F N C A Ne w s le t t e r N o . 8
Radiation Safety & Radioactive Waste Management

C o n te n t s
Marc h 2 01 4

The 2013 RS&RWM Workshop
P.1 – P.3

Issued by
Nuc lear Saf ety
Researc h Assoc ia tion
(F N CA Secr etar ia t,
JAPAN)

Topics from participating countries
P.3 – P.16
List of Project Leaders P.17
FNCA Framework

The 2013 FNCA Workshop on
Radiation Safety & Radioactive Waste Management (RS&RWM)
10-13 September, 2013, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
consolidated report. Participants thenhad a discussion about the report onradiation safety that is consolidating
drafts from the member countries. To
check and review the latest report,
member countries were divided into 3
groups and each group discussed areas toimprove comparing their reports.

The FNCA 2013 Workshop on
Radiation Safety and Radioactive Waste
Management (RS&RWM) was heldfrom September 10 to 13 2013, in
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. This workshop
was co-hosted by the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology (MEXT) of Japan, and the
Nuclear Energy Agency of Mongolia(NEA). Sixteen researchers and experts
from eleven FNCA member countries,
namely Australia, Bangladesh, China,
Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia,
Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, andVietnam participated in the workshop.
The first day was initiated withcountry report presentation, given bymember countries detailing the public
exposure in normal and emergency
situation. Additional information, mainlyin the area of regulatory framework,radiation emergency, and national
monitoring systems were provided forthe updating of the drafted 2010 FNCA

Fig1: The 2013 RS&RWM Workshop

1

P.18

In the morning of the second day,participants delivered a presentation
about status of radioactive waste
disposal and treatment at research
institutes. In the afternoon, a technicalvisit
toCentralGeological
Laboratory(CGL)wasconducted.
Initially, the FNCA participants were
given a presentation that described the
CGL’s activities including its various
cooperation with other professionalorganizations
both
local
and
international and its accreditations. Thiswas followed by a guided tour of various
facilities and laboratories where theparticipants got to observed anddiscussed the state of the art equipment
and analytical procedures implemented
by the CGL highly competent staff.
After the tour, a roundtable discussion
was carried out wherein the participants
provided their impressions, comments
and recommendations that would further
support the activities of the CGL.

An open seminar on Radiation Safety
Control and RI Analysis/Control in
FNCA Member Countries was held at
National University of Mongolia on thethird day. It was attended by around 60
local students and lecturers fromuniversities, researchers, radiation safety
inspectors from nuclear related institutes
in Mongolia. A poster session was also
held during the open seminar. Someleaflets related to RS&RWM, personal
dosimeters, and survey meters from themember countries were displayed.

Fig3: Open Seminar at National University of Mongolia

On the last day of workshop,
participants reviewed the project
activities implemented during phase4(2011-2013)
andagreedtocooperatively
work
towards
thecompletion of a consolidated report onradiation safety and the publication of
the newsletter. All member countries
agreed to continue the project with theFig2: Technical Tour at Central Geological Laboratory2theme -Progress of radiation safety of thegeneral public during emergency andradioactive waste disposal situations.
Subjects to be discussed for the next
three years include emergency response
and preparedness, radioactive waste
disposal, decommissioning, disused
radiation
sourcemanagement,
transportation, storage of spent fuel,uranium mining, NORM waste etc.
Kazakhstan was proposed as the next
workshop venue.
Fig4: Discussion with CGL staffs

Topics from Participating Countries
There are only a handful of nuclear
reactors producing radionuclides fornuclear medicine on an industrial scale.
The majority of these reactors along with
the Mo-99 production plants have beenin operation since the 1950s and 1960s.
The reliability of the supply chain has
been challenged in the recent years as
the aging facilities become increasingly
prone to unexpected shutdowns.
Furthermore, as the market is suppliedby only the few major producers, supply
disruptions inevitably occur when one ormore of the reactors undergo scheduled
or unscheduled shutdown at the sametime.

Australia
Mr. Lubi Dimitrovski
Australian Nuclear Science &Technology Organisation (ANSTO)
The Australian Nuclear Medicine ProjectRadioisotopes of Interest
Technetium-99m (Tc-99m) is themost widely used radioisotope in the
nuclear medicine industry accounting forover 80% of diagnostic nuclear medical
imaging worldwide. Its excellent nuclear
and chemical characteristics lends itself
to multiple medical and research uses,
including the evaluation of the medical
condition of the heart, kidneys, liver,spleen and bone, as well as blood flow
studies. Its use is expected to continue togrow as countries expand theirhealthcare programs.
Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), with ahalf-life of 66 hours, is used as the
precursor for the generation of Tc-99m,
whose half-life is only 6 hours. Over
95% of the Mo-99 required for Tc-99m
generation is obtained by the fission of
uranium-235 targets in nuclear reactors.

