THE NANKING MASSACRE:
Fact Versus Fiction

THE NANKING MASSACRE:
Fact Versus Fiction
A Historian’s Quest for the Truth
By

HIGASHINAKANO Shudo
Professor of Intellectual History
Asia University, Tokyo
Translated by Sekai Shuppan

Sekai Shuppan, Inc., Tokyo

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction
Published by Sekai Shuppan, Inc.
Shin Sakuma Building 3F
2-13-14, Nishi-Shimbashi,
Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0003
Japan
Copyright ©2005 by Higashinakano Shudo
Original Japanese Language edition
Published by Tendensha, Tokyo, Japan 1998.
English edition first published by Sekai Shuppan, Inc.
in soft cover 2005.
Hard cover edition published by Sekai Shuppan, Inc. 2006.
All rights reserved, including the rights ofreproduction in whole or in part in any form.
Designed by Hidaka Miki
First edition
Printed in Japan.
ISBN 4-916079-12-4 (sc.)
ISBN 4-916079-13-2 (hc.)

Translator’s Note
Japanese personal names have been rendered surname first, in
accordance with Japanese custom.
The hanyu pinyin Romanization system has been used to translate
Chinese personal and place names, with the exception of Wade-Giles
translations that are still in common use (e.g., Yangtze River, ChiangKai-shek).

i

PREFACEIn this book we present newly unearthed information pertaining tothe occupation of Nanking by Japanese military forces in 1937. We
also outline the points in dispute, in the hope of inspiring a fair debate
on the subject.
Japanese military personnel have been accused of slaughtering great
numbers of civilians and prisoners of war over a period of several
weeks, beginning with the fall of Nanking on December 13, 1937, inwhat is referred to as the “Nanking Massacre.” The conventional
wisdom concerning this topic is typified by a review of Iris Chang’s
Rape of Nanking that appeared in the Washington Post. In it George Will
wrote, “Japanese soldiers murdered tens of thousands of surrendered
Chinese soldiers, and almost certainly more than 300,000
noncombatants.”1 The western world is beginning to realize that
Chang’s book relies on faked photographs and hugely exaggerated
accounts. However, the myth of a massacre’s having been perpetrated
in Nanking, which has endured for several decades, remains largely
unshattered.
If Japanese scholars had countered the massacre accusations withirrefutable evidence at an early stage, the current situation regarding
this problem might be somewhat different. However, since they
didn’t, the “Nanking Massacre” has been accepted as fact to the pointthat it might as well have been etched in stone. Contemporary
scholars hoping to discover the truth about events that took place ahalf-century ago are faced with tremendous challenge, requiring themto expend a huge amount of time and energy. The intention of thisbook is to establish a framework for the facts relating to situationaland environmental factors prevailing in Nanking at the time ofJapanese occupation. To that end, we have conducted a scrupulous
examination of virtually every historical resource relating to the fall of
Nanking in 1937, and a meticulous investigation of all available
evidence. The results presented herein, substantiated by definitive
historical records, are the fruit of research that consumed 15 years
The 13 fundamental facts laid out below describe the situation in
Nanking when the city was occupied by the Japanese in 1937.

ii

1.

Most of the cities on the Eurasian continent were fortified orwalled, hence the German word Burg, which means “fortified
town.” Until the 20th century, Chinese cities were fortified for
defensive purposes, as were ancient Athens, Rome, Jerusalem,
Baghdad, Constantinople, Moscow, Hamburg and Paris until the
February Revolution. Nanking was surrounded by immense walls.
Once the city was captured, its gates were under tight militarycontrol. The Japanese did not allow ordinary citizens free access to
those gates until two and a half months had elapsed. Nevertheless,20 days before and immediately prior to the fall of Nanking, thecity’s population was 200,000, according to Europeans andAmericans who were there at the time. Eight days after the falland on Christmas Eve, it was still 200,000. No one indicated a vast
decrease in population due to mass slaughter. Confronted by thesefacts, how can anyone claim that 300,000 noncombatants weremurdered in Nanking?

2.

The situation in Nanking in 1937 was similar to that in Iraq in
2004: prior to the capture of the city, Chinese troops stripped off
their uniforms and mingled with the civilian population. By doing
so, they became unlawful combatants not protected by theRegulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Landannexed to the Hague Convention. No Chinese military personnel
inside the city walls surrendered to the Japanese. Accordingly,
during the 11-year period spanning December 13, 1937, the day
Nanking fell, to December 1948, when the Tokyo Trials ended, no
one accused Japanese troops of having killed prisoners of war in
violation of the aforementioned regulations. Confronted withthese facts, how can anyone claim that the Japanese murderedprisoners of war?

3.

The Japanese are accused of having murdered 7,000 persons eachday, i.e., 300,000 persons over a period of six weeks. But according
to “Daily Reports of Serious Injuries to Civilians,” the only killing
witnessed by a European or American in Nanking was one“lawful execution.” The contents of these reports (issued on adaily basis and submitted to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking)are corroborated by data gathered from the testimonies ofEuropean, American and Chinese residents in Nanking, and fromiii

Japanese military records (all of which data has been
computerized and analyzed).2 How do we explain a massacrewith no witnesses?
4.

One of the foundation upon which the massacre myth is based is
What War Means, edited by Harold Timperley. In it, he wrote thatthe “following selection of cases” (from the daily reports ofserious injuries to civilians in Nanking) “completes the story of
the first two months of the Japanese Army’s occupation of
Nanking.”3 The aforementioned reports were appended to thebook, but contained absolutely no eyewitness accounts of
unlawful murders. The book, however, also includes a section(written under an assumed name) that refers to “frequent
murder” attributed to Japanese. How do we explain thisinconsistency.

5.

Rev. Miner Searle Bates and George Fitch submitted material for
What War Means (both used pseudonyms). The ostensible intent of
the book, edited by Timperley, was to impress upon the reader
the horrors of war via accounts written by disinterested parties(European and American residents of Nanking). But Timperley
was, in fact, an advisor to the Nationalist government’s Ministryof Information. Rev. Bates, a famous Christian missionary whotaught at the University of Nanking, was also an advisor to the
Ministry of Information. And Mrs. Fitch was a close friend of
Mme. Chiang Kai-shek.4
It has also become clear that What War Means is a propaganda
book compiled and published by the Counterintelligence Divisionof the Nationalist Ministry of Information’s International
Propaganda Section. Timperley was paid by the Ministry ofInformation for editing the book.5 Thus, What War Means,perceived as proof of the “Nanking Massacre,” was not writtenfrom an impartial standpoint. On the contrary, it can be viewed
only as war propaganda.

6.

Also perceived as proof of the “Nanking Massacre” are articles
carried in the Chicago Daily News and the New York Times. They
refer to reports of “frequent murder”6 committed by the Japanese
during the three days following the fall of Nanking. However, itiv

turns out that that Bates was the source of the reports. Bates’
report describing those three days was used in What War Means(Chapter 1), edited by Timperley. But a look at the daily reportsthat Bates personally delivered to the Japanese Embassy reveals
not one case of witnessed murder. Nevertheless, foreign residentsof Nanking described “frequent murder.” Aren’t Rev. Bates’ report
andAmericannewspaper
articlesinconsistentwithcontemporaneous records?
7.

Although we have leaned that What War Means is a propaganda
book issued by the Nationalist Ministry of Information, we cannot
immediately dismiss its contents. But we must present some
important information that cannot be ignored.
Rev. Bates inserted language to the effect that 12,000 civilians and
30,000 soldiers had been killed in Nanking into Chapter 3 of What
War Means. The Ministry of Information should have beendelighted to disseminate news of a massacre with some 40,000
victims. However, Bates claim was deleted not only from the
Chinese translation of What War Means (publishedsimultaneously with the English-language edition), but also fromfour other books published at about the same time.7 Doesn’t thisdeletion signify the refusal of the Ministry of Information to lend
credence to Bates’ claim that 40,000 Chinese were massacred?

8.

A top-secret document issued by the Ministry of Information in1941 and entitled “Outline of the Operations of the International
Information Department, Ministry of Information” never mentions
a massacre. The document contains a summary of crimes (“rapes,
arsons and lootings, violations of ... basic standards of humandecency”) that are mentioned in the description of Nanking as aliving hell in What War Means, but does not mention a massacre.
Doesn’t this mean that the Ministry of Information had noknowledge of the “Nanking Massacre?”9.

According to the aforementioned top-secret document, theInternational Information Department (a branch of the Ministryof Information established not long before the fall of Nanking)sponsored 300 press conferences for foreign journalists between
December 1, 1937 and October 24, 1938. During that time,v

emergency press conferences were called whenever important
news broke (even in the dead of night, according to reports), andthe news was transmitted all over the world. But no press
conference was ever called to announce a massacre in Nanking.
Why not? Doesn’t this information tell us that the Ministry ofInformation did not believe that there had been a Nanking
Massacre?
10. The July 9, 1938 issue of China Forum, which was published by
the Ministry of Information seven months after the fall of
Nanking, carried a feature entitled “One Year of Sino-Japanese
War: Review Questions for Study Groups.” One of the questions
was “What was the attitude of China after the fall of Nanking?
The answer (intended to serve as a model) was “General ChiangKai-shek said on December 16, 1937: ‘No matter how the present
situation may change, we must not surrender but march
onward.’” The Ministry of Information never alluded to a
“Nanking Massacre” Neither did Mao Zedong, who criticizedJapanese military strategy in one of his famous lectures, statingthat Japanese troops committed a strategical error by notannihilating enemy soldiers in Nanking. Wasn’t Mao, too,
refuting the massacre argument?

11.

As we demonstrated in Nankin jiken “shoko shashin” wo kensho
suru [Analyzing “the Photographic Evidence” of the Nanking
Massacre],8 the photographs circulating the world, allegedly
substantiating the massacre argument are fakes whose origins
can be traced to propaganda books (Japanese Military Atrocities
Witnessed by Foreigners, issued by the Ministry of Information in
July 1938; and Record of Atrocities Committed by the Japanese Enemy,
issued by the National Military Council of the Nationalist
Government, also in July 1938). All the photographs aremontages, staged, or falsely captioned. Not one of them is proofof a massacre in Nanking.

12.

When Hitler rose to power in 1933, many Jews in Germany fled
to other countries. Many nations refused to open their doors to
the Jews, but Maj.-Gen. Higuchi Kiichiro, head of the Harbin
Special Agency, welcomed them. Higuchi lent his support to thevi

first conference of Jewish communities in the Far East, held at
Harbin in December 1937. Three months later, he helped a great
number of Jews who had traveled through Siberia to enter
Manchuria from Otpor, across the Soviet border. His name isinscribed in the Golden Book of the Jewish National Fund in
Israel.9 Note that just a year later in May 1939, 936 Jewish
refugees on board the German luxury liner St. Louis were denied
entry to the United States. Eventually, the passengers reachedGreat Britain, France and the Netherlands, each of which agreed
to accept some of them. The Jews who went to Great Britain
survived, but the others were sent to the gas chambers when theGermans occupied France and the Netherlands.10 How could thesame institution have risked Nazi retaliation by openly allowing
Jews to enter Manchuria, which is not so distant from Nanking,in March 1938 and secretly perpetrated “the forgotten holocaustof World War II” between December 1937 and January 1938?
13.

On January 27 and 28, 45 days after the fall of Nanking, theJapanese military transported approximately 1,000 refugees (from
Shanghai and its environs) who had fled to Nanking and had
expressed the desire to return to Shanghai. They also transported
all displaced Chinese to their homes in the Nanking area,
beginning on January 29.11 The transport was in compliance withorders issued by the Japanese commander in chief, General
Matsui Iwane to that effect (see p. 63). If the same people who
showed such kindness also massacred thousands of Chinese, wewould have to ascribe (incorrectly) a Jekyll-and-Hyde nature to
the Japanese military.

As we stated at the beginning of this Preface, the conventional
wisdom concerning the Japanese occupation of Nanking is that
300,000 persons were massacred in that city. This is a perception thatis seemingly engraved in the annals of history, and thus is difficult todispel. It is our hope that this book will serve to dislodge, howeverslightly, that perception. The Nanking Massacre: Fact Versus Fiction isbased on “Nankin Gyokusatsu” no Tettei Kensho [An exhaustive
examination of the Nanking Massacre] (written seven years ago andexamining the situation in 1937 Nanking from every conceivable
perspective) and two research papers that, combined, are the fruit of
15 years of research on my part. One of the research papers is “Thevii

Nanking Massacre as War Propaganda,” which I read at theInternational Commission of Military History held in Bucharest in
August 2003. It is included in the 29th International Congress of Military
History: War, Military and Media from Gutenberg to Today, issued in
Bucharest by Military Publishing in 2004. The other paper was
serialized in the Sankei Shinbun from January 3-8, 2005 under the title“Shin chikyu Nihon shi: 147 kai-152 kai” [New Japanese history froma global perspective: Nos.147-152]. It was subsequently included in
Shin chikyu Nihon shi 2 [New Japanese history from a global
perspective 2], edited by Nishio Kanji and published by Fusosha in2005. I recommend that readers begin with the final chapter (Chapter
17: New Evidence Leads to the Conclusion that There Was No
Massacre in Nanking ) on p.287.

viii

ix

x

TABLE OF CONTENTSPREFACEi

CHAPTER 1:
THE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

1

CHAPTER 2:
NANKING BEFORE THE FALL

23

CHAPTER 3:
ASSAULT ON THE GATE OF NANKING

43

CHAPTER 4:
THE MEANING OF “DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS”

59

CHAPTER 5:
INTERPRETATION OF POINTS IN DISPUTE (1):“ALL PRISONERS OF WAR ARE TO BE KILLED
IN COMPLIANCE WITH A BRIGADE ORDER”

65

CHAPTER 6:
INTERPRETATION OF POINTS IN DISPUTE (2):
“TAKE NO PRISONERS OF WAR”

77

CHAPTER 7:
INTERPRETATION OF POINTS IN DISPUTE (3)“WE ARE TOLD TO KILL ALL PRISONERS;ALL UNITS DESPERATELY SHORT OF FOOD”

85

CHAPTER 8:
FIERCE BATTLES OUTSIDE THE WALLS OF
NANKING AFTER THE FALL OF THE CITY

101

CHAPTER 9:
THE SWEEP AFTER THE FALL OF NANKING

111

xi

CHAPTER 10:
REQUIREMENTS FOR PRISONERS OF WAR

125

CHAPTER 11:
DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)149

CHAPTER 12:
DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)167

CHAPTER 13:
FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED CORPSES POSE THREATS 185
CHAPTER 14:
FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

211

CHAPTER 15:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

239

CHAPTER 16:
THE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA251

CHAPTER 17:
NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT
THERE WAS NO MASSACRE IN NANKING

287

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER:READING RABE’S DIARY

301

AFTERWORD

315

NOTES

319

BIBLIOGRAPHY

367

INDEX

385

AUTHOR PROFILE

395

HE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

1

CHAPTER 1:

THE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE
OF NANKING
The 1930’s:

A Divided China

In the 1930’s, China was fraught with internecine strife, with the
exception of Manchuria. Consequently, foreign nations with Chineseconcessions stationed troops in North China to protect their citizens.
Chiang Kai-shek controlled less than half the mainland at that time, afact that, apparently, has escaped even some specialists. For instance,
Utsunomiya University Professor Kasahara Tokushi, an East Asian
history scholar, has asserted that Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist
government had unified all of China by 1931.1 Accordingly, we
believe that it would be useful to provide an overview of the politicalsituation in China in the 1930’s.
The Atlas of World History published by Ringensha includes a map
entitled “China Under Nationalist Rule: 1928 - 1937.”2 According tothat map, only four provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangxi)
were controlled by Chiang and his Nationalist Party in 1928. In 1929,
Hubei Province fell into Nationalist hands, followed by Henan in 1930,
and Fujian in 1934. By 1937, the Nationalists also controlled Guizhou
and Guangdong provinces. Between 1935 and 1937, Guangxi and
Sichuan provinces, more than half of Gansu Province, and nearly halfof Shaanxi Province entered the Nationalist sphere. However,
Shandong Province was controlled by Han Fuju until 1938. Shanxi
was ruled by Yan Xishan, Xinjiang by Soviet sympathizer Sheng
Shicai, and Hunan by He Jian. According to Hallett Abend’s Tortured
China,3 Manchuria, the homeland of the Nuzhen (Manchurian) people,
was unaffected by the turmoil that plagued China.
Conversely, Mao Zedong had been defeated by Nationalist forces
and, in October 1936, finally succeeded in establishing a base at
Yan’an, in northern Shaanxi Province. The Communist Party was
unable to regroup until after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. Thus,
China was clearly a divided nation in the mid-1930’s.

2

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident
In 1937, foreign troops from Japan, the United States, Great Britain,
France, and Italy were stationed in North China to protect the citizensof their respective nations. Their authority to be present there wasbased on an agreement concluded between foreign powers and Li
Hongzhang in 1901, subsequent to the Boxer Rebellion (1900). The
agreement, the Final Protocol Relating to the North China Incident,
afforded nations affected by the rebellion the right to station troops at
12 locations between Beijing and Shanhaiguan, a town on the coast of
the Bo Hai.4 Foreign troops were permitted to hold maneuvers,
without reporting where and when they were to be held, as long as
they did not use live ammunition.5
That is how Japanese troops came to be stationed at Marco Polo
(Lugou) Bridge, situated 12 kilometers west of Peiping (Beijing), as
well as in other areas. On July 7, 1937, they were engaging in final
maneuvers on the left bank of the Yongding River, which is spannedby the Marco Polo Bridge, in preparation for a company training
inspection to be held two days later.6 The soldiers were using blanks.
At 10:40 p.m., they were attacked without warning by Chinese troops,
who were using live ammunition.7
It was difficult for the Japanese soldiers to gain access to theirammunition because it was stored, as usual, in heavy cardboard boxes
securely bound with yards of cotton string. To make matters worse,
they were not wearing helmets. Nevertheless, the Chinese continued
to fire on them. The fourth attack occurred on the following day at
5:30 a.m., when the sun had risen and visibility was good. Seven
hours had elapsed since the first shots were fired.
Not until then did the Japanese retaliate by firing against the 29th
Chinese Army. The battle between Japanese and Chinese troops, or
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, took place not on July 7, as has so
often been reported, but on July 8.
Jin Zhenzhong, commander of the garrison guarding the Marco
Polo Bridge, wrote his recollections of the incident in The July 7th
Incident, compiled by the Historical Accounts Committee of the
National Political Consultative Conference, People’s Republic ofChina (1986). Jin claims to have heard the “thundering of tanks” and“loud gunfire” on July 7.8 However, the Japanese artillery unit did
not arrive on the scene until 3:20 a.m. on July 8. Additional
reinforcements, a tank unit, did not appear until about July 10.9

HE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

3

4

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Jin also describes the night of July 7 as rainy and pitch-dark,10 but
the skies were clear that night, according to Japanese military records.
Further substantiation is provided by The Peiping News, a copy ofwhich was located by Nihon University professor Hata Ikuhiko. The
newspaper reports that the weather was clear on the 7th, and cloudy
on the 8th.11
Jin writes that Japanese troops “fabricated a story about a missing
soldier” in order to gain entry into the walled city of Wanping(approximately 1 kilometer due south of the site where final
maneuvers were held). However, the missing soldier, Private 2ndClass Shimura, returned to his unit at about 11:00 p.m. on July 7 (20minutes after the first Chinese attack).
Furthermore, the Japanese apprised Wang Lingzhai, the mayor of
Wanping, of Shimura’s return at 2:00 a.m. on July 8.12
Therefore, Jin Zhenzhong’s allegation that Japanese troops
demanded admittance to the town of Wanping “at about 8:00 a.m. on
July 8” under the pretext that one of their soldiers was missing wasclearly of his own invention, as Professor Hata and Dokkyo
University professor Nakamura Akira have indicated.13 Since it isobvious that Japanese troops were engaging in lawful maneuvers on
July 7, Jin may have been attempting to place the blame for theincident on the Japanese.
The Japanese military had no intention of engaging in hostilities
with Chinese troops. As defense attorney Lazarus indicated in his
opening statement at the Tokyo Trials (International Military Tribunal
for the Far East),14 Lieutenant-General Tashiro, commander-in-chief of
the North China Garrison, was gravely ill at the time. In fact, hedied shortly after the incident occurred, so obviously was in no
position to issue orders from his sickbed.
Then, who fired the first shots at Marco Polo Bridge? Professor
Hata believes that the soldiers of the 29th Chinese Army did, but
accidentally. Professor Nakamura concurs that the 29th Army was
responsible, but concludes that even if the first shots were fired by
accident, the subsequent, intentional escalation was perpetrated bycommunist elements within the 29th Army.15
On two occasions, the Japanese resolved to send out a punitive
expedition, but withdrew the orders both times. The Nationalist
government, however, instigated the Langfang (July 25) andGuanganmen (July 26) incidents, violating the armistice. On July 28,
the Japanese abandoned the non-aggressive stance they had
maintained during the three weeks following the Marco Polo Bridge

HE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

5

Incident, and went to battle. A renewed, massive Japanese offensive
resulted in Chinese troops’ abandoning Beijing and Tianjin andfleeing south. On July 29, the Japanese completed their sweep ofBeijing and Tianjin.
However, reports of the events that had transpired distorted thefacts. The Nationalist-controlled Nanking Broadcasting Company
emitted a spurious bulletin, i.e., that Chiang Kai-shek had routed
Japanese troops at Marco Polo Bridge, and then resolved to overthrow
the autonomous, anti-communist Yidong government headed bypro-Japanese Yin Rugeng of Tongzhou. The soldiers of Tongzhou
believed this fabrication. Then, either because they deemed it
prudent to change sides in the face of a Nationalist attack, or because
they harbored resentment against the Japanese, they brutally
massacred Japanese settlers in that city, located 25 kilometers east of
Beijing.16
The Tongzhou Massacre
According to an official statement, issued on August 2, and an oral
report (presented on August 4 by the director of the Japanese Foreign
Ministry’s Overseas Information Division, and recorded in Volume 3of Defense Exhibits Rejected by the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East), the incident erupted at 4:00 a.m. on July 29, 1937. Some
3,000 soldiers from the Tongzhou Peace Preservation Corps
surrounded the Japanese garrison’s barracks, where approximately
110 soldiers were stationed, and proceeded to raid Japanese shops,
inns, and private homes. Approximately 200 of the 380 Japanese
residents of Tongzhou were slaughtered. The 120 who survived did
so only because they fled to the barracks, seeking refuge, before they
were surrounded.17
The Overseas Information Division director’s oral report follows.
The Chinese had intended to massacre every single Japanese
resident, including women and children. Most of the women
were abducted. After being tortured for 24 hours, they were
dragged through the streets (some by the ropes with which theirhands and feet had been bound, others by wires that had been
forced through their noses or throats), and killed outside the East
Gate. The corpses were dumped into a nearby pond. Some of
the bodies had been coated with a virulent poison, which corroded
the skin on their faces, rendering them unrecognizable.18

6

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

These acts were flagrant violations of international law relating to
the conduct of war (hereafter referred to as “international law”).
Four days after the incident, the aforementioned director officiallycondemned the Chinese troops for the abduction, rape, and slaughterof Japanese citizens. Defense attorneys submitted his statement to
the Tokyo Trials, but it was rejected by William Webb, the presiding
justice, without explanation. The Allies were unwilling to allow any
mention of the Tongzhou Massacre in the courtroom.19
The rejection notwithstanding, on April 25, 1947, 10 years after themassacre, defense attorney Levine called Kayashima Takashi (aformer lieutenant-general in the Japanese Army) to the witness stand.
According to Volume 5 of Reports of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, Kayashima was concurrently commander of
the Tianjin Infantry and the 2nd Infantry Regiment (also stationed in
China). His unit was among those that rushed to Tongzhou to
rescue the Japanese settlers. He arrived on the scene at 4:00 p.m. on
July 30, the day after the massacre.
The scene inside the town was ghastly. Brutally murderedbodies of Japanese settlers were lying everywhere. Most of themhad ropes tied around their necks. I had to force myself to look at
the mutilated corpses of women and innocent children.
I no longer have the report I wrote at the time. I have relied on
my memories for this statement. But I assure you that what I
witnessed was so horrifying that I will never be able to forget it.
I went to a restaurant (I think it was called Asahiken) toinvestigate. There were seven or eight women there, ranging inage from 17 or 18 to 40. They had all been raped, and then shot
to death as they lay naked on the floor. Four or five of them had
been stabbed in the genitals with bayonets. ... The living
quarters had been ransacked, and all the furniture, bedding, andclothing stolen. The situation was virtually the same at thehomes of the other Japanese victims.
The scene at the Kinsuiro Inn was gruesome. Since many of theJapanese had gathered there, sensing danger, there had been masscarnage. ... The owner of Kinsuiro and the maids had been tied
together, raped, and decapitated.20 [Italics supplied.]HE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

7

When Lieutenant-General Kayashima’s testimony had ended,
former Army Major Katsura Shizuo took the witness stand. Katsura
was deputy commander of the 2nd Regiment’s infantry gun
detachment, sent to Tongzhou as reinforcements. His detachment
arrived there at 2:30 a.m. on July 31. His horrific eyewitness accountof the tragedy follows.
When I walked through the gate to the Kinsuiro Inn, I wasshocked at its transformation. It was in ruins. I was nauseatedby the stench of the corpses. ... I went into the combination
service area and office. There I found a man and two womendead, lying on their sides or face down. I don’t know if thewomen had been raped, but it was clear that the victims had tried
to fight off their attackers. The man’s eyes had been gouged out,
and his torso was riddled with bullets.
I went to a cafe that I had visited a year before the tragedy.
When I opened the door, nothing seemed to have been disturbed.
At first I thought that the cafe had been spared, but when I
investigated further, I saw the body of a naked woman in one of
the booths. She had been strangled with a rope. Behind the cafe
was a house where a Japanese family lived. There I saw a motherand child who had been slaughtered. The child’s fingers had been
hacked off.
There was a Japanese-owned store near the South Gate. The
body of a man, probably the owner, who had been dragged
outside and killed, had been dumped on the road. His body had
been cut open, exposing his ribs and his intestines, which had spilled out
onto the ground.21 [Italics supplied.]

The last witness Levine called to the stand was Sakurai Fumio, aformer Army major. The platoon Sakurai headed, attached to the
2nd Regiment, was also part of the reinforcements that entered thetown on July 30. He had ample opportunity to observe thedevastation that had been wrought.
When we passed through the East Gate of the garrison, the firstthing we saw was the mutilated bodies of Japanese settlers of both
sexes, lying on the ground just about every few yards. Every oneof us was overcome with grief and anger. Since we detected no

8

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

signs of the enemy, we concentrated on rescuing the survivors,
until midnight. We went to every home, calling out repeatedly,“Are there any Japanese here?” During the course of ourinspection, the survivors began to crawl out from their hiding
places — from trash and garbage containers, from inside the moat,from behind walls. Among them were children whose noses had beenpierced with wire, just like cattle. There were old women, now
one-armed, the other arm having been chopped off. And there
were pregnant women whose bellies had been stabbed with bayonets.
Inside a restaurant, a whole family had been slaughtered. The
enemy had cut off their arms. Every woman over 14 or 15 had been
raped. It was a pitiful sight.
When I entered another restaurant, Asahiken, I saw the corpses ofseven or eight women lying on the floor, naked. They had been
raped before they were killed. A broom protruded from thegenitals of one of them, where it had been shoved. The mouth ofanother had been stuffed with dirt. The belly of yet another had
been sliced open, vertically. It was truly a dreadful sight.
There was a pond near a Korean-owned shop, at the East Gate.
In it I saw the corpses of a family of six. Their necks and hands
had been bound with rope, and then pierced with No. 8 wire. They
had then been tied together with the same wire, and obviously
dragged for a distance before they died. The water in the pond
was red from all the blood.22 [Italics supplied.]

The Japanese settlers were cruelly and brutally murdered. But
the methods by which they were slaughtered have been used by the
Chinese since ancient times.
Sima Qian (Ssu-ma Ch’ien) (c. 145 BC - c. 86 BC), in Chapter 1 of
the “Book of Customs and Manners” of Shiji (Historical Records),
writes that “Emperor Zhou (the last emperor of the Shang Dynasty)
cut open Bi Gan’s chest. The emperor captured Ji Zi and, creating a
new method of execution, burned him to death. Emperor Zhou also
killed innocent people.”23
Similarly, in Chapter 9 of the “Book of Lu Hou”, he writes that“the Empress Dowager cut off Madame Qi’s arms and legs, put out
her eyes, burned off her ears, forced her to drink a potion that madeher deaf, caged her in a tiny room, and named her the ‘Human Pig.’”24

HE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

9

Apparently Lu Hou had married Emperor Gao Zu, the founder ofthe Han Dynasty (206 B.C. -220 A.D.) when he was still a peasant
known as Liu Bang. She was an extremely strong-willed woman.
After Liu Bang’s death, Lu Hou declared her son Xiao Hui emperor,
and became the empress dowager. When she transformed Madame
Qi, whom the late Emperor had adored, into the “Human Pig,” even
Xiao Hui was astonished, and agonized over her cruelty.
In Chapter 6 of “Book of the First Emperor,” Sima Qian writes that
Emperor Zheng killed disobedient subordinates, and mutilated theircorpses.25
Sima Guang’s Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government, asdistinguished a chronicle as Historical Records, states that in 279, Wu
King Sun Quan stripped the skin from his victims’ faces, and gouged
out their eyes. The corpse of Hou Jing, the mastermind of the HouJing Rebellion, was disinterred and eaten by soldiers and civilians,
who fought over it.26
According to Hallett Abend’s Tortured China, in the 1920’s, theflesh of law-abiding Chinese citizens was pierced with wire, which
was then used to tie them together. Entire families were slaughtered,and the corpses of women whose arms and legs had been chopped off
lay at the roadsides.27
In Journal of a Career Officer, Lieutenant-General Sasaki Toichi
describes a uniquely Chinese means of intimidation, namely, gouging
out the victim’s eyes, which Sasaki had the misfortune to experience
personally.28 Agnes Smedley also mentions an instance in which thatbarbaric act was perpetrated in The Great Road.29 The Journal of
Tanaka Seigen tells the story of Luo Yinong, a member of the Chinese
Communist Party’s Central Committee.
Luo was captured by
Chiang Kai-shek’s soldiers, subjected to torture, during which both
his eyes were gouged out, and later executed.30
Edgar Snow describes, in Red Star Over China, having encountered
the bodies of some men killed by Chinese soldiers: “Their skin had
been stripped from them, their eyes gouged out, and their ears andnoses cut off.”31 Smedley also mentions having seen a victim’s
severed head on display.32
Savage acts of this sort were committed frequently, even during
Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution. In China Wakes, coauthored by
Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn, there is an account of anincident arising from the confiscation of communiqués issued bydissident Zheng Yi. The principals of a number of middle schools,
deemed anti-revolutionary elements, were brutally murdered.

10

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Afterwards, their flesh was fried and eaten. Human bodies werehung on meat hooks in government-operated restaurants.33
During the Tongzhou Massacre, Chinese soldiers pierced thenoses of their enemies with wire, just as one would do to an ox.
They pierced their hands with wire, and tied their bodies together.
They slit their victims’ bellies vertically, exposing their intestines.
They cut out their eyes. One can find accounts of combat techniques
like these in Chinese records, since they have been used throughout
history, from ancient times to the present.
The Tongzhou Massacre on July 29 was followed by a rash ofsimilar incidents in which Japanese soldiers stationed in Tanggu and
Tianjin were ambushed. As defense attorney Lazarus mentioned in
his opening statement at the Tokyo Trials, every action taken by
Japanese military personnel was defensive.34 The Japanese made aconcerted effort to settle these incidents locally. But the Chinesepersisted, and the incidents escalated, from Marco Polo Bridge,
through Tongzhou, to Tianjin.
The Shanghai Incident
A peace conference at which these incidents were to be addressed wasscheduled to be held in Shanghai on August 9. However, on that day,in Shanghai, Navy Sublieutenant Oyama Isao (posthumously
promoted to lieutenant) and 1st Class Seaman Saito Yozo weremurdered by Chinese Peace Preservation Corps soldiers. Needless tosay, the negotiations never took place. In fact, the Chinese may very
well have orchestrated the incident to avoid holding the conference.
For instance, in Travels in China, a translation of which appeared in
the September 1938 issue of China, published by Toa Dobunkai, theauthor, Claude Farrère, writes that Oyama was lured into a cleverly
set trap, and mowed down by Chinese soldiers wielding machineguns.35
The Japanese soldiers maintained a surprising degree of calmness.
They followed the example set by the Roman police force — thebest in the world. Not one of the Japanese laid a hand on either
the automobile or the bodies. They summoned the Chinese
mayor of Shanghai, and the British, French, and American police
authorities, who arrived promptly.
The authorities began their investigation.

A Chinese soldier had

HE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

11

been killed, and his body was lying on the road about 100 paces
away. The unanimous conclusion reached after the on-site
inspection was as follows.
The unfortunate Chinese soldier had been shot in the back with anautomatic pistol by one of his comrades. His body was thendragged to a location where it would create the impression that
there had been a confrontation, setting the stage for theassassination of the Japanese.36

The Chinese soldier was shot not by Sublieutenant Oyama, but byanother Chinese soldier, in the back. Every one of the investigators
arrived at this conclusion — there were no objections. Farrère’s
account is consistent with Japanese records of the incident. The
investigation discredited the Chinese claim that Oyama was shot in
self-defense, after he had shot a Chinese soldier.
The Current Situation in China, published in 1938 by the Toa
Dobunkai, carried a report of the results of an investigation conductedby a Japanese naval landing party. Apparently Oyama sustained
fatal wounds from bullets that entered the back of his head, and diedinstantly. After his death, the Chinese Peace Preservation Corps
inflicted further injuries: “His head was split in two, half of his face
had been obliterated, and his intestines were protruding.37 There
was a hole in his heart the size of a fist.” Oyama had been the victim
of an assassination.
Edouard Helsey, the China correspondent for a Paris newspaper,
wrote an article entitled Witness to The Second Sino-Japanese War, whichappeared in translation in the August 1, 1938 issue of International
News Pamphlet.
An unfortunate incident occurred on August 9, in which aJapanese naval officer was murdered by Chinese sentinels fromthe Rainbow (Hong) Bridge Airfield. Perhaps the Japanese
officer should have been more cautious, but there is no denyingthat this was a Chinese plot. It is clear that the Nanking
government had decided to go to battle in Shanghai at least 15
days prior to this incident.
Their plan was not simply to split the Japanese forces in South
China, but also to entice them into the Neutral Zone, which act
would certainly cause international problems. It was a malicious

12

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

trick, this engineering of incident upon incident, themisinterpretation of which would sway public opinion in the West.
Chiang Kai-shek himself concurred that that was his intention,and he seemed rather pleased with himself. When I met with him
at the end of October (1937) in Nanking, I asked him the following
question.
“That was a clever ploy, since Shanghai is a thorn in Japan’s side.
Until it is extracted, the Japanese will be paralyzed, will they not?”Chiang replied, through an interpreter: “You are right. I believe
it was successful.” At that time, the Japanese government andmilitary authorities were attempting to avoid a war. They viewed
an attack on Shanghai as a real danger.38

One of the aims of the Chinese in perpetrating the Shanghai attack
was, as Helsey indicates, to convince the rest of the world that Japanand China were at war by initiating hostilities in Shanghai.
Shanghai, with the French Settlement and the International
Settlement at its center, was the perfect arena. If war should breakout between China and Japan, the Western world would certainly
hear about it. Residents of the foreign concessions and news
correspondents would be able to view the battle from an ideal
vantage point. That was part of Chiang’s plan.
Chiang’s German Military Advisors
One of the reasons behind Chiang Kai-shek’s decision to launch an
attack in Shanghai lay in improved military preparedness in that city.
Five years earlier, in 1932, Chiang had recruited a 60-member militaryadvisory team headed by General Hans von Seeckt, who had been theguiding force in the remodeling of the German army, to Nanking.
The Germans advised Chiang to construct a network of pillboxes
throughout the unarmed sector of Shanghai. Chiang heeded theiradvice.39
On July 12, Chiang Kai-shek issued extensive mobilization orders.
He ordered his Central Army, consisting of 10 divisions, to Shanghai.
On August 11, approximately 12,000 regulars masquerading as Peace
Preservation Corps personnel were dispatched to what had been
designated as a demilitarized zone in a truce between Japan andHE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

13

China in 1932. Since the truce specified that no armaments would bepermitted in Shanghai, Chiang’s orders constituted a grave violation.
Upon the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War,approximately 22,000 Japanese residing on the upper reaches of the
Yangtze River were evacuated to Shanghai. On August 11, Japan
dispatched a naval landing party of 4,000 to Shanghai, to protect the
lives and property of Japanese citizens. But by then, the Chinese
force, shielded by pillboxes and creeks, had already swelled to150,000. Therefore, the Japanese government decided to send two
more divisions from Japan to Shanghai on August 13.40
On the night of August 14, five days after Sublieutenant Oyama
was assassinated, as hostilities and tension heightened, Chinese Air
Force planes bombed Shanghai.
Several aircraft flew toward
Shanghai at 10:00 a.m., and dropped bombs on the Japanese
Consulate, Naval Landing Force Headquarters, Japanese warships,
and on the streets of Shanghai. At about 4:00 p.m., a dozen aircraft
bombed the moored warship Izumo, the French Settlement, and theInternational Settlement.41
An entry in The China Year Book 1938 reads “Chinese planes drop
bombs in International Settlement.”Those bombs killed 1,741
persons and wounded 1,868. Most of the victims were Chinese.
The Chinese Air Force had intentionally dropped bombs on its own
people, setting a world record, however disgraceful.42
On the night of August 14, Japanese naval aircraft bombed
airfields all over China. On August 15, Chiang Kai-shek established
his GHQ, and issued nationwide mobilization orders. He divided
China into four battle sectors, and installed himself as
commander-in-chief of the Chinese Army, Navy, and Air Force. It
was on that day that full-scale hostilities between Japan and China
commenced.
The following account appears in a middle-school history textbook
published by Kyoiku Shuppan: “Japan was attempting to makeinroads into North China. In July 1937, there was an encounter
between Japanese and Chinese soldiers in the outskirts of Beijing,
initiated by the Japanese. ... The Second Sino-Japanese War had
begun.”43 This account notwithstanding, that encounter was notinitiated by the Japanese, nor did they have any aggressive intentions.
Hallett Abend, who was in Shanghai at the time, dispatched areport to The New York Times, in which he wrote that the Japanese,wishing to avoid at all costs a recurrence of the Shanghai Incident,

14

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

HE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

15

16

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

had been exceedingly forbearing. They had made every effort toprevent the situation from worsening, but were coerced into war by
the Chinese, who were determined to involve the foreign concessionsin China in the turmoil.44
The account in the aforementioned textbook is refuted by Abend’s
statement that Japan was coerced into war in Shanghai by Chinese
who wished to draw foreign interests in China into the conflict.
Abend’s analysis is identical to that of correspondent Helsey. It isvery likely that Chiang Kai-shek intended to convince European andAmerican residents of Shanghai that Japan and China were at war
and, by forcing Japanese troops to enter Shanghai’s neutral zone,
attract international attention and, possibly, intervention.
On August 13, Army General Matsui Iwane was dispatched to
Shanghai as commander-in-chief of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force,to protect Japanese lives and property from the full-scale warfare that
had erupted between China and Japan. The Expeditionary Forcebegan landing — the 3rd Division at Wusong, and the 11th Division
at Chuanshazhen.
Chinese forces, already superior in numbers, were further
augmented. The buildup occurred at a frenzied pace, with at least
one division being added per day. By early September, nearly 40,000
Japanese soldiers had landed, but Chinese troops numbered 190,000
on the front lines alone. The rear echelons had swelled to 270,000
soldiers. By early October, 70,000 Japanese soldiers had landed, butthey now faced Chinese forces 700,000 strong.45
Consequently, the 10th Army, commanded by Army
Lieutenant-General Yanagawa Heisuke, was mobilized on October 12.
It comprised the 18th and 114th divisions from Japan, the 6th Divisionfrom North China, and the Kunisaki Detachment of the 5th Division.
The 10th Army landed in Hangzhou on November 5. Meanwhile, the16th Division from North China (part of the Shanghai Expeditionary
Force), landed at Baimaojiang on the upper reaches of the Yangtze.
Having landed at Hangzhou Bay, the 10th Army attacked Chinese
troops from Shanghai from the rear. The Chinese soldiers
immediately panicked and fled. Shanghai finally fell, seven days
later, on November 12.
It had taken Japanese forces three months to quell the second
Shanghai Incident. According to Volume 1 of Army Operations
During the Second Sino-Japanese War, part of the Military History Series,
approximately 20,000 Japanese soldiers were killed, and 60,000
wounded.

HE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

17

In the first Shanghai Incident (1932), 3,000 lives were lost.
Japanese casualties six years later, in the second incident, were sosevere as to defy comparison. This was a tremendous waste of lives,
the worst for Japanese soldiers since the Russo-Japanese War.46 The
German military advisory staff had advised the Chinese to erect
pillboxes in Shanghai, which were the cause of innumerable Japanesecasualties. As John Rabe wrote in The Good Man of Nanking: The
Diaries of John Rabe, it was the German military advisors who trained
the Chinese soldiers who fought so fiercely in Shanghai. 47
Order To Attack Nanking Issued
The first Japanese troops mobilized to the Shanghai conflict were themembers of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, followed quickly by
the 10th Army. Since a unit that would coordinate the movements ofthese two armies was needed, the CCAA (Central China Area Army)was established to fulfill that role.
General Matsui Iwane,
commander-in-chief of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force, wasappointed commander-in chief of the CCAA.
Meanwhile, Chinese troops that had retreated from Shanghai werefleeing to the capital, Nanking. On November 22, the Central China
Area Army sent a cable to Headquarters of the General Staff in Tokyo,
which read, “Nanking must be attacked.” (A reading of General
Matsui’s diary, War Journal, and Major-General Kawabe Torashiro Recalls
the War with China suggests that some CCAA officers were motivatedby the belief that they could defeat Chiang Kai-shek if they captured
Nanking. They thought that they would have the upper hand if they
acted before the routed Chinese forces had time to regroup.48)
On November 28, six days after the CCAA’s cable was transmitted,
the Headquarters of the General Staff decided to attack Nanking. To
communicate its decision, Tada Hayao, Subchief of the General Staff,
flew to Shanghai from Japan. In War Journal, General Matsui writes,“On December 1, the Subchief of the General Staff arrived, bearing
orders to attack Nanking.”49
Tada conveyed the gist of the order: “The commander-in-chief of
the Central China Area Army shall attack Nanking, the capital of theenemy nation, with the cooperation of the Navy” (Imperial General
Headquarters, Army Section, Operation Order No. 8).50
At 7:00 p.m. on December 1, General Matsui issued an order to the
CCAA (Central China Area Army Operation Order No. 25).51 The

18

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

CCAA was to first seize Nanking, “in cooperation with Central China
Navy warships.”
The main strength of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was next
to “commence operations on or about December 5, attack eastern
Nanking, concentrating its efforts on Danyang and Jurong Road.
Some of its units were instructed to “attack the enemy from the rear,from the left bank of the Yangtze River.”Similarly, the main strength of the 10th Army was to “commence
operations on or about December 3,” advancing to Lishui, south of
Nanking, and scattering any enemy soldiers they encountered. Partof the army was to advance to Nanking from the rear, from Wuhu.
In other words, the two armies had been ordered to make a
two-pronged advance. The Shanghai Expeditionary Force had been
instructed to take the northern route, and the 10th Army, the southernroute.
As soon as the order to attack Nanking was issued, the CCAA’sorder of battle was revised.
Lieutenant-General Prince Asaka
Yasuhiko was appointed commander-in-chief of the Shanghai
Expeditionary Force. General Matsui remained commander-in-chief
of
the
CCAA,
and
Lieutenant-General
Yanagawa,
commander-in-chief of the 10th Army.
The attack launched by the CCAA was sudden and swift. On
December 7, the Army pressed on to an area 20 kilometers away from
Nanking. On that same day, the order of battle for the capture of
Nanking was issued, since the attack was imminent.52
According to that order, enemy troops were expected to react in
one of two ways. If the commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense
Corps or any government officials “remained in Nanking,” theJapanese troops were to “urge them to open the gates and, once that
had been done, to enter the city peacefully.” In that case, only
designated units would enter Nanking and “sweep the city, dividing
it into sectors.”
If the enemy soldiers “should refuse to leave their bases at the citywalls,” Japanese troops were to “fire upon the walls and occupythem” and, subsequently, to “assign one infantry regiment from eachdivision to sweep the city.”
Fields of operations for the two armies were then assigned.
5. Fields of operations for both armies within the city shall be as
follows:

HE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

19

Gonghe Gate (Tongji Gate), Gongyuan Road, Zhongzheng Street,
Zhongzheng Road, Hanzhong Road.
6. Gate assignments:
Expeditionary Force: Zhongshan Gate, Taiping Gate, Heping Gate
10th Army: Gonghe Gate, Zhonghua Gate, Shuixi Gate.

When Japanese troops entered Nanking, regiments were toposition themselves at designated fields of operation, and sweep theenemy forces. With assigned fields of operations, Japanese soldiers
were less likely to fire at each other in error. Furthermore, it would
be easier to pinpoint responsibility for any wanton, unlawful acts,
which were strictly forbidden.
The purpose of the invasion was to take the necessary military
action to capture Nanking, not to engage in the random slaughter of
its residents after the city fell.
What orders were issued to regiments that would not be entering
Nanking? According to an order entitled “Action To Be Taken Upon
Entering Nanking,”53 presumably issued on December 7, the main
force of each division was ordered to “assemble at appropriate
locations outside the city,” and was not to enter Nanking without
permission. Moreover, a joint memorial service was scheduled forthe war dead subsequent to the sweep.
The main purpose of the “Nanking Invasion Outline” was toprevent the commission of unlawful acts, but to further emphasizethat purpose, additional orders entitled “Precautions To Be Taken
When Attacking and Entering Nanking”54 were issued.
1. The entrance of the Imperial Army into the capital of a foreign
nation is an enterprise of great magnitude, one that will go downin history. Since this event is destined to become known to theentire world, all units are instructed to set a standard for the
future by comporting themselves honorably, and by refraining, at
all costs, from looting, fighting among themselves, andcommitting unlawful acts.
...
3. Imperial Army personnel shall consult a map, to be provided
separately, to ensure that they do not approach foreign
concessions or foreign diplomatic missions. They shall also
refrain from entering the zone designated, by diplomatic
agreement, as neutral [the Safety Zone in Nanking], unlessabsolutely necessary. Sentries shall be posted to ensure that these20

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

instructions are carried out.
Furthermore, Imperial Army
personnel are forbidden to enter certain areas outside the citywalls, i.e., Zhongshan Tomb, where the remains of Sun Wen (SunYatsen) are interred, and the Ming Xiao Tomb, where the founderof the Ming Dynasty, Emperor Hong Wu, is buried.
4. Units entering the city shall be selected with the utmost careby the relevant division commanders. Division commanders
shall communicate precautions to be taken, and ensure that they
are understood, taking special care to indicate the locations offoreign concessions within the city, so that absolutely no errors are
made. Sentries shall be posted, if necessary.

Chief of Staff Nakayama Yasuto of the CCAA prepared maps onwhich he marked the locations of foreign concessions in red ink.
However, at some point, some frontline units did in fact enter
Nanking. At the Tokyo Trials, Nakayama testified as follows:
I was told later that they did so in the heat of the moment, in their
excitement at having overcome resistance at the city walls.
Furthermore, barracks or schools outside the city that might haveaccommodated the troops had been destroyed or burned by
Chinese soldiers or civilians, leaving the Japanese soldiers with no
housing. Also, there was a shortage of water outside the city.
What water could be found was not potable.55

Frontline units entered the city spontaneously, propelled by their
exhilaration at having finally breached the city walls. Even if they
had been sent back, there was neither lodging (since all suitablestructures had been burned to the ground by Chinese troops) nor
water outside the city. It was midwinter, and bitter cold. We know
from testimony given by Lieutenant-General Nakazawa Mitsuo, staff
officer of the 16th Division, at the Tokyo Trials that “there were nohouses that Japanese troops could use for shelter. Most of the units
were forced to bivouac.”56
The impulsive entry of frontline soldiers into Nanking suggeststhat there was a marked disparity between conditions hypothesizedwhen orders were drawn up and the events that actually occurred
during the battle.
The penalties for looting or arson were extremely harsh.
Any soldier who engages in looting, or sets a fire, however

HE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING

21

inadvertently, shall be severely punished.

The following order is probably the most pertinent one.
2. Soldiers are expected to adhere strictly to the military
discipline and moral standards of their units and, respecting andrevering the dignity of the Imperial Army, refrain fromcommitting any act against Chinese military personnel or civiliansthat would sully its honor.

It is important to note that all Japanese military personnel wereordered “to adhere strictly to the military discipline and moral
standards of their units” and to refrain from committing any act thatwould sully the honor of the Imperial Army. We can assume thatthe authority for military discipline was international law, a detailed
treatment of which can be found in Chapter 5, “Points in Dispute (1).”

22

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus FictionNANKING BEFORE THE FALL

23

CHAPTER 2:

NANKING BEFORE
THE FALL

Chiang’s Scorched-Earth Strategy
On July 31, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek made public a speech by Wang
Jingwei (originally Wang Zhaoming) entitled “The Final Juncture.”
Chiang’s purpose in doing so was to convince the entire nation thatboth he and Wang were now in total agreement, and working toward
the same goal. The following excerpts from that speech appear in
Shanghai Sojourn by Matsumoto Shigeharu.
We are now approaching the final juncture, and we must makesacrifices, demonstrating firm resolve and courage. ... We, yourleaders, must sacrifice ourselves, as must all our fellow
countrymen. ... We must resolve to reduce every Chinese andevery clod of earth to ashes, rather than render them unto theenemy. ... We must leave nothing — absolutely nothing — forthe enemy to claim.1

In his ardent oration, Wang Jingwei was advocating the exercise of
the scorched-earth strategy. He was urging Chinese troops, when
they retreated from an area, to burn everything in sight, until the
town or city, regardless of its size, had been reduced to ashes. He
was exhorting them to kill even Chinese, their own people, to prevent
their falling into the hands of the Japanese. And this strategy, which
destroyed human lives as well as property, was also embraced by
Chiang Kai-shek.
Though we may, today, react with horror to such a strategy, it had
been used in China for centuries. A description of the scorched-earth
strategy dating back to the Jin Dynasty can be found in Jin Shu(History of the Jin Dynasty). During the Eastern Jin Dynasty (265-317),
it was imperial policy to fortify (build strong walls around cities,
which were vigilantly guarded), and burn (set fire to fields and allow
them to burn until nothing remained).2 Another account, this one
from the chronology in The History of Rebellion in China for 1798 reads:

24

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction“The “fortify-and-burn” strategy begins to debilitate White Lotus
Society troops.”3 (It was used to suppress an uprising of White
Lotus Society soldiers.) There was nothing new about the sanguangor three-all strategy (kill all, plunder all, burn all) promulgated by
Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek.
Nanking:

Defend or Desert?

On November 11, two days after Shanghai fell, Chiang Kai-shek helda conference in Nanking to discuss the city’s defense. In attendanceat this important meeting were Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, He Yingqin,
Xu Yongchang, and Tang Shengzhi.
The opinions expressed by the participants are described in detailin the Memoirs of Li Zongren, commander-in-chief of the 5th War Area,
included in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1.
Apparently, the first person asked to speak was Li himself, whofavored withdrawing from the city.
I am opposed to defending Nanking, for strategic reasons. There isno means of escape from the city. It is possible for the enemy tosurround Nanking from three directions and, in the north, theescape route is blocked by the Yangtze River. We cannot expect
our troops, discouraged by defeat, to protect the city during a longsiege.4
Historically, no fortress has ever withstood an attack. Moreover,recent, bitter defeats have diminished our soldiers’ morale, whilemorale within the enemy ranks has never been higher, since theysense that victory is near. Nanking will surely be conquered.5

Li objected to defending Nanking for two reasons — the city’sgeographical situation, and the low morale of Chinese troops. He
then offered two proposals.
If we declare Nanking an undefended city, the enemy would haveno justification for arson, or for the murder of the city’s
inhabitants. We could arrange a withdrawal of large forces toboth banks of the Yangtze, thus preventing enemy troops fromadvancing either northward or westward. We must ensure that theenemy’s capture of Nanking, should that occur, has no major significancewithin the context of the war.6 [Italics supplied.]NANKING BEFORE THE FALL

25

The first proposal, declaring Nanking an undefended city, was asignificant one. In the language of international law, the terms used
are undefended places and open cities. According to the International
Law Dictionary compiled by the International Law Society of Japan,“areas in which no resistance is made against an attempt to occupy
them, even if a garrison is situated there, are termed ‘undefended
areas.’ In such areas, firing is restricted to military targets.” 7Thus, if Nanking were declared an “open city,” and no attempt
were made to use it as a relay station for military transport, the city
would come under the protection of international law — provided,that is, that Chinese troops in Nanking did not resist the invaders.
The Japanese might have occupied the city without any bloodshed.
But we must also direct our attention to Li’s second proposal:
everything possible should be done so that, in the event Japaneseforces did capture Nanking, their victory would have absolutely no
strategic merit. Li was simply restating Wang Jingwei’s version of thescorched-earth strategy. “We must resolve to reduce every Chineseand every clod of earth to ashes, rather than render them unto theenemy.” Since he submitted both proposals at the same time, Li
Zongren’s intention was to burn Nanking to the ground so that it
could not be used for military purposes, and then declare it an opencity.
The next person consulted was General Bai Chongxi. Like Li
Zongren, Bai replied that he was in favor of abandoning Nanking.
Then Chiang, who had been growing increasingly irritated, spoke out.
Nanking is our capital. The father of our nation [Sun Yatsen] isburied here. We simply cannot retreat from the city without
putting up any resistance. I am personally in favor of defending
Nanking to the death.8

Sun Yatsen had died in Beijing.
His remains had been
temporarily installed at Xishan, on the outskirts of that city. The
opportunistic Chiang had arranged for them to be transferred toZhongshan Mausoleum, on the side of Zijinshan, outside Nanking.
He had wanted to demonstrate to the entire world that he was Sun’s
successor. And now, supposedly because Sun’s mausoleum was in
Nanking, Chiang was determined to defend the city to the last man.
Chiang then questioned He Yingqin and Xu Yongchang. However,once Chiang had said that he would defend Nanking to the death, thetwo men could hardly speak candidly. Both He (Chief of Staff) and26

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Xu (Chief of the Naval General Staff) said that they would act inaccordance with the Chairman’s (Chiang’s) wishes.
Then, Chiang turned to General Alexander von Falkenhausen,
leader of his second team of German military advisors. The firstteam was headed by General von Seekt, the man responsible forrebuilding the German Army, who had arrived in Nanking in 1932.
Von Falkenhausen, who assumed the position of chief advisor in
1934, was promoted to senior advisor to the Nationalist government
the following year. (In 1938, when the entire German team departed,von Falkenhausen left Hankou for Germany. In 1940, he wasappointed military commander of the Netherlands, Belgium, andnorthern France.
When asked, at the conference, by Chiang Kai-shek for his opinion,
von Falkenhausen stated, as one might expect of a military advisor,
that he was in agreement with Li’s proposal to abandon Nanking.
He urged Chiang to avoid needless sacrifices.
Thus far, no one had come out in support of Chiang’s hard-line
stance. Then Chiang questioned Tang Shengzhi. The latter jumped
to his feet, and launched into a tirade.
The enemy is now pressing toward our capital, the site of the tombwhere the father of our nation is laid to rest. To declare that weshall not suffer the loss of one or two generals in Nanking, because
we are threatened by a powerful enemy, is an insult not only tothe departed spirit of our president [Sun Yatsen], but also to oursupreme commander [Chiang Kai-shek]. I propose that we
defend Nanking to the death — that we fight the enemy to thebitter end.9

Chiang was ecstatic. He immediately promised to appoint Tangcommander-in-chief of the Nanking Garrison (Nanking Defense
Corps). Tang responded with a vow: “I shall devote myself, bodyand soul, to the defense of Nanking. 10 The city’s fate shall be my fate.”
This animated, uncompromising outburst eclipsed the other, morerational argument, i.e., abandoning Nanking.
According to the Memoirs of Li Zongren, once installed ascommander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps, Tang Shengzhi
reiterated, this time publicly, his pledge to cast his lot with Nanking.
Upon orders from Chiang Kai-shek, he pressed both soldiers andcivilians into service in his frantic rush to fortify the city. 11

NANKING BEFORE THE FALL

27

Chiang Kai-shek’s “Fortify-and-burn” Strategy
Chiang Kai-shek issued orders to expedite the construction of double(sometimes triple) pillbox emplacements outside the massive walls
surrounding Nanking. This was the “fortification” aspect of his“fortify-and-burn” strategy. The following report from Nanking
appeared in the December 1 issue of The New York Times, under theheadline “Nanking Prepares To Resist Attack.”
Eight of Nanking’s city-wall gates were closed tonight inpreparation for the Japanese attack. Soldiers built sandbag
barricades and barbed-wire entanglements at the other four gates.
A telephone communication system was set up to link defense
positions commanding land and river approaches to the city.
Directed by army officers, a thousand Chinese civilians
reinforced existing gun emplacements, concrete pillboxes anddugouts with a trench network extending thirty miles from thecity in seven semicircular rings ending at the Yangtze River, whichbounds Nanking on two sides.12

Actually, according to Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking,Vol. 3, triple emplacements were constructed, and the semicircularrings of trench networks numbered 27 in total. 13 What is ofparticular interest here is that 1,000 noncombatants were mobilized
for this military operation.
Even boy soldiers were mobilized. They were spotted at an
artillery school in Tangshan, an area famous for its hot springs, 20
kilometers east of Nanking. On December 7, 1937, correspondent
Tillman Durdin sent the following special dispatch to The New YorkTimes.
Between Tangshan and Nanking barricades were ready along the
highway every mile or so, and nearer the capital there raged hugefires set by the Chinese in the course of clearing the countryside ofbuildings that might protect the invaders from gunfire. In one
valley a whole village was ablaze.
...
Boy camp followers were numerous in the Tangshan area. Theselads, 10 to 12 years old, are uniformed regulars serving as
messengers, bearers and cooks, and sometimes in the very front
lines they seem to enjoy the war as a game.14

28

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

The mobilization of boy soldiers does not constitute a violation ofinternational law, as long as they are wearing uniforms. However, if
boy soldiers were mobilized, we can assume that most of the young
men in the city were drafted. Even without Durdin’s account, weknow that Chiang Kai-shek, in his attempts to fortify Nanking, issuedorders to “muster any and every able-bodied citizen.” 15
Then Chiang unleashed his scorched-earth strategy, with a
vengeance. Zhenjiang (located east of Nanking), the former capitalof Jiangsu Province, had a population of 200,000. As the Japaneseapproached, Chinese troops set fire to the city, which was soon
enveloped in flames. The December 12 edition of The New York Times
reported that Zhenjiang had been reduced to ruins. 16 Durdin
described this desperate strategy in action in a special dispatch from
Nanking on December 8.
The burning of obstructions within the defense zone by the
Chinese continued. Palatial homes of Chinese officials in the
Mausoleum Park district were among the places burned lateyesterday.
The city was ringed by a dense pall of smoke, for the Chinese
also continued to burn buildings and obstructions yesterday intowns in a ten-mile radius.
This correspondent, motoring to the front, found the entire
valley outside Chungshan Gate, southeast of Mausoleum Park,ablaze. The village of Hsiaolingwei, along the main highway
bordering the park, was a mass of smoking ruins, and inhabitants
who had not evacuated days before were streaming toward
Nanking carrying their few miserable belongings and occasionallypausing to take last sorrowing looks at their former homes.17

The burning was not restricted to the area to the east of Nanking.
The Yangtze River flows to the west and north of the city. Japanese
troops were advancing along its south bank toward Nanking from
Shanghai. Since the Chinese military believed that hostilities would
break out to the east and south of Nanking, they burned the densely
populated Zhonghua Gate (South Gate) district, after forcibly
evacuating its residents. 18
Xiaguan wharf in northern Nanking was also incinerated. On thenight of December 9, flames rose from the eastern and northern
sections of the city. 19

NANKING BEFORE THE FALL

29

Villages located near principal roads leading to the front line, eastof Nanking, were reduced to smoldering ruins. 20 As Durdin indicatedin his December 9th dispatch from Nanking, this scorched-earth
strategy, this burning of entire cities and towns to the ground, was adefensive tactic used by the Chinese military but, militarily, it wasineffective. 21 The only way in which it hampered Japanese troops wasin forcing them to bivouac since, as the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun(December 10 edition) reported, “not one building remained.”
Nanking’s Residents Flee
After Shanghai fell, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces lost battle after battle.
Consequently, he opted to abandon Nanking and move his capitalelsewhere, despite having declared that he would defend Nanking to
the death.
According to The Current Situation in China (published by Toa
Dobunkai), Chiang announced his decision on November 16, ordering
government ministries and agencies to depart from Nanking within
three days. Nationalist government agencies moved to three different
locations. The five main branches (executive, legislative, control,
judicial, and examination), moved to Chongqing. The Ministry ofForeign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of
Finance relocated to Hankou. The ministries of communications andindustry moved to Changsha. 22
However, the relocation of the Nationalist government was not
publicly announced until noon on November 20. 23 A week later, on
November 27, Commander-in-Chief Tang Shengzhi issued a notice toforeign residents of Nanking, urging them to leave, and warning thathe could not guarantee the safety of anyone in the city, not evenforeigners.
Once they learned that even foreigners were in danger,
middle-class and wealthy Chinese residents began a hasty exodus
from Nanking. They did so not because a Japanese attack on the city
was imminent, but because they knew that Chinese troops would
soon be abandoning Nanking as well. They had not forgotten thewords of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei: “We must resolve to
reduce every Chinese and every clod of earth to ashes, rather thanrender them unto the enemy.”

30

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

A German Woman’s Last Days in Nanking
Lily Abegg was the China correspondent for the German newspaperFrankfurter Zeitung, and one of the many foreign residents who fled
Nanking. She is presumed to have boarded a boat provided by the
British Embassy on November 29, along with British citizens and a
few Germans.
Safe in Hankou and ensconced in the Foreign Ministry, Abegg
wrote an account entitled “Escape from Nanking: Our Last Days in
China’s Capital,” and sent it off to Frankfurt. Her article, excerpts
from which follow, appeared in the December 19 edition of theFrankfurter Zeitung.
The last sights I saw in Nanking were endless lines of evacuees,
boarded-up houses and shops, and troops rushing in to defend thecapital, the air-raid siren wailing all the while. Rickshaws andautomobiles were piled high with packing crates, bundles,
furniture, and humanity. Crowds of departing residents were on
the move at all hours of the day and night. One by one, theshops closed down. Since the electricity in most of the houses
had already been turned off, merchants were selling off theirremaining stock by candlelight. It was impossible to findpacking crates or brown paper anywhere — the shops were allsold out. Last week about 200,000 people left Nanking. One
million souls once inhabited the city, but their numbers had
dwindled to 350,000. Now there are at most 150,000 people
remaining, but the waves of evacuees seem interminable.24

According to Abegg’s estimate, the population of Nanking was “atmost 150,000.” This was, of course, only an estimate. Everyone waspreoccupied with the evacuation, and no one knew the correct figures.
Incidentally, after the 1934 rezoning of every province and city,
Nanking included, in addition to six districts within the city, threerural districts outside its walls: Yanziji to the north, Xiaoling to thesoutheast, and Shangxinhe to the southwest.
Consequently, Nanking’s population swelled to 973,000 (thepopulation of the three districts outside the city was approximately
150,000). These figures are based on a survey taken by the Nanking
city government in June 1936, and appear in Nanking, published by
the Nanking Japanese Chamber of Commerce.25
There are conflicting views about the population figures. In 1936,

NANKING BEFORE THE FALL

31

the same year the Nanking city government survey was conducted,
the Ministry of the Interior issued population statistics that were citedin The China Year Book 1938. The figure for Nanking was 1,019,000. 26
Thus, Chinese censuses and other population surveys tended to beinaccurate, and remain so. According to Ko Bunyu’s The Real China,someone asked Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang, during his visit to Japan
in 1983, what the population of China was. He replied, “Only God
knows.”27 Even today, the People’s Republic of China is not inpossession of accurate population statistics.
Abegg’s account continues:
The past three days have been chaotic ones. People who had
been vacillating suddenly began frenzied preparations forevacuation. We received confirmation that government agencies
had either completed their preparations for departure, or had
already left Nanking, and that Chiang Kai-shek and his GHQ
would be leaving shortly.28

Chiang remained in Nanking until December 7. Everyone knewthat the Chinese forces would be defeated, even if he remained there.
An article in the December 9 edition of the Osaka Asahi Shinbun
reports that many residents of Nanking believed that Chinese troops
would withdraw sooner or later. 29 The rumor spread that the
military was going to set fire to Nanking, though city authorities
denied it vociferously. Despite the denial, still more fearful residents
left Nanking. No form of transportation was to be seen — evenrickshaws had disappeared.
The exodus became a competition. Automobiles were very
difficult to obtain. Government agencies were seizing trucks
from one another. Automobiles were priced at several thousand
dollars. Waves of evacuees thronged the wharf at Xiaguan.
There was no other choice for them but to move forward, up the
Yangtze River. The flood of humanity surging toward Xiaguan,hoping to board a ship, defies description.30

Nanking is situated on the south bank of the Yangtze River. Ifthey were to avoid Japanese troops advancing from Shanghai, theevacuees had no choice but to proceed to the north bank. Therefore,
they thronged to Xiaguan, on the banks of the Yangtze. From about

32

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

November 20 to the beginning of December, there was an endlessstream of evacuees extending from the center of Nanking, for three
miles, to the Yangtze.
Eventually, preoccupation with the evacuation, which had
eclipsed everything else, gave way, to some extent, to preparation
for war. As civilians left Nanking, soldiers poured in. These
were soldiers from other regions, and a varied and sundry lot they
were. Soldiers from Guangxi in the south wore cotton uniforms
and straw hats — some of them painted in the green-and-yellow
camouflage pattern — just like automobiles — but they seemedwell-disciplined. All of them carried rifles over their shoulders,
not a common sight where local armies are concerned. Comparedwith the Guangxi soldiers, the Sichuan troops were a sorry sight.
Their legs and feet were bare. Their uniforms were of poor
quality, and in tatters. They looked as ragged as the mostdestitute coolie. A few of the soldiers at the vanguard carried
rifles, but those following them carried only stout sticks and packs.
31[Italics supplied.]According to Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 3, byUnemoto Masami, most of the units defending Nanking were from
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hunan.32
Abegg may have been
misinformed. In any case, her account provides us with a good
picture of the Nanking Defense Corps: a motley, uncontrolledcollection of soldiers, most of them from other regions of China.
Wherever we went, we could see that order was giving way tochaos. A train carrying 2,000 wounded soldiers arrived atNanking Station, but no one paid it any heed. There were no
medical corpsmen with them. The soldiers were ignored for twodays, and finally unloaded along with those who had died in themeantime, and lined up on the station platform. The corpses
emitted a horrible stench, polluting the air. Evacuees fleeing thecity simply stepped over the wounded soldiers, jostling them with
their baggage. Members of the Relief Committee, all foreigners,
asked government agencies to send ambulances. They were told
that, yes, there were a few ambulances, but there was no gasoline,
and no money to buy any. ... The Chinese simply stood about,indifferent.33

NANKING BEFORE THE FALL

33

34

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Lily Abegg must have stopped at Nanking Station, which was
adjacent to the Xiaguan wharf, before boarding her boat. The
situation in Nanking two weeks before its fall was very sad indeed,
the city’s train station filled with dead and wounded soldiers, and its
government offices so preoccupied with relocation preparations thatno money could be found to buy gasoline for ambulances.
The Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone
The inhabitants of Nanking fled the city in droves. Those who
remained there were, as Professor Miner Searle Bates observed, “thepoorest of the population.”34 Obviously, there was a need for aneutral zone where ordinary citizens could find refuge once war
broke out in the city.
Foreign residents of Nanking proposed the establishment of a
“Nanking Safety Zone.” They were inspired by the Jacquinot Zone,a safety zone established in November 1937 in Nanshi, southern
Shanghai, at the urging of Father Jacquinot, a Jesuit priest. 35
As Archibald Steele wrote in the Chicago Daily News, Americans
were the chief proponents of the Nanking Safety Zone, and were
instrumental in its establishment. Among them, Bates stands out for
his unstinting efforts. He was a professor at the University of
Nanking, and well-known in the city for his missionary activities.
From the time of its establishment, George Fitch, secretary of theInternational Committee of the YMCA, headed the International
Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. Lewis Smythe, also a
professor at the University of Nanking, served as the Committee’s
secretary.
Though the major roles on the Committee were assumed byAmericans, John Rabe, a German businessman, was invited to serveas chairman, in light of the relationship between Japan and Germany.
Other members were Rev. John Magee (chairman of the Nanking
Committee of the International Red Cross), the Rev. W. Plumer Mills,
and Charles Riggs, all Americans; and Eduard Sperling, a German.
(Here, the designation “Rev.” has been applied to both missionaries
and clergymen.)
Most of the 15 members of the International Committee for the
Nanking Safety Zone were missionaries, university professors,
physicians, or businessmen. And most of them were Americans(seven), but the Committee’s membership also included four
Englishmen, three Germans, and a Dane. 36

NANKING BEFORE THE FALL

35

According to Rabe’s diary, the establishment of the International
Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone was formally announced on
November 29, 1937. A headquarters was set up at No. 5 Ninghai
Road. The Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, issued
later, stated that the premises “had been kindly provided by theGerman Embassy.”37
The Nanking Safety Zone
A week earlier, on November 21, the International Committee for the
Nanking Safety Zone issued a declaration describing the location of
the Safety Zone and its boundaries. The eastern border would
extend along Zhongshan North Road from Xinjiekou to the traffic
circle on Shanxi Road. The northern border would extend from thetraffic circle on Shanxi Road due west to Xikang Road (the west sideof the new residential district). The western border would extend
along Xikang Road from the northern border to the Hankou Road
intersection (the southwest side of the new residential district).
From there, the border would run due southeast to the intersection of
Shanghai and Hanzhong roads. The southern border would extend
along Hanzhong Road from the point at which it intersected with
Shanghai Road to Xinjiekou, where the eastern border began. 38
Zhongshan Road, named after Sun Yatsen (sometimes called Sun
Zhongshan), was Nanking’s principal thoroughfare. It was linedwith diplomatic offices — the Japanese and American embassies, andthe British Consulate. Thus, the diamond-shaped sector, measuring
two miles long and one mile wide, was situated roughly in the centerof Nanking. According to The China Year Book 1939, the Safety Zone
occupied approximately 3.86 square kilometers, a relatively small area.
39

White flags imprinted with a red cross surrounded by a circle
were posted at various points along the boundaries of the Safety
Zone.40 Even when the flags were in place, it was not absolutely
clear where the boundaries were. Unlike the Jacquinot Zone insouthern Shanghai, there was no barbed wire around the Nanking
Safety Zone. One could simply walk into it.
The Departure of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Official Evacuation OrderAs Japanese troops drew nearer, Nanking fell into a state of utter
confusion. According to an article in the December 2 evening edition

36

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fictionof the Yomiuri Shinbun, there were daily “traitor hunts.” Individuals
accused of conspiring with the enemy were shot and killed. Soon
severed heads smeared with fresh blood were displayed on telephone
poles and at street corners. Nanking had become “a city of death.” 41
The mayor of Nanking and the minister of health left the city on
December 3. Scores of police officers followed suit, including Wang
Gupan, who had been head of the National Police Agency since 1936.
On December 7, Chiang Kai-shek made his exit from Nanking.
He had ordered “a futile defense of the capital, ” ignoring warnings
from Bai Chongxi, Li Zongren, and his German military advisors.
But now, six days prior to the fall of Nanking, Chiang, too, abandoned
the city, forsaking his subordinates. Durdin castigated Chiang in The
New York Times, stating that he was “responsible to a great degree” forwhat ensued, but that should be obvious to anyone. 42
On December 8, Tang Shengzhi (commander-in-chief of the
Nanking Defense Corps) issued a proclamation. According to
Durdin’s special dispatch, Tang “decreed that all noncombatants
must concentrate in the internationally supervised safety zone.”43
No noncombatants were permitted to venture outside the Safety Zone
without a special permit.
For all intents and purposes, Nanking was under martial law.
The Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun carried a special dispatch, sent from
Shanghai on December 8, describing Tang’s order.
On the morning of December 8, military authorities in Nanking
issued an official evacuation order. Once signs reading “Safety
Zone,” prepared by the International Committee for the Nanking
Safety Zone, had been posted, hordes of anxious evacuees poured
in. ... They numbered approximately 80,000. Thanks to the heroic
efforts of the Committee, buildings, schools, and clubs in the area
have been requisitioned. Administrative regulations have been
established, which give priority to the poorest evacuees. To date,
65,000 persons have been housed. The Red Swastika Society [aBuddhist charitable group] and the Red Cross are making an
herculean effort to distribute food to the evacuees. Since themorning of December 7, Tang Shengzhi, commander-in-chief of
the Nanking Garrison has further bolstered security in the city,
fearing that residents will become violent amid the turmoil.
Anyone who seems the least bit suspicious is gunned down.
Chinese newspapers report that 100 persons have been shot deadso far.44

NANKING BEFORE THE FALL

37

The evacuation order prompted an onrush of penniless souls who
remained in the city, or who had evacuated its outskirts, into the
Safety Zone. Anyone who looted, taking advantage of the upheaval
in the city, was shot to death. The Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun reported
that 100 people had been shot, but that figure may have been
exaggerated.
Overcrowding in the Safety Zone
Nanking had became a city with two faces.
It is described, in What
War Means: Japanese Terror in China (Harold Timperley, ed.), as
having been divided, almost overnight, into a Safety Zone “crowdedwith evacuees”45 and “a de facto no-man’s land,”46 until the end ofJanuary 1938. The December 8 edition of the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun
describes the situation in Nanking as follows.
Several hundred villages outside the walls of Nanking have been
burned to the ground by retreating Chinese troops. Thick cloudsof black smoke obscure the sky. Steady streams of residents havefled to the refugee area inside the city with only the clothing on
their backs. Residents of unprotected areas within the city havealso thronged the refugee area, which is now extremely crowded.
Elsewhere in the city, mobs have already begun looting andvandalizing private homes.
The police are punishing theperpetrators severely, and have already shot six of them to death.
However, the situation has become virtually uncontrollable.47

In China, evacuations had always been accompanied by looting
and vandalism.
An encoded telegram transmitted by George
Atcheson, a secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Nanking, on December 7
corroborates the Japanese newspaper account, reporting that six
soldiers had been executed.48 In an article written for the Chicago
Daily News, December 8 edition, Steele reported that the swift
execution of ringleaders and the exhibition of their corpses
discouraged others from emulating them.49
The Japanese Refuse To Recognize the Safety Zone
Nanking’s residents surged into the Safety Zone. There was nothing
to stop them since, for the most part, the boundaries of the Safety
Zone were public roads. Anyone could enter the Safety Zone simply

38

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

by crossing one of those roads. There was no barbed-wire fence
separating the Safety Zone from the rest of the city. It was just as easy
for Chinese soldiers to infiltrate the Safety Zone, and seek “refuge”
there. If it became a refuge for Chinese troops as well as for civilians,
the Safety Zone’s neutrality would be compromised. Moreover, there
were Chinese military installations inside the Safety Zone.
If the International Committee had been able to keep Chinese
soldiers out of the Safety Zone, the Japanese probably would haverecognized its neutrality. However, that was too much to expect of agroup of private citizens. The Japanese military authorities were
aware of that problem, and that is why they demurred.
The December 6 edition of the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun describes theprevailing attitude toward the Nanking Safety Zone among Japanesemilitary authorities: “We find it difficult to recognize the Nanking
Safety Zone. We are concerned about the Committee’s lack ofauthority.50” Authority was, actually, the decisive difference between
the Safety Zone in Nanking and the Jacquinot Zone in Shanghai.
The Jacquinot Zone was established as a safety zone in November
1937, when hostilities threatened Nanshi, the Chinese sector insouthern Shanghai. Father Robert Jacquinot, a French Catholic priest,
was the major force behind its establishment. Furthermore, theJacquinot Zone was adjacent to the French Settlement, whose
authorities, including French military units, made an effort tocooperate with the Japanese military. The Nanshi International
Committee also accepted the fact that the Japanese military would
have ultimate control over the Jacquinot Zone, and promised not tointerfere.
Consequently, the Japanese were able to justify granting theInternational Committee for the Jacquinot Zone the authority tomaintain neutrality there, should war break out. According to theNovember 16, 1937 edition of the Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun andtestimony
given
by
diplomat
HidakaShinrokuro,Commander-in-Chief Matsui made a contribution of ¥10,000 (theequivalent of $100,000 today) to the Nanshi International Committee.
When hostilities reached Nanshi, Chinese soldiers who sought
refuge in the Safety Zone were disarmed by the International
Committee. Japanese troops never entered the Safety Zone, and thesituation ran its course very peacefully.
This account is based on Hidaka’s testimony at the Tokyo Trials.
A counselor at the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai, Hidaka acted asintermediary between the Japanese military and Father Jacquinot.51

NANKING BEFORE THE FALL

39

The International Committee in Nanking was simply a group of
private citizens, who did not, unfortunately, have the authority toprevent Chinese soldiers from infiltrating the Safety Zone, or todisarm them. Therefore, the Japanese military did no more thanensure that it would “respect” the neutrality of the Safety Zone aslong as it contained no Chinese military installations.52 Even so, theconcerns of the Japanese had not been allayed. On December 8, thedirector-general for press and public information at the Japanese
Embassy in Shanghai issued a declaration stating that Japan would
not recognize the Nanking Safety Zone. The following excerpts fromthat declaration were published in the Foreign Affairs Review, No. 794,
on January 1, 1938.
Recent foreign communications from Nanking have described theactivities of members of the so-called Nanking Safety Zone, andthe influx of evacuees into same. However, in view of potential,
insurmountable difficulties, the Japanese authorities regret thatthey cannot provide any guarantee whatsoever with regard to theestablishment of the so-called safety zone, for obvious reasons. 53“Insurmountable difficulties” referred to the inability of theInternational Committee to prevent Chinese soldiers from infiltrating
the Safety Zone, and the fact that the boundaries of the Safety Zone
were not clearly delineated. For those reasons, Japanese authorities
made it clear that they could not provide any guarantee with respect
to the Safety Zone, even if one were established. They also statedthat they had made an announcement to that effect two days earlier,on December 6.
In view of Nanking’s geography and defenses, the city, in its
entirety, constitutes a huge fortress. The establishment of a
“Safety Zone” in such an area is an irrational concept. However,as we have stated in repeated declarations, the Imperial JapaneseArmy has absolutely no intention of deliberately subjecting the
lives or property of foreign or Chinese citizens to the calamities ofwar.54The city of Nanking was protected by walls, among the world’s
most impenetrable, that formed an immense citadel. The idea of ademilitarized zone within a giant fortress was merely an illusion.
Nevertheless, the Japanese did state that they would not

40

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

intentionally harm foreigners or Chinese civilians in the Safety Zone.
For reasons stated above, we cannot provide any guarantees
whatsoever with respect to the “Safety Zone” in Nanking. All
persons seeking refuge there should be aware that they are indanger. On this occasion, we would like to make it absolutely
clear that we will not be held responsible if the aforementioned
zone should be affected by hostilities.55

Once a fortress is surrounded, escape is virtually impossible. It
was patently obvious that Chinese troops inside Nanking would seek
refuge in the Safety Zone when they retreated. The Safety Zone
would, consequently, not only become a haven for Chinese troops,
but also a battle zone. On December 8, the Japanese foreign ministryasked the Norwegian diplomat who headed an association of
consulate and embassy officials in Shanghai to warn foreign residentsof Nanking to leave the city.56 The warning was communicated to
the American Embassy in Nanking on that same day.
Wounded Soldiers Refused Entry into Nanking
On December 8, all of Nanking’s gates were closed in preparation fora Japanese invasion. Japanese troops were now very close to the citywalls. The December 10 edition of the Tokyo Asahi Shinbun carried
the following report:
For several days, Chinese soldiers wounded at various battlefronts
on the perimeter of Nanking have been pouring into the city.
However, as of December 8, Tang Shengzhi, commander-in-chiefof the Nanking Garrison, realizing that the fall of Nanking isimminent, has ignored their pleas even though they stand outside
every one of the city’s gates, begging to be allowed entry.57

Unable to enter Nanking, survivors of previous battles, wounded
and otherwise, wandered pathetically about the gates, and eventuallydisappeared. As Durdin reported, strict orders had been issued
prohibiting them from entering the city. 58
As they headed away from Nanking, Chinese soldiers sometimes
encountered Japanese troops advancing toward Nanking, andhostilities were exchanged. According to Eyewitness Accounts of theBattle of Nanking, Vol. 4, the 36th Infantry Regiment was advancing

NANKING BEFORE THE FALL

41

silently toward a now closed Nanking in the middle of the night on
December 8. The soldiers were marching on the road that leads from
Shangfangzhen to Guanghua Gate, on a moonless night. But thearea around Nanking was illuminated by the scarlet flames of fires set
by Chinese troops.
Japanese troops headed directly for Nanking. Some enemy
soldiers fell in with them, mistakenly believing the soldiers of the 36th
Regiment to be their allies. The 36th Regiment ended up “engaging
in a chaotic, parallel pursuit,59” fighting hand-to-hand with the enemy
all the while. It was past 5:00 a.m. on December 9 when Japanese
troops finally reached Guanghua Gate, Nanking’s main gate.

42

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus FictionASSAULT OF THE GATES OF NANKING

43

CHAPTER 3:

ASSAULT ON THE GATESOF NANKING

The Japanese Issue a Warning
At noon on December 9, Japanese aircraft dropped leaflets onto
Nanking under orders from Commander-in-chief Matsui. They wereaddressed to Tang Shengzhi, commander-in-chief of the Nanking
Defense Corps, who had, on the previous day, ordered residents ofthe city to vacate their homes and proceed to the Safety Zone. He
had also issued announcements to the effect that no one would bepermitted to leave Nanking and that the city’s gates would be closed.
The leaflets, an excerpt from which follows, counseled Tang tosurrender.
The Japanese Army, one million strong, has already conquered
Jiangnan. We have surrounded the city of Nanking ... The
Japanese Army shall show no mercy toward those who offer
resistance, treating them with extreme severity, but shall harmneither innocent civilians nor Chinese military personnel who
manifest no hostility. It is our earnest desire to preserve the East
Asian culture. If your troops continue to fight, war in Nanking isinevitable. A culture that has endured for a millennium will be
reduced to ashes, and a government that has lasted for a decade
will vanish into thin air. This commander-in-chief issues awarning to your troops on behalf of the Japanese Army. Openthe gates to Nanking in a peaceful manner, and take theaforementioned action.1

The “aforementioned action,” described elsewhere in the leaflet,
involved delivering the response to the warning, by 12:00 noon on
December 10, to the sentry line on Zhongshan Road or Jurong Road.
Commander-in-chief Matsui added that if no response wasforthcoming, the Japanese would have no choice but to attack
Nanking.

44

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

An organization chart and a staff list 2 are appended to Source
Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1. On the CCAA
Headquarters staff list is a name that one normally would not expect
to find there. The listing reads: “Saito Yoshie, Doctor of Law,advisor on international law.” Matsui must have consulted with Dr.
Saito whenever the need arose. By having the leaflets dropped on
Nanking, the commander-in-chief was acting in full accordance withinternational law.
The Hague Convention of 1907 Concerning the Laws and Customsof War on Land 3 was signed at The Hague, Netherlands in October
1907. Article 26 of Regulations Annexed to the Convention (effectivein Japan as of 1912) dictates the issuance of a warning before initiating
hostilities.
The officer in command of an attacking force must, before
commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault, do all in
his power to warn the authorities.

Commander-in-chief Matsui was in complete compliance with
Article 26 and with the “Nanking Invasion Outline” issued on
December 7, when he advised military authorities in Nanking tosurrender.
Article 27 of The Hague Convention Regulations Strictly Observed
Article 27 of the aforementioned Regulations Annexed to the Hague
Convention, which concerns restrictions on bombardment, reads asfollows.
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken tospare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art,science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals,
and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided
they are not being used at the time for military purposes.
It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of suchbuildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be
notified to the enemy beforehand.

There was a distinct difference between the actions taken by the
Chinese and Japanese forces vis à vis Article 27. Chinese troops, intheir attempts to defend Nanking, set fire to nearly every city, town,

ASSAULT OF THE GATES OF NANKING

45

and village on the outskirts of the city. They burned down somemagnificent structures within the grounds of the Zhongshan
Mausoleum, as well as the stately Ministry of Communications
building. They incinerated nearly all of the Xiaguan district.
Conversely, Japanese troops observed the Regulations to the letter.
In his article in the December 18 edition of The New York Times,
Durdin wrote: “The Japanese even avoided bombing Chinese troop
concentrations in built-up areas, apparently to preserve thebuildings.”4
Before they attacked Zijinshan (Purple-and-Gold Mountain),Japanese military personnel had been ordered by Commander Matsui“not to destroy the Zhongshan Mausoleum,”5 as Shimada Katsumi, acompany commander, later testified. Consequently, they refrained
from using their field guns, accomplishing the attack using only
machine guns and rifles. International law was strictly observed, but
not without considerable sacrifice, since a great number of Japanesesoldiers were killed or wounded during the assault.
The International Committee Proposes an Armistice
When the Japanese issued their final warning, a final attempt to stave
off hostilities in Nanking was being made within the city. On
December 9, the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone
drew up an armistice proposal, which it submitted to ChiangKai-shek. The proposal requested that the Japanese enter Nanking
peacefully after Chinese troops had withdrawn from the city, also
peacefully. Before those actions could take place, a temporary
cease-fire, which the Committee proposed to both the Japanese andChinese military, would be necessary.
As for the length of the proposed cease-fire, there is a discrepancy
of one day between an account (dated January 20, 1938 and written by
Georg Rosen, secretary at the German Embassy in Nanking in The
Sino-Japanese Conflict, a collection of official documents from 1937 to
1939 prepared by the Embassy)6 and an article in the Chicago Daily
News submitted by Steele.7 Nevertheless, the cease-fire was to last
for a maximum of three days.
However, all of Nanking’s gates had been closed. The armisticeproposal never reached the Japanese, but its content was identical tothat of the leaflets they had air-dropped. It is likely that, if they hadreceived it, the Japanese would have consented, but since they had
not, its fate rested on Chiang Kai-shek’s decision.

