PARTICIPANTS’ PAPERSRESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54

GENERAL PICTURE OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN JAPAN:
THE ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPSBASED IN OR OUTSIDE JAPAN
Yutaka Nagashima*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Japan, the recent process ofinternationalization has brought about anincrease of Japanese going abroad, as wellas an expansion in the number of visiting
foreigners who are permitted to stay for alimited period of time, or are staying
illegally in Japan ( hereinafter the “visiting
foreigners”). It is quite natural that in linewith such a change of Japanese society,transnational or international crimes andcriminals have been attracting more andmore serious concern, not only from those
professionals in the criminal justice field,
but also by the mass media, politicians andcitizens in general.
In Japan, it seems that the traditionalorganized criminal groups, “Bouryokudan”,
are mostly involved in internationalized
crimes. So, this paper will first explain thehistorical background and changing
features of the activities of Bouryokudan,referring when appropriate to the special
laws and ordinances like the AntiBouryokudan Law, enacted to prevent andcounteract the organized criminal activities
and to protect the victims and the people
in general. The recent phenomena of theinternationalization of Bouryokudan, inparticular, dealing with crimes committed
in and outside of Japan among theBouryokudan and the organized criminalgroups of other nations and regions, will
also be considered.
The general trends in crimes committed
by visiting foreigners in Japan, with the* Senior Research Official, Reseach and Training
Institute of the Ministry of Justice, Japan.

130

intention of providing overall informationon the changing features of their criminal
conduct in Japan, will be discuction in thesecond half of this paper.
Information on individual cases in which
visiting foreigners staying in Japan
committed crimes as part of a criminalgroup, mostly in connection with theJapanese and their native-land criminal
syndicates will be provided. Crimes suchas the mass smuggling of illegal migrants,
robbery and burglary of jewelry etc., pickpocketing, ticket swinding, defrauding
pachinko ( a kind of slot-machine ) parlors,
theft and transnational trafficking of stolen
motor vehicles etc., will be considered inthis paper (excluding crimes involving
drugs).
II. TRENDS IN CRIMESBY GANG ORGANIZATIONS( BOURYOKUDAN ) IN JAPANA. Realities of Bouryokudan
Bouryokudan, or gang organization, may
be defined in general terms as “anorganization or group which collectively
and habitually engages, or is prepared toengage, in criminal activities accompanied
by violence.” A typical gang or gangster
includes the categories of professional
gamblers, street peddlers, delinquent
youth groups, stevedore gangs andunscrupulous constructors. Their scale andsphere of activity vary from one
organization to another, but there are somecommon characteristics peculiar to them.
For example, externally they intervene in
the civic life or business transactions ofcitizens, using the power of their

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINARPARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS
organization to obtain funds unlawfully or
improperly, and internally they try tostrengthen the control and solidarity of
their organization, based on the pseudokinship of all members.
Besides Bouryokudan, there exists
another type of organized criminal groupclose to them. They are Sokaiya, who after
obtaining rights as stockholders, demand
undue gains from enterprises by throwing
the general meeting of stockholders into
confusion etc. They also pose as publiccampaigners or political adventurers who
pretend or profess to be engaged in somesocial movements or political activities forthe purpose of disrupting commercial
enterprise. They meddle in civic life orbusiness activities and gain undue profits
to desist.
Such groups emerged through cracks inthe social structure and under the influenceof the socio-economic conditions of the time.
They repeatedly split and merged among
themselves and have survived persistently
over the ages as a true antisocial andmalignant element of society. Table 1
shows the trend in the number ofBouryokudan members cleared by thepolice for Penal Code offences, and referred
for Special Law violations (1956-1996).
B. Comprehensive View of the Past
Activities of Bouryokudan
During the period of post war chaos ( late
1940s), a number of new lawless groups,
small and large, mushroomed on top of thelong-established gangs of gamblers andstreet peddlers. They advanced into
various rackets such as street hawking,black markets, gambling, group robberies
and strong-arm protection. The newgroups repeatedly battled with the older
groups over the command of territories andover the various interests involved.
The number of gang members arraigned
on Penal Code offences cleared by the police
was more than 30,000 in 1946 and 1947.
This period was marked by frequent

clashes between gangs fighting over theirterritorial rights and interests such as therunning of black markets and otherrackets. The fights were frequently largescale and bloody, since the gangs werearmed with military weapons and fired oneach other indiscriminately, thus causingmuch public uneasiness. The gangsters
became the most important target of thepolice at that time. After 1948, the numberof gangster Penal Code offenders
decreased, due primarily to: gradual
recovery from postwar chaos; frequent
crackdowns on gangs; and strong police
efforts to force the gangs to disband,
including the mandatory dissolution of
specific gangs under Cabinet Order. Thesestrict measures against gangster criminal
activities seem to have worked effectively
to reduce the incidence of crime, for a while.
The early 1950s to the early 1960s iscalled the “Period of Gang Wars”. This was
the time when new entertainment quarters
arose in major cities, and newly
industrialized areas developed along with
the nation’s rapid social and economic
recovery, thanks to an economic boom
fueled by the Korean War procurement.
New Gurentai (street gangsters) came into
power, preying on such quarters, andtargeting the interests involved inpachinko (a kind of slot-machine) parlors,
public gambling set-ups (bicycle races, etc.),
sex-related business (massage parlors,etc.), prostitution, Philopon (a stimulantdrug) and other rackets. The new and oldgangs battled incessantly to stake out theirterritorial claims, and there were repeatedbreakups and mergers to establish thegangs’ ‘division of power’ over the nation
during this period.
From 1955 to 1965 Japan achieved
remarkable economic success. During thedecade, the boom stimulated international
trade and multiplied the amount of workat ports. The resulting spending spree
proved highly profitable for theentertainment business. This in turn131

