Monetary Policy:
Its Eﬀects and Implementation:
Summary of the 2015 BOJ-IMES Conference
Organized by the Institute for Monetaryand Economic Studies of the Bank of Japan
by Yushi Endo, Takushi Kurozumi,
Takemasa Oda, and Kenichirou Watanabe
The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES) of the Bankof Japan (BOJ) held the 2015 BOJ-IMES Conference, titled “Monetary
Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementation,” on June 4–5, 2015 at the BOJ
Head Oﬃce in Tokyo. The conference was attended by about 90 distinguished participants from academia, international organizations, andcentral banks. The participants discussed a wide range of issues concerning the eﬀects and implementation of unconventional monetary policy. In
his opening remarks, the BOJ Governor Kuroda raised several issues that
central banks currently faced, for instance, the eﬀects of unconventionalmonetary policy and its transmission channels. In the policy panel discussion, five panelists from central banks and academia, together withconference participants, discussed the issues and the thesis of secularstagnation, which had attracted growing attention in recent years. There
were also five paper sessions presented by professors and central bankeconomists, which addressed various issues including relationship between maturity structure and supply factors in Japanese government bondmarkets. The conference closed with the Mayekawa Lecture on secularstagnation.

Yushi Endo: Deputy Director, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan(E-mail: yuushi.endou@boj.or.jp)
Takushi Kurozumi: Director, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan(E-mail: takushi.kurozumi@boj.or.jp)
Takemasa Oda: Director, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan(E-mail: takemasa.oda@boj.or.jp)
Kenichirou Watanabe: Director-General, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank ofJapan (E-mail: kenichirou.watanabe@boj.or.jp).....................................................................................................................
The conference organizers would like to express their sincere gratitude to the IMES’s honorary
adviser Marvin Goodfriend (Carnegie Mellon University), the IMES’s chief councillor Kazuo
Ueda (University of Tokyo), and all of the other conference participants for thought-provoking
presentations and discussions. The views expressed throughout this summary are those of the
speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of their respective institutions. All remaining errors
are our own.

MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015
DO NOT REPRINT OR REPRODUCE WITHOUT PERMISSION

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I. Introduction
The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES) of the Bank of Japan (BOJ)
held the 2015 BOJ-IMES Conference, titled “Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementation,” on June 4–5, 2015 at the BOJ Head Oﬃce in Tokyo. The conference wasattended by about 90 distinguished participants from academia, international organizations, and central banks.1 The participants discussed a wide range of issues concerning
the eﬀects and implementation of unconventional monetary policy (UMP).
The conference began with the opening remarks delivered by the BOJ Governor, Haruhiko Kuroda. In the policy panel discussion moderated by Takatoshi Ito(Columbia University, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies), there were fivepanelists: Stephen G. Cecchetti (Brandeis International Business School), Marvin
Goodfriend (Carnegie Mellon University), Ravi Menon (Monetary Authority of Singapore), Hiroshi Nakaso (BOJ), and Lucas Papademos (Bank of Greece). There
were also five paper sessions presented by Jonathan H. Wright (Johns Hopkins University), Roland Straub (European Central Bank), James J. McAndrews (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York), Ichiro Fukunaga (BOJ), and Neil R. Mehrotra (Brown
University). The conference closed with the Mayekawa Lecture delivered by Barry
Eichengreen (University of California at Berkeley).

II. Opening Remarks2
In his opening remarks, Kuroda raised several issues that central banks currently faced,and emphasized the importance of a positive attitude and conviction to address theissues, quoting a line from Peter Pan, “The moment you doubt whether you can fly,you cease forever to be able to do it.”Kuroda began his remarks by reviewing the recent developments in global economic conditions noting that diverging directions of monetary policy among advanced
economies had become increasingly apparent over the past year. He then raised threecurrent issues concerning the conduct of monetary policy. The first issue involved theeﬀects of UMP and its transmission channels. The second issue pertained to inflation
expectations and the decline in crude oil prices. He pointed out that the plunge in crude
oil prices since 2014 had posed a new challenge for the conduct of monetary policy.
The third issue was how to deal with international spillovers induced by diverging directions in monetary policy among advanced economies.
Subsequently, in light of recent discussions over slow post-financial crisis recoveries in academic and central bank circles, Kuroda raised three policy issues from along-term perspective. The first issue was the extent to which central banks should
consider the impact on the supply side of the economy in conducting monetary policy. This issue was related to an interaction between supply and demand that has been
pointed out as a background factor in slow post-financial crisis recoveries. The second issue involved the question of which monetary policy tools were desirable under................................
1. See Appendix 1 for the program. See Appendix 2 for the list of participants; their aﬃliation is as of June 4–5,
2015.
2. For details, see Kuroda (2015).

2 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementation

a low natural rate of interest. The third issue concerned the optimal policy mix foran economy undergoing medium- to long-term stagnation with a low natural rate ofinterest.

III. Policy Panel Discussion
The policy panel discussion was moderated by Ito, with five panelists from academic
and central bank circles: Cecchetti, Goodfriend, Menon, Nakaso, and Papademos.
Ito began the panel discussion following Kuroda’s opening remarks by posing four
topics: (1) the eﬀects and transmission channels of UMP; (2) inflation expectations;(3) international spillovers caused by diverging directions of monetary policy among
advanced economies; and (4) secular stagnation. Each panelist spoke on some of thesefour. General discussion with conference participants followed.