The ANM Mo-99 Facility
The need for improvement of the
Mo-99 supply is increasingly recognised.
With the upcoming retirement of
Canada’s and France’s multi-purpose
research reactors in the next couple ofyears, a shortfall in the Mo-99 supply
market is imminent. Australia has
positioned itself to fill that global supply
gap with its AUD83 million ($73
million) investment on a new Mo-99
manufacturing facility. It will be situatedat the Australian Nuclear Science andTechnology Organisation's (ANSTO's)
Lucas Heights site near Sydney, where
3the state-of-the-art low-enriched uranium(LEU) Open Pool Australian Lightwater(OPAL) reactor, commissioned in 2006,
will be providing irradiation for the
LEU-targets.
OPAL is also the first research
reactor in the world to use only lowenriched uranium as a target for neutron
irradiation in the production of Mo-99(as well as for fuel), in support for the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative(GTRI) in its nuclear non-proliferation
mission.

Fig1: How the ANM Mo-99 facility at Lucas Heights
may look.

Figure 1 above depicts how the
ANM Mo-99 facility may look. The
building will be classed as a nuclear
installation and will be designed to meet
regulatory requirements of the Australian
Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety
Agency (ARPANSA) and AustralianNon-proliferation and Safeguards Office(ASNO).

Demand for Mo-99
In Australia, an estimated 550,000
people undergo nuclear medicine
procedures each year. The OPAL reactor
is not only able to meet the demands ofthe domestic market, but has the capacity
to produce half of the world's Tc-99
demand.
The new investment will enable
ANSTO to significantly increase output,
provide some 20 million doses per year,
launching Australia as a majorinternational supplier of the isotope. It
will meet about one-quarter of theworld’s demand which currently
numbered at about 45 million doses(23,000 six-day TBq) per year. The
investment will also create some 250
jobs and deliver a AUD1 billion return toAustralia.
The contract to design, develop andconstructofAustralian
Nuclear
Medicine(ANM)
Molybdenum-99
manufacturing facility has been awardedtoAustraliancompany
WatpacConstructions Pty Ltd. Design planningwill commence in February 2014 and the
project is scheduled for completion inearly 2016, in time to alleviate theanticipated Mo-99 shortfall in theinternational market due to the shutdownof the main players in Canada andEurope. Potential export markets for theradioisotopes include USA, Japan, China
and Korea.

The ANM Waste Treatment Facility
Together with the Molybdenum-99
manufacturing facility (ANM Mo-99),
the Australian Nuclear Medicine
program also includes a ‘first-of-a-kind’
waste treatment plant for managing thesubsequent radioactive by-products fromproduction.
The co-located waste treatment plant
will use the SYNROC technology,
which is a suite of technologies
developed by ANSTO for immobilisingvarious forms of intermediate- and highlevel radioactive wastes for disposal. In
the ANM Waste Treatment Facility(Figure 2), the intermediate level liquid
waste produced from the Mo-99
production facility will undergo avolume reduction and encapsulation
process. The SYNROC process with its
glass-ceramic waste form, made from aunique formulation of several naturalminerals, is able to incorporate nearly allof the radioactive elements present in
waste into their crystal structures. A
significant volume reduction of up to
99% can be achieved.
4Waste Management Facility can befound on the Department of Industry
website.

Bangladesh
Dr. M. Moinul Islam, Ms. Moutushi
Shidha Shome , and Mr. Shanjib
Karmakar
Bangladesh Atomic Energy
Commission (BAEC)

Fig2: How the Synroc facility at Lucas Heights may
look.
.

This technology is chosen as apermanent, safe and economical way oftreating the intermediate level waste.

Regulatory Framework in Bangladesh

The SYNROC Technology
Legislative and Statutory Framework

SYNROC’s
flexible
process
technology is able to accommodate
variations in waste chemistry, allowing it
to treat both acidic and alkaline wastes
from ANSTO’s past, current and future
manufacture of nuclear medicines. The
resultant waste volume using theSYNROC technology will only be 1% of
the same wastes treated using
cementation.

