Issue Briefing No. 63

Challenges in Measures against
Digital Influence Operations:
Why can't the EU/US deal withthe methods used by China,
Russia, and Iran?
Kazuki Ichida(Visiting Researcher, Cyber Security Research Institute, Meiji University)
April 15, 2024

Abstract
The digital influence operation measures being undertaken in the EU and the
US focus on dealing with disinformation, which in turn includes dealing withforeign interference and major social media platforms. However, the main
aim of the CRI (China, Russia, and Iran) operation is to widen the polarizationand distrust that already exist within their counterparts, and the use of
disinformation and major social media platforms is only one of the ways to
do so. The effectiveness of EU and US measures is limited in scope because
the CRI can use other options to circumvent them. Since the attacker's goal
is to divide the target country and spread distrust, it is essential for the
defender to have an overarching understanding of the domestic situation inorder to conduct research and to cope with the influence operation. However,surveys and research often involve case studies, and the overall picture israrely examined, so effective findings are scarce. Current countermeasures,
which are symptomatic treatments lacking a holistic picture, tend to fall into
alarmism that issues indiscriminate warnings, and as a result, may deepen
polarization and distrust. It is important to prioritize the understanding andsharing of the big picture in countermeasures against digital influence
operations.

1

Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations

Issue Briefing No. 63

Changes in Digital Influence Operations by China, Russia, and IranMany of the measures taken by the European Union and the United Statesagainst digital influence operations focus on countering disinformation(including misinformation). The EU and the US have requested the majorsocial media platforms and major ad networks to prevent interference using
disinformation from abroad. The EU has introduced restrictions on majorsocial networking platforms and ad networks, and the United States Cyber
Command (USCYBERCOM) has taken active defense measures against
Russia and other countries.
However, these countermeasures are easily evaded because they
respond to individual attack methods rather than the aims of the attackers,
the CRI (China, Russia, and Iran. See Table 1 for methods of digital influence
operations). A report released on December 11, 2023 by the US National
Intelligence Council shows that the situation is not compatible with the new
methods of the CRI, as is corroborated by other sources.1
Table 1: Common TTPs (tactics, techniques, and procedures) and measuresfor digital influence operations
AttackingSummary

strategy

countermeasures

State media and Information
diplomats

Effectiveness oforiginatesfrom Very weak;legitimate channels, such as state It is often difficult
media and diplomats. Accounts of togovernment

diplomats

deal

with

and diplomats

andinformation posted are less likely others.

1

National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Threats to the 2022 US Elections," December 11,
2023. (https://www.odni.gov/ files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Declassified-ICAForeign-Threats-to-the-2022-US-Elections-Dec2023.pdf); Kazuki Ichida, “in'bōron'to
roshiano yoron'sōsao sodateta ōbēmin'shushugikokuno kakusa” (Conspiracy Theories andRussian Public Opinion Manipulation Bred Disparities in Western Democracies), Newsweek
Japan, May 10, 2023. ( https://www.newsweekjapan.jp/ichida/2023/05/post-46.php );Rossine Fallorina, Jose Mari Hall Lanuza, Juan Gabriel Felix Ferdinand Sanchez II, Jonathan
Corpus Ong, Nicole Curato, "The Evolution of Disinformation in Three Electoral Cycles," Internews (June 29, 2023). (https://internews.org/resource/from-disinformation-to-influence-operations-the-evolution-of-disinformation-in-three-electoral- cycles/); Samuel Woolley, Manufacturing Consensus (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023); Brad Smith, "Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War," Microsoft, June 22, 2022.
(https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/22/defending-ukraine- early-lessonsfrom-the-cyber-war/); Kazuki Ichida, “Maikurosofutoshano repōtowa ēkyōkōsakuni shōten'oateteita Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War” (Microsoft Report Focusedon Influence Operations, Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War), Kazuki
Ichida's Notebook, July 2, 2022.(https://note.com/ichi_twnovel/n/n2cd93a5de9ab )2

Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations

Issue Briefing No. 63
AttackingSummary

Effectiveness ofstrategy

countermeasures
to be removed from social media
platforms.

Proxy

Dissemination of information from Weak;thinktanks,

non-profit However,theorganizations, and media outlets reality of proxies isthatostensibly

have

no muchbettergovernment involvement, but in understood.
fact do. Doppelgangers such as
Russia's“Election

Watch”

and“Lies of Wall Street,” as well as“News Front,” are well known.
Use of AI

Generate and use images and Not known;
video text utilizing LLM (Large Methodology is still
Language Models).

under development

CIB

Social media abuse. There are Strong;(Coordinatedvarious methods such as bots, Effective

Inauthentic

trolls,Behavior)

Spamouflage

andaccount

hacking. countermeasures

by

is

China

well areknown.
Hacks & leaks

being

established.

