ISIS Malaysia
The Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia is the country’s premier thinktank with a mandate to advance Malaysia’s strategic interests. As an autonomous researchorganisation, we focus on foreign policy and security; economics and trade; social policy andnation-building; technology and cyber; and climate and energy.
We actively conduct Track-Two diplomacy, promoting the exchange of views and opinions at thenational and international level. We also play a role in fostering closer regional integration andinternational cooperation through forums, such as Asia-Pacific Roundtable, and networks like
ASEAN Institutes of Strategic & International Studies network, Pacific Economic Cooperation
Council and Network of East Asian Think-Tanks.
focus | 1

Content
4
5
9
12
15
18
22
26
Editors

The Asia PacificRoundtable

What the changing global
order means for Malaysia
Prof Dr Mohd Faiz Abdullah

Asia’s growing agency in
new Cold War
Prof C Raja Mohan

Inevitable peace between
China-US
Victor Gao

How EU approaches major-power
rivalry in Southeast Asia
HE Sujiro Seam

India’s G20 presidency offers
Global South a ‘reset’Prof Harsh V Pant

Gaza gridlock to Mideast
peace
Maryam Ismail

How Gaza war could shift
Middle East geopolitics
Dr Ebtesam Al-Ketbi

Tan Wan-Peng
Yanitha Meena Louis

30
34
42
46
50
54
58
62

Preparing Malaysia for the
ASEAN chairmanshipIzzah Ibrahim

Wishlist for Malaysia’s ASEAN
chairmanship 2025

How Malaysia should seize
geostrategic advantages
Jaideep Singh

Australia with ASEAN every
step of the way
HE Tiffany McDonald

India’s foreign policy approach to the
Global South and Indo-Pacific
HE BN Reddy & Beno Zephine NL

How the EU could reshape
Indo-Pacific’s future
Dr Rahul Mishra

AI in defence and military innovation:
advances and challenges
Dr Michael Raska

Climate crisis at North-South
impasseKieran Li Nair

Designer

Mohd Farouf Sahal
Publisher

Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia
1, Persiaran Sultan Salahuddin
50480 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and may not necessarily reflect those of ISIS Malaysia
and the other individuals/organisations cited. Images obtained from Shutterstock.

2 | focus

Editors’

NoteThis issue of focus expounds on the key issues covered during
the 37th Asia-Pacific Roundtable (37APR), one of the Instituteof Strategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia’s flagshipconferences.
The 37APR was convened from 4-6 June 2024 with the theme“Crisis in an interregnum”, reflecting the current state of global
affairs where norms and mechanisms that have shaped theinternational order are breaking down, and no longer able torespond to the adverse challenges of the day.
The roundtable sought answers to distinct questions, such as
how established and emerging middle and major powers would
operate in this interregnum and if they would seek common
ground and cooperation. Role-players also tried to discern what
emerging structures and rules are being shaped in this complex
environment. Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim
who delivered the keynote address shared his perspectives on
the failure of existing international cooperative mechanisms
and the rise of strategic configurations of consequence, as a
product of this interregnum.
A key topic covered in this issue is what the changing global orderand strategic competition means for states, with perspectives
from Malaysia, India, China and the European Union (EU). It
also covers the dire situation in Gaza with two perspectives on
Middle East geopolitics.
This focus has an entire section dedicated to Malaysia’s
upcoming ASEAN chairmanship with views from Southeast
Asian experts, including the Secretary-General. There are also
articles on the state of global geoeconomics with a focus on
Malaysia’s competitive advantages, cooperation opportunities
for ASEAN with Australia, India and the EU respectively, theimpact of Artificial Intelligence on military capabilities and theNorth-South divide in addressing the climate crisis.
These articles are written by ISIS Malaysia researchers, 37APR
role-players and collaborators and members of the ASEAN-ISIS
network. The editors of ISIS focus remain ever grateful to allcontributors and readers for your unwavering support. We wish
you a productive reading.
This edition of focus is sponsored by the Delegation of the European Union to Malaysia

focus | 3

The Asia-PacificRoundtable
The Asia-Pacific Roundtable (APR) is the signature international conference of the Institute ofStrategic & International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia convened on behalf of the ASEAN Institutes ofStrategic & International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) network.
The APR is one of the region’s premier Track-Two gatherings and ranked among the world’s top
20 think-tank security conferences. From its modest beginnings at ISIS Malaysia’s conference
room in the late 1980s, the APR has grown significantly in scope, depth and size, attracting theparticipation of policymakers, thought leaders, intellectuals, scholars, officials and journalists
to address strategic issues concerning the Asia-Pacific and the world at large.
The APR has been held annually since its inception in 1987 and its long-standing success is a
result of the strong support from successive Malaysian prime ministers and regional leaders.
The roundtable brings together the best minds in the region and from around the world tostimulate frank discussions and serious policy debate on a wide range of topics. Over theyears, the APR has hosted participants from Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific, North
America, Europe, South Asia and the Middle East.

4 | focus

What the changing
global order means for
Malaysia
ASEAN chairmanship in 2025 an opportunity to
mitigate worst aspects of geopolitical rivalry
Datuk Prof Dr Mohd Faiz Abdullah

focus | 5

As the world’s economic order unravels intandem with the gradual disintegration of
the international rules-based order, we areentering the phase of interregnum – a shift
from an order defined by American primacy
to one that is yet undefined. A glimpse ofwhat may come was explored at the recent
37th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, one of theregion’s top security conferences.
In the words of Prime Minister Dato’ Seri
Anwar Ibrahim, “the geostrategic horizon
ahead is overcast with ominous signs offoreboding, foreshadowing the critical risks,hazards and potential catastrophes in ourpath that we ignore only at our peril”. The
prime minister emphasised that navigatingthese treacherous geopolitical waters,
Malaysia will continue to uphold its own
principles when dealing with major powers in
the face of multiple interlocking crises.
Common security interests
In the Asia-Pacific region, rivalry among the
majors has necessitated middle and smaller
powers to reassess and adjust their national
security interests to address threats, whether
perceived or real. This process has revealed
that the Asia-Pacific shares more security
interests and strategies than previously
thought. While that may lend some degreeof mutual reassurance, the reality bites hard.
That’s because the commonality of security
interests and strategies brings cold comfort
in the face of ongoing strategic competition,
economic rivalry and differing visions for the
preferred regional order.
The trepidation felt by middle and smaller
powers in the Asia-Pacific is further
accentuated by attempts to bring security
related discussions into trade and economic
platforms that have traditionally avoided
such controversial topics, for example, APEC.
Closer to home, the strategic geographyof Southeast Asian nations between thesea links of the Indian and Pacific Oceansmeans that the major powers have a lingering
6 | focus

presence in the region, bringing their rivalries
with them and piling on the pressure for theother powers, littoral or otherwise, to picksides.
China’s re-emergence as a significant player
and its attempts to redefine the regionalarchitecture, contrasted with the UnitedStates’ containment-driven approach, have
escalated both powers towards greater
confrontation, particularly in the South China
Sea.
With the prospects for consensus,
cooperation and coordination via multilateralgovernance mechanisms getting dimmer by
the day – thanks largely to institutional inertia
and the lack of willingness to find common
grounds – small and middle countries canneither let the grass grow under their feet nor
afford to be “at the space in between” of thesuperpower rivalries for too long.
ASEAN’s central role
In this regard, ASEAN and its inclusive
regional strategy might be just what thedoctor ordered to balance the interests of theoutside powers. ASEAN’s firm foundation ofcentrality, unity and non-alignment, together
with its enhanced collective economic
weightage, confers on this regional bloc a
position of significance. ASEAN is also proof
that carefully crafted cooperation can benefit
its members that are extremely diverse insize, geography, culture, income level andresource endowment.
Malaysia is preparing for its ASEAN chair in
2025 as we move forward with the ASEAN
Community Vision 2045. It is imperativethat ASEAN punches above its weight andexceeds expectations in promoting trust
through diplomacy and sustained dialogues.
ASEAN needs to be free from interstate
conflict and able to maintain its balanceat the intersection of great power interestsin the region. This, in turn, will ensure that
ASEAN remains in the central role in the
evolving regional architecture.

ASEAN plays a crucial role in the global
economy. The region’s combined GDP makes
it one of the largest economies in the world,
fostering significant trade and investment
opportunities. The economic integration
within ASEAN enhances the competitivenessof its member states, allowing them to attract
more foreign direct investment and benefit
from economies of scale. Moreover, its
strategic location at the crossroads of global
trade routes further amplifies its importanceas a hub for commerce and industry.
Given ASEAN’s prominence in the regional
political economy, Malaysia aims to
rejuvenate convening and norm-building
mechanisms, namely, the East Asian Summitand ASEAN Regional Forum, by focusing on
more contemporary issues. This is essential
in clinching more tangible and impactfulpolicy outcomes and revitalising theseprocesses as an effective entity within theoverall ASEAN ecosystem.

“

Malaysia is preparing
for its ASEAN chairin 2025 as we move
forward with theASEAN Community
Vision 2045. It isimperative that
ASEAN punches
above its weight andexceeds expectationsin promoting trust
through diplomacy andsustained dialogues.

ASEAN will remain unpretentious in its
endeavour to get on the front foot andwelcome productive yet meaningful relations
with our strategic and comprehensive
partners as well as friends in the Global
South. Yet we should remain committed tomaintaining and deepening our relations
with the Global North and ASEAN’s longstanding dialogue partners, the US aswell as the European Union. At the sametime, ASEAN should also look forward toenhancing relations with the Organisation of
African, Caribbean and Pacific States, Gulf
Cooperation Council and MERCOSUR, theSouth American trade bloc.
Yet difficult issues confront ASEAN, with thecrisis in Myanmar and the South China Sea
dispute being among the most intractable,
bearing longstanding ramifications for theregion and beyond.
Myanmar, South China Sea issues
Malaysia will be under tremendous pressure
to move the needle forward on the crisis in
Myanmar. No matter how daunting, it will beessential for Malaysia to work with ASEAN
member states and dialogue partners thathave influence with the various stakeholders.
Anwar has clearly stated his commitment toaddress the issue, as doing nothing is not an
option. Yet we must remain cognisant of thevarious changes taking place in Myanmar,
including
discussions
bynumerousstakeholders on its future as a federation,or if the fighting continues indefinitely, thepossibility of Balkanisation.
James Baldwin opines that “people aretrapped in history and history is trapped inthem.” Too sweeping perhaps and TS Eliot
should provide some relief: “History may beservitude, History may be freedom.” Eitherway, we forget history at our own peril.
It is in times of momentous geopoliticalconvulsions that we need to cast off ourpessimism in favour of the possible andinitiate discourse. With the crises andfocus | 7

conjunctures happening right now, whether itis the genocide of Palestinians in the Middle
East, war between Ukraine and Russia andcloser to the region, the conflict in Myanmar
and rising South China Sea tensions, it
is certain that multiple configurations ofalliances underscored by the mushroomingof mini-lateral alignments will be unable toserve the cause of peace. There is a need toreturn to a rules-based approach and valuebased leadership, instilled in every type ofbilateral or multilateral relationship.
It is more important than ever for all countries
to “cling to the law” more firmly or risk morechaotic collapse if the ruptures we arewitnessing are not sealed. Whether or not thebattle between the major powers will leadto zero-sum game, we, collectively, cannot
afford to weather another turbulence in therealm of international order. Averting such a
debacle warrants a return towards respecting
and observing the rule of law and upholding
the values of integrity and accountability.

“

Malaysia will be under
tremendous pressure
to move the needle
forward on the crisis
in Myanmar. No matter
how daunting, it
will be essential for
Malaysia to work with
ASEAN member statesand dialogue partners
that have influencewith the various
stakeholders.

Indeed, the onus is on the major powers toaspire to be responsible participants in theinternational system and avoid being the“spoilers” of global peace. In our region, it isvital for ASEAN through its mechanisms, tolead the major powers in mitigating the worst
aspects of their geopolitical rivalry. Malaysia
will use its capacity to shape these newcontours as we remain steadfast to our nonaligned, open and peaceful foreign policy,
as we have done over the last 67 years of
independence.

