Safe Management of Spent Radiation Sources(Activity Report of SRSM Task Group)

FNCA RWM-R002

March 2003

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) Group
Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA)

Safe Management of Spent Radiation Sources(Activity Report of SRSM Task Group)

March 2003

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) Group
Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA)

Contents
1. Preface

1

2.

3

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4

3.
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5

Outline of the Project 
Introduction
Approach and Present Status of the Spent Radiation Source Management
Consideration toward Solving Problems
Conclusion

Current IAEA Activities related to Safety of Radiation Sources
Introduction
Chronology of Development of Action Plan
Outline of the Revised Action Plan
Asian Regional Activities
Conclusion

4. Regulatory System and Lesson Learned from Accidents in Japan
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6

5.
5.1
5.2
5.3

13

Outline of Regulation System in Japan
Obligations of Licensed Users
Regulatory System on Sealed Radiation Sources
Status in the Incidents on Radiation Sources Occurred in Japan
Incident of Loss of Radiation Source
Incidents of Orphan Sources

SRS Management System in Japan

19

Current Status of Using of Sealed Radiation Sources in Japan
Collection System of SRS in Japan (JRIA Collection Services for SRS)
Disposal of SRS

6. Spent Sealed Radiation Source Management in the Philippines 
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8

7

Introduction
Sources of Radioactive Waste
Waste Management Strategies
Conditioning of Radium Sources
Regulations on Radioactive Waste
Philippine Action Plan on the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources
IAEA Regional Demonstration Centers
Siting Studies for a Near Surface Disposal Facilityi27

7. SRS Management in Thailand
7.1
7.2
7.3

39

Current Status of Using of Sealed Radiation Sources in Thailand
Inventory of Spent Sealed Radiation Sources in Thailand
Current Topics of SRS Management

8. Indonesian Experiences on the Management ofSpent Radiation Sources
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.5

Introduction
Principles of Management of Radiation Sources in Indonesia
Management of Spent Sealed Radiation Sources
Management Hurdles
Reported Incidents on Radiation Sources in Indonesia

9. Current Status of Spent Radiation Source Management in Korea
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
9.7

49

61

Introduction
Regulatory Framework
Collection System of SRS in Korea
Radioisotope Waste Generation
Radiation Exposure Incident in Korea
Scrap Monitoring System
Conclusion

10. Postscript

71

Appendix-A Discussion/Survey Meeting
A-1
A-2
A-3
A-4

Discussion/Survey Meeting at PNRI, the Philippines
Discussion/Survey Meeting at OAEP, Thailand
Discussion/Survey Meeting at BATAN and BAPETEN, Indonesia
Discussion/Survey Meeting at NETEC/KHNP, Korea

Appendix-B Presentation Materials
B-1 Co-60 Tele-therapy Source Loss of Shielding Accident
B-2 Brief Summary of the SRSM Task Group Activities: The Philippine Perspective
B-3 Thailand Experience for SRS Management
B-4 Indonesian Experiences on the Management of SRS

Appendix-C Photos of SRSM Task Group Activity for 2001 and 2002

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SRSM activity report

1. Preface
The safety management of spent radiation sources (SRS) is discussed in this paper based on
the task group work in Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) project under FNCA (Forum for
Nuclear Cooperation in Asia) framework.
The contents are; Chapter 2. Outline of the project, including the summary of important
discussion points, Chapter 3. International activities, which is touching the IAEA’s action plan (7items), historical background, Chapter 4. Regulatory System and Lessons Learned from Accidents inJapan, Chapter 5. SRS Management System in Japan. And Chapter 6 to Chapter 9 are Experiencesof SRS management in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, respectively.
This kind of information exchange and discussion based on the peer review through on-sitefact-finding observation between the neighboring countries will support not only a good practice of
RWM of each country but also a fertilizer activities of making up a harmonized international
agreement through IAEA.

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SRSM activity report

2. Outline of the Project2.1 Introduction
The recent events relating to the Spent Radiation Source (SRS) Management occurred inJapan. Those were Orphan Source Accidents; one was in Wakayama Prefecture (Am-Be neutron
source and Co-60 gamma source were mixed in the imported iron scrap as orphan source from thePhilippines), and the other was in Yamaguchi Prefecture (Co-60 source was found in the imported
iron scrap from Taiwan). These orphan sources caused a big confusion in the public through anamplifier of mass media like television, newspaper etc.
To avoid this kind of confusion and to get a more reliability of the radioisotope usage, wewould like to discuss on “what kind of method, countermeasure, thinking and framework is
effective?” We proposed here the SRS Management project under Forum for Nuclear Cooperationin Asia (FNCA).
FNCA was supported by Atomic Energy Commission in Japan and Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) to promote cooperation in the field of nuclear
energy with neighboring Asian Countries (Australia, China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, thePhilippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan). At the earliest stage in this forum 7 projects were listed
up. One of them is Radioactive Waste Project. As a task group work SRS activity did several
research activities under the support of 5 countries; Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand andJapan).
The collaborative work to make a same safety base between these countries is quite importantbecause the interdependence and the distribution through trade in this area are growing up.
But in this activity, the problem so-called NORM or TENORM (Technologically Enhanced
Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material) is not handled because the thinking procedure ofradioactivity management is different from the artificial radiation sources.
In this report, two years’ activity are summarized as listed below.
[Safe Management of Spent Radiation Sources]
Chapter 2. Scheme for Spent Radiation Source Management
Chapter 3. Current IAEA activities related to safety of radiation sources
Chapter 4. Current status of spent radiation source management in Japan
Chapter 5. SRS management operation system in Japan
Chapter 6. Current status of spent radiation source management in the Philippines
Chapter 7. Current status of spent radiation source management in Thailand
Chapter 8. Current status of spent radiation source management in Indonesia
Chapter 9. Current status of spent radiation source management in Korea

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SRSM activity report

2.2 Approach and Present Status of the Spent Radiation Source Management
The approach to the spent radiation source in each country has their own features.
In Indonesia, in 1997 the Act of Nuclear Energy was issued and the regulatory function was
separated from BATAN. The name is BAPETEN (English name is Nuclear Energy control Board,
NECB). An accident of loss of radiation sources, which were used in a thickness gage, accelerates
the promotion of safe management of radiation sources. Recent movement and effort ofIndonesian government to making up a new system are expected.
In Korea, in recent, Korean government did a reform of nuclear and radiation related
governmental systems. Now the regulatory aspect (safety management and licensing procedure) ofradiation source management is covered by Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). As aregulatory body Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) is nominated. Radiation source
management is attained together Korea Radioisotope Association (KRIA) and Nuclear Environment
Technology Institute (NETEC). KRIA covers a collection of radiation sources and NETEC covers
radioactive waste management and disposal. Korea also had several experiences of SRS
management events. But now a quite nice radiation source managing system based on the
Information Technology was prepared as a complete database and traceability system of radiation
sources.
In the Philippines, since 1958 Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) has covered boththe promotion of nuclear application and the safety aspect of nuclear and radiation field. PNRI
takes a position of direct introduction of IAEA safety system. From early stage PNRI joined
IAEA’s Radium Source Conditioning Project and got a magnificent outcome. They also had
several events of radiation source containing scrap. But an enthusiastic effort of thecountermeasure with education system introduction, custom monitoring system preparation wasdone. Combining with the introduction of IAEA action plan and these activities, the situation inthis country has been advancing.
In Thailand, a big radiation source loss and irradiation accident was occurred in 2000.
Medial use Cobalt-60 went to a scrap yard with no recognition. This caused 3 person’s death.
This severe event caused a strong impact of reform of Office of Atomic Energy for Peace (OAEP).
OAEP is going to spread into two activities, one is research activity, Thailand Institute of Nuclear
Technology (TINT), and the other is a regulatory and inspection body, Office of Atoms for Peace(OAP). Now new regulations are preparing in connection with the establishment of this neworganization.
In Japan, the regulatory system for spent radiation source management is not so good. We
also had experienced in recent days on the miss-management of spent radiation source; radiation
source (Co-60 and neutron source) found in iron scrap imported from an East Asian country at
Wakayama port in 2000. The other cases were radiation sources (Cesium-137 and Ra-226)
containing scrap imported from an East Asian country. Not only imported scrap but also domestic
scrap contained an orphan source; e.g. Okayama Prefecture event. After these accidents, several
domestic meetings were held to avoid these events. Some results like a manual of radiation checkfor scrap iron are effective to avoid these events. In detail the expense sharing for the4

SRSM activity reportcountermeasure works under emergency situation is not yet fixed connecting with the reversion of
the responsibility.
To accomplish this activity the deep communication between East Asian Countries will brig apractical effect because the material movement by trade in this area is quite growing. So thecountermeasure close to the source is most effective. The FNCA’s communication would be
important.

2.3 Consideration toward Solving Problems
2.3.1 Subject for Problem Solution
The matters for solution of SRS management are summarized into two aspects; domestic
problem and international problem.
<Domestic Aspect>
On the domestic aspect, the correspondences in a software field are important; those are alegal framework preparation, establishments of a source management system, a radioactive waste
management system, an inspection system and an emergency preparedness system, a collection
mechanism of spent radiation sources and an education.
The correspondences in a hardware field are the preparation of radiation equipment andmonitors; e.g. gate radiation monitors for a detection of orphan source in steel works, equipment forconditioning and stabilization of radium source used in medical area, equipment for emergency
remediation.
<International Aspects>
On the international aspect, the software correspondences are a clarification of radiation
source supplier’s responsibility, a joining with the radioactive waste convention, an agreement ofquality assurance system, a full use of custom system, an international agreement for a trouble
shooting to SRS management, multi-countries’ cooperation for emergency medical preparedness.
The hardware correspondences are the standardized radiation inspection monitors in customs,
and a preparation of standardized radiation mark plate for clear identification of radiation source.

