The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 28 (2017)
Copyright © 2017 Toru Onozawa. All rights reserved. This work may be used, with thisnotice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed,
electronically or otherwise, in whole or in part, without permission from the author.

The United States and the British Withdrawal
from South Arabia, 1962–1967

Toru ONOZAWA*

The period from the late 1960s to early 1970s constituted the final phaseof the British Empire in the Middle East that dated back to the nineteenth
century. The sphere of British influence that had reached its zenith at the endof World War II shrank rapidly thereafter as pro-British leadership was
replaced by anti-imperialist and progressive nationalists in such states as
Egypt and Iraq. By the early 1960s its range had shrunk to a strip runningalong the northern and eastern fringes of the Arabian Peninsula. On the
Persian Gulf side, the British retained an exclusive position formalized in aseries of protective treaties with Bahrain, Qatar, and seven smaller
sheikhdoms of the Trucial States, which formed the United Arab Emirates
after 1971. The British were responsible for diplomatic and defense mattersof these sheikhdoms and effectively controlled internal security throughseconded or contracted British officers. The British presence in the Persian
Gulf was closely linked with that of Aden and South Arabia, which came toconstitute South Yemen from 1967 to 1990. The military base in Aden, thelocale of the integrated British Middle East Command since 1958,
guaranteed the British ability to dispatch forces swiftly to the Gulf. The
importance of the Aden base was so great that it was counted as one of thethree main British bases along with those in Singapore and the British Isles.
Located close to the southern end of the Red Sea, Aden also served as one of
the world’s busiest bunkering ports into the early 1960s. The British position
in South Arabia, however, deteriorated rapidly in the 1960s and collapsed*Professor, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University

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miserably in 1967. Soon thereafter, the British government, pressed byextreme exigencies of the home economy, decided on a complete military
withdrawal East of Suez, including the Persian Gulf, by the end of 1971.
These final phases leading up to the demise of the British Empire in the
Middle East have been studied principally from the British side. Thistendency of existing studies is understandable considering that the scheduleof withdrawal was almost unilaterally set by the British, and the direct
involvement of the United States in these developments turned out to beminimal. However, US policy on British withdrawal and the perspective
behind it, including the reason for the absence of its direct involvement, isworth considering because the British presence had a significant meaning inoverall US strategy.
In this article I consider the British withdrawal from South Arabia and the
US policy toward it. Only a few works have dealt with US policy toward
South Arabia, and, somewhat surprisingly, the development of British policyin the final two years has been scarcely studied using declassified British andAmerican documents. Moreover, existing studies tend to attribute US
behavior largely to the economic and financial predicaments in which theUnited States along with the United Kingdom was placed in the 1960s.1 In
contrast, I reveal in this article that US policy and behavior toward SouthArabia can be understood within the context of the existing regional policy
framework as well as the Anglo-American mutual understanding datingfrom the late 1950s, and the economic/financial problems that came to thesurface in this period only reinforced these existing policy frameworks.
In retrospect, the South Arabian episode proved to be just the first act of
the final phase of British withdrawal from the Middle East. But putting thefirst act in a larger context will provide a better perspective from which tocomprehend the whole drama, including the next act in which the British
finally retreated from the Persian Gulf. In other words, this article provides apoint of view from which continuity and consistency of US policy toward
the Middle East can better be comprehended, even though it deals
specifically with a rather anticlimactic act in the whole drama.
I. THE SETTING
In the 1960s, policymakers of the United States and the United Kingdom
shared an understanding that the British should play the role of protector ofWestern interests in the Persian Gulf.2 The United States would support the
British diplomatically and, if need be, militarily, but it was the British who

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should take the primary responsibility for maintaining the stability of theGulf. This mutual understanding dated back to the Iraqi revolution of 1958.
Thus, to put this tacit Anglo-American agreement in perspective, we need togo back first to the development of US regional policy for the Middle Eastleading up to the Iraqi revolution.
In the early to mid-1950s, the US government consistently endeavored toestablish an alliance between the West and the Middle East as a whole thatwas characterized as a partnership based on a community of interests. Suchan ambitious and persistent endeavor, which could be called an allianceproject, faced formidable obstacles posed by nationalists of opposing
political strands. Emerging progressive nationalists, who came to bepersonified in the Egyptian president Gamal Abd al-Nasser, took neutralistor sometimes pro-Soviet stances, which by definition precluded close
alliance with the West. In contrast, pro-Western nationalists at the helm ofsuch countries as Turkey and Iraq, which constituted the Baghdad Pact in
1955, were willing to align closely with the West; but at the same time they
pursued confrontational foreign policies against progressive-neutralist
nationalist regimes, partnership with whom the United States deemed
equally essential to accomplish the alliance project. The administration of
Dwight D. Eisenhower tried tirelessly to overcome the growing
intraregional political polarization, which proved antithetical to the allianceproject to create a pro-Western Middle East as a whole by whatever means
available such as persuasion, inducements, political and economic pressures,and covert operations. Even the Suez Crisis and the war that ensued did not
daunt the will of US officials to carry through the project. They madeanother try in early 1957 by proclaiming the Eisenhower Doctrine, which,they optimistically envisaged, could resuscitate the alliance project bysubmerging the stigmatized Baghdad Pact and providing a new frameworkthat a pro-Western silent majority, which they believed to exist even in the
countries controlled by neutralist regimes, would find more palatable.
Such a silent majority, however, proved illusory. By summer 1957, US
policymakers found that the upsurge of Nasserite nationalism had created apolitical climate in the region in which alignment with the West was deemed
contradictory to the legitimacy of nationalism. This realization was fatal forthe alliance project, because US policymakers had recognized nationalism
as the predominant force in the Middle East for the foreseeable future anddeemed winning over the hearts of nationalists indispensable forestablishing an enduring alliance with the countries in the region.
Abandoning the existing regional policy was one thing, but envisaging a