A. Remarks by Panelists
Cecchetti gave a presentation entitled “Unconventional Monetary Policy: Transmission and Spillovers.” Regarding monetary policy transmission, he pointed to channels
through which monetary easing influenced the real economy: (1) reducing the cost ofinvestment; (2) raising values of equity, real estate, and other assets; (3) increasing the
net worth of nonfinancial firms and households; (4) improving banks’ capital and lending capacity; (5) reducing asset price volatility; and (6) putting depreciation pressure
on the domestic currency. He noted that many of the channels influenced household
and corporate balance sheets; and that some necessarily had international spillovers.
He next commented on monetary policy tools, indicating that these comprised boththe conventional one—the short-term interest rate—and unconventional ones, such as
forward guidance, quantitative easing (QE), and target asset purchases. He observedthat both had similar channels of transmission, altering financial conditions, so what
was now commonly referred to as unconventional was actually quite conventional. He
added, however, that we lacked suﬃcient experience and quantitative knowledge to accurately calibrate UMP tools. He also stressed that UMP was not new, in light of thepast experiences of the BOJ in the early 2000s and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
in 1998. He closed his remarks by questioning the need for international cooperation or
coordination of monetary policy even in the presence of international spillovers. Thatis, international policy cooperation or coordination would be suboptimal, because it
could result in lower economic growth in a major country.
Goodfriend gave a presentation titled “US Economic Situation and Perspectives on
Central Bank Polices.” He began his remarks by presenting the latest forecasts for the
U.S. economy. Regarding the participation rate, he expressed concern about the possibility of disincentives for participating in the U.S. labor markets. He then moved on
to a talk about perspectives on central bank policies. This talk focused on a taxonomy
of central bank policies, their transmission channels, and fiscal policy features. Fourtypes of central bank policies were introduced. The first was pure monetary policy,
which controlled bank reserves and influenced economic activity through the eﬀects
of expected future interbank rates on longer-term interest rates. The second type was3credit policy, which aimed to reduce credit spreads and shift credit risk to taxpayers.
The third type was interest on reserves policy, which literally paid interest on reserves.
The fourth type was QE (or bond market carry trade policy in his terminology), which
worked through a portfolio rebalancing channel and a credit channel. He stressed thatthese central bank policies diﬀered markedly in various respects, such as the mechanics, transmission, financial costs and benefits, risks for central banks and taxpayers,
and implications for fiscal transfers between monetary and fiscal authorities, despite
the fact that central banks usually referred to all of them solely as monetary policies.
He closed his presentation by cautioning that all the central bank policies had fiscal aspects, and thus central banks needed to distinguish among these central bank policies
and clarify the boundary of their independent responsibilities.
Menon discussed three points concerning the normalization of monetary policy inadvanced economies and its spillover eﬀects on emerging market economies (EMEs).
First, the normalization of monetary policy in the United States, while a good thing,
was fraught with diﬃculties, since policy decisions were data dependent and uncertainty remained as to the degree of slack in the economy, as revealed by estimates of
the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) and the output gap. In
this context, he wondered whether the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had
placed too high a threshold before initiating monetary policy normalization. Second,
he indicated that there was significant uncertainty about how financial markets would
behave when monetary policy stimulus was unwound. For instance, there were someindications that long-standing interest rate relationships between the United States andother countries could have been altered, at least temporarily, by unconventional monetary policies. Third, he argued that the sharply diverging monetary policies among
advanced economies had significant spillover eﬀects on EMEs, principally throughglobal currency markets. He expressed concern that the widening of interest rate gaps
between the United States and other advanced economies could lead to a super-strong
U.S. dollar and trigger significant realignments in exchange rates around the world.
These developments suggested that exchange rates could become shock transmittersrather than shock absorbers, especially for EMEs. He suggested that central bankers
could not aﬀord to treat the exchange rate as a residual by-product of monetary policy,
because exchange rate adjustments could potentially overwhelm the ability of someEMEs to cope, given their shallow financial markets.
Nakaso gave a presentation titled “Japan’s Lost Decades and the QQE-Driven Escape.” He discussed Japan’s experience with secular stagnation and gave an interim
assessment of the Japanese economy’s escape from a deflationary equilibrium driven
by the BOJ’s quantitative and qualitative monetary easing (QQE). Regarding Japan’s
lost decades, he indicated that the prolonged economic slump since the 1990s was attributable to a combination of factors, including demography as well as deleveraging
and the malfunctioning of financial intermediation, in line with the recent debate on
the secular stagnation hypothesis in the U.S. context. However, he stressed that there
was another very important factor: deflation. He was inclined to support the hypothesisthat Japan’s economy had fallen into a deflationary equilibrium during the latter phaseof Japan’s lost decades. That is, deflation following Japan’s banking crisis in the 1990s
had lowered the expected inflation rate, and over time deflationary expectations had

4 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementation

become self-fulfilling. He reiterated that to put an end once and for all to deflation, theBOJ launched QQE in April 2013. As for the interim assessment of the QQE-driven
escape from a deflationary equilibrium, he pointed out that QQE’s reduction in real interest rates—by lowering nominal interest rates and raising inflation expectations—had
pushed up both the output gap and inflation, and thus QQE had worked as intended.
He closed his remarks by presenting an idea borrowed from evolutionary game theory
that facilitated an understanding of the mechanism of the QQE-driven escape from thedeflationary equilibrium.3
Papademos gave a presentation titled “Unconventional Monetary Policy: Transmission Channels, Impact and Eﬀectiveness.” He addressed five issues pertaining to
UMP, with emphasis on the measures adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB).
First, he indicated that UMP measures had usually taken three forms: (1) managementof expectations about the future path of policy rates (forward guidance); (2) outrightlarge-scale purchases of assets by the central bank (QE); and (3) non-standard refinancing operations aimed at improving the provision of bank loans (credit easing).
The ECB had implemented various UMP measures since 2007, but, until 2015, they
were mainly forms of credit easing, the choice reflecting the eurozone’s bank-based
financial structure. Second, he summarized six transmission channels of the measurestaken by the ECB since the summer of 2014, notably the targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) and the asset purchase program (APP). Third, he reviewed
the impact of the UMP announcements and operations since June 2014 on bond yields,
equity prices, the euro exchange rate, inflation expectations, and the provision of bankcredit, concluding that it was in line with policy aims. Fourth, he assessed positively
the measures’ longer-term eﬀectiveness in achieving the objectives of price stability
and stronger growth, stressing three reasons: (1) the cumulative eﬀect of the measuresthrough all transmission channels would be powerful, especially via the exchange ratechannel; (2) the portfolio rebalancing eﬀects on both banks and non-banks would continue to be strong; and (3) the ECB’s two programs, APP and TLTROs, would havecomplementary and mutually reinforcing eﬀects. Fifth, he argued that a prolonged period of very low policy rates and UMP measures could entail several risks to financial
and macroeconomic stability and have other undesirable consequences, such as distributional eﬀects, postponement of reforms and fiscal adjustment, as well as spillovers toother economies; and he drew policy implications. He closed his remarks by emphasizing the importance of taking into account several growth-constraining factors—such as
structural weaknesses, high public debt relative to GDP, a potential decline in productivity growth—when designing the appropriate policy strategy for growth and stability
in the eurozone and elsewhere.

B. General Discussions
Regarding Cecchetti’s remark that UMP was quite conventional, Michael Dotsey (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) questioned Cecchetti’s approach for discussing differences between conventional and unconventional monetary policies. Specifically, he................................
3. Evolutionary game theory—which was proposed by the British theoretical biologist John Maynard Smith andothers in the 1970s—is an application of game theory to processes of biological evolution.