2.3.2 IAEA Action Plan
IAEA prepared a project of radiation source safe management based on the Code of Conduct
through multi-countries’ discussion. After that IAEA action plan was decided and applied to model
countries’ projects. In East Asian region these trials were attempted in Bangkok, Thailand in 2001
and in Tokyo, Japan in 2002. IAEA’s paper for the Action Plan states three layer’s (national level,
regional level and international level) activities are mutually important. The detailed structure of
IAEA Action Plan is described in Chapter 3.

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SRSM activity report

2.3.3

Role of FNCA
The Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) field team in the Forum for Nuclear
Cooperation in Asia (FNCA) arranged a project of Spent Radiation Source safe management project
for the promotion of safety culture in radioactive waste management field. This kind of“horizontal” cooperation will make not only a mutual understanding but also a steering of the
preparation of regulatory system and a management system. Through the workshop discussion andon-site observation the peer review was done and a mutual understanding was progressed. Thiskind of “horizontal” activities should be larded with a “vertical” activity of IAEA. That will cause
a synergy effect with each other.

2.4 Conclusion
The solution of the spent source management should be prepared in the international standpoint and framework, because, at present, various materials including radiation sources migrate allover the world and the safety framework will be accomplished under a deep consideration ofexperiences of past accident and an activity of international information exchange. For this purposethe activity of FNCA RWM is expected would work an accelerator for the promotion of safety
culture in this region, combining the world wide activity lead by IAEA.

References
1. International Atomic Energy Agency: Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security ofRadioactive Sources, December 2000.
2. Radioactive Waste Management Project Group, Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia: The
Consolidate Report on Radioactive Waste Management in FNCA Countries, March 2003.

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SRSM activity report

3. Current IAEA Activities related to Safety of Radiation Sources
3.1 Introduction
Radiation sources are used throughout the world for a wide variety of beneficial purposes, inindustry, medicine, research and education. The risks posed by these sources vary widely,depending on the amount of activities, the characteristics and chemical form of radionuclide, etc. If
sealed sources are not damaged or leaking, sealed sources present a risk from only external radiation
exposure. However, damaged or leaking sealed sources as well as unsealed radioactive materials
may lead to contamination of the environment and internal exposure. The Goiania accident in1987 could be listed as one of the biggest accident. After the Goiania accident, such kind of
accidents occurred incessantly, Tammiku, San Savador, Nesvizh, Yanango, Hanoi, Soreq, Sarov,
Samut Prakarn, etc. These accidents caused 266 individual exposued, 39 fatalities and serious
economic consequences.
Recently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been a growing awareness ofthese kind of problems associated with radiation sources and has begun several activities. One of
the biggest activities concerning to this problem is the Action Plan on the Safety of Radiation
Sources and Security of Radioactive Materials. The main purpose of the action plan is to enable
the IAEA to develop and implement activities that will assist member states in maintaining andwhere necessary, improving the safety of radiation source and the security of radioactive materials
over their life cycle.
In this report, the background, chronology, contents of the action plan were reviewed.
3.2 Chronology of Development of Action Plan
3.2.1 Dijon Conference
From 14 to 18 September 1998, the international conference on Safety of Radiation Sources
and Security of Radioactive Materials took place in Dijon, France. This conference was held
intending to address the growing concern about the safety of radiation sources and the security ofradioactive materials and to realize the scale and extent of the problem.
The conclusions of conference could be summarized as follows:(a) radiation sources should not be allowed to drop out of the regulatory control system (meaningthat the regulatory authority must keep up-to-date records of those responsible for each source,
monitor transfers of sources and track the fate of each source to the end of its useful life);(b) efforts should be made to find radiation sources that are not in the regulatory authority’s
inventory (because they were in the country before the inventory was established, or were never
specifically registered/licensed or were lost, abandoned or stolen); and(c) efforts to improve the detection of radioactive materials crossing national borders and moving
within countries by carrying out radiation measurements and through intelligence-gathering should
be intensified (optimum detection techniques need to be developed, and confusion would be avoided
if international agreement could be achieved on quantitative levels that would trigger investigations,for example, at border crossings).
3.2.2 Adoption of Action Plan
The IAEA General Conference held right after Dijon conference requested for the report fromexperts. Expert meetings were held at Buenos Aires and Washington in December 1998 andJanuary 1999, respectively. In February l999, the Secretariat submitted to the IAEA Board of7

SRSM activity report

Governors the expert report. The report was taken up by the Board at its March 1999 session.
The action plan was developed through the consultants meeting (Prague, May 1999) and thetechnical committee (Vienna, July 1999). In September 1999, the Board approved the action planand requested the Secretariat to implement it. In October l999, the action plan was endorsed byGeneral Conference [GC(43)RES/10] and its implementation started by the IAEA Secretariat.
3.2.3 Buenos Aires Conference
The International Conference of National Regulatory Authorities with Competence in the
Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Material, which was held in Buenos
Aires from 11 to 15 December 2000, was organized as one of the actions in the action plan which wasenvisaged under the topic "Information Exchange". The Buenos Aires conference, hosted by theGovernment of Argentina, was attended by 89 regulatory officials from 57 Member States, 31 of
those Member States being participants in the IAEA Model Projects for the strengthening of radiation
protection infrastructure, which cover 52 Member States.
A number of “major findings” were concluded at the Buenos Aires Conference. The key
words of major findings were listed as follows:-Education and training — the key factors-Difficulties in establishing effective systems for the regulatory control of radiation sources-Maintaining up-to-date knowledge of the situation of the radiation sources-Effective independence of the regulatory authority-Arranging for the insurance of radiation sources-Learning from accidents-Universal system of labeling-Radiation source registry-Continuity of control of radiation sources over the operational lifetime-Return of disused sources-Arrangements for handling orphan sources-Emergency arrangements-Prevention of the criminal misuse of radiation sources-Technical assistance by the IAEA
-Immediate future actions to ensure the safety and security of radiation sources-International follow-up conferences at frequent intervals
3.2.4 Revision of Action Plan
In March 2001, the Board of Governors noted these major findings and requested theSecretariat to assess the implications and to adjust the action plan in the light of those major findings.
In accordance with this request, a consultants' meeting at the end of May 2001 produced adraft revised action plan on the safety and security of radiation sources. This was reviewed andamended during a Technical Committee Meeting, 27-29 June 2001. The revised action plan
[GC(45)/12&GC(45)/RES/10] was approved by the Board of Governors and endorsed at 45th
General Conference in September 2001.

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3.3 Outline of the Revised Action Plan
3.3.1 Scope and Purpose
All components included the action plan should strengthen safety of radiation sources andsecurity of radioactive materials, fit with existing the IAEA sub-programmes and maximize use ofexisting IAEA initiatives, and identify methods to implement the recommendations in a mannerconsistent with the views of the Board of Governors.
Regulatory components are aimed at strengthening national regulatory programmes, i.e.
systems for notification and authorization (licensing and registration), and responding toemergencies, and regaining control over orphan sources. Moreover, training is an essential
component of all of these activities. Supporting components of the action plan are aimed at persons
or organizations having an interest in seeing that the orphan source problem is addressed.
3.3.2 Document Outline
The previous Action Plan was structured to cover seven areas, and this structure was still
considered as valid. The order of them does not imply any priority.
1) Regulatory Infrastructure2) Source Management and Control including the Management of Disused Sources
3) Categorization of Sources
4) Response to Abnormal Events
5) Information Exchange
6) Education and Training
7) International Undertakings
Brief explanations of the new actions are described in the following section.
3.3.3 Seven Areas of the Action Plan
(1) Regulatory Infrastructure1) Develop and implement a mechanism for feedback from all peer review services.
2) Develop a methodology to enable member states to perform self assessments of theirradiation protection infrastructures.
3) Encourage self assessments to identify weaknesses in radiation protection
infrastructures.
4) Promote mutual assistance using regional networks.
(2) Source Management and Control
1) Facilitate a continuing dialogue among manufactures, regulators and users on:a) export and return of sourcesb) definition of operation lifetime of a sourcec) design and manufacture of sources in accordance with ISO standardsd) radioactive source inventories
2) Develop guidance on a quality management system related to the life cycle ofCategory 1 and 2 sources(3) Categorization of Sources
1) Review how the Categorization of Sources is being used, and consider revising it on
the basis of this review

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SRSM activity report(4) Response to Abnormal Events
1) Encourage member states to use the “National Strategies” document to perform an
evaluation of the threat, risk, and the potential effects from orphan sources
2) Finalize arrangements for making the Emergency Preparedness Review Service
available to member states
3) Prepare a TECDOC on conducting radiological emergency response exercises withassociated materials4) Complete the establishment of ERNET (Emergency Response Network)5) Develop standardized training material on medical response preparedness
6) Prepare a TECDOC on public information management during radiologicalemergencies(5) Information Exchange
1) Organize a Second International Conference of National Regulatory Authorities in
2004.
2) Make the RADEV (database on unusual radiation events) available to member statesto establish their own database.
3) Encourages member states to use RADEV.
4) Clarify, modify and rationalize the objectives and interrelationships among thedifferent IAEA databases.
5) Establish and support regional networks to promote further informal mutual
assistance.
6) Consider establishing a list server to facilitate communication among those concernedwith radiation safety.
7) Create an integrated web-site devoted to the safety and security of radiation site.
8) Apply the lessons learned from all the information exchange processes in thedevelopment and revision of training material.
9) Develop an adaptable communications took kit to enable member state to effectively
communicate key messages regarding the safety and security of sources(6) Education and Training
No new actions were proposed, although following 4 items were listed in the previous
action plan.
1) Postgraduate educational courses in Arabic, English and Spanish were implemented.
2) More than 30 national and regional practice-specific training courses have been
implemented.
3) Complete the standardized practice-specific training modules covered by Category 1
and 2 sources.
4) A “Strategic Approach” to Education and Training in Radiation and Safety (Strategicplan 2001-2010) has been prepared.
(7) International Undertaking
1) Consult with member state on their experiences in implementing the Code of
Conduct to compile and disseminate a list of best practices. Following 1), convene ameeting to consider the necessity of further actions relating the Code of Conduct.
Follow up on the discussions regarding possible responsibilities of exporting states.

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Explore the possibility of developing and implementing a universal system of labellingsuch that any member of the public is immediately aware of the dangers.
Provide technical advice on the request to non-member states as appropriate and inaccordance with previous Board decisions.
3.4 Asian Regional Activities
The action plan on the safety of radiation sources and the security of radioactive materials
includes the organization of regional workshops on specific topical issues to target regional needs
and provide relevant information to the manufacturers and users of sources and related devices.
Based on this action plan, two regional workshops were held at Bangkok, Thailand in 2001 and at
Tokyo, Japan in 2002.
The workshops provided an opportunity to share experience with:
1) Loss of control over radiation sources: Problems dealings with securing radiation sources, withreturning or disposing of radiation sources or with finding radiation sources in the public domain
are all appropriate topics.
2) Problems with maintenance of devices that may lead to unsafe use: This includes such issues asunavailability of spare parts, insufficient training on equipment maintenance, lack of support
from manufacturer’s representatives, long waiting times for repairs or difficulties with funding.
3) Issues for gauges that may have been installed many years ago: Loss of corporate memory orlabeling damage from normal industrial wear and tear may have resulted in such sources being
forgotten.
4) Lack of proper management of spent or disused sources, with such sources being left in
inappropriate locations for extended times.
5) National or regional plans to recover control over orphan sources: The roles of such components
as inventory databases, administrative searches, physical searches or border/scrap yard monitors
need to be discussed and defined.
3.4.1

Thailand Workshop in 2001
The Thailand workshop was held with the participation of IAEA scientific secretary,
Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, Viet Nam (12 countries) at Bangkok, August 6-10, 2001.
Through the workshop, the outline of IAEA action plan was introduced by IAEA scientificsecretary. Each participated member states presented its current status of regulatory infrastructure,
management of disused sources, categorization of radiation sources, response to abnormal events,
information exchange and education and training.
3.4.2

Japan Workshop in 2002
The Japan workshop was held with the participation of IAEA scientific secretary, Bangladesh,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam (10countries) at Tokyo, November 11-15, 2002.
In addition to the introduction of IAEA action plan and the presentation of each participating
country, the exercise on national strategy for orphan source problem was executed as a group
discussion. The discussion proceeded on the basis of experiences of each participant referring to thepapers provided by IAEA. The workshop not only provided the participants a new outlook to review
the effectiveness of the regulatory system with respect to the control and management of disused andorphan sources, but combined the regional activities and the IAEA activities with a synergy effect.

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SRSM activity report

3.5 Conclusion
The action plan pointed out the key common elements which would have the greatest part toimprove the regulatory infrastructure, to control disused sources, to avoid orphan source problems, torespond to abnormal events and so on. It is deeply desired to implement the action plan at all stagesof regulatory body, manufacturers and distributors of source, and users.

References
1. International Atomic Energy Agency: “Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive
Materials”, Proceedings of a conference, Dijon, France, 14-18 September 1998.
2. International Atomic Energy Agency: “National Regulatory Authorities with Competence in the
Safety of Radiation Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials”, Proceedings ofinternational conference, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 11-15 December 2000.
3. International Atomic Energy Agency: Revised action plan for the safety and security ofRadiation Sources, GOV/2001/29-GC(45)/12 attachment, 2001.
4. International Atomic Energy Agency: Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security ofRadioactive Sources, December 2000.
5. International Atomic Energy Agency: Proceedings of Workshop on the Safety of Radiation
Sources and Security of Radioactive Materials, Tokyo, Japan, 11-15 November 2000.

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4. Regulatory System and Lesson Learned from Accidents in Japan
4.1 Outline of Regulation System in Japan
Radioactive materials other than nuclear material or nuclear fuel are subject to regulation by“the Law Concerning Prevention of Radiation Hazards due to Radioisotope etc”. Items listed below
are provided in the law.
࡮Permission and notification for use of radioisotopes
࡮Permission for selling and leasing business࡮Permission for disposing business࡮Approval of design for mechanism of radioisotope equipped device and confirmation of its
mechanism࡮Restrictions on possessing, transferring, receiving and handling of radioisotopes
࡮Requirements in technical standards for permission- Requirements for users:
Condition of site, structure and equipment of facilities for using, storage and disposing- Requirements for sellers and leasers
Condition of site, structure and equipment of facilities for refilling, storage anddisposing- Requirements for disposers
Condition of site, structure and equipment of facilities for refilling waste, storage of
waste and disposal
࡮On-the-spot inspection by the regulatory authority
࡮Facility inspection by Nuclear Safety Technology Center
࡮Periodical inspection by Nuclear Safety Technology Center

4.2 Obligations of Licensed Users
Obligations of licensed users provided in the law are as follows.
࡮Ensuring the necessary technical standards
࡮Executing administrative obligations- Monitoring- Drawing up and submitting the inner rules for the prevention of radiation hazards- Education and training- Checking up health of persons entering the facilities

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SRSM activity report- Keeping record of use, etc.
࡮Reporting about discontinuation of use etc, and taking necessary measures to prevent
radiation hazards
࡮Appointing a supervisor of radiation protection࡮Reporting about accidents (to policemen)࡮Taking measures at the time of danger
࡮Reporting about anything necessary for the enforcement of the law
4.3 Regulatory System on Sealed Radiation Sources
Outline of distribution of sealed source and regulatory system on manufacture, selling, use, anddisposal of sealed radiation sources is shown in the figure below.

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4.4 Status in the Incidents on Radiation Sources Occurred in Japan131 incidents related to radiation sources were occurred for 43years of the periods from 1958 in
fiscal year to 2001. Temporal change in number of incidents is shown in the following figure. From
the figure the peak of number of incidents were found in the middle of 1970’s which were coincided
to the peak of rapid increase of number of authorized user. The tendency of the increase is also
found in these 3 years.
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Type of incidents can be categorized into Loss of source, Excess exposure, contamination,orphan source, and others which proportion of number of incidents are shown in the following figure.

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4.5 Incident of Loss of Radiation Source
Loss of radiation source is one of the most serious problems because this type of incident
occurred most frequently and may cause fear of radiation exposure in surrounding peoples.
More than half of incidents related to loss of radiation source were occurred in hospitals or
clinical facilities and about 13% of the incidents were occurred in research laboratories, about 10%
were occurred in facilities of university, and about 10% were occurred industrial plants.
Proportions of radionuclides of radiation sources related to the incidents of loss or theft are as
follows:
Radionuclide Proportion of incident occurredType of source

Activity

Ra-22638 %Needle or tube

37㧙2000 MBq

Co-60

21 %

Medical use

37 – 740 MBq

Ni-63

16 %

ECD cell for GC

370 – 555 MBq

Ir-192

9%

Medical use

Needle and tube type of Ra-226 sources used to be frequently utilized for therapy in hospitals.
In the many cases of the incident, plural needles of the source were used at once and one of themmight be lost after the therapy because of its small size. In the recent case, sources of Ra-226 became
to be disused and someone might disposed the source without being aware of its radioactive.
Possible causes of the incidents of loss are generally considered to be as follows,- Handling by person who has insufficient knowledge of radiation protection or regulationaccording to law- Lack of specialist of radiation protection in hospital- Negligence of record related to use of source
As a unique case, 92 packages of radioactive materials including total activity of about 6GBq
were lost due to an airplane crash occurred in 1985. About 65% of packages were recovered bysearching activity of experts.
As measures against loss of source, frequent inspection of management of radiation sources byregulatory authorities and education/training program for supervisor of radiation protection andindividual user would be effective.

16

SRSM activity report

4.6 Incidents of Orphan Sources
Incidents of orphan sources were occurred frequently in these years. Because the companies ofsteel works or scrap dealers become aware of significance of orphan sources, many of them were
equipped with radiation monitor. This has improved the situation of finding orphan sources.
An incident occurred in April,2000 in Wakayama prefecture was the first serious accident inJapan. In the beginning of this accident, radioactivity in the scrap container imported from foreigncountry was detected by gate monitor equipped in the steel works. After several days, analysis withportable germanium detector revealed that Cs-137 and Am-Be or Ra-Be would be contained in the
scrap. The frequent meetings were held to discuss how to recover the sources and prepare theoperation. It took almost one month to recover the 230MBq of Cs-137 source andAm-241(1.8GBq)-Be neutron source from the scrap in safety.
The second incident was occurred in Kobe city. Ra-226 source for medical use was found inmetal scrap. After the investigation by the police, it was found that the source had been disposed
illegally by a hospital.
The third incident was that Cs-137㧔5.5 GBq㧕was found in container of stainless steel scrap
imported in Yamaguchi prefecture in March 2001. The workers of scrap dealer made efforts to findout the source and recover it by themselves. The dose to the workers during the recovery of source
was estimated to be less than 110ǴSv.
Responding to the series of the incidents occurred in 2000, Japanese government took
measures against orphan sources. Five ministries collaborated to develop a document for measures inAugust, 2000. An ad hoc advisory committee on appropriate management of radioactive materials
was established. According to the results of discussion, it should be promoted that custom offices inports should be equipped with radiation detectors.
An international cooperation project related to safe management of spent radiation sources in
the Forum of Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA) was proposed by the Minister of the Science andTechnology Agency. The conferences were held in various Asian countries to discuss issues related
to safety management of spent sources between member of regulatory authorities of the countries
and Japanese experts.
Various organizations other than the government also took measures against orphan sources.
A committee of Japan Health Physics Society developed a report in which status and useful
information about orphan sources in Japan and proposed measures are described.
Manual for dealing with orphan source developed by voluntary action of scrap dealers in corporation
with expert groups was published in April, 2002. International activities on safety and security ofradiation sources were actively developed and promoted by an action plan of IAEA.

17

SRSM activity report

5.

SRS Management System in Japan

5.1

Current Status of Using of Sealed Radiation Sources in Japan
Many kinds of sealed radiation sources have been used in various fields, research,
industry, medical, etc. Table 1 and Table 2 show the number of users of sealed radiation
sources in Japan. The number of users of sealed radiation sources is about 4,100 (as of March
31, 2001).
Most of the sealed radiation sources are obtained from overseas suppliers, but someparticular sources are supplied by Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute that is only
domestic manufacturer. Those sealed radiation sources are carried in to Japan Radioisotope
Association (JRIA) facility at first, and they are delivered to the end users after making
required inspection tests, and packing.
Table 3 shows major sealed radiation sources and its purposes of use. And Table 4shows amounts of major sealed radiation sources distributed in 2000. Major sealed radiation
sources are Co-60, Cs-137, and Ir-192. Co-60 is used for radiation therapy in hospital andclinic, and for medical device sterilization in industrial firms. Medical devices, such as
dialyses, syringe and needles, gloves, suture are sterilized by the gamma ray irradiation withthose cobalt sources. A total activity installed of such sterilization plant amounts from 74PBq
to 185PBq. Cs-137 is used for irradiation of transfusion blood.㩷 Radioactivity of the source isfrom 74TBq to 111TBq. Ir-192 is used for radiography apparatus that is Non-destructive tests.㩷
Radioactivity of the source is 370 GBq each. A number of Ir-192 is also used asbrachytherapy for after-loading.
The other sealed radioisotopes are used for various apparatus. For example, thickness
gauges, level gauges, density gauges, gas chromatographs. Ni-63 has been used in theelectron capture detector (ECD) of gas chromatographs. Neutron sources of Cf-252 lessthan 3.7MBq have been installed in many moisture gauges and others. Table 5 shows
number of isotope gauges in use by category of organizations.
The licensee should submit the report concerning management of sealed radiation
sources once a year, the report should be stated about the result of check of facility condition
and the contents of sealed radiation sources (type, the number, activity, etc.). Tables 1, 2 and5 show the summary inventory of users.
5.2 Collection System of SRS in Japan (JRIA Collection Service for SRS)
SRS, installed to instruments, should be returned to the instrument manufacturer, or to
JRIA. Some SRS are transferred to the instrument manufacturer first, finally returned back to
JRIA. JRIA is a non-profit organization that distributes radioisotope products to domestic
users and manages radioactive waste generated from user’s facilities.
Figure 1 is the flow of the management of SRS in Japan. On arrival at JRIA facility the
SRS are unloaded and then separately classified, checked and tested before being assigned tothe proper waste treatment route described below.
a) Reuse and Recycle
Some kinds of SRS may be transferred to reuse route after confirming the quality
required for its application. Certain kinds of neutron source and high-energy gamma-ray
source had been reused to the RI loaded industrial gauges.
19

SRSM activity reportb) Return to the foreign Manufacturer or Distributor
JRIA negotiates with the foreign manufacturer or distributor for returning the SRS asmuch as possible. If possible, the SRS are shipped to the manufacturer after confirmation of
the quality required for its reuse.
c) Storage
SRS incapable to be transferred to recycling and returning route has to be stored in thestorage facility equipped enough shielding against radiation. Some SRS such as Ra-226,
H-3, are packed into specially treated container for long term storage.
Procedures of JRIA collection service for SRS are preceded by three steps as follows:-Step 1: Contact with JRIA
At first, users ask JRIA to collect SRS by “SRS collection request sheet”. JRIA asks
the user a few simple questions about user’s SRS in order to confirm the safe collection
procedure according to the detail of SRS as follows:a) Content of user’s licenseb) Specification of SRS (if need, asked some question about detail of SRS)c) Method of packing and transportationd) Schedule of transportatione) Dose estimation-Step 2: On-Site Customer Services
After the radiation dose is monitored and the surface contamination is checked, theSRSs are sorted according to radionuclides or source activity and packed in to the propertransport container by JRIA (if necessary, extract SRS from instruments or gauges). Somelow level SRS (for example, Ni-63 of ECD) are to be transported by user’s responsibility.
Some instruments and gauges equipped SRS (for example, level gauge) are transported bymanufacturer.
-Step 3: Handling Process and Storage at JRIA
On arrival at JRIA facility the SRS are ordinary treated as follows:a) Unloaded at JRIA facilityb) Checked the consignment documentc) Tested and treated for appropriate waste stream (if necessary, some are repacked )d) Storage (some SRS are packaged within a suitable container for long term storage).
Finally, SRS assessed the appropriate treatment route: Recycle, Reuse, Return to
Manufacturer, or long term Storage.
Through all procedure, the user and JRIA should record matters prescribed by the
Radiation Hazards Prevention Law.
5.3

Disposal of SRS
With regarding to disposal of radioactive waste, including SRS generated from medical,
industrial and research facilities, the dedicated subcommittee was organized under Atomic
Energy Commission at 1995 to submit fundamental concept of these issues. And the othersubcommittee was organized under Nuclear Safety Commission to discuss conceptual design
and acceptance criteria for disposal facility.
20

SRSM activity report

Table 1㩷 Number of Users by Category of Organizations㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 㩷 (as of March 31,2001)
Category

Sealed Radioisotopes

Total

4,059

Hospitals & Clinics

450

Educational Organizations

338

Research Institutions

524

Industrial Firms

1,843

Other Organizations

904

21

SRSM activity report

Table 2㩷 Number of Users of Major Sealed Radioisotopes
by Category of Organizations(as of March 31, 2001)
Category
Major
NuclidesHospitals

Total

Educational Research
Industrial
Organizations Institutions Firms

ratio*(%) &Clinics

Other
Organizations

3H

48

1.2

-

7

17

16

8

14C

9

0.2

3

1

2

3

-

55Fe

83

2.0

-

10

14

58

1

57Co

124

3.1

9

65

34

14

2

60Co

593

14.6

252

50

57

219

15

63Ni

2564

63.2

21

224

462

942

915

85Kr

324

8.0

-

2

18

301

3

90Sr

323

8.0

141

27

23

127

5

109Cd

54

1.3

-

8

8

38

-

119mSn

44

1.1

-

26

18

-

-

125 I

30

0.7

21

2

5

2

-

137Cs

522

12.9

143

58

62

213

46

147Pm

153

3.8

-

4

13

135

1

170Tm

11

0.3

-

2

5

3

1

192 Ir

243

6.0

116

7

9

108

3

198Au

72

1.8

67

-

5

-

-

204Tl

12

0.3

-

3

6

3

-

210Po

12

0.3

-

5

6

1

-

222Rn

0

0

-

-

-

-

226Ra

137

3.4

60

23

31

17

6

241Am

327

8.1

11

43

46

220

7

252Cf

63

1.6

1

10

21

28

3

* Ratio to the total number of users (4059) of sealed radioisotopes. (See Table1)

22

SRSM activity report

Table 3 Major Sealed Radiation Sources distributed by JRIA
Medical use
Source type
Large㱏Sources

Medium&Small㱏Sources

㱎Sources

NuclideCo-60
Cs-137
Co-60
Cs-137
Cs-137
Ir-192
Ir-192I-125
Gd-153
Au-198
Sr-90

Typical Unit
111TBq111TBq
75GBq (×3 pieces)
740MBq26.6GBq
370GBq
370MBq
7.4GBq
3.7GBq
185MBq
370MBqPurposes of use
Tele-therapeutics
Blood Irradiator
Remote after-loader
Brachytherapy
Remote after-loader
Remote after-loader
Brachytherapy
Bone Mineral Analyzer
Bone Mineral Analyzer
Brachytherapy
Ophthalmic apparatus

Research & Industrial use
Source type
Large 㱏 Sources

Medium&Small 㱏 Sources

㱎 Sources

㱍 Sources
Neutron Sources
Positron Sources

X-ray Sources
TargetNuclideCo-60
Co-60
Cd-109I -125
Cs-137
Eu-152
Yb-169Ir - 192
Am-241
H-3
Ni-63
Kr-85
Sr-90
Pm-147Tl -204
Am-241
Am-241/Be
Cf-252
Na-22
Ge-68
Fe-55
Co-57
Sn-119m
Sm-151
H-3

Typical Unit
370TBq18.5TBq
37GBq
185MBq
7.4GBq18.5GBq
37MBq
185GBq
370GBq18.5GBq
4.8GBq
370MBq15.5GBq
740MBq
13GBq
185MBq
3.7MBq18.5GBq
18.5GBq
11.85GBq
370MBq
1.66GBq
925MBq
370MBq1.85GBq
370GBq23

Purposes of use
Radiation processing
Radiography
Level Gauge
Fluorescent X-ray Analyzer
Scientific research
Industrial Gauges
Reference Source
Radiography
Radiography
Industrial Gauges
Gas Chromatograph(ECD)
Gas Chromatograph(ECD)
Thickness Gauge
Industrial Gauges
Thickness Gauge
Reference Source
Smoke Detector
Moisture Gauge
Industrial Gauges
Positronium study
Positron Camera
Fluorescent X-ray Analyzer
Moessbauer Spectroscopy
Moessbauer Spectroscopy
Moessbauer Spectroscopy
Neutron Generator

SRSM activity report

Table 4

Amounts of Major Sealed Radioisotopes Distributed
by Category of Organizations in Fiscal Year 2000
䈀䌍Bq䈁

Category

Total

Hospitals& Clinics

Nuclides䋳䌈*

Educational
Organizations

Research
Institutions

Industrial
Firms

Other
Organizations

68,476,000-

68,476,000

-

-

-

䌎䌡

5,550

-

-

5,550

-

-

䌃䌲

0

-

-

-

-

-

䌆䌥

6,845

-

-

-

6,845

-

䋵䋷

䌃䌯

39,035-26,085

11,655

1,295

-

䋶䋰

䌃䌯

1,110 6,573,525,605 1.11685E+11

888

䋶䋳

䌎䌩

289,710---

289,710-䋶䋸䌇䌥

13,51010,687

-

2,238

-

585

䋸䋵

䌋䌲

1,532,540---

1,532,540

-

䋹䋰

䌓䌲

13,690---13,690

-

䋲䋲
䋵䋱
䋵䋵

䋱䋰䋹

䌃䌤

1.2005E+11 1,792,650,000

1,628

-

-

-

1,628

-

䋱䋱䋹䌭

740

-

370

370

-

-

䋱䋲䋵

䌉

7,410

7,400

-

-

-

-

䋱䋳䋷

䌃䌳

170,717,214

127,795,073-

130,055

5,610,236

37,001,850

䋱䋴䋷

䌐䌭

938,135--

185

937,950

-

䋱䋵䋱

䌓䌭

-

-

-

-

-

-

䋱䋵䋳

䌇䌤

3,700

3,700

-

-

-

-

䋱䋶䋹

䌙䌢

25,382,000

-

-

-

25,382,000

-

䋱䋹䋲

䌉䌲

560,602,279

112,752,579

1,113,700

5,180,000

441,556,000

-

䋱䋹䋸

䌁䌵

330,595

330,595

-

-

-

-

䋲䋴䋱

䌁䌭

192,400---

192,400

-

䌁䌭+䌂䌥

5,550

-

-

1,850

3,700

-

54,500---54,500

-

䌓䌮

䋲䋴䋱

䋲䋵䋲

䌃䌦

* Unsealed Radioisotope.
Note: The Radionuclides below 100MBq are omitted.

24

Main point of Regulatory Control for Sealed Radiation Source ( Competent authority : MEXT )䃂Low level sources

User

Manufacturer

JRIA

Transport

Handling
facility(Unload& check)

Quality
Confirmation

Disposal(future)StorageLong Term

Manufacturer

Return to& recycle

ReuseManagement of SRS in JRIA

Fig.1 㩷 SRS Management in Japan

䃂Instrument & gauges
equipped SRS

䃂Large㱏 SRS

User

䃂Licensing system (license or notification) 䃂Collection of report concerning sealed radiation source management
䃂Standards for facilities & Actions
䃂Notification of accidents
䃂Inspection of facilities (Periodic & whenever necessary )SRSM activity report

6. Spent Sealed Radiation Source Management in the Philippines
6.1 Introduction
The Science Act of 1958 created the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, presently
known as the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI), under the Department of Scienceand Technology (DOST). The PNRI is tasked with the dual role of promotion and control ofthe peaceful application of atomic energy. To carry out its mandate of regulation and control
on the use of radioisotopes in various fields, the PNRI had promulgated and issued specificregulations known as the Code of PNRI Regulations. The PNRI is also responsible, among
others, for the management of radioactive wastes generated by all authorized users ofradioisotopes, including about 200 medical and industrial users.
The use of both radiation and radioisotopes in the Philippines has been increasing
steadily over the past decade. Recent developments in the field of nuclear energy applications
have indicated the need to further strengthen radiation protection infrastructures including
those for radioactive waste management in many countries including the Philippines. The goalof any government policy for the management of radioactive waste from it’s nuclear
application program is to protect the health and safety of those working in these programs, thegeneral public and the environment.
The PNRI with the technical assistance provided by the International Atomic Energy
Agency establish a low level radioactive waste management facility in the country andsubsequently upgraded its waste management infrastructure.
.
6.2 Sources of Radioactive Waste
The number of PNRI licensees which are essentially the waste generators are shown in
Table 1. The licensees are categorized according to their specific type of application. It will
be noted in Table 2, which shows distribution of these licensees by region that National
Capital Region (NCR), or Metro Manila has the largest number of licensees.
Table 1 Number of Licensed Organizations as of May 2002
Type of Licensee
Commercial
Nuclear Medicine/RIA
Research/Education
Brachytherapy
Teletherapy
Industrial Radiography
Nuclear Gauges
Cyclotron Facility
TOTAL

Number
41
25/22
24
10
17
28
102
1
313

27

Percent (%)
13.1
15.7
7.7
3.2
5.4
8.9
45.7
0.3
100

SRSM activity report

Table 2 Geographical Distribution of Licensed Organization (End of May 2002)
No. of
Authorized
Users
2
25
44
2
8
15
2
2
4
10
4
2
4
189
313

Region
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII
CARAGA REGION
ARMM REGIONCARREGIONNCR
REGIONTOTAL

Table 3 Distribution of Licensed Users According to Geographical Location andClassification as of May 2002
MATERIAL LICENSEES
Facility
RegionCommercial

I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
XII

Hospital

Industrial
Radiography

Research

Physician

1
1
2
1
3
5

2
1

1
2
1
4

1

1
5
1

CARAGA

Industry

Radiation
ProducingAccelerator

TOTAL

1

2

21
39
1
3
6
2
1
4
5
3
2

25
44
2
8
15
2
2
4
10
4
2

ARMM

CAR
NCR

41

1
54

25

15

1

3
52

1

4
189

TOTAL

41

74

28

24

2

143

1

313

28

SRSM activity report

Table 4 Spent Sealed Sources as of EO2001
Radionuclides
Cs-137
Co-60
Ir-192
Sr-90
Co-57
Ba-133
Fe-55
Ra-226Am-241
H-3
Kr-85
Ni-63
Pm-147
Tl-204
Cd-109
Po-210
Pb-210C-14
Ce-144
Zn-65
Pu-238

No. of Units
140
154
33
125
3
1
11
263
919
15
8
346
18
8
1
208
4
1
1
1
10

Range of Activity per Unit
2MBq-18.5 TBq
37 MBq-92.5 TBq
74 MBq-740 MBq

740 MBq
37 MBq- 481 MBq
370 kBq

370 kBq
2.67 MBq – 1.29 GBq

37MBq – 740 MBq
47 MBqLess than 370 kBq
Less than 370 kBq
Less than 3.7 MBq

6.3 Waste Management Strategies
Based on the waste arisings and waste characteristics described in the previous section,
there are essentially two basic waste treatment and conditioning options that are adopted.
These are:xx

Waste collection and packaging for decay storage for final disposal as ordinaryrefuse in a conventional waste dump
Waste collection, segregation, treatment applying volume reduction whereappropriate, conditioning and packaging followed by interim storage awaiting
disposal in a final repository

Conditioning by cementation prevents unauthorized removal of the source because of thebulk weight and robust nature of the package. It also provides a barrier against loss ofcontainment of radioactive material. Such packages would weigh about 450 kg to 600 kg.
Removal and transportation would require mechanical equipment, e.g. fork lift.
On the basis of spent sealed sources collected and stored at the PNRI site in the past, it isestimated that this would result to around 30 – 40 drums of conditioned spent sealed sources,
corresponding to volumes of 6 – 8 cu. M. The new trench translated to an additional storage
capacity equivalent to five years waste generation volume. Two (2) more trenches are
29

SRSM activity report

proposed to be constructed which would translate further to an additional ten (10) years waste
generation capacity. It is hoped that at the end of this period, a final site would have been
established.
6.4 Conditioning of Radium Sources
Radium sources have been used for medical as well as other applications, not only in thePhilippines, but also all over the world. In a few countries, their use have even predated theestablishment of national regulatory authority thus creating problems later on related to lackof regulatory control. Because of their undesirable characteristics, the international radiation
protection community has repeatedly discouraged its continued use. Most countries havealready replaced them with other radiation sources. The long half-life of radium makes it
necessary to eventually dispose of the sources in deep geological repositories. However, thesewill not be available for many years to come (e.g., 40-50 years). In order to avoid accidents
that can arise from improper storage, it is necessary to collect the sources and to condition
them for safe storage until disposal can be made.
The IAEA programme was established in 1991, with the specific purpose of assisting
Member States in their efforts to avoid situations that might result in unnecessary exposure or
accidents with spent sealed sources. The program includes, inter alia, one activity specificallyrelated to the conditioning of spent radium sources for safe storage. The radium conditioning
approach, developed by the IAEA jointly with the Austrian Seibersdorf Laboratories,
comprised the encapsulation of radium sources in a stainless steel capsule followed by placing
the capsule in a steel lined lead container and placing the package inside a 22 L steel drum
filled with concrete in such a way that future retrieval of the capsule for disposal is possible.
The Agency’s assistance to Member States in the field of radium conditioning can beclassified in three major categories:x

Active involvement – An expert team (contracted by the IAEA) carries out theconditioning of all identified and collected radium sources. This approach is adopted
where the infrastructure in the country is not fully developed, only modest experience
with sealed sources management exists and experience with radioactive sources
encapsulation has not been gained in previous activities.

x

Advisory involvement - The Agency will only provide advice in the form of
documents and, if needed an expert who can provide on-the-spot advice. In this case,
the Agency role is more of an advisory in nature. This approach is adopted where theMember States have the necessary infrastructure and technical capability to carry out
such a task on their own. Further assistance is possible in terms of transfer of knowhow, training for a particular skill and providing specific equipment.

x

Information Technology involvement - This approach .is adopted for a country with afully developed infrastructure and experience with encapsulation of radioactive
material in stainless steel capsules for any purpose. The Agency’s involvement islimited to providing documentation, technical procedures and advice.

30

SRSM activity report

The Philippines participated in the above program under an IAEA advisory involvement
scheme in which a national team was identified to undertake the project with the IAEA
providing an expert and specialized tools/materials/equipment. The national team is composed
mainly of technical staff members of the Radiation Protection group of the PNRI responsible
for the routine operation of the centralized facility for radioactive waste management in the
country. The original project schedule was 18-22 September 2000, was moved to March 26 –30, 2001 due to some delay in the shipment of the lead shield. Mr. Qamar Ali of Pakistan
served as IAEA Expert for the Philippine radium-conditioning project.
6.4.1 Radium Project Action Plan
The status of radium sources in the country was validated and confirmed through theissuance of a PNRI Information Notice No. 99-01. The notice informed all concerned users
and licensees that the regulatory body will no longer authorize the use of Ra- sources forhuman use effective January 31, 2000. Authorized users of radium sources were encouraged
to transfer all these sources to the centralized waste treatment facility for safe and proper
management. In spite of the deadline imposed by the PNRI Information Notice, the lastbatches of licensed Ra sources from the Philippine General Hospital Cancer Institute in
Manila and the Ledesma Cancer Clinic in Iloilo City, were not received at the PNRI
Centralized Waste Treatment Facility until August of the same year. In addition to these Ra
sources being turned over due to the PNRI Information Notice, a total of approximately 615
mg of Ra 226 (22.75 GBq) were previously collected and stored, awaiting conditioning.
Further, in the early 1990s, another 450 mg (16.65 GBq) were conditioned in cement in
200 L drums using the “old procedure” of incorporating activated charcoal with the Ra
sources prior to overcrowding with cement, without being TIG welded. All the radiumsources that were previously collected were retrieved from interim storage and segregated inbatches to facilitate documentation and easy transfer to stainless steel capsules. Activity andgeometrical dimensions were noted in the segregation process. This Ra 226 inventory
however, does not include those which have been authorized for medical use but were later
reported/confirmed to be lost and subsequent efforts to recover the same have been terminated.
In preparation for the actual conditioning of the Ra sources, construction of the
workbench and work area was undertaken including the installation of the mobile filtration
system provided by the Agency for the project.

Fig. 1 Working bench/area showing the three distinct zones:
the transfer zone, the welding zone and the leak testing zone
31

SRSM activity report

The workbench/working area (shown in Fig. 1) was divided into three distinct zones; thetransfer zone, the welding zone and the leak-testing zone. The bench was lined with leadbricks (4 inch x 8 inch x 4 inch) about 16 inch in height, front and sides. A lead glass was
installed on top of the lead brick in the transfer zone to facilitate direct viewing of the sources
during transfer to the stainless steel (SS) capsule. The Agency additionally provided 25 piecesof standard size stainless steel capsules and 2 pieces of the big sized capsules for odd shapedsources, including a lead shield that will hold ten of the small sized SS capsules and one big
sized SS capsule. These capsules and the lead shield are shown in Fig. 2.
6.4.2 Conditioning of the Radium Sources
The conditioning process was undertaken directly under a plastic hooded working bench
fitted with a mobile filtration system. The radium sources in glass test tubes were moved one
by one using a transport car with lead shielding into the working area. The glass test tube
containing the radium sources was then picked up using a 24-inch handling tong and thesources are laid out in a polyethylene lined tray inside the transfer zone. The sources are thenloaded into the stainless steel capsule one by one taking note each time of the reading in thedigital survey meter positioned one meter away from the capsule being loaded with radium. A
maximum load of not more than 50 mg or approximately 50 mR/hr at one meter is maintained.

Fig. 2 The small stainless steel capsules and the big sized capsule shown withthe steel lined lead container for the ten small capsules and one big capsule
After the maximum load is attained, the capsule is transferred to a shielded slot in thewelding zone using a handling tong. Since the bottom lid has already been TIG welded andtested prior to the actual conditioning operation, only the top lid remains to be welded andtested. After a cooling period of 3-5 minutes, the capsule is transferred into the leak-testingzone for a bubble test, using a dessicator containing glycol evacuated by a pump at 25 kPa. If
no bubbles appear, it is said that the capsule has passed this test and that it is fully sealed.

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SRSM activity report

After passing the leak test, the capsule is emplaced into the lead shield that is designed tohold ten standard sized capsules and one big capsule at the center. After all the capsules areloaded and placed inside the lead shield, dose rates on contact and at one meter away aremeasured and recorded. The loaded lead shield is then lifted by an overhead crane and placed
inside a 200 L steel drum pre-lined with cement. The drum is then monitored and marked on
the outside surface with a final code number previously assigned.

6.4.3 ALARA Program
The main conditioning team was divided into two groups, 3 persons in each group; onewill be responsible in transferring the Ra sources from the lead pot to the stainless steel
capsule in the transfer zone, one will undertake the TIG welding of the SS capsule after the
Ra is placed inside and the third, will undertake the leak testing and eventual transfer of the
SS capsule into the lead shield. The first group is tasked to do the first five small capsules andthe second group, the remaining five small capsules and the big capsule.
The supporting team includes those who will move the radium sources from the storage
location to the work area. It also includes those who perform routine monitoring of external
exposures, air monitoring and routine contamination checks of lead pots, cover shoes,
disposable gloves, etc. of the main conditioning team inside the controlled area. The
supporting team was likewise grouped according to assigned tasks and duties alternately to
optimize exposure to radiation.
Cold runs involving all aspects of the conditioning process were undertaken using
ordinary construction nails to simulate the radium needles/sources for two consecutive
straight days, jointly with the IAEA Expert, using the remote handling tongs and all theprotective devices to be used in the actual operation. Particular attentions were given to theelapsed time in performing specific aspects of the whole procedure. Slight modifications in
the wok area had to be done in the interest of ALARA, prior to the hot run.
Remote handling tools were used as far as practicable to reduce exposures of the hands
and fingers. Protective clothing, gloves and cover shoes are worn at all times during actual
operation and routinely checked during the operation. Reading and recording of the pen
dosimeters of all the personnel inside the controlled area were done after each capsule iswelded and transferred to the lead shield. This allowed us the opportunity to closely monitor
individual exposures of personnel directly involved in the conditioning operation. Fresh TLD
whole body and finger badges were issued to all personnel during the actual operation in
addition to the badges previously issued for routine use for a specified monitoring period.
These special badges were meant to assess personnel exposures attributable to the actual
radium conditioning operation itself
The immediate vicinity of the work bench/area were lined with polyethylene sheets tocontain possible contamination. Handling tools and devices were provided or lined withdisposable sticky tapes or plastic covers to facilitate disposal of contaminated articles. All
items, including rubber gloves and cover shoes of the personnel who were inside thecontrolled area were checked for possible contamination and subsequently segregated and/or
cleared. A designated and labeled waste bin, which is foot operated, was positioned near thework area to contain possibly contaminated materials.
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SRSM activity report

A check list of all possible materials and supplies were anticipated, prepared and madeavailable prior to the actual operation to optimize the time spent in the actual operation andthus minimize exposures of personnel. Observers, for training purposes, were limited tocertain areas where the radiation levels are constantly monitored and were provided withpersonal dosimeters and subjected to routine contamination check. Digital images and video
footages were taken of the cold runs and the actual conditioning operations for
documentation/QA purposes and to allow for a retrospective analysis of the conditioning
operations and related safety measures.
A digital monitoring system was set up to facilitate actual monitoring and control of theradium sources being transferred from the lead pots to the SS capsules in terms of activity.
The standard sized SS capsule is designed to hold not more than 50 mg of Ra. The set up wasdone in such a manner that the readings are observed from a distance without the possibilityof being exposed unnecessarily to radiation.

