FNCA Newsletter No.6
Radiation Safety & Radioactive Waste Management
C o nte nts
Report of FNCA Workshop2012
P.1 ‐ P.2

N o v. 2 0 1 2

Topics from participating countries
P.2 ‐ 18

Issued byPhilippine Nuclear
Research Institute(PNRI)/Nuclear
Safety Research
Association(FNCA Secretariat,
JAPAN)

Introduction of Project Leaders
P.19
FNCA Framework

P.20

The FNCA Workshop on
Radiation Safety & Radioactive Waste Management (RS&RWM)
10 th‐13 th July, 2012, Manila, Philippines

The first day was initiated withcountryreports
fromAustralia,
Bangladesh, China and Indonesia
detailingtheimplementationofradiological protection for radiation
workers in the respective countries aswell as updates for the consolidated
report on radiation safety drafted in 2010.
The open seminar on the progress ofradiation safety control and radiation
emergency response in Asia was held in
the afternoon. It was attended by around40 local participants from hospitals andgovernmental institutes such as PNRI,
Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
Philippine Atmospheric, GeophysicalandAstronomical
Services
Administration (PAGASA), Philippine
Army (PA), and Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP). FNCA Participantsfrom Philippines, Australia, Japan,
Indonesia
andVietnamgave
presentations on national radiation
emergency plan, training program forradiation emergency response, andlessons learned from TEPCO Fukushima
Daiichi accidents, followed by an open
forum. A poster session was also held
during the open seminar. Some leaflets

The FNCA 2012 Workshop on
Radiation Safety and Radioactive Waste
Management (RS&RWM) was heldfrom July 10 to 13 2012, in Manila,
Philippines. This workshop was cohosted by the Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology(MEXT) of Japan, and the Philippine
Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI).
Sixteen researchers and experts fromeleven FNCA member countries, namely
Australia, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia,
Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mongolia,
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam
participated in the workshop.

The 2012 RS&RWM Workshop Open Seminar1

related
to
RS&RWM,
personal
dosimeters, and survey meters from themember countries were displayed.
On the second day, Japan,
Kazakhstan,
Malaysia,
Mongolia,
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam also
gave a report, respectively. At thesession of Discussion on Safety andSecurity of Disused Sources, Philippines,
Malaysia, and Japan delivered leadspeeches, followed by discussion.
A technical visit at Philippine
Nuclear Research Institutes (PNRI)
located in Quezon City was conductedon the third day. A tour of the Institute’s
major facilities which include the theEmergency Response Centre, Nuclear
Analytical Techniques laboratory, Co-60
Irradiation Facility, waste management
facility, Secondary Standard Dosimetry
Laboratory and the environmental
monitoring laboratories was undertaken.
After the visit, participants had atechnical
discussionforfurther
improvement of RS&RWM in nuclear
facilities.

Technical Tour and Discussion
at Philippine Nuclear Research InstituteDiscussions about the consolidated
report on radiation safety which wasdrafted in 2010 were carried out on theforth day. Participants reviewed andcompared report of each country
suggesting areas for improvement aswell as future plans. A discussion about
project activities in 2012 and 2013 wasalso considered.
The workshop was officially closedwith the remarks from Dr. Alumanda M.
DELA ROSA, Director of the PNRI and
Prof. Toshiso KOSAKO, UNIVESITYOF TOKYO.

Topics from Participating Countries
by Lubi Dimitrovski, Manager, Waste
Operations.
The super compactor will be an
integral part of ANSTO’s integrated

Australia
Mr. Lubi Dimitrovski
Australian Nuclear Science &Technology Organisation (ANSTO)
20,000kN Super Compactor Installed
and Commissioned to Reduce theVolume of Low Level Solid Waste
at ANSTO
On the 14 September, 2012 ANSTO
received its long awaited 20,000kN force
super compactor for the long term
management of low level solid waste.
The process to manage ANSTO’s low
level solid waste will be aligned withproven international best practice2waste management facility which also
houses the ANTECH S segmented
Gamma
Scanning
Waste
Characterisationequipment.
Additionally, the facility also caters forthe new waste cementation plant andother services to support these functions,
all conceptualised by Dr Kapila
Fernando.

collaboration with ANSTO’s Major
Project Delivery Office (MPDO).
Overall,theinstallation
andcommissioning spanned seven weeks
and was directed and supported by acomprehensive Project and Safety
Management Plan created and managed
by Senior Project Manager – Mr. Sriram
Kannan meeting all ANSTO Safety
Standards, Guides and other relevant
industry standards. The installation was
supervised by Mrs. Janina Cooper, Super
Compactor Commissioning Manager andconducted in partnership with other
ANSTO
business
units,ECP
Development Works and Support
Services Facilities Management Groupand Safety Environment & Radiation
Assurance units. These business units
supported the project team withcompletion of fabrication, welding
support, isolations and safety during the
installation and commissioning process.
The super compactor has been
specifically designed to manage thecompacting process for ANSTO’s low

