The Nanjing Incident: Japanese Eyewitness Accounts-Testimony from 48 Japanese Who Were ThereAra Ken’ichi

Translated by Maya Grohn

Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact©
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Copyright ©2002 by Ara Ken’ichi.
Originally published as Nankinjiken : Nihonjin jyuhachinin no shogen by Shogakukan Inc.,Tokyo, Japan 2002. English language copyright ©2020 by Society for the Disseminationof Historical Fact. All rights reserved, including the rights of reproduction in whole orin part in any form.
Japanese personal names have been rendered surname first, in accordance with Japanesecustom.

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Preface
On July 7, 1937, the Japanese army held a nighttime training exercise near the Marco
Polo Bridge, which was located in a suburb of Beijing. Suddenly, they were shot at. The
Japanese army determined that a Chinese army unit was shooting at them and immediatetalks were held.
Both sides continuously negotiated. Nevertheless, small-scale skirmishes continued, andfighting escalated such that on July 27, three Japanese army divisions were dispatched to
the Beijing area.
At the time, the largest number of Japanese residents in China was in Shanghai. Whilefighting in Beijing continued, outbursts of violence erupted in Shanghai. There wereJapanese factories in Shanghai and the Japanese Naval Landing Forces protected factories
and Japanese residents. As the days wore on, Shanghai grew more and more dangerous.
On August 9, Lieutenant Junior Grade Oyama Isao of the Japanese Naval Landing Forces
was shot to death. On the 13th, Naval Landing Forces and the Chinese Nationalist Armyclashed. The Chinese Army force was several times larger than the Naval Landing Forces,
meaning that Japanese people in China were in serious danger. As a matter of fact, on July
29, in Tongzhou (通州), east of Beijing, 223 Japanese citizens were massacred-- this is
known as the Tongzhou Incident.
The Shanghai Expeditionary Army was formed and dispatched to Shanghai. General
Matsui Iwane, who was renowned for his knowledge of China, was assigned as theCommander of the Army.
The Chinese Army, which built their positions over a period of years, was equipped withGerman weapons and trained by the German Army. Powerful military units awaited thearrival of the Japanese Army. The Shanghai Expeditionary Army landed on August 23
and a fierce battle began. The Japanese Army fought hard but after a couple of months,
they were unable to control Shanghai. Japanese Army casualties were mounting.
On November 5, the Japanese 10th Army, which was newly organized, landed at
Hangzhou Bay in order to attack the Chinese Army from the rear. Attacked from behind,
the Chinese Army panicked and routed.
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The 10th Army, which had just landed and not spent much time in action, thought the best
course would be to pursue the routed enemy, advance to attack the capital city of Nanjing,
and then offer peace terms. They submitted their plan and began to pursue the routed
enemy. Soon, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army controlled Shanghai and submitted asimilar plan as well.
On December 1, General Staff Headquarters issued the order to attack Nanjing. In order
to direct both the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army, the Central China
Area Army was organized and General Matsui was appointed as commander. For the
Nanjing attack, the number of Japanese army soldiers was about 70,000 to 80,000.
At first, the capture of Nanjing was estimated to take place in the middle of January 1938
but pursuit by the Japanese Army was so rapid that on December 10, 1937 the 36th
Regiment (originating from Sabae, Fukui Prefecture), plunged through Guanghua Gate
(光華門) Gate, and in the afternoon of December 12, the 47th Regiment (from Oita
Prefecture) set up ladders and started to scale the wall of Nanjing Castle.
On the evening of December 12, the Chinese Army was given the order to retreat. Since
avenues of escape were covered by Japanese troops, numerous soldiers removed theirmilitary uniforms and ran into a refugee area (a so-called “safety zone”).
On December 13, Japanese troops advanced into Nanjing Castle and started to sweep theCastle for enemy troops. The sweep continued until the 16th. On the 17th, an entrance
ceremony, headed by General Matsui, was performed and the next day a memorial service
was performed.
After the memorial service was completed, General Matsui returned to Shanghai on
December 22. After that the, the 16th Division of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army
garrisoned Nanjing until the end of January 1938.
As for casualties incurred between the battle of Shanghai and the Nanjing attack,according to the diary of General Matsui, the highest ranking commander of the JapaneseArmy in China, Japanese Army casualties were 24,000 and according to the military
record of Senior General (上将) He Yingin (何応欽), who was the military governor of
the Chinese Nationalist Army, 33,000 Chinese Army soldiers were killed.
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Most of the Japanese Army casualties, unexpectedly high, resulted from fighting inShanghai. Thereafter, the Japanese Army was locked in China for the next 8 years. The
beginning of a long war started with a huge number of casualties.
In December 1937, when Nanjing was captured, what happened then and there?
Nine years later, we Japanese were informed at the Tokyo Trials, the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, that atrocities were committed by the Japanese Army in Nanjing.
The Tokyo Trials alleged that between December 13, 1937, when the Japanese Armyentered Nanjing, and the end of January 1938, a number of assaults, rapes, plunderingand arson were repeatedly committed by the Japanese Army. The victims of a massacre
were said to be between 100,000 to 200,000. They claimed General Matsui, the highest
ranking commander, did not take reasonable measures to prevent crimes and sentenced
him to death by hanging. Hirota Koki, the foreign minister at the time, was also accusedof allowing the Nanjing Incident, and other charges, and was executed by hanging as well.
When we were informed about this issue, we were under American occupation, starving
and struggling to survive, so we did not give much thought about this issue.
Since then, decades passed. Did the atrocities which caused hundreds and thousands
victims really happen? Were they any different from incidents that are commonly seen inbattlefields? What happened really? Why don't we ask our people who were in Nanjing
at the time? They were there at that time--they could tell us what happened really. Any
Japanese with common sense would come to this conclusion.
What Japanese were in Nanjing at the time?
Needless to say, first and foremost, Japanese soldiers. Those who could explore andbroadly examine Nanjing and understand the situation in Nanjing were not lower ranking
soldiers but senior officers. Second, not only were the military in Nanjing, but more than
200 journalists entered Nanjing to report Nanjing’s capture. Third, diplomats were in
Nanjing in order to perform administrative duties and provide security after theoccupation--they too must have had good knowledge concerning the situation in Nanjing.

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The current author thought that these peoples’ observations would be reliable. I found 67
persons who were in Nanjing and were still alive and got in contact with them. The periodof contact was from 1984 to 1986.
At that time, almost half a century had passed since 1937. Among the 67 persons I
identified, I listened to the stories of 35 and corresponded with 11 by mail. I was unable
to communicate with the rest, as most were unfortunately ill.
Those people with whom I could meet and listen to were not necessarily knowledgeable
about Nanjing then, or what happened then. Some were very knowledgeable about someareas, but knew nothing about other areas. Some visited certain places and nowhere else.
Nonetheless, by fixing their statements together, like a jigsaw puzzle, you will get a
picture of Nanjing at that time.
Among the 35 interviewees, I met with some only once and some ten times, but, in general,
I met with them 3 times, twice to listen, and once to check my manuscript. For accuracy,
I asked them to check the manuscript before publication—not just their stories but theentire manuscript.
I got approvals from half of them, a quarter of them asked me to change wording andcorrect misunderstandings, and another quarter asked me to rewrite everything, based on
their instructions.
In 1987, I concluded all editing and published the book “Nanjing Incident – they told us”“聞き書き 南京事件” , published by Tosho Shuppansha.
Since then, 15 years has passed. The book went out of print. But in 2002, newly titled, it
was reprinted by Shogakukan Bunko, with an introduction by Ms. Sakurai Yoshiko, awell-known journalist.
The first book was 300 pages, published in a 79 x 109 mm format. For this new edition,
I wanted to add a statement by Mr. Minami Masayoshi, who told me to withhold hisstatement for a while because it might have a negative effect on current friendly relations
between China and Japan, and statements by Mr. Isayama Haruki and Mr. Otsuki Akira,who gave me their statements after publication of the first book.

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If these additional statements were included in the new edition, then the number of pages
would be too much for a bunko (paperback) edition, so I had to cut out some text notdirectly related with Nanjing, including background information of the interviewees.
Eventually, I managed to include all 48 statements into the bunko edition.
Most of them were born during the Meiji era, the generation of our parents, grandparents,
and great-grandparents. From their statements we will vividly see what happened, or what
did not happen, at the time of December 1937 in Nanjing. I believe the truth lies in theirstatements.
Ara Ken’ichi

8Table of Contents
Preface
Chapter 1

Nanjing, as Observed by Journalists

1. Asahi Shimbun Newspaper
1) Mr. Yamamoto Osamu (山本治), Staff, Shanghai Branch of Osaka Asahi Shimbun
2) Mr. Adachi Kazuo (足立和雄,), Reporter, Tokyo Asahi Shimbun
3) Mr. Hashimoto Tomisaburo (橋本富三郎), Vice-chief, Shanghai Branch of Asahi Shimbun
2. Mainichi Shimbun Newspaper
4) Mr. Kanazawa Yoshio（金沢喜雄,）Photographer, Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun
5) Mr. Sato Shinju (佐藤振寿), Photographer, Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun
6) Mr. Goto Kosaku (五島広作), Reporter, Osaka Mainichi Shimbun
7) Mr. Suzuki Jiro (鈴木二郎), Reporter, Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun
3. Yomiuri Shimbun Newspaper
8) Mr. Futamura Jiro (二村次郎), Photographer, Hochi Shimbun Newspaper
9) Mr. Taguchi Risuke (田口利介), Reporter, Hochi Shimbun Newspaper10) Mr. Higuchi Tetsuo (樋口哲雄), Film Operator, Yomiuri Shimbun Newspaper11) Mr. Mori Hiroshi (森博), Photographer, Yomiuri Shimbun Newspaper
4. Domei Tsushin News Agency12) Mr. Arai Masayoshi (新井正義), Reporter, Domei Tsushin
13) Mr. Asai Tatsuzo (浅井達三), Photographer, Domei Tsushin
14) Mr. Hosonami Takashi (細波孝), Radio Operator, Domei Tsushin
5. Other Newspapers15) Mr. Minami Masayoshi (南正義), Reporter, Shin-Aichi Shimbun16) Mr. Mitoma Mikinosuke (三苫幹之介), Reporter, Fukuoka Nichinichi Shimbun17) Mr. Koike Shuyo (小池秋羊), Reporter, Miyako Shimbun18) Mr. Yauchi Shogoro (箭内正五郎), Reporter, Fukushima Minpo

Chapter 2

Nanjing, as Observed by Japanese Soldiers

1. The Army19) Major Yoshinaga Sunao (吉永朴), Staff Officer, 10th Army20) Major Okada Yuji (岡田酉次), Staff Officer, Special Duty Departmentof the Shanghai Expeditionary Army
21) Captain Onishi Hajime (大西一), Staff Officer, Shanghai Expeditionary Army922) Mr. Okada Takashi (岡田尚), Attached to General Matsui23) Colonel Tanida Isamu (谷田勇), Staff Officer, 10th Army

24) Captain Kaneko Rinsuke (金子倫助), Staff Officer, 10th Army25) Mr. Okada Yoshimasa (岡田芳政), Officer of Planning Board
26) Colonel Isayama Haruki (諌山春樹), Chief of General Affairs, General Staff Headquarters
27) Major Otsuki Akira (大槻章), Officer, Military Formation Team of Military Affairs Section of
the Military Affairs Bureau, the Ministry of the Army
28) Colonel Mikuni Naofuku (三国直福), 22nd Regiment Commander, Field Artillery

2. The Navy
29) Lieutenant Commander Terasaki Takaharu (寺崎隆治), Captain of the Gunboat
Seta30) Commander Doi Shinji (土井申二), Captain of the Gunboat Hira
31) Lieutenant Shigemura Minoru (重村実), Member of Press Bureau, Shanghai
Military Office in the Navy32) Lieutenant Commander Genda Minoru (源田実), Staff Officer, 2nd Combined
Air Group

Chapter 3

Nanjing, as Observed by Painters and Photographers33) Mr. Sumitani Iwane (住谷磐根), Painter and Naval Correspondent34) Mr. Watanabe Yoshio (渡辺義雄), Photographer, Information Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
35) Mr. Koyanagi Jiichi (小柳次一), Member of the Press Corps, Japanese Army

Chapter 4

Nanjing, as Observed by Diplomats36) Mr. Eiichi Iwai (岩井英一), Assistant Consulate37) Mr. Kasuya Yoshio (粕谷孝夫), Assistant Consulate

Supplemental Materials38) Major Yoshikawa Takeshi (吉川猛,), Staff Officer, Central China Area Army
39) Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao (寺田雅雄), Staff Officer, 10th Army
40) Captain Sento Shunzo (仙頭俊三), Staff Officer, 10th Army

41)
42)
43)
44)
45)

Lieutenant Colonel Goto Mitsuzo (後藤光蔵,), Chamberlain Military Officer
Captain Okamura Tekizo (岡村適三), Shanghai Military Police
Mr. Horikawa Takeo (堀川武夫), Reporter, Domei Tsushin
Mr. Fujimoto Kame (藤本亀), Reporter, Asahi Shimbun
Mr. Asami Kazuo (浅海一男), Reporter, Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun
1046) Mr. Nishino Gen (西野源), Reporter, Osaka Mainichi Shimbun47) Mr. Otani Kosho (大谷光照), the Chief Abbot of Nishi-Honganji Temple48) Mr. Ishikawa Tatsuzo (石川達三), Novelist and War Correspondent

Postscript
Translator’s Note

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Chapter 1
Nanjing as Observed by Journalists“…. I do not think there was anything that could have been called an “incident”. I didn't
see anything and nobody associated with the Asahi raised it as topic. And, considering
the number of civilians and the presence of Chinese troops, such a thing could not havepossibly happened. The bodies I saw in Shanghai and Nanjing included bodies ofChinese soldiers that appeared around my ship in the Huangpu River, which were thefirst set of bodies I saw, and the bodies of the victims of fighting in the battle within thestreets of Shanghai. Others bodies I saw were around the ramparts. The bodies aroundthe ramparts were clean: no sign of beheading or anything like that. The bodies of thosekilled in battle were clean because they were shot to death.” (From the statement of Mr.
Yamamoto Osamu, staff of the Shanghai branch of the Osaka Asahi Shimbun)

A grateful Chinese person holds up a child to a Japanese photographer. In this photo,
there is no sign that he and others were afraid of the Japanese or Japanese soldiers. (By
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Mr. Sato Shinju, the Nanjing Safety Zone, December 15, 1937.)

1. Asahi Shimbun Newspaper
1) Interview with Mr. Yamamoto Osamu (山本治), Staff of the
Shanghai Branch of the Osaka Asahi Shimbun
Mr. Yamamoto Osamu graduated from Dong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen Da Xue or East
Asian Literary School, Shanghai, 1928, and then was drafted into the army. As amilitary cadet, he became a second lieutenant. Following his discharge from military
service, he joined the Osaka Asahi Shimbun-sha (currently the Asahi Shimbun) and was
assigned to the East Asia Department. The East Asia Department of the Osaka Asahi
Shimbun managed branch offices throughout Asia. Mr. Yamamoto's specialty was
China, so naturally, he followed China-related matters until the end of the [the Second
World] War.
In July 1936, he moved to the Hsin-king (新京) office, and then to the Nanjing office inApril 1937. The Nanjing office was headed by Mr. Hashimoto Tomisaburo(橋本登美三郎), who became a politician after the War. There were two staff membersin the Nanjing office after Mr. Yamamoto’s arrival. Soon thereafter, the Marco Polo
Bridge Incident broke out.
– What was the situation in Nanjing when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out?
Nanjing was the capital of China then but not many Japanese lived there at that time –doctors, employees of the Manchurian railway, embassy-related people and militaryrelated people--around 100 in total. There was only one Japanese inn there. In
comparison to Shanghai, in which 20,000 Japanese lived, Nanjing had a minor
Japanese population.
Most newspaper branch offices had no more than one person as staff. Mr. Hashimoto
did not understand Chinese so I traveled with him (as a Chinese language specialist).
So the Asahi Shibmbun had only two staff members.
As the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke and circumstances worsened, Mr.
Hashimoto’s and my family left Nanjing, and around the end of July, branch office13

staff of other newspapers also began leaving Nanjing.
However, Mr. Hashimoto mentioned to me that:“This is a challenging time for newspaper reporters. We should act as reporters of the
Asahi. Yamamoto, trust your life to me.” So, we remained in Nanjing until to the end.
Mr. Hashimoto was known as a magnanimous person, so he helped Japanese people,
who came from further up the Yangtze River and were stranded in Nanjing.
Mr. Hashimoto related to me: during the Manchurian Incident, he followed Colonel
Itagaki Seishiro (板垣征四郎), Staff Officer, Kwantung Army, who was to meet Ma
Zhanshan (馬占山), mounted bandits in Manchuria. Before departing for thisdangerous meeting, Staff Officer Itagaki assured Mr. Hashimoto that he would beentirely responsible for protecting Mr. Hashimoto. By contrast, Mr. Hashimoto
grumbled, the Japanese Embassy in Nanjing merely urged us to evacuate.
While watching Japanese warships go down the Yangtze, I idly thought, “Now we havearrived to the point of no return--friendly relations between Japan and China will soonend.”
– You eventually escaped to Qingdao.
On August 15, dozens of Japanese who remained in Nanjing planned to leave Nanjing
by train. The train was protected by Chinese soldiers under Chiang Kai-shek’scommand --their chests were decorated with Chiang Kai-shek's photo.
All of the train’s windows were covered by plates so we could not see outside for 36
hours. I escaped with nothing but a camera.
The Nationalist Party’s Central Army troops moved north, one after another, and ourescape almost coincided with their movement. At that point, it was impossible toescape to Shanghai, so from Nanjing, we moved north, and via Jinan, escaped to
Qingdao.
– What happened after that?

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Mr. Hashimoto returned to Tokyo but I continued to report from Qingdao because
there were many Japanese remaining there. A week later, I was called by our main
office in Osaka, Japan to give lectures in Osaka and Kobe on my experience inNanjing. Thus, I returned to Osaka.
The Shanghai Expeditionary Army soon began its Shanghai Landing Operation, and I
was appointed to staff the Shanghai branch. It was the end of August, and I headed for
Shanghai immediately. When we arrived, I found a number of bodies of Chinese
soldiers floating in the Huangpu River. At the moment, I was convinced that this was
now a real battlefield.
– At that time, how many staff were in the Shanghai branch office?
The head was Mr. Shirakawa Ikai (白川威海), with 4 to 5 staff in total, including Mr.
Moriyama Takashi (森山喬).
When I arrived in Woosung (呉淞), I found the town of Shanghai totally empty and the
Army's Headquarters was not set up yet. We ran our car at full speed from the wharf toour office.
In the hotel where we set up our office, the Army's press bureau also set up their office
there and my job was to visit the press bureau to have our advance copies checked.
– What was censorship specifically like?
There was no clear standard, but, at the very least articles that hinted at future troop
movements were forbidden. I had worked at the Hsin-King（新京）branch until April
that year and underwent the Kwantong Army’s censorship; I knew what they were after
by then and articles I that brought them almost always passed freely.
– Did you gather news from the front line too?
Yes. In those days, additional reporters came in from Tokyo and Osaka and I worked
with them. For the report of the Landing Operation at Bai Maojiang (白茆江), theYangtze River bank, which was conducted by the Shigefuji (重藤) Detachment, one
15

reporter per newspaper was allowed to join in the operation, so, from the Asahi, I was
the only one allowed to go.
– When did you go to Nanjing?
I repeatedly came back to Shanghai, from Suzhou, or from the front line or wherever.
When I visited Nanjing, to my memory, I was with Mr. Hashimoto.
For the entrance ceremony, the Army offered me passage by air, saying that it was akind of reward for my continuous reporting on the Battle of Shanghai from start to end.
We arrived in the afternoon and found that the entrance ceremony had already finished.
– How was the situation of Nanjing?
I found corpses of Chinese soldiers around the ramparts. Watching from Zhongshan
Gate (中山門), I noticed smoke rising in several places in Nanjing Citadel.
– What was it like inside of the Castle?
There was nothing in particular to note. The most impressive thing in Nanjing wasseeing the bodies of Chinese soldiers around the ramparts. That's all.
– It is said that there was a massacre.
I didn't see or hear anything like that. We reporters gathered together in the evening-and I never heard such a thing. Nobody mentioned such a thing. Within the Asahi
Shimbun, it was never raised as a subject.
– Did you see the Refugee District [Safety Zone]?
Soldiers and the military police guarded the Safety Zone and they didn't allow me toenter. Therefore, civilians were safe. I never saw a corpse of an ordinary citizen.

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I saw Red Swastika Society people clearing war victims.
– How many days did you stay in Nanjing?
A couple of days and then we returned to Shanghai by car.
– Did you stay in Shanghai after that?
Yes. But the 10th Army stayed in Hangzhou and in January, I moved to Hangzhou as thehead of the Hangzhou branch. Shortly after I arrived in Hangzhou, the chief of theSpecial Duty Organization in Hangzhou told me to bring my family to Hangzhou, so I
did.
In January, peace negotiations seemed to gain momentum, but during that time, peace
negotiations were not expected, so the reason for calling in Japanese families was toshow the Nationalist Chinese that the Japanese Army would be in for the duration.
– Didn't you hear of the Nanjing massacre in Shanghai and Hangzhou?
No. Mr. Shirakawa, the head of the Shanghai office, was acquainted with top officers of
the Army, but I never heard anything from Mr. Shirakawa.
After joining the Xuzhou operation, I became ill and returned to Japan in the summer of1938. I arrived in Kobe and at a hotel in Kobe, I was surprised to hear that the JapaneseArmy committed atrocities in Nanjing. They said it was reported in foreign newspapers.
While I was in Shanghai, I constantly read Chinese newspapers, in which I saw
something like “bloody battle at Guanghua Gate (血戦光華門)” in big letters, but I neversaw such a thing as a massacre in Nanjing. I felt very strange.
– The claims started recently.
I think there was no such thing as the Incident. I didn't see anything and no one within the
Asahi raised it. And, considering the number of citizens and the movement of Chinese
troops, such thing could not have possibly happened. The bodies I saw included a number
17

of bodies of Chinese soldiers around my ship in the Huangpu River, which were the firstbodies I saw, and the bodies of war victims in the city streets during the Battle of
Shanghai. Others I saw were around the ramparts. The bodies around the rampart wereclean, not beheaded or anything like that. The bodies of the war dead were clean because
they were shot to death.
And I'd like to mention something about the expression “massacre”. In a battlefield, an
act which could be regarded as the worst possible thing under peacetime circumstances
was regarded as the best of achievements. It is nonsense to define some act under normal
circumstances, during peaceful conditions. I think they used standards under normal
conditions and called it a “massacre”.
I was called to military service in 1940 and joined the army as a second lieutenant. At
that time, I myself, at times, ordered attacks on the enemy. Thus, I was engaged in the
war as a soldier as well as a reporter and saw matters objectively as a reporter. Based on
my experience, I have doubts concerning a “massacre”.
Mr. Yamamoto worked at the Asahi Shimbun until his retirement. After his retirement,
he edited a public information sheet in Nagaokakyo City, Kyoto. Nagaokakyo City
organized the Visiting China Group for the purpose of promoting friendship between
Japan and China, which was headed by the Mayor.
At that time, Mr. Yamamoto accompanied the group as the secretariat and met Mr. Liao
Chengzhi (廖承志), the first director of the China-Japan Friendship Association, andMr. Sun Pinghua (孫平化), the current director of the China-Japan Friendship
Association.
After that, Mr. Yamamoto tried to establish sister city relations with a Chinese city andNagaokakyo City. Mr. Yamamoto chose the Chinese city of Hangzhou (杭州), which heknew very well, but for some reason, the Chinese decided that the city was to be Ningbo(寧波). From early childhood through his 70s, Mr. Yamamoto was deeply involved in
China.
I interviewed him when he was 81 years old. He was very lively and spoke for morethan two hours without a break.
182) Interview with Mr. Adachi Kazuo (足立和雄), Reporter for the
Tokyo Asahi Shimbun
In autumn 1984, I asked Mr. Adachi Kazuo if he could discuss with me the situation in
Nanjing after its capture. He said he wondered if he could be of any help concerning
this, but promised to meet me nonetheless. On the appointed day, when I called him thatmorning, he stated, “I think I do not have much to say, so if it is alright let us speak overthe phone.” But I wanted to meet him in person, so I replied, “All of the issues which I
want to discuss with you are simple matters but I have over 20 questions, so I want tomeet you in person.”As I tried to persuade him to meet me, he got a little agitated.
“You people claim there was a “Nanjing massacre,” but I didn't see a massacre. I don't
know what position you have but I cannot make any statements concerning a massacre.”“Mr. Adachi, I don't know whether you suppose that there was a massacre, that was said
to have happened or not, but you were in Nanjing at that time. I just want to know what
you saw in Nanjing then.”My request for an interview developed into an argument.
Mr. Adachi wrote an article in “Moriyama Yoshio Anthology,” titled “The Nanjing
Massacre and me,” so I assumed that he saw the Nanjing massacre. But what I wanted
to know was what he saw in Nanjing with his own eyes. After several exchanges, hefinally relented, “OK. Please stop by.”
Mr. Adachi at first joined the 101th Division as a war correspondent and reported fromthe front line at Shanghai. As the battle in Shanghai concluded and the assault on
Nanjing started up, Mr. Adachi headed for Nanjing. The 101th Division remained in
Shanghai and later participated in the attack on Hangzhou. Thus, Mr. Adachi, who was
in Nanjing Castle at that time, moved south, following the 101th Division. As a result,
Mr. Adachi was in Nanjing for 10 days or so.
– It is said there was a massacre in Nanjing. What did you see at the time?
I can't say there were no victims. It was the next day, after I entered Nanjing, so it was
the 14th, that I saw the Japanese army shoot a dozen or so Chinese. They made a trench
19and put the Chinese in a line in front of the trench and shot them. I don't remember
exactly where--it was not the Safety Zone.
– How did you feel when you saw this?
I felt disappointed, that they did something irreparable. I thought that if they do things
like this, we will never be able to defeat China.
– Why did you think Japan could not win?
We did this in front of Chinese women and children, even if there were only a few ofthem, but we did this in front of civilians. These kinds of things must have led theChinese people to reproach us. I thought that we could not ethically excuse ourselves.
– Did you see anything else?
Just that.
– It is said there was massacre.
I saw dozen or so Chinese killed, maybe more were killed elsewhere, too. Maybe ahundred or two hundred elsewhere. In total it might have been a couple thousand
killed.
– How about outside Nanjing?
Well, outside Nanjing, between Shanghai and Nanjing, all of the deaths were frombattle. Including the ones outside Nanjing, I guess there were a total of several
thousand victims.
– If you say so, most of the victims were in the Castle?
Yes. All the young men were soldiers and they should not have been in the Castle. The
people remaining in the Castle were noncombatants, just elderly people and women20and children. There were some young men there, though. Those young men wereregarded as soldiers on special duty or ben-i-tai, plain clothing soldiers. After theconclusion of fighting, the ben-i-tai frequently snuck into places held by the Japanesearmy to disrupt or to attack our rear areas. If they couldn't escape and remained within
the Castle, the Japanese soldiers naturally considered them as enemies.
The purpose of the Japanese army was to clear out the ben-i-tai, but they might havegone too far.
– So, there were several thousand victims inside and outside of the Castle?
If you added them up, something like that. People have an image that the Japanese army
massacred prisoners but they are confused with losses due to battle. I think the Japanesearmy didn't massacre Chinese who were clearly prisoners.
– Some war correspondents then stated there was a massacre, for example, Mr. Imai
Seigo.
Mr. Imai died a while ago.
– Did you know Mr. Imai?
We worked in the same department, on the city news. We were not close but I don't
want to talk ill of the deceased.
– Yes, I understand. But could you tell something about him, as far as you know?
Mr. Imai did not report what he saw. I heard that he was always in the rear, that hewouldn't go out to the front line, dangerous places--as a matter of fact, in Nanjing,several photographers were killed. Mr. Imai’s talent was to write dramatic stories basedon hearsay. Even though he freely wrote based on his own imagination, his writing wasmuch appreciated.
– It is said that Mr. Imai wrote an article on the entrance ceremony--before theceremony occurred; a so-called advance manuscript.
21

Generally, advance manuscripts were acceptable. For example, events in which theEmperor was to attend. On the day of the event, we followed around and if there was a
deviation, we corrected the manuscript. I don't remember if Mr. Imai's article was anadvance manuscript or not, but this likely occurred in order to keep deadlines.
Aside from the article of the entrance ceremony, I felt that some of Mr. Imai's articles
might have been partially fictitious.
– How about reporter Moriyama Yoshio?
We were very close and I respected Mr. Moriyama.
In saying this, Mr. Adachi took a copy of Anthology for Moriyama Yoshio from his
bookshelf. It was published eight months after his death and contained his biography
and memories from his close friends.
“After he died we made this book. I contributed an article, too.”
Mr. Adachi located his article, “I would say now that this title is thoughtless.”
Regretfully, he showed it me.
“The Nanjing Massacre and Me” was a short article. It contained the incident in Nanjingthat he spoke to me about earlier. Mr. Adachi watched with reporter Moriyama and hewrote that he regretted seeing this.
Mr. Adachi now felt very uncomfortable about the title “The Nanjing Massacre andMe,” so he made sure to check my manuscript, especially the part that contained hisstory, before publication. He was worried that the public might misunderstand hisstatement. His worry was reasonable since there are few today who can state what
actual conditions in Nanjing were like in those days.
Mr. Adachi and Mr. Moriyama worked together in Nanjing but were later separated. Mr.
Adachi went to Hangzhou. Mr. Moriyama stayed in Nanjing for a while and returned toJapan. Then he went to Berlin as special correspondent. Mr. Adachi talked about his
recollection and admiration of Mr. Moriyama for 10 minutes, then, suddenly, heremembered an episode related to Mr. Moriyama:22

In the spring of this year, a person in charge of “Opinion”, an editorial column in the
Asahi Shimbun, called me. It was a story of Mr. Moriyama in Berlin; In Berlin, Mr.
Moriyama had a dinner with a Japanese student and Mr. Moriyama told the student that
there was massacre in Nanjing. The student eventually became a professor at a wellknown university. He was new to me but the professor sent an article to the column.
According to the story that Mr. Moriyama told the student, now a professor, theJapanese army killed old people, women, and children in Nanjing—so many that thestreets were flooded with blood, which leaked into his low-top boots. The professor
insisted that Mr. Moriyama told him such story. The editor of the “Opinion” column
heard that I was with Mr. Moriyama in Nanjing and that we were close, so he called me
to confirm this story.
I told him that, yes, I was with Mr. Moriyama in Nanjing but I didn't see such thingsand never heard of this from Mr. Moriyama. Mr. Moriyama was not the kind of person
who would lie. I don't know the professor but what he said was a lie, and if such a lie
appeared in our newspaper, then I would feel ashamed for Mr. Moriyama. The editor of“Opinion” seemed to understand. He didn't print the professor's article. Concerning the
Nanjing massacre, many people intentionally lie.
– At the Asahi Shimbun, where you used to work, reporter Honda Katsuichi (本多勝一)
insisted that there was a Nanjing massacre and the paper often discussed the subject inthe social issues section of the paper.
This is truly regrettable. I met with a director of the Asahi Shimbun recently and told
him that there was no massacre.
Within the Asahi Shimbun, the thinking is pro-Chinese Communist Party, anti-Taiwan,
pro-North Korea, and anti-South Korea. Not just Mr. Honda, but the whole social issue
section has a tendency to make the paper as such.
And some of the Asahi‘s readers are Honda believers. The publication section is
encouraged by successful sales and continues to publish his books. Mr. Honda is anenergetic, hard-working reporter. His reportage on Eskimos was wonderful. He lived
23

with the Eskimo. The reportage on Bedouins, too; he didn't hesitate to go out into thewild. Nobody could go out so far as he did. Mr. Honda joined an alpine club during histime in university--that experience worked out well. His set of three reportages in thosedays was stunning. After that, he went China and made “one-way” articles. He simply
wrote down what the Chinese told him to write, without checking the evidence. But his
fans for his set of three reportages still follow him.
I know that some people in the Asahi Shimbun frown upon his attitude.
Mr. Adachi continued to talk about the stance of the Asahi Shimbun.
– What was the tone of opinion at the Asahi Shimbun in 1937?
In response to my question, Mr. Adachi opened up his scrap book and said, “I found thisarticle.” He showed it me. It was titled “A baby and the death of parents,” written by
Mr. Adachi. It stated that at Tang Shuizhen (湯水鎮), located near Nanjing, a reporter
found a baby crying by the dead bodies of its parents. Worried, the reporter came backlater, but the baby was not there anymore. Japanese soldiers may have taken care of thebaby.
This article was not highly regarded by the army but the people at the Asahi Shimbun
made well of it. I don't deny that I wrote articles on brave Japanese soldiers but that’s
not all. Now, when I go back and read my articles, I find that I tried to write
objectively, and I also write articles that praised the enemy. We had such an atmosphereat the Asahi. Compared to the Asahi, the Mainichi Shimbun made a lot more boasts,
like the “100-killing” [kill 100 soldiers] contest.
– Did you know the story of 100-killing contest?
Yes, and I knew the reporter, Mr. Asami Kazuo, who wrote the article.
– Asami was a reporter from a competing newspaper, wasn't he?
Yes, but we met often. The Mainichi Shimbun tended to support the war and Mr. Asami
supported the war. I felt that the article on the “100 killings” contest was fake. It may
be true that Mr. Asami met the two soldiers who competed for 100 killings but theentire story involving the two seemed fictional. Mr. Asami has been quiet about this,24

but I feel that he secretly regretted writing the story. After the War, the two soldiers
were executed due to the article which was used as war crime evidence.
Incidentally, Mr. Asami visited China after the War as the head of the newspaper
company’s labor union.
– Did you meet Mr. Asami after that?
Several times. When I last saw him he looked very thin. I wonder what he is doingnow.
As mentioned to you earlier, I joined the 101st Division as a war correspondent. Mr.
Ito, a reporter from the Manichi Shimbun, also joined the Division. We were on thesame ship. He was a reporter but carried a Japanese sword on his waist and when hegot drunk, he became violent, wielding his unsheathed sword. He too, became a leaderof the labor union. I feel that Mr. Asami and Mr. Ito were not so bright.
Mr. Adachi continued for two hours. He seemed to want to talk some more but it wellpast time, so I concluded the interview.
To the readers: if it appeared that Mr. Adachi was blaming someone in his statement, it
was not his intention to do so, rather, I take responsibility for this. At times he held his
tongue closely, nevertheless, I urged him to continue for the sake of his valuablestatements.

3) Interview with Mr. Hashimoto Tomisaburo (橋本富三郎), Vicechief of the Shanghai Branch of the Asahi Shimbun
Mr. Hashimoto Tomisaburo, of the conservative party, is one of the most powerfulpersons in the world of post-War Japanese politics. He served as the Chief Cabinet
Secretary under Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, and the Secretary General of the Liberal
Democratic Party during the Tanaka Kakuei Cabinet.
Mr. Hashimoto entered Nanjing Castle in December 1937. Mr. Hashimoto graduatedfrom Waseda University in 1927 and joined the Asahi Shimbun. At the time of theManchurian Incident, he worked as a correspondent, reporting from the front.
25

In July 1937, when the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out, he was chief of the
Nanjing branch. The chief had only one reporter, Yamamoto Osamu (山本治), as
mentioned previously, and a couple of Chinese people. Most other branches of othernews agencies also had only one or two other reporters. In Nanjing, the anti-Japan moodincreased day by day, and eventually everyday outdoor activities became highly risky.
Chinese military policemen had to protect the Japanese branch offices. Mr. Hashimoto
stayed in Nanjing until the start of fighting in Shanghai, but on August 15, he, a resident
military assistant officer and others headed for Qingdao (青島), from Pukou (浦口), via
an evacuation train.
He returned to Tokyo and then went to Shanghai as the vice-chief of the Shanghai
branch. His duty was to manage local matters. He himself did not do any reporting but
gave orders to each of his reporters--thus, he was in a position to get an overall picture.
He served in this capacity from the beginning of the Battle of Shanghai and as theJapanese army moved for the attack on Nanjing he joined the troops as a manager of
war correspondents.
The Asahi Shimbun dispatched many war correspondents but most of them left Nanjing
after several days since Nanjing was in Japanese hands. However, Mr. Hashimoto
remained in Nanjing and met the New Year, 1938, in Nanjing.
After that, Mr. Hashimoto served as the chief of the Zinjing (新京) branch, as thedepartment chief for reporting, as the chief of the department for East Asia until the endof the War. After the War, he left the Asahi Shimbun and entered politics. Starting as themayor of the town of Itako, he proceeded to positions within the central government anddistinguished himself as an aide to former Prime Minister Sato. When he was appointed
as a minister, the newspapers profiled him as “The first journalist to enter Nanjing
Castle”.
In 1972, when the Nanjing massacre became a subject of discussion, Mr. Hashimoto
was the Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party, the main person supporting
the Tanaka Cabinet, so he was too busy to spare time and talk about the Nanjing
massacre.
In 1976, as the Lockheed bribery scandals unfolded, Mr. Hashimoto was charged withbeing involved in bribing All Nippon Airways, thus the opportunity for him to talkabout the Nanjing massacre further faded. In 1983, Mr. Hashimoto retired from politics.
26

It was in the fall of 1984 when I interviewed him. For Mr. Hashimoto, his days in
Nanjing were 47 years ago. As a matter of fact, his current concerns were the Lockheed
trial and the matter of finding his successor, and seemed concerned with nothing else,
not even the Central Government or Mr. Tanaka Kakuei, the former prime minister.
At the start, Mr. Hashimoto was reluctant to accept my interview request, saying he hadalmost no memory about a “Nanjing massacre”. But he would be the mostknowledgeable person about Nanjing before and after its capture. I repeatedly asked
him that I needed to know everything and anything he remembered about Nanjing; hefinally agreed.
Mr. Hashimoto was 83 years old when I met him but he looked very robust for his age.
He still visited his office twice a week. He spoke clearly and coherently.
– You were in Nanjing before the attack on Nanjing, so I think you know a lot about
Nanjing.
When the China Incident broke out I was the chief of the Nanjing branch. In thosedays, our branch office was situated in town, apart from the Japanese Embassy. I had acolleague who graduated from the Dong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen Da Xue, or the East
Asian Literary School, and was fluent of Chinese, so I could get fresh information of
the city.
– Your colleague was reporter Yamamoto Osamu (山本治)?
Yes, I couldn't speak Chinese so he handled everything relating to the Chinese.
– According to an article from those days, there was a growing anti-Japanese mood in
Nanjing and your wife had a dangerous experience.
Did she? My wife didn't stay in Nanjing, she visited me for a couple of days, I think.
During that time she must have had such an experience.
Fighting started in Shanghai and I hurriedly closed the Nanjing office and returned to27Tokyo. Then I went to the Shanghai branch again. In Shanghai, I didn't work as areporter but did desk work, compiling reporters' manuscripts.
At the attack on Nanjing, my duty was same--I gathered all materials which came from
reporters at the front. The newspapers was a competitive business, so I collected
information on which division would be the best to follow in order to get the news first,
and gave instructions to my reporters.
– Which Division did you follow?
I followed the headquarters of the Kyoto Division, or the 16th Division, and it just so
happened that I was around Division Commander Nakajima Kesago (中島今朝吾)
when he was injured.
– Were you near the Division Commander?
No, it just so happened that I was close enough to him to be covered with the same dust.
The Division Commander received a minor injury.
– Did you know Division Commander Nakajima?
In those days, the Division Commander was a significantly high- ranking officer, so I
had no opportunity to know him in person. His status was really high. I just followed
the headquarters of the Kyoto Division.
– How many reporters in the Asahi Shimbun joined the war?
From the Aashi Shimbun, to my memory, around 50 joined, including 15 war
correspondents and other reporters. I managed the entire staff.
– It is said there was a massacre in Nanjing. What was the situation in Nanjing?
The “Incident in Nanjing,” well, I have never heard of it. If there was one, reporters
would have talked about it. Reporters raise a subject whatever it is, if it has news value,28

even slightly--that is their job.
I have never even heard of it as a rumor. We at the Asahi held local meetings so if such athing occurred, somebody would have brought it up--talk might not have been direct,
but, for example, “it didn't feel good watching it,” or something like that.
I think there was no massacre in Nanjing.
– Did you know reporters Imai Seigo (今井正剛) and Moriyama Yoshio (守山義雄)?
I don't remember speaking with them. I have no clear memory of Mr. Moriyama Yoshio.
I knew another Moriyama, Mr. Moriyama Takashi, who was senior staff. I think the Mr.
Moriyama you’re refer to was in the political department and came from Tokyo as a
special correspondent.
– Imai wrote the report “The mass murder in Nanjing Castle” and claiming that 20,000
people were killed. And Moriyama, who didn't write anything, but someone said thatMoriyama told someone else about a massacre. [Refer to the second interviewee Mr.
Adachi's statement and story in Berlin.]
I didn't hear anything from them first-hand so I don't know if this is true or not. Both ofthese reporters were neither left-wing nor right-wing in particular. Nevertheless, people
make vague remarks at times and their remarks could be one of those.
– Do you remember anything about a manuscript written by reporter Imai? Someone
said he wrote it based entirely on his imagination.
Mr. Imai’s manuscript? Manuscripts must be written by reporters who were at the siteof the story.
– It was said that Mr. Imai wrote an article concerning the entrance ceremony before theceremony occurred. It was called an “advance manuscript”.
The manuscript of the entrance ceremony was an “advance manuscript”? There was no29

entrance ceremony during the Manchurian Incident, so we did not experience any
ceremonies-- we were unable to write “advance manuscripts”. I have no memory
instructing Mr. Imai to write an advance manuscript. If it was written ahead of time, hemust have visited headquarters, heard the schedule and wrote this out. And, you know,
it was called a “ceremony” but the real thing was very modest, far from elaborate. Mr.
Imai was a very talented reporter, using descriptive phrases, so I think he wrote thisusing his unique style.
War is abnormal. Just with natural disasters, like earthquakes, even a rumor became
news.
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?
I don't remember this very well. After a while I appointed someone as temporary chiefand returned to Shanghai.
– What did you think of the press code then?
I didn't feel there were any restrictions. We could write and talk about what we thought
and what we saw.
I was hoping that he would talk in more detail. During the interview, I tried to jog his
memory by asking questions from various angles. But now, I have to admit that thepresent interview was the maximum extent to which an 83-year-old man could
remember the things that he experienced as at the age of 36.

30

2. Mainichi Shimbun
4) Interview with Mr. Kanazawa Yoshio (金沢喜雄), Photographer for
the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun
Mr. Kanazawa Yoshio joined the army as a photographer for the Tokyo Nichinichi
Simbun (currently the Mainichi Shimbun). After the War, Mr. Kanazawa was involved in
the magazine Camera Mainichi from the day of its foundation, and worked as its chief
editor until his mandatory-age retirement. After retirement from the Mainichi Shimbun,
he worked as an instructor of photography at a junior college for 10 years and moved to
Fukuoka City in 1977.
I visited Mr. Kanazawa in February 1986. His house was situated in a suburb of
Fukuoka City, surrounded in three directions by small mountains. So far, he lived
quietly with the mountains for 9 years. He was 74 years old and healthy, climbing themountains alone, and didn't look like a pensioner.
Mr. Kanazawa was dispatched to Shanghai as soon as Dachang Town (大場鎮) was
captured by the Japanese Army in October 1937, and retained his position in the photo
department of the main office. He was 25 years old then. In those days, their Shanghai
branch was headed by Tachibana Nobuyoshi (田知花信良). There were several
reporters, including Edamatsu Shigeyuki (枝松茂之) (who later became Executive
Director of the Mainichi Shimbun), Shimura Fuyuo (志村冬雄), and other special
correspondents, dispatched from Tokyo, one after another--Mr. Kanazawa was one ofthem.
As Mr. Kanazawa arrived in Shanghai, the dead-locked battle in Shanghai shifted
rapidly, and the Japanese army advanced to Nanjing. Mr. Kanazawa joined the Jiangyin(江陰) Battery Attack which was the first battle after the order to attack Nanjing wasissued.
– When did you start moving to Nanjing?
As I returned from the battle in Jiangyin (江陰), staff in our branch office spoke
excitedly, that Regiment Commander Colonel Wakisaka Jiro (脇坂次郎), of the 9th31

Division, was proceeding ahead to the front with the Regimental colors, which was themost dangerous front. Still, the Commander dared to press on, even alone. It was
really a dangerous front--as a matter of fact, a reporter from the Yomiuri and aphotographer from the Asahi who traveled with Regiment Commander Wakisaka,
were just killed.
And we guessed that, among all troops involved in the attack on Nanjing, theWakisaka Regiment would advance to Nanjing first. I, just returning from the battle of
Jingyin (江陰), was chosen to follow the Wakisaka Regiment.
I departed at once, and I don't remember how many days it took, via Wu-xi (無錫) andChangzhou (常州), I finally met Regiment Commander Wakisaka. This was before wereached Nanjing. Since then, I constantly followed Regiment Commander Wakisaka.
On the dawn of December 9, in the morning mist, I vaguely recognized large ramparts
two kilometers away: it was Nanjing Castle. Everything was quiet. In the middle of therampart I found a gate, Guanghua Gate (光華門), from which a wide road extended
towards us. Soon, the streets lights lined along the road turned on all at once. The
Chinese soldiers hid behind Guanghua Gate (光華門) and had been patiently waiting
for the Japanese soldiers. As soon as they saw the Japanese army they turned on thestreet lights.
Then, all at once, the attack started. The rampart was surrounded by creeks and we had
no other way to attack except up the wide open road which led to Guanghua Gate (光華門), so the Japanese Army attacked from the road. This meant that Chinese soldiers
could easily target and shoot Japanese soldiers. Commander Wakisaka moved to the
air-defense school which was located under a bank in front of a creek and we also
entered the air-defense school. It was 600 meters away from Guanghua Gate (光華門).
The Battalion, headed by Major Ito Zenko (伊藤善光), eventually reached Guanghua
Gate (光華門) but Guanghua Gate was double-layered and the fierce attack by the
Chinese army prevented the Japanese from going any further.
At the time, when I tried to get up to take photos, Chinese troop shot at once. The roofof the air-defense school was gone, and under the circumstance, Commander Wakisaka
closely supervised the Ito Battalion at Guanghua Gate (光華門). I couldn't move at all
to take photos, so I instead, I took a photo of the Commander washing his face and32sent the negatives to our main office. Usually, photos of commanders were notpublished, but this photo was accepted.
– What was the situation inside Nanjing Castle?
Some Japanese troops moved along the Yangtze River and troops from Hangzhou Bay
took a huge detour to get to Nanjing; in any event, Nanjing was surrounded by
Japanese troops. Thus, most remaining Chinese soldiers fled via the Yangtze River.
Chinese soldiers who remained stayed at each gate, eventually fought with Japanese
troops. Thereafter, Japanese troops entered Nanjing. I also entered Nanjing through the
Guanghua Gate (光華門).
After the War, I heard a massacre of hundreds of thousands of people occurred, but
this was puzzling to me, indeed! At the time, I traveled around Nanjing and I neversaw anything that could be considered a massacre and I did not hear of this fromsoldiers.
The Mainichi Shimbun had 50 to 60 staff then, including correspondents. At first, we
stayed at an inn for our lodging which was located close to Zhongshan Gate (中山門)
and stayed there for several days. The work of the newspaper ended with the captureof Nanjing so staff who were dispatched from Tokyo returned thereafter. Then aroundDecember 20, we moved our lodging to the Foreign Affairs Office building which was
located along Zhongshan North Road (中山北路) and the staff of the Shanghai branch
stayed there.
The branch was headed by Shimura Fuyuo (志村冬雄), and they said they needed a
photographer, so I remained, too. Murakami Go (村上剛), who later succeeded
Shimura, was also in the branch. I was there for about one month and I never saw nor
heard anything like the massacres that some people after the War claimed to haveoccurred. It is said a massacre occurred but it was impossible to have occurred. I don't
understand why General Matsui Iwane (松井石根) had to be executed by hanging forthis allegation.
I was low ranking in those days and I had no opportunities to talk to army staff
officers but Mr. Shimura worked as chief of the Nanjing branch and visited33

headquarters often. Mr. Shimura knew more about matters than I did. He alreadypassed away but I have never heard of a massacre from Mr. Shimura.
– Were there any bodies at all?
Yes, there were. There were a number of corpses. Since it was war, the Japanese army
may have shot them, killed them and then threw them into the River. The bodies were
the same as the ones I saw in creeks on the way to Nanjing. It was a big battle and theJapanese army adopted encircling tactics. Therefore, it was as a matter of course to seebodies, corpses floating in the River. Encircling tactics were used for that purpose, todestroy the enemy.
It was a battlefield inside the Castle as well so several refugees may have been shotand killed. I don't deny that. It was war. If you call this a “massacre”, then every war isa “massacre”. The massacre story was made up by people who know nothing aboutwar.
– How about on the banks along the Yangtze River?
People often said a number of bodies were thrown into Yangtze and the river turned
red, but I never heard such thing, and of course never saw that.
– Was a massacre ever raised as a topic at the office?
Never.
– Within your company, the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, reporter Asami Kazuo (浅海一男) insists that a massacre happened.
Mr. Asami--he is a little bit of an odd fellow like me but good guy. He came from thesocial department of the main office. I met him in Wu-his (無錫) as I headed for
Nanjing. In order to reach Nanjing from Shanghai, we commonly used the main roadthrough Wu-his (無錫) and Changzhou (常州). Later I went to Guanghua Gate (光華門) and we separated. After we entered Nanjing, I met him at an inn located close to34

Zhongshan Gate (中山門), but he did not mention anything.
– After you left Nanjing, did you hear about a massacre?
I expected that the war would end when Nanjing was captured, and in thinking so I took
photos of the entrance ceremony. However the war did not end--on the contrary, it
eventually expanded into the Greater Eastern Asia War, and during all this time, I
remained at the Shanghai office.
After the capture of Nanjing, I had no specific assignment, so I stayed there for a monthwithout doing anything and then returned to Shanghai. After that I traveled to and from
Shanghai and Nanjing. When the Wang Zhaoming (汪兆銘) Government wasestablished, I took photos of Wang Zhaoming (汪兆銘) in Shanghai as well as inNanjing, but I never heard about a massacre.
After the War, I was surprised to read reports and notes of others about theirexperiences in those days, which could not have been true, and were merely selfpromoting. The Nanjing massacre falls into this category. I think my information won'tchange anything and I have not spoken with anyone else, but today you asked me so I
recalled what I know.
For my visit, Mr. Kanazawa looked through photos of those days of but couldn't findanything useful; nevertheless his interview was very descriptive.

5) Interview with Mr. Sato Shinju (佐藤振寿), Photographer for the
Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun
If you see a copy of the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimubun published during 1937, you willfind several photos of the battle of Nanjing, which were taken by Mr. Sato Shinju (佐藤辰寿). But it was after the War that Mr. Sato's name became widely known. About adecade ago, it was claimed that the 100-killing contest was fictional. It was Mr. Sato
who took the picture of the two Second Lieutenants, Mukai Toshiaki (向井敏明) andNoda Iwao (野田巌) at Changzhou Gate (常州門), who were famous for their story of
the 100-killing contest.
Mr. Sato made clear statement of his views in the books, “The Illusion of the Nanjing
35

Massacre (南京大虐殺のまぼろし),” and “History of Showa of One Hundred Million
People (一億人の昭和史).”
In autumn 1985, I asked him to talk about the situation in Nanjing back then and of themassacre; he quickly agreed. Upon visiting his home in Fujisawa, I saw that he had
prepared a number of materials, including the notebook which he used then, personal
photos of Nanjing which he took with his Leica and a scrapbook of photos, and so on.
With these documents, Mr. Sato spread out a map and began.
In 1932, Mr. Sato Shinju (佐藤辰寿) joined the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun as aphotographer. At the end of September 1937, as soon as the 101st Division wasdispatched to Shanghai, Mr. Sato and reporter Ito joined the troops. Mr. Sato completed
reporting on the Battle of Shanghai, conducted by the 101st Division, and on November
13th, together with reporter Asami Kazuo (浅海一男), he observed the Baimao-Kou(白茆口) Landing Operation, which was conducted by Shigefuji Detachment of the
Taiwan Garrison (台湾守備隊). After completing this assignment, from Baimao-Kou,
he went back Shanghai on the cruiser. Upon arrival, he immediately departed for
Nanjing. He was 24 years old.
After the battle of Nanjing, he returned to Tokyo. In 1939, he observed the Shantou (汕頭) Landing Operation again. Mr. Sato fell ill due to tuberculosis, and was unable tofurther carry out his duty as a war correspondent, and, given the irregular lifestyleworking in a newspaper, he quit the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun. He then edited a
photographic magazine of a photographic association, which was an externalorganization of the Bureau of Information. Since then, his career has been photo-related
and has worked as a photo critic as well.
After the War he was a prolific writer and he read a number of books related to the
Nanjing Incident.
– Did you go to Nanjing after Baimao-Kou (白茆口)?
Yes. I was originally a war correspondent attached to the 101st Division. When I
returned from Baimao-Kou, the 101st Division was in Shanghai. I had worked as a war
correspondent during the landing, which was conducted by the Taiwanese Garrison,
under enemy fire, so I thought I deserved some rest. Instead, I was suddenly ordered to
go to Suzhou (蘇州). It was November 20, according to my recollection. So I went as36

far as Kunlun (崑崙) by car then walked along the railway tracks to Suzhou (蘇州).
When I arrived at Suzhou (蘇州), it was rainy and I tried to get to Division
Headquarters. I couldn't find where other war correspondents for the Tokyo Nichinichi
Shimbun were lodged. It was a dark night and I could not locate our company's banner,
so in the middle of the cold street of Suzhou (蘇州), I shouted “Tokyo Nichinichi
Shimbun!” and eventually found my company.
– After that, what route did you take?
From Suzhou (蘇州), I went through Wu-xi (無錫), Changzhou (常州), Danyang (丹陽), and headed for the Mabansan (磨盤山) Mountains.
In Wu-xi (無錫), I followed the Commander, Colonel Wakisaka Jiro (脇坂次郎), and I
was accompanied by reporter Suzuki Jiro (鈴木次郎), of the Tokyo Nichinichi
Shimbun. Around that time, I landed in a drainage ditch and sprained a knee, and eversince I still suffer from the injury--still now, I have difficulty turning myself in bed attimes.
In Changzhou (常州), I took the picture of the two of the Second Lieutenants, Mukai
and Noda.
While talking, the two officers asked me if I had any cigarettes. I bought 100 boxes ofRuby Quinn before I left Shanghai and stored them in many places in my rucksack.
I gave the two officers a couple of boxes of cigarettes--they were very pleased and wereanimated when speaking. Asami asked many questions. I wondered how they were able
to keep track of numbers killed. They said: Noda’s orderly counts those that Mukai
killed and Mukai’s orderly counts those that Noda killed.
Listening carefully, I realized that Noda must have been be too busy to kill Chinese
soldiers in hand-to-hand fight because he was the battalion commander’s adjutant andhad to convey orders and other things during battle. And Mukai was likely busy too, as
he was an infantry gun platoon commander. He had to figure out coordinates and issueorders during battle. They could not have had a chance to do their “killing contest”
during a real battle; this was fairly obvious.
37

After the War, I came across Asami and he told me that he was called by the Chinese
prosecution to testify about the “100 killing contest”, and added that I might be called
soon; I didn't get a summons.
Had Asami clearly stated that the article was fictional, that would have been OK, but hedidn't. He and Liao Cngzhi (廖承志), the first director of the Sino-Japanese Friendship
Association, were classmate at Waseda University, so maybe he had something in
mind. As a result, the two officers were executed as war criminals in China.
– Did you always travel with Asami?
No, at that time I was with him by chance. After the capture of Nanjing, he returned toTokyo to attend a conference on Japan’s victory. One or two local reporters werealways attached to Divisional headquarters. Other reporters served as reserves. I was areserve and others who came from Tokyo, including Asami and Suzuki, were reserves
as well. So, we often ended up worked together.
In those days, troops competed with each other over who would get in Nanjing first,
and we, the reporters, would also wonder who would be first as we would be following
them. Information and instructions from the various Shanghai branches were delivered
to headquarters at the front, which was radio-equipped, by which troop movements
were announced (and we could figure out which troops would enter Nanjing first) andinstructions on following troops were given.
– So you followed the 9th Division and then the 16th Division?
Yes. As a result, Asami, Suzuki and I followed the 16th Division (Kyoto), but theoriginally assigned reporter to the 16th Division was Mitsumoto, who came from the
Kyoto branch of the newspaper.
– After crossing the Mabansan (磨盤山) Mountains, what route did you take?
I took a course between Chunhuazhen (淳化鎮) and Tangshuizhen (湯水鎮) to get to
Nanjing and on 10th we arrived at the Zhongshan Cultural Education Institute38

(中山文化教育館). The Zhongshan Cultural Education Institute was situated close to
the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum (中山陵) in Mt. Zijin (紫金). It was a four-storied building
and displayed antiques in glass cases. During that time, we suffered another shortage offood.
– How long did you stay at the Zhongshan Cultural Education Institute?
I stayed there until the capture of Nanjing on the 13th. We and other reporters shared aroom, and the headquarters of the Kusaba (草場) Brigadier of the 16th Division used
the next room. I went to the Brigadier’s headquarters everyday and asked the staff
when the capture of Nanjing would be, and they replied, “not today.” We ended up
stayed there for three days.