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new one proved quite another. During an interregnum in regional policy thatlasted for a year, US officials could neither define policy goals nor means toachieve them. As a result, US policy fluctuated wildly between conciliationand confrontation with nationalists in such countries as Syria and Lebanon.
Then came the Iraqi revolution. Right after the revolution, US
policymakers were struck by the highly disquieting thought that monolithic
Nasserite nationalism was sweeping away the residue of Western influencein the Arab world. In a few months, however, they found sufficient reasons
to reconsider their extremely pessimistic outlook. Pro-Western dominos did
not fall, partly because of the successful British and American interventions
in Jordan and Lebanon respectively. More important, the fallacy of theassumption of a single monolithic Arab nationalism became clear when
infighting took place within the revolutionary Iraqi government between thefaction of Nasserite pan-Arabists and that of Iraqi nationalists who rejected
Nasser’s tutelage and pursued Iraq’s independent national interests. The
latter emerged triumphant by fall 1958, and the serious schism among theArab nationalists became an established fact.
A new framework of US regional policy gradually took shape thereafter.
Instead of setting a grandiose objective of creating a pro-Western Middle
East, policymakers now determined to concentrate on pursuing the two
fundamental interests of the United States and the West; that is, preventing
the Soviet Union from attaining dominant influence in the region andmaintaining an uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. In order topursue these objectives, the United States would unilaterally maneuver andmanipulate each Middle Eastern country so as to create a regional
configuration of power conducive to Western interests. Endless balancing
acts replaced the alliance project. In other words, the United States
employed an offshore-balancing strategy as a new regional policy for the
Middle East.
The US offshore-balancing strategy for the Middle East had two
conspicuous characteristics. First, all the Middle Eastern states, bothneutralist/anti-Western and pro-Western, were considered equally objects to
be manipulated. There was an increasing tendency for US policymakers toevaluate each Middle Eastern state against the criteria of utility values. The
United States would extend support to particular states when they were
expected to further Western interests but withdraw it whenever they were
not. As a result, the American relationship with each Middle Eastern state
could not but be temporary in nature. Second, the United States tried to
avoid direct involvement in political and military affairs in the Middle East

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as far as possible. Except for Turkey, a NATO member, the United States did
not extend a formal commitment to defend any state in the region. Though
the United States sent military advisory missions to the recipients of militaryaid, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, its only combat force in the region was asmall naval unit stationed at Bahrain named the Middle East Force(MIDEASTFOR), which consisted only of a command vessel and two or
three destroyers. The United States also tried to steer clear of intraregional
disputes and conflicts by rejecting siding with any party and maintaining acorrect attitude toward everyone. This added flexibility and space formaneuvering. On balance, the United States distanced itself from the region
rather than intensified its involvement in it. Precisely as Christopher Layne
formulates in the concept of the offshore-balancing strategy, the UnitedStates was trying burden shifting rather than burden sharing.3
Someone, however, had to shoulder the burden that the United States
shied away from. It was the British who willingly accepted the role ofprotector and guarantor of stability in the Persian Gulf. In contrast with its
alienation from the Middle Eastern countries, the United States drew closer
to the United Kingdom. A closer Anglo-American relationship could befound in their contingency planning for intervention in the Persian Gulf,
which began to develop confidentially in the wake of the Iraqi revolution.
Though there are some indications that US officials contemplated thepossibility of military intervention in case of an interruption of the flow of
oil from Saudi Arabia, it was the British who took the primary responsibility
for maintaining stability in the Gulf, especially in the military field.4
The efficacy of this Anglo-American understanding was tested in summer
1961 when Iraq claimed the territory of Kuwait, which had just become
fully independent, and moved its military force to its border with Kuwait.
The British swiftly landed forces in Kuwait to deter the Iraqis. The
administration of John F. Kennedy, while showing its readiness to send asmall fleet to back up the British operation, benignly acquiesced in every
move the British found necessary and shifted to the British virtually all theburdens from the military operations and the debate at the UN Security
Council to the multiple diplomatic negotiations that would lead to an
arrangement by which British forces in Kuwait were replaced by Arab
League forces. At the same time, however, US officials held a much broader
view than their British counterparts, who were busy dealing with day-to-day
problems on the spot. The State Department, for example, envisioned asolution to the Kuwait crisis involving “a balance of Arab forces in the area,
Kuwaiti, Iraqi, UAR [the United Arab Republic, effectively meaning Egypt]

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and Saudi, that [would] work to assure Kuwait’s independence, along withthe propinquity of British forces.” Thus, the department welcomed theinjection of elements of the Arab League, in which Egyptian influence waspredominant, reasoning that “the UAR is less of a direct threat to US-UK
interests in Kuwait than is Iraq, largely because the UAR is not in a position
to take Kuwait into the UAR or to control Kuwait both by reason ofgeography and by reason of Iraqi and Saudi opposition.”5
The Kuwait crisis shows that the United States and the United Kingdom
shared interests in the Persian Gulf, but there was a division of labor: theformer, while eschewing direct involvement, engaged in maneuvering theconfiguration of power in the region conducive to Western interests, while
the latter willingly played the role of proxy to protect these interests on the
ground. This division of labor was also applied to South Arabia, where the
British retained formal rule into the 1960s.
II.

EROSION OF THE BRITISH POSITION

The British rule of South Arabia had a multilayered structure. The city ofAden and its immediate vicinity had been a Crown colony since 1937, while
its spacious hinterland constituted the Aden Protectorate. The protectorate
was administratively divided between east and west, but in reality itremained a bundle of tribal polities—sultanates and sheikhdoms—with
whose rulers the British had concluded a series of protective agreements.
The primary function of the protectorate was to provide a buffer to protect
Aden from outside influence inimical to British rule. Accordingly, British
officials in the field tried to expand and intensify British influence in theprotectorate in the 1950s in order to forestall the expansion of the influenceof Yemen, where Nasserite Arab nationalism was growing in influence. In
addition, in 1959, the British began to organize pro-British rulers in thewestern protectorate into a loose federation in expectation of stiffening thebuffer.6
The British position in Aden, however, rapidly became precarious in theearly 1960s. The internal political situation grew unstable as the increasingly
influential Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC) intensified its demand forthe expansion of the franchise to temporary workers in Aden in theLegislative Council of Aden, which enjoyed certain autonomy from the
British governor (later high commissioner). A substantial number of
temporary workers were Yemenis, receptive to the ideas of Arabnationalism. Moreover, the revolution that broke out in Yemen in September

