NUMBER 106

DECEMBER 2018

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIESFEATURED ARTICLESTHE INTERNATIONAL NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK ON DRUG CONTROL AND ITS EVOLVING CONTEXT
Mr. Celso Eduardo F. Coracini（UNODC）
COMBATING ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING BY UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS
Mr. Wasawat Chawalitthamrong（Thailand）

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALREPORT OF THE FOLLOW-UP SEMINAR FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF THE THIRD COUNTRY TRAINING
PROGRAMME（TCTP）FOCUSING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY-BASED TREATMENT OF
OFFENDERS IN THE CLMV COUNTRIES（UPDATED）
BY UNAFEI

THE UNITED NATIONS ASIA AND FAR EAST INSTITUTE FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERSRESOURCE MATERIALSERIES NO. 106

UNAFEI
Akishima, Tokyo, Japan

December 2018

Takeshi Seto
Director
United Nations
Asia and Far East Institutefor the Prevention of Crime andthe Treatment of Oﬀenders(UNAFEI)
2-1-18 Mokuseinomori, Akishima-shi, Tokyo, Japan
unafei@i.moj.go.jp

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE ㌀
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v

WORK PRODUCT OF THE 169TH
INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE“CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRACTICES AGAINST ILLICIT DRUG
TRAFFICKING”
Visiting Expertsʼ Lectures

The International Normative Framework on Drug Control and Its Evolving Context
by Mr. Celso Eduardo F. Coracini (UNODC) ㌀
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㌀3



Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking by Undercover Operations
by Mr. Wasawat Chawalitthamrong (Thailand) ㌀
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㌀7

Participantsʼ Papers
Transnational Illicit Drug Trafficking in Brazil: Addressing Good Practices for
Confiscation of Proceeds and International Cooperation
by Mr. Rodrigo Leite Prado (Brazil) ㌀
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㌀22



The Role of International Judicial Cooperation in the Egyptian Authoritiesʼ
Investigations of Illicit Drug Trafficking
by Mr. Mohamed Habib (Egypt) ㌀
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㌀29



Illicit Drug Trafficking in Côte DʼIvoire
by Ms. Yasmine Keita (Ivory Coast)㌀
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㌀37



Drug Laws in Malaysia: Whether the Drug Laws Have Been Effective in Curbing the
Drug Menace in Malaysia
by Mr. Chandra Segaran Subramaniam (Malaysia) ㌀
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㌀44



The Criminal Justice System against Illicit Drug Trafficking in Pakistan
by Mr. Ashgar Ali Yousafzai (Pakistan) ㌀
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㌀53



Smuggling of Illicit Drugs Aided by Customs Players
by Ms. Marie Catherine R. Nolasco (Philippines) ㌀
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㌀59



The Effectiveness of the Recent Amendment of the Narcotics Act and the Supreme
Court Decision about the Number of Offences in Narcotics Cases
by Mr. Nitchan Hadsarang (Thailand) ㌀
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㌀63

Reports of the Course

Effective Investigative and Prosecutorial Measures to Detect, Prosecute and Punish
Leaders of Crime Organizations and High Value Targets
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㌀68



Confiscation of Drugs and Proceeds Derived from Drug Offences: A Way Forward
for Effective Enforcement
by Group 2 ㌀
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㌀80

iii



Multi-Agency and International Cooperation
by Group 3 ㌀
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㌀89

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL ㌀
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㌀97


Report of the Follow-Up Seminar for the Second Phase of the Third Country Training
Programme (TCTP) Focusing on the Development of Community-Based Treatment of
Offenders in the CLMV Countries (Updated)
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㌀99

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㌀ 107
Presentations of the 169th International Training Course


The Global Situation of Illicit Drug Cultivation, Production and Trafficking
by Mr. Celso Eduardo F. Coracini (UNODC) ㌀
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㌀ 109



The Main Requirements of the International Drug Control System: Focus on Drug
Trafficking
by Mr. Celso Eduardo F. Coracini (UNODC) ㌀
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㌀ 130



Undercover Operation and Case Studyby Mr. Wasawat Chawalitthamrong (Thailand) ㌀
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㌀ 156

Group Photo

169th International Training Course ㌀
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㌀ 183

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES INDEX㌀
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㌀ 184
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iv

INTRODUCTORY NOTE
It is with pride that the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and theTreatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) offers to the international community the Resource Material Series No.
106. This volume contains the work product of the 169th International Training Course, conducted from 9
May to 14 June 2018. The main theme of the 169th International Training Course was Criminal Justice
Practices against Illicit Drug Trafficking.
One of the most serious global problems currently faced by criminal justice authorities is illicit drugtrafficking, which involves the cultivation, production, manufacture, distribution, sale, delivery and possessionof drugs and other illicit substances. Illicit drug trafficking not only facilitates drug abuse, which itself is aserious problem, but also generates substantial profits for organized criminal groups. These illicit profits fundsuch groupsʼ activities and stimulate their growth, and much of these profits infiltrate the legitimate businesssphere and impair the integrity and stability of legitimate economic and financial systems as a whole. Even
more troubling is the growing link between illicit drug trafficking and the financing of international terrorism.
UNAFEI, as one of the institutes of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Programme Network, held this Course to explore various issues that relate to combating organized crime.
This issue of the Resource Material Series contains papers contributed by the visiting experts, selectedindividual-presentation papers from among the participants, and the Reports of the Course. I regret that not
all the papers submitted by the participants of the Course could be published.
I would like to pay tribute to the contributions of the government of Japan, particularly the Ministry ofJustice, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, and the Asia Crime Prevention Foundation forproviding indispensable and unwavering support to UNAFEIʼs international training programmes. Finally, I
would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to all who so unselfishly assisted in the publication of this series.
December 2018

Takeshi SETO
Director of UNAFEIv

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES
No. 106

Work Product of the 169th International Training Course“Criminal Justice Practices against Illicit Drug Trafficking”

UNAFEIVISITING EXPERTSʼ LECTURES
THE INTERNATIONAL NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKON DRUG CONTROL AND ITS EVOLVING CONTEXT
Celso Eduardo F. Coracini＊

I. CURRRENT GLOBAL SITUATION OF DRUG TRAFFICKING
The international community has agreed on normative instruments to regulate the licit production andtrade of certain drugs in the early XXth century,1 which have been replaced by, and currently consist of, threetreaties on drug control.2 At that time, the main concern was to regulate the production of, and trade in,opium, which had been at the centre of the Opium Wars and had devastating health consequences, especiallyin China at the end of the XIXth century. Gradually, control over an increasing number of psychoactive
substances meant that authorized use would be restricted to medical and scientific purposes. That normative
development is the basis for the identification of production and trade that is illicit and for a discussion on thearray of measures intended to address drug trafficking.
The continued monitoring of the cultivation and production of traditional drugs, such as opium and heroin,
as well as coca and cocaine, are instrumental to understanding the evolution of global drug markets andprediction of drug use fluctuations.3 In addition to monitoring the supply of, and the demand for, controlled
drugs, the need for monitoring the spread of new psychoactive substances4 has been fundamental, for its
impact on health, on the dynamics of drugs markets, and as the basis for informed debates and decisions on
the scheduling of new substances under the international drug control system.
The 2018 World Drug Report,5 as in previous years, contains detailed data on various aspects of drug
control, including trafficking routes, which are based on an assessment of drug-seizure data, as provided by
Member States and validated by UNODC. The last three years have notably observed a considerable
increase both in the production of opium and heroin (especially from Afghanistan), as well as of coca andcocaine (especially from Colombia), which are likely to result in substantial pressures for the increase of thedemand of those drugs, including based on retail price reductions and on a geographical diversification andexpansion of drug markets. Cannabis has continued to be the most widely illicitly cultivated and consumed
drug, with strains and products of very high levels of THC.6 Whereas legislative changes in Canada and
Uruguay, as well as in some states of the United States, may contribute to changes in the perceived harm of
its use, the consequences of such normalization of non-medical use in those jurisdictions will have to continue
to be monitored, in particular in relation to their impact on health systems, security and international
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer, Division for Treaty Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC). The views expressed in this paper, summarizing lectures delivered at UNAFEI, do not necessarily represent theviews of the organization.
1
See UNODC, A century of international drug control, 2008, available from: https: //www. unodc. org/documents/data-andanalysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf.
2
The three drug control conventions are the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol(United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 976, No. 14152), hereinafter the “1961 Convention”, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic
Substances (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.1019, No. 14956), hereinafter the “1971 Convention”, and the 1988 United Nations
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1582, No.
27627), hereinafter the “1988 Convention”.
3
Contribution of the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to the special session of the General
Assembly on the world drug problem to be held in 2016, UNODC/ED/2016/1, 26 February 2016, p. 16.
4
See UNODC, New psychoactive substances: overview of trends, challenges and legal approaches, 2016, E/CN.7/2016/CRP.2*,
available from: http: //www. unodc. org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_59/ECN72016_CRP2_V1601405_
reissued. pdf) ; and UNODC, The challenge of new psychoactive substances, 2013, available from: https: //www. unodc.
org/documents/scientific/NPS_2013_SMART.pdf.
5
Available from: www.unodc.org/wdr2018.
6
Cannabis and cannabis products are currently undergoing review by the World Health Organization.
＊

3

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106

cooperation.
The non-medical use of prescription drugs has gained considerable magnitude, and pharmaceutic opioids
have been misused in different regions. North America currently faces an unparalleled opioid crisis, mainly
originated due to overprescription of fentanyl, which has led to historic increases in overdose deaths. In
parallel, the emergence of new psychoactive substances has stabilized, but continues to pose significant publichealth threats and to be a challenge for law enforcement action around the world.

II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON DRUG CONTROLThe three international drug control conventions are recognized by the international community as thecornerstone of its drug control system. Typically, in international legal matters, countries will normallyconduct negotiations and seek agreement on issues that have a transnational impact, and most will be
reluctant to engage themselves in respect of issues that are constrained within their borders.
For that reason, the 1961 and the 1971 Conventions, while expressing concern for the health and welfare
of mankind, are mostly focused on regulating drug production and trade for medical and scientific purposes.
The importance of health measures, including prevention of drug abuse, education and treatment of drug use
disorders, was recognized in the 1971 Convention, notably its article 20, and a similar provision was
introduced in article 38 of the 1961 Convention through its 1972 Protocol. Both provisions include the need forParties to duly train personnel for those purposes.
The 1988 Convention, which was developed against the background of the increasing power of drug
cartels in the 1980s, contains an articulated provision aimed at harmonizing the description of drug-related
criminal offences (with the highlight of the first definition of money-laundering offences in an international
treaty), and it mostly focuses on facilitating and rendering more effective judicial and law enforcement
international cooperation in relation to drug trafficking (which often requires transnational investigations andcooperation). Both the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime7 and the 2003
United Nations Convention against Corruption8 offer tools for Member States to address drug trafficking
from the perspective of measures targeting sophisticated forms of criminality, driven by profit and facilitatedby corruption and money-laundering strategies. Among such tools are the anti-money-laundering framework,
special investigative techniques, and their use as a basis for extradition, mutual legal assistance and joint
investigations.
The scope of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances under control is determined by a schedulingprocess, which is based on the scientific review of new or already controlled substances by the World HealthOrganization. Similarly, the scope of controlled substances, under the 1988 Convention, frequently used in theillicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances is based on the scientific review by theInternational Narcotics Control Board. In both cases, the concerned entities formulate recommendations on
adequate and proper schedules or tables for decisions to be taken by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.9
The drug control treaties established and mandated the International Narcotics Control Board as themonitoring body responsible for supervising their implementation and administering a system of estimates ofdrug requirements and statistical returns (with differences for psychotropic substances), aimed at advancing
the aims of the treaties: to “limit the cultivation, production, manufacture and use of drugs to an adequate
amount required for medical and scientific purposes, to ensure their availability for such purposes and toprevent illicit cultivation, production, and manufacture of, and illicit trafficking in and use of, drugs” (article 9,paragraph 4, 1961 Convention).
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs was established in 1946 by the Economic and Social Council of theUnited Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225, No. 39574.
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2349, No. 42146.
9
For more details on the procedures to schedule drugs and precursors under the international drug control conventions, see
UNODC, Note by the Secretariat on Challenges and future work of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the World HealthOrganization in the review of substances for possible scheduling recommendations, E/CN. 7/2014/10, available from: https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_57/_E-CN7-2014-10/E-CN7-2014-10_V1388967_E.pdf.
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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTSʼ LECTURES

United Nations, preceding the drug control conventions. In addition to its treaty functions related to deciding
on the scheduling of controlled substances, it is the central policy-making body of the United Nations on drug
matters. The Commission monitors global trends and proposes new concerted measures or agreed policies.
Besides resolutions and decisions adopted during its annual sessions, the Commission has been instrumental
for the adoption of high-level political declarations and plans of action.10
Those documents, adopted by the Commission, the Council or the General Assembly, are fundamental forthe development of national policies and strategies, as well as laws, despite their non-binding nature, and thisis all the more so when they are adopted by consensus and acted upon by Member States. In such policy
debates, the international community coined the term “common and shared responsibility” to describe theprinciple that binds the drug policies of different countries together, including the need for each State to
adopt measures at the national level that contribute, for example, to the reduction of illicit drug demand, andto overcome the artificial differentiation of responsibility among countries that are predominantly seen as
producing or as consumer markets.11
The latest instrument reflecting the array of measures and language of consensus of the international
community, including on matters that are not addressed in detail in the drug control treaties, is the outcome
document adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its special session on the world drug problem,
held in 2016.12 As the reading of all operational recommendations arising from that document reveals, thedrug control framework is not isolated from other normative instruments. It includes and encompasses
applicable international human rights norms, as well as standards and norms in crime prevention andcriminal justice.
In addition to supporting the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control
Board as their secretariat, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is mandated to provide technicalassistance to States, upon their request, in the implementation of international drug control norms, and inassisting them in efforts to reduce the world drug problem.

III. CONCLUSIONSIn sum, countering drug trafficking should not be an isolated action, but integrated as part of acomprehensive policy of promoting and protecting public health. This objective is therefore narrowed down
not only by the concern with selecting approaches that prove to have systemic positive effects, including on
reducing the influence and profits of organized criminal groups, but also by the concern with protecting andrespecting human rights.
Such efforts depend on political willingness as well as technical capacity to adequately cooperate intransnational investigations and prosecutions, and the exchange of operational information and, as much as
possible, direct contact among authorities of cooperating countries is fundamental for effectiveness. Data
collection also needs to be improved and expanded for the development of sound policies.
The international community faces considerable challenges, which include the need to reduce knowledge
disparities across the globe, which may lead to national laws and policies that are not adapted to their context.
When it comes to non-controlled substances manufactured to mimic the effects of controlled drugs, States arestill to find a proactive modality of response, which takes account both of the already insufficient forensic
services in many countries, and of the potential variety of chemical variants for many drugs.
Finally, there are barriers to the availability of controlled drugs for medical and scientific services that
More information is available from: http: //www. unodc. org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/Political_Declarations/PoliticalDeclarations_Index.html.
11
See the 1998 Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards and Integrated and Balanced
Strategy to Counter the World Problem (available from: http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/
CND_52/Political-Declaration2009_V0984963_E.pdf) and chapter I of the 2012 Annual Report of the International Narcotics
Control Board (available from: https://www.incb.org/documents/Publications/AnnualReports/AR2012/AR_2012_E_Chapter_I.pdf).
12
A/RES/S-30/1, available from: https://undocs.org/A/RES/S-30/1.
10

5

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106

need to be overcome, as well as barriers to the necessary delivery of social and health services to persons
with drug use disorders or who illicitly use drugs. The work of Governments to address drug trafficking is
not isolated from those services, which should be brought closer to those who need them. Cooperation andcoordination among authorities in charge of providing health and social services is important, as well as
addressing justice and law enforcement.

6

COMBATING ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING BY UNDERCOVER
OPERATIONS
Wasawat Chawalitthamrong＊

I. INTRODUCTION
Drug crime is a major problem facing every society in the world at present. They are different from thepast by having secretly specialized and complicated systems. New technology techniques are used as tools,
and drug crime is committed in systematic ways and in networks which involve organized crime andtransnational crime, causing severe damage and effects on society, economics, politics and national security.
Investigation cannot lead to offenders so efficient special investigation is needed to be used for wiretapping,intercepts, undercover operations, and controlled delivery. Special investigation plays a very important rolein suppressing and convicting offenders.
To understand how to handle organized crime and drug dealers, the comprehension of laws, investigation
systems and techniques of drug crime investigation are necessary. Moreover, creating networks for
information exchange and joint investigation will be the permanent solution and drug crime prevention.

II. CHAPTER ONE
A. Investigation Principles and Techniques of Drug Crime Investigation
Drug crime is different from other crimes since it is committed by a group of people engaged in organizedcrime and by secretly specialized and complicated systems. Normal investigation cannot lead to a drug lord.
The drug lord always avoids prosecution and conviction due to the lack of evidence such as drugs and moneyfrom drug dealings, except for money from money laundering. Collecting evidence and judicial proceedings
with offenders need effective investigative techniques that are different form general crime suppression. To
operate systematically and efficiently, undercover operations are the best solution for drug crime and for
obtaining justice.
Because undercover operations involve investigation techniques, we need to understand clearly about
investigation principles, the scope of universal drug trafficking proceedings and laws, for example, the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000. State parties must cooperate in order tosuppress transitional crime. Also, state parties can impose bold measures to give authority to law
enforcement authorities in order to collect related evidence, such as by wiretapping, controlled delivery, sting
operations and special laws relating to narcotics control and suppression in each state.
When considering drug crimes committed by a group of people, there are sharing the work, demanding
money in return, and breaking laws. Those are considered as crimes that are the meaning of organized crime
according to the convention so special investigation is applied for drug-related crime suppression. State
parties need to develop progressive laws suited to anti-crime and crime-suppression strategies. However,special investigation must be considered thoroughly to not affect human rights including residence, body,communication and freedom. Drug crime is different from other crimes. Normal investigation cannot provedrug lordsʼ guilt. Typically, only the drug dealers are arrested so to collect evidence and to proceed against
the drug lords requires investigation techniques. In case of conspiracy, authorities must collect evidence
proving that the offenders conspired. Only having evidence such as drugs and money is insufficient to lead todrug lords or prove that they have conspired. The Measures for Suppressing Narcotic Offenders Act B.E.
2534 (1991) provides that two or more persons conspiring to commit an offense relating to narcotics shall be
guilty of conspiracy, and if the offense is subsequently committed, shall all be equally liable for the penalty＊

Head of Sector, Department of Special Investigation, Ministry of Justice, Thailand.

7

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106

imposed for such offenses.
To collect evidence and proceed with offenders under drug trafficking, authorities need special
investigative techniques such as wiretapping and intercept to prove offendersʼ guilt. To collect evidence andproceed extensively, there are guidelines for special investigation and rules for operating legitimately.
Therefore, undercover agents are very important witnesses in narcotics cases, especially offenses about
supporting or conspiracy due to the fact that narcotics cases need undercover agents to interfere withoffenders to gather key information to arrest them.
B. Features of Narcotics Litigation
Drug crime and drug offenses are significantly different from other litigation. Drug crime involves two or
more persons conspiring to commit an offense and has a network in which drug lords or heads of theorganized crime group are just commanders. They are not associated with any process of drug trafficking, so
it is hard to find them guilty and subject them to law enforcement due to these separate actions. Only drugtraffickers and sub-drugs dealers are arrested.
Drug crime earns large profits. It easily motivates the offenders to commit their offense, risking big
money by doing it once or twice. That is why there are always new faces instead of those who are arrested.
Drug crime is a transitional crime. Offenders usually use methods of transacting their property so they
are not caught. They know exactly that financial institutions would give the information to state agencies.
Assets and property do not pass through the financial system but are spent immediately on goods, forinstance, cars, gold and jewels, or even livestock like crocodiles and ostriches.
Drug crime is a crime that needs special measures for judicial proceedings, such as conspiring measures,
entrapment, measures to regulate the transfers, wiretapping, witness protection, suspended prosecution andplea bargaining. Also, drug crime is unique in that there is no victim. A drug addict is a drug victim who gets
effects from drugs, so the victim becomes an offender. Therefore, both the producers and the drug addicts
are offenders. Even authorities who possess drugs are considered illegal, so there is a legal protection
measure for them in case of doing undercover operations, sting operations and transferring drugs under theircontrol.
C. Features of Narcotics Operations
Organized crime is an action by a group of people, including planning, illegal offenses or legal action with
unlawful conduct. They are an organizational structure, commanding in order to commit illegal acts by lowlevel members while commanders or other high-ranking persons of the organization become wealthy and dolegal work. They might be a group of powerful persons because crime earns large profits. Criminals needmoney and property from offenses to gain power and manpower to inspect authoritiesʼ suppression. The
structure of organized crime might be different depending on the network and the organization. There are 4
levels of commanders, as stated below.
Level 1 Chiefs, or bosses, (an investor or a drug lord which is behind the operation) are manipulators
responsible for organizational management. Usually, there is only one person, and this person is not
associated directly with the business and property which comes from illegal offenses except for
laundering money. This person always does a legal job for concealing the offense.



Level 2 Assistants, or under-bosses, are responsible for collecting data of process, reporting to achief and following up on commands or policies from the chief.

Level 3 Operation Supervisors, or buffers, are middlemen between high-level members and lowlevel members to protect the high-level positions from investigation.

Level 4 General Staff, or bottom, are persons who commit offenses following the commands from thehigher position, and they are normally caught easier than persons holding any of the other positions.

The process of drug trafficking is performed in a network, or an organized crime group, which covers anentire country or international area. The network is regulated by loyalty and honesty. It is extremely strict
8

169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTSʼ LECTURES

and if anybody does not follow the regulations, there will brutal punishment which can cause danger to theirfamilies, friends and themselves. When one in an organization, usually someone at the bottom such as atrafficker, a recruiter, a dealer and a drug addict, is arrested, he or she typically does not give any
information, especially about the high-level positions, to the authorities. Features of the process of drugtrafficking can be described in the following diagram.
Narcotics crime

Boss

Under Boss

Investor

AssistantOperation supervisor

BufferOperation Level

KeeperTrafficker
BottomDealerD. Collecting Evidence in Narcotics Operations Using Special Techniques
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) 2000 allows the stateparties to use special investigation by adjusting to their domestic laws. Special investigative techniques
consist of:Controlled delivery

Undercover operations

Electronic surveillance

1. Controlled Delivery
Controlled delivery is the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments to pass out of, through or
into the territory of one or more States, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competentauthorities, with a view to the investigation of an offense and the identification of persons involved in thecommission of the offense. However, a delivery method under control is quite inconvenient and complicated
due to the consent of the States parties concerned.
A controlled delivery is a law enforcement technique that allows the transport of illegal drugs or othercontraband, under law enforcement supervision, to those persons who have arranged for the shipment. It is
not considered as a sting operation or an offense conducted by competent authorities.
(i) Possession of contraband by authorities or persons responsible for controlled delivery
9

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106

Authorities or persons are responsible for controlled delivery under law enforcement supervision.
(a) Illegal drugs ‒ the permission under the ministerial regulations which identifies a person withauthority, a destination, a return and a report to the minister of the Ministry of Public HealthIn this process, the drug delivery needs to be sent by the person who wants to transmit drugs to a
country which is the destination of an assigned recipient. An operator entering a residence or a private placeof a drug sender is considered as having been done with the senderʼs permission and a delivery to a recipient
by entering a residence or a private place is also concerned as having been done with permission. Whileevidence taken illegally and unconstitutionally is unacceptable, the above-described practice is allowed by theprovisions of the constitution.
(b) Lack of authorization for law enforcement officers to possess contraband for controlled delivery
However, many jurisdictions still lack legislation or constitutional provisions that authorize law
enforcement officers to carry or deliver contraband. In these countries, law enforcement officers who do soare considered to have violated the law and may be found guilty of drug crime.
(ii) Possession of contraband by other persons involved in controlled delivery
In this case, a spy owns the contraband because of having an association with a network or crimeorganization. This kind of spying needs to be controlled strictly to prevent losing the contraband during theprocess. The spy must be the one that is trusted and accepted to be a part of law-enforcement process.
In Thailand, legal proceedings with authorized senders are not addressed in the provisions of any laws.
For most cases, the criminal procedure code and constitution permit confinement for up to 24 hours.
However, if it is a special case, confinement is allowed for 3 days and the offender must be sent to the court.
Hence, if authorities commit an offense, they will not be defended by law enforcement.
The aim of controlled delivery is to ensure that the authorities are able to find, investigate, search andseize evidence. The technique used for the investigation is a special technique to track investors,
manipulators and other offenders. This might take time longer than the law provided. If it is drug trafficking
to other countries or the network of transitional drug dealing, the investigation might take longer than thelaw provided and contrary to human rights under the constitution. Nevertheless, to use the measure isnecessary and also the path for investigation. Collecting evidence will be an advantage for gaining reliability
and validity. In addition, an attorney can acknowledge the facts about the case, which makes the trial fast andequitable. In conclusion, controlled delivery measures are an exception to common legal protections under theconstitution.
(iii) Possession by offenders
When there is a seizure, making the offender help the authority send the controlled delivery must be
approved. If there is no approval, the evidence will be considered unlawful due to forcing.
2. Undercover Operations
Undercover operations may be used where it is possible for a law enforcement agent or other persons toinfiltrate a criminal organization to gather evidence. Undercover operations should only be carried out by
well-managed and properly trained staff. However, this technique is dangerous and is always the last choiceof investigation. To do this technique needs to be carried out carefully and with the permission of the court ora person in authority.
Undercover operations avoid detection by the entity the person is observing, especially by disguising that
personʼs identity or using an assumed identity for the purposes of gaining the trust of an individual ororganization to learn or confirm confidential information or to gain the trust of targeted individuals in order togather information or evidence. The person to go undercover probably could be an authority but sometimes
another person under the supervision of the authority. The assigned person needs to keep the mission
confidential and keep hiding. For example, an undercover agent is an efficient technique and needs to be used
to interfere and gather information on organized crime. The agents need to disguise and hide their personal
information such as name, address, status and occupation. They might need to gather information that might
be helpful from citizens. Even if it is a very effective technique, it is always the last option due to its danger tothe agents and probably reveals the agentsʼ status. Moreover, undercover operations probably could have10

169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTSʼ LECTURES

been requested by the organized crime group to commit offensesor illegal deeds, such as offenses against
property, taking drugs and murders, to prove the new memberʼs loyalty to their organization. So that
undercover operation needs be carried out by well-managed and properly trained staff.
Undercover operations involve a technique in which a person disguises his or her identity for the purposesof gaining the trust of a network or an organization to be able to enter its residence in order to gather the
information or evidence which is stated below.
(i) Acknowledgement of information from duty
An undercover agent assigned to do a task in a crime organization or network has a different duty
because the duty is divided clearly. No one can do the duty for someone else. This is the acknowledgement ofoneʼs own information from duty.
(ii) Acknowledgement of information from investigation
Acknowledgement of information from investigation in an under undercover operation uses special
investigation tools to gain concealed information from the crime organization. However, undercover
operations affect a suspectʼs rights, so the legality of the technique has been considered, including how far it
can go before it violates the suspectʼs rights. It is also important to avoid entrapment. Each country hasenacted conditions and rules differently. For instance, the United States of America provides that it must be
an illegal incident. To avoid entrapment, the undercover operation must not encourage the suspect to engage
in a drug crime that he or she was not predisposed to commit. Thus, law enforcement officers must collectsufficient evidence to prove the suspect has committed drug crimes before the undercover operation started.
Such evidence includes the suspectʼs conduct or prior convictions related to drug crimes.
In Japan, there is a condition that undercover operations need permission with legality. The operation
rules must relate to benefits, regulations, and ethics. Nevertheless, the crime operation always associateswith other states in the same region. To succeed in undercover operation needs international cooperation.
The practice of undercover operation for police officers at the present (Omaracerid Wattanavipul,
Document of The Practice of Undercover Operation for Police Officers under Law, Drugs Investigation by
Undercover Operation under supervision, B.E.2551) takes place in many ways, as follows:(i) Undercover
Undercover is to disguise oneʼs identity in a crime organization to gather evidence and roles within theorganization. Sometimes, there is an authority involved with the offense. For example, an authority has aperson do the operation under the authorityʼs supervision. That person must keep it secret and disguise himor herself as a Co-operating Individual, or CI, but as another personʼs identity in public. Also, an informant
gives information about the crime activity by getting involved or associating with the activity. Reliability andtrust are important for getting this person as a witness.
(ii) Document concealment
If the target has influence in its area, they might have the policemen or the authorities check ID cards orany documents from the undercover agent. This could probably obstruct the operation or put the agent indanger. Thus, holding a fake ID card can decrease the targetʼs suspicion. The responsible government sector
can help in this process.
(iii) Vehicle concealment
Mostly, criminals or targets who already committed an offense would be very cautious. The vehicle
following after them or nearby their house will be suspected the most. Vehicles used for investigation might
be in varied forms, such as a company car, public transport, etc.
(iv) Place concealment
An observation post is another special investigative technique. If the target has its location in an
impossible area to monitor, there is a need to move into a house or a building for observation. Somehow, it
might set up a junk shop to get in touch with the target because this kind of shop is where to buy stolen
property. In the case of narcotics, the authority might establish a store for selling pharmaceutical production
tools.
11

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106(v) Situation concealment
Situation concealment is needed when the target is experienced in the landscape or the area is hard to
approach. Using too many authorities in the investigation might cause the mission to fail so there is a situation
simulation, for instance, setting up a Buddhist fundraising by the agent disguised as a villager in the targetʼsarea to gather information.
(vi) Occupation concealment
In some situations, undercover or impersonation is not enough to gain information. The occupation
concealment can help much more and reduce the targetʼs suspicion. Sometimes, it takes time to collectevidence. For example, a contractor is running his own company but gathering information about collusion inbids at the same time. If there is bid rigging, the agent can probably find the leader.
(vii) Information concealment
Some investigations require information concealment. The arrests in the case may cause damage to theoffender such as paying a penalty or having their business shut down (illicit CD factories, entertainment
places that are open over time or arranging drug parties, or drug factories). These offenders may havestrategies to follow the movement of officials such as getting to know some relevant officers and having
monthly benefits delivered to the officers. This causes the arrest to fail because the offenders are aware of
the arrest in advance, or even set the scene for the officers. So the arrest process needs to be concealed byinforming them to go to another location instead. Then, they are suddenly ordered to search and arrest thetarget.
(a) Using spies as witnesses in drug cases
Spies are divided into two types.


Created spies
This type of spy may be someone who is in the drug industry. In a criminal organization, usually,
they are the ones we call ʻlittle menʼ. These people are responsible for handling small jobs in thecriminal organization. This type of spy can give information but requires some benefit in return,such as money or other advantages.

Offered spies
This type of spy offers to give information themselves; mostly they are involved in the criminalgroup. But this type of spy needs different benefits, such as requiring the police to remove their datafrom the profile, wanting to quit, betraying the group, or money. There are lots of strategies andtechniques in the spy process such as watching and tracking following the information from theinformation files that are systematically made, or wiretapping using high technology gadgets, or
financial flow monitoring, including disguise or infiltrating the criminal organization.

3. Electronic Surveillance
For example, wiretapping, or intercepting communications, can be done in accordance with legal
requirements. This is to protect the freedom of the individual and without interference.
Why use spies in drug cases? Because drug crime is different from other crimes. First, the circle of drug
offenses is wide. Each step in the process may, or may not, be offensive. For example, there are some
important steps in the process of dealing with offenses of exporting drugs.
(i) Negotiating with foreign traders
If there is a law of conspiracy in that country, this action is a conspiracy offense.
(ii) Negotiating between local traders and minority trade networks
This action is a conspiracy offense.
(iii) Preparing and delivering drugs
At this stage, the supplier may be guilty of possession or guilty of possession for sale or even guilty of
distribution.

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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTSʼ LECTURES(iv) Preparing to export
This action may include the offenses of possession for sale and preparation.
(v) Delivering drugs to foreign traders
If the action is done in Thailand, the deliverer may be guilty of possession, possession for sale, anddistribution. But if it is done in another country that Thai traders have to deliver to, it is an export offense.
Second, in each drug offense, there are many offenders. The offense network is quite complex.
(i) It has real offenders(ii) It has a coordinator or trade agent to be a trade negotiator, or to run a business, instead of a capitalist,a coordinator, or a trade representative, depending on the size of the network. If the network is big,
there are several levels.
(iii) The agent works like a salesman, surveying for customer groups.
(iv) The deliverers deliver drugs to the meeting points.
(v) The financial manager is in charge of paying, receiving and laundering money. This may be done
through regular business or through other illegal business.
Each network is structured in a close structure, which has the following key components:
Cut out
They try to limit the relationship of offenders to the greatest extent possible so as to not let evidence ofthe offense be connected to others, especially, the heads of the criminal organization. No one knows eachother. They will contact only the real co-workers, like the major dealers and agents, but the deliverers will
not know the agents or the major dealers.
Need to know
They limit the information. In each offense action, the offenders only know information on a need-to-knowbasis. This especially happens at the lower level and close to the offense. For example, the deliverers willknow where to drive but they do not know who to go to. These networks may be established in the normal
business environment, such as tourism business, trade business, or charitable organization.
Code
Offenders use code to contact each other.
Third, drug crime is international because drug sources are available in certain areas. The main area is
the Golden Triangle. But the consumers are everywhere, so the drugs are indispensable goods that make anenormous profit for traders. A commercial network is created to connect producers and consumers aroundthe world. Destroying one place cannot stop the problem, because there will be other people, and other places
involved to carry on the drug trade.
So it is necessary for officers to study the system of action of the offenders. For example, officers muststudy the types of drugs, including how drugs are being hidden, sold, and made in the various forms of drugs,
such as heroin, powder or granules, and especially, investigate the sources of drugs, and those who are
involved with drugs. The study will always be useful to investigate the crime of narcotic drugs. According to
the evidence of the narcotics drugs authorities, it appears that the “Golden Triangle” is an important centerfor drug importation into Thailand or other countries, such as Myanmar, Laos and Thailand. The thread of
drug smuggling starts from the northern provinces, then expands to other provinces by cars, buses, andtrains. Smuggling by car, they usually hide drugs underneath the footrest, seat, spare tire, door edges, ormake a secret box hidden in inside the car, or concealed by mixing with goods and utensils, consumption,
medication, or attached to the body. It depends on the type and quantity of the drugs, or depends on thesituation. In particular, smuggling abroad is considered major smuggling, often by air, by sea or by mail. Thisrequires special investigation and spies in order to investigate in a systematic way to get the information tolink to the major offenders in the process.
E. Drug Prosecution in Thailand: Seeking Evidence in Drug Cases by Using Spies
Drug offense cases include several minor offenses, such as drug use and drug possession offenses. These
offenses do not really have problems with evidence in prosecution because the arrest happens at the time of13

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the offense. There is no need to seek other evidence in support. But the offenses related to production, import,
export, possession for sale and conspiracy offenses need evidence to support the prosecution of the offenders
to follow the elements of the crime. Most drug arrests are only for those who possess or transport drugs. The
suppression of drugs is not working as it should because the drug trade is a big system. It is a complex
network. They have major dealers or influencers behind them. Moreover, they cut their work into many
parts, which makes it even more difficult to take legal action over the major dealers. So evidence must be
reasonably and reliably gathered along with details to confirm that the suspects are involved with the offense.
Therefore, various types of investigative techniques are used in the search for evidence in drug cases, such as
luring by the authorities or undercover agents.
Undercover operations are important investigative approaches to gathering evidence to bring theoffender to justice by accessing the criminals. Then, the information obtained during the operation isassociated with the offense algorithm and the network of related persons to plan and find a way to suppress
the group of people. In Thailand, drug court investigators use the disguise method to find evidence toprosecute, such as drug luring. The officers will ask if they want to buy drugs from the seller or go meet withthe seller himself or with spies (Confidential Informants). When the seller agrees to sell and deliver drugs, theofficers will arrest the seller. According to the courtʼs judgment, investigative methods can be used in thisway to confirm the offense of the accused by the testimony of the officer in court, including other evidence
such as photos, money luring and drugs.
Another form of disguise is to be one of the offenders to collect evidence to document the sources anddates of drug trafficking. In such cases, the officers will not reveal themselves. They will collect the
information and evidence that has been sent to another officer, to collect evidence, leading to the prosecutionof the offender. And after the arrest, the officer may testify in court.
In addition, in the case of disguise by the presence of another person, in the case where the officer isrequired to have access to the offense but cannot get close to the offenders because there are no spies orcases to investigate in the closed area. In such cases, it is necessary for the official to identify himself as
someone else in order to reach the offender or to conduct an investigation. For example, disguise ofoccupation by showing that a related occupation is required to enter the area, or disguise of the person who
has contact with the offenders or the involved person.
In line with international practice, they legislated the laws and regulations, the procedures and theconditions of disguise which are summarized in terms of the rules and conditions of disguise. The following
are disguise monitoring procedures:
1. How Disguise Can Be Done by the Official(i) Infiltration or embedding into drug crime organizations continuously and for a long time.
(ii) The luring the offenders into selling narcotics or disguise for a while(iii) Luring a drug or disguise, which can complete the task at once.
2. Criteria for Applying for a Disguise Permit(i) The requesting officers are the officers under the law on drug trials.
(ii) Authorized commanders are the heads of the national police, or delegates, or the secretary-general of
the narcotics control board.
3. Conditions to Allow Disguise(i) Investigations of offenses that may have been committed to disguise are: legal offenses related tonarcotics in production, import, export and distribution, distribution of drugs or conspiracy to support
or attempt to commit such offense.
(ii) There should be reasonable grounds to believe that disguise will obtain the information or evidence ofdrug offenses and one of the following necessary cases.
 To investigate the seizure of a major drug offender or related person because of the circumstancesof the wrongdoer as appropriate.