Datuk Prof Dr Mohd Faiz Abdullah

ChairmanInstitute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS)
Malaysia

8 | focus

Asia’s growing agency
in new Cold War
Regional actors need internal cohesion, strong
leadership, judgment and political will to engage withgreat-power rivalry
Prof C Raja Mohanfocus | 9

Conventional wisdom suggests that greatpower conflict severely constrains thepolitical agency of others, including regional
powers and small states. As the UnitedStates-China rivalry envelops Asia, it has
become commonplace in the region to argue
that Asian states don’t want to choose.
In Asia’s real world though, it is not questionof picking a side but of navigating the realityof great-power rivalry that the region can’t
control. Recent history of international
relations suggests that great-power rivalry
increases the agency of states that arecapable and willing to seize the possibilities
that emerge. Like the Cold War in the second
half of the 20th century, the current greatpower conflict creates considerable room formanoeuvre for regional actors, big and small.
Recall that in the earlier Cold War, many Asianstates refused to abide by the presumed
rules of the conflict between the US and theSoviet Union. They were willing to challenge
the ideological framing of the Cold War
and the claim, from both Washington andMoscow, that their battle was between “goodand evil”. While some chose non-alignment,
other Asian states bargained with either orboth superpowers for their support.
As the Cold War unfolded and thecompetition between the US and the Soviet
Union intensified, they sought to win friends
and influence the vast number of states thatwere uncommitted to one side or the other.
Development assistance, arms supplies andcapacity building were offered by both sides
to key countries of interest.
Tracing geopolitical rivalry
Jawaharlal Nehru’s India, for example, notonly received aid from both sides but was
the biggest recipient of external assistancefrom Washington and Moscow. Mao Zedong’s
China switched from an alliance with theSoviet Union in the 1950s to the forging
of a productive political and economic
partnership with the US and the West in the
10 | focus“

In the earlier Cold War,many Asian states
refused to abide by
the presumed rules of
the conflict between
the US and the Soviet
Union. They werewilling to challenge
the ideological framingof the Cold War andclaim that their battle
was between ‘goodand evil’.
1970s. Egypt moved from a non-aligned
orientation to a strategic partnership with
Moscow and then broke with Russia for asecurity partnership with the US. Several
smaller states, too, followed this pattern ofbargaining with the great powers.
In the post-Cold War era that followed thefall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the great powers werein harmony with each other. Each of themsought greater economic cooperation
with the others. The creation of the World
Trading Organisation in 2000 and China’s
membership in 2001 saw the emergence of asingle framework to govern global commerce.
This peaceful, cooperative and “rules-basedorder” was indeed beneficial to most but itleft little agency for many that had to perforce
subordinate policy sovereignty in many
domains to the WTO rules. Some multilateral
institutions at the global level, too, began toassume the power to intervene in the internalaffairs of the states.
Renewed tensions between the West andRussia, on the one hand, and between the
US and China, on the other, as well as the“partnership without limits” between Beijing
and Moscow have set in motion an intense
geopolitical rivalry. Given the salience of theeconomic and technological dimensionsof the new Cold War, the old rules on crossborder trade, investment and technology arebreaking down.
Leveraging on ‘advantages’
While this complicates the predictable global
environment of the last several decades, italso has enhanced the leverage of countries
that have something of value to the great
powers. It could be a strategic location, forexample. Consider, for example, the growing
strategic focus of the great powers on theisland states of the Indo-Pacific. As potentialsites for bases and facilities, islands onor around the sea lines of communicationacquire considerable significance in themaritime competition between the major
powers.
The presence of critical minerals that havebecome so central to the pursuit of green anddigital technologies has given countries great
leverage in negotiating with the major powers.
Niche capabilities, such as semiconductor
production, have propelled countries like
Taiwan to the centre-stage of international
affairs. Countries seeking to develop theirdomestic industrial and other infrastructure
today can benefit from the rivalry between
China’s Belt and Road Initiative and theinfrastructure development initiatives of theG7 countries.
The war in Ukraine has seen the intensecompetition between Russia and the Westto win support for their respective narratives
on the war. More importantly, Europe hasturned to Asia for weapons supplies amid
the pressure on the defence industrial
production in the West that was not geared
up for the prolonged war of attrition between
Russia and the Ukraine.
North Korea has become a major supplierof ammunition for Russia. In return for its“

Renewed tensions
between the Westand Russia… andbetween the US andChina, as well as‘partnership without
limits’ between Beijing
and Moscow have set
in motion an intense
geopolitical rivalry.
valuable support to Moscow, Pyongyang
has gotten renewed Russian strategic
boost in the form of a security treaty andcommitments to bolster its broader national
military capabilities. This has allowed North
Korea to gain more room for manoeuvre
between South Korea, Japan, China and theUS. Meanwhile, South Korea has become asought-after supplier of advanced weapons
for Europe.
Having a valuable location, natural
resources or a niche industrial capability,
however, does not automatically translate
into strategic gains. Regional actors needinternal cohesion, strong leadership, prudent
judgment and the political will to engage
with great-power rivalry. Miscalculations,however, could turn out to be costly andturn the regional actors into theatres of great
power conflict.

Prof C Raja Mohan

Visiting research professor
Institute of South Asian Studies
National University of Singapore

focus | 11Inevitable peace
between China-US
Major nuclear powers should act as deterrent
to warVictor Gao

12 | focus

Since 2017, the United States’ bellicose
clamours for action against China haveincreased in tandem with accusations that
China is the root cause of all its problems.
The US has threatened all-out measuresagainst China, including military showdown
and war.
Such warmongering is sometimes backed
up by renowned American scholars throughbooks like Destined for War and otherpamphlets like One Hundred Years Marathon.
On the other hand, there are scholars andexperts with admirable intentions, who talked
about Avoidable War and Accidental Conflict
between China and the United States.
After the assassination attempt against
former President Donald Trump andthe addition of Senator JD Vance to the
Republican presidential ticket, there is morealarm, lest the US government, especially
under a second Trump administration,
resorts to extreme measures to pull the rugfrom under China-US relations.
I believe the destined-to-war analysis isfundamentally flawed. Without disputing theacademic excellence or its scholarship, no
mention was made that all the cases of war
analysed in great detail over the centuries
were all conventional wars, whereas China
and the US are major nuclear powers armed
to the teeth, rather than conventional weapon
powers.
Nuke weapon fears
One simply cannot apply conclusions
scientifically derived at from analysing
conventional wars to nuclear powers. Other
things being equal, having nuclear weapons
at their disposal should have completelychanged their respective ways of sizing up
each other, both in peace as well as in war,
potential or actual.
While the US has one of the largest and mostlethal nuclear arsenals in the world, China
has never disclosed the exact number of its“

One simply cannot
apply conclusions
scientifically derived
at from analysing
conventional wars tonuclear powers… While
the US has one of thelargest and most lethal
nuclear arsenals in theworld, China has neverdisclosed the exact
number of its nuclear
warheads.
nuclear warheads. For many years, China has
refused to enter nuclear-weapon-reduction
negotiations with either the US or Russia.
Beijing has always insisted that its policyof no-first use of nuclear weapons against
any country and no use of nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon countries andnuclear-weapon free zones should effectively
remove any country’s concern about China’s
nuclear weapon programme.
As to the numbers of nuclear warheads in its
possession, China philosophically refuses todisclose and assures every country that it will
have enough nuclear warheads to launch anannihilating retaliation against any country
which dares to launch a nuclear attack.
Any country wishing to dismiss China’s
assurances do so at its own peril, especially
now that it has dazzled the world by being
the first and the only country to land a lunar
probe on the far side of the moon and tohave flown back safely to the earth with lunar
soil. Further, it is reasonably expected that
focus | 13

in this round of lunar exploration, China iswell positioned to be the first country to land
Chinese taikonauts, both man and woman,on the moon and get them back safely to
Earth.
Third inevitability
The conclusion should be clear: between
China and the US, war is not and should not
be an option, because neither country canachieve anything meaningful through war
against the other country without suffering
mortal destruction. Such a war will bemutually destructive, triggering Armageddon
not only for the two of them, but for mankind.
This should lead to the inevitable peace
between China and the US. There is sayingthat nothing is certain except death andtaxes. Now a third inevitability should be
added, the inevitable peace between China
and the US.

“

Any country wishing
to dismiss such China’s
assurances will doso at its own peril,
especially now that it
has dazzled the world
by being the first andthe only country toland a lunar probe
on the far side of themoon and to haveflown back safely to
Earth with lunar soil.
14 | focus

Such inevitability does not need to be basedon love for each other or achieving identicalvalues. How could anyone in the right mind
expect both to have the same values? China
has 5,000 years of uninterrupted civilisation
and unique values accumulated over themillennium while the US has only about 400
years’ history since the Europeans landed.
Their differences should not drive them todecouple from each other or launch wars
against each other but should enrich the twocountries and mankind. “Your God for you
and my God for me” should be the megatrend
for China and the US.
And don’t do unto the other what I don’t want
the other do onto me should be the motto
for both. China and the US need to get alongwith each other, not in war, but in inevitablepeace.
The sooner the US extricates itself of the
Tonya Harding syndrome (an act of sabotage
where Harding, scheming to retain the
US national figure skating championship,
whacked her closest competitor Nancy
Kerrigan’s kneecap), the better.
Whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump or
anyone after them in the White House, theyneed to accept this inevitability of peace
between China and the US.

Victor Gao

Vice-President
Centre for China & Globalisation

How EU approaches
major-power rivalry inSoutheast Asia
Blocs have more in common than differences, spiritof consensus could lead to regional prosperity
HE Sujiro Seam

focus | 15

The European Union (EU) approaches the
major-power rivalry in Southeast Asia basedon the combination of its principles, interestsand institutions, and favours cooperation overconfrontation, integration over disintegration
but, above all, engagement and partnership.

human development – with all the countries
in the Indo-Pacific and like-minded partners.
ASEAN is animated by the same spirit andits Outlook on the Indo-Pacific offers acomparable platform for cooperation overconfrontation.

First, the EU defends and promotes theprinciples of the rules-based multilateralorder. Those principles are enshrined in
the United Nations Charter: sovereignty,
territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of
conflicts, prohibition on the use of threatof use of force and primacy of the rule oflaw. These principles are shared by ASEAN
because they are indeed universal principles.

The EU favours integration over disintegration.
The illegal war of aggression of Russia
against Ukraine and the situation in Myanmar
are forces of disintegration in Europe andSoutheast Asia. However, the EU remains
an attractive model and nine countries havecandidate status for accession (Albania,
Bosnia Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova,
Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia,
Türkiye and Ukraine). And so is ASEAN, with
Timor-Leste applying to join.

Second, these principles are aligned with theEU’s interests. The core interest of the EU,
its aspiration really since the creation of its
precursor, the European Community of Coaland Steel in 1951, has remained to achieve
peace and prosperity through democratic
institutions and market integration. Thisaspiration, as well as the awareness that
regional interests are more than the sum ofnational interests, is shared by ASEAN.
Third, the EU can count on solid institutions:
the European Council and Council of theEuropean Union representing the member
states respectively at leaders’ and ministerial
levels; European Commission, with thepower to propose and implement policies;
European Parliament as co-legislator with
the Council of the European Union; European
Court of Justice as the judicial branch of the
EU. ASEAN institutions might appear lesssophisticated but are anchored in regularsummits, bringing the legitimacy of leaderled processes.
Many commonalities
TheEU
favours
cooperation
over
confrontation. Its strategy for cooperationin the Indo-Pacific is not meant to confront
any country but to cooperate in seven priority
areas – prosperity; green transition; oceans;
digital; connectivity; defence and security;
16 | focus“

The EU favours
cooperation overconfrontation.
Its strategy forcooperation in the
Indo-Pacific is notmeant to confront
any country but tocooperate… ASEAN
is animated by thesame spirit andits Outlook on the
Indo-Pacific offers acomparable platform
for cooperation overconfrontation.

Above all, the EU favours engagement andpartnership. The EU has been an ASEAN
dialogue partner for 47 years. It became aStrategic Partner on 1 December 2020 andthe leaders of the EU and ASEAN met for thesummit commemorating 45 years of dialogue
relationship on 14 December 2022.
The EU-ASEAN engagement is reflected in the
joint leaders’ statement and plan of action
for 2023-2027 endorsed during that summit.
It covers all three ASEAN pillars: politicaland security, economic and socioculturalcommunities.
The EU has manifested its desire for moreengagement with ASEAN, in particularthrough regular summits every five years
and the celebration of 50 years of dialogue
relationship in 2027 and a special summit
to allow the new EU leaders, following theelections of 6-9 June 2024, to meet with
ASEAN leaders in 2025. The EU also signalled
its interest in attending the East Asia Summit
as guest of the chair, like in 2022, recognising
the centrality of ASEAN in the regionalarchitecture.
Display of soft enabler
In the major-power rivalry, the European
Union is not a hard power, but a “smart
enabler”, to use the formula proposedby the EU high representative and vicepresident for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy. For example, the EU has thecapacity to plan, coordinate and manage
operations on maritime security, off theHorn of Africa (Operation Atalanta) or in the
Red Sea (Operation Aspides). With ASEAN
member states, the EU offers engagement
and partnership through its projects on
Enhancing Security In and With Asia (ESIWA)
and Critical Maritime Routes (CRIMARIO).
For ASEAN, the EU is also a soft enabler. It
is its third largest trading partner and foreign
direct investor. In that regard, a region-toregion free trade agreement remains thelong-term objective, with bilateral FTAs with“For ASEAN, the EU is
also a soft enabler. It is
its third largest trading
partner and foreign
direct investor (and)a region-to-region
free trade agreement
remains the objective.
ASEAN member states serving as building
blocks towards this objective. The EU is also amajor development partner, with €250 million(RM1.26 billion) of regional projects and €4.2
billion in investment in infrastructure, in theframework of its Global Gateway Initiative.
In its engagement with ASEAN, the EU values
its approach based on a non-confrontational
diplomacy, mutual respect and spirit ofconsensus. The EU and ASEAN cannot agree
on everything, but their desire to work together
is stronger than their differences. The ASEANEU ministerial meeting joint statement of 2
February, including on sensitive issues likeUkraine and Myanmar, South China Sea,
Korean Peninsula or Middle East, is the best
example of this spirit of consensus.

