicate directly and enter into agreements with heads of
DoD Components, as necessary, in carrying out assigned
responsibilities. Communications with the Commanders of the Unified
Combatant Commands shall be communicated through the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(b) Recommend to the USD(A&T) revisions or exceptions to Military
Department and/or Defense Agency regulations, directives, procedures,or instructions for, or related to, system acquisition for individual
or a class of BMD requirements as determined necessary to accomplish
the BMD objectives.
(c) Enter into and administer contracts, directly or through a
Military Department, as appropriate, for supplies, equipment, andservices required to accomplish the mission of the BMDO.
(d) Serve as the head of an Agency and Contracting Activity, andact as the Senior Procurement Executive, within the meaning of andsubject to the limitations of 48 CFR 202.101 and 48 CFR 2.1, for the
BMDO.
(e) Authorize the allocation and/or sub-allocation of funds madeavailable to BMDO for assigned research, development, test, andacquisition projects.
(f) Acquire or construct, through a Military Department or other
Government Agency, such research, development, and test facilities andequipment required to carry out assignments that may be approved by the
Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense as recommended by
the USD(A&T), in accordance with applicable statutes.
(g) Negotiate agreements, as necessary, with other U.S. Agencies
and organizations to ensure proper coordination and execution of theDigitized by

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DOCUMENT(h) Negotiate agreements, as necessary, with foreign governments
toexecute allied participation in the BMDP. These agreements shall be
21
subject to approval by duly appointed DoD authorities, in accordancewith DoD Directive 5530.3.\3\--------------------------------------------------------------------------\3\See footnote 1 to Sec. 388.6(a)(4).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------(i) Establish, in coordination with appropriate DoD Components,
special security procedures for sensitive BMDPs.
(j) Exercise original classification authority over BMDO funded
technology development and acquisition programs. In general, whereanother DoD Component has been designated for program execution,
original classification authority will be delegated to that Component
as part of a program management agreement with BMDO. All originalclassification decisions must be made in coordination with the BMDO,
Military Departments, and other appropriate DoD organizations.
(k) Exercise foreign disclosure authority over BMDO funded
technology development and acquisition programs. In general, whereanother DoD Component has been designated for program execution,
foreign disclosure authority will be delegated to that Component as
part of a program management agreement with BMDO. All foreign
disclosure decisions must be made in accordance with National
Disclosure Policy and applicable DoD procedures, and be coordinatedwith the BMDO, Military Departments, and other appropriate DoD
organizations.
(l) Carry out the functions and exercise the responsibilities of
the Theater Missile Defense Initiative Office, as established by
Section 231 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993.
(m) Exercise the administrative authorities contained in Appendix A
to this part.
Sec. 388.8

Administration.

