Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-02-CR-22-001347
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 641
September Term, 2023______________________________________JOSE ONAN ALVAREZ-GARCIAv.
STATE OF MARYLAND______________________________________
Berger,Ripken,Raker, Irma S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Berger, J.
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J.
______________________________________
Filed: June 17, 2024

* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the ruleof stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms with
Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Md. Rule 1-104.

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
Following a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Jose Onan
Alvarez-Garcia (“Alvarez-Garcia”), appellant, was convicted of first-degree assault,
second-degree assault, and wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent toinjure. He was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment, with all but three years suspended,followed by a five-year term of supervised probation. Alvarez-Garcia now challenges thecircuit court’s denial of his motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement
officers and appeals his conviction. On appeal, Alvarez-Garcia presents two questions forour review, which we consolidate and rephrase slightly as follows: 1

1

Alvarez-Garcia’s original questions presented read as follows:
1. Did the lower court err in denying a Motion to Suppress acustodial statement after finding:a. That the Miranda advisements were sufficient whentranslated by an uncertified officer who had noformal Spanish language education and who, due topoor translation, informed the arrestee, animmigrant who only speaks Spanish and isunfamiliar with the American legal system, thatanything they say “can be used on their court day,”rather than the traditional Miranda advisement thatanything they say “can be used against them incourt”?
b. That the Miranda waiver was voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent, when the arrestee had been
improperly advised of his rights, has no English
language skills and is illiterate in his native languageof Spanish, was inebriated, and the advising officer
was aware of his lack of understanding?

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
Whether the circuit court erred in denying Alvarez-Garcia’s
motion to suppress.
For the reasons explained herein, we shall affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Alvarez-Garcia was arrested on September 9, 2022 following an incident in Anne
Arundel County, the facts of which are set forth in the agreed-upon statement of facts
presented at trial:
On September 9th of 2022, at approximately 2128 hours,
officers with the Anne Arundel County Police responded to thearea of Charlotte Drive and Jill Lane in Maryland City for areport of assault. Dispatch advised that there was a male slit in
the throat and suffering minor injuries. Upon arrival, officers
observed several individuals at the intersection, including thevictim, Mr. Jerson Daniel Guzman-Garcia. Mr. GuzmanGarcia had a laceration across his throat area. EMS arrived andtransported the victim to the fire station for treatment.
Witness Danny Surpas told the police that he saw the entire
incident. He reported that the two suspects involved wereHispanic males. One was wearing a yellow shirt, blue shorts,
and a hat. The second male was wearing a long sleeved blue
plaid shirt and black pants.
***

2. Should this Court direct the Circuit Court to correct theCommitment Record to reflect the oral judgment handed down
on May 11, 2023, which included credit for time served?
On January 4, 2024, Alvarez-Garcia filed a motion to correct the Commitment
Record in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The circuit court granted AlvarezGarcia’s motion on January 22, 2024. On February 6, 2024, Alvarez-Garcia withdrew his
second argument on appeal concerning the Commitment Record.
2

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Mr. Surpas stated that the incident stated [sic] when the malein blue got into a verbal argument with the victim. The malein blue pushed the victim and the victim pushed him back. The
male in blue then left the area, only to return shortly with themale wearing the yellow shirt. The male in yellow approached
the victim with a sharp silver object and lunged at the victim.
The victim then grabbed his throat area and the two males [sic]suspects ran towards the community pool area.
Mr. Surpas observed the laceration to the victim's neck. And
the victim would have testified at trial that he did not have any
injuries to his neck prior to the male in yellow lunging at him.
Police units canvassed for possible suspects. Two males
matching the description of the suspects were located and ashow up was conducted with Mr. Surpas. He positively
identified the suspects as the males involved in the assaults.
Police also located a silver box cutter in the chair that the malein blue was sitting in. Both males were placed under arrest.
The male in yellow would have been identified at trial as the
Defendant, Jose Onan Alvarez-Garcia.
After his arrest, Alvarez-Garcia was transported to the Central Holding andProcessing Center located in Annapolis, Maryland, where he was interviewed by Officers
Kimberly Callison and Rachel Campos of the Anne Arundel County Police Department.
Alvarez-Garcia is a native Spanish speaker with the equivalent of a first-grade education
who is illiterate and does not speak any English. Officer Campos served as a translator
during the interview. Officer Campos testified that, although she has no formal training inSpanish translation, she has spoken Spanish for 29 years. She learned English and Spanish
simultaneously as a child and grew up speaking Spanish in her household with her parents,
who are first-generation Americans. Officer Campos also testified that she frequently
serves as a translator to assist fellow officers, averaging at least once per month.
3

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________At the beginning of the interview, the officers advised Alvarez-Garcia that they were
there to “talk about what happened tonight.” In response, Alvarez-Garcia told the officers
that he would “tell [them] everything that happened.” The officers then proceeded toadvise Alvarez-Garcia of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Officer Campos began by asking Alvarez-Garcia to write his name on the Advisement ofRights form, which was printed in English. He wrote his first name but told her that he did
not know how to write his last name. Officer Campos then proceeded to advise AlvarezGarcia of his rights in Spanish. A translation of the statement of rights provided by Officer
Campos’s reads as follows: 2
I’m going to read this Ok? This paper what it says is “I” andthere goes your name. I have been advised of my rights. That
I’m going to advise you of your rights, I’m Officer Campos.
That you have the right not to speak, okay? Everything thatyou say can be used on the court day. That no one is(unintelligible) and not one is threatening you so that you speakwith us. You have the right to speak with an attorney. And if
you want an attorney [tell me?] at any time you can say thatyou want an attorney. If you cannot I mean . . . you don’t havemoney for an attorney you can (unintelligible) by the state.
Officer Campos asked Alvarez-Garcia if he “understood these rights,” and AlvarezGarcia responded in the affirmative. She asked him to indicate his understanding of hisrights on the form, providing guidance along the way. One section on the Advisement ofRights form requires the individual completing the form to identify whether they wereThis quote and future quotes appear in a translated transcript excerpt of the police
interview attached to Alvarez-Garcia’s Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion toDismiss.
2