HE Sujiro Seam

Ambassador of the European Union to ASEAN

focus | 17

India’s G20 presidency
offers Global Southa ‘reset’
New Delhi attempts to bring highly diverse
stakeholders together to act on global challenges
Prof Harsh V Pant

18 | focus

When New Delhi unveiled the logo, theme
and website for India’s presidency of the G20
in November 2022, Prime Minister Narendra
Modi said: “(It) is a representation of hopein these times. No matter how adverse thecircumstances, the lotus still blooms.”
Indeed, India took the helm of the G20 at
an inflection point in contemporary history,
when the word “adverse” seemed only apt
in describing the state of the world order.
“India’s G20 presidency is coming at a time ofcrisis and chaos in the world,” Modi had said.
“The world is going through the after-effects
of disruptive once-in-a-century pandemic,
conflicts and lot of economic uncertainty.”
India has been keen to play the role of a“leading power” – one that sets rules andshapes outcomes – and this presidency
could not have come at a more opportune
time to showcase India’s capabilities.
The world is churning and the challenges
are aplenty: the Covid-19 pandemic, RussiaUkraine conflict, US-China contestations
and withering away of the multilateral order
are fracturing the world in unprecedented
ways.

“

At a time of thisglobal fragmentation– and when the very
existence of Earth isbeing threatened by amassive climate crisis– the G20 is perhaps
the only platform of its
kind that could claim adegree of legitimacy.

Many of the assumptions that have guided
our engagements in the past three decades
have fallen by the wayside. The post-Cold
War world – nay, “History” itself, as we
knew it – can truly be said to be over. The
world is grappling with the fundamental
transformations brought in by shifting power
balance, technological overreach andinstitutional decay.
These underlying shifts have been
exacerbated by the pandemic and Ukraine
conflict, resulting in global inflationarypressures, food and energy crises, andwidespread economic downturn. Nations
are frantically scraping their coffers toprovide for their citizens’ basic needs and
we are standing farther from achieving the
Sustainable Development Goals.
At a time of this global fragmentation – andwhen the very existence of Earth is being
threatened by a massive climate crisis– the G20 is perhaps the only platformof its kind that could claim a degree of
legitimacy. Although it might be too much to
expect the G20 to deliver the world from its
contemporary challenges, its member states
are home to 67% of the global populationand they account for nothing less than 85%
of global GDP and more than 75% of global
trade.
Therefore, it has the potential to revive ourfaith in effective multilateralism. And thistall task needs a kind of leadership that India
today is in a singular position to provide.
Focused on G20
The G20 is unique in so far as it brings
together the developed and the developing
nations to discuss and create solutions to
global governance challenges. India tried tobridge this divide by forging consensus on key
global issues.
New Delhi has been vociferous in giving voice
to the aspirations of the Global South at atime when few global powers have neither
focus | 19

the time nor resources to cater to the mostvulnerable – occupied as they are with theirown domestic woes.
The pressures of global disruption are being
absorbed most by the poorer economies
and few powers are willing to consider
their challenges with the seriousness they
deserve. In recent years, India has taken up
their concerns more forcefully at multiple
global fora, be it the United Nations Security
Council, World Trade Organisation or World
Health Organisation.
For its G20 presidency, India focused
attention on the following areas: women’s
empowerment, digital public infrastructure,
health, agriculture, education, culture,
tourism, climate financing, circular economy,
global food security, energy security, greenhydrogen, disaster-risk reduction andresilience, fight against economic crime andmultilateral reforms.
While the G20 was initially formed to manage
global economic and financial challenges,
its remit has grown and with the current
conflation of geopolitics and geoeconomics,
the group’s centrality to the global governancediscourse is only likely to grow. New Delhi
has long insisted that the world needs to“redefine” its conversations on globalisation
to include social and humanitarian issues,
such as terrorism, climate change, andpandemics, as well as the financial andeconomic impediments to genuine progressand sustainable development.
India’s G20 presidency tried to move theworld away from polarisation towards agreater sense of solidarity. Its own realityof being a multicultural democracy should
guide it well in bringing together highly
diverse stakeholders to cogitate and act on
global challenges.
The theme of G20 India 2023 – Vasudhaiva
Kutumbakam: One Earth, One Family,
One Future – encapsulated India’s
conceptualisation of the global order and its
20 | focus

own role in it. And New Delhi has shown thatit does not dwell merely on rhetoric.
In 2020, as Covid-19 first surged, it insistedon the need for the international community
to work together and help those struggling
with the least resources, even as developed
nations focused inwards, some of themhoarding enough vaccines to inoculate each
adult five times over.
Bearing global burden
To be sure, the road ahead remains a toughone. The G20 is not a panacea for the global
governance deficit and the constraints are
significant. But with effective leadershipfrom India, New Delhi has viewed this as anopportunity to reinvigorate the multilateralorder from the stupor it has sunk into in thepast few years.
India’s push for “reformed multilateralism”
has gained greater credibility with its effective
stewardship of the G20. India today is willingto shoulder its share of the global burden.
How effective it will be in shaping the global
agenda at the G20 will also depend on how
willing others are reflecting seriously on thepresent-day disorder. New Delhi, for its part,is pulling out all the stops and aiming high.
For India, the G20 process has been one ofrediscovering its potential as a responsible
global stakeholder. New Delhi is today
seemingly keen to provide resolutions to
global challenges, announcing plans for a
Global Biofuel Alliance and India-Middle
East-Europe connectivity partnership and its
willingness to share its own success in digitalpublic infrastructure.
For the world at large, this process has been
about coming to terms with the shifting
centre of gravity toward the developing world.
The G20 summit and the consensus on a joint
New Delhi declaration reminded the major
powers of the world beyond geopoliticalconflicts that is also seeking a role in global
decision-making.

“The challenges
of sustainable
development,
inclusive growth,
climate change,
food security, digital
divide, emerging
tech regulationand multilateraldevelopment bankreform cannot be
undertaken without
the developing world
at the table.

The challenges of sustainable development,
inclusive growth, climate change, foodsecurity, digital divide, emerging tech
regulation and multilateral developmentbank reform cannot be undertaken without
the developing world at the table. The
inclusion of the African Union in the G20
has fundamentally altered the character ofthe platform, making it more inclusive andrepresentative of the emerging global order.
The global governance architecture has
been in disarray for a long time, a reality
few disagree with today. If New Delhi’s G20
succeeds in reviving even a little bit of thatlost faith in existing governance structures, itwould have served its purpose.

Prof Harsh V Pant

Vice-President
Studies & Foreign Policy, Observer Research
Foundation, India

focus | 21

Gaza gridlock to
Mideast peace
War forces Global North and South to revive
commitment to two-state solution following
Israeli rejection
Maryam Ismail

22 | focus

Israel’s military campaign in Gaza following
the 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israeli
territory has brought several realities to thefore. It is the lengthiest and deadliest war in
Gaza since the Six-Day War in 1967, at morethan double the casualty rate. The longer the
belligerents persist, the harder other statesand international organisations will haveto reassess their own stances and policy
direction vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine.
After nearly five decades of the Arab League’s
general rule of tethering their recognitionof Israel to Palestinian independence andstatehood, in 2020, the UAE and Bahrain
dared to test a new paradigm when they
signed the Abraham Accords with Israel.
This treaty included Israel’s agreement tosuspend settlement expansion in the WestBank. Israel has since approved thousandsof new settlement housing units there.
In May 2021, following the Israeli security
forces’ storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque, UAE
crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed offered
to mediate between Israel and Hamas in
an attempt to trial any new leverage theGulf monarchy had acquired over Israel.
Eventually, it was the usual suspects –Egypt, Qatar and the United Nations – whichbrokered a ceasefire.
Eleven months into Israel’s military campaign
in Gaza, peaceful instruments of persuasion
have been rendered impotent before Israel’s
single-minded aim to eliminate Hamas,
which has been widely agreed to be an
impossible goal.
If anyone entertained any illusion about
gaining leverage over Israel’s political andmilitary decisions through the warmth ofrelations, Washington’s limited influence
over Tel Aviv throughout this Gaza war should
snap them back to reality.
Israeli consensus on war
The truth is that in Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu’s calculations, the prospect of thereligious far-right abandoning his coalition isa far more pressing factor than any externalpressure. Nevertheless, it would be a mistaketo paint Israel’s genocidal resolve on Gaza
solely as Netanyahu’s doing. This decision
has majority support and is unlikely to bereversed with a change of leadership.

“

Eleven months into
Israel’s military
campaign in Gaza,
peaceful instrumentsof persuasion havebeen rendered
impotent before
Israel’s single-minded
aim to eliminate
Hamas.
Even if we juxtapose Israeli victims of the
Holocaust with the ongoing displacement andkilling of Palestinians – with the conclusionthat one genocide does not warrant another –those who acknowledge the Israeli genocideof Palestinians would be wise to recognise
seriously the existential threat that weighsheavily on the Jewish Israeli electorate’s
psyche.
It is essential to understand how, in thefunctional democracy that is Israel, thismentality, combined with the decadeslong dehumanisation of Palestinians, has
effectively sanctioned the systematic
decimation and oppression of its occupied
territories. This is not a force that can beoverturned by external persuasion.
Israelis collectively make this choice andIsrael must eventually deal with this damningaspect of its society and history. The repeatedfocus | 23

pleadings of self-defence lost any legitimacy
weeks into the disproportionate Israeli
offensive and with the well-documented andobscene disregard for human life in Gaza.
Rejection of two-state solution
The two-state solution was largely seen
as dormant prior to 7 October and Hamas
arguably succeeded in bringing Palestinianstatehood back into the spotlight.
However, in June, four developments drove
home Israel’s staggering impunity andintransigence that continue to scupper theprospect of two states: first, the Knesset
voted to oppose Palestinian sovereignty andthe two-state solution, marking the official
mainstreaming of decades of annexation.
A few days later, the International Court ofJustice issued an advisory opinion, which
confirmed Israel’s status as an occupying
power whose security concerns do not justify
the forcible displacement of Palestinians.

“

Even if the Palestinian
leadership is ready torecognise Israel as astate, reparations canonly be made when allparties have moved
past warring andaccepted that bothsides equally need asovereign governmentthat will upholdeveryone’s rights.
24 | focus

On the other side, 14 Palestinian politicalfactions, including Hamas and Fatah, signed
a national unity agreement with Beijing’s
mediation. Following that, in a mockeryof global opposition to the Israeli military
campaign in Gaza, the US Congress hosted
Netanyahu’s address in which he demanded
the expedition of further military aid so that
Israel could “finish the job faster”.
Even if the Palestinian leadership is ready torecognise Israel as a state, reparations canonly be made when all parties have moved
past warring and accepted that both sides
equally need a sovereign government – be ita single state or two states – that will upholdeveryone’s rights.
More importantly, any negotiation towards
Palestinian statehood must define andguarantee Palestinian and Israeli security inequal measure.
Middle East beyond Gaza
Genocide derails life and, in Gaza’s case, theongoing material, physical and psychologicalrehabilitation following previous wars. But as
we continue to press for a lasting ceasefire,
we cannot lose sight of consolidating peaceand security in the wider region to enable andsupport sustained development.
In reality, Abu Dhabi’s compartmentalisationof the Palestinian issue from its relations
with Israel is not that unusual in how proPalestine states conduct their bilateral
affairs. Nonetheless, we must be careful todistinguish between accepting a strategic
loss – e.g. Palestinians giving up land –and rewarding a coloniser state for its
perseverance in apartheid.
Regional security and political alliances in the
Persian Gulf have become more fluid over the
past few years. Saudi Arabia’s rapprochementwith Iran in March 2023, followed by the UAE’s
warming relationship with Iran show howeach state has prioritised national security
and economic interests above all else.

Ideology, it seems, can be hedged. This trend
is further empowered by the new mindset ofsourcing security domestically and regionallyin lieu of depending on external powers andtechnology.
Closer to home, the emerging relationshipbetween ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) can be expected to highlightthe commonalities and compatibility
between the two regions, which so far havebeen untested to a wider and deeper extent.
Finally, we can look forward to increased
ASEAN-GCC cooperation because it
could pave the way for a higher support for
multilateralism.

Maryam Ismail

AnalystInstitute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS)
Malaysia

focus | 25

How Gaza war could
shift Middle East
geopolitics
Region’s stability depends on ability to address
multitude crises, notably Palestine question,
Iranian issue
Dr Ebtesam Al-Ketbi

26 | focus

The debate continues among experts,
researchers and diplomats regarding the
global order amid a transitional periodcharacterised by division, reluctance andthe inability of great powers to utilise fully
their potential to address the many conflicts,
crises and challenges worldwide. These
powers even fail to reach consensus onestablishing new rules for this order.
The Middle East both influences and is
influenced by this international environment.
In recent months, Middle Eastern geopolitics
has been at its clearest and most powerfulform of impact. The war in Gaza since 7
October 2023 represents a complex crisis
that extends beyond its local dimension
to encompass regional and internationalramifications.

