JAPAN-EU DIGITAL PARTNERSHIP

Section 1. Background
1. The Japan-EU Summit conclusions of 27 May 2021 called for strengthening Japan-EU digitalcooperation to support an inclusive, sustainable, human-centric digital transformation.
2. Japan’s vision of Society 5.0, as proposed in the 5th Science and Technology Basic Plan in
2016, calls upon Japan to create a human-centred society that balances economic advancementwith the resolution of social problems by a system that highly integrates cyberspace andphysical space.
3. Moreover, Japan’s National Data Strategy (2021) and Priority Policy Programme forRealising Digital Society (2021) calls upon Japan to implement the vision of Society 5.0 andwork on materialising the concept of “Data Free Flow with Trust” (DFFT) for maximising thebenefit of data flows. In this regard, both sides recognise that the ability to move data acrossborders is essential for economic growth and innovation and that COVID-19 has demonstrated
the need for DFFT and its role in the global recovery. In this context, technologies enhancing
trust are essential to realise the data free flow with trust across borders, ensuring privacy,
security, intellectual property rights and data protection.
4. The European strategy for data (2020) describes the vision to create a genuine internal market
for data, where data flows freely across sectors and countries, in line with European rules andvalues, and data-driven innovation is embraced by society.
5. The Joint Communication of 16 September 2021 from the Commission and the High
Representative on the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy calls on the EU to deepen its engagement withpartners in the Indo-Pacific to respond to emerging dynamics that are affecting regional stability,
and on 1 December 2021 the EU launched the Global Gateway strategy for sustainable
connectivity.
6. The Commission’s 2030 Digital Compass Communication calls upon the EU to promote ahuman-centred digital agenda on the global stage and to form international Partnerships for the
Digital Decade with like-minded partners.
7. The European Commission’s Trade Policy Review Communication calls upon the EU to
support the recovery and fundamental transformation of the EU economy in line with its green
and digital objectives.
8. The “Joint Declaration by the European Union, Australia, Comores, India, Japan, Mauritius,
New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka on privacy and the protection of
personal data”, which was endorsed at the Ministerial Forum for Cooperation in the IndoPacific in Paris on 22 February 2022, expresses a common vision of a human-centric approachto the digital transformation, where the effective protection of personal data plays a crucial role,and underlines the importance of data free flow with trust as key to harnessing the opportunitiesof the digital economy.

9. Both sides have established a deep partnership building on joint work in the context of theJapan-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) and the Japan-EU Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA), as well as the long-standing and intense cooperation in the digital policy
sphere and on Japan and the EU leaders’ firm commitment to enhancing cooperation for a free
and open Indo-Pacific, which is inclusive and based on the rule of law and democratic values,
as well as unconstrained by coercion.
10. Both sides see the joint benefits of forming a Digital Partnership that will establish structures
for collaboration in the digital field. The Partnership will allow both sides to work towards
concrete policy deliverables, building on existing cooperation mechanisms.
11. The Partnership is not intended to create any rights or obligations under international ordomestic law. It does not have any financial implications on either side.
Section 2. Partnering for the development of a human-centric and sustainable digitalsociety
12. Both sides share a commitment to a positive and human-centric vision of the digital
economy and society where the design, development, governance, and use of technology are
guided by democratic values and respect for universal human rights. By joining their efforts,
they can contribute to enhancing this vision in their respective activities and towards
international partners.
13. Both sides share the common goal of ensuring predictability and legal certainty forbusinesses, to foster a secure online environment for consumers who engage in digitaltransactions across borders, to remove unjustified barriers to business and to prevent
discrimination between online and offline activities.
14. The Japan-EU Digital Partnership intends to cover the main dimensions of the digitaltransformation, including infrastructures, skills, digital transformation of businesses, anddigitalisation of public services. It intends to further facilitate data free flow and strengthen
consumer and business trust by respecting a high level of privacy and security.
15. By way of this Digital Partnership, both sides can ensure a successful digital transformationthat delivers solidarity, prosperity, and sustainability. The Digital Partnership should help
citizens in Japan and the EU to learn, work, explore, fulfil ambitions in the digital society, andshould empower Japanese and EU businesses to deploy new technologies and innovate. Bothsides also support the principles outlined in the Declaration for the Future of the Internet.
16. Both sides should promote their shared vision globally and should strive to extend theirpartnership to other like-minded partners across the world. Both sides share the ambition to
improve the functioning of the global digital economy and intend to work jointly in an active
and assertive manner to promote a human-centric vision of digitisation, building on respective
bilateral and multilateral work such as the G7, G20, OECD, and WTO. Japan will hold the 2023
G7 meeting and both sides are committed to develop the cooperation in light of the G7 Roadmap
for Cooperation on Data Free Flow with Trust adopted at the G7 Digital and Technology
Ministers’ Meeting in 2021 and the G7 Action Plan for Promoting Data Free Flow with Trust
adopted at the G7 Digital Ministers’ Meeting in 2022.

17. In this regard, both sides stress the importance of their commitments in the EPA chapter onelectronic commerce and consider the ongoing WTO negotiations under the framework of the
Joint Statement Initiative on electronic commerce a key element to advance the global settingof rules governing digital trade. In addition, both sides intend to promote a safer, human-centric
online environment, build a global coalition for the open, free and secure internet and continue
cooperating in relevant international fora.
18. The strong Digital Partnership between both sides can have positive implications wellbeyond the digital agenda, as digital solutions are also key to fighting climate change andachieving the green transition. The Digital Partnership intends therefore to contribute also to
Japan and the EU meeting the objectives of their Green Alliance.
Section 3. Establishing a Digital Partnership between Japan and the EU
19. The Digital Partnership intends to facilitate and organise joint work in areas of mutualinterest and will provide a mechanism to review progress on a yearly basis and enhancecollaboration by identifying areas for future collaboration and possible deliverables therein.
20. The Digital Partnership intends to establish an annual meeting at ministerial level (“JapanEU Digital Partnership Council”), of which the main contributors on the Japanese side are theDigital Agency, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry. It is expected to take stock of progress in the partnership and provide
political guidance on the next steps. Its secretariat will be provided informally by the Digital
Agency and the European Commission’s services (DG Connect), which will coordinate
activities on their respective sides, involving all relevant services.
21. The Digital Partnership intends to provide for the over-arching framework of bilateral
cooperation in the digital field for both sides. The partnership will not create legal obligations
on either side but will be based on voluntary cooperation. It is expected to prepare deliverablesin the areas identified, building on existing cooperation mechanisms such as the annual bilateral
Digital Policy Dialogues, Industrial Dialogue, the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation,
the EU-Japan Business Round Table, the Cybersecurity Dialogue, the EPA Committees, anddedicated expert workshops. It aims to leverage existing cooperation activities, not to replace
them, and it should not result in additional bureaucratic burdens or heavy coordination costs.
22. Regular stakeholder participation and involvement are key to its success, and exchanges are
expected to be organised as part of existing cooperation mechanisms and joint DigitalPartnership dialogues with stakeholders.
23. These various streams will be integrated in the yearly cycle of the Partnership, so thatsynergies can be clearly identified and reinforced between the various areas, and service-levelor sector-specific discussions can form a holistic political dialogue about digital technologies,
policies and exchanges. Efforts will be made to make the partnership as efficient as possible
and to limit extra costs. Priorities will be clearly defined and communicated through the JapanEU Digital Partnership Council.
24. The Partnership may continue until both sides confirm that the objectives of this instrument
have been achieved or until one side discontinues its participation in this instrument.
Section 4. Achieving joint results in priority areas for enhanced digital cooperation

25. The Japan-EU Digital Partnership aims at delivering concrete results. Both sides intend towork jointly on the following priority areas, and to launch a set of joint actions that are describedin the Annex to this document.
26. In the field of Privacy, both sides recognise high privacy standards as an essential elementof a human-centric approach to the opportunities and challenges of our digital age. Both sides
intend to pursue further cooperation with regard to the protection of personal information on
issues such as the impact of certain emerging technologies on privacy, privacy-enhancing
technologies and enforcement cooperation between supervisory authorities responsible for dataprotection.
27. Both sides intend to enhance their cooperation to strengthen the resilience of the global
semiconductor supply chain, including by exchanging information on their respective
approaches, and to develop through research and innovation the next generation ofsemiconductors. Both sides share the aim of avoiding a subsidy race and the risk of crowding
out private investments that would themselves contribute to our security and resilience.
28. Both sides intend to promote the development and deployment of secure, high performing,
energy efficient and sustainable 5G and Beyond 5G technologies, including through enhanced
R&D collaboration. Both sides endeavour to share the status of business-driven initiatives
towards open, diversified and interoperable network technologies, as well as to share
information on security and energy efficiency assessments and on the development of testing
facilities for such technologies.
29. On High Performance Computing and Quantum technology both sides aspire topromoting the exchange of researchers and engineers between Japan and the EU. Both sides
intend to promote the utilisation of their respective supercomputers and quantum computing
infrastructures among their research communities and to foster enhanced cooperation on High
Performance Computing applications of common interest.
30. In order to build resilience to cyber threats in an increasingly challenging environment, bothsides intend to promote information exchange and cooperation in the field of cybersecurity,
including by improving the usability of the Japanese Cyber/Physical Security Framework(CPSF). Both sides recognise the importance of promoting cybersecurity information sharing.
31. Regarding Artificial Intelligence (AI), both sides intend to cooperate in the deployment ofAI principles and the international adoption of those principles in order to advance thedevelopment and global use of trustworthy AI. Both sides want to pursue coordination of
positions on AI in international fora, such as the G7, G20, OECD and UNESCO. Both sides
intend to cooperate on the implementation of such principles in their respective jurisdictions
including through exploring cooperation on technical requirements for trustworthy AI.
32. In terms of digital connectivity, both sides intend to promote secure connectivity between
both sides and ensure the enabling environment for secure, trusted and green data centres at thelanding site of submarine cables. The existing EU-Japan Connectivity Partnership can support
this process.
33. In the field of online platforms, both sides share the objectives of keeping digital services
safe for citizens, and contestable by businesses. Both sides intend to continue exchanging
information on their respective approaches to regulating online platforms, with a view tofostering greater coordination around key regulatory principles and effective implementation.
This will build on the common approach taken to regulating so-called ‘platform-to-business’
relations.
34. On data, both sides envisage working towards strengthening Data Free Flow with Trust(DFFT), including by promoting technologies enhancing trust, deepening mutual
understanding of data governance on both sides, and on that basis working together to enhanceinternational cooperation to address unjustified obstacles for the free flow of data across borders
while preserving the regulatory autonomy of both sides in the area of data protection andprivacy.
35. On technologies enhancing trust, both sides recognise the role of trusted technologies,
certification and schemes like the EU 5G Toolbox in areas such as privacy, cybersecurity,
semiconductor supply chains, 5G and Beyond 5G technologies, High Performance Computing,
Quantum technology, and online platforms.
36. Both sides share the necessity to deepen discussions on digital trade. Both sides intend toseek a cooperative relationship regarding trade facilitation. In addition, both sides intend todeepen their common understanding and reflect it in a set of digital trade principles. Both sides
aim at cooperating and coordinating their approaches regarding digital protectionist measuresand trends around the world, which have a detrimental impact on trade and investment flows.
37. Digital technologies are key enablers for Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) toinnovate, grow and compete. Both sides will examine how they can cooperate on respective
initiatives to promote SME’s digital transformation. Both sides intend to exchange on
guidelines and best practices on how the digitalisation of industry including SMEs can support
the sustainability targets of companies and accelerate the transition to a circular economy.
38. Both sides intend to establish a cooperative relationship regarding international
standardisation, based on their ongoing cooperation within international standards bodies.
39. Both sides intend to share best practices, frameworks, content and continue dialogues in thefield of public sector interoperability. Both sides endeavour to continue to work on the basis ofuse cases and pilot projects towards interoperability of their trust services. Both sides intend
to collaborate on digital identity solutions, including continued information exchange on the
Trusted Web/EU Digital Identity Wallet and using appropriate channels.
40. Both sides envisage to further increase cooperation on Blockchain and Distributed Ledger
Technologies, by engaging international stakeholders, sharing best practices, exploring possiblealignment on regulatory frameworks and facilitating the discussions under the International
Association for Trusted Blockchain Applications (INATBA).
41. Both sides intend to share best practices, content and courses and continue dialogues in thefield of digital education to support high-quality inclusive and accessible education in Japanand the EU taking into account a human-centric vision and approach to digital transformation.
42. This list of priority topics is based on existing cooperation between both sides and on areas
where they believe cooperation will lead to tangible benefits for both sides. It will be reviewed
and updated on a regular basis through the Japan-EU Digital Partnership Council.
Section 5. Strong leadership and progress monitoring for a successful Digital Partnership43. As like-minded partners, both sides intend to expand and deepen their Digital Partnershipover time. The Strategic Partnership Agreement and the Economic Partnership Agreement will
also be important in this respect.
44. The Japan-EU Digital Partnership Council should be provided with clear progress reports
by its secretariat in order to take stock of the progress achieved and provide strategic guidanceon the priorities and next steps.
45. EU Member States will be closely involved in the implementation of this Digital Partnership,seeking complementarity between actions at EU level and at Member States’ level.
Annex: Initial set of joint actions
Supply chain resilience: semiconductors
46. Both sides intend to work towards achieving joint monitoring, exchange of information in
anticipation of disruptions in the supply chain, effective early warning mechanisms, crisis
preparedness, exchange of information on long-term investment strategies and coordination ofexport controls among the relevant authorities. Both sides should strive to extend this joint
exercise within a multilateral initiative.
47. Both sides intend to promote research in areas of combined strength, i.e. chip design,
automotive and power technologies, sensing, as well as integrated photonics in order tostrengthen the semiconductor supply chain and in order to address gaps in the value chain. To
that effect, both sides should explore and promote R&D on semiconductor technologies thatwill enable the future architecture of next generation computing. Research cooperation will be
set up in relevant domains for the future of the industry, e.g. design with open-source hardware,chips for AI, 5G/6G, HPC, and semiconductor integration technologies.
5G/Beyond 5G
48. Both sides intend to continue their Research & Innovation dialogue. For the EU, this will
be carried out within the context of the Smart Network and Services (SNS) Joint Undertaking,driven by industrial requirements for topical cooperation with selected partners.
49. Both sides are expected to share information on progress regarding connectivity
infrastructure sustainability, notably for what concerns the energy efficiency (greening) ofdigital infrastructures and how they can address climate change.
50. Both sides will share the status of business driven initiatives towards open, interoperable
network technologies, as well as share information on security and energy efficiency
assessments and on the development of testing facilities for such technologies and workon fostering security, diversity, interoperability, and resilience across the ICT supply chain.
51. Both sides will work towards a shared global vision of 6G and towards the stimulation of
global 6G ecosystems including standardisation of 6G.
High Performance Computing (HPC) and Quantum technology
52. Both sides should explore modalities of reciprocal access for researchers to their respective
supercomputing and quantum computing infrastructures, notably the utilisation of the “Fugaku”

and EU/EuroHPC, JU’s LUMI, Leonardo and MareNostrum supercomputers (once they areoperational), in conformity with the respective supercomputers’ access policy.
53. Both sides should exchange information regarding optimising HPC applications of common
interest for future generations of supercomputing platforms/architectures (pre-exascale,exascale, post-exascale, hybrid Quantum-HPC). The starting point could include applications
related to biomedical, material science, seismic/tsunami and/or weather and climate modelling.
Cybersecurity
54. Both sides intend to continue their activities towards enhancing information sharing
between Information Sharing and Analysis Centres (ISACs), and the EU-Japan-US Industrial
Control System Cyber Security training for participants from the Indo-Pacific region.
55. Both sides intend to work together as part of their cyber security dialogue as well as ininternational fora.
56. Both sides recognise that threats to cybersecurity undermine confidence in digital trade andthat cybersecurity measures should not create unjustified barriers to trade.
Artificial Intelligence
57. Both sides intend to continue to develop a mutual understanding of the principles underlying
trustworthy and responsible AI and of their respective methods to implement a risk-based
approach, as well as to explore cooperation on the technical requirements for trustworthy AI.
58. Both sides should pursue cooperation in practical initiatives that further the development oftrustworthy and responsible AI in the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI).
59. Both sides should pursue coordination of positions on AI in international fora, such as the
G7, G20, OECD, and UNESCO.
60. Both sides should work towards coordinating positions in international standardisation
organisations, as regards AI global standards.
Digital connectivity
61. Both sides will explore the possibility to ensure secure and sustainable connectivity links
between them that will be the basis of their strong digital partnership. Both sides may further
explore mapping current and future opportunities at the level of connectivity infrastructures(mainly submarine and space) between the EU and Japan; as well as assessing the need anddesign of a reporting system regarding submarine cable outages.
62. Both sides intend to promote the deployment of secure, trusted digital connectivity in third
countries, under the umbrella of the EU-Japan Connectivity Partnership.
Platform cooperation
63. Both sides intend to further deepen their cooperation and information sharing in the area ofplatform regulation. Both sides will specifically look towards mechanisms for the rapid
identification of emerging safety, contestability and fairness issues, and towards designing aframework for future information exchange and enforcement coordination of their respective
platform regulations.
64. Beyond information sharing, both sides will explore procedures and tools includingcommon reporting templates ensuring transparency and accountability, which can support theirrespective platform regulations, with a particular focus on the fight against illegal and harmful
content online, including the issues of hate speech and disinformation, and algorithmic
amplification. Online advertising markets will also be part of this analysis, which should coverissues beyond illegal and harmful content including the protection of minors and contestability
concerns. Such efforts could involve joint expert workshops and regular exchanges on emerging
issues including in content moderation, as well as work on common reporting templates
ensuring transparency and accountability and common procedures.
65. Over the short to medium term, both sides should share information regarding fundamental
trends in the evolution of their online environments.
Data and Data Free Flow with Trust (DFFT)
66. Both sides recognise that ensuring the free and trusted flow of data across borders incompliance with data protection rules and other public policy objectives, including public
security and public order, is fundamental to unlock the benefits of digitalisation. Trusted crossborder and cross-sector data flows enable actors of all sizes including our respective SMEs toadvance innovation and research, extend market reach and minimise economic and technicaluncertainties.
67. Both sides intend to deepen at expert level their understanding on the function of dataintermediaries (as in the EU Data Governance Act) and the Japanese certification scheme for“information banks” and market-driven initiatives such as Jdex.
68. Both sides are expected to work towards avoidance of discrimination between researchersaffiliated to universities or research organisations on the basis of affiliation outside the relevant
jurisdiction as concerns re-use of public sector information protected on grounds of commercial
or statistical confidentiality, protection of intellectual property rights of third parties andprotection of personal data.
69. Both sides are expected to promote the exchange of views between government technicalexperts from both sides on possible cooperation for harnessing technologies enhancing trust,
recognising the importance of trusted technologies certification and schemes such as the EU
5G Toolbox in areas such as privacy, cybersecurity, semiconductor supply chains, 5G and
Beyond 5G technologies, High Performance Computing, Quantum technology and online
platforms. This might include seeking the possibility of Japan-EU cooperation on technologies
for strengthening security.
Digital Trade
70. Both sides should seek a common understanding on digital trade principles building on the
EPA covering issues relevant for digital trade such as, inter alia, paper-less trading, electronic
invoicing, electronic transactions framework and digital identities, online consumer protection,
cybersecurity, source code and cryptography.

71. Both sides intend to discuss and, when relevant, share information, with a view to combating
together digital protectionist measures adopted by third countries.
Digital transformation of industry, disruptive innovation, SMEs
72. Both sides should seek to connect relevant stakeholders from Japan and the EU and support
knowledge exchange on innovative digital technologies, including AI applications, formanufacturing. Furthermore, business cooperation should be encouraged between the business
communities of Japan and the EU, such as the EU-Japan Business Round Table (BRT), theJapan Business Council in Europe (JBCE), and the European Business Council in Japan (EBC),
also relying on the EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation as a facilitator.
73. Both sides intend to also organise workshops to address current needs, consider future
requirements and stimulate long-term cooperation.
Standardisation
74. Both sides intend to continue exchanging with a view to cooperating on standardisation ininternational fora.
75. As part of this joint vision, both sides should continue and enhance their ongoing cooperation to: (i) promoting these standards globally through initiatives like the
INDICO partnership, (ii) achieve common goals and vision for 5G (including security), Beyond
5G/6G, Internet of Things, Artificial Intelligence and digital identities and iii) cooperate on
standardisation from the early stages of research and innovation (R&I).
76. Both sides intend to discuss the methods for establishing standardised methods for
estimating the net environmental impact of digital solutions in major sectors such as energy,transport, construction/buildings, agriculture, smart cities).
Trust services: digital identity and digital signatures
77. Both sides should continue working through pilot projects towards the interoperability of
their trust services, which are key enablers for public administrations, business transactions ande-commerce. This can pave the way for mutual recognition, which is a long-term goal.
Digital COVID Certificates
78. Both sides have an interest in working towards an equivalence decision for Digital COVID
Certificates (DCC) and may reinforce cooperation towards that goal. This may also entail
cooperation on different approaches based on International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Visible Digital Seal for Non-Constrained environments (VDS-NC), Smart Health Card (SHC),
and the EU Digital Covid Certificate.
Enhancing digital education and skills critical for the digital future
79. Both sides intend to promote digital education and enhance digital skills to ensure all canbenefit from digitisation and contribute to the digital transformation. Both sides could exchange
best practices and insights on successful initiatives and will explore the possibility to increasing
cooperation between leading education institutions and industry.

80. Japanese schools and other organisations could consider joining the EU “CodeWeek”.
“CodeWeek” is an EU grass-roots movement to which already many other countries outside
the EU are participating. Its aim is to promote and organise activities involving children related
to coding and computational thinking.
Privacy enhancing technologies
81. With respect to personal data, both sides recall that they have mutual adequacy decisions inplace, which together have created the world’s largest area of free and safe data flows.
82. Both sides intend to advance the cooperation further with regard to privacy-enhancing
technologies and enforcement cooperation between supervisory authorities responsible for dataprotection.
83. Both sides promote cooperation among likeminded economies to enhance the trusted flowof personal data, through various cooperation mechanisms including the OECD.