Introduction

Game theory has excisted existed for millennia and has been in applied to many formssituations; , ranging

Comment [A1]: Using 'and has' here makes thetwo verb phrases equivalent.

from historical events (such as Spains’ Spain’s rebellion on against Rome in 75 BCE ([McCain 2010), ]),biological models (such as natural selection), market environments (such as oligopolyoligopolies) ,politics (such as election bidding), and computer science to name few. This field of applied mathematics
captures behaviour behavior in strategic situations (called games ), wherein the success (payoff) of theComment [A2]: This phrase is not needed, it ismore conversational. It is always best to use formal
style of writing for academic manuscripts.

choice made by an individual (the (player ) is dependent on the choiceesmade choices made by others’(other players) (Myerson, 1991) .

The three main mathematical models of games are the extensive form, the strategic form, and the coalition
form. The bases of difference in one each of these models is are the amount of detail provided: the players,
their preferences, their information, the strategic actions available to them, and how these influence theoutcome?.

In this paper, we describe the strategic form and study its phenomena in a case of business management—- labor negotiation at an automobile factory.

The strategic form, also called the normal of a game, has much little fewer details compared with theextensive form. For In the extensive form, the position positions and move moves of the game are closely
followed, and the rules define the probable outcomes in planned or random moves (gambling ). By
contrast, in the strategic form, the players players’ choice, i.e., a strategy selected from a set of possible
strategies, determines the outcome, i.ee., payoff. All players choose a strategy, and once after the choices
are revealed, the game ends with each player getting some payoff. Each player’s payoff is influenced byby eachthe player’s players’ choicechoices. Payoffs can be quiet complex entityentities. For ourmodel, we represent payoffs by numerical values. Hence, we assume that the numerical payoffs depend on
the choices of all the players.

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Comment [A3]: This should be plural to matchthe subject 'playoffs.'

3 Three objects define the strategic form of a game: 1) the set of players, : N={1,2,…,n}, }; ii 2) thesequence of the players’ strategy sets:, X1,…, Xn, ; and 3) the sequence of player’s pay -off functions, :f(a1,…, an),…, fn(a1, , a n ).

All material in this document is the intellectual property of Crimson Interactive Pvt. Ltd. The use of information and content inthis document in whole or in part is forbidden unless express permission has been given in writing by Crimson Interactive Pvt.
Ltd.

www.enago.com | www.enago.jp | www.enago.com.tr | www.enago.com.br | www.enago.de | www.enago.tw |www.enago.cn | www.enago.co.kr | www.enago.ru

Comment [A4]: Sentences should not begin withnumerals.