NUMBER 104

MARCH 2018

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIESFEATURED ARTICLESTHE UNITED NATIONS ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND AN INTRODUCTION TO UNICRI INITIATIVESUNICRI INITIATIVES: REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION OF VIOLENT EXTREMIST OFFENDERSAND COMMUNITY-BASED PROJECTSJUVENILE JUSTICE
Chiara Bolonga（UNICRI）
STRATEGIC COUNTERTERRORISM, TERRORIST REHABILITATION AND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT:THE SINGAPORE EXPERIENCE
Sabariah Mohamed Hussin（Singapore）（ANTI）CORRUPTION WITHOUT BORDERS: BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNEDFROM THE CAR WASH CASE
EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR ASSET RECOVERY: THE BRAZILIAN APPROACH
By Vladimir Aras（Brazil）
AN OVERVIEW OF SINGAPORE´S ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGYAND THE ROLE OF THE CPIB IN FIGHTING CORRUPTIONSINGAPORE´S EXPERIENCE IN INVESTIGATING AND RECOVERING PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION CRIMESBy Vincent Lim（Singapore）

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALREPORT OF THE THIRD WORLD CONGRESS ON PROBATIONREPORT OF THE SECOND ASIA VOLUNTEER PROBATION OFFICERS MEETINGTHE UNITED NATIONS ASIA AND FAR EAST INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERSRESOURCE MATERIALSERIES NO. 104

UNAFEI
Akishima, Tokyo, Japan

March 2018

Keisuke Senta
Director
United Nations
Asia and Far East Institutefor the Prevention of Crime andthe Treatment of Oﬀenders(UNAFEI)
2-1-18 Mokuseinomori, Akishima-shi, Tokyo, Japan
unafei@i.moj.go.jp

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTORY NOTE ㌀
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vi

PART ONEWORK PRODUCT OF THE 167TH
INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREHABILITATION AND SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF ORGANIZED CRIMEMEMBERS AND TERRORISTS
Visiting Expertsʼ Papers


The United Nations Action to Counter Terrorism and an Introduction to UNICRI
Initiatives
by Ms. Chiara Bolonga (UNICRI) ㌀
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㌀3



UNICRI Initiatives: Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders
and Community-Based Projects
by Ms. Chiara Bolonga (UNICRI) ㌀
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Juvenile Justiceby Ms. Chiara Bolonga (UNICRI) ㌀
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㌀20



Strategic Counterterrorism, Terrorist Rehabilitation and Community Engagement:
the Singapore Experienceby Ms. Sabariah Mohamed Hussin (Singapore) ㌀
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㌀27

Participantsʼ Papers
Controlling the Activity of Criminal Factions within the Brazilian Prison System
by Mr. Carlos Vinicius Soares Cabeleira (Brazil) ㌀
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㌀36



Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration of Organized Crime Members and Terrorists
by Mr. Ahmad Naser Altaharwah (Jordan) ㌀
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㌀43



Individual Presentation on the Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration of Organized
Crime Members and Terrorists
by Mr. Soufiane Ahoujil (Morocco) ㌀
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㌀47



Is Namibia a Simmering Pot for Terrorism and Would the Current Status Quo in
Corrections Be Able to Deal with the Rehabilitation of Possible Future Terrorists?
by Ms. Remona Visser (Namibia)㌀
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㌀52



Offender Treatment and Organized Crime Members and Terrorists
by Mr. Nanding N. Bayle (Philippines) ㌀
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㌀57

Reports of the CourseSpecific Measures: Disengagement Interventions in Prisonsby Group 1 ㌀
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㌀61



Responding to Organized Crime Members and Terrorists in Contact with the Criminal
Justice and Penal Systems
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㌀69

iii

PART TWOWORK PRODUCT OF THE 20TH UNAFEI UNCACTRAINING PROGRAMMEEFFECTIVE MEASURES TO INVESTIGATE THE PROCEEDS OF
CORRUPTION CRIMES
Visiting Expertsʼ Papers
(Anti)Corruption without Borders: Best Practices and Lessons Learned from the Car
Wash Caseby Mr. Vladimir Aras (Brazil) ㌀
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㌀75



Effective Measures for Asset Recovery: The Brazilian Approachby Mr. Vladimir Aras (Brazil) ㌀
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㌀84



An Overview of Singaporeʼs Anti-Corruption Strategy and the Role of the CPIB
in Fighting Corruption
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Singaporeʼs Experience in Investigating and Recovering Proceeds of Corruption Crimes
by Mr. Vincent Lim (Singapore) ㌀
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㌀99

Participantsʼ Papers
Operation Carwash and the Fight against Corruption
by Mr. Frederico Skora Lieberenz (Brazil)㌀
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㌀ 105



Enhancing Synergies: The Multi-Agency Experience in Fighting Corruption in Kenya
by Ms. Caroline Nyaga (Kenya) ㌀
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㌀ 110



Tracing and Recovery of Proceeds of Corruption ̶ The Maldivian Challenge
by Ms. Mariyam Shahuma (Maldives) ㌀
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㌀ 117

Reports of the Programme

Methods of Investigation for Identification and Tracing of the Proceeds of Corruption
and International Cooperation
by Group 1 ㌀
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㌀ 121



Effective Measures to Investigate the Proceeds of Corruption Crimes
by Group 2 ㌀
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㌀ 127



Domestic and International Cooperation Approaches for Investigation of Proceeds ofCorruption Crimes
by Group 3 ㌀
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㌀ 134

Supplemental Materialiv

Report of the Third World Congress on Probation
by The Third World Congress on Probation ㌀
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㌀ 143



Report of the Second Asia Volunteer Probation Officers Meetingby UNAFEI ㌀
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㌀ 149

APPENDIX㌀
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Presentations of the 167th International Training Course

Radicalized Offenders and Security Threat Groups in Correctional Environments
by Dr. Andrea E. Moser (Canada) ㌀
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㌀ 155



Radicalized Offenders and Security Threat Groups: What do We Know?
by Dr. Andrea E. Moser (Canada) ㌀
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㌀ 156



Management of Radicalized Offenders and Security Threat Groups in a Correctional
Context
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㌀ 191



Gender and Cultural Considerations in the Management of Offenders
by Dr. Andrea E. Moser (Canada) ㌀
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Global Threat
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㌀ 257



Global Terrorist Rehabilitation and Community Engagement Programmes:
The State-of-the-Art
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㌀ 263

Presentations of the 20th UNAFEI UNCAC Training Programme

The Role of the United Nations in the Fight Against Corruption
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㌀ 277



How US Prosecutors and Investigators Use Anti-Money Laundering Laws toInvestigate and Prosecute Domestic and Foreign Corruption Affecting the US
by Ms. Mary Butler (United States)㌀
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United Statesʼ AML Laws
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Open Source Internet Tools
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Group Photos


167th International Training Course ㌀
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㌀ 359



20th UNAFEI UNCAC Training Programme ㌀
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES INDEX㌀
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v

INTRODUCTORY NOTE
It is with pride that the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and theTreatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) offers to the international community the Resource Material Series No.
104.
Before introducing the contents of this issue, I would like to draw your attention to a number ofenhancements to the Resource Material Series that have been made over the last few issues. In RMS No. 102,
we introduced a new section entitled “Supplemental Material”. This new section will include expertsʼ papers,
presentations and other reports produced by, or in connection with, UNAFEIʼs activities. In RMS No. 103, we
introduced a redesigned cover to give the journal a new look and to provide readers with quicker access to
information about the contents covered in each issue. In this issue, RMS No. 104, we have expanded thecontent of the appendix to include additional presentation materials related to certain courses, and we havecreated an index of the entire Resource Material Series in order to help our readers search for and locate
relevant papers published in prior issues. We hope that you find these changes beneficial and that theyenhance the value of the Series as a whole.
Part One of this volume contains the work product of the 167th International Training Course, conductedfrom 23 August to 21 September 2017. The main theme of the 167th Course was Rehabilitation and Social
Reintegration of Organized Crime Members and Terrorists. Part Two contains the work product of the 20th
UNAFEI UNCAC Training Programme, conducted from 1 November to 7 December 2017. The main themeof the 20th UNCAC Programme was Effective Measures to Investigate the Proceeds of Corruption Crimes.
The 167th Course offered participants an opportunity to deepen their understanding of relevant theories
and practices to facilitate the reintegration of former organized crime members and terrorists into society.
The rise of violent extremism and terrorism throughout the world presents criminal justice systems with theunique challenge of balancing the interests of public security with the well-established principles of humanrights. This challenge is compounded by the growing links between terrorism and organized crime, and theongoing threat of the radicalization of prisoners and detainees in custodial settings. While evidence-based
practices and research are still in the early stages of development, there is global recognition of the need to
identify effective measures that support offenders in the process of disengagement or deradicalization fromviolent extremism. Using the UNODCʼs “Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners andthe Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons” as a guide, as well as other global initiatives, criminal
justice practitioners can begin the process of implementing strategies and practices that may lead to therehabilitation and social reintegration of terrorists and members of organized crime groups.
The 20th UNCAC Programme addressed challenges facing anti-corruption officials in investigating,tracing, freezing and confiscating the proceeds of corruption crimes. To successfully prove corruption
offences, establishing the flow of the proceeds of corruption is a crucial element. However, the nature ofcorruption makes it very difficult for criminal justice authorities to obtain effective leads and to fully develop
and investigate them. This is because corruption is ordinarily committed in secret among a very limited
number of parties. Moreover, laundering of proceeds of corruption frequently involves various methods to
disguise illegal transactions, and, in our globalized society, the proceeds can be easily and quickly transferred
across national borders and investigative jurisdictions. Thus, accurate and speedy identification and tracing ofillicit proceeds of corruption are some of the most important elements to a successful investigation. These
steps are prerequisites for freezing, seizing and, ultimately, confiscating the proceeds of corruption from
offenders in order to deprive them of their ill-gotten gains, prevent their ability to commit further crime anddeter them from attempting to do so.
UNAFEI, as one of the institutes of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Programme Network, held these training programmes to offer participants opportunities to shareexperiences, gain knowledge, and examine crime prevention measures in their related fields, as well as tobuild a human network of counterparts to further international cooperation, which is vital to addressing theseissues.
In this issue, in regard to both the 167th International Training Course and the 20th UNAFEI UNCAC
Training Programme, papers contributed by visiting experts, selected individual presentation papers fromamong the participants, and the reports of each programme are published. I regret that not all the papers
submitted by the participants of each programme could be published.
viI would like to pay tribute to the contributions of the Government of Japan, particularly the Ministry ofJustice, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the Asia Crime Prevention Foundation forproviding indispensable and unwavering support to UNAFEIʼs international training programmes. Finally, I
would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to all who so unselfishly assisted in the publication of this series.
March 2018

Keisuke SENTA
Director of UNAFEI

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PART ONERESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES
No. 104

Work Product of the 167th International Training Course
Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration of Organized Crime Members andTerrorists

UNAFEIVISITING EXPERTSʼ PAPERS
THE UNITED NATIONS ACTION TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND AN
INTRODUCTION TO UNICRI INITIATIVES
Chiara Bologna＊

I. INTRODUCTION
The scope of this paper is to provide a brief introduction to the mechanisms behind the United Nations(UN) global strategy to combat terrorism in all its forms with the aim of presenting a holistic view of the work
carried out. What follows comprises a short summary of the UN action in the field of terrorism prevention,
including a mention of some key resolutions and instruments, its strategy in broad terms, and information onsome of the different UN entities working in this field. This will lead to the section describing the work of theUnited Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Institute (UNICRI) and its programmes relevant to advancing
the aims of the UN in this area, where the Institute has more than ten years of experience. In the final part ofthe document, an introduction will be provided on the theoretical and practical foundation used by UNICRI
for one of its projects on Counter-terrorism, namely the project on rehabilitation and reintegration of violent
extremists in prisons.

II. THE UNITED NATIONS COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGYThe United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy is a unique instrument designed to foster andenhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism globally. It was adopted byconsensus on 8 September 2006 by the UN General Assembly during which all Member States agreed to acommon strategic and operational approach to fight terrorism. Through this action, states have sent a clear
message that condemns terrorism in all its forms whilst also resolving to take practical steps bothindividually and collectively in order to prevent and combat this global threat.1
The Strategy, with its relevant resolution and Plan of Action, is composed of four key pillars,2 namely:
Addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.
Measures to prevent and combat terrorism.
Measures to build statesʼ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of theUnited Nations system in that regard.
Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis forthe fight against terrorism.
In response to the reality of a constantly evolving terrorism landscape, the Strategy is revised every two
years by the General Assembly, making it into a constantly updated and hence living document. The
revisions respond to new challenges and threats as well as recommendations to address them.

Associate Programme Officer, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). The content of
this paper does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNICRI or contributory organizations, nor does it imply any
endorsement. @UNICRI, August 2017. This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educationalor non-profit purposes without special permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made.
UNICRI would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this paper as a source.
1
United Nations General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/60/288) (2006) The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
2
For more information see United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/
en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy>.
＊

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III. OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED NATIONS COUNTER-TERRORISM
ARCHITECTURE
For decades the issue of terrorism has been on the agenda of the United Nations. Within the UN system,
there are specific entities and programmes that are mandated to carry out and monitor mechanisms to more
effectively implement and assess the components of the aforementioned Strategy. The current section
comprises a summary of the activities that the different UN entities on counter-terrorism carry out.3
Since 1963, the international community has promulgated 19 international legal instruments to address
terrorism. One landmark Security Council Resolution (1373) was adopted in 2001 and urged Member States tobecome part of the international instruments. Resolution 1373 called on States to implement measures related
to combating the financing of terrorism and law and justice related to this matter.4 The Resolution led to theestablishment of the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). The CTC5 isguided by the Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005)6 and is mandated to support Member
States in their prevention efforts both within their borders and across regions. Due to the complex nature of
the activities carried out, the CTC is assisted by the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate(CTED), which was established in 2004. The Security Council knows different bodies to enhance the capacityof Member States in terrorism including the CTC, the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Daʼesh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions
Committee, as well as the 1540 Committee on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biologicalweapons. The Counter-Terrorism Committee has its Executive Directorate (CTED) to conduct expert
assessments of Member States and to implement its policy decision whereas the 1267 Committee works witha Monitoring Team.7
A central component of the UN architecture is the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force(CTITF), which was established by the UN Secretary-General and endorsed by the General Assembly in linewith the requirements and recommendations set out by the aforementioned Counter-Terrorism Strategy.8
The CTITF consists of 38 international entities and INTERPOL,9 each with individual mandates, which areassigned to carry out efforts to maintain consistency across the UN system whilst aiming to strengthen thecoordination, given the multilateral nature of terrorism and the systematic response to counter the series ofphenomena that it entails. Although the Task Forceʼs major responsibility is to observe, implement andimprove the series of recommendations that the Strategy comprises, its mandate relies on working to ensurethat the UN system is adaptable to the evolving needs of Member States whilst countering terrorist
activities. Moreover, this mandate refers to offering policy support, improving in-depth knowledge of theStrategy, and where necessary, expediting the delivery of technical assistance.10
Another entity that supports the Strategy is the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT).
The Centre was established within the CTITF Office in 2011 with the aim to promote international
cooperation and support Member States in the implementation of the Strategy.11
On 15 June 2017 the UN Office of Counter Terrorism was established through the adoption of General
Assembly Resolution 71/291.12 The new UN Office for Counter Terrorism incorporates the CTITF and the
UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (CTC) which were moved out of the Department of Political Affairs. The
office is headed by an Under-Secretary-General and has close relationships with the Security Council bodies
The information in the following section has been complied from the United Nations (2017) Counter-Terrorism Implementation
Task Force, available at: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/about-task-force.
4
United Nations Security Council Resolution (S/RES/1373) (2001) Threats to international peace and security caused by terroristacts.
5
For more information of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, see: <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/>.
6
United Nations Security Council Resolution (S/RES/1624) (2005) Prohibition of incitement to commit terrorist acts.
7
For more information see the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism <http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/overview.shtml>.
8
United Nations (2017) Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. Available at: <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/
ctitf/en/about-task-force>.
9
To learn more about the structure of the CTITF, see: <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/structure>.
10
Ibid.
11
To learn more about the CTITF, see <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/about-task-force>.
12
United Nations General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/71/291) (2017) Strengthening the capability of the United Nations system
to assist Member States in implementing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
34

167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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and Member States, and aims to strengthen existing and developing new partnerships.
Numerous agencies, offices and programmes throughout the United Nations system are assisting Member
States in their counter-terrorism efforts. The diversification and multiplicity of the efforts undertaken by UN
system reflect the fact that terrorism involves a multitude of issues and must be addressed comprehensively.
The combined endeavours of all these entities make for a multi-disciplinary and tailored approach to counterterrorism.

IV. THE UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICERESEARCH INSTITUTE
The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) is part of the CTITF.
The Institute is one of six training and research Institutes of the United Nations. It was established by theUnited Nations Economic and Social Council in 1965 following Resolution 108613, which urged an expansion of
the UN activities in crime prevention and criminal justice. Its mission is to advance security, serve justice andbuild peace in support of the rule of law and sustainable development.
The Institute works in specialized niches and selected fields of crime prevention, justice, security
governance, counter-terrorism and social cohesion.
UNICRIʼs goals are:
To advance understanding of crime-related problems;
To foster just and efficient criminal justice systems;
To support respect for international instruments and other standards;
To facilitate international law enforcement cooperation and judicial assistance.
The Instituteʼs programmes (divided into thematic areas) aim to create and test new and holistic
approaches in preventing crime and promoting justice and development.
The Institute supports the designing and implementation of holistic and innovative modalities to confront
traditional and emerging threats, at both national and cross-border levels. In particular, the Institute:-Assesses countriesʼ threats and needs.
-Develops and shares knowledge.
-Acts as a worldwide training and capacity-building centre.
-Acts as a worldwide forum to identify, tailor and test strategies and practical models.
-Assists countries in strengthening national and international law enforcement cooperation and judicial
assistance.
-Establishes platforms for consultation and cooperation.
-Provides advisory services.
Using research as a foundation for projects, the Institute builds from this by offering training andtechnical cooperation programmes to requesting Member States. The Institute organises specialised
trainings and workshops as a direct way to disseminate knowledge and build capacity with a range oftargeted actors, including policymakers, practitioners (i.e. law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges)
and international experts. UNICRI promotes the exchange of expertise and fruitful discussion among
representatives from different sectors that lead to concrete recommendations and identification of areas inneed of more understanding and cooperation.
UNICRI serves as a platform for consultation and cooperation acting as an honest broker in bringing
together different partners such as Member States, local governments, research institutions, internationalorganizations, private entities and the civil society at large, in forging a common approach to addressing

United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 1086 (1965) Statute of the United Nations Interregional Crime andJustice Research Institute.
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 104

common challenges.
Establishing and promoting partnerships are central components of UNICRIʼs work, and events like these
represent important opportunities to share experiences and knowledge.

V. UNICRI AND COUNTER-TERRORISM
UNICRI contributes to the implementation of coordinated and coherent efforts across the United Nations
system to prevent and counter violent extremism as part of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task
Force. In this framework, the Institute supports Member States in preventing and countering terrorismʼsappeal and recruitment into violent extremism by strengthening national and regional capacities.
UNICRI plays a leading role in a number of initiatives. Within the Counter-terrorism (CT) field, theInstitute works on numerous projects which together cover a vast array of topics. For the scope of this paper,
some of the main UNICRI projects which are cross cutting in the field of CT are listed as follows:14 theinitiative on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks mitigation; cyber-crime; addressing hatespeech and hate crimes; returning foreign terrorist fighters; rehabilitation and reintegration of violent
extremists in prison settings; juvenile justice and diversion or alternatives to incarceration, and; the nexus
between transnational organized crime and terrorism. Exploring these intersections in greater depth makes
UNICRIʼs work multi-dimensional and builds a more detailed picture of the areas of need in the field of crimeand justice.
UNICRI has conducted several initiatives to support Member States in fulfilling their international
commitments (starting from UNSCR 2178) to address the threats posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) byincreasing awareness, understanding and capacities of national and international stakeholders. Moreover,activities are aimed to provide technical assistance in the identification of risks to be addressed, capabilities tobe strengthened and actions to be undertaken for developing and implementing a comprehensive and holistic
strategy to counter the FTFʼs phenomenon.
UNICRI liaised with other international organizations to ensure that various and separate efforts areincorporated into one coherent approach in order to build up and strengthen capacities for addressing thethreat posed by returning FTFs.
UNICRI is working in close cooperation with selected target countries to collect relevant data andpromoting the implementation of a tested method based on real case scenarios. Such activities facilitate thepreparation of action plans addressing the issue of rehabilitation and reintegration of returning FTFs, under
the different stakeholdersʼ perspective.
UNICRI has conducted a research project to assess the pre-conditions for developing a juvenile diversion
pilot programme for potential foreign terrorist fighters and others at risk. A preliminary analysis of thejuvenile justice systems and alternative measures/diversion programmes enforced in Bosnia andHerzegovina, Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya and Tunisia was conducted.
Furthermore, UNICRI is conducting a pilot project to counter radicalization and violent extremism in the
Sahel-Maghreb region. The initiative integrates international, regional and local resources to support thecountries of the region in countering the growing threat of violent extremism. The initiative promotes
inclusive activities through the development of more responsive and inclusive societies. The project is basedon the assumption that civil society actors enjoy a genuine grassroots support and could offer key assets in
the implementation of actions to limit the influence of violent extremist ideology and challenge the narrativesof extremists by offering positive alternatives to violence.
While being context-specific and people centred, the project facilitates the sharing of experiences,
guidelines and good practices in the region and among the different stakeholders. It supports cross-border

For more information of other important initiatives that UNICRI works on in the field of Counter-terrorism, please consult the
UNICRI website at: <www.unicri.it>.
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167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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cooperation and the establishment of synergies and mutual understanding between civil society groups andinstitutions.
A key topic of concern for many Member States is the financing of terrorism. Organised crime (oftentransnational) has been identified as one of the sources of terrorism financing, thus leading to a nexus
between organised crime and terrorism. The nexus can go further than simply the financing of terrorism,
however, particularly if we consider the entire continuum of alliance and convergence.15
Security Council Resolution 2195 (2014), on Threats to international peace and security,16 called upon
Member States to better understand and address the nexus between organised crime and terrorism as athreat to security and development. In line with this Resolution, UNICRI has undertaken a number of
initiatives on this topic. In May 2016, UNICRI organised a meeting in Bangkok, in partnership with theThailand Institute of Justice (TIJ), to examine the nexus and the threat that it poses to security anddevelopment.17 Representatives of 15 Member States and prominent international experts in the field wereinvited to discuss the issue in depth. During the meeting, participants reviewed the current evidence basis
and conceptual theories around the nexus, drawing from their knowledge of lessons learned and goodpractices, all with a view to defining better policy and programmatic responses.
Moreover, UNICRI worked in close partnership with the TIJ to carry out a research project concerningtransnational organised crime in Thailand as a result of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN)
Economic Integration. Besides looking at forms and trends of current and emerging transnational organised
crime, criminal groups operating in Thailand and illicit transit routes for trafficked goods, the question of thenexus between transnational organised crime and terrorism (both at local and international level) was
explored.18
UNICRI implements a variety of methods in the area of rehabilitation and reintegration of violent
extremist offenders, and the Institute plays a key role in supporting Member States in translating thegeneralised good practices identified in the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) Rome Memorandum19,
which specifically addresses the rehabilitation needs of incarcerated violent extremists, into national policies.
In the field of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes of violent extremist offenders (VEOs) in prison
settings, UNICRI has enhanced its cooperation with a number of countries (Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, thePhilippines, and Thailand) to support them in the design and implementation of tailored programmes.
Prisons are a priority for this area of research. It is important to address the possible risks in prison
environments where convicted terrorists can network, compare and exchange tactics, radicalize and recruit
new members, and command and control operations beyond the prison and in the community, whilst at thesame time realising that imprisoned or detained extremists will eventually be released. Thus, in order toreduce risk upon release, there is a universal need to find mechanisms to stimulate disengagement and/or deradicalisation.20 An initial step to tackle the issues mentioned above is to ground research in a soundtheoretical framework.

VI. THEORY OF CHANGE: THE CONCENTRIC CIRCLE MODEL
The theoretical basis for UNICRIʼs work on rehabilitation and reintegration is derived from broader
theories of behavioural change. Psychology focuses on the individual and individual agency in this process,
Makarenko, T. “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime andTerrorism”, Global Crime, 6(2) (2004).
16
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2195 (S/RES/2195) (2014) Threats to international peace and security.
17
Breaking the Organized Crime and Counter-Terrorism Nexus: Identifying Programmatic Approaches, Meeting report. The
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the Thailand Institute of Justice (TIJ).
18
For further information on this research, please ask UNICRI and/or TIJ for more information on the soon-to-be publishedcomprehensive report.
19
GCTF, The Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Good Practices of Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent
Extremist Offenders, available at: <https: //www. thegctf. org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/A/GCTFRome-Memorandum-ENG.pdf>.
20
Deradicalization and disengagement are tackled in more depth later in the document.
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while social sciences incorporate various social environments.21 The concentric circles model in Figure 1
shows the layers of social environments (family, friends, institutions, communities and beyond) that place theindividual in their wider social context.22 The theory of change that UNICRI applies is that all of these circles
matter when it comes to individual behavioural change.23
In the PVE context, the aim is to change the behaviour of a radical individual through rehabilitation andreintegration efforts. These will only be effective and sustainable as long as the different layers (eachconcentric circle) are involved in the process. For instance, if the individual changes but does not havesupport from their family, they will probably revert back to their previous behaviour (green circle ̶ red
circle relationship). The theory posits that the same dependent relationships occur between all adjacentlayers, which will eventually affect the individualʼs likelihood of maintaining his or her changed behaviour.
Consequently, social environments at all levels need to ensure continuous support in the process, which willallow radical individuals a greater chance of succeeding in changing their behaviour.

Figure 1: UNICRI’s concentric circles model in rehabilitation and reintegration24
Therefore, following UNICRIʼs theory of change, it can be said that the behaviour of an individual canmost probably be changed when the family, peers, institutions such as schools, the community, local andnational institutions and international organisations are jointly and actively involved in a coordinated process.
Rehabilitation and reintegration are ways to facilitate this change, but these concepts need to be

See Durkheim, E. (1966). The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York: Free Press; McKay, C. & Shaw, H. (1969). Juvenile
Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism,
Comparative Politics, vol. 13, pp. 379-399; Turner, J. (1984): ʻSocial identification and psychological group formationʼ in H. Tajfel(Ed.) The social dimension: European developments in social psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 518-538;
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1989). ʻEcological systems theoryʼ in Vasta, R. Annals of Child Development, vol. 6. London, UK: Jessica
Kingsley Publishers. pp. 187-249; Damon, W. & Eisenberg, N. (1998): Handbook of child psychology, vol. 3. Social, emotional, andpersonality development (5th ed.). New York: Wiley; Neff, J. A. & Macmaster, S. A., Applying Behavior Change Models to
Understand Spiritual Mechanisms Underlying Change in Substance Abuse Treatment, The American Journal of Drug andAlcohol Abuse, no. 31, 2005, pp. 669-684; Veldhuis, T.& Staun, J. (2009), Islamist Radicalisation. A Root Cause Model, Netherlands
Institute of International Relations Clingendael, 2009, p. 24-26; Chan, W. Y., Espelage, D. L., Hollingsworth, M. A. & Mitchell, K. J.
(2016), Preventing violence in context: The importance of Culture for implementing systemic change, Psychology of Violence, vol.
6, no. 1, pp. 22-26; Datchi, C., Barrenti, L., Thompson, C. M. (2016), Family Services in Adult Detention Centers: Systemic
Principles for Prisoner Reentry, Couple and Family psychology : Research and Practice, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 89-104.
22
Developed by Smith, C. J. UNICRI, see Klima, N. (forthcoming). ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle
approach on P/CVE in capacity buildingʼ. UNICRI, Turin.
23
Klima, N. (forthcoming). ‘Pathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approach on P/CVE in capacity building’.
UNICRI, Turin.
24
Developed by Smith, C.J.UNICRI, see Klima, N. (forthcoming). ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approachon P/CVE in capacity buildingʼ. UNICRI, Turin.
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deconstructed in order to understand how they can be integrated into counter-terrorism strategies.

VII. REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION
Rehabilitation and reintegration are broad terms that encompass a variety of practices as well as different
expected outcomes. Efforts can focus on the prevention of violent behaviour and enable inclusion andparticipation in society. Two concepts that underpin rehabilitation are de-radicalization and disengagement,
which have generated debate as to their respective definitions and utility for rehabilitation programmes25.
Two commonly used definitions are as follows26:
A) De-radicalization: the social and psychological process whereby an individualʼs commitment to, andinvolvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement
and engagement in violent activity. De-radicalization may also refer to any initiative that tries to achieve a
reduction of risk of reoffending through addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues.
B) Disengagement: the process whereby an individual experiences a change in role or function that is
usually associated with a reduction of violent participation. It may not necessarily involve leaving the
movement, but is most frequently associated with significant temporary or permanent role change.
Additionally, while disengagement may stem from role change, that role change may be influenced bypsychological factors such as disillusionment, burnout or the failure to reach the expectations that influenced
initial involvement. This can lead to a member seeking out a different role within the movement.
In other words, de-radicalisation represents an attitudinal change resulting from a psychological process.
Typically, the de-radicalized individual adopts more moderate views and renounces violence. Disengagement
refers to behavioural change whereby a person lessens their engagement in violent activities. Indeed, it isimportant to keep in mind that many Member States opt for disengagement as an outcome for theirrehabilitation and reintegration programmes, since it is very difficult to really know if an individual is deradicalized, whereas disengagement is possible to verify.
However, rather than being two clear-cut processes, de-radicalisation and disengagement interact, making
it difficult to focus explicitly on one or the other in a rehabilitation programme. For instance, radical ideas are
not dangerous in themselves, even though they may remain a risk factor for violent behaviour in somecircumstances. While there is general consensus on the broad definitions A) and B), the nuances of these
phenomena are not taken as given but continue to be disputed.
Rehabilitation and reintegration efforts need to be considered long-term (before detention, during
detention and after release) and should be embedded in the general CT/CVE policy and practice structure.
To design successful rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, expertise from different agencies (multiagency) and disciplines (multi-disciplinary) are highly beneficial.
Furthermore, as the theoretical model demonstrates, families and communities play a crucial role in thisprocess as well as other civil society actors. It may be the case that state actors are not used to working withcivil society actors or do not maintain a mutual trust relationship that enables fruitful cooperation (civilsociety actor involvement), which is why UNICRI assists in the development of platforms for this cooperation
to be strengthened and has an initiative based on this which will be discussed further in the following paper.
The UNICRI programme on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, developed
within the framework of the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and supported by theUnited States of Americaʼs Department of State, is aimed at supporting Member States in their efforts todesign, develop and implement effective rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist
See Horgan, J. Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements. (London:
Routledge, 2009); Bjørgo T. & J. Horgan, eds. Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement. (Oxon and
New York: Routledge, 2009); Rabasa, A., S. Pettyjohn, J. Ghez, & C. Boucek. Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists. (Santa Monica,
CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2010); Mullins, S. “Rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists: Lessons from
criminology.” Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict 3, no. 3 (2010);
26
From Horgan, J. Walking Away From Terrorism. pp. 152-153.
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offenders and foreign terrorist fighters, and to address the broad range of issues related to radicalisation inprison settings and beyond, thus enabling inclusion and participation within societies.

VIII. PROGRAMME DEVELOPMENT PATHWAYSUNICRI works on developing comprehensive, end-to-end and long-term rehabilitation and reintegration
programmes with Member states. When offering technical assistance, the approach is tailored to the cultural,
national and regional contexts as well as the present needs while always involving the programmeʼs actors
and stakeholders. There are several pathways that the programme development can take; these include but
are not limited to the following:
Pathway 1: The “traditional approach”
This approach is a linear consecutive process towards a comprehensive rehabilitation andreintegration programme. A multi-disciplinary team is central in developing the programmes.
Pathway 2: Towards changing attitudes by experiencing results
This approach is a rather adaptive and non-linear process towards a comprehensive
rehabilitation and reintegration programme based on scientific research results. Scientificresearch is an important accompanying and informing element to the continual developmentof programmes.
Pathway 3: From framework to programme approachThis is a consecutive pathway where framework and programme development are strictly
separated. The first focus lies in the development of a comprehensive and detailed framework, and the second one lies in the implementation of the framework towards a comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration programme.
Pathway 4: Targeted approach
Based on needs assessments and gap analysis in several countries, a targeted approach isapplied. This approach is an adaptive way of dedicating support to specific gaps tocomplement already existing rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. This approach is
non-linear, starting with identified gaps instead of a general situation assessment. Thisapproach is applied by member states with a relatively advanced level of maturity inrehabilitation and reintegration work and/or interest in specific support instead of a total
systemic revision of programmes in place.
Which pathway is most suitable in any given situation depends on many factors. The point to note is thatapproaches to the development of programmes on rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist
offenders need to be adaptive to the specific context.

IX. CONCLUSION
Action-oriented research combines research on issues of counter-terrorism with ways to put the results of
the research into action. In the case of rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders,
research and the programmes developed from research are key components of a counter-terrorism strategy.
This is in part because many of these individuals will re-enter society at some point, but it is a complex
process that involves all the social layers surrounding each individual offender. With this in mind, thedevelopment of a comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration programme is a step to encourage theindividual behavioural change and, in some aspects of its programme, reach out to families and communities
as well. With the action UNICRI is taking in the field of CT and P/CVE, the aims of the CTITF and moregenerally, of the UN goals are being advanced.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bjørgo T. & J. Horgan (eds.) (2009) Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective
Disengagement. Oxon and New York: Routledge.
Breaking the Organized Crime and Counter-Terrorism Nexus: Identifying Programmatic
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167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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Approaches, Meeting report. The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute(UNICRI) and the Thailand Institute of Justice (TIJ).
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1989). ʻEcological systems theoryʼ in Vasta, R. Annals of Child Development, vol.
6. London, UK: Jessica Kingsley Publishers. pp. 187-249.
Chan, W. Y., Espelage, D. L., Hollingsworth, M. A. & Mitchell, K. J. (2016), Preventing violence incontext: The importance of culture for implementing systemic change, Psychology of Violence, vol. 6,
no. 1, pp. 22-26.
Crenshaw, M. (1981). The Causes of Terrorism, Comparative Politics, vol. 13, pp. 379-399.
Damon, W. & Eisenberg, N. (1998): Handbook of child psychology, vol. 3. Social, emotional, andpersonality development (5th ed.). New York: Wiley.
Datchi, C., Barrenti, L., Thompson, C. M. (2016), Family Services in Adult Detention Centers: Systemic
Principles for Prisoner Reentry, Couple and Family psychology: Research and Practice, vol. 5, no. 2,
pp. 89-104.
Durkheim, E. (1966). The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York: Free Press.
Horgan, J. (2009) Walking Away From Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical andExtremist Movements. London: Routledge.
Klima, N. (forthcoming) ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approach on P/CVE
in capacity buildingʼ. UNICRI, Turin
Makarenko, T. “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational
Organised Crime and Terrorism”, Global Crime, 6(2) (2004) pp. 129-145.
McKay, C. & Shaw, H. (1969). Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
Mullins, S. (2010) “Rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists: Lessons from criminology.” Dynamics ofAsymmetric Conflict 3, no. 3.
Neff, J. A. & Macmaster, S. A., Applying Behavior Change Models to Understand Spiritual
Mechanisms Underlying Change in Substance Abuse Treatment, The American Journal of Drug andAlcohol Abuse, no. 31, 2005, pp. 669-684.
Rabasa, A. S. Pettyjohn, J. Ghez, & C. Boucek (2010) Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists. Santa
Monica, CA; Arlington, VA; Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation.
Turner, J. (1984): ʻSocial identification and psychological group formationʼ in H. Tajfel (Ed.) The social
dimension: European developments in social psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
pp. 518-538.
Veldhuis, T.& Staun, J. (2009), Islamist Radicalisation. A Root Cause Model, Netherlands Institute ofInternational Relations Clingendael, 2009, p. 24-26.
Websites
CTITF, About the Task Force: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/structure.
CTITF, Structure of the Task Force: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/structure.
GCTF, The Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Good Practices of Rehabilitation and
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 104

Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, available at: https: //www. thegctf.
org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/A/GCTF-Rome-Memorandum-ENG.pdf
UNICRI, Countering the Appeal of Terrorism:
http://www.unicri.it/topics/counter_terrorism/
United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy:
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy.
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI): http://www.unicri.
it/institute/.
United Nations Resolutions
United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 1086 (1965) Statute of the United Nations
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/71/291) (2017) Strengthening the capability of
the United Nations system to assist Member States in implementing the United Nations Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
United Nations General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/60/288) (2006) The United Nations Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (S/RES/1373) (2001). Threats to international peaceand security caused by terrorist acts.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2195 (S/RES/2195) (2014) Threats to international peaceand security.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1624 (S/RES/1624) (2005) Prohibition of incitement tocommit terrorist acts.

12

UNICRI INITIATIVES: REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION
OF VIOLENT EXTREMIST OFFENDERS AND COMMUNITY-BASEDPROJECTS
Chiara Bologna＊

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will illustrate, based on the Settings and Community-Based Initiatives, the Rehabilitation andReintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders platforms put forward by the United Nations in accordancewith the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
The notion of counter-terrorism has been materialised in a whole series of organisational mechanisms,
processes and entities within the United Nations system that aim to tackle the issues of violent extremism
and terrorism from all different angles so as to provide a more comprehensive approach to this multifacetedthreat. Taking such a comprehensive approach and making provisions for the coordination of all these efforts
is considered part of an effective Counter-Terrorism Strategy.1
Within the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, there are the two branches of countering violent extremism(CVE) and the preventing of violent extremism (PVE). Both are essential to reducing the risk posed by those
who are currently engaged in violent extremism and those who are vulnerable and on the way to becoming
engaged. In the case of the latter, it is challenging to identify which individuals would be vulnerable tobecoming involved in violent extremism. As for the former, the violent extremist offender (VEO) is a highpriority due to their history of engagement and the possibility that they would re-engage after entering andexiting the criminal justice system.
Many VEOs held in custody will one day be released from prison2 and dealing with this imminent reality
requires its own strategic response. Their successful rehabilitation can make the difference between acontinued terrorist threat and a reformed person returning to society ‒ and in some cases, even an individual
ready to aid in the rehabilitation of future persons at risk of radicalization, by providing counter narratives.
Rehabilitation and reintegration are therefore the combined stages to help an individual with their transition
away from violent extremism.
The process of rehabilitation and reintegration is a personal one since every VEO has their own beliefs
and experiences and will respond to rehabilitative efforts in different ways and at different times in theprocess. There is nevertheless space for a common conception of the scope and shape of VEO rehabilitation
and reintegration efforts that gathers them into one joint process.

II. CYCLE OF PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
This Cycle of Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) refers to a basis for acomprehensive programmatic approach to PVE intervention. The work of the United Nations Interregional
Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) explores all of the stages that comprise the Cycle (see Figure1) for ways to act on these opportunities and to enhance a comprehensive approach.3 Inspired by the Global
Associate Programme Officer, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). The content of
this paper does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNICRI or contributory organizations, nor does it imply any
endorsement. @UNICRI, August 2017. This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educationalor non-profit purposes without special permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made.
UNICRI would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this paper as a source.
1
United Nations General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/60/288) (2006) The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
2
Council of Europe Handbook for Prison and Probation Services regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism (2016)..
European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) and Council for Penological Co-operation (PC-CP) 2 rev 4＊

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 104

Figure 1. The cycle of preventing violent extremism5
Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF)4 life cycle and based on UNICRIʼs work, a cycle model has been developedwith the aim to create a comprehensive model towards preventing violent extremism.
When it comes to prevention of violent extremism with a focus on the individual VEO, there are multiple
opportunities to have interventions. These start at the earliest stages with PVE and continue as the offender
enters and eventually exits the criminal justice system. Once they have re-entered society, whether it is after
serving a custodial sentence or not, there is again a need for PVE to reduce the risk of recidivism. In this way,
counter-terrorism with regard to the individual is a cycle which can be broken down into a number of stages(see Figure 1), each of which presents its own opportunities for a person to break away from violent
extremism. For some, this may occur at the earliest stages but for some individuals the cycle might continue.
One of the stages of the cycle shown above is the community. The community is also one of the influentialsocial layers surrounding each individual offender, even at their time of detention. In order for the individual
to go through and sustain behavioural change, support from the community is needed6. Therefore, when it
comes to offender rehabilitation and reintegration, communities have a crucial role to play as they can serveas the foundation to rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders in numerous ways, namely: before prison if bail isgranted, after prison, or instead of custody altogether. For this reason, UNICRI has been working with thecountries in the Maghreb and Sahel regions since 2009. In 2015 the Institute embarked on a pilot project
launched in cooperation with the European Union.
The main objective of the project is to launch, implement and evaluate innovative projects aimed atpreventing and countering radicalization, terrorist recruitment and violent extremism in the Sahel-Maghreb
region and disseminate lessons learned and best practices. The Pilot Project has a particular focus on Algeria,
Klima, N. (forthcoming). ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approach on P/CVE in capacity buildingʼ.
UNICRI, Turin.
4
For more information on the GCTF, see: <https://www.thegctf.org/>.
5
Figure based on earlier work of Noel Klima, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute ‒ UNICRI.
6
See Arispe, I. (2017). ʻProgramming community-led interventions in CVEʼ. Lecture at Specialized Training on International
Criminal Law and Global Threats to Peace and Security ‒ Counter-Terrorism UNICRI, Turin.
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Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso. Smaller, innovative projects werelaunched under this more large-scale initiative. These projects targeted groups within civil society,particularly youth, women, religious groups, the media, and community leaders.
Engagement of civil society and non-state actors is the main focus, as well as cross-border cooperation.
These elements are essential in the community-based initiatives to ensure a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.

III. COMMUNITY-BASED INITIATIVES
Recognising the fact that VEOs come from, live in, and return to communities makes community-based
initiatives indispensable for many P/CVE efforts. No community can consider itself immune since VEOs havebeen shown to come from all different backgrounds. The importance of communities is highlighted in the UN
Security Councilʼs Foreign Fighters Resolution 2178 (2014), which recommends all Member States “to engage
relevant local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter the violent
extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts, address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent
extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism”.7
Many PVE and counter-radicalisation efforts are geared towards building community resilience to violent
extremism. The foundation of such efforts provides for a deeper understanding of the radicalisation
phenomenon, the associated risk factors, and indicators8 for when it happens. In general terms, radicalisationis the process by which individuals believe that non-state violence is a valid means to address theirgrievances or to foster social and political change. There are a variety of risk factors which have been
identified as rendering an individual more susceptible to becoming radicalised. While there is no absoluteconsensus on what all these factors are, some key areas include individual socio-psychological factors, social
factors, economic factors, and beliefs and ideologies.9 What leads a person to violent extremism is likely to besome combination of push factors (negative perceptions of features of the current societal environment) andpull factors (the perceived positive features of adopting violent extremist identity).
Deconstructing the combinations of risk factors in another way, they can also be grouped according towhether they are structural motivators, individual incentives, or enabling factors, as described in Table 1.
Risk Factor
combinations:

Can include the following, depending on the specific context:

Structural
Motivators

Repression, corruption, unemployment, inequality, discrimination, a history of hostility
between identify groups, external state interventions etc.

Individual
Incentives

A sense of purpose, adventure, belonging, acceptance, status, material enticements, etc.

Enabling
Factors

The presence of radical mentors, access to online radical communities, social networks
with VE associations, access to weapons, an absence of family support, etc.

Table 1. Source: RUSIThere are a series of stages to developing a community-based initiative for P/CVE or counterradicalisation. A well-planned approach is needed so that the initiative has a greater chance of success in
reducing risk. Figure 2 shows the flow of these stages, as well as some of the main activities involved in eachone.

The ‘Foreign Fighters’ Resolution. Paragraph 16.S/RES/2178 (2014). The United Nations Security Council.
Schmid, A. (2013) ʻRadicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review’.
The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Research paper.
9
See The Root Causes of Violent Extremism (2016). RAN Issue Paper.
7
8

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 104

Figure 2. Stages of development of community-based initiatives10
Community-led initiatives to prevent and intervene in the radicalisation process can have an impact inways that are responsive to local realities. This equally applies to rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives
for VEOs, which come in different forms. First, the community is itself a source for external experts who canbe integrated into the team that is supporting the rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders. Such experts
include local religious leaders 11 and well-known charismatic figureheads12, who, in coming from the samecommunity as the VEO, are well placed to build a good degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the offender.
Another form of rehabilitation and reintegration initiative is one that is entirely based in the community.
The difficulty with this can be that community actors who are trained and equipped to run counterradicalisation initiatives are likely to be few in number. Steps to overcome this challenge include engaging
community actors, providing them with training, and creating a supportive network around them by making
helpful connections. Ultimately, they will be empowered to deliver interventions.13 The whole community isalso then in a stronger position to build resilience to violent extremism. Some of the programmes will besmall-scale and specialised, such as youth projects or engaging with community leaders. This allows for a
programme to be put in place with fewer initial resources and for more concrete aims to be set, usually, but
not exclusively, to reduce offendersʼ potential risk factors.
One advantage of community-based programmes for all kinds of offenders, and not just VEOs, is they canbe alternatives to custody, which may reflect the best interest of the individual. Mechanisms for diversion
from formal legal proceedings are a means of channelling someone away from involvement in crime and, in
the appropriate conditions, can be used in cases of violent extremism. This is especially important as aconsideration for juvenile offenders who stand to gain a lot from the rehabilitative and non-punitive effects.14
Diversion can be instigated from the time of apprehension (before arrest) to any point up until the final
disposition hearing (the sentencing stage of the juvenile proceedings) and during pre-trial detention wherever
it occurs.15 These mechanisms would then operate in the community and can involve different actors from it.
Communities are sometimes reluctant to accept the return of former VEOs.16. This is due to an
Arispe, I. (2017). ʻProgramming community-led interventions in CVEʼ. Lecture at Specialized Training on International
Criminal Law and Global Threats to Peace and Security ‒ Counter-Terrorism UNICRI, Turin.
11
Additional Guidance on the Role of Religious Scholars and other Ideological Experts in Rehabilitation and Reintegration
Programmes (2013). United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute12
Roundtable Expert Meeting & Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders: Core Principles& Good practices (2012). ICCT Background Paper.
13
Arispe, I. (2017). ʻProgramming community-led interventions in CVEʼ. Lecture at Specialized Training on International
Criminal Law and Global Threats to Peace and Security ‒ Counter-Terrorism UNICRI, Turin.
14
Neuchâtel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a Counterterrorism Context (2015), Global Counterterrorism
Forum.
15
Mazzarese, D. & Bologna, C. (forthcoming). ʻAlternative Measures and Diversion in Youth Juvenile Justiceʼ, in Klima, N.
(forthcoming) ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approach on P/CVE in capacity buildingʼ. UNICRI, Turin.
1016167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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understandable fear and resentment held against this kind of offender. It is a considerable challenge toovercome in terms of reducing negative stigma and preparing the receiving community to accept the VEO
both passively and actively17. Establishing good relations with communities and reaching out to thedisaffected18 in particular are the basis of soliciting any community backing and involvement in VEO
rehabilitation, as indeed with any P/CVE initiative. Strategic communication between stakeholders insideand outside these communities is a useful initiative in this regard.19 In cases where criminal conviction ofstrongly suspected VEOs is unlikely, including returning foreign terrorist fighters in communities may be thesole opportunity to rehabilitate, making their engagement all the more important.
Monitoring and evaluation are vital steps in community-based initiatives, as they are in any programme.20
This makes clear goals and indicators of success all the more important to have at the design stage ofprogramming. Initiatives can then be evaluated against these indicators to see if the extent to which they
achieve their stated goals. There are notable challenges in this process, which include:
9999Issues of accessing the target population;
A highly sensitive topic;
Often indirect and intangible outcomes;
The lack of baseline data.

Planning the programme evaluation early on helps to prepare for these issues before they arise. Whatneeds to be taken into account at the planning stage are the goals and indicators, the methods andinstruments for data collection, the frequency of data collection, and identifying actors who can facilitate thisprocess.
As mentioned in the former section, a UNICRI-led initiative on communities and countering radicalisationand violent extremism was piloted in the Sahel-Maghreb region. Smaller, innovative projects were launchedunder this more large-scale initiative. These projects targeted groups within civil society, particularly youth,
women, religious groups, the media, and community leaders.
In addition to programmes based purely in the community, such as the UNICRI-led initiative piloted in the
Sahel-Maghreb, there is also an opportunity for initiatives that bridge some of the stages of the cycle for more
continuity in the rehabilitation and reintegration efforts.21 An example already given is the preparation ofcommunities through strategic communication when it is anticipated that VEOs will re-enter them. Other
examples are involvement of community actors with pre-release programmes, halfway houses, and actors
from prison-based programmes collaborating with community members to prepare for the offenderʼsreintegration. This acknowledges once again the importance of communities effecting sustained behaviouralchange for the individual offender by taking an active role in the process.

IV. CONCLUSION
The community represents a stage imbedded in the cycle of opportunities for counter-terrorism
intervention focussed on the individual VEO. The reasons for this are that communities are the societal
settings for a usually large and diverse group of people, any of whom could be at risk of being radicalised toviolence. Thus, community-based initiatives are instrumental to the early prevention stage. They are likewise
the settings where convicted VEOs re-enter society. This can be a very delicate issue because of a reluctanceto accept these offenders. Efforts to engage communities generally through strategic communication, andcommunity actors specifically as they could be directly involved in VEO reintegration and rehabilitation, are
UNICRI training for religious leaders, Bamako, Mali, 27-28 April 2017.
See Veldhuis, T. (2012) Designing rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist offenders: A realist
approach. ICCT Research Paper;
18
Lister, C. (2015) Returning foreign fighters: Criminalization or reintegration? Brookings Institution.
19
For examples of this see Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization toViolence in Prisons (2016) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
20
Arispe, I. (forthcoming). ʻEvaluating Counter Violent Extremism(CVE): A Fundamental Challenge to be Addressedʼ, UNICRI,
Turin.
21
Bologna (2017). ʻThe United Nations in Countering Terrorism and Introduction to UNICRI Initiativesʼ, UNICRI, Turin.
16
17

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 104

the first step in starting a community-based initiative. Community involvement at these preventative andrehabilitative stages are of course the major focus in the discussion about community-based initiatives. In
reality though, the community never stops being important, no matter where the offender is in the cycle.
Creating bridges between stages of the cycle is another way to enhance the existing opportunities for the
successful rehabilitation of offenders on their way to leaving violent extremism behind.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
9Arispe, I. (forthcoming). ʻEvaluating Counter Violent Extremism (CVE): A Fundamental Challenge
to be Addressedʼ, in Klima, N. (forthcoming). ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle
approach on P/CVE in capacity buildingʼ. UNICRI, Turin.

9

Arispe, I. (2017). ʻProgramming community-led interventions in CVE. Lecture at Specialized
Training on International Criminal Law and Global Threats to Peace and Security – CounterTerrorismʼ, UNICRI, Turin.

9

Bologna (2017). ʻThe United Nations in Countering Terrorism and Introduction to UNICRI
Initiativesʼ, UNICRI, Turin.

9Council of Europe Handbook for Prison and Probation Services regarding Radicalisation and Violent
Extremism (2016). European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) and Council for Penological Cooperation (PC-CP) 2 rev 4.

9 Lister, Charles (2015). Returning foreign fighters: Criminalization or reintegration? Brookings
Institution.
9

Klima, N. (forthcoming). ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approach on P/CVE
in capacity buildingʼ, UNICRI, Turin.

9

Mazzarese, D. & Bologna, C. (forthcoming). ʻAlternative Measures and Diversion in Youth Juvenile
Justiceʼ, in Klima, N. (forthcoming). ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approachon P/CVE in capacity buildingʼ. UNICRI, Turin.

9Counterterrorism Forum (2015), Neuchâtel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a
Counterterrorism Context. Available at: <https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Toolkitdocuments/English-Neuch%C3%A2tel-Memorandum-on-Juvenile-Justice.pdf>.

9Roundtable Expert Meeting & Conference on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist
Offenders: Core Principles & Good practices (2012). ICCT Background Paper.

9 The Root Causes of Violent Extremism (2016). Radicalisation Awareness Network Issue Paper.
9 Schmid, Alex (2013) Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual
Discussion and Literature Review. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Research paper.
9 Veldhuis, Tinka (2012) Designing rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for violent extremist
offenders: A realist approach. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Research Paper.
United Nations Documents

189Additional Guidance on the Role of Religious Scholars and other Ideological Experts inRehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes (2013). United Nations Interregional Crime andJustice Research Institute.

9

Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization toViolence in Prisons (2016). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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United Nations Resolutions
9

United Nations Security Council. Paragraph 16. S/RES/2178 (2014). The ‘Foreign Fighters’
Resolution.

