RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56

RECENT INNOVATIONS IN TACKLING CORRUPTION IN THE
CIVIL SERVICES IN INDIA
R. K. Raghavan*
I. BACKGROUND
A generally accepted historical fact isthat, like human deviance, humaningenuity has not known its limits. The
cruellest crime is also often the mostbizarre. Deviant behaviour, for their own
benefit, by those entrusted with the taskof rendering service to the community,
loosely called ‘corruption’, is a malaise thathas afflicted even ancient society, although
its dimensions and ramifications havevaried with time. The Indian subcontinent
is no exception. For instance, the classic
treatise Arthasashtra by Kautilya in the
4th Century B.C gives a lucid account ofcorruption as it prevailed in the Mauryan
administration. Indian history ofsubsequent times is also replete withgraphic accounts of official misconduct. In
this context, we know that just as many
forms of social control have sought torestrain individual proclivity to deviance.
Civilized and democratic governments
have found it necessary to regulate theconduct of their civil servants in different
ways, so that there is no dilution of the
major objective of a free and fair deliveryof service to the common citizen.
The Central Bureau of Investigation(CBI) of India, a pre-eminent federal
investigating agency, deals not only with
anti-corruption matters but major
conventional and economic crime as well.
Founded under the name Special Police
Establishment (SPE), it was primarily
intended to look into cases of corruption
involving the handling of federal* Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, New
Delhi, India.

378

government funds by federal civil servants,
starting with World War II, when large
military and naval contracts were awarded
and there was a need to keep a vigilant eye
on public expenditure. The Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act, promulgated in
1946, lends statutory backing to the CBI,
which acquired its present nomenclaturein 1963.1
The birth of the CBI itself was a sequelto the report of the Committee on
Prevention of Corruption (popularly known
as the Santhanam Committee after its
distinguished Chairman who was a former
Minister and Member of IndianParliament) set up in 1962 inter alia withthe following terms of reference:(i) to suggest measures calculated to
produce a social climate both
amongst public servants and in thegeneral public in which bribery andcorruption may not flourish; and(ii) to suggest steps for securing public
support for anti-corruption measures.
In the first of its two reports submitted
in 1963, the Santhanam Committee sought
the creation of a Central VigilanceCommission headed by a Central VigilanceCommissioner (CVC) with considerable
autonomy and status so as to consolidate
1

Legal support to anti-corruption work wasstrengthened in 1947 with the enactment of thePrevention of Corruption Act, that was replaced bya more Draconian legislation of the same name in1988, which considerably expanded the definitionof ‘public servant’.

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
the fragmented anti-corruption work thatwas being performed by the various
Ministries of the federal government. In
the Committee’s view, the two main tasksof the CVC were:(i) p r e v e n t i o n o f c o r r u p t i o n a n dmaintenance of integrity; and(ii) ensuring just and fair exercise ofadministrative powers vested invarious authorities by statutory rules
or by non-statutory executive orders.
The CVC has been performing an
exemplary advisory role since 1963,
although there is a school of thought that
the Commission could have been more
effective had it been given legal authority
under a parliamentary statute. Sensitive
possibly to this point of view, the Supreme
Court of India, in the celebrated Vineet
Narain case (1998), issued many directives
regarding the selection and appointmentof the CVC and the Director of the CBI.
For the first time, the Director of the CBI
was to be given a minimum tenure of two
years in office. The Court also vested thesuperintendence of the CBI in the CVC.
While the two functionaries have been
appointed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Court, a bill conferring
statutory authority on the CVC is pending
in Parliament.
The CBI is the sword-arm of the federal
government for investigating corruptionrelated cases. But the fight against
corruption is also carried on by a system of
Vigilance Officers headed by a Chief
Vi g i l a n c e O f f i c e r ( C V O ) i n e a c h
g o v e r n m e n t m i n i s t r y, a s w e l l a s
government-owned Public Sector
Undertakings (PSUs). Preventive
vigilance throughout the country is
exercised through these CVOs who are
expected to scrutinize major contracts
entered into by the departments/