46

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

The Committee’s proposal was telegraphed to Chiang from theAmerican gunboat Panay and from the U.S. Embassy. However, as
the International Committee had feared, Chiang rejected it.
Attack on Guanghua Gate
The deadline for the response to the final warning from the Japanesewas 12:00 noon on December 10. Major-General Tsukada Osamu(CCAA chief of staff) and Major Nakayama Yasuto waited for anemissary from Tang Shengzhi bearing a flag of truce. As a precaution,
they waited an additional hour after the deadline had passed, until
1:00 p.m. No emissary everappeared.
The Japanese assumedthattheChinesehad
resolved to resist to thebitter end. According to an
entry in the diary of
Yamazaki
Masao,
staff
officer of the 10th Army,
they “realized that theenemy had no intention ofsurrendering,”8 and decided
to launch a general offensive
at 2:00 p.m. on December 10.
The general offensive wasconducted in accordancewith the “Nanking Invasion
Outline” dated December
7. Japanese troops had beenordered to seize the gates bybombarding them if theenemy “should refuse toleave their bases at the city
Guanghua Gate, approximately 13 meters
walls,”9 and, once they had
high, fell at daybreak on December 13,
passed through the gates, to1937. This photograph originallyappeared in The Second Sino-Japanesesweep Nanking.
They
War: An Illustrated Report (January 11,
were never ordered to1938), with the caption “Prince Asaka’s
engage in random attacks on
aides apprise him of the war situation as
he stands atop the wall over Guanghua
civilians.10
Gate.”The gates were the firstASSAULT OF THE GATES OF NANKING

47

obstacles, and they were formidable ones. There were 19 of them in
Nanking, including two railway gates. The gates facing south fromthe east became the arenas for the heavy fighting that ensued. The
first gate reached by Japanese troops was Guanghua Gate, situatedbetween Zhongshan Gate (East Gate) and Zhonghua Gate (SouthGate).
At dawn on December 9, the 36th Infantry Regiment, attached tothe 9th Division from Kanazawa, fought its way to Guanghua Gate
after a forced march lasting several days and nights. According to
The Battle of Nanking (published by Kaikosha) and the 36th Infantry
Regiment’s “Report on Operations in Central China,” the wall inwhich Guanghua Gate was situated was approximately 13 meters
high. In front of the wall was the outer moat, approximately 135
meters wide. Guanghua Gate was actually a double gate, with outerand inner archways, and iron doors. The two archways were about
20 meters apart.11
Anti-tank trenches and five rows of chevaux-de-frise blocked theroad leading to the gate. The muzzles of machine guns protrudingfrom loopholes on top of the walls were aimed directly at Japanesepositions.
The attack on Guanghua Gate commenced at 2:00 p.m., after thedeadline for surrender had passed. But the gate was so solidly builtthat they could make little headway. Soldiers made desperatecharges against the wall, only to be killed, one after the other.
According to the recollections of Cheng Huanlang, a Chinese staff
officer, found in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2,
on the night of December 10, when the assault on Guanghua Gate
began, “a battalion from Deng Longguang’s unit, sent as
reinforcements to Guanghua Gate, arrived with some farmers,
carrying some dozen severed enemy heads in bamboo vegetablebaskets ... proclaiming victory.”12 Even farmers had been enlisted forthe defense of Guanghua Gate. This was clearly a violation ofinternational law, which prohibits the mobilization of noncombatants.
Japanese troops began firing their mountain guns, and finallysucceeded in demolishing part of the gate. Portions of the wall
crumbled, the debris forming a steep hill. The 1st Battalion ascended
that hill and, at last, broke through and seized the outer gate. By thetime the Japanese flag had been raised amidst the rubble, night had
fallen.
Guanghua Gate was defended by Chiang Kai-shek’s elitesupervisory unit. The day after the gate had been partially destroyed,

48

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Chinese forces were doubled in size, to 1,000.
Barricades ofsandbags covered with barbed-wire entanglements had already been
erected on the periphery of the gate. Furthermore, machine guns
were aimed at the Japanese by Chinese soldiers protected byimpregnable concrete pillboxes.
Outside the city, at Zijinshan (northeast of Guanghua Gate) andYuhuatai (south of Zhonghua Gate), Japanese and Chinese troops
were locked in a desperate struggle. The Nanking Defense Corps,
aware that if Guanghua Gate fell to the Japanese, hostilities outside
the city would, within a short time, be pointless, were motivated tofight even harder.
The Chinese brought in tanks, from which they fired on Japanesesoldiers inside the outer gate, immobilizing them. Then the Nanking
Defense Corps began strafing the Japanese from the top of the gate.
Next came an incendiary attack: the Chinese threw lumber down on
the Japanese, and poured petroleum on it, which they then ignited.
The 1st Company was trapped inside the outer gate. The 88
Japanese soldiers there fell, one after another, till only eight remained.
They were saved from total decimation by Japanese heavy artillery,
the firing of which commenced on the morning of December 12.
Gradually, the Japanese gained the upper hand. Finally, at 6:00 a.m.
on December 13, the Sabae Regiment occupied Guanghua Gate.
It had taken the Japanese three full days to occupy the gate in oneof the fiercest, bloodiest battles waged in Nanking, involving muchhand-to-hand combat, with both sides hurling hand grenades at eachother. Ouchi Yoshihide described the hostilities in his testimony at
the Tokyo Trials.
On the morning of December 13, we occupied the wall of
Guanghua Gate, but were not permitted to enter the city. The
military police and a few small units entered Nanking. That day,the charred bodies of some unidentified men were found near thewall. They were still breathing, but just barely. When he saw
them, Major Haga, the battalion commander, was furious. He
ordered an immediate search for the perpetrators. I halted mybattle preparations, and assembled my subordinates. I gavethem instructions, and conducted an investigation, but discoveredthat none of them had been involved.
The medical officer who examined the bodies said that thecrime had been committed at least 10 hours previously — before
Japanese troops entered the city. He determined that the victims

ASSAULT OF THE GATES OF NANKING

49

were Japanese soldiers who had been taken prisoner by the
Chinese and set fire to. That same night, I returned with my unit
to Tangshuizhen.13

Ouchi was a second
lieutenant in the 9th
Division, 9th Mountain
Artillery
Regiment.
Accordingtohistestimony, the Chinese
had
taken
Japanesesoldiers prisoner during
the peak of hostilities atGuanghuaGate, andburnedthem
alive.
However, the Chinese
could not be accused ofcruelty to prisoners ofwar (a violation ofinternational law). Thiswas war, and it was kill
Zhonghua Gate viewed from the south,or be killed.14
outside the city. The gate, which measures
The Capture ofZhonghua Gate

20 meters high and 10 meters deep, fell at 1:00
a.m. on December 13.
(Photo: Taku Yoshiro)

Zhonghua Gate was 20
meters high and 10 metersdeep.
It was the mostsolidly
built
of
all
Nanking’s gates, with four
iron archways. According
to the Nanjing Tourist Map,
there were 27 cave-likespaces within the gate
called “soldiers’ hiding
places,”15
which
could The plaza above Zhonghua Gate.
accommodate 3,000 soldiers.
Stone steps formed a gradual stairway from the base of Zhonghua
Gate to the top of the wall. Parallel to the stairway was a gently

50

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

sloping ramp, also leading
to the top of the wall,
designed for transporting
cannons. Across the top of
the wall, right at the end of
the stairway, stretched avast plaza. At the highest
point on the wall wererectangularholes(loopholes) set at specificintervals, through which
Chinese soldiers could fire
their guns at targets outside
the city walls, where there
was no shelter.
Outside the gate was the
Qinhuai River, an artificial
waterway excavated underorders
from
the
first
emperor of the Qin Dynasty,
which served as an outermoat.
Slightly downhill
Zhonghua Gate, with its four archways,
from Guanghua Gate, theviewed from inside the city.
Qinhuai converged with the
Hucheng River.
Near
ZhonghuaGate,theQinhuai was 30 meters wide
and three meters deep.
The 6th Division from
Kumamoto was entrusted
withtheassaulton
Zhonghua Gate.
On thenight of December 10, theDivision’s first priority was
attacking Yuhuatai, locatedsouth of the gate, on whichit concentrated all its
Zhongshan Gate after bombardment(Source: Reprints from Film Records ofresources.
It penetrated
the Battle of Nanking, Series 21)
Yuhuatai at dawn on
December 11. Not until 24hours later, however, was the 6th Division able to reach the Qinhuai

ASSAULT OF THE GATES OF NANKING

51

River, the moat outside Zhonghua Gate.
Before they could attack Zhonghua Gate, 6th Division soldiers first
had to ford the outer moat. They built a temporary bridge, but the
Chinese soldiers on top of the gate fired on it, and it soon collapsed.
With the help of an artillery unit, the Japanese began bombarding
Zhonghua Gate. First they demolished the southwest corner of thegate, and eventually succeeded in opening two breaches in the wall.
At 4:45 p.m., they occupied the breaches and, subsequently, the top of
the wall.
At 1:00 a.m. on December 13, they occupied the front of Zhonghua
Gate.16 At 3:00 a.m., they removed the stone blocks that had been
packed tightly into its archways. The bridge in front of the gate,
however, had been demolished. On December 14, after anothertemporary bridge had been constructed, Major Yamazaki Masao
crossed it on foot and entered Zhonghua Gate. Yamazaki described
the situation at the gate, after another pitched battle, in his war diary.
December 14: Corpse upon enemy corpse near the gate — apitiful sight. Our men and the moat in front of the gate, andbehind it a wall and a tightly closed gate. The enemy can neither
advance nor retreat, and will surely be annihilated.17

Japanese Soldier Tied to a Tree and Executed
The intense battle for Zhonghua Gate claimed the lives of countless
Japanese and Chinese soldiers. At the Tokyo Trials, Osugi Hiroshi
described his experiences in that battle.
I believe it was the evening of the 13th when we entered Nanking
from the South Gate. The ground was littered with the dead,both my comrades and the enemy. Among the bodies I saw thecorpse of a Japanese soldier who had been tied to a tree and shot
several times. I assumed that he had been taken prisoner by the
Chinese and then slaughtered. I cut the ropes and laid his bodyon the ground. Near the city walls, there were a large number ofdead Chinese soldiers, but I saw no civilian corpses. ... On
December 13, I returned to Tangshuizhen, and then led my unit toTushanzhen, south of Nanking, where we regrouped. At thattime, I forbade my men to leave the area, in accordance withorders from my superior.18

52

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Osugi was the head of an observation party from the 1st Battalion,
attached to the 3rd Division, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment. He wasalso the officer who had been ordered to reconnoiter the battlefield
subsequent to the attack on Nanshi in Shanghai (one month prior tohostilities at Nanking), to ensure that Japanese shells had not hit the
French Settlement. He was ordered to do reconnaissance work again
after the attack on Nanking. Osugi entered the city from the SouthGate.
It was then that he saw the Japanese soldier who had been taken
alive and brutally executed. But the Japanese could not claim thatthe massacre of a prisoner of war was in violation of international law.
In the midst of a battle, it was impossible to accommodate prisoners.
Tang Shengzhi Decamps
At 8:00 p.m. on December 12, several hours before Zhonghua Gate
(South Gate) and Guanghua Gate (Southeast Gate) fell, thecommander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps decamped.
Despite having declared that he would defend Nanking to the death,
Tang Shengzhi forsook his subordinates and escaped from Xiaguan to
Pukou, on the other side of the Yangtze.
One wonders what Tang expected his men to do from then on. All
the city’s gates were closed, with the exception of Yijiang Gate, where
the supervisory unit was posted, under orders to shoot deserting
soldiers.19 Having been abandoned by Tang Shengzhi, troops inside
the city were trapped, with only three options available to them.
(1) They could have fought to the last man, but this was not a viableoption. Once Tang had decamped, it is unlikely that anyone would
have obeyed orders to that effect. Furthermore, it was common
practice for Chinese soldiers, in the face of defeat, to remove theiruniforms and masquerade as civilians.
(2) They could have fled Nanking before it fell. But since the gateswere closed, there was no escape route available to them. Perhaps
40 or 50 soldiers could have escaped from the city walls, but not manymore.
(3) They could have escaped to the Safety Zone inside the city.
This was the most realistic option, and it surely was contemplated
before the decision was made to close the gates.
In fact, 90 minutes before Tang decamped (6:30 p.m. on December

ASSAULT OF THE GATES OF NANKING

5312), Rabe mentions, in his diary, that he personally witnessed Chinese
soldiers who had been fighting at Zhonghua and Guanghua gatesrunning toward the center of Nanking, as if insane.20 But as theyneared the Safety Zone, they gradually regained their composure, andslowed their pace. Though it was never mentioned, there was a tacit
understanding among Chinese soldiers escape to the Safety Zone wasan option available to them.
No one knows how many surviving Chinese soldiers remained in
the city. However, with the exception of those who had beenfighting in the Safety Zone from the outset, those who were shot
down by their own supervisory unit, those who died in battle, andthose few who escaped from the city walls, Chinese troops infiltrated
the Safety Zone.21
Thus, the Safety Zone, intended as a refuge for evacuees, became ahaven for thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) of Chinese soldiers,
primarily raw recruits — battle groups with no commander, no order,and no discipline. Soldiers who escaped to the Safety Zone were notacting spontaneously, but in accordance with an unspoken agreement,reached prior to the fall of Nanking.
Recruit Every Able-Bodied Man
Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1 contains a
description of Tang Shengzhi’s defense of Nanking. Apparently mostof the soldiers were recruited in Nanking, since units retreating from
Shanghai to Nanking had suffered so many casualties. As Tanghimself admitted, he had very few trained soldiers. Most of his men
were raw recruits.22 According to the Nanking Defense Corps Battle
Report, “At the time, the Nanking Defense Corps comprised only the88th Division, the 36th Division, the supervisory unit, and a military
police unit. All of them had come from Shanghai, after fighting theJapanese there, and new recruits were added in Nanking.” In thisbrief report, the term “new recruits” appears twice.23
As Durdin reported, Chiang Kai-shek and Tang Shengzhi roundedup every able-bodied man.24 Therefore, the Japanese were surprised“to find no young men anywhere” when they entered the city, as
Makihara Nobuo wrote in his diary.25
The Chinese military provided the conscripts with little, if any,training. Raw recruits who had never held a rifle, who had no ideaof their responsibilities as combatants, were sent off to the battlefield,
where they were compelled to learn how to wage war. This

54

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

phenomenon was not peculiar to the Nanking conflict. As both
Durdin and Steele reported, this was a traditional military procedure
practiced throughout all of China.26 When recruiters found men ofdraft age in a farming village, they would tie their hands together,and lead them away.27
Since there was no training, there was no discipline and, therefore,a very fine line between regular army personnel and outlaws.28
Unsurprisingly, losing battles resulted in uncontrollable chaos. As
we will discuss later, regular army personnel even removed theiruniforms on the battlefield.
Nanking Defense Corps Suffers Major Losses
The following account appears in the “Nanking Garrison Battle
Report” reproduced in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking,Vol. 1.
Most of the units in the Nanking Defense Corps sufferedtremendous casualties in battle.
There were few seasoned
soldiers. Raw recruits were sent to the frontlines with notraining. Officers and their men were not able to recognize eachother, so when they were hit by shell fire hit, they dispersed
immediately, and could not be controlled.29

The Nanking Defense Corps’ bitter experiences were partly due toJapanese aerial bombing and superior shell fire. But a far moresignificant factor was the quality of the Chinese soldiers, who had
been placed in an unenviable position. Officers and their untrained
recruits were meeting for the first time, so could not recognize eachother. Once they were fired upon, they “dispersed immediately.”
One could hardly expect the Chinese to conduct an organizedresistance under these circumstances.
It is not surprising that the
Defense Corps sustained “tremendous casualties.”30 Most of the
Defense Corps suffered “serious damage by battle.”31
The
consequences were of a seriousness that is impossible to overestimate.
According to The Battle of Nanking, the Chinese forces were
60,000-70,000 strong. Of their numbers, 30,000 are assumed to havedied in battle,32 and this is certainly not an exaggeration.

ASSAULT OF THE GATES OF NANKING

55

Chinese Soldiers Strafed by Supervisory Unit at Yijiang Gate
Most of the Chinese soldiers in the crippled city are presumed to haveremoved their uniforms and infiltrated the Safety Zone. However,some of them headed north on Zhongshan North Road for Yijiang
Gate (North Gate), which led to Xiaguan on the banks of the Yangtze.
Yijiang Gate was the only open gate and, therefore, the only possible
escape route.
On the night of December 12, multitudes of Chinese soldiersrushed to Yijiang Gate, which had been fortified with timbers andsandbags. The following is an excerpt from the memoirs of Staff Officer
Cheng Kuilang in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2.
In front of the Ministry of the Navy on Zhongshan North Road, I
saw units from the 36th Division standing on the road, having laid
down their machine guns, and blocking traffic. They would notallow other units coming from the south to pass. ... Zhongshan
North Road was soon filled with vehicles and soldiers, which
stormed Yijiang Gate. In the desperate competition to escapefrom the city, they lunged forward in waves, only to be pushed
back. Some of them were trampled, and I could hear themyelling, ‘Grandfather! Grandmother!’
The sentries with the36th division had placed machine guns on the parapets on thewall, and were shouting, ‘Don’t push! We’ll shoot if you push!’
But the pushing and shoving continued.33

According to the Nanking Defense Corps Battle Report, theresponsibility of the 36th Division was to use force to prevent units
from retreating. 34 This was a favorite tactic of the supervisory unit,
and a Chinese specialty.
According to the Memoirs of Li Zongren, the supervisory shot atwaves of fleeing Chinese soldiers from behind. Many of them were
wounded or killed.35
False Reports Issued by American Journalists
The realities notwithstanding, Durdin wrote the following report, andsent it off to The New York Times.
The capture of the Hsiakwan [Yijiang] Gate by the Japanese wasaccompanied by the mass killing of the defenders, who were piled

56

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

up among the sandbags, forming a mound six feet high.36

Later, Steele, who had left Nanking, wrote a similar report, statingthat when he left Nanking from Xiaguan, his car had to drive over a
five-foot-high pile of corpses. Japanese Army trucks and cannonsalso rode over the bodies. There were corpses of civilians on theroad, which was also scattered with Chinese military equipment anduniforms.37
Both journalists were implying that the Japanese were responsible
for the five-foot-high (or six-foot-high) mound of corpses. Readingthese articles, one would get the impression that the Japanese hadslaughtered Chinese soldiers en masse when the former occupied
Yijiang Gate.
However, the Japanese were not involved in any hostilities at
Yijiang Gate. When they occupied the gate, it was Chinese soldiers
who strafed their comrades, killing and wounding a great number ofthem.
In 1987, long after World War II had ended, Durdin finallyconceded that there was no battle between the Chinese and Japaneseat Yijiang Gate. According to Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1:
American References, Durdin recanted, admitting that there was aconfrontation at Yijiang Gate between Chinese soldiers attempting toescape. Some of them were trampled to death, and that was thereason for the mound of corpses.38 Steele, too, eventually spoke thetruth (in 1986), admitting that a great number of Chinese soldiers
suffocated while attempting to escape through Yijiang Gate.39
Both accounts placed the blame for hostilities among Chinese
soldiers on Japanese troops. They were malicious reports, with nobasis in fact. What Steele described as the bodies of civilians were
probably those of Chinese soldiers who had shed their uniforms in an
attempt to pass for civilians. The reason for his having made thatassumption shall be discussed later on in this book. It is impossible
to deny categorically that some of the corpses were those of civilians,
but most of Nanking’s noncombatants had already evacuated to the
Safety Zone.
Main Strength of Chinese Military EscapesSome Chinese soldiers were either shot and killed by members of thesupervisory unit or trampled to death. Others made desperateattempts to escape by lowering themselves on ropes from the top of

ASSAULT OF THE GATES OF NANKING

57

the city wall. Many of them fell to their deaths.
Even if they were fortunate enough to exit the city successfully
through Yijiang Gate, there were no boats available to ferry themacross the Yangtze. Some of the soldiers attempted to swim acrossthe river. Others boarded makeshift rafts. Many of them drowned orwere killed by machine-gun fire from a Japanese naval warship.
Thus, it would appear that the majority of Chinese troops were
killed either inside or outside the city, but that was not the case.
When news of [Tang Shengzhi’s] flight became known, theChinese soldiers attempted to leave the city. They were mowed
down by machine-guns in the hands of their own comrades, but,when it became apparent that the fall of the city was inevitable, all
Chinese troops who could fled from the scene.40

This account from The China Journal (January 1938 issue) describes
the situation in Nanking on the day before the city fell. The mainstrength of the defending Chinese units escaped Nanking alive.
Many Chinese soldiers in the city infiltrated the Safety Zone.
Soldiers fighting outside the city simply fled.
The flight of Chinese troops from Nanking is substantiated byother records as well. Every issue of The China Weekly Review included
a “day-to-day summary constituting a complete record of outstanding
events in the war on all fronts.” The following descriptions of the
movements of Chinese soldiers appeared in the January 29, 1938 issue.
December 21: Two Cantonese Divisions defending Nanking
fought their way through Japanese lines into Anhwei [Anhui]province.
December 22: Japanese reports that some 20,000 Chinese troops
still in Nanking denied by Chinese military authorities in
Hankow.41

These accounts must have been based on reports emanating from
Chinese military authorities in Hankou. The main strength of theChinese military had moved to Anhui, which is adjacent to Nanking,one week after the fall of Nanking.
The move had also been confirmed by the Japanese military. The
December 16 issue of the Osaka Asahi Shinbun carried the following
report.

58

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

In defending Nanking, defeated enemy units have broken throughJapanese lines and have travelled along two routes, over land (theeastern line of advancement) and up the Yangtze River. They areassembling at Bengbu in Anhui Province and at Anqing(Huaiqing). Subsequent to the fall of Nanking, the enemy has
been accommodating soldiers who survived hostilities there, andis building a major defense position in front of the mountainous
region bounded by Anhui, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang, withconcentration in Anqing. With these two lines of defense, theChinese are preparing for another battle.42

This account is more specific than the one that appeared in The
China Weekly Review. No accurate figures are available, but it isobvious that the majority of Chinese troops fled Nanking.

THE MEANING OF “DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS”

59

CHAPTER 4:

THE MEANING OF “DISPOSITIONOF PRISONERS”

Japanese military personnel were never ordered or instructed to kill
civilians.
What is at issue, however, is Japanese military policy vis
à vis enemy soldiers who had surrendered.
The prevailing view is that the Japanese military ordered theexecution of prisoners of war. We will discuss the regulations ofinternational law that apply to prisoners of war later on in this book.
But first we shall describe Japanese military rules governing thehandling of prisoners of war, and popular perceptions of those rules.
The Meaning of “Disposition of Prisoners”
A pedagogical example entitled “The Disposition of Prisoners of War”
found in A Study of Combat Methods Used Against Chinese Troops,
published by the Infantry School in 1933 (four years prior to theinvasion of Nanking), reads as follows.
In keeping with our policy toward prisoners of war of allnationalities, it is not absolutely necessary to remand or
incarcerate Chinese prisoners of war while waiting to see how the
war situation develops. With the exception of special cases, prisonersof war may be released where they were captured, or after having
been moved to another location.
Chinese census laws are not uniformly enforced, and there aremany vagrants in the Chinese military, whose identity is difficult
to ascertain. Therefore, if they were killed or released at anotherlocation, there would be no repercussions.1 [Italics supplied.]

There are two parts to this pedagogical example. The first partstates that, except in special cases, “prisoners of war may be released”
for reasons stated in the second part.
According to the rule governing the “disposition of prisoners ofwar,” as applied to Chinese prisoners, their captors were not required

60

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

to wait until a battle ended but, except in special cases, could release
the prisoners where they were captured or after having transported
them to another location. “Special cases” were probably those inwhich prisoners did not obey orders issued by the Japanese military.
In such cases, execution was permissible. In all other cases, prisoners
were to be released. Therefore, the “Disposition of Prisoners of War”
recommends, and explicitly so, that prisoners of war be released.
However, in his Proof of the Nanking Massacre, Hora Tomio bases
his argument that killing all prisoners of war was an establishedpolicy of the CCAA on the same Infantry School pedagogical example.2
Fujiwara Akira, author of The Nanking Massacre: The New Version,
also espouses the view that the Japanese had “no objection to killing
Chinese soldiers, though they were reluctant to execute Russian andGerman soldiers.” He claims that it was Japanese military policy “todisregard international law” where China was concerned.3
However, these views are inconsistent with the wording and spiritof the pedagogical example, i.e., that “prisoners of war may bereleased.” Hora was probably aware of the inconsistency, which is
why he cites only the second part of the example. There were, ofcourse, exceptions, but one must be careful not to confuse principles
and exceptions.
Then, what was the reason behind releasing prisoners of war? As
stated in the example, Chinese census laws were not uniformly
enforced, and many Chinese soldiers were, in fact, vagrants.
Therefore, there would be no serious consequences if they werereleased on the battlefield. Furthermore, in special cases, if aprisoner defied orders from a Japanese soldier, for instance, theexecution of that prisoner would not be in violation of internationallaw. Article 8 of the Rules Annexed to the Hague Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land reads: “Any act
of insubordination justifies the adoption towards [prisoners of war] ofsuch measures of severity as may be considered necessary.”4
Notice Issued by the Vice-Minister of War
Another document that addresses the treatment of prisoners of war isa notice issued by the Vice-Minister of War (Lieutenant-General
Umezu Yoshijiro), entitled “Application of Battle Regulations” (Top
Secret China Army Notice No. 198). The notice was sent by air to thechief of staff of the Army of Occupation in China. It was dated
August 5, 1937, four months prior to the invasion of Nanking.

THE MEANING OF “DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS”

61

The instructions begin: “Problems concerning battle regulationsin the current conflict are to be addressed in a separate document.”
That document reads as follows.
1. At this time, the Empire is not engaged in a full-scale war
against China.
Therefore, it is not appropriate to act inaccordance with specific items in the “Convention Respecting theLaws and Customs of War on Land and other treaties governing
battle regulations,” in their entirety.5 [Italics supplied.]Japan had not issued a declaration of war to Chiang Kai-shek’s
government. For that reason, it was inappropriate for the Japanesemilitary to act in accordance with specific items in the Convention, in
their entirety. A superficial reading of this notice might suggest that
the Vice-Minister of War was instructing the Occupation Army todisregard the Convention, and that is the conclusion reached by bothHora and Fujiwara.
However, that portion of the text was no more than a partial
disclaimer. The Japanese military certainly intended to adhere tointernational law during the Second Sino-Japanese War. That was aforegone conclusion. The purport of the text cited above was thatspecific items in the Convention should not be applied in their
entirety.
The next problem to be addressed is what “specific items” were
not to be applied. The notice continues.
4. ... At present, it is Imperial policy to avoid being drawn into afull-scale war in China. Therefore, a concerted effort must be
made to avoid words and actions (e.g., looting, the use of the term
“prisoners of war,” or official announcements by military
personnel to the effect that battle regulations will be applied, andother unnecessary actions likely to antagonize foreign nations)give the impression that we have resolved to initiate a full-scale
war in China.6 [Italics supplied.]

It being Japanese national policy to avoid full-scale war in China
at all costs, the Vice-Minister of War instructed Japanese military
personnel to avoid creating the impression that Japan intended towage such a war. Therefore, they were to refrain from making any
public mention of the application of battle regulations, or of prisonersof war.
Accordingly, it is doubtful that Hora’s interpretation, i.e., that “it62

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

was reasonable for Japanese military personnel in China to perceive
the notice as instructing them not to recognize the existence ofprisoners, and as giving them permission, or even license, to kill
them,” is valid. Anyone arriving at such an interpretation and acting
upon it by killing prisoners would have been committing a grave
violation of international law. Moreover, the execution of prisoners
would certainly “antagonize foreign nations,” and contravene theVice-Minister’s instructions. All those involved would have beencourt-martialed. There is no basis for the conclusion reached by
Hora and Fujiwara, i.e., that the Japanese military sanctioned theexecution of prisoners of war.
It should be obvious by now that the notice from the Vice-Ministerof War (Top Secret China Army Notice No. 198) was instructing
Japanese military personnel to respect international law.
Thefollowing portion, Section 4, which appears at the beginning of thenotice, and which neither Hora nor Fujiwara cites, provides further
substantiation.
4.
Military personnel are to act in accordance with theaforementioned instructions with respect to the matter at hand.
However, since it is the abiding desire of the Empire to minimize,
to the extent possible, the ravages accompanying war, military
personnel shall make every effort to comply with its objectives byadhering to the portion of the aforementioned “Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land” entitled“Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges and Bombardments,” and toother treaties governing battle regulations.7 [Italics supplied.]“Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges and Bombardments”
appears in Article 23, Chapter 2, Section II of Rules Respecting Laws
and Customs of War on Land.
Article 23 begins, “In addition to theprohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especiallyforbidden ... (c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down
his arms, or having no longer means of defense, has surrendered at
discretion.”8
To lessen the casualties of war, the Vice-Minister of War issued
instructions to the effect that every effort be made to adhere to thisregulation, i.e., to refrain from killing enemy soldiers who had surrendered.
Therefore, interpreting the Vice-Minister’s instructions as permission
to execute prisoners of war is totally inconsistent with the spirit of his
notice.

THE MEANING OF “DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS”

63

Notice Issued by 13th Division Headquarters
Another notice, entitled “Instructions Concerning Warfare,”addresses the treatment of prisoners of war. It was issued on October
19, 1937 (two months before the assault on Nanking) by the 13th
Division Headquarters, Shanghai Expeditionary Force. Section 11 ofthat notice, entitled “Treatment of Prisoners of War,” reads as follows:
When a great many prisoners of war are captured, they are not tobe shot to death, but disarmed, assembled in one location,
guarded, and their presence reported to division headquarters.
Furthermore, if there are officers among them, said officers are to
be disarmed and transported to division headquarters. They are
to be used for information-gathering and propaganda purposes.
These instructions are to be strictly observed by all subordinate
units. However, small numbers of prisoners of war are to bedisposed of appropriately after interrogation.9“Treatment of Prisoners of War” instructed Japanese military
personnel not to shoot prisoners to death, when a great many of themwere captured, but to submit a report of their capture to Division
Headquarters. When a small number of prisoners were taken, they
were to be “disposed of appropriately.” It would seem that the twophrases in this instruction contradict each other — that one isinstructing that prisoners not be shot, but their presence reported, andthe other, that they be executed.
Hata Ikuhiko, the author of The Nanking Incident, hypothesizes that“policy condoned the on-the-spot execution of small numbers oflower-ranking soldiers.”10 In other words, he assumes that the twophrases were in opposition, and that “disposed of appropriately”
meant “executed.”
However, such actions contradict instructions from theVice-Minister of War, in which he specified that Japanese military
personnel shall make every effort to adhere to the regulations ofinternational law, which prohibit the killing or wounding of “anenemy who ... has surrendered at discretion.” Furthermore, it is
impossible to believe that in October 1937, the 13th Division
Headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force issued orders
contradictory to the notice from the Vice-Minister of War (Top Secret
China Army Order No. 198) issued in August of the same year. Anyother interpretation would have been inconsistent with that order.

64

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction“Appropriate disposition” did not mean “execution.”
That being the case, what had Japanese military personnel been
instructed to do? Were they to continue to observe small numbers ofprisoners for an unspecified period of time? If so, they would havenot been arriving at a disposition, but maintaining the status quo and,by doing so, placing themselves in danger.
Since the course of action to be taken was neither execution nor
observation, the only remaining possibility is release. Therefore, thenotice issued by 13th Division Headquarters entitled “Instructions
Relating to Battle” was directing Japanese military personnel not todisarm and kill enemy soldiers who had surrendered, but to release
them.
Such action was in keeping with the Vice-Minister of War’s notice
instructing that the regulations of international law be observed. It
is also consistent with the principle outlined in the pedagogicalexample from the Infantry School, namely, “prisoners of war ... may
be released.” Therefore, “Treatment of Prisoners of War” was basedon previous notices, which stated that, in principle, “prisoners of war
are to be released where they were captured.”Then, why not write “release” instead of “appropriate
disposition?” The reason is perfectly clear. By writing “release,”
the authorities would have been ordering Japanese military personnel
to free even the most malevolent prisoners. By using the term
“appropriate disposition,” they were allowing for the execution ofprisoners who did not obey orders.
When we paraphrase this regulation, we have, “When there are asmall number of prisoners, release them after obtaining the necessary
information through interrogation, e.g., their unit, the number ofsoldiers in that unit, and their operation plan. When there are alarge number of prisoners, do not shoot them, but disarm them,
report their capture to Division Headquarters, and then release
them.” In other words, prisoners of war were to be released,regardless of their numbers.
This was a sound policy. It mattered little where a small numberof prisoners went once they were released. But it was necessary for
Division Headquarters to be aware of the existence of a large numberof enemy soldiers, even if they had been disarmed. That is why
there were two separate instructions relating to the treatment ofprisoners of war, in accordance with their numbers.

POINTS IN DISPURE (1)65

CHAPTER 5:

POINTS IN DISPUTE (1):“ALL PRISONERS OF WAR ARE TO BE KILLED
IN COMPLIANCE WITH A BRIGADE ORDER”“All Prisoners of War Are To Be Killed in Compliance With a
Brigade Order”
Kojima Noboru, the author of The Second Sino-Japanese War,discovered a battle report that includes an order stating
unequivocally that “all prisoners of war are to be killed”. 1 Since abattle report is an official record, this was a shocking revelation.
The same battle report, prepared by the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry
Regiment, also appears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of
Nanking, Vol. 1. It reads as follows.
8.
The following order was received from the regimental
commander at 1400 hours [on December 13]:
A. To comply with brigade orders, all prisoners of war are to be
killed.
What is the advisability of rounding up the prisoners, a dozen at atime, and then shooting them, one by one?
B. After weapons have been assembled, prisoners are to beobserved until instructions are forthcoming.
C. The main strength of the regiment is in the process of
sweeping the city, under brigade orders.
Your battalion’s assignment is as stated previously.
9.
In accordance with the aforementioned order, theprocurement and collection of weapons and the provision of
lookouts was assigned to the 1st and 4th companies.
At 1530 hours, all company commanders were assembled to
discuss the disposition of prisoners of war. They decided that the
1st, 3rd, and 4th Companies would divide the prisoners equally
among them, and bring out in groups of 50 from the detention
area. Prisoners were to be bayonetted by the 1st Company in thevalley south of the bivouac, by the 3rd Company in the hollow

66

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

southwest of the bivouac, and by the 4th Company near the valley
southeast of the bivouac.
The companies were cautioned to post sentries along theperimeter of the detention area, lest the prisoners become aware of
their fates when they were brought out. All companies completed
preparations and commenced bayonetting by 1700 hours. Bayonetting
ended at approximately 1930 hours, at which time a report was
submitted to the Regiment.
The 1st Company altered the original plan, and attempted toconfine the prisoners and burn them to death en masse. The
attempt failed.
Some of the prisoners resigned themselves to their fates,
bravely offering their heads before the sword, or calmly walking
toward the bayonets. Others wept and begged for mercy. The
company commander heard such entreaties when he patrolled theaforementioned areas.2 [Italics supplied.]Kojima claims that the commander of the 66th Infantry Regimentissued the following order to the 1st Battalion: “All prisoners-of-war
must be killed in compliance with brigade orders. Their execution is
to be effected by rounding them up, a dozen at a time, and shooting
them, one by one.”
According to the battle report, upon receipt of the aforementioned
order, the commander of the 1st Battalion assembled the commandersof the 1st, 3rd, and 4th companies, with whom he consulted about theexecution of the prisoners.
The commanders agreed that theprisoners should be divided among the three companies, brought out
in groups of 50, and bayonetted. The executions commenced
sometime after 5:00 p.m. on December 13, and ended at 7:30 p.m.

POINTS IN DISPURE (1)67

The chain of command was as follows: The original order was
issued by the 10th Army of the CCAA to the 114th Division, whichrelayed it to the 127th (left-flank) and 128th (right-flank) brigades.
The 127th Brigade then passed the order on to the 66th Infantry
Regiment which, in turn, relayed it to the 1st Battalion.
One often encounters entries like “The order was transmitted
verbally and in writing once the recipients had been assembled” inbattle reports. At that time, orders were communicated both orally
and in writing.3 Verbal transmission was permitted when time wasof the essence, but orders were always written down at some point.
Order from the 114th Division
We will consult Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1
for a closer examination of the battle report prepared by the 1st
Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment. The order in question, 114th
Division Order No. 62A, issued at 09:30 a.m. on December 13, reads asfollows.
1. The enemy is resisting stubbornly inside the city. ...
2. The Division shall continue its assault, with the intention ofannihilating the enemy inside the city.
3. Both flanks shall invade the city, and shall use bombardment
and whatever other means necessary to annihilate the enemy.
If it is deemed necessary to do so to accomplish this objective, burnthe city. Be especially careful to avoid being taken in by deceitfulactions perpetrated by defeated enemy troops.4 [Italics supplied.]

The order issued by the 114th Division was transmitted to the127th and 128th brigades. Unfortunately, the order received by the127th Brigade has been lost. However, it is extremely unlikely thatthe Division issued different orders to the two brigades.
Order Issued by the 128th Brigade
According to Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1, the128th Brigade issued “128th Infantry Brigade Order No. 66,” a rightflank order.
1.

The enemy continues to resist stubbornly inside the city.

...

68

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

2. The right flank shall advance into the city, and sweep theareas southward of and including the line extending from GongheGate, Gongyuan (Park) Road and Zhongzheng Road.
3. Both frontline regiments shall concentrate their resources on
gaining entrance into the city, and annihilating the enemy, using
any and all means. If it is deemed necessary to do so toaccomplish this objective, burn the city. Be especially careful toavoid being taken in by deceitful actions perpetrated by surviving
enemy troops.5

This order was issued at noon on December 13, two-and-a-half hours
after the 114th Division Order No. 62A (114th Division order), issued
at 9:30 a.m.
Comparing the two, we note that the brigade order is a faithful
rendering of the intent of the order issued by the superior entity, i.e.,the division order.
Therefore, we would like to provide an
explication of the italicized portions of 114th Division Order No. 62A.
The gates of Nanking were occupied on December 13. Chinese
troops fled in droves, but did not surrender. For both the invaders
and the defenders, it was a desperate battle. A conflict ends when
one side or the other surrenders. The sooner one side surrenders,
the sooner it is over. But in this case, each side was determined toannihilate the other. Annihilation is a matter of killing the enemy tothe last man, and annihilating an enemy that refuses to surrender isan act of war that does not violate the prohibitions specified byinternational law.
Next, we have: “If it is deemed necessary ... burn the city.” Thismeans that Japanese troops, when attacking enemy soldiers
entrenched in the second floor of a building, were to burn thatbuilding if necessary.
According to the 114th Division Order No. 59A issued on
December 12,6 “both flanks” referred to the 127th Brigade (left flank)
and the 128th Brigade (right flank). Therefore, we may assume thatthe 127th Brigade order was issued at the same time as the 128th
Brigade order, i.e., at about noon.
Two hours later, at 2:00 p.m. on December 13, the commander ofthe 127th Infantry Brigade (left flank) issued the order, “All prisoners
are to be killed in compliance with brigade orders” to the 1st Battalion
and the other battalions under his command.
However, the words “all prisoners are to be killed” appear
nowhere in the aforementioned 128th Brigade order (128th Infantry

POINTS IN DISPURE (1)69

Brigade Order No. 66). Thus, the execution order issued by thecommander of the 66th Infantry Regiment was not relayed as abrigade order. In that case, why did the words “all prisoners are to
be killed in compliance with brigade orders” appear in the battle
report prepared by the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment?
According to the 1st Battalion’s battle report, the order instructingthat “all prisoners are to be killed in compliance with brigade orders”
was relayed to the 1st Battalion by the regimental commander. Was it
issued by the commander of the 66th Regiment on his own initiative?
If it had been, the execution order would have been recorded in thebattle reports of the other battalions as well. The 66th regiment also
comprised the 2nd and 3rd battalions.
Fortunately, the 2nd
Battalion’s war journal is extant. However, it contains no record ofan execution order’s having been issued. In other words, there is no
trace of an order to that effect issued by the regimental commander tohis battalions. Therefore, we may assume that the regimental
commander did not issue the order on his own initiative.
It is possible, however, that the execution order was relayed only
to the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion’s battle report reads: “Themain strength of the Regiment is in the process of sweeping thecity ... .”The 1st Battalion had not been ordered to participate in
the sweep. Did the regimental commander issue the execution order,
arbitrarily, to the 1st Battalion?
The answer is no. “Battle Instructions” from the headquarters ofanother division (the 13th Division), dated July 1937, reads in part,“When a great many prisoners of war are captured, they are not to be
shot to death, but disarmed, assembled in one location, observed, andtheir presence reported to division headquarters.”7 As Deputy Platoon
Commander Oyake Isaburo later attested, “Only officers ranking
above regimental commander had the authority to issue orders
relating to prisoners of war.”8 No regimental or battalion commander
would have issued an execution order of his own volition.
Accordingly, no execution order was issued by the commanding
division or brigade. Nor was one issued arbitrarily by a regimental
commander (or battalion commander). What appears to be aphantom execution order is recorded in the 1st Battalion’s battle
report.
Given the facts stated above, there is only one possibility. There
must have been a problem at the 1st Battalion, which compiled thisbattle report. Therefore, we would like to submit the 1st Battalion’sbattle report to further scrutiny. Before we do that, however, an

70

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

investigation into the movements of the 1st Battalion is in order.
The 1st Battalion’s Battle Report
The 1st Battalion consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th companies,
and other units. Most of the soldiers belonging to the 1st and 3rdcompanies had already entered Nanking. Since the 2nd Company
was the color guard, it accompanied the regimental commander into
the city. The remaining company, the 4th Company, must have beenfighting near Zhonghua Gate.
According to entries in the 1st Battalion’s Battle Report for
December 10-13, the 4th Company, 1st Battalion was assisting a lightarmored vehicle company attached to the 114th Division in its
advance toward Zhonghua Gate (South Gate).
The Chinese were resisting the invasion doggedly, hurling hand
grenades from the roofs of private homes. Waves of Japanese
infantry soldiers charged continually through the hail of grenades,
bursting into houses where the enemy was entrenched, and engaging
in close combat. The light armored vehicles were very effective.
The terrified Chinese soldiers soon began to surrender, waving
white flags. Many of them were shot in the back by their officers.9
After having recorded the progress of the battle, Company No. 4
wrote the following in the Battle Report for the 1st Battalion, 66th
Infantry Regiment, which appears in Source Material Relating to theBattle of Nanking, Vol. 1.
By about 1900 hours (on December 12), the sound of hand
grenades exploding had become intermittent ... We took morethan 1,500 prisoners and confiscated many weapons and a large
amount of ammunition ... When we took our first prisoners, ourcommander sent three of them as couriers, instructing them to telltheir comrades that we would spare their lives if they ceased
resisting and surrendered. This enterprise was very successful ...
We searched the prisoners and attended to the wounded.10

The account continues, reporting that 1,500 Chinese soldierssurrendered. A significant number of prisoners were taken near
Zhonghua Gate by the 4th Company. This record is substantiated bya battalion order issued by Captain Shibuya, deputy commander ofthe 1st Battalion at 7:30 p.m. on December 12. The order read: “The4th Company shall be entrusted with the observation of prisoners ofPOINTS IN DISPURE (1)71

war.”11First Battalion Commander Ichikari was wounded on December 8,on the way to Nanking. Therefore, researcher Itakura Yoshiaki’s
hypothesis that 1st Battalion Commander Ichikari executed theChinese soldiers who had surrendered, at his own discretion, is notviable, since Ichikari had withdrawn from the battlefront.
Ara Kenichi’s Fortress: Soldiers’ Recollections of The Nanking
Incident (Vols. 1 - 20), on the other hand, is a very reliable source. The
author spent many years interviewing individuals who participatedin the invasion of Nanking. This writer is greatly indebted to him,
particularly for the material in this chapter. The book includes therecollections of Sergeant-Major Oyake Isaburo, deputy commander ofthe 1st Platoon. In 1938, after the fall of Nanking, Oyake went on to
become an instructor at the Nanking Military Academy.
Oyake’s account reveals some surprising information. According
to the battle report, when the 4th Company took its first prisoners, itscommander dispatched three couriers to the Chinese soldiers who
were still resisting the invaders.
Oyake mentions that First
Lieutenant Tezuka, commander of the 4th Company, had beenwounded near Nanking on December 7, and was out of action. He
had been replaced by 1st Platoon Deputy Commander Sergeant-Major
Oyake.12 (There were three platoons in each company.)Oyakesaid that he did indeed assume command of the 4th Company, butnever dispatched three couriers.
Sergeant-Major Oyake described his recollections of the hostilities
at the time when Chinese soldiers were taken prisoner as follows.
On December 12, the 4th Company’s war potential had been
reduced by half. However, we were ordered to advance to theright of Company No. 3, which was fighting on the front line. I
led the 1st and 3rd platoons and about a dozen of my staff
members (60 to 70 men in all) to assist the 3rd Company.
Therefore, I was in charge of the 4th Company at the time. Since
we were fighting on the front line, I had no idea where ourcompany commander or the other platoons were.
I supervised my men from the footbridge in front of thebarracks. Soon the Chinese began to retreat. When I noticed
that some of them were waving white flags, I ordered my men tostop shooting, and beckoned to the Chinese. Then, suddenly,
someone on top of the wall started shooting at me. There were
five or six shots. The bullets landed near me.

72

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Nevertheless, the Chinese continued to surrender.
I
interrogated them and escorted them behind the lines. During
the interrogation, I was consulting with Tank Corps Commander
Inoue about a possible Chinese counterattack, so I do not know
exactly how many prisoners there were. I recall having been told
later that there were 1,200 of them. Two or three hundred more
had been captured by other units, so all together, there were 1,500
prisoners.
But it is hard to believe that we could have interrogated anddisarmed 1,200 prisoners so quickly, so I cannot say with any
certainty that there were 1,200.13

The battle report states that “By about 1900 hours, the sound ofhand grenades exploding had become intermittent.”14 The battle
must have been nearing an end, but did 1,500 soldiers surrender?
In any case, the Chinese prisoners were fed at 10:00 p.m. on
December 12, even though Japanese troops had not eaten their fill.
According to the 1st Battalion’s battle report, “For this meal,requisitioned rice was cooked by 20 prisoners assigned to that task ...
When the food was served, at about 2200 hours, the starving prisoners
fought over it, and ate ravenously.”15
The meal was simply sustenance offered at the height of a battle,
but it was enough to fill the prisoners’ stomachs. However, it would
have been virtually impossible to disarm and feed 1,500 prisoners inless than three hours. The number of prisoners must have been
considerably smaller.
Who Wrote the Battle Report?
Battle reports were written after an engagement had ended. Whenand how was the 1st Battalion’s report prepared?
Nishizawa Benkichi, commander of the 3rd Company, 1stBattalion, writes in Our Battles in China that on December 31, “insteadof celebrating the New Year, the soldiers have been compiling thebattle report, work on which began yesterday. We have beendeluged with orders.”16Japanese units in Nanking began preparing their battle reports on
December 30. Preparation of the battle report in question, that of the
1st Battalion, must have begun on that same day.
Nishizawa continues, stating that even in January, “company
members have been assigned to prepare a battle report covering all

POINTS IN DISPURE (1)73engagements since our arrival in China, and to see to organization,equipment, and training. The men are working night and day.”17
Approximately 20 days had elapsed since the most recent battle.
Apparently, the personnel in charge of compiling the battle reportwere very busy. Then, who was entrusted with the preparation of
the battle report? Let us consult Sergeant-Major Oyake’s accountonce again.
The battle report, as its name suggests, is a detailed description of
all matters concerning battles. It was prepared by an adjutant ora clerk, and then submitted to the regiment after the battalion
commander had approved it. Ultimate responsibility rested withthe battalion commander.18

Thus, the battle report was drafted by the battalion’s adjutant, andthen copied by a clerk. Did the 1st Battalion’s adjutant prepare thebattle report? Since the battalion was in a combat zone, the adjutant
might have been wounded and removed from the battlefront. Hereare Deputy Platoon Commander Oyake’s comments on the subject.
I wrote the battle report for the 4th Company. There is noreference to the execution of prisoners in it, since no such action
was taken.
Commander Ichikari had been wounded, and Adjutant
Shibuya was the only logical person to replace him. Shibuya
took up the reins of command, and was responsible for our
military operations. But there was no time even to think about
the battle report, and since Adjutant Oneta had not been in active
service for very long, he didn’t know much about battle reports.
I don’t think we produced a proper battle report, since this was a
new experience for all of us.”19

It is true that Battalion Commander Ichikari had withdrawn fromthe battlefront, as Oyake mentioned. The order that read, “The 4thCompany shall be entrusted with the observation of prisoners of war”
was issued by Captain Shibuya.
Adjutant Shibuya was leading the 1st Battalion in battle. He was
required to make instant judgements at every stage of the conflict,and had no time to think about the battle report. Oneta, the otheradjutant, was inexperienced and unfamiliar with the preparation of
battle reports. Therefore, anyone in a position to prepare the report

74

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

was either preoccupied with the exigencies of warfare or incapable ofpreparing a proper report due to inexperience.
Nevertheless, for some reason, the 1st Battalion executed Chinese
soldiers who had surrendered. But after the battle had ended, when
it came time to justify the execution in the battle report, its writers
used a nonexistent brigade order, namely “All prisoners are to be
killed” as an excuse.
That is why the execution order did not appear in Division records
or in the 2nd Battalion’s war journal — only in the 1st Battalion’s
Battle Report.
In other words, as Ara Kenichi concluded through the process of
elimination, the “execution order” was the creation of the writer ofthe 1st Battalion’s battle report.20
That is the only plausible
explanation.
Further scrutiny of the report reveals two problems. The firstquestionable item is “What is the advisability of rounding up theprisoners, a dozen at a time, and then shooting them to death, one by
one?” Soldiers fighting for their lives on the battlefield cannot act
decisively when their commander is asking them to make decisions
for him. Orders were always written in the imperative mode. A
genuine execution order would have read “Shoot the prisoners of war,
one by one.”
Furthermore, the prisoners were not shot one by one, as the“order” instructed, but bayonetted to death. It was winter. By the time
the bayonetting commenced, night had fallen, and it was pitch dark.
The Chinese prisoners were wearing heavy winter uniforms. Were theJapanese able to aim at the prisoners’ vital organs, through theiruniforms, and bayonet them, again and again, in total darkness? And
did the Chinese prisoners stand there docilely awaiting their deaths?
Most of the executions were performed by the 4th Company,
which had captured the prisoners. Let us take another look at
Deputy Platoon Commander Oyake’s testimony in Ara Kenichi’s
Fortress: Soldiers’ Recollections of The Nanking Incident.
I don’t have a clear recollection of what happened to the prisoners
after that. But I do remember going to inspect the place where
they were confined, noticing that it was very noisy, and feelingsorry for the soldiers who were guarding them.21
The treatment of prisoners-of-war, defined as soldiers who
surrender, having lost the will to fight, and who obey our orders
and instructions, is prescribed in the International Convention.

POINTS IN DISPURE (1)75

But among those considered prisoners of war are soldiers who
have been defeated and lost the strength to fight when attacked.
They surrender, but when they regain their strength, they form
gangs where they are detained and foment rebellion. Or they
feign surrender and wait for an opportunity to return to thebattlefront. There have been instances in which prisoners under
escort have ambushed their guards, seized their weapons, andescaped in great numbers. In most cases, it takes quite some time
to confirm that they are genuine prisoners of war.22

A similar account appears in The Battle of Nanking published by
Kaikosha. Shimada Katsumi, commander of the 2nd Machine-gun
Company, 33rd Infantry Regiment, reports that many of the Chinese
soldiers who had surrendered “discarded their rifles, but had hand
grenades or pistols hidden in their clothing.”23
In other words, more than a few soldiers who surrendered
because they had lost the will to fight did not obey orders fromJapanese troops. Some of them were waiting for the right moment toreturn to the battlefront. Others seized opportunities to form gangs
and rebel.
According to Deputy Platoon Commander Oyake’s testimony, theprisoners of war at the detention center were “very noisy.”24 It is
likely that they later grew so restive and unmanageable that they
could not be released, leaving their captors with no choice but toexecute them.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

POINTS IN DISPURE (2)77

CHAPTER 6:

POINTS IN DISPUTE (2):
“TAKE NO PRISONERS”

The war journal of Lieutenant-General Nakajima Kesago, commanderof the 16th Division, was made public about a dozen years ago. It
was included in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1.
The entry Nakajima made on December 13 reads as follows.
1. Since our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners, we
attempted to dispose of all of them. However, they continued tosurrender in droves, first 1,000, then 5,000, then 10,000. We could
not begin to disarm such a large number of soldiers. They had
completely lost the will to fight, and simply followed after us.
They did not seem to present any threat, but if a riot had erupted,
we would not have been able to control them. Therefore, I had
additional units brought in by truck, and assigned them to guardand escort the Chinese.
On the evening of the 13th, we were required to makecountless trips with the trucks. But since this event occurred
immediately after a battle (which we had won), we were not able
to act expeditiously. The Operations Section was unbelievably
busy because we had to dispose of far more prisoners than we had
anticipated.
2. Later, I learned that Sasaki’s unit alone had processed
approximately 15,000 individuals, that a company commanderwith the garrison at Taiping Gate had processed approximately
1,300, that there was a concentration of approximately 7,000 near
Xianhe Gate, and that enemy soldiers were still surrendering.1

Readers were shocked by the first sentence in Nakajima’s entry,“Since our policy is to take no prisoners, we attempted to dispose of
all of them.” In this chapter, we shall analyze this sentence, as wellas the remainder of the entry, within the context of circumstances at
the time.
During the assault on Nanking, division commander Nakajima was

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

responsible for the area north of Zhongshan Gate (East Gate)extending to Taiping, Xuanwu, and Heping gates. The opposing
force, the Nanking Defense Corps, had been so hastily augmented
that its officers did not know their subordinates, and vice versa.
The moment Tang Shengzhi escaped, the Defense Corps began tocollapse. The leaderless Chinese troops, now an unruly mob,
attempted to flee Nanking, but the perimeter of the city was now
under Japanese control. Having lost the will to fight, the Chinese
began surrendering. On December 13, the day the gates were
captured, thousands of Chinese soldiers surrendered to the 16th
Division.
The Prevailing Perception:On-the-Spot Executions

In The Nanking Massacre: New Edition, Fujiwara Akira interprets thephrase “Our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners” as “shootprisoners to death.”2 In The Nanking Incident, Hata Ikuhiko perceives
the phrase as meaning “Execute prisoners immediately.”3 A cursory
reading does indeed give that impression.
But a more careful examination raises several doubts. First, let us
assume that “our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners” means“shoot prisoners to death,” and that “dispose of” means “execute on
the spot.”
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

If “our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners” meant that
prisoners were to be executed immediately, orders to that effectwould have been issued not only to the 16th Division, but also
to all other divisions. However, there is no execution order inthe official records of any other division.
Division Commander Nakajima might have issued an execution
order, at his own discretion, to the 16th Division and only thatdivision. In that case, one would expect to find the order in therecords of the 16th Division, but no such order exists.
According to 16th Division records, attempts were made to“dispose of all of [the prisoners].” That would mean that they
were summarily and indiscriminately shot to death. When thefirst 10 or 12 were executed, the sound of gunfire would
certainly have been audible. Would “1,000, then 5,000, then
10,000” prisoners have surrendered after hearing the gunshots?
There would have been corpses everywhere. Having seen those
corpses, would hordes of Chinese soldiers have submissively

POINTS IN DISPURE (2)

(5)

(6)

79

followed their enemies?
Nakajima “had additional units brought in by truck, andassigned them to guard and escort the Chinese.” If policy had
been to execute prisoners on the spot, was it not his duty to doso?
Nakajima would have been disobeying orders in taking theaction described in (5). Was he so determined to disarm theprisoners that he was willing to suffer the punishment metedout to those who defied orders? And why would he go to thetrouble of making himself “unbelievably busy” requisitioning
trucks and ordering emergency reinforcements?

If the policy in force at that time had been to shoot prisoners of war to
death on the spot, Division Commander Nakajima would surely havemade every effort to implement that policy. But he would also havementioned his frustration at not being able to shoot 1,000, then 5,000,
then 10,000 prisoners, because of their sheer numbers.
If we rewrite the sentence, following the sentence structure used in
the journal entry, we have:
1. Since our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners, we
attempted to dispose of all of them (by shooting them to death).
However, they continued to surrender in droves, first 1,000,
then 5,000, then 10,000. We could not possibly shoot them all.
In other words, if we assume that “our policy is to take no
prisoners” was an order to execute them, then it would have been
logical for Nakajima to write that his men attempted to dispose of allof them by shooting them to death, but could not because there wereso many of them. But that is not what he wrote. What he did write
was: “We could not begin to disarm such a large number of soldiers.”
If we assume an execution order was indeed issued, this sentence
no longer makes sense, which means that it is mistaken to conclude
that Nakajima was attempting to execute the prisoners. However, if
we assume that no execution order was issued, all of theaforementioned doubts disappear.
What “Take No Prisoners” Really Meant
In stating that “we could not begin to disarm such a large number ofsoldiers,” Nakajima was explaining that he was unable to act in

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

accordance with policy, i.e., disarm the prisoners. In other words,
the means for accomplishing the ultimate objective, i.e., “to take no
prisoners,” was the disarming of the Chinese soldiers.
Then, what was meant by “take no prisoners?” There are threepossibilities. The first possibility (and the prevailing interpretation)
was that policy dictated the shooting to death of prisoners of war.
If that had been the case, Division Commander Nakajima would havewritten: “Since our policy is to take no prisoners, we attempted toshoot all of them to death. However, they continued to surrender indroves, first 1,000, then 5,000, then 10,000. We could not begin toshoot such a large number of soldiers.” However, Nakajima did notwrite “We could not shoot all of them to death.” Therefore, it was
not Japanese military policy to execute prisoners on the spot.
In that case, was it policy to take prisoners? The answer is no,since the entry clearly states “our policy is, in principle, to take no
prisoners.”
The only remaining possibility is that prisoners were to bereleased, because the only plausible actions to be taken vis à vis
soldiers who surrendered on the battlefield were execution,
incarceration, or release.
Therefore, “our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners” means“Our policy is, in principle, to take no prisoners, but to release enemy
soldiers who surrender, after having disarmed them.”
From the locution “We could not begin to disarm such a large
number of soldiers,” we sense Nakajima’s frustration in not being
able to implement policy, i.e., to take no prisoners, but to disarm andrelease them. Nakajima could not release such a large number ofarmed soldiers. Neither could he execute them, since he would havebeen disobeying orders, which stipulated that they be observed andtheir presence reported to the Operations Section.
However,
Nakajima lacked sufficient manpower to guard the prisoners, and wasforced to dispatch trucks to transport personnel. That is why he wasso busy on the evening of December 13, procuring personnel andtrucks, and escorting the prisoners, something he had certainly not
anticipated.
The gates of Nanking had fallen but, inside the city, Chinese
troops had still not surrendered. The Japanese needed to maintainsafety inside the city. Outside Nanking, near Zijinshan, fleeing
Chinese soldiers were attacking Japanese units. Some of them wereembroiled in the worst hostilities they had experienced since
Shanghai. It is not surprising that the division commander and thePOINTS IN DISPURE (2)81

Operations Section were “unbelievably busy.”
Shanghai Expeditionary Force Staff Officer’s Testimony
Interviews With Witnesses to the Nanking Incident, also written by Ara
Kenichi, includes the testimony of Onishi Hajime, staff officer with
the Nanking Special Agency, a section of the Shanghai Expeditionary
Force.
Onishi explains that “take no prisoners” means “divest themof their weapons and release them.”4 His interpretation is consistent
with several previously cited regulations relating to the treatment ofprisoners of war.
It is consistent with the pedagogical example dating back to 1933,
which states how prisoners of war are to be treated: “With the
exception of special cases, prisoners of war may be released where
they were captured, or after having been moved to another location.”5
It is also in keeping with the notice issued by the Vice-Minister of War
in October 1937, which states that Japanese military personnel are tohonor the “prohibitions” provided by the regulations annexed to theHague Convention, and to refrain from attacking “an enemy who
has ... surrendered at discretion.” 6“Battle Instructions” from 13th Division Headquarters directedthat prisoners were not to be shot, but disarmed and released. It was
the policy of the Shanghai Expeditionary Force to release enemy
soldiers who had surrendered. Division Commander Nakajima’s
policy of disarming and releasing prisoners, and Onishi’s testimony
about releasing prisoners are completely consistent with Shanghai
Expeditionary Force policy.
What “Process” Meant
The verb “process,” which appears near the end of theaforementioned journal entry, now acquires a meaning that differsfrom previous interpretations. Let us refer again to that portion of
the text.
Later, I learned that Sasaki’s unit alone had processed
approximately 15,000 individuals, a company commander withthe garrison at Taiping Gate had processed approximately 1,300,
that there was a concentration of approximately 7,000 near XianheGate, and that enemy soldiers continued to surrender.7

82

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

There are three possible interpretations of “process.” The first is
the “execute all enemy soldiers who surrender.” Let us suppose that
15,000 prisoners were executed between Zijinshan and northeastern
Nanking, 1,300 at Taiping Gate, and 7,000-8,000 near Xianhe Gate
(more accurately, near Xianhemenzhen). If that had been the case, aburial report or a statement from a witness would have been required.
But there were no corpses and, therefore, no executions.
The second is “execute only rebellious prisoners.” Article 8 of theRules Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws andCustoms of War on Land states: “Any act of insubordination
justifies the adoption towards [prisoners of war] of such measures ofseverity as may be considered necessary.”8 Therefore, the executionof such prisoners would have been in keeping with international law.
However, even if that had been the case, it is not likely that manyprisoners were executed.
The third and last interpretation is “take no prisoners, but disarmand release enemy soldiers who surrender.” This interpretation is
supported by the war journal of Major-General Iinuma Mamoru,
Shanghai Expeditionary Force chief of staff, which contains two
crucial entries, both dated December 14. The first is “From anaircraft, I observed two groups of approximately 1,000 prisoners of
war being moved from east Nanking toward Xiaguan.”The second reads: “Report received to the effect that fourcolumns of prisoners of war, eight kilometers long, were observed
from aircraft, as they were being escorted north of Nanking.”9The second entry probably refers to several thousand members of
the Nanking Defense Corps (which had sworn to defend Nanking to
the death) who surrendered, “waving white flags,” in the vicinity of
Xianhemenzhen.10 According to Sasaki Motokatsu’s account in Field
Post Office Flag and Shanghai Expeditionary Force Sakakibara Kazue’s
eyewitness account, on or about December 17, a large number ofprisoners were escorted to the Central Prison in Nanking (No. 1
Penitentiary) and incarcerated there.11
If their captors had intended to execute them, they would havedone so immediately. It was not necessary for the Japanese to movethem into Nanking, and it was even dangerous, since the prisoners
might have instigated a revolt. Also, when Major-General Iinuma
received a report to the effect that the prisoners had been sighted, hewould have ordered a halt to the convoy and had them executed.
The fact that he did not demonstrates that Japanese military policy
was to disarm and release prisoners of war. It is likely that Chief ofPOINTS IN DISPURE (2)83

Staff Iinuma dispatched a plane to confirm that units under his
command were adhering to policy by escorting the prisoners.
It is true, however, that on December 13, during the pitched battle
at Zijinshan, quite a few enemy soldiers were killed subsequent totheir surrender. On December 14, when hostilities had virtuallyended, prisoners of war were transported and interned. A differenceof one day was also the difference between life and death.
Thus, the word “process” had two meanings:(1) releaseprisoners of war after disarming them and (2) execute antagonistic
prisoners. But when the Japanese transported soldiers who hadsurrendered, they really did intend to release them. Prior to theassault on Nanking, the policy was not to release prisoners
immediately, and that policy was still in force. The gates had been
occupied, but pitched battles were still being fought to the east andsoutheast of the city. The Japanese did not dare disarm and releasesoldiers who surrendered on the battlefield because of the risk of theirrejoining their comrades. That is probably why prisoners weretransported to the north, as Major-General Iinuma wrote in his
journal.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

POINTS IN DISPURE (3)85

CHAPTER 7:

POINTS IN DISPUTE (3):“WE ARE TOLD TO KILL ALL PRISONERS;ALL UNITS DESPERATELY SHORT OF FOOD”

Fifteen Thousand Chinese Soldiers Surrender at Mufushan
The Yamada Detachment, 65th Regiment, experienced the same
phenomenon —the unanticipated surrender of a huge number ofChinese soldiers. The Yamada Detachment was, formally, the 103rd
Brigade, 13th Division. Since it was commanded by Major-General
Yamada Senji, it was listed as the “Yamada Detachment” in the
Shanghai Expeditionary Force battle order. But being a detachment, it
had only two subordinate units, the 65th Infantry Regiment from Aizu
Wakamatsu and the 19th Mountain Artillery Regiment.
Major-General Yamada’s war journal can be found in Source Material
Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2. In it, he states that on December
12, his detachment was at Gaozizhen, about 12 kilometers north of
Nanking. Gaozizhen was a remote village that had been “totally
devastated” by Chinese troops.1
The detachment received an
emergency order “to take part in the assault on Nanking” at 1:00 p.m.
on December 12.2
The order stated that the Yamada Detachment was “to capture theforts at Wulongshan and Mufushan, and to facilitate the advance of the
Sasaki Detachment.”3 Upon receiving these orders, the 65th Regimentand the 3rd Battalion, 19th Mountain Artillery Regiment

86

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

departed from Gaozizhen. This was a night march, since it was 5:00
p.m. and already dark.
On December 13, Yamada and his men passed through Xiaqijie,
which had been so thoroughly burned by Chinese troops that no usablebuildings remained.4 At 1:00 p.m., the 1st Battalion, 65th Regimentsucceeded in capturing the fort at Wulongshan, on the banks of the
Yangtze River.
The next objective was to seize the fort on Mufushan, a mountainthat overlooks the Yangtze, three kilometers north of Nanking. The
Mufushan fort was the last Chinese defense line.
There was surprisingly little resistance from Chinese troops. Some
Japanese soldiers were killed or wounded, but the Chinese did not put
up much of a fight. Soon they began to surrender, waving white flags.
Yamada described the situation on the morning of December 14 in his
journal.
Fearing that the fort might be captured by another division, we
departed for Mufushan at 0400 hours. We reached the fort at dawn.
A host of soldiers surrendered, so many that we were at a loss as totheir disposition. 5

Every town and village in the area had been “burned by the enemy”—
another instance of the scorched-earth strategy.6
BrigadeCommander Yamada found a school at the base of Mufushan, where heconfined the prisoners after disarming them. It was a very large
group: Yamada reports that there were 14,777 in all.7 According to
65th Regimental Commander Morozumi Gyosaku, whose journal also
appears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2, there
were upwards of 15,300 prisoners.
In any case, the prisoners
outnumbered the 65th Regiment 10 to one. Yamada truly faced adilemma, writing, “There are so many that it will be just as difficult tokill them as keep them alive.”8
According to Soldiers’ Accounts of the Great Nanking Massacre: War
Journals of the Yamada Detachment, 13th Division, once the prisoners wereconfined, Morozumi noticed that they were “dressed in motley
outfits,”9 and wondered if they really were soldiers.
Further
inspection revealed that some of the prisoners were noncombatants,
residents of Nanking who had fled the city, and that some of thesoldiers were actually women, old men, or boys.10 Innocent children
only 12 or 13 years old had been sent to the front line, and women had
volunteered to fight with the men.

POINTS IN DISPURE (3)87

Noncombatants Released
Noncombatants were weeded out and released. The remaining 8,000
prisoners were confined to barracks at the base of Mufushan, on thesouth side. Morozumi thought that the “barracks,” a row of 10
buildings resembling chicken coops, had been part of the Mufushan
fortress.
According to the war journal of Miyamoto Shogo 1 , the Chinese
soldiers were starving. While they were being escorted to the barracks,“some of them were eating whatever vegetation was to be found.”Another war journal reports that “many of the Chinese soldiers had hadneither food nor water for a week.”11
Hirabayashi Sadaharu’s testimony in Suzuki Akira’s The Illusion of aGreat Nanking Massacre describes a similar case.
We interned a great number of prisoners. On the second day, there
was a fire. I don’t remember whether any of the prisoners escapedat that time. If they had wanted to escape, they could have done soeasily, because the fence that enclosed them was made of bamboo.
Our main problem was feeding them. It was all we could do to
feed ourselves, and we simply couldn’t prepare proper meals for
10,000 people. Besides, the Chinese were leaderless. When we
gave them water, they would fight over it. Some of them even ate
the grass in the garden.12“We Are Told To Kill All Prisoners; All Units Desperately Short ofFood”
The events of December 15, the second day of internment, are describedin Yamada Senji’s war journal.13 There are slight differences between
the phrasing in the journal located by Suzuki Akira and the one thatappears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2, forreasons that have yet to be determined. The following citation is from

Not his real name; a pseudonym has been supplied out of respect for
the writer’s wishes to remain anonymous.

a88

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

the latter publication.
I dispatched Cavalry 2nd Lieutenant Honma to Nanking to receive
instructions regarding the disposition of the prisoners and othermatters.
We are told to kill all of them.
All units are desperately short of food.14“We are told to kill all of them” gave rise to the belief that it was
official military policy to execute prisoners. We must remember,though, that war journal entries were necessarily terse, and covered
only the essentials. For that reason, they must be read with care. We
shall proceed to explicate this entry.
First, Yamada dispatched 2nd Lieutenant Honma to Nanking toreceive instructions regarding the disposition of the prisoners. He didso because brigades (regiments) were required to inform division
headquarters when they were faced with a large number of prisoners.
For instance, the notice discussed in Chapter 4 states that, “When agreat many prisoners of war are captured, they are not to be shot todeath, but disarmed, assembled in one location, guarded, and theirpresence reported to division headquarters.”
That instruction
emanated from the headquarters of the 13th Division, to which
Major-General Yamada (Military Academy Class of 1905) was attached.
When Honma reached Nanking, Ogisu Ryuhei, commander of the
13th Division (Military Academy Class of 1904), instructed him to kill all
the prisoners, as Yamada wrote in the second sentence of his entry.
There is a logical progression from the first to the second sentence.
However, the third sentence, “All units are desperately short of food,”
does not seem to follow. There is no connection between killing
prisoners and the food supply. In fact, the food shortage would havebeen a perfect excuse for allowing the prisoners to starve to death.
Deprived of nourishment, they would be too weak to resist, making iteasier for the Japanese to comply with an execution order.
However, without ammunition, it is impossible to perform
executions. If Yamada had written: “We are told to kill all of them.
All units are desperately short of ammunition,” that would make better
sense. But he wrote, “All units are desperately short of food.” Did
Brigade Commander Yamada actually obey the order to kill all theprisoners? Or is it true that, as Regimental Commander Morozumi
wrote, he “stubbornly refused to carry out the order, and instead,
instructed his men to intern the prisoners?”15 Did he defy the order,

POINTS IN DISPURE (3)89falling back on the military regulation that states, “Enemy soldiers who
surrender are not to be taken prisoner, but removed from the battle
zone after they have been disarmed?”16 Whatever the case, thethree-sentence entry in his war journal does not tell us how he felt when
he was ordered to kill all of the prisoners.
Prisoners Commit Arson
Fortunately, the Japanese found rations in an underground depot at
Mufushan, which were taken to the barracks. The prisoners were theninstructed to cook their own meals, and preparations commenced.
On the third day of internment, December 16, a fire broke out in oneof the barracks. It could not have been the result of carelessness, for theprisoners were aware that they would have to sleep out in the cold if
their barracks were destroyed. Regimental Commander Morozumi
concluded that the prisoners had set the fire, hoping to escape during
the ensuing confusion.17
The arson incident is mentioned by four of the 19 individuals who
contributed accounts to the “War Journal of the Yamada Detachment,
13th Division.” But the entries are inconsistent as to when the fire brokeout. Three of the four soldiers wrote that it started at about noon on
December 16. The fourth wrote, “In the evening, 20,000 prisoners
started a fire.” Morozumi wrote that it was dark when the fire started.
All agree as to the date of the conflagration (December 16). The accounts
also vary as to the extent of damage caused by the fire. Some of themstated that it destroyed half, and others, one-third of the barracks.
According to Regimental Commander Morozumi’s account, half ofthe prisoners escaped during the commotion that resulted, while the fire
was still raging. The Japanese fired their guns to prevent them fromfleeing, but could not see their targets in the dark. Morozumi
estimated that “if you moved away from the scene of the fire, you
couldn’t see anything, so at least 4,000 prisoners must have escaped.”18
That leaves 4,000 prisoners remaining in the barracks.
If the Japanese had intended to execute the prisoners from the outset,
they probably would have killed the remaining prisoners immediately,
since the arson justified such action. However, they did not do so,which is proof that immediate execution was not official policy.
Brigade Commander Yamada’s Real Motive
After that incident, however, policy changed.

The Japanese had

90

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

encountered a worst-case scenario (the arson and the escapes), whichtaught them that they would have to perform executions. Nanking
and areas in its vicinity had not yet been completely subdued.
In his war journal, Private 1st Class Odera Takashi described avolatile situation: On December 17, when his unit had advanced about
18 kilometers to the Shangyuan Gate, “every once in a while, rifle
bullets would fly very close to our heads.”19 There was a realpossibility that Chinese soldiers, once released, might engage inguerrilla warfare. Moreover, rather than surrendering to the Japanese,
Chinese troops in Nanking were disguising themselves as civilians andwaiting for a second chance to attack the Japanese. That behavior
prompted the issuance of the division order instructing that all
prisoners be killed.
The arson incident served to galvanize the position taken by division
headquarters. Prisoners who resisted were invariably shot. That is why
the brigade commander abandoned the idea of defying orders. As thesituation worsened, he acquiesced to the method of last resort —execution.
In his journal, Regimental Commander Morozumi wrote: “Wehave no choice but to comply with orders. Major-General Yamadacame to my unit, fighting back tears, to convince us.20 The brigade
commander had gone to Morozumi to announce that he had agreed toshoot the prisoners to death. Armed with this information, we canoffer the following interpretation of the third sentence in Yamada’s
journal entry.
We are told to kill all of them. However, I cannot bring myself to dothat, and would like to find some way to release them outside thebattle zone. But since all units are desperately short of food, theregiment cannot incarcerate the prisoners until it is safe to release
them. [Italics supplied.]

The text in italics had simply been omitted from the original entry.
Yamada’s secret plan for the disposition of the prisoners was contrary to
the order from division headquarters. There was never any agendathat prescribed “the systematic execution of prisoners of war,” asFujiwara Akira claims. Ultimately, however, Brigade Commander
Yamada’s plan to release the prisoners was thwarted.

POINTS IN DISPURE (3)91

Prisoners Executed After Arson Incident
On the evening the fire was set (December 16), some of the prisoners
were shot to death. However, Regimental Commander Morozumi
mentions nothing about executions taking place on the banks of the
Yangtze River, even though several of his men wrote entries to that
effect in their war journals. For instance, the “War Journal of Endo
Takaaki” contains the following passage: “In the evening, one-third of
the prisoners were taken to the riverbank, where they were shot by‘I’.”21
By “I,” 2nd Lieutenant Endo2 meant the 1st Battalion. The order herefers to was probably a brigade order that mirrored a division order.
A description of the fire and the subsequent executions appears in
the “War Journal of Miyamoto Shogo” as well.
Subsequent to the afternoon meal, a fire broke out, resulting in aterrific commotion. The fire spread to 30 percent of the buildings.
At 1500 hours, the battalion led approximately 3,000 prisoners to thebanks of the Yangtze River and shot them — the method of lastresort. A sight like that could never be seen, and never will be seen,
anywhere but in a war zone.22

Second Lieutenant Miyamoto wrote about a “terrific commotion”
after the fire broke out, and adds that the prisoners were executed — the“last resort.”
This was military action taken against rebellious
prisoners, which is condoned by international law. Miyamoto’s words— “A sight like that could never be seen, and never will be seen,
anywhere but in a war zone” — eloquently communicates this fact.
It is important to note here that even though Nanking fell on
December 13, the Chinese had not surrendered formally. Instead, they
mounted an obstinate resistance against the occupying Japanese forces.
We have already covered this territory, but to cite another example, on
December 17, the day after the arson incident, Nakano Masao3 wasstanding guard at the Wulongshan fort. He wrote in his journal about

2
3

See Note a.
See Note a.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

deaths on the battlefield — events that occurred all too often.
While on sentry duty, two members of my platoon were woundedby hand grenades thrown by enemy stragglers. Every day weshoot and kill any number of these stragglers.23

On December 16, Private 1st Class Nakano, a member of the 1st
Battalion, which was under Morozumi’s command, had been ordered toguard the Wulongshan fort. That day, a straggler threw a hand
grenade at one of Nakano’s comrades on sentry duty, injuring him.
Skirmishes like these were frequent occurrences. For the Japanese, thebattle was not over.
Regimental Commander Morozumi’s Recollections
December 17, the day after the fire had been set, was the fourth day ofinternment for the prisoners.
Though Regimental CommanderMorozumi had been ordered to execute them, he issued the following
instructions to 1st Battalion Commander Tayama.
On the 17th, assemble all remaining prisoners on the south bank of
the Yangtze River, north of Mufushan. Wait until dark, and thentransport them to the north bank and release them. Procure boats
and oarsmen from nearby villages.24

Why did Morozumi ignore the order to kill the prisoners?
According to his diary, he pondered it for a while, and then decided
that “the unit chosen to carry out this order must have somediscretionary authority. I will decide what to do on my own, and hopethat all goes well.”25 He resolved to release the prisoners on an islandin the middle of the Yangtze River. His plan was implemented on thenight of December 17, the day of the ceremonial entry into Nanking.
The series of events that occurred when the boats were halfway
across the river, events that could not possibly have been foreseen, is
described in Morozumi’s diary.
Small boats carrying two or three hundred prisoners had reachedmidstream, when Chinese troops guarding the bank toward which
the boats were heading opened fire. They must have thought that
the Japanese had launched an attack from across the river. The
terrified Chinese oarsmen veered left and right to avoid the bullets,

POINTS IN DISPURE (3)93but the boats were swept away. Meanwhile, when the prisoners
who had been assembled on the north bank heard gunfire, they
jumped to the conclusion that the Japanese had taken their comrades
onto the river only to shoot them. The silence was broken, andutter chaos resulted. About 2,000 of the prisoners began runningfor their lives, every which way. There was nothing we could do tostop them but fire our guns. But we could not see them in the dark.
Most of them escaped inland, but some jumped into the Yangtze.
The next morning, I saw the bodies of prisoners whom we had shot,
but there were only a few. That was the end of it. The outcome
was terribly disappointing, but I have written the truth. The stories
that have been circulated about what happened are full of hyperbole
and propaganda.26

A map of the area shows an island called Baguazhou on the Yangtze
opposite Mufushan, about 100 meters from the right bank of the river.
Though small, it is larger than the city of Nanking. Since it was easily
reached, many Chinese soldiers had escaped there from Nanking.
Lieutenant Hashimoto Mochiyuki had already sighted them on theisland from the battleship Hozu on December 13, according to The Battleof Nanking.27
But Regimental Commander Morozumi had no way of knowing this.
His 1st Battalion made preparations to release the prisoners, following
his instructions. The boats, packed with prisoners, set out for theisland. As they approached Baguazhou, Chinese troops on the islandspotted them and assumed, unsurprisingly, that the Japanese hadlaunched a night attack. They fired at the boats. The prisoners
waiting to be released on the banks of the Yangtze heard the shots.
They thought that their comrades were being executed. Desperate,they began to run.28
According to Morozumi’s account, this incident took place at “about
midnight.”29 The Japanese fired their machine guns, but since it wasdark, and since no one had anticipated such a situation, there wereJapanese casualties as well.
Were the Executions To Be Conducted in the Dark of Night?
Is it really justifiable to characterize this incident as a “night execution,”as some have done? Or was it a plan to release the prisoners under thecover of dark, as Morozumi wrote in his account?
The testimony of Sublieutenant Hirabayashi Sadaharu, the “walking

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

encyclopedia” of the 65th Regiment (the Morozumi Regiment), appears
in Suzuki Akira’s The Illusion of a Great Nanking Massacre. Hirabayashi
heard that “the prisoners were being sent back to the Division at
Zhenjiang by boat.”30
However, Hata Ikuhiko has expressed doubts about a plan
involving the release of prisoners in the dark of night, for two reasons.
He wonders why Morozumi’s unit didn’t move them during the day, if
it really intended to release them. Furthermore, he does not believe that
prisoners could have revolted with their hands were tied behind theirbacks.
In this writer’s opinion, there were two reasons for Morozumi’s
decision to carry out his plan at night. First, he had received divisionorders to kill all the prisoners and, therefore, wanted to keep his plan as
secret as possible. The island on which he intended to release theprisoners was very near Nanking. A Japanese Navy battleship wasmoored on the Yangtze, and an Army unit was stationed on its banks,
both war-ready. If Morozumi had released the prisoners in daylight,
the Japanese would have spotted them easily. The prisoners might
have been killed. That is why he chose to release them at night, when
there was less risk of detection.
Second, if the Japanese had intended to execute the prisoners atnight, they would not have removed the ropes that bound their hands,
to avoid the possibility of rebellion. If their hands had been tied, theprisoners could not have run properly, much less rebel. Surrounded,most of them would have been killed by machine-gun fire. There
would have been virtually no chance of their escaping.
To release the prisoners safely (and secretly), Morozumi deliberately
chose the dark of night. Since the prisoners’ bonds were probably
removed just before they were released, they could have rebelled or
escaped. Or, perhaps their hands were never tied since, given their
numbers, it is unlikely that there would have been time for that between
the issuance of the departure order and the actual departure. Whichever
the case, it is clear that Morozumi intended to release the prisoners.
At that time, the Japanese executed enemy soldiers who violated
international law on the banks of the Yangtze, in broad daylight. If
Morozumi had intended to kill these prisoners, he could have done soduring the day, to avoid overlooking any of them. After all, 4,000 ofthem had escaped on the previous day.
At nighttime, the Japanese could not have seen well enough to aim
their rifles accurately. Nor could they have distinguished the prisoners
from their comrades, whom they might have shot accidentally. It does

POINTS IN DISPURE (3)95

not take an expert to realize the folly of nighttime executions, andMorozumi would never have jeopardized the safety of his own men tothat extent.
In his war journal, Araumi Kiyoe, a member of the 1st Battalion
Headquarters staff, wrote on December 17, “Some of the men in our
battalion were killed or wounded.”31 Another war journal describes thewriter’s sorrow when his comrade’s belly was pierced by a stray bullet.
If Morozumi had been planning, secretly, to execute the prisoners,
he would have done so during the day. That way, he could haveavoided losing some of his men, and could ascertain that every single
prisoner had been killed. The clues that help solve the mystery are:Morozumi did not allow the prisoners to starve to death, his operation
took place at night, and some Japanese were killed during its course.
Suzuki Akira, who discovered the “Diary of Yamada Senji,” views
what happened as an accident,32 and he is correct. Even if Morozumi
actually did plan to execute the prisoners, why would he be so foolishas to do so at night? Thus far, no one has provided a plausible
response to this question.
Addendum
The events relating to the disposition of prisoners of war at Mufushan
occurred in five stages.
(1) On December 15, the day after the prisoners had been interned, theregiment received a division order to kill all the prisoners.
(2) In defiance of that order, Brigade Commander Yamada devised aplan to free them.
(3) Some of the prisoners started a fire, which created a distraction thatallowed many of them to escape. Since this was a rebellious action, theprisoners had to be executed. Yamada could no longer justify defying
orders.
Under the circumstances, Yamada regretfully opted for the methodof last resort, i.e., execution. On December 16, the third day ofinternment, he ordered Regimental Commander Morozumi to shoot theprisoners. A group of prisoners adjudged to be particularly malicious
was executed on the banks of the Yangtze.
(4) On December 17, the fourth day of internment, Morozumi chose toignore the brigade order and, instead, devised a plan whereby theprisoners would be secretly transported to an island near the opposite
bank of the river at night and released. By doing so, he was acting in

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

accordance with Yamada’s original intention — to spare the prisoners’
lives.
(5) The island was already populated by Chinese stragglers who had
fled Nanking, though Morozumi did not know that. When boats
carrying the prisoners reached the middle of the Yangtze, the stragglers
on the island began shooting at them, believing that the Japanese wereattacking them. This unanticipated turn of events ruined Morozumi’s
plan.
(6) When they heard gunshots, the prisoners on the banks of the
Yangtze assumed that executions were taking place, and ran for theirlives. The Japanese, having the right to shoot escapees, fired at them,but most of them got away, and some Japanese soldiers were killed orwounded.
When he heard what had transpired, Yamada, rather than reproving
Morozumi, was relieved. According to Morozumi’s diary, the brigade
commander “had read my mind.”33 Although Morozumi’s plan waspartly unsuccessful, its outcome was close to what the brigade
commander had originally intended. If Yamada’s policy had been to
execute all prisoners, he would have rebuked Morozumi severely fordisobeying his orders. But he did not.
Thus, Yamada and Morozumi both made a strenuous effort toremove Chinese soldiers who had surrendered from the battle zone.
But their plans ended in failure, betraying their good intentions.
Morozumi believed that his efforts had been in vain.
As he wrote, “That was the end of it. The outcome was terribly
disappointing, but I have written the truth.”34 But even if hemiscalculated, he did everything he could to wrest the prisoners fromthe jaws of death.
War Journals Written by Members of the Yamada Detachment, 13th
Division
Only the few officers who were involved in the operation knew what
had really happened, but none of them had the leisure to write detailed
reports. They were preoccupied with other events unfolding before
their very eyes, on the battlefield, which needed their attention. That is
why the entries in the “Diary of Yamada Senji” (“We are told to kill allof them. All units are desperately short of food.”) are so terse.
Moreover, the rank-and-file had no way of acquiring an accurate
grasp of the events that had taken place. Even if they had, battle
fatigue prevented them from doing much more than scribbling a few

POINTS IN DISPURE (3)97lines in their diaries. That is why the “War Journals of Soldiers in the
Yamada Detachment, 13th Division” describe only the final outcome,i.e., executions.
For instance, documents like “The War Journal of Meguro Fukuji”
record only the executions.35 Moreover, Corporal Meguro 4 was amember of the 19th Mountain Artillery Regiment, not of Morozumi’s
unit (65th Infantry Regiment). His (and only his) diary contains a fatal
misconception. He writes that on December 13 (actually December 14),100,000 Chinese soldiers surrendered, and that on December 17 and 18(actually only on the 17th) 13,000 were executed. He was mistaken
about all the important facts.36 His diary lacks accuracy and reliability,
but he cannot be blamed for that. Journal entries were written after thefact, when the soldiers had a spare moment. It is not surprising that
their memories sometimes failed them.
War Journal of Endo Takaaki
We would now like to examine some of the war journals kept by officers.
In the “War Journals of the Men of the Yamada Detachment, 13th
Division” we find the journals of four officers. Only two of them
contain accounts that mention the disposition of prisoners of war.
The first one is the “War Journal of Endo Takaaki.” In it he writes
that on or about December 16, “It seems that orders were received fromthe Division regarding the disposition of prisoners.”37 Thus, 2nd
Lieutenant Endo knew that the brigade commander, in issuing an orderinstructing that all prisoners were to be killed, had made a decision thatwas very painful for him (see (3) above).
But Endo could not have known about (4) and (5), since he did notaccompany Tayama’s 1st Battalion. Therefore, he recorded only the
tragic outcome of the regimental commander’s carefully laid plan torelease the prisoners. The entry in 2nd Lieutenant Endo’s journal for
December 17 follows.
Supplied nine soldiers for guard duty at the summit of Mufushan at

4

See Note a.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

0700 hours. Selected soldiers to line the route of the entry into
Nanking from “R” to represent “13D.” Depart with 10 soldiersfrom the platoon at 0800 hours, and enter Nanking from Heping
Gate ... Returned to barracks at 1730 hours, exhausted, as it was
three miles from the barracks to the site of the ceremony. At night,
provide five men for execution of more than 10,000 prisoners of
war ... .38 [Italics supplied.]By “from ‘R’ to represent ‘13D’,” Endo meant that he selected
soldiers from the regiment (Morozumi’s Regiment) to represent the 13th
Division, and instructed them to participate in the victory ceremony.
The first part of this entry describes participation in the ceremonial
entry. The second part refers to the fact that he dispatched soldiers forthe executions. Viewing only this entry, one would get the impressionthat Morozumi’s original intent was to execute the prisoners. Endo’s
entry for December 18 begins as follows.
Since executions not completed by 0100 hours, ordered to dispose ofremaining prisoners of war. Proceeded to execution site. Coldwind blowing; blizzard commenced at about 0300 hours. Am
chilled to my bones. It seemed as though daylight would nevercome. Completed at 0830 hours ... From 1400 hours until 1930
hours, mobilize 25 men to dispose of more than 10,000 corpses.39

It would appear that 2nd Lieutenant Endo participated in theexecutions after they were underway. Since shots were fired from
Baguazhou and the prisoners on the banks of the Yangtze beganrunning for their lives at “about midnight,” Endo must have beenordered to appear about an hour later. Therefore, he was not privy tothe information contained in (4) and (5) above.
Therefore, he describes only the final outcome (see (6) above) —the executions. Prisoners were shot to death, so executions did takeplace, but Endo had no idea about the preceding events. That is why
he wrote simply “executions.”
War Journal of Miyamoto Shogo
Next we will examine the “War Journal of Miyamoto Shogo.” On
December 16, 2nd Lieutenant Miyamoto took part in removing theprisoners to the banks of the Yangtze and “shooting them to death.”
Then, on the night of December 17, he oversaw the escorting ofPOINTS IN DISPURE (3)prisoners.

99

An excerpt from his entry for December 17 follows.

Today some of our men participated in the parade into Nanking, but
most of them had been entrusted with the disposition of the prisonersof war. I marched to Nanking, departing at 0800 hours ... By thetime I got back it was evening. I immediately set out to take part in
the disposition of the prisoners of war. There were more than
20,000 of them. There was a terrible mistake, and many of our men were
killed or wounded.40 [Italics supplied.]Miyamoto had taken part in the ceremonial entry into Nanking, as
had 2nd Lieutenant Endo.
But Miyamoto participated in the“disposition” of the prisoners of war immediately after he returned
from the ceremony, while Endo did not.
However, doubts remain. In the entry for December 16, Miyamoto
had written, “The battalion has decided upon the method of last resort ...
to shoot the prisoners to death.”41 But on December 17, he wrote
neither “shooting” or “execution,” but “disposition.” Was this because
the executions had ended in failure? If the intention had been to shootthe prisoners from the outset, then the executions could not have endedin failure, nor would any Japanese have been killed.
Thus, it was the 1st Battalion, Morozumi’s battalion, that shot someof the prisoners on December 16, after a fire had been set, and thatremoved the prisoners at night.
Morozumi had instructed 1st
Battalion Commander Tayama to release the prisoners. Therefore,
Tayama was well aware of (4) and (5) above.
Miyamoto was not only a member of the 1st Battalion, but also anofficer. Therefore, the battalion commander must have told him thatthe prisoners were being moved so that they could be released, notexecuted. It would have made more sense if he had written, “I
immediately set out to take part in the shooting of the prisoners of war.”
Why didn’t 2nd Lieutenant Miyamoto write the truth? If he had, hisentry would have read as follows: “I immediately set out to take partin the release of the prisoners of war. There were more than 20,000 ofthem. There was a terrible mistake, and many of our men were killed
or wounded.” But by writing that, he would have been criticizing theoperation and his superiors.
Neither Regimental Commander Morozumi nor 1st Battalion
Commander Tayama was responsible for the debacle. No one could
have foreseen the events that took place. And by writing “release,”“blunder,” and “many of our men were killed or wounded,” Miyamoto

100

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

would have been intimating that the regimental commander and the 1st
Battalion commander were to blame, which was not true. Therefore, toconvey the idea that the prisoners were removed so that they could be“released,” and that ultimately, they were “shot,” he wrote“disposition.”If the original intention had been to remove the prisoners to execute
them, 2nd Lieutenant Miyamoto would have written “shot” or“executed” in his entry for December 17, as he had on the previous day.
Instead, Miyamoto recorded a lawful act of war (execution), not a
massacre. However, since no one counted the actual number ofprisoners who were removed or shot, the accounts do not match.
Leaderless Chinese Soldiers Surrender
Rereading Suzuki Akira’s The Illusion of a Great Nanking Massacre, thiswriter noticed a passage in 2nd Lieutenant Hirabayashi’s testimony:“Besides, the Chinese were leaderless.”42 International law in time of
war is applied only to combatants led by someone in a position of
authority. The Chinese troops who surrendered at Mufushan werethus ineligible for prisoner-of-war status, but even so, the Japanese tried
to protect them.
Our company supplied a great number of sentries. I was orderedto act as patrol officer, and was exhausted from having to beconstantly vigilant. In the evening we provided meals to some of theprisoners. We didn’t have enough rations for ourselves, so we hada difficult time feeding the prisoners.43

This excerpt is from Miyamoto’s journal entry for December 15. It
tells us that, though “all units are desperately short of food,” all possible
was done to feed the Chinese prisoners, at the expense of the Japanesesoldiers “who had been suffering from exhaustion for two days.” 44
We must remember that the Japanese did not treat the prisoners harshly,even though the latter were not protected by international law.

