The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 24 (2013)

A Disturbing and Ominous Voicefrom a Different Shore:
Japanese Radio Propaganda and Its Impact
on the US Government’s Treatment
of Japanese Americans during World War II

Takeya Mizuno*

Introduction
On February 19, 1942, nearly two months after Japan’s sudden bombingof Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive
Order 9066, which forcibly removed approximately 120,000 people ofJapanese ancestry from the West Coast to inland camps. About one-thirdof them were first-generation immigrants from Japan, or “Issei,” while theremaining two-thirds were citizens of the United States by birthright, or
second-generation “Nisei.” For many, mass uprooting and confinement
continued until the end of the war.1
Since at least the early 1980s, the legitimacy of the federal government’s
wartime Japanese American policy has been denied almost unanimously
Copyright © 2013 Takeya Mizuno. All rights reserved. This work may be used, withthis notice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be
distributed, electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission fromthe author.
*Professor, Toyo University

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by leading scholars and critics as well as the general public. As a result of
the “redress” movement that progressed from the early 1970s to 1980s, anational consensus came to be formed to the effect that mass incarceration
was a serious wrongdoing that needed to be rectified. By 1982, thegovernment-sponsored Commission on the Wartime Relocation andInternment of Civilians (CWRIC) conducted comprehensive research andconcluded that the mistake occurred due to “race prejudice, war hysteria
and a failure of political leadership.” In 1988, redress was finally enacted
into law. Accordingly, an official apology and compensation were offered
to all survivors of mass incarceration.2
However, what is commonly understood today as an infamous“dark spot” in American history was at the time accepted widely as an
appropriate internal security measure. With authorization by the president,
the army implemented mass incarceration under the name of “militarynecessity,” and the rationale was upheld by the majority of the Supreme
Court. Coupled with long-standing hostility and prejudice against thoseoriginating from Asia, the federal government’s wholesale encampment ofJapanese Americans enjoyed public popularity, too.3
Previous studies have shown that opposition was rarely heard at thetime, even from the most liberal, pro-minority segments of society.
Certain individuals and groups expressed humanitarian concerns and evenraised critical questions. In a broader view, however, the overwhelming
majority tacitly or openly approved of the coercive segregation of a small
ethnic minority group that the military authorities categorically labeled as“potentially dangerous enemy aliens.”4
Meanwhile, academic literature, despite its enormous volume, has not
paid due attention to one less visible, but exceptionally influential, voiceof dissent: Japanese propaganda. The purpose of this article is to fill thisgap by examining what a Japanese short-wave radio propaganda network
known as Radio Tokyo said about the federal government’s treatment ofJapanese Americans during World War II and what impact it rendered on
government officials.5
When Pearl Harbor was attacked in December 1941, Japan owned two
principal channels of foreign propaganda: wire service by the national
news agency Domei and short-wave radio broadcasting by Nippon Hoso
Kyokai (NHK). Controlled directly by the military-led Cabinet Information
Bureau (Naikaku Joho Kyoku), both Domei and NHK served as Tokyo’s
official voice throughout the war.6
The short-wave broadcasting of NHK, better known as Radio Tokyo,

A Disturbing and Ominous Voice from a Different Shore107

was one of the most influential, widely recognized voices of wartime Japanaround the world. Beginning from June 1, 1935, NHK kept increasing
its short-wave broadcasts as Japan thrust its desire to build the so-called
Greater Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere over Asia. By 1941, NHK was
running daily more than twenty-five hours of overseas programs in sixteen
languages. Radio propaganda expanded even further as Japan entered
World War II. By November 1943, the duration of broadcasting exceeded
thirty-two hours daily, and the number of languages increased to twentyfive.7
Due to the unprecedented and wide-spreading nature of the researchquestion, some practical boundaries have to be set here.
First, this article’s time frame covers basically only the first year
after the outbreak of war in December 1941, or the initial phase of mass
incarceration.
Second, this article’s main focus is on Japanese radio broadcasts thatreferred to the overwhelming majority of Japanese Americans herded into
the “relocation centers” administered by the War Relocation Authority(WRA). Propaganda specifically referring to the few thousand Japanesenationals who were placed separately in the “internment camps” run by theJustice Department and the War Department is basically excluded.
Finally, this article examines only the short-wave overseas radio
programs of Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), the Broadcasting Corporationof Japan. Other forms and means of propaganda are not analyzed.
This article uses a variety of primary sources as well as previous
literature. Especially important are the transcripts of Japanese short-wave
broadcasts made by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) of
the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC), a federal agency
that monitored radio propaganda from abroad. These transcripts were all
kept in English. Japanese-language programs were translated by bilingual
staffers of the FCC. Archival records of other government agencies incharge of propaganda, intelligence activities, and Japanese American mass
incarceration are also utilized.

The Us Government’s Monitoringof Foreign Radio Propaganda
Seeing Japan as a potential enemy, the United States government
had been carefully “listening to” the rapidly growing Radio Tokyo
programming prior to Pearl Harbor. Monitoring agencies included the108

