The Japanese Journal of American Studies, No. 28 (2017)
Copyright © 2017 Akiyo Yamamoto. All rights reserved. This work may be used, with thisnotice included, for noncommercial purposes. No copies of this work may be distributed,
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US Hungarian Refugee Policy, 1956–1957

Akiyo YAMAMOTO*INTRODUCTIONThe United States did not politically intervene during the Hungarian
revolution that began on October 23, 1956,1 but it swiftly accepted more
Hungarian refugees than any other country.2 The first airplane, which carried
sixty refugees, arrived at McGuire Air Force Base located in Burlington
County, New Jersey, on November 21, 1956, only seventeen days after thecapital was occupied by Soviet forces, and were welcomed by the Secretaryof the Army and other dignitaries.3 A special refugee program, created tohelp meet the emergency, brought 21,500 refugees to the United States in aperiod of weeks. By May 1, 1957, 32,075 refugees had reached US shores.
The United States ultimately accepted approximately 38,000 Hungarian
refugees within a year following the revolution.4
The acceptance of Hungarian refugees took place within the framework ofexisting immigration laws, along with the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. The
State Department’s Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs developed thisprogram to bring Hungarians to the United States.5 The Immigration andNationality Act of 1952, known as the McCarran-Walter Act, permitted
entry by a quota system based on nationalities and regions, and only 865
people from Hungary could be accepted each year. The Dwight D.
Eisenhower administration expanded the quota by adopting the Refugee
Relief Act of 1953, which extended 214,000 special immigration visas over*Professor, Nagoya City University

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and above the existing quota limits over a three-year period.6 In addition, thegovernment had expanded the reception quota by introducing the concept of“parole,” temporary entry permission without the normally required
documentation, based on a decision of the Attorney General, because theRefugee Relief Act would expire in December 1956. With the launching ofOperation Mercy, President Eisenhower offered asylum to Hungarian
refugees in the form of 21,500 visas: 6,500 under the Refugee Relief Act
and 15,000 as “parolees” under section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration andNationality Act of 1952.7
Congress strongly criticized the administration’s actions, and as a result it
become difficult to accept further Hungarian refugees, accelerating thetermination of the Hungarian refugee program. The opponents objected to
the government’s admissions policy because Hungarian refugees wereformer Communists; also, active Communists could infiltrate the UnitedStates along with the refugees.8 Congressman Francis E. Walter, a Democrat
from Pennsylvania and chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Immigration and Naturalization,9 warned that many Communists wereentering the country disguised as “freedom fighters” along with some who
were seeking economic opportunity.10 In addition, the President’s Committee
for Hungarian Refugee Relief established by President Eisenhower on
December 12, 1956, received numerous letters from US citizens expressing
concern that the refugees might become a public burden or deprive
Americans of employment.11
Given these objections, how is it that the United States was able to accept
such a large number of Hungarian refugees? It is a matter of common
knowledge that during the Cold War the United States took the initiative toaccept refugees from Communist countries as a form of anti-Communist
propaganda directed at home and abroad. Some scholars continue to viewrefugee affairs in the light of the Cold War. For example, Carl J. Bon Tempo,
in a book that discusses the tangled domestic and international history of US
refugee accommodation during the Cold War, insists that the US decision toassist Hungarian refugees was largely driven by foreign policy concerns of
the day, that is, anti-Communism.12 He argues that the Eisenhoweradministration used propaganda about Hungarian Americanization topromote their acceptance in opposition to those who favored immigration
restrictions.13 Indeed, the intense media propaganda barrage in favor of
refugee relief undertaken by the government greatly influenced American
society.
However, anti-Communism was not the sole reason why American

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society accepted so many Hungarian refugees. Hungarian refugee policy not
only supported accepting refugees from the Soviet bloc for reasons of antiCommunism but also because it benefitted a wide range of organizations andindividuals in American society, including government agencies,
foundations, private corporations, voluntary agencies, and individual
citizens.
Instead of directly supporting refugees, the government ensured that thevarious organizations and individuals co-operated effectively to provide therefugees with means for making a living. At the same time, organizations
and individuals aimed at expanding their international and domestic
influence and/or contribution to American society by participating in thegovernmental refugee support system. The various motivations oforganizations and individuals were compatible with official anti-Communist
propaganda during the Cold War.
In describing American society in the 1950s, historian Jennifer A. Delton
explains how, despite Eisenhower’s self-professed conservatism, his
administration maintained liberal social policies to prevent the spread ofCommunism at home and to fight the Cold War abroad. She describes thatliberal agenda as a commitment to the idea that centralized state power
could be a progressive, benevolent, unifying force in a democratic society,one that could control the vicissitudes of modern capitalism and help thenation deliver its promise of liberty, equality, and prosperity for all.14 She
indicates that postwar liberals had “a belief in using state power for social
ends, a rejection of ‘rugged individualism,’ and a group-based conception ofsociety.”15 I adopt Delton’s definition of “liberal” in this article and, in
addition, pay attention to the internationalist refugee policy of theEisenhower administration. Because the government and various institutions
held liberal views, they accepted and supported Hungarian refugees.
In this article I explore how the United States accepted such a vast
number of Hungarian refugees between 1956 and 1957. I concentrate on theroles and motivations of various American institutions in accepting andsupporting them. Section One clarifies the backgrounds and characteristicsof the Hungarian refugees. Section Two examines how the president’s
special committee and nongovernmental foundations implemented refugee
acceptance and support policies for scientists, professionals, and students.
Section Three discusses the support provided by voluntary agencies andindividual US citizens.