In front of the front-line base of the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun. In the front row, from left
to right, Mr. Kaneko, vice-manager of the local news section, Mr. Shimura Fuyuo, former
Nanjing branch chief, Mr. Sato Shinju and Mr. Oya Soichi.

– Mr. Oya Soichi (大宅壮一), a critic, wrote in the magazine Kaizo (改造) that he met
you, Mr. Sato, at that time.
At that time, Oya Soichi was a company friend of the newspaper’s liberal arts
39

department and came to Nanjing as non-regular employee. I brought Oya to the
Zhongshan Cultural Education Institute. I didn't know where he found it, but I saw him
carrying a Chinese antique. Not only Oya, but other reporters had done the same thing.
In those days they said that, “I bought this at a 100 percent price reduction.” There
were a number of old Buddhist statues in China, as you know, and I often saw a few
people stealing them.
– What date did you enter Nanjing?
In the early morning of the 13th, I was awakened by shouting, that Nanjing fell. So I
walked from the Zhongshan Cultural Education Institute along the ridge for a while,
passed through the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and entered the Castle through the
Zhongshan Gate (中山門). It appeared that the fist soldiers entered the Castle before
dawn. At the Zhongshan Gate, I looked at the inside of the Castle with binoculars andsaw Chinese soldiers far away crossing Zhongshan East Road (中山東路). Watchingcarefully, I saw that they were wearing brown uniforms. I wondered if Chinese soldierswore brown uniforms as Japanese soldiers did. But in fact, they were Japanese soldiers-the 6th Division had already entered the Castle.
Kanazawa Yoshio (金沢喜雄), a photographer attached to the Wakisaka Regiment, hadalready taken the photo of the rising sun flag on the Guanghua Gate (光華門). This
meant that either the 9th Division or the 6th Division entered Nanjing before our 16th
Division.
– What was the situation like inside Nanjing Castle?
On the 13th, the battle continued, with Chinese soldiers hiding here and there--it was
dangerous, but the inside of the Castle was quiet. Walking a little from the Zhongshan
Gate (中山門), we found the Reishisha (励志社) off to the right and we decided to use
it as lodging for the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun staff. In one room, we found a sofa and abilliard table and so on. We decided who got to use what by playing janken, or the rockpaper-scissors game. I was happy to take the billiard table, but later I found out that
under the felt was a stone slab, so I had to suffer from coldness. The next day, we
moved to a nearby Chinese inn. Here we found a lot of beds, and I really felt good.
While I was in Nanjing, this inn served as our headquarters.
40

– What about the 14th?
I took many pictures at Zhongshan Gate (中山門) on the day when I entered, but I
wanted more impressive pictures which depicted the fall of Nanjing Castle. ShimuraFuyuo (志村冬雄), the chief of the Nanjing branch, suggested to us a place, theNationalist Government’s building, and we successfully took a picture of a man
waving our newspaper's banner there. We were lucky because only fifteen minutes
earlier, an Asahi photographer was attacked by Chinese stragglers there and he wasunable to take photos. So my photo became a scoop and was used in the extra edition.
On a street near the Safety Zone, a ramen noodle shop opened promptly and I saw
Japanese soldiers buying ramen for 10 sen (銭)1 and eating.
On the 14th, ransacking by the Chinese continued. I saw a Chinese walking down
Zhongshan Road (中山路) with a table on his shoulder, and another Chinese who
forced open a shop door and extended his hand into the store to steal something. On
the same day, fighting against Chinese soldiers continued elsewhere.
I think it was the 14th--inside the Castle, while walking from Zhongshan Gate (中山門), on the left side of the street, that I found the headquarters of the 88th Division of
the Chinese Army, which was directly administered by Chiang Kai-shek. It was locatedin front of the airfield. A signboard of the 88th Division was put up on the building.
There, I saw Japanese soldiers kill Chinese soldiers. They must have been stragglers. I
believe this was a consequence of the battle.
It is nonsense to talk about battlefield conditions during peace. Those Japanese soldiers
were full of enmity, their eyes bloodshot.
My colleague Ito followed the troops with me. He was the type who carried a Japanesesword with him all the time, but even he was shocked by the combat death ofRegiment Commander Colonel Kano Haruo (加納治雄), whom he highly respected.
He could not continue his job and was sent back to Tokyo.

1

Sen (銭); old Japanese currency, 100 sen =1 yen.
41

And Takada Tamotsu (高田保), a playwright, and Bando Mitsugoro (坂東三津五郎),
a kabuki actor, who visited Shanghai to entertaining the troops, as well, went back assoon as the next day, soon after arrival, because they understood what a real battlefield
was and were totally shocked. You know, a REAL battlefield is like that.
– How about the 15th?
This might have been the 14th, but I heard that the Nanjing Embassy was about to open
and went there to take photos. Kaida Seiichi (開田靖一), a director in our film team
who studied French at Tokyo University, was a high school mate of Mr. Fukuda
Tokuyasu (福田篤泰), assistant consulate, who came to Nanjing as diplomat and gave
us this information. So, we went over to the Embassy and took photos of the staff
raising the national flag.
Later, several of us went around the inside of the Castle by car. When we arrived at the
Safety Zone, a Chinese came up to us and started speaking in English. He saw ourclothes and thought that we were not soldiers. He asked us to tell the Japanese soldiers
not to kill the people in the Safety Zone.
From where we standing, we could see a hill behind the Safety Zone and on a westernstyle building which was standing on the hill, we saw the raising of the rising sun flag.
As a whole, the town was quiet.
– Could you enter the Safety Zone?
The entrance was closed and a Chinese guard stopped people from entering.
– How was 16th?
On the 16th, I saw on Zhongshan Road (中山路) that plain-clothed soldiers in the
Safety Zone were taken out and pictures were taken of them. The plain-clothedsoldiers filled Zhongshan Road (中山路). Only those with a shaved head, trace on theforehead of wearing a hat, sun-burned, or otherwise clearly recognized as soldiers
were picked out. Long-haired Chinese were considered civilians.

42

– How was 17th?
That was the day of the entrance ceremony. I wanted to take pictures of the ceremony
from a higher level so I found three ladders and prepared them the night before. I put
them on every second or third electric pole and as General Matsui entered throughZhongshan Gate (中山路), I climbed up those ladders and took photos. I took one
picture, then hurriedly moved to the next ladder and took another, so that I took several
photos.
At that time, Kimura Ihei (木村伊兵衛) and Watanabe Yoshio (渡辺義雄), bothphotographers, came to take photos as non-regular staff of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. They took a photo of me. NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) as wellcame to broadcast the event.
I completed my assignment, taking photos of the entrance ceremony and of thememorial service the next day.
– It is said there was a massacre.
I didn't see one. It is said there was massacre, but on the 16th and 17th, I found shopsthat were opened, not only on small streets but on big streets. In addition, I saw many
Chinese people wearing a rising sun armband gathered around Japanese soldiers in afriendly manner. I cannot believe that a massacre occurred under such circumstances.
– You didn't see anything with your eyes, but did you hear of any rumors?
I heard a rumor once. Three thousand Chinese prisoners who were caught inZhenjiang (鎮江) were lined up along a quay wall at Xiaguan and shot with a heavymachine gun. Several Japanese guards, not quick enough, were killed, too. Only acompany caught 3,000 prisoners—this must have been really tough. Of course, we
believed this was a consequence of the battle, it was not a massacre as it was claimed
after the War.
If we caught prisoners, we had no food to give them; we had nothing, no cup or nopan. Even Japanese soldiers did not get enough food. We reporters looked forward to
the rice which our correspondent from Shanghai brought us.
43

– Did you go to see Xiaguan?
Yes, after the entrance ceremony. I went there but saw no trace of anything as stated in
the rumor. When I visited, the army used coolies to unload liquor barrels. While I waswatching, a coolie dropped a barrel. I felt pity for him since he might be chided later.
– Did your newspaper talk about a massacre?
No one mentioned anything.
– Did you take photos in Nanjing wherever you went?
I had two cameras, one for my work, and one for myself, a Leica. The Leica was new
and I took many pictures with this. After the memorial service, I mainly used my Leicaand took the pictures of street scenes. I was told not to take photos of Japanesesoldiers' bodies, but I actually took photos of everything, including corpses.
That time I took approximately 100 photos, but I found no pictures that Japanesesoldiers were doing cruel things. Among the photos, you see Japanese soldiers giving
consoling bags and Chinese people gathering around the soldiers. Under thecircumstance, I don't believe that I missed seeing a massacre just by chance – I thinkthat a massacre didn't happen.
– Did you add captions to the photos you took?
Yes. I put the date, the location, and a simple explanation on the top of the film, which
was carried by correspondent to Shanghai. They were developed in Shanghai,delivered to Nagasaki, Japan by ship, and from Fukuoka electrically transmitted toTokyo. In Tokyo, we had to obtain the army's approval. The negatives were kept at themain office in Osaka.
– Were those photos then the property of the Mainichi Shimbun?
Yes. I took the photos but ownership belonged to the Mainichi Shimbun.
44

As a Japanese Pacification Unit started to deliver food and candies, Chinese people,
including grown-ups and children, gathered around the soldiers. (December 18th, 1937)– You say there was no massacre but photos from those times showed cruelties.
Yes, a photo alone does not mean anything--it's all up to its explanation.
For example, on the 15th, I took a picture in Nanjing Castle, in which a Japanese soldier
shouldered his belongings and pulled a baby carriage. (Explanation of Photo A) I
myself have experienced the difficulty of transporting belongings--they were such aburden. So I used Chinese porters to carry them or I used a donkey. I injured my kneein Wu-xi (無錫), so climbing the Mabansan (磨盤山) Mountains was exceptionallyhard. I started earlier in the morning than the others in order to not be late but arrived
last anyway. So I understood pain very well.
The soldier, of whom I took the photo, seemed distressed--after entering Nanjing, he
was in an unguarded moment and walked with sagging shoulders. I empathized withhim and took his photo. Nevertheless, here, it is captioned as, “A soldier carries
requisitioned goods.”
And, Mr. Fudo Kenji (不動健治), of the Domei Tsushin, and I took a picture of thesame scene. In Mr. Fudo’s photo-book, “Japanese Photo History, 1840 to 1945,”
published by Heibonsha, the caption stated that this scene was the site of a massacre(Refer to Photo B). However, Matsuo Kunizo (松尾邦蔵), of the Osaka Mainichi
45

Shimbun, showed a similar scene and we both knew that these were not bodies due to a“massacre”, rather, the photo showed “Chinese soldiers, victims of an air attack”.

Photo A: Mr. Sato’s explanation: Worn-out, exhausted Japanese soldiers carrying
their belongings. In front, one pulled a baby carriage in a shape of a boat, and in the
background, donkeys are used. (December 15, 1937)

Photo B: Mr. Sato’s explanation: Chinese soldiers killed in an air raid. (December 13,
1937, Mainichi Shimbun-sha)46

I knew Mr. Fudo very well but I never heard from him state that there was a massacrein Nanjing. I knew his brother, too, so when I met with his brother, I complained about
this to him. He replied, “My brother was suffering from dementia so he didn’t
understand.” He continued, that after the War, Mr. Fudo was asked to show any photosof a massacre and gave the photo mentioned above.
Mr. Fudo died recently, but I still have the recorded conversation with his brother.
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?
Until the 24th. On the afternoon of the 24th, I put our motorcycle, which was used forcorrespondence, onto the bed of a truck and left Nanjing. There were numerous big
holes in the road, so it was really hard driving. I stayed overnight on the way and in theearly morning of the 25th, I arrived in Shanghai. I stayed in Shanghai until February
1938, and then returned to Tokyo.
– When did you hear about the Nanjing incident?
After the War. It was after the US Army arrived, so 1946 or 1947. NHK’s program,“Truth Box” (From December 9, 1945, “Now It Can Be Told,” title later changed to“Truth Box,” was organized, scripted, and produced by the GHQ Civil Information and
Education Section.) was broadcast, in which it was said a massacre in Nanjing
occurred--that was the first time I heard about a massacre. It happened that I heard theprogram by accident. It started with Tchaikovsky’s symphony, then the sound of amachine gun shooting, followed by people screaming. The narrator said there was a
massacre in Nanjing. I was astonished. I snapped to persons around me that “This is alie.”
About 10 years ago (around 1975), the Asahi Shimbun published a series of articles,“Travel to China (中国の旅),” in which they parroted Chinese statements, that there
was massacre. At that time, there were many surviving Japanese people who were in
Nanjing and saw it with their own eyes. Why didn't they speak with those people andwhy did the Asahi adopt such lie, which simply benefited the Chinese government? The
people who were in Nanjing at that time would never believe such stories. Since this47

series was released, I stopped my subscription to the Asahi Shimbun. I told the Asahi
delivery person that I cancelled my subscription because of the Asahi’s brazen lie.
It often happens that victims tend to exaggerate their injury. At the time of the captureof Nanjing, a number of Asahi Shimbun reporters and photographers were there.
Without their statements, damages and losses claimed are based on the say-so of solely
one side. I doubt the reliability of the Asahi series.
Among the dozens of interviewees, Mr. Sato's statement was the most detailed. His
explanations were realistic for an event that occurred 50 years ago. The reason he could
speak in detail was in part due to the fact that he was the youngest of the interviewees,
but mainly due to the fact that he kept a number of photos of those times, which serve to
vividly remind him of his experiences. Most of his statements were based on his photos.

6) Interview with Mr. Goto Kosaku (五島広作), Reporter for the Osaka
Mainichi Shimbun
After the War, among the reporters who were present during the attack on Nanjing, Mr.
Goto Kosaku (五島広作) is the most vocal concerning the Nanjing Incident.
His representative work is “The Truth of Nanjing Operations – Kumamoto 6th Division's
Military History” (南京作戦の実相―熊本６師団戦記), published in 1964. The bookdescribes six months of the 6th Division movements, starting with the order to mobilize
in August 1937, battles in North China, the landing of Hangzhou Bay in November andthe attack on Nanjing. The book contains dictation from Colonel Shimono Ikkaku (下野一霍), Chief of Staff of the 6th Division. In addition to Shimono’s dictation, the bookincludes protest by Division Commander Lieutenant General Tani, written while
imprisoned in Nanjing, and a battlefield report by Mr. Goto, all of which were edited
and published by Mr. Goto.
Sixth Division Commander Tani Hisao (谷寿夫) was accused of being responsible forthe massacre and was executed in Nanjing after the War. Chief of Staff Shimono was
Division Commander Tani’s aide, and at the time Tani considered Goto a promising
officer. Both men kept close contact with Tani during the war. The two who knew
Division Commander Tani most, published this book in honor of Lieutenant General48

Tani as well as in honor of the 6th Division.
Mr. Goto suffered from Parkinson's disease for about ten years and continued his
struggle against illness. Nevertheless, he accepted my interview request, since the
Nanjing incident was his issue. Mr. Goto was 79 years old and had difficulty walking, acommon symptom of Parkinson's disease. His condition was worse than I expected. At
first, I thought of meeting him in a quiet location, but upon seeing his conditions, I
suggested a nearby cafe which was not too much trouble.
As soon as taking a seat at the cafe, Mr. Goto took his documents out from his shoulder
bag and started to explain the Nanjing Incident. I was taken aback by his unilateralmanner. I listened him for a while and at last caught a chance to say, “I have read yourbook, “The Truth of Nanjing Operation,” so I understand what you want to say. But
today I have specific questions to ask.”
Several days ago when I asked him for an interview about the Nanjing Incident, I told
him that I wanted to know details from those days. Mr. Goto seemed to misunderstandmy intention and tried to persuade me that there was no massacre.
Mr. Goto worked as a reporter at the Kumamoto branch of the Osaka Mainichi Shimbun(currently the Mainichi Shimbun) and as the 6th Division was dispatched to North China,
he followed the 6th Division. So he was the 6th Division’s correspondent and observed
the attack on Nanjing as well as the Baoding (保定 ) Operation, Zhengding (正定)Operation and Hangzhou (杭州) Bay Landing Operation.
– Where in the 6th Division did you work?
I always worked within Division headquarters. I was with the Division for a long time,since the fighting in North China, so Division Commander Tani was familiar with me
and at times he had Staff Officer Fujiwara Takeshi (藤原武 ) call me into their strategy
meetings, thinking that it might be useful to me.
– On reaching Kunshan (昆山), it is said that troops were ordered to kill all Chinese,
including women and children.

49

There was no such order. I worked at Divisional headquarters and frequently followed
the Division Commander and I never heard of anything like that. I think it was
something made-up after the Tokyo Trial (the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East)– Someone said that the 6th Division was unable to get a citation for battles in North
China, so that's why they had done cruel things in Central China.
That is a new story to me. Such things never happened in the 6th Division. This story,
like the previous story that I said was made-up, was fabricated after the Division
Commander was executed. After the War, many stories were created that were made to
make China look good.
– What was the movement of the 6th Division after the capture of Nanjing?
At 12 o'clock on the 12th, we captured the rampart for the first time, and on 13th some ofthe soldiers entered the Castle. I, too, entered the Castle with the troops who wereselected from the 13th Regiment.
– During that time, were there any acts of cruelty?
On 13th and 14th the troops conducted mopping-up operations, but no massacre
occurred.
– In the attack on Hankou (漢口) in October the following year, 1938, the 6th Divisionfell under the 11th Army, which was headed by Lieutenant General Okamura Yasuji(岡村寧次). According to “Documents of General Okamura Yasuji,” Major General
Ushijima Mitsuru (牛島満), the Brigadier Commander in the 6th Division, mentionedthat the 6th Division had disciplinary problems.
The attack on Hankou (漢口) was conducted the next year. I was not attached at thetime, so I have nothing to say.
I think at the time after the capture of Nanjing, the Brigadier’s headquarters and the50

Division headquarters were located in two different places. Major General Ushijima
was a righteous man, I met him at his headquarters. At that time we didn't talk about amassacre or anything like that. This is my thinking – perhaps something suspicious
might have had happened. But in any event, no one carried out a massacre.
– Were there foreign reporters stationed in Nanjing?
Yes. I spoke with several of them.
– When you spoke with them, did they mention disciplinary problem of Japanese
troops?
I have no memory of speaking to them about such things. Paramount shot a newsreelof Nanjing and I appeared in it. Arthur Menken made the film.
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?
I stayed there until January 10 the following year. During my stay, I visited many
places in Nanjing but never saw anything that can be called a “massacre”. Concerning
rapes, a brothel was already established, so allegations about that made after the War
are lies.
After the Nanjing Attack Operation was completed, Lieutenant General Tani was
appointed Commander of the Middle Area Garrison and left the 6th Division. I returnedto Shanghai with Lieutenant General Tani.
– In October 1967, on a TV program, war correspondent Imai of the Asahi Shimbun,
and Chief of Staff Shimono, of the 6th Division, argued about a massacre. Could you tellme about the argument?
I have no clear memory of this. I don't remember if I was there, or if I heard of thislater from Lieutenant General Shimono. Please refer to my writings.
The interview lasted one and half hour. He said his memory was not so clear so I
avoided pushing him further. In addition, he looked pained, due to his illness. I tried to51make the interview as brief as possible but he repeatedly assured me, “I am OK, go on,
go on.”

7) Interview with Mr. Suzuki Jiro (鈴木二郎), Reporter for the Tokyo
Nichinichi Shimbun
Mr. Suzuki Jiro (鈴木次郎) was at the attack on Nanjing as a reporter for the Tokyo
Nichinichi Shimbun and was one of the authors of the “100-killing contest” article.
After the War, Mr. Suzuki wrote about these matters in a magazine, Maru (丸), entitled“Cursed Scoop – The 100-Killing Contest,” which was published in January 1961. Helater wrote in Maru, “I Witnessed the Tragedy of Nanjing,” which was published in
November 1971.
Soon afterwards, Mr. Suzuki Jiro’s (鈴木次郎) statements sparked controversy. Mr.
Yamamoto Shichihei (山本七平), Isaiah Ben-Dasan and Mr. Suzuki Akira (鈴木明)roundly criticized Mr. Suzuki's article, “I Witnessed the Tragedy of Nanjing”. The
argument continued on in the magazine Shokum (諸君), from 1972 to 1973 – the threeclaimed that the 100-killing contest was fictional and that Mr. Suzuki made dubious
statements.
Shortly thereafter, a book critical of Mr. Yamamoto Shichihei (山本七平), “Plot of thePen,” was published. Mr. Suzuki Jiro (鈴木次郎) contributed an article to the book,“War Reporter in Those Days,” in which he stated that the Incident, which has he had
written about in his article, “I Witnessed the Tragedy of Nanjing,” was true.
In the fall of 1984, I asked Mr. Suzuki Jiro (鈴木次郎) for an interview and heresponded that his health condition was not good, perhaps the following year he will bebetter. If it was urgent, he would answer my questions by mail. It was not a matter that
could be completed by mail so I decided to wait. Mr. Suzuki was 78 years old, so I
could not force him any further. Unexpectedly, as soon as next year began, I got his OK.
As I visited his home on the day of the meeting, he came to see me outside. While
walking with him, I thanked him for accepting my request for an interview. Then, I said,“Can I take it that your statements written in the book “Plot of the Pen” are yourconvictions?” He nodded with a smile. We reached his house, and he led me to his room52

where I found documents from those days laid out on a table. We spoke across the table.
Mr. Suzuki said, “I wonder if I could help you.”“I think I have read all your writings. Based on your writings, I have some questions to
ask you.” Thus, I started the interview by asking questions.
It has been reported that the entrance of Nanjing Castle was on December 13, 1937. Mr.
Suzuki wrote that he entered the Castle on December 12. My first question was toconfirm this.
– You said that you entered the Castle through Zhongshan Gate (中山門) on December
12, but I think this is mistaken. Wasn't it actually the 13th?
No, it was 12th. I entered the Castle through Zhongshan Gate (中山門) on the 12th, witha senior staff member, Fukushima Takeshiro (福島武四郎). Japanese airplanes werestill bombing the Castle and I saw fires raging.
– According to various records and statements, Japanese troops entered the Castle after
midnight, actually 2 o'clock in the morning, of the 13th. If this is correct, did you enter
the Castle before the soldiers?
This shouldn't be. I entered with the first wave of soldiers.
– So, you entered on the night of the 12th, actually before the dawn of the 13th?
No, it was daytime. At Zhongshan Gate (中山門), a movie-news photographer whocame with me took my picture, saying it was better than taking of ones of soldiers.
Mr. Suzuki then showed me the picture, on the back of the picture was written, “OnZhongshan Gate (中山門)”.
– If it was daytime, I think it must have been the 13th.
Ever since, I have thought that it was the 12th. It was not likely for a reporter to be
there on time when the Army captured the Castle or entered the Castle, and, well, it
was common to correct later the date and time. Also, the office often corrected press
53manuscripts. I don't know what the newspaper stated, but to my memory, I entered theCastle during the day on the 12th.
– Did you take any memos or notes?
I didn't have a notebook. As a matter of fact, I had no time to take memos or notes.
When I wrote the article, “I Witnessed the Tragedy of Nanjing,” I didn't refer to any
memos or materials in particular. I wrote it based on my memory. My experiences itself
were the “memos and materials”.
– You mentioned that you stayed in Nanjing for four days, so you stayed in the Castle
from 12th to 15th?
Yes. I returned without seeing the entrance ceremony on 17th. It so happened that I
could get a ride in the truck that was going back to Shanghai.
– In the book, “Plot of the Pen,” you stated that, “I entered the Castle on the 12th or the
13th,” and that “I state this, having a slightly confused memory,” which seems to suggest
a need for correction.
At the time, what Yamamoto Shichihei (山本七平) wrote was very convincing, so I
felt that I might have been wrong and wrote that. But it was the 12th, nonetheless.
In those days, the news of Nanjing’s fall was released as early as December 10 in Japanand people started cerebrations. A part of Guanghua Gate (光華門) was captured on the10th and China Gate (中華門) and all of Guanghua Gate were captured on the 12th. But
in fact, it was the 13th when Japanese troops entered the Castle all at once throughZhongshan Gate (中山門) and China Gate. According to the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun(December 14, 1937), Zhongshan Gate (中山門) was captured by the Oono Unit at 2:30
AM on 13th.
– On the Ministry of the Army's announcement and in newspapers they said the captureof Nanjing was on the 13th.

54

The capture on the 13th was the official announcement—Japanese soldiers enteredearlier. The date was released after the last mopping-up operation was completed and it
became quiet in the Castle. The official date followed after the fact.
– In a newspaper photo, soldiers are cheering banzai on the Zhongshan Gate (中山門)
which is dated December 13.
Units came in one after another and took photos, cheering banzai on Zhongshan Gate
(中山門). This cannot be evidence.
– Mr. Nakagawa Norimoto (中川紀元), who entered Nanjing as a war painter, wrote in
his article, “Troops Entering Nanjing,” that in the afternoon of the 13th, we entered theCastle with frontline units and lodged in part of an excellent building called theReishisha (励志社).
Mr. Nakagawa came to the Reishisha a day later. That is, reporters found our company
banner raised at the entrance of the Reishisha and came in. After the War, people who
don't know the situation of those times, made wrong claims; it doesn't make sense.
The above statement was Mr. Suzuki's answer to my question concerning the date ofentering the Castle. He believed it was the 12th and repeated this with confidence.
In those days, it was popular to make a rhymes or puns, so the day (12), the month (12),and the year (Showa 12), was easily remembered, that is, Nanjing was Captured on
12/12/12. Accordingly, Mr. Suzuki is convinced that it was the 12th when he entered
Zhongshan Gate (中山門). If Mr. Suzuki is right, then this means that all newspapers,
battle progress reports, and so on, need to be corrected.
I ended the question concerning the 12th and 13th, and asked about his company’sbanner.
– You wrote that after you entered the Castle, you put up the company's flag in front of
the Reishisha, but according to “War Note,” which was published by the Tokyo
Nichinichi Shimbun and Osaka Mainichi Shimbun, Mr. Matsuo Kunizo (松尾邦蔵),
who was your colleague, also put up the flag.
55

Most of the reporters who were assigned to the battle had a banner. Therefore, it was
not strange that other reporters from the same company would put up the same banner.
We had a banner in order to distinguish our company from competitors; even in the
middle of a battle we often raised our company's banner.
When we entered Nanjing Castle we made a rule that the reporter who entered firstthrough whichever gate, put up our company's banner so that subsequent reporters
could find us. After we joined up, we started to find lodging that could be used as ourheadquarters. We raised our company's flag at the Reishisha (励志社), which was
located close to Zhongshan Gate (中山門), but the Japanese Army started searchingnearby remnants, so in the evening, we moved to a deserted inn nearby.
In saying so, Mr. Suzuki showed me a photo, showing reporters of the Tokyo Nichinichi
Shimbun and Osaka Mainichi Shimbun gathered in front of the inn. In the background,on a wall, a character 旅, for “travel” was written. Forty-one reporters appeared in the
picture, including Mr. Suzuki Jiro (鈴木次郎), Mr. Ooya Soichi (大宅壮一), and Mr.
Nakagawa Norimoto (中川紀元).
On the night of the 12th or the 13th (Author's note: his story continues on theassumption that he entered the Castle on the 12th), I saw fires here and there. I
remember Mr. Fukushima Takeshiro (福島武四郎) raising a cry, “Those are fires
celebrating victory!”
We were very excited that time. Excited more than I ever imagined. Joining thefighting was dangerous but I never thought of being killed. If we captured Nanjing, thewar would be over, that was all I thought.
My next question was about massacres. During arguments with Yamamoto Shichihei(山本七平) doubt was cast regarding the massacre at the Zhongshan Gate (中山門). Mr.
Suzuki described the Chinese soldiers who were executed at Zhongshan Gate: some ofthem grinned, and some of them laughed out loud.
– Mr. Yamamoto’s question was that how could you see the faces of soldiers standing on
the rampart; some people, who support you, such as Mr. Suzuki, suggest that you might
have seen them by climbing up the rampart, or you might have had binoculars.
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I watched them from the inside of the Castle. I saw them from the ground. I didn't
climb the rampart and I didn't use binoculars.
After midnight of the 12th, in the stage of capturing the Zhongshan Gate (中山門), allenemy soldiers on the rampart were cleared and on the 13th, Japanese troops went
through the Zhongshan Gate (中山門), one after another. Naturally, it seemed that there
were no enemies left on the rampart. It was not likely that Japanese soldiers would bring
Chinese soldiers up the rampart, which was 25 meters high, in order to kill them. The
rampart might have been partly collapsed yet had very steep sides. And under the
rampart, Japanese troops continued to pour in.
– It is not easy to believe that Japanese soldiers threw Chinese soldiers down from therampart under such circumstances.
I do not have the courage to make up a lie.
In confronting him, I did not feel as if he was intentionally lying.
– Other than the massacre you saw at the Zhongshan Gate, what else did you see withyour own eyes?
Apart from the massacre at the Zhongshan Gate (中山門), I saw that survivors were
killed by pickax at the entrance of the Reishisha, and—I don't remember the place—I
saw a corporal showing other soldiers, “When you want to kill, do it like this,” and hekilled Chinese soldiers. These three occasions were all that I saw with my own eyes.
– You wrote that you saw burning bodies in a trench.
These could be suggestions of a massacre. Other suggestions of a massacre were piled
up bodies found at Guanghua Gate (光華門) and the bodies at Xiaguan (下関).
– As for the bodies at Guanghua Gate (光華門) it is argued that there were no bodies.

57Surely there were bodies, as tanks were running over the bodies. I can't confirm theplace but I think it was Guanghua Gate (光華門).
I'll tell you one thing: several years ago, an imperial soldier, Mr. Tsuchiya, who lived
in Tokorozawa, visited me. Mr. Tsuchiya also entered the Castle through Guanghua
Gate and he said he saw no bodies at Guanghua Gate, and wanted to make sure if I
really saw bodies. I think Mr. Tsuchiya entered the Castle a little later. When heentered the Castle, the bodies must have been cleared already.
– Were they cleared by Japanese soldiers?
I think so, though I didn't see for myself.
– As for the bodies in Xiaguan (下関), did you see the moment when they were killed?
No. What I saw was bodies. More than 1,000.
– The bodies in the trench were not battle dead but burned bodies?
They had been burned with gasoline. All of these incidents may not necessarily meanthat a massacre occurred, but such a conclusion is the fate of the defeated nation; welost the war so it became a “massacre”.
As I was embedded with the troops, I became very familiar with their situation: if you
don't kill, you will be killed. The soldiers were in the highest level of alertness. So, I
can understand that they killed Chinese soldiers. In addition, escaped Chinese soldiers
turned into plain-clothed soldiers or guerrillas. Before reaching Nanjing, the Japanesesoldiers saw a number of their comrades killed in creeks during enemy-held rivercrossing operations. So, killing Chinese soldiers was a matter of due course.
– Did you see all areas of Nanjing?
I didn't see all of it. Mostly around Zhongshan Gate (中山門) and Yi Jiang Gate.
– How many total victims of a massacre were there, from which you saw on Zhongshan
58

Gate (中山門), at the Reishisha, and the killing by the corporal?
I don't know have a clear idea; several for each. The scenes of their acts are imprinted
in my mind.
– How many massacres, do you think, happened in Nanjing?
I cannot say how many because I didn't see them with my own eyes. I don't know.
– It is said that 200,000 or 300,000 were massacred.
I think no Japanese could know the entire amount. At best, a commander would know
casualties numbers for which he was responsible. If you ask the commanders today,
they would not be able to tell you the numbers.
The figure of “hundreds of thousands” was stated at the Far East Military Tribunal.
Mr. Hora Tomio (洞富雄), a former professor at Waseda University, gave the number
based on the Tribunal’s report.
– Next, I'd like to hear the story of 100-killing contest.
Among the three news articles, I was only involved with the last article. As I was
heading for Nanjing, I met Mr. Asami Kazuo (浅海一雄), who wrote the article. Mr.
Asami told me that: there are two such persons and if you meet them on the way to
Nanjing, ask them how many they killed. Thus, I wrote the article. I didn't know thewhole story.
– When you heard the story from the two, did you believe it was true?
They said they would not kill Chinese soldiers if they ran away. I believed that wastrue. After the War, Second Lieutenant Noda Iwao (野田巌) told a story in which hetricked Chinese soldiers in a trench, calling out “Ni, lai lai!” As the Chinese soldierscame out of the trench, he killed them. When I heard the story, I felt betrayed.
– Did you see with your eyes that they killed at least one person?
59

I didn't see anything. I was so busy that I did not follow them. I was focused about
sending an article on the First to Capture Nanjing, by staying as near to the front line aspossible.
– In the column, “Anonymous Monthly Critic of Newspapers,” which appeared in the
February issue of the magazine Bungei Shunju (文藝春秋), it reads:“– Pulled up a sword from its sheath, he rushed to the trench where Chinese army
soldiers were hiding. Then, slash! Makko-karatake-wari! Two pieces apart! – According
to an article in a newspaper, the head was cut into two pieces! This sounds like thenarration of a drama. War is not a theatrical story!”– As stated above, they implicitly criticized the 100-killing contest story as fictional.
I had no other choice but to believe their story, which they boasted of so proudly. What
I was thinking then that I just wanted to hear the numbers they killed.
– At first the article was written by reporter Asami, but someone who knew Asami then,said that it might be fictional.
We made no fictional stories for the special issue. But I don't know about Mr. Asami. It
was not only the 100-killing contest, but there were many other inspiring militarystories with fictional components, like the Three Bomb Heroes.
I met Mr. Asami for the first time in 30 years at an off-site party for the Mainichi
Shimbun’s social news department. At first I didn't recognize him. Someone waslooking at me with a grin. Who is he, I wondered. It was Mr. Asami.
The interview lasted over an hour. We made the other relax at times, making a joke ortwo.
In 1946, Mr. Suzuki Jiro (鈴木次郎) visited the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE) at Ichigaya for 40days, as a witness to the 100-killing contest. As a witness for the prosecution, his
statement was taken by the British prosecutor.
“I clearly told the prosecutor the 100-killing was not a massacre.” Thus, Mr. Suzuki was60not needed for further testimony.
At the Tokyo Trial this issue was dropped. However, in Nanjing, the news article wasadopted as evidence and two Japanese soldiers were executed based on the article.
“I have done whatever I could do after the two soldiers were sent to China. I want to
add this: that, after the War, I found that Second Lieutenant Mukai Toshiaki (向井敏明)
was remarried by a chance due to the article and the Second Lieutenant Noda becamefamous because of the article.”
As stated earlier, Mr. Suzuki got involved in the massacre debate shortly after the War,when he worked in Sapporo as an executive of a subsidiary of the Mainichi Shimbun.
He was told by his employee that his article raised controversy. Then he received aphone call from the weekly magazine Shukan Shincho (週刊新潮). Without his
knowledge, the dispute started.
“I was upset when I was told that I wrote a lie. I couldn't stand it as a person making aliving by the pen at the Mainichi Shimbun. But at that time, I was not given a chance toprotest. I was an honorable, lifelong reporter and I wrote my statement in our company
magazine.”
Before I left his house, I confirmed with Mr. Suzuki that:
He watched a so-called massacre at Zhongshan Gate (中山門), at the entrance of the
Reishisha (励志社), and at an unnamed place in which a corporal killed Chinese
soldiers. Also, he saw what could have been a massacre in Xiaguan (下関) and in a
trench, at a place assumed to be Guanghua Gate (光華門).
The number of victims were: “more than 1,000” in Xiaguan, “many” at Guanghua Gateand others places, where the exact number is not known but there were “several” killed.
Also, he does not know how many people were massacred in all of Nanjing.
When I went over these Mr. Suzuki Jiro (鈴木次郎) confirmed these things with a“yes.”

61

3. Yomiuri Shimbun Newspaper
8) Interview with Mr. Futamura Jiro (二村次郎), Photographer for the
Hochi Shimbun Newspaper (Yomiuri Group newspaper)With the outbreak of the China Incident, the major newspaper companies dispatched theirreporters and photographers to the battlefield; the Hochi Shimbun (Yomiuri groupnewspaper) followed as well. At the time, the Shanghai branch of the Hochi Shimbun
had only three members, including Chief Hyakutake (百武), and this was insufficient, so
the Hochi Shimbun sent five reporters and photographers first, with the outbreak of the
Shanghai Incident; then two additional reporters were dispatched to Shanghai. And on
September 5, 1937, the third reinforcement arrived, that is, photographer Mr. Futamura
Jiro.
Mr. Futamura joined Hochi Shimbun at the age of 16, starting as a flush-operator, andwhen he was dispatched to Shanghai, he was still 22 years old, the youngest in thephotograph department. Like Robert Capa, who took pictures of the Spanish Civil War,
war photography was a most challenging job so he was envied by colleagues. He followed
numerous battles, including Zhabei (閘北), Dachang Town (大場鎮), and Zoumatang (走馬 塘 ). On November 11, 1937, the Japanese Army took control of Shanghai. The
Japanese Army moved to Nanjing and Mr. Futamura followed the Army.
Mr. Futamura stayed in Shanghai until the end of March 1938 and then returned to Tokyo.
In June, he was recruited by the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun. He kept his position at theMainichi Shimbun after the War, publishing numerous photos and eventually opened his
own studio.
I interviewed Mr. Futamura in April 1986, when cherry trees were full of bloom, at his
studio in Shibuya, Tokyo. Mr. Futamura showed me his last remaining album, whichnarrowly escaped destruction by American air raids during the War, as well as articles
concerning the so-called Nanjing Massacre published by Asahi Shimbun.
Mr. Futamura told me that he had nearly forgotten about the Nanjing issue but a decadeago, Mr. Suzuki Akira, who wrote the book, “Illusion of the Nanjing Massacre” (南京大虐殺の幻) (Nankin daigyakusatsu no maboroshi), visited him and informed him that the62Nanjing issue became a subject of public discussion. Since then, he has followed every
and any discussion concerning the Nanjing Incident and kept an article, ‘Wanrenkeng’(万人坑), published by the Asahi Shimbun several years ago.
– What route did you take when you moved from Shanghai to Nanjing?
At first, I walked on the railway tracks to Kunshan (崑山); needless to say, there wereno trains. I didn't follow any particular group of soldiers. Then I went to Suzhou (蘇州), where I took pictures of the troops entering the fortress. Suzhou was a big city andthe pictures of the troops entering the fortress made headlines, so we sent the photos toShanghai immediately. Magara Akinori (真柄秋徳), the head of the photo section of
the Hochi Shimbun and photographer Miyakawa Katsumi (宮川克己), and Suzuki Jiro
(鈴木二郎), a reporter from the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, and I, started for Shanghai.
The regimental commander, Fujii Sueyoshi (藤井末吉), I don’t remember his namevery well, came up to me and said, “We could have taken the area sooner, as the enemy
was asleep, but now they are awake, so your journey will be very dangerous. Takethese.” And he handed us weapons. We knew that they could not spare any soldiers toprotect us. The weapons we received were those captured from the Chinese army. I was
given a light machine gun and the other three were given infantry rifles. I didn't knoweven how to shoot so I was told to try it out first. When I shot it, I fell on my butt fromits recoil. I was far from hitting the target but just having the weapon might be useful,so I carried it and headed for Kunshan.
Our luggage was carried by several coolies.
When we arrived at Kunshan there was a car waiting me, which was arranged by ourcompany Hochi, so I took the car, leaving the other three and went back to Shanghai.
We were comrades in the battlefield but, in the end, as journalist we were competitors,
so I didn't offer them a ride. I think rides were already arranged for them as well.
– Did you head for Nanjing from Shanghai again?
Yes, of course. Reporters wrote their articles later but photos cannot wait. You must be
there at the right moment. I departed right away, alone. I went to Wu-xi (無錫 ) and as
far I remember, delivered my photos to Shanghai as well. After that, I decided to follow
63any group of soldiers and departed Shanghai for the third time--I met the 47th Regimentof the 6th Division. I was born in Oita, Kyushu, and this Regiment was the “Oita
Regiment,” so I decided to follow the Regiment.
– According to my knowledge, the 47th Regiment suffered from cholera and stayed in
Jiashan (嘉善) for a while.
Did it? I don't remember that at all. Maybe I joined them after the cholera incident. I
was with the 47th Regiment for a week before we arrived in Nanjing.
I moved with Regimental headquarters but later went to the front line in order to takegood photos. As a matter of fact there was food at headquarters and they generously
gave me their portions. But when I moved to the front, I had to find food for myself.
Soon, my stock ran out and I had to eat the last of my stock, a pickled plum. I put it in
my mouth and found that it was not pickled plum but candy plum. After that, I entereda nearby farmhouse and took some food. I think other solders had done the same.
– Did you move with other photographers?
For a while, I moved with Ishii Kiyoshi (石井清), a Mainich Shimbun photographer,
but we separated thereafter, so later I was alone most of the time.
I heard that photographer Konoyama Kunio (此山国雄) of the Fukuoka Nichinichi
Shimbun, had been accidentally shot by a Japanese soldier at Zhonghua Gate (中華門)—I was in the area as well--because he wore a Chinese soldier's steel helmet. In
those days, Chinese soldiers hid in farms in the area, so using the enemy's helmet madeno sense. But in any event, his death should be regarded as war-related.
– It was the 47th Regiment who first put up the hinomaru flag over the fortress, wasn't it?
Yes, it was. They climbed the rampart of Zhonghua Gate to attack and, being with thefirst wave, I took pictures. Actually, it was not easy to follow the first wave. Taking thebest shot of capturing the castle at the right moment was quite a rare opportunity so weusually made the soldiers pose again, for a good shot.

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– When did you enter the castle?
I remember that the 47th Regiment climbed over the captured rampart. It was either the
12th or 13th.
– What did you see in the Castle?
No Chinese there. I separated from the 47th Regiment and moved alone. Our Hochi
Shimbun reporters moved to Nanjing separately so I tried to find my colleagues tomake a temporary Hochi office and pictures of capture of the rampart were carried byairplane to Shanghai.
– Where did you make your temporary office?
I don't remember. What I remember was, the Hochi brought staff from Japan who
handled carrier pigeons.
– Have you heard about the so-called Nanjing Massacre?
During my stay in Nanjing, I never saw anything like that at all. After the War, people
often asked me about this but I have no memory about it. For sure, I would want toknow about this. Unlike Auschwitz, there was no designated place to kill people. It was
the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE) when I heard about this for the first time after the War. I
thought very deeply and I remember that I saw a huge hole inside the Castle.
– When did you see this?
It was shortly after I entered the Castle. It was a rectangular hole, 20 to 30 meters long,more than 1 meter depth--it looked new. It was not located in the housing area but inthe fields.
– Who made the hole, Japanese or Chinese soldiers?
I don't know. When I heard about Nanjing Massacre I felt that the hole might have65been somehow related. But this is just my guess; I know nothing about it.
– Did you go back later to check?
I was not concerned at all that time, so it never occurred to me to check again. After
the War, there were claims about the Nanjing massacre so I tried to remember
anything, and I finally remembered that hole.
– Someone said prisoners-of-war were killed.
I saw prisoners walking--they were tied up in rows. It was daytime.
– Did you mention this with others in your office?
In the middle of battle, I watched one or two war prisoners being killed. We reporters
saw those things but it did not become a topic in particular. You might just call themprisoners but prisoners could turn to be enemy at anytime. And, practically it was
impossible to bring prisoners with us. We could not move with them. Several hundredprisoners I saw in Nanjing might have been killed because we did not enough foods forthem. If you can find the soldiers who led those prisoners, you might be able to findsomething about so-called Nanjing Massacre.
– How about civilians?
I don't believe Japanese soldiers had done any wrong with them.
– Did you not see bodies in Nanjing?
I saw almost nothing. Had I seen hundreds of bodies, I would not have forgotten. But
for the Yangtze River, I heard many reporters saying they saw countless bodies floatingin the river.
– Was this the so-called massacre?

66

They were not massacred--but the number of bodies was large so they might havementioned this, I think.
– What places did you visit in Nanjing?
I visited the Yangtze River myself but what I saw with my own eyes were one or twobodies. I visited a depository which kept goods of abandoned property. There werehuge buildings and the inside was ransacked. Chinese soldiers or Japanese soldiers--I
don't know who did it--anyway, no valuables were left.
I visited the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum (中山陵), of which I have still pictures, together
with my colleagues from the Hochi Shimubun. There were hundreds of stone steps andthe journey took a whole day. I remember that there were Japanese soldiers acting
outrageously, throwing papers into a room and setting it on fire. So all of us had tocarry water to put out the fire.
Also I visited buildings of the Nationalist Party's Government and took a picture of theJapanese flag being hoisted there.
– Did you take pictures of the two ceremonies, the triumphant entry and memorialservice?
Yes, I did. The memorial service was especially impressive. At the time, it was not easy
to get near Commander General Matsui but I was able to take close-up photos of him. I
remember that I was trembling because I was so nervous, to see him so close.
Commander General Matsui Iwane, full of tears, mourned the dead and I found myself
crying as well. Even now, I have not forgotten the feeling.
– Were you back to Shanghai soon after the memorial service?
Maybe I stayed Nanjing for a couple of days. We returned to Shanghai by car, and the
car fell into a rice paddy but luckily nobody was injured at all.
– Did you stay in Shanghai after that?
67

After I returned to Shanghai, I went to Hangzhou (杭州). After the New Year, inJanuary or February 1938, I went to Nanjing in order to take the Tianjin-Pukou line (津浦線).
– What was the situation in Nanjing then?
There were no Chinese soldiers and the town was quiet. Regarding Japanese soldiers,
only sentries were posted. I went to the Tianjin-Pukou line and stayed for a while,
since the Xuzhou (徐州) Operation was going to start, but there was no progress withthe operation, so I came back to Shanghai and later returned to Tokyo. I arrived inTokyo on April 1.
Thinking back those days, I feel strange – we didn't know how or when we will die.
During the battle of Somatou (走馬塘 ), I took pictures at the front and came back in
one piece. But my backpack, which I left in a shelter, was hit by a bomb. Later, inTokyo, my backpack was exhibited to the public as a backpack carried by a war
correspondent, as well as my light machine gun, as I previously mentioned.
Mr. Iwakura Tomomasa (岩倉具方) (painter and the third son of Duke Iwakura), whojoined the Navy as an artist/reporter for the Hochi Shimbun, was a very quiet person.
He said that he would never go to out to a battlefield because he was really afraid andnever left Shanghai. However, the Chinese army bombarded Shanghai, and Mr.
Iwakura, who lived on Woosung Road (呉松路), where many Japanese lived and a
supposedly safe place took a direct hit by a bomb. I think he was the first reporter
casualty in Shanghai. At the time, I thought we would die wherever we were, in a town
or on the battlefield, when the time came.

9) Interview with Mr. Taguchi Risuke (田口利介), Reporter for the
Hochi Shimbun Newspaper
On August 13, 1937, at the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident, Mr. Taguchi Risuke was areporter from the social department of the Hochi Shimbun and was assigned to the
Ministry of the Navy. At that time, 7,000 Japanese citizens lived in Shanghai, and in orderto protect them, 4,000 members of Imperial Japanese Navy Landing Forces stood up
68

against 30,000 Chinese troops. Accordingly, the Kuroshio-kai (黒潮会), a reporters’
association which was assigned to the Ministry of the Navy, reporters were sent toShanghai, from the Domei Tsushin, Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri, and Hochi newspapers.
Reporters sent were Mr. Taguchi from the Hochi and Mr. Hayashi (林謙一) from theMainichi. Mr. Hayashi Kenichi , later wrote “Ohan-han,” which became a popular TV
program. They left Tokyo on September 12. Mr. Taguchi was 26 years old.
When they arrived in Shanghai, the Japanese Army had just arrived at Kunda (公太)Airfield as well. Thereafter, they attacked Nanjing from September 19 to 25, with a totalof 300 airplanes, 11 times. The Nanjing air-raid was internationally condemned.
– Did you go to Shanghai to report on naval activity?
Yes. Ten days after the attack, the Imperial Japanese Navy Landing Forces defended
Headquarters at all cost, and when we arrived in Shanghai, they confronted theChinese Army at North Sichuan Road (北四川路).
Military artist Iwakura Tomomasa (岩倉具方) (Duke Iwakura's son and Tomomi
Iwakura's great-grandson) from the Hochi Shimbun, took a mortar round to the head as
walked in the International Settlement. He died on October 14.
He was indeed dedicated to the Navy, so I asked the Navy to spare a couple of sailors
for his cremation. I guessed that the Landing Forces or its press section did not haveany sailors on hand, so I went to the Third Fleet. “We do not have anyone available forsuch purpose,” they simply told me. They didn't care for war correspondents or
military artists at all. After we died, we were nothing to them; chilly. So, in the earlymorning, we placed Mr. Iwakura's body into a coffin, which the Japanese residents’society prepared, and went to a mulberry field near the airfield, and two persons, aChinese and a driver, burned the coffin with petroleum.
– The fighting by the Landing Forces was over with the battle of Zhabei (閘北), is that
correct?
While the Landing Forces won the battle of Zhabei, the Japanese Army also won thebattle of Dachang (大場鎮). After that, the main force shifted to the Army. So I began69

reporting news mainly on the Army.
A number of creeks and lakes dotted the suburbs of Shanghai and the Chinese militaryused them to build their pillboxes. Chiang Kai-shek called it the “Von Seeckt Line”.
German commander von Seeckt used these creeks to build a solid defensive line
connected to Suzhou (蘇州), which was regarded as firm as the Maginot Line.
Japanese Naval Aviation had command of the air but it was not easy to defeat the
Chinese.
– When you went to Nanjing, you followed Japanese Army troops?
The Shanghai Expeditionary Army attacked from both directions, against Kunshan (昆山) and Suzhou (蘇州). We followed, but not with any particular unit. While we moved
to Suzhou and Wu-xi (無錫), we came across the 16th Division and after that wefollowed the 16th Division. We continued to move to Changzhou (常州), then Danyang(丹陽), and I wrote several stories about Colonel Katagiri (片桐), the Commander of
the 9th Regiment.
In those days, I traveled by jeep and delivered my reports to Shanghai by jeep. But as
we got closer to Nanjing, we found that the Chinese military had burned down a bridge
before they disappeared, so our jeep could not go any further, and that report became
my last article.
– Did you move with divisional Headquarters?
I moved at the company level, so I didn't know anyone such as the Division
Commander or his staff officers.
On either December 8 or 9, we were at, if my memory is correct, Jiangsu (句容) –several consoling visitors from the House of Representatives came to Headquarters andleft Japanese sake for Prince Asakanomiya. That night, a staff officer, a lieutenantcolonel, in the Asakanomiya Army, brought the sake to us. We lit a candle in a smallbox, trying not to leak the light out, and sipped the sake. “The Prince doesn't
experience hardships – it is you, reporters, who face the hoary front, who deserve thesake,” said the lieutenant colonel. I think then that the lieutenant colonel acted like70

yakuza or a gangster. His name was Lieutenant Colonel Cho Isamu (長勇), who later
committed harakiri (suicide) at the battle of Okinawa. This well describes his
character.
– Did you move with Staff Officer Cho (長) after that?
No. I met him only once, that night.
The next day, I went to a place called Kirinmon (麒麟門). It was called mon (gate) but
it was not one of Nanjing Castle’s gate. The place I stayed at hardly looked like avillage--it was just a cluster of several houses, where the front-line company was
deployed. Nanjing Castle stood firmly despite Japanese field gun attacks. We spent 3 to
4 days there.
Incidentally, this is after the fact--at around the same time when we were there, theMainichi Shimbun printed a special edition on the start of the attack on Nanjing Castle.
I heard about this after I returned to Shanghai. “What have you been doing?” the deskyelled at me. But in fact, the Japanese military just reached Nanjing Castle!
Back to the story at Kirinmon--in the middle of night, a voice suddenly awakened me,“Okinto yakemasse--wake up or you will be burned!” in a Kyoto dialect that soundedsomewhat peaceful to my sleepy head. At first I didn't understand what had happened.
The next moment, my eyes caught scarlet fire past the windows. It was unlike thesituation of yakemasse, like a baked potato, so I rushed out of our lodging immediately.
The battle had started.
Several days like that passed. Then one morning, when I got up, I realized that there
were no more sounds of shooting. Nanjing fell that day.
Just over one night the world had completely changed. I entered Nanjing that day.
What I only had in my rucksack then was a handful rice and three dried sardines.
– Did you enter from Zhongshan Gate (中山門)?
Yes. There were a lot of sandbags clogged up the inside the gate. Those sandbags had
71been partially removed before I entered so I climbed up. The inside of the Castle wasquiet, no sound of guns. I felt strange--only a short while ago we had been surroundedby noisy gunfire.
Zhongshan Gate led to a big street, Zhongshan East Road (中山東路,), where I saw
nothing, not even a kitten. Walking along the deserted street, I found buildings of the
Nationalist Party's Government. I entered and was surprised to see that it remained
intact, as if Chiang Kai-shek was there. On his desk were pencils, pens and otherthings, as if he were ready to go to work. I heard he had escaped around December 7 –it seemed that he in fact ran away in a hurry.
What I found next was a bidet in the bathroom. At first, I wondered what it was, butthen I realized that this was bidet. I had heard of bidets but it was the first time I
actually saw one.
– What was it like inside Nanjing Castle?
I saw just 2 or 3 bodies. I heard that the Chinese Military fled from Xiaguan (下関), so
I visited Xiaguan. Xiaguan was a harbor town along Yangtze River. To reach it, youhave a lot of choices of gates to go through--I didn't know which gate they used.
I found nothing at Xiaguan. Maybe it was because they had long since fled.
– Did you find anything impressive in Nanjing?
One day, I visited the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum (中山陵 ) at Mt. Zijin (紫禁山). I
climbed up more than 300 spacious, gentle steps made with white granite. The SunYat-sen Mausoleum looked magnificent. Incredibly, I saw no traces of gunfire there
and felt relieved.
– It is said there was a massacre in Nanjing.
I never heard of that then--nobody mentioned such a thing.
– Did the 16th Division keep discipline?
72

As far as I saw, there were no big problems. Except on the way to Nanjing, a sergeantfrom the 16th Division declared that he would kill 100 Chinese with his sword on theway to Nanjing. I don't know if he actually did that. He said he would do it to avenge
his comrades and it was said that whenever he met Chinese he used his sword to killthem. It was said that he killed not only uniformed Chinese soldiers but also ben-i,
plain-clothed soldiers.
– What did other soldiers think of him?
I am sure that no one else thought that this was good. In war, it is kill or be killed,
nothing more. The sergeant was obsessed by the idea of revenge but I felt he wassomewhat of a coward.
– It is said that Staff Officer Cho Isamu, as you previously mentioned, ordered hissolders to do this.
I don't know. I met Staff Officer Cho just once. But from my naval reporter's point ofview, generally speaking, I felt that those army Staff Officers didn't care much fororders coming from above. Lieutenant General Sato Kenryo (佐藤賢了) and
Lieutenant General Tominaga Kyoji (富永恭次) were the typical. Cho Isamu (長勇)was one of them, I think.
– How long were you in Nanjing?
Until the entrance ceremony. I didn't know anything about the memorial service for the
next day. I heard about it later.
– When did you come to know about Nanjing-Incident?
Recently. I read a book written by Mr. Maeda Yuji (前田雄二), a Domei Tsushin
reporter. In his book, he said he saw bodies at Xiaguan, but when I went there, I foundno bodies.
On the other hand, one of my colleagues, Mr. Iwata Iwaji (岩田岩二), a Navy reporter73

who later came to Nanjing by gunboat, said that he saw many bodies floating in the
Yangtze River as the boat got close to Nanjing. But whether this was due to a massacre
or not, I was not sure at the time.
– The Nanjing Incident was an agenda item at the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE). Did you know
that?
I was drafted in 1943 and went to Harbin (哈爾濱), serving in the Special Duty
Organization. As the war ended, I was detained in Siberia by the Soviet Military. I
came back to Japan with the last evacuees in 1950. So, for 5 years after the War, mymemory is blank. But after I returned to Japan, for long time, I never heard about a“Nanjing Massacre.” It was only in these past 10 years that this kind of talk started.
According to my experience, I feel that any “massacre” was somehow exaggerated,maybe in order to oppose the Army’s fascism or for propaganda purposes for the
Chinese Communist Party's Army.
In 1940, Mr. Taguchi joined the Ministry of the Navy. At around the same time,
Germany established the PK (Propagandakompanie) under the RMVP (Reich Ministry
for Information and Propaganda). They realized the importance of news from the front
as well as the soldiers on the front lines. Later, the US Navy also followed in kind, but
in Japan, journalists and war correspondents were not as highly valued.
Mr. Taguchi could not forget the Navy’s attitude as demonstrated by the death of Mr.
Iwakura, the military artist, in Shanghai. Therefore, he approached Colonel Hiraide
Hideo (平出英夫,) Chief of the Public Relations section in the Ministry of the Navy,
who previously served as a resident military officer in Italy and had just returned from
Italy. Mr. Taguchi tried to persuade Hiraide to realize the value of information andpropaganda, and, eventually, Mr. Taguchi himself joined the Navy’s PR section to helpthem.
After joined the PR section, Mr. Taguchi was engaged in writing press releases andinspections. It was Mr. Taguchi who deified the nine sailors who served in the special
attack submarine, sacrificed themselves in Pearl Harbor Attack.
He was drafted in 1943 and went Harbin, assigned to the Special Duty Organization. As
74the War ended, he was detained in Siberia and was finally returned to Japan 1950.
After returning from Siberia, he established the Marine Boy Scouts and was involved inteaching this organization for the next 10 years. Then, he continued the program “Tokino Kadai,” (Today's Issues) which was created by former Navy Commander Baba Kinji,
press section, Ministry of the Navy, continuing this until the present day. Additionally,
he wrote several books, including “Fighting Navy Spirits”(戦う海軍魂) and “History ofNaval Strategies”(海軍作戦史).