5

noted that aﬀecting term premia for certain specific maturities on specific assets was
diﬀerent from aﬀecting the entire position of the expected path of future short-term
rates, which would aﬀect the term structure across all asset classes. He also mentionedthat the linearly approximated term structure used by Cecchetti was too simplistic as
it avoided consideration of covariance terms of the original nonlinear term structure,
which were primarily responsible for aﬀecting changes in term premia. Kuroda indicated, as Cecchetti also acknowledged, that quantitative knowledge and experiences of
UMP were very limited compared with conventional policy. He also pointed out that
UMP diﬀered from conventional monetary policy because the costs of normalizationof unconventional policy might matter, as argued by Goodfriend in the context of thebond market carry trade policy. That is, when a central bank expanded its balance
sheet, its profits tended to soar; on the other hand, when the balance sheet was reduced,
its profits tended to decline and could even become negative. Cecchetti agreed with
Kuroda’s point and stressed that we should keep in mind the costs and benefits of UMP,
presenting a recent policy change in Switzerland as an example. Regarding the question raised by Hiroshi Fujiki (Chuo University) about the optimal size of the balance
sheet of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) after its policy normalization, Goodfriend
answered that the optimal size should be large enough that the federal funds rate was
kept at a suﬃciently low level from the perspective of the Friedman rule.
Straub indicated that, given the taxonomy of central bank policies discussed by
Goodfriend, both conventional and unconventional policies had fiscal implications andunintended consequences, so what was crucial was not the type of instrument used but
whether monetary policy acted within the same stability mandate, following the same
objectives. In this context, Kazumasa Iwata (Japan Center for Economic Research)mentioned that unconventional monetary policies approached fiscal policy (“helicopter
money”) as the role of QE increased. McAndrews argued that even the pure monetary policy mentioned by Goodfriend could have a fiscal implication, referring to U.S.
monetary policy carried out by Paul Volcker in the early 1980s. He then discussed theexperiences of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York during the last financial crisisand stressed that it was important for central banks to preserve their transparency whenfiscal risks arose from their UMP. Goodfriend commented that central banks needed
to clarify the boundary of their responsibility to maintain their independence.
As for credit policy, Woon Gyu Choi (Bank of Korea) asked for a comment on thevalidity of expanding credit policy to the non-banking sector in addition to the banking
sector in South Korea. Goodfriend commented that it was possible to use credit policy
to connect or reconnect markets segmented in a particular country, but when doing so
it was valuable to acknowledge that central banks were using credit policy rather thanmonetary policy and that what they were actually doing was beneficial. For the questions about negative interest rate policy raised by Kazuo Momma (BOJ) and Kazuo
Ueda (University of Tokyo), Goodfriend indicated that the fact that negative interest
rate policy worked only in countries in the eurozone was evidence of a very severe
situation in that region. He also pointed out that money market mutual funds wereless developed in the eurozone than in the United States. Papademos remarked thatthe negative interest rate on the ECB’s deposit facility was complementary to and supportive of the central bank’s credit-easing policies, notably the longer-term refinancing

6 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementation

operations, as it is mainly aimed at encouraging banks to provide credit to the economy
instead of depositing borrowed funds with the ECB.
On the argument by Menon about the spillover eﬀects of UMP in advanced
economies on EMEs, Juda Agung (Bank Indonesia) commented that the monetary
policy transmission of the ECB’s QE worked through banks because of the bank-based
financial system in Europe, and therefore the spillover eﬀects from the eurozone to
EMEs might be more limited compared with those from the United States, where
the financial system was market-based. He added that the Indonesian economy had
not observed a significant impact from the ECB’s QE. Masahiro Kawai (Universityof Tokyo) pointed to the possibility that the divergence of monetary policy among
advanced economies had limited impacts on countries where the exchange rate wasallowed to fluctuate against a basket of major currencies, because the eﬀects of
U.S. dollar appreciation could be oﬀset to some extent by the eﬀects of currency
depreciation in advanced economies where monetary easing continued. Menon commented that while exchange rate targeting could work well for small open economies,
medium-sized ones—including not only EMEs but also advanced economies such as
Switzerland—might face a dilemma, as for them both the exchange rate and interest
rates had important eﬀects on aggregate demand and inflation. These countries must
therefore pay attention to both exchange rates and domestic interest rates.
Regarding international coordination of monetary policy, Choi claimed that such
coordination would be optimal if repercussions from EMEs were fed back to advanced
economies. Kawai also indicated that the feedback eﬀects from EMEs could not be ignored because the aggregate economic size of EMEs was suﬃciently large compared to
the United States, and thus international coordination would be valuable for advanced
economies. Andrzej Rzońca (Narodowy Bank Polski) argued that policy coordination
resulting in less unconventional policy in major economies might be worthwhile in acase where the expected marginal cost of unconventional policy measures—derived
from their possible side eﬀects—dominated their expected marginal benefit. He asked
panelists whether the current sluggishness in recoveries in major economies impliedsuch a dominant marginal cost of unconventional policy measures. Cecchetti commented that benefits of policy coordination in terms of welfare were seen as small
from the perspective of the relevant literature, and therefore it was important for eacheconomy to privately optimize its policy. Papademos noted that, in principle, the central banks of advanced economies should take into consideration the spillovers of theirmonetary policies on EMEs and potential feedback eﬀects. Such eﬀects, if significant,could encourage international monetary policy coordination. In practice, coordinationof monetary policies would be very diﬃcult because national monetary policy has toachieve domestic policy objectives—price stability and economic growth—as specified
in the central bank’s statute and in the relevant law. As another form of policy coordination, Kawai proposed strengthening financial safety nets, such as the International
Monetary Fund and a bilateral currency swap arrangement between countries and, especially, the United States. Nakaso commented that swap lines were a major inventionof central banks to address a financial crisis, but this was intended to be a backstop,and the issue of moral hazard arising from such safety nets should be considered.
Regarding Nakaso’s presentation, Choi asked how Japan’s economy was escaping

7

from a deflationary equilibrium. Nakaso pointed to the diﬃculty of changing the mindsets of a wide variety of economic agents, but mentioned that the BOJ’s current policy
was achieving success in changing mindsets and contributing to the current economic
improvement in Japan. In response to Kazumasa Iwata’s question on how QQE could
encourage a low natural interest rate, Nakaso commented that QQE contributed tostrengthening supply capacities by stimulating investment—“animal spirits”—which
expanded the growth potential and increased the natural interest rate. Jan Marc Berk
(De Nederlandsche Bank) argued that to escape an economic downturn, most of thecurrent monetary policies intended to encourage risk-taking behavior, which could leadto economic and financial bubbles. He asked how monetary policy and financial stability should be considered. In this context, Yuzo Honda (Kansai University) mentioned
an example in which the Bank of England had recently introduced a new regulation tocontrol land prices as a precautionary measure, from the perspective of macroprudential policy. Papademos commented that monetary policy should take financial stability
considerations into account by being defined over a longer time horizon and by assessing the macroeconomic consequences of emerging systemic risks, particularly those
fueled by excessive credit creation. In an environment of deflationary pressure andweak economic activity, monetary policy should focus on achieving its price stability
objective; at the same time, and especially as the economy strengthens, the central bankshould address potential adverse eﬀects on financial stability of monetary policy withthe support of macroprudential tools.