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 Investigating and arresting drug offenders in other ways is difficult or there is risk of injury or
damage in the performance thereof.
 For extending the results of the offenderʼs drug arrest.
4. The Camouflage Operation without Prior Permission
The camouflage operation without prior permission shall require the competent official to carry out the
disguise operation in an urgent and timely manner. But he must report the urgent need to the authorities
quickly; not more than three days from the date of the commencement of the operation.
In summary, the disguise, as prescribed in Thai law, with the element is the action to hide status or the
purpose of the operation by disguise information. The purpose of the disguise is to disguise the facts about theduties of the official. The basis for the offense that can be investigated by disguise is drug offenses in the
production, import, export, distribution, possession to distribute, conspiracy, support, or attempt to commit
those offenses. It should be reasonable to believe that such operations will obtain information or evidence ofdrug offenses.
F. Person Undercover Have the knowledge and ability to solve problems immediately.
 Have a personal touch in the target area. Sometimes, access to certain areas requires a person who
can use the local language.
 Have knowledge and experience in the subject that they will disguise.
To disguise themselves, the officers or staff members have the following methods.
 Creating a story to reach the target group harmoniously.
 To act as if he /she has gone into action or practice; Impersonation to enter into a criminal organization.
 Solving the problem of disguise
G. Control and Monitoring of Disguise Operations
The disguise operation will be under the control of senior officials in order to be properly implemented
along with the law to prevent harm. The planning and implementation guidelines are as follows.
(i) The actions taken during the specified period must be reported to gather relevant evidence. This may
be investigated by other means to confirm the message from the disguise.
(ii) The disguise must be aware of its own state. Otherwise, the disguise may be involved in the offensewith criminal organizations. If an offense is committed, it must be reported to the superiors. This may
result in the cancellation of such activity or action.
(iii) In some disguise operations, there may be other organizations who investigate the same crime groups
in other ways. When a member of a crime organization is arrested, there may be an investigation
whether another organization is also acting within the crime organization. In this case, the disguiseprocess must be canceled for the safety of the disguise.
H. The Use of Spies in Entrapment
The principle of entrapment is set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Sherman v.
United States (1958). The court maintains that luring is a deceptive act or an inducement of a person who has
no idea or consent to commit the offense for the purpose of prosecuting the person.
The method of the lure may be as follows: The use of persons who have been in contact with the person, the network or the criminalorganization to establish trust. These people may be double agents, i.e., they are paid by both thecriminal organization and the officers.
 The use of spies in criminal organizations to lure
 The use of officers by the advice of persons who have been in contact with the criminal organization.
In practice, this is called a ʻmajor lureʼ
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The use of special measures may affect the freedom of the people, which is contrary to the due process oflaw, which may cause problems and obstacles in litigation as per the following considerations.
(i) Spy as a witness
Witnesses who are spies in drug cases are very important witnesses during the trial process because they
not only are witness to the crime and know the details of the offense in the case, but they also know the
network of the offenders. However, in the interrogation of witnesses who are spies in the investigation,
investigators may allow the person not to provide personal information such as domicile or occupation for the
benefit of witness protection. The investigators record only the testimony of the witness in the inquiry. Whenthe case is brought to court, the court cannot summon the witness to the floor because the witness did notreveal his name and domicile. Therefore, there is a lack of testimony to confirm the guilt of the offender, or
supporters who are not in the place of arrest. In practice, most cases with spies as witnesses in theinvestigation, the witness usually does not come to court. As a result, the court may listen only to thetestimony during the inquiry. The defendant has no opportunity to object to the witness. When there is no
confirmation by a spy in the court, the court will often consider the matter in favor of the defendant anddismiss the case.
(ii) The information received from the disguise of the spy
It can be said that the operation of the spies and disguise of the officials cannot gather all the evidence.
Other investigative methods are needed to collect evidence. But what has been given by the spies anddisguise is very beneficial to the case because the information obtained is the information that confirms theplace of the offense, the offenders, the network, system, the division of duties, and the escort of the criminalorganization. It helps other investigations to be done correctly straight to the target. Without such aninvestigation, investigative information and clues may not be systematically investigated because theoffenders will try to hide and find out how the officials know the various things. In some cases, disguise
officers carry out investigations in multiple locations to obtain information confirming the offense of a
network or criminal organization by using the method of wiretapping and electronic equipment so that data
is sent to the operating center.
(iii) The exhibits from the arrest
All the exhibits̶drugs, money, belongings that are used in the crime̶will be impounded as evidence ofthe defendantʼs guilt. But it still cannot point out the other offenders who were not arrested at that time or at
previous times.
I. Listening to Witnesses as Spies in Narcotics Cases in the Court of Thailand
According to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Thailand, the court will accept the luring method
except that it may not create a temptation to persuade someone who does not intend to commit an offense,such as Mr. A never intended to sell heroin before but the police ask for heroin and will pay a good price. Mr.
A wants to get money so he goes to find heroin. This act of Mr. A is considered as having been caused bybeing lured into wrongdoing. Mr. A will not be punished. The judgment of the Supreme Court agrees if theaccused or the defendant is intent on committing the offense himself but the officers have no witnesses toprosecute the accused or the defendant. So the lure is needed to arrest the offenders. The evidence that isderived from the lure is acceptable evidence. When applying these guidelines to the issue of disguise, it could
be separately considered in two cases. First, if the disguise officer contacted or committed a crime to obtainevidence and the offenders have committed crime regularly̶i.e., not committing an offense because of thepersuasion of the official̶this is a legal practice because the offender was not persuaded by the lure tocommit the offense. The evidence obtained from such lure can be accepted as evidence. Second, in a casewhere the official is responsible for causing another person to commit an offense, it is considered as a lure tocommit an offense (entrapment). The evidence obtained cannot be accepted as evidence to punish theoffender.

III. CHAPTER TWO: CASE STUDY
A. A Sting Operation to Catch the Big Heroin Dealers within the Last 10 Years in Thailand
1. Prologue
The Department of Special Investigation (DSI) was requested by the USA Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) to probe drug (heroin) trafficking from Thailand to the U.S. The Drug Enforcement
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Unit took charge of the case.
2. Operations(i) Investigation
We knew that heroin was being trafficked from Thailand to the U. S., as informed by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA).
The Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU DSI) started an investigation to find where the heroin was
manufactured. Generally, qualified heroin, Double UOGLOBE brand, was produced in neighboring countries,
dominated by minorities. The gangs that had alliances in Thailand could smuggle drugs due to the fact thatthey were supported by some Thai governors, Black Moozer, with the cooperation of Lt. Preeda
Trakoolpreeda, who was a Black Moozer soldier and held Thai nationality. He was the leader of the Thai
alliance and had connections both within and without Thailand.
The investigation mainly focused on the group of Lt. Preeda Trakoolpreeda. It reported that a couple, Mr.
Wirot and Mrs. Fang, were the heads. Both lived in Fang district, Chaingmai. So the agents were assigned tobuy heroin from Mr. Wirot. Two agents, Mr. Henry (DEA) took the role of a Malaysian drug dealer and Mr.
Suwat took the role of a Thai drug dealer, convinced them to make a trade and then send drugs to Malaysia
and the U.S.
The two agents disguised themselves in the dealer groups for 2 years and made trades until seven drug
dealers were arrested with 100 bars of heroin (amount 36 kilograms), with an estimated street value of 300
million baht or 8.3 million US dollars in Thailand and valued at 10 times that, or 83 million US dollars, in the U.S.
(ii) Trading(a) The undercover agents tried to convince Mr. Wirot and his family to trust them, and Mr. Wirot
eventually talked with the agents about drug trafficking.
(b) The undercover agents agreed to find a middle man to buy drugs by giving him 10 percent of the
profits in return.
(c) The undercover agents made an appointment with Mr. Suwat, a Thai undercover agent.
(d) Mr. Suwat met Mr. Wirot and his wife more than 5 times to purchase heroin, and Mr. Wirot was fully
aware of the transactions.
(e) Mr. Wirot agreed to send 2 bars (amount 720 grams) of heroin of Double UOGLOBE brand.
(f) Mr. Suwat checked the drug, estimated the value at 500,000 baht, or 14,000 US dollars.
(g) After checking the quality, Mr. Suwat found that it was good quality, so he contacted Mr. Wirot to buy
40 more bars of heroin at a cost of 10 million baht. Before the shipment one day, Mr. Wirot and his wife
asked Mr. Suwat to declare if he had enough money. The agents had prepared to take a picture tocollect as evidence, but Mr. Wirot cancelled the appointment and gave an excuse that it was heavily
raining.
(h) Because of Mr. Wirotʼs cancellation, Mr. Suwat contacted him again and blamed him for damaging his
business. He asked Mr. Wirot to recompense him with 10, 000 US otherwise he would stop doing
business with him. Mr. Wirot didnʼt have money to pay so he apologized and asked Mr. Suwat to meetwith Lt. Preeda to confirm that everything had already been prepared and the shipment had not
arrived on the due date due to the heavy rain. The undercover agents also investigated whether it was
raining or not at that time and found that it was true. Mr. Wirot was blamed by Lt. Preeda, which is
why Mr. Suwat did not wait for the shipment.
(i) Mr. Suwat made an appointment with Lt. Preeda a few weeks later. Lt. Preeda said that he also
suffered damages, explaining that he had to pay for the shipping because of no purchasers. Then Mr.
Suwat gave Lt. Preeda 5,600 US dollars to help cover the damages and make Lt. Preeda trust him.
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106(j) Next, Mr. Suwat met Lt. Preeda again and invited Mr. Henry who was a Malaysian undercover agentof DEA. He lied to Lt. Preeda, saying that Mr. Henry was his business partner.
(k) Later on, there were more than five meetings to make deals. The largest amount was 100 bars (36kilograms) of heroin.
(l) Lt. Preeda came to check money by himself in the final meeting before doing payment and shipment
and sent four drug smugglers to meet Mr. Suwat.
(m) On the next day, Lt. Preeda and his gang including seven people were arrested with 100 bars heroin of
Double UOGLOBE brand.
(iii) Successful special investigative measures(a) The Special Case Investigation Act B.E. 2547 (2004)
Section 27. If it is necessary and to benefit the compliance with this Act, the Director-General or person
designated thereby shall have the power to have anyone prepare a document or evidence or falsify his/her
identity in an organization or a group of people for the benefit of the investigation, which however shall beaccording to the regulations provided by the Director General. When preparing such a document or evidence
or when falsifying his/her identity in a particular organization or a group of persons for the purpose of theinvestigation as stated in paragraph one, this action shall be considered legitimate.
In this case, Mr. Suwat, Mr. Henry and the undercover agents were drug dealers within the scope ofsection 27.
Section 24. To perform his/her duty hereunder, the Special Case Inquiry Official shall have the following
powers:To enter any dwelling place or premises to search when there is a reasonable ground for suspecting that aperson suspected of committing a Special Case offense is hiding there or possessing properties which isconsidered an offense or acquired by committing an offense, or which has been used or will be used incommitting an offense of a Special Case, or which may be used as evidence, while there is also a reasonableground to believe that by reason of the delay in obtaining a warrant of search, the person shall escape or theproperty may be relocated, hidden, destroyed or transformed from its original condition.
This case was conducted without a search warrant because the evidence would be destroyed if it took
long time.
Section 31. Expenses used for the investigation of a Special Case as well as advancing disbursement shallbe according to the regulations of the Ministry of Justice upon the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
This case used expenses according to section 31 until completed. On the contrary, the regular measureswould not give the amount of money (5,600 US dollars) to help cover the expenses of the shipping and to makeLt. Preeda trust Mr. Suwat.
B. King Cobra Operation
1. Prologue
The Department of Special Investigation (DSI) was requested by the USA Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) to probe a gang of drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle area from countries
neighboring Thailand. Drugs were being sold and delivered through Thailand to a third country. The
Enforcement Unit took charge of this case.
2. Operations(i) Investigation
The investigation was started to arrest the major transitional drug dealers, which are Mr. Arlong Seali,
Mr. KriangKrai Seali and Mrs. Pranee Seali, Mr. KriangKraiʼs wife. The DEA said that Mrs. Pranee is Mr.
Arlongʼs niece.

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The investigation aimed at Mr. Arlong, Mr. KriangKrai and Mrs. Pranee. It was reported that Mr. Arlong
is a boss of the gang, and Mr. KriangKrai and Mrs. Pranee are under-bosses. Mr. Arlong was not associatedwith the drugs and money, but had other business such as import and export company and a stone company
to cover up his offense.
The undercover operation, King Cobra, was conducted through cooperation between Thailand and the
DEA, which sent two undercover agents to complete the mission for three years. The two suspects werearrested and the warrant of arrest was issued. However, Mr. Arlong was not prosecuted. Since the arrests,
Mr. Arlong has stopped drug dealing and trafficking.
(ii) Trading(a) Investigation and personal information of three suspects which are Mr. Arlong, Mr. KriangKrai andMrs. Pranee.
Mr. Arlong, 65, has two wives. Both Mrs. Yupa, 60, and Mrs. Kingkan, 30, reside in Thailand andneighboring countries.
Mr. KriangKrai, 45, and Mrs. Pranee, 43, are married, having two daughters, 14 and 12, residing in Chiang
Saen District, Chiang Rai Province, Thailand.
Mr. Arlong has no property registration, money or assets. Mrs. Yupa, his first wife, runs the import andexport company without Mr. KriangKrai and Mrs. Pranee as partners. The company has two offices in
Bangkok and Chiang Rai. Based on his passport, Mr. Arlong had traveled between neighboring countries andHainan many times.
Mr. KriangKrai and Mrs. Pranee are convenience store owners and partners in a stone carving company
in Chiang Rai. Mrs. Kingkan, Mr. Arlongʼs wife, is a partner in the company. Mr. KriangKrai and Mrs. Pranee
have two houses, two cars, a motorcycle and 30,000 US dollars in their bank account. Mr. KriangKrai had
traveled between neighboring countries and Hainan many times.
(b) Planning to approach the target
From the investigation, it was hard to get a major target like Mr. Arlong, and the import and export
company of Mrs. Yupa is far away from the drug manufacturing area. The way to get to Mr. KriangKrai andMrs. Pranee was the stone carving company.
(c) Two teams of undercover agents were sent to the company to inspect and gather information toprepare for the undercover operation. It was found that the company staff consisted of a manager, Mr.
KriangKrai, and a few employees.
(d) Undercover
Mr. Tee, a Thai undercover agent
Undercover information
Age: 40
Status: Single
Domicile: Southern Thailand
Present Address: Bangkok
Occupation: A partner of a delivery express company in southern Thailand, an owner of an Internet Caféin Bangkok and a football pool agent. Relatives have an import and export company in Malaysia.
Mr. Tony, a Malaysian undercover agent
Undercover information
Age: 60
Status: Married, 2 wives, Thai and Malaysian
Domicile: Penang, Malaysia
Present Address: Penang, Malaysia
Occupation: An owner of a shipping company, shipping to Europe and China

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The investigation team sent both undercover agents to the stone carving company and made up a story
about exporting carved stone to Penang in Malaysia. They wanted to see the goods and asked for the pricelists and shipping method. They visited the company three times in three months and had dinner with Mr.
KriangKrai every time. Finally, they bought a sample of carved stone.
(e) Two months after the purchase of the sample stone, the undercover agents went back to the company
again to consult with Mr. KriangKrai about the stone. They wanted him to make a hole inside thestone to make it lighter for cheaper shipment fees. He made it according to their request, but Mr. Tonywas still not satisfied. He wanted the stone to weigh less by making a bigger hole and also wanted tocover up the hole. After finishing their business meetings, they would go to dinner and drink alcohol.
The undercover agent sometimes left for two months in connection with him and his wife.
(f) When Mr. KriangKrai finished the stone, the undercover agents went to pick it up and had dinner as
they usually did. This time, he asked if they had any drugs to put into the stone. They both pretended
to be startled. He said that he knew everything about the business they were doing. Mr. Tee said thatthe problem was exactly the quality of heroin, not the price. Mr. KriangKrai told him that he mightfind a better one at a good price for him.
(g) Mr. KriangKrai met them several times to negotiate the drug deal at the hometown of Mr. Deang in
Chaingmai and in Bangkok. They made a deal at 600,000 Baht per unit (two bars per unit) and pickedup the drugs in Bangkok.
(h) The undercover agents asked Mr. KriangKrai for a sample to test before making a large purchase sohe agreed to give a bar of heroin to Mr. Tee in Bangkok.
(i) Mr. KriangKrai taught how to avoid police tracking by buying a new telephone and a new sim card.
Therefore, Mr. KriangKrai used a new telephone and a new sim card to contact Mr. Tee. After
receiving the heroin, they had to trash their telephone.
(j) Mr. KriangKrai also wanted to know about Mr. Teeʼs career, so he came to receive money and told
him to deliver the drugs as soon as possible.
(k) A week after Mr. KriangKrai had received the money, he called Mr. Tee to explain that there would
be a call for the drug delivery.
(l) On April 10th in the evening, Mr. Aoun called Mr. Tee and informed that he would deliver the drugs on
April 11th at an abandoned amusement park in Bangkok. He did not say the time but told Mr. Tee towait for his call. Mr. Tee informed his commander and scheduled a meeting with the investigation
team. From their experience, they thought that Mr. Aoun would definitely not deliver the drugs at theamusement park but at some other place that would have a large crowd and ways to escape. They
guessed it would be a department store nearby the amusement park which had many exits and had nohidden cameras. Thus, they went to the place and divided into 4 groups, 2 groups heading to thedepartment store and others joining with people in the early morning on April 11th.
(m) On April 11th, Mr. Aoun called Mr. Tee about the delivery at the amusement park and Mr. Tee told
him that his staff would wait there. At 3 P.M., Mr. Aoun called him back and told him to move to theparking lot of the nearby department store which the investigation team had presumed. He was 30
minutes late. He came to where the undercover agent told him and then drove off. The undercoveragent tracked him down and tried not to make him aware. They did not want to arrest him that day
because they wanted Mr. KriangKrai to trust them and sell them a large amount of heroin.
(n) After the drugs were tested, the heroin, Double UOGLOBE brand, it was found that the drugs were ofgood quality and had been produced in the Golden Triangle area. The car used for drug delivery and
Mr. Somchai, the car owner, were caught in the next two months with 20 kg of Ice found in his car.
(o) Mr. Tee told Mr. KriangKrai to make an appointment for the next purchase of 100 units. They had met
many times, but they could not make a deal. He wanted money before delivery, but Mr. Tee wanted to20

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exchange money for drugs.
(p) The negotiation happened many times, but they still could not make it. Mr. KriangKrai offered Mr. Tee
to move to a casino in the Golden Triangle area while transporting heroin. After he had received
money, Mr. Tee was allowed to come back (This actually happens in drug trafficking. The head buyer
would be a hostage). The undercover team would not agree with the offer.
(q) The investigation team tried extremely hard to buy heroin, but they were so cautious andexperienced. The investigation team decided to issue arrest warrants which included four suspects,
Mr. KriangKrai, Mrs. Pranee, Mr. Aoun and Mr. Somchai.
(r) They were arrested but there was no evidence implicating Mr. Arlong.
(s) Since his arrest, Mr. Arlong has stopped drug trafficking.

IV. REFERENCES
Pattama Warin, (2011). Factual discovery in narcotics cases: a case study on the admissibility of confidential
informants as witnesses, Bangkok: Thammasat University.
Mayura Wimollohakarn, (2010). Seeking evidences in drugs cases by using special investigation methods,
Bangkok: Thammasat University.
Kittipong Kittayarak, (2000). Justice on the path of revolution, Bangkok: Vinyooshon.
Pol. Col. Surachai Tianchai, Investigative techniques. Retrieved from http: //chiangsan. chiangrai. police. go.
th/detective%20lesson5.html.
Joseph Wheatley, (2017). U. S. Law Enforcement Techniques Against Organize Crime Group. U. S.
Department of Justice.
Kären, M. H., Christine, H. O. & Henry L. C., (2013). Police Operations: Theory and Practice.

21

PARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS
TRANSNATIONAL ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING IN BRAZIL:ADDRESSING GOOD PRACTICES FOR CONFISCATION OF
PROCEEDS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Rodrigo Leite Prado＊

I. INTRODUCTION
According to its Constitution, Brazil is a democratic republic in which the rule of law prevails. Brazilian
legislation boasts modern statutes criminalizing drug trafficking and money laundering, fair tools to deprive
perpetrators of their unlawful proceeds and provisions granting the deployment of advanced investigation
techniques against organized crime, all of them largely compliant with the United Nations Convention
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. However, daily news reports bear
testimony of the increasing role of Brazilian criminal syndicates in the global cocaine business and the generalperception of insecurity in the country.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first section attempts to contextualize the fight against drugtrafficking in Brazil. It outlines the country profile as an aggressive consumer and transit-point of illicit drugs,
the statutory response to this problem and some of the legal, institutional and practical barriers faced bynational authorities to confront the illegal drug trade. The second section, limited to the scope of transnational
drug trafficking, is intended to draw underlying problems and possible solutions concerning two focus points:
the confiscation of proceeds and international cooperation related to drug smuggling.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING IN BRAZIL
A. Current Situation of Illicit Drug Trafficking in Brazil
Despite the socioeconomic advances experienced during the two past decades, violence rates in Brazil
have never been higher1. Many of the factors contributing to this multi-causal phenomenon are widely known:
the infamous inequality, the lethality and corruption of the police, the urban militias, the combination of spatial
segregation, weak state presence and territorial disputes over “squatter” neighborhoods and overcrowded
penitentiaries. Notwithstanding the lingering cultural and human development issues attached thereto, it isubiquitously understood that an important part of this scenario is linked to drug trafficking operated by localorganized crime groups.
Due to its porous land borders with the worldʼs top three cocaine-producing countries (Colombia, Peru and
Bolivia) and its long coastline on the Atlantic, Brazil emerged as an obvious transit-point for drug trafficking
towards the East. The heightened availability of cocaine in the country skyrocketed the local drug market
over the last decade, making it the second biggest consumer of cocaine, the worldʼs leading consumer of crack‒ cocaineʼs cheapest and most addictive derivative ‒ and increasingly of marijuana and ecstasy2.
The escalation of the domestic drug demand in Brazil changed deeply the profile of the countryʼs
criminality. Once confined to territorial disputes in penal facilities, the comandos (gangs involved with drugtrafficking) gained control of the narcotics supply, corrupted the system and its agents and spread into theoutskirts, creating a criminal network that operates outside and inside prisons3. Nowadays, besides
smuggling and distributing drugs, the comandos commit violence throughout the country and control many
aspects of life in favelas4. Their sizeable criminal portfolio includes racketeering, extortion, corruption andFederal Prosecutor, Criminal Division of the Federal Prosecution Office in Minas Gerais, Federal Prosecution Service ofBrazil.
1
Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança Pública 2017 (São Paulo, pubd online 2017) <http://www.forumseguranca.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ANUARIO_11_2017.pdf> accessed 20 March 2018.
2
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2017 (Vienna, pubʼd online 2017) <http://www.
unodc.org/wdr2017/en/topics.html> accessed 20 March 2018.
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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

murder, as well as a huge market of firearms smuggling, responsible for 50 per cent of the weapons
accessible today within the Brazilian territory5.
The “marijuana polygon” in the arid Northeast of Brazil, the countryʼs sole drug-producing area, meets
only a slight part of the local demand for cannabis. Almost all the illicit substances are imported. The main
gateway connects Boliviaʼs cocaine and Paraguayʼs marijuana to the major cities in the Southeast and thesouthwestern tri-border region (Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina), entering the country whether by land,
plane or boat cruises through the tropical wetland area of Pantanal. From Peru and Colombia, the vast
inhabited lands and waters of the Amazon forest are a staging ground for the distribution of cocaine, notably
via the northern tri-border region (Brazil, Peru and Colombia), a major hub for local drug smuggling. All ittakes is to fly into one of Amazoniaʼs many clandestine landing tracks or to cross the boundary rivers.
The comandos also share control of the suppliers and routes related to the cocaine exported overseas.
Three of them ‒ the hegemonic First Command of the Capital (Primeiro Comando da Capital - PCC), the Red
Command (Comando Vermelho) and the Northern Family (Família do Norte), based respectively in the Statesof São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Amazonas ‒ have stretched their power over the borders and already took
over part of the drug trafficking in Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru. As noticed in the UNODC World Drug Report
2017, Brazil has been the single most frequently mentioned country of departure of cocaine shipments to
Europe, Africa and Asia over 2010-2015. The main direct destinations are the Iberian Peninsula and the portsof Rotterdam (Netherlands) and Antwerp (Belgium), whereas a second route uses the West African countriesof Nigeria, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Ghana as transit points, from which the cocaine is dispatched to Spainand Italy. The use of drug mules and twin-engine airplanes for exporting cocaine still exists, but undeniably
most of the drugs smuggled from Brazil are concealed inside containers shipped to Africa and Europe,
profiting from the rising commerce with the European Union and the corruption of port agents on both sidesof the Atlantic6.
B. Legal Framework
Historically, Brazilian legislation has been very influenced by the United Nations conventions on drugs.
The countryʼs official commitment to “eradicate” supply and demand of illegal narcotics led to the adoption ofa prohibitionist approach on the matter, placing drug trafficking and drug consumption under the same
criminal justice umbrella and engendering massive incarceration.
The 11, 343 Drug Law, enacted in 2006, covers nearly all regulations related to drug abuse and drugtrafficking in Brazil, including procedural and health policy provisions. The new law intended to make adefinitive distinction between drug consumption and drug dealing: the former, comprising the possession,storage, transportation or cultivation of illicit substances for personal use, was depenalized and subject tosocial-educational measures, while the latter, related to the import, export, preparation, production,
manufacture, sales, offer, storage, transport, prescription or delivery of illicit substances for consumption or
supply, was subject to a harsher punishment of imprisonment from 5 to 15 years. It also contains rules about
controlled delivery, covert operations, incentives for collaboration with the justice system and asset recovery.
Money laundering is dealt with by Law 9,613, as amended by Law 12,683, enacted in 2012. All the illicit
conduct referred to by the FATF7 Recommendations are sanctioned with imprisonment from 3 to 10 years,
regardless of the predicate offence involved. It provides extensive measures for freezing, seizing andforfeiting illicit proceeds, instruments and their equivalent value, as well as licit property aiming tocompensate victims for crime-related damages.

MIRAGLIA, Paula, Drugs and Drug Trafficking in Brazil: Trends and Policies (Washington, Center for 21st Century Security
and Intelligence, Latin America Initiative, pubʼd online 2016) <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/MiragliaBrazil-final.pdf> accessed 20 March 2018.
4“Favelas” are squatter settlements characterized by simple housing, less-than-average access to public services, highpopulation density and informal property rights.
5
Viva Rio, Arms Control (Rio de Janeiro, pubd online 2011) <http://www.vivario.org.br/en/human-security/arms-control/>accessed 20 March 2018.
6
Carta Capital, Os Caminhos da Cocaína que Sai do Brasil para a Europa (São Paulo, pubd online 2017) <https: //www.
cartacapital.com.br/internacional/os-caminhos-da-cocaina-que-sai-do-brasil-para-a-europa> accessed 20 March 2018.
7
Financial Action Task Force.
3

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106

A last legal instrument of paramount importance for the struggle against large-scale drug trafficking is
Law 12,850, enacted in 2013, which addresses organized crime in Brazil. It criminalizes the participation inand the funding of organized crime groups and regulates in detail the deployment of advanced investigativetechniques, such as controlled delivery, audio and video surveillance, undercover operations and collaborationagreements. Along with Law 9,296, enacted in 1995 and related to communications interception, Law 12,850ʼs
provisions are applicable on a subsidiary basis to drug trafficking operated by criminal syndicates.
C. Obstacles to Countering Illicit Drug Trafficking in Brazil
Highlighting the factors that withhold effective enforcement of drug trafficking in Brazil is no easy task.
From the legal response perspective, the lack of objective criteria to determine which amount of illicit
substance pertains to “personal use” has become a giant loophole for police and judicial discretion. Despite theintended improvements of the 2006 Drug Law, the “war on drugs” culture remained the same among thecriminal justice actors, leading to a 123 per cent rise of incarcerations linked to drug trafficking8, most of them
related to low-level criminals with no connection with organized crime. Likewise, 44 per cent of the prison
population consists of pre-trial detainees, feeding a vicious cycle that only strengthens recruiting and coercionin overcrowded penal facilities run by comandos9.
The double jurisdiction applicable to drug trafficking offences ‒ federal courts, when there are sufficientgrounds to believe that a specific drug dealing involves substances directly smuggled into the country or outof the country, or state courts, in the residual cases ‒ makes it almost impossible to enforce a national antidrug policy. As a result, most arrests and convictions in Brazil do not target traffickers strategically, threaten
the comando regime or affect the violent criminality surrounding drug rings.
As for the practical challenges, there are more than plenty. Drug and arms trafficking, police corruption
and brutality, intergang warfare and absence of the state in vulnerable urban areas are interwoven in Brazil.
One feeds on the other, perpetuating violence, marginalization, territory control and counter-violence. The
cheap supply of illicit substances, especially crack, has ensnared thousands of addicts among the poor, forcing
them to work for traffickers in order to acquire drugs.
From the institutional point of view, the police lack expertise in collecting financial evidence, as well as
appropriate personnel and minimum structure for forensics. The tiny military contingent in Amazonia andPantanal does not stand a chance to oversee Brazilʼs 12,000 kilometers of wild jungle, swamps and rivers.
Furthermore, overpopulated incarceration facilities favour the management of prisons by comandos, while
the judicial system, overwhelmed with an average of 10,000 cases per judge, struggles against inefficiency
and high impunity rates among white-collar criminals.

III. KEY FOCUS POINTS: CHALLENGES AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Notwithstanding all the harsh drawbacks aforementioned, one must permanently seek ways to overcome
adversity. The present section intends to address uncomplicated solutions, raised from the experienceacquired by the Brazilian National Prosecution Service in actual investigations, to bypass challenges at thefronts of asset recovery and international cooperation related to transnational drug trafficking. The
highlighted barriers are objectively listed and followed by an operational proposal to overcome them, as well
as a real-case example of success.

Organization of American States (OAS), The Drug Problem in the Americas (Washington, pubʼd online 2013), <http://www.
oas.org/documents/eng/> accessed 20 March 2018.
9
Instituto Sou da Paz, Relatório da Pesquisa Prisões em Flagrante na Cidade de São Paulo (São Paulo, pubd online 2012), <http://www.soudapaz.org/upload/pdf/justica_prisoesflagrante_pesquisa_web.pdf>, accessed 20 March 2018.
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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

A. Deprivation of Property Related to Transnational Drug Trafficking in Brazil
1. Barriers Related to the Identification of High-Value Targets: Criminal Organizations Leaders,
Gatekeepers and Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)
Proposal:
4 Before opening the investigation, gather comprehensive background information about known targets,
including family members, nominees, power-of-attorney holders, ʻstraw menʼ and their companies. Submit theoutput to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in pursuit of suspicious/currency transaction reports. With theresults, identify the account holders involved in the suspicious transactions, beware of PEPs, employees andgatekeepers (accountants, notaries, solicitors etc.). Track their possible liaisons with the targets and initiate
the investigation against the potentially responsible parties.
＊ After the seizure of $200,000 hidden in a speedboat on the Amazon River, a financial investigation
unveiled the links between the money seized and lawyers hired by incarcerated members of the Northern
Family Cartel. It eventually gave rise to the launch of Operation “L.M.”, allowing the identification of the main
suppliers of cocaine in the northern tri-border region and the heads of the Northern Family, as well as theforfeiture of assets belonging to 173 of its members. One year later, a thorough linkage analysis based on theevidence seized in the investigation led to the strike of a second Operation. Charges were dropped and the caseawaits trial.
2. Barriers Related to the Adherence to a Culture of Promoting Money Laundering Investigations andSeeking Asset Recovery
Proposal:
4 Launch a parallel money laundering investigation as soon as the predicate offencesʼ perpetrators are
pinpointed. Attempt to estimate the value of the proceeds and start tracing assets acquired after the crime
was committed, whether under the names of the perpetrators or under the names of the third-parties
mentioned in subheading 1. Cross-check the results with suspicious and currency transactions reported by
the FIU. Assess the money laundering risks in accordance with regional patterns of drug trafficking andformulate hypotheses from typologies described in FATF and FATF-Style Regional Bodies, bearing in mind
red flags of concealment and disguise, unusual transactions or operations without economic rationale. To (in)validate the hypothesis, use all information available, including open source, tax and financial intelligence.
4 Prioritize initiatives in favour of big, promising cases with active media coverage and engagement ofsociety.
4 Begin by allocating the returned assets to the benefit of the branches reluctant to adhere to the newparadigm.
＊ Operation “V.” attempted to dismantle a criminal organization dedicated to the trafficking ofamphetamine to North America and Europe. The money laundering probe was set forth from day one; itbrought up not only evidence of many typologies of concealment, but also data related to unexpected trafficking
modi operandi and the identity of conspirators in the United States and Venezuela. Freezing warrants were
enforced simultaneously in four countries. The accused were all convicted of drug trafficking and money
laundering.
3. Barriers Related to the Expertise to Conduct Money Laundering Investigations and Seeking Asset
Recovery
Proposals:
4 Designate specific law enforcement branches, prosecution offices and courts to deal with money
laundering cases.
4 Create an inter-institutional Asset Recovery Office responsible for tracing, seizing and managing stolen
assets.
4 Put into action an ambitious capacity-building programme with basic contents on money laundering
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106

and asset recovery aiming at police officers, prosecutors and judges throughout the country.
＊ In 2006, after realizing that most prosecutors and judges lacked the expertise to assess financial crimeand money laundering cases, the Brazilian Federal Justice Council decided to entitle specific courts in eachState to deal with such matters. Positive outcomes arose after years of struggle, but they eventually changed theculture towards white-collar criminality and spread basic operational know-how on economic crimes among
the Federal Justice community. Nowadays, specific courts are being designated to deal with international
cooperation, a matter still unknown to most practitioners.
4. Barriers Related to the Existence of and Access to Public Registries
Proposals:
4 Implement a permanent working group among the agencies involved directly or indirectly in thephenomenon of crime, setting a timeline to accomplish predetermined tasks, a methodology to assess theresults and new goals to be reached every year.
4 Adopt an aggressive plan of gathering, structuring, exchanging and mining data available in dispersed
public and private registries.
＊ The National Strategy for Fighting Money Laundering and Corruption (ENCCLA) was set forth inBrazil after 2004 and nowadays benefits from the participation of more than 50 federal and state-levelagencies. Among its dozens of achievements, ENCCLA has drafted the current money laundering andorganized crime legislation bills, published guidelines and manuals, created databases and enhanced
coordination among rival agencies. Most of the databases available to the Federal Prosecution Service today
have been shared from other agencies.
B. International Cooperation Related to Transnational Drug Trafficking in Brazil
1. Barriers Related to the Diversity of Legal Traditions, Terminology and Measures to Ensure Punishment(Due Process, Dual Criminality, Reasonable Cause, Mandatory Refusal)
Proposal:
4 In order to build trust, avoid miscommunication and prevent refusal of assistance, establish informal
contact as a starting point in any request related to countries with relevant cultural or legal differences. It
offers a good opportunity to learn about the justice systems involved, better understand each otherʼsrequirements and act as a prelude to a subsequent formal Mutual Legal Assistance Request (MLAR).
Informal contacts comprise connections with counterparts, liaison magistrates, police attachés, FIU liaison
officers and focal points in international cooperation networks. If distrust is an issue, practitioners can address
the implications of providing information on a merely theoretical basis, prior to any discussions of substanceon the matter.
＊ In 2014, as a result of Operation “M. P.”, warrants of arrest, search and seizure and asset freezing were
enforced simultaneously in Brazil, Italy, Portugal, Germany, Spain, Serbia, Montenegro and Peru. Theytargeted the exploitation of cocaine routes by a joint-venture formed by the Brazilian First Command of theCapital and the Calabrian Mafia ‘Ndrangheta. 1.3 tons of cocaine and 10 vessels were seized during the arrests.
The evidence collected also uncovered bank accounts in Singapore related to the corruption of officials
investigated in the infamous “Car Wash” probe in Brazil.
Informal contacts were essential to ensure the coordination among all countries under Brazil’s guidance,
notably with Serbia, in light of the profound language and legal tradition barriers between the twojurisdictions. The enforcement of freezing orders in Singapore was also a challenge; due to its both Common
Law and Eastern grounds, different charges had to be dropped in Brazil, two new requests of assistance weredrafted and unexpected evidence was required to match the Singaporean Law. The criminals were convicted in
Brazil and Italy and the freezing order in the Car Wash probe is still being enforced.
2. Barriers Related to the Timely, Full and Valid Execution of Requests of Assistance
Proposals:
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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

4 When the case reaches beyond domestic borders, it is crucial to immediately focus on international
cooperation. Making proactive, early contact may aid in diagnosing potential challenges, obtaining additional
information and making strategic decisions. It also gives the foreign jurisdiction the opportunity to prepare
for its role in providing cooperation.
4 Since formal MLARs are time-consuming and resource-intensive, appeal first to the available informal
assistance channels. Usually, they are fit for all non-coercive measures, such as intelligence gathering,obtaining public records and locating assets or persons.
4 Multilingual forms can be a way to expedite the exchange of informal assistance and document it.
4 Most drug trafficking cases use Interpol-channeled documents. Make sure that their chain of custody isspot on and that the documents obtained will be admissible in court as evidence; if not, submit an MLAR.
4 Envisage the creation of an international cooperation unit within your agency. It is helpful to executeurgent requests, review MLAR drafts, control follow-up efforts and ensure capacity-building.
＊ The International Cooperation Unit of the Brazilian Prosecutor General’s Office was established in2015. Its many tasks encompass the management of international cooperation networks and informal contacts,
the review of active requests drafted by Brazilian authorities, the oversight of the execution of passive requests
in Brazil – as well as their direct execution, in urgent or sensitive cases – and the supervision of each and every
international assistance case in the interest of the Federal Prosecution Service. It accomplished a lot after one
year: 2, 236 follow-up cases were opened, 560 informal requests were granted, 113 missions abroad werecompleted and four Memoranda of Understanding were signed, among others.
A good example of the difference made by the International Cooperation Unit can be found in theextradition request of V. A. M., a well-known Paraguayan drug dealer. Pursuant to Interpol’s request ofprovisional detention for the purpose of extradition, V. A. M. presented a Brazilian birth certificate andclaimed not to be eligible for extradition, according to the Brazilian Constitution. His deception manoeuvre
almost succeeded, had not the Unit been previously informed about the Paraguayan request, proactively
checked his nationality and started an inquiry to solve the deadlock. The Prosecutor-General presented
evidence about the falsehood of his Brazilian birth certificate to the Supreme Court before he could be released
and V. A. M. was extradited months later.
3. Barriers Related to Coordinating the Deployment of Advanced Investigation Techniques
Proposals:
4 If the assistance requested involves the deployment of advanced investigation techniques, use a stepby-step process in which the outcome obtained pursuant to one request is used to support the next one. It
helps making important decisions at each stage and adopting corrective measures in a timely fashion.
4 Videoconferences, face-to-face meetings and instant message groups are important tools to ensure
coordination. They should aim at the identification of the executing authority, the definition of execution
parameters and the anticipation of possible obstacles to overcome.
4 Due to jurisdictional matters, consider creating joint investigation teams to deal with cases involving
the execution of controlled deliveries, electronic surveillance or covert operations.
＊ In 2015, the Netherlands requested assistance to conduct a controlled delivery of cocaine supposed to be
shipped from a Brazilian port in a three-day time frame. Many flash videoconferences were run to coordinate
the measures among the border control and customs authorities involved in both jurisdictions. In order toprevent causing a stir at the harbour, the original request of installing a GSM tracking device was abandoned infavour of the infiltration of Brazilian and Dutch policemen to monitor the cargo in each territorial sea andattend to the chain of custody from one tip to the other. Brazilian and Dutch warrants were granted in time andthe drugs shipped reached the Netherlands under full surveillance, allowing the identification of high-value
targets, the seizure of the cocaine smuggled and the arrest of port authorities and several members of the gang.