The Regulatory Authority of
Bangladesh is authorized for issuingrules and regulations and conducting
licensing and supervisory processes for
issuing licenses, and thereby regulating
nuclear and radiation safety for siting,design,equipment
manufacturing,
construction, commissioning, operation
anddecommissioningof
nuclear/radiological facilities. Nuclear
Safety and Radiation Control Division(NSRCD), now called Bangladesh
Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority(BAERA) is responsible for the
regulation of issues related toaccounting and control of nuclear
materials, radioactive substances andphysical protection. The BAERA is thecompetent authority for licensing
shipments out of Bangladesh and giving
consent to shipments into Bangladesh.

HIP unit

BeforeAfter

Fig3: Volume reduction achieved through the hot
isostatic pressing (HIP) process, one of
SYNROC’s suite of technologies used for Mo99 intermediate level liquid waste treatment.

The
final
SYNROC-treatedwasteform (Figure 3) will be sent from
Lucas Heights to Australia’s National
Radioactive Waste Management Facility(NRWMF), planned to be operational by
the end of the decade.
More information on the ANM Mo99 and SYNROC project can be foundon the ANSTO’s website. Information
on Australia’s National Radioactive

Fig1: Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority(BAERA), Dhaka

5following regulations under BAER Act2012 are being prepared:

Legal Background
National policy is to provide
adequate protection for man and theenvironment against undue exposure toionising radiation from radiation
sources and radioactive wastes for thepresent and future generation. Nuclear
Safety and Radiation Control Act 1993
was duly approved and enacted (1993)
and the Regulations have been put into
force (1997). NSRC Rules -1997 arebased closely on the BSS and cover
most
of
the
principal
elements necessary for an effective
radiation protection regime. They apply
to all practices in Bangladesh, including
those carried out in establishments of
the BAEC.

 Regulation on the Safety of
NuclearInstallationsSite
Evaluation
 Regulation on Radiation Protection
 Regulation on Management of a
NuclearoraRadiological
Emergency
 Regulation on Licensing of
Nuclear Installation
 Regulation on Radioactive Wasteand Spent Fuel Management Regulation on the Safety of
Nuclear Power Plants Operation
 Regulation on the Safety of
Nuclear Power Plants Design.

The following acts that address thebasic nuclear activities have alreadybeen approved by the Government of
Bangladesh. This act will establish theset up basic requirements for
management of radioactive waste;
define basic requirements, licensing
procedures and responsibilities ofdifferent organizations involved innuclear activities and related radioactive
waste management.

Present
StatusofRegulatory
Framework:
A new act, called ‘Bangladesh
Atomic Energy Regulatory (BAER) Act2012’, has been passed 29 March 2012by the parliament. As per act there isprovision to establish an independent
Regulatory Authority under the Ministryof Science and Technology to perform
its regulatory activities. New Act will
empower the regulatory authority todevelop safety principles and criteria.
The New Act and NSRC Rules-1997
include exclusion, exemption andclearance criteria. The new act allows
appeal against regulatory decisions.
Under the proposed act, a four member
regulatory body, titled ‘Bangladesh
Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority’
headed by a chairman, will be
constituted to supervise the nuclear andradiological activities.
Besides, anadvisory committee will be formed withexperts from related sectors. The issuesof definition, goals and activities of theauthority, determination of compensation,
security and safety of the power plants aswell as safety measures against radiationand management of nuclear waste havebeen mentioned in the proposed act. The
public and other bodies are involved in Nuclear Safety and Radiation
Control Act 1993, Act No. XXI
of 1993,
 Nuclear Safety and Radiation
Control Rules – 1997 SRO. 205 –Law/97, Date:
September 04, 1997
The
Radiation
Protection
Regulations contains information on
clearance and sets up clearance levels
and limits for authorized discharges ofradioactive substances from nuclear
facilities. In addition, Nuclear Safety andRadiation Control Division (NSRCD)
presently known as BAERA have
prepared new rules for the ‘Radioactive
Waste and Spent Fuel Management. The

6

regulatory process through training,
workshop and seminar.

Fig2: Present Structure of Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory
Authority (BAERA)

facility for very low level radwaste witha half-life very short (less than 5 years)
which are now being storage in theinterim storage facility. Through acertain sorting system, some waste
packages in the interim storage facility
can be moved and placed at thedemonstration disposal facility in the
future.