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Federal Communications Commission, the Office of the Coordinator ofInformation, and the intelligence branches of the US Army and Navy. The
sudden outbreak of war inevitably intensified their monitoring activities,
which produced voluminous intelligence material for various government
institutions up until Japan accepted unconditional surrender in 1945.
The federal agency that most systematically monitored international
radio propaganda was the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the
FCC. The FBIS was formerly called the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring
Service (FBMS), which was established in February 1941 and was
reorganized into the FBIS in July 1942. Throughout the war, as thearmy’s internal memorandum put it, the FBIS “provided United States
Government war agencies a global coverage of radio output of news andintelligence from enemy, neutral and allied transmitters.”8
The FBIS confidentially translated, transcribed, and analyzed agreat amount of short-wave broadcasts beamed across the world. As of
August 1941, it was monitoring from 600,000 to 900,000 words of radio
propaganda daily. Its monitoring service covered a variety of programs.
“Speeches, newscasts, and entertainment to the inclusion of some musicalprograms, are carefully watched for intelligence and trends, which arereported immediately to Government officials responsible for counterpropaganda or other action,” explained the FCC’s general information
release. To assume such an immense and highly specialized duty, the
FBIS mobilized hundreds of technicians, translators, and stenographers.
Bilingual Japanese Americans were among its employees.9
The intelligence activities of the FBIS contributed to the national war
efforts in various ways. Its transcripts and reports were regularly sent toand actually utilized by a number of government institutions, including the
Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), intelligence
division (G-2) of the US Army, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Censorship,
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
Office of War Information (OWI), War Relocation Authority (WRA), andWestern Defense Command and Fourth Army (WDC). As R. Keith Kane,
an intelligence official of the Office of Facts and Figures (OFF), which
was later integrated into the OWI, stated, “The Monitoring Service [of the
FBIS] has become a valuable weapon for the ideological war against the
Axis and is undoubtedly destined to be one of the most useful instrumentsof grand strategy.”10Intelligence material procured from the Axis short-wave broadcasts
was deemed especially valuable because sources of information were soA Disturbing and Ominous Voice from a Different Shore

109

scarce. In the words of the FCC, “a considerable amount of news andintelligence information comes over the short-wave which is not available
from other sources, and which must be transmitted immediately to theproper Government officials. The value of short-wave sources increases
as it becomes more difficult to obtain news from various countries byother means.” Radio Tokyo was thus given keen attention by government
officials, although they understood well that propaganda was in its nature
biased in favor of the disseminator.11

Focus on Internal Racial Conflicts
From the beginning, Japanese propagandists identified racial inequities
and discord within the United States as one of the most desirable themes
for propaganda. From this basic strategy many race-related radio programs
developed. Saul K. Padover, an analyst of international psychological
warfare, wrote in 1943 that Radio Tokyo’s exploitation of domestic racial
problems was a serious menace to the national interest because “there ismore than a grain of truth” in it.12
Government officials in charge of propaganda and intelligence activities
were well aware of Radio Tokyo’s intention to widen internal divisions in/among the Allies. The OFF’s Bureau of Intelligence examined the generaltendencies of Axis propaganda from March to April 1942 and found that
“Axis broadcasters make vigorous efforts . . . to magnify the differences
between racial and religious groups. . . . The numerous nationalistic
groups in this country are represented as the victims of discrimination andmaltreatment.” Another internal report by the same office observed: “Thestrategy of Axis short wave propaganda—to divide country from country,
class from class, race from race, religion from religion—remains the same.
Only its tactics change as Axis propagandists come upon or manufacture
new incidents and issues.”13
After more than fifty years since the end of the war, scholars have cometo maintain that World War II was a major turning point for government
policymakers in that they came to weigh domestic racial problems in
considering international policies. Mary L. Dudziak in her 2000 book
Cold War Civil Rights wrote: “During the war years the idea that a conflictinhered in American ideology and practice first gained wide currency.”
Justin Hart has shown in more detail that officials of the State Department
and OWI were concerned that enemy propaganda highlighting theunfavorable plight of Hispanic Americans and African Americans would

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harm the nation’s image abroad and eventually its foreign relations. As
Hart explains, “information from abroad could shape debates about racein the United States; those debates would, in turn, play out before a global
audience.” Officials in charge of domestic policies such as JapaneseAmerican mass incarceration had similar concerns.14

Radio Tokyo on Mass Incarceration
The federal government’s decision to single out one particular minority
group and send them en masse to distant camps gave Radio Tokyo many
opportunities to discredit the United States. As President Roosevelt in
February 1942 authorized the army to execute mass incarceration, Japanese
propagandists quickly jumped on it. A confidential report compiled by
the FBI pointed out that “discrimination against the Japanese regardlessof citizenship is making them vulnerable to short wave racial propaganda
coming from the Japanese Broadcasting Company in Tokyo, Japan. This
propaganda is to the effect that war between the Axis and [A]llies is based
upon the difference of race rather than upon any political ideals.”15
As the army actually carried out mass uprooting and confinement, it
inevitably invited more propaganda attacks from Tokyo. Examining thetranscript of the April 4 broadcast provided by the FCC, the OFF’s internal
memorandum summarized it as saying that, “while Japan is exerting
herself to assure the comfort and well-being of enemy nationals in her
care, the US is herding its alien internees from their homes to isolated
regions of Montana and Arizona. The radio charges, further, that Japaneseare being deprived of their constitutional rights.”16Radio Tokyo rebutted every justification or excuse for mass
incarceration, particularly the “military necessity” rationale. A typicalargument can be seen in the May 1 broadcast, which stated:
The official version [is that] the evacuation plan is designed to assure
military security, but such is a phony excuse in view of the fact thata relatively few unarmed Japanese civilians surrounded by millionsof Americans never constitute a military menace to the entire Pacificcoast of the United States.
How could a “democratic” nation possibly indulge itself with such an“undemocratic” act? After raising the question, Radio Tokyo charged that“all this indicates ‘good-bye to civilization,’ for the Japanese in the United