Influencebyhackingand Strong;publishing stolen information. The Effective
Russian“Tainted

Leaks”and countermeasures

hacking into the Democratic Party are
of

the

US

are

well

being

known established.

instances. Sometimes the stolen
information is misused.
Small-scale

Actors use smaller, less-regulated Very weak;social media

social media rather than the more The actual situation
regulated platforms. They are also has
increasingly

using

not

encrypted identified

been
or

a

instant messaging services such contermeasure has
as Telegram.

not

been

established.
Linked
major
media

3

with In conjunction with the above Very weak;social strategies, small social media and In addition to themessenger posts are reprinted on difficultyof

Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations

Issue Briefing No. 63
AttackingSummary

Effectiveness ofstrategy

countermeasures
major social media. Not only is this ascertaining

thedone by the concerned parties, situation, it is also
but

sympathizers

in

the

other difficult

country may also cooperate.

to

deal

with it when thesympathizers

areone's own citizens.
Decentralization In

parallel

with

the

above Weak;strategies, attacks are done via Major soial media
dozens of social media.

can be addressed.

Interlocking

The CRI spreads narratives that Very weak;withare easy for individuals, groups, This is difficult tocounterpart

and media within the other country deal

sympathizers

tosympathize

spreads

with,

and

narratives

thatconvenientwithin

the

with,

as

itself countermeasures
are would conflict withother freedom of speechcountry. They are more likely to and expression.
resonate with the other party's
domestic anti-mainstream groups(RMVEs,conspiracy

theorists,rightists, etc.).
Information

By

havingtheinformation Very weak;laundering

reprinted in the other country's Not

currently

media, it becomes easier to gain addressed.
credibility.
Perception

When an influence operation is Very weak;hacking

exposed,disseminatingthat In principle, this is

information in turn can foster impossible to deal
anxiety and distrust towards all with.
forms of information within thetarget country. Lately, there havebeen instances where “not carriedout" cyber attacks or influence
operations

arevoluntarily

disclosed, aiming to exploit theeffects of perception hacking.
Source: Kazuki Ichida, “Nisen'nijūyonen'sen'kyono toshi sekaino arikataga kawarukamo

4

Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations

Issue Briefing No. 63
shirenai” (Election Year 2024 May Change the Way the World Works), Newsweek Japan,
January 10, 2024. (https://www.newsweekjapan.jp/ichida/2024/01/2024.php)

Russia also tried to deepen polarization and distrust within the US in
the 2016 US presidential election,2 as well as in the BLM (Black Lives Matter)movement.3 The EU and the US are aware of this, but have failed to deal with
it effectively, and are still using symptomatic measures, mainly against
disinformation.4 To take advantage of domestic divisions and distrust in thetarget country, one can incite, cooperate with, and express support forgroups and individuals within the country (Types 3 and 4 in Table 2). The
main actors are the domestic groups and individuals in the other country.
Table 2: Four classifications of digital influence operations
Activity

