*FM 20-3

Field Manual
No. 20-3

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 30 August 1999

FM 20-3
CAMOUFLAGE,
CONCEALMENT, AND
DECOYSTABLE OF CONTENTSPREFACECHAPTER BASICS
Doctrinal Considerations
1
Responsibilities
Priorities
Training
Other Considerations

CHAPTER THREAT
Doctrine
2
Organization
Data Collection
Sensor Systems
CCD Versus Threat Sensors

CHAPTER FUNDAMENTALS
Section I — Principles
3
Avoiding Detection
Identifying the Threat
Avoiding Detection by Routine Surveillance
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This publication supersedes FM 20-3, 14 November 1990.

Taking Countermeasures
Employing Realistic CCD
Minimizing Movement
Using Decoys
Avoiding Operational Patterns
Applying Recognition Factors
Site Selection
CCD Discipline
Section II — Techniques and Materials
Techniques
Tests and Evaluations
Natural Conditions
Data Sources
Materials

CHAPTER OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Preparations
4
BattleCHAPTER OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Preparations
5
Survivability Positions and Obstacles
BattleCHAPTER HIGH-VALUE TARGETS
Section I — CCD Planning
6
Plans
Objective
Planning Process
Section II — Fixed Installations
Concept
Command Posts
Supply and Water Points
Army Aviation Sites
Section III — Relocatable Units
Mobility and CCD
Built-In Capabilities

CHAPTER SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS
Desert7
Snow-Covered Areas
Urban Terrain

APPENDIMETRIC CONVERSION CHARTX A.
APPENDIX B.

GUIDELINES FOR TACTICAL STANDING OPERATINGPROCEDURES
Content
Commanders' Responsibilities
Fratricide

APPENDIX C.

CAMOUFLAGE REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES

APPENDIX D.

INDIVIDUAL CAMOFLAGE, CONCEALMENT, AND
DECOYSLightweight Camouflage Screen System
Supplemental Camouflage
Vehicle Camouflage
Training

Materials
Discipline
Dispersal
Considerations
Employment

APPENDIX E.

STANDARD CAMOUFLAUGE MATERIALSAPPENDIX F.

THE GENEVA EMBLEM AND CAMOUFLAGE OF
MEDICAL FACILITIESGLOSSARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AUTHORIZATION PAGE

Preface
This field manual (FM) is intended to help company-level leaders understand the principles andtechniques of camouflage, concealment, and decoys (CCD). To remain viable, all units must
apply CCD to personnel and equipment. Ignoring a threat's ability to detect friendly operations
on the battlefield is shortsighted and dangerous. Friendly units enhance their survivability
capabilities if they are well versed in CCD principles and techniques.
CCD is equal in importance to marksmanship, maneuver, and mission. It is an integral part of asoldier's duty. CCD encompasses individual and unit efforts such as movement, light, and noise
discipline; litter control; dispersal; and deception operations. Each soldier's actions must
contribute to the unit's overall CCD posture to maximize effectiveness.
Increased survivability is the goal of a CCD plan. A unit commander must encourage eachsoldier to think of survivability and CCD as synonymous terms. Training soldiers to recognize
this correlation instills a greater appreciation of CCD values.
A metric conversion chart is provided in Appendix A.
The proponent of this publication is HQ TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on
Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) directly to Commandant, United States Army Engineer School (USAES), ATTN: ATSEDOT-DD, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-6650.
This publication implements Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 2931, Orders for the
Camouflage of the Red Cross and Red Crescent on Land in Tactical Operations.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively
to men.

Chapter 1

Basics
CCD is the use of materials and techniques to hide, blend, disguise, decoy, or disrupt theappearance of military targets and/or their backgrounds. CCD helps prevent an enemy
from detecting or identifying friendly troops, equipment, activities, or installations.
Properly designed CCD techniques take advantage of the immediate environment andnatural and artificial materials. One of the imperatives of current military doctrine is toconserve friendly strength for decisive action. Such conservation is aided through soundoperations security (OPSEC) and protection from attack. Protection includes all actions
that make soldiers, equipment, and units difficult to locate.

DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS
1-1. CCD degrades the effectiveness of enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and targetacquisition (RSTA) capabilities. Skilled observers and sophisticated sensors can bedefeated by obscuring telltale signs (signatures) of units on the battlefield. Preventing
detection impairs enemy efforts to assess friendly operational patterns, functions, andcapabilities.
1-2. CCD enhances friendly survivability by reducing an enemy's ability to detect,
identify, and engage friendly elements. Survivability encompasses all actions taken toconserve personnel, facilities, and supplies from the effects of enemy weapons andactions. Survivability techniques include using physical measures such as fighting andprotective positions; nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) equipment; and armor. These
actions include interrelated tactical countermeasures such as dispersion, movement
techniques, OPSEC, communications security (COMSEC), CCD, and smoke operations(a form of CCD). Improved survivability from CCD is not restricted to combat
operations. Benefits are also derived by denying an enemy the collection of information
about friendly forces during peacetime.
1-3. Deception helps mask the real intent of primary combat operations and aids inachieving surprise. Deception countermeasures can delay effective enemy reaction by
disguising information about friendly intentions, capabilities, objectives, and locations ofvulnerable units and facilities. Conversely, intentionally poor CCD can project
misleading information about friendly operations. Successful tactical deception depends
on stringent OPSEC.
1-4. Smoke and obscurants are effective CCD tools and greatly enhance the effectivenessof other traditionally passive CCD techniques. Smoke and obscurants can change
battlefield dynamics by blocking or degrading the spectral bands used by an enemy's
target-acquisition and weapons systems. More recently developed obscurants are now
able to degrade nonvisual detection systems such as thermal infrared (IR) imaging

systems, selected radar systems, and laser systems. (See FM 3-50 for more information
on planning smoke operations.)

RESPONSIBILITIES
1-5. Each soldier is responsible for camouflaging and concealing himself and his
equipment. Practicing good CCD techniques lessens a soldier's probability of becoming atarget. Additionally, a thorough knowledge of CCD and its guiding principles allows asoldier to easily recognize CCD as employed by an enemy.
1-6. A commander is responsible for CCD of his unit, and noncommissioned officers(NCOs) supervise well-disciplined soldiers in executing CCD. They use establishedstanding operating procedures (SOPs) and battle drills to guide their efforts. CCD is acombat multiplier that should be exploited to the fullest extent.
1-7. An engineer is a battlefield expert on CCD. He integrates CCD into higher unit
operations and advises commanders on all aspects of CCD employment as it relates to aunit's current mission.

PRIORITIES
1-8. Every soldier and military unit has an inherent mission of self-protection, and theyshould use all CCD means available. However, CCD countermeasures have become more
complicated due to advancing technology. Commanders must recognize that advanced
technologies have—•

Enhanced the performance of enemy recon and surveillance equipment.

•

Increased an enemy's ability to use electromagnetic (EM) signature analysis for
detecting friendly units.

•

Reduced the time available to apply CCD because units must perform nearly all
aspects of battlefield operations at an increased speed.

1-9. When time, camouflage materials, or other resources are insufficient to provide
adequate support to units, commanders must prioritize CCD operations. Considerations
for establishing these priorities involve analyzing the mission, enemy, terrain, weather,troops, time available, and civilian considerations (METT-TC). The following sets forth a
METT-TC methodology to help determine CCD priorities:•

Mission. The mission is always the first and most important consideration. CCD
efforts must enhance the mission but not be so elaborate that they hinder a unit's
ability to accomplish the mission.

•

Enemy. An enemy's RSTA capabilities often influence the camouflage materials
and CCD techniques needed to support a unit's mission. Before beginning amission, conduct an intelligence analysis to identify the enemy's RSTA
capabilities.
•

Terrain and weather. The battlefield terrain generally dictates what CCD
techniques and materials are necessary. Different terrain types or backgroundenvironments (urban, mountain, forest, plains, desert, arctic) require specific CCD
techniques. (See Chapter 7 for more information.)•

Troops. Friendly troops must be well trained in CCD techniques that apply totheir mission, unit, and equipment. A change in the environment or the mission
often requires additional training on effective techniques. Leaders must also
consider the alertness of troops. Careless CCD efforts are ineffective and may
disclose a unit's location, degrade its survivability, and hamper its mission
accomplishment. Intelligence analysis should address the relative detectability offriendly equipment and the target signatures that unit elements normally project.

•Time. Time is often a critical consideration. Elaborate CCD may not be practicalin all tactical situations. The type and amount of CCD needed are impacted by thetime a unit occupies a given area, the time available to employ CCD
countermeasures, and the time necessary to remove and reemploy camouflage
during unit relocation. Units should continue to improve and perfect CCD
measures as time allows.

•

Civilian considerations. From conflict to war and from tactical to strategic,
civilians in the area of operation (AO) may be active or passive collectors of
information. Commanders and their staffs should manage this collection
capability to benefit the command and the mission.

TRAINING
1-10. CCD training must be included in every field exercise. Soldiers must be aware thatan enemy can detect, identify, and acquire targets by using resources outside the visual
portion of the EM spectrum.
INDIVIDUAL
1-11. Each member of the unit must acquire and maintain critical CCD skills. These
include the ability to analyze and use terrain effectively; to select an individual site
properly; and to hide, blend, disguise, disrupt, and decoy key signatures using natural andartificial materials.
CAUTION
Ensure that local environmental considerations
are addressed before cutting live vegetation or
foliage in training areas.

UNIT
1-12. Unit CCD training refines individual and leader skills, introduces the element ofteam coordination, and contributes to tactical realism. If CCD is to conserve friendly
strength, it must be practiced with the highest degree of discipline. The deployment andteardown of camouflage; light, noise, and communications discipline; and signal security
must be practiced and evaluated in an integrated mission-training environment. CCD
proficiency is developed through practicing and incorporating lessons learned fromexercises and operations. A unit must incorporate CCD (who, what, where, when, andhow) into its tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP). (Appendix B provides
additional guidance on integrating CCD into a unit's field TACSOP.) Generally, CCD is
additive and synergistic with other defensive measures. CCD enhances unit survivability
and increases the likelihood of mission success. A unit that is well trained in CCD
operations more easily recognizes CCD as employed by an enemy, and this recognition
enhances a unit's lethality.
EVALUATION
1-13. CCD training should be realistic and integrated with a unit's training evaluations.
Employ the following techniques to enhance training evaluations:•Have small-unit leaders evaluate their unit's CCD efforts from an enemy's
viewpoint. How a position looks from a few meters away is probably of little
importance. Evaluators should consider the following:n Could an approaching enemy detect and place aimed fire on the position?
n From what distance can an enemy detect the position?
n Which CCD principle was ignored that allowed detection?
n Which CCD technique increased the possibility of detection?

•

Use binoculars or night-vision or thermal devices, when possible, to show a unit
how it would appear to an enemy.

•

Use photographs and videotapes, if available, of a unit's deployments andpositions as a method of self-evaluation.

•

Incorporate ground-surveillance-radar (GSR) teams in training when possible. Let
the troops know how GSR works and have them try to defeat it.

•

Request aerial multispectral (visual, IR, radar) imagery of friendly unit positions.
This imagery shows how positions appear to enemy aerial recon. Unit leaders
should try to obtain copies of opposing forces (OPFOR) cockpit heads-up display(HUD) or videotapes, which are excellent assessment tools for determining a
unit's detectability from an enemy's perspective. Another valuable assessment tool
is the overhead imagery of a unit's actions and positions. Overhead imagery isoften difficult to obtain; but if a unit is participating in a large-scale exercise ordeployment, the imagery probably exists and can be accessed through the unit's
intelligence channels.
•

Use OPFOR to make training more realistic. Supporting aviation in an OPFOR
role also helps. When possible, allow the OPFOR to participate in the after-action
review (AAR) following each mission. The unit should determine what factors
enabled the OPFOR to locate, identify, and engage the unit and what the unit
could have done to reduce its detectability.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
1-14. Warfare often results in personnel losses from fratricide. Fratricide compels
commanders to consider CCD's effect on unit recognition by friendly troops.
1-15. Army policy prescribes that camouflage aids be built into equipment and supplies
as much as possible. Battle-dress uniforms (BDUs), paint, Lightweight Camouflage
Screen systems (LCSSs), and decoys help achieve effective camouflage. These aids are
effective only if properly integrated into an overall CCD plan that uses natural materials
and terrain. During training exercises, ensure that cutting vegetation or foliage does notadversely effect the natural environment (coordinate with local authorities). CCD aids
should not interfere with the battlefield performance of soldiers or equipment or the
installations that they are designed to protect. (See Appendix C for more information on
CSSs.)
1-16. When employed correctly, expedient CCD countermeasures are often the mosteffective means of confusing an enemy. Along with the standard items and materials
listed above, soldiers can use battlefield by-products, construction materials, andindigenous or locally procurable items to enhance unit CCD posture. For example, asimple building decoy can be constructed with two-by-fours and plywood. With theaddition of a heat source, such as a small charcoal pit, the decoy becomes an apparently
functional building. However, as with all CCD countermeasures, ensure that expedienttreatments project the desired signatures to the enemy and do not actually increase theunit's vulnerability to detection. Expedient CCD countermeasures are also beneficial
because the enemy has less time to study and become familiar with the selected
countermeasures.

Chapter 2

Threat
The enemy employs a variety of sensors to detect and identify US soldiers, equipment,
and supporting installations. These sensors may be visual, near infrared (NIR), IR,ultraviolet (UV), acoustic, or multispectral/hyperspectral. They may be employed bydismounted soldiers or ground-, air-, or space-mounted platforms. Such platforms areoften capable of supporting multiple sensors. Friendly troops rarely know the specificsensor systems or combination of systems that an enemy employs. When possible,
friendly troops should protect against all known threat surveillance systems.

DOCTRINE
2-1. Many threat forces were trained and equipped by the former Soviet Union. Its longstanding battlefield doctrine of maskirovka is a living legacy in many former Sovietclient states. Maskirovka incorporates all elements of CCD and tactical battlefield
deception into a cohesive and effective philosophy. During the Gulf War, Iraq usedmaskirovka to effectively maintain its capability of surface-to-surface missiles (Scuds) in
the face of persistent coalition-force attacks. Enemy forces that are trained in maskirovka
possess a strong fundamental knowledge of CCD principles and techniques. Friendly
forces must be very careful to conduct CCD operations so that a well-trained enemy will
not easily recognize them.
2-2. Typical threat doctrine states that each battalion will continuously maintain two
observation posts when in close contact with its enemy. An additional observation post isestablished when the battalion is in the defense or is preparing for an offense.
2-3. Patrolling is used extensively, but particularly during offensive operations. Patrols
are used to detect the location of enemy indirect- and direct-fire weapons, gaps informations, obstacles, and bypasses.
2-4. Enemy forces use raids to capture prisoners, documents, weapons, and equipment. A
recon-in-force (usually by a reinforced company or battalion) is the most likely tactic
when other methods of tactical recon have failed. A recon-in-force is often a deceptive
tactic designed to simulate an offensive and cause friendly forces to reveal defensive
positions.

ORGANIZATION
2-5. A typical enemy force conducts recon activities at all echelons. A troop recon isusually conducted by specially trained units. The following types of enemy units mighthave specific intelligence-collection missions:•Troops. An enemy uses ordinary combat troops to perform recon. One company
per battalion trains to conduct recon operations behind enemy lines.

•

Motorized rifle and tank regiments. Each regiment has a recon company and achemical recon platoon.

•

Maneuver divisions. Divisions have a recon battalion, an engineer recon platoon,a chemical recon platoon, and a target-acquisition battery.

DATA COLLECTION
2-6. An enemy collects information about United States (US) forces for two basic
reasons—target acquisition and intelligence production. Enemy weapons systems often
have sensors that locate and identify targets at long ranges in precise detail. Soldiers andunits should take actions to hinder the enemy's target-acquisition process. These actions
include all practical CCD operations expected to reduce the identification of soldiers,
units, and facilities.
2-7. An enemy uses sensor systems to locate and identify large Army formations andheadquarters (HQ) and to predict their future activities. Enemy detection of rear-area
activities, such as logistics centers and communications nodes, may also reveal friendly
intentions.
2-8. An enemy uses tactical recon to provide additional information on US forces'
dispositions and the terrain in which they are going to operate. The enemy's tactical recon
also attempts to identify targets for later attack by long-range artillery, rockets, aircraft,and ground forces.

SENSOR SYSTEMS
2-9. An enemy uses many different types of electronic surveillance equipment. Sensor
systems are classified according to the part of the EM spectrum in which they operate.
Figure 2-1 shows the EM spectrum and some typical enemy sensors operating within
specific regions of the spectrum. An enemy uses detection sensors that operate in theactive or passive mode:•

Active. Active sensors emit energy that reflects from targets and is recaptured by
the emitting or other nearby sensor, indicating the presence of a target. Examplesof active sensors are searchlights and radar.

•

Passive. Passive sensors do not emit energy; they collect energy, which may
indicate the presence of a target. Examples of passive sensors are the human eye,night-vision devices (NVDs), IR imaging devices, acoustic sensors, andphotographic devices.

Figure 2-1. EM spectrum
VISUAL
2-10. Visual sensors work in the parts of the EM spectrum that are visible to the humaneye. Enemy soldiers' eyes are the principle sensors on a battlefield. They may be aided bybinoculars, telescopic sights, and image intensifiers. Civilian populations, enemy agents,
recon teams, and patrols are visual-sensor systems from the enemy's intelligenceviewpoint. Three types of enemy visual sensors are—•Image intensifiers. Image intensifiers are passive night-observation devices.
They amplify the low-level light that is present on even the darkest nights. These
devices are used for surveillance and as weapon sights on small arms andvehicles. Airborne platforms are also capable of supporting image intensifiers.

•

Low-light television (LLTV). LLTV combines image intensification with
television technology, and it is usually mounted on airborne platforms.

•

Aerial recon, remote sensing, and imagery. Aerial photography, satellite
imagery, and video imagery allow image analysts to record and study visual
information. These analysts then produce target nomination lists that are, in effect,priority lists of targets in a given target scene. Since analysts often have to makesubjective determinations of the identity and/or importance of a given target, theranking of targets provides the defender with an opportunity to use CCD to
impact an enemy's target-prioritization process. Video systems allow transmissionof visual images to the ground while the manned aircraft, satellite, or unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) is still in flight.

