Geraghty v. Jackson Local School District Board of Education et alDoc. 62

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIOEASTERN DIVISIONVIVIAN GERAGHTY,

Case No.: 5:22-cv-02237
Plaintiff,-vs-

JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

JACKSON LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTBOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
ORDER

OPINIONAND

Before the Court are cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed on February 14, 2024, byDefendants Jackson Local School District Board of Education (“the Board”), Christopher DiLoreto(“DiLoreto”), Monica Myers (“Myers”), and Kacy Carter (“Carter”) and by Plaintiff Vivian Geraghty(“Geraghty”). (Doc. Nos. 46, 52.) Both parties filed Oppositions to each other’s Motions (Doc. Nos.
54, 57) and Replies in Support of their own Motions. (Doc. Nos. 58, 59.)
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the parties’
cross Motions for Summary Judgment.
I.

BackgroundA.

Factual Background1.

Geraghty’s Hiring and the 2022 Academic YearIn August 2020, the Jackson Local School District (“the District”) hired Geraghty as a longterm substitute teacher at Jackson Memorial Middle School. (Doc. No. 48 (Geraghty Depo.) at
PageID# 1067.) Geraghty worked as a substitute teacher through the 2020 to 2021 academic year.
(Id. at PageID# 1068.) At the end of the 2021 academic year, Geraghty interviewed for a full-timeteacher position at the District, and the District hired her to teach seventh-grade English Language

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Arts. (Id. at PageID# 1068, 1073.) Geraghty taught English through the 2021 to 2022 academic year.
(Id. at PageID# 1076.) She received a positive review at the end of the year. (Id. at PageID# 107677.)
For students, the 2022 to 2023 academic year began on Monday, August 16, 2022. (Id. at
PageID# 1079.) That year, Geraghty taught three English Language Arts sections. (Id. at PageID#
1080.) Each of these sections had different students, but the classroom instruction was the same foreach section. (Id. at PageID# 1081.)
On the first day of class, two of Geraghty’s students—whom the Court will refer to as “Student
A” and “Student B”—asked that Geraghty refer to them using names different from their names on
the school’s roster. 1 (Id. at PageID# 1104, 1106.) Geraghty understood at the time that Student A’s
request was part of the student’s social transition. (Id. at PageID# 1104-05.) As for Student B,
Geraghty had received background information before the first day of class from one of Student B’steachers from the prior year that Student B was “wanting to transition.” (Id. at PageID# 1106.)
Either that first day of class or the following day, Geraghty went to speak with a fellow teacher
and mentor, Ramey Mason (“Mason”), about the students. (Id. at PageID# 1121.) Geraghty told
Mason that two of her students “want[ed] to be called by a different name.” (Doc. No. 48-2 (Mason
Decl.), PageID# 1323.) Geraghty explained that she disagreed with the students’ requests because ofher religious beliefs. (Id.) During the conversation, Geraghty told Mason that “[she] want[ed] thosestudents out of [her] classroom.” (Id.) Geraghty meant this “as an accommodation for [the] students”

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The Court will refer to the students’ requested names as their “preferred names” and their given names as their “rosterednames.”

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(Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1122), but the statement “shocked” Mason. (Mason Decl. at PageID#
1323.)On Monday, August 22, 2022, at 12:52 p.m., Student A sent Geraghty an email with thesubject “Using my name in class,” which read as follows:
Hello, Miss Geraghty
I’m emailing you because I prefer to go by [preferred name] instead of [rosteredname], I know it’s the start of the school year and it’s hard to remember names, but
I’d really appreciate it if you called me [preferred name]. Thank you for your time.
Kind regards, [Student A](Doc. No. 48-1, PageID# 1316.) Geraghty did not respond to Student A’s email. (Geraghty Depo. at
PageID# 1112.) And she continued using the student’s rostered name in class. (Id.) Geraghty saw
that Student A “looked uncomfortable” when she used Student A’s rostered name. (Id. at PageID#
1114.) Geraghty testified that she “was equally uncomfortable . . . because [she] didn’t want to dosomething that was damaging to [Student A] and [she] also didn’t want to violate [her] religious
beliefs.” (Id.)
On Wednesday, August 24, 2022, Student A sent a request to see a school counselor. (Doc.
No. 48-1, at PageID# 1318.) The student wrote that the reason for the request was “[o]ne of myteachers dead-naming me all the time in class.” (Id.)
The following day, Student A’s counselor, Christopher Tracy (“Tracy”), sent an email to allof Student A’s teachers that year, including Geraghty. (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1116.) The
subject was “Student A” and the email read:Hey all!
I’m not sure if everyone/anyone was aware, but I just met Student A today. He istransitioning, and actually goes by [preferred name]. So, he would prefer to be called[preferred name] in class!
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He also goes by he/him/his pronouns as well.
Sorry this is coming a week and a half late or if he’s already spoke to you about this.
I literally just met him and found this out.
Thanks everyone!
(Doc. No. 48-1, PageID# 1319.) Geraghty interpreted the email to be a directive since, generally,teachers would follow counselors’ guidance about students. (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1117.)
Geraghty knew that she “could not continue at this point calling [Student A] by [Student A’s] legalname and [she] wanted to reach a solution on what could be done instead.” (Id. at PageID# 112425.) So, she decided to meet with Carter, the middle school principal, “to seek an accommodation sothat students would not continue to feel uncomfortable.” (Id. at PageID# 1084, 1125.)
1.

The First Meeting

On Friday, August 26, 2022, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Geraghty met with Carter. (Id. at
PageID# 1125.) The meeting lasted between 10 and 15 minutes. (Id. at PageID# 1126.) Geraghty
explained that two of her students asked her to call them by their preferred names as part of theirsocial transition. (Id.) She further explained that she received an email from one of the student’s
counselors about the student’s preferred name and pronouns. (Doc. No. 55 (Carter Depo.), PageID#
3073.) She told Carter that her religious conviction would not allow her to agree to their requests.
(Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1126.) Carter responded that “if the pronouns are the issue, . . . there
are instances where you just don’t use pronouns.” (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3074.) According toGeraghty, she “generally agree[d]” with this statement. (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1126.) But
Carter remembered Geraghty responding that “she still wouldn’t be comfortable using preferrednames or preferred pronouns because she would know what was behind it.” (Carter Depo. at PageID#43074.) Both agreed that the meeting ended with Carter agreeing to “look into it further” and to then“get back” with Geraghty. (Id.) Geraghty left the first meeting “feeling that . . . everything was going
to be okay.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1129.)
After the meeting, Carter called Myers (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3097), the District’s directorof curriculum, instruction, and assessment. (Doc. No. 56 (Myers Depo.), PageID# 3258.) Carter
briefly recapped his conversation with Geraghty, and Myers responded that she was going to go to
Carter’s office to speak with him in person. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3098.) As she was leaving thebuilding, Myers told DiLoreto, the District’s superintendent, that she was headed to the middle school
to meet with Carter. (Myers Depo. at PageID# 3319.)
Myers met Carter in his office around 10:00 a.m. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3098.) They
spoke for 10 to 20 minutes about Carter’s previous meeting with Geraghty. (Id. at PageID# 3320.)
Around this time 2, Carter went to speak with Student A’s and Student B’s counselors. (Carter Depo.
at PageID# 3077.) He first spoke with Student B’s counselor, Joni Craver (“Craver”). (Id. at PageID#
3078.) Craver explained that Student B had made name requests in past school years, but she was
not certain if Student B had made a request this year. (Id. at PageID# 3078-79.) Craver said Student
B’s mother was aware of and supported Student B’s social transition. (Id. at PageID# 3079.)
Carter next spoke to Tracy, Student A’s counselor. (Id. at PageID# 3081.) They discussed
the email that Tracy had sent about Student A to Geraghty and Student A’s other teachers. (Id.) Tracy
relayed that a parent was aware and supportive of Student A’s social transition. (Id. at PageID# 3082.)
Carter then returned to his office and filled in Myers on what each counselor had said about the2Carter could not remember whether he called Myers before or after speaking with the counselors. (Carter Depo. at
PageID# 3097.) Myers remembered Carter leaving his office to speak with the counselors while she was there. (Myers
Depo. at PageID# 3322.)

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students. (Myers Depo. at PageID# 3324.) Myers and Carter decided they needed to speak with
Geraghty further to “understand better how to move forward” and to “find out all the details.” (Carter
Depo. at PageID# 3098-99.) So, a short time after 10:00 a.m., Carter called Geraghty to his office
for a second meeting. (Id. at PageID# 3101.)
2.