IV. Paper Presentation Sessions

A. Forward Guidance and Asset Prices4
In the wake of the global financial crisis, forward guidance on the future path of the policy rate has become an important policy tool for many central banks. Wright presented
empirical results on the eﬀects of forward guidance in the context of the United States.
The empirical analysis consisted of two parts. The first estimated a macro-finance termstructure model of the U.S. economy that incorporated the zero lower bound (ZLB) on
nominal interest rates, and used the model to explore the eﬀects of various types of forward guidance. These types included an unconditional commitment under which thepolicy rate would be kept at zero for two years and a conditional commitment underwhich the policy rate would be kept at zero until the unemployment rate hit 5.5 percent.
The second part of the analysis conducted event-study regressions regarding surprises
to future policy rates that could capture a change in forward guidance, and estimatedtheir eﬀects on asset prices. Based on the empirical analysis, he argued that forward
guidance operated through its eﬀect on long-term interest rates by aﬀecting term premia in addition to the expected future path of the (short-term) policy rate through the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. Indeed, according to theestimated model, both the conditional and unconditional commitments, if conductedat the end of 2013, would have increased the term premia but lowered the long-term................................
4. For details, see Akkaya et al. (2015).

8 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementationinterest rates. The results of event-study regressions suggested that surprises to future
policy rates would aﬀect stock prices and exchange rates as well. Furthermore, he indicated that the eﬀect of forward guidance depended on the state of the economy. In
particular, when the economy was far from interest rate normalization, a commitment
to keeping the policy rate low for some time had little eﬀect on long-term interest rates.
For this reason, he stressed that additional forward guidance would not generate a large
amount of monetary easing eﬀects in the euro area and Japan in the present situation.
The discussant, Berk, praised the presented paper for its interesting empirical results. He then indicated that the results depended on several assumptions and raised
three main issues related to them. The first issue was that the estimated macro-financeterm-structure model assumed no changes in values of model parameters, suggestingthat the Fed had kept its policy reaction function unchanged since 2008, which was
unlikely to be plausible. The second issue was that other models with diﬀerent specifications or identification assumptions would generate various results on the monetary
policy stance, so robustness exercises using these models were desirable. The third
issue was that the persistent monetary policy shocks assumed in the presented paper
were likely to overestimate the impact of forward guidance, as argued in the recent
literature. Thus, it was desirable to conduct another robustness exercise with no persistence in the monetary policy shocks. Berk closed his discussion with the remarkthat these issues had to do not with the presented paper itself but with macro-financeterm-structure models in general and that the paper provided interesting insights on the
conduct of monetary policy.
From the floor, Goodfriend commented that forward guidance could only be eﬀective if it was used in conjunction with balance-sheet policy, including asset purchaseprograms. In this context, Ito indicated that forward guidance had worked in Japan because it had been combined with QQE and the price stability target of 2 percent. In his
responses to these comments, Wright agreed that asset purchase programs probably
had greater eﬀects on long-term interest rates than forward guidance. Cecchetti asked
why monetary policy was analyzed in terms of monetary policy shocks that were unrelated to a systematic part of monetary policy. Choi noted that monetary policy shocks
measured as an additive term to a monetary policy rule might not be suﬃcient to capture a monetary policy response to inflation in a deflationary trap. In reply, Wrightadmitted that there was some limitation in capturing a monetary policy response interms of shocks, but insisted that such shocks were still useful for analyzing monetary
policy. Straub commented that an international dimension was missing in the analysis. Momma asked how the presented paper would interpret the “taper tantrum” in2013. Wright replied that this could be interpreted as a question of credibility, which
was not present in the model, which assumed perfect credibility. Kazuo Ueda notedthat the BOJ had provided forward guidance twice around 2000 and asked whether thepresented paper was able to isolate the eﬀect of the second forward guidance. Wright
replied that the model of the paper could incorporate such an incremental eﬀect.

9

B. On the International Spillovers of US Quantitative Easing5
Straub discussed the spillover eﬀects of the Fed’s QE policies on global asset prices
and capital flows. One of the great features of the presented paper was its use of a
meticulous dataset that covered 16,000 equity funds and 8,000 bond funds on a daily
basis. Moreover, the paper not only analyzed the spillover eﬀects on both prices andquantities but also distinguished the eﬀects arising from policy operations and policy
announcements. Straub presented five empirical results. First, the Fed’s QE policies
did have an influence on global asset prices, capital flows, and exchange rates. Second,
the spillover eﬀects of policy operations on asset prices and capital flows were larger
than those of policy announcements. Third, QE1 (from November 2008 to June 2010)
and QE2 (from November 2010 to June 2011) had diﬀering impacts on capital flows;
QE1 caused portfolio rebalancing from EMEs to the U.S. markets, while QE2 resulted
in rebalancing both across countries (i.e., from the United States to EMEs) and acrossassets (i.e., from bonds to equities). Fourth, the Fed’s QE policies increased procyclicality of capital flows into EMEs, although the policies were not the main drivers of
the flows. Last, the impact of the Fed’s QE policies was diversified among EMEs, inthat the spillover eﬀects were smaller in a country with a more active monetary policy
and higher-quality institutions.
The discussant, Kei-Mu Yi (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis), oﬀered twocomments. First, the methodology should be compared to other methodologies thatused a data frequency shorter than one day. Although the main identification window
was appropriate to capture the accumulated eﬀects of the Fed’s QE policies, the data
included not only the eﬀects of the policies but also noise arising from other shocks.
Related, the eﬀects of policy announcements might be underestimated so that such
eﬀects would be smaller than those of policy operations. The underestimation mightarise because the dummy variable regarding policy announcements captured just thetiming of the announcements but not quantitative information on the content of the announcements. Second, it was important to measure the eﬀects of the QE policies onmacroeconomic variables targeted by central banks, such as inflation and unemployment rates. Also, because each channel by which policy was transmitted to financial
markets had potentially a diﬀerent eﬀect on the macroeconomic variables, each channel
should be studied separately.
From the floor, Wright suggested that in the estimation, including some control
variables that captured the actual monetary policy surprise would be better than justtreating all of the announcements as an identical dummy variable. Christopher J.
Waller (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) argued that QE1 and QE2 had completely
diﬀering eﬀects, because their policy objectives were completely distinct. Straub
agreed that the aim of QE1 was to support the real side of the U.S. economy, whereas
the aim of QE2 was to influence the nominal side to avoid deflation. Choi pointed to thepossibility that the paper’s results were biased, because the model failed to control the
feedback eﬀects from the real side of EMEs to the U.S. financial markets. He also suggested that it would be better to consider lingering eﬀects of the global financial crisis
to measure the eﬀects of QE1 accurately, and to add control variables associated with................................
5. For details, see Fratzscher, Lo Duca, and Straub (2015).