9

United Nations General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/60/288) (2006) The United Nations Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

19

JUVENILE JUSTICE
Chaira Bologna＊

I. INTRODUCTION
This paper has the scope of providing a background to the issue of juvenile justice, particularly from thepoint of view of the research and work carried out in the field by the United Nations Interregional Crime andJustice Research Institute (UNICRI).
In order to promote justice and development, one of the aims of UNICRI is to foster just and efficientcriminal justice systems in consonance with international instruments and other significant standards such as
the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. For this purpose to be attained, one of the areas in which theInstitute plays a leading role is juvenile justice.
With dedicated juvenile justice systems absent in many developing countries, young people caught
breaking the law often end up in places of detention that are inappropriate for their age and development,
and, as such, will not increase the likelihood of their reintegration into society. In such custodial or detention
facilities, young people are forced to reside with adult criminals, putting them at risk on a number of different
fronts. Violence, including sexual violence, bullying, extortion and torture have been found to be the mosttypical forms of mistreatment and abuse inflicted on young people by adult inmates, and sometimes also staff
of such institutions, who take advantage of age and power differentials. Alcohol or drug intoxication, lack ofappropriate food, and untreated illness are other common features of detention centres.
Although in some countries, young people are held in specific juvenile facilities, the detention conditions
are often extremely poor and dangerous. Correctional centres and educational establishments can be arenas
for fights, violence and abuse between rivals. In any case, international standards provide that detention
should be a measure of last resort and used only for the most serious crimes. Moreover, ample research has
shown that the intensity and duration of intervention and services should mimic the risk level of the juvenile,with higher risk youth receiving more intense services for longer periods of time.1 Empirical research also
demonstrates that intensive services provided to low-risk youth are often iatrogenic, having the unintended
negative consequence of increased recidivism.2
Cognizant of the above, part of the work of UNICRI is to carry out action-oriented research to advance theunderstanding of juvenile justice-related problems, with the finality of aiding future policy. Using thisresearch as a foundation, it offers training and technical cooperation programmes to Member States withregards to preventing violent extremism (PVE), as its mandate indicates.
Furthermore, UNICRI is working on several projects to protect the rights of young people in conflict withthe law. In Angola and Mozambique, for example, UNICRI supported local governments in establishingjuvenile courts and juvenile justice departments, while at the same time making sure that they were
Associate Programme Officer, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). The content of
this paper does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNICRI or contributory organizations, nor does it imply any
endorsement. @UNICRI, August 2017. This publication may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educationalor non-profit purposes without special permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made.
UNICRI would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses this paper as a source.
1
Mazzarese, D. & Bologna, C. (forthcoming). ʻAlternative Measures and Diversion in Youth Juvenile Justiceʼ, in Klima, N.
(forthcoming). ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approach on P/CVE in capacity buildingʼ. UNICRI, Turin.
2
For further information, see: Andrews & Bonta, 2003; Andrews & Kiessling, 1980; Andrews et al., 1990; Baglivio et al., 2014;
Gatti, Tremblay, & Vitaro, 2009.
＊20

167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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administered in the best interests of young people. In Mozambique, the programme also conducted analysis
and information-sharing through a juvenile justice forum and a database on minors in conflict with the law.3

II. CONCEPTUALISATION AND INSTRUMENTATION
Throughout this section, this paper will focus on the conceptualisation and instrumentation of juvenile
justice and the policies, strategies, laws, procedures and practices that the area of countering terrorism
entails. For this purpose to be attained, UNICRIʼs Guidance for Legislative Reform on Juvenile Justiceprovides, since its publication in 20164, a thorough analysis that sheds light on the particular vulnerability ofchildren and juveniles in the context of counter-terrorism, for which it examines children as perpetrators,
direct victims and indirect victims of terrorist-related activity. Moreover, the utility of the Guidance further
relies on its aim to increase the capacity of governments to integrate international juvenile justice and childprotection standards into their national counter-terrorism standards, which is the reason why it explores
radicalisation, de-radicalisation and counter‒radicalisation.
A. Conceptualisation
As stated throughout the Guidance, juvenile justice (or childrenʼs justice, as it is sometimes referred to) isa general term used to describe the policies, strategies, laws, procedures and practices applied to children
over the minimum age of criminal responsibility who have come into conflict with the law.5 The termʻjuvenile justiceʼ needs to be distinguished from the broader concept of ʻjustice for childrenʼ, which covers
children in conflict with the law (i.e. alleged as, accused of, or recognised as having infringed the penal law),children who are victims or witnesses of crime, and children who may be in contact with the justice systemfor other reasons such as custody, protection or inheritance.6
Albeit there is no generally accepted definition of the term ʻjuvenileʼ, it is often used to signify a child who
is over the minimum age of criminal responsibility and is alleged to, accused of, or convicted of a criminal
offence.7 Moreover, it is a general term used to describe the policies, strategies, laws, procedures andpractices applied to children over the age of criminal responsibility.
The United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (the ʻHavana Rulesʼ)
simply define a juvenile as ʻevery person under the age of 18.ʼ The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules)8 provide the following definition: ʻA juvenile is achild or young person who under the respective legal system may be dealt with for an offence in a manner
which is different from an adultʼ. The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) avoids the use of the term
juvenile, referring instead to “children in conflict with the law”.9
B. Instrumentation
The 1985 Beijing Rules and The Riyadh Guidelines10 established basic actions to prevent children andyoung people from engaging in criminal activities, as well as to protect the human rights of youth alreadyfound to have broken the law. In 1989, the focus on safeguarding the human rights of children and young
people was strengthened by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which entered into force in1990. In 1995, the United Nations adopted the World Programme of Action for Youth (WPAY), providing a
policy framework and practical guidelines for national action and international support to improve the
Mazzarese, D. & Bologna, C. (forthcoming). ʻAlternative Measures and Diversion in Youth Juvenile Justiceʼ, in Klima, N.
(forthcoming). ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approach on P/CVE in capacity buildingʼ. UNICRI, Turin.
4
Hamilton, C. (2011) Guidance for Legislative Reform on Juvenile Justice. UNICEF. Available at:<http://www.unicef.org/policyanalysis/files/Juvenile_justice_16052011_final.pdfp.3>.
5
See Hamilton, C. (2011) Guidance for Legislative Reform on Juvenile Justice. UNICEF. Available at:<http://www.unicef.org/policyanalysis/files/Juvenile_justice_16052011_final.pdfp.3>.
6
See Penal Reform International (2013) Protecting childrenʼs rights in criminal justice systems: A training manual and reference
point for professionals and policymakers. Available at: <http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Childrensrightstraining-manual-Final%C2%ADHR.pdf>.
7
Ibid. 2011.
8
For further information, see United Nations (1985) Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice.
9
Mazzarese, D. & Bologna, C. (forthcoming). ʻAlternative Measures and Diversion in Youth Juvenile Justiceʼ, in Klima, N.
(forthcoming). ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approach on P/CVE in capacity buildingʼ. UNICRI, Turin.
10
For further information, see United Nations (1990) Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency.
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situation of young people.
Through the WPAY, the United Nations puts forth policy actions specifically tailored to young people
between 15 and 24 years of age. The World Programme of Action for Youth aims at fostering conditions andmechanisms to promote improved well-being and livelihoods among young people. As such, it requires that
Governments take effective action against violations of all human rights and fundamental freedoms andpromote non-discrimination, tolerance and respect for diversity as well as religious and ethical values. The
WPAY focuses on 15 priority areas, among which is juvenile delinquency. Under that priority area, it details
proposals for action towards preventing juvenile delinquency and rehabilitating young people who haveengaged in criminal activity.11

Figure 1: Antecedents of Juvenile Justice Framework at the United Nations level
C. Current Framework
The most important international instruments for the administration of juvenile justice are the CRC andthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 40(3) of the CRC requires States topromote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and institutions specifically applicable to children
alleged as, accused of, or recognised as having infringed the penal law. In other words, a State is required toestablish a juvenile justice system. Children over the Stateʼs minimum age of criminal responsibility andunder the age of 18 who are charged with a criminal offence should be dealt with in the juvenile justicesystem, regardless of the nature of the charge. This applies just as much to terrorist offences as it applies toany other criminal offence.

For current information on international standards, norms and instrument of reference for juvenile justice, see: United
Nations Interagency Panel on Juvenile Justice: <http://www.ipjj.org/resources/internationalstandards>.
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Regional instruments also address juvenile justice, including:) the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms(European Convention);) the African Charter on Human and Peoplesʼ Rights (Banjul Charter);) the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child;) the Arab Charter on Human Rights (Arab Charter); the American Convention on Human Rights(American Convention);) the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man as well as the jurisprudence developedby the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR);) the Inter-American Court of Human Rights;) the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and;) the African Commission on Human and Peoplesʼ Rights.

III. CHALLENGES
Overall, youth are disproportionately represented in statistics on crime and violence, both as victims andas perpetrators, and in many developed countries violent crimes are being committed at younger ages than in
the past. Moreover, there is growing concern that, in some countries, the proportion of violent crimes
committed by youth has been increasing:12) Statistical data in many countries show that delinquency is largely a group phenomenon. Between
two-thirds and three-quarters of all offences committed by young people are committed bymembers of gangs or groups, which can vary from highly structured criminal organizations to lessstructured street gangs. Even those young people who commit offences alone are likely to be
associated with groups.
) Though poverty and unemployment are not, by themselves causes of violence, they become
important factors when coupled with other triggers such as lack of opportunity, inequality,
exclusion, the availability of drugs and firearms, and a breakdown in access to various forms ofcapital, justice and education.
) While adolescence can be an age of “breaking rules” evidence shows that most first time offenders
do not reoffend, and that diversion and other community-based measures are the best responses tooffences committed by young people.
) Incarceration, including pre-trial detention, is still used frequently including for young people having
committed very minor crimes (such as using drugs, or stealing basic commodities).
) Crime committed by young people is mainly an urban phenomenon. Evidence shows that theprobability of being a victim of crime and violence is substantially higher in urban areas than in rural
areas.

IV. GOOD PRACTICESAt the Sixth Ministerial Plenary Meeting in New York on 27 September 2015, Global Counterterrorism
Forum (GCTF) Ministers endorsed the launch of the GCTFʼs Initiative to Address the Life Cycle ofRadicalization to Violence (Life Cycle Initiative). As part of this new initiative, Switzerland launched an
initiative on juvenile justice in a counterterrorism context to address the emerging questions regardingchildren involved in terrorism, and the different phases of a criminal justice response, which include
prevention, investigation, prosecution, sentencing, and reintegration.13
The aim of this initiative on juvenile justice in a counterterrorism context is to bring together
practitioners and policymakers from a range of GCTF Members and other States representing a variety of
disciplines to share experiences, explore good practices, and identify challenges in tailoring responses tothreats of terrorism while protecting public safety and upholding the rights of the child. As a result of the
Meeting, the memoranda of good practices ̶ the Neuchâtel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile

For further information, see United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime & Latin America and the Caribbean Region of theWorld Bank (2007).
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Justice in a Counterterrorism Context14 ̶ intended to assist through shaping national, bilateral, regional, andmultilateral capacity-building assistance in this area with a view to including consideration of the particularneeds of children into counterterrorism policies and measures.
Hence, within the field of the Status of Children and their Protection under International Law and Juvenile
Justice Standards, the practices relate to the importance of addressing children alleged to be involved in
terrorism-related activities in accordance with international law and in line with international juvenile justice
standards. Moreover, they urged States to assess and address the situation of children in a terrorism-related
context from a child rights and child development perspective.15
In relation to prevention, which plays a significant role in the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
the good practices focus on addressing childrenʼs vulnerability to recruitment and/or radicalization toviolence through preventive measures and also focus on the need to develop targeted prevention strategies
with a strong focus on the creation of networks to support children at risk.
However, the aspect of prevention also needs to consider and design diversion mechanisms for children
charged with terrorism-related offences, even more significantly in light of recent indicators that attest thatchildren are increasingly affected and victimised by terrorism, but at the same time, the last few years haveshown them to be increasingly engaged in terrorist-related activity. For example, the Dutch counter
terrorism coordinator estimates that at least 80 children with a Dutch connection live within Daesh-held
territory in Syria and Iraq. Of these 80 known children, 30 % are between four and eight years old and aroundhalf of them are aged three or younger. According to French officials, there are around 460 French minors in
Daesh claimed territory, with half of them under the age of five and a third born there. Belgian officials
reported around 78 Belgian minors in Daesh-claimed territory.16
As for the field of Justice for Children, the importance of addressing children prosecuted for terrorismrelated offences was highlighted, especially through the juvenile justice system. In this sense, it was further
outlined the necessity to apply the appropriate international juvenile justice standards to terrorism cases
involving children even in cases that are tried in adult courts.17
Of utmost importance is also to consider and apply alternatives to arrest, detention, and imprisonment
including the pre-trial stage, as well as to apply the principle of individualisation and proportionality insentencing. Should children be deprived of their liberty, this should be carried in appropriate facilities, and all
support for their protection and preparation for reintegration should be provided.18
In relation to the last point on reintegration, the good practices also refer to the development of
The Government of Switzerland proposed an initiative on juvenile justice in a counterterrorism context at the GCTFʼs
Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group Plenary Meeting in Malta on 13-14 April 2015. A first expert-level meeting
was organized by the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) in Valletta, Malta, on 10-12 November 2015
under the auspices of the GCTF, with the participation of experts from governments, the judiciary, academia, internationalorganizations, and civil society. A second expert-level meeting was organized by the IIJ at the United Nations Interregional
Crime and Research Institute (UNICRI) in Turin, Italy, on 16-17 February 2016. The findings developed during these expert
meetings led to the good practices and recommendations laid out in this Memorandum. However, the experts acknowledgedthat further empirical research and data is necessary to increase the understanding of the factors that drive children into
violent extremism and to tailor responses accordingly. States are therefore encouraged to collect and collate information on
children engaged in terrorism-related activities.
14
Global Counterterrorism Forum (2015), Neuchâtel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a Counterterrorism
Context. Available at: <https: //www. thegctf. org/Portals/1/Documents/Toolkit-documents/English-Neuch%C3%A2telMemorandum-on-Juvenile-Justice.pdf>.
15
Ibid. 201516
See Meines, Marije, Merel Molenkamp, Omar Ramadan, Magnus Ranstorp, RAN Manual, Responses to returnees: Foreign
terrorist fighters and their families, RAN Centre of Excellence, 2017.
17
Global Counterterrorism Forum (2015), Neuchâtel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a Counterterrorism
Context. Available at: <https: //www. thegctf. org/Portals/1/Documents/Toolkit-documents/English-Neuch%C3%A2telMemorandum-on-Juvenile-Justice.pdf>.
18
Global Counterterrorism Forum (2015), Neuchâtel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile Justice in a Counterterrorism
Context. Available at: <https: //www. thegctf. org/Portals/1/Documents/Toolkit-documents/English-Neuch%C3%A2telMemorandum-on-Juvenile-Justice.pdf>.
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Rehabilitation and Reintegration programmes for children involved in terrorism-related activities to aid theirsuccessful return to society.
Finally, the fifth set of practices based on the memoranda relate to capacity development, monitoring andevaluation, which could be implemented in line with the numerous relevant international standards, capacity
development and specialised training of law enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges, corrections officers
defence counsels and other actors dealing with children involved in terrorism-related activities ̶ taking into
consideration the applicable legal system. These are needed to help ensure the appropriate application ofjuvenile justice standards regardless of the charges. Technical assistance should thus be targeted to both
policymakers and practitioners. It is likewise important to ensure that those involved in juvenile justicebenefit from specialized training to handle terrorism-related cases.19
Additionally, with the purpose of ensuring the effective implementation of international juvenile justice
standards, it was highlighted to design and implement monitoring and evaluation programmes.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
There is a common acknowledgment within the UN system that strategies to tackle juvenile delinquency
are often too narrowly focused on tough penalties and law enforcement. Many countries still have “punitive”
prevention programmes that try to suppress juvenile and youth offences and gang activity by means of police
surveillance and prosecution.
The UN, however, also puts forward a series of recommendations for Member States to more effectively
address youth crime-related issues. An initial stage suggests targeting communities severely affected byviolence and other criminal activity with a holistic approach to the rule of law and justice that takes into
consideration the causes of delinquency and its prevention through measures that address both individual
needs and socio-environmental conditions.20
These measures should provide meaningful alternatives for socialisation and achievement for young
people. This can be achieved by:) Providing rural areas with socio-economic opportunities and services to promote rural development
as well as discourage young people from migrating to urban areas.
) Providing recreational, sport and leisure activities.
) Improving school quality, incorporating into school programmes seminars and lessons to raiseawareness about issues related to violence, and expanding access to/retention in schools for highrisk individuals and communities, with meaningful after-school group activities.
) Providing tailored apprenticeship programmes that enable youth to enter the labour market
through an alternative, effective channel.
) Preventing violence by involving families and entire communities, raising awareness of theimportance of domestic support in the prevention of juvenile crime, and setting up information
campaigns and training and educational programmes for family members or guardians.21
Overall, these recommendations and good practices on juvenile justice need to be seen as a vital part ofthe puzzle for the success of the pillars of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy launched by the United Nations
and followed by UNICRI.
Being that juvenile justice is a meaningful element within counter-terrorism efforts and, more concretely,of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy, UNICRI plays a very important role while drawing the attention to this
topic, making an emphasis on those countries where there is a systematic absence of juvenile justiceplatforms.
Ibid (2015).
See United Nations Fact Sheet on Juvenile Justice (2015) <http: //www. un. org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/wyr11/
FactSheetonYouthandJuvenileJustice.pdf>.
21
See United Nations Fact Sheet on Juvenile Justice (2015) <http: //www. un. org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/wyr11/
FactSheetonYouthandJuvenileJustice.pdf>.
19
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Therefore, the Instituteʼs mandate to carry out action-oriented research to advance the understanding ofjuvenile justice-related problems further represents an opportunity to implement and innovate in ways totackle the effects of young people caught breaking the law and committing terrorism-related crimes often
ending up in places of detention that are inappropriate for their age and development, thus conditioning the
likelihood of their reintegration into society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY) Brett, R. (2002) Juvenile justice, counter-terrorism and children. Quaker United Nations Office.
Available from: http: //www. quno. org/resource/2002/11/juvenile-justice-counter-terrorism-andchildren) Boutin, B. (2016) “Administrative Measures against Foreign Fighters: In Search of Limits andSafeguards”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) ‒ The Hague 7, no. 12.
) Entenmann, E., Van der Heide, L., Weggemans, D. & J. Dorsey, (2015) “Rehabilitation for Foreign
Fighters? Relevance, Challenges and Opportunities for the Criminal Justice Sector”, The
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague 6, no. 5.
) Global Counterterrorism Forum (2015), Neuchâtel Memorandum on Good Practices for Juvenile
Justice in a Counterterrorism Context. Available from: https: //www. thegctf. org/Portals/1/
Documents/Toolkit-documents/English-Neuch%C3%A2tel-Memorandum-on-Juvenile-Justice.pdf) Hamilton, C. (2011) Guidance for Legislative Reform on Juvenile Justice. UNICEF. Available from:http://www.unicef.org/policyanalysis/files/Juvenile_justice_16052011_final.pdfp.3.
) Mazzarese, D. & Bologna, C. (forthcoming). Alternative Measures and Diversion in Youth Juvenile
Justice, in Klima, N. (forthcoming). ʻPathways towards an integrated and integral life-cycle approachon P/CVE in capacity buildingʼ. UNICRI, Turin.
) Meines, Marije, Merel Molenkamp, Omar Ramadan, Magnus Ranstorp, (2017), RAN Manual,
Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families.
) Penal Reform International (2013) Protecting childrenʼs rights in criminal justice systems: A training
manual and reference point for professionals and policymakers. Available from: http: //www.
penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Childrensrights-training-manual-Final%C2%ADHR.
pdf) United Nations (2005) Fact Sheet on Juvenile Justice. Available from: http: //www. un. org/esa/
socdev/unyin/documents/wyr11/FactSheetonYouthandJuvenileJustice.pdf) United Nations (1990) Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (“The Riyadh
Guidelines”) A/RES/45/112. Available from: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/juvenile.htm.
) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime & Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the WorldBank (2007). Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean.
Report No. 37820 (March). Available from: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/Cr_and_Vio_Car_E.
pdf.
United Nations Resolutions)

United Nations (1985) United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice (“The Beijing Rules”), Resolution A/RES/40/33. Available from: http: //www2. ohchr.
org/english/law/pdf/beijingrules.pdf) United Nations (1990) Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, Resolution
45/113. Available from: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/res45_113.pdf
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STRATEGIC COUNTERTERRORISM, TERRORIST REHABILITATIONAND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT: THE SINGAPORE EXPERIENCE
Sabariah Mohamed Hussin＊

I. BACKGROUND
Following the terrorist attacks in the United States (US) on 11 September 2001, the Internal Security
Department (ISD) in Singapore uncovered a local cell of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a group that aimed toestablish a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) in Southeast Asia through violent means.1
The ISD through intelligence sharing and quick response, crippled and foiled at least six different plans to
attack foreign and local assets on Singapore soil. Unfortunately, JI was successful elsewhere in the region.
Some examples include the bombings of churches in Indonesian cities on Christmas Eve in 2000, the OctoberBali Bombings of 2002 and the Metro Manila bombings on Rizal Day in the Philippines.
After detaining more than 20 JI members between 2001 and 2002, the Singapore government was
confronted with a unique situation. Initial findings led to insights into government consciousness thatpsychologists alone may not be sufficient to understand the phenomena of violent extremism. Outcomes fromthe sessions and meetings with the detainees, the counsellors observed that all detainees had distorted
ideologies on Islam which encouraged simplistic thinking, fueled them towards anger and hatred, andpromoted the use of violence to achieve their aims. Their exclusivist paradigm contributed to theirradicalization.

II. MODES OF REHABILITATION
From the chart below, there are 7 modes of terrorist rehabilitation that are currently being employed bygovernments around the world. Empirical evidence has shown that some countries are developing different
facets of terrorist rehabilitation programmes, focusing on ideological, religious, educational, vocational, social,creative arts therapy, sports and recreation and psychological issues that cause violent extremism. The
varied rehabilitation modes are employed by governments and agencies around the world, depending on therecommendations, availability of resources and acceptance by the implementing bodies.

Sabariah Mohamed Hussin is a Research Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at
the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. She is amember of the Secretariat of the Religious Rehabilitation Group responsible for rehabilitating detained terrorists andradicalized individuals and their families through counselling. RRG counters misinterpretations promoted by self-radicalized
individuals and those in support of IS or other terrorist organizations. At MENDAKI, the Council for the development of the
Malay/Muslims community in Singapore, she developed and implemented intervention programmes for community
developments previously. She works extensively with partners and stakeholders to empower the community throughexcellence in education and self-development initiatives.
1
HistorySG, “Operations against Jemaah Islamiyah Begins”, 8 Dec 2001, assessed on 10 August 2017, http://eresources.nlb.gov.
sg/history/events/90267935-71ef-4829-8faf-f6039a086cda＊

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The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for example, has a comprehensive rehabilitation approach consistingof religious, psychological, social, vocational, creative art therapy, as well as ʻOnline Engagementʼ as part oftheir rehabilitation initiatives. In the area of religious rehabilitation, the Ulamaʼ (religious scholars) perform
group counselling and discuss the legitimacy of the king as the ruler of Saudi Arabia. They conduct
comprehensive discussions on the position of a fatwa (Islamic rulings and guidance) vis-à-vis their leaders.
The KSAʼs psychological component employs psychologists to engage detainees and to further examine therationale behind these detaineesʼ decisions to use extremism. In their social rehabilitation programme, family
members are engaged in incentives like supporting the detaineeʼs marriage, education, or financial assistance.
The KSAʼs vocational rehabilitation gives the detainees opportunities to learn carpentry, clay shaping,pottery and the like. In addition, they make use of art through drawings, guided by professional art therapists
in their art rehabilitation. A distinct feature of the rehabilitation of KSA is their ʻOnline Engagementʼ. The
Sakinah campaign, run under the auspices of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, is a government agency andindependent programme where qualified scholars are hired to enter online chat rooms to hold discussions
with users on Islam, wherein, for example, they discuss the dangers of the takfiri (apostasy) ideas.
Evidently from our experience, religious intervention is a pivotal component that must be a part ofterrorist rehabilitation programmes. In Singapore, Religious rehabilitation had played a key role in educating
detainees, as mentioned by our Deputy Prime Minister in 2005. The government had sought expertise fromreligious experts as they believed that these initiatives should be carried out by subject matter experts.
Different states have different concerns and considerations, which thus decide which mode suits theirdetainees best. In my view, the modes of rehabilitation can be divided into two prongs. The corerehabilitation approach must include psychological, religious and social approaches. For the other, states may
decide to provide an enhanced rehabilitation programme that includes other skills where suitable.
Another country worth mentioning is Sri Lanka. They had worked closely with the private sector as anenabler to terrorist rehabilitation in South Asia. Sri Lanka is in a unique position to be able to work closelywith the private sector. It is a multi-faceted programme. They have rehabilitated and reintegrated 12,000
fighters. These detainees studied and transformed into productive citizens. You know it is a success when
the rehabilitation produced men and women with a fresh outlook.

III. THE SINGAPORE EXPERIENCEThe Singapore rehabilitation programme consists of three components: psychological rehabilitation, social
rehabilitation and religious rehabilitation. Throughout their detention, detainees are visited regularly bypsychologists, who provide psychological counselling and assess their ability to cope with the mental stress ofdetention as well as their psychological reasoning to establish their propensity for hatred and violence, andvulnerability to radical influence. The psychologists also assess behavioural and cognitive aspects of thedetaineesʼ progress in rehabilitation.

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A. Psychological Rehabilitation2
Studies (e.g. Prochaska, Velicer, DiClemente & Fava, 1988; Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcross, 1992) havefound commonalities in the manner people modify their behaviour. They showed that it was necessary toassess the clientʼs level of readiness for change and to customise interventions accordingly. Thus, throughinterviews with detainees and RO supervisees, ISD psychologists have identified seven positive changes inassessing detaineesʼ level of readiness for change3 that take place in the course of rehabilitation.
The stages are illustrated with reference from anecdotal evidence derived from former detainees and RO
supervisees who have been through the ISD rehabilitation programme.
1. Self-Re-Evaluation
Self-re-evaluation is the cognitive and affective process of re-appraisal of oneʼs self and his behaviour(Prochaska et al., 1988). During the initial period of detention, detainees begin to reflect on their past actions
and their consequences. According to M, an ex-member of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) who had received militarytraining in Afghanistan, “When the detention order was served to me, I accepted the danger that I had posed
to national security” (Hussain, 2012). This detainee felt guilty and remorseful for all that he had done and feltthat the move by the JI members to create chaos in Singapore had tarnished the good name of the Muslim
community here. “We had not been fair. Because of the actions of a minority, the majority Muslim community
had to bear the brunt. I am guilt-ridden,” he said (Ibrahim, 2007).
By not being defensive about their past actions, detainees are able to appreciate the process of self-reevaluation in their reflections.
2. Environmental Re-Evaluation
A re-evaluation of their environment occurs when radicalised individuals re-assess the impact that hisradical beliefs and actions have on the social environment (Day, Bryan, Davey & Casey, 2006). When in
detention, they realize the consequences of the impact of detention on their families. They also gain insight
into the consequences of their action on the wider Singapore society. In addition, being detained means thatthese radicalised individuals are removed from the online or offline radical community, which provides thespace needed for them to reflect and re-evaluate their previous radical beliefs.
Religious counsellors also help the detainees to realise that the radical ideology propagated by radical
preachers has deliberately ignored the importance of ʻcontextʼ. They learn that contextualisation has to be
applied in the interpretation of Quranic verses. Through these religious counselling sessions, detainees
eventually realise that radical Islamic scholars, who supported armed jihad, misinterpreted Islamic religious
texts and their ideas promoting hate and violence are in fact in contradiction with the religion.
Hu Weiying, “The Process of Change in the Rehabilitation of Violent Extremist- The Singapore Experience” paper resides
with ICPVTR, 2017.
3
Home Team Journal, Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore
Studies (E.g. Prochaska, Velicer, DiClemente & Fava, 1988; Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcross, 1992)
2

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3. Formation of Therapeutic Relationships
Through their care and concern for the detainees and their families, the case officers and counsellors
develop a close rapport and therapeutic relationship with the detainees. This helps detainees to develop
confidence that the help and advice rendered are well-intentioned and will benefit them and their families.
The therapeutic relationship aids detainees to be more receptive to the alternative ideas presented to them.
It also provides a safe environment for them to share openly and encourages them to change. Former JI
member M said: “Throughout (my) detention, I was treated well, and given encouragement and guidance
when required. This on its own was an encouraging factor” (Hussain, 2012). As time passes, a trusting
relationship is developed between the detainee and his case officers. This leads to the detainee becoming
more cooperative with investigations and rehabilitation efforts.
4. Awareness of Radicalisation Pathway
Upon reflection and self-re-evaluation, detainees learn to be more cognizant of their radicalization
pathway. Moreover, through interactions with case officers, psychologists and religious counsellors, they
become aware of the factors and processes leading to their radicalisation.
Former JI member recollected that he was impressed by the religious knowledge and apparent piety
from the white robe of their leader. He recounted the seemingly innocuous beginnings where the leader
suggested that he attend a class conducted by another preacher. He shared that he did not question the JI
spiritual leader because of his trust in his friend. Ex-JI member M added that soon, he and several others
went for an intensive course, which stressed the need to start a struggle to establish an Islamic state. He
explained: “The preachers told us that the establishment of an Islamic state must be pursued by waging jihad.
According to the JIʼs terminology, this meant the use of armed force to take over control of the state.... I
accepted their explanations because they were charismatic and very convincing. The way they presented
themselves gave the impression that they were sincere and wanted only the best for Islam” (Hussain, 2012).
Recognising their path of radicalisation helps detainees to understand their actions and to avoid making thesame mistakes in future.
5. Ideological Rectification
Upon reflection and engagements with the case officers and counsellors, detainees recognize that theideas they have been exposed to and subsequently imbibed through books, the Internet, and from terrorist
personalities, are not mainstream. They have been led to believe that hate and violence were what Islam
required of its adherents. Through counselling by religious counsellors and reading mainstream literature
promoting peace and non-violence, detainees undergoe the processes of change that help keep theminoculated against terrorist ideas. The RRG counsellors helped the detainees see that the ideologies presented
actually cause harm to the society, and it is a challenge to develop oneself and oneʼs society.
The detainees start to realise that terrorists have been misinterpreting Islam and that hate and violence
is not propagated by the religion. They also learn to identify inconsistencies between these values and how
they behaved in the past (Robinson & Porporino, 2001). The work of the RRG counsellors is crucial in helping
detainees achieve this change. Many detainees continue to see their religious counsellors after release and arealso encouraged to seek guidance from their local mosques.
6. Cognitive Restructuring
Radicalised individuals have a distorted sense of reality and a tendency to focus solely on information
which confirms their biases while disregarding alternative views. Through counselling, these cognitive
distortions are restructured and detainees start to develop the cognitive tools that help prevent themselvesfrom falling prey to aberrant influences again (Robinson & Porporino, 2001).
An example of cognitive restructuring can be seen when the detainees gradually learn from thepsychologists how to manage emotion and develop the capacity to objectively frame global events. Detainees
also learn personal problem-solving skills, to evaluate ideas critically and to be more open-minded.
Through counselling, detainees learn: (i) that their actions carry consequences for others, (ii) how toevaluate ideas objectively and consider a variety of sources of information in the process of decision-making,and (iii) to become less rigid and narrow in their thinking and less prone to externalise blame.

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7. Individual Commitment
Towards the end of the change process, detainees are led to the stage where they make a choice about
their future path (Prochaska & DiClemente. 1982). When the detaineesʼ beliefs have been restructured, they
are guided to commit themselves not to be re-involved in terrorist activity. They make resolutions,
testimonies, and post-release plans to show their determination to fulfil what they have committed
themselves to. Before a detainee is released, they are encouraged to share their reflections of their detention,
including their regrets, and resolutions and plans for the future.
With their commitment not to be re-involved in terrorist activities, detainees are more likely to focus on
constructive activities to rebuild their lives and reintegrate into the community. Nonetheless, as with all
terrorist rehabilitation programmes, the notion of relapse is a possibility. This underscores the criticality of arigorous post-release programme to ensure that detainees do not re-engage in terrorist activity after theirrelease.

The distinct feature observed thus far is that people modify their behaviour. It is then necessary to assess
the level of each detaineesʼ readiness for change and to customise interventions accordingly. These were seen
in individuals detained by ISD for involvement with groups ̶ disengage from radical ideologies ̶renouncing the use of violence. The above has no fixed pattern. Each could develop in different directions fordifferent individuals. In some cases, the stages feed off one another in a mutually reinforcing way. In otherwords, they strengthen one another as they interact.
B. Religious Rehabilitation

The Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) is a group of volunteers mainly from the Asatizah (religious
clerics) fraternity and teachers in Singapore. Members of RRG contribute their services based on theirpersonal capacity and their areas of expertise.

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Detainees were exposed to verses and most of the time, part of the verse and not the entirety of the holy
Quran. There are two components for Muslims to be aware of in order to practice Islam fully. One is to beable to read the holy book and secondly to understand the Islamic sciences (asbab ul nuzul (reason ofrevelation), Nashikh Wal Mansukh (the abrogation)) and related issues. Having this knowledge would thengive the Muslim a complete understanding of the verses in applying them to the daily life.
The approach that the RRG counsellors have been undertaken through the detaineesʼ thoughts with thefollowing objectives:
1) To extricate their negatively imbibed ideology 2) To replace the negative ideology with the correct
ideology 3) To imbue in them the rightful understanding of Islamic knowledge and finally and 4) To
exemplify the fulfilling ways of living in a multi-racial, multi-religious society as shown by our beloved
Prophet Muhammad saw.
In order to ensure consistent messaging given by the counsellors to the detainees, RRG had produced
three manuals to date. The manual serves as an important tool and guide for our religious counsellors to
conduct structured counselling sessions. The manual is divided into three themes ‒ Understanding Realities,
Purely Concepts and Exploring Behaviors.
All the Asatizah involved in counselling the detainees are certified and have been endorsed by the Islamic
Religious Council under the Asatizah recognition Scheme in Singapore. The scheme, which endorses qualified
religious teachers in Singapore, was made compulsory this year in a move to ensure the community knows
whom to turn to for credible religious advice. A register of these teachers is available at www.ars.sg
C. Social Rehabilitation
Social rehabilitation in the form of social support is also given to enable the detainees to reintegratesmoothly into society upon release. The family also plays a significant role in this regard. Detainees are
granted family visits to preserve the family unit as much as possible. An aftercare officer is assigned to eachdetaineeʼs family to provide social and financial support for the detainees. The support provided by the ACG
ensures that the family remains functional. Detainees can then focus on cooperating with the investigation
and rehabilitation. Regular interactions with ISD case officers also provide the detainees with another sourceof social affiliation and support. Regular assessment, monitoring and guidance by the case officers are also
conducted. Efforts are also undertaken to help detainees improve their academic and other vocational skills.
This is to help the detainees find employment upon release.
To facilitate the reintegration process of the detainees released under restriction orders (RO) throughcareer preparation and job matching exercise. This is where the detainee will be matched with relevant jobs
according to their skills. The employers are fully aware of the situation of the candidate. Here we see a
tripartite partnership undertaken by MHA, MOM and MOE.
In implementing terrorist rehabilitation, we have identified challenges. For example, some governments
may not be willing to invest in a soft approach and may prefer the kinetic approach as religion is seen as a
private affair.
In some countries, the involvement in religion should remain in the private sphere. Itʼs a fallacy to look at
the programme as one that strictly focuses on religion. While counsellors do teach about Islam, theprogramme is really about de-radicalization, and you cannot pull someone away from extremism unless you
touch on all the reasons that have driven a person to engage in violence.
There is no way we can guarantee that rehabilitation is a full proof process. But to measure, for instancewe could look into recidivism in Singapore. Since 2002, of 83 people detained under ISA for terrorism related
activities, 62 were then released. To date there have been reported only two cases of recidivism and this is avery low figure.

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VISITING EXPERTSʼ PAPERS

IV. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT INITIATIVES
A. Objectives

Raise
awareness tocommunity on
dangers ofradical/extremeideologies

Highlight
importance ofthe need tocounter theseideologies

Prevent
ideology from
infecng
community

Encourage
collaborative
efforts tocounter
extremeideologies

While there have been many initiatives, designed and implemented in Singapore for corrective purposes,
since 2002, Singapore has been active in getting the participation of the public to build community resilience.
As a society, Singapore has always emphasised the need to build trust between communities and decades ofwork have gone into developing such relations. The Inter-Racial Confidence Circles (IRCCs), set up in 2002,
helped entrench these efforts, as did the Community Engagement Programme, launched in 2006, with thelatter now receiving an important refresh through the SGSecure movement.
SGSecure is our communityʼs response to the terror threat. It is a national movement to sensitise, train
and mobilise the community to play a part to prevent and deal with a terrorist attack. It is a call to action foreveryone to unite and safeguard our way of life. The intent of terrorists is to inject fear and weaken thepsychological resilience and social fabric of our society. This is why the cornerstone of our counter-terrorism
strategy must be the strengthening of community vigilance, cohesion and resilience. We can all do our part tokeep Singapore safe and secure.
The message that Islam is a peaceful religion needs to be amplified. The table below shows the messages
that RRG, ICPVTR and other bodies are communicating with the members of the public.

B. In Community Engagement
RRG has made several efforts through establishing an Intellectual Partnership with Academicians,
Institutions (RSIS) building Social Networking with Government Agencies, NGOs, and Multi Religious
Organizations & Grassroots, thus promoting Community-based Learning by having Dialogue Sessions or
Closed-Door Discussions, Forums and talks.

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The RRG helpline was launched in June 2015. This is a toll-free helpline as part of RRG effort to provide
outreach services to the community at large. The public can use the helpline to clarify religious concepts or
seek help if they are unsure or wanting to help someone they know who might need help. The RRG App
launched in June 2016, allows members of the public to chat with counsellors on issues related to ideologies or
terrorism-related matters. This App allows booking of the RRG resource and counselling centre for visits.

Besides the helpline and Apps, we produced publications. This is intended to provide the public withinformation to clarify doubts on terrorism-related events or issues currently in public debate.
The Islamic Religious Council (MUIS) of Singaporeʼs efforts to counter extremism and exclusivism include:
1) Pre-sermon on Fridays before the mandatory Friday prayers for men 2) certification programmes forgraduates returning from Islamic Institutions abroad and 3) Mandatory Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS).
Topics covered in the Friday pre-sermons, range from the fallacy of ISISʼ so-called Islamic caliphate, to theneed to avoid literal interpretation of religious texts ̶ an approach that is prevalent among extremists ̶and the concept of moderation in Islam. MUIS has also worked with the RRG on themes such as the34

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importance of staying vigilant, and building resilience against extremist and exclusivist ideologies.
Certification programmes for graduates returning from overseas Islamic institutions feature automatic
enrolment into the programme, which aims to familiarise them with how Islam should be practiced in
Singaporeʼs context. A 10-day pilot was run last year, and a second run is due in 2017. It is being adapted intoa certification course, which has been made a compulsory requirement in the Asatizah Recognition Scheme.
This was launched in early 2017. The scheme, which endorses qualified religious teachers in Singapore, moveto ensure the community knows whom to turn to for credible religious advice.
In conclusion, the soft approach in countering terrorism must be positioned strategically. Governments
must introduce both preventive and corrective measures in addressing violent extremism. The challenge
today is to ensure terrorists are rehabilitated in the best possible way. This is imperative because if notrehabilitated, these terrorists when released will pose security threats, become terrorist iconography andinfluence the rest of their family members or the larger community.

35

PARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERSCONTROLLING THE ACTIVITY OF CRIMINAL FACTIONS WITHIN
THE BRAZILIAN PRISON SYSTEM
Carlos Vinicius Soares Cabeleira＊I. THE CHARACTERISTICS AND CURRENT STATE OF ORGANIZED CRIME
AND TERRORISM
A. The Current State of the Brazilian Prison System
In June 30, 2014, which is the date of the latest official data available1, Brazil had a prison population of
607,731 inmates, distributed in 1,424 prisons spread over the country. The installed capacity of these prisons
is 376,669 places2, which means that there is an overcrowding of 61%. The prison population grew by anaverage 7% per year from 2000 to 2014, while the total population grew only a much smaller average of 1%.
In absolute numbers, Brazil has the fourth largest prison population in the world, after the United States,
China and Russia. Relative to their general population, rates of imprisonment in these countries also rank
Brazil as the fourth largest prison population: only the United States, Russia and Thailand have more people
behind bars.
The Brazilian federal prison system comprises 4 prisons, each one with 208 vacancies, where the mostdangerous criminals and leaders of criminal organizations are held. All other prisons are run by the states.
The state of Espírito Santo manages 35 prison units. By June 13, 2017, it counted 19,778 inmates for a total of
13,873 vacancies.
B. The Current State of Terrorists in the Brazilian Prison System
Terrorist groups and cells have not been acting significantly in Brazil. There have been no reports ofterrorist attacks since the countryʼs re-democratization in 1986. There are groups of individuals carrying out
illegal activities similar to terrorism. However, they do not fit into the most usual international definitions.
Among them, left-wing oriented social movements such as the Landless Rural Workers Movement(Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra – MST), which promote occupation and often depredationof public buildings, as well as highway blockades. Also, the news has been frequently reporting attacks topolice facilities and public buildings promoted by criminal organizations related to drug trafficking, such as
the First Command of the Capital (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC) from São Paulo and the Red
Command (Comando Vermelho – CV) from Rio de Janeiro.
The National Security Act issued during the military government (Law 7170/1983) incorporated a broad
definition of terrorism, which was criticized by Criminal Law scholars for not describing in detail the criminal
conduct, as can be seen from article 20:
Article 20 - Devastating, pillaging, extorting, robbing, kidnapping, keeping in false imprisonment,setting fire, wrecking, provoking explosion, assaulting individuals or carrying out acts of terrorism, forpolitical non-conformity or acquisition of funds intended for maintaining clandestine or subversive
political organizations. (Punishment: imprisonment, from 3 to 10 years.)Sole Paragraph ‒ Should the assault result in aggravated battery, the punishment shall be increased in
up to double; should it result in death, the punishment shall be increased up to three times.
Federal Prosecutor, Espirito Santo Prosecution Service Office, Federal Prosecution Service, Brazil.
http://www.justica.gov.br/seus-direitos/politica-penal/documentos/relatorio-depen-versao-web.pdf
2
The Globo Media Group, in January 2017, has come to the number of 668,182 inmates for 394,835 vacancies, which means anovercrowding of 69.2%. http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/am-supera-pe-e-lidera-ranking-de-superlotacao-em-presidios-brasiltem-270-mil-presos-acima-da-capacidade.ghtml＊
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In fact, the conduct criminalized by virtue of article 20 was similar to then existing definitions of criminalacts. New definitions brought by Law 7170/1983 were qualified as “crimes against national security, politicaland social order” depending on the element of mens rea. Criminal intent sufficient to qualify such offences,
however, was not clear. On the other hand, the conduct of terrorism was described only as “carrying out actsof terrorism”.
With the intensification of international terrorism, notably after the 9. 11 attacks in New York, Brazil
became a signatory to international agreements and was pushed to pass legislation that would promote more
modern and detailed criminalization of terrorism. Such legislation has become more urgent with thedesignation of Brazil to host world events such as the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games.
Law 13260/2016 came into force on March 2016, a few months before the Olympic Games. It incorporated
the following legal definition of terrorism:
Art. 2 Terrorism consists in the practice by one or more individuals of the acts foreseen in this article,
for reasons of xenophobia, discrimination or prejudice in regard to race, color, ethnicity and religion,
when committed for the purpose of provoking social or generalized terror, exposing persons, property,
public peace or public safety to danger.
Paragraph 1. The acts of terrorism are:I - use or threaten to use, carry, keep, possess or bring explosives, toxic gases, poisons, biologicalcontent, chemical, nuclear or other means capable of causing damage or promoting mass destruction;
II and III ‒ (VETOED);IV - to sabotage the functioning of or to seize, with violence, by means of posing a serious threat topersons, or through making use of cybernetic mechanisms, the total or partial control, albeit on atemporary basis, of means of communication or transportation; ports; airports; railways or bus stations;
hospitals; nursing homes; schools; sports stadiums; public facilities or places where essential works ofpublic services are performed; facilities for the generation or transmission of energy; military
installations; facilities for the exploration, refining, and processing of oil and gas; and bank institutionsor their service network;V - to make an attempt against the life or physical integrity of a person.
Penalty - imprisonment, from 12 to 30 years, in addition to the sanctions corresponding to the threat orviolence elsewhere prescribed.
Paragraph 2. The provisions of this article do not apply to the individual or collective conduct of
persons in political manifestations, social movements, trade unions, religious, class or professional
category, directed by social or claim purposes, aiming to contest, criticize, protest or support, with the
purpose of defending constitutional rights, guarantees and freedoms, without prejudice to the criminal
classification contained in law.
The aforementioned statute has been enforced only once, in the so-called Hashtag case, which culminatedin the arrest of 10 persons suspected of terrorist activity on July 21, 2016. In September 2016, Brazilʼs Federal
Prosecution Service indicted eight of those persons based on the new counter-terrorism law. On May 4, 2017,
the defendants were sentenced to imprisonment from 5 to 15 years. The sentence is still subject to appeal.
Four of them are currently under pre-trial arrest, incarcerated in federal prisons3.
Considering the limited importance of Brazil to international terrorism and the fact that anti-terrorism
legislation was passed a little more than a year ago, with only one sentence of conviction imposed so far,Brazil has no experience with the rehabilitation of prisoners convicted of terrorism.

3

http://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2017/05/06/politica/1494076153_663185.html

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C. The Current State of Organized Crime in Brazil
On the other hand, organized crime has played a key role both in the context of high-level national
corruption and in the context of urban violence related to drug trafficking.
As to the first, it is worth mentioning the now worldwide famous Car Wash case4, which has revealed
criminal acts by the current President of the republic, former Presidents of the republic, ministers and former
ministers, congressmen, state Governors, hundreds of politicians and low-level civil servants, in association
with the largest business groups in the country. It has already been shown that this criminal organization
was responsible for fundamental decisions in the direction of the country in recent years. Car Wash has
resulted in several defendants being convicted so far, whereas some other defendants are still under pre-trial
arrest. Corruption-related organized crime, however, is not relevant in the context of the prison system.
Organized crime related to drug trafficking is the most pressing problem for the Brazilian prison system.
In March 2017, around 32.6% of prisoners were held for illicit drug trafficking5. Among women, thepercentage grows up to 70%6. In addition to that, trafficking of illicit substances fuels firearms andammunition smuggling, as well as the bulk of police corruption. Most homicides are related to drugtrafficking. Even property crimes such as theft, bank or vehicle robbery have a strong link to the traffickingof narcotics, as they are a means of financing drug use, paying debts related to trafficking, or simply a way toraise money for criminal organizations, when the crackdown of drug trafficking itself increases.
It should be stressed that simple personal consumption of drugs, although still formally a criminal offence,
does not lead to imprisonment, since a number of alternatives to incarceration are at hand. In fact, drug users
are seldom being subjected to law enforcement. Even petty trafficking has been treated more leniently by the
courts. As a result, it is unlikely that a defendant will be sentenced to a long prison term for drug trafficking
alone.
Thus, it can be said that criminal organizations related to drug trafficking are responsible for the mostcriminal convictions. The greatest threat to the correctional system, however, is the domination of prisons by
these organizations, known as criminal factions.
D. The Current State of Organized Crime in the Brazilian Prison System
In October 2016, the warfare between aforementioned criminal factions PCC and CV led to rebellions inthe states of Rondônia, Roraima and Pará, with the death of 18 detainees. In 2016, Brazil had 379 violent
deaths inside prisons. The state of Espírito Santo had none7.
In January 2017, the same ʼwarʼ led to the deaths of 60 inmates inside a prison in the city of Manaus, stateof Amazonas, and 33 inmates were killed in Roraima. In Manaus, the victims were members of the PCC, while
in Roraima the members of the PCC were the executors. Between January 1st and 16th 2017, violent deaths in
Brazilian prisons reached a peak of 1338.
These events of violence and related numbers demonstrate that many prisons are completely dominatedby criminal organizations. Over them, the state has no control. Very often, state control is only exercised off
the walls, to prevent prison-breaks, whereas the internal routine of prisons is dictated by the leaders ofcriminal factions.
Even in state-controlled prisons, order is often maintained only by the separation of prisoners affiliated todifferent criminal factions in different wings, which makes those prisons a space for strengthening theseorganizations and increasing their internal cohesion.

For a case presentation in English: http://www.mpf.mp.br/atuacao-tematica/sci/car-wash-case/car-wash-case-brasilia-april2016.pdf The official website in portuguese is http://lavajato.mpf.mp.br/lavajato/index.html
5
http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/um-em-cada-tres-presos-do-pais-responde-por-trafico-de-drogas.ghtml
6https://jota.info/artigos/10-anos-da-lei-de-drogas-quantos-sao-os-presos-por-trafico-no-brasil-24082016
7
http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/brasil-teve-mais-de-370-mortes-violentas-nos-presidios-em-2016.ghtml
8
http://g1.globo.com/bom-dia-brasil/noticia/2017/01/mortes-em-presidios-do-pais-em-2017-ja-superam-o-massacre-do-carandiru.
html
4

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The domination of criminal factions over the prison system is fundamentally linked to the lack ofresources being invested in the prison system: (i) lack of investment in the increasing of vacancies, whichleads to permanent overcrowding; (ii) low numbers of prison staff, leading to difficulty in controlling inmates;(iii) lack of investment in technologies such as surveillance cameras, metal detectors, X-ray machines; (iv) lackof physical structure for legal, medical, dental, psychological and social assistance; (v) permission for visitors
to bring inside prisons food, clothing, medicines and hygiene material, which are not adequately supplied by
the state; and (vi) lack of job opportunities, education and professional qualification.
The state of Espírito Santo has made massive investment in its prison system over the last ten years.
These investments led to the building of new prison units, the hiring and training of prison staff, andultimately the re-gaining of prison control by the state, with full provision of all the needs of inmates and theprohibition of private materials inside the prison system. For those reasons, Espírito Santo has been currently
regarded as a model for other states in Brazil.

II. DISENGAGEMENT INTERVENTIONS IN PRISON
A. Prison Intelligence and the Separation of Faction Members
For the disarticulation of criminal organizations in the prison system, prison intelligence activity plays acrucial role. Prison intelligence works by identifying negative leaders in the prison environment, members ofwealthy criminal organizations, violent prisoners, prisoners capable of inciting uprising and indiscipline.
Initially, these prisoners are separated inside the prison unit in specific wings or cells. The most serious
cases are transferred to maximum security units or to the federal prison system.
Practice has shown that the separation of prisoners by criminal offence type, with the exception of a few
exceptional cases such as sexual offences, is not the best strategy. Separation of prisoners in accordance with
their level of reintegration can be more effective. First, if the focus is on social rehabilitation andreintegration, the most important thing is what the prisoner sees in his/her future instead of the crime
he/she has committed in the past. Second, the absolute majority of prisoners have been sentenced for drugtrafficking or related offences, so there is significant homogeneity. Third, the grouping of prisoners who
study, work, or take part in a particular rehabilitation programme facilitates their movement inside prison
facilities, and stimulates the mutual encouragement to maintain discipline and make progress towards resocialization. In addition, for security reasons, since inmates who work or study may be pressed by others tobring prohibited items to the cells or carry unauthorized communications, itʼs better that they dwell
separately.
In addition to prison intelligence considerations, classification and separation are decided bymultidisciplinary commissions, the Technical Classification Commissions, taking into account a range of
criteria.
Acts of indiscipline are punished through administrative processes. Serious misconduct reflects in theimpossibility of obtaining progression of prison regime and legal benefits such as pardon, grace, commutationof sentence or conditional release. Less serious misbehaviour entails less harsh consequences, such as
temporary bans on social visits or intimate visits, bans on playing games in the cells or watching movies or
TV in the wings.
Law 10792/2003 introduced what is termed Differentiated Disciplinary Regime (Regime disciplinardiferenciado - RDD). This prison regime is designed for highly dangerous prisoners, and is intended to last amaximum of a 1-year term in which the prisoner is deprived of collective activities, work or study, remaining
23 hours a day in his individual cell. Social visits and interviews with lawyers, however, are maintained. If
separation in specific wings or maximum-security units does not suffice, the detainee may be put under RDD.
Law 11671/2008 regulated the system of federal prisons, designed to remove inmates with great
articulation capacity from their state of origin. The federal system is the destiny of the top leaders of criminal
factions. Although some degree of communication with the criminal faction outside prison still remains, nobreakouts have been reported since its creation.