6.4.4 Dose Assessment
A total of 560 mg Ra (20.52 GBq) were encapsulated and TIG welded in 10 stainlesssteel capsules (9 standard sized and one big one) and emplaced in the lead shield provided by
the IAEA. The maximum contact dose rate at the external surface of the lead shield is 1.2
mSv/hr. A Capsule Information Form containing the details is filled out for QA/ record
purposes.
A 55 mg Ra (2.03 GBq) source was encapsulated, TIG welded and leak tested in thesecond big sized SS capsule due to its odd shaped dimension. As it was not possible to place
this source in the lead shield provided by the Agency, the SS capsule was placed in a 2.5 inch
thick lead container, properly marked for temporary storage. The contact dose rate on theexternal surface of the lead container is 1 mSv/hr and at one meter, 30 PSv/hr. This will betransferred later to a standard lead shield similar to that provided by the Agency and into a
200 L pre-lined steel drum. A Capsule Information Form containing the details is also filled
out for record purposes.
The lead shield was then lifted and transferred, by overhead crane to a pre-lined 200liter steel drum. The contact dose rates at the external surface of the steel drum are 130 PSv/hr
at the side and 170 PSv/hr at the top.. A Package Information Form containing the results ofthe measurements is likewise filled out in compliance with transport safety requirements.
Contamination checks on the work areas showed slightly contaminated disposable
materials. These materials were segregated and collected in properly labeled containers forproper management. All personnel were cleared for possible contamination using the handand foot monitor at the designated control points of the radioactive waste treatment area.
TLD results, both for whole body and extremity monitoring showed values all within
acceptable limits and indicative of an effective ALARA program.

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SRSM activity report

6.5 Regulations on Radioactive Waste
Disposal of radioactive waste is covered by Chapter IV of Part 3 Standards for Protection
Against Radiation, the latest version of which is currently being revised to conform to the newinternational safety standards published by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
In its effort to establish specific requirements within the framework of the proposed final
repository site and to guarantee the effective treatment and conditioning of radioactive waste
accepted, the PNRI issued Administrative Order (AO) #01, Series of 1990 to all radioactive
material licensees, providing guidelines for the acceptance of low level raw radioactive wastes
from off-site generators. The set of criteria and requirements set in the AO were establishedpursuant to Part 3 , Standards for Protection Against Radiation and Part 4, Transport
Regulations of the Code of PNRI Regulations.
Acceptance criteria for final disposal of radioactive wastes are currently being drafted. A
set of regulations specifically on radioactive waste management is seriously being consideredin the interest of public health and safety among others.

6.6 Philippine Action Plan on the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources
Following the International Conference on the Safety of Radiation Sources and the
Security of Radioactive Materials held in Dijon, France in 1998 and the International
Conference of National Regulatory Authorities with Competence on the Safety of Radiation
Sources and the Security of Radioactive Materials in Buenos Aires in 2000, the IAEA has put
in place an Action Plan for the information and guidance of Member States. This Action Plan
has been revised in June 2001 and was the basic document, among others, used in formulating
the Philippine Action Plan on the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources.
The Philippine Action Plan involves activities related to the establishment and update ofa more comprehensive national database of radiation sources currently in use and those whichhave been spent and disused, including recovered and identified orphan sources. Issues
related to trans-boundary movement of radiation sources in scrap metals
importation/exportation are being addressed through the conduct of dialogues with relevant
government and private institutions and the further strengthening of regulatory infrastructures
already in place. The Philippine Action Plan has been institutionalized and widely
disseminated for the information and/or compliance of concerned sectors. The activities thatare being pursued under this initiative are constantly monitored and assessed to determine its
effectiveness in attaining the set objectives of the Action Plan.

6.7 IAEA Regional Demonstration Centers
The Philippines have hosted two (2) regional IAEA Demonstration Course on Predisposal Waste Management Methods and Procedures in 1998 and 1999. The objective of thedemonstration course is to demonstrate to Member States one or more waste management
methods and procedures which are documented in the IAEA Technical Reports or TechnicalDocuments and which are in agreement with internationally accepted standards and criteria.
The hands-on waste demonstration will provide the developing Member States withappropriate technologies and the practical experience of all pre-disposal steps needed to
manage waste from their nuclear applications. The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute35

SRSM activity reportthrough its centralized facility for radioactive waste management has developed in close
collaboration with the IAEA a demonstration manual which consists of three modules, one ofwhich is on the pre disposal treatment and conditioning of spent sealed sources.

6.8 Siting Studies for a Near Surface Disposal Facility
6.8.1 The Regional Site Screening Methodology
The Philippines is divided into 12 regions excluding the National Capital Region where
Metro Manila belongs. Initially, the site assessment process made use of about 8 appropriate
maps of differing scales. These maps describe the litho-logical conditions, major faults,
shorelines, freshwater bodies, groundwater potential, slopes, and protected areas. A
Geographical Information System (GIS) was employed wherein the various criteria for site
suitability were applied.
6.8.2 Application of Siting Criteria
The Hydro-geological component of the site screening criteria was analyzed to determine
the hydro-geological framework for assessment. This framework basically translates to theidentification of sites with the lowest potential for groundwater and surface water transport ofcontaminants. Equivalent mapping units reflecting the different characteristics that are
deemed favorable or unfavorable for the proposed facility were applied. The units wereidentified based on the presumptive hydrologic characteristics of particular landforms, soil
units and rock formations as well as the regional climato-logical characteristics as publishedby the local weather administration, the PAGASA.

6.8.3 Preliminary Results
The resulting map from the activities described in the preceding section showed thegeologic, hydro-geologic and environmental considerations that were utilized in the site
assessment process. The maps correspond essentially with the hilly to mountainous sectionsof the country. If each of these resulting maps were overlaid, about 90% of the country will beeliminated from being suitable for radioactive wastes disposal. The final map listed about 40
candidate sites to date. This map will be used as a primary map and will serve as an input tosubsequent analysis. The political boundaries of the various regions were delineated and used
to divide the whole area into segment with the aim of identifying an area, considering that abuffer zone of limited land use will be imposed for the disposal site. Final candidate sites willbe identified after the application of the criteria on land use, access and population.

36

SRSM activity report

References
1. International Atomic Energy Agency Technical Document 886, Conditioning and Interim
Storage of Spent Radium Sources, 1996.
2. International Atomic Energy Agency, Management of Small Quantities of Radioactive
Waste, TECDOC-1041, Vienna, 1998.
3. Valdezco, E.M., Marcelo,E.A. , Caseria, E.S., Salom, D.S., Dela Cruz, J. M. “ A National
Strategy for the Management of Disused Radium Sources in the Philippines” poster
presented at the International Conference on Management of Radioactive Waste from
Non-Power Applications-Sharing the Experience, 5-9 November 2001, Malta.
4. Geo-sphere Technologies Inc. Final Report on Site Characterization Study for a Near
Surface Disposal of Radioactive Wastes Project, Subcommittee on Radioactive Waste
Management, Nuclear Power Steering Committee, Philippine Nuclear Research Institute,
2000.
5. Proceedings of the IAEA International Conference on the Safety of Radiation Sources andthe Security of Radioactive Materials, Dijon, France, 14-18 September 1998.
6. Proceedings of the IAEA International Conference of National Regulatory Authorities
with Competence on the Safety of Radiation Sources and Security of Radioactive
Materials, Buenos Aires, 2000.
7. Manual for the IAEA Demonstration Course of Pre-disposal Radioactive Wastes
Management Methods and Procedures, Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, 1998.

37

SRSM activity report

7. SRS Management in Thailand
7.1 Current status of using of sealed radiation sources in Thailand
Radionuclides are used in various applications in medicine, industry, agriculture,research and education and other applications. At present, there are about 700 licensees of
non-nuclear power applications in Thailand. The summary of the number of licensee by
category of organizations is shown in Table 1.
Sealed radiation sources have been used in Thailand for more than 40 years. All sealed
radiation sources are imported from oversea suppliers. The use of sealed radiation sources areclassified by different applications as follows:- Medicine
Major large gamma sources used in Medicine are as Co-60 and Ir-192 for tele-therapy in
hospitals. The activity of large gamma sources are in rage of 500-13,000 Ci. The medium andsmall gamma sources are as Cs-137, Co-60, Ir-192, Au-198 and Ra-226 for remote after
loading and brachytherapy. Such kinds of beta source is Sr-90 used for eye applicator. Detailsof the types of sealed sources and their purpose of use can be seen in the Table 2.
- Industry
Thai industry uses sealed radiation source in a variety of applications such as using Cs137, Co-60, Kr-85 for level and density gauging of uncountable goods and for automatic
thickness measurement respectively. The radiography gamma sources (Ir-192) are also
applied for non-destructive material testing of metal construction. Major large gamma source
used in industrial application is Co-60 for irradiation purposes such as sterilization of medical
and hygienic products and sterilization of food and agriculture products. The activity of large
gamma sources are in range of 500,000-3,000,000 Ci. Table 3 shows details of sealed source
used in industrial applications.
- Research & Education
Research & Education authorities use many kinds of sealed radiation sources for theirtraining and education purposes. OAEP itself uses Co-60 as gamma irradiator for research on
agriculture such as insect- sterilization, plant-mutation, polymerization of natural rubber andetc. Table 4 shows details of sealed source used in research and education.
- Other applications
Some radionuclides are used for other purposes, Am-241 and Ra-226 are still used as
ionization source for lightning preventors, depleted uranium is used in mass balancing
applications in aeroplanes and yachts and also used as shielding material in nuclear industry.
The summery of nuclides used in this category can be seen in Table 5.