Construction of the super compactor
took 2.5 years to complete with thecontract being managed by ANSTO
Major Projects Program Managers - Mr
Michael Deura and Mr Lester Bemand.
The testing of the super compactor
was conducted in the Netherlands at the
Fontijne Grotnes factory and again at
ANSTO. The testing comprised of amandatory factory acceptance test andsite acceptance test. The tests wereconducted primarily to ascertain system
functionality specifically, to ensure thecompactor evaluated to the specification
set by ANSTO. The specifications were
inclusive of mechanical, electrical, HMI
controls,
safetyinterlocks,
documentations and training/handover.
Many test drums were successfullycompacted
withvariedvolumereductions depending on the nature ofwaste (approx. 60% reduction for
concrete rubble and approx. 80%
reduction for metal and soft waste).

The 20,000kN super compactor was
installed on site at ANSTO by its Dutch
manufacturer, Fontijne Grotnes in3

level solid waste drums. The compactor
also has the capacity to collect andmanage any liquid by a solution
collection system which forms part ofthe compacting process for any liquid
waste that may be present in the lowlevel solid waste drums.

residues that come from nuclear reactors,
medical uses and various researchstudies that involve radioactive isotopes.
Identification and characterization ofradioactive wastes is one of the maintechnical issues from waste management
point of view. The 3 MW TRIGA MarkII research reactor of Atomic Energy
Research Establishment (AERE) is alight water-cooled graphite reflectedreactor designed for training, researchand isotope production. An ion exchange
purification unit is attached within
research reactor, which produces reactor
waste in the form of spent resin
contaminated with activation products. A
significant amount spent ion-exchange
resins generated from the research
reactor purification column. These
wastes are collected in polythine bags
and store in 200L plastic drums.
Collected resins are dehydrated byair/sun light and finally transferred to theCentral Waste Processing and Storage
Facility (CWPSF) AERE, Savar for
further management.

The acquisition of the supercompactor will streamline the process
for the management of ANSTO’s low
level solid waste.
Internationally, the super compactor
is considered to be best practicetechnology for both volume reduction
and long term management of low levelsolid waste. The super compactor will
now enable ANSTO to increase its
standardinwaste
management
operations.

Since
the
waste
activity
concentration is one of the key
parameters of waste characterization in
the planning stage of waste management
system. The aim of the study was todevelop a procedure for the sequential
determination of radioisotopes in theradioactive wastes.

Bangladesh

Gamma-spectrometry

Dr. M. Moinul Islam and Dr. S.Ghose
Bangladesh Atomic Energy
Commission (BAEC)

To analyse the spent ion-exchange
resins which are safely stored in central
waste processing and storage facility,
were collected in 250 ml cylindricalgeometry container. The surface activityof each container was recorded. For
gamma analysis each sample has been
weighed and measured on a calibrated
HPGe detector with 40% relative
efficiency coupled with Genie-2000
software. In order to calculate theactivity of the resin sample the energy
and efficiency calibration was doneusing 152Eu standard source.

Characterization of spent ionexchange resins originating from the
Nuclear Facility
In Bangladesh, radiation sources
have been used for many years in a wide
range of application in the field of
research, medicine, industry andagriculture. Radioactive wastes are4Knowledge on the contents of emitting radionuclides in radioactive
wastes is an important parameter forchoosing their appropriate storage mode
as well as for further processing. In thiscontext, this work represents aninevitable step in establishing a national
radioactive waste management system.

The dominant gamma lines havebeen found in the spectrums which were
evaluated for activity concentrations.
Four radionuclides e.g., 137Cs, 54Mn,
65Zn, 60Co have been identified in the
spent ion-exchange resin samples. Fromthe strong gamma lines the calculated
specific activity concentration of 137Cs
ranging from 2.98 to 7.7 Bq/kg with anaverage value of 5.89 Bq/kg whilst the
specific activity of the 54Mn ranging
from 109.05 to 2682.82 Bq/kg with anaverage value of 1037.21 Bq/kg. For
65
Zn the activity concentration ranging
from 15 to 158.31 Bq/Kg. with anaverage value of 70.85 Bq/Kg. The
activity concentration of 60Co withgamma line 1173.2 keV found in theranging from 259.06 to 4684.16 Bq/kg
with an average 797.1 Bq/kg. On theother hand the activity concentration of60
Co with gamma energy 1332.5 kev
ranging from 250.53 to 4538.55 Bq/kg
with an average value of 1710.93 Bq/kg.

Indonesia
Dr. Syahrir and Agus Gindo
Simanjuntak
National Nuclear Energy Agency(BATAN)
Continuous and Centralized
Monitoring System for Ambient
Radiation and Meteorology in
BATAN Serpong Indonesia
INTRODUCTION
Atmospheric releases of nuclear
facilities in BATAN Serpong which
consists of Multi Purpose Reactor
30 MW and Supporting Laboratories(MPR-SL) has been being monitored
throughon-linecontinuousandcentralized system for environmentral
radiation
andweather(http://183.91.85.130:1169/radmon/)which is called an environmental
radiation monitoring system. There have\been being 5 radiation ambient and one
meteorological stations that send data to
the processing unit. The system isindependent from the facility source
monitoring systems and is intended tosupport the available stack monitoring
systems as an early warning systen incase of abnormal atmospheric releases. It
also can be used to verify releases fromsources
other
than
MPR-SL(transboundary releases for example).