undertakings concerned, and also conduct
vigilance checks on erring employees. The
efficacy of CVOs can be argued, but the fact
remains that internal vigilance has
contributed to a significantly lower rate ofcorruption than countries which do nothave this system. ‘Agreed Lists’ of civil
servants who had come to adverse notice
are also maintained both by the CBI andthe departments. These serve as a guidefor career advancement and for placing
them in positions which offer minimum
opportunity for indulging in corruption.
In addition, every state - there are 25 inIndia - has its own Anti-Crruption Bureau(ACB), manned by police officers andheaded by the Director-General of Police,that looks into the conduct and affairs ofstate government employees. The
Vigilance Commissioner of each stateoversees the ACB’s work and obtains
government sanctions for prosecuting
government officers at various levels before
the courts of law.
II. DIMENSIONS OF THE
PROBLEM
The high level of corruption in publicestablishments has been a matter of great
concern to successive governments. There
are indications that the ill is all pervasive,
and afflicts even those who have theauthority to take crucial decisions
involving large sums of publc money.
Transparency International, which ranks
countries on the basis of a Corruption
Perception Index, in its last report, put
India in 68th place. Statistics from Crimein India 1997, an official publication of the
National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB)
functioning under the Ministry of Home
Affairs (MHA), are illustrative, though only
partially, of the situation (Annexures A and
B).

379

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
III. MECHANICS OF ANTICORRUPTION WORK IN INDIA
Anti-corruption organizations in India
generally adopt two means to combat theevil. Whenever they suspect corruption,or have received a definite report of an
instance of corruption in a government
agency, they initially opt for a Preliminary
Enquiry (PE) or a Detailed Enquiry (DE),as it is called in a few states. This is apurely administrative action aimed atunearthing more facts than are available.
While there is no statutory provision for
this, courts have countenanced this asadmissible preparatory work before
launching action under the Prevention of
Corruption Act. Once the PE or DE
concludes that, prima facie, the facts
collected make out an offence under thePrevention of Corruption Act, a Regular
Case (RC) is registered under the Act anda full-fledged investigation, as set out in
the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr. PC) 1973,
is launched. Where material unearthed isinsufficient for an RC, a report is sent to
the head of the government department
concerned for such appropriate action,
including proceedings under disciplinary
rules which may or may not result in a
penalty (such as censure, removal,
dismissal or reduction in salary or rank),
depending on the evidence adduced in adomestic enquiry. There are tribunals
available to handle these enquiries.
A direct manner in which brazen acts ofcorruption are tackled is to trap a public
servant while accepting money or any othervaluable security from a member of the
public. Courts have prescribed certain
safeguards, such as obtaining a written
complaint from the aggrieved citizen fromwhom money had been demanded by acorrupt public servant, before a trap is laid.
This is done with a view to eliminating
frivolous and motivated complaints that
could demoralize the civil services. Traps