FIERCE BATTLES OUTSIDE THE WALL OF NANKING

101

CHAPTER 8:

FIERCE BATTLES OUTSIDE THE WALLS OF
NANKING AFTER THE FALL OF THE CITY

During the invasion of Nanking, 16th Division Commander Nakajima
Kesago was in charge of the gates north of Zhongshan Gate (EastGate): Taiping, Xuanwu, and Heping gates. That entire area wasdefended by Chiang Kai-shek’s crack training unit. Before, and evenafter Nanking fell, the 16th Division was engaged in heated combat
with Chinese troops attempting to escape from the city.
The unit that Lieutenant-General Nakajima refers to as the “Sasaki
Unit”1 in his war journal was the 30th Infantry Brigade, commanded
by Major-General Sasaki Toichi. However, Sasaki was, in fact, thecommander of the 38th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 33rd
Regiment, both attached to the 30th Infantry Brigade. Sasaki’s
memoirs have been published in Source Material Relating to the Battle of
Nanking, Vol. 2. We shall refer to them as we examine hostilities
subsequent to the capture of the gates.
Desperate Chinese Training Unit Attempts To Shoot Its Way to
Freedom
Even when the Japanese captured and occupied Zhongshan Gate andother gates, the Chinese did not surrender. Counteroffensives
perpetrated by Chinese troops desperate to escape from Nanking
were vicious, especially in the vicinity of Zijinshan. In the “Journalof Major-General Sasaki Toichi,” the situation there is described asfollows.
At about 0830 hours, I was awakened by a barrage of gunfire very
close to me ... enemy soldiers were approaching in great numbers,
and from all directions. They were members of a training unitthat had been at the summit of Zijinshan, and now they werelaunching an assault behind the battle line, attempting to cut
through our unit.2

Sasaki was at detachment headquarters, located in Baying, north

102

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fictionof Zijinshan. Five or six hundred soldiers from the training unit
converged on Baying, shooting everything in sight with their
Czech-made guns.3 The 16th Division, Sasaki’s detachment inparticular, was forced into a pitched battle.
At about 9:00 a.m. on December 13, Sasaki’s unit fought a“formidable enemy force,”4 in compliance with orders from the 38th
Regiment, for an hour. Most of the hostilities took place at Zijinshan,
but the battle zone “extended over several kilometers,”5 from
Tangshuizhen (two kilometers east of Nanking) in the east to Heping
and Taiping gates in the west. During the intense, bloody battle,
Chinese soldiers began to surrender.
Tang Shengzhi, commander of the Nanking Defense Corps, hadsworn to defend the city to the death, but fled Nanking before the city
fell. He did not order his troops to surrender to the Japanese. As
Tillman Durdin wrote in a dispatch to the New York Times(December 18, 1937 edition), an alarming number of commanders
deserted their men and “fled, causing panic among the rank andfile.”6The counterattacks outside Nanking (particularly near
Zijinshan) were the abandoned soldiers’ last-ditch, desperate attempts
to escape.
Major-General Sasaki’s Report
The vanquished stragglers were determined to escape at all costs, andthat made them very dangerous. A typical example of their behavior
was experienced by a combined cavalry unit at Xianhemenzhen (20kilometers east of Nanking). The “Journal of Major-General Sasaki
Toichi” describes a straggler attack that took place on the morning ofDecember 13, resulting in a bitter struggle.
The combined cavalry units were there also, in the rear, near thesanitary troops. But it was dark, and when the enemy attacked,
they were pushed into a village. It was a fiasco — they lost 200
men and 60 horses. The combined cavalry units and the heavy
artillery units behind them begged me for reinforcements. But I
simply could not attend to anyone capable of defending himself, because
my unit was engaged in a desperate battle, spread out over what musthave been several kilometers.7 [Italics supplied.]According to History of the 3rd Cavalry Division, the first wave of
the attack occurred at midnight on December 12. At Xianhemenzhen,

FIERCE BATTLES OUTSIDE THE WALL OF NANKING

103

a “disorderly mob”8 consisting of approximately 20,000 Chinese
soldiers, mainly from the 159th Division, “blew their bugles and thencharged like an avalanche.”9
A chaotic battle ensued,10 andcontinued until 9:00 a.m. on December 13.11
Among the more than 3,000 enemy dead was 159th Division
Deputy Commander Cheng.12 The 3rd Cavalry Regiment sustained
the “heaviest casualties since the Shanghai conflict.”13 Therefore,
even on December 13, when Nanking’s gates were captured, battles
were raging at Zijinshan — battles so fierce that the Japanese had torequest reinforcements.
Chinese Troops Storm Shanghai Expeditionary Force Headquarters
On the afternoon of December 13, the Shanghai Expeditionary Force
Headquarters at Tangshuizhen was ambushed by Chinese stragglers.
The Japanese repelled them, but they attacked again at 5:00 p.m.
Then, according to Major-General Iinuma’s war journal, “a free-for-allensued.”14 The hostilities were so severe that when night fell, theentire 19th Regiment and one mountain gun battalion rushed toTangshuizhen from Nanking.15 On the following day, the Japanese
discovered that 12 of their comrades had been killed during theengagement. It is time to correct the common perception, i.e., that
hostilities ended when the gates of Nanking were captured.
Testimony of the 38th Regiment’s Adjutant
Chinese soldiers invariably surrendered during these battles, as
described in an account written by Captain Kodama Yoshio, adjutantof the 38th Regiment, which appears in Eyewitness Accounts of theBattle of Nanking, Vol. 5.
When the regiment’s front line was one or two kilometers awayfrom Nanking, engaged in close combat, the division’s adjutant
told me, over the telephone, “Do not accommodate any Chinese
soldiers who surrender. Dispose of them.” I couldn’t believe myears ... the whole unit was astonished and confused. But orders
were orders, so I conveyed the instructions to all battalions. I
received no subsequent reports from any of them. We were in the
midst of a pitched battle, so you can imagine what it was like.16 [Italics
supplied.]

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Captain Kodama stated that these events took place on either
December 12 or 13. Both he and the regimental commander were in
the battle zone which, according to the 38th Regiment’s Battle Report,
extended from Xingwei, a village on the north side of Zijinshan, to
Shizijie, east of Heping Gate.
Since the houses in the area north of Zijinshan (near Xingwei and
Shizijie) had already been burned by Chinese troops, few residents
remained there. Furthermore, that same area “had regularly beenused by the Chinese for maneuvers,” so they knew it very well. The
36th and 48th divisions and the supervisory unit did not surrender.
Seeking an escape route, they launched a counterattack.17
The division adjutant responded by ordering his men, over the
telephone, not to take prisoners. He was justified in doing so, since hehad received repeated requests for reinforcements from a nearby unit
under his command. Sasaki refused those requests, instead urging
all his men capable of defending themselves to fight on. If theJapanese had accepted prisoners of war and disarmed them in the
midst of hostilities, they would have been depleting their own war
potential, and might have lost the battle.
The men of the 38th Regiment had the right to defend themselves
and, in the throes of a pitched battle, had no obligation toaccommodate prisoners of war. If they executed soldiers who
surrendered, they were not necessarily violating international law.
They were simply engaging in an act of war. Hata Ikuhiko wasprobably aware of that, and that is why he deleted the second(italicized) portion of the testimony cited above.18
Inaccurate Locution
Sasaki’s men finally fought their way to Heping Gate, where several
thousand enemy soldiers surrendered to them. By then, it was about
2:00 p.m. on December 13, the same time when hordes of Chinese
stragglers were ambushing Shanghai Expeditionary Force
Headquarters at Tangshuizhen. Another excerpt from Sasaki’s diaryfollows.
We reached Heping Gate. Later, several thousand prisoners of war
surrendered to us. Our exasperated soldiers would have killed
them all, had their officers allowed them to. Looking back overthe carnage that has taken place over the past 10 days, and during
which many of our comrades lost their lives, I too want to say,

FIERCE BATTLES OUTSIDE THE WALL OF NANKING

105“Kill them all.”19

Sasaki should not have used the term “prisoners of war.”
Prisoners of war do not need to surrender. As is indicated in The
Battle of Nanking, Sasaki should have written: “We reached Heping
Gate. Later, several thousand enemy soldiers surrendered to us.”
Why were there so many stragglers near Heping Gate? The mostplausible answer to that question is found in the eyewitness accountof Nishiura Setsuzo, commander of the 7th Company, 9th Infantry
Regiment, 16th Division, in The Battle of Nanking.
[On December 14], I saw many corpses of Chinese soldiers lying
in hollows when we were advancing south of Taiping Gate. Since
they had been carefully lined up, I assumed that they were thebodies of Chinese military personnel who had died during theconflict at Zijinshan, and were later transported to the gate.20

The wounded had probably been brought from the site of thepitched battle at Zijinshan to Nanking, through Taiping Gate.
Soldiers who died en route were buried carefully in the caverns inside
the gate. We can, therefore, assume that Taiping Gate was open
until immediately before Nanking fell, so that wounded soldiers
could be transported into the city. By the time that Sasaki’s unit
encountered stragglers at Heping Gate, at 2:00 p.m. on December 13,
12 hours had elapsed since the fall of Nanking. When the stragglers
who had failed to escape were rushing from the north side ofZijinshan to Taiping Gate, in the hope of escaping into Nanking, they
had a fateful encounter at Heping Gate with Sasaki’s unit, which wastravelling south from that gate.
“Kill Them All”
When enemy soldiers surrendered, the soldiers in Sasaki’s unit
apparently “killed them all.” Article 23 of the regulations annexedto the Hague Convention states, in part, that it is unlawful “to kill orwound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having nolonger means of defence, has surrendered at discretion.”
Did Sasaki’s unit violate the Hague Convention?
Anyjudgements must be made in view of the circumstances prevailing at
the time, for which there were two possible scenarios:

106

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction(1)

The Japanese had subdued all of Zijinshan, and Chinese attacks
had ceased.
Chinese soldiers quietly came forward andsurrendered.
Japanese troops were ambushed by the Chinese near Zijinshan,
and forced into a pitched battle. During that battle, some
Chinese soldiers surrendered. If the Japanese had treated themas prisoners of war and gone through the formalities, theywould have been unable to assist their comrades, who were stillfighting.

(2)

As stated previously, the prevailing circumstances were not as
described in (1). A desperate, bloody battle was taking place at
Zijinshan, as described in (2).
At 5:00 p.m. on December 13, three hours after several thousand
Chinese soldiers had surrendered to Sasaki’s unit (Right-Flank
Detachment, 16th Division), the Shanghai Expeditionary Force
Headquarters at Tangshuizhen was ambushed a second time.
Another melee ensued.21 According to the Tangshuizhen Battle
Report prepared by the 2nd Company, 9th Infantry Regiment, theChinese used tanks in that encounter. At Shenhemenzhen, north ofTangshuizhen, the Chinese counterattack was so ferocious that the
2nd Battalion, Heavy Artillery (an independent unit), suffered its
worst casualties since landing at Shanghai.
Chinese troops were attempting to flee from the east of Zijinshan
to the west or southeast. On every battlefront except for Heping
Gate, elite Chinese units were launching counterattacks. Put on the
defense in the face of the violent attack, the 16th Division fought
desperately. When the Shanghai Expeditionary Force Headquarters
was ambushed a second time, it was not the 16th Division that rushed
to its aid from Nanking, but the 19th Regiment, 9th Division. The
16th Division could not spare a single man.
“Take No Prisoners Until So Ordered”
Had it not been for the skirmishes and bloody defensive battles,
Major-General Sasaki’s 31st Infantry Brigade Order (issued on
December 14 at 04:50 a.m.), i.e., “Take no prisoners until soordered,”22 would never have been issued.
The situation in the vicinity of Zijinshan was described in the
aforementioned order.

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107

1. The enemy has been defeated on all fronts, but stragglers
continue to resist.

“Resisting” seems a rather tame word to use to describe what theenemy was actually doing, i.e., launching savage counterattacks allaround the base of Zijinshan.
The execution of enemy soldiers who surrendered on thebattlefield was an act of war. If the Japanese had taken the time todisarm and free (or incarcerate) them, their war potential would havebeen diminished. That would have provided additional motivation
to enemy soldiers attacking nearby, and might have caused aJapanese defeat. Even after the battles had ended, Japanese soldiers
were ambushed by fleeing stragglers on many occasions.
Chinese troops never formally surrendered en masse. Some ofthem did surrender, but others went on the offensive. There was noorderly action on their part. As Tillman Durdin wrote for the January
9, 1938 edition of The New York Times: “Tang’s departure, unknown
even to many members of his own staff, left the army leaderless andwas the signal for complete collapse.”23 [Italics supplied.]
Leaderless troops have relinquished their obligations as
combatants, and are not entitled to combatants’ rights. Even if they
were taken prisoner, they lacked legal prisoner-of-war status.
Killing them was not in violation of international law. Nevertheless,the Japanese transported this large group of prisoners in order tointern them.
Unrest Among the Prisoners
As stated in The Battle of Nanking, the majority of Chinese soldiers
were completely without supervision.
As long as the enemy
possessed the will to resist, the Japanese had the legal right to crush
that resistance.
Even when Chinese troops surrendered, the Japanese had
difficulty determining their motives, which were, in many cases,
suspect.
Sergeant Shimizu Kazue of the 38th Regiment (16thDivision) recorded one such incident in his war journal on December
14, which appears in Hata Ikuhiko’s The Nanking Incident.
As the sweep unit, we were assigned to the northern part ofNanking. We commenced our advance at 0800 hours ... weclimbed over the wall into the city. While we were opening the

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

gate, Chinese stragglers were running wild. We captured andannihilated them. Some of the stragglers came to us make peace,
but we bayonetted 92 of them since they were behaving restively ...
Countless stragglers were hiding in the city or running wild. I
have never seen such a disgraceful sight. The spirited men of ourcompany annihilated some stragglers who continued to resist, thus
restoring order in the city.24 [Italics supplied.]Hata’s reaction to this incident is that “it would be more
appropriate to describe these as executions than acts of war.” One
wonders what is at the basis of his conclusion. Normally, whensoldiers who surrender on the battlefield are rebellious or defiant, thestrictest measures are taken against them, i.e., execution. Executions
performed under such circumstances are not in violation ofinternational law. The italicized portions of Shimizu’s account provethat the actions taken by the 38th Regiment were not unlawful.
Chinese Soldiers Hurl Grenades After Surrendering
Japanese troops were plagued by acts of violence committed by
Chinese soldiers who pretended to surrender and then attacked themby, for instance, throwing hand grenades. If they had refrained fromattacking an “enemy who ... has surrendered at discretion,” theywould have been leaving themselves open to attack. Let us examine
the testimony of 2nd Lieutenant Muguruma Masajiro, adjutant of the
1st Battalion (16th Division), which can be found in Eyewitness
Accounts of the Battle of Nanking: A Comprehensive Examination, Vol. 8.
With one platoon, I was entrusted with security at Zijinshan, northof Zhongshan Gate. The battle had been harsh, however, andonly about 30 men remained in the platoon. At midnight, we
captured several hundred stragglers who had emerged from theeast side of the mountain and, not having noticed us, were
heading toward Nanking.
But there weren’t many of us, and if the Chinese had becomeaware of that, we would have been in danger. So we took away
their guns, and assembled them in a hollow. We tied only thesoldiers on the perimeter with electric wire so that they could not
escape.
Perhaps they underestimated us because of our small forces,
because they began throwing hand grenades and rioting. They

FIERCE BATTLES OUTSIDE THE WALL OF NANKING

109

became uncontrollable, so we fired our light machine guns andrifles at them until we ran out of ammunition.25

In his Memories of My Youth, Muguruma mentions being shot witha dumdum (expanding) bullet.26 The Chinese were using dumdum
bullets, which were expressly prohibited by the Declaration
Concerning Expanding Bullets,27 signed at The Hague in 1899. Theyalso, on many occasions, concealed hand grenades in their clothing,which they held onto even after they had laid down their guns.
Stragglers often fought back when captured.
Moreover, frontline combatants “did not have the leisure tocarefully determine that each enemy soldier who raised his arms insurrender had lost the will to resist, or to accommodate him as a
prisoner of war, in accordance with international law,”28 as stated in
Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 5. It would havebeen different if only a few soldiers were left behind after an entire
enemy force had been routed. But when Chinese troops, desperate
to escape, counterattacked, “if we failed to kill the enemy, we weresealing our own fates.”
Transport and Medical Units Attacked
Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1 contains theBattle Report prepared by the 3rd Battalion, 68th Infantry Regiment,
3rd Division. The report states that a second-line transport unit
attached to the 68th Infantry Regiment and carrying ammunition,
provisions, and fodder departed from Tianwangsi (approximately 50
kilometers southeast of Nanking) on December 11. The unit wasscheduled to join the main strength of the regiment.
At 4:20 p.m. on December 14, as the party approached amountainous area east of Tuqiaozhen (approximately 24 kilometers
southeast of Nanking), “about 200 stragglers came out of a pine foreston the left side of the road, and attacked us.”29 This was an ambush.
The clever enemy had persuaded some Chinese farmers to put on
the armbands that Japanese soldiers wore, and to approach us. Theirmain force hid in the forest, and when we made contact with thefarmers, used that as their signal to attack the unit from a location
50 meters ahead of us. At that point, the head of the transport
unit deployed members of the party who were carrying rifles toboth sides of the road, and instructed them to attack.30

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

The transport unit was carrying a full load of weapons,ammunition, provisions, and fodder. Moreover, not being a combat
unit, it was at a distinct disadvantage. The Chinese often attacked
transport units, but this time they “persuaded farmers to donarmbands with a picture of the rising sun on them,”31 and to approach
the Japanese unit.
It is a violation of international law for civilians to engage incombat. Fortunately, the Japanese routed the Chinese after a battle
that lasted approximately one hour. Still, the following warning wasadded to the Battle Report, “for future reference.”
Since large numbers of stragglers remain in territory we haveoccupied, we urge all units incapable of defending themselves toproceed with the utmost caution.32

Those who have claimed that stragglers presented no danger
would be wise to revise their views.
Major Yamazaki Masao wrote in his war journal that at 3:00 p.m.
on December 15, “more than a hundred”33 enemy soldiers attacked aparty that included the Assistant G-4 (Ordnance Department, 3rdDivision), the principal medical officer, and the principal veterinary
officer. According to the war journal kept by Iinuma Mamoru, theparty’s fate was unknown for a time,34 but later, word was received
that it was safe. That safety had not been achieved, however,
without the loss of several Japanese lives.
On December 16, Sasaki’s unit made a sweep of stragglers on thenorth side of Zijinshan. Not until then did the Battle of Nanking
finally end.

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111

CHAPTER 9:

THE SWEEP AFTERTHE FALL OF NANKING

The Nanking Safety Zone
The immense fortress that is the city of Nanking was constructed byHong Wu (1368-1398), the first Ming emperor. Granite was used forthe foundation, on top of which huge bricks were laid. Above someof the gates (Zhonghua Gate, for instance), the wall tops were pavedwith stones so that they could be used as roads for vehicles (see pp. 49,
50).
According to Nanking, edited by the Nanking Japanese Chamberof Commerce, the circumference of the city walls was 34.24
kilometers.1 Within those walls was the Nanking Safety Zone. As
described in Chapter 2,2 the Safety Zone, roughly square in shape,
was 3.2 kilometers long and 1.6 kilometers wide, with a total area of
3.86 square kilometers.
Nanking After the Fall
The city walls presented both advantages and disadvantages. They
were useful for defense purposes, but once the city was surroundedby enemy troops and the gates captured, the defenders would betrapped inside. Such was the case when the Japanese invaded
Nanking, since they attacked the gates from the east and the south.
The only escape route available to Chinese troops was Yijiang Gate in
the north of the city.
According to the testimonies of Captains Sekiguchi Kozo andHashimoto Mochiyuki3 in Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking,Vol. 10, the road leading from Yijiang Gate to Xiaguan (located on thebanks of the Yangtze) — the escape route used by Chinese troops —was “littered with blue-and-yellow uniforms” for a full kilometer.
During their flight, Chinese troops, who “had been careful toretain their rifles and machine guns,” crossed the Yangtze in rowboats
and barges, on rafts and even doors, but not one of them was inuniform. Stragglers on the riverbank fired their rifles, but “none of

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

them waved white flags, or raised their arms to show that they
wished to surrender.” The Japanese pursued the fleeing enemy
soldiers, and shot them, just as every army has done in every war
throughout history. From these testimonies, we know that Chinese
soldiers discarded their uniforms and attempted to escape through
Yijiang Gate. What became of those whose attempts were
unsuccessful?
Chinese Soldiers Infiltrate the Safety Zone Before Nanking’s Gates
Are Breached
TillmanDurdin,anAmerican journalist who
departed from Nanking on
December 15, wrote thefollowing in a dispatch to
The New York Times (January
9, 1938 edition).
Sunday evening [Chinese
troops] spread all over thesafety zone and thousands Yijiang Gate after the fall of Nanking,began shedding their viewed from inside the city. (Source:
uniforms.
Civilian Reprints from Film Records of the Battle of
Nanking, Series 21)
clothes were stolen or
begged from passing
civilians, and when no“civvies” could be foundthe soldiers neverthelessdiscarded army garb and
wore
only
their
underclothing.
Arms were discarded
along with uniforms, andthestreets
becamecoveredwithguns,
grenades,swords,knapsacks, coats, shoes The view across the Yangtze River fromandhelmets.4[Italics Xiaguan to Pukou. The 1.5-kilometer
bridge at left, the Changjiang River Bridge,
supplied.]
was completed in 1968.

THE SWEEP AFTER THE FALL OF NANKING

113

Here, too, Chinese troops discarded their uniforms andmasqueraded as civilians. In another article (December 18, 1937),
Durdin wrote that he witnessed “the wholesale undressing of anarmy that was almost comic.”5 When they robbed civilians of theirclothing, some Chinese soldiers even murdered their victims for theirgarments,6 as James Espy, vice-consul at the American Embassy in
Nanking, inferred. Since these events took place on the night ofSunday, December 12, we know that Chinese troops had fled to the
Safety Zone before Nanking fell.
Nanking:

A Deserted City

The Japanese entered Nanking on the night of December 13. By then,Chinese troops had completed their flight into the Safety Zone.
Sumiya Iwane was an artist assigned to the 3rd Fleet, Central China
Expeditionary Force, on board the battleship Ataka. His descriptionof Nanking on December 13 appears in Eyewitness Accounts of theBattle of Nanking, Vol. 10.
At the time, I was on board the Ataka, the flagship of the 11th
Squadron, on the Yangtze River.
After Nanking fell, anewspaper reporter drove me to the city from Xiaguan. On theway, we passed corpse upon corpse lying near Xingzhong Gate
[northwest of Nanking, directly north of Yijiang Gate].
The streets were deserted, and the houses had been damagedby fires. I got out of the car and found a bicycle. It wasfunctional, though I had to ride slowly because there wassomething wrong with the pedals. I rode to the seat of the
Nanking municipal government, the Headquarters of the General
Staff, and the city assembly hall. At each of these places, I
dismounted and went inside. But all was quiet, and there was noone in sight. ... The Ono and Wakizaka units, Army units that
had invaded the city, seemed to have located buildings with roofs
intact to serve as billets. In any case, I saw no Japanese soldiers.
Nanking was truly a deserted city. ...
The next day, I explored more of the city on the bicycle,
because I thought it strange that I hadn’t encountered any of its
residents. I came upon a banner on the street that read “Refugee
Zone: Do Not Enter.” The zone was packed with refugees. I
don’t think I have ever seen such a crowded place.7

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

An eerie silence reigned in Nanking. Yasuyama Kodo, a colonel
in the Army Medical Corps and the 3rd Fleet’s head physician, also
described Nanking as a “deserted city”8 in his war journal entry for
December 19. The headquarters of the 80th Division, the Ministry ofCommunications, and the Railway Ministry had been burned to theground, another example of the scorched-earth strategy. There wereno signs of life. Nanking had been abandoned. Most of its
residents had congregated in the Safety Zone.
Armed Chinese Troops Hide Among Civilians
On December 13, there were no hostilities between the Japanese andChinese within the city limits. But that did not mean that Nanking
was a safe place immediately after it fell. As we can see from theaccounts cited above, Chinese soldiers became “civilians” by casting
off their uniforms, and disappeared into the Safety Zone.
The Safety Zone had been established to accommodate civilians(noncombatants). But in their midst were regular Chinese Army
personnel dressed in civilian clothing. No matter what they were
wearing, they were still soldiers. Some of them had discarded boththeir uniforms and their weapons, but certainly not all. Chinese
military personnel had concealed an enormous quantity of weapons,
as we shall demonstrate later. They could have planned andlaunched an attack at any time. Chicago Daily News correspondent
Archibald Steele wrote that Chinese soldiers were still shooting fromconcealed points of vantage in the city.9
According to The Battle of Nanking, on December 14, a Japanesetank company was shot at by several dozen Chinese stragglers whensome of its members alighted from their tanks on Zhongshan Road
and entered a nearby auditorium. They rushed back to their tanks,
barely escaping injury or death.10 Other Japanese soldiers were shotat by stragglers during their sweep of the city. Nanking was not yeta safe place.
Japanese Sweep Nanking in Accordance with Invasion Outline
If Chinese troops had not concealed themselves among civilians, theJapanese sweep of Nanking would have proceeded without difficulty.
The sweep was begun in accordance with the “Nanking Invasion
Outline,” issued on December 7.
As William Webb, the presiding justice at the Tokyo Trials, said, aTHE SWEEP AFTER THE FALL OF NANKING

115

sweep is conducted to “drive out or drive away the enemy.”11
International Prosecutor’s Office: Interrogations, Vol. 50: The Nanking
Incident defines a sweep as a legitimate military action that involves“driving out” or “driving away” enemy soldiers.12
The “Nanking Invasion Outline” included two important
instructions to be followed during the sweep of Nanking, one ofwhich was:
3. ... Each division shall designate one infantry regiment as itscore unit, which shall sweep the city. With the exception of that
unit, the main strength of the division shall assemble at an
appropriate location outside the city.13

Even units that did enter Nanking were not permitted to movefreely about the city, as substantiated by Eyewitness Accounts of theBattle of Nanking, Vol. 8. According to that publication, when the20th Infantry Regiment, 16th Division captured Zhongshan Gate andentered Nanking, 2nd Lieutenant Muguruma Masajiro’s 9th Infantry
Regiment, 16th Division, was “forbidden to advance into the city.”
He reported that “Japanese military control was strict, as it shouldbe.” But, to his disadvantage, there were “no buildings to use forbarracks” and, forced to bivouac, he slept poorly because it was socold.14
Troops Not Participating in the Sweep Forbidden To Leave Their
Barracks
Takeuchi Goro, a medical corpsman with the 9th Infantry Regiment,
was billeted at the Nanking Military Academy until the end of 1937,
when he moved to a barracks in Tangshuizhen. Takeuchi wrote that,like Muguruma’s unit, “we were not permitted to leave our barracks
while we were in Nanking.”15
A 38th Infantry Regiment order issued on December 14 at 9:30 p.m.
instructed the main strength of the regiment to “form village
bivouac”16 at Xiaguan. Xiaguan, located outside Nanking, was inruins, having been burned by Chinese troops.
In addition to soldiers’ accounts, there is other evidence that
attests to the fact that the Japanese bivouacked or were forbidden toleave barracks, in the form of regimental orders and a divisioncommander’s testimony.
On May 2, 1946, not long after World War II had ended, Fujita

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Susumu, commander of the 3rd Division, Shanghai Expeditionary
Force, when interrogated by the International Prosecutor’s Officeduring the Tokyo Trials, was asked if all units were granted freedomof movement in Nanking after the ceremonial entry into the city on
December 17. Fujita answered in the negative, and added that he hadordered his men to remain in their quarters when they were off-duty,
and to refrain from approaching the Safety Zone. Moreover, his entire
division had moved outside the city after the ceremony.17
Sergeant-Major Fujita Kiyoshi (later promoted to 1st Lieutenant),
attached to the 2nd Light Armored Vehicle Company, an independent
unit, testified that “on the 21st, my company moved to the Chinese
training unit’s barracks at the Military Academy in Nanking ... wewere forbidden to leave our quarters unless we were on official business.”18[Italics supplied.]
During an interview, 2nd Lieutenant Inukai Soichiro, head of the
9th Infantry Regiment’s Signal Section, told this writer that each day,someone from his unit was appointed bivouac orderly officer, andthat non-commissioned officers and members of the rank-and-filewere assigned to sentry and patrol duty. He added that it wasagainst the rules for Japanese military personnel to leave theirbarracks, except when on official business.19
His testimony
demonstrates that the aforementioned instruction, i.e., that “the mainstrength of the division shall assemble at an appropriate location
outside the city,”20 was strictly enforced.
Designation of Operation Areas and Accountability
The other important instruction included in the “Nanking Invasion
Outline” was as follows.
4. During the sweep of the city, operation areas shall be
designated and strictly observed, thus ensuring that there is nofighting among Japanese military personnel, and that perpetratorsof unlawful acts are held accountable.21

Japanese military authorities did not tolerate unlawful acts.
Operation areas for the sweep were designated, and notice was giventhat crimes would not go unpunished. The operation areas were:(1)

The area northeast of Nanking (north of Zhongshan East Road),
including the fort at Shizishan: 33rd Regiment (the Noda Unit)

THE SWEEP AFTER THE FALL OF NANKING

(2)

(3)

(4)

117

and the 38th Regiment (the Sukegawa Unit), 30th Infantry
Brigade (under the command of the 16th Division)
The area west of Guanghua Gate extending to Hanxi Gate:
19th Infantry Regiment (the Hitomi Unit), 18th Infantry Brigade(under the command of the 9th Division)
The area east of Zhongshan Gate extending to Zhongshan East
Road (south of Zhongshan East Road and east of ZhongzhengRoad): 35th Infantry Regiment (the Fujii Unit), 6th Brigade(under the command of the 9th Division)
The northern part of the city (west of Zhongshan Road andnorth of Hanzhong Road): 7th Infantry Regiment (the Isa Unit),
6th Brigade (under the command of the 9th Division)22

No units were assigned to the area near Zhonghua Gate (SouthGate) and the eastern sector of the city. No sweep was needed there,
because Chinese troops had already retreated to the Safety Zone orleft the city through Yijiang Gate (North Gate).
As Major Yamazaki Masao, staff officer with the 10th Army,recorded in his war journal, the eastern sector of Nanking was “a vast
empty space.”23 Major Kisaki Hisashi, a 16th Division administrative
staff officer, described the southern sector of the city as “residential,”
and the northern and western sectors as “agricultural” in his journal.24
No sweep was scheduled for the eastern sector because it was
impossible for Chinese soldiers to hide there.
The Sweep of Nanking
The testimony of First Lieutenant Tsuchiya Masaharu, commander ofthe 4th Company, 19th Infantry Regiment, 9th Division, describes thesweep as follows. (Tsuchiya was the officer whose unit commenced
its sweep at Guanghua Gate (Southeast Gate) on December 13. His
testimony appears in The Battle of Nanking.)
The walls had been destroyed by bombardment, but the homes
inside were completely intact. Not even one roof tile had been
displaced.
However, an atmosphere of eerie silence anddesolation pervaded the city, and even my stalwart subordinates
hesitated for a moment. In the midst of this ineffable silence, onethat I had never experienced before, I found myself, at some point,
standing at the head of my company.
As we proceeded further into the city, I sensed that Nanking

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

was truly a “deserted city.” No enemy bullets flew at us.
saw no one — only endless, silent rows of houses.25

We

A captain, commander of the 3rd Company, 23rd Infantry
Regiment, wrote that on December 13, “At night I heard nothing, noteven dogs barking in the distance.
Nanking was completely
silent.”26 An entry in Battle Report No. 12 (dated December 14)
prepared by the 38th Infantry Regiment, which swept thenortheastern sector of the city, stated that “There are numerous
refugees in Nanking, but they have all congregated in one area [theSafety Zone]. We saw very few civilians during our sweep.”27
It is no wonder that Japanese troops saw few civilians, since itwould have been foolhardy for the latter to venture out into a battle
zone. Moreover, according to International Committee Document
No. 9, “we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in aZone.”28
However, in the northeastern sector of the city, to which the 30th
Infantry Brigade (the Sasaki Brigade) had been assigned, the 33rd
Infantry Regiment and the 38th Regiment apprehended and executed
hostile enemy soldiers.
Sweep of the Safety Zone
However, as we have previously indicated, the Safety Zone presented
the most serious problem, because it harbored both civilians andsoldiers. The objective of the sweep was to ferret out Chinese soldiershiding in the Safety Zone, and to intern soldiers who surrendered. It
also involved executing restive soldiers in the Safety Zone, andconfiscating their concealed ordnance.
The sweep of the Safety Zone, as statedearlier, was the responsibility of the 7th
Infantry Regiment (6th Brigade, 9thDivision). The sweep order issued by the
6th Infantry Brigade at 4:30 p.m. on
December 13 instructed the 7th Infantry
Regiment and other units to “comport Sino-Japanese War: Anthemselves in accordance with the Nanking Illustrated Report, March 21,
1938, with the following
Sweep Outline during the sweep.”29“Farming begins
The first three items in the Nanking caption:
again inside Guanghua Gate.
Sweep Outline read as follows.
In the background is
Zijinshan.”THE SWEEP AFTER THE FALL OF NANKING

119

1. Sweep the enemy stragglers remaining in the city.
2. During the sweep, precautions relating to entry into the city
are to be strictly observed, except in areas where the enemy
resists.
3. When buildings are burned because of enemy resistancetherein, special precautions are to be taken so as not to obstructcommunications between units.
Power plants, the Electricity Bureau, post offices, telegraphoffices, water sources, gas companies, warehouses, factories, andany other facilities suitable for military use are to be occupied
expeditiously to prevent the enemy from destroying or burning
same.
Since we assume that the majority of fleeing enemy soldiers havedonned civilian clothing, apprehend any suspicious individuals, anddetain them at an appropriate location.30 [Italics supplied.]

Precautions to be observed upon entering Nanking were as follows.
1. In light of the fact that this operation, due to its magnitude,
will come to the attention of the entire world, all units are
instructed to set a standard for the future by comportingthemselves honorably, and by refraining, at all costs, from looting,fighting among themselves, and committing unlawful acts.
2.
Japanese military personnel shall not approach foreign
concessions or foreign diplomatic missions, and shall refrain fromentering the neutral zone [the Safety Zone] unless absolutely
necessary.31

Precautions Issued by Brigade Commander Akiyama
In accordance with the Nanking Sweep Outline, the following
precautions were relayed to the 7th Infantry Regiment and other units
by the commander of the Right-Flank Unit (Major-General Akiyama
Yoshimitsu, commander of the 6th Infantry Brigade), at 4:30 p.m. on
December 13.
2. Entry into any building in a foreign concession is strictly
forbidden, unless said building is being used by the enemy.

This precaution was issued because there would be serious, lastingrepercussions if the Japanese entered a foreign embassy, or a foreign

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

residence.
3. Sweep units are to annihilate enemy stragglers. The sweep shallbe conducted by units commanded by officers (including warrant
officers). Anyone ranking non-commissioned officer or below isabsolutely forbidden to act independently.

Only officers could serve as commanders of sweep units. The
purpose of the sweep was to annihilate enemy soldiers, not to commit
atrocities against civilians. Independent activity was, of course,
strictly prohibited.
4. Assume that men aged 16 to 40 are stragglers or soldiers wearing
civilian clothing. Apprehend and intern them. With that exception,
Chinese civilians who do not behave in a hostile manner, especially theelderly, women, and children are to be treated kindly, so as to earn theirrespect for the dignity of the Imperial Army. [Italics supplied.]

Since Chiang Kai-shek had conscripted all able-bodied men andsent them off to the battlefield, it was extremely likely that all men
between the ages of 16 and 40 were stragglers. That is why they
were to be arrested and confined.
On the other hand, “Chinese civilians who do not behave in a
hostile manner, especially the elderly, children, women, and girls”
were to be treated leniently. To earn their respect, Japanese military
personnel were to comport themselves with dignity.
5. Post sentries at public or private banks, but do not enter such
establishments.
6. Refrain from entering private homes and looting them.
7.Anyone who commits arson or accidentally causes a conflagration
shall be severely punished, as per the warning issued by the Armycommander..
8. Military personnel are not to fight among themselves.
“Kanazawa” and “Toyama” [Japanese place names] have been
designated as passwords.

Even though Nanking had fallen, hostilities were still taking placeover the entire Zijinshan area. The city was still a dangerous place.
There was good reason to designate passwords in advance. Most of
the members of the division hailed from Toyama, Ishikawa (in which

THE SWEEP AFTER THE FALL OF NANKING

121

Kanazawa is located), or Fukui prefectures.
9. If a fire is sighted, sweep units, as well as any other units in thevicinity, shall endeavor to extinguish it.32

Sweep units were also given instructions as to their attire.
According to an infantry order (7th Infantry Regiment Operation
Order No. 106A), issued at 9:30 p.m. on December 13, military
personnel were to wear their uniforms minus knapsacks.33 The
soldiers normally carried knapsacks, which held their daily
necessities, but also impeded their movement.
Sweep of the Safety Zone Commences on December 14
Infantry Operation Order No. 107A, reminded military personnel to“leave the city once the sweep had ended.”34 Headquarters did notwant soldiers to be roving aimlessly around Nanking.
Furthermore, in Order No. 130A (a 9th Division operation order)
issued at 7:00 a.m. on December 13, part of the 18th Infantry Brigade,commanded by Major-General Ide Nobutoki, was designated as theleft-flank unit. Part of the 6th Infantry Brigade, commanded by
Major-General Akiyama, was designated as the right-flank unit.
A 9th Division Sweep Unit Order, issued at 7:00 p.m. on December
14, prohibited the left-flank unit, which was not involved in the sweep,from leaving the area to which it was assigned.35 It also forbade anyunits other than the left- and right-flank units to enter Nanking.36
Therefore, not all Japanese military personnel proceeded into
Nanking — not even the entire 9th Division entered the city.
Four Tanks Captured
The material cited above represents only a small portion of theoperation order. Orders related to the sweep were also very detailed.
Japanese military regulations were exceedingly strict, and that is why
the behavior of Japanese soldiers was quite different from that of theirChinese counterparts. The 7th Regiment’s sweep of the Safety Zone
commenced on December 14. Seventh Regiment Commander Isa
wrote the following in his war journal: “We begin the sweep in themorning. There is a refugee zone in our assigned area.”37 On thenight of December 13, the 7th Regiment entered the city from east ofZhongshan Gate, and bivouacked near Gugong Airfield.38 The men

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had not yet reached the Safety Zone.
The Regiment’s “Report on the Results of the Sweep of Nanking”(compiled between December 13 and December 24)39 reveals exactly
how undisciplined the Chinese soldiery was.
This table lists only one-third of the items confiscated during thesweep conducted by the 7th Regiment.
Chinese soldiers who discarded their uniforms without any
intention of surrendering were clearly in violation of internationallaw. Furthermore, there was a huge cache of their weapons in the
Safety Zone — also a violation of international law.
No hostilities took place in the Safety Zone. The incident
described by Durdin in the December 18 edition of The New YorkTimes, in which he writes that a group of 100 Chinese soldiers wasbombarded by Japanese tanks, never took place.40
Chinese Military Personnel Found in Safety Zone Executed
Nevertheless, according to the “Report on the Results of the Sweep of
Nanking,” the 7th Infantry Regiment bayonetted or shot 6,670
Chinese soldiers to death. We will provide an account of thatincident from another source.
In his war journal, Private 1st Class Mizutani So, 1st Company, 7thInfantry Regiment, made the following entry.
Every young man has been rounded up, or at least the ones wewere able to locate. ... Each company has rounded up several
hundred of them. The 1st Company had the least success, but
still brought in close to 200. Individuals we assumed to be family
members (wives and mothers) wept and begged us to release them.
We released all civilians, after ascertaining that they were indeed
civilians, and shot 36 individuals.41 [Italics supplied.]

The 1st Company, 7th Regiment released several hundred persons
after determining that they were civilians, and shot 36 soldiers incivilian clothing on the banks of the Yangtze. A similar entry in the
war journal of Private 1st Class Inoie Matakazu, 2nd Company, 7thInfantry Regiment, dated December 16, appears in Source Material
Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1.

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At 10:00 a.m. we set out on our sweep of enemy stragglers. We
confiscated one trench mortar. We resumed our work in theafternoon. We apprehended 335 young men. We arrested every
one of the refugees whom we suspected of being a soldier. ... We
removed those 335 stragglers to the banks of the Yangtze, where
they were shot.42

The entry cited above is supported by another journal entry, also
from Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking. It was written
by Colonel Isa Kazuo, commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment:“On December 16, we moved to new quarters in private homes on
Chibi Road.
During the three-day sweep, we disposed ofapproximately 6,500 individuals in the most severe manner
possible.”43
If the Japanese had shot someone in error, someone who had notbeen a soldier, his family members surely would have submitted aprotest, which would have included the victim’s name. However, theInternational Committee made no such protests.
Furthermore, Chibi Road was located at the northern edge of the
Safety Zone. The 7th Infantry Regiment moved its headquarters there
to conduct sweeping operation around the noon of December 16.44
According to the Battle Report, “the sweep of the assigned area, theSafety Zone in particular, commenced on December 16.”45 It wascompleted on the following day, the day of the victory parade.46
We would like to digress a bit, and mention that the 7th Infantry
Regiment had its headquarters on Chibi Road until it departed on
December 26.47 Until 6:00 p.m. on December 24, when the unit
received orders to “end the sweep now”48 (7th Infantry RegimentOperation Order No. 117A), it had been assigned to sweep the Safety
Zone. However, the sweep was, for the most part, completed inthree days, by December 16.
The much-discussed sentence, “we disposed of approximately
6,500 individuals in the most severe manner possible,” probably
means that 6,500 Chinese soldiers, out of all those who had been
captured — regular army soldiers in civilian clothing — were
executed because they were extremely hostile. Europeans andAmericans in Nanking were critical of those executions. Were theyin fact violations of international law? We shall address that issue inthe next chapter.

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CHAPTER 10:

REQUIREMENTS FORPRISONER-OF-WAR STATUS

Japanese Spare Safety Zone
Document No. 1, dated December 14, prepared and submitted by theInternational Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone to the Japanese
Embassy, opens with the following words of gratitude:
We come to thank you for the fine way your artillery spared the
Safety Zone ...1 [Italics supplied.]

The great majority of Nanking’s residents had taken refuge in the
Safety Zone, as stated in Document No. 9, dated December 17: “Onthe 13th when your troops entered the city, we had nearly all thecivilian population gathered in a Zone.”2 Moreover, as early as
December 8, they were prohibited from venturing outside the Safety
Zone. Nor was it likely that they would have attempted to leave,
given that immediately after the fall of Nanking, all areas outside theZone were potential battlefields. Testimonies provided by Japanesemilitary personnel stating that they saw no residents on the city’s
streets at that time are entirely credible. Therefore, it is extremely
likely that anyone outside the Safety Zone was not a civilian, but asoldier. Any corpses sighted outside the Safety Zone must havebeen those of soldiers, not civilians.
Were Soldiers Who Had Shed Their Uniforms “Former Soldiers”?
If Chinese troops had laid down their weapons and surrendered to
the Japanese, they would have been treated as prisoners of war, andthe disputes that we shall proceed to describe would never havearisen. But rather than surrendering, Chinese soldiers shed theiruniforms and transformed themselves into civilians by donning
civilian clothing. Furthermore, as the Japanese discovered during thesweep, many of them were carrying concealed weapons (see Chapter

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9).
To make matters worse, the International Committee describedsoldiers who had shed their uniforms as “former soldiers.”3 The
term first appeared in Document No. 2 (dated December 15) ofDocuments of the Nanking Safety Zone. Even when John Magee and Xu
Chuanyin testified at the Tokyo Trials, after World War II had ended,they would not yield on this point: “We consider them as civilians
before they gather themselves together in open resistance.”4
Was there any justification for perceiving soldiers who had
removed their uniforms as former soldiers? Or for classifying
former soldiers as civilians?
When Europeans and Americans
accused the Japanese military of having committed atrocities against
civilians, they were relying on this sort of “logic.” In this chapter,
we shall examine this issue, citing newspaper articles and otherrecords written by Europeans and Americans. However, before we
begin, we would like to discuss lawful and unlawful behavior, asprescribed by international law.
Regulations Governing Warfare
Normally, civilians are not charged with a crime unless they havebroken the law. The same principle applies to military personnel.
Only when they violate the rules of international law have they
committed a crime.
On this point, Adachi Sumio writes thefollowing in Theory of Modern Regulations Governing War.
Uniformed units have the right to attack enemies, using whatevermeans are not clearly proscribed by regulations governing warfare.
They also have the right to resist enemy attacks, and to crush
enemy resistance, for as long as it continues.5 [Italics supplied.]

Article 23 of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention
states that it is unlawful “to kill or wound an enemy who ... hassurrendered at discretion.” An attack against an enemy soldier who
surrenders, following officially recognized procedures, is in violationof international law.
However, in Nanking, Chinese troops
infiltrated the Safety Zone, and opted not to surrender, but to resist.
Since it was not in violation of regulations governing warfare toattack enemy soldiers who had not surrendered, the Japanese had theright to attack Chinese troops, “and to crush enemy resistance, for as
long as it continues.”

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The Qualifications of Belligerents
Regulations governing the laws and customs of war on land weresigned at The Hague in October 1907, and annexed to the Hague
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. They
defined the laws, rights, and duties of combatants. One of the most
pertinent regulations is Article 1, or the definition of belligerents.
Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only toarmies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling thefollowing conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws andcustoms of war.6

Unless they fulfill all four of these conditions, warring parties are
not considered belligerents. If they do satisfy the conditions, they
are qualified to be treated as prisoners of war, should the fortunes of
war turn against them. However, if they do not satisfy them and are
captured, the regulations of the Hague Convention do not apply tothem. They lose the right to become prisoners of war.
Chinese Troops in the Safety Zone and International Law
Based on this information, we would now like to examine, in order,
the regulations of the Hague Convention in light of the behavior
exhibited by Chinese troops after the fall of Nanking.
(1) As we have stated previously, before Nanking fell, Tang Shengzhi,
the commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps, who hadsworn to defend the city to the death, fled to Hankou by train. As
military historian Okumiya Masatake has stated, Tang did not movehis command post to another location.7 When he escaped, all otherofficers ranking division commander and below escaped at the sametime. Tillman Durdin indicated that “Tang’s departure, unknown
even to many members of his own staff, left the army leaderless andwas the signal for complete collapse.”8 Therefore, Chinese troops
were an uncontrolled mob that did not fulfill Condition No. 1 of the

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Qualifications of Belligerents: “To be commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates.”(2)
Leaderless Chinese troops discarded their uniforms andinfiltrated the Safety Zone. However, the rules of the Hague
Convention require that belligerents “have a fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance.” The Chinese also violated that rule.
(3) Furthermore, regular army soldiers concealed a huge amount of
weapons in the Safety Zone, thereby violating the regulation that
requires them to “carry arms openly.”(4) In addition to violating the aforementioned three regulations,
Chinese troops also violating the regulation stipulating that they
“conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs ofwar.”
Thus, regular Chinese army soldiers failed to meet any of thequalifications of belligerents specified by international law. By doing
so, they lost the right to prisoner-of-war status.
Requirements for Recognition as a Prisoner of War
Soldiers who did not fulfill the conditions for belligerents were notqualified to be treated as prisoners of war. Nor did the item in
Article 4 of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention, i.e.,“They must be humanely treated,” apply to them. (Nor did thearticle of the Geneva Convention cited by Okumiya, which reads,“Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited” apply
to Chinese military personnel in the Safety Zone.)
Soldiers who did not meet the qualifications of belligerents werein violation of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention.
In Modern References: International Law, Tsutsui Jakusui writes thefollowing subsequent to his exposition of the four conditions laid
forth at the beginning of the aforementioned Regulations.
Those who are qualified to be treated as prisoners of war, should
they be captured, are combatants who have engaged in warfare,and who have fulfilled these conditions. All others may bepunished (in most cases, executed) in accordance with the law.9

Thus, international law sanctions the punishment, usually
execution, of war criminals, i.e., soldiers who do not meet thequalifications of belligerents. We should note here that not only

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129

regular army soldiers, but also members of militias and volunteer
soldiers were required to meet the qualifications of belligerents. All
military personnel who did not fulfill them had no right to be treatedas lawful prisoners of war, if captured.
Also noteworthy is the fact that “The Qualifications of Belligerents”
was incorporated into the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949
relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, and is still in effect.
Civil Defense, a manual compiled in 1969 by the Swiss government,
advises Swiss citizens about actions to be taken in the event of an
enemy invasion. It includes the following precautions.
Regulations governing international law in time of war are to bestrictly observed.
1. Warfare is the responsibility of the Army and only the Army, which
has been organized, outfitted, and trained for that purpose. Military
personnel may be distinguished by uniforms and badges denoting
their ranks, and the fact that they are led by a commander in aposition of responsibility.10 [Italics supplied.]

The Swiss government advised its people that military personnel
must strictly observe international law, laying special emphasis on theitalicized portions of the text cited above. This part of the document
may be considered a paraphrase of the “Qualifications of
Belligerents.” If not in the same order, there is an item that
corresponds to each of the four items in that section of theConvention.
Chinese troops had no legal right to prisoner-of-war status.
Nevertheless, the Japanese treated them as prisoners of war. During
the segregation of soldiers from civilians, which took place from theend of 1937 to early 1938, they allowed Chinese military personnel toregister as civilians. In light of these facts, we shall examine records
kept by Europeans and Americans in the order in which they were
written.
Smith’s Lecture (1)“The Second Sino-Japanese War,” compiled by the German Embassyin Nanking, contains a lecture presented by a Mr. Smith, acorrespondent for Reuters. Since this same lecture also appears inRabe’s diary, under the title “Report of an Address by Mr. Smith

130

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction(Reuters) in Hankow,” we would like to submit it to scrutiny. A
summary of the address was prepared in Hankou on January 1, 1938.
It is, therefore, likely that the actual address was delivered by Smithon or about December 20, 1937.
By the eve of 13 December [the night of December 12], Chinese
troops and civilians had begun to loot. Mainly grocery stores
were pillaged, but Chinese soldiers were also seen leaving private
homes with food. It would be a mistake, however, to claim that
Chinese troops were intent on systematic looting.
It is worth describing the scenes that took place outside
Chinese clothing stores in South City. Hundreds of soldiersthronged before these shops. Ready-made civilian clothes of every
sort sold like hotcakes. Soldiers spent their last cent on theseclothes, changed into them out in the street, threw their uniforms
away, and vanished as civilians. Several hundred of these civilians
gathered later at the Military College and the International Club.11[Italics supplied.]

On December 8, an order was issued instructing residents to go to
the Safety Zone. Therefore, by the night of December 12, four days
later, the most of them had already complied. Furthermore, the news
had spread that the most intense warfare would be waged in thesouthern part of Nanking. And in fact, a bitter struggle did take place
there. It is extremely unlikely that clothing stores were actually open
and operating while rifle bullets and artillery shells flew overhead.
Chinese troops probably broke into them to obtain civilian garb.
Smith reported that Chinese soldiers “threw their uniforms away,and vanished as civilians.” Can soldiers become “civilians” by simply
changing into civilian clothing on the battlefield?
Next, Smith describes the situation on December 13, the day
Nanking fell.
It was not until almost noon that Mr. McDaniel spotted the firstJapanese patrols in South City. In groups of six to twelve men
they cautiously and slowly felt their way forward along the mainstreets. Occasional shots could be heard. Here and there one
saw dead civilians at the side of the road, who, or so the Japanesesaid, had been shot while trying to flee. At the sight of the Japanese,a sense of relief seemed to pass through the Chinese civilian population,and they came out ready to accept the Japanese if they would have

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131

behaved humanely.
In the so-called Safety Zone about a hundred Chinese had been
killed by stray bullets and grenades and several hundreds morewounded.12 [Italics supplied.]

As Rabe’s diary, The Good Man of Nanking, first revealed, Chinese
troops had positioned a small anti-aircraft gun on the southern edgeof the Safety Zone.13 That gun was, as Captain Orikono Suetaro,
23rd Infantry Regiment, wrote in his war journal, at Qingliangshan.14
The Japanese were adjusting the angle of elevation of their gun
barrels as they bombarded the fort at Qingliangshan. That is why
some stray shells landed in the Safety Zone.
But as is clear from Document No. 9, “there had been very little
destruction by stray shells ... .”15 Therefore, only Smith claimed that“about a hundred Chinese had been killed by stray bullets andgrenades and several hundreds more wounded,” and he was surely
mistaken.
Smith did not say who had shot the Chinese. This omission isvery important, because if the Japanese had shot civilians, they would
have been in violation of international law. If Smith was certain that
the Japanese were guilty, one would think he would have been more
explicit. By using vague language, however, he was inviting his
audience to assume that the Japanese were responsible.
But it was probably, as the Japanese explained to Smith, Chinese
soldiers in civilian clothing who were shot by their comrades — by asupervisory unit, as they attempted to escape.
By then, most of Nanking’s noncombatants had congregated in the
Safety Zone, so they could not have been in the battle zone in thesouthern part of the city. Therefore, civilians attempting to flee
could not have been shot by the Japanese. Any corpses found weremost likely those of soldiers who had divested themselves of theiruniforms and changed into civilian clothing. During the course of
their flight, between December 12 and early morning on December 13,
they were shot by members of the supervisory unit.
The China Journal (January 1, 1938 issue) was more objective.
When news of [Tang Shengzhi’s] flight became known, theChinese soldiers attempted to leave the city. They were mowed
down by machine guns in the hands of their own comrades ... .16

As Smith reported, “a sense of relief seemed to pass through the

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Chinese civilian population” that had taken refuge in the Safety Zone.
Nanking’s residents welcomed the Japanese Army. They anticipatedthat the well-disciplined Japanese troops would restore order andpeace, once they entered the city.
Fitch’s AccountGeorge Fitch wrote an account similar in content to Smith’s lecture.
Harold Timperley, the editor of What War Means: The Japanese Terror
in China, included letters sent to him in Shanghai by both Fitch andMiner Searle Bates in the book. This work was published in great
haste, and Timperley did not take the time to do any fact-checking.
Fitch’s letter, an excerpt of which follows, appears in Chapter 1.
[The Japanese] were first reported in the Zone at eleven o’clockthat morning, the 13th. I drove down with two of our committee
members to meet them, just a small detachment at the southern
entrance to the Zone. They showed no hostility, though a few
moments later they killed twenty refugees who were frightened bytheir presence and ran from them.17 [Italics supplied.]

Fitch claims to have witnessed the shooting of refugees byJapanese military personnel at about noon on December 13, at thesouthern edge of the Safety Zone. But except for Fitch, no one — no
Japanese, no American, no German — recorded an incident in which
the Japanese “killed twenty refugees who were frightened by theirpresence and ran from them.” That is not surprising. At noon on
December 13, the Japanese had not yet arrived on the scene (in the
Safety Zone). Their sweep of the Safety Zone did not begin until thefollowing day, December 14.
Fitch and his two colleagues from the International Committee
could not have encountered Japanese military personnel “at thesouthern entrance to the Zone.” He claimed that he had seen themkill “twenty refugees who were frightened by their presence and ran
from them.” But why would refugees flee at the sight of Japanese
troops? Did Smith not report that “at the sight of the Japanese, asense of relief seemed to pass through the Chinese civilian
population?”
Approximately one year after Fitch’s account was published,
Documents from the Nanking Safety Zone was issued. It contained a
related account, an excerpt from Document No. 9, dated December 17.

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133

In the afternoon of December 13, we found a captain with a groupof Japanese soldiers resting on Han Chung Lu [Hanzhong Road]. We
explained to him where the Zone was and marked it on his map.
We politely called his attention to the three Red Cross Hospitals
and told him about the disarmed soldiers.18 [Italics supplied.]

As readers will note, this is the same scene that Fitch described.
Hanzhong Road is at the southern edge of the Safety Zone. But there
are two discrepancies between Fitch’s account and Document No. 9.
The first is the time. Did the encounter take place at 11:00 a.m. orat noon on December 13? Whichever the case, this is not a serious
discrepancy. The second is Fitch’s mention of 20 refugees’ being
killed when they were frightened by the appearance of the Japaneseand ran from them. This incident is not recorded in Document No. 9.
Fitch’s record is a personal account. When one compares the two, it
is easy to detect the inaccuracies in his description.
The Account in Rabe’s DiaryJohn Rabe was the chairman of the International Committee for the
Nanking Safety Zone. Sometime on December 13, he and his party
travelled north on Zhongshan Road. They passed the University of
Nanking Hospital, and turned onto Zhongshan North Road. Thenthey headed for the Foreign Ministry, which was being used as a field
hospital. The following is an excerpt from his entry for that day.
The dead and wounded lie side by side in the driveway leading
up to the Foreign Ministry. The garden, like the rest of Chung
Shan Lu [Zhongshan Road], is strewn with pieces of cast-off
military equipment.19

The dead and wounded lying in front of the field hospital were
probably Chinese soldiers, many of whom had shed their uniforms
and thrown away their weapons on their way to the hospital at theForeign Ministry. But Rabe described them only as “dead andwounded.” The use of language like this invites misunderstanding.
Rabe and his two companions from the Committee then left theForeign Ministry and drove back to the main street.
We drive very cautiously down the main street.

There’s a danger

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

you may drive over one of the hand grenades lying about and be
blown sky-high. We turn onto Shanghai Lu, where several deadcivilians are lying, and drive on toward the advancing Japanese. One
Japanese detachment, with a German-speaking doctor, tells us that theJapanese general is not expected for two days yet. Since the Japaneseare marching north, we race down side streets to get around themand are able to save three detachments of about 600 Chinese soldiers by
disarming them. Some of them don’t want to obey the call tothrow down their weapons, but then decide it’s a good idea when they
see the Japanese advancing in the distance. We then quartered these
men at the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Court.20

Again, Rabe does not state explicitly that the dead civilians wereshot by the Japanese. But that seems to be what he wishes to imply.
A rereading of this entry raises further doubts.
After Rabe and his companions had travelled approximately 100
meters from the Foreign Ministry, they turned onto Shanghai Road,
where they encountered the advancing Japanese. As we have statedpreviously, Shanghai Road was part of the Safety Zone. It was alsopart of the sector that the 7th Infantry Regiment had been assigned to
sweep (See p.117). However, the 7th Regiment did not enter the Safety
Zone until the following day, December 14. On December 13, it was
stationed on the west side of an airfield in Nanking, about two
kilometers from the Zhongshan Gate.21
Rabe’s description places the medical officer he encountered on
the front line. During and after hostilities, medical officers werealways stationed at a field hospital behind the battle line. On
December 13, there was a field hospital at the southern base of
Zijinshan, so the medical officers would have been there. They could
not have been on Shanghai Road.
A Japanese medical officer might have studied the German
language and, thus, might have been able to converse with Rabe.
That is why “a German-speaking doctor” was created, to render thestory more believable. But even if a medical officer had been on
Shanghai Road, the account is still suspect. A medical officer would
not have been privy to information pertaining to thecommander-in-chief’s scheduled arrival in Nanking. Major-General
Iinuma Mamoru wrote in his war journal on December 14, “I was
informed by the Central China Area Army chief of staff, by telephone,that he plans to hold the ceremonial parade on December 17 and,
therefore, wishes the sweep to be completed by then.”22 On December

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135

13, no one knew when the commander-in-chief would be arriving inNanking. Rabe’s account was probably based on information obtained
after the fact.
Rabe mentions that his party rushed to pass the Japanese unit,
which was marching north, and then encountered and disarmed three
Chinese units. If they really did pass the Japanese, why were Rabeand his companions, civilians, permitted to enter the dangerous
sweep area outside the Safety Zone? At the time, they were on theperimeter of the Safety Zone, on Zhongshan North Road.
And if Chinese troops had seen the Japanese approaching, theJapanese would have seen them, too, and gone on the alert. It is
unlikely that, under such circumstances, Rabe could have disarmed
the Chinese, despite his claim. Could he have escorted 600 disarmed
Chinese soldiers to the field hospital at the Foreign Ministry, or to theSupreme Court, and then retraced his steps?
Rabe wrote that as he was travelling south on Zhongshan North
Road, the Japanese were advancing north on the same road. One
would think that his party would have encountered the Japanese,
who would have asked him to turn over the Chinese troops. It isdifficult to imagine Rabe’s refusing that request and marching the
Chinese to the Foreign Ministry.
Or did the Japanese make no demands of Rabe? That is alsodifficult to believe. But even if they did not, surely someone would
have told an Army officer that Rabe, having introduced himself to theJapanese, escorted the Chinese soldiers to the Foreign Ministry. The
incident would certainly have been mentioned in a battle report, but
no such record exists. The many doubts raised by this part of his
account make it impossible to believe that Rabe disarmed Chinese
troops while Japanese military personnel watched.
Rabe continues with his description of the events of December 13.
It is not until we tour the city that we learn the extent of thedestruction. We come across corpses every 100 to 200 yards.
The bodies of civilians that I examined had bullet holes in their backs.
These people had presumably been fleeing and were shot frombehind.23

The 66th Infantry Regimental Order issued at 9:00 p.m. on
December 13 can be found in Source Material Relating to the Battle of
Nanking, Vol. 1. The order includes an unusual note stating that insouthern Nanking, “there were signs that some foreigners in an

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

automobile had been inspecting the area, and taking photographs.”24
The “foreigners” may very well have been Rabe’s party. Rabementions having seen the bodies of civilians who had been shot frombehind. But like Smith, he does not say who shot them. Rabe
deliberately used the passive voice, omitting the subject of thesentence — the perpetrators of the deed — so that at first glance,
readers would assume that the Japanese had shot civilians in the back.
However, as previously stated, the 7th Infantry Regiment did notconduct its sweep of the Safety Zone until December 14. Any
corpses of soldiers executed by that regiment on December 13 would
have necessarily been outside the Safety Zone. Rabe must haveexited the Safety Zone for his tour of the city. There were no
civilians outside the Safety Zone, so he was mistaken to write“civilians.” If he did see corpses, they were those of Chinese soldiers
who had posed as civilians.
If the Japanese had actually shot and killed civilians, one would
assume that Rabe, as chairman of the International Committee, would
have submitted a protest to the Japanese Embassy. Since he did
submit protests in connection with other murders, why is it that henever mentioned this one?
On the other hand, when James Espy, vice-consul at the American
Embassy, returned to Nanking on January 6, he was visited by the 14
Americans remaining in the city. They told him about the events
that had transpired in Nanking. Their accounts were compiled into
the top-secret “Espy Report,” which was sent to the American
Embassy in Hankou.
It is logical that the Espy Report would include claims made byRabe and Fitch, i.e., that there were many civilian corpses on
Shanghai Road, and that 20 refugees were killed when theyencountered and ran from Japanese military personnel. After all,Fitch and Rabe were both accompanied by two other members of theInternational Committee when they made their respective inspections.
Then why does neither man’s account appear in the Espy Report?25
The only plausible explanation is that the “civilians” or “refugees”
mentioned by Rabe, Smith, and Fitch were Chinese soldiers in civilian
clothing who were shot in the back by the Chinese supervisory unit.
That is why, even in his diary, in which he wrote his own impressions,
Rabe did not mention having seen corpses of civilians who had been
shot in the back by the Japanese military. Furthermore, he neither
submitted a complaint to the Japanese Embassy, nor mentioned theincident in protests drafted by the International Committee inREQUIREMENTS FOR PRISONER OF WAR STATUS

137

Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.
Steele’s Dispatch from the Oahu (December 15)
Steele wrote about the sweep conducted by the Japanese in an article
that appeared in the December 15 edition of the Chicago Daily News.
He described the systematic execution of 300 Chinese at the city wallnear the riverbank as the last thing he saw as his party headed to
Xiaguan to board a boat bound for Shanghai. Steele also claimed
that thousands of residents had been executed, most of them innocent
civilians.26
In Witness to the Nanking Incident, Okumiya Masatake cites the
portion of Steele’s article that refers to the systematic execution of 300
Chinese.27
However, Okumiya wrote “Chinese soldiers,” not“Chinese.” His conviction that these were executions of prisoners ofwar, which were prohibited by international law, probably caused
him to commit this error in transcription.
We still do not know, however, why Steele wrote that the Japanese
executed 300 Chinese rather than 300 Chinese soldiers.
Smith’s Lecture (2)Smith, like Steele, left Nanking on December 15. We have alreadyexamined excerpts from his lecture, but will now refer to its
conclusion, since the material it contains is especially relevant.
On 15 December ... When the wait for our departure lasted longer
than expected, we used the time to undertake a short investigative
walk. We saw how the Japanese had tied up some thousand
Chinese out in an open field, and watched as small groups of themwere led away to be shot. They were forced to kneel and were thenshot in the back of the head. We had observed some 100 suchexecutions, when the Japanese officer in charge noticed us andordered us to leave at once. What happened to the rest of theChinese, I cannot say.28 [Italics supplied.]

As we mentioned earlier, this lecture also appears in Nanking noshinjitsu, the Japanese translation of Der gute Deutsche von Nanking.
However, auf einem freien Feld (in an open field) is mistranslated as“plaza,”29 leading the reader to believe that the events described took
place within the city of Nanking, when in actuality they occurred

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

outside the city, in Xiaguan. Furthermore, the translator omits theword “thousand.”30
In any case, the scene described in Steele’s article is the same onethat Smith witnessed. And like Steele, Smith stated that “Chinese”
had been executed. One wonders why he did not write that it was
Chinese soldiers who were executed.
Durdin’s Dispatch from the Oahu (December 17)
Next, we shall examine an article by Durdin that appeared in the
December 18 edition of The New York Times, under the headlines “AllCaptives Slain,” “Civilians Also Killed as the Japanese Spread Terror in
Nanking,” and “Nanking Butchery Marked Its Fall.”Through wholesale atrocities and vandalism at Nanking theJapanese Army has thrown away a rare opportunity to gain therespect and confidence of the Chinese inhabitants and of foreign
opinion there.
...
The mass executions of war prisoners added to the horrors theJapanese brought to Nanking. After killing the Chinese soldiers
who threw down their arms and surrendered, the Japanese combed
the city for men in civilian garb who were suspected of being
former soldiers.
...
Just before boarding the ship for Shanghai, this writer watched
the execution of two hundred men on the Bund.31 [Italics supplied.]

Before we address the problems presented by this excerpt, wemust note some errors in the Japanese translation, as it appears inNanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References: Both“slaughter” and “atrocities” are rendered as “massacre.”32
Translations must be faithful renditions of the source language.
Durdin did not personally witness the “slaying of all captives.”
He simply recorded rumors that he had heard. An entry in the diaryof Dr. Robert Wilson written on December 24, which appears inNanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References, reads asfollows.
And now they tell us that there are twenty thousand soldiers stillin the Zone (where they get their figures no one knows) and that

REQUIREMENTS FOR PRISONER OF WAR STATUS

139

they are going to hunt them out and shoot them all.33

Durdin based his article on rumors that were circulating at thetime. But the source of the assertion that there were 20,000 Chinese
soldiers inside the Safety Zone was, of course, the Japanese military.
For instance, “The military say there are still twenty thousandsoldiers in the Zone”34 appears in Chapter 2 (written by Fitch) of What
War Means: The Japanese Terror in China. The hypothesis that “atleast 20,000 were killed in this way, though we have not been able toobtain detailed accounts”35 appears in the Espy Report (“The Situationin Nanking”. And based on that hypothesis, the prosecution, at theTokyo Trials, asserted in the Prosecutorʹs Summation (2) that “over20,000 persons were executed out of hand by the Japanese.”36
The truth is that Chinese troops inside Nanking had shed theiruniforms, thrown away or concealed their weapons, and infiltrated
the Safety Zone. If they had laid down their arms and surrendered,
it is likely that they would have been treated as lawful prisoners ofwar. Nevertheless, despite Durdin’s claim, no Chinese soldiers laid
down their arms and surrendered.
Therefore, from the Japanese viewpoint, Chinese troops were stillin a state of war, and might counterattack at any time. And in fact,
they did attack Japanese military personnel after the fall of Nanking.
(See Chapter 8.)
That is why the Japanese captured them, and executed thoseamong them who were hostile. Those were the executions that
Durdin saw on his way to Shanghai. He described them as “massexecutions of war prisoners.” Why did he write “the execution of
200 men?” What prevented him from writing “the execution of 200
Chinese prisoners of war?”
Durdin’s Dispatch from Shanghai (December 22)
An article that Durdin dispatched from Shanghai on December 22
appeared in The New York Times, January 9, 1938 edition.
Civilians of both sexes and all ages were also shot by the Japanese. ...
Tours of the city by foreigners during the period when the Japanese wereconsolidating their control of the city revealed daily fresh civilian dead.
Often old men were to be seen face downward on the pavements,
apparently shot in the back at the whim of some Japanese soldier.
Wholesale looting was one of the major crimes of the Japanese140

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

occupation.37[Italics supplied.]

This article and those cited previously have two points in common.
The first is that Durdin, Steele, and Smith all based their writings onreports from other foreigners, probably Fitch and Rabe. However,
Rabe never wrote that civilians had been shot in the back by Japanese
troops.
The second is that, despite the fact that Durdin, Smith, and Steele
protested “mass executions of war prisoners,” they dared not writethat the Japanese executed 200 (or 300) prisoners of war, or 200
soldiers, or 200 civilians.
All three used ambiguous language. Steele wrote that “300
Chinese” were executed; Smith, that “1,000 Chinese” were executed;
and Durdin, that “200 men” were executed. Was their choice of words
influenced by their knowledge that the executions were lawful?
Durdin and the other journalists could write only comments like,“Wholesale looting was one of the major crimes of the Japanese
occupation.” If the Japanese had killed a great number of civilians(prisoners of war), they would have been guilty of violatinginternational law. Why did the journalists not write that the major
crime of the Japanese occupation of Nanking was the mass murder ofcivilians (prisoners of war)?
As we shall describe later in more detail, of all murders attributed
to Japanese military personnel, only two cases were actuallywitnessed by foreigners. One involved lawful executions witnessedby Christian Kröger. The other was an incident described in
testimony given by John Magee at the Tokyo Trials, and which
involved the shooting of a Chinese male who fled in response to achallenge (when he was stopped for questioning). However, accounts
such as “Civilians of both sexes and all ages were also shot by theJapanese” appear nowhere in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.
Abend’s Dispatch (December 19)
On December 15, Durdin, Steele, and other foreign correspondents
left Nanking. Subsequent accusations were made by European andAmerican residents of the city. An article written by Hallett Abend
for The New York Times (December 19 edition), is of considerable
interest.
Japanese authorities realize and ruefully admit that it is useless toREQUIREMENTS FOR PRISONER OF WAR STATUS

141

attempt to suppress the shocking facts, for an indictment on the
conduct of Japanese soldiers will not be based upon tales ofChinese, who could be charged with prejudice and hysteria. On
the contrary, it will be based upon diaries and careful notes ofhourly outrages kept by responsible Americans and Germans who
remained in the city throughout the ghastly events and are still
there.38

Abend castigated the Japanese military for alleged atrocities, rapes,
and murders. He predicted that charges would be brought against
the Japanese military by foreign residents of Nanking, based on notes
they had taken.
Report in The China Weekly Review (January 29, 1938)
As Abend predicted, foreign residents of Nanking did condemn theactions of the Japanese in that city. Their accusations appeared in
the January 29, 1938 issue of The China Weekly Review, a Shanghai
publication edited by an anti-Japanese, pro-Chiang American named
John Powell. Reports from foreigners in Nanking were printed
under the title “Outstanding Events in the Sino-Japanese War.”
Dec. 23. —Collapse of discipline among section of Japaneseforces and atrocities committed by Japanese soldiersin Nanking revealed in dispatches published in New
York Times from Nanking correspondent reprinted in
Shanghai Evening Post. Outrages included “chaosof looting and raping which has made the Japanese
entry into Nanking a national disgrace.”
Dec. 24. — Massacre of civilians, rape of Chinese women andsystemetic [sic] destruction and looting of property in
Nanking by Japanese troops confirmed by reliable
foreign residents in the city. Eye-witness accounts ofwholesale looting and murder.39 [Italics supplied.]By “reliable foreign residents in the city,” the writer was probablyreferring to Rabe, Bates, and Fitch. But social position does notnecessarily guarantee accurate statements. The three men certainly
censured Japanese troops for their “atrocities” and “outrages,”
specifically, looting, raping, and the murder of civilians. But thesewere not eyewitness accounts. As we have described in detail, these

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

criticisms were all based on hearsay.40 Furthermore, there was noteven one eyewitness account of the unlawful murder of “civilians.”
Since this is such an crucial issue, we shall reiterate that like
Durdin and Steele, European and American residents of Nanking
knew that Chinese troops who had discarded their uniforms andconcealed weapons did not meet the legal qualifications of prisonersof war. Therefore, they were unable to claim that the Japanese had
massacred prisoners of war. To find an excuse to charge theJapanese with violation of international law by executing Chinese
troops, they represented the latter as former soldiers (civilians), andclaimed that there had been a “massacre of civilians.”
British Consular Officer Castigates Japan (1)In addition to the “massacre of civilians” argument, there was anotheroverriding theme that pervaded foreign criticism of the behavior ofJapanese military personnel in Nanking. The theme was atrocities,
and its chief proponent was E. W. Jeffery, the British consul in
Nanking. In a report dated January 28, 1938, Jeffrey denounced theJapanese as follows.
The atrocities committed during the first two weeks of theoccupation of the city were of a nature and on a scale which arealmost incredible.41

This report was sent by the American Embassy in Nanking to the
U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C., by wire. It has beenpreserved on microfilm at the Department of State under the title“Records of the Department of State Regarding Political Relations
between China and Japan, 1930-1944.”
The period singled out by the British consul was the two weeks
subsequent to the Japanese occupation of Nanking (not two months,
as claimed by the Chinese at the Tokyo Trials held subsequent to theend of World War II).
The target of that criticism was atrocities — not a “Nanking
Massacre.” The editor of Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1:
American References was taking unconscionable liberties in entitling
the Jeffery’s report “British Consul’s Report on the Nanking
Massacre,”42 rather than “British Consul’s Report on Atrocities in
Nanking.”

REQUIREMENTS FOR PRISONER OF WAR STATUS

143

British Consular Officer Castigates Japan (2)What did Jeffrey mean by “atrocities?”contains the following passage.

His report of January 29

Military lawlessness continues due to a lack of centralized control.
Majority of cases are of ransacking.43

This report was written in late January. If the execution ofregular army soldiers had been in violation of international law, thatwould have been cited as the most opprobrious unlawful act. But
according to the Jeffery, the main Japanese violation of internationallaw was “ransacking.”
He added that “atrocities” had beencommitted in Nanking, without specifying what those atrocities were.
Similarly, the Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee,
issued in 1939, when Professor Bates was chairman of the Committee,
criticized the sweep conducted by the Japanese in mid-December,citing “the general slaughter of mid-December.”44 However, it
contained no mention of a massacre perpetrated by the Japanesemilitary.
Defining “Atrocity”
The next topic we would like to address is the difference between“massacre” and “atrocity.” The highly respected Cobuild English
Dictionary defines “atrocity” as “a very cruel, shocking action.”45
The torture of prisoners of war, looting, and rape, all of which are
in violation of international law, would certainly be considered
atrocities.
The only atrocity cited by Vice-consul Jeffrey was
ransacking.
Defining “Slaughter”
The same dictionary defines “slaughter” as the killing of people oranimals in a way that is cruel, unjust, or unnecessary, and provides
the following sentence to show how the word is used: “Thirty-fourpeople were slaughtered while queuing up to cast their votes.”46
By “the general slaughter of mid-December, the Report of the
Nanking International Relief Committee was referring to unjust
executions of regular Chinese Army soldiers. If the executions were144

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

unjust, the report should have called them “unjust slaughter inviolation of international law,” i.e., a massacre. But it made no
explicit mention of a massacre.
Defining “Massacre”“Massacre” is defined as “the killing of a large number of people atthe same time in a violent and cruel way.”47 The following sample
sentence is provided: “300 civilians are believed to have beenmassacred by the rebels ... Troops indiscriminately massacred thedefenceless population.”48
When defenseless civilians or prisoners of war are attacked andkilled by an armed group, this is violence and brutality in the extreme,i.e., a massacre. But warfare is a serious of battles, where one must
kill or be killed. In Nanking, Chinese troops did not surrender en
masse. Both inside and outside the city, combatants were engaging
in hostilities. No matter how violent or brutal the conflicts, theywere, as Fujioka Nobukatsu writes in Reforming Modern andContemporary History Education, acts of war.49
Report from 2nd Brigade, U.S. Marines
Another noteworthy report is one issued by the 2nd Brigade, U.S.
Marines, on December 18, 1937, by the Office of the Brigade
Intelligence Officer Headquarters, Second Marine Brigade.
It
appears in “Records of the Department of State Regarding Political
Relations between China and Japan, 1930-1944. An excerpt follows.
Japanese units in Nanking are still engaged in mopping up
operations, searching out small bands of snipers. Large numbersof Chinese soldiers who shed their uniforms in an effort to bespared, are summarily shot with characteristic ruthlessness.50

This part of the report was concerned with operations that took
place between 8:00 a.m. on December 16, 1937 and 8:00 a.m. on
December 18. It states that many Chinese soldiers were “summarily
shot,” but does not accuse the Japanese of having violated
international law.
If they had violated international law, then it might have been
appropriate to write that the Chinese soldiers had been “massacred.”
But that is not what was written. Regardless of the degree of brutality

REQUIREMENTS FOR PRISONER OF WAR STATUS

145

that characterizes a battle, as long as it does not violate internationallaw, it is considered an act of war, not a massacre.
Furthermore, the facts have been subverted in this report, which
implies that large numbers of Chinese troops shed their uniforms sothat they would be spared by the Japanese when they conducted their
sweep. But the truth was that large numbers of Chinese troops shed
their uniforms, and infiltrated the Safety Zone with weapons
concealed on their persons. That is why the Japanese were forced to
conduct a sweep of the Safety Zone — to segregate civilians fromsoldiers.
Report from German Embassy in Nanking
Since this is such an important issue, we would like to cite anotherreport prepared by a diplomat.
To the best of this writer’sknowledge, there are only two records that accuse the Japanesemilitary of violating international law. One is a report written by
Secretary Georg Rosen of the German Embassy. The other is Bates’
memorandum, dated January 25, 1938. We shall address the latter
later on in this book, but for now we shall examine “Events in
Nanking” written by Rosen (dated January 20, 1938) and included in
The Sino-Japanese Conflict, compiled by the German Embassy in
Nanking.
Between December 18 and 20, while we were on board the British
warship Bee, moored very near Nanking, Sublieutenant Kondo
spoke to British Major-General Holt. He told him that theJapanese needed to conduct a “sweep” of a large island in the
Yangtze River downstream of Nanking, since there were 30,000
Chinese soldiers there. This “sweep” or “mopping up” operationis mentioned in official Japanese Army announcements. But it is,in effect, the murder of defenseless enemy soldiers, and goesagainst the highest principles of humanitarian warfare.51

Rosen used the expression “highest principles of humanitarian
warfare.” Diplomats and foreign correspondents were very familiar
with the letter of international law.
It is true that Article 23 of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague
Convention prohibits the killing or wounding of “an enemy who,
having laid down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, hassurrendered at discretion.” Then, did the sweep scheduled by the

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Japanese of “a large island in the Yangtze River” constitute a violationof those rules?
Rosen described the sweep as the “murder of defenseless enemy
soldiers.” Therefore, he was, however indirectly, claiming that theJapanese sweep violated the Regulations.
This writer does not know whether the sweep in question actually
took place. But, as we have seen, the sweep of the city of Nanking
had already been completed by mid-December. Rosen was aware ofthat sweep when he wrote his report on January 20. If he wasconvinced that it was in violation of international law, he could havementioned that in his report, and criticized the Japanese for having
murdered “defenseless enemy soldiers.” However, he did not. In
other words, Rosen did not directly characterize the sweep of
Nanking as being “in conflict with the highest principles ofhumanitarian warfare.”Document No. 4
The International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone shared
Secretary Rosen’s perspective. According to Document No. 4, dated
December 15, the third day after the fall of Nanking, Chinese soldiersin the Safety Zone were “lawful prisoners of war.”52 But theCommittee later retracted that statement, and it was never reiterated.
The Committee realized that Chinese troops in the Safety Zone were
not lawful prisoners of war.
China Today (January 1938)
Articles written by American correspondents at the time could hardly
be termed unbiased reportage. Nevertheless, they were included in
respected English-language magazines published in Shanghai. For
instance, Peter Nielsen’s “The Nanking Atrocities” appeared in China
Today, a magazine published in the United States. His article wasbased on a report written by Durdin and published in the December
18 edition of the New York Times. In it, Nielsen wrote of the “massmurder of peaceful civilians.”53 (Incidentally, the title of that article ismistranslated as “Nanking Massacre” in a collection of American
sources translated into Japanese. Another translation error is therendering of “mass execution of war prisoners” as “mass slaughter of
war prisoners.”54)

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147

The China Journal (January 1938)
At about the same time, an editorial appeared in the Shanghai
publication The China Journal (January 1938 issue), in the “Events andComments” column. It stated that compared with the slaughter
perpetrated by the Japanese military in Nanking, the behavior
exhibited by Chinese troops prior to the fall of the city was child’splay.55
Historically, the aforementioned articles or reports appertain to
the initial phase of the “Nanking Massacre” argument.
Time Magazine (February 14, 1938)
Shortly thereafter, an article mentioning “Nanking atrocities”
appeared in the February 14, 1938 issue of the popular American
weekly, Time. Based on an article written by Steele, it begins:“With Japanese last week still forbidding foreign correspondents to
go to captured Nanking .... the Chicago Daily News received last week
one of the best eyewitness accounts thus far of the ‘Nanking atrocities’
from its Far East Ace Reporter A. T. Steele.”56 It concludes byreiterating Steele’s claim — i.e., that the “Japanese executed 20,000 at
Nanking. However, Steele’s claim, as we have mentioned, wasbased not on an eyewitness account, but on a rumor. (Theaforementioned collection of translated American sources renders“Nanking atrocities” as “Nanking massacre.”57)
North China Daily News (January 21, 1938)
The January 21, 1938 issue of North China Daily News, an established
English-language newspaper published in Shanghai, also refers to amassacre, reporting that its victims numbered 10,000.58
China Forum (March 19, 1938)
The March 19, 1938 edition of China Forum, a weekly issued by the
Chinese League of Nations Union in Hankou, carried an anonymous
editorial asserting that 80,000 persons had been massacred.59 Thiswas probably the last time during that era that the Japanese wereaccused, in the Chinese print media, of having perpetrated a
massacre.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

American Military Attaché’s AccountThree months after Rosen had penned his “Events in Nanking,” Cabot
Coville, a military attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, travelled to
Nanking on an inspection tour. In April 1938, he was briefed byJohn Allison of the U.S. Embassy in Nanking, and also by Espy, Bates,
Smythe, Rosen, and Jeffery.60
Coville kept records of these meetings. According to Nanking
Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References, Allison told himthat the Japanese Army had looted and raped for several weeks, as
though he were the spokesman for the foreign community in
Nanking.61
But no one indicated, as Rosen did, that the Japanese sweep was“in conflict with the highest principles of humanitarian warfare.”Even Rosen, whom Coville described as being openly anti-Japanese,
did not claim that the execution of prisoners of war violated
international law.
Prior to the fall of Nanking, leaderless Chinese troops shed theiruniforms, concealed weapons on their persons, and infiltrated the
Safety Zone. As long as they did not lay down their weapons andsurrender, Chinese and Japanese were still at war. Therefore, theJapanese arrested enemy soldiers and executed those who resisted.
These executions were witnessed by European and Americancorrespondents.
But Chinese troops, having failed to meet their obligations as
belligerents, were not eligible to be treated as prisoners of war. No
one could rightfully accuse the Japanese of having conducted
executions in violation of international law.

149

CHAPTER 11:

DOCUMENTS OF
THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)Street Markets Open Three Days After Occupation
By December 8, most of Nanking’s residents had taken refuge in the
Safety Zone, which Japanese troops were forbidden to enter.
Japanese military policy was “kill no civilians, and refrain fromentering the Safety Zone.”1 That is why public safety was restored
so quickly.
On December 14, two days after Nanking fell, the Japanesecommenced their sweep of
the Safety Zone.
The
operation did not target
civilians.
At about 3:00
p.m., Colonel Tanida Isamu,
accompanied by a squad ofsentries
attachedto
Headquarters, set out by
automobile for a tour of
Nanking. His recollectionsof what he saw that day areincludedinEyewitness
Accounts of the Battle of
Nanking, Vol. 4.
The streets of Nanking
werepeaceful.
Residents were busily
cleaning up, and children
were playing in thestreets everywhere wewent.
I saw Japanesesoldiers giving food tosome of them.2

This photograph appeared in The Second
Sino-Japanese War: An Illustrated Report,
February 1, 1938, with the following
caption: “Street vendors in Nanking
selling their wares to Japanese military
personnel.”

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

On December 15, the third day of the occupation, in the Safety
Zone, next to the Japanese Embassy, street vendors were selling
groceries. Some barbers had also set up shop.3 Private1st Class
Inoie Matakazu, 7th Infantry Regiment, who participated in the sweepof the Safety Zone, described these scenes in his diary.
The sweep ended on December 16, and the ceremonial entry took
place on the following day. On December 18, according to Maeda
Yuji’s Caught in the Current of War, war correspondents from Domei
News Agency moved into the company’s former branch office inside
the Safety Zone. They felt that it was safe to return, since the city
was peaceful once more.4 Order had been restored to the point thaton December 19, Private 1st Class Inoie had his hair cut by a barber hehad spotted earlier, in the Safety Zone.5
Were 5,000 Persons Killed Each Day?
Nevertheless, in The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of WorldWar II, Iris Chang writes that “Chinese women were raped in all
locations and at all hours.”6 She also claims that 300,000 people were
killed in Nanking.
The British consul wrote only that Japanese soldiers had committed
unlawful acts (mainly looting) during the two weeks subsequent to
the fall of Nanking. If 300,000 were indeed massacred over a period of
two months, then 5,000 people would have been killed each day, at a
rate of three or four per minute, for a period of 60 days.
For so many homicides, Headquarters would have had to issue awritten plan, and a mobilization order. However, neither was issued
and, in their absence, the killings might have lasted for one day, but
certainly not for 60.
If 5,000 people were massacred each day, 20,000 would have diedbetween December 13 and 17. On December 17, the day theceremonial entry into Nanking took place, corpses would have beenstrewn about the city (including the Safety Zone) — 20,000 of them —since burials did not commence until February 1.7
The total area of the Safety Zone was only 3.86 square kilometers.
If, in such a small space, 100,000, or 300,000, individuals weremassacred, there would have been corpses everywhere. There is no
mention of those corpses in Rabe’s diary, nor in Japanese records.
For instance, according to The Imperial Army Soldiers Who Recorded
the Nanking Massacre: War Journals of the Members of the Yamada
Detachment, 13th Brigade, five soldiers from the Yamada Detachment

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)151

participated in the ceremonial entry into Nanking.8 All of themrecorded their impressions of the city, but no one mentioned piles ofcorpses.
Two days later, Corporal Horikoshi Fumioa of the Yamada
Detachment entered Nanking under orders from the commander of
his unit. While he was in Nanking on official business, he did not
see large numbers of corpses on the streets. What he did see werestreet vendors, from whom he purchased “something that resembled
flat bread, which the refugees were selling.”9These journals contain no mention of massacred corpses, or ofcorpses of any sort, for that matter. Nor does Rabe’s diary. On
December 15, the third day after the fall of Nanking, the city was safeenough for the refugees to engage in commerce.
The Safety Zone’s Population Increases
The population of the Safety Zone burgeoned. As stated in theReport of the Nanking International Relief Committee, included in Rabe’s
diary, and other sources, those remaining in Nanking were “thepoorest of the population.”10 The problem of providing food for the
refugees soon became an urgent one. The International Committee
made a conscious effort to obtain up-to-date population statistics, andoften mentioned them. The first reference appears in Document No.
9, dated December 17, which states that the 200,000 refugees were
threatened with “starvation.”11
How did the International Committee arrive at the figure of
200,000? For many years this question remained unanswered, but
Rabe’s diary has solved the mystery. Apparently, Wang Gupan,head of the National Police Agency, was the source: “There are still
200,000 residents remaining here in Nanking.”12 Wang provided thisinformation on November 28, 1937. Nanking fell on December 13,
but even on December 17, the city’s population was the same as it had
been 20 days before. The International Committee was aware thatNot his real name; a pseudonym has been supplied out of respect
for the writer’s wishes to remain anonymous.
a152

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

the population of Nanking had not changed.
Document No. 10, dated December 18, states, “We 22 Westerners
cannot feed 200,000 Chinese civilians ... .”13 The Committee appealed
to the Japanese military for help.
Document No. 20, dated December 21, mentions difficulties theCommittee had experienced in supplying food and fuel to 200,000
civilians, and adds, “The present situation is automatically andrapidly leading to a serious famine.”14
It is clear from the aforementioned three documents that the
population of Nanking did not change between the end of November
and December 21. There had been no massacre and, therefore, nodecline in the population.
The December 24th Census
Document No. 24, dated December 26 and addressed to the Japanese
Embassy, contains the following sentence: “We are glad to reportthat cases are declining and conditions are much improved.”15
Two weeks after the fall of Nanking, the situation there had, forthe most part, returned to normal, partly because of the International
Committee’s protests to the Japanese military, and the subsequent,some might say draconian, punishment meted out by the latter.
There were two other contributing factors. One was a census,
which was announced on December 22, and implemented on
December 24. Residents of Nanking were asked to register in person16
at locations designated by the Japanese military. They were notpermitted to send proxies. The purpose of the census, during which“civilian passports” were issued, was to separate civilians fromsoldiers.
Interrogations Held to Distinguish Soldiers from Civilians
Interrogations were held simultaneous to the census. In Document
No. 4, the International Committee had reported that it was “unable
to keep the disarmed soldiers separate from civilians.”17 That is why
the Japanese initiated the interrogations under the watchful eyes ofNankingʹs residents — to apprehend stragglers who had infiltrated
the Safety Zone.
We know from the “Journal of Major-General Sasaki Toichi,”which appears in Source Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1,that Sasaki, an officer of the 30th Infantry Brigade, was in charge of

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)153

the interrogations.
Uchida Yoshinao, an interpreter attached to headquarters of the
16th Division, recorded his impressions of the interrogations, whichwere included in The Battle of Nanking.
The Chinese language has regional dialects. The Chinese troops
that defended Nanking, from Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hunan,
spoke a southern dialect, which made it difficult to distinguishthem from civilians by virtue of their speech. But it was easy to
distinguish soldiers from civilians when we used physique as agauge. Chinese from the Self-Government Committee assisted us
with the segregation process.
We did not apprehend any
civilians. Many of the men were wearing army-issue underwear
under civilian garments, so it was easy for us to tell that they were
soldiers.18

There is no reason to suspect that Uchida’s recollections areinaccurate. The Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone contain many
criticisms of the Japanese Army, some justified, and some groundless.
But they include no accounts that accuse the Japanese of harassing
civilians during the segregation process — none in which victims are
named, at least.
As the “Journal of Major-General Sasaki Toichi” describes, theapproximately 2,000 stragglers in the Safety Zone were apprehended
and their weapons confiscated. Therefore, the claim made by theInternational Committee in Document No. 10, dated December 18, i.e.,“But now we can safely assure you that there are no groups ofdisarmed Chinese soldiers in the Zone,”19 was incorrect.
The January 10, 1938 edition of the Yomiuri Shinbun reported that“the inspection of refugees began at the end of 1937. After sevendays, the first stage of the inspection had been completed. Safe
living quarters were provided for 1,600 stragglers and others. They
can now walk around the city without fear.”20
Some Chinese soldiers who had found it difficult to survive inhiding voluntarily surrendered, and were permitted to register ascivilians. The number of stragglers decreased, as did disturbances ofthe peace for which they had been responsible. Furthermore, thepopulation increased when soldiers who had been in hiding turned
themselves in.

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Population of Nanking Reported at 200,000 on December 27
According to Document No. 26, on December 27, three days after the
segregation process commenced, Nanking’s civilian population was
200,000.21
This was the last document to report that figure.
Document No. 41 stated that on January 14, 1938, the total population
was 250,000 — an increase of 50,000.22 The increase also proves that
there had been no large-scale slaughter.
It is the events that occurred prior to January 14 that are at issue.
The Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee cites events thattook place in mid-December.23 Jeffery, the British consul refers to the“first two weeks after the occupation of the city”24 and only those two
weeks.
Exactly what did happen during the two weeks after the fall of
Nanking? Our investigation will focus on criticisms of the Japanesemilitary by the International Committee, which were compiled andpublished in book form more than a year after Nanking fell. The
170-page book is entitled Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone is a compilation of written
protests submitted by the International Committee, edited by Hsü
Shuhsi. Born in 1894, Hsü returned to China after having earned adoctorate at Columbia University and, for a time, served as an advisor
to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. When he edited the Documents, he
was a professor at Yanjing University, which merged with Beijing
University in 1952. The Documents open with a preface written by
Hsü, dated May 9, 1939.
Therefore, the book was probably
published on the second anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War,in July 1939.
We would like to emphasize that the Documents of the Nanking
Safety Zone were not official government documents.
The
International Committee was, according to Document No. 35, “aprivate organization for assistance to civilians.”25 Nevertheless, they
are important because they bear the imprimatur of the Chinese
government: “Prepared under the Auspices of the Council ofInternational Affairs, Chunking,”26 and thus represent the official
position of the Republic of China at the time.

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)155

Murders Reported in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
The following is a list of murders recorded in Documents of the
Nanking Safety Zone.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

There were eyewitnesses to only two of the above 25 cases (52victims). Thus, more than 90% of the reports were based on hearsay.
Were these 25 cases investigated before they were recorded? We
would now like to examine two cases in detail.
Case No. 219
The much-discussed Case No. 219, the first one listed above, isrepresentative of the murder cases recorded. We cite it in its entirety.
Mr. John Magee has an account of a family in South City of 13 inwhich 11 were killed, women raped and mutilated, on December
13-14 by Japanese soldiers. Two small children survived to tell
the story. (Magee)27

The fact that Magee’s name appears at the end of the accountindicates that he recorded information that was reported to him about
the incident. However, Magee did not personally witness themurders.
Magee Provides Another Account of Case No. 219
Magee provided another account of this Case No. 219 to Georg Rosenof the German Embassy. Rosen asked the German Embassy inShanghai to send Magee’s seven-page description of all cases, andfour films the latter had made, to the Foreign Ministry in Germany.
This occurred on February 10, 1938, about 10 days after Magee foundthe eight-year-old girl.
The following is the full text of Magee’s account of Case No. 219,
which was later translated and included in The Sino-Japanese Conflict,compiled by the German Embassy in Nanking.
On December 13, about thrity [sic] soldiers came to a Chinesehouse at #5 Hsing Lu Kao in the southeastern part of Nanking,and demanded entrance. The door was opened by the landlord,a Mohammedan named Ma [1]. They killed him immediately witha revolver and also Mr. Hsia [2], who knelt before them after Ma’s
death, begging them not to kill anyone else. Mrs. Ma [3] asked
them why they had killed her husband and they shot her dead.
Mrs. Hsia [4] was dragged out from under a table in the guest
hall where she had tried to hide with her one-year-old baby [5].

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)After being stripped and raped by one or more men, she wasbayonetted in the chest, and then had a bottle thrust into hervagina, the baby being killed with a bayonet.
Some soldiers then went to the next room where were Mrs.
Hsia’s parents, aged 76 [6] and 74 [7], and her two daughters aged
16 [8] and 14 [9]. They were about to rape the girls when the
grandmother tried to protect them. The soldiers killed her with arevolver. The grandfather grasped the body of his wife and was
killed.
The two girls were then stripped, the older being raped by 2-3men, and the younger by 3.
The older girl was stabbed
afterwards and a cane was rammed into her vagina. The
younger girl was bayonetted also but was spared the horrible
treatment that had been meted out to her sister and her mother.
The soldiers then bayonetted another sister of between 7-8 [10],who was also in the room.
The last murders in the house were of Ma’s two children, aged
4 [11] and 2 years [12] respectively. The older was bayonetted
and the younger split down through the head with a sword.
After being wounded the 8-year old girl [13] crawled to the next
room where lay the body of her mother. Here she staid [sic] for
14 days with her 4-year old sister [14] who had escaped unharmed.
The two children lived on puffed rice and the rice crusts that formin the pan when the rice is cooked. It was from the older of thesechildren that the photographer was able to get part of the story,
and verify and correct certain details told him by a neighbor and a
relative. The child said the soldiers came every day taking thingsfrom the house, but the two children were not discovered as they
Family Structure Chart basted on Magee’s Accounts

157

158

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

hid under some old sheets.
All the people in the neighborhood fled to the Refugee Zone
when such terrible things began to happen. After 14 days the oldwoman [15] shown in the picture returned to the neighborhoodand found the two children.
It was she who led thephotographer to an open space where the bodies had been taken
afterwards. Through questioning her and Mrs. Hsia’s brother[16] and the little girl, a clear knowledge of the terrible tragdey[sic] was gained.28

This is Magee’s account of the incident, whose veracity heallegedly confirmed. The case involved the murder of not one
family, but two. Twelve people were killed, and two sisters escapedwith their lives. The two small children were the only survivors, andthe only witnesses.
A Myriad of Questions
Magee’s account raises a myriad of questions.
(1) The murders supposedly were committed on December 13, 1937.
Fourteen days later, on December 27, the old woman returned to theneighborhood, and found the two children. One would think thatthe news of her discovery would have spread throughout the Safety
Zone and that when the Americans and Europeans heard about theincident (and they certainly would have), they would have conducted
an investigation.
However, according to Magee’s testimony at the Tokyo Trials, he
did not begin his investigation until approximately six weeks after themurders were alleged to have been committed. Rabe did not
mention the case in his diary until January 29. He wrote: “John
Magee found two girls, aged eight and four, whose entire family of
eleven had been murdered in the most gruesome fashion.”29 Notethat Rabe mentions 11 victims, not 12.
(2) The report written by Magee, which we cited earlier, and whichappears in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, includes no mention of women
having been raped and mutilated. Nevertheless, in Documents of the
Nanking Safety Zone, which was published approximately one year
later, Case No. 219 (Magee’s report) states that the women were“raped and mutilated.” What is the explanation for this discrepancy?

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)159(3) No given names are provided for the victims, the eight-year-old
girl, the old woman (the neighbor), or Hsia’s brother. Perhaps thechild didn’t know them. But when Magee testified about this case at
the Tokyo Trials, he said that the child’s grandmother on her mother’sside had led him to the scene of the crime. Surely the grandmotherwould have known the given names of the victims. Magee verified
neither the victims’ ages nor their full names. In the absence of thisbasic information, it is difficult to give credence to his account.
(4) Magee claims that Japanese soldiers forced Ma, the head of thehousehold, to open the door, then stormed into the house and shot
him to death.
Such behavior implies that the crime waspremeditated. But for whatever reason, the two sisters, aged fourand eight, were not killed. Normally, murderers are careful to kill
all witnesses. Why were the children spared?
(5) Though, as Magee wrote, “When this terrible thing began,neighboring residents had all fled to the Safety Zone,” the two little
girls spent two weeks with 12 mutilated corpses. Why didn’t they
run away?
(6) The two girls apparently hid under old sheets after the incident.
Apparently, nearly 30 Japanese soldiers went to the house every day
to steal the residents’ possessions. Normally, one can sense thepresence of another human being, yet they remained undiscovered for
14 days.
(7) The eight-year-old girl, who had sustained a bayonet wound,
did not die from shock. How did she manage to survive without
medical attention for 14 days?
(8) The incident is described as having occurred on December 13 in
the “southeastern part of Nanking.” (An account written by Honda
Katsuichi refers to Magee’s report, but mistranslates “southeastern”
as “southwestern.”30 It was common knowledge that the southeastern
sector of Nanking would become a battle zone even before thehostilities began.)
Furthermore, an evacuation order had been issued on December 8.
According to the December 8th edition of the Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun,
residents of the areas of the city in which hostilities were expected totake place fled to the Safety Zone in droves.31 The areas near
Guanghua Gate (Southeast Gate) and Zhonghua Gate (South Gate)
had been deserted.
Therefore, several days before the crime was said to have beencommitted (December 13), almost all of Nanking’s residents had
departed. Those two families, and only those two families, for some

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

inexplicable reason, elected to remain in their home, within earshot of
the Japanese Army’s deafening artillery fire. It is difficult tounderstand why they remained in a danger zone, knowing full wellthat a Japanese attack was imminent.
(9) The number of family members varies from account to account.
Case No. 219 as described in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
(Magee’s account) states that the household comprised 13 persons.
However, Magee’s account in The Sino-Japanese Conflict mentions 14
people.
Moreover, the family relationships are not at all clear. Who were
the parents of the two children alleged to be the only survivors of theincident, described only as an ʺ8-year-old girl” and her younger sister(aged four)?
Magee abruptly introduces the “8-year-old girl,” writing that she“crawled into the next room, where her mother’s body lay.” Was hermother Hsia’s wife [4] or Ma’s wife [3]? If she was the daughter of
Mr. and Mrs. Hsia, then she must have been the sister of the girl of“between 7-8” [10]. If the two were twins, that would make the girlof “between 7-8ʺ eight years old, but her age was never verified. The“8-year-old girl” did not know how old she was. Neither did the“old woman” nor Hsia’s brother. We can thus assume that the two
girls were not twins. In that case, the girl aged “between 7-8ʺ would
have been seven years old but, again, that information remains
unverified. It would make more sense to assume that the girl“between 7-8ʺ was not the younger sister of the ʺ8-year-old girl.ʺ
Therefore, the “8-year-old girl” could not have been the daughter of
Mr. and Mrs. Hsia.
Then, was she the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Ma? She had afour-year-old sister.
The Mas had a four-year-old child, sex
unknown. That would make the eight-year-old’s younger sister [14]and the Mas’ four-year-old child twins. Twins are easily identifiable,
though, so someone would certainly have made a note to that effect,
also stating their sex. But even that information was not recorded.
Therefore, we may assume that the eight-year-old girl was thedaughter of neither Mr. and Mrs. Ma nor Mr. and Mrs. Hsia.
The Eight-Year-Old Girl Changes Her Story
Kasahara Tokushi’s One Hundred Days in the Nanking Refugee Zone
contains another account told to Magee by Xia Shuqin (theeight-year-old girl).

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)161Japanese soldiers came to the Hsia home in the southeastern partof the city. They killed everyone in the house, 13 people, sparing
only two children, an eight-year-old and a three-year-old (orfour-year-old).32

Thirteen people were killed, according to this account. The girl’ssurname is given as Hsia (Xia). However, in light of our analysis, Hsia
was almost certainly not her name.
There are subtle but obvious differences between the“eight-year-old girl’s” account and those that appear in Case No. 219
in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, and in The Sino-Japanese
Conflict.
(1)
The account of Case No. 219 in Documents of the Nanking
Safety Zone lists 11 victims, while that in The Sino-Japanese Conflictlists 12. To confuse matters further, Xia Shuqin, “the eight-year-old
girl,” mentions 13.
(2) In Magee’s account, the head of the household in question is a
Muslim named Ma, while in the girl’s account, his name is Xia.
(3) The girl’s younger sister survived, but in this account she is notfour years old, but three or four years old.
Most people who have survived an event of this magnitude
remember the details as vividly as if they had happened the previous
day. In some cases they don’t remember anything, but then they
have nothing to tell. If she had a story to communicate, Xia Shuqin
should have told the truth, in which case there would have been no
inconsistencies.
Xia Shuqin’s Story in Honda Katsuichi’s The Road to Nanking
Interestingly enough, Xia Shuqin’s story also appears in Honda
Katsuichi’s The Road to Nanking. This version has the incident taking
place at about 9:00 a.m. on December 13. Xia Shuqin was sofrightened that she screamed, upon which the soldiers stabbed her
three times with their bayonets. She fainted. When she regained
consciousness, she went with her younger sister to the “air-raid
shelter in the landlordʹs inner garden.” The shelter was not a simple
hole dug in the ground, but a structure consisting of “four sturdy desks,
on top of which doors had been placed, and under which straw had

162

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

been laid.” When she reached the shelter, she discovered the bodies
of her mother and the baby. She was afraid to emerge from “under
the desks” during the day, so she seldom ventured out. Even though“severely wounded,” she managed to fetch water from an earthen jar
used by the entire household to store water for cooking by climbing
onto a box.33
Italics have been used to designate portions of this account thatdiffer from that provided by Magee.
Xia Shuqin’s Story in Magee’s Testament
When we viewed the film “Magee’s Testament” on the Internet, we
noticed that Xia Shuqin appears after the film has ended. She speaks
the following lines:
You ask about No. 5 Xinlukou? Thatʹs where I used to live.
Japanese soldiers ran after my father and then shot him in the back,killing him. They also killed a married couple and their children
who lived in the house next door.

As readers will note, this account also differs from Magee’s
description. Inconsistencies have been italicized.
Even more surprising is the fact that Xia Shuqin visited Japan,
where she again told her story. According to the testimony she givesin The Great Nanking Massacre and the Atomic Bomb, compiled by the
Association for the Commemoration of the War Dead, there were 15
people living in the household in question. Japanese soldiers firstkilled Xia Shuqin’s father when he opened the door to them. Thenthey killed her sexagenarian grandparents, her elder sisters (aged 13 and15), and other household members — 13 victims in all. Only Xia
Shuqin, who was eight at the time, and her four-year-old sister were
spared. A week after the murders had been committed, people who hadgone to pick up the bodies discovered the two girls.34
Xu Chuanyin Bears False Witness
Here we would like to add the testimony given by Xu Chuanyin at theTokyo Trials with respect to another case reported by the sameeight-year-old girl. Xu Chuanyin was one of the “Chinese
co-workers”35 who extended unstinting cooperation to theInternational Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. His name

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)163

appears eight times in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.
Xu claimed that he accompanied Magee to the scene of the crime.
As a key witness, one would have expected to find his name in
Magee’s report, but there is no mention of him.
Xu Chuanyin claimed that the bodies of two girls, aged 17(actually, 16) and 14, were found lying in a pool of blood on a table
and in a blood-drenched bed, respectively.36 According to his
account in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, when Magee went to the scene,
all the bodies had been removed. Xu was clearly lying.
Incidentally, at the Tokyo Trials, when questioned about a rapecommitted by Japanese military personnel, Xu again bore false
witness. He testified that he had seen the incident with his own
eyes.37 However, since no record of what he claimed he had
witnessed appeared in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, we must
assume that it did not take place.
Case No. 185
Next we shall address an incident described as Case No. 185 (seep.155).
The excerpt below is from The Sino-Japanese Conflict,compiled by the German Embassy in Nanking.
On the morning of January 9, a few hours before our return toNanking, Messrs. Kröger and Hatz (an Austrian) witnessed thefollowing application of bushido very near the Embassy: In a
partly frozen pond, located on the left side of Embassy Street
between the building that houses the British Boxer Indemnity
Commission and the so-called Bavarian Place, stood a Chinese
man in civilian clothing in water up to his hips. Two Japanesesoldiers lay in front of the pond with weapons aimed. Whenordered by an officer standing behind them, the soldiers shot the
Chinese until he fell down. The corpse is still in the water today,
polluting it, as are the corpses filling the ponds and reservoirs inand around Nanking.38

On January 6, three employees of the American Embassy returned
to Nanking. Three days later, on January 9, six diplomats, three
employed by the German Embassy, and three by the British Embassy,
also returned to the city. The incident witnessed by Kröger and Hatz
occurred shortly before the German Embassy reopened. Theiraccount was published in a report entitled “The Situation in164

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Nanking.”
In Vol. 2 of his book, Atrocities in Nanking that Astonished Even Nazi
Germany, Honda Katsuichi quotes from this same report, claiming thatthe incident it describes attests to the massacre of civilians.
One would expect the International Committee to have heard
about the incident, given its seriousness; and to have issued a letter ofprotest and mentioned having done so in its records. Despite thefact that there is a fair amount of duplication, we cite the following
portion of Case No. 185 from Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.
On the morning of January 9, Mr. Kroeger and Mr. Hatz saw aJapanese officer and soldier executing a poor man in civilian clothes
in a pond inside the Safety Zone on Shansi Road, just east of the
Sino-British Boxer Indemnity Building. The man was standing in
the pond up to his waist in water on which the ice was broken andwas wobbling around when Mr. Kroeger and Hatz arrived. The
officer gave an order and the soldier lay down behind a sandbag
and fired a rifle at the man and hit him in one shoulder. He fired
again and missed the man. The third shot killed him. (Kroeger,
Hatz)39 [Italics supplied.]

When we compare these two accounts, we notice that, according
to The Sino-Japanese Conflict, three Japanese soldiers participated in theexecution, while in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, there were
only two. This is not a glaring discrepancy.
Executions Recognized as Legal
However, there are two major differences. The account in Documentsof the Nanking Safety Zone, published approximately 18 months
subsequent to the incident, contains a very important note, whichrefers to the inquiry into the incident conducted by the International
Committee.
Note: We have no right to protest about legitimate executions by
the Japanese army, but this certainly was carried out in an inefficientand brutal way. Furthermore, it brings up a matter we havementioned many times in private conversation with the Japanese
Embassy men: this killing of people in ponds within the Zone
has spoiled and thereby seriously curtailed the reserve watersupply for the people in the Zone. This is very serious in this

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)long dry spell and with the city water coming so slowly.40
supplied.]

165[Italics

This note does not appear in The Sino-Japanese Conflict. Thisomission is not inexcusable, but why did Honda Katsuichi, inreferring to this incident as described in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, notmention it? Rabe, too, in the account of the incident he wrote in hisdiary, intentionally omitted the information contained in the note.
Not having access to the note, his audience would assume that theincident as described in “The Situation in Nanking” (dated January15) in The Sino-Japanese Conflict, involved the slaughter of a civilian.
But when the note is taken into consideration, it is obvious that theincident in question was a lawful execution. An investigation
revealed that since the “man in civilian clothes” was a soldier who
had disguised himself as a civilian, his execution was justified.
Why was the note appended? At the time, there was no central
water supply (running water) in Nanking. Nor were there manywells. In Journal of a Career Officer,41 Sasaki Toichi tells us that
Yangtze River water brought in by truck from Xiaguan was referred
to as “first-class water.” Other water transported from outside thecity was “third-class water.” A mixture of the two was “second-classwater.” Nanking’s residents rinsed their rice and washed theirvegetables at several dozen ponds in the city. They did their laundry
and washed their chamber pots in those same ponds.
It was unsafe to drink untreated water, which elucidates a rather
odd warning in the battle report issued by the 1st Company, 66th
Infantry Regiment: “Do not drink unboiled water. Two soldiersfrom Unit X died instantly when they drank unboiled water near
Nanking.”42
The German Embassy in Nanking was not criticizing the Japanese
for conducting lawful executions, but urging them to refrain from
polluting the cityʹs precious water supply.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

167

CHAPTER 12:

DOCUMENTS OF
THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)Rapes Committed During the Nanking Incident (1927)
Now we would like to examine the rape cases mentioned inDocuments of the Nanking Safety Zone. But before we begin, we shallfirst look at the memoirs of John Powell (publisher of The China
Weekly Review), entitled My Twenty-Five Years in China. Powell wrotethat on the night after the Nanking Incident, he and all other foreign
correspondents were summoned to a press conference held at the U.S.
Consulate.
He accompanied Manley O. Hudson, professor ofinternational law at Harvard University, to the conference. There, heand his colleagues were introduced to an American missionary who
had been in Nanking when terrorism was rampant.1
The American missionary presented a report mentioning several
rapes that had occurred in Nanking. The journalists in attendance
listened raptly as he spoke. A member of the consular staff
distributed copies of the missionary’s statement, which had just been
printed. Before the conference ended, Professor Hudson suggested
that Powell ask the speaker whether he had actually witnessed a rape.
The speaker replied no, he had not, but had heard about them fromsomeone he trusted. A heated debate ensued, in the midst of which
Professor Hudson told the gathering that he had been a member of acommittee that investigated World War I atrocities. He explainedthat upon investigating those atrocities, the committee discoveredthat very few of them had actually been committed.2
The missionary was referring not to incidents that had taken place
in Nanking in 1937 after the city fell, but to those that had occurred 10
years previously, in 1927. However, one does notice a common
thread linking the Nanking Incident of 1927 to that of 1937 —
namely, even when reports of rapes were investigated, very few were
found to be based on fact.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Rapes Reported in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone contain records of cases
numbered 1 through 444, including those that warranted
investigation, e.g., murders and rapes. Cases 114-143, 155-164, and204-209 (46 in all) were deleted, probably because they were deemed
groundless. Of a total of 398 cases, 251 were rapes (or attempted
rapes), if one includes ʺasking for girlsʺ3 in this category. However,
190, or 75.7% of those case records were missing crucial information,e.g., the names of witnesses or of those who had reported incidents.
Therefore, John Magee was lying when he testified, at the Tokyo
Trials, that the records contained the names of the persons who hadreported them.4
Sixty-one descriptions of rape or attempted rape cases included
the names of the parties who had recorded them. Our examination
will begin with these cases.
First, we have Case No. 167.
Five Japanese soldiers and one servant ... took away two girls.
Fortunately, while these two girls were just being dragged out,some Military Police came to our place for inspection and so theyfound the happening and captured these three soldiers and one
servant.5

Eyewitnesses were mentioned in some of the cases, Case No. 107,
for instance.
December 21, 3 p.m. Mr. Sperling was called to Mo Kan Lu No. 8.
When he came ... he found one soldier locked in a room with ayoung girl.6

However, since the Japanese soldier in question was not arrestedby the military police, this incident may have taken place in a brothel.
Case No. 227 is similar to Case No. 107, and allegedly occurred on
February 1. According to the record, Magee and Ernest Forster were
summoned to a house, where they found two Japanese soldiers and ayoung girl in a locked bedroom. Magee and Foster handed thesoldiers over to sentries.7

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)169

Case No. 192, an excerpt from which follows, seems even more
improbable.
On the morning of [January] 17 ... the [Japanese] soldiers cameagain with two trucks, two cars with two officers and got* somemen and seven women from the Sericulture Building. Dr. Bates
was there and observed the whole process and found it wascompletely voluntary on the part of the men and women going. One
woman was young but went willingly.8 [Italics supplied.](Note: Hora mistranslates got* as abducted.”9)These people had probably been offered paid work, which theymust have been happy to get. The record shows that the women
acted of their own volition. The young woman who ʺwent willinglyʺ
was probably a prostitute10 recruited by Wang Chengdian (akaJimmy) of the Red Swastika Society, as stated in Rabeʹs diary and in
The Sino-Japanese Conflict, compiled by the German Embassy in
Nanking.
The account of Case No. 146 follows.
December 25 ... two Japanese soldiers came to the Hankow
Primary School Refugee Camp ... and then raped a Miss Hwang of
the staff. It was immediately reported to the Japanese Special
Service Military Police. They sent Military Police to get thesoldiers who had left, so they took the girl to their office and held
her as witness.11

This case was, evidently, thoroughly investigated.
Whenaccusations were found to have been based on fact, Japanese military
authorities made certain that the perpetrators were arrested. Theynever ignored crimes committed by Japanese soldiers.
Of 61 rapes or attempted rapes reported by someone who isnamed in the record, those reported to Japanese military authorities
may be classified as follows.
(1) One case (No. 167) in which a Japanese soldier was arrested.
(2) One case (No. 227) in which Japanese soldiers were turned overto military police.
(3) One case (No. 426) in which military police were contacted.

170

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction(4) Two cases (Nos. 168 and 220) in which Japanese soldiers werebrought before military authorities.
(5) One case (No. 146) in which a victim was apprehended andinterrogated by Japanese authorities.
(6) One case of attempted rape (No. 216) in which both a Japanesesoldier and the victim were brought before the authorities.
Only About a Dozen Rapes Reported to Japanese Military
Authorities
A total of seven rapes or attempted rapes were reported to Japanesemilitary authorities. It is possible that there may have been cases
other than those enumerated above. Therefore, we would like torefer to testimony given by Tsukamoto Koji, head of the Judicial
Department, at the Tokyo Trials.
The Judicial Department was an entity that administered military
trials. Tsukamoto was assigned to Nanking as judge advocate of the
Shanghai Expeditionary Forces, from December 1937 to August 1938.
When asked by prosecutor Sutton how many incidents had occurred
during his assignment, Tsukamoto responded as follows: ʺI believe
there were about 10 cases ... Quite a few of them involved more than
one person.ʺ12
He added that most of the crimes involved looting or rape,13 andthat there were few incidences of personal injury or theft.14
Furthermore, very few crimes had resulted in someoneʹs death.15
There had been two or three cases of murder16 in Nanking, but theperpetrators were individual soldiers.
For purposes of comparison, we would like to cite some statistics
concerning rapes committed by American soldiers in Japan, during
the Occupation. During a 12-day period extending from August 30 to
September 10, 1949, the Japanese government reported 1,326 rapes, in
Kanagawa Prefecture alone, to the authorities at GHQ. This topic is
discussed in detail in Gifts from the Vanquished by Masayo Duus.17
Perpetrators Severely Punished
Testimony from Tsukamoto Koji, head of the Judicial Department,
and accounts in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone attest to the factthat Japanese military personnel committed very few crimes in
Nanking.
According to ʺThe Diary of Orita Mamoruʺ in Source Material

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)171

Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1, on December 16, two soldiers
raped two women in the city. They were caught by 1st Lieutenant
Yunoki, and interrogated at regimental headquarters.18 Also, inʺEyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, No. 8,ʺ there is areference to an incident in which Major Kisaki Hisashi, 16th Division
deputy chief of staff, caught a soldier in the act of committing rape,apprehended him, and demanded that he be punished severely.19
More than 10 soldiers were charged with mutiny and ʺseverely
punished.ʺ20 The Japanese claim that soldiers were severely punishedwhen they committed crimes was substantiated in an article thatappeared in the February 9, 1938 edition of the Chicago Daily News.
In Chapter 1 of What War Means, Fitch wrote: ʺThe victorious army
must have its rewards — and those rewards are to plunder, murder,
rape, at will ... .ʺ This statement is patently untrue.21 Soldiers who
violated military regulations never went unpunished. Tsukamotorecalled that the punishments were so severe that ʺthe Judicial
Department of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces received
complaints from many units to the effect that we were meting out
cruel and unusual punishment for even petty infringements.ʺ22
Rapes committed by Japanese troops were indeed dealt withseverely — seven of them, according to Documents of the Nanking
Safety Zone. Americans and Germans had been sending protests to
the Japanese Embassy about looting and the abduction of women.
Colonel Uemura Toshimichi, Shanghai Expeditionary Forces deputy
chief of staff, expressed his indignation and anger in a diary entry
dated January 21, describing the perpetrators as ʺunforgivable.ʺ23
At the 73rd Budget Committee Meeting of the Imperial DietʹsHouse of Peers held on February 16, 1938, Baron Okura Kimimochi
remarked that ʺwhen even one or two persons stray from the path ofrighteousness, our disappointment is thousandfold.ʺ24 This was asentiment shared by Commander-in-Chief Matsui Iwane.
On February 7, at a memorial service for the Shanghai
Expeditionary Forces war dead, General Matsui condemned ʺthemisconduct of our troops subsequent to the occupation of Nanking.ʺ25
Major-General Iinuma, Shanghai Expeditionary Forces chief of staff,
who was present at the service, wrote in his war journal that Matsuiʺstated that there have been a number of abominable incidents within
the past 50 days.ʺ26
However, according to Matsuiʹs own war journal, thoseabominable incidents were “rapes”27 (December 20) and ʺlootingʺ28(December 29), which ʺto my great regret, have sullied the reputation

172

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fictionof the Imperial Army.ʺ29
Cases Devoid of Names
The Japanese military authorities were almost obsessively intent on
maintaining discipline. However, accounts written by Europeans
and Americans claimed that 20,000 women had been raped. Were
the Japanese lying when they insisted that military regulations werestrictly enforced? Let us return to our examination of the cases
recorded in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone.
(1)
Case No. 1030
This was the first record of a rape, supposedly been committed atnoon on December 14, the day after Nanking fell. According to theaccount, four girls were raped by Japanese soldiers in the house of a
Chinese on Chien Ying Hsiang.
(2)
Case No. 1231
On the night of the same day, December 14, the second rape was said
to have occurred at the same location, Chien Ying Hsiang. Again,
the victims were four Chinese women.
(3)
Case No. 1532
The third incident took place on the night of December 15. According
to the record, Japanese soldiers entered the house of a Chinese on
Hankou Road, raped one woman, and abducted three others. Whenthe husbands of two of them ran after the soldiers, they were shot.
However, records of these three cases are totally devoid of names— the names of the victims (complainants), witnesses to the incidents,and of those who had reported them. In the absence of witnesses,
they lack credibility.
Reports of Unsubstantiated Incidents Broadcast Throughout theWorld
Nevertheless, reports of unsubstantiated incidents, to which there had
been no witnesses, appeared in The New York Times. On December
18, the sixth day after the fall of Nanking, the news that ʺmany
Chinese men reported to foreigners the abduction and rape of wives
and daughtersʺ was broadcast throughout the world.
The article was written by Tillman Durdin, who had departed
from Nanking on December 15 and, therefore, was not in the city on

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)173

the night of December 15, when the incident recorded as Case No. 15
was alleged to have taken place. He must have based his article on
Cases No. 10 and 12, alleged to have occurred at noon and on thenight of December 14, respectively.
Another record of unsubstantiated rapes appears in Documents of
the Nanking Safety Zone as Case No. 5.
On the night of December 14, there were many cases of Japanesesoldiers entering Chinese houses and raping women or taking
them away. This created a panic in the area and hundreds ofwomen moved into the Ginling College campus yesterday.
Consequently, three American men spent the night at GinlingCollege last night to protect the 3,000 women and children in thecompound.33

There are three other accounts of similar cases.
One is a letter from Fitch addressed to Timperley, which was
reprinted as Chapter 2 of What War Means, and which reads in part:ʺA rough estimate would be at least a thousand women raped lastnight and during the day.ʺ34
At the Tokyo Trials, McCallum gave the following testimony:ʺRape: Rape: Rape: We estimate at least 1,000 cases a night andmany by day.ʺ35
And in his diary entry of December 17, Rabe wrote: ʺLast night
up to 1,000 women and girls are said to have been raped, about 100 girls
at Ginling Girls College alone.ʺ36 [Italics supplied.]According to Case No. 5, on the night of December 14, ʺthere weremany cases of Japanese soldiers entering Chinese houses and raping
women or taking them away.ʺ As we have established, the truth isthat there were not ʺmany,ʺ but only two such cases (Cases No. 10 and
12). Furthermore, there were no witnesses to either of the alleged
crimes. We can only assume that on the day after Nanking fell,rumors of rapes spread throughout the city, and gave rise to still morerumors.
A Missionary’s AccountSince Ginling [Jinling] Girls College was mentioned both in Rabeʹsdiary and in Case No. 5 (Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone), wewould like to examine an account written by Professor Minnie
Vautrin, who taught at the College.

174

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

When the Japanese occupied Nanking, Professor Vautrin (also a
Christian missionary) established a camp for women and girls, thelargest of its kind in the city, at Ginling Girls College. Her account,entitled “Sharing ‘the Abundant Life’ in a Refugee Camp,” appearedin the July-August 1938 issue of The Chinese Recorder (a monthly
Protestant magazine that boasted a 70-year history).
From December 8 when the college gates were first opened to
women and children refugees until January 16, there was little
time to plan for other than the most pressing elemental needs oflife — for food, clothing and shelter from the uncontrolled
passions of men. The camp had originally planned to provided[sic] for a maximum of 2750 refugees and had put in readiness thecollege buildings for this number, but when the “Reign of Terror”
came to the great walled capital, and no woman was safe fromharm, the gates of the college were flung wide and the distraught
and frenzied women and girls streamed in until every available
space within the buildings was tightly filled and at night evenverandahs and covered ways were packed closely, head to feet,and feet to head.37

According to an entry in Rabeʹs diary dated December 26, Vautrin
was a single woman who was so fastidious that she said she “would
rather die on the spotʺ38 than allow a woman to fall prey to the lust ofJapanese soldiers. However, the account in which she described her
refugee camp (written in the summer of 1938), makes absolutely no
mention of rape, which is further proof that no such incidents
occurred. She must have eliminated any such references at a later
date, when she realized that they were nothing more thanpropaganda.
Contradictory Accounts
Chapter 4 of What War Means consists of a letter written by Bates toTimperley, dated January 10. Part of that letter follows.
Incidentally, military police ... took a woman from a University
house and raped her thoroughly, after putting a bayonet against
our man Riggs, when he happened along at the wrong time.39

This incident was included in Documents of the Nanking Safety ZoneDOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)175

as Case No. 187, from which the name of the person who recorded it
is missing. We cite the account in its entirety.
On the night of January 9, a military police took a woman from Dr.
Smythe’s house at No. 25 Hankow Road and another from anotherhouse. He met Mr. Riggs returning to his home at No. 23
Hankow Road and threatened him with a bayonet.40

Which account is correct? Batesʹ description was written on
January 10, 1938. The one that appears in Documents of the Nanking
Safety Zone, which was published in 1939, is probably the moreaccurate of the two, since someone must have edited it, and deleted
unreliable information.
Case No. 148
To examine differences between accounts of the same incident, weshall refer to Case No. 148. In this incident, a 12-year-old girl was
allegedly raped by seven Japanese soldiers on the night of December
25.41 The same case appears in What War Means. Chapter 2, entitledʺRobbery, Murder and Rape,ʺ which was written by George Fitch,
secretary of the YMCA International Committee. According to his
account, the victim was a 12-year-old girl, and the perpetrators wereseven Japanese soldiers. But the rapes were said to have taken placeon the nights of December 23 and 24. Fitch included neither thenames of witnesses nor of the person who had recorded the incident.42
Thus, the date of the incident as recorded in the account in What War
Means and that in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone differs by one
or two days.
Cases Devoid of Dates
Next we shall cite cases that describe incidents without any mentionof the dates on which they took place, i.e., Cases No. 283, 307, and 436.
Case No. 283
At No. 384 Tientsin Chieh, widow Chow, aged over 50 years, wasraped by force. Now still detained and compelled to cook food.
Reported February 1.43 [Italics supplied.]

176

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Case No. 307
At the railway station at San Pai Lou an old woman over 60 has
been recently raped over 10 times.44

Case No. 436
An old woman named Chen, over 60, at San Pai Lou, was visitedby three Japanese soldiers. One was stationed outside while theother two raped the old woman by turn. One of the soldiers
asked her to clean the penis by her mouth. Her grandson was
stabbed twice for crying.45

Case No. 283 was supposedly reported on February 1, but there isno indication of the date on which it occurred. The same information
is missing from the descriptions of Cases No. 307 and 436.
Some incidents were heavily publicized, despite the fact that
accounts of them bore no names (of witnesses or informants) or dates.
We have already mentioned Bates’ letter to Timperley, dated January
10, 1938, which was reproduced as Chapter 4 (“The Nightmare
Continues”) of What War Means. In that letter, Bates makes thefollowing accusation.
You can scarcely imagine the anguish and terror. Girls as low aseleven and women as old as fifty-three have been raped on University
property alone. In other groups of refugees are women ofseventy-two and seventy-six years of age who were raped
mercilessly.46 [Italics supplied.]

Approximately 10 days after Bates wrote to Timperley, the North
China Daily News (Janary 21 edition) reported that 8,000-20,000
Chinese women and girls ranging in age from 11 to 53 had been
raped.47
The advanced ages of some of the alleged victims are puzzling. A
search through Documents of the Safety Nanking Zone reveals no casesthat mention rapes committed against victims aged 11, 72, or 76. The
reports were groundless rumors, and were deleted from case records.
That leaves us with the case in which the victim is a 53-year-old
woman. This was recorded by the International Committee as Case
No. 138, and submitted as Exhibit 328 at the Tokyo Trials. This,DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)177

despite the fact that the account had been expunged from Documentsof the Nanking Safety Zone, along with other spurious cases numbered
114-143.48
However, rumors were recorded, and given as muchcredence as facts. Rabeʹs report to Hitler states that women who
ranging from eight to 70 years old had been raped.
Another Case Deleted from Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone
The following account appears in Chapter 2 of What War Means.
This time the writer is not Bates, but Fitch.
Friday, Dec. 17. Robbery, murder, rape continue unabated ...
One poor woman was raped thirty-seven times. Another had her
five months infant deliberately smothered by the brute to stop its
crying while he raped her.49

A similar account can be found in an entry in Dr. Wilsonʹs diary,
dated December 18. Wilson wrote that after a Japanese soldier raped
a woman, he stabbed her young son with a bayonet, killing him.50
This is indeed a shocking account. However, the incident inquestion is nowhere to be found in Documents of the Nanking Safety
Zone, which means that the report was judged baseless, and deleted
from that publication.
Claim that 20,000 Women Were Raped DeletedThus, even cases that had been deleted from Documents of the Nanking
Safety Zone generated rumors that spread like wildfire, and spawned
the argument that 20,000 rapes had been committed. In Chapter 4 ofWhat War Means, Bates claimed that ʺable German colleagues put thecases of rape at twenty thousand.ʺ51
As Bates testified at the Tokyo Trials, one of the ʺable Germancolleaguesʺ was none other than Rabe. However, the charge that
20,000 rapes had taken place does not appear in the report sent byRabe to Hitler. Were 20,000 rapes actually committed in Nanking?
The September 25, 1996 issue of Newsweek carried an article
entitled “Born Under a Bad Sign.” According to that article, which
reported statistics provided by the EU, 20,000 women were raped
during the war in Bosnia. The tragic aftermath of the conflict wasmarked by the births of illegitimate children, many of whom wereabandoned. The conflict in Rwanda produced the same phenomenon.52

178

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

But the absence of any mention of a rash of illegitimate births inDocuments of the Nanking Safety Zone discredits the argument that
20,000 rapes were committed in Nanking. And a look at both the1938 and 1939 editions of an authoritative publication of the time, The
China Year Book, reveals no record of 20,000 rapes. The North China
Daily News, which carried an editorial arguing that 20,000 rapes had
been committed, was published by the same company that produced
The China Year Book — the North China Daily News and Herald
Company.
Therefore, if the editorial in the North China Daily News stating that
20,000 rapes had been committed had been accurate, it is likely thatthe same information would have been printed in the The China Year
Book. However, that argument is missing from both the 1938 or 1939
editions of the latter publication, which means that the publisher
refused to give credence to a rumor. Therefore, Iris Changʹs claim in
The Rape of Nanking that a minimum of 20,000 and a maximum of
80,000 women were raped is totally groundless.
“Colonel and His Aides Admit Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in
Nanking”
Japanese soldiers were, in principle, forbidden to leave theirquarters except when they were engaged in official business. Given
the strict discipline to which they were subjected, it is extremely
unlikely that they could have found an opportunity to venture out tocommit rapes. That being the case, why were there so many
unsubstantiated cases?
Powell made a comment about the Nanking Incident of 1927, tothe effect that the majority of news correspondents determined thatreports of atrocities that they had wired to their various publications
were not based on eyewitness accounts. Rumors of atrocities
circulated in Nanking, taking on a life of their own to the point thatthey received newspaper coverage.
Reactionaries took fulladvantage of the rumors,using them to encourage foreign military intervention.53 Might
Powell’s words also apply to the Nanking Incident of 1937?
The answer is yes, according to an article that appeared in theJanuary 4, 1938 edition of The New York Times, based on a January 3
dispatch from Shanghai. The headline was ʺEx-Chinese Officers
Among U.S. Refugees: Colonel and His Aides Admit Blaming theJapanese for Crimes in Nanking.ʺ The article follows in its entirety.
American professors remaining in Nanking as foreign members of

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)179

the Refugee Welfare Committee were seriously embarrassed to
discover that they had been harboring a deserted Chinese Armycolonel and six of his subordinate officers. The professors had, infact, made the colonel second in authority at the refugee camp.
The officers, who had doffed their uniforms during the
Chinese retreat from Nanking, were discovered living in one of
the college buildings.
They confessed their identity after
Japanese Army searchers found they had hidden six rifles, five
revolvers, a dismounted machine gun and ammunition in thebuilding.
The ex-Chinese officers in the presence of Americans and otherforeigners confessed looting in Nanking and also that one night
they dragged girls from the refugee camp into the darkness andthe next day blamed Japanese soldiers for the attacks.
The ex-officers were arrested and will be punished undermartial law and probably executed.54

The fact that the Nanking Safety Zone was a neutral zone
notwithstanding, American professors (Bates, Smythe, etc.) harbored
Chinese Army officers there.
This was clearly a violation ofneutrality. To make matters worse, the officers, who had shed theiruniforms and were masquerading as civilians, looted and raped, forwhich crimes they blamed the Japanese. It is not surprising that theAmerican professors were ʺseriously embarrassed,ʺ especially since
they had given their word, in Document No. 10 (dated December 18)
that there was not one Chinese soldier in the Safety Zone.55
It is difficult to understand why an event of this magnitude was
not recorded in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone. Perhaps it wasomitted because having included it would have weakened the caseagainst the Japanese but, whatever the case, it was merely the tip of
the iceberg.
On about January 22, 1938, Nakazawa Mitsuo, chief of staff of the
16th Division, prepared a report entitled ʺNoteworthy Events in
Nanking,ʺ which contains the following passage.
Yesterday we arrested the commander of a battalion attached tothe 88th Division. Particularly worrisome is the fact that all
foreign diplomatic entities are harboring Chinese officers ofsignificantly high rank.
The aforementioned 88th Division
battalion commander admitted that a brigade commander and abattalion commander are hiding on American Embassy property.56

180

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Lieutenant General Ma Foments Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Safety
Zone
The January 25, 1938 edition of the China Press, published byAmericans in Shanghai, carried a similar article stating that, as ofDecember 28, the Japanese had apprehended 23 officers, 14
non-commissioned officers and 1,498 soldiers of the Chinese Army inforeign embassies or consulates, or buildings owned by them.
This roundup was a result of the census conducted by theJapanese on December 24 and thereafter. The aforementioned
edition of the China Press then referred to a report issued the previous
day by the Nanking Japanese Military Police.
Among them, it is claimed, was the commander of the Nanking
peace preservation corps, Wang Hsing-lau, “who masqueraded as
Chen Mi” and was in command of the fourth branch detachmentof the international refugee zone, Lieutenant-General Ma
Pou-shang, former adjutant of the 88th Division, and a highofficial of the Nanking Police, Mi Shin-shi.
General Ma, it is claimed, was active in instigating
anti-Japanese disorders within the zone, which also sheltered
Captain Hwan An and 17 men with a machine-gun and 17 rifles,
while the report states that Wang Hsing-lau and three former
subordinates were engaged in looting, intimidating and raping.57

Major-General Iinuma Mamoru, chief of staff of the Shanghai
Expeditionary Forces, wrote the following in his diary on January 1,
1938: “Foreign powers suspect Japanese troops of having entered
their embassies or consulates, but a watchman bowed to me and said
that Chinese troops were to blame.ʺ On January 4, he wrote that“the commander of the Nanking Peace Preservation Corps and the
deputy commander of the 88th Divisionʺ had been arrested, which
corroborates the aforementioned article.58
Chinese troops in the Safety Zone did more than spread rumors ofrapes committed by Japanese soldiers. To lend credence to therumors, they themselves raped women or attempted to do so.
Some Chinese came forward to report that the rapes had beencommitted by Chinese soldiers. This explains a January entry in
McCallumʹs diary, which was also submitted to the Tokyo Trials.
Some of the Chinese are even ready to prove that the looting,

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)181

raping and burning was done by the Chinese and not theJapanese.59

However, this passage was omitted when the monitor read
McCallumʹs testimony at the tribunal.
Magee’s Testimony at the Tokyo Trials
Mageeʹs testimony at the Tokyo Trials is of considerable interest.
Oddly enough, when we would rush at these Japanese soldiers
they would just enter a place and then go away. We often
wondered why.60

However, Mageeʹs doubts are quickly resolved when we take into
consideration the looting and rapes orchestrated by Wang Xinlao[Hsing-lau] and his cohorts, and substitute ʺChinese soldiersʺ forʺJapanese soldiers.ʺ
If Japanese soldiers had been the perpetrators, they would havereceived punishment to fit their crimes. Therefore, they would havefled before Europeans and Americans arrived on the scene, since theyfeared witnesses above all else. Or they would have waited until theforeigners had left a scene before committing a crime. However, thatis not what happened, or so we are led to believe. They wereaccused of having committed their crimes in front of the foreigners —behavior that strains credulity. But let us, for a moment, assume that
Chinese soldiers were responsible for the crimes.
Without European or American witnesses to their looting, arson,or rape, the Chinese soldiers could not have attained their goal(agitation). Furthermore, if Japanese military personnel had rushed
to the scene, the Chinese would have been arrested. Since time wasof the essence, they had to escape as soon as they had been spotted byforeign witnesses.
Therefore, when Magee rushed to the scene after he had beensummoned, it was probably a Chinese soldier disguised as a Japanesesoldier who fled immediately from the home he had invaded. It isdifficult to understand why it never occurred to Magee or his fellow
committee members that the perpetrators might have been Chinese,and not Japanese, soldiers.

182

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Case No. 33
In connection with Case No. 33, Kröger reported the following: ʺOn
December 17 [the day of the Japanese ceremonial entry] Japanesesoldiers ... raped four women ... They disappeared quickly when
Hatz and myself appeared on the spot (Kroeger).”61
A careful reading reveals that Kröger did not claim to havewitnessed the incident.
When the soldiers saw him, they
disappeared at once. Krögerʹs report was based solely on anallegation made by a Chinese.
Then, why did Kröger and Hatz say that Japanese soldiers had
committed the rapes? Probably because that was what they weretold, and they believed their informant.
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone and What War Means are rifewith examples like these. According to Case No. 58 in the former
publication, at about 6:00 p.m. on December 17, just when Rabe
returned to his home, which displayed German swastika flags, twoJapanese soldiers entered. One of them proceeded to remove his
clothing and attempt to rape a young woman. When Rabe ordered
the soldiers to leave, they obeyed.62
But if the soldiers in question were intent on rape, why were they
not careful to ascertain that neither Rabe nor anyone else who might
have apprehended them was in the house? Why would they appear
ʺjust when Mr. Rabe returned to his home,ʺ as if they had been
waiting for him? Even allowing for coincidences, the timing seems
suspicious.
Case No. 77
Next we will examine Cases No. 77 and 75.
Case No. 77
On December 19 about 6 p.m. Dr. Bates, Mr. Fitch and Dr. Smythe
were called to a University of Nanking house at 19 Hankow Road,
where a University staff man was living, in order to escort out
four Japanese soldiers who were raping the women there. We
found them in the basement where the women had been hidden.63

Case No. 75

DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)183

On the evening of December 19 about 4:45 p.m. Dr. Bates wascalled to the house at 16 Ping Tsang Hsiang where Japanesesoldiers had a few days previously driven out refugees (viewed by
Riggs, Smythe and Steele). They had just finished looting theplace and started a fire on the third floor. Dr. Bates tried to put
out the fire but it was too late and the whole house burned to theground. (Bates)64

The second case cited describes an incident that allegedly took
place at 16 Ping Tsang Hsiang [Ping Cang Xiang], which was locatednear 3 Pin Cang Xiang, the site of the headquarters of theInternational Committee, according to the speech Rabe delivered on
his departure from Nanking. According to McCallumʹs diary, which
was submitted as evidence at the Tokyo Trials, the home of Lossing
Buck at 3 Ping Cang Xiang, also housed Riggs, Smythe, Bates, Fitch,
Mills, Sone, and Wilson.65
Why would Japanese soldiers choose to move into a house so close
to one occupied by members of the International Committee? And
why would they be foolish enough to sneak into a building on
University of Nanking property? In any case, members of theCommittee were summoned to both scenes. When they arrived, they
allegedly found soldiers in the basement, who had just finishedlooting and set a fire.
There are about 10 instances in Documents of the Nanking Safety
Zone in which members of the International Committee, whensummoned to the scene of an alleged crime, actually witnessedlooting or a rape. These were probably contrived incidents, which
the perpetrators had planned so that they would be witnessed bymembers of the foreign community. It is likely that they had agreed
to divide the labor, designating a perpetrator, an informant, etc.
“They Believe Everything the Chinese Tell Them”
An account written by Chancellor Scharffenberg of the German
Embassy and dated February 10, 1938 appears in Rabeʹs diary. It
contains the following passage: ʺAnd as for all these excesses, onehears only one side of it, after all.ʺ66
So many rape cases were fabricated that Uemura Toshimichi,
deputy chief of staff, wrote in his war journal on January 25 that theAmericans ʺwere reporting crimes that had never been committed to
the Japanese Embassy.ʺ67

184

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

On January 26, as distrust between the Japanese military andforeign residents of Nanking mounted,
U.S. Consul Allison
attempted to enter a home to investigate an incident, despite theefforts of a Japanese company commander to prevent him from doing
so. The situation worsened when Allison was assaulted by acorporal.
The assault may have been provoked, but the soldier should nothave attacked a diplomat. The Japanese apologized, but it was
Allisonʹs officious behavior and his taking the law into his own handsthat spurred the incident. According to the March 1938 issue ofInternational Scholarship and Commentary, Japanese military authorities
in Nanking ʺtook the stance that Allison, in exhibiting insolent
behavior to Japanese military personnel, exceeded the authority of his
office, and provoked the unfortunate act committed by the Japanesesoldier.ʺ68

185

CHAPTER 13:

FOOD SHORTAGE AND
UNBURIED CORPSES POSE THREATS

According to Document No. 9 of Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone,
prior to the fall of Nanking, “most of the trained, intelligent andactive people [had] all moved further west.”1 Almost all of Nankingʹsgovernment bureaucrats and police officials had abandoned the city,
leaving no one there to protect the residents or to maintain public
safety and, more pertinently, no one with whom the Japanese could
negotiate.
The social infrastructure had totally collapsed. According to thediary of staff officer Kisaki Hisashi of the 16th Division, ʺall radio,
telegraph, and telephone equipment was useless, having been
disconnected, and replacement parts destroyed.ʺ2 Therefore, when
the Japanese entered Nanking, they were ʺat a loss as to where to
begin,ʺ3 according to Nakazawa Mitsuo, 16th Division chief of staff.
Nanking Self-Government Committee Established
The Japanese military first sought to restore public order and createan administrative entity. To that end, they established the Nanking
Self-Government Committee and installed Tao Xishan, chairman of
the Red Swastika Society, as its chairman.
On December 23, 10 days after the fall of Nanking, Tao articulated
his aspirations as the Committeeʹs first chairman in a speech, whichappeared in the February 1938 issue of International Scholarship andCommentary. He first stated that he had seen how the Japanese Army
had restored order within 10 days after its entry into Nanking. Thenhe mentioned his goals for the future, his highest priority being the
speedy recovery of Nanking. He cited the necessity for the refugees,
the majority of whom were civilians, to be able to resume their work.
Finally, he stressed the importance of restoring public safety, and of
disciplining the few undesirable elements in the city in a peacefulmanner.4
The Self-Government Committee held a lavish celebration on

186

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

January 1, 1938 to commemorate its founding. Nevertheless, theCommittee never amounted to any more than its name implied, since
it consisted of and represented, as Rabe wrote, “the poorest of the
population.”5 A passage from General Matsuiʹs war journal, dated
February 7, reads: ʺThe Committee’s unimposing membership canbe explained by the absence of even the most basic resources or
facilities.ʺ6
There was no financial or political base, and theCommittee lacked the authority to collect taxes.
Obviously, the Committee
was weak, in terms of both
human
and
physicalresources. It was bolsteredby a special agency of theJapanese Army, the Nanking
SpecialAgency.
The
Agency, however, made aconcerted effort to stay in the
background.
It provided
financial and other support,
but the Committee wasThis photograph originally appeared in The
nominally
responsible
for Second Sino-Japanese War: An Illustrated
executivefunctions,e.g., Report (January 21, 1938) with the caption,
ʺMembers of the Self-Government
supplying food and fuel, and Committee. At the right is theburying the dead.
Committee’s chairman, Tao Xishan.ʺ
The Nanking Pacification
Unit
One of those involved insolving the city’s problems
was Maruyama Susumu.
According to Mission in
Nanking: (Manchurian Railway
Employee)
Maruyama
Susumu’s Recollections, editedby this writer, Maruyama
was dispatched from theManchurian Railway office inShanghai to serve in the
Nanking Special Agency’s
Pacification Unit. This unit

This photograph originally appeared in The
Second Sino-Japanese War: An Illustrated
Report (January 21, 1938) with the caption,
ʺOn New Yearʹs Day, residents of Nanking
file through the streets of Nanking bearingcelebratory flags provided by the
Self-Government Committee.ʺ

FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED COPSES POSE THREATS

187

made a strenuous effort to aid the refugees, while taking pains not towound the egos of Self-Government Committee members.7
For instance, with the aid of the head of the Nanking Special
Agency, Maruyama succeeded in retrieving a large amount of coalfrom an open field in the city, and having it delivered to the
Self-Government Committee, free of charge. The Committee thensold the coal to several
charcoal
manufacturers,
who mixed the powderedcoal with clay to form
charcoal bricks, which they
then sold on the open
market.8
Maruyama used similar
methods,onseveraloccasions,toremovethousands of sacks of ricefrom warehouses under This photograph originally appeared in The
Japanese control in Xiaguan Second Sino-Japanese War: An Illustrated
andPukou,
which
he Report (January 11, 1938) with the caption,
ʺDelighted refugees in Nanking shouting
presented
tothe ʹBanzai!ʹ to Japanese soldiers distributing
Self-Government Committee. sweets and tobacco.ʺ
The Committee then sold it at
the market price to rice
dealers who, in turn, sold it
to retail customers.
He
also arranged to have 200
60-kilogram containers of
peanut oil taken from astorehouse in Pukou anddelivered to the Committee.9
The Committee was thus
able to obtain some income
to use for its projects fromthese sales activities, and to
This photograph originally appeared in The
earn the trust of Nankingʹs Second Sino-Japanese War: An Illustrated
residents.
Report (January 21, 1938) with the caption,
ʺOur sanitary corpsmen ministering to theneeds of the sick in the refugee zone in
Nanking.ʺ

188

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Sergeant Kanamaru’s Memorandum
Japanese soldiers would sometimes voluntarily transport flour from amill storehouse to the University of Nanking. The following is anexcerpt from the diary of Sergeant Kanamaru Yoshio of theIntendance Department, 16th Division, which appears in Source
Material Relating to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1.
Military police and sentries from the Japanese Army werestanding at the entrance, but when we explained why we were
there, they opened the gate immediately. When we drove thetruck onto the campus, and unloaded the flour, the Chinese
caretaker thanked us with tears in his eyes. Moved by his
response, I repeated the mission three more times, but this was
something I did on my own. Someone who appeared to be a
Jinling University [University of Nanking] professor extended hishands, palms joined, as if in prayer, and said, ʺI had thought thatJapanese soldiers were horrible creatures. This is the first time I
have seen them act with such kindness. Xiexie, xiexie [Thankyou].10The gifts of rice from the Japanese Army were also mentioned inInternational Committee documents.
Safety Zone Population Swells to 250,000
On January 14, 1938, Document No. 41 recorded the population of the
Safety Zone as 250,000, for the first time. It also announced that the
distribution of rice, flour, and coal would be handled by the JapaneseArmy through the Self-Government Committee.11
Document No. 43, dated January 17, included a note to the effectthat ʺthe Japanese authorities have assigned 1,000 bags of rice to the
Tze Chih Wei Yuan Hwei [Self-Government Committee], delivery ofwhich started this morning.”12
According to International Committee records, the population in
the already overcrowded Safety Zone had increased by 50,000.13
The Population Increase and Food Shortages
The population increase was, unsurprisingly, accompanied by serious
food (and temporary housing) shortages.
The International

FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED COPSES POSE THREATS

189

Committee asked Japanese military authorities to increase rice rations
to 1,000 bags per day in order to provide enough food for 250,000
people.14
Document No. 48, dated January 21, reports that Fitch and Smythe
went to inspect the new rice shop operated by the Self-Government
Committee. On January 18, Fitch had wired the following report(Document No. 46) to Boynton in Shanghai.
Food question more serious because no regular supply available[to] civilian population. Only twenty-two hundred bags rice[and] one thousand bags flour released for sale from large stocks
on hand to two hundred fifty thousand people since December
thirteenth.15

Fitch was expressing the International Committeeʹs dissatisfaction
with the handling of the food problem. Since Nankingʹs government
officials had fled the city, there was no administrative organization tolook after the welfare of the residents.
Furthermore, theInternational Committee could not segregate soldiers from civilians,
so the Japanese military was preoccupied with that process and theissuance of civilian passports from December 24 on. The Japanese
had had no time to address the food problem.
Why the Population Increased
According to Document No. 54, the population of the Safety Zone on
January 28, 1938 was estimated at 250,000.16 That same figure wasmentioned in the Nanking International Relief Committee Report of1939, which stated that ʺvery nearly 250,000 people were packed into
the Safety Zone.ʺ17
How had the Committee arrived at that figure? International
Committee Document No. 35, dated January 14, addressed to Fukuda
Tokuyasu of the Japanese Embassy, reads as follows.
We understand that you registered 160,000 people without
including children under 10 years of age, and in some sections
without including older women. Therefore there are probably
250,000 to 300,000 civilians in the city.18

The International Committee made its own estimate of the numberof persons who had not been registered, arriving at the figure of

190

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

300,000 for the total population. Its members must have realizedthat they had inadvertently overestimated the number of residents,
doubling the registered population because, in subsequent reports,
the Committee always used the figure of 250,000. Therefore, thenumber of civilian passports issued by the Japanese military and the
Self-Government Committee became the basis for subsequent
population estimates.
Civilian passports were, as stated in Document No. 23 (December22),19 issued to civilian residents of Nanking by the head of the
Nanking Special Agency. In order to receive them, residents wererequired to appear in person at registration sites designated by theJapanese military. The aforementioned Maruyama was responsible
for the behind-the-scenes administration of this process.
According to Maruyamaʹs memoirs, the Self-Government
Committee ʺwrote each residentʹs name and age with a brush on apiece of cotton cloth on which ‘Civilian’ had been stamped in ink.ʺ
After the Self-Government Committee and the Nanking Special
Agency had granted their approval, residents were issued civilian
passports. They were not permitted to send proxies. Therefore, thenumber of passports issued was as accurate a representation of the
population as possible under the circumstances.20
Since Nankingʹs residents were required to appear in person,
Chinese soldiers hiding in the Safety Zone found themselves in a very
precarious position. The city was surrounded by massive walls
whose gates were guarded by Japanese troops. Anyone who
approached those gates was interrogated. The soldiers could neither
enter nor leave Nanking undetected.
In a report issued on January 21, 1938, the Nanking Special
Agency stated that ʺat present, passage into and out of the city ... isbeing permitted in a few cases, with special consideration given to
those who have family either inside or outside the city or who haveother valid reasons.ʺ21 Incidentally, the Japanese military ʺallowed
unlimited free passage after February 25,ʺ22 according to the second
report issued by the Nanking Pacification Unit.
Consequently, Chinese soldiers hiding in the Safety Zone wereunable to escape from Nanking. Several thousand of them wereapprehended, along with the weapons they had concealed. Others,
fearing the fate that was in store for them, came out of hiding andattempted to pass themselves off as civilians. According to theJanuary 10, 1938 edition of the Yomiuri Shinbun, ʺRefugee registration,
begun at the end of last year to ferret out stragglers, has, after sevenFOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED COPSES POSE THREATS

191

days, been completed for the most part. Sixteen hundred stragglers
and others have been provided with shelter and can now walk thestreets of Nanking without fear.ʺ23
Moreover, one week subsequent to the fall of Nanking, residents
returned to the Safety Zone from outside the city, after having passed
through Japanese checkpoints located at every gate. An entry in the
War Journal of General Matsui Iwane dated December 21, 1937 reportsthat ʺresidents seem to be returning gradually.ʺ24 (According to War
Damage in the Nanking Area, beginning in February and March, 1938,
there was a significant influx of people from areas near Nanking
where order had not yet been established.25)
Whatever the case, the census taken between December 24 andJanuary 6 established that the population had increased by 50,000.
Population of Nanking Reaches 308,546 Nine Months After
Occupation
According to Nanking, edited by Ichiki Yoshimichi and published in
1941, the city government conducted a census in August 1938 to
obtain accurate population statistics.
The aforementioned
publication contains monthly statistics compiled by the Nanking
Police Agency26 between August 1938 and December 1940.
In August 1938, nine months after the Japanese occupation, there
were 162,586 males and 145,960 males in Nanking, for a total of
308,546 residents. International Committee records, which estimatedthe total population of Nanking when the city fell at 200,000-250,000,
were accurate.
Therefore, there is no basis for Iris Changʹs claim, in The Rape of
Nanking,27 that Nankingʹs population was 600,000 when the city fell.
The population did not reach 600,000 until June 1940, 30 months after
the Japanese occupied the city.
Reviewing the Population Question
We would like to settle the controversy surrounding the population of
the Safety Zone once and for all. An anonymous article at the end ofChapter 4 of What War Means contains the following passage, whichrefers to mid-January of 1938.
We have a big refugee problem on our hands now with this large

192

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED COPSES POSE THREATS

193

number of people — perhaps 150,000 or more in this Refugee Area,
and perhaps 60,000 in our Refugee camps.28 [Italics supplied.]Hora Tomio based his claim that the population was 150,000
inside the Safety Zone, and 60,000 outside on this article. And
indeed, these figures do, at first, seem plausible. Fujiwara Akira
wrote that ʺa great number of residents remainedʺ outside the Safety
Zone (inside and outside the city).29
However, the 1939 edition of the The China Year Book, in referringto the first relief work done by the International Committee in 1938,
includes the following passage.
This responsibility was not a light one, as at the height of theemergency some 250,000 refugees were sheltered in the Zone; close
upon 70,000 being housed in 25 matshed camps and the remainder
finding shelter where they could30. [Italics supplied.]

The fact that 70,000 of the 250,000 refugees who had sought refugein the Safety Zone were accommodated in matshed camps indicatesthat there were both refugee camps and refugee areas inside theSafety Zone. Residents of potential war zones outside the city had
fled to the Safety Zone before hostilities commenced. Nankingʹsresidents, too, had been ordered to gather in the Safety Zone. As
stated in Document No. 34 (dated January 7, 1938), the Safety Zone
was safe, but ʺthe present state of insecurity outside of the Zone”31
had caused overcrowding in the Safety Zone. Thus, the area outside
the Safety Zone was, according to What War Means, ʺpracticallydesertedʺ32 until the end of January 1938.
The Burial Problem
In Interviews With Witnesses to the Nanking Incident by Ara Kenichi,
Onishi Hajime, head of the Special Agency, is quoted as saying that
all Japanese soldiers who died during the attack on Nanking werecremated by their comrades subsequent to the fall of the city.33
Bodies of Chinese soldiers who died while retreating from the city,were left where they had fallen. Fleeing Chinese troops did not havethe luxury of attending to their dead.
Then, when did the interment of Chinese soldiers begin? And
where, how, and by whom were they buried? The International
Committee first mentioned burials in Document No. 9, dated

194

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

December 17, 1937. On the morning of December 14, the day after
the fall of Nanking, the Red Swastika Society dispatched a truck toretrieve corpses in the Safety Zone. But the truck was stolen, and thelaborers on it hauled away.34
Judging from Document No. 9, it would seem that burials
commenced on December 14, but that was not the case. The cityʹsgates were closed, and no one was permitted to leave the city to bury
the dead or for any other reason.
Red Swastika Society Truck Laden With Uniformed Chinese Soldiers
The information in Document No. 9 coincides with the following
testimony provided by 1st Lieutenant Mori Hideo, commander of the34th Company, 20th Infantry Regiment. On December 13, Mori
noticed piles of enemy uniforms on Zhongshan Road, right acrossfrom the Safety Zone. He sensed that enemy troops had fled to the
Safety Zone, but could not investigate further, since Japanese military
personnel had been forbidden to enter the Safety Zone. Instead, hepositioned a light machine gun on the road, aiming it at Xiaguan, andwatched to see if any regular Chinese soldiers attempted to flee inthat direction. His observations follow.
A truck approached from the direction of Xiaguan. It carried the
Red Swastika Society flag, and was filled with uniformed enemy
soldiers. As I stood there, astonished, the truck sped across ourbattle line and kept on going.35

This was a brazen act, since it was illegal for a privately owned
truck to carry uniformed enemy soldiers. This incident explains whyeven Red Swastika Society trucks were later subjected to official
inspections. The men described in Document No. 9 were not Red
Swastika Society workers, but soldiers disguised as laborers.
Most Pressing Problem After Occupation:

The Food Shortage

The Japanese sweep of Nanking continued until December 16,
followed by the ceremonial entry on December 17. The census andthe issuance of civilian passports began on December 24. During
this time, the most pressing problem was the food shortage. As Fitch
had written in his telegram to Boynton, “Food question more serious
because no regular supply available [to] civilian population.”36

FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED COPSES POSE THREATS

195

There was no time to even contemplate burying the dead.
The International Committee issued a series of documents relating
to the food shortage after the fall of Nanking. Document No. 66,
dated February 8, mentions that the Trucking Department of the
Self-Government Committee was transporting 1,500 bags of wheat
flour per day.37 Document No. 68, dated February 10, reports thatJapanese military authorities had released a total of 5,200 bags of riceand 10,000 bags of wheat flour, and given the Self-Government
Committee 2,000 gallons of gasoline.38
Document No. 68 also states that the Japanese gave theSelf-Government Committee ʺ9 old trucks.ʺ39 Document No. 49, dated
January 22, refers to those trucks, commenting that it was difficult to
use them to transport food and fuel because, besides being old, ʺnorepair parts exist.”40 If the Red Swastika Society had possessed trucks,
they, too, would have been mobilized for the transport of food.
According to The Second Sino-Japanese War: A Guide to Former
Battle Sites, published by Rikugun Gahosha, transportation in
Nanking prior to World War II consisted ʺmainly of rickshaws andhorse-drawn carriages. Automobiles and buses were seldom used.
Oddly enough, there were no trains in this capital city.ʺ41
Even today, automobiles are beyond the reach of ordinary citizens.
At that time, no one owned an automobile. According to a statement
made by Ernest Forster (who was affiliated with an Episcopalian
missionary group based in the United States), found in Nanking
Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References, all means oftransportation had been commandeered by the Japanese.42 Whatremained were trucks that lacked tires or were otherwise unusable.
Given the transportation situation, and the food problem, thesolution of which was of the greatest urgency, it is extremely unlikelythat burials commenced on January 18, 1938. In his diary entry
dated January 22, Rabe writes, ʺMy protests and pleas to the Japanese
embassy finally to get this corpse buried, or give me permission tobury it, have thus far been fruitless.ʺ43
Census Ends; Problem of Unburied Corpses Addressed
Then, when did the burials begin?
Nakazawa Mitsuo, 16th
Division chief of staff, provides a hint in a report intended for his
successor entitled ʺNoteworthy Events in Nanking,ʺ written on
January 22, 1938. Nakazawa refers to the effort to remove debris
from the battlefield, mentioning that the task had been completed.

196

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

However, since the work had been done in haste, he worried that
decomposing corpses might pose a health hazard in the summer.44
In other words, the dead had not been buried, but simply covered
with earth.45 Therefore, as the temperature rose, burying the deadproperly was even more urgent. However, Nakazawa assumed thatas far as proper burials were concerned, ʺit would not be extremely
difficult to inter the bodies, since they were located near a former
battle zone.ʺ46
Thus, we know that on January 22, after the process of segregating
civilians from soldiers had nearly reached its end on January 5, theburial problem was finally contemplated. Nakazawa had assumed
that only bodies near the battlefield would be buried, and that that
could be accomplished ʺwithout great difficulty.ʺ
ʺNoteworthy Events in Nankingʺ also contains a warning,
motivated by an incident that had occurred 10 days earlier (on or
about January 12). Approximately 100 Chinese stragglers had
ambushed Japanese communications troops to the east of
Jiangningzhen, causing the Japanese to be even more cautious. The
warning was as follows: ʺFurther door-to-door surveys are needed,
to search for and confiscate weapons. Additionally, all comings andgoings should be carefully monitored until we are satisfied that there
is no longer cause for concern.ʺ47
It was impossible to enter or leave Nanking without passing
through one of its gates. The frustration of the city’s residents isevident in International Committee Document No. 49, dated January
22: ʺUntil persons are allowed to leave or enter Nanking, it isimpracticable to do anything ... .ʺ48
Xu Chuanyin was telling the truth when he testified at the Tokyo
Trials that the Japanese did not permit burials until approximately
one month after they had occupied Nanking.49 But if he wasimplying that the Japanese were apathetic about interments, he waswrong. Nankingʹs government organizations had collapsed, and theJapanese were forced to take the initiative.
Immediately after the fall of Nanking, the Japanese attended
carefully to their own dead, after which they cremated some of thebodies of enemy soldiers, which were strewn about, and buried them.
The following passage is an entry from the diary of Staff Officer
Kisaki Hisashi, dated December 26.
Accompanied the commander during his inspection. ... The
commander inspected the area near Taiping Gate. As the smoke

FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED COPSES POSE THREATS

197

rose from enemy corpses being burned inside, he was told about
the hostilities that took place when we occupied the city.50

Northeast of Taiping Gate, where the Japanese were burning thebodies of Chinese soldiers, was Zijinshan, where the fighting had
been particularly brutal. By ʺenemy corpses,ʺ Kisaki meant thecorpses of enemy soldiers who had died in battle.
The Chinese did not cremate their dead at that time, but rather,buried them in the ground. When they saw the Japanese piling
corpses on log pyres, pouring a small amount of gasoline on them,and then igniting it, they must have thought their compatriots werebeing burned alive. If rumors to that effect spread, they would
explain the report sent by Rabe to Hitler, in which he told ofcomplaints that Chinese were being burned alive.51 But there is no
mention of the Japanese having burned anyone alive in the records ofthe time, or in the main text of Rabeʹs diary.
Whatever the case, corpses soon rot, and if neglected for a monthor two, can cause communicable diseases — even epidemics. That
is why the Nanking Special Agency decided to have the cityʹs
residents attend to the corpses before the hot weather arrived.
According to Maruyamaʹs memoirs, orders emanating from Sakata
Shigeki, head of the Special Agency and predecessor of Onishi Hajime,
instructed that burials should commence.52
It was probably near the end of January when the Nanking Special
Agency addressed the burial problem and began organizing a burialcrew. On January 31, Rabe wrote in his diary, ʺThe dead Chinese
soldier who has been lying at my door for six weeks now has at last
been buried.ʺ53 Later, in his report to Hitler, Rabe stated that ʺon
February 2,ʺ54 burials had finally begun.
Interments and the Nanking Special Agency
The Nanking Special Agency entrusted the Self-Government
Committee with the burials, because one of the responsibilities of that
entity was to improve the state of public health. One gets theimpression that the International Committee, too, was anxious to havethe dead interred. Document No. 33 stated that the Committee
would ʺbe glad to see the local Self-Government Association assume
as speedily as possible all the usual functions of a local civic
administration: policing, fire protection, sanitation, et cetera.”55
On April 16, 1938, the North China edition of the Osaka Asahi

198

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Shinbun carried an article that read, in part, ʺThe Red Swastika Society,
the Self-Government Committee, and our priests, who are affiliatedwith Nihonzan Myoho Temple, have joined together to bury thedead.ʺ56 One must be mindful, however, that the Self-Government
Committeeʹs role in the interments, as in any other of its activities,
was only nominal.
Interments commenced, supposedly as a voluntary activity of the
Self-Government Committee, but they were funded by the Nanking
Special Agency. The Agency stayed in the background, so that
Chinese who cooperated with the Committee would not be labelledtraitors. The fact that the Japanese military financed the interments
was never made public.
Self-Government Committee Chairman Tao Xishan
Tao Xishan, the chairman of the Self-Government Committee decided
to resign from that position according to a report prepared by Rosenʹsreport, dated March 16. On that occasion, Tao had said, “For 16
years, I have worked for the Red Swastika Society, a charitableorganization.”
Tao had been, concurrently, the Nanking
representative of the Red Swastika Society and chairman of the
Self-Government Committee.57 It is, therefore, not surprising that
the Self-Government Committee recruited the Red Swastika Society tobury the dead.
Note: The Society’s insignia was a swastika. The Winter 1938
issue of the China Quarterly carried an essay by Zhu Youyu
entitled “The Christian Church in War-time Service,” in which hementions the ʺSwastika symbol, worn on the arm-bands of theworkers or borne on the banners of the relief teams... [Italics
supplied.]
Footage of the Red Swastika Society appears in “American
Newsreels: January 1938,” broadcast as part of an NHK special
series entitled A Century of Images: #11 — Japan. However, thatfootage had been faked. In it, a man appears wearing clothingthat bears a large swastika printed on a white background, but his
attire does not coincide with the description in Zhu Youyu’sreport. Furthermore, the Red Swastika Society could not havebeen engaged in burials in January 1938.

Even assuming that the Red Swastika Society did begin interments

FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED COPSES POSE THREATS

199

on February 1, no preparations had been made, nor had a sufficientnumber of laborers been recruited.
The aforementioned Mr.
Maruyama took charge of the burials. In his memoirs, he wrote,
ʺThe head of the Nanking Special Agency told me that he would
obtain the necessary funds
somehow. I then set out toaccomplishmymission,which was to ensure that thedead were buried.”58
The Search for Burial Sites
According to Maruyama,
most of the corpses wereoutside the city. How many
were there?
In a reportabout the progress of relief
work in Nanking, dated
February 14, Bates estimatedthat the Red Swastika Society
might bury 200 bodies per day,but 30,000 bodies remained
unburied.59
Rabe estimatedthat there were 50,000 or 60,000
dead, but Maruyama calculated
that, at most, there were ʺabout
20,000.ʺ60 Maruyama selected
the burial sites, at which heinstructed the Red Swastika
Society to inter the dead.

On February 24, 1996, the NHK
Broadcasting Co. aired a special program
entitled A Century of Images: Japan, in
which it rebroadcast “American Newsreels:
January 1938.” This photograph allegedly
shows the interments done by the Red
Swastika Society. However, since all
foreign cameramen had left Nanking by
December 15, 1937, this photograph could
not have been taken by an American
photographer. Furthermore, this scene wasreportedly photographed in January 1938,
despite the fact that the Red Swastika
Society did not commence burials until
February 1, 1938. The photograph shows
the swastika symbol on the front of
uniformlike garb worn by the Societyʹs
There was absolutely no members, but in fact, the emblem appeared
only on armbands and banners. Thispublic land.
If the Red newsreel was faked.
Swastika
Society
hadarbitrarily selected burial sites, and interred the dead there, thelandowners would, of course, been furious. Since long-time
residents of Nanking knew who owned which land, rumors would
have spread like wildfire if the Red Swastika Society had
designated private property as a mass burial site. Affectedlandowners would have voiced strong objections to the Red
Swastika Society. Therefore, I couldnʹt allow the Society to select200

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

burial sites. Left with no other option, I made the selections
myself. There were mass graveyards and temple cemeteries inevery district, but not much space was available, so they were notsuitable for mass burials.61

Since Maruyama was acting on behalf of the Nanking Special
Agency, landowners were forced to acquiesce when their property
was selected, and the Red Swastika Society could bury the dead there
without fear of repercussions.
Maruyama wrote that burials
commenced in early February,62 as did Rabe.
Furthermore, according to the ʺThird Report of the Nanking
Special Agencyʺ for March 1938, included in Central China Pacification
Operations, corpses ʺwere interred at designated areas in Xiaguan andShangxinhe outside the city.ʺ63
Interment Methods
There were no trucks to be had in Nanking. The Red Swastika Society
recruited nearby farmers, who transported the corpses in large,
two-wheeled carts. They then used hoes to dig two-meter-deep graves,lined the corpses up in the graves, and covered them with soil.
According to Maruyama, the number of bodies that could beburied in one day, using this method, was ʺat most 200, normallyapproximately 180.ʺ64 The work proceeded slowly at first, because
there weren’t enough workers, and those recruited were
unaccustomed to this sort of task. Rabe also mentions having heardthat it was impossible to bury more than 200 bodies per day65 in areport he sent to Hitler. But how was Maruyama able to keep trackof the work that was being done?
Workers’ Wages
The Red Swastika Society had been entrusted with burying the deadby the Nanking Special Agency (and the Self-Government
Committee). The Society was paid 30 sen (1 yen = 100 sen) for each
body buried (approximately $7.00 today), at a time when police
officers in the Republic of China earned ¥3-5 per month. For thoseresidents who remained in Nanking, ʺthe poorest of the population,ʺ
the opportunity to earn this much money was an attractive
proposition.

FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED COPSES POSE THREATS

201

Later,
othersmallorganizations(Chongshantang,forinstance)
asked
theSelf-Government
Committee for some of theburial work, but the latterhad entrusted the entire
task to the Red Swastika
Society, and so refused allsuch applications. The Red
Swastika Society may havesubcontracted some of thework to them, but according
to Maruyama, the Society
was the sole contractor.
Because the Society was
being paid 30 sen per bodyburied, Maruyama was kept
informed of the progress of
the work. Since he was
required to submit a reportto the Manchurian Railway
office in Shanghai eachmonth, he took notes on apresented to Maruyama Susumu
daily basis.
He sent Scroll
when he departed for Japan, by Wang
monthly reports to his Chengdian of the Self-Gaverment
superiors at the Nanking CommitteSpecial Agency and to Ito
Takeo, director of the Manchurian Railway office in Shanghai.
The reports must have been relayed from Shanghai to the office ofthe president of the Manchurian Railway in Dairen (Dalian). Their
recent discovery was mentioned in an article in the May 10, 1994
edition of the Asahi Shinbun, under the headline ʺSecret Reports from
Nanking Special Agency Dispatched by the Shanghai Office of theManchurian Railway.ʺ
When Were the Burials Completed?
Maruyama wrote that Onishi Hajime, the head of the Nanking Special
Agency, scheduled a memorial service for civilians and soldiers who

202

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

died during the hostilities, to be held on the vernal equinox in 1938 at
Yijiang Gate.
Maruyama instructed the Red Swastika Society,through the Self-Government Committee, to complete the burials by
March 15. With the deadline looming, the Red Swastika Society
recruited a large number of workers to complete the project.
Maruyama reports that ʺthe burials were completed on March 15.ʺ66
At the service, Kawano Sangyo, a priest affiliated with the Honganji
sect of Buddhism (and subsequently a member of the House ofCouncillors), chanted the sutras.
That is why there were many more burials in March than there
had been in February. It is likely that 500-600 bodies were buried
per day in March,67 since in ʺThe Situation in Nanking,ʺ dated March 4,
Rosen reported that the Red Swastika Society buried that number ofbodies each day in mass graves.
Note: In ʺThe Situation in Nanking,ʺ Rosen wrote that the bodiesof 30,000 persons, killed in mass executions when the terror was at
its worst, still lay in a port town outside the city. However, his
report was totally unfounded. The records of the Red Swastika
Society, accurate or not, state that the Society buried 3,003 bodies
in the Xiaguan area subsequent to March 4 — specifically, 1,772
near the coal harbor in Xiaguan on March 6, and 385 in an open
field near the coal harbor in Xiaguan on April 27.

Since the burials were completed on March 15, it is unlikely thatany bodies were interred on April 27. It is also unlikely that the Red
Swastika Society buried 1,772 bodies on March 6, two days after
Rosen wrote his report. Even if did, the total number of bodies
buried at Xiaguan was 3,000.
The Dead Interred Only by Red Swastika Society
According to Japanese records, only the Red Swastika Society
conducted burials. What did American references have to say on
this matter?
First, the International Committee reported thefollowing in Document No. 33, dated January 7: ʺWe would be glad
to cooperate with other organizations in the relief work, as we are
now doing with the Red Swastika and the Red Cross ... .”68
A month later, Bates described that cooperation in detail in“Refugee Problems in China,” dated February 14.
He evenmentioned the soup kitchen where meals were served free of charge,

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203

the burials, and the free medical treatment. His report appears inNanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References. In it,
he lists all the relief activities coordinated by the International
Committee, organized in the Nanking Safety Zone. In cooperation
with the local branch of the Chinese Red Cross Society, the Committee
was able to operate a large soup kitchen. The Red Swastika Society
also assisted in the relief effort by running two large soup kitchensand by burying the dead.69
According to Bates’ report, only the Red Swastika Society
conducted burials. The Chinese Red Cross Society, a local organization,
was involved only with a soup kitchen, not in the burials.
Chapter 22 of the 1939 edition of the The China Year Book carried anarticle about the refugee problem in China, which contains thefollowing passage.
Throughout the emergency period, the International Safety Zone
Committee had the co-operation of the Chinese Red Cross Society
in conducting a large soup kitchen for the refugees; and the Red
Swastika Society also rendered valuable assistance by maintaining
two soup kitchens and by burying dead bodies. Coal for thesoup kitchens was delivered by the Self-Government Committee,
and was also purchased from private yards. As soon as thesurrounding country began to settle down, the Safety Zone
Committee directed its efforts toward persuading the peasants toreturn to their farms; assistance was rendered, where necessary, toenable them to take up their work again.70 [Italics supplied.]

This article corroborates Batesʹ report.
Bates listed all the relief efforts, but with regard to burials, hementioned only the Red Swastika Society, as did the 1939 edition of
the The China Year Book. Again, the Chinese Red Cross Society was
not involved in burial work. “Burial Statistics by Month, Preparedby Burial Crew No. 1, Chinese Red Cross Society, Nanking Chapter”
is included in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 2: Chinese
References. But since the information it contains is inconsistent withthe records of the time,71 it must have been fabricated.
Republic of China Reports “279,586 Compatriots Slaughtered”
Nevertheless, the Republic of China submitted records to the Tokyo
Trials claiming that 279,586 Chinese citizens had been slaughtered.72

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We have numbered those records for purposes of explanation.
1. In the Xinhe district, 2,873 Chinese were killed (from testimony
given by burial workers Cheng Shizheng and Chang Kaiyun).
2. In the vicinity of the Army Arsenal and Huashenmiao (outside
the South Gate), more than 7,000 were killed (from testimony given byburial workers Rui Fangyan and Zhang Hongru).
3. At Caoxiexia, 57,418 were killed (from testimony given by Lu Su,
who managed to escape).
4. At Hanzhong Gate, more than 2,000 were killed (from testimony
given by Wu Zhangde and Chen Yongqing, who escaped).
5. At Linggu Temple, more than 3,000 were killed (from aninscription on a stone monument to the dead erected by traitor Gao
Guanwu).
6.
Chongshantang buried 11,267 (112,266) bodies, working
continuously for four months.
7.
The Red Swastika Society buried 43,071 bodies, working
continuously for six months.
These records were compiled by Chen Guangyu, head prosecutor
at the Nanking District Court. However, he does not explain how heobtained them, or on what references they are based. Nor do weknow precisely when they were compiled, since the compilation dateis listed only as “February 1946.” Moreover, the names of burial sites
and of organizations mentioned in 1. to 6. above as having done theburial work are fictitious. They do not appear in any of the recordsof the period. The Red Swastika Society, which is mentioned in 7.,
did engage in burial work, but its work was done over 40 days, not“continuously for six months.”
No one seems to have bothered to check the arithmetic in theserecords. For instance, the total obtained when all the figures in thisreference are added up amounts to 227,628 bodies, not to 279,586, as
was testified.
Nanking International Relief Committee Report
The Nanking International Relief Committee Report, which probably
appeared in the summer of 1939, contains the following reference toburials. (Bates chaired the Committee.)
For example, $2,540 was used to complete the necessary burial

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205

enterprises undertaken by the Red Swastika Society, which
covered over 40,000 bodies otherwise uncared for. During some
40 working days, this employed nearly 170 men. On this and anumber of other work relief jobs, forty cents per day of actual
work was taken as the standard wage.73 [Italics supplied.]