Fig1. A full setup of HPGe detector system

OBJECTIVES
The radiation monitoring systemprovides early protection to workers,
public and environment against radiation

Fig2. Gamma spectrum of a spent ion exchange sample
obtained from HPGe  spectrum detector

52.

hazards from the operational of MPR-SL
at Batan Serpong.
GOALS
1. To obtain weather data andambient radiation dose in- and offsite.
2. To detect abnormal atmosphericreleases of BATAN Serpong
stacks promptly

BLOCK DIAGRAMMETHODOLOGY• Sensors of the automatic weather
system (AWS) are located atheights of 60 meters, 30 meters, 15
meters and 4 meters. The data suchas wind direction, wind speed,
temperature, relative humidity, airpressure, solar radiation and rain
fall are used to determine
atmospheric stability classes andwind rose. The meteorologicaltower station is about 600 metersfrom the reactor site. The data arereported routinely as part of theenvironmental monitoring report of
BATAN Serpong.
• The monitoring of ambient
radiation consists of three stations
in-site and two stations off-sites.
The results of monitoring data suchas dose rates and accumulated
doses are used as part of theenvironmental monitoring report of
BATAN Serpong routinely.
• The transmission of wheater danradiation exposure data conductedwith wireless radio modem fromeach stasion to data processing
center.
• The processing data use the Projex
Measurement Information System
software.
SPECIFICATIONS
1.

Gamma Monitor :• Detector type: GM tube;
range: 50 nSv/h - 1000
mSv/h.
• Radio modem frequency:
900 MHz – 2.4 GHz.
• Solar panel power: 21 W,
17.4 V, 1.21 A.

Meteorology System :• Sensor Combo WXT-520
Vaisala : WD, WS, Temp,
RH, and Bar.
• Sensor SPLite2 Kipp &Zonen : Solar radiasi• Sensor Rain Gauge ARG :Rain fall

6

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results of dose rate measurements were obtained from five stations around thesite on the August, 28 to September, 10 with average equals to 93 nSv/h. The alarm
setting for BATAN Serpong site is 250 nSv/h. This average equals to backgroundradiation levels around the area. Below the comparison to Fukushima gamma dose ratearound the accident area.

7

JapanProf. Toshiso Kosako,
University of Tokyo,
Dr. Yuji Matsuzoe,
Fuji Electric Co., Ltd.
Fukushima No.1 Nuclear Plant Accident
and the Monitoring of Radiation
The Great East Japan Earthquake(magnitude 9.0) struck northeast Japanon March 11, 2011. Seismic intensity ofmagnitude 7 was recoded in Miyagi
prefecture, while intensity of magnitude
6-plus was recorded in the prefectures ofFukushima, Ibaragi and Tochigi (Fig. 1).
A massive tsunami triggered by thequake then struck the Pacific coast of
East Japan. In the prefectures ofFukushima, Iwate and Miyagi, theinundation height of the tsunami was notless than 20 m in many areas. The
tsunami also killed more than 19000
people (Fig. 2).

Fig2. Height of TSUNAMI and disaster
Reference: The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.

The Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant
has six nuclear reactors (Fig. 3) and islocated 220 km north of Tokyo. On
March 11, 2011, the Fukushima No. 1
nuclear plant was operating nuclear
reactors Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The othernuclear reactors were being inspected atthat time. Figure 3 shows the Pacific
Ocean at the top, with the flooded areas
indicated in blue. The entire region
surrounding the Fukushima No. 1
nuclear plant was flooded. Figure 4
shows the plant before and after thehydrogen explosion and subsequent fire.
First, the emergency D/G and seawater
pumps failed to operate due to thetsunami. Secondly, the nuclear reactor
building was damaged by the hydrogen
explosion and fire, and the portion
housing the nuclear reactors wasdestroyed.

Fig1. Seismic intensity of Great East Japan
Earthquake on 11th March

8
Fig3. Damage of FUKUSHIMA 1 by TSUNAMIFig4. Before and after of Hydrogen explosion and fire

Figure 5 shows a map of thecontamination at Fukushima and therelation between the distance from the
Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant and thenecessary radiation monitoring system
and instruments. Within a radius of 30
km from the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear
plant, a mass of debris caused by thetsunami is polluted with radioactive
material generated by the hydrogen
explosion. Therefore, treatment of thepolluted debris is very difficult. The area
is classified by distance from the
Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant into threeareas, that is, inner circumference of theplant, the evacuation area and outside ofthe evacuation area. In addition, themonitoring system and instruments areclassified into the personal dose,
environmental monitor and pollution
monitor. As shown in Fig. 5, the need foreach monitoring system and instrument
is based on distance from the Fukushima
No. 1 nuclear plant.