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I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUNGARIAN REFUGEES
The primary reason why so many Hungarians arrived in the United States
was the suppression of the Hungarian uprising by Soviet forces in 1956.
There certainly were other motivations—political, economic, and social—
for them to leave their country. Many refugees who fled to neighboring
countries sought asylum in the United States. Apart from those having
relatives who had already emigrated to the United States, there were those
who desired the material affluence to be found in America and were
influenced by propaganda regarding the American dream that with effort
everyone could succeed and become rich.
The following incident, however, was what primarily prompted people toleave Hungary. In October 1956, university students began to organize
opposition to the Communist regime in several Hungarian cities.16 The
revolution was formalized when students at the Technical University ofBudapest issued a sixteen-point declaration demanding changes in national
policy. The ÁVH (Államvédelmi Hatóság), Hungarian secret security forces,intervened and turned the peaceful demonstration of October 23, 1956, into
a bloody revolution. Members of the workers’ committees and other citizens
later joined the students to demand the withdrawal of Soviet forces, which
had been permitted to stay in Hungary in accord with the Paris Peace
Treaties in 1947, the COMECON mutual assistance treaty in 1949, and theWarsaw Pact Organization in 1955. They demanded freedom of speech andfree elections. Soon after Soviet forces entered Hungarian territory,reformist prime minister Imre Nagy declared Hungary’s neutrality andwithdrew from the Warsaw Pact on November 1, 1956. After a fierce battle
lasting ten days, the revolutionaries succumbed to the Soviets. Contrary to
Nagy and his fellow revolutionaries’ expectations, the United States andother Western European countries did not step in to support therevolutionaries’ military action.17
Statistics by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office reveal that highly
educated and skilled citizens departed from the country after the revolution,with more than 200,000 Hungarians escaping to foreign territories.18 Overthe next few years, until January 1959, an estimated 179,000 more fled toAustria, 19,900 to Yugoslavia, and more than 1,000 to other countries.19
Among them, 67 percent were men and 40 percent were aged fifteen to
twenty-four. In terms of occupation, blue-collar workers accounted for 63.5
percent, and among them, more than half were industrially skilled workers.
White-collar workers accounted for 25.4 percent; among them, 21.2 percent

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were engineers and technicians, while others were educators, medical
doctors, intellectuals, and artists. More than 3,000 college and university
students illegally departed Hungary; among them 40 percent were intechnical fields, 22 percent were in agriculture, and 14 percent were in artsand sciences.
The motivations of those who left Hungary involved several interwoven,randomly connected factors. Julianna Puskás has identified the following
three motivators. First, there was a fear of retaliation against those who
participated in the armed uprising. Second, there were the negative aspectsof the pre-1956 political situation, including social and economic
disadvantages and fear of repression or imprisonment. Third, there werepersonal reasons such as psychological factors, individual character traits,
and events in an individual’s life history.20 Though political reasons were
important, economic and personal reasons are worthy of attention as well.
Most Hungarian refugees hoped to emigrate to the United States. The
refugees, who were provided protection by the Austrian government,
congregated at the US consulate in Vienna expecting to obtain US visas.
Péter János Sós has highlighted two reasons why so many sought asylum in
the United States.21 First, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth
century, a large number of Hungarians had immigrated to the United States.
The refugees believed the existing social network of their relatives andacquaintances in the United States would support them in establishing new
lives. Second, the American ideal, derived from material affluence, attracted
them. For instance, they retained the image of US soldiers stationed inWestern Europe handing out American-made food and stockings after theend of World War II. In addition, the idea of the American dream, a countryof freedom and opportunity, was disseminated throughout Eastern Europe
via American propaganda organs, the Voice of America and Radio Free
Europe, during the Cold War.22
It was necessary for the US government to decide how to accept such avast number of refugees. I have discussed the legal acceptance measures forrefugees in the introduction. In the next section I consider the acceptanceand supporting policies that were implemented.
II. THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE AND THE ROLE OF FOUNDATIONSThe Eisenhower administration established the US President’s Committee
for Hungarian Refugee Relief, consisting of the Army, government agencies,
cooperating organizations and voluntary agencies, to offer support to132

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Hungarian refugees. These organizations played the following roles:
transporting refugees, setting up and operating camp facilities for them, andproviding them with support, both material and otherwise. The President’s
Committee was responsible for coordinating and mediating between theseagencies. Philanthropic institutions, the National Academy of Sciences of
the United States (NAS), and leading firms provided people and funds forthe selection of scientists, professionals, and university students of naturalsciences. They achieved their purpose of acquiring top-rate talent by using
the state’s power to further American society according to their liberal ideas.
THE PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL COMMITTEE
During the final stages of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, President
Eisenhower issued a statement accepting refugees from Hungary andencouraging Americans to fulfill their humanitarian duty as citizens of a freenation with the assistance of voluntary agencies and other humanitarianorganizations.23 One month later, on December 12, 1956, President
Eisenhower established a special committee, the President’s Committee for
Hungarian Refugee Relief. Tracy Voorhees, a former Undersecretary of the
Army and US adviser to NATO, was appointed the committee’s chairman,
with the expectation that his military experience in refugee administration
would prove to be beneficial. The committee operated until May 1957.
The committee was assigned four duties and objectives.24 First, it was toassist in every way possible the various religious and voluntary agencies
engaged in working for Hungarian refugees. Second, it was to coordinate theefforts of these agencies, with special emphasis on those activities related to
the resettlement of the refugees. The committee also served as a central
point to which offers of homes and employment could be forwarded. Third,
it was to coordinate the efforts of the voluntary agencies with the work ofinterested governmental departments. Fourth, it was not allowed to raisemonetary aid itself for refugees.
Before the establishment of the President’s Committee, the US Armytransported the refugees to a facility prepared for them in Kilmer, New
Jersey. The chief of the New Jersey Military District had placed the Joyce
Kilmer Reception Center under the command of the US Refugee Reception
Center on November 14, 1956, for this very purpose.25 After Eisenhower
announced the formation of the President’s Committee, offices were openedin Washington, DC, and Camp Kilmer to organize government andvoluntary agencies. At Kilmer, the Army housed and fed the refugees and,