The Second Meeting

Carter began the second meeting by asking Geraghty to share her concerns with Myers.
(Myers Depo. at PageID# 3327.) Geraghty restated her concerns about the two students in her classand the use of their preferred names. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3102.) Carter offered Geraghty an
example of how she may be able to work through her concerns. (Id.) He explained that his son isnamed John but goes by Jack, and that calling his son Jack is no different than using a student’s
preferred name. (Id.) Geraghty responded that she would still know that behind the student’s
preferred name was a social transition, and thus, based on her religious beliefs, she could not use thestudent’s preferred name. (Myers Depo. at PageID# 3328.) Myers then asked Geraghty, “[w]ell, . . .
what are your beliefs?” (Id.) Geraghty responded that she was “apostolic Pentecostal.” (Doc. No.
52-15, PageID# 2842.) And she explained that she was taught that there are males and females andthat the use of preferred names and pronouns contrary to those sexes is against her beliefs. (Myers
Depo. at PageID# 3328.) Myers responded that if Geraghty “wouldn’t comply to use the student’s
preferred names it was going to be a problem.” (Doc. No. 52-15, PageID# 2842.) From this point,
Carter’s, Myers’s, and Geraghty’s accounts of the meeting differ.
Carter testified that Geraghty said something to the effect that she thinks students at the middle
school age are too young to make the decision about social transition, and that it is an adult’s job toguide them. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3102.) Carter and Myers expressed that the District “want[s]6to be supportive of our students.” (Id.) They then ended the meeting by saying that they “think
everybody needs to think about [this] a little more” and had Geraghty return to her class. (Id. at
PageID# 3103.)
Myers testified that she tried to reiterate to Geraghty that the District has “lots of kids thathave preferred names and [Geraghty] didn’t have to use pronouns.” (Meyers Depo. at PageID# 3329.)
Carter also chimed in and said, “there are ways around it,” and Geraghty could “just not use[pronouns]” and instead “just use the [student’s] preferred name.” (Id.) According to Myers, she andCarter told Geraghty that they had to “think on this” and told Geraghty to go back to her classroom.
(Id.)
According to Geraghty, after she explained her religious beliefs to Carter and Myers and told
them that her beliefs are “something that [she’s] unwavering on,” Myers asked Geraghty if she “knewthat taking this stand would count as insubordination.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1130.) Myers
told Geraghty that she “should be prepared to draw [her] line in the sand if that is the conviction[she’s] going to stand behind.” (Id.) Carter and Myers then dismissed her from the office. (Id.)
After Geraghty left, Carter and Myers spoke among themselves for a short time, trying to lookat the issue from all perspectives. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3106.) In Carter’s mind, “the feeling . . .
was that [Geraghty] would need to use preferred names.” (Id. at PageID# 3114.) Around 10:46 a.m.,
Carter asked an assistant principal to cover Geraghty’s class and called Geraghty back for a third
meeting. (Id. at PageID# 3110.)
3.

The Third Meeting

The accounts of Geraghty, Myers, and Carter concerning this third meeting also differ.

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According to Geraghty, the third meeting began with Myers asking her if she was willing tocall students by their preferred names. (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1136.) Geraghty responded that
she would not. (Id.) Carter then told Geraghty, “If that is your final decision, then we need a letterof resignation effective today.” (Id.)
Carter and Myers recalled that the third meeting began with Myers asking Geraghty if she had
had time to think about the situation and the “work-arounds” discussed during the second meeting
and whether “she had an opportunity to rethink her position on the use of names.” (Carter Depo. at
PageID# 3110; Myers Depo. at PageID# 3337; Doc. No. 52-15, PageID# 2842.) Geraghty reiterated
that she would not use the students’ preferred names and pronouns because “she felt like that was
lying.” (Myers Depo at PageID# 3337.) Myers responded that it was not their job to “impose [their]
personal views upon children but to support children.” (Id.) At some point, Geraghty asked about
her rights. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3111.) Carter and Myers responded that they “were going toaccommodate the students.” (Id.) Geraghty repeated that she would not use preferred names andpronouns. (Myers Depo. at PageID# 3337.) Myers then said, “That’s going to be problematic” andasked Geraghty whether she was “really prepared to draw that line in the sand.” (Id. at PageID#
3337-38, 3345-46.) Geraghty responded, “I don’t think I can work for Jackson anymore. I guess I’ll
resign.” 3 (Id. at PageID# 3346.) Myers told Geraghty, “If you’re going to resign, then I need a letter.”
(Id.)

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Carter testified that these statements occurred in a slightly different order. According to him, Geraghty first said thatshe did not think that she could work at the District anymore, then Myers made the “line in the sand” remark, and then
Geraghty offered her resignation. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3111.) During her deposition, Myers first recounted theevents in the order that Carter did in his deposition, but she later clarified that she made the “line in the sand” statement
before Geraghty said she could not work at the school anymore. (Compare Myers Depo. at PageID# 3337-38, with Myers
Depo. at PageID# 3345-46.)

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All agreed that Carter and Myers asked Geraghty if she preferred to handwrite or type her
resignation. (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1136.) If she wanted to type it, they offered to get her alaptop to do so. (Id.) Geraghty asked to type her resignation. (Id.) Carter offered Geraghty his
laptop. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3111.) Geraghty took the laptop into a room adjoining Carter’s
office, sat at a table, and began typing her resignation letter. (Id.)
Myers checked in on Geraghty a few times to make sure she was okay. (Myers Depo. at
PageID# 3338-39.) Geraghty finished her letter and brought the laptop back to Carter. (Carter Depo.
at PageID# 3112.) Carter and Myers then reviewed the letter and stated it “could be printed andsigned.” (Doc. No. 52-15, PageID# 2843.) Carter printed two copies of the letter, and he explainedthat one copy would go the District’s central office and the other copy was for her records. (Carter
Depo. at PageID# 3112.) Geraghty addressed her letter to the District’s superintendent, DiLoreto.
(Doc. No. 48-2, PageID# 1330.) In pertinent part, the letter reads as follows:
Please accept this letter as a notice of my resignation from Jackson Local Schools asa teacher. This letter is effective August 26, 2022.
This is due to irreconcilable differences between myself and the Jackson Local School
District. At the beginning of the 2022/23 school year, I was asked to conform tostudents’ gender identities that opposed my religious beliefs. Unequivocally andunapologetically, I will not do so. . . .
I have enjoyed my time working at the Jackson Local School District and am saddened
that I have been asked to resign over this issue. While this is not the result that I was
hoping for in this issue, as I sincerely enjoyed my job, it was an easy decision to makein resigning. . . .
(Id.)
After Carter gave Geraghty one of the copies of her letter, Myers told her that she needed tocollect her keys and laptop. (Myers Depo. at PageID# 3339.) Geraghty responded that they were inher classroom. (Id.) Myers said she would walk with Geraghty to her class. (Id.) Geraghty asked to9wait until the class change so that she would not run into anyone in the hallways while walking to herclassroom. (Id.)
Once the bell rang for the next class period, Myers and Geraghty walked together toGeraghty’s classroom. (Id. at PageID# 3340.) Geraghty gave Myers her laptop and gathered up her
things. (Id.) It looked like too much for Geraghty to carry herself, so Myers radioed Carter for help.
(Id.) The three of them then walked Geraghty to her car. (Id. at PageID# 3340-41.) Once atGeraghty’s car, Myers asked Geraghty if she was okay. (Id. at PageID# 3341.) Geraghty responded
that she was fine and drove off. (Id.)
4.

After the Resignation

On Friday, after Geraghty left the middle school, Carter and Myers called DiLoreto to let him
know what had transpired. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3174.) DiLoreto asked Myers to bring him
Geraghty’s resignation. (Doc. No. 47 (DiLoreto Depo.) at PageID# 910.) Di Loreto then called Keith
Kohmann (“Kohmann”), the union vice president, to advise him that Geraghty had resigned. (Id. at
PageID# 914.) On either that Friday or on Saturday, Kohmann called Deidre Disman (“Disman”),
the union president, and told her that Geraghty had resigned over a “gender identity issue.” (Id. at
PageID# 1864-65.) After speaking with Kohmann, Disman called DiLoreto and asked to meet withhim and Myers on Monday morning. (Id. at PageID# 1869.)
Later Friday evening, Myers texted Carter, “Just can’t seem to shake today. Kinda feel bad
but I know it had to happen or would have eventually…” (Doc. No. 52-2, PageID# 2317.) Carter
responded, “I’m the same way. I don’t think there was any coaching through that one. Every analogy
I gave was not what she wanted to hear. Ultimately it just wasn’t a fit.” (Id. at PageID# 2313.) Myersthen replied, “Yeah. Kinda sad but what had to happen.” (Id.)
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On Sunday, August 28, 2022, Geraghty sent an email to Disman, Kohmann, and the middle
school union representatives. 4 (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1148.) She wrote that she “brought a
concern to [Carter] and was forced to resign within two hours of the concern being raised.” (Doc.
No. 48-2, PageID# 1331.) And “[t]he concern was rooted in sincerely held religious convictions overaffirming (or not affirming) students’ chosen gender identity.” (Id.) She admitted that she “should’ve
had union representation with [her],” but did not think to ask in the moment. (Id.) She then listed aseries of questions, including, “Were my rights violated?” (Id.)
On Sunday, after receiving Geraghty’s email, Disman called Geraghty. (Disman Depo. at
PageID# 1871.) Disman asked Geraghty to go through what had happened on Friday. (Id. at PageID#
1877.) According to Disman, she asked Geraghty what outcome she was looking for. (Id.) Geraghty
repeated that she did not want to call the students by what they were identifying as. (Id.) Then
Disman told Geraghty that since the Board’s meeting was not until next month, she could “get[Geraghty’s] resignation pulled and then [they] could work on [the issue.]” (Id.) Disman asked
Geraghty whether she could “call [the students] by their last name until [she] get[s] this figured out.”(Id.) Geraghty responded that no, she would not use the students’ last names. (Id. at PageID# 1879.)
So, Disman again asked Geraghty what outcome she was looking for. (Id. at PageID# 1880.)
Geraghty answered that, “[s]he would like those students removed from the classroom.” (Id.) Disman
said the District cannot do that, and she asked Geraghty “what do you want me to fight for . . . because. . . right now I want to fight for your job, and then we can figure this out as we go.” (Id.) According
to Disman, Geraghty replied that “[s]he [didn’t] want her job” and “didn’t want to teach.” (Id.)

4
Once Geraghty was hired on as a full-time teacher, she was a member of the teachers’ collective bargaining unit.
(Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1068-69.)