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States.”17Radio Tokyo often addressed mass incarceration as evidence of moral
superiority of Japan. In so doing, a stark contrast was made between
Washington’s “barbaric” acts and Japan’s self-declared “generous” and“fair” treatment of US citizens in its hands. For instance, the March 5
broadcast alleged:
Japan’s fundamental policy towards civilians in the occupied areas
is to allow them all freedom possible and every consideration andprotection. This policy must mark a vivid contrast to the barbaric
savagery of treatment by the US Government of an unfortunate
percentage of its own citizens who have committed no sin, but madethe fatal mistake of being born of the Japanese race and living in
America.
The June 1 broadcast went so far as to say that Americans in Japan “roamstreets” while the Japanese in the United States were “lynched.”18
To impress on listeners the greater morality of Japan, Radio Tokyo
quoted “eyewitnesses” of Washington’s “inhuman acts.” Such “reliable”
accounts became available due to the agreement between the two
governments to exchange repatriates. On August 20, 1942, approximately
1,500 Japanese nationals living in the United States at the time of Pearl
Harbor returned home aboard the Asama Maru. About two weeks later, on
September 7, Radio Tokyo declared:
A very inhuman treatment of Japanese internees in the US by theAmerican police has been brought to light by the Japanese whohave returned here aboard the exchange liner. We should also like toinform the American people that, on the basis of reliable evidence, weare ready to disclose more about the inhuman acts of the American
authorities toward the Japanese internees.19
Radio Tokyo kept its promise. Only three days later, on September 10,
the following commentary was aired:No words can adequately describe the reaction that is prevalent in theminds of the Japanese people today over the reports of indefensible
torture that our nationals in the US were subjected to following theoutbreak of the war. These reports are by no means relayed messages,

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but eyewitness accounts brought home by those who were fortunate
enough to return home on the repatriation vessels.20
On another occasion, Radio Tokyo cast a narrator who allegedly visiteda prisoner of war camp in Japan. In the December 18, 1942, program titled“Light from the East,” the narrator described how favorably American
captives were treated in Japan as opposed to the Japanese and theirfamilies living miserably in the United States. To the American audience,
the narrator professed:
That is how Japan is treating your prisoners. American civilians whoare interned are being accorded even better treatment and what did
surprise me is that only a small fraction of non-combatant Americans
in the Far East are in internment camp. Wherever possible theJapanese authorities are permitting Americans to go about their daily
lives in a normal manner. How different this is from the shamefultreatment to which your authorities are subjecting Japanese noncombatants [in the United States].21
It should be noted, however, that in the above broadcast and many others
Radio Tokyo apparently overstated Japan’s actual treatment of American
civilians and prisoners of war. Japan’s inappropriate treatment of captives
has been documented in detail by a number of scholars and survivors.22
In a similar vein, Radio Tokyo insisted that the United States wasbullying Japanese Americans because Japan was winning the war. This
type of propaganda appeared mostly during the first several months after
Pearl Harbor when the Japanese military was in fact taking the upper
hand over the United States. The aforementioned “Light from the East”
commentary that was aired on November 3 contended that “Roosevelt
suffered because of war losses, so he got revenge by rounding them up.
The Roosevelt Administration has lost all sense of reason because of
military defeats.”23
Radio Tokyo criticized not only the fundamental injustice of mass
incarceration but also the policy’s more specific aspects. Severe living
conditions around or within camps were frequently mentioned. This typeof propaganda increased around mid-1942 as the US Army completed
transfers of uprooted Japanese Americans into hastily constructed camps.
Manzanar in California, the first camp, which opened in late March
1942, was Radio Tokyo’s favorite target of attack. In a serial programA Disturbing and Ominous Voice from a Different Shore

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titled “American Pictures” that was broadcast sometime in 1942, Japanese
propagandists complained that the environment around Manzanar was far
below the bearable level for any humans to live in.
No one had ever heard of Owens Valley [where the Manzanar camp is
located] before. [It is] beyond the desert of Mojave and beyond rangesof the Sierra Nevada. East of this spot there is an area bespeaking oftragedy of California—Death Valley. It is desert about 100 miles longand 30 miles wide. So barren and is below sea level. . . . Roosevelt
and his henchmen are treating the Japanese in America terribly.
Roosevelt has made the Japanese go to the Valley of Death.
Radio Tokyo added that the deadly Manzanar camp symbolized theimmaturity of the United States as a civilized nation: “For the Americans
this is a great disgrace. They are going against everything their ancestors
cherished. We have overestimated American civilization.”24
As more information about Manzanar became available throughpublic sources, Japanese accusations also became more detailed. The
October 10 broadcast, for example, argued that “the Japanese populationin California has to lead a semi-primitive life in the so-called reception
center of Manzanar. All Japanese evacuees were stripped of almost all
their properties, except cooking utensils, clothing, tools of trade, andbedding, which it has taken them scores of years to procure.” Citing anarticle published in Life magazine, Radio Tokyo continued: “Although theAmerican authorities called Manzanar a reception center, Life admitted
this is no idyllic country club. It is [a] concentration camp.”25
At the same time, Radio Tokyo kept pressing Washington to investigate
and disclose the actual state of Manzanar and other camps. The September
16 commentary demanded:
Cases of outright robbery have been committed by officials of thedetention and internment camps on the [Japanese] nationals who
were herded away from their homes. . . . If the American people aresincere in their claims to humanitarianism, [they should let someone]
investigate the actual conditions in these detention and internment
camps.
Radio Tokyo then asserted that “the American people are kept in complete
ignorance of the things that take place behind their backs” and that “it is114