380

have often proved effective in bringing tobook errant government officials, provided
the procedure recognised by the courts isadhered to rigidly.
IV. SOME RECENT INNOVATIONS
A. Elimination of Loopholes in theAnti-graft Law
In contrast to the expression ‘civil
servant’, we in India use the word ‘public
servant’. In earlier years, this term wasmeant to include only civil servants, butvarious court-based interpretations of law
have brought within its ambit politicalfigures and elected representatives ofLegislatures who are also being prosecuted
under the corruption laws in our country.
Indeed, the definition of public servant has
been enlarged to such on extent that except
for employees of voluntary agencies,
anybody who receives a salary fromgovernment or quasi-government bodies
and works in the public interest is deemed
to be a ‘public servant’ and can beprosecuted for criminal acts of negligence.
A very significant move against corrupt
public servants has been the inclusion of aclause in the Prevention of Corruption Act
1988 which makes it criminally negligent
for a civil servant or public servant to cause
loss to the government or the state by anapparently wrong decision, even though heor she may not benefit from it directly.
Thus, awarding contracts without
following proper procedures, wastefulschemes and other items of expenditureand delayed projects could come under theambit of this clause, and usually it ispossible to prove that the civil servant(public servant) entered into collusive
conspiracy with non-government officials
to cause loss to the government. The
rationale is that in a developing country
like India, where public finances aregathered by taxing people who are not very
well-off, it is important to safeguard the113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
use and distribution of public funds.
The CVC has also been active in the areaof tightening law and procedure with a viewto enhancing the deterrence of anticorruption measures in the country. Twosignificant moves by the Commission are
worthy of mention here. One is the request
to the government to notify under the
Benami Transactions Prohibition Act 1988,
how to confiscate benami property (that is,property held by a person in the name ofanother in an attempt to conceal his/her
ill-gotten wealth) and also how to empower
the CVC in this connection. Secondly, theCVC has forwarded to the Government for
its acceptance a draft legislation called the
Corrupt Public Servants (Forfeiture of
Property) Act, prepared by the Law
Commission of India.
These
recommendations, if accepted by theGovernment, are expected to give a newthrust to the battle against corruption in
the civil services.
B. Grant of Autonomy to the CBIA traditional criticism of the CBI is that
it is toothless in respect of corruption inhigh places, and that it usually goes after
only the ‘small fish’. There was some
substance to this charge till a few years ago,because of the so-called single directive
issued by the Federal Government, which
required the CBI to secure the clearanceof the Government before launchinginvestigations against senior bureaucrats.
There were in fact delays in a few instances
in issuing such a clearance. The Supreme
Court of India, in the already cited Vineet
Narain case, struck down this directive inan obvious effort to streamline anticorruption work and confer greater
autonomy on the country’s most crucial
anti-graft agency. Under the newdispensation, the CBI is free to register
regular cases, even against top civil
servants, without being bogged down by
red tape. This has given a new dimension

altogether to the fight against corruption
in high places, and accounts for the large
number of investigations started lately by
the CBI against very highly placed officials.
C. Induction of Specialists
The CBI and State ACBs are now
assisted by technical and specialised staff
who advise them in the course ofinvestigation, particularly in respect ofcomplex issues of taxation, excise andrelated matters, as well as banking
procedures. Indeed, in the recent past, theReserve Bank of India had set up a
Banking Advisory Board to assist the CBI.
This board examines apparent
irregularities committed by bank officials
which are brought up for its scrutiny, andidentifies instances of grave criminal
misconduct pointing to malafide, so thatthese are considered by the CBI for
appropriate legal action. The point at issue
is that banking decisions cannot be equatedwith routine civil servants’ decisions, andare attended by a degree of commercial risk
which such a board alone can notappreciate before offering an opinion onwhether a detailed criminal investigationby the CBI is warranted.
D. Use of Computers
The quality of anti-corruption work by
the CBI and similar agencies in the stateshas been markedly improved through theuse of computers. Investigators areencouraged to use computers formaintaining their day-to-day records. As
a result, the load of scriptory work has comedown appreciably, saving precious
investigation time. Also, the review of casepending by supervisory officers has become
easier, so that investigators are driven hardto speed up their work. It should be
mentioned here that a major charge, onethat is not without substance, against the
CBI and the ACBs is that theirinvestigations take enormous time, making
their final action pointless.