Indonesia
Dr. Budi SETIAWAN
Dr. Suryantoro
National Nuclear Energy Agency(BATAN)Radioactive Waste Managementin Indonesia
INTRODUCTION
To anticipate the possibility of interim
storage facility becoming full withradwaste packages, BATAN is preparing
a location near waste treatment facility in
Serpong Nuclear Area is used as a
radwaste disposal site for demonstration
purpose (SP-4 site, see Fig. 1), and nearsurface disposal type was chosen.
Existence of a disposal facility fordemonstration purpose in Indonesia is
expected could show the ability andmastery of technology and safety on
radwaste management activities to the
public.
Disposal facility for demonstration
purpose was also intended as a disposal

Fig1: Location of site candidate for demonstration disposal
facility at Serpong Nuclear Area

7

Such as other radwaste disposal
facility, the facility will be equippedwith multibarrier system which consistsof engineering barrier and natural barriersystem to ensure the realization ofenvironment and public safeties at thesurrounding facility. SP-4 site as naturalbarrier system made the facility site
provide an important position on the stepof radwaste disposal facility preparation,
and all information related to thecondition and subsurface around the siteneed to be investigated in detail todetermine soil ability supports facility
construction, pattern and direction ofgroundwater
distribution
intheenvironment. The information can
indicatepossible
directionofradionuclide spreading into environment
when demonstration disposal facility
operates. Placement of disposal andwaste treatment facilities at a nearby
location (as co-location principle) is
expected to be a good example ofradwaste management strategy inIndonesia in the future.

processes became small. While thelithology up to 10 m depth including toblack sandstone area which inserted withclay stone lenses. Massive clay stone
was found at more than 20 m depths.
Based on the unified soil classification
system (USCS), soil at SP-4 site wasclassified as organic clay and silt withhigh compressibility, groundwater flow
and variation of groundwater table. FromXRD analysis, site soil contains calcite,
dolomite and montmorillonite minerals.
Calcite couldbedissolved ingroundwater and it can be an additional
pathway for radionuclides migration into
environment. The use of shallow
foundation
systeminfacility
construction is less ideal. Soil
stratigraphy at some drilling points on
SP-4 site is shown in Fig. 2.

OBJECTIVE
To obtain field observation anddrilling data on SP-4 site to be used for
preparation of demonstration disposal
facility
construction
meet
theenvironmental safety requirement.
METODHOLOGY
Through field observation around thesite and drilling work at some points in
SP-4 site the information were searched.
The data consists of seismicity andvolcanic condition, site morphology,
lithology and stratigraphy, depth ofwater table, and groundwater flow
direction was collected.

Fig2: Stratigraphy of soil in SP-4 site

Environment of SP-4 site include to the
Cisadane watershed, where about 180 m
towards the west direction is found asurface water body, Cisalak river. While
SP-4 site has groundwater level in 9-8 m
depth, and its groundwater flow follows
hydraulicgradient
accordingtogroundwater level contour to thesouthwest side slopes. Monitoring
equipment on the groundwater pathway
is needed to monitor the possibility ofradionuclides release to the environment
later, and the groundwater distribution

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
SP-4 site was classified as undulatingplateauoffluvio-volcanicingeomorphology unit. Almost no
difference in topography in the location
with small slope, and geomorphologic

8

will be controlled by lithology spread ofand site morphology conditions.
Based on seismic zonation map ofIndonesia, SP-4 site include to the areawith seismic ground acceleration 0.150.3 g on the MMI scale < IV. Nearby
volcano is mount Salak with harmlessstatus (dormant), located at a distance of> 50 km toward south direction with ash
rain or lapili as a potential hazards to thefacility.

CONCLUSION
Based on field observation and drilling
work has obtained the data on the site
morphology, lithology and stratigraphy,
depth of water table, and groundwaterflow direction, seismicity and volcanic
condition,. The obtained of lithologicaland groundwater flow conditions
indicate that the location is less ideal for
shallow foundation system using, and thedesign of disposal facility need to bestrengthened with multibarrier system.

Fig3: Current condition of SP-4 site

Japan

Radioactive waste is categorized into as
following“Highlevel”,“L1”,“L2”,“L3”and clearance level.
Clearance level is the level todiscriminate “no need to handle asradioactive material”. In case of cobalt
60 and 0.1Bq/cm2 or less, it can behandle as general waste.

Prof.Toshiso Kosako
University of Tokyo
Dr. Yuji Matsuzoe
Fuji Electric Co., Ltd.
Radioactive Waste Disposal/
Treatment in Japan
Clearance level contamination monitor
Radiation handling facility (NNP anduranium mine, etc) occur the large
amount of radioactive waste such as
metal and concrete when facility isdecommissioned

Fig2: Clearance Level

Clearance monitor is to detect the shape of
the article and radiation dose and evaluate theclearance level.
Fig1: Dismantling of Radiation Handling Facility

9

Food contamination monitor
In Japan, concern about radioactive
material in food is increased since Great
East Japan earthquake result in TEPCO
Fukushima NPP accident.

nuclear accident.