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easy enough to preach the humanitarian rights of other people, especiallywhen one is ignorant of such violations within his own country.”26
Not surprisingly, Radio Tokyo reacted furiously when a large-scale
uprising occurred in Manzanar in early December 1942. After presenting
a factual summation that “a group of internees was fired on by the guardwith a series of tear gas bombs causing the death of one and injuries toseveral others,” one broadcast contested in a decided tone:
The forcible evacuation of the Japanese nationals from the Pacific
Coast area is in itself a violation of international law not to mention
the brutal treatment accorded these nationals. . . . The American
government leaders should at least conduct this war on a basis thatwill always mark them as clean fighters and not as ones who would
vent their wrath upon such innocent people as the interned Japanesenationals.27
The so-called Manzanar incident was a mass disturbance that developedin the camp when some two thousand inmates protested against thearrest and imprisonment of one popular man named Harry Ueno. Ueno
was charged with beating a pro-camp administration Japanese American
leader, who was suspected of being an “informant” (or “inu” in Japanese)for the camp authority and FBI. In order to silence the crowd that grewemotional and aggressive as they requested the immediate release of Ueno,
on the afternoon of December 6 the military police sprayed tear gas andeventually shot into the crowd, killing two and injuring many others.28
Shocking events such as this one frustrated the federal governmentby creating a spiral of criticism, at first causing sensational coverageby the domestic news media, then provoking Radio Tokyo to repeatedcondemnations, which further fueled the domestic press coverage ofTokyo’s angry allegations. An internal survey conducted by the OFF
ascertains that the US news media customarily depended on Radio Tokyoand other Axis radio broadcasts for some of their news. The survey
analyzed twenty-three major metropolitan newspapers such as the New
York Times, the Baltimore Sun, and the Washington Times-Herald fromMarch 8 to 14, 1942, finding that 13 percent of the total column inchesof news about the Axis was taken from short-wave material beamed
from those enemy nations. There existed no restrictions against listening
to foreign radio broadcasts, even those disseminated by the belligerent
powers.29

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One may find it ironical that the constitutional principle of press
freedom thus gave assistance to enemy propagandists abroad. Anotherconfidential study of the OFF pointed out: “The enemy’s most direct
avenue of communication with the American people, however, is by theshortwave radio—an instrument the effectiveness of which is multipliedby the currency given to its messages through regular American media
of information.” Sherman H. Dryer, director of radio productions at the
University of Chicago, also wrote in his 1942 classic, Radio in Wartime:“A free press is often an aid to the broadcaster, for it helps to carry his
propaganda to a secondary audience. In this regard, the American press has
been of inestimable help to the Axis, for it prints regularly ‘news’ received
from enemy radio stations.”30

Threat of Reprisal and Concerned Government Officials
What bothered government officials most, however, was that RadioTokyo indicated repeatedly that Japan might mistreat Americans in its
captivity as a reprisal against mass incarceration. To take one typicalexample, the September 7, 1942, broadcast reminded, apparently consciousof the US government officials monitoring their programs:
The American people should remember that many Americans who areyour relatives or friends are still interned in Japan and also remaining
in various parts of the Greater East Asia. We sincerely hope that the
US Government authorities will seriously reflect upon themselves
for what they have done to the Japanese internees and tender sincere
apologies to the Japanese.
Three days later, on September 10, Radio Tokyo dispatched an even morealarming message: “Let us remind you that there are many of your friends
and relatives who reside in this part of the world, either as internees, likeour nationals in your country, and a still larger number of war prisoners.”
Similar warnings continued to be aired thereafter.31
Those threatening words were more than enough to alert officials in
Washington, who had been mindful of the danger of retaliation from the
beginning of the war. On December 9, 1941, only two days after Pearl
Harbor, Attorney General Francis Biddle made an announcement that
the FBI’s warrant-based arrests of nationals of the Axis powers wereconducted with utmost carefulness so as not to endanger the welfare of

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Americans in Axis hands.
The Department of Justice for some time has been preparing forthis emergency. Those who have been apprehended have been
carefully selected and will be dealt with according to preparedplans. These plans have been made in order to avoid disturbanceand confusion, which would inevitably lead to retaliatory measuresby the governments of these nationals towards Americans under thejurisdiction of those governments.
From this consideration did Biddle request the state and local law
enforcement authorities to refrain from taking direct, arbitrary actions
against aliens.32
Reflecting the seriousness of the federal government’s concern, next day,on December 10, the Attorney General issued another public statement that
explicitly insured proper treatment of the nationals of the Axis nations:“[Aliens] may be assured, indeed, that every effort will be made to protect
them from any discrimination or abuse. This assurance is given not only
in justice and decency to the loyal non-citizens in this country but also in
the hope that it may spare American citizens in enemy countries unjust
retaliation.”33
As a matter of course, officials responsible for handling JapaneseAmericans were highly alarmed by Radio Tokyo’s intimidation. Assistant
Secretary of War John J. McCloy was one of them. In June 1942, McCloy
requested the American National Red Cross to conduct a “prompt andthorough survey” of the army-controlled temporary “assembly centers.”
McCloy feared that a recent article published in the liberal weekly
magazine New Republic regarding poor camp conditions might be picked
up by enemy propagandists and, even worse, result in retaliatory actions.
The article “Concentration Camp: US Style,” written by Ted Nakashima,a second-generation Japanese at the Puyallup Assembly Center in
Washington state, read in part: “The resettlement center is actually apenitentiary. . . . The food and sanitation problems are the worst. . . . Can
this be the same America we left a few weeks ago? . . . I can’t take it!”34
Being well aware of Radio Tokyo’s tireless efforts to play up the issue,
McCloy admitted bluntly that Japanese propaganda and its threat ofreprisal were pressing concerns for the military. In his memorandum to the
Red Cross dated June 19, McCloy wrote:

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The War Department has been disturbed at the publication in a recent
issue of the “New Republic” of an article by a Japanese, which isdefinitely and, we feel, unfairly critical of conditions in the evacuation
centers. It seems highly probable that this article may be cited in Axis
propaganda, and it might conceivably be used as justification for the
mistreatment of American prisoners in the custody of the Japanese.
McCloy added that an objective investigation was therefore necessary in
the interests of not only Japanese Americans in camps but also American
citizens abroad held by Japanese authorities: “Care has been exercised
not only from humane considerations, but also because of the desire to set
within this country a high standard . . . as an inducement to the Japanese
to exercise a similar consideration for American citizens who have beeninterned by them.”35
Besides military officials, civilian staffers of the War Relocation
Authority also found Japanese propaganda extremely disturbing. The
WRA was a federal agency created by the president’s Executive Order
9120, singed on March 18, 1942. The WRA took over the responsibility
from the army to take care of uprooted Japanese Americans in permanent“relocation centers” throughout the war.
Archival records reveal that the WRA was regularly receiving up-todate radio broadcasts from Japan and making policies accordingly. A shorttime after the authority was created, an information officer made a requestof the Office of the Coordinator of Information: “We would be especiallyinterested in knowing from time to time what the Axis radio and otherpropaganda outlets are saying about the alien resettlement program in thiscountry and also in learning what sort of treatment is being accorded to
the United States citizens caught behind the Axis lines.” The WRA was
frequently contacting the FCC, too.36
In fact, the camp authority’s highest-raking officials admitted that they
were highly mindful of Axis propaganda and the danger of reprisals. The
first national WRA director Milton S. Eisenhower stated confidentially:“Our enemies are watching us even more closely than our friends—they
are watching and waiting for any opportunity to turn our mistakes totheir profit. . . . And, they are watching for pretexts—even the slightest
will serve their purpose—to take terrible, unspeakable revenge upon
[US citizens].” Sometime later, Eisenhower’s successor, Dillon S. Myer,
remarked: “Ever since the time of the evacuation, we have been awarethat our progress is being watched by the Japanese government and that

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it might provide a pattern for the treatment of American nationals—bothsoldiers and civilians—in Japanese hands.”37
Primary sources further indicate that the WRA did consider RadioTokyo’s threat of reprisal as an essential factor in its decision making. The
agency’s internal policy guideline, “A Statement of Guiding Principles ofthe War Relocation Authority,” reflects the impact of Japanese propaganda.
The statement read:
Steps which this government takes to suppress or discriminate against
the people now in relocation centers give weight to the enemy’sargument that the [Allies] are waging a race war. This argument isused in propaganda directed at the peoples of the Pacific areas, andothers whose collaboration with the [Allies] can help to speed up the
day of victory.
Repressive or discriminatory treatment of people of Japanese
ancestry in relocation centers will be used by the Japanese militarists
as a pretext for reprisals against American prisoners of war andAmerican civilians held by the Japanese government.
Radio propaganda beamed from Tokyo certainly affected the framingof the fundamental principles as well as the actual practice of mass
incarceration.38
Before concluding this article, it should be noted for the sake ofcontextualization that the WRA was then facing quite opposite accusations
from some domestic critics that Japanese Americans in camps were
“pampered” and “coddled.” At the forefront of this controversy were theanti-Japanese Congress members of the House Special Committee on
Un-American Activities (the so-called Dies Committee). National WRA
director Myer once refuted these charges: “They accuse us of pamperingand coddling because we have not allowed the brutality of the Japanese
enemy to influence our policies and program. I say to them: No, we havenot taken Japan as a model—thank God!” Myer went on to say: “We
are working to the best of our ability to avoid conditions and incidents
that might encourage the Japanese enemy to inflict more suffering on
Americans imprisoned by them.”39
Government officials in charge of mass confinement were thus caught
between conflicting voices from inside and outside the national borders.
Constantly feeling the pressure of Japanese propaganda threatening
reprisals, they had to handle at the same time an opposite adversary at

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home. As national WRA director Eisenhower correctly observed as earlyas March 1942, “the evacuation and relocation of Japanese is a touchy
and difficult task. . . . The program will require the full measure oftolerance and carefully weighed judgment, . . . bear[ing] in mind not only
the domestic, but also the foreign repercussions of the manner in which
Japanese evacuees are handled by the Government.”40

Conclusion
From the earliest phase of the war, Radio Tokyo saw the federal
government’s discriminatory policy toward Japanese Americans as abonanza of propaganda opportunities. With the ultimate intent to widen
domestic and international divisions among races, Japanese short-wave
radio propaganda took advantage of the mass incarceration policy todiscredit the United States and, at the same time, to proclaim Japanesesuperiority in both morality and military power. For militaristic Japan,
mass incarceration was a sort of propaganda gift.
Radio Tokyo made various efforts to enhance the credibility andinfluence of its own claims. For example, it quoted “eyewitness” accountsof those who returned to Japan from the United States on the exchange
ships. On other occasions, Japanese radio broadcasters cited articles
published in the US news media. Such techniques made Radio Tokyo’s
accusations even more specific and detailed. Extreme living conditions
around or within the Manzanar camp in California were frequently
mentioned. At the same time, the American press often relied on Axis
radio broadcasts for news, and this gave further assistance to Japanese
propagandists.
While federal government officials from the beginning were attentive
to what Radio Tokyo was saying, they became especially anxious whenenemy propagandists implied that there might be reprisals against
Americans in Japanese custody. Radio Tokyo suggested repeatedly thatJapanese authorities might mistreat American captives tit for tat. This
made government officials frightened. Staffers of the WRA who took the
immediate responsibility for operating Japanese American camps wereparticularly watchful so as not to provoke Tokyo to take retaliatory actions.
The WRA was facing another dilemma, too. At the same time as they werebeing threatened by Japanese radio propaganda, they had also to cope with
anti-Japanese critics on the home front who demanded harsher treatment
of Japanese Americans.

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In a broader picture, these findings demonstrate that the impact ofJapanese American mass incarceration was much wider and deeper
than previously thought. While previous literature has tended to discuss
the policy in the domestic context only, it was actually a policy of aninternational scale, involving dynamic global propaganda warfare among
the Allies, Axis, and possibly many other nations where the Japanese
short-wave radio broadcasts could reach. Contrary to the intent of thefederal government, the wartime measure meant to maintain internal
security crossed the national borders and by that effect bounced back evenharder from abroad. The echo was a disturbing and ominous voice from adifferent shore.