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4. Barriers Related to the Identification of Relevant Information about Domestic Cases Abroad
Proposal:
4 Transnational crimes always leave leads on both sides. Enforce and foster spontaneous disclosures,
intelligence sharing and proactive discussion.
＊ As a member of the Network of Anti-drug Prosecutors in Iberoamerica (RFAI), Brazil has recently
joined the “Bogotá Protocol”, an intelligence sharing platform related to drug trafficking through container
shipments. It has delivered great results and proven to be a hallmark of success in preventing and combating
trafficking inside containers, thus the slight broadening of its scope to include air cargo shipments and joint
investigation teams. Other countries have applied to join the Protocol, such as Belgium and the Netherlands.

28

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL COOPERATION IN THE
EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIESʼ INVESTIGATIONS OF ILLICIT DRUG
TRAFFICKING
Mohamed Habib＊

I. INTRODUCTION
Drug trafficking is a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale ofsubstances which are subject to drug prohibition laws. The national authorities are continuously monitoring
and researching global illicit drug markets in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of theirdynamics, but practice shows that combating such phenomena requires cooperation and coordination
between the various authorities at different levels. The investigation of illicit drug trafficking is a key part ofthis research, as it seeks the importance of cooperation between the domestic authorities combating the illicit
drug trafficking on the one hand and the cooperation on the international level between the law enforcement
agencies on the other. This paper will give an overview on the drug situation in Egypt, the legal framework of
combating the illicit drug trafficking and the national anti-drug institutions. Then the paper will discuss theimportance of cooperation in general and judicial cooperation in particular on both the national andinternational levels.

II. GENERAL DRUG SITUATION IN EGYPT
Egypt is not a significant producer or consumer of narcotics or precursor chemicals, despite the fact that
opium poppy and cannabis plants are grown in Egypt. The substances that are most commonly abused arecannabis, which is known in Egypt as bango (cannabis herb), hashish (cannabis) and legitimate
pharmaceuticals1. Egyptʼs long and mostly uninhabited borders, combined with the high level of shipping
passing through the Suez Canal Zone, have made Egypt prone to the transshipment of Asian heroin. Egypt is
considered a transit point for Southwest Asian and Southeast Asian heroin and opium moving to Europe,
Africa, and the US. It is also considered as a transit stop for Nigerian couriers2. Other types of narcotics
periodically pass through Cairo International Airport. Transshipment has diminished considerably in recent
years due to the elevation of security in Egypt and the region as a whole.
A 2003 study conducted by the Government of Egypt showed that the narcotics problem costs the
Egyptian economy approximately $800 million annually, including the amount spent on illegal drugs and what
the government spends to combat the problem. The most commonly seized drug in the country is cannabis,in a variety of forms. In the first three quarters of 2011, more than 52,000 kg of cannabis was seized by antidrug authorities in Egypt. In addition to this, close to 70 acres of illicit cannabis plantations were destroyed3.
Synthetic designer drugs are also rife in Egypt, and during the first three quarters of 2011 more than 45
million psychotropic pills were seized. As a large-scale producer of cold medicines, Egypt is a major importerof ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, important precursor chemicals for the production of the drug
methamphetamine. It is feared that these chemicals may be being diverted to illicit drug laboratories.
Research by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime suggests that approximately 0.44% of 15-64 year
olds in the country use opiate drugs, while 0.5% take amphetamines. 6.2% of 15-64-year-old Egyptians are
estimated to use cannabis. 50. 1% of those seeking treatment for drug abuse are estimated to do so forcannabis use. 42.7% do so for opiate/opioid drug addiction4.
Chief Prosecutor, Member of the Technical Office of the Court of Cassation, Cairo, Egypt.
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/egypt/egypt_country_profile.pdf., accessed on March 21st, 2018.
2
United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control, March 2010, Egypt Profile, p. 262.
3
Dr. Dalal ABD EL WAHAB, General Secretary of Mental Health, DRUG SITUATION AND POLICY, 2014, https://rm.coe.
int/drug-situation-and-policy-by-dr-dalal-abd-el-wahab-general-secretary-o/168075f0e5.
＊
1

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III. THE LEGAL FRAMWORK OF ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING IN EGYPT
A. On the International Level
Egypt is party to the three major international drug control treaties: the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs of 1961 (as amended in 1972), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the United
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.5
Also, it ratified the crime-related treaties, such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption(UNCAC, Feb. 2005) and the United Nations Convention against Trans-National Organized Crime (UNTOC)
and two of its protocols: A- Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, B- Protocol
against Smuggling of Migrants. (March 2004).
The abovementioned treaties are considered to be legal instruments for the Egyptian authorities as they
are legally binding documents according to the Egyptian constitution6. In addition, the Egyptian authorities
use those treaties as legal bases for international judicial cooperation between the Egyptian judicial
authorities and the foreign judicial authorities.
B. On the National Level
1. Law No. 182 / 1960 for Combating Narcotic Substances, Organizing its Usage and Selling Them
The law was issued on June 6, 1960 and published in the Egyptian Official Gazette on June 13, 1960. It
consists of 56 articles divided into 9 chapters, and 6 tables are attached thereto. Chapter One is named
narcotic substances and contains the general rule which prohibits anyone from importing, exporting,producing, owning, possessing, or buying or selling narcotic substances or exchanging them or distributing
them without a license. Chapter Two provides regulations for the import, export and transport of narcotic
substances. Chapter Three deals with drug trafficking and the necessary regulations and permissions needed
to legitimate trafficking. Chapter Four deals with the trade of narcotic substances through pharmacies andregulates the work of the pharmacists. Chapter Five prohibits the production, extraction, separation or
manufacture of any substance of the narcotic substances. Chapter Six deals with the materials that are
subject to certain restrictions as narcotic substances. Chapter Seven deals with the plants that are prohibited
to be cultivated. Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine deal with the general rules and penalties of the crimes
stipulated in the law.
2. Rules Stipulated in the Law(i) The law adopted sanctions depending on the seriousness of the offender and the gravity of the crime tothe society, Article 33 stipulates the penalty of capital punishment for those who export or import without alicense the narcotic substances provided for in Article 3, as well as those who produced, mined, separated or
manufactured drug substances for the purpose of trafficking.
Article 34 adopted the penalty of capital punishment or life imprisonment for the category of less serious
offenders than those referred to in the preceding article, a group of drug traffickers and plant cultivators
which are mentioned in the table (No. 5) and traffickers, as well as persons who had licenses for the possessionof drugs to use for certain purposes where certain acted in any way other than those purposes, and offenders
who conducted or prepared a place for drug abuse. Finally, Article 35 deals with the case of providing
narcotic substances for abuse without charge or facilitating drug abuse, which is punished with a sentence oflife imprisonment.
(ii) Article 37 stipulates slightly less harsh penalties in order to deal with criminals for the possession of
narcotic substances for personal use and made the penalty of imprisonment and a fine of ten thousand EGP to
Fifty thousand EGP. However, the second paragraph of Article 37 allowed the courts in the case of a
http://www.ginad.org/en/world/countries/65/egypt, accessed March 21, 2018.
Egypt ratified Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, as amended by the Protocol amending the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs on Jan 14th, 1974. Also, ratified the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 on June 14th, 1972. Finallyratified the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs on March 15th, 1991. Check http://www.unodc.
org/unodc/en/treaties/index.html) accessed march 21, 20186
Article 151 of the Egyptian Constitution (www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf?lang = ar) accessed March
21, 2018.
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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

convicted addict to refer him or her to a specialized facility for treatment rather than imprisonment. This
compulsory admission starts from 6 months and does not exceed 3 years, during which monitoring andevaluation of treatment is to be performed by a multidisciplinary committee. However, such article is inactive
for unknown reasons.7(iii) The law stipulated in Article 38 the punishment of the person who has been in the status of possessionof narcotic substances with no intention of trafficking or the handling for personal use so the law covers all
the practical cases as no holder of narcotic substances will go unpunished.
(iv) The law criminalizes, in article 33(d), criminal organized groups. The law reads as follows:
Anyone even if he/she is abroad, who forms a gang or manages it or interferes in its management or
its organization or joins it or participates in it and its purpose was trafficking in narcotic substances orsubmitting it for abuse or committing any of the crimes set forth in this article inside the country.
The abovementioned crime considers an application to the criminal organized group within theprospective of the Egyptian legislation for combating narcotic substances. However, this crime has somedifficulty in practice as the definition of gang is not clarified in the article or the number of persons that isneeded to label them as a gang. In addition, the law does not mention any conditions related to the hierarchyof the persons who participated in the gang.
Those gaps in the article gave judicial precedents wide authority to characterize the merits of the casesand develop the legal principles that govern such criminalization of gangs. It is worth mentioning, thecriminal organized group has been defined in the Egyptian legal system, but not in the context of the Law on
Combating Human Trafficking and the Law on Combating Smuggling of Migrants8.
3. Pharmacy Law No. 127/1955
The law was issued on March 10, 1955. It consists of 96 articles divided into 8 chapters. The law mainly
deals with the regulations and conditions needed to work as a pharmacist or open a pharmacy. However, thelaw stipulated detailed rules regarding the importing and manufacturing of drugs and other substances that
may be used for medical purposes, but it lays within the category of narcotic substances.
4. The Anti-Money Laundering Law Issued by Law No. (80) for 2002 as Amended.
The Anti-Money laundering law was promulgated by law No. 80 for 2002; the Law was amended threetimes; by virtue of Law No. 78 for the year 2003, then by virtue of Law No. 181 for the year 2008 and by virtueof Law No. 36 for the year 2014.
It is worth mentioning that the old approach of the Egyptian legislator in that law was to determine andlist the predicate offences which may generate proceeds used in money laundering activities. The modern
approach of the Egyptian legislator did not adopt the old trend and specifies the predicate offences but
contains a provision that defines the predicate offences generally as follows9: “Every act that constitutes afelony or misdemeanor under Egyptian law, whether the crimes are committed within the Egyptian
territories or abroad, provided that such crimes are penalized by both Egyptian and foreign laws”.
To sum up, the Anti-Money Laundering Law allows the initiation of money laundering investigations incases where the illicit drug trafficking crime generated proceeds to be laundered.

IV. NATIONAL ANTI-DRUG INSTITUTIONSThere are many institutions that deal with illicit drug trafficking domestically. Some of the institutions
provide medical care to others for the prevention and raising the awareness, in addition to the law
Ibid, 3; Usually the courts are reluctant to apply such article due to security issues and less trust in the abilities of thespecialized facilities to monitor the convicted person.
8
Article 1 of The Law No. 82 of 2016 on Combating Illegal Migration & Smuggling of Migrants, article 1 of The Law No. 64 of2010 on combating Human Trafficking.
9
Article 1(c) of law no 80/ 2002, http://www.mlcu.org.eg/AML%20law%20En.pdf, accessed march 21, 2018.
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enforcement agencies (police, prosecution, customs, border control and immigration authorities), which play
an important role in tracing the crime and the perpetrators to bring them to justice for deterrence. This
paper will shed light upon three main national institutions that play an essential role in combating the crimefrom two different perspectives.
A. Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA)The Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA) is Egyptʼs main agency responsible for overseeing
anti-drug operations in the country. It is a specialized department in the Ministry of Interior (Police). To thisend it undertakes a range of activities, including intercepting drug smuggling operations, seizing illicit drug
manufacturing facilities and equipment, and confiscating drug proceeds. ANGA was first established in 1929,
making it one of the oldest anti-drug organizations in the Arab world. It works with national law enforcement
agencies and with foreign anti-narcotics agencies to achieve the aims of preventing the supply of illicit
substances. In the past it has cooperated successfully on numerous occasions with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) of the US, resulting in the seizure of large amounts of narcotics and drug-related
proceeds. Though Egypt is not a major producing country, limited growth of cannabis and opium takes placein the Sinai region, and ANGA carries out regular crop eradication activities. The agency also carries out
drug awareness activities and is involved in a number of programmes to reduce the amount of drug abuse
that takes place10.
Based on the ANGA report for the year 2004, in the general framework of the Ministry of Interiorʼstackling of the narcotic drug cultivations in the Sinai Peninsula, ANGA prepared a comprehensive plan incooperation with the Central Security Forces and the Armed Forces, to fulfil the following objectives: (i)destroying illicit cultivations in rigid and remote areas; (ii) arresting cultivators and tools used for cultivation;(iii) attacking storage places of bango (cannabis herb) after collecting it; (iv) imposing tight control on alloutlets, and smuggling areas from the Sinai to other governorates11.
According to the US State Department 2005 report, late in 2004, a joint DEA-ANGA investigation
uncovered an MDMA laboratory located in a small apartment building in Alexandria, Egypt. ANGA raided
the laboratory, arresting four individuals and seizing chemicals, paste, and equipment. This was the first
known discovery of an MDMA laboratory in Egypt, and according to the DEA, the first in the Middle East,and may represent a new trend toward shifting artificial drug labs to the region due to the regionʼs relatively
lax regulation of commercial chemical products. With the passage of the first anti-money-laundering law in
2002, which criminalized the laundering of proceeds derived from trafficking in narcotics and numerous othercrimes, seizures of currency in drug related cases has amounted to over 3,000,000 Egyptian Pounds ($485,000)12.
B. The Public Prosecution
In Egypt, the Public Prosecution is considered one of the most important authorities based on its role in
the effective enforcement of the rule of law and its concern with the protection of human rights. This isreflected in the review of its functions, characteristics and independence.
The Judicial Authority Law (JAL)13 defines the Public Prosecution as the legal representative of thecommunity in initiating criminal proceedings and is presided over by the Prosecutor General followed by theAssistant Prosecutor General, Senior Attorney General, Attorney General, Chief Prosecutors, Public
Prosecutor, and assistants.
The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt affirms the independence of the Public Prosecution and isan integral part of the judiciary. Article 189 of the Constitution states that:“The Public Prosecution is an integral part of the judiciary, which undertakes investigation and theinitiation and prosecution of criminal proceedings except for what is excluded by law.”https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol1/238967.htm, accessed on March 21, 2018.
Ibid 3.
12
United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control, March 2007, Egypt report, p. 529.
13
The Judicial Authority Law no. 46 for the year 1972, issued and published on 5 October 1972.
10
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Article 67 of the JAL states that the members of the Public Prosecution cannot be dismissed like otherjudges. Article 26 of the same law states that prosecutors are subordinate to their superiors in order of rank
and then to the Attorney General.
The Public Prosecution is responsible for investigating crimes as part of the judicial authority in Egypt, as
it enjoys impartiality and independence. It also combines the powers of investigation and indictment. Under
the investigation authority, it controls all interrogation procedures from questioning the accused, crossexamining witnesses and collecting evidence that enables it to show the truth in the case, either to acquit thedefendant or to convict him.
The Public Prosecution shall prepare the decision of referral and bring the criminal case before thecompetent criminal court as a party representing the society vis-à-vis the accused. The role of the Public
Prosecution shall be governed at the trial stage by the principle of confrontation between the litigants. The
jurisdiction of the Public Prosecution extends to all parts of the Egyptian territory, including all crimes
committed therein, as well as crimes committed by Egyptians outside the Egyptian territory in accordancewith article 3 of the Egyptian Penal Code.
1. The Public Prosecutionʼs role in International Judicial Cooperation
 Egypt has concluded several treaties on the exchange of legal assistance and extradition with many
countries all over the world. These treaties are all aimed at achieving justice, arresting theperpetrators and preventing them from escaping justice.
 The Public Prosecution benefits from those mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties as it
performs the duties and responsibilities entrusted to it by virtue of those treaties.
 It submits requests to extradite fugitives to other countries for prosecution for crimes committed in
Egypt, and in turn it responds to requests for extradition submitted to them by other countries.
 In the absence of bilateral or multilateral treaties, the Public Prosecution responds to requests forjudicial and legal assistance and extradition on the basis of the principle of reciprocity, as long as
they do not conflict with Egyptʼs sovereignty, national security, public order or legal system.
2. The International Cooperation Office of the Prosecutor General Office
On 19 October 1999, the Prosecutor General issued Decree No. 1884 of 1999 on the establishment of the
Office of International Cooperation, the enforcement of judicial sentences and the welfare of prisoners. It is
mandated to examine and execute all requests of international judicial cooperation referred by the Central
Authority and to review the papers of the requests then to be reported to the Prosecutor General who has
the authority to give the final decision either to accept or refuse the assistance in light of the information
attached to the request. The requesting State may be asked to provide any additional information or
documents if it seems that the information and documents submitted are insufficient.
C. National Council for Combating and Treating Addiction (NCCTA)
The National Council for Combating and Treating Addiction (NCCTA) is a governmental body
responsible for the programme to reduce demand for illicit drugs in Egypt. It was first established in 1986,
and today its primary activities are training drug treatment and rehabilitation workers and mounting drugawareness campaigns.

V. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONThe need for cooperation is essential to combat illicit drug trafficking. Cooperation between the relevant
institutions takes place domestically and on the international level.
A. Cooperation on the National Level
Practice has shown the crime of illicit drug trafficking has completely changed, in terms of theperpetrators of the crime and the means used to commit it. The recent cases show that the criminal acts doneby criminal organizations follow a regime and plan to conceal their activities and protect their business.
Further, to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations, it is essential to identify, investigate, prosecute and
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punish high value targets, i.e. leaders of the organizations, and there is a need of multi-agency cooperationand coordination on the domestic level to combat the illicit drug trafficking. The information and evidence
obtained are very important for investigation and prosecution because they show how illicit drugs were
found and how the criminal behaved at that time, thus clarifying the situation of the possession anddemonstrating the illicit intention of the criminals.
Thus, clear strategy and MOUs between the authorities working in the field is essential and may improve
the quality of evidence in illicit drug trafficking cases. It is important that the relevant authorities exchange
views and share the barriers and good practices among them. This will lead to strong cases and everyone will
be updated on the new forms and techniques of the criminals and their plans of how they commit crimes.
B. Cooperation on the International Level
Cooperation on the international level can be between different institutions, either between Law
Enforcement Agencies (police to police), Judicial Authorities, and treatment or policy institutions.
This part of the paper will focus on international cooperation between the law enforcement agencies andthe judicial authorities. International judicial cooperation which happens between the national and foreignauthorities has played an essential role in the recent cases of illicit drug trafficking that involve criminalorganized groups where their criminal acts are committed in different territories. The role played byinternational judicial cooperation assists in solving the dilemma of the cases by gathering the evidence,
attaching testimony needed, capturing the illegal narcotic substances, tracing the proceeds of the crime andextraditing the fugitive criminal.
The means of international cooperation varies from one institution to another, as for the Egyptian
authorities ANGA and the Public Prosecution benefit to the maximum from the means of the international
cooperation available.
For the police-to-police cooperation, the means of cooperation vary in terms of sharing of intelligence
information, the criminal records of suspects, the new types of narcotic substances appearing in the society,and the flow of the illicit drug trafficking.
On the other hand, the most well-known means of international judicial cooperation are as follows: mutual
legal assistance requests, extradition requests, transfer of convicted persons, asset recovery requests andserving of judicial papers.
Below are some of the good practices of the national anti-drug authorities in the area of international
cooperation.
C. ANGAʼs Experiences in International Cooperation
ANGA has been both a regular and an active participant in the Arab Office for Narcotic Affairs which ispart of the Arab Interior Ministers Council (AMIC) of the League of Arab States. ANGA also regularly
attends Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) meetings.
On June 30, 2003, in cooperation between ANGA in Egypt and Libya, a seizure of cannabis weighing 1150
kg in the port of Masrata in Libya was seized before it was smuggled to Egypt. Also late in 2004, a joint (USDrug Enforcement Administration) DEA-ANGA investigation uncovered an MDMA laboratory located in asmall apartment building in Alexandria, Egypt. ANGA raided the laboratory, arresting four individuals andseizing chemicals, paste, and equipment. This was the first known discovery of an MDMA laboratory in
Egypt, and according to the DEA, the first in the Middle East14.
The activities of ANGA in cooperation with its international partners achieved success in combating illicit
drug trafficking. The practice shows the need for cooperation and coordination in the cases that involve
multi-lateral parties such as criminal organized groups or the crime took place in different territories as theindividual work will not result in successful cases.

14

Ibid 3.

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D. Public Prosecutionʼs Experiences in International Cooperation
As it has been mentioned above, the forms and mechanisms of international cooperation can be summed
up as follows: extradition, mutual legal assistance in criminal matters (MLA), transfer of prisoners, seizureand forfeiture of illicit proceeds of crimes, the recognition of foreign criminal judgements, the transfer ofcriminal proceedings, service of the judicial papers, and joint investigation teams.
Although Egypt does not have domestic law for international judicial cooperation, it is party to various
multilateral and bilateral conventions and treaties15 dealing with international judicial cooperation. The
prosecution office uses those treaties as legal basis for such cooperation. In many cases the prosecution officeuse the tools of international cooperation to fulfill the ongoing investigation that taking place in Egypt,
specifically the MLA requests to collect evidence as testimony or documents for ships and cargos captured
abroad and linked to the investigation in Egypt.
The following case study will demonstrate how the prosecution office can by the means of international
judicial cooperation build a strong case of Illicit drug trafficking.
1. Case Study
The Prosecution Office opened an investigation concerning Narcotic Material (Cannabis) brought into
Egypt by sea.
According to the police investigations conducted jointly by the police officers of the Anti-Narcotics
General Administration (ANGA), three persons (A), (B), (C) were involved. (A) and (B) constituted a criminalgang for bringing cannabis into Egypt from Morocco by sea on board a vessel owned by the accused / (C).
The vessel is known as “Adam” holding the number I.O.M. 08804775 and flying the flag of Comoros. The
defendants aimed to bring such shipment into Egypt with the help of the ship crew, who are of Syrian
nationality, to be unloaded in international waters in the Mediterranean Sea and delivered to several smallboats that would enter into Egypt at different times. The investigation showed that the “Adam” vessel wasshipped before the Moroccan coast having on board a shipment of cannabis, that exceed fifteen tons andapproximately weighted twenty tons, though the international waters of the Mediterranean Sea.
Therefore, the ANGAʼs officers communicated with the American anti-narcotic department in Cairo tonotify the findings of the investigation; accordingly, the vessel was seized on 17 April 2013 by the Italianauthorities and taken to one of the Italian ports on the island of Sicily. On 20 April 2013 the Egyptian Pubic
Prosecution issued a search warrants against the accused (A), accused (B) (son of the first), and accused (C).
The defendant (B) (son of the first accused), and defendant (C) were arrested on 20 April 2013; they werecaught while the first was handing the latter, an amount of money of one hundred thousand US dollars that
believed to be the expenses of the Syrian crew.
Questioning accused (B) (son of the first accused), he denied all charges brought against him stating that
he met A. B. under a request by his father A.S. and the seized amount of money was a down payment for thepurchase of a boat owned to A. B. known as “Noah”. Added that his father is out of the country in the current
period; Questioning A. B. he denied all charges brought against him stating that the seized amount of money
was the deposit for the purchase of the “Adam” vessel not “Noah”, arguing that Omar Ahmed ignored thedeal since it is with his father not him; he added that he knew about the seizure of Adam on 17 April, 2013
because of having narcotic material on board and it was taken to Marsala, Province of Trapani; where hedenied any relation to the seized narcotic saying that itʼs the responsibility of the vesselʼs Captain and its
crew.
Questioning officers of the ANGA, they gave statements in a manner similar to the finding of the reportmentioned above; and listing the names of the Syrian crew. Witnesses added that the crew members are partof the criminal gang that is constituted by the Egyptian defendants with a view to bring cannabis from
Morocco to Egypt; and its role was to bring the illegal narcotic material into Egypt while being fully aware of
On the bilateral level Egypt concluded many judicial cooperation treaties; Arab Countries such as: Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco,
Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, UAE and European countries: France, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Albania,
Romania, (Italy), Switzerland; and the USA.
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the nature of the shipment.
The international cooperation office of the Prosecutor General sent a mutual legal assistance request to
the Italian authorities to give its consent to take the necessary actions to furnish the findings of the ongoinginvestigations conducted by the Italian authorities concerning the seizure of “Adam” that was flying theComoros flag on 17 April 2013, which is kept in Marsala, Province of Trapani, Italy16:
Furnish us the testimonies of the Syrians crew members and matching their data with those set out
at the judicial request. Also to provide us with the nature of the accusations that have been filed
against them in addition to all the data concerning the ongoing investigations carried out by the
Italian authorities in this regard and copies of their passports;



Take the Syrian crewʼs testimonies, if not, concerning their relation with the Egyptian defendants,
and how they received the instructions from the boatʼs owner and to identify him. Also to confront
them, with the outcome of the investigations conducted by the Egyptian authorities, and to bequestioned about the capture incident, the navigation route and the port of destination as well as thereason of their presence in front of the Moroccan coast in case of denying, and how they obtained thenarcotic shipment;Furnish the technical reports regarding the examination of the seized narcotic drugs; while
identifying its precise volume, nature and weight;



Examine the “Adam” and provide us with its data, indicating the whereabouts of the narcotics at thetime of the seizure and how it looked then.

The request was implemented and documents returned from the Italian authorities and the case wasreferred to the court. The competent court rendered its judgement in absentia against the defendants on May
14th, 2017 sentencing them for 10 years in addition to fine and confiscation penalties.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONSThis paper tried to demonstrate the legal framework of the illicit drug trafficking and general drug
situation in Egypt. Although, the laws and institutions in Egypt are playing an important role in combating
the crimes of illicit drug trafficking, the development of the criminal conduct of the criminals requires morecooperation between the relevant authorities on the national and international level.
It is highly advisable that the legislation on combating narcotic substances needs to be amended in thearea of the criminal organized groups, and procedural rules regarding the international judicial cooperation incases of transnational crimes of illicit drug trafficking need to be added.
As for international judicial cooperation, it is important to overcome some procedural challenges. The longprocess of diplomatic channels that the requests shall follow affect the speed of the criminal investigations. It
is important to establish direct contacts between the relevant authorities in the region through regional
networks and platforms and to designate focal points to assist the criminal investigation and allow the flow of
the information and intelligences between the competent authorities.
Finally, there should be an increase in the awareness of the importance of tracing the proceeds of illicit
drug trafficking through initiating money laundering investigation or implementing confiscation sanctions on
the assets located abroad and attributed to the convicted persons by the means of international judicial
cooperation.

This Request is made on the bases of Principle of Reciprocity, the United Nation Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime (UNTOC) (adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000) to which both Egypt and
Italy are members states; the Arab Republic of Egypt signed it on 13 December 2000 and ratified it on 5 March 2004, while Italy
and signed it on 12 December 2000 and ratified it on August 2, 2006; and the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to which
Egypt ratified on 20 Feb. 1967.
16

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ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING IN COTE DʼIVOIRE
Yasmine Keita＊

I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT TRENDS
In 1973, the Economic and Social Council of Côte dʼIvoire was reporting of the spread of drugs in CôtedʼIvoire and highlighted the need for efficient transnational cooperation to fight against illicit drug trafficking:“The drug issue is a fairly recent phenomenon which current development must make us aware that evil
exists, that we must stop it before it is too late and help each other, with our neighbours and other nations, if
we want to achieve concrete results”1.
The strategic geographical position of Côte dʼIvoire, located between the producer countries of Latin
America and Asia and the consumer countries of Europe, and the presence of the most important port inWest Africa, made it a drug-transit country. Then, by dint of crossing the country, drugs ended up affecting
the local populations and the phenomenon of consumption has increased, taking advantage of the migratory
flows and the economic growth.
Until the mid-1980s, the most common drug was cannabis, mainly grown in isolated clandestine
plantations and located in forested areas.
Table A. Cannabis seizures and offenders 1969-1971
Year

Seized and destroyed quantity*

Number of offenders arrested

Ivoirians

1969

13,1

6

5

1970

8

36

7

1971

28,65861

17*Unit: Kilograms
Although there are no official statistics about the scope of cannabis production, studies on the issue showthat its increase was due to the collapse of coffee and cocoa prices on which Côte dʼIvoire had founded its
economy. After their abrupt loss of income, farmers have found a lucrative substitute through the cannabis
crop, which was hidden in tens of hectares of coffee or cocoa plantations.
According to a survey undertaken by the OGD between 1994 and 1995, two thirds of cannabis farmers
in the country began cultivating in response to the price collapse of cocoa and coffee. 22 Cannabis
farmers earn about CFA 500,000 for a sack weighing 20 ‒ 25 kg: CFA 20 ‒ 25,000 per kilo. When crop
yields are taken into account, a farmer who devotes 0. 1 ha to cannabis cultivation can earn theequivalent of 30 ‒ 40 ha of cocoa cultivation.2
While income seeking is the primary driver of cannabis cultivation, its growth must also be consideredwithin the context of local consumption. In addition to domestically produced cannabis, other drugs havespread, including heroin, cocaine and amphetamine-type stimulants introduced by land, air and sea from
Judge, Court of First Instance of Abidjan, Côte dʼIvoire.
Economic and Social Council of Côte dʼIvoire, Rapport sur le problème de la drogue en Côte dʼIvoire, (Abidjan, 1973; pubd
online 2017) <http://ces.ci/accueil/saisinedetail/58> accessed 6 Apr. 2018.
2
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, The Drug Nexus in Africa, (Austria, 1999 ; pubd online 1999)<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/report_1999-03-01_1.pdf> accessed 6 Apr. 2018.
＊
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neighbouring countries ̶ such as Ghana and Nigeria ̶ which are hubs of international traffic.
Table B. Drug seizures from 2010 to 2015
BZDs*

ATS

Year

Cannabis

HeroinCocaineNon-specified

2010

3643,25 kg

0,637 kg

1,995 kg

84880 units

2011*691,207 kg

0,927 kg

0,991 kg

101944 tablets

2012

3991,227 kg

45,341 kg

27,346 kg

116 316tablets

2013

4152,896 kg

4,33 kg

20,947 kg

3422,094 g

1254 kg197136 tablets

2014

2,897 Tons

1,778 kg

9,77 kg

7,273 kg

0,5 kg***12268 kg***

2015

4,02 Tons

0,78 kg

18,08 kg

3,82 kg

96,4 g* Benzodiazepines /** Five months only / *** First six months
Source: www.unodc.org
In 2002, with the country split between a rebel-held North and a government-held South, drug trafficking
actors made the most of the opportunity to implement new modes of consumption. In urban areas, makeshift
shelters for narcotics and psychotropic substance consumption ̶ called fumoirs ̶ were implanted and are
constantly developing. In Côte dʼIvoire there is at least one of these drug areas in each city. At least one
hundred are reported to exist in Abidjan alone. Frequent police demolition operations do not seem to deter
leaders of illicit drug trafficking, who find a significant financial windfall with it.
In the specific case of cocaine smuggling, Côte dʼIvoire remains a transit country that does not play acentral role in the traffic.
Despite being well connected to Europe, Cote dʼIvoire is the source of very few of the couriers and has
had no major seizures associated with its territory. More research would be required to determine
why this country seems to be overlooked by cocaine traffickers, particularly as it was formerly afavourite point for transshipping heroin.3
Figure 1. Detected cocaine couriers on flights to Europe per 100,000 international passengers
by country of embarkation (January 2006-May 2008)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Drug Trafficking As A Security Threat In West Africa, (pubd online November2008) <http: //www. unodc. org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Drug-Trafficking-WestAfrica-English. pdf> accessed 8
Apr. 2018.
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Figure 2. Cocaine seizure volume on flights to Europe by country of embarkation(January 2006-May 2008)

II. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TOOLS
Until the 1980s, Decree No. 53-100 of 5 October 1953 established the Public Health Code that governed
drug offences. Since the adoption of Law No. 88-686 of July 22th 1988 establishing repression against illicit
traffic and use of narcotics, psychotropic substances and poisonous substances, Côte dʼIvoire has had arepressive legal tool. Also, the country has set up specialized structures and agencies to fight against illicit
drug trafficking.
A. Criminal Justice System in Côte dʼIvoire
As a former French colony, Côte dʼIvoire has inherited from France the legal system of Civil Law, as
opposed to the Common Law system, which is mainly found in English-speaking countries. In accordancewith the principle of the right of appeal, in criminal cases as in civil cases, the judicial system is divided
between the Lower Courts ‒ which are the First Instance Courts ‒ and the Upper Courts ‒ or Appeal Courts.
First instance and Appeal Courts judge at the same time the facts and the law, whereas the Supreme Court
rules only on the legality of Lower Courtsʼ decisions.
Criminal courts punish infringements against property, individuals and society. The Penal Code, which
defines and punishes offences, and the Code of Penal Procedure, which establishes the framework of criminal
procedures, distinguish three types of public offences and the relevant courts which have jurisdiction to hearsuch matters. Thereby, contraventions that are minor offences are punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of 2 months and/or a fine that does not exceed CFA 360,000 (650 USD). They are referred to
the Tribunaux de simple police. Offences punishable by more than 2 months and less than 10 years of
imprisonment are called délits and are referred to the Tribunaux correctionnels. Finally, crimes that areserious felonies are heard by the Cours d’Assises, which are composed by three professional judges and six
jury members. When minors4 have committed crimes or délits, juvenile courts and juvenile assize courts aresolely competent to rule on such cases.
In some special cases such as criminal cases, or when the complexity of the case demands it, the Public

4

According to the Penal Code, a minor is a person who has not reached the age of 18 at the time of committing the offence.

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Prosecutor requires the opening of a judicial inquiry. He then seizes an examining judge who is in charge ofconducting investigation within the limits of the mandate given by the prosecutor in his initial indictment5.
This is the inquisitorial system, as opposed to the adversarial system used in Common Law countries.
At the end of his inquiry, if the judge finds that the charges are sufficient, he sends the case to the relevant
court for judgement. In Côte dʼIvoire, the principle of collegiality is applied in such a way that every hearing ispresided over by one judge (called the President) who is assisted by assessors. Most drug cases areinvestigated directly by law enforcement agencies under the supervision of the Public Prosecutor6.
B. The Existing Legal Framework for Investigation and Prosecution of Drug Offences
Côte dʼIvoire is party to the main treaties and conventions in the field of drugs and international crime.
Thus, it has acceded to:(i) The Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs, 1961;(ii) The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971;(iii) The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,
1988;(iv) The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000.
At the national level, the provisions of the 1988 Act punish cultivation, production, manufacture,
extraction, preparation, possession, offering, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any
terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs.
The sentences of imprisonment under this text are severe and the perpetrators of these offences cannot
benefit from extenuating circumstances. For example, possession of drugs for consumption is punishable by aminimum sentence of twelve monthsʼ imprisonment and a fine of CFA 200, 000 (350 USD). Similarly,
possession of drugs for the purpose of sale is punishable by at least five years in prison and a fine of CFA
500,000 (900 USD).
In accordance with the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, an investigator ̶ who shall be a
judicial police officer ̶ reports these offences to the Public Prosecutor, who decides on the mode ofprosecution. He can either choose the procedure known as flagrante delicto or require an investigating judge
to open a judicial inquiry.

A criminal case may be brought before an investigating judge either by the Public Prosecutor as well as a victim. Even in thesecond situation, the judge has to open a case after the initial indictment of the prosecutor. He cannot open a criminal
investigation sua sponte.
6
See paragraph B below.
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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

Chart 1. Investigation and prosecution in drug offence cases

DRUG OFFENCE

Reported by a judicial
police officer

The report comes to the
Public Prosecutor

Procedure offlagrante delicto

Judicial inquiry by
an examining judge

The cases that are referred to the Tribunal most frequently are those of consumption and narcotic sale.
Insofar as these are material offences, the seizure of the drug is one of the crucial elements upon which thejudgeʼs decision rests. Therefore, the investigatorʼs work must be meticulous.
C. Actual Drug Cases
The main cases of drug offences are those of consumption and sale. Two actual cases have been chosen to
be exposed in order to illustrate the current trends. The first one concerns three individuals who werebrought before the Criminal Court on charges of drug consumption. Following anonymous information,
officers of the Department of Narcotics and Drugs police had apprehended those three people and seized 400
grams of cannabis in the vicinity of a fumoir. During the pre-trial investigation, two of them admitted being
found in possession of cannabis, while the third claimed to have been arrested outside the fumoir. At thehearing, they all contested the charges against them. The Court found that the charge against the third
defendant, on whom no drugs had been found, was insufficient, and sentenced each of the two others to
twelve monthsʼ imprisonment and a CFA 200,000 (350 USD) fine, which is the minimum penalty for suchcases. In most of the consumption-related cases, when several people are arrested at the same time, theyoften name their provider or the owner of the fumoir. But the investigatorsʼ task is made difficult by the lackof information, which is most often limited to a nickname.
However, the second example demonstrates the effectiveness of some investigations. In a procedure inwhich two persons had been sentenced for heroin and cocaine sale, the defendant was named as the owner ofseveral fumoirs. Following a radio message from the Police Department of Narcotics and Drugs, the suspect
was arrested and interrogated. He told the investigating officers that he used to supply several drug sellers.
He has been brought before the Correctional Court under the charge of possession of drugs for sale. As he
had not been arrested in possession of drugs, the charge has been modified in that of facilitation to otherpeople of the use of narcotics, and he was sentenced to 10 yearsʼ imprisonment, CFA 10,000,000 (18,000 USD)
fine and his movable and immovable property was confiscated, as it was alleged to be the product of theoffence or to have been used to commit it.
In these two actual cases, as well as in the most common drug-related cases, the preliminary phase led by
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law enforcement agencies is crucial.
D. Governmental Structures and Specialized Agencies
The Ivorian government has set up numerous specialized agencies in charge of hunting and arresting
drug offenders:(i)

The Inter-ministerial Committee to Combat Drug Abuses (CILAD). Created by Decree No. 94-399 ofJuly 28, 1994, this committee coordinates the action of administrations and structures involved inprevention, information, medico-social care and the repression of drug addiction. It is overseen by the
Ministry of the Interior;(ii) The Police Department of Narcotics and Drugs (DPDS);(iii) The Anti-Drug Section of the National Gendarmerie;(iv) The Transnational Organized Crime Unit (UCT). Created by decree No. 2014-675 of November 5,2014 and supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the UCTʼs core mission is tocombat all types of trafficking, fight against corruption and money laundering as well as maritime
piracy. It also has to provide the competent authorities with information for the development ofcontrol strategies and policies and to conduct investigations to gather evidence for prosecution;(v) The Airport Anti-Trafficking Cell. This unit gathers interministerial structures of the National Police,
National Gendarmerie, Customs and Waters and Forestry. It was created as part of the AIRCOP
Project7.
E. International Cooperation
By ratifying the main international conventions on the fight against drugs, Côte dʼIvoire has undertaken tocooperate with other States Parties. It therefore joined two major international projects.
1. Airport Communication Programme (AIRCOP)
This multi-agency project gathers the UNODC, the World Customs Organization (WCO) and theInternational Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) along with 24 countries in Africa, Latin America,
Europe and the Caribbean. Funded by the European Union, Canada, Japan, Norway and the United States, itaims to facilitate joint investigations and rapid exchange of operational information between law enforcement
agencies to promote intelligence-led investigations for intercepting drugs in participating countries.

Source; www.unodc.org
7

See Section C-1 below.

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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

In Côte dʼIvoire, the Joint Airport Interdiction Task Force is now operational, after several training andmonitoring sessions.
2. The West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI)At the regional level, the ECOWAS Action Plan to Address the Growing Problem of Illicit Drug
Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa is backed by the United Nations and
INTERPOL through the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI). It is in a start-up phase in Côte dʼIvoire.
WACI is a joint technical assistance framework aimed at:

8'

Enhancing national enforcement and justice institutions; and to build capacity for better national,
regional and international enforcement cooperation;'

Creating Transnational Organized Crime Units (TCUs) for national inter-agency enforcement
coordination, information exchange and intelligence gathering, and serving as the entry and support
point for regional and international enforcement operations;'

Increasing regional and national capacity-building, primarily in the vulnerable countries, as identified
by ECOWAS (Côte dʼIvoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone);'

Contributing to security sector reform in the WACI countries.8

Presentation of the WACI <http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/newrosenwebsite/TOC/waci.html>

43

DRUG LAWS IN MALAYSIA: WHETHER THE DRUG LAWSHAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE IN CURBING THE DRUG MENACE IN
MALAYSIA
Chandra Segaran Subramaniam＊

I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of drug abuse is really a global problem that has haunted modern society. Its notoriety
practically does not confine itself within specific geographical borders nor differentiate its numerous victims
in terms of ethnicity or the socio-economic status of nations. Malaysia itself is no exception because each year
the statistics of new drug addicts identified has steadily given rise to staggering drug laws around the world,
whereby trafficking in drugs carries the mandatory death penalty or life imprisonment in most of thecountries in South East Asia. Nevertheless, the drug problem seems to have persisted unabated. The problem
is considered more challenging, largely due to its close proximity to the Golden Triangle, the main heroinproducing region. However, the development of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS) such as methamphetamine, which has a bigger market and offered high profits, contributes to the higher prices in Malaysia. This
makes Malaysia particularly attractive for the operation of international drug trafficking syndicates, thus
presenting a big challenge for the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP), in particular the Narcotics Crime
Investigation Department (NCID).
The Royal Malaysia Police (RMP), in particular the Narcotics Crime Investigation Department (NCID), isalways serious and committed in combating illicit drug production, manufacturing, trafficking and abuse in
the country. The drug situation in Malaysia is very much under control with regular detection and disruptionof drug trafficking syndicates, dismantling of clandestine laboratories, seizures of drugs and illegal proceedsof drug traffickers mainly by the NCID, as well as other enforcement agencies such as the Royal Malaysia
Customs, National Anti-Drugs Agency (NADA), the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency and the
Malaysia Border Security Agency (AKSEM).
The objective of this paper is to discuss the issue of the effectiveness of the countryʼs various drug laws,
particularly the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, in combating the drug menace. It is fervently hoped that suchdiscussion will be able to greatly provide an insight to assist the respective authorities in tackling and curbing
the nationʼs drug problems more effectively. The arguments raised in discussing this issue are primarily
based on statistical data obtained from the NCID of the RMP. Despite their deficiencies, police statistics arecloser to the real amount of crime than other statistics.

II. MALAYSIA DRUG SITUATION: THE FOUR DRUG WAVES
During the nineteenth century, the colonial British master that governed Malaya, as Malaysia was thenknown, recruited labourers from China and India respectively to develop the abundant tin mines and rubber
plantations. These labourers brought along with them their habits of opium smoking and marijuana. This
period, which can be identified as the countryʼs first drug wave, has now almost vanished except for
marijuana abuse.
Subsequently the trend of drugs has changed from being opiate-based (heroin, morphine, marijuana) which
are depressants to amphetamine-based (ecstasy, amphetamine, yaba pills), which are stimulants regarded as
the countryʼs second and third drug waves. The emergence of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) in theworld, in what can be called now the fourth drug wave, was first detected in Europe about three years ago,
and about 800 types have been in the market. In Malaysia, we have already traced 20 types of NPS, but we
can only take action on seven of them, as they are listed under the Poisons Act 1952. Although the Malaysian＊

Head of Legal/Investigation Unit, Narcotics Crime Investigation Department, Royal Malaysia Police.

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authorities have been working round the clock to combat the spread of illegal drugs, the fight is hampered by
global demand.

III. DOMESTIC DRUG LAWS
In order to control and curb the drug menace, Malaysia enacted the following five relevant drug laws
namely:A. Dangerous Drugs Act 1952
This is the countryʼs main drug law which regulates the importation, manufacturing, selling, possessing,exporting and usage of all types of drugs. Besides, that, it also provides for the punishment for various drugs
offences under the Act, which includes the mandatory death sentence for drug trafficking. Recently there aremany significant developments in this Act which have drastically transformed the legal jurisprudence in thisbranch of the criminal law. One such significant change is the amendment to Section 39B of the Act of which
the judge has discretionary power to impose life imprisonment and not less than 15 strokes on conviction
instead of the death penalty. However, the courtʼs discretionary power is subject to certain conditions, and,
importantly, the accused has an obligation to assist the enforcement agencies, particularly the NCID, indisrupting drug trafficking within or outside of Malaysia (see Appendix 1). Prior to the amendment, the trial
judge had no discretionary power even if the accused may have assisted the enforcement agencies. The trial
judge handling the case is forced to impose the death sentence on conviction since there is no other penalty
provided in that law. With this amendment, the accused has the option to cooperate with the enforcement
agencies for a lighter sentence. The word “assist” is not defined in the Act and this may lead to someuncertainty, and perhaps controversies, in determining to what extent the accused needs to assist theenforcement agencies. This new amendment came into force on 15th March 2018.
The other change is the introduction of a new section 37A in the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 which allows
the invocation of multiple presumptions. These multiple presumptions have indeed been effectively buried in
Muhammad bin Hassan v PP1. In that case, the court gave a clear distinction between the word “deemed”
used in s. 37(d)2 and the word “found” employed in s. 37(da)3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. The court wasof the view that the word “deemed” possession in section 37(d) is by operation of law and there is no necessity
to prove how that particular state of affairs is arrived at. There need only be established the basic or primaryfacts necessary to give rise to that state of affairs, i.e. the finding of custody or control. The word “found” inthe operative phrase of section 37(da), on the other hand, connotes a finding after a trial by the court. Thus, tocome to the presumptions of possession and knowledge under section 37(d), one need only to arrive at afinding of having had “in custody or under control anything whatsoever containing” the drug (as opposed tothe drug itself), whereas to arrive at the presumption of “trafficking” under section 37(da), a finding of being“in possession” of the drug is necessary, in addition to proof of the relevant minimum quantity specified. To
conclude, the court opined that once the presumption of possession under section 37(d) has been invoked, thenthe prosecution cannot resort to another presumption of trafficking under section 37(da) of the Act. The
introduction of double presumption in Section 37A of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 is indeed a setback to
Malaysian jurisprudence and impliedly overruled the decision made in Muhammad bin Hassan v PP4.
It has been claimed that the law nowadays has become more draconian, but in a series of recent decisions
from the superior courts which, in essence, ruled that the accused is entitled to a fair trial and if those rights
are violated, the conviction cannot be sustained, may bring comfort to some. Some of these cases include
Prasit Punyang v PP5 and Zulkefly bin Had v PP6. They echoed the “right to a fair trial” principle propoundedin Lee Kwan Woh v PP7.
(1988) 2 CLJ 170
Section 37(d) any person who is found to have had in his custody or under his control anything whatsoever containing any
dangerous drug shall, until the contrary is proved, be deemed to have been in possession of such drug and shall, until thecontrary is proved, be deemed to have known the nature of such drug;
3
Section 37 (da) any person who is found in possession of :4
Supra, n. 1.
5(2014) 7 CLJ 392
6(2014) 6 CLJ 64.
7(2009) 5 CLJ.
1
2

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In Prasit Punyang v PP8, the court opined that there was merit in the contention of the appellant. In
accordance with the provisions of s. 182A (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code9, it was the duty of the presiding
Judge, at the conclusion of the trial, to consider all the evidence adduced before him. The legislature hadadvisedly used the term “all the evidence”. The emphasis must be on the word “all”. The cautioned statement
tendered by the appellant was evidence which the Judge should have taken into consideration in order tomake a finding whether or not the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
The Judge must consider carefully whether the cautioned statement was capable of raising a reasonable
doubt as to the prosecutionʼs case. The appellantʼs cautioned statement was recorded a day after the arrest of
the appellant. It was important, therefore, to point out that the appellant had mentioned the basic facts of his
defence at a very early stage of the police investigation against him that the drugs found in his bag belonged
to him, and they were brought upon request by one “Mail” and he has no idea about the drug hidden in theboat. Accordingly, the defence of the appellant was not something that was sprung for the first time in the
defence case. The evidence led by the prosecution left questions unanswered, especially the role of “Mail”.
The fact that the defence was not a recent fabrication was supported by the contents of the appellantʼs
cautioned statement which was substantially similar to the defence advanced.
Meanwhile in Zulkefly bin Had10, the trial judge failed to appreciate and give due consideration to thedefenceʼs evidence adduced by the appellant. The issue or fact of whether the drugs were found in car PBH
1632 or AEQ 5321 was a pivotal and primary fact in this case. The trial judge had also failed to consider thetestimony of the accusedʼs wife, which had supported that of the appellant about his involvement with the carin which the drugs were found. Even though the prosecution witness who acted as Agent Provocateur (AP)
had testified that he had constantly contacted the appellant via mobile phone until the later stage before thearrest and an ambush was carried out, there was no mobile phone belonging to the appellant tendered inevidence or any seizure made of the said mobile phone. The seizure form had also not disclosed any mobile
phones seized from the appellant. Doubt as to this APʼs veracity was raised, and the trial judge had not taken
this witness statement into consideration at all. The failure of the trial judge in making a critical analysis of
the APʼs evidence, which was the main thrust of the prosecutionʼs case against the appellant, was also anoversight and a fundamental failure warranting appellate intervention.
In Lee Kwan Woh11, at the close of the prosecutionʼs case, the learned trial judge ruled that he did notwish to hear submissions as he was satisfied that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case as requiredby s. 180(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code12. This ruling formed the first ground of complaint in this case.
The second complaint is that the learned trial judge failed to judicially appreciate the evidence, thereby
misdirecting himself, which misdirection has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Taking the first ground, theissue here is whether a court acting under s. 180(1) is entitled ̶ to quote from the subsection ̶ to “consider
whether the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused” without affording the accused
an opportunity to make a submission of no case. No doubt the subsection does not expressly confer such aright upon an accused. However, counsel submitted that his client has a constitutionally guaranteed right to afair procedure by virtue of Article 5 (1) of the Federal Constitution. He argued that this right had been
Supra n. 2.
(1) At the conclusion of the trial, the Court shall consider all the evidence adduced before it and shall decide whether theprosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.
(2) If the Court finds that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall find the accused guilty
and he may be convicted on it.
(3) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, the Court shall record an order ofacquittal
10(2014) 6 CLJ 64.
11(2009) 5 CLJ 631.
12(1) When the case for the prosecution is concluded, the Court shall consider whether the prosecution has made out a prima
facie case against the accused.
(2) If the Court finds that the prosecution has not made out a prima facie case against the accused, the Court shall record anorder of acquittal.
(3) If the Court finds that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused on the offence charged the Court shall callupon the accused to enter on his defence.
(4) For the purpose of this section, a prima facie case is made out against the accused where the prosecution has adduced
credible evidence proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction.
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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

violated by reason of the learned judgeʼs ruling. This is an important submission and calls for carefulconsideration. Whether the right claimed in the instant case exists at all turns on the interpretation of Article
5(1) which provides that: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty, save in accordance withlaw”. Before we embark upon that interpretive exercise, it is important to bear in mind the principles thatgovern the interpretation of the Federal Constitution.
In the first place, the Federal Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation. Though by definition it isa written law, it is not an ordinary statute. Hence, it ought not to be interpreted by the use of the canons ofconstruction that are employed as guides for the interpretation of ordinary statutes. Indeed the prismaticinterpretation of the Constitution gives life to abstract concepts such as “life” and “personal liberty” in Article
5(1), and it confers on our citizens the most cherished of human rights̶it must on no account be given aliteral meaning. It should not be read as a last will and testament.
More importantly, the majority of the court also accepted the omnipresence of Article 8 (1) of theConstitution13 when interpreting its other provisions. And that brings us to the next principle ofinterpretation.
The third principle in this case is when interpreting the other provisions of the Federal Constitution, inparticular, those appearing in Part II14 thereof, we must do so in light of what has been correctly referred toas the humanising and all pervading provisions of Article 8(1). That article reads: “All persons are equal
before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law”. That article guarantees fairness of all forms ofState action. When Article 5(1) is read prismatically and in the light of Article 8(1), the concepts of “life” and“personal liberty” housed in the former are found to contain in them other rights. Thus, “life” means morethan mere animal existence and includes such rights as livelihood and the quality of life. “Personal liberty”
includes other rights such as the right to travel abroad. In Loh Wai Kong v. Government of Malaysia,15 thecourt said that “personal liberty” includes “liberty to a person not only in the sense of not being incarcerated
or restricted to live in any portion of the country but also includes the right to cross the frontiers in order toenter or leave the country when one so desires.”In this case the court16 also considered the expression “according to law” appearing in Article 5(1). The
expression “law” includes procedural law. Here the point is not whether the question of procedure is more
important under one Constitution than under the other. If the expression ʻin accordance with lawʼ were to beconstrued as to exclude procedure, then it would make nonsense of Article 5 of the Federal Constitution.
The law on the identity of exhibits has also undergone a radical change. A discrepancy in weight alone is
not sufficient to dislodge the case for the prosecution. The question the court has to ask itself now is, whether
the exhibit produced has passed the test of reliability? If the answer is in the affirmative, the identity is no
issue as stated in Lew Wai Loon v PP17 . In this case the appellant, charged with the offence of trafficking in
2,831 grams of heroin under section 39B(1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, was sentenced to death by
the High Court upon being found guilty as charged. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal and hence,
appeals to the apex court. The appellantʼs appeal was confined to one ground, i.e., that there existed serious
doubt as to the identity of the drug exhibit. The appellant submitted that there were discrepancies in the
gross weights of the drug exhibits. The three different gross weights of the drug exhibits alleged by theappellant were, inter alia: (i) 3.5 kg given by SP1, the Head of the Narcotics Department at Kuala Lumpur
International Airport (KLIA) who found the drugs with the appellant; (ii) 3, 720 grams given by SP9, theforensic unit officer; and (iii) 3,703.8 grams given by SP3, the chemist. The appellant further submitted thatthe mere statement by the investigating officer (ʻSP7ʼ) and SP9, that the weighing scales used by them were
not calibrated, without scientific evidence to show that the scales were not accurate, was not good law. The
appellant also submitted that there was a break in the chain of evidence in the handling of the drug exhibit as
there was no explanation given on the movement of the drug exhibit. On the other hand, the prosecution
Article 8(1) of the Federal Constitution says, “All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of thelaw”.
14Part II of the Federal Constitution is pertaining to Fundamental Liberties from Article 5 to 13.
15[19781] LNS 106; [1978]2 MLJ 175.
16
Lee Kwan Woh (2009) 5 CLJ 631.
17(2014) 2 CLJ 649.
13

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submitted that the relevant witnesses had explained the discrepancies on the drug exhibit. It was submitted
by the prosecution that the differences in the weights given was due to the types of weighing machines usedby the respective witnesses and as such, there was explanation given for the variations in the weights. In
dismissing the appeal the court opined that the discrepancy in the weight of the drug alone should not ipso
facto cast doubt on its identity. There are other primary factors to consider such as the facts and/or events
that form the foundation for its admission as a piece of evidence. One fact and/or event to consider waswhether there was any break in the handling or custody which tantamount to a break in the chain ofevidence which, if occurred, should cast doubt in the exhibit as a reliable and trustworthy piece of evidence.
In the instant case, the discrepancies as to the weight of the drugs, although not necessary, were explained by
SP1, SP7 and SP9. The obvious explanation for the discrepancies in the weight of the drug exhibit as obtainedby SP1, SP7 and SP9 was due to their use of uncalibrated weighing machines as compared to the weightobtained by SP3 who used a calibrated weighing machine. Although their explanations might not have beennecessary, the explanation was given or could easily be inferred from their testimonies.
Further the drug exhibit admitted in evidence in this case was the same as those seized by SP1 at the
KLIA. SP1 who marked the drug exhibit before passing it to SP7 testified and confirmed that it was the same
drug exhibit that he seized from the appellant at KLIA. The unchallenged confirmation by SP1 should begiven due consideration in determining that there was no issue of doubt in the identity of the drug exhibit.
This was one of the facts and events that formed the foundation not only for the admission in evidence of the
drug exhibit but also its reliability and trustworthiness as a piece of evidence.
In regard of agent provocateurs, which represent the prosecutionʼs most effective arsenal in drugtrafficking cases as the evidence of an agent provocateur is to be given special treatment. Their evidence isalways admissible and his credit worthiness presumed. However, in the decision by the apex court in Wan
Mohd. Azman Hassan v PP18, apart from its comprehensive discussion on the law on agent provocateurs, it
opens a window for the defence to argue that entrapment ought to be considered in determining the
culpability of the accused in certain situations. Under section 40A of the Act19, the evidence of the agent
provocateur cannot be excluded in the exercise of judicial discretion. Otherwise admissible evidence such as
this one under section 40A20 of the Act does not become inadmissible merely because it had been improperlyor unfairly obtained. Section 40A (2) of the Act21 affirms this admission notwithstanding any other laws,
written or otherwise, to the contrary. He may thus relate the full story of what happened in his negotiations
with the drugs seller and any statements made by the latter to him shall be admissible in evidence.
The common law position that entrapment is not a substantive defence remains the law. In any event, it isfor the appellant to prove that he committed this offence as a result of an entrapment. This can only be
determined from the facts to be evaluated by the trial court. In other words it is a question of fact. As there
was no finding of facts on this issue by the trial court the issue of entrapment as a defence did not arise in thiscase. On this point alone, it demolished the argument raised by the appellant. For the defence to operate at all,the appellant needed to show that he was actually an “unwary innocent” who would not, but for theentrapment, have committed this offence. The facts in this case however show that the appellant was aperson with an opposite disposition; i.e., that of an “unwary criminal” who readily participated in the offence.
In this case, at worst, SP3ʼs action can only be described as soliciting the appellant to supply the drugs. There
was no entrapment as such.
The court22 was of the view that, in the fight against the drug menace, Parliament has deemed it fit that
evidence of an agent provocateur be admissible without any restrictions. The trial judge is no longer vested(2010) 4 CLJ 529
Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 ‒ Section 40(1) Notwithstanding any rule of law or the provisions of this Act or any other written
law to the contrary, no agent provocateur shall be presumed to be unworthy of credit by reason only of his having attempted toabet or abetted the commission of an offence by any person under this Act if the attempt to abet or abetment was for the sole
purpose of securing evidence against such person.
20
ibid
21
Ibid-Section 40A (2) Notwithstanding any rule of law or this Act or any other written law to the contrary, and that the agent
provocateur is a police officer whatever his rank or any officer of customs, any statement, whether oral or in writing made to anagent provocateur by any person who subsequently is charged with an offence under this Act shall be admissible as evidence at
his trial.
22
Supra No. 18
18
19

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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

with discretion to exclude such evidence. The court is only to interpret legislation and not to add newelements, especially when the words in statutes are clear and unambiguous. There is thus no further need tosubject that evidence to any balancing exercise as proposed by learned counsel in his submission.
However, the presumed credibility of an agent provocateur can be challenged and is usually challenged orfor some credible reasons his evidence ought to be received with caution or completely rejected as in PP v
Bird Dominic Jude23. Bird Dominic Jude is an Australian man has escaped the death penalty for a second
time after a Malaysian court rejected an appeal by prosecutors against his acquittal on drug charges. He wasarrested in March 2012 at a cafe near his apartment in Kuala Lumpur and accused of trying to supply anundercover police officer with 167 grams of methamphetamine, an amount that carries a mandatory death
sentence. He was acquitted after the case fell apart amid allegations of corruption on the part of theprosecutionʼs star witness and his entire testimony had been disregarded as his credibility had been
destroyed.
B. Dangerous Drugs (Special Preventive Measures) Act 1985
This piece of preventive legislation provides powers to the Executive to detain a drug trafficker for up to
two years at a time without going through the process of a court of law. This law provides the Royal
Malaysian Police power to detain an individual for not more than 60 days for drug-related offences. Following
the preliminary 60-day detention, individuals can be detained for a period of not more than 2 years by theHome Ministry or to be restricted for two years and have been strapped with an electronic monitoring device(EMD) to monitor their movements.
C. Dangerous Drugs (Forfeiture of Property) Act 1988
The aim of this law is to provide the authorities with the powers to trace, freeze and forfeit the assets ofthe drug traffickers, and the onus is placed on the liable person or drug trafficker to prove that his properties
were gained through legal means.
D. Drug Dependents (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act 1983
This law deals specifically with the treatment and rehabilitation of drug dependents. The RMP,
particularly the NCID, have power to enforce this law. But with effect from 14th January 2017, allinvestigations relating to drug dependentsʼ cases are now enforced by the National Anti-Drug Agency(NADA) in the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was aimed to reduce the burden on the police force. NADA
has adopted a paradigm shift in transforming the treatment and rehabilitation services into a more accessible
one and providing people with drug-related problems an opportunity to undergo drug treatment andrehabilitation services on a voluntary basis known as Cure & Care 1Malaysia Clinic. It is an alternative tocompulsory drug rehabilitation centres, which involve the process of arrests, court orders and legal
implications. It has received recognition and is regarded as one of the best practice to be followed in thewhole region.
E. Poison Act 1952
This law meanwhile provides for the control, sale, import and export of poisons, precursors and otheressential chemicals.

IV. CURRENT DOMESTIC DRUG SITUATION
In 2017, NCID seized a larger amount of drugs in 2017 as it intensified enforcement against drug
syndicates. This includes improving the security checks at Malaysiaʼs international airports and the countryʼsborder entry points. Methamphetamine and heroin remain as the two most commonly abused drugs in
Malaysia respectively made up seizures of 1,258.33 kg and 653.79 kg compared to last year of 653.79 kg and425.24 kg respectively. The total drug value seized in 2017 is worth about RM 198.54 million compared to RM
188.97 million in year 2016.
In 2017, the number of persons arrested for possession of drugs was 82, 866 compared to 72, 675 in 2016.
As for drug abuse cases, the RMP have arrested 84, 006 persons in year 2017 compared to 128, 031 in year

23

[High Court Kuala Lumpur Criminal Trial No: 45A-13-05/2012]

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2016. Those who were arrested by the RMP in 2017 are indeed not for rehabilitation purposes but merely forpunishing them for administrating drugs, which normally the court imposes either fine or imprisonment.
On the other hand, 2017 marked a higher number of people arrested under the Dangerous Drugs Act(Special Preventive Measures) 1985. A total of 1237 people were arrested under the preventive laws,
compared to 1015 in 2016.
Meanwhile the total value of properties seized under the Dangerous Drugs (Forfeiture of Property) Act
1988 continued to increase from 2016 with RM 99.4 million to RM 113.7 million in 2017. However, the amountof the value of properties forfeited in 2017 decreased to RM 7.03 million compared to RM 15.1 million in 2016as most the cases are pending for process of court.
Intensified enforcement efforts done by the NCID had resulted in many successes in tackling the supply
dimension of the drug problem. The drug trafficking syndicates continue to adapt their manufacturing
strategies in order to avoid detection which resulted in the syndicates changing their modus operandi. Rather
than conducting their operations in state-of-the-art facilities, these syndicates conduct their operations insmaller labs to avoid detection by authorities. With drug processing methods at their fingertips, these
syndicates resort to constructing ʻkitchen labsʼ in order to produce the drugs to cater to their customers.
These labs, easily constructed and requiring less manpower to be operated than an advanced lab, pose athreat for the local drug enforcement agencies as it is far more difficult to be located. The construction ofthese kitchen labs contributes to the higher number of clandestine laboratories dismantled by NCID as wellas the increase in the number of people arrested in recent years. In 2016, a total of 14 manufacturing facilities
and pill processing operations, primarily crystalline methamphetamine and ecstasy facilities, weredismantled. Due to the continuous robust enforcement, the number of arrests in clandestine laboratories in2017 has decreased to 73 persons compared to 130 persons in 2016.
From the statistics of the drugs seized by the NCID from the year 2016 to 2017, they clearly show there
was a hike in drug activities which mainly contributed to the International Drug Trafficking Syndicates(IDTS). The IDTS are known to use Malaysia as a temporary hub to transport these substances to othercountries, especially Indonesia, China, Japan, Korea and Australia. NCID, however, continues to monitor theseillicit activities with active enforcement actions and joint operations with local authorities and cooperationfrom international drug enforcement agencies. This resulted in the numerous successes in operation which
contributes to the figure of seized drugs in recent years.

V. DRUG LAWS VERSUS MINIMAL MANPOWER
In formulating the strategies in combating the country drug problems the Government has adopted thefollowing approaches:(a) Supply Reduction(b) Demand Reduction
Supply reduction is principally aimed at stopping the inflow of drug supplies into the country due to thereason that Malaysia is a country which does not produced her own drug supplies. On the other hand,demand reduction deals with the treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts including preventive education
to the society. In respect of supply reduction the tasks are shouldered by various enforcement agencies suchas the police (NCID), Customs Department and the Malaysia Border Security Agency (AKSEM).
By and large, the NCID is the backbone and lead agency in the fight against drug trafficking activities.
Even though the RMP has a workforce of approximately of 104,000 personnel (as of 2017), the NCID itself ishardly made up of 4,160 (4%) personnel of the total workforce throughout the country.
The point raised above is to indicate that to enforce the drug laws with such minimal manpower would
clearly entail a heavy responsibility. As such to gauge whether the drug laws are effective in such a state
would not fair judgement by itself.

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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERS

VI. CONCLUSION
It can be seen from the above arguments that the drug problems posed a rather unique situation
whereby, despite Malaysiaʼs very stringent drug laws, it does not seem to have been effective in curbing the
drug menace. All available statistics show the discouraging situation whereby there is a constant increase in
all types of arrests. As such it can be concluded that the present drug laws of the country have not beeneffective in curbing the nationʼs drug problems. Illicit drug smuggling and trafficking cannot be overcome bya country alone. Drug syndicates operate without boundaries and continue to find new markets and expand
their activities. To combat the drug problem effectively, more initiatives have to be aggressively planned andexecuted to ensure successes in combating the drug menace.
Cooperation among international organizations and regional counterparts is vital to overcome the illicit
drug trafficking in Malaysia. The RMP, particularly the NCID, will continue to cooperate with foreigncounterparts in their continuous effort to overcome illicit drug activities in the country. Thus, it is imperative
to enhance the intelligence, enforcement and drug detection capabilities with a view of serving the main
purpose of identifying and crippling the drug syndicates in this region.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Mimi Kamariah Majid, 1995. Dangerous Drugs Laws. Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd.
2. Hisyam Abdullah @ Teh PohTeik, 2014. Drugs Trafficking and the Law.
3. Data Analysis, Narcotics Crime Investigation Department, Police Headquarters, Royal Malaysia Police,
Bukit Aman, 2018
4. Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952
5. Dangerous Drugs Act (Special Preventive Measures), 1985
6. Dangerous Drugs Act (Forfeiture of Property) 1988
7. Drugs Dependents Act (Rehabilitation & Treatment), 1983
8. Poisons Act, 1952

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Appendix 1

DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT 1952 (REVISED 1980)
ACT 234
39B Trafficking in dangerous drug(1) No person shall, on his own behalf or on behalf of any other person, whether or not such other person isin Malaysia(a) traffic in a dangerous drug;(b) offer to traffic in a dangerous drug; or(c) do or offer to do an act preparatory to or for the purpose of trafficking in a dangerous drug.
(2) Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence against
this Act and shall be punished on conviction with death or imprisonment for life and shall, if he is notsentenced to death, be punished with whipping of not less than fifteen strokes.
[(2) Subs. Act A1558:s.2](2A) In exercising the power conferred by subsection (2), the Court in imposing the sentence ofimprisonment for life and whipping of not less than fifteen strokes, may have regard only to the following
circumstances:(a) there was no evidence of buying and selling of a dangerous drug at the time when the person convicted
was arrested;(b) there was no involvement of agent provocateur; or(c) the involvement of the person convicted is restricted to transporting, carrying, sending or delivering adangerous drug; and(d) that the person convicted has assisted an enforcement agency in disrupting drug trafficking activities
within or outside Malaysia.
[(2A) Ins. Act A1558:s.2](2B) For the purposes of subsection (2A), “enforcement agency” means(a) the Royal Malaysia Police;(b) the National Anti-Drugs Agency;(c) the Royal Malaysian Customs Department;(d) the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency; or(e) any other enforcement agency as may be determined by the Minister.
[(2B) Ins. Act A1558:s.2](3) A prosecution under this section shall not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Public
Prosecutor:
Provided that a person may be arrested, or a warrant for his arrest may be issued and executed, and any
such person may be remanded in custody notwithstanding that the consent of the Public Prosecutor to theinstitution of a prosecution for the offence has not been obtained, but the case shall not be further
prosecuted until the consent has been obtained.
(4) When a person is brought before a Court under this section before the Public Prosecutor has consented
to the prosecution the charge shall be explained to him but he shall not be called upon to plead, and theprovisions of the law for the time being in force relating to criminal procedure shall be modified
accordingly.

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THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AGAINST ILLICIT DRUG
TRAFFICKING IN PAKISTAN
Asghar Ali Yousafzai＊

I. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF PAKISTAN
Pakistan is located in South Asia and is at the junction of Central Asia and the Middle East, which gives its
location great significance. Pakistanʼs total land border is 6,774 kilometres long, and it borders four countries.
While surrounded by land from three sides, the Arabian Sea lies in the south. On the north-east side, Pakistan
shares a 500-kilometre-long border with China, and, on the eastern side, it has a 2,912 kilometre border with
India. The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is called the Durand Line and is 2,430 kilometres long.
The border between Pakistan and Iran is also called the Pakistan-Iran Barrier and is 909 kilometres long. The
Arabian Sea is located south of Pakistan with a coastline of 1,046-kilometres. The Arabian Sea also serves as
an important trade route between Pakistan and other countries.

II. CURRENT SITUATION OF ILLEGAL DRUG TRAFFICKING IN PAKISTANThe Golden Crescent is the name given to the principal area of illicit opium production located at thecrossroads of Central, South, and Western Asia. The Golden Crescent covers three countries̶Afghanistan,
Iran and Pakistan̶whose mountainous peripheries define the crescent. Afghanistan is the worldʼs largest
producer of hashish and opiates. The majority of opium produced in Afghanistan comes from Kandahar andHelmand provinces.
Due to the ongoing continuous war over the last four decades, Afghanistan has become the global
epicentre of poppy cultivation and narcotics production. This is perhaps due to the universally agreed
phenomenon that drug trafficking not only generates substantial profits for organized criminal groups, but
the illegal profit earned this way remains a major source of funding of such criminal groups and helps infinancing international terrorism. The drugs normally smuggled from Afghanistan include opium and otherpoppy products. This is due to the large-scale cultivation of poppy crops in Afghanistan in which a gradualincrease has taken place since the year 2001 till the year 2017. According to the UNODC Afghan Poppy
Survey Report 2017, the poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has increased from 7,606 hectares in 2001 to 328,000
hectares in 2017.
As Pakistan shares a common border of 2,611 kilometres with Afghanistan, the illicit drug trafficking fromAfghanistan poses a serious social, political and security problem not only for Afghanistan itself but also forPakistan and other countries of the region.

＊

Senior Superintendent of Police, National Highways and Motorway Police, Ministry of Communications, Pakistan.

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III. DRUG TRAFFICKING ROUTESThe routes followed for the purpose mostly join at different border points between Baluchistan and
Afghanistan, then passing through Baluchistan towards the Arabian Sea as below:
S/No

Transit Route

Exit from Pakistan

1.

Chamman-Muslim Bagh-Qila Saifullah-Loralai-DG Khan

2.

Quetta-Panjpai-Kalat-Khuzdar-Bela3.

Noshki- Kalat-Khuzdar-Bela

4.

Barabcha-GirdiJungle-Kharan-Karachi

5.

Barabcha-GirdiJungle-Kharan-Washuk-Ormara

Arabian Sea

6.

Choto-GirdiJungle-Dalbadin-Kalangor-Pasni

Arabian Sea

7.

Choto-Chagi-Girdi Jungle-Dalbadin-Kalangor-Mand/TurbatRadeeq-Jiwani

Arabian Sea

8.

Choto-GirdiJungle-Kharan-Washuk-Ormara

9.

Choto-Dalbadin-Kalangor-Mand/Turbat-Pasni/Gwadar

Arabian Sea

10.

Noshki-Kharan-Washuk-Kalangor-Pasni

Arabian Sea

11.

Barabcha-Yakmacu-Mushkel

Arabian Sea

12.

Barabcha-Chagi-Koh Sultan-Taftan

Arabian Sea

13.

Rabat-Koh Sultan-Saindak-Taftan

Arabian Sea

14.