381

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
Computerisation has contributed at least
a little to taking care of this charge,
although a lot more speed is still definitely
called for.
One positive step is the CBI decision tocreate a website for itself. It offers a wide
spectrum of information on several aspectsof the agency’s work, making it moretransparent and people-friendly. There
have already been more than 15000 visitors
to the site in the year during which it has
been operational. The latest decision toincorporate a ‘Contact Us’ module in thewebsite offers hope that the public will be
encouraged to pass on information on
corruption in the civil service without fearof harassment or their identity being
exposed.
E. The Role of the Central VigilanceCommission
The Central Vigilance Commission(CVC) in its reconstituted version is amulti-member body. At present, apart fromi t s c h a i r m a n ( C e n t r a l Vi g i l a n c eCommissioner), there is one more member,
who is a retired senior police officer. Thereis provision for a few more members tobring in the required wide-spectrum
expertise. A bill outlining its compositionand powers is pending before the SelectCommittee of Parliament. As per theSupreme Court directive and the earlier
ordinance (since expired) issued to giveeffect to the court directive, the CVC was
to exercise powers of superintendence over
the CBI. This provision was intended togive needed insularity to the CBI fromextraneous pressures in its investigative
work. At the same time, this mechanism
was expected to act as a check on possible
abuse of authority by CBI functionaries.
This new experiment has a lot to commend
for itself.
In specific terms, the CVC is yet anotherforum for the common person to bring their382

complaint of corruption to the attention of
the appropriate department of theGovernment, or by the CBI itself througha preliminary enquiry, or by registrationof a Regular Case (RC). This function of
the CVC enlarges the network of
information available to the CBI and
thereby helps to broaden its operations.
Moreover, it lends certain credibility andquality to information that requires CBIverification, because the CVC officer
applies their mind to such information
before passing it on to the CBI.
One more feature of the CVC thatsharpens anti-corruption work is thediscussions that the Commission holdswith CBI investigators on select cases
referred to it by the government for advice.
On such occasions, the CBI officials will
have to justify their conclusions in an
investigation, or else the recommendation(either for prosecution of a civil servant incourt, their arraignment before adepartmental enquiry authority or for
closure of a case for want of sufficientevidence) could be overturned by the CVC
while forwarding its own recommendation
to the government. This procedure assuresthat a CBI investigator will have to be
objective and thorough in theirinvestigation, and that only quality cases
are pursued for action. In my view, thisenhances both CBI performance andaccountability.
F. Transparency in Anti-CorruptionWork
The CVC has its own website that packs
a lot of information on the crusade against
corruption. The site has recently posted
the names of senior civil servants who havecome to the adverse notice of theCommission. This action has generated an
animated public debate and has received
wide media attention. The CVC has also
directed all federal government offices todisplay prominently a board to the effect:

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS“DO NOT PAY A BRIBE. IF ANYBODYASKS FOR A BRIBE, COMPLAIN TO
THE CVO/CVC”. This is a novel
experiment that aims at exerting
considerable psychological pressure bothon the bribe-taker and the bribe-giver. It
further seeks to empower the publicthrough transparency.
G. Mobilising Public Opinion
The CVC’s focus on building public
opinion in favour of rooting out corruption
in the services is gratifying. Throughlectures to a cross-section of the public, theCVC has been spreading the message thatwithout the community’s active
cooperation, no anti-corruption campaign
can succeed. An attempt has been made to
involve the youth and the NonGovernmental Organizations (NGOs) inthe country in this endeavour. An appeal
has been made to draw on the support ofbodies such as the Confederation of Indian
Industry (CII), Federation of Indian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry(FICCI) etc, which represent the private
sector, the quality of whose interaction withthe civil service at all levels is crucial totackling corruption in government.
V. THE FUTURE
The future of anti-corruption work in
India is directly linked to the role ofgovernment in the lives of people. If thisshrinks, as it is expected to in India, thescope for corruption by public servants
should correspondingly minimize, although
new forms of deviance could emerge. In
the context of the government’s focus on
privatisation and globalisation, there is adefinite prospect of the average civil
servant having much less say in economic
decision making. This could greatly affect
the quantum of corruption. Nevertheless,for the present, this is a knotty problem
that requires dexterous handling by thoseheading the administration in India.