Notes
1
Major previous works on Japanese American mass incarceration include Morton
Grodzins, Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacuation (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1949); Jacobus tenBroek, Edward Norton Barnhart,
and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War, and the Constitution (Berkeley: Universityof California Press, 1954); Roger Daniels, Concentration Camps, USA: JapaneseAmericans and World War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971); Roger
Daniels, The Decision to Relocate the Japanese Americans (New York: J. B. Lippincott,1975); Michi Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration
Camps (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1976); Peter Irons, Justice at War: The
Story of the Japanese-American Internment Cases (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1983); Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment ofJapanese Americans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Brian Masaru
Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004); Greg Robinson, A Tragedy of Democracy: JapaneseConfinement in North America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
2
The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC),
Personal Justice Denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation andInternment of Civilians (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 18. For
detailed accounts of the redress movement, see William M. Hori, Repairing America:
An Account of the Movement for Japanese American Redress (Pullman: Washington
State University Press, 1988); Leslie T. Hatamiya, Righting a Wrong: JapaneseAmericans and the Passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993); Don T. Nakanishi, “Surviving Democracy’s ‘Mistake’: JapaneseAmericans and the Enduring Legacy of Executive Order 9066,” Amerasia Journal 19(1993): 7–35; Charles McClain, ed., The Mass Internment of Japanese Americans and
the Quest for Legal Redress (New York: Garland, 1994); Mitchell T. Maki, Harry H.
L. Kitano, and S. Megan Berthold, Achieving the Impossible Dream: How JapaneseAmericans Obtained Redress (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999); Robert
Sadamu Shimabukuro, Born in Seattle: The Campaign for Japanese American Redress(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).
3
The 1993 survey by the Journal of American History found that the journal’s
readers ranked Japanese American mass incarceration eighth among the “dark spots” inA Disturbing and Ominous Voice from a Different Shore

121

US history. (David Thelen, “The Practice of American History,” Journal of American
History 81 [December 1994]: 931–60, 1175–1217.) For the Supreme Court rulings,
see Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 US 81 (1943); Toyosaburo Korematsu v.
United States, 323 US 214 (1944); Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 US 283 (1944).
4
Major works that have highlighted opposition to mass incarceration include
Grodzins, Americans Betrayed; Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A
History of the ACLU (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Cheryl Greenberg,“Black and Jewish Responses to Japanese Internment,” Journal of American
Ethnic History 14 (Winter 1995): 3–37; Gerald L. Sittser, A Cautious Patriotism:
The American Churches and the Second World War (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1997); Judy Kutulas, “In Quest of Autonomy: The Northern
California Affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union and World War II,” PacificHistorical Review 67 (May 1998): 201–31; Takeya Mizuno, “The Civil Libertarian
Press, Japanese American Press, and Japanese American Mass Evacuation” (PhD
diss., University of Missouri–Columbia, 2000); C. K. Doreski, “‘Kin in Some Way’:
The Chicago Defender Reads the Japanese Internment, 1942–1945,” in The Black
Press: New Literary and Historical Essays, ed. Todd Vogel (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 2001), 161–85; Douglas Dye, “For the Sake of Seattle’s Soul: The
Seattle Council of Churches, the Nikkei Community, and World War II,” PacificNorthwest Quarterly 93 (Summer 2002): 127–36; Takeya Mizuno, Nikkei America
jin kyosei shuyo to journalism: Liberal ha zasshi nihongo shinbun no Dainiji Sekai
Taisen [Japanese American mass incarceration and journalism: Liberal magazines andJapanese-language newspapers during World War II] (Yokohama: Shunpu Sha, 2005);
Allan W. Austin, Quaker Brotherhood: Interracial Activism and the American Friends
Service Committee, 1917–1950 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012); Greg
Robinson, After Camp: Portraits in Midcentury Japanese American Life and Politics(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).
Robert Shaffer’s following articles deserve attention in that the author sheds
relatively positive light on those who supported Japanese Americans: Robert Shaffer,“Cracks in the Consensus: Defending the Rights of Japanese Americans during WorldWar II,” Radical History Review 72 (Fall 1998): 84–120; Robert Shaffer, “Opposition
to Internment: Defending Japanese American Rights during World War II,” The
Historian 61 (March 1999): 597–619.
5
Setsuro Kitayama’s three-volume work Radio Tokyo is virtually the only previous
examination in a more-or-less substantial manner of how Japanese radio propaganda
commented on mass incarceration. But Kitayama’s work is based on only a handfulof Japanese sources. Unfortunately, most of the internal papers of the NHK and otherrelevant records of Radio Tokyo were destroyed right after Japan’s surrender in 1945.
No US government record is used in Kitayama’s Radio Tokyo. (Setsuro Kitayama,
Radio Tokyo, vols. 1–3, [Tokyo: Tabata Shoten, 1988].)
For other major works on Japanese propaganda during World War II, see, forexample, Lucy D. Meo, Japan’s Radio War on Australia 1941–1945 (Carlton, Aus.:
Melbourne University Press, 1968); Namikawa Ryo, “Japanese Overseas Broadcasting:
A Personal View,” in Film and Radio Propaganda in World War II, ed. K. R. M. Short(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983), 319–33; John W. Dower, War without
Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986); Masaharu
Sato and Barak Kushner, “‘Negro Propaganda Operations’: Japan’s Short-Wave Radio
Broadcasts for World War II Black Americans,” Historical Journal of Film, Radioand Television 19 (March 1999): 5–26; Jane M. J. Robbins, Tokyo Calling: JapaneseOverseas Radio Broadcasting 1937–1945 (Fucecchio, Ital.: European Press Academic
Publishing, 2001); Barak Kushner, The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda

122

Takeya Mizuno(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2006); Frederick P. Close, Tokyo Rose/An
American Patriot: A Dual Biography (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010).
6
Norio Tamura and Setsuro Kitayama, “Radio Tokyo and FBIS,” Journal of Tokyo
Keizai University 184 (November 1993): 82.
7
Kaigai Hoso Kenkyu Group, ed., NHK senji kaigai hoso [Wartime overseas
broadcasting of the NHK] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1982), ii.
8Edwin Ware Hullinger, Assistant Director, and Spencer Williams, Chief Field
Correspondent, to Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth
Army (WDC), “Memorandum on Japanese-Language Work of the Foreign Broadcast
Intelligence Service (FBIS) for the Commanding General, Western Defense Command,
San Francisco,” December 15, 1943, Record Group (RG) 338 (in 2001 RG 338 wasreclassified as RG 499: Records of US Army Defense Commands [World War II]),
entry 2, box 4, file 000.77, National Archives and Record Administration, College Park,
Maryland (hereafter cited as NA).
9
General Information Release, Federal Communications Commission (FCC),“Dissecting Foreign Radio Propaganda: Purposes and Functions of the Foreign
Broadcast Intelligence Service,” August 25, 1941, RG 60, entry SWPU (Special War
Policies Unit), box 75, file 148-301-1, section 1, NA, College Park, Maryland.
10
R. Keith Kane, “The O.F.F.,” Public Opinion Quarterly 6 (Summer 1942): 208.
11
FCC, “Dissecting Foreign Radio Propaganda.”
12
Saul K. Padover, “Japanese Race Propaganda,” Public Opinion Quarterly 7(Summer 1943): 197.
13
Enemy Source Section, Source Division, Bureau of Intelligence, Office of Facts
and Figures (OFF), “Axis Short-Wave Propaganda Directed at the United States andIntended to Undermine Public Confidence in the American Government: Based on the
Daily Reports and Weekly Analyses of the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service of
the Federal Communications Commission for March 15–April 12, 1942,” n.d., RG 208,
entry 3D, box 10, file: Short Wave Broadcasts, NA, College Park, Maryland; Bureau
of Intelligence, Office of War Information (OWI), to Archibald MacLeish, “Axis Short
Wave Propaganda to the US for Period Jan. 22–30,” n.d., RG 208, entry 3D, box 10,
file: Short Wave Broadcasts, NA, College Park, Maryland.
14
Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 7; Justin Hart, “Making
Democracy Safe for the World: Race, Propaganda, and the Transformation of US
Foreign Policy during World War II,” Pacific Historical Review 73 (February 2004):
69.
15
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “General Intelligence Survey,” February
1942, RG 208, entry 368, box 350, file “L”: US, 0.9, Serial Federal Bureau of
Investigation General Intelligence Survey—German Activities, NA, College Park,
Maryland.
16
OFF, “Axis Short-Wave Propaganda Directed at the United States and Intended toUndermine Public Confidence in the American Government.”
17
Radio Tokyo, “US Viciously Discriminates against Japanese,” May 1, 1942,
Foreign Office of Tokyo, We Fight through the Radio, vol. 1, (Tokyo: Foreign Office,1942), 215. This document was made available by the courtesy of Setsuro Kitayama.
18
Public Relations Division, Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA),“Copy of Excerpts of Foreign Radio Broadcasts which Make Reference to Evacuationof Persons of Japanese Ancestry or Collateral Subjects as Recorded by Foreign
Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission,” n.d., RG 338,
entry: Bound Volumes, vol. 21, NA, College Park, Maryland; Elinor J. Bauman, San
Francisco Regional Office, War Relocation Authority (WRA), to R. B. Cozzens, Field