Figure 6 shows the personal dose
meter used for workers working near the
nuclearreactors
andperforming
decontamination work. The dose meter
detects the charge generated byionization of the depletion layer of asemiconductor detector as a signal of theradioactive rays. The dose meter isequipped with low-cost semiconductor
photo sensors and micro cells. The dose
meter is characterized by compact andlightweight.

Fig6. Personal DOSE Meter for Worker

Fig5. Contamination map and relation between the distance from
FUKUSHIMA No.1 nuclear plant and the needed radiation monitoring
9
system and instrument

Figure 7 shows the personal dose rate
meter used for residents in theevacuation area. The intended purpose ofthis dose meter is to manage theexposure to residents in daily life and to
search for contaminated areas. This dose
rate meter employs the same method of
detection as the other dose meter. The
dose rate meter offers high sensitivity inmeasuring radiation dose (mSv) anddose rate (mSv/h), are compact in size,and feature a rechargeable battery.

Figure
9
shows
the
food
contamination monitoring. After the
nuclear plant accident, it became
necessary to ensure the security andsafety of food produced in Fukushimaandneighboring
prefectures.
In
particular, this resulted in an urgent
demand to quickly inspect any
radioactive material contained in the
food.
The
food
contamination
monitoring (Fig.9) can inspect leafy
vegetables, rice, and beef stored in
cardboard boxes, thereby enabling easy
and continuous screening measurement.
Radiation monitoring equipment andsystems contribute to the safety of daily
life for the residents of Fukushima andits surrounding neighborhood.

Fig7. Personal DOSE Rate Mater for Resident

Figure 8 shows the environmental
monitoring post, from which the spacedose of radioactivity is measured. The
environmental monitoring post transfers
data via FOMA every 10 minutes, using
a solar battery as its power source.

Fig9. Food Contamination Monitoring

Malaysia
Dr. Mohd Abd Wahab Yusof
Malaysian Nuclear Agency

Nuclear and Radiological Safety at
Reactor TRIGA PUSPATY
1. Introduction
Malaysian Nuclear Agency or
Nuclear Malaysia, which was establishedin early 1970’s, is an institution thatdevelops, promotes and enhances thepeaceful uses of nuclear technology inagriculture, medical, manufacturing,Fig8. Environmental Monitoring Post

10

industry, health and the environment. In
order to enhance research anddevelopment activities, a TRIGA MARKII research reactor, called Reaktor
TRIGA PUSPATI (RTP), was built. It
came into operation in 1982 and reached
its first criticality on 28 June 1982.
The reactor was designed toeffectively implement the various fields
of basic nuclear science and education. It
incorporates facilities for advanced
neutron and gamma radiation studies aswell as for application, including
Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA),
Delayed Neutron Activation Analysis(DNAA), radioisotope production for
medical, industrial and agricultural
purposes, neutron radiography and Small
Angel Neutron Scattering (SANS).

Fig1. Nuclear Malaysia’s Reactor TRIGA

3. Safety Objective
Since established, the promoting
safety of RTP operation is a prime
concern of the management and the staff
of Nuclear Malaysia. These include
during operation, repair and maintenance,
radiation doses to workers, radioactive
waste management and environmental
management. The fundamental safety
objective is to protect people, bothindividually and collectively (workers
and public at large) and the environment
from harmful effects of ionizing
radiation. However, this should beenachieved without unduly limiting theoperation of facilities or the conduct ofactivities that give rise to radiations risks.
In order to achieve the fundamental
safety objective, Nuclear Malaysia has
implemented the ten safety principles
formulated by International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) on the basis ofwhich safety requirements are developedand safety measures are to be
implemented [1].

2. RTP Technical Specifications
RTP was supplied by General
Atomic of the USA and installation
programme was started on 9 November
1981. RTP is a pool type reactor where
the reactor core sits at the bottom of 7
metre high aluminium tank which issurrounded by a biological shielding
made of high density concrete (seeFigure 1). The reactor uses solid fuelelements in which a zirconium-hydride
moderator is homogeneously combinedwith enriched uranium. Demineralised
water acts both as coolant and neutron
moderator, while graphite acts asreflector. The following are brief
descriptions of RTP: Type: TRIGA Mk II, pool type
 Fuel: Uranium Zirconium HydrideAlloy Coolant: Light Water
 Moderator: Light Water Reflector: Graphite Control Rods: Boron Carbide Status: Operating Operational Mode: Steady State(1MW)
 Operation: 6hrs/day weekdays

4. Organisation and Management of
Safety4.1
Nuclear Malaysia’s Occupational
Safety, Health and Environment Policy
Statement
Nuclear Malaysia, an agency who
responsibleforthepromotion,
development and application of nuclear
technology
andnuclearrelatedtechnology for the national development,

11

4.2

is committed to continually improve andprevent pollution, incidents, accidents
and occupational illness in its operation.
This is the commitment of the
management in ensuring safety at
Nuclear Malaysia complex. Toward thisend, Nuclear Malaysia will:Comply with all applicable
environmental, occupational safety
and health, legal and otherrequirements.