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when necessary, provided hospitalization and medical and dental care.
There were twenty-two governmental and voluntary agencies
participating in the refugee reception and resettlement program at Kilmer.26
These agencies were independent of one another and were directly
responsible to their own individual headquarters, located either in New Yorkor in Washington, DC. In order to improve coordination among thesevarious groups, all of which were performing essential services, anorganizational plan was agreed on for the Kilmer center.
The various agencies were divided into three groups: government
agencies directly concerned with the resettlement program, voluntaryagencies that were sponsoring refugees, and cooperating agencies that were
not directly concerned with sponsoring refugees, such as the American
National Red Cross, the National Academy of Sciences, the World
University Service, and the Hungarian National Council. Leo C. Beebe fromthe Ford Motor Company was appointed vice-chairman of the office atCamp Kilmer, and employees of leading firms such as Standard Oil
Company, IBM, and others were involved in administrative services such as
public information, administrative services, data processing services, andeducational services.27
SUPPORT FOR SCIENTISTS
The President’s Committee prioritized the acceptance of scientists among
the Hungarian refugees, and this process was directed by NAS. Throughout
January and February 1957, letters arrived at NAS’s office at Camp Kilmer
from Hungarian scientists stranded in Austria, which could not afford to
keep them.28 NAS asked one of its members, Paul Alfred Weiss of theRockefeller Institute for Medical Research, to go to Vienna to investigate.29
He reported that many of the refugees who had written to NAS had arrived
in Austria after December 1, 1956, and thus were not eligible to enter theUnited States under the parole program. Since the number of refugees
requesting parolee status was larger than could be accepted by the US
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), post–December 1 arrivals
were not considered true refugees of the revolution that took place in
October. Therefore, Weiss proposed that NAS should establish an office inVienna to help the scientists among the refugees to find professional
opportunities in the United States. At the same time, Eisenhower expanded
the reception quota via Operation Mercy, as discussed in the introduction.
Subsequently, NAS formed a team in cooperation with the American

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Consul in Vienna and the representatives of the INS and began activities.30
They distributed formal messages to the refugee camps, universities, andvarious offices frequently visited by refugees in Austria. The message, inEnglish and Hungarian, invited the holders of an undergraduate degree or adoctorate degree in any of the natural sciences (physics, biology, medicine),
mathematics, or engineering to apply to immigrate. NAS operated on bothsides of the Atlantic in cooperation with the US Department of State andINS to assist and select the scientists from among the refugees. In the UnitedStates, a special division of the Kilmer Reception Center was created inconjunction with NAS, where Hungarian American scholars who had
immigrated to the United States in the 1930s conducted assessments of the
new refugees; among those doing the assessments were Nobel Prize–
winning physiologist Albert Szent-Györgyi, theoretical physicist Eugene
Paul Wigner, and mathematician Edward Teller.31 The selected refugee
scientists were offered employment at research institutions or universities in
the United States.
There were two reasons why the philanthropic institutions and NAS
conducted such an operation. First, following the rise of Nazism in the
1930s, the United States had accepted several East European scientists who
subsequently contributed to the development of American science andtechnology. Second, during the 1950s, the Rockefeller Foundation and theFord Foundation led the nation in the area of cultural diplomacy toward
Europe. Both foundations played key roles not only in providing funds toHungarian refugees but also in influencing the foreign policy of theEisenhower administration.32 The foundations had their own humanitarian
objectives, and during the Cold War, both foundations worked in close
cooperation with the US government.
Nelson Rockefeller, special assistant to the president for foreign affairs,
created the Special Studies Project funded by the Rockefeller Brothers Fundin 1956 to identify problems facing the United States and to define strategic
goals for President Eisenhower. The reports published by the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund maintained that the Communist rulers of the Soviet Union
and China posed the greatest immediate threat to the United States.33 To
counteract the Soviet threat to the United States, they argued that economic
development through education and a trained work force were essential.34 In
particular, the report asserted that improving science education in the UnitedStates was of critical importance.35 In order to win the Cold War against theSoviet Union, the development of science, technology, and education were
essential in both foreign and domestic policies. Hungarian refugees wereUS HUNGARIAN REFUGEE POLICY, 1956–1957

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generally highly educated professionals and scientists whose skills
coincided with the needs of US policy at the time.36
The Ford Foundation, which played a particularly international role,
wanted European countries to be included in the aid program in 1951 for theFree University in West Berlin, founded in 1948 when Berlin’s old
university in the Soviet sector of the city become Stalinized.37 After Shepard
Stone was made director of the Ford Foundation’s International Affairs
Program in 1954,38 he produced a memorandum on September 13, 1956, thatstated that “the strengthening of Europe and of American-European relations
is fundamental to the security and well-being of the United States and to theFoundation’s interest in peace, freedom, and human progress.”39 After the
Hungarian revolution, Stone immediately traveled to intervene on behalf ofthe refugees. For instance, on January 17, 1957, the president of the Ford
Foundation authorized Stone to offer a grant of nearly ten thousand dollars
for a bulldozer to clear snow-clogged mountain passes so the Hungarians
could escape. In addition, the foundation conducted “Hungarian student
intellectual refugee programs,” which will be discussed in detail below.40
During the Cold War, the Rockefeller Foundation used grant funding topromote pro-Western social and political ideals and to counter antiAmericanism abroad.41 Rockefeller’s activities in Hungary began shortly
after the foundation was established in 1913.42 In the years following WorldWar II and up to 1956, the Rockefeller Foundation did not work in Hungary
because of the new regime’s distrust of foreign institutions. This wasreflected in problems with successfully transferring grant funds andobtaining visas for foundation officers to visit the country to identify andmonitor potential projects.43 After the 1956 revolution, however, thefoundation provided large sums of money for Hungarian refugee aid.44
SUPPORT FOR PROFESSIONALS AND STUDENTS
Not only Hungarian scientists but also professionals and university
students attracted attention and gained acceptance. After inspecting theKilmer Reception Center in January 1957, Vice President Richard Nixon
stated in a report to the president that in terms of personal qualifications, the
Hungarian refugees should be regarded as valuable assets rather thanliabilities.45 The final report of the Kilmer Reception Center also indicatedthat of the 30,673 Hungarian refugees received in the camp, one third wereskilled workers, which was the same as the percentage computed by the
Hungarian Statistical Office between 1956 and 1957, but there were more