10 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementation

the European debt crisis to measure the eﬀects of QE2 properly. Eli Remolona (Bankfor International Settlements) agreed that the measured impact of QE2 contained noise
originating from the European debt crisis. Kazuo Ueda stated that U.S. dollar appreciation during QE1 was caused by financial industries’ deleveraging of dollar liabilities
after the global financial crisis. As for the feature of the Fed’s QE policies, Kawai
asked whether the spillover eﬀects of QE and QE tapering were symmetric or not. In
addition, Ito commented that EMEs would have a variety of defense policies, depending on the diﬀerences in spillover eﬀects, and asked how the spillover eﬀects diﬀered
between the QE policies and conventional interest rate policy. Straub replied that
according to related literature, the transmission of these two diﬀerent policies would
have diﬀering implications for international environments. Goodfriend argued that
the Fed’s preference for discretion rather than rules-based policy made it diﬃcult for
both the U.S. markets and foreign markets alike to position themselves in advance of
the Fed’s monetary policy actions, but foreign markets less familiar with the Fed’s
inclinations and concerns exhibited greater distress in this regard. Pornpinun Chantapacdepong (Asian Development Bank Institute) proposed that it would be better toinclude, as explanatory variables, indicators of financial account openness, diﬀerencesin the economic growth rate from the United States, and interest rate spreads on U.S.
Treasuries.

C. Money Markets and Monetary Policy6
McAndrews talked about four tools for monetary policy conduct under a high level ofreserves: the term deposit facility (TDF), overnight or term reverse repurchase agreements (RRPs), interest on excess reserves (IOER), and segregated balance accounts(SBAs). He began by presenting a theoretical analysis of the TDF and RRPs. The
analysis focused on two frictions banks were facing: balance-sheet costs and interbank
monitoring costs. Regarding the former, he indicated that RRPs could reduce banks’balance-sheet costs by decreasing their asset size, because their depositors could invest
in RRPs by withdrawing deposits from banks. He also mentioned that the TDF did notaﬀect banks’ asset size or balance-sheet costs, as it was their deposit at the Fed. As forinterbank monitoring costs, he pointed out that both RRPs and the TDF increased themby reducing reserves and that the eﬀect of RRPs was weaker than that of the TDF because RRPs also reduced banks’ asset size. Moreover, he argued that term RRPs weremore eﬀective for raising short-term interest rates under high reserve levels than the
TDF, since banks’ balance-sheet costs were dominant over their interbank monitoring
costs.
A basic monetary policy tool under high reserve levels was IOER. The Fed devised
IOER in October 2008 to form a floor for short-term interest rates. However, the rateof IOER had failed to serve as the floor. This had been caused by non-depositories, including government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), as many had argued. McAndrews
proposed SBAs—accounts segregated from the main accounts at the Fed—to pushshort-term interest rates closer to the rate of IOER.
The discussant, Remolona, first stressed that McAndrews’ presentation made very................................
6. For details, see Martin et al. (2015), Frost et al. (2015), and Garratt et al. (2015).

11

clear how the use of the aforementioned monetary policy tools was considered by the
Fed to enhance its ability to influence money market rates in conditions of high reservebalances. Remolona then stepped back to place the discussion of monetary policy
tools in a broader context and took them out of an “inside baseball” discussion. He
pointed out that monetary policy had grown increasingly complicated near the ZLB;
that is, only interest rate decisions had mattered in the past, whereas many issues regarding monetary policy tools had become important. He discussed other policy tools
under high reserve levels adopted by other central banks, including the BOJ’s complementary deposit facility. He also noted that when central banks found themselves at the
ZLB and thus engaged in UMP, their treatment of transparency became asymmetric.
Central banks tended to surprise the market when easing further but tended to be moretransparent, especially in their use of forward guidance, when planning to tighten.
From the floor, Goodfriend cautioned that monetary policy itself should be clear
to the public, referring to some of the arguments by McAndrews as “inside baseball.”He also argued that to help push the federal funds rate up to the rate of IOER, the Fed
should ask the U.S. Congress to allow the Fed to pay interest on overnight balancesheld by GSEs at the Fed, or else GSEs should be disallowed from holding balances at
the Fed. Anne Le Lorier (Banque de France) pointed to the need for regulations on
non-depository institutions, such as GSEs at the Fed, for interest rate control. In thiscontext, Goodfriend noted that balance-sheet costs stemming from regulations were at
risk of impeding arbitrage by banks. Cecchetti indicated that the risk of SBAs was thatthey could impair banks’ intermediation function by providing cost-free riskless assets
in money markets, and asked how large the amount of SBAs should be. Choi mentioned the large inflows toward the United States from the rest of the world. Kazumasa
Iwata questioned whether the policy tools adopted currently by the Fed were suﬃcient
to answer the increasing demand for safe international assets in the United States. In
response to the questions raised, McAndrews emphasized the importance of providing
places, such as the TDF and RRPs, for the increasing amount of international funds,
since otherwise such funds might cause problems in other markets, including mutual
funds. Waller argued that a single policy rate was desirable for clear communication
between central banks and the public. Momma presented the idea that raising the rateof IOER would be a much simpler monetary policy tool under high reserve levels thanother tools, including SBAs. Berk remarked that modification of reserve requirements
was another monetary policy tool under high reserve levels. Kenichirou Watanabe(BOJ) pointed to the possibility that the scarcity of collateral impeded the competitionin federal funds markets and thus caused short-term interest rates to deviate from therate of IOER.