This report is an important, decisive reference, from which we caninfer the following.
1. All necessary burials were undertaken by the Red Swastika
Society, which interred approximately 40,000 bodies. The burials
were completed in about 40 working days.
2. During that period, workers were paid $.40 per day. The Red
Swastika Society also received remuneration from the Nanking
Special Agency through the Self-Government Committee, which
doubled the aforementioned wage. According to this record, at least,neither the Nanking Special Agency nor the Self-Government
Committee was aware of this duplication.
3. Since the International Committee paid $2,540 to cover daily
wages of $.40 per worker, we can assume that a total of 6,350 laborers
participated in the operation over 40 days. The mention of “170men” in the above citation probably refers to the average number oflaborers used each day. The Society found it difficult to recruit
laborers in early February.
4. If the project required 40 working days, then the burials done by
the Red Swastika Society continued for two months (February andMarch). Rabe mentions that burials were not permitted between
December 13, the day that Nanking fell, and the end of January.
Therefore, the Red Swastika Society’s burial records for the months ofDecember and January are total fabrications.
Burials Completed on or About March 20
Normally, when a project nears its end, only the finishing touches are
required. Inspections are made to ensure that nothing has been
overlooked, but not much actual work takes place. An examinationof the burial records of the Red Swastika Society from that viewpoint
reveals that 500-600 bodies were interred during early March, but
only 112 on March 15. That number decreases to 100 on March 19.
These figures suggest that the work was nearing an end, and that theburials themselves had been completed. On March 22, a memorial

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

service may have been held for the war dead, both soldiers andcivilians.
It is likely that burials were completed on March 15, as Maruyama’s
memoirs suggest. In that case, the records for March 19 must havebeen added at a later date. If they are accurate, then burials may
have been completed on March 19, and the memorial service held on
March 22. Still, it is difficult to believe that work was not halted foreven one day during that time, since Nanking’s roads normally froze
when the temperature dropped. In his journal, Isa Kazuo wrote,“The rains started this morning, turning the ground into mud.”When the roads were muddied due to rain or snow, burials were
impossible. What we do know about unfavorable weather at the timeis that on February 4 it both rained and snowed. On February 23 there
were torrential rains, which would have prevented burial work on thefollowing day as well. However, there is no extant data that would
allow us to determine weather conditions subsequent to February 23.
A Maximum of 15,000 Bodies Buried
Let us assume that there were three days in February on which burials
could not take place, and that in March, work proceeded continuously.
If we also assume that the burials were done over 40 days, fromFebruary 1 to March 15, we arrive at figures that, for the most part,coincide with information in the Nanking International Relief Committee
Report. At first (in February), the work did not go smoothly but,estimating that 200 bodies were interred on each of 25 working days,
then the total number of burials in February would be 5,000.
According to Rosen’s Report, in March, 500-600 bodies wereburied per day. But since little burial work was done in the latterpart of March, the figure of 550 bodies per working day is probably
more accurate. Even that might be an overestimate, but if 550 bodies
were buried per day, and the burials were completed on March 15, thetotal number of interments for March was 8,250. When we add thefigures for February, that makes 13,250 burials in all.
If burials were completed on March 19, the total for March would
have been 19 times 550, or 10,450. Together with the 5,000 bodies
interred in February, that makes 15,450. Even allowing for possible
omissions, the maximum number of bodies buried in Nanking wasapproximately 13,000-15,000.
Proof that the number of actual burials was inflated by

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207

28,000-30,000 can be found in the second report issued by the
Pacification Unit of the Nanking Special Agency. That report statesthat “as of the end of February, approximately 5,000 bodies have beenburied.”74 However, the burial records of the Red Swastika Society,as submitted at the Tokyo Trials, assert that 30,382 bodies had beenburied by the end of February.
In fact, as early as the end of February 1938, the Red Swastika
Society had inflated its burial records by approximately 20,500. Thatis probably why it announced, from the end of February through the
beginning of March that “there are still 30,000 bodies in Xiaguan.”Hearing that announcement, Rabe (and later Rosen) wrote that “there
are still 30,000 to be dealt with, most of them in Hsiakwan [Xiaguan].
But as we have shown, the Red Swastika Society buried only about
3,000 corpses (if that many) in Xiaguan subsequent to March.
Discrepancies in Nanking Burial Records
How many of the dead were buried within the walls of Nanking?
An examination of the Red Swastika Society’s burial records (seep.208) found in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 2: Chinese
References, reveals three fundamental errors.
1. No burials took place during December or January. Therefore,
the figures for those two months must be disregarded. Furthermore,
there is no mention of bodies having been interred in Nanking inMarch.
2. The figures listed for the interments of males add up to 1,761, but
the records show the total as 1,759.
3. The subtotal for the number of children buried should be 56, but
the number reads 26. According to the record, the bodies of 30
children were interred on February 22, but they are not added in thesubtotal on the chart. Or was this information included later? Inthat case, 26 is the correct number.
Since the burial records submitted at the Tokyo Trials, found on p.
378, Vol. 1 of Source Material Relating to the Great Nanking Massacreduring the Second Sino Japanese War also fail to mention those 30 bodies,
this figure was clearly entered on a subsequent date. Therefore, we
may conclude that 30 dead children were not buried on February 22.
(The 26 bodies that were actually buried may have been those of boy
soldiers, since the International Committee received no complaints

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

from parents to the effect that their children had been murdered.)A Maximum of 623 Bodies Buried in Nanking
On February 13, there were torrential rains. Since the roads would
have been muddy the next day, it would have been impossible tobury 109 bodies on Mt. Gulinsi. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that672 corpses were buried in northern Nanking on February 19.
Furthermore, on that same day, outside the city in Xiaguan, 524
corpses were buried. Would the Society have hired extra workers,
enough to bury 1,196 bodies in one day? Even if 180-200 bodies
were indeed interred each day in northern Nanking, it would havebeen virtually impossible to bury more than 200.
Moreover, the last burials in the city (a total of 337 bodies) took
place on February 27. The last days of a project, as we mentioned
previously, are spent checking to ensure that everything has been
done. These figures have obviously been embellished.
An investigation into the dates of burials completed prior to
February 27 reveals an entry for February 22. The record states thatcorpses were interred in northern Nanking on February that day, andagain on February 27. Why would the work crew, once it had buried

Burial Records within the Wall of Nanking

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209

30 men and women on February 22, not have time to bury
theremaining 170 bodies on the same day? The answer is, most
likely, that there were no bodies to be buried. The operation was
most likely completed with the burial of those 30 bodies in thenorthern Nanking on February 22. The 337 bodies allegedly buried
on February 27 probably never existed.
Thus, the correct figures would be: 19 bodies buried on February
2, 49 on February 6, 151 on February 7, 20 on February 11, 154 on
February 12, and 30 on February 22, for a total of 423. Even if we
include the 200 burials recorded for February 19, the total rises only to
623.
Classification of the 600 Bodies Recovered in Nanking
Who were the approximately 600 persons laid to rest in Nanking, andhow did they die? The following classification seems reasonable.
1. Rioters and looters were shot to death by Chinese military police
prior to the fall of Nanking to set an example (see p.36).
2. Two thousand Chinese soldiers, most of whom were dead, orwounded and dying, were dumped on the platform at Nanking
Station in Xiaguan (see p.32) prior to the fall of the city. According
to Lily Abegg, they were eventually taken to a hospital, but some ofthem did not survive.
3. Many Chinese soldiers were killed during the hostilities atNanking’s gates prior to the fall of the city. For instance, a witness
saw “corpse upon enemy corpse” in front of the gate (see p.51).
(4) Prior to the fall of Nanking, at Yijiang (North) Gate, members of
the Chinese supervisory unit shot at Chinese soldiers attempting toescape and, as a result, many were killed or wounded (see p.55).
(5) Prior to the fall of Nanking, Chinese soldiers were killed when
they sought to escape from the city walls. Others rushed to Yijiang
Gate at the northern end of the city, and were trampled (see p.56).
(6) Prior to the fall of Nanking, many wounded Chinese soldiersheaded for the field hospital (located in the Foreign Ministry), butdied before they could be treated (see p.133).
(7) After the fall of Nanking, rebellious Chinese soldiers were
(lawfully) executed by Japanese troops (see Chapter 10).

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211

CHAPTER 14:

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF
THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

In the previous chapter, we discussed the burial work performed by
the Red Swastika Society in Nanking. We demonstrated that theSociety actually buried only about 15,000 bodies, despite its claims of
having interred 43,000. Are we to believe that the 43,000 bodies
listed in the Society’s records were casualties of war?
Or were they
victims of a massacre? We shall address that issue in this chapter
but, before we do, we shall address some of the Chinese allegations ofJapanese atrocities reported to Europeans and Americans in Nanking.
Chinese Allegations of Japanese Atrocities
Most of the Americans who remained in Nanking (Bates, Smythe,
Wilson, Fitch, Riggs, and Sone) resided in the home of Professor
Lossing Buck.
Living at close quarters, the men discussed
everything they had heard or seen with each other.
The most serious allegations made by Chinese residents are,fortunately, extant, having been recorded in Nanking Incident Source
Material, Vol. 1: American References. They have also been carefullycompiled by Kasahara Tokushi into a book titled One Hundred Days in
the Nanking Refugee Zone. We will cite some of the accounts therein.
1. Fitch’s Criticism of the Japanese Military During the Sweep of
Nanking
Fitch claimed that when the Japanese saw huge piles of Chinese
military uniforms on December 14 (the day after Nanking fell), they
apprehended 1,300 persons in the vicinity and shot them to death.
He also accused the Japanese of, two days later, abducting 1,000
persons from the Safety Zone and massacring them. The eyewitnessreport he wrote was carried in the March 16, 1938 edition of the South
China Morning Post, a full three months after the incidents allegedly
occurred.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

2. An 11-Year-Old Boy’s AccountIn a letter dated December 18, Dr. Robert Wilson, a physician
associated with the University of Nanking Hospital, wrote that agroup of 79 Chinese had been led away from the Safety Zone, andkilled on a hill west of Xizang Road. His informant was an
11-year-old boy, who claimed that he had regained consciousness
after the Japanese soldiers had departed, and returned to the Safety
Zone. Dr. Wilson wrote;
He came to after they had left and found the other seventy-nine
dead about him. His bullet wounds are not serious.1

This account strains credibility in several ways.
(1) There was only one witness to this incident, the boy in question.
Who was he? What was his name?
(2) After such a traumatic experience, would an 11-year-old child,after regaining consciousness, have remained on the scene longenough to count 79 corpses? Wouldn’t one expect him to have fled
the scene, terrified, at the earliest opportunity?
(3) The burial records of the Red Swastika Society do not mention 79
corpses on a hill west of Xizang Road.
3. A 17-Year-Old Boy’s AccountIn another letter, this one dated January 3, Wilson recounts a story heheard from one of three boys who came to him that day for medical
treatment. The boy, 17 years old, reported that on December 14,
about 10,000 men and boys ranging in age from 15 to 30 were taken to
the banks of the Yangtze near a barge. There, Japanese soldiers shotthem with field and machine guns, and hurled hand grenades at them.
Most of the dead were dumped into the river. The Japanese piled up
the remaining corpses and burned them. The boy and two others
had, miraculously, managed to escape. Six thousand of the victims
were former soldiers and 4,000, civilians.
This account, too, raises questions.
(1) Neither the given name nor surname of the boy is mentioned.
(2) All of Nanking’s gates were guarded by Japanese soldiers on
constant alert. How was the boy able to enter the city?
(3) Why did the boy risk returning to a city where, as he stated,shootings were taking place?
(4) Why did he remain silent until January 3? If he had confided insomeone, news of his ordeal would have spread throughout theFURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

213

Safety Zone. Why didn’t the other two boys come forward?
(5) How was this boy, who was running for his life, able to ascertainthat 6,000 former soldiers and 4,000 civilians had been killed?
(6) How was he able to distinguish civilians from soldiers? And how
could he possibly have counted the victims? With some many
flaws in his story, why didn’t Dr. Wilson interrogate him further?
If incidents like this one had actually occurred, they would havebeen recorded by more than one person. But the 17-year-old boy’s
account exists only in Dr. Wilson’s letter.
Bates’ Memorandum Deleted
Bates wrote a memorandum on January 25, 1938, the gist of which
was his claim that the Japanese military had conducted unlawful
executions. He sent the memorandum to Harold Timperley inShanghai. It was reprinted as Chapter 3 of What War Means, edited
by Timperley and published in July 1938.
In that memorandum, Bates criticized the way in which theJapanese segregated combatants from noncombatants, a process thatcommenced on December 24. He claimed that when the Japanese
were registering the refugees and issuing civilian passports, theyrounded up 3,000 Chinese men next to the University library. The
Japanese assured the men that their lives would be spared if they
admitted that they were soldiers. In front of Bates’ eyes, “between
two and three hundred” men stepped forward. Later, they weretaken away “in two groups.” But the Japanese broke their promise,and secretly executed the men outside Hanxi and Hanzhong gates.
Or at least that is what eight men told Bates.
The first man to approach Bates told him that he had been forced
to join the group of “between two and three hundred” after having
been apprehended by the Japanese on the street. He had sustained
bayonet wounds. Bates’ description follows.
Next morning, a man with five bayonet wounds came to the
University Hospital ... That evening, he said, somewhere to thewest, about 130 Japanese soldiers had killed most of five hundred
similar captives with bayonet thrusts.
When he regained
consciousness he found that the Japanese had gone, and managed
to crawl away during the night. He was not familiar with this partof Nanking, and was vague as to places.2 [Italics supplied.]214

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

There are problems in this account as well, which we shall list.
(1) The group of “between two and three hundred” men has now
ballooned to 500.
Bates later wrote, “This confusion orcomplexity of reports was discouraging.”(2) Who was the “man” who reported the incident to Bates? No
name is given.
(3) According to Bates’ subsequent investigation, the incident took
place on the banks of a canal outside Hanxi Gate.3 How did theman manage to pass through the gate, where Japanese sentries
were posted?
(4) The man claimed that he had barely escaped being executed by thefearsome Japanese. Why didn’t he attempt to distance himself
from Nanking? Why did he return to a city in which, as heclaimed, arrests and executions were taking place?
The number of corpses mentioned is quite large. Were the bodies
ever discovered? If there were no bodies, there were no murders,and Bates’ account was nothing more than malicious propaganda.
Further on in the same account, Bates writes that burial gangs did
discover the corpses.
Burial gangs report three thousand bodies at the point, left in rows orpiles after mass executions.4 [Italics supplied.]

Burials did not commence until February 1938, however, so no“burial gangs” were working on December 25. And how do we
explain yet another increase in the body count, to 3,000? We shallnow proceed to shed some light on these mysteries.
As previously stated, Bates’ memorandum was reprinted as
Chapter 3 of What War Means, and was carried in the following four
English-language publications as well.
1.
2.

What War Means, edited by Timperley (March 23, 1938)
The War Conduct of the Japanese, edited by Hsü Shuhsi (April 12,
1938)
3. A Digest of Japanese War Conduct, edited by Hsü Shuhsi (January
28, 1939)
4. The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39 (March 15, 1939)
5. Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, edited by Hsü Shuhsi (May 9,
1939)
All but one of the aforementioned publications, including The

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

215

Chinese Year Book: 1938-39, which was based on official sources,deleted the sentence that read “Burial gangs report three thousand
bodies ... left in rows or piles.” Therefore, it is safe to assume thatthose 3,000 bodies never existed, and that the story Bates heard fromthe “man” was untrue. The claim that the Japanese promised tospare the lives of Chinese soldiers who came forward, and thenreneged, is totally without merit.

The first portion of text is part of Bates’ memorandum, which was
included in What War Means, edited by Harold Timperley. The
second portion is the same text, as printed in The Chinese Year Book:
1938-39, except for the sentence mentioning “three thousand
bodies ... left in rows or piles,” which was omitted.

Bates Accuses Japanese Military of Violating International Law
Bates also recorded another hearsay account from two Chinese men.
Two other men from the University Library reported indirectlythat they escaped from a large body of several hundred who werebayoneted along the canal wall to the north, near to San Chia Ho.
Finally, it should be remembered that this incident is only oneof a series of similar acts that had been going on for two weeks,with changes on the main theme of mass murder of men accusedrightfully or wrongfully of being ex-soldiers. This is not theplace to discuss the dictum of international law that the lives ofprisoners are to be preserved except under serious militarynecessity, nor the Japanese setting aside of that law for frankly statedvengeance upon persons accused of having killed in battle
comrades of the troops now occupying Nanking. Other incidents
involved larger numbers of men than did this one. Evidences from216

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

burials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were killed
within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom some 30 per cent had
never been soldiers.5 [Italics supplied.]

Bates, who never seemed to question what Chinese informants
told him, accused the Japanese military of violating international law.
As proof of that crime, he cited the 40,000 corpses that had beeninterred, insisting that they were not victims of war, but of a massacre.
He also alleged that approximately 12,000 of the dead were notsoldiers, but civilians.
On January 25, 1938, when Bates wrote his memorandum, burials
had not yet commenced. How did he know about the 40,000 bodies
buried by the Red Swastika Society? He reported that when hewrote the announcement of the publication of What War Means, hemade a final check of the draft of that memorandum.6 By that time,
all the burials had been completed. Records dated March 23 statedthat nearly 40,000 bodies had been interred. We assume that Bates
inserted the passage that stated that “close to forty thousand persons”
had been buried during the final editing process.
Bates Again Claims 12,000 Civilians Massacred
In 1938, Bates wrote the preface to War Damage in the Nanking Area, areport of war casualties compiled by Smythe, representing theInternational Committee. The publication was completed in June ofthat year. At the end of the report were the results of surveys of one
in every 50 households, conducted between March and April 1938.
According to one of them, “Number and Cause of Deaths and Injuries,
by Date,” between December 12, 1937 (the day prior to the fall of
Nanking) and January 13, 1938, 2,400 persons, including thosementioned in cases with no dates, were killed as a result of “soldiers’
violence.”
For some reason, Bates multiplied the survey figures by five, andagain insisted that the Japanese had massacred 12,000 persons. Hisargument was included in War Damage in the Nanking Area as afootnote to a passage that referred to the massacre of 12,000 civilians.
A careful estimate from the burials in the city and in areas adjacent to
the wall, indicates 12,000 civilians killed by violence. The tens of
thousands of unarmed or disarmed soldiers are not considered inthese lists.7 [Italics supplied.]FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

217

However, as even Hora Tomio has conceded, there are no burial
statistics for the number of soldiers versus the number of civilians
interred. The claim that approximately 30% of the corpses, i.e.,
12,000 were those of civilians was the product of Bates’ imagination.
Thus, there was no objective evidence that could be used as proof
that 12,000 civilians were interred.
The content reflected thepersonal, unsubstantiated views of Bates, who wrote the preface, andof the editor, Smythe. The argument that 12,000 civilians weremassacred has taken on a life of its own, despite the fact that it is
Bates’ opinion, and nothing more than that.
Moderate View Rooted in Bates’ Argument
Nevertheless, Bates was the first of the “moderates” (the term favoredby those who write on this subject) to assert that tens of thousands ofChinese were massacred in Nanking. The positions taken by later
moderates— Hata Ikuhiko, Okumiya Masatake, Itakura Yoshiaki, andcontributors to The Battle of Nanking (Kaikosha) — may differ as far
as the number of victims is concerned, but they are all variations on
Bates’ theme. The moderates all agree with Bates on one point, i.e.,that the Japanese perpetrated executions in violation of internationallaw during their sweep of Nanking. Therefore, contrary to popularbelief, this allegation was not made for the first time after World War
II. It was made by Bates immediately after the fall of Nanking, andcontinually thereafter.
The gist of Bates’ argument, which has played a key role in thecontroversy about Japanese military conduct in Nanking, is as follows.
(1) The Japanese military executed Chinese soldiers in violation ofinternational law.
(2) The Japanese military killed 40,000 persons, 12,000 of whom were
civilians and 30,000 soldiers, in violation of international law.
(3) These mass murders took place over a period of two weeks, not twomonths.
(The claim was made that executions in violation of international law
took place over a period of two weeks, from December 13 to
December 26, not over two months. This two-week period was also
cited by Jeffery, the British consul.)
Bates’ argument was, most likely, based on stories he had heard

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

about the execution of 10,000 persons from the 17-year-old boy, andabout the execution of 79 persons from the 11-year-old boy. Despite
the fact that those accounts had been deemed groundless andexpunged from official records, Bates wrote (on January 25, 1938) that“evidences from burials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed
persons were killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whomsome 30 per cent had never been soldiers.”
Was his claim accurate? If it had been, it would have been
investigated and entered into the records of the time, where it would
have remained. If it was not accurate, it would have been removed
from official records (discredited). At this juncture, we would like toreport the results of our search for the term “Nanking Massacre” inthe English-language magazines and official records of the time.
The China Year Book 1938
Unlike Japanese publications, those issued in other nations do notinclude the day or month of publication, only the year. Hints can,however, be obtained from the dates that follow prefaces. For
instance, the preface of the 1938 edition of the venerable
English-language almanac, The China Year Book, first published in 1912,
carries the date of February 2, 1938.
The China Year Book was issued by the North China Daily Newsand Herald Company, originally a newspaper company founded bya Briton in 1864. The company produced the North China Daily Newsand a weekly newspaper known as the North China Herald. The
former boasted the largest circulation for an English-language daily in
the Far East at the time.
The 1938 edition of the The China Year Book included a chronology
for 1937, covering Chinese politics, economics, military affairs, andtrade. At the beginning of Chapter 19, “Sino-Japanese Hostilities,”
was a “Summary of Events.” Following the summary is a list ofitems relating to Nanking.
Aug. 13
Aug. 14

Aug. 23

Outbreak of hostilities at Shanghai.
Chinese planes drop bombs in International
Settlement, causing 729 deaths and wounding 861
between Cathay and Palace Hotels in Nanking Road,and killing 1,012 and wounding 1,007 at junction of
Avenue Edward VII and Boulevard de Montigny.
Japanese troops force landing near Woosung.

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

Sept. 20

Oct. 24
Dec. 12

Dec. 13219

Chinese plane drops bombs in International
Settlement: one (which did not explode) behind
Hamilton House, and another on Sincere Co.’s
Emporium, killing 215 and wounding 558 persons.
Four air-raids, in which 80 Japanese planes took part,on Nanking, which hereafter was bombed almost
daily.
British soldier (Rifleman W. McGowan) killed ... in ...
Shanghai, by machine-gunning from Japanese plane.
U.S. Panay sunk by Japanese aerial bombing above
Nanking. H.M.S. Ladybird badly damaged by Japaneseshell-fire of Wuhu.
Nanking occupied by Japanese.8

The same edition of The China Year Book contains only a very brief
passage about the Japanese occupation of Nanking, dated December
13: “Nanking occupied by Japanese 1937.”
Some might think that the North China Daily News and Herald
Company did not know anything about the “Nanking Massacre”
because its offices were located in Shanghai, but that was not the case.
We have previously noted that an editorial in the January 21, 1938
edition of the North China Daily News claimed that 10,000 persons had
been massacred in Nanking.
But the 1938 edition of the The China Year Book, whose preface isdated February 2, contains no reference to the claim made just eightdays earlier in a newspaper issued by the same company.
Furthermore, at the end of the same edition of the The China Year Book
is an “Index to Past Issues.” Listed under “Nanking” we find
“Nanking Outrages 1927.” Since these were infamous incidents inwhich the Japanese, British, and American consulates were attacked
by Nationalist troops, they were included in the list of important
events in Nanking. No mention was made of a Nanking Massacre.
The 1939 edition of the The China Year Book was no different. The
one and only item listed under “Nanking” was the “Nanking
Outrages” of 1927.9 Moreover, both the 1938 and 1939 editions begin
with a chronology outlining the main events of past years. For
instance, the entry for Sunday, January 2 is “Port Arthur captured by
Japan 1905,” and for Tuesday, January 4, we have “Hankow British
Concession entered by Communist mob 1927.” The entry for March
24 reads, “Nanking Outrages 1927,”10 but nowhere in the chronology
is there a similar entry for 1937.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

The entry for December 13, 1937 in the calendar is “Japanesetriumphal entry into Nanking,”11 and for December 18 of the same
year, “Japanese mills destroyed at Tsingtao [Qingdao]1937.”
Jeffery, the British consul, asserted that atrocities had beencommitted during the first two weeks after Nanking was occupied.
However, his assertion appeared neither in the calendar nor
anywhere else in the 1938 edition of the respected The China Year Book.
It had, therefore, been repudiated.
If the Japanese had conducted executions in violation ofinternational law in Nanking, they would have overshadowed the“Nanking Outrages” of 1927. A special entry referring to them would
certainly have been included in the 1938 edition of The China Year Book.
But there was no Nanking massacre and, therefore, no entry.
China at War
The first issue of China at War appeared in April 1938. The fact thatan editorial entitled “China’s Spiritual Mobilization,” written by
Soong Mei-ling, the wife of Chiang Kai-shek, appears at the beginningof that issue reveals that this was an English-language magazine
designed to rally support for the Chinese war effort. Careful readingof a message conspicuously placed above the “Table of Contents”
advertises that intent. The first half of the message follows.
Within this inaugural issue of “China at War” are selections fromthe daily bulletins of the China Information Committee, Hankow,
whose main object has been to present a realistic and truthful
picture of the many forces at work in the New China born in war
brought by Japan.12 [Italics supplied]

The “bulletins” were short official announcements. Therefore,
the selections in China at War were official records of the Republic ofChina.
Furthermore, when the first issue was published (April 1938), fourmonths had elapsed since the fall of Nanking. An anonymous
editorial in the March 19 issue of China Forum, issued by the Chinese
League of Nations Union in Hankou, accused the Japanese of having
massacred 80,000 persons. How, then, did the inaugural issue ofChina at War, which claimed to be providing the true facts, based on
official records, describe the situation in Nanking after the Japanese
occupation?

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221

Nanking — after December 12, 1937 — became a hunting groundfor the Japanese soldiers who combed the city looking for money,loot and women.13

Nanking fell not on December 12, but December 13. On thatpoint, China at War was mistaken. It is the remainder of the sentence,
however, to which we should turn our attention, regardless of its
accuracy. Though it paints an extremely unflattering portrait ofJapanese soldiers, it does not allude to unlawful executions (theNanking Massacre). The only explanation for this “omission” is that
the Japanese military did not execute Chinese soldiers in violation ofinternational law. Also noteworthy is the fact that the China
Information Committee in Hankou did not accuse the Japanese of
executing prisoners of war unlawfully.
The War Conduct of the JapaneseAt the beginning of The War Conduct of the Japanese is a statement to
the effect that the publication was compiled under the auspices of theCouncil of International Affairs. The preface is dated April 12, 1938,
and the editor was Hsü Shuhsi, a Yanjing University professor who
had also served as a member of the commission appointed by the
League of Nations to investigate the Manchurian Incident.
The memorandum Bates wrote in January 1938 also appears in The
War Conduct of the Japanese, as one might expect. However, thepassage in which Bates expresses his personal view (“Evidences fromburials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were
killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom some 30 per
cent had never been soldiers.”) is absent.14 Bates’ argument, i.e., that
40,000 Chinese were massacred, remained uncorroborated andunaccepted.
Bates never reiterated his claim that the Japanese military violated
international law. As previously stated, Cabot Coville, a militaryattaché with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, visited Nanking in later
April 1938. At that time he met with Bates, but the latter did not tell
him that the Japanese had violated international law. Bates had
retracted that particular charge.
Mao Zedong’s On Protracted War

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Nor did Mao Zedong make any mention of a Nanking Massacre in his
famous lecture entitled On Protracted War, delivered over a period ofnine days, beginning on May 26, 1938 at an anti-Japanese symposium
at Yan’an. Part of that lecture follows.
Prior to the Taierzhuang campaign [March 1938], the enemy
demonstrated its lack of able commanders. During hostilities inShanghai, Nanking, Cangzhou, Baoding, Nankou, Xinkou, andLinfen, the enemy won many battles, but took only a few
prisoners and trophies.
Five blunders — inadequate
reinforcements, the lack of a main direction of attack, poor
strategic coordination, the inability to use opportunities
appropriately, and the failure to annihilate more than a few
soldiers though having encircled many — demonstrated theincompetence of Japanese military leadership.15

When this lecture was presented, six months had elapsed since thefall of Nanking. Mao analyzed the errors made by the Japanesemilitary as follows.
1. The Japanese did not annihilate Chinese troops.
2. Therefore, large numbers of Chinese soldiers survived the conflicts.
3. Survivors regrouped and launched counterattacks against theJapanese.
4. The Japanese, in failing to annihilate Chinese troops, afforded thelatter an opportunity to retaliate.
In Mao’s opinion, the Japanese could have exterminated Chinese
soldiers trapped within the city walls, but did not do so. Note that
he did not accuse the Japanese military of violating international law— of perpetrating a massacre in Nanking.
The League of Nations Resolution
On May 27, 1938, two months after the inaugural issue of China at War
came out, the Council of the League of Nations (the forerunner of theUnited Nations) adopted the following resolution, which was
published in the 1939 edition of The China Year Book.
The Council having heard the statement by the Representative ofChina on the situation in the Far East, and the need for national

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

223

defence in China, firstly, earnestly urges the Members of the
League of Nations to do their utmost to give effect to therecommendations contained in the previous Resolutions of theAssembly and the Council in this matter.
It earnestly urges the Members to take serious and sympathetic
consideration of the requests they may receive from the Chinese
Government.
In conformity with the said Resolutions the Council expresses
its sympathy with China in her heroic struggle for the
maintenance of her independence and integrity, which arethreatened by the Japanese invasion, and in the suffering which
has thereby been inflicted on her people.
Secondly, the Council recalls that the use of toxic gases in war
is condemned by International Law, and cannot fail to meet withthe reprobation of the civilized world. It requests the Governmentsof the States which may be in a position to do so, to communicate
to the League any information they may obtain on the subject.16

The resolution was adopted six months after the fall of Nanking.
The “Representative of China” mentioned in the citation above was
Gu Weijun. Gu, born in 1887, received a doctoral degree from
Columbia University. Prior to his appointment as Representative, heserved the Nationalist government as foreign minister, deputy prime
minister, minister of finance, member of the Lytton Commission, andambassador to France. Despite Gu’s having been a leading Chinese
diplomat, and despite his broad range of activities, he makes noreference to a Nanking Massacre in this resolution. Nor is there any
evidence that a protest relating to the “Nanking Massacre,”propaganda about which had circulated for three months after thecity fell, was ever submitted to the League of Nations. Given theabsence of any allusion to executions carried out in violation ofinternational law, i.e., a massacre, we can assume that thoseallegations were unfounded.
The China Critic: Special Second Sino-Japanese War First
Anniversary Issue
July 8, 40 days subsequent to the adoption of the League of Nations
resolution, marked the first anniversary of full-scale hostilities
between Japan and China. All Shanghai-based English-language
magazines published special issues commemorating that anniversary.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

The China Critic was no exception. The bureau chief of thisweekly which, from its inception in 1928, carried articles, editorials,
and reproductions of official records, was Gui Zhongshu, a graduateof the University of Wisconsin. Gui had been the editor of an
American daily newspaper called the China Press, published in
Shanghai, since 1935.
The July 7 issue of The China Critic contained a noteworthy editorial,
entitled “A Year of Undeclared War,” an excerpt from which follows.
Nanking fell on December 10. The immediate result was very
damaging to China and a big celebration went on in Japan. The
Japanese “Victory Parade” in Shanghai narrowly escaped anothermajor incident. But soon China regained her composure again.
The capital was removed to Hankow. Many competent observers
even then were quite confident that China could not be conquered.
Even after the fall of Nanking and the beginning of the Great
Retreat, Nathaniel Peffer wrote that Japanese expectations were
“illusory,” and events of subsequent months bore out thatprediction.17

As an editorial, “A Year of Undeclared War” represented theofficial views of The China Critic. Like China at War, it was mistaken
about the date of the fall of Nanking, but it did not mention a
Nanking Massacre.
China Forum:
Issue

Special Second Sino-Japanese War First Anniversary

China Forum was a weekly English-language magazine published in
Hankou “under the auspices of the Chinese League of Nations
Union.” Its role was to communicate official Chinese views to therest of the world. As we mentioned previously, the March 1938 issueof China Forum included an unsigned editorial claiming that 80,000
Chinese had been massacred in Nanking.
The manner in which the July 9 issue of this magazine describes
the occupation of Nanking is of considerable interest. The issue
included an article entitled “One Year of Sino-Japanese War: Review
Questions for Study Groups.” There were more than 10 of thesereview questions, each accompanied by a sample response. The 10thquestion is of special interest: “What was the attitude of China after
the fall of Nanking?”

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225

The sample response provided is as follows.
General Chiang Kai-shek said on December 16, 1937: “No matter
how the present situation may change, we must not surrender but
march onward. To capitulate would be to court sure national
disaster.” Meantime, Tokyo announced its decision to “pursue
extended hostilities.”18

Let us assume that the Japanese executed Chinese soldiers inviolation of international law after the fall of Nanking. If that had
been the case, Chiang Kai-shek would have broadcast accusations tothat effect throughout the world. The sample response to theaforementioned question would have been, “After the fall of Nanking,a massacre commenced, perpetrated by the Japanese military.
Chiang Kai-shek appealed to the entire world to condemn the
Nanking Massacre.”Instead, the response to that question was Chiang’s appeal to his
compatriots for a war of resistance. He said nothing about a massacrein Nanking. The special issue of China Forum commemorating thefirst anniversary of the conflict between Japan and China also
discredited the massacre argument, as well as the claim that 80,000
Chinese had been massacred, as stated in the March 19 issue.
Chiang’s Statements on the First Anniversary of the Second
Sino-Japanese War
On July 7, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek delivered “The Generalissimo’s
Statement to Friendly Nations” and “The Generalissimo’s Statement
to the Japanese People.” A good part of each statement was devoted
to a denunciation of “Japanese atrocities.” Below we cite portions of“The Generalissimo’s Statement to Friendly Nations” found in the1939 edition of The China Year Book.
Facts as mentioned above are well known to the world and needno recitation. ... In war areas and districts under Japanese
occupation, besides incalculable losses of property and resources,
innumerable able-bodied men and youths, women and children,and the enfeebled old, were all subjected to wholesale slaughter,raping and other wanton acts of barbarity. ...
Take Canton, for instance. That city has been attacked from theair day and night during the last fortnight. Thousands of civilians

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

have been killed. Their blood and flesh sputtered with thesplinters of their houses where the infernal machines raged.
Foreign officials and civilians who personally witnessed theappalling scenes have written reports and made motion pictures
thereof illustrating the unprecedented cruelty committed by thebarbarous Japanese in China. If such acts of extreme barbarity,committed under pretence of civilization, should be left
unpunished, there would be no more equity and justice in thisworld. This is an ineffaceable blot on the history of mankind.19[Italics supplied.]

Never mind that in the section entitled “Japanese Atrocities,”
Chiang neglected to mention the scorched-earth strategy that hehimself had implemented.
When one reads through thesestatements looking for a reference to Japanese atrocities in Nanking,one notices that Chiang mentions nothing about a Nanking Massacre.
The atrocities he describes allegedly occurred in Guangdong.
There had been no Nanking Massacre. Since the International
Committee had expressed its gratitude to the Japanese for having
restored peace in the Safety Zone (Document No. 34), even Chiang
could not say, “Take Nanking, for instance.” He could not submit aprotest to the League of Nations. Chiang was unable even tofabricate a Nanking Massacre in his “Statement to Friendly Nations”
and “Statement to the Japanese People.”
The China Journal:
Anniversary Issue

Special Second Sino-Japanese War FirstThe China Journal prided itself on publishing genuine historical
records and essays written by distinguished writers and scholars. It
was one of the best monthlies of the time. The magazine had started
out in 1923 as The China Journal of Science and Art, and acquired its
new name in 1927.
As we mentioned earlier, the “Events and Comments” column of
the January 1938 issue of The China Journal carried an editorial thatreferred to “slaughter” committed by Japanese troops in Nanking.
However, the same column in the following issue contained only thefollowing reference.
It is a well known fact that the fall of Nanking and Hangchow[Hangzhou] was followed, even up to weeks afterward, and even

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227

to date, with Japanese looting, raping, and wanton destruction.

The China Journal was the first magazine to revise (deny) the claimthat there had been a massacre in Nanking.
The July issue also carried an editorial penned by Arthur Sowerby,
former editor-in-chief, under the title of “One Year of Undeclared War
in China. An excerpt follows.
The Japanese pushed on towards Nanking, reaching the outskirtsof the capital on December 8. After a week of terrific fighting the
Chinese forces evacuated Nanking on December 13. Terrible
scenes followed as the Japanese forces, completely out of hand,committed unspeakable outrages upon the civilian population in
the city and its suburbs.20

Sowerby wrote that looting and raping by Japanese soldiers
ensued after the fall of Nanking. He must have obtained his
information from erroneous articles in The New York Times and similarsources. Nevertheless, he did not allude to executions of soldiers orcivilians in violation of international law, i.e., the Nanking Massacre,in his editorial. The July issue also rejected the accusation that there
had been a massacre in Nanking. The publication’s editors saw
absolutely no reason to change their point of view.
China Quarterly: Special Second Sino-Japanese War First
Anniversary Issue
China Quarterly, based in Shanghai, was an English-language monthly
magazine first published in 1935. The Summer 1938 issue carried ananonymous editorial entitled “One Year of Sino-Japanese Conflict,”which described a “reign of terror” in Nanking.
After vigorously resisting Japanese attacks for a week, the Chinese
defenders evacuated Nanking in the night of December 13. The
Japanese entry into Nanking was followed by a reign of terror
which lasted for many months. Prior to the Japanese advance on
Nanking, the National Government was removed to Chungking,Szechwan [Sichuan] province, on November 20 and officiallycommenced functioning on December 1.21

Chinese troops deserted Nanking on December 12, not December

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

13. Bates condemned incidents that allegedly took place between
December 13 and 26, 1937 — a period of approximately two weeks —not over several months, as the editorial states. Still, there was nofurther mention of the argument that Bates had broached six months
earlier, i.e., that 40,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians had beenmassacred.
The writer of the editorial describing a “reign of terror” inNanking could certainly have revived Bates’ argument, but he did not.
By “reign of terror,” he might have been referring to rapes, rumors ofwhich had circulated in the city.
The China Weekly Review:
Anniversary Issue

Special Second Sino-Japanese War First

Among editorials of this sort, the only one that adopted a different
stance appeared in The China Weekly Review, published in Shanghai.
The publication’s first issue is thought to have appeared in 1917. Its
editor-in-chief was John Powell, known for his anti-Japanese,
pro-Chiang stance.
The January 29 issue of The China Weekly Review included thefollowing text: “Massacre of civilians, rape of Chinese women andsystemetic [sic] destruction and looting of property in Nanking by
Japanese troops confirmed by reliable foreign residents in the city.”22
Then, in the June 11 issue, Peter South wrote an editorial entitled“Nanking and Taierchwang — Where Japan Lost the War.” South
included Rabe’s viewpoint, i.e., that 20,000 women had been raped in
Nanking. He also reprinted part of one of Durdin’s articles in asection subtitled “Horrors of Nanking,” which stated that the latterhad “watched the execution of 200 men on the Bund.”However, we would like to reiterate that the first appearance of
the argument that 20,000 Chinese women had been raped was in theJanuary 21, 1938 edition of the North China Daily News. Furthermore,that argument was not included in the 1938 edition of The China Year
Book, issued by the same publisher, the North China Daily News andHerald Company. South was resurrecting an accusation that had
already been repudiated in the publication’s June 11 issue.
Then, how should we interpret Durdin’s eyewitness account? An
important hint is provided by the issue of China Todaycommemorating the first anniversary of the Second Sino-JapaneseWar.
But before we refer to that, we shall examine anothercommemorative issue, published by The China Weekly Review.

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

229

The July 9 issue of that publication contains an unsigned editorial
entitled “Review of the First Year of the War.” The only indication
as to the identity of the author is “By a Chinese Contributor.” An
excerpt from the editorial follows.
After the fall of Shanghai, the Japanese Army pushed on to
Nanking, which fell on December 13. The wildest excesses
imaginable of Japanese soldiery followed; civilians, young and old
and of both sexes, were wantonly murdered; Chinese women,estimated to number as high as 20,000, were raped; 20,000 helplesscaptured Chinese soldiers were executed ... .23

This was a reiteration of the claims brought forward by Rabe andBates.
The author might well have used his real name andmentioned that Rabe and Bates had made similar claims. But hecould not do so in good conscience, because these were claims that
had already been repudiated.
By publishing arguments that had already been repudiated, i.e.,that 20,000 women had been raped and 20,000 Chinese massacred, The
China Weekly Review failed to provide unbiased reportage.
China Today:
Issue

Special Second Sino-Japanese War First Anniversary

China Today was a monthly magazine published by American Friendsof the Chinese People, a New York-based organization. The firstissue appeared in about 1933. Since the organization had labeled
Japan as a military-fascist state, the magazine’s editorials were,
unsurprisingly, slanted.
The January 1938 issue contained an article written by Peter
Nielsen, based on Durdin’s eyewitness account of the executions of
200 soldiers, describing the “mass murder of peaceful civilians.”
Six months later, editor-in-chief Robert Norton wrote an editorial
entitled “One Year of War,” part of which follows.
By the end of November, Shanghai was in Japanese hands,
excepting for the International Settlement ... The advance upon
Nanking was rapid, and Japanese troops entered the city on
December 13. Meanwhile, on December 12, the Panay had been
sunk on orders of Colonel Hashimoto, a leader of the attemptedTokyo coup of February 26, 1936. ...

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

In preparing for resistance to this offensive, Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek held military meetings with many generals,
including the commanders of the Eighth Route Army, culminatingwith the important session of the National Military Council at
Wuchang, January 27-30. This meeting not only laid plans for
positional defense on three lines, but also developed a plan ofcoordination of positional and guerilla warfare. Plans weremade for organization immediately of three guerilla armies, eachconsisting of over 100,000 men.24

Ninety days subsequent to the fall of Nanking, Nationalist andCommunist military leaders gathered in Wuchang. Even at that
historic important meeting of minds, there was no discussion ofJapanese executions of civilians and military personnel in violation ofinternational law. The only topic addressed was the organization ofguerrilla forces.
The July issue of China Today did not reprint Durdin’s andNielsen’s accusations about a Nanking Massacre.
If thoseaccusations had been true, records substantiating them would remain.
However, they were removed from the records. Durdin’s and Bates’
views had been rejected.
The Evolution of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College
What was the Chinese Communist Party’s stance vis à vis the“Nanking Massacre.” Useful information on this subject is provided
by The Evolution of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College.
In 1931, the Red Army School was established in Ruijin, Jiangxi.
Its name was changed to the Red Army Academy two years later. It
was closed for some time, but was reestablished in June 1936. Lin
Biao was installed as its president. On July 1, 1937, a month after the
Xian Incident, the Academy was moved to Yan’an, where its namewas changed, again, to the Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Militaryand Political College (abbreviated to the Anti-Japanese Military and
Political College). After the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out,
branches of the Academy were established all over China. Their
purpose was to nurture Communist Party leaders capable of resisting
the Japanese.
In August 1938, The Evolution of the Anti-Japanese Military and
Political College was published by the Dongyuan Company in Hankou.
A description of the history and activities of the College, the book’s

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231

intention was to attract warriors who would fight for the communist
cause. Nanking is mentioned in the following passage.
Beijing, Tianjin, Nanking, Shanghai may have fallen, but we canstill crush the enemy. Nankou, Shijiazhuang, Taiyuan, andLinfen may have fallen, but we can still crush the enemy.
Beiping [Beijing], Nanking, and now Wuhan, the center ofresistance against the Japanese ... these beautiful cities have been
trampled by thieves, and we will never again be able to frolic on
their mountains and fields.25

If there had been a massacre in Nanking, a great deal of space
would have been devoted to it, as excellent pedagogical material for
the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College. But as the citation
above indicates, there was no mention of such an incident. The
assumption that there had been a massacre was erroneous from thevery beginning.
Guo Moruo’s Reflections on the War Against JapanThe golden age of Nationalist-Communist cooperation extended fromthe summer of 1937 to the end of 1938. The center of that activity
was Hankou (Wuhan, after World War II). On April 1, 1938, thenewly-established Nationalist Political Agency No. 3 began operatingin Hankou. The responsibility of the Agency, whose slogan was“propaganda before strategy,”26 was, as one might surmise, thecreation and dissemination of propaganda.
Within the Agency, departments were formed and staffed withseveral hundred persons engaged in propaganda-related activities:
the editing and printing of documents, and the creation of cartoons,propaganda directed toward the enemy, and films.
The Agency
received funds amounting to 10,000 yuan for a week of heightened
propaganda production.27
The head of the Agency was therenowned historian Guo Moruo, who served as deputy prime
minister after World War II.
Guo supplied the preface for the Chinese edition of What War
Means in June 1938. He was instrumental in the diffusion of
propaganda relating to the Nanking Massacre. Then, according toReflections on the War Against Japan, which he wrote in 1948, sometimearound the first anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War (July
1938), he edited and published A Factual Account of Enemy Atrocities,

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

mobilizing the entire Agency.
Still, during this massive propaganda campaign, the term
“Nanking Massacre” did not appear in any of the English-language
magazines commemorating the first anniversary of the war. Even in
The Evolution of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College, there isno mention of a massacre in Nanking.
But Guo did refer to a Nanking Massacre in Reflections on the War
Against Japan, as follows.
When the end came for Wuhan Sanzhen, I heard no sound, nohuman voice, beneath the ink-black skies. Through the haze, I
could see only the frigid mist rising from the Yangtze. ... Then,suddenly, there was a bloody apparition before me. Transfixed, I
stared at a city bathed in blood. I was looking at the aftermath of
the Nanking Massacre. Who can be sure that we won’t see arepetition of that horror, tomorrow or the next day, in Wuhan
Sanzhen?28

Reading this passage, one might think that the Guo Moruo had
personally witnessed a massacre in Nanking, but what he wrote wasfiction. Guo was not in Nanking when the city fell. In the same
publication, he wrote:“The fall of Nanking ... viewed from
Guangzhou [Canton] seemed like an event that had taken place onanother planet.”
General Xiang Ying’s Speech
In September, 1937, Xiang Ying, under orders from the Communist
Party, entered into negotiations with Xiong Shihui, a proxy for He
Yingqin, concerning a truce between the communist commando
troops and Nationalist forces. The result was the consolidation ofmultiple units into the New 4th Army, with Ye Ting as commander,and Xiang Ying as deputy commander, two months prior to the fall of
Nanking. On January 1, 1939, approximately one year later, Xiang
Ying delivered a speech entitled “Lessons Learned During a Year of
Combat,” in which he outlined 4th Army strategy from the time of its
establishment until the end of 1938.
That speech can be found in Volume 9 of Chinese Communist Party
History: Source Materials. Though Xiang alluded to Nanking manytimes, he never mentioned a massacre. What he remembered about
Nanking in 1938 was the constant disturbances created by his men

FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

within the city.29

233

There had been no Nanking Massacre.

Bates Persists
Bates, possibly frustrated because his claim that 40,000 Chinese had
been massacred had been continually rejected, he restated hisargument on November 29, 1938, in the form of a letter addressed toChristians in the United States. To an audience that was notconversant with China, much less with the situation in Nanking, hesubmitted, once again, his claim that the Japanese had massacred
more than 30,000 prisoners of war.30
Bates was convinced that 40,000 Chinese, both civilians andsoldiers, had been massacred. The only new material in his letter
was the assertion that prisoners of war had been massacred, probably
a ploy to attract attention.
“The Christian Church in War-Time Service”
The Winter 1938 issue of the China Quarterly appeared in January 1939.
In it was an editorial written by Zhu Youyu, entitled “The Christian
Church in War-Time Service,” which reads, in part:
In many cities, as the tide of war engulfs them, international relief
committees have been set up, largely with missionary personnel
and utilizing mission property. A notable example was theInternational Relief Committee of Nanking, which cared for
250,000 men, women and children in the so-called Safety Zone andfed 50,000 destitute persons, through those dark weeks following
the fall of the city, that have become historic in modern warfare
for the barbarities, lack of military discipline and the terrorismthat prevailed.31

The focus of Zhu’s editorial was the relief work done by the
Christian church. In it he cites the International Relief Committee of
Nanking.
If noncombatants had been killed in Nanking, those murders
would have taken place in the Safety Zone, where almost all the
refugees had congregated.
However, the editorial makes noreference to the murder of 12,000 civilians in the Safety Zone. Nordoes he state, as Bates had, that more than 30,000 prisoners of war had
been taken from the Safety Zone and unlawfully executed. He

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

alluded only to barbarities, lack of military discipline and terrorism.
Bates’ Argument Again Discredited
Not long after “The Christian Church in War-Time Service” appeared,
A Digest of Japanese War Conduct, edited by Hsü Shuhsi, former
advisor to the Foreign Ministry, was published. It included Bates’
memorandum asserting that 40,000 Chinese had been massacred.
The preface is dated January 28, 1939.
That same memorandum also appeared in Chapter 1 (“Japanese
War Conduct”) of The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39. The preface isdated March 15, 1939.
The Chinese Year Book was an
English-language almanac, which stated, in its inaugural (1935-36)
edition, that it was “entirely under Chinese editorship andmanagement.” Only the fourth edition of The Chinese Year Book
(1938-39), was “prepared from Official Sources by the Council ofInternational Affairs.” Hsü Shuhsi was the director of the Council.
Furthermore, Bates’ memorandum also appeared in Documents of the
Nanking Safety Zone, edited by Hsü. This was the fourth inclusion.
The preface is dated May 9, 1939.
In other words, the accounts carried by the aforementioned threepublications were based on “official sources,” and thus represented
the official view of the Republic of China. Bates’ memorandum
appeared several times in those official sources. But subsequent to
its first appearance, his argument that 40,000 Chinese had beenmassacred was never reprinted. The memorandum was included ina total of four official Nationalist records, as follows.
1. Hsü Shuhsi, Japanese War Conduct (preface dated April 12, 1938)
2. Hsü Shuhsi, A Digest of Japanese War Conduct (preface dated January
28, 1939)
3. The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39, edited by Hsü Shuhsi (preface
dated March 15, 1939)
4. Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, edited by Hsü Shuhsi (preface
dated May 9, 1939)
All four publications had deleted (repudiated) Bates’ argument,i.e., “Evidences from burials indicate that close to forty thousand
unarmed persons were killed within and near the walls of Nanking,of whom some 30 per cent had never been soldiers.”32

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235

Edgar Snow Revives Bates’ Argument
Nevertheless, in The Battle for Asia, published in 1941, Edgar Snow
wrote the following.
The sordid story of the Nanking massacres is now pretty familiar
to the world. According to an estimate given to me by membersof the Nanking International Relief Committee — which was,incidentally, headed by a German business man, Mr. John H.D.
Rabe, who wore Hitler’s highest Nazi decoration — the Japanesemurdered no less than 42,000 people in Nanking alone, a large
percentage of them women and children.33

What Snow wrote, in actuality, reflected the estimate arrived at byInternational Committee members. It was Bates’ personal opinion,
as well as that of the foreign residents of Nanking, which made it
seem credible.
Still, the members of the International Committee never claimed
that 30,000 civilians had been massacred. They believed that 12,000
civilians and 30,000 soldiers had been killed. Snow shamelesslytransposed the figures, claiming that most of the 40,000 were womenand children.
He thus revived an argument that had been refuted many times in
official publications of the Republic of China, and presented it to aWestern audience unfamiliar with the situation in China. Despite
the fact that it had already been repudiated by The Chinese Year Book:
1938-39, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, and other official
sources, Snow insisted on resurrecting Bates’ argument.
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, minus the offending portionof Bates’ memorandum, was published by Kelly & Walsh in Shanghai.
The company was, therefore, aware that Bates’ argument had been
removed from official sources.
Inexplicably, Kelly & Walsh also published Snow’s The Battle for
Asia, thus aiding in the revival of an argument that had beenthoroughly discredited. Kelly & Walsh acted as Bates’ accomplice indisseminating this malicious propaganda.
Lily Abegg’s The Renewal of China
We would now like to cite a portion of Lily Abegg’s The Renewal of
China: Space as a Weapon that relates to the occupation of Nanking.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Abegg was a foreign correspondent who moved to Hankou not long
before the fall of Nanking. According to Owen Lattimore’s Solutionin Asia, at the time of the first anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese
War (July 1938), Abegg was in close contact with German militaryadvisors.
Her voluminous book (481 pages), published in 1940, describes thesituation in Nanking as follows.
Afterwards, exhausted Japanese soldiers wreaked havoc forseveral weeks, so much so that they ruined the reputation of theJapanese Army for years to come. Since until then, members of
the Japanese Army had never committed such atrocities, their lackof discipline in Nanking was particularly appalling. The few
foreigners who remained in Nanking were worried that there
would be looting and robberies once Chinese troops had deserted
the city, but they did not fear Japanese soldiers. Until then, theentry of Japanese military personnel into cities all over China had
been welcomed, even by those who were politically ill-disposed
toward Japan. They expected the Japanese to establish peace andorder. The events that enfolded in Nanking were so sudden andso horrible that it took years to erase the terrible memories. The
reputation of the Japanese military was finally restored when
Guangdong and Hankou were taken. There, Japanese behavior
was faultless.34

Abegg had left Nanking two weeks prior to the fall of Nanking.
Therefore, her description was probably based on accounts provided
by Bates and Fitch, which appeared in What War Means. Those twomen were the source of the propaganda describing rapes and looting
in Nanking. Their influence must have been powerful, since even
Abegg believed them. Even so, Abegg did not reiterate Bates’ claimthat 40,000 Chinese had been massacred. That argument had been
dismissed many times as groundless and fallacious in statements
made by Chiang Kai-shek, by English-language magazines andalmanacs published in Shanghai, and by “official sources,” such as theCouncil of International Affairs in Chongqing.
Preface to 1939 Edition of The China Year Book
We shall close this chapter with a citation from the preface of the 1939
edition of The China Year Book, dated May 8, 1939.

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237

It has been the constant aim of the Editor, ever since thepublication of the first issue of the China Year Book, to make its
contents impartially factual, and to avoid including material
which could in any way be considered partial, on controversial
issues.
For that reason, except for a brief commentary on the actual
progress of hostilities, the Sino-Japanese conflict has been dealt
with entirely on the basis of official documents or speeches.
Inclusion of more than a limited number of these official
pronouncements is out of the question, but in the selection of themevery effort has been made to preserve a balance between theparties involved, whether belligerents or neutrals. It is hopedthat no document, speech or statement essential to anunderstanding of the issues raised by the present hostilities has
been omitted.35

Here, the editorial policy of The China Year Book since its founding
in 1912 is restated. The commitment of its editors to providing
information based on official documents and speeches, withoutomission, especially where the “Nanking Massacre” is concerned, isjust as relevant today as it was some 60 years ago.
How was the situation in Nanking after the occupation reviewed
and documented by individuals? How was it described in speeches
and statements emanating from Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong?
And how was the situation after the fall of Nanking described in
English-language magazines of the time?
To ignore official records of the situation in Nanking after it was
occupied by the Japanese — as documented by individuals, and as
described in speeches and statements made by Chiang Kai-shek and
Mao Zedong, and printed in English-language magazines andnewspapers, i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary resources, inhistoriographic terms — is to violate the standards of historicalresearch. The indiscriminate use of dubious sources, some of whose
authors are unnamed, and others whose veracity has otherwise been
compromised, to describe the events of the past is propaganda at its
very worst.
The “Nanking Massacre” gained credence as a result of“evidence” far removed from primary or secondary sources. Thereis not one single source that proves the claim that Chinese citizens
were massacred in Nanking, or that states the number of victims. Aslong as that continues to be the case, the Nanking Massacre will

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

remain a global fantasy — nothing more.
We invite those who would say otherwise to demonstrateirrefutable proof that the Japanese violated international law
subsequent to the fall of Nanking.

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CHAPTER 15:

AN OVERVIEW OF
THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

When and why did the outcry over the “Nanking Massacre,”supposedly perpetrated during the four months subsequent to the fallof that city, begin? As we stated in the previous chapter, the words“Nanking Massacre” are nowhere to be found in English-language
magazines commemorating the first anniversary of the Second
Sino-Japanese War (with the exception of one anonymous article), or
in official documents.
In this chapter, we shall examine the way in which the term
“Nanking Massacre” has alternately come to the fore and receded into
obscurity during the period extending from December 1937 to thepresent, which we have divided into six phases.
Phase 1:

December 1937 to March 1938

Burial records show that approximately 40,000 bodies were interredin Nanking. Did those 40,000 individuals die in battle, or were theymassacred? The massacre argument was put forth by Europeans
and Americans residing in Nanking, University of Nanking Professor
Miner Searle Bates in particular.
In a letter to Harold Timperley, Bates wrote: “Evidences fromburials indicate that close to forty thousand unarmed persons were
killed within and near the walls of Nanking, of whom some 30 per
cent had never been soldiers.” This sentence appears in Chapter 3 ofWhat War Means:
The Japanese Terror in China (1938), which
Timperley edited.
This was the first time that the argument that Japanese military
personnel had massacred 40,000 soldiers and civilians in violation ofinternational law was broached. However, there was no solid
evidence substantiating the massacre of 12,000 civilians.
Bates’ argument may have been rooted in a perception shared byWestern residents of Nanking, i.e., that Japanese troops had
unlawfully executed large numbers of Chinese soldiers and civilians

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

during their sweep of the city and their subsequent segregation of
combatants from noncombatants. That perception was based on an
account that Bates had heard from a Chinese who claimed that healone had escaped with his life. Bates did not claim to have seen
40,000 corpses. The conclusion he reached, namely that 40,000
persons had been massacred, was his extrapolation of reports heheard from various Chinese individuals.
Phase 2:

April 1938 to 1940

A memorandum written by Bates asserting that 40,000 Chinese had
been massacred was reproduced in The War Conduct of the Japanese,
published in April 1938. The War Conduct of the Japanese, written in
English and issued by the Council of International Affairs in Hankou,
was a propaganda magazine intended for worldwide distribution.
However, Bates’ reference to the massacre of 40,000 unarmed soldiersand civilians, cited above, had been deleted in its entirety and,
therefore, discredited.
This was the first time that an official publication had denied thatthe “Nanking Massacre,” which allegedly occurred over a four-month
period beginning on the day the city fell, had taken place. The
Council of International Affairs viewed the 40,000 dead not as victims
of a massacre, but of war.
There was no mention of a “Nanking Massacre” in a resolution
issued by the League of Nations a month later, on May 27, nor in a
lecture entitled “On Protracted War” delivered by Mao Zedong over a
period of nine days, commencing on May 26. Nor was it mentioned
in Chiang Kai-shek’s statements to friendly nations and to theJapanese people sent on July 7, or in special issues ofEnglish-language magazines commemorating the first anniversary of
the Second Sino-Japanese War published in Shanghai.
The“Nanking
Massacre”
remained
unacknowledged.
Furthermore, the claim that it had occurred had been dismissed bynumerous official statements and records.
In November 1938, Bates felt compelled to inform American
readers, who were largely unfamiliar with the situation in China, that
the Japanese had executed 30,000 prisoners of war in Nanking. Evenso, his most vociferous argument, i.e., that 40,000 Chinese had beenmassacred, had yet to gain acceptance.
For instance, Bates’ memorandum was included in The ChineseYear Book: 1938-39, published in 1939 but, again, his reference to theAN OVERVIEW OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”

241

massacre of 40,000 Chinese was omitted. It is important to note thatthat issue was compiled from official source material provided by theCouncil of International Affairs in Chongqing. Bates’ claim that
30,000 prisoners of war and 12,000 civilians had been massacred had,once again, been repudiated in official records emanating from theRepublic of China.
Nor was The Chinese Year Book: 1938-39 the only publication todisregard Bates’ assertions. As we mentioned earlier, though Bates’
memo was included in The War Conduct of the Japanese (1938), thereference to the massacre of 40,000 Chinese was deleted. The samereference was omitted in A Digest of Japanese War Conduct (1939),
issued in Chongqing by the Council of International Affairs. Nor
did it appear in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, also publishedby the Council. In The Renewal of China: Space as a Weapon, Lily
Abegg makes absolutely no mention of a “Nanking Massacre.”
Therefore, prior to World War II, the accusation that Japanese military
personnel violated international law had already been repudiated in official
records, statements, and speeches.
During Phase 2, two Germans (John Rabe and Georg Rosen), a
Briton (E.W. Jeffery), and four Americans (James Espy, Miner SearleBates, Tillman Durdin, and Archibald Steele) all retracted their claims
that the Japanese had violated international law. No one accused theJapanese of having perpetrated unlawful executions. Those who
argue that there was a massacre in Nanking have continually
overlooked these facts.
Phase 3:

1941 to 1945

In The Battle for Asia, written by Edgar Snow and published in 1941,
the author resurrected Bates’ argument, despite the fact that it had
been discredited, and presented it to a poorly informed audience.
Snow reversed the alleged combatant-to-noncombatant ratio,
claiming that the majority of victims were women and children.
American journalist Agnes Smedley, in her Battle Hymn of China(1943),1 increased Bates figure fivefold, declaring that Japanesemilitary personnel had slaughtered 200,000 Chinese.
Phase 4:

1940 to 1949

The first Japanese reference to the “Nanking Massacre” was a
feature article in the December 8, 1945 edition of the Asahi Shinbun.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

The article was entitled “History of the Pacific War: The Downfall of
Deceitful, Militarist Japan, Supplied by Allied Headquarters.” It
described Nanking after its occupation by the Japanese as follows:
We have positive proof that Japanese troops perpetrated
unspeakable atrocities, slaughtering 20,000 men, women, andchildren, from witnesses who described the worst massacre inmodern history. [Italics supplied.]

This article, and its claim that the massacre had claimed 20,000
victims, shocked Japanese readers.
“History of the Pacific War” was carried by most of Japan’snational newspapers in 10 installments, the last one appearing on
December 17. It was later published in paperback form, under thetitle History of the Pacific War Compiled by the Civil Information and
Education Division, Allied Headquarters. The content was identical tothat of the article serialized in Japan’s dailies.
Bates’ Testimony at the Tokyo Trials
The Tokyo Trials or the IMTFE (International Military Tribunal for the
Far East) opened on May 3, 1946. The prosecution began submitting
evidence relating to the Nanking Incident on July 25. After several
witnesses had testified, among them Robert Wilson, a physician at the
University of Nanking Hospital, and Xu Chuanyin, Bates took thestand.
He testified that “the bodies of many civilians who had been shot todeath were lying about on the streets in my neighborhood for manydays after the entry of the Japanese Army.”2
This is the same man who, on December 15, 1937, three days after
the fall of Nanking, had told a Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun correspondent,“I am pleased that the orderly entry of the Japanese Army has
brought peace to Nanking so quickly.”
While on the witness stand, Bates expatiated upon the “conclusion”
he had reached, i.e., that after Nanking fell, Japanese troops had killed
30,000 Chinese soldiers and 12,000 civilians, including women andchildren. This conclusion had already been omitted from (repudiatedby) official documents of the Republic of China.
Normally, when a writer provides material to be used in a book,he receives a copy of the work, once it has been published.

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243

Therefore, we may assume that Bates was aware that his claim that
the Japanese had massacred 40,000 Chinese had been deleted fromnumerous publications. We may also assume that since he did notprotest, he did not object to the deletions. Nevertheless, he revived
that same argument at the Tokyo Trials.
Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan
The number of victims reported by witnesses varied considerably,
especially among those from the Republic of China. Count No. 45 of
the indictment charged that Japanese military personnel had
murdered and slaughtered tens of thousands of civilians anddisarmed soldiers of the Republic of China.3
In his opening statement, Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan said
that “the occupation of Nanking was characterized by the ...
organized and ruthless extermination of tens of thousands ofprisoners of war, civilians, women and children.”4
Keenan’s position coincided with the charges in Count No. 45, as
far as the number of victims (tens of thousands) was concerned.
That figure would accommodate Bates’ argument (42,000 victims) andCount No. 45, both of which Keenan had embraced. By not being
specific, was he making a concession to the Republic of China, one of
the Allied Powers? Or was he leaning toward Espy’s testimony (the“Espy Report”),5 which stated that 20,000 had been killed, and which
was based on what the latter had heard from Americans who
remained in Nanking (Bates et al.)? It is likely that the answer toboth questions is yes.
Nanking District Court Report on Crimes Committed by the Enemy
The “Nanking District Court Prosecutor’s Report on the Investigationof Crimes Committed by the Enemy” was submitted to the Tokyo
Trials in February 1946. It was an undated official document, whose
content is absurdly inconsistent.
While asserting that “a massacre that exceeded all other massacresin history in terms of its scale” had taken place in Nanking, the reportconceded not only that “a very small number of individuals” had
notified Chinese authorities of Japanese atrocities, but also that those
who were questioned about the atrocities “had been rendered
speechless, like cicadas in winter.”
It also stated that “someindividuals had actually denied that there had been a massacre.”6

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

The report described the victims of the massacre as follows:“There are now 300,000 confirmed victims, and possibly 200,000
more.”7
The next sentence reads: “It has been confirmed that 340,000
persons have been killed.” As if this were not enough to confuse thereader, the report later states that “279,586 of our fellow countrymen
were slaughtered.”
Never mind that the Red Swastika Society, with the assistancewith personnel from the Japanese Army’s Nanking Special Agency
and the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, hadinterred approximately 40,000 bodies in Nanking. The “Nanking
District Court Prosecutor’s Report on the Investigation of Crimes
Committed by the Enemy” completely disregarded this authenticatedfigure and, instead, submitted falsified burial records (see p.203).
The Prosecution’s Concluding Arguments and the Judgements
These inconsistencies were, of course, reflected in the prosecution’ssummations and the ensuing judgments. On February 18, 1948, theprosecution’s general summation included the following comment
about what was referred to as the “Rape of Nanking”:
The approximate number of those who were killed within andnear the city of Nanking over a period of six weeks is anywhere
between 260,000 and 300,000.
All of them were brutallymurdered without benefit of trial.8

At this point, it is appropriate to recall the question raised by E.W.
Jeffery, the British consul, which concerned the first two weeks of theoccupation of Nanking.
The summation simply mirrored theRepublic of China’s allegation.
The “Matsui Summation” was presented by the prosecution aweek later, on February 25. It included the following statement:“Tens of thousands of Chinese men, women, children, unarmed
soldiers and policemen were killed by Japanese soldiers.”9 This wasconsistent with Bates’ position, since the number of victims had been
reduced by one-fourth.
Nine months later, on November 11, 1948, the blanket judgmenton the “Nanking Atrocities Incident” was read in the courtroom.
More than 200,000 civilians and prisoners of war were killed

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245

within and near Nanking during the first six weeks of theoccupation of the Japanese Army.10

However, on the following day, when the judgment against
Commander Matsui was read, the wording was different.
More than 100,000 were killed ... during those six to seven weeks.11

The number of victims mentioned varied, and wildly so, with eachjudgment. Neither Chief Prosecutor Keenan nor the Republic ofChina seemed to care how many victims there had been. All theywanted to do was to prove, in their fashion, that atrocities had beencommitted in Nanking, and to have those who had been responsible
for them executed.
For further details on how the “Nanking Massacre” was invented
at the Tokyo Trials, we refer readers to Fuji Nobuo’s How the “Great
Nanking Massacre” Was Manufactured.
Defense Attorney Jodai Takuzen Describes the Courtroom Drama
In his later years, Jodai Takuzen, the attorney who defended General
Matsui, shared his recollections of the Tokyo Trials with Ara Kenichi.
They can be found in an article written by the latter entitled “Soldiers’
Recollections of The Nanking Incident, No. 22.”)
The tone for the entire proceedings was set soon after they began,when defense attorney Kiyose submitted a motion concerning
jurisdiction.
The court rejected the motion, but we were never told why.
Proceedings conducted under such circumstances do not deserve
to be called “trials.” What I learned about criminal law wascertainly not applied in that courtroom.
Every summer the controversy about the Nanking Incident
resurfaces, and those who believe it occurred, as well as those who
do not, voice their opinions. My heart sinks every time thishappens. General Matsui was sentenced to death and executed.
But who really believes that there was a massacre in Nanking? I
don’t think anyone does. Certainly no one who knows how theTokyo Trials were conducted would claim that there was a
massacre. I am saddened by these annual polemics.
Not only the Nanking Incident, but all cases addressed at the246

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Tokyo Trials were handled in a way that bore no resemblance towhat I was taught about the practice of criminal law. Those whoare engaged in the dispute today are doing so because they believethat the drama that unfolded in that courtroom reflects thefacts. ...
The defense believed that some soldiers did commit immoral
acts when the Japanese Army occupied Nanking. Such acts are
one of the evils of war, and are inevitable. They must haveoccurred in Shanghai, as well as in Nanking, and in every war thathas ever been fought in the history of mankind. ...
I was skeptical about the many testimonies I heard in the
courtroom. I don’t know how people reading the records today
would react to them, but at the time, in the courtroom, no one
granted the testimonies any credence. We all knew that they had
been fabricated.12

By way of explanation, we would like to add that when he said,“What I learned about criminal law was certainly not applied in thatcourtroom,” Jodai was referring to the fact that by applying the law ex
post facto, the court violated a fundamental legal principle, i.e., thatthe law is not to be applied retroactively, as Kiyose Ichiro indicated in
his motion concerning jurisdiction. The Tokyo Trials: The World Passes
Judgment, edited by Sato Kazuo, states that the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East was a “showcase trial open to the public,”13
to use the words of William Webb, the presiding justice, and a trial inwhich there was never any attempt to respect international law.
And, as defense attorney Logan indicated, the Court also violated
the procedural principle “commonly recognized by English-speaking
nationals”, i.e., “the court calls witnesses and conducts directquestioning and cross-examination.”14 Witnesses did not testify —they signed affidavits. Defendants were tried on the basis of thoseaffidavits.
Jodai stated, with respect to the many testimonies presented, that“no one gave them any credence.”
That was a reasonableconclusion, given the testimonies we have examined so far.
Nevertheless, from the outset of the proceedings, questioning theveracity of those testimonies was taboo. Though “we all knew thatthey had been fabricated,” the defense was not permitted to raise
objections.

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247

Japanese Military Personnel Executed Without Sufficient Evidence of
Their Guilt
Many Japanese military personnel were held responsible for the
Nanking Massacre and executed, without adequate verification orincontrovertible proof.
In April 1947, 6th Division Commander Tani Hisao was executedat Yuhuatai in Nanking. In January 1948, Captain Tanaka Gunkichi,
2nd Lieutenants Noda Tsuyoshi and Mukai Toshiaki, among others,
were executed, also at Yuhuatai.
On December 23, 1948, General Matsui Iwane, who had
commanded the Central China Area Army, was executed in Tokyo.
These executions took place before the Chinese Communist Partycame into power.
Phase 5:

1949 to 1978

The following year marked the establishment of the People’s Republicof China, on October 1, 1949. The Chinese Communist Party had
wrested Nanking away from the Nationalist Party in April. One of
the first projects the Communist Party undertook after its return toNanking was the creation of a memorial park and Martyrs’ Tomb at
Yuhuatai.
After 1927, when the Nationalists designated Nanking as theircapital, many revolutionaries who opposed the Guomindang(Nationalist Party) were executed at Yuhuatai, situated south ofZhonghua Gate (South Gate). That is why the Communist Party
selected Yuhuatai as the site of a memorial park to honor its dead.
At the center of the park, near the entrance, stands the Martyrs’
Tomb, on top of which are nine giant human figures carved fromstone. According to Maruyama Susumu’s The Truth about the
Nanking Incident, the following inscription is engraved on the tomb:
The Guomindang Government captured 300,000 Chinese
Communist Party activists, brought them to Nanking andslaughtered all of them at this execution site in Yuhuatai. This
memorial park was created to comfort the souls of these heroes.15[Italics supplied.]

Chen Shunchen, in Journey Through China’s History, writes about astone monument in front of the Martyrs’ Tomb on which Mao Zedong

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

personally inscribed “Long Live the Martyrs Who Died for the
Revolution.”16
No Monument to “300,000 Chinese Slaughtered by the Japanese”
According to the inscription on the stone monument, the Nationalists
killed 300,000 Communist Party members.
As we mentioned
previously, Nanking became the Nationalist capital in 1927, andexecutions of revolutionaries began that same year.
The Japanese occupied Nanking in 1937. The Republic of Chinabegan executing Japanese military personnel in 1947.
Both Communist Party members and Japanese military personnel
were executed at Yuhuatai. The executions of the Japanese musthave been fresh in the minds of the Chinese, since they had takenplace only a few years before the park was opened. If a massacre did
indeed occur in Nanking, it would have been appropriate to honor its
victims as well. Mao Zedong did not, however, inscribe “TheJapanese military slaughtered 300,000 Chinese in Nanking” on the
Martyrs’ Tomb.
There are several possible explanations. If Mao was convinced thata massacre had taken place in Nanking, he might have decided that
the Yuhuatai Martyrs’ Tomb was not an appropriate place to honor
the memory of the victims, since it was intended to commemorate
revolutionary heroes, not to censure Japanese soldiers. But if that
had been the case, he would have looked for another site to honor themassacre victims. There he would have written the inscription:“The Japanese military slaughtered 300,000 Chinese in Nanking.” If
he thought there had been a massacre, he certainly would haveconstructed a memorial for its victims. But he did not. That meansthat Mao Zedong did not believe that there had been a massacre in
Nanking. Without proof that 300,000 Chinese had been slaughtered,neither Mao nor anyone else would have written such a thing.
Earlier we mentioned that Mao presented a lecture entitled “On
Protracted War” over a period of nine days, beginning in May 1938
and ending in June. In that lecture, he stated that the Japanesecommitted a strategic blunder in not killing everyone in Nanking
after they had surrounded the city. That error permitted Chinese
troops to regroup and counterattack.
Mao Zedong rejected the argument that the Japanese had
murdered 300,000 Chinese before World War II began. Even after
the war ended, he did not alter his position.

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249

No References to “Nanking Massacre” in History Textbooks
Published in China and Hong Kong
There is no reference to a massacre in Nanking in the entries for 1937
in the “Chronology of Chinese and Foreign History” in the Handbook
for Middle-School History Teachers, published in 1958 by the Shanghai
Educational Publishing Company. The only entry that mentions theJapanese is:“Japanese troops occupy Shanghai; Nationalist
Government moves to Chongqing.” On the other hand, one of theentries for 1927 reads:“Chiang Kai-shek establishes ananti-revolutionary government in Nanking ... and slaughters many
Communist Party members and revolutionaries.”
Similarly, the main text of Chinese History: A New Edition (atextbook first published in Hong Kong in 1972 by the Lingji
Publishing Company), revised in 1975, contains the following accountfor 1937: “On December 13, Nanking fell. In the north, fierce
battles raged, claiming many victims, and often resulting in defeat.”17
The entry in the book’s chronology for 1937 reads simply, “TheNationalist Government moves its capital to Chongqing; attempt todefend Nanking unsuccessful.”
It is, of course, impossible to make sweeping judgements about all
textbooks issued up until 1975 on the basis of these two. However,the People’s Republic of China being a proletarian dictatorship,
textbook compilers were not permitted to do any editing. If thenational consensus were that a “Nanking Massacre” had occurred, an
account of it would surely have appeared in government-approved
textbooks. At that time, Hong Kong was a British Crown Colony.
Since the United Kingdom is a democratic nation, textbook compilers
in Hong Kong had the freedom to edit. Therefore, if they had
determined that there had been a “Nanking Massacre,” they would
have described it in the Colony’s textbooks.
However, there is no mention of the Nanking Massacre in
textbooks used in 1975, which means that it was acknowledged neither
by the citizens of the People’s Republic of China or Hong Kong.

Phase 6:

1978 to the Present

In the People’s Republic of China, the claim that there had been a
massacre in Nanking gained no momentum until Deng Xiaoping

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

came into power.
By July 1977, Deng had been restored tohigh-ranking posts he had previously held (vice-chairman of theCommunist Party’s Central Committee and chief of staff of the PLA(People’s Liberation Army)). In December 1978, he became the “RedEmperor.18”
Less than a year later, in July 1979, an account of the “Nanking
Massacre” appeared in the first printing of The History of China, atextbook designed for elementary- and middle-school students
attending school in the full-day, 10-year program.19 In 1985, theMemorial Hall to Compatriots Slaughtered by Japanese Troops
During the Nanking Massacre was built. The hall’s facade bears theinscription “Victims: 300000.”

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CHAPTER 16:

THE “NANKING MASSACRE”
AS WAR PROPAGANDA

The “Nanking Massacre” is the generic naming incidents thatJapanese forces committed (massacre, rape, plunder, and arson) overthe six week period following the capture of the city of Nanking on
December 13, 1937. There are still different interpretations on the scaleof the incidents among the researchers, and they haven’t reached any
definitive conclusions yet. One perspective that has not been
considered is that the “Nanking Massacre” be considered as war
propaganda.
Based upon recent research and a top-secret document of theChinese Nationalist Party which I recently found, it would be fair tosay that the “Nanking Massacre” may be considered war propaganda.
This paper presents clear evidence that the root of the “Nanking
Massacre” lay in the Nationalist Party’s propaganda campaign, andverifies the actual scale of the Nanking Incident.
First, this will paper look at when and how accounts of the“Nanking Massacre” were spread throughout the world. Second, it
will scrutinize two kinds of documents which contributed to thatspread and are considered the evidence for the massacre. Third, it will
examine the situation before the “Nanking Massacre”: how the
Nationalist and Communist Parties looked at it, and the reasons why
they had to resort to propaganda. Fourth, the paper will make use ofrecent research and a top-secret document which was recently found,and verifies the validity of the two kinds of documents. Fifth, it will
examine the shrewd methods of propaganda in detail, and why they
were successful. Finally, it will conclude that the “Nanking Massacre”
was the result of this propaganda, and explains the aftermath effect.
Before entering into the main discussion, I would like to present a
brief overview of at which point and how the “Nanking Massacre”
was reported. American newspapers first reported on the “Nanking
Massacre.” It was on December 15 (Dec. 16 in Japan), 1937, three days
after the fall of Nanking, that the Chicago Daily News published the“Nanking Massacre Story” by Archibald Steele, a special

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

correspondent. Then, in July, 1938 — seven months after the fall of
Nanking and the first anniversary of the Second Sino-Japanese War —when Harold Timperley edited the accusations of the Americans
living in Nanking against the Japanese forces into a book What War
Means: Japanese Terror in China. These two were the principal sourcesthat spread the account of the “Nanking Massacre” throughout theworld, before the start of World War II.
It should be noted that no country — including Nationalist China
where the alleged massacre occurred — ever publicly criticized Japan
It was only after World War II that the Tokyo Tribunals first took up
the issue of the “Nanking Massacre” and assigned guilt to Japan
before the world.
In 1946, Joseph Keenan, the chief prosecutor at the Tokyo
International Military Tribunal, insisted that there had been a
massacre of tens of thousands of people. Miner Bates, Professor of the
University of Nanking, who contributed of articles to What War Means,asserted there had been a massacre of 40,000. Nationalist China,
which had never criticized Japan for this issue before World War II,
claimed that 300,000 had been killed.
Most Japanese did not accept the story of the “Nanking Massacre,”which was condemned at the Tokyo Tribunals. As evidence of this, it
was not presented in any Japanese history textbook under
government authorization for a great while. Neither had it been
discussed in any Chinese national textbook.
It was not until the 1980’s that the “Nanking Massacre” wascovered in all Japanese and Chinese history textbooks. A history
textbook for junior high schools published in Japan in 1999 says, “TheJapanese forces encountered fierce resistance in various places, killed,
it is claimed, 200,000 civilians after the occupation of Nanking. They
were criticized [for this] by other countries.”1 Chinese History, atextbook published in China 1997 says, “When the Japanese forces
occupied Nanking, they conducted an enormous, bloody massacre of
the Nanking civilians, and committed outrageous crimes. … For thesix weeks after the occupation of Nanking, the Japanese forcesslaughtered 300,000 unarmed Chinese civilians and soldiers who had
abandoned their weapons.”2
The Roots of the “Nanking Massacre”
As stated before, American newspapers first reported the “Nanking
Massacre” to the world — the Chicago Daily News and the New YorkTHE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

253

Times — and the book, What War Means. The media reports and thebook have been considered the evidence of the “Nanking Massacre”;
it is these accounts that give credence to the “Nanking Massacre” up
until the present day.
They were widely accepted because: First, these were real-timenews reports. The Chicago Daily News story was published on
December 15 and the New York Times story was published on
December 17. The special correspondents who sent the reports stayedin Nanking until December 15, and this gave the readers theimpression that the correspondents were there actually witnessing the
massacre.
Second, What War Means was considered to be a contemporary
record written from a neutral position. Harold Timperley, the editor,
was an Australian and a special correspondent in China for the British
newspaper Manchester Guardian. Those who contributed articles thatwere the highlights of the book were Americans living in Nanking,and were accepted as third party of eye-witness accounts.
Third, What War Means was published seven months after the fallof Nanking and attracted a wide readership, which viewed it as alegitimate contemporary record.Certainly there was not even a hint ofanything in it to suggest that the accounts were merely propaganda.
Due to recent research, the basis of these sources is beginning to
crumble. For example, Suzuki Akira found that although editor
Timperley was certainly a journalist, he was also an “advisor” to theCentral Information Department of the Nationalist Party. He assumed
that the Central Information Department of the Nationalist Party inthe capital of Hankou had “devoted all their energy”3 to thecompletion of What War Means. Suzuki’s position is based on thisstatement in Jindai Laihua Waiguoren Ming Zidian (The Modern Who’s
Who of Foreign Visitors to China), which describes Timperley as
follows:
After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, he was sent toEurope and America by the Nationalist Party, and was engaged inpropaganda maneuvers. Thereafter he took a position as anadvisor to the Central Information Department of the Nationalist
Party.4

As will be discussed later, Professor Kitamura Minoru found thatin Zeng Xubai’s (the oldest member of the Central Information
Department of the Nationalist Party), autobiography, Zeng Xubai

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Zichuan, he disclosed propaganda operations of the department, andrecalled that they were related to Timperley. Unfortunately, however,
his autobiography did not mention anything about the editing andpublication of What War Means.
All contributors to What War Means were anonymous; but they
have, except for one article, all been subsequently identified as
Professor Minor Bates of the University of Nanking, and George Fitch,.
Moreover, Bates has turned out to have been an “advisor” to theChinese Nationalist Government.5 Also, (how about ‘George Fitch’s
wife’(?)) Mrs. Fitch was found out to have been a “close friend” ofMadame Chiang Kai-shek.6 Therefore, we cannot trust the neutralityof the articles in the book.
For example, Chinese forces established anti-aircraft emplacementsin the civilian refugee Safety Zone that was in Nanking and left them
there, ignoring repeated complaints from the International Safety
Zone Committee. But Fitch, siding with the Nationalists, wrote:
Gen. Tang,… charged with the defense of the city, cooperated
splendidly on the whole in the very difficult task of clearing theZone of the military and anti-aircraft.…7

Can we not say that this statement was contrary to fact, rather
than a witnesses’ true record?
The basis for accepting What War Means as unbiased evidence forthe “Nanking Massacre” has begun to be undermined. But there is
still a lack of decisive evidence to assert it was just propaganda.
Propaganda Has Priority over Tactics
Mainland China was not unified as it is today. Internal conflicts had
continued for one and a half centuries since the end of the 18th century.
Military factions existed in various places, and the country was torn
by internal conflicts. The Nationalist Party, led by Chiang Kai-Shek,
expanded their power most in 1930’s.
The Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, was attacked militarily
by the National Party and managed to limp away to Yan’an for safety.
They could barely maintain the status quo. After an incident in
December 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was held hostage by Chang
Shueliang., the Nationalist and Communist Party came to anagreement. In September of 1937 they entered the era of the so-called
second cooperation between the Nationalist government and theTHE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

255

Communist government. Even though it was called “cooperation,”
the Nationalist Party received the generous support of the U.S. andGermany and thus possessed the more powerful military force
compared with the Communists. Therefore, the Nationalist Party took
leadership.
When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937, it was
Nationalist forces which actually fought against the Japanese forces.
After the war, General He Yingching of the Nationalist Party
expressed his dissatisfaction that the Communist Party took the leadand fought only “twice” out of 40,000 battles.8 But in terms of
conducting propaganda, the Nationalist Party combined with theCommunist Party produced a powerful campaign.
Shortly after the war, Communist Party member Guo Moruo wrote
his memoirs, which were later published in Japanese as Konichisen
Kaisoroku (Memoirs of Anti-Japanese Warfare). According to Guo, theCommunists established the First Office to oversee Party affairs in theforces, the Second Office to oversee civilian organizations, and theThird Office to oversee propaganda under the directorship ofchief-of-staff Chen Cheng with Chow En-lai, representing the 8th Rte
Army (stationed in Hankou) as deputy director in the political
department. It was the Third Office that was responsible forpropaganda for military forces, international propaganda, andanti-enemy propaganda, which began operations with Guo as thehead on April 1, 1938.
Guo recalled that he “felt much better” when he saw the slogan,“Propaganda has priority over tactics, and politics has priority overmilitary affairs.” He described himself as the person in charge of
propaganda warfare. But the work of the Third Office — which was
also a “group of people opposing Japanese culture” — was not topublicize real facts, but rather to propagate “exaggerated” facts,9
namely “exaggerated propaganda.”10 His greatest achievement was
the publication of Dikou Baoxing Zhen Lu (True Records of theInvader’s Atrocities) in 1938. Guo boasted that its publication “frominformation gathering, editing, printing, and stocking, to publishing,
was all done by the people at the Third Office.”11 The existence of thisparticular document has yet to be confirmed, but this document islikely to have actually been called Rikou Baoxing Zhen Lu (True
Records of Japanese Invader’s Atrocities), which does exist.
The Nationalist Party’s documents describe almost the sameorganizational structure and the same elements of propaganda as
described by Guo’s Memoirs, but mentioned Dong Xianguang and256

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Zeng Xubai as the persons in charge. In November 1937, the Central
Information Department of the Nationalist Party was established.
Therein, the International Information Division was organized to be
in charge of overseas propaganda. According to Zeng’s Autobiography,
Dong Xianguang (vice-director of the Central Information
Department of the Nationalist Party) oversaw the overseas
propaganda, while Zeng (a professor of Ginling College in Nanking)assumed the position as head of the International Information
Division.
Nationalist Party and Communist Party documents were notexactly identical, and it appears as if the Communist Party conducted
their own separate propaganda campaign. The fact that Guo was thehead of the Third Office of the Political Department of the Nationalist
Party, however, tells everything: people belonging to the Communist
Party were included in the Nationalist Party’s organizations. The
Central Information Department of the Nationalist Party “closelycooperated with”12 the Third Office of the Political Department of the
Nationalist Party, and promoted propaganda. For this reason, Guorecalled that he “saw” Zeng, the head of the International Information
Division “all the time.”13 After the fall of Nanking, the International
Information Division, “together with”14 the Third Office, invitedforeign special correspondents to the International Information
Division in Hankou every Monday.
The Top-Secret Document: Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu Guoji
Xuanchuan Chu Gongzuo Gaiyao (An Overview of Propaganda
Operations of the International Information Division of the Central
Information Department)
Propaganda had priority over tactics. The greatest exaggerated
propaganda success was the publication of Timperly’s What War
Means. Given that no one was able to detect that this book was a workof propaganda for more than half a century following its publicationin July 1938, one can easily understand how shrewd and successful
the effort was. But now it is revealed to be merely a “propaganda
book.” What indicates this without any doubt is the document
Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu Guoji Xuanchuan Chu Gongzuo Gaiyao: zi
1938-nian zhi 1941-nian 4-yue (An Overview of Propaganda
Operations of the International Information Division of the Central
Information Department of the Nationalist Party: from 1938 to April
1941). This document, which was kept at the Party History Committee

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257

of the Central Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party in Taipei, isa booklet of approximately 100 pages (along with a hand-written
mimeographed copy). The cover page was stamped “Top Secret”.
According to this document, the International Information
Division of the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department
was divided into five sections and three offices: the Editing Section,
the External Affairs Section, the Anti-Enemy Propaganda Section, thePhotographic Section, the General Affairs Section, the Office ofBroadcasting, the Office of Documents and the Clerks’ Office. This
top-secret document detailed the “Anti-Enemy Propaganda Section.”
One chapter is called, “An Outlook on Activities of the Anti-Enemy
Propaganda Section”:
The Anti-Enemy Propaganda Section began operations on
December 1, 1937. At that time, our forces retreated from Nanking
and Shanghai, and were conducting the warfare bravely. It wastime that we should do our best to expand our activities, andcooperate effectively with the forward military actions. Time flies
like an arrow, and three years have passed. We submit thesituation of the development for consideration.
Our activities can be divided into two types: propaganda
and research. What follows here is the analysis:15

In other words, this top-secret document records activities from
December, 1937 (two weeks before the fall of Nanking) to March, 1941
(nine months before the outbreak of hostilities between the U.S. andJapan). In the sub-section headed “Books,” of the section “Editing and
Producing Books for Anti-Enemy Propaganda,” one of their activities
is recorded:
1. Books
The anti-propaganda books that this section edited and printed
were in two kinds as follows:
A Wairen Mudu zhi Rijun Baoxing (Japanese Atrocities
Witnessed by Foreigners).
This book was written by Harold Timperley …, a prominent
British journalist. The contents were on rape, arson, and plunder;
namely wicked conduct after the enemy entered into Nanking on
December 13, 1937. The book also equally described the detailed
situation of deterioration of military discipline and degradation ofhuman nature. The book was published both in Chinese and258

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

English. It was also published in Japanese. The title of thisJapanese version was changed to, What Is War? The book started
with the introduction by Aoyama Kazuo, an anti-war Japanesewriter, and contained many photos of violence. This book was
widely sold in Hong Kong, Shanghai, and various places in theworld. Prince Kanyin, the Chief of Staff of the enemy’s
headquarters, distributed this book to all the generals of theJapanese forces in an attempt to persuade them to admit theImperial Army’s conduct of national disgrace in China, andadmonish it for those activities 16

From this document, it is clear that Timperley’s What War Means
was edited and printed as a “propaganda book” by the International
Information Division, rather than just merely translated by theDivision. Therefore, What War Means, which first brought theaccusation of a “Nanking Massacre” to the world, was not written
based on a neutral third person’s point of view, but actually a work of
biased propaganda. We can say that this with absolute certainty.
The Realities of the Shrewd Propaganda 1: Delegated Propaganda
Timperley’s What War Means was not identified as propaganda for
more than half a century. That is how shrewd was the method inwhich the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department edited
and produced it.
Zeng, details the story in his Memoirs. China, which was militarily
inferior to Japan, propagated the accounts of their heroic warriors andthe enemy’s atrocity as a national policy. In doing so, the Chinese
Nationalist Party did not appear in the forefront; rather, they
preferred an indirect method of propaganda, which was to ask their“international friends”17 (so-called third persons) to speak on theirbehalf. This was their method of “delegated propaganda.”18 Zeng
contacted Timperley in Shanghai and asked him to fly to Hankou,
where he consulted with him for many hours in a “closed room”.
Zeng recounts:
What was just good in timing was that two foreigners werestaying in Nanking, and watching the course of this tragedy. Oneof them was Timperley, a special correspondent for the Manchester
Guardian in England, and the other was Professor Lewis S.C.
Smythe from the U.S.