Minimize release of pollutants to air,water, land and promote waste
minimization through reduction,
recycling and reusing activities.

Optimize the use of materials andnatural resources.

Ensure that all radiation exposures
are kept as low as reasonably
achievable.
Ensure that all other occupational
hazards and risks are prevented,
where practicable, and controlled
and managed through the adoptionof proper management measures.
Stress on environmental,
occupational health and safety
aspects in our facilities operation,equipment, field work, building
construction and modification
through appropriate assessments at
the planning stage.
Promote environmental,
occupational health and safety
awareness among employees,
contractors, vendors and visitors.
Ensurethatallemployees,
contractor, vendors and visitors on
site
complywith
Nuclear
Malaysia’s
environmental,
occupational health and safety
requirements at all times.

Safety Management System

In ensuring the above safety policy
implemented in daily work, Safety,
Health and Environmental Management
System (SHE-MS) Committee wasestablished in year 2005 to review all
aspects of safety, including occupational,
nuclear and radiological safety. This
committee is responsible to report all
safety activities in Nuclear Malaysia to
the highest management committee
headed by the Director General. Safety
Audit Team performs auditing functions
and reports its finding to the SHE-MS
committee on a regular basis.
The RTP is headed by a Reactor
Manager whose is directly report to the
Director of Reactor Technology Division.
To maintain high level of safety, theoperation and maintenance of RTP aresupported by the other groups such as
Radiation Safety and Health Division,
Waste Management Centre, Mechanicaland Electrical Unit and Physical Security
Unit.
5. Safety Analysis Report
Safety analysis report (SAR) is an
essential document when talking about
safety in nuclear installations. Nuclear
Malaysia’s first SAR document for RTP
was prepared in 1982. Since then, thedocument had not been revised until
2007 when the new SAR document was
prepared in accordance with the IAEA
safety standards and recommendations[2]. The SAR document has been
approved by the regulatory body.
6. Quality Assurance Programme
Quality
Assurance
Programme(QAP) is very important in running
nuclear reactor and it is not exceptionalwith RTP. Some of the content of the
QAP
areOperational
Control,
Emergency Response and Preparedness,
Safety and Health, Physical Security,
Infrastructure Maintenance, Reactor
Maintenance,
ExperimentandThis safety policy statement isdisplayed at all notices boards within the
Nuclear Malaysia premises to inculcate
safety culture to all staff and contract
workers, and to show that management
is serious in managing safety.

12

can occur at any time and anywhere.
Widespread use of nuclear technologies
in application as diverse as industry,
medicine, agriculture etc. in Malaysia,
means that more possibility of accident
can happen. In recent year, mostcountries including Malaysia are very
concern about emergencies arising frommalicious use of radioactive material or‘dirty bomb’.

Modification,
Measurement
andMonitoring Device Control, Human
Resource
Management,
Waste
Management, Special Nuclear Material
Counting Control and refuelling. The
regulatory body i.e. Atomic Energy
Licensing Board will do inspection twicea year to ensure that Nuclear Malaysia
comply with all safety requirements
stipulated in the act, regulations andlicence conditions.

In Nuclear Malaysia, emergency
preparedness and response are given
very top priority by the top management.
On-site Emergency Response Plan
(ERP) is in place and recently has beenrevised. On the other hand the off-site
emergency plan is under the jurisdictionof the regulatory body which is the leadtechnical agency to handle any
radiological emergency at national level
under the Directive No. 20, National
Security Council. Emergency drill is
performed at least twice a year.

7. Radiation Protection Programme
Radiation exposure is set-out in thesafety manual approved by the SHE-MS
Committee. It is based on the Atomic
EnergyLicensing(BasicSafetyRadiation Protection) Regulations 2010[3] and IAEA safety documents. In the
manual, radiation exposure is managed
using radiation protection principles suchas policy on As Low As Reasonable andAchievable (ALARA), annual dose limit,classification of area, personal dosimetryetc.

9. Operation and MaintenanceWithout a doubt, a good design,
manufacture and construction of reactor
are pre-requisites for high levels ofsafety.
However,theultimate
responsibility for safe operation lies withthe operating organization. Therefore,
Nuclear Malaysia is really emphasizedon this issue. RTP reactor building,equipment and facilities are wellmaintained, generally clean and tidy andin good condition. The annual and semiannual maintenance are carried out inJune and December respectively. Anychange in operation and maintenanceplan must be approved by Reactor
Supervisor. However any unplanned
maintenance works must be approved by
theReactorManagerupon
recommendationoftheReactorSupervisor.