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The isolation of leaders of criminal factions is impossible as long as they are entitled to contact visits,
whether social visits or intimate visits, or even have physical contact with lawyers. The other way of
breaking the isolation regime is by means of corrupting prison agents.
Apart from the isolation of members of criminal factions from the outside world, segregation of membersof criminal organizations from other prisoners who are not part of these organizations is crucial. These
prisoners become employees or servants of faction members and begin to carry out their orders, including
outside prisons upon release. These orders are related especially to sending scraps abroad; practising acts ofindiscipline, and even beating up or executing prisoners of other factions.
Criminal organization members seek to be as disciplined and obedient as possible, in order to be entitledto the benefits related to good behaviour, and to get out of jail quickly. All their indiscipline acts are carriedout through the other prisoners, who even assume the authorship of the leaderʼs crimes or disciplinary
faults.
B. Progressive Execution of the Prison Sentence
The execution of sentences in Brazil takes place progressively. There are three statutory penalty
regimes: closed, semi-open, and open regimes. A convicted defendant may begin to serve his/her sentence inany of these regimes depending on the length of the sentence imposed, the type of crime committed and thepersonality of the sentenced person. Then, after certain periods of time and maintaining good behaviour, aprisoner can progress to a more favourable regime.
A closed regime is executed in maximum-security or average-security prison units. It allows the inmate towork, study or participate in re-socialization programmes inside the prison unit. Initial closed regime isapplicable for prison sentences of more than eight years or those resulting from a conviction for heinous
crimes, including terrorism.
A semi-open regime is implemented in the so-called agricultural or industrial colony. It allows an inmate towork or study outside the prison unit if certain requirements are met. A prisoner is entitled to temporary
exits of up to seven days, up to four times a year. It is the initial prison regime for sentences from four to eight
years of custody.
An open regime is based on self-discipline of the inmate, who must work or study outside the prison
system without supervision, remaining at a designated place at night and on days off. Although it is expectedthat the sentenced would sleep at certain public establishments called sheltered houses (Casa de albergado),
due to their scarcity, usually they practice the house recollection. Community labour and periodic attendanceat court may also be added as conditions of this prison regime.
In many states in Brazil, the open regime can be executed through electronic monitoring. The main use ofelectronic tagging, however, is as a substitute for pre-trial detention.
There is also conditional release (livramento condicional), by means of which an offender can leave prison
under parole. It is intended for those convicted who have served one-third to two-thirds of the sentence,
depending on the crime committed. He/she must comply with certain conditions such as attendance by social
service staff.

III. MECHANISMS FOR REHABILITATION AND SOCIAL REINTEGRATION
The main mechanism of social re-insertion carried out in prison units is internal and external work, paid or
voluntary ̶ unpaid, but never forced. Unpaid work is not mandatory under the Brazilian legal framework,
but it allows a reduction of sentence and is one of the main factors taken into account when selecting an
inmate for paid work. Work of the inmate is stimulated with tax benefits and exemption from labour charges.
Nevertheless, it still faces great resistance from society and companies, so there are few workplaces in theprison system.
Likewise, formal education and professional training are not compulsory, but they ensure a reduction of
the sentence term, preparation for a paid job during the sentence and afterwards. Despite the absence of40

167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

statutory provision, judges sometimes admit that the mere reading of certain books, accompanied by areview to be evaluated by an appointed teacher, can also reduce prison time.
Psychological care and treatment of the prisonerʼs health are fundamental mechanisms for resocialization, in large part by the recovery of self-esteem and dignity, especially when it comes to dependantsof chemical substances.
There is also strong presence of social services, seeking to resolve documentary barriers to work andpromoting the monitoring of prisoners by families.
A major ally of the prison system are religious assistance groups, almost entirely Protestant and Catholic
Christians. They have easy access to prison units, to attend individually and to worship in common. In almost
every case, desisting from crime and drug use is heavily influenced by religious engagement. In any case, formany sentenced persons, religious practice does not prevent them from returning to their previous criminal
life as soon as they leave the prison system.
Experience in the prison system shows that family and religious practice are the most important
motivational factors for re-socialization. In the case of members of criminal organizations, they are the onlyones.
Criminal factions are governed by their own statutes of mutual protection and vows of reciprocal loyalty.
Desertion is punishable with death as provided in the PCC statute. In some other criminal factions such as theFirst Command of Vitoria (Primeiro Comando de Vitória – PCV), in addition to death, the individual
conversion to a Christian faith is the sole reason accepted for abandoning the faction.
Drug trafficking is a highly profitable economic activity, which allows individuals to enjoy an economic
standard of living absolutely inaccessible to people without formal education, who came from humble families
and who have no interest in working hard. It is difficult for the common trafficker to comply to the rules ofhonest work, which requires much more dedication and discipline and provides much smaller gains. This
breakup requires a great deal of will, family support, and humility.
For members of criminal factions, the punishment of death for desertion is the factor that virtually
prevents their re-socialization. After adhering to a criminal faction, criminals treated each other as “brothers”
and enter a network of mutual protection that provides them with legal and financial support and protects
their family when they are incarcerated. Upon release, they have an obligation to remain in their previous
criminal life in order to obtain resources for the faction to be able to also support those who are in jail.
Desisting from crime and breaking such commitment are considered crimes that cannot be forgiven, subject
to capital punishment. Only if he/she can move away and disappear, along with his/her family, would it bepossible for him/her to untie.

IV. CONCLUSION
Terrorist organizations still have little penetration and little activity in Brazil. Criminal organizations
linked to drug trafficking, however, play a leading role not only in criminal life in general, but also in thefunctioning of Brazilian prisons. There are many prison units controlled by criminal factions, responsible foralmost all murders within the prison system.
The lack of investment in the prison system, either because of lack of resources or because of politicaldisinterest, is the main reason why the state has lost control of these prisons.
There is a plethora of support activities aiming at re-socialization, promoted by the state, althoughinsufficient due to lack of resources. The re-socialization of members of criminal factions is largely hamperedby the death penalty they impose on deserters, combined with the low profitability of legal activities as
opposed to those coming from drug trafficking.
Only the neutralization of these organizations within the prison system, through effective control by thestate, can prevent their continued growth and serve as a basis for the fight by the criminal law enforcement
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agencies on the streets.

42

REHABILITATION AND SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF
ORGANIZED CRIME MEMBERS AND TERRORISTS
Ahmad Naser Altaharwah＊

I. INTRODUCTION
Prisons matter. They have played an enormous role in the narratives of every radical and militant
movement in the modern period. They are ʻplaces of vulnerabilityʼ in which radicalization takes place. Yet
they have also served as incubators for peaceful change and transformation. Much of the current discourse
about prisons and radicalization is negative. But prisons are not just a threat ̶ they can play a positive rolein tackling problems of radicalization and terrorism in society as a whole.
The objectives of the rehabilitation are to change the individualʼs belief system, rejecting the extremist
ideology, and embracing mainstream values, emphasizes that the extremists do not actually care about us,
but callously use them to achieve their own objectives. Also, the prison is to prevent the most ideologicallycommitted individuals from converting more vulnerable persons and offer them alternatives.

II. SUCCESSFUL DERADICALIZATION DEPENDS UPON AN UNDERSTANDING
OF THE PATH TO RADICALIZATION
A sound deradicalization programme needs to learn from how individuals become radicalized: indeed,both radicalization and deradicalization lean heavily on family or other social ties, and the Internet isincreasingly playing a large role in both. Indeed, a particularly striking feature of radicalization is that today it
happens primarily over the Internet. As this paper will explore in greater depth later on, an individual needhave had no prior contact with a terrorist group, nor have ever traveled to those countries where the group is
active, to become directly involved with terrorism. This trend of “self-recruitment” has moved many
governments and NGOs to look more closely at the Internetʼs role in both terrorism and counterterrorism.
Researchers described those generally susceptible to radicalization as having a combination of thefollowing characteristics: trusting a person already involved with a radical group; being “spiritually hungry”
and dedicated to their faith, but having limited knowledge of their religion; and being desperate, naïve, or
simply in need of money. Those seeking to recruit such people try to cater to their needs and interests.
During the process of radicalization, as described, the “targetʼs” characteristics are identified to determine
their suitability for terrorism. They are then engaged in dialogue, befriended, and their social, financial, or
psychological needs are addressed as a means of gaining their trust. This part of the process closely
resembles the initial steps taken in many deradicalization programmes. However, throughout therecruitment process, radical groups will often isolate the targeted individual and “educate” them about thecause.
If they refuse to participate in violence, they may then be asked to do something seemingly innocuous, likerenting a car or an apartment to help out the group. This act is then leveraged to elicit continued
participation. For example, they may be told that “the security forces now know about you, and they may
torture you.” The targeted individual is consequently drawn closer to the radical group.

III. THE APPROACH IN JORDAN
The Government of Jordanʼs approach is based on the premise that violent extremism is not a political＊

Director, Corrections and Rehabilitation Centre, Public Security Directorate, Jordan.

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issue but rather stems from “misguided youth” taking a “perverse view of Islam.” The state has tackled thisissue with a two-pronged approach that focuses on military measures and an education initiative. Much of thestateʼs action has resulted from its own experiences with terrorism, especially the 2005 Amman hotelbombings, which have led it to take a more comprehensive and aggressive approach to violent extremism.
However, the real blow against radical groups has come not from the stateʼs deradicalization activities but
from the impact of the 2005 bombings, the devastation of which led to a decline in support for extremistgroups.
The security steps taken by the state have led to the infiltration and monitoring of these groups as well as
crackdowns, arrests, and prosecutions. Jordan also introduced an Anti-Terrorism Law and a Fatwa Law in2006, which gives only clerics sanctioned by the state the right to issue fatwas. The Anti-Terrorism Law has
been viewed by critics as being detrimental to civil society because of the freedoms it undermines.
The cultural initiative to tackle the problem began with the Amman Letter of 2004, which confronts
Islamist extremism with its presentation of a wide consensus against its ideology.
The Letter was issued following an accord with 180 prominent Muslim scholars representing a range ofschools of Islamic thought. The aim of the initiative was to refute and delegitimize certain radical
interpretations of Islam and bring back the focus to disseminating a moderate and apolitical Islam. This has
been followed up with conferences as well as media outreach on television and radio. Interestingly, Jordan has
seen a spillover effect from the Saudi deradicalization programme in the form of its prison inmates
demanding a dialogue with the state. The demand of prisoners for dialogue with religious scholars led to a
two-month ad hoc programme, which included debates and lectures. However, a speaker noted that the
programme was not a success, as many inmates felt that the state had not provided tenable, independentscholars̶a misjudgement that significantly weakened the programme. The need for a credible prison
programme is particularly urgent in Jordan as studies indicate that its jails have proved to be a hothouse forthe growth of extremism.

IV. DEREDICALIZATION IN JORDAN
Jordanian deradicalization is based on the following:
A. Contain a mix of different kinds of programming, typically combining ideological and/or religious reeducation with vocational training
B. Pay attention to facilitating prisonersʼ transition from prison back into mainstream society, typically byproviding them with the means for a new beginning and by establishing (or re-establishing) social
networks away from extremism
C. One of the overriding aims is to reduce opportunities for re-offending and increase the social and material
cost of doing so. Much of the activities in sophisticated programmes are consequently geared towards
locking prisoners into commitments and obligations towards family, community, and the state
D. The programme realized that the structure and instruments must reflect local contexts and conditions, inparticular prisoner population, and their individual and collective needs and motivations;
1. the nature and ideology of the groups to which prisoners used to belong;
2. the society from which they originate, its structure and customs;
3. the dynamics of the wider conflict and other external conditions, which may affect the programmeʼs
outcome.
4.

44

The need to consider what the societies in which they take place find politically and ethically
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167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

5. The programme realized that it can be significant when both external conditions and the wider
political environment are conducive. In particular, they can play an important role in facilitating thetransition from conflict to peace when the political momentum is no longer with the terrorists and/or
conflicts are winding down.
6. Religious Members, the members will directly engage in the prisoner dialogues and the counselling
process. The sheikhs are typically approached on a personal basis and asked whether they would liketo participate in the committee activities and engage in dialogue with detainees. Key in selecting
members is communication style. One member is a formal extremist who has changed his ideas andperceived as good role model.
7. Members trained on psychosocial support (preferably on psychology) and members trained on social
skills, these members focus primarily on evaluating a detaineeʼs social status, diagnosing any
psychological problems and determining the type of support the prisoner and his family may needafter his release.
8. Security Members, security members are to evaluate prisoners for security risks and then makerelease recommendations based on input provided by the Religious, Psychological and Social members.
One of the Security Members serves as the overall Chief of the Advisory Committee.
9. Media Members. Media members produce materials aligned to the agreed Communication Strategy
used for sensitizing the community about the deradicalization project. This will include public
educational materials for use in schools and mosques, focused on outreach and education, primarily
targeting young Somali men using Internet, radio, television, and print media.
10. The Jordanian deradicalization programme shows that prisons are not just about locking people away,
but that they can make a real and positive contribution to tackling problems of radicalization andterrorism in society as a whole.

V. CONCLUSION
Prisons matter. Often ignored by the public and policymakers, they are important vectors in the processof radicalization, and they can be leveraged in the fight against it.
Much of the public debate about prisons and terrorism is about locking people away. This paper has
aimed to focus a more sophisticated understanding of the role prisons can play in radicalizing people ̶ and inreforming them. In doing so, it has analysed the policies. Take, for example, prison regimes for terrorists.
Governments everywhere have had to address a trade-off between wanting to treat terrorists ʻjust like otherprisonersʼ and preventing them from mobilizing outside support, recreating operational command structures,and radicalizing others.
The paper showed that there are no hard and fast rules about whether terrorist prisoners should beconcentrated, separated and/or isolated. In fact, most of the countries that have been looked at practice a
policy of dispersal and (partial) concentration, which distributes terrorists among a small number of highsecurity prisons. Even within such mixed regimes, however, it rarely seems to be a good idea to bring
together leaders with followers and mix ideologues with hangers-on.
The wider, and perhaps even more important, problem is that ̶ in most of the countries that have been
looked at ̶ prison regimes for terrorists are informed by the demand for security before everything else.
While understandable, the ʻsecurity firstʼ approach has resulted in missed opportunities to promote reform.
Many prison services seem to believe that the imperatives of security and reform are incompatible. In reality,
though, reform does not need to come at the expense of security. Prison services should be more ambitious inpromoting positive influences inside prison, and develop more innovative approaches in facilitating prisonersʼ
transition back into mainstream society.
Another issue which this paper has devoted much attention to is that of prison-based radicalization.
Prisons are often said to have become breeding grounds for radicalization. This should come as no surprise.
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Prisons are ʻplaces of vulnerabilityʼ, which produce ʻidentity seekersʼ, ʻprotection seekersʼ and ʻrebelsʼ ingreater numbers than other environments. They provide near-perfect conditions in which radical, religiously
framed ideologies can flourish. While the extent of the problem remains unclear, the potential for prison
radicalization is significant, and the issue clearly needs to be addressed.
Based on the research, it seems obvious that over-crowding and under-staffing amplify the conditions that
lend themselves to radicalization. Badly run prisons also create the physical and ideological space in which
extremist recruiters can operate at free will and monopolize the discourse about religion and politics.
For many prison systems, therefore, the first and most important recommendation is to improve generalconditions, avoid over-crowding, train staff, and provide meaningful programming that allows prisoners todevelop stable inmate identities. Prison imams are important in denying religious space to extremists, butthey are not a panacea.
Not all the findings in this paper are negative. The paper shows that, while certain countries fall short ofeven the most basic good practices, others have recognized the enormous potential for prisons to become net
contributors in the fight against terrorism, and have encouraged ̶ sometimes sponsored ̶ initiatives that
seek to promote disengagement and de-radicalization.
For example, where groups are hierarchical and have strong, authoritative leadership, collective
disengagement and de-radicalization becomes possible. Such processes have to be carefully managed. When
political concessions form part of the ʻdealʼ between the government and the terrorists, collective
disengagement and de-radicalization may, in fact, assume the character of a fully-fledged peace process, andrequires the necessary skills, resources, and ̶ above all ̶ patience.
Individual disengagement and de-radicalization, on the other hand, remains understudied and is often
misunderstood ̶ despite all the publicity that programmes have attracted in recent years.
Looking at six individual disengagement and deradicalization programmes in the Middle East and South
East Asia, the paper has identified key principles, which will help policymakers understand the phenomenon
and identify elements of best practice that can be adopted in their own prison systems.
Whether individual disengagement and deradicalization programmes can make a strategic contribution tobringing a terrorist campaign to an end remains to be proven. The programmes that have been examinedsuggest that they can ̶ as long as the political momentum is no longer with the insurgents and otherexternal conditions are conducive. An over-reliance on individual disengagement and de-radicalization
programmes as the primary means of fighting terrorism should be avoided, therefore ̶ they complement
rather than substitute other instruments in the fight against terrorism.
In bringing together the experiences of 15 countries, the paper has attempted to show the diversity ofpolicy and practice across the world. Not every lesson may be relevant or applicable in every context, but ̶taken together ̶ they demonstrate the enormous possibilities for prisons to make a positive and significant
contribution to countering terrorism.

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INDIVIDUAL PRESENTATION ON THE REHABILITATION AND
SOCIAL REINTEGRATION OF ORGANIZED CRIME MEMBERS
AND TERRORISTS
Soufiane Ahoujil＊

The topic of extremist offenders in Morocco surfaced in May 2003 as five suicide bombings took place inCasablanca. In the ensuing crack-down, the Moroccan authorities arrested 1100 terrorist suspects (more than
50 sentenced to life in prison and 16 to death). Since then, several terrorist cells have been dismantled andmany radicals have been arrested for the formation of terrorist groups and the preparation for terrorist
attacks. Thus, the Moroccan Prison Department has adopted different approaches to manage this specificcategory of offenders by ensuring effective security measures and developing and implementing suitable
reintegration programmes.
The present paper emphasizes the new management mode of offenders in Moroccan prisons, in terms of
security and reintegration, while providing some relevant statistical data on regular and extremist offenders.
A. Statistical Data on Extremist Offenders in Morocco
1. Extremist Offenders in Morocco since 2008
Year

Extremist offenders

Prison population

%

2008

852

59212

1.43

2009

730

57563

1.26

2010

755

64877

1.16

2011

635

64833

0.97

2012

582

70758

0.82

2013

604

72005

0.83

2014

764

74941

1.01

2015

915

74039

1,23

2016

970

76139

1.27

March
2017

1062

77784

1,36

From 2008 up until 2012, the vast majority of offenders were incarcerated since the 16th May 2003
attacks. However, starting from 2012 up until the ongoing year, the number of extremist offenders grew
bigger due to the increasing scale of the various hotbeds of tension in the world, namely Syria, Iraq, theSahelo-sub-Saharan region, and the south of Libya.

＊

Executive/Advisor, Prison and Reintegration Department, Morocco.

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2. Extremist Offenders of Foreign and Dual Nationality
Nationality

NumberAlgerian

2

French3Tunisian

1

Italian1

Chadian1

Turkish1

French-Algerian

1

Moroccan-French

5

Moroccan-Belgian

6

Moroccan-Dutch

1

Moroccan-Hispanic

1

Total

23

B. The New Security Approach in Extremist Offendersʼ Management
The management mode of extremist offenders in Morocco has evolved gradually. Up until 2014, extremist
offenders were gathered in four correctional facilities. Hence, they were able to undertake collective andconcerted actions, like the riot they started in one correctional facility. From then on, the Correctional
Department decided to reconsider extremist offendersʼ classification by dispersing them in 47 correctional
facilities, mixing most of them with common-law offenders. However, this procedure also proved to havesome drawbacks, such as the tendency of extremist offenders to indoctrinate regular ones. In line with thesemeasures, the UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners suggests that: “violent
extremists should be categorized according to the security risk (escape) and control risk (likelihood ofparticipating in activity that would disrupt the prison or radicalize other prisoners to violence) that corresponds
to the findings of their risk assessment”.
The Prison Department had also to cope with the increase of extremist offenders arrested since 2003 (815
out of 1074 offenders) connected in any way with the new hotbeds of tension, especially in Syria and Iraq. This
led to the occurrence of extremist rhetoric and attitudes in prisons, as well as connections with drugtraffickers likely to provide financial support and to smuggle contraband.
C. The New Classification System in Moroccan PrisonsThis system consists in separating extremist from regular offenders according to their risk degree.
Similarly, the UNODC Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners states that: “theclassification process is based on the information gained through the individual risk and needs assessment ofeach prisoner and may be further informed by potential health issues assessed in the course of the medical
examination upon admission”.
After the risk and needs assessment process, extremist offenders are classified in four subcategories toensure complete or partial isolation and efficient supervision:- Subcategory 1 includes: “indoctrinators”, “instigators”, “leaders”, “hard-liners”, the “indoctrinated”, and“suppliers of material support” for potential disruptive actions. Individual cells contain “indoctrinators”,“leaders”, “instigators”, the “indoctrinated” and “indoctrinators”. “Hard-liners” and “suppliers of material
support” are accommodated in collective cells with five beds.

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The said category has access to separate courtyards in restricted groups, with restrictions in all
movements, namely during visitation, health care, food service and reintegration programmes.
-

Subcategory 2 comprises: introverted extremist offenders and those with psychological vulnerabilities.
Besides, the said category houses ideological review offenders, as well as royal pardon/amnesty
requests offenders. This isolated category is housed in high supervision units in cells with a capacity of
7 beds each. Collective recreation is organized in successive groups so as to avoid any mass
movements. Offenders of this category can be directed in groups under close supervision for indoor
medical examination and outdoor hospitalization.

-

Subcategory 3: is placed in cells with an accommodation capacity of 9 beds and is constituted ofcompliant offenders yet under supervision. This has reduced the number of prison facilities for thiscategory of offenders from 47 in 2016 to only 18 in April 2017.

D. Extremist Offendersʼ Participation in Regular Reintegration Programmes in 2016

Programmes

Regular Offenders

Extremist Offenders

Percentage
among Extremist
Offenders

Vocational training

7341

51

4.80 %

Educational
programmes

3920

201

18.92 %

Literacy
programmes

6666

40

3.76 %

Total

17927

292

27.48 %In Moroccan prisons, as illustrated in the table above, extremist offenders are less involved in vocational
training programmes than their regular counterparts, preferring higher education in different fields, mainly
in religious sciences, law and sociology on account of the fact that only 9.03% of them are unemployed. It is
worth noting that sentence length may justify their desire to pursue long-term studies.
Similarly, the general prison population benefits from sessions of Quran memorization, guidance andreligious counselling, delivered by scholars affiliated to the Moroccan Department of Religious Endowment
and Islamic Affairs, with the purpose of safeguarding prison population from radicalization. Moreover, 109
extremist offenders out of 9,321 participated in Quran memorization programmes. In addition, 228 extremist
offenders out of 90, 460 participated in religious guidance and counselling sessions. However, extremist
offendersʼ low rate of participation in these programmes may be due to the prejudice they hold against official
Islamic scholars. However, many of them are fully involved in religious contests, such as Quran psalmody,
prophetic Hadiths memorization and Quranic exegesis.
1. Counter-Radicalization Programmes
In early 2016, the Moroccan Correctional department signed a convention with the UNDP on support for
Prison system reform, in cooperation with the Rabita Mohammedia of Islamic scholars, which developed andimplemented a specific programme funded by the Japanese government, aiming namely at training
correctional staff members and religious scholars to identify and analyse extremist signs, attitudes andbehaviours, by deconstructing extremist religious rhetoric to prevent regular offendersʼ radicalization.
The first category of participants is constituted mainly of security chiefs and social workers trained byexperts from the Rabita Mohammedia of Islamic scholars. The second category includes peer educators
trained by the first category. The training is more didactic than pedagogical, as the kind of language usedduring sensitizing and persuasion activities is made clear to all offenders.

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The training of peer educators started in 6 piloting prison facilities with a view to training 120 peer
educators in 60 training sessions. Each session involves 20 offenders, i.e. the total number of offenders tosensitize is 22.000 offenders. For their part, peer educators are assisted by supervisors among the trainedcorrectional staff and religious scholars. Being in charge of the overall follow-up of sensitizing activities, eachsupervisor assists binomial teams in implementing an evaluation grid on a quarterly basis in each of the six
corrections. Hence, to implement the training programme, the Rabita Mohammedia of Ulemas developed a
training guide aimed at achieving capacity and skill building relating to counter-radicalization in corrections.
The table below illustrates the number of extremist offenders involved in peer education. Two extremist
offenders operated as peer educators for offendersʼ sensitization:
TargetPopulation

Regular
Offenders

500

465

Extremist Offenders

Salafi-Jihadists

ISIL Jihadists
FTFs/Supporters/
Sympathizers

1124

Some extremist offenders expressed their wish to participate in peer education:
Salafi-Jihadists

ISIL Jihadists
FTFs/Supporters/
Sympathizers

Total

09

06

15

2. Creating Room for Open Debate and Interaction
Two major events were held in this regard. The first one under the theme: “Citizenship as a key toreinsertion”, which is a summer university organized in September 2016 by the Correctional Department in
partnership with national reintegration, human rights and academic institutions and organizations.
In 2017, a Spring University was organized under the theme: “The Preparation of Inmates: What Role
Could Elected Representatives Play?” Among addressed topics was offendersʼ voting, (especially those whoare not deemed eligible), as well as the role of the parliament in supporting Prisonsʼ overall strategy andoffendersʼ reintegration programmes. Noteworthy, 17 Extremist offenders out of 129 have partaken in
activities conducted by the two universities and 20 offenders out of 165 in the second one. Participants have
had a successful education path or vocational training. They even have shown great interest in the topics
covered and interacted constructively with the lecturers. The general purpose of the meeting was to makeextremist offenders call in question their extremist mode of thinking.
The two universities had very positive feedback on the public opinion, more importantly on extremist
offenders. At the closing ceremony of Spring University, a speech was delivered by a Salafi jihadist extremist
offender connected with the 16th May 2003 terrorist attacks in Casablanca, Morocco. During the event, he
expressed his readiness and that of his counterparts to interact positively and constructively with all kinds ofinitiatives aiming at their reintegration in society, expressing their will to prohibit extremist thoughts andremain devoted to the Moroccan stateʼs fundamental constants.
Civil society actors, members of diplomatic missions and local representatives have all highly appreciatedand encouraged the initiative. Likewise, the head of the Prison Department received several letters ofgratitude, not only from extremist offenders participating in those debate platforms, but also from those who
did not participate at all: they manifested their interest and wished such an approach in offendersʼreintegration may continue.
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3. Cooperation with International Agencies and NGOs on Deradicalization via Staff Training
Staff training is a key factor to successful deradicalization. In this respect, correctional personnel are to besensitized and well trained on detecting signs of radicalization. They are also required to learn ways andtechniques of radicalization, accountability, professional confidentiality, effective professional communication,
conflict management, mediation, ethics, etc. as a means of preventing regular offendersʼ manipulation or
recruitment by radical offenders. To this end, a training guide was developed in 2016 on radicalization
prevention in prisons.
In 2016, all correctional psychologists were involved in a training programme delivered by international
experts in cooperation with UNICRI on psycho-social assistance to prison populations in general and extremist offenders in particular, while implementing related good practices.
In cooperation with the Global Centre on Cooperative Security (GCCS) a tailored and targeted a training
programme (CVE/P) was developed, which was conducted in March 2017 on behalf of 23 frontline prison
officials to help them better manage extremist offenders by focusing on understanding and identifying violent
extremism and radicalization, identifying the best methods and practices in the management of extremist
offenders, as well as defining the role of correctional staff in addressing radicalization in prisons.

51

IS NAMIBIA A SIMMERING POT FOR TERRORISM AND WOULD
THE CURRENT STATUS QUO IN CORRECTIONS BE ABLE TO
DEAL WITH THE REHABILITATION OF POSSIBLE FUTURETERRORISTS?
Remona Visser＊This paper has two main parts. Firstly, it looks at Namibia as a possible “simmering pot” for terrorist
activities, and secondly it aims to see whether or not the current status quo in corrections will be able to deal
with the rehabilitation of possible future sentenced terrorists.
The sequence is as follows: First a definition of terrorist activities is provided. This will be followed byoutlining some of the key reasons why someone would engage in such terrorist activities and whether or not
those reasons are applicable to the Namibian situation. The supposition being that if these reasons areapplicable in the Namibian environment this will facilitate the increase of terrorism. At this point protective
factors that could inhibit the development of terrorist activities is also discussed.
This will be followed by what is currently happening in Namibia in terms of rehabilitation within acorrectional facility, and how this measures up to what is currently being done in other parts of the world inresponse to the rehabilitation of terrorists.

I. DEFINITIONS
Although defining of terrorist activity remains highly contested in the literature on the subject as well as
amongst countries, in Namibia it is defined in the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and Proliferation
Activities Act, 2014 (Act No. 4 of 2014). The definition reads:(a) Any act committed by a person with the intention of instilling terror and which is a violation of thecriminal laws of Namibia and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, orcause serious injury or death to, any private property, natural resources, the environment or cultural
heritage and is the calculated or intended to(i) Intimidate, instil fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the generalpublic or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon aparticular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles;(ii) Disrupts any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public
emergency;(iii) Create general insurrection in the State; or(b) any act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in one of the following
treaties –(i) the Convention of the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970);(ii) the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971);(iii) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973);(iv) the International Convention against Taking of Hostages (1979)(v) the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980)(vi) the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988)(vii) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation(2005);(viii) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on＊

Case Management Officer, Windhoek Correctional Facility, Namibian Correctional Service, Namibia.

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167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

the Continental Shelf (2005);(ix) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997) and(x) International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999);(xi) International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)(xii) Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil Aviation (2010)
and(xiii) Protocol Supplementary on the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(2010);(c) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt,
threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act
referred to in paragraph (a) and (b);(d) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not
taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act,by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an internationalorganisation to do or to abstain from doing any act; or(e) the payment of ransom to designated persons or organisations, except where such payment isapproved or authorised to secure the safety of a national of that country.

II. NAMIBIA AS A SIMMERING POT
A. Conditions That Foster Terrorism
Individuals are propelled to join terrorist organizations and / or to launch a terrorist attack due toprolonged unresolved conflicts; de-humanization and violation of human rights; lack of law; collective
grievance and victimization; intolerance or exclusion; lack of good governance; socio-economic marginalization; political discrimination; economic reasons including under/unemployment; lack of educational
opportunities, deprivation, attachment to people who are in terrorist organizations; personal experience with
unfair treatment; charismatic leaders of terrorist organizations that speak to the disenfranchised andglobalization to name a few. (The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); Kruglanski et al.).
In addition to this, Kruglanski and Fishman (2009) assert that terrorist behaviour can also be understoodas a form of psychopathology and/or as reflecting as a unique constellation of personality traits. Thus,
individuals who possess a specific problematic personality profile could also foster terrorism as the chances ofthem being recruited in terrorist organizations could not be overlooked.
It is difficult to establish if these factors prove true for Namibia, as at present there are no documented
cases for terrorist offenders in Namibia.
What is discussed above refers to conditions that foster terrorism. In the next section what will be
discussed is to what extent the conditions outlined above are relevant to the Namibian context.
B. Factors That Could Be Warning Signs for Namibia
Having looked at some of the basic conditions that foster terrorism one can assess if these conditions arepresent in Namibia. The author would like to reiterate that the path to offending is different for eachindividual. The factors and motivations that contribute to offending are unique to an individual, and greatcare should be taken not to generalize. Furthermore, the presence of the conditions that foster terrorism
mentioned under Section 2.1 should not be viewed as conclusive evidence of the presence of terrorism, but
merely as warning signs. Warning signs, which without intervention could escalate the current Namibian
situation.
From the writerʼs observation and experience, having worked at a Correctional Facility as a CaseManagement Officer, there are no known cases of offenders who have been incarcerated due to acts ofterrorism. This, however, is not an indication that it does not exist, or that there are no ongoing investigations
related to terrorism.
The biggest and longest trial in the history of Namibia took place from 2003-2015. This case was oftreason, and it started with the indictment of 132 people who attempted to secede (the Caprivi Strip) from
Namibia. Given the definition of terrorism as indicated in the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist and53

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Proliferation Activities Act, 2014 (Act No. 4 of 2014) it is highly likely that had the Act been in place in 2003
some if not all of the accused would have been tried under the Prevention and Combating of Terrorist andProliferation Activities Act, 2014 (Act No. 4 of 2014).
In recent years there have also been newspaper articles related to terrorist organizations such as AlQaeda and Al-Shabaab using Namibia as a springboard for their terrorist activities. (The Namibian 14.08.
2015). In the last couple of months there have been newspaper reports of a group of young people who callthemselves Boko Haram terrorising the streets of Katutura (The Namibian 24.03.2017). What is worthy ofnote about this case is not only the name choice for the group, but also that witnesses described the youth asangry and having no regard for other people. At the very least this indicates that Namibia is not immune tointernational influence. This influence is made more readily available to people through the easy access to theinternet.
Globalization therefore increases the likelihood of Namibia becoming a fertile ground for terrorism.
Technology has made it easy to get news as it is developing from around the world. As Namibians we can see
what is happening in other countries, the demonstrations, the violence, the tactics used by extremist
organizations to get what they want. We are not immune to this information. This information can affect us in
two primary ways. Firstly, it can cause Namibians to use those tactics in pursuit of what we want. This hascome out in some of the actions of the people who are in pursuit of acquiring land as well as recent activities
by the children of the liberation struggle. Secondly, Namibians can view the footage of what is happeningaround the world and endeavour to take up the fight for those who seemingly cannot fight for themselves.
Namibia has one of the biggest gaps between the rich and the poor (UNDP Income Inequality Report,
2013). According to the last Namibian Housing and Population Census of 2011 the unemployment rate of
Namibia is at 37 %. This gap is conducive to the fostering of terrorist activities because the poor which is the
majority could feel as if the government is not responsive to their needs, making them fertile to being incited
to anarchy. The high unemployment rate, particularly amongst the youth, is significant in three key ways.
Firstly, it leads to idleness. If time is not used productively, it creates an opportunity for offending especiallywhen individuals are not able to afford or provide their basic needs or let alone have access to services andresources (Mehlum, Moene & Torvik 2004). This is especially telling as in the last number of years there has
been an increase in the number of instances of “land grabbing”, which is the illegal occupation andappropriation of land. Making this portion of the population susceptible to recruitment into terrorist activities.
Secondly, unemployment can make the youth vulnerable to recruitment, particularly if they are offeredfinancial or material compensation for their efforts (Kruglanski and Fishman, 2009). Thirdly, it can lead to anincrease in anger or feelings of being disenfranchised. These feelings could be exploited by terrorist
recruitment officers that aim to direct these feelings of anger at, for example, the government. Terrorists arenotorious for distorting or misusing cultural, political or religious beliefs in an attempt to garner support for
their nefarious activities (Kruglanski and Fishman, 2009).
The children of the liberation struggle are another group of people vulnerable to recruitment into
terrorist activities. As a group these individuals have a collective memory of feeling victimized. They havebeen airing their grievances over the last couple of years in a variety of ways. They are not above using
violence to get their point across. Last year in a struggle between the children of the liberation struggle andthe police, shooting broke out where one protestor died. This collective memory of grievance, or sense of
feeling oppressed or victimized could easily be exploited by a terrorist organization who might look to recruitin an attempt to cause civil unrest, or to overthrow the government. This group is worth looking into further
as they have shown to be both willing and able to use violence in pursuit of their agenda and have beenrelentless and steadfast in that pursuit.
C. Protective Factors
Namibia is run as a secular state where people are free from discrimination based on religion, culture andethnicity. The Constitution protects peopleʼs right to life, education, to own property, to a fair trial to name afew. People have under the Constitution some inalienable freedoms such as the freedom of speech andexpression, freedom of peaceable assembly, freedom of movement and freedom of association. Namibians
vote in free and fair elections for their representatives in government including the president, who can servea maximum of two terms. Added to this is the establishment and running of the Office of the Ombudsman.
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One of the key roles of this office is to investigate all violations of the rights and freedoms afforded to the
Namibian people under the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia. Since independence, Namibia has also
enjoyed relative peace and stability in the country, free from civil war and lawlessness. These factors could
be viewed as protective factors against the likelihood of Namibia becoming a fertile ground for terrorism.

III. CAN THE CURRENT STATUS QUO IN NAMIBIAN CORRECTIONALFACILITIES DEAL WITH THE REHABILITATION OF POSSIBLE FUTURETERRORISTS?
As stated earlier, at present there are no offenders in incarceration for offences related to terrorist
activities. This being said it is important to look at whether or not the Namibian Correctional Service (NCS)
will be able to effectively rehabilitate these offenders based solely on what is currently being done.
First the author will look at what has been identified as best practices in the rehabilitation of terrorists incorrectional facilities, followed by what is currently being done within correctional facilities in Namibia. The
aim is to see if we are on par with global trends and possible shortfalls that need to be ironed out before the
NCS is faced with terrorists to rehabilitate while in custody.
A. Global Trends
The UNODCʼs Handbook on the Management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention ofradicalization to violence in prisons, the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the treatment of prisoners as wellas the Rome Memorandum on good practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of violent extremist
offenders jointly discuss various strategies or good practices for use in the rehabilitation of offenders while ina correctional facility. In a nutshell these include but are not limited to: Respect for human rights and nondiscrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religious or political affiliation; housing offenders in safe,
secure and adequately resourced facilities (preventing overcrowding); rehabilitation that is dynamic byrelying on input from various disciplines such as social workers, religious leaders, and psychologists;
adequately trained and educated staff; effective intake, assessment and classification system; separation of
offenders (juveniles from adults, men from women, and tried from untried); medical service;, opportunity towork, improve their education and engage in recreation and sport. These are a few of the elements outlinedthat improve or foster rehabilitation of offenders.
B. The Namibian Situation
Namibia, as a member of the UN, has ratified all UN resolutions or guidelines including the UN Standard
Minimum Rules for the treatment of prisoners. Furthermore, the Namibian Constitution protects all humanlife and safeguards all offendersʼ inalienable rights and freedoms secured thereunder. This sentiment isevident in the Namibian Correctional Service Act, 2012 (Act No. 9 of 2012). Some of the key functions outlinedin the Act include: to ensure the secure, safe and humane custody of all inmates, rendering health care toinmates, applying rehabilitative programmes and other meaningful and constructive activities that contributeto their rehabilitation and successful reintegration as well as the supervision of offenders on conditional
release.
The structure of the Namibian Correctional Service (NCS) has provisions made to assist offenders in a
multi-faceted manner. There are Directorates for Rehabilitation and Re-integration (which includes
psychological services, educational services, conditional release, community corrections, programmes andresearch); Health Care; Inmate Affairs, Pastoral Care, Community Supervision and a separate division tasked
with female and juvenile offenders. The Government through the NCS provides an offender with their basic
needs such as bedding, food, clothing and cleaning materials. Correctional Officers also receive basic trainingof six months before starting to work with the NCS. This basic training is aimed at equipping correctional
officers with the necessary skills to work with offenders. It also provides them with skills to assess dangerous
situations and how to diffuse these using minimum force. This period is therefore aimed to relay skills
necessary for working in the NCS.
On the ground at present, correctional facilities have a total population size of 3,505 (as on 17.05.2017), andthe total capacity for all thirteen correctional facilities is 4,150. This indicates that at present as a whole there
is no overpopulation.

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NCS is fervent in its pursuit to use the period of incarceration as a means through which to rehabilitate
offenders. To this effect NCS has implemented the Offender Risk Management Correctional Strategy(ORMCS). This is a multi-faceted approach to incarceration, rehabilitation and reintegration. Although thesystem has not rolled out to all the facilities, it is envisioned to do so in the next couple of years.
C. The Offender Risk Management Correctional Strategy (ORMCS)The Offender Risk Management Correctional Strategy (ORMCS) at its core is a three-component-based
system that deals with offenders from admission to discharge. The three components are: The Offender DataManagement System (ODMS), the Unit Management System and Case Management System.
The ODMS is an electronic and automated data-capturing and management system that records all the
key and relevant information of the offender. This system captures the basic profile of offenders including but
not limited to their identity, offence, sentence, further charges, nationality and property booked in and kept
until their release.
Unit Management focuses on separating offenders based on their level of security risk. In order to manage
offenders, they are divided into four main categories (minimum, low-medium, medium and maximum
security) upon admission. Furthermore, a re-classification is done annually thereafter, or upon a breach insecurity. Each unit will therefore have different privileges and different security protocols. Unit management
also allows for offenders to be separated: males from females, juveniles from adults, and sentenced offenders
from non-sentenced offenders.
Case Management is the cornerstone for rehabilitation and reintegration. Different tasks are completed
from admission to discharge. Upon admission Case Management Officers (CMOs) at the Reception andAssessment (R&A) Unit are tasked to complete the tools that will put in process the path of the offenderʼsstay within the correctional facility. These tools are scientifically based. CMOs complete the initial security
classification that will determine the first security level of the offender, they complete a risk and needs
assessment that will outline what criminogenic factors (both internal and external factors) contributed to thecommission of the offence, and what needs need to be addressed during the period of incarceration. Based on
this they also complete a correctional treatment plan that aims to address these needs and criminogenic
factors. After this the offender is sent to the living units. The onus then rests on the CMOs of the living units
to make sure that the plan is followed and that the offenderʼs criminogenic factors are addressed. The CMO
does this in a number of ways. By referring the offender for education, to workshop to learn a marketableskill, or to Programmes where the offender is assisted with structured core programmes that are
cognitive‒behavioural in nature and attempt to address problematic thinking.
The above-mentioned indicates that Namibia is on par with what is expected for the rehabilitation of
offenders. The Unit Management and Case Management components of the ORMCS is still in the process of
being rolled out to all thirteen correctional facilities. Whether or not it is effective in the rehabilitation ofterrorists remains to be seen. At present there is not a programme tailor-made for the rehabilitation of people
sentenced for terrorist activities.

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OFFENDER TREATMENT FOR ORGANIZED CRIME MEMBERS ANDTERRORISTS
Nanding N. Bayle＊I. INTRODUCTION
The threat to security of countries both from the homeland and international fronts is taking on a newform. The claw of terrorism has spared no one and has rendered even the most advanced countries
vulnerable to this emerging security risk. Terrorism is traced to radicalism in ideologies and religious
practice.
From the 1960s to 1970s, domestic terrorism widely increased in the United States of America such as thegroups known as the Black Panthers, the Weatherman, and other radicals. It was only during the late 1980s
that international terrorism began to proliferate around the world. The war in Lebanon was a result of aterrorist attack. In 1993, the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City started a new era ofinternational terrorism in the United States. Thereafter, in 1996, the Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski (anindividual terrorist) was arrested and charged for killing three and injuring twenty-three individuals. In 1998,
Islamic terrorist Osama Bin Laden attacked American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing American
citizens. Then, on a sad day in the history of America, on September 11, 2001, Bin Laden successfully funded
and organized an attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, killing approximately 3,000 individuals(Rotledge, 2009).
In Central Asia, terrorism is largely a cross-border phenomenon. The source of most terrorist
organizations that operate is Pakistan and Afghanistan. Southeast Asia also has faced multiple terrorist
attacks in the past, particularly in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. The Prime Minister of Singapore
has called Southeast Asia a “key recruitment area for ISIS.”

II. SETTING
Basically, terrorism consists of criminal activity. The one well-known definition of terrorism is in theFederal Bureau of Investigationʼs Policy and Counterterrorism Guidelines. It states that terrorism is “aviolent act or an act dangerous to human life in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any
state to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance ofpolitical or social objectives. It has a broad definition that includes actions designed to instill fear andintimidation (Schubert, 2016).
A. Human Security Act of 2007
In the Philippines, terrorism is a crime under the Human Security Act of 2007 and is described as causingwidespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace.” The first group to be listed as a terrorist
organization under the law is the Abu Sayyaf Group, as declared by the Basilan Provincial Court on
September 10, 2015 (Sun Star, 2015).
Public transport and other gathering places, such as street markets, have been the favoured bombing
targets; however, large-scale abductions and shootings have also been carried out by the groups,
predominantly by Abu Sayyaf and the Rajah Solaiman Movement.
Most of these (groups of) individuals ended up in jails where the crime was committed. However, due to

Deputy Director, National Jail Management and Penology Training Institute, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology,
Philippines.
＊

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security reasons, these individuals were typically transported and transferred to BJMP jails located at Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. They can be re-committed to jail upon issuance of an appropriate order issued by
a competent court or authority so mandated under Philippine laws. As such, by way of imprisonment, there
had been several questions as to whether or not imprisonment helps in crime control even for individuals
behind the four walls of the jail. Some agents of criminal justice believed that imprisonment can be a form of
retribution, deterrence, reformation, and protection, but it can also be a perfect place to radicalize theinmates.
B. BJMP Manual, under Rule 1, Book II, on Safekeeping Functions
The BJMP Manual, under Rule 1, Book II, on Safekeeping Functions (Operations) enumerated thedifferent classification of inmates according to security risk. These involve among others the following: High
Profile Inmates, High Risk Inmates, High Value Target (HVT), Security Threat Group, Subversive Group,
Terrorist Group, Violent Extremist Offender (VEO), Medium Risk Inmates, and Minimum Risk Inmates(Ordinary Inmates).
Mainly, the very purpose of classification of inmates in the Jail Bureau under the Directorate forOperation Manual is to (a) separate from others those prisoners who, by reason of their criminal records or
bad characters, are likely to exercise a bad influence and (b) divide the prisoners into classes in order tofacilitate their treatment with a view to their social rehabilitation.
The Classification Board is tasked to conduct background investigation of inmates to determine the cell
assignment, the appropriate rehabilitative programme, type of supervision and degree of custody andrestrictions applicable to him/her. The investigation shall focus on the following: a. Facts and data of thepresent case; b. Earlier criminal history and if he/she is a recidivist or habitual delinquent, the facts about
his/her attitudes and behavior while confined in other institutions; c. Biography or life history; d. Medical
History; e. Vocational, recreational, educational and religious background/interests; and f. Psychologicalcharacteristics as evaluated by the psychiatrist and psychologist. The inmate is then required to appear
before the Classification Board for validation of his/her profile. Upon completion of the classificationassessment, the inmate is then apprised of his/her cell assignment and welfare programmes appropriate forhim/her.
C. Philippine Criminal Justice System
The institution of the Criminal Justice System in the country has also recognized incarceration as the best
tool to prevent and control crime; however, this strategy has remained futile in resolving the growing crime
rate in the country, and worse, resulted in progressive overcrowding of detention centres and prisons.
D. Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
The Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), created pursuant to Republic Act 6975, is under
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and is responsible for persons detained, awaiting
investigation or trial, and/or awaiting final judgement. Similar to the innovations of other correctional
institutions, the Jail Bureau emphasized the safekeeping and development of inmates as the two importantmandates to ensure the safety of individuals housed in any of its facilities.
E. Special Intensive Care Area
There were different groups of inmates detained in a Special Intensive Care Area (SICA); these include
among others: Abu Sayaff Group, Raha Solaiman Movement, Jemaah Islamiah, the Communist Party of thePhilippines/New Peopleʼs Army/National Democratic Front, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and all otherinmates detained and classified according to security risk.
Out of 29,794 NCR inmates, 2,809 inmates are classified as high-risk and high-profile or special
management (herein referred to as “high security inmates”). This constituted 10.06% of the population. With
this alarmingly increasing number, the emergence of radicalization is very much daunting. Currently, there
exists SICA 1 and SICA 2 holding 374 and 317 inmates (as of December 2016 from the database of the
Directorate for Operations), respectively. As the Jail Bureau tends to truly gauge its success on continuous
achievements, at this point, it is obvious that the jails were now struggling to attain their purpose.
Consequently, they cannot be given credence as a formal modernized detention facility to handle highsecurity inmates.
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As prison grows in complexity, the demand for secured facilities and intervention programmes, especiallyfor (radical) inmates in the country, has become essential and challenging. The Jail Bureau, in this regard,
finds it necessary to actively develop strategic action plans and preventive measures to safeguard the facility
against possible threats of escape, rescue from unfriendly forces, instabilities, riots, siege, and radicalization.
F. Experience Factors
On March 14, 2005, a 29-hour stand-off occurred by an extremist group at Special Intensive Care Area
(SICA) 1, Bicutan, Taguig City. The siege was led by Commander Robot, despite being incapacitated inside
the jail. This incident, which caused the loss of lives, was presumably a clear and distinct case ofradicalization. Although, at that time, radicalization was not yet widely known to have proliferated in thePhilippine jails. However, the vulnerability of the jail sector may become a breeding ground for radicalization,
and without being aware of it, there are greater chances of bringing surprisingly the same consequences in
the future (Bonto, 2012).
Ahmed Sadat, a Palestinian terrorist, commented in 2004 that, “The prison became their best university
for finding and teaching recruits” (Speckhard, 2007). It has been said and done in 2005 at SICA, Bicutan,
Taguig wherein the extremist led by commander Robot successfully radicalized some inmates to join the
Abu Sayyaf groups and put the jail under siege.
It also assumes that terrorists live in places where they can be singled out and hunted down. In fact,
terrorists do not fight on traditional battlefields: they live and fight among civilians, making it difficult to know
where to aim, and even more difficult to avoid civilian casualties. Their goal is to frighten the enemy into
launching attacks that hurt civilians (Stern, 2010).
The terrorist strategy of fighting is within places of civilians, valuable and historical structures, more so in
prison jails. These will serve as their shield and part of their glory once unsuccessful and killed. They standhappily with their ideologies that their death is admirable when they killed a lot of civilians and humiliatedthe government.
However, terrorists are still human beings who need care and treatment. If they are living in a wrong wayof thought or ideologies, that is because they are also victims, having been tricked, swayed or seduced into
adopting a radical perspective. They are victims, objects of pity and fear who have been dragged away fromtheir homeland into foreign beliefs and alien values (Edwards, 2015). If radicals are products of radicalization,then it is true to believe that there is a chance for them to be deradicalized and to bring back to their normal
perspective of life.
G. Prison-Based Disengagement Interventions
Radicals are known people who hold extreme views and ideologies that are not open to any kind ofcounselling to change their perspective. The BJMP initiated the implementation of Alternative Learning
System (ALS) for the deradicalization of inmates at SICA 1 and 2 in 2012. ALS is a kind of programme which
serves as an intervention strategy for high-risk and high-profile inmates. The ALS is a national government
programme under the Department of Education (DepEd). The programme provides a viable alternative tothe existing formal education instruction encompassing both the non-formal and informal sources ofknowledge and skills that provide “education for all”.
The DepEdʼs Bureau of Non-Formal Education (BNFE) was renamed as the Bureau of Alternative
Learning System (BALS) by virtue of Executive Order No. 356 (2004). It aims to provide a free education
programme implemented by the Department of Education (DepEd) under the Bureau of Alternative
Learning System which benefits those who cannot afford formal schooling and at their available schedule. It isa ladder-like, modular non-formal education programme in the Philippines for dropouts of elementary andsecondary schools, out-of-school youths, non-readers, working Filipinos and even senior citizens. It became
part of the educational system of the Philippines but an alternative to the regular classroom studies where
Filipino students are required to attend daily.
Through the ALS, it is more fitting to say that a majority of those incarcerated lack formal education.
However, despite this fact, the person charged with a crime should not be denied of his/her freedom andprotection of the laws. Thus, the present task of todayʼs modern penologists as agents of the government is to59

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be morally responsible in upholding the fundamental rights of its clientele during their stays in jail.

III. CHALLENGES TO THE BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGYAt the very least, the BJMP must put emphasis on this, and complacency by disregarding radicalization injails is not an option. The Jail Bureau cannot afford to experience another stand-off brought about by
terrorists or other group of high profile inmates that causes loss of lives and destruction of facilities. The
BJMP, having the mandate and big role in public safety, must act in a way toward sustainable homeland
security.
The rehabilitation programmes of detainees at SICA 1 and 2 are usually part of a larger deradicalization
scheme. Different countries used strategies to rehabilitate individuals and vulnerable communities, ranging
from engagement to winning their hearts and minds, but the main purpose of the programmes is neutralizing
the security threats.
In response to the challenge of terrorism, during the last quarter of 2008 up to the third quarter of 2009,
the Prison/De-radicalization/Counter Radicalization Program of the National Intelligence Coordinating
Agency (NICA), through its Anti-Terrorism Council Coordinating Center (ATC-CC) began a nationwide
information campaign among jail wardens and prison authorities on the phenomenon of terroristsʼ
recruitment inside jail and prison facilities, or what is simply known as “prison radicalization”.
Strongly supported by BJMP management and heavily participated in by BJMP Wardens nationwide, theprogramme continued through its second phase of implementation in early 2010 with the crafting of a
National Project Framework for Intensified Prison De-radicalization Program. The second phase of the
programme is now organized by the National Counter Terrorism Unit (NCTU) of the NICA.
Towards this end, the proponent as a Commissioned Officer of the Jail Bureau has acknowledged his rolein the management of said inmates. Though the detention facilities are places of vulnerability in whichradicalization and all other forms of ferocity may take place, nevertheless, these facilities can also become
special places for the transformation and reintegration of individuals behind bars, not excluding the radicals.
It was necessary to actively develop strategic action plans and preventive measures to deradicalize (radical)
inmates in order to safeguard the jail facilities in the country against possible threats of escape, rescue from
unfriendly forces, instability, riots, siege and other jail disturbances that affect public safety.
There should be a clear motivation and goal against the current situation of jail management even during
the most difficult time of seeking support to improve the administrative, logistical, and operational services of
the Jail Bureau. This will eventually set how the organization should be planned and programmed and how
the (radical) inmates should be managed during their period of confinement. Hence, certain priorities anddevelopments should be ideally employed in all areas of concern to strengthen the capabilities of the JailBureau in the deradicalization programme through the Alternative Learning System in coordination with the
Department of Education. This will create and stimulate the foundation on which the Bureauʼs mission andvision is based.