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Disman ended the call by telling Geraghty that she would have a union attorney reach out to her andthat she was meeting with DiLoreto and Myers on Monday. (Id. at PageID# 1884.)
Geraghty remembered Disman’s phone call differently. First, she testified that she first spokewith Disman on Monday, after Disman had met with Myers and DiLoreto, not on Sunday. (Geraghty
Depo. at PageID# 1149.) Second, she testified that Disman told her that she could get her resignation
rescinded, but only if Geraghty called the students by what they were asking to be called. (Id. at
PageID# 1150.)
On Monday, August 29, 2022, at approximately 7:00 a.m., DiLoreto, Myers, Disman, andKohmann met in DiLoreto’s office. (DiLoreto Depo. at PageID# 916, 918.) Disman told the others
that she had spoken with Geraghty on Sunday. (Disman Depo. at PageID# 1891.) And she said that
she told Geraghty that she could “get her resignation pulled, but [Geraghty] declined.” (Id.) Dismanstated that she was confused why Geraghty even reached out to her if she did not want her job back.
(Myers Depo. at PageID# 3355-56.) DiLoreto responded that he “[a]bsolutely” would rescind
Geraghty’s resignation if she was willing to come and talk through what had happened. (DiLoretoDepo. at PageID# 919.) He added that nothing was over until the board took action on Geraghty’s
resignation. (Id. at PageID# 921.) The meeting ended with Disman agreeing to reach back out toGeraghty to see if she had changed her mind. (Disman Depo. at PageID# 1894.)
A few hours after the meeting, DiLoreto sent Geraghty an email titled “Resignation” that readas follows:
I am writing to inform you I am in receipt of your correspondence of August 26, 2022,
as well as a follow up text message to Kacy Carter confirming your resignation from
employment on that same date. On behalf of the School Board, I have accepted that
resignation effective as of the end of business, August 26, 2022.

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(Doc. No. 15-1.) DiLoreto did not discuss this email with Disman before sending it to Geraghty.
(DiLoreto Depo. at PageID# 925.)
Later that week, Disman called Geraghty to let her know that a union attorney would becontacting her. (Disman Depo. at PageID# 1897-98.) During the call, Disman asked Geraghty
whether there was “still a way that [she] [could] pull [Geraghty’s] resignation,” but Geraghty
responded that “she wasn’t interested in that.” (Id. at PageID# 1898.)
5.

The District’s Policy

After Geraghty filed this lawsuit, Christopher Goff (“Goff”), the president of the Board,published a letter to the community that read, in pertinent part, that the District “does not have a‘policy’ regarding our teachers and the gender identity of students.” (Doc. No. 52-17, PageID# 2913.)
DiLoreto, Myers, and Carter all similarly testified about the District’s lack of a policy on gender
identity.
DiLoreto testified that there is no board policy obligating the District to use a student’s
preferred name. (DiLoreto Depo. at PageID# 866, 879, 990.) Rather, he described it as the District’s“practice” to address a student consistent with their request. (Id. at PageID# 884.)
Myers testified that using a student’s preferred pronouns and preferred name is an “informal”
and “implied” practice at the District. (Myers Depo. at PageID# 3302, 3314.) And she stated thatthe practice is not necessarily “mandatory.” (Id.)
Carter testified that the District does not have a “policy” on using preferred names andpronouns. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3033.) Instead, he described it as a “practice” to “honor students’requests for preferred names.” (Id.) And “[t]eachers, staff members, [and] administrators” across theDistrict recognized this practice. (Id. at PageID# 3034.)
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Additionally, Mason testified that while teachers attended periodic trainings through the year,
none of those had any discussion of gender identity. (Doc. No. 49 (Mason Depo.), PageID# 177576.) Mason described the District’s practice on the use of students’ preferred names to be “justunderstood.” (Id. at PageID# 1776.)
B.

Procedural History

On December 12, 2022, Geraghty filed a Verified Complaint against Defendants together witha Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. Nos. 1, 2.) In her Complaint, Geraghty brings five causesof action. The first four are under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allege free speech retaliation in violation of
the First Amendment; compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment; a violation of her First
Amendment right to freely exercise her religion; and a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment due to the District’s allegedly vague and overbroad policy regarding thesocial transition of students. (Doc. No. 1, ¶ 138-183.) Geraghty’s fifth cause of action alleges aviolation of her right to freely exercise her religion under Article 1, Section 7, of the Ohio
Constitution. (Id. at ¶ 184-192.)
On January 25, 2022, after a short extension, Defendants filed an Answer to Geraghty’sComplaint and an Opposition to her Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. Nos. 13, 14.) On
February 1, 2023, Geraghty filed a Reply in support of her Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (Doc.
No. 15.)On February 6, 2023, the Court conducted a telephone conference with the parties’ leadcounsel. (Doc. No. 16.) The parties agreed to mediate the case before the assigned magistrate judge.
(Id.) In the event the parties were unable to resolve the case, the Court set an evidentiary hearing on
Geraghty’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction for April 13, 2023. (Id.)
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On March 3, 2023, Geraghty filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. (Doc. No. 21.) The District agreed that it “would employ Ms. Geraghty as a long-term
substitute at the elementary level during the pendency of this litigation in exchange for Plaintiff’s
withdrawal of her Motion for Preliminary Injunction without prejudice.” (Id. at PageID# 468.)
The parties continued to mediate the remainder of the case with the magistrate judge, but they
were unable to reach a complete resolution. (Doc. No. 25.) So, on April 25, 2023, the Court held a
Case Management Conference and set case deadlines. (Doc. Nos. 31, 32.) The parties requested toextend these deadlines several times, which the Court granted. (Doc. Nos. 34, 40, 42, 43.)
On February 14, 2024, the parties filed their respective Motions for Summary Judgment.
(Doc. Nos. 46, 52.) On March 15, 2024, they filed Oppositions to each other’s Motions. (Doc. Nos.
54, 57.) And on March 28 and 29, 2024, they filed Replies in support of their own Motions. (Doc.
Nos. 58, 59.)
On August 2, 2024, Defendants filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority, advising the Courtof two recent decisions: Parents Defending Educ. v. Olentangy Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2024
U.S. App. LEXIS 18634 (6th Cir. July 29, 2024), and Kluge v. Brownsburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 2024
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78340 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 30, 2024). (Doc. No. 60.) On August 7, 2024, Geraghty
timely filed a Response to Defendants’ Notice. (Doc. No. 61.)
II.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A
dispute is ‘genuine’ only if based on evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict infavor of the non-moving party.” Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d 479, 487 (6th Cir.
15

2006). “Thus, ‘the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will
be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.’”
Cox v. Kentucky Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). A fact is “material” only “if its resolution might affect theoutcome of the suit under the governing substantive law.” Henderson, 469 F.3d at 487.
At the summary judgment stage, “[a] court should view the facts and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Pittman v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 901 F.3d 619,
628 (6th Cir. 2018). In addition, “the moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there isno genuine dispute of material fact.” Ask Chems., LP v. Comput. Packages, Inc., 593 F. App’x 506,
508 (6th Cir. 2014). The moving party may satisfy this initial burden by “identifying those parts of
the record which demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.” Lindsey v. Whirlpool
Corp., 295 F. App’x 758, 764 (6th Cir. 2008). “[I]f the moving party seeks summary judgment on anissue for which it does not bear the burden of proof at trial,” the moving party may also “meet its
initial burden by showing that ‘there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s
case.’” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). Once the moving party
satisfies its burden, “the burden shifts to the non-moving party who must then point to evidence that
demonstrates that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial.” Ask Chems., 593 F. App’x at
508-09. “[T]he nonmoving party may not simply rely on its pleading, but must ‘produce evidence
that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by a jury.’” MISC Berhad v. Advanced Polymer
Coatings, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 731, 736 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (quoting Cox, 53 F.3d at 150).
Here, the parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment. “Each party, as a movant
for summary judgment, bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists
16and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Peters v. DCL Medical Laboratories, LLC,
305 F.Supp.3d 799, 814 (S.D. Ohio 2018). “The fact that one party fails to satisfy that burden on its
own Rule 56 motion does not automatically indicate that the opposing party has satisfied the burden
and should be granted summary judgment on the other motion.” Id. Rather, in reviewing crossmotions for summary judgment, the court should “evaluate each motion on its own merits and viewall facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Wiley v. United States,
20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1994). The standard of review for cross motions for summary judgment
does not differ from the standard applied when a motion is filed by one party to the litigation. See
Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991).
III.

Law and Analysis
A.

Initial Matters

Defendants raise two issues that the Court will analyze before the parties’ Motions for
Summary Judgment.
1.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

First, Defendants argue that Geraghty is subject to a collective bargaining agreement that
required her to initiate a grievance process, which she did not do. (Doc. No. 46-1, PageID# 590.)
Defendants contend that Geraghty is trying to “circumvent” the grievance process by pleading hercase as a section 1983 action, but, in substance, her Complaint “seeks relief only available throughher collective bargaining agreement.” (Id. at PageID# 590-91.) Since she did not initiate thegrievance process, Defendants argue that Geraghty’s claims fail as a matter of law. (Id. at PageID#
592.)

17

Geraghty responds that she “seeks relief that any public employee, including an at-will
employee, could seek” and that “to the extent a public employee collective bargaining agreement
seeks to impose an exhaustion requirement in order to vindicate constitutional rights, such an
agreement is unenforceable.” (Doc. No. 57, PageID# 3475.)
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that “[e]xhaustion of state administrative remedies is
not a prerequisite to suit under § 1983” because “§ 1983 contains no exhaustion requirement beyond
what Congress provided.” Waskul v. Washtenaw Cty. Cmty. Mental Health, 979 F.3d 426, 445 (6thCir. 2020) (first citing Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982), then quoting Heckv. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994)); see also Watkins v. Columbus City Sch., 2020 U.S. App.
LEXIS 35444 at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2020) (affirming a district court that “correctly held” that “§1983 does not require that a plaintiff first exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit”);
Grise v. Stewart Cty. Sch. Sys., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201181 at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2021)(“Plaintiff is correct that she is not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a § 1983
claim.”).
Accordingly, Geraghty’s claims may proceed.
2.