Kani-Aminabad-Dalbadin-Kharan-Washuk-Kalangor-Pasni

Arabian Sea

KarachiHub
KarachiHub
KarachiHub

Arabia Sea
Arabia Sea
Arabia Sea

IV. AVAILABLE STATISTICS
As per data obtained from the Anti-Narcotics Force, 1,177 operations were carried out against illegal
drugs/narcotics dealers in the year 2017. In these operations various narcotic drugs were confiscated. In
total, 32,573.10 Kg of opium, 7,132.20 Kg of morphine, 19,775.915 Kg of heroine, 102,113.593 Kg of hashish and
387.09 Kg of cocaine were seized during these operations, which shows that a huge amount of drug trafficking
takes place in Pakistan.
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V. CHALLENGES
The following are the main challenges faced by the LEAs in combating illicit drug trafficking:
A. Porous Border with Afghanistan
Afghanistan and Pakistan have a 2,430-kilometre-long porous common border called the Durand Line. It
passes through hilly and mountainous areas. Due to the difficult terrain and tribal belt, there is uncontrolled
movement of persons across the border. The situation is further worsened due to the fact that tribal people
are residing on both sides of the border, having common social bonds and family relationships. The easement
rights conventionally exercised by Afghan peoples for movement of their goods through the Pakistan borderis another aspect of this challenge, as vehicles on their way back from Afghanistan are normally being used toimport illicit narcotic substances into Pakistan.
B. Afghan Refugees in Pakistan
Another challenge is that around 3 million Afghan refugees settled in Pakistan. Due to the unbridled
movement of these refugees in the country, they can easily roam around the entire country; thus not only is
law and order jeopardized but illegal drug trafficking is also facilitated.
C. Lack of Control on Financial Transactions
The majority of the transactions between the tribal peoples associated with narcotics trafficking and their
Afghan counterparts takes place through the hawala/hundi system. This leads to an absence of control of
unusual financial transactions that take place in the illegal trade. Under the law, Section 67 of the Control of
Narcotics Substances Act, 1997, financial institutions are responsible to report any unusual financialtransactions when there is no apparent source of income. However due to the prevalent system of
hawala/hundi this provision is almost impracticable in the area.
D. Prevalent Security Situation
Due to the war on terror in Pakistan the security situation across Pakistan is precarious. Most of the areasin the far-flung mountainous regions of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) are infested withterrorists; hence, ANF cannot operate there against the drug peddlers. Apart from FATA the situation in
Balochistan is also precarious. Several sub-nationalist Baloch organizations are involved in active terrorism
against the state of Pakistan. Some of the areas through which the smuggling routes pass are no-go areas for
ANF and other Law Enforcement Agencies working for drug control.
E. Corruption within Drug Control Departments
It is an established fact that some officials in the drug control agencies are involved in corruption. These“black sheep” in collusion with the drug peddlers not only give protection to the drug peddlers, but also help
in transportation of narcotics. A case in example is the FIR dated 06-09-2015 lodged against a high-ranking
officer of Police Service of Pakistan in the Police Station Wadh District Khuzdar, Balochistan under 9(C),
CNSA-1997 on the directions of the undersigned.
F. Poor and Uneducated Populace
One of the factors facilitating the thriving narcotics business in Pakistan is the lack of literacy andprevalent poverty among the masses. The poor and illiterate youth become easy victims for transportation of
narcotics in return for petty sums of money.
G. Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts
According to the UN report on drug addicts, there are 6.7 million people in Pakistan who are drug addicts.
This poses a serious challenge to the control of narcotics, and unless a detailed programme is implemented
for rehabilitation of these addicts, there will always be demand for drugs.
H. Lack of Modern Technology for Detection of Drugs
One of the problems in controlling drugs in Pakistan is the lack of modern expertise and state-of-the-art
gadgetry.
I. Witness Protection
Witness protection is another challenge of the day. Drug trafficking is a transnational organized crime.
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People engaged in this crime are members of very powerful groups. Persons who give evidence against thesegroups are hardly available. Witnesses normally hesitate and even refuse to give testimony before the courts,
and the culprits are ultimately acquitted.

VI. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Cognizant of the gravity of the problems connected with drug abuse and illicit drug trafficking, thegovernment has promulgated a number of laws in the country from time to time. Various Law Enforcement
Agencies (LEAs) both at federal and provincial levels, i.e. the Anti-Narcotics Force, Provincial Police, National
Highways & Motorway Police, Pakistan Customs and respective Excise and Taxation Departments of theprovinces, have been tasked under the law to take action, within their respective domains, against narcotic
drugs.
A number of statutes have been enacted from time to time to deal with narcotic drug trafficking and theiruse. These include, the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930, the Customs Act, 1969, the Prohibition (Enforcement ofHadd) Order, 1979 and Control of Narcotics Substances Act, 1997. Moreover, the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860,
the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 and the National Highways Safety Ordinance, 2000 also contain penal
provisions for certain acts committed while under the influence of drugs. The Code of Criminal Procedure(Act V of 1898), along with the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, provide procedural law, in conjunction with
the Narcotics Control Act, 1997, for arrest, investigation and trial of the offenders and for procedures forarrest and seizure of the drugs.
“The Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 1997, being the latest and more exhaustive law on the subject of
narcotics as compared to the other laws and by virtue of sections 74 and 76 of the Act, ibid, its provisions
have overriding effect on any other law for the time being enforce”1. Therefore, the legal framework available
under this Act is discussed hereinbelow:

VII. CRIMINALIZATION OF ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING
Illicit drugs or narcotic drugs under section 2, clause (s) of the Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 1997
refers to coca leaf, cannabis, heroin, opium, poppy straw and all manufactured drugs. This law has further
defined these substances and their derivatives in detail under the respective clauses of the section. For
instance clause (t) of the section has defined opium which, as per the said provision, means “poppy straw thatis to say, all parts of the poppy plant (Papaver Someniferum or any other species of Papaver) after moving,other than the seeds and includes the spontaneously coagulated juice of capsules poppy which has not been
submitted to any manipulations other than those necessary for packing and transport. This definition also
includes any mixture with or without natural materials of any of the above forms of opium including a
mixture containing more than 0.2% morphine”2. The law has further defined opium derivatives.
The Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 1997 has not only imposed a prohibition on the cultivation of
narcotic plants, possession of narcotic drugs etc. Import or export of narcotic drugs and trafficking or
financing the trafficking of narcotic drugs etc., owning, operating premises or machinery for manufacture of
narcotic drugs, acquisition and possession of assets derived from narcotics offences and adding abetment or
association in narcotics offences under section 4, sections 6, 7 and 8, 10, 12 and 14 of the Act but has also
provided punishments for these crimes, respectively, under sections 5, 9, 11, 13, 15 and 16 of the Act.3

VIII. PROCEDURE FOR SEARCH AND SEIZURE ETC. IN NARCOTIC DRUG
OFFENCESThe Control of Narcotics Substance Act, 1997, contains both substantive as well as procedural law. The
relevant sections referred to above are substantive provisions for crimes of illicit drug trafficking while
Chapter-III of the Act, comprising of sections 20 to 35, deals with procedural matters including arrest, search,
seizure, undercover and controlled delivery operations etc. Section 20 of the Act relates to the powers of the2000 Pakistan Criminal Journal 1222.
Section 2, (s), Narcotics Control Substance Act (Act No. XXV), 1997.
3
The Control of Narcotics Substance Act (Act XXV) of 1997.
1
2

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Special Court constituted for the purpose under this Act to issue warrants for arrest of any person whom it
has reason to believe committed an offence of illegal illicit drug trafficking etc. The power of the Special
Court under this provision is to issue search warrants both during day- or night-time. The law under section
21 also empowers police officers not below the rank of Sub-Inspector to enter any building, place or premises
etc. for the purpose of search and to effect seizure and arrest without any warrant, if he has knowledge orinformation that a controlled substance in respect of which an offence is punishable under the Act and that awarrant for arrest or search cannot be obtained against the suspect without affording him an opportunity forthe concealment of evidence or to facilitate his escape. In such circumstances, he enters into the building,place, premises or conveyance and breaks open any door and removes any other obstacle to such entry incase of resistance and is empowered to seize such narcotic substances. However, such powers conferred onpolice officers by the Act are subject to certain conditions, as held by Special Court decisions. In one such casethe honourable Court held that:
Search and seizure proceedings by obtaining a search warrant was a rule and exercise of unusual
power to effect search without warrant was an exception. Conscious application of mind needed onpart of officer to effect search or arrest without a warrant as to possibilities of escape or concealmentof evidence on part of the offender. Provision of section 21, (2) of Control of Narcotics Substances Act,
1997 required that before or immediately after taking any action under section 21, (2) of the said Act,
officer concerned must record grounds and the basis of his information and proposed action andforthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate superiors. Such safeguard was provided to prevent
abuse of extraordinary powers.4
Section 24 of the Act also provides for undercover and controlled delivery operations. This provision isaddressed below.

IX. UNDERCOVER AND CONTROLLED DELIVERY OPERATIONS
Section 24 of the Act deals with undercover and controlled delivery operations. This provision lays downthat, subject to the conditions laid in the said section, the Federal Government may give approval in writing
to controlled delivery operations, for the purpose of gathering evidence in Pakistan or elsewhere relating to
the commission of any offence against this Act or similar law of a foreign state. The controlled delivery is
carried out through properly designed operations to give opportunity to intending criminals engaged, orabout to engage, in illicit drug trafficking to manifest that conduct or provide other evidence of it.

X. DISPOSAL OF PERSON ARRESTED IN ARTICLES SEIZED
Section 27 of the Act provides procedures for disposal of a person and articles seized. Under the said
provision, persons arrested and articles seized have to be forwarded without delay to the Special Court
having jurisdiction.

XI. PRESUMPTIONS OF INTENT IN TRAFFICKING AND POSSESSION OF
ILLICIT ARTICLES ETC.
The law presumes under section 29 of the Act that whenever any narcotic drug, psychotropic substanceor controlled substance, including cannabis, coca or opium poppy plant, is growing on any land cultivated bysuch persons, any apparatus designed or adopted for the production or manufacture of any narcotic drugs,
psychotropic substance etc. for which such person fails to account satisfactorily is presumed to havecommitted an offence under the Act. However, the presumption laid down under this provision has been
subjected to certain qualifications by the honourable Court, particularly in light of the fundamental rights ofcitizens provided under Article 14 of the Constitution.5

45

1999 Pakistan Criminal Law Journal, 1033.
2000 Pakistan Supreme Court Cases (Criminal) Supreme Court (Pak) 792.

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XII. CONFISCATION OF ARTICLES AND PROCEEDS OF ILLICIT DRUG
TRAFFICKING
Irrespective of whether an accused person is convicted or acquitted during trial of an offence, the Special
Court has been empowered by section 33 of the Act to decide whether any article frozen or seized is liable toconfiscation. Moreover, narcotic drug psychotropic substances are controlled substances that have to bedisposed of under section 516 (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

XIII. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN COMBATINGILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING
The clandestine nature and complexity involved in identifying, tracing and seizing of the proceeds ofcrime related to narcotic drugs, Law Enforcement Agencies are facing serious challenges in this regard. Dueto the procedural technicalities involved in the trial of offenders, conviction of such criminals is also achallenge for Law Enforcement Agencies and the prosecution. The challenge is further aggravated by theongoing Afghan war for the last four decades. The war has virtually turned Afghanistan into a global
epicentre of poppy cultivation and narcotics production. Afghan drugs pose a serious social, political andsecurity problem not only for Afghanistan itself but also for its neighbouring countries. Because Pakistan
shares a common border of 2,611 kilometres with Afghanistan, Pakistan has thus become the major victim
and major transit country for Afghan opiates and hashish.

XIV. CONCLUSION
Given that generally the motive behind illegal drug trafficking is to pursue financial gain, which not only
generates substantial profits for organized criminal groups, the illegal profits remain the major source offunding of such criminal groups and their activities which in turn lead to the growth of their illegitimate
business sphere. Resultantly, the profit earned through such businesses penetrates into the legally operated
business sphere and eventually impairs integrity and stability of the economic and financial systems aroundthe globe. The linkage between illegal drug trafficking and financing of international terrorism has made theissue more troubling for the entire global community. Therefore, more effective strategies need to be devised
through inter-agency coordination both on the national and international levels. Moreover, applicable laws on
the subject need to be reviewed and updated to cope with modern-day challenges in the field.

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SMUGGLING OF ILLICIT DRUGS AIDED BY CUSTOMS PLAYERS
Marie Catherine R. Nolasco＊

I. INTRODUCTION
The entry into the Philippines of large volumes of imported illicit drugs was initially believed to bethrough the various islands of the Philippines, taking into consideration the archipelagic nature of the country.
However, there have been reservations on this because of the proliferation of smuggling activities being
perpetrated by the “players”1 or “fixers” at the Bureau of Customs.
In an investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation in September 2013, whereby 62
kilograms of methamphetamine hydrochloride̶commonly known as shabu̶were seized by virtue of theservice of a search warrant2 issued against the occupants of a condominium unit in Manila used as a “drying
station” of shabu, large empty tea packs were found inside the premises. Examination conducted on the tea
packs revealed the presence of shabu residue.
It was assumed that tea packs containing shabu were smuggled into the country through boats entering
through the various islands of the Philippines. There was no opportunity to confirm or disprove it. The
investigation reached a dead-end since no documents were found within the premises that could lead theinvestigation beyond the three (3) Chinese nationals arrested during the operation, since, as with otherinvestigations, the arrested Chinese nationals were mum when questioned.
Another investigation in December 2016 conducted by the Task Force on Anti-Illegal Drugs (TFAID) of
the NBI in the City of San Juan yielded a total of almost 800 kilograms of shabu in a series of interrelated
operations.3 Likewise, no documents were found in the premises subject to the search warrant that would
provide leads as to the source of the illicit drugs. Similarly, no additional information was revealed by the
Chinese nationals arrested in the operation. As in the other case, there were indications that the same werealso smuggled into the country.
A breakthrough came about in 2017, when the Bureau of Customs sought the assistance of the NBI in theinvestigation of the contents of five (5) metal cylinders from China containing a total of over 600 kg of shabu.

II. INVESTIGATION OF THE SHABU CONTAINED IN METAL CYLINDERS
A. Initial Discovery of the Shabu by the Bureau of Customs4
On 26 May 2017, the Bureau of Customsʼ (BOC) Criminal Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS)
sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigationʼs (NBI) Anti-Organized and Transnational
Crime Division (NBI) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) to assist them in theinvestigation and processing of the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, they discovered in awarehouse in Valenzuela City.
Executive Officer for Operations, Anti-Organized and Transnational Crime Division, National Bureau of Investigation,
Philippines.
1“Players”, or “fixers”, are the terms used to refer to those who facilitate/process the importation of goods in the Bureau of
Customs.
2
Search Warrant No. SW 13-147-MN issued by the Regional Trial Court of Malabon City on 06 September 2013.
3
By virtue of Search Warrant No. 16-031 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65 and a series of related
operations, such as interdiction.
4
Joint Affidavit, dated 14 August 2017, executed by the operatives of the AOTCD in filing charged against the importers of theshabu. (NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-17H-00206)＊

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106

A total of 605 bags of shabu were found inside five (5) metal cylinders placed in wooden crates. After
deliberations among the BOC, NBI and PDEA, it was decided that a controlled delivery would be conducted
as to one of the cylinders containing shabu. The controlled delivery was led by the PDEA. Delivery was madeto the ultimate consignee as indicated in the documents. The consignee was arrested by the PDEA for
violation of R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). A total of 100 bags of shabu were seized
at the address indicated, with a net weight of 100,181.0 grams (100.181 kg).
Meanwhile, the rest of the transparent bags containing a white crystalline substance and the fourcylinders containing the same were left in the custody of the NBI-AOTCD for field testing, seizure,
qualitative and quantitative examination and further investigation. Personnel from the NBI Forensic
Chemistry Division (FCD) were, thus, called-in for the field testing.
B. Investigation Conducted by the AOTCD5After the illicit drugs were seized, the NBI-AOTCD conducted a thorough investigation on how the shabu
was able to pass through the BOC without being detected. Various modes of investigation were utilized,
among which are: (1) interviews of witnesses, officials and employees of the different departments of theBOC, experts in the field of importation, among others; (2) backtracking of the import documents,
accreditation papers, as well as the various customs orders and issuances; (3) verification with several
government agencies; and (4) issuance of subpoenas to those who participated in the importation.
Based on the investigation, the warehouse where the metal cylinders containing the shabu were found isowned by a company engaged in international sea and air freight forwarding. The company receives several
items for shipment from its various warehouses in China and assembles and consolidates the same into asingle lot. Once a container is filled up, it contacts its broker in China to arrange for the shipment of thecontainers to the Philippines. Since the company is no longer a registered forwarder of the Bureau of
Customs, to continue its operation as an international freight forwarder, it hires consultants handling therelease of goods from the Bureau of Customs. These consultants in turn use the players for the importations.
The players charge an all-in package of one hundred ninety thousand pesos (Php190,000)6. It means that forthe said amount, the player will provide a “consignee-for-hire”7, pay the taxes and duties, and deliver thecontainer to the importer.
Further, the player guides the importer through the consultants in the preparation of the import
documents. The player revises the packing list with the corresponding harmonized system (HS) codes to be
used by the importer to ensure that the shipment would be categorized as “general merchandise.”In the importation of the shipment which includes the five (5) metal cylinders containing the shabu, thesame procedure was adopted. The actual packing list of the importer was revised by the player. As preparedby the player, the packing list forming part of the import documents to be submitted to the BOC indicated thecontents as cutting boards, footwear, kitchenware and molds, contrary to the actual contents of the original
packing list as transmitted by the importerʼs warehouse in China.
In the course of the preparation of the documents, the shipment was brought to the Port of Shihu where it
was loaded into a vessel. It arrived at the Manila International Container Port (MICP) on 15 May 2017.
On 17 May 2017, the customs broker hired by the player lodged the details of the shipment in the Bureauof Customs Electronic to Mobile (E2M) System. As part of the all-in package, the playerʼs customs broker
entered a trading company or the consignee-for-hire as the importer/consignee for the shipment.
The player and the consignee-for-hire verbally agreed that the player would use the business name of her
trading company in exchange for a royalty/retainer of one thousand five hundred pesos (PhP 1,500.00) per
container. The shipment was assigned a “Green Lane” tag by the Selectivity System of the Bureau of
Customs. Because the shipment was tagged “GREEN”, no physical inspection and further documentary
Transmittal of the NBI to the Department of Justice, dated 14 August 2017 (NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-17H-00206).
Equivalent to around US$3,800.
7A “consignee for hire” is a consignee whose business name is used as consignee of the various importation of the playerʼsclients.
5
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examination was required. All that was needed was the payment of customs fees and taxes.
On 23 May 2017, the shipment was released from the MICP. It was loaded onto a truck owned by theplayer and delivered to the importerʼs warehouse on 24 May 2017. Upon arrival of the container, thewarehouse personnel listed its contents, and checked the same to see if it matched the actual packing list emailed from China. They then called up the individual consignees of the shipments to inform them of thearrival of their goods.
At around 5 or 6 oʼclock in the evening of 25 May 2017, the warehouse manager, who is also theimporter/consolidator (hereinafter referred to as importer), received a call from a Xiamen Customs Police
Officer, asking if the shipment of five (5) insulator machines had arrived. The warehouse manager answeredthat it arrived on 24 May 2017. The Xiamen Customs Police Officer then told the importer that the shipment
contained voluminous drugs; and that the shippers thereof were arrested in China.
Fearing that the shipment would be discovered in his warehouse by the Philippine authorities, theimporter then coordinated with the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines. He also called up a Philippine
customs official, who has contacts with the Customs of China to assist him. After proper verification by thePhilippine Customs official with the Xiamen Customs Police Officer, the package as described was indeed
part of the shipment. The information was relayed by the Philippine Customs official to his superior, the BOCCIIS head. Consequently, the assistance of the NBI and the PDEA were sought.
C. Result of the Investigation
As a result of the investigation conducted by the NBI-AOTCD, charges for Importation of Dangerous
Drugs, under Section 4 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. 9165) were filed against theactual consigneeʼs importer, players, consultants, broker and the consignee-for-hire.8 The case is now pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila and arrest warrants have been issued against them.9
In addition, criminal cases for Unauthorized Practice of Customs Broker Profession, under Section 28 of
the Customs Brokers Act of 2004 were filed against the player and the consultants. Criminal cases forviolation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019, as amended) were also filed against
employees of the Bureau of Customs: the Chief of the Risk Management Office (RMO) and two employees of
the Formal Entry Division (FED).10

III. BEATING THE SYSTEM OF THE BOC
A. Selectivity System of the BOC
The players at the Bureau of Customs have wittingly or unwittingly paved the way for the drugtraffickers to smuggle illicit drugs into the country passing through the Bureau of Customs itself.
The customs player in his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon) hearings in the Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, Into the Php6. 4
Billion Worth of Shabu Shipment From China, on the Possible Malfeasance, and Nonfeasance of Bureau of
Customs (BOC) Officials and Employees and the corresponding parallel investigations before the House
Committees on Dangerous Drugs and Good Government and Public Accountability admitted the employmentof the “tara system”, whereby he pays off customs officials to ensure the release of the importations heprocesses.
According to the player, he was provided with the HS Codes and other methods to give his shipments a
better chance of being tagged “green” in the BOCʼs Selectivity System. Under the said system, when given agreen tag, goods are released without further inspection. All that has would have to be done is the payment of
the assessed duties and taxes, and the shipment will be released from the Bureau of Customs without
Ibid.
Criminal Case No. R-MNL-18-00347-CR.
10
The cases were docketed as NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-17I-00251 and NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-17I-00252. The case against
the Chief of the RMO was dismissed while the cases against the employees of the FED are awaiting Resolution of theProsecutor of the Department of Justice.
8
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inspection.
True enough, in the investigation conducted by the NBI-AOTCD, for the period of 31 March 2017 to 29
May 2017, or for almost two (2) months, out of the six hundred sixty-four (664) shipments processed by theplayer through his broker and consignee-for-hire, five hundred thirty-two (532) were tagged green, one
hundred twenty-three (123) were tagged yellow and only nine (9) were tagged red.11 (With a yellow tag, only adocumentary check is made on the shipment while with a red tag, documentary check and physicalexamination is conducted.) This is despite the fact that the consignee-for-hire utilized by the player is a “newimporter” and a “sole proprietorship”, which are considered as high risk by the Selectivity System.
B. Insufficient X-ray Machines
Since the shipment was assigned a green lane, it did not have to go through the x-ray machines. Under thecurrent set-up of the BOC, only a small number of containers pass through the x-ray machines due to thelimited machines available. Had the container containing the metal cylinders been examined through the xray machines, the magnitude of the size of the metal cylinders would have alerted the inspector. The
discrepancy between the actual contents of the container and the packing list submitted with the import
documents could have been detected.

IV. CONCLUSION
Entry of illicit drugs in large volumes through the Philippine ports has become an easier and perhaps acheaper mode for drug traffickers. Corruption coupled with the lack of sufficient technology has allowed
entry under the noses of customs officials. If not for the timely information coming from the Chinese
authorities, over 600 kilograms of shabu would have been distributed in the Philippines; thus, taking a big step
backward on the current administrationʼs war on drugs.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the Philippine government invests in sufficient x-ray machines to enable the BOC
to have an efficient 100% inspection of all importations and not just a small percentage. This will deter the
proliferation of smuggling not only of drugs but other contraband as well. Further, law enforcement agencies
should develop partnerships with other nations to enable sharing of intelligence.

11

Transmittal filed by the NBI before the DOJ under NPS Docket No. NPXVI-INV-17I-00251, dated 18 September 2017.

62

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECENT AMENDMENT OF THE
NARCOTICS ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ABOUT
THE NUMBER OF OFFENCES IN NARCOTICS CASES
Nitchan Hadsarang＊

I. ILLICIT DRUG SITUATION IN THAILAND
A. Overview
Illicit drugs have been one of the biggest problems in Thailand for a long time. Among the various types ofdrugs, methamphetamine is the most problematic one. According to the statistics from the Office of the
Narcotics Control Board, between 2011 to 2016, there were approximately 100,000 methamphetamine cases
each year, followed by cannabis or kratom cases with the approximate number between 6,000 and 20,000 eachyear. The government has been engaging in the war against illicit drugs, especially methamphetamine, for
years with the approach of harsh measures to eliminate and isolate drug offenders by using a very strict
narcotics law and strong punishments. Despite this effort, the situation did not get better, and even got worse.
Prisons have been crowded with drug offenders while the number of drug cases has not been significantly
decreased. According to recent statistics, Thailandʼs incarceration rate ranks among the worldʼs top ten1.
Thus, the government decided to change its approach towards illicit drugs in the hope of solving the problem
of crowded prisons; hence, the amendment to the Narcotics Act B.E. 25222, namely, the Narcotics Act (No. 6)
B.E. 25603. Although this amendment has been in effect for only about a year, I will address it in this paper.
Apart from, and not directly related to, the problem of the crowded prisons is a somewhat disputableinterpretation and application of law specifically in narcotic cases by the Supreme Court of Thailand, which I
think, results in a peculiar outcome of punishment that I will also address in this paper.
This paper will be based mainly on category I narcotics (more details in the next section below) defined in
the Narcotics Act B.E. 2522 with emphasis on methamphetamine because the majority of the prisoners in
Thailand are those convicted of possession of methamphetamine for disposal and/or for the actual disposal ofit4.
B. Methamphetamine
Methamphetamine has been the most widespread drug in Thailand for years. It is commonly being
distributed in two forms. The first one is in the form of a pill. Methamphetamine pills usually have lowquantity of pure substances. They often have the colour of orange and sometimes green. But in recent years,
the quantity of pure substances of methamphetamine pills has been higher. The other form of
methamphetamine is a crystalline white powder which typically has a very high quantity of pure substances.
Methamphetamine traded in Thailand is mainly produced in the Golden Triangle5 area (the mountainous areathat overlaps Thailand, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar and Lao Peopleʼs Democratic Republic). It issmuggled through the countryʼs border in the northern part of Thailand and then is distributed to the otherparts of the country. Methamphetamine has been spreading among workers, truck drivers, as well as
teenagers and young children, often causing them mental and physical problems.

Judge of the Chiang Mai Juvenile and Family Court, Thailand.
https://www.oncb.go.th/SitePages/narcotics_effect.aspx. (available in Thai only).
1
http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total.
2
A.D. 1979.
3
A.D. 2017.
4
http://www.correct.go.th/stat102/display/drug_select_date_user.php (available in Thai only).
5
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden_Triangle_(Southeast_Asia).
＊
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Narcotics Act B.E. 2522
1. Overview
This act criminalizes and sets out the main rules and punishments for narcotics offences. It classifies
narcotics into five categories which are:- category I consisting of dangerous narcotics such as heroin;- category II consisting of ordinary narcotics such as morphine, cocaine, codeine, medicinal opium;- category III consisting of narcotics which are in the medicinal form and contain narcotics of category
II as ingredients in accordance with the rules prescribed by the minister6 and published in the
Government Gazette;- category IV consisting of chemicals used for producing narcotics of category I or category II such as
acetic anhydride, acetyl chloride;- category V consisting of narcotics which are not included in category I to category IV such as
marijuana, kratom plant.
Methamphetamine falls into category 1 of this act.
2. Estoppel
Prior to the amendment by the Narcotics Act (No. 6) B.E. 2560, section 15, paragraph 3, subparagraph (2)states that the production, import, export or possession of narcotics of amphetamine or derivatives ofamphetamine of the quantity computed to be pure substances of 375 milligrams or more or is of narcotics
substances thereof of 15 doses or more or is of pure weight of 1. 5 grams or more shall be regarded7 as
production, import, export or possession for disposal. This estoppel prohibits offenders from defending
themselves or presenting any evidence to prove that they have no intention to dispose of the narcotics.
3. Punishments
Punishments range from fine or imprisonment to the death penalty depending on the category andquantity of the pure substances of narcotics. According to section 66, paragraph 1 of this act, anyone who
disposes or possesses for disposal narcotics of category I without permission and in a quantity computed tobe pure substances, or in the number of dosages, or in net weight, that does not reach the quantity prescribedin section 15, paragraph 3 will be liable to imprisonment for a term of 4 to 15 years, or a fine of 80,000 to 300,000 baht8, or both. And in paragraph 2, if the narcotics under paragraph 1 are of a quantity computed to be
pure substances of the quantity prescribed in section 15, paragraph 3, but not over 20 grams, the offender will
be liable to imprisonment for a term of 4 years to life and a fine of 400,000 to 5,000,000 baht9. And in paragraph3, if the narcotics under paragraph 1 are of a quantity computed to be pure substances over 20 grams, theoffender will be liable to imprisonment for life and a fine of 1,000,000 to 5,000,000 baht10, or the death penalty.
According to section 67 of this act, the punishment for an offender who possesses narcotics of category I
without permission will be liable to imprisonment for a term of 1 to 10 years, or a fine of 20,000 to 200,000 baht11,
or both. That means an offender who possesses methamphetamine with the computed pure substances lessthan 375 milligrams or at a dosage less than 15 or the net weight less than 1.5 grams will be punished withless severity.
From the abovementioned section 66 and section 67 with the estoppel set forth in section 15, paragraph 3,
subparagraph (2), we can see that the differences of punishment between the accusation for the possession of
methamphetamine and the possession for disposal of methamphetamine are quite large. Moreover, inpractice, there is a classified norm of each courthouse for adjudicating various cases including narcotics, andspecifically, methamphetamine. This norm governs the final punishment that will be given to the convicted
defendant. These factors seal the fate of the convicted defendant and end up sending more and more people
to jail.
Minister of Public Health.
Emphasis added.
8
Approximately 2,500 to 9,500 US$.
9
Approximately 12,700 to 159,800 US$.
10
Approximately 31,900 to 159,800 US$.
11
Approximately 600 to 6,300 US$.
6
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B. Narcotics Act (No. 6) B.E. 2560
The most recent amendment of the Act in 2017 is aimed to help solving the prison overcrowding problem
This amendment changes the estoppel provision in section 15, paragraph 3 by replacing the word “regarded”
with “presumed”. So, for narcotics crime committed from 16 January 2017 onwards, defendants can now deny
the charge of possession for disposal and present their evidence in court to prove that the possession of thenarcotics is not for disposal. This amendment aims to reduce the number of prisoners as I mentioned earlier.
But from what I have seen and adjudicated in narcotics cases, especially methamphetamine cases, I havefound that only a few defendants took advantage of this newly amended provision. I will address this problem
in the next section.
C. Supreme Court Decision
According to section 91 of the Criminal Code, if a defendant commits more than one distinct and different
offence, the court shall punish that defendant for each of the offences. This provision would be obvious if thecommitted offences are distinct and different in their natures. For example, if someone possessed narcotics
and when a police officer tried to arrest him/her, that person killed the police officer, it is clear that thisperson committed two distinct and different offences of possession of narcotics and murder. But what if thesituation is not that clear cut? For instance, if someone is a drug dealer and he/she possesses 100 tablets ofmethamphetamine for disposal and then sells 50 of them to another person, is it only one offence or two
offences since he/she has the intention from the start to sell the methamphetamine. Now, if that same person
possesses 100 tablets of methamphetamine for disposal and then sells all of them to another person, howmany offences this time?
There is nothing in section 91 or the other provisions that talk about how to distinguish these two
examples. To answer these questions, the Supreme Court of Thailand ruled that, for the first instance, thepossession of 100 tablets of methamphetamine for disposal constitutes an offence, and since the offender only
sells half of them to another person, it constitutes another offence. While in the latter instance, the offendersells all of the methamphetamines that he/she possesses with the intention of disposal; thus, the offender isdeemed to commit only one offence. Consequently, the first offender will receive higher punishment than thesecond offender.
Because Thailand uses the civil law system, there is no judge-made law like in those countries with
common law system. But the Supreme Courtʼs decisions are treated as precedent of interpreting andapplying laws so they have binding force. This issue will also be addressed in the next section.

III. UNDERLYING PROBLEMS
A. The Effectiveness of the Newly Amended Section 15
In the real world, at least, from my own experience, I only saw a few cases in which the defendants
admitted that they possessed the methamphetamine but denied that the possession was for disposal. Most of
the time, the defendants either plead guilty to the whole charge or plead not guilty at all. This maybe becauseof two reasons: one, if they plead guilty to the whole charge, they will normally get half deduction of the final
punishment. Two, if they admit the possession of the methamphetamine but deny that it is for disposal, they
have the burden to prove it because the law “presumes” that the possession is for disposal. And it is quite
hard to prove. If they are lucky enough to prove it, then the baseline of the punishment will be somewhat
lower, but if they are unsuccessful, they will usually get only one-third or one-fourth deduction of the final
punishment. It means that this recent amendment of section 15 is not that effective in practice.
B. Supreme Court Decision
As I explained earlier, it is very surprising that the outcomes of two cases are quite different: one who is
not-so-good a drug dealer that he can sell only a portion of the methamphetamines in his possession, and theother one who is a competent drug dealer that can sell all of the methamphetamine in his possession. For
example, a defendant who is charged with the possession of 15 tablets of methamphetamine for disposal anddisposes 14 of them, will get at least 8 years of imprisonment before the deduction (a minimum of 4 years forthe possession for disposal and another minimum of 4 years for the disposal in accordance with section 66,
paragraph 1 of the Narcotics Act). Meanwhile, another defendant who is charged with the possession of 15
tablets of methamphetamine for disposal and disposes all of them will get only at least 4 years of
imprisonment before the deduction. Is the punishment proportional for the crimes committed by these two
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defendants?
A Supreme Court case dating back to 1979, case no. 1074/2522, states that, the defendantʼs possession ofheroin for disposal means that he had the intent to dispose of it. And the amount of heroin he disposed of was
the same amount he possessed for disposal, so his act constitutes one offence.
In 1976, case no. 638/2519, states that, the possession of heroin and the disposal of it have separable intent
even though the heroin that the defendant disposed of was part of the heroin that he possessed. The act of
disposal creates another offence by means of another intent other than possession, thus, constituting multiple
offences.
A more recent decision in 2010, case no. 6634-6635/2553, in a sting operation, police made a deal to buy
20,000 doses of methamphetamine for 500, 000 Baht (approximately 15, 800 US$) from the defendants.
Afterward, the defendants were arrested with the handed over drugs of 19,800 doses, 200 short of the amountdealt. Later, the remaining 200 doses were found in the defendantsʼ car. The court of first instance rendered
the judgement that the act constituted two offences of possession for disposal and sale of methamphetamine
resulting in 50 years of imprisonment (33 years and 4 months for the offence of possession for disposal andanother 33 years and 4 months for the offence of sale12 but the final imprisonment was capped at 50 years inaccordance with the Criminal Code Section 91), and life imprisonment for the second defendant (lifeimprisonment for both offences). The Court of Appeal Region 5 affirmed. The Supreme Court states in its
decision that the defendants intended to sell 20,000 doses but merely mistakenly handed over only 19,800
doses, so, it is deemed that the defendants had sold all of the 20,000 doses, which was the same amount they
had in possession for disposal. Consequently, their acts constitute only one offence. The first defendant got 33
years and 4 months of imprisonment, and the second defendant still got life imprisonment.

IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Reconsideration of the Policy, Taking into Account Other Circumstances, and Shifting the Burdenof Proof
In my opinion, this issue has to be dealt with through the policy of the government against illicit drugs.
Thailand is a civil law country that mainly uses adversarial trial procedures, which means that, especially incriminal cases, the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
But section 15, paragraph 3 of the Narcotics Act B.E. 2522 disrupts this principle by shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant in light of fighting against illicit drugs. So, the government should carefully consider its
view of narcotics offenders, whether to continue to strongly punish the offenders, or to shift the focus to morepreventive measures and treat some offenders more like patients who need rehabilitation rather thansending them to jail, and to help them to get back on the right track. Particularly in Thailand, sending
someone to jail has proven, in many situations, not to be the best choice. Some people even say, if you sendsomeone to jail, it is like sending that person to a school that teaches you how to commit more serious crimes.
If the government really wants to soften the punishment of drug dealers and give them more leeway withrespect to the committed crimes, then the law should give more flexibility to the defendants to deny the
charge of possession for disposal and to prove that the possession was not for disposal. Maybe shifting theburden of proof of the possession for disposal charge to the public prosecutor would be one idea; or maybe
requiring the public prosecutor to prove some preliminary facts to demonstrate that the possession of thedrugs was for the purpose of disposal but allowing the defendant to offer evidence against it. This will placeless burden on the offenders and may help the amended section 15 be more effective.
B. Reconsideration of the Supreme Court Decision
The fastest way of dealing with this issue is to have more debate about the Supreme Court decision andreconsider the precedent set by the decision. One might say that the two situations are different because thedefendant who only sells a portion of the possessed drugs has a chance to sell the remaining drugs to anotherperson; hence, creating a large network for the illicit drug business if the defendant has not been arrested.
But, in my opinion, there is not much difference between the two situations in which the offender can sell all

He pleaded guilty in the investigating phase so he got 1/3 deduction of life imprisonment which equals to 33 years and 4
months.
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169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEPARTICIPANTSʼ PAPERSof the methamphetamine in his or her possession or only a portion of it. The harm that these two cases will doto the society is the same. The selling of the remaining portion and expanding the illicit drug network is more
like a prediction of the future. So, it is not proportionate to punish these two offenders differently. The
underlying thought of this issue should be based on the intent of the defendant. In my view, the intent of
possession for disposal and the intent of disposal are different and separable. So, the act of possession for
disposal and the act of disposal should always constitute two offences.

V. CONCLUSION
While it may seem like these issues are not directly related to fighting illicit drug trafficking, and the twoissues that I address sound like they contradict each other, but I think in order to make the effort of solving
the illicit drug problem run smoothly, the whole system should be in harmony, reasonable, and effective.
However, in the meantime, there is no concrete or clear-cut conclusion for the issues in this paper. But I hope
to share my views and opinions with the other participants, and I would love to get suggestions and to learn
about practices from other jurisdictions in other countries either with similar or dissimilar legal systems.