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REPORTS OF THE COURSEGROUP 1

SPECIFIC MEASURES:DISENGAGEMENT INTERVENTIONS IN PRISONS
Rapporteur: Ms. Folole Lemisio (Samoa)
Co-Rapporteur: Ms. Remona Visser (Namibia)

Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Members

Advisers

Mr. Ahmad Altaharwah
Mr. Nanding Bayle
Mr. Yuta Abe
Mr. Galih Rakasiwi
Ms. Chantima Uiyyasathian
Mr. JongWoong Youn
Mr. Kei Takayama
Mr. Yukio Kono
Prof. Mana Yamamoto
Prof. Fumiko Akashi(Jordan)(Philippines)(Japan)(Indonesia)(Thailand)(Korea)(Japan)(Japan)(UNAFEI)(UNAFEI)

I. INTRODUCTION
Group 1 started its discussion on the 4th of September 2017. The group elected by consensus thechairperson, co-chairperson, rapporteur and co-rapporteur. Five topics were decided by the group as themost important to address:
A. How do we manage prison staff and other people who work with organized crime members andviolent extremists?
B. How do we classify, allocate and accommodate violent extremists in prison?
C. How can we assess violent extremistsʼ risk and needs?
D. What are methods and approaches to delivering interventions, especially psychological and cognitive
interventions?
E. How can we involve community and governmental organizations in the process of reintegration ofrehabilitated violent extremist offenders into the community?

II. SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSIONS
Brief summary of the problem (definitions) the group discussed:
1. The logic behind disengagement programmes: Radical Islamism has been an enduring problem formany nations, but it became a prominent international priority only after the 9/11 attacks. Counterterrorism
campaigns in many theatres around the world have produced a mounting number of incarcerated Islamist
extremists. These detainees present a dual problem for the nations holding them. Firstly, most states do notwant to hold the growing numbers of extremists in their prisons indefinitely, and, in many cases, they lack theresources to do so. They have, therefore, searched for a way to rehabilitate these prisoners so that they canbe released without posing a threat to society. Secondly, many states have recognized that prisons are often
incubators of radicalization, and, in an effort to stymie this process, they have sought to tackle radicalizationin their penitentiaries by reforming violent extremist detainees.
2. Radicalization: Most of the definitions currently in circulation describe radicalization as the process (orprocesses) whereby individuals or groups come to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use ofviolence for political aims. (Ms. Chiara Bologna, UNICRI, Preventing and Countering terrorism and violent
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extremism, 167th UNAFEI International Training Course (5 September 2017)
3. Disengagement entails a change in behaviour (i.e., refraining from violence and withdrawing from aradical organization) but not necessarily a change in beliefs. A person could exit a radical organization andrefrain from violence but nevertheless retain a radical worldview. (Dr. Andrea Moser, Correctional Service
Canada Management of Radicalized Offenders and Security Threat Groups in a Correctional Context, 167th
UNAFEI International Training Course (30 August 2017)
A. How Do We Manage Prison Staff and Other People Who Work with Organized Crime Members andViolent Extremists?
Individuals play an integral role in any workforce. Prison systems cannot function well if there are no staff
members to implement its core responsibilities. Hence prison administrations should recognize this anddevote significant time and resources to the recruitment, selection and training of personnel who work inprison. Ensuring that prisons holding violent extremist prisoners have a sufficient number of good quality andwell-trained staff should be a priority for all prison systems.
1. Quality of Prison Staff
Staff working with violent extremist prisoners requires a good combination of personal qualities andtechnical skills, and high standards of personal and professional conduct. They need personal qualities thatenable them to deal with all prisoners, including the difficult, dangerous and manipulative, in an even-handed,
humane and just manner. It should be remembered that people joining the prison administration do so with arange of existing skills, knowledge and abilities.
2. Recruitment and Selection of Staff
Safeguards should be put in place to ensure that staff selected to work with violent extremist prisoners
are not members of violent extremist groups, criminal gangs or associated with organized crime, and are notbeing used to infiltrate the prison.
Every effort should be made to recruit staff from ethnic, religious and racial minorities and indigenous
peoples represented among the violent extremist prisoner population. This will help to ensure a better
understanding among staff about different cultures and establish a nondiscriminatory attitude towards
prisoners from minority groups and indigenous peoples.
Particular attention needs to be paid to the recruitment of specialist staff. These are likely to be
individuals who are already trained in a specific profession. They will include faith leaders, teachers,
instructors and health-care staff. Adequate numbers of specialist staff, such as psychiatrists, psychologists
and social workers, should also be appointed to prisons holding violent extremist prisoners, given therequirement to address the complex needs of this group of prisoners.
3. Training and Development of Staff
Training, which is crucial to any environment, is especially important for people working with violent
extremist prisoners. International standards indicate that prison staff should receive training before
beginning work in prison (pre-service “orientation” training) and throughout their careers in the prison
administration (in-service “refresher” training).
Introductory-level modules such as on “Managing violent extremists in prison” or on “Identifying
radicalization to violence within prison” can be delivered to new staff as part of their primary orientation
training. In addition, it is important to offer courses that educate and sensitize staff to linguistic, cultural andreligious diversity.
More advanced training should be provided for staff working with violent extremist prisoners on a daily
basis and should include topics such as: understanding violent extremism; recognizing signs of radicalization
to violence; assessment of violent extremist prisoners; implementing a positive regime for violent extremist
prisoners; assessment of intelligence and other information about violent extremist prisoners; and anticonditioning and manipulation training. It is particularly important that frontline prison staff understand andare carefully attuned to the disengagement and reintegration process, even if they are not directly
responsible for its delivery. Staff should avoid actions that undermine disengagement and reintegration.
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167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE(Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization toViolence in Prisons 2016 )4. Conditions of Service
As the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela
Rules) make clear, prison staff should be given appropriate status, levels of pay and conditions of employment.
The conditions of service for staff working with violent extremist prisoners should reflect the challenges andimportance of their role. The issue of pay requires careful consideration. If staff does not receive salary levels
appropriate to the economic situation in their country, they may be open to corruption of a direct or indirect
nature.
5. Contributions of Specialist Staff and Other People
Faith professionals: Integrating appropriate faith professionals into the disengagement process should beconsidered, as they can play an important role in the process.
6. Psychologists
Psychologists can play a key role in the disengagement process and should be fully integrated into thosedisengagement interventions. They can help identify factors in the social context and psychological make-up
that made the individual vulnerable to violent extremism and the motivational factors that contributed to his
or her decision to engage in violent extremist activity.
B. How Do We Classify, Allocate and Accommodate Violent Extremists in Prison?
Governments everywhere have to ask themselves how violent extremists are different from “ordinary”
prisoners and what this means for how they should be treated in prison.
1. Prison regimes for violent extremists need to be informed by a sophisticated understanding of the
motivations and behaviours of politically motivated offenders, who ‒ unlike “ordinary prisoners” ‒ may
want to mobilize outside support.
2. Radicalize other prisoners, and (in the case of violent extremists) re-create operational command
structures.
3. Most practice a policy of dispersal and (partial) concentration, which distributes violent extremists
among a small number of high security prisons. The overall approach can be characterized as“security first”,
4. In the prison context, most difficulties in dealing with violent extremists are caused precisely by thefact that these offenders do not see themselves as criminals. Rather than quietly serving theirsentences, many regard their time in prison as an opportunity to continue the “struggle”,
5. Challenges in dealing with violent extremist inmates include:
6 Preventing the radicalization of (non-violent-extremist) inmates;
6 Preventing the maintenance and/or re-creation of operational command structures;
6 Preventing the exploitation of the prison environment for the purpose of mobilizing outside
support. In addition, prison regimes for violent extremists should also aspire to:✓ Providing opportunities for deradicalization and disengagement; and✓ Making a positive contribution to reducing terrorism and radicalization on the outside.
6. Concentration, Separation and Isolation
All prison services that deal with violent extremists need to decide how to distribute this prisoner
population around their systems. In most cases, this boils down to three related questions, namely
whether they should all be held in one place (concentration); whether they should they be separated
from the general prison population (separation); and if they should be isolated from each other(isolation). There is no one right answer, and prison administrations will need to determine the best
approach to accommodation, based on specific factors within the country, such as:
6 The size of the violent extremist population
6 The state of the prison infrastructure
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6
6

The financial resources available
The cultural, political and social context (Dr. Andrea Moser, Management of radicalized offenders
and security threat groups in a correctional context, 167th UNAFEI International Training
Course, 30 August 2017 )The group explored different accommodation strategies used by countries such as France, Spain,
England/Wales, Morocco, Canada, Algeria and Indonesia. Some Member States adopt a mixed approachbased on the influence of the violent extremist prisoner. For example, violent extremist ideologues andcharismatic leaders are assessed as more likely to radicalize others than those who are criminal opportunists.
Therefore, the ideologues and leaders are separated from the general population, while criminal opportunists
are integrated with the general population. (Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation andReintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders)
The group agreed:6

To adopt a hybrid strategy that merges the ideas of separation (separate housing units) and isolation(single cells) depending on the level of influence and modus operandi based on assessment, in orderto deny violent extremists the opportunity to influence vulnerable prisoners in the general
population.

6

That those who are successfully rehabilitated can be moved back into the general population.

C. How Can We Assess Violent Extremistsʼ Risk and Needs?
Assessment may be conducted during an offenderʼs stay in prison, and an assessment is also
recommended: (a) at the time of determining the appropriate sanctions or measure or when diversion fromformal criminal proceedings is being considered; (b) at the beginning of a period of supervision; (c) whenever
there are significant changes in the offenderʼs life; (d) when consideration is being given to a change in thenature or the level of supervision; or (e) at the end of the supervision measure.
There are methods and instruments to evaluate the key factors that may have an impact on the likelihoodthat an offender will reoffend. These risk factors are defined as prior factors that increase the probability(risk) of reoffending and the potential danger an offender may thus represent to the victim and thecommunity.
Knowledge about risk factors associated with recidivism can be used to develop profiles of high-risk
offenders (forensic profiles) to help practitioners and decision makers identify candidates for various forms ofintervention. Evidence suggests that an accumulation of risk factors in an individualʼs life is associated with ahigher likelihood of involvement in criminal behaviour.
A lot of work has been done to try to identify an empirical framework capable of supporting decisions
concerning the treatment of offenders and their successful reintegration into the community.
The risk-needs-responsivity (RNR) framework is one of those frameworks, initially based on research toidentify the risk factors associated with recidivism (as outlined in the UNODC Introductory Handbook on theprevention of recidivism and the social reintegration of offenders p 38).
1. Risk
6 What do we know about offender characteristics that are associated with reoffending
6 Risk factors are not necessarily causal factors (behavioural and cognitive markers)
6 Risk factors can be static or dynamic
6 High-risk offenders can be identified
2. Needs
6 Needs that are criminogenic (associated with reoffending)
6 Needs that can be addressed by treatment or other interventions
6 Needs may vary by types of offender (e.g. violent offenders)
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167TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE

3. Responsivity
6 General responsivity (emphasis on cognitive social learning interventions within a supportive
structure)
6 Specific responsivity (motivation, special characteristics of offenders, special circumstances, culture)
These risk factors are not necessarily causal, but their identification led to the formulation of the notion of“criminogenic needs” associated with the factors and are therefore related in a more “causal way” toreoffending. These criminogenic needs can be understood as issues that must be addressed by treatment,
including various cognitive-behavioural intervention techniques.
Furthermore, a risk/needs assessment is not complete without a corollary assessment of protective (orresiliency) factors. These are factors that reduce the risks for the onset and repeat offending behaviour
associated with the risk factors.
A number of tools have been developed and validated for different types of offenders in order to proceed
as systematically as possible with the identification of risk factors in individual offenders. However, there arequite few specific tools for violent extremists at the moment, for example, VERA-II (Pressman, D. andFlockton, J. (2014) “Violent extremist risk assessment: issues and applications of the VERA II in a highsecurity setting”, chapter 9 in Silke, A. (ed.) Prisons, Terrorism and Extremist – Critical Issues inManagement, Radicalization and Reform.) and ERG22 (Lloyd, M and Dean, C. (2015) “The Development ofStructured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders”, Journal of Threat Assessment andManagement, 2015, Vol.2, No. 1,40-52.)
Summary of scored areas for VERA II
Beliefs and attitudes

Risk Factors (Not changeable)

Need Factor (Changeable)

Victim of personal or group injusticeand grievances

Feelings of hate, frustration, persecution and / or alienation
Dehumanization of identified targets
of injusticeRejection of democratic, pluralistic
society and values
Attachment to ideology justifying
violence
Hostility to national collective identity/identity conflict
Lack of understanding or empathy for
those outside own groupContext and intent

Seeker, consumer, developer of violent
extremist materials

Anger and expressed intent to act
violently

Identification of target (person, place,group) in response to perceived injusticeExpressed desire to die for cause or
martyrdom

Active personal contact with violent
extremists

Expressed intent to plan, prepare
violent action
Susceptible to influence, authority,
indoctrination

History and capability

Early exposure to pro-violence militant ideology
Network of family, friends involved inviolent action
Prior criminal history of violence
Tactical, paramilitary, explosive train65

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 104

ing
Extremist ideological training
Access to funds, resources, organizational skills
Commitment andmotivation

Driven by perceived noble cause/
glorification of violent action/religious
obligation
Driven by opportunism, excitement,
adventure
Driven by comradery, group belonging, status in group, social needs
Driven by moral imperative, moral
superiority, identity
Driven by excitement, adventure

Protective items

Re-interpretation of ideology less rigid, absolute; rejection of violence to obtaingoals, change of vision of enemy; involvement with offence-related programmes; community support for non-violence, family support for non-violence.

D. What Are the Methods and Approaches to Delivering Interventions, Especially Psychological andCognitive Interventions?
Key Components of Successful Disengagement Programmes:
1. To effectively challenge radical Islamism, a programme must employ an interlocutor whom themilitants view as credible. In addition, after the programme has been completed, graduates must be
carefully monitored and offered continued support to reduce the likelihood of recidivism.
2. Disengagement programme is not likely to succeed unless the ties with the organization can be broken
and alternative means to meet the militantʼs psychological and material needs are provided. (RomeMemorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders)
3. Many radical organizations not only provide for all their membersʼ basic needs, but they also offer
assistance to their membersʼ families. Thus, disengagement programmes need to help ex-militants andtheir families find alternative sources of income, housing, health care, and education.
4. Disengagement programmes need to continue to monitor and support rehabilitated violent extremists
after they have completed the programme to facilitate their reintegration into mainstream society.
5. It appears that it is important that efforts be made to facilitate the process of disengagement during
the crucial early stages.
6. A government can take actions that make disengagement more attractive and continued extremist
behaviour less appealing by implementing counterterrorism measures that increase the costs ofremaining in an extremist organization while strategically offering incentives that increase thebenefits of exiting.
7. It is important that these programmes continue to assist freed, rehabilitated individuals. In particular,
the programme should assist the ex-militant in finding a job and locating a supportive environment(Ms. Chiara Bologna UNICRI, Prison-based rehabilitation and reintegration approaches andcommunity-led initiatives, 167th UNAFEI International Training Course (7 Sepember 2017)
8. Rehabilitated violent extremists engage extremists in discussions of Islamic theology in an effort toconvince the militants that their interpretation of Islam is wrong.
9. Prison Imams:
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Little attention had been paid to the provision of religious services for this segment of the prison
population. Only recently have prison services begun to embrace the institution of the prison imam asa counter-radicalization tool.
E. How Can We Involve Community and Governmental Organizations in the Process of Reintegrationof Rehabilitated Violent Extremists into the Community?
In order to ensure public reassurance and understanding, regular work with the media (newspapers,
television) should take place to explain the positive disengagement activity taking place in prison, The
growing popularity of social media offers many opportunities for publicizing disengagement activity andsuccess stories to the members of the community, including celebrities and other influential personalities, canalso help inspire change among violent extremist prisoners, and could be included in disengagement
interventions. The motivational themes and public service messages they deliver can be quite captivatingand effective. Enhancing relationships with the private sector to support the released extremist with
employment opportunities or financial support after release is also important. (Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Global
Terrorist rehabilitation and community engagement programs: The state-of-the-Art, 167th UNAFEIInternational Training Course (8 September 2017).
Good governance can deter the involvement of people from terrorist activities, and consideration should
also be given to involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-sector organizations and theprivate sector. These bodies are often not seen as being part of the system or State and, therefore, may find it
easier to establish relationships with violent extremist prisoners. Engaging these groups brings the added
benefit of continuity of care for the reintegration of violent extremist prisoners upon release. The prison
authorities should carefully assess external bodies before they are permitted to engage with violent
extremist prisoners.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Recommendations
At the end of the discussion, the Group reached a consensus on the following recommendations:
1. Prison staff working on this challenging category of prisoners should be carefully selected for theirintegrity, humanity, professional capacity, personal suitability and ability.
2. Prison administrators should implement measures to prevent prisons from becoming locations inwhich violent extremism can thrive and where prisoners can be radicalized to violence. All violent
extremist prisoners should be (a) separated according to gender, legal status, and age; (b) classified
according to the information gained through the risk and needs assessment; and (c) categorizedaccording to the appropriate level of security they will need to be held in.
3. Upon admission of a violent extremist prisoner, a thorough, evidence-based risk and needs assessment
should be undertaken by specialized trained staff and based on structured professional judgement.
4. Disengagement interventions may consist of a variety of activities including:
Psychological counselling and support; cognitive-behavioural programmes; social work interventions;faith-based debate and dialogue;
5. In order to ensure public reassurance and understanding, regular work with the media should takeplace to explain the positive disengagement activity taking place in prison. Consideration should also
be given to involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community sector organizations and theprivate sector.
B. Conclusion
1. The first and most crucial recommendation is to enhance security, staff training, and evidence-based
assessment that contributes to classification and allocation. Furthermore, it is necessary to provide
meaningful programmes and work collaboratively with the wider community, allowing violent
extremists to develop stable inmate identities.

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2. The good practices outlined in this document are intended to inform and guide countries as they
develop programmes designed to rehabilitate and disengage incarcerated violent extremists or toaddress more general issues relating to prison radicalization.
3. The document also can be used to shape any bilateral or multilateral technical or other capacitybuilding assistance that is provided in this area.

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GROUP 2RESPONDING TO ORGANIZED CRIME MEMBERS AND TERRORISTS
IN CONTACT WITH THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PENAL SYSTEMS
Rapporteur: Mr. Soufiane Ahoujil (Morocco)
Co-Rapporteur: Ms. Li Pui Ling (Hong Kong)
Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Members

Advisers

Mr. Carlos Vinicius Cabeleira
Mr. Adam Azim
Ms. Phoungpaka Wilson
Mr. Helder Cosme Marcal Belo
Mr. Karma Tshewang
Mr. Adachi Taku
Mr. Sakatani Tokuji
Mr. Tsukahara Akihiro
Mr. Yamane Sachio
Prof. Takeshi MatsumotoProf. Hiroyuki Watanabe(Brazil)(Maldives)(Thailand)(Timor-Leste)(Bhutan)(Japan)(Japan)(Japan)(Japan)(UNAFEI)(UNAFEI)

I. INTRODUCTION
Group 2 started its discussion on 4 September 2017. The group elected, by consensus, Mr. Carlos Vinicius
Cabeleira as its chairperson, Mr. Adam Azim as its co-chairperson, Mr. Soufiane Ahoujil as its rapporteur,and Ms. Li Pui Ling as its co-rapporteur. The group was assigned to discuss the topic of “responding toorganized crime members and terrorists in contact with the criminal justice and penal system”. Despite
differences in each countryʼs penal and correctional systems, the group undisputedly agreed that alternative
measures to incarceration have many advantages but are, nonetheless, difficult to implement considering thespecific requirements they entail. In addition, all participants concurred that offendersʼ reintegration throughalternative measures necessitates the support of several stakeholders as well as sufficient financial resources.

II. SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSIONS
Throughout the discussions, the group identified two major themes pertaining to organized crime
members and terrorists in contact with the criminal justice and penal systems, i.e. A) alternative measures toincarceration; B) reintegration into society: rehabilitation after release.
A. Alternative Measures to Incarceration
Through the discussions, most participants agreed that many forms of alternative measures need to betaken to divert offenders from jail into the community. Hence, to confront the underlying causes of crime, andensure offenders stay on track, it was suggested by all participants that courts should tailor sentences that fit
offenders, protect citizens and provide suitable rehabilitation programmes.
During the discussion, the group considered both the use of this measure in the extra judicial phase, as analternative to prosecution, and their assignment in the adjudication, as an alternative to imprisonment.
Alternative measures to incarceration may be used for some associates of criminal organizations or lowrisk offenders. For terrorists, however, some difficulties were pointed out. Indeed, some participants believethat they should be jailed, but depending on the crime they perpetrated.
Reasons why alternatives to incarceration are difficult implement:a) Potential risk to society (reoffending, radicalize others etc.)b) Ideology-driven crime (need to address ideology itself)c) Security issues for the suspects/accused.

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Advantages of alternative measures:a) Preventing sympathizers from joining terrorist organizations.
b) Identifying low-risk offenders to avoid high-risk reoffending.
Upon discussion, the group concurred that alternative measures to incarceration can also involve
terrorists, while considering:







The severity of the crime charged
The kind of organization they are affiliated withAcceptance of alternative measures by the victim and the community
The level of radicalization to violence and commitment to violent extremism.
The offenderʼs receptiveness to intervention and treatment
The likelihood of the person reoffending

1. Procedural Considerations: Pre-assessment
The group debated the necessity of creating a pre-assessment procedure to implement appropriate
treatment of offenders. Some participants referred to one of the Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF)
recommendations, stating that “alternative measures should be based on a comprehensive assessment process1”.
Likewise, a participant contended that in the case of juvenile offenders, it is necessary “to hold investigations
using medical, psychological, pedagogical and other expert knowledge and, among other items, the findings ofthe assessment by the juvenile classification home2”. The above-mentioned participant also indicated that preassessment is not necessary for adult cases, considering that judges are entitled to decide a sentence based on
the nature of the act committed rather than the personʼs characteristics. Nevertheless, all participants agreed
that in some alleged terrorist-related crimes, pre-assessment is a viable means to help investigatingprosecutors and judges impose appropriate treatment for offenders. Most participants agreed that probation
officers involved in the implementation of alternative measures to incarceration should play a part in the preassessment process; given their ability to determine which alternative measures to incarceration best suits
the offender. In addition, many participants emphasized the importance of intelligence gathering in the preassessment process.
2. Examples(a) Community service
During the discussion, most members of the group agreed that community-service can be a reparative
sanction, in the sense that it defines responsibility of the offender for their crime and can reduce prison
overcrowding. By contrast, some participants stated that judges can sentence defendants to perform unpaid
community service under enhanced supervision, mainly on behalf of civic or non-profit organizations. Somegroup members, however, argued that serious crimes such as first-degree murder, firearms trafficking,conspiracy and terrorist-related cases should not be subject to community corrections. Most participants also
pointed out that if the offender violates the terms set by the court, probation should be revoked, after which
the offender is liable to a term of imprisonment. The group also suggested that the offender be given theopportunity to repair the damage caused by their crime.
(b) Electronic Monitoring
In parallel, most participants agreed that electronic monitoring can be a relevant community-basedalternative measure to incarceration, mainly for low-risk offenders. Hence, upon discussion, it was asserted
that proximity monitoring can identify offendersʼ locations using electronic ankle or wrist bracelets. However,from various viewpoints that have been expressed during the discussion, some participants were reluctant as
to the use of that alternative. They argued that no such alternative is stipulated by their respective countriesʼ
constitutional texts, considering it a violation of privacy, mainly without the offenderʼs prior consent.
Nevertheless, all members of the group shared the view that if the offender violates conditions set by the
court regarding that alternative measure (ex: taking off the bracelet), the offender should be denied the rightto undergo electronic monitoring.

The GCTFʼs “Recommendations on the Effective of Appropriate Alternative Measures for Terrorism-Related Offenses(Recommendation 6)”.
2
Article 9 of the Japanese Juvenile Law.
1

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B. Reintegration into Society: Rehabilitation after Release
1. The Role of the Community and Civil Society
The group agreed that reintegration is of the utmost importance for organized crime group members or
terrorists. Hence, with the exception of convicts sentenced to death, all offenders have to receive necessary
support to go back to the community. All participants underscored that the reintegration process shall begin
before an offenderʼs release, by promoting interaction between reintegration partners and offenders before
release.
In addition, the group called attention to the fact that reintegration is a fundamental approach inaddressing recidivism, on account of the fact that offenders may well undergo rehabilitation programmes andyet unscrupulously reoffend all over again. Therefore, there was general agreement that community
acceptance is the backbone of social reintegration. Accordingly, the group unanimously agreed on thefollowing measures as being advantageous, mainly to organized crime members and terrorists:(a) Religious partners
Group members discussed the situation in some countries, such as Morocco, Maldives and Singapore,
where official bodies are in charge of religious education, notably the Ministry of Religious Endowment whichworks in collaboration with the correctional department in implementing peer education programmes andnational religious contests (Quran memorization and recitation, prophetic Hadith memorization, etc.). In Brazil
and Japan, however, official religious bodies or agencies are not permitted to undertake such activities.
Despite all those differences, the group members highlighted the importance of religious guidance inreintegration.
(b) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
It was stated by visiting experts that in order to make good use of community resources, NGOs should
provide support, counselling, recreational activities and visits to organized-crime members (OCMs) andterrorists. In this regard, most participants agreed that halfway houses are essential for supporting released
offenders and an opportunity for them to learn the necessary skills to reintegrate into society. In addition,
the group believes that halfway houses can bridge the gap between prison and community, thus enabling
OCMs and terrorists to start afresh with the aid of community support networks.
(c) Companies/Employers
The group reached a consensus that providing OCM/terrorist offenders with an adequate income isfundamental to bringing them back into society. Hence, government policies are no less necessary inadvocating and encouraging the public to employ OCMs/terrorists. Consequently, the overwhelming
majority of the group stressed the significance of the governmentsʼ input in supporting companies or
employers in hiring former OCMs and terrorists. Throughout the discussion, focus was placed on the“Incentive Payment” and “Guarantor” systems in Japan. Most participants called for encouraging the private
sector to offer more job opportunities to offenders. Moreover, public campaigns in recognizing thecontribution of such cooperative employers as well as promoting corporate social responsibility may also
increase the number of cooperative employers.
(d) Individuals
The group discussed and expressed their interest in volunteer probation officers as being preponderant
players in supporting rehabilitation of former offenders in the community and connecting them with welfare
services. All agreed that volunteer probation officers (VPOs) play the most important role in the Japanese
offendersʼ rehabilitation system. Furthermore, volunteersʼ active participation would assist former
OCMs/terrorists and regular offenders in reintegration. The implementation of the VPO system wasunanimously highly regarded by group members for giving support and advice as well as serving as a model
to OCMs/terrorists.
(e) Mass Media
Most participants concurred that mass media is a public channel that not only helps with the transmissionof positive messages, but also enhances the publicʼs acceptance of offendersʼ rehabilitation. Self-reflection offormer organized crime members and terrorists and interviews may be adopted for such objectives.
Nevertheless, victimsʼ feelings and consent should be taken into consideration when using the mass media.

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2. Restorative Justice
Most participants agreed that restorative justice can repair harm and restore justice to the victims. They
stated that the justice system can resort to victim-offender mediation and conferencing through joint
meetings with the offender and the victimʼs family, with a view to reaching an agreement as to which option
may best suit the victimʼs family and the community.

III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations outlined in this report are intended to demonstrate that organized crime members
and terrorists should not be considered as an obstacle to the implementation of alternative measures,
especially in the case of juvenile offenders, first-time offenders, etc. Nevertheless, balance needs be struck
regarding the rights of individual offenders and those of the victims, as well as the concern for public safety.
Therefore, at the end of the discussion, the group reached a consensus that the following should berecommended as possible measures. Key components in implementing alternative measures for OCMs andterrorists would be:) Creating a pre-assessment procedure at the request of the court or authority in charge of thedecision, by public officers involved in the supervision process or experts, with the objective ofproviding information regarding the proper assignment of alternative measures.
) In addition to the punitive scope, the judicial and criminal justice systems should consider the
reintegration of organized crime or violent extremist offenders as one of the main objectives ofincarceration.
) Providing close assistance to offenders in the community and connecting them with the community:(halfway houses, probation officers, etc.).
) Offering job opportunities to offenders and financial support to reintegration programmes, according
to their corporate social responsibility, by providing government support to private companies.
) Providing religious assistance and guidance on behalf of ideologically driven violent extremists byofficial agencies or private religious organizations, according to each countryʼs legal system.
) Particular attention should be given to reconciliation with victims and the community, to enable theoffender to express regret and repentance through direct communication, written communication orvideos, as well as mass and social media.
References:- The GCTFʼs “Recommendations on the Effective of Appropriate Alternative Measures for TerrorismRelated Offenses (Recommendation 6)”.
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Article 9 of the Japanese Juvenile Law.

PART TWORESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES
No. 104

Work Product of the 20th UNAFEI UNCAC Training Programme
Effective Measures to Investigate the Proceeds of Corruption Crimes

UNAFEIVISITING EXPERTSʼ PAPERS(ANTI)CORRUPTION WITHOUT BORDERS: BEST PRACTICES ANDLESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CAR WASH CASE
Vladimir Aras＊

I. INTRODUCTION
March 2014 will long be remembered in Brazil as a turning point. A huge police operation took place inCuritiba and other Brazilian cities. The Lava Jato (Car Wash) case was started. There is little doubt that aculture of self-enrichment and collusion prevailed at the top echelons of Brazilian government and businesssector, and kickbacks were and still are the norm when it comes to large government contracts.
According to the Latinobarómetro1, for the first time in Brazilian history, corruption is at the forefront of
citizens concerns. Since 2003 reducing corruption has been a major issue, and it is also a subject considered bypolicymakers when building local, public policies. It is quite easy to perceive that grand corrupt practices
have a close connection with poor public management, which has well-known impacts on social rights.
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson explain that “[e] mpowerment at the grass-roots level in Brazil
ensured that the transition to democracy corresponded to a move toward inclusive political institutions, andthus was a key factor in the emergence of a government committed to the provision of public services,educational expansion, and a truly level playing field”2. One of those inclusive institutions in Brazil is the
Public Prosecution Service3, responsible for fighting corruption in both civil and criminal arenas and toadvocate civil and social rights before Brazilian courts.
Many countries in Latin America have been struggling against corruption and bribery for many years.
Citizens across the Americas press for more transparent governance, probity and accountability. Somenations in the hemisphere, including Brazil, have implemented legal reforms that favour integrity andaccountability. However, other civic attempts to implement new laws were defeated, as the nation witnessed
last year when the Brazilian Parliament rejected the bill for the 10 Measures Against Corruption. In thisregard, the ratification of international treaties on anti-corruption is of paramount importance for theadvancement of Latin American nations on this item. At this point, the results achieved by prosecutors andother law enforcement agents across the region have been impressive.
Brazil and other countries in this region are striving to counter corruption since popular demands formore transparency and integrity are increasing. On the other hand, politicians and some entities from theprivate sector are resisting and pushing back reforms against the work of those national institutions engaged
in anti-corruption efforts. When prosecutors use the powers vested in them by the Constitution to initiateprobes, immediate retaliation is expected. This decade seems to be a perfect time to raise awareness on thehuge costs of corruption and its impact on civil and social rights.
In this article, I intend to address the current Brazilian criminal and civil justice practice against
corruption, constructed over the past two decades. International cooperation strategy with foreignauthorities to tackle cross-border corruption is also discussed. Considering my vantage point as former head
Federal Appellate Prosecutor in Brasilia, Brazil, former Head of the International Cooperation Unit at the Office of theProsecutor General (2013-2017), Professor of Criminal Law, Master degree in Public Law (UFPE), MBA in Public Management(FGV), UNAFEI alumni.
1
Latinobarómetro Corporation is a non-profit NGO based in Santiago, Chile, and is responsible for data production andpublication on Latin American democratic, social and economic development, using indicators of opinion, attitudes, behaviour
and values.
2
Why nations Fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Profile Books, London, 2013, p. 460.
3This institution is known as “Ministério Público” in Portuguese.
＊

75

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 104of the international cooperation unit at the Office of the Prosecutor General4 between 2013 and 2017, myintention is to provide an overview of the good practices applied on and the lessons learned from the Lava
Jato case. In other words, this essay will analyse the Brazilian context and drill down on lessons learned froma major, recent corruption scandal, the largest corruption scheme ever unveiled in Latin America.

II. THE 2030 AGENDA FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
It is very important to consider the purpose of fighting corruption for the development of human societies.
It is not about incarcerating people, according to a criminal law perspective. It is all about enforcing citizenʼsrights. Having this in mind, in 2015, the United Nations have decided to adopt new global Sustainable
Development Goals (SDG). The representatives of the Member States have resolved “to end poverty andhunger; to combat inequalities within and among countries; to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies; toprotect human rights and promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; and to ensure
the lasting protection of the planet and its natural resources”5. This is a new agenda to be accomplished by
2030.
For the purpose of this article, one should pay attention to the Goal 16, which calls for the promotion ofpeaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, demands that access to justice is provided for all,and requires nations to build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. Some of the main
targets of SDG 16 are to:16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justicefor all
16.4 By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return ofstolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime
16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels
16. 10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance withnational legislation and international agreements
16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building
capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism
and crime.
Notably, by implementing target 16.5 nations across the globe are expected to reduce corruption andbribery as a way to save and provide public moneys, funds and resources to provide health and educational
services, build infrastructure works, empower women, protect children, enforce environmental laws and soon, in order to achieve sustainable development all over the world.

III. THE BRAZILIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMFirstly, I would like to explain how the prosecution services in Brazil are organized. An independent
nation since 1822, Brazil is a federation of 26 States and the Federal District, which means that there arefederal and state courts, and federal and state prosecution services in all the 26 Brazilian states and in theFederal District, where Brasilia is located.
The Federal Prosecution Service (MPF)6 ‒ the agency I work for ‒ has jurisdiction all over the nation. The
Prosecutor General is the head of the MPF and the president of the National Council of Public Prosecution
Services (CNMP), an external, oversight body.
Under the 1988 Constitution, the prosecutors are responsible for investigating crimes and prosecuting
criminals before state, federal, military and electoral courts. Police forces at the state and federal level also
conduct criminal investigations and must refer their reports to the relevant prosecutors. There is an
Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR), in Portuguese.
United Nations. Sustainable Development Goals at <www.un.org> accessed 20 Oct. 2017.
6
Ministério Público Federal (MPF) in Portuguese.
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20TH UNAFEI UNCAC TRAINING PROGRAMMEVISITING EXPERTSʼ PAPERS

accusatorial system. One-judge courts try criminal cases. The defendant has all the fundamental rights
specified by Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the right tocounsel and right to appeal.
There are two central authorities for mutual legal assistance purposes, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) andthe Office of the Prosecutor General (PGR), which handles cases from the Portuguese-speaking countries andCanada, pursuant to two specific treaties.
Taking account of the Federal Prosecution Service (MPF), its strategic plan states a mission and a vision.
Its vision is to promote justice and social welfare and to defend the rule of law. According to its vision, by
2020, the MPF intends to be acknowledged both nationally and internationally as a chief agent in fostering ofjustice, protecting civil rights and in the fight against crime and corruption. Bear in mind that in Brazil the
Ministério Público (the prosecutorial agency) has powers to investigate illegalities outside the criminal field
and to file civil lawsuits to enforce social and fundamental civil rights, including aspects of non-criminal
corruption or improbity. This unique feature of the prosecution service in Brazil grants opportunities to theagencyʼs influences on public policies7.
This subject brings us back to the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, especially some targets of Goal 16. It
is important to stress the Brazilian Federal Prosecution Serviceʼs commitment to the SDGs. There is no doubtthat prosecution services, courts and law enforcement agencies across the world should adopt in theirstrategic plans an approach consistent with the United Nations 2030 Agenda.
As a matter of fact, the global legal framework is very complex, so it is also necessary to face thechallenges of implementing the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) andthe United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) by enacting new legislation when it is needed.
To achieve this purpose, since 2003 the Brazilian government instituted a National Strategy to Tackle
Corruption and Money Laundering. Also known as ENCCLA, this initiative brings together many different
agencies and public bodies which propose draft bills and bylaws to implement international conventions thatare legally binding in Brazil and to improve the national legal framework.
For this reason, in order to tackle money laundering, the Brazilian government and independent agencies,
prosecution services and courts get together every year to establish goals to be achieved the following year
by each branch, agency or institution.
ENCCLA stands for national strategy against corruption and money laundering. Other predicate offences
are dealt with in this coordinated work of the Brazilian Federation. The strategy includes proposals forenacting new legislation, capacity building, and coordination of law enforcement agencies.
Thanks to ENCCLA proposals, Brazilian prosecutors and judges can rely on up-to-date legal tools andspecial investigative techniques to prosecute felons and protect their victims, including under UNTOC and
UNCAC provisions.
It goes without saying how important these conventions are to the effectiveness of complex prosecutions,especially when it comes to investigating the relationship between corruption, money laundering and otherforms of organized crime.

IV. THE LAVA JATO CASE
The major part of political and economic institutions in Brazil fall under the classification of “extractive
institutions” developed by Acemoglu and Robinson:
We will refer to political institutions that are sufficiently centralized and pluralistic as inclusive
This dual power is consistent with target 16.a, which aims to strengthen relevant national institutions, including throughinternational cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat
terrorism and crime.
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political institutions. When either of these conditions fails, we will refer to the institutions as extractive
political institutions.
There is strong synergy between economic and political institutions. Extractive political [institutions]concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite and place few constraints on the exercise of thispower. Economic institutions are then often structured by this elite to extract resources from the restof the society. Extractive economic institutions thus naturally accompany extractive politicalinstitutions. In fact, they must inherently depend on extractive political institutions for their survival.
Inclusive political institutions, vesting power broadly, would tend to uproot economic institutions that
expropriate the resources of the many, erect many barriers, and suppress the functioning of markets
so that only a few benefit. [...]
Nations fail economically because of extractive institutions. These institutions keep poor countries
poor and prevent them from embarking on a path to economic growth. This is tue today in Africa, inplaces such as Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone; in South America, in countries such as Colombia andArgentina; in Asia, in countries such as North Korea and Uzbekistan; and in the Middle East, in nations
such as Egypt.8
This is absolutely true when it comes to Brazil. In the Car Wash Case (or Petrobribe), prosecutors
investigate the largest corruption scheme ever discovered in Brazilian history. A coalition between politicalelites and tycoons from the civil engineering sector engaged in a huge, long-running scheme, designed tomake profit and obtain illegal advantages harming the public interest.
In a nutshell, high-level employees within the state-owned company PETROBRAS received bribes inorder to benefit certain private companies hired to execute large construction projects. In addition to that,these private companies formed a cartel, which increased artificially their prices and profits in detriment of
the state-owned company.
PETROBRAS is a huge company whose performance areas comprise oil, gas and energy. Some of its
directors were aware of this cartel formation, and they agreed to receive bribes in order to foster the cartelʼsinterests within the state-owned company. Bribe payments were handled by financial brokers and illegalmoney exchange providers (“doleiros” in Portuguese), who laundered the money and handled it in such amanner that it appeared to stem from legitimate operations. But it was nothing but bribes. A criminalorganization was settled, integrating construction companies, financial brokers, and PETROBRASʼ
employees. It is estimated that the amount paid in bribes exceeds USD 1 billion.
Later on, the investigators found out that other Brazilian companies were involved in the scheme, such as
ODEBRECHT, OAS and CAMARGO CORREA. These giant construction companies were part of the cartel,
which was also responsible for providing slush funds to political parties and to politicians running for elections
across the country, both for the Legislative and the Executive branches.
So as to help grasp the scope of those illegal operations, only one of the state-owned companyʼs employees,
who entered into a collaboration agreement with the Federal Prosecution Service, returned to the Brazilian
government treasury USD 100 million he had received as bribes.
The Car Wash case uncovered a large criminal scheme involving the commission of the following crimes:
engaging in a criminal organization, tax crimes, official misconduct (both active and passive bribery), financial
crimes and money laundering, as well as the formation of a mighty cartel, which was settled by the largest
construction companies from Brazil, with operations across Latin America and Africa. In this scheme,
between 2004 and 2014, bids for government contracts for PETROBRAS were fraudulent, and civil agentswere paid bribes in order to make that fraud happen.
According to court files, this cartel for bid rigging was formed, at first (in the mid-2000s), by the following
construction companies: ODEBRECHT, UTC, CAMARGO CORRÊA, TECHINT, ANDRADE GUTIERREZ,
MENDES JÚNIOR, PROMON, MPE, and SETAL-SOG. As of 2006, other companies joined the cartel, andthey were as follows: OAS, SKANSKA, QUEIROZ GALVÃO, IESA, ENGEVIX, GDK, and GALVÃO

8

Why nations Fail: the origins of power, prosperity, and poverty. Profile Books, London, 2013, pp. 81 and 398.

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20TH UNAFEI UNCAC TRAINING PROGRAMMEVISITING EXPERTSʼ PAPERSENGENHARIA.
So that the cartel would remain operative, the construction companies paid bribes to several high-level
civil servants at PETROBRAS. Among them, the Head of Downstreaming Operations PAULO ROBERTOCOSTA, who was in charge of having the government bids manipulated. Furthermore, the construction
companies taking part in the cartel and both the civil and the private agents who took part in the scheme
used the services of financial brokers, such as ALBERTO YOUSSEF. These co-conspirators employed manyscams in order to launder the illegal money stolen from PETROBRAS, such as making fraudulent contracts,
and the issuance of false invoices through front companies. This was made so that the payment of bribes
would seem to be legitimate. At times, the amounts would also be sent to bank accounts overseas.
Therefore, the criminal organization was operating in three core areas. The first one involved themembers of the cartel, CEOs of large construction companies, who paid bribes so that the government bids
were rigged. Civil servants who received bribes in order to conduct the criminal scheme within
PETROBRAS formed the second area. Finally, the third one was composed by financial brokers, such as
ALBERTO YOUSSEF, who were in charge of handling the payment of bribes to members of the second
group, as well as of laundering the money stemming from crimes perpetrated by the criminal organization.
Then there were the political parties, which shared bribes with the former PETROBRAS employees,
assigned by their leaders and committed to maintain the scheme running and making money turned intoslush funds for political campaigns.
Two CEOs of construction companies involved in the scheme entered into collaboration agreements with
the Federal Prosecution Service (MPF), and corroborated PAULO ROBERTO COSTAʼs and ALBERTOYOUSSEFʼs testimonials.
The Federal Prosecution Service has received from Switzerland bank statements regarding bankaccounts maintained by the suspects. Following Swiss mutual legal assistance to Brazil, it became possible todetermine the origins and the destination of the amounts transferred from and to the bank accounts held by
PAULO ROBERTO COSTA and other defendants.
As one may see, the main target of the criminals, either from the public or the private sector, was thegovernment procurement of goods, services, public works, construction and supply contracts on behalf of apublic company or other government agency. To prevent fraud and corruption, cartels or protectionism, thelaw must be enforced by independent and accountable agencies.
During this investigation, federal prosecutors in Brazil pressed charges and indicted politicians andbusinesspersons for committing financial crimes, bribery, money laundering, and obstruction of justice. The
relevant legal provisions are in the Criminal Code and in special laws.
Pursuant to Article 317 of the Brazilian Criminal Code, passive bribery is committed when someone
requests or receives for oneself or for a third party, both directly or indirectly, undue gain or advantage byusing his/her position as a public official or a civil servant. The undue advantage or gain may be obtainedeven outside of the scope of the public position, or before taking office. The crime also takes place when theagent accepts an offer of a future payment of undue gain or advantage under the outlined circumstances. The
punishment for this felony is imprisonment from 2 to 12 years, and a fine. According to the law, thepunishment can be increased by a third if, as a consequence of the undue advantage or promise, the public
employee delays or does not practice an official act or if such an act is practiced by the infringement of an
official duty.
The Federal Law No. 9. 613, of 1998 (Anti-Money Laundering Law) makes it a crime to conceal ordissimulate the nature, origin, location, availability, transfer or property of assets, rights or amounts
stemming from crimes, whether direct or indirectly. The punishment under this law is imprisonment, from 3
to 10 years, and a fine. The punishment can be increased from one to two thirds if the crimes provided by thisLaw are committed repeatedly or by members of a criminal organization.
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promote, constitute, finance or integrate a criminal organization, either in person or through the actions ofintermediaries. The punishment is imprisonment from 3 (three) to 8 (eight) years, and a fine, regardless of thecorresponding penalties related to the other criminal offenses committed by the offender. The punishment isincreased, from 1/6 (one sixth) to 2/3 (two thirds), if a civil servant is involved as a co-conspirator, and thecriminal organization relies on such a condition to commit the offense.

V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
In this section, it is time to address the issue of international cooperation to tackle corruption andorganized crime, especially in the context of complex financial and white-collar crimes, such as Lava Jato. It isalso adequate to discuss the experience and current problems when it comes to mutual legal assistance in
Latin America.
For the purpose of clarification, Latin America is a socio-cultural concept, not a geographic one. It refers to
the 20 Spanish-speaking and Portuguese-speaking countries of the Americas, from Mexico to Argentina andChile. More than 588 million people live in that region which faces many problems related to public security,
civil rights violations, access to justice and failure of criminal justice.
Considering the mutual legal assistance scenario, the most serious crimes in Latin America are drugtrafficking, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants, trafficking firearms, corruption and money
laundering. However, the Lava Jato case added a new element to the interaction amongst the Prosecution
Services across the region: fighting transnational schemes of corruption and illegal funding of electoral
campaigns.
Unfortunately, many countries in Latin America have porous, penetrable and unprotected borders. Even
outside certain economic cooperation zones, there is a free movement of goods, assets and citizens, including
criminals. In some places there are no immigration and customs controls whatsoever, which facilitates many
forms of criminal activities.
It is hard for authorities to track down those serious crimes, because of legal loopholes in many countries.
It is true that there are some very useful treaties in criminal matters, which are binding for Latin America
and for other countries in the region, like the Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad, and the relevant
United Nations Conventions. Specifically on bribery, it is important to highlight that the first comprehensive
international convention on this matter was negotiated in the Americas. I refer to the Inter-American
Convention against Corruption, adopted in Caracas in 1996. One of its purposes, under Article II. 1 is to“promote and strengthen the development by each of the States Parties of the mechanisms needed toprevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption”.
It is worth mentioning the COMJIB Agreement on the Use of Videoconferencing in International
Cooperation; and the COMJIB Agreement on Joint Investigation Teams. COMJIB stands for the Conferenceof Ministers of Justice of Ibero-American Countries. However those treaties are not implemented yet.This list
will not be complete without the MERCOSUR treaties on extradition and MLA and other regional
agreements ratified in Central America for similar purposes. Still, this legal framework is not sufficient to
supply prosecutors with the proper tools to investigate transnational organized crimes.
This scenario makes it necessary for the countries to have proper rules on MLA and to provide theirprosecutors and judges with sufficient information on judicial cooperation in criminal matters; and on policeand customs cooperation. For example, many countries across Latin America need to enact legislation on hot
pursuit and trans-border surveillance. In general, nations from Central and South America have neither alegal scheme for cross-border cooperation nor rules permitting the free flow of evidence between theirinvestigative and prosecutorial officials. And there is little experience on transferring criminal proceedings
within the region.
The lack of training programs for magistrates is an important issue as well. Some judges and prosecutors
are not prepared to deal with MLA requests. The requirements to write an outgoing request sometimes
seem very hard to cope with. So States and international organizations, such as UNAFEI and ILANUD,80

20TH UNAFEI UNCAC TRAINING PROGRAMMEVISITING EXPERTSʼ PAPERS

should offer such training programs on international cooperation on a regular basis.
Another problem is the translation of the MLA requests into Portuguese or into Spanish. The translations
are expensive and sometimes the result is of poor quality. For this reason it is important to develop an
electronic writing tool to facilitate the work of prosecutors, like the one designed by the UNODC.
Besides that there are concerns on human rights violations and the due process clause during criminal
proceedings and the related MLA requests. This clause should always be invoked as a ground to refuse theexecution of a particular request in order to protect the defendant from unfair or unjust prosecution.
Lack of coordination at the national level between law enforcement agencies and prosecuting authorities
at the national level is also a problem because it has an impact on international cooperation, especially on theincoming MLA requests. Moreover, in some countries there is more than one central authority in criminal
matters, and in some other countries this task is performed by the Ministry of Justice and not by the Public
Prosecution Services.
International cooperation to fight serious crimes is one of the most important policies to promote peaceand security, foster justice and advocate human rights. However, the principle of mutual recognition offoreign decisions is not present in many domestic legal systems and it is not clearly stated in any of thebinding Organization of American States (OAS) and Mercosur treaties. And generally speaking there is poor
capacity to enforce foreign judgements, meaning that the transfer of the execution of criminal sentences(which is different from the transfer of convicted persons) as an alternative to extradition is not available. So
the scenario is completely different from Europe.
There are well known best practices for the betterment of international cooperation. Direct contact
between prosecutors in different countries is the first one of them. Before preparing an MLA request
prosecutors should talk to their colleagues abroad in order to write requests more suitable for transmission
by the Central Authority, facilitating their execution by the receiving State.
The use of networks of prosecutors ‒ both formal and informal ‒ is also a good practice. Most of the Latin
America countries are members of the Ibero-American Association of Prosecutors (AIAMP), established in
1954; are integrated in the Ibero-American Judicial Cooperation Network (Iber-Red); take part in the
Hemispheric Network of the OAS; have public officials assigned as focal points within the RRAG or Asset
Recovery Network of the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT). Some Ministérios
Públicos are also part of the Specialized Meeting of Public Prosecution Services of Mercosur Member Statesand of the Central American Council of Public Prosecutors Offices.
It is also necessary to improve the coordination between prosecution services both at the regional and at
the global level. Two good examples are the West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors(WACAP), and the Central America and the Caribbean Network of Prosecutors Specialized in Organized
Crime (REFCO).
The Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) Resolution 19/7 recognizes thepotential benefits of establishing such networks in regions where they do not exist, in order to facilitate
coordination to tackle organized crime and make it easier to exchange information between prosecuting
authorities. The Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the UNTOC adopted Resolutions 5/8 and 6/1 which
mandate the UNODC to foster international and regional cooperation by facilitating the development ofregional networks, and where appropriate, facilitating cooperation between such networks.
Therefore, we should facilitate cooperation between such networks for the betterment of MLA in Latin
America and in other regions. Perhaps in the future the Americas could have a more formal, supranational
body, according to the Eurojust model and we could call it Amerijust.
Another best practice is the assignment of police attachés and liaison magistrates/prosecutors to deal
with mutual legal assistance and extradition matters. In Brazil, the services provided by the Federal Police
liaison officers are very useful. In a particular case, Italyʼs highest court has granted the extradition of a
Brazilian banker. The banker, who has dual Brazilian and Italian citizenship, had fled to Italy to avoid serving
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12 years in prison for corruption, embezzlement and money laundering. He was convicted as a co-conspiratorof the Mensalão trial (case file No. 470), a huge political corruption scandal previous to Lava Jato. Without theefforts taken by the Brazilian police attaché in Rome and the Italian police attachés in Brazil, this difficult casecould have had a different outcome.
On the other hand, it is worth sharing the successful experience Brazilian prosecutors and judges had in
the last five years with the only liaison prosecutor seated in Brazil, a French colleague who is able to provide
a desirable direct contact with all Brazilian law enforcement and government authorities, reducing
drastically the time of international cooperation proceedings. This liaison magistrate follows up on Frenchoutgoing requests to Brazil to ensure adequate execution. This officer has jurisdiction in Suriname, Guiana
and French Guiana, an overseas department of France. Situated on the northeastern coast of South America,
French Guiana shares a frontier of 730 km with Brazil. So it is necessary to stress the importance of involving
such liaison officers and prosecutors when it comes to prepare a formal MLA request and during its
execution.
As for corruption probes, it is important to rely on the United Nations Convention Against Corruption(UNCAC) and OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The 1992 Inter-American Convention on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters and a dozen bilateral treaties signed by the Federative Republic of Brazil also
played a role in recent cross-border anti-corruption investigations.
As a civil law country, a request for cooperation can be executed pursuant to an MLA treaty or on thebasis of reciprocity. If a foreign government so requests, there is information sharing for intelligence purpose.
In some cases, regarding the specialty principle, the cooperating authority may establish conditions orlimitations on the use of the evidence requested. So investigators and prosecutors must be in a position tocomply with these conditions, after signing a specific undertaking.
According to this principle, the central authority of the requested State may demand that the requesting
State not use any information or evidence obtained following an MLA request in any investigation,prosecution, or proceeding other than that described in the request without the prior consent of the Central
Authority of the Requested State. In such cases, the Requesting State shall comply with the conditions.
Finally, let us discuss a very effective technique to coordinate cross-border investigations. Pursuant to
Article 49 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and Article 19 of the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime States that parties may conclude agreements or
arrangements to establish joint investigative teams (JIT) on a case-by-case basis. A similar provision exists inother treaties. JITs are very useful when the same facts or intertwined events are under investigation in two
or more jurisdictions.
In such cases, the competent authorities may establish joint investigation bodies with regard to thecommon criminal investigations. A standard memorandum or agreement must have provisions on definitions,scope, duration, operational arrangements, leadership of the team, powers of the members and seconded
members, civil and criminal liability, confidentiality, restriction on the use of information, treatment ofevidence, data protection, costs etc.

VI. CONCLUSION
It is important to say it one more time. Fighting corruption is an indispensable step to tackling organizedcrime. Furthermore, corruption has a devastating impact in developing countries, which bring us back again
to the 2030 Agenda and its 17 SDGs. According to the OECD, “corruption in the public sector hampers theefficiency of public services, undermines confidence in public institutions and increases the costs of public
transactions. Integrity is essential for building strong institutions resistant to corruption”9.
In the Doha Declaration of 2015, the United Nations reiterated “the importance of promoting peaceful,corruption-free and inclusive societies for sustainable development, with a focus on a people-centred approach

9Fighting corruption in the public sector, OECD <www.oecd.org/corruption/ethics> accessed 27 Oct. 2017.