(a) The Director, BMDO, shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Defense, upon recommendation from the USD(A&T).
(b) The Military Departments shall assign personnel to BMDO, in
accordance with approved authorizations and procedures for joint duty
assignment and the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act.
(c) Administrative support required for BMDO shall be provided by
the other DoD Components, as appropriate.
(d) The Director, BMDO, shall consult on all key military andcivilian personnel assignments within the BMD management network.
Appendix A to Part 388--Delegations of Authority
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense,
and in accordance with DoD policies, Directives, and Instructions,the Director, BMDO, or, in the absence of the Director, the person
acting for the Director, is hereby delegated authority, in theadministration and operation of the BMDO, to:
1. Perform the following functions in accordance with theprovisions of 5 U.S.C. 7532; Executive Order 10450, 3 CFR, 1949-1953
Comp., p. 936 and 32 CFR part 154.
a. Designate and position in the BMDO as a ``sensitive''
position.
b. Authorize, in case of an emergency, the appointment of aperson to a sensitive position in the BMDO, for a limited period oftime, for whom a full field investigation or other appropriate
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completed.
c. Authorize the suspension, but not the termination, of the21
services of a BMDO employee in the interest of national security.
2. Authorize and approve:a. Travel for BMDO civilian employees, in accordance with Joint
Travel Regulations,\1\ Volume II.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------\1\Copies may be obtained, at cost, from the Superintendent ofDocuments, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------b. Temporary duty travel only for military personnel assigned ordetailed to BMDO, in accordance with Joint Travel Regulations,
Volume I.
c. Invitational travel to persons serving without compensation
whose consultative, advisory, or other specialized technicalservices are required in a capacity directly related to, or inconnection with, BMDO activities.
3. Approve the expenditure of funds available for travel by
military personnel assigned or detailed to BMDO for expenses
incident to attendance at meetings of technical, scientific,
professional, or other similar organizations in such instances where
the approval of the Secretary of Defense or designee is required bylaw (37 U.S.C. 412).
4. Develop, establish, and maintain an active and continuing
Records Management Program under DoD Directive 5015.2;\2\ DoD
Directive 5400.7;\3\ and DoD Directive 5400.11.\4\--------------------------------------------------------------------------\2\Copies may be obtained, at cost, from the National Technical
Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
\3\See footnote 2 to section 4. of this Appendix.
\4\See footnote 2 to section 4. of this Appendix.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------5. Establish and use imprest funds for making small purchases ofmaterial and services, other than personal, for the BMDO when it isdetermined more advantageous and consistent with the best interestsof the Government, in accordance with DoD Directive 7360.10\5\ andVolume 5, DoD 7000.14-R,\6\ and the Joint Regulation of the General
Services Administration-Treasury.\7\--------------------------------------------------------------------------\5\See footnote 2 to section 4. of this Appendix.
\6\See footnote 2 to section 4. of this Appendix.
\7\See footnote 1 to section 2.a. of this Appendix.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------6. Authorize and approve overtime work for civilian personnel in
BMDO, in accordance with provisions of the Federal Personnel Manual
Supplement\8\ 990-1, section 550.11.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------\8\See footnote 1 to section 2.a. of this Appendix.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------7. Establish and maintain appropriate property accounts for BMDO
and appoint boards of survey, approve reports of survey, relieve
personal liability, and drop accountability for BMDO property
contained in the authorized property accounts that have been lost,
damaged, stolen, destroyed, or otherwise rendered unserviceable, in
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DOCUMENT
8. Establish and maintain for the functions assigned an
appropriate publications system for the promulgation of regulations,21
Instructions, and reference documents, and changes thereto, pursuant
to the policies and procedures prescribed in DoD 5025.1-M.\9\--------------------------------------------------------------------------\9\See footnote 2 to section 4. of this Appendix.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------9. Issue the necessary security regulations for protection ofproperty and places under the jurisdiction of the BMDO, under DoD
Directive 5200.8.\10\--------------------------------------------------------------------------\10\See footnote 2 to section 4. of this Appendix.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------10. Exercise original TOP SECRET classification authority.
11. Establish security classification guidance and review
policy.
12. Enter into inter-service support agreements with theMilitary Departments, other DoD Components, or other Government
Agencies, as required, for the effective performance of
responsibilities and functions assigned to the BMDO.
13. Establish advisory committees pursuant to the provisions of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (Pub. L. 92-463) and DoD
Directive 5105.18.\11\--------------------------------------------------------------------------\11\See footnote 2 to section 4. of this Appendix.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------14. Authorize the publication of advertisements, notices, or
proposals in newspapers, magazines, or other public periodicals as
required for the effective administration and operation of BMDO (44
U.S.C. 3702).
15. Request specific Military Departments and Defense Agencies
to serve as contracting activities for the BMDO, as necessary.
Dated: August 18, 1994.

SECDEF Rumsfeld Missile Defense Program Direction Documents
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGONWASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JAN

2 ID02MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSESECRETARIES OF THE MILITARYDEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINTCHIEFS OF STAFF UNDER SECRETARIESOF DEFENSEASSISTANT SECRETARIES Digitized
OF DEFENSE
byGoogleGENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT
DOCUMENT
OF
21
DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OPERATIONAL TEST AND
EVALUATIONCOMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANTCOMMANDSASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION &MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS OF THE
DEFENSE AGENCIESSUBJECT:

Missile Defense Program Direction

The Department last year conducted extensive
and rigorous missile defense reviews to determine
how best to fulfill the Nation's need to defend
the U.S., deployed forces, allies and friends. The
findings underscore the importance of layered
defenses as well as the need for new approaches toacquire and deploy missile defenses.
The attached provides my key priorities andspecific direction to execute the Missile Defense
Program. My objectives are:a. Establish a single program to develop an integrated system undera newly titled Missile Defense Agency (MDA).
b. Assign the best and brightest people to this work.
c. Apply a capability-based requirements process for missile defense.
d. Direct the MDA to develop the missile defense system andbaseline the capability and configuration of its elements and the Military
Departments to procure and provide for operation and support.

0

Ul8606 /01
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The full and cooperative efforts of theServices, Joint Staff, and defense agencies are
essential to this goal. I ask that you give yourfull support to this national priority. I will
look to the Senior Executive Council for oversightand recommendations for decision-making in thisarea.
Point of contact for this matter is Lieutenant
General Ronald Kadish, Director, Missile Defense
Agency,Attachment:AsstatedDigitized by

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21

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21
Missile Defense Program Direction
This document provides the Secretary of
Defense's priorities and guidance for the
Department's Missile Defense Program. The
following are the top four missile defense
priorities for the Department of Defense:a. First, to defend the U.S., deployed forces, allies, and friends.
b. Second, to employ a Ballistic Missile Defense System(BMDS) that layers defenses to intercept missiles in all phases of theirflight (i.e., boost, midcourse, and terminal) against all ranges of
threats.
c. Third, to enable the Services to field elements of the overall
BMDS as soon as practicable. To that end, we have started to deploy the
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system this year, after successful testing,as the first line of defense against short-range missiles.
d. Fourth, to develop and test technologies, use prototype and test
assets to provide early capability, if necessary, and improve theeffectiveness of deployed capability by inserting new technologies as they
become available or when the threat warrants an accelerated capability.

To enhance elevated national priority andmission emphasis, the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO) is hereby redesignated theMissile Defense Agency (MDA). The Director, MDA
will report directly to the Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)(USD (AT&L)).
To improve the leadership, management, andorganization of missile defense activities, I
direct the USD (AT&L) to take the following
actions:
a. Establish a single development program for all work needed todesign, develop, and test the elements of an integrated BMDS.
b. Develop for deployment, when directed, a useful militarycapability to detect, track, intercept, and defeat ballistic Digitized
missilesin allbyGoogleDOCUMENT
phases of flight against all ranges of threats. Improve the
21 BMD systemthrough incremental improvements and block upgrades to BMDS
elements over time.
c. Plan and execute work such that efforts in particular areas of the
BMDS may be truncated or stopped if the results are unsatisfactory or
where the development effort should be shifted to another integrated
BMDS element to permit its acceleration.

1

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d. Execute the program such that demonstrated 21
capabilities canbe fielded in limited numbers when available. Base production decisions
on the initial performance of the BMDS as demonstrated throughcredible testing, availability of system alternatives, and consideration of
threat evolution.
e. Adopt a flexible approach to the overall BMDS such that each
BMDS element complements the others, supports deployment in differing
combinations over time, and is open for international participation.

The special nature of missile defense
development, operations, and support calls fornon-standard approaches to both acquisition andrequirements generation. As a development
activity, the Missile Defense Agency will
require some expanded responsibility andauthority. I therefore direct the following:a. To rapidly carry out my direction, streamlined executive oversightand reporting will be implemented. The Senior Executive Council (SEC),
chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, will, in addition to other
responsibilities, provide policy, planning and programming guidance;oversee the Department's missile defense activities; and approve BMDS
fielding recommendations. The USD (AT&L) will establish a Missile Defense
Support Group (MDSG) of appointed department officials to advise the
Director, MDA and support SEC decision- making. The chairman of the
MDSG will report to USD (AT&L).
b. Management of the BMDS elements will consist of threephases: development, transition, and procurement and operations. The
recommendation by Director, MDA for a BMDS element to move to thetransition phase; and by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) to enter
the procurement phase will be approved by the SEC along with budget
and force structure levels.
c. To encourage flexible acquisition practices, I delegate to the
Director, MDA, authority to use transactions other than contracts, grants,
and cooperative agreements to carry out basic, applied, and advanced
research.
d. The Secretary, with input from the SEC, will decide whether to
use Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) assets for
emergency or contingency deployment, based on assessment ofmilitary utility, progress in development and recommendation by the
Director, MDA and Military Services.
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GoogleDOCUMENT21; ,e. The Director, MDA will manage the BMDS through thedevelopment and transition phases, and baseline the capability andconfiguration of its capability blocks and BMDS elements. The
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force will procure the BMDS
elements and provide, with the Defense
r.a<'l,\'.'/4, gencies, for their operation and support.

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21
f. The Djrector, MDA will work closely with the Commanders-InChief and Services throughout the development of the BMDS.
Production quantities and operational force levels will be settled earlyenough in the development for an effective transition of responsibility.
BMDS elements will enter the formal DoD acquisition cycle atMilestone C, concurrent with Service procurement responsibility
transfer. USD (AT&L) will oversee all Service missile defense
procurement phase activity.
g. Budgetjng for RDT&E is the responsibility of MDA; budgetingfor procurement is the responsibility of the Services.
h. The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), as a member of theMissile Defense Support Group, will ensure international participation
remains a key, long-term component of the missile defense program.
i. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial
Officer will develop within 120 days for the Deputy Secretary's approval,in coordination with the USD (AT&L) and the Director, MDA, a descriptionof how the Department's Planning, Programming and Budget Systemprocess will be tailored for the missile defense program. The process will
clarify the lines of authority, specific responsibilities and coordination
requirements consistent with the intent of the authorities andresponsibilities in this memorandum.
j. To reinforce the single-system focus, and to implement a
successful transition to capability-based management, the BMDS program
will not be subject to the traditional requirements generation process of
CJCSI 3170. The current Service missile defense Operational
Requirements Documents are not consistent with the proposed BMDS
development program objectives and are hereby cancelled. However, theDirector, MDA will establish a process that sets initial capability standards,
engages the participation of future users early and throughout
development, and permits capability trades across all BMDS elements.
MDA will manage through System Technical Objectives and Goals andduring the transition phase will baseline capabilities and configurations.
During transition, the Services will develop a capability-based Operational
Requirements Document (ORD) that will become operative upon transfer
of capabilities to the Services. Throughout development, the military
departments and the Joint Staff will provide guidance and advice ondesired capabilities, operational approaches, and suitability andsupportability features.
k. The Military Departments will provide forces, as needed, tosupport the fielding of early and/or contingency capability and will budget
the resources to procure and operate the planned force Digitized
structure.
ThebyGoogleDOCUMENT21

MDA will continue to fund3

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missiledefense capabilities and modifications to fieldedsystems.
1. The MDA is responsible for Developmental
Testing and Evaluation (DT&E) of the BMDS and its
elements. When a decision is made to transition a
block configuration of an element to a Service for
procurement and operation, an Operational Test
Agent will be designated and an Operational Testand Evaluation (OT&E) will be conducted at the endof the transition phase to characterize theoperational effectiveness and suitability of thatblock configuration of that element.
m. A DoD Force/Activity Designator (FAD) -1 priority is assigned for
the BMDS and its elements.
n. The MDA will be staffed with our most-talented people throughcompetitive nominations, selective personnel transfers, and recruitment.
The Service Secretaries will assist in this effort. The Department will
staff the MDA and program offices, both direct and matrix, at 100 percent
of authorized levels. The Director, MDA will be the final authority for all
personnel actions.
o. The Director, MDA will retain management responsibility fordefining the overall BMDS and the interoperability standards for programs
that transfer to the Services (e.g., Patriot Advanced Capability 3, NavyArea Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, and Medium Extended Air Defense
System). The Services will ensure such systems remain interoperable, as
defined by the Director, MDA, in the BMDS.
p. The Director, MDA will have all management authority andfunding responsibility for the Space Based Laser, Airborne Laser andSpace-Based Infrared System (Low) programs.
q. The Director, MDA will work with the designated Air ForceDoD Executive Agent for Space to develop a seamless process that
ensures close management, integration, and interoperability withexisting and planned space systems.

Additionally, to affirm my commitment torapidly capitalize on promising concepts andpromptly adjust program priorities, I request the
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Deputy Secretary of Defense to ensure21 thatdecision-making cycle times are as rapid as
possible for proposed executive decisions on
missile defense. I will support additional orrevised statutory authority as identified by the
Director, MDA, to reduce development time andenhance program success.
feld
"Q

•

l

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4

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will be planned without regard for compliancewith the ABM Treaty but no action will be takenthat would violate that treaty as required byparagraph. 3.1, DoD Directive 2060.1, dated
January 10, 2001.
DoD Directive 5134.9, the "Ballistic
Missile Defense Program," will be revised
within 90 days to implement this memorandum.
Regulations and Instructions of the military
departments and other departmental components
will be revised as needed within 120 days.

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21
THE

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENS E ..,001 l'f1',' ,...._1

1.1

1 n: S?

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGONWASHINGTON, DC 2030 1-3 0 10

ACTION MEMOAC QU ISIT ION ,TECHNOLOGYAND LOGISTICS

9 November 2001?°"

FOR: SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
FROM: Mr. E.C. "Pete" Aldridge,

Dep Sec Action_o)Yefewl'Acisition,C

1oTechnology & Logistic

2001

NOV
SUBJECT: Authorities and Responsibilities for Missile Defen ·•Sign the memorandum at TAB A which provides direction for the
Department to expeditiously implement the findings of your missile
defense review, including:•Establishment of a single development program to design, develop, andtest an integrated missile defense system under a newly titled Missile
Defense Agency(MDA).

•

Streamlined oversight/executive decision-making by Senior Executive Council.
Applying a capability-based requirements process for missile defense
development. Ta@ .foint Staff ?F d \21115 stwP.f rlOfl: cottearr@d with
1?xe:1aptigg
mi.i;i;ile defen e from th@ teffflul military 1eqttiremcttts pfocess. Rather ttiancJ;umge owr p1=oii1cb, I will ensure close Joint Staff and Service
participation through a Missile Defense Support Group, which willadvise the SEC.

••

Assigning to the MDA the responsibility to develop the missile defense
system and baseline the capability and configuration of its elements and to
the Military Departments the responsibility to procure and provide for
operation and support.

With your signature at TAB A, I will provide further implementing
guidance,
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DOCUMENT
RECOMMENDATION: SecDef sign at TAB A and approve
21 memorandum for USD(AT&L) to sign at TABB.
COORDINATION: SECNAVY, SECAF, SECARMY, CJCS, USD(P), GC (TAB C).
ATTACHMENTS: As stated, Prepared by Lt Gen Kadish, BMDOPROVED:DISAPPROVED:OTHER:_

U 18 606 /01

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21

November 10, 2001

Mr. Secretary:
There is one remaining critical issue that needs your decision before signing
this implementing document. It is the question on whether the Ballistic Missile
Defense System (BMDS) should follow the traditional military requirements
process. What thismeans is that the Military Departments and Joint Staff will
establish firm requirements for the performance of the BMDS against a specified
threat and have those requirements approved by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC). This would be the performance required before the
BMDS deployment would be authorized. I would observe that this process works
for a specific syste like an F-22, a space communication system or anarmored vehicle, but is less appropriate for a system of systems like BMDS.
What we have proposed for the BMDS, and reflected in the implementation memo,
is a••capabilities based" approach. As the technologies mature and individual missile
defense systems become integrated, BMDO will tell us what capability they canprovide against a variety of threats. We will then decide whether this capability isworthy of deployment. The Senior Executive Council will provide that advice to you
and the President for a deployment decision.
Only tJw brm,-nntl the Joint Staff are opposed to this approach.

approve the "capabilities based" process, lementing memo as
is.

E. C. Aldridge, Jr.

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21

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The full and cooperative efforts of the Services,
Joint Staff, and defense
agencies are essential to this goal. I ask that you give
your full support to this"national priority. I will look to the Senior Executive Council
for oversight and ,i\ecowv11••e...,J'.>Jrot1_.J decision-making inthis area.
Point of contact for this matter is Lieutenant
General Ronald Kadish, Director, Missile Defense
Agency,Attachment:AsstatedDigitized by

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21

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21

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DOCUMENT
301 0 DEFENSE PENTAGON21

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

ACQUISITION,TECHNOLOGYAND LOGISTICSMEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARYDEPARTMENTS ATTN: SERVICEACQUISITION EXECUTIVESSUBJECT: Ballistic Missile Defense Program
Implementation Guidance This memorandum
provides my guidance to implement thedirection
Secretary Rumsfeld provided in his memorandum ofNovember 1, 2001, subject:"Missile Defense Program Direction." Secretary
Rumsfeld restated the Nation's need forestablishing effective, layered defenses against
ballistic missiles and established theDepartment's missile defense program as a toppriority. He assigned responsibility for the
program to the Director, Missile Defense Agency(MDA) and tasked all Departmental components withhelping to ensure the program's success.
To implement the Secretary's direction:
a. I direct the Director, MDA to set up and carry out a single program ofresearch and development work to develop the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS). The BMDS program shall use a system-level
management structure that integrates work and enables capability trades
among BMDS elements and decisive action in response to program
events.
b. I hereby assign responsibility and delegate full authority to the
Director, MDA as follows:(1) Responsibility to plan and execute an evolutionary,capabilityDigitized by

Googlebased acquisition approach focused on developing and deploying
DOCUMENT
missile defense capability as soon as practical.

21(2) Responsibility to assure the operational suitability andsupportability of fielded capability, baseline the system capability andconfiguration, conduct developmental testing and evaluation, conduct
initial capability-based operational testing and evaluation, and provide asound basis for production decisions.

0

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21(3) Responsibility to conduct technology development activity anddecide on missile defense applications, obtain the guidance and advice of
the warfighter community on desired operational features and approaches
to system deployment, and provide tools to enable further development ofoperational approaches.
(4) Authority for program direction and execution at the operating
management level. This shall include authority to tailor the application of
DoD 5000 provisions, decide acquisition strategy, make programcommitments and terminations, conduct source selections and award
contracts, analyze performance and make affordability tradeoffs, anddocument the BMDS program of work and report progress. The
traditional Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) and Integrated Product Team
processes will not apply to the BMDS program during the development
phase. Upon a recommendation from the Director, MDA and approval fromthe Senior Executive Council (SEC) for a BMDS element to enter thetransition phase, USD (AT&L) will establish necessary product teams to
support a subsequent Milestone C decision by the DAB.
(5) Authority to set up and carry out special access program
activities to protect sensitive information, applying adequate procedures
to maintain security.
c. Given the early stage of BMDS overall development andelement integration, I have determined that the BMDS elements are in anon- Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) status. I direct the
preparation of termination Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) for these
BMDS elements until such time as they reach MDAP status.
d. To assist the Director, MDA in managing the BMDS program
and the SEC in executive decision making on missile defense, I will forma Missile Defense Support Group (MDSG) of designated senior experts
from selected Department staffs. I will provide further guidance on the
responsibilities of this group in separate correspondence.
e. The Director, MDA, working with the Services, shall develop atransition plan (to include resources, contracting, personnel, facilities, etc.)
for the BMDS elements transferring into, or out of, MDA responsibility.
f. The National DX priority is assigned for all BMDS
industrial acquisition activities including those activities executedby the Services.

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21

2

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21
Because of the special nature and priority of
the BMDS program, it is important to implement a
disciplined acquisition approach. The Director,
MDA shall submit for my review a draft program
implementation plan within 60 days to address thefollowing:a. program structure with funding allocations;b. technical and program management structure (to include
organizational changes and program transfer realignments);
c. planned program documentation and reporting;d. personnel ceiling adjustments including adjustments ofFederally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC)
staff-year ceilings or reallocation to the MDA of sufficient FFRDC staffyears of technical effort required for the BMDS program;e. selective staffing procedures and service support;
f. Service interfaces;g. OSD and Joint Staff interfaces;
h. approach to test and evaluation; andi. transition plan for each program transferring into, or out of,
MDA responsibility.

The MDSG will review this implementation
plan and provide their advice to the Director,
MDA and USD (AT&L) before SEC final approval.

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21

3

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COORDINATION SUMMARY
Secretary of the
Navy

Mr.
EnglandOctober
2, 2001
ConcurSecretary of
the Air Force

Mr.
Roche

October 12,
2001 Concur with comments

•
•
•
•

Endorses the streamlined ac;quisition of a missile defense capability.
Agrees that capability-based acquisition demands flexibility to beeffective but believes the acquisition flexibility can still be achieved byworking from JROC- validated requirements.
Supports the establishment of the Missile Defense Support Group.
Recommends the Director, MDA work with the Air Force DoD Executive
Agent to develop a process to ensure close management, integration andinteroperability with existing and planned space systems. The following
bullet was added to the memorandum:

The Director, MDA shall work with thedesignated Air Force DoD Executive Agent forSpace to develop a seamless process that
ensures close management, integration, andinteroperability with existing and planned
space systems.
Secretary of the Army

•

•
•
•
•

Mr. McDonald October22, 2001 Dep. Under
Secy
Comments

Supports call for non-standard approaches to both acquisition andrequirements generation but believes that the requirements development
process defined in CJCSI 3170 should remain in effect for missile _defense
capabilities.
Recommends USD (AT&L) retain the milestone decision authority for
MDA programs.
States perception that there is no Service involvement in personnel
management.
Raises the issue that systems returned to the Services must be full
funded and executable.
Recommends that a working group comprised of Service and Defense
Agency representatives convene to address implementation
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GoogleDOCUMENTThe issues addressed notably modify the flexibility
21sought under the proposed BMDS approach.
Therefore,
no changes to the SECDEF memorandum are recommended
as a result of these comments.

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GoogleChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
LTG Abizaid
Acting Dir,
Joint Staff••

DOCUMENT
21 October
13, 2001
Non Concur

Contests exemption from traditional military requirements (CJCSI 3170) andinsists the MDA will work through the JROC process.
Nonconcurs with portions of the plan they perceive as conflicting with the
Defense Planning Guidance that directs JTAMDO to construct theoperational concept and operational architecture for the Department's
missile defense program. States that JTAMDO, as the interface on missile
defense matters for the Joint Staff, has the responsibility to:• Assess potential military utility during development and characterize
operational effectiveness and suitability during the transition phase.
• Define the overall architecture and interoperability standards for the
missile defense system elements.
• Lead the collaborative process with the combatant commands andServices to produce a unified view of ballistic missile defense
operational requirements and priorities.
• Serve as the single voice to MDA for missile defense requirements andoperational priorities and as the single proponent for BMD elements andsystem performance objectives during research, development, test andevaluation.

The position taken would depart from thecapability-based approach to BMDS development andsignificantly alter the flexibility sought.
Therefore, no changes to the SECDEF memorandum arerecommended as a result of these comments.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy•••

Mr. Feith
October 10,
2001 Concur with comments

Recommends adding language to the Secretary's fourth priority directingthat there be sufficient test assets and plans for an emergency capability
Recommends coordination with USD (P) to ensure international
participation remains a key, long-term component of the missile
defense system.
Recommends language to clarify timing of the various phases of the missile
defense program for baseline capability and configuration, production
quantities and operational force levels and initial capability standards.
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We added language and a bullet to the SECDEF
21
memorandum modifying the fourth priority
accordingly and highlighting their participation in
the Missile Defense Support Group to focus oninternational concerns. Wording was revised toclarify activities during the various programphases.
General Counsel ofthe Department/

i?,"iP: .n Se

Mr. Haynes

October, 2001
Concur - withcomments

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Recommends clarification to consistently describe an RDT&E program
to develop a single BMDS with integral system elements that are nolonger stand-alone MDAP programs.
Raises legal concerns regarding non-MDAP status of the BMDS
elements.
Recommends clarification to provide that operational testing for
BMDS elements will occur in accordance with statutory andregulatory requirements.
Suggests wording preferences to alleviate these concerns.

Suggestions have been incorporated and are notbelieved to alter the planned approach.