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
produced huge income for the gangs who
controlled construction and harborworkers, and maintained strong-arm men
to ‘protect’ the entertainment quarters.
During this period, the so-called seven gang
syndicates (later named as such by the
National Police Agency (NPA)) achieved
great power. The seven syndicates are
Yamaguchi-gumi, Honda-kai (later
renamed Dainihon Heiwa-kai), Sumiyoshikai (currently Sumiyoshi Rengo-kai),
Kinsei-kai (currently Inagawa-kai), andMatsuba-kai.
The number of gang-associated Penal
Code offenders was approximately 2,500 in
1952, but increased to approximately
11,000 in 1953. It rose to more than 80,000
in 1956. The number then decreased, but
hovered at the 40,000 to 50,000 level until
1965. The total number of gangsters
involved in crimes of violence, bodily injury
and murder in 1968 constitutes 48.4
percent of the total number of gangassociated Penal Code offenders, reflecting
the intense inter-gang confrontation andconflicts during that year. A significant
number of cases of inter-gang conflict was
shown in the decade beginning in 1955.
With this situation as the background, thenumber of gang syndicates and theirmembers drastically increased during theperiod. There were approximately 4,200
organizations with approximately 93,000
members in 1958. However, in 1963, theorganizations increased to approximately
5,200, with a record-breaking membershipof approximately 184,000.
In 1958, in order to properly cope withthe situation, the government proposed in
the Diet, a bill to introduce in the Penal
Code a new article on the crime of
intimidation of a witness, and the proposal
became law. Also amended was the Codeof Criminal Procedure whereby gangassociated inmates were placed under astatus in which bail may only be granted
at the discretion of the court, if the court
deems it likely that they will retaliate

132

against witnesses who testify against
gangsters in detention. In addition, the
Law Concerning Compensation for
Damage Inflicted on the Witness, waspromulgated to provide protection towitnesses. With a view to forestalling intergang conflicts, the crime of unlawful
assembly with dangerous weapons was also
introduced in the Penal Code. In the same
year, the Firearms and Swords Control
Ordinance was revised whereby heavier
penalties were provided for the use andpossession of dangerous weapons,
including firearms and swords. In 1964,
the Law for Punishment of Acts of Violence
was amended to introduce an aggravatedcrime of bodily injury committed with
firearms and swords, as well as to provide
for heavier penalties for habitual offenders
involved in crimes of violence. Fromaround 1952, Local prefectural legislatures
promulgated the Public NuisancePrevention Ordinance to protect residents
from the distasteful, annoying conduct of
the gang members. This legislation paved
the way for devising nationwide systems
to restrain underworld criminal syndicates.
With the nationwide campaign for
sweeping crackdowns on gangorganizations as the background, intensive
and comprehensive attempts to control
gang members were conducted from 1964
to 1965. The main focus of the policy was
the strict control of the illegal activities ofleaders of gang organizations, crimes
related to revenue sources of the syndicates
and their weapons. These were called‘summit operations’, by which police aimed
at keeping the activities of gang syndicatesin check. The operations were continuously
performed, later joined by local
governments who banned events sponsoredby gangs at public facilities, throughout thenation.
Looking at the total number of gangsters
cleared by the police for Penal Codeoffences and Special Law violations,approximately 59,000 gangsters were108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINARPARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS
cleared in 1964 and 57,000 in 1965, which
accounted for one-third of the members of
the criminal syndicates. The figure
dropped to approximately 43,000 in 1966,
and further declined to the 38,000 level
between 1967 and 1969, which reflected theconcerted ‘summit operation’ and thesubsequent reduction in the overall
activities of criminal organizations.
Broken down in terms of offences, heinous
crimes and violent offences markedly
decreased in 1968 compared with those in
the decade from 1955. The effects of thesummit operation were also seen in thedecrease of gang syndicates and theirmembership. The number wasapproximately 5,200 with approximately
184,000 membership in 1963. However, it
decreased to 3,500 organizations in 1969,and membership decreased toapproximately 139,000.
In the early 1970s, gangs managed torevive themselves through reorganization.
Major gangs with extensive areas of thenation under their influence absorbed
small and medium-sized gangs. A new mapof territories governed by such syndicates
was made as a result. The number of gang
syndicates was approximately 3,000 andthe membership was approximately
123,000 in 1972. The number decreased
gradually to approximately 2,500
organizations and approximately 107,000
membership in 1979. However, during
1972 to 1979, the total number oforganizations under the NPA-designatedseven syndicates increased fromapproximately 870 to 1,000, and themembership from approximately 33,000 to
34,000.
The power of the gang syndicates, whose
influence covered a wide range of areas, did
not necessarily decline but was rather
reinforced during 1970s. The ‘summit
operation’ worked effectively on small andmedium-sized gang syndicates as a resultof a decline in the overall number oforganizations and their membership.

However, major gang syndicates placedsuch damaged small and medium-sizedorganizations under their umbrellas andthus their power was increased in general.
Because of the economic slump in the
period of low economic growth after the oilcrisis in 1974, it became difficult for gangs
to maintain their organizations while
depending only on their traditional money
sources. Some gangs disguised themselves
into rightist political organizations, whileothers advanced into the field of Sokaiyastock racketeers ( racketeers to blackmaila company at a general meeting ofstockholders ). They even intervened ineconomic transactions and sponsoredoverseas gambling tours. In this way they
promoted multiple business operations,modernization and every possible illegal
activity to survive, while trying to hidethemselves from police crackdowns.
Small and medium sized gangs had only
traditional illegal money sources, while
major syndicates had abundant, diversified
money sources, regardless of whether they
were illegal or legal, and established the
management system by collecting moneyfrom organizations under their umbrellas.
Because the smaller organizations werevulnerable to invasions of larger
organizations and police checks, it was anatural result that smaller organizations
were dissolved or merged under major
syndicates. Especially notable were theexpansion of the three NPA-designatedmajor syndicates, i.e the Yamaguchi-gumi,
Inagawa-kai and Sumiyoshi Rengo-kai,and the progress of ‘oligopoly of the gangworld’ by major syndicates. If the numberof gangs under the umbrella of the threesyndicates and their membership in 1968
is set as 100, the indicator increased to
153.9 for the number of organizations and140.4 for membership in 1979.
The total number of gangster-related
offenders cleared by police on Penal Codeand Special Law violation charges
gradually increased after 1970 and the133

