INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL CONTROVERSIES
1. Capitulating to Chinese and Korean demands
During the postwar era, historical controversies are the most nagging problems confronting Japan.
Just as an ex-convict, forever branded, must live out his days as a pariah, Japan has seen its history
reviled. Encumbered with the aggressor stigma, our country has yet to resume its rightful status in
the international community.
Here are some examples of historical controversies that have plagued Japan:
1. Chinese interference during the Ministry of Education’s selection of history textbooks
for use in Japan’s high schools in 1982 (the First Textbook Controversy).
2. The international uproar that ensued in 1986 when both China and Korea interfered in
the same selection process in connection with New Edition: Japanese History,1another high school textbook.
3. Korean protests against a comment made by Minister of Education Fujio Masayuki in1986 to the effect that Korea bears as much responsibility as Japan for the annexationof Korea, which was the result of an agreement between the two nations. Fujio wassubsequently dismissed by Prime Minister Nakasone.2
4. Chinese protests and harassment in connection with comments made by Minister ofEducation Okuno Seisuke to the effect that Japan did not wage a war of aggression,
which led to his resignation, also in 1986.
It is not hard to imagine the distress experienced by Japanese officials in the face of such protests
and harassment, distress that perhaps drove them to respond obsequiously.
A similar problem erupted in February 1989 in the wake of a comment Prime Minister Takeshita
Noboru made at a Diet session. In response to a question, the prime minister said, “The questionof whether (World War II) was a war of aggression should be decided by the historians of thefuture.” This prompted an outcry from the Chinese Foreign Ministry: “Japanese militarism
unleashed a war of aggression, which brought great misfortune upon the Chinese and Asian people.
We will not tolerate the misrepresentation or denial of this unfortunate chapter in history.” The
response of the Japanese government to that outburst was to relay its fundamental stance to our
diplomats, and then to ask the Chinese “for their understanding.” That stance was: “We cannot
disavow past aggressive behavior toward China.” The message from the Chinese was: “There isno need to wait for the historians of the future. Japan must abide by the position taken by thePeople’s Republic of China.”
Here I would like to quote from an article I wrote in 1987:（新編日本史）published in 1987 under the title Saishin Nihonshi, （最新日本史） (Updated Japanesehistory) by Meiseisha.
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https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E8%97%A4%E5%B0%BE%E6%AD%A3%E8%A1%8C (retrieved 07/2022).

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Each time the publication of a textbook or a prime minister’s pilgrimage to Yasukuni
Shrine sets off a dispute between Japan and China, the Chinese use the same,
overworked language: “We object to the juxtaposition of offender and victim.” Thenotion of Japan as the malefactor and China, its victim, forms the basis for China’s
official historical view. The Chinese employ arrogant, intrusive language to describe
Japanese textbooks or pilgrimages to Yasukuni Shrine because they believe that they
were victimized by the Japanese. Unfortunately, a great many Japanese haveembraced this official Chinese historical view. Every time the Chinese complain that“the Japanese show no remorse for their evil deeds,” our immediate reaction is tocower: such is the wretched position that Japan finds itself in now. The “China asvictim” claim has become China’s way of compelling the Japanese to grovel. Unless
we cease acquiescing to Chinese demands, Japan will have no choice but to be theservant, and China the master, for all eternity.3

How long must the Japanese people endure servitude to China?
2. History: chronicle of a people
The first thing we must remember when we write our own history, the history of Japan, is that
there is no need for us to consult China or Korea.
After my series, “The Road to the Greater East Asian War,” appeared in Shokun!, I engaged in a
dialogue with a historian who specializes in the modern era.4 During our discussion, he countered
my every mark with “But China will not accept that.” Apparently, in his mind, only accounts thatwere accepted and sanctioned by the Chinese constituted accurate history. I know for a fact that
there are plenty of other Japanese historians who always have China in the back of their minds
when they do their research. The history that emerges from such a subservient spirit – never mind,
it does not deserve to be called history.
No nation seeks the understanding and approval of another state before recording its own history.
Or perhaps some do, but only colonies or protectorates, not independent states. It is common
knowledge that Chinese and Korean history textbooks are riddled with anti-Japanese accounts thatare an amalgam of truth and lies. However, would the Chinese or Koreans accommodate requests
from Japan to revise those accounts? Never! They would hurl vitriol at the Japanese, accusing usof interfering in their domestic affairs.
History is a chronicle of a particular people, or ethnic group. It is natural for every ethnic group,for every nation, to adopt an affectionate view of its past. Consequently, every nation does its best
to cast its history in a favorable light. Chinese history textbooks devote dozens of pages to theOpium Wars (1839-42, 1856-60), while it is difficult to find even one line about those conflicts in3

Nakamura Akira, “中国＝被害者説の神話“(Mythology: the China-as-victim argument), Shokun!, January

1987.
4Shokun!, March-April 1990.