Fig3: Clearance level radiation monitor

Article contamination monitor
When the articles are taken out fromradiation controlled area, it is necessary
to confirm whether or not thecontamination exists and contaminationlevel is less than 4Bq/cm2. The
monitoring equipment varies depending
on article size such as pipe or concrete
block and clothes to be measured.

Fig6: Contamination provision of radioactive material in foodFig4: Article contamination monitor

Fig7: Food contamination monitor

Wearing clothes in the radiation
controlled area is monitored by Landry
monitor which can detect thecontamination generating from theradioactive material on clothes.

Fig8: Set up example of food contamination in Japan
farmers’ cooperative

Food contamination monitor
Fig5: Landry monitor

10countries, using Japan’s knowledge,
experiences and know-how in peacefuluses of nuclear energy.
The course was inaugurated by Dr
Mohd Ashhar bin Hj Khalid, Deputy
Director General, Malaysian Nuclear
Agency. Mr Norfaizal Mohamed as the
Project Course Coordinator, in his
opening remarks hoped that this course
will increase participants capability andskill in collecting, preparing, measuring
and analysing of radioactivity sample
and measure radiation in environment
surrounding.
The FTC provided a series oflectures and basic practical experienceforcollection,
preparationofenvironmental samples such as soil,
water and grass in terrestrial andsubsequent radionuclide analyses. The
participants
were
also
exposedpractically in performing environmental
radioactivity analysis using selectednuclear instrument such as Gamma
Spectrometry System and Liquid
Scintillation Counter. All participants
were
expectedtounderstandtheoreticallyandpracticallyinperforming environmental monitoring.
Further, the participants were also given
lectures on nuclear safety. This training
program gave benefit to participants andit is that they will disseminate and share
their knowledge to other staff at theirrespective work organization for better
implementation of radioactivity andradiation monitoring in the environment.
In general, pollution of environments
is global issues threatening the health of
the beyond country borders. Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, accident on
March 2011 gave us more concerned tothe environments health. A failure tomonitor the terrestrial and marine
environment and recognize and deal withthe effects of pollution result in negative
impacts at all levels of economic activity,from subsistence uses of environment

Malaysia
Ms Nurrul Assyikeen Bt. Md. Jaffary
Dr Mohd Abd Wahab Yusof

Malaysian Nuclear Agency
Follow up training course on
environmental monitoring at Nuclear
Malaysia
FOLLOW UP TRAINING COURSE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AT
NUCLEAR MALAYSIA

Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear
Malaysia) in collaboration with Japan
Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has
conducted 2nd Follow up Training
Course on Environmental Radiation
Monitoring from 16th until 20thof
December
2013.
Participantsinparticular from the Ministry of Health,Atomic Energy Licensing Board (AELB),
Nuclear Malaysia and Malaysia - Japan
International Institute of Technology(MJITT) were gathered at Nuclear
Malaysia for 2 weeks to meet,
networking and learn from distinguishedlocal instructors and JAEA Experts.
JAEA and Nuclear Malaysia haverecognized the importance of promoting
and accelerating human resources
development activities in each agency.
This training course has been planned
and launched to support the humanresources development activities. All the
local core-instructors contribute during
Follow-up Training Course (FTC) are
graduated from Instructor Training
Course (ITC) program on Environmental
Monitoring after attending 6 weeks train
the core-trainers programs in Japan since2010. The ITC is conducted underannual sponsorship by the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology (MEXT) of JAPAN(MEXT) of Japan government. The ITC
program had contribute to humanresourcesdevelopment
in
Asian
11

resources to commercial food processing,import and export of food productactivities, agriculture operations andtourism. Therefore, the effort made by
JAEA to lead and implement the training
course on environment monitoring andnuclear safety is highly commendable toevaluate the possible impact of thereleases of radioactivity into ourenvironment.
Fig1: Group photo of the participants after opening
ceremony in front of administration building, Malaysian
Nuclear Agency

The Philippines

radiation level at the surface acceptable
for long storage, thereby eliminating therisk of overexposure to the public andalso possible covert action.
NECSA was authorized to conduct
the SHARS conditioning at the PNRIRadioactive Waste Management Facility(RWMF) after complying with theregulatory
requirements.
The
conditioning activity was conductedfrom March 21, 2013 to April 28, 2013.