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
number topped 50,000 from 1973 until
around 1975. Although the number ofgangsters was decreasing during theperiod, the number of those cleared bypolice remained at a high level. From thestatistics, we can conclude that thecriminal activities by gangsters did not
calm down, but were rather activated in
the new drastic moves, including
reorganization, of the gang world. Looking
in more detail, homicide, bodily injuries
and gambling, and Special Law violationsof the Firearms and Swords Control Law,
Stimulant Drug Control Law, Child
Welfare Law and Horse Racing Law
showed marked increases. This trend
suggests the progress of gangarmamentation and diversification of theirmoney sources. Among them, increases inviolations of the Stimulant Drug Control
Law suggest that the sale of stimulant
drugs is the most convenient and, also themost profitable, crime in terms of money
sources for major syndicates ( which werethen rapidly growing during the period,
taking advantage of the fact that theirinfluence covered wide areas).
The 1980s was called the ‘Period ofGeneration Exchange and Transition’. In
the world of gangsters, major generation
changes went on and the ganglandexperienced a major transition over a newhegemony. For instance, the thirdgeneration boss of Yamaguchi-gumi died in1981 and fights over the next boss started.
In 1984, those against appointment of the
fourth-generation boss spun out from thesyndicate and established anothersyndicate named Ichiwa-kai. In 1985, thefourth-generation boss of Yamaguchi-gumi
was shot and killed by members of Ichiwakai, triggering a series of fierce battles
between the two major syndicates. Ichiwakai dissolved in 1989 and the confrontation
was finally settled. The fifth-generation
boss was appointed to head Yamaguchig u m i . H o w e v e r, t h o s e a g a i n s t t h eappointment of the fifth boss left the134

syndicate and declared their independence
from Yamaguchi-gumi. The similar
problem of succeeding aged bosses was seen
in other syndicates which covered major
areas.
Also, since the 1980s, criminal
syndicates are expected to face difficulties
in trying to enlist new young members, asituation which they have probably neverexperienced before. In the gangland,gangsters are steadily aging since young
people try to stay away from gangs. In thepast it was said that the supply of ganglandmembers would never be cut. However,each organization is now suffering from theshortage of new young members.
On March 1, 1992, the so-called AntiBouryokudan Law ( the Law Concerning
Prevention of Unjust Acts by Bouryokudan
Members ) came into force as a law toregulate the various activities of gangsters’organizations administratively. The
purpose of the Law is to secure the safeand peaceful life of citizens and to protect
the freedom and rights of the people. It
authorizes the Government to exercise
administrative control over dubious
activities which, though suspected to becriminal, are difficult to control with only
the investigative techniques available in
the past. Under this Law, a gangsters’organization which comes under specificconditions prescribed by the Law is a
“Designated Bouryokudan”, and themembers of such Bouryokudan are subject
to control. As of the end of 1996, thenumber of designated Bouryokudan is 24.
The acts to be controlled are those which
unduly demand money or other things,
through demonstrating the strength oftheir organizations. Administrative orders
are issued against these acts. The numberof cases where such orders were issued wasabout 4,700, as of the end of 1996. This
Law also provides for: assistance tooperators of businesses to prevent
Bouryokudan from inflicting damage;restriction of the use of Bouryokudan’s

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINARPARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS
offices at the time of fighting among
Bouryokudans; prohibition of interferencein the sucession of a member from theorganization and so on; which is proving
effective for promoting the measuresagainst Bouryokudan. Since 1992, whenthe Anti-Bouryokudan Law was enacted,
the number of struggling incidents between
rival Bouryokudan organizations has
rapidly decreased.
Looking at the changes in the numberof gangs and their members since the1980s, the number of gangs wasapproximately 2,500 (organizations) withapproximately 104,000 members in 1980.
However, the number of organizations
decreased to approximately 2,200, withapproximately 94,000 members, in 1985.
These figures are about half or more of thecorresponding figures in the beginning of
1960s. The number of sub-organizations
under the three major syndicates decreased
from approximately 770 in 1980, toapproximately 720 in 1985. However, theirmembers slightly increased fromapproximately 22,800 in 1980, toapproximately 23,200 in 1985. As at theend of 1996, all the members ofBouryokudan were approximately 46,000,
and the members under the three major
syndicates were approximately 30,900. As
a whole, the number of gangsters has been
decreasing as a recent tendency.
The number of gang members cleared bypolice on Penal Code and Special Law
violations decreased drastically after 1985.
Especially, the number of Penal Codeoffenders has decreased remarkably. The
number of Special Law violators has also
decreased but the number of Stimulant
Drug Control Law violations is still high,even after 1985. These crimes frequently
take place because the trafficking ofstimulant drugs are major monetary
sources for gang organizations. Thesecriminal offences of gangsters in general
have, however, become less typical in gangorganizations. One possible reason for thisis that criminal activities of the gang
syndicates have gone further underground.
Also, diversification of their revenue
sources, such as running companies, havefurther progressed, along with theeconomic expansion during 1980s as a
background.
Although gangs meddling in civil
disputes - civil disputes being those arisingfrom the loaning of money, tenancy of realestate and amicable settlements incompensation for traffic accidents - are notnew, gangsters are now living closely withthe general public and have been utilizing
civil troubles positively as major money
source since the 1980s. This may be
regarded as one of the diversified revenue
sources of gangs. Also activities such as
Sokaiya professional shareholders’ meeting
racketeers, and involvement in real estate
racketeering, and stock speculation
operations, are also regarded as activities
creating a the diversified money source.
Considering this situation, it is safe toconclude that the diversification andmodernization of gangster syndicatesmanagement has been drasticallyprogressing.
The main sources of income for
Bouryokudan was gambling andtransactions in contraband, such as drugs.
In recent years however, Bouryokudan
have apparently been engaged in largescale fund-raising activities such as largescale fraud and intimidation, to gain hugeamount of funds, in addition to theactivities they have been engaged in up topresent. This trend is clearly demonstrated
by the growing number of cases involving
violent acts against enterprises; aimed atsqueezing undue gains from enterprises
which produce enormous profits. Also, as
mentioned below, it appears that theactivities of Bouryokudan have tended to
become international.
Also in recent years, there has beenremarkable changes taking place among
Bouryokudan. As mentioned above, one

135

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
such change is the large syndicates’
oligopolistic trend. Pursuant to the
expansion of the scope of activities of thecriminal syndicates, large syndicatesabsorb smaller ones in various parts of thecountry. At present, three large syndicatesin Japan enroll two-thirds of all themembers of the syndicates. Also, criminal
syndicates in Japan tended to show off in
the past, flaunting their existence andpower at opportunities such as the
succession of crime bosses or at the funerals
of seniors, but after the enforcement of theAnti-Bouryokudan Law, there is also thetendency to try to hide their organizationin order to avoid being “designated” under
the Law.
In regard to cases of violence directed
toward enterprises, Bouryokudan, Sokaiya
and political activity interference groups
can expect substancial gains because thevictims are large companies. In recent
years, there has been a tendency among
these groups to work in closer cooperation.
The tendency of Japanese criminal
syndicates to become oligopolistic orborderless in their activities can be said tobe a special feature of organized crime inJapan.
Another point of note is the progressive
armament of gang organizations with guns
and other weapons. Looking at thestatistics concerned, the fluctuation in thenumber of weapons seized from gang
syndicates and members show a marked
change in weapons the gangsters use, fromswords and daggers to guns, in step withthe changing times. In terms of guns, thenumber seized and its percentage against
the total weapons seized increased since1970. Especially, the numbers increased in
the early 1980s. In recent years, thenumber of guns occupied about one-thirdof the all weapons seized. The progressive
armament of each syndicate is top secret
and thus we project a large increase incrimes related to weapons. The armament
number must be further progressing, thus,