NEAR INFRARED
2-11. NIR sensors operate at a wavelength immediately above the visible lightwavelength of the EM spectrum (Figure 2-1). NIR energy reflects well from live
vegetation but reflects better from dead vegetation and most man-made materials. NIR

sensors, such as sights and periscopes, allow the human eye to detect targets based on
differences in their reflection of NIR energy. NIR sensors are partially blocked by fog,
mist, and smoke operations, although not as completely as visual sensors. An enemy's
combat vehicles use active NIR sensors that employ searchlights, scopes, and sights; butthese sensors are rapidly being replaced with image intensifiers and thermal gun sights.
INFRARED
2-12. IR sensors detect the contrasts in heat energy that targets radiate on the battlefieldand display the contrasts as different colors or shades. Because longer wavelength IR
radiation is more susceptible to atmospheric absorption than NIR radiation, IR sensors
are less affected by typical concentrations of fog or conventional smoke.
2-13. Differences in thermal mass and surface properties (reflectivity) of man-made andnatural materials result in target-to-background contrasts. These contrast levels change
dramatically over a daily cycle. For example, operating vehicles and generators, heatedbuildings and tents, and soldiers are usually hotter than their background. Also,
equipment exposed to direct sunlight appears hotter than most natural backgrounds. At
night, however, equipment might appear cooler than its background if it is treated withspecial emissivity coatings. In other words, military equipment, particularly metallic
equipment, generally heats up and cools off more quickly than its background.
2-14. Sophisticated, passive IR sensors (such as the Forward-Looking Infrared System[FLIRS]) can be mounted on aircraft. FLIRS sensors provide aircrews and enemy groundforces with real-time IR imagery that is displayed on video monitors.
2-15. Recon aircraft often employ special IR films to record temperature differences. Due
to film processing, however, these systems are subject to time delays in obtaining thedata. Newer versions of this sensor produce non-film-based images.
ULTRAVIOLET
2-16. The UV area is the part of the EM spectrum immediately below visible light. UVsensors are more important in snow-covered areas, because snow reflects UV energy welland most white paints and man-made objects do not reflect UV energy very well.
Photographic intelligence systems with simple UV filters highlight military targets as
dark areas against snow-covered backgrounds. These backgrounds require speciallydesigned camouflage that provides a high UV reflectance.
RADAR
2-17. Radar uses high-frequency radio waves to penetrate atmospheric impediments suchas fog, mist, and smoke. Radar works by transmitting a very strong burst of radio waves
and then receiving and processing the reflected waves. In general, metal objects reflectradar waves well, while radar waves are either weakly reflected by or pass through mostother objects. The shape and size of a metal object determine the strength of the reflectedsignal. A large, metal object generally reflects more signal than a small object. Therefore,
large, metal objects can be detected from greater distances. The method by which thereceived radio wave is processed determines the type of radar. Radar systems commonlyused against ground forces on the battlefield include—•

Moving-target indicators (MTIs). When an EM wave hits a moving target, thewave is reflected and changes frequency. The faster the target moves, the larger
the changes in frequency. The simplest and most common battlefield radar detects
this frequency change. Threat forces use MTIs for target acquisition. Moresophisticated developmental radar systems, such as the Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS), use airborne surveillance platforms that
downlink captured data to ground-station modules in near real time. Groundbased operators are then able to manipulate the data and gain heightened
situational information, which is forwarded to command-and-control (C2) nodes
to enhance tactical decision-making.

•Imaging radar. An imaging radar's receiver and processor are so sensitive that animage of the detected target is displayed on a scope. Imaging radar, such as sidelooking airborne radar (SLAR), is generally used on airborne or space-borne
platforms. Imaging radar typically does not provide the same resolution as the
FLIRS and is less likely to be used for terminal target acquisition.

•

Countermortar (CM) and counterbattery (CB) radar. CM and CB radar
usually transmit two beams of energy that sweep above the horizon. An artillery
or mortar round or a rocket passing through the beams reflects two signals that arereceived and plotted to determine the origin of the round.

ACOUSTIC
2-18. The three predominant types of acoustical detection systems are—•Human ear. Every soldier, whether engaged in normal operations or at a listening
post, is an acoustic sensor. However, visual confirmation is usually preferred.

•

Flash-sound ranging. Flash-sound ranging is used against artillery. Light travels
faster than sound, so enemy sound-ranging teams can determine the distance to a
gun tube by accurately measuring the time between seeing a muzzle flash andhearing the sound. If the sound is detected by two or more teams, analysts plot theranges using automated data-processing computers. The target is located where
the plots intersect.

•Ground-based microphone array. Ground-based microphone-array systems
allow listeners to record acoustic signatures and accurately triangulate theirpositions.

RADIO
2-19. Threat forces make a great effort to search for, detect, and locate the sources of US
radio communications. They use various direction-finding techniques to locate opposing
emitters. Once an emitter is detected, an enemy can take a number of actions, ranging
from simply intercepting the transmissions to jamming or targeting the emitter for
destruction. (See FM 34-1 for more information on radio sensors.)MULTISPECTRAL AND HYPERSPECTRAL
2-20. Recent advancements in sensor acquisition and information-processing
technologies have fostered the advent of multispectral and hyperspectral sensors:•

Multispectral. Multispectral sensors typically scan a few broad-band channels
within the EM spectrum. An example of a multispectral sensor might be one
which coincidentally scans the visual and thermal IR portions of the EM
spectrum. Such sensors allow an enemy to assess a cross section of EM
wavelengths and acquire a target in one wavelength even though it might beeffectively concealed in another.

•Hyperspectral. Hyperspectral sensors collect data across a continuous portion of
the EM spectrum. These sensors scan many channels across a relatively narrow
bandwidth and provide detailed information about target spatial and spectral
patterns. Absorption and emission bands of given substances often occur withinvery narrow bandwidths. They allow high-resolution, hyperspectral sensors to
distinguish the properties of the substances to a finer degree than an ordinary
broadband sensor.

CCD VERSUS THREAT SENSORS
2-21. Target acquisition can be accomplished by a variety of sensors that operate
throughout the EM spectrum. This poses a challenge in CCD planning andemployment—determining which enemy sensor(s) that CCD operations should bedesigned to defeat. Unfortunately, no single answer is correct for all situations. Unit
commanders without specific guidance from higher echelons assess their tactical situationand plan CCD operations accordingly. If intelligence data indicate that an enemy will use
visual sensors for recon and target acquisition, then visual countermeasures must be
employed. For IR or radar sensors, countermeasures that are effective in those spectra
must be employed. If a multispectral or hyperspectral threat is anticipated, CCD
operations are conducted to protect a unit in its most vulnerable EM bandwidths. Veryfew available camouflage materials or techniques provide complete broadband
protection.

Chapter 3

Fundamentals
To remain a viable force on the battlefield, units must understand CCD fundamentals
because they are essential to survivability. To design and place effective CCD, soldiers
must constantly consider an enemy's point of view. (What will it see? Whatcharacteristics will its sensors detect?) Placing a low priority on CCD because of time
constraints, minimal resources, or inconvenience could result in mission failure andunnecessary loss of life. (Appendix D contains more information on individual CCD.)SECTION I — PRINCIPLESAVOIDING DETECTION
3-1. The primary goal of CCD is to avoid enemy detection; however, this is not always
feasible. In some cases, CCD may succeed by merely preventing an enemy fromidentifying a target. Simply avoiding identification is often sufficient to increasesurvivability. The following seven rules are critical when considering how to avoid
detection or identification:•

Identify the enemy's detection capabilities.

•

Avoid detection by the enemy's routine surveillance.

•

Take countermeasures against the enemy's sensors.

•

Employ realistic, CCD countermeasures.

•

Minimize movement.

•

Use decoys properly.

•

Avoid predictable operational patterns.

IDENTIFYING THE THREAT
3-2. Obtain as much information as possible about an enemy's surveillance capability.
Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) should—•

Include the sensors that an enemy may use in a particular AO.

•Include information on the enemy's tactical employment of the sensors, if
possible.

•

Assess the impact of the enemy's surveillance potential on the target underconsideration. This assessment varies with the relative positions of the sensor andthe target on the battlefield, the role of the target, and the physical characteristicsof the sensor and the target.

AVOIDING DETECTION BY ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE
3-3. Sophisticated sensors often have narrow fields of view. Furthermore, sensors can bevery expensive and are unlikely to be deployed in such numbers as to enable coverage ofthe entire battlefield at all times. Sophisticated sensors are most likely to be deployed inthose areas where an enemy suspects that friendly targets are deployed. The enemy may
suspect that an area contains targets because of detection by less sophisticated, widercoverage sensors or because of tactical analysis. Therefore, an important aspect ofremaining undetected is to avoid detection by routine enemy surveillance.
3-4. Many sensors operate as well at night as they do during the day. Therefore, darkness
does not provide effective protection from surveillance. Passive sensors are very difficult
to detect, so assume that they are being used at night. Do not allow antidetection efforts
to lapse during the hours of darkness. For example, conceal spoil while excavating afighting position, even at night. Certain types of smoke will also defeat NVDs.

TAKING COUNTERMEASURES
3-5. In some cases, it might be appropriate to take action against identified enemy
sensors. The ability to deploy countermeasures depends on a number of factors—theeffective range of friendly weapons, the distance to enemy sensors, and the relative costin resources versus the benefits of preventing the enemy's use of the sensor. An additional
factor to consider is that the countermeasure itself may provide an enemy with anindication of friendly intentions.

EMPLOYING REALISTIC CCD
3-6. The more closely a target resembles its background, the more difficult it is for an
enemy to distinguish between the two. Adhering to this fundamental CCD principle
requires awareness of the surroundings, proper CCD skills, and the ability to identify
target EM signatures that enemy sensors will detect.
VISUAL SENSORS
3-7. The most plentiful, reliable, and timely enemy sensors are visual. Therefore, CCD

techniques effective in the visual portion of the EM spectrum are extremely important.
Something that cannot be seen is often difficult to detect, identify, and target. BDUs,
standard camouflage screening paint patterns (SCSPPs), LCSS, and battlefield obscurants
are effective CCD techniques against visual sensors. Full-coverage CCD helps avoid
visual detection by the enemy. When time is short, apply CCD first to protect the target
from the most likely direction of attack and then treat the remainder of the target as timeallows.
NEAR INFRARED SENSORS
3-8. NIR sights are effective at shorter ranges (typically 900 meters) than enemy main
guns. While red filters help preserve night vision, they cannot prevent NIR fromdetecting light from long distances. Therefore, careful light discipline is an important
countermeasure to NIR sensors and visual sensors (such as image intensifiers). BDUs,
LCSS, battlefield obscurants, and SCSPPs are designed to help defeat NIR sensors.
INFRARED SENSORS
3-9. Natural materials and terrain shield heat sources from IR sensors and break up the
shape of cold and warm military targets viewed on IR sensors. Do not raise vehicle hoods
to break windshield glare because this exposes a hot spot for IR detection. Even if the IR
system is capable of locating a target, the target's actual identity can still be disguised.
Avoid building unnecessary fires. Use vehicle heaters only when necessary. BDU dyes,
LCSSs, IR-defeating obscurants, and chemical-resistant paints help break up IR
signatures; but they will not defeat IR sensors.
ULTRAVIOLET SENSORS
3-10. UV sensors are a significant threat in snow-covered areas. Winter paint patterns, thearctic LCSS, and terrain masking are critical means for defending against these sensors.
Any kind of smoke will defeat UV sensors. Field-expedient countermeasures, such as
constructing snow walls, also provide a means of defeating UV sensors.
RADAR
3-11. An enemy uses MTI, imaging, CM, and CB radars. Mission dictates the appropriate
defense, while techniques depend on the equipment available.
Moving-Target Indicator
3-12. MTI radar is a threat to ground forces near a battle area. Radar-reflecting metal on
uniforms has been reduced, and Kevlar helmets and body armor are now radartransparent. Plastic canteens are standard issue, and buttons and other nonmetal fasteners
have replaced metal snaps on most field uniforms. A soldier wearing only the BDU
cannot be detected until he is very close to MTI radar.
3-13. Soldiers still carry metal objects (ammunition, magazines, weapons) to accomplish
their mission, and most radar can detect these items. Therefore, movement discipline isvery important. Moving by covered routes (terrain masking) prevents radar detection.

Slow, deliberate movements across areas exposed to radar coverage helps avoid detection
by MTI radar.
3-14. Vehicles are large radar-reflecting targets, and a skilled MTI operator can even
identify the type of vehicle. Moving vehicles can be detected by MTI radar from 20
kilometers, but travelling by covered routes helps protect against surveillance.
Imaging
3-15. Imaging radar is not a threat to individual soldiers. Concealing vehicles behind
earth, masonry walls, or dense foliage effectively screens them from imaging radar. Lightfoliage may provide complete visual concealment; however, it is sometimes totallytransparent to imaging radar. When properly deployed, the LCSS effectively scatters thebeam of imaging radar. (See Appendix C for more information.)
Countermortar and Counterbattery
3-16. Radar is subject to overload. It is very effective and accurate when tracking single
rounds; however, it cannot accurately process data on multiple rounds (four or more) thatare fired simultaneously. Chaff is also effective against CM and CB radar if it is placednear the radar.
ACOUSTIC SENSORS
3-17. Noise discipline defeats detection by the human ear. Pyrotechnics or loudspeakers
can screen noise, cover inherently noisy activities, and confuse sound interpretation.
3-18. It is possible to confuse an enemy by screening flashes or sounds. Explosives or
pyrotechnics, fired a few hundred meters from a battery's position within a second of
firing artillery, will effectively confuse sound-ranging teams. Coordinating fire withadjacent batteries (within two seconds) can also confuse enemy sound-ranging teams.
RADIO SENSORS
3-19. The best way to prevent an enemy from locating radio transmitters is to minimize
transmissions, protect transmissions from enemy interception, and practice goodradiotelephone-operator (RATELO) procedures. Preplanning message traffic,
transmitting as quickly as possible, and using alternate communication means wheneverpossible ensure that transmissions are minimized. To prevent the enemy fromintercepting radio communications, change the radio frequencies and use low-powertransmissions, terrain masking, or directional or short-range antennas. (FM 24-33
provides an in-depth review of reducing the threat to friendly communications.)

MINIMIZING MOVEMENT
3-20. Movement attracts the enemy's attention and produces a number of signatures(tracks, noise, hot spots, dust). In operations that inherently involve movement (such as
offensive operations), plan, discipline, and manage movement so that signatures arereduced as much as possible. (See Chapter 4 for information on disciplined movement
techniques.)

USING DECOYS
3-21. Use decoys to confuse an enemy. The goal is to divert enemy resources into
reporting or engaging false targets. An enemy who has mistakenly identified decoys asreal targets is less inclined to search harder for the actual, well-hidden targets. The keys
to convincing an enemy that it has found the real target are—•Decoy fidelity (realism), which refers to how closely the multispectral decoy
signature represents the target signature.

•

Deployment location, which refers to whether or not a decoy is deployed so thatthe enemy will recognize it as typical for that target type. For example, a decoy
tank is not properly located if it is placed in the middle of a lake.

3-22. A high-fidelity decoy in a plausible location often fools an enemy into believingthat it has acquired the real target. Deploying low-fidelity decoys, however, carries anassociated risk. If an enemy observes a decoy and immediately recognizes it as such, itwill search harder for the real target since decoys are generally deployed in the same
vicinity as the real targets. Plausible, high-fidelity decoys specifically designed to draw
enemy fire away from real targets should be deployed to closely represent themultispectral signatures of the real targets. Properly deployed decoys have been proven in
operational employment and experimental field tests to be among the most effective of all
CCD techniques.

AVOIDING OPERATIONAL PATTERNS
3-23. An enemy can often detect and identify different types of units or operations byanalyzing the signature patterns that accompany their activities. For example, anoffensive operation is usually preceded by the forward movement of engineer obstaclereduction assets; petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL); and ammunition. Suchmovements are very difficult to conceal; therefore, an alternative is to modify the patternof resupply. An enemy will recognize repetitive use of the same CCD techniques.

APPLYING RECOGNITION FACTORS
3-24. To camouflage effectively, continually consider the threat's viewpoint. Prevent
patterns in antidetection countermeasures by applying the following recognition factors totactical situations. These factors describe a target's contrast with its background. If
possible, collect multispectral imagery to determine which friendly target signatures aredetectable to enemy sensors.

REFLECTANCE
3-25. Reflectance is the amount of energy returned from a target's surface as compared tothe energy striking the surface. Reflectance is generally described in terms of the part of
the EM spectrum in which the reflection occurs:•

Visual reflectance is characterized by the color of a target. Color contrast can beimportant, particularly at close ranges and in homogeneous backgroundenvironments such as snow or desert terrain. The longer the range, the lessimportant color becomes. At very long ranges, all colors tend to merge into a
uniform tone. Also, the human eye cannot discriminate color in poor light.

•

Temperature reflectance is the thermal energy reflected by a target (except when
the thermal energy of a target is self-generated, as in the case of a hot engine). IR
imaging sensors measure and detect differences in temperature-reflectance levels(known as thermal contrast).

•

Radar-signal reflectance is the part of the incoming radio waves that is reflectedby a target. Radar sensors detect differences in a target's reflected radar return andthat of the background. Since metal is an efficient radio-wave reflector and metals
are still an integral part of military equipment, radar return is an importantreflectance factor.

SHAPE
3-26. Natural background is random, and most military equipment has regular featureswith hard, angular lines. Even an erected camouflage net takes on a shape with straightline edges or smooth curves between support points. An enemy can easily see silhouetted
targets, and its sensors can detect targets against any background unless their shape is
disguised or disrupted. Size, which is implicitly related to shape, can also distinguish atarget from its background.
SHADOW
3-27. Shadow can be divided into two types:•

A cast shadow is a silhouette of an object projected against its background. It is
the more familiar type and can be highly conspicuous. In desert environments, ashadow cast by a target can be more conspicuous than the target itself.

•

A contained shadow is the dark pool that forms in a permanently shaded area.
Examples are the shadows under the track guards of an armored fighting vehicle(AFV), inside a slit trench, inside an open cupola, or under a vehicle. Contained
shadows show up much darker than their surroundings and are easily detected byan enemy.