10) Interview with Mr. Higuchi Tetsuo (樋口哲雄), Film Operator for
the Yomiuri Shimbun Newspaper
Mr. Higuchi Tetsuo made films for Nikkatsu Motion Pictures.
In 1933, several people jumped, one after another, into Mt. Mihara on Izu Oshima Island,
to kill themselves. It was big news at the time, so the Yomiuri Shimbun and Nikkatsuplanned to make a film of the crater in cooperation with university professors.
Mr. Shoriki Matsutaro (正力松太郎), the president of the Yomiuri Shimubun, saw thefilm of the crater made by Mr. Higuchi, who was at the Nikkatsu then, recruited Mr.
Higuchi for his film department at the Yomiuri Company--thus, Mr. Higuchi ended up at
the Yomiuri Shimbun in 1935.
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred on July 7, 1937. Mr. Higuchi and three reporters
were dispatched to Beijing (北京). On the night of July 11, he departed the Tokyo station
together with Mr. Magara (真柄), the head of the photographic section, and others.
For a while, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident seemed to have subsided but it eventually
resulted in full-scale conflict. The film he took at the Marco Polo Bridge was soonreleased on July 17 as special edition news.
The Japanese military entered Beijing Castle and fighting expanded. Mr. Higuchi
followed the Army. On September 16, on the way to Baoding (保定,) during a rivercrossing operation, Mr. Higuchi jumped into the Juma (拒馬河) River naked, holding his
Eyemo camera high overhead. Photographs of him at the time entitled “Desperate
Photographer Crossing River,” were posted in newspapers and magazines and gained a75

lot of popularity.
On October 29, during the Taiyuan (太原) Attack, his left hand was injured by a piece of
ammunition. Mr. Higuchi was 38 years old then--he was a really brave war photographer.
After this, he moved to Shanghai.
– Which troops did you follow to Nanjing?
None in particular. After leaving Shanghai, I went to Suzhou (蘇州) and through the
Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum I reached Nanjing and entered the Castle through Zhongshan
Gate (中山門).
– What was the date when you entered the Castle?
I think it was immediately after the capture. Zhongshan Gate was surrounded byramparts, and there was a moat in front of it. Japanese troops tried to enter by shooting
the Zhongshan Gate, but breaking the gate was very difficult because there were hugeamounts of sandbags and dirt stacked high--we didn't know that.
– Where did you stay in the Castle?
Walking from Zhongshan Road (中山路) toward Zhongshan North Road (中山北路)
and turning left, there was a slope and after turning left we found a private house on
the left side of the slope. Mr. Kamahara (釜原), a member of our branch, and I decided
to use the house as our temporary branch.
Chinese children were called shohai. We hired a shohai and we three managed well. It
was not real employment, just small jobs and giving food in return. I think the shohai
was satisfied with the arrangement because he was not able to find enough food for
himself.
– What was the situation inside of the Castle?
Walking along Zhongshan North Road from the temporary branch office, there wasRegimental Headquarters. In the headquarters' backyard a lot of guns and pistols,
76which were taken from Chinese Army soldiers, were piled up to one meter in height.
One Japanese soldier told me, “Take whatever you want,” but I declined. For
journalists, weapons were useless.
– How many guns were there?
Hundreds or thousands. Also there were piles of Hohei (法幣,) Chinese paper money.
– Didn't they use the money?
I think we were unable to use it. The money was left there long after. I think theyburned the Hohei in the end.
– Where did you go in the Castle?
We had a car so I went here and there, everyday. One day I visited Whampoa Military
Academy (黄埔軍官学校), where I found Chiang Kai-shek’s name card, 4 times
bigger than a Japanese name card.
– Where did you take pictures of the entrance ceremony?
I took photos of Commander General Matsui from the opposite side of the Military
Academy across Zhongshan East Road (中山東路). At the time of the entrance
ceremony, the Zhongshan Gate looked clean.
– Did you deliver the photos you took, by yourself?
No. A correspondent came up to us from Shanghai and he took the photos back to
Shanghai.
– What was most impressive thing in Nanjing Castle?
As I mentioned earlier, the countless number of guns and pistols at Headquarters.

77

– Around that time, it is said that the Japanese army committed a massacre.
I don’t know anything about that, whether that happened or not.
– Have you not seen or heard anything about that?
I know nothing about that. I did not see any traces of a massacre. People have said sucha thing occurred, but where and how? The Chung Shan Mausoleum (中山廟) was notransacked--it looked clean. Under wartime circumstances, if you don't kill, you will bekilled; some people say this was a massacre.
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?
After I entered the Castle, I stayed for a month or so. After the ceremony, I had nothing
to do in particularly--just killing time. At a road starting from the central rotary for
China Gate we found a place on the left side called Fushibyo (夫子廟), a red-light
district.
The Sinjun (秦准河) River ran along the street, so it was also known as Sinjun. Thiswas just like the Japanese Yoshiwara (吉原), where you could play with women anddrink alcohol. Kamahara, my colleague, and I waited for dusk and visited there
frequently.
– How many places like that existed?
Around the area, a lot. We called the women working there chansy kunyan. Usually we
stayed a whole night there, leaving our car with our company flag flying high, so we
got an unfavorable reputation at times.
– Did Japanese soldiers visit there as well?
No, no soldiers at all. I think they were prohibited from going there. As far as Japanese
were concerned, the visitors were all reporters and news-related.
– How about other Japanese who were not news-related?
78

Japanese civilians had not yet entered Nanjing.
– Do you think Japanese soldiers visited comfort houses or brothels?
I don't know whether there were such houses or not.
– Where did you go after Nanjing?
Back to Shanghai, then Tokyo. So I didn't join Operation Xuzhou (徐州), whichhappened immediately after that.
Mr. Higuchi was born July 1899 and was 87 years old when I met. He had no healthproblem, except for his teeth–he said he just had five teeth pulled out before we met.
His speech and gait were very steady.
Before I visited Mr. Higuchi, he insisted that no massacre took place in Nanjing and hehad nothing to say about it. His statement concurred with his narration. Still, I asked
him to talk about anything, whatever he experienced in Nanjing, and he told me what heremembered by referring to the “100 Years History Book” of the Yomiuri Shimbun.
After returning to Tokyo, Mr. Higuchi joined the Army again in the Hankou（漢口）
Operation. In 1940, he moved to the Japan News Eiga-sha Movie Company. After theGreater East Asia War started, he went to Lourenço Marques, Africa on a repatriation
ship, then served as Chief of the Hong Kong branch, then General Chief of theManchuria branch.
After Japan lost the War, Mr. Higuchi quit the Japan News Eiga-sha and worked atseveral jobs with his friends. Then he joined Allied General Headquarters (GHQ) to
make films. After GHQ disbanded, he joined an advertisement agency, a company
affiliated with the Yomiuri Shimbun, and worked there until his retirement.

11) Interview with Mr. Mori Hiroshi ( 森 博 ), Photographer for the
Yomiuri Shimbun Newspaper79Mr. Mori Hiroshi was a well-known photographer--he took the picture of a Navy airplanethat flew with a single wing at the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War.
On December 9, 1937, just before Nanjing fell, a Type 96 carrier-based fighter plane,
appeared over the Kunda (公太) airfield, Shanghai, which had lost one wing yet it kept
flying. The pilot was Staff Sergeant Kashimura (樫村) of the 13th Air Corps. The 13th Air
Corps had started an attack on Nanchang (南昌) and Kashimura's Type 96 fighter clashedwith a Chinese fighter over Nanchang and lost its wing. Yet the single-winged fighter
managed to fly back to Shanghai. Witnessing this, Mori started to film the scene with his
Eyemo, against the order of a naval officer.
In the end, the film was allowed to be shown and released to the public as a news reel,
which was welcomed with cheers by the Japanese people. From the film, a photo for thenewspapers was also made, which resulted in a scoop for the Yomiuri. The photo wasdisplayed at Yasukuni shrine and Vice-Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku (山本五十六), theUnder Secretary of the Navy (海軍次官) at the time, had long displayed this photo in his
office.
Mr. Mori went to Nanjing immediately after this scoop.
In the beginning of August 1937, one year after he joined the Yomiuri Shimbun, he wassuddenly assigned to the naval news section and went Shanghai. Several days later, inShanghai, the Japanese Landing Force confronted the Chinese Army, so he found himself
watching the second Shanghai-Incident from the very beginning. He was born in 1911
and 26 years old at the time.
– You came back from Hangzhou Bay (杭州湾) and after that you headed for Nanjing?
When I came back from Hangzhou Bay, Shanghai was quiet. Soon after, the JapaneseArmy headed for Nanjing and I followed them. I took films of Wu-xi’s (無錫) capture.
That time a reporter, Watanabe Mineo (渡辺峰雄) of the Yomiuri Shimbun, and aphotographer, Maeda Tsune (前田恒) of the Asahi Shimbun, were killed. Watanabe wasoriginally living in Shanghai and was hired by the Shanghai branch as a temporary
reporter. He was a brave man. I was shocked to hear that Mr. Maeda was killed only
one hour after we separated. He must have been the first photographer killed.
80

I followed the Army to Wu-xi but I came back to Shanghai later because at that time, it
was not yet clear when the Nanjing attack would start.
Under the rules of the Yomiuri Shimbun, after being on the battlefield for three months,
we had to go back to Tokyo. I had already stayed 3 months in Shanghai, so I returned toTokyo.
In those days, the Asahi Shimbun and Miyako Shimbun paid extra to war
correspondents, 15 yen per day, and the Mainichi Shimbun, 13 yen per day.
The Yomiuri Shimbun paid nothing extra but there was a custom--when a reporter
returned to the head office Tokyo, Mr. Shoriki Matsutaro, the president of the Yomiuri
Shimbun, gave 500 yen, which he personally handed us. In those times, our standard
monthly pay was 60 yen. And Mr. Shoriki not only met with each reporter whenreporters returned to Japan but also came to see reporters off at Tokyo Station, whenreporters were leaving. Naturally, his manner gave us much encouragement.
After I returned Tokyo due to the rule, I went back to Shanghai soon after, then went toNanjing by car for the entrance ceremony. The Nanjing Castle entrance ceremony was
December 17, 1937, so I think I went there either on the 15th or 16th.
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?
To my memory the pictures of the entrance ceremony were taken by photographer
Oshima Genjiro (大島源次郎). I took films of the Memorial Service on the next day.
So I think I stayed in Nanjing until the 19th.
– What was the situation in Nanjing?
There was nothing in particular. I visited Nanjing several times after that. The next year,
January 1938, I went to take photos of Nanjing, which recovered its tranquility. At thetime of the entrance ceremony, I found quite a few Chinese people in town, but
Japanese soldiers had a lot of roles to play. But in this second visit in January, for which
I caught a train, Japanese soldiers did not have major roles, just minor ones. And at my81third visit, I found many Japanese civilians there, and in addition, a Japanese inn called
Fukuda-ya started operation.
– At the entrance ceremony, were Chinese citizens afraid of Japanese soldiers?
They didn't show any hostility and I think they were not scared of Japanese soldiers. On
the contrary, Japanese soldiers were more alert toward Chinese because of ben-i-hei,civilian-clothed soldiers, hid among the citizens.
– It is said that Chinese soldiers were slaughtered by Japanese soldiers?
Yes, so I have heard.
– Have you seen this?
No. But I heard this from Japanese soldiers.
– How?
They brought prisoners to the Yangtze River and set them free, saying, go anywhere,
but eventually they killed them all, so I heard. I also heard that the shore was full of
bodies. I believed that it was true. They have did nothing to civilians but something
happened to the Chinese soldiers.
– Did you hear that story while you were in Nanjing?
Yes, in Nanjing. I heard it in several places.
– Why did they do such a thing?
They captured Chinese soldiers, but there was no food for them nor places to keep
them. If they released the Chinese soldiers, they would start fighting against Japanagain, so they were killed, that's what I heard. Unlike Japanese soldiers, the Chinese
became soldiers, without any feeling of patriotism, because they could not eat
82otherwise. As a matter of fact, if they were released they would turn around and start
fighting. Also, there were ben-i-hei, civilian-clothed soldiers, and Japanese soldiers
were scared of them. That was another reason.
– How many prisoners were killed?
Many, so I heard.
– Did they do it under orders from the top?
I think some petty officer, such as squad leader rank, had done ordered this, on his own.
It is possible that higher ranking officers had known about it. Yes, there wasinternational law that said how to treat prisoners of war, but this grade of soldiers didn't
know how to handle them. You know, Japanese soldiers believed that they, themselves,
had to die if they were captured, so they thought killing prisoners was a matter ofcourse.
Some of the Army petty officers had long experience in the Army, they knew
everything about the Army, so they paid no respect to a newly assigned superior, asecond lieutenant, for example. Also they treated raw recruits quite roughly by hitting
them without reason. I think that those kinds of officers did such things.
As a matter of fact, a couple of years later I myself came across the moment that aJapanese petty officer killed captured Chinese prisoners. He asked me plainly, “Why
don't you try it?” I knew it was a war, kill or be killed--that was inevitable--but they
have done unnecessary things, too.
– All petty officers behaved like that?
No, no. It was just a few of them. In the Army, anyone can be a soldier, and among themwere the “bad eggs” who could not fit into any ordinary community. They corrupted the
Army. I believe such men corrupted the Army. Luckily, I followed the Army asphotographer so I wasn’t involved in that kind of thing. I always hoped to avoid joining
the Army.

83Unlike the Army, the Navy looked smart, I liked the Navy. Lieutenant Shigemura
Minoru (重村実) often visited a dance hall in the International Settlement and enjoyeddancing. On the other hand, if Army officers visited the hall, they drew their swords
and displayed a swords dance. Just like that, there were significant differences between
the Army and the Navy.
– Did these officers feel guilty for the cruel acts?
I think Japanese soldiers didn't feel guilty killing prisoners during battle. We neverthought Japan would lose the war and thought that if we lost, then it was time for all of
us to die. War is win or to die, we genuinely believed that. Japanese soldiers believed
this, so that's why they did not hide the fact they killing prisoners; they didn't feel guilty,
it was done for their survival.
– About a massacre, did you see something with your own eyes?
No, just heard the stories. I had seen nothing in Nanjing, but later during an attack
operation, I saw Japanese soldiers enter private house and pry the wooden floors out forcooking fires. And as they left the place, they intentionally trashed the house,sometimes setting them on fire. I asked soldiers why they did that and they said thatremaining Chinese soldiers in the area would use them.
– I heard they ransacked sometimes.
I don't know about the case in Nanjing. But to tell you the truth, it was not only soldiers
but we reporters also stole food. When the operation started, we reporters, as well as thesoldiers, were given food for several days by division headquarters. The food stock was
heavy so we took stock only for 2 to 3 days and when it ran out, we entered private
homes, looking for food. We didn't feel guilty stealing foods, both reporters and soldiers
did this.
But among the reporters, I heard someone stole something more than food, from a
museum in Shanghai. Funny thing was that I heard that all of the stolen items were
imitations and that the genuine articles were kept in Chongqing (重慶).

84

– Which division was said to have committed the massacre?
I don't know. A powerful division, like the 6th Division, was well known by the Chinese
Army and the Chinese Army fled before the 6th Division got near them. I was born inKagoshima, so during the Hankou (漢口) Operation I followed the 6th Division, which
was organized in Kagoshima. After the 6th Division went through, some Chinese
soldiers may have still been active in the area, so the Japanese divisions dispatched
thereafter might have attacked them.
– At that time did other reporters know about the incident in Nanjing?
We often took tea together but it was not raised as a subject. Nevertheless, I think theyknew about it.
– Why they didn't talk about it?
Because it was war, killing was normal and nobody minded about the bodies at all. It
was not news so no reporter tried to collect materials. And we were told not to takepictures of bodies, whether Japanese or Chinese; corpses were off limits. So we didn't
take the kinds of photos that could not be used in a newspaper article.
Maybe I talked too much about the wrong-doings of Japanese soldiers but I'd like toemphasize that there were many good stories of them, also.
– At the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), the Nanjing-Incident became a issue. How many people
knew about it at that time?
Nobody knew, I think. I don't have a clear memory of the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE) but
maybe it was caused by people like Major General Tanaka Ryukichi (田中隆吉), who
made accusations.
Nevertheless, I knew about the “prisoners story” in Nanjing so I assumed that theytalked about that.
Mr. Mori stayed in Shanghai until the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War. He joined85many operations, so his memory could have been a little bit confused--dates and times
were not always accurate. However, during the interview, he showed photo albums fromthose times, trying to correctly place the facts. I visited him repeatedly and asked manyquestions when I felt his answers were not clear. He answered my questions in detailwhenever I visited him.
After returned from Nanjing, Mr. Mori stayed in Shanghai to continue to make news
reels around Shanghai. He joined Operations Hankou (漢口) and Yichang (宜昌), thencontinued to make films showing the revival of Shanghai and peace returning toNanjing, and so on.
In 1940, the news reel sectors of Domei, Asahi, Mainich, and Yomiuri were united into
Nihon News Eigasha and Mr. Mori moved to the new company as a matter of course.
As he stayed in Shanghai, he shifted positions, from an employee of the Yomiuri
Shimbun to an employee of the Nihon News Eigasha. At the same time, Mr. Asai
Tatsuzo (浅井達三), of the Domei, also stayed in Shanghai and moved to the Nihon
News Eigasha.
In 1946, at the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), GHQ asked Mr. Mori to take a film of the Trials
because the American photographers could not identify the Japanese defendants. At
Ichigaya Court, Mr. Mori took film of the Trials as representative of GHQ and Mr. Asai
took film as a representative of Nihon News Eigasha. (Refer to the section (13), Mr.
Asai.)
After taking films of the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), Mr. Mori joined NHK and worked there
until his retirement. The monumental film of Staff Sergeant Kashimura with a singlewinged fighter is currently kept at NHK.

4. Domei Tsushin Newspaper
12) Interview with Mr. Arai Masayoshi (新井正義), Reporter for theDomei Tsushin Newspaper
When I asked Mr. Arai Masayoshi for an interview about Nanjing, he quickly said yes.
86

It was Autumn 1984.
“I had a war log during Nanjing but I lost it due to a US air raid during the War. Now I
will try to remember those days.”
In the reminiscences written by his colleague, Mr. Maeda Yuji（前田雄二）, he said that
Mr. Arai, a stout man, was a samurai type, on the other hand Mr. Horikawa was an
academic type. Mr. Horikawa (堀川) was Mr. Arai's colleague at the Domei Tsushin anda war correspondent as well. When I met Mr. Arai I felt that his description was true.
At the time, Mr. Arai worked in the politics section at the Domei Tsushin and he was 32
years old. He was dispatched to Shanghai from Tokyo as a reporter. After the War, inNovember 1945, the Domei Tsushin was divided into two companies, the Kyodo Tsushin
and the Jiji Tsushin. He was appointed as chief of the politics department in the Kyodo
Tsushin, and then in 1958, appointed as executive director of the Kyodo Tsushin, an office
he retained until his retirement in 1964.
He started to talk in a brisk tone as soon as I took a seat. He was very aware of thesignificance of this interview so he opened his talk with the Nanjing massacre.
When we were in Nanjing, we never heard of any massacres. Several years ago,
Matsumoto Shigeharu (松本重治), then the branch manager of the Shanghai Domei
Tsushin, started to write his memoirs of those days, but he was in Shanghai during thattime and didn't know about Nanjing at all. So he asked the three of us, Fukazawa
Kanzo (深沢乾蔵), Maeda Yuji (前田雄二) and I, who were reporters in Nanjing then,to tell him of those days.
Matsumoto invited us to dinner. At the dinner Maeda said he saw a massacre but I
didn't see anything like that at all. I saw bodies. Bodies of soldiers, including ben-i-hei,or soldiers in civilian clothing and among them maybe there were some corpses ofprisoners. I didn't check all of Nanjing, but I guess the number of bodies was 30,000 to
40,000 in total. Most were killed in battle and maybe some of them were not.
We, war correspondents, were treated well after the Xuzhou (徐州) Operation, butduring our time in Nanjing, we were not included as members. We had to prepare
everything by ourselves, including food and donkeys for transportation. It was really
tough.

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In those days, the main story was which Division would reach Nanjing first, whichnewspaper would report this first–it was serious competition. So, we didn't mind thedanger, we just headed straight for the front. The three of us, Horikawa Takeo (堀川武夫), who later became a professor at Hiroshima University, Maeda, who died recently,
and I made a team. One stayed at army headquarters and the other two went to thefrontlines. We made a schedule of our shifts. We brought a young Chinese man, whom
we hired in Shanghai, to the frontlines as a messenger. If something happened, we
dispatched him to headquarters. There was radio equipment at headquarters and weused this to send reports to Shanghai. The radio equipment was very heavy--we
couldn't carry it alone so we used a donkey.
After the battle of Zhabei (閘北), I returned to Tokyo, then went to Shanghai again to
await further instructions. I was ordered to follow the Yanagawa Army. I caught up
with the Yanagawa Army around Suzhou (蘇州). The Army arrived in Nanjing without
engaging in any serious battles after they landed Hangzhou Bay (杭州湾). I don't thinkthey had done anything like slaughter people. A Division that fought in Shanghai latercaught up with us. They had experienced serious fighting in Shanghai, losing nearly
half of their comrades and were terribly agitated. If any slaughtering had occurred it
might have been done by them, I guess.
Once I had heard from Commander Lieutenant General Yanagawa Heisuke (柳川平助)
that the Nanjing Capital Defense Force was estimated at around 200,000 to 250,000
soldiers. And the Japanese force totaled 100,000, including Yanagawa Army of 50,000
soldiers.
I tell you, the Yanagawa Army arrived at Nanjing without significant fighting but it
didn't mean that there were no enemy soldiers. As a matter of fact, soon after Suzhou, areporter from Asahi Shimbun was killed. We moved along railway tracks for Nanjing,
while the Yanagawa Army went around Lake Taihu (太湖). Walking on the railway
tracks north, as the railroad crossed with rice fields at right angles, we found Chinese
soldiers hiding in the rice field. Suddenly shooting erupted. This was repeated but weadvanced.
On the way to Nanjing, we frequently met ordinary Chinese people. Some of theChinese showed us their arm bands, which read, “This Chinese is hired by the JapaneseArmy,” which protected them and did not confuse them with ben-i-tai, civilian-clothed88

soldiers.
Around Mt. Zijin (紫金山), there was serious fighting. Between Mt. Zijin and Nanjing
Castle, the exchange of gunfire became intense. On December 13, 1937, we entered
Nanjing Castle through Zhongshan Gate (中山門). After entered the Castle, we began
to look for a place suitable for our Domei Tsushin's office. Every house was closed.
Eventually we settled in a place close to Zhongshan Gate that night. The Chinese who
remained in the Castle were only poor people--that was obvious.
We successfully entered Nanjing Castle, however, there were lot of stragglers outside
so we didn't feel like the battle was over. Fighting occurred here and there, it was still
very dangerous. According to my calculation, there were around 160,000 remnants of
the Chinese military.
On the 13th or 14th, I heard that Prince Asakanomiya was attacked at his headquarters inthe suburbs. I rushed over to headquarters; it took 40 minutes or so by car. Hurriedly, I
met the prince, His Highness murmured, “Well, well, we had a terrible night.” That was
the situation at the time.
On the 15th, we entered the old branch office of the Domei Tsushin. The office was
located in the middle of town and the Jin Ling Women's College (金陵女子大学) stood
nearby. The head of the College or the dormitory leader came to us, complaining that,“We accommodated female refugees and the Japanese soldiers made advances to thewomen, so I came here to ask for your help: Mr. Domei, can you help us?” So we took
her complain to army headquarters.
I myself hadn't seen any slaughtering or bodies from a slaughter. At Xiaguan (下関),
there must have been fighting while the Chinese soldiers crossed the Yangtze River. At
Xiaguan, my colleague Horikawa, or someone, said that he saw shooting or bodies
resulting from shooting.
My colleague Maeda wrote that he saw an execution on the 16th at the military
academy but I doubt that – it might have been the military administration (軍政部).
Anyway, I myself saw nothing. Several Japanese troops rushed in the castle at a time.
They somehow checked each other so they couldn't have done unreasonable violence.
There were Chinese prisoners and I saw Japanese soldiers put rice into the prisoners'
89canteens.
Soon after the entrance ceremony, we found Chinese people selling small articles andvery often saw them selling sweets because Japanese soldiers craved sweets. Under
such circumstances, I doubt there was a massacre. I can't deny that there were somecausalities, but 200,000 or more—that is not possible. I can't estimate the number ofvictims because I didn't see any with my own eyes.
At the entrance ceremony my colleague Maeda and I ran after General Matsui Iwane,
behind of the soldiers who stood in line on the street. We still prepared for the worst,
which means that it was not totally safe. After the ceremony, I remained in Nanjing fora couple of days and returned to Shanghai by a Navy ship. So, I in the end I stayed in
Nanjing for a week.
I heard about the massacre for the first time in the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE) after the War.
Mr. Arai narrated his story without referring to memos or documents. He told me allthat he could remember. I didn't interrupt him and wrote the above verbatim.

13) Interview with Mr. Asai Tatsuzo (浅井達三), Photographer for theDomei Tsushin Newspaper
In July 1937, with the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Mr. Asai Tatsuzo wasbeen employed by the Japanese branch of Metrotone News, as a press photographer.
On August 13, the Sino-Japanese War had spread to Shanghai and the Imperial Japanese
Navy Landing Forces fought a fierce battle against the Chinese Nationalist Army. The
Shanghai branch of the Domei Tsushin’s photo department was filming and considering
the extended nature of the fighting, they hired Mr. Asai and dispatched him to Shanghai.
It was late August 1937.
As soon as Mr. Arai arrived in Shanghai, he went to the frontlines. The result of his
difficult work was titled “A News Camera Watched The Turbulent Showa Period,” andwas shown by NHK. Since then, Mr. Asai spent 8 years on the battlefield, the hardest ever.
He was 24 years old, the second youngest employed at the Domei Tsushin.
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For the first 4 years, before the beginning of the Greater East Asia War, Mr. Asai took
news reels of several battles across China, including Shanghai, Nanjing, Xuzhou, Hankou,
and so on. The funny thing was that he remained in China during almost all this time, so
he hardly saw the Domei News reels released in Japan which he filmed. In 1940, as several
news reel companies were united into single company, called Nihon News Eigasha, hejoined the new company.
After the War, Mr. Asai was assigned to a new job--filming the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), andfor three years he visiting Ichigaya-dai, where the Trial was held. After that he returned
to Metrotone News, he then joined a film making company and produced the film, “Gateof Friendship,” with China’s support. He visited China frequently before the restorationof diplomatic relations between Japan and China in September 1972. In this manner, hekept his ties with China after the War.
I interviewed him on October 21, 1985--it was the next day that Keio University won the
6-universities baseball game after several years of struggle. I interviewed Mr. Asai at his
office which was located in front of the main entrance of Keio University.
– You were not only in the battle of Shanghai but also in the Hangzhou Bay Landing
Operation conducted by the 10th Army, on November 5.
Yes. I had been filming the battle of Shanghai, then the Army told me to film theLanding Operation so I took a ship from Shanghai over to Hangzhou. After I completed
the task, I carried the film to Shanghai escorted by a platoon. We were surrounded by
Chinese soldiers, so without an escort it was impossible to move alone.
– Did you go to Nanjing after that?
I stayed in Shanghai for a while and at the beginning of December, I went to Nanjing
together with Araki Shuzo (荒木秀三), a photographer.
Regarding the Domei Tsushin, you can see everything in the book “In The Flow ofWar,” (戦争の流れの中で) written by my colleague Mr. Maeda Yuji and published by
Zenhonsha (善本社). He wrote in his diary every night. His book was based on the91diary so every detail is reliable. All names he mentions are correct--which we havealready completely forgotten. In addition, he wrote of some serious matters, which we
could not tell to the Army at the time. Also he wrote openly about arguments among
our colleagues at the Domei Tsushin. Everything in it is true.
– Which Division did you follow?
There was no rule in deciding which division to follow, so I followed any group, here
and there. I tried always to be at the front. Every now and then soldiers would asked
me, “Hey, Mr. Newspaper, do you have a cigarette?” In those days, Ruby Quinn was
the most popular brand of cigarette. At the same time, the soldiers offered us food,“Take some pig's feet.” We knew that the food must have been confiscated but we werelonging for meat.
Like the soldiers, we reporters boiled rice in a canteen, and slept fully clothed on straw.
You know, straw is unexpectedly warm.
On the way to Nanjing, we found a bank. After blowing it open, a safe was full ofChinese paper money. Some soldiers used the money to make cooking fires.
– I thought using Chinese money to make cooking fires was just a story. But was thistrue?
Yes, it was. I didn't see them blowing open the safe but I watched them making fires
with the money. Pity, the money could have been used in the International Settlement.
This happened in Changzhou (常州), to my memory.
– Which route did you take?
We went through Wuxi (無錫), Changzhou, and Zhenjiang (鎮江).
In Zhenjiang, my colleague Haraikawa Chikashige (祓川親茂), a photographer, and I
met a Chinese man who was carrying something on his shoulder pole. As he saw us, heran away, leaving the pole there. We checked the carrier and found it filled with hand
grenades. Like soldiers, we reporters were constantly surrounded by danger. For92example, when we were moving from Zhenjiang to Mt. Zijin, my colleague Makishima(牧島) got injured. We had to carry him out by the Mainichi Shimbun’s car.
– When did you enter Nanjing?
On the 13th. I entered from Zhongshan Gate (中山門).
– What was the situation like inside?
Walking along Zhongshan Street toward the Yangtze River, we found the Safety Zone.
No Japanese were allowed to enter the Safety Zone. We wouldn't dare enter because it
was full of Chinese; too risky for us. The Red Swastika Society (紅卍字会), thecharitable organization, took care of the refugees. It seemed that mostly Chinese
civilians were in the Safety Zone and others stayed in their homes, daring not toventure out.
– How many people were working at the Red Swastika Society?
I am not sure. But there were so many--that's why I remember this so well. I once sawthat the staff of the Red Swastika Society confronted Japanese soldiers and explained inearnest that their refugees were not soldiers.
For a couple of days after entering, I saw fires here and there in the Castle.
– Were the fires started by Japanese soldiers?
Japanese soldiers or Chinese soldiers, I was not sure.
– Were the Chinese civilians afraid of Japanese soldiers?
I think so. It was same when we were afraid of American soldiers when they landed inJapan after the War.
– It is said that a massacre occurred.
93

I hadn't seen one but heard so. I heard about it.
– Did someone witness the killings?
I heard a couple of reporters saw it. I suppose that Mr. Shirai Shigeru (白井茂), a
photographer from the cultural film section at Toho (a movie studio), saw many things
because unlike our place, his office was located in the middle of Nanjing. He
mentioned a massacre in his book “Camera and Life”.
– Where were the bodies left?
In his book, he said in Yangtze River and Yuhuatai (雨花台).
– Were those bodies casualties from the fighting?
I don't know. I heard they were slaughtered. I wonder how they could have cleared thebodies, but I heard the bodies were cleared before the entrance ceremony.
– Did you hear how many bodies there were?
I didn't.
– Did you witness a massacre with your own eyes?
In the Castle I, saw a number of lines of Chinese soldiers being dragged along. I could
not forget the scene. Among them were the ben-i-hei, plain-clothed soldiers who
discarded their uniforms and wore civilian clothes. There were others, farmers fled as
refugees. Someone with dark tanned wrists were caught as stragglers.
– What time did this occur?
Around noon. One line consisted of 200 to 300 people and there were 2 to 3 lines like
that.
94

– Did you take photos of the prisoners? Or other photos in the Castle?
I used a lot of film just after the Castle's fall but once it was captured, I didn't. Other
things had no news value. I took film of the entrance ceremony. I climbed up the
Zhongshan Gate and from behind took film of General Matsui Iwane marching throughthe gate, then hurriedly climbed down the gate and took film of him from the front.
– Did any news company take pictures of a massacre?
I do not think anyone did. There is no record at all. I didn't want to take photos ofbodies, so I didn't even try even if I saw them. I had been in battlefields but never took
photos of corpses.
And I had never done staged photos. The photos of cheering at Nanjing Castle werestaged. The moment of the capture of the city was in the middle of a battle. You could
not cheer at that moment. Also, photographers were hardly at the right spot at the rightmoment. Cheers was done later in the day. However, I think this kind of staging was
acceptable in order to express excitement of the capture of Nanjing. The feeling wasreal.
– Among members of Domei Tsushin, did anyone talk about a massacre?
No. At that time Nanjing was full of stragglers and ben-i-hei plain-clothed soldiers andwe believed, well, that was war--kill the enemy.
– I heard that several foreign journalists stayed in Nanjing.
I never saw them. Except, during the Panay Incident on December12, four reporters
came to Nanjing on the 14th. They visited the Domei Tsushin to ask us to help them getto Shanghai. Reporters for reporters. There was an option to go to Shanghai by car but
it was too risky because of Chinese soldiers, so we contacted the Navy and the four
went to Shanghai on a Navy ship. Later, I heard that some water splashed on theirphotos of sinking ships, the photos were not damaged.

95

– Did the foreign reporters see the massacre?
At the time, nobody mentioned anything about a massacre, so I don’t think they did.
– It is said that Mr. Arthur Menken, a cameraman for Paramount, stayed in Nanjing andtook pictures of the Fall of Nanjing .
I knew Menken. I met him in Shanghai. But I didn't see him in Nanjing. After I
returned to Shanghai in January 1938, I often went out to lunch with him. I always
found him at a shop called “Jimmy” in the French Concession. I have a picture of me
taken with him.
– Did you heard about a massacre from him?
No, I did not.
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?
I remember that I took photos of the entrance ceremony, but after that my memory is
not clear, whether I returned Shanghai soon or stayed there in Nanjing for several days.
Anyway, after I returned to Shanghai, the Hangzhou Attack began and I went toHangzhou at once.
When I returned to Shanghai in January 1938, I met Ishikawa Tatsuzo (石川達三), thenovelist. He and I have the same name “Tatsuzo,” and it happened that the Domei
Tsushin had another person who had same name, Murakami Tatsu (村上達). We called
ourselves the three Tatsus and drank a lot together. Ishikawa Tatsuzo wrote a story thattook place in China in his book titled “Ikiteiru Heitai (生きている兵隊),” or “Living
Soldiers.” Also, he wrote an introduction for the book, “In The Flow of War,” written
by Mr. Maeda Yuji. I think everything he wrote was true.
– Did you stay in Shanghai after that?
In February, I went back to Tokyo following General Matsui's triumphant return. When96

we were leaving Shanghai, General Hata Shunroku (畑俊六) and Prince Asakanomiya
came to see off General Matsui. From Shimonoseki to Tokyo, we took a train called
Fuji, which was decorated with red carpet. It was a specially coupled two-vehicle train,
in which six to seven people sat, including General Matsui and his adjutant, Lieutenant
Colonel Mabuchi Hayao (馬淵逸雄), others and myself. On the way, several staff
officers joined us.
Before arriving in Tokyo, we stayed overnight at--to my memory--Atami. We cleaned
off our “dust from the war” before meeting the Emperor next day. When we arrived inTokyo, we found almost all of the important military staff came over to see us.
As soon as the train stopped, I got off the train before anyone else in order to takephotos of General Matsui. Then I was yelled by a military policeman to stop, but it was
my job so I kept taking photos.
– What kind of person was General Matsui?
Oh no, I did not dare to speak with him. I was in the next car. But in Shanghai,
especially at press interviews, I saw him several times.
– After the War you were assigned to film the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE). General Matsui
was sentenced to death.
I had been filming the Trial from the beginning. When he was accused of the incidents
that occurred in Nanjing, I thought the accusation was reasonable. It happened to acertain degree. General Matsui sat on the top of the military pyramid so it was his
responsibility.
But concerning the number of victims I cannot believe it was 200,000. This means thatthe majority of the population of Nanjing was wiped out.

14) Interview with Mr. Hosonami Takashi (細波孝), Radio Operator for
the Domei Tsushin Newspaper
Mr. Hosonami was born in November 1905. He joined the Dentsu Company (Nihon
97

Denpo Tsushin-sha) in 1929 and joined the Army during the Manchurian Incident. In
1936, Dentsu merged with Rengo and became Domei Tsushin.
The next year, 1937, the North China-Incident occurred in July and fighting expanded to
Shanghai in August. At first, China coverage was managed by the staff of the Shanghai
branch of the Domei Tsushin, but as fighting expanded, additional reporters, radio
operators and photographers were dispatched from Tokyo.
Mr. Hosonami was dispatched to the Shanghai branch in October. In order to set-up aradio system, he arrived in Shanghai prior to other reporters. He was 31 years old at thetime.
Mr. Hosonami moved through Taihu Lake (太湖) and Wu-xi (無錫.). He used Wu-xi as
the company's base lodging and stayed there for a while. From there, he transmitted
articles on Nanjing’s capture written by reporter Maeda Yuji and others. Naval Air Groups
were based in Changzhou (常州) and reporter Matsuo Tetsuo (松尾鉄夫), who was incharge of naval news brought Navy-related articles to Mr. Hosonami. Mr. Hosonami
transmitted these articles to Tokyo as well.
Thus, in those days the radio system, which was operated by Mr. Hosonami, was thefrontline headquarters of the Domei Tsushin. Naturally, among war staff, he waspositioned farthest away from the frontlines.
– Which route did you take to reach Nanjing Castle?
Through Tangshanzhen (湯山) I entered Nanjing Castle from Zhongshan Gate (中山).
Coming close to Tangshanzhen, I was surprised to see many prisoners kept withinwalls made of bamboo.
– How many prisoners were there?
I couldn't count them all, so to my guess, around 10,000. The place was not seen fromthe main road for Nanjing, but it was visible from a small path. I think I saw this byaccident.
– What date it was?
98I got through Tangshanzhen on the day after Nanjing’s fall, so it should be December
14. The place was a field, it looked like a golf course surrounded by trees. The Chinese
soldiers were eating porridge-like food. After that we reached our frontline lodging forthe Domei Tsushin, which was situated in the Castle.
– It is said that at the Domei's lodging house, terrible fighting occurred among reporters,
between the Tokyo reporters and Osaka reporters. Was this true?
Yes. A reporter named Higuchi Kenkichi (樋口憲吉), who had a black-belt in Judo,loved drinking and fighting. Others were same. I was not a drinker so watched themfighting from a distance.
There were all kinds of war correspondents and some collected the stolen goods.
Hangzhou was called a temple town and it held a lot of antique art. They wereabandoned, so some indiscreet persons took them freely.
– At which place did you see the entrance ceremony?
General Matsui Iwane entered through Zhongshan Gate for the ceremony and I stayednear the place where the ceremony was to be held. I think it was close to the
Nationalist Government’s building. Photographer Inazu Mikiji (稲津巳喜二) took
photos around the area.
– It is said that there was a massacre in Nanjing. Did you see this?
May I speak something?
– Sure, please do.
I have never spoken anyone if there was a massacre or not. There was a wide open
space called Xiaguan (下関) along the Yangtze River.
– Xiaguan was a wharf at Nanjing.
99

Yes. It was the embankment of the riverbed leading to the Castle Gate. There wereseveral trenches and tochkas. The tochkas mostly faced the Yangtze River but some ofthem were facing Nanjing. The tochka was made with concrete and looked like asquare watermill. In China, they made one or two tochkas at every important place for
defense purposes.
It seemed that the Chinese Nationalist Army tried to fight at that point but they
eventually ran away. Chiang Kai-she also fled from Xiaguan. When I arrived at
Xiaguan, I saw burning furniture, traces of killing, or so I thought.
–Did you see the killings?
No. I just assume that the killings were just completed. They wouldn't show killings. I
think they kept prisoners in the tochika and set it on fire. I have not forgotten a Chinese
soldier who saw me from the crenel of a tochika, twitching his nose in agony.
– How many people were in the tochika?
It could hold 20 to 30 people. Some furniture was packed in there and there were 3 or 4
tochikas like that. I think they were burned by spreading oil over the furniture andsetting it on fire. Bullets were precious, that's why. Not only in the tochika but also
along the shore of the Yangtze River, I saw bodies. Some of them were bound withwire.
– How many bodies did you see?
I am not sure. One-hundred or so. I think they were prisoners whom I saw inTangshanzhen.
– Were they brought from Tangshanzhen ?
I think so. After I entered Nanjing, I saw Chinese prisoners who were forced marched. I
think that they were the prisoners who were kept in Tangshanzhen.
– They were made to walk in Nanjing Castle?
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Well, yes that was the case. I think it was down a street leading to the Zhongshan Gate.
It was at night. Someone said prisoners were being moved and I went out to watch.
Eight persons per line, each line separated by 50 meters. The prisoners were walking
slowly, escorted by Japanese soldiers in the front and rear of the lines.
–All of the prisoners in Tangshanzhen were moved?
What I saw was just a part of them. I watched only once but I suppose they weremoved separately, little by little. Moving them all at once was not easy.
–According to your story, there must have been around 10,000 bodies found in Xiaguan.
Is this correct?
No, it is not.
– Did you watch the 10,000 prisoners being killed?
Under the circumstances, what I saw was the end part--maybe. Considering thesignificant difference between high and low tide in the Yangtze River, the bodies
which were left at the shore must have been washed away by the strong central current
and sent into the Yellow Sea without surfacing. That's what I imagined happened.
Later, I heard around 20,000 prisoners were killed. So in Xiaguan, considering theplace and time, it might have been 10,000 or fewer.
In Tangshanzhen, there were unseen places like hollows and some of the prisoners
were killed in such areas. But this is also hearsay. When I saw the prisoners being
pulled along I thought they were just being moved, but thinking back to Xiaguan, theprisoners I watched seemed pale and looked like they were prepared to die.
– Do you remember the exact date of the Xiaguan Incident?
Maybe it was the day before or the day of the entrance ceremony.
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– Did you see it alone?
We went to Xiaguan by car, including a driver and other colleagues.
– What time was it?
Early in the morning. So maybe they were killed during the night.
– According to the book, “In The Flow of War,” written by Mr. Maeda Yuji, reporter
Fukazawa Mikizo (深沢幹蔵) went to Xiaguan alone on the evening of the 17th and saw
a number of bodies there.
Was it? Fukazawa and I always moved together and, to my memory, we went to
Xiaguan together. Other than us, there were a driver and one other, someone else.
– Did you mention what you saw to other members of the Domei Tsushin?
No, I didn't talk about it.
– Why not?
During those times, we were numbed to corpses.
– When you saw the bodies, did you think they were massacred?
I thought of International Law, that it said not to kill prisoners. This might have been aviolation of International Law, but on the other hand, I thought they were casualties
from an ongoing battle. Until the very last moment, before the entrance ceremony,Japanese soldiers continued mopping-up operations. Chinese soldiers who were notprisoners but stragglers and deserters would very likely try to attack us again, given
any chance, at any moment.
Thinking back those times now, the bodies in Xiaguan remain with me. But in thosedays, if you didn't kill, you will be killed. Fukazawa and I always kept guns. Just like102

soldiers, we could be killed at anytime, anywhere. Already, colleagues and otherreporters were killed. Do not think about the Chinese soldier's wife or children, do notthink that they have family just as we do. In war, kill or be killed.
– Did you talk about that among members of the Domei Tsushin?
Not in particular. It was just one aspect of war.
– Did you see any other slaughter or something like that?
Around the same time, Matsumoto Shigeharu (松本重治), the manager of the Shanghai
branch, arrived in Nanjing from Shanghai. Matsumoto told us something happened at auniversity in Nanjing City so the four of us went over. Matsumoto was very active ininternational society, so we thought he heard something in Shanghai. He had plenty ofnews sources. However, we found nothing at the university, no trace of anything at all.
There were many people within the university.
– Were Chinese people staying in certain areas?
Yes. There was an area for women only, an area for men only, and family areas. There
were many people that we couldn't distinguish between soldiers and civilians. As soon
as the entrance ceremony was completed, we found that the city’s Chinese population
suddenly increased. We didn't know where they came from, from the suburbs or fromhiding places.
– Were they afraid of the Japanese soldiers?
Maybe this was so in Shanghai but in Nanjing, they didn't seem scared. And even in
Shanghai, the Chinese living in the International Settlement were not afraid of Japanesesoldiers or other foreign soldiers. The Chinese living in the suburbs seemed afraid ofJapanese soldiers. As a matter of fact, there were not many Chinese in suburbs, where
the battlefields were.

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Nanjing citizens remaining in the Castle gathered into areas on Zhongshan
Road in the central part of Nanjing, and on the western side of Zhongshan
North Road. They lived in barracks-style huts. In the background are thedeserted homes of the wealthy. (December 15, 1937)– How many days did you stay in Nanjing?
Four to five days, or a week. I went back to Shanghai together with my colleague
Fukazawa. On the way back to Shanghai, we went through Tangshanzhen, but we saw
no prisoners anymore. We then went through Wuxii, did some sightseeing in Suzhou
and went back to Shanghai.
After one or two days in Shanghai, I was dispatched to Hangzhou as the attack started.
At the end of December, I left my responsibilities to my colleague Ohoshi Ishimatsu(大星石松), who was at Domei's Hangzhou branch, and I returned to Shanghai.
– What was the situation in Nanjing then?
Anyone who tried to pass through the gates needed a certificate. The certificate was104issued by the military. I saw a Chinese with a certificate which read “I am a spy.”
Maybe the Japanese soldier wrote it in jest.
It was October 1985, when I visited Mr. Hosonami's house in Hodogaya, Yokohama
city. Mr. Hosonami waited me with his documents in Domei Tsushin period. He wasalmost 80 years old, very active and chatty. While speaking, he smoked one cigarette
after another.
Mr. Hosonami hadn't read Mr. Maeda's memoirs, “In The Flow of War,” and he had
hardly took notice of the controversial subject, the so-called Nanjing Massacre. He
simply told me what he had seen and what he had heard. There were, under thecircumstances of the war--kill or be killed--unforgettable things he himself had
experienced.
Mr. Hosonami went back to Nanjing in January 1938, and thereafter joined the Zuzhou(徐州) Operation. From Nanjing he returned to Tokyo. After that, he joined the Bias
Bay Landing Operation. Later, he was assigned to Imperial Headquarters and worked
under the Chief of Press Section, Mr. Matsumura Shuitsu (松村秀逸). After the War, hejoined Jiji Tsushin, and lived in Saga, Kyushu for a while, where he had been evacuated,then returned to Tokyo in 1949. H worked at Jiji Tsushin until his retirement.
After I met him in person for the first time, we spoke on phone several times. On thethird call, he surprised me by mentioning that Mr. Fudo died. Mr. Fudo Kenji(不動健治) was the head of the Domei Tsushin‘s photo department. After the War, hepublished many photos of the era.
Mr. Hosonami recommended that I meet Mr. Fudo, because Mr. Fudo also went toNanjing and he still seemed to be active. I said, yes, I would do so at once.
After the call, I checked a newspaper and saw Mr. Fudo's obituary.

5. Other Newspapers
15) Interview with Mr. Minami Masayoshi (南正義) , Reporter for the
Shin-Aichi Shimbun
105

I met Mr. Minami Masayoshi on July 4, 1987.
Mr. Minami served as the president of Tokai Radio, Nagoya. He must have been very
busy, so I hesitated in asking for interview. Eventually, I requested an interview, and to
my surprise, he quickly accepted.
When he appeared, he looked as if he was in his sixties or so. But in fact he must havebeen 70 or so at least because of his career as a wartime correspondent of 50 years. I have
met with a number of people since I started these interviews--some were still working,more or less, but Mr. Minami was on active duty. Most interviewees looked young but
Mr. Minami looked more than young—he looked brilliant.
I sent him three letters before we met, so he knew of my request very well--that I would
like to hear about the Nanjing Attack and those days. He spoke freely.
Mr. Minami was born in Ise, Mie prefecture, April 1912. As he worked as reporter for the
Shin-Aichi Shimbun (currently Chunichi Shimbun) the China Incident broke. As soon as
the war started, the Shin-Aichi Shimbun dispatched several reporters to the battlefield. In
December, it seemed that the capture of Nanjing was imminent, so four additional persons,
including reporters and photographers, were dispatched. Mr. Minami was one of them.
The Kokumin Shimbun newspaper became an affiliate of Shin-Aichi Shimbun, due to its
financial problems, so Mr. Minami was a reporter for the Shin-Aichi Shimbun as well as
the Kokumin Shimbun. He was 25 years old.
– Which route did you take to enter Nanjing?
I entered from Zhongshan Gate (中山門). I moved with the first group of soldiers andreached Zhongshan Gate in the dark. We could not move ahead from there so we had to
wait on the top of the Zhongshan Gate and watched the inside of the Castle.
It was December 13--I entered the Castle with the first group of soldiers through the
Zhongshan Gate and went along Zhongshan East Road (中山東路), and there – wewere shocked to see Japanese soldiers being hanged from plane trees that lined thesteets.
– Japanese soldiers were hanged?
106

Yes. Later we realized there was a battle at either Tongji Gate (通済門) or Guanghua
Gate (光華門) and Japanese soldiers were caught there. The Chinese soldiers broughtthem to Zhongshan East Road and killed, then hung them from the plane trees. They
were burned from below.
– How many bodies were there?
I saw two to three. Immediately we lowered them down from the plane trees. The
Japanese soldiers became furious. Even without this episode, they were filled withhostility.
– I heard this for the very first time.
Naturally. Only the first group of Japanese soldiers saw them and we lowered thebodies at once. This was the most impressive incident, among others, that I saw in
Nanjing Castle.
After the War, I visited Nanjing again and went to the plane trees. Time has passed--40
years--but the trees were still there. The tree trunks then were small like this (using
both forefingers and thumbs, Mr. Minami made a circle), but now they big around likethis (he made a circle with both of his arms). I was deeply moved.
After we lowered the bodies, we continued to move to the Castle's center--we were stillin the middle of battle after all.
– It is said that there was massacre in the castle.
No, there was not. Nobody said and heard of such a thing. After Japan lost the War,China made up this story and started making claims.
– Did you see anything like massacre in the Castle?
Never. All things came from battle. Some soldiers may have lost their senses, but it was107

a battle. Japanese soldiers were not supplied with enough food, the Chinese soldiers
were not well-disciplined--not everything goes by the rules in a war.
Besides in the Castle, every soldier was prohibited from Fuzimiao (夫子廟), no one
was allowed to go where civilians lived.
– It is said the prisoners were killed.
In those times there was a saying, “no prisoners on the battlefield”, so I assumed thatthe idea of “prisoners” did not exist in the Japanese army. The Chinese burned houses,
destroyed everything before they fled or became ben-i-hei, soldier in civilian clothes, tospy – they didn't want to get caught and end up being prisoners.
Thus, both sides had no concept of “prisoners” and were in a fight to the end, so theaccusation of “killing prisoners” does not make sense. This kind of thinking, of “notkilling prisoners by international law” was said much later. People who have not been
in a real battlefield will call killings “massacres”. Some say the killing of soldiers incivilian clothes was a massacre, but it was not.
– Some journalist has different opinions. The Asahi Shimbun says there was a “Nanjing
Massacre”.
The Asahi Shimbun, oh, yes. They need to publish their newspaper elsewhere, like in
Moscow.
– Where did you stay in Nanjing?
The 3rd Division of Nagoya arrived in Nanjing later and I followed the soldiers. From
Shanghai, I repeatedly visited Nanjing for the purpose of reporting and visited again
after the New Year1938, mostly with Kawai Katsumi (川井克己), a photographer, who
was also dispatched to Shanghai. Among war correspondents, Matsui Satoshi (松井敏),
a relative of General Matsui, was there.
– You said before that you visited Nanjing after the War. When was this?