Ms. Editha A. Marcelo
Philippine Nuclear Research Institute(PNRI)

Conditioning of Spent High Activity
Radioactive Sources(SHARS) in thePhilippines Using the Mobile Hote Cell

The Philippines, through thePhilippine Nuclear Research Institute,availed of theInternational Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) technical assistance for SHARS
conditioning in the early 2008. In
November 2008, an IAEA pre-mission
team conducted an evaluation of the
SHARS inventory and the PNRIRadioactive Waste Management Facility.
Finally, the technical assistancerequest for SHARS conditioning was
funded in 2012, and the Nuclear Energy
Corporation of South Africa wascontracted by the International Atomic
Energy Agency in January 2013 tocondition the SHARS using the Mobile
Hot Cell.
The objective of the conditioning
project was to ensure safe and securemanagementof high risk spent high activity
radioactive sources (SHARS) in a longterm storage container.
The containment process reduced the

SHARS Inventory and Description
SHARS are Category I radioactive
sourcesfromradiotherapy
andirradiation facilities. These radiotherapy
sources were used in the hospitals fortreatment of cancer or tumor, while theirradiator sources were used by thedifferent research laboratories at PNRI.
These sources were in the range of
100TBq-10PBq. Due to their highactivities, they still pose a high risk tohuman health if not properly managed at
the end of their useful lives.
A total of 22 units of spent teletherapy
sources (Co-60, 18 units) and spent
irradiator sources(4 units, 3 –Co-60 & 1–Cs-137)) were stored in the PNRIRadioactive Waste Management Facility
since late 1970s. These sources werereceived in original working device(teletherapy head), fabricated shieldedcontainer or original transport container.

12

SHARS Mobile Hot CellSHARS cannot be handled safely
without utilizing standard remotehandling tools in a shielded facility;
otherwise, it could result in individual
radiation exposure. The site must not be
close to any multi-storey building to
avoid the sky-shine during theconditioning operation. The site for theassembly of hot cell must have at least
30m x 30m surface area with a hardsurface area of 8 m x 8 m in the center,
reinforced and concreted. The site mustbe leveled.
The conditioning facility is a
mobile hot cell that can be assembled,
disassembled, packaged and transported
to a site. It consists of a biological shieldwith a window for viewing the work inprogress inside the hot cell cavity. The
biological shield has a double wall cavity
filled with ordinary river sand asshielding material. It has a telescopic
master slave manipulator, an internalcrane to handle and lift objects inside thehot cell. A movable overhead craneoutside the biological shield lifts heavy
object in and outside the hot cell. The
hot cell is fitted with video cameras andlights to allow viewing of the inside of
the hot cell. A ventilation system
maintains negative pressure within the
hot cell, so as to contain and prevent thepossible spread of contamination. A longterm storage shield container is coupled
to the side of the biological shield foreasy and safe transfer of theencapsulated spent highactivity radioactive sources from the hot
cell.

SHARS Conditioning
The shielding head, transport
container or working device containing
the high activity sources were lowered
into the mobile hot cell cavity by a crane,
one at a time. A trained operator used
the master slave manipulator to remove
the drawer containing the source fromthe shielding head, transport container or
the working device inside the plastic
lined hot cell cavity. Prior to source
removal, the drawers were leak tested forpossible contamination.
Teletherapy sources were removed
from the drawer by cutting the pin of thesource cap or plug using an air-driven
circular saw or a special tool. The drawer
is rotated and the source drops. The
retrieved sources were loaded in thespecial form stainless steel capsule, TIG
welded and leak tested using bubble test
inside the mobile hot cell cavity.
Capsules were pulled one after the otherthrough the transfer port into the drawersof the long term storage shield.
Long Term Storage Shield
A unit of the long term storage shieldhas 4 drawers in a rotating carousel, andcan accommodate a total activity of
370TBq. The long term storage shielddesign is based on a standard transport
container and can be used in case ofsource repatriation to the country oforigin. It was designed to maintainintegrity for at least 50 years in highhumidity covered storage and to provide
shielding for the sources to maintaindose rate not greater than 2 mSv/hr oncontact.
SHARS Conditioning Result
A total activity of 204 TBq for the
sixteen (16) units of spent high activity
radioactive sources from teletherapy (13units) and irradiator (3 units) wereconditioned successfully. Teletherapy
sources ranged from 18mm to 45mm indiameter, and 33mm to 40mm in length.
The irradiator sources were pencil-type