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that provides access to justice for all and builds effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”10.
Having this in mind, the world leaders decided:
To make every effort to prevent and counter corruption, and to implement measures aimed atenhancing transparency in public administration and promoting the integrity and accountability of ourcriminal justice systems, in accordance with the United Nations Convention against Corruption11.
There are some good ideas to be implemented both regionally and internationally. For the Americas,
Transparency International, Atlantic Council and other NGOs have been suggesting the adoption of
institutional mechanisms, such as a rapporteur on corruption and human rights at the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, as well as to institutionalize hybrid investigatory mechanisms, such as theInternational Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), or even “establishing a roster of anticorruption advisors, investigators and prosecutors to support States with investigations upon request”12.
There is much work to be done. There is no other way to achieve government integrity and corruption-freesocieties without autonomous, transparent and committed institutions and, more importantly, without theincessant oversight of citizenship.

Doha Declaration on Integrating Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice into the Wider United Nations Agenda to AddressSocial and Economic Challenges and to Promote the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, and Public
Participation, § 4.
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/Declaration/V1504151_English.pdf> accessed 10 Oct 201711
Idem, § 5.b
12
Meeting of experts on democratic governance against corruption, Lima, Nov. 2017.
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EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR ASSET RECOVERY: THE BRAZILIANAPPROACH
Vladimir Aras＊

I. INTRODUCTION
Brazil still occupies a quite uncomfortable position in the International Corruption Perception Index (CPI).
However, through the years there has been a remarkable advancement regarding the Brazilian anticorruption policies. Many good practices were adopted to fight corruption, money laundering, terrorism
financing and to trace and seize proceeds of crime.
The Car Wash Case (“Lava Jato”, in Portuguese), one of the largest corruption investigations in LatinAmerican history, and a great number of previous and current criminal probes came to demonstrate that coordinating civil and criminal investigations and using international co-operation requests produces excellent
results, when it comes to asset recovery.
A huge corruption scheme was found within one of the most important oil companies in the world,
PETROBRAS. This state-owned company has always been very close to Braziliansʼ hearts. Investigations
showed that the corruption scheme was dependent on the participation of many Brazilian and foreign
construction companies, which signed fraudulent contracts with Petrobras. Huge amounts of public money
were diverted from the company to politicians, financial market operators and lobbyists. From day one, it was
clear that prosecutors and police officers would have to face a great challenge: to trace the assets in Brazil
and abroad and to get them back to the government and to that state company itself.
In this essay, my aim is to verify how the Brazilian law enforcement confronted that challenge and theresults so far.

II. BEST PRACTICES OVERVIEW
One of Brazilʼs most successful practices in this regard has been the co-ordinated action amongst federal
and state agencies, civil society and the private sector, all integrated into the National Strategy against
Corruption and Money Laundering (“Estratégia Nacional de Combate à Corrupção e à Lavagem de Ativos”, inPortuguese) or ENCCLA. This expert policymaking group was brought together by the Ministry of Justice in
2003, and its purpose was and is to improve legal provisions which regulate various segments of financial andeconomic activities. Many very effective laws were enacted during the last decade as a result of ENCCLAʼsefforts. One of these efforts, was the reform of the Anti-Money Laundering Law, in 2012, when the National
Congress passed a modification to suppress the list of predicate offenses, making it easier to investigate andprosecute this felony and the crimes associated to it, bribery included.
The Federal Prosecution Service (MPF)1 has led some of the changes the Brazilian criminal justice system
passed in the recent years. Since 1988, under the new Constitution, the Prosecution Service is an independentagency. This is a key feature of the prosecutorial organization. This autonomy buys some space forprosecutors both at the state and federal level to investigate and indict very powerful targets, politicians,
entrepreneurs and businesspersons, without suffering any undue influence from the government.
Many offices of the MPF across Brazilian lands created special units, comprised of adequate personnel toFederal Appellate Prosecutor in Brasilia, Brazil, former Head of the International Cooperation Unit at the Office of theProsecutor General (2013-2017), Professor of Criminal Law, Master degree in Public Law (UFPE), MBA in Public Management(FGV), UNAFEI alumni.
1
Ministerio Público Federal, in Portuguese.
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investigate and prosecute criminal and non-criminal corrupt practices. Corruption (passive and active),
embezzlement and other crimes against the interests and monies of the Administration are dealt with by the
Criminal Code.
Nevertheless there is a key act in Brazil which empowers prosecutors to bring law suits against corrupt
agents as well. Working outside of the criminal field, before civil courts, the MPF and the 26 State mirrorentities may rely on the 1992 Administrative Improbity Act. This legislation stems from article 37 of theBrazilian Constitution, and it is intended to protect public funds, promote integrity and transparency, and toprevent illicit enrichment of public officials or third-parties when involved with public procurement or withthe government. This 1992 Improbity Act provides for very hard sanctions for civil liability, including but notlimited to compensation, retribution, fines, debarment, disgorgement, suspension of political rights for a time
period (right to vote and to run for elections).
The MPF has offices in all the 26 Brazilian States and in the Federal District, where Brasília is located. In
those offices there are specialized anti-corruption units known as “Núcleos de Combate à Corrupção” (NCC).
The prosecutors working there are entitled to adopt this approach when handling corruption cases. The 26
Prosecution Services of the States have their own organization charts and may establish similar, specialized
units, usually known as “Promotorias de Defesa do Patrimônio Público”, loosely translated as the Office of theProsecutor for the Protection of Public Property.
Once a public servant, a mayor, a businessman or even a corporation engages in an improper, illegal
relationship and causes harm to a state-owned entity, to a city or to the federal government or theirproperties, the perpetrator will be investigated and can be prosecuted before a non-criminal court pursuant
to the Improbity Act. If this conduct is also a crime, the same federal prosecutor, when it comes to the federal
judicial systems, will be responsible for the criminal investigation and the prosecution before a criminal court.
This concentrated-management for adjudicating corrupt practices saves resources and time, and it is a very
effective manner of producing and handling evidence. This practice facilitates the asset search andinvestigation for a future recovery.
One last thing must be noticed. Under this law, private companies and other legal entities (not only
individuals) may be sued for corrupt practices; this is very important because in Brazil there is no criminal
liability for legal persons, except in environmental crimes. For this reason, Brazil is considered a compliant
country when its judicial system is confronted with article 26 of UNCAC:
Article 26. Liability of legal persons
1.Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary,consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for participation in theoffenses established in accordance with this Convention.
2.Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil oradministrative.
3.Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural persons who havecommitted the offenses.
4.Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in accordance with thisarticle are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions,
including monetary sanctions.
This is now even more a reality since the Congress passed a new law in 2013 to tackle corrupt practices
from private companies in public procurement and other kinds of relationship with the government. The socalled Clean Compact Act (Federal Law No. 12,846 of 2013) grants powers to state and federal regulators toinvestigate and impose administrative sanctions to legal entities which engaged in corrupt practices
describes therein.
These investigative tactics allow prosecutors to identify large corruption schemes, usually designed to
pay hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes and kickbacks by means of over-priced contracts and through bid
rigging. Unfortunately, schemes like that are very hazardous for any country, as they undermine theeconomy and paralyze construction work and infrastructure building.

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The Federal Prosecution Service has also been successfully using international co-operation requests toobtain evidence abroad, to arrest fugitives, and above all things, to track down, freeze, confiscate andrepatriate assets stemming from corruption.
In this context, one must also mention a new element of anti-corruption good practices that Brazil now
adopts: the co-ordination between investigations carried out by the Federal Prosecution Service and thoseundertaken by private investigators hired by the companies involved in the corruption schemes. This newpractice has become very evident, especially in relation to three cases: Petrobras, Odebrecht and Embraer.
This co-ordination allowed for the return of hundreds of millions of dollars to Petrobras, as its assets had been
embezzled by corruption performed by its former heads of departments. Such a positive result has beenachieved for the first time in Brazilian history.
In order to promote integrity, the Office of the Prosecutor-General of the Republic, which is the head of
the Brazilian Prosecution Service, has signed partnerships with the World Bank and with the InterAmerican Bank for Development through memoranda of understanding so as to ensure the adequate use of
public money for works and projects financed by these institutions in Brazil.
Taking into consideration its articulation with the civil society, the Federal Prosecution Service has also
signed an operational agreement with Transparency International in order to house projects in common toprevent and fight corruption.
With the purpose of informing the population about dishonest practices, the MPF sponsored the campaign
Corruption No during the Brazilian presidency of the Ibero-American Association of Prosecution Offices(which brings together 21 prosecution services). The campaignʼs targeted audience were teenagers andyoung adults, who are perceived as culture-changers across the region.
In the technology field, the MPF have developed their own investigation systems for tracking illegal
financial transactions. SIMBA is an example of such technology. This software is now largely used by othercontrol agencies in Brazil to manage and control bank data acquired in compliance with court orders.
The lessons learned in the last decade and the good practice developed by Brazilian law enforcement havebeen instrumental for the advancement of the investigative procedures. But there are many challenges toaddress. For that reason, the MPF sponsored a public campaign to get support from citizens enlisted to voteto present a bill of popular initiative. Known as the Ten Measures against Corruption, this bill was intended to
implement new legislation on whistleblower protection, statutes of limitations, right to habeas corpus, andillicit enrichment of public officials. One of the proposals targeted political parties involved in corrupt
practices. The parties could be held liable for this kind of conduct if they are financed with slush funds or offthe-books assets. The ninth measure would allow courts to remand or send to preventive detention adefendant trying to conceal or dissipate ill-gotten gains. According to the MPF, this would help prevent thelaundering of proceeds of crime and prevent defendants from disappearing.
For the purpose of this essay, the tenth measure was the most important one. The idea was to enhance
the asset recovery proceeding, by allowing the court to confiscate assets when the individual underinvestigation could not demonstrate their lawful origin.

III. STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES: LESSONS LEARNEDThe negative relationship between corruption and organized crime is remarkable. Therefore, itʼs very
important to craft a strategy to the effectiveness of a complex investigation or prosecution, especially when it
comes to investigate corruption, money laundering and white collar crimes in a transnational context and to
confiscate ill-gotten assets. Long-standing Brazilian experience in this field shows how useful UNTOC and
UNCAC provisions are as a legal ground for investigation and international cooperation in a huge criminal
case, including for asset recovery.
Starting in March 2014, Switzerland and Brazil have been investigating criminal offenses in connection
with the activities of PETROBRAS, a state-owned Brazilian company, and several construction companies. It
is true that an investigation like that entails hard enquiries having links with the other country, requiring
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coordinated, concerted action and a particularly close cooperation between the involved law enforcement andprosecutorial authorities.
In the Car Wash case (or Petrobribe), the MPF prosecuted hundreds of individuals, including senators,
representatives (deputies), members of the cabinet, public officials and businesspersons. Politicians andpolitical parties used to take bribes from contractors to facilitate their business with the public sector. Several
individuals were indicted for different crimes, as large-scale corruption, financial crimes, cartels, money
laundering and racketeering.
The strategy adopted by the federal prosecutors in charge of this investigation was very adequate for thiskind of probe. The Car Wash strategy relies on five pillars: training, collaboration, coordination, transparency
and international cooperation, enforcing a new legal framework provided by punctual legislative reforms andthe implementation of at least three UN and OECD conventions.
As commented before, one of the most important pillars of the MPF strategy is to handle criminal andcivil cases at the same time using criminal laws and civil statutes, for example, the Improbity Act(Administrative Malfeasance Act) of 1992. Since 2014, the prosecutors in that task force have been conducting
criminal and civil probes on the same facts and have brought complaints against several persons and legal
entities.
Additionally, there three separate but coordinated teams of prosecutors and police officers, that work
together in different Brazilian cities (Brasilia, Curitiba and Rio) to tackle the scheme known as the Lava Jato
case. Since 2014 more than 40 sub-operations (called phases) were carried out to arrest politicians, former
lawmakers, contractors, CEOs, public servants and hawala operators. A great number of search warrants
and detention orders were executed.
The task forces also work in close relationship with the federal government, regarding the administrative
investigations performed by the Ministry of Transparency and of the Comptroller General of the Union(CGU), the Federal Revenue Service and the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU).
Its of paramount importance the coordination between the Federal Prosecution Service, the Federal
Police and the Brazilian federal government to investigate this huge corruption scheme.
Technology and technical tools are very useful as well. In the technology field, the MPF has developed its
own investigation systems for checking illegal financial transactions. As stated before the software known as
SIMBA is now largely used by many law enforcement agencies in Brazil to manage bank data acquired incompliance with court orders, so as expert reports can be released. Another computational system changed
the landscape of the financial crimes investigations in Brazil. In 2003 the National Database of Clients of theBrazilian National Financial System (CCS) was established. It allows prosecutors, police officers and judges tohave direct access, pursuant a court order, to bank accounts of any individual living in Brazil. CCS andSIMBA play a very important role in asset recovery.
Relying on expertsʼ networks is also a good practice. The GAFILAT Asset Recovery Network (RRAG) is
one fruitful way to trace assets abroad. Each country has two or three points of contact on the network.
Those officials connect investigators across the region facilitating the tracking of legal or illegal assets.
Now we come to another important pillar of the FPS strategy: the intensive use of the special
investigation techniques provided by the Brazilian law on criminal organizations, of 2013. Many of these legal
tools were useful in the Car Wash case and other probes, especially the use of cooperating defendants. The
defendant is entitled to many different legal benefits when he or she decides to plead guilty and become acooperating witness.
The requirements to craft a deal like that are described by the Brazilian law. The assistance provided
must be substantial. The defendant should express his/her consent prior to the execution of the deal. On theother hand, by offering a plea agreement the prosecutorsʼ aim is to identify co-conspirators, clarify thetimeline, places and conduct related to a set of criminal acts; prevent new crimes; save or protect the victimsʼ
lives or health and, finally, recovery assets and proceeds of crime.
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Prosecutors may combine plea agreements with natural persons and leniency commitments ‒ a kind of
non-prosecution agreement (NPA) ‒ with legal entities they work for. The possibility of achieving settlementsin the criminal and non-criminal jurisdiction makes a difference, because this combined approach potentialize
the workload of evidence delivered in exchange of the agreement, and the amount of assets returned.
The use of cooperating witnesses in connection with MLA tools in the Car Wash case was also of great
importance. Currently (as of October 2017) the Lava Jato task forces signed more than 180 plea agreementswith different defendants or suspects. Another 300 defendants await their trials. There are almost a dozen
NPAs entered with corporations. Several defendants were convicted by lower courts, and the amount ofassets frozen or confiscated is really impressive.
The traditional legal basis for recovery in Brazil is the confiscation of proceeds of crime after a conviction.
Here, if the decision is not final it is not possible to confiscate the illegal assets of the defendant. In general, it
takes too long for a decision to become final, because there are too many appeals available for the defense in
the four levels of the Brazilian court system.
The Brazilian criminal justice system is full of examples of conviction rulings waiting for more than adecade to be confirmed by the Brazilian superior courts.
The difference with the Car Wash case was the use of the plea agreements ‒ or collaboration agreements‒ to make the recovery faster. The defendant waives his/her right to appeal and agrees to return the assets
to Brazil. A mutual legal assistance request is filed through the central authority. Then the foreign prosecutor
and the local central authority can handle the request, check the waiver and send the assets back more
rapidly. This proceeding is also valid and applicable domestically, not demanding an MLA request, of course.
Some of the suspects used to maintain their funds hidden abroad. As a result of two dozen MLA requests
received from Brazil and due to their own probes, Swiss authorities have frozen millions in assets tied to the
PETROBRAS and ODEBRECHT2 corruption scandals, and have discovered hundreds of accounts at
Switzerlandʼs banks used to funnel bribes as part of the wrongdoing at Brazilʼs state oil company and otherBrazilian entities. According to its 2016 activities report released in March 2017, the Ministère Publique de laConfédération (MPC), the Swiss federal prosecution authority, the findings and results so far are quite
impactful.
3.7 Petrobras / Odebrecht proceedings
In connection with the corruption scandal relating to the semi-state-owned Brazilian company
Petrobras, the OAG has been conducting investigations since April 2014 in relation to money
laundering and acts of bribery in particular. In 2016 some 20 fresh criminal investigations were
instigated in these proceedings, as a rule following corresponding reports of suspicion from the MROS.
This increased the total number of criminal investigations conducted by the OAG in this context tomore than 60. The investigations in Switzerland are being conducted, above all, into Brazilian officials
on the suspicion that they had bribes paid to them in accounts in Switzerland in return for awarding
public procurement contracts in Brazil, but also into Brazilian construction and supplier companies on
the suspicion that they paid bribes via these account structures in Switzerland and unjustly enrichedthemselves in numerous cases.
In this process, the OAG seized and has largely examined banking documents relating to far more than
1,000 accounts. To date, assets in the total amount of CHF 1 billion, converted, have been confiscated,of which some CHF 200 million has already been returned to the Brazilian law enforcement authorities
on request and with the consent of the account holders concerned. A special focus of the OAGʼsinvestigations was on the proceedings being conducted since summer 2015 into the Odebrecht
conglomerate based in Brazil, which is active, among other things, in construction, petrochemicals,
energy, engineering, infrastructure and property management. In the criminal investigations into
Odebrecht, other companies and numerous private individuals, a key employee of Odebrecht wasarrested and interrogated in Switzerland in February 2016. In March 2016 the OAG managed to seizeODEBRECHT is one of the major construction companies in Brazil. The company is also a holding doing business in many
sector of the Latin American and African markets.
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a server system featuring key evidence with the support of the FCP in Geneva and analyzed at least
part of the data. The investigations into Odebrecht in Brazil also progressed, and at the start of theyear initial judgments were handed down against executives of Odebrecht, sentencing them to several
years of imprisonment for corruption, among other things. Odebrecht subsequently decided to cooperate with the law-enforcement agencies, and the investigations conducted against it in Brazil, theUS and Switzerland were brought to a conclusion.
Odebrecht was found guilty in Switzerland by penalty order under Article 102 Swiss Criminal Codeand fined CHF 4.5 million. By sequestration and determination of a corresponding compensation claim,
Odebrecht was obligated in Switzerland to refund proceeds from crimes in the amount of CHF 200
million. Another USD 1.8 billion in total is to be repaid on the basis of corresponding agreements withor rulings of the competent authorities in Brazil and the US. The co-ordinated conclusions of theproceedings in Switzerland, Brazil and the US are a success for the international combating ofcorruption and the result of close co-operation and co-ordination of the law-enforcement authorities incharge.3
From March 2014 until now, the prosecution task force has issued or received more than three hundred
incoming and outgoing MLA requests addressed to 40 different countries and territories spread throughout
the world, in the Americas, Africa, Europe and Asia, in order to gather or provide evidence, arrest fugitives
and get assets frozen and repatriated. This is for sure the major transnational probe in the Brazilian history.
Many of these MLA requests were prepared after informal, direct contact between Brazilian prosecutors,
police attachés and the competent authorities of the requested countries. On this ongoing investigation, many
MLA requests have been issued pursuant to UNCAC provisions, including the ones relevant to asset
recovery.
In addition to this, for the first time in Brazil, the MPF has signed two memoranda of understanding torefund US$ 80 million to Petrobras, the main victim of this graft scheme. This was the greatest compensation
to a state-owned company in a criminal case in Brazilian history.
But there are still other challenges. Considering that the targets of this investigation are politicians andpowerful businessman, pushback may come. Some backlashes already happened. Currently there are bills toprevent prosecutors from cutting deals with arrested defendants and to remove some powers of prosecuting
authorities. Another bill makes it a crime broadly defined as abuse of function specifically tailored to target
prosecutors and judges.
Commenting on the joint settlement among Brazil, Switzerland and the United States, prosecutor Deltan
Dallagnol, coordinator of the MPF task force in Curitiba stated:
These leniency agreements expand the boundaries of the Car Wash investigation and the prosecutorsʼ
ability of obtaining evidence on more crimes. This kind of settlement also provides a way forcompanies who commit malpractice to assist the authorities, to conduct their business under the law
and to invest, which contributes to the maintenance of jobs and to the economy itself”.4
His colleague Paulo Galvão, also a member on the Lava Jato task force with headquarters in the southerncity of Curitiba, stresses the relevance of this kind of settlement:
Moreover, the commitments undertaken before the Brazilian Federal Prosecution Service foster a
new business culture in the construction sector, establishing a new relationship between the public
and the private sectors, thus hedging the companies against the influence of cartels and corruption.
Under that light, the companies who enter leniency agreements are regarded as catalysts of therenewal of practices and the increase of competitiveness in the market. With the strengthening of themarket, efficient companies find better conditions to develop and therefore compete in the global
market.5
MPC 2016 Activities Report, <www.ministerepublique.ch> accessed 3 Nov. 2017.
MPF press release, <www.mpf.mp.br> accessed 10 Nov. 2017.
5
Idem.
3
4

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IV. ASSET RECOVERY BY MEANS OF LENIENCY PROGRAMS AND
COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS
When it comes to evidentiary international cooperation and asset recovery the Brazilian legal frameworkcomprises provisions on the use of civil and administrative proceedings against corruption along with
provisions pertinent to criminal matters.
Brazilian legislation provides for two different sorts of settlements. The 2013 Anti-Bribery Act ‒ also
known as Clean Company Act ‒ permits leniency agreements for companies, as a non-criminal tool to fightcorruption, dealing with civil and administrative liability.
The 2013 Brazilian Organized Crime Law allows cooperation agreements to be signed with witnesses ordefendants in criminal proceedings.
Both instruments are effective, and its results are visible, mainly in recent years, asset recovery activities
included. Before the Car Wash case, Brazil had recovered no more than US$15 million, because of statutes oflimitations and flaws in the appellate system, which makes it too long to solve a case. In the Car Wash casealone, until 2017 federal prosecutors recovered over US$250 million and an estimated US$600 million in frozen
assets are abroad, which represents a significant example of the effectiveness of mutual legal assistance.
A leniency agreement must be understood as an investigative tool and not as a primary instrument toresolve financial problems. It is also a way to impose fines for the wrongdoings, recover damages, make thelegal entity comply with the legislation, conduct internal investigations to unveil other malpractice, andimplement compliance and integrity programs for their boards and employees. Another key obligation is theestablishment of corporate anti-bribery and anti-corruption (ABAC) monitoring, which can be kept for two or
three years, under the scrutiny of the prosecution service. The independent monitor is hired by the company
which entered into the agreement.
To obtain the legal benefits stemming from a leniency program a corporation must fully cooperate withthe authorities and regulators, admit and cease its involvement in the wrongdoings, and provide full
restitution for the damages it caused. The benefits of different natures include, but are not limited to,
reduction of fines and the prevention of debarment. The leniency also is intended to avert the company fromgoing bankrupt.
In 2016 the Brazilian Federal Prosecution Service (MPF) entered into huge global leniency agreementswith ODEBRECHT and BRASKEM. The companies admitted to having committed wrongdoing to obtain
illicit gain to companies belonging to their economic group.
According to the statement of facts accepted by the aforementioned corporations, one of the victims ofthis scheme was Petrobras. The representatives of the legal entities reported crimes committed bypoliticians from Brazilian federal, state, and local governments, also from foreign governments. Odebrecht
former CEO and former directors established a Department of Structured Operations, as a division of theOdebrecht group, in order to manage the bribes and kickbacks to be paid to politicians and other corrupt
official across the region.
According to the MPF, these are the largest settlements ever signed in a corruption case.
Both agreements are part of a broader covenant undersigned by the corporations themselves with
Brazilian, Swiss and American authorities. Although the main reason why these leniency agreements
are signed in the first place is for obtaining information and documents regarding malpractices (towhich end company co-operation makes all the difference), the companies have also committed to
paying damages and compensation for victims and to the Brazilian public coffers. BRASKEM agreed
to pay as much as BRL 3,131,434,851.37 due to its leniency agreement. Of this amount, approximately
BRL 2.3 billion will be due to Brazil for the payment of damages to victims. As for ODEBRECHT, it has
agreed to pay BRL 3,828,000,000.00, of which approximately BRL 3 billion will be also allocated toBrazil so as to compensate victims. The values shall be paid when due, as stipulated on the agreement
signed. At the time of payment, monetary adjustment may increment the amounts to be paid to
Brazilian authorities. For example, the sum of the installments concerning the agreement signed by90

20TH UNAFEI UNCAC TRAINING PROGRAMMEVISITING EXPERTSʼ PAPERSODEBRECHT (after applying the correction rate called SELIC) results in the final payment of BRL 8,
512, 000, 000. 00, which corresponds to approximately USD 2. 5 billion. If considered together, theamounts paid due to the leniency agreements signed with both ODEBRECHT and BRASKEM
constitute the largest leniency agreement ever paid in connection with a corruption and bribery casein the world.6
This kind of leniency agreement ‒ which is very similar to a non-prosecution agreement ‒ is usuallycombined with cooperating agreements entered with individuals related to the company. Also known as“acordos de colaboração premiada”, those agreements must be approved in court. The Federal Law 12,850 of2013 (Organized Crime Act) provides that a cooperating defendant has the right not to be prosecuted(immunity), or to a reduced sentence.

V. OTHER USEFUL MEASURES TO RECOVER ASSETS
In some jurisdictions, like the United States, there are administrative injunctive measures or cease anddesist orders to prevent illegal conduct of companies and individuals. Regulators may also impose thedisgorgement of illegal gains (or of the losses avoided), civil monetary penalties, claw-back suspensions, anddebarment of a lawyer or an accountant or a director from appearing or practicing before the agency.
The disgorgement targets the illegal profits from legal violators. The idea behind this kind of remedy is totake all the profit out of violations. A disgorgement looks at the gains of the violators, not to the losses ofshareholders. The violators must be deprived from the profits of their misconduct. In some jurisdictions thelaw may also provide for orders requiring the defendant or the respondent to lay ill-gotten gains or unjust
enrichment, so as the crimes do not pay7.
A civil monetary penalty is a pecuniary sanction imposed on a company or a natural person who hascommitted a violation. This kind of remedy is not intended to compensate a victim or the state. It has the
purpose of deterrence, but the funds derived from it may be sent to the government or to a victim.

VI. CONCLUSION
The impacts of corrupt practices in organized crime are very clear. There is a direct effect between themand a symbiotic relationship. Criminal organizations make money. Those proceeds of crime are laundered andused to bribe public officials, and they, in their turn, have to launder it again. So there is a never ending vicious
cycle which ties organized crime to corruption.
Corruption undermines enforcement strategies established by the government to prevent criminalorganizations from maintaining their illegal businesses and thus can be identified as one of the underlying
factors that affects the rule of law and the fight against organized crime.
On one hand, criminal organizations profit from crime. Corrupt politicians and public officials take bribes.
Then criminal organizations make more money. And when organized crime gets stronger, the rule of law isendangered.

Ibidem.
See for example the StatOil case, a company from Norway, <https: //www. sec. gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54599. pdf>
accessed 27 Sept. 2017.
6
7

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AN OVERVIEW OF SINGAPOREʼS ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGYAND THE ROLE OF THE CPIB IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION
Vincent Lim＊

I. INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a serious offence. It is important to fight corruption since it has serious repercussions which
can lead to a breakdown in social order, increase the cost of doing business, tarnish the reputation of an entire
country and worse, result in the loss of human lives. Singapore is fortunate that corruption is now not a wayof life there. However, we recognize it as a fact of life since we cannot eradicate human greed, and that is why
we continue to remain vigilant against corruption.
My paper will look into the history of Singaporeʼs fight against corruption, our national strategies to deal
with the corruption threat and the role and structure of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB).

II. EARLY STRUGGLES
During the British colonial rule of Singapore, corruption was a way of life. There was a law against
corruption called the (Prevention of Corruption Ordinance 1937); however it was not effective at all. The postwar period was no better. Corruption was entrenched in government, businesses and the society because of
the rising cost of living.
In October 1951, there was a case of opium robbery worth $400, 000. There was, however, no harshpunishment meted out to the group of robbers consisting of 3 police officers. The British government thenrealized the need for an independent body to fight corruption effectively. CPIB was thus established in 1952.
However, even with the establishment of CPIB in 1952, nothing much was changed. The situation was still
as bad. The turning point only came when the current Singapore Government assumed office in 1959.
The Singapore government resolved early on to fight corruption as a strategic imperative to sustain ahealthy state of governance, rule of law and economic and social development. From the early days of selfgovernment, the new political leaders took it upon themselves to set good examples for public officers tofollow. They created, by personal example, a climate of honesty and integrity, and made it known to public
officers in no uncertain terms that corruption in any form would not be tolerated.
The governmentʼs stand against corruption was also made clear in 1960 when the Parliament enacted arevised anti-corruption law, the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), to replace the Prevention of Corruption
Ordinance. New sections in the PCA made anti-corruption enforcement and prosecution easier. Since then,the Prevention of Corruption Act had undergone various amendments to increase the power of investigationof the CPIB officers, and to enhance the punishment for corruption and plug any loophole to prevent
exploitation by criminals.
The policy that the perpetrators should not benefit from corruption was further fortified by theenactment of the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act in 1989. This Act has been replaced by the
Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act in 1999. The Act
provides the Court with powers to confiscate properties which a person convicted of a corruption offencecannot satisfactorily account for, or when the properties are found to be benefits of corruption offences. The

Senior Deputy Director, Private Sector / Financial Investigations and Policy, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau,
Singapore.
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legislative framework sets the boundaries of conduct and defines the offences which the society frowns upon.

III. SINGAPOREʼS CORRUPTION CONTROL FRAMEWORKSingapore is now well regarded globally as one of the few countries in the world with a low incidence ofcorruption. In 2016, Transparency Internationalʼs Corruption Perceptions Index (TI-CPI) ranked Singapore as
the 7th least corrupt country in the world and the least corrupt Asian country with a score of 84 out of 1001.
The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) also ranked Singapore as the least corrupt country in
Asia in 20162, a position Singapore held since 1995. Over the years, Singapore has established an effective anticorruption framework which has seen it transform from a country rampant with corruption to one of theleast corrupt nations in the world.
A. Root Causes of Corruption
Before we touch on any corruption control framework, it is important to identify the root causes ofcorruption so as to understand why our framework worked for Singapore. According to a study by Dr Leslie
Palmier, the key reasons for corruption were: “Low Salaries, Ample Opportunities for Corruption andIneffective Policing”3.
I do not hold the sole wisdom to state these are the main reasons for corruption, but these were issues
that Singapore recognized and took measures to address so that corruption can be mitigated. This approach
can be best described by Dr Jon S T Quah. In the 60s, the current Singapore government tackled corruption
by adopting a two-prong strategy:(a) Reducing the opportunities for corruption through strengthening the existing legislation to fight graft,and increasing the penalty for corrupt behaviour;(b) Reducing incentives for official abuse by “improving salary and working conditions in the civil service.”4
B. Corruption Control Framework
Singaporeʼs strategy on anti-corruption can be illustrated through diagram A, which consists of fourpillars of corruption control, underpinned by strong political will.

Diagram A. Singapore’s corruption control framework
1. Political Will
The political will to eradicate corruption was established by Singaporeʼs founding Prime Minister, Mr Lee
Refer to www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.
Refer to www.asiarisk.com/subscribe/exsum1.pdf.
3
Refer to Dr Leslie H Palmier, The Control of Bureaucratic Corruption: Case Studies in Asia 1985.
4
Refer to Dr Jon S T Quah, Corruption in Asian Countries: Canʼt It Be Minimized? December 1999.
1
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Kuan Yew, when the Peopleʼs Action Party (PAP) was elected into government in 1959. The PAP wasdetermined to build an incorruptible and meritocratic government and took decisive and comprehensive
action to stamp out corruption from all levels of Singaporeʼs society including within their own ranks. The
party to date has not blocked any investigation by CPIB on PAP leaders and that includes the Minister for
National Development, Tan Kia Gan, in 1966; Minister of State, Wee Toon Boon, in 1975; Phey Yew Kok, an
MP and trade union leader, in 1979; and Teh Cheang Wan, the Minister for National Development, in 1986.5
This determination is further demonstrated when Phey Yew Kok, who absconded in 1980 and was on therun for 35 years overseas, surrendered himself in 2015 at the age of 81. His case was re-opened by the CPIB
and he was subsequently prosecuted for 34 charges involving more than $450,000, almost 5 times the $100,000
in union funds he was originally charged with misappropriating in 1979. Phey Yew Kok pleaded guilty andwas sentenced to 60 months in jail.
As a result of the governmentʼs unwavering commitment and leadership, a culture of zero tolerance
against corruption became ingrained in the Singaporean psyche and way of life.
2. Effective Laws
Singapore relies on two key laws to fight corruption: the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), and the
Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act (CDSA). The PCA has awide scope which applies to persons who give or receive bribes in both the public and private sector. The
CDSA, when invoked, confiscates ill-gotten gains from corrupt offenders and this includes not only
confiscating benefits from the receiver but also profits that were made by individuals or companies due tobribery to win contracts.
Together, the two laws ensure that corruption remains a high-risk, low-reward activity. Upon the
conclusion of investigations by the CPIB, all alleged corruption cases will be handed over to the AttorneyGeneralʼs Chambers (AGC), the prosecutorial arm of the Singapore Criminal Justice System, to obtain the
Public Prosecutorʼs consent to proceed with Court proceedings.
3. Independent Judiciary
In Singapore, an independent judiciary provides insulation from political interference. The Chief Justice isappointed by the President on advice from the Prime Minister and the Council of Presidential Advisers. State
Court judges and magistrates are appointed by the President with advice from the Chief Justice. Various
provisions of the Constitution also guarantee the independence of the Supreme Court judiciary. Transparent
and objective in its administration of the rule of law, the judiciary recognises the seriousness of corruption
and adopts a stance of deterrence by meting out stiff fines and imprisonment towards corrupt offenders. Thisis important as both investigation and prosecution, no matter how effective, must, however, be complemented
by subsequent court conviction and the appropriate punishment to deter corruption.
4. Responsive Public Service
The Singapore Public Service is guided by a Code of Conduct, which sets out the high standards of
behaviour expected of public officers based on principles of integrity, incorruptibility and transparency andthis is enshrined in the Government Instruction Manual (IM), as follows:a. a public officer cannot borrow money from any person who has official dealings with him;b. a public officerʼs unsecured debts and liabilities cannot at any time be more than three times hismonthly salary;c. a public officer cannot use any official information to further his private interest;
d. a public officer is required to declare his assets at his first appointment and also annually;e. a public officer cannot engage in trade or business or undertake any part-time employment without
approval;
f. a public officer cannot receive entertainment or presents in any form from members of the public.

Refer to Prof Jon S.T. Quah, “Curbing Corruption in a One-Party Dominant System: Learning from Singaporeʼs Experience” inTing Gong and Stephen k. Ma (eds), Preventing Corruption in Asia: Institutional Design and Policy Capacity: London: Routledge,
2009. Chapter 9.
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The commitment of Government similarly resulted in the establishment of administrative measures toreduce the chances of public officers getting involved in corruption and wrongdoing. These measures include:a. streamlining cumbersome administrative procedures and slashing red tape to provide an efficient andtransparent civil service so that no one needs recourse to corrupting civil servants to get things done;b. reviewing public officersʼ salary regularly to ensure that they are paid adequately and comparable tothat of the private sector;
c. reminding Government contractors at the time when contracts are signed that bribing public officers
administering the contract may render their contracts to be terminated. A clause to this effect forms
part of the standard contract conditions.
A case in point is when the Singapore government implemented e-services to enhance the accessibility
and convenience of government services. Now thousands of government services can be transacted via theinternet in the comfort of the homes. A national ICT masterplan was put in place since the 1980s, updated
over the years to enable government to exploit technology to benefit the country and to spur economic
growth. An example is GeBIZ, the governmentʼs online procurement portal. Today, all government
procurement is done through the internet. The procurement specifications are posted on the Internet for all
to see, including international businesses which wish to take part. Transparency and efficiency are enhanced,
and opportunities for abuse and corruption are in a way reduced.
The systems and processes put in place by government to promote excellence in government services dohave an impact upon the culture of anti-corruption. By making systems efficient and transparent, the public is
more aware of what can be done and what is acceptable. The greater knowledge translates into greater
vigilance and ability to report when there is corruption encountered by the public.
5. Effective Enforcement
The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) is the only agency authorised to investigate
corruption offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241) and other related offences. It is agovernment agency under the Prime Ministerʼs Office, operating with functional independence and is helmed
by a director who reports to the Prime Minister. The CPIB acts swiftly and vigorously to enforce the toughanti-corruption laws impartially for both public and private sector corruption. During the investigation
process, the CPIB will work with various government agencies and private organisations to gather evidence
and obtain information.

IV. STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF THE CORRUPT PRACTICES INVESTIGATIONBUREAUThe organization chart of our Bureau is illustrated in Diagram B. Assisting the Director are the 3
departments which consists of the Operations Department that houses the Intelligence Division and the
Operations Management & Support Division. The Corporate Affairs Department houses all the other staff
support divisions like the Finance & Administrative Division, the Planning, Policy & Corporate Relations
Division, the Information Technology Division as well as the People Management & Development Division.
Our core business lies in the Investigation Department where it is further segregated into Public and Private
Special Investigation Branches, General Investigation Branches and a Financial Investigation Branch.

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Diagram B
The current CPIB staff strength stands at 220, where about 60% lies in the Investigation and Operations
Department.
A. Role of the CPIBAs stated earlier, the CPIB is a government agency under the Prime Ministerʼs Officer but operates withfunctional independence. Nonetheless, the Singapore government in 1991 further strengthened thisindependence, during the amendment of the Constitution of Singapore to establish the Elected President,
whereby Article 22G empowers the CPIBʼs Director to investigate ministers and senior bureaucrats without
the Prime Ministerʼs consent if he obtains the consent of the Elected President. That means that the CPIB
can investigate the Prime Minister if it obtains the Elected Presidentʼs permission to do so.6
CPIB is the sole agency responsible for combating corruption in Singapore in both the public and private
sectors. The Bureau is also empowered to investigate any seizable offences which may be disclosed in thecourse of their investigation into corruption. As such, CPIB officers are also deemed to be officers not below
the rank of inspector of police.
1. Public Sector
One of the core values of the Singapore Public Service is integrity. Therefore, the CPIB places a certain
emphasis on the public sector in its efforts to eradicate corruption. Particular attention is paid to officers who,
by nature of their jobs, are more susceptible to the crime. Although public sector employees formed theminority of individuals prosecuted for corruption in Singapore, the Bureau does not rest on its laurels in
educating this group on the ills of corruption through regular talks/workshops/conferences and otherprevention initiatives. Each government agency in Singapore has a point of contact in the CPIB of which
advice and consultation could be easily sought and given. Through the Singapore Governmentʼs and the
Bureauʼs relentless efforts, the number of prosecuted public employees remained low at an average of lessthan 10% for the last three years.
Alongside statutory measures dealing with corrupt offenders in the public sector, when CPIB comes
across cases which reveal corruption-prone areas or loopholes in the government departments, the Bureau
will, based on its findings, review the department concerned, point out weaknesses and recommend changes

6

Ibid.

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in their procedures.
2. Private Sector
Singaporeʼs effort to curb corruption is not solely confined to its public sector. Since 1970s CPIB have been
taking action against corruption in the private sector as well. In this regard, Singapore is a pioneer. Action
taken goes beyond simply prosecuting members of public involved in bribing public officers but also amember of the public bribing another member of the public in relation to oneʼs principal affairs. This iscommonly referred to as “commercial bribery” in laymanʼs term.
In the modern economy, corruption in both the public and private sectors is increasingly dynamic and isinter-coupled, i.e. failure to effectively control corruption in one sector will result in an increase in the overall
corruption situation. The public and private sector divide is not a very clear thing in the world of corruption.
In todayʼs interconnected world, one cannot afford to ignore either area.
The sum of public and private sector corruption will contribute to the general anti-corruption climate inan economy, and maintaining and taking action against the two hand in hand is crucial. Failure to do so will
have an adverse impact on economic growth, efficient leadership in both the public and private sector
domains and, in the long term, the quality of life will deteriorate. In fact, the World Bank lists corruption
control as one of the 6 key fundamentals of good governance and their studies show that countries that havecorruption under control are more developed and ahead of the rest.7
In Singapore, corruption control goes beyond ensuring having competent and incorruptible public officers.
An effective corruption control regime will first create an incorruptible and competent public service. This isthe very bedrock of any development in a country. Only when this is in place, will the rule of law prevail andthe society function in a manner that the law intends it to be. A predictable and stable environment will inturn attract investment and contribute to sustainable economic development. In the long run, it creates alevel playing field for all, whether for a Singapore citizen or a business entity with an interest in investing in
Singapore. This can best be summed up in the speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew which he made in 1979 andwhich is still very relevant in todayʼs context.
Only when we uphold the integrity of the administration can the economy work in a way whichenables Singaporeans to clearly see the nexus between hard work and high rewards. Only then will
people, foreigners and Singaporeans, invest in Singapore; only then will Singaporeans work to improve
themselves and their children through better education and further training, instead of hoping for
windfalls through powerful friends and relatives or greasing contacts in the right places.
3. Public Support
Public support, so vital in any anti-corruption programme, is best won through successful action against
the corrupt, regardless of colour, creed or status and executed without fear or favour, firmly and fairly. Public
support cannot be taken for granted. The Bureau makes itself readily accessible to the public. Anyone with acomplaint of corruption has many easy means to lodge the complaint. They can go through the Internet(www.cpib.gov.sg), through walk in to the Bureau, through phone calls, through letters and faxes. As we areaccessible, we even find the public coming to us with problems which are not corruption matters, but mattersmore appropriately handled by other government departments such as the Police, Immigration or Ministry of
Manpower. Our Bureau will not turn away these complainants but will take down the information and passon to the relevant department. This is in line with the spirit of the governmentʼs “No Wrong Door” policy.
This approach helps to keep the publicʼs faith in the Bureau and in the government. In order to ascertain that
we continue to be effective and trusted, public perception surveys are done regularly by the Bureau to gauge
public sentiments.
4. Prevention, Outreach and International Engagements
The CPIB provides corruption education and prevention programmes to various local and foreignaudiences including students, public sector officers, private sector organizations and foreign visitors. In 2016,
the Bureau hosted 44 visits. The 783 foreign delegates had hailed from different parts of the world comprising

7

Refer to Daniel Kaufmann, Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption, 2005.

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the Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Tatarstan, Republic of Madagascar, Ukraine, State of Qatar and theRepublic of the Union of Myanmar etc. Keeping in mind that the bulk of corruption cases in Singapore
continue to come from the private sector, the CPIB will continue to focus our engagements on the industry
players and business communities to educate private sector employees.
The CPIB also actively engages the industry and business communities. One of such initiatives is theISO37001 on Anti-Bribery Management Systems which was launched by CPIB and Spring Singapore on 15
October 2016. This is a new standard to help businesses and companies implement an anti-bribery
compliance programme. In addition, a new guidebook, PACT: A Practical Anti-Corruption Guide for
Businesses in Singapore has also been developed to help local business owners reduce the risk of corruption in
their companies. As part of CPIBʼs ongoing anti-corruption efforts, a Corruption Reporting & Heritage Centre(CRHC) was also set up and officially opened by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on 6 June 2017. The CRHC
serves as a convenient and accessible space for members of the public to lodge corruption complaints and tolearn about corruption matters. As part of its continuing efforts to provide greater transparency and promotea culture of zero tolerance against corruption, CPIB has been releasing detailed corruption statistics on
Singapore annually since 2015. The latest corruption statistics, which shows trends spanning 2012 to 2016, canbe accessed online ‒ https://www.cpib.gov.sg/press-room/press-releases/corruption-singapore-low-levels.
The CPIB plays an active role in the international communityʼs fight against corruption and regularly
represents Singapore at various international anti-corruption platforms. These include the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)8, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)-Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, the South East
Asia ̶ Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC) meetings between parties of a regional Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MOU), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Anti-Corruption and Transparency(ACT) Expertsʼ Working Group, and the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group. CPIB is also one of the pioneer
participants of the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC) that was launched in July
2017 to improve fast-time intelligence sharing and assist countries in tackling allegations of grand corruption.
In 2016, the CPIB hosted 801 foreign delegates from different parts of the world who were interested to learn
about Singaporeʼs experience in combating corruption.

V. CONCLUSIONSPolitical will is the bedrock that a country must start with for a successful anti-corruption programme. Itʼs
only when the country establishes this foundation that the systems and institutions they have built to tackle
corruption can succeed.
Equally important is growing the economy of the country so that the peopleʼs standard of living, including
the public servants, can be improved and when this is coupled with an effective enforcement strategy, it willin turn increase the opportunity cost for anyone contemplating to indulge in bribery. The importance ofeconomic growth also brings me to reiterate the need for corruption to be dealt with not only within the
public sector but also the private sector so that investors will be attracted to your county knowing that they
can compete in an environment of a level playing field based solely on the price and quality of the products orservices they provide.
As such, it is clear that there are multiple factors in a successful anti-corruption strategy, which requires acomprehensive approach. One cannot deal with the scourge of corruption with isolated initiatives, nopartnership and without understanding the nature of corruption. An integrated national plan incorporating
the whole government and the private sector is necessary to increase the chances of success in fighting
corruption.

A major milestone was the completion of the review of Singaporeʼs implementation of UNCAC Chapters III (Criminalisationand Law Enforcement) and IV (International Cooperation) in 2015. The executive summary and full country report has since
been published on the UNODC website (refer to https://unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalreports/
2016_07_06_Singapore_Final_Country_Report.pdf).
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SINGAPOREʼS EXPERIENCE IN INVESTIGATING AND
RECOVERING PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION CRIMES
Vincent Lim＊

I. INTRODUCTION
One of CPIBʼs strategies to rip corruption at its core is to disgorge the criminal gains of the corrupt
through strict enforcement of money laundering offences and rigorous asset recovery efforts. These, coupledwith strong political will and other definitive measures, have abated the corruption situation in Singapore.
The majority of the corruption cases are from the private sector. The public-sector cases are typically petty
corruption by low or mid-level public officials.
CPIB also lends support to international asset recovery efforts and investigates into laundering of criminal
proceeds of foreign origin. This is part of Singaporeʼs national anti-money laundering and counter financing ofterrorism policy objective to seize and restrain proceeds and instrumentalities of crime or property ofequivalent value to prevent dissipation, regardless of the origin of the predicate crime.1
This paper sets out our experience and practices in investigating and recovering proceeds of crimes in
Singapore and our legislative framework that has supported us in this endeavour. We are cognisant that thesame set of practices that work in Singapore may not achieve the same result in another country, and viceversa. An effective system is often the result of an interplay of myriad measures taking into account theunique circumstances of the country. Nevertheless, it is hoped that through this paper, lessons can be drawn
and further discussions facilitated on the subject of asset recovery as a means to combat corruption.

II. SINGAPOREʼS LAWS IN SUPPORT OF MONEY LAUNDERINGINVESTIGATION AND ASSET RECOVERYThe foremost underpinning of our successful asset recovery efforts is our legal framework that allows forexpeditious seizure and restraint of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime or property of equivalent value,and secureing of evidence thereof.
A. Prevention of Corruption Act
In Singapore, investigators in CPIB are empowered under our Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241)
to arrest, search and seize properties related to the commission of corruption offences. Additionally, they canalso exercise general police powers to seize or prohibit disposal of or dealing in any assets to prevent theassets from being dissipated, without the need to obtain any court warrant, so long as there is sufficient
information that an offence has been committed and that the assets are linked to the criminal activity.
However, as a check and balance, such seizure has to be reported to the Magistrate when the property is nolonger relevant to investigation or one year from the seizure date, whichever is earlier.
The Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241) also encourages financial investigation to be conductedagainst the corrupt. Evidence adduced of accused in possession of pecuniary resources or property that isdisproportionate to his known income and that he cannot satisfactory account for, or that he had accumulated
Senior Deputy Director, Private Sector / Financial Investigations and Policy, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau,
Singapore.
1
During the Second Reading of our primary anti-money laundering law, Corruption Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes
Act (Amendment) Bill on 7 July 2014, the Minister for Home Affairs stated that it is:“in our national interest to participate pro-actively in the global effort against cross-border crime and money laundering. And thisaffirms our strong stance against such crimes, and sends a clear signal that illicit assets do not have safe harbour in Singapore,
upholding our status as a well-regarded and well-regulated financial centre.”＊

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during the material period of the offence, may be used as corroborating evidence that the accused hadreceived bribes, under section 24 of the Act.
Lastly, section 13 of Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241) has an in-built mechanism to recover anddisgorge criminal proceeds from corrupt receivers. Anyone who is convicted of corruptly receiving any
gratification in contravention of the Act, and if that gratification is a sum of money or if the value of thatgratification can be assessed, the court shall order the person to pay a penalty equal to the amount ofgratification received. The imposition of penalty under this Act is not a discretionary judicial measure but amandatory one that has to be imposed in addition to any other punishment such as fines or imprisonment
term that the court may mete out.
B. Corruption Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes Act
The Corruption Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes Act (“CDSA”) (Chapter 65A) is the primarylegislation in Singapore that criminalises the laundering of criminal benefits and provides for the investigationand confiscation of such benefits. The Act provides for a wide range of serious offences for which an ML
charge can apply. (As of last update on 1 September 2017, there are 460 serious offences listed in the CDSA
schedules.) It provides for heavy penalties for money laundering offences, with imprisonment up to 10 years
and/or fines up to $500,000 for natural persons and S$1 million for legal persons.
CPIB investigators are “authorised officers” under this Act and thus are also empowered to investigate
money laundering offences and conduct asset recovery under this Act.
CDSA has a more extended reach for asset recovery, as it also goes after assets that are not directly
traceable to a criminal offence. Under the Act, the court may make restraint orders or charging orders on
any property owned or linked to a person, as long as the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable cause tobelieve that benefits have been derived from his criminal conduct. In the eventuality that the person isconvicted of a serious offence such as corruption as specified in the CDSAʼs schedule, a confiscation order
may be obtained against the defendant for the benefits that he derived from the criminal conduct. The
confiscation order can extend to any property or any interest therein (including income accruing from suchproperty or interest) held by or linked to that person that is disproportionate to his known sources of income,the holding of which he cannot explain to the satisfaction of the court, and thus is presumed to have been
derived from criminal conduct.
Singapore generally adopts a conviction-based confiscation regime. Having said that, there are allowable
exceptions to this rule. For example, if a person cannot be found, apprehended or extradited at the end of six
months from the date on which an investigation was commenced against him, he shall be taken as having
absconded and thus deemed to be convicted of the offences for which he was investigated. In this way, aconfiscation order can still be obtained against fugitives.
To illustrate the application of CDSA to recover assets from an absconded person, we have the caseagainst Ng Teck Lee (“Ng”), who was the Chief Executive Officer and President of Citiraya Industries
Limited, a publicly-listed electronic waste recycling company, at the material period of offence. Before CPIB
commenced a corruption investigation against Ng, he fled Singapore with his wife. He was placed on Interpolʼs wanted person list and his whereabouts are still unknown to this day.
Notwithstanding his absence, investigation by CPIB has adduced sufficient evidence that Ng had
misappropriated and diverted the electronic scrap to overseas syndicates for repackaging and sale asstandard products, and bribed various parties to keep the scam under wrap. The Court was satisfied that
CPIB had exhausted its efforts to locate Ng and pronounced Ng an absconded person under CSDA and bythat note, deemed to have been convicted of the alleged serious offences. Subsequently, a confiscation order of
US$ 51 million was issued against Ng for the benefits known to be derived by him through his criminal
conduct. This was feasible even though Ng was never apprehended.
The same legal provision can be relied on to recover assets of international fugitives who have evaded
investigation or prosecution in foreign jurisdictions and whose assets are still in Singapore.

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III. CPIBʼS EMPHASIS ON MONEY LAUNDERING INVESTIGATION ANDASSET RECOVERY
Aligned with its strategic direction to cripple corruption through disgorgement of criminal proceeds,
CPIB set up a Financial Investigations Branch in June 2011 as a specialised unit within its Investigations
Department to lead money laundering investigations, as well as in the recovery and confiscation of benefits
derived from corrupt proceeds. CPIB also aspires to have all its investigators adequately trained in financial
investigations by year 2020, so that asset recovery and money laundering investigation will, in the near
future, be performed as part of corruption investigation.
Internally, CPIB has also put in place processes throughout investigative phases to ensure that cases thatinvolve significant proceeds are identified early, so that financial investigations can be triggered andconducted in parallel alongside predicate corruption investigations, so that proceeds and instrumentalities ofcrime can be identified, traced and seized promptly to prevent dissipation.
To enhance effectiveness in asset recovery, CPIB has invested in technology so that the financial
investigators have the necessary intelligence analytical tools to analyse complex fund flows. CPIB also
subscribed to third party solutions to allow for corporate and person screenings and risk screenings so thatinvestigators can gain early insight into the relationships and interconnections between persons or entities ofinterest. More recently, CPIB is also enhancing its case management system to allow for more active
tracking and managing of assets recovered.

