A Report on the Formulated Generic Set of Fundamentals based on
Good Practices on the Implementation of the Additional Protocol
Member Countries - Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA)
Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project

INTRODUCTION
The ratification of the Protocol Additional (AP) to the safeguards agreement had
involved some changes in the Asian countries’ resource infrastructures. These changes
are necessary to ensure adherence to the respective State’s obligations andcommitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Member Statesof the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA) under its Nuclear Security and
Safeguards Project (NSSP), had undertaken a 3-year plan (2017-2019) with the task offormulating a generic set of fundamentals on the AP implementation. Since the nuclear
fuel cycle characteristics of the Asian countries involved in the project are quite
different in several aspects, these entail a diverse strategy in resource infrastructuredevelopment. Thus, formulating a generic set of fundamentals based on good practices
would be beneficial not only among the project members but also to all countries whichhave ratified and those intending to ratify the AP.
This report describes good practices and the different approaches the country may
implement toward achieving the same objectives. The generic set of fundamentals are
based on the States’ experiences and their respective good practices, including lessons
learned, following the requirements stipulated in the articles of the AP. Two surveys
were conducted. The first survey in the last quarter of 2017, involved a template
requesting information on a general context. However, the second survey in the second
quarter of 2019, was focused on export/import. The participating countries wererequested to provide the information and to describe what has been implemented or stillin the process to meet the requirements of the AP.
The members of the NSSP include Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Viet Nam. It
was decided and agreed, among the members, that each country will randomly be
assigned a letter from A to J to keep the confidentiality of the information.
The formulated generic set of fundamentals, relevant and important in achieving therequirements and the safeguards (SG) technical objectives of the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA) with the AP implementation are as follows:1.

Provision of Information
The scope of the information required under the safeguards agreement with an AP
is intended to provide the IAEA with a complete picture and a better understanding of
the nuclear activities in a State. The information will lead to the State’s increasedtransparency allowing the IAEA to confirm with a high degree of confidence theabsence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The good practices on theprovision of information are further categorized according to the following:a. Collection of Declarationb. Preparation of Declarationc. Reporting and Submission of Declaration
2.

Complementary Access (CA)The AP provides the IAEA with expanded rights of access to information and sites,
including any other location where nuclear material is or may be present.
Complementary access provides the IAEA the assurance of the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and nuclear-related activities, or to resolve any questions orinconsistencies in the State’s declarations.
The good practices on the CA
implementation are further categorized according to the following:a. Handling of Advance Notificationb. Conduct of CA
c. Documentation of CA
3.

Designation of Agency (IAEA) Inspectors
The acceptance by the Member States of the simplified procedures for designationsof inspectors under the AP contributes to strengthening the effective and efficient
implementation of the safeguards system. This also includes the issuance of a multiple
entry visa valid for a least one year.
4.

Annexes
The State’s provision of information on the manufacture and export of sensitive
nuclear-related technologies allows the IAEA a verification mechanism for the
manufacturing and import locations in a State. The AP annexes are:Annex I: List of Activities referred to in Article 2.1.(iv) of the AP
Annex II: List of Specified Equipment and Non-Nuclear Material for the reportingof exports and imports according to Article 2.a.(ix) of the AP

5. Supporting SG Infrastructures
The States, in meeting their safeguards obligations, can establish different
processes and procedures at the national level in organizing the necessary safeguards
infrastructures. In particular, the SG agreement emphasizes the establishment of theState System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). The SG
infrastructures would depend on the size and complexity of their respective nuclear
programmes and regulatory frameworks. These infrastructures should consider thefollowing:a. Established laws and regulations should meet the requirements of the AP,
b. Provision of timely, accurate and complete declarations, and otherinformation to the IAEA, andc. Provision of support and timely access to locations and informationnecessary for the IAEA to carry out its verification activities.
The following sections of this report provide a summary of good practices, including
lessons learned, shared by the participating member countries which have responded tothe survey conducted during the period 2017-2019. This report has also considered what
the countries have shared during the annual workshops.

COUNTRY A
A1. Provision of Information
The State Regulatory Authority (SRA) prepares the AP declarations with the useof the IAEA AP Protocol Reporter Software. The SRA has developed and implemented
a procedure for receiving, processing and submitting AP declarations to the IAEA. The
SRA performs safeguards inspections to verify the AP information received fromstakeholders prior to its submission to the IAEA. It uses the IAEA State Declaration
Portal (SDP) in submitting its AP declarations. The SRA’s Virtual Private Network(VPN) device has been upgraded for secured communication between the SRA and theIAEA.
A2. Complementary Access
Country A is maintaining a secure channel of communication between the SRA
and the IAEA in sending advance notifications. It is keeping a direct communicationline between the SRA and the IAEA thus facilitating IAEA access. The SRA has
developed and implemented procedures to receive IAEA inspectors.
A3. Designation of Agency (IAEA) Inspectors
The SRA is developing and implementing the procedure for the approval ofdesignated IAEA inspectors. It is cooperating with its Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA) to support the issuance of visas to designated IAEA inspectors. It is keeping aregularly updated list of designated IAEA inspectors with support from MOFA, theresponsible Ministry.
A4. Annexes
Export/Import control measures are regulated under the Atomic Energy Law.
Following the country’s Atomic Energy Law, the Agency for Radiation and Nuclear
Safety is responsible for the issuance of license/permit to nuclear fuel cycle-related
nuclear material and activities. It requires the Customs clearance/approval forexport/import. The SRA is developing and implementing a procedure with guidelines
for specified equipment and non-nuclear material exports and imports.
The SRA has conducted an outreach activity, with support from international
partners, on matters related to Annexes I and II for the industrial stakeholders.
A5. Supporting SG Infrastructures
Country A is in the process of amending its Atomic Energy Law to promote theindependence of its SRA. It is developing working procedures in support of the IAEA
safeguards activities. It is sending new SRA staff for training at regional andinternational SSAC courses. It has conducted a workshop on performing national SG
inspections with support from international partners. The SRA provides training to thefacilities on safeguards implementation.
The SRA has established and installed a safeguards information management
system to handle accounting reports, AP declarations and other safeguards related
information (in consultation with international partners). This system is also being usedby facility operators. It is providing training, in cooperation with the IAEA, for the SRA
and licensees, on the use of the Protocol Reporter for AP declarations.

COUNTRY B
B1. Provision of Information
The SRA collects information from the licensees (facilities and LOFs), as part ofits regulatory activities, in-person during inspection or over-the-phone during review
and assessment or when needed. However, for non-licensee stakeholders (e.g.,
Department of Foreign Trade, Customs Department, Research and Academic Institutes
not using nuclear material), information is collected through collaboration andMemorandum of Understanding (MoU), and through official letters/announcements.
Meetings/Workshops/Training/Seminars are conducted for all stakeholders. The SRA
makes use also of topical questionnaires to collect information. The SRA maintains
close contact with domestic stakeholders.
The SRA prepares its AP declarations with the use of the IAEA AP Protocol
Reporter Software. It is performing a consistency check of all reported information
against the SG agreement. It is transmitting digital maps to the IAEA under Article

2.a.(iii) using geodatabase format. It is sending timely quarterly declarations under
Article 2.a.(ix) even when there is “nothing to declare”.
B2. Complementary Access
The SRA is setting up a procedure for CA. It is sharing the IAEA’s AdvanceNotification with the Facility and Location Outside Facility (LOF) officers.
B3. Designation of Agency (IAEA) Inspectors
Country B is keeping a regularly updated list of designated IAEA inspectors.
B4. Annexes
Export/Import control measures of dual-use items (DUI) are regulated under the
Trade Control on Weapons of Mass Destruction Related Items Act 2019 (TCWMD).
The Department of Foreign Trade, under the Ministry of Commerce, is the designatedauthority for the issuance of license/permit. The AP Annex II items are regulated as
dual-use items in Country B. The SRA is cooperating with the Ministry of Commerce
for Article 2.a.(ix) and Annex II declarations. The SRA is cooperating with the Customs
to regulate exports of items under Annex II. The SRA is obtaining information on the
Annex I activities by enforcing the Ministerial Regulation.
B5. Supporting SG Infrastructures
The SRA is utilizing communication tools: conventional method, securecommunication channel and the SDP. The SRA finds consulting with the IAEA, throughthe designated IAEA country officer, useful for effective and efficient safeguards
implementation.
The SRA is developing and maintaining regulations and procedures to support AP
activities. It is also developing and maintaining mandatory training and re-training for
SRA and Operators.
It is providing working-level training on specific AP
implementation reporting issues. It is sending new SRA staff for training at regional
and international SSAC courses. It is securing adequate office space, information
technology (IT) capabilities, access to meeting rooms and support staff in building andstrengthening its safeguards infrastructures. It is collaborating with international
partners to strengthen its capacity building.

COUNTRY C
C1. Provision of Information
The SRA has established a database of possible stakeholders to facilitatecommunication. Having an efficient system for collecting information was necessary
to make it easier for AP implementation.
The SRA is preparing AP declarations using the IAEA guidelines and format as
published in the IAEA Services Series 11. It is using the AP Protocol Reporter Software.
It is holding outreach seminars for universities and mining industries for SG-exemptednuclear materials, that are reportable under Article 2.a.(vii). It is distributing Annex II
brochures to relevant stakeholders which are helpful for reporting exports and imports
under Article 2.a.(ix). It is establishing a timeline, under Article 3, for the effective andefficient submission of reports to the IAEA.
C2. Complementary Access
When hosting CA, the SRA is developing procedures with operators to avoid
delaying access for IAEA inspectors. The SRA recognizes the availability of updated
and accurate facility layouts and site maps is vital in the conduct of CA.
C3. Designation of Agency (IAEA) Inspectors
The SRA is keeping an updated list/database of designated IAEA inspectors. In
addition, the SRA is maintaining communication with facility owners/operators, andkeeping updated contact numbers of stakeholders for CA notices.
C4. Annexes
All import/export of strategic goods is required to apply for permits from theRegistration Authorization Division of the Strategic Trade Management Office.
Import/export permits from the Bureau of Customs through E2M (Electronic to Mobile)
system and the National Single Window System links other regulatory body issuancesof the licensees for the relevant import/export.
C5. Supporting SG Infrastructures
The SRA is developing its knowledge management system. It is maintaining aroster of qualified safeguards staff. To strengthen its current organization, the SRA isrequesting an ISSAS mission to assess gaps and shortcomings and as well to recognize
good practices of SG implementation.
The SRA has conducted an outreach program with colleges and universities thathave established Research & Development (R&D) activities, as well as the mining
industries involved with the leaching process. For updates, constant communication is
maintained with the stakeholders. Country C is providing regular training on
Commodity Identification for Stakeholders and the SRA, coupled with the provision of
the relevant brochures.

COUNTRY D
D1. Provision of Information
The SRA is disseminating AP information to relevant government authorities. The
relevant government authorities are directly providing information to the SRA. All
reported information is checked. Declarations related to exports and imports ofequipment and non-nuclear material are sent timely on a quarterly basis, even when
there is “nothing to declare”.
The SRA is using the US DOE NNSA’s “AP Declaration Helper” as a tool toclarify AP reporting requirements. The SRA prepares its AP declarations with the useof the IAEA AP Protocol Reporter Software and is using the IAEA SDP to submit.
D2. Complementary Access
The experience of Country D from its first CA provided a meaningful input for
the SRA’s continuous improvement of its national safeguards system.
D3. Designation of Agency (IAEA) Inspectors
Country D is keeping an updated list/database of designated IAEA inspectors.
D4. Annexes
For nuclear material and radiation generators, under the Law on Nuclear Energy,
the State Administrative Authority for Geology and Mining Issues is responsible for theissuance of license/permit. However, for export/import activities, under the General
Agency for Specialized Inspections, the State Administrative Authority for professional
inspection issue is responsible for issuance of license/permit. Country D is providing
workshops on Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC), for Annexes I andII, to all relevant authorities.
D5. Supporting SG Infrastructures
Country D is formulating accountancy and control rules and regulations for theestablishment of the SSAC. It is holding jointly organized training courses on nuclear
safety and nuclear safeguards. It is sending new SRA and inspection staff for training
at regional and international SSAC courses and NMAC. The SRA has drafted guidanceon quality management system including managing and controlling safeguards
documents, the use of the condition report system, and the principles of continuous
process improvement.

COUNTRY E
E2. Complementary AccessIn the case of a force majeure, Country E has opted on the use of all available
communication to alert the IAEA of the situation impeding CA. The SRA has informed
the IAEA of the forecast on severe cold-weather conditions and the probable impositionof a travel restriction to the site.
Photos taken by IAEA inspectors during the verification activities are consideredby representatives of stakeholders as containing “sensitive” (commercial) information.
Therefore, these photos should remain onsite. The IAEA, together with Country E, hasdeveloped a procedure to address photos taken during CA. It was decided to keep thecollected information obtained during CA (e.g., photographs) at the location(facilities/sites, mines) under IAEA seals for future reference.
E3. Designation of Agency (IAEA) Inspectors
Country E is keeping a regularly updated list of designated IAEA inspectors at thecheckpoints of controlled facilities/sites.
E4. Annexes
Country E is a member of the Zangger Committee (ZAC) and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). Export/Import control measures are implemented under theOrder of the Minister of Investment and Development. The issuance of license/permit
is with the Decision of the Customs Union Commission. After document control, theact of joint inspection is implemented by Custom Officers, which is a joint inspectionof vehicle and goods, to confirm passage of control at the checkpoint.
E5. Supporting SG Infrastructures
Country E is introducing online remote video monitoring systems at criticalfacilities under safeguards. Recognizing the importance of timely and clarity ofcommunications, the SRA has been judiciously providing the IAEA with informationon the State and National holidays.

COUNTRY F
F4. Annexes
For export/import control measures in Country F, all applicants must apply for thepermit online, either under the Atomic Energy Licensing Act or the Strategic Trade Act.
If the permit is approved by the SRA or the permit-issuing agency, the approved permits
are sent to the Customs for validation and cross-reference against Customs declarations.
There are different requirements depending on the means of transport: By air, the applicant must comply with the law and procedure under the
Civil Aviation Authority;
 By land, for radioactive material, nuclear material, prescribed substance or
irradiating apparatus must comply with the Atomic Energy Licensing Act,
Radiation Protection (Transport) Regulations and other relevant act;
 By sea, must comply with the relevant act controlled by the relevant
agency.
F5. Supporting SG Infrastructures
Country F is providing support to IAEA SG activities by hosting regional
workshops on CA.

COUNTRY G
G1. Provision of Information
The SRA is dedicating staff responsible for collecting and maintaining the AP
declarations.

G2. Complementary AccessThe SRA is sharing advance notifications with all site representatives.
G3. Designation of Agency (IAEA) Inspectors
Country G is sharing the list of designated IAEA inspectors between the SRA andOperators.
G4. Annexes
For all types of import/export, Customs documentation check is the firstcontrolling measure under the Customs Act and the Prescribed Bill of Entry and the Billof Export Form Order. In the case of import/export of nuclear, radioactive content,
radiation equipment, and nuclear reactor and its parts, import/export permit and NOC(No Objection Certificate) issued by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority, thedesignated SRA, is required under the Import Policy Order and the Export Policy.
G5. Supporting SG Infrastructures
Country G has incorporated the issue of IAEA safeguards into one of the sectionsof its Atomic Energy Regulatory Act. The SRA is working to develop a number ofregulations, rules, and guidance that have to be incorporated into the National
Import/Export Policy for the full-fledged implementation of the Act.