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259

Conveniently, Timperley was one of the three importantmembers who were attending the “resistance committee” inShanghai as we were promoting anti-Japanese international
propaganda. He is an Australian. So as soon as he came to
Shanghai, we contacted him immediately. Then we asked him tofly from Hong Kong to Hankou to consult with him on everything.
When he came, we talked with him in a closed room for many
hours, and decided the early plan for the overseas propaganda
network of the International Information Division.
In the current international propaganda, we talked to each other:
We Chinese ourselves should never go to the fore, but find ourinternational friends who can understand the real situation of ourresistance and our policy; and that we should ask them to speakon our behalf. Timperley was an ideal person for this. For the firststep, we decided to pay money to Timperley asking him andSmythe (whom he introduced us to) to write two books on the“Nanking Massacre” as the witnessed records, and to print andpublish them.
After that, Timperley wrote Rijun Baoxing Qizhen (Records ofJapanese Atrocities), and Smythe wrote Real Records of War Damage
in Nanking. They sold well and spread widely. Thus they attained
the propaganda purpose. At the same time, we consulted with
Timperley again. We asked him to become a secret person who
would be in charge of our International Information Division andliving in the U.S. It was registered there as the Trans Pacific News,and published his manuscripts in the U.S. At the same time, Earl
Leaf became responsible for the clerical work in New York, Henry
Evans was in charge of that of Chicago, and Malcolm Rosholt wasin charge of that of San Francisco. They were all experienced
American journalists, and we completed the whole U.S.
propaganda network. Our propaganda was focused on the U.S.,
but simultaneously they were compelled to represent the openings
for England and Hong Kong, and a contingency station for theenemy’s policy in Shanghai. 19

Zeng recounts that Timperley executed everything as decided,
and the International Information Division of the Nationalist Party’s
Central Information Department achieved their propaganda goal. But
what did he secretly discuss with Timperley for so many hours? Zeng
did not specify, but it must have concerned the editing andproduction of What War Means. These closed-room discussions

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

indicate how careful members of the Information Division, including
Zeng, were in keeping secrets.
Timperley was no exception. Two months after the fall of Nanking,an exchange of opinions began between Timperley in Shanghai andMiner Bates of the University of Nanking, a contributor of articles,
over editing of What War Means. On March 14, 1938, Timperley told
Bates:
50% (instead of the whole) of the profits derived from thesale of the book will be given to the Shanghai International Red
Cross Committee and the balance will be used to meet the cost of
production and of translation into various languages. I find thatthe whole thing is costing a great deal more than I have bargainedfor; especially in the way of photographs, which will run me into
something like Mex. $1,000. Gollancz [the English publisher]
asked for 200 photographs, though of course he will not use
anything like that number in the book. I have had four typists andtwo other assistants at work on the preparation of the manuscript
for the past fortnight and there have been numerous otherexpenses. It has been suggested to me that the manuscript ought
to be translated into Japanese and perhaps into Hindustani,
among other languages.20

From this letter, it seems as if Timperley had been editing the bookbut is having a hard time paying the various costs. It also seems as if
he had been translating the manuscript into several languages,
colleting photographs and editing by himself with the help of his“assistants.” We see no obvious sign of his connections with the
Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department.
Timperley’s letter was carefully camouflaged. to achieve thepurpose of producing a propaganda book. First, as the top-secretdocument of the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department
and Zeng’s Memoir make clear, it was the Nationalist Party’s Central
Information Department that decided to “pay money to Timperley ...
to write two books on the ‘Nanking Massacre’…” One of those books
was What War Means. They then printed and published it. Any
financial burden on him was out of the question. Despite the fact that
he did not have to worry about the costs of production, translation, or
photography, to say nothing of “four typists” and “two assistants,” hereferred to the finances to make the pretense that he had edited thebook (and that he had had nothing to do with the Nationalist Party’s

THE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

261

Central Information Department).
Second, Victor Gollancz in England did not print even a single
photograph, when they published What War Means, even though
Timperley said Gollancz asked him to send them 200 photos forinclusion in the book. In contrast, the Chinese edition, publishedsimultaneously with the English edition, had approximately 30
photos in it. Therefore, the one who really asked him to send themphotos had to have been the Central Information Department. To give
an impression that he had nothing to do with them, he needed towrite as if the British publisher had made the request.
Third, Timperley wrote that Gollancz suggested that “themanuscript ought to be translated into Japanese and perhaps into
Hindustani.” Nothing is so absurd as to suggest publishing books inforeign countries where no distribution channel existed. The one who
actually suggested he translate the book into Japanese was the Central
Information Department, which had abundant funds. After they
published the English, Chinese, and Japanese versions, they also
published a French version in Paris next year.
Fourth, Timperley said, “I am thinking of using Gollancz for the
publisher,” but in London, New York City, Hong Kong and Shanghai,
where What War Means was published, the International Information
Division’s overseas offices had also been established.
Thus, Timperley paid careful attention such that his connection to
the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department would not be
discovered. Also he did so to make What War Means receive wide
acceptance, even if his correspondence should be made public in the
future. This was the extent to which the editing of What War Means
was carefully disguised.
The Realities of the Shrewd Propaganda 2: Concealing Lies in a Fact
In order for propaganda not to be detected, it is necessary to impress
the intended audience that the grounds for the argument are based on
doubtless facts. In this respect, What War Means was fully developed.
In the introduction, Timperley wrote as follows:
Perhaps this book would not have come to be written had it
not been for the fact that telegrams reporting [sic.] the outrages
committed against Chinese civilians by the Japanese troops which
occupied Nanking in December of last year. I make this personal
explanation in order to show that the idea of producing this book

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

was entirely my own. It is by no means the purpose of this book tostir up animosity against the Japanese people. The aim of thisbook is to give the world as accurately as possible the facts about
the Japanese Armyʹs treatment of the Chinese civilian populationin the 1937–38 hostilities so that war may be recognized for thedetestable business it really is and thus be stripped of the false
glamour with which militarist megalomaniacs seek to invest it.21

Timperley tried to send a telegram to the Manchester Guardian. He
emphasized that the Japanese authority in Shanghai seized it, which
motivated him to edit this book. Based on the introduction of the book,the reader must have developed some antagonism against the country
that seized his telegram, thus setting up a negative image of Japan. At
the same time, the reader must have felt that he can trust What War
Means.. This is because of what Timperley said and how he included a“fact.” The readers are weak in facts.
This presentation of this fact was the beginning of their shrewd
propaganda because there was a trick. Timperley’s telegram told of“the massacre of 300,000 people in the Yangtze Delta,” as it had beencleared before. However, he did not quote the contents of his telegram
in the introduction of his book. He mentioned the Japanese “seizure”
of his telegram in his letter to Bates on February 4, 1938, but he did
not touch upon the contents. To begin with, “the massacre of 300,000
people in the Yangtze Delta” was a phrase best suited for accusing theJapanese forces, but he did not quote his telegram in the introduction.
There was space enough to do so, so why did he not do so?
Timperley’s aim was to allow the Japanese to seize his telegram sothat he can report the fact that his telegram had been seized. For thispurpose, the contents had to be such that the Japanese forces would
be forced to seize it, thus the words, “the massacre of 300,000 people
in the Yangtze Delta.” But he himself knew that this was a false
statement. In Chapter 6 of What War Means, he wrote:
According to a careful estimate made by a foreign observer who
had visited these regions on several occasions, both before andafter the Japanese occupation, at least 300,000 Chinese civilians
have lost their lives as a result of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in
the Yangtze Delta. 22

It would have been impossible that the general civilians were at
the battlefield, so it was strange to say “300,000 Chinese civilians.” AtTHE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

263

any rate, Timperley recognized it as “a result of the Sino-Japanesehostilities,” and not as a “massacre.”
Here is another example. In publishing What War Means, Bates
suggested to Timperley the following, twice — first on March 3 andthen again on March 21:
For purpose of impressing a distant public with the brutality of
warfare waged as this one has been waged, it seems much more
effective to have a base wider than that of one city. But if similar
stories come over a period of months from Shanghai, Sungkiang,
Soochow, Wushi, Huchow, Hangchow, the total effect is far more
massive and convincing.23

In other words, Bates suggested to Timperley to write about theactions of Japanese forces in the places other than Nanking such as
Shanghai. But Timperley, who sent a telegram addressing thesituation and in which he proclaimed “the massacre of 300,000 people
in the Yangtze Delta,” answered:
In your letter you ask why I have done nothing about Shanghai,
Sungkiang, and Kashing. I think you will find that Chapter VII
fills the gap. When we looked into the matter we found that there
was very little authentic evidence of Japanese outrages against thecivilian population around Shanghai.24

Contrary to his claim of a “massacre of 300,000 people in the
Yangtze Delta,” he admitted that “there was very little authentic
evidence of Japanese outrages against the civilian population” inShanghai, Sungkiang and Kashing.
If he switched “a result of the … hostilities” with “Japanese
outrages against the civilian population,” and with no authentic
evidence to support this send a telegram, inevitably the Japanese
would have to seize it, which they did since it was “grossly
exaggerated”25 and untrue. He fully estimated the necessity that theexaggerated contents would certainly cause its seizure. Timperley
could have sent the telegram from the French settlement in Shanghai,
where it would not have been seized; but he deliberately tried to send
it from the Japanese telegraph office in Shanghai. This was also a part ofhis scheme to make them seize his telegram.
Since What War Means has been revealed as propaganda, theintroduction sounds hollow. The top-secret document of the Central

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Information Department indicated that the International Information
Division edited and printed What War Means. His statements, “I makethis personal explanation in order to show that the idea of producing
this book was entirely my own,” and “it is by no means the purposeof this book to stir up animosity against the Japanese people” weredeliberately written to conceal his real intention．
The reason the readers still did not notice his “lies” was that, as
stated before, by establishing and presenting a “fact” that the readers
liked he made them relieved, and the readers were attracted by thepresentation of this “fact.” By doing so, what was disadvantageous
for Timperley, namely the fact that the Nationalist Party’s Central
Information Department “edited and produced” the book, hadcompletely disappeared because of the fact that Japanese had seized
his telegram.
The Realities of the Shrewd Propaganda 3: Exaggerated Facts
In the first four chapters of What War Means, the articles described
the city after the fall and were contributed by Americans living inNanking.. The description was tricky in that the “facts” were
exaggerated and disguised qualitatively and quantitatively to an
extent that they would not to be recognizable as lies. The fact that thecontributors were anonymous diminished their moral integrity, which
contributed to the further exaggeration of actual events .
However, if the contributors were entirely anonymous, thecredibility of the book could be called into question. Timperley
therefore described the contributors as follows:
Further details are given in the following vivid account by aforeign resident of Nanking who has spent almost the whole of hislife in China. His letter has been left exactly as it was received byhis friends in Shanghai except that references of a largely personal
nature have been deleted.26

And he introduced another as:
This brief but illuminating description of events immediately after
the Japanese entry of Nanking is taken from a letter dated
December 15, written to a friend in Shanghai by one of the mostrespected members of Nanking’s foreign community who is noted
for his fair mindedness.27

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These details appeal to readers. First, the contributors wereregarded as neutral third-persons in decent social positions who lived
in Nanking. Second, they did not contribute articles specifically for
What War Means, but their letters to their friends happened to be usedas the manuscripts for it. This was the first step to subconsciously
reassure the readers.
Approximately twenty years ago, the anonymous contributors
were identified by Itakura Yoshiaki. The accuracy of his verification
was endorsed by Bates’ statement, “In Timperley’s volume, Chapters
I & II came from George Fitch; except pp.18–20 from me, also III, IVa
and Appendix F.”28 So for the next step, in order to verify the contentsof the two contributors’ manuscripts, the letters to their friends, thefollowing is excerpted from Bates’ “letter to his friend in Shanghai” inthe first half of Chapter I:
But in two days the whole outlook has been ruined by frequent
murder, wholesale and semi-regular looting, and uncontrolled
disturbance of private homes including offences against the
security of women. Foreigners who have traveled over the city
report many civilians bodies lying in the streets. A considerable
percentage of the dead civilians were the victims of shooting orbayoneting in the afternoon and evening or the thirteenth, which
was the time of Japanese entry into the city. Any person who ran
in fear or excitement, and any one who was caught in the streets oralleys after dusk by rowing patrols was likely to be killed on the
spot. It proceeded in the safety zone as well as elsewhere, andmany cases are plainly witnessed by foreigners and by reputable
Chinese.29

The article by Fitch who wrote the latter half of Chapter I had
similar contents with expressions such as “a story of such crime andhorror as to be almost unbelievable”30; “the story of depredations”31;“Complete anarchy has reigned for ten days — it has been a hell on
earth.”32 Probably the readers can guess from what he said. I excerpt
only the part which is worth attention:
Every day we call at the Japanese Embassy and present ourprotests, our appeals, our lists of authenticated reports of violence
and crime. We are met with suave Japanese courtesy, but actually
the officials there are powerless. The victorious army must have

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its rewards — and those rewards are to plunder, murder, rape, atwill, to commit acts of unbelievable brutality and savagery on thevery people they have come to protect and befriend, as they have
so loudly proclaimed to the world. In all modern history surely
there is no page that will stand so black as that of the rape of
Nanking.33

Based on these descriptions, I would not be the only person who
would believe that that the Japanese indulged in atrocities such as
murder, rape, plunder and arson when they occupied Nanking. Also,
I would probably not be the only one that thought that something
dreadful was happened in Nanking based on Fitch’s expression, “ahell I had never before envisaged.”34 Moreover, when read that “manycases were plainly witnessed by foreigners and by reputable
Chinese,” or “the foreigners who looked around Nanking,” called “atthe Japanese Embassy and are present our … reports, ” we really feelthe credibility of the expression “a hell I had never before envisaged.”
Since they wrote their manuscripts anonymously, thecharacteristic of chapters one through four was that no one could callthem to account. How the manuscripts were to be perceived
depended on the European and American readers. For example, theLondon Times published their book review, “The evidence … here put
forward is clearly genuine and reliable.”35
Was each of their descriptions a fact? I would like to look into each
description, whether they are so, but space limitations make this
impossible. Therefore, this paper will focus on the “daily reports ofthe serious injuries to civilians”36 that the International Committee
submitted to the Japanese Embassy (and included in the appendix ofWhat War Means) to verify whether Bates’ and Fitch’s descriptions
were true.
The International Committee (consisting of the Europeans andAmericans in Nanking) gathered and submitted documents called“Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians” to the Japanese
Embassy. These were appeals as well as accounts from the Nanking
residents of things that they saw and heard.
The reports were compiled by Professor Smythe in a “complete oralmost complete” set by the beginning of February 1938. The mainparts (41% of all the cases) were published in the Appendix of What
War Means. Almost all (except for very doubtful cases) were
published in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone. Timperley also
summarizes it, “The following section of cases … completes the story

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267

of the first two months of the Japanese Army’s occupation of
Nanking.”37 Bates and Fitch were among the powerful members of theInternational Committee. What they saw and heard were certainly
written up in the Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries to Civilians.
To sum up the Daily Reports: 27 cases of murder, 175 cases of rape,
131 cases of plunder, and 5 cases of arson. There was only one case an
actual, witnessed murder, which was a “legitimate execution.” Theother cases of murder were simply rumors, and no one even knew
who witnessed them. Similarly, almost all the cases for rape, looting,and arson were based on hearsay. Just in case, this paper examines thestatistics other than the Daily Reports.
According to research in which all the data from the diaries andrecords of the Europeans and Americans who remained in Nanking,Chinese Related Documents, and all Japanese officers’ and soldiers’
records were entered into a computer and analyzed,38 the incidents in
Nanking break down as follows: 94 cases of murder, 243 cases of rape,
201 cases of looting, and 34 cases of arson. Out of all these, there wasonly one case of a witnessed “murder,” and it was actually an
incidence of legal execution.39 Of the numbers given above, 17 cases ofrape, 26 cases of looting, and one case of arson had witnesses.
Therefore, the remainder was based on hearsay.
It should be clear that the total number of incidents in the Daily
Reports, which Fitch indicated as “our lists of authenticated reports,”
was a far cry from Fitch’s description of “a hell on earth” where
Japanese forces looted, murdered, and raped, “at will,” and Bates’
charge of “frequent murder” being carried out in the Safety Zone. The
facts simply do not jibe with their assertions that many cases wereplainly witnessed by foreigners and by reputable Chinese.
It is surprising that most of the reports were based on hearsay. Of
course, this is because nearly the entire civilian population took
refuge in the Safety Zone of Nanking, and everything outside theZone was practically deserted. Moreover, in order to make a charge of
murder, a corpse was needed as evidence; without a corpse, no one
could make a charge. One can therefore infer that the claims ofincidents of murder were reflected by reality. But when rape wasclaimed, on the other hand, no actual evidence was necessary, so that
there were more claims of rape than that of murder. Let us look at
Fitch’s accounts of rape:
That morning the cases of rape began to be reported. Over ahundred women that we knew of were taken away by soldiers, …

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there must have been many times that number who were raped intheir homes.40
Friday, Dec. 17. Robbery, murder, rape continue unabated. A
rough estimate would be at least a thousand women raped lastnight.41

The Fitch accounts were like this. His description, “there musthave been many times that number who were raped in their homes”
was his guess, which was far and away different than “our lists ofauthenticated reports” as Fitch himself had claimed. In addition,
when Fitch wrote “a thousand women were raped,” it sounds as if it
was a fact. But as John Rabe, the chairman of the International
Committee, wrote in his diary on December 17, “Last night up to athousand women and girls are said to have been raped.”42 Rabe wrote
of it as hearsay. This was the result of typing all the reports brought tothe International Committee one after the other and leaving themunverified, for as the committee pointed out, “There is no time orspace here to go into the cases that are pouring in faster than we cantype them out.”43
Bates said, “Understanding with embassies that any acts ofbrutalities will be adequately witnessed and promptly reported.”44 In
acts of rape, looting, and arson, which were to have been witnessed,
there was no way to verify whether they were committed by either
Japanese or Chinese. For the Europeans and Americans in Nanking,nothing was so difficult as to distinguish whether one was Japaneseor Chinese. These westerners could hardly be trusted to verify
unlawful acts.
This paper does not intend to claim that there were no incidents ofbad conduct on the part of individual Japanese solders. Armed forces
are inseparably bound up with disgraceful incidents. Even in presentday, peaceful Okinawa, serious incidents such as the rape of an
innocent girl by American soldiers, for which then President Bill
Clinton apologized, has taken place. But the Japanese forces in
Nanking had to respond to roll-call several times every day, and they
were certainly not allowed to engage in any conduct which was not
appropriate. Moreover, nothing was more dangerous than wandering
at night alone in the Safety Zone where Chinese soldiers lurked. In
addition, the Japanese Army imposed strict penalties on soldiers who
exhibited bad behavior — which were so strict thatunits
complained to their commanders.
Since these were the actual conditions under which JapaneseTHE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

269

forces were operating, there simply could not have been many
disgraceful incidents. In fact, the Daily Reports actually indicate thisto be the case. It is possible that liaisons with prostitutes were counted
as “rapes,” and Japanese requisitioning of goods for the occupation
was perceived as “looting.”45 In the middle of January, 1938, Japaneseforces organized a firefighting unit46 to cope with incidents of Chinesearson. Nothing is so inconsistent as to assert that the same Japaneseforce which organized a unit specifically intended to fight fires allowed
arson. Moreover, if the Japanese were committing arson, this would
have been like slitting one’s own wrists since this would meanburning their own lodgings down. Yes, it was true that there were afew disgraceful incidents. But the exaggeration of the facts wasnothing more than a propaganda ploy.
The Realities of Propaganda 4: No Explanation of the Situations
A certain amount of explanation of each incidence would beindispensable to prevent a misperception of events by a third person,
butbyintentionallyomitting
those
explanations,themisunderstanding persisted and so the propaganda worked. In
describing corpses and mop-up operations by the Japanese military,
the contributors omitted vital explanations of the situation.
Let us consider their descriptions of corpses. As stated before, Bates
wrote, “foreigners who have traveled over the city report many
civilians’ bodies lying in the streets.” Fitch also wrote, “at the gate
more cars jammed and were burned … [it was] a terrible holocaust,…
and the dead lay feet deep.” 47 War, by its nature, leads to death andcorpses.
The corpses in Nanking before and after the fall of the city are
categorized as follows:
1. those of Chinese soldiers who died in battle;
2. those left on the platforms of the Nanking station before the fallof the city;
3. those of soldiers who had been wounded and subsequently left
at the field hospital (of the Diplomatic Division) in the northernpart of the city;
4. those of soldiers who were shot at the North Gate and the South
Gate by a “supervising unit” peculiar to Chinese forces which
preventing desertion;
5. those of soldiers who rushed into a narrow path at the North

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Gate trying to escape and were crushed to death;
6. those of soldiers who were trying to escape to the outside overthe city wall by the North Gate;
7. those of soldiers who tried to escape from the North Gate to theshore of the Yangtze River, but were drowned in the river;8. those of soldiers who were killed trying to resist Japanese forces;
9. those of soldiers who had removed their military uniforms andhad hidden in the Safety Zone, but were found and executed by
Japanese forces.
Bates and Fitch must have fully known the circumstances
surrounding the corpses found in Nanking. Certainly there were alarge number of corpses at Yijiang Gate (North Gate), which had
become the only escape route for the defeated Chinese. But as Durdin
and Steele confessed fifty years later, the corpses were not the resultof attacks by Japanese forces. Rather, the corpses at Yijiang Gate
were those of soldiers either crushed by their comrades in thestampede to escape or were the victims of a supervising unit
responsible for preventing deserters from fleeing by shooting theoffenders.48
It is similar to the situation with mop-up operations. Even if theoutcome of a battle is clear, mop-up operations continue until there is
no more enemy soldiers in the area. The city wall of Nanking was 34
kilometers in total circumference. Zhonghua Gate, the strongest of all,was 118 meters in width from the East to the West, 128 meters in
depth from the North to the South, and 20 meters in height. It fell
early — at dawn on December 13, but no Chinese soldier raised hishands and surrendered inside the walled city.
On the contrary, they began to take off their military uniforms,
disguising themselves as civilians and hid in the civilian Safety Zone.
This was witnessed and fully acknowledged by the Europeans andAmericans in Nanking — including Bates and Fitch. The International
Committee, which could not prevent it, did not fulfill their obligation
for neutrality. The “unarmed” and “neutral” Safety Zone was a
failure. Moreover, John Rabe, the chairman of the International
Committee, hid Chinese officers and cooperated with theirconcealment.49 This was a serious violation of the neutrality
agreement.
At any rate, those in the Safety Zone knew that Chinese soldiers
were hiding amongst them. Certainly everybody knew that theJapanese would prosecute them if they found the Chinese. If they

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resisted, they could have been hurt, or even executed; such was thesituatioon. Instead, Bates and Fitch put the situation out differently:(On December 14) four hundred men … were marched off inbatches of fifty between lines of riflemen and machine gunners.
The explanation given to observers left no doubt as their fate.50(On December 15) The men were lined up and roped together ingroups of about a hundred by soldiers with bayonets fixed;… by
the light of our headlights we watched them marched away totheir doom.51

These descriptions stress only the Japanese forces’ “atrocity,” butmasked the following important points:
First, mop-up operations are conducted at every battlefield, inevery war, by every military, to ensure security. Mop-up operations
also protected the lives of civilians. Had the remaining Chinese
soldiers who discarded their uniforms attacked from the Safety Zone,
which existed only for civilians, the lives of those civilians would
have been in danger. As Steele said, “There were some Chinese
soldiers who were still hiding and attacking in the city, and theJapanese soldiers were mopping them up.”52 The actual situation was
not different from any other battle.
Second, they wrote, “we watched them marched away to theirdoom,” but in fact, they did not watch their executions. The Japaneseforces did not execute all the regular Chinese soldiers they caught, but
only some of them. They used others as coolies. As of the end of
February 1938, the total number of coolies (in man-days) Japaneseforces used reached approximately 10,000 people.53
Third, the execution of the Chinese soldiers by the Japanese forces
was legitimate under the International Law Relating to War Conduct.
Bates, Fitch, and other Europeans and Americans discussed this. They
stood up for and argued the case of the disarmed Chinese soldiers on
both the principles of humanity and the acknowledgment the laws ofwar, in unified opposition to the Japanese forces for their exposureand executions of Chinese from the Security Zone. This was the new
appeal of the International Committee, and the general points of theirposition are as follows.
On December 15, two days after the fall of the gates, theInternational Committee maintained that, “The Committee fullyrecognizes that identified soldiers are lawful prisoners of war.”55 This
indicates that they understood the situation as being the same as

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executing prisoners of war, which was against the International Law
Relating to War Conduct. But this interpretation was wrong. (Therecognition of the law on war will be discussed later.)Since it was not the execution of prisoners of war, but rather thatof unlawful combatants, the International Committee was compelled
to admit that the executions were legitimate; so after their lastassertion on December 15, they never again claimed it was unlawful.
People usually continue to complain about things they consider tobe unlawful, but often do stop once legality has been established. It is
telling that Europeans and Americans in Nanking stopped criticizing
the executions. For example, E.W. Jeffrey, a British consul, reported
on January 29, 1938. “Military lawlessness continues due to a lack ofcentralized control. Majority of cases are of ransacking.”56 This was
his complaint.
Even the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department(which surely would have immediately disseminated reports of any
illegal activities that may have occurred), responded only with the
publication of What War Means. They addressed the issue generally in
an internal document thusly: “After the fall of Nanking, the Japaneseforces [committed] rape, arson, and looting — that is, acts of brutal
cruelty.” In conducting the exaggerated propaganda campaign related
to Japanese forces’ unlawful actions in Nanking, what was mentioned
first was “rape,” but the critical word “massacre” was not mentioned.
It was the same with the United States. Despite the fact that an
American newspaper published a story on the “Nanking Massacre,”
the U.S. State Department criticized Japan only on the Panay Incident
and the incident where Consul John Allison was beaten. They nevercriticized the Nanking executions as unlawful.
Bates and Fitch therefore had to avoid stating publicly the
executions were unlawful. Instead, they described the situation to
make the readers imagine illegal killings. There lay the trick of“adverse propaganda,” which omits explaining the real situation andallowing readers to take it from there..
Fitch wrote, “by the light of our headlights we watched themmarched away to their doom”; but Japanese forces publicly executed
them at the shore of the Yangtze River in the daytime. They never did
so during night when it was dangerous. Japanese forces wereprohibited from going out at night, in fact. Fitch’s writing, however,gave the impression of Japanese forces committing nefarious acts
hidden by the cover of darkness.

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Lawful Prisoners of War, or Unlawful Combatants?
Bates and Fitch described the situation two days after the fall of
Nanking as “frequent murder,” and “a hell on earth.” Who were thetargets of “murder?” As will be discussed later, Documents of the
Nanking Safety Zone showed that these incidents were only the fivecases of looting and rape where no one knew who the witnesses were.
The object of their description was nothing more than the executions
carried out by the Japanese forces.
Certainly, Japanese forces prosecuted, and executed, Chinese
soldiers in their mop-up operations during this period but can it becalled murder? That is, was it lawful or unlawful killing? It isnecessary to look at the incidents in detail. The Hague Regulations of1907 listed four qualifications that had to be met by combatants. For
the first time, a belligerent could become a lawful prisoner of war
protected by law — so long as he observed the regulations and they
were recognized by his captors. We must contrast that with the
Chinese soldiers who did not express their will to surrender during
the mopping-up operations which continued for three days even after
the fall of the city gates. The qualifying conditions cited in the Hague
Regulations are highlighted in bold-face below:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
The Chinese forces lacked commanders because theircommander, General Tang Shengzhi, and his subordinates had fled.
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance;
They had already taken off their military uniforms.
3. To carry arms openly;
Japanese forces found secretly hidden weapons amongst
Chinese soldiers which, until March 1938, amounted to fifty
truckloads worth. They obviously possessed hidden weapons.
4. To conduct operations in accordance with the laws andcustoms of war.
Violation of the first three regulations indicated that
Chinese soldiers didn’t adhere to the fourth requirement of The
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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

accordance with the laws and customs of the war.”
How fatal it was to violate the rule governing the qualification of
combatants! Regarding this problem, a concrete example from thepresent would serve to provide some context.
In January, 2002, when the soldiers of al-Qaeda and the Taliban
were interned at the U.S. base in Guantanamo, Cuba, the U.S.
government announced their position on the treatment of thesesoldiers. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, “One of themost important aspects of the Geneva Convention is the distinction
between lawful combatants and unlawful combatants.”57 He
continued:
It is a terribly dangerous thing from the standpoint of our military
and the military of other countries if we blur the distinction
between lawful combatants and unlawful combatants. An
unlawful combatant is a person who tries to look like a civilian
and puts in jeopardy civilians. And a lawful combatant is one thatfunctions as I described, in a uniform, in an organized operation,
showing their weapons. The reason they are provided a higher
standard of care is because they are lawful combatants, and the idea weshould blur that distinction out of some unknown idea that thatʹs agood thing to do is just fundamentally flawed. We want not toblur that distinction.58

Colin Powell, then Secretary of State, had the same view.
Rumsfeld, who conferred with the Secretary of State on this matterten times, emphasized, “He has said basically what I have said.”59
A central purpose of the Geneva Convention was to protect
innocent civilians by distinguishing very clearly between
combatants and non-combatants. This is why the convention
requires soldiers to wear uniforms that distinguish them from thecivilian population. The Taliban did not wear distinctive signs,
insignias, symbols, or uniforms. To the contrary, far from seeking
to distinguish themselves from the civilian population of
Afghanistan, they sought to blend in with civilian non-combatants,
hiding in mosques and populated areas.60

We must recall that at the time of the fall of Nanking, the Chinese
soldiers were in a situation similar to the one just described. The
Chinese soldiers took off their military uniforms, and escaped into theTHE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

275

Safety Zone where almost all the civilians had taken refuge. Once thebattle broke out, the uniformless combatants were completely
indistinguishable from civilians. Any counterattack on those
uniformless combatants would endanger civilians. Therefore, in order
to avoid such a situation, combatants had an obligation to clearly
distinguish themselves from civilians.
Those who observed the law were protected by it, and those who
did not were not protected; combatants who were wearing militaryuniforms and observing the Hague Regulations were under its
protection and thereby earned the status of prisoner-of-war. Giving
prisoner-of-war status to combatants who had taken off theiruniforms and violated the Regulations, however, meantfundamentally undermining the “incentive system”61 of theRegulations.
The soldiers who took off their uniforms became unlawful
combatants, and technically speaking, they did “not have any rights
under the Geneva Convention.”62 This was Mr. Rumsfeld’s answer tothe question, “Mr. Secretary, can you explain why combatants who
are on the enemy side and were captured … in some cases, combat …
in wartime should not be considered prisoners of war? ”63
We must remember that though the Chinese soldiers who took off
their uniforms and hid themselves in the civilians’ Safety Zone werenothing but unlawful combatants, the Japanese soldiers still treatedthem as prisoners-of-war. At any rate, the Japanese forces’ executionof some Chinese soldiers was nothing but the execution of unlawful
combatants. Not only they did not possess any rights under theHague Regulations of 1907, but any executions were legal according
to the International Law Relating to War Conduct as there are no war
regulations negating the legality of the execution of unlawful
combatants.
The Chinese Nationalist Party Did Not Recognize the “Nanking
Massacre”
There were no unlawful murders in Nanking, there were only legal
executions. Since Bates and Fitch were writing anonymously, they
deliberately described the lawful executions as unlawful murders.
Since the Central Information Department decided to exaggerate andspread accounts, making the claim “after the fall of Nanking, theJapanese forces [committed] rape, arson, and looting — that is, acts ofbrutal cruelty,” those murders Bates and Fitch described were at odds

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from the real situation in Nanking as recognized by the Central
Information Department. Nonetheless, if they spread word of it, theywould be able to receive enormous benefits for its propaganda value.
The Central Information Department, pleased by being provided withsuch a convenient source of propaganda, readily adopted it.
Since anonymity did not come with any journalistic responsibility
for accuracy, it also allowed Bates to embellish. He added thefollowing:
Evidence from burials indicate that close to forty thousand
unarmed persons were killed within and near the walls of
Nanking, of whom some 30 per cent had never been soldiers.64

This was completed on January 25, 1938, and was added to“Memorandum” which made up Chapter III of What War Means. The
addition of this sentence — which did not appear in the original“Memorandum” — was a “major revision.”65 Since Report of the
Nanking International Relief Committee, which he as chairman edited,
reported that the Red Swastika Society buried approximately 40,000
corpses that had been left in Nanking, and completed all thenecessary burial enterprises,66 it is fair to assume that this sentence
was inserted at the beginning of April of 1938 when he checked his
final manuscript. In other words, after they found out the number ofburials in Nanking.
This was the root of the “Nanking Massacre” wherein the Japaneseforces killed 12,000 civilians and 30,000 prisoners of war. Runningaway was all the defeated Chinese forces could do, they did not havetime to bury their fellow soldiers’ corpses at all. But Bates insisted thatthe corpses left in Nanking were those of soldiers massacred by
Japanese forces; this view completely ignored the real situation in
Nanking.
For the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department,
whose goal was the propagation of anti-Japanese propaganda, thiswas a problem that they could not ignore. It is clear from this simple
fact that, as stated before, they published the English and Chineseversions of What War Means simultaneously. The Central Information
Department allowed Bates to insert the sentence of the massacre of
40,000 into the English version for Europeans and Americans who
were far away from China — people who did not know much about
the real situation of Nanking. However, they did not publish thissentence in the Chinese version as it could be easily have been read by

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the Japanese and Chinese who knew the actual situation well. If it had
been published, his lie would have been detected, and theirpropaganda would have failed.
They treated Bates’ sentence of the massacre of 40,000 differently
for the English version and the Chinese one.
To reiterate from the
top-secret document, the Central Information Department
acknowledged, “After the enemy invaded in Nanking on December
13, 1937, rape, arson, plunder, namely wicked conduct.” They did not
admit that the Japanese forces massacred people in Nanking. This
paper asserts that the view of the Central Information Department
was firm on this.
The National Military Council chaired by Chiang Kai-shek was animportant organization of the government, and the Council ofInternational Affairs can be considered to be one organ, or anaffiliated organ, of the Chinese Nationalist government. The Councilof International Affairs edited the following four books under its
auspices:
1. The War Conduct of Japanese, edited by Hsü Shuhsi and prepared
under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs inHankou, April 12, 1938.
(Shanghai, Singapore, and Hong Kong: Kelly & Walsh,1939)
2. A Digest of Japanese War Conduct, edited by Hsü Shuhsi andprepared under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs
in Chongqing, January 28, 1939.
(Shanghai, Singapore, and Hong Kong: Kelly & Walsh, 1939)
3. “The War Conduct of the Japanese, “ in The Chinese Year Book
1938–39, edited by Hsü Shuhsi and prepared from official sourcesby the Council of International Affairs in Chongqing, March 15,
1939.
4. Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, edited by Hsü Shuhsi andprepared under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs
in Chongqing, May 9, 1939.
(Shanghai, Singapore, and Hong Kong : Kelly & Walsh, 1939)
When Bates’ “Memorandum” was included in the above
publications, the Council of International Affairs deleted the sentencethat Bates had added to What War Means, claiming a massacre of
40,000 people.
If a massacre had occurred in Nanking, it would have been naturalfor the Nationalist Party to take every possible opportunity to repeat

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it over and over again; but they did not. The Chinese Nationalist
Party had a plan for “disclosing the enemy’s atrocities after the fall of
the capital.”67 But even if they conducted exaggerated propaganda,
they did not recognize any “massacre” in Nanking. Even if one tries
to find the expression “Nanking Massacre” one can find it nowhere in
Chiang Kai-Shek’s Generalissimo’s Message to the Japanese People,68 (theproduction of which Guo Moruo joined in69) which was printed70 by
the Central Information Department on July 7, 1938, commemorating
the first anniversary of the Sino-Japanese war.
The Source of the Newspaper Articles Was Bates
The first half of Chapter I of Timperley’s What War Means wascontributed by Bates. According to Timperley, the chapter included
Bates’ “letter to his friend in Shanghai” dated on December 15, 1937.
This letter was sent not only to his friend in Shanghai but also handed
to the special correspondents who were about to leave Nanking for
Shanghai on December 15. He wrote about this in his letter
announcing the publication of What War Means in April, 1938.
The book (What War Means) uses a statement (will be called, a“report” from now on) which I prepared on the 15th of December
to be utilized by the various correspondents leaving Nanking onthat date.71

On December 15, two days after the fall of the city, Bates prepareda “report” to be used by the special correspondents leaving Nanking.
On that day, there were five special correspondents leaving Nanking.
Among them were Steele of the Chicago Daily News and Tilman
Durdin of the New York Times. They boarded the Oaff, a U.S. Navygunboat, and left Nanking where they lost their means ofcommunication with the international settlement in Shanghai. As
soon as the Oaff left Nanking, Steele sent the following article, which
was published in the Chicago Daily News on December 15 (U.S. time).
In the article, he said,
The story of Nankingʹs fall is a story of indescribable panic andconfusion among the entrapped Chinese defenders, followed by areign of terror by the conquering army which cost thousands of
lives, many of them innocent ones. It was like killing sheep. Thisaccount is based on the observations of myself and otherTHE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

279

foreigners remaining in Nanking through the siege.72

Following this, Durdin reported in The New York Times dated on
December 18:
Wholesale looting, the violation of women, the murder of civilians,
the eviction of Chinese from their homes, mass executions of war
prisoners, and the impressing of able-bodied men turned Nanking
into a city of terror.73

I will now compare their articles with Bates’ “report” in the firsthalf of Chapter I of What War Means. (B stands for Bates, S for Steele,
and D for Durdin.)
B: “At Nanking the Japanese Army has lost much of its
reputation, and has thrown away a remarkable opportunity togain the respect of the Chinese inhabitants and of foreign
opinion.”
S: “Japanese brutality at Nanking is costing them a golden
opportunity to win the sympathy of the Chinese population.…”
D: “Through wholesale atrocities and vandalism at Nanking
the Japanese Army has thrown away a rare opportunity to gain
the support and confidence of the Chinese inhabitants and of
foreign opinion there.”
B: “Any local people freely expressed their relief when theentry of Japanese troops apparently brought an end to the strainsof war conditions….”
S: “Nanking experienced a distant sense of release when theJapanese entered….”
D: “A tremendous sense of relief … pervaded the Chinese
populace when the Japanese took over control within the walls.”
B: “The whole outlook has been ruined by frequent murder,wholesale and semiregular looting, and uncontrolled disturbanceof private homes including offices against the security of women.”
S: “They were quickly disillusioned.”
D: “Two days of Japanese occupation changed the whole
outlook. Wholesale looting, the violation of women, the murder ofcivilians … mass executions of war prisoners….”
B: “Any persons who ran in fear or excitement … was likely
to be killed on the spot.”
D: “Any persons who ran because of fear or excitement was

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

likely to be killed on the spot as was any one caught by roving
patrols in streets or alley after dusk.”
B: “Foreigners who have traveled over the city report many
civilian bodies lying the streets.”
S: “Streets throughout the city were littered with the bodies
of civilians and abandoned Chinese equipment and uniforms.…
This account is based on the observations of myself and otherforeigners.”
D: “Foreigners who traveled widely through the city
Wednesday found civilians dead on every street.… Many slayings
were witnessed by foreigners.… Nanking’s streets were litteredwith dead.”

While these three men ostensibly acted separately, theirdescriptions are strikingly similar. Steele’s and Durdin’s articles werecompletely under the influence of Bates’ “report.”
Articles that condemned the Japanese army appeared 37 times
only in American newspapers from December 15 through February of
the following year. They can all be found in Nankinjiken Shiryoshu(Collected Materials on the Nanking Incident). The articles, the sourceof which turned out to be Bates’ “report,” appeared in as many as ten
different newspapers. Since his “report” was published in What War
Means, it can be understood and dismissed as a kind of propaganda.
Just in case, however, let us verify whether or not the article was
accurate.
Assuming Bates completed his writing by 6 o’clock on themorning of December 15, it means that the articles described thesituations on December 13, when the city gates fell, December 14, thenext day, and before dawn of December 15. To make the descriptionsof Nanking at that time easy to understand, the paper recreates thesituation from December 12, before the fall, to December 15 based on
the records “seen by foreigners.”

Nanking on December 12
As of December 12, where were the civilians? Five days before thefall, General Tang Shengzhi, the commander of the Nanking Defense
Corps, made a proclamation that all the civilians in the city must“concentrate” in the Safety Zone. Document No. 9 (dated December17) of the International Committee (consisting of sixteen Europeans

THE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

281

and Americans in Nanking) said, “On the 13th when your troops
entered the city, we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in
the Zone.”74 Almost all the Chinese soldiers, on the other hand, were
stationed near the city wall for the battle. This was the distribution of
the population on December 12.
At 8pm on December 12, Tang, who had publicly announced his
intent to defend Nanking to the death, abandoned his subordinatesand fled. The Chinese forces then flew into a panic. Chaos was createdby soldiers who were trying to escape from the front and as asupervising unit shot at them. The supervising unit in turn began toflee. The soldiers who tried to escape from the city wall and who tried
to flee from the North Gate stampeded into a narrow defile and werecrushed to death. The remaining soldiers finally threw away their
weapons, took off their military uniforms, and infiltrated the Safety
Zone disguised as civilians. Some soldiers tried to deprive thecivilians of their clothes because they did not have any civilian clothesof their own.
Nanking from December 13 to 15
Confusion and panic continued from the night of December 12 to
December 13. The New York Times and Japanese Army records madereference to Chinese military uniforms and weapons being scattered.
In other words, from the 12th to 13th, more and more Chinese soldiersbegan to discard their military uniforms and enter the Safety Zone
where civilians sought refuge, and hid themselves. The
3.86-square-kilometer Safety Zone was filled with a mix of civilians
and soldiers.
Outside of the Safety Zone, the city was “practically deserted,”75 as
Timperley described. He seemed to have based his information on
descriptions by Bates, Professor Lewis Smythe, and Secretary-General
Paul Scharfenberg of the German Embassy in Nanking. Therefore, if amassacre of civilians took place, either it happened in the Safety Zone,
where in fact all the civilians took refuge, or the civilians were taken
away and killed elsewhere. If the civilians were taken away andmassacred, the local civilians and European and American civilians
surely must have seen and heard about it.
If there were people outside the Safety Zone, they were Chinese
soldiers. As Steele admitted, “The Japanese army did not obtain thewhole city instantly. From the place they entered, they advanced
orderly, and hunted down Chinese soldiers from one block to the282

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

other.… It took several days to complete the occupation,”76 The fall of
the gates on December 13 did not mean the instantaneous fall andoccupation of Nanking. The battle between the Japanese and Chinese
forces continued for several days even after Japanese entry into thecity.77 When the Japanese army entered the city, the Safety Zone wasactually in the middle of a sort of a battle.
Only the 7th Infantry Regiment entered the Safety Zone. Other
officers and soldiers were denied entry.
For three days, on December 14, 15, and 16, the 7th Infantry
Regiment had specific orders to undertake mop-up operations(typical with any battle) to eliminate remaining enemies and secure
Nanking. They also prosecuted regular Chinese soldiers. They
executed only those who had given indications of resistance, andconscripted others as coolies.
This was the situation of Nanking on December 12 before the fall,
and from the 13th to the 15th. Did the Japanese army massacre
civilians and prisoners of war? In other words, did the Europeans andAmericans in Nanking see and hear the incidents reported by Bates,
Steele, and Durdin? It must be questioned. As stated before,
Documents of Nanking Safety Zone, the Daily Reports of the Serious
Injuries to Civilians, and Tomisawa Shigenobu’s Nankin Jiken no
Subete — Deta Besu ni yoru Zenjiken Ristoappu (The Whole Nanking
Incident — Listing All the Incidents Using a Database), no murders
were witnessed. Dated on December 14, Document No. 1 of theInternational Committee says, “We come to thank you for the fine
way your artillery spared the Safety Zone…. “78 If murder, looting,and rape had frequently happened, and Bates’ testament that, “surely
there is no page that will stand so black as that of the rape of
Nanking,” had been true, such words of gratitude from the committee
would not have been made to the Japanese army.
There were no murders after the fall of the city. The evidence forthis is found in Documents of Nanking Safety Zone in the Daily Reportsof the Serious Injuries to Civilians. There were only five incidents that
the Chinese made appeals on from December 13 to 14, and which
Bates’ ”report” mentioned as problems. They were all the incidents on
December 14. Out of the five, three cases were rape, and two cases
were the theft of gloves, fountain pens, and clocks.79 Moreover, they
were incidents without witnesses and credibility because no one
knew who had witnessed them.
While Bates wrote of “frequent murder” in his “report” to the U.S.,
did he complain only of the Japanese Army’s plunder of gloves to theTHE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

283

Japanese Embassy? While the Europeans and Americans in Nanking
were supposedly observing thousands of innocent civilians beingslaughtered like sheep, instead of making a complaint to the Japanese
Embassy about that, why did they instead complain about these fiveincidents? It is strange in that if “frequent murder” had been true,
why did the International Committee feel the need to record only thetheft of gloves? Since there were other serious incidents which shouldhave been recorded, didn’t the Committee record them?
Bates’ Real Intention Is An Enigma
Bates, who had insisted that the executions had been unlawful, did
not mention them when he used his own name. For example, When
Cabot Coville, a military attaché who came from the American
Embassy in Tokyo to Nanking in April, 1938, to confer with Bates andgather detailed information,, Bates never referred to the contents of
his articles which were in What War Means and his assertion which
was added to it.80 This was because Professor Lewis Smythe, Consul
John Allison, Vice-Consul James Espy, the British Consul E. W. Jeffrey,
Secretary George Rosen and others were present and knew the actual
situation. Even Bates, who insisted that, “in America and England weare accustomed to free statement of facts and opinion,”81 could notstate what was not true, and tell them lies.
Even so, why did Bates release a groundless “report”? So far thereason has not been fully explored or understood. What is known isthat he was at the time an “advisor” to the Nationalist Chinese
Government before the fall of Nanking, and that he was later twice
decorated by the Chinese government. It was in 1938 when heinserted the bit about the “Japanese army’s killing of prisoners of war
and civilians” (which he did not mention to Coville), into What War
Means, and in 1946, when he testified to the massacre of 40,000 people
at the Tokyo Tribunal as a witness.82
Theodore White, who was hired as an “advisor” by the Nationalist
Party’s Central Information Department and later became aprominent journalist, seems to hint at Bates’ motive in his memoir, In
Search of History: A Personal Adventure. When White assumed his officein Chongqing in April, 1939, he did not fully understand his job. Hislack of understanding was not due to his irresponsibility; no one
could explain his job.
I did not understand the job. No one could explain it to me. I

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

thought of myself in the stiff Socialist rhetoric of my youth as a“fighter against Fascism.” But in reality, I was employed tomanipulate American public opinion. The support of America
against the Japanese was the governmentʹs one hope for survival;
to sway the American press was critical. It was considerednecessary to lie to it, to deceive it, to do anything to persuadeAmerica that the future of China and the United States ran
together against Japan.83

Conclusion
The Chinese Nationalist Party, which had released disinformation to
the U.S. but never to the Chinese mainland, and the Communist Party,
knew the “Nanking Massacre” was, above all, just war propaganda.84
While American newspapers first reported on the “Nanking
Massacre,” the U.S. government only addressed problems such as theaccidental bombing of the Panay in Nanking and the incident of thebeating of Consul John Allison; they never touched upon any“Nanking Massacre.” So didn’t the U.S. government know about it?
When the war ended, the war propaganda should have been
stopped. The Tokyo Tribunals, which relied solely on war
propaganda, conducted anything but a fair “trail” .85 It assumed the“Nanking Massacre” was true and executed General Matsui Iwane,
the Supreme Commander in Nanking, as a scapegoat.86 The facts
that the Nationalist Party’s Central Information Department sealed
away never to be detected as propaganda were all the more hidden
away.
In summary, the Sino-Japanese war broke out in July, 1937, andthe Nationalist Party cooperated with the Communist Party in
September 1937 to fight against Japan. The Nationalist Party received
support from the U.S. and Germany, so it was important to promoteanti-Japanese and pro-Chinese sentiment in the U.S. and Europe. It
was also necessary to overcome Chinese military inferiority. So in
November they established the Central Information Department topromote propaganda warfare — delegated propaganda, exaggerated
propaganda, adverse propaganda, and so on. The quintessential
example of the department was What War Means They paid money
to Harold Timperley, their international friend, to edit it. Then theyedited and published it.
On the other hand, Miner Bates, an advisor to the Chinese
Nationalist Government, wrote anonymous articles for What War

THE “NANKING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA

285

Means, and added the infamous line about a massacre of 40,000 people.
It was published in American newspapers, and spread throughout theworld. He also testified to this at the Tokyo Tribunal. Moreover, he
was decorated twice by the Chinese Government: when he wrote apart of the book in 1938, and when he testified at the Tokyo Tribunal
in 1946.
What War Means was highly regarded as important evidence forthe “Nanking Massacre,” but it turns out to be a merely war
propaganda. That the book was written from a neutral third party iscompletely untrue. On the contrary, the Nationalist Party promoted
the existence of a “Nanking Massacre” using the book.
As stated before, the real facts of the “Nanking Massacre” weredoubly sealed and became insubstantial. This was the beginning of
the second tragedy for Japan. War propaganda was conveyed to thepostwar world as the facts of the situation. The “Nanking Massacre”
has been eating at the Japanese heart. At the same time, it has been
preventing the normal development Japanese-Chinese relations.
Ironically, since this fiction has come to be accepted by the post-War
Japanese as factual history, the Beijing government has decided thatthey could use it for their own diplomatic purposes.
In May 1988 the late Professor Muramatsu Takeshi urged theChinese in Beijing, “You mention the ‘Nanking Massacre’ and say
300,000 people were killed. But there were only 200,000 people in
Nanking at that time. How could they kill 300,000 people? Establish
the International Committee (for the research).”87 Sun Ping Hua, thepresident of the Japanese-Chinese Friendship Association answered,“There is no such need. The number of 300,000 has already been
decided.” War propaganda made up by the Nationalist Party’s
Central Information Department, together with the Communist Party,
was introduced to the present Chinese Communist Party. The“Nanking Massacre” became a politically determined fact.
But thanks to the result of the recent research and the newly
discovered top secret documents, the veil of the “Nanking Massacre”
has finally been removed, and the real facts are exposed to the publiceye. Unless the world recognizes, and copes with it, we cannot saythat the war ended in peace. War threatens the lives of people, but
war propaganda threatens their very hearts. Therefore, we must
eradicate it.
(This chapter first appeared in the 29th International Congress of Military
History: War, Military and Media from Gutenberg to Today, issued in286

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Bucharest by Military Publishing in 2004.)

NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION

287

CHAPTER 17:

NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO
THE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WASNO MASSACRE IN NANKING

1. On December 13, 1937, approximately 67 years ago, the city of
Nanking fell. Japanese newspapers of that era carried photographs
showing Japanese soldiers standing atop one of the city gates, raising
their voices in cheers of “Banzai!” Other photographs showed people
carrying lanterns and parading through the streets of Japan’s towns
and cities to celebrate the victory.
But in the U.S., the coverage was entirely different. The top headlineof the December 15 edition of the Chicago Daily News read “Nanking
Massacre Story.” The text of the article reads, in part, as follows.
The story of Nanking’s fall is a story of indescribable panic andconfusion among the entrapped Chinese defenders, followed by areign of terror by the conquering army which cost thousands of
lives, many of them innocent ones. (...) This account is based on
the observations of myself and other foreigners in Nanking
throughout the siege.1

The New York Times, in its December 18 edition, ran a similarstory under the title of “Nanking Butchery Marked Its Fall.” Excerpts
follow.
Wholesale looting, the violation of women, the murder ofcivilians ... turned Nanking into a city of terror. (...) Any person
who ran because of fear or excitement was likely to be killed on
the spot (...) Many slayings were witnessed by foreigners.2

Reading these articles, one would certainly be led to believe thatthe moment Japanese troops breached the city walls, they had
stormed the city and proceeded “to plunder, murder, rape, at will”
any citizens who crossed their paths. The two news stories marked
the first time that the world ever heard of the “Nanking Massacre.”288

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Both were scoops, the former wired by Archibald Steele, and the latterby Tillman Durdin. Steele and Durdin, the foreign witnesses
described in the articles, were American correspondents who were in
Nanking when the city fell, but left soon after (December 15).
The news seemed to spread like wildfire. Nearly 200 Japanesejournalists and photographers were scouring Nanking for news, andword of the massacre stories reached some of them, including Maeda
Yuji, a graduate of Tokyo University who had majored in French
literature. Maeda was employed by the news agency Domei Tsushin,which assigned him cover the movements of Japanese troops involvedin the Battle of Nanking. Years later (in 1982), Maeda authored a bookentitled Caught up in the Current of War, which includes the following
passage.
Cables emanating from foreign news agencies describednumerous instances of looting, rape and arson in the Safety Zone,
after the city was occupied. (...) My colleagues and I stared ateach other, dumbfounded. Not one photographer - not one
cinematographer (and they had all made the rounds of the city)
had heard about any violent crime in Nanking once order was
restored. (...) If any unlawful acts had been committed, not justpeople from my agency, but the 100 other journalists assigned to
Nanking from Japan’s news media would have heard about them.3

Another journalist, Yamamoto Osamu, was in Nanking when the
hostilities took place, representing the Osaka Asahi Shinbun. About thealleged atrocities, he wrote: “I neither saw nor heard anything about
them. (...) We reporters used to get together every night ... but nobody
from any of the Asahi papers mentioned anything of the sort.” When
Yamamoto returned to Japan in the summer of 1938, someone struck
up a conversation with him at a Kobe hotel. “He told me he’d heardthat Japanese soldiers had committed violent acts in Nanking. I
couldn’t believe my ears. My interlocutor reported that he had readabout them in a foreign newspaper.”4
Who was telling the truth?
Since the two American correspondents departed from Nanking on
December 15, we must assume that their reports were based on
foreigners’ “observation” and “witnesses” between the 13th and the15th. Let us now have a look at “Daily Reports of the Serious Injuries

NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION

289

to Civlians,” 5compiled in February 1938 by Lewis Smythe,
professor at the University of Nanking, then edited as Documents of the
Nanking Safety Zone by Hsü Shuhsi and published in 1939: “Thefollowing section of cases ... completes the story of the first twomonths of the Japanese Army’s occupation of Nanking.”
During the three-day period in question, the following cases are
mentioned: one rape and two instances of looting for a total of threecases on December 13, a murder, four rapes and three thefts (of gloves,a fountain pen and a clock) on December 14, and four murders, fiverapes, and five cases of looting on December 15. But it was nevermade clear who had witnessed these crimes. The murders committed
prior to the two foreigners’ departure from Nanking were few, andwere not substantiated. No one had witnessed the murder of a civilian
during the three days that followed the fall of Nanking.6 What did thereporters mean by “observations of myself and other foreigners” and“many slayings were witnessed by foreigners?”
2. What actually was the situation in Nanking at about the time of thecity’s fall, when the two American correspondents (Steele andDurdin) and other foreigners claimed that they witnessed a massacre?
Five days before the city fell, the commander in chief of the Nanking
Defense Corps ordered all civilians to evacuate to the Safety Zone.
International Committee Document No. 9 bears witness to the fact
that, for all intents and purposes, every civilian in Nanking took
refuge in the Safety Zone.
But during the Battle of Nanking, events that the Japanese could
not have anticipated occurred. Commander-in-Chief Tang Shengzhi
ignored Japanese warnings to surrender, swearing to fight to thedeath, if necessary, to defend Nanking. But at 8:00 p.m. on December
12 (shortly before the fall of Nanking), Tang fled from the battlefield,
without surrendering, even though the hostilities were still in fullforce.
Tang’s men were trapped inside the city, surrounded by huge
walls and gates. They had two options: escape from the city or
infiltrate the “neutral” Safety Zone, which was intended only forcivilians. Since the city was about to fall, most of the soldiers poured
into the Safety Zone, where the mixture of combatants and civilians
caused chaos. (Foreigners had also taken refuge there.)
The Japanese breached Nanking’s gates in the wee hours ofDecember 13. Chinese troops never surrendered; in fact, the hostilities

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

continued outside the city’s walls. Fleeing Chinese troops launchedfierce assaults on Japanese soldiers, killing or wounding many ofthem.
Between December 14 and 16, Japanese troops embarked on a
mission “to solidify the occupation by sweeping Nanking and its
outskirts to rid those areas of any remaining enemy soldiers.” The
restoration of public order hinges on such sweeps, which were then,and continue to be, essential battlefield operations.
The Japanese faced their most daunting challenge in the Safety
Zone. Chinese troops, having discarded their uniforms, were posing
as civilians. To make matters worse, there were Chinese militaryfacilities inside the Safety Zone. Although those facilities should havebeen vacant, they were occupied by some enemy soldiers, who had
hidden weapons inside them and were using them to launch a
counterattack. Any such assault within the Safety Zone would cause
hostilities to recommence. There would be civilian casualties, andJapanese soldiers would be in danger as well. Japanese military
authorities ordered the 7th Regiment (and that unit only) to sweep the
Safety Zone. Its men exposed and captured Chinese soldiers, andexecuted any who resisted on the banks of the Yangtze River.
However, the Japanese used most of the soldiers they ferreted out as
coolies (a total of 10,000 men as of February 28, 1938.)7
Then what are we to make of the “[w]holesale looting, theviolation of women, the murder of civilians” witnessed by the two
American journalists and by no one else? We can assume only that thereports they wrote were informed by (1) the panic that ensued withthe fall of Nanking, (2) the presence of corpses, and (3) executions thattook place on the banks of the Yangtze River.
For instance, Durdin wrote, “The capture of the Hsiakwan[Yijiang] Gate by the Japanese was accompanied by the mass killing of
the defenders, who were piled up among the sandbags, forming amound six feet high.”8 In his mind, the corpses were the result of“mass killing.” But as he recalled 50 years later, they were the bodies
of Chinese soldiers who had flocked to Yijiang Gate, the sole escaperoute inside the city walls, where they had the misfortune to be
trampled to death, or shot and killed by a Chinese supervisory unit.
Right before he left Nanking, Steele wrote about executions ofChinese: “The last thing we saw as we left the city was a band of 300
Chinese being methodically executed before the wall near thewaterfront.”9 But note that when he was asked, 50 years later,whether he had seen Chinese being massacred, he replied that he had

NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION

291

seen a large number of soldiers being shot in a systematic and orderly
manner.10 Since Steele mentioned soldiers, it was clear that he hadperceived the execution of soldiers as a massacre.
Furthermore, one would have expected Durdin, too, when asked(50 years later) for his impressions of the three days he spent inNanking, to describe the traumatic experience of witnessing (or being
told of) the murders of women and children. Instead, he replied that
the Safety Zone, though packed with refugees, was peaceful, and foodseemed abundant.11
In other words, neither journalist ever witnessed “wholesalelooting, the violation of women, or the murder of civilians.” We canmake this statement with confidence because the information we
presented in 1. (i.e., that there no murders of civilians), is supported
by “daily reports of serious injuries to civilians” compiled by Dr.
Smythe on behalf of the International Committee for the Nanking
Safety Zone) and the recollections of reporters assigned to Japaneseunits. The Americans apparently seemed to base their opinions that a
massacre had taken place on the corpses lying in the street andexecutions conducted by the Japanese military.
3. Japan’s Army authorities dispatched a team to Nanking todetermine whether there was any truth to the “Nanking Massacre”
stories carried by American newspapers. Ishii Itaro, head of theForeign Ministry’s East Asia Bureau, read the “daily reports of serious
injuries to civilians” from the International Committee delivered to
the Japanese Embassy in Nanking. The report he subsequently
submitted to the government listed acts of rape, arson and looting
committed by Japanese military personnel inside the walls of
Nanking;12 however, are we to attribute the fact that they contained
not one instance of the word “massacre” to mere coincidence?
The reports checked by Ishii, which covered a two-month period,
listed a total of 26 murders, 175 rapes, 131 robberies, and five cases ofarson. Most of the reports were based on rumors, and contained nowitnesses’ names.13 The only murder observed by a named witness
turned out to be a lawful execution.14
In those reports, every incident reported by a resident of Nanking
or a foreign resident there was recorded. The information was
accepted as fact by foreign residents of Nanking. It is small wonderthat Ishii Itaro and other Japanese investigators reached theconclusion that the “wholesale looting, the violation of women, or themurder of civilians” supposedly witnessed by foreigners had never

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

been committed.
How did Americans react to the stories they read in thenewspapers? After Steele’s and Durdin’s articles appeared in theirrespective newspapers, other American newspapers carried similar
coverage. However, the only protest raised by the U.S. government
concerned the bombing (in error) of the Panay, and the assault against
U.S. Consul John Allison. At the February 1938 conference of the
League of Nations, a representative of the Republic of China broached
the topic of the “Nanking Massacre” (as described in U.S.
newspapers). However, the League was not asked to send an
investigative team similar to the Lytton Commission to Nanking.
What about the Chinese Nationalist Party, which claimed that a
multitude of compatriots had been massacred? If the Nanking
Massacre story had been true, the Party would certainly have
unleashed anti-Japanese invective for days on end – invective far
more vitriolic than what we hear today. But nowhere in China at War,issued in April, 1938 by the Ministry of Information, do we find any
mention of a “Nanking Massacre,” though the book does containreferences to the city itself.15 Nor does the famous address entitled“On Protracted War” delivered by Communist Party head Mao
Zedong over nine days in late May 1938 contain even one reference toa massacre in Nanking. Mao did address Japanese strategic errors,
however, and in citing one of them (failing to take advantage ofopportunities to annhilate more enemy soldiers in Nanking), heessentially discredits the massacre theory.16
U.S. newspapers may have publicized the massacre argument, but
no other nation disseminated similar accusations. Nor did any othernation scorn Japan for having perpetrated a massacre in Nanking.
But looking back, we realize that the Japanese Foreign Ministry
was seriously remiss in not immediately reacting to accusations
published in American newspapers by setting the story straight. An
international investigative team should have been formed, and theresults of its work published for all the world to see.
Harold Timperley took full advantage of this unfortunate lapse on
the part of the Japanese. He published, in London and New York,
What War Means: Japanese Terror in China in July 1938, the firstanniversary of the Sino-Japanese War (and seven months after themassacre stories appeared in U.S. newspapers). The book was
supposedly written from the perspective of a disinterested party who
wished to impress upon the public the cruelty of war, with the
Sino-Japanese War as a backdrop. The first four chapters of theNEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION

293

eight-chapter book consist of letters written by foreign residents of
Nanking to a friend.
[I]n two days the whole outlook has been ruined by frequent
murder, wholesale and semiregular looting, and uncontrolled
disturbance of private homes including offences against the
security of women. (...) Complete anarchy has reigned for ten days
- it has been a hell on earth ... close to forty thousand unarmed
persons were killed.17

The Chinese translation of What War Means (entitled Japanese
Atrocities as Witnessed by Foreigners) was also published in July 1938.
Not long afterwards a French-language edition was issued. Japanese
government officials were not, however, accustomed to protesting oreven objecting in situations like this. They simply pretended that What
War Means didn’t exist, never dreaming that their failure to set awrong right would haunt them long after Japan’s defeat.
4. On December 8, 1945 (six months prior to the commencement of theTokyo Trials), Japan’s newspapers carried a two-page article entitled“History of the Pacific War: The Downfall of Deceitful, Militarist
Japan, Supplied by Allied Headquarters.” An excerpt follows:A nightmare in Nanking (... ) We have positive proof that Japanese
troops perpetrated unspeakable atrocities, slaughtering 20,000
men, women, and children, from witnesses who described theworst massacre in modern history. During a four-week period,
Nanking transmuted into a city of blood. Hacked-off pieces offlesh littered the streets.18

But exactly who were the witnesses? Where was the “positive
proof” that 20,000 persons had been slaughtered? Allied
Headquarters never conducted an investigation of the events thatwere said to have transpired in Nanking.
The Tokyo Trials began on May 3, 1946, and in July the court took
up the matter of the “Nanking Massacre.” At no time during theproceedings were the articles published in American newspapers
about the “massacre” or What War Means submitted to the court,
either in part or in their entirety, despite their potential evidentiary
value. Nor were the contributors, both named and nameless, called as
witnesses.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Five Chinese and three Americans took the witness stand. Their
testimony should have been weighed carefully, and a determination
made as to whether it was eyewitness testimony or corroborative
testimony. However, only Rev. John Magee was asked, undercross-examination, how many murders he had personally witnessed.
He replied that he’d seen only one (involving one victim), butaccording to a diary entry he had made at the time, which mentionedthat particular case, Magee wrote that “The actual killing we did not
see as it took place.”19
The testimony that most heavily affected the outcome of the Tokyo
Trials was that given by Rev. Miner Bates, who claimed that “as aresult of our investigations and observations and checking of burials,
that twelve thousand civilians, men, women and children were killed
inside the walls within our own sure knowledge.”20 Also, citing thefigure of 30,000, Bates insinuated that prisoners of war had beenmassacred: “Large parties of Chinese soldiers laid down their arms,
surrendered, immediately outside the walls of the city and there,
within the first seventy-two hours, were cut down by machine gunfire.”21 However, not once did Bates publicly accuse Japanese military
personnel of having executed prisoners of war.
In February 1947, subsequent to his testimony at the Tokyo Trials,
Bates made the following statement.
[A] low and incomplete figure for civilian deaths ... inflicted by theJapanese in the first few weeks of their occupation of Nanking,was 12,000; and for deaths of unarmed men in military clothing,
35,000. Of these murders, over 90 per cent occurred in the first ten
days, most of all in the first three days.22

Bates’ allegation that the slaughter occurred “most of all in thefirst three days” is important, because we have already demonstrated
that it is untrue. Since foreign residents’ estimates of the population of
Nanking (200,000 immediately before its fall,23 200,000 10 days later,24
and 250,000 a month later25), they obviously didn’t think that there
had been a decrease. In fact, it is impossible to imagine that there
were even several dozen murders, judging from an examination of thecontents of the aforementioned “daily reports of serious injuries tocivilians” over a period of two months.
The only possible explanation for Bates’ massacre accusations is
executions of enemy soldiers by Japanese troops during the 72-hour
sweep of Nanking. It is important to remember that those executed

NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION

295

were not “unarmed men in military clothing,” but unlawful
combatants who had cast off their uniforms. So the executions were
not unlawful.
Nevertheless, Bates’ testimony wielded tremendous influence on
the Tokyo Trials. On November 11, 1948, the Tribunal’s verdict was
read: “More than 200,000 civilians and prisoners of war were killed
within and near Nanking during the first six weeks of the occupationof the Japanese Army.”26
5. The verdict handed down at the Tokyo Trials stated that Japanesemilitary personnel had killed at least 200,000 civilians and prisonersof war. Today the “Nanking Massacre” is mentioned in the same
breath as the Nazi Holocaust, but we find reactions to that verdict, or
rather, the lack of any at the time, puzzling. For years none of theworld’s nations (including the Republic of China) spoke out about amassacre in Nanking. There was not a single reference to a “Nanking
Massacre” in the textbooks of Japan, China, or any other nation, forthat matter. After that, it seemed as though the verdict rendered at theTokyo Trials had been accepted, but only nominally so.
Then, 25 years after the Tokyo Trials, when diplomatic relations
between Japan and China were normalized, the climate shifted, andthe “Nanking Massacre” allegations resurfaced. A new movement
took shape – one whose adherents were convinced that justice had
been served at the Tokyo Trials as far as Nanking was concerned, andsought to focus the world’s attention on the “Nanking Massacre.”The turning point in public opinion came when Travels in China,
written by Honda Katsuichi, was serialized in the Asahi Shinbun in1971. The articles consist of testimony provided by Chinese nationals
who claimed that they had been harmed in some way by Japanesesoldiers during the Sino-Japanese War. The following year, thearticles were compiled into a book, which became a bestseller.
Another ten years elapsed, and then the spotlight focused on“Nanking,” one of the chapters of Travels in China. Someone
unearthed the articles that had appeared in U.S. newspapers in late1937, as well as What War Means. All of these were translated into
Japanese and widely disseminated. What War Means was held in highesteem because it was revealed that the man whose (anonymous)
allegations it contained had testified at the Tokyo Trials. That man
was none other than Professor Miner Bates.
In his testimony Bates had never uttered a word about What War
Means. Since he was a contributor to the book, why did he neither

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

mention What War Means nor submit it as evidence at the Tokyo
Trials? In any case, the book penned by someone who was both a
Christian missionary and a professor at the University of Nanking
received great acclaim.
In 1982, an article printed in Japanese newspapers stated thatJapan’s Ministry of Education had ordered publishers to tone down
language used in a high-school history textbook, replacing the wordinvasion in “the invasion into China by the Japanese Army” withadvance. The Ministry had never issued instructions to that effect, but
the appearance of the article resulted in protests from China.
Consequently, new approval standards requiring textbooks to be
more sensitive toward Japan’s neighbors were introduced, and soon
the “Nanking Massacre” found its way into the textbooks of both
Japan and China.
In 1985, the Museum of the Nanjing Massacre was established in
China. Fifty years after the fall of Nanking, most of the people
involved in the occupation of that city were no longer alive. However,Fukuda Tokuyasu, a junior diplomat attached to the Japanese
Embassy in Nanking at the time (and later minister of posts andtelecommunications), was entrusted with the processing ofcomplaints addressed to the Embassy. About the “massacre”
allegations, he remarked:
It is true that not all Japanese soldiers behaved well. But there wasno massacre ‑ not of 1,000 individuals, let alone 200,000 or 300,000.
(...) The supposed venue was a public place. The consequences of a
massacre would have been disastrous. Furthermore, there would
have been a multitude of witnesses. These accusations are outrightlies. They are propaganda, pure and simple.27

Fukuda Tokuyasu was in Nanking right after the city fell, and heinteracted with Europeans and Americans residing there. He swore
that the “Nanking Massacre” allegations were built on lies andpropaganda, but he was unable to supply evidence to support his
convictions. In recent years, Fukuda’s claims, especially“propaganda” have at long last acquired credibility. First of all, What
War Means was “edited and published”28 by the Nationalist Party’s
Ministry of Information as a “propaganda material”29. Second, its
editor, Harold Timperley, was an “advisor”30 to that same ministry.
Furthermore, we now know the names of the anonymous contributors.
One was George Fitch, whose wife was a “close friend”31 of Mme.

NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION

297

Chiang Kai-shek. The other was Miner Bates, who served as an“advisor”32 to the Nationalist government.
As for the source of the American newspaper articles that firstbroadcast the “Nanking Massacre” story to the world, again theevidence points to Professor Bates: “The book uses a statement which
I prepared on the 15 of December to be utilized by the various
correspondents leaving Nanking on that date.”33 The statement
became the second half of the first chapter of What War Means. The
foreign witnesses to the “Nanking Massacre” mentioned in the U.S.
newspaper articles certainly included Bates, whom the Nationalist
government decorated twice.34 He received the first award in 1938
(the same year in which he submitted his anonymous contribution to
What War Means claiming that 40,000 persons had been massacred in
Nanking), and the second in 1946 (the year when he reiterated thisclaim on the witness stand at the Tokyo Trials).
6. Now that there is a distinct possibility that the “Nanking Massacre”
was Nationalist propaganda, we recall an article written by Tillman
Durdin. As mentioned earlier, Durdin was the New York Times
correspondent who disseminated stories about the “Nanking
Massacre.” We discovered only recently that he was also a goodfriend and “old colleague” of Hollington Tong, the Nationalist
vice-minister of information.
Durdin wired the article in question to the New York Times on
December 22, 1938. It reads, in part:[T]he Chinese command, fully realizing the practical certainty that
the Chinese Army would be completely surrounded in the walledcity of Nanking ... chose voluntarily to place themselves in justsuch a situation, apparently with the intention of making thecapture of the city as costly as possible.

What was the Chinese plan to make the Japanese conquest of
Nanking “costly?” It is certainly within the realm of possibility that
Nanking Defense Corps commanders were anticipating that Chinese
troops remaining in Nanking might enter the Safety Zone before thecity fell, creating panic and havoc; and that after the city fell, theJapanese might search the Safety Zone for Chinese troops, whom theywould then capture and execute. Such a scenario would be perfectfodder for the Nationalist propaganda machine.
Coincidentally, a “top-secret” propagandist document from the298

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

second Nationalist-Communist coalition’s Ministry of Information
has surfaced. Issued in 1941 and entitled Outline of the Operations of theInternational Information Department, Ministry of Information, thedocument describes propaganda strategy implemented during thethree-year period commencing on December 1, 1937 (prior to the fallof Nanking).
Let us first examine the outline of operations issued by theCounterintelligence Division (one branch of the five-division,
three-section ministry). It states that the Counterintelligence Division
circulated a secret report describing What War Means as a bookcompiled and published by the Ministry of Information for
propaganda purposes, and includes a synopsis of What War Means:
The book recounts rapes, arsons and lootings, i.e., heinous crimes
perpetrated by enemy troops subsequent to their invasion of
Nanking on December 13, 1937. It also describes in detailviolations of military rules and basic standards of humandecency.35 [Italics supplied.]

What War Means is crammed with accounts of murders, rapes,
arsons and lootings. Consequently, one would expect the Ministry ofInformation to have made at least some mention of those crimes at thevery beginning of the synopsis. However, the words “murders” and“massacre” are nowhere to be found.
Let us also explore another outline of operations, this one issued
by the Foreign Affairs Division. The staff of this division of theInternational Information Department obviously believed that its
propaganda would be more effective if disseminated by foreign
journalists. Between December 1, 1937 and October 24, 1938 thedepartment held 300 combination press conferences and tea parties.36
However, there is no mention of press conferences held toannounce the “Nanking Massacre,” neither when American
newspapers reported a massacre in Nanking in mid-December 1937,
nor when What War Means came out in July 1938. If there actually had
been a massacre in Nanking, it would certainly have behooved the
Nationalist Ministry of Information to react to the news that Chinese
citizens had been killed in an unlawful manner by presenting the facts
to the entire world, and immediately so.
Furthermore, operations outlines issued by other divisions of the
Ministry of Information (all of which we have examined) contain no
confidential reports describing the use of mass murders in Nanking

NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION

299

for propaganda purposes. What are we to make of the fact thatabsolutely no reference to the “Nanking Massacre” appears in theseprimary sources — confidential reports emanating from the
Nationalist Ministry of Information?
We have established the following facts: (1) there is no mention of
unlawful killings in the “daily reports of serious injuries to civilians,”and (2) Bates’ claim that the Japanese murdered 40,000 Chinese wasdeleted from the Chinese translation of What War Means, as well asfrom four printings of the English-language version of the book.37
When we combine these facts with other suspicious “evidence” andinconsistencies, we can arrive at only one logical conclusion: the
Nationalist Ministry of Information perceived the “Nanking
Massacre” not as historical fact, but as propaganda material.
We, too, wonder whether some civilians were caught up among
Chinese soldiers exposed subsequent to the hostilities in Nanking,and whether perhaps some unlawful executions might possibly havetaken place. But this is mere speculation.
Ultimately, we realize that the “Nanking Massacre,” originally a
Nationalist propaganda tool, was resurrected to help justify the Tokyo
Trials. We must insist that those who argue that there was a massacrein Nanking produce even one contemporary Nationalist Party
document that offers unequivocal and unambiguous proof of the“Nanking Massacre.”(This chapter first appeared in Sankei Shimbun from January 3 to 8,
2005 )

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301

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER:REREADING RABE’S DIARY

Six months have elapsed since the publication of the Japanesetranslation of John Rabe’s diary, The Truth About Nanking(subsequently translated into English under the title The Good Man of
Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe). Since Rabe served as chairmanof the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, the bookhas generated a great deal of interest and controversy. It has alreadybeen evaluated by six critics, but it is our opinion that thoseevaluations have not been sufficiently exhaustive.
The book, advertised as a diary, actually comprises two distinct
sections. One is the diary Rabe kept while in Nanking, entries fromwhich he compiled the two-volume The Bombing of Nanking in October
1942 (four-and-a-half years after he had returned to Berlin). Did
Rabe edit his original entries during that period, making additions tosome entries and deleting material from others? This is the firstquestion that comes to mind.
The other section consists of written reports addressed to Adolf
Hitler. Are the diary entries consistent with his reports to Hitler?
This is the next question we must address.
Investigative Focus
For our investigation, we will focus on Rabe’s diary entry for January
9, in which he describes the one and only execution to which there
were witnesses.
Kröger and Hatz arrive at our Zone headquarters at 11 o’clock andreport that there’s been a “small” execution that they were forced
to witness. A Japanese officer and two soldiers drove a Chinese
civilian out into one of the ponds on Shansi Road. When the man
was standing hip-deep in the water, one of the soldiers madehimself comfortable behind a nearby sandbag barricade and kept
firing until his victim sank into the pond.1

Accounts similar to this one appear in other books, namely:

302

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction(1) Harold Timperley, The Japanese Terror in China, “Case No. 185,”
1938, 1969, p. 159ff.
(2) Hsü Shuhsi (ed.), Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, “Case No.
185,” 1939, p. 78. (This book is a compilation, effected by theeditor, of documents issued by the International Committee inprotest of Japanese atrocities, and signed by Rabe, issued by theCouncil of International Affairs in Chongqing.)(3) Translation of (1) in Hora Tomio, (ed.), Source Material Relating
to the Great Nanking Massacre during the Second Sino Japanese War,
Vol. 2: English-Language Sources
Though accounts of Case No. 185, supposedly witnessed by
Kröger and Hatz, appear in all three books, they are not consistent
with Rabe’s account. The results of an investigation conducted by
the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone, i.e., thatwhat Rabe described simply as “executions” were, in fact, lawful
executions performed by the Japanese military are cited in the notes
to (1), (2), and (3). Rabe did not, however, mention that crucial
report in his diary. By omitting any reference to it, he was implyingthat lawful executions were unlawful massacres.
We will now cite all existing accounts that contain references toCase No. 185 for purposes of comparison. English-language records
used as propaganda by the Republic of China, accounts written by
American residents of Nanking, and The Sino-Japanese Conflict, acollection of official documents from 1937 to 1939, prepared by theGerman Embassy in Nanking (on microfilm) are extant and available
for analysis.
Rabe’s diary consists of (1) factual accounts, (2) accounts in which
he embellishes the facts, (3) accounts that omit crucial facts, and (4)accounts based on stories he heard from Chinese informants andaccepted as fact. All of the passages cited below belong to one ofthese four categories.
Discrepancies Between Rabe’s Diary and Official Documents
Rabe writes about grenades landing in the Safety Zone, causing
deaths.
The first grenades land in the refugee Zone in front of and behind
the Foo Chong [Hempel’s] Hotel. A total of twelve dead andabout twelve wounded. ... Another grenade was fired into ourREREADING RABE’S DIARY

303

Zone (at the middle school) and killed 13 people.2

Strangely enough, he does not say whether the victims were
soldiers or civilians. In one of the documents included in Documentsof the Nanking Safety Zone, which bears his signature, Rabe wrote, “ ...
we had nearly all the civilian population gathered in a Zone in which
there had been very little destruction by stray shells ... .”3 He could
not have written these words if civilians had been killed. He omitted
an important fact, i.e., that the dead were Chinese soldiers.
Robert Wilson wrote, in a letter dated December 14, 1937, that in
the firing of guns the Japanese Army had apparently made special
efforts to keep the Safety Zone intact.4 We find in the document asimilar expression of gratitude to the Japanese Army from Rabe, thecommittee chairman. Hata Ikuhiko claims that no such letter exists
but, as Watanabe Shoichi
has already indicated, it
does.
It appears at the
beginning of Document No.
1: “We come to thank you
for the fine way yourartillery spared the Safety
Zone.”5
The words initalics were intentionallyomitted from the Japanesetranslation of Rabe’s book,which may explain why
Hatareachedtheconclusion he did.
Inconsistencies in Rabe’sOverdramatized Diary
The entry in Rabe’s diaryfor December 13, the day
after Nanking fell, provides
much food for thought.
We drive very cautiously
down the main street.
There’s a danger you
may drive over one ofThis photograph appeared in The Second
Sino-Japanese War: An Illustrated Report,
March 21, 1938, with the following caption:“A Bustling Street Market on HuazhongRoad, Nanking.”

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

the hand grenades lying about and be blown sky-high. We turnonto Shanghai Lu, where several dead civilians are lying, anddrive on toward the advancing Japanese.
One Japanese
detachment, with a German-speaking doctor, tells us that theJapanese general is not expected for two days yet.6 [Italics
supplied.]

If the Red Swastika Society’s records are accurate, there were 20
bodies on Shanghai Road. Were they indeed the corpses of civilians,
as Rabe described them?
It was standard procedure for Chinese soldiers, in the face ofdefeat, to shed their uniforms, change into civilian clothes, and flee,
while the Chinese supervisory unit fired at them from behind (alsostandard procedure). A Chinese officer standing near Rabe (whowas urging Chinese troops to lay down their arms) was firing his
carbine. The corpses may have been those of Chinese soldiers shotby that officer as they attempted to escape.
On December 8, Tang Shengzhi issued an evacuation order,
directing all civilians to concentrate in the Safety Zone, andforbidding them to leave it. There are references to this order inJapanese and American records, but none in Rabe’s diary.
International Committee Document No. 9, which bears Rabe’s
signature, reads as follows: “In other words, on the 13th, when yourtroops entered the city, we had nearly all the civilian population
gathered in a Zone ... .”7 Thus, civilians could not have been in thebattle zone at the intersection of Zhongshan and Shanghai roads.
The bodies seen by Rabe were those of soldiers, not civilians, his diary
entry notwithstanding.
If Japanese troops had shot civilians, the “Espy Report,” whichcontained complaints from 14 American residents of Nanking
submitted to the American Embassy, would have mentioned such
incidents.8 Since it does not, we must assume that the Japanesemilitary personnel did not shoot civilians.
Rabe’s Blatant Prevarications
Rabe did not, of course, state specifically that Japanese soldiers shot
civilians. But he attempted to sway the reader by using the passive
voice, and omitting the subjects of sentences. Note the report that hesent to Hitler, which differs subtly from what he wrote in his diary.

REREADING RABE’S DIARY

305

According to a Japanese soldier on outpost duty who came by on a bicycle,
the supreme commander would be arriving within three days.
Here and there were the dead bodies of Chinese civilians. Upon
examining several of them, I found that they had been shot point-blankin the back, perhaps when they were trying to flee.9 [Italics supplied.]

The italicized portions of this excerpt differ from the diary entry
cited above. The discrepancy in the number of days (two versus
three) is not serious, but the other inconsistencies are.
Rabe
exaggerated and bent the truth to create what is, essentially,
propaganda. Rabe did not “present the facts in an unbiased
manner,”10 as critic Fukuda Kazuya claims.
False Reports to Hitler
Here are further excerpts from Rabe’s report to Hitler.
Suspected of once having been soldiers, thousands of individuals
were killed with machine guns or hand grenades.11
Gasoline was poured over them, and they were burned alive.12
Females ranging in age from eight to over 70 were raped andkilled ... beer bottles or bamboo sticks had been shoved into theirgenitals. I saw these victims with my own eyes.13
Perhaps half of the resident population has died from thispestilence.14 [Italics supplied.]

In his diary entry for December 24, Rabe writes that he “wanted tosee these atrocities with my own eyes, so that I can speak as an
eyewitness later.” Those who have reviewed his book have praised
it as “better than a primary reference, since Rabe saw the atrocities
with his own eyes,”15 without taking the trouble to verify the
information it contains. One would expect him to have submitted afactual report to Hitler, but the portions cited above are nowhere to befound in Rabe’s diary or in any other record and are, therefore,
fiction.

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THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Chinese Military Exploited Safety Zone
The Nanking Safety Zone became a refuge for the 200,000 residents
who remained in the city. The use of the Safety Zone as a haven wasapproved by Chiang Kai-shek.
However, Tang Shengzhi,
commander-in-chief of the Nanking Defense Corps, did not order
Chinese military personnel to withdraw from the Safety Zone. Even
police officers armed themselves with rifles in violation of regulations.
Chinese troops were ensconced in the Safety Zone, fully armed, wellbefore Nanking fell. The prevailing view, i.e., that Chinese soldiers
infiltrated the Safety Zone immediately before the occupation, isincorrect.
Rabe urged Tang to remove military personnel and facilities fromthe Safety Zone. But Tang claimed that that was out of the question.
He had new trenches dug at three locations in the Safety Zone, andanti-aircraft batteries installed. On two occasions, Chinese military
personnel removed all the red-cross flags from the Safety Zone.
They even insisted on reducing the size of the area occupied by the
Safety Zone.
Safety Zone Not a Neutral Zone
At 6:30 p.m. on December 12, several hours prior to the fall of
Nanking, Rabe saw Chinese soldiers making a frantic beeline from
Zhonghua and Guanghua gates to the Safety Zone. Their flight was
not a desperate emergency measure, but a premeditated action or, atthe very least, the result of a tacit understanding. As they neared the
Safety Zone, they gradually regained their composure, and theirracing slowed to a casual stroll.
From their behavior, we arrive at the conclusion that aside fromsoldiers who were shot by members of the supervisory unit at theSouth Gate or the North Gate (Yijiang Gate), the few who escapedfrom the city walls, and those who had been fighting from theencampment within the Safety Zone from the outset, Chinese troops(tens of thousands of them) had escaped to the Safety Zone,
knowingly and willfully. The neutral zone intended for civilian
evacuees became a refuge for soldiers.
As P.R. Shields, manager of the China Industrial Foreign Trade
Association (and a member of the International Committee for the
Nanking Safety Zone), later admitted, establishing the Safety Zone
was a mistake, since it was abused.16 The Japanese treated the Safety

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307

Zone with respect, though they had the authority to refuse torecognize its neutrality. The Safety Zone proved to be the source of
all the “Nanking problems.”
Neutral Zone Committee Chairman Aided Deserting Enemy Troops
At 8:00 p.m. on December 12, about the same time when Tang
Shengzhi decamped, Colonels Long and Zhou paid another visit toRabe, asking him to give them shelter.
Rabe agreed, apparently without any pangs of conscience. Only
two days earlier, Rabe had lamented the presence of severely
wounded soldiers in the Safety Zone as “contrary to our agreement.”17
Wasn’t the presence of perfectly healthy high-ranking officers evenmore “contrary to our agreement?” If Rabe was able to justify
harboring Chinese military personnel, he must have lost his reasoning
powers.
Furthermore, Rabe sheltered Colonel Luo Fuxiang (Wang
Hanwan) after Nanking fell, a fact that he did not enter in his diary
until 71 days later, on February 22, 1938. Most diaries are faithfulrecords of the events of the day, but Rabe’s diary does not belong inthat category. He made his entries selectively and after the fact, toserve his own purposes. His garden, dubbed the “Siemens Camp,”
sheltered 650 evacuees, among whom may have been a great numberof soldiers, including Wang Hanwan.
When Rabe returned to Germany, he took Wang Hanwan on
board ship with him, claiming that the latter was his servant, andhelped Wang escape to Hong Kong. Rabe viewed himself as a herofor having abetted the infiltration into the Safety Zone andsubsequent escape of high-ranking Chinese officers.
But forsomeone who was committee chairman of a neutral zone, this was
extremely irrational behavior.
What Happened During the Illegal 64-Day Sojourn?
On February 15, 1938, Rabe wrote the following entry in his diary:“Lung [Long] and Chow [Zhou] left my house yesterday
evening ... .”18 The Chinese officers had stayed, illegally, in his homefor 64 days. Kasahara Tokushi characterizes Japanese attempts toferret out Chinese soldiers as one of “total envelopment andannihilation,”19 but this accusation is patently untrue.
Colonel Long claimed that he and Zhou had been left behind to308

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

care for the wounded, under orders from Tang Shengzhi.20 If their
duty was to tend to the wounded, why did they not go directly to the
diplomatic office set up by the Red Cross Hospital, instead of toRabe’s home? What did they have in mind?
An article in the January 4, 1938 issue of The New York Times
provides a useful hint. Having heard about it from Ara Kenichi, thiswriter searched for the article in Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol.
1: American References, but to no avail. An examination of thenewspaper’s archives on microfilm finally produced the article,
entitled “Ex-Chinese Officers Among U.S. Refugees: Colonel and
His Aides Admit Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in Nanking,”
which follows in its entirety.
American professors remaining at Ginling College in Nanking as
foreign members of the Refugee Welfare Committee wereseriously embarrassed to discover that they had been harboring adeserted Chinese Army colonel and six of his subordinate officers. The
professors had, in fact, made the colonel second in authority at the
refugee camp.
The officers, who had doffed their uniforms during the
Chinese retreat from Nanking, were discovered living in one of
the college buildings.
They confessed their identity after
Japanese Army searchers found that they had hidden six rifles, five
revolvers, a dismounted machine gun and ammunition in the building.
The ex-Chinese officers in the presence of Americans and otherforeigners confessed looting in Nanking and also that one night theydragged girls from the refugee camp into the darkness and the next day
blamed Japanese soldiers for the attacks.
The ex-officers were arrested and will be punished undermartial law and probably executed. [Italics supplied.]

The removal of uniforms and the concealment of weapons andammunition are both violations of international law in time of war.
The International Committee had repeatedly assured the Japanesethat “we know there are no groups of disarmed soldiers in theZone”21 (Document No. 10), but that was not true.
There is no reference to Chinese soldiers’ looting or raping inRabe’s diary or in Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, which hesigned. Rabe visited the Japanese Embassy nearly every day to file a
protest, but he made no protest against the article in The New YorkTimes. The facts were accepted, ignored, and forgotten.