67

REPORTS OF THE COURSEGROUP 1
EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATIVE AND PROSECUTORIAL MEASURESTO DETECT, PROSECUTE AND PUNISH LEADERS OF CRIMEORGANIZATIONS AND HIGH VALUE TARGETS
Rapporteur: Mr. Asghar ALI (Pakistan)
Co-Rapporteurs: Mr. Rashmi SINGAPPULIGE (Sri Lanka)
Mr. AMAYASU Ryo (Japan)
Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Members

Advisers

Ms. Yasmine Nagnouma KEITA
Mr. Khurshed Iskandar ISOZODA
Mr. Maurice Kouadio NʼDRI
Ms. TSHIBOLA Mulumba Annie
Mr. Augustus Apelis Mathew BRAY
Mr. FUKUSHIMA Yoshihiko
Mr. Valentyn SHMITKO
Prof. Masahiro YAMADA
Prof. Hidenori OHINATA(Cote dʼIvoire)(Tajikistan)(Cote dʼIvoire)(D.R. Congo)(PNG)(Japan)(Ukraine)(UNAFEI)(UNAFEI)

I. INTRODUCTION
This group workshop commenced on 23rd May 2018 under the guidance and advice of Professor Masahiro
YAMADA and Professor Hidenori OHINATA. Group 1 unanimously chose Ms. Yasmine Nagnouma KEITA
as chairperson and Mr. Khurshed Iskandar ISOZODA as co-chairperson, Mr. Asghar ALI as Rapporteur and
Mr. AMAYASU Ryo and Mr. Rashmi SINGAPPULIGE as co-rapporteurs.
Drug trafficking is a global crime and it has distinctive characteristics. Drug-related organized crime
cannot ordinarily be investigated by conventional investigative methods alone. For example, it is a victimlesscrime in most cases. Moreover, the witnesses in drug-related crimes do not feel safe while testifying against
the drug traffickers. Therefore, special investigative methods are needed to detect and prevent drugtrafficking.
Group 1 was assigned the thematic topic: “Effective investigative and prosecutorial measures to detect
prosecute and punish leaders of crime organization and high value targets”. The Group worked in a
structured manner and produced with consensus the following report analysing the pros and cons of thespecial investigative techniques used for detection and prevention of drug-related crimes, both domesticallyand internationally. The report discusses in detail the techniques and use of controlled delivery, informants,
electronic surveillance, undercover operation, and use of protection of witnesses and immunity in exchange
for testimony.

II. USE OF INFORMANTS
A. Introduction
Although drug crime is done systematically in that there are no victims and it is conducted secretly,
because relationships between each other are weak and the organization is also complicated, we obtainevidence from the organizers concerned who have been arrested, it is characterized by hardship and it has
characteristics different from other crimes. Therefore, in order to clarify the whole picture of theorganization, to identify the members of the organization, to arrest and prosecute the leaders of theorganization, it is important to obtain information from an informant who is familiar with the actual
circumstances of the organization. The use of informants is also very effective to develop leads for theinvestigation. The term “informant” refers to a person who is not a member of the investigating institution. In
many cases, the informants may be citizens who are offenders, such as members of the organization.

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B. Current Situation in Each Country
In all countries, investigative agencies obtain information on criminal organizations from informants anduse them for investigation. However, in the provincial areas of Papua New Guinea, the population is small, andthe residents are familiar with each other, so if the residents provide information to the investigation
agencies, this is known to the other residents. For this reason, residents are unwilling to provide information
to investigation agencies, and there are circumstances in which investigating agencies are unlikely to obtain
information. This is not limited to Papua New Guinea; as long as communities are closely knit, suchcircumstances will be common to all countries.
Regarding informants, countries such as Pakistan, Tajikistan and Ukraine have legislation in this regard.
In these countries, provisions for protecting informants and provisions on remuneration for informants are
stipulated. Particularly in Pakistan, information on informants is restricted so that personal information, suchas the name and address of the informants, is protected. This information can only be known to investigators
who have directly contacted the informants. Even the investigatorsʼ superiors cannot learn the identities andother personal information of the informants. In this way, since informants are thoroughly protected,
investigation institutions are more likely to obtain information from informants.
In other countries such as Sri Lanka, Cote dʼIvoire, Congo and Japan, there are no laws on informants.
However, even in these countries, investigative agencies give remuneration to informants in return for
information. In addition, the investigative agency does not disclose the identity of the informants and protects
them so as to make information easier to obtain.
C. Common Issues and Problems
In general, information on drug crime organizations is unknown to the outside. Thus, it is more desirable
to obtain information from insiders. But, the informants themselves are criminals and sometimes tell lies.
Sometimes these lies make it impossible for investigators to achieve the purpose of the investigation.
In addition, the information provided may be fragmentary. Initially, they may deliberately wait for the
response of the investigative authorities with only fragmentary information in order to seek more beneficial
return from investigation authorities. This seems to be caused by ulterior motives of providing information.
Their motives include money, retribution, immunity, greed, and so on. But it is not a problem that theirmotives are impure. It is important for investigators to firmly identify the motivation of the informants.
In this regard, even if they initially cooperate with law enforcement agencies, informants sometimes
betray investigators. This is the case where the informants think that it is more attractive to the high value
targets of the drug crime organization.
This will cause more serious damage than just a lie. In other words, if the investigator cannot grasp thissituation in advance, in the worst case the investigators may face difficulty. On the other hand, regarding
informants, once a drug crime organization knows the existence of informants, the members of the drug
crime organization add various adverse activities including murder. Therefore, we must conceal them fromthe drug crime organization without fail, but it is not easy. Most countries have no legal system to protect
them. There are also concerns that investigators will let them do illegal actions or dangerous things. In somecases, investigators may bear legal responsibility.
In addition to these, informants are used as a starting point for investigation, because it emphasizes
confidentiality and difficulties in collecting other evidence. In other words, at the trial, it is not customary to
make informants testify. Also, when using information obtained from the informants to prove the crime incourt, the prosecutor needs to disclose the information on the informants at least to the accused and thejudge. Otherwise, the information will not be admissible in a court of law.
Finally, there is also the problem of corruption of the investigators when using the informants. When an
investigator contacts an informant alone by emphasizing the confidentiality of informants, it may cause
corruption and the like. Also, when giving money to an informant as compensation, it may be paid from abudget separate from the normal budget. In such cases, there is no need to make a record, which may
encourage corruption of investigators.

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D. Solutions
Members of Group 1 recognize that it is important to use informants to arrest high value targets of drug
crime organizations. But if law enforcement agencies make a mistake in using the informant, theinvestigation will fail.
First, it is important to strongly manage informants. Also, in advancing the case, law enforcement should
refrain from making decisions with information from an informant alone. Considering information obtained
from other investigation methods, such as undercover operations, the accuracy of the information from theinformant should be ascertained. It is also important to confirm certain related information from multiple
informants. In other words, it is necessary to collect information not only passively but also actively.
In addition, a legal framework to protect informants is also necessary. It may be something similar to thewitness protection system. On the other hand, unlike witnesses, long-term relationships with informants willcontinue, so it should be kept in mind that informants are not necessarily on law enforcementʼs side
indefinitely.
There are several ways to prevent corruption of investigators related to informants, such as using
multiple investigators when contacting informants. Also, if money is provided as remuneration, then it must
be properly accounted for in regard to informants. The informantʼs name can be a number or a codename. By
keeping records, the authorities can check whether the payment was legally justified.
It is thought that as a method of paying appropriate compensation to informants, payment should madeafter the investigation. This is because we can adjust the amount to pay according to the investigation result.
Finally, it must be reiterated that a trustworthy informant is extremely useful for arresting high value
targets of a drug organization. On the other hand, if an investigation that relies only on the informant is
continued, the investigation sometimes may not lead to arrest of the high value target. Therefore, it isnecessary to use informants actively by combining other investigation methods and investigation results.
In other words, we need to sublimate, or distil, “the information” provided by the informant to“intelligence” and use it to investigate the high value targets.

III. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND COMMUNICATION INTERCEPTION
A. Introduction
There is no concrete definition of this investigative technique. However, it is recognized that some typesof electronic devices, such as audio recording, visual recording or wiretapping, will be employed in the courseof investigation. Utilization of electronic surveillance and communication interception are very usefulmeasures for obtaining information of the existing criminal activities and also being able to identify future
offences. It is one of the best methods of collecting critical evidence with low risk since the operator andinvestigator can monitor from a remote distance. The evidence will be admissible and reliable for prosecution
and trial. Nonetheless, the application of this method is a very sensitive issue due to the concern with abusing
individual privacy rights.
The goals of electronic surveillance are:(i) To gather strong and precise evidence with low risk.
(ii) To expose the nature of a criminal offence (organizational structure, network, process, activity and soon).
B. Current Situation
Almost all countries of Group 1 use electronic surveillance and communication interception as
investigative techniques, although some countries have legal frameworks for these techniques. Electronic
surveillance and communication interception are used in Tajikistan by law enforcement agencies, and there isa legal provision for this process. Similarly, Ukraine, Pakistan and Japan have legislation for electronic
surveillance and communication interception. However, there are no legal frameworks for electronic
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surveillance and communication interception in Sri Lanka, Cote dʼIvoire, Democratic Republic of Congo andPapua New Guinea. Nonetheless, Papua New Guinea and Democratic Republic of Congo, where electronic
surveillance and communication interception are not covered by legislation, law enforcement agencies do
conduct electronic surveillance and communication interception.
In Japan and Pakistan, prior permission is not required for the use of electronic surveillance in public
places. In Pakistan the Superintendent of police may authorize electronic surveillance. Besides the legal
issues, other general constraints that every country is now facing are the infrastructure and technology
issues. Even though electronic surveillance is very effective, the government has to invest a lot of money inorder to employ high technology devices. In addition, new communication technologies are introduced to theworld market many times a year, particularly multifunction wireless phones, which are used by theorganized crime groups.
C. Common Issues, Problems and Solutions
The hurdles in the use of electronic surveillance and communication interception are as follows:
1. Prior Approval
In order to protect the rights of privacy of people, it is absolutely essential that permission is obtained
from a judge before starting the process of communication interception. Generally, the request of aninvestigator to use this method is strictly scrutinized by a judge or other authority before granting
permission. In most cases, the interception of either a mobile or fixed-line phone shall be equally subject to theprior approval criteria. With regard to the interception of electronic communications, like e-mail or website
tracing, prior permission is also required.
2. Scope of Criminal OffenceElectronic surveillance and communication interception does affect privacy rights, so this method should
be executed only when necessary. In other words, it should be conducted in critical criminal investigations
such as when other investigation techniques have not worked or appear unlikely to succeed or would be too
dangerous to try. In addition, it shall be applied to investigations in only serious crimes or offences related toorganized crime groups. Japanese law provides details of crimes for detection of which this method can beused, such as offences relating to drugs, firearms, and human smuggling.
3. Duration
The available period for conducting electronic surveillance and communication interception varies fromcountry to country. We found the range to be from ten days at the first stage in Japan up to a maximum 30
days. However, in Pakistan, there is no limit on the number of days for electronic surveillance.
4. Approach to Non-relevant Information
Another problem with the use of electronic surveillance and communication interception is risk of misuseand disposal of irrelevant information. When carrying out communication interception, it is very important toanalyse the information received as to whether it is useful and can be used as evidence or not. On the one thehand, there will be a lot of non-relevant information in the case, i.e. social talk or private discussions. This
information should be deleted or cut off since it is generally not admissible in court. The disclosure of suchinformation, even when not related to the case, is prohibited in order to protect privacy rights. However, if,during electronic surveillance and communication interception, the investigator unexpectedly foundinformation about other crimes or a plan to commit imminent crimes outside the scope of the permission, forexample, to commit some serious crimes such as murder or firearms trafficking, using such information canbe a difficult decision for investigators. The official may opt to interfere to safeguard a personʼs life but thisaction may tip-off the suspect and make him aware of the communication interception. On the other hand,such information gathered under the permission of one case may be not be admissible in another case subject
to the law of each country. The best solution in such a situation may be to establish a legal framework or
guidelines which the investigators must follow.
5. Post-interception Requirements
The post-interception process is very complicated. In addition to sorting out the non-relevant information,
harmonizing the relevant information and making records, there are still some points of concern. We
categorize them as follows:
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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106(a) Preservation of Evidence
For preserving the evidence, the following steps are required: Wiretapping: Creation of a transcript and a summary report (Pakistan and Japan - submitting atranscript to the court after the processing) Sealing the record: The sealing of the material evidence (audio recordings, visual recordings, etc.)
after use.
 Creation of a report and submission to a court̶wiretapping and other devices(b) Slang or Encoded Language
Yet another problem or difficulty in the use of electronic surveillance and communication interception isuse of slang or encoded language used by criminals. Even when investigating officers listen to theconversation of the criminals, it is hard to understand their conversation as they use encoded words toconvey to each other. Similarly, the problem of interpretation of other language may crop up in interceptionof international communication. In such situation, the appropriate experts will be required for decoding
encrypted messages or translating foreign languages by expert interpreters.
(c) Cooperation of Communication Companies
Unless the provisions of laws clearly specify the authority for communication interception and electronic
surveillance, the communication companies, such as telephone companies or webmasters, will be reluctant tocooperate with law enforcement. In Pakistan, all the telecommunication companies are under the authority of
the PTA (Pakistan Telecommunication Authority), and these companies are legally bound to cooperate withlaw enforcement agencies. But in the countries where there is no specific law for electronic surveillance, thetelecommunication companies always try to avoid access to their customersʼ communications since they areafraid of probable litigation and losing customers. In Japan, the representatives of telecommunications
companies are always present with investigators when communication interception is taking place.
6. Further Action
Group 1 recognizes that electronic surveillance and communication interception is an important tool forlaw enforcement to get reliable information and evidence to combat serious crime. With the different
situations in each country, it is indispensable to explore such tools for further effective use and each country
may broaden the scope of their legal framework to facilitate such techniques while paying heed to privacy
rights. From a technical point of view, the respective governments should consider allocating a sufficientbudget for buying state-of-the-art electronic gadgets to keep abreast with the criminal groups. Investigatorsand relevant officials should also learn and be trained in cutting-edge technology for communicationinterceptions and surveillance. Additionally, officials who are engaged in wiretapping should be highly
sensitized to privacy rights of citizens.

IV. UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS
A. Definition
Undercover operations consist of surveillance of persons suspected of committing offences, carried out by
specialized officers acting as participants to those offences. To that end, designated officers are authorized touse an assumed identity. They cannot act in a way that instigates the commission of offences. (Model
Legislative Provisions against Organized Crime, UNODC) In other words, it is a planned investigative andsurveillance process in which police officers use disguises and subterfuge to gain evidence and intelligenceagainst criminal offenders who have become resistant to traditional policing methods.
An undercover operation must be differentiated from entrapment. When the agent induces a person tocommit a criminal offence that the person would have otherwise been unlikely or unwilling to commit, thiskind of behaviour amounts to entrapment. As a matter of a fact, this agent is an agent provocateur. Thisevidence collected is not admissible in court.
Undercover operations can be classified as simple or complex. Simple undercover operations usually lastless than six months, have a limited budget, and have no sensitive issues that would elevate the operations to72

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a higher level of review within the investigating agency.
A simple undercover operation might include the undercover officer who buys drugs from a local drug
seller on two or more occasions with the investigative goal of identifying and successfully searching andseizing the drug dealerʼs supply, or that of the supplier.
A complex undercover investigation is usually long term and more sophisticated in both the use of
specialized techniques and the creativity of the investigation itself. Complex investigations can include
investigations of public officials, even if the investigation is of short duration.
B. Current Situation in Each Country
Only three countries represented in this group have legal provisions on undercover operations: Pakistan,
Tajikistan and Ukraine. In the other countries (Cote dʼIvoire, DRC, Japan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka), it is
not stipulated in the law. However, simple undercover operations are carried out by law enforcement
agencies. In the countries where undercover operations are not covered by legislation, the law enforcement
officers still do simple undercover operations. For example, if police officer(s) get information that there is adrug dealer selling drugs, they use an informant to confirm the information and then the police officer willapproach the drug dealer and purchase drugs and then arrest the drug dealer and charge him.
In Papua New Guinea, the use of the police officer to actually purchase the drugs will be unsuccessful as
everyone knows who the policemen are. The actual purchase of the drugs will have to be made by an
informant or civilian, and then the police can arrest the drug dealer.
In Pakistan, law enforcement agencies do not need a warrant from the court before undertaking an
undercover operation. This authority has been delegated to the police superintendent and, in the case of theAnti Narcotic Force (ANF), to the Director General of the ANF.
In Tajikistan and Ukraine, undercover operations are also performed within the safeguards of legal
provisions.
Japan does not have special provisions concerning undercover operation. Nevertheless, article 58 of the
Narcotics and Psychotropic Control Law provides that “with the authorization of the Minister of Health,Labour and Welfare, a narcotics agent can receive a narcotic drug from any person”. Based on this provisionand on paragraph 1 of article 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, undercover operations are conducted
mainly against subordinates of crime syndicates.
C. Main Issues
Group 1 pointed out the following as the main issues and problems in the use of undercover operations. To
begin with, several countries of Group 1 lack legal frameworks for the authorization of undercover operations.
Secondly, many countries do not have access to the use of modern technology which is necessary for
conducting undercover operations. Thirdly, the concerned members of law enforcement authorities are notsufficiently trained in the use of undercover operations. Fourthly, the dearth of sufficient manpower is also
one of the challenges faced by countries of Group 1. Another problem in the use of undercover operations is
the high risk and threat to the life of the officer involved. Lastly, another problem in conducting undercover
operations is the lack of sufficient and adequate funding, as undercover operations require a great deal ofmoney.
D. Recommendations
 Enactment of special legislation in the countries where there is no legal framework for undercover
operations;

Recruitment of sufficient police personnel for undercover operation is required;

Specialized training of the concerned officers for undercover operations is necessary;Cutting-edge equipment required for undercover operations must be provided to law enforcement
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Undercover agents and their families must be protected (revelation of their identity or any harm
perpetrated against them must be harshly punished, such as in France);Specialized accounts for undercover operations, such as in Thailand, must be created to cover the
expenses involved in undercover operations.

V. CONTROLLED DELIVERY
A. Definition
Controlled delivery is commonly recognized as the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments topass out of, through or into the territory of one or more states, with the knowledge and under the supervisionof their competent authorities, with a view to the investigation of an offence and the identification of persons
involved in the commission of the offence. (See Article 2 (i) of the UNCTOC Convention.) The UNCTOC
requires State Parties to use the necessary techniques to allow for the appropriate use of controlled delivery,
if permitted by the basic principles of the State Partyʼs domestic legal system (paragraph 1 of Article 20).
1. The Goals of Controlled Delivery
The goals of controlled delivery are to: (i) broaden the investigation to higher levels of the criminalorganizations, (ii) get additional evidence in cases concerning organized smuggling, (iii) get proof that theviolations of law are intentional, (iv) discover storage places for smuggled goods and seize additional
contraband, and (v) detect the final destination of smuggled goods. The controlled delivery method could be
utilized inside one countryʼs jurisdiction, or it could be conducted with international cooperation by allowing
controlled transportation of smuggled goods over the borders of one or more countries. In the first case, it is
known as domestic or internal controlled delivery while in the later case it is called international controlled
delivery.
Controlled delivery can be carried out by:(i) Recruiting a cooperative suspect after initial recovery of the illicit substance.
(ii) Using a “blind courier”, by covert surveillance of the smuggled goods without the cooperation of thesuspect, in which case the suspect does not know that the contraband was discovered by customs
officials or the contraband is smuggled by a courier company that has not been informed of thecontrolled delivery.
(iii) Using the cooperation of the courier company for conducting the controlled delivery operation.
2. Current Situation in Participating Countries
Several participating countries of the 169th UNAFEI International Training Course have utilized
controlled delivery successfully, bringing to justice the leaders of criminal groups rather than merelyarresting couriers or seizing drugs which unknown persons own. In Japan, controlled delivery has been usedby law enforcement agencies and there is a legal framework for this process. Similarly, Pakistan andTajikistan and Ukraine also have legislation in place allowing for controlled delivery. However, there is no
specific legal provision for controlled delivery in Sri Lanka, Cote dʼIvoire, Democratic Republic of Congo andPapua New Guinea. Controlled delivery has been used not only domestically but also internationally in cases
where the consignments are delivered to other countries. However, each country has somewhat different
laws and approaches in this matter. For example, there are two types of controlled delivery, namely live
controlled delivery, which allows the original contraband to be moved to its final destination under the controlof law enforcement officers, and clean controlled delivery, in which law enforcement agencies remove andsubstitute drugs with a harmless substance before allowing the consignments to be delivered. Also, the scopeof controlled delivery is different from one country to another. In some countries, beyond drug trafficking,this technique is used to investigate other types of crimes such as illegal firearms trafficking and money
laundering.
3. Common Issues, Problems and Solutions
Live operations and clean operations: The members of Group 1 recognized that controlled delivery is a
useful method for arresting suspects and seizing illicit drugs. We also discussed the differences between theuse of live and clean controlled delivery operations. In other words, we sought to determine which operation
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would be more effective. With regard to both operations, we analysed the advantages and disadvantages asfollows:(a) Advantages of live controlled delivery operations(i) Possibility of obtaining indefensible evidence that the suspects have conducted drug smuggling, inparticular the chance of disclosing the transaction of drug trafficking and of annihilating organizedcriminal groups.
(ii) Reduction of the risk of controlled delivery operations being exposed by the suspects, especially incases in which the final destination of the delivery was unclear.
(b) Disadvantages of Live Controlled Delivery Operations(i) Burden of carrying out the surveillance.
(ii) Hazardous aspect of the disappearance of the drugs and the suspects.
(c) Advantage of clean controlled delivery operations(i) Prevention of risk of the disappearance of the drugs or other smuggled items.
(d) Disadvantages for clean controlled delivery operations(i) Risk of disclosing the controlled delivery operation.
(ii) Risk of losing the evidence of the suspectʼs drug smuggling.
4. Solutions
Our Group reached the consensus that it is always necessary to consider the checks and balances before
law enforcement agencies decide to launch controlled delivery operations. In addition, before performance ofsuch operations, it will be necessary to collect and evaluate all available information on whether the delivery
situation is part of a systematic smuggling operation, if the recipient is a member of a criminal group, andwhether he has a prior criminal record. Utilization of informants should also be considered. Before arrestingor approaching the offender, law enforcement agencies should analyse information about the offender,
including his or her contacts, means of communication and address to evaluate the possibility of recruiting
the suspect after arrest. At this point, it is to be decided if the offender can be recruited for controlled
delivery or if the controlled delivery should be carried out by covert surveillance of the offender to the finaldestination of the smuggled goods.
5. How to Use the Results of Controlled Delivery as Admissible Evidence at the Trial Stage
Controlled delivery is mostly conducted in the investigative stage of a criminal case for collecting
information to reach the criminal networks. Nevertheless, the officers who employ this technique must
carefully plan and prepare the operation in order to guarantee the success of the seizure and arrest andensure that such evidence is securely used at the trial stage. When law enforcement officers detect
contraband, it is essential to mark the evidence, packages, containers, etc. to be able to identify them after
seizure at the final destination. The contraband should be tested, weighed and evaluated by credible experts.
The parcel or container should be photographed or videotaped before and after the search and after its
preparation for controlled delivery. Each countryʼs procedural law should be applied in order to guarantee theadmissibility of the evidence. In this phase of planning of the operation, the law enforcement officers should
consult prosecutors to avoid misinterpretation of legal details and conduct the controlled delivery in a way
such that it can be used as admissible evidence in court. All necessary warrants to conduct electronic
surveillance or searches and seizures etc. should be obtained before carrying out the actual operation.
6. Cooperation at the National and International Levels
Controlled delivery may be conducted within the country where the drugs are detected or with thecooperation of countries from where the drugs are originated, transited and where they are delivered to thereceiver. The major concern is that, in order to get good results, the controlled delivery should often be done
promptly and without any delay to prevent the awareness of targeted offenders. Therefore, cooperation of allconcerned authorities is required.

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On the international level, cooperation may be achieved through bilateral or multilateral agreements
between countries, effective and fast contacts between law enforcement agencies and by regular informationexchanges. It should be pointed out that in order to conduct successful controlled delivery, the concernedcountries should have already established good relations before starting the process. It would be useful tohave mutual understanding treaties or guidelines beforehand for smooth cooperation among the concernedcountries. The same approach can be applied to domestic operations as well. Many authorities may be
involved in conducting a controlled delivery operation, i.e. the police, customs office, narcotics office, border
guard, port officers, courier services, telecommunication companies. Therefore, these authorities will have tocooperate with each other. One way to organize smooth operations is to set up fundamental guidelines andStanding Operating Procedures for the concerned authorities to be followed in a controlled delivery situation.
7. Utilization of Cooperative Offenders for Controlled Delivery
The cooperation of an offender to carry and deliver the detected drugs to his criminal network under
supervision of law enforcement officials is also recognized as one method of controlled delivery. However,comprehensive prior arrangements among competent authorities will be needed before starting this process.
One of the difficulties in employing this technique is to negotiate with the offender for their cooperation. Somecountries may provide an immunity system subject to their laws to facilitate such cooperation. For example,
in Pakistan, the law provides for the pardon, or mitigation of punishment, of the accused if he or she provides
useful information to the investigating officer or prosecution. But in other participating countries, there is nosuch legal framework for pardon or mitigation of punishment. In such cases, law-enforcement officers have torely on so-called “gentlemenʼs agreements” in negotiations with the offender. Usually the operating officers
may not be able to give any promises to the offender. In this case it is essential for investigators to cooperatewith prosecutors who have first-hand knowledge of the sentencing system and who can influence thesentencing at the trial stage. If the country has a plea-bargaining system, the prosecutors could directly
inform the offender of the difference in imposed penalties in case of refusing or accepting cooperation. In theabsence of a plea-bargaining system, the prosecutors may still indirectly influence the court proceedings. If
the offender agrees to cooperate, investigators have to evaluate his or her ability to carry out orders andwhether his or her unusual behaviour could jeopardize the operation. Law enforcement officials should
undertake this kind of operation only when they are confident of the offenderʼs reliability, because otherwise
there is a significant risk of losing track of the offender as well as of the controlled item. This is one reason
why investigators often prefer clean controlled delivery.
8. Combination of Controlled Delivery with Other Investigation Techniques
Besides being an independently recognized investigative method, controlled delivery is actually conductedwith a combination of different investigative and surveillance methods that are utilized to control the
movement of the item in question. The process of controlled delivery may be initiated on the information
provided by the informants. The informants or undercover agents may also be used to accompany thedelivered item or the cooperating offender. Physical covert surveillance of the delivered item or the criminal
is often used. Electronic surveillance should also be an essential part of the delivery. For example, if anelectronic device attached to the delivered item could be used to determine the location of the item or notify
the investigators of the disclosure of the item, it would make the controlled delivery almost perfect. In suchcases, the officials would know the appropriate time to enter the offenderʼs house, office or other respective
location and arrest him with the evidence. However, in most of the countries, regular investigators are notqualified to operate electronic surveillance equipment, and, therefore, experts or special units should
participate in carrying out the operation.
9. Appropriate Timing to Enter the Targeted Location
The most difficult point of controlled delivery operations is to decide on the appropriate time to arrest theoffender along with the controlled item in order to create strong evidence. If the law enforcement agency
enters into the targeted house/location before the parcel is opened, the offender may raise an excuse or pleathat the parcel was delivered by mistake, and he or she intended to return it to the courier service. In
addition, early arrest may cut off the offender from the criminal network or alert the higher levels of thecriminal organization that the operation is intended to reach by employing controlled delivery. On the other
hand, the delay of arrest will increase the probability of the criminalʼs escape or losing track of the offenderand the controlled item. Appropriate timing of entering the house/location to make the arrest or seizure,
therefore, is of utmost importance. Nevertheless, officers should not enter the suspectʼs house/location before
he/she has completely opened the parcel. When the parcel has already been opened, he or she cannot deny76

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being the recipient. As aforementioned, law enforcement agencies may have to rely on an advanced
electronic device to inform them of the right time to enter the offenderʼs house/location and arrest him with
the incriminating evidence.
10. Limitations on the Usage of the Controlled Delivery Method
Controlled delivery, especially live CD, is an investigative method involving a high level of risk andrequiring vast professional skill and knowledge on the part of the investigator. When controlled delivery is
employed, we should consider the cost-effectiveness and the time frame constraints for this method
compared to other investigative techniques in advance. Nevertheless, Group 1 recognizes that it ought to be abeneficial technique to establish a link between the illicit drugs exposed and high-level criminals to achieve
the goal of combating organized crime. In order to conduct a controlled delivery operation effectively, weneed to combine it with other appropriate techniques such as utilization of informants, undercover agents andelectronic indicators for opened parcels, and to fully conduct the follow-up investigation to gain the evidence
which can identify it as an organized crime. It is also critical to conduct skills training by sharing bestpractices before launching the operation and to establish a close relationship with the related authorities forthe realization of a speedy and smooth operation.

VI. PROTECTION OF WITNESSES AND IMMUNITY IN EXCHANGE FORTESTIMONY
A. Introduction and Definition
The cooperation of drug offenders is crucial in dismantling drug trafficking organizations since they know
the structure, activities and functioning of these groups. However, criminal organizations have the means toprevent potential witnesses from collaborating with law enforcement and judicial authorities by threatening
them and their relatives.
To overcome the unwritten “rule of silence”, national authorities have to ensure witnessesʼ protection at
every step of the proceedings. On the other hand, as they might have committed offences, such informants /witnesses may be reluctant to cooperate with law enforcement and prosecution authorities.
According to article 24 of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, eachState Party has to take appropriate measures to provide effective protection from potential retaliation or
intimidation for witnesses who give testimony and for their relatives and other persons close to them.
The protection of witnesses may consist of physical protection such as:(i) Police escort to and from the court;(ii) Close protection;(iii) Re-location;(iv) Non-disclosure or limitations on the disclosure of information concerning their identities andwhereabouts;(v) Changing identity.
Several measures may also be adopted to provide psychological safety:(i) Keeping the witness fully informed of the proceedings;(ii) Allowing expert counsellors to accompany him/her to the court;(iii) Providing a room where the witness can wait before testifying, so that he/she is not in physicalcontact with the accused or his relatives during the trial.
Also, procedural or in-court measures can be set up to allow the testimony to be given in a manner that77

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ensures the witnessʼ safety, e.g. by providing testimony through communications technologies such as video
links or other appropriate means.
The choice of the form of the protection̶from basic and affordable measures to more complicatedones̶has to be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the completeness of the testimony, the role of thewitness in the criminal group and the level of threat he or she may be facing.
Another means to encourage witnessesʼ cooperation is to reward their testimony by a limited or total
immunity, which may consist of stopping the prosecution or promising not to prosecute them for a specificoffence related to the case for which they are about to give testimony. Immunity is different from plea
bargaining as the latter usually aims to obtain leniency in the sentence.
The UNCTOC encourages States Parties to “consider providing for the possibility, in accordance with
fundamental principles of its domestic law, of granting immunity from prosecution to a person who provides
substantial cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of an offence covered by this Convention” (article
26, para. 3).
B. Current Situation in Each Country
1. Witnesses Protection
Although most countries have no specific witness protection programmes, all of them have a general legal
framework that ensures witness security during the trial stage.
In Pakistan, under the general provisions, female witnesses who fear for their security can be offeredprotection within a “shelter house” for an unlimited period. Special legislation addressing the issue of witness
protection is in process.
In Côte dʼIvoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Japan and Papua New Guinea, the police escort andprotect witnesses who testify in the court.
In 2015, Sri Lanka adopted an act to provide assistance and protection to any witness who might need it1.
Under the provisions of this Act, a victim of an offence or a witness who has reasonable grounds to believethat any harm may be inflicted on him or her due to his or her cooperation in criminal proceedings shall beentitled to seek protection from such harm. Therefore, the authority established for protection of the victims
and witnesses or any Court may grant a request to provide relevant protection measures.
Tajikistan and Ukraine have specific legal frameworks that guarantee protection by the police and/or
public prosecutor to any witness who feels unsafe. Several measures are available, such as personal escort,
bodyguards, protection of property, and concealing or changing of identity.
2. Regarding Immunity in Exchange for Testimony
With the exception of Pakistan and Japan, none of the participating countries represented in Group 1 havespecific legislation dealing with immunity in exchange for testimony. However, in Côte dʼIvoire, DRC, and
PNG, general legislation authorizes public prosecutors to refrain from prosecuting a person who gives useful
information for the investigation.
In Pakistan and Sri Lanka, an informant or potential witness who has taken part in the offence may agree
to plea bargain. When an accused person becomes an “approver” or “state witness”, judges in Pakistan may
grant the witness complete immunity or leniency while in Sri Lanka the Attorney-General may only grant thewitness leniency. In this case, the statement has to be made in open court, without any compulsion. In Japan, a
new act came into force on 1st June 2018 regarding leniency and immunity for the suspect or accused in
exchange for testimony regarding an organized crime, but so far no cases have been dealt with under thislaw.

Parliament of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, Assistance to and Protection of Victims of Crimes and Witnesses
Act, No. 4 of 2015.
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C. Common Issues and Problems
In addition to the significant resources that are required to implement effective protection of witnesses,
extreme precautions are required, and protection cannot be provided in every case. Moreover, the credibility
and accuracy of a witnessʼs testimony can be diminished by his or her fear of reprisals by the members of thecriminal organization. It also can lead the witness to change his or her testimony and/or refuse to make astatement in open court. When a programme is set up, psychological and practical barriers can be
encountered that compromise its success:(i) High expectations;(ii) Lack of cooperation and/or discipline of the protected witness;(iii) Lack of ability to refrain from using an old identity and contacting old acquaintances;(iv) Insufficient psychological training;(v) Insufficient social capacity to cope with the drastic change in lifestyle the programme requires;(vi) Factors related to the witnessesʼ frequent criminal background.
In countries that allow police officers to appear in court as witnesses, there is no specific protection. As
regards immunity in exchange for testimony, the main concern is about ethical issues, as the practice may beperceived as inciting impunity.
D. Solutions(i) Since witness protection measures may be considered as affecting the defendantʼs rights to a fair trial,a specific legal framework is required;(ii) Define who may be a protected witness and the general type of protection that may be provided;(iii) Set out the factors to determine admission to a protecting programme;(iv) Settle a witness protection authority in charge of deciding on the type of measures to be applied andapplying such measures;(v) When necessary, amend the rules of evidence to permit the use of video link systems during trial;(vi) Amend mutual assistance agreements in criminal matters to address the issue of international
relocation.

VII. CONCLUSION
After threadbare and thorough deliberations, Group 1 reached consensus on the following conclusions.
The current paper mainly emphasizes and explores the utilization of special investigative techniques in thebattle against organized crime. These techniques, if used in a calculated and professional manner, could prove
to be very successful in order to broaden the investigation to higher levels of criminal organizations. On theother hand, no judicial decision can be based only on a single piece of evidence. Therefore, it is important torealize that one successful operation of controlled delivery, electronic surveillance etc. might not be sufficient
to secure the conviction of the offenders. Special investigative techniques should always be supported byeffective utilization of conventional investigative tools. It is also obvious that the scope of special investigativetechniques covered by this paper is not final, and the arsenal of law enforcers must always be creatively
supplemented by new methods in accordance with the trends and developments of the criminal world.

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GROUP 2
CONFISCATION OF DRUGS AND PROCEEDS DERIVED FROMDRUG OFFENCES: A WAY FORWARD FOR EFFECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT
Rapporteur: Maxine Tuedian Bernard (Jamaica)
Co-Rapporteurs: Aida Syeliza Binti Abdul Jalil (Malaysia)
Yoshie Takeuchi (Japan)
Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Members

Advisers

Mohamed Ahmed Habib
Ihor Yaselskyi
Chandra Segaran Subramaniam
Cheick Sala Sangare
Ismail M. I Hammad
Roshan Wijesinghe
Shunichi Akima
Takahiro Konishi
Prof. Takuya Furuhashi
Prof. Nozomu Hirano
Prof. Ryo Futagoishi(Egypt)(Ukraine)(Malaysia)(Mali)(Palestine)(Sri Lanka)(Japan)(Japan)(UNAFEI)(UNAFEI)(UNAFEI)

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
Illicit drug trafficking yields significant profits for criminal organizations, and the profits are reinvested inillegal activities conducted by those organizations, including international terrorism. Therefore, afundamental priority for law enforcement agencies dealing with combating illicit drug activity is to confiscateillegally obtained assets along with the illegal drugs. The confiscation of drugs and assets, however, requires
first to successfully identify, seize and trace them. Moreover, those assets are often laundered to hide the true
nature, origin and ownership of criminal proceeds. Thus, covering legislative and practical loopholes by
sharing strong anti-money laundering policies and confiscation methods throughout the world is an essential
issue in combating illicit drug trafficking.
This group shared the current situation, legislation and good practices of each participating country anddiscussed the possible solutions for the common challenges that we face concerning this issue.
B. International Conventions and Frameworks
As it is broadly recognized among law enforcement agencies worldwide, there are several international
conventions addressing combating money-laundering and confiscation of criminal proceeds.
1. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2004 (Palermo Convention)
For instance, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2004 (hereafterreferred to as the “Palermo Convention”) stipulates in its Article 7 that each state party “shall institute acomprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime” for specified business operators and “establish a
Financial Intelligence Unit (hereafter referred to as ʻFIUʼ) to serve as a national center for the collection,
analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential money-laundering”. It also urges the states
parties in its Article 12 to adopt measures to enable confiscation of proceeds derived from, and property,
equipment or other instrumentalities used in criminal offences.
2. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988
(Vienna Convention)
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances(hereafter referred to as the “Vienna Convention”) also requires each party in its Article 5 to adopt measures
to enable confiscation of proceeds from or instrumentalities used in drug-related crimes as well as narcotic
80169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE

drugs and psychotropic substances.
3. Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
Since money laundering is a transnational crime, each country is encouraged to work in harmony within
the international frameworks such as the Financial Action Task Force (hereafter referred to as the “FATF”)
and the Egmont Group1.
The FATF Recommendation most recently revised in 2012, which is recognized as the international
standard for anti-money-laundering measures and which should be adopted by the member states, includes
criminalization of money laundering, adoption of measures to enable them to identify, trace, freeze andconfiscate criminal proceeds, and possible adoption of non-conviction-based confiscation.