All radiation workers are provided
with TLD badges for personalmonitoring which are assessed onmonthly basis. Staff working with
unsealed sources or using hand on moreof their work wear wrist and finger
TLDs as well. On the other hand, area
monitoring using TLDs is performed at
all control areas. Medical surveillance ofradiation workers are also carried out atleast once in two years.
Environmental samples such as water,
sediments, soils, vegetables from areas
surrounding Nuclear Malaysia complex
are collected and analysed. Whilst
external radiations from the nuclear
installation are monitored using TLDs
which are changed on monthly basis.
8. Emergency Preparedness andResponse

10. Radioactive Waste Management

Emergency preparedness means
being ready to reacts or response to abroad range of emergency situations that

Nuclear Malaysia is committed tominimize release of pollutants to air,water, land and promote waste

13

licence are managed by the AELB. The
reactor operator licence can only be
renewed after the licensed operators
have successfully undergone a refresher
course.

minimization
through
reduction,
recycling and natural resources. All
precautions are taken into account tominimise the generation of unnecessary
activation radionuclides to minimise
waste generation. This is evaluated whenrequest for irradiation is received.

12. Regulations and Licensing
Principle 2 of the safety objectives isclearly stated that there shall be an
independent regulatory body in eachcountry to control and supervise all
atomic energy activities. Therefore, tomaintain
independency,
Nuclear
Malaysia is licensed by the Atomic
Energy Licensing Board (AELB), whichis independent body established underthe Atomic Energy Licensing Board
1984 (Act 304). This is to ensure that thesafety is kept in high standard andconsistent with the IAEA’s nuclear
safety standards. The AELB regularly
inspects RTP to ensure that all
requirements under the law andregulations are complied.

There also has a specific procedure
for collection, control and treatment ofradioactive waste activities as specified
in the Nuclear Malaysia’s safety, healthand environment manual. The Waste
Treatment Centre, an organization within
Nuclear Malaysia, is given responsibility
to manage radioactive waste andchemical waste. In this centre,
radioactive wastes are categorised andseparated based on their types, solidor/and liquid and according to thestandard classification of radioactive
waste established by the IAEA andAtomic Energy Licensing (Radioactive
Waste Management) Regulations 2011.
With respect of spent fuel, until now,
Nuclear Malaysia has no spent fuel at all.
However, the RTP was designed in such
away that it can be used as a storage
facility for spent fuels before these spent
fuels are sent back to the supplier.

Alongside
inspections,
yearlydialogue and direct meeting between the
Nuclear Malaysia and AELB are made to
exchange information and resolution ofissues raised. This meeting is alternately
chaired by the Director General of
AELB and Director General of Nuclear
Malaysia. A part of that, the AELB isreviewing
theirregulations
andguidelines related with nuclear safety inaccordance to the latest IAEA’s safety
standards and guidelines.

11. Education and Training
As safety is a prime concern of
Nuclear Malaysia, therefore educationand training on nuclear and radiologicalsafety to staff are very important. For a
new staff, they are required to attend an
induction course while the other staff areencouraged to attend a radiation safety
awareness training course conducted by
Nuclear Malaysia. Nuclear Malaysia isalso sent their staff to, either local
institutions or a broad for updating theirskills and knowledge.

13. The way forward
For almost 30 years of RTP
operation, considerable attention had
been paid to the safety of RTP. However,no matter how well an organization iscurrently performing safety, it always
needs to consider how it could improvefurther. Therefore, nuclear safety willcontinue to give cause for serious
concern and the RTP operation willcontinue to meet national andinternational safety standards.

For a reactor operator, there is a
training programme which is based on
the guidelines issued by the AELB
where Nuclear Malaysia is responsible
for conducting the course while theexamination and issuance of operator

14

really seen to devote time and resources
to safety and react as a role model for
their staff with their action clearlymatching their words. Work procedures
are in place and implemented properly.
However, there is still room for
improvement as improvement is acontinuous
process
andNuclear
Malaysia is committed for it.

Ageing Management
Although has regular maintenance,
Nuclear Malaysia management is very
concern on RTP ageing components
which suffer degradation of its physicalproperties due to operational condition.
Regular maintenance of RTP will be
continued. A programme to assess theimplications of ageing of components
and systems will be established.

References:[1]

Fostering Safety Culture
Developing, improving and fostering
safe culture in organization is theessence of nuclear or radiological safety.
Therefore, Nuclear Malaysia will keep
continue its safety programme topromote safety culture.

[2]

Knowledge management
Most of the members of seniors’ staff
at Nuclear Malaysia are going to retire
within a few years. Their skill,
knowledge and experiences need to betransferred to the young staff. Nuclear
Malaysian will continue its knowledge
management programme to ensure thatthe knowledge gained by senior staff istransferred to the young staff.

[3]

INTERNATIONAL ATOMICENERGY AGENCY,
Fundamental Safety Principles,
Safety Fundamentals No. SF-01,
IAEA, Vienna 2006.
INTERNATIONALATOMICENERGYAGENCY,
SafetyAssessment of Research Reactors
and Preparation of the Safety
Analysis Report, Safety Series
35-G1, IAEA, Vienna 1993.
PERCETAKAN NEGARA,
Atomic Energy Licensing (Basic
Safety Radiation Protection)
Regulations 2010.