4

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
forced or coerced into giving a statement to law enforcement officers. Officer Campos
explained this to Alvarez-Garcia, stating: “Now this one says that no one is threatening
you, no one is forcing you and no one is convincing something [sic] for you to speak withus. Yes or No?” Alvarez-Garcia responded in the affirmative. Officer Callison requested
that Officer Campos “[e]xplain to him this is his way of saying that we’re not promising
you anything, that he has to check over here ‘no.’” Officer Campos did so, and AlvarezGarcia switched his answer on the Advisement of Rights form to indicate “no.” Officer
Campos later testified that when Alvarez-Garcia originally answered in the affirmative, shethought “he probably didn’t understand what I was trying to explain to him that [sic] thepaper said.”
The officers also asked Alvarez-Garcia if he was under the influence of alcohol ordrugs. He initially answered that he had not been drinking and that he “came from work.”
Officer Campos responded: “Yes, but you have been drinking?” This time, Alvarez-Garcia
responded in the affirmative and confirmed on the Advisement of Rights form that he had
been drinking. Officer Campos asked if he was too intoxicated to speak with the officers
and Alvarez-Garcia assured them that he was “fine” and “good” to speak with them. Afterthe form was completed, Alvarez-Garcia began to tell the officers about the incident
leading to his arrest.
Alvarez-Garcia was charged with first-degree assault, second-degree assault,
reckless endangerment, and wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent toinjure. On December 27, 2022, Alvarez-Garcia filed a motion to suppress the statements5

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
he made to the officers during his custodial interrogation. 3 He argued that the Miranda
advisements he received were not sufficient because he was not advised that anything hesaid could be used against him in court. He also argued that his waiver of his rights was
not knowing and voluntary.
The circuit court held a hearing on Alvarez-Garcia’s motion to suppress on May 1,
2023. Officer Campos testified at the hearing, detailing the process through which she
advised Alvarez-Garcia of his rights. Alvarez-Garcia also testified and stated that he did
not remember being advised of his rights. The court concluded:
The Court in this case does find that the Defendant's statements
were voluntarily given. The Court credits Officer Campos's
testimony that she explained to the Defendant the Miranda
rights. The Court finds that Officer Campos's statement,"Everything you say can be used on the court day" issubstantially similar to, "Anything you say can be used againstyou," and does find that on that issue, the Defendant wasproperly advised of that right.
The Court further finds and does credit Officer Campos's
testimony that it was her perception that the Defendantunderstood the advice that he was being given, that in certain
circumstances, where he said "Si" indicating yes, it was notparticularly with regard to that. When she asked whether hewas being forced or coerced, she didn't perceive, nor did the
Court in viewing the Defendant's body language and demeanoron the video, perceive that the Defendant was actuallyindicating that there was threats or coercion.
It certainly did not seem to the Court in viewing the body
camera video that – or the recording of the interrogation thatthat was the case. The Court does consider the fact that Mr.
Alvarez-Garcia testified that he is illiterate and is not able toAlvarez-Garcia also filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of his Motion to
Suppress on May 1, 2023.
3

6

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
read either English or Spanish. But the Court doesn't find, inlight of the fact that all of advice was given to him orally, thatthat was a significant factor in his making the determination.
The circuit court, therefore, denied Alvarez-Garcia’s motion to suppress.
Alvarez-Garcia entered a plea of not guilty and waived his right to a jury trial,
agreeing to proceed via bench trial based on an agreed-upon statement of facts. The State
entered a nolle prosequi as to the charge of reckless endangerment. Based on the statementof facts, the circuit court found Alvarez-Garcia guilty of first-degree assault, second-degree
assault, and wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure. The court
sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment, with all but three years suspended, followed bya five-year term of supervised probation. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Alvarez-Garcia argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the statements he made to Officers Callison and Campos. First, Alvarez-Garcia
contends that the officers failed to adequately advise him of his Miranda rights because
Officer Campos told him anything he said could “be used on the court day” but did not
specify that his statements could be used against him in court. He also argues that it was
improper for Officer Campos, as a law enforcement officer, to serve as a translator during
his custodial interrogation. Additionally, Alvarez-Garcia asserts that his waiver was notknowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. For the reasons discussed
below, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.

7

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________I.