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professionals in the American group than in the groups of refugees who
were accepted by other countries. Among the 294 highly educatedprofessionals and scholars sampled, there were 58 medical doctors, 37
chemical experts, 34 lawyers and economists, 59 mechanics, 19 technicalresearchers, 16 electrical experts, 12 architectural experts, 12 mining
engineers, 6 physicists, and 3 biologists who were settled in the UnitedStates.46 Regarding the university and college students, an estimated 7,000,
or one fifth, of all Hungarian university and college students left Hungary in
1956. Approximately 1,800 of them went to the United States. Most of themhad completed their second or the third year of study in Hungary. A large
number of them were specializing in natural sciences, an area in which theUnited States had a critical personnel shortage.47
In the beginning of this migration, the US Labor Department’s Bureau of
Employment Security played an important role by sending a team to Vienna
to classify refugees by occupation and training.48 At Kilmer, the Labor
Department’s processing center, staffed mainly by volunteer workers, tried
to match as many men and women as possible to similar occupations as
those they held in Hungary. Special employment information was provided
to the doctors and the nurses who were refugees at Kilmer.49 The refugee
doctors who were MDs were instructed to allow immigrant doctors to gain
positions in American hospitals, since an approved internship in the UnitedStates was a prerequisite for several licensure examinations for graduatesfrom foreign medical schools. A procedure to find work, similar to what
NAS had for scientists, was established for physicians through the American
Medical Association.50
Hungarian refugee students of the natural sciences also received support.
Most of the refugee students received scholarships to continue their studies
from the governments of their host countries or from internationalorganizations, such as the World University Student Service (WUS) and theInstitute of International Education (IIE).51 From the beginning of theexodus from Hungary, American educational institutions and organizations
expressed their interest in helping Hungarian students. As a result, a
cooperative program was established to place Hungarian students in
American colleges and universities where scholarship opportunities wereavailable. A total of 1,288 students had registered with the integrated IIE/
WUS unit for scholarship placement by October 1, 1957.52
For training in English language, special centers were established andsupervised by the IIE, with financial support from the Ford Foundation, theRockefeller Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. The IIE-WUS

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joint committee spent $296,500 on the Hungarian program between
November 1956 and October 1, 1957.53 Thus, selective and substantial
subsidy support was provided not only to scientists but also to professionals
and students specializing in natural sciences by government agencies andinternational organizations with the financial support of philanthropic
institutions.
III. THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE AND VOLUNTARY AGENCIESThe voluntary agencies had a central position in the President’s
Committee to accept and support Hungarian refugees. They supported therefugees with the aid of local representatives and their networks. Hungarian
American organizations and individuals directly interacted with the
refugees, while other American citizens did volunteer work on each purpose.
As discussed, the activities of various organizations and individuals in the
United States were based on the liberal idea that progressive, benevolent,
unifying forces benefitted American society and brought prosperity to all
people.
VOLUNTARY AGENCIESThe voluntary agencies played a principal role in the reception andresettlement of Hungarian refugees. Their activities date back to World War
II. In 1944, the American Council of Voluntary Agencies was established by
the US government to work with the US Army in distributing supplies in
occupied areas.54 The administrator of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953
recognized American religious and voluntary welfare agencies asorganizations entitled to underwrite and endorse assurance of employment,
housing, and support provided by individual sponsors of refugees. They
were also recognized for this service in connection with the parole
procedure for Hungarian refugees. 55 The President’s Committee
acknowledged these supporting agencies as most qualified in the country toassist refugees in adjusting to a new way of life, spiritually, materially, andphysically.56
Many American volunteer organizations also went to Austria to support
the refugees and participated in the relief activities because they had priorexperience in refugee relief in Europe after World War II. When the refugee
exodus from Hungary began, the larger agencies expanded their overseas
staff in cities, including Salzburg, Vienna, and Linz, to receive refugees

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immediately after they crossed the border from Hungary and to supervise
preliminary processing before sending them to the United States. These
organizations respected Austrian sovereignty and refrained from interfering
in internal affairs; the acceptance of refugees and the official contact withthe refugees was the domain of the Austrian Ministry of the Interior. The
most important mission of these voluntary groups was to procure theappropriate material items for the refugees from Western Europe andsometimes from countries in Eastern Europe.57 The voluntary agencies
provided funds, food, medicines, hospital supplies, clothing, blankets,
bedding, and other necessities.58 They assisted in refugee resettlement
services, working closely with the US Escapee Program, which thegovernment started in April 1952 to assist escapees from Soviet-dominatedcountries in Eastern Europe, and international agencies such as theIntergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), theInternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),59 and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
These volunteer agencies stationed officers not only in Austria and at the
Kilmer Center but throughout the United States to maintain an orderly flowof refugees from Austria to American communities.60 Following government
examination and registration at the reception center, refugees would go totheir volunteer sponsoring agency. Most parolee refugees were notsponsored when they arrived at the Kilmer Center, in contrast to visa
refugees who were sponsored when they left Austria. The agencies that wereinvolved included Catholic, Jewish, and Lutheran religious denominations
as well as nonsectarian organizations such as the American Hungarian
Federation, the Tolstoy Foundation, and the United Ukrainian American
Relief Committee.
The large church agencies resettled refugees through their clergy and lay
workers in local American communities. Generally, it was the responsibilityof these local representatives to find housing and employment for the
refugees and to integrate them into the community. According to a document
at the Kilmer Center dated February 7, 1957, the total number of refugeesthat arrived was 24,404, and 22,558 of them were resettled by voluntaryagencies. The largest agency, the National Catholic Welfare Conference,
accepted the maximum number, 14,231 refugees, and resettled 13,026.61
The voluntary agencies were expected to support the refugees by
providing employment where they resettled. Vice President Nixon received
a letter from a refugee resettled in Cleveland, Ohio, who asked thePresident’s Committee for employment assistance.62 Nixon in replyUS HUNGARIAN REFUGEE POLICY, 1956–1957