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British history textbooks. But I have yet to hear of any protests lodged by the Chinese about theseparticular omissions. Even if such had been lodged, the UK would probably not entertain them.
History is intimately linked with national sentiments and interests. No common understanding ofhistory between or among nations is possible. For instance, if Japan and the USSR had a common
understanding of history, then the Northern Territories would have already been returned to Japan.
But they have not, and the reason why can probably be explained by the difference between thetwo nations’ understanding of history.
Every nation’s history has a nationalistic tinge, and Japanese history is no exception. To define
history as a “science” is to adopt the specious reasoning of Marxism (specious reasoning that willcease to be taken seriously when the 20th century ends). History that is written after being accepted,
understood, and approved by another nation or nations may endure as the epitaph of a defunctethnicity, but will not endure as genuine history, as the soul and the memory of a nation and itspeople.
3. Interpretation of the Greater East Asian WarThere are other controversies in addition to those concerning textbooks and official pilgrimages toYasukuni Shrine. I speak of the annual controversy over the raising of the Japanese flag and thesinging of our national anthem at graduation ceremonies.
We also have the “war responsibility” controversy, which surfaced at about the time when Emperor
Showa’s health began to fail. To begin with, the word responsibility is intended for use inconnection with unfair and unlawful actions. If we are speaking of war responsibility, we must
begin by pronouncing the Greater East Asian War an unfair war (a war of aggression), or at leasta war initiated for no good reason. Therefore, if we arrive at the conclusion that the Greater East
Asian War was not a war of aggression, but a defensive war, the debate over responsibility
becomes meaningless. Then, at the basis of the debate over war responsibility lurks a battle
between historical perceptions. Regardless of whether we are talking about legal responsibility or
moral responsibility, we end up with an empty argument.
Then how do we characterize the Greater East Asian War? Are we truly unable to explain theconflict except in terms of the conspiracy theories and the war-of-aggression historical view
imposed by the IMTFE?
Wars are conflicts between nations, but ultimately, they are no more than conflicts between
societies. It should be possible to arrive at a convincing interpretation and evaluation of that war
by comparing each side’s past claims and positions, and the evolution of their relationships over
the years, just as we might when disputes among individuals are involved. This process does not
require a historical perception where a war of aggression is a political ideology that forces facts tobe dependent upon theories.
By performing a structural analysis of the Greater East Asian War, and retracing its progress, I
was able to discover two main themes, i.e., negotiations between Japan and the US in connection
with the Open Door Policy, and the battle against communism. That discovery enabled me toposition the Greater East Asian War at the climactic point where those two themes met and3

expanded. This book is my attempt to validate my interpretation of the Greater East Asian War
with the aid of a great many historical facts. Unlike the theoretical historical perception that seeks
to explain all historical phenomena, which is similar to the historical perception rooted in
Marxism-Leninism (the collapse and fallacies of Marxism-Leninism, as we are well aware, willsoon be exposed by history), my interpretation has been obtained by analyzing history leading up
to the Greater East Asian War, and only that particular aspect of history. Allow me to add that
there is nothing ambiguous about my historical perception.
4. Defying postwar taboos
Human relationships are complex, and so are the history and events that lead up to wars, which
are disputes among nations. To make simple, precise pronouncements designating one side themalefactor and the other, the victim, is to distort the truth.
A formula that designates Japan and only Japan the malefactor, and China and Korea the victims,
has become the official historical view in both countries. Japanese academics, educators, andfourth estate consider objections to that perception taboo. However, in this book I fully intend toaddress this taboo. After all, in every dispute there is usually some degree of responsibility on bothsides.
This is especially true in wars that have a complex historical background. There is more than one
way to seek responsibility in history. Not only the exercise of military force, but also negligence,
conservatism, obstinacy, domestic conflict, corruption, xenophobia, violations of covenants,
betrayal, territorial ambition, and lack of willingness to compromise are major causative factorsthat exacerbate international relations, invite historical chaos, and bear a reasonable amount ofresponsibility to history. If, in a war, there is a responsible party (nation), the word responsibility
must be used in its broad sense. In other words, it must include any of the aforementioned factorsthat are relevant to the situation at hand. A writer who fails to do that is burying the truth. It isabsolutely imperative to determine where responsibility lies. That is what I attempt to accomplish
in this book, and taboos will not deter me.
Now I shall proceed to tell the story behind the Greater East Asian War. This is my attempt toreexamine modern history, which is premised on doubts about the perception that Japan waged awar of aggression. This may seem like a roundabout way of doing things, but since my position isto emphasize the historical background of the war, I must follow the standard format, meaning that
I shall begin with the relationship between Meiji Japan and China and Korea, both of which wereon the verge of modernization.

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