The Philippines
Ms. Maria V. B. Palattao
Mr. Carl M. Nohay
Philippine Nuclear Research Institute(PNRI)Developing Staff Skill and Knowledge
Most of Nuclear Malaysia staff are
new and were appointed to replacesenior ageing staff. They need to be
trained to enhance their skill andknowledge on nuclear and radiologicalsafety. The present platform, e.g. IAEA,
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT) will
be used for that purpose. Beside that, the
new staff are also encourage to do
further study i.e. Master degree and PhD.

Status of the On-Going Drilling
Program for the Disposal of Disused
Radioactive Sources
The
Philippines
throughthePhilippine Nuclear Research Institute(PNRI) and its collaborators has been
investigating intensively a proposed site
for the disposal of disused radioactive
sources generated over the years and in
the future by hospitals, industries, andresearch institutions including the PNRI.
Borehole drilling is being carried out forinvestigation purposes, but with an
option to develop it into a disposal
borehole at a later stage of the program.

14. Conclusion
Nuclear Malaysia will continue tomaintain, improve and strengthen safety
withinitsorganization.
The
management is very committed inpromoting safety and senior officers are

15

The primary objective of the drilling
campaign would be to drill down to adepth of approximately 100 meters toestablish the subsurface soil, rock andwater characteristics.
Ideally, it isexpected to intersect a monolithic blockof intact rock formation suitable for deep
disposal of canisters containing theradioactive sources. Confirmation of thesite’s suitability requires the presence ofa host formation characterised by asufficiently low hydraulic conductivity
and hydraulic gradient, absence ofgroundwater
aggressivetotheengineered barriers, and good sorption
properties.
Initially, a site topographic survey
covering an area of 40 hectares at 1.0
meter interval was conducted in April
2012. A plan view of the digital terrain
model showing the location of the deep
boreholes (DDH-5 and DDH-6) that are
currently being drilled along with 2 othershallow boreholes is presented in Figure 1.

Fig 1. GIS equipment used to create the topographic mapof the siteTheadvanced
geographicalinformation system (GIS) survey
equipment used in undertaking the site
topographic survey is shown on Figure 2.
The borehole designated as diamond
drilled hole-5 (DDH-5) is located at
PTM coordinates of 2,002,878.1600 N,
579,637.3700 E at an elevation of
361.835 meters above sea level.
However, due to mechanical problems
encountered by the equipment (Figure 3)
during drilling operation, DDH-5
collapsed. DDH-6 which is 1-m east of
DDH-5 at same elevation has to be
drilled using a different drilling
equipment (Figure 4). The 100-meterdeep borehole is expected to be achievedin the next few days. Geologic logs andinterpretations both for DDH-5 and -6
have been recorded.

Fig 1. Topographic map of the site (plan view ofthe digital terrain model)

Fig3 and Fig4. The drilling equipment(the initial and currently on use)

16

Preliminary drilling results andgeologic log intersected a thick soil andhighly weathered rock from the surface
down to 15 meters depth. The section
from 15 meters down to 39 meters in
depth consist of highly altered andesitic
pyroclastic breccia (probably, lapilli
breccias is medium sized (5 millimeters– 64 millimeters), volcanic fragments(probably, andesite). Cores are below
the residual cover and fractures areoxidized with red tinges, while thedeeper core recoveries are grey, withwhite streaks and highly fractures. The
red coloured cores are silicified but mostof the matrix is clayey (probably
consisting of expansive clays). At depth
17.8 to 21 (elevation 344-341) meters
below ground level a tuff layer describedin the log as reddish brown andesite(pyroclastics without clasts or fragments)
was recognized. This fine grained facies
may indicate an interface or boundary
between a younger and older
pyroclastics deposit.
The younger
pyroclastics deposit is the layer from thesurface down to 18 meters while theolder layer from the deeper pyroclastic
layer from 21 to 39 meters with the tuff
as indicator of another volcanic
explosion regime. Other pyroclastic
layers may be encountered at the deeper
levels. If these pyroclastic flow layerinterface intersect the ground surface,these may act avenues for groundwaterflow and manifest as springs andconsequently, as sources of contaminantleakage.

The lapilli breccias is highly
fractured. Core recoveries vary from 96
to 46 percent. Rock quality is 10 to 46
indicating a highly fractured rock mass.
Groundwater level was not encounteredat this stage of the drilling. Other
conditions noted during drilling included
very slow drilling penetration, loss ofwater circulation and jamming of thecore bit during advance. Loss of drilling
water in some portions of the drilling
advance indicates zones of highpermeability in high fractured sections
with low RQD.
While drilling campaign is taking
place, the PNRI, which is the proponentof this project, is continuously doing
information campaign at the project site
and its vicinities. Figure 5 shows someof the photos taken during the project
presentation at the Department of
Science and Technology Regional Officein Tuguegarao City.
The meeting
seminar was attended by representatives
from the local government units and key
officials of the regional office. An IAEA
expert was also present during thestakeholder forum.