COUNTRY H
H1. Provision of Information
The SRA is requiring the facility to submit the annual update one month before
the time specified under the AP. It is preparing AP declarations using the Protocol
Reporter Software. It is creating a list of person-in-charge from each nuclear installation
to facilitate coordination and declaration process.
H2. Complementary Access
The SRA is creating a list of point-of-contact, available at any time, for advance
notification. It is developing procedures for accepting CA.
H3. Designation of Agency (IAEA) Inspectors
The SRA is coordinating with MOFA for the inspector’s designation and visa
processing. It is keeping a regularly updated list of designated IAEA inspectors.
H4. Annexes
The SRA controls the import/export of nuclear materials, radioactive sources and
X-ray generators. The licensing and approval are managed through the SRA’s online
system which is integrated with the Customs’ system (Country H National Single
Window).
The SRA is coordinating with nuclear installation experts to identify Annex IIequipment specifications.
H5. Supporting SG Infrastructures
The SRA is engaging staff to participate in SG training and is conducting Focus

Group Discussion on SG and AP. It is cooperating with stakeholders (Universities,
MOFA, private companies) on AP related issues. It has created awareness by
incorporating, in a dedicated database, news and information related to nuclear arms
control.

COUNTRY I
I1. Provision of Information
The Government has granted the SRA to request any concerned individual tosubmit a report relevant to AP declarations.
I2. Complementary Access
The Government has provided the legal authority to allow the entry of IAEA
inspectors to any location, other than facilities, to perform CA in the presence ofdesignated government official(s).

I4. Annexes
Country I is a member of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group,and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Annex I activities are defined in the domestic law
which is necessary for the preparation of Article 2.a.(iv) declarations. Export/Importcontrol measures are stipulated in the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act andrelevant legislation under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, andIndustry.
I5. Supporting SG Infrastructures
Country I has amended the Domestic Law/Regulation to provide legal authority
to the SRA to collect AP relevant information and to conduct CA. Meetings, including
continuing dialogue, are held with Operators for the effective development ofprocedures on AP declarations and for fostering common understanding.

COUNTRY J
J1. Provision of Information
Country J submits to the IAEA a comprehensive report on its nuclear cooperation.
Upon request by the IAEA, information is offered regarding research and development
activities on nuclear fuel recycle conducted in the country through international
cooperation.
J2. Complementary Access
Country J permits and protects free communications for official reasons between
the IAEA inspectors and the IAEA Headquarters and/or regional offices, and theattended and unattended transmission of information obtained in the facilities undersafeguards.

J3. Designation of Agency (IAEA) Inspectors
Country J provides support to the designation of IAEA safeguards inspectors, visa
application, inspection communications, message transmission, and other safeguardsrelated activities.
J4.

Annexes
Country J is a member of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear SuppliersGroup. It provides reports to the IAEA on the export and import of uranium and thorium
under Article 2.a.(vi)(b)(1).

SUMMARY
Every country, as described in this report, may have varied approaches to the AP
implementation in meeting their respective safeguards obligations. Although the Asian
countries involved in the project have different nuclear fuel cycle characteristics, thisreport also shows that there are some common good practices being implemented inaddressing the AP requirements. The FNCA objective of formulating a generic set offundamentals on AP implementation was achieved through a collection/compilationand the analysis of good practices and shared experiences from its project members.
The experiences and good practices shared by each member country become a learningreference and a motivation for further improvement.
The result of the NSSP task highlights the country’s capacity-building
development efforts in providing assurance on the correctness and completeness of theState’s declarations and reports to the IAEA. In addition, this report emphasizes andconfirms the country’s unwavering effort and support to fulfill its commitments under
the nuclear non-proliferation regime.