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1962 further invigorated Arab nationalists in South Arabia.7 The ensuing
civil war in Yemen between the revolutionary force that declared theestablishment of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the royalists now in
opposition became a major focal point of intraregional politics when two
regional powers intervened on behalf of opposing parties. Egypt, responding
to the call for help from the YAR, dispatched a large number of troops aswell as civil administrators and soon established a firm presence in Yemen.
Saudi Arabia, perceiving a serious threat to the security of its own regime,
began to arm royalist tribes in Yemen.
Precisely when the Yemeni civil war broke out, the British scheme toensure political stability in Aden by annexing it to its hinterland, which
proved more amenable to British rule, was in the final phase of preparation.
In January 1963, the colony was transformed into the State of Aden andincorporated into the federation of rulers of the western protectorate, now
renamed the Federation of South Arabia (SAF).8 The British tactics,
however, backfired. Many Adenis were displeased with the new politicalarrangement of the federation in which the city of Aden was relegated to adefinite minority position vis-à-vis the hinterland, whose backwardness theytended to despise. Moreover, as the Yemeni civil war dragged on, its effects
permeated into South Arabia. Anti-British nationalist elements in SouthArabia, under the strong influence of the YAR and Egypt, formed the
National Liberation Front (NLF) and began to attack British positions andpro-British elements both in Aden and the hinterland. In December 1963,
following a failed attempt to assassinate the British high commissioner in
Aden, a state of emergency was declared. However, anti-British activities,
including terror attacks by various nationalist forces, never ceased.9
Meanwhile, there developed differences between the British and US
policies toward southwest Arabia. The Kennedy administration, convincedthat an early conclusion of the Yemeni civil war would prevent possible
disorder in the area, recognized the YAR. At the same time, theadministration tried to persuade Nasser to refrain from intervention in
Yemen while extending large amounts of economic aid to Egypt as
inducement. The British, in contrast, concerned that recognition of the YAR
might seriously damage British credibility and enfeeble the morale of proBritish elements in South Arabia, refrained from offering recognition.10
Under the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson, US relations with Egypt
soured because of Nasser’s failure to fulfill his promise to terminate
Egyptian involvement in Yemen. But the Anglo-American difference
persisted. By spring 1964, the British, identifying Nasser clearly as “a major

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enemy” of Western interests in South Arabia, urged US officials to “frame ajoint Anglo-American policy to cope with him,” probably in cooperation
with Saudi Arabia.11 Moreover, the British began to interfere, though largely
indirectly, in Yemen by providing support to Yemeni royalists in expectationthat the prolongation of the civil war would at least hinder Nasser’s
supposed designs in South Arabia. In contrast, the Americans, still
convinced that an early conclusion of the Yemeni civil war throughcessation of outside interference would best enhance the possibility ofregional stability, criticized the British for interfering in Yemen even in
indirect forms. In order to maintain room to maneuver in intraregional
politics, US policymakers adamantly resisted taking sides with parties inregional conflicts. Thus, they rejected the British invitation to form acommon front against Egypt, arguing, “If we start actions which will annoy
and antagonize Nasser, we have not helped our situation but have hindered itby closing a channel of communication to him and losing what little
influence we have in Cairo.”12 Concurrently, US officials continued theirefforts to convince Nasser that “reasonably orderly change in South Arabia,
rather than uncontrollable chaos which would ensue in [the] wake of sudden
British withdrawal” would serve mutual interests of the US and Egypt.13 But
Nasser turned a deaf ear to American advice.
Too much emphasis on the Anglo-American disagreement, however,
obscures the more fundamental consensus, as well as the consistency in US
regional policy. Fundamentally, policymakers of both countries recognized
Aden as “the key” to the maintenance of the British presence in the Persian
Gulf and shared an outlook that “anarchy” would result if “the British
political and military influence were removed” there.14 Regarding Yemen
specifically, British officials behind the scenes acknowledged the advantagesof an early recognition of the YAR as well as the risks accruing fromnonrecognition, but the YAR government’s unilateral decision to sever
diplomatic relations left them few alternatives. Their American counterparts
recognized this as well as the British need to retain credibility among theirfriends in South Arabia.15 Moreover, British officials, while harboring deepseated distrust of Nasser, looked to American-supported UN initiatives tobring about an Egyptian-Saudi mutual disengagement from Yemen.16 In themeantime, the US administration carefully avoided anything that might
adversely affect the British position in South Arabia. For example, in spring
1964, the British carried out an air attack against Harib, Yemen, as a reprisal
for Yemeni republicans’ repeated infiltration, including air strikes, on SAF
territory. The United States, though reluctant to offend Afro-Asian countries,

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whose voice was rapidly growing in the international arena, abstained on the
UN Security Council resolution condemning the British.17
The US policy of supporting the British in South Arabia while avoiding
direct involvement in regional conflicts was clearly derived from theframework of the offshore-balancing strategy. By the middle of the decade,moreover, the offshore-balancing strategy in the Middle East came to bealigned more closely with US global strategy than before. The British
overseas commitments became all the more important for the United States,
which was pouring more and more resources into Southeast Asia, precisely
when the British began to find it difficult to sustain their overseas
commitments indefinitely. Concurrently, the currency system based on fixedexchange rates, the lynchpin of the postwar Bretton Woods regime, wasincreasingly in jeopardy. Because of Britain’s ongoing foreign-exchange
deficit and gold drain, the pound sterling had suffered repeatedly from
speculation. Now that the value and credibility of the US dollar was also
being battered, sterling effectively became the front line in defense of thedollar. The British Labour government of Harold Wilson, while rejecting
devaluation, was reviewing defense expenditures, including ones accruing
from overseas commitments. The US administration successfully organized
an international framework for an aid package to bail out the British from aseries of financial/currency crises in 1964 and 1965, aiming at two
intertwined objectives of defending sterling and preserving British overseas
commitments, including those in the Middle East.18
The aid package met the first objective but not completely the second, as
the Wilson government decided in the Defence White Paper of February
1966 not only that the British force would be evacuated from the Aden base
but also that the British would not conclude any defense arrangement with aSouth Arabian state after independence, presumably in 1968. The Johnson
administration, though “with regret,” acquiesced to the British decision for
two reasons.19
First, such an outcome was not unexpected. Earlier, in June and July
1964, the British, Adeni, and SAF representatives convened in London to
discuss the constitutional development of Aden and South Arabia, andagreed in principle that a unitary state of South Arabia would be given
independence not later than 1968. It was also agreed at this stage that the
British would conclude with an independent South Arabian state “a Defence
Agreement under which Britain would retain her military base in Aden.”20
However, the next round of the constitutional conference scheduled forMarch 1965 was aborted because of increasing pressure from radical Arab