The drilling of DDH-6 to a final
depth of 100 meters is expected to becompleted within the month of October
2012.
Further site characterization,
including preparation of geologic maps
and the development of hydrogeologic
model is currently on-going.

Fig5. IAEA Expert and PNRI Technical Team during the
project presentation at DOST Regional Office II,
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan

17

- Radiation safety and radioactive waste
management of activated materials inmaterial testing reactors

Thailand
Ms. Nanthavan Ya-anantThailand Institute of Nuclear
Technology (TINT)- Safety and Public acceptance of test
and research reactors
In this symposium, human resource
development including development oftraining infrastructure and constructionof the Asian network for testing reactors
was also discussed as the town meeting.

The 50th Anniversary of the Operation ofThai Research Reactor and The 2nd Asian
Symposium on Material Testing Reactors
was held in Bangkok
During October 11th-12th, 2012

There were about 30 participantsfrom Argentina, China, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Kazakhstan,
Vietnam and Thailand. Participants are
nuclearengineers,
researchers,
professors, research reactor operators,
fromseveralresearch
institutes,
universities, nuclear industry companies
and regulatory body.

The 2nd Asian Symposium on
Material Testing Reactors was held from
October 11th to 12th, 2012 in Bangkok,
Thailand. The objective of this
symposium is to exchange theinformation among each test andresearch
reactorsformutualunderstanding of status of each reactor,
and to discuss the Asian network
construction of testing reactors. Thissymposium is jointly organized by
ThailandInstituteofNuclearTechnology (TINT) and Japan Atomic
Energy Agency (JAEA).

Professor. Dr. Toshiso Kosako, whois the FNCA project leader from Japanwas invited to give the presentation on“Evaluation for Radioactive Inventory ofStructural Materials in Nuclear Power
Plant Induced by Neutron Activation.”Fig1. The 2nd Asian Symposium on Material Testing
Reactors Participants

Fig2. Prof.Toshiso Kosako, The University of TokyoTECHNICAL PROGRAM
Presentations were performed
following areas;

CONCULSION
The participants acknowledged the cooperation of Asian countries, especially
the JAEA and the TINT for their efforts
to strengthen the Asian network
construction ofMaterial Testing
Reactors, as well as the safety andsecurity of Nuclear Reactor, and tosupport the upgrading ofMaterial
Testing Reactor management in Asia.

in the- Status and future plan of test andresearch reactors- Utilization of test and research reactors- Research and development of
Irradiation tests include RI and Si
semiconductor production technology- Research and development of PIEs
- Nuclear Human Resource Development

18

The FNCA RS&RWM Project Leaders
Australia

Bangladesh

Dr. Lubi Dimitrovski
Manager,
Waste Operations
Safety and Radiation Servic
Australian Nuclear Science &Technology Organisation(ANSTO)

Dr. Moinul Islam
Principal Scientific Officer,
Health Physics & Radioactive
Waste Management Unit,
Atomic Energy Research
Establishment (AERE), Bangladish
Atomic Energy
Commission (BAEC)
Deputy Director General,
Department of Safety, Protection
and Quality,China National
Nuclear Corporation (CNNC)

Indonesia

Head of Safety and Environment
Division, National Nuclear Energy
Agency (BATAN)

Malaysia

Dr. Mohd Abdul Wahab
Yusof

Professor,
Nuclear Professional School,
Graduate School of Engineering,
The University of Tokyo

Mr. Yuriy Aleinikov
Head of Laboratory,
Department of Reactor Research,Institute of Atomic Energy,
National Nuclear Centre of the
Republic of Kazakhstan

19

Director,
Radioactive Waste
Management Policy Office,
Korea Radioactive Waste
Management Corporation(KRMC)

Senior Research Officer,
Waste Technology &Environment Division,
Malaysian Nuclear Agency(Nuclear Malaysia)

Ms.Oyuntulkhuur
Navaangalsan
Head,
Radiation Regulatory
Department,
Nuclear and Radiation
Regulatory Authority,
Nuclear Energy Agency

Mr. SyahrirProf. Toshiso Kosako

Kazakhstan

Dr. Chang Lak Kim

Mongolia

Dr. Zhang Jintao

China

Japan

South Korea

Philippines

Ms. Maria Visitacion B.
PalattaoHead, Regulations andStandards Development
Section, Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute (PNRI)

Thailand

Mr. Sutat Thiangtrongjit
Director,
Radioactive Waste
Management Center,
Thailand Institute of Nuclear
Technology (TINT)

Dr. Le Ba Thuan

VietnamDirector,
Institute for Technology ofRadioactive and rare Elements,
Vietnam Atomic Energy
Institute (VINATOM)FNCA Consolidated reports on RS&RWM and Task Group Reports are available on FNCA Website.

[URL]: http://www.fnca.mext.go.jp/english/rwm/e_projectreview.html

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