Expert Report of Stephen Levine, M.D.

Second, Defendants argue that the Court should strike the expert report of Stephen Levine,
M.D., because it was not authenticated when Geraghty attached it in support of her Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 54, PageID# 2970.)
Geraghty responds that Dr. Levine has now submitted a declaration in support of his report.
(Doc. No. 58, PageID# 4580; see Doc. No. 57-6, PageID# 4429.) And since Defendants were awareof the report well before the parties filed their respective Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court
18

should not strike it and should consider it in evaluating the parties’ Motions. (Doc. No. 58, PageID#
4580.)
Generally, unsworn expert reports are hearsay evidence that a court may not consider when
deciding a motion for summary judgment. Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 532 F.3d 469, 481 (6thCir. 2008). But courts overwhelmingly find that if a party later attaches a sworn declaration attesting
to the accuracy and contents of the report, it cures any technical deficiencies with the original,
unsworn report. See Riveredge Dentistry P’ship v. City of Cleveland, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26292
at *20 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2024) (subsequent sworn declarations “attest[ing] to the accuracy andcontents of [the] expert reports . . . cure any technical deficiencies with the submission of the original,
unsworn reports”); Hope v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26878 at *8 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 3, 2016) (“The affidavits affirming the contents of each expert’s report cure any technicaldeficiencies associated with the submission of the original, unsworn reports.”); In re Iron Workers
Local 25 Pension Fund, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34505 at *32-33 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2011) (“Theaffidavits affirming the contents of each expert’s report, however, cure any technical deficiencies
associated with the submission of the original, unsworn reports.”).
Accordingly, the Court will consider Dr. Levine’s expert report.
B.

First Amendment Claims

The Court now turns to the substance of Geraghty’s Complaint, beginning with her First
Amendment claims. She brings three retaliation claims under the First Amendment: two under theFree Speech Clause and one under the Free Exercise Clause. Geraghty’s first two causes of action
allege that Defendants violated her rights to “remain[] silent on a matter of public concern” and to“be free from compelled speech.” (Doc. No. 1, ¶¶ 139, 164.) Geraghty’s third cause of action alleges
19that Defendants’ policy on social transition violated her right to freely exercise her religion. (Id. at¶¶ 166, 174.)
All three causes of action require that Geraghty prove three elements: (1) that she engaged inprotected conduct, (2) that Defendants took an adverse action against her, and (3) that the adverse
action was taken at least in part because of Geraghty’s exercise of the protected conduct. Heyward
v. Cooper, 88 F.4th 648, 657 (6th Cir. 2023). The Court will consider each element in turn.
1.

Conduct that the First Amendment Protects

The first element of Geraghty’s First Amendment claims requires that Geraghty show that she“engaged in protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). For afree-speech claim, that conduct must be “protected speech.” Myers v. City of Centerville, 41 F.4th
746, 759 (6th Cir. 2022). And for a free-exercise claim, that conduct must be “a specific exercise of[her] religion.” Speed Way Transp., LLC v. City of Gahanna, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 5135 at *19(6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2023). Whether Geraghty engaged in protected conduct is solely a question of law.
Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, 856 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2017).
The Court begins with Geraghty’s free-speech claim.
a.

Free Speech

The First Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects
both “the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 714 (1977). That means that while the First Amendment “secures the right to proselytize
religious, political and ideological causes,” it also “guarantee[s] the concomitant right to decline tofoster such concepts.” Id.
As an initial matter, the Court must determine what “speech” is at issue.
20Defendants frame Geraghty’s speech as “[h]er statements addressing [Student] A and[Student] B by their ‘deadnames’ during their Language Arts class.” (Doc. No. 46-1, PageID# 597.)
Geraghty argues that her “actual position . . . is that Defendants [sought] to compel her toexpress personal agreement with their preferred message on a matter of public concern.” (Doc. No.
57, PageID# 3478.)
In their Reply, Defendants contend that Geraghty is recharacterizing the facts to suit her claim
and that Geraghty “did not request to ‘remain silent,’ but rather persisted in deadnaming her gender
diverse students.” (Doc. No. 59, PageID# 4605.)
The Court disagrees with Defendants that Geraghty’s compelled speech claim is arecharacterization of the record evidence. The summary judgment record is undisputed that Geraghty
resigned—whether voluntarily or involuntarily—because she refused to use the students’ preferrednames and pronouns, not because she “deadnamed” the students. (See, e.g., Carter Depo. at PageID#
3074 (“[Geraghty] stated that she still wouldn’t be comfortable using preferred names or preferredpronouns because she would know what was behind it.”); Myers Depo. at PageID# (“[Geraghty]
would not use preferred names. She would not use pronouns because she would know what wasbehind it.”).)
By compelling Geraghty to use students’ preferred names and pronouns, Defendants “[sought]
to force [Geraghty] to ‘utter what [was] not in [her] mind’ about a question of political and religious
significance.” 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 596 (2023) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943)). Accordingly, the speech at issue was compelled speech.
Id.; see also Tennessee v. Cardona, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106559 at *66 (E.D. Ky. June 17, 2024),
stay pending appeal denied, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17600 (6th Cir. July 17, 2024) (concluding that21

a U.S. Department of Education rule requiring that teachers use pronouns that do not correspond to a
student’s biological sex is compelled speech because it would require teachers to communicate themessage that students can have a gender identity inconsistent with their sex at birth).
The Court now turns to the question of whether Geraghty’s compelled speech was protectedunder the First Amendment.
(1)

Compelled Speech

Since the First Amendment protects “the right to refrain from speaking at all,” Wooley, 430
U.S. at 714, the government “may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the speakerdisagrees.” Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995). Indeed, “[w]hen speech iscompelled . . . additional damage is done.” Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878, 893 (2018).
This is because “[f]orcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable
is always demeaning.” Id. And “the First Amendment tolerates none of that.” 303 Creative LLC,
600 U.S. at 590.
As for teachers, they do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
506 (1969). So, the right against compelled speech extends to them too. For example, a school board
cannot compel teachers and students to salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance. Barnette,
319 U.S. at 642.
But “the speech rights of public school employees are [not] so boundless that they may deliver
any message to anyone anytime they wish.” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 527(2022). While they are private citizens, teachers “are also government employees paid in part tospeak on the government’s behalf and convey its intended messages.” Id. As such, when teachers
22

“make statements pursuant to their official duties, [they] are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). The Garcetti rule balances the publicteacher’s right to “participat[e] in public debate” with the supervisor’s need to “ensure that [theteacher’s] official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the[school’s] mission.” Id. at 422-23.
(2)Garcetti and Compelled Speech

The threshold question, then, is whether the Garcetti rule bars Geraghty’s claim. For thefollowing reasons, the Court concludes that it does not.
First, by its plain language, Garcetti only applies to situations where public employees “makestatements.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added). That is, “the employee must have spoken”
for Garcetti to apply. Myers v. City of Centerville, 41 F.4th 746, 760 (6th Cir. 2022) (emphasis
added). In Garcetti, the plaintiff wrote a memo—i.e., spoke—and was punished for it. Yet here,
Defendants allegedly caused Geraghty to resign not for what she said, but for what she refused to say.
In this situation, where “a public employer does not simply restrict potentially disruptive speech but
commands that its employees mouth a message on its own behalf, the calculus is very different.”
Janus, 585 U.S. at 908; see also Vlaming v. W. Point Sch. Bd., 895 S.E.2d 705, 741 (Va. 2023)(rejecting view that Garcetti applies to compelled-speech cases).
Second, even if Garcetti were to apply, Geraghty’s compelled speech was not pursuant to her
official duties.
Whether speech is pursuant to an employee’s official duties “depends primarily on whether
the speech is ‘ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties.’” Ashford v. Univ. of Mich., 89
23

F.4th 960, 972 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 533-34 (6th Cir. 2015)).
And to determine whether the employee made the speech pursuant to her ordinary job duties, courts“look to factors like the speech’s ‘impetus,’ setting, audience, and general subject matter.’” Id.
(quoting Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 546 (6th Cir. 2007)). In Garcetti, theSupreme Court explicitly rejected “the suggestion that employers can restrict employees’ rights bycreating excessively broad job descriptions.” 547 U.S. at 424. Rather, “[t]he proper inquiry” for thisCourt “is a practical one.” Id.
Defendants argue that Geraghty’s compelled speech was pursuant to her ordinary job duties
because (1) its “impetus” was “to create a safe, secure, and welcoming learning environment” and tocomply with U.S. Department of Education policies interpreting Title IX; (2) it directly related to
Geraghty’s job duties; (3) it was in the classroom and during instruction; and (4) its audience wasstudents and not the general public. (Doc. No. 46-1, PageID# 596-97.)
Geraghty responds that her compelled speech was not pursuant to her ordinary duties because
it (1) went “beyond the scope of any valid official duty” and (2) “deprive[d] [Geraghty] of her ability
to express her preferred message ‘on [her] own time.’” (Doc. No. 57, PageID# 3479 (quoting EvansMarshall v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332, 340 (6th Cir.
2010)).)
Defendants seek to reduce the compelled speech at issue to a “non-ideological ministerialtask[].” (Doc. No. 59, PageID# 4607 (emphasis deleted).) They see the use of preferred names andpronouns as a “standard back-and-forth ritual of greeting” without any meaning. (Doc. No. 46-1,
PageID# 599 (quoting Parents Defending Educ. v. Olentangy Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 684 F.
Supp. 3d 684, 707 (S.D. Ohio 2023)).) But such a sanitized view of language ignores the reality that24