REREADING RABE’S DIARY

309

Chinese Military’s Covert Anti-Japanese Activities
The January 25, 1938 edition of China Press, an English-language
newspaper published by an American press in Shanghai, contains anarticle entitled “The Second Sino-Japanese War,” an official documentcompiled by the German Embassy in Nanking.
It contains
information similar to the content of the aforementioned article in The
New York Times, i.e., the disclosure that as of December 28, 1,575
Chinese soldiers (including 23 officers) had entered the Safety Zone
with machine guns and rifles hidden on their persons. Among them
was Wang Xinlao, commander-in-chief of the Nanking Peace
Preservation Corps. Under an alias, Chen Mi, he took charge of theInternational Committee’s Fourth Branch Detachment and, with threesubordinates, proceeded to engage in “looting, agitation, and rape.”22
Major-General Iinuma Mamoru, in an entry in his diary dated
January 4, wrote that he had arrested one Ma Pou-shang, the deputy
commander of the 88th Division.23 Lieutenant-General Ma had been
“instigating anti-Japanese disturbances”24 in the Safety Zone. The
refugees in the Safety Zone must have been aware of these incidents
that took place behind the scenes. Some of them even said that thelooting, arson, and rape were the work of Chinese soldiers.
James McCallum wrote the following in his diary on January 9,
1938: “Some of the Chinese are even ready to prove that the looting,raping and burning was done by the Chinese and not the Japanese.”25
His entry was submitted as evidence to the IMTFE, but was notread aloud.
Colonels Long and Zhou may have been ordered to remain in the
Safety Zone for the purpose of instigating disturbances. If that was
so, Rabe’s and Tang Shengzhi’s homes, both located in the Safety
Zone, would have made ideal headquarters for such activity.
But an official announcement was issued, proclaiming that the
Safety Zone would cease to exist on February 8. Without theprotection of the Safety Zone, Nanking would become a dangerous
place for the Chinese officers to be. They could not afford to linger.
Six days later, both Long and Zhou disappeared from Rabe’s home inthe dark of night.
What were the true identities of Colonels Long and Zhou? Rabewrote in his diary that Luo’s real name was Wang Hanwan, but he
did not pass that information along in his report to Hitler, eventhough he had harbored the officers for 64 days. Rabe may havebeen worried about the repercussions from having revealed a name

310

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fictionthat turned out to be an alias.
A Spate of Fires Set in Rabe’s Neighborhood
Reading Rabe’s diary, one is perplexed at the sheer number of fires set
and rapes committed in his neighborhood.
For instance, on
December 19, he records conflagrations to the north and south of his
home. He writes about another fire on December 20, and anotherthat consumes three nearby houses on January 3, and yet another on
January 5. He reports still another on January 9, again in his
neighborhood. On December 27, he visits a “Japanese-Chinese
store,” which is probably not yet open for business, and lo, someone
has set fire to it!
His diary entries, however, contain absolutely no conclusive
evidence that incriminates Japanese soldiers as the arsonists. Evenso, he writes, on December 21, “There can no longer be any doubt that
the Japanese are burning the city ... .”26 The acts of arson, which
Rabe must have thought were intended to target him, had had achilling effect.
Fabricated Rapes
According to Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 8, thecity of Nanking was “off-limits”27 to Japanese soldiers. Nevertheless,Rabe wrote that many of them went to his house intent on rape. He
had recruited a security team, which he equipped with police whistles,
but Japanese soldiers continued to attempt to trespass on his
property: “As I write this, the fists of Japanese soldiers arehammering at the back gate to the garden ... When I suddenly show
up with my flashlight, they beat a hasty retreat.”28
Throughout history, criminals have feared witnesses. Rapists
have traditionally favored deserted, dark places.
Why would
Japanese soldiers go to Rabe’s house when he was there?
Rabe reports that, on one occasion, he returned home to find that a“Japanese soldier” had entered his property, looking for someone torape. But Rabe arrives “just in time” to save the day. The timing ofthese intrusions seems very strange indeed. Perhaps someone familiar
with his comings and goings — the Chinese officers he harbored, forinstance — orchestrated them.
In Xiaotaoyuan, the area in which Rabe’s house was located, there
were plenty of places for Chinese soldiers to hide: the spacious

REREADING RABE’S DIARY

311

Hujia vegetable garden, the University of Nanking Agricultural
School field, and the refugee camp at the Nanking Language School.
Moreover, Europeans and Americans have trouble distinguishing
between Chinese and Japanese. Chinese soldiers could disguisethemselves as Japanese soldiers without fear of being detected.
Taken in by Baseless Rumors
Rapes that seemed timed so that Rabe would discover themheightened his illusion to the point that he believed every rumor heheard.
Last night up to 1,000 women and girls are said to have been
raped, about 100 girls at Ginling Girls College alone. You hear ofnothing but rape.29

This entry was written on December 17, the day of the JapaneseArmy’s ceremonial entry into Nanking. Since Rabe had recorded therumor that 1,000 girls and women had been raped, perhaps the rapesof “100 girls at Ginling Girls College alone” were part of that same
rumor. Nakamura Akira surmised that that must be the case, while
Hata Ikuhiko has rejected the “rumor” theory.
Actually, Professor Minnie Vautrin, who established the largest
refugee camp for women at Ginling Girls College, the very same
institution where the rapes allegedly took place, penned herrecollections of the camp in an essay entitled “Sharing ‘the AbundantLife’ in a Refugee Camp,” which was published in July-August 1938
issue of The Chinese Recorder. Space limitations prevent us from
reproducing the entire essay, but nowhere in it does she write that“about 100 girls were raped at Jinling Girls College alone,” which she
surely would have done if they had been.
These rumors were probably spread by Chinese officers hiding in
the college. As Chancellor Scharffenberg remarked, “When there is acase involving violence, only one side is heard,”30 meaning the
Chinese side.
Chinese soldiers who infiltrated the Safety Zone spread rumorsthat Japanese military personnel were committing rape, arson, andmurder. They then proceeded to lend credibility to those rumors bycommitting those crimes themselves. The foreigners in Nanking
accepted these rumors as fact. Rabe perpetuated these rumors in hisdiary, a more accurate title for which might be Rumors from Nanking.

312

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

Discredited Account of Japanese Violations of International Law
Document No. 4 issued by the International Committee, and dated
December 15, alleged that Chinese soldiers were “lawful prisoners ofwar.”31 But that was the first and last time that that allegation was
made, and not because the International Committee was “indifferent”
to international law, as Hata claims. The realization that the Chinese
soldiers were not lawful prisoners of war as defined by internationallaw forced those who wished to use the law as a weapon against theJapanese to abandon their claims.
Even when Chinese soldiers were, as Steele wrote, executedwithout benefit of trial, no one could accuse the Japanese of violatinginternational law. When such accusations were made, they weredisregarded, as was Bates’ claim, made in the fall of 1938, that theJapanese had massacred 30,000 prisoners of war.32
Why did the Chinese soldiers fail to meet the criteria for prisonersof war, as defined by international law? Rabe is silent on this matter,but he and his colleagues twisted the facts by asserting that theJapanese executed “former soldiers,”33 to imply that they had
massacred civilians. Still, they were forced to withdraw thoseaccusations.
No More Than 15,000 Interred
We will now put Rabe’s diary aside, and examine the five burial
records from 1938.
The only organization entrusted with burials was the Red
Swastika Society. When the Report of the Nanking International Relief
Committee was issued (in summer, 1939), Bates was still chairman. It
states that all necessary burials were performed by the Red Swastika
Society. A total of $2,540 was expended to inter more than 40,000
bodies which had been left lying about.34
Chongshantang was not involved in the burials, which werecompleted by the Red Swastika Society. Furthermore, the Relief
Committee report adds that they were completed in approximately“40 working days.” However, when interviewed by this writer,
Maruyama Susumu, an employee of the Manchurian Railway and amember of the Nanking Special Agency, which supervised theinterments, said that the burials commenced in early February andended on or about March 15.
One would expect to find references to the burials, with dates, inREREADING RABE’S DIARY

313

Rabe’s diary, and he does make a casual reference to their having
begun on February 1. This date, quite surprisingly, matches theinformation obtained from Maruyama.35
As mentioned previously, the burials took place overapproximately 40 working days. They were completed on March 15,
or March 19, at the latest. Thus, we know that the Red Swastika
Society falsified its records.
How many bodies were interred? Since Rabe writes that it was
impossible to bury more than 200 per day36 and Maruyama reported
that “normally, 180 bodies37 were buried each day,” we can assume
that 5,000 bodies were buried in February, over a period of 25 days.
And from Rosen’s report stating that the Red Swastika Society wasinterring 500-600 bodies per day38, we can deduce that 10,450 bodies
were buried in March at the rate of 550 per day, over a 19-day period.
Therefore, the total number of interments could have been no morethan 15,000.
Therefore, we must conclude that:
(1)

(2)

(3)

The Red Swastika Society, by stating that it buried
approximately 40,000 bodies, more than doubled the actual
figure.
Rabe’s contention that he and the other foreigners in Nanking
believed that “50,000-60,000” were killed was a grossexaggeration. Where there is no body, there is no murder.
Hata’s theory that 40,000 Chinese were massacred is baseless.

Then, were the 15,000 dead (according to our estimate) the victims
of a massacre? We will address this question at a later date, due tospace constraints. We will close by stating that Bates’ argument that
40,000 Chinese were massacred was deleted from official records of
the Republic of China any number of times and thus, discredited.
(This chapter is a modification of and expansion on an article thatappeared in the April 1998 issue of Seiron.)314

THE NANKING MASSACRE: Fact Versus Fiction

315

AFTERWORD
Just as aspects of certain events, even seemingly minor aspects, canraise doubts and questions that linger in our minds, the Nanking
Massacre has been haunting me for years. Some of the particularly
nagging doubts and questions concern (1) the population of Nanking
before and after its capture, (2) the absence of any reference on thepart of the Nationalist government to a massacre in Nanking, (3)editorials in English-language magazines published by Europeans
and Americans in Shanghai and (4) burials.
Seven years ago, I analyzed each of these difficult questions, one byone. The result of my efforts is “Nankin gyakusatsu” no tettei kensho [Anexhaustive examination of the “Nanking Massacre”]. I began with theverification of the most elementary facts, even widely accepted
theories. For instance, I did not accept any item of information as fact
until it had been proven so, all the time being careful to avoid“precipitancy and prejudice.” So that I would not overlook even one
contemporary record, during my journey to “knowledge of the more
complex,” I took pains to “make enumerations so complete, andreviews so general” in my journey to “knowledge of the more
complex.” Without even being aware of it at first, I was following thefour Cartesian precepts outlined in A Discourse on Method.
My mission in writing “Nankin gyakusatsu” no tettei kensho [Anexhaustive examination of the “Nanking Massacre”] was, while
avoiding precipitancy and prejudice, to verify the facts through theconduct of a meticulous, exhaustive examination of contemporary
records. My intensive research into the “Nanking Massacre” broughtme to the conclusion that the evidence supporting the massacre claim
is unreliable at best.
Five years later, however, I was made aware of the existence ofrecords that I had not examined. In January 2003, I visited theMuseum of Chinese Nationalist Party History in Taipei, where I
unearthed a top-secret document dated 1941 and entitled Outline of
the Operations of the International Information Department, Ministry ofInformation. Readers are referred to Chapters 16 and 17 for myanalysis of that document. The top-secret document in question

316

AFTERWORD

demonstrated beyond a doubt that there was absolutely no historicalperception of a massacre in Nanking, not within the Nationalist Party
nor the Communist Party during the Second Nationalist-Communist
United Front (established in 1937). The time has come for a complete
reexamination of the “Nanking Massacre,” with a focus on thistop-secret document. I hope to publish the results of that
reexamination in Japan in the near future.
Now that the Internet has become such a popular forum, one sees
unauthenticated photographs that purportedly bear witness to amassacre in Nanking posted on countless Web sites. Therefore, wehave conducted the first comprehensive study of the 143 photographs
offered as evidence of the “Nanking Massacre.” After scouring
approximately 30,000 photographs in photojournalistic magazines
published (before and after the Japanese capture of Nanking) in Japanand the U.S., we have discovered that every single one of these“evidentiary photographs” published in 1937-8 is a fake, theproduct of splicing, staging or false captioning. See Nankin jiken “shoko
shashin” wo kensho suru [Analyzing “Photographic Evidence” of the
Nanking Massacre], issued in February 2005, for the results of ourresearch. We expect to post an English translation on the Internet(http://www2.asia-u.ac.jp/~jh2cqxyz) in the near future.
In closing, I would like to acknowledge the many people who urged
me to have this book translated into English seven years ago, when it
first came out in Japanese under the title “Nankin gyakusatsu” no tettei
kensho [An exhaustive examination of the “Nanking Massacre”].
Special thanks are due to Ito Takashi, professor emeritus at Universityof Tokyo; Kobori Keiichiro, ex-professor emeritus at University ofTokyo; Tonooka Akio, ex-professpr at Tokyo Gakugei University;
Watanabe Shoichi, professor emeritus at Sophia University; Odamura
Shiro, ex-chancellor at Takushoku University; Nagoshi Futaranosuke,
ex-professor at Takachiho University; Dr. Komuro Naoki, Sato Kazuo,
professor emeritus at Aoyama Gakuin University; Takubo Tadae,
professor at Kyorin University; Nishio Kanji, professor emeritus at
University of Electro-Communications; Suginoo Yoshio, ex-professor
at National Defence Academy; Ko Bunyu, visiting professor at
Takushoku University; Nakagaki Hideo, ex-professor at National
Defense Academy; Kitamura Yoshikazu, professor at Aichi Universityof Education; Sugihara Seishiro, professor at Musashino University;
Hasegawa Michiko, professor at Saitama University; Nakagawa

AFTERWORD

317

Yatsuhiro, professor at Tsukuba University; Nakanishi Terumasa,
professor at Kyoto University; Matsumoto Michihiro, ex-professorat Honolulu University; the Messrs. Nakajima Shinzaburo, Hara
Takizo, Kondo Yasushi, Saisu Shigekazu, Masuda Toshio, Moteki
Hiromichi and Ms. Mayumi Atsuko.
The author would also like to express his gratitude to Takemoto
Tadao, professor emeritus at Tsukuba University; Fujioka Nobukatsu,
formerly professor at University of Tokyo and currently professor at
Takushoku University; and the Messrs. Takahana Yutaka, Iwata
Yoshiyasu and Yuhara Masataka for their unceasing support andencouragement during the long road to publication.
Higashinakano Shudo
Tokyo
August 1, 2005

318

AFTERWORD

319

NOTES
Works frequently cited have been identified by the following
abbreviations:
BN

EABN

SMBN

Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai [Battle of Nanking Editorial
Committee], Nankin senshi [The Battle of Nanking] (Tokyo: Kaikosha,
1993).
Unemoto Masami, “Shogen ni yoru Nankin senshi” [Eyewitness
accounts of the Battle of Nanking], Parts 1-10 in Kaiko (April
1984-March 1985).
Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai [Battle of Nanking Editorial
Committee], Nankin senshi shiryoshu [Source material relating to theBattle of Nanking] (Tokyo: Kaikosha, 1993).

PREFACE
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

James Bacque, Other Losses: An Investigation into the Mass Deaths of German
Prisoners at the Hands of the French and Americans After World War II(Toronto: Stodart Publishing, 1990), p. 87.
Ibid., p. 87.
Yamamoto Akihiro, “Amerika ni okeru ‘Nankin’ kenkyu no doko: James
Bacque [no] Other Losses wo meguru rongi to hikaku shite” [Comparisonof “Nanking” research trends in the U.S. and the debate over James
Bacque’s Other Losses] in Higashinakano Shudo, ed., Nankin “gyakusatsu”
kenkyu no saizensen 2003 [The front line of research on the “Nanking
Massacre” 2003] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2003), p. 143-174.
George F. Will, “Breaking a Sinister Silence,” Washington Post (19February 1998), p. A17.
Tomisawa Shigenobu, Nankin jiken no kakushin [The core of the Nanking
Incident] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2004).
See Chapter 17, Note 17.
H.J. Timperley, ed., What War Means: Japanese Terror in China (New York:
Modern Age Books, 1938), p. 161.
Higashinakano Shudo, Kobayashi Susumu and Fukunaga Shinjiro,
Nankin Jiken: “Shoko Shashin” wo kensho suru. [Analyzing the “Photographic
Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre] (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2005), p. 128.
Higuchi Kiichiro, Rikugun chujo Higuchi Kiichiro kaisoroku [Memoirs of
Maj.-Gen. Higuchi Kiichiro] (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo, 1999), p. 352; David
Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind (New York:

320

NOTES

Free Press, 1995), p. 112.
10. Maeda Toru, Ruuzuberuto hiroku gekan [Roosevelt’s Secret Records, vol. 2](Tokyo: Fusosha, 2000), p. 118.
11. Higashinakano Shudo, ed., “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2)” [Nanking
Special Agency Report No. 2] in Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen
2004 [The front line of research on the Nanking Massacre 2004] (Tokyo:
Tendensha, 2004), p. 84.

CHAPTER 1: THE ROAD TO THE CAPTURE OF NANKING
1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

See Kasahara Tokushi, “Hakken sareta Nankin gyakusatsu no shogen”[Testimony about Nanking Massacre unearthed] in Sekai (September1997), p. 153.
See “China unter der Kuomintang 1928-1937” in Grosser Atlas zur
Weltgeschichte: Von der Entstehung der Welt bis zur Gegenwart (Köln: Lingen
Verlag, 1988), p. 123.
Hallett Abend, Tortured China (New York: Ives Washburn, 1930), pp. 64,
220.
Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan], ed., Nihon gaiko nenpyo
narabi ni shuyo bunsho [Almanac of Japanese foreign relations and principal
diplomatic documents] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1965), vol. 1, p. 197.
The established interpretation to the effect that they need not announce
maneuvers planned for this area (as long as live ammunition was notused) notwithstanding, Japanese troops had the courtesy to notify
Chinese authorities in advance of their schedule. See Hata Ikuhiko,
Rokokyo jiken no kenkyu [Study of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident] (Tokyo:
Tokyo University Press, 1996), p. 52; and “Jin Zhenzhong kaiso no
kaisetsu to bunseki: Genba butai ga akashita kichona shogen” [Analysis
of Jin Zhenzhong’s recollections: Valuable testimony revealed by abattalion commander on the scene] in Chuo Koron, December 1987, p. 215
by the same author. Note further that Teradaira Tadasuke (a former
Army lieutenant colonel assigned to the Beijing Special Agency as an aidein 1936), who witnessed the Marco Polo Bridge Incident stated, “LinGengyu of the Hebei-Chahar government’s Foreign Relations Committee
requested that we give advance notice to the Chinese whenever Japanese
troops planned to conduct maneuvers using blanks, especially at night.
The Final Protocol Relating to the North China Incident specifies that weare to notify Chinese authorities when we use live ammunition, but there
is no mention of such an obligation when blanks are used.” Teradaira
described his reaction as follows: “We’ve been doing things this way for
30 years and have never had any problems.” See Teradaira Tadasuke,

NOTES

321

Rokokyo jiken: Nihon no higeki [The Marco Polo Bridge Incident: A Japanesetragedy] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1970), p. 49.
6. See dialogue among former Army Sgt. Abe Kyuroku, Pfc. Ishikawa
Kotaro and Pfc. Takakuwa Yaichiro, all of whom witnessed the incident,
in Showa shi no Tenno [The Emperor and Showa era history] (Tokyo:
Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 1971), p. 311f.
7. Using blanks was standard practice during maneuvers, to avoid
casualties to allies. Cf. Hata, “Jin Zhenzhong kaiso no kaisetsu tobunseki,” p. 215. Note further that according to Company Commander
Shimizu Setsuro (8th Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment,
China Garrison), who was fired upon during night maneuvers on theright bank of the Yongding River, “The men in our unit were wearing theclothing they always wore for maneuvers. We had neither helmets nor
provisions, and our front ammunition pouches contained only blanks.
But since we were in an area that harbored real danger, our rearammunition pouches held 30 rounds of live ammunition. Unfortunately,
it was sealed so securely that it was virtually inaccessible.” Cf. Araki
Kazuo, Rokokyo no ippatsu: Jugun kenpei no shuki [A shot fired at Marco
Polo Bridge: Memoirs of a military policeman] (Tokyo: Hayashi Shoten,1968), p. 80f.
8. Jin, Zhenzhong, “Moto Ryokokyo Shubi Daitaicho Jin Zhenzhong kaiso”[Recollections of Jin Zhenzhong, formerly a battalion commander
stationed at the Marco Polo Bridge] Chuo Koron (December 1987), p. 209f.
9. There were no Japanese tanks in the area until reinforcements arrived
toward the end of July. Cf. Hata, “Jin Zhenzhong kaiso no kaisetsu tobunseki,” p. 215.
10. Jin, op. cit., p. 209.
11. Hata, Rokokyo jiken no kenkyu, p. 140.
12. According to Hata, “the soldier who was reported missing (Private
Shimura) returned to his unit within 20 minutes, at about 11:00 p.m. on
July 7. The Beijing Special Agency sent a report to that effect to theChinese authorities at about 2:00 a.m. on July 8. Thereafter, Japanese
troops no longer had a pretext for gaining entry into Wanping (theyoccupied the castle on July 29).” Cf. Hata, “Jin Zhenzhong kaiso no
kaisetsu to bunseki,” p. 215. See also Hata’s citations from “The Memoirsof Wang Lingzhai” in his Nicchu senso shi [History of the Second
Sino-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1961), p. 173. Notefurther that when Wang Lingzhai received the aforementioned report,
Maj. Sakurai Tokutaro (adviser to the 29th Nationalist Army) proceeded
to Wanping, accompanied by Wang, Lin Gengyu (member of the Foreign
Relations Committee) and Teradaira Tadasuke, an aide on the staff of the

322

NOTES

Beijing Special Agency). The party departed from the Beijing Special
Agency at about 4:00 a.m. on July 8, the purpose of their journey being toconvince Jin Zhenzhong, commander of the Chinese troops in Wanping,
to prevent the hostilities from escalating. See Teradaira, op. cit., 104.
13. Officers of the 29th Army insisted that none of the units under them hadever been sent outside the Marco Polo Bridge area. For statements madeby Vice-Commander Qin Dechun and 37th Army Commander Feng
Zhian, see Araki, op. cit., pp. 83, 87. However, at 5:30 a.m., when theJapanese began to retaliate, the 39th Army fled to the Marco Polo Bridgein front of Wanping. Also, a notebook in the pocket of a Chinese soldier
found in a trench under the bridge contained the following information
about his superiors: “Gen. Song Zheyuan, commander, 29th Army; Lt.
Gen. Feng Zhian, commander, 37th Division; Maj. Gen. He Fengji, 110th
Brigade; Col. Ji Xingwen, commander, 219th Infantry Regiment; Maj. Jin
Zhenzhong, commander, 3rd Battalion; Capt. Geng Xixun, commander,
11th Company.” For further details, see Teradaira, op. cit., pp. 134f., 137.
Note further that Jin Zhenzhong stated that the Japanese commenced
firing between 11:00 p.m. on July 7 and 2:00 a.m. on the following
morning. However, the fact is that the Japanese did not begin shelling
until 5:30 a.m. on July 8 (See Jin, op. cit., p. 209f.)
14. Tokyo Saiban Shiryo Kankokai [IMTFE Document Publishing Group],
Tokyo Saiban kyakka miteishutsu bengogawa shiryo [Defense exhibits rejectedby the International Military Tribunal for the Far East or prepared for but
not submitted to] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1995), vol. 7, p. 296.
15. See Hata, Rokokyo jiken no kenkyu, p. 171 and Nakamura Akira, Dai Toa
Senso e no michi [The road to the Greater East Asian War] (Tokyo:
Tendensha, 1990), p. 395.
16. Nakamura, op. cit., p. 402f.
17. Tokyo Saiban Shiryo Kankokai, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 56f.
18. Ibid., p. 57.
19. The following contemporaneous books authored by Americans refer to“the massacre of Japanese men, women and children at Tungchow by
Chinese soldiers” or the “Tungchow massacre:” Frederick Williams,
Behind the News in China (New York: Nelson Hughes Co., 1938), p. 22 andGeorge C. Bruce, Shanghai’s Undeclared War (Shanghai: Mercury Press,
1937), p. 10.
20. Nitta Mitsuo, ed., Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokkiroku [Reports of theInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East] (Tokyo: Yushodo Shoten,1968), vol.5, p. 171.
21. Ibid., p. 172.
22. Ibid., p. 173.

NOTES

323

23. Shiba Sen, Shiki [Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s historical records], trans. Odake Fumio
and Odake Takeo (Tokyo: Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 1995), vol. 2, p. 16.
24. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 282.
25. Ibid., p. 138.
26. Yang Jialuo, ed., Xinxiao zizhitongjian zhu [Revised commentary ofcomprehensive mirror for aid in government] (Taipei: World PublishingCo., 1962).
27. Abend, op. cit., pp. 66f., 72.
28. Sasaki Toichi, Aru gunjin no jiden [Autobiography of a career officer](Tokyo: Futsusha, 1963), p. 174.
29. Agnes Smedley, Idai naru michi [The great road], trans. Abe Tomoji(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1955) vol. 2, p. 213.
30. Tanaka Seigen, Tanaka Seigen Jiden [Autobiography of Tanaka Seigen](Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1993), p. 283.
31. Edgar Snow, Chugoku no akaihoshi [Red Star Over China], trans. Usami
Seijiro (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1964), p. 239.
32. Smedley, op. cit., p. 263.
33. See Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl Wudun, China Wakes: The Struggle for
the Soul of a Rising Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), pp. 73ff. The
authors include descriptions of horrendous crimes: “Bodies were
humiliated and destroyed, so that while the killing was awful, what camenext was even worse. Take the case of three women: Lu Yu, of Siyang
Commune; Huang Shaoping, a teacher at Guangjiang River Elementary
School; Chen Guolian, of Hepu County’s Shikang Township. After they
were beaten to death, sticks were poked into their vaginas and theircorpses were left naked along the roadside.”
34. Tokyo Saiban Shiryo Kankokai, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 6.
35. Claude Farrère, “Shina Kiko” (Travels in China) in Shina (China), Toa
Dobunkai, (September 1938), p. 193. This article also appeared in the May
1938 issue of Revue des deux mondes.
36. Ibid., p. 193.
37. Toa Dobunkai, ed., Shin Shina gensei yoran [The current situation in
China] (Tokyo: Toa Dobunkai, 1938), p. 65.
38. See Edouard Helsey, “Shina Jihen mita mama” [Witness to the Second
Sino-Japanese War] in Kokusai panfuretto tsushin [International news
pamphlet] 1120 (01 August 1938), p. 14f. Helsey was a correspondent for
Gringoire, a French weekly. The article’s original title was “La guerre en
Chine.”
39. See Toa Dobunkai, op. cit., p. 772 and BN, p. 11ff.
40. As of July 12, Chinese forces numbered 50,000 as opposed to only 5,000
Japanese troops (a Special Naval Landing Forces unit). Cf. Boei Kenshujo

324

NOTES

Senshishitsu [Defense Research Institute, Military History Department],
Senshi sosho: Shina jihen rikugun sakusen (1) Showa 13 nen 1 gatsu made[Military history series: Army operations during the Second
Sino-Japanese War, Part 1: 1933-1938] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shinbunsha,
1975), p. 261f.
41. Toa Dobunkai, op. cit., p. 71ff.
42. The China Year Book 1938 (Shanghai: The North-China Daily News &Herald, 1938), p. 352. Similar accounts appear in Farrère, op. cit., p. 194
and Helsey, op. cit., p. 25.
43. Chugaku shakai: Rekishi [Middle school social studies: History] (Tokyo:
Kyoiku Shuppan, 1999), p. 250.
44. See Eto Jun, Wasureta koto to wasuresaserareta koto [What we haveforgotten and what we have been forced to forget] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju,
1979), p. 280. Chinese troops, already superior in number, received
further reinforcements at the rapid rate of one division per day. By early
September, nearly 40,000 Japanese soldiers had landed, but the Chinese
had 190,000 men on the front lines alone, and forces at the rear had
swelled to 270,000. Seventy thousand Japanese troops had landed byearly October, but by then the Chinese forces were 700,000 men strong.
45. Japanese troops required three months to bring the second Shanghai
Incident to an end. According to Boei Kenshujo Senshishitsu, op. cit.,
approximately 20,000 Japanese soldiers died in battle, and some 60,000
were wounded. Three thousand Japanese troops were killed during thefirst Shanghai Incident, but the statistics from the second incident defy
comparison. They represented losses of life not seen since the
Russo-Japanese War.
46. Boei Kenshujo Senshishitsu, op. cit.
47. Erwin Wickert, ed., The Good Man of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 9.
48. SMBN, vol. 2, pp. 185, 210.
49. Ibid., p. 133.
50. SMBN, vol. 1, p. 428f.
51. “Nakashina Homen Gun meirei” [Central China Area Army Order] in
ibid., p. 432.
52. “Nankinjo koryaku yoryo” in ibid., p. 433.
53. “Nankin nyujogo ni okeru shochi” [Course of action to be taken uponentering Nanking] in ibid., p. 432.
54. “Nankinjo no koryaku oyobi nyujo ni kansuru chui jiko” [Precautions to
be taken when attacking and entering Nanking) in ibid., p. 434.
55. Testimony of Maj. Nakayama Yasuto, Central China Area Army staff
officer, in Hora Tomio, ed., Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken

NOTES

325

shiryoshu (1) Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen [Source material
relating to the Nanking Massacre during the Second Sino-Japanese War:
Sources from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East] (Tokyo:
Aoki Shoten, 1985), vol. 1, p. 203.
56. Testimony of Lt. Gen. Nakazawa Mitsuo, 16th Division chief of staff, inibid., p. 245.

CHAPTER 2: NANKING BEFORE THE FALL
1.

For the text of Wang Jingwei’s speech, “The Final Juncture,” delivered on
July 31, 1937, see Matsumoto Shigeharu, Shanhai jidai [Shanghai Sojourn],
vol. 3 (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1975), pp. 170-174, especially p. 172f.
2. See Wakokubon seishi shinjo [Authorized history (reprinted in Japan)](Tokyo: Kyuko Shoin, 1971), p. 1325. The purpose of the scorched-earth
strategy was to leave no food, shelter or potential laborers behind forenemy troops to use. The Jin Shu [History of the Jin Dynasty] contains anexhortation to fortify cities, then to reduce all the land around them toashes so that nothing remains for an invading army to steal or use. This
exhortation is an indication that this strategy was employed at least as far
back as the 4th century. Furthermore, we know that it endured well into
the 20th century, since it was used by Chiang Kai-shek in the Battle of
Nanking. Cf. Higashinakano Shudo, “Nankin koza dai ikkai: Sanko
sakusen to Nankin gyakusatsu —Nankin no rekishi ni miru senpo” [First
Nanking lecture: Sanguang (three-all) strategy and the Nanking Massacre– tactics used throughout Nanking’s history] in Getsuyo Hyoron [Monday
review] (January 2000).
3. “Nenpyo (1798)” [Chronology for 1798] in Tanigawa Michio and Mori
Masao, eds., Chugoku minshu hanranshi [The history of people’s rebellions
in China] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1982), vol. 3, p.337.
4. See “Li Zongren kaioku roku” in SMBN, revised edition, vol. 1, p. 639.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. For “undefended places,” see Kokusai Hogakkai hen [International Law
Society of Japan], Kokusaiho jiten [International law dictionary] (Tokyo:
Kajima Shuppankai, 1982), p. 661.
8. For Bai Chongxi’s views, see “Li Zongren kaioku roku” in SMBN, vol. 1,
p. 639.
9. Ibid. (for statements made by He Yingqin, Xu Yongchang, vonFalkenhausen and Tang Shengzhi).
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 640.

326

NOTES

12. “Nanking Prepares to Resist Attack,” New York Times (01 December 1937).
13. EABN, Part 3 in Kaiko (June 1984), p. 6.
14. New York Times (07 December 1937).
15. See Kasahara Tokushi, “Tillman Durdin shi kara no kikigaki”[Conversations with Tillman Durdin] in Nankin jiken shiryoshu 1: Amerika
kankei shiryo hen [Nanking Incident Source Material: American
References], trans. Nankin Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai hen [Nanking Incident
Research Group] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1992), vol. 1, p. 572.
16. Tillman Durdin, “Chinese Make Stand,” New York Times (08 December1937).
17. Ibid.
18. Tillman Durdin, “300 Chinese Slain on a Peak Ringed by Fires Set byFoe”, New York Times (09 December 1937).
19. Abend, “Japanese in Drive to Take Nanking after Ultimatum,” New YorkTimes (10 December 1937).
20. Durdin, “300 Chinese Slain on Peak,” op. cit.
21. As Durdin’s article dispatched from Nanking on December 9 indicates,
the scorched-earth tactic was a Chinese defense strategy.
22. Toa Dobunkai, op. cit., p. 760.
23. Ibid. Cf. Wickert, op. cit., p. 26.
24. Lily Abegg, “Wie wir aus Nanking flüchteten: Die letzten Tage in derHaupstadt Chinas” in Frankfurter Zeitung (19 December 1937).
25. Ichiki Yoshimichi, ed., Nankin [Nanking] (Nanking Japanese Chamber ofCommerce, 1941), p. 22.
26. The China Year Book 1938, (Shanghai: The North China Daily News &Herald, March 1938), p. 1.
27. Ko Bunyu, Ari no mama no Chugoku [The Real China] (Tokyo: Nihon
Bungeisha, 1996), p. 56.
28. Abegg, op. cit.
29. The 09 December 1937 edition of the Osaka Asahi Shinbun reported that“the valley containing Mausoleum Park is now a sea of furious flames.”
The New York Times carried a story reading, in part: “Rumors of a plan toburn down Nanking, though they are daily officially denied, are causing
terror among many sections of the populace.” Cf. Durdin, “Chinese Make
Stand,” op. cit.
30. Abegg, op. cit.
31. Ibid.
32. EABN, Part 3 in Kaiko (June 1984), p. 7.
33. Abegg, op. cit.
34. Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee: November 1937 toApril 1939, in Miner Bates’ Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 102, Folder

NOTES

327

867, p. 5.
35. Cf. Testimony of Hidaka Shinrokuro, Japanese consul general in
Shanghai, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,“Sanjuman hinanmin no chichi, Jakino sojo wo tou” [A visit with Father
Jacquinot, protector of 300,000 refugees] in Hora, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 185,
271 for a description of the Jacquinot Zone in Shanghai; Tsu Y.Y., “The
Christian Church in War-time Service,” China Quarterly (Winter 1938-39),
p. 79.
36. For information about members of the Committee for the Nanking Safety
Zone, see Tillman Durdin, “Japanese Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking
after Chinese Command Fled,” New York Times (09 January 1938); Wickert,
op. cit., p. 43.
37. Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 3.
38. Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 125f.
39. The China Year Book 1939 (Shanghai: The North-China Daily News &Herald, 1939), p. 562. The Safety Zone was approximately the size of New
York’s Central Park.
40. Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 130.
41. “Nanking was transformed into a huge fortress.” Yomiuri Shinbun (02December 1937, evening edition) in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 642.
42. Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” New York Times (18 December 1937).
43. Durdin, “Chinese Make Stand.” Note further that Durdin’s coverage of
the Nanking Safety Zone included the following: “The movement of
noncombatants elsewhere [in the city] will be banned, except for persons
holding special permits to be indicated by a symbol on yellow armbands.”
44. Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun (08 December 1937) in BN, p. 273.
45. John Rabe’s letter to Dr. Rosen dated January 30, 1938 in Hsü Shuhsi,
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1939), p.
114.
46. Harold J. Timperley, ed., What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China(Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), reprint of 1938
edition, p. 143.
47. Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (08 December 1937) in Meiji Taisho Showa Shinbun
Kenkyukai [Meiji, Taisho, Showa Period Newspaper Research Group],
Shinbun shusei Showa hennenshi: Showa 12 nendoban IV [Annual chronology
from newspapers in the Showa era: 1937 Edition] (Tokyo: Shinbun Shiryo
Shuppan, 1990), vol. 4, 619. This information was disseminated by theDomei News Agency on the basis of an Associated Press wire sent fromNew York on December 7.
48. Encrypted telegram (No. 1007) sent by Gray and dated 11:00 a.m.,

328

NOTES

December 12, in Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 94.
49. Archibald T. Steele, “Chiang Quits Nanking as Foes Advance,” Chicago
Daily News (08 December 1937), in Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 459.
50. Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (06 December 1937), in Meiji Taisho Showa Shinbun
Kenkyukai, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 590.
51. For details about Commander-in-Chief Matsui’s gift of ￥10,000 to theInternational Committee in Nantao, Shanghai, see the testimony of
Shanghai Consul General Hidaka Shinrokuro at the Tokyo Trials, in Hora,
op. cit., vol. 4, p. 185. For French authorities’ plans for and attitude toward
the Jacquinot Zone, see ibid., p. 185f.
52. Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (06 December 1937), in Meiji Taisho Showa Shinbun
Kenkyukai, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 590.
53. “Nankin anzen chitai fushonin seimei” [Announcement of refusal torecognize Nanking Safety Zone], Gaiko Jiho [Foreign Affairs Review], No.
794 (01 January 1938), p. 340.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. “Foreigners Urged to Evacuate; Notification Sent to Shanghai Consular
Association,” Osaka Asahi Shinbun (09 December 1937) in Meiji Taisho
Showa Shinbun Kenkyukai, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 638.
57. “Fleeing Chinese Soldiers Refused Entry; Hostilities Continue on
Outskirts of Nanking,” Tokyo Asahi Shinbun (10 December 1937), in Meiji
Taisho Showa Shinbun Kenkyukai, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 645.
58. Durdin, “300 Chinese Slain on a Peak Ringed by Fires Set by Foe,” NewYork Times (09 December 1937).
59. EABN, Part 4 in Kaiko (July 1984), p. 8.

CHAPTER 3: ASSAULT ON THE GATES OF NANKING
1.
2.

3.

Hora, op. cit., p. 176.
For the China Area Army’s organization chart and staff list, see SMBN,
vol. 1, pp. 685-725, especially p. 696. During the Russo-Japanese War,which took place right before Japan signed the Hague Convention of 1907
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, four legal scholars
accompanied Japanese troops to Russia. Thus began a tradition, which
continued with the assignment of Saito Yoshie, doctor of law, to China.
See Shinoda Harusaku, “Hokushi jihen to rikusen hoki” Gaiko Jiho
[Foreign Affairs Review], No. 788 (01 October 1937), p. 50f.
“Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land”,
in Yamamoto Soji, Kokusai Joyakushu 1995 [Anthology of International
Treaties: 1995] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1995), pp. 510-513, especially p. 512.

NOTES

4.
5.
6.

329

Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” New York Times (18 December 1937).
Shimada Katsumi: “Do not destroy the Zhongshan Mausoleum.”
Georg Rosen, “Nankings Übergang, 20. Januar 1938”, in Deutsche
Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 203.
7. Steele reports that the International Committee proposed a two-day
cease-fire. See “Death Rains on Nanking in Furious Bombardment,”
Chicago Daily News (10 December 1937).
8. Entry for December 10, 1937, in “Yamazaki Masao nikki” [Journal of
Yamazaki Masao] (major) in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 289.
9. “Nankinjo koryaku yoryo”, in ibid., p. 433.
10. In China, the practice of annihilating enemy troops who refuse tosurrender is called 屠城(tucheng: literally, “butcher the city”). The entry
in the 13-volume Dai kanwa jiten (大漢和辞典) edited by Morohashi
Tetsuji draws on the chapter of Xunzi that relates to military affairs forthe example it gives: “Do not obliterate cities.” (In this case, “obliterate”
means destroying the walls of a city and slaughtering its residents.)
Xunzi, who flourished during the 3rd century BC, cautions virtuous men
to refrain from obliterating cities and their inhabitants. The word“annihilate” ( 屠 る ), as the aforementioned note tells us, describes
attackers’ acts of destroying a resisting enemy’s city walls, and thenslaughtering the inhabitants of that city, just as they would animals.
There is a clear distinction between tucheng and 抜城 (bacheng), whichmeans simply to storm or capture a city. Chinese military leaders
adopted the 堅 壁 清野 (jianbi qingye) or “fortify and burn” strategy,
which, according to the same dictionary, describes a military tactic
whereby city walls are strengthened and fields burned, leaving no spoils
for the vanquishing enemy. When this strategy was employed,conquering armies found no food, shelter or laborers. We know that
jianbi qingye dates back to the 4th century AD, since 晋書 [Jinshu, orHistory of the Jin Dynasty] contains a reference to it: “All the city walls
were fortified, and all the fields burned, so that nothing remained.” It is
common knowledge that the strategy persisted until the 20th century,
when it was adopted by Chiang Kai-shek for the Battle of Nanking. See
Morohashi Tetsuji, ed., Dai kanwa jiten [Comprehensive Chinese-Japanesedictionary] (Tokyo: Taishukan, 1955-60), vol. 6, p. 162.
11. Hohei dai 36 rentai [36th Infantry Regiment], “Chushi homen ni okeru
kodo gaiyo: 1937 nen 9 gatsu kokonoka - 1939 nen 7 gatsu 11 nichi”[Operations in central China between September 9, 1937 and July 11,
1939] (mimeographed on October 1, 1939), p. 26; BN, p. 175. For a
description of the situation at Guanghua Gate, see Sasaki Motokatsu,
Yasen Yubinki [Field post office flag] (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryo Center

330

NOTES

Shuppankai, 1973), p. 223.
12. Cheng Kuilang, “Nankinjo fukukaku jinchi kochiku to shujo sento” [Thecomplex architecture of Nanking’s walls and the defensive battle] in
SMBN, vol. 2, pp. 485-494, especially p. 492.
13. Testimony of Ouchi Yoshihide (Defense Exhibit No. 2686) in Hora, op. cit.,p. 237f.
14. For details concerning hostilities at Guanghua Gate, see BN, p. 175ff.
15. For more information concerning soldiers’ hiding places, see Nanjing:
Tourist Map, (Jiangsu: Jiangsu People’s Publishing, 1992), which explainsthat “Zhonghua Gate, built in the 14th century, it consists of 3 citadels, 4archways and 27 caves big enough for hiding 3000 soldiers.”
16. For details about the hostilities at Zhonghua Gate, see BN, p. 218f.
17. “Yamazaki Masao nikki” entry dated December 14, 1937 in SMBN, vol. 1,
p. 295.
18. Testimony of Osugi Hiroshi (Defense Exhibit No. 2238) in Hora, op. cit., p.
235.
19. Cheng Kuilang, op. cit. in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 494; “Li Zongren kaioku roku”
in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 640.
20. Wickert, op. cit. p. 63.
21. In a journal entry dated December 17, Maj.-Gen. Iinuma Mamoru writes
that he observed approximately 20 units of enemy soldiers, comprising,
10,000 men, in the neighborhood of Nanking. Cf. SMNB, vol. 1, p. 159.
Tillman Durdin wrote the following on this subject:
It is difficult to say just what the strength of the Chinese Army in andaround Nanking was. Some observers estimated that there were as manyas sixteen divisions participating in the battle for the city. This could betrue. Chinese divisions even in normal times have an average of only
5,000 men. The battered divisions that defended Nanking were, possibly,
at least in some cases, composed of only 2,000 or 3,000 men each. It is
fairly safe to say that some 50,000 troops took part - and were trapped - inthe defense of Nanking.
It is very likely that the source of Durdin’s figures was a prior briefing.
He continues:
The Japanese themselves announced that during the first three days ofcleaning up Nanking 15,000 Chinese soldiers were rounded up. At thetime, it was contended that 25,000 more were still hiding out in the city.
Durdin adds that “about 20,000 were executed.” Cf. Durdin, “JapaneseNOTES

331

Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese Command Fled,” op. cit.
22. Tang Shengzhi, “Nankin boei no keika” [The Defense of Nanking] in
SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 621-626, especially p. 624.
23. “Nanjing baoweizhan zhandou xiangbao (1937 nian 12 yue) Nanjing
weishujun zhandou xiangbao” [Battle report: Battle waged in defense of
Nanking: Nanking Garrison, December 1937] in ibid., pp. 608-614,
especially pp. 609, 614.
24. Kasahara, “Tillman Durdin shi kara no kikigaki” in op. cit., p. 572.
25. “Makihara Nobuo nikki” [Journal of Makihara Nobuo] in SMBN, vol. 1, p.
406. Makihara was a private first class in the 23rd Infantry Regiment.
26. Kasahara, “Tillman Durdin shi kara no kikigaki” in op. cit., p. 569.
27. Kasahara, “Archibald Steele shi kara no kikigaki” [Conversations with
Archibald Steele] (September 4, 1987), in Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p.
584.
28. Abend, op. cit., pp. 170, 176. He describes groups of regular Chinese
soldiers as “bandit armies” and the Chinese Army as a whole as a“predatory organization.”
29. “Nanjing baoweizhan zhandou xiangbao” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 614.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. BN, pp. 348, 358.
33. Cheng Kuilang, op. cit. in SNBM, vol. 2, p. 494.
34. “Nanjing baoweizhan zhandou xiangbao” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 613.
35. “Li Zongren kaioku roku” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 640.
36. Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” op. cit.
37. Steele, “Nanking Massacre Story,” Chicago Daily News (15 December1937).
38. Kasahara, “Tillman Durdin shi kara no kikigaki” in op. cit., p. 571.
39. Kasahara, “Archibald Steele shi kara no kikigaki” in op. cit., p. 577.
40. B.K., “Events and Comments: The War in China” in The China Journal,
XXVIII (January 1938).
41. “Outstanding Events in the Sino-Japanese War: A Day-to-Day Summary”
in The China Weekly Review (29 January 1938).
42. “Enemy stragglers converging at Anqing,” Osaka Asahi Shinbun (26December 1937).

CHAPTER 4: THE MEANING OF “DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS”
1.

Rikugun hohei gakko [Army Infantry School], “Tai Shina gun sentoho no
kenkyu” [A study of combat methods used against Chinese troops], 1933
in Fujiwara Akira, Shinpan Nankin daigyakusatsu [The Nanking Massacre:

332

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.
7.
8.
9.

NOTES

New edition] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1992), p. 26.
Hora Tomio, Nankin daigyakusatsu no shomei [Proof of the Nanking
Massacre] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1987), p. 316.
Fujiwara, op. cit., p. 26.
“Article 8 of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land” in Yamamoto, op. cit.,p. 511.
For “Kosen hoki kanrei ni kansuru kisoku” [Application of customaryrules of warfare], a notice issued by the vice-minister of war on August 5,1937 (Top Secret China Army Notice No. 198), see Defense ResearchInstitute, Army Operations During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Part 2, p.
465; SMBN, vol. 1, p. 457.
Ibid., p. 465f.
Ibid., p. 466.
“Article 23 of Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land” in Yamamoto, op. cit., p. 512.
“Dai 13 shidan sento shoho besshi oyobi fuzu” [13th Division battle
instructions] in Hata, Nankin Jiken [The Nanking Incident] (Tokyo: Chuo
Koronsha, 1992), p. 68f.

CHAPTER 5:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

POINTS IN DISPUTE (1)Kojima Noboru, Nicchu senso [The Sino-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Bunshun
Bunko, 1993 (first printing, 1984)), vol. 4, p. 225.
Hohei Dai 66 Rentai Dai 1 Daitai [1st Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment],
Sento shoho [Battle report] in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 560- 572, especially p. 567.
Sento shoho: Showa 12 nen 12 gatsu toka kara 12 gatsu 13 nichi made [Battle
report: December 10-13, 1937] of the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry Regimentcontains five types of battalion orders, including one issued at 2:30 p.m.
on December 12. It also contains five types of 66th Infantry Regimentorders, one of which was issued at 12:20 a.m. on December 13. The
recipient is designated on the first of the five battalion orders, but theothers are marked simply “transmitted verbally and later in writing.”“114 shimei ko 62 go dai 114 shidan meirei” [114th Division Order No.
A62] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 450.
“Ho dai 128 ryo mei dai 66 go: uyokutai meirei” [128th Infantry Brigade
Order No. 66 (right flank order)] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 451.
“114 shimei ko dai 59 go dai 114 shidan meirei” [114th Division Order No.
A59] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 449.
“Dai 13 shidan sento shoho besshi oyobi fuzu” in Hata, op. cit.
Oyake Isaburo was deputy commander of the 1st Platoon, 4th Company.

NOTES333

See Ara Kenichi, “Jorui: Heishitachi no Nanking jiken 19” [Fortress:
Soldiers’ recollections of the Nanking Incident 19] in Maru (July 1990), p.
213.
9. According to a battalion order issued at 2:30 p.m. on December 12, atZhonghua Gate, “some enemy officers refused to surrender, opting tofight to the death; others shot their subordinates in the back when theyattempted to surrender.” See SMBN, vol. 1, p. 561. The Chinese
supervisory unit was notorious for its habit of shooting soldiers who
attempted to escape or surrender.
10. Battalion order issued at 2:30 p.m. on December 12, ibid. The order was
issued (and signed by) Captain Shibuya, deputy commander, 1stBattalion.
11. Battalion order issued at 2:30 p.m. on December 12; 66th Infantry
Regiment order issued at 12:20 a.m. on December 13 in ibid., p. 562ff.
12. “Oyake Isaburo daiichi shotaicho dairi no shogen” [Testimony of Oyake
Isaburo, deputy commander, 1st Platoon] in Ara, op. cit., p. 212.
13. Ibid., p. 213.
14. Battalion order issued at 2:30 p.m. on December 12 in ibid., p. 561.
15. Battalion order issued at 7:50 p.m. on December 12 in ibid., p. 562.
16. Nishizawa Benkichi, Warera no tairiku senki: Hohei dai 66 rentai dai 3 chutai
no ayumi [Our battles in China: History of 3rd Company, 66th Regiment],
self-published, 1972, p. 92.
17. Ibid., p. 97.
18. Oyake, in Ara, op. cit., p. 213.
19. Ibid.
20. Ara Kenichi, who has pointed out how difficult it is to accurately depict
the events that transpire during hostilities, believes that the battle report
prepared by the 1st Battalion is more fiction than fact. Cf. Ara, “Jorui:
Heishitachi no Nanking jiken” in op. cit, p. 209.
21. Oyake, in Ara, op. cit., p. 213
22. Ibid., p. 97.
23. Testimony of Shimada Katsumi (commander, 2nd Machine-gun
Company, 33rd Infantry Regiment) in BN, p. 163.
24. Oyake in Ara, op. cit., p. 213.

CHAPTER 6: POINTS IN DISPUTE (2): “TAKE NO PRISONERS”
1.
2.
3.

See “Nakajima Kesago nikki” [Journal of Nakajima Kesago] (16thDivision commander), in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 197-251, especially p. 220.
Fujiwara, op. cit., p. 30f.
Hata, The Nanking Incident, pp. 69, 117.

334

NOTES

4.

Testimony of Onishi Hajime, Shanghai Expeditionary Force staff officer(later head of the Nanking Special Agency) in Ara Kenichi, Kikigaki:
Nankin jiken [Interviews with witnesses to the Nanking incident] (Tokyo:
Tosho Shuppansha, 1987), pp. 6-23, especially p. 10.
5. See Chapter 4, Note 1.
6. “Dai 13 shidan sento shoho besshi oyobi fuzu” in Hata, op. cit., p. 69.
7. “Nakajima Kesago nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 220.
8. “Article 8 of the Regulations Annexed to the Hague Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land” in Yamamoto, op. cit.,p. 511.
9. “Iinuma Mamoru nikki” [Journal of Iinuma Mamoru] in SMBN, vol. 1, p.
156f.
10. The several thousand Chinese soldiers who surrendered near XianheGate, “waving white flags,” bore strips of cloth on their chests on which“Our unit will fight to the death to defend the capital” had been written.
The unit comprised regular soldiers and civilian volunteers, all of whomwere wearing uniforms. For details, see the testimony of 2nd Lt. Sawada
Masahisa in BN, pp. 254-257, especially p. 255f. For details of the conflictat Xianhe Gate, see Chapter 8, p. 155 of this book.
11. “Sento shoho” [Battle report], No. 12, 38th Infantry Regiment (December
14, 1937) in BN, pp. 483-488, especially p. 488. A chart is attached to theend of this battle report, on which is written: “The 200-man 10th
Company received orders to guard the area around Yaohua Gate. There,
at about 8:30 a.m. on [December] 14, several thousand enemy soldiers
were observed approaching, waving white flags. At 1:00 p.m. said
soldiers were disarmed and transported to Nanking.” Sasaki Motokatsu,
who ran the field post office established after the fall of Nanking
describes an encounter with “large groups of disarmed Chinese soldiers”
in front of Zhongshan Gate on December 17. (See Sasaki Motokatsu, op.
cit., p. 220. Furthermore, Staff Officer Sakakibara Kazue attests to having“escorted four to five thousand prisoners to the Central Prison (No. 1
Penitentiary) in Nanking on December 16 and 17, where they wereconfined.” See BN, p. 324.

CHAPTER 7:
POINTS IN DISPUTE (3): WE ARE TOLD TO KILL ALL
PRISONERS; ALL UNITS DESPERATELY SHORT OF FOOD
1.

“Yamada Senji Nikki” [Journal of Yamada Senji ] (Hohei Dai 103
Ryodancho, Rikugun shosho) [Major general and commander of 103rd
Infantry Brigade] in SMBN, vol. 2, pp. 283-338, especially p. 330 (journal

NOTES

335

entry dated December 11).
Ibid. (journal entry dated December 12).
Yamada had been ordered to capture the forts at Wulongshan andMufushan, and to facilitate the advance of the Sasaki Detachment. Whenhe received his orders, the 65th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 19th
Mountain Artillery Regiment departed, at 5:00 p.m. Theirs was a nightmarch, as it was already dark.
4. Maj.-Gen. Yamada had planned to spend the night at Xiaqijie, “but allhouses there had been burned to the ground — there were no usablebuildings.” See SMBN, vol. 2, p. 331.
5. “Yamada Senji nikki” [Journal of Yamada Senji] in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 331.
6. Ibid.
7. “Morozumi Gyosaku shuki (Hohei dai 65 Rentaicho: Hohei taisa)”[Journal of Col. Morozumi Gyosaku: Commander, 65th Infantry
Regiment] in SMBN, vol. 2, pp. 339-341, especially p. 339.
8. “Yamada Senji nikki,” SMBN, vol. 2, p. 331.
9. “Saito Jiro jinchu nikki” [War journal of Saito Jiro] (pseudonym, private
first class) in Ono Kenji, Fujiwara Akira, Honda Katsuichi, eds., Nankin
daigyakusatsu wo kiroku shita kogun heishitachi: Dai 13 shidan Yamada shitai
heishi no jinchu nikki [Imperial Army soldiers’ accounts of the Nanking
Massacre: War journals kept by soldiers in the Yamada Detachment, 13th
Division] (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1996), pp. 3-55, especially p. 37; “Endo
Shigetaro jinchu nikki” [War journal of Endo Shigetaro] (pseudonym,
private first class) in ibid., pp. 87-95, especially p. 89.
10. “Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 339; Ono et al., op. cit., pp.
255, 325, 351, 373.
11. “Miyamoto Shogo jinchu nikki” [War journal of Miyamoto Shogo](pseudonym, 2nd lieutenant) in ibid., pp. 123-140, especially p. 133;
“Amano Saburo gunji yubin” [Military mail posted by Amano Saburo](pseudonym, 2nd lieutenant) in ibid., pp. 245-258, especially p. 251.
12. Testimony of Hirabayashi Sadaharu in Suzuki Akira, Nankin
daigyakusatsu no maboroshi [The Nanking Massacre illusion] (Tokyo:
Bungei Shunju, 1982), p. 198.
13. The journal entry in “Yamada Senji nikki” cited by Suzuki Akira reads:“On December 15 I dispatched 2nd Lt. Honma to the Division regarding
the disposition of the prisoners. We are told to kill them. All units aredesperately short of food.” Cf. ibid., p. 193.
14. “Yamada Senji nikki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 331.
15. “Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in ibid., p. 339.
16. See conclusion stated at end of Chapter 4.
17. “Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 339.
2.
3.

336

NOTES

18. Ibid.
19. “Odera Takashi jinchu nikki” [War journal of Odera Takashi](pseudonym, private first class) in Ono et al., op. cit., pp. 183-209,
especially p. 196.
20. “Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 339.
21. “Endo Takaaki jinchu nikki” [War journal of Endo Takaaki] (pseudonym,
2nd lieutenant) in Ono et al., op. cit., pp. 211-229, especially p. 219.
22. “Miyamoto Shogo jinchu nikki” in ibid., p. 134.
23. “Nakano Masao jinchu nikki” [War journal of Nakano Masao](pseudonym, private first class) in ibid., pp. 113-121, especially p. 116.
24. “Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 340.
25. Ibid., p. 339.
26. Ibid., p. 340.
27. Testimony of Navy Lt. Hashimoto Mochitsura in BN, p. 264.
28. “Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 340.
29. Ibid.
30. Testimony of Hirabayashi Sadaharu in Suzuki, op. cit., p. 196f.
31. “Araumi Kiyoe nikki” [Journal of Araumi Kiyoe] (pseudonym, private
first class) in SMBN, vol. 2, pp. 342-346, especially p. 345.
32. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 196f.
33. “Morozumi Gyosaku shuki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 340.
34. Ibid.
35. “Meguro Fukuji jinchu nikki” [War journal of Meguro Fukuji](pseudonym, corporal) in Ono et al., op. cit., pp. 359-374, especially p. 373.
36. Ibid.
37. “Endo Takaaki jinchu nikki” in ibid., p. 219.
38. Ibid., p. 219f.
39. Ibid., p. 220.
40. “Miyamoto Shogo jinchu nikki” in ibid., p. 134.
41. Ibid.
42. Testimony of Hirabayashi Sadaharu in Suzuki, op. cit., p. 198.
43. “Miyamoto Shogo jinchu nikki” in Ono et al., op. cit., p. 133f.
44. Ibid.

CHAPTER 8: FIERCE BATTLES OUTSIDE THE WALLS OF
NANKING AFTER THE FALL OF THE CITY
1.
2.

“Nakajima Kesago nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 220 (cited in Chapter 6, p.
115?).
“Sasaki Toichi shosho shiki (Hohei dai 30 ryodancho/rikugun shosho)”[Diary of Maj. Gen. Sasaki Toichi (Army major general and commander

NOTES337

of 30th Infantry Brigade)] in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 263-276, especially p. 270.
Ibid. Maj. Gen. Sasaki continues with a comment about Chinese troops:“The enemy at hand was Chiang Kai-shek’s pet division — rightly so,since they fought most bravely till the bitter end.”
4. “Hohei dai 38 rentai ‘Sento shoho’ dai 11 go: 12.12.12. yori 12.12.13
made” [Battle report No. 11 prepared by 38th Infantry Regiment andcovering December 12-13, 1937] in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 475-483, especially p.
479.
5. “Sasaki Toichi shosho shiki” in ibid., p. 271.
6. Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” op. cit.
7. “Sasaki Toichi shosho shiki” in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 271.
8. Ki 3 shi hensan iinkai [Committee for the compilation of the history of the
3rd Cavalry Regiment], Kihei dai 3 rentai shi [History of the 3rd Cavalry
Regiment] (Tokyo: Kisankai, 1978), p. 157; BN, p. 251.
9. Ibid., p. 155.
10. Ibid.
11. Ki 3 shi hensan iinkai, op. cit., p. 158.
12. Ibid., p. 158.
13. Ibid., p. 158; testimony of Kato Masayoshi, clerk at 3rd Cavalry RegimentHeadquarters in BN, p. 251.
14. “Iinuma Mamoru nikki” [Journal of Iinuma Mamoru] in SMBN, vol. 1, p.
155.
15. Ibid., p. 156.
16. Testimony of Capt. Kodama Yoshio in BN, pp. 341, 344.
17. “Sento shoho” [Battle report], No. 11, 38th Infantry Regiment in SMBN,
vol. 1, p.476.
18. Hata, Nankin jiken, p. 118.
19. “Sasaki Toichi shosho shiki” in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 272.
20. Testimony of Nishiura Setsuzo in BN, p. 164
21. “Iinuma Mamoru nikki,” p. 155.
22. “Hohei dai 30 ryodan meirei (12.12.14)” [30th Infantry Brigade order(12/14/1937)] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 439.
23. Durdin, “Japanese Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese
Command Fled,” op. cit.
24. Excerpt from entry dated December 14, 1937 in war journal of Sgt.
Shimizu Kazue, 38th Regiment, 16th Division in Hata, Nankin jiken, p.
120f.
25. Testimony of 2nd Lt. Muguruma Masajiro in EABN, Part 8 (November
1984), p. 7.
26. Muguruma Masajiro, Sekishunfu: Waga seishun no omoide [Memories of myyouth], self-published, 1990, p. 391f.
3.

338

NOTES

27. “Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets” in Yamamoto, op. cit.,p. 523.
28. EABN, Part 5 in Kaiko (August 1984), p. 8.
29. “Hohei dai 68 rentai dai 3 daitai ‘Sento shoho’ dai 8 go: 12.11.27. yori
12.12.13 made” [Battle report No. 8 prepared by 3rd Company, 68th
Infantry Regiment and covering November 27 - December 13, 1937] in
SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 534-541, especially p. 538.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. “Yamazaki Masao nikki” (entry dated December 15, 1937), p. 296.
34. “Iinuma Mamoru nikki” (entry dated December 15, 1937), p. 158.

CHAPTER 9: THE SWEEP AFTER THE FALL OF NANKING
1.
2.
3.

Ichiki, op. cit., p.5.
See Chapter 2, p. {54}; Cf. Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 562.
Testimony of Capt. Sekiguchi Kozo and Capt. Hashimoto Mochiyuki in
EABN, Part 10 (January 1985), p. 30.
4. Durdin, “Japanese Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese
Command Fled,” op. cit.
5. Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” op. cit.
6. James Espy, “Nankin ni okeru jokyo” [The Situation in Nanking] in Hora,
Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 151.
7. Testimony of Sumiya Iwane in EABN, Part 10 (December 1985), p. 31
8. Capt. Yasuyama Kodo (Army Medical Corps physician), Shanghai War
Journal cited in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 417-426, especially p. 426.
9. Kasahara, “Archibald Steele shi kara no kikigaki” in op. cit., p. 582.
10. According to testimony of Muraoka Minoru and Enoki Katsuharu, “We
did shoot at Chinese stragglers to lure them out, but we never used tankguns.” Cf. BN, p. 194.
11. Statement made by William Webb (IMTFE presiding justice) at the Tokyo
Trials on April 25, 1947 in Nitta, op. cit., vol. 5, p. 174.
12. Nanking Incident in Awaya Kentaro, Yoshida Yutaka, eds., Kokusai
kensatsukyoku: Jinmon chosa [International Prosecutor’s Office:Interrogations] (Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Center, 1993), vol. 50, pp. 31-94. See
also interrogation of Lt. Gen. Nakazawa Mitsuo on April 30, 1946 in ibid.,
pp. 45, 52.
13. “Nankinjo koryaku yoryo” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 433.
14. Testimony of 2nd Lt. Muguruma Masajiro in EABN, Part 8 (November
1984), p. 7.

NOTES

339

15. Testimony of Takeuchi Goro, medical corpsman, in ibid.
16. “Hohei dai 38 rentai ‘Sento shoho’ dai 10 go” [Battle report No. 10
prepared by 38th Infantry Regiment] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 485.
17. Response of 3rd Division Commander Fujita Susumu in Awaya et al., op.
cit., pp. 60f., 64.
18. Testimony of Master Sgt. Fujita Kiyoshi in EABN, Part 6 (September 1984),
p. 6.
19. Interview with 2nd Lt. Inukai Soichiro on February 3, 1998.
20. “Nankinjo koryaku yoryo” in SMBN, vol. 1, p.433.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. “Yamazaki Masao nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 296.
24. “Kisaki Hisashi nikki” [Journal of Kisaki Hisashi] (major andadministrative staff officer, 16th Infantry Division) in SMBN, vol. 1, pp.
307-329, especially p. 320.
25. Testimony of 1st Lieutenant Tsuchiya Shoji in BN, p. 179.
26. “Orikono Suetaro nikki” [Journal of Orikono Suetaro] (captain andcommander of 3rd Company, 23rd Infantry Regiment) in SMBN, vol. 1,
pp. 337-340, especially p. 337.
27. “Hohei dai 38 rentai ‘Sento shoho’ dai 12 go” [Battle report No. 12
prepared by 38th Infantry Regiment] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 484-488,
especially p. 484.
28. Hsü, op. cit., p. 15.
29. “Rokuryo sakumei: Ko dai 138 go uyokutai meirei: 12 gatsu 13 nichi gogo
4 ji han” [6th Brigade Operation Order A No. 138 (right-flank brigade
order) issued at 4:30 p.m. on December 13] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 444.
30. “Nankinjo koryaku yoryo” in ibid., p. 444.
31. “Nankinjo no koryaku oyobi nyujo ni kansuru chui jiko” in ibid., p. 434.
32. “Soto jisshi ni kansuru chui” [Precautions to be taken when
implementing the sweep] in ibid., p. 444f.
33. “Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 106 go: hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 13 nichigogo 9 ji 30 pun” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order No. 106 issued
at 9:30 p.m. on December 13] in ibid., p. 514.
34. “Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 107 go: hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 14 nichigogo 1 ji 40 pun” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order No. 107 issued
at 1:40 p.m. on December 14] in ibid., p. 515.
35. “Dai 9 shidan sototai meirei” [9th Division Sweep Unit Order] in ibid., p.
445.
36. “Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 109 go: hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 14 nichigogo 10 ji” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order A No. 109 issued at
10:00 p.m. on December 14] in ibid., p. 515.

340

NOTES

37. “Isa Kazuo nikki” [Journal of Isa Kazuo] (colonel and commander, 7thInfantry Regiment) in ibid., pp. 331-336, especially p. 334.
38. The battle report indicates that the 7th Regiment was near No. 1 Park,
which was located southwest of the Gugong airfield. Cf. “Ho 7 sakumei
ko dai 105 go: hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 13 nichi gogo 5 ji 30
pun” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order A No. 105 issued at 5:30
p.m. on December 13] in ibid., p. 514; “Hohei 7 sakumei ko dai 106 go” in
ibid., p. 514.
39. “12 gatsu 13 nichi yori 12 gatsu 24 nichi made: Nankin jonai soto seika
hyo: hohei dai 7 rentai” [7th Infantry Regiment: Chart showing results of
Nanking sweep conducted from December 13 to December 24] in ibid., p.
524.
40. Durdin presented as facts events that never took place, e.g., “In one
slaughter a tank gun was turned on a group of more than 100 soldiers at abomb shelter near the Ministry of Communications. See Durdin, “AllCaptives Slain,” op. cit.
41. “Mizutani So nikki ‘Senjin’ (Hohei dai 7 rentai dai 2 chutai, itto hei)”[Journal of Mizutani So (The Winds of War) (private first class, 2ndCompany, 7th Infantry Regiment)] in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 393-399,
especially 396.
42. “Inoie Matakazu nikki (Hohei dai 7 rentai dai ni chutai, itto hei)” [Journalof Inoie Matakazu (private first class, 7th Infantry Regiment) in ibid., pp.
363-375, especially p. 370.
43. “Isa Kazuo nikki” in ibid., p. 334.
44. “Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 111 go: Hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 15 nichigogo 8 ji 30 pun” [7th Infantry Regiment Operation Order No. 111 issued
at 8:30 p.m. on December 15] in ibid., p. 516.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. According to a 7th Regiment battle report, “I remained in my current
location until my departure on the 26th.” Cf. “Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 117
go: Hohei dai 7 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 24 nichi gogo 6 ji” [7th Infantry
Regiment Operation Order No. 117 issued at 6:00 p.m. on December 24]
in ibid., p. 517.
48. Ibid.

CHAPTER 10:
REQUIREMENTS FOR PRISONER-OF-WAR STATUS
1.
2.

Hsü, op. cit., p. 1.
Ibid., p. 14f.

NOTES

3.
4.

341

Ibid., p. 5.
See Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, pp. 40,
109. At the Tokyo Trials, Magee testified as follows: “We consider themas civilians.” However, that would certainly have been in violation of theHague Convention of 1907. For more information on this point, see
Higashinakano Shudo, “Nankin no Shina hei shokei wa iho ka: Yoshida
Yutaka kyoju no hihan ni kotaeru” [Were executions of Chinese soldiersin Nanking unlawful? A response to criticism levied by Prof. Yoshida
Yutaka] in Getsuyo Hyoron (March 2000).
5. Adachi Sumio, Gendai Senso Hokiron [Theory of modern regulations
governing war] (Tokyo: Keiseisha, 1979), p. 52f.
6. Yamamoto, op. cit., p. 511.
7. Okumiya Masatake, Watashi no mita Nankin jiken [Witness to the Nanking
incident] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 1997), p. 60.
8. Durdin, “Japanese Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese
Command Fled,” op. cit.
9. Tsutsui Jakusui, Gendai shiryo: Kokusai ho [Modern references:
International law] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1987), p. 184f.
10. Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartment [Federal Justice and Police
Department], ed., Zivilverteidigung [Civil defense] (Aarau: Miles-Verlag,1969), p. 218.
11. Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 179f.
12. Ibid., p. 180.
13. Wickert, op. cit., p. 56.
14. “Orikono Suetaro nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 337-340, especially p. 337.
15. Hsü, op. cit., p. 15.
16. B. K., op. cit., p. 4.
17. Timperley, op. cit., p. 26f.
18. Hsü, op. cit., p. 12.
19. Erwin Wickert, ed., John Rabe, Der Gute Deutsche von Nanking (Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1997), p. 107; Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p.
66.
20. Wickert, John Rabe, p. 107; Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 66.
21. Headquarters of the 7th Infantry Regiment were located at No. 1 Park,
southwest of the airfield in the wall of Nanking, i.e., in the Dongchangstreet of Nanking. See “Ho 7 sakumei ko dai 105 go” and “Ho 7 sakumei
ko dai 106 go” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 513f.
22. “Iinuma Mamoru nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 157.
23. Wickert, John Rabe, p. 108; Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 67.
24. “Hohei dai 66 rentai meirei: 12 gatsu 13 nichi gogo 9 ji rei fun” [66thInfantry Regiment order issued at 9:00 p.m. on December 13] in SMBN,

342

NOTES

vol. 1, p. 568.
25. James Espy, “Nankin ni okeru jokyo” [The Situation in Nanking](January 1938) in Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu,
vol. 1, p. 149ff.
26. For details about Steele’s article, see Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 466.
27. Okumiya, op. cit., p. 50.
28. Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 182f.
29. John Rabe, Nankin no shinjitsu [The truth about Nanking], trans. Hirano
Kyoko (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1997), p. 118.
30. Ibid.
31. Durdin, “All Captives Slain,” op. cit.
32. Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, pp. 417, 426.
33. Ibid., p. 288.
34. Timperley, op. cit., p. 38.
35. Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 152.
36. Ibid., p. 308.
37. Durdin, “Japanese Atrocities Marked Fall of Nanking After Chinese
Command Fled,” op. cit.
38. Abend, “Japanese Curbing Nanking Excesses” in New York Times (19December 1937).
39. “Outstanding Events in the Sino-Japanese War,” in The China Weekly
Review (29 January 1938), p. 246.
40. A typical example of this was Rev. John Magee’s testimony. He testified
that on December 17, 1937, “I only personally witnessed the killing of one
man.” However, in his diary he wrote “The actual killing we did not see
as it took place.” Magee perjured himself at the Tokyo Trials. Cf. Hora,
Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 89; Martha L.
Smalley, ed., American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre,
1937-1938 (Connecticut: Yale Divinity School Library, 1997), p. 23.
41. Gray telegram dated February 3, 1938, No. 793.94/12303 in Records of the
Department of State Relating to Political Relations between China andJapan, Roll 49.
42. Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 312.
43. Gray telegram in ibid.
44. Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 29.
45. Cobuild English Dictionary (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995), p. 94.
46. Ibid., p. 1565.
47. Ibid., p. 1023.
48. Ibid.
49. Fujioka Nobukatsu, Kingendaishi kyoiku no kaikaku [Reforming Modern
and Contemporary History Education] (Tokyo: Meiji Tosho, 1996), p. 233.

NOTES

343

50. Gray telegram in op. cit.
51. Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 204.
52. Hsü, op. cit., p. 5.
53. Peter Nielsen, “The Nanking Atrocities” in China Today (January 1938).
54. Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 548.
55. B.K., op. cit.
56. “War in China” in Time (14 February 1938), p. 17.
57. Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 543.
58. Nankin jiken shiryoshu 2: Chugoku kankei shiryo hen [Nanking Incident
Source Material: Chinese References], trans. Nankin Jiken Chosa
Kenkyukai hen [Nanking Incident Research Group] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten,1992), vol. 2, p. 31.
59. Anonymous, “Japan’s ‘Dance Macabre’ in Nanking” in China Forum (19March 1938), p. 130f.
60. “Cabot Coville no Nankin ryokoki” [Travel journal of Cabot Coville] inNankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 112.
61. Ibid., p. 116
62 Ibid.

CHAPTER 11:
DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (1)
1.
2.
3.

4.

See Chapter 9, p. 175f.
EABN, Part 4 in Kaiko (July 1984), p. 14.
“December 15: We fell in at 8:00 a.m. and proceeded along Zhongshan
Road to our new quarters. We passed by the Japanese Consulate and partof the international refugee zone, where the residences of foreigners arelocated, and where the sweep to round up enemy stragglers is being
conducted. I caught cold a while ago, and my stomach hurt so much I
could hardly walk. Street vendors are already plying their trade. Most ofthem are selling food, but I also saw a barber cutting hair on a main road.
The houses and main roads are packed with people. Some of them areeating standing up. (...) Nine stragglers have taken over a foreigner’shouse, and have put up a sign reading ‘Home of nine refugees.’ How
ridiculous!” Entry for December 15, 1937 in “Inoie Matakazu nikki,”
SMBN, vol. 1, p. 369.
Maeda Yuji, Senso no nagare no naka ni [Caught in the current of war]
(Tokyo: Zenponsha, 1982), p. 125. After graduating from Tokyo
University with a degree in French literature, Maeda was hired by theDomei News Agency, which he served as war correspondent. After thewar, he became executive director of the Japan National Press Club. Senso

344

NOTES

no nagare no naka ni is based on the journal he kept during the war years.
An excerpt follows.
After our troops had occupied Nanking, I heard about a foreign news
report that described wholesale looting, violence and arson in the refugeezone. We were totally mystified, because immediately after theoccupation, the refugee zone was designated off-limits to military
personnel. Furthermore, after the ceremonial entry, vendors opened stalls
both inside and outside the refugee zone. And precisely because order
had been restored there, the Domei staff members moved back to ourbranch office, located in the refugee zone.
When we arrived, we noticed that the cooks and other servants who
had been working for us had also returned. We had just missed Li
Xingquan, who had served us faithfully; after being given a large bundleof war currency and an identification card, he disappeared into thecrowd.
Soon afterwards, rumors about acts of violence committed by
Japanese soldiers, emanating from Shanghai, reached our ears. According
to the accusations, those acts would have been perpetrated immediately
before we commenced our peaceful daily routine at our branch office inthe now lively refugee zone. My colleagues and I stared at each other,dumbfounded. Not Arai, not Horikawa, not Nakamura — not one
photographer or cinematographer (and they had all made the rounds ofthe city) had heard about any violent crime in Nanking once order was
restored. The sweep for stragglers, and the apprehension of Chinese
troops hiding in the refugee zone had ended on [December] 14th. If any
unlawful acts had been committed, not just people from my agency, but
the 100 other journalists assigned to Nanking from Japan’s news media
would have heard about them.
5. “Inoie Matakazu nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 371.
6. Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II(New York: BasicBooks, 1997), p. 90.
7. Rabe writes that requests for burial permits submitted between December
13 and the end of January were, without exception, rejected by Japanesemilitary authorities. Not until February 2 was it possible to bury the dead.
See Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 170.
8. Saito Jiro, Endo Takaaki, Amano Saburo, Kondo Eishiro and Kurosu
Tadanobu (pseudonyms) all participated in the ceremonial entry. See
Ono, et al, op. cit., pp. 38, 220, 254, 326, 351.
9. Ibid., p. 79
10. Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p.5; Wickert, GoodMan of Nanking, p. 5.

NOTES345

11. Hsü, op. cit., p. 17.
12. Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 39.
13. Hsü, op. cit., p. 20.
14. Ibid., p. 49.
15. Ibid., p. 53.
16. According to a proclamation issued by Japanese military authorities, “No
one is allowed to get a passport for another person.” See ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 5.
18. BN, p. 387
19. Hsü, op. cit., p. 20.
20. “Nankin zokuzoku kaiten” [Vendors’ stalls in Nanking open forbusiness], Yomiuri Shinbun (10 January 1938).
21. Hsü, op. cit., p. 57.
22. Ibid., p. 84.
23. Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 29.
24. See Chapter 10, Note 41.
25. Hsü, op. cit., p. 74.
26. Ibid. (title page).
27. Hsü, op. cit., p. 121.
28. Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 160.
29. Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 163.
30. Honda Katsuichi, “Nachi Doitsu wo mo kyogaku seshimeta Nankindaibogyaku jiken: chu” [Atrocities in Nanking that astonished even Nazi
Germany: Part 2 of 3], Asahi Journal (01 February 1991), p. 70.
31. See Chapter 2, Note 47.
32. Kasahara, Nankin nanminku no hyakunichi [One hundred days in the
Nanking refugee zone] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), p. 254f.
33. Honda, Nankin e no michi [The Road to Nanking] (Tokyo: Asahi Bunko,
1994), pp. 198-202.
34. Senso giseisha wo kokoro ni kizamu kai hen [Association for theCommemoration of the War Dead], Nankin daigyakusatsu to genbaku [TheNanking Massacre and the atomic bomb] (Osaka: Toho Shuppan, 1995), p.
15ff.
35. Timperley, op. cit., p. 143.
36. Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 29.
37. Ibid., p. 27.
38. Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 216.
39. Hsü, op. cit., p. 78.
40. Ibid.
41. Sasaki Toichi, Aru Gunjin no Jiden, p. 199.
42. SMBN, vol. 1, p. 562.

346

NOTES

CHAPTER 12:
DOCUMENTS OF THE NANKING SAFETY ZONE (2)1.

John B. Powell, My Twenty Years in China (New York: Macmillan
Company, 19545), p. 156.
2. Ibid.
3. Hsü, op. cit., p. 150.
4. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, p. 105.
5. Hsü, op. cit., p. 61.
6. Ibid., p. 47.
7. Ibid., p. 123f.
8. Ibid., p. 89.
9. Hora, Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu (2) Eibun shiryohen[Source material relating to the Nanking Massacre during the Second
Sino-Japanese War: English-language sources] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten,1985), vol. 2, p. 182.
10. Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 205. “Dieser Wang ist in
Nanking unter den Namen Jimmy als Altwarenhändler gut bekannt (...)
Zu Jimmy’s ersten Amtshandlungen gehörte die Einrichtung vonBordellen (...).”[This particular Wang, a dealer in second-hand goods,
goes by the name of “Jimmy” in Nanking. His first official duties
involved establishing brothels.]
11. Hsü, op. cit., p. 54f.
12. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, pp. 192, 198.
13. Ibid., p. 192.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Masayo Duus, Haisha no okurimono [Gifts from the Vanquished] (Tokyo:
Kodansha Bunko, 1995), p. 78ff.
18. Entry for December 17, 1937 in “Orita Mamoru nikki (Hohei dai 23 rentai
dai 3 chutaicho dai 1 daitaicho dairi hohei taii” [Journal of Orita Mamoru,
captain, acting commander of 1st Battalion, commander of 3rd Company,
23rd Infantry Regiment] in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 342.
19. EABN, Part 8 in Kaiko (November 1984), p. 9.
20. Reginald Sweetland, “Japanese Punish 10 Soldiers in Connection withLooting in Nanking” [as translated], Chicago Daily News (09 February1938), in Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 476.
21. Timperley, op. cit., p. 22.
22. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, pp. 191.

NOTES

347

23. “Uemura Toshimichi nikki (Shanhai hakengun sanbo fukucho, hohei
taisa)” [Journal of Uemura Toshimichi (Infantry colonel, deputy chief ofstaff, Shanghai Expeditionary Force)], in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 277.
24. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, pp. 192, 298.
25. “Matsui Iwane taisho jinchu nikki” [War journal of Gen. Matsui Iwane] in
SMBN, vol. 2, p. 169.
26. “Iinuma Mamoru nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 188.
27. “Matsui Iwane taisho jinchu nikki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 145.
28. Ibid., p. 149.
29. Ibid.
30. Hsü, op. cit., p. 11.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Hsü, op. cit., p. 10.
34. Timperley, op. cit., p. 33.
35. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, pp. 117.
36. Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 77.
37. Minnie Vautrin, “Sharing the Abundant Life in a Refugee Camp” in The
Chinese Recorder (July-August 1938), p. 365.
38. Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 99.
39. Timperley, op. cit., p. 56.
40. Hsü, op. cit., p. 78f.
41. Ibid., p. 55.
42. Timperley, op. cit., p. 39f.
43. Hsü, op. cit., p. 131.
44. Ibid., p. 133.
45. Ibid., p. 154.
46. Timperley, op. cit., p. 53.
47. North China Daily News (22 January 1938) in Nankin jiken shiryoshu 2:
Chugoku kankei shiryo hen, vol. 2, p. 31.
48. “Cases 114-143 not among the documents secured.” Cf. Hsü, op. cit.,
Table of Contents.
49. Timperley, op. cit., p. 33.
50. “The Family Letters of Dr. Robert Wilson” in Timothy Brook, ed.,Documents on the Rape of Nanking (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1999), p. 52.
51. Timperley, op. cit., p. 52.
52. Joshua Hammer, “Reipu de umareta kodomotachi” [English title: Born
under a Bad Sign], Newsweek (Japanese edition) (25 September 1996), pp.
35-37.
53. Powell, op. cit., p. 551.

348

NOTES

54. “Ex-Chinese Officers Among U.S. Refugees: Colonel and His Aides
Admit Blaming the Japanese for Crimes in Nanking,” New York Times (04January 1938).
55. Hsü, op. cit., p. 21.
56. Nakazawa Mitsuo (chief of staff, 16th Division), “Moshitsugisho: Nankinni okeru moshiokuri yoten” [Noteworthy events in Nanking] (c. January
22, 1938) in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 474f.
57. “Chinese Troops Sought Refuge in Nanking’s Camps, Japanese Say,” The
China Press (25 January 1938) in Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p.
195.
58. “Iinuma Mamoru nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, pp. 173, 175.
59. James McCallum, letter to his family, 09 January 1938, in Smalley, op. cit.,p. 43.
60. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, p. 104.
61. Hsü, op. cit., p. 30.
62. Ibid., p. 34.
63. Ibid., p. 40.
64. Ibid.
65. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, p. 117; James
McCallum, letter to his family, 29 December 1937, in Smalley, op. cit., p.
34.
66. Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 190.
67. “Uemura Toshimichi nikki” in SMBN, vol. 2, p. 278.
68. “Arison jiken kaiketsu su” [The Allison incident is resolved] in Kokusaichishiki oyobi hyoron [International knowledge and commentary] (March
1938), p. 152.

CHAPTER 13:
FOOD SHORTAGE AND UNBURIED CORPSES POSE THREATS
1.
2.
3.

4.

Hsü, op. cit., p. 16.
“Kisaki Hisashi nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 317.
BN, p. 141. Note further than the order issued on December 10, at aboutnoon, by Tang Shengzhi (Defense Operation Order No. 1) dictated that all
gunpowder and ammunition be detonated, all communication networks
inside the city be destroyed, and all bridges over main thoroughfares be
demolished. Cf. “Tang Shengzhi no meirei genko” [Original order issued
by Tang Shengzhi] in SMBN, p. 618.
“Nankin ni jichi iinkai seiritsu su” [Self-Government Committee
established in Nanking], Kokusai chishiki oyobi hyoron (February 1938), p.
143.

NOTES

5.
6.
7.

349

Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 5.
“Matsui Iwane taisho jinchu nikki” in op. cit., vol. 2, p. 169.
Maruyama Susumu, letter to author, February 5, 1997. For details about
Maruyama’s assignment to the Nanking Special Agency, see
Higashinakano Shudo, ed., “Nankin tokumu kikan (Mantetsu shain)
Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” [Recollections of former Manchurian
Railway employee Maruyama Susumu] in Higashinakano Shudo, ed.,Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2002 [The front line of research on
the Nanking Massacre 2002] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2002), p. 215. See also
Imura Tetsuro, “Tokubetsu rensai Mantetsu chosa kankeisha ni kiku: Dai
30 kai Kumagaya Yasushi: Mantetsu Shanhai jimusho no senbu katsudo,joho katsudo” [Special series featuring interviews with former
Manchurian Railway employees: Interview No. 30 with Kumagai Yasushi,
formerly in charge of pacification and intelligence-gathering efforts at the
Shanghai office], Ajia Keizai [Asian Economies] 29:12 (1988), p. 90.
8. Maruyama Susumu, letter to author, February 5, 1997.
9. Ibid.
10. “Kanamaru Yoshio gunso shuki (Dai 16 shidan keiribu)” [Journal of Sgt.
Kanamaru Yoshio, Intendance Dept., 16th Division] in SMBN, vol. 1, p.
257.
11. Hsü, op. cit., p. 83f.
12. Ibid., p. 87
13 Ibid., p. 114.
14. Ibid., p. 87.
15. Ibid., p. 90.
16. Ibid., p. 112.
17. Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 6.
18. Hsü, op. cit., p. 84.
19. Ibid., p. 53.
20. Higashinakano, “Nankin tokumu kikan (Mantetsu shain) Maruyama
Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 218.
21. Nankin tokumu kikan hen [Nanking Special Agency, ed.] (revised by
Higashinakano Shudo), “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (1)” [Nanking
Special Agency Report No. 1] in Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensensaizensen 2004 [The front line of research on the Nanking Massacre 2004](Tokyo: Tendensha, 2004).
22. “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2)”, in ibid., p. 85
23. Yomiuri Shinbun (10 January 1938).
24. “Matsui Iwane taisho jinchu nikki” in op. cit., vol. 2, p. 145.
25. Lewis S.C. Smythe & Assistants, War Damage in the Nanking Area,
December 1937 to March 1938: Urban and Rural Surveys, On Behalf of

350

NOTES

The Nanking International Relief Committee, footnote under Table 1.
26. Ichiki, op. cit., p. 22.
27. Chang, op. cit., p. 139.
28. Timperley, op. cit., p. 59.
29. Fujiwara, op. cit., p. 44f.
30. Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 562.
31. Hsü, op. cit., p. 68.
32. Timperley, op. cit., p. 143.
33. Ara, Kikigaki: Nankin jiken, p. 18.
34. Hsü, op. cit., p. 14.
35. EABN, Part 8 in Kaiko (November 1984), p. 5.
36. Hsü, op. cit., p. 90.
37. Ibid., p. 157.
38. Ibid., p. 163.
39. Ibid., p. 166.
40. Ibid., p. 99
41. Rikugun Gahosha, Shina jihen: Senseki no shiori [The Second Sino-Japanese
War: A guide to former battle sites] (Tokyo: Rikugun Juppeibu, 1938), p.
183.
42. Nankin jiken shiryoshu 1: Amerika kankei shiryo hen, vol. 1, p. 311.
43. Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 147.
44. Nakazawa, Moshitsugisho in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 475.
45. The following sentence appears in records kept by the Nanking Special
Agency describing the situation in March 1938: “They may call themburials, but most of the time, they appear only to be dumping
straw-wrapped corpses in the designated areas.” Cf. Nankin tokumu
kikan (revised by Higashinakano Shudo), “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku(3)” in Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2004, p.121.
46. Nakazawa, Moshitsugisho in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 475.
47. Ibid., p. 474.
48. Hsü, op. cit., p. 99.
49. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, p. 386.
50. “Kisaki Hisashi nikki” in SMBN, vol. 1, p. 318.
51. Rabe, [Report to Hitler] in Nankin no shinjitsu, p. 315.
52. Higashinakano, ed. “Nankin tokumu kikan (Mantetsu shain) Maruyama
Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 222.
53. Wickert, Good Man of Nanking, p. 170.
54. Rabe, [Report to Hitler] in Nankin no shinjitsu, p. 317.
55. Hsü, op. cit., p. 66.
56. Georg Rosen, “Endgültiger Rücktritt des Vorsitzendes des Nankinger‘Selbstverwaltungskomites’ Tao Hsi-san” in Deutsche Gesandschaft

NOTES

351/Botschaft in China, p. 80.
57 Ibid.
58. Higashinakano, ed. “Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 222.
59. “Though they have been burying 200 bodies a day, they find there arestill 30,000 left to bury, mostly in Hsiakwan.” See Miner Searle Bates,“Relief Situation in Nanking” in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record GroupNo. 10, Box 102, Folder 866, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven,
Connecticut.
60. Higashinakano, ed. “Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 223.
61. Ibid., p. 224.
62. Ibid., p. 225.
63. Higashinakano, ed., Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2004, p. 121.
64. Higashinakano, ed., “Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 225.
65. Rabe, [Report to Hitler] in Nankin no shinjitsu, p. 317.
66. Higashinakano, ed., “Maruyama Susumu shi no kaiso” in op. cit., p. 228.
67. Georg Rosen, “Die Lage in Nanking” in Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in
China, p. 107f.
68. Hsü, op. cit., p. 67.
69. Bates, op. cit.
70. Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 562.
71. Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 2, p. 263f.
72. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, p. 145.
73. Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 19.
74. Higashinakano, ed., Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2004, p.87.

CHAPTER 14:
FURTHER EXAMINATION OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”
1.