Several experiments in the past have
proved only modestly effective. As a result,in the language of the CVC, corruption has
become “a high profit, low risk” enterprisein the country. More than anything, there
appears to be a need to tackle the mindset
that has, over the years, afflicted theadministrative culture and placed apremium on sloth and lack of objectivity.
It is widely believed that new measures,such as according statutory status to the
CVC through suitable legislation; greater
autonomy to the CBI, including a minimum
tenure for its Director, and mobilising
NGOs and the youth in building popular
opinion against administrative corruption,
could pay rich dividends in course of time.
There is the hope that there will be
increased judicial support of these newstrategies.
REFERENCES
1. Government of India (1963), Report of
the Committee on the Prevention of
Corruption.
2. National Crime Records Bureau (1999),
Crime in India 1997.
3. The Prevention of Corruption Acts 1947
and 1988.
4. The Criminal Procedure Code 1973.
5. Vittal, N. (1999), ‘Corruption as the
AIDS of the Society’ in Economic Times,
New Delhi, dated May 24.
6. Vittal, N. (1999), ‘The Corruption
Perception Index’, Economic Times,
New Delhi, dated November 18.
7. Vittal, N. (1999), ‘The Supply Side ofCorruption’, Economic Times, New
Delhi, December.

383

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
ANNEXURE A
STATEMENT OF COGNIZABLE CRIMES REGISTERED, AND THEIRDISPOSAL BY ANTI-CORRUPTION AND VIGILANCE DEPARTMENTS OF
STATES AND UTS UNDER THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT AND
RELATED SECTIONS OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE DURING 1997

Pending investigation from previous year
Cases registered during the year
Total cases for investigation
Cases investigatedCases not investigated or investigation dropped
Cases transferred to local police
Cases declared false etc during the year
Cases charge sheeted
Cases pending dept. sanction for prosecution
Cases sent for trial and also reported for dept. action
Cases reported for regular dept. action
Cases reported for suitable action
Cases in which charge sheet was not laid
but final report submittedCases pending investigation at end of year
Cases resulted in recovery or seizure
Value of property recovered/seized (in Rs.’000)
Percentage of cases charge sheeted tototal cases investigatedCases pending trial from the previous year
Cases sent for trial during the year
Total cases for trial
Cases withdrawn/discharged or otherwise disposed of
Trials completed during the year
Cases convictedCases acquitted or discharged
Pending trial at the end of year
Percentage of cases convicted to trials completed
Total amount of fine imposed during
the year (in Rs.’000)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

3972
2788
6722
5486
335
23
95
1586
1000
657
124
31
400

14
15
16
17

4573
257178149369
28.9%

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

8019
1766
9371
60
875
296
603
8569
33.8%
5751

(Source: Crime in India 1997, National Crime Records Bureau, New Delhi).

384

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
ANNEXURE B
STATEMENT OF PERSONS ARRESTED IN COGNIZABLE CRIME CASESUNDER THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT AND RELATEDSECTIONS OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE IN STATES & UTS DURING 1997

Persons in custody/bail during investigation
at beginning of year
Persons arrested during the year
Persons released by police/court before trial
Persons in custody/bail during investigation
at end of year
Persons in whose cases charge sheets were laid
Persons under trial at beginning of year
Total persons under trial
No. of cases withdrawn or otherwise disposed of
Persons in custody/bail during trial at end of year
Persons in whose cases trial was completed
Persons convicted
Persons acquitted
Percentage of persons convicted to trials completed
Persons reported for regualar dept. action
Persons reported for suitable action
Persons punished departmentally• Dismissed from service• Removed from service• Awarded other major punishment• Awarded minor punishment
Gazetted or equal status officers involvedin public undertakings• Group A officers• Group B officers
Non-gazetted or equal status officers involvedin government or public undertaking
Private persons involved

1

3798

2
3
4

3603
226
3853

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

27732
12825
1416
588
12573
1047
355
733
33.9%
212
163

16
17
18
19

9
3
53
64

20
21
22

185
266
2568

23

493

(Source: Crime in India 1997, National Crime Records Bureau, New Delhi).

385