“titles and pronouns carry a message.” Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 507 (6th Cir. 2021); seealso Parents Defending Education, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 18634 at *19 (“The pleadings in this case,in fact, underscore that perhaps the single thing on which the parties agree is that pronouns matter.”).
For Geraghty, using the students’ preferred names and pronouns carried the message that she“affirm[ed] [the student’s] identity,” which was against her religious beliefs and her understanding of
biology and “basic human function.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1172.) For the school, using thestudents’ preferred names and pronouns carried the message that it supported its students. (Carter
Depo. at PageID# 3031; Myers Depo. at PageID# 3280; DiLoreto Depo. at PageID# 859.) And, mostimportantly, for the students, using their preferred names and pronouns carried the message that the
speaker respected their gender identity. (See Doc. No. 48-1, PageID# 1316, 1319.)
So, the question is not whether using preferred names and pronouns was part of Geraghty’s
ordinary job duties, but whether it was part of her ordinary job duties to convey (or refuse to convey)
the message that those names and pronouns carried. It was not. Geraghty was a middle school English
Language Arts teacher. (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1073.) Her job was to teach English to theappropriate state standards. (Doc. No. 48-3, PageID# 1460.) It was not her job “to teach anythingwith regard to LGBTQ issues.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1085.) Indeed, “gender identity andsexual orientation” were not part of the middle school curriculum at all. (Myers Depo. at PageID#
3270.) Defendants make much of the fact that Geraghty was compelled to speak “in the classroom
setting and during class time.” (Doc. No. 46-1, PageID# 596.) But it is not “dispositive” that
Geraghty’s compelled speech “took place ‘within the office’ environment,” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at
530, because, again, Geraghty did not “shed [her] constitutional rights” when she entered theclassroom. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
25

In short, compelling Geraghty to use students’ preferred names and pronouns had nothing to
do with “when and how English [was] taught to [her] students.” Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d at 340.
Accordingly, it was not “in-class curricular speech” or otherwise pursuant to Geraghty’s ordinary job
duties and, therefore, not barred by Garcetti. Cf. id. at 342.
(3)

Pickering-Connick

But this does not end the analysis. The Court must now apply the Pickering-Connick
framework to determine whether the First Amendment protected Geraghty’s compelled speech.
Meriweather, 992 F.3d at 507-08 (applying Pickering-Connick to compelled speech); but see Janus,
585 U.S. at 908 (recognizing that “the Pickering framework fits much less well where the government
compels speech” and that the Supreme Court has “never applied Pickering” to a “situation in whicha public employer . . . demand[s] that its employees recite words with which they disagree).
Under the Pickering-Connick framework, the Court asks two questions: First, was the speech
at issue “a matter of public concern?” Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 508 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 147 (1983)). And second, was Geraghty’s interest in remaining silent greater than
Defendants’ interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees?” Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
Whether speech involves a matter of public concern turns on the “content, form, and context
of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147). The
crux of the analysis is “the extent to which the speech advances an idea transcending personal interest
or opinion which impacts our social and/or political lives.” Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d
1177, 1189 (6th Cir. 1995).

26

Defendants argue that “[i]t is undisputed that [Geraghty] could avoid the use of pronouns,” so
the only issue is whether the use of a preferred name was a matter of public concern.” (Doc. No. 461, PageID# 599.) They agree that the Sixth Circuit held in Meriwether that “pronoun usage can be amatter of public concern in certain settings.” (Id.) But they argue that the Sixth Circuit’s decision
was limited to pronouns, not preferred names, and depended on “the context of the course [theprofessor] was teaching.” (Id.) And they contend that using a student’s preferred name is a “meresalutation[]” that is “more like a mechanical exercise” and Geraghty “only had to use students’ namesin this mechanical context.” (Id. (quoting Parents Defending Education, 684 F. Supp. 3d at 706).)
Therefore, they conclude, Geraghty did not “wade into the gender identity debate” or “express apersonal belief about gender identity.” (Id.)
Geraghty responds that Defendants are incorrect that “this case is only about pronouns.” (Doc.
No. 57, PageID# 3483.) Geraghty contends that the record shows that she had to “fully accommodate
the students,” which “indisputably” means that she had to “use both names and pronouns requested
by students.” (Id.) Further, Geraghty maintains that Meriwether was not limited to the words atissue—that is, pronouns—rather, it was “about what the words, including ‘titles and pronouns’
convey about ‘gender identity.’” (Id. (quoting Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 507).)
First, the record reflects that Defendants were requiring that Geraghty use both the pronouns
and preferred names requested by the students. Geraghty understood during the last meeting that sheneeded to “accommodate the students,” which, in her mind, meant “the whole package—names andpronouns.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1161.) Carter likewise testified that he and Myers told
Geraghty during the last meeting that they “were going to accommodate [their] students . . . [and]27work with [their] students.” (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3111.) And for Carter, supporting the students
meant “us[ing] whatever names and pronouns a student asks for.” (Id. at PageID# 3031.)
And second, even if the case were only about preferred names, the Court disagrees that theholding in Meriwether was limited to pronouns being a matter of public concern. A preferred nameserves to “validate—or invalidate—someone’s perceived sex or gender identity” in the same way a
pronoun does. Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 509. Geraghty’s refusal to address Student A and Student B
by their preferred names manifested her belief that “sex is a biological function and that a person’s
gender identity will always match up with their sex,” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1176), in the same
way that the Meriwether professor’s refusal to address a student as a woman “manifested his belief
that sex is fixed in each person from the moment of conception, and that it cannot be changed,
regardless of an individual’s feelings or desires.” Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 509. Indeed, it is because
preferred names carry a meaning that Student A emailed Geraghty asking Geraghty to use Student
A’s preferred rather than given name. (See Doc. No. 48-1, PageID# 1316.) Otherwise, if the namecarried no message, why would it matter what name Geraghty used to address Student A? It did
matter to Student A, and it mattered to Student A because names, like titles and pronouns, “carry amessage.” Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 507. Accordingly, when Defendants compelled Geraghty to use
the students’ preferred names and pronouns, they forced her to “wade[] into a matter of publicconcern.” Id. at 510.
The final question is whether Geraghty’s “interest in” remaining silent on a “matter[] of publicconcern” outweighs “the interest of [Defendants], as [Geraghty’s] employer, in promoting theefficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.” Gillis v. Miller, 845 F.3d 677,

28

684 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2000). The burden
shifts to Defendants on this final question. See Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 532.
“The pertinent considerations for [this] balancing test are whether the statement (1) impairs
discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, (b) has a detrimental impact on close working
relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, (c) impedes the performanceof the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise, or (d) undermines themission of the employer.” Bennett v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 977 F.3d 530, 540(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 602 (6th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted).
Defendants assert that they have a compelling interest that “teachers teach and do not use theirposition of trust and authority to impose their religious beliefs.” (Doc. No. 46-1, PageID# 600.)
Defendants also contend that compelling the use of preferred names and pronouns creates a safe,
supportive, and non-discriminatory environment for students.

(Id. at PageID# 601.)

Finally,

Defendants maintain that to comply with Title IX, it is necessary that they compel teachers to use
students’ preferred names and pronouns. (Id. at PageID# 602.)
Geraghty responds that Defendants’ first alleged interest that teachers do not impose theirreligious beliefs on students is a “red herring” because Geraghty “just wants to refrain from personallyexpressing Defendants’ preferred message about sex and gender.” (Doc. No. 57, PageID# 3484.)
And Geraghty argues that Defendants’ practice of requiring that teachers use students’ preferrednames and pronouns “actually jeopardizes students’ wellbeing rather than supporting them.” (Id. at
PageID# 3484-85.) Finally, Geraghty maintains that Title IX “doesn’t require anything about the useof names and pronouns.” (Id. at PageID# 3486.)
29

The Court will begin with Defendants’ first and third arguments. As for Defendants’ firstargument, Defendants may have an interest in preventing Geraghty from “conveying or attempting toconvey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.” Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 605 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). But Geraghty conveying a message
about her religious beliefs is not at issue here. As explained in section III.B.1.a.(1) above, this caseis about Defendants compelling Geraghty to “recite words with which [she] disagree[s].” Janus, 585
U.S. at 908. Geraghty refraining from speaking does not amount to her “impermissibly coerc[ing]”
her religious beliefs on her students. Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 540. “And in no world may a government
entity’s concerns about phantom constitutional violations justify actual violations of the individual’sFirst Amendment rights.” Id. at 543.
As for Defendants’ third alleged interest, in Meriwether, the Sixth Circuit rejected a similarargument. It held that Title IX is not implicated unless the “speech inhibited [the students’] education
or ability to succeed in the classroom.” 992 F.3d at 492. At most, the record evidence is that Student
A “looked uncomfortable” when Geraghty failed to use the student’s preferred name. (Geraghty
Depo. at PageID# 1114.) But discomfort does not rise to the level of “systemic[ally] . . . denying[Student A] equal access to an educational program or activity.” Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 511(quoting Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999)). Further, “learning how totolerate speech . . . is ‘part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society,’ a trait of character essential
to ‘a tolerant citizenry.’” Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 538 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 590). Finally, it is“likely” that Title IX’s definition of sex discrimination does not “extend to discrimination on the basisof ‘gender identity.’” Cardona, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17600 at *7.