“

The discourse
surrounding greatpower competition in
the Middle East has
undergone a shiftsince 7 October. The
polarisation between
the US and Western
allies, and China andRussia, has intensified
in the wake of Gazawar.
It transcends the security and military
dimensions to encompass humanitarian,legal and political aspects, among others.
We are witnessing a unilateral polarity in a
new age where middle powers and non-state
actors wield significant influence in shaping
realities and events.

The impact of the war in Gaza is no lesssignificant than that of the war in Ukraine in
the order of importance of questions raisedby observers examining the recalibrationof facts pertaining to the evolving worldorder, fluctuations in the regional strategic
environment, mapping of actors and theirpriorities, and the challenges facing thevalue system, global concepts and humanrights. Moreover, it prompts inquiries into thestandards of response to open-ended andunforeseen crises and the risks that face deescalation efforts.
Middle powers’ growing influence
In the broader picture, there are morechallenges and crises while there arefewer solutions. There exists a sense of
randomness and selectivity in the mannerand extent of the great powers’ engagementwith their responsibilities in the international
arena and their commitment to preserving
peace and security.
While the imperative to restore respect
for politics, diplomacy, international
conventions and co-existence remains
paramount, questions persist regarding
the growing influence of middle powers inshaping the global landscape and facilitatingde-escalation efforts.
Additionally, attention is directed towards theincreasing role of minilateralism in reshaping
blocs and partnerships, first and foremost on
the basis of geoeconomic considerations,alongside the transformative impact oftechnology and artificial intelligence on
redefining states’ power and status in thisnew age.
The discourse surrounding great-powercompetition in the Middle East has undergonea shift since 7 October. The polarisation
between the United States and its Western
allies, on the one hand, and China andRussia, on the other, has intensified in thewake of the Gaza war. This is reflected in thedivergent positions and calculations among
focus | 27

these international actors regarding the war
and its broader ramifications.
The situation in the Middle East and its
trajectory in the near- to medium-term future
hinges on the region’s ability to address its
multitude of crises, notably the Palestinequestion and the Iranian issue.
Nevertheless, the war in Gaza transcends
mere domestic or regional boundaries: it isan international one in which Washington has
asserted unilateral dominance in managing
the conflict based on its perspective andconfronting its rivals and competitors. We
should keep in mind that wars open the doors
to exploit the “window of opportunity”.
Strategic shifts
The US – Israel’s closest ally – might haveinterpreted the event as a terrorist attack
against Tel Aviv, while also perceiving it as an
attempt by Moscow to divert Washington’s
attention from the war in Ukraine, as well as
an effort to embroil the US in a raging crisis to
distract it from the growing influence of China
and Russia.
Iran strategically aligned itself with antiAmerican objectives by leveraging on Hamas’
action on 7 October, anticipating that it
would deal a blow to Saudi Arabia’s efforts tonormalise relations with Israel. This strategic
move bolstered Iran’s position and enhanced
its leverage against Israeli and Americanpressures.
The conflict in Gaza has indeed created asignificant strategic shift by re-engaging
the US in the region in a different manner.
We have witnessed a surge in militarisation
across the Middle East, a development
particularly noted by Beijing, especially inlight of the heightened US military presencein the eastern Mediterranean.
The conflict in Gaza and its aftermath
necessitates a re-evaluation of approaches
to de-escalation, coexistence, economic
28 | focus“

There is a pressing
need post-7 October
to review andreassess various
concepts concerning
collective regional
security, de-escalation
and reconciliation
approaches, greatpower competition,
multipolarity, regional
integration projects
and trans-regional
infrastructure.
diplomacy,
supplychain
challenges
and security of international corridors.
Furthermore, ongoing interactions following
the war prompt a reconsideration ofstrategies.
Regional actors in the Middle East and North
Africa are increasingly pursuing independent
foreign policies and greater self-organisation
amid great-power competition and the trend
towards multipolarity in the international
system. It is evident that the conflict
challenges the notion that geoeconomics
outweighs geopolitics in the new Middle
East, a trend that had been shaping up in theyears leading to 7 October.
Addressing root causes
Middle Eastern parties that are losing out
because of initiatives, such as the IndiaMiddle East-Europe Corridor or the Abraham
Accords, among others, might disrupt orcomplicate the de-escalation process,highlighting its fragility in the absence ofa realistic and sustainable solution to
the region’s underlying issues. From thePalestinian problem to other crises in the
Middle East, addressing the root causes isimperative.
Furthermore, the Gaza war necessitatesa re-evaluation of European engagementin the Middle East and with Gulf states,and potentially even prompting Japanese
involvement in the region. The significanceof oil and gas alone in shaping relationships
is no longer sufficient. In the Gulf, there is
anticipation regarding how the Gaza war
will influence the region’s hedging approachto major-power competition, prompting areassessment of the “less America, more
China” strategy.

Therefore, there is a pressing need post7 October to review and reassess various
concepts concerning collective regional
security, de-escalation and reconciliation
approaches,
great-powercompetition,
multipolarity, regional integration projects
and trans-regional infrastructure and railway
plans.
This underscores the enduring influenceof geopolitics on geoeconomics andemphasises the necessity of strengthening
collective action across multiple fronts
and rehabilitating international laws toachieve higher levels of sustainable stability,
comprehensive security, developmental
justice and human dignity.

Dr Ebtesam Al-Ketbi

President
Emirates Policy Centre, United Arab Emirates

focus | 29

Preparing Malaysia
for the ASEAN
chairmanshipWith pressure to build on existing track record,
Malaysia should leverage on interests to deliver on
economic and development front
Izzah Ibrahim

30 | focus

ASEAN remains in the limelight because ofdevelopments within and beyond Southeast
Asia. Of great interest to many is the discourse
surrounding the current state of institutionalcohesion and its ability to assert centrality
while managing regional affairs.
This focus on assessing ASEAN’s overall
leadership in relation to its mechanisms,
while important, does not sufficiently
incorporate discussions about the capacity
and role given to the rotational chairmanship.
With Malaysia assuming this role in 2025 andin consideration of past chairs, there needs
to be greater preparation and understandingof what the role entails and whether they canmeet them.
For the most part, there are generally positive
sentiments towards the chairmanship role.
For example, Indonesia’s term, entitled“ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth”, wasan effort to empower the institution throughbolder initiatives. These include the issuesof Myanmar, the promotion of the maritime
agenda and the implementation of theASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
Similarly,
Laos’“ASEAN:
Enhancing
Connectivity and Resilience” complemented
its efforts to strengthen its position forregional connectivity while reaffirming its
commitment to a better connected andresilient regional bloc. It also serves as anopportunity for a member state to guideregional agendas into aligning with its own
national interests.
Dealing with reality checks
Despite expressions of interest, the last twochairmanships highlighted the dilemma of
the interplay of national priorities, institutional
constraints and external variables. It remains
clear that domestic interests are the mostinfluential driver guiding international relations
in Southeast Asia. Both the Indonesian andLaotian examples demonstrated the extent towhich individual state capacity limited theircontributions to ASEAN.

“

Critics have longpointed out thelimitations of ASEAN’s
leadership and lackof enforcement
measures. These pose
further obstacles tomove the institution
collectively at a
feasible pace whileallowing ASEAN to
maintain its relevanceby contributing
substance in such
unpredictable times.
The former’s initial gusto slowed withtime, especially over the management ofsensitive matters, such as Myanmar andthe competing attention demanded fromits G20 chairmanship. The latter, alreadyfacing apprehensions about their capacityand overall diplomatic capital, were focusedon achieving the desired results for theirown economic development. There werediscussions about whether they managed todeliver on such promises and the continued
comparisons will provide a means toevaluate a state’s goals and the means used
to achieve them.
Thus, the varying ways member states carriedout their chair duties do raise questions
about the expectations and qualifiers for
successful leadership in ASEAN. In principle,
the chair is entrusted with three main duties:
to act as a spokesperson; to be both chairand facilitator of ASEAN Summits andsimilar official meetings; and promote theinstitution’s interests and wellbeing.
focus | 31

Alongside the general norms and conduct
characterising the ASEAN way, there is thetacit expectation that the initiatives arecontingent upon the member state. Ideally,
this would contribute towards the goal of
consolidating regional interdependence,creating benefits out of the cooperative
engagement that could not be achieved frombilateral partnerships alone.

Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim isaware of this enthusiasm, saying that he will
chair the periodic meetings leading up to
2025. While no concrete details have beenshared, there is considerable speculationon the general themes of the agenda. It is
likely the chairmanship will gear towards amore economic- and development-oriented
agenda.

Expectations of Malaysia’s chairmanshipThis is supported by then finance minister
Senator Tengku Datuk Seri Utama Zafrul
Tengku Abdul Aziz’s statements that Malaysia
would pursue initiatives that enhance
intraregional economic cooperation andto coordinate and complement Southeast
Asian economies to benefit from increased
foreign direct investments into the region.

While much of ASEAN’s shortcomings
were framed through its ability to navigate
the regional environment, there remains
concerns over the ability of the acting chair
to support internal cohesion.
Critics have long pointed out the limitations of
ASEAN’s leadership and lack of enforcement
measures. These pose further obstacles tomove the institution collectively at a feasible
pace while allowing ASEAN to maintainits relevance by contributing substance insuch unpredictable times. This also raises
questions whether internal reforms could
be implemented, especially when evaluating
which principles and practices to retain,reform or retire.
This shows the considerable list of challenges
that a member state must confront uponassuming the chairmanship. In the case of
Malaysia, its status as one of the founding
members of ASEAN and general track record
establishes some degree of expectation of amore assertive chairmanship that is able topush for the implementation of challenging
decisions.
Malaysia’s track record includes theimplementation of the Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality, admission of
Myanmar as a member and establishment of
the ASEAN Economic Community. These were
follow throughs from ASEAN’s ambitions andthe culmination of past groundwork. There is
expectation that similar achievements will be
replicated.

32 | focus

However, this will not mean that othermajor concerns, such as the South China
Sea and Myanmar, would be overlooked.
As Malaysia remains committed tocontinuously improving its, and ASEAN’s
by extension, image on the global space,“

The outcome of
ASEAN chairmanships
has produced mixed
results, underscoring
the ongoing dilemmaof balancing theinstitution’s goals with
its own limitations,member states’
national priorities
and the dynamic
international
environment.

they would still retain these priorities in thechairmanship’s agenda. While the outcome
from these admittedly sensitive issues are
not guaranteed, it is still a key opportunity
to reassert the strengths of multilateral
institutions at a globally challenging time.
Amplifying ASEAN’s relevance
However, there is a pattern to Malaysianforeign policy that could be detrimental toefforts aimed at sustaining more assertive
action. While the principles of non-alignment
and upholding amicable relations areunlikely to change, the execution remains
inconsistent at best. Inward-focused policies
and concerns of appeasing domestic
constituents continue to sap politicalleaders’ attention, as are concerns overactions that might disrupt the stability of its
external environment. Furthermore, foreign
policy endeavours have long remained under
the purview of the prime minister, whose
interests towards certain subjects do playa role in the political will and allocation of
resources.

A greater awareness of the roles andresponsibilities can encourage initiative andself-confidence in how member states could
add value to ASEAN and the institution’s way
to meet growing challenges.
The outcome of ASEAN chairmanships
has produced mixed results, underscoring
the ongoing dilemma of balancing theinstitution’s goals with its own limitations,member states’ national priorities and the
dynamic international environment.
Given the expectation and roles theframework exists in, there needs to be arecalibration in the way ASEAN’s successes
are measured. It should be approached as awork in progress, an evolving body that thrives
from its members mutually agreeing to goals.
While the chairmanship is limited to a year,
it could still contribute towards long-term
outcomes and continuation of the broader
regional vision rather than just adding more
empty promises.

Therefore,
inpreparationof
thechairmanship, there needs to be a clear
focus in determining deliverables that could
be realistically met. This does present an
opportunity to incorporate the Malaysia
Madani framework into the chairmanship,as the themes of connectivity, togetherness
and community building could pave a way
to revitalise the way ASEAN’s regionalism ispursued. Furthermore, by leveraging on theexisting internal focus, this civil-oriented
and inclusive brand of leadership could lend
greater domestic buy-in that is often lacking
in ASEAN’s pursuits.
This approach must also include proactive
engagements beyond policymakers andpolitical leaders. They need to include
the youth, civil society and other relevant
stakeholders to create opportunities fortangible exposure to ASEAN’s relevance inthe wider developments in Southeast Asia.