IV. LEVERAGING ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE TO DETECT OFFENCES
AND IDENTIFY PROPERTY LINKED TO CRIMEIn Singapore, there is a statutory obligation on everyone to file suspicious transaction reports (“STRs”)
with our Financial Intelligence Unit (“FIU”) if, in the course of oneʼs work, one has reason to suspect that any
property is linked to crime, irrespective of the quantum of criminal proceeds or property involved. Due toextensive outreach efforts on the part of our FIU, there has been a significant increase in the STRs filed. In
2016, there were 34,129 such reports filed, of which one third were filed by the banking sector and anothertwo-fifths from casinos, moneychangers and remittance agents.
In addition, anyone who brings cash into or moves cash out of Singapore in excess of S$20,000, or any
precious stones and metals dealer that conducts a cash transaction with a client in excess of $20,000, or any
casino operator that conducts a cash transaction with a patron in excess of $10,000, are also compelled to filed
cash movement and transaction reports with our FIU.
These STRs contain important information on red flags and potential leads that enforcement authorities
can leverage for detection and pursuit of money laundering offences. Together with the cash movement andtransaction reports, they are a rich source of financial intelligence. They can shed light on beneficial
ownership of accounts and transaction details that can lead to identification of assets related to criminal
activities. They can also lead to disclosure of corruption or money laundering offences which could haveremained undetected if not for the STRs.
For this reason, CPIB has for many years been leveraging financial intelligence for early detection of
offences and for asset tracing.
A. Financial Intelligence as a Detection Tool
CPIB works closely with the FIU to scope the types of corruption-related financial intelligence that are
relevant to CPIB. Based on the agreed understanding and pre-defined parameters, our FIU disseminates to
CPIB a filtered list of corruption-related STRs fortnightly. A team of financial intelligence analysts in CPIB
will then systematically review these STRs to detect if any corrupt proceeds of foreign or domestic origin
were laundered in Singapore. The team will also identify whether any offence of corruption and money
laundering has been disclosed in the STRs to warrant domestic investigation.
This proactive effort has yielded some positive results. There was one such case in 2010 where theproactive use of STRs by CPIB led to identification of a transnational crime and money laundering offences
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that implicated a foreign head of state. Investigation was immediately mounted against the two co-accused in
Singapore. They were apprehended, prosecuted and eventually convicted of fraudulently benefiting US$3.6
million from a community project overseas through the use of false invoices issued under the name of a
British Virgin Islands registered company. The accused were sentenced to jail for 60 to 70 months and theassets of the shell company and the foreign politically exposed person over $2 million dollars were forfeited tothe state.
B. Financial Intelligence as an Investigation Tool
Singapore does not have a central beneficial ownership database, but this does not significantly impact on
our effectiveness in enforcing money laundering offences or asset recovery. If we require beneficial
ownership information, we can order the corporate secretarial agents and banks to produce such information.
Furthermore, through experience, it is found that FIUʼs financial intelligence of suspicious transactions may
be more relevant and critical information for money investigation and asset tracing.
Therefore, in CPIB, as part of our standard procedures for money laundering investigation and asset
recovery, we will screen against our FIU database all persons of interest and their related family members
and entities, to uncover leads on financial assets and transactions that may be linked to the crime. This isparticularly important if there is no prior information on how the corrupt proceeds were received or passed.
Take for example, in 2013, CPIB received information that a foreign national had assisted foreign
politically exposed persons to receive bribes and part of the bribes might be laundered through Singapore.
The foreign national has absconded and been placed on Interpolʼs wanted person list. Acting on theinformation, CPIB commenced a money laundering investigation immediately. A screening against the FIUʼs
database revealed several bank accounts in Singapore that were beneficially owned by the foreign national
abettor. The financial intelligence, supplemented with other reliable sources of information, led to CPIBʼsseizure of close to S$100 million in these bank accounts that were reasonably suspected to be criminal
proceeds. At the material times, the fugitive was in the midst of moving his funds out of Singapore. Had there
been no STRs filed on the bank accounts linked to the fugitive or no screening against the FIUʼs database,
CPIB would not have been able to so quickly recover the assets.
In another case, CPIB opened an investigation against a person linked to bribery of foreign public officials
in that country. Based on open source information, the accused had paid bribes directly through his company.
However, through the STRs, CPIB identified that the bribes were probably paid through another company
owned by his mother, as banks have disclosed in their STRs that a significant amount of cash was withdrawn
by his family members from the company of the accusedʼs mother.

V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN MONEY LAUNDERINGINVESTIGATION AND ASSET RECOVERY
Besides enforcing against the laundering of proceeds originating from domestic corruption, the CPIB also
proactively detects and investigates money laundering offences involving corrupt proceeds of foreign origin.
About 70% of assets recovered by CPIB are linked to foreign corruption cases.
To this end, all requests for assistance received by CPIB are reviewed to determine whether any personor property in Singapore may be linked to crimes of foreign origin that warrant a domestic investigation. If
sufficient information of a domestic offence is disclosed through the requests, CPIB will liaise with the foreignauthorities for the purpose of investigation and asset recovery efforts.
The bedrock to a successful international asset recovery is trust and cooperation among the foreign
enforcement authorities. If this foundation is absent or weak, cross-agency information sharing will be
impeded and asset recovery action cannot be taken as quickly. With this in mind, in July 2017, CPIB joined
other law enforcement agencies from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates of America in the launching of the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC) which
was set up to serve as a platform for enhancing international cooperation against grand corruption.
At this point, I wish to share a case to underscore the need for close cooperation and trust among foreign
law enforcement agencies to allow for sharing of financial intelligence and, at times, investigation findings to102

20TH UNAFEI UNCAC TRAINING PROGRAMMEVISITING EXPERTSʼ PAPERS

enable prompt action to be taken to arrest the illicit fund flow.
Last year, in 2016, through review of a suspicious transaction report, CPIB came to know that a Singapore
bank account might be used as a conduit to receive funds intended for bribing foreign politically exposed
persons. The filer informed that the bank account was featured in a foreign adverse news and there weresuspicious bank transactions passed in the bank account. CPIB then, through the FIU, immediately alerted
the foreign authorities and sought their confirmation whether the bank account was featured in theircorruption investigation. The foreign authorities were also aware of the urgency of the matter as thebeneficial owner was making plans to move the funds out of Singapore. Within a day, the foreign authorities
responded and produced court affidavits to show that the bank account was complicit in a foreign offence.
With the information, CPIB immediately launched a money laundering investigation and seized close to
US$16 million in the account.
Almost a year later, the foreign authorities followed up with a formal mutual legal assistance (“MLA”)
request to Singapore to restrain the bank account. Had CPIB not acted to seize the assets earlier, the funds inthe bank account would have been dissipated by the time the MLA request reached Singapore.

VI. EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF SEIZED ASSETS
A. Preserving Value of Seized Assets
Through our experience, it is not ideal to seize and hold the tainted assets until the conclusion of theprosecution against the accused and through the protracted asset confiscation process that might take years
to conclude, during which the values of the seized assets such as real estate properties, vehicles, precious
metals and stones or luxury items, might have depreciated and dwindled. The conditions of the seizedproperty might also be impaired if not properly maintained and safeguarded during the passage of time.
Therefore, in recent years, CPIB started to take a more proactive approach to preserving or realizing thevalue of the seized property, by working with the defendant, victims and other stakeholders to agree on an
arrangement to realize the value of the seized property early.
Such an approach was adopted in realizing the seized assets of one accused person who was investigatedby CPIB in 2015 for conspiring with others to cheat her company through use of fictitious quotations andinvoices and from which she benefited about S$ 5 million. Financial investigation against the accused revealed
that she had an obsessive spending behaviour and would use the criminal benefits derived from cheating her
company to purchase luxury items such as branded watches, jewellery, branded handbags and clothes,amongst other things. She also invested in a few properties in Singapore and offshore. During the course ofinvestigations, CPIB had seized four properties, three bank accounts, two insurance policies and numerous
luxury items and branded apparels.
The luxury items are of particular concern to us. Care has to be exercised to prevent loss and damage andthus they were catalogued meticulously, individually photographed and stored in a strong safe. Consideration
was also taken to ensure that the seized assets were stored in optimal conditions (e.g. in a room with lowered
humidity to prevent damage to luxury items) in order not to cause impairment to the seized property.
After the investigation into the predicate offences was substantially completed, CPIB started to engage
the accused person to secure her agreement to liquidate the luxury items and branded apparel. Eventuallywith her consent and assistance of the accusedʼs employer who was victimised in this cheating scheme, apublic auction was called to liquidate the seized items. Altogether, over 500 items of luxury watches,
jewellery and branded bags were sold through the public auction and the liquidated value recovered from theauction was close to half a million Singapore dollars. It is noteworthy that the public auction was conductedmonths before the accused was finally charged for the cheating and money laundering offences in December
2016.
For this particular case, CPIB also secured the agreement from the developers of two properties ownedby the accused, to return to the state the sums that the accused had contributed towards the properties, as acondition to lift the caveats that were placed on these properties. Negotiation is still ongoing with respect tothe liquidation of two other properties owned by the accused.
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B. Avoiding Holding and Maintenance Costs
Asset seizures also do not come without cost. It will be ineffectual against the asset recovery cause if thecost of holding and maintaining the asset seizures were to outweigh the value that can be realised from them.
Therefore, another practice of CPIB with respect to seizures of assets particularly those that havesignificant holding cost attached thereto, was to avoid taking physical possession of the seized assets, whilst
applying the necessary safeguards to prevent dissipation and negotiating with the owner to liquidate theassets.
For example, if an accused was found to acquire luxury cars using criminal proceeds, the risks associatedwith holding these valuables may outweigh the benefits of taking physical possession of such assets. Insteadof physically seizing the cars, CPIB investigators may decide to exercise their powers to order our landtransport authorities to prevent transfer of ownership of the vehicles, which will effectively prevent theaccused from disposing the vehicles.

VII. CONCLUSIONS
Monetary gratification remains the primary drive behind corruption. Tough actions must be taken and be
seen to be taken against the laundering of criminal proceeds and to disgorge criminal benefits of the corrupt
in order to deter and abate corruption.
Money laundering investigation and asset recovery however often entail an arduous and lengthy processeven with the most effective legislative framework in place. The process can be even more resource
intensive for transnational laundering or asset recovery cases.
Therefore, from CPIBʼs experience, it is more effective for law enforcement authorities to adopt a morecollaborative and proactive approach towards asset recovery; through cooperation from law enforcement
agencies but also from the accused person and key stakeholders of the assets. The assistance from the lattergroup is paramount to secure early preservation of the value of the assets seized and to overcome any
operational constraints perennial in cross border asset recovery.

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PARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS
OPERATION CARWASH AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
Frederico Skora Lieberenz＊

I. OPERATION CARWASH
Operation Carwash, as several actions against corruption in Brazil and abroad have become known since
March 2014, all started with the arrest of a former senior director of the national oil company for his
involvement with a group of money launderers. It has been going strong for three-and-a-half years at the time
this paper was being written, and even though it is showing signs of slowing down, it is safe to assume that it
was a major step forward in the fight against corruption in Brazil and the recovery of the proceedings fromthose crimes.
A. Early Developments
Before the success of Operation Carwash, several other operations that investigated rampant corruption
in the country had failed to stand in the superior courts. It was a known fact in Brazil that crime paid off if
you were a politician or a high government official, and that the chances of conviction were minimum. This
scenario started to change in 2005.
1. The Scandal of the Mensalão
In the year 2005, a Brazilian politician took the stand in Congress to report on what came to be known as
the Mensalão: legislators were being paid a monthly amount by their parties to vote according to theinterests of the government. The money came through fraudulent contracts with marketing companies andwas suspected to have paid off more than half of the Congress. After these revelations, the second mostpowerful politician in the Labourerʼs Party of Brazil, which ruled the country, was removed from office, neverto regain his former status. Several other politicians floundered but managed to come once more into office inthe next legislature. In the end it amounted to a political earthquake, but economic gains and an increase inpopular programmes managed to keep the government of the Labourerʼs Party of Brazil in power despite theheavy toll on its public image.
2. The Popular Revolts of 2013
In 2013, there were several popular uprisings in the country, the most famous of which began in Rio deJaneiro after an unpopular increase in the prices of public transportation. What at first was a movement ofstudents suddenly started to congregate several groups, which were out to demonstrate their disapproval of
the current government of both the state and the city of Rio de Janeiro. The movement culminated with the“walk of the two hundred thousand”, one of the largest public demonstrations in Brazilian history, which took
place in one of Rio de Janeiroʼs largest avenues downtown. Legislators, terrified of the public uprisings, among
other measures approved several pieces of anti-corruption legislation, which had been put away in their officedesks for more than a decade.
3. The Supreme Court Judgement on the Mensalão Scandal
It was not until 2013 that the Mensalão Scandal was finally mature for trial by the Supreme Court ofBrazil. Since several office holders such as deputies, senators and ministers were involved in the corruption
and money laundering schemes, the constitution demanded that the case had to go to trial in the highest courtin the country, the Supremo Tribunal Federal.
The judgement exposed the Supreme Court judges and was entirely televised; public opinion was adefinite factor in the decision taking of the judges, as they would have to answer for their opinions in court.

＊

Federal Commissioner, Repression of Corruption and Abuse of Public Resource Division, Federal Police.

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The meticulous tracing of the money used to purchase votes in Congress and the adoption of the Theory of
the Domain of the Fact as derived from Claus Roxinʼs exposition on Mediate Authorship1 also led ultimately
to the conviction and incarceration of several high-office-holding individuals and entrepreneurs, somethingunheard of in the country thus far.
B. The Operation Begins
What began as an investigation on general money laundering schemes in Brasília, the countryʼs capitalcity, suddenly took a turn towards what came to be the greatest corruption scheme in the country.
1. Paulo Roberto Costa, Former Director of Oil and Gas of Petrobrás
Mr. Paulo Roberto Costa was early in his retirement after a successful term as Director of Oil and Gas ofPetrobrás, the countryʼs largest and most traded national public company. Such a position had put him inclose proximity with Brazilʼs most powerful politicians and businessmen, including the former President of
the Republic Mr. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and at-the-time current President of the Republic Mrs. Dilma
Rousseff.
Until one day, at the beginning of March 2014, Mr. Costa was on the passive end of a judicial search andseizure warrant for allegedly receiving a luxury automobile as a donation from Mr. Alberto Youssef, one of
the countryʼs most well-known money launderers. This discovery had been possible through the tracing of
one of Mr. Youssefʼs bank transactions, and the vehicle was ultimately found parked in front of Mr. Costaʼshouse. Investigators were intrigued as to the reason a former high-office-holding public servant would havefor receiving such a gift, and suspicions of corruption came to mind, but nothing could be proven at the time.
However, the fact that more than one million Reais (approximately five hundred thousand dollars at the time)in cash was found in a safe in his residence brought more questions that required answers.
The turning point in the investigation came quickly, when it was discovered that relatives of Mr. PauloRoberto Costa had been in one of his offices during the same morning of the search and seizure warrant at his
home and took several documents and possibly money to an unknown location. Rather than suffer his familyʼs
incarceration, Mr. Costa began negotiations with the Prosecutorʼs Office of Brazil for a “Colaboração
Premiada”, Brazilʼs form of plea bargaining. He finally delivered testimony that put several politicians andother high-ranking officials in prison, including his former colleague Mr. Renato Duque, Director ofEngineering of Petrobrás. From that point on, the scope of the operation escalated quickly, making full use ofits momentum.
2. Pedro Barusco, Former General Manager of Engineering of Petrobrás
As the investigations advanced, in March 2015, a former General Manager of Engineering of Petrobrás,rather than face imminent arrest, decided to come forward and offer the Prosecutors a deal. Mr. Pedro
Barusco proposed to repatriate more than one hundred and eighty million Reais he had stashed in a secretbank account in Switzerland and explain the whole scheme of corruption in Petrobrás if he could get
immunity from prosecution. The deal was considered and the Prosecutorʼs Office decided it was worth it.
Renato Duque was arrested a second time, after having been released once by the Supreme Court. It had
been discovered through spontaneous international cooperation with Switzerland and Monaco that he had
tried to take money from his bank accounts in the former countryʼs financial institutions to the latterʼs.
Differently from Paulo Roberto Costa, Renato Duque refused to cooperate with Brazilʼs authorities in theinvestigation for more than a year, before giving in and confessing his crimes in court in exchange for a
reduction of his sentence.
3. The Labourerʼs Party of Brazilʼs (PT) Involvement in Carwash
It was already suspected, but due to constitutional immunities regarding the prosecution of legislators andministers, it was a difficult case to take to court. It was easier for politicians to expel the accused from their
parties and revoke their mandates, but once the investigation came too close to the leaders of the parties,
including former President of the Republic Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, it was decided that a change in strategy
was necessary.

1

Also known as the Control Over the Organization Theory.

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In fact, the second arrest of Renato Duque, the director that had been appointed by the Labourerʼs Party,
and veiled threats by his family that he would cooperate if he was not released, made it only a matter of time
before the partyʼs connection was put to light. Financial operators of other parties, including the mostpowerful, the Democratic Movement Party of Brazil (PMDB), had also been incarcerated and could decide tocome clean to the authorities at any moment. The investigatorsʼ experience in other money laundering cases
made them experts in following the money, and international cooperation, especially with Switzerland and theUnited States, had borne fruit. The situation was desperate for the survival of the parties.
It was at this already delicate time that several contractors with the government became targets of theinvestigators. Several publicly traded companies, multinationals of the oil and gas and construction businesses
suffered search and seize judicial others. It had been discovered that all those companies involved had somekind of department for handling the payment of bribes to politicians and other public officials. Brazilʼs largest
construction firm, Odebrecht, with business all over the country and the world, after a long incarceration of
its president, finally decided to collaborate with the prosecutors and revealed their “Department ofStructured Operations”, or the bribe payment and accounting department, which ran parallel to thecorporationʼs regular operations. Their computer servers were encrypted and housed in a computer farm in
Switzerland. Once the proper key was inserted, it revealed a world of bribes.
Testimony by Odebrecht and other companiesʼ highest officials revealed what had long been suspected in
Brazil: that the very structure of democracy in the country had been tainted by corruption since time
immemorial. The president at the time, Mrs. Dilma Rousseff from the Labourerʼs Party, was impeached fromoffice following constitutional dictates. The vice-president, Michel Temer, was seriously assailed afterwards,
but has managed to hold on to his office despite public opinion at the time of the writing of this paper.

II. MEASURES FOR TRACING PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION
Several instruments for tracing the proceeds of corruption are available for use in Brazil, and all of them
have been used in Operation Carwash.
A. SARs (Suspicious Activity Reports)
Known as RIFs (Relatórios de Inteligência Financeira), reports from Brazilʼs Financial Intelligence Unit
(Conselho de Controle da Atividade Financeira, or COAF) are some of the best means of tracing the proceedsof corruption. Financial institutions in the country are required to report any suspicious activities to COAF or
run the risk of facing severe fines and other penalties according to the Anti-Money Laundering Statute. SARs
can be used as evidence; however, this is not encouraged by the FIU as it exposes investigative techniques.
Additional information can be retrieved by the Group of Egmont, a network of FIUs from all over the world.
B. Lifting of Bank, Tax and Phone Record Secrecy
Judges and prosecutors, to a lesser extent, can lift the secrecy of bank and tax statements and telephonerecords. Specialized computer software and investigators can then help trace the relations between certaintransactions and individuals and expose corruption and/or money laundering schemes.
C. Organized Crime Legislation
Laws against Organized Crime in Brazil, especially the Act of 2013, have made it clearer to judicial
authorities that Plea Bargaining and Controlled Delivery can and should be used to trace the proceedings ofcorruption. Means of finding evidence, such as the Colaboração Premiada (plea bargaining), are essential as
they paint a much clearer picture than investigators can usually reveal using only the other means available
and are often the only means to go into the deepest depths of the companiesʼ and partiesʼ money laundering
operations. Controlled delivery can be used to trace the route used by money launderers to escape theauthoritiesʼ watch and find the final recipients, those that are usually too far from the corruption act itself tobe convicted otherwise.
D. Task Forces
Special judges, prosecutors and investigators have been designated by their own organizations to work instrict cooperation and in special cases. Without this joining of efforts it would not have been possible forinvestigations, prosecutions and convictions to happen in such short times; usually a corruption case in
Operation Carwash is investigated, indicted and presented to an individual judge and tried in under a year.
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Meanwhile, most of the indicted have been incarcerated for the time being due to the potential to escape andto interfere with the investigation. Cases are made strong, carried by specialized authorities and rarely sufferfrom nullities. Tracing and seizing of assets are done in the proper moments so it is made harder for criminals
to move the proceedings from their crimes before they are taken from them. Investigations also run insecrecy until the serving of the search and seizure and arrest warrants.
E. Central Bank of Brazil
The Central Bank of Brazil keeps a record of all the financial institutions and their account holders in
Brazil. This means that investigators, prosecutors and judges may at any time request information on theaccount holders. This is usually restricted to their names and social security numbers (CPFs), but from that
small piece of information, an investigator could build up a case and request a court order to lift the banksecrecy and get the statements. The Central bank also demands that information passed by the financial
institutions come in an orderly, predetermined fashion, so it can be easily run through computer software thatanalyses and cross references the information as to make it useful for the investigations.
F. Direct International Cooperation
Several treaties have already been signed by Brazil in the areas of Money Laundering, Corruption and theTracing and Freezing of the proceedings from those crimes. This allows for spontaneous assistance bycountries often targeted by money launderers such as Switzerland, Luxembourg and Monaco as well as
direct cooperation through national central units. In Brazil the Departamento de Recuperação de Ativos e
Cooperação Internacional receives both domestic and international requests for cooperation and distributes
them accordingly. Statutes demand that the requests follow international guidelines and the nationʼsfundamental principles regarding human rights.
G. INTERPOLAs a part of INTERPOL, Brazil has an international network of police organizations at its disposal andmay use it to find and arrest criminals abroad, request intelligence on individuals and companies, try to findworks of art that might have been used to launder money, etc. Since corruption and money laundering isalready an international crisis, police cooperation through INTERPOL has been growing in scope and is an
integral part of Brazilʼs Federal Police structure.
H. Rogatory Letters
Once a judicial decision has been made final, it is not a matter of direct cooperation anymore. Brazilian
court sentences that must be served abroad and international sentences that must be served in Brazil have togo through the countryʼs highest courts. The long time it usually takes for a court decision to become final in
Brazil, however, causes Rogatory Letters to become limited in their use against corruption and money
laundering, which require quick action if they are to be effective against organized crime.

III. PROBLEMS WITH OPERATION CARWASH AND ITS FUTURE
The many investigations that have taken place since March 2014 have run into several difficulties in the
judicial, political and social levels in Brazil.
A. Court Privilege
Several authorities in Brazil, not only presidents but also all ministers, presidents and governors, somesecretaries, legislators, judges, prosecutors, among other authorities, all have court privileges: they must be
tried by a superior court, which are generally ill suited for investigations. Usually cases tried in the first
instance in superior courts go nowhere and get tangled in politics and bureaucracy. Superior courts excel inappeals but are not investigative courts. This causes office holders and other high officials to escapeconvictions that expire through the statute of limitations, and they often get to keep their ill-gotten gains.
B. Difficulties in the Suspension or Revoking of a Term of Office
Only legislators can suspend or revoke the Terms of Office of their peers. This causes deputies andsenators with little in-house support to be ousted quickly, to appease public opinion, but those with a lot of
support, such as party leaders, are usually protected from such measures, no matter the crime or how clearly
it was exposed.

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C. Social Partisanship
As Operation Carwash started, the country was under the rule of the Labourerʼs Party. President Dilma
Rousseff, while she counted with the support of the extremely popular former president, Luiz Inácio Lula daSilva, did not have much charisma or support from the parties. The Labourerʼs Party also suffered fromprejudice, being the countryʼs only party of the masses, dedicated to the proletarian causes. Once President
Dilma lost the support of Congress, it was a matter of time before the Labourerʼs Party was removed fromoffice and the Democratic Movement Party of the vice-president Michel Temer was instated to resume themandate. This has caused much belligerence between supporters of PT and those who were against it, and so
the whole discussion on corruption became secondary.
In practical terms, investigations in the superior courts ran much more quickly and had more support
when PT was being targeted more often. Now there is a general feeling in the country that investigations go
slower and that the government is removing investigators, prosecutors and judges from Operation Carwash.

IV. CONCLUSION
There is a major election next year, and society is very polarized. Former President Mr. Luiz Inácio Lulada Silva has announced he shall be running for office once more, and there is a chance he can lose his politicalrights before the elections. Meanwhile candidates from the extreme right movements, which had never been
seriously considered for the highest office in the country, suddenly seem to be the only alternative to Mr. Lulafor some.
There is also a serious discussion as to whether the current political scheme should be kept or changed toanother configuration, and as to whether companies should be allowed to pay for office runnersʼ campaigns ornot. The focus is on the next elections and the means to balance public opinion and the legislatorsʼ survival
instincts.
Meanwhile, efforts to stop corruption and to seize the proceedings of the crimes continue in Brazil andabroad, but legislators are not keen to give up their court privileges and thus allow the cases against them tobe handled by singular, experienced judges. Only public pressure and serious discussions of the ways to leavethis standstill can move the authorities to go against their own wishes and respect those of the general
populace.

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ENHANCING SYNERGIES: THE MULTI-AGENCY EXPERIENCE IN
FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN KENYA
Caroline Nyaga＊

I. INTRODUCTION
During the Second State of the Nation Address to Parliament1, the President took an unprecedented moveby tabling a confidential report on corruption cases under investigation by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission (EACC) and directed all the Public and State Officers implicated in graft to step aside pending
the outcome of the ongoing investigations. He further directed the Office of the Attorney General &Department of Justice to undertake a thorough review of the legal, policy and institutional framework forfighting corruption in Kenya. A Task Force2 was formed to oversee the whole process and it drew its
membership from all Ministries, Departments and Agencies charged with fighting corruption in Kenya
including the enforcement, investigative and prosecutorial agencies.3 One notable recommendation that arose
was the lack of proper coordination among agencies and duplication of efforts by various agencies thus
making the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases an uphill task due to lack of a coordinatedframework for reporting corruption, information gathering, intelligence sharing, cooperation in investigations,prosecutions joint trainings, among other areas.
Despite the myriad of laws in place to combat corruption, Kenya still ranks highly in the Corruption
Perception Index.4 The Task Force recommended institutional collaboration and partnerships amongagencies to enhance the fight against corruption.

II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSET RECOVERY IN KENYA
The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (POCAMLA) is the main legislation that provides
for the offence of money laundering and introduces measures for combating the offence, the identification,
tracing, freezing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime. It establishes the Assets Recovery
Agency5 and the Financial Reporting Centre. Others include the Mutual Legal Assistance Act of 2011 thatgoverns the mutual legal assistance to be given and received by Kenya in investigations, prosecutions andjudicial proceedings in relation to criminal matters. The Attorney Generalʼs Office acts as the Central
Authority. The Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 2012, also makes provisions in Kenya forthe enforcement of judgements given in countries outside Kenya which accord reciprocal treatment tojudgements given in Kenya. Others include: The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003; the AntiState Counsel at the Office of the Attorney General & Department of Justice, Kenya. She serves in the Legal Affairs Division,
Anti-corruption, Ethics and Integrity Section.
1
This was on 26th March 2015. (Art 132 (1)(c) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 requires the President to, annually, give a Stateof the Nation Address on all the measures taken and the progress achieved in the realization of the national values referred in
Article 10.)
2
Task Force on the Review of the Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework for Fighting Corruption in Kenya (2015), see
Gazette Notice No. 2118 of 30th March 2015.
3
The exercise culminated in the Report of the Task Force on the Review of the Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework forFighting Corruption in Kenya (2015). (The Task Force gave various recommendations for various agencies including the Asset
Recovery Agency, Financial Reporting Centre and others and most have been implementing them as part of their work plans.
When coming up with the recommendations, the Task Force considered: (i) The UNCAC Country Review Report (ii) The Draft
National Ethics and Anti-Corruption Policy (iii) Memoranda from member institutions, public organizations, civil society
organizations and select individuals.)
4
The 2016 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranks Kenya at No. 145/176 www.transparency.org
5
The ARA is an autonomous body whose mandate is to identify, freeze and seize assets which are proceeds of crime and tocombat money laundering. The EACC also has a department that recovers assets. The Agency was also established in further
fulfilment of the national obligations under UNCAC.
＊

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20TH UNAFEI UNCAC TRAINING PROGRAMMEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERSCounterfeit Act, 2008; the Counter-Trafficking Persons Act, 2010; the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act,
2010, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2010, the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act No. 47 of2013, The Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya.6
In the asset recovery chain, the agencies involved face various challenges ranging from: complexities ofcases; inadequacy of capacity especially if the same involves recovering assets stashed in other jurisdictions,lack of witnesses to support applications therefore implying that they are not sustainable before court, thetime frame for processing Mutual Legal Assistance requests is sometimes protracted and thus therequirement for interagency cooperation.
The punishments under Kenyan Law for corrupt practices include:
7 Imprisonment
7 Hefty Fines
7 Debarment from holding public office
7 Compensation orders on conviction
7 Forfeiture of unexplained assets.

III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATIONIn regard to asset recovery and prior to the Task Force undertaking its assignment, there were various
fragmented avenues of institutional collaboration between agencies, for instance:
A. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecution (ODPP) Vs. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission Collaboration (EACC)The ODPP is mandated to prosecute all criminal cases while EACC is the main enforcement agency onmatters of corruption. In order to achieve success in the investigation and prosecution of these cases, the twohave to worked together. This has been achieved through joint trainings of investigators and prosecutors,
joint forms and prosecution-guided investigations. Through this initiative, the Guidelines for the Investigationof corruption and Economic Crimes and the Guidelines for the Prosecution of Corruption and Economic
Crimes have been developed and implemented by both agencies.
B. The Financial Reporting Centre (FRC)The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act also establishes the FRC7 whose main objective
is to assist in the identification of the proceeds of crime and the combating of money laundering and thefinancing of terrorism. It is mandated8 to:77
7

Make information collected by it available to investigating authorities, supervisory bodies and anyother bodies relevant to facilitate the administration and enforcement of the laws of Kenya;
Exchange information with similar bodies in other countries regarding money laundering activities
and related offences;
Ensure compliance with international standards and best practice in anti-money-laundering
measures.

The FRC collaborates by assisting in the tracing of illicit financial flows relating to corruption and liaisingwith sister agencies outside the country on sharing of information related to corruption investigations. It has
concluded MOUs with the Central Bank of Kenya, the Insurance Regulatory Authority and the Capital

All these pieces of Legislation can be accessed from www.kenyalaw.org.
Section 23 of the POCAMLA.
8
Receive and analyze: reports of unusual or suspicious transactions submitted by reporting institutions; cash transactions madeby reporting institutions; cash declaration forms received from border points: Disseminating of reports received to appropriate
law enforcement authorities or other supervisory bodies for further handling: Make information collected by it available toinvestigating authorities, supervisory bodies and any other bodies relevant to facilitate the administration and enforcement of
the laws of Kenya; undertaking inspection and supervision of Reporting Institutions to ensure compliance with AML/CFT
reporting obligations as prescribed in POCAMLA: facilitating exchange of information on money laundering activities withother financial intelligence units in other countries: Developing AML/CFT Regulations to provide guidance to support
implementation of the Act: Developing AML/CFT training programmes for Reporting Institutions.
6
7

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 104

Markets Authority.
C. Anti-Money-Laundering and Combating of Financing of Terrorism Round Table Meeting
This forum brings together financial sector stakeholders with the aim of creating awareness on antimoney-laundering issues. It also trains reporting entities, law enforcement authorities and personnel in the
FRC on anti-money-laundering issues. The Round table is now a national forum for information sharing,developing common approaches to issues and promoting desirable policies as well as standards. It draws
membership from: the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission; Office of the Attorney General & Department of Justice; Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions; National Intelligence Service; Kenya Revenue
Authority; Central Bank of Kenya; Asset Recovery Agency; Insurance Regulatory Authority; Directorate of
Criminal Investigations; Banks; Mobile Money Service Providers.9
D. The Birth of the Multi-Agency Team (MAT)The Multi-Agency Team is not anchored in law and was born out of a Presidential directive in November
2015. This was around the same time the Task Force submitted its Report to the President who directed thatthe recommendations be implemented fully. It had been noted that the lack of synergy and inter-agency
cooperation among law enforcement agencies was compromising the fight against corruption, economic
crimes and other related crimes. The areas of focus are:77
7
7

Corruption
Economic crimes
Other organized crimes
Cartels and syndicates

The essence of the MAT is to ensure that corrupt individuals have no leeway to escape when caught. All
agencies go for the culprit simultaneously, for instance: the DCI and EACC will conduct the investigations,the police would arrest, the KRA will go after taxes and revenue, the ARA/EACC will trace, identify, freeze
and preserve or recover assets. Therefore, this would corner the culprits and ensure they cannot run.
1. The Composition and Mandate of MAT
It is worth noting that the country has faced serious challenges with corruption whereby assets andmoney are stashed abroad. During the Third State of the Nation Address10, the President reported that theGovernment has invested in preventive measures as well as tracking, seizing and confiscating the proceeds ofcorruption. A total of Kshs. 1.6 billion was allocated to the multi-agency institutional framework to support its
operations. The membership comprises the following institutions:
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7

Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Directorate of Criminal Investigations
National Intelligence Service
Financial Reporting Centre
Asset Recovery Agency
Kenya Revenue Authority
Office of the President

2. Terms of Reference
The terms of reference of the multi-agency team are:7
7
7
7

To enhance cooperation, coordination and collaboration among the agencies
To engage other relevant agencies in order to enhance the effectiveness of the graft war
To identify resource needs for each agency and lobby for the same
To develop effective communication strategies for awareness creation on the gains andachievements made in the fight against corruption.

Report of the Task Force on the Review of the Legal, Policy and Institutional Framework for Fighting Corruption in Kenya(2015).
10
The Third State of the Nation Address made by the Parliament in March 2016.
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20TH UNAFEI UNCAC TRAINING PROGRAMMEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

3. The Benefits of the Multi-Agency Team11
The Multi-Agency Team has accomplished the following since its inception. They include:
7 Better coordination, cooperation and collaboration among agencies. There have been joint trainings
to increase the capacities of officers handling corruption-related cases.
7 Joint investigations and operations among the agencies therefore pooled resources, synergy andavoidance of duplication of efforts. The MAT has undertaken joint sting operations through which
contraband cargo has been seized in Mombasa.
7 Real time information gathering and intelligence sharing.
7 Co-option of other agencies on an as needed basis into the MAT, for instance Kenya Wildlife
Services, National Transport and Safety Authority, the National Land Commission, among others.
There are times when the agencies lend resources (human capacities) to each other as needed.
7 Replication of the MAT collaboration in the counties
7 Engaging other stakeholders to enhance the fight against corruption including the Judiciary,
Parliament, donors and foreign missions.
7 Simultaneous actions, for instance: prosecution, civil proceeding, administrative action, asset
recovery, protection and freezing
In March 2017, the President reported that approximately 3 billion shillings had been recovered orpreserved12. The positive result of this is that the MAT has managed to marshal up resource allocations andincreased their visibility. Further, the MAT enjoys support and good will from the Government, donors andinternational agencies.
So far, the MAT has been in charge of some of the following major cases and investigations:
S/No.

Case Details/Particularsa)NYS: Investigation into
allegation of embezzlement of funds in excess ofKshs 1.5 billion

Outcome/Status
7

7

Assets, movable and immovable properties, worth Kshs.
421 million were either recovered/frozen/seized asproceeds of crime.
Various applications to vary or discharge preservation
orders defended before various courts.
26 suspects charged in court in predicate offence ofstealing, attempted stealing, conspiracy, tampering with apublic officer.
11 suspects have been charged with money laundering.

7
7

b)

Nairobi City County:
Investigation against theformer Finance Director
and others

7
7

Assets worth Kshs. 1.3 billion were frozen
The suspect charged in courtc)Eastleigh Mall Ltd:
Investigations into tax evasion in excess of Kshs. 386
million7

Company charged in court for tax evasion, along with 8
directors:d)7
Contraband Goods: 194
containers were seized at
Mombasa Port, made up of:- 75 containers of7
sugar- 69 containers of
7
ethanol

127 containers were destroyed, made up of:- 18 containers of sugar- 59 containers of ethanol- 50 containers of rice
Estimated Customs value of the destroyed goods: 214
million67 containers are under investigation and prosecution,

These achievements were reported by MAT during the National Governance and Accountability Summit at the State House,
Nairobi on 18th October 2016
12This was reported during the Annual State of the Nation Address in March 2017, http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/03/
15
11

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50 containers ofrice
Estimated Customs value:
359 million Estimated tax
amount: 517 million

made up of:- 57 containers of sugar- 10 containers of ethanol
7 2 suspects charged with respect to 5 containers of sugar:
7 Accused out on bond. 11 suspects charged with respect to
5 containers of ethanol:

National Youth
Development Fund: CEOof the Youth Enterprise
Development Fund in collusion with Board
Members schemed to defraud Kshs. 181 million

777

4 Persons Charged:
Charges: unlawful disposal of public property throughunlawful payment
Case is still before court

Tax evasion on Imported
Motor Vehicles:

7
7
7
7

121 registration number withdrawn
5 Suspects charged
All accused out on bond.
Warrants obtained for 3 suspects,

-

e)

f)

Impounded high value motor vehicles which were
allegedly stolen/improperly registered

114

g)

Theft of containers in theport - 124 containers removed from the port without payment of taxes

7
7

Loss of 121 containers under investigation.
16 suspects charged (3 stolen containers):h)Fuel Adulteration: Sale ofadulterated fuel without
licenses.

7
7

Rampant in Eldoret, Malaba and Nakuru
12 suspects charged in Court in Nakuru on 2nd
September, 2016.
All accused out on bond. Warrants obtained for 1 suspect.

7j)Imperial Bank Case: W.
E. Tilley case where thedirectors fraudulently
withdrew funds contrary
to the banking regulations.

7

5 Suspects charged: Suspect charged with: conspiracy todefraud, fraudulent accounting by officers, stealing, money
Launderingk)Eurobond: Allegations
that not all the moneys
realized through theEurobond issue could be
accounted for, and thatpayments were made froman offshore account without authorization.

7

The investigations by EACC did not establish any wrong
doing, and a recommendation was made for closure of the
file.
The DPP concurred with EACC recommendation forclosure and advised that the matter be referred to the
Kenya National Audit Office.

l)Tatu City: Fraudulentchange and/or transfer ofshares, shareholding anddirectorship in Purple
Saturn properties and forgeries.

7
7

Joint investigation team (EACC, DCI and DPP) formed
The matter is still under investigationm)

Wildlife
Crime

7

Convicted with jail term of 20 years and fined Kshs. 20
millionFeisal case:Feisal andothers werecharged withdealing withpieces of elephant tusks.

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20TH UNAFEI UNCAC TRAINING PROGRAMMEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

7
ThailandIvory Case:
Case no. 1132 of 72015 where a
consignment of
511 pieces ofivory weighing
3127kg said tohave originatedfrom Kenya
and confiscatedin Thailand

10 Persons charged: Case Pending Before Mombasa Court Mutual Legal
Assistance is ongoing

MAT has enhanced the institutional arrangement and administrative actions geared towards
streamlining and enhancing the fight against corruption and other organized crimes. These include:i.

Development of CBK guidelines on large cash transactions: The Central Bank of Kenya issued
additional guidelines in respect of large cash transactions to tighten compliance with the POCAMLA.13
ii. Establishment of a High Court Division on Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes: The Chief Justiceestablished the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Division to expedite the hearing and conclusionof cases.14
iii. Appointment of additional special magistrates: an additional 13 special magistrates were appointed to
specifically deal with corruption and economic crimes cases. They ensure the cases are heard on adaily basis.
iv. Prosecution guided investigations: The ODPP has assigned special prosecution counsel to specificallydeal with corruption and economic crime cases. The Prosecutors liaise with investigators thus
shortening the period that would be spent in reviewing the investigation reports before a decision onwhether or not to prosecute.
v. Establishment of a specialized prosecution unit for corruption offences in the ODPP.
vi. Establishment of a centralized government data platform: MAT is overseeing a project to establish acentralized data platform held by all government agencies; spearheaded by the National Intelligence
Service.
vii. Establishment of County MAT teams: the MAT initiative is replicated in all the 47 counties and theseteams have been trained and their capacities built.
viii.Vetting of officers under MAT: The vetting process is continuous and all officers under MAT arevetted to ensure they are people of integrity.
ix. MAT has also contributed to the development of legislation that touch on anti-corruption matters
including:a. Ethics and Anti-Corruption Laws Amendment Act, 2016, resulting in the number of Commissioners being enhanced from 3 to 5.
b. Draft Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendments) Bill, which operationalizes the proposals made by the
Task Force as well as recommendations of the 1st Cycle Review of Kenya under UNCAC. Most
notably, it proposes amendments to the POCAMLA to allow the FRC to take administrative action;
levy civil monetary penalties and clarify the operational independence of the FRC.15
c. The Whistleblower Protection Bill: this will be overarching legislation that provides for theprocedure of disclosure of information relating to improper conduct in the public and private
sectors as well as for the protection of persons who make such disclosure against victimization.
d. Computer and Cyber Crimes Bill, 2016: Stipulates the need to tame abuse of web-based systems,
reduce or eliminate cybercrimes arising from increased use of new technology. It also seeks toprotect online cash transactions.
e. Bribery Act: this Act outlines stringent measures to check graft between the public and private

Customers are required to declare names of beneficiaries of cash withdrawals above Kshs 1million and justify why such largetransactions cannot be done using electronic transfer channels. The CBK Banking Circular No. 1 of 2016 ʻAdditional Guidelineson Large Cash Transactionsʼ is available on https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/banking_circulars/.
14
See Gazette Notice No. 136 of 11th December 2015.
15
This is now catered for by Section 4 of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2017.
13

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sector. It criminalizes both the offering and receiving of bribes by any person including local orforeign entities.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONSThe MAT has been largely successful in recovering assets as outlined above. However, the biggest
challenge facing it is the lack of legal anchorage in law and thus the legality of some MAT joint operations arechallenged by culprits. There is need to anchor MAT in law to protect it from any external influences likechange of Government. Sometimes, individual institutions face capacity constraints. It is recommended that
there be continuous funding for the MAT to be enhanced. The capacity of officers under MAT agencies need
to be built continuously through training and cooperation with other similar bodies. Moreover, there needs tobe a central depository for data including cases, and other resources not only on asset recovery, but also
economic crimes and corruption-related cases. All in all, it is a great step towards eradicating corruption andneeds to be borrowed as a best practice for states that do not have such initiatives.

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TRACING AND RECOVERY OF PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTON ̶
THE MALDIVIAN CHALLENGE
Mariyam Shahuma＊

I. INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a global epidemic that has devastating effects on economies. Maldives is not immune fromthis epidemic. The country has been ravaged by corruption and embezzlement of millions in state funds. As
Maldives is a developing country with limited resources and a heavy reliance on foreign aid, corruption
greatly hinders economic development.
To fight and minimize corruption, three governmental agencies are involved in different stages ofenforcement of anti-corruption laws. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) established in 2008 is anindependent agency mandated to investigate offences of corruption, conducting studies and research todetect and prevent corruption and raising public awareness on corruption1. The Prosecutor Generalʼs Office(PG Office) is the sole authority tasked with prosecuting offences of corruption2 while the Attorney Generalʼs
Office (AG Office) is the responsible authority for asset recovery. However, there is no clear and specificmandate on the AG Office and no specific and effective mechanism for asset recovery in corruption cases.
The Auditor Generalʼs Office and Ministry of Finance and Treasury also play an important role in identifying
cases of corruption. The efforts to recover stolen, embezzled and laundered state money has not been very
effective to date mainly due to an inefficient legal framework for tracing and recovering proceeds of crimes.
To address this default, on 20th July 2017, the President of Maldives established the Commission on State
Assets Recovery for a one-year period to speedily recover millions of state funds misused, stolen andembezzled. Hence, the commissionʼs mandate is limited to past cases only.

II. CHALLENGES IN TRACING AND RECOVERY OF PROCEEDS OF
CORRUPTION
A. Existing Legal Framework
1. The Prevention and Prohibition of Corruption Act 2002
The Prevention and Prohibition of Corruption Act 2002 (PPCA) criminalizes various acts of corruption
and bribery. The ACC is mandated to investigate acts of corruption and bribery and forward such cases withevidence to the PG Office for prosecution. In the investigations, the ACC identifies whether there are assets
to be recovered and where there are assets to be recovered, ACC identifies the assets and amounts to be
recovered. Upon receiving a case for prosecution, the PG Office assesses the evidence presented and pursues
criminal charges if the evidence is sufficient to prove a preliminary case. The PPCA clearly states thatproperty and money received through the commission of an offence stated in the Act, wherever the property
is, whether sold or given to a third person can be confiscated only when the accused is convicted of suchoffence.3 PPCA only provides for asset recovery through criminal proceedings and does not provide forrecovery of assets through civil action by the government. Hence, if the PG Office declines to prosecute due
to lack of evidence in a case of corruption or where a corruption charge could not be proved beyond areasonable doubt, there are no avenues for asset recovery through PPCA. The Act does not stipulate means
for the ACC to trace proceeds of corruption or to recover proceeds of corruption without a conviction.
2. Penal Code 2014
Chapter 510 of the Penal Code (the Code) specifies offences of bribery and official misconduct. Several of
Public Prosecutor, Economic and Financial Crimes Unit, Prosecution Section, Prosecutor Generalʼs Office, Maldives.
Article 202, The Constitution of Maldives.
2
Article 223, Constitution.
3
Section 24, Prevention and Prohibition of Corruption Act 2002.
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the acts criminalized under this Chapter coincide or conflict with offences under PPCA. The Penal Codeprovides that the Code shall take precedence in such cases of coincidence or conflict.4 The Code does notprovide for tracing and recovery of assets through criminal proceedings, but the Code does not bar, suspend
or affect civil forfeiture or rights to recovery.5
3. Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Act 2014
The Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Act is an important piece of legislation
which came into effect on April 2014. The Act provides for recovery of assets embezzled and launderedthrough predicate offences, which involve corruption.6 The Financial Intelligence Unit (the Unit) which acts
as a watchdog monitoring and collecting intelligence on financial transactions through various financial
institutions, was established pursuant to this Act. Financial institutions are obliged to report any suspicioustransactions to the Unit which collects the data and reports flagged transactions to investigating authorities.
The Act allows various actions to be legally taken in order to trace proceeds of corruption and othercrimes. Court warrants can be obtained to:monitor bank accounts
surveil computer systems, networks and servers
tap or surveil telephone lines, fax lines, electronic transmissions and communication equipment
record audio or video of conversations and actions
intercept or forfeit letters and other communications7
Furthermore, the Act provides that the investigating authority may conduct covert operations andcontrolled delivery operations to trace proceeds of crimes.8 Investigating authorities may also obtaintemporary injunctions to freeze assets and bank accounts suspected to be proceeds of corruption and othercrimes.9
The Act provides that the court shall order for proceeds of crime of money-laundering or moneylaundering-related offences to be forfeited by the state. It is implied from the wording of the statute that such
assets can be forfeited only upon criminal conviction.
4. Mutual Legal AssistanceMore often than not, corruption offences are transnational in nature. Thus, recovery of assets is impossible
without the assistance of other foreign jurisdictions involved as the Maldives cannot exert its jurisdiction on
another country according to the long-established rules of international law. Until 2015, Maldives had nolegislation to enforce seeking and providing mutual legal assistance. Law No: 2/2015 (the Mutual Legal
Assistance Act) came into force in 2015, pursuant to which assets in foreign jurisdictions may be recovered.
However, no request has been made yet to recover assets in a foreign jurisdiction obtained by way ofcorruption. Thus, this area of law remains to be explored.
B. Challenges in Existing Asset Recovery Mechanisms
1. Asset Recovery through Criminal Proceedings
Prior to 2014, it was the PG Office that sought recovery of state assets in corruption cases throughcriminal proceedings. As stated earlier, this was due to the fact that the PPCA provides for asset recovery
only when there is a criminal conviction. Due to the low conviction rate and lack of enforcement mechanisms
in the Criminal Court for asset recovery in cases that result in convictions, assets were not being recovered ina speedy manner. The PG Office, AG Office, ACC and the Ministry of Finance and Treasury held discussions
in 2014 to determine a solution for speedy and wholesome asset recovery within the existing legal
framework. It was decided between the parties that the solution was to seek asset recovery under Act
Number: 3/2006 (State Monetary Act). Hence, since 2014 asset recovery has not been sought throughSection 18, Penal Code 2014.
Ibid, Section 14.
6
Section 7, Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Act 2014.
7
Section 49, Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Act 2014.
8
Ibid., Section 50.
9Ibid., Section 51.
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criminal proceedings.
The Criminal Procedure Code (Procedure Code) has come into effect since then on 2nd July 2017, and theProcedure Code stipulates that the court presiding over any criminal case resulting in a conviction shall makean order for recovery of assets if any is owed to the state.10 As the Procedure Code came into force only
recently, no such order has been made yet and the effectiveness of asset recovery through criminal
proceedings under the new Procedure Code is yet to be observed.
2. Asset Recovery under Act Number: 3/2006 (State Monetary Act)The State Monetary Act (SMA) is a statute prescribing rules and procedures to be followed by stateauthorities in conducting financial transactions. SMA provides only for recovery of funds and assets lost or
damaged due to negligence of a responsible person or due to failure to observe the rules and procedures laid
down by the statute.11 However, it must be noted that action pursuant to SMA is not recovery per se, as the
SMA provides for imposition of fines amounting to the funds lost, and not for recovery itself.
Pursuant to the decision made in 2014 that the AG Office shall seek recovery of proceeds of corruption
under SMA, the PG Office forwards investigation reports of the ACC to the AG Office. The AG Office thenanalyses the evidence to determine whether the case falls under the circumstances for asset recovery under
the SMA. So far 66 cases have been forwarded by the PG Office to the AG Office, but only 26 cases have been
identified as cases capable of being pursued under the SMA. This is because the SMA is not legislation on
recovery of proceeds of crimes and specifies only limited circumstances of state fund loss that warrant
recovery action.
Where the AG Office determines recovery can be pursued, the AG Office notifies the Ministry of Financeand Treasury to impose a fine on the person or persons involved. The Minister may request the AG Office toseek civil action against the person or persons involved.12
The AG Office faces additional challenges as the investigation reports of the ACC are more focused on
securing a conviction rather than asset recovery. In cases involving two or more accused persons, theinvestigation reports may not ascertain the amounts each one is individually responsible for. Thus, the AG
Office is challenged in seeking recovery of assets as the AG Office cannot prove what amounts eachindividual person has embezzled.
Some cases of corruption come to light several years after the commission of the offence. This results inevidence being lost and the state failing to prove the amounts that have been embezzled.
In August 2016, the Ministry of Finance and Treasury fined and ordered several ex-government officials
to pay funds owed to the government. They include the ex-President Mohamed Nasheed, four of his cabinet
ministers and two others. The Ministry stated that civil action will be sought through the AG Office if thepersons concerned fails to pay the money back. However, the concerned persons have not paid the amounts
sought and the AG Office has not taken civil action against them to date.
3. Asset Recovery through Civil Action
The AG Office is the authority responsible for representing the State in civil actions by and against it.
Thus, when it comes to recovery of assets through civil action, the AG Office is the responsible authority.
Initiating civil action for asset recovery is inefficient and takes a long time. This is due to lack of proper
legal framework to allow the ACC to directly submit its investigation reports to the AG Office and seek asset
recovery. Currently, the ACC submits its investigation reports to the PG Office seeking prosecution against
accused persons. If the investigation report states that assets are to be recovered, the PG Office forwards theinvestigation report to the AG Office to take action for asset recovery. If assets or their equivalent cannot berecovered under the State Monetary Act as discussed above, the only choice left is to initiate a civil suit torecover the assets. As the investigations of ACC are criminal based, it takes additional time and further
Section 156 (b) (10), Act Number: 12/2016 (Criminal Procedure Code)
Section 24, Act Number: 3/2006 (State Monetary Act)
12
Ibid., Section 48(b)
10
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inquiries for the AG Office to gather information and evidence relevant to civil action. Furthermore, the AG
Office may only seek civil action when a person accused of embezzlement is fined by the Ministry of Financeand Treasury as discussed above. Thus, the procedure for civil action is lengthy, involving several agencies,
which limits the efficiency of civil action to recover state funds.

III. CONCLUSION
It is essential to have efficient legal frameworks to rapidly trace and freeze proceeds of corruption inorder to successfully recover the assets and secure criminal convictions. Though the Prevention of Money
Laundering and Terrorism Financing Act provides various avenues for such, the Maldivian legal framework
still lacks efficient legal avenues for asset recovery including confiscation without a conviction and recovery
through civil actions. The recent establishment of Commission on State Assets Recovery, though temporary,
was an overdue important policy decision to recover assets. It is also crucial to enact specific legislation on
recovery of proceeds of crimes that would enable recovery without the need for a conviction and establish
permanent special asset recovery offices and build capacity of investigators, prosecutors and state
counsellors.