Fig1: Assembled Mobile Hot Cell

13containing 6 pencils per unit, with adiameter of 12mm to 15mm, and lengthof 150mm to 345.5mm.
All conditioned sources were Co-60
and were distributed in the two units oflong term storage shield (LTSS-1 andLTSS-2). The total dose rate of Co-60
sources loaded in the LTSS-1 is 10.5
Sv/h containing 1 unit irradiator and 9
units teletherapy sources. The LTSS-1
maximum contact dose rate is 103 µSv/h
and 25.4 µSv/h at 1 meter. The Co-60
sources in LTSS-2 has a total dose rateof 3.35 Sv/h containing 4 units
teletherapy and 2 units irradiator sources.
The LTSS-2 has maximum contact dose
rate of 102 µSv/h and 34 µSv/h at 1
meter. The dose rate is below the 2
mSv/h contact limit for safe transport ofradioactive material.
Six (6) units with a total activity of
73.8TBq of spent high activity
radioactive
sourcesremained
unconditioned because the source cannot
be extracted from the drawer due toheavy corrosion. These units are
currently stored in the interim storage
together with the long term storageshield.

for doses. These values are below
the IBSS dose limits for occupational
and public exposures. The TLD wholebody dose value of all team members
were below the ALARA objective limits,thus indicating an effective ALARA
program.

ALARA Program
The SHARS conditioning team wasdivided into two teams with six persons
per team. A team is composed of a teamleader, 3 technicians and 2 radiation
protection officer. Team 1 assembled
the mobile hot cell, commissioned andstarted with the conditioning of thesources. After three weeks, Team 2 camein to relieve the first team. They
completed the conditioning work anddismantled and packaged the mobile hotcell and components.
The ALARA principle was used to
set an occupational ALARA objective ofless than 5mSv and public ALARA
objective of less than 20µSv for thewhole operation.
The ALARA
objective is a value used in the design ofthe mobile hot cell as an objective value

Thailand

References:
1. Potier, J.M. and Al-Mughrabi, M. 2007.
A Shared Solution for Risky Radioactive
Sources, IAEA Bulletin 49/1, September 2007,
pp. 56-58.
2. Liebenberg, G.R. and Al-Mughrabi, M.
2008. The Development of a Mobile Hot Cell
Facility for the Conditioning of Spent High
Activity Radioactive Sources (SHARS),
WM2008 Conference, February 24-28, 2008,
Phoenix, AZ.
3. Swart, H.S. 2012. Radiological Operational
Safety Assessment for the Conditioning ofHigh Activity Disused Sealed Radioactive
Sources, NECSA Report NLM-REP-12/029.
4. Very, S.J. 2012. Radiological Protection
and Operational Safety Programme for theConditioning of High Activity Disused Sealed
Radioactive Sources, NECSA Report NLMSUR-062.

Ms. Nanthavan Ya-anantThailand Institute of Nuclear
Technology (TINT)

Management of Disused Sealed
Radioactive Source(DSRS) in Thailand

Introduction
In many countries, radioactive
sources may have been used prior to theestablishment of effective regulatory
requirements and may not have been
disposed of appropriately. Therefore,
information should be gathered about the“early days” of radioactive material use
as soon as possible, while individuals
who were present at the time are still14

alive. The earliest uses of radioactive
material in Thailand typically involved
radiumparticularlyinmedicalapplications. For Thailand and otherdeveloping countries, the earliest use are
more likely to be in the medical field,
and particularly in cancer therapy using
Co-60 or Cs-137. In addition, radioactive
sources are used in agriculture, industry,mining, research and education as wellas in consumer products. They provide
many benefits to the country. The safety
record of these technologies with regard
to the radioactive sources that they
employ has generally been good.
However, occasionally a lack ofappropriate control or circumvention of
those that exist, has led to sources
becoming orphaned or vulnerable
resultinginseriousradiologicalaccidents, or to harmful environmental,social and economic impacts.