Izzah Ibrahim

AnalystInstitute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS)
Malaysia

focus | 33

Wishlist for Malaysia’s
ASEAN chairmanship2025
34 | focus

HE Dr Kao Kim HournASEAN Secretary-General

In 2025, Malaysia will assume the ASEAN chairmanship and will oversee the completion of thecurrent ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and its accompanying blueprints, marking a decadeof deepened regional integration and community-building. ASEAN’s commitment to its norms
and values of diplomacy, dialogue, cooperation and adherence to the rule of law has enabledSoutheast Asia to remain a peaceful and stable region where economic prosperity thrives.
ASEAN is poised to become the 4th largest economy by 2030.
However, ASEAN cannot afford to be complacent. The world has undergone significant changes
since Malaysia last chaired ASEAN in 2015. Today, we are in an era of profound uncertainties
and divergence driven by great power competition, technological disruptions and climatechange, among others. Moreover, we cannot take our usual path to economic prosperity for
granted. Malaysia’s Chairmanship also marks the launch of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045
and its strategic plans, which will guide ASEAN in enhancing its adaptability, resilience andresponsiveness to the multitude of challenges. ASEAN has a proven track record of progress,
resilience and problem-solving. As I always emphasize, ASEAN has been and will continue tobe a part of the solution.
ASEAN is poised to strengthen its institutional capacity. Under Malaysia’s chairmanship,
ASEAN-led mechanisms will be reinforced to preserve our convening power, provide regional
solutions to our common challenges, and strengthen ASEAN’s role as the centripetal force
in the region. ASEAN, with its tech-savvy population, stands at the threshold of anothertransformative milestone: the conclusion of the Digital Economy Framework Agreement, theworld’s single largest digital economy agreement, in 2025, which would unlock the regional
digital economy up to US$2 trillion by 2030.
Meanwhile, green transition will be a new driver of regional growth and dynamism. ASEAN
is expected to further accelerate its clean energy transition, including through effective
implementation of the ASEAN Strategy for Carbon Neutrality and the ASEAN Power Grid. ASEAN
is also cognisant of the immense potential of the blue economy as a new engine of the region’s
future growth. I am confident that Malaysia will effectively steer the region’s interests andpriorities, and advance ASEAN community building, given its extensive experience, leadershipand unwavering commitment to ASEAN.

focus | 35

Prof Thitinan Pongsudhirak

Senior Fellow, Institute of Security and International Studies
Faculty of Political Science
Chulalongkorn University

Malaysia will be taking over the ASEAN chairmanship in 2025 at a most crucial time, following
Laos’ low-key leadership of the organisation and ahead of the Philippines’ rotational turn. Given
internal divisions over the past decade from the United States-China geostrategic conflict to
Myanmar’s military coup and civil strife, Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Hamas-Israel war,
ASEAN must regroup and close ranks to regain a semblance of cohesion and credibility. ASEAN
centrality in the regional architecture-building for peace and security and its ability to convenesummit meetings among the major powers, such as the East Asia Summit, have lost lustre andmomentum, challenged and bypassed by mini-lateral strategic cooperation between ASEAN
member states and outside powers as well as among the external players themselves.
Malaysia should be clear and credible on ASEAN’s revitalisation imperative and thegovernment’s own agenda. Although what ASEAN needs and what’s good for Malaysia as chairoverlap, they should not be conflated. For example, Malaysia should be assertive on Myanmar
beyond the Five-Point Consensus, aiming to broker dialogue and engage civilian and ethnic
stakeholders towards a common future beyond the military junta. The incoming chair should
also maintain ASEAN’s balancing act between the US and China, sticking to ongoing patterns
and trends of relying on Beijing’s economic partnership for growth and Washington’s strategic
counterbalancing for regional security. Doing so will require a measured approach towards theHamas-Israel war, whose injustices are felt by ASEAN member states broadly but to varying
degrees. Malaysia should retake the driver’s seat and get momentum going for the chairs in
2026-28 to reinvigorate the ASEAN spirit for a progressive and consequential region that could
make a difference in a turbulent world, working among the five founding members as the core,
if necessary, to get things done.

36 | focus

Institute of Foreign Affairs
Lao PDR

In a rapidly changing and complex world, ASEAN faces challenges that need to be addressedcollectively. These include economic and financial difficulties, climate change, and traditionaland non-traditional security threats. Against this backdrop, enhancing connectivity andresilience is of utmost importance to ensure ASEAN collective efforts in strengthening theASEAN Community and addressing present and emerging challenges effectively. As a result,the Lao PDR as the 2024 ASEAN chair has set the theme “ASEAN: Enhancing Connectivity and
Resilience.”
The Lao PDR has put in collective efforts and worked closely with Malaysia as the 2025 chairin drafting the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, including ASEAN Political Security Community,
ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, and Master Plan on ASEAN
Connectivity 2025. Hence, the expectations for Malaysia’s chairmanship in 2025 would be not
only to adopt but put such a vision into impactful implementation and build on the progress
made over the past decades.
We also hope that Malaysia will further drive our vision and build upon the achievements
made under the Lao PDR’s ASEAN chairmanship 2024. We believe that Malaysia will leadefforts for ASEAN to enhance connectivity and resilience under the three community pillars,such as promoting infrastructure connectivity, narrowing the development gap, promoting
greater economic integration and people-to-people exchanges. Coping with current andfuture challenges, in the context of uncertain global geopolitics and geo-economics, ASEAN’s
fundamental principles, particularly ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mechanisms remain
relevant. However, ASEAN’s leadership in regional cooperation and external relations should
be further strengthened.
We hope that Malaysia will continue to uphold ASEAN’s commitment to assist Myanmar infinding a peaceful, durable, and a Myanmar-owned and led comprehensive political resolution
to the ongoing crisis through the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. We fully supportand strongly believe that Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2025 will mark another seminal
moment for ASEAN to foster cooperation among regional countries with common interests. We
are eager to see the way forward to guide ASEAN’s future within the next decades and beyondin a sustainable way.

focus | 37

Evelyn Tan

Assistant Director of Policy Programmes
Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA)

Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship next year will mark a significant milestone for advancing
regional integration. The final review of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 will take place,alongside the adoption of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045. However, the road ahead will
not be easy for Malaysia. Globally, multiple crises from geopolitical tensions and wars havepersisted. And our ASEAN region is not immune to the effects. A fragmented global order has
made regional integration more challenging.
The consequent lingering economic disruptions and uncertainties have worsenedsocioeconomic inequalities in the region. While some ASEAN economies like Vietnam
were able to benefit from US-China supply chain diversions, the effect has not been evenly
distributed across the region. Overall price increases have hit lower-income economies thehardest. The humanitarian crisis in Myanmar and climate-related disasters have exacerbatedthe situation. But for successful community building, more equitable economic growth isnecessary. Malaysia is well positioned to lead ASEAN towards achieving a more equitable
growth and integrated community. This is if the Malaysia Madani framework, which champions
sustainability and social justice alongside growth, also forms a strong basis for its chairmanshipof ASEAN. Integrating economic goals with human capital development will be a crucial task
for Malaysia as ASEAN chair.
Better synergy across ASEAN’s political, economic and socio-cultural community pillars isneeded to develop human capital that is future-ready, skilled, safe and healthy across ASEAN
economies. In view of the evolving global landscape, this is even more important. It is hopedthat Malaysia, under PM Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim, who has championed reform agenda for
the welfare of the people of Malaysia, could pave the way for ASEAN to successfully realise its
community vision.

38 | focus

Dr Lina Alexandra

Head, Department of International Relations
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Indonesia

Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship comes at a crucial time when ASEAN officially launches its
post-2025 ASEAN Community Vision. This will inform the organisation’s future direction at atime where many are questioning ASEAN’s relevance and credibility.
ASEAN is nowhere from seeing any progress in facilitating a solution to the Myanmar crisis.
ASEAN’s unity is also at stake, as there has been no coherent understanding and approach tothe crisis which prohibits any substantive result of the Five-Point Consensus.
Therefore, ASEAN must have a fixed, credible and agile decision-making process mechanism
to deal with urgent situations that threaten regional security. In this case, the recommendationfrom the High-Level Task Force on this matter must be rigorously followed up. The discussion
on reviewing the ASEAN Charter, to allow such specific crisis-management mechanism to be
fixated within ASEAN, should be taken up by Malaysia as next chair. It is no doubt that ASEAN
is losing its gravitas externally and its so-called its centrality. ASEAN-led platforms, such as
ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three and East Asia Summit (EAS), have lost their spark as
mini-lateralism or trilateral cooperation trends are on the rise.
One way to reinforcing ASEAN centrality is to rejuvenate the EAS as it incorporates the key major
powers in Asia-Pacific. During its chairmanship, Malaysia can consider these three concrete
steps for the EAS.
First, extending the duration of the EAS meeting to at least a day long to allow for substantive
discussion among the leaders. Second, institutionalising the EAS mechanism by building
a secretariat and creating a Sherpa system where specific member states can work on theleaders’ recommendations thoroughly. Finally, proposing for a joint chairmanship of EAS
where ASEAN co-chairs with other non-ASEAN members to allow for bigger ownership of themechanism.

focus | 39

Dr Azmi Mohamad

Researcher
Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy & Strategic Studies (BDIPSS)

In 2025, Malaysia will assume its ASEAN chairmanship amid persistent regional and global
challenges, such as climate change, major-power rivalry and unresolved territorial disputes.
While major powers remain key to global stability, emerging middle actors are gaining
prominence on the international stage, presenting ASEAN with both opportunities for enhanced
cooperation and competition for leadership on regional issues. As external pressures test
ASEAN’s unity and centrality, Malaysia’s chairmanship could focus on strengthening ASEAN’s
internal foundation, while addressing external challenges and upholding the region’s credibility.
During its chairmanship, Malaysia could lead by example and advocate for future chairs
to champion their respective “flagship” initiatives in the medium to long term. This means
taking ownership, driving progress and creating a sustainable framework to ensure that these
initiatives can continue to thrive and deliver value even after their respective chairmanshipsend. This approach also allows various new initiatives to be introduced and championed by
the rotating chairs, while existing ones remain anchored to their original proponents, ensuringcontinuity and maximising their effectiveness.
Notwithstanding ASEAN’s ongoing efforts to streamline its work processes, more needs tobe done to ensure continuity and coherence between its past and new initiatives. Therefore,
Malaysia’s chairmanship could prioritise streamlining ASEAN’s initiatives by integrating similar
activities to optimise resources, leading to cost savings, improved efficiency and enhanced
collaboration. This could apply to various marine and maritime initiatives with potential
overlaps, e.g., Blue Economy, Combating Marine Debris, Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery
against Ships in Asia, ASEAN Maritime Outlook, ASEAN Maritime Forum and Expanded ASEAN
Maritime Forum.
As chair, Malaysia has the prerogative to promote new deliverables in 2025. However, its
chairmanship could, at the same time, offer ASEAN a chance to take a strategic pause amid theconstant push for innovation and change, allowing for a reassessment of its overall approach.
A balanced strategy that fosters both alignment and innovation can help ASEAN maintainstability and focus, especially in times of continued uncertainty.

40 | focus

Prof Antoinette R Raquiza

Vice-President
Asia Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation Inc (APPFI)The Philippines

ASEAN has yet to find its bearing in the changing geopolitical and economic architecture. On
the one hand, its apparent disorientation comes from the credible challenge that its rising andincreasingly aggressive neighbour, China, presents to the US’ global dominance. On the other
hand, there is the ASEAN’s commitment to respect each member state’s national sovereignty
as well as its historic propensity to work with both sides of the aisle towards advancing theirnational interests. These push-and-pull factors have led to efforts towards regional integration
to lose steam and put into question the viability of a core guiding principle, that is, ASEAN
centrality.
In this light, Malaysia as ASEAN chair in 2025 will have to do a lot of heavy lifting for the regional
body to regain its pivotal role as a regional and global player. The transition from the unipolarworld that began with the end of the Cold War and peaked in the 2000s has risks but also
creates spaces for it to contribute to shaping the emerging regional and global order. Given
the tug and pull that small and middle states experience in geopolitical issues that strike at
the core principle of national sovereignty, there is wisdom in Malaysia’s call for ASEAN to lean
into areas that strengthen regional cooperation: economy and trade, sociocultural communitybuilding, cross-border environmental issues, and digital connectivity.
Towards this end, there are five areas that deserve focused attention (1) gear economic
integration towards building the production base of low-income and low-middle-income
countries. Raising these countries’ productivity and real economy would, in the long run,contribute to their autonomy, freeing them from the exigencies of great power competition;(2) explore concrete ways to realise the concept of the regional commons towards peacefully
resolving competing territorial and maritime claims among ASEAN member states; (3) study
different decision-making processes that would allow for quick action, especially in response
to grave humanitarian crises and emergency situations, such as those in Gaza and the Rakhine
state in Myanmar; (4) promote and deepen Southeast Asian consciousness by increasing
cultural and study exchange programmes among the youth and; (5) as suggested by MalaysianPrime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim at the 37th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, use ASEAN as aplatform to advocate seats for regional alliances, such as ASEAN in the United Nations Security
Council.

focus | 41

How Malaysia should
seize geostrategic
advantages
Focus must be redirected at revitalising
manufacturing and diversifying trade for nation tobenefit from global geoeconomic developments
Jaideep Singh

42 | focus

Time and again, experts have argued that
the US-China rivalry is advantageous for
Malaysia. The country’s strategic locationand economic non-alignment are allegedly
favourable in today’s age of supply chain
diversification.

Malaysia must also redouble its efforts tobuild broader geoeconomic resilience, givenrisk factors, such as a possible second
Donald Trump administration, more severe
supply chain disruptions and mounting useof non-tariff measures.