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REPORTS OF THE PROGRAMMEGROUP 1METHODS OF INVESTIGATION FOR IDENTIFICATION AND
TRACING OF THE PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Rapporteur: Mr. Frederico Skora (Brazil)
Co-Rapporteurs: Ms. Mariyam Shahuma (Maldives)
Mr. Christian Nyakizee (Tanzania)
Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Members

Advisers

Mr. Harsha Sethunge
Mr. Fujioka Takashi
Mr. Phouangphet Somvorachit
Mr. Puttipong Huntopap
Mr. Manabe Atsushi
Ms. Nirmala Sharma Subedi
Professor Yukawa Tsuyoshi(Sri Lanka)(Japan)(Laos)(Thailand)(Japan)(Nepal)(UNAFEI)

I. INTRODUCTION
This report is the result of the joint effort of all members of Group Workshop 1. Members of Group 1
started their first session on 17 November 2017. Mr. Harsha was elected as Chairperson and Mr. Fujioka as
Co-Chairperson while Mr. Skora was elected as Rapporteur and both Ms. Mariyam and Mr. Christian were
elected as Co-Rapporteurs. The Group was required to choose a topic which carries the theme of 20th
UNAFEI UNCAC Training Programme. After many discussions, all the members agreed to the topic of“Methods of investigation for identification and tracing of the proceeds of corruption and international
cooperation”.

II. INVESTIGATION AND TRACING OF THE PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION
A. Methods of Investigation
1. Whistle-Blowers
Usually witnesses of corruption and the laundering of proceeds do not feel secure to report cases torelevant authorities. In certain countries people feel reluctant to report corruption based on the belief that noaction will be taken against the corrupt and that the one who reports would face retaliation. For instance, inthe Maldives, the assistant bank manager who disclosed bank statements regarding a huge corruption
scandal in 2016 was prosecuted for leaking confidential information. He was convicted despite his defence ofbeing a whistle-blower and that he disclosed the information in good faith; his defence was not accepted by
the courts, possibly due to political reasons.
2. Anonymous Letters, E-mails and Phone Calls
Anonymous reports are very important for intelligence gathering purposes but should never be fully
relied upon in tracing proceeds of corruption as information from anonymous sources may be unreliable.
However, these sources must not be disregarded and if possible, information from various sources should begathered in a single database so it can be searched efficiently and used to corroborate where more reliable
evidence is found later.
3. Witness Testimony
Like whistle-blowers, witnesses in general are rare for corruption cases. Also, it was pointed out that insome countries that rely heavily on witness testimony (e.g., Nepal) there is a large number of acquittals due towitnesses changing their testimony in the course of the investigation and lack of other forms of evidence tosupport the case.
4. Interrogations
Criminals involved in laundering proceeds of corruption can sometimes reveal their activities during
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interrogation. However, this is not very useful or to be expected in most cases since suspects are usuallyadvised by their lawyers to remain silent. In fact, in certain countries (e.g., Brazil) the right against selfincrimination is broadly interpreted by the supreme courts to an extent that suspects lying or giving false
information during interrogations would not be considered as obstructing justice.
5. Plea Bargaining
Possibly the most essential and effective method for tracing proceeds of corruption is obtaining
information from those involved in the corruption, who would have knowledge of how the money was moved
and how properties were concealed. This method has been in use for several decades in the United States andother countries. However, plea bargaining is a rather new concept for other countries such as the Maldives oris yet to be implemented in some countries such as Japan which will introduce a procedure similar to plea
bargaining in 2018.
6. STRs and Other FIU Documents
STRs and similar records are very important to the investigation of proceeds of corruption as financial
institutions, registries and other institutions and corporation that deal in large sums can inform theauthorities immediately when money is laundered. FIUs play a very important part in the discovery anddisgorgement of illicit proceeds from criminal organizations for this very reason.
7. Bank Records
Basic financial statements and other banking documents can provide investigators with hard evidence ofmoney laundering or just enough to trace the proceeds of corruption. However, in certain countries (e.g.,
Thailand) people can open several accounts in different banks in order to make several smaller transactions
from different accounts instead of one large transaction so as to avoid detection and getting reported to the
FIU. Also, officers in central banks do not have time to check all the KYC forms sent from the banks, and any
person can have several bank statements and credit cards.
8. Tax Reports
Like bank records, tax reports are very useful for the investigation of proceeds of corruption and as
evidence of the crimes connected since such reports are usually based on hard evidence and/or provided by
the suspects themselves. However, this is another area very prone to the interference of the officials involvedin making sure the reports are properly written and filed.
9. Media
The media is not only essential in raising public awareness of corruption but can also be very important inproviding information on the whereabouts of the proceeds of corruption.
10. Controlled Actions
Controlled operations are one of several special means of investigation. When investigators are able tomonitor and record money deliveries from beginning to end, it provides better evidence and broad insight
into the criminal organization.
11. Undercover Operations
Undercover operations such as police or informant infiltrations, although possible, should be used only by
the very experienced and trained.
12. Physical Surveillance
Monitoring meetings and the general ways of living of the suspects and family members can be very
important in determining the locations of proceeds of corruption.
13. Electronic Surveillance
The increase in the use of smartphones and computers connected to the Internet makes electronic
surveillance of suspects and family members very important, even though many programmes nowadays use
some kind of encryption to protect communications.
14. Wiretapping and Examination of Call Records
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20TH UNAFEI UNCAC TRAINING PROGRAMMEREPORTS OF THE PROGRAMME

conversation applications results in only the sloppy or careless being caught discussing proceeds ofcorruption on the phone. On the other hand, examination of call records is still very useful to establish
relations between people under investigation.
15. Search and Seizure and Proper Analysis of Material SeizedWith the large amount of information being stored in smartphones and computers in recent years, searchand seizures of such objects are extremely important. However, the huge amounts of data to be analyzed
pose a challenge to investigators.
B. Challenges
1. Lack of Free MediaIn some countries the media is not free. The media is an important tool in the fight against crime and must
be free to be able to access and provide information to the public so as to pressure authorities. In Nepal, therecent Panama and Paradise Papers have forced requests through diplomatic channels since several
members of parliament were on the lists that were released.
2. Lack of Political Will
The main difficulty in some countries is the lack of political will to fight corruption. In some countries thisleads to many difficulties, such as challenges in the implementation of UNCAC provisions and fulfilment of its
basic requirements in asset recovery. There needs to be proper legal and institutional mechanisms for it andalso for international cooperation.
3. Lack of Focus on Asset Recovery
Investigators tend to focus on obtaining evidence to secure a conviction for an offence of corruption andfocus less on tracing assets and obtaining evidence for recovery.
4. Low Level of Public Trust in Agencies Dealing with Corruption
In some countries there is a low level of public trust in the organizations that deal with corruption.
5. Cash-Based Economies
In some countries such as Tanzania, a cash-based economy makes it difficult to trace tainted financialtransactions.
6. Lack of Know-How, Training, Special Techniques or Tools by Investigators and Prosecutors
Lack of know-how and training in modern investigation techniques results in ineffective investigations,and it is necessary that investigators learn how to effectively utilize the tools already in place. Furthermore,in certain countries such as Nepal and Maldives, the bodies tasked with investigating corruption and tracing
proceeds do not have forensic or technical capabilities to conduct and make use of special investigativetechniques. Those authorities only utilize traditional methods of investigation and when forensic or special
investigative methods are required, corruption investigation authorities need to seek the assistance of otherlocal or international authorities.
7. Political Appointment of Investigators, Prosecutors and Judges and Other Political Influences
In some countries commissioners are appointed on the basis of political ties instead of qualification, andeven though they can be independent and may not be answerable to anyone, their political appointments
usually still have influence over them. On the other hand, the grassroots are usually not independent frompolitical influence, and that influence on the investigative, prosecutorial and judicial bodies is one of the mostserious threats to the fight against corruption.
8. Culture of Impunity and Immunities for Certain Public Officials
Some countries have a culture of impunity for powerful figures and politicians and also of bribes by people
in order to cut the red tape in government institutions, and a lack of accountability among the law
enforcement authorities and other government institutions. Furthermore, corruption investigation bodies insome countries do not have jurisdiction over certain officials such as members of parliament.
9. Lack of Coordination Between Investigators and Prosecutors
Sometimes investigators conclude and forward serious cases of corruption for prosecution without prior123

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consultation with prosecutors which in some instances results in evidence being insufficient to prove all
elements of the crime. A crucial technique of the Japanese police is to meet with prosecutors at thecommencement of investigations and obtain their guidance, as prosecutors are equipped with necessary legal
knowledge. While police just obtain guidance from prosecutors in some cases, in more complicated cases
police and prosecutors conduct a joint investigation. It is crucial for investigators to obtain guidance fromprosecutors to proceed with investigation in order to build an effective case for trial.
10. Non-Mandatory Confiscation of Proceeds after Conviction for Corruption
In some countries such as Japan, judges are required to order confiscation of the bribe if the bribe-taker isconvicted of obtaining a bribe. However, in some other countries it is not mandatory for the judges to makean order for confiscation of a bribe or proceeds of corruption even upon a conviction, and authorities are
required to seek asset recovery through other legal avenues.
11. Separation of Jurisdiction for Corruption and Asset Recovery
In some countries such as Maldives and Nepal, the asset recovery process is handled by agencies otherthan the investigative/prosecutorial bodies that deal with corruption.
12. Action against Investigators and Prosecutors in Case of Acquittals
Investigators in certain countries such as Laos face a penalty when the case they investigated results inan acquittal. Such a rule would unfortunately result in investigators being reluctant and afraid to initiate
investigations for fear of job security since the political authority is the final governing body.
13. Conviction-Based Confiscation
While obtaining a conviction in corruption offences is a huge challenge due to various factors, some ofwhich are discussed above, failure to obtain a conviction is an obstacle for asset recovery due to confiscation
being conviction based in several countries. In order to secure evidence and for efficiency, it is important thatmoney laundering is investigated simultaneously with the predicate corruption offence.
C. Proposals
1. Corruption Reporting Centres
Easily accessible corruption reporting centers independent of investigation and prosecution authorities
should be established for the public to lodge complaints of corruption and obtain notices of progress of thecases they report. Such centres need to be less stringent and more public friendly as most public members
are usually discouraged to report cases and obtain information from police or similar agencies due to theirstringent administrative procedures.
2. Better Mechanisms for International Review of Independence and Technical Capability of Organizations
Tasked with Fighting Corruption
Countries should implement UNTOC and UNCAC recommendations and establish truly independent
commissions or investigative agencies, as well as prosecutors and judges. To this end, it is essential for there
to be international bodies in place to supervise the independence of such agencies since one country cannot
go against corruption alone: it needs the support of the others. Even though UNCAC provides mechanisms toreview countriesʼ compliance with the treaty, it is considered insufficient. In order to be considered compliant,countries should have sophisticated tools and trained personnel to investigate corruption and proceeds andalso have independence from political interference.
3. Better Coordination Between Investigators and Prosecutors
Prosecutors and investigators should meet and share information on what evidence they have incorruption and asset recovery cases. In cases of serious crimes there should be prosecution guided
investigations, so as to show investigators what would be needed in courts to obtain convictions.
4. Specialized and Independent Courts
There should be special courts for corruption cases with independence from political appointments,
promotions and transfers and without pressure from powerful public officials, politicians and businessmen.
Judges in such courts should receive specialized training in corruption and seizing proceeds.

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5. Protection for Investigators
It was agreed that investigators whose cases fail in court and do not lead to convictions should have somedegree of immunity as to make sure they are not intimidated from doing their jobs.
6. Public Trials
Publicity of trials is also relevant to provide independence to judges to rule against powerful officials andpoliticians. The media, both regular and social media, should be encouraged to report on official acts and trialsof corruption.
7. Enactment of Legislation to Criminalize Illicit Enrichment and Corruption in the Private Sector, Witness
Protection among Other Legislation Proposed in UNCAC
Legislation proposed in UNCAC but made optional for treaty parties should be enacted to facilitate theseizing of the proceeds of corruption.
8. Adoption of Non-Conviction-Based Forfeiture
In countries with only conviction-based forfeiture it is very difficult to trace and seize the proceeds ofcorruption. Thus, it is crucial for the law to provide for non-conviction-based forfeiture.
9. Promoting a Less Cash-Based Economy
Governments should not encourage cash-based economies as cash transactions are very difficult to trace.
10. Efficient Central Banks and Tax and Customs Agencies
Central banks and tax and customs agencies have a role that is essential for the investigation of theproceeds of corruption. Hence, in addition to investigation authorities, such agencies need to be efficient.
11. Transparency of Government Acts and Expenditures
It is crucial that all public transactions and government activities are transparent in order to eliminate
any opportunities for public officials to engage in corruption. Thus, governments must establish systems foreasy access to information on public affairs for the public and digitalize government transactions where
possible.
12. Demanding Proper Explanation of Origin of Funds for Large Purchases
Buyers should be required to produce a certificate from tax authorities attesting to the buyersʼ financial
capacity when making transactions of large amounts. Title to properties bought without producing such acertificate shall not pass to the buyer, and the buyer shall be liable for an offence under anti-corruption,bribery or illicit enrichment laws.

III. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A. Methods
1. Informal Networks
All countries acknowledge the importance of informal networks for asset recovery: investigator,
prosecutor and judicial informal international networks, such as AIAMP, IBER-RED, WACAP, REFCO;
informal asset recovery networks, such as RRAG (GAFI-FATF Network for the Recovery of Assets); Carin(Camden Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network); investigator, prosecutor and judicial attachés in embassies;
among several others. It is believed that in the coming years there will be a greater reliance upon suchnetworks, as seemingly local cases are becoming more international every year due to money laundering andinternational procurement. However, it was pointed out that if there was a common legal framework in all
countries, such informal networks would not have to be used, and investigators could apply directly to thecourts for assistance. Nevertheless, in the cases of countries that are not a part of UNCAC, such informal
networks would remain useful, for it is important to know the systems of these countries in order to makerequests, and even then, it is not guaranteed that it will be done.
2. Intelligence Gathering
Reliable information that can be used to initiate formal investigations can be obtained through Interpol
and the Egmont Group of FIUs.

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3. Formal Requests for Legal AssistanceFormal requests can be made through MLATs, UNCAC, UNTOC, other multilateral treaties and bilateralagreements and are processed by each countryʼs central authorities.
B. Challenges
1. Slow or No Response to Assistance Requests
A major issue highlighted with regard to International Cooperation is that MLA requests are notresponded to timely by requested countries, which effectively stops cases from advancing in court.
2. Different Authorities for Legal Assistance Requests and Asset Recovery
Also in some countries there is one central authority for MLATs (e.g., Prosecutor Generalʼs Office) but
another authority (e.g., the Attorney General) for asset recovery. If this recovery of assets was also inside thestructure of the investigative/prosecutorial bodies, it would be more effective.
C. Proposals
1. More Use of Joint Investigative Teams
Since crime has been without borders for a long time now and has managed to contaminate our economies
and governments, large parts of our sovereignty are in the hands of criminals. It is also time for investigators,
prosecutors and judges to become transnational as well. There is already a system for this underway inEurope, and international treaties already allow for Joint Investigation Teams (JITs), which in a sense are theembryos of the multinational institutions that we need. There should be international bodies of investigators
to trace the proceeds of corruption. Countries that rate higher in the fight against corruption should assist in
this matter.
2. More Investment in Major Foreign Languages
In order to achieve better integration, the language barrier between investigators, prosecutors and judges
from different countries has to be destroyed. If they cannot communicate freely among themselves, it will bedifficult to achieve any kind of collaboration. Although it is true that many central authorities have some kindof translation system for documents and requests, this is costly and ineffective. Investigators, prosecutors andjudges should receive additional training in English, and new employees should be recruited taking into
consideration their ability in a major foreign language.
3. More Spontaneous Collaborations from FIUs
There should be an increase in spontaneous collaboration between countries, especially from FIUs, sincethose are usually very important in speedily seizing the proceeds of corruption that can be easily transferredfrom country to country.
4. More Training for Authorities to Use International Collaboration
Many authorities make very little use of the international structure to fight corruption either because
they do not know it is in place or due to the belief that international cooperation is a complicated process thatwill take too much time. However, the increasingly common usage of foreign bank accounts and the use ofinterposed persons make international cooperation a necessity to track and recover the proceeds ofcorruption. Therefore, there should be an investment in explaining to the authorities how they can make useof international cooperation and make this process more streamlined for them.
5. Common Legal Framework for Investigating Proceeds of Corruption
There is no formal mechanism to force international assistance. As corruption and money laundering arebeing committed beyond borders, it is crucial to have a mechanism that compels requests from foreignauthorities to be processed and delivered. There should be a common framework so that informal networks
do not have to be used and investigators can come directly to courts, such as the international mechanisms inplace with regard to intellectual property laws. Due to the differences in criminal justice and basic legal
systems of jurisdictions, UNCAC itself left some of its provisions as optional for Member States. However,
due to the nature of corruption and money laundering offences, it is crucial to harmonize the corruption andanti-money laundering laws of all countries to ensure effective international cooperation.

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GROUP 2
EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO INVESTIGATE THE PROCEEDSOF CORRUPTION CRIMES
Rapporteur: Ms. Mariyam LIUSHA (Maldives)
Co-Rapporteur: Mr. Khalid Ali ALSAEDI (Iraq)
Chairperson
Members

AdviserMr. Tiago SANTOS FARIAS
Mr. Umesh ADHIKARI
Mr. Aung THAN TOE
Mr. Nanang SURYADI
Ms. Tariro Rosa TAKUVA
Mr. Gerard NEDEOU TEUBDOYOMr. Shuhei HISAOKA
Mr. Kentaro HIRATE
Mr. Masahiro YAMADA(Brazil)(Nepal)(Myanmar)(Indonesia)(Zimbabwe)(Chad)(Japan)(Japan)(UNAFEI)

I. INTRODUCTION
Today in this globalized world, developing countries lose millions of dollars each year through corrupt
practices. Most of the time criminals keep moving the proceeds of corruption crime through global financial
institutions, changing them to legitimate assets or properties across the globe. The proceeds of corruption
crime divert money from services such as healthcare and education, and also weaken public trust andthreaten governance.
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is the only legally binding universal
instrument dealing with asset recovery. Chapter V of UNCAC establishes asset recovery as a “fundamental
principle” of the Convention and provides the framework to recover the proceeds of corruption crime,
requiring Member States to take measures to seize, confiscate, and return the proceeds of such offences.
However, the biggest challenge is to turn UNCAC into an effective tool in recovering these proceeds.
The main focus of this paper is to discuss the effective measures to investigate the proceeds of corruption
crime. Each member of the group contributed the current challenges they face in identifying, tracing andrecovering the proceeds of corruption crimes. The group also discussed the possible measures they can taketo resolve the current challenges under different circumstances and what will be the ideal way to identify,
trace and recover proceeds of corruption crime that is suitable for each country to make the fight against
corruption effective. The following are the main challenges and the solutions discussed among the group.

II. CHALLENGES IN THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
A. Not Being a Member of UNCAC
In the group discussion, the members noticed that some participantʼs countries, like Chad, are notmembers of UNCAC. Also some of the countries which are members of UNCAC have not internalized someof the provisions of UNCAC in their domestic law. It is necessary to affirm that UNCAC is a very important
legal tool which sets general provisions so that the State Parties can more effectively fight corruption andrecover the proceeds of crimes.
Solution: All participants agreed that in order to investigate corruption crimes and also to identify, traceand recover assets it is very important to be party to UNCAC. Because UNCAC provides a framework torecover assets, those countries have a legal basis not only to investigate but to seize, confiscate and recoverproceeds of corruption crime and extradite the offenders. Being party to UNCAC also entails a review andimplementation mechanism which States Parties shall comply with. That mechanism is a useful tool to show
the international community how each country is implementing the Conventionʼs provisions.

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B. Lack of Legislation to Criminalize Private Sector Corruption
Most of the participantʼs countries have not criminalized private sector corruption. Japan and Zimbabwe,
however, have laws that do not specifically mention corruption in the private sector, but those countriesʼ
authorities can apply their existing legislation to corruption crimes committed in the private sector.
Solution: All participants of the group agreed that it is necessary to encourage the countries that do nothave the power to investigate private sector corruption, to amend their existing laws to criminalize it andtherefore enable confiscation and recovery of assets as proceeds of corruption crime.
C. Lack of Criminalization of Illicit Enrichment
Members discussed that in order to identify the proceeds of corruption it is necessary to criminalize illicit
enrichment. For example, under the constitution of Maldives, the Executive Branch, Members of the Cabinet,
Members of the Parliament and Judges are constitutionally obliged to declare assets annually. However, in
Maldives illicit enrichment is not an offence under any law. Therefore, the fundamental purpose of asset
declaration has been largely left unrealized.
Solution: The members of the group agreed that it should be mandatory for all government officials to
declare their assets, criminalize illicit enrichment in domestic law and make any property that cannot be
explained subject to forfeiture.
D. Whistle-Blower and Witness Protection
Group members discussed and agreed that whistle-blower and witness protection is very important as atool to identify and trace the proceeds of corruption crime. Lack of these protection measures makes it moredifficult to identify and trace the proceeds of corruption.
Solution: It was agreed among the participants that enacting and enforcing whistle-blower and witness
protection laws will encourage people to come forward to the anti-corruption agencies or investigating
authorities and provide information about the proceeds of corruption instead of being reluctant to share theinformation with the authorities in charge due to being afraid for their careers or even lives or safety.
E. Lack of Non-Conviction-Based Confiscation of Assets
All participantsʼ countries except Zimbabwe have no legislation on non-conviction-based confiscation.
Forfeiture actions depend upon the governmentʼs ability to demonstrate the relationship between thecriminal conduct and the particular property subject to confiscation. Also, as a general rule those actions arelimited to property traceable to the criminal offence.
Solution: Non-conviction-based forfeiture is civil in nature and the burden of proof is on a balance of
probabilities. It does not depend on the conviction of the offender, and it can be resorted to where theoffender is acquitted, deceased or is a fugitive.
F. Criminal Procedure Allows Multiple Appeals
Brazilian criminal procedure allows multiple appeals, even within the same court without limitation on thenumber depending on the case. It takes a long time to finalize corruption cases, even up to more than ten
years. The system has been criticized by the courts, prosecutors and civil society. As a result, there is aconsiderable delay in recovering the proceeds of corruption crimes since a final decision by the judiciary isnecessary. In the meantime, there is a possibility of dissipation of certain assets during the appeal period,
which results in decreasing the benefit to the government of those assets.
Solution: All the members discussed this challenge faced in Brazil and agreed that Brazil and othercountries need to amend their laws to limit the number of appeals in corruption cases in order to make theasset recovery process more effective.
G. Absence of Specialized Commissions or Agencies to Investigate and Prosecute Corruption Crimes
In some countries there are no specialized agencies to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. There
are also no special departments to deal with asset recovery. All participants agreed that to investigate andprosecute corruption cases there is a need for special expertise.

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Solution: Even if the country is not a member of UNCAC, it is very important to have a special agency toinvestigate corruption cases, and it is important to have a special court or judges appointed to deal with thosecases.
The members agreed on the need of a special agency to investigate and a special court for corruption
trials so that the people involved become specialized in the field of corruption, enabling more effectiveness inthe asset recovery process. The members also agreed that specialized judges and prosecutors become
quicker at identifying trial issues and more efficient and effective in the decisions taken in that regard. Also,
the quality of work will be of a higher level due to the experience gained in dealing with corruption and asset
recovery on a regular basis.

III. CHALLENGES IN INVESTIGATING PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION CRIME
A. Lack of Special Investigation Techniques
Lack of legislation allowing the use of special investigative techniques such as wiretapping, telephonebugging and undercover operations is one of the challenges faced by most of the participantsʼ countries toeffectively investigate and trace proceeds of corruption crime.
Solution: All participants agreed that there is a need to allow special investigation techniques in
corruption cases by amending existing law and by training investigators to deal with those techniques.
B. Difficulty in Accessing Bank Records
All participants except Japan agreed that they have difficulty in accessing bank records for domestic
investigations or when responding to international cooperation requests. A court warrant is usually needed toobtain the bank information. Apart from the banksʼ delays in providing information, the documents areusually hard to be read and some banks do not transmit all the necessary documentation which causes severe
delay to the investigation. It is also worth mentioning that Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRʼs) are notadmissible as evidence in court, which makes it difficult for the prosecution to prove their case without callingfor oral evidence.
Solution: Give the investigators and the anti-corruption agencies the authority to obtain bank records
without court order. SIMBA, a software programme developed by the Brazilian Federal Prosecution Service,
is a useful tool to gather bank statements, since it allows banks to transmit electronically the documents tothe agency in charge, and it also controls the deadlines and creates graphics and information about thetransactions in an easier way for the investigators and authorities to read. It is also important that STRʼs andinformation gathered by Financial Intelligence Units such as the one provided by Egmont Group members
are admissible in court as evidence to expedite the proceedings.
C. Statute of Limitations
In some jurisdictions the statute of limitations is very short and some investigations need time to be
conducted, especially when information from foreign countries is necessary.
Solution: Increase the statute of limitations to a longer period, enabling competent authorities to gather
evidence in a reasonable time period. For example, in Zimbabwe the statute of limitations is 20 years for all
offences except murder, and in Singapore there is no limit1.
D. Budget Constraints in Tracing, Freezing and Recovering Assets
Lack of budget to investigate the proceeds of corruption crime is one the main challenges faced by mostparticipantsʼ countries. For example, in Indonesia the budget is limited, and they have difficulty inmaintenance of the frozen assets, especially abroad.
Solution: Agencies should increase budgets to investigate corruption crimes and to recover assets. It also
recommended that agencies be permitted to retain a certain percentage of the recovered assets to utilize in

LIM, Vincent. Effective measures for tracing proceeds of corruption crimes. Lecture given for the 20th UNAFEI UNCAC
Training Programme, 15 November 2017.
1

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the business of the agencies.
E. Lack of Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining is an agreement between the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case to arrive at asatisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendantʼs pleading
guilty to a lesser offence or to one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter
sentence. A majority of participants agreed that plea bargaining is not practiced in their countries.
Solution: The advantage of plea bargaining is that the prosecution secures a faster conviction andrecovers the proceeds of corrupt practices. Also, UNCAC in Article 37(1) states that each State Party shalltake appropriate measures to encourage persons who participate or who have participated in the commissionof an offence established in accordance with this Convention to supply information useful to competentauthorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes and to provide factual, specific help to competentauthorities that may contribute to depriving offenders of the proceeds of crime and to recovering suchproceeds2. It was agreed among the group to amend the domestic law to allow plea bargaining agreements tofacilitate the recovery of proceeds of corruption crime.
F. Lack of Access to Most Databases
In countries like Maldives, Iraq, Japan, Zimbabwe, Nepal, Indonesia and Myanmar, the investigator does
not have direct authority to access most of the government databases such as immigration, company
registrations and transport registrations without making an official request. Due to the lack of direct access,investigators have to walk in to the relevant institutions with a warrant or request and get the information
they need through the requested department staff. However, in Brazil investigators have direct access to acentralized government database, and there is no need of a warrant or request to do so.
Solution: All participants agreed that it would be easier to identify and trace proceeds of corruption
crimes if investigators had direct access to a centralized government database without a court order or aformal request.

IV. POLITICAL CHALLENGES
A. Lack of Political Will
Lack of political will and government support to pursue asset recovery and deal with corruption issues is
one of the main challenges faced by many countries. The participants agreed that even though there are laws,
there is reluctance by politicians to enact and enforce the laws. The political will of both the victim country
and the countries where the proceeds are located is necessary for asset recovery to materialize.
Solution: It was agreed among the group that in order to have political will, there is need to raise publicawareness about corruption through education, media, seminars etc. Also, pressure from civil society isnecessary for parliament to pass and enforce the necessary laws.
B. Political Influence in the Appointment of Anti-Corruption Commission Members
In order to identify, trace and recover proceeds of corruption crime, it is important that the anticorruption officials be independent and free from political influence or pressure. In most of the countries
there is political influence in appointing anti-corruption commission members. As a result of this, there is thepossibility of political influence in investigating cases where politicians are involved.
Solution: All participants agreed that those who fight against corruption need to be independent from allpolitical influence. Their appointment could be done by a committee of the parliament instead of theexecutive branch. Participants also agreed that members of the anti-corruption agency could also be electedby the people.

2

United Nations Convention against Corruption, Article 37 (1).

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V. PERSONNEL CHALLENGES
A. Shortage of Trained Staff
In most of the countries there is a shortage of trained staff such as judges, prosecutors and investigators
to deal with corruption cases.
Solution: If the authorities dealing with corruption cases are well trained and experienced, the quality ofwork will be high and the job will be done more effectively. All participants agreed that job training forexisting staff is necessary to improve their skills, and it is also important to increase funds for the agencies
that deal with corruption, permitting them to hire more staff or to have officers seconded to the anticorruption agencies.
B. Low Salaries and Privileges (for Those Who Fight Corruption)
The participants noted that salaries and benefits of anti-corruption officials are usually low in all countries.
Investigators and officers are not provided with adequate benefits to carry out their duties.
Solution: All participants agreed to improve the salaries and benefits for officials who fight against
corruption to encourage them and motivate them. Increased remuneration and benefits could be a preventive
measure against their becoming corrupt.
C. Existence of Corrupt Officers among Those Who Fight Corruption
In some countries it is also perceived that those who fight corruption are also corrupt, which affects theeffort to recover proceeds of corruption crime.
Solution: It is necessary to have an internal reporting system within the anti-corruption agency tomonitor the officials. The participants also agreed to have high standards and requirements for hiring officials
and to make sure that those officials should be of high integrity and responsible people in the community. It
was also agreed to have a transparent and clear reporting system to communicate if such crimes arecommitted by anti-corruption officials.

VI. CHALLENGES IN INSTITUTIONS/AGENCIES
A. Lack of Cooperation between Organizations (Task Forces and Joint Units)
The participants agreed that lack of cooperation between organizations is a main issue in identifying,tracing and recovering proceeds of corruption crime.
Solution: It was agreed that, having joint task forces or liaison officers from anti-corruption agencies inother organizations will help with the lack of cooperation between agencies.
B. Bureaucracy
In most countries the investigators face challenges to identify and trace proceeds of corruption due tounnecessary and excessive administrative procedures and authorizations.
Solution: The participants agreed it is important to remove unnecessary bureaucratic steps tocommunication channels and to give authorization to administrative personnel to disclose necessary
information to anti-corruption agencies instead of meeting with high-ranked officials to get the informationneeded.
C. Lack of Equipment (Surveillance Vehicles, Software, Computer Hardware)
In most of countries there is a lack of equipment such as surveillance vehicles, forensic resources,
software and modern equipment in the agencies investigating corruption crimes. Due to the complexity ofcorruption crime, the lack of such equipment affects the effectiveness of investigation of the crime andtracing of proceeds.
Solution: All the participants agreed it is important to have adequate equipment and other means forinvestigation to enhance the recovery of proceeds of crime.

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D. Lack of Sufficient Authority (Arrest/Seizure, Prosecution, Requesting Information from Abroad)
It was noted that in some countries the anti-corruption agency does not have the power to arrest, seize,
prosecute or request information from abroad.
Solutions: The participants agreed that anti-corruption bodies should have sufficient authority toarrest/seize with or without court orders. For example, in Indonesia the anti-corruption agency can arrest
suspects with enough evidence, even without a court order, as corruption crimes are considered as
extraordinary offences. Therefore, extraordinary measures are used to deal with corruption cases.

VII. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
A. Dual CitizenshipIn some countries, the investigators and prosecutors face challenges to investigate and prosecuteoffenders that have dual citizenship because they flee to the other country where they are nationals. Somecountries refuse to extradite the offender as he/she is the citizen of that country.
Solution: The participants agreed that in this case, it is important to use the provisions of UNCAC toextradite or prosecute offenders who commit crimes abroad. As Article 42 and 46 of UNCAC provide that
dual criminality should not be an obstacle to rendering assistance to other countries.
B. Different Legal Frameworks
Some countries face difficulty in international cooperation due to different legal frameworks, such as
incompatibility of legal proceedings in the requesting and requested states.
Solution: The participants agreed to encourage establishment of MLA agreements to facilitate and to
implement some compatibility between legal systems, to recover assets and to gather evidence from abroad.
States should be encouraged to enforce non-conviction-based forfeiture orders from foreign jurisdictions.
C. Failure to Acquire Assets from Non-Responsive Jurisdictions
One of the main challenges to recover the proceeds of corruption crime is that anti-corruption agencies
fail to acquire the assets from non-responsive jurisdictions.
Solution: International cooperation is very important in addressing corruption crimes because in mostcases the assets illegally obtained are transferred to other countries. Therefore, it is crucial to cooperate withforeign requests for evidence and asset recovery even in the absence of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties,
using the principle of reciprocity as a legal basis to execute other countriesʼ requests.
D. Lack of Familiarity with the Process of Mutual Legal Assistance Requests
It was noted that most of the time the barrier to recovering proceeds of corruption crime is that the anticorruption agencies are not familiar with MLA requests and other ways to get legal assistance.
Solution: Having international cooperation units within the agencies with trained staff in that regard is a
key factor for obtaining information from overseas. Also important is using informal contacts between
international agencies and INTERPOL to gather intelligence and evidence and to bypass lengthy formal
procedures. Networks such as CARIN3, RRAG4, ARINSA5 and StAR6 are useful tools to trace proceeds ofcorruption crimes.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Corruption is a serious offence and fighting it and recovering assets are difficult tasks faced by the
majority of countries in the world. In order to better fulfill their duties, investigators, prosecutors and judges
need adequate staff, budget, equipment and training. Corrupt criminals often abuse loopholes in the legal
CARIN‒Camden Assets Recovery Inter Agency Network
RRAG‒Asset Recovery Network of GAFILAT (Financial Action Task Force of Latin America)
5
ARINSA‒Asset Recovery in South Africa
6
StAR‒Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative
3
4

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frameworks. Thus, in order to tackle corruption and recover the proceeds, we need to establish adequate
legal frameworks.
But most important is political will to pass laws to enable investigations and fair decisions and theenforcement of those decisions. The role of civil society and the media is crucial to providing pressure on the
Parliament and Cabinet members. In the globalized world we are living in, international cooperation between
nations is no longer just a formality but a key factor to establishing an adequate response and obtaining
reparation for the society that had its money diverted from public use.
To complete the fight against corruption, State Parties to UNCAC and countries that are not signatories
need to vigorously pursue the proceeds of corruption crime across borders, ensuring that their countries are
not perceived as safe havens for the proceeds of corruption crimes. States should endeavour to the best of
their abilities to seize, confiscate and recover proceeds of corruption crimes. The use of non-conviction-based
confiscation and forfeiture is the best tool in this regard. States should also assist in enforcing orders fromother jurisdictions in order to make asset recovery a success.

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GROUP 3
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION APPROACHES FORINVESTIGATION OF PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION CRIMES
Rapporteur: Ms. Caroline Nyaga (Kenya)
Co-Rapporteurs: Mr. Kazuo Akagi (Japan)
Mr. Asrori Iftikhor Qurbon (Tajikistan)
Mr. Desmond Mwayawa (Papua New Guinea)
Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Members
Advisers

Mr. Abdelazim Mohammed Elzaki
Mr. Tandin Penjor
Mr. Mohamed Abdelhamid Elhamady
Mr. Sovann Srin
Mr. Mohammad Ibrahim
Prof. Ayuko Watanabe
Prof. Nozomu Hirano(Sudan)(Bhutan)(Egypt)(Cambodia)(Bangladesh)(UNAFEI)(UNAFEI)

I. INTRODUCTION
Following a series of lectures, Individual Presentations and study trips focused on the theme of “Effective
measures to investigate the proceeds of corruption crimes”, the participants were asked to retreat into
groups so as to exchange experiences, share best practices, identify challenges and consider practical
recommendations that would help them resolve the identified issues. Group 3 decided on the topic of“Domestic and International Cooperation Approaches for Investigation of Proceeds of Corruption Crimes”.
There is need for domestic and international cooperation due to the complexities of corruption crimes,
challenges of capacity constraints of individual agencies and emerging transnational trends that result insuspects transferring assets across borders. At the domestic level authorities charged with prosecuting andinvestigating corruption crimes cooperate in conducting joint inquiries and sharing information.
Internationally, states cooperate with one another through:a. Establishing channels of communication between authorities, agencies and services to secure andfacilitate rapid exchange of information;b. Conducting inquiries with respect to identification, whereabouts and activities of suspects andmovement of property and proceeds of crime;c. Providing, where appropriate, necessary items or quantities of substances for analytical orinvestigative purposes, among others.
This cooperation will assist states in sharing information on a real-time basis and will enhance the tracing,
freezing, confiscation and recovery of proceeds of corruption crimes.
It was agreed that the deliberations would take the following outline:
1. Introduction
2. Information and detection of corruption
a. Whistle-blowers
b. Financial intelligence unitsc. Other agencies

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3. Investigationa. Special investigative techniquesb. Tracing, freezing and confiscation
4. International cooperation
a. Bilateral and multilateral agreementsb. Joint investigations
5. Challenges
6. Recommendations

II. INFORMATION AND DETECTION OF CORRUPTION
Corruption is mostly a “silent” crime with no crime scene and no clear evidence. The perpetrators act inprivate, hence the importance of whistle-blowers, FIUs and other agencies in the detection and reporting ofcorruption cannot be understated. This leads to efficient recovery of proceeds of corruption crimes.
A. Whistle-Blower Protection
A whistle-blower is a person who exposes any kind of information or activity that is deemed illegal within
an organization or public office, in this instance, corruption. Therefore, to enhance reporting, a whistle-blower
must be protected from any harm or victimization that may befall him as a result of exposing corruption,such as dismissal from work, harassment, death or harm to his life or family. Members reported that mostagencies had put mechanisms in place to enable corruption reporting, including websites, phone calls,
anonymous reporting or emails. All reports whether anonymous or not have to be verified.
Most countries have specific whistle-blower protection laws while others have provisions in various laws
for the same purpose. It was noteworthy though, that for some, whistle-blowers are protected but must
appear as witnesses in court. On the other hand, in Bhutan, whistle-blowersʼ identities are withheld, and theirnames are not disclosed to any other person or brought to court. If it is extremely necessary for them toappear, they are put in separate rooms and they testify on different days from the rest of the witnesses.
Other forms of protection offered to whistle-blowers include protection from victimization at their work
places and dismissal.
B. Financial Intelligence Units
All countries in this group have Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) established in accordance with UNCAC
due to the rising cases of money laundering activities by corrupt individuals who either stash money inforeign countries or have secret accounts used to conceal proceeds of crime. Some FIUs are independentwhile others operate under the police service or the national or central bank.
The main responsibility of the FIUs include: to receive, process, analyse and disseminate information
relating to suspicious transaction reports (STRs), and to provide such information to enforcement agencies.
Also, FIUs transmit the same information simultaneously to foreign FIUs they collaborate with. The FIUs
also work in collaboration with investigation authorities. For some states, however, any information must be
relayed through the ministry in charge of foreign affairs. In Bangladesh, Tajikistan, Bhutan, Papua New
Guinea, Sudan, Egypt, Cambodia, Japan and Kenya, the FIU may enter into Memoranda of Understanding
with other foreign FIUs for purposes of easier collaboration and also to direct banks to freeze accounts until
the STRs are investigated.
C. Other Agencies
Other agencies identified as sources of information include banks and other financial institutions, tax
agencies, customs, securities exchange, audits, and the media. The group was informed that the banking
institutions cooperated with enforcement agencies and most of them report any suspicious transactions, andsome have power to freeze accounts for a period of time until investigations are completed. In some countries,
the banks are required to report to the Central Bank regularly, which flags any suspicious transactions.
In Bangladesh, the banks are required to report to the Central Bank at the end of each day, and it flags
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any suspicious transactions and freezes the account for an initial 30 days (maximum of 6 months).
Asset declaration was also a tool used to detect corruption and trace proceeds of crime. In most states,
certain or all public officers are required to submit wealth declaration forms, whether digitally or manually,
on a regular basis; annually or biannually. Various agencies are charged with the responsibility ofsafeguarding records of the declarations. Officers who fail to declare are punished administratively.
In Egypt, appointed and elected officials, including large contractors or suppliers to any public agency, arerequired to declare and justify their assets to the Illicit Enrichment Organization administratively. Failure to
do so will result in prosecution for the crime of illicit enrichment. In Japan, only politicians are required todeclare their assets and liabilities.

III. INVESTIGATION
Using the information received from the sources outlined above, the prosecutors, police or investigators in
the anti-corruption agencies, as the case may be, employ various techniques to trace, freeze, seize andconfiscate proceeds of crime that may be concealed either domestically or in foreign jurisdictions.
The members shared the practices from their countries on how investigations are conducted. As per
UNCAC, special investigative techniques were identified. These methods allow investigators to gather
further information useful to freeze, seize and confiscate proceeds of corruption crimes. Papua New Guinea
does not recognize or use special investigative techniques. For Cambodia, there has to be a clear hint ofcorruption in order for such techniques to be used. As per UNCAC, these special investigative techniques
include:a) Controlled delivery̶In most countries, controlled delivery is allowed. However, these techniques
require supporting evidence and are not given much weight to guarantee convictions; therefore,
controlled delivery is not very effective.
b) Electronic or other forms of surveillance̶This is an effective method of investigation. In somejurisdictions, a court order has to be obtained as it borders on infringement of privacy, which is aconstitutional guarantee. In Sudan, only the Special Court can issue the warrant allowing the use of
these techniques. In Egypt and Tajikistan, wiretapping is only allowed after obtaining a court
order/warrant. In Bhutan, the Chairman of the Anti-Corruption Commission has the power to issue awarrant for wiretapping and has to inform the Court within 24 hours of the same. Japan does not allow
use of wiretapping for corruption crimes.
c) Undercover operations̶All countries, except Japan, use this special technique. However, it is arequirement that undercover operations must be carried out within the ambit of the law.
 Freezing, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of corruption crime
Freezing is an effective method in the process of recovery of proceeds of corruption crimes. In somecountries, court orders are required while in others, orders from the heads of the anti-corruption agencies,
prosecution agencies, police commissioners and registrar of titles suffice. It was noted that most confiscations
were conviction based and only non-conviction based where a person fled the country or was deceased. The
issue of liquidation of depreciating assets or those that were perishable so as to maintain value also posed achallenge to some states due to lack of cooperation by the suspect. All states have legislation on anti-money
laundering that stipulates the procedure to be followed in the process of recovering proceeds of crime.
Moreover, some countries have special agencies whose function is to recover assets. In Kenya for instance,
there is a Multi-Agency Team that is composed of various investigative and enforcement agencies that work
simultaneously in these cases through real-time sharing of information. This has enhanced the conviction
rates and asset recovery, as all necessary information and evidence is shared and simultaneous actions aretaken by the various agencies to enable cases to be water tight.

IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONIn the course of investigations, it may be found out that the suspect has assets concealed in foreign136

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jurisdictions. Therefore, there may be need for mutual legal assistance and joint investigative techniques tobe employed. Moreover, states reported that most of them are members of organizations that enable them tocollaborate, including: Interpol, the Egmont Group, the East Africa Police Chiefs Organization, among others.
States reported that most of them offer MLA on the basis of reciprocity and dual criminality. Others haveconcluded bilateral and multilateral agreements that enable them to seek assistance as well as conduct joint
investigation teams with their counterparts.
The Central Authorities for purposes of MLA were shared including the Office of the Attorney General,
the Prosecutor General and the Ministry of Foreign/International Affairs (through diplomatic channels), theMinistry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior in all countries. In Cambodia, the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU)
cooperates with its foreign counterparts based on its membership in the South East Asian Parties Against
Corruption (SEA-PAC) and through MoUs. In practice, if MLA is required, the anti-corruption agency of aforeign state can directly send a request to the ACU. Upon receiving the request, the ACU will undertake
measures on a case-by-case basis.

V. CHALLENGES
A. Difficulties in Gathering Information from the Public
UNCAC obligations on whistle-blower protection guarantee that people with information can comeforward with information for which the full protection of the law is guaranteed to such persons afterward.
Without the existence of such protection, persons with information fear that their personal, economic and job
security will be at risk when information is given to authorities. Inadequate laws and mechanisms of whistleblower protection posed a challenge for some countries because whistle-blowers are afraid to report toauthorities. Public awareness on whistle-blower protection is important because lack of cooperation bywhistle-blowers with the authorities was also identified as a challenge.
B. Balancing between the Right to Privacy and Investigation of Proceeds of Corruption Crimes
Discussions among group members also point to the fact that access to information may infringe the rightto privacy in some countries. UNCAC obligates member states to put in place legislative measures to ensurebank-client privileges relating to privacy are overridden when information on bank accounts is requested byauthorities. In some countries banks may willingly provide a clientʼs banking information. In some countries, acourt warrant has to be obtained for banks to provide such information as well as wiretapping into private
communications. As courts are independent, applications to obtain banking information and private
communications may not be provided in instances where the case is not properly argued with all relevant
background information being presented. Such instances hamper the likelihood of success in any investigation
for a successful conviction. Although the importance of such measures is noted in gathering information
against a suspect, the discussions pointed to the fact that some countries view this as infringing privacy
rights.
C. Special Investigative Techniques
It was noted that not all countries implement controlled delivery, undercover operations and surveillance
provisions under UNCAC. This is largely due to lack of technological requirements, capacity requirements ora legal basis to authorize such measures. In PNG, all of these measures are not utilized because of privacy
issues and the lack of a legal basis. Appropriate training and technological resources would follow suit in theevent that laws are amended to provide a legal basis.
D. Lengthy Court Processes
In some jurisdictions, court processes hamper obtaining important warrants to complete investigations.
An application may be made ex parte or inter parte in some jurisdictions. The decision made is subject to anumber of instances for appeal and may take some time before the final result is known. In countries where
there are no special corruption courts, this may take longer. In freezing assets, where it is not possible toadministratively freeze a bank account, the funds may be transferred before the warrant to freeze is obtained
and any appeal is decided on.
E. Lengthy MLA Processes
Although UNCAC obligates member states to offer assistance in an timely manner, practically suchassistance may take years, or a request may not even be responded to at all. As the laws relating to137

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production of evidence in a requesting State may differ drastically to those of the requested State, the time
taken to obtain court warrants may be an issue. In some instances, conflicting laws in gathering evidence
may result in MLA requests being refused.
In some countries, the primary administrative process of putting together an MLA request from thepolice or anti-corruption agency for the MLA authority is an issue. Because of the non-uniformity of MLA
authorities among countries, the administrative approvals required and the channels such approvals have togo through before the actual request is sent may deter investigators. This may be the same for the requested
country. It is hoped that countries will reduce bureaucratic procedures to ensure that MLA requests remaina productive tool in international cooperation.
F. Immunities
In some countries, high-ranking officials are provided immunity from investigations or being charged for
an offence. In such instances, vital information required for an investigation may not be obtained. Where theoffice holder has immunity, it is not possible to charge that person for a corruption crime. Hence, the assets
which he illegally holds may not be recovered until such time as the person leaves office and loses theimmunity. Other countries hold the view that no one is above the law. Hence, no immunity is provided to any
office holder. Associated issues with immunities therefore require political support to change laws. However,that may not be possible in most instances where lawmakers are vested with immunity.
G. Conflict of Laws
As mentioned earlier, UNCAC requires cooperation amongst its member States. However, in MLA andextradition requests, dual criminality requirements and conflicting laws for obtaining evidence may result inrefusal of requests for assistance. The UN recognizes this as a problem which still requires more discussions
among Member States before a resolution on a way forward is passed. The timeframe for this still remains
indefinite.
H. Lack of Capacity
It is noted that it is vital that officers in anti-corruption agencies and FIUʼs are well trained to ensure
effective results in the fight against corruption. In-house training, on-the-job training and international
training courses are required to achieve this. Hence, there should be adequate funding put in place fortraining and appropriate administrative support to ensure training remains an integral component in thefight against corruption. Attending UNCAC training is seen as an important capacity-building tool. Officers
who attend such international training must therefore take it upon themselves to train fellow colleagues intheir home states.
I. Lack of Centralized Databases
It was noted that Brazil has a centralized database from which anti-corruption investigators easily search
assets in the form of bank accounts, real property, movable property etc. In almost all other countries, thistool does not exist. Hence, investigators are required to conduct searches at the relevant land registry toobtain information about real property or at vehicle and vessel registries to obtain information on vehicles
and vessels. Banking information may also require a court warrant. It was agreed that putting in place such a
database requires Government support and may take time, if it can be done at all. However, it remains a vital
tool for efficient and timely investigation where a country chooses to create such a database.
J. Lack of Stringent Punishment
It was agreed that punishment for corruption differs from country to country depending on the laws ofeach country. However, to ensure the fight against corruption, appropriate sentencing laws must be
formulated to ensure deterrence. In countries where sentences are weak, corruption is not deterred. It is also
noted that in some countries plea bargaining agreements or leniency programmes exist as a trade-off
between a lighter sentence or immunity and the suspect providing information or transferring assets back to
the State. Hence, there are advantages and disadvantages of plea bargain agreements or leniency
programmes. These mainly exist to ensure assets are recovered as imprisoning the offender does not solve
the issue of asset recovery where the asset cannot be located.
K. Restricted Media
Though media is an important source of information for reporting corruption crime, it may be restricted.
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20TH UNAFEI UNCAC TRAINING PROGRAMMEREPORTS OF THE PROGRAMMEIn Sudan, the media is restricted from reporting or publishing certain corruption cases, such as when a highranking officer is involved.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Corruption crimes are complex in nature and carried out in secret, sometimes across borders. The use ofmodern technology has made transferring proceeds of corruption crimes even easier both domestically andinternationally. Cooperation assists in detecting and recovering of corruption proceeds that have beentransferred or hidden. Therefore, it is important for agencies fighting corruption to cooperate both
domestically and internationally. Given the foregoing, the members proposed the following recommendations:i.

There is need for joint trainings for capacity-building for judicial officers, investigators and prosecutors
on modern trends in corruption. More international training programmes should be offered withfinancial support from the UN or donor agencies to countries in need;ii. Governments should enhance public awareness efforts to educate the public to detect and reportcorruption crimes;iii. More effort should be placed on discussions at the UN level to ensure harmonized laws in Member
States to reduce instances of conflicts of laws. This includes laws relating to criminalization andevidence;iv. The media is given freedom to report without influence from the government. The media must also beaware of international conventions and treaties to which its host county is a party; andv. Governments should establish a central database for law enforcement agencies to gather vital
information.