II. DRUGS
A. Identification and Tracing
1. Overview
The discussion found that all participating countries commonly use traditional investigative methods suchas informants and random checking as measures to identify drugs. Due to current threats and rapid
technological development, some countries have adopted special investigative tools to identify and trace
drugs, such as controlled delivery, undercover operations and electronic surveillance (video surveillance andinterception of wire, oral, or electronic communications).
Some participating countries have jurisdiction to conduct these special investigations while enforcement
agencies in some of the countries conduct controlled delivery, undercover operations and surveillance inpractice without written jurisdiction. The group has agreed that the uses of these techniques vary fromcountry to country and is aware of controversy surrounding their use, such as abuse of power andinfringement of human rights.
2. Challenges and Countermeasures
Drug law enforcers have to continuously keep pace with criminal modus operandi and current drug
trends. Drug traffickers, in an effort to elude law enforcement, will consistently change their methods ofconcealment and their trafficking behaviour and routes forcing investigators to be reactive rather thanproactive2. Another challenge identified is that there are inadequacies in trained or specialized personnel
coupled with weak financial support to conduct special investigation.
To remedy these challenges, we suggest that the countries faced with these challenges engage in capacitybuilding for their investigators, such as training in proactive investigation techniques, surveillance,
undercover operations where the legislation will permit and to a greater extent consistent refresher training
in current drug trends which can be done by engaging international partners and sharing current trends.
To address the issue of inadequate financial resources, we recommend that the responsible
agencies/country identify and put measures in place to ensure at the very least that investigators areprovided with the basic resources necessary to interdict drug trafficking activities. Some of these basic
necessities vary from technological resources, financial support for witnesses and informants to physicalresources.
From the discussions it was also recognized that witness protection, and the lack thereof, is an issue insome countries which negatively affects the gathering of information in identifying and tracing drugs.
Witnesses are reluctant to assist law enforcement with information as to where drugs are stored and theidentities of the criminals involved. This hinders investigators and further exacerbates the issue of
conducting proactive investigation.
Concerning this challenge, we recommend that countries adopt Article 24 of the Palermo Convention on
The Egmont group is a united body of 155 Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). The Egmont provides a platform for the secureexchange of expertise and financial intelligence to combat money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF)
2For example, the dark web can be described as one of the most recent emerging threats in the field of drug trafficking.
1

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106“Protection of Witnesses”3.
B. Seizing Drugs
1. Overview
Most of the countries need search warrants or written authority to conduct searches, with the exceptionof Malaysia4, Mali5 and Sri Lanka6. All participants confirmed that enforcement agencies will seize all drugs
that they identify. Pre-testing will be carried out on the drugs seized to verify that the substances seized
were drugs.
Some of the countries stated that investigation will be done by public prosecutors and the drugs will behanded over to their storage/exhibit/evidence facility. In some countries, enforcement agencies such aspolice and customs officers will conduct investigation into drug seizures. The drugs then will be sent to aforensic laboratory for analysis to confirm that it is a narcotic drug and that the substance is illegal. After
getting a conclusive result, drugs seized will be kept in secure storage by enforcement agencies, publicprosecutorsʼ offices or other competent authorities.
2. Challenges and Countermeasures
From the discussion, we identified one of the challenges as being limited storage areas and lack of financial
allocation to keep the drugs during the trial phase, which normally takes years in some countries. This maylead to loss or theft of exhibits in custody.
To effectively counter this challenge, we agreed that early disposal of the larger portion of the drugs
seized is recommended by applying to the appropriate or competent body to dispose of the said exhibits
before the conclusion of the case. To do this, it is necessary to amend the domestic laws in some counties
which are in need of but do not have such provisions. Increased financial allocations to investigative bodies
can also be suggested to assist in providing adequate storage areas coupled with sufficient human resources.
C. Disposal or Use of Drugs
1. Overview
All countries stated that drug exhibits will only be disposed of on conclusion of the court case. Committees
consisting of public prosecutors or police officers and other stakeholders are established to monitor the
disposal of drugs in some jurisdictions. Some of the countries7 may need approval from specific authorities
such as enforcement agencies, environmental bodies and/or other health officials beforehand.
The common method used to dispose the drugs is burning in incinerators by appointed and competent
enforcement agencies. It was noted that the methods of disposal vary by country as in some countries
burning is carried out in open spaces and in one country8 it is carried out in the presence of the public. For
some countries, some drugs are not being destroyed but are used for medical treatment as well as scientificstudy/research purposes9.
2. Challenges and Countermeasures
In some countries there is an issue of lack of trust in members of the police department or competentauthorities by the public, fearing that there will be issues of corruption. Because excessive amounts of drugs
are seized by law enforcers, from time to time there may be concerns embedded in the minds of civilians thatthe drugs seized are being infiltrated back into the black market by corrupt officials.
To effectively counter this challenge, it was suggested in the group to have a special vetted agency,“Each State Party shall take appropriate measures within its means to provide effective protection from potential retaliation
or intimidation for witnesses in criminal proceedings who give testimony concerning offences covered by this Convention and,as appropriate for their relatives and other persons close to them.”
4Dangerous Drugs Act, 1952
5
Penal Procedure Code, 2001
6
Criminal Procedure Code No. 15, 1979
7
Malaysia, Japan, Egypt, Sri Lanka and Mali
8
Sri Lanka
9
Sri Lanka and Palestine
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committee or independent persons participate in the disposal proceeding to mitigate allegations of corruption
against law enforcement.
There is no single international standard addressing the disposal of drugs seized by law enforcers. In all
countries represented there were varying methods of how and when seized drugs are disposed. For some,the disposal is done in public, for others in incinerators. Some countries expressed that there are concerns
regarding disposal raised by environmentalists.
Regarding this challenge, it is suggested that the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 should adopt
and declare an internationally accepted method of disposal of drugs seized in an effort to alleviate the varying
methods of drug disposal. In treating this issue, it is recommended that stakeholders such asenvironmentalists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and members of the public be engaged throughworkshops, surveys and research to arrive at an accepted method of disposal.

III. ASSETS
A. Identification of Assets
The group examined the ease or lack thereof of identifying assets in its respective jurisdictions. In any
asset tracing investigation there are objectives to be considered: locating the assets, linking them to an
unlawful activity with a view to freezing or confiscating them and proving the commission of the relevant
offence. Identification of assets is carried out in a similar manner in almost all countries represented. This isdone by:
1. Search Procedures
Searching is a very effective method of gathering evidence to trace these assets. Search procedures are
conducted in all countries, some with warrants and in some cases without warrants because their legislation
does not require such. Searches minimize the opportunity for document destruction and concealment, andthey can avoid deliberate or inadvertent failure to produce documents following an agency request. There
are, however, notable disadvantages to conducting searches and seizures of documents in tracing assets as
sometimes the material gathered is very large and is time consuming to analyse. For example, the vast
number of documents gathered during a search takes a considerable amount of time to review.
2. Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)
It was confirmed from the discussions that all countries have well-established FIUs. In some jurisdictions
the names or titles given to this body differ, but the meaning or classification remains the same. FIUs in somecountries are tasked to identify assets linked to the predicate offences being investigated. In some countries,
they do not have investigative powers and, therefore, will only seek to identify assets when requested by theinvestigative body, which in most cases is the police or narcotics investigative body. Once assets are
identified, then the next step is to trace these assets to verify if they are proceeds that were derived from
criminal activities.
3. Information Obtained by Investigation and Interrogation
Assets are identified through interviews and interrogations in some countries. For example, during
interviews suspects and their relatives are asked certain questions relative to their addresses and addressesof associates. The information garnered is then used to identify assets which may have been acquired from
criminal conduct.
4. Tracing Assets
From all indication the group shares similar methods of asset tracing in that they seek to trace assets
through similar channels such as financial institutions, public records and government/non-governmental
bodies charged with recording and documenting purchases and acquisitions.
Tracing of assets in drug investigations is conducted by the FIUs in some countries. These units are
considered pre-trial bodies or pre-investigative bodies and can undertake investigation into tracing of assets.
For other countries, assets are traced by the police under direct or indirect supervision of the prosecution,and the FIUs have no investigative authority. Assets are also traced, upon the request of the FIU, prosecution
or police department, across borders using or requesting international cooperation.
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In some participating countries there is a structured process or formal committee/body in place toundertake this type of tracing while in others it is done informally or professionally through establishednetworks or stakeholders.
5. Challenges and Countermeasures
As stated above, it was discovered that there are certain limitations on scope in that FIUs in somecountries only respond to requests of another investigative body while those in some other countries are notauthorized to conduct investigations.
To address the issue of the varying roles of FIUs it was suggested that some countries strengthen or
broaden the scope or authority given to FIUs, which will afford their FIUs the power to have a commitment
to the investigations process. This will ensure cohesiveness and, to a greater extent, continuity. It is also
recommended that the FIUs which do not have investigative authority coordinate and communicate withother investigative bodies.
The issue of third party ownership and unregistered properties/assets was identified as a challenge in all
countries; in some instances the assets concerned are registered to a third party individual or company whichmakes it extremely complicated when tracing ownership of assets. In other instances, the assets identified
are unregistered and difficult to trace.
Those countries with concerns about third party ownership and unregistered assets should consider
implementing FATF Recommendation 4 (2017) which includes instituting legislative measures to enable theircompetent authorities to freeze, or seize and confiscate (a) property laundered, (b) proceeds from or
instrumentalities used in or intended for use in money laundering predicate offences without prejudicing therights of bona fide third-party owners.
There is a difficulty in identifying and tracing criminal proceeds when the transaction is conducted acrossinternational borders due to legislative powers and the slow pace of assistance in international cooperation(Mutual Legal Assistance), whereas a written request is mandatory but takes too much time in processing.
Dual criminality is an issue that affects tracing these assets as whenever the offence concerned is not an
offence in the participating country then there will be limited or no assistance.
It is recommended that clear guidelines be established addressing international cooperation between
countries and that measures be implemented when assets are identified and traced overseas. Countries
should have adequate legal basis for providing assistance and where appropriate should have in place
treaties, arrangements and other mechanisms to enhance cooperation and expedite assistance which should
include addressing the issue of dual criminality. In addition each country should engage in networking
mechanisms establishing appropriate focal points when conducting these investigations. This will enhancecooperation between countries and reduce the response time in forwarding trace requests.
It was also pointed out in discussion that criminals tend to avoid using established financial institutions
and spend below thresholds that will raise concerns. This is a major problem for some countries as it allows
criminals to conduct illicit transactions which often go undetected.
In countering the issue of unreported suspicious transactions, it is recommended that the affected
countries adopt FATF Recommendation 21 (2017), which speaks tipping-off and confidentiality.
We also agreed that all countries should engage in capacity-building for law enforcement officers includingprosecutors and that they should organize training sessions aimed at enhancing the knowledge base offinancial investigators, developing their skills and competencies especially in a technological sense.
B. Measures of Freezing and Confiscation of Assets in Illicit Drug Investigations
1. Freezing of Assets
Evidently all participating countries engage in the practice of freezing assets of suspects believed to beacquired through criminal conduct, whether directly or indirectly. These assets are oftentimes frozen on an
application of the investigative body or the prosecuting authority. These applications must be approved by acompetent court, and in some cases the applicant must prove that the assets to be frozen are directly or
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indirectly the proceeds of criminal conduct or that those assets are directly related to the charged offence. In
most countries10 the assets are frozen throughout the investigation process until the conclusion of the case.
In some cases, a bond is placed on the asset and the suspect/accused is allowed to utilize the asset
depending on the type of property; however, the holder cannot dispose, destroy or transfer the asset. In allcases when assets are frozen and involve a third party, the party is duly informed and in certain instances
they are given the right to appeal.
2. Confiscation of Assets
Relative to confiscation of assets, the general consensus is that assets are deemed confiscated or forfeitedon authority of the court or an equally competent body and are only so confiscated on conclusion of trial orinvestigation. In countries such as Ukraine and Egypt, two methods of confiscation of assets are practiced.
This is, however, dependent on the type of asset and the value. The method used depends on whether theassets were directly used in the commission of the predicate offence or the value of the assets. Somecountries practice two methods of confiscation, such as Jamaica and Malaysia, that is, criminal and civil
forfeiture.
When confiscating assets, anti-money-laundering measures are one method in the criminal sense. In thisprocedure, the assets are only liable for confiscation if it is proven that they were direct proceeds of the crime
and the accused is convicted of the said offence(s). In civil forfeiture proceedings, the assets can be confiscatedregardless of whether or not a conviction is obtained; if the accused is acquitted, civil proceedings are
immediately initiated with a view to seizing assets identified and traced, and it is upon the defendant to prove
the legitimate source of his/her assets.
Another notable procedure practiced in some countries11 is the principle of “equivalent value” or “valuebased confiscation”, which stipulates that once the court determines that the benefit that accrued to theindividual/accused was directly or indirectly obtained from illegitimate conduct, it would enforce a financial
liability such as an amount, usually in multiples of the profit or benefit derived from the crime which isrealizable against the assets of the individual.
All but three represented countries, Mali, Malaysia and Palestine, have clearly established and specificmoney laundering acts or procedures. For some it is classified as the Money Laundering Act which stands on
its own, and for some it is embedded in articles in their Proceeds of Crimes Act. Money laundering
procedures are initiated as a result of predicate offences and intentions to deprive criminals of their profits
derived from criminal conduct.
In one country12 there is no link between money laundering investigation and drug crimes, and it isinvestigated just like any other criminal investigation. In another country13 there is a supreme committee
consisting of all stakeholders responsible for money laundering policies to gather the efforts and coordinate
the parties tasked. This supreme committee is headed by the FIU.
In Japan it is presumed that any property obtained from criminal conduct during the purported time of
the commission of any drug offences provided for can be regarded as proceeds of the crime. This isdependent on the affordability of the offender and what can be reasonably assumed as property beyond his
scope or any known benefits he has been in receipt of.
Two countries14 have no distinction between Money Laundering Laws and Proceeds of Crimes Acts but
are subjected to predicate offences dictated in law. It is however possible to initiate money laundering
investigations in absence of those predicate offences as well as conduct money laundering investigations
simultaneously with the criminal or predicate offence(s).

Except Malaysia and Jamaica
Except Sri Lanka and Mali
12
Ukraine13
Palestine
14
Japan and Ukraine
10
11

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3. Challenges and Countermeasures
In some countries15 confiscation is only possible after final verdict, and the verdict must be in favour of theprosecution. Some frozen assets deteriorate during the investigation process, and should the prosecution orcompetent body fail to prove its case, then the assets may devalue, which can result in the state having tocompensate the party or in the reverse where on conclusion of the case the asset is forfeited but hasdeteriorated and is of no value.
It is recommended that countries institute a special vetted agency or committee with expertise inproperty management to manage the storage and utilization of high value assets that are frozen by the state.
This committee can develop measures to preserve or market the assets during the course of theinvestigation and where legally possible the state can earn revenue from the asset in its frozen state.
The time for completion of criminal procedures is exhaustive in some instances, and the assets are
sometimes stored at a high cost to the state, for example, storage for high value assets. To counter thischallenge, it can be recommended that the state institute alternate procedures, such as bonding the owner of
the asset, that is, the owner will retain the asset/property and be liable to pay the state the value of the asset
at the time of freezing should he fail in his bid to retain the asset on conclusion of the investigation.
The burden of proof rests on the state/prosecution in some countries, and the standard is beyond
reasonable doubt, which is oftentimes difficult to prove, especially where a continuous drug crime must be
proven. In Malaysia, where non-prosecution is practiced when freezing assets, the standard of proof is on thebalance of probability.
It is recommended that countries adopt best practices of other countries, such as simultaneously bringing
both cases before the court to eliminate the time wasted waiting for a conviction on the predicate offence.
Also, amendment in legislation can be encouraged to make provision for civil proceedings where the burdenof proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defendant.
C. Disposal of Assets
1. Forfeited Assets
All participating countries have provisions for disposing assets forfeited to the state or competent body. In
most instances the assets are disposed of on the instructions of a court or competent body on the conclusionof the investigation and almost always when there is a conviction. The method of disposal varies dependingon the type and value of assets. These variations include but are not limited to:a. Auctions for moveable property such as motor vehicles;
b. Caveats placed on immovable property such as land;c. Monetary assets transferred to government institutions;d. Assets utilized by investigative bodies or departments that made the case such as (boats, motor
vehicles, houses, etc.);e. Monetary assets lodged in interest-bearing accounts and its allocation decided by the state; it may also
be utilized in drug investigations such as payment for informants.
In some countries16 a designated body or committee is assigned to assess the assets forfeited and make adecision on the best way to dispose of the asset. This is so when the asset is considered disposable, forexample, a fish pond, animals and other perishable assets.
2. Returning Seized Assets
Participantsʼ countries have systems or procedures in place to return assets whenever there is an

1516Japan, Egypt, Ukraine and Sri Lanka
Malaysia, Ukraine and Jamaica

86169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE

acquittal in a case or where the prosecution or investigative body has failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the assets were proceeds of criminal conduct such as drug crimes.
3. Challenges and Countermeasures
Some challenges identified were common among all participating countries, especially where the assets
frozen deteriorated while in storage and, hence, the disposal is counter beneficial to the state. This is a resultof lengthy trial process and administrative proceedings.
Countries can employ an approach whereby assets that devalue quickly are disposed using the “valuebased procedure”; the owner can retain the asset but must pay to the state the equivalent value at the time offreezing.
Some forfeited assets are of little or no use to the state. For example, in one country where houses areforfeited to the crown/state, there is difficulty selling them as buyers are concerned about their safety.
It can be recommended that countries either amend legislation or adopt best practices where the drugtrafficker is made to compensate the state an assumed value of property believed to be obtained from
criminal conduct particularly in cases where there is a difficulty in identifying where the dirty money was
integrated back into society as legitimate gain.
There are no clear procedures in some countries addressing how assets are valued. For example, where acommittee is responsible for valuing the assets forfeited, there are no clear guidelines on assigning valuation.
Therefore, those countries with no clear guidelines in valuing or revaluing high priced assets should consider
instituting unambiguous and written guidelines on disposal of those assets.

IV. CONCLUSION AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
In conclusion, the group reached a consensus that illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances and drug-related offences is a global problem that needs global and new solutions. As the different
jurisdictions adopt different systems to identify, trace, freeze and confiscate drugs and assets in drug cases,
they recognize that the need to strengthen multidisciplinary measures at the international, regional, national,
local and community level to prevent drug-related crimes and foster social development and inclusiveness isvery much a requirement in all the jurisdictions.
The group reached the following recommendations:a. Monitor current trends and drug trafficking routes and share experiences, best practices and lessons
learned in order to prevent and counter the misuse of international trade for illicit drug related
activities. In addition, note the current initiatives by the UN institutions in preventing and countering
the diversion of precursors for illicit use and illicit financial flows stemming from drug trafficking andrelated crimes.
b. Strengthen coordinated border management strategies as well as the capacity of border control andlaw enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, including where appropriate the provision of equipment
and technology, along with the necessary training and maintenance support in order to prevent,monitor, and counter trafficking in drugs, trafficking in precursors and other related crimes such as
illicit financial flows, smuggling of bulk of cash and money laundering.
c. Develop and strengthen mechanisms of domestic coordination and timely and efficient information
sharing between authorities involved in identifying and countering drug trafficking and related money
laundering. Integrate financial investigation more thoroughly into interdiction operations to identify
individuals and companies involved in such activities.
d. Strengthen and utilize existing and relevant regional, sub-regional and international networks for theexchange of operational information to prevent and counter money laundering and illicit financial
flows.

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e. Promote effective measures capable of addressing the links between drug crimes and the assets
generated from such crimes for successful confiscation procedures.
f.

Improve the availability and quality of statistical information and analysis of illicit drug cultivation,
production and manufacturing, trafficking, money laundering and illicit financial flows, including
appropriate reflection in reports of the UNODC and the International Narcotics Control Board in order
to better measure and evaluate the impact of such crimes and to further enhance the effectiveness ofcriminal justice responses in that regard.

g. Enhance the capacity of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies especially in forensic science inthe context of drug investigations and issuing guidelines to the investigating authorities regarding
harmonizing the implementation of anti-money-laundering laws.

88

GROUP 3
MULTI-AGENCY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Rapporteur: Mr. Rodrigo LEITE PRADO (Brazil)
Co-Rapporteurs: Ms. Marie Catherine NOLASCO (Philippines)
Mr. NAKAJIMA Hirokazu (Japan)
Chairperson
Co-Chairperson
Members

Advisers

Mr. Nitchan HADSARANG
Mr. Mostafa Hicham ELBASTAWISSY
Ms. NKULU Mbayo Marie Claude
Mr. Modibo SACKO
Mr. IBROHIMZODA Abdushukur
Ibrohimjon
Mr. Murod Abdurakhimovich
MAVLYANOV
Ms. SADA Yoshiko
Mr. Junichiro OTANI
Ms. Mana YAMAMOTO
Ms. Mika KITAGAWA(Thailand)(Egypt)(D.R. Congo)(Mali)(Tajikistan)(Uzbekistan)(Japan)(UNAFEI)(UNAFEI)(UNAFEI)

I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting citizens from the harmful consequences of drug trafficking has become a major global concern.
Despite the differences related to each countryʼs realities and legislation, it is a phenomenon that poses
unexpectedly similar challenges to nations and cannot be solved without a united effort.
Indeed, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan struggle every day to deal with the flow of opiates into their territories
through the Afghan border. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali face analogous problems as transit
countries for cocaine, a significant part of which comes from Brazil, a hub for the distribution of cocaine
smuggled from Colombia, Peru and Bolivia towards the East. Meanwhile, drug mules recruited from thePhilippines cross Malaysia with stimulants, a part of which may arrive in Japan. Egypt has limited productionof cannabis and heroine, but gets its supply from foreign countries. For all we know, the proceeds of thecriminal activities may be handed to a Brazilian hawala to be deposited in a fictitious bank account in a Thaibank and laundered through real estate purchased in the Philippines by a dummy corporation.
Despite the efforts of the United Nations to address the issue of international drug trafficking, the problem
persists. It feeds from a bad equation: high demand for illicit substances, poverty among mules, failed states,
higher profits for supply rings and a vast array of financial, commercial and transport professionals who
benefit from the criminal chain. Unlike state agents, drug traffickers are not bound by territorial borders.
Cultural traditions and legal systems can be used both as a sword and a shield. Criminal groups are awareof this. They take advantage of the jurisdictional limits of countries to operate freely and shield themselvesfrom prosecution. No matter how devoted a country may be in combating drug trafficking, it is a battle thatcannot be beaten alone. That is the reason why nations should resort to mutual dialogue and cooperation.
The main objective of the group workshop is to exchange experiences related to each participant
countryʼs challenges and good practices on the front of international cooperation on drug trafficking, in orderto achieve better mutual understanding and find possible solutions.
After reviewing the main issues related to multi-agency and international cooperation on drug trafficking
matters, the group agreed to focus the discussion on the following topics: border control, informationexchange, mutual legal assistance and its financial aspects. The discussion, summarized below, led to sixteen(16) recommendations.

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In the presentation of the groupʼs report, each participantʼs input was referred to under the name of thecountry they represent. Their ideas do not necessarily reflect their countriesʼ policies.

II. SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION
A. Border Control
Border control was the most frequently mentioned issue by the participants. Thailand, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Brazil reported similar problems related to their status astransit-point countries for illicit drug smuggling. These problems persist due to (i) the insufficiency of border
outposts and checkpoints; (ii) the deterioration of the existing facilities and road signals; (iii) the deficiency ofspecific capacity-building for troops, police and customs officers; (iv) the shortage of personnel; and (v) thelack of technical means, such as appropriate vehicles, x-ray machines, radar, optical observation equipment
and night vision/infra-red devices.
The Democratic Republic of Congo, Brazil and Thailand highlighted the challenges inherent to their vastand porous boundaries, some of them spread over forests, jungles and different bodies of waters. Meanwhile,
Japan and the Philippines, both archipelagic in nature, have difficulty in guarding their coastlines. In isolatedareas, it is the absence of the state that cuts deeper, unleashing free drug smuggling through pathways andwaterways.
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan reported encountering severe difficulties at their borders with Afghanistan, an
opium source country whose economy and institutions have proven incapable of tackling poppy trafficking.
Afghan smugglers have adopted a system of drug trafficking without physical contact, by means of burying
drugs at the border area in plastic bags. Although the Tajik and Uzbek authorities can seize the illicit
substances, such modus operandi makes it hard to adjudicate the traffickers, especially in light of theimpossibility of undertaking investigation measures inside the Afghan territory.
Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo shared concerns related to their inland borders withmultiple states, some of them sources of illicit substances, like Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, or destination
countries, like Angola.
Japan introduced a complicated issue to deal with: the transshipment of drugs in foreign vessels beyond
the jurisdiction of the national coastal authorities. The challenge was said to be particularly tricky because
many ships have fake flags or no flags at all, enhancing the need for intelligence disclosure from the outboundports in order to raise the Japanese authoritiesʼ suspicion of specific vessels used for trafficking.
The abuse of airports, seaports and free ports/economic zones by drug syndicates for the sake oftransshipment and drop-off of illegal substances was mentioned by the Philippines as well. Thailand reported
that criminal rings have also taken advantage of the international postal service. Both countries emphasized
the increasing role of couriers, runners and peddlers in trans-border drug trafficking. These couriers pose as
tourists in exchange for money.
Brazil described the feeble monitoring of its inland borders, despite the number of governmental agencies
with overlapping duties related to boundary control. Part of the problem is due to the lack of a national
border control policy, entailing poor institutional coordination, instability of goals, unpredictability ofresources and little accountability.
Mali reported fruitful outcomes after establishing an office of its anti-drug unit (CAAT) at the Bamako
Airport. By working side by side with foreign countries, they have been able to seize cocaine andmethamphetamine.
Tajikistan also provided input about promising results related to its National Counter-Narcotics Strategy
for 2013-2020, aiming at the structuring and amelioration of the Tajik border facilities and the increase inmobility of the frontier guards, personnel and equipment.
Thailand saw the need for enhancing day and night joint patrols by the rivers. Such policy should be
addressed along with the establishment of quick response units on both sides of the border, in case one90169TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSEREPORTS OF THE COURSE

country stumbles upon a drug dealer and the perpetrator tries to run away to the neighbouring country.
The discussion moved on to the need of enacting treaties to grant the possibility of conducting hot
pursuits in neighbouring countries, in order to avoid impunity and the loss of investigative windows ofopportunity. However, most of the members of the group considered it an impossible solution, taking into
consideration jurisdictional issues.
B. Information Exchange
The participants were unanimous in acknowledging the importance of information exchange incountering transnational drug trafficking. Tajikistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo mentioned theexistence of specific agreements with neighbouring countries aiming at information exchange, but Tajikistan
said there have been no fruitful results so far. On this subject, Uzbekistan added that an agreement sealedwith Afghanistan in 2017 has contributed to effective sharing of information related to drug trafficking.
Japan emphasized the need for data exchange on a daily basis to perform the Coast Guard duties. This is
one of the reasons to foster relations of trust with other states, because transnational crimes cannot be solvedon the ground of only one countryʼs efforts. A successful investigation launched as a result of intelligenceshared from a foreign agency was presented as a good practice, leading to a large seizure ofmethamphetamine concealed inside a container.
The Philippines also mentioned the successful seizure of about 600 kilograms of methamphetaminehydrochloride after information was received from China. The Philippines, Japan and Uzbekistan concurred
about the disadvantages of mutual legal assistance (MLA) as opposed to direct information exchange, pointing
out that the MLA procedure is usually complicated and takes a long time. Japan added that probes based on
information provided abroad have been conducted by its National Police Agency; although mutual legal
assistance is considered to be the appropriate way to produce evidence, a report based on information may be
admissible in court if the defence consents.
It was suggested by the Philippines that there is a need for “active and strong cooperation with foreigncounterparts. Strengthening the bilateral, regional and multilateral coordination is crucial in the conduct ofinternational operations”1. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali underlined the important role played
by INTERPOL in this field. Egypt and Brazil reckoned that the information exchange can be performed not
only through agency-to-agency contacts, but also through liaison magistrates, police attachés, FIU liaison
officers and focal points of international cooperation networks.
The Democratic Republic of Congo reported that, even though its drug trafficking legislation is still weakand Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with neighbouring states and Southern African Development
Community (SADC) members have been signed, the country could also benefit from effective informationexchange with other countries.
The Philippines encouraged “embassies and consulates to undertake tighter screening of visa applicationsof nationals known to be involved in drug smuggling activities, and immigration officials should closely
monitor and track their activities. This can only be achieved if concerned agencies have sufficientadministrative and financial support”2.
As a good practice, Brazil presented a project adopted by the Network of Anti-Drug Prosecutors in IberoAmerica called the “Bogotá Protocol”, an intelligence sharing platform related to drug trafficking throughcontainer shipments. It has delivered great results and has proven to be a hallmark of success in deterringand combating smuggling inside containers, hence the broadening of its scope to include air cargo shipments.
C. Mutual Legal AssistanceConcerning MLA, Egypt introduced a major barrier against the countryʼs efforts to perform international
assistance: the absence of domestic laws, bylaws or guidelines on the subject. While its Constitution provides

1
2

Drug Courier or Drug Mule http://pnp.gov.ph/operations/483-drug-courier-or-drug-mule, citing PDEA as source.
Ibid.

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for the assimilation of international treaties as domestic legislation and Egypt has ratified all the major
multilateral Conventions, proper regulation on the procedure of requesting and granting international
cooperation remains unclear.
Brazil made a long exposé on obstacles faced by its practitioners when it comes to effective transnational
assistance, most of them associated with the lack of minimum expertise on international cooperation affairs.
Specialized units devoted to managing informal assistance, providing capacity-building and reviewing MLA
drafts do not exist in most Brazilian state level police, prosecution services and courts, entailing scarce resort
to formal and informal international cooperation, along with low-quality experiences with MLA requests. As
for the federal level institutions, despite the significant progress experienced during the past decade, theperception of the Brazilian legal procedures as “universal” by practitioners and the disregard for othercountriesʼ grounds and ways to grant assistance are almost widespread. This attitude has taken its toll on theperformance of outgoing MLA requests, distinctively on those addressed to countries with different legal
traditions. In such cases, the assistance sought tends to be lengthy, erratic and subject to frequent calls forclarification. Meanwhile the evidence obtained does not always match the local standards of admissibility.
Other barriers include legal terminology differences, insufficiency of grounds in the requested country andprocedural inconsistencies.
Japan presented the number of MLA requests made by its police and prosecutorial authorities in 2016 andconcluded that, in light of the statistics related to crimes perpetrated by foreigners in the same year, amodest resort to international assistance has been done by local practitioners. A possible explanation for the
MLA underuse in the country is the maximum time set by the Japanese law for the pre-trial detention of
perpetrators: 20 days, which is not enough to obtain formal assistance. Therefore, Japan proposed that, in
those cases when the evidence subject to MLA is not indispensable for indictment, formal assistance may berequested to obtain additional proof to support prosecution.
Uzbekistan raised attention to the obstacles posed by discrepancies in domestic legislation concerning thelist of banned substances and the conditions related to the lawful use of precursors and prescribed drugs. It
was asserted that it could lead to the impossibility of granting international cooperation due to dual
criminality issues. Accordingly, in view of his professional experience, the Uzbek participant suggested aprompt update of the list of common illicit substances and precursors published by the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations, which could be recommended to its member states as a standard for
MLA purposes. The topic led to a comprehensive discussion among the participants. Egypt, Brazil, Japan, and
the Philippines replied that the endorsement of a unified list would not be realistic for economic anddiplomatic reasons. However, other solutions were suggested. These include (i) urging the UNODC to createa working group to study the subject; (ii) establishing MoUs to allow the exchange of information, regardlessof the different approaches of each country on the drugs banned; (iii) harmonizing the list of illicit substancesand precursors with neighbouring countries through bilateral treaties; and (iv) bypassing the question via theinclusion of the concept of “analogue substances” in the banning lists.
Japan clarified that bilateral treaties with various nations have achieved good results, but it does not mean
the country would not grant assistance to other countries when requested on grounds of reciprocity.
The Democratic Republic of Congo adduced a pact on security, stability and development that was signedby the countries located in the Grand Lakes Region and has shown good outcomes related to MLA. Likewise,
Mali described fruitful results by virtue of an existing regional platform for international cooperation and
MLA treaties sealed with fellow states.
Brazil reported that deploying special investigative techniques through MLA has been specificallydifficult for its practitioners. Wiretapping and the interception of electronic communications have posed
insurmountable obstacles due to the need for timely judicial supervision by the requesting state, whereas
controlled deliveries and undercover operations depend highly on comprehensive coordination between
counterparts and may face sovereignty challenges. As a result, most practitioners rely on operations carriedout by the police or customs without judicial concurrence, or simply give up on them. The general lack ofawareness about informal cooperation channels and their role in international assistance has accounted formany of the aforementioned obstacles.

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The great value of making informal contact as soon as the case reaches beyond domestic borders was also
pointed out. Signs of transnational dimensions include having family, assets or companies abroad, granting or
receiving loans/investments from overseas and making suspicious trips. Previous contacts offer a good
opportunity to learn about the justice systems involved, better understand each otherʼs requirements,
identify potential challenges and act as a prelude to a subsequent MLA request. If distrust is an issue,
practitioners could address the implications of providing assistance on a merely theoretical basis prior to any
discussions of substance. Strict enforcement of the principle of specialty within each agency, granting
attention to confidentiality requests and fostering effective reciprocity are conditions frequently reckoned
with as necessary to increase and maintain trust between nations.
Brazil also described the difficulties related to MLA faced by its 588 prefectures located in the inlandborder. Because most boundary rivers and pathways allow free circulation of individuals, drugs and assets,
the lengthy procedure of translating MLA requests and sending them through central authorities haverendered it almost impossible to provide an effective response to criminal activity. The situation isparticularly critical in the 30 twin-cities along the border, because their territories spread over both sides andbear no physical limits besides simply crossing a street.
D. Financial Institutions
Thailand and the Philippines presented challenges associated with laundering the proceeds of drugtrafficking inside and outside the financial system. This was addressed in the Philippines by amending its
Anti-Money Laundering Law to cover transactions made in casinos. Brazil accentuated the importance ofinternational cooperation in identifying high-value targets through non-official financial transactions, whether
through formal or informal channels, a point of view with which Egypt concurred.
Brazil introduced challenges related to the refusal of assistance on grounds of fishing expeditions, in lightof the insufficient identification of bank accounts and other assets in MLA requests aimed at obtaining
financial records and freezing orders. Another frequent obstacle pertains to meeting the dual criminality
criteria with countries described as tax havens when the charges are related to tax evasion or capital flight.
The group discussed alternatives for identifying bank accounts and assets without the input of the requested
state, whereas Japan asserted the convenience of trying to obtain financial records by means of addressing adomestic non-coercive request to the bankʼs branches within Japan.
Mali made a thorough exposé on its financial intelligence unit, CENTIF, which is entitled to oppose theexecution of suspicious bank transactions on the basis of serious, concordant and reliable information. The
country also provided input on the role of the Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering inWest Africa (GIABA), an agency backed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The Democratic Republic of Congo added that the country can count on two governmental bodies under
the direction of the Central Bank to counter money laundering and financing of terrorism: a national
commission in charge of overseeing the domestic financial institutions and a special council which reports
suspicious transactions directly to the president of the Republic. Local banks have the obligation of refraining
from carrying out such transactions, under penalty of fine.
Brazil and Egypt advanced the discussion of the importance of the Egmont Group network in sharing
precious intelligence on financial matters, side by side with main asset recovery networks.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
After a thorough discussion among the participants, the following recommendations were made:1) having treaties or memoranda of understanding among neighbouring countries, in order to:(a) enhance coordination of border control policies and strategies;(b) facilitate MLA by means of the exemption of translation and the exemption of intermediation
through central authorities;

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106(c) create joint patrols and quick response units on both sides of land and river borders; and(d) grant specific measures to reconcile sovereignty and law enforcement in transboundary twin cities;2) on a domestic level, institutionalization of global border control strategies and permanent bordercontrol task-forces, along with the quantitative and qualitative upgrade of border control facilities,
equipment, technology and capacity-building;3) enhancement of visa application screening and monitoring of aliens known to be involved with drugtrafficking, even before the beginning of their displacement towards the border;4) creation of international cooperation units within the main agencies involved (police, customs,
prosecution service, border control and narcotic agencies, FIUs), intended to:(a) oversee the agencyʼs international cooperation efforts;(b) manage international assistance networks and informal contacts;(c) review drafts of outgoing MLA requests;(d) supervise the execution of incoming MLA requests;(e) control follow-up measures;(f) allow direct cooperation between counterparts; and(g) provide appropriate capacity-building;5) promotion of an active international cooperation culture among practitioners based on the following
paradigms:(a) legal systems are culturally conditioned and do not have a universal rationale;(b) upholding justice in a global society involves not only preserving the countryʼs citizenry, but also
overcoming cultural biases;(c) obtaining international cooperation depends on the consideration that the assistance sought will
have to comply with the requested stateʼs law and be useful before the requesting stateʼs courts;(d) because the matter may not be dealt with in the same manner as it is in the requesting stateʼsjurisdiction, both in substance (grounds) and form (procedure), requests should mention the core
conditions for the measure to meet its due process rules;(e) in order to build trust, avoid miscommunication and prevent refusal of assistance, informal contact
should be used as a starting point in any request related to countries with relevant legal
differences;(f) depending on the country involved, informal cooperation will suffice to obtain the assistance;(g) in order to be enforced, requests must provide all data available about the measures sought, suchas the identification and possible location of suspects, witnesses and companies, the addresses to be
searched, the evidence to be seized, the records to be produced and the assets to be frozen;(h) making proactive, early informal contact can aid in diagnosing potential challenges, gathering
additional information, making strategic decisions and allowing the foreign authority to prepare forproviding assistance;

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6) creation of a national board formed by central authorities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and eachagencyʼs international cooperation units, aiming at coordinating views and efforts towards
international cooperation;7) publication of online booklets concerning each countryʼs criminal justice system and basic MLA
provisions;8) exchange of professional and cultural knowledge by means of joint training courses, seminars andworkshops;9) strict enforcement by the prosecution services of the principle of specialty and the observation ofother conditions imposed by the requested country;10) supporting the harmonization of every countryʼs domestic law with the provisions of the United
Nations convention on drug trafficking;11) fostering communication and integration among agencies and officers in charge of informalcooperation (law enforcement attachés, liaison magistrates, network focal points);
12) implementation of intelligence sharing platforms and counterpart networks;
13) encouraging usage of the UNODC Mutual Legal Assistance Request Writer Tool, along with other
UNDOC tools;
14) development of domestic procedures related to the transnational chain of custody of evidence, in order
to meet the requirements of other countries;15) capacity-building related to investigating transnational money laundering and using open source andFIU tools to trace foreign bank accounts and assets; and16) devotion of comprehensive effort to allow international cooperation based on a list of common illicit
substances and precursors, whether through the United Nations or by bilateral treaties.