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nationalists as well as the internal bickering among conservative SAF
leadership.21 Soon thereafter, a moderate Adeni government was replaced by
one led by Abd al-Qawi al-Makkawi, who demanded a lifting of the state of
emergency and implementation of UN resolutions calling for the immediate
British withdrawal from Aden. Progressive and radical nationalists were
gaining ground at the expense of the moderate and conservative elements.22
Finally, in September, the British suspended the constitution of the State of
Aden and reintroduced direct rule. Though the British had made thisdecision out of desperation in order to prevent the Adeni government’s
further drift toward an extreme anti-British position and a possible collapseof the pro-British SAF government rather than with a reasonable prospect
for an orderly development toward independence, US officials acquiesced in
the British decision on the grounds that the end of terror was a prerequisite
to “an orderly evolution to independence” of South Arabia, and “precipitate
British withdrawal from Aden area would result in [a] chaotic situation
harmful to Western interests.”23 By this time, however, US officials had
considered a pro-British independent South Arabia as almost a lost cause.24
Second, and more important, the US administration was less concerned
about the future of Aden and South Arabia per se than the overall British
readiness to shoulder responsibility for maintaining stability in the generalarea East of Suez. The British government took a position in the Defence
White Paper of 1966 to retain its overall posture East of Suez as well as in
NATO while curtailing some forces deployed overseas and cancelling
procurement of some of the latest military equipment. Specifically, British
officials made it clear that they were planning to redeploy part of the forcesfrom Aden to its bases in such places as Bahrain and Sharjah in the Persian
Gulf and that their commitment to the Gulf sheikhdoms as well as to Kuwait
would be retained, though in somewhat reduced form. US officials weremore appreciative of the British intention to maintain its overall posture thanthey were disappointed with specific decisions on Aden.25
Interestingly, the United States could have salvaged some Western
influence in South Arabia had it responded positively to unofficial pleas
from conservative leaders in Aden and the SAF to conclude some defense
arrangement and/or to extend US aid after independence. US officials,
however, consistently refused to establish such a relationship with any newstate and only urged friendly South Arabians to look to the British as
before.26 In mid-1966, the US administration reaffirmed the existing policy
toward South Arabia, agreeing “that it is in the US interest that the Westretain a significant influence in South Arabia; also that dominant Communist

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influence in the area be prevented, and that major regional disputes (such asa Saudi-UAR confrontation) over the area be avoided,” but “any attempt topre-empt the area for the West and to ensure its political and economic
stability would require a major commitment of resources, the justification
for which has not been established.”27 The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed
these conclusions, pointing out that Aden was no longer essential militarily
even though its continued availability might be valuable.28 Consequently, theUS administration kept its distance from developments in South Arabia andlooked to the British to establish a sustainable, and as pro-Western as
possible, government before their withdrawal.29
III.

DRIFT AND COLLAPSEThe British, however, could no longer manage the course of events inSouth Arabia, and their policy oscillated between continued reliance on the
SAF and a trial opening to the nationalists. Throughout 1966, British policy
focused on strengthening the SAF government, which consisted of proBritish elements from Aden and the hinterland. The British government tried
to bolster the SAF by expanding military aid, justifying it on the grounds
that “the humiliation of a disorderly withdrawal would weaken confidence in
us in the Persian Gulf: and our failure to bring South Arabia to independence
in an orderly manner would damage our prestige throughout the world.”30 As
the situation in South Arabia, especially in Aden, further deteriorated into
1967, the British objective came to be defined narrowly as maintaining the
SAF government “at least up to the time of our final withdrawal” in order toeliminate “the risk of becoming involved in internal security operations after
independence.”31 Thus, in March, the Wilson government decided toadvance the date of South Arabian independence from 1968 to November
1967 because the prospect of maintaining order was dimming, and tried toobtain the consent of the SAF government by offering to keep British naval
forces in the vicinity for six months after independence to provide air
defense against external threats. The adamant rejection by the SAF,
however, forced them to reschedule independence again to January 1968.32
US officials quietly accepted a series of British decisions, recognizing thegrowing British concern over the viability of the SAF.33
Thereafter, British policy shifted to backing the formation of a broadlybased government. Their effort was now focused on the Front for the
Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), headed by an ATUC leader
Abdullah al-Asnaj and supported by Egypt. It was thought that the FLOSY,94

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while following a strongly nationalist line of demanding expulsion ofWestern influence, was likely to take a relatively moderate approach incomparison with its more radical rival, the NLF, which had taken a strongly
anti-Egyptian position and parted completely with the FLOSY. The
infighting between these nationalist forces, along with their assault on
British personnel and the SAF government, had intensified.34 US diplomats
in close coordination with their British counterparts tried confidentially topersuade the FLOSY leadership to negotiate.35 To their chagrin, however, theFLOSY rejected any negotiation either with the British or the United
Nations, which had dispatched a special mission to help establish a SouthArabian government that would include nationalist elements, unless it wasrecognized in advance as the sole representative of South Arabia.36 The
FLOSY publicly announced its position on April 23, which made UKFLOSY talks almost impossible, and by default brought the NLF, which had
been banned as a subversive organization, for the first time into the picture
as part of a possible solution to the increasingly chaotic South Arabiansituation.37
By the early summer, the situation in Aden had so deteriorated that terror
and street fighting became daily events. The devastating defeat of the Arabstates in the Arab-Israeli War in June (the Six-Day War) greatly aroused
nationalist feeling against the West along with Israel. This made British
military activities in and out of the Aden base, as well as normal business inAden, almost impossible. In these circumstances, the British government inearly July tilted again toward the SAF and decided to expand military aid,
which now included heavy equipment such as bomber aircraft.38 US
officials, while depicting the British policy as “a gamble,” acquiesced to it inrecognition that the possibility of co-opting nationalists had all but beendashed.39
Shortly thereafter, the British government tried a last-ditch effort to forma broadly-based government by expanding the supposedly strengthened SAF
government. Under the strong influence of the last high commissioner in
Aden, Humphrey Trevelyan, a seasoned diplomat who had witnessed thecollapse of British presence in Egypt in 1956 as ambassador on the spot, theSupreme Council of the SAF chose in early July a new prime minister
designate, Husayn ‘Ali Bayyumi, who was expected to be acceptable toconservative hinterland rulers, the armed forces (South Arabian Army:
SAA), and the NLF, but not the FLOSY. The British were beginning to findpartners for a broadly based government in the NLF, which had acquired aclear upper hand not only in the hinterland but also in Aden vis-à-vis theTHE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH ARABIA, 1962–1967