Standard of Review
On review of a motion to suppress, this Court “view[s] the evidence adduced at the

suppression hearing, and the inferences fairly deducible therefrom, in the light mostfavorable to the party that prevailed on the motion.” Corbin v. State, 428 Md. 488, 497–
98 (2012) (quoting Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 531–32 (2010)). While we defer tothe factual findings of the trial court unless clearly erroneous, we “make our own
independent constitutional appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts ofthe case.” Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349, 362 (2010) (quoting Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490,
505 (2009)).
When appellate courts review the “adequacy of the Miranda warnings, we look to
the totality of the advisements.” Gonzalez v. State, 429 Md. 632, 651 (2012) (citing State
v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360, 379–80 (2010)). The Supreme Court of Maryland has determined:[I]f the warnings, viewed in the totality, in any way misstate
the suspect's rights to silence and counsel, or mislead orconfuse the suspect with respect to those rights, then thewarnings are constitutionally infirm, rendering any purported
waiver of those rights constitutionally defective and requiring
suppression of any subsequent statement.
Luckett, supra, 413 Md. at 380. Nevertheless, “[e]ven if the warnings themselves passconstitutional muster,” the State must still establish that the appellant’s waiver of his
Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary. Gonzalez, supra, 429 Md. at 651.
A circuit court’s determination that a statement given during custodial interrogation
was voluntary “is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.” Brown v.
State, 252 Md. App. 197, 234 (2021) (citing Buck v. State, 181 Md. App. 585, 631 (2008)).
8

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________“In evaluating the validity of a waiver in a given case, the court must consider the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including background, experience, andconduct of the accused.” Gonzalez, supra, 429 Md. at 651 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our review is limited to therecord of the suppression hearing. Brown, supra, 252 Md. App. at 234 (citing Lee v. State,
418 Md. 136, 148 (2011)).
II.

Alvarez-Garcia was properly advised of his Miranda rights.
On appeal, Alvarez-Garcia first argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress because the officers failed to adequately advise him of his rights under
Miranda and its progeny. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, madeapplicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects individuals frombeing compelled to make self-incriminating statements. U.S. Const. amend. V; Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1964). In the seminal case Miranda v. Arizona, the United States
Supreme Court set forth the following prophylactic warnings that law enforcement officers
must convey to an individual before undergoing custodial interrogation:[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that hehas the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be usedagainst him in a court of law, that he has the right to thepresence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he sodesires.
Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 479.
The United States Supreme Court, however, has “never insisted that Miranda
warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision.” Duckworth v. Eagan, 492
9

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U.S. 195, 202 (1989).

The Supreme Court clarified in Miranda that the warnings

articulated in that opinion or any “fully effective equivalent” may serve as “prerequisites tothe admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.” Miranda, supra, 388 U.S. at 476(emphasis added). As the Supreme Court recognized in California v. Prysock:This Court has never indicated that the “rigidity” of Miranda
extends to the precise formulation of the warnings given a
criminal defendant. This Court and others have stressed as one
virtue of Miranda the fact that the giving of the warnings
obviates the need for a case-by-case inquiry into the actual
voluntariness of the admissions of the accused. Nothing inthese observations suggests any desirable rigidity in the formof the required warnings. Quite the contrary, Miranda itself
indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy
its strictures.
453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
While Alvarez-Garcia was in custody, Officer Campos advised him: “Everythingthat you say can be used on the court day.” Alvarez-Garcia argues that this statement is
not a fully functional equivalent of the “traditional” Miranda advisement that anything asuspect says can be used against them in court. He contends that the “used against”
language is a “material aspect” of the advisement of rights required under Miranda andthat Officer Campos’s omission of this language renders the advisements inadequate.
Alvarez-Garcia relies on a case from the Court of Appeals of North Carolina as persuasive
authority.
In State v. Ortez, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina considered whether a
Spanish translation of a “waiver-of-rights” form adequately conveyed to Ortez his Miranda
rights. 631 S.E.2d 188, 243–48 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). Ortez argued on appeal that the10

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Spanish translation of the Miranda warnings read to him were “inadequate to convey to[him] the substance of his Miranda rights” because of the misuse of two Spanish phrases.
Id. at 244. First, the warnings included the phrase “corte de ley,” which has no meaning inSpanish, as the proper translation of “court” is “tribunal de justicia.” Id. Second, thewarnings used the term “interrogatorio,” which refers to a more “formal proceeding, suchas a court trial” rather than custodial interrogation. Id. Ortez also argued that argued thatthe translating officers’ advisement of Ortez’s right to a court-appointed attorney was notadequate because the translating officer did not specify that such as attorney “could comewithout cost to him.” Id. at 245. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that thewarnings issued to Ortez were sufficient to adequately convey his Miranda rights,
concluding:In the present case, the warnings read to defendant in Spanish
reasonably conveyed to defendant his Miranda rights and were
therefore adequate . . . . [W]hen defendant was asked in
Spanish whether he understood his rights, defendant answeredin the affirmative and signed the bottom of the waiver form.
Moreover, a material part of the Miranda warning given—that
anything defendant said could be used against him—waspreserved in the translation.
Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
Alvarez-Garcia uses this holding to support his assertion that individuals subjected
to custodial interrogation must be specifically warned that anything they say can be usedagainst them—not merely that the individual’s statement can be used in court. Our readingof Ortez does not lend support to Alvarez-Garcia’s argument. The Court of Appeals ofNorth Carolina appropriately recognized in Ortez that a “material part” of Miranda
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warnings requires law enforcement to inform a suspect that anything they say can be usedagainst them in court. Nevertheless, the court never analyzed or otherwise discussed
whether use of the phrase “used against you” is required in order to adequately advise asuspect of their Miranda rights. Indeed, the court does not place any emphasis whatsoeveron the “used against” language.
In our view, Smith v. State, 31 Md. App. 106 (1976), is instructive. Although Smith
does not involve a translation of rights, it does involve an advisement of Miranda rightsthat omits certain words included in “traditional” Miranda warnings. The United States
Supreme Court asserted in Miranda that “[t]he warning of the right to remain silent mustbe accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against theindividual in court.” Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 469 (emphasis added). In Smith, during
the appellant’s custodial interrogation, officers advised the appellant that his statement
could be “used against [him] in court.” 4 Smith, supra, 31 Md. App. at 118. On appeal, theappellant argued that this advisement of rights was infirm because the officers did notinclude language specifying that a suspect’s statements “can and will” be used against themin court. Id.