D. Maturity Structure and Supply Factors in Japanese Government
Bond Markets7
Given the conduct of UMP, the eﬀects of central banks’ purchases of government bonds
on long-term interest rates have gained increasing attention. Fukunaga presented an................................
7. For details, see Fukunaga, Kato, and Koeda (2015).

12 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementation

empirical analysis on the eﬀects of changes in the maturity structure and holders ofJapanese government bonds (JGBs) on the term structure of interest rates and risk premia of long-term bonds, using a novel dataset on the amount outstanding of JGBs categorized by holder and remaining maturity. The results from both a regression approachand a term-structure model approach were consistent with the preferred-habitat theory:the net supply of JGBs, defined as the supply from the Japanese government minus
the demand by preferred-habitat investors with preferences for bonds of particular maturities (namely, insurance companies, pension funds, and the BOJ), had significant
eﬀects on long-term interest rates. Based on the results, Fukunaga showed the degree
to which the BOJ’s JGB purchases, as part of QQE, had lowered term spreads as wellas term premia.
The discussant, Waller, applauded the authors of the presented paper for their
devoted eﬀorts to conduct a thorough econometric analysis, and oﬀered three comments from a theoretical viewpoint. The first was that there might be ways besides thepreferred-habitat theory to consider how QE could aﬀect interest rates across diﬀerent
assets, especially assets of diﬀerent maturities with diﬀerent collateral and liquidity
properties. The second comment was that some preferred-habitat investors might exist merely because of regulations rather than because of their actual preferences forlonger-term bonds. In this case, changes in regulations would have the same impact oninterest rates as QQE in the framework of the presented paper. The third comment wasthat a central bank’s purchases of private assets rather than public bonds might work
diﬀerently.
From the floor, McAndrews suggested that, in relation to the third comment raisedby Waller, it would be interesting to apply the presented model not only within government bond markets but also between government bond and other bond markets.
Fukunaga replied that the suggested extension was possible, although the presented
paper focused on the eﬀects of a central bank’s purchases of government bonds onlong-term interest rates, because the aim of purchases of private assets by many central
banks in advanced economies was mainly restoring the functioning of financial markets and intermediation rather than lowering long-term interest rates. Hiroshi Ugai
(Hitotsubashi University) asked how they discerned the duration risk channel from thesafety channel, considering the diﬀerence between the eﬀect through altering the yield
curve and permeating those of risky assets and that through changing the valuations ofsafety attributes of JGBs on economic welfare. One of the coauthors of the presented
paper, Naoya Kato (BOJ), answered that portfolio rebalancing had occurred in Japanfollowing the implementation of QQE, in that private entities had been increasing theirholdings of risky assets while reducing their holdings of JGBs. In relation to the second comment by Waller, Kazuo Ueda asked whether the eﬀect of the BOJ’s JGB purchases from other preferred-habitat investors was neutral on interest rates. Fukunaga
answered that it was neutral within the baseline specification of the presented paper but
in general would not necessarily be neutral, because there might be some heterogeneity among preferred-habitat investors. Goodfriend asked about the diﬀerence between
the eﬀects of a central bank’s outright purchases of bonds and a maturity swap without changing reserves. The remaining coauthor of the presented paper, Junko Koeda(Waseda University), answered that these two eﬀects were almost the same, based on13the result of the term-structure model approach in the paper. Goodfriend also asked
what the term premium in the model looked like. Koeda replied that the movement of
the 10-year term premium was similar to that of the bond yields, because the expectation component of the yields had been stable at a low level. Choi commented that the
net supply eﬀect might change reflecting potential asymmetry in market liquidity.

E. A Model of Secular Stagnation8
The secular stagnation hypothesis, revived recently by Lawrence Summers, has attracted a great deal of attention for its consideration of slow economic recoveries following the recent global financial crisis. The main components of the recent thesisof secular stagnation were a permanently negative natural rate of interest and a binding constraint of the ZLB on nominal interest rates. Mehrotra presented a model forthe recent thesis of secular stagnation. This model was a three-period overlappinggenerations model in which the ZLB on the nominal interest rate was binding andlong-run wage rigidity was present. He indicated that in the model a negative naturalrate of interest could be generated by four factors: a deleveraging shock; a slowdown
in population growth; an increase in income inequality; and a fall in the relative priceof investment. He then stressed that the model could produce a secular stagnation phenomenon, such as weak aggregate demand and low rates of interest and inflation. He
also pointed to implications of monetary and fiscal policies in the model. Forward
guidance regarding the future path of the nominal interest rate had little stimulus eﬀect
on the economy, since the ZLB on the nominal interest rate was always binding. On theother hand, a suﬃciently high inflation target was needed to avoid a permanent slump
caused by a negative natural rate of interest. Regarding fiscal policy, he mentioned thatthe eﬀects of permanent and temporary rises in public debt diﬀered, and pointed outthat a permanent rise in public debt might increase the real interest rate, but a temporaryrise might not necessarily do so.
The discussant, Dotsey, praised the presented paper as a foundation for considering
the recent thesis of secular stagnation in a very rigorous way. However, he questioned
the validity of the model, especially in terms of the assumptions of a cashless setting
and long-run wage rigidity, and raised three main issues. The first was that the absenceof money in the model was crucial, because once money was introduced in the model
the natural rate of interest could not be negative and hence a deflationary equilibrium
failed to exist. The second issue was that wages were too high in a deflationary equilibrium in the presence of long-run wage rigidity. This did not match the data on the
U.S. labor market, such as wages for new hires, wage growth, and real hourly earnings.
Moreover, Dotsey stressed that in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan,
there was no clear evidence for the secular stagnation phenomenon, even in terms of
output growth. The third issue was that the secular stagnation phenomenon—such as
weak aggregate demand and low rates of interest and inflation—could also be generated by recently developed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models,even when the ZLB on nominal interest rates was not necessarily binding. This contrasted with the presented paper, where the ZLB was always binding. He then argued................................
8. For details, see Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2015).

