To the Abstract
K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, JapanIUGG2003 Sappro

JSP11

Geophysical Risk and Vulnerability: The Population-Hazard Interaction
July 7, Mon.,14:30 Site A, Room 10

Genpatsu-Shinsai:
Catastrophic Multiple Disaster of Earthquake
and Quake-induced Nuclear Accident
Anticipated in the Japanese Islands
Katsuhiko ISHIBASHI
Dept. Earth & Planet. Sci., Kobe Univ., Japan

Genpatsu-Shinsai
Nuclear power plant

Japanese new wordcoined by Ishibashi (1997)

Earthquake disaster

減師力発電暑 地人砕街
Complex of an earthquake disaster and radioactive disasterdue to a severe accident of a nuclear power plantcaused by the earthquake● Quake-induced nuke accident magnifies quake disaster.
● Earthquake damage magnifies radioactive disaster.

Entirely new type of natural + manmade disasterthat the human beings have never encountered
Japan may well cause Genpatsu-Shinsai
ruining itself and changing the world.

This grave problem is not restricted in Japan.
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K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, Japan

World Map of Nuclear Power Reactors
International Nuclear Safety Center at Argonne National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy
http://www.insc.anl.gov/pwrmaps/map/world_map.php

Japan
Capacity	 of	 Nuclear	 Power	 Plants	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Japan	 Atomic	 Industrial	 Forum,	 INC.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 As	 of	 Dec.31,2002	 	 	 	 Country	 	 	 	 	 Total	 capacity	 	 	 Units	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 MWe	 1.	 USA	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 101,998	 	 	 	 	 103	 2.	 France	 	 	 	 	 	 65,952	 	 	 	 	 	 59	 3.	 Japan	 	 	 	 	 	 	 45,907	 	 	 	 	 	 53	 4.	 Russia	 	 	 	 	 	 22,556	 	 	 	 	 	 30	 5.	 Germany	 	 	 	 	 22,365	 	 	 	 	 	 19World Seismicity᳃1975~1994᳀Mᳲ4.0᳀depthᳱ100km
Data from International Seismological Center0

Japan is one of the present mobile belts
with the highest activity on the globe.

Rika nenpyo 2003 (Chronological Scientific Tables), Nat. Astro. Obs. (ed.), Maruzen Co., Ltd., 2002

2K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, Japan

Earthquakes: mb≧5.0, h≦60km
1981 Aug.1~2001 Jul.31

FranceData from International Seismological Center

Japan

77%

Germany

85%70%

Plates around Japan● Subduction● E-W compression
NE Japan
SW Japan

Earthquake Research Committee
Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion
Prime Minister’s Office, Government of Japan(1998)

3K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, Japan

Distribution of land
active faults in Japan

Active faults are faults which havebeen dislocated repeatedly in recent
geological times and have thepotential of reactivation in the future.
Note that only the faults observed on
the surface are mapped.
Therefore, large shallow earthquakes
can occur in places where no active
fault has been mapped. The 2000
Western-Tottori earthquake was thecase.

Science and Technology Agency (2000)
originally by the Research Group for Active Faults of Japan (1991)

Destructive earthquakes
in Japan, 599-1995

Science and Technology Agency(1996)

4K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, Japan

Earthquake types in and around Japanslab = subducted oceanic plate

drawn by K. Satake

Light Water Reactor
PWR & BWR
~1,000 MWe

Oct. 1997- Sept. 2001

SapporoHokkaido

after Japan
MeteorologicalAgency

2●
○

3
6○
●
○
●
4○
●
○
●
1en ch●○○ +1●

2●○○●

uPacificplate○●

4+1○●Shikoku

3KyotoKyushuN ankaoui trghTokyo

Philippine Sea plate

5trench○2●

shIzu-Bonin

4nHoJapa

○
●4 2●
○○
●
○
○
●
4●
3n tr○●

1+1 7 ●○

Nuclear powerstations
16 + 1Reactors
52 + 3
Nuclear fuelplants 2Rokkasho
Tokai

K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, Japan

Safety of NPPs from earthquakes
According to the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (1999)

For NPPs, sufficient earthquake countermeasures
are made from construction till operation.

Ჽ1. Avoiding active faults in site selection.

Actually, many plants have active faults very close to them.
Large earthquakes can occur even if active faults havenʼt been observed.

Ჽ2. Construction of reactor buildings directly on solid rock beds.
Actually, many plants are situated on young soft rocks.

Ჽ3. Seismic design assuming violent earthquakes.
Actually, in most cases largest earthquakes are not considered.

Ჽ4. Safety confirmed by computing earthquake behaviors.
Unknown factors of earthquake phenomena canʼt be covered by computer programs.

Ჽ5. Emergency shutdown system for strong earthquake motions.
There remains possibility of failing in shutdown.
Moreover, shutdown is not enough to prevent severe accident.

Ჽ6. Actual proof by a large-scale shaking table experiment.
Full-size shaking test of aged plant system as a whole has not been performed.

Ჽ7. Countermeasures against tsunamis.
We donʼt know completely all possible tsunamis.