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Report of the Follow-Up Seminar for the Second Phase of the Third Country Training
Programme (TCTP) Focusing on the Development of Community-Based Treatment of
Offenders in the CLMV Countries (Updated)

UNAFEIREPORT OF THE FOLLOW-UP SEMINAR FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF
THE THIRD COUNTRY TRAINING PROGRAMME (TCTP)
FOCUSING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY-BASEDTREATMENT OF OFFENDERS IN THE CLMV COUNTRIES＊From 26 to 28 June 2018, the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime andthe Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) hosted the Follow-up Seminar for the Second Phase of the Third
Country Training Programme (TCTP) Focusing on the Development of Community-Based Treatment of
Offenders in the CLMV Countries (hereinafter, the “Follow-up Seminar”). This report summarizes theproceedings, country presentations and general discussions held throughout the Follow-up Seminar.
Proceedings
1. MS. KAYO ISHIHARA, Deputy Director of UNAFEI, welcomed the participants and announced the openingof the Follow-up Seminar. Further, she recognized the efforts of the Japan International Cooperation
Agency, the Department of Probation of Thailand (DOP), and the Thailand International Cooperation
Agency (TICA) in organizing and implementing the TCTP with the cooperation of UNAFEI. Noting thatthe establishment of effective community-based treatment (CBT) in the CLMV countries faces numerous
challenges, it is very important to share periodically what each country has achieved and to evaluate
progress. To achieve the goal of the TCTP, Deputy Director Ishihara stressed that it is important for allparticipants, as experts and practitioners, to take the initiative to introduce and develop CBT in theirrespective countries, making use of the knowledge and insights obtained during the TCTP.
2. MR. PAYONT SINTHUNAVA, Deputy Director-General of the Department of Probation (DOP) of the Ministryof Justice of Thailand, emphasized the importance of implementing the Tokyo Rules in criminal justicesystems in order to rehabilitate offenders in the community with their families and to allow them tobecome productive members of society. Noting that the first two phases of the TCTP have demonstrated
the importance of implementing probation practices in the context of each country with an understandingof the “big picture” in terms of legislative, executive and judicial powers of the state, this Follow-up
Seminar presents an opportunity to discuss the progress and challenges of implementing communitybased treatment in the CLMV countries, with the goal of full implementation of the Tokyo Rules in thenear future.
3. The Visiting Expert, DR. MANUEL G. CO, EX Officio Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole andAdministrator of the Parole and Probation Administration (PPA) of the Republic of the Philippines,delivered a presentation on “Countermeasures to Supervisees who Commit Bad Conduct”.
4. Country presentations detailing progress made since the first phase of the TCTP were made by thedelegations from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Viet Nam.
5. Lectures were delivered by: (1) MR. HITOSHI MIYAKE, Principal Examiner of the Kanto Regional Parole
Board, on an “Outline and details of punishment and sanctions imposed on persons released on parole andpersons under probation with suspension of execution of the sentence” and (2) Deputy Director Ishihara,on the “Legislative Steps for Introduction of Community-based Treatment of Offenders”.
Visiting Expertʼs Lecture
6. Dr. Co presented on the topic of dealing with supervisees who violate conditions of probation or parole,considering the question of whether revocation of probation or parole should be considered a failure of thesystem. In the Philippines, community corrections is implemented through individualized treatment. The[Editor’s Note: This version of the report replaces the version that was originally published in Resource Material Series No.
105 (Sep. 2018). Since publication, the delegations of Cambodia and Viet Nam have requested minor changes to the report
regarding their country presentations, all of which are reflected herein.]＊

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PPA supervises and rehabilitates parolees, pardonees, probationers and first time minor drug offenders in
the community, and its three vital responsibilities are investigation, supervision and rehabilitation. Postsentence investigation into the background of each offender identifies which offenders are suitable forcommunity-based treatment, and those who are suitable are supervised in the community with thesupport of Volunteer Probation Assistants. Rehabilitation programmes are applied according to a threepronged approach, including (i) restorative justice, (ii) the Therapeutic Community (TC) Ladderized
Program, and (iii) volunteer resource mobilization.
Community-based treatment is a conditional release subject to conditions. While the conditions serve as a
substitute to iron bars and prison laws, it is important that conditions are realistic and imposed for the
purpose of helping each individual offender conform conduct to a law-abiding lifestyle. In addition toprobation and parole, conditional pardons are used as a means to release offenders while maintaining
control over their conduct in the community. Control over supervisees in the community is maintained
through mandatory and special conditions. Mandatory conditions include the duty to report to probation
offices, to reside at the offenderʼs approved residence, and to refrain from committing further offences.
Special conditions are designed to encourage offenders to develop as responsible, productive and sociallyredeemed individuals by requiring them to engage in productive behaviours, e. g., employment, or torefrain from destructive behaviours, e.g., drug use, possession of firearms, or relationships with criminal
associates.
If mandatory or special conditions are breached, the PPA may take various actions depending on thenature of the violation. Minor violations of conditions may be addressed by administrative disciplinary
protocols, which may include corrective measures imposed at the discretion of Probation and Parole
Officers. If a parolee commits another offence while on conditional release, he or she must serve theremaining portion of the original sentence in addition to the term required for the new offence;probationers who reoffend must serve the time for the original and the new offence. Violations ofconditions of parole or pardon are evaluated by the Board of Pardons and Parole based on fact-finding andthe recommendations of probation officers, and the Board may issue an Order of Arrest andRecommitment to place the offender in custody. At any time during probation, the Court may issue awarrant for the re-arrest of a probationer for violation of any condition. In all cases, it is important toremember that offenders are entitled to the presumption of innocence and other constitutional rights.
In answering the question of whether revocation is a failure of the system, Dr. Co stressed that failure
cannot be attributed to the probation officer alone, as each offender is ultimately responsible for his or her
own behaviour and faces his or her own family and other problems in the community. The role ofprobation officers is to serve as gatekeepers of the justice system and to help offenders comply with theirconditions. Recalling that the purposes of supervision are to implement conditions, rehabilitate theoffender and prevent the commission of further crime, Dr. Co recommended that the participating
countries consider the adoption of volunteer probation officer/assistant programmes to enhance offendersupervision and rehabilitation through the use of community volunteers and community resources.
Country Presentations
7. CAMBODIA. Like a number of other countries, Cambodia has adopted legislation that addresses communitybased treatment but has faced challenges in implementation. The reported challenges include public
resistance to the concept and financial constraints that prevented the commencement of a pilot project.
These challenges were raised at the Cambodian MOJʼs annual congress, and the MOJ committed tofurther promotion of community-based treatment by disseminating relevant statues on non-custodial
measures to judges, prosecutors and judicial police of various provinces. The Ministry of Interior has
established a committee to address these issues, agreeing that the best way to initiate a trial programme
would be to focus on the community-based treatment of juvenile delinquents. In 2019, responsibility forjuvenile delinquents will be transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Social Affairs,
Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation. Under existing law, prosecutors execute the decisions of the courtwith the assistance of judicial police officers. The delegation plans to raise public awareness of CBT andnon-custodial measures though all means possible.
8. LAOS. The delegation from Laos reported having gained useful knowledge during the Second Phase of the
TCTP, which was reported to the Minister of Justice. The Criminal Procedure Law contains provisions on
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re-education without deprivation of liberty, stay of execution of penalty, conditional release, and other
CBT-related measures. Currently, however, no ministry has been assigned as the responsible agency for
CBT, so offenders are entrusted to local administration authorities (such as village, district, andcommunity police), mass organizations and other state organizations for rehabilitation, reintegration andrecidivism prevention. The village administration system, including village mediation committees, areresponsible for handling normal cases and non-violent cases, such as stealing property, traffic violations,battery and other cases resulting in minor damage or those that do not affect society. Applicable laws,
regulations and policies will be disseminated to local administrations and the other organizations
mentioned above to raise public awareness.
9. MYANMAR. The delegation reported that there is no specific legal framework for CBT, but a CBTframework is applied in drug cases in which police officers take drug users to medical centres for medical
treatment. Drug users who refuse treatment are sent to a rehabilitation centre for six months. This
process involves the police, the courts, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Health and Sport, andthe Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (MOSWRR). The MOSWRR implements
rehabilitation services by Centre Based Rehabilitation, Semi-Community Based Rehabilitation, andCommunity-Based Rehabilitation Reports on Activities of Rehabilitation. These processes involve
interviewing and recording of the biological data of trainees and making assessments based on the use ofdrugs. The social work practices being carried out include mental and physical rehabilitation, providing
vocational training, preparing for reintegration into society and the provision of after-care services.
Myanmar is undertaking efforts to raise public awareness in order to educate the public, change thepublic mindset, promote the use of community corrections over imprisonment, and prevent recidivism.
10. VIET NAM. The delegation from Viet Nam reported learning about organizational structure, qualified staff,
facilities, and professional volunteers during the second phase of the TCTP. Since January 2018, Viet Nam
has issued some documents related to guidance on conditional early release and suspended sentence. In
Viet Nam, CBT basically includes conditional early release, non-custodial sentences, and suspended
sentences. Vietnamese law emphasizes the participation of the community in offender treatment(including inmates, persons serving non-custodial sentences, persons serving suspended sentences, andpersons granted conditional early release) through many measures such as education and job training,sport and cultural activities, yearly meetings for families of inmates, agreements with the private sector to
support offender rehabilitation, and legal support and psychological counselling. Inmates are eligible forconditional early release if they meet certain requirements. Conditional release decisions are made byprovincial peopleʼs courts where the inmates are serving the sentence. Offenders serving sentences in thecommunity are subject to management, supervision, education and reporting as well as otherrequirements, such as vocational training and job-hunting and financial support. To raise awareness of
CBT in the community, the delegation recommended measures such as (i) issuing instruction documents,(ii) dissemination of information through the media, especially national television, (iii) conducting national
surveys on CBT, (iv) developing mechanisms to reward active participation of people in the communityand extending models of funds and clubs for rehabilitation.
Plenary Discussion
11. PROFESSOR HIROYUKI WATANABE (UNAFEI) chaired a plenary discussion, during which the participants
shared comments and asked questions regarding their respective systems. Noting that Thailand took 22
years to adopt a fully functional CBT system, Mr. Sinthunava (DOP) stressed the importance of setting
timelines for the adoption of such systems. Prof. Watanabe raised the issue of dealing with drug crimes in
the CLMV countries, whereupon Mr. Nouth (CAMBODIA) pointed out that there is a difference in the waythat drug use and possession is viewed in many countries. While drug use is considered a medical
problem, drug possession is viewed as a crime. In jurisdictions where drug possession is aggressively
enforced, the result is that even minor possession cases can result in prosecution, and, thus, prison
overcrowding. Additionally, while the public may be more accepting of drug users in medical treatment,
the public will be much less sympathetic to those who are labelled as criminals. Dr. Co (PHILIPPINES) raised
the importance of performing drug dependency examinations prior to making probation decisions in drugcases because drug-dependent offenders cannot be effectively treated in the community (without firstcompleting a drug addiction treatment programme at a rehabilitation centre). PROFESSOR TAKUYAFURUHASHI (UNAFEI) enquired into the use of risk assessment in CBT programmes, and it was report that
Thailand conducts assessment based on Andrews and Bontaʼs well-known Risk-Need-Responsivity (RNR)
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Model, which assesses each offenderʼs (i) risk of reoffending and (ii) dynamic criminogenic needs that canbe supported in various ways by government and community resources. Finally, all participants
recognized the need to develop effective strategies to promote public awareness of CBT.
Lectures12. Mr. Miyakeʼs presentation addressed the topics of probation supervision in Japan and sanctions for bad
conduct. Pursuant to the Offenders Rehabilitation Act, the purpose of rehabilitation is to prevent
reoffending and juvenile delinquency and to assist offenders as in becoming self-reliant as sound membersof society. The primary measures for offender rehabilitation include (i) instruction and supervision, which
guide offenders toward pro-social thinking and living, and (ii) guidance and assistance, which connect
offenders with social services to facilitate their rehabilitation and reintegration. In Japan, probation
supervision can be applied to juvenile and adult probationers and parolees. Supervision is conducted on an
individualized basis, taking account of each offenderʼs age, family situation, etc., and efforts are made toapply the most “appropriate” measures to facilitate the offenderʼs rehabilitation and reintegration into
society. For example, if a probationer exhibits self-reliance and other pro-social qualities, probation is nolonger necessary or “appropriate”. On the other hand, if probation is not effective in a particular case andthe probationerʼs attitude or conduct deteriorates, the continuation of probation may not be appropriate.
Probationers and parolees are subject to general and special conditions, and when these conditions are
violated, action must be taken in response. For example, probationers are required to reside at a specificaddress that has been reported to the probation office. If the probationer cannot be found or has changed
residences without permission, measures may need to be taken to address the probationerʼs violation of
his conditions of probation (i.e., bad conduct). In such cases, the probation officer will submit a report to
the regional parole board, which will determine what action should be taken. If a probationer cannot befound, it may be necessary to suspended probation, which means that the probationer will not be given
credit for serving probation for the period during which he or she cannot be found. This effectively
extends the probationary period by the number of days the probationer was absent without leave.
However, in cases where probation is no longer appropriate due to bad conduct, e. g. reoffending or
violation of special conditions, probation will be revoked unless the regional parole board finds that special
circumstances exist that make it reasonable to continue probation. Probation is revoked by the issuance ofa warrant of appearance, and a probation officer may serve the warrant on and arrest the probationer.
The probationer is then taken to the probation office, where he or she is interviewed and detained
pending the final revocation decision of the regional parole board. If a probationer receives suspended
execution of sentence and violates the conditions of probation, the public prosecutor must be informed toprocess the revocation through the courts.
13. Deputy Director Ishihara presented on legislative and practical strategies for the creation of effective
CBT systems. Legislation is necessary because CBT is a constituent element of a criminal penalty which
restricts the liberty of offenders. Thus, due process protections must be afforded to provide a check on theexercise of state power. Appropriate laws must address, among others, (i) the conditions upon which CBT
can be applied, (ii) who may impose CBT, and (iii) which agency is responsible for conducting CBT. At thesame time, the application of CBT must remain flexible, diverse and discretionary because the sanction is
imposed in the community where offenders are faced with real-life challenges. Accordingly, input frompractitioners on developing workable practices is extremely important. Of course, the enactment oflegislation alone is insufficient. To carry out the purpose of the law, the following factors must be present
when the law enters into force: an implementing agency, adequate resources, detailed procedures, and the
support of relevant stakeholders and the general public. This makes it critically important to conduct
adequate “market research” to determine an appropriate timeframe for implementation. In this context,
market research is a process to gather information to estimate the number of offenders that will be
subject to CBT once the system becomes operational. This requires policymakers to frame the scope of
CBT by clarifying the major conditions as defined by law, such as the types of crime and penalties eligible
for CBT, the degree to which criminal records and family relations are considered and so on. Each country
will need to determine whether judges or administrative bodies will be responsible for deciding which
offenders are eligible for CBT. If judges, make such decisions, the law should refer to the factors to beconsidered; if administrative bodies make such decisions, guidelines should be developed and training
should be provided. Additionally, reliable statistics are necessary to plan for the implementation of CBT
programmes. Such planning should take “market size” into consideration, for example, by recognizing that
CBT in an urban setting is likely to face different challenges and require different resources than in102

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suburban or rural areas. After gathering the information necessary to create a roadmap toimplementation, stricter conditions for eligibility and limiting the initial scope of CBT are options foraccelerating implementation with the expectation of expanding the programme in the future.
Introduction of the Third Phase of the TCTP
14. MS. TARUATA KLAEWKLA (DOP) introduced the General Information for the Third Phase of the TCTP,
reviewing the application procedures, participant qualifications, and the programme schedule. The
programme will take place in Thailand from 10-22 December 2018. The primary objective of the Third
Phase is to gain practical experience by working with Thai probation officers in the field.
Presentation on Halfway Houses in Japan
15. PROFESSOR HIDENORI OHINATA (UNAFEI) delivered a final presentation on halfway houses. Japan currently
has 103 halfway houses, which accommodate discharged offenders and provide aid and guidancenecessary for offendersʼ reintegration. Halfway houses are run by persons approved by the Minister ofJustice, and the government provides financial support for their operations. These operations include
housing, feeding, and the provision of training and other guidance programmes for residents. Probationers,
parolees, offenders released from prison after serving their full terms of imprisonment, and persons
released from pre-trial detention are eligible to reside in halfway houses. Upon release, roughly 30% of
parolees reside in halfway houses, and the average length of a residentʼs stay is 79.8 days.
Study Visit
16. At the conclusion of the Follow-up Seminar, the participants visited the Saishukai Halfway House inTokyoʼs Shinjuku Ward.
28 JUNE 2018
AKISHIMA CITY, TOKYO, JAPAN103

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 106

ANNEX
1. LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
2. THE FOLLOW-UP SEMINAR SCHEDULE

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The 169th International Training Course

The 169th International Training Course (UNAFEI, 9 May - 14 June 2018)

Left to Right:
Above
Mr. Coracini (UNODC)
4th Row
Ms. Iwakata (Librarian), Ms. Odagiri (Chef), Ms. Yamada (Staff), Mr. Hirose (Staff), Ms. Nagahama (Staff),
Mr. Elbastawissy (Egypt), Mr. Leite Prado (Brazil), Ms. Oda (Staff), Ms. Kamada (Staff), Mr. Saito (Staff), Ms.
Kita (JICA)
3rd Row
Ms. Bernard (Jamaica), Ms. Sada (Japan), Mr. Amayasu (Japan), Mr. Bray (Papua New Guinea), Mr.
Sangare (Mali), Mr. Mavlyanov (Uzbekistan), Mr. Hammad (Palestine), Mr. Nakajima (Japan), Mr. Hadsarang(Thailand), Mr. Akima (Japan), Mr. Shmitko (Ukraine), Ms. Abdul Jalil (Malaysia), Ms. Keita (Ivory Coast), Mr.
Sacko (Mali), Ms. Iinuma (Staff)
2nd Row
Prof. Yamamoto, Ms. Tshibola (D. R. Congo), Mr. Konishi (Japan), Mr. Nʼ Dri (Ivory Coast), Mr. Ali(Pakistan), Ms. Takeuchi (Japan), Mr. Subramaniam (Malaysia), Mr. Isozoda (Tajikistan), Mr. Ibrohimzoda(Tajikistan), Mr. Gammanpila Imiyage Don (Sri Lanka), Mr. Singappulige (Sri Lanka), Mr. Habib (Egypt), Mr.
Fukushima (Japan), Mr. Yaselskyi (Ukraine), Ms. Nolasco (Philippines), Ms. Nkulu (D.R. Congo), Prof. Ohinata,Prof. Kitagawa
1st Row
Mr. Toyoda (Staff), Prof. Otani, Prof. Watanabe, Prof. Furuhashi, Deputy Director Ishihara, Mr. Millard(United States), Director Senta, Mr. Chawalitthamrong (Thailand), Prof. Yamada, Prof. Hirano, Prof.
Futagoishi, Mr. Fujita (Staff), Mr. Schmid (LA)RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES INDEXVol.

Training Course Name

Course No.

Course Dates

1

Public Participation in Social Defence

25

Sep-Dec 1970

2

Administration of Criminal Justice26

Jan-Mar 1971

3

[Corrections]27

Apr-Jul 1971

[Police, Prosecution and Courts]

28

Sep-Dec 1971

Social Defence Planning

29

Feb-Mar 1972

Treatment of Crime and Delinquency

30

Apr-Jul 1972

United Nations Training Course in Human Rights in the
Administration of Criminal Justicen/a

Aug-Sep 1972

Administration of Criminal Justice31

Sep-Dec 1972

Reform in Criminal Justice32

Feb-Mar 1973

Treatment of Offenders

33

Apr-Jul 1973

7

[Administration of Criminal Justice]34

Sep-Dec 1973

8

Planning and Research for Crime Prevention

35

Feb-Mar 1974

Administration of Criminal Justice36

Apr-Jun 1974

International Evaluation Seminar37

Jul 1974

Treatment of Juvenile Delinquents and Youthful Offenders

38

Sep-Nov 1974

The Roles and Functions of the Police in a Changing Society

39

Feb-Mar 1975

Treatment of Offenders

40

Apr-Jul 1975

4
5
6

9
10

NB: Resource Material Series Index, Nos. 1-10 (p. 139)n/a

Oct 1975

11

Improvement in the Criminal Justice System

41

Sep-Dec 1975

12

Formation of a Sound Sentencing Structure and Policy

42

Feb-Mar 1976

Treatment of Offenders

43

Apr-Jul 1976

13

Exploration of Adequate Measures for Abating and Preventing
Crimes of Violence

44

Sep-Dec 1976

14

Increase of Community Involvement

45

Feb-Mar 1977

Treatment of Juvenile Delinquents and Youthful Offenders

46

Apr-Jul 1977

Speedy and Fair Administration of Criminal Justice47

Sep-Dec 1977

Prevention and Control of Social and Economic Offences48

Feb-Mar 1978

Report of United Nations Human Rights Training Coursen/a

Dec 1977

Treatment of Offenders

49

Apr-Jul 1978

Dispositional Decisions in Criminal Justice Process50

Sep-Dec 1978

Treatment of Dangerous or Habitual Offenders

51

Feb-Mar 1979

Community-Based Corrections

52

Apr-Jul 1979

18

Roles of the Criminal Justice System in Crime Prevention

53

Sep-Dec 1979

19

Arrest and Pre-Trial Detention

54

Feb-Mar 1980

Institutional Treatment of Adult Offenders

55

Apr-Jul 1980

Institutional Treatment of Adult Offenders

55

Apr-Jul 1980

Integrated Approach to Effective and Efficient Administrationof Criminal Justice56

Sep-Nov 1980

57

Feb-Mar 1981

15

16
17

20

NB: Resource Material Series Index, Nos. 1-20 (p. 203)
21

Crime Prevention and Sound National Development

Mar 1981

Integrated Approach to Effective Juvenile Justice
Administration (including Proposed Guidelines for the
Formulation of the Standard Minimum Rules for Juvenile
Justice Administration: A draft prepared by UNAFEI on thebasis of the reports of the study groups at the 58th International
Training Course)

58

May-Jul 1981

Contemporary Problems in Securing an Effective, Efficient andFair Administration of Criminal Justice and Their Solutions

59

Feb-Mar 1982

Secruing Rational Exercise of Discretionary Powers at
Adjudication and Pre-adjudication Stages of Criminal Justice
Administration

60

Apr-Jul 1982

23

Improvement of Correctional Programmes for More Effective
Rehabilitation of Offenders

61

Sep-Nov 1982

24

Promotion of Innovations for Effective, Efficient and Fair
Administration of Criminal Justice62

Feb-Mar 1983

Community-Based Corrections

63

Apr-Jul 1983

The Quest for a Better System and Administration of Juvenile
Justice64

Sep-Dec 1983

Documents Produced during the International Meeting ofExperts on the Development of the United Nations Draft
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justicen/a

Nov 1983

International Cooperation in Criminal Justice Administration

65

Feb-Mar 1984

Promotion of Innovation in the Effective Treatment of
Prisoners in Correctional Institutions

66

Apr-Jul 198427

An Integrated Approach to Drug Problems

67

Sep-Dec 1984

28

Contemporary Asian Problems in the Field of Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice, and Policy Implications

68

Feb-Mar 1985

Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committeeof Experts on UNAFEI Work Programmes and Directions

n/a

Mar 1985

Report of the International Workshop on the Role of Youth
Organizations in the Prevention of Crime Among Youthn/a

Jul 1985

Follow-up Team for Ex-Participants of UNAFEI Courses

n/a

Dec 1985

Community-Based Corrections

69

Apr-Jul 1985

29

In Pursuit of Greater Effectiveness and Efficiency in theJuvenile Justice System and Its Administration70

Sep-Dec 1985

30

Promotion of Innovation in Criminal Justice Administration for
the Prevention of New Criminality

71

Feb-Mar 1986

The Quest for Effective and Efficient Treatment of Offenders in
Correctional Institutions

72

Apr-Jul 1986

Economic Crime: Its Impact on Society and Effective
Prevention73

Sep-Nov 1986

Report of the International Seminar on Drug Problems in Asiaand the Pacific Regionn/a

Aug 1986

Advancement of Fair and Humane Treatment of Offenders andVictims in Criminal Justice Administration74

Feb-Mar 1987

Non-institutional Treatment of Offenders: Its Role andImprovement for More Effective Programmes

75

Apr-Jun 1987

22

25

26

31

32

Evaluation of UNAFEIʼs International Courses on Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders, and Drug Problems in Asia

76

Aug-Sep 1987

Crime Related to Insurance77

Oct-Dec 1987

Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committeeof Experts on UNAFEI Work Programmes and Directionsn/a

Sep 1987

Report of the Workshop on Implementation Modalities for the
Twenty-Three Recommendations Adopted by the International
Seminar on Drug Problems in Asia and the Pacific Regionn/a

Sep 1987

Footprints, Contemporary Achievements and Future
Perspectives in Policies for Correction and Rehabilitation of
Offenders78

Feb-Mar 1988

Search for the Solution of the Momentous and Urgent Issues inContemporary Corrections

79

Apr-Jul 1988

Resolution of the Asia and Pacific Regional Experts Meetingn/a

Mar 1988

Report of the Meeting of Experts on the United Nations Draft
Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (TheTokyo Rules)n/a

Jul 1988

35

Quest for Effective International Countermeasures to Pressing
Problems of Transnational Criminality

80

Sep-Nov 1988

36

Advancement of the Integration of Criminal Justice
Administration

81

Feb-Mar 1989

Innovative Measures for Effective and Efficient Administrationof Institutional Correctional Treatment of Offenders

82

Apr-Jul 1989

Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Adolescence and Crime
Prevention in the ESCAP Regionn/a

Aug 1989

Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the Context ofDevelopment83

Sep-Nov 1989

International Workshop on Victimology and Victimʼs Rights

n/a

Oct 1989

Policy Perspectives on Contemporary Problems in Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Administration

84

Jan-Mar 1990

Wider Use and More Effective Implementation of Noncustodial Measures for Offenders

85

Apr-Jun 1990

39

Search for Effective and Appropriate Measures to Deal with
the Drug Problem

86

Sep-Dec 1990

40

Development of an Effective International Crime and Justice
Programme

87

Jan-Mar 1991

Institutional Treatment of Offenders in Special Categories

88

Apr-Jul 1991

NB: Resource Material Series Index, Nos. 21-40 (p. 333)

n/a

n/a

41

Effective and Innovative Countermeasures against Economic
Crime

89

Sep-Dec 1991

42

Quest for Solutions of the Pressing Problems of Contemporary
Criminal Justice Administration

90

Jan-Feb 1992

Further Use and Effectual Development of Non-Custodial
Measures for Offenders

91

Apr-Jul 1992

33

34

37

38

43

Quest for Effective Methods of Organized Crime Control

92

Sep-Nov 1992

44

Policy Perspective for Organized Crime Suppression

93

Feb-Mar 1993

Current Problems in Institutional Treatment and Their Solution

94

Apr-Jul 1993

45

Effective Countermeasures against Crimes Related to
Urbanization and Industrialization̶Urban Crime, Juvenile
Delinquency and Enviromental Crime95

Sep-Dec 1993

46

Promotion of International Cooperation in Criminal Justice
Administration

96

Jan-Mar 1994

Effective Treatment of Drug Offenders and Juvenile
Delinquents

97

Apr-Jul 1994

47

Economic Crime and Effective Countermeasures against It

98

Sep-Dec 1994

48

The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice: Public
Participation and the Prevention of Corruption

99

Jan-Mar 1995

The Institutional Treatment of Offenders: Relationships with
Other Criminal Justice Agencies and Current Problems in
Administration

100

Apr-Jul 1995

49

The Fair and Efficient Administration of Criminal Justice: The
Proper Exercise of Authority and Procedural Justice101

Sep-Dec 1995

50

Crime Prevention through Effective Firearms Regulation

102

Jan-Mar 1996

51

Improvement of the Treatment of Offenders through theStrengthening of Non-custodial Measures

103

Apr-Jul 1996

International Cooperation in Criminal Justice Administration

104

Sep-Nov 1996

The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice for thePrevention of Corruption by Public Officials

105

Jan-Feb 1997

The Quest for Effective Juvenile Justice Administration

106

Apr-Jul 1997

The Role and Function of Prosecution in Criminal Justice107

Sep-Nov 1997

The Ninth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee ofExperts on UNAFEI Work Programmes and Directionsn/a

Oct 1997

Current Problems in the Combat of Organized Transnational
Crime

108

Jan-Feb 1998

Effective Treatment Measures for Prisoners to Faciliate Their
Reintegration into Society

109

Apr-Jul 1998

Effective Countermeasures against Economic and Computer
Crime

110

Aug-Nov 1998

The Role of Police, Prosecution and the Judiciary in the
Changing Society

111

Jan-Feb 1999

Participation of the Public and Victims for More Fair andEffective Criminal Justice112

Apr-Jul 1999

The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice for thePrevention of Corrupt Activities by Public Officials

113

Aug-Nov 1999

International Cooperation to Combat Transnational Organized
Crime̶with Special Emphasis on Mutual Legal Assistance andExtradition

114

Jan-Feb 2000

Current Issues in Correctional Treatement and Effective
Countermeasures

115

May-Jun 2000

Effective Methods to Combat Transnational Organized Crime
in Criminal Justice Processes

116

Aug-Nov 2000

Current Situation and Countermeasures against Money
Laundering

117

Jan-Feb 2001

Best Practices in the Institutional and Community-Based
Treatment of Juvenile Offenders

118

May-Jul 2001

52
53

54

55

56

57

58

59

Current Situation of and Countermeasures against
Transnational Organized Crime

119

Sep-Nov 2001

60

Effective Administration of the Police and the Prosecution in
Criminal Justice120

Jan-Feb 2002

61

Enhancement of Community-Based Alternatives toIncarceration at all Stages of the Criminal Justice Process

121

May-Jul 2002

62

The Effective Administration of Criminal Justice to Tackle
Trafficking Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants

122

Sep-Oct 2002

63

The Protection of Victims of Crime and the Active Participationof Victims in the Criminal Justice Process Specifically
Considering Restorative Justice Approaches

123

Jan-Feb 2003

64

The Effective Prevention and Enhancement of Treatment for
Drug Abusers in the Criminal Justice Process

124

Apr-Jun 2003

65

Effective Countermeasures against Illicit Drug Trafficking andMoney Laundering125

Sep-Oct 2003

Sixth International Training Course on Corruption Control in
Criminal Justice

6th UNCAC

66

Economic Crime in a Globalizing Society̶Its Impact on theSound Development of the State

126

Jan-Feb 2004

67

Implementing Effective Measures for the Treatment of
Offenders after Fifty Years of United Nations Standard Setting
in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice127

May-Jun 2004

Measures to Combat Economic Crime, Including Money
Laundering

128

Aug-Oct 2004

68

Crime Prevention in the 21st Century̶Effective Prevention of
Crime Associated with Urbanization Based upon Community
Involvement and Prevention of Youth Crime and Juvenile
Delinquency

129

Jan-Feb 2005

69

Integrated Strategies to Confront Domestic Violence and Child
Abuse

130

May-Jun 2005

7th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2005

Seventh Special Training Course on Corruption Control in
Criminal Justice

Nov 2003

70

The Use and Application of the United Nations Declaration of
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse ofPower̶Twenty Years after Its Adoption

131

Aug-Oct 2005

71

Strengthening the Legal Regime for Combating Terrorism

132

Jan-Feb 2006

Eighth International Training Course on Corruption Control in
Criminal Justice

8th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2005

72

Effective Prevention and Enhancement of Treatment for Sexual
Offenders133

May-Jun 2006

73

Challenges in the Investigation, Prosecution and Trial ofTransnational Organized Crime

134

Aug-Oct 2006

Ninth International Training Course on Corruption Control in
Criminal Justice

9th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2006

74

Promoting Public Safety and Controlling Recidivism Using
Effective Interventions with Offenders: An Examination of Best
Practices

135

Jan-Feb 200775

Effective Measures for the Treatment of Juvenile Offenders
and their Reintegration into Society

136

May-Jun 2007

76

Corporate Crime and the Criminal Liability of Corporate
Entities
Tenth International Training Course on the Criminal Justice
Response to Corruption

137

Sep-Oct 2007

10th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2007

77

Effective Legal and Practical Measures for Combating
Corruption: A Criminal Justice Response

138

Jan-Feb 2008

78

Profiles and Effective Treatment of Serious and Violent
Juvenile Offenders

139

May-Jun 2008

79

The Criminal Justice Response to Cybercrime140

Sep-Oct 2008

Eleventh International Training Course on the Criminal Justice
Response to Corruption

11th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2008

The Improvement of the Treatment of Offenders through the
Enhancement of Community-Based Alternatives toIncarceration

141

Jan-Feb 2009

Effective Countermeasures against Overcrowding ofCorrectional Facilities

142

May-Jun 2009

Twelfth International Training Course on the Criminal Justice
Response to Corruption

12th UNCAC

Jul-Aug 2009

Ethics and Codes of Conduct for Judges, Prosecutors and Law
Enforcement Officials

143

Sep-Nov 200981

The Enhancement of Appropriate Measures for Victims of
Crime at Each Stage of the Criminal Justice Process

144

Jan-Feb 201082

Effective Resettlement of Offenders by Strengthening“Community Reintegration Factors”

145

May-Jun 2010

83

Attacking the Proceeds of Crime: Identification, Confiscation,
Recovery and Anti-Money Laundering Measures

146

Aug-Oct 2010

The 13th International Training Course on the Criminal Justice
Response to Corruption

13th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2010

80

84

Community Involvement in Offender Treatment

147

Jan-Feb 201185

Drug Offender Treatment: New Approaches to an Old Problem

148

May-Jun 2011

86

Securing Protection and Cooperation of Witnesses and Whistleblowers

149

Aug-Sep 2011

Effective Legal and Practical Measures against Corruption

14th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 201187

Trafficking in Persons̶Prevention, Prosecution, Victim
Protection and Promotion of International Cooperation

150

Jan-Feb 201288

Evidence-Based Treatment of Offenders

151

May-Jun 201289

Trafficking in Persons̶Prevention, Prosecution, Victim
Protection and Promotion of International Cooperation

152

Aug-Sep 2012

Effective Legal and Practical Measures against Corruption

15th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2012

90

Treatment of Female Offenders

153

Jan-Feb 2013

91

Stress Management of Correctional Personnel̶Enhancing the
Capacity of Mid-Level Staff

154

May-Jun 201392

Effective Collection and Utilization of Evidence in Criminal
Cases

155

Aug-Oct 2013

Effective Measures to Prevent and Combat Corruption and to
Encourage Cooperation between the Public and Private Sectors

16th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2013

Protection for Victims of Crime and Use of Restorative Justice
Programmes

156

Jan-Feb 2014

93

94
95

Assessment and Treatment of Special Needs Offenders

157

May-Jun 2014

Measures for Speedy and Efficient Criminal Trials

158

Aug-Sep 2014

17th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2014

Effective Measures to Prevent and Combat Corruption
Focusing on Identifying, Tracing, Freezing, Seizing,
Confiscating and Recovering Proceeds of Corrpution
96

Public Participation in Community Corrections

159

Jan-Feb 201597

The State of Cybercrime: Current Issues and Countermeasures

160

May-Jun 201598

Staff Training for Correctional Leadership

161

Aug-Sep 2015

Effective Anti-Corruption Enforcement and Public-Private andInternational Cooperation

18th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2015

99

Multi-Agency Cooperation in Community-Based Treatment of
Offenders

162

Jan-Feb 2016

100

Children as Victims and Witnesses

163

May-Jun 2016101

Effective Measures for Treatment, Rehabilitation and Social
Reintegration of Juvenile Offenders

164

Aug-Sep 2016

Effective Anti-Corruption Enforcement (Investiagation andProsecution) in the Area of Procurement

19th UNCAC

Oct-Nov 2016

102

Juvenile Justice and the United Nations Standards and Norms

165

Jan-Feb 2017

103

Criminal Justice Procedures and Practices to Disrupt Criminal
Organizations

166

May-Jun 2017

104

Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration of Organized Crime
Members and Terrorists

167

Aug-Sep 2017

Effective Measures to Investigate the Proceeds of Corruption
Crimes20th UNCAC

Nov-Dec 2017

105

Enhancing the Rule of Law in the Field of Crime Prevention andCriminal Justice: Policies and Practices Based on the United
Nations Conventions and Standards and Norms

168

Jan-Feb 2018

106

Criminal Justice Practices against Illicit Drug Trafficking

169

May-Jun 2018

ISSN 0256-5471
ISBN 978-4-87033-325-3

Printed in Japan by TAIHEI PRINTING Co., LTD.