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Report of the Third Word Congress on Probation

Report of the Second Asia Volunteer Probation Officers Meeting

UNAFEISUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALREPORT OF THE THIRD WORLD CONGRESS ON PROBATION
From 12-14 September 2017, the Third World Congress on Probation (the “Congress”) was held at the
Shinagawa Prince Hotel in Tokyo, Japan, co-hosted by the Rehabilitation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice(“MOJ”) of Japan, the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and theTreatment of Offenders (“UNAFEI”), the Japan Rehabilitation Aid Association, The National Federation of
Volunteer Probation Officers (Japan), The National Association of Offenders Rehabilitation Services (Japan)
and the Japanese Association of Offenders Rehabilitation. The main theme of the Congress was“Development of Probation and the Role of the Community”. Mr. Shoji Imafuku, Director of the General
Affairs Division, Rehabilitation Bureau, MOJ of Japan and Ms. Minako Shoji, the government attorney of
Rehabilitation Bureau, MOJ of Japan served as the Masters of Ceremonies.
Participants
1. 371 participants from 34 countries/regions attended this Congress. The participating countries andregions were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Georgia, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Lesotho, the Netherlands, Malaysia, Moldova, Myanmar,
New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Taiwan,
Uganda, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Viet Nam.
Opening Ceremony
2. Ms. Naomi Unemoto, Director-General of the Rehabilitation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of Japan,
welcomed the participants to the Congress and expressed her hope that the Congress would lead tothe development of probation and community corrections throughout the world. Ms. Unemoto
concluded by declaring the opening of the Congress.
3. The Honourable Yoko Kamikawa, Minister of Justice of Japan, welcomed the participants attending
the Congress from 34 countries and jurisdictions and thanked the many Japanese volunteers andpractitioners who extended their support for the Congress. Minister Kamikawa recalled that Japanʼslong history of offender rehabilitation dates back to the late nineteenth century, explaining thatcurrent efforts are supported by Japanʼs community volunteers, including 48,000 volunteer probation
officers (“VPOs”). She also noted that these efforts are founded on the principle that “No one will be left
behind”, which is the essential idea of the “Sustainable Development Goals”. Finally, Minister
Kamikawa expressed her hope that this Congress will strengthen probation and community
corrections and the development of personal and professional networks.
4. Welcome remarks were also delivered by Mr. Gerry McNally, President of the Confederation ofEuropean Probation (“CEP”); Ms. Erica Preuitt, President of the American Probation and Parole
Association (“APPA”); Ms. Anne Connell-Freund, President of the International Community
Corrections Association (“ICCA”); and Mr. Peter van der Sande, President of the International
Corrections and Prisons Association (“ICPA”).
Keynote Speeches
5. Dr. Frank Porporino1, Senior Partner, T3 Associates Training and Consulting, Inc. (Canada), presented
on the theme of “Developments and Challenges in Probation Practice: Is There a Way Forward for
Establishing Effective and Sustainable Probation Systems?” Acknowledging that probation andcommunity corrections face a number of challenges, including the current political environment,
insufficient financial resources, overburdened and undervalued staff, the lack of statistics oncommunity corrections, and so on, Dr. Porporino observed that modern probation practice isstruggling to define its proper aim. There is a growing consensus among experts in the field thatprobation must engage communities and families in providing support to offenders, focusing on
achievements and strengths rather than just targeting deficits, imbuing the system with the corevalues of justice, fairness and respect, and creating a truly integrated, evidence-informed model ofDr. Porporinoʼs presentation material is available on the Congress website:
http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/program/pdf/Speeches_FJP.pdf
1

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practice. Dr. Porporino proposed extending this model by offering five additional themes: 1)
challenging the trend of mass probation and the “net-widening” effect; 2) challenging the value ofintensive supervision and surveillance, replacing invasive monitoring with voluntary, self-imposedcompliance; 3) coupling procedural justice, in which offenders have fair opportunities to provide theirside of the story with the belief that the authorities will listen, with skilled and personalized care andsupport; 4) defining occupational professionalism by awakening a “relational revolution” in probation
practice in which practitioners are expected to relate to offenders through acceptance, respect,support, empathy, and belief; and 5) enhancing leadership among practitioners to drive change. To
achieve this change, importance must be placed on leveraging relationships with offenders.
6. Prof. Peter Raynor2 of Swansea University (United Kingdom) presented on “Effective Practice: The
Past, Present and Future of Probation Research”. When modern probation began in the 1950s in aperiod of optimism, probation was viewed as the conditional suspension of punishment coupled withpersonal care and supervision by a court welfare officer. From the ʻ70s into the ʻ90s, probation
experienced a period of pessimism resulting from the 1974 publication of Martinsonʼs famous “Nothing
Works” article, followed by a period of research-based optimism through 2003. Now probation is in aperiod of evidence-based realism, in which research is focused on measurement of inputs and outcomes
and comparison of results, but what is missing is a clear understanding of the activities and needs ofprobationers, making it necessary to widen the scope of research from program design to focusing on
skills and implementation. These skills include listening, understanding (empathy), helping, being
reliable and consistent, modeling and reinforcing appropriate thinking and behavior, and appropriate
challenging. Probationers need help and support from others rather than monitoring and surveillance.
To provide this support, probation staff need to receive appropriate training, be empowered, and takeresponsibility for the outcomes. Studies focusing on skills used by probation officers show differences
ranging from 12% to 32% in the effectiveness of probation officers trained in certain skills (such as prosocial modeling) compared to those who were not. In the new political climate, we must beware of“post-truth” policymaking, as evidenced by the privatization of probation in England and Wales. As
post-truth policies will ultimately fail, priorities for future research include: continuing to examine skills
and implementation̶how and what works; learning from ex-offenders about their pathways out ofcrime and how we can help to support desistance; studying how successful policies achieve support
and legitimacy̶from judges, politicians, and communities affected by crime; understanding theactivities and needs of probationers; and measuring and comparing practices to ensure effective
probation practice.
7. Prof. Todd Clear3 of Rutgers University (United States) presented on “Imagining Community Justice
Values in Probation Practice”, introducing “community justice” as a transformative model for
probation practice. Recounting his early experiences working in prisons, Professor Clear found that
prisons are not places where rehabilitation is possible. Throughout his career, and despite efforts toabolish prisons, the United States experienced the largest period of growth in its penal population. The
prison system continued pursuing the objective of controlling offenders inside and outside of prison, as
well as control of correctional officers, while the 40-year goal of U. S. probation has been to turncommunity corrections into community incarceration. Citing the recent report published by theHarvard Executive Series on Community Corrections, which represents a consensus on the role ofcommunity corrections in the twenty-first century, Professor Clear explained that the report has
planted a stake in the ground that calls for a transformation of community corrections, which he would
call “community justice”. Community justice stresses three core values: 1) the well-being principle, 2)
the harm-avoidance principle, and 3) the human dignity principle. This statement of orienting
principles should be deemed as radical, at least from the perspective of the United States. Professor
Clear urged practitioners to become agents of community justice, not just community corrections, by
focusing on public well-being rather than merely public safety. Thus, community justice is in thechange business, not the control business. Rather than focusing on the reduction of recidivism, practiceand reform should focus on helping people become better parents, siblings, and neighbors. The
Professor Raynorʼs presentation material is available on the Congress website:
http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/program/pdf/Speeches_PR.pdf
3
Professor Clearʼs presentation material is available on the Congress website:
http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/program/pdf/Speeches_TC.pdf
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community justice movement promotes success rather than punishing failure and pursues goal-based,
strengths-based, victim-centered, family-inclusive and community-based approaches to rehabilitation.
To foster change in others, we must proceed on the core assumption that it is the natural state of aperson to want to live a better life, to be a positive influence on others, and to be respected by peers.
This creed should guide us in practice toward achieving public well-being.
8. Ms. Tomoko Akane4, Ambassador for International Judicial Cooperation of Japan, presented on thetheme of “The Future of Probation: Asian Experiences and the Role of the Community”, which
considered improving the future of probation through the engagement of the community, such as
through the efforts of VPOs in Japan. While the Tokyo Rules have long established non-custodial
measures and public participation as global norms in community corrections, implementation varies
significantly throughout the world. Too often, incarceration leads to social isolation, radicalization, andrecidivism. To mitigate or avoid these negative impacts of incarceration, Ambassador Akane offered athree-pronged model for the future of probation. First, involvement of community volunteers, such as
VPOs and cooperative employers, is crucial. For example, Japanese VPOs meet with offenders as
individuals, not as probationers, and build close personal relationships based on trust, leading
probationers toward the path of desistance, while cooperative employers offer juveniles and adultoffenders employment despite prior criminal records. The importance of active engagement ofcommunity volunteers was emphasized, introducing a wide range of activities of VPOs in East andSoutheast Asia. Second, broader public engagement by reaching out to all segments of the community
is an important step toward building resilient and sustainable communities, which Japan is pursuingthrough its high-level governmental commitment to the “Movement for a Brighter Society” in an effort
to promote a culture of lawfulness. Third, cooperation among criminal justice agencies is important todetermine which persons are suitable for probation or community corrections, as is sharing
information and cooperation among criminal justice agencies to achieve rehabilitation of individual
offenders, citing the example of collaboration between prosecutors and probation officers in Japan.
Ultimately, people are inspired to change not through systematic control but through personal
relationships and patient encouragement and support from people they respect and trust.
Workshop Sessions
9. Twelve workshop sessions5 were held during the Congress, which provided opportunities to moredeeply explore policies, practices and research on probation and community corrections from aroundthe world. The overarching themes addressed during the workshops included the development ofpolicies and practices, evidence-based theories and practices, offenders with special needs and the roleof the community. Around 70 academics and practitioners presented during the workshop sessions,detailing the community corrections practices from 17 countries.
Special Speech
10. Mr. Ryohei Miyata, Commissioner for Cultural Affairs, Japan, delivered his special speech on the roleof art in offender rehabilitation, reviewing his activities to promote and enhance the presentation ofJapanese culture. He stressed the importance of working directly with each person, including
offenders, to nurture their creativity and spirit of self-expression and to use creativity to turn initial
failure into success.
Opening Remarks on September 14
11. Mr. Keisuke Senta, Director of UNAFEI delivered the opening remarks on September 14. Mr. Senta
emphasized the significance of the Congress in sharing global knowledge and experiences. As well assummarizing the discussion of the previous days, he noted that community corrections has been a
topic of great importance to UNAFEI for several decades, including the first drafting of the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures ̶ commonly known as the Tokyo
Rules. He expressed his hope that this Congress will develop personal and professional networks
which will lead to the expansion of many cooperative projects like UNAFEI has been conducting.
Ambassador Akaneʼs presentation material is available on the Congress website:
http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/program/pdf/Speeches_TA.pdf
5
Most of the presentation materials presented during the workshop sessions are available on the Congress website:
http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/.
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Plenary Session
12. The Plenary Session,6 on the theme of “Probation, Public Participation and Public Engagement”, wasmoderated by Mr. Gerry McNally, President of the CEP, and Mr. Steve Pitts, Ambassador of the CEP.
Mr. Pitts presented an introduction to the session, emphasizing the centrality of the public andcommunities in effective probation work, and the value of international learning.
13. Presentation 17, on “Volunteer Probation Officers in Japan̶Community Volunteers Supporting
Offender Rehabilitation”, provided an overview of the activities of VPOs in Japan. Ms. Kimiko Iino
presented a case study of a juvenile probationer and highlighted VPOsʼ continuous support, despite
recommission of delinquency, of probationers and the use of affection, patience and community
resources to allow the probationer to achieve success. Mr. Mitsuru Iino outlined the activities of
Ryugasaki VPO associations focusing on the activities of Ryugasaki Offenders Rehabilitation Center,
which provides parenting-skills classes, VPO training, and places where VPOs can consult senior
VPOs for advice or meet probationers. VPOs are also engaged in crime prevention activities,
collaboration with schools, and supporting at-risk youth through after-school programs. These
activities help to identify at-risk youth and seek to establish inclusive communities.
14. Presentation 28 was presented by Dr. Naras Savestanan, the Director-General of the Department of
Probation, Ministry of Justice Thailand, on the topic of “Development of Probation in ASEANCountries”, reported on the status of probation in ASEAN and presented the ASEAN Roadmap for thedevelopment of probation, which emphasizes knowledge sharing, capacity building and international
cooperation. In ASEAN, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore have structured volunteer
participation in probation, and all other ASEAN countries are working toward the establishment andimplementation of probation laws, institutions and practices. In Thailand, to enhance public
engagement, the minimum qualifying age for VPOs has been decreased, the amount of remuneration
has been moderately increased, the appointment process has been expedited, and efforts have been
undertaken to expand channels for recruiting.
15. Presentation 39 was presented by Mr. Clement Okech, Assistant Director of Probation and Aftercare
Service, Kenya on the topic of “Facilitating Offender Supervision and Re-Entry through Community
Support Service: The Role of Volunteer Probation Officers Program in Kenya”, reviewed the concept
and core functions of VPOs in Kenya and introduced the Kenyan governmentʼs Guiding Principles on
Volunteerism. Volunteers are important in Kenya because of the need for a greater role ofcommunities in the supervision and rehabilitation of offenders. To encourage public participation,
Kenya provides structured training and public recognition to VPOs. The volunteer nature of VPOs,
including the lack of compensation, is viewed as a challenge to effectiveness, yet public engagement inselection and recruitment has become a fundamental characteristic of the VPO system in Kenya.
16. Presentation 410 was presented by Ms. Audrey Alards, Circles Coordinator of the Dutch Probation
Service, on the topic of “Best Practices of CoSA in the Netherlands”, introducing the European model
for circles of support, which is a citizen-based approach that includes the core member (the sex
offender), volunteers, professionals, and the circle coordinator. Core members may volunteer toparticipate or are referred by professionals; they must be assessed as medium to high risk, and theymust join voluntarily, accept responsibility for their conduct, and agree to the sharing of information
among members of the circle. Volunteers must apply, be interviewed and undergo training. Three tofive volunteers work as a group, and they form a circle supported by a coordinator. A key goal of thecircles is to lead the core members to the realization that they have a place in society.
17. Presentation 5 11 was presented by Ms. Rosemary Caruana, Assistant Commissioner, Community
Biographies of speakers and abstracts of presentations are available on the Congress website:
http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/program/pdf/plenary_speaker.pdf
7
For presentation materials, visit: http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/program/pdf/SessionJapan.pdf
8
For presentation materials, visit: http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/program/pdf/SessionThailand.pdf
9
For presentation materials, visit: http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/program/pdf/SessionKenya.pdf
10
For presentation materials, visit: http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/program/pdf/SessionNetherlands.pdf
11
For presentation materials, visit: http://www.moj.go.jp/HOGO/WCP3/program/pdf/SessionAustralia.pdf
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Corrections, Corrective Services of New South Wales, Australia, on the topic of “Reducing Reoffending
and Social Impact Investment in Australia”, introducing a model for financing offender rehabilitation
services that allocates the most resources to the offenders who have been assessed as having thehighest risk of reoffending. Social Impact Investment (SII) takes an integrated approach to providing
services to offenders in the community. SII operates in partnership with not-for-profit groups and the
National Australia Bank. If the program is successful, the government will reimburse the initialinvestment required to deliver the service and share the net financial benefits generated by the
program. Payment is outcome based as measured by reduction in reoffending. Thus, by establishing
public-private partnerships, the risk of providing rehabilitation services is borne by all parties, i.e., thegovernment, the service provider and the financier.
18. During the discussion, it was pointed out that there is tremendous innovation in public engagement.
An important task is to determine how these various approaches can be shared and how they may betailored for implementation in a way that reflects the social and cultural circumstances in each country
or jurisdiction. The presentations demonstrate that there are tremendous opportunities for public
engagement that offer the promise of successful offender rehabilitation and reintegration into thecommunity with the support of the community.
Guest Speech
19. Mr. Asato Takasaka of Japan candidly described his experiences as a juvenile delinquent and an adultoffender, and he graciously shared the very personal story of his path toward rehabilitation. Mr.
Takasaka was motivated to change with continuous support of many people; his parents, a volunteer
probation officer, a family court investigating officer and his lawyer. He believes that all juvenile
delinquents can change themselves and their futures, but they cannot change themselves alone. Thus,
he has dedicated himself to helping youth avoid delinquency and crime. He stressed the importance of
not giving up on youth no matter how difficult the situation is and arranging support using a teambased approach.
Receptions
20. At the welcome reception on September 12, welcome remarks were delivered by Mr. Daizo Nozawa,
the President of the National Federation of Volunteer Probation Officers of Japan, Mr. Masaharu Hino,
Chairperson of the Asia Crime Prevention Foundation, and Dr. Zin-Hwan Kim, President of the Korean
Institute of Criminology. In addition, letters of appreciation were presented from the Minister ofJustice of Japan to APPA, CEP, ICCA, ICPA, and Dr. Frank Porporino for their contributions inoffering support and advice throughout the preparation and delivery of this Congress.
21. At the reception on September 13, the Honourable Yoko Kamikawa, Minister of Justice of Japan, Mr.
Fujio Mitarai, President of the Japan Rehabilitation Aid Association, Ms. Yuriko Koike, Governor ofTokyo, and Mr. Taichi Sakaiya, President of the Asia Crime Prevention Foundation delivered remarks.
Cultural and other traditional activities and performances were held by the Volunteer Probation
Officers Association in Support of UNAFEIʼs Activities and other volunteers. The participants werewelcomed by musical performances of the Japanese harp (koto) and bamboo flute (shakuhachi),participated in a Japanese tea ceremony, received gifts of Japanese paper crafts (origami) andJapanese fans (uchiwa) with Japanese calligraphy, and enjoyed a Japanese drum performance by
Zuiho-Taiko and traditional Japanese dance (awa-odori). In the reception hall, Japanese paintings(ukiyoe) were displayed by Tokyo University of the Arts along with a portable shrine (mikoshi)
provided by the Japanese Correctional Association.
Closing Ceremony
22. Dr. Tetsuya Fujimoto, President of the Japanese Association of Offenders Rehabilitation, expressed his
sincere appreciation to the many individuals and organizations that made the Congress a resounding
success, particularly the high-level presentations delivered by the keynote speakers. Noting that
attendance at this Congress was the highest in the series of congresses, he stated that the World
Congress on Probation is clearly proceeding in the right direction and is succeeding in achieving its
goals of strengthening international cooperation and broadening the global professional network. As
probation practice must take each countryʼs culture into account, diversity is a crucial element of theWorld Congress. Dr. Fujimoto expressed his hope that the World Congress will continue as a forum for147

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 104

information sharing and ongoing consideration of the vision, mission and future of probation. In closing
his speech, Dr. Fujimoto acknowledged that the Congress included presentations covering a wide
range of topics from all over the world, and emphasized that the importance of the role of thecommunity was the underlining principle throughout this Congress. Lastly, he confirmed the values of
the community by explaining the logo design of the Third World Congress on Probation named the“Symphony of Three Rings”, which consists of three rings representing community, people, and faith,belief and heart.
23. Following the speech, a brief handover ceremony was held to transfer the administration of theCongress to the host of the Fourth World Congress. Ms. Rosemary Caruana was invited to the podium
for the handover ceremony. A plaque was presented to Ms. Caruana by Dr. Fujimoto.
24. Ms. Rosemary Caruana, Assistant Commissioner, Community Corrections, Corrective Services, NewSouth Wales, Australia, thanked the organizers for their role as hosts of the Third World Congress on
Probation and invited the participants to attend the Fourth World Congress on Probation, which will
be held in Sydney, Australia in 2019.
Study Tours
25. Study tours were held on September 12, and they included visits to Offender Rehabilitation Facilities(Halfway Houses) (“Kawasaki Jiritsu-kai” and “Ryozen-kai”), Offender Rehabilitation Support Centers(“Kawasaki Nanbu Offender Rehabilitation Support Center” and “Ota Offender Rehabilitation Support
Center”), Fuchu Prison，Tama Juvenile Training School, and the Tokyo Probation Office. The study
tour also included home visits with Japanese VPOs, during which participants visited VPOsʼ homes,
enabling them to experience Japanese culture and to learn how Japanese VPOs work with offenders.
Asia Volunteer Probation Officers Meeting
26. As a side event of the Third World Congress on Probation, the Second Asia Volunteer Probation
Officers Meeting was held on September 12. The meeting was attended by VPOs and officials
responsible for community corrections from the following countries: Korea, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand and Japan. Observers from China and Kenya also attended the meeting. In total, around 200
participants attended the meeting. The details of the meeting can be found in the “Report of theSecond Asia Volunteer Probation Officers Meeting”.
Publications
27. The following publications were published by the Congress Organizing Committee and were
distributed to the Congress participants:
1) “Volunteer Probation Officers and Offenders Rehabilitation” written in English includes an overview
of the Japanese VPO system, case reports from Japanese VPOs, a research paper by Dr. Frank
Porporino and Dr. Andrew Watson on the Japanese VPO system, and overviews of the VPO systemsof Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Kenya.
2) “Sekai no Hogokansatsu (Probation Systems around the World)” written in Japanese outlines theprobation and community corrections systems of 16 countries (Thailand, the Philippines, Korea, China,
Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Romania, Germany,
Finland, the United States, Canada and Kenya).
3) “When People Change” is a DVD in English that introduces probation and community corrections
practices in Japan by interviewing the persons working with offenders in the community.
14 SEPTEMBER 2017
THE THIRD WORLD CONGRESS ON PROBATIONTOKYO, JAPAN148

REPORT OF THE SECOND ASIA VOLUNTEER PROBATION OFFICERS MEETINGThe Second Asia Volunteer Probation Officers Meeting, hosted by the organizers of the Third World
Congress on Probation, was held from 15:00 to 17:30 on September 12, 2017 at the Shinagawa Prince Hotel inTokyo, Japan. Mr. Shoji Imafuku, Director of the General Affairs Division Rehabilitation Bureau of the
Ministry of Justice of Japan presided over the meeting as Chair. The meeting was attended by volunteer
probation officers (VPOs) and officials responsible for community corrections from the following countries:
Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Japan. Observers from China and Kenya also attended themeeting. In total, around 200 participants attended the meeting.
1. Opening Addresses
Mr. Daizo Nozawa, President of the National Federation of Volunteer Probation Officers of Japan,
extended his heartfelt welcome to the overseas participants and volunteer probation officers who
participated in the meeting. At the first meeting three years ago, participants exchanged information
about their respective volunteer probation officer systems, shared common challenges among theparticipating countries, and adopted the Tokyo Declaration, the first international declaration addressing
the role of VPOs in offender rehabilitation. The purpose of the Second Asia VPO meeting is to assess the
progress of the implementation of the Tokyo Declaration and to share best practices for enhancing publicawareness and recognition of the role of VPOs.
Mr. Keisuke Senta, Director of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crimeand the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), welcomed the participants and introduced UNAFEIʼsactivities to enhance the role of VPOs and community corrections. These activities focus on the exchange
of information and experiences between Japanese VPOs and criminal justice practitioners from othercountries.
2. Country Presentations
The Chair recalled that the purpose of the Tokyo Declaration, adopted at the First Asia VPOs Meeting, isto share information on VPO and similar systems in the participating countries and to the enhance publicrecognition of VPO systems.
JAPAN: Mr. Shojin KOBAYASHI, Vice President of the National Federation of Volunteer Probation Officers,
summarized the characteristics of the VPO system in Japan and reported the challenges facing thecurrent system, including the declining number of VPOs and increased pressure on current VPOs. In
response, Japan has established Offenders Rehabilitation Support Centers to provide VPOs with a location
where VPOs can meet and interview probationers, exchange ideas with other VPOs, consult experienced
VPOs stationed at the centers, and so on. An internship program was also established to identify
promising VPO candidates, and Japan has prioritized the engagement of younger generations in crime
prevention activities with VPOs.
PHILIPPINES: Volunteer Probation Assistants (VPAs) in the Philippines amply the services provided toclients in the community and promote greater citizen awareness and involvement in the criminal justicesystem. Regular evaluation and recognition of VPAs are key measures for motivating VPAs. Challenges
faced include community doubt of the effectiveness of community corrections and insufficient funds totrain and sustain the VPA program. To further improve the VPA system, measures include providing
continuous training for VPAs, enhancing public private partnerships in community corrections, andexpanding the evaluation and recognition system for VPAs.
SINGAPORE: The delegation from Singapore introduced the recruitment process for VPOs, which allows exoffenders to volunteer under certain conditions, and the training process, which includes both an elearning module and seminar-style meetings. To encourage VPOs and enhance bonding among them,
VPO committees organize events for VPOs, and VPOs are given awards and other forms of publicrecognition. The challenges faced by the VPO scheme include dealing with the evolving needs ofprobationers and balancing the organizationʼs needs and volunteersʼ aspirations.
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THAILAND: The delegation from Thailand introduced its VPO system based on the new legal framework
resulting from the recent passage of the Probation Act. These changes include the lowering of theminimum age qualified to serve as a VPO from 25 to 20 because, like Japan, the average age of VPOs has
been increasing, and some older VPOs have challenges relating to younger probationers. To enhanceservices and public recognition, Thailand also engages in evaluation and public recognition of VPOs.
Among other roles, Thai VPOs are tasked with engaging in pre- and post-sentence investigations,
supporting the work of the Probation Department, and so on.
KENYA: The delegation explained that the VPO program provides auxiliary support to relieve the problem
of prison overcrowding, particularly for the many offenders who are imprisoned for minor crimes. VPOs
enable the probation department to extend its reach into Kenyaʼs villages, many of which are
geographically isolated. Progress was reported in the fields of recruitment, organization and development,
and public recognition. The programme had also developed system of working with Non ‒governmentalorganizations. In order to strengthen the VPO system in Kenya, recommendations include entrenching
the VPO system in Kenyaʼs laws and policies; enhancing recognition, capacity building, and government
funding; and expanding coverage of the VPO system to all parts of Kenya.
CHINA: Community corrections has developed over the past two decades in response to the increasing
prison population. As of 2016, China has 672, 100 volunteers, such as retirees, college students andprofessionals, who provide a variety of services to rehabilitate offenders in the community. A number ofmodels for treatment and support were provided, all of which draw on the support of community
volunteers, criminal justice agencies and social support agencies. To identify and retain these volunteers,
the volunteer system engages in recruitment, provides training, and offers commendations to outstanding
volunteers. Challenges include the lack of funding, poor organization, including high turnover ofvolunteers, and insufficient training.
3. Plenary Discussion
The Chair stated that the theme of the plenary discussion would focus on enhancing public recognition of
VPOs and that, to do so, it is important to engage a broader set of society. Before opening the floor to abroader discussion, the Chair asked the eminent experts in attendance to share their thoughts on the
country presentations and on how to promote public recognition of VPOs.
Prof. Tatsuya OTA of Keio University (Japan) commented that recruitment is an important issue in Japanand pointed out that the VPO population in Japan is aging. Accordingly, Japan should reconsider how it
recruits VPOs. He also stated that persons with professional experiences and knowledge, such as nurses,
mental health practitioners, lawyers, etc., should be recruited as VPOs in order to provide special
guidance and support to probationers. Furthermore, VPOs should operate in teams of two or three alongwith other professionals, and they should cooperate directly with social welfare agencies and otherresources. In Japan, the statistics suggest that a majority of Japanese are aware of the role of VPOs, butthere is a lack of understanding of community supervision in general.
Prof. Hiroshi SHOJIMA of Fukushima University (Japan) suggested that it is necessary to reconfirm the role
of VPOs, particularly by focusing on their role in their communities. Certain offenders, such as sexual
offenders, require specialized treatment, but most offenders require the support of the community toreintegrate. Building such understanding does not require expertise; it requires someone who has
standing in the community and knowledge of local resources. Although confidentiality is important, the“visibility” of VPOsʼ non-confidential activities in the community is indispensable. Recently, open dialogue
in our communities is important to enhance public recognition of VPOs and community-based treatment,
while community-based monitoring is not an important factor.
Dr. Frank PORPORINO, Senior Partner, T3 Associates Training and Consulting Inc. (Canada), stated that
although the VPO approach is not known well on the international level, the Asian region should be proudof what VPOs have been able to achieve. Although each country applies its own variation of the VPO
scheme, the essence of the VPO scheme is that it is there to support, not to enforce. The VPO scheme
should not be viewed as a measure to save money, but rather it should be viewed as a culturally
appropriate and evidence-based approach for working with offenders. While the term volunteer
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sometimes implies “amateur”, VPOs are professionals in their own way. Organizing the VPO system too
much could result in losing its vitality and energy. It is very important to create an evidence base in the
Asian region based on the practices related to VPOs: who is able to relate with offenders best, why andhow. Also, Dr. Porporino suggested that ex-offenders might be excellent candidates for VPOs, because
those who have traveled the path to rehabilitation know it best.
Director Senta of UNAFEI stated that the United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice will be held in Kyoto in 2020. Participants include ministers of justice, attorneys general, chiefjustices of Supreme Courts, as well as criminal justice practitioners and academics from around the world.
The Congress will promote the building of peaceful and inclusive societies. During the Congress, someagenda items are closely related to VPOsʼ activities. UNAFEI will be in charge of the workshop on
reducing reoffending, and the workshopʼs panelists will include experts or practitioners of community
corrections. In addition, there will be more than 100 side events during the Congress. These events are
excellent opportunities to promote the public recognition of VPOs nationally and internationally.
Moreover, the Kyoto Declaration will be adopted during the 2020 Congress, and through diplomaticnegotiation, the importance of community corrections and VPOs might be included.
Following the expertsʼ remarks, the general discussion touched upon four key issues: (1) public
understanding of the VPO concept and measures that should be taken at (2) the community andoperational level, (3) the national level and (4) the international level. All participants agreed that theseissues must be addressed in order to enhance public recognition of VPOs.
(1) Public Understanding of the VPO Concept
In countries with active VPO systems, the general public may have a basic understanding of the VPO
concept, or at least the existence of VPOs. However, it was suggested that in most countries there is alack of public understanding of the goals of community corrections. Consequently, it is important that
actions are taken on all levels and by all countries to enhance public understanding of community
corrections and, where applicable, the VPO concept. At the community level, this does not necessarily
require expertise; rather, it requires someone who has standing in the community and knowledge of local
resources. It was proposed that efforts to enhance public understanding should focus on open dialogue
with members of the public, explaining that the role of VPOs is to provide offenders with support for theirreintegration rather than monitoring them or enforcing compliance with conditions of probation.
(2) Community and Operational Level
A number of countries reported issues with the aging of the VPO population, stating that they faced
challenges in the recruitment of VPOs at the community level. It was proposed that the engagement ofyouth as VPOs should be prioritized, citing the possible benefits of expanding the recruitment pool andthat younger VPOs may relate better to younger offenders. However, it was also pointed out that older
VPOs can still play an important role in mentoring younger offenders despite differences incommunication style and technological ability. One innovative idea for recruitment is to allow community
participation in the nomination and selection of VPOs, which would also enhance public understanding andacceptance of VPOsʼ roles. The discussion also addressed the question of whether former offenders shouldbe allowed to serve as VPOs. Although differing perspectives were shared, some believe quite strongly
that former offenders can be extremely effective at relating to offenders and showing them the path torehabilitation and desistance based on their actual experience. From an operational perspective, a numberof ideas were presented, including enhancing the professionalism of VPOs by recruiting nurses, mental
health practitioners, lawyers, etc., encouraging VPOs to operate in teams of two or three, encouraging
VPOs to work directly with social welfare agencies, partnering with NGOs, and expanding the use of
offender rehabilitation support centers, which allow VPOs to conduct their work and meet with offenders
in a safe, collegial environment.
(3) National Level
Some of the participants stressed the importance of enhancing national recognition of the efforts of VPOs.
Measures discussed during the session included publication of annual reports on VPOs activities,
strengthening press relations and communicating with the public through the media, establishing anational recognition day for VPOs, conducting law-related education for citizens, offering tax incentives to
VPOs to encourage more working professionals to volunteer, and offering preference to students who
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serve as VPOs when seeking government jobs.
(4) International Level
There was general agreement that the VPO concept is not so well known at the international level andthat measures need to be taken to enhance awareness globally. One idea that garnered unanimous
support was to promote the establishment of an International Volunteer Probation Officersʼ Day. It wasalso noted that countries with active or developing VPO systems should promote the concept atinternational conferences, including the United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice, which will be held in Kyoto, Japan in 2020. It was also suggested that the 2020 Congress presents
the unique opportunity to hold the Third Asia Volunteer Probation Officers Meeting as a side event,which would draw international attention to VPO systems.
4. Closing Address
Ms. Naomi UNEMOTO, Director General of the Rehabilitation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of Japan,
delivered the closing address, noting that the country presentations identified tremendous work among
the VPO and community corrections systems represented at the Meeting, as well as a number of common
challenges facing these systems, and that many important initiatives for enhancing public recognition for
VPOs were proposed and discussed during the plenary session in terms of enhancing public recognition
for VPOs. The Rehabilitation Bureau, in cooperation with UNAFEI, will use their best efforts to promote
the public recognition of VPOs at the international level.
SEPTEMBER 12, 2017TOKYO, JAPAN152

APPENDIX••UNAFEIRADICALIZED OFFENDERS AND SECURITY THREAT GROUPS IN
CORRECTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
Andrea E. Moser, Ph.D., C.Psych.
Recently, there has been an increasing focus in many countries regarding the challenge of violent
extremists as well as members of Security Threat Groups (e. g., gangs, organized crime) in correctionalsettings. This includes both concerns about the safe management and community reintegration of these
individuals as well as their potential to radicalize and/or recruit others. With respect to violent extremists,
while several countries have long histories of managing individuals and groups who have committed criminal
acts to promote religious or political aims, an increasing number of high profile attacks over the previous two
decades have put an increased focus on establishing a greater understanding of these individuals and how tobest manage them in a carceral setting. In a series of three lectures, key issues related to correctional
management of violent extremists and members of Security Threat Groups (STGs) will be explored, drawing
on both international research as well as work completed by the Correctional Service of Canada.
In the first lecture “Radicalized Offenders and Security Threat Groups: What Do We Know?”, several
themes will be discussed, including definitional issues (i.e., what do we mean by a “radicalized offender”; what
is a Security Threat Group), myths and realities regarding STGs and radicalized offenders, an overview of
research on STGs and violent extremists, and work that has been done to assist in identifying STG members
and radicalized individuals in correctional settings. In addition, international best practices regarding themanagement of radicalized offenders will be discussed.
The focus of the second lecture, “Management of Radicalized Offenders and Security Threat Groups in a
Correctional Context” builds on the first lecture by exploring “What Do We Do” in relation to these offendersʼgroups, concentrating on evidence-based strategies and approaches. Topics covered include: population
management strategies for STGs and radicalized offenders, assessment and intervention approaches, and theimportance of collaboration with external partners. Specific issues to be discussed include accommodation
models, staff training, information sharing, and the importance of all assessment and intervention approaches
being grounded in principles of effective corrections such as the Risk, Needs, Responsivity (RNR) Model(Andrews, Bonta and Hoge, 1990). Research on disengagement from radical behaviour and violent extremism
will also be explored.
The final lecture focuses on “General and Cultural Considerations in the Management of Offenders”
including those who are members of STGs or radicalized. Drawing on research related to specificresponsivity (Andrews, Bonta and Hoge, 1990), the impact of both gender and ethnocultural identity as it
relates to issues of assessment and effective interventions will be reviewed, as well as the implications thatthe research findings in the area have on the correctional management of specific subgroups of offenders.
References:
Andrews, D. A., Bonta, J., & Hoge, R. D. (1990). Classification for effective rehabilitation: Rediscovering
psychology. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 17, 19-52.

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The 167th International Training Course

The 167th International Training Course (UNAFEI, 23 August - 22 September 2017)

Left to Right:
Above
Dr. Andrea Moser (Canada), Dr. Rohan Gunaratna (Singapore)
4th Row
Ms. Odagiri (Chef), Ms. Hisa (JICA), Mr. Ohno (Staff), Mr. Ueki (Staff), Prof. Umemoto, Mr. Ohta (Staff), Mr.
Furuhashi (Staff), Mr. Haneda (Staff), Ms. Oda (Staff), Mr. Hirose (Staff), Prof. Yoshimura, Ms. Iwakata (Staff),
Ms. Yamada (Staff)
3rd Row
Ms. Nagahama (Staff), Prof. Watanabe, Mr. Yamane (Japan), Mr. Adachi (Japan), Mr. Takayama (Japan),
Mr. Abe (Japan), Mr. Soares Cabeleira (Brazil), Ms. Camposanto (Philippines), Ms. Visser (Namibia), Mr.
Tsukahara (Japan), Mr. Sakatani (Japan), Prof. Akashi, Prof. Watanabe
2nd Row
Prof. Yamada, Mr. Bayle (Philippines), Mr. Rakasiwi (Indonesia), Ms. Uiyyasathian (Thailand), Mr. Marcal
Belo (Timor-Lest), Mr. Ahoujil (Morocco), Ms. Wilson (Thailand), Mr. Altaharwah (Jordan), Mr. Azim
(Maldives), Mr. Youn (Korea), Ms. Li (Hong Kong), Ms. Lemisio (Samoa), Mr. Tshewang (Bhutan), Mr. Kono
(Japan)
1st Row
Mr. Schmid (LA), Mr. Jimbo (Staff), Prof. Minoura, Prof. Matsumoto, Deputy Director Morinaga, Ms.
Chiara Bologna (UNICRI), Director Senta, Ms. Sabariah Binte Mohamed Hussin (Singapore), Prof. Yamamoto,Prof. Yukawa, Prof. Hirano, Ms. Kikuchi (Staff)

The 20th UNAFEI UNCAC Training Programme

The 20th UNAFEI UNCAC Training Programme (UNAFEI, 1 November - 7 December 2017)

Left to Right:
Above
Ms. Mary Butler (United States)
4th Row
Ms. Yamada (Staff), Ms. Iwakata (Staff), Mr. Haneda (Staff), Ms. Nagahama (Staff), Mr. Kiguchi (Staff), Mr.
Ueki (Staff), Mr. Furuhashi (Staff), Mr. Ohno (Staff), Mr. Alsaedi (Iraq), Ms. Yamamoto (JICA), Ms. Oda (Staff)
3rd Row
Mr. Mwayawa (Papua New Guinea), Mr. Elzaki (Sudan), Mr. Hirate (Japan), Mr. Nedeou Teubdoyo (Chad),
Mr. Huntopap (Thailand), Mr. Hisaoka (Japan), Mr. Asrori (Tajikistan), Mr. Santos Farias (Brazil), Mr. Fujioka(Japan), Mr. Aung Than Toe (Myanmar), Mr. Elhamady (Egypt), Mr. Sethunge Mdiyanselage (Sri Lanka), Ms.
Tsujii (Staff)
2nd Row
Mr. Lieberenz (Brazil), Mr. Manabe (Japan), Mr. Suryadi (Indonesia), Mr. Nyakizee (Tanzania), Mr. Akagi(Japan), Mr. Penjor (Bhutan), Mr. Ibrahim (Bangladesh), Mr. Srin (Cambodia), Mr. Adhikari (Nepal), Ms.
Sharma Subedi (Nepal), Mr. Somvorachit (Lao PDR), Ms. Takuva (Zimbabwe), Ms. Shahuma (Maldives), Ms.
Nyaga (Kenya), Ms. Liusha (Maldives)
1st Row
Mr. Schmid (LA), Mr. Jimbo (Staff), Prof. Watanabe, Prof. Watanabe, Prof. Yamada, Deputy Director
Ishihara, Mr. Lim (Singapore), Director Senta, Mr. Aras (Brazil), Prof. Yukawa, Prof. Akashi, Prof. Minoura,
Prof. Matsumoto, Ms. Kikuchi (Staff)

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES INDEXVol.

Training Course Name

Course No.

Course Dates

1

Public Participation in Social Defence

25

Sep-Dec 1970

2

Administration of Criminal Justice26

Jan-Mar 1971

3

[Corrections]27

Apr-Jul 1971

[Police, Prosecution and Courts]

28

Sep-Dec 1971

Social Defence Planning

29

Feb-Mar 1972

Treatment of Crime and Delinquency

30

Apr-Jul 1972

5

United Nations Training Course in Human Rights in the
Administration of Criminal Justicen/a

Aug-Sep 1972

Administration of Criminal Justice31

Sep-Dec 1972

6

Reform in Criminal Justice32

Feb-Mar 1973

Treatment of Offenders

33

Apr-Jul 1973

7

[Administration of Criminal Justice]34

Sep-Dec 1973

8

Planning and Research for Crime Prevention

35

Feb-Mar 1974

Administration of Criminal Justice36

Apr-Jun 1974

International Evaluation Seminar37

Jul 1974

Treatment of Juvenile Delinquents and Youthful Offenders

38

Sep-Nov 1974

The Roles and Functions of the Police in a Changing Society

39

Feb-Mar 1975

Treatment of Offenders

40

Apr-Jul 1975

4

9
10

NB: Resource Material Series Index, Nos. 1-10 (p. 139)n/a

Oct 1975

11

Improvement in the Criminal Justice System

41

Sep-Dec 1975

12

Formation of a Sound Sentencing Structure and Policy

42

Feb-Mar 1976

Treatment of Offenders

43

Apr-Jul 1976

13

Exploration of Adequate Measures for Abating and Preventing
Crimes of Violence

44

Sep-Dec 1976

14

Increase of Community Involvement

45

Feb-Mar 1977

Treatment of Juvenile Delinquents and Youthful Offenders

46

Apr-Jul 1977

Speedy and Fair Administration of Criminal Justice47

Sep-Dec 1977

Prevention and Control of Social and Economic Offences48

Feb-Mar 1978

15

Report of United Nations Human Rights Training Coursen/a

Dec 1977

Treatment of Offenders

49

Apr-Jul 1978

Dispositional Decisions in Criminal Justice Process50

Sep-Dec 1978

Treatment of Dangerous or Habitual Offenders

51

Feb-Mar 1979

Community-Based Corrections

52

Apr-Jul 1979

18

Roles of the Criminal Justice System in Crime Prevention

53

Sep-Dec 1979

19

Arrest and Pre-Trial Detention

54

Feb-Mar 1980

Institutional Treatment of Adult Offenders

55

Apr-Jul 1980

Institutional Treatment of Adult Offenders

55

Apr-Jul 1980

Integrated Approach to Effective and Efficient Administrationof Criminal Justice56

Sep-Nov 1980

57

Feb-Mar 1981

16
17

20

NB: Resource Material Series Index, Nos. 1-20 (p. 203)
21

Crime Prevention and Sound National Development

Mar 1981

Integrated Approach to Effective Juvenile Justice
Administration (including Proposed Guidelines for the
Formulation of the Standard Minimum Rules for Juvenile
Justice Administration: A draft prepared by UNAFEI on thebasis of the reports of the study groups at the 58th International
Training Course)

58

May-Jul 1981

Contemporary Problems in Securing an Effective, Efficient andFair Administration of Criminal Justice and Their Solutions

59

Feb-Mar 1982

Secruing Rational Exercise of Discretionary Powers at
Adjudication and Pre-adjudication Stages of Criminal Justice
Administration

60

Apr-Jul 1982

23

Improvement of Correctional Programmes for More Effective
Rehabilitation of Offenders

61

Sep-Nov 1982

24

Promotion of Innovations for Effective, Efficient and Fair
Administration of Criminal Justice62

Feb-Mar 1983

Community-Based Corrections

63

Apr-Jul 1983

The Quest for a Better System and Administration of Juvenile
Justice64

Sep-Dec 1983

Documents Produced during the International Meeting ofExperts on the Development of the United Nations Draft
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justicen/a

Nov 1983

International Cooperation in Criminal Justice Administration

65

Feb-Mar 1984

Promotion of Innovation in the Effective Treatment of
Prisoners in Correctional Institutions

66

Apr-Jul 198427

An Integrated Approach to Drug Problems

67

Sep-Dec 1984

28

Contemporary Asian Problems in the Field of Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice, and Policy Implications

68

Feb-Mar 1985

Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committeeof Experts on UNAFEI Work Programmes and Directions

n/a

Mar 1985

Report of the International Workshop on the Role of Youth
Organizations in the Prevention of Crime Among Youthn/a

Jul 1985

Follow-up Team for Ex-Participants of UNAFEI Courses

n/a

Dec 1985

Community-Based Corrections

69

Apr-Jul 1985

29

In Pursuit of Greater Effectiveness and Efficiency in theJuvenile Justice System and Its Administration70

Sep-Dec 1985

30

Promotion of Innovation in Criminal Justice Administration for
the Prevention of New Criminality

71

Feb-Mar 1986

The Quest for Effective and Efficient Treatment of Offenders in
Correctional Institutions

72

Apr-Jul 1986

Economic Crime: Its Impact on Society and Effective
Prevention73

Sep-Nov 1986

Report of the International Seminar on Drug Problems in Asiaand the Pacific Regionn/a

Aug 1986

Advancement of Fair and Humane Treatment of Offenders andVictims in Criminal Justice Administration74

Feb-Mar 1987

Non-institutional Treatment of Offenders: Its Role andImprovement for More Effective Programmes

75

Apr-Jun 1987

22

25

26

31

32

Evaluation of UNAFEIʼs International Courses on Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders, and Drug Problems in Asia

76

Aug-Sep 1987

Crime Related to Insurance77

Oct-Dec 1987

Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committeeof Experts on UNAFEI Work Programmes and Directionsn/a

Sep 1987

Report of the Workshop on Implementation Modalities for the
Twenty-Three Recommendations Adopted by the International
Seminar on Drug Problems in Asia and the Pacific Regionn/a

Sep 1987

Footprints, Contemporary Achievements and Future
Perspectives in Policies for Correction and Rehabilitation of
Offenders78

Feb-Mar 1988

Search for the Solution of the Momentous and Urgent Issues inContemporary Corrections

79

Apr-Jul 1988

Resolution of the Asia and Pacific Regional Experts Meetingn/a

Mar 1988

Report of the Meeting of Experts on the United Nations Draft
Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (TheTokyo Rules)n/a

Jul 1988

35

Quest for Effective International Countermeasures to Pressing
Problems of Transnational Criminality

80

Sep-Nov 1988

36

Advancement of the Integration of Criminal Justice
Administration

81

Feb-Mar 1989

Innovative Measures for Effective and Efficient Administrationof Institutional Correctional Treatment of Offenders

82

Apr-Jul 1989

Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Adolescence and Crime
Prevention in the ESCAP Regionn/a

Aug 1989

37

Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the Context ofDevelopment83

Sep-Nov 1989

International Workshop on Victimology and Victimʼs Rights

n/a

Oct 1989

38

Policy Perspectives on Contemporary Problems in Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Administration

84

Jan-Mar 1990

Wider Use and More Effective Implementation of Noncustodial Measures for Offenders

85

Apr-Jun 1990

39

Search for Effective and Appropriate Measures to Deal with
the Drug Problem

86

Sep-Dec 1990

40

Development of an Effective International Crime and Justice
Programme

87

Jan-Mar 1991

Institutional Treatment of Offenders in Special Categories

88

Apr-Jul 1991

NB: Resource Material Series Index, Nos. 21-40 (p. 333)

n/a

n/a

41

Effective and Innovative Countermeasures against Economic
Crime

89

Sep-Dec 1991

42

Quest for Solutions of the Pressing Problems of Contemporary
Criminal Justice Administration

90

Jan-Feb 1992

Further Use and Effectual Development of Non-Custodial
Measures for Offenders

91

Apr-Jul 1992

43

Quest for Effective Methods of Organized Crime Control

92

Sep-Nov 1992

44

Policy Perspective for Organized Crime Suppression

93

Feb-Mar 1993

Current Problems in Institutional Treatment and Their Solution

94

Apr-Jul 1993

33

34

45

Effective Countermeasures against Crimes Related to
Urbanization and Industrialization̶Urban Crime, Juvenile
Delinquency and Enviromental Crime95

Sep-Dec 1993

46

Promotion of International Cooperation in Criminal Justice
Administration

96

Jan-Mar 1994

Effective Treatment of Drug Offenders and Juvenile
Delinquents

97

Apr-Jul 1994

47

Economic Crime and Effective Countermeasures against It

98

Sep-Dec 1994

48

The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice: Public
Participation and the Prevention of Corruption

99

Jan-Mar 1995

The Institutional Treatment of Offenders: Relationships with
Other Criminal Justice Agencies and Current Problems in
Administration

100

Apr-Jul 1995

49

The Fair and Efficient Administration of Criminal Justice: The
Proper Exercise of Authority and Procedural Justice101

Sep-Dec 1995

50

Crime Prevention through Effective Firearms Regulation

102

Jan-Mar 1996

51

Improvement of the Treatment of Offenders through theStrengthening of Non-custodial Measures

103

Apr-Jul 1996

International Cooperation in Criminal Justice Administration

104

Sep-Nov 1996

The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice for thePrevention of Corruption by Public Officials

105

Jan-Feb 1997

The Quest for Effective Juvenile Justice Administration

106

Apr-Jul 1997

52
53

54

55

56

57

58

59

The Role and Function of Prosecution in Criminal Justice107

Sep-Nov 1997

The Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee ofExperts on UNAFEI Work Programmes and Directionsn/a

Oct 1997

Current Problems in the Combat of Organized Transnational
Crime

108

Jan-Feb 1998

Effective Treatment Measures for Prisoners to Faciliate Their
Reintegration into Society

109

Apr-Jul 1998

Effective Countermeasures against Economic and Computer
Crime

110

Aug-Nov 1998

The Role of Police, Prosecution and the Judiciary in the
Changing Society

111

Jan-Feb 1999

Participation of the Public and Victims for More Fair andEffective Criminal Justice112

Apr-Jul 1999

The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice for thePrevention of Corrupt Activities by Public Officials

113

Aug-Nov 1999

International Cooperation to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime̶with Special Emphasis on Mutual Legal Assistance andExtradition

114

Jan-Feb 2000

Current Issues in Correctional Treatement and Effective
Countermeasures

115

May-Jun 2000

Effective Methods to Combat Transnational Organized Crime
in Criminal Justice Processes

116

Aug-Nov 2000

Current Situation and Countermeasures against Money
Laundering

117

Jan-Feb 2001

Best Practices in the Institutional and Community-Based
Treatment of Juvenile Offenders

118

May-Jul 2001

Current Situation of and Countermeasures against
Transnational Organized Crime

119

Sep-Nov 2001

60

Effective Administration of the Police and the Prosecution in
Criminal Justice120

Jan-Feb 2002

61

Enhancement of Community-Based Alternatives toIncarceration at all Stages of the Criminal Justice Process

121

May-Jul 2002

62

The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice to Tackle
Trafficking Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants

122

Sep-Oct 2002

63

The Protection of Victims of Crime and the Active Participationof Victims in the Criminal Justice Process Specifically
Considering Restorative Justice Approaches

123

Jan-Feb 2003

64

The Effective Prevention and Enhancement of Treatment for
Drug Abusers in the Criminal Justice Process

124

Apr-Jun 2003

65

Effective Countermeasures against Illicit Drug Trafficking andMoney Laundering125

Sep-Oct 2003

Sixth International Training Course on Corruption Control in
Criminal Justice

6th UNCAC

66

Economic Crime in a Globalizing Society̶Its Impact on theSound Development of the State

126

Jan-Feb 2004

67

Implementing Effective Measures for the Treatment of
Offenders after Fifty Years of United Nations Standard Setting
in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice127

May-Jun 2004

Measures to Combat Economic Crime, Including Money
Laundering

128

Aug-Oct 2004

68

Crime Prevention in the 21st Century̶Effective Prevention of
Crime Associated with Urbanization Based upon Community
Involvement and Prevention of Youth Crime and Juvenile
Delinquency

129

Jan-Feb 2005

69

Integrated Strategies to Confront Domestic Violence and Child
Abuse

130

May-Jun 2005

7th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2005

Seventh Special Training Course on Corruption Control in
Criminal Justice

Nov 2003

70

The Use and Application of the United Nations Declaration of
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse ofPower̶Twenty Years after Its Adoption

131

Aug-Oct 2005

71

Strengthening the Legal Regime for Combating Terrorism

132

Jan-Feb 2006

Eighth International Training Course on Corruption Control in
Criminal Justice

8th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2005

72

Effective Prevention and Enhancement of Treatment for Sexual
Offenders133

May-Jun 2006

73

Challenges in the Investigation, Prosecution and Trial ofTransnational Organized Crime

134

Aug-Oct 2006

Ninth International Training Course on Corruption Control in
Criminal Justice

9th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2006

74

Promoting Public Safety and Controlling Recidivism Using
Effective Interventions with Offenders: An Examination of Best
Practices

135

Jan-Feb 200775

Effective Measures for the Treatment of Juvenile Offenders
and their Reintegration into Society

136

May-Jun 2007

76

Corporate Crime and the Criminal Liability of Corporate
Entities
Tenth International Training Course on the Criminal Justice
Response to Corruption

137

Sep-Oct 2007

10th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2007

77

Effective Legal and Practical Measures for Combating
Corruption: A Criminal Justice Response

138

Jan-Feb 2008

78

Profiles and Effective Treatment of Serious and Violent
Juvenile Offenders

139

May-Jun 2008

79

The Criminal Justice Response to Cybercrime140

Sep-Oct 2008

Eleventh International Training Course on the Criminal Justice
Response to Corruption

11th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2008

The Improvement of the Treatment of Offenders through the
Enhancement of Community-Based Alternatives toIncarceration

141

Jan-Feb 2009

Effective Countermeasures against Overcrowding ofCorrectional Facilities

142

May-Jun 2009

Twelfth International Training Course on the Criminal Justice
Response to Corruption

12th UNCAC

Jul-Aug 2009

Ethics and Codes of Conduct for Judges, Prosecutors and Law
Enforcement Officials

143

Sep-Nov 200981

The Enhancement of Appropriate Measures for Victims of
Crime at Each Stage of the Criminal Justice Process

144

Jan-Feb 201082

Effective Resettlement of Offenders by Strengthening
Community Reintegration Factors

145

May-Jun 2010

83

Attacking the Proceeds of Crime: Identification, Confiscation,
Recovery and Anti-Money Laundering Measures

146

Aug-Oct 2010

The 13th International Training Course on the Criminal Justice
Response to Corruption

13th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2010

80

84

Community Involvement in Offender Treatment

147

Jan-Feb 201185

Drug Offender Treatment: New Approaches to an Old Problem

148

May-Jun 2011

86

Securing Protection and Cooperation of Witnesses and Whistleblowers

149

Aug-Sep 2011

Effective Legal and Practical Measures against Corruption

14th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 201187

Trafficking in Persons̶Prevention, Prosecution, Victim
Protection and Promotion of International Cooperation

150

Jan-Feb 201288

Evidence-Based Treatment of Offenders

151

May-Jun 201289

Trafficking in Persons̶Prevention, Prosecution, Victim
Protection and Promotion of International Cooperation

152

Aug-Sep 2012

Effective Legal and Practical Measures against Corruption

15th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2012

90

Treatment of Female Offenders

153

Jan-Feb 2013

91

Stress Management of Correctional Personnel̶Enhancing the
Capacity of Mid-Level Staff

154

May-Jun 201392

Effective Collection and Utilization of Evidence in Criminal
Cases

155

Aug-Oct 2013

Effective Measures to Prevent and Combat Corruption and to
Encourage Cooperation between the Public and Private Sectors

16th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2013

Protection for Victims of Crime and Use of Restorative Justice
Programmes

156

Jan-Feb 2014

93

94
95

Assessment and Treatment of Special Needs Offenders

157

May-Jun 2014

Measures for Speedy and Efficient Criminal Trials

158

Aug-Sep 2014

17th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2014

Effective Measures to Prevent and Combat Corruption
Focusing on Identifying, Tracing, Freezing, Seizing,
Confiscating and Recovering Proceeds of Corrpution
96

Public Participation in Community Corrections

159

Jan-Feb 201597

The State of Cybercrime: Current Issues and Countermeasures

160

May-Jun 201598

Staff Training for Correctional Leadership

161

Aug-Sep 2015

Effective Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Public-Private andInternational Cooperation

18th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2015

99

Multi-Agency Cooperation in Community-Based Treatment of
Offenders

162

Jan-Feb 2016

100

Children as Victims and Witnesses

163

May-Jun 2016101

Effective Measures for Treatment, Rehabilitation and Social
Reintegration of Juvenile Offenders

164

Aug-Sep 2016

Effective Anti-Corruption Enforcement (Investiagation andProsecution) in the Area of Procurement

19th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2016

102

Juvenile Justice and the United Nations Standards and Norms

165

Jan-Feb 2017

103

Criminal Justice Procedures and Practices to Disrupt Criminal
Organizations

166

May-Jun 2017

104

Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration of Organized Crime
Members and Terrorists

167

Aug-Sep 2017

Effective Measures to Investigate the Proceeds of Corruption
Crimes20th UNCAC

Nov-Dec 2017

ISSN 0256-5471
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