Robert Wilson, letter to his family, 18 December 1937 in Zhang Kaiyuan,ed., Eyewitnesses to Massacre (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 394.
2. Timperley, op. cit., p. 47f.
3. Ibid., p. 49.
4. Timperley, op. cit., p. 50.
5. Ibid., p. 50f.
6. Miner Bates’ letter to Harold Timperley, 12 April 1938 in Miner SearleBates Papers, Record Group 10, Box 4, Folder 52.
7. Smythe et al., op. cit., p. 8.
8. Woodhead, The China Year Book 1938, p. 352.
9. Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 640.
10. Woodhead, The China Year Book 1938, p. xv; The China Year Book 1939, p.
xv.

352

NOTES

11. Ibid., p. xxiv.
12. China at War, vol. 1, No. 1 (April 1938), see comment above Table ofContents.
13. Ibid., p. 70.
14. Hsü Shuhsi, ed., The War Conduct of the Japanese (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh,1938), p. 146.
15. Mo Takuto [Mao Zedong], “Jikyusen ni tsuite” [On protracted war], in
Mo Takuto senshu [Selected Works of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Gaiko
Shuppansha, 1968), p. 237.
16. Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 435f.
17. “Editorial: A Year of Undeclared War” in Kwei Chungshu, ed., The China
Critic (07 July 1938), p. 6.
18. China Forum, 09 July 1938, pp. 51, 58.
19. Woodhead, The China Year Book 1939, p. 417.
20. Arthur de Carle Sowerby, “One Year of Undeclared War in China,” in The
China Journal, vol. XXIX (July 1938), p. 7.
21. C.H., “One Year of Sino-Japanese Conflict” in China Quarterly, vol. 3, no.
3, (08 January 1938), p. 271.
22. “Outstanding Events in the Sino-Japanese War,” p. 246.
23. “Review of the First Year of the War (By a Chinese Contributor)” in The
China Weekly Review, vol. 85, no. 6, (09 July 1938), p. 188.
24. Robert Norton, “One Year of War” in China Today, vol. 4, no. 10, (July
1938), p. 7.
25. The Character and the Activities of the Anti-Japanese College for Military and
Political Training, trans., Mikami Taicho, Ishikawa Tadao, Shibata Minoru(Osaka: Kansai University Institute of Oriental and Occidental Studies,1965), pp. 60, 151.
26. Ibid., p. 191.
27. Ibid., p. 48.
28. Ibid., p. 159.
29. See Chugoku kyosanto shi shiryoshu [Collected Materials on the History of
the Chinese Communist Party] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1974), p. 388.
30. Miner Searle Bates, letter to his friends, 29 November 1938 in Bates
Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 4, Folder 52, Yale Divinity School
Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
31. Tsu, op. cit., p. 79.
32. Hsü, The War Conduct of the Japanese, p. 146; Hsü, ed., A Digest of Japanese
War Conduct (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1939), p. 11; “The War Conduct of
the Japanese” in Hsü, ed., Chinese Year Book 1938-39, p. 185; Hsü,
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 106.

NOTES

353

33. Edgar Snow, The Battle for Asia (New York: World Publishing Co.,
1941-1942), p. 57.
34. Lily Abegg, Chinas Erneuerung: Der Raum als Waffe (Frankfurt:Societäts-Verlag, 1940), p. 183.
35. Woodhead, “Preface,” The China Year Book 1939.

CHAPTER 15: AN OVERVIEW OF THE “NANKING MASSACRE”
1.
2.

Agnes Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (New York: Knopf, 1943), p. 213.
See John Pritchard and Sonia Zaide, eds., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial(New York: Garland Publishing, 1981), vol. 2, p. 2630.
3. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen vol. 1, p. 13.
4. Nitta, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 50.
5. Espy, “Nankin ni okeru jokyo,” in op. cit., p. 150.
6. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, vol. 1, p. 142f.
7. Ibid., p. 143.
8. Ibid., p. 300.
9. Ibid., p. 339.
10. Nitta, op. cit., vol. 10, p. 768.
11. Ibid., p. 800.
12. Ara, “Jorui: Heishitachi no Nanking jiken,” p. 210ff.
13. “Tokyo Saiban no Uebbu Saibancho, ‘Misemonoteki Kokaisaiban ni
Hantai’” [“Presiding Justice Webb Opposed to ‘Showcase Trial’” ] in
Asahi Shinbun (08 February 1995), p. 9.
14. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, vol. 1, p. 111.
15. Maruyama, “Waga showashi” [My Showa era] (24)], in Mantetsu
wakabakai kaiho [Manchurian Railway Employees Journal], no. 138,
October 1998, p. 80.
16. Zhen Shunchen, Chugoku rekishi no tabi [Travels through Chinese history](Osaka: Toho Shoten, 1991), p.180.
17. Chan Yik Cham, New Chinese History: New Edition (Hong Kong: Ling Kee
Publishing Co., 1975), p. 130.
18. Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn, China Wakes: The Struggle for theSoul of a Rising Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), pp. 92-124.
19. Zhongxiaoxue tongyong jiaocai bianxiezu bian [Middle and Elementary
School Textbook Editorial Committee], ed., Zhongguo lishi [History of
China] (Beijing: Renmin Shubanshe [People’s Education Press], 1979), p.
51

354

NOTES

CHAPTER 16:
THE “NANING MASSACRE” AS WAR PROPAGANDA
1.

Atsuta Ko et al., Chugaku shakai (Rekishiteki bunya) [Middle school social
studies (history)] (Osaka: Osaka Shoseki, 1999), pp. 252-253.
2. Department of History, People’s Education Publishing, Chinese History,
Vol. 4, 1997, p. 54.
3. Suzuki Akira, Shin Nankin daigyakusatsu no maboroshi [The illusion of the“Nanking Massacre”: New edition] (Tokyo: Asuka Shinsha, 1999), p. 285.
4. Ibid., p. 292.
5. Esther Tappert Mortensen papers, Record Group No. 21, Box 7, Folder
120, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
6. See Editors’ Note in The China Monthly, January 1940, Vol. 1, No. 2.
7. Timperley, op. cit, p. 24.
8. Ho Yingching, Chunichi kankei to sekai no zenshin [Sino-Japanese relations
and the advancement of the world], trans. Association of Sino-Japanese
Culture and Economy (Taipei: Shochu Publishing, 1974), p. 87.
9. Guo Moruo, Konichisen kaisoroku [Reflections on the war against Japan],trans. Okazaki Toshio, (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1959), pp. 20, 25, 48, 50,
58, 191, 202. Guo Moruo was a famous revolutionary and historian.
10. Ibid.
11. Guo Moruo, op. cit., p. 62.
12. “Bo tekitai senden” [5. Propaganda against the enemy] in ”Daisanbu
kokusai senden” [International Propaganda Section 3] in Chuo sendenbu
hantoshi chushin kosaku keikaku, [Central Information Department’s
six-month central plan (March- August 1939), property of the Chinese
Nationalist Party’s Central Committee for the Compilation of Documents
Relating to Party History], mimeographed, [1939?].
13. Guo Moruo, op. cit., p. 113.
14. Ibid., p. 154.
15. Chinese Nationalist Party, ed., Chuo sendenbu kokusai sendensho kosaku gaiyo
1938 nen kara 1941 nen 4 gatsu [Overview of the activities of the Central
Information Division’s International Information Division (1938-April
1941). Since this publicaton contains no serial page numbers, please refer
to “Activities of the Division for Propaganda Against the Enemy.”
16. Ibid. Gaijin mokuto no Nichigun boko is followed by Kamino shison wa
Chugoku ni ari [God’s children are in China]. The correct title of Gaijin
mokuto no Nichigun boko [Japanese atrocities witnessed by foreigners] is
Gaijin mokuto chu no Nichigun boko [Japanese atrocities while witnessed byforeigners], which is the Chinese version of Timperley’s What War Means.
17. “Overview of the Activities of the External Affairs Section.”

NOTES355

18. Wang Ling Xiao, Chugoku Kokuminto shimbun seisaku no kenkyu [Study of
the Chinese Nationalist Party’s Newspaper Policy], Party History
Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s Central Committee, 1996, p.
209.
19. Zeng Xubai, Autobiography of Zeng Xubai (Shokukei Publishing Co., 1988),
Vol. 1, pp. 200-201.
20. Harold Timperley’s letter to Miner Bates, March 14, 1938, in Miner SearleBates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 4, Folder 65.
21. Timperley, ed., Japanese Terror in China, p. 9f.
22. Ibid., p. 71
23. Miner Bates’ letter to Harold Timperley, March 3, 1938, in Miner SearleBates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 4, Folder 65.
24. Harold Timperley’s letter to Miner Bates, March 28, 1938, in Miner SearleBates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 4, Folder 65.
25. Timperley, op. cit., p. 9.
26. Ibid., p. 20
27. Ibid., p. 18.
28. Professional Record, M.S. Bates, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record
Group No. 10, Box 126, Folder 1132.
29. Timperley, op. cit., p. 19; copy of a report by Dr. M. S. Bates of the
University of Nanking—Confidential, Anlage zum Peiping-Bericht, Nr.
2722/4579/37 vom 30. Dezember 1937, in 2205 Chinesisch-Japanischer
Konflikt, Bd.3,11/ 1937-3/1938, Botschaft in China (Bestand R9208),
Bundesarchiv, Berlin.
30. Ibid., p. 20f.
31. Ibid., p. 21.
32. Ibid., p. 21.
33. Ibid., p. 22.
34. Ibid., p. 22.
35. See the cover of Japanese Terror in China (New York: Modern Age Books,
1938).
36. Bates’ testimony at the Tokyo Trials. See R. John Pritchard and Sonia M.
Zaide, ed., The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Vol. 2 (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1981), p. 2626f.
37. Timperley, ed., op. cit., p. 161.
38. Tomisawa Shigenobu, Nankin jiken no kakushin [At the core of the
Nanking Incident] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2003), pp. 83-84.
39. Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p.78; Higashinakano, ed.,Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen 2002, p. 128. John Magee testified, “I
saw a Chinese being killed,” when he was asked during the Tokyo Trials
actually how many murder cases he witnessed. But it is extremely likely

356

NOTES

that he bore false testimony. Magee wrote in his diary that he did not see“the actual killing.” See Letter of John Magee to his wife, December 19,
1937, in Martha L. Smalley, ed., American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the
Nanking Massacre, 1937-1938, (New Haven: Yale Divinity School Library,1997), p. 23.
40. Timperley, op. cit., p. 31.
41. Ibid., p. 33.
42. Wickert, The Good Man of Nanking, p. 77.
43. Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 18.
44. Bates’ letter to his wife, February 1, 1938, in Miner Searle Bates Papers,
Record Group No. 10, Box 1, Folder 8. After the war ended, Tokuyasu
Fukuda, who had been “in charge of handling complaints” at theJapanese Embassy in Nanking (he later became Minister of Postal Affairs),
testified as follows:“My duty was to go to the office at No. 5 Ninghai Road No. 5 fromtime to time to negotiate with the International Committee there.
One day, I saw two or three Americans busily typing. When I took aquick glance at them, I noticed that they were typing reports, such as“Japanese soldiers assaulted a woman at such and such a place at suchand such a time today.” I scolded them: “Just a minute! I don’t know who
told you that, but never type such a thing without checking. Why don’t
you investigate the matter before you report on it?” Later, it occurred tome that they must have been preparing material for Timperley’s book
[What War Means]. After that, I cautioned them any number of times:“Don’t you think there’s something strange about recording what a
Chinese tells you (which might have been invented) without conducting
an investigation?” [...] My duty was to receive Chinese complaints. They
protested against this and that, mixing truth and falsehoods. My patience
was wearing thin. [...] For instance, one day the American vice-consul
came to the office and said, “Japanese soldiers are stealing lumber froman American warehouse in Xiaguan and loading it into a truck.”“We can’t have that. Come with me!” I sent for a staff officer, and thethree of us drove over there. It was around 9 o’clock on a cold morning; it
was snowing heavily. When we arrived, we found the place deserted.
The warehouse was locked, and there was no sign of its having been
opened. I berated the vice-consul: “There’s nothing amiss here! You’ve
wasted my time and the staff officer’s time! Next time, do some checking
before coming to me! The Army is concerned about every incident, nomatter how minor, as I’m sure you can see since we rushed over here.”“Please make sure this doesn’t happen again.” The vice-consul said
he’d be more careful in the future. [...] There were many similar incidents.

NOTES

357[...] It is true that the Japanese Army was to blame in some cases, butthere was absolutely nothing remotely resembling a massacre, especially
one claiming 200,000, 300,000 or even 1,000 victims. [...] There was noplace to hide there. There would have been countless witnesses, and theconsequences would have been horrible.
This accusation is totally without basis. It’s a propagandist plot.
Tanaka Masaaki, Nankin gyakusatsu no kyoko [The fallacy of the “Nanking
Massacre”] (Tokyo: Nihon Kyobunsha, 1984), pp. 35-37. Similar
testimony can be found in Fukuda Tokuyasu,“Timpare hodo no shinso”[The truth about Timperley’s report], Ichiokunin no showashi: Nicchu senso I[The history of one hundred million people in the Showa era:
Sino-Japanese War I] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1979), p. 261.
45. Bates witnessed men and women responding to the Japanese Army’sclassified advertisements. Their responses were completely voluntary ...
they welcomed the opportunity. The women must have gone to apply forwork at a house of prostitution that Wang Changtien of the Red Swastika
Society was in the process of establishing. Hsü, Documents of the
Nanking Safety Zone, p. 89; George Rosen, Nankings Übergang, den 20
Januar1938,
inDeutschGesandschaft/Botschaft
inChina.
Japanisch-Chinesischer Konflikt (Microfilm), Deutsches Bundesarchiv, S.205.
46. Higashinakano, ed., “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2),” op. cit., p. 96.
47. Timperley, op. cit., p. 26.
48. See Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, pp. 571, 577.
49. Wickert, The Good Man of Nanking, p. 201f.
50. Timperley, op. cit., p. 19.
51. Ibid., p. 30.
52. See Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 582 (translated from Japaneseversion).
53. Higashinakano, ed., “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2)”, op. cit., p. 99.
54. Smythe Letter, December 15, 1937, in Zhang Kaiyuan, ed., Eyewitnesses to
Massacre: American Missionaries Bear Witness to Japanese Atrocities inNanjing (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), p. 258.
55. Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 5. No Chinese soldier was
disarmed in the Safety Zone by the Japanese Army. The International
Committee may have disarmed some of them. But they did not return thedisarmed soldiers and weapons to the Japanese army. Instead, they hid
them. In March 1938, the Japanese army wrote, “The weapons whichwere already found reached the amount of fifty trucks.” Higashinakano,ed., “Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (3)”, op. cit., p. 119.
56. Gray telegram, op. cit.

358

NOTES

57. DoD News: Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability en route to Camp-X-Ray,
United States Department of Defense News Transcript, January 27, 2001.
58. Ibid.
59. DoD News: DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,
United States Department of Defense News Transcript, January 30, 2001.
60. DoD News: Dod News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,
United States Department of Defense News Transcript, February 8, 2001.
61. Ibid.
62. DoD News: DoD News Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,
United States Department of Defense News Transcript, January 11, 2001. I
have to say that Perry Link’s “Forward” which criticized my paper inNanking 1937 completely ignored this point, and was a criticism besidethe point. Cf. Perry Link, “Forward,” Fei Fei Li, Robert Sabella and David
Liu, ed., Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing, (New York: M.E. Sharpe,
2002), p. xvii.
63. Ibid.
64. Timperley, op. cit., p. 51.
65. Ibid. Harold Timperley’s letter to Miner Bates, March 14, 1938.
66. Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 19.
67. See The Chinese Nationalist Party, “ Henshuka kosaku gaiyo” [Overview
of Editing Section activities], Chuo Sendenbu Kokusai Sendensho Kosaku
Gaiyo [Overview of the activities of the Central Information Division’sInternational Information Division]
68. Guo Moruo, op. cit., p. 69.
69. See“4. Kokusai Senden” [4. International Propaganda], Chinese
Nationalist Party, Overview of Propagandist Activities, mimeographed,n.d..
70. China Year Book 1939, pp. 416-420. More attention should be paid to thefact that the Special Issue Commemorating the First Anniversary of
Sino-Japanese War, an English-language magazine published by
Europeans, Americans and Chinese in Shanghai did not mention the“Nanking Massacre.” See Chapter 14.
71. Note written by Miner S. Bates, April 12, 1938, in Miner Searle Bates
Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 4, Folder 52, Yale Divinity School
Library.
72. Steele, “Nanking Massacre Story: Japanese Troops Kill Thousands,” in
Chicago Daily News, December 15, 1937.
73. Durdin, “Butchery Marked Capture of Nanking”, in New York Times,
December 18, 1937.
74. Timperley, op. cit., p. 14f.
75. Ibid., p. 143. Minnie Vautrin’s Diary (1937-1940), Miscellaneous Personal

NOTES

359

Papers Collection, Record Group No. 8, Box 206, Yale Divinity School
Library, p. 123. Wickert (Hrsg.), John Rabe, S.186; Wickert, ed., The GoodMan of Nanking, p. 131.
76. See Nankin jiken shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 583.
77. What should be noted is that the battle was not over even when the city
gates fell. On December 13, the day the city fell, at Shanghezhen near thebank of the Yangtze River, to the west of the South Gate (Zhonghua Gate),the 11th Company, attached to the 45th Infantry Regiment of the 6th
Division, entered into a fierce battle after having been surrounded by atremendous number of Chinese soldiers.
In his diary, veteran soldier Fukumoto Tsuzuku wrote that the 11th
Company was “surrounded by approximately 40,000 enemy troops.” A
counterattack by a battery of mountain artillery could repulse theChinese soldiers. But Company Commander Ozono Shozo and his 14
subordinates were killed. Thirty-five Japanese soldiers were injured. It
was a very fierce battle. At that time, according to the testimony of
Lieutenant Takahashi Yoshihiko (who was under the command of the
11th Company as the platoon leader of the battery of mountain artillery),the Chinese whose escape was blocked “stripped naked and jumped into
the river.” They became the victims of the Japanese army’s continued
attack, and many of them died in the Yangtze River.
Another entry in Fukumoto Tsuzuku Nikki [Fukumoto Tsuzuku’s diary]
mentions that on December 20, the divisional commander supervised acount of the corpses. “In the afternoon a small platoon went out toShanghezhen, where we counted 2,377 enemy corpses. I heard many ofthem drowned in the river.”At 8 pm, on December 13, outside Taiping Gate in the east, Chinese
soldiers who had been taken prisoner noticed that were not many
Japanese Army soldiers guarding them. They threw hand grenades andescaped, killing or injuring six Japanese soldiers.
At 4:30 pm on December 14, three Japanese soldiers were killed
instantly by Chinese troops’ trench mortars on a street near a munitions
factory (in the vicinity of the South Gate (Zhonghua Gate)) outside thecity. Regiment Commander Ide Tatsuo died the next morning.
The city gates had fallen, but fierce battles still raged in some areas
outside the city on December 13 and 14. For this reason, some Japaneseunits had the largest number of dead and injured since the Shanghai
conflict. Even inside the city, Chinese soldiers attacked the Japanese army.
There was no street fighting inside the city, but there was sporadic
shooting. SMBN, p. 385. Kobayashi Masao, ed., Sakigake: Kyodo jinbutsu
senki [Pioneer: Diary of a Japanese soldier] (Ise Shimbun Sha, 1984), p. 536.

360

NOTES

Kajimura Itaru, Tairiku o tatakau: Kansoku shotaicho no nikki [Fighting
in China: Diary of an observation platoon commander], self-published,
1979, p. 50.
78. Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 1
79. Ibid., p. 10f; Timperley, op. cit., p. 144.
80. See Nankin jiken shiryoshu , vol. 1, pp. 110-121.
81. Conversation of Consul Tanaka with M.S.B., March 31, 1938, in Miner
Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No.10, Box 102, Folder 867, Yale
Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
82. Based on data made available to biographical dictionaries and dated
December 1, 1972 (profile of Bates’ last years) in Miner Searle Bates Papers,
Record Group No. 10, Box 126, Folder 1132.
83. Theodore H. White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1978), p.76.
84. The Nationalist Party’s Central Information Division held a news
conference for foreign correspondents and military officers who were
living in China almost every two days. This amounts to a total of 600
news conferences during the 42 months between December 1937 andApril 1941; protests were not registered against the “Nanking Massacre”
at any of them. Wang Ruowang, a Chinese writer born in 1918 andstripped of his party membership in 1987 recalled, “During the war I
never heard anything about a Nanking Massacre.” For his observations,
see Suzuki, Shin Nankin dai gyakusatsu no maboroshi, pp. 34, 36.
85. The words of William Logan, Jr., a lawyer at the Tokyo Trials. As Loganstated, by admitting transcribed oaths of witnesses, the tribunal
disregarded the common sense “which is well recognized in all English
speaking countries, to see them, hear their testimony, and have theopportunity of cross-examination of the witness.” The prosecution did
not [establish perjury], and accepted even testimony by hearsay. Logan’s
testimony was as follows: “That being so, if the Tribunal pleases, The
defense are unanimous in opposition to a trial of this case on affidavits.
This raises the fundamental proposition of law, which is well recognizedin all English speaking countries, that the accused in a criminal case isentitled to be confronted by the witnesses, to see them, bear their
testimony, and have the opportunity of cross-examination of the witness.
If the witness is not produced, the opportunity of cross-examination is
lost; and this trial would be presented by testimony from an unseen,
unknown, and unheard of witness.” See Hora, Nichu senso Nankin
daigyakusatu jiken shiryoshu (1), p. 111. See also Pritchard and Zaide, ed.,The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, vol. 2, p. 4451f.
As many have indicated, those who sat as judges at the Tokyo WarNOTES

361

Crimes Trials, represented only the victorious nations. Those fromneutral nations did not sit there. All persons on trial were from Japan.
This was not a trial, but retaliation. Moreover, they ignored the grandrule, “The law should not influence the past,” resorting to the use of ex
post facto law.
86. General Matsui was heard to say that the “Nanking Massacre” was a
fiction created by the foreign press. See Miner Bates’ letter, December 10,
1946, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, RG10, B4, F53.
87. Based on the late Professor Muramatsu Takeshi’s speech entitled“Recollections of the Japanese Emperor’s Visit to China” at Sankei Kaikan
in Tokyo on May 16, 1992. The population of 200,000 (according to Prof.
Muramatsu) is confirmed by the following:
Daily press conferences at the Chinese-British Cultural Association
spanned a period beginning 20 days before the fall of Nanking andending on the day after the city fell. Participants at the conferences,which focused on events in Nanking, included the mayor, military
personnel, news correspondents, missionaries and businessmen. There is
no record of a government representative (or anyone else, for that matter)stating that the population of Nanking was 500,000 during any of those
conferences. On November 28, Wang Gupan, head of the Police
Department, made the following announcement: “At present, there are
200,000 people living here in Nanking.” Thereafter, the conventional
wisdom in the foreign community was that Nanking’s population was
200,000.
Nanking was surrounded by massive walls with a circumference of 34
kilometers. Not until February 25, 1938 were ordinary citizens allowed totravel into or out of the city. Despite the fact that there was noappreciable civilian traffic into or out of Nanking, the city’s population
increased.
Five days after the fall of Nanking, the International Committee
reported that the population was “200,000.” On December 21, the[Foreign Community of Nanking] mentioned that there were currently“200,000 civilians in Nanking.” Therefore, we must conclude that the
population of Nanking did not change before or after the city fell. If there
had indeed been a massacre, the population would have decreased.
On January 14, 1938, one month after the fall of Nanking, theInternational Committee estimated the population to be “250,000 to
300,000 civilians inside the city” – in other words, inside the Safety Zone.
The Committee’s estimate (based on figures from a census taken by theJapanese military) was later corrected to “250,000 civilians.” The

362

NOTES

population increased because the Japanese Army did not execute all thesoldiers hidden in the Safety Zone, but recognized them as civilians. The
assertion that the population at the time of the fall of Nanking was
500,000 shows blatant disregard for or ignorance of the information
stated in contemporary documents. See Minnie Vautrinʹs letter: A Reviewof the First Month, December 13, 1937 to January 13, 1938, in Archives of
the United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia, Record Group
No.11, Box 145, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut;
Wickert, ed., John Rabe, p. 28; Wickert, The Good Man of Nanking, p. 39;
Higashinakano, ed., Nankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2), p. 99; Hsü,
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 20; Letter of the Foreign
Community of Nanking to the Imperial Japanese Embassy, December 21,
1937, in Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box 102, Folder
864, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut; Hsü,
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 84; Iris Chang, The Rape of
Nanking (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 81.

CHAPTER 17: NEW EVIDENCE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSIONTHAT THERE WAS NO MASSACRE IN NANKING
1.

Archibald Steele, Nannking Massacre Story: Japanese Troops Kill
Thousands, in: The Chicago Daily News, December 15, 1937.
2. Tillman Durdin, Butchery Marked Capture of Nanking, in: New YorkTimes, December 18, 1937.
3. Maeda Yuji, op. cit., p.125.
4. Ara, Kikigaki: Nankin jiken p.209, 210.
5. John Pritchard and Sonia Zaide, ed., op. cit., vol. 2, p.2,626.
6. Tomisawa Shigenobu, op. cit., p.iii, vi, viii.
7. Higashinakano（revized）, ʺNankin tokumu kikan hokoku (2)ʺ in Nankingyakusatsu kenkyu no saizensen saizens2004, p.90.
8. See p.55 of this book.
9. See p.137 of this book.
10. See Kasahara, ʺTillman Durdin shi kara no kikigakiʺ in Nankin jiken
shiryoshu 1: Amerika kankei shiryo hen, vol. 1, p. 577.
11. Ibid., p.564.
12. Isii Itaro, Ishii Itaro Diary (continued), Monthly Chuo Koron (June, 1991),
p.271.
13. Tomisawa, op. cit. p.v, vii, ix.
14. See p.155. of this book.
15. See p.220. of this book.
16. See p.222 of this book.

NOTES363

17. Timperley, ed., Japanese Terror in China, p.19, 21, 51.
18. The Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 9, 1945, p.4.
19. Letter of John Magee to his wife, dated Dec. 19, 1937, in: Martha L.
Smalley, ed., American Missionary Eyewitnesses to the Nanking Massacre,
1937-1938 (Connecticut: Yale Divinity School Library, 1997), p. 23.
20. Pritchard and Zaide, ed., op. cit., p.2, 630.
21. Ibid., p.2,630f.
22. Statement of M.B.Bates, dated February 6, 1947, in : Miner Searle Bates
Papers, Record Group No.10, Box 126, 4, Folder1132, Yale Divinity School
Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
23. A proposed three days armistice reads as follows: ʺFor the sake of 200,000
helpless civilians, the International Committee for a Safety Zone in
Nanking respectfully proposes to the Chinese and Japanese authorities a
truce of exactly three days….ʺ See Plumer Mills letter to his family, dated
on January 31, 1938 in: Plumer Mills Papers, Record Group No.8, Box 141,
Folder ?, Yale Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut; China
Bulettin No.7, issued on March 28, 1938 reads as follows: ʺNANKING: As
the siege of Nanking developed rapidly, 80 % of its one million people
left for parts unknown. As many as possible of the remainng 200,000
sought the Safety Zone conducted by a group of foreigners, with George
Fitch, International Committee secretary, as director in charge.ʺ See
Plumer Mills Papers, Record Group No.8, Box 281, Folder 1. Whenarguing the population in Nanking, we must also take into consideration
the following fact that they thought on Dec. 28, 1937 ʺwe do not know
when people will be allowed to move in and out of the city freely.ʺ It was
on February 25, 1938 that the Japanese allowed to move freely. On thesepoints, see Ernest Forsterʹs letter to his wife, in: Plumer Mills Papers,
Record Group No.8, Box 263, Folder 5;
24. Letter of the Foreign Community of Nanking to the Imperial Japanese
Embassy, December 25. 1937, in: Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record
Group No.10, Box 102, Folder 864.
25. Hsü, ed., Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p.84.
26. Hora, ed., Nicchu Senso Nankin daigyakusatsu jiken shiryoshu (1), vol. 1,
p.396.
27. Tanaka Masaaki, ʺNankin gyakusatuʺ no kyoko, p.37; The similar testimny
is in Fukuda Tokuyasu, ʺTimpare hodo no shinsoʺ, Ichiokunin no Showashi
I : Nicchu senso, p.261.
28. Outline of the Operations of the International Information Department,
Ministry of Information 1941, p.1 of the Counterintelligence Division.
29. Ibid., p.2.
30. Institute for Modern History Research of China Social Science Academy,

364

NOTES

ed., Dictionary of Notable Visitors to China in the Modern Era (Beijing: China
Social Science Publishing, 1981), p.477.
31. This is based on a newspaper clip carrying an article with a photo ofBates which is supposed to be on just before the fall of Nanking.
However, the name of the newspaper is not identified. Esther Tappert
Mortensen papers, Record Group No.21, Box 7, Folder 120, Yale
Divinity School Library, New Haven, Connecticut.
32. See the editorʹs note, in: The China Monthly, January 1940, Vol1, No.2.
33. Note of Miner S. Bates, April 12, 1938, in: Miner Searle Bates Papers,
Record Group No.10, Box 4, Folder 52, Yale Divinity School Library.
34. Some data available for directories ― Miner Searle Bates, dated
December 1, 1972, im: Miner Searle Bates Papers, Record Group No.10,
Box 126, Folder 1132.
35. Tillman Durdin, Japanese Atrocites Marked Fall of Nanking After
Chinese Command Fled, New York Times, January 9, 1938.
36. Outline of the Operations of the International Information Department,
p.2 of the Counterintelligence Division.
37. Outline of the Operations of the International Information Department,
p.1 of the Foreign Affairs Division.
38. Hihgashinakano, The Overall Picture of the ʺNanking Massacreʺ, in: Fei
Fei Li, Robert Sabella and David Liu, eds, Nanking 1937: Memory and
Healing (New York: M.E.Sharpe 2002), p.111.

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER: REREADING RABE’S DIARY
1.
2.
3.
4.

Wickert, John Rabe, p. 170f.
Ibid., p. 99.
Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 1.
Robert Wilson’s letter to his family, 14 December 1937 in Nankin jiken
shiryoshu, vol. 1, p. 277.
5. Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 1.
6. Wickert, John Rabe, p. 107.
7. Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 14f.
8. Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban kankei shiryohen, vol. 1, p. 150f.
9. Rabe’s Report to Hitler in Nankin no Shinjitsu, p. 96.
10. Fukuda Kazuya, “John Rabe no nikki ‘Nankin daigyakusatsu’ wo do
yomuka?” [What are we to make of the “Nanking Massacre” described inJohn Rabe’s diaries?], in Shokun! (December 1997), p. 37.
11. John Rabe’s Report to Hitler in Nankin no Shinjitsu, p. 314.
12. Ibid., p. 315.
13. Ibid., p. 316.

NOTES365

14. Ibid., p. 303.
15. Yokoyama Hiroaki, “Commentary: The Tragedy in Nanking and Rabe’s
Diary” in Wickert, Nankin no shinjitsu, p. 328.
16. For further information about the comment made by P.R. Shields of the
British Export Co. in Nanking, see Hora, Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban
kankei shiryohen, vol. 1, p. 120.
17. Wickert, John Rabe, p. 96.
18. Ibid., p. 268.
19. Kasahara, Nankin nanminku no hyakunichi, p. 153.
20. Wickert, John Rabe, p. 105.
21. Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safey Zone, p. 21.
22. Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China, p. 195.
23. BN, p. 175.
24. See Chapter 12, Note 59.
25. Smalley, op. cit., p. 43.
26. Wickert, John Rabe, p. 130.
27. EABN, Part 8 in Kaiko (November 1984), p. 7.
28. Wickert, John Rabe, p. 121f.
29. Ibid., p. 122.
30. Ibid., p. 261.
31. Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 5.
32. Bates, op. cit. He refers to prisoners of war as “military prisoners.”
33. For example, see Hsü, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, p. 60.
34. Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee, p. 19.
35. See Chapter 13, Note 54.
36. See Chapter 13, Note 65.
37. See Chapter 13, Note 64.
38. See Chapter 13, Note 67.

366

NOTES

367

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sources written between the eve of the fall of Nanking andMarch 1938
I.

In Japanese

Abegg, Lily. “Nankin Dasshutsuki” (Escape from Nanking). Bungei
Shunju, February 1938.
Akimoto Ken, ed. Nankin Eiga Fukkokuhan Shirîzu (Reprints from
Film Records of the Battle of Nanking, Series 21). Kokusho
Kankokai, 1997.
“Arison Jiken Kaiketsu Su” (The Allison Incident Is Resolved).
Kokusai Chishiki oyobi Hyoron (International Scholarship andCommentary), March 1938. Nihon Kokusai Kyokai.
Dokuritsu Kojo Juhohei Daini Daitai (4th Independent Siege Heavy
Artillery Battalion). “Shinjo Senkakumonchin Fukin Sento Shoho:
Junigatsu Jusannichi Gozen Ichiji - Junigatsu Jusannichi Shogo”(Battle Report for Engagements in the Vicinity of Xianhe Gate,
Xinya, Between 0100 Hours and 1200 Hours on December 13).
“Eibei Kansen Gosha Jiken to I Kisha no Sonan” (Incident Involving
the Accidental Shelling of British and American Warships and theUnfortunate Fate of an Italian Journalist). Kokusai Chishiki oyobi
Hyoron (International Scholarship and Commentary), Feburary
1938. Nihon Kokusai Kyokai.
Hohei Daikyu Rentai Daini Daitai (2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry
Regiment). “Tosuichin Fukin Sento Shoho Daihachigo: Showa
Juninen Junigatsu Muika - Junigatsu Yoka” (Battle Report No. 8:
Engagements in the Vicinity of Tangshuizhen 12/06 - 12/08/1937).
Hohei Daikyu Rentai Daini Daitai (2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry
Regiment). “Shikinsan Fukin Sento Shoho Daikyugo: Showa
Juninen Junigatsu Kokonoka - Junigatsu Jusannnichi” (Battle
Report No. 9: Engagements in the Vicinity of Zijinshan 12/09 12/13/37).
Hohei Dairokujuroku Rentai Daini Daitai (2nd Battalion, 66th Infantry
Regiment). “Hohei Dairokujuroku Rentai Daini Daitai Jinchu
Nisshi” (War Journal of the 2nd Battalion, 66th Infantry Regiment).
Hohei Daisanjuroku Rentai. “Chushina Homen ni Okeru Kodo
Gaiyo: Showa Juninen Kugatsu Kokonoka - Juyonen Shichigatsu

368

INDEX

Juichinichi” (Central China Area Operation Outline: 09/09/37 07/11/39).
Hora Tomio, ed. Nicchu Senso Nankin Daigyakusatsu Jiken Shiryoshu(2) Eibun Shiryohen (Source Material Relating to the Great Nanking
Massacre during the Second Sino Japanese War, Vol. 2:
English-Language Sources). Aoki Shoten, 1986.
Ishii Hisashi, ed. Kachu Senbu Kosaku: Jugonen Senso Gokuhi Shiryo,
Dai 13 Shu (Central China [Placation/Conciliation] Operations: 15
Years of Top-Secret War Records, Vol. 13). Fuji Shuppan, 1989.
“Kanraku Zen’ya no Nankin” (The Eve of the Fall of Nanking).
Kokusai Chishiki oyobi Hyoron (International Scholarship andCommentary), February 1938. Nihon Kokusai Kyokai.
“Nankin Anzen Chitai Fushonin Seimei” (Announcement of Refusal
To Recognize Nanking Safety Zone). Gaiko Jiho (Foreign Affairs
Review), No. 794. Gaiko Jihosha, January 1, 1938.
Nankin Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai Hen (Nanking Incident ResearchGroup). Nankin Jiken Shiryoshu: (1) Amerika Kankei Shiryo Hen(Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References).
Aoki Shoten, 1992.
Nankin Jiken Chosa Kenkyukai Hen (Nanking Incident ResearchGroup). Nankin Jiken Shiryoshu: (1) Chugoku Kankei Shiryo Hen(Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 2: Chinese References).
Aoki Shoten, 1992.
“Nankin Kanrakugo no Kokkyo Ryoto Kankei” (Nationalist andCommunist Party Relations After the Fall of Nanking). Toa (EastAsia), February 1938. Zaidan Hojin Toa Keizai Chosa Kyoku.
“Nankin Kanrakugo no Sho Seiken” (Chiang’s Government After the
Fall of Nanking). Kokusai Chishiki oyobi Hyoron (International
Scholarship and Commentary), February 1938. Nihon Kokusai
Kyokai.
“Nankin ni Jichi Iinkai Seiritsu Su” (Self-Government Committee
Established in Nanking).
Kokusai Chishiki oyobi Hyoron(International Scholarship and Commentary), February 1938.
Nihon Kokusai Kyokai.
Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai Hen (Battle of Nanking Editorial
Committee). Nankin Senshi (The Battle of Nanking). Kaikosha,
1993.
Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai Hen (Battle of Nanking Editorial
Committee). Nankin Senshi Shiryoshu I (Source Material Relating
to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 1). Kaikosha, 1993.
Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai Hen (Battle of Nanking Editorial

INDEX

369

Committee). Nankin Senshi Shiryoshu II (Source Material Relating
to the Battle of Nanking, Vol. 2). Kaikosha, 1993.
Timperley, Harold, ed.
Gaikokujin no Mita Nihongun no Boko(Japanese Army Atrocities as Witnessed by a Foreigner).
Hyodensha, 1982.
II.

In other languages

Abegg, Lily. “Wie wir aus Nanking flüchteten: Die letzten Tage inder Haupstadt Chinas” (Escape from Nanking: Our Last Days in
China’s Capital). Frankfurter Zeitung, December 19, 1937.
Anonymous. “Japan’s ‘Danse Macabre’ in Nanking.” China Forum,
March 19, 1938.
K.B. “Events and Comments: The War in China.” The China
Journal, January 1938.
K.B.
“Events and Comments: The War Continues.” The China
Journal, February 1938.
Bruce, George. Shanghai’s Undeclared War. Shanghai: Mercury
Press, 1937.
Durdin, Tillman. Butchery Marked Capture of Nanking, in The New
York Times, December 18, 1937.
Esther Tappert Mortensen papers, Record Group No. 21, Box 7, Folder
120,, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Divinity School Library.
H.C.
“One Year of Sino-Japanese Conflict.”
China Quarterly,
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The China Year Book 1938. Shanghai: The North China Daily News
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Fitch, Robert. “The Christian Church and War Relief.” The Chinese
Recorder, March 1938.
Minnie Vautrinʹs letter: A Review of the First Month―December 13,
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Nielsen, Peter. “The Nanking Atrocities.” China Today, January
1938.
“Outstanding Events in the Sino-Japanese War.” The China Weekly
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Steele, Archibald. Nanking Massacre Story: Japanese Troops Kill
Thousands, in The Chicago Daily News, December 15, 1937.

370

INDEX

Timperley, Harold, ed. Japanese Terror in China, 1938. New York:
Books for Library Press, 1969.
Vautrin, Minnie. Minnie Vautrinʹs Diary 1937-1940, in: Miscellaneous
Personal Papers Collection, Record Group No.8, Box 206, New
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Zhang Kaiyuan, ed. Eyewitnessets to Massacre: American Missionaries
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Sharpe, 2001.

Sources written between April 1938 and the first anniversary of theSecond Sino-Japanese War (July 1938)
Anonymous. “Review of the First Year of the War.” The China
Weekly Review, July 9, 1938.
Chinese Nationalist Party, ed. Chuo Sendenbu Kokusai Sendensho
Kosaku Gaiyo: 1938 Nen Kara 1941 Nen 4 Gatsu(The Outline of
Maneuvering of International Information Division, Ministry ofInformation: from 1938 to April 1941), Chungking: The Chinese
Nationalist Party 1941, mimeograph.
Chinese Nationalist Party’s Ministry of Information, ed. JapaneseMilitary Atrocities Witnessed by Foreigners, 1938.
National Military Council of the Nationalist Government, ed. Recordof Atrocities Committed by the Japanese Enemy, National Military
Council of the Nationalist Government 1938.
Deutsche Gesandschaft/Botschaft in China:
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Konflikt, Dezember 1937-January 1939 (The German Embassy inChina: The Sino-Japanese Conflict, December 1937 - January
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H.C. “One Year of the Sino-Japanese Conflict.” China Quarterly,
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“Editorials: A Year of Undeclared War.” The China Critic, July 7,
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Norton, Robert. “One Year of War.” China Today, July 1938.
“One Year of the Sino-Japanese War: Review Questions for Study
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Smythe, Lewis S.C. War Damage in the Nanking Area, December 1937
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Committee, November 1937 to April 1939, in: Miner SearleINDEX

371

Batesʹs Papers, Record Group No. 10, Box102, Folder 867, New
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South, Peter. “Nanking and Taierchwang — Where Japan Lost theWar.” The China Weekly Review, June 11, 1938.
Sowerby, Arthur de C. “One Year of Undeclared War in China.”
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Vautrin, Minnie. “Sharing ‘the Abundant Life’ in a Refugee Camp.”
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Sources written between August 1938 and 1940
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In JapaneseHai Yan, ed. Konichi Gunsei Daigakuno Doutai. (Evolution of theAnti-Japanese Military and Political College). Hanko Doinsha,
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Helsey, Edouard. “Shina Jihen Mita Mama” (Witness to The Second
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Isobe Eiichi, ed. Jusannenban Saishin Shina Yoran (New Survey ofChina: 1938 Edition). Toa Kenkyukai, 1938.
Kachu Gensei:
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Taoka Ryoichi.
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Abegg, Lily. Chinas Erneuerung: Der Raum als Waffe (The Renewalof China:
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Frankfurt am Main:
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The China Year Book 1939. Shanghai: The North-China Daily News

372

INDEX

& Herald, 1939.
The Chinese Year Book 1938-39, Prepared from Official Sources by theCouncil of International Affairs, Chunking. Shanghai, 1939.
(Klaus Reprint, 1968)
Hsü Shuhsi, ed. A Digest of Japanese War Conduct. Shanghai: Kelly& Walsh, 1939.
Hsü Shuhsi, ed. Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone. Shanghai:
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Hsü Shuhsi, ed. The War Conduct of the Japanese. Shanghai: Kelly& Walsh, 1938
Tsu Y.Y. “The Christian Church in War-time Service.” China
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Sources written between 1941 and August 1945
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In JapaneseAsahi Shinbunsha Chuo Chosakai Hen (Asahi Shinbun Central
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Buck, Pearl.
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Farrère, Claude. “Shina Kiko” (Travels in China). Shina (China),
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Hora Tomio, ed. Nicchu Senso Nankin Daigyakusatsu Jiken Shiryoshu(1) Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban Kankei Shiryohen (Source Material
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Ichiki Yoshimichi, ed. Nankin (Nanking). Nankin Nippon Shoko
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Rikugun Gahosha. Shina Jihen: Senseki no Shiori (The Second
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Somukyoku (Administration Department of Ministry of Greater

INDEX

373

East Asia), 1943.
II.

In English

Snow, Edgar.

The Battle for Asia.

Shanghai:

Kelly & Walsh, 1941.

Sources written after September 1945
I.

In JapaneseAra Kenichi. “Jorui: Heishitachi no Nankin Jiken” (Fortress:
Soldiers’ Recollections of The Nanking Incident). Maru, January
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Ara Kenichi. Kikigaki: Nankin Jiken (Interviews With Witnesses to
the Nanking Incident). Tosho Shuppansha, 1987.
Adachi Sumio. Gendai Senso Hokiron (Theory of Modern Regulations
Governing War). Keiseisha, 1979.
Aso Tetsuo. Shanhai yori Shanhai e (From Shanghai to Shanghai).
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Awaya Kentaro, Yoshida Yutaka, eds.
Kokusai Kensatsukyoku:
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Boei Kenshujo Senshishitsu. (Defense Research Institute, Military
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Chen Shunchen. Chugoku Rekishi no Tabi (Journey Through China’s
History). Shueisha Bunko, 1997.
Chen Shunchen. Chugoku no Rekishi 6: Sekai Teikoku e (Chinese
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Date Muneyoshi. Chugoku Kyosanto Ryakushi (A Short History of theChinese Communist Party). Takushoku University, 1991.
Doi Shinji. Hana to Shi: Omoide no Izumi (Flowers and Poems: A
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374

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Great Nanking Massacre Was Manufactured). Tendensha, 1995.
Fuji Nobuo. Watakushi no Mita Tokyo Saiban (Witness to the Tokyo
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Fujioka Nobukatsu.
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Fujioka Nobukatsu.
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Fujioka Nobukatsu. Ojoku no Kingendaishi (The Disgraces of Modern
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Fujiwara Akira. Shinpan Nankin Daigyakusatsu (The Great Nanking
Massacre: New Edition). Iwanami Shoten, 1992.
Fukuda Tokuyasu. “Timperley Hodo no Shinso” (The Truth About
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MainichiShinbunsha, 1979.
Goto Kosaku, ed. Nankin Sakusen no Shinso: Kumamoto Dairoku
Shidan Senki (The Truth about the Nanking Campaign: War
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Shobo, 1995.
Guo Moruo (Okazaki Toshio, tr.) Konichisen Kaisoroku (The Memoirof the War Against Japan). Chuo Koronsha, 1959.
Hamasaki Tomizo.
Doronko no Hei (Mud-Covered Soldiers).
Self-published, 1970.
Hamasaki Tomizo. Zoku Doronko no Hei (Mud-Covered Soldiers,
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Hammer, Joshua. “Reipu de Umareta Kodomotachi” (Born Under a
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Hata Ikuhiko.
Gendaishi no Soten (Modern History:
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Bungei Shunju, 1998.
Hata Ikuhiko.
Nankin Jiken (The Nanking Incident).
Chuko
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Hata Ikuhiko. Rokokyo Jiken no Kenkyu (Study of the Marco Polo
Bridge Incident). Tokyo University, 1997.
Higashinakano Shudo. “Aratamete Rabe no Nikki wo Tettei Kensho
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Higashinakano Shudo. “Nankin Jiken no Shinso” (The Truth About
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Japan Cultural Research Institute, 1996.

INDEX

375

Higashinakano Shudo. “Nankin Tokumu Kikan (Mantetsu Shain)
Maruyama Susumu Shi no Kaiso” (Mission in Nanking:(Manchurian
Railway
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Higashinakano Shudo. “Tsukurareta Jiken: Nankin Daigyakusatsu(1 - 8)” (Fabricated Incident: The Great Nanking Massacre, Parts
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Nos. 22 - 28, 1993.
Higashinakano Shudo. “Yahari Rabe no Nikki wa Santo Shiryo:
Itakura Yoshiaki Shi no Hihan ni Kotaeru” (Rabe’s Diary Is a
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Yoshiaki). Seiron, July 1998.
Higashinakano Shudo, ed. Nankin Gyakusatsu Kenkyu No Saizensen
2002 (The Frontline of the Study on the “Nanking Massacre,”2002), Tokyo: Tendensha, 2002.
Higashinakano Shudo, ed. Nankin Gyakusatsu Kenkyu No Saizensen
2003 (The Frontline of the Study on the “Nanking Massacre,”2003), Tokyo: Tendensha, 2003.
Higashinakano Shudo, ed. Nankin Gyakusatsu Kenkyu No Saizensen
2004 (The Frontline of the Study on the “Nanking Massacre,”2004), Tokyo: Tendensha, 2004.
Honda Katsuichi. “Nachi Doitsu wo mo Kyogaku Seshimeta Nankin
Daibogyaku Jiken” (Atrocities in Nanking that Astonished Even
Nazi Germany). Asahi Journal, January 25, 1991.
Honda Katsuichi. Nankin e no Michi (The Road to Nanking). Asahi
Shinbunsha, 1987. (Paperback: Asahi Bunko, 1994.)
Honda Katsuichi, ed. Sabakareta Nankin Daigyakusatsu (Judgementon the Great Nanking Massacre). Banseisha, 1989.
Honda Katsuichi. Travels in China, Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 1972.
Hora Tomio. Ketteiban: Nankin Daigyakusatsu (The Authoritative
Version of the Great Nanking Massacre). Tokuma Shoten, 1987.
Hora Tomio. Nankin Daigyakusatsu no Shomei (Proof of the Great
Nanking Massacre). Asahi Shinbunsha, 1987.
Ichiko Chuzo.
Sekai no Rekishi 20:
Chugoku no Kindai(Twentieth-Century World History: China in the Modern Age).
Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1990.
Ishii Itaro. Gaikokan no Issho (A Diplomatic Career). Chuko Bunko,
1992.
Ishikawa Tadahisa. Nankin Monogatari (The Story of Nanking).
Shueisha, 1987.

376

INDEX

Itakura Yoshiaki. “Nankin Daigyakusatsu no Shinso (Zoku)” (TheTruth About The Great Nanking Massacre). Sekai to Nihon (TheWorld and Japan), No. 420, 1984.
Itakura Yoshiaki. “Nankin Jiken: Gyakusatsu no Sekininron” (TheNanking Incident: Responsibility for the “Massacre”). Gunji
Shigakkai Hen. Nicchu Senso no Shoso (Aspects of the Second
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Itakura Yoshiaki. “Nankin Jiken no Suryoteki Kenkyu (The Nanking
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Quantitative Research).
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Itakura Yoshiaki. Tettei Kensho: Nankin Jiken no Shinjitsu (AnExhaustive Investigation:
The Truth About the Nanking
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Kaizuka Shigeki, Oshima Toshikazu. Sekai no Rekishi 3: Chugoku no
Akebono (World History 3: The Emergence of China). Kawade
Shobo Shinsha, 1989.
Kasahara Tokushi. Nankin Jiken (The Nanking Incident). Iwanami
Shoten, 1997.
Kasahara Tokushi. Nankin Nanminku no Hyakunichi (One Hundred
Days in the Nanking Refugee Zone). Iwanami Shoten, 1995.
Katogawa Kotaro.
“Shogen ni yoru Nankin Senshi:
Sono
Sokatsuteki Kosatsu” (Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of
Nanking: A Comprehensive Examination). Kaiko, March 1985.
Kawabe Torajiro. Ichigayadai kara Ichigayadai e (From Ichigayadai to
Ichigayadai). Jiji Tsushinsha, 1962.
Kawakatsu Yoshio.
Chugoku no Rekishi 3:
Gishin Nanbokucho(History of China 3: The Era of Two Dynasties). Kodansha,
1964.
Kimura Kuninori. Koseiha Shogun: Nakajima Kesago (A Rugged
Individualist: General Nakajima Kesago). Kojinsha, 1987.
Kimura Kuninori.
“Nankin Koryakusen:
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Zokan Rekishi to Jinbutsu(History and People: Special Edition), December 1984.
Kisanshi Hensan Iinkai (Committee for the Compilation of theHistory of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment). Kihei Daisan Rentaishi(History of the 3rd Cavalry Division), 1978.
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Kiyose Ichiro. Hiroku: Tokyo Saiban (Secret Records from the TokyoINDEX

377

Trials). Chuko Bunko, 1992.
Kobayashi Yoshinori. Shin Gomanizumu Sengen Supesharu: Sensoron(A New Declaration of Arrogant-ism: Military Theory Special).
Gentosha, 1998.
Ko Bunyu. Ari no Mama no Chugoku (The Real China). Nihon
Bungeisha, 1996.
Ko Bunyu. Netsuzo Sareta Nihonshi (The Fabrication of Japanese
History). Nihon Bungeisha, 1997.
Ko Bunyu. Norowareta Chugokujin: Chugoku Shokujinshi no Judaina
Imi (The Chinese Curse:
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Throughout Chinese History). Kobunsha, Kappa Books, 1990.
Kobori Keiichiro, ed. Saikensho: Tokyo Saiban (Reexamination of theTokyo Trials). PHP Kenkyujo, 1996.
Kobori Keiichiro, ed. Tokyo Saiban: Nihon no Benmei (The Tokyo
Trials: Japan’s Defense). Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 1995.
Kojima Noboru. Nicchu Senso (The Sino-Japanese War). Bunshun
Bunko, 1993 (First printing: 1984).
Kokusai Hogakkai Hen (International Law Society of Japan).
Kokusaiho Jiten (International Law Dictionary).
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Komuro Naoki, Watanabe Shoichi. Fuin no Showashi (Sealed Showa
Era History). Tokuma Shoten, 1995.
Komuro Naoki, Watanabe Shoichi. Mizukara Kuni wo Tsubusu no ka?
(Are We Going To Destroy Our Own Nation?). Tokuma Shoten,
1993.
Lattimore, Owen (Haruki Takeshi, tr.). Ajia no Kaiketsu (Solution inAsia). Aoyama Gakuin Law Society, 1970.
Lindbergh, Charles A. (Shinjo Tetsuo, tr.). Lindbergh Dainiji Taisen
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Shinchosha, 1974.
Maeda Yuji. Senso no Nagare no Naka ni (Caught in the Current of
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Maruyama Susumu. “Nankin Jiken no Jisso” (The Realities of the
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Meiji Taisho Showa Shinbun Kenkyukai (Meiji, Taisho, Showa Period
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378

INDEX

Mitamura Taisuke. Sekai no Rekishi 14: Min to Shin (World History
14: Ming and Qing Dynasties). Kawade Shobo Shinsha, 1990.
Morohashi Tetsuji. Daikanwa Jiten (Chinese Character Dictionary).
Taishukan Shoten, 1968.
Muguruma Seijiro. Sekishunfu: Waga Seishun no Omoide (Memories
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Nagoshi Futaranosuke.
Hannichi Kokka:
Nippon (Japan, theAnti-Japanese Nation). Yamate Shobo, 1984.
Naito Chishu. Shigaku Gairon (An Outline of Historiography).
Fukumura Shoten, 1961 (First printing, 1932).
Nakamura Akira. Dai Toa Senso e no Michi (The Road to the Great
Asian War). Tendensha, 1990.
Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai (Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee).
Nankin Senshi (The Battle of Nanking). Kaikosha, 1993.
Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai (Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee).
Nankin Senshi Shiryoshu I (Source Material Relating to the Battleof Nanking, Vol. 1). Kaikosha, 1993.
Nankin Senshi Henshu Iinkai (Battle of Nanking Editorial Committee).
Nankin Senshi Shiryoshu II (Source Material Relating to the Battleof Nanking, Vol. 2). Kaikosha, 1993.
Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo (Japanese Institute for the Study ofInternational Problems). Chugoku Kyosantoshi Shiryoshu (Chinese
Communist Party History: Source Materials), Vol. 9. Kyoso
Shobo, 1974.
Nishio Kanji.
Kotonaru Higeki:
Nihon to Doitsu (Disparate
Tragedies: Japan and Germany). Bunshun Bunko, 1997.
Nishio Kanji. Rekishi wo Sabaku Orokasa (The Folly of Judging
History). PHP Kenkyujo, 1997.
Nishio Kanji, Fujioka Nobukatsu.
Kokumin no Yudan: Rekishi
Kyokasho ga Abunai (An Indifferent Nation: Imperiled History
Textbooks). PHP Kenkyujo, 1997.
Nishizawa Benkichi. Warera no Tairiku Senki: Hohei Dairokujuroku
Rentai Daisan Chutai no Ayumi (Our Battles in China:
3rdCompany, 66th Regiment). Self-published, 1972.
Nitta Mitsuo, ed. Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokkiroku (Reports of
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East). Yushodo
Shoten, 1968.
Oi Mitsuru. Shikumareta “Nankin Daigyakusatsu” (How the “Nanking
Massacre” Was Invented). Tendensha, 1995.
Okada Yuji. Nicchu Senso Urakataki (The Second Sino-Japanese War:
Behind the Scenes). Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1974.

INDEX

379

Okumiya Masatake. Shinjuwan made no Gojunen (The 50 Years
Preceding Pearl Harbor). PHP Kenkyujo, 1995.
Okumiya Masatake. Watakushi no Mita Nankin Jiken (Witness to the
Nanking Incident). PHP Kenkyujo, 1997.
Ono Kenji, Fujiwara Akira, Honda Katsuichi, eds.
NankinDaigyakusatsu wo Kiroku Shita Kogun Heishitachi (Imperial Army
Soldiers’ Accounts of the Great Nanking Massacre). Otsuki
Shoten, 1996.
Rabe, John (Hirano Kyoko, tr.). Nankin no Shinjitsu (The Truth About
Nanking). Kodansha, 1997.
Rengogun Soshireibu Minkan Joho Kyoikukyoku Shiryo Teikyo (Civil
Information and Education Division, Allied Headquarters)(Nakaya Ken’ichi, tr.). Taiheiyo Sensoshi (History of the PacificWar). Takayama Shoin, 1946.
Sankei Shinbunsha. Sho Kaiseki Hiroku (Chiang Kai-Shek’s Secret
Records). Sankei Shinbunsha Shuppankyoku, 1976.
Sasaki Motokatsu. Yasen Yubinki (Field Post Office Flag). Gendai
Shiryo Center Shuppankai, 1973.
Sasaki Motokatsu. (Zoku) Yasen Yubinki (Field Post Office Flag, Part
2). Gendai Shiryo Center Shuppankai, 1973.
Sasaki Toichi. Aru Gunjin no Shogai (Journal of a Career Officer).
Futsusha, 1963.
Sasayama Haruo, Okuda Yoshio.
Chugaku Shakai:
Rekishi(Middle-School Social Studies:
History).
Kyoiku Shuppan.
Approved by the Ministry of Education on February 29, 1996.
Sato Kazuo. Kenpo Kyujo, Shinryaku Senso, Tokyo Saiban (Article Nineof the Japanese Constitution, War of Aggression, and the Tokyo
Trials). Hara Shobo, 1991.
Sato Kazuo, ed. Sekai ga Sabaku Tokyo Saiban (The Tokyo Trials: The
World Passes Judgement). Jupiter Shuppan, 1996.
Senso Giseisha wo Kokoro ni Kizamu Kaihen (Association for theCommemoration of the War Dead). Nankin Daigyakusatsu toGenbaku (The Great Nanking Massacre and the Atomic Bomb).
Toho Shuppan, 1995.
Smedley, Agnes (Takasugi Ichiro, tr.) Chugoku no Utagoe (Battle
Hymn of China). Misuzu Shobo, 1966.
Smedley, Agnes (Abe Tomoji, tr.). Idai naru Michi (The Great Road).
Iwanami Shoten, 1963.
Snow, Edgar (Takahashi Tadashi, tr.). Konichi Kaiho no Chugoku(Edgar Snow’s China). Simul Shuppankai, 1986.
Snow, Edgar (Usami Seijiro, tr.). Shinpan Chugoku no Akai Hoshi (Red

380

INDEX

Star Over China: Revised Edition). Chikuma Shobo, 1972.
Suzuki Akira. Nankin Daigyakusatsu no Maboroshi (The Illusion of aGreat Nanking Massacre). Bungei Shunju, 1982.
Suzuki Chusei. Shincho Chukishi Kenkyu (Research on Mid-Qing
Dynasty History). Aichi Daigaku Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo,
1952.
Suzuki Akira. Shin Nankin Daigyakusatsu No Maboroshi (New Edition,
The Illusion of the ʺNanking Massacreʺ), Tokyo: Asuka Shinsha,
1999.
Takahashi Shiro. Kensho: Sengo Kyoiku (An Examination of Postwar
Education). Koike Gakuen Shuppanbu, 1995.
Takahashi Shiro. Rekishi no Soshitsu (The Forfeiture of a National
History). Sogo Horei, 1997.
Takikawa Masajiro. “Yoshu Tokaki to Nankin Daigyakusatsu Jiken”(Ten Days in Yangzhou and the Great Nanking Massacre). Sokoku
to Seinen (The Fatherland and Young Men), July and August, 1985.
Tanaka Masaaki. Nankin Gyakusatsu no Kyoko (The Fabrication of
the Nanking Massacre). Nihon Kyobunsha, 1984.
Tanaka Masaaki. Nankin Jiken no Sokatsu (A Comprehensive Study of
the Nanking Incident). Kenkosha, 1987.
Tanaka Seigen.
Tanaka Seigen Jiden (Autobiography).
BungeiShunju, 1993.
Tanigawa Michio, Mori Masao, eds. Chugoku Minshu Hanranshi (TheHistory of Rebellion in China). Toyo Bunko, Heibonsha, 1983.
Tokyo Saiban Kenkyukai (IMTFE Research Association). Kyodo
Kenkyu: Paru Hanketsusho (Joint Research: The Pal Judgment).
Kodansha Gakujutsu Bunko, 1989.
Tokyo Saiban Shiryo Kankokai Hen (IMTFE Document PublishingGroup).
Tokyo
Saiban Kyakka Miteishutsu Bengogawa Shiryo(Defense Exhibits Rejected by the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East). Kokusho Kankokai, 1995.
Tsutsui Jakusui. Gendai Shiryo: Kokusai Ho (Modern References:
International Law). Yuhikaku, 1987.
Ukai Toshisada, ed. Shina Jihen: Dai Toa Senso Shashinshu (The
Second Sino-Japanese War: Photographs from the Great Asian
War). Hohei Daiyonjugo Rentaishi Hensan Iinkai, 1983.
Unemoto Masami. Shijitsu no Waikyoku (Distorting Historical Fact).
Kakubunsha, 1992.
Unemoto Masami. “Shogen ni yoru Nankin Senshi (1) - (11)”(Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking, 1-11.) Kaiko, April
1984 - February 1985.

INDEX

381

Watanabe Shoichi. Mankenkyo ni hoeru: Kyokasho Mondai no Okori
wo Tsuku (How Rumors Begot Rumors: Pinpointing the Origin of
the Textbook Problem). Tokuma Bunko, 1997.
Watanabe Shoichi.
Nihonjin no Kigai (Japanese Pride).
PHP
Kenkyujo, 1998.
Yamamoto Shichihei. Watakushi no Naka no Nihongun (What theJapanese Army Means to Me). Bunshun Bunko, 1983.
Yamamoto Soji, ed.
Kokusai Joyakushu 1995 (Anthology ofInternational Treaties: 1995). Yuhikaku, 1995.
Yoshida Yutaka. Tenno no Guntai to Nankin Jiken (The Emperor’s
Soldiers and the Nanking Incident). Aoki Shoten, 1988.
Zawodny, Janusz K. (Nakano Goro, tr.). Katein no Mori no Yoru to
Kiri (Night and Fog in the Katyn Forest). Yomiuri Shinbunsha,
1963.
II.

In other languages

Chang, Iris. The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of WorldWar II. New York: Basic Books, 1997.
Chen Yizhan, ed. Chinese History: A New Edition. Hong Kong:
Lingji Publishing Co., 1972 (Second printing, 1975).
Cobuild English Dictionary. Harper Collins Publishers, 1995.
Dyregrov, Atle, Magne Raundalen, and Rolf Gjestad. Children’s
Exposure to War Scenes in Rwanda. UNICEF, 1994.
Eidgenössiches Justiz und Polizeidepartment (Hrsg.) (Federal Justiceand Police Department).
Zivilverteidigung (Civil Defense).
Aalau: Miles Verlag, 1969.
Fei Fei Li, Robert Sabella and David Liu, ed. Nanking 1937: Memoryand Healing, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002.
Grosser Atlas zur Weltgeschichte: Von der Entstehung der Welt bis zur
Gegenwart (Comprehensive Atlas of World History: From the
Beginning of the World to the Present). Köln: Lingen Verlag,
1988.
Hammer, Joshua.
“Born Under a Bad Sign.” Newsweek, September
23, 1996.
Ho Yingching. Chunichi Kankei To Sekai No Zenshin (Chinese-Japanese
Relations and the Advancement of the World) translated by the
Association of Chinese-Japanese Culture and Economy, Taipei:
Shochu Publishing.
Kristof, Nicholas D., Sheryl Wudunn. China Wakes: The Struggle for
the Soul of a Rising Power. Vintage Books, 1995.

382

INDEX

Lattimore, Owen. Solution in Asia. Boston: Little, Brown andCompany, 1945.
Office of History, ed. Chinese History, Vol.4, Beijing: Peopleʹs
Education Publisher, 1997.
Röling, Bert, C. F. Rüter, eds.
The Tokyo Judgement, 2 vols.
Amsterdam: APA-University Press, 1977.
Tao Jizhong, ed. Nanjing Tourist Map. Jiangsu People’s PublishingCo., 1992.
Wang Ling Xiao. Chugoku Kokuminto Shimbun Seisaku No Kenkyu(AStudy of Chinese Nationalist Partyʹs Newspaper Policy), Party
History Committee of the Chinese Nationalist Partyʹs Central
Committee, Taipei: 1996.
Wang Zhijiu, Song Guozhu. Handbook for Middle-School History
Teachers. Shanghai Educational Publishing Company, 1958.
Wickert, Erwin, ed. (John E. Woods, tr.). The Good Man of Nanking:
The Diaries of John Rabe. Alfred A. Knopf, 1998.
Zawodny, K. Zum Beispiel Katyn: Klärung eines Kriegsverbrechens(Katyn:Elucidation of a War Crime).
Munich:VerlagInformation und Wissen, 1971.
Zeng Xubai. Zeng Xubaiʹs Autobiography , Taipei: Shokukei Publishing,
1988.

Other Sources
I.

In Japanese

Abend, Hallett (Azusa Takio, tr.). Kuzureyuku Shina (Tortured
China). Nihon Koronsha, 1938.
Atsuta Ko and others. Chugaku Shakai Rekishi Bunya (Social Studies forjunior high schools: The Field of History). Osaka: Osaka Shoseki,
1999.
Farjenel, Fernand (Ishikawa Yu, Ishikawa Fumi, trs.).
Shingai
Kakumei Kenbunki (Witness to the Xinhai Revolution). Toyo
Bunko, Heibonsha, 1975.
Fujii Sen’ei. Shinshaku Kanbun Taikei 5: Junshi (New Anthology ofChinese Literature with Commentary 5: Xunzi). Meiji Shoin,
1968.
Li Luzhou. Nankin Seifu no Jisso (The Realities of the Nanking
Government). Toakai, 1935.
Lindley, Augustus F. (Masui Tsuneo, Imamura Yoshio, trs.). Taihei

INDEX

383

Tengoku (History of the Taiping Rebellion). Toyo Bunko,
Heibonsha, 1974.
Luo Guanzhong (Tatsuma Shosuke, tr.). Chugoku Koten Bungaku
Taikei 27: Shiengi (Anthology of Classical Chinese Literature 27:
Romance of the Three Kingdoms). Heibonsha, 1979.
Maeda Toru. Ruuzuberuto Hiroku-gekan (Roosevelt’s Secret Records,
vol. 2). Tokyo: Fusosha, 2000
Shiba Goro, Hattori Unokichi. Pekin Rojo Hoka (Siege in Beijing andOther Stories). Heibonsha, 1977.
Shiba Sen. Shiki (Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s Historical Records). Chikuma
Gakugei Bunko, 1995.
Wakokubon Seishi Shinjo (Authorized History (Reprinted in Japan).
Kyuko Shoin, 1971.
II.

In other languages

Abend, Hallett. Tortured China. New York: Ives Washburn, 1930.
Bacque, James. Other Losses: An Investigation into the Mass Deaths ofGerman Prisoners at the Hands of the French and Americans After
World War II, Toronto: Stodart Publishing 1990.
The China Year Book 1914. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1914.
The China Year Book 1928. Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, 1928.
The Chinese Year Book 1935-1936: Premier Issue. Shanghai: The
Chinese Year Book Co., 1935.
Yang Jialuo, ed. Xinxiao Zizhitongjian Zhu (Revised Commentary ofComprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government).
World
Publishing Co., 1962.
Theodore H..White. In Search of History: A Personal Adventure, New
York: Harper Row Publishers, 1978.

384

INDEX

385

INDEX
A
Abegg, Lily ····················································· 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 209, 235, 236, 241
Abend, Hallett ········································································· 1, 9, 13, 16, 140, 141
Akiyama Yoshimitsu ················································································· 119, 121
Allison, John ································································ 148, 184, 272, 283, 284, 292
Ara Kenichi ········································································ 71, 74, 81, 193, 245, 308
Araumi Kiyoe ········································································································ 94
Asahi Shinbun ················································································· 57, 201, 241, 295
Asaka Yasuhiko (Prince) ······················································································ 18
Atcheson, George ·································································································· 37

BBacque,James··········································································································· i
Bai Chongxi ····································································································· 24, 25, 36
Bates, Miner Searle ······ 385, 34, 132, 141, 143, 145, 148, 169, 174, 175, 176, 177,
179, 182, 183, 199, 202, 203, 204, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 221, 228, 229,
230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 252, 254, 260, 262, 263, 265,
266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284,
294, 295, 297, 299, 312, 313
Battle of Nanking, The ·································47, 54, 75, 93, 105, 107, 114, 117, 152, 217
Baying ························································································································ 102
Boxer Rebellion ············································································································· 2
Buck, Lossing ···································································································· 183, 211

C
Chang, Iris ····························································································· ii, 150, 178, 198
Cheng Huanlang ········································································································ 47
Chiang Kai-shek ·········· v, 1, 5, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 35, 36,
45, 46, 47, 53, 61, 101, 120, 141, 220, 225, 226, 228, 230, 236, 237, 240, 249, 277,
297, 306
Generalissimoʹs Statement to Friendly Nations, The ························· 225, 226
Chicago Daily News ························· 34, 37, 45, 114, 137, 147, 171, 251, 253, 278, 287
China at War ··············································································· 220, 221, 222, 224, 292
China Critic, The ······························································································ 223, 224
China Forum ·························································· 385, 147, 220, 224, 225
China Journal, The ········································································ 57, 131, 147, 226, 227
China Press ································································································· 180, 224, 309

386

INDEX

China Quarterly ·························································································· 198, 227, 233
China Today ································································································ 228, 229, 230
China Weekly Review, The ····················································· 57, 58, 141, 167, 228, 229
China Year Book, The ······················· 13, 30, 35, 178, 193, 203, 213, 219, 220, 222, 225,
228, 236, 237
Chinese Recorder, The ···················································································· 174, 311
Chinese Red Cross Society ······················································································ 203
Chinese Year Book, The ··············································· 214, 215, 234, 235, 240, 241, 277
Chongshantang ························································································· 201, 204, 312
Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government ·····················································
9Coville, Cabot ··························································································· 148, 221, 283

D
Daily reports of serious injuries to civilians ······························· iii, 291,
294, 299
Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets ························································· 109
Defense Exhibits Rejected by the IMTFE ·································································· 5Deng Longguang ········································································································ 47
Deng Xiaoping ·········································································································· 250
Digest of Japanese War Conduct, A ··············································
214, 234, 241, 277
Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone ············ 126, 136, 140, 153, 154, 158, 160, 161,
162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 182, 183,
185, 214, 234, 235, 241, 267, 273, 277, 289, 302, 303, 308
Durdin, Tillman ··········· 27, 28, 29, 36, 40, 45, 53, 54, 55, 56, 102, 107, 112, 113, 123,
127, 138, 139, 140, 142, 172, 228, 229, 230, 241, 270, 278, 279, 280, 282, 288, 289,
290, 291, 292, 297
Duus, Masayo ··········································································································· 170

E
Endo Takaaki ···························································································· 91, 97, 98, 99
Espy, James ······················································· 113, 136, 139, 148, 241, 243, 283, 304
Evolution of the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College ·················
230, 232
Eyewitness Accounts of the Battle of Nanking ················ 27, 32, 40, 103, 108, 109, 111,
113, 115, 149, 171, 310

F
Falkenhausen, Alexander von ·················································································· 26
Farrère, Claude ····································································································· 10, 11
Final Protocol Relating to the North China Incident ·············································· 2

INDEX

387

Fitch, George ·············· 34, 132, 133, 136, 139, 140, 141, 171, 173, 175, 177, 182, 183,
189, 194, 211, 236, 254, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 276, 297
Foreign Affairs Review ···························································································· 39
Fortify-and-burn strategy ··················································································· 24, 27
Forster, Ernest ··································································································· 168, 195
Frankfurter Zeitung ··································································································· 30
Fuji Nobuo ················································································································· 245
Fujioka Nobukatsu ··································································································· 144
Fujita Kiyoshi ············································································································ 116
Fujiwara Akira ············································································ 60, 61, 62, 78, 90, 193
Fukuda Tokuyasu ···························································································· 189, 296

G
Gao Zu, Emperor ·········································································································· 9
German military advisors ························································································· 12
Gonghe Gate (Tongji Gate) ················································································· 19, 68
Gu Weijun ················································································································· 223
Guanghua Gate ········································· 41, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 117, 159, 306
Gui Zhongshu ··········································································································· 224
Guo Moruo ················································································ 231, 232, 255, 256, 278

HHague Convention · iii, 44, 60, 61, 62, 81, 82, 105, 126, 127, 128, 129, 145
Han Fuju ························································································································ 1
Hanxi Gate ································································································ 117, 213, 214
Hata Ikuhiko ······························· 4, 63, 78, 93, 104, 107, 108, 217, 303, 311, 312, 313
Hatz, Rupert ·············································································· 163, 164, 182, 301, 302
He Jian ···························································································································· 1
He Yingqin ···································································································· 24, 25, 232
Helsey, Edouard ····························································································· 11, 12, 16
Heping Gate ···························································· 19, 78, 97, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106
Hidaka Shinrokuro ···································································································· 38
Higuchi Kiichirou ·································································································· vi
Hirabayashi Sadaharu ················································································· 87, 93, 100
Historical Records ········································································································ 8Hitler, Adolf ················································ vi, 177, 197, 200, 235, 301, 304, 305, 309
Honda Katsuichi ··············································································· 161, 164, 165, 295
Hora Tomio ············································································· 60, 61, 62, 193, 217, 302
Horikoshi Fumio ······································································································ 151
Hsü Shuhsi ································································ 154, 214, 221, 234, 277, 289, 302
Hudson, Manley O. ·································································································· 167

388

INDEX

Hwan An (Huang An) ····························································································· 180

I
Ichiki Yoshimichi ······································································································ 191
Ide Nobutoki ············································································································· 121
Iinuma Mamoru ··················································· 82, 83, 103, 110, 134, 171, 180, 309
IMTFE (International Military Tribunal for the Far East) ·········· iii, 4, 6, 10, 20, 38,
48, 51, 114, 116, 126, 139, 140, 142, 158, 159, 162, 163, 168, 170, 173, 176, 177,
180, 181, 183, 196, 203, 207, 242, 243, 245, 246, 252, 283, 284, 285, 293, 294, 295,
296, 297, 299, 309
Inoie Matakazu ································································································· 123, 150
International Committee for Nanking Safety Zone ··············· 34, 35, 36, 38, 39,
45, 46, 118, 124, 125, 126, 132, 133, 136, 146, 151, 152, 153, 154, 162, 164, 175,
176, 183, 188, 189, 191, 193, 195, 196, 197, 202, 203, 205, 207, 216, 226, 235, 244,
291, 301, 302, 304, 306, 308, 309, 312
Armistice proposed by ············································································ 45, 46
Inukai Soichiro ·········································································································· 116
Isa Kazuo ··························································································· 117, 121, 124, 206
Ishii Itaro ·········································································································· 291
Itakura Yoshiaki ································································································· 71, 217
Ito Takeo ···················································································································· 201JJacquinot Zone, The ······················································································· 34, 35, 38
Jeffery, E.W. ······································· 142, 143, 148, 154, 217, 220, 241, 244, 272, 283
Jin Zhenzhong ···································································································· 2, 4, 23
Jinling Girls College ················································································· 173, 174, 311
Jodai Takuzen ··································································································· 245, 246

K
Kanamaru Yoshio ····································································································· 188
Kasahara Tokushi ················································································· 1, 160, 211, 307
Katsura Shizuo ·············································································································· 7
Kawabe Torashiro ····································································································· 17
Kawano Sangyo ········································································································ 202
Kayashima Takashi ·································································································· 6, 7
Keenan, Joseph ························································································· 243, 245, 252
Kisaki Hisashi ··········································································· 117, 171, 185, 196, 197

Kitamura Minoru ··················································································· 253

INDEX

389

Kiyose Ichiro ····································································································· 245, 246

Ko Bunyu ·································································································· 31
Kodama Yoshio ································································································ 103, 104
Kojima Noboru ····································································································· 65, 66
Kristof, Nicholas ··········································································································· 9Kröger, Christian ······························································ 140, 163, 164, 182, 301, 302

L
Lattimore, Owen ······································································································ 236
Lazarus (IMTFE defense attorney) ······································································ 4, 10
Leaf, Earl ·············································································································· 259
League of Nations resolution ········································································· 222, 223
Levine (IMTFE defense attorney) ·········································································· 6, 7
Li Hongzhang ··············································································································· 2
Li Zongren ··························································································· 24, 25, 26, 36, 55
Lin Biao ······················································································································ 230
Liu Bang ························································································································· 9Logan (IMTFE defense attorney) ··········································································· 246
Luo Yinong ···································································································· 9, 307, 309

M
Ma Pou-shang ··································································································· 180, 309
Maeda Yuji ················································································································ 150
Magee, John ················· 34, 126, 140, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 168, 181, 294
Makihara Nobuo ········································································································ 53
Mao Zedong ···························· iv, 1, 9, 221, 222, 237, 240, 247, 248, 249, 254, 292
Marco Polo Bridge Incident ······································································ 1, 2, 4, 5, 10
Maruyama Susumu ·········· 186, 187, 190, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206, 247, 312, 313
Matsui Iwane ·························· 16, 17, 18, 38, 43, 44, 45, 171, 186, 191, 244, 245, 247
Matsumoto Shigeharu ······························································································· 23
McCallum, James ····································································· 173, 180, 181, 183, 309
Meguro Fukuji ············································································································ 97
Mi Shin-shi ········································································································ 180, 309
Mills, W. Plumer ································································································· 34, 183
Ming Xiao Tomb ········································································································· 20
Miyamoto Shogo ·············································································· 87, 91, 98, 99, 100
Mizutani So ··············································································································· 123
Mori Hideo ················································································································ 194
Morozumi Gyosaku ····················· 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99
Muguruma Masajiro ················································································ 108, 109, 115
Mukai Toshiaki ········································································································· 247

390

INDEX

N
Nakajima Kesago ········································································ 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 101
Nakamura Akira ·································································································· 4, 311
Nakayama Yasuto ································································································ 20, 46
Nakazawa Mitsuo ······································································ 20, 179, 185, 195, 196
Nanking Garrison Battle Report ·············································································· 54
Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 1: American References ····· 56, 138, 142, 148,
195, 203, 211, 308
Nanking Incident Source Material, Vol. 2: Chinese References ··············· 203, 207
Nanking Invasion Outline ···················································· 19, 44, 46, 114, 115, 116
Nanking Japanese Chamber of Commerce ···················································· 30, 111
Nanking Safety Zone ·················· 19, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 45, 52, 53, 55, 56,
57, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130,131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 158, 159,
164, 179, 180, 188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 203, 211, 212, 213, 226, 233, 282, 301,
302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309, 311
Nanking Self-Government Committee ················ 153, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190,
195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205
Nanking Sweep Outline ················································································· 118, 119
Nanking, sweep of ············· 18, 19, 46, 65, 68, 69, 107, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118,
119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150,
194, 211, 217, 240
Nanshi (southern Shanghai) ········································································· 34, 38, 52
New York Times, The ··········· iii, 13, 27, 28, 36, 45, 55, 102, 107, 112, 123, 138, 139,
140, 141, 172, 178, 227, 253, 278, 279, 281, 287, 297, 308, 309
Newsweek ················································································································· 177
Nielsen, Peter ···································································································· 229, 230
Nishiura Setsuzo ······································································································ 105
Nishizawa Benkichi ··································································································· 72
Noda Tsuyoshi ········································································································· 247
North China Daily News ···················································· 147, 176, 178, 218, 219, 228
Norton, Robert ·········································································································· 229

O
Ogisu Ryuhei ·············································································································· 88
Okumiya Masatake ·········································································· 127, 128, 137, 217
Okura Kimimochi ····································································································· 171
Onishi Hajime ····················································································· 81, 193, 197, 201
Order of battle, CCAA ······························································································· 18
Orikono Suetaro ······································································································· 131
Orita Mamoru ·········································································································· 170

INDEX

391

Osaka Asahi Shinbun ················································································ 31, 198, 288
Osugi Hiroshi ········································································································ 51, 52
Ouchi Yoshihide ··································································································· 48, 49
Oyake Isaburo ····················································································· 69, 71, 73, 74, 75
Oyama Isao ····································································································· 10, 11, 13

P
Panay, U.S., The··························································································· 46, 219, 229
Powell, John ······················································································ 141, 167, 178, 228
Prisoners of war, legal qualifications ···························· 127, 128, 129, 142, 148, 312

Q
Qualifications of belligerents ·································································· 127, 128, 129

R
Rabe, John ················ 17, 34, 35, 53, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 140, 141, 150, 151,
158, 165, 169, 173, 174, 177, 182, 183, 186, 195, 197, 199, 200, 205, 207, 228, 229,
235, 241, 268, 270, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313
Records of the Department of State Regarding Political Relations between China andJapan, 1930-1944····························································
142, 144
Red Swastika Society ········ 36, 169, 185, 194, 195, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204,
205, 207, 208, 211, 212, 216, 244, 276, 303, 312, 313
Report of the Nanking International Relief Committee ······ 35, 143, 151, 154, 276, 312
Riggs, Charles ············································································· 34, 174, 175, 183, 211
Rosen, Georg ······························· 45, 145, 146, 148, 156, 198, 202, 206, 207, 241, 313
Rosholt, Malcolm ································································································ 259

Rumsfeld, Donald ·········································································· 274, 275

S
Saito Yozo········································································································· 10
Saito Yoshie ················································································································· 44
Sakakibara Kazue···················································································· 82
Sakata Shigeki ··········································································································· 197
Sakurai Fumio ··············································································································· 7
Sasaki Motokatsu ······································································································· 82
Sasaki Toichi ··············· 9, 77, 81, 85, 101, 102, 104, 105, 106, 110, 118, 152, 153, 165
Scharffenberg, Paul (Chancellor) ··································································· 183, 311
Scorched-earth strategy ····················································································· 23, 226
Seeckt, Hans von ·································································································· 12, 26
Sekiguchi Kozo ········································································································· 111
Shanghai Incident ····················································································· 10, 13, 16, 17

392

INDEX

Sheng Shicai ·················································································································· 1
Shields, P.R. ··············································································································· 306
Shimada Katsumi ································································································· 45, 75
Shimizu Kazue ·································································································· 107, 108
Shuixi Gate ·················································································································· 19
Sima Qian (Ssu-ma Chʹien) ····················································································· 8, 9
Sino-Japanese Conflict, The ················· 45, 145, 146, 156, 158, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165,
169, 227, 302
Smedley, Agnes ···································································································· 9, 241
Smith (Reuters correspondent) ······························ 129, 130, 131, 132, 136, 137, 140
Smythe, Lewis ············· 34, 148, 175, 179, 182, 183, 189, 211, 216, 217, 281, 283, 289
Snow, Edgar ·································································································· 9, 235, 241
South China Morning Post ···················································································· 211
South City (Shanghai) ······················································································ 130, 156
South, Peter ··············································································································· 228
Sowerby, Arthur ······································································································· 227
Sperling, Eduard ································································································ 34, 168
Steele, Archibald ··············· 34, 37, 45, 54, 56, 114, 137, 140, 142, 147, 183, 241, 251,
283, 312
Sumiya Iwane ··········································································································· 113
Sun Quan ······················································································································· 9
Sun Yatsen ································································································· 20, 25, 26, 35
Supervisory unit, Chinese ················ 47, 52, 53, 55, 56, 104, 131, 136, 209, 303, 306
Suzuki Akira ··················································································· 87, 93, 95, 100, 253

T
Tada Hayao ················································································································· 17
Taiping Gate ················································ 19, 77, 78, 81, 82, 101, 102, 105, 196, 197
Takeuchi Goro ·········································································································· 115
Tanaka Gunkichi ······································································································ 247
Tanaka Seigen ··············································································································· 9Tang Shengzhi ······················· 24, 26, 29, 36, 40, 43, 46, 52, 53, 57, 78, 102, 127, 131,
273, 280, 281, 289, 304, 306, 307, 309
Tangshuizhen ······························································· 49, 51, 102, 103, 104, 106, 115
Tani Hisao ················································································································· 247
Tanida Isamu ············································································································ 149
Tao Xishan ········································································································· 185, 198
Third Cavalry Regiment ·························································································· 103
Three-All strategy (Sanguang) ················································································· 24
Time Magazine ··························································································· 147, 233, 234
Timperley, Harold ··········· iv, 37, 132, 173, 174, 176, 213, 214, 239, 252, 253, 254,

INDEX

393

256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 267, 268, 281, 284, 292, 296, 302
Tokyo Asahi Shinbun ·················································································· 29, 37, 38, 40
Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun ··························································· 36, 37, 38, 159, 242
Tokyo Trials ······························································································· See IMTFE

Tong, Hollington ···················································································· 297
Tongzhou Massacre ··················································································· 5, 6, 7, 8, 10
Training unit, Chinese ············································································· 101, 102, 116
Tsuchiya Masaharu ·································································································· 117
Tsukada Osamu ·········································································································· 46
Tsukamoto Koji ································································································ 170, 171
Tsutsui Jakusui ········································································································· 128
Tuqiaozhen ··············································································································· 109

U
U.S. Marines, Report from 2nd Brigade ································································ 144
Uchida Yoshinao ······························································································ 152, 153
Uemura Toshimichi ························································································· 171, 183
Umezu Yoshijiro ········································································································· 60

VVautrin, Minnie ························································································ 173, 174, 311

WWang Chengdian ····································································································· 169
Wang Gupan ······································································································· 36, 151
Wang Hanwan ·································································································· 307, 309
Wang Hsing-lau ······················································································· 180, 181, 309
Wang Jingwei ··························································································· 23, 24, 25, 29
Wang Lingzhai ············································································································· 4
War Conduct of the Japanese, The··································· 214, 221, 240, 241, 277
War Damage in the Nanking Area······························································ 191, 216
Watanabe Shoichi ····································································································· 303
Webb, William ······························································································ 6, 114, 246
Wilson, Robert ·················································· 138, 177, 183, 211, 212, 213, 242, 303
Wudunn, Sheryl ··········································································································· 9

X
Xia Shuqin ································································································· 160, 161, 162
Xiang Ying ················································································································· 232
Xianhemenzhen ·························································································· 82, 102, 103
Xingzhong Gate ········································································································ 113

394

INDEX

Xiong Shihui ·············································································································· 232
Xu Chuanyin ············································································· 126, 162, 163, 196, 242
Xu Yongchang ································································································ 24, 25, 26
Xuanwu Gate ······································································································ 78, 101Y
Yamada Senji ·············································· 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 95, 96, 97, 150, 151

Yamamoto Osamu···················································································288
Yamazaki Masao ·················································································· 46, 51, 110, 117
Yan Xishan ···················································································································· 1
Yanagawa Heisuke ······························································································ 16, 18
Yasuyama Kodo ······································································································· 114
Yijiang Gate ······················· 52, 55, 56, 57, 111, 112, 113, 117, 202, 209, 270, 290, 306
Yin Rugeng ···················································································································· 5
Yomiuri Shinbun ·························································································· 36, 153, 190
Yuhuatai ································································································ 48, 50, 247, 248
Yuhuatai, Martyrs’ Tomb at ··········································································· 247, 248

Z
Zeng Xubai ························································································ 253, 256, 258, 260
Zhao Ziyang ················································································································ 31
Zhonghua Gate ············· 19, 28, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 70, 111, 117, 159, 247, 305
Zhongshan Gate ············································· 19, 47, 78, 101, 108, 115, 117, 123, 134
Zhongshan Mausoleum ······················································································ 25, 45
Zhongshan North Road ······································································· 35, 55, 133, 135
Zhu Youyu ········································································································ 198, 233

395

AUTHOR PROFILE
Born in Kagoshima in 1947, Dr. HIGASHINAKANO Shudo isprofessor of history of political thought and Japanese intellectual
history at Asia University in Tokyo. He majored in the history ofGerman political thought and socialism at Kagoshima University andOsaka University. Prior to his appointment as professor at Asia
University in 1995, he served as visiting professor of Japanese
intellectual history at Western Washington University (1985-86), andvisiting scholar at the University of Hamburg (1988-89).
In 1990, a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Dr. Higashinakano
started to research the situation in Nanking in 1937. And since 1995,
the main focus of his research interest has been this subject. He has
been president of Japan Nanking Society since 2000. The original titleof this translated work is “Nankin gyakusatsu” no tettei kensho [Anexhaustive study of the “Nanking Massacre”] (Tokyo: Tendensha,
1998).
He has published many books, among them Nankin jiken “shoko
shashin” wo kensho suru [Analyzing the “photographic evidence” ofthe Nanking Massacre] (co-authored with Kobayashi Susumu andFukunaga Shinjiro, Tokyo: Soshisha, 2005), Nankin gyakusatsu kenkyu
no saizensen, vols.1-4 [The front line of research on the Nanking
Massacre, vols. 1-4] (Tokyo: Tendensha, 2002-2005), 1937 Nankinkoryaku sen no shinjitsu [ The truth about the capture of Nanking in1937] (Tokyo: Shogakukan Bunko, 2003), An Overview of the Nanking
Massacre (Osaka: Kokumin Kaikan, 1999), Za reipu obu Nankin no
kenkyu [A Study of the Rape of Nanking] (coauthored with Fujioka
Nobukatsu, Tokyo: Tendensha, 1999), Higashi Doitsu shakaishugi taisei
no kenkyu [A study of the socialistic System in East Germany] (Tokyo:
Nansosha, 1996), and Kokka hasan: Higashi Doitsu shakaishugi no 45 nen[Bankruptcy of a state: 45 Years of Socialism in East Germany](Tokyo: Tendensha, 1992). One of his research papers, titled “TheOverall Picture of the Nanking Massacre,” is included in Nanking
1937: Memory and Healing (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).