30

In their Notice of Supplemental Authority, Defendants further argue that in Parents Defending
Education v. Olentangy Local School District Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit recognized the“deleterious effects of misgendering a student, which reinforces the [District’s] interest in preventing
misgendered pronoun speech.” (Doc. No. 60, PageID# 4616.) Parents Defending Education is
distinguishable for several reasons. First, the case arrived at the Sixth Circuit on the denial of a motion
for a preliminary injunction. 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 18634 at *9. The preliminary injunction
standard of review, and the burdens associated with it, “pervade[d]” the court’s analysis. Id. at *10.
Here, the Court has a full summary judgment record to consider under a decidedly different standard.
Second, in determining that the use of non-preferred pronouns cause harm, “the district court reliedon evidence that the [defendant] never submitted, including law-review and journal articles,
newspaper stories, examples from its other pending cases, and its own personal opinions.” Id. at *56(Batchelder, J., dissenting). That is not the case here. Again, the Court has a full summary judgment
record before it, to include expert reports submitted by both parties. Lastly, the Sixth Circuitspecifically noted that “at the summary judgment stage, the District may need to provide additional
evidence regarding the likelihood of disruption from the repeated use of non-preferred pronouns.” Id.
at *18. Thus, the Sixth Circuit did not hold that using a student’s non-preferred pronoun is harmful,but only that the district court did not err in concluding that it was harmful based on the limited record
before it.
Since neither Defendants’ first or third alleged interests are compelling, this case hinges on
Defendants’ second alleged interest in creating a “safe and supportive environment” for its students.
According to Defendants’ expert Matt Goldenberg, Psy.D., a teacher “utilizing a student’s chosenname and pronoun is a developmentally appropriate task for all educators interacting with students
31and increases the likelihood that the student can and will feel motivated to participate in both theclassroom and the overall school community.” (Doc. No. 46-4 (Goldenberg Report), PageID# 714.)
Another of Defendants’ experts, Katherine Kuvalanka, Ph.D., opines that “not respecting a student’s
chosen name and pronouns will likely cause them discomfort and distress, thereby also likely
negatively impacting their classroom experience, capacity to learn, and overall mental health.” (Doc.
No. 46-5 (Kuvalanka Report), PageID# 766.)
Geraghty’s expert, Stephen Levine, M.D., paints a different picture. According to him, “nostudies show that the social or medical affirmation of a transgender identity in children (or anyoneelse) reduces suicide, prevents suicidal ideation, or improves long-term outcomes, as compared toeither a ‘watchful waiting’ or a psychotherapeutic model of response.” (Doc. No. 52-11 (Levine
Report), PageID# 2635.) Further, he opines that “[m]iddle school children are in the midst of intense
identity development as they are coming to grips for the first time with their new sexual anatomic andphysiological functions.” (Id. at PageID# 2651.) School officials need not interfere with this naturalprocess because they “have little reason to comprehend the complexities of the student’s family life,
developmental adversities, and private ambivalence and worry about their currently expressed gender
identity.” (Id.)
The parties’ “competing expert opinions present the classic battle of the experts.” Taylor v.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (In re Onglyza)), 93 F.4th 339, 348 (6th Cir. 2024). In such a situation, it
should be “up to a jury to evaluate what weight and credibility each expert opinion deserves,” not a
judge. Id.; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge” when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.). To be32sure, the question of whether an employee’s speech is protected under Pickering is a legal question.
See v. City of Elyria, 502 F.3d 484, 492 (6th Cir. 2007). But a “jury may, however, resolve someunderlying factual questions, which can inform the legal determination of the Pickering balancing.”
Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. Court, 596 F. App’x 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Donlin v. Watkins, 814
F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1987)); see also Moser v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 984 F.3d 900, 905(9th Cir. 2021) (“While the Pickering balancing test presents a question of law for the court to decide,
it may still implicate factual disputes that preclude the court from resolving the test at the summary
judgment stage.”). As the diametrically opposed opinions of the parties’ experts demonstrate, “theuse of gender-specific titles and pronouns has produced a passionate political and social debate” inthis country. Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 508. Whether use of student’s preferred names and pronouns
creates a safe and supportive environment for students is a factual question a jury should decide after
hearing the parties’ expert testimony.
Accordingly, while the Court concludes that Geraghty’s compelled speech was not pursuant
to her ordinary job duties, it denies the parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment as to the Pickeringbalancing test.
b.

Free Exercise of Religion

The First Amendment also “requires that the government commit ‘itself to religious
tolerance.’” Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 512 (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018)). This means that “laws that burden religious exercise arepresumptively unconstitutional unless they are both neutral and generally applicable.” Id. (citing
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990). It is the plaintiff’s
burden to show that the government’s policy is not neutral or generally applicable. Kennedy, 597
33

U.S. at 525. Should she discharge that burden, then the court “will find a First Amendment violation
unless the government can satisfy ‘strict scrutiny’ by demonstrating its course was justified by acompelling state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest.” Id.
(1)

Neutral and Generally Applicable

Geraghty argues that Defendants’ practice was not neutral toward religion or generally
applicable for two reasons. First, she contends that “Defendants will credit some religious objections
to preferred names but not objections . . . rooted in a religious belief prohibiting participation in socialtransition.” (Doc. No. 52-1, PageID# 2299-300.) To prove her point, she uses the example that
“Defendants wouldn’t make a Jewish teacher use a preferred name ‘Yahweh,’ but they will make
Geraghty use preferred names in violation of her beliefs.” (Id. at PageID# 2300.) Second, Geraghty
argues that Defendants “excuse teachers from the obligation to use ‘inappropriate’ requested names
both for secular reasons (in cases of racial slurs) and religious reasons.” (Id.) Geraghty maintains
that this amounts to “a system of individual exemptions, [which is] the antithesis of a neutral andgenerally applicable policy.” (Id. (quoting Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir. 2012)).)
Defendants respond that Geraghty’s hypothetical “is not proof of anything.” (Doc. No. 54,
PageID# 2982.) And they further assert that their preferred names and pronouns practice “wasuniversally embraced, and aside from [Geraghty], no one objected.” (Doc. No. 46-1, PageID# 604.)
For the following reasons, the Court concludes that Defendants’ practice was not neutral andgenerally applied.
First, and most importantly, it is undisputed that Defendants did not have a policy. Indeed,from the top down, all Defendants are emphatic that they did not have any policies on gender identity.
In his letter to the community, Goff, the president of the Board, wrote, in bold and underlined, “[t]he34

Jackson Local School District does not have a policy regarding our teachers and the gender identityof students.” (Id. at PageID# 2764.) And he testified that the District “[doesn’t] have any specificpolicies that cover gender identity.” (Doc. No. 52-13 (Goff Depo.), PageID# 2753.) Nor does it have“any specific policy related to the use of preferred names.” (Id. at PageID# 2754.) Rather, he testified
that the District has a “practice” of “granting requests when students ask for a different name or
pronoun.” (Id. at PageID# 2784.) DiLoreto likewise testified that it was a “common practice thatha[d] never been challenged” for the school “to respect a student’s wishes regarding the use of apreferred name.” (DiLoreto Depo. at PageID# 888.) Carter too testified that the District had “arecognized practice” that the District would “honor students’ requests for preferred names.” (Carter
Depo. at PageID# 3033-34.) And Myers testified that for the District it was “an implied practice”
that staff would use students’ preferred names. (Myers Depo. at PageID# 3342.)
The lack of a written policy means that the District’s practice was “a moving target.”Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 492. No one other than Geraghty had ever challenged the practice. (DiLoretoDepo. at PageID# 887.) And when she did, it required Carter “to look into it further” to make surethat he was giving Geraghty “the proper instruction on how she should handle things moving
forward.” (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3075.) Carter had to look into it further because before his
meeting with Geraghty he had never “discuss[ed] whether there were any factors that would beconsidered when determining whether or not the [student’s] request[ed] name or pronoun was
mandatory.” (Id. at PageID# 3087.) Nor had he ever discussed “any alternative practices to the useof names or pronouns.” (Id. at PageID# 3088.)
Defendants dismiss Geraghty’s hypothetical of the Jewish teacher and a student preferring to
be called Yahweh as “not proof of anything.” However, the Court finds this hypothetical to be a35

telling example of how the District denied Geraghty an exemption from its practice that would havebeen available to another teacher of a different faith. When asked whether a Jewish teacher could
refrain from addressing a student by the student’s preferred name Yahweh, DiLoreto responded that,“There would be consideration, absolutely. As well as trying to inform the student of that, as well, tosee what compromise could be made here.” (DiLoreto Depo. at PageID# 894.) When asked the samequestion, Carter similarly responded that “it would be a practice of mine in the sense that a conflictfor a staff member that would necessitate my call to central office for clarification. (Carter Depo. at
PageID# 3056.) This hypothetical shows that the District would have provided the Jewish teacher an“individualized exemption” from its practice. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 537 (1993). Defendants could not “refuse to extend” this same individualized exemption
to Geraghty “without compelling reason.” Id. Yet that is what they did here.
Second, Defendants do not agree whether the District’s practice was even mandatory. Carterindicated that a teacher’s “consistent[] and intentional[]” refusal to use students’ preferred names andpronouns “could” subject the teacher to “discipline,” but it would be a “case-by-case” determination.
(Carter Depo. at PageID# 3136.) Myers testified that the practice of using students’ preferred names
and pronouns is “not necessarily mandatory” but “an implied practice that everybody does.” (Myers
Depo. at PageID# 3342.) She further testified that she “[didn’t] know” whether a teacher would be“subject to discipline for declining to use [a student’s] preferred name.” (Id. at PageID# 3293.)
DiLoreto similarly testified that the District’s practice was not “enforced” but “embraced” and that itwas not “an absolute requirement” but a “best practice.” (DiLoreto Depo. at PageID# 889.) Further,he stated that it would be “possible for a “deviation from [the District’s] practice” to “not lead to
discipline.” (Id.)
36