108My job was a war correspondent, and I wrote a number of articles on Japanese
victories, so I thought Chinese people would hate me and I didn't want to go. In
addition, I was deeply disappointed since we lost the war against China. I held suchfeelings until the time Nagoya City and Nanjing City established a sister-city
relationship for the purpose of Japan-China friendship. In my position as president of
Tokai Radio, I had no choice but to reconcile with Nanjing for the sake of thefriendship program. For this, we at Tokai Radio planned some program and I took the
initiative to go to Nanjing.
When we performed Tokai Radio's program, the Chinese people liked our music a lot.
So we decided to broadcast our program in Nanjing.
Additionally, we planned a jogging event using Chang Jiang Great Bridge (長江大橋),
which was several kilometers long, a splendid bridge constructed across the Yangtze
River. The idea was to emphasize Japan-China friendship by jogging on the bridge.
This year is the third time we held this jogging event, scheduled on November 3. Last
year, wearing a T-shirt, I ran together with the mayor of Nanjing City.
– When you visited Nanjing, didn't the Chinese mention the Massacre?
Never.
– The Massacre Memorial Hall was built in Nanjing.
Was it? I visited Zhongshan Gate, Zhongshan street, and so on, but I didn't know about
the Massacre Memorial Hall.
– I heard it is located in the outside of Jiangdongmen (江東門).
I never visited that area. The Mayor of Nanjing said nothing, and to begin with, inNanjing, nobody talked about the Nanjing-Incident at all. Naturally, the Chinese
investigated my background, so they must know all about me. Or, I assume that they
did not talk about it because we are getting along now.
However, if they start to insist, I would fight because the so-called Nanjing-incident did
109not happen. I knew Nanjing then better than the current mayor of Nanjing.
On the other hand, for Japan-China friendship, I understand that it would not be wise todeny it. It would cast an aspersion on our friendship, which I, myself, am leading.
Someday, after I quit my job, I'd like to write the true story based on my oldmemorandum which still have on hand.
Later the Shin Aichi Shimbun merged with the Nagoya Shimbun, forming the Chubu
Nippon Shimbun. In 1953, Mr. Minami left the Chubu Nippon Shimbun to establish
Tokai Radio. Currently, Mr. Minami serves several roles, including president of both
Tokai Radio and Tokai TV.
The preceding interview was performed in 1987. He requested that I withhold hisstatement for a while, so it was not printed in the earlier version of my book - Kikigaki
Nankin jiken. He allowed me to publish his statement sometime later, so I decided toinclude this in the new version of the book.
16) Interview with Mr. Mitoma Mikinosuke (三苫幹之介), Reporter for the Fukuoka
Nichinichi Shimbun
Mr. Mitoma Mikinosuke was born 1902 in Fukuoka, Kyushu. After graduated from theTokyo Imperial University, he joined a local newspaper, the Fukuoka Nichinichi
Shimbun (currently Nishi-Nippon Shimbun). Around 1937, he was working as an
editorial writer of the local news section.
The Fukuoka Nichinichi Shimbun dispatched its reporters and photographers to north
China as soon as the Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred. Then, as the battlefield
extended to Central China, they dispatched staff to Central China as well--as a result 15
reporters and photographers were sent to China that year. For a local newspaper
company, they dispatched the largest number of war correspondents. Reading the
Fukuoka Nichinichi Shimbun of those times, one would find a number of special,
impressive spreads that one would not see in other local newspapers.
In Central China, in order to support the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, the Hangzhou
Bay Landing Operation was planned and in October 1937, the 10th Army was organized.
Under the 10th Army, the special 18th Division was organized in Kurume, Fukuoka. The
110

Fukuoka Nichinichi Shimbun dispatched Mr. Mitoma to Central China as a war
correspondent. Mr. Mitoma was 34 years old then.
On October 5, 1937, the 18th Division left Kurume, took a ship from Moji Port for Goto
Island, where they were given military training and waited for a month. Then on
November 5, the Division joined the Hangzhou Bay Landing Operation, to land in thearea around Jinshan Acropolis (金山衛城), which was situated close to the mouth of the
Qiantang River (銭塘江口).
– Did you land with the 18th Division?
Yes. In the dark, early morning haze, together with the troops I landed in the muddy
and shallow downstream of the Qiantang River, soaking in salty water up to the chest.
Shouldering a heavy backpack, I tried to take pictures, as many as possible, but in theend, I was thoroughly wet and only 1 or 2 blurry pictures were basely usable.
– Did the 18th Division join the Nanjing Attack?
During the Attack, the duty of the 18th Division was to cut off the enemy's retreat,
those escaping from the Nanjing Castle, and to destroy the enemy. For that purpose,
after the capture of Zheijiang (湖州), the Division was deployed in the south-west,
between Taihu Lake (太湖) and Yangtze River (揚子江). Surrounding Nanjing out inthe distance, we waited.
Soon, we heard a report that the attack against Nanjing’s Chaina Gate (中華門) had
started. Despite the fierce battle, we knew that the capture of Nanjing was only amatter of time. After the capture, we had to prepare for the entrance ceremony. The 18th
Division headquarters got an order to attend the ceremony as representatives of thearmy. Therefore, the headquarters unit entered the Castle beforehand through Water
West Gate (水西門), located on the west side of Nanjing and waited for the day of
ceremony.
– So did you enter the Castle together with the 18th Division Headquarters?
No. I wanted to see the exciting attack of Nanjing, so I left the troops and walked
111around, then I found myself at the shore of the Yangtze River. It was at a place called
Taiping (太平), and it looked like a port town. I caught sight of a transport carrying
Japanese soldiers and running upstream; soon it arrived at the port. They said they
were going to Nanjing. “Good luck.” I asked them to take me on board.
– So you went down the Yangtze River.
On the way down, I saw an island in the middle of the river where a Japanese unit was.
I asked to stop the boat and landed on the island. According to the map, the shore on
the left side of the island was called Wu Jiang (烏江), a place well-known for the oldstory of Ziang Yu (項羽,) Chu(楚.).
On this island in the middle of the river, Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro (橋本欣五郎),
the 13th Regiment Commander of Field Heavy Artillery (野戦重砲兵第十三連隊, set
up a base. He boasted triumphantly, “I got an order and just destroyed a British ship.”– Did you enter Nanjing after that?
I went down the river on the transport and landed at the wharf of Xiaguan (下関), thefront entrance to Nanjing. I am not sure of the date, maybe it was the afternoon of
December 13. On December 12, the Japanese Army attacked around China Gate (中華門). The mopping-up in and out the Castle continued until the morning of the 13th, so I
guess that I entered the Castle on the afternoon of the 13th. The battle was completely
finished.
When I landed Xiaguan, I saw a Japanese army truck running--it was empty. I asked
the driver where was he going, he said he was going to the Water West Gate (水西門)located on the west side, by passing through the inside of Nanjing Castle. I asked him
to give me a ride and when we arrived at Water West Gate, it was evening and alreadygetting dark.
– What did you do after you arrived at Water West Gate?
Outside Water West Gate, I found the Obara Battalion, which was organized in
Kagoshima, Kyushu. According to the Battalion Adjutant, they had fought fiercely,112

fully bloodied, until noon that day.
I went to meet Major Obara Shigetaka (小原重孝). Commander Obara had experience
as military officer overseas and had a very strict manner. While I was speaking with
him in a wide empty room, a reporter from another newspaper nonchalantly walked in,without knocking. Upset, the commander shouted at him in a loud voice, “Who areyou? Get out!” Hearing that the adjutant jumped into the room, and the commanderordered the adjutant not to allow intruders into his room. Sensing his mood, we quickly
withdrew from the room. Later the adjutant pitied us and assigned us a corner room inthe building that night.
The next day, I got up before dawn and went out. I was told to watch the roadsidecarefully. In the morning mist, I was surprised to find a number of Chinese bodies inindigo dyed uniforms, here and there. I counted roughly 500 to 600 of them.
– Did you find the place where the 18th Division Headquarters lodged?
The inside of the Castle was empty and quiet. I didn't see any civilians, no one at all. I
saw people occasionally, Japanese soldiers patrolling in the Castle. Each time I met
with Japanese soldiers, I asked them where the 18th Division was camped, and soon I
found the Headquarters. The 18th Division used an empty house called the Hokei Ginro(宝慶銀楼) as their lodging.
The Commander of the 18th Division, Lieutenant General Ushijima Sadao (牛島貞雄),
knew me well--I moved with them on a poorly maintained, muddy road for many days
and struggled to find a way to send my articles from the battlefield to Shanghai.
Commander Ushijima had written “You had such a hard time,” and handed me his
calligraphy which he had already prepared. I thought it was like a commendation given
by a high-rank samurai to his subordinate in old times. In addition, Commander
Ushijima gave me a bottle of sake, a regal gift, which he kept for me, as well as a boxof cigarettes with chrysanthemum crest. This demonstrated his warm, fatherly
personality.
– After the capture, what was the situation in Nanjing?

113

I expected inside Nanjing to be a mess but I was surprised to see that was not so. Maybearound the Chaina Gate (中華門) or other gates where fierce fighting occurred there
was more damage done, but I didn't go to those places because they were too far away.
Anyway, as far as I saw, the town and the streets looked clean. Before the entrance
ceremony, they must have been cleaned. Before the ceremony, I visited the Military
Academy located in Zhongshan East Road (中山東路 ) and Zhongshan Gate to do apreliminary check of where the ceremony was to be held. It was clean everywhere andno abandoned bodies were seen.
– It is said that there was a massacre in Nanjing.
I saw Nanjing immediately after the capture so I am confident to say that I neither saw
nor heard about a massacre; any massacre whatsoever. I cannot say anything about
matters after the ceremony because after the ceremony I went back Shanghai, leaving
my duties to the next reporter. I returned to Japan before the end of the year.
However, it was totally unlikely that a massacre happened after the capture of Nanjing.
Nanjing citizens were evacuated to the Safety Zone long before and they were protected
there. I assume that the large Chinese Army had withdrawn, leaving only a garrison in
Nanjing. If large numbers of Chinese troops gathered in Nanjing, then they had nochance to survive because the Japanese Army surrounded the Castle for the attack.
China is a huge country, therefore they promptly fled all the way to Hankou (漢口)before they sustained serious damage, then again to Chongqing (重慶). It was areasonable strategy to stretch the Japanese lines, to make them long, thin and weak likea thread.
In the Spring of 1939, I was assigned to be the chief of the Nanjing branch and went toNanjing again. Our branch office was located along Zhongshan North Road (中山北路).
Since then, I stayed in Nanjing for 6 years and then drafted into the army there andjoined the army in Hankou and moved to Changsha (長沙). As the War ended, I wasdischarged from military service. I stayed at a camp, an old lodging for Japanese troops
which was located outside Nanjing, together with 10,000 Japanese residents for half ayear then returned Japan. While I was in Nanjing, as I mentioned earlier, I had never114

heard about a massacre.
I heard the story of a massacre when the Tokyo Trial raised the issue. It was a frame-upby the winner. I do not believe it.
– In order to understand those times, do you have something to share?
Yes. During the period I worked at our Nanjing branch, the two-year anniversary of the
Capture of Nanjing had arrived. Our head office wanted a special featured article forthe anniversary and I made the following:We, the Nanjing branch office of the Fukuoka Nichinichi Shimbun, hired a Chinese
couple as assistants. The couple has continuously lived in Nanjing, including during theconflict, and know of those times in great detail. On the condition of providing
anonymity, I interviewed them for a special article. The article was published on in the
Fukuoka Nichinichi Shimubun on December 10, 1939, on page 7.
This article described the situation in the Safety Zone.
It was titled:“Refugees interviewed,
Men and women in fear of kidnapping,
Painful atrocities committed by the Chinese Central Army.”
The husband’s name was Kosinmin (黄真民) (assumed name, 27 years old) and camefrom the southern countryside, several kilometers from Nanjing. He graduated fromjunior high school. His wife’s name was Chinmi (陳美) (assumed name, 26 years old)and her mother came from Suzhou.
The reporter started with the following:– When the Japanese Army entered Nanjing where were you and what were you doing?
Koshinmin
My wife and I were in the Safety Zone set by the International
Committee, located in Yihe Road (頤和路), deeply secluded from Shanxi
Road (山西路), in the northwest part of Nanjing.
Packed into the Safety Zone were 300,000 people. Night and day, the115soldiers of the Central Army came, one after another, showing off theirguns, searched us, took our food, property and our last penny. The mostscaring thing was that they kidnapped men and women, especially single
men, who were often taken for labor, and girls for the night. Theirviolence was really insufferable.
– How did you know that the Japanese Army arrived?
Koshinmin
After we entered the Safety Zone, we never left the place because thefighting was getting really serious and we felt that we were in danger. I
think it was December 11, when I was chattering with my friend, when
we heard some gunshots from outside. “What is that?” I exchanged aglance with my friend.
– Did you see the Japanese Army?
Koshinmin
I saw the Japanese Army on December 18. It was the first time for me tosee Japanese Military Policemen patrolling.
– Were there any Chinese soldiers among the refugees?
Koshinmin
There were. All Chinese soldiers were found and caught.
– Didn't the Japanese soldiers mistake you for a Chinese soldier?
Koshinmin
They inspected my hands and head, but my color was not of a soldier
and I had my wife with me so they soon recognized that I was not asoldier.
– So your wife Chinmi saved your life. You must be treating her well, and the both of
you are very devoted to each other.
ChinmiI was so scared when we were searched, we couldn't imagine what
would happen.
116

– Was there enough food in the Safety Zone?
Koshinmin
As soon as the Safety Zone was organized, I quit my departmental job,bought 2-koku of rice, oil, salt and so on and evacuated to the Safety
Zone with my wife. At first there were no residents in the Safety Zone –the former residents evacuated already – but later it became packed. For
example, 12 people had to sleep together in a room as small as thisoffice.
– Your home village was not far from Nanjing. Why didn't you evacuate to your homevillage?
Koshinmin
Because there were many bandits on the way to my village—and theCentral Army as well.
– Was it not good that the Central Army prevented banditry?
Koshinmin
No, no. The Central Army and the bandits are the same. They neverhesitated to rob--or kill us--if we have money or valuables.
ChinmiThat's why we hurriedly moved to the Safety Zone which was supposed
to be the safest place.
– Did you have so much money or valuables that might cause you to be killed orrobbed?
Koshinmin
We worked and had a house full of furniture. And I saved 800 Yuan, mywife 400 Yuan.
– I see. That's why you were afraid of bandits and the Central Army.
Koshinmin
And we were afraid of something else, too.
117

– What's that?
Koshinmin
Gangsters. There are many of these in China. An acquaintance of mine
envied my money and informed one of these guys. The gangster caught
me and took my money right from my pocket.
– When did this happen?
Koshinmin
It happened when the Japanese Army had started to attack the Castle. My
bad acquaintance disappeared since then but the gangster who stole mymoney is still walking the streets in Nanjing. Not just me, but there aremany other victims of gangsters.
– Why didn't you tell the police about it?
Koshinmin
It is useless. The police are in with the gangsters. But the gangster who
stole my money is now very poor, having had no food for a day.
– This must be Heaven's punishment. Was Chinmi's 400 Yuan also stolen that time?
ChinmiI sewed the money tightly into a futon, so he couldn't find it.
– Where were the fiercest battles that happened in the Castle?
Koshinmin
It is said there were serious battles around Water West Gate (水西門),
Guanghua Gate (光華門), Xiaguan (下関) and Yi Jiang Gate (挹江門).
The strategy of the Japanese Army was to surround Nanjing--thatworked in successfully capturing Nanjing in a short period of time. I
heard that 11 Japanese soldiers caught 3,000 Chinese soldiers around
Water West Gate.
– What a strange story. Why didn't the Chinese soldiers protest?
Koshinmin
118

They probably lost the will to fight and threw down their weapons.
– As a matter of fact, I [the reporter] was here, in Nanjing, at that time as a war
correspondent specifically for the attack on Nanjing. I saw 500 to 600 bodies scatteredoutside the Water West Gate. At the time, I stayed at a building called the Hokei Ginro(宝慶銀楼), located along China Road (中華路). Now, being in Nanjing again, as soon
as I arrived, I went to see the building, to see what had happened, and found the same
Chinese who were there then still living there.
Koshinmin
Oh, you were here then. I didn't know that at all.
– And at the Attack of the China Gate, one of my colleagues, a war correspondent for
the Fukuoka Nichinichi Shimbun, was killed in the battle.
Koshinmin
Oh. Did you volunteer for the job?
– We are dispatched by the newspaper companies. At the time 7 to 8 reporters and I
were dispatched to Nanjing.
During the period of working as the chief of the Nanjing branch office, Mr. Mitomo
had also brought his family to Nanjing. His daughter attended Japanese Elementary
School in Nanjing from first to 5th grade. She joined the interview and I asked her about
the Nanjing Massacre. She said:
I have never heard such a story. In Nanjing, I often played with Chinese children in theneighborhood, but they never mentioned it, not even a rumor.
After the War, Mr. Mitomo served as the chief of the business section in Nishi-Nihon
Shimbun, and is now living in Tachiarai, a suburb of Fukuoka, with his daughter'sfamily. He was 83 years old yet looked 10 years younger. His mind was also such thathe could very clearly remember details from those times.

17) Interview with Mr. Koike Shuyo ( 小 池 秋 羊 ), Reporter for the
Miyako Shimbun
119I interviewed Mr. Koike Shuyo shortly after the beginning of the New Years’ Day, 1986.
Last year, in Autumn, Mr. Koike had an acute heart problem and was taken by
ambulance to a hospital. He left the hospital at the end of the year. He had been going to
the hospital every other day for kidney dialysis before being hospitalized. I asked him
for an interview before knowing anything about his health.
When I met him, I felt that he was not strong enough to do the interview, yet he insisted,
partly because he himself was a reporter and partly, I guess, because he felt lonely,
having not spoken much for a long time due to his health problem.
Mr. Koike was born in 1907. In 1928, he joined the Miyako Shimbun (currently the
Tokyo Shimbun), working at the time as assistant director of the local news section. In
1937, he was dispatched to the battles of Shanghai and Nanjing together with Mr.
Tsukamoto, the assistant director of the politics section, and Mr. Yoshino, photographer.
The Miyako Shimbun was a local Tokyo newspaper. The news from the Shanghai front
was taken from the Domei Tsushin, but the Miyako Shimbun wanted their uniquecoloration of the conflict, so Mr. Koike and two others were dispatched for this purpose.
– When did you go to Nanjing?
We visited Taihu Lake (太湖) and returned to Shanghai on either December 2 or 3.
Those days, Lieutenant Colonel Mabuchi Itsuo (馬淵逸雄) was in charge of the Army's
news section, so I visited his office and found a group of consoling visitors, 13 to 14
Diet members. They were talking about visiting Nanjing because the capture of
Nanjing was only a matter of time. In the group, I saw Mr. Kato Kanju (加藤勘十), of
the Japan Proletarian Party, (who was arrested a couple of weeks later due to the
Popular Front Incident. After the War, he became Minister of Labor).
They invited us to go with them, so we three joined the group and headed for Nanjing.
It was on either December 5 or 6 we left Shanghai for Nanjing, through Suzhou, Wu-xi,
and Changzhou, riding an Army truck.
It was around December 9 we arrived at the 16th Division Headquarters located near
Ma Qunzhen (馬群鎮). Division Headquarters was deployed a distance from the120

frontline.
The Chinese Army continuously shot their cannons from Mt. Zijin (紫金山). The
Headquarters was setup at the rear and there was no mountain in the area from which
the Chinese Army could see us. It was very dangerous. When the visitors tried to takepictures of their visit, the thunder of Chinese cannon made us shudder. Terrified, theofficial visitors went back at once--they stayed at Headquarters for only an hour.
Reporters were not able to abandon our job, so we remained with at 16th Division
Headquarters.
The Commander of the 16th Division was Lieutenant General Nakajima Kesago (中島今朝吾), who limped due to a bullet wound. Nevertheless, he was actively incommand. When I met him for the first time, I was impressed by his softness, like agentle old man.
We stayed at a place close to Ma Qunzhen (馬群鎮) for 3 to 4 days before we entered
Nanjing. During that time the Japanese Army scattered bills advising surrender, andalso they released balloon in order to gauge shooting distance to Nanjing. I heard thatthey attacked Xiaguan from there. Around 250,000 to 300,000 Chinese soldiers had
been deployed in Nanjing but, at that time, 50,000 soldiers were left in Nanjing. The
rest of the Chinese soldiers withdrew by passing through Xiaguan, so I heard.
Several kilometers behind the 16th Division Headquarters was a hot spring called Tang
Shuizhen (湯水鎮). We used the hot spring several times.
– When did you enter Nanjing?
On either the 13th or 14th--my memory is not clear, but it must be 13th. We followed
Division Headquarters and entered from Zhongshan Gate. Up to then, soldiers of the
16th Division completed mopping-up actions to clear Chinese soldier remnants, movingaround every street of Nanjing starting from Zhongshan Gate.
We reporters walked along Zhongshan East Road (中山東路) and found that every
house in the Castle was empty. It was a deathly quiet town, not even a cat or dog was
seen--it was just a weird atmosphere that surrounded us. We were surprised to see thestreets were perfectly in order, no trace of battle. After 200-300 meters of walking, we121met a man walking toward us and then passed us, staggering as he went. His face andbody were covered with blood, he looked like a ghost. He did not seem to be a soldier
but ordinary civilian. Still, neither we reporters nor our soldiers offered him any help.
We had no time. The place was a strange, unknown town to us. We were constantly indanger--the enemy could appear anytime, anywhere. I felt scared, and realized againthat this was a real battlefield.
The 6 to 7 of us reporters, including the Hochi, Yomiuri, Shanghai Nippo, and our own
Miyako, were fed by Nakajima Division Headquarters since we arrived outside ofNanjing. A monk, who joined the Division, took the job of communication between thereporters and the Division.
When we reporters walked around the Castle, somewhere behind Zhongzheng Road(中正路), a little past the rotary where the Zhongshan Road (中山路) and theZhongzheng Road intersected, a fire broke out. The empty street was covered withblack smoke, and the fire spread quickly and widely without anyone to extinguish it. As
we watched the fire, several foreigners came by in two cars, racing at full speed aroundthe street, took several pictures, then left the place at full speed again. Later, we foundout that the group belonged to reporter Tillman Durdin of The New York Times, whoreported the scoop--the atrocities committed by the Japanese Army in Nanjing. Theyran into us and fled instantly. Considering that this battlefield was enemy territory tothem as well as to us, we secretly admired their braveness and tactful manner asreporters.
Back to my story, we had to find our lodging and looked around in a luxury housingarea close to Division Headquarters. We found a house that looked like the official
residence of a high rank government official. We got permission from the Division andsettled there. All furniture and decorations were intact. The house had a wide reception
room, sunny living room and western style bathroom. I turned the faucet on and foundwater running. We spent more than a week on a fierce battlefield outside the Castle, so
we cried with joy when we saw running water. But later we found out that the water
was merely remains from the house's water tank; we were disappointed.
The house was two-storied, the second floor was apparently the family's private rooms.
And in the perfume-scented luxurious daughter's room, I imagined that a beautiful
Chinese girl was actually in there. There was a study with full of books arranged neatly122

in shelves, which must also be the owner's room. We were very satisfied with thishouse, which made us feel human.
– What was the situation in Nanjing then?
Around that time, I went to the Safety Zone and watched the assistant military
policemen picked out Chinese soldier stragglers. A parent or brother of one of thesoldiers who was caught by the military policemen begged them not to take him,
crying, he was not a soldier. I couldn't stand to watch the scene. But, anyway, I guessedthat the policemen took him.
– How many remnants did they take away?
Ten or 20, in a group. I think the military policemen shot them.
– Where?
I didn't see it, but I suppose the policemen took them to the suburbs and shot them
there.
– How was the Safety Zone at the time?
The refugees were upset while the military policemen looking for stragglers, but
generally they were calm.
And there was not enough food so the people begged us for food. In our lodging, wefound several bags of rice, so we brought the leaders of the refugees to our lodging andgave them rice and other food, enough for two carts. But there were 60,000 to 70,000
people in the Safety Zone, so it was almost nothing.
– Did you send articles about the people in the Safety Zone?
Yes. I wrote articles about what I myself saw while walking around. We didn't haveradio equipment so we asked a person in the Army press section, who came from123

Shanghai, to send my articles, using the Army's radio system.
– What was the situation in Nanjing after that?
I visited many places in Nanjing, but we didn't have a car so my movement waslimited. At the entrance ceremony, I waited on the Zhongshan Gate and took pictures ofGeneral Matsui entering the Castle from a distance and Mr. Yoshino, who was aprofessional photographer, took close-up pictures of the General. The picture wasdisplayed on the first page of the Miyako Shimbun. Also, we took pictures for the New
Year – a group of soldiers cheered “banzai” on Mt. Zijin. It was set-up.
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?
I wanted to return to Shanghai before the 24th and asked the Navy to get me passage for
Shanghai on the 22nd. I stayed one night on board a ship and I suppose I arrived in
Shanghai on the 23rd. Yes, I remember cerebrating Christmas Eve, the 24th, in the
French Concession in Shanghai.
– It is said there was a massacre in Nanjing. Did you see bodies from a massacre?
I don't know whether they were the result from a massacre or fighting, but I saw several
bodies in a basement of a half-constructed building near the central rotary. The
basement was filled with water and the water was red with blood. When I saw the palebodies, I was really scared.
And I think it was at Yi Jiang Gate (挹江門) – I went there on a Army truck and I saw acorpse which had been run over repeatedly by cars and it was flat.
And when I left Xiaguan, where a dock or a pan-shaped shipyard-like grandstand stood,
I saw a number of bodies thrown in it.
– How many were bodies in the dock?
It was not just 5 or 10. More than that--20 or 30. I think they were battle casualties.
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– Did you see any other bodies?
No, that's all what I saw.
– Did you heard about a massacre while you were in Nanjing?
No.
– Did you hear any rumors, of any kind at all?
I heard a story that Chinese soldiers couldn't find any food, so they turned themselvesin.
– You said that you met foreign reporters.
They each had a car, took pictures including our mopping-up operation in the Castle,
the place that was on fire, and even of the Safety Zone. I was surprised they took somany pictures.
I once saw the soldiers of the 16th Division seizing something by force. It seemed thatthe top officers overlooked soldiers taking food. It would not be so good if foreign
reporters wrote an article about this, so I reported this matter to, maybe, Lieutenant
Colonel Mabuchi Itsuo (馬淵逸雄). He understood immediately and tried to stop
foreign reporters at each Castle gate but they had already gone back to Shanghai. The
article was published by several newspapers, including the Shanghai Evening Post, andthe North China Daily Newspaper. In addition, as mentioned before, it was publishedby foreign newspapers, like The New York Times, too.
– Have you seen the Shanghai Evening Post and the North China Daily News yourself?
Yes, I read them after I returned to Shanghai. It was published, not only by neutral
newspapers, but also by Chinese newspapers.
– What did the papers say?
125I don't remember exactly, it mentioned Japanese soldiers' plundering or something likethat.
Our Miyako Shimubun made the Astor House, near the Garden Bridge, our lodging.
Across the Garden Bridge was the International Settlement, which housed citizens fromthe UK and other countries, and where we could buy English language newspapers andnewspapers written in Chinese.
Usually we Miyako Shimbun reporters visited the press department of the JapaneseArmy to get news but we have only three staff members and our capacity to get news
was limited, so we tried to get information from the English language newspapers
rather than going up to the front.
Therefore, starting with the Attack on Dachang Town (大場鎮攻略), it became ourregular duty to read the newspapers published in the International Settlement. OtherJapanese newspapermen did the same, but I believe we had the best knowledge about
foreign newspapers then.
– In those newspapers you must have found a lot of anti-Japan articles. How did you
take it?
Naturally, in the International Settlement, being Japanese was dangerous. On a street
corner, I saw some Chinese people who were accused of being pro-Japanese traitors.
There were killed and their heads put on public display. The UK was also anti-Japanese
so they didn't step in and just left the heads there. I often visited an English bookshop
called Kelly, where I saw a number of anti-Japanese books.
Under those circumstances, even the so-called neutral newspapers written in English
took the Chinese side. We couldn't use those articles, literally, but we did get to know
the Chinese point of view. Taking those things into consideration, I wrote my article.
– After the War, it was said there was a massacre with hundreds of thousands victims.
The bodies I saw with my own eyes were those that mentioned earlier. However, I
didn't get to see all of Nanjing, so I don't know of anything else. If someone said there
was a massacre, I cannot refute that. But even in Japanese Army's reports, for example,
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when they said they killed 10,000, in fact it was 1,000. The numbers were always
exaggerated.
I have no intention of taking the Chinese or the Japanese side. What I talked about
today was all that I witnessed and experienced in Nanjing.
Mr. Koike stayed in Shanghai until February 1938, and returned to Tokyo. His first visit
to China ignited his dream of China, of which he held for a long time. He quit his job at
the Miyako Shimbun in 1939 to go China again. Pulling some strings, he joined acompany called Mokyo-dengyo 蒙疆電業 in Zhangjiakou (張家口), China. He worked
there for 5 years and then drafted into the Japanese military in 1944.
Living in China for a total of 6 years, he made his dream come true, that is, he saw thestone Buddhist images of Yungang Grottoes (雲岡) and Longmen Grottoes (竜門), forwhich he had been longing. After the War, he established a company and engaged inbusiness. During this time, he wrote three books, “Mongolia, A Country Far Away,”“Note on Yungang Grottoes,” and “Longmen Mandala.”18) Interview with Mr. Yanai Shogoro (箭内正五郎), Reporter for the Fukushima
Minpo Newspaper
In August 1937, the second Shanghai Incident broke out and the 3rd Division and the 11th
Division landed at Shanghai. However, the Chinese Army fiercely resisted. Therefore, in
September, the 13th Division, the 9th Division, the 101th Division and Shigefuji (重藤)Detachment were dispatched to Shanghai. The 13th Division was organized in Sendai,
Aizuwakamatsu, Shibata and Takada, as a reserve unit. Within the division, the 65th
Regiment was organized in Aizuwakamatu, headed by Colonel Morozumi Gyosaku (両角業作), who was just promoted to colonel.
The 13th Division landed China in the beginning of October, and fought against the
Chinese Army in Lao Lu Zhai (老陸宅) and Ma Jiazhai (馬家宅). Later the JapaneseArmy moved north, chasing the Chinese Army along the Yangtze River and captured
Jiangyin (江陰) Battery, the largest fortress in the area around the Yangtze River. Afterthe capture of the Jiangyin Battery, the Shibata Regiment and the Takada Regimentcrossed the Yangtze River, heading towards Jingjiang (靖江), while the Sendai Regimentand the Aizuwakamatsu Regiment stayed there and moved to Zhenjiang (鎮江). After the127capture of Zhenjiang, the Sendai Regiment crossed the Yangtze River and moved north,while the 65th Regiment moved for Nanjing along the Yangtze River. The 65th Regiment
was under Brigade Commander Major General Yamada Senji (山田栴二).
After the War, Mr. Hata Kensuke (秦賢助) wrote an article in the magazine Japan
Weekly, titled by “Byakko Troop Blooded by Prisoners' Blood”. In the article, Mr. Hata
wrote that on December 15, 1937, the Byakko Troop massacred Chinese 20,000
prisoners, who were caught at Mufushan (幕府山).
Shortly thereafter, the Fukushima Minyu Shimbun started a two-year series titled “War
Story of The Local Regiment”. In those times, there were many surviving soldiers who
participated in the Nanjing Battle, and Brigade Commander Yamada and 65th RegimentCommander Morozumi were also alive and well. Based on various witnesses andevidence, the series “War Story of The Local Regiment” proved that Mr. Hata's article
was not based at all on fact. In addition, ten years later, journalist Mr. Suzuki Akira
revealed in his book, “Nanjing Illusion of the Nanjing Massacre,” that Mr. Hata’s story
was nothing more than fiction. However, the story spread widely and persisted. The 65th
Regiment and the 16th Division, which remained in Nanjing after the capture, have been
associated with the Nanjing-Incident.
To follow the 65th Regiment, three reporters were assigned from the Fukushima Minpo,
Fukushima Minyu, and the Fukushima. These newspapers received general news fromthe Domei Tsushin. The three reporters instead tried to report something special,focusing on the Regiment's soldiers, by following their local regiment.
Among the three reporters, two reporters, of the Fukushima Minyu and the Fukushima
died and only Mr. Yanai Shogoro of the Fukushima Minpo, was alive.
In those time, there were five local newspapers in Fukushima prefecture and the
Fukushima Minpo had the largest number of subscriptions. The Fukushima Minpo
published a collection of photographs titled by “Our Local Regiment's Photographs in
the China Incident” in 1938. This book showed the battles of the 65th Regiment inShanghai and Nanjing. Mr. Yanai, who had returned to Japan by then, edited this photobook, using some of the photos he himself took.
Mr. Yanai was born in January 1904. He joined the Fukushima Minpo in 1928 and in128

September 1937, followed the 65th Regiment to Shanghai. This was to be his first andonly military experience. Among other reporters he was the only reporter following the
local soldiers, which suggests that he must have been the most promising reporter at the
Fukushima Minpo.
After he returned from China, he was appointed chief editor in 1940 and he served inthat capacity until he was purged by the American Occupation and had to leave thecompany in 1948. During the period from 1940 to 1944 he served Mr. Horikiri Zenbei(堀切善兵衛), the Ambassador to Italy, as the Ambassador's secretary, keeping his
status as the newspaper’s chief editor in the mean time. When he was purged after theWar, he decided to join the company in which Mr. Horikiri was involved.
I interviewed him in December 1985 at his home in Fukushima City. It was a cold day.
Mr. Yanai, wearing a pullover, looked plump and energetic for an 81 year-old.
– After the Zhenjiang Attack, of the 13th Division, the 65th Regiment alone went toNanjing, is that correct?
Yes. Other regiments crossed the Yangtze River and headed north, but only the 65th
Regiment moved for Nanjing along Yangtze River. The 65th Regiment had completed
most of their serious battles in Shanghai. After the Shanghai battle, the last significant
battle was the attack against Jiangyin Battery. The battle at Jiangyin Battery was very
hard but Japanese soldiers inflicted far fewer casualties compared to the battle inShanghai. When we arrived in Zhenjiang, we found almost nothing, the enemy had
already withdrawn.
– You went to Nanjing after that. Did you go with the 65th Regiment Headquarters?
Usually we always followed Regiment Headquarters. We were under the Regiment, sothey supplied us with leftover food and delivered our articles to the Army's Press
Section in Shanghai. In exchange of their support, we had to inform the adjutant of theRegiment beforehand if we wanted to leave the Regiment. The Asahi, Mainich, andother main newspapers had to manage their own food supply and delivery of theirarticles but they had the liberty to gather news materials from wherever they wanted.
That was the difference between the local newspapers like ours and the big, mainnewspapers.
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As I said, we followed the 65th Regiment until the battle of Jiangyin, but after that, wedidn't have any serious battles, so we left the Regiment with permission and tried togather news materials. It so happened that we could get a ride on a transport unit’s truck
from Zhenjiang to Nanjing. The transport unit was moving in the rear of the Regiment,
which meant that I was apart from Headquarters.
– When did you join the 65th Regiment's Headquarters again?
Perhaps either December 17 or 18. The Headquarters was deployed at a place two to
three kilometers from the north gate of Nanjing. We found them there and joined themagain.
– Did you see the entrance ceremony on December 17?
No. So I assume that I had arrived in Nanjing after the ceremony was completed. Fromthe 65th Regiment, Brigade Commander Yamada and Regiment Commander Morozumi
and several soldiers attended the ceremony, entering from the north gate. I hadn't
entered the Castle that time.
– It was said that around December 14, the 65th Regiment caught 15,000 or 20,000
prisoners.
As I mentioned before, I was in a transport unit’s truck, so I was not there the moment
they caught the prisoners. I heard about the prisoners after we caught up with RegimentHeadquarters.
– What did they do to the prisoners?
I guess they set them free because keeping prisoners was huge trouble. Those times, theJapanese soldiers had no other choice but to drive off the prisoners, but if they said thisopenly, they would have gotten a reprimand from their superiors, so they simply said
they made the Chinese soldiers retreat, or were “destroyed”.
– Did you write about the prisoners?
130No. The people back home wanted to know about the soldiers' surroundings, so I wrote
about their daily life. Regarding the prisoners, I think the story is in the photo-book,“Our Local Regiment's Photographs during the China Incident published in 1938 isaccurate. The book “Our Local Regiment's Photographs in China Incident” was written
based on the facts.
– Did you refrain from writing about the prisoners due to censorship?
No, it had nothing to do with censorship. I didn't write about the prisoners because I
hardly heard about it. Just like that, it was not a topic.
Speaking of censorship, we were strictly prohibited from using names of places and thesoldiers. Revealing location, especially, was never allowed, as well as the name of asoldier--they were expressed as ○○. However, only when the 65th Regiment spent New
Year’s in Quanjiao (全椒) (20 kilometers away, northwest of Nanjing), were weallowed to use the name of locations in our article. If a name was shown as ○○, wedidn't really feel the atmosphere of the New Year.
– According to the series of articles titled “War Story of The Local Regiment,”
published by the Fukushima Minyu Shimbun after the War, most of the prisoners ran
away and when the Japanese soldiers tried to set the rest of them free, approximately
3,000, they started to rebel. Therefore, the Japanese soldiers had to shoot them.
It was after the War when I heard that prisoners revolted. While I was in Nanjing,
nobody raised the matter of prisoners as a subject. After the War, for the first time, I
heard it was called a massacre, and that reminded me about the prisoners again.
– Mr. Hata Kensuke said the Byakko Troop massacred 20,000 prisoners.
Mr. Hata Kensuke, oh yes. Mr. Hata wrote a book called “Byakko Troop” while the65th Regiment fought in China. The book sold well and he became well-known. I was
the first reporter to follow the 65th Regiment, joining them in December 1937, andfollowed them as far as Shushen (滁県) and then I returned to Fukushima at the end ofJanuary 1938. Later, around February or March, an alternate reporter, Sakamoto131

Mutsuyoshi (坂本六良), went to China. At that time, Mr. Hata did not visit either
Shanghai or Nanjing. Nevertheless, without ever visiting China, he wrote the book
“Byakko Troop.”At the time, my elder brother also joined the Japanese Army, serving as platoon leader
in a machine-gun unit in the First Battalion. Until two months ago, he was fine, then hedied at the age of 86. My brother joined the Army and volunteered for a second term to
go to China, where he was on active duty. The 65th Regiment mainly consisted ofreserve soldiers but my brother was in the center of the front line. After the War, I
asked my brother if he killed prisoners, he answered that we didn't have enough bullets
to kill the prisoners. In those times, the Regiment was under-supplied. Therefore, they
couldn't waste a bullet--they had to keep their bullets for the next battle. When theprisoners got violent, then they had to shoot them--otherwise they wouldn't.
Think about that--it was just some Japanese soldiers who were moving up front andcaught Chinese soldiers. The 65th Regiment had numerous casualties in battle atShanghai and lost many soldiers. Yes, they were filled with recruits. Nevertheless, their
numbers were less than usual. How many Japanese soldiers could catch 15,000 Chinese
soldiers? If 1,000 Japanese soldiers, for example, caught 15,000 Chinese soldiers andthen if 15,000 prisoners attacked the Japanese soldiers, the Japanese soldiers would not
be able to shoot them all. On the contrary, the Japanese soldiers would have been
killed. It does not make sense from the standpoint of numbers, for one thing. Mr. Hata
had no knowledge about Nanjing. The people who knew of those times never believed
Mr. Hata's story. Mr. Hata was born in Fukushima and lives in Fukushima.
– Mr. Hata died several years ago.
Did he? I didn't see him long. Mr. Hata's story about a massacre was not what he saw
himself but what he heard from the soldiers after the War, probably while they were
drinking. After the War, the soldiers wanted to talk about their war stories, often incolorful ways.
– At least something happened which was raised during drinking?
There were stories of other prisoners and ben-i-hei, plain clothes soldiers, and so on.
132Especially in Shanghai. One episodes which happened in Shanghai was that prisoners
were paid to do odd jobs during the day, rebelled at night and threw hand grenades andset fire to our lodgings. One fire burned my cloak. Also, Japanese soldiers found ben-ihei, or civilian-clothed soldiers, throwing grenades so the Japanese soldier killed ben-ihei. Therefore, there were bodies in civilian-clothes. I assume such stories spread byword of mouth.
Another misunderstanding was that, stories of soldiers hunting for rabbits or birds
somehow became plundering. For war stories, good stories do not spread but bad
stories spread out like a ripples from a rock thrown into a pond because people love
exciting stories. I think the massacre story was one of those.
– Was it not ordered from the top?
If you knew the Regiment Commander Morozumi, you could not say such a thing.
Regiment Commander Morozumi had common sense, was easily moved to tears and a
reliable person. He was not a graduate of the Army War College but was promoted to
Regiment Commander and finally to Lieutenant General. He was so great that people
naturally thought that he must have been a graduate of the Army War College.
When we landed Shanghai, Regiment Commander Morozumi instructed his soldiers at
the wharf, “Weapons can be made easily but not humans. It took 20 to 30 years of time
to make you as you are now. Take care of yourself. For that purpose, dig trenchs deep
enough and make them perfect.”In the battle of Shanghai, the 65th Regiment lost the largest number of soldiers--soldiersadmired Regiment Commander Morozumi and they fought bravely for him. In otherwords, the Commander's caring and compassion toward his soldiers killed soldiersagainst the Commander's will. If soldiers had antipathy for their commander, theywouldn't want to die for him and that would result in fewer casualties and minor
injuries. I can say this according to my experience. Many soldiers died when they had
caring commanders and soldiers with nagging commander survived. In the battlefield,
the soldiers' mind became simplicity itself. If you wanted to save your soldiers you
must be hated by the soldiers – to his regret, Regiment Commander Morozumi said
this. It is true.
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I have my own memory about Commander Morozumi. I kept moving with RegimentHeadquarters and had no chance to meet my brother as I mentioned before, who hadjoined the Regiment. Knowing this, the Commander occasionally informed me that mybrother was fine. I found out later that the Commander also told my elder brother that I
was doing well.
When we started the attack on Jiangyin Castle(江陰城), the Commander was orderedfrom his superior to capture the Castle before a certain date, but he instructed hissoldiers, “Try to capture the castle before this date, but if not possible, do not push
yourself too hard, do not waste your life.” Therefore, even if he got an order from his
superior to kill prisoners, I am sure he would have rejected it. That was his character.
And it was quite unlikely for him to order such a thing himself.
Incidentally, Mr. Morozumi Yoshihiko (両角良彦), who served as the undersecretary of
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry several years ago, was the eldest son ofthis Commander Morozumi.
– Did you hear something about disciplinary problems in the 65th Regiment?
No. In Fukushima, there are hundreds of people who fought in the war who are still
alive. If you ask them, you will see.
After the War, Mr. Hata Kensuke said that the 65th Regiment committed a massacre, but
nobody believes that. A person who went to war knew very well that killing a person is
not easy. Even a small war, you hear thundering sounds of cannons and gunshots thatmakes everything look awful and inflated. But later, when you look at that same
battlefield, it looks incredibly small. Such impressions of battle multiplied and spread
after the War.
Some people insist it was a massacre from an ideological point of view and somepeople have started to believe this, but considering the situation in Nanjing then, it was
not possible.
– Did you see bodies along the shore of the Yangtze River?
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In Nanjing, no. I have a stronger impression of things in Shanghai than from Nanjing. I
saw a number of bodies in Shanghai. No one cleaned the battlefield so they wereabandoned in the fields. I remember that very well.
– The 65th Regiment crossed the River from Xiaguan to Pukou (浦口) on December 20.
Did you see any corpses at that time?
For crossing the River, I took a small Navy gunboat from a pier in Xiaguan. I think
there were several piers in Xiaguan but at least I did not see any bodies at the pierwhere I took the gunboat.
– Have you heard about the Nanjing-Incident after the War?
Yes. After the War I, was surprised to hear that there was massacre in Nanjing. As
mentioned before, compared to the fighting in Shanghai, the Nanjing front was not sosevere, and reporters from the Fukushima Minyu and Fukushima Shimbun left Nanjing
before the end of December 1937. I crossed the River, went to Chushen (滁県) andstayed there until January 1938, but I had never heard of that.
I believe that there was no massacre. It was a rumor spread after the War.

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Chapter 2
Nanjing, as Observed by Japanese Soldiers“As a matter of fact, I sympathize with China. I did not agree with the establishment ofManchuria. In the Nisshi-jihen, or China Incident, Japan went too far. But as far as therefusing to surrender as advised in Nanjing, I think China was wrong. And eventually,
the top commander, T'ang Sheng-chih (唐生智), himself escaped. …... This would be
the same at a company. If the company’s leaders disappeared, the company would beleft in chaos and their employees would steal goods and run away. Had they not refusedsurrender, the matter of prisoners would have never come up. If you look atinternational law, I think the path China had taken was the problem.” (From a statement
by Mr. Okada Takashi, attached to General Matsui.)Around the Safety Zone at Zhongshan Road, a stall for boiled gyoza started business.
The first customers were Japanese soldiers. (December 15th, 1937)

136

1. The Army19) Interview with Major Yoshinaga Sunao (吉永朴), Staff Officer,
10th Army

Mr. Yoshinaga Sunao served as Staff Officer in the 10th Army, then as senior Staff
Officer in the 3rd Army, then Chief of Staff in the 2nd Aviation Forces, and finally as
Director of Imperial Japanese Army Air Academy, for which he is well-known today.
Mr. Yoshinaga was born in 1897, participating in the attack on Nanjing at the age of 40,
and at the end of the War he was 47 years old. When I interviewed him he was 88 years
old but he looked stately and fine. He did not need a hearing aid. He told me, “You are
the first person to ask me to talk about Nanjing,” and tried to remember of the thingsfrom a long, long time ago.
It was December 27, 1985 when I interviewed him. Actually, I got a letter from him in
the summer of that year, in which he responded my questions. His letter started bystating that the Nanjing massacre is groundless rumor. And he answered my questions,
one by one, on the controversy issues regarding Nanjing and ended the letter with: “Ifyou want to know more details I can meet you.” Encouraged, I asked him for interview
at once and waited for his response. But he didn't respond after that. Considering hisage, I assumed that his health might not be so good, so I waited patiently.
Around the same time, I got responses to my questions from Mr. Matsumae Misoo (松前未曽雄), the former executive secretary to the Minister of Army. Unexpectedly,
however, soon I saw Mr. Matsumae’s obituary in the newspaper, less than one monthafter I got his letter. I did not get any sense that he was on the verge of death from his
postcard, so I was really surprised. I thought that the same thing might have happened to
Mr. Yoshinaga. I inquired about his health at the Army Officer’s Club, Kaikosha (偕行社). The reply was that Mr. Yoshinaga had no health problems.
But several months already passed since I sent my letter. I decided to call him, and hiswife answered the phone. She said that Mr. Yoshinaga could not meet me. She
explained that immediately after he got my letter, a stranger came to meet him on a137

similar issue and he defrauded Mr. Yoshinaga. Mr. Yoshinaga was terribly shocked bythis and so he decided not to meet strangers anymore, he could not stand further shocks.
I understood his shock but I still had many things to ask him. I sent him a letter again,
and called him again--finally he agreed to meet me. The interview finally, conducted at
the end of December. Under the circumstances, he was cautious, so the vice-manager ofthe retirement home where he lived, was present with us. Accordingly, one might
imagine that there was a harsh atmosphere during the interview, but, in fact, Mr.
Yoshinaga prepared a room for the interview and answered my questions politely,
despite my questions focusing on the 10th Army, which may have sounded likeaccusation.
– Mr. Uesuna Katsushichi (上砂勝七), Chief of Military Police, 10th Army, wrote in his
memoir, Military Policeman for 31 Years2, the following:
After the Hangzhou Bay landing, the 10th Army had to rely on rqusition for food supply.
The chief accountant of the 10th Army raged that he would go back Japan because hecould not take responsibility for such an undesirable approach. Chief Staff Officer
Tanabe tried to soothe him to settle the matter.
Have you heard of this argument within the 10th Army?
I knew Mr. Uesuna but never met him in face-to-face at Headquarters, I don't think thiswas true. I knew Captain Fujino Ranjo (藤野鸞丈), adjacent to the Chief of Military
Police, too. While I was serving as the director of Imperial Japanese Army Air
Academy, Mr. Fujino was the Chief of Tokyo Military Police. Mr. Fujino and I talked
many times regarding the case of Ward Chief Colonel Uehara Shigetaro (上原重太郎),
so we had many chances to talk several matters but I have never heard such things from
Mr. Fujino.
– I assume that the requisition was really undertaken…
As soon as the 10th Army landed at Hangzhou Bay, they had to rush across the creek
zone in order to reach the rear of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army as according to2

Uesuna Katsushichi, Military Policeman for 31 Years, Tokyo Life Inc., Tokyo,

1955.
138

plan. So the Army soldiers, including the commander, raced along a field footpath withminimum equipment. The mountain artillery was disassembled and transported. Under
the circumstances, the transportation corps landed everything in Shanghai, including
our heavy equipment. The horses were exhausted, some of them just stood there likestatues. Even my baggage was carried to Shanghai--it was a lot of trouble for me, too.
In this situation, as Sun Tzu said in his book, The Art of War,3 “Rely on the enemy forfood”, it was an inevitable part of the job.
– In his book Military Policeman for 31 Years, it says that the 10th Army had
disciplinary problems, therefore the General Chief of Staff issued admonitions. How
was the discipline of the 10th Army in general?
From Hangzhou Bay Landing until the Nanjing Attack, the 10th Army fought withspeed and bravery. Some confuse their brave, reckless action with disciplinary problem.
I regret that Mr. Uesuna brought up an entirely unacceptable discussion of the 10thArmy.
– Did you move together with Headquarters before you reached to Nanjing?
Yes, I did.
– When did you enter Nanjing?
At the Nanjing Attack, the 10th Army’s Headquarters was deployed at Hong Lanbu(洪藍埠). Then the artillerymen joined us for the first time, and on December 12, theOita Regiment hoisted the Japanese sun-flag on the rampart. I was ordered to establish
the Headquarters of the Army by the Chief Staff, Major General Tanabe Moritake(田辺盛武), so on the early morning of the 13th, I entered Nanjing through China Gate
(中華門). Walking one kilometer or so from the gate, I found Shanghai Saving Bank
(上海儲備銀行) at the intersection of Zhu Qiaolu (朱雀路) and Health Road (健康路),
and decided to use it as headquarters and made it ready for the Commander.
– What was the situation in Nanjing then?
The Art of War, written by Sun Tzu (5th century B.C.), is a book composed of 13 chapterson ancient Chinese military strategy. This book is utilized even today by the US Army.
139
3

I saw bodies abandoned near the rampart. They looked miserable, some of them wererun over by cars. Looking them, I thought we had to win the war, and that the country
which lost was just shattered. On the way to the Saving Bank, I met a family in descentshape. I gave them my name card and wrote on it “Let them pass freely through sentry
lines.” This meant that the inside of the Nanjing was settled enough such that a family
could walk about. I'd like to add: the number of Japanese soldiers who were allowed toenter Nanjing was limited. I was not in charge for issuing restrictions, so I do not know
the details, but before the Nanjing attack, each Division was given an order concerning
troop numbers.
– What did you do after December 14?
A couple of days later, I went to Xiaguan to confer on military operations. I saw a
number of corpses of Chinese soldiers at the wharf--they were submerged in the
Yangtze River.
– How many is “a number of”?
I don't know exactly, several thousand, maybe. The 10th Army attacked from the southof Nanjing and at the same time the Kunizaki detachment also attacked the Chinesearmy from Pukou (浦口). I think the corpses were battle casualties.
– Were they all soldiers?
There were many Chinese in civilian-clothes. I heard later that in Nanjing a large
number of military uniforms were discarded, so I guess that Chinese corpses in civilianclothes were ben-i-hei, soldiers in civilian attire. I saw hanging corpses dressed incivilian clothes.
– Where?
I am not sure. To my memory, the corpses looked like they were hanged, but they might
have been washed up shore due to the tide and so I thought that they had been hanged.
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– Other than Xiaguan, did you visit any other place?
I climbed Mt. Zijin. I think it was December16, the day before the entrance ceremony. I
was not impressed by Mt. Zijin in particular.
– Did you hear about a massacre by then?
No, not once.
– Muto Akira (武藤章), the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central China Area Army,wrote in his memoir, From Philippines to Sugamo: “During the operations, General
Matsui tried to respect Chinese standing to the extent that it was far from realistic. The
General’s soft attitude frustrated some of the officers. A commander and divisional
general, who considered strategy a priority, gave protest to the General. At Nanjing,
being lodged in a neighboring room, I could hear them quarreling furiously.”– I assume that this certain commander was Lieutenant General Yanagawa Heisuke(柳川平助). Did you come across such arguments?
I don't know what they were quarreling about, they might have been arguing about theLady Bird (the accidental shelling of a British ship by the Japanese Army). The 10th
Army had to move to attack Hangzhou immediately after the entrance ceremony, sothey must have had no time for such an argument.
– When was the Hangzhou Attack decided?
I assume that the moment of Nanjing Attack, the Hangzhou Attack had already been
decided. Lieutenant General Yanagawa insisted on capturing Hangzhou as well, so at
his initiative, Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao (寺田雅雄), who was in charge ofstrategy, planned the Hangzhou Attack. The operational plan was presented to
Headquarters. Therefore, at the moment of entering Nanjing, Headquarters had alreadyprepared to move on to Hangzhou. Lieutenant General Yanagawa’s idea was that Japan
had to capture the triangular area of Shanghai – Nanjing – Hangzhou, then to wait for
diplomatic negotiations. He submitted his idea again after he returned Tokyo.