The DSRSs (as Fig.1) have been
managed as the followings;

F

1. The register of DSRSThe following information should berecorded:- The former owner who possess
the source and associated device,including contact information- The unique identification of thesource(manufacture,model
number, serial number, and date of
manufacture)- The unique identification of theassociateddevice(manufacture,model number, serial number, anddate of manufacture)- The location of the source- The radionuclide, the sources
activity and the date on which theactivity was measured- The category of the source- The form of the radioactive
material (physical and chemical)
including its special form status- A record of where the source wasreceived from or transferred to- The date the source and associateddevice was entered into the register- The planned disposition of thesources such as the planned date ofits transfer to any waste storage/
disposal facility

Management of Disused Sealed
Radioactive Sources (DSRS)When radioactive sources has nolonger used, it should be returned back to
the country of origin as written in the
Ministerial Regulation on Procedure on
RWM B.E.2546 (2003). But most of
DSRS could not be returned to the origin,
therefore the Radioactive Waste
Management Center (RWMC), Thailand
Institute of Nuclear Technology (TINT)
has a duty on managing of DSRS under
the regulatory control by the Office
Atoms for Peace (OAP)

Note : A register of DSRS has been
generated and maintained using a
database software.
2. Relocation & Reorganization
The mission of relocation andreorganization of DSRS has been
operated as the national work plan, the
IAEA Project : RAS 9071.

Fig1: Disused Sealed SourcesFig2: Checking dose-rate of DSRS

15

Procedure
The procedure is as the followings;
1) Prepare the operational area
2) Check the radioactive contaminationof each DSRS before moving for
operation3) Take the individual source to theoperational area and check dose rate
(Fig.2)4) Check the identification label, andtake photos (Fig.3)

Fig5: Before and After the Reorganization

ResultThe outputs achieved as the results ofactivities implemented as follows:
1. The record keeping of DSRS wasdeveloped.
2. The reorganization of DSRS was welldone within the storage facilities (Fig.5)
3. Unknown DSRS was determined to the
known DSRS and was segregated, due tothe characterization technique.
4. The national inventories of stored
DSRS is up to dated.
5. The proper operational procedures andquality control at the storage of DSRS
was established and implemented.
6. A training material by recording(filming) all activities was carried out
during the operation.

Fig3: Identification of DSRS

5) Place temporary the sources in theempty room, organized by type of source
and radionuclide (segregation) as in
Fig.4

Fig4: Segregation of DSRS

6) Volume reduction by removing DSRS
from big containers and re-packing in
200 Litre -drum.
7) Complete inventory of DSRS
8) Improve the storage conditions bycleaning he floor and cellar9) Arrange sources in baskets and put inshelves, grouping by radionuclide /typeof radiation
10) Record keeping for regulatory
control

Acknowledgement:
Special thanks to the IAEA, the OAP,
the TINT Safety Unit and the RWMC
for their kind co-operation.

16

The FNCA RS&RWM Project Leaders
Australia

Ms.Lynn TAN

Bangladesh

Dr. Moinul Islam

Project Transition Leader
Waste Projects and Strategic
Planning
Australian Nuclear Science andTechnology Organisation

Principal Scientific Officer,
Health Physics & Radioactive
Waste Management Unit,
Atomic Energy Research
Establishment (AERE), Bangladish
Atomic Energy
Commission (BAEC)

China

Dr. Zhang Jintao

Indonesia

Mr. Suryantoro

Japan

Kazakhstan

South Korea

Dr. Chang Lak Kim

Malaysia

Dr. Mohd Abdul Wahab
Yusof
Senior Research Officer,
Waste Technology &Environment Division,
Malaysian Nuclear Agency(Nuclear Malaysia)

Mongolia

Ms.Oyuntulkhuur
Navaangalsan
Head,
Radiation Regulatory
Department,
Nuclear and Radiation
Regulatory Authority,
Nuclear Energy Agency

Deputy Director General,
Department of Safety, Protection
and Quality,China National
Nuclear Corporation (CNNC)

Philippines

Head of Radwaste Treatment
Division, Radioactive Waste
Technology Center, National
Nuclear Energy Agency ofIndonesia (BATAN)

Director,
Radioactive Waste
Management Policy Office,
Korea Radioactive Waste
Management Corporation(KRMC)

Ms. Maria Visitacion B.
PalattaoHead, Regulations andStandards Development
Section, Philippine Nuclear
Research Institute (PNRI)

Prof. Toshiso Kosako

ThailandProfessor,
Nuclear Professional School,
Graduate School of Engineering,
The University of Tokyo

Mr. Yuriy Aleinikov
Head of Laboratory,
Department of Reactor Research,Institute of Atomic Energy,
National Nuclear Centre of the
Republic of Kazakhstan

17

Vietnam

Ms. Nanthavan Ya-anantHead, Radioactive Waste
Management Section,
Radioactive Waste
Management Center,
Thailand Institute of Nuclear
Technology (TINT)

Dr. Le Ba Thuan
Director,
Institute for Technology ofRadioactive and rare Elements,
Vietnam Atomic Energy
Institute (VINATOM)

18