136

there is concern that the proliferation ofhigh-powered weapons will increase asgang syndicates have to supplement
declining strength due to difficulties inrecruiting successors and the aging of thecurrent members.
C. Internationalization of
Bouryokudan
Internationalization is one of theimportant trends of gang syndicates inrecent years. Data on internationalization
is not necessarily sufficient, but thefollowing points can be judged from therecent trend in crimes.
Crimes involving drugs and weapons,such as violations of the Stimulant Drug
Control Law and the Firearms and Swords
Control Law, are committed on theinternational stage in many cases. Drugs
and guns have been smuggled into Japanfor a long time and in recent years such
smuggling has come to be committed, on alarge scale, by organized groups. Largescale smuggling cases, unprecedented in
the past, are sometimes detected andcleared. As the smuggling and illicit saleof drugs, among others, bring huge profits,
the Bouryokudan actively take part in
unlawful drug transactions, and in recent
years, smuggle and illicitly sell drugs inJapan. Considering the frequency thatthese crimes have been taking place, I haveto assume that cooperation between
Japanese gangs and foreign criminal
syndicates has been considerably
progressing. Bouryokudan may be linking
with some overseas criminal groups which
deal in drugs, in order to smuggle drugs
into Japan. Gambling tours to othercountries, and tours to obtain drivers’
licenses, are assumedly done in cooperation
between Japanese and foreign local gangs.
In recent years, the violation ofregulations on businesses affecting public
morals and illegal employment of foreign
workers is becoming a social problem.
Since the violators are illegal aliens,

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINARPARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS
domestic and foreign criminalorganizations are usually involved in
obtaining their entry into the country, andproviding residence and employment. It
is worrisome that Japanese gangs will
strengthen ties with foreign syndicatesthrough these activities.
The overseas activities of Japanesegangs, in addition to the above-mentioned
activities, so far includes: operatingnightclubs, bars and souvenir shops;
introduction of gambling spots andprostitutes to Japanese tourists; and thesale of pornographic films. Because oflimitations in their language ability, areasof activity are limited to countries where
many Japanese travel. However, as theties with foreign syndicates increases andstrengthens at home and abroad, theinternationalization of gang syndicates is
expected to further progress the Japanesegangs.
III. TRENDS IN CRIMES BY
VISITING FOREIGNERS IN JAPANA. Entering Aliens and Residents
Who Illegally Overstay
The number of entering aliens started
to show a prominent increase around the
mid-1980s. It was approximately 1,787,000
in 1987, and exceeded 3,000,000 in 1991.
It was approximately 3,410,000 in 1996. As
for the breakdown by nationality( including regions; hereinafter the same )in 1996, those from Asian countries
accounted for about 60% of the total andKoreans ( 26% ) were the largest in number,
followed by Taiwanese ( 20% ), Americans( 16% ) and Chinese ( 4% ), in that order.
Regarding the status of residence,“temporary visitor” occupied the majority,
accounting for about 93% of the total.
The estimated number of illegal
residents who overstayed in Japan was
283,000 as of 1 November 1996. As for the
breakdown by nationality, Koreans ( 18% )were the largest in number, followed byPhilippinos ( 15% ), Thais ( 14% ), Chinese( 13% ) and Peruvians ( 5% ), in that order.
B. General Trends in Crimes
Committed by Foreigners
The number of Penal Code offences(excluding traffic professional negligence )committed by visiting foreigners, whichwere cleared by the police, has greatly
increased since 1980. It was 867 in 1980.
It continued to increase drastically,
exceeding 10,000 in 1993. The number in1996 reached approximately 19,500, which
was 23 times as high as that of 1980 ( refer
to Figure 2 in Appendix A ).
As for the Special Law violations byforeigners, the numbers of offences(excluding road traffic violations ) clearedby the police have shown a similar trend
as those of Penal Code offences committed
by visiting foreigners, which started toincrease in 1990. The number of Special
Law offenders, who were visiting foreigners
and who were referred to the publicprosecutors offices (excluding road traffic
violators), has increased fromapproximately 2,300 in 1980 toapproximately 5,900 in 1996.
As for the violations of the ImmigrationControl and Refugee-Recognition Act, thenumber of received violators (the number
of offenders referred by the police or otherinvestigating organizations and newly
received by the public prosecutors offices)
has been on the decrease since the early
1960s. It was on the 600 mark mostly
during the period of 1966 to 1985. Since
1989, however, it has shown a drastic
increase. It was more than 1,000 in 1990,
when the total number of foreigners
entering Japan exceeded 3,500,000. The
number totaled some 8,000 in 1996.
The number of received violators of the
Alien Registration Law had peaks
exceeding the 20,000 mark every other year
during 1952 to 1957 ( namely in 1953, 1955,
and 1957 ) and smaller peaks exceeding the
15,000 mark every three years since 1957,