In Smith, law enforcement advised the appellant of his rights in two ways. Smith,supra, 31 Md. App. at 118. First, officers read off of a card to advise the appellant of hisrights. Id. The card stated: “If you choose to answer, your answers can be used against
you in court.” Id. Additionally, the “prelude” to a written statement made by appellant
contained a similar warning: “If you want to make a statement and answer our questions,anything you do or say can be used against you in a court of law.” Id. On appeal, theappellant challenged the omission of the terms “and will” in both of these advisements. Id.
412

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This Court concluded that “[t]he omission of the words ‘and will’ in the Miranda
warnings was not sufficient standing alone, to render the [appellant’s] statements
inadmissible.” Id. at 119. We reasoned that “the language used left no uncertainty as tothe consequences of” making statements to officers during custodial interrogation. Id. at
118 (citing Craft v. United States, 403 F.2d 360, 364 (9th Cir. 1968). Accordingly, theappellant was “sufficiently appraised of his rights.” Id. The State contends that the same
principle applies in the present case. We agree.
Similar to the omission of the words “and will” in Smith, we conclude that theomission of the words “used against” in the present case does not render an advisement ofrights deficient under Miranda. As the State aptly emphasizes, advising a suspect thatanything he says “can be used on the court day” is sufficient to notify him that his
statements can be used by the State in court to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, thatthe defendant is guilty of the crimes charged. Despite the omission of the terms “usedagainst,” Officer Campos’s statement “left no uncertainty as to the consequences” ofAlvarez-Garcia making statements to Officers Campos and Callison during his custodialinterrogation.
The advisement of rights that Officer Campos issued to Alvarez-Garcia did not in
any way narrow or minimize his rights. By contrast, the phrase “can be used on the courtday” adequately notified Alvarez-Garcia that any statements made to Officers Campos andCallison could be used by the State in court. As such, Officer Campos adequately advised
Alvarez-Garcia of his right to remain silent and the consequences of waiving that right.
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Accordingly, we reject Alvarez-Garcia’s argument that an advisement of a suspect’s rightto silence that omits the words “used against” is a misstatement of law rendering theadvisement constitutionally infirm.
In sum, Alvarez-Garcia fails to present any Maryland case law to support hisargument that Miranda warnings are inadequate if law enforcement tells an individual that
their statements can be used in court, but fails to specify that those statements can be “usedagainst” them. In our view, requiring such would go strictly against the principle that
Miranda requires “no talismanic incantation” to “satisfy its strictures.” Prysock, supra,
453 U.S. at 359. We, therefore, conclude that the advisement of rights issued by Officer
Campos were fully effective equivalents of the warnings required under Miranda and were,
therefore, sufficient to advise Alvarez-Garcia of his rights.
III.

It was not improper for Officer Campos to serve as a translator during
Alvarez-Garcia’s custodial interrogation.
Alvarez-Garcia also argues that it was improper for Officer Campos, as a police

officer, to serve as a translator during Alvarez-Garcia’s custodial interrogation. He assertsthat Officer Campos “was not a neutral translator, was not qualified to translate Miranda,
and was unable to properly translate the advisements” in a manner that allowed AlvarezGarcia to understand his rights.
In doing so, Alvarez-Garcia bases his argument on this Court’s holding in Soares v.
State, 248 Md. App. 395 (2020). Soares similarly involved a police officer serving as atranslator to advise a suspect of his Miranda rights. Id. at 399–401. Although Soares wasadvised of his right to silence, the officers never asked Soares if he understood his rights
14

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________and he never volunteered his understanding. Id. at 404–06. The translating officer
nevertheless related to a fellow officer that Soares understood his rights, despite Soares
never expressing this to the officers. Id. Later in the interrogation, Soares asked theofficers “if he ha[d] to answer” specific questions or if he could “keep his mouth shut.” Id.
at 407. The officers responded that they had “advised [him] of [his] rights already” butthat they were asking him those questions so that they could “move past [him]” in theirinvestigation. Id. They proceeded to ask Soares various questions, including questions
about his wife’s involvement in the crime charged. Id. at 408.
This Court ultimately held that the State failed to meet its burden to establish that
Soares was “ever fully advised” of his Miranda rights and the “implications” of waiving
those rights. Id. at 417. Although the translating officer recited what this Court deemed to
be a “mechanical simple reading” of the suspect’s rights, “[t]here were no follow-up
questions or inquiries by anyone.” Id. The officers never asked Soares if he understood
his rights and he never otherwise indicated his understanding of his rights. Id. at 417. We
noted that it is improper for a translating officer to simply “give his opinion as to whether
the appellant understood his rights” without any words or actions by the appellant
indicating his understanding. Id. at 402–03. Whether or not a suspect understands his
Miranda rights “cannot be delegated to the interpreter.” Id. at 406. Furthermore, we
recognized:
The satisfaction of Miranda’s right to silence is at least a
tripartite obligation. There is first the obligation on the Stateto inform the suspect of the right to silence. That means morethan reciting to a defendant the words on a written form. That15