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– Did the Commander Yanagawa have the idea of attacking Nanjing from the
beginning?
Yes, he did. At first, the 10th Army focused on the attack of Shanghai from the rear but
Commander Yanagawa already had a plan to attack Nanjing. He presented his plan
repeatedly. There were a lot of differences between his plan and Imperial
Headquarters'.
– What kind of person was the Commander Yanagawa?
While I was in the 10th Army, I was constantly under Lieutenant General Yanagawa. He
was great man and, even now, he has my deepest respect. He was a reticent person, in aword, he was a quiet hero.
Lieutenant General Yanagawa loved China. On the way to Nanjing, he gathered severalof his staff in the inner courtyard of a Chinese house, and watching the harvest moon,
said that it was not a desirable thing for Japan and China to fight each other, however,
duty is duty.
After entered Hangzhou, the 10th Army was not engaged in battle--it was relatively
peaceful. I even had time to play tennis. Shortly after, Lieutenant Colonel Terada
Masao returned to Tokyo and I was ordered to become an instructor at the Military
Staff College. But I had tasks to be completed, so I asked Major General Iimura Yuzuru(飯村穣), the director of the Military Staff College, to allow me to stay in China for alittle longer and I did my tasks under Colonel Fujimoto Tetsukuma (藤本鉄熊).
The Headquarters of the Army was at a place called Xileng Fantien (西冷飯店) nearWest Lake, and Lieutenant General Yanagawa lodged at a wealthy Chinese man's house
located close to Headquarters. It was said the Commander Yanagawa recited a sutra
everyday. I wrote a battle report for the 10th Army, and visited the Commander
Yanagawa several times in order to get his signature. I stayed on with the last of the10th Army soldiers and on February 26, 1938, when the Commander Yanagawa
returned to Tokyo, in triumph, I accompanied him.
After the War, I met the Commander's wife and his daughter. Still now, I keep in142

contact with his daughter.
– In the beginning of February Lieutenant General Honma Masaharu (本間雅晴), Chiefof the Second Section of the General Staff Headquarters, visited Hangzhou. Did you
meet him?
Lieutenant General Honma was my instructor at the Military Staff College who taught
me current circumstances regarding the UK. He knew my brother, who was a doctor,
too. But I have no memory of meeting him in Hangzhou.
– It is said there was a massacre in Nanjing.
I have the firm belief that there was no massacre in Nanjing. Most of all, Chinese
civilians escaped quickly. Only a few were left. Furthermore, if Japanese soldiers had
killed hundreds and thousands of Chinese, how would they have accomplished this?
Even if they had made every Chinese line-up, it still would not have been possible. The
number “hundreds and thousands” is a huge amount that you cannot move through sucha group of prisoners. There was not even that many people left in Nanjing (before theattack).
Like the Chinese saying, hakuhatsu sanzen-jou, or 3,000 jou4 of white hair, the Chinese
made mentions of “massacres” much later. My conclusion is: there was no massacre.

20) Interview with Major Okada Yuji (岡田酉次), Staff, Special Duty
Section of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army
In 1930, Mr. Okada Yuji, then an accounting officer, was studying in the department of
economics at Tokyo University as a correspondent student. He had already realized theimportance of a Japan-China economic bloc, that is, the importance of economic ties
between the two countries in order to fight a modern war, which was characterized as“total war” at the time.
For 12 years, since his graduation from Tokyo University in 1933 until the end of theWar, his career mainly related to China, including the China Section of the General Staff
Headquarters, Shanghai Military Office, Shanghai Expeditionary Army, East Asia
4

1 jou is approx. 3 meters.
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Development Board, adviser to the Wang Zhaoming (汪政権,) Government, and China
Expeditionary Army, and so on. In Shanghai, together with the Shanghai Mayor Chou
Fo-hai (周仏海), Mr. Okada heard the broadcast in which the Emperor accepted the
Potsdam Declaration. He was a Major General then.
Mr. Okada's activity in China and his Chinese friends and acquaintances are describedin his memoir, Behind the Scenes – Note on the Japan-China War. In his longexperiences in China, I asked him questions focused on the period of the entrance into
Nanjing in 1937.
Mr. Okada was a quiet person--from his compact body, it was not easy to imagine hewas once a major general. This was due in part because his responsibility was not on thebattlefield but in financial matters. When I interviewed him he was 88 years old, very
active and still working at a leading company in Yokohama – he travels to his officeeveryday from his home in Kamakura. After the War, he engaged in business, serving asvice president of his company and now as a consultant.
In April 1936, Mr. Okada moved from “the China Section of the General Staff
Headquarters” to “the Office of Military Attaché to the Shanghai Embassy”. His job was
to research and study the Chinese economy and he did this by creating a new office.
The next year, in August 1937, as the Shanghai Expeditionary Army landed in
Shanghai, he joined the Army as a special duty member of Headquarters. The name ofhis position changed but his duty was same--he was responsible for financial
arrangements in the Expeditionary Army. During the China Incident, economic andpolitical matters were regarded as important as military strategy. For the purpose of
economic arrangements, Mr. Okada entered Nanjing as soon as Nanjing was captured.
– Did you enter Nanjing with Headquarters?
No, I entered Nanjing following front-line troops. When Japanese troops started toattack Nanjing, the Headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was deployed inTang Shuizhen (湯水鎮) and I was there. The Shanghai Expeditionary Army washeaded by Prince Asakanomiya. The Central China Area Army was headed by General
Matsui, and Major General Tsukata was the Chief of Staff. The Headquarters of theCentral China Area Army had not arrived at Tang Shuizhen yet.

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I was in the Headquarters of the Expeditionary Army but I had to handle Chinese bankmatters of as soon as possible, once Nanjing was captured, so I moved with the frontline troops after we expected that the capture of Nanjing was only a matter of time. We
traveled by car, bullets spraying, and on the way to Nanjing we came across Chinese
remnants, who escaped from Nanjing and were fleeing towards Tang Shuizhen. Also, I
saw lines of prisoners tied-up and marching. It was December 12.
– When did you enter Nanjing?
In the afternoon of the 13th, through China Gate. I stayed in Nanjing for 4 days.
– What was the situation inside of Nanjing?
There were not so many bodies around the rampart, but after walking for a while, I saw
a number of bodies. First, I entered the Bank of Communications, and were not somany bodies around the bank.
– Were you the first Japanese who entered the Bank of Communications?
Yes, I was the first Japanese. There was nobody in it.
– Did Japanese soldiers or anyone else use the building?
No one came in while I was there.
– What was the inside of the bank like?
It was empty. I found no important account books, nothing. No hohei, Chinese paper
money--the safes were open. Perhaps as the Chinese Government fled, their people
took everything. Even if they had left something, Chinese soldiers and civilians musthave ransacked the place. After checking the Bank of Communications, I went to thenearest bank, China Bank. But like the Bank of Communications, this bank was also
empty. So I gave up on inspection of the banks, ending with these two banks.

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– According to the diary of Lieutenant General Nakajima Kesago, the 16th Division
Commander, there were some Japanese soldiers who ransacked the bank's safe.
I know--that is from Lieutenant General Nakajima’s diary, published recently[November 21, 1984] by the Yomiuri Shimubun.
In the banks which I inspected, there was no money found at all. I am sure of that
because I was the first to enter. I doubt the statement in Nakajima’s diary.
However, other than the 4 main banks, there were several ordinary banks in China andmost of them established their main offices in Nanjing. They had also many branches
in Nanjing so there might have been some money left in those branches.
– According to Nakajima’s diary, some Japanese exchanged the hohei to Japanese yen
and sent them to Japan. Was it possible to exchange the hohei to yen?
This was possible in Shanghai. In the Shanghai International Settlement, the hohei was
the main currency and Japanese Bank notes were also used there, so they were freely
exchangeable.
– But was it possible to send them to Japan?
There was the Shokin Bank (正金銀行) in Shanghai which could transmit funds withthe permission of the Vice Minister of Finance. I should add that governmental funds,
which were handled either by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Army, were adifferent matter. I heard that Kodama Yoshio, (児玉誉士夫), [a well-known but
mysterious gangster], asked the Army to handle his money as governmental funds andsent them to Japan. I guess that Kodama got permission from the Army’s financedepartment. Each soldier had an accounting officer, and if the officer gave permission
then it was possible. I heard that some people begged the accounting officer to give
permission to transmit funds to Japan.
– According to a memoir written by Mr. Maeda Yuji, a war correspondent for Domei
Tsushin:“At the end of November, in Suzhou (蘇州), Japanese soldiers never gave a second
146glance to piles of Chinese money, hohei.” On the other hand, according to Nakajima’s
diary, less than one month after Maeda’s story, Japanese soldiers tried to get hohei bybreaking into bank safes in Nanjing. Which is true?
In November, in Suzhou, Japanese soldiers were constantly in battle and, at the time,
were confronted with death, so paper money meant nothing to them, I guess. If suchthings as breaking into safes happened in Nanjing, it means the battle was over and thesoldiers had time to think about money.
– Did you enter Nanjing just to inspect the Chinese banks?
I had another important job. The soldiers had military scripts and I had to check to see if
military notes would be accepted in Nanjing. It was very important to decide how tohandle military scripts after that.
– You left Nanjing before the entrance ceremony. Before you left Nanjing, did you haveany opportunity to see the moment that the military scripts were used for selling andbuying goods?
Yes, a couple of times. It was outside China Gate, my memory is not clear but surely
outside the Castle. It was not a real flea market, just several people standing outside thegate, here and there, to start their businesses. It could not be called a market, but,anyway, people were selling their used books or imitation antique goods.
– The sellers were Chinese, and the buyers were Japanese soldiers, right?
Yes. In addition to the antiques, the sellers sold cigarette, piece by piece. I watchedthem if they accepted military scripts or not. Unfortunately, it was not so successful.
Some Japanese soldiers forced the sellers to take the military scripts. After I saw that, I
went back Shanghai by car, on 15th or 16th – maybe it was the 16th .
– Have you met the Commander of the 10th Army, Lieutenant General Yanagawa
Heisuke?

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Yes, I had several opportunities to meet him. In 1933, when I was to be promoted tomajor, I learned that I was short of the required years of army experience, because of
my time spent at Tokyo University, department of economics, for study. In order tofulfill the requirement, I quickly joined the 1st Division. Lieutenant General Yanagawa
was the Commander of the Division. Also, when I became a field investigator in the
East Asia Development Board, Lieutenant General Yanagawa served as the SecretaryGeneral. He was a great man.
– How about General Matsui Iwane?
I worked at the Special Duty Section in General Matsui's Army and I met him several
times in Shanghai. I was just a major and he was the top Commander, so I was not able
to speak with him directly. So, my opinion at the time was that we had to get along with
China for the purpose of forming an economic bloc. I studied China and I considered
myself to be pro-Chinese. General Matsui had the same ideas, so I met him
occasionally at meetings of people who shared the same ideas.
After the entrance of Nanjing, General Matsui wrote me a classical Chinese poem
depicting the entrance of Nanjing Castle. In addition, after he returned to Tokyo intriumph, he shared with me some of gifts given to him by the Emperor. I was so
impressed by his tenderness and greatly admired him.
General Matsui loved China and the Chinese people so much, yet he was accused ofcommitting the Nanjing-incident and executed. I have no words that could console hissoul and express my sorrow.
– You stayed in Nanjing for 4 day. During that time, did you see something called a“massacre”?
“Massacre” means gathering up unarmed people and shooting them or something like
that, but I didn't see such a thing. After the capture of Nanjing, I returned to Tokyo toreport, and after a week, I visited Nanjing again. It was shortly after the entrance
ceremony, everything was in a mess, but, generally, Nanjing city looked secure and inorder.

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– It is said a massacre happened.
In the Nanjing Attack I saw women among the Chinese soldiers. I myself saw female
Chinese soldiers killed. Some of the Chinese army stragglers and ben-i-hei, soldiers incivilian clothes, put up unexpected resistance, and I watched them being killed. I
assume that their corpses were later designated as “massacre” victims.
In battlefields, I saw Japanese soldiers set fire to Chinese huts. I asked the soldiers why
they did that--I thought those huts could be used for Japanese soldiers. The soldiers
replied that when they were on sentry duty, they were attacked by Chinese soldiershiding behind the thatched huts, which were standing in front of them. This means that,in order to protect their own lives, they sacrificed their own lodgings. You have to kill
the enemy before he kills you--that was more or less instinctive.
Under normal circumstances, no one could kill a person who begged for his own life.
Some Japanese soldiers might have gone crazy for revenge because one of theircomrades, who was alive yesterday, was killed today. Being desperate, I don't totally
discount this, they might have slaughtered some Chinese soldiers. But to make a
judgment on their battlefield motivation, here and now, is not such a simple matter. In
the case of Nanjing, it was not an open battlefield but an urban battle, inside the Castle,
and that made matters more complicated.
I'd like to add this: in the International Settlement in Shanghai, you could buy goodcameras such as a Leica and if you have the Army’s permission, you could buy thosecameras cheap at what we would call today tax-free shops. After the end of the
Shanghai Attack, a number of Japanese soldiers went to the International Settlement toobtain cameras. Those soldiers went to Nanjing with their cameras in hand. I myself
entered Nanjing with my camera. What did these soldiers take photos of? An apricot
flower? No, they took photos of unusual things, things which you could never see innormal circumstances, that is, horrible things like corpses. They asked merchants in theInternational Settlement to develop the photos. The merchants then gave the photos toforeigners in the International Settlement, which in turn, flowed abroad as news.
Individual pictures of bodies formed an overall image--this happened often enough in
Nanjing.
During the Wang Zhaoming (汪兆銘) administration, advisers of the government,
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including Mr. Fukuda Takeo [former Japanese prime minister], gathered together
annually. All advisers, including myself, had many Chinese friends and acquaintances.
After the War, my Chinese friends told me that, in China there was a word, Han Jian(漢奸), or traitor, and every person who stood against the Government was definitely
regarded as Han Jian, for whatever reason. This means that the Chinese government
would never allow people to say anything wrong about China. Therefore, if we insist
that the Nanjing incident was exaggerated beyond a doubt, the Chinese would consider
this treason and would never accept this.
The fact is fact. It is hopeless to oppose each comment, who said this, who said that.
Just pursue the facts, then someday people in next generation will arrive at the rightconclusion.

21) Interview with Captain Onishi Hajime (大西一), Staff Officer of
the Shanghai Expeditionary Army
Considering the Nanjing Attack, then the Nanjing Capture, the most knowledgeable
people of these events in general as well as of details must be the people who were in
the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the Central China Area Army. The Shanghai
Expeditionary Army, in particular, fought against the Chinese Nationalist Army as earlyas August, so they grasped the overall situation. In addition, after the capture of
Nanjing, their Headquarters was located at Capital Hotel (首都飯店), Zhongshan North
Road (中山北路), in Nanjing, at which they stayed until February. Compared to the 10th
Army, which left Nanjing on December 18 in order to attack Hangzhou, and comparedto the Central China Area Army, which returned to Shanghai on December 22 toadminister the whole of Kangnam (江南), the Shanghai Expeditionary Army had themost experience and knowledge about Nanjing.
The members of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army Headquarters were the Commander,and under the Commander, the Chief of Staff Major General Iinuma Mamoru (飯沼守),
Vice of Chief Staff Colonel Uemura Toshimichi (上村利通), and several staff officers.
Among Headquarters staff, only Staff Officer Onishi is alive today.
Mr. Onishi was born in December 1902, graduating from the 36th Class of the Military
Staff College. In 1935, one year after graduated from Military Staff College, Mr. Onishi
150was assigned to General Staff Headquarters’ China Section, and in August 1937, hebecame a staff officer of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army. He was captain and 34
years old.
In February 1938, after the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was disbanded, he was
assigned to the Central China Expeditionary Army, as the Chief of Special Duty
Organization in Nanjing and stayed in Nanjing. One year later, in 1939, Mr. Onishi
returned to Tokyo to staff the Military Affairs Bureau. At the end of the War, he was in
Nagoya where the Headquarters of the 13th Area Army was deployed. By then he was acolonel.
The Headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army had 15 staff officers in its three
sections. The First Section was in charge of strategy, the Second was in charge ofintelligence, and the Third was in charge of logistics.
The head of the Second Section was Lieutenant Colonel Cho Isamu (長勇), under him
were Major Hongo Tadao (本郷忠夫), Major Mikuriya Masayuki (御厨正幸), andCaptain Onishi Hajime. The duty of the Second Section was to collect information on
the Chinese Army and to know of the deployment of the Chinese division. The Chinese
Army was an aggregate of military cliques, therefore differences among of eachdivision's strength was significant. Knowing the disposition of Chinese troops was vital.
Naturally, persons who were familiar with China were assigned to the Second Section.
Captain Onishi worked for two years in the military geography group of the China
branch in the Second Section of General Staff Headquarters. The leader of the militarygeography group was Lieutenant Colonel Cho Isamu. Captain Onishi and Lieutenant
Colonel Cho had worked in China-related sections in the Army. In December 1936, Cho
lived in Hankou as a resident military officer. Captain Onishi remained in Japan. The
next year, 1937, Captain Onishi was appointed assistant military attaché to the Shanghai
Embassy and prepared to go China in August--he was officially appointed and alreadygiven traveling expenses.
However, fighting occurred at the Marco Polo Bridge in July, which spread to Shanghai
in August and in response, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was organized. Under thecircumstances, his appointment as assistant military attaché was dropped, and Mr.
Onishi went to Shanghai under a different status, that is, as a staff officer in the151Expeditionary Army.
Lieutenant Colonel Cho, who was resident military officer in Hankou, went to Shanghai
as well. Major Hongo, who served as resident researcher in Changsha, also came to
Shanghai, as their offices in Hankou and Changsha were abolished due to the all-out
confrontation between Japan and China.
The Third Sexction was mainly in charge of supply and correspondence, plus prisoners.
Under Lieutenant Colonel Chief Teragaki were 4 staff members, Kushida (櫛田),Sakakibara (榊原), Kitano (北野), and Sasaki (佐々木). Among them, Accountant
Major Sakakibara (榊原) was mainly in charge of prisoners.
I started by asking Mr. Onishi about the Chief of the Second Section, Cho Isamu, on
whom several rumors were pinned.
– According to the magazine Kaiko (a monthly magazine published by Kaiko-sha)published in March 1985, Major Sumi Yoshiharu (角良晴), who was a senior adjutant
to General Matsui Iwane, stated that Lieutenant Colonel Cho ordered the massacre.
I served under Staff Officer Cho, but I have never seen nor heard him issuing such anorder. In Sumi's statement, he said that Lieutenant Colonel Cho gave an order to the 6th
Division, but the 6th Division was under the 10th Army, not under the Shanghai
Expeditionary Army.
It is impossible for the Shanghai Expeditionary Army to issue an order to a division
which was under the 10th Army. Also, Lieutenant Colonel Cho was in charge ofintelligence, and it is not likely a person in charge of intelligence issued such an order.
Someone said Lieutenant Colonel Cho served as a staff officer in the Central China
Area Army as well, but I have not heard that he held such a concurrent post.
– Major Tanaka Ryukichi wrote a book, A History to be Judged, in which he said
Lieutenant Colonel Cho had ordered the massacre.
I have a story about Mr. Tanaka Ryukichi: when he was working as the chief of the
Troop Office, I was working at the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs
Bureau. During the time we had to settle a matter of Yen Hsi-shan (閻錫山,) a Chinese152warlord, in Shanxi Province (山西省), and Mr. Tanaka, the chief of the office, who wasgood at handling such matters, went to meet Yen Hsi-shan.
But Chief Tanaka was unable to meet him after all--instead, he met a messenger of thewarlord. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Japanese Army was to give rifles to Yen
Hsi-shan’s army. The problem was that the amount of the rifles they demanded wasequal to the annual amount produced in Japan. Totally unacceptable--I repeated this toChief Tanaka. As shown in the episode, I was unable to trust him since then.
Also, considering his statement at the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE) after the War, I cannot
believe his story concerning Staff Officer Cho.
– According to the book, Illusion of Nanjing Massacre5 written by Mr. Suzuki Akira,
Major General Yamada Senji (山田栴二), of the 13th Division, was given the order of
massacre by Staff Officer Cho.
As the time for the attack on Nanjing approached, headquarters was deployed in Tang
Shuizhen (湯水鎮), a stone hut standing in a basin was used as the headquarters’ office.
At that time, I was in Jurong (句容), but as the Nanjing Attack approached, I wasordered back to Tang Shuizhen on the 11th. This happened during my stay in Tang
Shuizhen: when I got up one morning I found a number of Chinese soldiers appeared in
the surrounding mountains. Headquarters hurriedly gathered all of its available soldiersand started to fight. We, staff officers, also surrounded the room of the Prince in orderto protect His Highness. Normally protecting His Highness was the duty of adjutants
but that time all of us were prepared to die. Soon the Tsuruga Regiment Commander
and his battalion rushed over by truck and we were saved.
Just after the 13th Division captured prisoners, we had just received Prince
Asakanomiya as Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, so even someone
like Staff Officer Cho was very nervous to serve the Prince. Under these conditions, it
was quite unlikely for Cho to issue such an order.
Staff Officer Cho belonged to the so-called right-wing, and in Shanghai he wore ajinbaori, or a classical Japanese surcoat, which was given to him by the Elder Toyama
Mitsuru, who was assumed to be the founder of a Japanese right wing group. His right5

Suzuki Akira, Illusion of Nanjing Massacre, Bungei Shinju Sha, Tokyo, 1973.
153

wing followers followed Staff Officer Cho to Shanghai, and Staff Officer Cho once
offered me to use his followers freely. He was that kind of man, so he could not, infront of the Prince, issue an order to kill the prisoners.
– What was his personality like?
I had worked with him twice, at the China Section of General Staff Headquarters andthe Shanghai Expeditionary Army. He had a hot temper but understood China very
well. Not an unreasonable man. All staff working in the Second Section knew Chinavery well and were sympathetic towards China.
Staff Officer Onishi entered Nanjing in the afternoon of December 13, 1937. Around thearea of Capital Hotel (首都飯店), which stood on Zhongshan North Road, the battle
still continued. It was 10 days later that the Headquarters of the Shanghai Expeditionary
Army entered the Capital Hotel. Lieutenant General Prince Asakanomiya entered aswell. They stayed until February 1938, when the Shanghai Expeditionary Army was
disbanded after completed its duty. All orders during the occupation were issued from
Headquarters.
– According to the diary of Lieutenant General Nakajima Kesago, the Commander ofthe 16th Division, it was said that “Because of our policy not to take prisoners,” and thiswas interpreted as evidence of a massacre.
It meant: confiscate their weapons and let them go. Chinese soldiers were gatheredfrom all over the country, but since it was their own country, they should return homeon foot.
– Was it not the Army's order?
The Army had never issued an order to massacre.
– Was it the Third Section that was in charge of prisoners?
Yes. Lieutenant Colonel Teragaki Tadao (寺垣忠雄) was the chief of the Section. He
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was a quiet man. And it was Major Sakakibara who was in charge. He was more quiet
than his chief, the most quiet person in the Army. This Section never issued such anorder. Staff Officer Sakakibara was alive until only recently, and he visited the
Kaikosha to join in publishing the book “Nanjing War History Based on the
Testimony”. At the meeting, he left us quickly due to his wife's illness, but ironically, hedied before his wife.
– There are many rumors about Nakajima, the Commander of the 16th Division. Whatwas he like?
Commander Nakajima was a lieutenant general, and I was just a captain then. I had noopportunity to talk to him directly. So, personally, I don’t know.
– But the 16th Division was under the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, so it is likely you
had some contact with the Commander?
Personally, I remember being uneasy about seeing him wearing a ring. The Commander
studied in France, that's why he adapted such a custom, but I felt uneasy seeing his ringin the battlefield.
– It is said that General Matsui criticized Commander Nakajima’s command. Is thistrue?
I heard the Commander said that it was no problem to burn Chinese homes. This was
not said in front of General Matsui, of course. But on hearing that remark, General
Matsui instructed me to speak to Commander Nakajima, to warn him not to do such athing.
So it was true that General Matsui had criticized Commander Nakajima.
So I went to the 16th Division, but I was just a captain, and it was not possible for me togive a direct warning to the commander. Fortunately, I found a staff officer in the 16th
Division with whom I made an acquaintance during the Shanghai landing, and passed
him the General's message.
– I assume that usually a commander would not give warning to other commander.
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Didn't General Matsui say something to the Commander Nakajima face-to-face?
It would be an exceptionally important occasion for the General to say something to adivision commander directly.
– Lieutenant General Nakajima was eventually promoted to Commander of the Armyand a representative of the Japanese Imperial Army.
One of my classmates, who served under Regiment Commander Nakajima, tried toapply to take the Military Staff College examination but couldn't get his permission.
Without the Commander’s permission, he couldn't apply to take the examination. My
classmate was very upset. It seemed the Commander Nakajima very clear liked anddisliked certain people. Regarding Commander Nakajima, I heard only negative stories.
– After the occupation of Nanjing, the 16th Division took charge of garrisoning Nanjing.
After the capture of Nanjing, the 10th Army left, and the Shanghai Expeditionary Armyremained in Nanjing. Among the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, the 9th Division, the13th Division and the 16th Division joined the Nanjing Attack, and the 13th Division had
already crossed Yangtze River after the capture.
The matter of who will garrison Nanjing was discussed within the Shanghai
Expeditionary Army. The 13th Division was already gone, so the choice was either the
9th Division or the 16th Division. There were many people who didn't like Mr.
Nakajima and tried to avoid him, so I proposed to leave garrison duty to the 9th
Division and it was decided so. Therefore, I was ordered to give the instruction andwent to the 9th Division, which was situated at the Guanghua Gate. However, the Chiefof Staff of the 9th Division, Colonel Nakagawa Hiroshi (中川広), said that they had
come to Nanjing before clearing their own battle in Shanghai, that they wanted to go
back to Shanghai and to clear the battlefield, so he declined Nanjing garrison duty. As aresult, the 16th Division took the charge of Nanjing garrison duty.
– Were you performing liaison duties between divisions?
I was performing the duty of staff officer not only within the Shanghai Expeditionary156

Army, but also within the Third Fleet, where I had an office in the Izumo Fleet, too. So
I did liaison work with the Navy as well. I acted as liaison among the staff of the
Expeditionary Army so my duty was to inform on the acts and the intention of each
Division to Headquarters.
–Major General Sasaki Toichi (佐々木到一), Brigade Commander, who commanded the16th Division, was appointed to Garrison Commander of Nanjing Castle.
Major General Sasaki was a well-known expert of China, but his behavior was notgood when he was drinking.
– Colonel Muto Akira (武藤章), the Vice Chief Staff of the Central China Area Army,wrote in his memoir, From Philippines to Sugamo [prison]6:“During the operations, General Matsui tried to respect Chinese standing to the extent
that it was far from realistic. The General’s soft attitude frustrated some of the officers.
A commander and divisional general, who considered strategy a priority, gave protest to
the General. At Nanjing, being lodged in a neighboring room, I could hear themquarreling furiously.”– Were you there in the middle of the argument?
I don’t know of such a thing at all. Chief of Military Affairs Muto looked after me a lot
while I was working in the Bureau of Military Affairs for 6 years. I have never heard ofthis story from him. But Mr. Muto became the Vice Chief of Staff of the Area Armywhen the Area Army was established, and he worked together with Mr. Matsui, so I
think this was true.
– I assume that the certain Commander was Lieutenant General Yanagawa Heisuke, andthe certain Division Commander was Lieutenant General Nakajima.
The Division Commander must be Lieutenant General Nakajima, and the Armycommander was no one else but Lieutenant General Yanagawa. But I doubt there was

6Muto Akira, From Philippines to Sugamo [prison] , Jitugyo no Nihon Sha, Tokyo, 1952.

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any furious argument with General Matsui. They had some differences of opinions but I
can’t imagine a serious argument between them.
– What was the situation in Nanjing after December 13?
On the 13th, the battle was still ongoing and we could not move ahead from the areaaround the Capital Hotel. When I went to Yi Jiang Gate (挹江門) it was full of bodies
on both sides. On either the 17th or 18th, I went to Xiaguan, where I found a lot ofbodies in Yangtze River. Not on the riverbank but in the River. This was a result of thesweeping nature of the battle. The bodies were left there until the end of 1937.
– How long were the bodies at Yi Jiang Gate left there?
They were left there at least until the 18th, the day of the memorial service forcasualties from both sides. After that, maybe there were bodies that remained until the20th or so.
Later a memorial service for Chinese victims was held by the Special Duty
Organization inside the Yi Jiang Gate. At that time, the area around Yi Jiang Gate wascleared. I hosted the service and Chinese people related to the City Office Government,
Japanese authorities and ordinary Chinese attended the memorial service, 400 to 500
people in total.
– Within the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, did you hear any stories of a massacre?
Never. After we entered Nanjing, the Second Section patrolled the inside of the Castle
to control military discipline and public decency. I myself patrolled by car.
– Did you see anything?
I saw one rape.
– In the daytime?
Yes. We caught the soldier in the act. He was the soldier of the 16th Division, so I
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delivered him to the Division. Several cases of rape occurred, other than the one that I
witnessed. At first, we opposed setting up a ian-jo, or brothel, but after seeing theseincidents, we decided to establish a facility. The Third Section was in charge of making
the ian-jo.
– Did you see anything else, such violence or ransacking?
No. After that, I was in Nanjing for a year as the Head of the Special Duty
Organization.
During the period, I visited many areas, in addition to Nanjing, including Wuhu (蕪湖),
Taiping (太平), Jiangning (江寧)、Jurong (句容)、Zhenjiang (鎮江)、Jintan (金壇),Danyang (丹陽),Yangzhou (揚州), Shushen(滁県), twice for each area, but neither saw
nor heard of a massacre.
During the period that the Japanese Army headed for Nanjing until its fall, the Army’s
Central Authorities dispatched several staff members to the battlefield, including Chiefof Strategic and Tactical Operations Section Kawabe (河辺), and the Vice Chief of Staff
Lieutenant General Tada Shun (多田駿), and after the capture, Chief of Personnel
Affairs Major General Anami Korechika (阿南惟幾) and Chief of the Second Section ofGeneral Staff Headquarters Major General Honma Masaharu (本間雅晴).
After the War, dispatches of these inspections, sent by the Army's Central Authorities,
raised the possibility that the Central Authorities had known about the Nanjing-incident.
– On one of those days, Staff Officer Hongo visited the US Embassy to explain theactual situation.
In General Staff Headquarters’ Second Section, Staff Officer Hongo was mostexperienced, so, naturally, negotiations with foreign countries were handled by Major
Hongo. After we arrived in Nanjing, I remember him visiting the US Embassy, though I
don’t know the details of his business. Since September, when we were in Shanghai,
the Central Authorities repeatedly instructed us that we must respect American andBritish interests. During the battle conducted by the 3rd Division at Suzhou River, we
saw machine guns at American and British factories, on left side of the river, pointed atus. However, due to the warnings about American and British interests, we could do159nothing; it was very frustrating.
– Did you know that Lieutenant Colonel Nishi Yoshiaki (西義章) went to Nanjing?
I don't remember. When I moved back to the Bureau of Military Affairs, Mr. Nishi wasin the Intelligence Section of General Staff Headquarters. I don’t know why he went toNanjing, if he went at all.
– Second Section Chief Honma went to Nanjing at the beginning of February.
I didn’t know that.
– According to records then, he visited Nanjing in order to protect US interests, butsome people said he visited because of a massacre.
If he did go, I believe that he went to Nanjing in regard to American interests.
– Lieutenant Colonel Hirota was dispatched to the Shanghai Expeditionary Army.
Yes, I remember that. But he was very senior to me, and I don't remember any casualconversation, even if we did manage to meet.
– Have you met Eastern Area Defense Staff Officer Koga Takeshi (古閑健)?
No, I didn't know him then.
In February 1938, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army were disbanded,leaving the Central China Area Army in place, and personnel were reassigned to their
new responsibilities, because operations were completed by capturing Shanghai,
Nanjing, and Hangzhou. The name of the new army was the Central China
Expeditionary Army. Staff Officer Onishi remained in Nanjing as the Chief of Special
Duty Organization of the Central China Expeditionary Army.
In the Nanjing Experience Report, which was published in 1938, names such as “MajorO”, or “young chief of Special Duty Organization”, appear frequently, which refer to160

Mr. Onishi.
Major Sakata Shigeki (佐方繁木) was appointed as the first Chief of Special Duty
Organization in Nanjing, on December 14, 1937, immediately after the capture of
Nanjing. In February of the following year, Colonel Usuda Kanzo (臼田寛三) was
appointed. However, only 10 days later, Major Usuda was replaced by Captain Onishi.
Mr. Onishi worked in the Special Duty Organization with the rank of captain, so he wascalled the Chief Assistant Officer of the Special Duty Organization, because other chiefs
in Shanghai and Hangzhou usually held a higher rank, such as colonel or lieutenantcolonel. One month later, in March, Mr. Onishi was promoted to major, and thereafter
was called the Chief of Nanjing Special Duty Organization for the first time.
Mr. Onishi was in charge of Nanjing and 9 other prefectures around Nanjing. He
assigned 5 to 10 Special Duty staff to each prefecture and directed all of them. Staff
members were civilians employed and dispatched by the Ministry of the Army. Mr.
Onishi stayed mostly in Nanjing and served as negotiator with the Chinese.
During Mr. Onishi’s service as the Chief of the Special Duty Organization, a Chinese
civilian complained to him that Japanese soldiers were destroying their homes. He wentout with the Chinese and found that his home and neighboring homes, which were near
Nanjing Station, were being demolished. He questioned the Japanese soldiers who weredemolishing the homes and the soldiers replied that Colonel Tanida Isamu's (谷田勇)ordered the demolition. Mr. Onishi ordered the soldiers to stop and went to see Colonel
Tanida. It so happened that Colonel Tanida was Mr. Onishi's instructor at a militaryengineers’ class when Mr. Onishi a student at the Military Staff College. Colonel Tanida
was now staff officer in charge of Logistics of the Central China Expeditionary Army.
Mr. Onishi asked the Colonel Tanida why the houses were being demolished and theColonel said that they were continuously receiving munitions from Shanghai, and themunitions must be stored around the Nanjing Station, so they had to demolish those
homes. So, the reason was based on war necessity. As a solution, Mr. Onishi built 20
barracks outside of the Castle and let the Chinese live there.
As you can see, the Chief of Nanjing Special Duty Organization had to handle thesekinds of matters, as representative of Japan in China. He was in the best position toknow of the real situation of the people of Nanjing.
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– So, since February your duty for a year in Nanjing was Chief of Nanjing Special Duty
Organization?
Yes. All staff in China-related sections of General Staff Headquarters were expected to
go to China, in one way or another. Under the circumstances, I remained in China as
the Chief of Nanjing Special Duty Organization.
– Were the bodies of Japanese soldiers who were killed in the Nanjing Attack crematedby the Japanese?
Yes, all of them were cremated by the Japanese. In the Shanghai battle, some of themwere left there, but after the Nanjing battle, there were no Japanese corpses remaining.
– Burial of the bodies of Chinese soldiers was performed under instruction of theJapanese army?
The bodies of Chinese soldiers were buried by the Chinese. They didn't particularly
inform us of when they were buried. The Japanese army, however, did ask the Red
Swastika Society to bury bodies which were abandoned here and there.
– Are you familiar with the Red Swastika Society?
Yes, they worked very well, wearing their red mark.
– According to records, the Self-Government Committee was engaged in the burials as
well.
The Self-Government Committee also did some but didn't do many burials. The burials
were mainly done by the Red Swastika Society. And you mentioned a group--what wasname?--who also did burials.
– Chongshantang (崇善堂) ?

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Yes. But, at the time, I never heard of such a group. I didn't know them at all, but after
the War, in the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), they claimed to have done a lot of work. At thetime, I never knew about them at all.
– When the year 1938 began, were the suburbs of Nanjing safe?
They were almost completely safe.
– The Japanese started to come to Nanjing to do business.
The matters of the Japanese people were handled by the Consulate General. The duty of
the Special Duty Organization was to assist with Chinese administration. The Consulate
General was operated by Mr. Fukuda Atsuyasu (福田篤奏), alone first, then Mr.
Kasuya Takao (粕谷孝夫), the Consular Assistant, arrived. Our Special Duty
Organization was on the second floor of the Bank of Communications, and before theConsulate General was opened, they used its first floor, which was empty then, as
temporary office for the Consulate General.
– Did you hear of the Nanjing-incident after the War?
Yes. I heard that General Matsui was charged and prosecuted for it and I offered to be awitness for him, since I was in Nanjing as the Chief of the Special Duty Organization
after General Matsui returned, and was very well aware of matters within Nanjing.
However, at the time, I was also accused of being a war criminal, relating to the 13th
Area Army, and so I was told that a “war criminal” would not be suitable as a witness,so I was unable to testify.
– Do you think you are the most knowledgeable person about Nanjing during the period
from 1937 to 1938?
I think so. A decade ago, the Asahi Shimbun published the series, ‘Journey in China’7.
Its depiction of the Japanese army during those times was far from the truth. I once met

The series, ‘Journey in China’, was published in the Asahi Shinbun from August to December,1971. Then, in 1972, the book Journey in China, was published by the Asahi Shinbun Sha.
163
7

reporter Honda Katsuichi and denounced his claims.
The Nanjing-incident was raised in the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), but after that it wasalmost forgotten. Then, as the series of ‘Journey in China’ was published, the Japanesestarted to say there was a “massacre”. I know the truth--I, who knows the truth, must
write the truth, so I thought and tried to write the truth. However, people around me
told me that it was too late, that people would simply look at this as an excuse andnobody would believe me anymore, so I was discouraged.
Since the series ‘Journey in China’ was published by the Asahi Shimbun, Mr. Onishi lost
his trust in the mass media and, as a matter of fact, he at first refused my request for aninterview. That's why his name is not mentioned in the mass media, despite the fact that
he is the most qualified person to inform about the Nanjing-incident.
After I interviewed Mr. Onishi, I interviewed several people who were in Nanjing at thetime. Some of them, including Mr. Okada Takashi (岡田尚) who served under General
Matsui, Mr. Terasaki Ryuji (寺崎隆治), Captain of Gunboat Seta, and Mr. Yoshikawa
Takeshi (吉川猛), Staff Officer of the Central China Area Army, assured me that Mr.
Onishi was the most knowledgeable person about Nanjing, and his statements are totally
reliable.
I want to again emphasize the importance of Mr. Onishi's statements.

22) Interview with Mr. Okada Takashi (岡田尚), Assistant to Army
Commander Matsui
From the Meiji through the Showa era, a number of people, such as Toyama Mitsuru(頭山満) and Kayano Nagatomo (萱野長知), assisted in the Chinese Revolution and
Mr. Okada Takashi's father, Mr. Okada Aritami (岡田有民) was one of them. Mr. Okada
Aritami supported the Xishan clique of the Nationalist Party and when the Fujian
People’s Government was established, Mr. Okada, together with General Matsui Iwane,
then-Commander of the Taiwan Army of Japan, tried to mediate between the Fujian
People’s Government and the Nationalist Party Government. Therefore, Mr. Okada
Aritami was very close to General Matsui, and consequently, Mr. Okada Takashi,
Aritami's son, knew of General Matsui during his childhood.
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In August 1937, General Matsui was appointed Commander of the Shanghai
Expeditionary Army. Invited to General Matsui's house, Mr. Okada Takashi was orderedto accompany the General as non-regular-staff of Army Headquarters, and to serve
under his command. Mr. Okada could speak the Shanghai dialect and was acquainted
with Chinese VIPs, so the General Matsui needed him to communicate with these VIPs
in order to hasten a peace agreement with China.
Thus, Mr. Okada worked in Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hong Kong, under General
Matsui’s special orders of, until the end of February 1938, when General Matsui
returned to Japan in triumph.
Due to their close ties, General Matsui shared with Mr. Okada his feelings that could not
be expressed in public. Since General Matsui entry into Nanjing, Mr. Okada was with
him the whole time. Therefore, through Mr. Okada, we can see General Matsui's
thinking, what did he thought about the Nanjing Attack and what he saw in Nanjing.
Considering these things, I asked Mr. Okada what he himself saw in Nanjing, as well as
what General Matsui was thinking and what he saw in Nanjing.
As the capture of Nanjing became merely a matter of time, Mr. Okada followed General
Matsui to Suzhou, where Mr. Okada translated the advisement for surrender into
Chinese, which was to be scattered within Nanjing Castle. The handbills calling for
surrender were scattered within the Castle on the 9th, setting the deadline for a reply forthe 10th.
However, the Chinese Army refused to surrender and the Japanese Army began an allout attack.
After the capture of Nanjing, General Matsui entered Nanjing. While in Nanjing, Mr.
Okada followed General Matsui, and on December 22, General Matsui and Mr. Okada
returned to Shanghai by the torpedo boat Ootori. Thereafter, Mr. Okada engaged inpolitical maneuverings within the International Settlement. At the end of February,
General Matsui returned to Japan in triumph but Mr. Okada remained in Shanghai, andwhen the Reformed Government of the Republic of China was established, Major
General Harada Kumakichi (原田熊吉) became the Supreme Adviser of the Reformed
Government and Mr. Okada served as Secretary-General of the Advisers Department.
After the War, Mr. Okada managed his medical books publishing company for a long165

period of time. When I met him, he was 78 years old, yet he was still working at his
company twice a week.
The interview started with events on December 8, 1937 when Army Headquarters was
located in Suzhou.
– Who did make the advisement of surrender?
General Matsui. In the battle of Shanghai and later battles, incredibly large numbers ofJapanese soldiers were killed and all soldiers were really riled up with anger, not justthe lower ranks but Regiment Commanders were as well. There was insufficientequipment, insufficient numbers of soldiers, so the damage we took was inevitable.
Under such circumstances, General Matsui wanted a peaceful entry into Nanjing, thecapital of China, so he decided to demand that they surrender.
– Were the Japanese soldiers in a rage?
Yes. They didn't expect enemy resistance to be so strong—more than they imagined. In
addition, their comrades, brothers-in-arms, were killed. General Matsui knew of hissoldiers’ feelings and worried about it; therefore, the General advised the Chinese tosurrender.
– The designated deadline was noon on December 10, wasn't it?
Yes. The four of us, Chief of Staff Major General Tsukada Osamu (塚田攻), Staff
Officer Lieutenant Colonel Kimihira Masatake (公平匡武), Staff Officer Major
Nakayama Neito (中山寧人), and I, went to the designated spot near Zhongshan Gate.
At the time, a cease-fire was issued but in fact fighting continued at Mt. Zijin. Under
such a condition, we went to the Zhongshan Gate. No military messenger appeared, so
we hurried back to Suzhou in order to decide what to do after that. Then, our all-out
attack started. Hearing that the enemy refused our advice to surrender, General Matsui
was very disappointed.
– How long did you stay in Suzhou?

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I stayed Suzhou for 2 days and as Nanjing was almost captured, Lieutenant Colonel
Murakami Soji (村上宗治) of the Management Division and I went to Tang Shuizhen(湯水鎮). On the way to Tang Shuizhen, I saw Japanese soldiers stabbing prisoners todeath on the bank of a creek.
– What date was it?
I think it was the 12th, around 1 p.m. One thousand to 2,000 Chinese soldiers weremade to sit in the empty area, female soldiers were among them. They lined several
prisoners on the bank and stabbed them to death. Lieutenant Colonel Murakami got out
the car and told the officer in command, maybe it was a first lieutenant or second
lieutenant, that that was cruel. The commanding officer said that they were in the
middle of battle, that they had no other choice. We had nothing further to say.
The commanding officer told Lieutenant Colonel Murakami that they could not waste asingle bullet, and that they didn't ask headquarters for permission. They couldn’t thinkbut to kill the Chinese soldiers and go on to Nanjing. As I mentioned earlier, they wereso enraged that they did not know what to do with the prisoners.
– Did they kill them all?
I don't know. We left there quickly.
– When did you enter Nanjing?
My memory is not clear, it might have been the 13th or 14th, maybe 13th. Lieutenant
Colonel Murakami and I stayed in Tang Shuizhen overnight, then went to Nanjing bycar. We had to prepare for lodging of the Army Headquarters and the entrance
ceremony.
– At that moment, was holding of the entrance ceremony decided?
Yes. The 17th was not fixed but holding of the ceremony itself was decided. So I entered
Nanjing and chose the Nationalist Government’s building as the place for ceremony167

preparation. For the lodging, I chose the Capital Hotel for Army Headquarters andprepared a room and so on for General Matsui.
– What was the situation inside Nanjing?
An amazing number of military uniforms, gaiters, caps and so on were scattered aroundthe town. That was most impressive. The Chinese soldiers abandoned their uniforms
and slipped themselves in with the civilians. From the Chinese soldiers' point of view,
this was reasonable because if they wore their uniform, then they would be killed by
Japanese soldiers. On the ramparts around Zhongshan Gate hung many gaiters(puttees)--the Chinese soldiers used their gaiters to climb the wall and run away.
Under the instruction of Captain Onishi Hajime, a bearded man called Son (孫)organized an autonomous safety association to dispose of the abandoned uniforms andgaiters.
The shops in the Castle were empty—they were ransacked either by Chinese soldiersduring their escape or by Japanese soldiers after they entered; anyway there were tracesof plundering. I assume the Japanese soldiers stole foods, but the other things werestolen mostly by Chinese soldiers.
In March 1938, when the Reformed Government was established, I visited Nanjing
again, and I found a flea market full of luxurious carpets and antiques. I believe thatthey were goods that were previously plundered. At the flea market, I bought a carpet
for my house.
– It is said that immediately after the capture, Japanese soldiers had massacred civilians.
Did you see a massacre?
No. There were no corpses in the Castle. Therefore, I believe that there was no massacreof the general population. I am not saying that nothing happened. There were so many
soldiers that a couple of rapes or robberies must have occurred. But the incidence ofsuch cases was very small.
At the time, Japanese diplomats were already in Nanjing. If a rape or something168

happened, the victim reported it to the Consulate. The Consulate had an idea of thenumbers, which were very limited. A massacre could not have happen. In those days,
Mr. Fukuda Tokuyasu (福田篤泰), Consular Attaché (later Director General of theJapan Defense Agency), was in charge of those kind of matters.
In addition, it is said that fires broke out in Nanjing but I don't remember any. When I
visited Nanjing in March 1938, I found all of large buildings standing there, and otherbuildings, which we used for lodging directors and officers of the Reformed
Government. I was also given a house. Therefore, it was not true that fires burned downa large number of buildings.
– You didn't see a massacre. But did you hear about one?
I heard about the prisoners. At Xiaguan, Japanese soldiers tried to make the prisoners
cross the River – they just wanted to drive off the prisoners, far away from Nanjing, by
any means. During the crossing, a disturbance occurred and they shot the prisoners-that's what I heard.
– It is said a great massacre took place.
About 140,000 to 150,000 civilians stayed within the Safety Zone safely but some of theprisoners or stragglers must have been killed, like those I saw in Tang Shuizhen.
Japanese soldiers were totally exhausted and worn out—I could say they had no energy
left to care for prisoners.
Also, Chinese soldiers who slipped into the Refugee Safety Zone were caught.
Investigation was done by the military police and they said they could identify a Chinese
soldier by checking for traces of wearing a cap. Those Chinese soldiers were killed but I
doubt that this should be called a “massacre”. You can say anything now in peacefulsurroundings, but you cannot say that given the circumstances of those days.
One thing I wonder about is why the Chinese soldiers did not accept our call for
surrender. They were obviously already defeated. Nothing else to do but surrender. It
was not the surrender of the entire nation—it was the surrender of Nanjing only. During
the Russo-Japanese War, General Anatoly Stessel surrendered to General Nogi when
169Port Arthur fell. Same as that. After the capture of Port Arthur, the Russo-Japanese War
continued. In the case of Nanjing, they could have surrendered, just Nanjing.
As a matter of fact, I sympathize with China. I did not agree with the establishment ofManchuria. During the China Incident, Japan went overboard. But as far as the refusal tosurrender in Nanjing is concerned, I think China was wrong. And eventually the highest
commander himself, T'ang Sheng-chih (唐生智), escaped. This was wrong of China andsame thing happened in the Boxer Rebellion, in which, in the end, the highest
commander of Qing dynasty fled. It is the same for a company—if the person
responsible for the company fled, then the company would fall into chaos and theiremployees would loot and run off.
If they had surrendered the matter of prisoners would never have arose. If you cite
International Law, I think the route that China had taken was the problem.
– Did you see Xiaguan?
I went to Xiaguan, together with General Matsui. Xiaguan was a place where Nanjing
Station was situated. Many bodies were left. General Matsui and I saw this.
– How many bodies?
I can't say exact number, but several hundreds. I assume some of them had been clearedaway before General Matsui arrived.
– Major Sumi Yoshiharu (角良晴), who was the General's adjutant stated that he saw
hundreds of thousands of bodies.
Concerning the bodies in Xiaguan, Mr. Sumi, General Matsui and I saw the same
bodies, but it couldn't have been hundreds of thousands. I moved to Tokyo in the
Taisho era in order to enter junior high school and I experienced the Great Kanto
Earthquake8. After the Earthquake, I saw 1,000 – 2,000 bodies with my own eyes, butthere were not so many bodies at Xiaguan. Mr. Sumi came from Kagoshima, he was

8

The Great Kanto Earthquake, September 1, 1923, claimed around 105,000 victims.
170

very quiet man—the impression of bodies at Xiaguan was exceptionally strong to him.
He kept this impression and expressed it as “hundreds of thousands”. For a person who
saw bodies for the first time, it likely looked greater than it actually was.
At the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), it was said that 100,000 to 200,000 Chinese weremassacred. These are inconceivable numbers. Of course, in the suburbs there were
hundreds and thousands of bodies. During fighting in the suburbs, a considerable
number of Japanese soldiers were also killed. But in town, I didn't see bodies. The
things that I saw and heard and the incident which was called the Nanjing-incident
after the War are not consistent.
If you want to know about the Chinese soldiers who fled to the Yangtze River, I think
the people in the Navy know better about this than we do.
– It is said that Staff Officer Cho issued the “massacre order”.
Yes, I heard the rumor that Mr. Cho said, “Kill the prisoners,” “We are in war, kill
them,” or something like that.
– Did he issue such order?
No, no. At Headquarters the issue of prisoners was discussed and Mr. Cho uttered such
wild words. Naturally, these were not orders. He was just a staff officer, so he had nopower to issue an order. People around him didn't take it seriously. Mr. Cho had no
idea what to do—he just used violent words. Later, people exaggerated his remarks.
– Did anybody reprimand Lieutenant Colonel Cho? Deputy Chief Muto Akira, forexample?
We knew Mr. Cho often used empty words. I don't think Mr. Muto said about that.
– What did General Matsui think of Lieutenant Colonel Cho?
I think General Matsui didn't appreciate him. General Matsui’s main concern was what171

to do after we won the war, that he wanted to establish a stable Chinese government
and to bring stability to the Chinese peoples’ lives. He was planning to use Colonel
Wachi Takaji (和知鷹二) for the planning. Anyway, Mr. Cho had been appointed as
Information Staff Officer so General Matsui used him partly for planning.
– Do you think General Matsui knew about Lieutenant Colonel Cho's wild words?
I don't know. I have never heard anything about this from General Matsui. I don't knowwhether General Matsui knew of the rumor or not, but I remember he ordered someone
to summon Cho to him.
– Did Mr. Matsui know of the rumor of the shooting the prisoners at Xiaguan?
I don't know. He might have known about this. Even if he knew, he would havethought that it was a battlefield-related matter. Otherwise, he would have said
something about it. General Matsui was not easy-going person, never blindly signed
anything. You could see his personality during the Aizawa Incident9. He took
responsibility and withdrew from his post. As shown in this episode, he was a man
who took responsibility seriously, therefore if he didn't like something he would makehis displeasure known.
– Who was the General's source for news? Chief of Staff Tsukada?
General Matsui got information not only from him but also from several other staff
officers. I saw him speaking often with Mr. Kimihira, and Mr. Nakayama. And in
Nanjing, Mr. Muto always followed General Matsui, so he got information from Mr.
Muto, too.
Other news sources were the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army.
The Central China Area Army had only an administration department and staff
officers, and they didn't have a legal department. So matters on prisoners or others
were handled by the Shanghai Expeditionary Army and the 10th Army, from which
General Matsui might have heard something about prisoners.
On August 1935, Major General Nagata Tetsuzan (永田鉄山), Army Military Affairs Bureau
Chief, was attacked in his office and killed by Lieutenant Colonel Aizawa.
172
9

– Who were serving closely to General Matsui?
Senior adjutant Lieutenant Colonel Murakami, and Mr. Sumi, who was an executive
adjutant. Mr. Saito Yoshie (斉藤良衛), an expert in International Law, gave advice
about international matters. In addition, the interpreter Fujiki (藤木), who was a
Chinese language teacher, and Dr. Sasakawa (笹川), Chief of Army Surgeons, thePaymaster Lieutenant Kuruma (車), Pay Officer, etc.
– According to the book Age of Shanghai, written by Mr. Matsumoto Shigeharu, after
the memorial service on the 18th, General Matsui chastised all commanders, including
General Prince Asaka [Asakanomiya]. What did he say?
I think General Matsui called the commanders' attention to general matters. He started
to speak “On procedures to maintain the order of battle,” and he mentioned
disciplinary problems. The memorial service was not the only time—General Matsui
always warned discipline.
– Did he know there were disciplinary problems?
He heard of a couple of cases—as I mentioned earlier, he was informed by staff
officers. However, in those days nobody heard about a massacre. General Matsui didn't
hear of one either. He simply was upset about general discipline.
At first glance, General Matsui looks like an easy-going person but he was very strict
and had a strong personality. He spoke his mind and would not act disobediently. Even
Mr. Cho became helpless in front of him.
General Matsui graduated from the Army Academy with General Araki Sadao, andGeneral Matsui acted as go-between at Mr. Araki's daughter’s wedding. General
Matsui complained that Mr. Araki was easily flattered by young people. Just like that,
General Matsui openly said what was on his mind, even of small matters.
– It seemed that General Matsui was not satisfied with Divisional Commander
Lieutenant General Nakajima Kesago’ command. Did you see something related with173

that in Nanjing?
In Nanjing, I saw nothing between the two. But after returned to Shanghai, General
Matsui complained that, “Division Commander Nakajima is not good, he is reckless,gives no consideration to matters, and, as superior, too imprudent in controllingothers.”– Muto Akira (武藤章), Deputy Chief of Staff of the Central China Area Army, wrote
his memoir, From the Philippines to Sugamo (prison):“During operations, General Matsui tried to respect Chinese standing to the extent that
it was deemed far from realistic. The General’s soft attitude made some officers
frustrated and an Army commander, someone, and some Division commanders, who
considered strategy should be the priority, protested to the General. Lodging in the nextroom, at Nanjing, I heard them quarreling furiously.”
I assume that this “Army Commander” was Lieutenant General Yanagawa Heisuke(柳川平助) and the Division Commander was Lieutenant General Nakajima. Were you
there in the argument?
No, I was not. If Mr. Muto wrote this, I think it is true. It was very likely that General
Matsui argued with Mr. Yanagawa. In Shanghai, he did not speak well of Mr.
Yanagawa.
– Did General Matsui disagree with Commander Yanagawa about the Ladybird
Incident10?