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
the last of which was of some 18,300 in
1972. The number started to decrease in1973. It has decreased remarkably since
1989, and has remained on the 300 marksince 1991.
The number of heinous offences(homicide and robbery) committed byvisiting foreigners has still kept a high level
despite a declining trend after a peak in
1993. As for homicide, the number ofoffences and offenders cleared by the police
were 58 cases and 72 offenders in 1993, and36 cases and 41 offenders in 1995. As forrobbery, these numbers were 124 cases and142 offenders in 1993, and 104 cases and135 offenders in 1995. As to the victims ofsuch offences, in 1995 persons of the samenationality were victims in 40% of thehomicides committed by visiting foreigners,
but Japanese were the victims in more than
80% of the robberies committed by visiting
foreigners.
The number of visiting foreigners among
the Stimulant Drugs Control Law violators
cleared by the police increased greatly since
1989, when the number was approximately
70.
The number in 1996 wasapproximately 560.
IV. ACTIVITIES OF SOMEORGANIZED TRANSNATIONALCRIME GROUPS IN JAPAN
A. Activities Related to the Mass
Smuggling of Illegal Migrants
More than 1,000 illegal immigrants had
been arrested in Japan in 1997 ( by the endof September ). According to the National
Police Agency ( NPA ), 1,070 people, 90 %of whom were Chinese, were arrested in
51 separate incidents in the same period.
In 1996, there were a total of 670 illegal
immigrants apprehended, compared with
350 in 1995. In 1996, 670 arrests weremade in 28 separate cases, almost double
the 15 cases in 1995. Police sources
attributed the jump in these figures toincreased activity by the “Shetou,” or138“Snakeheads” organized crime group,
based largely in Hong Kong and Taiwan,
who organized the smuggling of illegal
immigrants from China.
The extent of organized smuggling
involving Chinese nationals was revealedin 1997 by the January arrest of 86 Chinese
in Okinawa Prefecture. Again in January,
31 Chinese were arrested at the Kobe Port.
In February, the Maritime Safety Agency
arrested a further 96 Chinese on board a
vessel off Kochi Prefecture (Shikoku
Province). Again in February, 67 foreigners
were discovered after some of them landed
on Hachijo Island, about 250 kilometers
south of Tokyo. In another case in
February, 29 Chinese, whose boat ran
aground on a local beach, were arrested in
Shizuoka Prefecture.
Most of the Chinese arrested in 1997
came from the Fujian Province. They wererecruited by the Snakehead group andshipped to Japan where there is asophisticated reception network for them.
The illegal immigrants are lured by theprospect of high wages. Although several
members of the Snakehead group havebeen arrested, police are still unsure as tothe extent of its activities. The crime
syndicates in Japan also cooperate in thesmuggling racket. The following cases
showed that the activities of the Japanesecrime syndicates, in collusion with a
syndicate Snakehead, were playing an
increasingly major role in smuggling illegal
Chinese immigrants into Japan.
In late March 1997, W.Y. ( 33, Chinese )was arrested on suspicion of illegallyobtaining a Japanese passport. He wasalso suspected of helping 99 Chinese
nationals attempt to enter Japan illegallyin December 1996. Police believe W.Y.
played a key role in bringing illegal
immigrants from China, under instruction
from the Snakehead smuggling ring, while
residing in Japan.
In the early hours of a December 1996
day, a Maritime Safety Agency patrol boat

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINARPARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS
seized a Japanese fishing boat after thewould-be illegal immigrants weretransferred to it from a Chinese fishingboat off the tip of a peninsula in Aichi
Prefecture. After arresting the Chinese
passengers and a member of a gangaffiliated with the Yamaguchi-gumi crime
syndicate, police discovered the Chinesesyndicate’s involvement in the smuggling
attempt. A Japanese gangster told policethat he had been asked by W.Y. to arrangea ship for the Chinese.
W.Y., who once studied at a Japanese
language school in Kobe on a student visa,
frequently traveled to Kyushu and theSanin region, where many Chinese havebeen arrested since the summer of 1996 fortrying to enter Japan illegally. He also
traveled between Japan and China, via
Hong Kong in late 1996 allegedly using a
passport he had obtained illegally, to meetwith Snakehead members in China.
A failed Snakehead operation to smuggle
about 40 illegal immigrants into Japan in
1996 involved 2 Chinese criminal groups
and 2 Japanese crime syndicates. The
illegal immigrants, smuggled in by the
Sino-Japanese group, were arrested inTokyo in December 1996. The illegal
immigrants, mostly Chinese, werediscovered crammed into a condominium
in Tokyo. The smuggling ring was madeup of criminal groups from the Shanghai
and Fujian Provinces in China and from
crime syndicates in Tokyo and Kyushu.
However, the ring had no fixed membershipor formal structure and was joined by someof the illegal immigrants being smuggled.
Six Chinese Snakehead members who areresidents in Japan and 12 Japanese,
including gang members, have beenarrested in connection with the incident.
According to police investigations, theunsuccessful smuggling operation was
launched when L.G. ( 27, Chinese, from
Fujian Province ) received instructions
from Snakeheads in China. L.G. sought
the cooperation of Z.L. ( 40, Chinese ),leader of the Shanghai group, and the
Fujian and Shanghai groups agreed tojointly conduct the operation. Z.L. asked
T.H. ( 28, Japanese ), a member of a gangaffiliated with the Tokyo-based Sumiyoshikai crime syndicate, to transport the
Chinese to Tokyo. T.H. then asked E.T. ( 37,Japanese ), members of the Dojin-kai crime
syndicate in Kyushu, to arrange a fishingboat for the stowaways.
Two Japanese gang leaders, T.H. andE.T., admitted making four attempts, with
the Hong Kong crime syndicate
Snakehead, to smuggle Chinese into
Japan. Police quoted the men as sayingthat two of the attempts were successful,netting Snakeheads an estimated 300
million yen. The Tokyo and Kyushu based
gangs each received a cut of 70 million yen.
T.H. told police Snakeheads enlisted his
support in smuggling operations on fouroccasions in early November andDecember. The first and third attempts
were unsuccessful as the smuggling boats
failed to appear at a designated place.
However, two of the attempts weresuccessful with a total of about 100 Chinese
smuggled into Japan. T.H., accompaniedby 2 Snakehead members, chartered afishing boat and took the illegal
immigrants to a fishing port in Nagasaki
Prefecture ( Kyushu Province ). They weretransported by a large truck to a local
expressway and then transferred to two
small buses, arriving at the condominium
in Tokyo. When the Chinese secured work
they would call their families and ask themto pay Snakeheads 3 million yen. Police
believe T.H. received a total of 70 million
yen from Snakeheads, and that after
paying 10 million yen in truck and fishingboat rental fees, he divided the money
between the two gangs.
Previously, Snakeheads had divided the
profits equally between itself and local
gangs. Police said the fact that T.H. waspaid only about 20 percent of the profits
indicated that many Japanese gangs were139