MOVEMENT
3-28. Movement always attracts attention against a stationary background. Slow, regularmovement is usually less obvious than fast, erratic movement.
NOISE
3-29. Noise and acoustic signatures produced by military activities and equipment arerecognizable to the enemy.
TEXTURE
3-30. A rough surface appears darker than a smooth surface, even if both surfaces are thesame color. For example, vehicle tracks change the texture of the ground by leaving
clearly visible track marks. This is particularly true in undisturbed or homogeneousenvironments, such as a desert or virgin snow, where vehicle tracks are highly detectable.
In extreme cases, the texture of glass or other very smooth surfaces causes a shine thatacts as a beacon. Under normal conditions, very smooth surfaces stand out from thebackground. Therefore, eliminating shine must be a high priority in CCD.
PATTERNS
3-31. Rows of vehicles and stacks of war materiel create equipment patterns that areeasier to detect than random patterns of dispersed equipment. Equipment patterns should
be managed to use the surroundings for vehicle and equipment dispersal. Equipment
dispersal should not be implemented in such a way that it reduces a unit's ability toaccomplish its mission.
3-32. Equipment paint patterns often differ considerably from background patterns. The
critical relationships that determine the contrast between a piece of equipment and its
background are the distance between the observer and the equipment and the distance
between the equipment and its background. Since these distances usually vary, it isdifficult to paint equipment with a pattern that always allows it to blend with its
background. As such, no single pattern is prescribed for all situations. Field observations
provide the best match between equipment and background.
3-33. The overall terrain pattern and the signatures produced by military activity on theterrain are important recognition factors. If a unit's presence is to remain unnoticed, it
must match the signatures produced by stationary equipment, trucks, and other activities
with the terrain pattern. Careful attention must also be given to vehicle tracks and theiraffect on the local terrain during unit ingress, occupation, and egress.

SITE SELECTION
3-34. Site selection is extremely important because the location of personnel andequipment can eliminate or reduce recognition factors. If a tank is positioned so that it
faces probable enemy sensor locations, the thermal signature from its hot engine
compartment is minimized. If a vehicle is positioned under foliage, the exhaust will
disperse and cool as it rises, reducing its thermal signature and blending it more closelywith the background. Placing equipment in defilade (dug-in) positions prevents detection

by ground-mounted radar. The following factors govern site selection:
MISSION
3-35. The mission is the most important factor in site selection. A particular site may be
excellent from a CCD standpoint, but the site is useful only if the mission isaccomplished. If a site is so obvious that the enemy will acquire and engage a target
before mission accomplishment, the site was poorly selected to begin with. Survivability
is usually a part of most missions, so commanders must first evaluate the worthiness of asite with respect to mission accomplishment and then consider CCD.
DISPERSION
3-36. Dispersion requirements dictate the size of a site. A site has limited usefulness if itwill not permit enough dispersal for survivability and effective operations.
TERRAIN PATTERNS
3-37. Every type of terrain, even a flat desert, has a discernible pattern. Terrain features
can blur or conceal the signatures of military activity. By using terrain features, CCD
effectiveness can be enhanced without relying on additional materials. The primary factor
to consider is whether using the site will disturb the terrain pattern enough to attract anenemy's attention. The goal is not to disturb the terrain pattern at all. Any change in anexisting terrain pattern will indicate the presence of activity. Terrain patterns havedistinctive characteristics that are necessary to preserve. The five general terrain patterns
are—•

Agricultural. Agricultural terrain has a checkerboard pattern when viewed fromaircraft. This is a result of the different types of crops and vegetation found on
most farms.

•

Urban. Urban terrain is characterized by uniform rows of housing withinterwoven streets and interspersed trees and shrubs.

•

Wooded. Woodlands are characterized by natural, irregular features, unlike thegeometric patterns of agricultural and urban terrains.

•

Barren. Barren terrain presents an uneven, irregular work of nature without thedefined patterns of agricultural and urban areas. Desert environments areexamples of barren terrain.

•

Arctic. Arctic terrain is characterized by snow and ice coverage.

CCD DISCIPLINE
3-38. CCD discipline is avoiding an activity that changes the appearance of an area or
reveals the presence of military equipment. CCD discipline is a continuous necessity thatapplies to every soldier. If the prescribed visual and audio routines of CCD discipline arenot observed, the entire CCD effort may fail. Vehicle tracks, spoil, and debris are themost common signs of military activity. Their presence can negate all efforts of proper
placement and concealment.
3-39. CCD discipline denies an enemy the indications of a unit's location or activities byminimizing disturbances to a target area. To help maintain unit viability, a unit must
integrate all available CCD means into a cohesive plan. CCD discipline involves
regulating light, heat, noise, spoil, trash, and movement. Successful CCD discipline
depends largely on the actions of individual soldiers. Some of these actions may not beeasy on a soldier, but his failure to observe CCD discipline could defeat an entire unit's
CCD efforts and possibly impact the unit's survivability and mission success.
3-40. TACSOPs prescribing CCD procedures aid in enforcing CCD discipline, and theyshould—•List specific responsibilities for enforcing established CCD countermeasures anddiscipline.

•

Detail procedures for individual and unit conduct in assembly areas (AAs) orother situations that may apply to the specific unit.

3-41. Units should have frequent CCD battle drills. CCD discipline is a continuous
requirement that calls for strong leadership, which produces a disciplined CCD
consciousness throughout the entire unit. Appendix B contains additional guidance forincorporating CCD into a unit TACSOP.
LIGHT AND HEAT
3-42. Light and heat discipline, though important at all times, is crucial at night. As longas visual observation remains a primary recon method, concealing light signatures
remains an important CCD countermeasure. Lights that are not blacked out at night canbe observed at great distances. For example, the human eye can detect camp fires from 8
kilometers and vehicle lights from 20 kilometers. Threat surveillance can also detect heatfrom engines, stoves, and heaters from great distances. When moving at night, vehicles in
the forward combat area should use ground guides and blackout lights. When using heatsources is unavoidable, use terrain masking, exhaust baffling, and other techniques tominimize thermal signatures of fires and stoves.
NOISE
3-43. Individuals should avoid or minimize actions that produce noise. For example,
muffle generators by using shields or terrain masking or place them in defilade positions.
Communications personnel should operate their equipment at the lowest possible levelthat allows them to be heard and understood. Depending on the terrain and atmosphericconditions, noise can travel great distances and reveal a unit's position to an enemy.
SPOIL
3-44. The prompt and complete policing of debris and spoil is an essential CCD

consideration. Proper spoil discipline removes a key signature of a unit's current or pastpresence in an area.
TRACK
3-45. Vehicle tracks are clearly visible from the air, particularly in selected terrain.
Therefore, track and movement discipline is essential. Use existing roads and tracks asmuch as possible. When using new paths, ensure that they fit into the existing terrain's
pattern. Minimize, plan, and coordinate all movement; and take full advantage of coverand dead space.

SECTION II — TECHNIQUES AND MATERIALSTECHNIQUES
3-46. CCD is an essential part of tactical operations. It must be integrated into METT-TC
analyses and the IPB process at all echelons. CCD is a primary consideration whenplanning OPSEC. The skillful use of CCD techniques is necessary if a unit is to conceal
itself and survive. A general knowledge of CCD methods and techniques also allows
friendly troops to recognize CCD better when the enemy uses it. Table 3-1 lists the fivegeneral techniques of employing CCD—hiding, blending, disguising, disrupting, anddecoying.

Table 3-1. CCD techniques
CCD
Techniq
ues
HidingSensor Systems
OpticalEarth cover
Earth embankments
Vegetation
LCSS
Screens
Smoke

Blending Paint
Foam
LightsVegetation
LCSS

ThermalRadar

Earth cover
Earth embankments
Vegetation
LCSS
Screens
Smoke

Chaff
Earth coverEarthembankments
Vegetation
Nets
RAM
LCSS

Thermal paintFoam
Air
conditioning/heating
Vegetation

Vegetation
LCSS
RAM
Reshaping
Textured mats

Textured mats

LCSS
Textured mats
Water
Insulation

DisguisingReshaping
Paint
LCSS

Reshaping
Paint

Cornerreflectors

DisruptingCamouflage sails
FOS
Pyrotechnics
Smudge pots
Balloons
Strobe lights
Tracer simulators
Smoke

Flares
Smoke

Chaff
Cornerreflectors

Decoy target
FlaresAirconditioning/heating
Smoke

Decoy target
Cornerreflectors
Signalgenerators

Decoyin Decoy target (pneumatic or rigidgstructures)
LightsSmoke
HIDING

3-47. Hiding is screening a target from an enemy's sensors. The target is undetected
because a barrier hides it from a sensor's view. Every effort should be made to hide all
operations; this includes using conditions of limited visibility for movement and terrainmasking. Examples of hiding include—•

Burying mines.

•

Placing vehicles beneath tree canopies.

•

Placing equipment in defilade positions.

•

Covering vehicles and equipment with nets.

•

Hiding roads and obstacles with linear screens.

•

Using battlefield obscurants, such as smoke.

BLENDING
3-48. Blending is trying to alter a target's appearance so that it becomes a part of the
background. Generally, it is arranging or applying camouflage material on, over, and/or
around a target to reduce its contrast with the background. Characteristics to consider
when blending include the terrain patterns in the vicinity and the target's size, shape,texture, color, EM signature, and background.
DISGUISING
3-49. Disguising is applying materials on a target to mislead the enemy as to its true
identity. Disguising changes a target's appearance so that it resembles something of lesser
or greater significance. For example, a missile launcher might be disguised to resemble acargo truck or a large building might be disguised to resemble two small buildings.
DISRUPTING
3-50. Disrupting is altering or eliminating regular patterns and target characteristics.
Disrupting techniques include pattern painting, deploying camouflage nets over selected
portions of a target, and using shape disrupters (such as camouflage sails) to eliminate
regular target patterns.
DECOYING
3-51. Decoying is deploying a false or simulated target(s) within a target's scene or in aposition where the enemy might conclude that it has found the correct target(s). Decoys
generally draw fire away from real targets. Depending on their fidelity and deployment,
decoys will greatly enhance survivability.

TESTS AND EVALUATIONS
3-52. Until recently, the effectiveness of CCD techniques had not been scientificallyquantified. As such, CCD was not widely accepted in the US military as an effectivemeans of increasing survivability. However, the Joint Camouflage, Concealment, andDeception (JCCD) Joint Test and Evaluation (JT&E) completed in 1995 measured theeffectiveness of CCD against manned aerial attacks. It provided military services thebasis for guidance on CCD-related issues. JCCD field tests were conducted in multiple
target environments using a broad cross section of US attack aircraft flying against
different classes of military targets. In controlled attack sorties, targets were attacked
before and after employing CCD techniques.
3-53. The presence of CCD greatly reduced correct target attacks, particularly when
decoys were employed as part of the CCD plan. Other JCCD findings included thefollowing:•

CCD significantly increased aircrew aim-point error.

•

CCD increased the target's probability of survival.

•

Each CCD technique (hiding, blending, disguising, disrupting, and decoying) was
effective to some degree in increasing the probability of survival.

•

CCD was effective in all tested environments (desert, temperate, and subarctic).

NATURAL CONDITIONS
3-54. Properly using terrain and weather is a first priority when employing CCD. Coverprovided by the terrain and by conditions of limited visibility is often enough to conceal
units. The effective use of natural conditions minimizes the resources and the time
devoted to CCD. The terrain's concealment properties are determined by the number andquality of natural screens, terrain patterns, and the type and size of targets.
FORESTS
3-55. Forests generally provide the best type of natural screen against optical recon,
especially if the crowns of the trees are wide enough to prevent aerial observation of theground. Forests with undergrowth also hinder ground observation. Deciduous (leafing)forests are not as effective during the months when trees are bare, while coniferous(evergreen) forests preserve their concealment properties all year. When possible, unit
movements should be made along roads and gaps that are covered by tree crowns. Shadeshould be used to conceal vehicles, equipment, and personnel from aerial observation.
OPEN TERRAIN
3-56. Limited visibility is an especially important concealment tool when conducting
operations in open terrain. The threat, however, will conduct recon with a combination ofnight-surveillance devices, radar, IR sensors, and terrain illumination. When crossing
open terrain during limited visibility, supplement concealment with smoke.
DEAD SPACE
3-57. Units should not locate or move along the topographic crests of hills or otherlocations where they are silhouetted against the sky. They should use reverse slopes ofhills, ravines, embankments, and other terrain features as screens to avoid detection byground-mounted sensors. IPB concealment and terrain overlays should identify areas ofdead space. If overlays are not available, use the line-of-sight (LOS) method to identify
areas of dead space. (See FM 21-26 for more details.)
WEATHER
3-58. Conditions of limited visibility (fog, rain, snowfall) hamper recon by opticalsensors. Dense fog is impervious to visible sensors and some thermal sensors, making
many threat night-surveillance devices unusable. Dense fog and clouds are impenetrable
to thermal sensors (IR). Rain, snow, and other types of precipitation hinder optical,
thermal, and radar sensors.
SMOKE
3-59. Smoke is an effective CCD tool when used by itself or with other CCD techniques.
It can change the dynamics of a battle by blocking or degrading the spectral bands that an
enemy's target-acquisition and weapons systems use, including optical and thermalbands. (See FM 3-50, for more information on planning smoke operations.)

DATA SOURCES
3-60. Commanders must be able to evaluate natural conditions in their area to effectively
direct unit concealment. They must know the terrain and weather conditions before
mission execution. In addition to IPB terrain overlays, weather reports, and topographic
maps, commanders should use aerial photographs, recon, and information gathered fromlocal inhabitants to determine the terrain's natural concealment properties.

MATERIALS
3-61. Using natural conditions and materials is the first CCD priority, but using manmade materials can greatly enhance CCD efforts. Available materials include patternpainted equipment, camouflage nets (LCSS), radar-absorbing paint (RAP), radarabsorbing material (RAM), false operating surfaces (FOSs), vegetation, expedient paint,
decoys, and battlefield by-products (construction materials, dirt). (Appendix E lists manmade CCD materials that are available through the supply system.)
PATTERN PAINT
3-62. Pattern-painted vehicles blend well with the background and can hide from opticalsensors better than those painted a solid, subdued color. Pattern-painted equipment
enhances antidetection by reducing shape, shadow, and color signatures. Improved paints
also help avoid detection by reducing a target's reflectance levels in the visible and IR
portions of the EM spectrum. The result is a vehicle or an item of equipment that blends
better with its background when viewed by threat sensors. While a patterned paintscheme is most effective in static positions, it also tends to disrupt aim points on amoving target. (See Appendix E for a list of available paints.)
CAMOUFLAGE NETS
3-63. The LCSS is the standard Army camouflage net currently available, and it can beordered through normal unit supply channels (see Appendix E). The LCSS reduces avehicle's visual and radar signatures. Stainless steel fibers in the LCSS material absorb
some of the radar signal and reflect most of the remaining signal in all directions. The
result is a small percentage of signal return to the radar for detection. The radar-scattering
capabilities of the LCSS are effective only if there is at least 2 feet of space between the
LCSS and the camouflaged equipment and if the LCSS completely covers the equipment.
Do not place a radar-scattering net over a radar antenna because it interferes withtransmission. The LCSS is also available in a radar-transparent model.
3-64. The three different LCSS color patterns are desert, woodland, and arctic. Each sideof each LCSS has a slightly different pattern to allow for seasonal variations. The LCSS
uses modular construction that allows the coverage of various sizes of equipment.
(Appendix C discusses the required components and the instructions for assembling
LCSS structures for different sizes of equipment.)

VEGETATION
3-65. Use branches and vines to temporarily conceal vehicles, equipment, and personnel.
Attach vegetation to equipment with camouflage foliage brackets, spring clips, orexpedient means (such as plastic tie-wraps). Use other foliage to complete thecamouflage or to supplement natural-growing vegetation. Also use cut foliage to augment
other artificial CCD materials, such as branches placed on an LCSS to break up its
outline. Be careful when placing green vegetation since the underside of leaves presents alighter tone in photographs. Replace cut foliage often because it wilts and changes color
rapidly. During training exercises, ensure that cutting vegetation and foliage does notadversely effect the natural environment (coordinate with local authorities).
Living Vegetation
3-66. Living vegetation can be obtained in most environments, and its color and texture
make it a good blending agent. However, foliage requires careful maintenance to keep thematerial fresh and in good condition. If branches are not placed in their proper growing
positions, they may reveal friendly positions to enemy observers. Cutting large amountsof branches can also reveal friendly positions, so cut all vegetation away from target
areas.
3-67. Living vegetation presents a chlorophyll response at certain NIR wavelengths. As
cut vegetation wilts, it loses color and its NIR-blending properties, which are related tothe chlorophyll response. Replace cut vegetation regularly because over time it becomesa detection cue rather than an effective concealment technique.
Dead Vegetation
3-68. Use dead vegetation (dried grass, hay, straw, branches) for texturing. It provides
good blending qualities if the surrounding background vegetation is also dead. Deadvegetation is usually readily available and requires little maintenance; however, it isflammable. Due to the absence of chlorophyll response, dead vegetation offers little CCD
against NIR sensors and hyperspectral sensors operating in the IR regions.
Foliage Selection
3-69. When selecting foliage for CCD, consider the following:•

Coniferous vegetation is preferred to deciduous vegetation since it maintains avalid chlorophyll response longer after being cut.

•

Foliage cut during periods of high humidity (at night, during a rainstorm, or when
there is fog or heavy dew) will wilt more slowly.

•

Foliage with leaves that feel tough to the fingers and branches with large leaves
are preferred because they stay fresher longer.

•

Branches that grow in direct sunlight are tougher and will stay fresher longer.

•

Branches that are free of disease and insects will not wilt as rapidly.

CHLOROPHYLL RESPONSE
3-70. Standard-issue camouflage materials (LCSS) are designed to exhibit an artificial
chlorophyll response at selected NIR wavelengths. Nonstandard materials (sheets, tarps)
are not likely to exhibit a chlorophyll response and will not blend well with standard
CCD material or natural vegetation. Use nonstandard materials only as CCD treatments
against visual threat sensors, not against NIR or hyperspectral threat sensors.
EXPEDIENT PAINT
CAUTION
Expedient paint containing motor oil should
be used with extreme caution.
3-71. Use earth, sand, and gravel to change or add color, provide a coarse texture,
simulate cleared spots or blast marks, and create shapes and shadows. Mud makes an
excellent field expedient for toning down bright, shiny objects (glass, bayonets, watches).
Add clay (in mud form) of various colors to crankcase oil to produce a field-expedientpaint. Table 3-2 provides instructions on how to mix soil-based expedient paints. Usesurface soils to mimic natural surface color and reflectivity.

Table 3-2. Expedient paints
Paint Materials

MixingColor

FinishEarth, GI soap,
water, soot,paraffinMix soot with paraffin, add to solution of 8
gal water and 2 bars soap, and stir in earth.

Dark grayFlat,lusterless

Oil, clay, water,
gasoline, earthMix 2 gal water with 1 gal oil and to gal
clay, add earth, and thin with gasoline orwater.

Depends
on earthcolorsGlossy on
metal,
otherwise dull

Oil, clay, GI
soap, water,earth

Mix 1 bars soap with 3 gal water, add 1 gal
oil, stir in 1 gal clay, and add earth for color.