After her first meeting with Carter, Geraghty felt “hopeful” that “everything was going to beokay.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1129.) But during the second meeting, “the tenor ha[d] changed”
and Geraghty understood that “there could be disciplinary action taken.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID#
1133.) Tellingly, it was during this second meeting that Myers asked Geraghty to explain what
exactly her religious beliefs were, which Geraghty did. (Myers Depo. at PageID# 3328.) By the thirdand final meeting, Geraghty’s refusal to use the student’s preferred names and pronouns because ofher religious beliefs had become a “line in the sand” for Carter and Myers. (Id. at PageID# 3338.)
This testimony shows that the District’s policy evolved in real time from Geraghty’s firstmeeting with Carter through her third meeting with Carter and Myers, all of which took place over a
few hours on a Friday morning. Before the first meeting, the District’s practice was an “implied” and“embraced” “best practice,” and non-compliance with the practice could, or could not, subject ateacher to discipline, to be determined on a “case-by-case” basis. Yet after three meetings during themorning spanning only a few hours, Geraghty’s refusal to comply with the practice had become a“line in the sand,” which, once crossed, led to Geraghty’s resignation. (Myers Depo. at PageID#
3346.) This shows that the District was thus “not applying a preexisting policy in a neutral way, but
was instead using an evolving policy as pretext for targeting [Geraghty’s] beliefs.” Meriwether, 992
F.3d at 515; cf. Dahl v. Bd. of Trs. of W. Mich. Univ., 15 F.4th 728, 733 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding thata vaccine mandate that granted religious exemptions on an individual basis was not neutral andgenerally applicable).
In short, while the District’s practice might look neutral and generally applicable, it was illdefined and provided the District a discretionary “mechanism for individualized exemptions.” Id.
Accordingly, it must survive “the most rigorous of scrutiny.” Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546.
37

(2)

Strict Scrutiny

As Geraghty has met her burden in showing that the District’s practice was not neutral andgenerally applicable, the District must now “satisfy ‘strict scrutiny’ by demonstrating its course wasjustified by a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest.” Kennedy,
597 U.S. at 525 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546). Ohio courts apply the same standard to freeexercise claims under the Ohio Constitution, so the analysis in this section applies to Geraghty’s fifth
cause of action as well. See Humphrey v. Lane, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (Ohio 2000). Though thistest is less lenient than the Pickering-Connick test applied to Geraghty’s free speech claim, the same
alleged governmental interests are at issue.

See Kennedy, 597 U.S. at 532.

And, while theconstitutionality of the District’s practice is a legal question for the court to decide, “a jury may makefactual determinations as to compelling interests and narrow tailoring.” Thomas v. Schroer, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42188 at *14 n.2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2016) (citing Majeske v. City of Chicago,
218 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2000)).
As explained in section III.B.1.a.(3) above, whether use of students’ preferred names andpronouns creates a safe and supportive environment for students is a factual question a jury should
decide after hearing the parties’ experts’ testimonies. Accordingly, while the Court concludes thatthe District’s practice was not neutral and generally applicable, it denies the parties’ Motions for
Summary Judgment as to whether the District’s practice was narrowly tailored to a compellinginterest.
2.

Harmful Adverse Action

The second element of Geraghty’s First Amendment claims requires that Geraghty show that“an adverse action was taken against [her].” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396. “[A]n adverse action is38

one that would ‘deter a person of ordinary firmness’ from the exercise of the right at stake.” (Id.) An
example of an adverse action in the employment context is a “discharge.” (Id.)
Where an employee is not discharged but rather resigns, the employee’s resignation is“presumed to be voluntary.” Nunn v. Lynch, 113 F. App’x 55, 59 (6th Cir. 2004). But a presumptively
voluntary resignation “rise[s] to the level of constructive discharge” when “it is objectively reasonable
for the employee to leave under the circumstances.” Id. Accordingly, “[a]n employee can rebut thepresumption of voluntariness by demonstrating that ‘an objectively reasonable person would, under
the totality of the circumstances, feel compelled to resign if he were in the employee’s position.’”Spangler v. Lucas Cty., 477 F. App’x 301, 303 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rhoads v. Bd. of Educ., 103
F. App’x 888, 895 (6th Cir. 2004)). Courts consider the following factors to determine whether areasonable person would feel compelled to resign:(1) whether the employee was given some alternative to resignation; (2) whether theemployee understood the nature of the choice she was given; (3) whether the employee
was given a reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether the employee waspermitted to select the effective date of resignation.
Id. (quoting Rhoads, 103 F. App’x at 895).
Defendants argue that the Court should grant summary judgment in their favor because
Geraghty has “at most . . . alleged that there were ‘purposefully vague’ statements implying the threatof future adverse employment action if she continued to be ‘insubordinate.’” (Doc. No. 46-1,
PageID# 587.) Defendants contend that these vague threats are “simply not sufficient as a matter oflaw.” (Id.) Defendants further argue that “[a]n employee does not have an objectively reasonable
belief that they have no choice but to resign when they could initiate a grievance procedure but donot.” (Id. at PageID# 589.)

39

Geraghty responds that Defendants constructively discharged her because there was “a direct
demand for [her] resignation without more process as the alternative.” (Doc. No. 57, PageID# 3490.)
And Geraghty argues that such “[a] direct order to resign is even more egregious when the alternative
is an immediate surrender of a constitutional right.” (Id. at PageID# 3491.) Geraghty asks that the
Court grant her summary judgment because the only conclusion that a rational trier of fact can draw
from Defendants telling Geraghty “we need a letter of resignation effective today” is that “Defendants
constructively discharged [her].” (Doc. No. 52-1, PageID# 2302.)
For the following reasons, the Court concludes that there is a genuine dispute of material fact
regarding whether Geraghty involuntarily resigned. The Court will consider each Rhoads factor in
turn.
The first Rhoads factor is whether Defendants gave Geraghty some alternative to resignation.
According to Geraghty, her third meeting with Carter and Myers began with them asking her whether
she was “willing to call the students by their preferred names.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1136.)
Geraghty said that she was not. (Id.) Carter and Myers responded, “If that is your final decision, thenwe need a letter of resignation effective today.” (Id.) Several hours after Geraghty submitted her
resignation, Myers texted Carter that she “kinda f[elt] bad” about Geraghty’s resignation, but she
knew “it had to happen or would have eventually.” (Doc. No. 52-2, PageID# 2317.) Carter responded
that he felt the same way and that Geraghty “[u]ltimately . . . just wasn’t a fit” for the District. (Id. at
PageID# 2313.) Myers then reiterated that it was “[k]inda sad but what had to happen.” (Id.) Theseexchanges show that Geraghty’s resignation was inevitable so long as she refused to call the students
by their preferred names and pronouns. Thus, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable
to Geraghty, Defendants gave Geraghty no alternative to resignation. As Geraghty puts it in her
40Motion, Defendants presented her a “Hobson’s choice” between continuing to work under conditions
that offend her religious beliefs and resignation, which is really no choice at all. (Doc. No. 52-1,
PageID# 2301 (quoting M.P.C. Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 1990)) (“Thesecond [type of constructive discharge] involves a situation in which an employer confronts anemployee with the Hobson’s choice of either continuing to work or foregoing the rights guaranteed
him under Section 7 of the [National Labor Relations] Act.”).)
But when viewed in the light most favorable to Defendants, the evidence shows that Geraghty
intentionally chose not to pursue any of the alternatives to resignation available to her. Carter andMyers both testified that Geraghty was the first to use “the word resign or resignation,” not them.
(Carter Depo. at PageID# 3113; Myers Depo. at PageID# 3346.) And Geraghty admitted that neither
Carter nor Myers threatened that she would be terminated if she did not resign. (Geraghty Depo. at
PageID# 1140.) Further, when Disman offered to “get [Geraghty’s] resignation pulled” so that she
could work with the District on the issue, Geraghty unequivocally refused and said she did not want
her job and did not want to teach. (Disman Depo. at PageID# 1877, 1880.) Moreover, Geraghty
admitted that she never asked for union representation during any of her meetings with Carter andMyers, that she never asked for an opportunity to speak with a lawyer, that she never asked to speakwith DiLoreto, and that she never asked to speak with the Board. (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 113132, 1145-46.) In sum, from Defendants’ perspective, Geraghty had alternatives to resignation, but
she intentionally chose not to pursue them.
Accordingly, there is a genuine dispute whether Defendants gave Geraghty an alternative toresignation.