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suggested that the person contact the local office of the United States
Employment Service accompanied by the local representative of the
National Catholic Welfare Conference, since they had assisted in the
person’s resettlement.
Indeed, when the President’s Committee received information thatrefugees remained unemployed after resettlement, they kept in close contact
with the supporting agencies and the Bureau of Employment Security, US
Department of Labor. For instance, the committee received information thatthe employment situation in Detroit, Michigan, had deteriorated in early
April 1957.63 Therefore, they inquired the various supporting agencies andthe Bureau of Employment Security concerning the unemployment situationin Detroit. In turn, the six supporting agencies queried their Detroit
representatives and reported the employment or unemployment situation to
the committee, mentioning the individual names of the accepted refugees.64
This case shows that the President’s Committee functioned effectively
during the resettlement process of refugees. When difficulties arose, thesupporting agencies worked with their local representatives to resettle
refugees.
According to reports from the supporting agencies, the network ofreligious denominations and kinship ties played an indispensable role inproviding employment for refugees. For instance, Catholic Relief Services
reported that twenty-five men were still being fed at their shelter but thatthey would be employed in Detroit shortly. Meanwhile, a small number of
Hungarian refugees who could not find work in Detroit moved to Florida.65
In addition, according to the report of the International Rescue Committee,
one Hungarian refugee who joined his relatives living in Detroit found a job;another, who initially stayed with his relatives in New York City, moved to
Detroit where his mother was living and found work assisting his father-inlaw.66 In this way, religious denominations and relatives arranged for theemployment of refugees and cared for them.
Hungarian American organizations played a complementary role to thesponsoring agencies. The Hungarian National Council organized acommittee to provide clothes, dictionaries, Hungarian newspapers, and otherliterature to the refugees.67 Besides material help, the Hungarian National
Council assisted refugees by giving them advice, moral support, and an
opportunity to unburden themselves of their apprehensions. The council also
assisted them in establishing contact with their close relatives or friends in
the United States. However, the council was not a sponsoring agency; allsponsors and employment offers received by the council had to be

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forwarded to the President’s Committee. The council believed that they
provided the most valuable help to the refugees since their entire staff
consisted of Hungarians who had escaped or left Hungary in the recent past
under similar circumstances as the refugees. Thus, they were in a position tounderstand and respond to their struggles better than almost anyone else.
VOLUNTEERS
Although the voluntary agencies were at the center of the President’s
Committee, it is worth noting that many citizens volunteered and supported
the Hungarian refugees through agencies or outside them. Volunteers
worked in various fields, collecting supplies for the voluntary agencies tosend to Austrian refugee camps, accepting and assisting resettlement at
Kilmer, and providing support for refugees living and working atresettlement destinations. The activities of volunteers across the country
enabled the efficient resettlement and rehabilitation of the refugees into newcommunities. It is necessary to explore the reason why many Americans
engaged in voluntary work supporting Hungarian refugees.
The documents of the President’s Committee contain the records oftwenty-nine offers of volunteer activities (thirty-one people) preserved in afolder titled “Job volunteers.”68 Although the sample is quantitatively
limited, it displays a certain trend as the materials discuss the motivations ofvolunteers.
Two of the offers were from organizations and twenty-seven fromindividuals. The two organizations involved female supporters of President
Eisenhower and the Republican Party. The gender ratio of individual
offerings was twenty-four men to five (three cases) women.
The diversity of motivations for volunteering demonstrates that American
society extensively supported the large number of Hungarian refugees. In
descending order, these were the people and their expressed motivations foroffering help: people of Hungarian descent who wanted to support theirfellow countrymen (four); administrators who wanted to use their expertisein New York or Washington, DC (three); members of the US military whowanted to share their experience gained during World War II (three); thosewith legal experience in international tribunals who wanted to offer practical
help (two); those with experience working in international refugee relief
organizations after World War II (two); those who were able to provide legal
advice (two); retired businessmen who wanted to share their businessexpertise (two); a Jewish labor organization that wanted to provide supportUS HUNGARIAN REFUGEE POLICY, 1956–1957