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FLOSY after the short-lived but disquieting nationalist uprising in the socalled Crater district of the city, triggered by a mutiny of elements of the
SAA and the police.40 However, the new government never took off.
Leading figures declined to cooperate with the thinly veiled machinations of
the British, and the FLOSY took a highly hostile stance. Though Bayyumi
managed to present a list of government members, internal strife among the
SAF leadership prevented the Supreme Council from approving it.41 Thisepisode marked the end not only of the British hope to form a broadly-based
government but also of the SAF as a political entity. By late August, theSAF government, except for the SAA, ceased its functions and effectively
disintegrated much more rapidly than Anglo-American officialdom had
expected. Concurrently, in the hinterland, the sultans’ rule crumbled, and the
NLF seized power in many tiny principalities.42
Now the SAA leadership demanded that the British negotiate directly withboth the NLF and the FLOSY. US officials, still determined not to assume arole “beyond that of interested observer,” became concerned that the British
might be driven to the impossible position of becoming a mediator of
warring nationalist factions.43 British officials, however, revised policy much
more radically than their American counterparts had supposed. On
September 5, Trevelyan issued a statement declaring that the SAF
government had “ceased to function and no longer exercises control in thefederation” and calling on “the nationalist forces” to commence discussions
for forming a new government.44 His aide confided to a US diplomat thatbehind his statement was a calculation that “orderly British withdrawal andformation [of a] viable South Arabian government can best be achieved withcooperation of groups which control terrorism.”45
Policymakers in London soon found in the virtual disintegration of the
SAF government an opportunity to extricate themselves from obligations
they had somewhat reluctantly assumed. They also considered that
formidable obstacles to negotiation with nationalist elements had been
removed now that they were no longer bound by moral responsibility
toward pro-Western regimes in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran,which had insisted that a viable pro-Western regime be left behind after the
British departure. They could also calculate that the external threat to SouthArabia was reduced, given that Nasser was rapidly withdrawing Egyptian
troops from Yemen after his devastating defeat in the Six-Day War. As aresult, in late October, the Wilson government annulled its commitment ofsix-months’ air defense along with heavy equipment that had been includedin the military aid program to an independent South Arabian state.46

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By now the British thought it most likely that the successor to their rulewould be the NLF, which was about to establish a preponderant position
among nationalist factions. The British found the NLF, the most left-wingfaction in South Arabia, acceptable simply because it could best help orderly
withdrawal of the British troops. At the same time, they officially retained aneutral position toward all nationalist factions, because the FLOSY, though
weakened after losing substantial support from Egypt, remained influential
enough to disrupt a British-NLF deal. Thus, the British waited nervously for
two months to see the outcome of inconclusive NLF-FLOSY talks in Cairo
that were sponsored by the Arab League. Finally, the declaration issued by
the SAA leadership on November 6 stating that they recognized “the NLF as
the only organization legally representing the people of South Arabia” andappealing to the NLF to enter into discussions with the British provided along-awaited way out.47 On November 14, Foreign Secretary George Brown
declared in the House of Commons the decision to initiate negotiations with
the NLF, and the British-NLF talks in Geneva on transferring sovereignty
started at last on the 21st. The agreement was signed on the morning of the
29th, the day the last British soldier departed from Aden. On the next day,the establishment of the People’s Republic of South Yemen (PRSY) was
proclaimed by the government led by the NLF leader Qahtan al-Sha’abi.48
Meanwhile, US officials were silently watching the British departure. The
only exception was their diplomatic presentation to King Faysal of Saudi
Arabia, who bitterly criticized the British policy in South Arabia, alleging
that the British had colluded with the NLF at the expense of the SAF. US
officials defended in general terms the British policy of negotiation with the
NLF, arguing that “reality and not UK preferences must govern [the] lastphase of disengagement.”49
Behind their equanimity was a sober observation and calculation
regarding the intraregional balance of power. As early as May, when theyshared with the British the objective of forming a broadly-based
government, they considered that “our most important concern is not withrespect to South Arabia itself but the implications of the transition forneighboring regimes friendly to us, notably Saudi Arabia, Iran, andEthiopia.” Observing that a nationalist regime that might possibly emerge inSouth Arabia would “reflect the strong impulses of independence” thatwould resist any outside interference, they concluded that US interests
would still be served “if the transition is relatively peaceful and takes placewith a minimum of outside intervention” and that “to whom among internal
elements the transfer is made” was a lesser concern.50 In early November,THE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH ARABIA, 1962–1967

97

they chillily observed that what was taking place in southwest Arabia inessence was “both the Egyptians and the British are withdrawing militarily.”Though “what the independent regime might look like is still an enigma,”they predicted that “Arabism may be less a concern than the immediateproblem of the creation of a unified nation.”51 They found a South Arabia led
by an anti-Western regime acceptable so long as it remained free from thedominant influence of the Soviet Union or Communist China, and the US
diplomatic post in Aden, the only one in the southwest Arabia area andserving also as a listening post, could remain. What the United States should
and could do was to extend diplomatic recognition as soon as deemed
appropriate in order to offset its inability to offer economic and military
assistance, which Communist countries were expected to be willing to do.52
In contrast, US officials responded very nervously to the slightest signs of
the possibility of British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Rumors andspeculation about an early British retreat from the Gulf were alreadyspreading not only in London but also in the Middle East, partly because of
the Wilson government’s earlier decision to withdraw from Southeast Asia
by the mid-1970s. Many rulers of the Trucial States expressed strong
concern about such possibilities, and King Faysal’s criticism of the British
policy in South Arabia was at least partly derived from the same concern.
US officials repeatedly confirmed to their British counterparts their“continuing belief that their [British] role in [the] Gulf remains crucial for
maintenance [of] stability in [the] foreseeable future” and cheered theBritish “experienced note of caution against too facile comparison between
situations in South Arabia and [the] Gulf States.”53 The State Department
became highly offended when it learned that the British ambassador to
Saudi Arabia in reassuring King Faysal had told him that the British would
stay in the Gulf “at least until 1970.”54 The department instantly directed theembassy in London to “make low-key attempt [to] determine” British
intentions. This did not become a diplomatic issue as the embassy soon
reported back that the Foreign Office “assure[s] us [the] British intend [to]remain in [the] Gulf as long as need be: i.e. until adequate local security
arrangements are made,” even though the Ministry of Defence envisionedthat they would be out of the Gulf by the mid-1970s when they would
withdraw also from Singapore and Malaysia.55 Even in November, theBritish reiterated publicly as well as confidentially to US officials andleaders of Persian Gulf states that their commitment to the security of the
Gulf would be unaffected by the departure from Aden. Accordingly, US
officials could retain their assumption that “so long as the British remain, we