14 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementationthat such DSGE models were useful to investigate the eﬀects of UMP measures, suchas forward guidance, price-level targeting, and nominal GDP targeting.
From the floor, Wright mentioned that in the United States, according to long-run
projections by the FOMC, Blue Chip, and the Congressional Budget Oﬃce, the expected rate of future output growth was around 2 percent, while the expected futureinterest rate was 4–5 percent, and that the former rate matched the secular stagnation
hypothesis but the latter did not. He then asked why people in the United States had
such an inconsistent view. Ito commented on a diﬀerence between the secular stagnation hypothesis and Japan’s experience, where a deflationary equilibrium was more
likely once downward nominal wage rigidity had been relaxed. Choi posed the question of what mechanism or policy tool could achieve a positive inflation target when theeconomy was close to the ZLB on nominal interest rates. Straub asked about the effects of asset purchase programs, which could not influence the natural interest rate but
could aﬀect term premia. It could be judged that monetary policy would still influencelong-term interest rates through asset purchase programs, even in a model where forward guidance had little eﬀect. Waller mentioned that several other constraints caused
slow recoveries following the recent global financial crisis and that QE could play asignificant role in such a situation. Yi commented that many countries grew rapidly following World War II, but as growth theory predicts, their capital accumulation growthrate eventually slowed down. In addition, population growth in these countries slowed;
both forces could be part of a secular stagnation story without needing the assumptionof the permanently binding ZLB constraint on nominal interest rates. Berk cautionedthat it was problematic that the model included no financial sector, where fiscal policy
could have no negative eﬀect on risk premia. Goodfriend argued that low interest rates
in advanced economies were caused by capital inflow from EMEs which were still subject to various institutional frictions. Rzońca mentioned that a sluggish recovery wasmost strongly related to low productivity rather than to insuﬃcient demand.

V. The Mayekawa Lecture: Wall of Worries—Reflections on the Secular Stagnation Debate9
Eichengreen argued the secular stagnation hypothesis from historical vantage points.
He began his lecture by presenting the (equilibrium) real interest rate calculated using
an optimal economic growth model with standard values of model parameters and dataon labor productivity growth. He then indicated that secular declines in real interest
rates in advanced economies were not recent phenomena but had commenced in the
1980s.
Eichengreen argued that the real interest rate could be thought of as equating desired levels of saving and investment. He then introduced several factors that had an
influence on the saving-investment (I-S) balance. As three factors aﬀecting mainly thesaving side of the balance, he noted (1) the so-called global savings glut, (2) an increase in income inequality, and (3) population aging. Regarding the first factor, hepointed out that in advanced economies the nominal ratio of investment to GDP would................................
9. For details, see Eichengreen (2015).

15

not have increased even if the real interest rate had fallen significantly due to rapid
growth in high-saving EMEs. As for the second and third factors, he stressed that there
was little systematic empirical evidence for decisive links between them and the realinterest rate. In light of these facts, he concluded that the three factors did not provide acompelling explanation for the observed decline in real interest rates and the observed
low level of demand.
Regarding factors that influenced mainly the investment side of the I-S balance,
Eichengreen cited (1) declining relative prices of investment goods and (2) fewer attractive investment opportunities. Regarding the former, he pointed to international
evidence that countries with the lowest relative price of investment goods would havethe highest ratios of investment to GDP. This evidence contrasted with the secular stagnation thesis that a decline in the relative price of investment goods reduced the nominal ratio of investment to GDP because the quantity of investment did not increase inaccordance with the drop in the relative price.
Concerning the latter factor, Eichengreen cast doubt on the hypothesis that the contribution of recent technological innovations to total factor productivity (TFP) growth
was smaller than that of past innovations, because the latest innovation was less profitable and harder to commercialize than past innovations. In this regard, he mentionedthat advanced economies had the capacity to eﬀectively apply and commercialize information technology (IT) in terms of finance, entrepreneurship, coordination between
basic and applied research, and so forth.
Eichengreen then cited three historical examples of innovation waves: (1) steam
and rail in the 19th century; (2) electricity, the internal combustion engine, and indoor plumbing from the late 19th through the mid-20th century; and (3) IT, such as
computers, cellphones, and the web, since the 1960s. He argued that there was a lag
between innovation and TFP growth when new products and processes had network
characteristics requiring rearrangement of a wide range of distinct activities before theeﬀects of investment for innovation began to materialize. He also indicated that it was
not unprecedented for three decades of incremental innovation, standardization, andadaption to pass before the eﬀects on eﬃciency began to boost TFP. Based on theseobservations, he closed his lecture with the remark that the IT revolution had takena decade-long pause between 2005 and 2015, but this fact might be less a portent ofsecular stagnation than a harbinger of better times to come.
From the floor, Goodfriend argued for the importance of property rights and other
impediments that might depress investment. Eichengreen replied that it might be an
open question whether there had been a visible decline in the security of property rights
and how this point was linked to secular stagnation. Cecchetti asked whether low
real interest rates were compatible with deficient aggregate demand over the long run.
Eichengreen highlighted his concerns about the investment side of the I-S balance
rather than the saving side. Cecchetti also asked how properly we could measure
prices with quality adjustment. Le Lorier questioned how we could measure an intangible contribution to well-being. In response to their comments, Eichengreen acknowledged diﬃculties in measuring real interest rates and prices of investment goods.
He also noted that there was no obvious trend in the relative price of investment goods
before 1950, but there had been a clear downward trend thereafter. Momma indicated16 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementationthat income inequality might be still a good candidate for over-saving, because weak
income generation by middle-class households might make scaling up innovation lessprofitable and therefore lead to depressed levels of investment. The session chair, Choi,
pointed out that it would be important to create a new industry to meet the potential
demand of the elderly in an aging economy. Kuroda argued that it would be diﬃcult topredict any long-term trend in the future from the past experiences in the first two innovation waves mentioned by Eichengreen, because these two waves were quite diﬀerent
from the recent third innovation wave.

17References
Akkaya, Yildiz, Refet S. Gürkaynak, Burçin Kısacıkoğlu, and Jonathan H. Wright, “Forward Guidance and Asset Prices,” IMES Discussion Paper No. 2015-E-6, Institute for Monetary andEconomic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2015.
Eggertsson, Gauti B., and Neil R. Mehrotra, “A Model of Secular Stagnation,” IMES Discussion
Paper No. 2015-E-9, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2015.
Eichengreen, Barry, “Wall of Worries: Reflections on the Secular Stagnation Debate,” Monetary andEconomic Studies, 33, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2015,
pp. 29–44 (this issue).
Fratzscher, Marcel, Marco Lo Duca, and Roland Straub, “On the International Spillovers of US Quantitative Easing,” IMES Discussion Paper No. 2015-E-7, Institute for Monetary and Economic
Studies, Bank of Japan, 2015.
Frost, Josh, Lorie Logan, Antoine Martin, Patrick McCabe, Fabio Natalucci, and Julie Remache,“Overnight RRP Operations as a Monetary Policy Tool: Some Design Considerations,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDs), 2015-010, Federal Reserve Board, 2015.
Fukunaga, Ichiro, Naoya Kato, and Junko Koeda, “Maturity Structure and Supply Factors in Japanese
Government Bond Markets,” Monetary and Economic Studies, 33, Institute for Monetary andEconomic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2015, pp. 45–96 (this issue).
Garratt, Rodney, Antoine Martin, James J. McAndrews, and Ed Nosal, “Segregated Balance Accounts,” Staﬀ Report, 730, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2015.
Kuroda, Haruhiko, “Opening Remarks,” Monetary and Economic Studies, 33, Institute for Monetaryand Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2015, pp. 25–28 (this issue).
Martin, Antoine, James J. McAndrews, Ali Palida, and David Skeie, “Federal Reserve Tools forManaging Rates and Reserves,” IMES Discussion Paper No. 2015-E-8, Institute for Monetaryand Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, 2015.