141(one); an international educator who wanted to use his experience (one); an
individual who wanted to criticize Communism (one); and those withunknown reasons (two).
It was characteristic of some male volunteers that they had served in the
military in World War II, while others offered their services based on theirexperience with refugee support in Europe immediately following the war.
For instance, there was a Jewish man who had been persecuted and deprivedof his job as a lawyer in Nazi Germany.69 He had fled as a refugee to theUnited States in the 1930s and engaged in intelligence activities for theUnited States government against Germany. After the end of the war, hetook part in the Nuremberg trials, where Nazi war criminals wereprosecuted. He desired to help the government because he sympathized with
the Hungarian refugees based on his own experiences during World War II.
He wished to contribute to the resolution of the refugee problem by using
his knowledge as an expert in international law and administration.
Similarly, men who engaged in the military occupations in Austria andOkinawa and lawyers who were involved in refugee relief after World War II
desired to use their expertise in supporting the Hungarian refugees. It should
be noted that their motivations for volunteering strongly reflected theirexperiences during World War II, even though it had ended more than adecade earlier.
A Hungarian man who was enthusiastic about voluntary work generally,
also volunteered because of his origins. Though he was already committed
to several volunteer activities, he now planned to use his day off andevenings after work for refugee support.70 He desired to renew the type ofvolunteer work he accomplished during the war and for which he hadreceived several commendations. Although he had a full-time job and was
raising four children, he wished to sacrifice his free time in volunteer
activities. His letter reveals his enthusiasm for volunteer activities and forparticipating in the government’s social policy.
The female volunteer applicants were few, and unlike the men, theirmotivations were ambiguous. Three women preferred to offer their talents
and efforts in practical support rather than monetary donations. The
motivations of the other two women were unknown. This does not indicate,however, that only a few women were interested in voluntary work for the
Hungarian refugees. For example, a Hungarian American woman played an
active role as an interpreter, providing support to Hungarian refugees in the
Hungarian American community of New Brunswick, New Jersey, close to
Kilmer.71

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A group of three secretaries from New York City wished to volunteer after
the end of their normal working day. The women criticized the bureaucratic
method of support for the refugees, that is, providing support only during
working hours, and claimed to be able to help in different ways, as follows:“We can devote our time from 6 p.m. We are willing to go around ringing
doorbells. Anything from the menial to the executive, and there arethousands like us, we will do.”72 Although the participation of women in
public affairs was not common in the 1950s, this letter expresses how
women had a strong awareness of making a social contribution. From thefact that the letter was written by three company colleagues, it can beunderstood that the Hungarian refugee issue was an important topic ofdiscussion among American women and that they had a strong motivationfor volunteer work.
The female political groups offered to do volunteer work while the malepolitical group did not, although the female group was small. The female
political groups apparently assumed that women made their international
contribution through refugee support. The National Federation of
Republican Women offered to do volunteer work for Hungarian refugees.
This organization had four thousand clubs across the country that
implemented a program for Ike Day, which memorialized General
Eisenhower’s launch of Operation Overlord, the code name for theliberation of Western Europe and the invasion of Germany on June 6, 1944.
A woman who wrote the following letter participated in a project organizedby the Women’s Division of the Labor Department to bring women fromother countries to the United States and to encourage understanding among
nations. The letter talks about her strong interest in international affairs:“Like many other Americans I feel we have a great deal at stake in thehuman facets of this present international situation. I would like tocontribute in some way to the resolving of those problems.”73
CONCLUSION
In this article I have explored how the United States was able to accept avast number of Hungarian refugees between 1956 and 1957, paying
attention to the roles and motivations of various institutions in the UnitedStates for accepting and supporting the refugees. The acceptance andsupport of the Hungarian refugees united the government and various
institutions based on liberalism. This cooperation made it possible for theUnited States to accept so many Hungarian refugees in a short period.

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143

In the system of cooperation that was developed, each organization andindividual fulfilled the following functions for the reception and resettlementof the Hungarian refugees in the United States. First, the Eisenhoweradministration adopted an internationalist foreign policy for the Hungarian
refugees, which regarded refugees as human resources for the nation todemonstrate American economic and cultural superiority over the Soviet
Union and over Communism. The government established a special
committee that organized and utilized volunteer organizations for refugee
relief and through them acquired personal, material, and financial resources
for accepting and resettling the refugees. Under the liberal refugee policy,
the Eisenhower administration used centralized state power to ensure thecooperation of various groups and encouraged them to regard themselves as
collaborating with the government to accelerate prosperity in American
society.
Second, the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation led inselective acceptance for scientists by means of their political influence; they
funded the English education of refugee students whose majors were in thenatural sciences. They engaged in public diplomacy to expand American
influence with the financial power of the foundations and their mothercompanies and followed the diplomatic and domestic policies of theEisenhower administration during the Cold War. Their internationalism andtheir desire to expand business were consistent with the Eisenhower refugee
policy and formed the liberal consensus with the government.
Third, various volunteer agencies were centrally situated in the
President’s Committee to accept and support Hungarian refugees and tocooperate with the government’s liberal refugee policy. They supported therefugees transnationally or locally in their transition from Austria to
American communities, with the purpose of expanding their organizational
networks and influence internationally, domestically, and locally. Networksof religious denominations and kinship ties played an indispensable role inproviding employment for refugees. Members of Hungarian American
communities played a complementary role to the sponsoring agencies andassisted refugees by giving them advice and moral support.
Fourth, US citizens who individually participated in volunteer activities
were indispensable for accepting such a large number of refugees into
American society. US citizens had the opportunity to address a humanitarian
issue and utilize their experiences in light of the government’s policy. Whilevolunteer activities are commonplace in American society, especiallythrough religious organizations and ethnic communities, many desired to144