Proponents cite Malaysia’s record-highapproved foreign direct investment (FDI)
figures of RM188 billion in 2023 as proof of
its attractiveness to investors from East andWest alike. Another perceivably potent toolin the nation’s arsenal is its participationin an extensive ecosystem of regional free
trade agreements (FTAs) and comprehensive
partnerships,
signalling
Putrajaya’s
unwavering openness as a bulwark against
protectionism elsewhere. In March, theInternational Monetary Fund affirmed
Malaysia’s economic potential, thanks
to its “strong fundamentals” and “soundpolicymaking”.

To achieve this, Malaysia needs to focus ondiversifying its mix of trading partners andproducts. Structurally, trade is a lifeline forthe open Malaysian economy, constituting
147% of GDP. The country is, therefore, notimmune to fluctuations in global investment
and trade. Nevertheless, there is scope toreduce exposure to the economic ebbs andflows emerging out of any single source
country or commodity.

But we should not rest on our laurels.
Though export performance has recovered
since the pandemic, annual exports
declined by 8% in 2023 because of thecyclical downturn in semiconductors andcommodities. Further, Malaysian companies
continue to underutilise mega-FTAs like
Regional
Comprehensive
EconomicPartnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive
and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP). Meanwhile,
uncertainties are growing amid escalating
geopolitical conflict in Eastern Europe andthe Middle East alongside interferences toshipping routes.
Maximising opportunities, minimisingcomplacency
The country must not take it for granted
that its geostrategic advantages will accrue
automatically. To be sure, the government
has rolled out domestic initiatives, such as
the New Industrial Master Plan (NIMP) 2030
and National Energy Transition Roadmap,
targeting improvements in competitiveness,value-add and sustainability. However,In the last decade, Malaysian trade has
become more concentrated. UNCTAD
data show that two such measures – theHerfindahl-Hirschman Index and the shareof trade among Malaysia’s top 10 partners– increased by 1% between 2012 and 2022.
Additionally, China, Malaysia’s biggest trading“

Trade is a lifeline forthe open Malaysian
economy but it
is not immune tofluctuations in global
investment and trade.
Nevertheless, thereis scope to reduce
exposure to theeconomic ebbs andflows emerging outof any single source
country or commodity.
focus | 43

partner, now accounts for 17% of its tradeflows. Though reports of “overdependence”
are exaggerated – China’s contribution to
Malaysian trade has declined since thepandemic, not to mention its smaller share of
inward FDI than the US, Singapore and Japan– weaker Chinese demand does have knockon effects on Malaysian export performance.

in areas like infrastructure, agriculture andrenewable energy, thereby diversifying tradeand investment prospects. At the same time,
Malaysia could solidify its soft power as areliable global partner, establishing itself asa resilient middle power.

So far, Malaysia has relied mostly on
traditional instruments of economic
diplomacy, including FTAs, to broaden
trading opportunities. For instance, through
CPTPP, Malaysian exporters now enjoy lower
tariffs in three new markets – Canada, Mexicoand Peru. But a more specialised approach isneeded.

Malaysia has reduced its dependence on the
production and export of commodities, which
are prone to business cycle fluctuations
and shocks. The share of commodities likepalm oil and crude oil in total exports has
declined from 23% in 2010 to 15% in 2022
while the collective contribution of mining,
construction and agriculture to GDP dropped
from 32% in 2000 to 22% in 2016. This is anencouraging development but more can bedone.

As Malaysia sets its sights on strengthening
South-South cooperation, market accessalone will not matter as much as developing
a holistic policy toolbox consisting of
capacity building, technical cooperationand information sharing, targeting bothgovernment-to-government and businessto-business ties.
Rather than resigning to the notion that
Malaysia is “too rich” to receive support fromthe Global North and “too poor” to assist the
Global South, the narrative should focus on
carving out a niche as a bridge between the
two. As early as the late 1990s, the country
received technical assistance from highincome economies while contributing morethan RM200 million to multilateral institutions
like the Asian Development Bank.
Today, Malaysia should work on expanding
existing initiatives, including the Third
Country Training Programme run with Japan,
through greater interministerial cooperation.
Singapore’s framework, through whicha centralised cooperation programme
coordinates targeted partnership packages
for Africa and climate action, among others,
could serve as a guide.
Done well, this would unlock markets in fastgrowing countries across the Global South44 | focus

Making manufacturing matter

The priority in the coming years should beto reinvigorate manufacturing as set out in
NIMP 2030. This is because global patternsof industrialisation demonstrate that
manufacturing is a major source of overallinnovation, R&D and productivity growth.

“

Rather than resigningto the notion that
Malaysia is ‘too rich’ toreceive support fromthe Global North and‘too poor’ to assist
the Global South, thenarrative should focus
on carving out a niche
as a bridge between
the two.

Accordingly, the government announced
a National Semiconductor Strategy in May
2024, earmarking RM25 billion to move
Malaysia up the semiconductor value chain.
But the devil is in the details – the strategy’s
success will be contingent on firms’
access to targeted incentives, initiatives todevelop domestic human capital and theintegration between academia, industry andgovernment.
Properly executed, this could upstream
Malaysia’s electronics sector, making it
increasingly indispensable in the global
semiconductor trade. A strong electronics
sector should also be more closely linked
with adjacent downstream activities likeelectric vehicles, energy efficient solutions

and smart furniture, creating an end-to-end
ecosystem of interlinked supply chains withconsiderable export-linked value addition.
Malaysia is in a prime position to benefit
from the renewed economic interest inSoutheast Asia precipitated by geopoliticaltensions. But geography and foreign policy
alone will only take us so far. Ultimately, thecountry must be proactive in addressing
vulnerabilities by diversifying its economic
activities and trading partners. That way,
Malaysia could strengthen its economic
positioning and navigate the complexities ofglobal trade more effectively.

Jaideep Singh

AnalystInstitute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS)
Malaysia

focus | 45

Australia with ASEAN
every step of the way
Canberra views ASEAN as primary norm-setting
body in region with unmatched convening power
HE Tiffany McDonald

46 | focus

This year, Australia and ASEAN commemorate
50 years since Australia became the bloc’s
first Dialogue Partner. Shortly after theestablishment of ASEAN, with Malaysia as afounding member, Australia recognised thevalue of engagement with ASEAN.
In 1974, Australia’s then Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam said: “that of all the arrangements
in our region, ASEAN is unquestionably themost important, the most relevant”.
Since then, Australia and ASEAN have steadily
built habits of cooperation, understanding
and trust to expand our partnership. Thisculminated in the establishment of aComprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP)
with ASEAN in 2021. We work together toaddress our shared challenges, respecting
ASEAN centrality through ASEAN-led regionalarchitecture and mechanisms.
As this year’s Asia-Pacific Roundtable theme
Crisis in an Interregnum alludes to, theexisting system of rules and norms is understrain. The theme asks us to reflect on thenorms, which have shaped our world today
and how we will maintain common ground.
ASEAN Centrality
In this time of heightened tensions, it is
crucial we protect and uphold international
law to prevent conflict and safeguard
sovereignty in our region. Each country –large or small – must operate by the same
rules: rules that we have all had a say inshaping and international law that we haveall agreed and committed to upholding. And
when disputes inevitably arise, they must be
managed in accordance with internationallaw, and through respectful dialogue, not thethreat or use of force.
Australia sees ASEAN at the forefront of these
efforts. It is the primary norm-setting body in
our region and has unmatched convening
power in the Indo-Pacific region. It sets
expectations of responsible state behaviour
in our shared region. As Australia’s Foreign

Minister Penny Wong has said, the strengthof ASEAN’s collective voice “resonates
throughout the region when it speaks on its
view of the importance of sovereignty andrules”.
Last year’s ASEAN Foreign Ministers’
Statement on Maintaining and Promoting
Stability in the Maritime Sphere in Southeast
Asia – which Australia welcomed – was an
example of ASEAN using its voice to express
concerns about developments that threaten
regional peace and security in the maritime
domain.
Australia has always attached great
importance to ASEAN processes that havebrought ASEAN and external partners
together to discuss the strategic issues facing
the region. We recognised the value of this,
supporting ASEAN as a founding member“

In this time ofheightened tensions,
it is crucial we
protect and upholdinternational law toprevent conflict andsafeguard sovereignty
in our region. Eachcountry – large orsmall – must operateby the same rules:
rules that we have all
had a say in shaping
and international law
to which we have allcommitted to uphold.
focus | 47

of the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia
Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting Plus (ADMM+).
The EAS – an initiative established during
Malaysia’s 2005 ASEAN chair year – is theregion’s premier leader-level forum forstrategic dialogue. Meetings held under EAS
framework are pivotal platforms for frank
discussions on political, regional security andeconomic issues, and its joint statements are
key articulations of ASEAN-led responses tothe strategic issues affecting the region.

“

Australia is invested,engaged andcommitted to working
with Malaysia and
ASEAN to realise ourshared vision for apeaceful, stable andprosperous future.
We will continue
to champion theeffectiveness andresilience of ASEAN
centrality…
As Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim
said during his visit to Australia in March:“working on our respective strengths andunique relationships with the major countriesof this region, we can achieve something of
profound consequence”. This speaks to therole we all play in maintaining regional peaceand stability, and creating the kind of regionin which we want to live.
This role was recognised at the ASEANAustralia Special Summit, with the Joint
48 | focus

Leaders’ Vision Statement committing us towork together to promote strategic trust anda rules-based regional architecture, which
upholds international law. The Joint Vision
Statement also outlined our shared objectiveof a region where sovereignty and territorial
integrity is respected.
ASEAN saw respect for sovereignty andsettlement of disputes by peaceful means as adriving principle as early as 1976, establishing
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in
Southeast Asia. By becoming a signatory in
2005, Australia reiterated its commitment toTAC’s principles.
TAC continues to gain signatories fromacross the international community, with
54 parties and counting, demonstrating its
ongoing relevance, as reflected at the recent
Conference of High Contracting Parties to the
TAC held in June.
Show of support
At this year’s Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Anwar
described ASEAN as a “force multiplier, anda valuable asset to exercise our agency”. In
this regard, we are approaching a pivotal time
for ASEAN as Malaysia takes on the chair in
2025 and ASEAN crafts its strategic direction
for the future through its ASEAN Community
Vision 2045.
Malaysia has always been a strong driver of
ASEAN’s efforts, such as the establishmentof the EAS in 2005 and the 2015 Kuala
Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of
the ASEAN Community during previous chair
years. I am confident Malaysia will continue
to advance ASEAN’s ambition of fosteringstability and promoting prosperity – andAustralia stands ready to support.
We build on a strong history of collaboration,such as the January Track 2 workshop on
Conflict Prevention and the ASEAN-led
Regional Architecture, co-hosted by Australia
and Malaysia, alongside Indonesia. Australia
was also proud to support Malaysia hostingthe first ASEAN Green Jobs Forum in Kuala
Lumpur and ASEAN Maritime Connectivity
Forum in Penang earlier this year.
Australia and Malaysia are also strong
supporters of Timor-Leste’s full ASEAN
membership, working trilaterally with TimorLeste on capacity building assistance tosupport the accession process. We lookforward to continuing this close cooperation,building habits of cooperation to address
the challenges and opportunities thecurrent times present, including aroundenergy transition, digital transformation andequipping our workforces with skills for the
future.

Australia is invested, engaged and committed
to working with Malaysia and ASEAN to realise
our shared vision for a peaceful, stableand prosperous future. We will continue tochampion the effectiveness and resilience of
ASEAN centrality, not only in our words but inour actions, including by implementing morethan A$500 million (RM1.6 billion) in newand expanded initiatives, announced at theASEAN-Australia Special Summit in March.
Australia continues to be with ASEAN – every
step of the way.

HE Tiffany McDonald

Australian Ambassador to ASEAN

focus | 49

India’s foreign policy
approach to the Global
South and Indo-PacificChampioning the cause of holistic human-centric
development and promoting self-reliance among
Global South countries
HE BN Reddy & Beno Zephine NL

50 | focus

India’s foreign policy has undergone
significant transformation over the pastfew decades, adapting to the changing
geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape. A
constant all along has been India’s steadfast
support for countries of the Global South.

India has also extended financial, budgetaryand humanitarian assistance to mitigate
economic challenges. Other support include
capacity building and skill development
via scholarships and training programmes
offered to students and professionals.

For India, the term “Global South” is notjust a diplomatic term but part of its sharedhistory from the days of its united opposition
to colonialism and apartheid. India has beena key player within Non-Aligned Movement,
UNCTAD and G77 since their establishment,
working actively for the economic
development of the Global South.

Since 1964, under the Indian Technical andEconomic Cooperation programme, morethan 200,000 officials from 160 countries
have benefited from capacity building
training at premier institutions. Development
assistance through LOCs worth US$31 billion
was extended to 65 countries covering diverse
economic sectors. During the Covid-19
pandemic, India supplied made-in-India
vaccines to more than 100 nations underthe “Vaccine Maitri” (Vaccine Friendship)
initiative, apart from supplying medicines to
150 nations.