Depends
on earthcolorsGlossy on
metal,
otherwise dull

NOTE: Use canned milk or powdered eggs to increase the binding properties of fieldexpedient paints.
RADAR-ABSORBING MATERIAL
3-72. RAM was designed for placement on valuable military equipment. It absorbs radar
signals that are transmitted in selected threat wave bands and reduces the perceived radarcross section (RCS) of the treated equipment. RAM is expensive relative to other CCD
equipment and is not yet widely available. RAP offers the same RCS reduction benefits

as RAM, and it is also expensive.
BATTLEFIELD BY-PRODUCTS
3-73. Battlefield by-products (construction materials, dirt) can be used to formulate
expedient CCD countermeasures. For example, use plywood and two-by-fours to erect
expedient target decoys or use dirt to construct concealment berms.
DECOYS
3-74. Decoys are among the most effective of all CCD tools. The proper use of decoys
provides alternate targets against which an enemy will expend ammunition, possibly
revealing its position in the process. Decoys also enhance friendly survivability anddeceive an enemy about the number and location of friendly weapons, troops, andequipment.
Employment Rationale
3-75. Decoys are used to attract an enemy's attention for a variety of tactical purposes.
Their main use is to draw enemy fire away from high-value targets (HVTs). Decoys are
generally expendable, and they—•

Can be elaborate or simple. Their design depends on several factors, such as thetarget to be decoyed, a unit's tactical situation, available resources, and the time
available to a unit for CCD employment.

•

Can be preconstructed or made from field-expedient materials. Except for
selected types, preconstructed decoys are not widely available (see Appendix E).
A typical Army unit can construct effective, realistic decoys to replicate its key
equipment and features through imaginative planning and a working knowledgeof the EM signatures emitted by the unit.

3-76. Proper decoy employment serves a number of tactical purposes, to include—•

Increasing the survivability of key unit equipment and personnel.

•

Deceiving the enemy about the strength, disposition, and intentions of friendly
forces.

•Replacing friendly equipment removed from the forward line of own troops(FLOT).

•

Drawing enemy fire, which reveals its positions.

•

Encouraging the enemy to expend munitions on relatively low-value targets(decoys).

Employment Considerations
3-77. The two most important factors regarding decoy employment are location andfidelity (realism):•

Location. Logically placing decoys will greatly enhance their plausibility.
Decoys are usually placed near enough to the real target to convince an enemy
that it has found the target. However, a decoy must be far enough away to prevent
collateral damage to the real target when the decoy draws enemy fire. Proper
spacing between a decoy and a target depends on the size of the target, theexpected enemy target-acquisition sensors, and the type of munitions directedagainst the target.

•

Fidelity. Decoys must be constructed according to a friendly unit's SOP and must
include target features that an enemy recognizes. The most effective decoys arethose that closely resemble the real target in terms of EM signatures. Completely
replicating the signatures of some targets, particularly large and complex targets,can be very difficult. Therefore, decoy construction should address the EM
spectral region in which the real target is most vulnerable. The seven recognition
factors that allow enemy sensors to detect a target are conversely important fordecoys. When evaluating a decoy's fidelity, it should be recognizable in the sameways as the real target, only more so. Try to make the decoy slightly more
conspicuous than the real target.

Chapter 4

Offensive Operations
CCD countermeasures implemented during an offensive operation deceive the enemy orprevent it from discovering friendly locations, actions, and intentions. Successful CCD
contributes to achieving surprise and reduces subsequent personnel and equipment losses.

PREPARATIONS
4-1. The main CCD concern in preparing for offensive operations is to mask tactical unit
deployment. While CCD is the primary means of masking these activities, deceptive
operations frequently achieve the same goals.
SIGNATURES
4-2. Offensive operations create signatures that are detectable to an enemy. Analyzingthese signatures may alert an enemy to the nature of an offensive operation (such asplanning and location). Commanders at all levels should monitor operation signatures andstrive to conceal them from enemy surveillance. These signatures include—•

Increasing scouting and recon activity.

•

Preparing traffic routes.

•

Moving supplies and ammunition forward.

•

Breaching obstacles.

•

Preparing and occupying AAs (engineer function).

•

Preparing and occupying forward artillery positions.

•

Increasing radio communications.

ASSEMBLY AREAS
4-3. Prepare AAs during limited visibility. They should then suppress the signatures that
their preparations produced and remove any indications of their activities upon mission
completion.
4-4. Designate Aas on terrain with natural screens and a developed network of roads andpaths. Thick forests and small towns and villages often provide the best locations. If
natural screens are unavailable, use spotty sectors of the terrain or previously occupied
locations. Place equipment on spots of matching color, and take maximum advantage ofartificial CCD materials.

4-5. Designate concealed routes for movement into and out of an area. Mask noise bypracticing good noise discipline. For instance, armor movements can be muffled by thethunder of artillery fire, the noise of low-flying aircraft, or the transmission of sounds
from broadcast sets.
4-6. Position vehicles to take full advantage of the terrain's natural concealment
properties, and cover the vehicles with camouflage nets. Apply paint and cut vegetation
to vehicles to enhance CCD at AAs and during battle. (When using vegetation for thistype of CCD treatment, do not cut it from areas close to vehicles.) Aas are particularly
vulnerable to aerial detection. Strictly enforce track, movement, and radio discipline.
Remove tracks by covering or sweeping them with branches.
4-7. While at an AA, personnel should apply individual CCD. Applying stick paint andcut vegetation enhances CCD during all phases of an operation.
DECOYS
4-8. An enemy may interpret decoy construction as an effort to reinforce a defensive
position. Laying false minefields and building bunkers and positions can conceal actual
offensive preparations and give the enemy the impression that defenses are being
improved. If necessary, conduct engineer preparation activities on a wide front so that thearea and direction of the main attack are not revealed.
MOVEMENT
4-9. Move troops, ammunition, supplies, and engineer breaching equipment forward atnight or during limited visibility. Although an enemy's use of radar and IR aerial recon
hinders operations at night, darkness remains a significant concealment tool. Select routes
that take full advantage of the terrain's screening properties. Commanders must
understand how to combine darkness and the terrain's concealing properties to conceal
troop and supply movements.
4-10. When conducting a march, convoy commanders must strictly enforce blackout
requirements and the order of march. Guidelines concerning lighting, march orders, andother requirements are usually published in SOPs or operation orders (OPORDs).
Required lighting conditions vary depending on the type of movement (convoy versus
single vehicle) and a unit's location (forward edge of the battle area [FEBA], divisionarea, corps rear area). Inspect each vehicle's blackout devices for proper operation.
4-11. Enemy aerial recon usually focuses on open and barely passable route sectors.
When on a march, vehicles should pass these types of sectors at the highest possible
speeds. If prolonged delays result from encountering an unexpected obstacle, halt thecolumn and disperse into the nearest natural screens. If a vehicle breaks down during a
movement, push it off the road and conceal it.
4-12. When conducting a march during good visibility, consider movement by infiltration(single or small groups of vehicles released at different intervals). Movement in stages,
from one natural screen to the next, will further minimize possible detection. Use smoke
screens at critical crossings and choke points.

4-13. During brief stops, quickly disperse vehicles under tree crowns or otherconcealment along the sides of the road. Strictly enforce CCD discipline. Watch for glarefrom vehicle windshields, headlights, or reflectors; and remedy the situation if it does
occur. Try to control troop movement on the road or in other open areas. Conduct recon
to select areas for long halts. The recon party should select areas that are large enough toallow sufficient CCD and dispersion. The quartering party should predetermine vehicle
placement, develop a vehicle circulation plan, and guide vehicles into suitable andconcealed locations. The first priority, however, is to move vehicles off the road as
quickly as possible, even at the expense of initial dispersion. Use camouflage nets andnatural vegetation to enhance concealment, and carefully conceal dug-in positions.
4-14. Traffic controllers have a crucial role in enforcing convoy CCD. Commanders
should issue precise instructions for traffic controllers to stop passing vehicles and havethe drivers correct the slightest violation of CCD discipline. Convoy commanders are
responsible for the convoy's CCD discipline.
4-15. Pass through friendly obstacles at night, in fog, or under other conditions of poor
visibility. Also use smoke screens because these conditions will not protect against many
types of threat sensors. Lay smoke on a wide front, several times before actually
executing the passage of lines. Doing this helps deceive an enemy about the time andplace of an attack. Conceal lanes through obstacles from the enemy's view.
DECEPTIVE OPERATIONS
4-16. Conduct demonstrations and feints to confuse an enemy about the actual location of
the main attack. Such deceptive operations are effective only if prior recon activities wereconducted on a wide front, thereby preventing the enemy from pinpointing the likely
main-attack area.

BATTLE
4-17. Units should adapt to the terrain during a battle. Deploying behind naturalvegetation, terrain features, or man-made structures maximizes concealment from enemy
observation. Make optimum use of concealed routes, hollows, gullies, and other terrain
features that are dead-space areas to enemy observation and firing positions. A trade-off,however, usually exists in terms of a slower rate of movement when using these types ofroutes.
4-18. Movement techniques emphasizing fire and maneuver help prevent enemy
observation and targeting. Avoid dusty terrain because clouds of dust will alert an enemy
to the presence of friendly units. However, if the enemy is aware of a unit's presence, dust
can be an effective means of obscuring the unit's intentions in the same way as smoke.
When natural cover and concealment are unavailable or impractical, the coordinatedemployment of smoke, suppressive fires, speed, and natural limited-visibility conditions
minimize exposure and avoid enemy fire sacks. However, offensive operations underthese conditions present unique training and C2 challenges.

4-19. Breaching operations require concealing the unit that is conducting the breach. Useconditions of poor visibility, and plan the use of smoke and suppressive fires to screen
breaching operations.
4-20. Deliberate river crossings are uniquely difficult and potentially hazardous. Plan thecoordinated use of terrain masking, smoke, decoys, and deceptive operations to ensure
successful crossings (see FM 90-13).

Chapter 5

Defensive Operations
Successful defensive operations require strong emphasis on OPSEC. Proper OPSEC
denies an enemy information about a friendly force's defensive preparations. Particularly
important is the counterrecon battle, where defensive forces seek to blind an enemy byeliminating its recon forces. The winner of this preliminary battle is often the winner ofthe main battle. CCD, by virtue of its inherent role in counterefforts, plays an importantrole in both battles.

PREPARATIONS
5-1. The purpose of CCD during defensive preparations is to mask key or sensitive
activities. Successful CCD of these activities leads to an enemy force that is blinded or
deceived and therefore more easily influenced to attack where the defender wants (at thestrengths of the defense). These key activities include—•

Preparing reserve and counterattack forces' locations.

•Preparing survivability positions and constructing obstacles (minefields, tankditches).

•Establishing critical C2 nodes.

SIGNATURES
5-2. A number of signatures may indicate the intentions of friendly defensive
preparations, and an enemy analyzes these signatures to determine the defensive plan.
Specific signatures that could reveal defensive plans include—•

Working on survivability positions.

•Emplacing minefields and other obstacles.

•

Moving different types of combat materiel into prepared positions.

•Preparing routes and facilities.

•

Constructing strongpoints or hardened artillery positions.

COUNTERATTACK AND RESERVE FORCES
5-3. Due to the similarity of missions, the concerns for concealing counterattack andreserve forces are similar to those of maneuver forces engaged in offensive operations.
Chapter 4 discusses considerations about AAs, troop and supply movements, passages oflines, and deception operations. This information is also useful as a guide when planning
CCD for a counterattack.
Planning
5-4. Proper planning is essential to avoid threat detection and prevent successful enemy
analysis of the engineer efforts that are integral to defensive preparations. Engineer
equipment creates significant signatures, so minimize its use to a level that iscommensurate with available time and manpower. Disperse engineer equipment that is
not required at the job site. Complete as much work as possible without using heavyequipment, and allow heavy equipment on site only when necessary. Engineers should
minimize their time on site by conducting thorough, extensive planning and preparation.
Additional signatures include—•

Supplies, personnel, and vehicles arriving to and departing from the unit area.

•

Survivability positions being constructed.

•

Smoke and heat emitting from kitchens, fires, or stoves.

•

Communications facilities being operated.

•

Educational and training exercises being conducted.

Movement
5-5. Reserve forces should move along preplanned, concealed routes. They should also
move and occupy selected locations at night or during other conditions of limited
visibility. Quartering parties should preselect individual positions and guide vehicles andpersonnel to assigned locations. Light, noise, and track discipline are essential; but they
are difficult to control during this phase. The quartering party should also develop a
traffic-flow plan that minimizes vehicle and troop movement to and from the unit area.
5-6. Arriving units should immediately begin to conceal their positions. Commanders
should detail the priorities for CCD in the OPORD, based on their assessment of which
signatures present the greatest opportunity for threat detection.
Assembly Areas
5-7. While AA CCD actions are similar to those of counterattack and reserve positions,the latter positions are more likely to be occupied longer. Therefore, CCD needs are more
extensive and extended for counterattack and reserve forces. In fact, their CCD
operations are often indistinguishable from those of support units.
5-8. Counterattack and reserve forces awaiting employment should capitalize on the time
available to conduct rehearsals. While essential, these activities are prone to detection by
an enemy's sensors so observe CCD discipline at all times and locations.

Placement and Dispersal
5-9. Site selection is crucial when concealing engineer effort. Proper placement anddispersal of equipment and operations are essential. Use natural screens (terrainmasking); however, urban areas often provide the best concealment for counterattack andreserve forces. (Chapter 7 discusses placement and dispersal in more detail.) When using
forests as natural screens, carefully consider factors such as the height and density ofvegetation, the amount and darkness of shadows cast by the screen, and theappropriateness of the particular screen for the season. The condition and quality ofnatural screens have a decisive effect on the capability to conceal units. Commanders
should evaluate natural screens during engineer recon missions and conduct the missions
on a timely, extensive basis.
5-10. The probability of detection increases considerably when survivability positions areprepared. Detection is easier due to the increased size of the targets to be concealed, thecontrasting upturned soil, and the difficulty of concealing survivability effort. Despite
these considerations, the enhanced protection afforded by survivability positions usually
dictates their use. To minimize the probability of detection, employ a combination ofnatural screens and overhead nets to conceal construction sites.
CAMOUFLAGE NETS
5-11. Use camouflage nets (LCSS) to conceal vehicles, tents, shelters, and equipment.
Use vegetation to further disrupt the outline of the target rather than completely hide it.
Ensure that vegetation is not removed from a single location, because it could leave asignature for threat detection. Gather vegetation sparingly from as many remote areas as
possible. This technique allows the immediate area to remain relatively undisturbed.
STOVES AND FIRES
5-12. Strictly control the use of stoves and fires because they produce visual and thermal
signatures detectable to threat sensors. If fires are necessary, permit them only during
daylight hours and place them in dead ground or under dense foliage. Use nets and otherexpedient thermal screens to dissipate rising heat and reduce the fire's thermal signature.
COMMUNICATIONS
5-13. Monitor communications to prevent enemy intelligence teams from identifying unit
locations. (FM 24-33 addresses techniques for reducing the threat to friendly
communications.)
CCD DISCIPLINE
5-14. Strict CCD discipline allows the continued concealment of a unit's position. The
longer a unit stays in one location, the harder it is for it to maintain CCD discipline.
Extended encampments require constant command attention to CCD discipline. The
evacuation of an area also requires CCD discipline to ensure that evidence (trash, vehicle
tracks) is not left for enemy detection.

SURVIVABILITY POSITIONS AND OBSTACLES
5-15. Survivability positions include fighting positions, protective positions (shelters),
and trench-work connections. Such positions are usually constructed of earth and logs but
may also be composed of man-made building materials such as concrete.
PLACEMENT
5-16. Properly occupying positions and placing obstacles are critical CCD considerations.
When possible, place obstacles and occupy positions out of the direct view of threat
forces (such as a reverse-slope defense), at night, or under conditions of limited visibility.
BACKGROUNDS
5-17. Select backgrounds that do not silhouette positions and obstacles or provide color
contrast. Use shadows to hinder an enemy's detection efforts. If possible, place positions
and obstacles under overhead cover, trees, or bushes or in any other dark area of theterrain. This technique prevents the disruption of terrain lines and hinders aerial
detection. CCD efforts, however, should not hinder the integration of obstacles with fires.
5-18. When using the terrain's natural concealment properties, avoid isolated features thatdraw the enemy's attention. Do not construct positions directly on or near other clearly
defined terrain features (tree lines, hedge rows, hill crests). Offsetting positions into treelines or below hill crests avoids silhouetting against the background and also counters
enemy fire.
NATURAL MATERIALS
5-19. Use natural materials to supplement artificial materials. Before constructing
positions and obstacles, remove and save natural materials (turf, leaves, humus) for use inrestoring the terrain's natural appearance for deception purposes. During excavation,collect spoil in carrying devices for careful disposal. When preparing survivability
positions and obstacles—•

Avoid disturbing the natural look of surroundings. Use camouflage nets andnatural vegetation to further distort the outline of a position, to hide the bottom ofan open position or trench, and to mask spoil used as a parapet. To further avoid
detection, replace natural materials regularly or when they wilt or change color.

•

Consider the effect of backblasts from rocket launchers, missile systems, andantitank weapons. Construct a concealed open space to the position's rear toaccommodate backblasts. A backblast area should not contain material that willreadily burn or generate large dust signatures.

•

Use natural materials to help conceal machine-gun emplacements. Machine guns
are priority targets, and concealing them is an essential combat task. Although
CCD is important, placement is the primary factor in concealing machine guns.

•Place mortars in defilade positions. Proper placement, coupled with the use of
artificial and natural CCD materials, provides the maximum possible
concealment. Also consider removable overhead concealment.

•

Use decoy positions and phony obstacles to draw enemy attention away from
actual survivability positions and traces of obstacle preparation. Decoys serve theadditional function of drawing enemy fire, allowing easier targeting of an enemy's
weapons systems.

BATTLE
5-20. CCD during the defensive battle is essentially the same as for the offensive battle.
While a majority of the battle is normally fought from prepared, concealed positions,defensive forces still maneuver to prevent enemy breakthroughs or to counterattack.
When maneuvering, units should—•

Adapt to the terrain.

•

Make optimum use of concealed routes.

•

Preselect and improve concealed routes to provide defensive forces with amaneuver advantage.

•

Plan smoke operations to provide additional concealment for maneuvering forces.

Chapter 6

High-Value Targets
The purpose of threat doctrine is for enemy forces to locate, target, and destroy deeptargets, thereby degrading friendly capabilities while adding offensive momentum toattacking enemy forces. Enemy commanders focus their most sophisticated sensors insearch of HVTs. By attacking these targets, enemy forces hope to deny adequate C2,
combat support, or resupply operations to forward friendly forces throughout thebattlespace. Therefore, properly employing CCD at key fixed installations, such ascommand posts (CPs) and Army aviation sites (AASs), is essential to survival on abattlefield. HVTs fall into two general classifications—fixed installations (Section II) andrelocatable units (Section III). For information on camouflaging medical facilities, see
Appendix F.