General Matsui and Mr. Yanagawa did not get along from the beginning. General
Matsui was in the same Academy class as General Mazaki Jinzaburo (真崎甚三郎)11
and those two did not getting along. Mr. Yanagawa belonged to Mr. Mazaki's group.

10

A British gunboat, Ladybird, on the Yangtze River was accidently fired upon by a Japanese Army

Artillery unit near Nanjing early December 12, 1937. The Japanese government made an official apology
to UK.
11
General Mazaki belonged to Imperial Way Faction.

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– According to a memoir written by Lieutenant General Kawabe Torashiro (辺虎四郎),
then Chief of Operations, General Matsui had read an admonition written by theGeneral Chief of Staff immediately after the Capture of Nanjing, and cried, “I amterribly sorry.” Some people said this was the proof of a “Nanjing Massacre”. Did you
know about that?
No. I never heard that General Matsui cried. It was likely that the admonition might
have been issued from the Central Authorities if it was related with general discipline.
But if it was related with a massacre that happened in Nanjing, an admonition fromCentral Authorities was quite unlikely.
Shanghai was an international city so we were constantly warned about discipline, but
we heard nothing about a massacre--it was not possible that Central Authorities got
information before we did and warned us. Concerning third countries' interests,
General Matsui repeatedly warned the soldiers to protect the interests of uninvolved
parties.
– According to the note “Efforts for Peace” written by Prime Minister Konoe after theWar; when General Matsui was about to leave Tokyo Station he said to the Prime
Minister that he would go to Nanjing. Was he already intending to go as far as Nanjing?
I doubt that story. In a war we don't know how far we go or where to stop. The war
might have ended in Shanghai. I think that he didn't think about going Nanjing at first.
If he thought that he had to go Nanjing, it must be for the purpose of peace. General
Matsui held Japan-China peace in high regard and had a close relationship with ChiangKai-shek.
At the end of February 1938, the night before General Matsui was leaving for
Shanghai for his triumphant return, General Matsui invited Ri Takuichi (李択一),
MineTokuhiro (岑徳広,), Major General Harada (原田), Colonel Usuda (臼田), and me, fordinner. At the dinner, he said “I will go back Japan tomorrow but I would like to cometo China again as ambassador and discuss peace.” That was his cherished dream.
When he left Tokyo, General Matsui required at least five Divisions. He knew that the175

Chinese Nationalist Party was more powerful than they used to be. He made hisrequest to Minister of Army Sugiyama (the former General). He asked Prime Minister
Konoe, too. Mr. Sugiyama, based on successful experiences in the ManchurianIncident and the first Shanghai-Incident, said General Matsui's demand was too great.
General Matsui complained that Mr. Sugiyama hardly knew anything about China.
– After the War, the Nanjing-Incident was raised by the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE).
I was totally astonished. As I was very close to General Matsui, I started helping hislawyers Mr. Ito Kiyoshi (伊藤清) and Mr. Ueshiro Takuzen (上城琢禅 ).
I never expected the sentence of death by hanging at the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE). Every
defendant was unable to predict what accusations and decisions would be made. Afterall, the charge against General Matsui was a single count, that is, the Nanjing Incident.
I knew a person called Mr. Yamada Junzaburo (山田純三郎 ) who helped in Sun Yatsen’s Chinese Revolution. More than anything, Junzaburo's brother, Mr. Yamada
Yoshimasa (山田良政) was killed by the Qing, at the beginning of the Revolution.
Because of such a background, Sun Yat-sen admired Mr. Yamada Junzaburo, andChiang Kai-shek did as well. Chiang Kai-shek treated Mr. Yamada Junzaburo
respectfully at his departure from China to Japan after the War.
Mr. Yamada Junzaburo knew General Matsui, so during the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), I
counted on Mr.Yamada's friendship with Chinag Kai-shek and asked him to plead to
Chiang Kai-shek to help General Matsui. But the answer from Chiang Kai-shek was“NO”—General Matsui was the representative Japanese who had to take responsibility.
So General Matsui was responsible for everything, with or without a “Nanjing
Massacre”. Nanjing was the capital and they tried to make Nanjing a symbol foreverything and it happened when General Matsui was the supreme commander. He
was sacrificed for the convenience what was then Chinese policy.
Anyway, Japan attacked China and lost, and there was some misconduct in the war.
For misconducts, General Matsui had to take responsibility. He understood this very
well.

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Before the execution, General Matsui's wife, their foster daughter, and his (major
general) brother Nanao’s wife and I visited him at Sugamo Prison.

23) Interview with the Colonel Tanida Isamu (谷田勇) , Staff Officer ofthe 10th Army
Mr. Tanida Isamu graduated from the 27th Army Academy class with an excellent
performance record. Also he graduated from Artillery and Engineering School withexcellent performance, as well as the Army War College—which means, he was, nodoubt, an elite of the 27th class.
However, he did not move to the sunny side of the Army. A reason for this was that hebelonged to the Imperial Way Faction. Since the 1936 2.26 Incident12, people who were
thought to belong to the Imperial Way Faction were expelled from the Army and young
people who narrowly escaped banishment remained in the Army but had no chance to
get important positions. Mr. Tanida was one of these.
However, it happened that Mr. Tanida's father, Lieutenant General Tanida Fumie(谷田文衛), and Tojo Hideki's father, Lieutenant General Tojo Hidenori (東条英教),
had shared a similar background, of attending the Army War College, and Mr. Tanida
was favored by General Tojo. This might be the reason that he was promoted tolieutenant general despite the fact he belonged to the Imperial Way Faction. He was thelast lieutenant general of the Imperial Way Faction.
Mr. Tanida held his position as nonconformist after the War, and kept in contact withMajor General Tanaka Ryukichi (田中隆吉), who was completely ignored by the entire
Imperial Army after the War. At the death of Major General Tanaka, while almost no
member of the Imperial Army attended his funeral, Mr. Tanida did. Also in 1957, hevisited the People's Republic of China, together with Lieutenant General Endo Saburo(遠 藤三郎,), who also was treated coldly by the Imperial Army.
In October 1937, Mr. Tanida, then working as an instructor of tactics at the Army War
College, was assigned as staff officer of the 10th Army. At the time, Mr. Tanida was 43
An attempted coup d'etat by a group of young Imperial Japanese Army soldiers occurring on
February 26, 1936.
177
12

years old and he received the radio notice of his promotion to colonel, onboard thewarship Isuzu, which was on the way to Hangzhou Bay.
After participating in the Attack on Nanjing, Mr. Tanida moved to suppress Hangzhou.
In February of the next year, 1938, after the 10th Army was disbanded, he remained in
China as Staff Officer, Chief of Logistics, in the Central China Expeditionary Army andparticipated in the Battle of Xuzhou, then the Hankou Operation. After that, Mr. Tanida
served as the Chief of Staff of the 38th Division, then the Chief of the Second Section ofTechnical Headquarters.
And in May 1943, due to being accused of joining the peace movement by the Imperial
Way Faction, Mr. Tanida was demoted by the Commander of the Signal Corps of the 8th
Area Army, and sent to Rabaul, where he remained for the duration of the War.
Mr. Tanida contributed articles to the monthly magazine Kaiko every now and then andcompleted a great work, A Battle between Dragon and Tiger, in 1984 as well. When abook written by former Major General Tanaka Ryukich, was re-published, Mr. Tanida
contributed his article to the book as well. With Mr. Tanida being as energetic as he was,I asked him for an interview. He answered that he would wait for me at 10 a.m., July 17,
1985. He was 92 years old and, needless to say, he was the oldest of the Imperial
Soldiers who participated in the Attack on Nanjing.
At the time of the Nanjing Attack, Colonel Tanida was the Chief of the Third Section,
which was in charge of in the 10th Army. Practically, he was the responsible person in
charge of logistics. Some have stated that disciplinary problems of the 10th Army wasdue to poor supply, so I was going to ask him about this. Furthermore, this section wasin charge of prisoners as well, plus it was said that Mr. Tanida was friendly with
Lieutenant General Yanagawa Heisuke, the Commander of the 10th Army. This was thebest opportunity to ask Mr. Tanida all about that.
On the day of interview, I was led to a room and I waited for him. In the room were
portraits of Mr. Tanida and his father, Lieutenant General Tanida Fumie (谷田文衛) andI felt a little bit intimidated. Soon, Mr. Tanida appeared. He looked dignified in his
kimono—even in his 90s, he no trace of senility. I was full of questions, so after
exchanging short greetings we began:– It is said that the Commander Yanagawa, when landed at Hangzhou Bay, told soldiers178that even mountains, rivers, plants and trees, all were enemies…
To my sudden question, Mr. Tanida looked surprised and put his hand on his face.
I had requested that Mr. Tanida allow me to interview him, and in my letter, I wrote that
I wanted to hear about Nanjing in 1937. To my request he responded simply, “Pleasecome.” He knew nothing about me, and didn't expect such questions, so his surprise
was quite understandable. Mr. Tanida contemplated for a while, 10 seconds or so. Then,suddenly, he said, “Let's start with my story.” He said this without answering my firstquestion. Then he took his book, A Battle between Dragon and Tiger, from his
bookshelf and said “Let's start with this story in this book.”
Each of his stories were concise and to the point. And his memory was very clear. I
visited him 10 a.m., and when he completed his first part it was around 11 a.m. He kept
up his monologue for one hour without fatigue. Eventually the interview lasted for threehours, I felt a little tired, but Mr. Tanida did not show any sign of fatigue up to the end.
The first part of Mr. Tanida's story is outlined as follows:
Within the Central Authorities of the Imperial Army during the Showa era, two factions
struggled against each other due to differences in belief and philosophy—they were theControl Faction and the Imperial Way Faction.
Originally the Japanese Imperial Army regarded the Soviet Union as the biggest threat,against which Japan could not fight alone, so they believed that Japan, Manchuria andChina must combine forces. The Imperial Way Faction was idealist, which believed thatthey could subsume China if they contacted them in friendly manner based on theImperial Philosophy. On the other hand, the Control Faction was theoretically rationalist
and insisted that against current-day China, with anti-Japanese and Japanophobia
feeling running high, talk wouldn't work, so teaching them a lesson first, then enter into
an agreement. This was the main difference between the two Factions on the matter offoreign policy.
In the March 1932 Shanghai-Incident, the Japanese Imperial Army destroyed theChinese Army around Shanghai and returned to Japan quickly before May, withoutleaving any soldiers there. And during the “Within the Great Wall” Operation in April
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1933, the Japanese Army advanced to Huairou (懐柔), which was situated within
hailing distance of Beijing, but the Japanese Army concluded a cease-fire in Tanggu(塘沽) and withdrew to the Great Wall. These two operations were performed during theterm of the Minister of Army Araki Sadao (荒木貞夫), which expressed the philosophyof the Imperial Way Faction, that is, they would not touch the mainland of China except
Manchuria.
Mr. Tanida stated all this to me and then went back to my first question:– It is said that the Commander Yanagawa, when landed at Hangzhou Bay, told soldiersthat even mountains, rivers, plants and trees, all were enemies…
No. The top members of the Imperial Way Faction were the General Mazaki Jinzaburoand Lieutenant Generals Araki Sadao, Yanagawa Heisuke and Obata Toshishiro(小畑敏四郎). Lieutenant General Yanagawa, a member of the Imperial Way Faction,
did not say things like “even mountains, rivers, plants and trees in China, all wereenemies.” If such a statement was made somewhere, I can be sure that the article waswritten by a person belonged to the Control Faction or a person who favored theControl Faction.
Among the top members of the Imperial Way Faction, Mr. Yanagawa was mostdevoted to deities, and regarded the Kojiki and the Nihonshoki as sacred texts.
Wherever he went, he visited the local shrine first and prayed to the local deity.
Thus, my first question was answered. At times laughing out and at times thinking
deeply, Mr. Tanida's facial expression was very rich. Being relaxed, I dared to ask all of
my questions.
Mr. Tanida continued;
Mr. Yanagawa’s idea was based on his firm faith—once the triangle zone of central
China was suppressed, the Japanese Army should withdraw from China as they did in
the first Shanghai Incident. Mr. Yanagawa did not hesitated to state this idea.
Mr. Yanagawa made great contribution to battles, nevertheless his picture was always
180

prohibited by instruction of the Central Authorities. Even in a photo of the entrance
ceremony, General Yanagawa's face was defaced and displayed. Seeing the photo,
members of the Imperial Way Factions were upset, saying it was dirty revenge.
– Who would have instructed defacing a picture? Army Minister General Sugiyama
Gen? Or Vice Minister Lieutenant General Umedu Michirou (梅津美治郎,)?
Persons of superior rank would never suggest such things.
– So a leader of the press group or someone in the Ministry of Army suggested this?
Yes, that is likely.
– According to a memoir written by Lieutenant General Kawabe Torashiro(河辺虎四郎 ), then Chief of the Operations Section of General Staff Headquarters,
General Matsui and Lieutenant General Yanagawa did not get along.
As I mentioned earlier, one belonged to the Control Faction and the other belonged to
the Imperial Way Faction, so naturally their relationship was not friendly. However,during operations they had to act as ordered by their superiors. I don't think anything
happened in particular.
– According to the book, Military Policeman for 31 Years, written by Mr. Katsushichi
Uesuna, who was the Chief of Military Police of the 10th Army: the work of unloading
food, etc. was very slow and without permission, the soldiers' requisition increased. The
Chief of the Accounting Section couldn't take it, saying in a rage that he could not takeresponsibility for such terrible planning and he would quit. The Chief Staff Officer,
Major General Tanabe Moritake, tried to soothe him to settle the matter.
Concerning the supply, the Third Section was in charge, and I was the head of theSection. If the Accounting Section had a complain, it should have been passed to me.
At meetings between various levels, the senior staff of the Accounting Section shouldhave talked to me if there was such problem. But I have no memory of that.

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The chiefs of the sections of the 10th Army were mostly major generals on reserve duty
and the Chief of the Accounting Section was on reserve duty also. The party to whom
the Chief of the Accounting Section himself must consult, was the Chief Staff Officer,me, so such a story could not have possibly happened without my knowledge.
– Was the plan for supplies a feasible one?
At the beginning, the Hangzhou Bay Landing Operation was successful, but after thelanding, unloading was not completed for 4 to 5 days. Hangzhou Bay was shallow andthe tidal range was significantly great, therefore gun carriages and other vehicles could
not be landed. Even if unloading was successful, the road was so terrible that heavy
vehicles could not proceed. How about the Shanghai route? We decided on a new planaround November 10: move the ships to Shanghai and unload equipment in Shanghai
where the road was good and also we could use creeks to carry the equipment.
To change the place of landing and logistics station was an important matter but I
decided this on my own because we couldn't contact Headquarters. So I dispatched
Staff Officer Lieutenant Colonel Obata Nobuyoshi (小畑信良) to Shanghai. The
Shanghai Expeditionary Army understood my plan at once and gave their port
Nanshi in Shanghai to us, the 10th Army. I myself had landed Hangzhou alreadybut returned to the ship and went to Shanghai. So we landed in Shanghai,followed after Headquarters and caught up Headquarters in Jiaxing (嘉興) where
we got necessary supplies.

After that we stayed in Huzhouz (湖州) and waited for the order to attack Nanjing. So
we were able to get supplies as well as considerable provisions and food, plus
ammunition. Therefore, except at the first stage of landing, we generally had nodifficulty with regard to supply.
– According to the book, Military Policeman for 31 years, the 10th Army had
disciplinary problem.
It is common in any military all over the world, including the Japanese military, thatstrong troops have a high standard of discipline, and weak troops tend to raise
disciplinary problems. It is a matter of human psychology – the weak tend to take out
182his own frustration toward those who are weaker, the people.
In case of the Japanese Army, soldiers who came from Tohoku and Kyushu were strong
and soldiers who came from Kyoto and Osaka were weak. The Tohoku soldiers werecharacterized by obedience and the Kyushu soldiers were characterized by being proud.
The 10th Army mainly consisted of the 6th Division and the 18th Division, both of whichcame from Kyushu, and I didn't hear that they had disciplinary problems.
– Lieutenant General Endo Saburo, Chief Staff of the First Section of General
Headquarters then said in his book that the 6th Division didn't get a citation of merit for
their achievement in the Battle of North China, and added that Chief of Operations wasColonel Sato Kotoku (佐藤幸徳). Due to the above two reasons he writes as if they
committed a massacre.
Lieutenant General Endo could not have known about the 10th Army first hand. Since
Huzhou (湖州), the Headquarters of the 10th Army followed the route of the 6th
Division and we found no trace of a massacre at all. We saw bodies but all of themwere Chinese soldiers. Besides, Colonel Sato was already transferred out of the 6th
Division by this time. Concerning the 6th Division, they didn't commit any massacres.
– According to a battle report written by troops in the 114th Division, it is said that theyreceived Brigade’s order to kill the prisoners.
I cannot believe that at all. I don't know Major General Akiyama Juuzaburo (秋山充三郎), the Brigade Commander, but I knew Lieutenant General Suematsu Shigeharu (末松茂治), Division Commander. He was called from reserve duty and had very gentle
personality—it was not likely that he would issue such an order.
– The Third Section was in charge of prisoners. What thoughts did you have on theprisoners?
I thought we had to treat them in accordance with International Law, not be cruel, notshow favor. As a matter of fact, during the Operation, we met no problems withprisoners, so I never dreamed that Nanjing would be raised as an issue after the War.
There were prisoners in Nanjing but in the Wuhan Operation, the enemy scampered far,
183

far away, hardly any remaining.
– What was the situation inside Nanjing?
Headquarters entered Nanjing Castle on the 14th shortly before noon, 11:30 a.m. We
entered through China Gate, hardly any corpses around there. Around 3:00 p.m., as theChief of Logistics, I needed to inspect the condition of occupied places and I looked
around the Castle by car, with a squad of guard from Headquarters.
When I went Xiaguan, I saw a warship anchored in the Yangtze River and met the
Captain of the warship. At wharf’s shore, I saw a number of bodies. There were morethan 1,000, maybe more accurately 2,000 to 3,000. More than half of the bodies wore
military uniforms and there were ordinary people's bodies, too.
– Were they killed in battle?
I thought that they had fled from the Castle and the 16th Division cornered them andshot them. I suppose that this was the so-called Massacre of decades later.
In saying so, Mr. Tanida took out his photo albums. In those days, Mr. Tanida was crazy
about photography and during military service he took many photos of battlefields andeveryday activity. Therefore, he had many important photos, every photo was indicatedwith a date and the circumstances.
Among the photos on December 14, there were photos of the entrance and inspection of
the Castle as talked about. There were photos of Xiaguan, too. In the photos you can see
burning buildings off in the distance, and in the foreground were 20 to 30 bodies.
When we arrived Xiaguan, it was around 4:00 p.m., the buildings were still burning,
and we saw those bodies, 2,000 or so.
In his albums I found photos of the Headquarters of the 10th Army, in Lishui on
December 8. One was a picture of a strategy meeting between the Army and its
subordinate divisions before the Nanjing Attack, in which you can see the General
Yanagawa and the 6th Division Commander Tani Yasuo (谷寿夫).
184During the meeting, the General Yanagawa repeatedly warned Lieutenant General Tani
about discipline. This shows Mr. Yanagawa’s personality.
On the 16th, the Sanmei Company of the 47th Infantry Regiment from Oita, which
arrived first at the rampart, reported details of their moment, in front of the
Commander of the Army, then the Commander and others started to climb the rampart.
Inside the Castle, we found several bodies of Chinese soldiers.
It was the 6th Division that occupied the rampart of Nanjing Castle first. Neverthelessthe Wakisaka Regiment of the 9th Division, which attacked Guanghua Gate, got more
publicity because the 9th Division had their own reporters. I knew Colonel Wakisaka
Jirou very well--he was a senior adjutant while I was working as a strategy instructor at
the Army War College.
After the entrance ceremony on the 17th, I left Nanjing on the 19th in order to suppress
Hangzhou, so I don't know anything after the 19th, but I do know of the situation in
Nanjing until the 19th. The number of bodies was several thousand to 10,000, includingin the area surrounding Nanjing, and no trace was found of a “massacre”. Therefore, I
am sure that after the War, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, that
200,000 or 300,000, which was pushed by the Chinese side, must be intentional
exaggerations.
– You wrote an article in the magazine Kaiko that the number of soldiers who wereallowed to enter the Nanjing Castle was restricted to 8,000.
The Central China Area Army issued the instruction anew to the Shanghai
Expeditionary Army as well as to the 10th Army, that they must restrict the number ofunits entering the Castle. From that we understood that the Central China Area Armywanted to avoid chaos in the Castle.
– How was the situation of Nanjing, other than Xiaguan?
I saw more than 10 bodies in Mo Chouhu (莫愁湖). In three places in Nanjing, I saw
bodies.
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– Were the bodies you saw in Mo Chouhu soldiers or civilians?
I am not sure now, whether they were soldiers or civilians. It might have been half-andhalf. The bodies found in two places, Xiaguan and Mo Chouhu, were now considered
as a “massacre”, I assume.
– It is said there were bodies at Yi Jiang Gate ( 挹江門) as well. Did you see them?
In some documents, there is mention of some bodies at Yi Jiang Gate, too. I passed thegate in the afternoon of the 14th, but there was nothing there that time.
In so saying, Mr. Tanida opened his album again. He showed me a photo of Yi Jiang
Gate on the 14th. In the picture, we can see all of Yi Jiang Gate with its three arches, butthere were no body-like shapes visible.
Some said they were killed at Yuhuatai (雨花台) too, but there were no bodies at all.
– In the book, The History to be Judged, written by Major General Tanaka Ryukichi, hesaid that Staff Officer Cho of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army confessed that he gavean order to massacre. You were close to Mr. Tanaka, what do you think of this?
Cho Isamu was one year junior to me--he was in the 28th class and graduated from the
Army War College with excellent performance. He was a man of angular, patriotic,
righteous indignation and never hesitated to pursue his belief. Together with Lieutenant
Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro (橋本欣五郎,), he was one of main members of Sakurakai, the third biggest cross-sectional faction in the Showa era. At the October Incident,
in 1931, the Sakura-kai’s plot (an attempted coup d'etat) was uncovered before it
happened and it is said that failure was partly because of Cho's reckless behavior.
Nevertheless, Lieutenant Colonel Cho was surprisingly modest and polite when heassociated with friends, and he was very kind to me, maybe because we had same
name, Isamu.
Considering his personality, the above story might be not groundless. However, if hetried to issue a military order to a subordinate unit he must first obtain clearance from186

the Commander. It was not likely he had issued an official order without permission.
Perhaps he gave it orally to military staff of a subordinate unit who came to get anorder. I heard such a persistent rumor in the Central China Area Army. I knew they
actually killed prisoners by sword.
– What kind of person was Division Commander Lieutenant General Nakajima Kesago?
I heard many stories about the 16th Division. The 16th Division came from Kyoto, so, as
I said before, they were weak, so it was not unlikely they might have caused trouble.
Lieutenant General Nakajima was stationed in France for a while, being sophisticated,
so I don't think he could have performed such a thing as the rumor suggested, but on
the other hand, I could say he was not strong enough to control it. As a matter of fact,
the bodies I saw in Xiaguan were the work of the 16th Division.
– At the end of January 1938, Colonel Hirota Yutaka (広田豊,) together with Chief of
the Second Section of the General Staff Headquarters, Honma Masaharu, visited
Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou. It is said that the purpose of their visit was to handle thematter of foreign countries' interests.
Hirota and I were in the same graduating class at the Army Academy. He was not sogood at the Academy but it seems that he studied very hard at the Army War College,
hard enough to get into the Army Saber Club.
After the inspection, Mr. Honma returned to Tokyo, while Hirota was assigned to the
Headquarters of the Central China Expeditionary Army and opened an office inShanghai, where he handled matters concerning foreign countries' interests. I also
served as the Chief of Logistics in the Central China ExpeditionaryArmy
Headquarters, and frequently negotiated with resident foreigners. I think Hirota's duty
was not so difficult then compared to issues arising in later years.
In November 1938, the Central China Expeditionary Army captured all of Wuhan.
Without any sign of a Chinese Army's counterattack, the Japanese Army completed
post-battle procedures and disbanded the Battle Command Base in Hankou, thenreturned to Nanjing to shift the troops to a defensive posture.
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During this period, the Japanese government established the Central China
Development Company in Shanghai as the top organization for financial development,
as well as a number of Japan-China National Policy Joint Ventures for the managementof railway, ships, communication, national land development, electricity and waterbusiness, and so on. The Headquarters of the Central China Expeditionary Army
directed these local businesses and afterwards returned to Nanjing, the duty of
Headquarters not only being military matters but also political and economical matters,
which gave them new functions. The Third Section, in particular, which was in chargeof logistics, had to direct the previously mentioned economical matters. Therefore wewere terribly busy. Naturally, our staff and I, the Chief, had a lot of occasions to spend
time with Japanese and Chinese businessmen and officials in which we received deep
understandings of Central China's traditions.
During that time, I had many opportunities to talk with Chinese businessmen andofficials on friendly terms, but even during drinks, I never heard about a Nanjing
Massacre--not at all. Therefore, I have a strong belief that the truth is nothing like thatas the current Chinese government insists, decades after the fact.

24) Interview with Captain Kaneko Rinsuke (金子倫助), Staff Officerof the 10th ArmyIn the middle of October 1937, Captain Kaneko Rinsuke, who worked in the
Maintenance Bureau of the Ministry of the Army, was appointed staff officer in chargeof logistics for the 10th Army, and participated in the Nanjing Attack. The 10th Army had
14 staff officers and Captain Kaneko was youngest, 32 years old at the time. The Third
Section, which was in charge of logistics, had three members, Colonel Tanida Isamu,
the Chief, Lieutenant Colonel Obata Nobuyoshi (小畑信良), and Captain Kaneko.
Next year, 1938, at the end of February, Captain Kaneko returned to his former positionat the Maintenance Bureau of the Ministry of the Army. He joined the 10th Army as soon
as the Army was organized and returned to Japan as soon as the 10th Army was
disbanded.
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After returned to Tokyo, Captain Kaneko worked at the Maintenance Bureau, then the
Third Section of General Staff Headquarters, then in the early summer of 1941 he wasappointed as resident officer in the US.
He was repatriated to Tokyo in the summer of 1942 by ship. After that, he served as
staff officer of the 8th Area Army, then senior staff officer of the 4th Air Force and at theend of the War, he served as munitions officer, the Ministry of Munitions – he was 40
years old then, a colonel.
In those days, he was the youngest and now he is 80 years old. He is fine but his wife
has had health problem, so three years ago the couple moved to a private residential
home that prepares meals and doctors on call. Mr. Kaneko now takes care of his wifeand goes the company twice a week. I met him in December 1985 at the lobby of saidsenior home.
– When did you enter Nanjing?
I was terribly busy with matters concerning supply and guarding in rear areas so I had
no impression when I entered Nanjing. Perhaps I was engaged in other jobs at that time
because I was of the lowest rank. One thing I remember--before entering Nanjing
Castle, it happened that I was in the Headquarters at Yuhuatai for some reason, I saw
the flag of rising sun hoisted over the rampart and champagne was opened. I rememberthat moment at Headquarters at Yuhuatai clearly.
Also, I attended a meeting in the room of the Area Army Commander, where a sergeantof the 6th Division, who first raised the rising sun flag over the rampart, reported to the
Commander, Lieutenant General Yanagawa Heisuke. The sergeant said that he threw arope with hook and started to climb and during the climb someone shook his rope. The
time that the sergeant hoisted the flag was 12 o'clock, December 12, so the meeting
was probably on the 13th or 14th.
– When you entered Nanjing, what was the situation in there?
The date that I entered Nanjing was 13th or 14th. I saw no corpse in the Castle nor heard
any shooting. I entered Nanjing but I had the task of moving to Hangzhou so I stayedjust one night, or maybe two nights, and departed for Hangzhou. I had no clear memory189about the inside of Nanjing. No memory means nothing happened; I think so.
– Did you see the entrance ceremony performed by General Matsui Iwane andLieutenant General Yanagawa.
No memory of it at all. I believe I had already headed for Hangzhou .
– It is said there was massacre in Nanjing. Did you see something?
I remember well the bodies I saw between Hangzhou Bay and Nanjing. I saw the firstbodies at the place of where the landing took place at Hangzhou Bay. Wearing new
military uniforms, the bodies of Japanese soldiers lay in an orderly line. Their fresh,
new uniforms were very impressive.
At the same place, I saw bodies of Chinese soldiers in a trench, too. And on the way to
Nanjing, I saw a Chinese solder's corpse run over by car, revealing the internal organs,a Chinese soldier's body sitting dead along the road, like Jizo or Kshitigrbha, and at aplace around 10 km before Yuhuata, a swollen body. I remember these clearly. I saw noother bodies.
– The 10th Army was engaged in heavy fighting at Jinshan (金山) immediately after thelanding, as well as at Yuhuata, outside Nanjing Castle.
I was always in the rear and moved through the logistics route. The bodies that I saw
were all that I saw, as I said before. There were battles and there were bodies--maybe
before I arrived there they were cleared already.
– So, you never heard of a Nanjing-Incident?
Never. After the War, I was totally surprised to hear about it at the Tokyo Trial(IMTFE). I am not hiding anything. I am not hesitating to say--I did not see anything
in Nanjing, really. There was nothing impressive that happened.
– Did you go straight to Hangzhou after you left Nanjing?

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Yes. There was no order to attack Hangzhou yet. Moving to Hangzhou was the firstorder, so I had to prepare the logistics line, and so on and went there. During the move
to Hangzhou no significant battle occurred.
– In Hangzhou, you joined the Headquarters again?
Yes. The Headquarters was situated by a lake called Lake Xi (西湖) which had anisland in the middle, and we met the New Year there. In Hangzhou, I had arranged forprostitutes--it was one of my jobs, concerning logistics. I found a contractor andnegotiated with him on the highest price, that is, to my memory, 50 sen; to preserve thesoldiers morale--that was the nominal purpose. I think it helped to reduce fighting
between soldiers.
– In the beginning of February, the Chief of the Second Section of the General Staff
Headquarters, Major General Honma Masaharu, visited Hangzhou for the matter offoreign countries' interests. Did you meet him?
I knew nothing about his visit.

25) Interview with Mr. Okada Yoshimasa (岡田芳政), official, Cabinet
Planning Board
Mr. Okada Yoshimasa was a civil servant, an official of the Cabinet Planning Board.
Prior to this, he was a military officer and temporarily transferred from the Ministry of
the Army to the Cabinet Planning Board. Mr. Okada was a member of the 36th
graduating class of the Army Academy. According to the book, “Army Operation
Counterfeit Note,” written by Mr. Yamamoto Keizo (山本景蔵):

Mr. Okada Yoshimasa was a cheerful and magnanimous man who was in the same
graduating class as Mr. Tsuji Masanobu (辻政信) at the Imperial Japanese Army
Academy as well as the Army War College and both were known for their excellent
performance. After graduating from the Military Staff College, Mr. Okada was assigned
to the China Department of General Staff Headquarters, and after two years, he went to191

China as a resident officer. He was in Beijing from January until April 1935, in Nanjing
from May 1935 to February 1936, and then in Canton from February to December
1936. During the Nanjing period, in autumn of 1935, he saw the grand cerebration of
Chiang Kai-shek's 50th birthday.

Mr. Okada returned to Japan in January 1937 and entered the Department of Economics,
Tokyo Imperial University. In those times, as was customary, each year, two to three
persons in the Military Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of the Army were sent to Tokyo
Imperial University to study for 3 years. Captain Okada was selected to enter Tokyo
Imperial University. But shortly after he entered University, the China Incident brokeout. Thus, he had to terminate his studies at the University and was temporarilytransferred to the Cabinet Planning Board, under the same status he held at the Military
Affairs Bureau. In those days, the Cabinet Planning Board prepared and drew up themost important national policies, and so the best people were recruited from eachministry. The Cabinet Planning Board established the Third Committee for the researchand planning for Chinese Economic Development in the old Parliament Building, which
was situated at Hibiya Park, to which the Ministry of the Army, the Ministry of theNavy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent someone--the Ministry of the Army sent
Mr. Okada. During the time described above, Mr. Okada went to Nanjing. He was 34
years old.
After completing his duties at the Cabinet Planning Board for over a year, Mr. Okada
returned to his old position, the 8th Department of General Staff Headquarters in March
1939 and engaged in strategizing against China. In September 1939, he was appointed
as staff officer of the China Expeditionary Army and continued to engage in strategic
operations as an Information Staff Officer. At the end of the War, he held rank as acolonel and served as the Chief of the Second (Intelligence) Section of the 6th Area
Army (Hankou).
Mr. Okada was born in 1903 and when I interviewed him he was 82 years old. He wasin fine health and walked everyday. I interviewed several times and he always
designated the Kazan-kai Club, located at Toranomon, as the place for interviews. The
Club was established by members of the Dong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen Da Xue, the East
Asian Literary School, and the name of the Club was derived from Prince Konoe Kazan(Atsumaro) (近衛篤麿), the founder of the School, who used the pseudonym “kazan”.
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This Club has very close ties with China.
– You were in Nanjing for a year before the China Incident. What was the situation in
Nanjing then?
When I was in Nanjing from 1935 to 1936, new government buildings had just been
constructed in the northern half and most of the citizens lived in the southern half. It
was the capital of the Nationalist Government, but the real center was still Shanghai, soon the weekends, the management class went to Shanghai—there was no one in
Nanjing. This was understandable as Shanghai was a lively town whereas Nanjing had
no entertainment. Chiang Kai-shek knew this very well so he made his home at the
Military Academy and never left Nanjing, either on weekdays or weekends. Wang
Zhaoming (汪兆銘) and He Yingqin (何応欽) followed his example--their homes werein Nanjing. Those buildings stood alone in an empty field. Nonetheless, themanagement class continued to visit Shanghai over the weekends.
– You visited Nanjing the year shortly after the capture of Nanjing. What was yourpurpose?
When Shanghai fell into the hands of the Japanese Army, the Third Committee was
assigned to inspect Shanghai for its economic recovery. I was a member of the Third
Committee and went to Shanghai. Based on the Committee's report, the Central China
Development Company was established the following year, in 1938.
We completed the inspection of the Shanghai area on December 23– at that time,
Nanjing was already captured. I had stayed in Nanjing for a year as a resident officer.
The New Year holiday was coming, so I asked for permission to go to Nanjing. I got
permission and then went to Nanjing.
– What date was it?
The morning of December 24. Lieutenant Colonel Sasaki, who was sent from the
Ministry of the Navy, helped me to get a surface boat and we went to Nanjing by boat.
There were several people from other Ministries who also wanted to go to Nanjing. We
arrived up-stream of Nanjing in Yangtze River. We asked the boat to stay there and in193the afternoon of the next day, the 25th, we returned to Shanghai.
– What was the situation of Nanjing?
We found war casualties, 10 or so, floating in the Yangtze River. We heard that there
were more bodies but they drifted away. We landed at a place near Yi Jiang Gate, a car
waited for us, and we entered Nanjing through this gate by car. The officer who
received us said that Japanese soldiers encircled the Chinese soldiers around the Yi
Jiang Gate, so many bodies were found there. But when I visited, I found just a few.
I visited the Headquarters at the Capital Hotel (首都飯店) and heard the story of thecapture.
In the evening, I visited the Special Service Agency to meet Major Sakata Shigeki (佐方繁木) who was my superior at the China Department in General Staff Headquarters– I had heard beforehand that he had arrived Nanjing as the Head of Special Service
Agency. At the cross-section of Zhongshan Road and Zhongshan East Road stood thethree-storied China Bank building. The building was terribly ruined but Mr. Sakata
used the second floor of the building. A bottle of sake was delivered from
Headquarters, so we set up candles and sipped sake, chatting until midnight. It was
Christmas Eve. Mr. Sakata said nothing but later I heard that his child died that day.
The next day, with Mr. Sakata's guide, we drove around Nanjing. I visited Guanghua
Gate and China Gate, where intensive battles took place. At the China Gate, a couple ofChinese street stalls were open for business. After that, I went to the northern area,
which became a battlefield, and found Japanese soldiers, Japanese civilians, andreporters, I guessed, walking around. Several houses had burned. In Nanjing, I
remember one house smoldering.
I visited the place where I used to lived, it stood as it was, looking peaceful, no trace ofdamage from battle. There was Jin Ling Women's College nearby, where I found many
refugees, who looked very calm. The Chinese gatekeeper of the College, who knew
me, welcomed me with a big smile.
– I thought you could not freely access areas where refugees were.
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Nobody stopped me, in particular. I entered--perhaps because the gatekeeper knew me.
– It is said that there was a massacre. Did you see any other bodies?
I saw only a few bodies on the shore of the Yangtze and outside Yi Jiang Gate. When I
drove around in the city I did not see any battle casualties. The city was calm and quiet.
I assumed that battle casualties had already been cleared away.
At any rate, the Japanese Army entered Nanjing on the 13th and there was still fighting
on that day. I visited Nanjing only 10 days after that. How many bodies could they takeaway? Even if there were bodies, there must have been several hundred or several
thousand. I doubt, number of bodies which the Red Swastika Society stated they
themselves had buried.
–After that, you were engaged in formulating strategy for China. You must have had
frequent opportunities to meet Chinese people. Did you not hear from them that there
was massacre in Nanjing?
No. Never. For the first time, I heard about it after the War. I was totally surprised tohear this. I lived for a long time in China and I knew Chinese people well, and I saw
Nanjing before its capture and after its capture, too. That's why I am convinced that the“Nanjing-Incident” is Chinese propaganda. After the War, at the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE),
China quickly claimed that hundreds of thousands were killed and their claim spreadall over the world. That is the reality of the Nanjing-Incident--the impression of which
is so strong that it will not easily go away. The Nanjing-Incident is one tale in the
propaganda war, a war which China was engaged in before the War and is still waging
even today.
China is very good at propaganda. Japanese people cannot understand this, but in
China, the country of Hakuhatsu 3,000 jo13, this is an everyday occurrence. Japan lostthe propaganda war.
A typical expression of exaggeration commonly used in China. It came from Tufu’s famous poem,“My white hair has become 3,000 jo (9 kilometers)”.
195
13

In those times, we didn't have an accurate number of the Chinese population, we didn't
know who were soldiers--it is impossible to get an exact number. Therefore, no matter
how hard the Japanese side tries to show the truth, by collecting reports of the army's
activities and witnesses’ testimonies, it is impossible to overcome this huge work ofpropaganda. Besides, China is a county of “FACE”, they would never take back what
they once said, since it means losing “face”. So there will never be a solution to the
Nanjing-Incident.
– We don't have any means by which to reveal the truth of the Nanjing-Incident?
Admit defeat, quite simply. We lost the propaganda war. Nothing else. Arguing over thenumbers is silly.
What I wanted to discuss with Mr. Okada was matters concerning Nanjing but Mr.
Okada always converged on the present: how to maintain Japan-China friendship. I met
him three times, got 5 letters and frequent phone calls before I wrote his statement
above. Japan-China friendship--that was his highest concern.
In those days, as a member of group that plotted against China, Mr. Okada could haveused abundant secret military funds to operate the organization but now, empty-handed,he must feel helplessness in the conflict against China. He was deeply involved in
China from the beginning and still now, he tries to contribute to various matters and tofriendship between Japan and China.

26) Interview with Colonel Isayama Haruki (諌山春樹) , Chief of theGeneral Affairs Bureau, General Staff Headquarters

Since the landing of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army in September 1937, the Central
Authorities frequently sent their staff to Army units dispersed throughout China, for the
purpose of inspecting them and communications.
At the end of December 1937, Colonel Isayama Haruki, the Chief of General Affairs
Bureau in General Staff Headquarters was dispatched to Shanghai, and then in the New
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Year, to Nanjing. He was accompanied by Major General Anami Korechika (阿南惟幾),
the head of the Bureau of Personnel Affairs of the Ministry of the Army, Lieutenant
Colonel Nukata Hiroshi (額田担), Senior Officer of the Personnel Assignment Section,
Lieutenant Colonel Inada Masazumi (稲田正純), Senior Officer of the Military Affairs
Bureau, and Major Arao Okikatsu (荒尾興功), staff officer in the Operations and War
Plans Section of General Staff Headquarters. Among these men, only Mr. Isayama isalive today. I interviewed Mr. Isayama in September 1987 and asked him what theCentral Authorities thought about the dispatch of troops and Nanjing.
– According to a 1937 report prepared by the General Affairs Bureau:“On December 26, Colonel Isayama was dispatched to the central China area in order tocommunicate with the headquarters of the Army and Divisions regarding personnel
affairs and staff officers' duties.”– Specifically, what was the objective of this trip?
The purpose of this trip was to check the situation of dispatched troops and therelationship between the Army and the Divisions.
– Was the purpose to inspect disciplinary problems?
No, it was not. The purpose was to grasp the situation of the troops there and theactivities of staff officers; nothing further than that. It was standard.
– The Chief of the Office of Personnel Management, Anami, and Senior Staff in the
Office of Personnel Management, Nukata, were sent together with you as well.
Originally, personnel affairs of the General Staff Headquarters were handled by theGeneral Affairs Bureau and other personnel affairs were handled by the Personnel
Affairs Office of the Ministry of the Army. However, since the February 26 Incident in
1936, all personnel affairs were handled by the Personnel Affairs Office.
Concerning personnel affairs of staff officers, the General Affairs Bureau of the General
Staff Headquarters made the original plan, then the Personnel Affairs Office approved it
and received the final decision. Accordingly, the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau
and the Personnel Affairs Office in the Ministry of the Army related with each other. I
remember I was with the Chief of the Personnel Affairs Office Anami, but I have no197

memory of Mr. Nukata.
– Did you visit Nanjing, too?
I went to Nanjing around the New Year. I inspected several places in the city and founda woman's body,--that's all. Nevertheless, Chief Staff Officer Tsukada Osamu (塚田攻)
told me that General Matsui Iwane was extremely worried about outrages committed
by Japanese soldiers. It was not a specific remark but just general one, and did notsuggest a massacre or anything shocking like that, so I didn't take it too seriously. It
was not a matter of a massacre, of which it is currently argued, and it did not occur toanyone to ask of a “massacre”.
– Did you discuss this with Headquarters?
No, I think we spoke at a restaurant in Shanghai. The Chief of Staff was a strict man,he spoke in a serious tone.
– Did you meet General Matsui?
I met General Matsui at the Headquarters. We just exchanged greetings.
– What kind of person was General Matsui ?
He was my boss when I was assigned to the Second Section of General Staff
Headquarters after I graduated from the Army Staff College. Since then I met him
every now and then. The Chief of the Section was Colonel Tatekawa Yoshitsugu (建川美次). Mr. Tatekawa was carefree man but under Mr. Matsui he restrained himself.
During World War I, Mr. Matsui was in France as a resident officer, and hisachievement then was said to be remarkable. After serving the Chief of the Second
Section, he attended the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, as a plenipotentiary. I
was in Paris then and served with him.
In Shanghai, he looked deeply matured and like a greatly experienced man.
– In the Special Services Agency in Shanghai, Colonel Kimura Matsujiro (木村松次198郎), who was in the same class as you, served as the head of publicity.
I didn't meet him.
– On January 4, 1938, the General Chief of Staff Officers gave an admonition on
disciplinary problems and on January 9, Chief Staff Officer Tsukada Osamu, of theCentral China Area Army, issued a notice of discipline to subordinate troops.
I don't remember.
– While you were in General Staff Headquarters, didn't you hear about disciplinary
problems of dispatched troops?
No, I didn't.
– Were there order issued to hush-up the Nanjing-Incident?
All the reports which came to the General Staff Headquarters were received first by theGeneral Affairs Bureau, including daily telegrams, then divided into two; one for themain affairs section and another for the related affairs section, which were mimeographat the time and then copies were delivered to the two departments. I checked all the
documents, therefore it was not possible that I was not at all unaware. I served as theChief of General Affairs until March 1939, all the while nothing of a massacre story
arose; there was no order to hush things up at all.
– The Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred in July 1937. How did the General Staff
Headquarters respond?
The Chief of Strategic Operations Bureau, Major General Ishihara Kanji (石原莞爾),applied a non-expansion policy but in general others did not support the non-expansion
policy.
– It is said the China Section insisted that they could defeat China with a single blow.

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I don't know. I was not involved in that matter directly.
– In January 1938, the US claimed that the Japanese Army violated American interests
in Nanjing and the Chief of the Second Section Honma Masaharu went to Nanjing
together with Lieutenant General Hirota Yutaka (広田豊).
On hearing this, I vaguely remember that the US accused us of this then, but I don't
remember Mr. Honma's visit. If he made the trip as the Chief of the Second Section it
seems strange that he did not bring his subordinate but brought Lieutenant General
Hirota.
By the way, Hirota and I were in the same graduating class of the Army Academy.
– According to the diary written by Lieutenant General Nakajima Kesago, commanderof the 16th Division, “Our policy is not to take prisoners,” What did this mean?
Take their weapons and let them go. The prisoners were to be freed but before that their
weapons must be confiscated--otherwise they would come back to attack us.
– What thoughts did you have concerning prisoners?
Nothing in particular. We Japanese didn't think that we would be taken alive so we hadno thoughts about being prisoners. In March 1939, I went to Datong as the Regimental
Commander of the 26th Division, and as far as I remember, not many prisoners weretaken. And I didn't know whether they were prisoners or not, but some Chinese wereused as labor. I followed this practice as the former Regiment Commander did.
– At the time, did anyone talk about a Nanjing Incident?
I didn't know there was such an incident at all. When we lost the War, I was the Chief
Staff Officer in the Taiwan Army of Japan and after the evacuation was completed I was
brought in front of an American trial charged with the execution of a B-29 pilot andsentenced to life imprisonment. I was kept in Shanghai and then later in Sugamo. So I
didn't know that the Nanjing Incident became a topic then. I was taught about the200

Incident recently and that is how I came to know about it.
Since 1985, Mr. Isayama sent me letters on several occasions to teach me what theCentral Authorities were doing then. I wrote the gist of his statement in my book,“Nanjing-Incident – they told us “聞き書き 南京事件” published in 1987. Shortly
after the book was published Mr. Isayama sent me a letter in which he spoke about thearmy in general, and I met him in person for the first time. In fact, at first, he had
declined my request to interview him, saying that he had no documentary evidence
about the Nanjing-Incident.
During the interview, he brought up everything that was in his memory, including theCentral Authorities and the trip to Nanjing. When he went to Nanjing, he was 43 years
old--now he is 93 years old; 50 years had passed since his trip to Nanjing. Mr. Isayama
is well-known for his gentle characteristics – when I met him, I was treated to his
kindness.
In 1933, he returned from France and was assigned to the Second Section of the General
Staff Headquarters. He was just a major, nevertheless serving as senior staff in the
General Affairs Bureau. In August, he joined the Fukuoka Regiment, and one year later
he returned to General Staff Headquarters as senior staff again. Because of his neutral
and calm personality, he was definitely needed for managing matters related topersonnel.
In November 1937, he was promoted to Chief of the General Affairs Bureau and servedin this position until March 1939.

27) Interview with Major Otsuki Akira (大槻章), Member of the Army
Affairs Formation Team, Military Affairs Bureau, the Ministry of the
Army
Mr. Otsuki Akira went to Nanjing shortly after its capture, as a staff of the Army Affairs
Section of Military Affairs Bureau, in the Ministry of the Army.
He was a major then. In the previous year, 1936, he was transferred from the post of
adjutant of the Ministry of the Army to the Military Affairs Formation Team, Military
Affairs Bureau. Since then, for 6 years before interruption by World War II in 1941, he
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worked in the Formation Team except for a period of time when he worked as a staff
officer in the Central China Expeditionary Army, and in 1940 he was appointed as Chiefof the Formation Team. At the end of 1941, he moved over to the South Area Army toserve as a staff officer, then as a staff officer of the 14th Army. At the end of the War, he
was a senior staff officer of the 36th Army which was deployed on the Japanese homeland.

In 1989, I visited Mr. Otsuki's home in Hachioji, Tokyo to interview him.
– What was your position when you arrived at Nanjing?
The Military Affairs Section staff took occasional trips to view current military
circumstances. We made trips to Japan as well as China. So at the end of December
1937, I went to Nanjing, to inspect Nanjing.
– At the end of December 1937, Major General Anami Korechika, the Chief of
Personnel Affairs, also visited Nanjing with his staff. Did you accompany them?
No. I went alone. At that time, I went to Nanjing and Hangzhou and returned to Tokyo,
then went to North China as well.
– Where did you stay in Nanjing?
It was such a long time ago, I don't remember too well. I stayed overnight at a logistics
inn. I went over to a bed and found that it was only the steel frame, no mattress, noteven a straw mat. I spent the night covered with a single blanket – it was freezing cold.
That was what I remember most.
– It is said that there was a massacre. Did you see or hear something?
I saw no trace of anything. Nothing. I discussed many things with staff officers at
Headquarters, they didn't mention this at all. I believe that the massacre story is a lie.
After that I went to Hangzhou and visited the Headquarters of the 10th Army. As soon
as I arrived in Hangzhou, there was heavy snowfall, all transportation stopped,202

including airplanes. I was trapped at Headquarters. All other Headquarters staff officers
could do nothing as well.
In the 10th Army I met Major Yamasaki Masao (山崎正男), an operations staff officer.
Mr. Yamazaki was from my home town, senior to me, and I knew him from MilitaryPreparatory School. Mr. Yamazaki worked at the Military Affairs Section, being incharge of formation. I went there as his replacement. Therefore, we talked a lot. But
issues such as a “massacre” was never raised in our discussions.
– Did you hear from other staff?
We were trapped in Hangzhou for a week or 10 days, we talked about many things
because we had nothing to do. Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao joined our
discussions. And so did Colonel Tanida Isamu and Lieutenant Colonel Yoshinaga
Sunao. I heard nothing from them.
– A massacre did not happen?
The massacre story is a lie. I went to Nanjing the next year, 1938, as a staff officer of
the Central China Expeditionary Army, but I heard nothing then either. Without an ordersuch a thing as a massacre couldn't have happened. If there was massacre, which wasclaimed after the War, I should have heard of this as a staff officer when I went toNanjing. The massacre story is beyond belief.
– If there was massacre you should have heard of it?
Yes. The Commander who attacked Nanjing was General Matsui, then General Hata
Syunroku (畑俊六) succeeded him. I worked with General Hata in the Central China
Expeditionary Army, and when I returned to the Military Affairs Section of the Ministryof the Army he was Army Minister. In addition, in 1943 when I was appointed as staff
officer of a Brigade, which was deployed near Nanjing, he was the General
Commander. So I was able to speak frankly with General Hata, but I never heard abouta massacre. It is a downright lie.

20328) Interview with Colonel Mikuni Naofuku (三国直福), Commanderof the 22th Field Artillery Regiment
Mr. Mikuni Naofuku was born in 1893, and when I interviewed him he was 92 years
old. He worked at a company in Tokyo until he was 85 years old. He lost his wife when
he was 79 years old. Since then, he lived alone. At the age of 85, he quit his job andmoved to Chiba where his son lived. I visited him at his home in Chiba. He had a goodcomplexion and looked very healthy. He did, he said, have a little problem withwalking, so if he needed to go to Tokyo he goes by car. I visited him three times, we
spoke for two hours each time. During the interview he sat on a zabuton cushion withhis back straight. I, half his age, couldn't sit still long and moved my knees restlessly,
looking for a comfortable position but Mr. Mikuni didn't show any sign of fatigue. I
admired his attitude and felt guilty for letting him speak for as long as two hours.
Mr. Mikuni had a clear memory and well remembered matters that occurred in Nanjing,including dates. He was working at the Newspaper Unit in the Ministry of the Army andhad a great appetite for knowledge about the mass media and for information in general,so he was well informed of current events. He knew what I wanted to hear from him
before my visit, so he was prepared to speak in detail.
After serving as Commander of the 22th Field Artillery Regiment, he was appointed as
Chief Staff Officer of the 15th Division, then Chief of Nanjing Special Services Agency,
and at the time of outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, he served as the Chief of the
Research Section of the Ministry of the Army, that is, on the staff of Political
Information under Prime Minister Tojo. He met the end of the War in Hanoi, when he
was at the time Commander of the 21st Division.
– You went to Nanjing in January 1938.
I arrived in Nanjing on the 15th and stayed until the 22nd. I arrived in the evening ofJanuary 15 and on the 22nd, took a boat for my return, so I stayed in Nanjing in total for
6 days.
I visited Division Headquarters the next day to report my return. Divisional
Headquarters was located in the splendid buildings of the Nationalist Government. I
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apologized to the Divisional Commander for my absence due to illness.
– At that time, did you hear anything about disciplinary problem or the Nanjing-Incident
at Division Headquarters?
I heard nothing. After I visited the Divisional Commander I went to the Chief of Staff,
and I heard nothing there either. When I returned to my job, the 16th Division wasplanned to move to North China again and, a couple of days later, the Divisional
Commander came to our Regiment for an inspection. The inspection took either a half
day or all day. I spoke about many things with the Divisional Commander but it wasnothing special.
– Did you hear something from lower ranking soldiers in the 22nd Regiment?
Usually, I made a report on officer performance evaluations in December, but I was
hospitalized that time so I couldn't do that, therefore I had to collect information about
the battle for Nanjing and other things as soon as I arrived Nanjing. I got a number ofreports from subordinates and found no special incidents.
– Did you hear any talk about disciplinary problems from the other divisionalcommanders or regimental commanders?
I had opportunities to talk to my own Divisional Commander and our Chief of Staff, butrarely with the other divisional commanders and regimental commanders. This wascommon in the army.
The 16th Division was mobilized in August 1937 and I stayed with the 16th Division
until July 1938. On the battlefield, I never met Mr. Noda Kengo (野田謙吾), theCommander of the 33rd Regiment, nor Mr. Sukekawa Seiji (助川静二), Commander ofthe 38th Regiment. Mr. Noda was a year senior to me and later was substituted by
Yamada Kizo (山田喜蔵), who was in the same graduating class as me. I had often
shared the same battles with Mr. Katagiri Goro (片桐護郎), the Commander of the 9th
Regiment, yet I talked to him in person only a couple of times. And I have no memoryof meeting Mr. Oono Noriaki (大野宣明), of the 20th Regiment.