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would expect general political stability in the Gulf.”56
CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the Aden/South Arabian episode, the offshore-balancing
strategy demarcated the outer limit of the behavior of the United States. The
United States, while carefully avoiding its own involvement and calculating
the intraregional balance of power, acquiesced in British policies in SouthArabia. The Anglo-American relationship over South Arabia went basicallywell because both sides respected the division of labor that resulted from themutual understanding of the late 1950s. And it was on the understandingthat the British would continue to take the primary responsibility for
maintaining the stability of the Persian Gulf that the US government
accepted the British decision to leave Aden. Though US officials hoped tosee an independent South Arabia politically oriented toward the West, they
did not consider this objective so important as to justify allotting American
resources either economically or politically.
Certainly, the increasingly precarious economic and financial conditionsof the mid-1960s as well as the opinions of the US Congress and public thatwere becoming rapidly critical of expansive foreign policies set limits on theforeign policy options available to US policymakers. However, these factors
did not specifically determine the options to be employed. The USsponsored package in support of the pound sterling in the middle of thedecade shows that the US administration was prepared to share the burden in
the form of bolstering the United Kingdom itself rather than taking over its
overseas commitments. Moreover, the basic character and contour of US
policy toward South Arabia proved unchanged since the early 1960s when
the Western economic problems had not seemed so serious and the UnitedStates had not yet dispatched substantial combat forces to Vietnam. Whileeconomic factors limited US options, it was the offshore-balancing strategy
that determined the specific course the United States actually took in SouthArabia. Somewhat surprisingly, the renewed British economic crisis of
1967, which proved much deeper than that of previous years and finally led
to the devaluation of the pound sterling on November 18, had little impact
on US policy toward South Arabia. Even in the critical weeks of November
and after the independence of PRSY, US officials continued to express hopeto their British counterparts that the British should “sustain an effective level[of] assistance to new state . . . in order [to] obviate full PRSY dependence
on Communists for essential needs,” while refusing to share any of theTHE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH ARABIA, 1962–196799

burden themselves.57
As it turned out, however, the days when US policymakers could count on
the British to play a proxy role in the Middle East were numbered. In early
January 1968, they were galvanized by the British decision to withdraw
entirely from East of Suez by 1971. Secretary of State Dean Rusk andPresident Johnson expressed “dismay” at “British withdrawal from world
affairs.” At a meeting with Foreign Secretary Brown on January 11, Rusk
went so far as to depict the British decision as “a catastrophic loss to humansociety” and advised him very succinctly, “Be Britain.” However, the British
determination to make a complete withdrawal proved firm. Moreover, they
were adamant on announcing explicitly the planned date of departure,reasoning that such a course would reduce “the risk of an Aden typesituation.”58
It should be noted, however, that this did not mark the end of the US
offshore-balancing strategy but rather the beginning of the same strategy
that depended on Middle Eastern regional powers, instead of Britain, as
proxies. A clue to such a new offshore-balancing strategy had alreadyemerged in the harsh exchanges at the Rusk-Brown meeting. When Rusk
told Brown that “the resulting gap would be contrary to free world interests”
and that the “US could not pick up these responsibilities,” Brown rebuttedsaying that “there was no reason why it should be filled by HMG” andadvised that regional powers along with the United States should “gettogether to discuss how to fill that gap.”59 Soon thereafter, Anglo-American
policymakers came to share a general outlook that the key to the security ofthe post-Britannic Gulf should rest on regional powers, especially Iran andto a lesser extent Saudi Arabia. The American principle of burden shifting in
the Middle East, nevertheless, proved so unwavering that the United States
continued to place the primary responsibility for constructing a new politicalorder in the Persian Gulf on the United Kingdom until the very last momentof the British presence there in 1971. Seen in this context, the consistent
American noninvolvement in the developments in South Arabia, which lay
between the Kuwait crisis of 1961 and the British decision to withdraw fromthe Gulf, provides the missing link to understanding the continuity of the US
offshore-balancing strategy throughout the 1960s.
NOTES
Spencer Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1955–67: Last Outpost of a
Middle East Empire (London: Routledge, 2005) is the only work that extensively uses
declassified British documents to elucidate the development of the British policy toward
1

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South Arabia, but it pays little attention to American behavior. Karl Pieragostini, Britain,
Aden and South Arabia: Abandoning Empire (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1991), chaps.
2–8, analyzes the development of British policies in detail but deals only with the period up
to early 1966. An article by Yusuke Shibazaki, “Sekaiteki Eikyouryoku Iji no Kokoromi:
Suezu-itou karano Tettai to Igirisu no Chutou Seisaku” (The search for worldwide influences:
Withdrawal from the East of Suez and British policy for the Middle East), in Teikoku no
Nagai Kage (Long shadows of empire), ed. Yoichi Kibata and Harumi Goto (Kyoto: Minerva
Shobou, 2010), 71–92, provides a concise overview of the development of British policy
toward South Arabia. Although it does not use the primary British declassified documents
used in more recent works, Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East:
Britain’s Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap. 3, written by a former diplomat, remains a highly
valuable account. Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), chap. 4, is a detailed account focused on domestic dynamics. W.
Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 153–65, provides a short description of US policy toward
South Arabia based on analysis of primary sources.
2
The argument in this section is based on Toru Onozawa, Maboroshi no Doumei: Reisenshoki Amerika no Chutou Seisaku (Illusory alliance: American regional policy for the Middle
East in the early Cold War), 2 vols. (Nagoya: University of Nagoya Press, 2016). This article
deals with the period immediately following those dealt with in the book and is partiallyintended to show the validity of its conclusion on US offshore-balancing strategy for the
Middle East.
3
Christopher Layne, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 2(Spring, 2002): 233–48.
4
Memorandum by Arabian Department of Foreign Office (hereafter FO), “United
Kingdom/United States Military Planning in the Middle East (especially Kuwait),” June 6,
1961, in FO371/156694/B1198/3, The National Archives, Kew, England (hereafter TNA).
See also Onozawa, Maboroshi no doumei, 954–63, 1158–62.
5Phillips Talbot to Dean Rusk, “Consultation with the UK on the Kuwait Situation,” July7, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1961–1963, microfiche
supplement to vols. 17, 18, 20, and 21, document no. 196. On details of the Kuwait crisis, see
Onozawa, Maboroshi no doumei, 1162–84.
6
Spencer Mawby, “Britain’s Last Imperial Frontier: The Aden Protectorates, 1952–59,”
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 29, no. 2 (2001): 75–100.
7
Aden to Colonial Office (hereafter CO), no. 789, October 6, 1962; CO to Aden, no. 756,
October 8, 1962, both in PREM11/3684, TNA. (Hereafter, “TNA” is omitted in citations of“PREM” and “CAB” documents held at TNA.)
8
Memorandum for Prime Minister, “Constitutional Development in Aden (C.(61)68 and70),” May 29, 1961, and Memorandum for Prime Minister, “Constitutional Development in
Aden (C.P.C.(62)8),” February 15, 1962, both in PREM11/3684. The remaining parts of theprotectorate, mostly in the eastern half, were reorganized into the Protectorate of SouthArabia.
9
Pieragostini, Abandoning Empire, chaps. 3 and 4.
10
CC(62)66, CAB128/36/66, November 6, 1962; Simon C. Smith, “Revolution andReaction: South Arabia in the Aftermath of the Yemeni Revolution,” Journal of Imperial andCommonwealth History 28, no. 3 (2000): 193–208. As for the Kennedy administration’s
policy toward Egypt, see Douglas Little, “New Frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser, and ArabNationalism,” Journal of American History, 75, no. 2 (September 1988): 501–27; Fawaz A.
Gerges, “The Kennedy Administration and the Egyptian-Saudi Conflict in Yemen: Co-Opting

THE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH ARABIA, 1962–1967

101

Arab Nationalism,” Middle East Journal 49, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 292–311.
11
Memorandum of Conversation (hereafter Memcon), April 27, 1964, FRUS, 1964–69, 21:
130–35.
12
Butler to Douglas-Home, PS/64/30, March 20, 1964, in PREM11/4678; Memcon, April
27, 1964, FRUS, 1964–69, 21: 130–35.
13
Department of State (hereafter DOS) to Cairo, no. 2064, May 5, 1964, FRUS, 1964–69,
21: 136–38.
14
London to DOS, A-2919, May 31, 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, 18: 559–61; Memcon,
January 30, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1969, 21: 118–25.
15
C (63)3, CAB129/112/3, January 10, 1963; CC (63)11, CAB128/37/11, February 14,
1963; London to DOS, no. 1721, October 30, 1962, in “UK General 10/15/62–11/12/62”
folder, National Security File, John F. Kennedy Library.
16
CC (63)16, CAB128/37/16, March 14, 1963; C.C. (64)8, CAB128/39/8, November 12,
1964.
17
DOS to USUN, no. 2581, April 1, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1969, 21: 621–22; Memorandum
for the Record, April 16, 1964, FRUS, 1964–1969, 21: 626; CM (64)21, CAB128/38/35, April
9, 1964; CM (64)23, CAB128/38/37, April 16, 1964. The British government decided on theretaliatory attack rather hesitantly in order to address the strong grievance expressed by the
SAF government. It informed Secretary of State Dean Rusk of its plan in advance. Rusk
stopped short of endorsing but did not oppose it. FO to Washington, no. 4372, March 26,
1964; Washington to FO, no. 1188, March 28, 1964; Washington to FO, no. 1211, April 1,
1964, all in PREM11/4679.
18
Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary
Relations, 1958–1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 125–33;
Jeremy Fielding, “Coping with Decline: US Policy toward the British Defense Reviews of
1966,” Diplomatic History 23, no. 4 (Fall 1999): 633–56.
19
C(66)33, CAB129/124/33, February 11, 1966; C(66)34, CAB129/124/34, February 11,
1966; CC(66)8, CAB128/41/8, February 14, 1966; Memcon, January 22, 1966, FRUS, 1964–
1968, 12: 514–15.
20
London to DOS, no. 48, July 5, 1964, in DOS Central Files, in POL 19 ADEN, RG59,
NARA (hereafter cited only “POL 19 ADEN”); London to DOS, no. 161, July 10, 1964, in
POL 19 ADEN; Airgram from London, A-9, July 18, 1964, in POL 19 ADEN.
21
Aden to DOS, no. 109, February 24, 1965, in POL 19 ADEN; Airgram from Aden, A-124,
February 27, 1965, in POL 19 ADEN. Interestingly, American diplomats observed that the
SAF leadership’s support for the British was weakening as they became concerned about the
British Labour government’s tilt toward the voice of Aden and the ATUC.
22
Airgrams from Aden, A-152, April 5, 1965, and A-180, May 17, 1965, both in POL 19
ADEN. See also Pieragostini, Abandoning Empire, 95–100.
23
Aden to CO, no. 998, September 16, 1965; Memorandum for Prime Minister, “Aden,”
September 23, 1965, both in PREM13/113; Circular Telegram from DOS, no. 509,
September 28, 1965, FRUS, 1964–1969, 21: 148–49; Circular Telegram from DOS, no. 625,
October 14, 1965, in POL 19 ADEN. Subsequently, the United States voted against
resolutions submitted to the UN General Assembly as well as at lower committees deploring
the British behavior in South Arabia and demanding immediate British withdrawal from
Aden. Circular Airgram from DOS, CA-4185, October 15, 1965, FRUS, 1964–1969, 21:
149–53.
24
Memorandum, “British Position in Aden and Persian Gulf,” September 2, 1965, FRUS,
1964–1968, 21: 146–48; Memorandum by CIA, November 5, 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21:
156–61.
25
Memcon, January 27, 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 12: 516–28; Memcon, February 4, 1966,

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FRUS, 1964–1969, 21: 162–65; Fielding, “Coping with Decline,” 650–51.
26
Aden to DOS, no. 147, May 18, 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 170–71; DOS to Aden,
no. 22442, August 5, 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 173–74. In February 1967, King Faysal of
Saudi Arabia also expressed concern about post-Britannic South Arabia and urged “action tocreate stability by the US.” But the administration did not move. Stewart Udall to Dean Rusk,
February 15, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.
27
IRG/NEA 66–35, October 14, 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 181–83.
28
Paper Prepared by JCS, August 9, 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 175–77; JCS to
McNamara, May 18, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 203–6.
29
Memcon, October 19, 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 183–85; London to DOS, no. 5986,
January 27, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 191–93; DOS to Aden, no. 155272, March 15,
1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 197; Aden to DOS, no. 1168, March 14, 1967, in POL 19
ADEN.
30
CC (66)26, CAB128/41/26, May 26, 1966.
31
CC (67)13, CAB128/42/13, March 16, 1967.
32
CC (67)13, CAB128/42/13, March 16, 1967; Circular Telegram from DOS, no. 160010,
March 22, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; C(67)78, May 9, 1967, CAB129/129/28.
33
William Handley to Under Secretary, “Your Appointment with Sir Michael Stewart,
British Charge,” undated; Memcon, “Revised British Withdrawal Plans for South Arabia,”
March 16, 1967; Aden to DOS, no. 1438, May 17, 1967, all in POL 19 ADEN.
34
Cairo to DOS, no. 4327, February 2, 1967; London to DOS, no. 7101, March 3, 1967,
both in POL 19 ADEN. While the FLOSY’s political base existed in Aden, the NLF, thoughoriginating in the hinterland, was also expanding its influence in Aden, especially amonglabor movements. Nasser tried in vain to unify these two groups in December 1965, andthereafter stood behind the FLOSY because he found it more amenable than the NLF. Aden
to DOS, no. 1267, April 5, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.
35
DOS to Taiz, no. 151922, March 9, no. 153487, March 11, and no. 153578, March 13, in
POL 19 ADEN; DOS to London, no. 178848, April 20, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 201–2.
36
Taiz to DOS, no. 1376, April 20, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; C(67)78, CAB129/129/28, May9, 1967. In early April, the UN mission arrived but soon left Aden, having failed to establish
contact with the FLOSY. This failure effectively doomed the possibility that the UN mission
could bring about a broadly based government, which both US and UK officials had looked
forward to. Memcon, “UN Mission to Aden,” April 29, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.
37
Aden to DOS, no. 1342, April 23, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; London to DOS, no. 8915,
April 28, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.
38
Aden to DOS, no. 1584, June 14, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; London to DOS, no. 10453,
June 16, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; Aden to DOS, no. 1607, June 20, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN;
FO and CO to Certain British Missions, Guidance no. 171, July 4, PREM13/1297.
39
Lucius Battle to Acting Secretary, “Independence Arrangements for South Arabia,” June
19, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.
40
Aden to FO, no. 855, June 27, 1967, in PREM13/1297; Memorandum for Prime Minister,“Aden,” June 28, 1967, in PREM13/1297; CC(67)50, CAB128/42/50, July 20, 1967; London
to DOS, no. 10761, June 28, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; Aden to DOS, no. 29, July 6, andno. 36, July 8, in POL 19 ADEN. See also Mawby, British Policy, 164–69.
41
Aden to DOS, no. 55, July 13; no. 73, July 19; and no. 93, July 26, 1967, in POL 19
ADEN.
42
Aden to FO, no. 1233, August 21, 1967, in PREM13/1297; Aden to DOS, no. 226 andno. 227, August 28; no. 234, August 31, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; CC(67)54, CAB128/42/54,
September 7, 1967.
43
Aden to DOS, no. 234, August 31, 1967, POL 19 ADEN; DOS to London, no. 31801,THE UNITED STATES AND THE BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH ARABIA, 1962–1967

103

September 2, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.
44
FO and CO to Certain British Missions, Guidance no. 227, September 5, 1967, in
PREM13/1297.
45
Aden to DOS, no. 254, September 4, no. 259 and no. 261, September 5, 1967; London toDOS, no. 1636, September 4, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.
46
Memorandum for Prime Minister, “South Arabia,” October 26, 1967, in PREM13/1297;
C(67)169, CAB129/133/29, October 26, 1967; CC(67)62, CAB128/42/62, October 30, 1967;
FO to Aden, no. 1969, October 31, 1967, in PREM13/1297.
47
Aden to FO, no. 1689–1691, November 6, 1967, in PREM13/1297; US Mission to NATOto DOS, no. 355, November 10, 1967, POL 19 ADEN.
48
Aden to DOS, no. 567 and no. 568, November 11, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN; Foreign
Secretary to Prime Minister, PM/67/104, November 13, 1967, in PREM13/1297; CC(67)68,
CAB128/42/68, November 23, 1967; CC(67)69, CAB128/42/69, November 30, 1967.
49
Jidda to DOS, no. 910, September 5; no. 976, September 10 and no. 1060, September 14,
1967, in POL 19 ADEN; DOS to Jidda, no. 38541, September 16, and no. 43065, September
25, in POL 19 ADEN.
50
Memorandum Prepared by DOS, “Future of South Arabia,” undated, FRUS, 1964–1968,
21: 211–15.
51
Memorandum Prepared by DOS, “South Arabian Prospects,” November 8, 1967, FRUS,
1964–1968, 21: 237–41.
52
Rusk to Johnson, December 4, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 249–50. As for the
possibility of expansion of Soviet and/or Chinese influence, see Research Memorandum, “A
New Look at South Arabia,” July 25, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.
53
Dhahran to DOS, no. 212, September 24, 1967; London to DOS, no. 2384, September 27,
1967; DOS to London, no. 47358, October 2, 1967; DOS to London, no. 55444, October 17,
1967, all in POL 19 ADEN.
54
Jidda to DOS, no. 1647, October 28, and no. 1674, October 31, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.
55
DOS to London, no. 61726, October 30, 1967; London to DOS, no. 3509, November 1,
and no. 3752, November 9, 1967, all in POL 19 ADEN.
56
NIE30–1–67, “The Persian Gulf States,” May 18, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 206–8;
Battle to Rusk, November 20, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 244–45; London to DOS,
no. 4365, November 29, 1967, in POL 19 ADEN.
57
Memcon, November 1, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 232–33; DOS to London,
no. 86853, December 19, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, 21: 255–56; Gavin, Gold, Dollars, andPower, 166–71.
58
All the quotations in this paragraph are from Memcon, January 11, 1968, FRUS, 1964–
1968, 12: 603–8; Johnson to Wilson, January 11, 1968, FRUS, 1964–1968, 12: 608–9. As forthe background of the attitude of US officials, see Battle to Rusk, January 9, 1968, FRUS,
1964–1968, 21: 256–58.
59
Memcon, January 11, 1968, FRUS, 1964–1968, 12: 603–8.