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participate in volunteer activities specifically targeted at the Hungarian
refugees, based on their individual experiences during the war, theirprofessional expertise, and a strong awareness of wanting to make a social
contribution. Their enthusiasm might indicate that US citizens began toacquire an internationalist perspective by supporting refugees andparticipating in the government’s liberal refugee policy.
In this article there is not room to include what happened to the
Hungarian refugees after their resettlement in American society. For
instance, the Hungarian refugee students set up a student organization to
support the movement against the Communist regime in Hungary. Further
investigation is necessary to clarify the impact of American society on themin the late 1950s.
NOTES
The US government regarded the Hungarian revolution as placing the United States in an
uncomfortable and embarrassing position, as it heightened global tension. Ronald R. Krebs,
Dueling Visions: U.S. Strategy toward Eastern Europe under Eisenhower (College Station:
Texas A & M University Press, 2001), 34. For US foreign policy in Eastern Europe in the
1950s and the Hungarian revolution of 1956, see Krebs, Dueling Visions; Alex vonTunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary and the Crisis That Shook the World (London:
Simon & Schuster, 2016); David A. Nichols, Eisenhower 1956: The President’s Year of
Crisis—Suez and the Brink of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011); Robert R. Bowie
and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War
Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
2
Of European countries, England accepted 20,660 Hungarian refugees; West Germany
took in 14,310; Switzerland welcomed 12,130; and France received 10,240. Outside ofEurope, only Australia, with 9,743 refugees, the United States, with 41,000, and Canada, with
37,000, took in more than 5,000. Peter Gatrell, Free World? The Campaign to Save theWorld’s Refugees: 1956–1963 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 50–51.
3
The President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief at Joyce Kilmer Reception
Center, Kilmer, NJ, A Manual of the Policies and Procedures Followed in Connection with
Hungarian Refugee Resettlement, B-7, box 7, U.S. President’s Committee for Hungarian
Refugee Relief, Records, 1957, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter DDEL).
4“White House Statement on the Termination of the Emergency Program for Hungarian
Refugees, December 28, 1957,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States,
Dwight D. Eisenhower: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the
President, January 1 to December 31, 1957 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing
Office, 1958), 850–52. According to Cnossen, who estimated the number of Hungarian
refugees at a higher number than others, approximately 41,000 arrived in United States and37,000 in Canada. T. Cnossen, “Integration of Refugees: Some Observations on the
Hungarians in Canada,” in supplement 7 REMP Bulletin, Research Group for European
Migration Problems (July 1964): 6.
5
The President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief at Joyce Kilmer Reception
Center, Kilmer, NJ, A Manual of the Policies and Procedures, B-7, B-8, box 7, DDEL.
6
Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half1

US HUNGARIAN REFUGEE POLICY, 1956–1957

145

Open Door, 1945 to the Present (New York: Free Press, 1998), 55; Carl J. Bon Tempo,
Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2008), 45.
7
Arthur A. Markowitz, “Humanitarianism versus Restrictionism: The United States and the
Hungarian Refugees,” International Migration Review 7, no. 1 (Spring 1973): 47–48. doi:
10.2307/3002493.
8
Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 73.
9Francis E. Walter coauthored the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952.
10
Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 2, 218; Markowitz, “Humanitarianism
versus Restrictionism,” 52.
11
Folders of the President, Letters Received 1–3 [principally letters from the public
expressing opposition to Hungarian Immigration], box 8, DDEL.
12Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate, 3, 8, 60.
13Ibid., 75–85.
14
Jennifer A. Delton, Rethinking the 1950s: How Anticommunism and the Cold War Made
America Liberal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5.
15
Ibid., 10.
16
Pomogáts Béla, 1956 egyetemisták a forradalomban (Budapest: Littera Nova Kiadó,
2006).
17
Lee Congdon, Béla K. Király, and Károly Nagy, eds., 1956: The Hungarian Revolution
and War for Independence (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs and Atlantic Researchand Publications, 2006), 243–310.
18
This statistic was disclosed after 1989. KSH (Központi Statisztikal Hivatal, the Hungarian
Central Statistical Office) jelentés az 1956-os disszidálásról, “Az illegálisan külföldre
távozott személyek főbb adatai (1956. október 23.-1957. április 30.),” Regió 2, no. 4 (1991).
19
Report of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) on the
Hungarian Refugee Situation, December 31, 1957 (Austria: ICEM).
20
Julianna Puskás investigated the UN reports that contained interviews with Hungarian
refugees. Puskás, Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide: 100 Years of Hungarian Experience in the
United States (New York: Holmes and Meier, 2000), 273–76.
21
Sós Péter János, Magyar Exodus: Magyar menekültek Nyugaton 1956–1959 (Budapest:
Gondolat Kiadó, 2005), 77–78.
22
The Voice of America was founded in 1942 by the US government to exert political andcultural influence on foreign countries as a propaganda organ. Alan L. Heil, Voice ofAmerica: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). Radio Free Europe wasfounded in 1949 by the US government and during the Cold War broadcasted exile
statements and anti-Communist propaganda to the Soviet satellites. Vajda Barnabás, Egy
szabad hang Kelet-Európában: A Szabad Európa Rádió tevékenységéről a hidegháború alatt(Dunaszerdahely, Hungary: Nap, 2011); Loescher and Scanlan, Calculated Kindness, 33.
23“Statement by President Eisenhower on Hungarian Refugees, November 8, 1956,” inPublic Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Containing the
Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1 to December 31,
1956 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1958), 1093.
24
Function of the President’s Committee, Outline of the Organization and Work of the
President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief in Assisting in Resettlement of
Hungarian Refugees, January 7, 1957, box 2, DDEL.
25
The President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief at Joyce Kilmer Reception
Center, Kilmer, NJ, A Manual of the Policies, box 7, DDEL.
26
Ibid.
27
Personnel Summary, The President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief, Kilmer