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It was same with the Brigade Commanders, I met Mr. Sasaki Toichi (佐々木到一),
Commander of the 30th Brigade, only once and Mr. Kusaba Tatsumi (草場辰巳),
Commander of the 19th Brigade, more often yet a couple of times at most. And I neverheard of the Nanjing-Incident from them.
– Who grasped the Division’s situation as a whole?
I think the Chief of Staff did, Colonel Nakazawa Mitsuo (中沢三夫). After Nanjing,
the 16th Division moved to North China again and around Zuzhou they were incontinuous battle, for as long as 29 days. During the battle, an adjutant from each
Regiment regularly visited the Chief of Staff to receive orders. And the Chief of Staff
himself gave them orders. So the Chief of Staff knew everything in the Division. Mr.
Nakazawa Mitsuo lived in Fukakusa, Kyoto, and it so happened that his house was one
house over from mine. He was a quiet man.
– What was the situation of Nanjing, when you arrived on 15th January?
It was a battlefield so I accepted that. It was wretched and empty. Nevertheless, I felt
good because I could catch up with my troops, finally, after my sick leave.
– Were there bodies in the street then?
There might have been, but I didn't see any. I didn't have time to make carefulobservations.
– Did you look around Nanjing City?
Yes. I inspected my subordinates’ battle area. At Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, I received an
explanation from an officer who was in charge of observation, and inspected the area fora couple of days. But I didn't see any bodies that looked like they were the result of a
massacre.
– When you headed for North China, you must have left from Xiaguan. What was thesituation in Xiaguan?

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I don't remember anything in particular.
– So, among the top officers in the 16th Division, nobody talked about a NanjingIncident?
No one did. Not only among top-level soldiers but also lower ranking soldiers, I heard
nothing from them. I myself didn't see anything.
During battle in North China again, I was appointed Chief of Staff of the 15th Division
in Nagoya, Japan, and went to Nagoya in July 1938. Later, this Division was ordered togarrison Jiangning (江寧), therefore, I returned to Nanjing in August. Here again, I
heard nothing about a massacre. At that time a number of Japanese merchants had
already arrived in Nanjing, many from Nagasaki, so we call Nanjing “Nanjing City ofNagasaki Prefecture”. I knew that people couldn't speak out against the Japanese army
but the Nanjing streets atmosphere was very lively.
After that, I served in Nanjing as Chief of Staff of the 15th Division until August 1939,
then was appointed to Chief of the Nanjing Special Service Agency and stayed on until
May of the next year, 1940. My duty as the Chief of the Special Service Agency wascompletely different from my past military duties. I had to meet and negotiate with
Chinese people every day in order to consider their point of view. So I spoke with
Chinese people in town in a friendly manner, but never heard from them about amassacre story.
I met frequently with Mr. Liang Hongzhi (梁鴻志), Premier of the Restoration
Government, but I heard nothing from him about a massacre. Mr. Liang Hongzhi was aliterary man and I still have his calligrapher which he wrote for me.
– The Chief of Special Service Agency – Captain Onishi Hajime, I think —was also theChief of the Agency.

Yes, Mr. Onishi replaced Colonel Akiyama Yoshitaka (秋山義隆), then I succeeded
Mr. Akiyama.

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– Around that time it is said that Mr. Gao Guanwu (高冠吾), the Mayor of Nanjing,buried around 3,000 abandoned bodies found in the suburbs of Nanjing and built amonument.
Is that so? I didn't know that. Mr. Kokango drank well and we met often but I neverheard reproachful words from him.
– There were many stories about Divisional Commander Nakajima, what did you thinkof him?
In short, he was keen and tactful in war. He was an expert in artillery; I had no bad
feelings toward him. I was often with him – in 1933 when I became Lieutenant
Colonel to the 22nd Regiment of the 16th Division, Lieutenant General Nakajima was
the Commander of Maizuru Fortress, Kyoto. The Commander of Maizuru Fortress
was under the 16th Division so I met him several times. During a military exercise we
stayed at the same local inn for a couple of nights.
At the time of the February 26 Incident in 1936, I was staff officer at the Martial Law
Headquarters and later, Mr. Nakajima became Commander of the Military Police.
During that time, Mr. Nakajima went to General Ugaki Kazushige (宇垣一成) to stop
him to form a cabinet--that was so well-known a story. I think it happened that Mr.
Nakajima was in the position to do the job; it was a turn of fate.
In December of the same year, 1936, I was appointed Commander of the 22nd Field
Artillery Regiment and in August 1937, the next year, I received Mr. Nakajima, whobecame Divisional Commander. As I received Divisional Commander Nakajima, he
asked me about the field artillery regiment in detail. I had 8 months experience as theRegiment Commander and when I mentioned that he said, “Only 8 months, so you
know nothing. OK, don't worry, I will teach you.”
Less than a month later, our regiment was scheduled for live fire exercise in Aibano,
Shiga, so, on the night before we expected the Divisional Commander's inspection.
The next day, we were suddenly ordered to mobilize. I stopped the training scheduleand hurried to Division Headquarters. It was 3 o'clock in the morning, August 25.
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The Divisional Commander was there, he saw my tensed face and said, “Artilleryman, don't worry.” I was touched.
Divisional Commander Nakajima was very devoted on battlefield, I was surprised thatin North China, the Divisional Commander himself moved ahead to the front of theline.
Those days I left all shooting matters to the chief of the company. The Divisional
Commander asked the company commander to “Show me the target lists,” and asked
many questions and gave instructions. It so happened that the company commander
had just completed his training at artillery school, so he could answer all of hisquestions; I felt relieved.
During the moving from North China to Central China, the Divisional Commander
instructed us to do live fire training whenever we had leisure time. We had once done acomplete live fire exercise – all 12 companies laid out before the Divisional
Commander. Divisional Commander Nakajima was well-known as an expert inartillery--he was really devoted. In the attack on Nanjing, he moved to the frontline
artillery base and got injured.
I went to Nanjing to return to my duty after the attack on Nanjing was completed. The
Divisional Commander scolded me, “The shooting performance by the 22nd Field
Artillery Regiment was terrible.” He was expert in artillery--that's why he was notsatisfied with our performance.
He paid attention to details on operations, so some infantry regimental commanders
complained about this – in a favorable view he was a very attentive person, and in an
unfavorable view he was a meticulous person.
On the other hand, Divisional Commander Nakajima had a sensitive aspect. In Shunde(順徳), which was located in north China, a superior of a soldier showed me a letter
which was sent to the soldier in my regiment from his mother in which the soldier’s
mother worried for her son, from the beginning to the end. I showed the letter toCommander Nakajima, he read it and shed many tears.
And during the battle at Taierzhuang (台児荘), when a transportation corps was introuble due to the loss of their horses, the Divisional Commander himself came to me209asking to give some of the artillery units’ horses to the transportation corps. We wererunning low on artillery shells so our load was lighter, so I made our horses 6-in-handto 4-in-hand and managed to give some of our horses to the transportation corps. Soonthe Divisional Commander came to me again and said that the transportation corps
was very pleased.
He cared for me as well. I have a hemorrhoid problem and during the training heworried about my problem in a friendly manner. After a battle in Xuzhou, I got amessage tube, thrown from a plane, in which I was ordered to be the Chief of Staff ofthe 15th Division. Therefore, after the battle was settled, I went to Divisional
Commander Nakajima to report that I was leaving my current position. He told me
then, “Mr. Mikuni is a man of sentiment, rather than rationality.” I thought surely thisapplied to Divisional Commander Nakajima.
–Both you and Divisional Commander Nakajima were artillerymen, his demands werehigh, nevertheless, there was understanding between each other, I suppose?
That was one reason. But there was another reason: commanders of artillery regiments
and military engineers regiments must stay near the Divisional Commander-- that wasa rule. In case of the 16th Division, the brigade commanders and commanders ofinfantry regiments deployed far away so they could communicate only via radio. On
the other hand I was always with the Divisional Commander. I think I was most near tohim.
The Chief of Staff was always busy issuing orders and plans, and the Divisional
Commander was often alone so I acted something like a conversationalist or
entertainment. For this performance, Chief of Staff Nakazawa, greatly appreciated that.
Also, the senior adjutant, whose duty was to serve the Divisional Commander, was in
the same graduating class as me, told me often enough, “You helped my job a lot.”– It is said that General Matsui criticized the Divisional Commander's command in
Nanjing.
As I mentioned earlier, the Lieutenant General was very keen in battle. His mainconcern was battle. And for a person in the position of lieutenant general, he handled210matters of detail himself so people thought every result was attributed to him.
Generally speaking – around 1913, when I graduated from the Military Academy-“Depend on the enemy for food” and “Only reasonable number of prisoners” werecommonly stated so I cannot deny those rough ideas existed.
– What kind of person was Brigade Commander Sasaki, who served as the Commanderof the Nanjing Garrison?
As you know, he was an expert of China. I first met him at the Jinan (済南) Incident,
1928. In Jinan, the Japanese 6th Division and Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition,
clashed. I was working with the newspaper team in the Ministry of the Army then andwas ordered to join the 6th Division immediately. Lieutenant General Sasaki was inNanjing then and he came to Jinan together with Chiang Kai-shek. In those days,
Lieutenant General Sasaki had very friendly relationship with Chiang Kai-shek and he
was posted in Nanjing as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. Later 1937, the Lieutenant
General came to Nanjing again and that time he was in the position to attack ChiangKai-shek. I wonder what he felt then.
While I was in the 16th Division, I had hardly opportunities to speak with Brigadier
General Sasaki.
– General Matsui was sentenced to death at the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE) and executed, due
to the Nanjing Trials.
The War Trial was problematic. When the War ended, I was in Hanoi where I was about
to leave by ship, but I was forced off the ship by a US military officer. Then, Chief ofStaff Shishido (宍戸) and I were brought to Canton and charged as war criminals. The
trial then was totally unreasonable, I was charged with creating the “puppet government”
of Wang Zhaoming (汪兆銘), and that my soldiers used violence against civilians. Yes, I
served as the Chief of Special Service Agency in Nanjing when the Wang Government
was established but I was not deeply involved with them. Concerning the violence of mysoldiers, my Division was involved in almost no battles and was strictly warned about
discipline and so we had no problems at all. As a matter of fact, I awarded branch units
for their good behavior.
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When I was accused of using violence against civilians, I demanded for them to show
evidence. They brought me a file as evidence, in which I found statements from people
who were ordered by the Chinese army to make statements. In the file, the order of thestatements was left as is--the dates shown in the file were of the lunar calendar andplaces and dates hardly matched that of the Division's movements. That was the extent
of the Chinese “evidence”.
Also, in some trials there was neither a prosecutor nor an attorney. I heard that in a
determination of the death sentence, the defendant's appearance played an importantrole. I don't know how the sentence and personal looks are related.
It was rumored that I would get a death sentence but I protested against every
accusation. My trial was set towards the end but in the earlier trials, there so many
people sentenced death, so beginning with the person tried before me, they handed out
life imprisonment sentences and I got a sentence of life imprisonment, too. I was
imprisoned in Canton for two years, then in a Shanghai prison for one–and-a-half years,
and furthermore in Sugamo Prison for three-and-a-half years, until 1952.
That was how war trials were conducted by China after the War.
– When did you learn about the Nanjing-Incident?
After I was released from Sugamo Prison. But I knew that General Matsui had been
executed, maybe I heard the news in prison in Shanghai. There were Chinese
newspapers and someone who could read Chinese told me about it.

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2. The Navy29) Interview with Lieutenant Commander Terasaki Takaharu (寺崎隆治), Captain of the gunboat Seta
In 1937, Lieutenant Commander Terasaki Takaharu was an instructor at the Naval War
College. On August 13, as the second Shanghai-Incident broke out, LieutenantCommander Terasaki asked Deputy Head Rear Admiral Sato Ichiro (佐藤市郎) [theoldest brother of former prime ministers Kishi Nobusuke and Sato Eisaku] to allow him
to go China and in October he was appointed captain of the gunboat Seta.
In the Shanghai area, the Third Fleet, headed by Vice Admiral Hasegawa Kiyoshi (長谷川清), was deployed and the Seta belonged to the 11th Squadron under the Third Fleet.
– Before reaching Nanjing, were you heavily attacked from both shores?

On December 9, we were attacked by the Chinese army by the Guishan (亀山) Battery,which was situated downstream near Zhenjiang (鎮江). There was fierce shelling and
the Seta was hit by three shells, but without taking casualties. So we withdrew andthen bombed the battery by airplane.
Next, after the battle of Guishan Battery subsided, we were attacked fromDoutianmiyao (都天廟), which was in front of us--fierce shooting and bombardment
began, fire from machine guns and rifles from both sides continued until we reached
Nanjing. In addition, a number of underwater mines lay in the water, which madenavigation very difficult.
In the evening of 11th, as we broke into Zhenjiang, the Seta had no fuel and we quickly
pulled up to the enemy's wharf to take on coal and continued up river.
– Where was Rear Admiral Kondo Eijiro (近藤英次郎), Commander of the 11th213

Squadron, at the time?

Commander Kondo was on board the Ataka, 10 miles to the rear in the Fleet, andcommanding the Fleet.
On the 12th, we underwent a fierce attack from an artillery battery at Mt. Wulong (烏龍) in Nanjing, as well from Liu Zikou (劉子口), from the opposite shore, and we
encountered a choke point right before Mt. Wulong. The choke point was made by 12
sunken ships that were tied to each other with wires. At 11 p.m., the demolition team,
guarded by the Seta, dismantled the wires, and, at 3 a.m. on the 13th, opened thewaterway.
At 10 a.m. on the 13th, the Seta initially navigated the waterway opened by thedemolition. After confirming passage, 100 meters behind the Hodu, the Seta advanced
to Nanjing. The Hodu's captain, Lieutenant Commander Ueda Mitsuhiro (上田光浩),
was five grades above me, so the Hodu went ahead of us.
The Yangtze River separated into two streams before Nanjing and we took the left
stream. Heavy attacks by Chinese soldiers from both shores continued. Around thattime, we found a number of Chinese soldiers floating on junks and rafts, and their
numbers gradually increased over time. The Seta had 4 sets of 25 mm machine guns
and we shot at them as they moved.
– Were they Chinese soldiers who had fled from Nanjing?
Yes. It was the 13th when the Army entered Nanjing, so I assumed that Chinese soldiers
tried to escape down the Yangtze River by junks and rafts.
– Didn't they think that Japanese troops would come upstream?
At first, they tried to escape to Pukou (浦口), on the opposite bank, but Japanese
troops soon arrived at Pukou, so they had no choice but to either flee up or down the
Yangtze.

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As we neared Nanjing, we found Chinese soldiers using not only junks and rafts, butalso clinging to doors; the Yangtze River became full of Chinese soldiers. They never
expected the Japanese fleet from downstream.
– How many people were on board a junk?

Around 100 people, I think.
– How many Chinese soldiers tried to escape by junk or raft?
Several thousands. The Seta shot at them as went by, and the ships in convoy shot atthem as well. There were approximately 20 junks and rafts in total. We just happened toencounter them.

In the Jiangnan Grand Canal near
Danyang, civilians fled in junks inorder to avoid gunfire.
(December 2, 1937)– When did you arrive at Nanjing?
It was at 3:15 p.m. on the 13th. As we reached Zhongxing (中興) Wharf, we saw theJapanese Army waving hinomaru flags. We were ordered by the Commander to makecontact with the Army when we arrived at Nanjing. Therefore, we sent a message to the215Hodu that the Seta was going to go Zhongxing Wharf for that purpose, but the Hodu,
which was in the vanguard, quickly moved into Zhongxing Wharf before us. So as aresult, the Seta became the lead and headed for the next wharf, Xiaguan (下関).
As we reached Xiaguan Wharf, we saw a number of soldiers waving at us. I used a pairof binoculars and saw that they were Chinese soldiers. The Chinese soldiers did not
expect that the Japanese fleet would come so quickly and thought that we were a
Chinese fleet. We shot at them with 25 mm machine guns as we moved into the wharf.
– How many Chinese soldiers were there?
We saw around 500 and there were many in the rear. We were shooting as we reached
the wharf, so the Chinese soldiers in the rear escaped upstream.
The Seta entered Nanjing in the vanguard, so I sent a telegram: “We broke throughNanjing 1515”. Using code would take about half an hour, so I sent it un-coded. Rightaway, the telegram was received by Commander Kondo of the Third Fleet, the Naval
General Staff, and the Ministry of the Navy.
– After the 14th, what did you do?
The Panay Incident (a mistaken attack by a Japanese plane on a US gunboat), occurred
before the Nanjing Attack. The Hodu was tasked for rescue and the Seta remained in
Nanjing.
– According to the New York Times, the Seta left Nanjing, headed for Shanghai, withforeign reporters on board, on the 15th.
No, this did not occur. I never saw any foreign reporters. We didn't leave Nanjing until
the entrance ceremony on the 17th.
– According to the New York Times, when foreign reporters, who remained in Nanjing,boarded the Seta, they saw Japanese soldiers execute 300 prisoners on the quay.

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We stayed at Xiaguan, but I never saw anything like that.
– What was the situation in Nanjing?
There was a senior officer on the Seta, Lieutenant Sekiguchi Kozo (関口鑛造), who
was a relative, and I sent him to inspect Nanjing on the 14th. He reported to me that
Nanjing was calm, that there were no special incidents. Later on, there was nothing
special to report.
– When did you enter Nanjing?
The Seta remained at Xiaguan and, under orders, we captured an ammonium sulfate
factory, which was on the shore opposite from us.
Once, Captain Okamura Motoharu (岡村基晴), a combat aircraft veteran, who was in
the same graduating class as me, came to Nanjing, and we lit candles and gave a toast
at Xiaguan.
The day I entered Nanjing for the first time was the 17th, the day of the entrance
ceremony, I think. I attended the ceremony which was held in the square of the
Nationalist Party Government, and together with General Matsui and Vice Admiral
Hasegawa Kiyoshi, we made a banzai-sansho, or three cheers. Next to me,
Commander Doi Shinji (土井申二) was there and Mr. Doi gave me a Chinese poem
which he wrote.
Guided by the Army, I visited Mt. Zijing and China Gate but no corpses were foundthere. I saw bodies only at the shore of the Yangtze, that is, around Xiaguan and Pukou.
– How many bodies did you see on the shores of the Yangtze?
I think 4,000 to 5,000.
– What bodies did you see?

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As Chinese troops tried to escape the Yangtze, the Japanese Navy stopped them and as
they tried to escape to Pukou, the Japanese Army stopped them. The bodies were result
from these battles.
– Was this the basis of a “massacre”?
They started to call it a “massacre” at the War Trial after the War. At the time there wasa war, therefore, we shot Chinese soldiers in the ensuing chaos and some citizens andresidents who were struggling to escape or fight against us might have been included. It
was a consequence of war. I believe they called those casualties of war, resulting undersuch circumstances, “massacre” victims. China is a propaganda expert--they used theirstyle of exaggeration, hakuhatsu sanzen-jo.
To my knowledge, it was totally impossible to massacre 300,000 in the small confinesof Nanjing Castle.
Lieutenant General Tani Hisao (谷寿夫), Commander of the 6th Division, was executedin Nanjing. Lieutenant General Tani was a man with international thinking and familiar
with international law--such a person would not have ordered a massacre.
After the War Trial, China stopped making claims. Nevertheless, some Japanese visited
China, 40 years since the end of the War, for the opportunity to blame ourselves for
igniting the Nanjing Incident. That's why China has started to make these claims.
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?

I stayed Nanjing until July 1938. I often met with Army personnel. I was given a
consolation gift from Lieutenant General Prince Asaka-no-miya, the Commander of the
Shanghai Expeditionary Army.
In the New Year, 1938, I was in Zhenjiang, where Major General Uchiyama Eitaro (内山英太郎), Commander of a Artillery Brigade, was deployed. We exchanged visits,
Major General Uchiyama visited the Seta several times.
In those days, Captain Onishi Hajime was a staff officer in the Shanghai Expeditionary
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Army and served as the liaison officer between the Army and the Navy. Later, he wasappointed to Chief of the Special Service Agency, so Mr. Onishi knew the most about
matters concerning Nanjing.
Mr. Onishi was a student at the Military Academy at the time I was a student at Naval
Academy, and we had done an orienteering exercise together. He has a strong sense ofjustice and is an honest man. He never pays lip service and I am sure he is a highly
reliable person. Many things have been said about the Nanjing massacre, I really want
to reveal the truth.
Mr. Terasaki was born in November 1900. When he attacked Nanjing, he was 37 years
old. After the Yangtze Operation, he joined the Canton-Hainan Island Operation as astaff officer in the Fifth Fleet. In the Greater East Asian War, he participated in the
Malayan Campaign as a staff officer in the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, then served as
staff officer in the Second Aviation Squadron, then as staff officer in the Combined
Fleet. At the end of the War, he was a captain.
I interviewed Mr. Terasaki in February 1986--he was 85 years old. Even at his age he
was very busy, studying war history, meetings with Suikokai, a Japanese naval officers’organization, and meeting with a service memorial society honoring the Tokkotai, thespecial attack units. He spared time out of his busy day for me. During the interview, hespoke of dates and years without any trouble. I was surprised by his clear memory, andat times, when I encountered unfamiliar Chinese places, he wrote the names down forme.

30) Interview with Commander Doi Shinji (土井申二), Captain of the
Gunboat HiraAs the Marco Polo Bridge Incident broke out in 1937, the Third Fleet headed for
Shanghai in order to protect Japanese residents there and to secure Japanese interests.
The 11th Squadron, which had guard duty in the Yangtze River, started withdrawing
Japanese residents who lived all across China, including Chongqing (重慶), Yichang(宜昌), Shashi (沙市), and Hankou (漢口). The gunboat Hira boarded Japanese people
from Chongqing and returned to Shanghai, that was its last departure from Chongqing.
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Mr. Doi Shinji was the Captain of the Hira. The Hira left Chongqing on August 1 andarrived in Shanghai on August 8. A couple of days later, 52 Japanese who fled Hankou
were unable to reach Shanghai and made it as far as Nanjing.
On August 13, five days after the Hira arrived at Shanghai, the Japanese Naval Landing
Force clashed with the Chinese Army in Shanghai, which turned into a full-scale war.
In the middle of November, as Japanese Troops captured most of Shanghai, the 11th
Squadron, including the Hira, started to open the waterway of the Huangpu (黄埔)River, then headed for the Yangtze River.
On December 1, the 11th Squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral, Kondo Eijirou,
consisted of 24 gunboats and mine sweepers, moved up the Yangtze for Nanjing.
China already gave notice of the closure of the Yangtze to foreign countries. They sunkships to obstruct passage in key areas, and laid underwater mines to close the Yangtze
River completely. In addition, they had several fortresses along the shores of the
Yangtze, including Jiangyin (江陰), Zehenjiang (鎮江) and Mt. Wulong. Under suchconditions, the 11th Squadron advanced up the Yangtze for Nanjing.
I interviewed Mr. Doi Shinji in January 1986, he was over 89 years old. He had no
health problem in particular, and spent his life creating his favorite kanshi, classicalChinese poetry. Also, he has no problem getting around and attended meetings of the
Suikokai.
In Mr. Doi’s room, there were photos of him during his years in the navy, as a naval
ensign, and a photo of the Emperor and Empress. Furthermore, his bookshelves were
full of books and documents relating to the Navy. He spends all of his time surroundedby these things, so he is aware of these times, but that was, after all, a long time ago;some of his recollections were not entirely clear.
Mr. Doi was born in 1896 and graduated from the 45th class of the Naval Academy.
While he served as a Lieutenant Junior Grade, and then as a Lieutenant, he was assigned
to garrison duty in China, and in January 1937, he was appointed captain of the gunboat
Hira.
He worked to protect Japanese residents mainly in Changsha (長沙), Yichang, and220

Chongqing, and then he joined the Nanjing Attack. In February 1938, he returned toTokyo as a temporary on-active-duty instructor, but in 1939, he went China again toparticipate in the Southern China Operation as captain of the gunboat Saga.
“Biographies of China-Related Persons in the Imperial Japanese Navy” – this was abooklet composed by Mr. Okino Matao (沖野亦男), a China expert in the Navy whoserved as an assistant officer to the resident military officer in China. Mr. Doi wasincluded in the list of China-related Navy personnel who loved China, and he wasdescribed as follows; “Mr. Doi served 5 years in Chang Jiang and his soul was kindled
by the beautiful scenery of South and Central China that resulted in him becoming anaesthetic poet.”
At the end of the War, Mr. Doi had the rank of captain.
– You moved up the Yangtze heading for Nanjing?
Yes. Around November 10, we started work to open the Huangpu River, and then went
up the Yangtze, it was December 1, I think. On the way, we landed at Jiangyin. Then,
we advanced to Zhenjiang, where our Hira remained for several days, in order to cover
the river crossing operation by the Amagaya Brigade. In the meantime, the Hodu andthe Seta continued up the River.
– When the Seta attacked Nanjing on the 13th, was your Hira still in Zhenjiang?
I don't remember the date well, but when the Seta went to Nanjing we stayed in
Zhenjiang. The Hira arrived in Nanjing a day or two before the entrance ceremony.
– Did you arrive at Xiaguan?
No, a little bit downstream of Xiaguan, at a place called Zhongxing Wharf. It might
have been Xiaguan but we didn't call it Xiaguan; we called it Zhongxing Wharf. I think
the Seta arrived up-stream of Xiaguan.
– What was the situation at Zhongxing Wharf?

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The area was called Pagoda Bridge Town, which was used as the Chinese army's
military materials base. There were a lot of military materials and railroad siding was
installed for carrying such materials.
At the Paul Temple I saw 6,000 to 7,000 refugees.
– At Pagoda Bridge Town, only the Navy was there?
No, the Army already arrived, though not so many.
– Did you see any corpses in Pagoda Bridge Town?
The battle had started when the Army went in the town, so naturally I saw some war
casualties. And they said they shot thieves who were trying to steal--there were 10 or sobodies.
– Were you at the entrance ceremony on the 17th?
I attended the ceremony.
– What was the situation in Nanjing then?

The inside of Nanjing was almost clean.
– It is said there were bodies around Xiaguan.
When I was headed for the entrance ceremony, we went from Xiaguan to Yi Jiang Gate,
where I saw 5 to 6 bodies near the gate.
At the entrance ceremony, I suggested to Commander Kondo Eijiro that Pagoda Bridge
Town must be organized and secured. He gave me permission to do so, therefore I
returned to Zhongxing Warf on the 26th and started to organize Pagoda Bridge Town.
– Until when did you stay in Pagoda Bridge Town?
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I stayed until the 28th, when I departed to rescue Minesweeper No. 1 which sank off theshores of Mt. Wulong.
Before I left Pagoda Bridge Town, we worked to rebuild the town by clearing thestreets and reconstructing the bridges. A man called Chen Hansen (陳漢森) of the Red
Swastika Society was head of the refugee camp, so I enlisted him to bury bodies.
Also, we tried to return the refugees to their homes. While we were there, the town
seemed well-settled, and I ordered Chen Hansen to change the name Pagoda Bridge
Town to Heiwagai, or Peace Town.
– What role did Chen Hansen play in the Red Swastika Society?
He was the president, or the chairman. He called himself the director of the Nanjing
Branch of the World Red Swastika Society.
I rescued injured sailors from Minesweeper No. 1 and went back to Shanghai. Then I
went to Third Fleet Headquarters to tell the Commander that I could not allow Pagoda
Bridge Town to be neglected, from a humanitarian point of view. Commander
Hasegawa Kiyoshi was pleased to hear what we had done in Pagoda Bridge Town andprovided us with medicines and food for the people. I quickly headed for Pagoda
Bridge Town and on New Year’s Day, 1938, we arrived at Zhongxing Wharf again.
That time, the citizens as well as Chen Hansen welcomed us with firecrackers. The
next day, Chen Hansen visited me and gave me a letter of gratitude.
After Peace Town became calm, the Hira was ordered to guard Wuhu and left
Zhongxing Wharf. Chen Hansen gave me another letter of gratitude and we kept
correspondence with each other until the end of the War. I admire his gratitude.
Mr. Doi kept personal letters, thank-you letters, receipts, and so on that Chen Hansen
sent him. In addition, a large calligraphy, the size of one tatami mat, sent by Chen
Hansen, was mounted and displayed in his room.

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Copy of a letter of gratitude to Commander Doi,with Mr. Chen Hansen’s
signature and stamp.
“As the flames of war spread over Eastern
Asia and engulf the Continent, warships
are going back and forth on the Yangtze
River, and now, heading a fleet, Your
Excellency arrived in Nanjing. Under suchcircumstances, a number of refugees from
Nanjing and Shanghai gathered here. In
order to help these refugees, a branch of
the International Red Swastika Society
was established at Baokuo (保国寺)
Temple, and I, humbly, was appointed tothe head of the branch. When you
anchored your battleship at Jiangbinfu(江浜府), Your Excellency understood thepeople’s need for food and gave us bags offlour and cooking oil that saved a numberof people's lives. Also, you ordered
maintenance work for roads andconstruction of bridges and took commandyourself. Later you named the town Peace (平和) and made a poem for the occasion.
The meaning of the poem is warm like incoming spring sunlight. Soon, you will goback to Japan to report and before that you gave us a photo of yourself. We displayed
the photo on a wall and always admire your greatness and are praying for the friendshipbetween neighboring countries, Japan and China. The sea between the two countries,
Japan and China, is not so wide that fishes and birds always come and go freely, but
unfortunately I am not able to cross the sea to visit you, I can do nothing but give a sighupon seeing the ocean. Consequently, I write you this humble letter for our recollection.
“To Commander Doi, the former Captain of the Gunboat Hira
Chen Hanssen,224the head of the Nanjing Branch of the International Red Swastika Society”– It is said there was massacre in Nanjing.
I don't believe there was a massacre. It was battlefield, therefore, corpses were present,
but I didn't see the bodies of a massacre. As shown in the letter of gratitude, which I got
from the Chinese, the Chinese people tend to express things in an exaggerated way.
Before I published his statement I sent him the manuscript for his confirmation.
Surprisingly, his family told me he died a month after I met with him. When I met him,
he looked very fine; I am truly remorseful.

31) Interview with Lieutenant Shigemura Minoru (重村実), Member of
the Japanese Navy Press Bureau, Shanghai Military OfficeSince the summer of 1936, Lieutenant Shigemura Minoru served as Gunnery
Lieutenant on the destroyer Fumiduki, then as the Division Leader on the Light Cruiser
Tenryu for garrison duty in Shanghai and the Qingdao area. Then he was transferred toJapan to serve as Squad Leader of the Heavy Cruiser Mikuma, but on July 8, 1937, theday after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, he was moved to the Military Office of theNavy in Shanghai. The title of the official appointment was: Staff of the Imperial
Japanese Navy General Staff Office and Staff of the Office of the Commander of theThird Fleet in Shanghai.
Lieutenant Shigemura arrived at his office in Shanghai, and was given a room on thesecond floor of the Military Office. In the city of Shanghai, a number of wild rumors
were in the air and people were panic-stricken. In an area that was usually guarded by aChinese peace keeping force, soldiers of the Chinese regular army inconspicuously
appeared. Soon thereafter, surrounding the International Settlement, sandbagged
trenches were being conspicuously built.
Soon, Japanese people withdrew from the upper Yangtze and Japanese residents fromseveral areas gathered and landed at Shanghai. In the Military Office, there were many
new faces, of military officers who withdrew from various areas in China. In addition,
Dr. Shinobu Junpei (信夫淳平), an international law expert, was invited from Japan by225

Fleet Headquarters and stayed for several days. It was a time of turmoil.
In the afternoon of August 9, Fleet Headquarters got a call from adjutant Chin at Guard
Headquarters in Songhu (松滬), “Something happened.” Assistant officer Okino (沖野),adjutant Chin, and Lieutenant Shigemura rushed to the place and found the body of
Lieutenant Junior Grade Oyama Isao (大山勇夫), machine-gunned to death, on a roadthat was on the Extension of the International Settlement. This was the so-called Oyama
Incident.
That night, when Lieutenant Shigemura was to lead a group of Naval Landing Forcesailors in order to examine and collect the bodies, he invited Japanese and foreign
reporters and correspondents to accompany them. Since then, he has been involved inpublic relations. In those times, even within the Ministry of the Navy, a press bureau did
not exist--it was called the military affairs publicity section.
Since August 13, which was the day after funerals for Lieutenant Junior Grade Oyama
and Seaman Apprentice Saito Yozo (斉藤与蔵) were held, Shanghai was turning into abattlefield. On the 14th, Chinese attacks increased, and when Lieutenant Shigemura
went back to his Military Office he found it that it was burned down from the shooting.
The Military Office was moved into the International Settlement and Lieutenant
Shigemura lived in the Pierce Apartments in the International Settlement.
– When did you go to Nanjing?
On December 17, from Yangshupu (楊樹浦), by airplane. I think I was with Rear
Admiral Honda Tadao (本田忠雄), a resident officer.
– Did you go to Nanjing for the entrance ceremony?
Yes, I stood in line and received General Matsui Iwane and Vice Admiral Hasegawa.
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?
I left there that day by airplane, so I didn't attend the memorial service, which was held
the next day.
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– What was the situation in Nanjing?

As far as I could see, there was nothing out of the ordinary. From the airfield, which
was located outside of the Castle, I went to the ceremony by car and I didn't see any
corpses on the way. Inside of Nanjing, maybe it was already cleaned, it looked to be inorder.
– Do you have any special recollection of Nanjing?
It was the outside Nanjing, near the airfield, where I found several Chinese entering
private homes to steal. It looked like they stole anything, whatever they found--one ofthem carried a stool for a toilet. One of my colleagues jokingly said that it might betoilet stool of Soong May-ling, Chiang Kai-shek’s wife.
– It is said that Japanese soldiers had performed acts of cruelty.
I doubt it. I stayed only a day but I didn't see anything.
– Did you hear any rumors?
I heard a story that, in Nanjing, an amazing number of uniforms were found whichwere abandoned by Chinese soldiers. This meant that the remnants of the Chinese armysneaked into the civilian population. Therefore, Japanese soldiers caught plain-clothedsoldiers and killed them; that's what I heard later. To identify a suspect, whether he wasa soldier or a civilian, the Japanese soldiers used Chinese people to point them out. At
times, wives of men who were pointed out as a soldier desperately denied such acharge. Also, I heard from a reporter that a Chinese who was hired by his newspaper
company was taken away by the Japanese military police so the reporter went to themilitary police and narrowly saved the Chinese in time. I am afraid that on occasion
there were arrests made without substantial evidence.
While I was in Shanghai I saw an incident: a Japanese Army soldier caught a Chineseand I asked him what he was going to do to him. The soldier said, “If this mas issuspicious, I will kill him.” I asked him how he could tell whether the Chinese was227suspicious or not. He said he knew based on the man's look.
On the other hand; during the first Shanghai-Incident, I was serving as platoon leader inthe landing force, and I caught a Chinese man for scrutiny and told him to raise hishands. It was winter and the Chinese man wore heavy Chinese clothes, and as soon as
he lowered his hands, a pistol fell out from his clothes. There were many incidents likethat from the first Shanghai-Incident, so Japanese soldiers must have experienced manydifficulties in the second Shanghai-Incident.
– Did you receive any questions about Nanjing from reporters?
I do not recall being asked questions.
– Some of the reporters said that there were atrocities committed by the Japanesesoldiers, such as Imai, from the Asahi Shimbun.
“Reporter Imai” refers to Mr. Imai Seigo (今井正剛), I think. He is a fine writer, and I
knew him. But I do not remember hearing such a story from him. Mr. Imai came to
Shanghai from Tokyo and I met him often in Shanghai. He was one of the best writers
at the Asahi.
There was an episode: The newspaper usually made a special article for the New Yearand for the New Year of 1947 or 1948, he was selected as one of the writers to report
the news from the north-end of Japan and the south-end of Japan. In those days, thesouthern most end of Japan was Yakushima and he wrote about Yakushima. Yakushima
is a wonderful place where you can catch a lot of fish. In the end, he quit the Asahi
company to start a business in Yakushima, which ended unsuccessfully. Then heworked in Hyogo Prefecture as director of public affairs under Mayor Sakamoto
Masaru. During the Hyogo period he wrote a lot about Hyogo Prefecture--they were
wonderful writings. Mr. Imai and I were friendly after the War, too, but I have neverheard about a massacre from him.
– Who else did you know at the Asahi?
Other than Mr. Imai, Mr. Nakamura Shogo (中村正吾), who was firm, handsome man.
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I met Mr. Imai and Mr. Nakamura at the entrance ceremony in Nanjing. Mr. Nakamura
stayed in Shanghai and when the 10th Army was going to land at Hangzhou Bay, hewent there and followed the 10th Army to Nanjing.
The Asahi branch office was headed by Mr. Shirakawa Ikai (白川威海), and staff
members included Mr. Moriyama Takashi (森山喬) and Mr. Saito Torao (斉藤寅郎).
Among the Shanghai branch offices of newspaper companies, the Asahi boasted thelargest number of staff and cars – they had a solid system.
One day, Hayashi Kenichi (林謙一), a reporter from the Mainichi Newspaper,suggested that we view a Chinese anti-Japan movie. I guessed that Mr. Hayashi was
asked by the intelligence sector to watch the movie – Mr. Hayashi had a wide range ofacquaintances and someone in the intelligence sector who knew Mr. Hayashi thoughtthat it would be better to ask him rather than members of the Japanese Embassy to see
the movie. Thus, the two of us went to a movie theater over the Garden Bridge. In thosetimes, the theaters over the Garden Bridge frequently played such movies.
The inside of the theater was surrounded by an eerie atmosphere. Shortly, on the screen,
the character for “KILL” (殺) appeared, which became bigger and bigger. A man,supposedly Japanese, but we Japanese did not see him as Japanese, cut off the head of a
Chinese with one blow. That was the kind of movie it was, definitely not a
documentary. In those days, these kinds of movies were often made to incite anti-Japanfeelings and after the War, similar pictures were often used as so-called evidence of
cruel acts committed by the Japanese army.
In the Yomiuri Shimbun, they called their Shanghai branch the “Daitoa branch” or“Great Eastern Asia branch”, but, as a matter of fact, the branch actually was managed
by Mr. Tanaka Yukitosh (田中幸利) alone and later, after the flames of battle extended
to Shanghai, two more staff, Mr. Hara Shiro (原四郎) and Mr. Furuta Tokujiro (古田徳二郎) were additionally dispatched.
The Domei Tsushin was headed by Mr. Matsumoto Shigeharu (松本重治) and his staff
included Mr. Sakata Jiro (坂田二郎), Mr. Horiguchi Mizunori (堀口瑞典), Mr. Tonoki
Keiichi (殿木圭一), and Mr. Maeda Yuji (前田雄二). Mr. Sakata came from the Navy’s
reporters' club called Kuroshiokai, the Black Current Society. After the War, I foundsomething in Mr. Sakata's book, which stated that there was massacre in Nanjing. He
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had a strong sense of justice and righteous indignation, if he had known about it then hemust have mentioned it – strangely enough I have never heard about this from him.
Mr. Matsumoto wrote things from those days in his book, Shanghai Sojourn, which
nicely expressed the facts and the sentiment as a person involved in journalism.
– In Shanghai Sojourn, it said that General Matsui gave a sharp reprimand at the
memorial service.

Yes. That time I was back to Shanghai already but I heard later that General Matsui
gave an admonition at the memorial service.
– From whom did you hear this?

I don't remember well, but everyone knew this. I thought the troops had done somethingso bad--that's why General Matsui warned his troops. General Matsui said repeatedlythat we should treat the Chinese with affection. The troops had done what he hated
most.
– What do you mean by “so bad”?
I heard about the plain-clothed soldiers, so I thought the troops killed them. I thought“so bad” meant several hundred of them.
– It is said that there were hundreds and thousands.
After the War, people started to say “hundreds and thousands”, but if that were true, it
was not just “so bad” but far from it. The thinking in those times was quite different
from the thinking that existed after the War. It was true, as reported after the War, that
the Navy shot Chinese soldiers with machine-guns at Xiaguan, but it was battle andthere were not many casualties.
– Have you ever met General Matsui?
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Once, in Shanghai. He was not a person to make boasts.
– Does this mean that General Matsui’s intensions were not conveyed to his
subordinates?
We cannot say simply that the troops committed excesses. If you were not in battle, you
cannot understand individual thinking under battlefield conditions. I will give you one
example: it was in the first Shanghai-Incident, a petty officer in my platoon, who was avery brave man, was on sentinel duty after a battle, and one of his subordinates got
injured. I ordered him to watch the operation on his subordinate. In the operating room,
the petty officer, such a brave man on the battlefield, was pale and trembling.
In those days, the Navy had many volunteers who were trained well, organized in small
groups, orders from the top were conveyed smoothly – they were professionals. But in
the Army they were not professionals. The Army consisted mostly of draftees, thenumber of soldiers was too unwieldy, spread out over wide areas, orders from the top
were not conveyed well, and showed their natural behaviors, as is. The Army men weretypical Japanese; Japanese they were.
– Have you heard about Army staff officer Cho Isamu at the time?
I have never met him, but heard a rumor. The rumor was that he was like Ban
Dan’emon, a boasting samurai, in a kodan story.
– Did foreign reporters ask something about Nanjing?
When the Lieutenant Junior Grade Oyama Incident happened, I brought along foreign
reporters to the scene, and they understood it was not of our doing. Since then, it was
decided that a position dedicated to foreign reporters was needed and Mr. Isobe Taro
(磯部太郎), of the 31st class of the Naval Engineering College, was appointed to theposition. Mr. Isobe and I lived at the Pierce Apartments and had dinner together every
night unless we had special business. While we had dinner we chatted about things but
I had never heard from him that he got questions from foreign reporters about Nanjing.
If he had, he would have told me during our daily discussions.

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– At the time, the accidental shooting incident of British Ambassador KnatchbullHugessen and the accidental sinking of the Panay occurred. How did you handle thesematters?
Such important matters were handled by Military Resident Officer Honda and theThird Fleet.
– How long did you stay in Shanghai?

I stayed there until March 1938, when I was transferred to Japan.
As I asked Mr. Shigemura for an interview, he declined my request at first, saying that
he saw nothing particular, saying that he was not of any use. In those times, information
on Nanjing flowed from Shanghai to Japan and to the rest of the world. To the Naval
Press Bureau in Shanghai, where Mr. Shigemura worked, the information on Nanjing
must have flowed to him. What kind of information on Nanjing did the Navy received?
The information might have been different from the information that the Army received.
In order to check this, I asked Mr. Shigemura for another interview. He accepted mythird request. It was the end of December 1985.
After the War, Mr. Shigemura was actively engaged in the broadcast industry, including
Nippon Hoso, Yamaguchi Hoso, and Radio Kanto.

32) Interview with Lieutenant Commander Genda Minoru (源田実),
Staff Officer of the 2nd Combined Air Group
Lieutenant Commander Genda Minoru, a staff officer of the 2nd Combined Air Groupwas involved in the Pearl Harbor Attack in 1941, then was a staff officer of the 1st Air
Fleet, and in 1945 he was Commander of the 343rd Sky (Matsuyama) Naval Air Group,
shooting down incoming B-29 in his fighter plane Shidenkai – he was well-known for
this.
After the War, he served as the Chief of Staff of the Air Self-Defense Force, and thenfrom 1962 to 1986 he served as a member of the House of Councilors.
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I interviewed Mr. Genda in his office at the Diet Members' Hall.
On December 3, 1937, the 2nd Combined Air Group advanced its front base to
Changzhou, in concert with the Army which started to attack Nanjing. The Groupbombed Nanjing. The 2nd Combined Air Group attacked Nanjing everyday and on
December 12, the 13th Air Group, under the 2nd Combined Air Group, accidentally
struck the US gunboat Panay in the Yangtze.
– When the 2nd Combined Air Group moved its front base to Changzhou, did you move
to Changzhou too?

No, I stayed in the Kunda (公大) base and visited Changzhou only when necessary. Air
Rear Admiral Mitsunami Teizo (三並貞三), the Commander, remained at Kunda baseas well.
– Upstream of Nanjing, the Panay Incident occurred.
The air corps mistook the Panay as a Chinese warship and accidentally attacked it--it
was not intentional.
We never expected a US gunboat there. Nanjing was war zone and the US had many
options to avoid it, like going further upstream. I felt that they stayed in Nanjing inorder to provoke us, somehow.
The person who hit the Panay was Lieutenant Murata Shigeharu (村田重治),
nicknamed Butsu. He was the leader of the thunderbolt corps, in the Pearl Harbor
Attack. He was a great man.
– Did the 2nd Combined Air Group know that the Panay was in the Yangtze?
My guess is that they knew.
– It was a big diplomatic issue, wasn't it?

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Yes, it surely was. Due to that the Commander Mitsunami was admonished.
– For the investigation of the incident, Lieutenant Colonel Nishi Yoshiaki (西義章)
from the Army went to Nanjing. From the Navy, who went there?
No one in particular.
– On the next day, Nanjing fell. What did the Flying Corp do?
The Flying Corps was still in battle, so remained in Changzhou and after a week, we
moved our base to an airfield in Nanjing. I also operated airplanes to go to Nanjing.
– Did you attend the entrance ceremony?
No, I didn't. I went to Nanjing after the ceremony was completed.
– What was the situation in Nanjing City?

We set the Headquarters near the airfield and I went to and fro every day, between theairfield and Headquarters, so I knew nothing about the city. Also, after we arrived at
Nanjing, we started bombing Nanchang and Hankou, so we were very busy during
those operations.
–The Shanghai Expeditionary Army and Navy gunboats came to Nanjing. Did you meetthose people?
The Flying Corps was involved only in limited matters, which were related aviation, so
I never met anyone who was not related with aviation.
– In those days, a “Nanjing massacre” was said to have occurred.
I knew nothing about this. As far as the Navy was concerned, such an act was against
Bushido, the samurai spirit, and this would never have happen.

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– Did you hear any rumors?
Not at all.
– In the Army someone said it happened.
I don't know about Army. Generally speaking, in those days the Japanese people
vividly remembered the earlier Nanjing-Incident, that is; in 1927, the Japanese
Consulate in Nanjing was attacked and plundered. And Japan fought against China so
we had hostile feelings toward Chinese. I myself called Chinese Chankoro then, it wassuch a time.
However, in the Navy, I warned my soldiers that we should not kill prisoners or anyone
who could not resist, and if such things happened, then they would be punishedheavily. At the Pearl Harbor attack, someone said we should attack the town as well,but I definitely said NO.
And after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the 1st Air Fleet attacked the British fleet in the
Indian Ocean and at the eastern shore of Ceylon, sank the aircraft carrier Hermes. At
that time we found an enemy soldier floating near the aircraft carrier Akagi and picked
him up. In the course of battle, it was not easy to save a person at sea. It took time but,anyway, we saved him. Some of the sailors were furious with anger and tried to hit
him. I stopped him and inspected the enemy myself. I found that he was a Canadiansailor. He troubled me at first by refusing to eat, but later he ate curry rice. Like that,some soldiers did not control themselves, but in the Navy, the treatment of prisoners
was clearly defined.
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?
The 2nd Combined Air Group set its base in Nanjing for a while but I was appointed to
Chief of the Yokosuka Flying Corps and went back to Japan in January. I operated
planes to go back to Japan from Nanjing. So my stay in Nanjing was 3 weeks or so.
– What was the situation around the base in Nanjing?

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I think there was no severe damage in the suburbs around the airfield. It looked
ordinary and I met the New Year, 1938, in Nanjing quietly.

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Chapter 3
Nanjing as Observed by Artists and Photographers…..Chinese soldiers who were left behind later attacked Japanese troops. ….
Also, Chinese soldiers who escaped from Nanjing by crossing the Yangtze battled against
Japanese troops during the Zuzhou Operation in April. Under such a circumstance,
Japanese soldiers needed to clear out Chinese soldiers. That was war. Otherwise, Japanesesoldiers would be killed. Without knowing the entire picture, one would never know thereality by taking in a single segment. This holds for the so-called Nanjing Massacre as
well. (Statement by Mr. Sumitani Iwane (住谷磐根), Artist and Naval Correspondent.)

Out on the streets, Chinese civilians sold vegetables they grew in theirown gardens. (December 15, 1937)23733) Interview with Mr. Sumiya Iwane (住谷磐根), Artist and Naval
Correspondent

I interviewed artist Sumiya Iwane about the Nanjing Attack at a museum in Ueno. It
was spring of 1986, and the 25th anniversary exhibition of Daichowa-ten, initiated by
Mushanokoji Saneatsu, was held at the Ueno-no-mori Museum. Mr. Sumiya was amember of the Japanese Paintings Section for the exhibition and he also exhibited his
own work. When I asked him for interview he offered to speak to me about Nanjing
within the environment of paintings that he appreciated.
Mr. Sumiya was born in 1902, won an award from the Nikaten, a well-known Japaneseartists organization, at the age of 22. Despite receiving an award from the Nikaten, hestarted a movement against the Nikaten. In 1937, with the outbreak of the China
Incident, he heard from someone that the Navy wanted combat artists. Mr. Sumiya
jumped at the chance to go to China and paint, and applied for the position. His
application, however, was quickly turned down. His family in Gunma prefecture wasrich but his eldest brother Sumiya Etsuji (住谷悦治), a professor of Doshisha
University then, later the Dean of the University, was regarded as an unfavorable person
who had “dangerous thoughts”. Mr. Sumiya sent a letter directly to the Minister of theNavy Yonai Mitsumasa. On September 8, three combat artists, Kobayakawa Atsushiro(小早川篤四郎), Yoshihara Yoshihiko (吉原義彦), and Iwakura Tomokata (岩倉具方)
left for Shanghai as the first combat artists-correspondents. The letter to the Minister
didn't work, so Mr. Sumiya went to Colonel Mori Tokuji (森徳治), the head of the
fourth department of military affairs, and made an appeal in person, He was finallyaccepted. Mr. Sumiya was the 8th combat artist. He was 35 years old then.
In November 1937, Mr. Sumiya arrived in Shanghai, at the Naval Officers’ office. The
10th Army had already landed at Hangzhou Bay, and the situation around Shanghaichanged rapidly. Mr. Sumiya used the Press Bureau of the Military Officers office of theNavy as his base and visited the Landing Forces and warships. In the beginning ofDecember, when he was on the warship Izumo, which was anchored near the Japanese
Consulate, he heard news that the capture of Nanjing was only a matter of time. So heboarded the gunboat Toka (栂), which was about to leave for Nanjing.

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– When did you arrive in Nanjing?
The Toka, on which I was on board, was under the 11th Squadron and its departurefrom Shanghai was delayed for some reason. It took 2 to 3 days after leaving the
Huangpu River in Shanghai to arrive in Nanjing.
As we reaching Nanjing—from far away we saw that Nanjing was in flames—and as
we neared, within 1,500 or 2,000 meters, I saw Chinese soldiers on boats trying toescape toward Pukou. The Toka shelled them, and the Chinese soldiers who held onto
planks or something that floated, here and there, were shot at by rifles. The distance
was short, 4 to 5 meter from the deck to the water surface, no one missed a shot. It was
winter, so if they were not shot, they would have died soon enough anyway. I saw a
soldier look at us and pray.
When we arrived in Nanjing, it was night and in upstream of Xiaguan Wharf, where
we arrived, I found the gunboat Atami. I stayed overnight on the gunboat Atami andthe next morning, I transferred to the Atago (愛宕), the flagship of the 11th Squadron.
– When did you land in Nanjing?

I think it was the day when I moved over to the Atago. I went to Nanjing and was
surprised to see a number of ropes hanging over the rampart, which looked like acurtain. I thought that the Chinese soldiers used those ropes to escape.
– How many ropes were hanging?
One to two hundred at least. There was the Lion Rock (獅子山) in Nanjing. I entered
Nanjing through Xing Zhong Gate (興中門), which was closest to the Lion Rock.
Around the gate, I found a number of steel helmets and bodies of Chinese soldiers andI almost slipped on the blood.
– How many bodies did you see?
Dozens of them. I assumed a battle occurred there, too.

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– What was the situation inside of Nanjing?

A day or two afterward, I found a bicycle in Nanjing near the Xing Zhong Gate and I
cycled around Nanjing with the bicycle and made sketches. There were fields and hills
in Nanjing; it was quiet, I saw no Chinese, and there were also very few Japanesesoldiers.
I entered the municipal administration hall and the military officers’ headquarters andwas surprised to find that the second floor and third floor were used as stables. If they
had left their horses outside, Japanese airplanes would have found them so they kept
horses inside. Just then, I came across Shimizu Toshi (清水登之) who was sketching.
It seemed he came to Nanjing after I did. He had no bicycle, but I had one so I could go
here and there--even outside Nanjing Castle I make sketches.
In those days, I wore knickerbockers and fur, and carried a shoulder bag; I have looked
suspicious. Suddenly, someone far away shouted “Oo-i” to me, so hurriedly I grabbed arising sun flag and waved it. As I went closer, I found three Japanese soldiers who said
that they thought I was Chinese soldier and were about to shoot me. They told me that
the Chinese soldiers would shoot at them from anywhere – they were very scared ofChinese soldiers. Also, I saw several dogs fighting each other over the body of a
Chinese soldier.
That day, after I made sketches in many places, I was on my way back, 5 to 6 dogs – I
was not sure if they were from same group that I saw in the afternoon – tried to follow
me. I fled for my life by pedaling the bicycle but the pedals were only the stems, it was
really hard work. I shook off the dogs at last, then I found myself at a different gate, notthe one I saw in the morning, so I had to make a U-turn to head for Xing Zhong Gate.
While I was cycling, I was singing a part of popular song, “For His Majesty theEmperor,” which was very popular then, in a loud voice because I worried thatJapanese soldiers might mistake me for a Chinese soldier. As expected, when I cameclose to Xing Zhong Gate, the soldier on sentry duty told me he was about to shoot me
as he thought I was a Chinese soldier. The song saved me.
– It is said there were many prisoners in Nanjing.
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That day when I came back in dark, I saw dark shadows ahead of me as I came to close
Xing Zhong Gate. The road would have looked white, had there been no shadows fromthe buildings. So I wondered what was going on. I passed over the shadow at the Xing
Zhong Gate, and found that the shadow was a group of Chinese soldiers walking
slowly.
When I went back the Ataka, the staff officers had just finished their meals and werechatting. They told me that they were worried that I might have been mistaken for a
Chinese soldier and killed. Then I went to the staff officers’ room and heard the radio
operator: Chinese stragglers were caught in Nanjing, that had already been reported to
the Third Fleet. Responding to the report the radio operator asked what happened to thestragglers. It seemed that said stragglers were the Chinese soldiers I saw hours ago.
Then, a Junior Grade Lieutenant stood up with his military sword, saying he was goingto test his sword, and I followed him. On the top of the wharf, an iron fence stood,
beyond it was a breakwater with concrete, where Japanese soldiers lined up 4 to 5
Chinese soldiers, stabbed them in the back and pushed them down to the concrete
below. There were 20 or so Japanese soldiers and there were just under about 1,000
Chinese soldiers. Seeing that, the Junior Grade Lieutenant lost the energy to test hissword. I turned a flashlight on to see, then the Japanese soldiers warned me I would getsplashed by blood if I stood there, and I went back.
Next morning, I got up early and went to see the bodies. On the concrete were a numberof bodies--I counted 800 or so. Among them, some moved their hands or were rustling;
not yet quite dead. They had been stabbed in the back with swords and some of thewounds were not fatal. I believe that was what was later called the so-called Nanjing
Massacre.
– Were there any rules regarding captured stragglers?
I don't want to say this, but the Japanese soldiers lost their comrades, their war brothers;
so in their mind, they were after revenge.
– Was there any other option?