A Disturbing and Ominous Voice from a Different Shore

123

Assistant Director, “Japanese Propaganda in Office of War Information Files,” July 27,
1943, RG 210, entry 42, box 1, file 001.4: Information on Evacuation and Evacuees,
NA, Washington, DC.
19
WCCA, “Copy of Excerpts of Foreign Radio Broadcasts.”
20
WCCA, “Copy of Excerpts of Foreign Radio Broadcasts.”
21
Public Relations Division, WCCA, “Supplement I: Foreign Radio Broadcast
Intelligence Service, FCC: ‘Light from the East Commentary,’ Tokyo in English at 9:50
P.M. EWT, 12,18,42, to Eastern United States and Latin America,” n.d., RG 338, entry:
Bound Volumes, vol. 21, NA, College Park, Maryland.
22
Major published works on Japan’s treatment of Allied captives include Scott
Corbett, Quiet Passages: The Exchange of Civilians between the United States andJapan during the Second World War (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1987); Gavan
Daws, Prisoners of the Japanese: POWs of World War II in the Pacific (New York:
William Morrow, 1994); Robert S. LaForte, Ronald E. Marcello, and Richard L.
Himmel, eds., With Only the Will to Live: Accounts of Americans in Japanese PrisonCamps, 1941–1945 (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1994); Frances B. Cogan, Captured:
The Japanese Internment of American Civilians in the Philippines, 1941–1945 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 2000); Bernice Archer, The Internment of Western
Civilians under the Japanese, 1941–1945: A Patchwork of Internment (London:
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004); Bruce Elleman, Japanese-American Civilian Prisoner
Exchanges and Detention Camps, 1941–45 (London: Routledge, 2006); Greg Leck,
Captives of Empire: The Japanese Internment of Allied Civilians in China, 1941–1945(Bangor, PA: Shandy Press, 2006); Karl Hack and Kevin Blackburn, eds., Forgotten
Captives in Japanese Occupied Asia (New York: Routledge, 2008).
23
WCCA, “Copy of Excerpts of Foreign Radio Broadcasts.”
24
Public Relations Division, WCCA, “Supplement I: Foreign Radio Broadcast
Intelligence Service, FCC: Tokyo, English, EWT to North America, ‘Light From theEast Program,’ 3rd in series titled ‘American Pictures,’” n.d., RG 338, entry: Bound
Volumes, vol. 21, NA, College Park, Maryland.
25“Radio Tokyo English Commentary 1:30 A.M. EWT 10/10,” October 10, 1942,
RG 338, entry 2, box 4, file 000.77, NA, College Park, Maryland.
26
WCCA, “Copy of Excerpts of Foreign Radio Broadcasts.”
27“Tokyo in English at 2:00 A.M. to Western US and Latin America,” n.d., RG 338,
entry 2, box 4, file 000.77, NA, College Park, Maryland.
28
For more details about the Manzanar incident, see Gary Y. Okihiro, “Japanese
Resistance in America’s Concentration Camps: A Re-evaluation,” Amerasia Journal 2(Fall 1973): 20–34; Arthur A. Hansen and David A. Hacker, “The Manzanar Riot: An
Ethnic Perspective,” Amerasia Journal 2 (Fall 1974): 112–57; Arthur A. Hansen, Betty
E. Mitson, and Sue Kunitomi Embrey, “Dissident Harry Ueno Remembers Manzanar,”California History 64 (Winter 1985): 58–64, 77; CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied;Harlan D. Unrau, The Evacuation and Relocation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
during World War II: A Historical Study of the Manzanar War Relocation Center,vols.1–2, (Washington, DC: US Department of the Interior, 1996).
29
Division of Information Channels, Bureau of Intelligence, OFF, “Axis News in
United States Newspapers,” Special Intelligence Report No.19, March 30, 1942, RG
208, entry 3D, box 10, file: Special Intelligence Reports, NA, College Park, Maryland.
30
John R. Fleming, OFF, “Survey of Intelligence Materials,” No. 28, June 17, 1942,
RG 208, entry 3D, box 11, file: Survey of Intelligence Materials, NA, College Park,
Maryland; Sherman H. Dryer, Radio in Wartime (New York: Greenberg, 1942), 40.
31
WCCA, “Copy of Excerpts of Foreign Radio Broadcasts.”
32
Department of Justice, December 9, 1941, RG 208, entry 5, box 4, file 020, NA,124

Takeya Mizuno

College Park, Maryland. Dating back to the 1930s, the FBI had been secretly probing“dangerous” aliens and citizens whom the bureau suspected to have close connection
with nations potentially hostile toward the United States. Major previous works on the
FBI’s prewar and postwar intelligence activities include J. Edgar Hoover, “Alien Enemy
Control,” Iowa Law Review 29 (March 1944): 369–408; Bob Kumamoto, “The Search
for Spies: American Counterintelligence and the Japanese American Community, 1931–
1942,” Amerasia Journal 6 (Fall 1979): 45–75; CWRIC, Personal Justice Denied;
Pedro A. Loureiro, “Japanese Espionage and American Countermeasures in Pre-Pearl
Harbor California,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 3 (Fall 1994): 197–210;
Tetsuden Kashima, Judgment without Trial: Japanese American Imprisonment during
World War II (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003).
33
Department of Justice, December 10, 1941, RG 208, entry 5, box 4, file 020, NA,
College Park, Maryland.
34
Ted Nakashima, “Concentration Camp: US Style,” New Republic June 15, 1942:
822.
35
John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, to Norman H. Davis, Chairman,
Central Committee, American National Red Cross, June 19, 1942, Papers of the US
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Part 1: Numerical
File Archive, reel 6 (hereafter cited as Papers of the CWRIC). Pursuant to McCloy’s
request, the Red Cross by August 1942 had conducted an investigation tour andconcluded that both “assembly camps” and “relocation camps” were in general
operated appropriately. (American National Red Cross, “Report of the American Red
Cross Survey of Assembly Centers in California, Oregon, and Washington,” August
1942, Papers of the CWRIC, reel 10; American National Red Cross, “Report of theAmerican Red Cross Survey of Relocation Centers in Arizona and California,” August
1942, Papers of the CWRIC, reel 13.)36
M. M. Tozier, WRA, to Robert Bishop, Office of the Coordinator of Information,
April 7, 1942, RG 210, entry 38, box 13, file 210: General, NA, Washington, DC.
37
Milton S. Eisenhower, Director, WRA, “Statement by M. S. Eisenhower, Directorof the War Relocation Authority,” April 7, 1942, RG 210, entry 38, box 3, file 102:
Meetings and Itineraries, 1942, NA, Washington, DC; Dillon S. Myer, Director, WRA,“The Truth about Relocation: An Address Delivered by Dillon S. Myer before aLuncheon Meeting of the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California,” August
6, 1943, RG 210, entry 5A, box 3, file: WRA Publications, 101–210, NA, Washington,
DC.
38
WRA, “A Statement of Guiding Principles of the War Relocation Authority,” ca.
1943, Emery E. Andrews Papers, Accession no. 1908-003, box 2, folder 6, Special
Collections, University of Washington.
39“Relocation Problems and Policies: An Address Delivered by Director D. S.
Myer of the War Relocation Authority before the Tuesday Evening Club at Pasadena,
California,” March 14, 1944, RG 210, entry 5A, box 3, file: WRA Publications, 101–
210, NA, Washington, DC. The WRA was facing similar charges from some major
news media such as the Denver Post in Colorado. For a detailed content analysis of
the Post, see Kumiko Takahara, Off the Fat of the Land: The Denver Post’s Story of
the Japanese American Internment during World War II (Powell, WY: Western History
Publications, 2003).
40
M. S. Eisenhower, Director, WRA, to Leland Ford, United States Representativefrom California, March 29, 1942, Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement
Records, BANC MSS 67/14c, reel 19, file C1.02, Bancroft Library, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley.