Summary of Country Reports―Current Status of
11 FNCA Member States*―

11th Workshop on Nuclear Security and Safeguards Projectof Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA)

February 15, 2022

Regulatory Authority

Independence of Regulatory Agencies

 Independent: China (CAEA), Indonesia (BAPETEN), Japan (NRA), ROK (NSSC),
Mongolia (Executive office of the NEC and General Agency for Specialized
Inspections (GASI)) Semi-Independent*: Bangladesh (BAERA), Kazakhstan (NNC), Malaysia (AELB),
Thailand (OAP), Viet Nam (VARANS)*The regulatory agency is under a governmental body or ministry towhich a nuclear promotion agency belongs
 No Independent: Philippines (PNRI)
Recent Development
Philippines: The Comprehensive Nuclear Regulation Act, creating and independent
regulatory body, instead of “Philippine Nuclear Regulatory Commission” to“Philippine Atomic Regulatory Commission” submitted to Congress.
* Independent: Australia (ARPANSA, ASNO)

2

Safeguards (1)Implementation of International Treaties and Agreements

 Member of NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty): 12/12 states
 CSA (Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement) in Force: 12/12 states (VOA isin force in China)
 AP (Additional Protocol) in Force: 11/12 states
 IS (Integrated Safeguards): 6/12 states
NPT Member

CSA in Force

AP in Force

Australia
Bangladesh
China
Indonesia
Japan
Kazakhstan

Integrated
safeguards

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
VOA in force✓✓✓

12 Dec.1997
30 Mar. 2001
28 Mar. 2002
29 Sep. 1999
16 Dec. 1999
9 May 2007

✓
✓
n/a
✓
✓
✓

ROK

✓

✓

19 Feb. 2004✓

Malaysia✓✓(Signed: 22 Nov. 2005)

Mongolia
Philippines

✓
✓

✓
✓

12 May 2003
26 Feb. 2010

Thailand✓✓17 Nov. 2017

Viet Nam✓✓

17 Sep. 2012

＊1 Philippines got Broader Conclusion from IAEA in May 2013 and implementing IS in 2017.
＊2 Viet Nam got Broader Conclusion from IAEA in May 2015.

✓＊1

＊2

3

Safeguards (2)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2020-2021
 Bangladesh:• IAEA Inspectors visited Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP 1 & 2) and carried out
design information verification (DIV) activities in accordance with the Safeguards
Agreement (INFCIRC/301) on 29 November 2021. IAEA’s Department of Safeguards
acknowledged that the results of DIV were satisfactory.
• ‘National Policy for Nuclear Safeguards and Management of Nuclear Materials’ is
now on the approval process.
• Bangladesh officially requested IAEA for IAEA State System of Accounting for andControl of Nuclear Materials Advisory Service (ISSAS) and an ISSAS mission isscheduled to be hosted in first quarter of 2022.

4

Safeguards (3)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2020-2021
 China: Submits safeguards reports annually to the IAEA by December each year forthe two civilian nuclear facilities, the Shandong Shidao Bay 200MWe HighTemperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Pebble-Bed Module Demonstration Power Plant
and Shaanxi Uranium Enrichment Plant that are placed voluntarily under IAEA
safeguards. Routine IAEA inspection to Shidao Bay HTGCR Reactor.
 Indonesia: Physical protection routine inspection one time in a year for eachnuclear facility (on September - October 2021), Safeguards routine inspection twotimes for each MBA (Pre PIV & AP, PIV), Technical Workshop on AP declaration using
PR3, PIV with IAEA on July 2021 for RI-B, RI-C. and RI-G , Annual Safeguards Review
Meeting on 15 July 2021SNI by IAEA on 29 - 30 November 2021 for RI-C , CA by IAEA
on 29 November 2021 for Serpong Nuclear Research Complex.

5

Safeguards (4)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2020-2021

 Japan: As a result of cooperation between the Government of Japan and the IAEA,
the successful implementation of safeguards has enabled the broader conclusion
for 2020, first reached for the 2003 calendar year; For Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant, additional safeguards measures such as remote monitoring by
surveillance cameras and radiation monitor have been applied to confirm noundeclared removal of nuclear material. In 2021, the shipment of all fuelassemblies in Spent Fuel Pond at Unit-3 to the Common Spent Fuel Storage and reverification by the IAEA were successfully completed.
 Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan chaired Working Group B of the CTBTO Preparatory
Commission, the Law about “Semipalatinsk Nuclear Safety Zone” is adopted,
reactor testing of SNP-fueled irradiation devices is conducted, participation of
Kazakhstan in the World Nuclear Association (WNA) Symposium, participation in
the Nuclear Disarmament Verification Expert Group, preparatory work to establish
a Regional Nuclear Disarmament Verification Center has begun, preparatory work
for CTBT calibration testing has begun.
6Safeguards (5)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2020-2021
 ROK : In 2020, a total of 95 IAEA inspections were performed, including
unannounced inspections and physical inventory verification. Also, 9complementary accesses were conducted for the provision of information underthe AP. The safeguards conclusion of IAEA inspections were ‘satisfactory’ for all thetimes, and a broader conclusion was made.
 Malaysia: The new Atomic Energy bill is schedule to be table in Parliament by Q42022; Malaysia had received IAEA Safeguards Annual Inspection on the 2nd and3rd of November 2020; Malaysia currently implementing IAEA Comprehensive
Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs (COMPASS) in accordance with its
project schedule. Preparatory activities on AP implementation are on going toensure groundworks are ready once ratification of AP is decided by Government.

7

Safeguards (6)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2020-2021
 Mongolia: AP declarations are submitted in a timely manner. The Rules on Nuclear
material accountancy and control was approved by Government Resolution No.
229 on on December 23, 2020.
 Philippines: Nuclear Material Accounting reports and AP declarations are
submitted annually through the Secure Communication. Integration of Safeguards
to the Regulatory Process (i.e. Licensing, Enforcement) and development ofregulations for Safeguards and Additional protocol. Migration of Protocol Reporter2 to Protocol Reporter 3.Conducted an awareness seminar on the Additional
Protocol to the Regulatory Body (Nuclear Regulatory Division) and to revive AP
Outreach program to Universities and Industries.

8

Safeguards (7)Updates on Safeguards Implementation of 2020-2021
 Thailand: Annual activity requirements for CSA/AP obligations are PhysicalInventory Verification, Design Information Verification, and Nuclear Materials
Accountancy Reports. Pre-DIQ for Suranaree University of Technology Research
Reactor was submitted to the IAEA in 2020. The AP declarations have been
updated, composing of fifteen declarations and four quarterly declarations. OAP,
Department of Foreign Trade and Thai Customs cooperate on information sharing
regarding commodity required to be declared.
 Viet Nam: 128 reports of nuclear research reactor, 104 LOF reports under CSA(2021); NNSA Webinars for International Safeguards Professionals (WISP) (2021);
International Training Course on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Practitioners Q1 (2022); IAEA Safeguards inspector team in 2021.

9

Nuclear Security (1)Implementation of International Treaties and Conventions

 CPPNM (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material): 11/12 states
 CPPNM Amendment*: 9/12 states*IAEA Recommendation INFCIRC 225/Rev5 consistent with the Amendment
 Nuclear Terrorism Convention (International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism):
Ratification: 6 states, Accession: 2 state, Acceptance: 1 state, Signature: 3 states
CPPNM

CPPNM Amendment

Nuclear Terrorism Convention

Australia

22 Oct 1987 in force

Ratification 16 Mar 2012

Bangladesh

10 Jun 2005 in force

China

09 Feb 1989 in force

Ratification 17 Jul 2008
Entry into force
since 04 Jul 2017

Ratification 14 Se. 2009

Ratification 08 Nov 2010

Indonesia

08 Feb 1987 in force

Ratification 27 May 2010

Ratification 19 March 2014

Japan

27 Nov 1988 in force

Ratification 17 Jun 2014

Acceptance 02 Oct 2007

Kazakhstan

02 Oct 2005 in force

Ratification 26 Apr 2011

Ratification 31 Jul 2008

ROK

08 Feb 1987 in force

Ratification 29 May 2014

Ratification 29 May 2014

Malaysia

Accession 07 Jul 2007

Signature 16 Sep 2005

Mongolia

08 Feb 1987 in force

Preparing to join

Ratification 06 Oct 2006

Philippines

08 Feb 1987 in force

Ratified 16 June 2021

Signature 15 Sep 2005

Thailand

27 Mar 2018 in Force

Ratification 27 Mar 2018

Signature 14 Sep 2005

Viet Nam

03 Nov 2012 in force

Ratification 03 Nov 2012

Accession Sept 201610

Nuclear Security (2)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2020-2021
 Bangladesh:• Bangladesh hosted an Expert Mission on Nuclear Security Detection Architecture
in Dhaka from 24-27 February 2020. This event was organized as a part ofscheduled activities under the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP)
for Bangladesh. IAEA expert as well as representatives from different organizations
relevant to the implementation of nuclear security activities in the country such as
Ministry of Science and Technology, Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory
Authority, Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission, Nuclear Security and PhysicalProtection System Cell, Border Guards Bangladesh, Bangladesh Cost Guard,
Bangladesh Customs, Nuclear Power Plant Company Bangladesh Limited,
Bangladesh Police, Intelligent Agencies, etc. participated in the expert mission.
• ‘National Nuclear Security Policy’ is now on the approval process.
• Bangladesh is preparing to request for the International Physical Protection
Advisory Service (IPPAS).
11

Nuclear Security (3)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2020-2021
 Bangladesh(cont.):• A research project, 'Factors that can influence culture for safety, organizational
culture and human performance at nuclear and other facilities in Bangladesh' isongoing under the IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) ‘I22004’ entitled‘Organizational Culture Basis for Successful Performance in Nuclear Power Plants’.
Actively participated all the RCM of this CRP. It is expected that the outcomes ofthis project will help to enhance the understanding of parameters related to andneeded for improvement of organizational factors and human factors in theorganization's culture for safety and security in Bangladesh.

12

Nuclear Security (4)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2020-2021
 China : Cyber Security Law released in Nov 2016; Nuclear Safety Law released in Aug
2017; Atomic Energy Law (draft) as a direct upper-level legislation of nuclear security,
is in the process of review and approval; Regulations on Nuclear Security underdevelopment; Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security (COE) came into operation in
Mar 2016, to provide all-around support to the nuclear security governmental
management and capacity building in China; successful completion of he Ghana MNSR
HEU conversion Project in Aug. 2017; Completed IAEA IPPAS mission in Sep. 2017;
Signing the Agreement between the IAEA and CAEA concerning the designation of the
CAEA as an IAEA collaborating Center in 2019. Cyber Security Guidance for Nuclear
Facility released in 2019;Practicl arrangement on cooperation on nuclear forensic with
IAEA signed in 2020;Practicl arrangement on cooperation on Nuclear Security of Major
Public Event with IAEA signed in 2021.

13

Nuclear Security (5)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2020-2021
 Indonesia: BAPETEN Physical Protection regulation is under revision to comply withINFCIRC/225/Rev.5), BAPETEN, BATAN and security authorities conducted. Performance
Testing Course (blended training face to face and virtually) to evaluate PPS
implementation in Serpong Nuclear Research Center 2021 ; number of trainings
completed and planned. ORTN-BRIN conducted Security Risk Assessment, Performance
Testing and Contingency Plan in 2021 as required by BAPETEN Chairman Regulation as
well as BATAN Standard. In 2021 ORTN-BRIN and BAPETEN conducted cyber security
WS supported by U.S.DOE. In 2021, ORTN-BRIN continued to conduct PhysicalProtection training course at Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) in Serpong site.
BATAN’s NSSC in collaboration with NNSA/INS/U.S. DOE conducted National Nuclear
Security Training Course virtually in 2021 and one regional (SEA) course on Insider
Threat Mitigation in September 2021 virtually. Per 1 September 2021, BATAN’s name is
no longer used, and now so-called Nuclear Technology and Research Organization(ORTN) - under the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN). ORTN-BRIN NSSC
in collaboration with NNSA/INS/U.S. DOE will conduct National Nuclear Security
Training Course virtually in 2022.
14

Nuclear Security (6)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2020-2021
 Japan: The new performance-based inspection system started in April 2020 in which
security inspections are more focused on activities with higher security risks. This new
inspection system allows for comprehensive oversight of licensees’ nuclear security
practices. Under this inspection system violations of the security plan of KashiwazakiKariwa Nuclear Power Station were identified. Currently, supplemental inspections areunderway to address these violations. Regarding RI security, Act on the Regulation ofRadioisotopes, etc., and Enforcement Regulation of the Act on the Regulation ofRadioisotopes, etc. which took effect in September 2019, established a nationalframework in Japan for RI security based on IAEA guidance (NSS). ISCN was designatedas the Collaborating Centre of IAEA on nuclear security in November 2021.
Kazakhstan: IGR research reactor fuel enrichment reduction, nuclear-hazardous
object “Experimental Field”, located at the STS was transferred to the responsibilityof the National Guard of RK, construction of RONA repository, training courses fornuclear security forces, construction and equipping of a test site of the National
Guard of RK, security enhancement work to the nuclear-hazardous object “AktanBerli” was competed, integrated studies of STS territory were completed.
15

Nuclear Security (7)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2020-2021
 ROK: A guidance document for physical protection examination and inspection wascompletely revised in their format and the details were supplemented to provide abasis for efficient and thorough regulatory implementation. In addition, systematicstandards for cyber attacks were prepared by setting up the guidelines for cyberincident response training in nuclear facilities and cyber security review andinspection for wireless connection of nuclear facilities.
 Malaysia: Participation and implementation of activities in 2021 was almost via
online with various counterparts such as IAEA and NNSA. Those activities include
National Workshop on Threat Assessment and Design Basis Threat, AELB/NSDD
Nuclear Security Detection Peer-to-Peer Engagement, The Nuclear Threat Initiative(NTI) and Pacific Forum on the amended Convention of the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials (A/CPPNM), Development of Regulations for the PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities Workshop etc.

16

Nuclear Security (7)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2020-2021
 Mongolia: Mongolia acceded to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons(TPNW) on December 10, 2021 becoming the 57th state party. Joining this treaty
would “meet the fundamental interests of national security”. National action planon the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 was
developed.
 Philippines: Review of the INSSP schedule for 2022 which includes Nuclear Energy.
Continue collaboration with IAEA, US DOE and other organizations for seminars,
workshops, etc on Nuclear Security for Nuclear Material and Radioactive Material
including the NSDD program. Establishment of Nuclear Forensics of which the PNRI
NFG participates in the CMX-7. Collaboration with PNRI Nuclear Training Center in
the introduction of three (3) days Pilot training course on Security of Radioactive
Material for Security Officers and Regulatory Personnel, PNRI mobile expert
support team deployed in the Feast of the Black Nazarene, a religious event withattendance of five (5) million last 2020 and only less that a million this 2021 due to
COVID-19. Participated in the IAEA CRP on the Advance Maintenance, Repair andCalibration of Radiation Detection Equipment.
17

Nuclear Security (8)Updates on Nuclear Security Implementation of 2020-2021
Thailand: In January 2021, OAP and World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS)
signed an MOU to support the establishment of the National Nuclear Security
Support Centre (NSSC) in Thailand. The project, funded by the Weapons Threat
Reduction Programme of Global Affairs Canada (GAC), supports international
commitments to enhance competence. ISO92223:2017 is pursuing the certification
process for OAP's nuclear security training activities. In the process of drafting the
Nuclear Security Regime. Thailand held annual training workshops for the frontline
officers in Nuclear Security Incident Response and Nuclear Forensics.
Viet Nam: June 2018 - INSSP updated. 2019 - New Regulatory of security of radsource;T3 course and operator training with DOE/NNSA's Office of Nuclear
Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD); 2020 - Decree No. 142/2020/ND-CP of
the Government: Regulations on the conduct of radiation work and service activities
to support the application of atomic energy; 2021 - IAEA Project – Radiation Portal
Monitoring (RPMs) installed in Tan Son Nhat Airport; 2020-2021 ensured nuclear
security for MPEs (ASEAN activities in Viet Nam, Congress Regular Meeting);
participated in a series of virtual meetings in 2020-2021.

18

Nuclear Security Culture (1)Methods and Plans to Foster Nuclear Security Culture Bangladesh: participation of national/international training courses/workshops/
meetings in collaboration with FNCA, IAEA, U.S.DOE, Russia; undertaken nuclear
safety and security culture awareness programs through poster display; participationin IAEA CRPs in safety and security culture.
 China : organize/ participate in the national/regional/international training
courses/workshops in collaboration with IAEA, U.S.DOE; publish magazine titled“China Nuclear Security”; develop curriculums on nuclear security culture to
improve the awareness of nuclear security culture for domestic nuclear-related
personals; conduct online training and workshop during Covid-19 pandemic.
product nuclear security science popularizing video.

19

Nuclear Security Culture (2)Methods and Plans to Foster Nuclear Security Culture Indonesia: CSCA/BATAN: conducting self-assessment on nuclear security culture forradioactive source facility in Pasar Jumat (2018-2019), final report has completed in
2020; develop nuclear security culture guidance (in progress), ORTN-BRIN
conducting self-assessment on nuclear security culture for entire workforce by using
on-line survey cause of pandemic COVID-19; Indonesia shared experience on self
assessment of nuclear security culture at research reactor to IAEA member States
through IAEA Workshop on Nuclear Security Culture and Self-Assessment, in 2018
the report submitted to the IAEA-TECDOC CRP on nuclear security culture
enhancement solutions. The IAEA has offered to Indonesia to be the first country to
hold a Seminar for Senior Managers on Nuclear Security Culture, which is plannedfor Q1 2022.

20

Nuclear Security Culture (3)Methods and Plans to Foster Nuclear Security Culture Japan: NRA Commissioners regularly hold nuclear security briefings for executivesof operators and conduct interviews to them to communicate the expectation for
their leadership in nuclear security, and if necessary, directly request them to takethe lead in fostering nuclear security culture.
 Kazakhstan: Nuclear Disarmament Verification Initiative, participation of national
and international training courses in collaboration with IAEA, JAEA, US/DOE and etc.
 ROK: organized and hosted a regional workshop on Asia’s considerations of nuclear
security on 23-24 March 2021. This workshop aimed at enhancing awareness of
nuclear security in Asia by discussing the perception of nuclear security threats andanalyzing nuclear security priorities in the region, and providing relevant
information regarding the A/CPPNM and its review conference.
 Malaysia: Conducted nuclear security culture self assessment and Nuclear Security
Culture Campaign on Cyber Security and Physical Security was conducted at
Malaysian Nuclear Agency. Implementation of IAEA Coordinated Research Project Design and development of a Knowledge-Based Model and Software Module forIntelligent & Integrated Nuclear Security System for Malaysian Nuclear Agency.

21

Nuclear Security Culture (4)Methods and Plans to Foster Nuclear Security Culture Mongolia: Cooperation with Executive office of the NEC and US department ofEnergy, Sandia National Laboratory jointly organized the virtual training course on“Transportation response” was held on September 28-30, 2021. Total of 34
employees from 22 government agencies were attended this training andacquired knowledge and skills to organize prevention and response activities
during the transportation of radioactive materials.
 Philippines: Incorporated nuclear security culture topic in the Pilot Training
Course with PNRI-NTC. Strengthening nuclear security culture in the workplace.
 Thailand: Continuous training, stakeholder communications, and revision ofregulations and guidelines under the Nuclear Energy for Peace Act.
 Viet Nam: Developed and implemented of regulatory documents (Circular
01/May 2019 on security of radioactive sources; and Decree No. 142/2020/NDCP of the Government: Regulations on the conduct of radiation work and service
activities to support the application of atomic energy), continue fostering Nuclear
Security Culture (NNSA NSC workshop 2021).
22