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also means imparting to a suspect at least a rudimentary
understanding of what that right means and what the suspect
can do with it.
Id. at 416.
This Court also concluded that Soares’s inquiry as to whether he could “keep his
mouth shut” later in the interrogation served as “stark proof of his earlier lack ofunderstanding” of the advisement of rights. Id. at 417. Additionally, we held that that theofficers failed to honor Soares’s invocation of his right to silence when he asked thisquestion, improperly continuing to question him in the interest of “mov[ing] past [him]” in
their investigation. Id. at 418.
We, therefore, concluded that the circuit court erred in denying Soares’s motion to
suppress. Id. Our holding in Soares, however, was not based on the fact that a law
enforcement officer served as a translator during a suspect’s custodial interrogation. To be
sure, our opinion does provide some guidance on the limited role of an interpreter and theimportance of neutrality. Id. at 401–03. Moreover, we emphasized various factors“[f]urther complicating the distinctive communicative murkiness” of Soares’sinterrogation, including the “level of the appellant's education (elementary school)” andthe “less than ideally neutral status of the present interpreter (a fellow policeman).” Id. at415. This Court, however, did not hold that Soares was not adequately advised of his rights
simply because a police officer served as an interpreter during his custodial interrogation.
We further conclude that Soares is not analogous to the case before us here.
Alvarez-Garcia never invoked his right to silence. By contrast, he explicitly articulated his
16

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
understanding of his rights to Officers Campos and Callison and proceeded to answer theirquestions. While the translating officer in Soares independently evaluated the suspect’s
understanding of his rights, Officer Campos explicitly asked Alvarez-Garcia if heunderstood his rights and he responded in the affirmative. In our view, Soares is easily
distinguishable and does not in any way substantiate Alvarez-Garcia’s argument that theuse of a police officer as a translator is per se improper.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Maryland has affirmed a circuit court’s denial of amotion to suppress where the Miranda warnings were issued to a defendant by a police
officer serving as a translator. In Gonzalez v. State, the Supreme Court considered whether
the State met its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that officers
adequately advised Gonzalez, a non-English speaker, of his Miranda rights. Gonzalez,supra, 429 Md. at 647–57. Gonzalez’s native language was Mixtec, an indigenous
language spoken in regions of Mexico, though he also spoke some Spanish. Id. at 637.
During his custodial interrogation, a law enforcement officer fluent in Spanish served as atranslator. Id. at 637–38. Although the officer did not speak any Mixtec, he issued
Gonzalez an advisement of his rights in a combination of Spanish and phonetic
pronunciations of certain Mixtec words such as “court” and “attorney” -- the Spanish termsof which Gonzalez did not understand. Id. at 641–42. The advisement of rights portion of
the interview was not recorded, nor was the first part of the interview in which Gonzalez
answered the officers’ questions. Id. at 639. The second portion of the interrogation,
however, was recorded. Id.
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Because the advisement of rights was not recorded, the suppression court focusedon the testimony of Trooper Torres, the translating officer. Id. at 649. Trooper Torres“explained in detail how he advised [Gonzalez] of the Miranda rights in Spanish, how [he]obtained the Mixtec translation of certain words . . . and how [Gonzalez] indicatedeventually that he understood each warning contained on [the Advisement of Rights]
form.” Id. He also testified that he asked Gonzalez if he understood after each line of thetranslated Miranda warnings and “would rephrase each Miranda right and warning until
he was satisfied that [Gonzalez] understood.” Id. at 641–42. The officer’s testimony was
also corroborated by the audio recording of the second portion of the police interview
during which Gonzalez “answer[ed] questions in Spanish appropriately and without
hesitation.” Id. at 649.
The suppression court found the officer’s testimony to be “truthful and persuasive,”and the Supreme Court determined that this credibility determination was “virtually
unassailable,” recognizing:Consequently, we, as the reviewing court, must accept as fact
(as obviously did the suppression court) Trooper Torres's
testimony concerning his impressions of Petitioner's
comprehension of not only the Spanish language, but also thetrooper's phonetic pronunciation of the Mixtec words for“court” and “attorney.” Indeed, the suppression court foundthat Petitioner “could sufficiently understand Spanish in orderto waive his rights under Miranda.” Implicit in that finding,moreover, is the suppression court's predicate (albeit
unexpressed)
finding
that
Petitioner
sufficiently
comprehended the Miranda warnings so as to enable him to
make a valid waiver of the rights described therein.
Id. at 652–53.
18

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the officers adequately advised
Gonzalez of his Miranda rights and that his waiver of his right to silence was knowing andvoluntary. Id. at 657–60. The Court also emphasized that its “conclusion that witness
testimony may be sufficient to establish the adequacy of Miranda warnings delivered in aforeign language, without an audiotape or a transcript of the advisement, finds support in
the decisions of other state supreme and federal courts.” Id. at 654; see also United States
v. Abdi Wali Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 470 (4th Cir. 2012); Perri v. Director, Dep’t ofCorrections, 817 F.2d 448, 453 (7th Cir. 1987); Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 562 N.E.2d797, 803 (Mass. 1990).
Gonzalez is instructive and analogous to the case at issue. Both cases involve theuse of law enforcement officers as translators to advise suspects of their Miranda rights
while under custodial interrogation. Both translating officers asked the individuals being
questioned whether they understood their rights, and both individuals answered in theaffirmative. Furthermore, the records in both cases illustrate the individuals’ understandingof their rights. While the translated advisement of rights in Gonzalez was not videotaped
or audio recorded, the translating officer gave detailed testimony about the issuance of thesuspect’s Miranda warnings and the efforts he took to ensure the suspect’s understanding.
In the case before us, the record includes not only Officer Campos’s testimony but a video
recording of the entire police interview. Officer Campos’s testimony is corroborated by
the recording, documenting her efforts to adequately convey to Alvarez-Garcia his rights
and to confirm his understanding of those rights. Like the Court in Gonzalez, we conclude
19