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
vying for Snakehead’s business.
The cost of arranging a smuggling
operation of this type varies depending on
the case and the degree of risk involved.
In a case cleared in 1997, brokers( Snakehead members ) who help an illegal
immigrant enter Japan could expect toreceive around 80,000 yuan ( 1.18 million
yen ). The sum increases to approximately
250,000 yuan ( 3.7 million yen ) if they help
them to find a job and somewhere to live.
With regard to the techniques of themass smuggling, Kobe maritime police
have established how 31 Chinese, found in
a container aboard a freighter, were able
to smuggle themselves into Kobe Port inJanuary 1997. The Chinese stowaways
were arrested and charged with violating
the Immigration Control and Refugee
Recognition Law after they emerged fromthe container.
According to police, the smuggling
attempt was arranged by a Chinese broker
based in Fujian Province. The 31 Chinese,
all from Fujian and Guangdong provinces,in groups crossed the Chinese border into
Hong Kong in late 1996 in cars provided
by brokers. After staying at an apartment
for one month, they were collected one day
by a big refrigerator truck, which took themto the port. After spending five days in thetruck, they finally transferred to acontainer that was connected to therefrigerator truck. Food and plastic bottles
of water had been left in the 12-meter-longcontainer to sustain the group during theweek long voyage to Japan. They arrived
in Kobe on a January morning, and waited
at the port to be collected by a person sentby the broker. As the person responsible
for collecting them never arrived, thestowaways emerged from beneath thecanvas cover of the container and werespotted by police and arrested.
B. Activities of Robbery and
Burglary Groups
The National Police Agency (NPA)

140

announced that the number of wellplanned robberies committed by organizedcrime groups, some of them foreign,increased in 1996. Gang members werearrested in more than 24,000 theft-relatedcases in 1996, an increase of 1.3 times over
1995. More than 25 percent of gang-relatedrobberies were carried out by two or more
people, a rate that is significantly greaterthan the 15.2 percent for all arrests fortheft.
The growing role played by foreign
gangs, like those from Russia, should be
noted. Russian Mafias are believed to be
the intended recipients of many of theluxury cars stolen by thieves in this country
and then shipped overseas. Japanesegangsters were arrested in Hokkaido andTottori in car-theft rings that sold theirbooty to Russian gangsters. Fukuoka
Prefectural Police are also investigating
allegations that a gang member played aleading role in a ring that stole luxury cars
for sale in Russia.
Chinese gangs have also made theirpresence felt in recent years. As mentioned
above, one Chinese triad, the Snakeheads,
has been implicated in the smuggling ofillegal immigrants into Japan. Membersof the Snakeheads are also suspected ofhaving used some of those smuggled
migrants to rob clothing and jewelry
outlets.
Of the 38 cases in which arrests weremade in connection with organized heists
at clothing and jewelry outlets 1996, 31
involved Chinese nationals. The robberies
netted about 50 billion yen. Miyagi
Prefectural Police arrested 11 Chinese - allof whom were smuggled into the country
by the Snakeheads - in similar thefts
involving about 380 million yen.
About 20,000 jewelry items and brandname products, worth a total of about 1.2
billion yen, were stolen from 21 stores inTokyo and seven neighboring prefectures
over a one-year period since November
1996, by thieves who visited the stores

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINARPARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS
during the day and disabled crimeprevention sensors. Posing as customers,
the thieves masked the sensors when clerks
were not watching and broke into the storesafter they had closed. The sensors, whichwere switched off during the day, were
wired to security company offices. If thesensors are covered they cannot detectmovement and trigger alarms.
In November 1996, about 200 brandname products worth about 150 million
yen, including Rolex watches and Chanelbags, were stolen from a display case in an
imported-goods store in Tokyo. The robbers
broke into the store by breaking a window
on the second floor. In February 1997,
about 1,700 rings and other pieces ofjewelry worth about 200 million yen werestolen from a jewelry shop in Tokyo. In
May 1997, 1,500 watches and items ofjewelry worth about 65 million yen werestolen from a watch shop in Yamanashi.
According to police, many of the stores
were visited by a group of two or threecustomers, apparently Chinese nationals,
who reportedly had acted suspiciously at
the stores several days prior to therobberies. While one of them kept the clerk
busy by asking questions or asking to beshown various products, the othermembers apparently worked on thesensors, they said.
Police suspect a foreign theft ringcapable of selling large amounts of stolen
jewelry and brand-name products may bebehind the robberies. Police also believe
the thieves are knowledgeable about store
security systems.
In some respects, Chinese and Japanesegangs operate along similar lines.
Generally, they delegate particular tasks,
such as making fake license plates or
carrying out robberies, to individual
members. However, the Chinese gangs
differ in that their leaders instruct gangmembers via cellular phones and take amore behind-the-scenes approach torobbery.

C. Activities of the Pickpocket
Rings
An increasing number of gangs of
pickpockets, with Chinese leaders andJapanese subordinates, have been
allegedly stealing wallets from salaried
workers’ jackets at drinking spots andshops in Tokyo. In the majority of cases,
Chinese pickpockets, assisted by Japanesehelpers, lift wallets out of jackets hung on
the back of chairs or on hooks on the wallat drinking establishments and otherplaces. The pickpockets call this sort ofcrime ‘swing’.
Such thefts have been on the rise acrossthe country since 1994. In Tokyo, police
received about 200 reports of swing-typethefts in 1994, about 400 reports in 1995
and the same number in 1996. But thefigure in 1997 ( by the end of September )had already reached about 600. In
addition, police suspect at least 10 times
the reported number of crimes had actuallyoccurred in 1997, because most of thevictims probably assumed they had losttheir wallets. Most of the thefts took placein bars, barber shops and mah-jong clubs
in amusement districts frequented bysalaried workers, such as Shinjuku inTokyo.
A group of 5 pickpockets were arrested
in July 1997 for allegedly trying to lift awallet out of a company employee’s jacket
that was placed on the back of a chair at aJapanese restaurant in Shinjuku. Of thefive, 2 were Japanese. Both were recruitedby the group leader ( 37, Chinese ).
The two Japanese helpers told policethat the Chinese leader recruited them into
the group with promises of lucrative work.
The leader promised to pay them 20,000
yen a day if they successfully stole wallets
and 10,000 yen daily even if they failed to
do so. The leader ordered the pair to handle
the risky elements of the crimes, such as
actually picking pockets and using thecredit cards they stole. He provided themen with jackets and ties so they could