In order to prevent a severe accident withlarge-scale release of fission products outside,three functions are essential.
加圧水型 (PWR)

沸騰水型 (BWR)

SHUT DOWNCONFINE

COOL
According to the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (1999)

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K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, Japan

Existing Procedure of Seismic Design of NPPs
“Shut Down, Cool, Confine” Functions Should Be Kept
For a Much Severe Earthquake than the Biggest One in the Past
Seismic Classification of Importance (As, A, B, C)

1. Assumption of Two Kinds of Earthquakes (Underground Sources)Maximum design earthquake
The biggest earthquake assumed based on past large earthquakes around the siteand expected earthquakes originated from nearby active faults

Extreme design earthquake
A stronger earthquake than maximum one (M6.5 nearby earthquake included)

2. Determination of Basic Earthquake Ground Motion S1 & S2
Artificial seismic
waves for S1 & S2

3. Structure Seismic Analysis & Ground Stability Analysis by Computer“Guidelines for Examining Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants”
Drawn up in 1978, Revised in 1981

Important Points
Construction of NPPs was started before the birth and spread offault model of earthquakes and plate tectonics.
Almost the whole Japanese Islands are expected to enter the seismically active period.
Large earthquakes in APEMMB, M8 Tokai & Nankai earthquakes, etc.
Large/great slab earthquakes are very difficult to tell where and when.

Serious mistakes in assuming earthquakes
᳂Ignorance of large/great slab earthquakes: Only interplate earthquakes andactive faults have been considered.
᳂Possibility of large earthquakes in places without active faults has been ignored:
Maximum nearby earthquake is only M6.5.
᳂Evaluation of active faults is inadequate: Ignorance of active fault system andgrouping; underestimation of M.
᳂Ignorance of the concept of seismic gap: Danger of places where historicalearthquakes are unknown has been ignored.

Determination method of basic earthquake ground motion is very oldin view of modern earthquake science and strong motion seismology:
Tendancy of underestimation of S1 & S2.

Effect of large aftershocks is not taken into account.

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K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, Japan

Shimane Nuclear Power Station
BWR 460 & 820 MW●The company admitted an 8 km-long nearby active fault.
They insist that the possible earthquake is M 6.3 by an old formula( M = (log L + 2.9)/0.6 ), smaller than the assumed earthquake of M
6.5 which they have taken into account.
But, an earthquake of M~7 can occur beneath a short active fault.
1 & 10 : 古浦東方 (II, C, 3.4 km)
8 : 古殿 (II, C, 3.5 km)
9 : 宍道 (I, C, 10 km)

Research Group for Active Faults of Japan (1991)

20 km

1943 Tottori earthquake M7.2
Tottori

Shikano fault

Okada, Y. (1991)

8K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, Japan
What happen?
Any of Japanese NPPs and NFPs could be attacked
by an unexpected large earthquakes nearby.
Probably the strong ground motion exceeds S2 at each plant.
Many devices and piping systems get in trouble all at once.
Multiple defense systems lose their function simultaneously.
Aging and defects in construction and maintenance are severe background problem.
Successive large aftershocks are also serious.
Violent shaking may affect operators physically and mentally.

Loss of AC power, fail in control rods inserting, runaway
Pipe rupture accidents, loss of coolant, fail in ECCS, meltdown
Steam explosion, hydrogen explosion, nuclear explosioon
Release of huge amount of fission products outside the reactor
Due to the severe earthquake damage, management of the nuke accident andevacuation of inhabitants from radioactivity become extremely difficult,
The nuke accident would be left to expand to the maximum scale.
Strong radioactivity prohibit rescue works in the earthquake disaster area,
and cause evacuation of numerous people in a very wide area.
Victims of radiation exposure and ordinary quake disaster becomes uncountable.
The final result is global as well as a fatal blow to Japan,
and affect deeply future generations.

MM Intensity

Impending Tokai earthquake

10~12
9~10~9Hamaʼoka Nuclear
Power Station
4 + 1 BWRs
3.62 (+1.38) GWeGround motion

M8 Tokai Eq. Source
Central Disaster Management
Council (2001)●tsunami height9K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, Japan

Coseismic crustal movements(Ishibashi, 1976, 1981)●Hamaʼoka

Hypothetical Tokai
fault model

Evacuation boundary(leeward side)

after Seo, K. (1995): Nuke Accident

Hamaʼoka Unit 3 (BWR, 1100MWe)
Accident type: BWR2
Wind vel.: 2m/sec
Atm. st.: D

severe control

Acute death●Hmlax control
For latent health hazard prevention

5%%
10%
50%
9099%

10K. Ishibashi (2003) Genpatsu-Shinsai: Catastrophic Quake and Nuke Disaster Complex
Presented in the 23rd. General Assembly of IUGG, 2003, Sapporo, Japan

50 km
1948
M7.1
Wakasa Bay

1927
M7.3

4

●

2
3● ●

4●
Lake
Biwa

1662
M~7.5

1891
M8.0
Nagoya

Kyoto

1596
M~7.5

OsakaKobe

Research Group for Active Faults of Japan (1991)

Collapse of the Hanshin Expressway

The impossible happenedin Kobe, Japan, in 1995.
Genpatsu-Shinsai also can happen.
It may happen in other countries than Japan,and the result is global.
So, it should be an international concern.
Seismologists share responsibility to prevent
Genpatsu-ShinsaiItʼs objective risk assessment should be started,
Kyodo News (1995)
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