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Address by the Executive Secretaryof the Preparatory Commission for theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Mr. Tibor T6th
2010 NPT Review Conference
New York, 6 May 2010

I would like to express my appreciation for the opportunity to address this Review Conference andto provide an update on the progress that has been achieved by the Preparatory Commission for theComprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). I would like to thank alldelegations that have expressed their support for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) in their statements during the past few days. This is yet again a powerful andoverwhelming verdict on the part of the international community in favour of a legally binding: andeffective verifiable global nuclear test ban.
While rejoicing in the wide support for the Treaty, even though it has not entered into force almost
14 years after being negotiated in Geneva, I am deeply saddened by the passing away of a one of
the Treaty's principal negotiators and dear friend on the very day this Review Conference started.
Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, the U.S. chief negotiator was deeply devoted to the establishment of
the Treaty and to arms control and non-proliferation in general, even in the final months of his life.
In a recent interview with the Organization's publication Spectrum, which is available todelegations at this Conference, he retlected on the importance of the Treaty for nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation. It is tragically serendipitous that he said "Quite frankly, I don't
think that we're going to get to zero nuclear weapons in the world in my lifetime but I think thatpeople should continue working towards that goal. I think the CTBT should stand on its own andthat should be done as soon as possible." I therefore wish to pay tribute to Steve and dedicate thisstatement in his memory.
The CTBT has endured some politically difficult times. Yet, despite the many direct challenges to
its authority, support for the Treaty has grown continuously. The Treaty now enjoys near universal
support, with 182 signatories and 151 ratifying states. But. the ratification of nine Annex 2 countries
is still needed for the Treaty to enter into force. In this regard I wish to again warmly welcome thestatement made by Foreign Minister Marty Natalagewa that Indonesia will soon ratify the Treaty.
This announcement is of crucial importance in moving the Treaty closer to entry into force, andunderscores the leadership role of Indonesia in regional and global non-proliferation anddisarmament efforts.
While the ratification by all the remaining Annex 2 states remain the legal requirement for theTreaty to enter into force, the signature and ratification of all States that have not yet done so willprovide important momentum towards this goal as an expression of global confidence in the wider
non-proliferation and disarmament regime. In this regard, the results of last September's
Conference to promote the entry into force of the Treaty were particularly gratifying. More than 110
countries, 40 of which at Ministerial level attended the Conference, held simultaneously with thehistoric Security Council Summit. Co-chaired by the Foreign Ministers from France and Morocco,
the Conference was an unequivocal expression of the international community'S continued faith in
the Treaty, and the Commission. In a strongly worded consensus Final Declaration, holdout States
were called on to sign and ratify for the Treaty it to enter into force. This event was atransformational experience reflecting the transformed environment. which we now enjoy.
The Commission has come within sight of the fulfillment of our mandate. Through dedication,commitment and very hard work, we are approaching the point of readiness for the entry into forceof the Treaty. I am pleased to report that the CTBT verification regime is nearing completion. 80(lrof the system's 321 global monitoring stations already send data to the headquarters in Vienna.
Several more IMS stations have been built and are in the process of being certified and many moreare under construction.
But the Treaty will only enter into force if States, in particular the remaining Annex 2 States, see it
as being fundamental to their national interest. Essentially, they must ask themselves: is it better tokeep the door open for testing in the future, or should a cap be placed on the development of nuclear
weapons by possessors and non-possessors alike in the implementation of a universal ban') I am
convinced that the Treaty has a key role to play in toduys security environment. A strong andverifiable final barrier to a nuclear weapons capability is of vital importance for a comprehensive
approach to address our common security challenges.
The CTBT is one of the strongest catalysts for nuclear disarmament. It provides a firm legal barrier
against nuclear testing, thereby curbing the development of new types and new designs of nuclear
weapons by possessors. Moreover, the Treaty is a strong confidence and security building measure.
A CTBT in place will be an essential element for a process in which deeper arms reductions arebeing discussed and pursued by nuclear weapons States. It will be equally essential when moving
towards multilateral disarmament in a process involving all the nuclear-armed states. The Treaty
could also serve as an essential regional confidence and security building measure in the Middle
East and in Asia. In this regard, I believe that if all countries in the Middle East would to ratify, it
would be a key step in creating the right conditions for a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone.
CTBT ratification carries no political cost while the positi ve spillover effects can increase mutual
trust and significantly enhance stability throughout this region.
The Test Ban Treaty is an equally important instrument for nuclear non-proliferation. Testing isnecessary for the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons by establishednuclear weapon possessors. The.. -T-reaty is also essential for establishing technical and scientificconfidence in any developing programme on the part of would-be possessors. Making the de-facto
international norm against nuclear testing legally binding through the entry into force of the Treaty,
will close this door once and for all. While the IAEA safeguards system remains the critical legal
requirement to verify a state's peaceful nuclear activities, this "upstream" confidence building
mechanism has come under significant pressure in recent years. With the resurgence of nuclear
energy in a number of states capable of mastering the nuclear fuel cycle technology, thedifferentiation between technologies for peaceful and military purposes will be more and more apolitical and legal issue rather than technological one. Given the nature of nuclear testing, ratifying

2the CTBT provides the final "downstream' proof of the intentions of a state. It is the last barrier on
the road to nuclear weapons capacity.
Moreover. once the Treaty's unprecedented verification regime is fully operationalizcd, issues ofnon-compliance will be addressed in a pre-determined and pre-agreed manner. In light of increased
concerns over non-cornpl iance in other quarters of the nuclear non-pro] iferation regime. thecompliance mechanisms built into the treaty are of extreme importance in strengthening the overall
objectives of the NPT.
The NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime is challenged on many fronts.
This Review Conference therefore represents one of the most important thresholds in the Treaty's
history. Its parties are faced with two relatively simple choices: Confront the issues at stake, eventhe ones that are the most difficult to resolve. with a view to seek a sensible and practical outcome
aimed at strengthening the overall non-proliferation and disarmament regime. This was the recipe
for success in 1995 and :WOO. Or NPT parties could widen their differences. and seek opportunities
to break consensus. This will lead to either a failed outcome. or an outcome so weak that it would
do very liule to strengthen the overall nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. including
prospects for entry into force of the CTBT.
I am convinced that the CTBT represents one of the key clements on which effective international
consensus can be built at this Review Conference. Its entry into force and full implementation isachievable and within reach. Progress towards this goal bridges the divide between NPT parties oneach of three pillars. It signals commitment to disarmament, it strengthens non-proliferation, itfaci I itutes peaceful uses.
The CTBT is of course not the answer to all non-proliferation and disarmament concerns. But it isan integral part of the comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It is ameasure where progress can be achieved in a relatively short time. The Treaty already exists, it has
near universal membership. its verification regime is close to completion, and it has been tried andtested by two nuclear test explosions conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of North
Korea.
As such the Treaty's entry into force may pave the way to solving many of the current and futurechallenges facing the NPT.

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