18 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementation

APPENDIX 1: PROGRAM
Thursday, June 4, 2015
Morning
Opening Session
Chairperson:
Opening Remarks:

Kenichirou Watanabe, Bank of Japan
Haruhiko Kuroda, Bank of Japan

Session 1: Forward Guidance and Asset Prices
Chairperson:
Mehmet Yörükoğlu, Central Bank of the Republic of
TurkeyPaper Presenter:
Jonathan H. Wright, Johns Hopkins University
Discussant:Jan Marc Berk, De Nederlandsche Bank
Session 2: On the International Spillovers of US Quantitative Easing
Chairperson:
Kazuo Momma, Bank of Japan
Paper Presenter:
Roland Straub, European Central Bank
Discussant:Kei-Mu Yi, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Session 3: Money Markets and Monetary Policy
Chairperson:
Anne Le Lorier, Banque de France
Paper Presenter:
James J. McAndrews, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Discussant:Eli Remolona, Bank for International Settlements
Afternoon
Policy Panel Discussion
Moderator:
Takatoshi Ito, Columbia University
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Panelists:
Stephen G. Cecchetti, Brandeis International Business
SchoolMarvin Goodfriend, Carnegie Mellon University
Ravi Menon, Monetary Authority of Singapore
Hiroshi Nakaso, Bank of Japan
Lucas Papademos, Bank of Greece

19

Friday, June 5, 2015
Morning
Session 4: Maturity Structure and Supply Factors in Japanese Government
Bond Markets
Chairperson:
Kazuo Ueda, University of Tokyo
Paper Presenter:
Ichiro Fukunaga, Bank of Japan
Discussant:Christopher J. Waller, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Session 5: A Model of Secular Stagnation
Chairperson:
Jean-Luc Schneider, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Paper Presenter:
Neil R. Mehrotra, Brown University
Discussant:Michael Dotsey, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Mayekawa Lecture
Chairperson:
Lecturer:

Woon Gyu Choi, Bank of Korea
Barry Eichengreen, University of California at Berkeley

20 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementation

APPENDIX 2: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Juda Agung
Masayoshi Amamiya
Hanna Armelius
Suat Aydin
Jan Marc Berk
Adam Cagliarini
Stephen G. Cecchetti
Pornpinun Chantapacdepong
Lillian Cheung
Daniel Chiquiar
Woon Gyu Choi
Angelo Alfonso Alberto Cicogna
Francisco Jr. Garcia Dakila
Michael Dotsey
Barry Eichengreen
Yushi Endo
Norhana EndutÁngel Estrada García
Hiroshi Fujiki
Ichiro Fukunaga
Marvin Goodfriend
Yutaka Harada
Hisashi Harui
Hideo Hayakawa
Yuzo Honda
Daisuke Ikeda
Nobuo Inaba
Takatoshi Ito
Kazumasa Iwata
Naoya Kato
Masahiro Kawai
Yukinobu Kitamura
Takahide Kiuchi
Junko Koeda
Hirohide Kouguchi
Haruhiko Kuroda
Takushi Kurozumi
Samu Kurri

Bank Indonesia
Bank of Japan
Sveriges Riksbank
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
De Nederlandsche Bank
Reserve Bank of Australia
Brandeis International Business School
Asian Development Bank InstituteHong Kong Monetary Authority
Banco de México
Bank of Korea
Banca d’Italia
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
University of California at Berkeley
Bank of Japan
Central Bank of Malaysia
Banco de España
Chuo University
Bank of Japan
Carnegie Mellon University
Bank of Japan
Kwansei Gakuin University
Fujitsu Research InstituteKansai University
Bank of Japan
Ricoh Company, Ltd.
Columbia University, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
Japan Center for Economic Research
Bank of Japan
University of Tokyo
Hitotsubashi University
Bank of Japan
Waseda University
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Finland

21

Shigeki Kushida
Shigehiro Kuwabara
Anne Le Lorier
Eiji Maeda
James J. McAndrews
Neil R. Mehrotra
Ravi Menon
Kazuo Momma
Stephen Murchison
Shigeto Nagai
Takeshi Nakajima
Hiroshi Nakaso
Viet-Linh Nguyen
Kiyohiko G. Nishimura
Takemasa Oda
Shingo Odaka
Yutaka Okada
Akira Otani
Sakkapop Panyanukul
Lucas Papademos
Eli Remolona
Adam Richardson
Andrzej Rzońca
Takehiro Sato
Jean-Luc Schneider
Toshitaka Sekine
Seiichi Shimizu
Tokiko Shimizu
Mototsugu Shintani
Sayuri Shirai
Nicolas Stoﬀels
Roland Straub
Norikazu Takahashi
Jie Liang Thum
Shinichi Uchida
Kazuo Ueda
Kozo Ueda
Hiroshi Ugai
Willem Van ZandwegheBank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Banque de France
Bank of Japan
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Brown University
Monetary Authority of Singapore
Bank of Japan
Bank of Canada
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Banque de France
University of Tokyo
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Thailand
Bank of Greece
Bank for International Settlements
Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Narodowy Bank Polski
Bank of Japan
Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
Bank of Japan
University of Tokyo
Bank of Japan
Swiss National Bank
European Central Bank
Bank of Japan
Monetary Authority of Singapore
Bank of Japan
University of Tokyo
Waseda University
Hitotsubashi University
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

22 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015

Monetary Policy: Its Eﬀects and Implementation

Christopher J. Waller
Kenichirou Watanabe
Toshiaki Watanabe
Jonathan H. Wright
Hiromi Yamaoka
Kei-Mu Yi
Mehmet Yörükoğlu
Nobuyasu Yoshioka

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Bank of Japan
Hitotsubashi University
Johns Hopkins University
Bank of Japan
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
Bank of Japan

23

24 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES / NOVEMBER 2015