Judgment

Whether the measure

Current

is targetedmeasures

Domestic
Type 1
Type 2Type 3

Self-

Clear hostile

executioninterference

Not

Instructions,Interference

targeted byordersand Judgment

measures

Gray zone

againstIncitement,cooperation

Foreign
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Poor

No

digital2

Renee DiResta, Kris Shaffer, Becky Ruppel, David Sullivan, Robert Matney, Ryan Fox, Jonathan Albright, Ben Johnson, "The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency," Congress of the United States, October 2019. (https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/senatedocs/2/);
Philip N. Howard, Bharath Ganesh, Dimitra Liotsiou, John Kelly, Camille François, "The IRA,
Social Media and Political Polarization in the United States 2012-2018," University of Oxford, October 2019. (https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/senatedocs/1/)
3
On April 17, 2015, ZeroFOX sent an email to the Mayor of Baltimore, "Crisis Management,"
that mentions Russian interference. The reference has now been deleted; Kazuki Ichida andKayoko Ezoe, Han'zai jizen' sōsa shirarezaru bēkoku kēsatsutōkyokuno gijutsu (Crime 'Advance' Investigation: The Unknown Techniques of U.S. Police Authorities), Kadokawa
Shinsho, 2017, chapter 1; Donie O'Sullivan, Dylan Byers, "Exclusive: Fake Black Activist Accounts Linked to Russian Government," CNN, September 27, 2017.
(https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/28/media/blacktivist-russia-facebook-twitter/index.html)
4
Alina Polyakova, Marlene Laruelle, Stefan Meister, Neil Barnett, “The Kremlin's Trojan
Horses," Atlantic Council, November 15, 2016 (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/kremlin-trojan-horses/); Alina Polyakova, Markos Kounalakis, Antonis
Klapsis, Luigi Sergio Germani, Jacopo Iacoboni, Francisco de Borja Lasheras, Nicolás de
Pedro, "The Kremlin's Trojan Horses 2.0," Atlantic Council, November 15, 2017,(http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/the-kremlin-s-trojan-horses-2-0); Alina
Polyakova, Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, Robert van der Noordaa, Øystein Bogen, Henrik
Sundbom, "The Kremlin's Trojan Horses 3.0," Atlantic Council, December 4, 2018,(https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-kremlins-trojanhorses-3-0/)

5Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations

Issue Briefing No. 63
Activity

Judgment

Whether the measure

Current

is targetedmeasures

Domestic
Type 4

Supportstatement,

Gray zone

influence

ForeignNo

No

operations

indirect
supportNote: Light blue cells = condemnable, but enforceable measures are difficult and likely tobe repudiated.
Source: Kazuki Ichida, “Kotoshino furikaeri shūkaiokureno jōhōsen'taisakuto kōgekino
shin'kokuna kairiga susumu” (Review of the Year; The Serious Divergence between Lapsed
Information Warfare Measures and Attacks Continues), Kazuki Ichida’s Notebook, December
28, 2023 (https://note.com/ichi_twnovel/n/n3b271f0fe338 ) modified.

On the other hand, the Type 1 and 2 methods, such as CoordinatedInauthentic Behavior (CIB), are also used, and countermeasures by the EU
and the US can achieve results against these methods. Other attacks are notaddressed, but only successful results are publicized, making it appear as if
countermeasures are working. A prime example is the attack on the US
Capitol on January 6, 2021. While there were some successes in deterring
digital influence operations from China and Russia during the 2020 US
presidential election, the following year saw domestic groups such as QAnon
perpetrate the attack on the Capitol. A report from the Soufan Center has
revealed that behind this event lay digital influence operations orchestrated
by China and Russia.5 Although this report is disputed, the QAnon-ChinaRussia connection is also noted in other reports listed in footnote 11, and it
is believed that there was some involvement.
In recent years, there has been a setback in digital influence
operations measures in the US.6 In addition, the divisiveness and distrust in
5

Jason Blazakis, Mohamed H. El Shawesh, Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Leela McClintock, Mollie Saltskog, Zach Schwitzky, "Quantifying the Q Conspiracy: A Data-Driven Approach to Understanding the Threat Posed by QAnon," Soufan Center, April 21, 2021. (https://thesoufancenter.org/research/quantifying-the-q-conspiracy-a-data-driven-approach-to-understanding-the-threat-posed-by- qanon/); Zachary Cohen, "China and Russia 'Weaponized' QAnon
Conspiracy Around Time of US Capitol Attack, Report Says," CNN, April 19, 2021,(https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/19/politics/qanon-russia-china-amplification/index.html);
Kazuki Ichida, “Koronakade chūgokuya roshiaga hirometa kanan'no in'bōron” (QAnon Conspiracy Theory Spread by China and Russia in the COVID-19 Pandemic), Kazuki Ichida's
Notebook, October 9, 2022. (https://note.com/ichi_twnovel/n/ne1c8818d9a5c)
6
Kazuki Ichida, “Amerikano nisejōhōtaisakuga chokumen'shiteiru mon'dai” (Problems Facing
U.S. Disinformation Measures), GGR Issue Briefing, No. 32, September 1, 2023.
(https://ggr.hias.hit-u.ac.jp/2023/09/01/problems-facing-us-disinformation-measures/ )6

Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations

Issue Briefing No. 63
the country has worsened to the point that the 2024 presidential election is
expected to cause turmoil regardless of the outcome.7
While

the

CRI’s

interference

alone

has

not

exacerbatedthepolarization and distrust in the US, the three countries are playing a part.
Russia has recently refrained from cyberattacks on US elections because,
according to a report by the National Intelligence Council, it has determinedthat digital influence operations are less risky and more effective.8
Widespread domestic division and distrust is not only a problem in the
United States, but in many other democratic countries as well, leading to therise of populism and authoritarianism.9 The groups promoting it are diverse,
including Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVEs) suchas white supremacist groups, conspiracy theorists, and the far right, but it ishighly likely that they are not different groups at all, but overlapping.
Although they differ in their claims, they share a common denial of the statusquo, and they change their claims depending on the time of their activities.10
For instance, those who had been anti-vaccine advocates during the COVID19 pandemic started simultaneously making pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian
claims when the Russian invasion of Ukraine began.11 China and Russia have7

Ian Bremmer, Cliff Kupchan, “Ten Major Risks for Eurasia Group 2023,” Eurasia Group, January 2024. (https://www.eurasiagroup.net/siteFiles/Media/files/Top%20Risks%202024%20JPN.pdf)
8
National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Threats to the 2022 US Elections," December 11,
2023. (https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/NIC-Declassified-ICAForeign-Threats-to-the-2022-US-Elections-Dec2023.pdf); Kazuki Ichida, “Bēkoku in'terijen'su komyunitino hyōkano hen'kakara wakaru atarashī nin'chisen'no toren'do” (New Cognitive Warfare Trends Revealed by Changes in the U.S. Intelligence Community's Assessment),
Kazuki Ichida's Notebook, January 7, 2024.
(https://note.com/ichi_twnovel/n/n30ab8574915c)
9
Jon Henley, "How Europe's Far Right Is Marching Steadily into the Mainstream," The Guardian, June 30, 2023. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/30/far-right-on-themarch-europe-growing-taste-for-control-and-order); Pankaj Mishra, "Europe's Far Right Isn't
So Fringe Anymore," Washington Post, July 19, 2023. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/07/19/europe-s-far-right-putin-allies-are-rising-in-popularity/286def02-25ef-11ee- 9201-826e5bb78fa1_story.html); Tim Gosling, "Nationalist, Populist, Far-Right Parties Eye Rising Support across Europe," Aljazeera, September 20, 2023.
(https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/9/20/nationalist-populist-far-right-parties-eyerising-support-across-europe)
10
Aoife Gallagher, Ciarán O' Connor, Francesca Visser, “Uisce Faoi Thalamh: Summary Report," Institute for Strategic Dialogue, November 20, 2022. (https://www.isdglobal.org/isdpublications/uisce-faoi-thalamh-summary-report/); Jan Rathje, “From the Crisis to the Reich
Post -Pandemic Developments of ‘Reichsbürger' and Sovereignists in Germany," Center for
Monitoring, Analysis and Strategy, November 5, 2023. (https://cemas.io/en/publications/from-the-crisis-to-the-reich/); Kazuki Ichida, “ISDno ichiren'no hōkokushowa jōhōno
ekoshisutemuno hōkatsutekichōsadatta” (ISD's Series of Reports Was a Comprehensive Survey of the Information Ecosystem), Kazuki Ichida's Notebook, November 28, 2023.
(https://note.com/ichi_twnovel/n/n6c8c44b74953)
11
Elise Thomas, "QAnon Goes to China - Via Russia," Institute for Strategic Dialogue, March
23, 2022. (https://www.isdglobal.org/digital_dispatches/qanon-goes-to-china-via-russia/ );7

Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations

Issue Briefing No. 63
made good use of these groups.

Existing research on the need to understand the big picture
The problem that countermeasures to digital influence operations haveremained symptomatic has been pointed out in the past. Alicia Wanless hasrepeatedly stressed the importance of looking at the big picture.12 According
to Wanless, case studies, experiments, and surveys of high-profile cases in
the media, such as elections and conflicts, are currently the norm, but they
fail to capture the whole picture, not to mention the underlying causes, andWanless claims the importance of capturing the information ecosystem.
However, there are difficulties in attempting to uncover the whole picture,such as funding and the fact that it spans multiple fields of expertise.
Instead, it is much easier to simplify by blaming Russia, 4chan, etc., for the
results.
In the paper “Thinking Clearly about Misinformation," Li Qian Tay andcolleagues focus on causal inference to summarize the issues and argue that
understanding

causality

isnecessarytoconsidertheeffects

andcountermeasures of digital influence operations. The authors also argue thatdifferent research studies present different hypotheses and causal models,