SECTION I — CCD PLANNING

PLANS
6-1. No single solution exists for enhancing the survivability of HVTs with CCD (except
for large-area smoke screens). The characteristics of many such targets are unique andrequire the creative application of CCD principles and techniques. Therefore, the CCD
planning process presented in this section is not intended to impose a regimen that mustbe followed at all costs. Rather, it suggests a logical sequence that has proven successful
over time. In fact, the steps outlined below often lead to creative CCD solutions simply
because they allow designers to consider the many options, benefits, and pitfalls of CCD
employment. No CCD plan is wrong if it achieves the intended signature-management
goals and does not impair mission accomplishment.
6-2. Each commander should develop his unit's CCD plan based on an awareness, if not acomprehensive assessment, of the detectable EM signatures emitted by HVTs under his
command. He should evaluate these signatures by considering the enemy's expected
RSTA capabilities (airborne and ground-based), knowledge of the target area, andweapons-on-target capability.

OBJECTIVE
6-3. A CCD plan increases target survivability within the limits of available resources.
The design procedure must systematically determine which features of a given target areconspicuous, why those features are conspicuous, and how CCD principles andtechniques can best eliminate or reduce target signatures. CCD should decrease theeffectiveness of enemy attacks by interfering with its target-acquisition process, which inturn increases target survivability.

PLANNING PROCESS
6-4. The steps outlined below provide guidance for designing CCD plans for HVTs. The
detailed planning approach is applicable in any situation where CCD employment isnecessary, but more so when the plans include HVTs.
Step 1. Identify the threat. Identify the principal threat sensors, weapon-delivery
platforms, and likely directions of attack.
Step 2. Identify critical facilities. Identify critical HVTs. Include those that are criticalfrom an operational standpoint and those that may provide reference points (cues) for
an attack on more lucrative targets.
Step 3. Evaluate facilities. Once the critical HVTs are identified, focus efforts on
identifying the target features that might be conspicuous to an enemy RSTA.
Consider multispectral (visual, thermal, NIR, radar) signatures in this assessment. The
seven recognition factors (Chapter 3) are an excellent framework for conducting thisassessment. Include a review of area maps, site plans, photographs, and aerial imagesof the target area.
Step 4. Quantify signatures. Quantify the multispectral signatures that are emitted byhigh-value facilities. Base the quantification on actual surveys of critical facilities,
using facsimiles of threat sensors when possible. Specify the EM wavelengths inwhich targets are most vulnerable, and develop signature-management priorities.
Step 5. Establish CCD goals. Establish specific CCD goals for HVTs. These goals
should indicate the signature reduction (or increase) desired and the resources
available for CCD implementation. Base these goals on the results of steps 1 through
4. Change the CCD goals as the planning process develops and reiterate themaccordingly.
Step 6. Select materials and techniques. Select CCD materials and techniques thatbest accomplish signature-management goals within logistical, maintenance, andresource constraints. Expedient, off-the-shelf materials and battlefield by-products are
not identified in this manual, but they are always optional CCD materials.
Step 7. Organize the plan. Develop a CCD plan that matches goals with available
materials, time and manpower constraints, and operational considerations. If the goals
are unobtainable, repeat steps 5 and 6 until a manageable plan is developed.
Step 8. Execute the plan. Once a feasible CCD plan is developed, execute it. Store
temporary or expedient materials inconspicuously. Conduct deployment training on aschedule that denies enemy intelligence teams the opportunity to identify thecountermeasures or develop methods to defeat the CCD.
Step 9. Evaluate the CCD. The final step in the CCD planning process is to evaluate
the deployed CCD materials and techniques. Important questions to ask in thisevaluation include the following:•

Does CCD increase the survivability of HVTs?

•

Does deployed CCD meet the signature-management goals outlined in the
plan?

•

Is deployed CCD operationally compatible with the treated target(s)?

•Are CCD materials and techniques maintainable within manpower andresource constraints?

SECTION II — FIXED INSTALLATIONSCONCEPT
6-5. Fixed installations (base camps, AASs, CPs, warehouses, roadways, pipelines,
railways, and other lines-of-communication [LOC] facilities) provide scarce, nearly
irreplaceable functional support to ground maneuver forces. The threat to these facilities
is both ground-based and aerial. The CCD techniques for the two attack types do notnecessarily change, but the defender must be aware of the overall implications of his
CCD plan.
GROUND ATTACKS
6-6. Ground attacks against fixed installations (enemy offensives, terrorist attacks, andenemy special-force incursions) require constant operational awareness by the defenders.
While most CCD techniques are conceptually designed to defend against an aerial attack,these same techniques can affect the target-acquisition capabilities of an enemy's groundforces to the benefit of the defender. SCSPP, LCSS, and natural vegetation provide CCD
against a ground attack.
6-7. CCD discipline (light, noise, spoil) involves prudent operational procedures thatfriendly troops should observe in any tactical situation, particularly in the presence of
hostile ground forces. (See Chapter 5 for more information.)
AERIAL ATTACKS
6-8. Fixed installations are susceptible to aerial attacks because of their long residence
time and immobility. However, fighter-bomber and helicopter aircrews face uniquetarget-acquisition problems due to the relatively short time available to locate, identify,
and lock onto targets. Fighter-bombers typically travel at high speeds, even duringweapons delivery. This means attacking aircrews have limited search time once theyreach the target area. Helicopters travel at slower speeds but generally encounter similar
time-on-target limitations. Because of lower flying altitudes and slower speeds,
helicopters are more vulnerable to ground defenses. In either case, proper CCD canincrease aircrew search time, thereby reducing available time to identify, designate, andattack an HVT. The longer an aircrew is forced to search for a target in a defended area,
the more vulnerable the aircraft becomes to counterattack.
ENEMY INTELLIGENCE
6-9. The location and configuration of most fixed installations are usually well known.
CCD techniques that protect against sophisticated surveillance sensor systems,
particularly satellite-based systems, can be costly in terms of manpower, materials, andtime. Steps can be taken to reduce an enemy's detection of relocatable targets. Fixedinstallations are difficult to conceal from RSTA sensors due to the relatively longresidence time of fixed installations versus relocatable targets. Unless the construction
process for a given fixed installation was conducted secretly, defenders can safely assume
that enemy RSTA sensors have previously detected and catalogued its location.
Defenders can further assume that attacking forces have intelligence data leading them tothe general area of the fixed installation. CCD design efforts, therefore, should focus on
the multispectral defeat or impairment of the enemy's local target-acquisition process.
CCD TECHNIQUES
6-10. Selected CCD techniques should capitalize on terrain features that are favorable tothe defender and on the short time available to attacking aircrews for target acquisition.
Use artificial and natural means to camouflage the installation. Where time and resources
allow, deploy alternative targets (decoys) to draw the attention of the attacking aircrews
away from the fixed installation.
6-11. Comprehensive CCD designs and techniques for fixed installations can be costly,
yet field tests have shown that simple, expedient techniques can be effective. HVTs areusually supplied with artificial CCD materials. If they are not, soldiers increase thesurvivability of an installation by using CCD principles.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
6-12. While standard CCD materials are designed to enhance fixed-installation
survivability, they have practical limitations that are not easily overcome. Materials
applied directly to a fixed installation may achieve the signature-management goals
stated in the CCD plan. However, if other features of the target scene are not treatedaccordingly, the target may be well hidden but remain completely vulnerable.
6-13. For example, three weapons-storage-area (WSA) igloos are in a row. The middle
igloo is treated with CCD materials while the other two are not. The middle igloo will
still be vulnerable. The enemy knows that three igloos exist and will probably locate themiddle one no matter how well the CCD plan is designed. However, if all three igloos aretreated with CCD materials and three decoy igloos are placed away from them, thetreated igloos' survivability will increase.

6-14. Furthermore, if a man-made object (traffic surface) or a natural feature (tree line) is
close to the igloos, attacking forces will use these cues to proceed to the target area even
if all three igloos are treated with CCD materials. Remember, an HVT is part of an
overall target scene and an attacker must interpret the scene. Do not make his task easy.
CCD plans that treat only the target and ignore other cues (man-made or natural) within
the target scene are insufficient.

COMMAND POSTS
6-15. C2 systems provide military leaders with the capability to make timely decisions,communicate the decisions to subordinate units, and monitor the execution of thedecisions. CPs contain vital C2 systems.
SIGNATURES
6-16. Since World War II, the size and complexity of CPs have increased dramatically.
Their signatures have correspondingly increased from a physical and communications
perspective (more types of antennas and transmission modes at a wider range of
frequencies). As a result, the enemy can use several conspicuous signatures to detect andtarget CPs for attack. Therefore, CPs require excellent CCD to survive on the battlefield.
Lines of Communication
6-17. CPs are usually located near converging LOC, such as road or rail junctions, andoften require new access and egress routes. Consider the following regarding CCD and
CPs:•

Vehicle traffic. When evaluating EM signatures that CPs emit, consider
concentrations of vehicles, signs of heavy traffic (characteristic wear and track
marks), and air traffic. Park vehicles and aircraft a significant distance from CPs.

•

Antennas. Antennas and their electronic emissions and numerous support towers
are common to most CPs. Paint antennas and support equipment with
nonconductive green, black, or brown paint if the surfaces are shiny. If tacticallyfeasible, use remote antennas to reduce the vulnerability of the radio system tocollateral damage.

•

Security emplacements. Security measures (barbwire, barriers, security anddismount points, and other types of emplacements) can indicate CP operations.
Barbwire exhibits a measurable RCS at radar frequencies. Ensure that barbwire
and concertina wire follow natural terrain lines and are concealed as much as
possible.

Equipment
6-18. Power generators and other heat sources produce signatures that an enemy's
surveillance and target-acquisition sensors can detect. Place heat-producing equipment

and other thermal sources in defilade positions, within structures, or under natural cover.
Heat diffusers, which tone down and vent vehicle exhaust away from threat direction, arean expedient means of thermal-signature reduction.
Defensive Positions
6-19. Defensive positions (berms, revetments, fighting positions) for protection against
direct- and indirect-fire attackers typically create scarred earth signatures and detectable
patterns due to earth excavation.
CCD
6-20. CCD improves OPSEC and increases survivability by minimizing the observablesize and EM signatures of CPs. CP CCD requires recon, planning, discipline, security,and maintenance. Carefully controlled traffic plans decrease the possibility of disturbing
natural cover and creating new, observable paths. Decoys are a highly effective means ofconfusing the enemy's target-acquisition process, particularly against airborne sensors.
Against ground threats, the same general rules of CCD discipline apply; however, reconand heightened security patrols enhance CCD efforts against ground attack.
SITES
6-21. CP sites, which could move every 24 hours, are still occupied for a longer period
than AAs. CP site selection is crucial, therefore units should—•

Consider the needs of supporting an extended occupation while minimizingchanges to natural terrain patterns. When constructing defensive positions,minimize earth scarring as much as possible. If scarred earth is unavoidable, cut
vegetation, toned-down agents (paint), and camouflage nets help conceal scarredareas.

•

Use existing LOC (roads, trails, streams). If a site requires construction of roads
or paths, make maximum use of natural concealment and existing terrain. The
fewer new lines required, the better the CP blends, leaving natural features
relatively unchanged.

•

Never locate a CP at a road junction. Road junctions are high-priority targets forenemy forces and are easily detectable.

•

Locate a CP in an existing civilian structure, if possible, which simplifies hiding
military activity. However, choose a structure in an area where a sufficientnumber of buildings with similar EM signatures can mask its location.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES
6-22. By strictly complying with proper radio, telephone, and digital communications
procedures, the opportunities for an enemy to detect friendly telecommunications
activities are minimized. Consider the following:•

Place antennas in locations using natural supports when possible (trees fordipoles). As a rule of thumb, place antennas a minimum of one wavelength awayfrom surrounding structures or other antennas. NOTE: One wavelength is 40
meters (typically) for low frequencies and 1 meter for very high frequencies(VHFs).
•

Move antennas as often as possible within operational constraints.

•

Use directional antennas when possible. If using nondirectional antennas, employ
proper terrain-masking techniques to defeat the threat's radio direction-finding
efforts.

•

Use existing telephone lines as much as possible. Newly laid wire is a readily
observable signature that can reveal a CP's location. Communications wire andcable should follow natural terrain lines and be concealed in the best way
possible.

CCD DISCCIPLINE
6-23. Maintain CCD discipline after occupying a site. Establish and use designated footpaths to, from, and within a CP's area. If a unit occupies a site for more than 24 hours,
consider periodically rerouting foot paths to avoid detectable patterns. Conceal security
and dismount points and other individual emplacements, and make paths to the CP
inconspicuous. Enforce proper disposal procedures for trash and spoil. Rigidly enforce
light and noise discipline. Enhance the realism of a decoy CP by making it appear
operational. Allow CCD discipline to be lax in the decoy CP, thus making it a more
conspicuous target than the real CP.

SUPPLY AND WATER POINTS
6-24. Supply and water points provide logistical support—the backbone of sustained
combat operations. As these targets are relatively immobile and the object of an enemy's
most sophisticated sensors, using CCD is one of the most effective means to improvetheir survivability.
OPERATIONS
6-25. Many CCD methods associated with AAs and CPs also apply to supply and water
points, but with additional requirements. Large amounts of equipment and supplies arequickly brought into tactical areas and delivered to supply points located as close to the
FLOT as possible. Supplies must be unloaded and concealed quickly, while supply points
remain open and accessible for distribution. Under these conditions, multiple supply
points are generally easier to camouflage than single, large ones. Decoy supply and water
points can also confuse a threat's targeting efforts.
CCD
6-26. Take maximum advantage of natural cover and concealment. Configure logistics

layouts to conform with the local ground pattern. Creativity can play a role in this effort.
The following guidance enhances concealment of these operations:•

Avoid establishing regular (square or rectangular) perimeter shapes for an area.

•

Select locations where concealed access and egress routes are already establishedand easily controlled.

•

Use roads with existing overhead concealment if you need new access roads.
Conceal access over short, open areas with overhead nets.

•

Control movement into and out of the supply area.

•

Mix and disperse supply-point stocks to the maximum extent possible. This not
only avoids a pattern of stockpile shapes but also avoids easy destruction of one
entire commodity.

•

Space stocks irregularly (in length and depth) to avoid recognizable patterns.
Stack supplies as low as possible to avoid shadows. Dig supplies in if resources
allow. In digging operations, disperse the spoil so as not to produce large piles ofearth.

•

Cover stocks with nets and other materials that blend with background patterns
and signatures. Flattops (large, horizontal CCD nets) are effective for concealing
supply-point activities when resources allow their construction and when supply
points are not too large. Dunnage from supply points provides excellent material
for expedient decoys.

TRAFFIC CONTROL
6-27. Ensure that vehicles cause minimal changes to the natural terrain as a result of
movement into, within, and out of the area. Provide concealment and control of vehicles
waiting to draw supplies. Rigidly practice and enforce CCD discipline and OPSEC.
Debris control could be a problem and requires constant attention.
WATER POINTS
6-28. CCD for water points include the following additional considerations:•

Spillage. Water spillage can have positive and negative effects on a unit's CCD
posture. Standing pools of water reflect light that is visible to observers. Pools canalso act as forward scatterers of radar waves, resulting in conspicuous black-hole
returns on radar screens. Therefore, minimize water spillage and provide adequate
drainage for runoff. On the other hand, dispersed water can be used to reduce thethermal signatures of large, horizontal surfaces. However, use this techniquesparingly and in such a way that pools do not form.

•

Equipment. Use adequate natural and artificial concealment for personnel,
storage tanks, and specialized pumping and purification equipment. Conceal

water-point equipment to eliminate shine from damp surfaces. Conceal shine byplacing canvas covers on bladders, using camouflage nets, and placing foliage on
and around bladders. This also distorts the normal shape of the bladders.
•

Scheduling. Enhance CCD discipline at water points by establishing and strictly
enforcing a supply schedule for units. The lack of or violation of a supply
schedule produces a concentration of waiting vehicles that is difficult to conceal.

ARMY AVIATION SITES
6-29. AASs are among the most important of all battlefield HVTs. AASs are typicallycomprised of several parts that make up the whole, including tactical assembly areas(TAAs), aviation maintenance areas (AMAs), forward operating bases (FOBs), andforward arming and refueling points (FARPs). The positioning of AAS elements withrespect to each other is dynamic and often depends on the existing tactical situation. In
the following discussion, an AAS will be defined as a TAA, an AMA, and a FARP
collocated in the same area. While these elements are not always collocated, the CCD
techniques for individual elements will not greatly differ based on positioning. Untreated
AASs are detectable in most threat sensor wavelengths.
•

TAA. A TAA is typically a parking area for helicopters. Helicopters are highly
conspicuous targets because of their awkward shape, distinctive thermal
signatures, and large RCS. An enemy expends a lot of time and energy attempting
to locate TAAs. Once it finds them, the enemy aggressively directs offensive
operations against them.

•

AMA. The most conspicuous features of an AMA are the large transportable
maintenance shelters. These shelters are highly visible and indicate the presenceof helicopters to an enemy. AMAs occupy large areas to allow for groundhandling of aircraft. Traffic patterns around AMAs are also strong visual cues tothe enemy. Maintenance assets, including aviation shop sets, havecharacteristically distinct multispectral cues.

•

FARP. A FARP provides POL and ammunition support to AASs and othertactical units. A FARP consists of fuel bladders, heavy expanded mobility tactical
trucks (HEMTTs), fueling apparatus, and bulk ammunition. Due to safety
requirements, FARP elements are dispersed as much as possible within terrain
and operational constraints. Each element is detectable with multispectral radar.
In a FARP—n Fuel bladders contain petroleum liquids whose thermal mass is a strong IR
cue relative to the background. Bladders are often bermed, which meansthat visible earth scarring is necessary to construct the berm.
n Large HEMTTs are conspicuous in all wavelengths.
n Fueling areas are generally arranged in such a way that the fuelingapparatus (hoses, pumps) are arranged linearly in an open area for safe andeasy access. The linear deployment of these hoses is a strong visual cue,and their dark color usually contrasts with the background. The dark hoses
experience solar loading, and the POL liquids within the hoses can provide
a thermal cue.
•Equipment. Palletized ammunition and support equipment accompany AASs.
Such equipment is often stacked in regular, detectable patterns.

•

Aircraft. Aircraft create large dust plumes when deployed to unpaved areas. Such
plumes are distinct visual cues and indicate the presence of rotary aircraft to an
enemy.
n Parked aircraft. Camouflage nets, berms, stacked equipment, andrevetments can effectively conceal parked aircraft. Vertical screensconstructed from camouflage nets help conceal parked aircraft,particularly against ground-based threats. However, CCD techniques for
rapid-response aircraft must not impair operational requirements, meaningthat obtrusive, permanent CCD techniques are generally not an option.
Also, foreign object damage (FOD) is a critical concern for all aviation
assets. CCD for parked aircraft depends on the expected ground time
between flights. The commanding officer must approve all aircraft CCD
techniques before implementation.
n Aircraft refueling. Aircraft refueling positions, particularly fuel hoses,
should be dispersed and arrayed in a nonlinear configuration. The hoses
can be concealed at periodic locations with cut vegetation or a lightearth/sod covering to reduce visual and thermal signatures.

•

Defensive positions. Constructing defensive positions can create detectable areasof scarred earth.

•

CCD. AASs are extremely valuable targets; therefore, try to prevent their initialdetection by an enemy.

•

Vehicles. Large vehicles can be effectively concealed with camouflage nets. Also,
properly placing these vehicles to use terrain features and indigenous vegetation
increases their survivability. Expedient vehicle decoys provide an enemy withalternate targets, and proper CCD discipline is essential.

•

Dunnage. Quickly conceal all dunnage (packing materials) to minimize theevidence of AASs.

•

Dust. To avoid dust, park aircraft in grassy areas or where the earth is hardpacked. If such areas are unavailable, disperse water on the area to minimize dust
plumes. However, water-soaked earth can also be an IR detection cue so use thisoption sparingly and, if possible, at night. Several chemical dust palliatives areavailable that provide excellent dust control for aviation areas.

•Construction. When constructing defensive positions, minimize disturbances tothe surrounding area. Cover scarred earth with cut vegetation, camouflage nets, or
toned-down agents.

SECTION III — RELOCATABLE UNITSMOBILITY AND CCD
6-30. Examples of valuable relocatable units include TOCs, tactical-missile-defense(TMD) units (Patriot batteries), refuel-on-the-move (ROM) sites, and FARPs. These units
are critical to offensive and defensive operations, and their protection should receive ahigh priority.
6-31. Mobility and CCD enhance the survivability of relocatable units. A CCD plan must
include the techniques for units to deploy rapidly and conduct mobile operations
continuously. The CCD techniques available to mobile units are basically the same as for
fixed installations, and the principles of CCD still apply. However, the mission of
relocatable units differs from that of fixed installations so CCD execution also differs.
6-32. Relocatable units spend from a few hours to several weeks in the same location,
depending on their tactical situation. CCD techniques must be planned accordingly. If aunit is at a location for a few hours, it should employ expedient CCD techniques. If a unit
is at a location for several days, it should employ robust CCD plans. The resources a unit
expends on CCD execution must be weighed against the length of time that it remains inthe same location. As CCD plans increase in complexity, subsequent assembly andteardown times also increase. Commanders must ensure that the unit's manpower andresources dedicated to CCD execution are equal to the tactical mobility requirements.

BUILT-IN CAPABILITIES
6-33. CCD should be built into systems to the maximum extent possible. Supplemental
CCD is usually necessary and should be designed to enhance the built-in CCD. Apply thesame rules for avoiding detection and the same considerations regarding the sevenrecognition factors that are discussed in Chapter 3. The CCD planning process outlined at
the beginning of this chapter also applies.

Chapter 7

Special Environments
The fundamentals of CCD do not change between environments. The seven rules foravoiding detection and the seven recognition factors that are listed in Chapter 3 and thethree CCD principles—preventing detection, improving survivability, and improving
deception capabilities—still apply. However, the guidelines for their application change.
Different environments require thoughtful, creative, and unique CCD techniques. This
chapter discusses different CCD techniques that have proven effective in three special
environments—desert, snow-covered areas, and urban terrain.

DESERT
7-1. The color of desert terrain varies from pink to blue, depending on the minerals in thesoil and the time of the day. No color or combination of colors matches all deserts.
Patches of uniform color in the desert are usually 10 times larger than those in wooded
areas. These conditions have led to the development of a neutral, monotone tan as thebest desert CCD paint color.
TOPOGRAPHY
7-2. Although desert terrain may appear featureless, it is not completely flat. In someways, desert terrain resembles unplowed fields; barren, rocky areas; grasslands; andsteppes.
SHADOWS
7-3. The closer a target is to the ground, the smaller its shadow; and a small shadow iseasier to conceal from aerial observation. The proper draping of CCD nets will alter or
disrupt the regular, sharp-edged shadows of military targets and allow target shadows to
appear more like natural shadows. When supplemented by artificial materials, natural
shadows cast by folds of the ground can be used for CCD purposes. The best solution to
the shadow problem in desert terrain is to dig in and use overhead concealment or cover.
Otherwise, park vehicles in a way that minimizes their broadside exposure to the sun.
PLACEMENT
7-4. Proper placement and shadow disruption remain effective techniques. Place assets ingullies, washes, wadis, and ravines to reduce their shadows and silhouettes and to takeadvantage of terrain masking. More dispersion is necessary in desert terrain than inwooded areas. Move assets as the sun changes position to keep equipment in shadows.

TERRAIN MOTTLING
7-5. Use terrain mottling when the ground offers little opportunity for concealment. This
technique involves scarring the earth with bulldozers, which creates darker areas onwhich to place equipment for better blending with the background. Ensure that the
mottled areas are irregularly shaped and at least twice the size of the target you areconcealing. Place the target off center in the mottled area and drape it with camouflage
nets. When employing the scarring technique, dig two to three times as many scars as
pieces of equipment being concealed. Doing this prevents the mere presence of mottled
areas from giving away a unit's location.
MOVEMENT DISCIPLINE
7-6. Movement discipline is especially important in the desert. Desert terrain is uniform
and fragile, making it easily disturbed by vehicle tracks. Vehicle movement also produces
dust and diesel plumes that are easily detectable in the desert. When movement isnecessary, move along the shortest route and on the hardest ground. Shine is aparticularly acute desert problem due to the long, uninterrupted hours of sunlight. To deal
with this problem, remove all reflective surfaces or cover them with burlap. Use matte
CCD paint or expedient paints (see Table 3-2) to dull the gloss of a vehicle's finish.
Shade optical devices (binoculars, gun sights) when using them.
NOISE SND LIGHT DISCIPLINE
7-7. Noise and light discipline is particularly important in desert terrain since sound andlight can be detected at greater distances on clear desert nights. The techniques for
reducing these signatures remain the same as for other environments. Be aware that
thermal sensors, while not as effective during the day, have an ideal operating
environment during cold desert nights. Starting all vehicle and equipment engines
simultaneously is a technique that can be used to confuse enemy acoustical surveillance
efforts.

SNOW-COVERED AREAS
7-8. When the main background is white, apply white paint or whitewash over thepermanent CCD paint pattern. The amount of painting should be based on the percentage
of snow coverage on the ground:•

If the snow covers less than 15 percent of the background, do not change the CCD
paint pattern.

•

If the snow cover is 15 to 85 percent, substitute white for green in the CCD paintpattern.

•

If the snow cover is more than 85 percent, paint the vehicles and equipment
completely white.

PLACEMENT
7-9. A blanket of snow often eliminates much of the ground pattern, causing natural
textures and colors to disappear. Blending under these conditions is difficult. However,snow-covered terrain is rarely completely white so use the dark features of the landscape.
Place equipment in roadways, in streambeds, under trees, under bushes, in shadows, andin ground folds. Standard BDUs and personal equipment contrast with the snow
background, so use CCD to reduce these easily recognized signatures.
MOVEMENT
7-10. Concealing tracks is a major problem in snow-covered environments. Movement
should follow wind-swept drift lines, which cast shadows, as much as possible. Vehicle
drivers should avoid sharp turns and follow existing track marks. Wipe out short lengthsof track marks by trampling them with snowshoes or by brushing them out.
THERMAL SIGNATURES
7-11. Snow-covered environments provide excellent conditions for a threat's thermal andUV sensors. Terrain masking is the best solution to counter both types of sensors. Use
arctic LCSS and winter camouflage paint to provide UV blending, and use smoke tocreate near-whiteout conditions.

URBAN TERRAIN
7-12. Urbanization is reducing the amount of open, natural terrain throughout the world.
Therefore, modern military units must be able to apply effective urban CCD. Many of the
CCD techniques used in natural terrain are effective in urban areas.
PLANNING
7-13. Planning for operations in urban areas presents unique difficulties. Tactical maps do
not show man-made features in enough detail to support tactical operations. Therefore,
they must be supplemented with aerial photographs and local city maps. Local
government and military organizations are key sources of information that can support
tactical and CCD operations. They can provide diagrams of underground facilities, largescale city maps, and/or civil-defense or air-raid shelter locations.
SELECTING S SITE
7-14. The physical characteristics of urban areas enhance CCD efforts. The dense
physical structure of these areas generates clutter (an abundance of EM signatures in agiven area) that increases the difficulty of identifying specific targets. Urban clutter
greatly reduces the effectiveness of a threat's surveillance sensors, particularly in the IR
and radar wavelengths. Urban terrain, therefore, provides an excellent background forconcealing CPs, reserves, combat-service-support (CSS) complexes, or combat forces.
The inherent clutter in urban terrain generally makes visual cues the most importantconsideration in an urban CCD plan.

7-15. The regular pattern of urban terrain; the diverse colors and contrast; and the large,
enclosed structures offer enhanced concealment opportunities. Established, hardened roadsurfaces effectively mask vehicle tracks. Depending on the nature of the operation,
numerous civilian personnel and vehicles may be present and may serve as clutter. This
confuses an enemy's ability to distinguish between military targets and the civilian
population. Underground structures (sewers, subways) are excellent means of concealing
movement and HVTs.
7-16. When augmented by artificial means, man-made structures provide symmetricalshapes that provide ready-made CCD. The CCD for fighting positions is especially
important because of the reduced identification and engagement ranges (100 meters orless) typical of urban fighting. Limit or conceal movement and shine. These signatures
provide the best opportunity for successful threat surveillance in urban terrain. Carefulplacement of equipment and fighting positions remains important to provide visual CCD
and avoid detection by contrast (thermal sensors detecting personnel and equipment
silhouetted against colder buildings or other large, flat surfaces).
ESTABLISHING FIGHTING POSITIONS
7-17. The fundamental CCD rule is to maintain the natural look of an area as much as
possible. Buildings with large, thick walls and few narrow windows provide the best
concealment. When selecting a position inside a building, soldiers should—•

Avoid lighted areas around windows.

•

Stand in shadows when observing or firing weapons through windows.

•

Select positions with covered and concealed access and egress routes (breaches inbuildings, underground systems, trenches).

•

Develop decoy positions to enhance CCD operations.

PLACING VEHICLES
7-18. Hide vehicles in large structures, if possible, and use local materials to help blend
vehicles with the background environment. Paint vehicles and equipment a solid, dull,dark color. If you cannot do this, use expedient paints to subdue the lighter, sand-colored
portions of the SCSPP. When placing vehicles outdoors, use shadows for concealment.
Move vehicles during limited visibility or screen them with smoke.

Appendix A

Metric Conversion Chart
This appendix complies with current Army directives which state that the metric system
will be incorporated into all new publications. Table A-1 is a conversion chart.

Table A-1. Metric conversion chart
US Units

Multiplied By

Metric Units

Cubic feet

0.0283

Cubic metersFeet0.3048MetersGallons3.7854

LitersInches

2.54

Centimeters

Inches

0.0254

MetersInches25.4001

Millimeters

Miles, statute1.6093

Kilometers

Miles, statute

0.9144

Yards

Ounces28.349Grams

Pounds

0.454

Kilograms

Tons, short

0.9072

Tons, metric

Square feet

0.093

Square meters

Metric Units

Multiplied By

US Units

Centimeters0.3937

InchesCubic meters35.3144

Cubic feet

Cubic meters1.3079Cubic yards

Grams

0.035

OuncesKilograms

2.205

PoundsKilometers0.62137

Miles, statute

Kilometers

1,093.6

Yards

Liters0.264

Gallons

Meters3.2808Feet

Meters39.37

InchesMeters

1.0936

Yards

Millimeters0.03937

InchesSquare meters10.764

Square feetTons, metric

2,204.6

PoundsAppendix B

Guidelines for Tactical Standing Operating Procedures
TACSOPs are critical to battlefield success. All commanders should establish
camouflage guidelines in their TACSOPs and ensure that their soldiers are familiar withthem. TACSOPs provide guidelines that help reduce the time required to perform routine
tasks. Commanders can achieve these ends by defining the responsibilities, identifying
the expected tasks, and providing supervisors with a memory aid when planning or
inspecting. TACSOPs, coupled with battle drills (Appendix C), provide units withguidance on how to execute anticipated battlefield tasks. CCD employment is a task thatshould be routine for all units.

CONTENT
B-1. The following CCD considerations may be included in a unit TACSOP:•

A review of CCD fundamentals.

•

Rules of unit CCD discipline.

•

Memory aids for supervisors, which should include an inspection checklist(Figure B-1) and a chart of an enemy's sensor systems with possible
countermeasures.

•

Guidelines on CCD discipline to provide uniformity among all subunits.

•

The different CCD postures.

•

Procedures for blackout, the quartering party, unit movement, and the deployment
area.

•

Appropriate CCD postures in OPORDs for different missions.

CCD Inspection Checklist
1. Command Emphasis.
a. The commander—(1) Establishes CCD goals.
(2) Executes CCD plans.

(3) Inspects frequently doe CCD deficiencies.
(4) Conducts follow-up inspection of CCD deficiencies.
(5) Integrates CCD into training exercises.
b. The unit—(1) Intregrates CCD into its TACSOP.
(2) Follows the TACSOP.
2. Discipline.
a. The unit—(1) Observes noise disciplene.
(2) Observes light discipline with respect to smoking, fires, and lights.
(3) Conceals highly visible equipment.
(4) Covers shiny surfaces.
(5) Keeps exposed activity to a minimum.
(6) Uses cut vegetation properly.
(7) Uses and conceals dismount points properly.
b. Soldiers—(1) Wear the correct uniform.
(2) Control litter and spoil.
3. Techniques. The unit—a. Places and disperses vehicles and equipment.
b. Disperses the CP.
c. Employs camoulfage nets (LCSS)
d. Uses (or minimizes) shadows.
e. Minimizes movement.
f. Hides operations and equipment.
g. Blends operations and equipment with backgrounds.
h. Employs pattern-painting techniques.

i. Employs decoys.
j. Integrates smoke operations with unit movement.
k. Practices individual CCD on—(1) Helmet.
(2) Face.
(3) Weapon.
(4) Other Equipment.
l. Employs CCD on fighting positions by—(1) Eliminating or minimizing target silhouettes.
(2) Practicing spoil control.
(3) Eliminating or minimizing regular or geometric shapes and layouts.
(4) Maintaining overhead concealment.
(5) Practicing dust control.
m. Employs CCD on tactical vehicles by—(1) Minimizing and concealing track marks.
(2) Minimizing or eliminating the shine on vehicles and equipment.
(3) Reducing or using shadows to the unit's advantage.
(4) Enploying camouflage nets (LCSS).
(5) Painting vehicles to match their surroundings.
(6) Dispersing vehicles and equipment.
(7) Concealing vehicles and supply routes.
(8) Controlling litter and spoil.
(9) Storing and concealing ammunition.
n. Employs CCD on AAs by—(1) Facilitating mission planning for access and egress concealment.
(2) Marking guideposts for route junctions.
(3) Ensuring that turn-ins are not widened by improper use.

(4) Dispersing dismount, mess, and maintenance areas.
(5) Dispersing the CP.
(6) Maintaining CCD by—(a) Inspecting CCD frequently.
(b) Controlling litter and garbage.
(c) Observing blackout procedures.
(7) Observing evaluation procedures by—(a) Policing the area(b) Covering or eliminating tracks.
(c) Preventing traffic congestion.
(d) Concealing spoil.
o. Employs CCD on the CP by—(1) Ensuring that LOC are not converged.
(2) Dispersing vehicles.
(3) Ensuring that turn-ins are not widened through improper use.
(4) Ensuring that protective barriers follow terrain features.
(5) Concealing defensive weapons.
(6) Ensuring that existing poles are used for LOC.
(7) Digging in the CP (when in open areas).
(8) Maintaining camouflage nets (LCSS).
(9) Using civilian buildings properly by—(a) Controlling access and egress.
(b) Observing blackout procedures.
(c) Avoiding obvious locations.
p. Employs CCD on supply points by—(1) Dispersing operations.
(2) Concealing access and egress routes.

(3) Using the track plan.
(4) Providing concealed loading areas.
(5) Developing and implementing a schedule for the units being serviced.
q. Enploys CCD on water points by—(1) Concealing access and egress routes.
(2) Ensuring that the track plan is used.
(3) Controlling spillage.
(4) Controlling shine and reflections.
(5) Developing and implementing a schedule for the units being serviced.
Figure B-1. Sample CCD checklist

COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES
B-2. Commanders must ensure that each soldier has the required quantities
of serviceable BDUs and that these uniforms are properly maintained toprotect their IR screening properties. Based on unit requirements, supply
personnel forecast, request, and store adequate quantities of expendable
CCD supplies (paint, makeup, repair kits). Commanders ensure that
authorized quantities of CCD screens (LCSS) and support systems (toinclude repair kits and spare parts) are on hand and continually maintainedin a clean, serviceable condition.

FRATRICIDE
B-3. Since warfare often results in the loss of life from fratricide, the unit
TACSOP should include a way to reduce fratricide. Commanders should
consider ways for friendly and allied units to identify each other on thebattlefield. Fratricide compels commanders to consider the effect CCD
and deception operations have on the necessity of being recognized byfriendly troops.

Appendix C

Camouflage Requirements and ProceduresThis appendix provides information on the LCSS and describes how to erect it. Also
included is a figure for determining the amount of modules needed to camouflage thevarious vehicles in the Army's inventory. This appendix also includes a sample battle
drill that can be used to train soldiers.

LIGHTWEIGHT CAMOUFLAGE SCREEN SYSTEM
C-1. The LCSS is a modular system consisting of a hexagon screen, a diamond-shaped
screen, a support system, and a repair kit. You can join any number of screens to cover a
designated target or area (Figure C-1). Use Figure C-2 to determine the number ofmodules needed for camouflaging a given area. Measure the vehicle or use Table C-1 todetermine the vehicle's dimensions.

Figure C-1. LCSS modular system.

Figure C-2. Module determination chart.

Table C-1. Vehicle dimensions
Nomenclature

Height

Width

Lengt

No. of(feet)(feet)

h(feet)

Module
s

AVLB

17

13

37

5

C7 loader, scoop, 2-ton, w/o cage

9

9

25

2

D7 dozer, with blade

10

12

19

2

M106A1 carrier, mortar, 107-mm

7

10

16

2

M109A3 howitzer, 155-mm (SP)

11

12

30

3

M113A2 carrier, personnel

7

9

16

2

M113A3 carrier, personnel

7

9

19

2

M125A1 carrier, mortar, 81-mm

7

9

16

2

M149 trailer, water, 400-gal

6

7

7

1

M172 trailer, low-bed, 25-ton

6

10

35

2

M1A1 tank, with mine roller

10

12

40

3

M1A1(2) tank, combat, 105- and 120-mm

10

12

28

3

M2 fighting vehicle, infantry

10

11

22

2

M2 TOW vehicle, improved

11

9

15

2

M3 fighting vehicle, cavalry

10

11

22

2

M35A2 truck, cargo, 2-ton

9

8

23

2

M520 truck, cargo, 8-ton

11

9

32

3

M548 carrier, cargo, 6-ton

10

9

21

2

M54A2 truck, cargo, 5-ton

10

8

26

2

M553 truck, wrecker, 10-ton

11

9

33

3

M559 truck, fuel, 2,500-gal

11

9

33

3

M577A1 carrier, CP

9

9

19

2

M578 vehicle, recovery, light

11

10

21

2

M60A3 tank, combat, 105-mm

11

12

27

3

M713 truck, ambulance, -ton

7

6

12

2

M728 vehicle, combat engineer

11

12

29

3

M792 truck, ambulance, 1-ton

8

7

19

2

M816 truck, wrecker, 5-ton

10

8

30

3

M880 truck, cargo, 1-ton

8

7

19

2

M88A1 vehicle, recovery, medium

10

11

27

3

M9 vehicle, ACE

9

13

21

2

M920 truck, tractor, 20-ton

12

11

27

3

M930 truck, dump, 5-ton

9

8

24

2

M977 truck, cargo, HEMTT

9

8

34

3

M978 truck, tanker, HEMTT

9

8

34

3

M992 ammo carrier (FAAS-V)

11

11

23

3

M998, HMMWV, carrier, personnel

6

7

15

2

MLRS

9

10

23

2

MT250 crane, hydraulic, 25-ton

10

8

45

3

RT crane, boom, 20-ton

14

11

44

4

NOTES:
1. See Appendix E for a list of LCSS national stock numbers (NSNs) and ordering
information.
2. See TM 5-1080-200-13&P for more information on maintenance, erection, andcharacteristics of the LCSS.
CAPABILITIES
C-2. The LCSS protects targets in four different ways. It—•

Casts patterned shadows that break up the characteristic outlines of a target.

•

Scatters radar returns (except when radar-transparent nets are used).

•

Traps target heat and allows it to disperse.

•

Simulates color and shadow patterns that are commonly found in a particularregion.

ERECTING PROCEDURES
C-3. To erect camouflage nets effectively—•

Keep the net structure as small as possible.

•

Maintain the net a minimum of 2 feet from the camouflaged target's surface. This
prevents the net from assuming the same shape and thermal signature as the target
it is meant to conceal.

•

Ensure that the lines between support poles are gently sloped so that the net
blends into its background. Sloping the net over the target also minimizes sharpedges, which are more easily detectable to the human eye.

•

Extend the net completely to the ground to prevent creating unnatural shadowsthat are easily detected. This ensures that the net effectively disrupts the target's
shape and actually absorbs and scatters radar energy.

•

Extend the net all the way around the target to ensure complete protection fromenemy sensors.

SUPPLEMENTAL CAMOUFLAGE
C-4. Camouflage nets are often employed in conjunction with supplemental camouflage
because nets alone do not make a target invisible to a threat's multispectral sensors. Useother CCD techniques to achieve effective concealment. Cover or remove all of thetarget's reflective surfaces (mirrors, windshields, lights). Also ensure that the target's
shadow is disrupted or disguised. Use native vegetation, because placing a target in dense
foliage provides natural concealment and a smoother transition between the edges of the
camouflage net and the target's background. Cover exposed edges of the net with dirt orcut vegetation to enhance the transition.

VEHICLE CAMOUFLAGE
C-5. Measure the vehicle or determine its dimensions from Table C-1. Use the following
equations and Figure C-2 to determine the number of modules needed to camouflage avehicle.
Equation 1: A = 2h + w + 5 feet
Equation 2: B = 2h + L + 5 feet

where —h = height, in feetw = width, in feet
L = length, in feet
Step 1. Determine the vehicle's dimensions (measure or use Table C-1). For the M2
fighting vehicle, the height is 10 feet, the width is 11 feet, and the length is 22 feet.
Step 2. Use the above equations and the measurements from Step 1 to determine thetotal dimensions.
A = 2(10) + 11 + 5 = 36 feet
B = 2(10) + 22 + 5 = 47 feet
Step 3. Determine the number of modules needed (use Figure C-2). Since A equals
36 and B equals 47, two modules of camouflage are required to cover the M2 fighting
vehicle.

TRAINING
C-6. Units should develop and practice battle drills that cover the requirements andprocedures for erecting nets over assigned equipment. Table C-2 shows a sample battle
drill.

Table C-2. Sample battle drillStandards:•

Complete camouflage net setup drills within 20 minutes.

•

Complete camouflage net teardown drills within 15 minutes.

Personnel Required: Three crew members.
Equipment Required: Two modules or the following items:•

Nets, hexagonal, 2 each.

•Nets, diamond, 2 each.

•

Pole sections, 24 each.

•

Stakes, 36 each.

•

Lanyards, 6 each.

•

Spreaders, 12 each.

Stowage Location: The camouflage net is strapped to the right side of the trim vane.
Setup Drill:•

The gunner and the assistant gunner remove the camouflage net from the trim vane andplace it on top of the M2.

•

The driver removes poles and stakes from the bag and places them around the vehicle.

•

The gunner and the assistant gunner remove the vehicle's antenna, position the net on
top of the vehicle, and roll the net off the sides of the vehicle.

•

The driver stakes the net around the vehicle.

•

The driver and the assistant gunner assemble plies and spreaders and then erect the net.

•

The gunner inspects the camouflage from a distance.

•

The crew adjusts the camouflage as necessary.

Teardown Drill:•

The driver and the assistant gunner take down and disassemble plies and spreaders.

•

The gunner and the assistant gunner unstake the net and roll it to the top of the M2.

•

The gunner and the assistant gunner complete rolling the net on top of the vehicle andreplace the vehicle's antenna.

•

The driver stores the net on the trim vane.

•

The gunner and the assistant gunner store poles, spreaders, and stakes on the trim vane.

NOTES:
1. Preassemble the nets before placing them on the M2.
2. Supplement camouflage nets by properly placing vehicles and using naturalvegetation.

Appendix D

Individual Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys
Each soldier is responsible for camouflaging himself, his equipment, and his position.
CCD reduces the probability of an enemy placing aimed fire on a soldier.

MATERIALS
D-1. Use natural and artificial materials for CCD. Natural CCD includes defilade, grass,bushes, trees, and shadows. Artificial CCD for soldiers includes BDUs, camouflage nets,
skin paint, and natural materials removed from their original positions. To be effective,
artificial CCD must blend with the natural background.

DISCIPLINE
D-2. Noise, movement, and light discipline contribute to individual CCD:•

Noise discipline muffles and eliminates sounds made by soldiers and theirequipment.

•

Movement discipline minimizes movement within and between positions andlimits movement to routes that cannot be readily observed by an enemy.

•

Light discipline controls the use of lights at night. Avoid open fires, do not smoke
tobacco in the open, and do not walk around with a lit flashlight.

DISPERSAL
D-3. Dispersal is the deliberate deployment of soldiers and equipment over a wide area. It
is a key individual survival technique. Dispersal creates a smaller target mass for enemy
sensors and weapons systems. Therefore, it reduces casualties and losses in the event of
an attack and also makes enemy detection efforts more difficult.

CONSIDERATIONS
D-4. Every soldier should have a detailed understanding of the recognition factors
described in Chapter 3. While all of these factors remain important when applying
individual CCD, the following factors are critical:

•

Movement. Movement draws attention, whether it involves vehicles on the roador individuals walking around positions. The naked eye, IR, and radar sensors candetect movement. Minimize movement while in the open and remember thatdarkness does not prevent observation by an enemy equipped with modern
sensors. When movement is necessary, slow, smooth movement attracts lessattention than quick, irregular movement.

•

Shape. Use CCD materials to break up the shapes and shadows of positions andequipment. Stay in the shadows whenever possible, especially when moving,
because shadows can visually mask objects. When conducting operations close to
an enemy, disguise or distort helmet and body shapes with artificial CCD
materials because an enemy can easily recognize them at close range.

•

Shine and light. Shine can also attract attention. Pay particular attention to lightreflecting from smooth or polished surfaces (mess kits, mirrors, eyeglasses,
watches, windshields, starched uniforms). Plastic map cases, dust goggles wornon top of a helmet, and clear plastic garbage bags also reflect light. Cover these
items or remove them from exposed areas. Vehicle headlights, taillights, andsafety reflectors not only reflect light but also reflect laser energy used in weapon
systems. Cover this equipment when the vehicle is not in operation.
Red filters on vehicle dome lights and flashlights, while designed to protect asoldier's night vision, are extremely sensitive to detection by NVDs. A tank's red
dome light, reflecting off the walls and out through the sight and vision blocks,
can be seen with a starlight scope from 4 kilometers. Red-lensed flashlights and lit
cigarettes and pipes are equally observable. To reduce the chances of detection,
replace red filters with blue-green filters and practice strict light discipline. Use
measures to prevent shine at night because moonlight and starlight can bereflected as easily as sunlight.

•

Color. The contrast of skin, uniforms, and equipment with the background helps
an enemy detect OPFOR. Individual CCD should blend with the surroundings; orat a minimum, objects must not contrast with the background. Ideally, blend
colors with the background or hide objects with contrasting colors.

EMPLOYMENT
D-5. Study nearby terrain and vegetation before applying CCD to soldiers, equipment, or
the fighting position. During recon, analyze the terrain in lieu of the CCD considerations
listed above and then choose CCD materials that best blend with the area. Change CCD
as required when moving from one area to another.
SKIN
D-6. Exposed skin reflects light and may draw attention. Even very dark skin, because ofnatural oils, will reflect light. CCD paint sticks cover these oils and help blend skin withthe background. Avoid using oils or insect repellent to soften the paint stick because

doing so makes skin shiny and defeats the purpose of CCD paint. Soldiers applying CCD
paint should work in pairs and help each other. Self-application may leave gaps, such as
behind ears. Use the following technique:•

Paint high, shiny areas (forehead, cheekbones, nose, ears, chin) with a dark color.

•

Paint low, shadow areas with a light color.

•

Paint exposed skin (back of neck, arms, hands) with an irregular pattern.

D-7. When CCD paint sticks are unavailable, use field expedients such as burnt cork,bark, charcoal, lampblack, or mud. Mud contains bacteria, some of which is harmful andmay cause disease or infection, so consider mud as the last resource for individual CCD
field-expedient paint.
UNIFORMS
D-8. BDUs have a CCD pattern but often require additional CCD, especially inoperations occurring very close to the enemy. Attach leaves, grass, small branches, or
pieces of LCSS to uniforms and helmets. These items help distort the shape of a soldier,and they blend with the natural background. BDUs provide visual and NIR CCD. Do notstarch BDUs because starching counters the IR properties of the dyes. Replace
excessively faded and worn BDUs because they lose their CCD effectiveness as theywear.
EQUIPMENT
D-9. Inspect personal equipment to ensure that shiny items are covered or removed. Takecorrective action on items that rattle or make other noises when moved or worn. Soldiersassigned equipment, such as vehicles or generators, should be knowledgeable of theirappropriate camouflage techniques (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5).
INDIVIDUAL FIGHTING POSITIONSNOTE: Review the procedures for camouflaging positions in Chapter 5, which
include considerations for camouflaging individual positions.
D-10. While building a fighting position, camouflage it and carefully dispose of earth
spoil. Remember that too much CCD material applied to a position can actually have areverse effect and disclose the position to the enemy. Obtain CCD materials from adispersed area to avoid drawing attention to the position by the stripped area around it.
D-11. Camouflage a position as it is being built. To avoid disclosing a fighting position,never—•

Leave shiny or light-colored objects exposed.

•

Remove shirts while in the open.

•

Use fires.

•

Leave tracks or other signs of movement.

•

Look up when aircraft fly overhead. (One of the most obvious features on aerial
photographs is the upturned faces of soldiers.)

D-12. When CCD is complete, inspect the position from an enemy's viewpoint. Check
CCD periodically to see that it stays natural-looking and conceals the position. When
CCD materials become ineffective, change or improve them.

Appendix E

Standard Camouflage Materials
Table E-1 lists standard camouflage items available to the soldier. Items on this list areordered through normal unit-procurement channels:•

A complete list of Department of Defense (DOD) stock materials is available from the
Defense Logistics Service Center (DLSC), Battle Creek, Michigan, Defense Switched
Network (DSN) 932-4725 or commercial (616) 961-4725.

•

A complete list of Army materials is available from the Army Materiel Command(AMC), Logistics Support Activity, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, DSN 645-0782 orcommercial (205) 955-0782.

Table E-1. Camouflage items
Item

NSN

Mil No.

Remarks

Camo enamel, black

8010-00-111-8356

NA

5 gal

Camo enamel, black

8010-00-111-8005

NA

1 gal

Camo enamel, sand8010-00-111-8336

NA

5 gal

Camo enamel, sand8010-00-111-7988

NA

1 gal

Camo screen, ultralite,
asphalt/concrete1080-01-338-4468

PN8811616
CVU-165/G
9

Camo screen, ultralite, green/tan 1080-01-338-4471

PN8811600
CVU-166/G
3

Camo screen, ultralite,
snow/partial snow

1080-01-338-4469

PN8811617
CVU-164/G
0Camo support set, ultralite (Aframe)1080-01-338-4472

PN8811615
MTU-96/G
4

Connector plug, w/o gen-test

5935-01-050-6586

MS3456W1
Use 5935-00-431-4935
6S-1P

Connector, receptacle, electrical
1370-01-171-1336
CCK-77/E

293E663P4
1.4G class/div, 49 ea
04

Control, remote smoke gen,
MXK-856/E32

1080-01-338-7051

PN8811551
For SG-18-02
0

Decoy target, bailey bridge

1080-00-650-1098

MIL-D52165

None

Decoy target, how, 105-mm

1080-00-570-6519

MIL-D52165B

PN EB 306D4904-IT08

Decoy units, inflating, radar,
AN/SLQ-49

5865-01-266-3840

MRIIRVIN Passive radar freq
820/821
respondent

Decoy, aircraft, ground (F-16)

1080-01-301-8273

PN160002 Only 25 produced

Decoy, close combat, M1A1
tank

1080-01-242-7251

PN13277E9
None
830

Decoy, close combat, M60A3
tank

1080-01-242-7250

PN3228E19
None79

Decoy, runway (FOS)

1080-01-338-5201

PN8811610
50 x 1,000 ft
0Diesel fuel, DF-1

9140-00-286-5288

VV-F-800D Smoke/obsc-alt

Diesel fuel, DF-2

9140-00-286-5296

VV-F-800D Smoke/obsc-alt

Diesel fuel, DF-2

9140-00-286-5297

VV-F-800D Smoke/obsc-alt

Drum, S&S, 55-gal

8110-00-292-9783

NA18-gauge steel, painted

Drum, S&S, 55-gal

8110-00-597-2353

NA

16-gauge steel, painted

Explosive, airburst projectile
launch atk

1055-01-175-4002

PN102575 Smoky flak, LMK-25

Federal standard colors 595-B

7690-01-162-2210

NA

2-ft x 10-in fan deck ofcolor

Gen set, smoke, mech, M157

1040-01-206-0147

PN31-15255

None

Gen, signal radio freq

6625-00-937-4029

NA

SM-422/GRC

Gen, smoke, mech, A/E32U-13

1040-01-338-8839

PN8811546
SG-18-020Gen, smoke, mech, M3A

1040-00-587-3618

MILSTD60
None
4Gen, smoke, mech, M3A4

1040-01-143-9506

MILSTD60
PN E31-15-2000
4

Indiv camo cover, 3-color
woodland8415-01-280-3098

MIL-C44358

8 oz, 5- x 8-ft coverage

Indiv camo cover, 6-color desert 8415-01-280-5234

MIL-C44358

8 oz, 5- x 8-ft coverage

Indiv camo cover, snow

8415-01-282-3160

MIL-C44358

8 oz, 5- x 8-ft coverage

Launcher rckt, 1-bay launcher,
LMU-23E

1055-01-131-7857

PN1335AS
Smoky SAM
380

Launcher rckt, 4-bay launcher,
OMU-24E

1055-01-144-0864

PN1335AS
Smoky SAM700LCSS support set, desert

1080-00-623-7295

MIL-C52765

Can use 1080-01-2530522

LCSS support set, snow

1080-00-556-4954

MIL-C52765

Same as 1080-01-1796024

LCSS support set, woodland

1080-00-108-1173

MIL-C52765

Same as 1080-01-1796025

LCSS support set, woodland

1080-00-108-1173

MIL-C52765

Plastic poles

LCSS, desert, radar-scattering

1080-00-103-1211

MIL-C52771

Can use 1080-01-2661828

LCSS, desert, radar-scattering

1080-01-266-1825

PN13228E5 Can use 1080-01-266930
1828

LCSS, desert, radar-scattering

1080-01-266-1828

PN13228E5 Use 1080-01-266-1825
933
first

LCSS, desert, radar-transparent

1080-00-103-1217

MILC52765

PN13226E1357

LCSS, snow, radar-scattering

1080-00-103-1233

MIL-C52765

Can use 1080-01-2661826

LCSS, snow, radar-scattering

1080-00-103-1234

MIL-C52765

LCSS, snow, radar-scattering

1080-01-266-1823

PN13228E5 Can use 1080-01-266928
1826

LCSS, snow, radar-scattering

1080-01-266-1826

PN13228E5 Can use 1080-00-103931
1233

LCSS, woodland, radarscattering

1080-00-103-1246

MIL-C53004

Can use 1080-01-2661827

LCSS, woodland, radarscattering

1080-00-103-1322

MIL-C53004

PN13226E1356

LCSS, woodland, radarscattering

1080-01-266-1824

PN13228E5 Can use 1080-01-266929
1827

LCSS, woodland, radarscattering

1080-01-266-1827

PN13228E5 Use 1080-01-266-1824
932
first

Lead acid btry, 24V, BB-297U

6140-00-059-3528

MS75047-1 For SG 18-02 w/o gen

PN13226E1355

Mounting kit, smoke gen, M284 1040-01-249-0272

PN31-142680

For M157 gen

Net, multipurpose, olive-green
mesh8465-00-889-3771

MIL-N43181

108- x 60-in coverage

Paint, temp, tan

8010-01-326-8078

MIL-P52905

Fed-std-595B 33446

Paint, temp, tan

8010-01-326-8079

MIL-P52905

Fed-std-595B 33446

Paint, temp, white8010-01-129-5444

MIL-P52905

None

Pump inflating, manual, smoky
flak

4320-00-822-9036

XX-P-746

Need 1 ea TO 11A-146

Reflector, radar, Coast Guard
buoy marker

2050-01-225-2779

120768

1 cu ft, 10-lb,
aluminum

Simulator, atomic explosion,
M142

1370-00-474-0270

MIL-S46528(1)PM8864243

Simulator, projectile airburst,
PJU-7/E

1370-01-180-5856

PN102549 1.1G class/div, 48 ea

Simulator, projectile airburst,
PJU-7A/E

1370-01-279-9505

PN8387310 1.3G class/div, 48 ea

Smoke pot, 30-lb, HC, M5

1365-00-598-5207

MIL-S13183

PH E36-1-18, 17 min

Smoke pot, floating, HC

1365-00-939-6599

MIL-S51235

w/M208/M209 fuse

Smoke pot, floating, HC, M4A2 1365-00-598-5220

MIL-S51235B

w/M207a fuse, 12 min

Smokey SAM rocket, GTR-18A 1340-01-130-6282

DL1335AS Firing cartridge and100rocketSupport poles, camo net, ultralite 1080-01-338-4470

PN8811615 MTU-99/G, 23poles/battens

Tool, special purpose, smoky
flak

PN103320 Need 1 ea

5120-01-176-2188

Trailer, ground-handling, MHU1740-01-031-5868
141/M

MIL-BK300

5,500-lb cap, for SG18-02

Valve adapter assy, smoky flak1055-01-216-4803

PN8523971
Need 1 each
-10

Valve, pneumatic tank, smoky
flak

4820-00-427-5047

GV500RK2 Need 1 ea

Wrench, bung

5120-00-045-5055

Cage#072272- x -in plugs

Appendix F

The Geneva Emblem and Camouflage of Medical Facilities
This appendix implements STANAG 2931.
STANAG 2931 covers procedures for using the Geneva emblem and camouflaging
medical facilities. This STANAG requires signatories to display the Geneva emblem (redcross) on medical facilities to help identify and protect the sick and wounded. All
signatories, however, are allowed to display the Geneva emblem according to theirnational regulations and procedures. STANAG 2931 also defines medical facilities as
medical units, medical vehicles, and medical aircraft on the ground. A tacticalcommander may order the camouflage of medical facilities, including the Geneva
emblem, when the failure to do so will endanger or compromise tactical operations. Suchan order is considered temporary and must be rescinded as soon as the tactical situation
permits. The camouflage of large, fixed medical facilities is not envisaged under theguidelines of STANAG 2931.

Glossary
AA assembly area
AAR after-action review
AAS Army aviation site
ACE armored combat earthmover, M9
AFJPAM Air Force joint pamphlet
AFV armored fighting vehicle
alt alternate
AM amplitude modulation
AMA aviation maintenance area
AMC Army Materiel Command
ammo ammunition
AO area of operation
assy assembly
atk attack
ATTN attention
AVLB armored vehicle-launched bridgebackgrou The features in a target area that surround the target.
nd
BDU battle-dress uniform
blending A CCD technique that causes a target to appear as part of the background. Manytarget characteristics must be considered when attempting a blending treatment,
including target size and shape, regular patterns in the target scene, and rough orsmooth target contours.
btry battery
C2 command and control
C2W command and control warfare. The integrated use of PSYOP, military deception,
OPSEC, EW, and physical destruction supported by intelligence to deny

information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary C2capabilities while
protecting friendly C2capabilities against such actions.
C3 command, control, and communications
C3CM command, control, and communications countermeasure. The integrated use of
OPSEC, military deception, jamming, and physical destruction supported byintelligence to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary
C3capabilities while protecting friendly C3capabilities against such actions.
camo camouflage. The use of natural or artificial materials on personnel, objects, andtactical positions to confuse, mislead, or evade the enemy.
camoufla Part of a system designed to blend a target with its surroundings and conceal thege net identity of critical assets (aircraft, fixed targets, vehicles, personnel) where natural
cover and/or concealment might be absent or inadequate.
camoufla Standard DOD set consisting of a hexagon-shaped net (673.6 sq ft), a diamondge net set shaped net (224.5 sq ft), and a net repair kit.
camoufla A plastic or aluminum disc or paddle that is supported by a lightweight pole andge net used to support camouflage nets above the ground, buildings, or vehicles.
spreadercap capacity
CB counterbattery
CCD camouflage, concealment, and decoys. Methods and resources to prevent
adversary observation or surveillance; confuse, mislead, or evade the adversary;or induce the adversary to act in a manner prejudicial to his interests.
CCD A combination of CCD equipment and techniques applied to a selected target
treatmen and/or its background to reduce or delay target acquisition.
tchaff Material consisting of thin, narrow, metallic strips of various lengths andfrequency responses used as artificial clouds to scatter radar signals.
clutter EM radiation from sources around the target that tend to hinder target detection.
CM countermortar
counterm Any technique intended to confuse or mislead hostile sensors.
easureCOMSE communications security
Cconcealm The protection from observation or surveillance.
entconspicui A term peculiar to the CCD community that denotes the perceived difference ofty one feature in a scene as compared to other features in the scene.
corner An object that reflects multiple signals from smooth surfaces mounted mutuallyreflector perpendicular and produces a radar return of greater magnitude than expectedfrom the size of the object the reflector conceals.
counterre All measures taken to prevent hostile observation of a force, an area, or a place.
connaissa
ncecounters All measures, active or passive, taken to counteract hostile surveillance.
urveillancecover Any natural or artificial protection from enemy observation and fire.
covered Any route that offers protection against enemy observation or fire.
approach
CP command post
CSS combat service support
cu cubic
DA Department of the Army
DC District of Columbia
deceive Any action that causes the enemy to believe the false or purposely causes theenemy to make incorrect conclusions based on false evidence.
deception Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or
falsification of evidence, inducing him to react in a manner prejudicial to hisinterests.
decoy An imitation in any sense of a person, an object, or a phenomenon that is intended
to deceive enemy surveillance devices or mislead enemy evaluation.
detection The discovery of an existence or presence.
disguise Any alteration of identity cues for items, signals, or systems sufficient to cause
misidentification by the enemy.
dispersal Relocation of forces for the purpose of increasing survivability.
disrupt Any action intended to interrupt the shape or outline of an object or an individual,
making it less recognizable.
div divisionDLSC Defense Logistics Service Center
DOD Department of Defense
DSN Defense Switched Networkea each
ECCM electronic counter-countermeasure. Any action involving effective use of the EM
spectrum by friendly forces, despite the enemy's use of EW.
ECM electronic countermeasure. Any action involving prevention or reduction of an
enemy's effective use of the EM spectrum. ECMs include electronic jamming andelectronic deception.
electronic The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized personss security information of value that, when analyzed, might alert the enemy to the intentionsof friendly forces (for example, a signal security provided by encryption
equipment).
EM electromagnetic
EM electromagnetic spectrum. The range of frequencies from zero to infinity where
spectrum energy is transferred by electric and magnetic waves. EM waves at the lower endof this spectrum (low-frequency navigation aids and AM and shortwave radio
services) are refracted back to earth by the ionosphere to frequencies as high as 50
MHz. At frequencies above 50 MHz, propagation is generally limited to LOS.
These frequencies are used by TV, FM radio, and land-mobile and point-to-point
communication services. They extend on to parts of the EM spectrum generally
termed as radar, IR, visible light, UV light, and cosmic rays.
EW electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of EM energy todetermine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the EM spectrum; action
which retains friendly use of the EM spectrum.
FAAS-V field artillery ammunition support vehicle
FARP forward arming and refueling point
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
fed federal
FLIRS Forward-Looking Infrared System. An imaging IR sensor used to acquire atarget's heat signature.
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manualFM frequency modulation
FOB forward operating base
FOD foreign object damage
fog oil Petroleum compounds of selected molecular weight and composition to facilitate
the formation of smoke by atomization, vaporization, and subsequent
recondensation.
FOS false operating surface. A simulated horizontal construction placed to represent
operating surfaces such as runways, taxiways, parking pads, and access roads.
freq frequency
ft foot, feetgal gallon(s)gen generator
GHz gigahertz
GI government issue
GSR ground-surveillance radar
hardenin The construction of a facility to provide protection against the effects ofg conventional or nuclear explosions. The facility may also be equipped to provide
protection against chemical or biological attacks. Construction usually involves
reinforced concrete placement and/or burying the structure.
HC hydrogen chloride
HEMTT heavy expanded mobility tactical truck
hiding The choice of a position or materials to obstruct direct observation.
HMMW high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicleV
how howitzer
HQ headquarters
HTF how to fight
HUD heads-up display
HVT high-value target
hyperspe

Refers to a sensor or data with many bands extending over a range of the EMctral spectrum.
imaging An electronic or optical process for recording or displaying a scene generated by aradar radar sensor.
in inch(es)indiv individualintervisib The condition of the atmosphere that allows soldiers the ability to see from one
ility point to another. This condition may be altered or interrupted by weather, smoke,
dust, or debris.
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield. A systematic approach to analyzing theenemy, weather, and terrain in a specific geographic area. It integrates enemy
doctrine with the weather and terrain conditions as they relate to the mission andthe specific battlefield environment. IPB provides the framework for determining
and evaluating enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.
IR infrared
IR smoke It produces obscuration in one or more of the transparent IR spectral bands
screen between 0.7 and 14 microns. In most cases, an effective IR smoke screen is also
an effective visual smoke screen. However, effective visual smoke screens are notnecessarily effective IR smoke screens.
JCCD Joint Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
JT&E Joint Test and Evaluation
lb pound(s)LCSS Lightweight Camouflage Screen System
LLTV low-light television
LOC lines of communication
LOS line of sightlow Paint used to lower the apparent temperature of a target (or nearby scene features),emissivit thus making the hot target less conspicuous to a thermal target-acquisition sensor.
y paint Using a paint that has too low an emissivity (less than 0.6) causes the target tobecome more visually conspicuous (or shiny).
maskirov The battlefield doctrine of the former Soviet Union.
ka
MCRP Marine Corps reference publication

MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publicationmech mechanized
METT- mission, enemy, terrain, weather, troops, time available, and civilian
TC considerations
MHz megahertz
mil military
min minute(s)MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
mm millimeter(s)MOUT military operations on urbanized terrain
movemen The methods used by a unit to travel from one point to another (traveling,t traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch) are considered movement
technique techniques. The likelihood of enemy contact determines which technique is used.
s
MTI moving-target indicator
multispec Refers to a sensor or data in two or more regions of the EM spectrum.
tral
NA not applicable
NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
NCO noncommissioned officer
NIR near infrared
No. number
NSN national stock number. A 13-digit number assigned to each item of supply
purchased, stocked, or distributed within the federal government.
NVD night-vision device
NWP Navy warfighting publication
obsc obscurant. Suspended particulates or entrained liquid droplets that can absorb
and/or scatter EM radiation in various parts of the EM spectrum (visual, IR,radar).
obscurati The effects of weather, battlefield dust, and debris; the use of smoke munitions toon hamper observation and target acquisition; and the concealment of activities ormovement.
OPFOR opposing forces
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security. The process of denying adversaries information about friendly
capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting signaturesassociated with planning for and conducting military operations and otheractivities. It includes countersurveillance and physical, signal, and information
security.
oz ounce(s)POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PSYOP psychological operations
pub publication
radar A device that uses EM waves to provide information on the range, the azimuth, orthe elevation of objects.
radar Any radar-absorbing or -reflecting material that changes the radar-echoing
camoufla properties of an object's surface.
geradar Unwanted signals, echoes, or images displayed by a radar unit that interfere withclutter the observation of desired signals.
radar The picture produced on a radar screen by recording the EM waves reflected fromimagery a given target surface.
radio The detection of a radio's presence by intercepting its signals without precise
detection determination of its position.
radio The act of determining the azimuth to a radio transmitter, from a specific location,
direction- using signal-detecting equipment.
finding
radio fix The location of a radio transmitter determined by simultaneously using two
direction-finding devices stationed at different locations and plotting the results on
a map. The intersection of the two azimuths indicates the transmitter's location.
radio The act of determining the distance to a radio transmitter. This technique involves
range- using electronic equipment to intercept and measure a transmitter's emissions andfinding then translating this information into a distance.
RAM radar-absorbing material. Material that absorbs and dissipates incident radarenergy as contrasted to radar-scattering material, which reflects the incident
energy in a different direction.

RAP radar-absorbing paint. A coating that can absorb incident radar energy.
radiotelephone operator
RATEL
O
rckt rocket
RCS radar cross section. The size of a conducting square, metal plate that would returnthe same signal to a radar sensor as a target, provided that the radar energy
received at the target is reradiated equally in all directions.
recon reconnaissance. An exploratory survey of a particular area or airspace by visual,aural, electronic, photographic, IR, or other means. It may imply a physical visit
to the area.
redundan The use of multiple systems with similar perceived functional capabilities tocy provide higher system survivability.
relocatab A military asset that normally stays in place for a short period of time relative to ale asset fixed asset.
reverse- A position on the ground that is not exposed to direct fire or observation; forslope example, a slope that descends away from the enemy.
position
revetmen A barrier used to protect assets against attack.
t
ROM refuel on the move
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
RT rough terrain
S&S supply and service
SAM surface-to-air missile
SCSPP standard camouflage screening paint pattern
Scud A surface-to-surface missile.
signature Detectable indications that forces are occupying or operating in an area.
Signatures can be EM (visible, IR, NIR, radar) or mechanical (acoustic, seismic).
Common detectable EM signatures include visible vehicle tracks, thermal flames,
and radar signal returns. Common mechanical signatures include radio noise,humans conversing, and seismic ground waves produced by tanks and heavy
vehicles.
SLAR side-looking airborne radarsmk smoke. An artificially produced aerosol of solid, liquid, or vapor deposited in theatmosphere that inhibits the passage of visible light or other forms of EM
radiation.
smky smoky
smoke A machine that produces large volumes of smoke to support hasty or deliberate
generator operations for screening, protecting, and/or sustaining airfields, ports, staging
areas, and bridge crossings. Present smoke generators vaporize liquid aerosol
materials such as fog oil, diesel fuel, and polyethylene glycol. These generators
consist of a heat source to vaporize the liquid aerosol material and an apparatus
for the production of airflow to efficiently disseminate the smoke vapor into theatmosphere where it disperses and condenses.
smoke An expendable bucket- or pot-like munition that produces dense smoke by
pot burning combustible material.
smoke Smoke generated to deceive or confuse an enemy as to the activities of tacticalscreen elements.
SOP standing operating procedure
SP self-propelledsq square
STANAG standardization agreement
std standard
surveilla A systematic observation of airspace or surface areas by visual, aural, electronic,
nce photographic, IR, or other means.
survivabi Activities involving the development and construction of fighting and protective
lity positions (earth berms, defilade positions, overhead protection, camouflage) that
operation reduce the effectiveness of enemy detection systems.
s
TAA tactical assembly area
TACSOP tactical standing operating proceduretarget The process involving the detection and identification of hostile operations andacquisitio equipment for subsequent engagement.
ntarget The view of a target area that includes both the target and its surroundings.
scene
temp temporaryterrain The process of examining a geographic area to determine what effects its natural
analysis and man-made features may have on military operations.
terrain A camouflage technique normally used in desert terrain. It involves scarring themottling earth with heavy equipment to expose patches of bare ground. Equipment andsupplies are placed on the bare patches to avoid detection by aerial
reconnaissance.
thermal The difference in radiance (as usually measured in the 8-to-14 micron band)
contrast between two features of a scene; for example, a target and its background.
thermal A temporary situation, in the morning or evening, when the target and backgroundcrossover temperatures become equal.
thermal The ratio of the emissive power of a surface to that of a black body. The
emissivit emissivity is 1 for a black body and 0.9 for most natural and man-made materials.
y The apparent temperature of a target can be reduced by reducing its realtemperature and/or lowering its emissivity. Unfortunately, as the thermal
emissivity is lowered, its reflectivity in the visual portion of the spectrum
increases, thus making the target more conspicuous to a visual sensor. A typicalcompromise is 0.7, which lowers the apparent target temperature but does notmake it too shiny in the visible spectrum.
TM technical manual
TMD tactical missile defense
tone The process of blending a target or other high-value asset with the background by
down reducing its brightness characteristics using nets or coatings. The recommended
reflectance of a target as compared with the surrounding scene is 10 percent orless.
TOW tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided
TRADO United States Army Training and Doctrine CommandC
TV television
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
US United States
USAES United States Army Engineer School
UV ultraviolet
V voltVHF very high frequency

w/ withw/o without
WSA weapons storage area
µ micron(s)Bibliography
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms. 1 February 1974.
FM 3-50. Smoke Operations. 4 December 1990.
FM 3-100. Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals {MCWP 3-3.7.1}. 8 May 1996.
FM 5-34. Engineer Field Data. To be published within 6 months.
FM 5-103. Survivability. 10 June 1985.
FM 21-10. Field Hygiene and Sanitation. 22 November 1988.
FM 21-26. Map Reading and Land Navigation. 7 May 1993.
FM 24-33. Communications Techniques: Electronic Counter-Countermeasures. 17 July 1990.
FM 34-1. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. 27 September 1994.
FM 34-3. Intelligence Analysis. 15 March 1990.
FM 90-10 (HTF). Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) (How to Fight). 15
August 1979.
FM 90-13. River-Crossing Operations {MCWP 3-17.1}. 26 January 1998.
FM 90-19. Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Camouflage, Concealment, andDecoy (CCD) Employment in Command and Control Warfare (C2W) {MCRP 3-36.4A, NWP 358.1.1 TP, AFJPAM 10-223}. 4 April 1997.
Joint Pub 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 23 March
1994.
Joint Pub 3-13.1. Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W). 7 February 1996.
STANAG 2931 (Edition 1). Camouflage of the Red Cross and Red Crescent on Land in Tactical
Operations. 18 October 1984.
TM 5-1080-200-13&P. Operator's, Organizational and Direct Support Maintenance Manual,
Including Repair Parts and Special Tools for Lightweight Camouflage Screen Systems andSupport Systems. 29 January 1987.

PIN: 045158-000