141

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
pass for salaried workers.
The five visited the Japanese restaurant
one night, pretending to be salaried
workers out for a drink. While the group’s
Chinese members tried to create adiversion by making noise and speaking
loudly to restaurant employees, theJapanese pair casually approached a man.
The pair allegedly stood on either side of
the man’s chair, on the back of which hisjacket was hanging. When one of themreached into the pocket of the jacket,
plainclothes policemen, who had beenstaking out the restaurant, arrested them.
Police said the five members each played
different roles in carrying out the crime.
Some kept a lookout, while others diverted
attention by creating a disturbance. The
Japanese helpers were assigned the risky
job of actually stealing the wallets.
Before their arrest, the Sino-Japanese
pickpocket gang had committed similar
thefts several times, police said. The
Japanese pair told police that their leader
made them use credit cards found in thewallets they stole to buy luxury goods
within an hour after stealing the wallets.
In most cases, staff and customers at theestablishments targeted by the group
thought the five were just being rowdy andrarely noticed the crimes, according topolice.
In June 1997, C.F. ( 37, believed to be a
Chinese national ) was arrested on
suspicion of theft after allegedly orderingring members to steal a wallet from a jacket
hung over the back of a chair at a bar in
Osaka. The police suspect that C.F. is theleader of a pickpocket ring, with about 60
members, responsible for a string of thefts
in Tokyo and Osaka. The group targets
unsuspecting male office workers who
leave their jackets unattended while
drinking in bars. C.F. usually did not
perform any of the thefts. He is suspectedof using stolen cash cards to withdraw
money from the owners’ accounts, and ofusing stolen credit cards to purchase142

jewelry, which is easily pawned in exchange
for cash. Police also speculate C.F. entered
Japan illegally with the help of a Chinese
Snakehead smuggling ring.
C.F. told police that he had formed the
pickpocket gang, along with Chinese
nationals who had entered the country
illegally. He said he became acquainted
with those individuals at coffee shops andpachinko parlors in Shinjuku, Tokyo. C.F.
also lured Japanese who were in need of
cash to the group with the promise of highfinancial rewards. He told police that hedid much of his recruiting of Japanese
members in the Kabukicho entertainment
district of Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo. Ring
members were allegedly informed ofmeeting times and places via mobile
phones loaned to them by C.F..
The number of similar pickpocket groups
led by Chinese have been increasing. Someof the Chinese leaders enter Japan on a
tourist visa, recruit Japanese assistants,
direct them to steal as many wallets as
possible during their short stay in Japan,
then return to China. Police said the hitand-run nature of the crime makes it very
difficult for them to arrest the Chinesesuspects.
D. Activities of the Ticket
Fraudsters
A total of 15 people ( 6 Japanese, 8 Hong
Kong residents and 1 Australian ) werearrested in June 1997 on suspicion of aseries of thefts of beer tickets and highway
tickets nationwide. The 15 formed a groupthat stole and sold cash-convertible beertickets and highway tickets in six
prefectures, according to police. The gang
is believed to have committed more than
30 crimes, netting more than 200 million
yen.
The arrested Hong Kong residents
include 3 members of a Hong Kong criminalgroup. These three played a central rolein the thefts; allegedly stealing about
250,000 yen cash and 8,700 highway

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINARPARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS
tickets ( worth 13 million yen ) from a ticket
shop in Tokyo, late December 1996. Two
unemployed Japanese, T.S. ( 43 ) and K.U.
( 51 ) were arrested on suspicion of buying
the tickets in the knowledge that they had
been stolen. T.S. and K.U. exchanged thetickets for cash in ticket shops in Tokyo andOsaka.
The Metropolitan Police Department( MPD ) began investigations in October
1996, when about 23 million yen worth of
highway tickets were stolen from acompany office in Tokyo. Police later
arrested a woman ( 53, Chinese ) on
suspicion as she exchanged the stolentickets for cash in Tokyo. The woman gave
police information about the 3 Hong Kongsuspects. The woman’s home was used tostore stolen items. Police searched thehouse and confiscated beer and highway
tickets worth 100 million yen, 2 pistols and16 bullets from the premises.
The arrested Hong Kong residents
employed a hit-and-run technique;repeatedly entering, departing andreentering Japan to commit crimes. They
entered the country with short-term visas,committed crimes within short periods andleft the country to avoid police
investigation.
E. Activities of the Groups to
Defraud Pachinko Parlors
Some years ago, counterfeit prepaid
pachinko cards were rampant in Japan.
Recently, criminals are using high-techknowledge to defraud pachinko ( a kind ofslot-machine ) parlors out of large sums ofmoney. Radio transmitters, for instance,
are being used to interfere with the readonly memory system that functions as themachine’s nerve center.
In one case, a construction worker ( 22,Japanese ) was arrested in Osaka in
December 1996, while trying to steal
pachinko balls by using a wireless device.
A parlor employee became suspicious of theconstruction worker when he saw themachine in front of the man in operation,even though the man was not manipulatingt h e m a c h i n e ’s h a n d l e . T h e p a r l o r
employee’s suspicions were also aroused by
the fact that the man was wearing a coat,
despite the relatively high temperatureinside the parlor. The man was equippedwith a radio transmitter, a controller, anantenna, a switch and batteries. He had
hidden the switch inside one of his shoes,
the controller inside a money belt, and was
holding the mini-antenna in his left hand.
The whole system was designed to makethe machine spit out extra balls. The
construction worker told police that he hadpurchased the device for 200,000 yen froma Chinese man. Similar devices made theirdebuts in Tokyo and Osaka earlier in thesame year.
Other cases have involved people
sneaking into parlors late at night andinstalling bogus ROM systems. A partner
visits the parlor the following day, targets
the machine and cashes in the balls later.
In some cases, customers have even been
kidnapped from pachinko parlors while
playing on machines that had been secretly
readjusted to release a large number ofballs. In Yokohama, a man ( 22, Chinese )was abducted from a pachinko parlor inearly May 1997 by a Chinese group. He had
been operating a machine whose original
ROM had been switched for a doctored onethat radically increased the number of balls
released. The kidnappers then demanded
a 7 million yen ransom from the man’sfamily. In Sendai, a former restaurant
employee was also kidnapped in February
1997 by a group of men who appeared to
be Chinese. The gang demanded a 5
million yen ransom, but then freed the manafter he promised not to use the samemachine.
The machine had been loaded with adoctored ROM system to pay out extra
balls. The NPA reported that there were
only two such incidents in 1992, 64 in 1993,
103 in 1995, and 53 in 1996. The agency