Kazuki Ichida, Ukuraina shin'kōto jōhōsen' (Ukraine Invasion and Information Warfare), Fusosha Shinsho, 2022; Kazuki Ichida, “Sekai kakuchide dōjihassēshita han'wakuchin'kara
shinro hatsugen'eno ten'kan'” (The Simultaneous Worldwide Anti Conversion from Vaccine to
Pro-Russia Statements), Kazuki Ichida's Notebook, March 31, 2022.
( https://note.com/ichi_twnovel/n/nce3b3fc468a7 ); Mark Hay, "Pandemic and Anti-vaxxer
Conspiracy Theorists are Making the Ukraine Crisis All About Them," Daily Beast, March 22,2022. (https://www.thedailybeast.com/pandemic-and-anti-vaxxer-conspiracy-theoristsmake-ukraine-crisis-all-about-them); Laura KayaliI, Mark Scott, "Anti-vax Conspiracy Groups
Lean into Pro-Kremlin Propaganda in Ukraine," Politico, March 17, 2022. (https://www.politico.eu/article/antivax-conspiracy-lean-pro-kremlin-propaganda-ukraine/); Josh Butler, Sarah
Martin, “Australian Online Anti-Vaccine Groups Switch to Putin Praise and Ukraine Conspiracies," The Guardian, March 1, 2022. (https://www.theguardian.com/australianews/2022/mar/02/australias-anti-vaccine-groups-switch-focus-to-putin-praise-andukraine- conspiracies); Graig Graziosi, “Anti-vax Conspiracy Theorists in US Turning to Antisemitic Pro-Putin Propaganda, Report Says," The Independent, March 2, 2022.
(https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/putin-propaganda-usaconspiracy-theorist-b2027230.html); Sheera Frenkel, Stuart A. Thompson, “How Russia andRight-Wing Americans Converged on War in Ukraine," The New York Times, March 23, 2022.
(https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/technology/russia-american-far-right-ukraine.html)
12
Alicia Wanless, “Seeing the Disinformation Forest Through the Trees: How to Begin Cleaning Up the Polluted Information Environment," The Forum Network, November 13, 2023.
(https://www.oecd-forum.org/posts/seeing-the-disinformation-forest-through-the-treeshow-to-begin-cleaning-up-the-polluted- information-environment); Alicia Wanless, “There Is
No Getting Ahead of Disinformation Without Moving Past It," Lawfare, May 8, 2023.
(https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/there-is-no-getting-ahead-of-disinformation-without-moving-past-it)

8

Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations

Issue Briefing No. 63
and reach different conclusions. 13

According to Tay et al., there are

hypotheses and assumptions that dis/misinformation or conspiracy theories
are caused by social backgrounds such as inequality, polarization, and therise of populism, as well as distrust of the society; there are also hypotheses
that misinformation is the cause of such backgrounds, and that suchbackgrounds and misinformation influence each other. Different hypotheses
naturally lead to different conclusions. Tay et al. point out the oversight offactors that can occur in data analysis using randomized controlled trials
with causal diagrams. This is a problem that arises as a result of prioritizing
the convenience and feasibility of the research method. Therefore, Tay et al.
recommendamethod

that

is

in

line

with

the

actualsituation,acomprehensive approach based on causal inference, and the use of findings
from cognitive science.
While causal inference is necessary to address digital influence
operations, there is a tricky problem. As Judea Pearl points out, the resultsof causal inference follow the causal model chosen subjectively by the
analyst, and different analysts using different causal models may get
different results, both of which are correct.14 Furthermore, in many cases, aless comprehensive model makes it easier to assign blame and takecountermeasures. It is tempting to use a less comprehensive model thatallows existing methodologies to be applied if they have been scientificallyvalidated. Rather than choosing the best solution to the problem, we tend to
define and address the problem with an approach that is optimized for the
existing methodologies. A less comprehensive model leads to partially
optimal measures, which can have a negative effect on the whole.

Negative effects of ineffective measures
Compounding the problem is the negative impact of the measures andthe press. Those who indiscriminately disseminate disinformation threats arecalled alarmists, and it has been noted that the warnings issued by alarmists
reduce satisfaction with democracy itself and with the press. 15 This
13

Li Qian Tay, Stephan Lewandowsky, Mark J. Hurlstone, Tim Kurz, Ullrich K. H. Ecker, “Thinking Clearly About Misinformation," Commun Psychol, 2-4, 2024.
(https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-023-00054-5)
14
Judia Pearl, Dana McKenzie, In'gasuiron'no kagaku naze no toini dō kotaeruka (The Book
of Why： The New Science of Cause and Effect [Kindle Edition]), Bungeishunju, 2022, p.
166.
15
Andreas Jungherr, Adrian Rauchfleisch, “Negative Downstream Effects of Alarmist Disinformation Discourse: Evidence from the United States," Political Behavior , 2024.
(https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-024-09911-3); Kazuki Ichida, “Nisejōhōeno chūikan'kiya

9Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations

Issue Briefing No. 63
mechanism is similar to a technique called perception hacking, which Russia
was already using in 2016. Perception hacking refers to the practice ofmaking people skeptical and distrustful of information and media simply bylearning that “digital influence operations were taking place."
The indiscriminate warnings by governments and media since 2016 may
have contributed to the retreat of democracy. In Japan, for example, theMinistry of Internal Affairs and Communications is active in combating
disinformation, but of course this does not include security, nor does it
include Type 3 or 4 in principle. In the US election, the USCYBERCOM istaking action, but the focus is on disinformation, and furthermore,interference from within the country is beyond its scope. Both Japan and the
US focus on disinformation and not much on other issues. The result is
unbalanced and biased warnings, which increases the risk of alarmism. Thereis also a risk that issues outside the scope will be invisible, and that atrivialized partial problem will be misinterpreted as representing the whole
picture.
In recent years, an increasing number of governments and companies
haveoutsourced

countermeasuresagainstdisinformationtoprivatecompanies, such as reputation management firms. These companies spreadthe negative impact by publishing reports promoting the threat ofdisinformation due to sales imperatives, or by talking about the threat andthe need for countermeasures in response to media interviews.

Conclusion
As we have seen above, current measures towards digital influence
operations are not able to capture the entire picture, and therefore, they are
only addressing problems within the scope of existing methodologies, andnot selecting the best solution. Even if huge amounts of data are analyzed,each research study has a different way of looking at the problem, which isthe premise for the analysis, so the findings cannot be integrated, anddiscussions are spinning out of control. Organizations and regulations havebeen established, countermeasures have been taken, fact-checking andtakedowns of disinformation providers have been carried out, and it appears
that results have been achieved – but in reality, there has been no
improvement. In fact, these measures may even be having the opposite
hōdōga min'shushugio suitaisaseru = kēkaishugishano risuku” (Alerting and Reporting on
Disinformation Declines Democracy = Alarmist Risk), Kazuki Ichida's Notebook, January 17,2024. (https://note.com/ichi_twnovel/n/n02d7e7230e8b)

10Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations

Issue Briefing No. 63
effect. Meanwhile, digital influence operations by the attackers – China,
Russia, Iran, and other authoritarian countries – are evolving their methods
and cross-referencing effective attack techniques, resulting in increasingly
similar TTPs.
In Europe, the US and Japan, the trend is likely to be toward moreregulation that is unlikely to be effective. In their earlier paper, Tay et al.
argued that alarmism increases consent to regulation. The focus is thenskewed, which further exacerbates alarmism. In addition, the regulation ofincreasing amounts of disinformation often requires a systemic response,
but the implementation of such a system is likely to lead towards
authoritarianism. This is because all systems have ideas and intentions
woven into them at the time of design and development, and operating thosesystems means following those ideas and intentions. The strong linkage ofideology to specification was demonstrated at the World Congress on
International Telecommunications (WCIT-12).16 The destination of alarmism
is increased censorship and suppression of speech.
It is necessary to switch to a comprehensive approach at an early stage
and to take measures based on an overall picture.
【Translated by】
Tomohito Nakano (Master’s student, School of International and Public
Policy, Hitotsubashi University)

Kazuki Ichida Profile
After managing several IT companies, Kazuki Ichida became a permanent
resident of Canada in 2011 and moved to Vancouver. At the same time, hemade his debut as a novelist. He has published many novels about cybercrimes that could happen in real life, as well as books and reviews about the
manipulation of public opinion on the Internet. In recent years, he has
written extensively on digital influence operations.

16

Japan Network Information Center, “Domein'mēo chūshin'to shita in'tānettoporishīrepōto
2013nen 1gatsugō WCIT2012no kekkani tsuite” (Internet Policy Report with a Focus on Domain Names January 2013 - Results of WCIT 2012). (https://www.nic.ad.jp/ja/in-policy/policy- report-201301.pdf); Takehito Deguchi, “Sekai kokusaiden'kitsūshin'kaigi(WCIT-12)
kekka hōkoku (sōkatsu)” (Report on the Results of the World Conference on International
Telecommunications (WCIT-12)), ITU Journal, 43(2), 2013. (https://www.ituaj.jp/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/WCIT12.pdf)

11

Challenges in Measures against Digital Influence Operations