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The Japanese Army moved to Nanjing very quickly, therefore, on the way to Nanjing
they overtook a significant number of Chinese soldiers. Chinese soldiers who were left
behind later attacked Japanese troops.
In March of the following year, 1938, when I was in Wu-xi, I heard that Japanese troops
at Taihu Lake were surrounded by 10,000 Chinese soldiers and the Toyohashi troop
rushed over to help them. Also, Chinese soldiers who escaped from Nanjing bycrossing the Yangtze battled against Japanese troops during the Zuzhou Operation in
April. Under such a circumstance, Japanese soldiers needed to clear out Chinese
soldiers. That was war. Otherwise, Japanese soldiers would be killed. Without knowing
the entire picture, one would never know the reality by taking in a single segment. This
holds for the so-called Nanjing Massacre as well.
The Chinese soldiers who fought to the end at Nanjing Castle were best soldiers andmost of them were killed in the battle. The remaining soldiers were mob as written in
the book The Good Earth by Pearl Buck. I witnessed several times such things myself.
Commander Hasegawa Kiyoshi, Vice Admiral, demanded that the valuable historicalruins along the Yangtze be preserved. However, when we went Jiujiang (九江), Wuhan
San Zhen, and so on, we found that Chinese soldiers always fled into the ruins without
concern for their historical value; those were Chinese soldiers.
Besides, in those times, we did not have enough food so there was no other choice. In
the staff officers’ room on the Ataka, a staff officer offered me yokan, a traditional
Japanese sweet if I liked sweets or whiskey if I liked alcohol. I declined his offer
because I had just finished my meal, but he insisted, “Please take them,” so I did. The
next day, I gave the food to people at Air Corps Nango, Shiota and Wada, the airfield inNanjing. They were very pleased because the Air Corps did not have a lot of food either.
Only on naval warships did you find any food.
– Did you see any other executions?
The only execution I saw was at the wharf.
– It was said that civilians were gathered in one place in Nanjing.

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Yes. At first, I didn't see any Chinese at all, but a couple of days later, I found a sign,“Refugee Zone,” which was written in large letters so that it could be seen from far
away. I went in and found many civilians. The people there were Chinese who could not
escape from Nanjing. They knew the Japanese army would attack Nanjing and they
thought that they would be killed. Still, they remained in Nanjing because they were
helpless.
Access to this area was strictly limited and even other Chinese couldn't come in. The
civilians who remained in Nanjing stayed in the Refugee Zone. Chinese soldiers
escaped and hardly any remained. Therefore, a so-called massacre could not haveoccurred in Nanjing. Later, I went to many places by bicycle and made a lot of sketches
but never saw anything like a “massacre” at all.
– Did you see the entrance ceremony?
Yes. I attended both the entrance ceremony and the memorial service.
– Until when did you stay in Nanjing?
While the 11th Squadron was in Xiaguan, I visited each warship and got the signaturesof the commanders and vice commanders on my shikishi, hard poetry card. The shikishi
were donated to the Togo Shrine after the War.
The next year, 1938, on January 8, the train between Shanghai and Nanjing started
running so I took the train to go back to Shanghai. We closed all windows as aprecaution against any remaining enemies, but Matsui Suisei (松井翠声), a comic-chatartiste, who visited to consol us, entertained us along the way. The next day, the 9th, I
visited the gunboat Izumo to salute Commander Hasegawa. After I came back to
Shanghai, I visited Taihu Lake on the Artillery Boat Unit of the Navy, and returnedJapan in April. So I was in Central China for 6 months in total.
After that, artist Sumiya went to China again and continued drawing in China until theoutbreak of the Greater East Asian War. After the outbreak of the Greater East AsianWar, Mr. Sumiya became non-regular staff, treated the same as a captain, and went to
the Southern area.
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The interview with Mr. Sumiya at the Museum in Ueno lasted four and half hours. For
his age, 84, Mr. Sumiya showed no fatigue and his story was not yet over. I also wanted
to hear more but Mr. Sumiya said he had to prepare supper so we made a promise to talkagain at the next opportunity.
Mr. Sumiya’s long discussion was done for caution--in order to avoid misunderstanding.
He was afraid that if discussion focused solely on Nanjing, then the so-called Nanjing
Incident could not be understood. So he started with the Navy in those times – weneeded to know about the battle before anything else. His four-and-a-half hour talk was
mainly dedicated to the understanding of the battlefield and he emphasized that thebattle of Nanjing was an extension of the battle of Shanghai.

34) Interview with Mr. Watanabe Yoshio (渡辺義雄), Photographer,
Information Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
At the beginning of the Showa era (1926 –1989), new photographers were created, one
after another. The word “press photos” was first created in those times and Natori
Yonosuke (名取洋之助), who studied in Germany, started an English language graphic
magazine, “NIPPON”, in 1934. In 1936, the photo-magazine Life started in the US,
which gained tremendous popularity. After the outbreak of the China Incident,
photography attracted attention as an important medium for journalism--cameras werevery popular among the soldiers, too.
Mr. Watanabe Yoshio was 30 years old then, and he was already well-known as a rising
renowned photographer, as were Natori Yonosuke and Kimura Ihei (木村伊兵衛).
In those days, China made efforts to make world opinion favorable to China by using
various means of propaganda. As soon as the China Incident broke out, China provokedanti-Japan sentiment and spread photos to win the world’s sympathy--this wascompletely successful. Therefore, the Information Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs needed to give foreign countries the real story behind the China Incident and forthat purpose they organized a film crew team to take photographs and make news films,
and took film of Shanghai and Nanjing. Mr. Watanabe Yoshio and Mr. Kimura Ihei were244

selected as the photographers of the film crew team.
On December 12, 1937 the film crew team left Nagasaki, took film of Shanghai andNanjing and returned to Nagasaki the next year, on January 14, 1938. They took a onemonth journey for filming. During that time, Mr. Watanabe visited Nanjing twice to takefilms.
Mr. Watanabe was born in 1907. In 1933, he held a private exhibition at the age of 26
years old, and in 1934, together with Mr. Kimura Ihei, established the International
Press Photographs Society. The photo “Bunraku” was a representative work before theWar.
After the War, while teaching at Nihon University, he took many photos of buildings
including “Katsura Rikyu” and “Ise Jingu”, for which he received the Mainichi Art
Award. In 1958, he was appointed to Chair the Japan Photographers Society and served
until 1981. He has a round face, round body and “round” personality.
Currently, Mr. Watanabe serves as the Honorary Chairperson of the Japan
Photographers Society, a giant in the photography industry, yet he is still active as aphotographer.
He said he talks a lot about photography but rarely talks about Nanjing. Putting his
finger on his forehead, he tried to remember Nanjing and started to talk.
– What was the purpose of the film trip?
As soon as the out break of the China Incident, a photo in which a Chinese baby wascrying at a Shanghai train station was published in US newspapers and became a topic
of discussion. Japan was terrible, they did wrong even to such a young child. This kindof public opinion arose in the US and the US increasingly sympathized with China
against Japan.
However, this photo was not the original photo, and in the original, there was an adult,
who looked like the father, standing nearby, who was trying to hold the child or adjust
him, but the father was brushed out and the photo, of the child crying alone, wascreated. The retouched photo was sent to the US through an unknown route andbecame a sensation. In those times, a shocking picture like this was not common, so it
was tremendously effective in the beginning of the war. After the War, a photo245

magazine in the US published the original photo, with the father. Retouching
techniques were well-known as early as the Taisho era (1912-1926), they could have
known about this if they had checked carefully. I was teaching photojournalism at
Nihon University after the War, and this revelation of the real photos was very
impressive.
At the time, China often used these kinds of strategies. So the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs decided to take photos and films, and deliver them worldwide in order to show
the real Japanese Army. They wanted to show the actual state of our holy war,
especially to the US. One of activities in the holy war was to help the refugees, which
was performed by the Pacification Unit and my job was to take film of their work.
Headed by the first secretary, Ogawa Noboru, who had earlier served as the chargéd'affaires ad interim in Czechoslovakia, and that time worked at the Information
Bureau, our team went to Shanghai and Nanjing. Mr. Ogawa was a very talented
person—he could even perform Joruri, which made our trip quite fun. Members were:
Mr. Goto Kotaro (後藤光太郎), who was in charge of office work in the Information
Bureau and handling photos as well as taking care of us, plus two photographers andtwo cinematographers, so there were a total of six of us.

In

1937, a photo of a crying baby, who appeared to be abandoned in rubble resulting fromJapanese bombing, appeared in the American magazine Life(left). However, in the original
photo, you can see a father-like adult beside the baby, who seems to be watching the baby
(right). From History of the 20th Century – vol. 5, World War II – Scenes of Battle Fire, edited by
J. Campbell, Heibon-sha)
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– In some reports at the time, they stated that the group had 12 members.

No, I think it was only 6 members. The photographers were Mr. Kimura and me, thecinematographers were Mr. Nakayama, who came from a movie studio, and one other(and Mr. Ogawa and Mr. Goto). I can say this because I have a photo form the time andeveryone is in it.
– Did you go to Nanjing at once?
To my memory, we stayed at an inn in Shanghai the night we arrived, and the next day
we headed for Nanjing. We went up the Yangtze on a minesweeper. In theminesweeper, I found Saijo Yaso (西條八十), a poet, and other war novelists andcombat artists.
– When did you arrive at Nanjing?
We stayed overnight in the minesweeper and we arrived at Nanjing next day. I don't
remember well but it was a couple of days before the entrance ceremony.
– Did you arrive at Xiaguan Wharf?
Yes. As we arrived at Xiaguan, a soldier told us that they were doing decapitations at aplace 300 meters or 500 meters ahead, cutting the heads along the shore and dropped
them into the river. “Soon the River will become red,” he continued, then added, “Why
don't you come and see?” Mr. Kimura hated to see even ordinary dead bodies and hesaid “NO.”– Did the soldier say the river would turn red?
Yes. Actually the river did not turn red, but he said so.
– Did you not dare to take a look?

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Like Mr. Kimura, I didn't like such things, so if Mr. Kimura didn't go, then I didn't go; I
did not want to go alone. Mr. Ogawa, too, didn't say he would go.
Thinking about this now, I should have gone and seen it as a journalist, even if I didn't
take photos. Things that you saw and things that you heard about are quite different.
Some photographers tried to take photos of crimes for the purpose of making
accusations or for exposure, but I didn't have such a thought, so even if I went to see, I
wouldn't have taken photos.
– Was the beheading done openly?

The soldier asked me, “Why don't you watch? Why don't you take photos?” – he nevertried to hide. Those soldiers were filled with anger because their comrades, or war
brothers, had just been killed so they were out for revenge. They said, “Serves you
right! Revenge taken! Feels good!”– Did you think that they didn't think that they themselves had done something cruel?
I think they didn't feel that way then. Revenge taken—that was all in their minds.
Words such as cruel and massacre were used starting after the War.
– What did you feel when you heard that they were cutting heads off?
On the previous day, I saw the result of a furious battle in Dachang Town, Shanghai, so
when I heard what those soldiers said, I somehow agreed with them. It was cruel yet
understandable. At the time, I thought killing by sword was reasonable punishment for
Chinese soldiers.
– Were the Chinese who were cut to death prisoners?
A couple of days later, I met two Japanese soldiers, an officer and petty officer, andasked them about the prisoners. They said they caught the prisoners and kept in a
prison in Nanjing, but there were too many of them to be kept at the prison. Besides,248they didn't have food for the prisoners, so they had no choice but to kill them. The twosolders snapped at me – “How would you manage feeding them?” Hearing that, I
agreed with them; there was no other choice.
– How many prisoners were caught?
I heard around 10,000 including prisoners and criminals. Some of them were killed, but
I don't know whether they killed only criminals or not and if prisoners were included, I
didn't know how many.
– Did you see something else the day you arrived in Nanjing?
All the doors of the street shops were opened and the showcases were empty. I believethat the Chinese stole the goods. The rich Chinese had already escaped and the poor
remained, who ransacked the shops.
– Was this not done by Japanese soldiers?

I don’t think so. The houses in the streets were empty so Japanese soldiers used themfor their lodgings. And I found something then – Chinese people used special paper
money for funerals. They put them in the coffin with the body. You could not use thispaper money as if it was real. This money was spread all over the streets. Some
Japanese soldiers didn't know that and collected them as if they were valuables.
That night, we went to the embassy, which was managed by three Chinese and stayed
the night there. However, there was no food in the embassy so we went to acommanding officer, with whom Mr. Ogawa was acquainted, and got food. We
believed that we could get food in Nanjing. But, as a matter of fact, the Japanesesoldiers entered Nanjing without food or water. Had we known this beforehand, we
could have brought food from Shanghai; we regretted this. I remember, that night, we
slept on the floor on blankets in a spacious room of the embassy.
– Was there any consulate staff from Shanghai?

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I don't think so. Only our group. There were only the three Chinese who were hired.
On the morning of the next day, a woman from the Refugee Zone came to the Embassy
and complained that a Japanese soldier took a woman away. We stayed two nights atthe Embassy, both days we got the same complains. The soldiers came here without
enough food or water, so maybe the head of the unit was ignoring this – I had mixed
feelings on hearing this.
– Have you seen with your own eyes any acts of cruelty by Japanese soldiers?
I didn't see any real moments of cruelty done by Japanese soldiers.
As far as bodies were concerned, I saw bodies thrown into the bushes, which wereplanted in the center of a rotary at a crossing of two wide streets – one was of a Chinese
soldier with a cut in the middle of his forehead, and a couple of bodies with their heads
cut from the back. The blood stopped running but their faces were dark with blood, it
was terrible. I was scared to even look.
– Anything else?
The only bodies that I saw with my own eyes were at that rotary.
– What places did you visit in Nanjing?

I went to the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. I strolled around the city, but without a car, myrange was limited to walking distance.
– What kind of photos did you take?
I went to the Refugee Zone and took pictures of the Japanese soldiers who were giving
the refugees food. The Japanese army had the idea of helping the refugees as soon as
they captured the city, so in the Refugee Zone in Nanjing, too, soldiers distributed to
the refugees a portion of rice or handed out comfort bags, one by one. I took pictures of
that.
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– As you mentioned earlier, it was claimed that women in the Refugee Zone were being
kidnapped. Was the Refugee Zone in order?
Nothing happened during the daytime. I saw Japanese soldiers in charge and refugees in
the Refugee Zone chatted and I took pictures of them. Photographers were allowed toenter the Refugee Zone but ordinary soldiers were not. So perhaps some soldierssneaked into the Refugee Zone at night and did such things.
– Did you take pictures of the entrance ceremony?
I took photos of General Matsui entering Nanjing. I took the picture at the Zhongshan
East Road, and Mr. Kimura took pictures of the place of the ceremony, the Nationalist
Government’s former headquarters. At that time, I met a photographer from the Asahi
Shimbun, Kojima Tadao (小島忠郎).
– How long did you stay in Nanjing?
To my memory, I took pictures of the entrance ceremony and then the next day, went
back to Shanghai. After I returned to Shanghai, I stayed at a hotel close to Garden
Bridge, where reporters from the Mainichi Shimbun stayed were as well..
Once, in Shanghai, I was invited by a Chinese who was acquainted with Mr. Ogawa. He
was a broad-minded man, and had no hostile feeling toward the Japanese. This Chinese
man said that he regarded this war as a war between the Japanese Army and ChiangKai-shek’s Army. Not just him, but other Chinese people living in the International
Settlement behaved as if they had nothing to do with the war. Shanghai was lively andbustling and Mr. Kimura and I often went out for enjoyment.
I visited Nanjing in the new year, 1938, again. At that time, the Head of the Information
Bureau, Kawai Tatsuo (河相達夫), arrived in Shanghai and he wanted to go to Nanjing,
so we went to Nanjing by a Navy flying boat from Yangshupu. At that time, Mr. Kimuraremained in Shanghai, so three from my group, Mr. Ogawa, Mr. Goto and I, went toNanjing. I remember we felt terribly chilly in the flying boat.
– Did you take any pictures of Nanjing again?
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I did, but I didn't go there to take anything in particular.
– What was the situation in Nanjing then?

Most of troops left Nanjing so no soldiers were left for a photo opportunity.
The refugees were still in the Refugee Zone. I heard gunshots occasionally from thedirection of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, but there did not seem to be enemies there.
– What did you do with the photos you took?
Those photos were exhibited at the Mitsukoshi Department Store in March, titled,“Nanjing – Shanghai Press Photo Exhibition,” and that it was very successful, so I wastold.
I sent my photos to foreign countries, their ministries of foreign affairs, as well as themagazine Life but nothing was published – so I heard later. In those times, the US's antiJapan feeling was quite obvious and they knew that the photos were taken by theJapanese so rejection was just a matter of course.
All the photos that I took were burned during the US air raid on March 9, 1945.

35) An Interview with Mr. Koyanagi Jiichi (小柳次一), Member of the
Army Press TeamIn March 1937, Mr. Koyanagi Jiichi, who was active as freelance photographer, wasintroduced to Natori Yonosuke by Wada Hidekichi (和田日出吉), who was a managerof the Chugai Shogyou Shinpo (currently the Nihon Keizai Shimbun), and Mr. Koyanagi
decided to join Nihon Kobo. At the time, Natori Yonosuke had returned from Germany
where he realized the importance of press photos, and established Nihon Kobo to launch
the magazine NIPPON in order to introduce Japan overseas. At first, Domon Ken (土門拳) was the only staffer, shortly thereafter, Fujimoto Shihachi (藤本四八) joined.
252

Soon the China Incident occurred. At the time, Natori Yonosuke, who had seen how
Japan was negatively regarded in the western media, insisted that Japan must reportnews from the Japanese perspective. He went to Army Central Authorities but they
didn't listen to Natori's idea. Then Natori Yonosuke went to Shanghai and repeatedly
explained his idea. At last, he was able to successfully persuade Major Kaneko
Toshiharu (金子俊治), who was in charge of publicity of the Headquarters of the
Shanghai Expeditionary Army. Thus, Nihon Kobo was assigned the job of taking films,
and Mr. Natori Yonosuke and Mr. Koyanagi went to Shanghai. Mr. Koyanagi was 30
years old then.
– What was your position then?
At first, when Natori went to the Army as well as the Navy to talk about the importanceof press pictures, they didn't want to listen at all. So Natori went to Major Kaneko, who
was in charge of propaganda operations towards China in the Army’s Special Service
Agency in Shanghai, and successfully convinced Major Kaneko the importance of
publicity and media. Some Army heads even stated that war correspondents wereuseless. Under such circumstances, if we officially belonged to the Army, then wewould be strictly bounded by their orders, so we asked Major Kaneko that our position
be non-paying and that we’d be non-regular staff in order retain freedom to take photos.
The position was supposedly non-paying but actually I got an allowance from the
Army’s secret service fund. The conditions were all negotiated by Natori. So myposition in those days was as a member of the Press Team in the Special Service
Agency as well as an employee of Nihon Kobo.
Mr. Natori was a photographer who was well-known abroad, and we sent and sold ourphotos under Natori’s name to photo-magazines, newspapers, and publishers all over
the world.
Shortly, it was decided to publish photos under the name of the photographer who
actually took the photo, and in March 1938, the photo of the executing of a spy inNanjing appeared in Life under my name.
– When did you go to Nanjing?

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As soon as Natori concluded negotiating our status, Natori and I left Japan at the end of
December 1937 and we arrived in Shanghai in 1938. I knew nothing about military
service--everything was new to me.
Nanjing had just been captured so we decided to go to Nanjing. We left Shanghai on
January 2, stopped at Suzhou, and arrived in Nanjing, to my memory, on the evening of
the 4th. We arrived at Nanjing Station.
– What was the situation in Nanjing?
The first sight of Nanjing was a number of ropes hanging over the rampart. We entered
Nanjing through the Yi Jiang Gate. On the right side we found a big wooden memorial
monument standing upright. I found no bodies there then, but I heard that at the time of
the capture, bodies were piled up around the gate. Japanese warships used all availableammo, simply because they engaged the enemy and shot at them. The number of bodies
was said to be enormous.
The night we arrived, a fire occurred. They said that plain-clothed soldiers set the fire.
The next day, I started taking photos. The Chinese people were used to war andeveryone lived calmly. In those days, 20,000 to 30,000 people lived in the Refugee Zone
and no young girls were walking the streets. In Jin Ling Women's College, which wassituated in the Refugee Zone, I found young girls. I tried to take pictures of them but aJapanese guard who was standing by the gate did not allow me to do so, saying that noone was allowed to enter.
In addition, I saw Japanese merchants, who came from Shanghai, were keen to dobusiness.
– Didn't you see any acts of cruelty done by Japanese soldiers?
Nanjing was quiet, I never saw such thing.
– How about a rumor?

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I never heard of such a thing as a “massacre”. I heard that 300 or so were killed down by
the Yangtze and bodies were thrown into the river. Those kinds of stories were often saidon the battlefield but I never heard such thing as a “massacre”—mention of that started
after the War.
Later, I was fully involved on the battlefield and went to the frontlines at Xuzhou andHankou to take photos. Aside from the story of Nanjing, I don't deny some criminal
assaults occurred but the soldiers who did such things were one and the same and rare.
– Were you with Mr. Natori in Nanjing?
Natori moved to and fro between Shanghai and Nanjing. He visited Nanjing with a fleet
vehicle. Natori was surprised to find how news of Japan was incorrectly reported in thewest and decided that we had to do something. In the west, public relations andpropaganda prevailed, and make-believe had been perpetuated as well. Based on his own
experience, he was convinced of the importance of media.
– The photo of the baby in Shanghai, which caused a sensation.
Yes. The photo appeared full page in the magazine Life, which became famous, wellknown throughout the world.
After the War, during the Korean War, press photographers gathered in Seoul from allover the world. I found a photographer in the UN photographers group who took the
baby's photo. I talked him about that. His name was Wong, a Chinese photographer, who
was senior to me.
– The press-photos were not always as is?

Of course, they should report facts in photos, but photographer took pictures with theircountry's position in mind and many make-believe photos were found everywhere.
After the War, shortly after the US Army came to Japan, an American photographer
asked me, “Koyanagi, you have taken pictures of war, what do you think about the photoof the Spanish soldier taken by Capa?”
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– Was it the famous photo by Robert Capa?
Yes. Among American photographers, there was doubt whether the photo was taken on abattlefield or not. That's why he asked me. I told him, I also had doubt – this photo could
not have been taken in a battlefield, based on my experience. “You think so, too?” He
looked satisfied with my answer. Americans were good for taking pictures of, posing forphotos just the way the photographer wanted. So the issue of set-up was a subject of
discussion.
– So Capra's photo from the war was doubted then?
I think so.
– The Nanjing Incident is still controversial today.

There were bodies because it was a battlefield. They talked about those battlefieldbodies. From my experience, being in Nanjing for long time, I can say this.
It may be meaningless to talk about battlefields today--I don't think Japanese soldiers
were especially cruel. For example, Chinese soldiers stabbed Japanese soldiers so thatthey looked like a beehive. It might have had a purpose for demonstration—but it was
not a Japanese characteristic. The US Army, too, during the attack on The Philippines,
we reporters heard stories from an American prisoner, who was caught in Bataan, who
said that they ran over the corpses of Japanese soldiers. Hearing that, we got upset,“Goddamn you,” we said. I thought back to those times when Japanese soldiers captured
Chinese cities, they often gave Chinese people Japanese goods. After the War, US
soldiers, too, came to Japan and gave us chocolates and so on. The difference was thatJapanese soldiers gave things to Chinese people with affection and often they becamefond of us, on the other hand, the US soldiers just threw them from a high place--no
Japanese were fond of them.
Reporter Honda Katsuichi of the Asahi Shimbun said the Japan had done wrong inNanjing, but such things often happened in war, he just pick-up one of them. If you don't
know anything about war, you can easily say anything about it. Reporter Honda wrote
256another book, The Road to Nanjing14, recently. I cannot read books due to mydeteriorated eyesight, but I cannot ignore this book, so I slowly started to read his book.
The Road to Nanjing was the same route novelist Hino Ashihei (火野葦平) walked
during his military service. If Hino Ashihei was alive today, he could debate and makethings interesting. I was with Hino in Hangzhou when Kobayashi Hideo (小林秀雄), thecritic, brought the Akutagawa Prize to Hino in Hangzhou.
Facts are twisted by ideology and twisted facts are accepted today.
Soon, the Army realized the importance of media and, with the help of Lieutenant
Colonel Mabuchi Itsuo (馬渕逸雄) in the Central China Expeditionary Army, the Press
Bureau was established. Nihon Kobo established the company Press Union Photo
Service and began supplying photos abroad. Mr. Koyanagi continued working in China.
After the Great Eastern Asia War, they had no need for overseas appeal and their focus
shifted from news photos to documentary photos.
Mr. Koyanagi worked actively as a photographer after the War. In the first postcard that
I received from Mr. Koyanagi, he said “I wrote this postcard with a groping handbecause my eyesight is almost gone now.” I almost canceled his interview but then I
asked him again, then he said “OK”.
Mr. Koyanagi lives in Kawaminami, Miyazaki. He had been living in Tokyo and
Kamakura for more than 50 years, however about 10 years ago his friend living in
Miyazaki recommended that he move to Kawaminami—and so he moved. One reason
is that as the War was about to end he took pictures of the Tokkotai, the kamikaze, in
Kyushu. He wanted to console their souls--those who departed from an airfield in
Miyazaki and died young. Mr. Koyanagi is now 79 years old. He visits Tokyo once a
year to meet his old friends.

The Road to Nanjing [Nankin heno Michi] by Honda Katsuichi, Asahi Shimbun Sha, Tokyo,
1990.
257
14

Chapter 4
Nanjing, as Observed by Diplomats….. Major General Sasaki was the top China expert in the Army, had friendly
relationships with most of the main leaders of the Chinese Nationalist Party, including
Chiang Kai-shek, and understood the Nationalist Party’s Revolution. He loved China.....
He knew the most about Nanjing before and after its capture. I believed Major General
Sasaki’s statement expressed the correct view on Nanjing then. I have never seen nor
heard a so-called Nanjing massacre. It is said something happened in Nanjing but I
think that what Major General Sasaki described in his book was the fact. (Statement by
Mr. Iwai Eiichi, Assistant Consul)

Near Chong Shang Road in Nanjing. A Japanese soldier found a carriage, to which heattached the Japanese flag, and ran it with a Chinese riding along.
(December 23, 1937)25836) Interview with Mr. Iwai Eiichi (岩井英一), Assistant Consul
Mr. Iwai Eiichi, a China expert in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, graduated from theDong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen or East Asian Literary School. It was said that he had astrong network of acquaintances in the military world. His name appeared in the context
of several incidents that occurred in China, including the Chengdu Incident and the
Xingyi Construction Movement.
I heard that he was in Shanghai in the beginning of 1938 and asked him for interview
about the Nanjing incident. Unexpectedly, he sent me a long letter, in which he asked
me to call him before the interview. I called him at once and he said he was going totake a trip to Nagoya so we set the interview for the following week. It was 1984.
Mr. Iwai was born in 1899. When we met he was 85 years old yet in very fine health.
He practiced judo in the old days and his firm body proved it. His memory was
splendid, he remembered China-Japan diplomacy before the War in detail and he talked
about those times for an hour. He wrote the book Memory of Shanghai, but he spoke tome about things that were not in the book.
“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should try to get to know the Army and encourage thesharing of information with them,” that was Mr. Iwai's idea. So, he proposed this to Mr.
Kawai Tatsuo (河相達夫), the Director of the Information Bureau, to hold a dinner
meeting with Army once a month. Attendees were, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Kawai, Mr. Tanaka Shigetoku (田中重徳), the Chief of the First Department of theInformation Bureau, and Mr. Iwai, and from the Army, Mr. Kagesa Sadaaki (影佐禎昭),
the Chief of the China Section, and the selection of other members was up to Mr.
Kagesa. The first meeting was scheduled for August 13 at a Japanese restaurant in
Akasaka. That day, in Tokyo, the decision to dispatch two Divisions to Shanghai was
finalized, while in Shanghai, the Chinese Army and Japanese Landing Force initiatedbattle. Both the Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were in a great stir. They
waited for Mr. Kagesa at the restaurant and he eventually appeared. Mr. Kagesa broughtwith him from the Army, Major Kawamoto Yoshitaro (川本芳太郎) of the Military
Affairs Department of the Military Affairs Bureau, who came with Mr. Kagesa, but theother invitee, Lieutenant Colonel Watari Sakon (渡左近), Chief of the China
Department of the General Staff Headquarters, could not make it.
259

During dinner, opposed to the idea of an all-out attack, which Mr. Iwai insisted on, Mr.
Kagesa said, “We decided to dispatch two Divisions to Shanghai, and one Division to
Qingdao.” Mr. Iwai protested, “All available Divisions should be dispatched to
Shanghai, attack Nanjing, and then we can conclude a peace treaty.”
Mr. Iwai believed that if Japan attacked Nanjing, China would surrender. Mr. Kagesa
eventually agreed with him. After that, Mr. Iwai visited Beijing and Tianjin in Augustand September, then Shanghai and Nanjing in December.
– Did you think, at the time, that if Japan captured Nanjing China would havesurrendered?
In the previous year, I went to Chongqing from Nanjing to my new appointment,
consul- general in Chengdu. Before reaching Chongqing, I had to change to smallerboats a couple of times. The Chang Jiang was a serpentine river and during the weeklong trip I felt as though I was in the same place as I was from the previous day.
Chengdu was situated in a far, far-off place. China declared already they would keep
fighting even if they had to run into the depths of their huge country, so I knew that if
we started a war against China, it would get serious. As I met Mr. Kagesa, I knew thatthe war would not end anytime soon. Nevertheless, to capture the enemy's capital was amain wartime objective.
I guessed that the discussion at the meeting on the 13th was conveyed to General
Matsui, the Commander of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, by Mr. Kagesa, the Chiefof the China Department, because I heard that, when General Matsui was leaving for
China, at the platform at Tokyo Station, he said to the Prime Minister Konoe, who had
come to see General Matsui off, that he would advance as far as Nanjing. This meantthat Mr. Kagesa gave General Matsui this advice, which was the thought that I sharedwith Mr. Kagesa. This struck me as I read the Note written by the Prime Minister
Konoe. I didn't write this story in my book because it might sound self-serving, but thiswas very likely what had happened.
– At the end of December 1937, you went to Shanghai and Nanjing.

260

Mr. Kawai went to inspect the occupied areas and I accompanied him. We left Tokyo on
December 31.
– Did someone else accompany you?
No, it was only the two of us.
– After that, did you go to Nanjing?
I went to Nanjing with Mr. Kawai. We stayed in Nanjing for a couple of days. It was
three weeks after the capture, so we were unable to find a decent hotel or inn--maybe
we stayed somewhere in Nanjing, or found an inn in Xiaguan and stayed there.
– Did you visit the consulate-general?
Well, no. I didn't know in what situation the consulate-general was. We had no
particular plan for the consulate-general, but just to inspect the place that we had
occupied.
– What was the situation in Nanjing?

The city was a battlefield; it looked like as battlefields do.
– Did you see any scene of a massacre or hear about a massacre?
I didn't see anything. I didn't hear anything. Also, in Tokyo, I never heard of such athing. Mr. Kawai had a strong personal sense of justice and was very keen to those kindsof rumors. I suspected that the purpose of his Nanjing visit was to investigate the rumor
himself.
– Probably after you returned to Shanghai, Chief Kawai talked with reporters Hallett
Abend of The New York Times, and David Fraser of The Times of London. Did you
know that?

261

No, I didn't know that. Mr. Kawai could speak English so he spoke with foreign
reporters. I couldn't understand English, as my specialty was Chinese, so we worked
separately, in those cases.
– You were working at the Information Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
After returned to Tokyo, did you hear something in the Ministry about a massacre?

I stayed in China for about two weeks and returned to Japan on January 13. I have norecollection of such talk in Tokyo as well. It might be possible that I heard something
but I had no interest in it so I don't remember.
In 1965, “Biography of a Military Man,” was published, which was a diary written by
Major General Sasaki Toichi (佐々木到一), who performed brilliantly as the BrigadierCommander of the Nanjing Attack Forces. Major General Sasaki was the top expert on
China in the Army, had friendly relationships with most of the main leaders of theChinese Nationalist Party, including Chiang Kai-shek, and understood the Nationalist
Party’s Revolution. He loved China. Nevertheless, Major General Sasaki joined in on
the Nanjing Attack, and after its capture, he served as the Commander of the Nanjing
Garrison. He knew the most about Nanjing before and after its capture. I believed
Major General Sasaki’s statement expressed the correct view on Nanjing then.
I have never seen nor heard a so-called Nanjing massacre. It is said something
happened in Nanjing but I think that what Major General Sasaki described in his book
was the fact.
– Mr. Ishii Itaro (石射猪太郎), the Chief of the East Asia Bureau, wrote in his memoir
after the War that stories of atrocities in Nanjing quickly spread around the world,
causing a sensation, and all accusations focused on the Japanese Army. And hedescribed the relationship between Japan and China, as “China-Japan”, or the “ChinaJapan” War, China coming first. What was his intention?
Mr. Ishii graduated from the Dong A Dong Wen Shu Yuen, or the East Asian Literary
School, like I did. He was senior to me. When Mr. Ishii became consul-general, thenews was greatly welcomed and Mr. Ouchi, the head of the Dong A Dong Wen Shu
Yuen, held a party for him.
262

Mr. Ishii thought of himself as an expert on China. However, his ideas were notacceptable to the Army, and I have also a difference of opinion from him. The Axis
Powers gradually gained support from members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, yet
Mr. Ishii was different from them in that respect, too. The expression “Japan-China”
was changed to “China-Japan” after the War because China won.
– You went Shanghai again in February, as the Vice-Consul of the Shanghai ConsulateGeneral. In Shanghai then, did you hear something about a massacre?
I left Tokyo on February 25, 1938 and arrived in Shanghai on the 28th. I will say againthat I heard nothing about a massacre.

37) Interview with Mr. Kasuya Yoshio (粕谷孝夫), Assistant Consul
Mr. Kasuya Yoshio was born in 1909, joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1934,and in July 1937 his duty station changed from the London Embassy to the ConsulateGeneral in Shanghai. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident had already occurred, and in
Shanghai confrontation between Japan and China was expected as well.
Five months after he was assigned to the Shanghai Consulate-General, Nanjing fell.
Several members of the Shanghai Consulate-General entered Nanjing as soon as
Nanjing was captured, and in the following year, Mr. Kasuya was appointed Nanjing
Consul-General. He was 28 years old.
In January 1938, in Nanjing, several issues arose concerning US interests . In the middleof January, the American consulate complained that Japanese soldiers trespassed on US
property. Also, on January 26, an assault occurred on Consul John Allison. The story
was that a Chinese woman who claimed that she was raped by Japanese soldier tried tofind the offender. Together with Consul Allison, Professor Riggs of Ginling College andJapanese military policeman they tried to enter the Japanese soldiers’ barracks. A
Japanese soldier started to argue with Consul Allison and the soldier struck Consul
Allison. Remember that in the Tokyo Trial (IMTFE), during this very period, theTribunal accused Japanese soldiers of committing atrocities. Assistant Consul Kasuya263

went to Nanjing during this period to handle matters pertaining to the interests offoreign countries, including those of the US.
After the War, Mr. Kasuya served as Ambassador to Peru and Thailand. After retiring in
1971, he joined Matsushita Electric Industrial. I interviewed him in autumn 1985, at his
office at Matsushita Electric Industrial, which was located in the World Trade Center
Building. Mr. Kasuya was 75 years old, with fine silver-gray hair. He was friendly andsmiled during our discussion.
– When Nanjing fell, were you in Shanghai?

Yes. We had the embassy and consul-general in Shanghai but both of them weresituated in the same building and their duties were not clearly separated.
Staff included Mr. Okamoto Suemasa (岡本季正), Mr. Tajiri Akiyoshi (田尻愛義), Mr.
Sone Eki (曽称益), Mr. Okumura Katsuzo (奥村勝蔵), and Mr. Wajima Eiji
(倭島英二).
I was very busy with matters related to the Shanghai area.
– It is said that when the Japanese army entered Nanjing, a massacre occurred. You wereat the Shanghai Consulate-General then. Did you hear about the incident?

I never heard anything directly. It is often called a massacre, but I don't understandthis. I had been in Shanghai and so busy with matters related to Shanghai.
– At the time, The New York Times and Chinese newspapers wrote about Nanjing.
Did they? I didn't read The New York Times or Chinese newspapers.
– Americans and Germans who were in Nanjing at the time established the International
Committee for Nanjing Safety Zone to demand and protest against the Japanese
Consulate. Those demands and protests were sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via
Shanghai. Did you hear about these things when you were at the Shanghai ConsulateGeneral?
264

I didn't hear about these things either.
– According to a memoir written by Mr. Uemura Shinichi (上村伸一), who was theChief of the First Department of the East Asia Section at the Ministry, protests, reports
and photos from Nanjing piled up in a room.
He wrote this? This is the first time I have heard of this.
– The following year, 1938, you went to Nanjing.
In January. I don't remember the exact date. I was in Nanjing until October of the sameyear.
– Who else were at the Nanjing Consulate-General?

Mr. Fukui Atsushi (福井淳), was, to my memory, the acting consul-general. He waslater replaced by Mr. Hanawa Yoshitaka (花輪義敬). Also, Mr. Tanaka Shoichi(田中正一) and Mr. Fukuda Tokuyasu (福田篤泰) were there. Mr. Tanaka spoke
fluent Chinese. In addition, a couple of young staffers were there. The Consulatecompound had a consulate area and a residence and I lived in the residential area.
– Was Mr. Hidaka Shinrokuro (日高信六郎) there?
When the Consulate was closed in August, I saw him there but after that he returned to
the Embassy in Shanghai. Mr. Hidaka was the Chief of the Personnel Department
when I joined the Ministry.
– What was the situation in Nanjing?
Uneventful and nothing special. The shops were open and Japanese merchants were
there. There was no such thing as a massacre.
– What was your duty in Nanjing?
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My duty was to contact and negotiate with foreign countries. There were many foreign
consul-generals, and my duty was to negotiate with them. With foreigners there, thatmeans their interests were there as well, so troubles occurred as a matter of course.
The American Consul was Mr. Allison, who was later appointed Ambassador to Japan.
He spoke Japanese fluently.
– In Nanjing, the International Committee for Nanjing Safety Zone was organized by thethird-party nationals like Mr. Rabe and Mr. Bates. Did you see them?

I knew nothing of them.
– The incident, that Consul Allison was struck, happened at the end of January.
Yes. Mr. Allison went to the Japanese soldiers’ barracks to either confirm his suspicion
or to investigate, and tried to cross a sentry line despite the guard’s warning and he washit-- that's what I heard.
– Was it a significant matter?
It was said that the Consul made a claim against Japan and the main office of the
Ministry handled it well--thus the matter was soon resolved.
– What kind of person was Consul Allison? Pro-Japanese? Or Anti-Japanese?

He was knowledgeable about Japanese. It seemed that he didn't take the incident badly
in particular.
– As an Assistant Consul, you must have performed many negotiations with the Army.
Major Hongo Tadao (本郷忠夫), who was in charge of Army information, handled the
responsibility of negotiations. When I got a claim against the Army from a foreign
consulate, I negotiated with Major Hongo. He was a son of General Hongo Fusataro(本郷房太郎.). Later, Major Hongo died in New Guinea; he was a good man.
266

Later, Colonel Hirota Yutaka (広田豊) arrived as the Chief of the Negotiations
Department. Mr. Hirota had an office in Shanghai, he was a calm person. Mr. Hirota
could speak English, he lived in the US at one time and he was a so-called globallyminded person. He knew the US well. I assumed that he belonged to the “common
sense” group. Later, he transferred to the aviation sector and became a divisionalcommander.
And, though it was only once, I met Colonel Muto Akira (武藤章). He had an ear for
listening. His attitude, of hearing people voice themselves, might be related with hishigh position, but anyway, he was not an arrogant person.
– From the end of January to the beginning of February 1938, Major General Homma
Masaharu visited Shanghai, Nanjing, and Hangzhou, from Tokyo. At that time Colonel
Hirota accompanied him.
At the time, Mr. Honma was the Chief of the Second Department in General Staff
Headquarters. I heard Mr. Honma had arrived. It was said that he came to inspectspecific areas in China. I didn't know Mr. Hirota arrived with him.
– Have you ever heard about the Nanjing incident?

No.
– According to Mr. Johnson, the American Ambassador to China, the Japanese embassy
tried to send a telegram and the Army prevented this. Did this really happened at the
Nanjing General-Consulate?

No such things happened. I think the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had their own
telegraph equipment.

267

Supplement
I (Ara) couldn't meet half of the survivors, mostly because of declining health.
Nevertheless, they sent me letters and postcards concerning the situation in Nanjing at
the time. I exchanged letters with some of them for a number of years. Statements fromthose whom I could not meet in person are as follows.

38) Major Yoshikawa Takeshi (吉川猛), Staff Officer of the Central
China Area Army
The Central China Area Army had six staff officers and Mr. Yoshikawa Takeshi, theyoungest of them, was the only one still alive. When I asked him for an interview, he
was undergoing repeated hospitalized, so he was not able to talk to me personally. But
he was able to answer my questions with detailed letters. At times, due to his illness, hisletters stopped but over three years we exchanged eight letters, in which he wrote thefollowing replies:
One dog barked a lie and millions of dogs spread it as truth – once a thing is thought ofas true, it is tough to argue and correct it. The first impression deeply pierces into
humans’ emotion.
In December 1937, as we moved the Headquarters of the Central China Area Army toSuzhou, Staff Officer Ninomiya, the Chief of Logistics, and I, a Staff Officer of theGeneral Affairs Section, were called in by General Matsui. General Matsui gave us asevere scolding, that our treatment of the bodies were wrong, that only the bodies ofJapanese soldiers were being handled properly but the bodies of Chinese soldiers werebeing neglected--this was not acceptable. That was the kind of person Excellency
Matsui was.

39) Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao (寺田雅雄,), Staff Officer of the10th Army
Lieutenant Colonel Terada Masao served as a leading staff officer of the Strategy
268

Department in the 10th Army and later became well-known as the Chief of Strategy
Department in the Kwantung Army during the Nomonhan Incident, that is, the SovietJapanese border conflicts.
When I asked him for an interview he was over 90 years old and I was unable to meethim. But he answered my questions in his letters below:
Due to the fact that the Operation in the Shanghai Area seemed deadlocked, Imperial
Headquarters planned to land the 10th Army at Hangzhou Bay. The 10th Army wasvery cautious not to take the same path as the Shanghai Area Army took, so they simply
focused on strategy.
The 10th Army adopted the strategy to advance in a rush as soon as they landed at
Hangzhou Bay. Therefore, they understood that it would be impossible to get supplies
from the rear. That's why we had to manage to get food wherever we can. The strategy
adopted by the 10th Army was so tough and brave that the enemy in the Shanghai Areaquickly withdrew.
Regarding disciplinary problem, it was said that we were wrong to rely on local areas
for food. But I don't think discipline of the 10th Army was especially bad.
I never heard of the “Nanjing incident” in those days.
Mr. Terada lived in Obama City, Fukui. When I went to Fukui, I tried meeting with him,
but he was bedridden, so I was unable to meet him.

40) Captain Sento Shunzo (仙頭俊三), Staff Officer of the 10thArmy
The 10th Army had the Kunizaki Detachment (mainly 9th Brigade, 5th Division). The
Kunizaki Detachment was instructed to cut off the enemy’s retreat by crossing theYangtze at around Wuhu and advancing to Pukou. Mr. Sento, a Strategy Staff Officer inthe 10th Army, joined the Detachment.
Due to his health conditions, I was unable to see Mr. Sento Shunzo in person but he269

replied to my letters as well as showed me his memos from the time. His recollection of
those days was as follows:

On December 12, 1937 as we advanced to Pukou, which was on the opposite side of
the Yangtze from Xiaguan, I saw that our artillery was shooting a number of 15
centimeter high explosive shells over Pukou. The bodies of the enemy, which were
floating along both sides of Yangtze, was in the order of several hundreds by myestimate. Bodies were hardly found in midstream. I saw that the quay wall of Xiaguan
had turned red, and bodies seemed to have had their hands and feet tied.
I knew nothing about a massacre then. Regarding discipline, as far as the Kunizaki
Detachment was concerned, there were no disciplinary problems.

41) Lieutenant Colonel Goto Mitsuzo (後藤光蔵), Military Attaché
Lieutenant Colonel Goto Mitsuzo went to the 10th Army’s front line as a Military
Attaché and entered Nanjing. He was known as the last Konoe Division Commander.
Due to his health, I could not meet him but he described in his letter the situation when
he entered Nanjing.
Nanjing was an empty town--no one there. I stayed at an empty home, nothing
happened.
He died in December 1986.

42) Captain Okamura Tekizo (岡村適三), Shanghai Military Police
While Mr. Okamura Tekizo was in Shanghai, the Shanghai incident occurred. He thenwent to Nanjing as soon as Nanjing was captured.
He had a health problem, senile ischemia, and I was unable to meet with him, but he did
answer my questions in his letter, as shown below:
270

I didn't hear about Nanjing incident at the time. Regarding disciplinary problem of thetroops, I heard nothing in particular from Lieutenant Colonel Yokota Masataka(横田昌隆), Chief of Military Police of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, Major
Uesuna Katsushichi (上砂勝七), Chief of Military Police of the 10th Army, andLieutenant Fujino Ranjo (藤野鸞丈), Sub-Chief.
I heard the Japanese Army acted arrogantly.
Because he was a military policeman he must have been familiar about disciplinary
matters relating to the Japanese Army. I wanted to hear in detail of this from him in
person and after several letters were exchanged, he agreed.
On the day of meeting, when I called him from Fukuoka Airport to announce myarrival, one of his family members told me, “He said something in the morning andcompletely forgot about it in the afternoon, so an interview is impossible.” I shrugged
and went back home.

43) Mr. Horikawa Takeo (堀川武夫), Reporter for the Domei Tsushin
Mr. Horikawa Takeo joined the 16th Division and after the War he taught at Hiroshima
University.
I was unable to meet him due to his illness, but I listened to him say the following:
As for your question, I didn't see nor hear anything in particular.

44) Mr. Fujimoto Kame (藤本亀), Reporter for the Asahi Shimbun
Mr. Fujimoto Kame entered Nanjing through Guanghua Gate on December 13.
After the War, he served as the director of the Sanyo Shimbun and as the president of
Sanyo Hoso Broadcasting. Due to his health, I was unable to meet him, but he wroteme:271

I want to inform you that during the time I joined the Army I didn't see nor hear ofanything in particular.

45) Mr. Asami Kazuo, Reporter for the Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun
Mr. Asami Kazuo entered Nanjing on December 13. I asked him for an interview, but hedeclined my request, saying that he had no clear memory of that time. At the same time
he stated:
I wish that this fact, of the massacre of the century, will never be denied and denial will
not be an occasion to praise--an accompaniment to--militarism.

46) Mr. Nishino Gen (西野源,), Reporter for the Osaka Mainichi
ShimbunMr. Nishino Gen joined the Army from the Nagoya general office of the Osaka
Mainichi Shimbun, and entered Nanjing through Guanghua Gate with the 9th Division.
As to your questions, unfortunately I heard nothing. It is common that a number ofgroundless rumors fly on the battlefield.

47) Mr. Otani Kosho大谷光照, Chief Abbot of Nishi-Honganji Temple
Chief Abbot Otani Kosho visited Shanghai in November 1937 as consolation visit for
the Imperial Army in Shanghai, then went to Nanjing to attend the entrance ceremonyon December 17. On the 18th, the next day, a memorial service, which was held at an
airfield within the Castle, was performed by the Chief Abbot.
He described the situation of Nanjing as follows;I arrived in Nanjing on the evening of the 14th, it was the next day after the final
capture of the city, and I lodged in Nanjing and stayed for 4 days. I entered the Castle
several times and I saw no massacre and heard no rumor of one at all. At that time, the272battle was entirely over, the town was calm, no citizens were found there – it was not a
circumstance under which a massacre occurred. The Japanese Army lodged inside andoutside of the Castle, getting their rest in peace.

48) Mr. Ishikawa Tatsuzo, War Correspondent
Mr. Ishikawa Tatsuzo was awarded the first Akutagawa prize for his novel, “Sobo (蒼氓),” in 1935 and in 1937 he was dispatched by the magazine Chuo Koron to Nanjing,
immediately after its capture. He left Tokyo on December 21, 1937 and visited
Shanghai, Suzhou, and Nanjing, and returned to Tokyo at the end of January 1938.
During his visit, he mainly met soldiers of the 16th Division and, based on his
experience during that time, he wrote the novel, “Soldiers Being Alive,” and published
it in the magazine Chuo Koron, which was released on February 18. However, on the
day of release, Chuo Koron was banned from sale under the Newspapers Regulation
Law and Mr. Ishikawa was prosecuted,. In September, he was sentenced to four months
in prison, suspended for three years.
After the War, his novel, “Soldiers Being Alive,” was said to have described the Nanjing
incident.
In October 1984, I asked him for an interview but I was unable to meet with him. Later,
I found the reason--three months after he declined, in January 1985, he died ofpneumonia. At the time I asked him for interview, his gastric ulcer was improving, yet
his condition was not good enough to withstand an interview. However, he responded to
my letter at that time:
When I entered Nanjing, it was two weeks after the entrance ceremony. I didn't see any
trace of a massacre.
It is impossible to clear out hundreds and thousands bodies within a couple of weeks.
I have never believed that Nanjing massacre story and I don't believe now.
People the author contacted and received no reply due to death or illness, are:Colonel Matsuda Chiaki (松田千秋), Staff Officer of the Shanghai Expeditionary
Army
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Major Yonihana Utakichi (米花宇太吉), Chief of the Press Team, Shanghai
Expeditionary Army
Mr. Isshiki Tatsuo (一色達夫), Chief of the Photo Team, Shanghai Expeditionary
Army
Mr. Kojima Tomou (小島友宇), Nanjing Special Service Agency
Major Yamazaki Masao (山崎正男), Staff Officer, 10th Army
Captain Shimizu Takeo (清水武夫), Staff Officer, 10th Army
Lieutenant Colonel Miyamoto Seiichi (宮本清一), Staff Officer, Central District
Army
Mr. Fukuda Atsuyasu (福田篤泰), Assistant Consul, Nanjing Consulate
Mr. Goto Mitsutaro (後藤光太郎), Staff in the Information Bureau, Ministry ofForeign Affairs
Mr. Ikeno Seikyu (池野清躬), Interior Ministry official, Ministry of the Interior
Mr. Maeda Yuji (前田雄二), Reporter for the Domei Tsushin
Mr. Fudo Kenji (不動健治), Chief of the Photography Department for the Domei
Tsushin
Mr. Kato Sho（加藤松, Reporter for the Domei Tsushin
Mr. Haraikawa Chikashige (祓川親茂), Photographer for the Domei Tsushin
Mr. Takasaki Osamu (高崎修), Photographer for the Domei Tshushin
Mr. Kikuchi Hisataro (菊池久太郎), Radio Operator

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Mr. Tabata Masashi (田畑雅), Photographer for the Asahi Shimbun
Mr. Endo Tshuyoshi (遠藤毅), Chief of Field Senior Post, Transportation andCommunications Director General’s Office275

Epilogue
Interviews with those who were at the front during the Battle of Nanjing were conductedwith reporters, officers, artists and diplomats are compiled in this book. These interviews
were carried out more than 40 years after the Battle of Nanjing. Reporters and staff
officers, who were free to walk wherever they wanted to and to observe whatever theywanted to in Nanjing, told me about Nanjing then.
Listening to them speak, I began to realize that Nanjing, in their eyes, was totally different
from what was presented at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, or the
Tokyo Trial.
During the Tokyo Trial, Nanjing was supposedly full of civilian corpses and a verdict wasgiven based on this account. However, reporters and others who I interviewed, never saw
civilian corpses. No one could have imagined at the time that a so-called Nanjing
massacre would take hold of peoples’ minds decades after it supposedly occurred andspread around the world.
The statements in the book are not new. Those statements were given at the Tokyo Trial.
The trial was only nine years after the Battle of Nanjing. Therefore statements concerning
Nanjing were vivid and detailed. But the statements of the defense were buried under apile of false statements and fake evidence, which were presented by the prosecutor. The
defense appropriately objected that statements by the prosecutor were not real and thatthe so-called “Nanjing Incident” was Chinese propaganda. However, the Tokyo Trial wasa victor's court: the victors did not heed the defense at all. The defense was eager tocounter the prosecution’s allegation with facts, but going to China to investigate was
impossible.
But around the time when I started to interview the witnesses, the claim of the defense
began to be supported by the facts. A fact, for example, is that Tinperley, who made theso-called Nanjing incident news and initiated its first worldwide spread, was an advisor
to the Nationalist Party’s Central Propaganda Bureau. This finding is based on concrete
evidence.
In addition, Professor Bates, who stated at the Tokyo Trial that there was elimination of276

civilians, was an advisor to the Nationalist government. Also Zeng Xubai (曾虚白), thechief of International Information Division of the Central Propaganda Bureau of the
Nationalist Party, implemented a propaganda strategy in order to discredit the Japanesearmy. These facts have been revealed recently, which make it clear that the Nanjing
incident is nothing but a fantasy and wartime propaganda.
Despite the intervening 30 years, the statements in my book are almost same as thestatements of Japanese who gave their statements in the Tokyo Trial. “The Nanjing
Incident: Testimony from 48 Japanese” has now been reappraised after the revelation ofthese facts. The key people mentioned earlier actually carried out the Chinese strategy for
propaganda.
While I was doing my interviews, I asked the same questions to hundreds of soldiers as
well. Ordinary soldiers are restricted to actions based on their designated responsibilities.
Therefore, their knowledge about general condition of Nanjing was not always accurate.
What soldiers tended to discuss, in graphic detail, was the furious battles against the
Chinese army and cruel killings. Those stories are very common in war. However, taking
stories out of context and fabricating victims, the stories form the basis of the incident,
like the so-called Nanjing incident.
November 5, 2020.

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Translator’s noteThis book is full of names, ranks, military organizations, places, political incidents, etc.,
which might not be familiar to you. It is likely difficult for non-Japanese, as well as formodern Japanese, to comprehend Japan and the world in 1937 and 1938.
If there is difficulty in understating the times described in the book, a few videos may be
helpful, which I found after I completed translation of this book. I have added English
language narration and subtitles.
YouTube Channel: Cinema Japan Retrospective
Documentary Film Nanjing 1938

https://youtu.be/kKY0m80jgYo
The Greater East Asia Conference 1943 Nov.4-5
https://youtu.be/rZsLLllySEc
Maya Grohn

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