India has been constructively championing
the cause of holistic human-centric
development in the Global South. Several
steps were taken to promote self-relianceamong countries of the Global South byenhancing connectivity and economic interlinkage projects, ranging from large-scale
infrastructure development to community
related projects, including health, housing,environment and education.

“

India’s vision ofIndo-Pacific is anextension of its
ancient philosophy
of Vasudhaiva
Kutumbakam (theworld as one family).
Modi described India’svision of Indo-Pacificas SAGAR in 2015 –Security and Growthfor All in the Region.

G20 and Global SouthStanding beside US President Joe Biden at
a 22 June White House press conference,Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced
that “under India’s G20 presidency, we
are lending a voice to the priorities of the
Global South”. This, in a way, defines India’s
approach to addressing core challenges
confronting the Global South in a plurilateralformat.
India has been advocating reforms in themultilateral system to represent the concernsof the Global South more effectively. PM Modi,
while addressing the G20 foreign ministers
in March 2023 stated that “multilateralism
is in crisis today”, referring to the inability ofexisting multilateral institutions to effectively
serve their mandate for fostering international
cooperation on issues of interest to the
Global South.
In line with PM Modi’s vision, India hosted
two editions of the Voice of Global South
Summits in January and November 2023.
India worked to ensure that the Global
South’s concerns and priorities received due
cognizance in several G20 verticals, duly
focus | 51

factoring in solutions to the most pressing
contemporary global challenges. The
induction of the African Union into the G20
as a permanent member during India’s G20
presidency in September 2023 is a reflectionof this commitment.
India, during its G20 presidency, announced
five major initiatives to advance its
development partnership with the Global
South:
1. Establishment of a “Global-South Centreof Excellence”
2. Launch of a “Global-South Science &Technology Initiative”
3. Launch of a new “Aarogya Maitri (Health
Friendship) Project”
4. Creation of a “Global-South Young
Diplomats Forum”
5. Instituting “Global South Scholarships”
for students to pursue higher educationin India.
Malaysia’s Minister of International Trade andIndustry, Senator Tengku Datuk Seri Utama
Zafrul Tengku Abdul Aziz, while speaking
at the Voice of the Global South Summit
in January 2023, noted that “as the world’s
fifth largest economy, soon to be the mostpopulous country and one of the fastestgrowing economies in the world, I believe
India truly represents the voice of the Global
South advocating a more balanced futureoriented development agenda”.
India-led initiatives, including International
Solar Alliance (ISA), Coalition for Disaster
Resilient Infrastructure and LiFE or Lifestylefor the Environment movement, serve as
platforms for stakeholders to find innovative
solutions to energy, humanitarian andclimate-change-related problems. These
initiatives have provided avenues forinvestments, capacity building of personnel
and assist in R&D efforts. ISA has acquired
universal acceptance, with 118 and 98
countries signing and ratifying the agreement,
respectively.

52 | focus

India and the Indo-PacificIndia’s vision of Indo-Pacific is an extensionof its ancient philosophy of Vasudhaiva
Kutumbakam (the world as one family). PM
Modi described India’s vision of Indo-Pacificas SAGAR in 2015, which stands for Security
and Growth for All in the Region. While
presenting India’s vision of Indo-Pacific at the
Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, he described
the Indo-Pacific region as “a natural region
from the shores of Africa to that of theAmericas”.
India’s Indo-Pacific vision rests on fivepillars – a free, open and inclusive region;
ASEAN centrality; upholding the notionsof sovereignty and territorial integrity
irrespective of the size or strength of any
nation; equal and unimpeded accessthrough freedom of navigation; and peacefulsettlement of disputes following internationallaw.

“

India’s Indo-Pacific
Oceans Initiative (IPOI)
does not envisage
a new institutionalframework but will
rely on the leaderled East Asia Summit
process, framework
and activities.
India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI),
launched by PM Modi at the East Asia Summit
in 2019, does not envisage a new institutionalframework but will rely on the leader-led
East Asia Summit process, framework andactivities.

IPOI looks at establishing a safe, secureand stable maritime domain. This broadly
supports the direction, vision and objectivesof the Quad. All four countries of the Quadpartners and other countries have joined inco-leading the eight pillars of this initiative.
Both India and ASEAN are also working
towards finding greater convergence
between IPOI and the ASEAN Outlook on the
Indo-Pacific.
QUAD in Indo-Pacific construct
Like any new mechanism or platform, theQuad, too, is a product of its times. Quadis propelled by a change in the global orderfor global good and for the global commons.
External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar said
“Quad reflects the growth of a multipolarorder and it is a post-alliance and postcold war thinking. It is against spheres ofinfluence, and it expresses the democratisingof the global space and a collaborative, notunilateral, approach”.
Quad is now focussing on maritime security,
infrastructure and connectivity, HADR,
critical technologies, communications,spacecooperation,
cybersecurity,
counterterrorism, fellowships and climate
action.

Quad countries also offered 1,800
infrastructure fellowships for policymakers
and technical experts, deploying digitalpublic infrastructure to deliver public goodsin the Indo-Pacific, and STEM fellowship
programme. Quad has extended STEM
fellowships to ASEAN member states as well.
Another collaboration announced underQuad serves the same objectives of global
good – the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain
Awareness Initiative.
Both India and Malaysia are part of the
Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF),
along with 12 other countries. IPEF is now inadvanced stages of reaching agreements onfour pillars – trade, supply chain resilience,clean economy and fair economy.
In conclusion, India’s foreign policy approachto the Global South and the Indo-Pacificwould contribute to a more stable, rulesbased and inclusive multipolar worldorder, particularly one that reflects andaccommodates the interests, concerns andaspirations of the Global South.

HE BN Reddy

High Commissioner of India to Malaysia

Beno Zephine NL

First Secretary, High Commission of India in Malaysia

focus | 53

How the EU could
reshape Indo-Pacific’s
future
Bloc could pursue strategy to build trust, address
mutual concerns as it seeks to expand regional
influence
Dr Rahul Mishra

54 | focus

The European Union (EU) launched its IndoPacific strategy in September 2021. Even
though some first thought it was “too little,
too late”, the EU has already established itself
as a major actor in the Indo-Pacific region.
Notwithstanding several obstacles, theEU’s strategic involvement has contributed
significant weight to the swiftly evolving IndoPacific order, consistent with its overarching
objective of maintaining a rules-based
international order founded on universally
acceptable norms.
The growing EU presence in the Indo-Pacificregion corresponds with risks that the rulesbased order faces. The rise of revisionist states
has weaponised trade, deepened strategic
polarisations, and disregarded international
norms, laws and principles. In this context,
the EU’s steadfast commitment to a rulesbased international order is vital, particularly
as it strives to address key regional security
challenges, including maritime security,
cybersecurity and terrorism.
As a multilateral regional organisation, theEU naturally emphasises collaboration
with other regional and multilateral
institutions. Strengthening ties with regionalorganisations, such as ASEAN, is central
to its strategy, particularly in addressing
global challenges like climate change andpandemics.

“

The EU has madesignificant strides in
its trade relations with
ASEAN. The launch of
the Comprehensive Air
Transport Agreementin December 2021,
the first of its
kind between thetwo regions, hassignificantly improved
connectivity andeconomic cooperation.
in this regard. EU’s Global Gateway strategy
is another multi-pronged tool to enhance its
presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine came as ashock for the EU, rendering its systematicplans to engage Russia on trade, commerce
and the diplomatic front futile. As the conflict
spilt over to the diplomatic domain, the EU
quickly realised the importance of “doingmore” in diplomacy.

Bolstering economic diplomacy andpromoting trade ties with the aim to diversify
its engagements has been one of the EU’s
Indo-Pacificstrategy’s
major
goals.
Interestingly, before EU came up with its
Indo-Pacific strategy, it worked on somekey enablers to systematically foster its
engagement. The 2019 connectivity strategy
and launching of several trade and investment
agreements worked as two important
foundational pillars of the strategy. The
launching of trade negotiations/agreementswith Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, New
Zealand, India, Thailand and South Korea isnotable in this regard.

Strengthening ties with regional partners,
including ASEAN member states, India, Japan,
Australia and South Korea, promoting trade,investment, and sustainable development
in line with the EU’s Green Deal and digitaltransformation agendas are important steps

The EU’s proactive engagement in signing
FTAs with ASEAN partners – Singapore
and Vietnam – resulted in an effective andcoordinated plan to enhance economic ties.
The EU has made significant strides in its
trade relations with ASEAN. The launch of theProactive engagement moves

focus | 55

Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement in
December 2021, the first of its kind between
the two regions, has significantly improved
connectivity and economic cooperation.
The EU’s focus on maritime security,
cybersecurity and counterterrorism has
been demonstrated through joint naval
exercises with regional partners to securevital sea lanes. In 2021, the EU launched the
CRIMARIO II (Critical Maritime Routes IndoPacific) project to improve maritime domainawareness and foster cooperation among
regional navies.
Cybersecurity has also been its focal point.
Recognising the growing cyber threats in theregion, the EU has bolstered its cybersecurity
partnerships. In 2022, the EU and Japanintensified their cooperation in this area
through joint exercises and informationsharing mechanisms, reflecting the EU’scommitment to regional stability andsecurity.
In line with the 2020 EU Green Deal,the EU’s Indo-Pacific approach gives
considerable attention to climate action
and sustainability. To advance sustainableinfrastructure, circular economy principles
and renewable energy, green alliances havebeen established with Indo-Pacific nations.
The establishment of the EU-India Clean
Energy and Climate Partnership in 2022,
which intends to improve collaboration in
renewable energy and energy efficiency, wasa noteworthy effort in this area.
Furthermore, the EU has promoted thesustainable
managementofmarineresources in the Indo-Pacific region via
several initiatives. Its commitment toenvironmental sustainability was highlighted
during the EU-ASEAN High-Level Dialogue on
Environment and Climate Change in 2021,
which focused on reducing marine pollution
and advancing the blue economy.

56 | focus

Challenges galore
The EU has been playing an active role inproviding humanitarian aid and disaster relief
in the Indo-Pacific region. Notable efforts
include significant contributions to the Covax
initiative, providing vaccines to Indo-Pacificcountries during the Covid-19 pandemic. Its
Team Europe initiative mobilised resources
to support health systems and economic
recovery in the region.
Notwithstanding these successes, there
are still many challenges to the Indo-Pacificstrategy. The safety and security of thesea lanes of communication, particularly
South China Sea and Strait of Malacca, andcomplications in dealing with China areamong them. Above all, the escalating rivalry
between the United States and China posesa significant challenge for the EU. Aligning
too closely with either side could alienate
the other, while a neutral stance may limit
the EU’s influence in the region. Countries,
such as India, Japan, and Australia, havetheir strategic interests and partnerships,
which may not always align with the EU’s
objectives. Balancing these relationships is
crucial but challenging.
Economic competition, especially China’s
dominant presence through initiatives
like the Belt and Road Initiative, presents
another formidable challenge to the EU’s
efforts to establish its economic footprints
and connectivity initiatives in the region.
Additionally, security concerns, such as theuse of AI and swarms in the South China
Sea waters, cybersecurity threats andterrorism, demand substantial resources
and coordination with regional partners.
Keeping these challenges in view, the EUshould work towards deepening its bilateralrelations with key Indo-Pacific countries
through high-level dialogues, strategic
partnerships, and cooperation agreements.
Regular Track 1, 1.5 and 2 exchanges
could help build trust and address mutual
concerns. Pursuing comprehensive tradeand investment agreements with Indo-Pacificcountries will enhance market access andeconomic ties. Reducing trade barriers andfostering a conducive business environment
are essential for mutual benefit.
The EU should actively participate in regional
multilateral forums, such as ASEAN, the East
Asia Summit, and the Pacific Islands Forum,
to enhance its influence and support regional
stability and development. Furthermore, theEU should continue to strengthen maritime
security cooperation through joint exercises,
capacity building and information-sharing
mechanisms. Enhancing cybersecurity
partnerships is equally critical to addressing
common threats.

research and capacity building is essential
for resilience to future health emergencies.
Over the past three years, the EU’s IndoPacific strategy has significantly increased
its participation and influence in thearea. Through strengthened economic
ties, security cooperation, sustainability
initiatives and humanitarian aid, the EU has
positioned itself as a key player in the IndoPacific. As the region continues to evolve, its
proactive and multifaceted approach will be
crucial in promoting stability, prosperity, andsustainability. By addressing the challenges
and seizing opportunities, the EU cancontinue to play a pivotal role in shaping the
Indo-Pacific’s future.

The EU should forge climate action
partnerships to address climate change andpromote sustainable practices. Collaborative
efforts in renewable energy, climate resilienceand environmental conservation are vitalfor long-term sustainability. The EU should
improve disaster preparedness and response
mechanisms, ensuring timely and effective
humanitarian aid in the region. Strengthening
health security cooperation through joint“

Economic competition,
especially China’s
dominant presence
through initiatives like
BRI, presents anotherformidable challenge
to the EU’s efforts toestablish its economic
footprints andconnectivity initiatives
in the region.