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that the trial court’s credibility determination of Officer Campos’s testimony is “virtually
unassailable.” Gonzalez, supra, 429 Md. at 652.
Despite these similarities, Alvarez-Garcia presents multiple arguments assertingthat Gonzalez is distinguishable. He also misconstrues our holding in Gonzalez andsuggests that translations of Miranda warnings are only adequate where the translating
officer takes some sort of “additional steps” to ensure that the suspect understands theirrights. Alvarez-Garcia insists that Officer Campos “made no efforts” to clarify his rights“when he appeared to not understand” them. He also argues that Officer Campos’s“cursory” question asking Alvarez-Garcia if he understood his rights was “a far cry” fromthe translating officer’s “painstaking” efforts to ensure the suspect’s understanding of hisrights in Gonzalez.
We are not persuaded by this argument. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s holding in
Gonzalez requires an officer translating Miranda warnings into a suspect’s native language
to take some sort of elusive “additional steps” to ensure the suspect’s understanding.
Although the State bears the burden of establishing that a suspect has “full awareness ofboth the nature of the right[s]” and the consequences of waiving those rights, law
enforcement officers are not required to follow a specific script or formula to confirm thatan individual understands their rights after being issued Miranda warnings. Id. at 652(quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). Officer Campos asking AlvarezGarcia “do you understand?” after advising him of his rights is no less effective than theofficer’s approach in Gonzalez. Notably, what is critical is that Alvarez-Garcia responded20

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
in the affirmative, indicating he understood his rights, completed the Advisement of Rights
form accordingly, and proceeded to answer the officers’ questions.
Alvarez-Garcia also argues that, while the officer in Gonzalez was fluent in Spanish,“Officer Campos had only spoken Spanish casually in her childhood home.” Although
Officer Campos testified that she spoke Spanish in her home when she was growing up,
nothing in the record suggests she is not fluent or that she only speaks Spanish “casually.”
She has been speaking Spanish for 29 years and testified that she serves as a translator toassist her fellow officers at least once per month. We agree with the trial court that nothing
in the recording or transcript indicates that Alvarez-Garcia had any trouble understanding
Officer Campos. Notably, Alvarez-Garcia did not testify at the suppression hearing -- nordoes he argue on appeal -- that he had difficulty understanding Officer Campos’stranslation of his rights or subsequent questions during his custodial interrogation.
In our view, Gonzalez is analogous and persuasive. We, therefore, reject AlvarezGarcia’s contention that it is improper for a law enforcement officer to serve as a translator
while a suspect is undergoing custodial interrogation. Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in denying Alvarez-Garcia’s motion to suppress based on the fact that Officer Campos
served as a translator during his custodial interrogation.
IV.

Alvarez-Garcia’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary
under a totality of the circumstances.
Alvarez-Garcia’s final argument on appeal contends that his waiver of his rights

was not knowing and voluntary. An individual’s waiver of rights is valid “[o]nly if thetotality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced21

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
choice and the requisite level of comprehension[.]” Lee, supra, 418 Md. at 150 (quoting
Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at 421) (internal quotation marks omitted). There exists a
presumption that the individual did not waive their rights, and the State bears the heavy
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual’s waiver was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979);
McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 614–15 (1987). Nevertheless, “in at least some cases
waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.”
Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at 373.
Our determination of whether an individual’s waiver of their rights was knowing
and voluntary is twofold:First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntaryin the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberatechoice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.
Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awarenessof both the nature of the right being abandoned and theconsequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the“totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation”
reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level ofcomprehension may a court properly conclude that the
Miranda rights have been waived.
Gonzalez, supra, 429 Md. at 652 (quoting Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at 421). Our inquiry on
appeal requires us to consider various factors such as the individual's “age, experience,education, background, and intelligence[.]” Id. (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,
725 (1979)). This Court must determine whether the individual had “the capacity tounderstand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and theconsequences of waiving those rights.” Id.
22

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
Alvarez-Garcia contends that his waiver of his rights was not knowing or voluntarybecause he was “unaware of what his rights were.” Alvarez-Garcia argues that, due to theallegedly infirm advisement of rights from Officer Campos, he could not have waived his
rights because he did not have an adequate understanding of the rights nor the effect ofwaiving those rights. As we noted previously, we conclude that Alvarez-Garcia wasadequately advised of his rights. The translated advisement provided by Officer Campos
was a fully effective equivalent of the prophylactic warnings outlined in Miranda.
Additionally, as demonstrated in Gonzalez, it is not per se improper for a law enforcement
officer such as Officer Campos to serve as a translator during a suspect’s custodialinterrogation. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Alvarez-Garcia had any
difficulty understanding Officer Campos’s Spanish translation during the advisement ofrights or the subsequent interview. In fact, Alvarez-Garcia affirmed his understanding of
his rights to Officer Campos even before the officers began questioning him.
Alvarez-Garcia also argues that “his waiver was not free of governmental coercion.”
He contends that Officers Campos and Callison “blatantly directed [him] to complete thewaiver [form] in the manner they deemed to be proper, capitalizing on his lack ofunderstanding and his state of inebriation.” Specifically, Alvarez-Garcia highlights theinteraction between himself and the officers when completed the section of the Advisementof Rights form regarding force and coercion. The record indicates that Alvarez-Garcia
initially answered in the affirmative when the officers described the inquiry as follows:“No one is forcing you and no one is convincing something [sic] for you to speak with us.
23