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
said that while the number of cases had
decreased, the crimes had become morevicious. It added that the development of
new prepaid cards had made crime hardfor counterfeiters.
F. Activities of Groups Engaged in
the Theft and Illicit Trafficking ofMotor Vehicles
Cars and motorbikes stolen in Japan arebeing sent for resale on the black market
in China, Hong Kong, Russia, Southeast
Asia and the Middle East. Police in a
number of prefectures have confirmed that
non-Japanese and members of more than
one large criminal organization have been
involved in at least some of the thefts.
There have been many instances
nationwide of vehicles - from luxury
Mercedes Benz automobiles to Super Cub
motorbikes - being stolen and sent abroad.
Japan has become a supply source for aninternational black market in motor
vehicles.
In a case in March 1997, theMetropolitan Police Department (MPD)
arrested 2 Japanese and 2 Chinese
students on suspicion of stealing expensive
scooters. One of the suspects told police
they had stolen more than 300 scooters.
More than 100 million yen, identified as apayment for stolen vehicles, wastransferred from Hong Kong to a trading
company bank account. The stolen scooterswere transported to Hong Kong by a bogus
company, with the 2 Chinese registered asboard directors. As the scooters were soldat slightly more than 100,000 yen each, thenumber of stolen vehicles was estimatedat more than 1,000. In this case, only 250cc
scooter-type motorbikes made by Honda
Motor Co. were targeted. It was found thatthe vehicles had been sent via Hong Kongto China, where demand for motorbikes has
mushroomed.
In another case investigated by MPD, aman ( 30, Vietnamese ) man was arrested
on suspicion of stealing motorbikes over a144

long period. The bikes he stole were sentto Hong Kong and then on to othercountries according to type. For example,
Super Cub models, which are cheap anddurable, ended up in Vietnam, while
Harley-Davidson luxury models were sent
to Thailand, where the make is very
popular.
Chiba prefectural police investigating
the theft of Super Cub motorbikes foundthat a group of Vietnamese refugees had
set up a trading company and were able toexport about 1,000 stolen motorbikes toVietnam without arousing the suspicionsof customs officials. Investigations
revealed that the stolen bikes were sent tostorage sites in inland prefectures aroundTokyo where transportation and customsclearance procedures were entrusted to amajor transportation company. The bikes
were loaded into containers at Yokohama
Port and sent to Vietnam, via Hong Kong.
Kanagawa prefectural police arrested agroup of non-Japanese, including a
Pakistani and a Sri Lankan, for their
alleged involvement in the theft of fourwheel-drive cars, such as the Toyota Land
Cruiser, for the United Arab Emirates andMyanmar markets.
Fukuoka prefectural police were
investigating the theft of luxury cars andhave arrested a total of 23 people, including
gang members. About 500 Toyota Crown,
Nissan Cedric and Mitsubishi Pajero
models stolen in Tokyo and surrounding
areas were transported to some ports along
the Sea of Japan, from which they were to
be sent to Russia. Different gangorganizations performed various roles in
the operation, including the theft of thevehicles, transportation and negotiations
on sales. Police suspect the involvement of
Russian brokers. One of the suspects inthis case told police that security at
customs houses was laxer at ports along
the Sea of Japan.

108TH INTERNATIONAL SEMINARPARTICIPANTS’ PAPERS
V. CONCLUSION
Organized crimes in Japan, as
mentioned above, are characterized by thelong existence of Bouryokudan and theirorganized criminal activities. Under
traditional family-like set-ups these groups
gain illegal profits through the mostsuitable ways and means to meet thechanging social environment of the time.
In recent years, the social environment inJapan may be characterized by the
progressing internationalization of its
society, as well as by the more severe
watching of both the police and the citizens
over the daily activities and movement ofBouryokudan ( since the enactment of theAnti-Bouryokudan Law ). Of particularmention are the citizens group movements
to erradicate Bouryokudan, in close
cooperation with the police, raising publicawareness under the “Three Never
Slogan”campaign; namely “Never Fear!”,“Never Give Money!”, “Never Try to
Utilize!”.
It seems that the future activities ofBouryokudan will become moreinternationalized as the Bouryokudan try
to conceal their presence in Japan bysupporting and secretly using visiting
foreigners to organize themselves ( withJapanese members ) into criminal gangs
in Japan, committing most profitable
crimes; including the transnationaltrafficking of goods and people. Thesetypes of crime, are potentially assisted by
the secret cooperation of criminalorganizations of the native lands of thevisiting foreigners. Also, the criminal
activities of Bouryokudan and other newly
developing criminal organizations may bestrengthened by the ( rapid developmentof the international communications )furthering the secret cooperation withother criminal syndicates.
To cope with the changing features ofcrime and criminal activities, theeradication or controlling of such criminalorganizations, old and newly developing,in every country seems to be the mosturgent task for all the states of the world.
To win the battle against such criminalorganizations, sufficient information of
their movements, particularly of atransnational nature and of secretinternational group meetings, must be in
the hands of the officers in charge of every
country concerned.
Needless to say, the law enforcement
agencies shall make continuous efforts,
availing current information, to acquire
key evidence and to make thoroughinvestigations of such cases under close cooperation with the law enforcement
agencies of the other countries concerned.
Similar international co-operation isneeded in the process of prosecution, trial
and treatment of these criminals. Various
treaties and agreements codifing such cooperation may well be developed, based on
the model treaties adopted by the United
Nations Congress.
Lastly, I must highlight that thereferences made in this paper to thecriminal activities of the specific nationals
does not intend to disgrace or negate theintegrity of all other visiting foreigners
staying in Japan, and or people of the samenationality.

145

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 54
TABLE 1
TRENDS IN THE NUMBER OF BORYOKUDAN MEMBERS CLEARED BY
THE POLICE FOR PENAL CODE OFFENCES, AND REFERRED FOR
SPECIAL LAW VIOLATIONS(1956-1996)(ten thousand persons)
9
8
7
6
5
Special Law Offenders Referred

432Penal Code Offenders Cleared by the Police
1
0
1956

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

TABLE 2
TRENDS IN THE NUMBER OF PENAL CODE OFFENCES
BY FOREIGNERS AND FOREIGN PENAL CODE
OFFENDERS CLEARED BY THE POLICE(1949-1996)(thousands offences)(thousands offenders)
40
35
30
25

Offences Cleared by the police(Total)

20
15

Offenders Cleared by the police(Total)

105Offences Cleared by the police(Visiting Foreiners)
Offenders Cleared by the police(Visiting Foreiners)

0
1954

1970

Sources:Criminal Statistics by National Police Agency

146

1990

95