41

The second factor is whether Geraghty understood the nature of the choice she was given. As
written above, from Geraghty’s perspective, the choice Defendants gave her was to “compromise[her] religious beliefs or resign.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1137.) Constructively, for Geraghty,
that meant resignation “was [her] only option.” (Id. at PageID# 1142.) So, when Carter and Myers
told her that they “need[ed] a letter of resignation effective today,” Geraghty believed that she had nochoice but to comply and resign. (Id. at PageID# 1136.) Stated simply, it was impossible for
Geraghty to understand a choice that Defendants did not give her.
Yet when viewed in the light most favorable to Defendants, the evidence shows that Carterand Myers offered Geraghty a choice, and that Geraghty understood her choice. Both Carter andMyers testified that they gave Geraghty several “workarounds” to her religious objections, but before
they could even discuss those workarounds, Geraghty “offered up her resignation.” (Carter Depo. at
PageID# 3116; Myers Depo. at PageID# 3343.) In other words, from Defendants’ perspective, theygave Geraghty the choice to either work with them and “giv[e] [the workarounds] a try” or to resign.
(Meyers Depo. at PageID# 3345, 3336.) Geraghty chose to resign. (Id. at PageID# 3345.)
Therefore, like the last factor, there is a genuine dispute whether Geraghty understood thenature of the choice she was given (and whether she was given any choice at all).
The third factor is whether Geraghty was given a reasonable time in which to choose. It is
undisputed that approximately three hours elapsed between when Geraghty first met with Carter andwhen Geraghty submitted her resignation. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 52-15, PageID# 2841-43.) In Rhoads,
the plaintiff had approximately seven hours to choose between resignation and termination. 103 F.
App’x at 895. While the court found that this amount of time was “perhaps not as lengthy as [the42plaintiff] would have liked,” the plaintiff “was not pressured to make her decision immediately orotherwise coerced into making an informed judgment.” Id.
Here, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Geraghty, it shows that she
had far less time to decide than the plaintiff in Rhoads and that Defendants pressured her to make her
decision effectively immediately. Geraghty testified that she left her first meeting with Carter feelingthat “everything was going to be okay” and that she and Carter “would work through a solution
together.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1129, 1141.) But in the second meeting, which began about
a half hour later, “the tenor ha[d] changed.” (Id. at PageID# 1132.) From Geraghty’s perspective, “itdidn’t appear that [Carter and Myers] wanted a solution” at that point. (Id. at PageID# 1141.) At theend of the second meeting, Geraghty understood the decision that she had to make “was between
choosing [her] religious convictions or compromising [her] religious convictions.” (Id. at PageID#
1132.) Carter and Myers dismissed Geraghty from the second meeting only to call her back fiveminutes later for the third meeting. (Id. at PageID# 1135.) Shortly into that third meeting, after
Geraghty stated that she would not call students by their preferred names, Carter told Geraghty thathe “need[ed] her letter of resignation effective today.” (Id. at PageID# 1136.) Geraghty understoodthat “there was no option for additional time.” (Id. at PageID# 1138.) So, she submitted her
resignation. (Id. at PageID# 1144.) And in her resignation letter, Geraghty wrote that she was “asked
to resign” over the issue of using students’ preferred names and pronouns and that her resignation
was effective as of the day that she wrote it. (Doc. No. 48-2, PageID# 1330.) Carter and Myers
reviewed Geraghty’s letter, and neither disputed its contents. (Doc. No. 52-15, PageID# 2843; seealso Carter Depo. at PageID# 3161; Myers Depo. at PageID# 3347.)

43

The following Monday, DiLoreto met with Disman. At the conclusion of that meeting,
Disman told DiLoreto that she was going to reach back out to Geraghty “to see if she changed hermind” about her resignation. (Disman Depo. at PageID# 1894.) Yet only a couple of hours later,
DiLoreto sent Geraghty an email accepting her resignation on behalf the Board. (DiLoreto Depo. at
PageID# 922-923.) When Geraghty received DiLoreto’s email, she understood that her resignation“was final,” even if the Board had not yet acted on her resignation. (Id. at PageID# 1147-48.)
But when viewed in Defendants’ favor, the evidence shows that Geraghty had—or could have
had—a reasonable time to choose but instead decided to immediately resign. According to Carter,
during the third meeting, he specifically asked Geraghty whether she “had time to think about” theworkarounds that they discussed during the second meeting. (Carter Depo. at PageID# 3115.) But
before they could even discuss those workarounds, Geraghty “offered up her resignation.” (Id. at
PageID# 3116.) And Geraghty herself admitted that she never asked for additional time to make adecision. (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1138.) Further, Disman testified that Geraghty twice rejected
her offer to “pull” Geraghty’s resignation, even after Disman explained that “nothing is really official
until it’s approved by the board.” (Disman Depo. at PageID# 1878, 1880, 1898.) DiLoreto testified
that Geraghty “[a]bsolutely” could have rescinded her resignation had she chosen to. (DiLoreto at
PageID# 919.) And he reiterated that Geraghty’s resignation was not “over . . . until the board [took]
action,” which did not happen until September 20, 2022, over three weeks later. (Id. at PageID# 921,
925.) Thus, from Defendants’ perspective, Geraghty could have requested additional time before
submitting her resignation, and even after Geraghty submitted it, she had three weeks before the Board
met during which she could have rescinded her resignation. See Kirk v. Hockenberry, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11392 at *16-17 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2016) (finding that the plaintiff had a reasonable time to44

decide because, in part, the plaintiff “had another two weeks before the School Board met to formally
accept his resignation during which he could have withdrawn his resignation but did not”).
Therefore, this third factor is also in genuine dispute.
The fourth and final factor is whether Geraghty was permitted to select the effective date ofher resignation. According to Geraghty, Carter and Myers told her that her resignation had to be“effective today.” (Geraghty Depo. at PageID# 1136.) Yet Carter testified that neither he nor Myers
told Geraghty that her resignation needed to be effective immediately. (Carter Depo. at PageID#
3120.) Rather, Geraghty herself decided that it would be effective immediately. (Id.; see also Myers
Depo. at PageID# 3347.) Therefore, there is a genuine dispute whether Defendants permitted
Geraghty to select the effective date of her resignation.
As all four factors are in genuine dispute, the Court denies both parties’ summary judgment
motions on this element.
3.

Protected Conduct Caused Adverse Action

The third and final element of Geraghty’s First Amendment claims requires her to show that“there [was] a causal connection between elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was
motivated at least in part by [the] protected conduct.” Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d
286, 294 (6th Cir. 2012). The parties do not directly address the causation element in their Motions.
Since, as explained above, there are genuine disputes about whether there was protected conduct(element one) and whether there was an adverse action (element two), the Court denies the parties’
Motions for Summary Judgment on this third element.

45

C.

Due Process Claim

Geraghty’s fourth cause of action alleges that the District’s preferred name and pronoun
practice is “vague and overbroad” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
(Doc. No. 1, ¶ 178.) A policy or practice “is so vague as to violate due process when it either (1) fails
to inform ordinary people what conduct is prohibited, or (2) allows for arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 517-18 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
In the employment context, such as here, “[t]here is ‘substantially more room for imprecision in
regulations . . . than would be tolerated in a criminal code.’” Id. (quoting Dade v. Baldwin, 802 F.
App’x 878, 885 (6th Cir. 2020)).

So, “[e]ven where First Amendment values are at stake,‘employment standards are not void for vagueness as long as ordinary persons using ordinarycommon sense would be notified that certain conduct will put them at risk’ of discipline.” Id. (quoting
Dade, 802 F. App’x at 885.)
Geraghty does not dispute that she received an email from Student A’s guidance counselor
telling her and Student A’s other teachers to use Student A’s preferred name and pronouns. (Geraghty
Depo. at PageID# 1124.) Geraghty testified that she understood that “anything that came from theguidance office, teachers were just supposed to follow.” (Id. at PageID# 1117.) While she did notknow if there was a written policy stating as such, “it was the practice,” as she understood it, to follow
a counselor’s instructions “[e]specially when it [came] to student treatment.” (Id.) Therefore,
Geraghty interpreted the counselor’s email as a directive. (Id. at PageID# 1117-18.) And according
to Geraghty, after her second meeting with Carter and Myers, she thought that if she did not use thestudents’ preferred names and pronouns, she “would face discipline.” (Id. at PageID# 1130.)46

Geraghty was therefore “clearly on notice that the policy applied to [her]” and that it required
her to use the students’ preferred names and pronouns. Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 518. Accordingly,
she “may not challenge it for vagueness.” Id. (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-56 (1974)).
The Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim.
D.

Official Capacity

Defendants argue that Geraghty’s claims against DiLoreto, Myers, and Carter are against themin their “official capacity” and therefore duplicative with her claims against the Board. (Doc. No. 461, PageID# 610-11.) Geraghty “does not dispute the dismissal of her official capacity claims against
the individual Defendants,” but only to the extent that the individual Defendants’ conduct is
attributable to the Board. (Doc. No. 58, PageID# 4591.) Defendants, however, do not stipulate thatthe individual Defendants acted pursuant to the Board’s policy or practice.
In general, official-capacity claims “represent only another way of pleading an action against
an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). However, “it does not appear that the
Sixth Circuit affirmatively requires the dismissal of official capacity claims against an official when
the government entity is also a party to the suit.” Baker v. Cty. of Macomb, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
129936 at *26 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 28, 2015). Rather, when the Sixth Circuit has affirmed the dismissalof official-capacity claims, it has done so because “the plaintiff fail[ed] to demonstrate that a policy
or custom of the defendant government entity played a part in the violation.” Baar v. Jefferson Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 476 F. App’x 621, 635 (6th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). As Geraghty has not failed toso demonstrate here, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue atthis time.
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IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the parties’ cross Motionsfor Summary Judgment. (Doc. Nos. 46, 52.) Specifically, the Court concludes that Geraghty’s
compelled speech was not pursuant to her ordinary job duties and that the District’s name and pronoun
practice was not neutral and generally applied. But it withholds deciding whether the Pickeringbalancing test and strict scrutiny weigh in Plaintiff’s favor or Defendants’ favor until a jury makes
factual determinations regarding the alleged interests at stake. Further, the Court concludes that there
are genuine disputes of material fact about whether Geraghty involuntarily resigned and, if she did,whether her protected conduct (if there was any) caused her to resign. Lastly, the Court grants
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Geraghty’s due-process claim, but it denies theirrequest to dismiss Geraghty’s official-capacity claims against the individual Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 12, 2024

s/ Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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