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
Yes or no?” Officer Campos testified at the suppression hearing that when Alvarez-Garcia
originally answered in the affirmative, she thought “he probably didn’t understand what I
was trying to explain to him that [sic] the paper said.”
In our view, the wording of the initial question could easily confuse any listener, nomatter the language in which the question was posed. It is unclear if the “correct” answer
would be “Yes, correct, no one is forcing me” or “No, no one is forcing me.” It is notuncommon for any one of us to encounter a similarly befuddling question in daily life. For
example, we may be seated in a public place and have a stranger ask us: “Do you mind if
I take this seat?” Technically speaking, if you were comfortable with the stranger sittingwith you, the correct answer would be: “No, I do not mind, please go ahead.” Nevertheless,
we may make a common linguistic mistake and instead tell the stranger: “Yes, please go
ahead.”
An interrogation, like any conversation, is a fluid process whereby any party -- theinterrogator or the suspect -- may display momentary confusion as to the wording of aquestion. Indeed, this is one of the myriad of reasons why this Court considers a totalityof the circumstances when determining whether a suspect’s waiver of their right to silence
was knowing and voluntary. Notably, the trial court did not consider this interaction in
isolation. Based on Officer Campos’s testimony and the video recording of the police
interview, the trial court concluded that Officer Campos “didn't perceive, nor did the Courtin viewing the Defendant's body language and demeanor on the video, perceive that the
Defendant was actually indicating that there was threats or coercion.” Our review of the24

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
record leads us to the same conclusion. Alvarez-Garcia did not hesitate to change hisanswer on the Advisement of Rights form after the officers clarified the meaning of thequestion regarding coercion. Moreover, Alvarez-Garcia did not testify at the suppression
hearing and further fails to specify on appeal as to how he was forced or coerced by law
enforcement during his custodial interrogation.
Furthermore, we reject Alvarez-Garcia’s argument that his consumption of alcohol
prior to his arrest impacted his ability to knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda
rights.

The Supreme Court of Maryland has recognized that “evidence of mental

impairment from drugs or alcohol does not per se render a confession involuntary, and thata court may admit a confession into evidence if it concludes that it was freely and voluntary
made despite evidence of mental impairment.” Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 620 (1995). See
also Harper v. State, 162 Md. App. 55, 85 (2005) (holding that the appellant’s waiver of
his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary despite being intoxicated at the time hemade statements to law enforcement); Bryant v. State, 229 Md. 531, 536 (1962) (holdingthat “the fact that the appellant was probably under the influence of narcotics at the time of
the confession . . . does not of itself make the confession not free and voluntary”).
Officers Callison and Campos specifically recognized that Alvarez-Garcia had been
drinking and asked him whether or not he was too intoxicated to speak with them. He
insisted he was “fine” and “good” before the officers proceeded with their questioning.
Based on our review of the record -- including testimony presented at the suppression
hearing and the video recording of Alvarez-Garcia’s police interview -- there is no25

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
indication that Alvarez-Garcia was so intoxicated as to render his statements to the officers
involuntary.
Alvarez-Garica also raises other factors relevant to our analysis. Alvarez-Garcia isrecent immigrant who is illiterate, speaks little English, and has a low level of education.
The circuit court considered these factors at the suppression hearing and ultimately
concluded that these factors did not impact the court’s conclusion that Alvarez-Garcia wasknowing and voluntary “in light of the fact that all of advice was given to him orally.” Wereach the same conclusion here. Officer Campos verbally delivered a clear advisement ofrights to Alvarez-Garcia in his native tongue and asked him to affirm his understanding of
his rights. As such, Alvarez-Garcia’s literacy, language skills, and educational level do notcompel this Court to conclude his waiver was involuntary. Additionally, although AlvarezGarcia is a recent immigrant with little knowledge of the United States legal system, thisdoes not render his statements involuntary. See Madrid v. State, 474 Md. 273 (2021)(discussing Gonzalez, supra, and noting that a “defendant's waiver was not rendered
unknowing by the circumstance that the defendant was eighteen years old, uneducated, anda recent immigrant to the United States unfamiliar with the criminal justice system in thiscountry”).
Finally, Alvarez-Garcia’s testimony that he did not remember being advised of his
Miranda rights is not dispositive on appeal. The Supreme Court of Maryland considereda similar argument in Madrid v. State, supra, 474 Md. at 325–28. The appellant, Madrid,
similarly argued that he did not remember law enforcement officers advising him of his
26