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AKIYO YAMAMOTO

Office, box 2, DDEL.
28
Wallace W. Atwood and M. H. Trytten, The Academy’s Role in the Hungarian Scientists’Fight for Freedom, repr. from News Report 7, no. 3, (May–June, 1957): 37.
29
Tracy S. Voorhees wrote the letter to D. W. Bronk, president of the National Academy of
Sciences, stating that Weiss had informed him that there were many scientist refugees inAustria. March 8, 1957, box 6, DDEL.
30
Atwood and Trytten, Fight for Freedom, 37–38.
31
Sós, Magyar Exodus, 83.
32
Olivier Zunz, Philanthropy in America: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press,2012), 137–49; Kenneth Alan Osgood, ed., The United States and Public Diplomacy: New
Direction in Cultural and International History (Leiden, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff,2010).
33
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, The Mid-Century Challenge to U.S. Foreign Policy: Panel
Report of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, America at Mid Century
Series, Special Studies Report 1 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959), 37, 41.
34
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Foreign Economic Policy for the Twentieth Century: Panel
Report of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, America at Mid Century
Series, Special Studies Report 3 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958), 209.
35
Immediately after the project report was published, the Soviet Union preceded the UnitedStates in the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and the successful
launch of an artificial satellite, Sputnik, in 1957, reinforcing the importance of promoting andimplementing rigorous scientific education to win the Cold War. Rockefeller Brothers Fund,
The Pursuit of Excellence in Education and the Future of America: Panel Report of theRockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, America at Mid Century Series, Special
Studies Report 5 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958), 368–69.
36
They had the most advanced university training, for instance at the Technical University
and the Eötvös Loránd University.
37
Volker R. Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone
between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2001), 145.
38
Ibid., 178.
39
Ibid., 183.
40
Ibid., 184–87.
41
Laura Gousha, “‘Extraordinary Measures’: The Funding of Hungarian Refugee Students
by the Rockefeller Foundations, 1956–1958” (master’s thesis, Central European University,
Budapest, 2011), 3, 36.
42
Ibid., 38.
43
Ibid., 39.
44
The Rockefeller Foundation provided $600,000 for this purpose to Hungarian scientists,
scholars, and artists. “Rockefeller Fund Aiding Hungarians,” New York Times, December 8,
1956, 3.
45
“Special Message to the Congress on Immigration Matters, January 31, 1957”, in Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1957, 110–17.
46
Sós, Magyar Exodus, 84–85.
47
Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, Hungarian Refugee Students and U.S.
Colleges and Universities: One Year Later (February 1957–January 1958) (New York:
1957–58).
48
Markowitz, “Humanitarianism versus Restrictionism,” 49.
49
Office of the Surgeon, The President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief at Joyce
Kilmer Reception Center, A Manual of the Policies, box 7, DDEL.

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147

50
Meeting, Friday, December 21, 1956, President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee
Relief, box 2, DDEL.
51
The World University Student Service was founded in 1920 to meet the needs ofinternational students and academics. The Institute of International Education (IIE) wasestablished in 1919 by Nobel Peace Prize winners Nicholas Murray Butler, president ofColumbia University; Elihu Root, former Secretary of State; and Stephen Duggan, Sr.,
professor of political science at the College of the City of New York.
52
Hungarian Refugee Students and U.S. Colleges and Universities, 2–3, 18.
53
The United States President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief, Report to the
President (May 14, 1957) (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1957), 6.
54
Zunz, Philanthropy in America, 142.
55
From James L. Hennessy, Executive Assistant to the Commissioner, to General J. Lawton
Collins, Vice Chairman and Director, The President’s Committee, 56363/809 Pt. 2, box 2,
DDEL.
56
Public Information Section, President’s Committee, February 11, 1957, “Here is the storyof the program for Hungarian refugee relief as it happened at the Joyce Kilmer Reception
Center,” box 2, DDEL.
57
Sós, Magyar Exodus, 38–43.
58
Outline of Activities of Various Countries and Agencies assisting Hungarian Refugees,
November 26, 1956, box 2, DDEL.
59
The International Committee of the Red Cross participated in refugee relief action incooperation with local Red Cross organizations. League of Red Cross Societies, Hungarian
Refugee Relief: Report on the Relief Measures for Hungarian Refugees Undertaken by the
League and Member National Societies in Austria, Yugoslavia, and Countries of Transit andResettlement, October 1956–September 1957 (Geneva: League of Red Cross Societies,1957); International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on Relief Action in Hungary,
October 1956–June 1957 (Geneva, 1957).
60
Outline of Activities of Various Countries and Agencies Assisting Hungarian Refugees,
November 26, 1956, 20, box 2, DDEL.
61
Ibid., 21.
62
Draft, March 25, 1957, From Richard Nixon, to Dr. Julius Szentendrey, box 2, DDEL.
63
From Harry Tyson Carter, Assistant to the Chairman, to A. W. Motley, Assistant Director,
Bureau of Employment of Labor, April 18, 1957, box 11, DDEL.
64
The letters from the Lutheran Refugee Service, the United Ukrainian American Relief
Committee, the United HIAS Service, the International Rescue Committee, the Catholic
Relief Service, and the Church World Service, from April 25, 1957, to May 8, 1957, box 11,
DDEL.
65
From Edward E. Swanstrom, Executive Director, Resettlement Division of the Catholic
Relief Service, to Tracy S. Voorhees, Chairman, The President’s Committee for Hungarian
Refugee Relief, May 6, 1957, box 11, DDEL.
66
From Charles Sternberg, Director, Case Department of the International Rescue
Committee, to Tracy S. Voorhees, Chairman, The President’s Committee for Hungarian
Refugee Relief, May 2, 1957, box 11, DDEL.
67
The President’s Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief at the Joyce Kilmer Reception
Center, Kilmer, NJ, A Manual of the Policies and Procedures, G-6, box 7, DDEL.
68
Folder: Job volunteers, box 2, DDEL.
69
From Robert M. W. Kempner, to Scott McLeod, Administrator, Bureau of Security andConsular Affairs, Thanksgiving Day, 1956, box 2, DDEL.
70
From Frank Szekely, to Tracy S. Voorhees, December 3, 1956, box 2, DDEL.
71
Sós, Magyar Exodus, 89–93.

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72
From Ingrid Helen Coleman, Helen Johnson, and Rita C. Thompson, to Mr. Tracy S.
Voorhees, December 15, 1956, box 2, DDEL.
73
From Louise Gore, National Federation of Republican Women, to Mr. Tracy S. Voorhees,
December 1, 1956, box 2, DDEL.