Dr Rahul Mishra

Short-term expert, EU-Malaysia Cooperation Facility;
Senior Research Fellow, German-Southeast AsianCentre of Excellence for Public Policy and Good
Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand;
Associate Professor, Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

focus | 57

AI in defence andmilitary innovation:
advances and challenges
Gap between ‘haves’, ‘have-nots’ in militarycapabilities likely to widen further
Dr Michael Raska

58 | focus

The rise of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled
systems and technologies presents a
multifaceted transformation opportunities
and challenges for ASEAN militaries.

double-edged sword, demanding a nuanced
approach that balances the pursuit oftechnological advancement with responsible
development and regional cooperation.

On the one hand, AI offers significant
potential for enhancing regional security.
AI-powered systems can bolster maritime
domain awareness through real-time data
analyses from sensors and drones, enablingearlier detection of incursions and grey-zone
tactics in the South China Sea. Additionally,
AI can streamline logistics and optimise
resource allocation, leading to more efficient
deployments and improved decision-making
during crises.

AI-enabled RMA wave

Indeed, for the first time in history, thecharacter of human involvement in warfare is
being fundamentally challenged by the rise of
AI-driven decision-making and autonomous
systems, and the blurring lines between
human and machine on the battlefield.

Indeed, with the rapid development andconvergence of emerging technologies suchas AI and autonomous systems, whether
in the People’s Liberation Army, Republicof Korea Army, Japan Self-Defence Forces,
Singapore Armed Forces, and the forwarddeployed US armed forces in the region,
one could argue that a new AI-revolution in
military affairs (AI-RMA) is emerging.

Algorithms may soon play a critical role
shaping human judgment on the battlefield.
Advanced AI systems can analyse vast
amounts of data in real time, influencing
targeting decisions, troop movements andeven tactical strategies. Imagine soldiers
equipped with AI-powered tactical assistants
that analyse battlefield data, suggest
optimal courses of action, or even control
autonomous drones for reconnaissance or
combat.
However, the integration of AI also introduces
substantial challenges. Concerns regarding
an AI arms race in the region could exacerbate
tensions and hinder peaceful resolutions toterritorial disputes.
Moreover,ethicalconsiderations
surrounding autonomous weapons andthe potential for algorithmic bias within AI
systems necessitate careful development
and deployment strategies to ensure humanoversight and prevent unintended escalationor violations of international law. Overall,the impact of AI on ASEAN militaries is a

While major powers, including the UnitedStates, China and, to a lesser degree, Russia,
are now increasingly experimenting with AI
technologies that enable unprecedented
data analytics and automation in warfare– these technologies are increasingly
permeating future warfare experimentationand capability development programmes,
including in select militaries in East Asia.

The new “AI-enabled” RMA wave, however,differs from the past information-technology(IT)-led RMA waves in several ways, whichshaped military modernisation trajectories
over the past four decades: first, the diffusionof AI-enabled data innovation proceeds at amuch faster pace and through more diverse“

Concerns regarding
an AI arms race inthe region could
exacerbate tensions
and hinder peacefulresolutions toterritorial disputes.
focus | 59

pathways, notably through the accelerating
geostrategic competition for emerging
technologies between great powers – theUS, China and, to a lesser degree, advanced
middle powers and small states, such as
South Korea, Japan, Israel and Singapore.
For the first time in decades, the US faces a
strategic peer competitor, China, capableof pursuing and implementing its own AIRMA in areas, such as robotics, cyber,additive manufacturing, advanced materials,
synthetic biology, quantum computing,directed energy, space technologies andmany others.

“

The ability to innovate
and integrate AI
technologies issynonymous withinternational influenceand national power.
In this context, the ability to innovate andintegrate AI technologies is synonymous withinternational influence and national power– generating economic competitiveness,
political legitimacy, military power, andinternal security. Therefore, the AI-RMA wave
is arguably diffusing much faster acrossgeopolitical lines in East Asia than in othergeographical regions.
Second, contrary to previous decades,
which, admittedly, utilised some dual-use
technologies to develop major weapons
platforms and systems, the current AIenabled wave differs in the magnitude andimpact of the commercial-technologicalinnovation and use of data as the primarysource of military innovation.

60 | focus

Large military industrial primes are no longer
the only key drivers of military technologicalinnovation, instead, advanced technologies
with a dual-use potential are being
developed in the commercial sectors andthen being “spun on” to military applications.
Imagine self-driving car technology being
adapted for autonomous military vehicles
or commercially available drones being
repurposed for military reconnaissance.
The implications of this shift are far-reaching.
The convergence between militaries
and commercial tech companies allows
militaries to keep pace with technologicaladvancements at a more cost-effective
rate, while commercial tech companies are
becoming primary drivers of military strategic
advantage – through their ability to harness
the power of data.
Third, the diffusion of autonomous and AIenabled autonomous weapon systems,
coupled with novel operational constructs
and force structures, challenges the direction
and character of human involvement in
future warfare – in which algorithms may
shape human decision-making in warfare,and future combat will be conducted byunmanned Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems.
Algorithm to the fore
These
technologies
areincreasingly
permeating future warfare experimentationand capability development programmes
and select militaries in the region are actively
exploring how AI and automation can beutilised to enhance battlefield awareness,
improve decision-making speed andaccuracy, and potentially reduce humancasualties in specific scenarios.
This focus on experimentation signifies that
we are at the forefront the AI-driven revolution
in warfare. Its rapid diffusion trajectory
inherently also poses new challenges andquestions concerning strategic stability,
alliance relationships, arms control, ethics

and governance and, ultimately, the direction
and character in the use of force.
Indeed, militaries – including ASEAN – mustgrapple with the contending legal and ethicalimplications of new weapon technologies
and problems in encoding diverse valuesof safety, ethics and governance into thesesystems. Integrating data streams and AI
systems across different military platforms
will require trustworthy algorithms that canadapt to changes in their environment andlearn from unanticipated events. It would
also call for designing ethical codes andsafeguards for these systems.
Hence, building a viable road map for
traditional militaries to incorporate disruptive
technologies will be a difficult task. While
many advanced militaries may strive todesign and implement varying digitisation
paths, only some will have the vision,
resources and will to succeed.

The principal challenge for implementing
the AI-RMA is a wholesale re-engineeringof Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance (C4ISR) strategies anddoctrines. An entirely new operational
environment and novel technologies will
require new mindsets at every echelon of
military organisation.
The gap between the “haves” and “havenots” in the military capabilities between
countries will likely widen further. This gap
will impact on future interoperability within
military alliances and security partnerships,
depending on how new technologies interact
with current and emerging operational
interfaces and force structures. ASEAN
member states must resolve thesechallenges of the AI wave to manage new
types of conflicts in the 2030s and beyond.

Dr Michael Raska

Assistant Professor, Institute for Defence& Strategic Studies
S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)
Singapore

focus | 61

Climate crisis at
North-South impasse
Paris Agreement at risk until historical inequalities,
Global North-South divide addressed
Kieran Li Nair

62 | focus

Addressing the modern polycrisis isa momentous task, more so its allencompassing component of climatechange. Despite acknowledging this, thecurrent state of global climate discourse is acontentious one.
Progress remains inadequate to limit thetemperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, as underlined within the
Paris Agreement. The UAE Consensus
produced at the 28th Conference of Parties(COP28) has been heralded as the “beginningof the end of the fossil fuel era”, yet it was
heavily criticised for watering down thecommitment to transitioning away from fossil
fuels through the inclusion of “transitionary
fuels” and carbon capture technologies.
Some argue that the movement has lostsight of the “common but differentiatedresponsibilities” principle meant to underlie
international cooperation. To examine thisargument, it is necessary to delve into howinequalities have been exacerbated acrossvarious stakeholders in the mutual pursuit ofinternational climate commitments.
Unequal playing fields
Climate action has increasingly taken on
an angle of profitability. COP28 marked themost attendance of “fossil fuel lobbyists” –a whopping 2,456 compared with COP27’s
636, raising concerns about the co-opting ofclimate narratives on the ground.
Consulting firms have also gained
prominence within climate spaces, from therising numbers of government contracting fornational policymaking to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) bringing on consultancies as
official strategic partners, creating a conflictof interest because of their expanse of fossilfuel clientele and exposing these spaces tofurther risk of greenwashing and inadequate
market-based solutions.
Civil

societyplaysacrucialrole“

Civil society plays
a crucial role incommunicating
the needs ofunderrepresented
groups and serving asa check-and-balance
for state actors, yet
inclusivity remains along-standing issue.
incommunicating
the
needs
of
underrepresented groups and serving asa check-and-balance for state actors, yet
inclusivity remains a long-standing issue –marred by tokenisation, inequitable access
and, in extreme cases, state-sanctioned
oppression.
Many have consistently advocated forequitable solutions at the national levelthat have either seen slow progress or failto reflect within parties’ actions throughout
the years. These circumstances perpetuate
the exclusion of grassroots perspectives
and are further amplified for marginalisedcommunities in the Global South, where
disproportionate climate impacts and urgent
perspectives fail to be recognised at theinternational stage.
The UNFCCC and the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), both
serving as the authoritative drivers on
climate knowledge and global cooperation,
are not exempt from circumstances whichperpetuate global dynamics of inequality.
For example, the IPCC’s assessment reports
are a crucial component of understanding
climate science, however, authorship from
Global South and socially diverse scientists
remains insufficiently represented, wherein
focus | 63the latest report comprised of 38% Global
South authors and 33% female authors,
missing out on crucial perspectives.
Equitable access to spaces, such as
COP, has also been a long-standing issue,
wherein Global North players not only bear
disproportionate soft-power influence, butalso do not face the same barriers as Global
South and civil society actors, including
negotiators, when it comes to capacity,
funding and travel arrangements.
In view of these issues, shifting the tide ofglobal climate discourse to mobilise proper
action is a Herculean task. But keeping three
things at the forefront is vital to provoke theparadigm shift needed to achieve equitableoutcomes.
Key bases to equitable outcomesFirst, reaffirming that these existing modern
inequalities bear historical context. Namely,
historical emissions and colonialism –circumstances explicitly acknowledged in
the IPCC’s sixth assessment report – haveformed the basis of resource extractionand ecological degradation which createdthe climate crisis, as well as set up theuneven dynamics of the Global North andGlobal South when it comes to parties’
respective development and mutual pursuitof emissions reductions.
The US$1 billion (RM4.5 billion) global
climate finance goal, for instance, has largely
been delivered in the form of loans, whichhinders accessibility and thereby crucial
adaptation progress for the Global South.
What’s more, superpowers, such as the US,
alone comprise one-fourth of the world’s
carbon dioxide emissions after accounting
for historical emissions, a far cry from thedeveloping world’s cumulative.
These showcase the existing dynamics
where developing nations are pressured
to weigh national development against
adapting to climate impacts while facing
64 | focus“

Given that the climate
crisis does not exist
in a vacuum, this isalso tied to broader
development reformmovements, which aim
not only to decouple
imperial patterns
of profiteering andoverexploitation fromdevelopment, but also
decentralise decisionmaking processes
from the ruling classto empower equal
participation ofordinary citizens.
exacerbated inequalities, as compared with
developed nations which do not face thesestruggles largely on account of perpetuating
exploitative practices from their colonial
histories.
Second, global climate governance requiresa level of systemic change. This not only calls
for the ambition required to fulfil the fossil fuelphase-out and wider just energy transition inachieving meaningful emission reductions
but also to halt the overexploitation that
our current institutional structures enforce,damaging ecosystem services, biodiversity,
indigenous livelihoods and more.
Given that the climate crisis does not exist
in a vacuum, this is also tied to broader
development reform movements, which
aim not only to decouple imperial patterns

of profiteering and overexploitation fromdevelopment,but
also
decentralisedecision-making processes from the rulingclass to empower equal participation ofordinary citizens, including grassroots andmarginalised communities.
This is tied to the third point, in which a criticalclimate justice lens must be the north star indriving policy action. Such a lens integrates
frameworksofintersectionality
anddecolonisation, as well as the right to selfdetermination for indigenous populations,to ensure a holistic approach to our climate
responses.
For Global North players to build solidarity
through these principles, true allyship must
be built by empowering the inclusion of
Global South and civil society movements,
through amplifying awareness, capacity
building, consultations and partnerships,
ensuring meaningful participation andimplementation of viewpoints in spaces
where these actors are underrepresented or
excluded.

Where gaps of inclusion have been
identified, institutions such as the IPCC
must continuously implement and review
measures to ensure Global South andgrassroots perspectives are adequately
represented within the negotiating process
and outcomes.
Developed nations should also continue
to fulfil their financial and technologicaltransfer obligations as agreed upon to bridge
the Global North-South divide.
We return to “common but differentiatedresponsibilities” as the central and guiding
principle of global climate discourse. The
climate crisis is a global fight, but thebattleground was not made equally. While
all stakeholders must commit to their parts,
the world must acknowledge the inequalities
at hand and the collective action needed toaddress them, ensuring the Paris Agreement
does not become a futile aspiration.

Kieran Li Nair

Senior researcher
Institute of Strategic & International Studies (ISIS)
Malaysia

focus | 65