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
rights. Id. at 326. The Supreme Court emphasized that the appellant never testified “thathe did not understand his rights.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court also noted that a video
recording of the appellant’s police interview “plainly showed that Detective Cruz gave theMiranda advisement and Madrid responded that he understood his rights.” Id. The
Supreme Court determined:
Madrid gave no indication in the recording that he was
confused or did not understand anything Detective Cruz had
explained to him. Madrid replied in the affirmative when
Detective Cruz asked him if he understood the rights that had
just been read to him. And, in the answers Madrid gave toquestions posed immediately before and immediately after the
Miranda advisement, Madrid responded appropriately, giving
no indication that he was having any difficulty understanding
the detective's statements.
Id. (quoting Madrid v. State, 474 Md. App. 693, 717 (2020)).
The instant case is strikingly similar to Madrid. Although Alvarez-Garcia testified
that he did not remember being advised of his rights, he never testified that he did notunderstand his rights. As we have repeatedly emphasized in this opinion, Alvarez-Garcia
affirmed to Officer Campos that he understood the advisement of rights provided to him.
He then proceeded to answer the officers’ questions and exhibited no difficulty
understanding Officer Campos’s questions or responding accordingly.
The United States Supreme Court has established that, “[w]here the prosecution
shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, anaccused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010). We conclude that the State met its
27

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that law enforcement officers issued
an adequate Miranda warning and that Alvarez-Garcia understood his rights. AlvarezGarcia’s uncoerced answers to Officers Callison and Campos’s questions constitutes animplicit waiver of his right to remain silent. Based on our review of the record, weconclude that Alvarez-Garcia’s waiver was voluntary under the totality of thecircumstances.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR
ANNE
ARUNDEL
COUNTY
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BYAPPELLANT.

28

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-02-CR-22-001347
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 641
September Term, 2023

JOSE ONAN ALVAREZ-GARCIAv.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Berger,Ripken,Raker, Irma S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Raker, J.
Filed: June 17, 2024

* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the ruleof stare decisis. It may be cited for its persuasive value only if the citation conforms with
Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B). Md. Rule 1-104.

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
Raker J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The Miranda warnings given in this case were not thefunctional equivalent of the traditional and required Miranda advisement. As the majority
notes, if the warnings given to a suspect in any way misstate the suspect’s rights or are
misleading or confusing with respect to those rights, then “the warnings are constitutionallyinfirm, rendering any purported waiver of those rights constitutionally defective andrequiring suppression of any subsequent statement.” State v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360, 380(2010). The warnings in this case were constitutionally defective, and I would reverse andremand for a new trial in which appellant’s statement to the police must be suppressed.
The “traditional” Miranda warnings require as follows:“He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has theright to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). Appellant was not warned that anything hesaid could be used against him in a court of law. He was warned that “everything that you
say can be used on the court day.” Crucially, this advisement omits the concept thatanything appellant said could be used against him by the State, as opposed to used in his
defense.
I recognize that, for the Miranda warnings to be sufficient, there need not be any“talismanic incantation” of the Miranda warnings. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355,
359 (1981). The warnings must merely reasonably convey to the suspect his rights.

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989). We have held, for instance, that thewarning “your answers can be used against you” is the functional equivalent to “anything
you say can and will be used against you.” Smith v. State, 31 Md. App. 106, 118 (1979).
Yet, one of the most crucial concepts that must be conveyed is that the statements
made can be used against a defendant in an adversarial manner. Indeed, our sister courts
have held that Miranda advisements that misstate or mistranslate portions of the traditional
advisement are permissible provided that they maintain the crucial piece: that what thesuspect says can be used against him. State v. Ortez, 631 S.E.2d 188, 245 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006) (“Moreover, a material part of the Miranda warning given—that anything defendantsaid could be used against him—was preserved in the translation.”).
The majority notes, correctly, that the court in Ortez did not analyze or otherwise
discuss whether the words “used against you” are an essential part of that crucial
advisement (as opposed to simply “used”). But we are called to do so today.
I would hold that the words “used against you” convey an important concept thatthe word “used” does not. “Used against you” informs a suspect succinctly that thestatements he makes may be used but not by him and not to his benefit. An inculpatory
statement made by a suspect will be admissible later against him in court. Md. Rule 5803(a)(1). An exculpatory statement made by a suspect ordinarily will not be admissible.
Muir v. State, 64 Md. App. 648, 656 (1985) (explaining that, while an inculpatory postarrest statement made to the police will be admissible against the defendant, an exculpatory2

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
post-arrest statement will be inadmissible when offered for the defendant under the hearsayrule).
The Miranda warnings in this case missed that crucial nuance. “Everything that you
say can be used on the court day” implies that the defendant would have a right to the useof his statement. It implies that the statements can be used for any purpose. The warning
given here substantially changes the incentive structure of the rights. If it were the case that“everything that you say can be used on the court day” by anyone (including the defendant)
for any purpose (including bolstering the defendant’s assertions of innocence), thensuspects would have an incentive to speak and give exculpatory statements which they
could later use at trial. But this is not the reality. By leaving out the words “against you,”the officers implied a right and an incentive that did not exist. They did not adequately
convey the consequences of appellant’s decision.
The majority reasons that, by advising the suspect that “[e]verything that you say
can be used on the court day,” the officers amply warned appellant that what he said could
be used by the State. If everything can be used (without any limitation), the majority
reasons, then it can be used by the State to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that thedefendant was guilty of the crimes charged. I agree that the warning adequately conveyed
the fact that the State could use appellant’s statements. But what the majority misses is that
the Miranda warnings do not just convey the potential use of the statements by the State;
the warnings, as ordinarily given, tell the suspect that any statements will not be used for3

— Unreported Opinion —________________________________________________________________________
his benefit. In my view, this notion (that the use is against the speaker) is important incalculating whether one should speak or remain silent.
For the above-stated reasons, I would hold that the motion court erred in not
suppressing appellant’s statements to the police and I would reverse the judgments below.

4