Capacity Building (1)Nuclear Security (and Safeguards) Training Centers

This chart identifies the existing training centers in the FNCA member countries, which provide
trainings to practitioners in the areas of nuclear security and safeguards, and training functions of
the centers. Educational programs are not included on the chart.
Training Center/
Training Provider

Status ofTraining
CenterTargetBangladesh

TBD / BAEC, BAERA

PlannedChina

SNSTC(COE)/
SNSTC(COE)Indonesia*1

BAPETEN ETC,
Directorate ofCompetency
Development (BRIN’s
Training Center/
BAPETEN, BRINJapan
Kazakhstan

Training Topics

Cooperation with

Security

SG

OthersInternational/
Domestic✓✓

Border control

IAEA, US/DOE,
Russia, JAEA, FNCA

In operation

International/Do
mestic✓✓Border control

IAEA, US/DOE

In operation

International/
IAEA courses✓✓

IAEA, US/DOE,
APSN, PNTR, JAEA

In operation

International/Domestic/
IAEA courses✓✓

IAEA, US/DOE,
EC/JRCTC of INP/ TC of INP In operation

International/Domestic/
IAEA courses

ISCN / ISCN✓

*1 Gajamada University in Indonesia launched master course on nuclear security in 2017.
*2 BAPETEN ETC will be hosted 3rd regional school on nuclear security in October 2018.

✓

Radiation Safety andRadiation Monitoring
Information Security

US/DOE, Japan23

Capacity Building (2)Cont.

Nuclear Security (and Safeguards) Training Centers

Training Center/
Training
ProviderStatus ofTraining
CenterTargetROK

INSA /INSA

In operation

International/Domestic/
IAEA courses

Malaysia

NSSC / AELB

Training classand Testing Lab
in operation

Mongolia

TBD / NECPhilippines

PNRI

Licensee, FLO
NSSC- training and othermodules
government
agencies

Thailand

TBD / OAP,
CU*1

Domestic
Under
Competence
Consideration
Authorities

Viet Nam

VARANS / TSC

PlannedTraining Topics

Cooperation with

Security

SG

Others✓✓Export control

IAEA, US/DOE✓

Border control

IAEA, ANSTO,
US/DOE✓

Border control

US/DOE, IAEA✓

Border control

IAEA, US/DOE✓✓

Border control

IAEA, ASNO,
US/DOE, JAEA, EC✓✓

Rad Detection

IAEA, US/DOE, JAEA

*1 Chulalongkorn University in Thailand has master course on nuclear security and safeguards for international/domestic students.

24Capacity Building (3)Nuclear Security (and Safeguards) Training Centers

Cont.

List of the Training Centers
Bangladesh: TBD
China: State Nuclear Security Technology Center (Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security)
China Customs Training Center for Radiation Detection (border control)
Nuclear Safeguards Technical Research Laboratory (Safeguards)
Indonesia: Nuclear Energy Regulatory Authority Education and Training Center (BAPETEN ETC)

Directorate of Human Resource Development and Competency – BRIN, insteadof BATAN-CET. Both ETC and CET will always work together.

Japan: Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN)
Kazakhstan: Nuclear Security Training Center
ROK: International Nuclear Security Academy (INSA)
Malaysia: Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC)
Mongolia: TBD (Executive Office of the NEC is responsible to strengthening human resourcesin a nuclear and radiation field.)25

Capacity Building (4)Nuclear Security (and Safeguards) Training Centers

Cont.

List of the Training Centers
Philippines: Philippine Nuclear Security Support Center is underway. Developed two (2)modules for National Coast Watch Center and for Philippine AirForce on
Awareness and Basic Radiological Detection Workshop.
Thailand: Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP), Chulalongkorn University.
Viet Nam: Technical Support Centre for Radiation & Nuclear Safety and Emergency Response(VARANS/TSC)26