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SRSM activity report

Table 1 Number of Users by Category of Organizations( as of fiscal year 2001)

Category
Hospitals & Clinics
Research & Education
Industries
Others
Total

Number of License
92
174
258
167
691

Total activity ( Ci)323,842.01
7,811,186.81
686,468.97
1.20
8,821,498.99

Table 2 Major Sealed Radiation Sources in Medical Use
Source Type

NuclideActivity/unit

Large Gamma
Sources
Medium &Small Gamma
Sources
Beta Sources

Co-60
Cs-137
Co-60
Cs-137
Ir-192
Sr-90

500 -13,000 Ci
1,700 Ci
5000 mCi
1000-1300 mCi
12000 mCi
50 -100 mCi

Total
Unit
29
1
11
63
7
27

Purposes of use
Teletheraphy
Blood Irradiator
Remote after-loader andBrachytherapy
Eye Applicator

Table 3 Major Sealed Radiation Sources in Industrial Use
Source Type

NuclideActivity/unit

Total
TypicalUnit

Large Gamma
Sources

Co-60

500,000-3,000,000 Ci

3

Co-60

500,000 Ci

1Medium &Small Gamma
Sources

Co-60
Co-60
Co-60
Cs-137
Cs-137
Ir-19230 Ci
1-5 Ci
1-3 Ci
1-5 Ci
500 mCi
500 Ci

2
58
141
29
484
16

Irradiator for Sterilizationof Medical Products
Irradiator for Sterilizationof Agricultural ProductsRadiography
Logging
Level Gauge
Logging
Level Gauge
Radiography

NeutronSources
Alpha Sources
Beta Sources

Am-241

1 Ci

31

Moisture Gauge

65 mCi
10 mCi
150 mCi - 1 Ci
50 mCi
700 mCi
20 mCi
45 mCi
5 mCi

155
10
120
37
15
55
10
10

Level Gauge
Gas ChromatographThickness Gauge
Industrial Gauge
Thickness Gauge
Industrial Gauge

X-ray source

Purposes of use

Be
Am-241

Ni-63
Kr-85
Sr-90
Pm-147
Po-210Fe-55
Cd-10940

Fluorescent X-ray Analyzer

SRSM activity report

Table 4 Major Sealed Radiation Sources in Research and Education
Source Type

NuclideActivity

Total
Unit

Large Gamma
Sources

Co-60

7,000-656,000 Ci

5

Irradiator for research
works

Medium andSmall Sources

Co-60
Cs-137
Am-241
Am-241,Be
Ra-226Fe-55

0.05 PCi-50 mCi
0.5 PCi-50 mCi
0.01 mCi-10 mCi
1 Ci
0.1 mCi
10 mCi - 1 Ci

86
110
63
51
6
23

Standard Source
Standard Source
Standard Source
Moisture gauge
Standard Source
Fluorescent X-ray Analyzer

Beta Sources

Sr-90
Kr-85

0.02-20 mCi
10 mCi -1Ci

1224Standard Source
Standard Source andThickness Gauge

Purposes of use

Table 5 Major Sealed Radiation Sources in Other Applications
Source Type

NuclideActivity (mCi)

Total
Unit

Alpha Source

Am-241
Ra-2263 -10
0.5 -1277
31Lightning Preventor
Lightning Preventor

Alpha Source

Am-2410.001

267

Smoking Detector

Total

575

Purposes of use

7.2 Inventory of Spent Sealed Radiation Sources in Thailand
The inventory of Spent Sealed Radiation Sources in Thailand has been assessed byRadioactive Waste Management Division, OAEP since 1974. The data keeping is now
developing by computer programs. The details of accumulation of disused sources can beseen in the Table 6.

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SRSM activity report

Table 6 Major Spent Sealed Radiation Source Inventoryat Waste Management Division, OAP(as of October,15 2002)

Inventory
Source Type Half life

Am-241, Be
Am-241
Au-195
Cd-109
Co-57
Co-60

Cs-137

DepleteU
Fe-55
Ir-192
Kr-85
Ni-63
Pm-147

Activity(Numberof Piece)

Present status of Management

10
161
1
15
11
125
8
1*
12

Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned
Delay for decay
Delay for decay
Delay for decay
Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned

432.7 y432.7 y186.1 d462 d271.8 d5.271 y50 - 3,000 mCi
2.4 - 150 mCi
1 mCi
0.33 - 10 mCi
1.8 mCi
less than 1 Ci
1 Ci - 50 Ci
420 Ci
400-1000 Ci(Teletherapy Units)30.17 yless than 1 Ci
1 -50 Ci
Unknown
4.47E9 y
Unknown
2.73 y2.08 mCi-20 mCi
73.84 dUnknown
1000 mCi
10.76 yUnknown
8.39 mCi-500 mCi
92 y
Unknown
2.6234 y
Unknown

154
66
7
61
13
8
1
8
22
15
1
18
1
19
3
6
58
948
1
165
35
28

2.25 mCi-5,000 mCi

Po-210138.38 d

Ra-226, Be
Sr-90

1600 y29 yUnknown
0.002 mCi-12 mCi
3-7 mCi
Unknown
0.075 mCi-106.4 mCi

Ra-2261600 y4823.6 mg(total)
4000 mg1818.2002 mg(total)

Tl-204

1.60E3y

unknown
0.6 - 500 PCi

already conditioned in September 2002

Interim storage or Return toOriginal
Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned
Reuse
Delay for decay
Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned
Delay for decay
Delay for decay
Plan to condition around June , 2003

Not yet conditioned
Not yet conditioned
already conditioned in 10 drums
Plan to condition around June , 2003
Plan to condition around June , 2003

Not yet conditioned

Note * The Co-60 Source from the radiological accident in year 2000, was successfully
conditioned in September 2002.

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SRSM activity report

7.3 Current topics of SRS Management
OAEP has been the central of radioactive waste management in Thailand. Allradioactive wastes including disused sealed sources which can not be returned to
manufacturer have to be sent to OAEP for further management and storage. Spent sealed
radiation sources received from users are kept in shielded containers. Most of them are unconditioned but planed to condition in the near future. Large sources are still kept in theoriginal packages. Small sources will be conditioned by cementation in appropriate container.
a) Conditioning of Radium-226
Sealed radium-226 source is the primary radiation source used in medicine for morethan 40 years in Thailand. Radium-226 has been used in the form of needles and tubes for
Brachytherapy or applicators for external betatherapy. The strategy of safe management ofspent radium sources is the optimization of conditioning techniques. The approach comprised
the encapsulation of spent radium sources in a stainless-steel capsule , lid welding, capsuleleakage testing followed by placing the capsule in a lead container, and placing the package
inside a 200 L concrete-lined steel drum. For safe interim storage, the drums were closed bytheir lids with appropriate security seal.
In the early year 2001, the radium conditioning operation was co-operated with thesupport of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Korean Hydro Nuclear Power(KHNP). As a result of conditioning operation, 4,823.6 mg (178.47 GBq) of radium sourceswere conditioned in 10 packages (200 L concrete-lined steel drums)and stored at an interim
storage facility, OAEP. The details is shown in Table 7.
Table 7 Package Code and Dose Rate of Final Radium Waste Form

Package Code
CRA012001
CRA012002
CRA012003
CRA012004
CRA012005
CRA012006
CRA012007
CRA012008
CRA012009
CRA012010

Dose rate on
Lead Container(PSv/h)
1,780
1,840
2,460
1,620
1,980
2,402
1,780
1,950
2,560
2,370

Dose rate on Final Package(PSv/h)Surface
1 m. Distance
134
14
142
15
182
24
122
12
142
15
172
21
151
19
120
18
186
23
183
24

43

Measuring Date
21-02-2001
21-02-2001
21-02-2001
27-02-2001
21-02-2001
21-02-2001
21-02-2001
21-02-2001
21-02-2001
21-02-2001

SRSM activity reportb) The Radiological Accident from the Scrap Metal
OutlineA serious radiological accident occurred in Samut Prakarn, Thailand, in late January andearly February 2000, when a disused 60Co teletherapy head was partially dismantled, takenfrom an unsecured storage location and sold as scrap metal. Individuals who took the housing
apart and later transported the device to a junkyard were exposed to radiation from the source.
At the junkyard the device was further disassembled and the unrecognized source fell out,
exposing workers there. The accident came to the attention of the relevant national authority
when physicians who examined several individuals suspected the possibility of radiation
exposure from an unsecured source and reported this suspicion. Altogether, ten people
received high dose from the source. Three of those people, all workers at the junkyard, diedwithin two months of the accident as a consequence of their exposure.
Discovery
After the physician from the Samut Prakarn Hospital called the OAEP about the patientsand expressed his concern about a possible unsecured radiation source in the environment, the
OAEP immediately dispatched two officers (health physicists) to see the physician and hispatients. The OAEP officers arrived at the Samut Prakarn Hospital at 12:30 on 18 February
2000 to investigate the case further. From the information provided by the patients and theowner of the srap meatal shop, the OAEP officers, jointly with local public health officers,
initiated a search to find the unsecured radiation source. During their journey towards the
junkyard, the officers had their radiation detectors switched on. In the direction of the
junkyard, they noted a significant increase in radiation levels about 20 times normal. There, aradiation level of over 1 mSv/h was measured at the side entrance of the yard, confirming thepresence of an intense gamma source. At this point they recognized that this was a serious
radiological accident and called for assistance.
Recovery
Recognizing the seriousness of the radiological situation, the OAEP officers called uponan emergency response team. A command and co-ordination post was then established in thevicinity of the junkyard. The radiation level survey found a dose rate of up to 10 Sv/h in the
junkyard and around the pile of scrap where the source was located. The local area wascordoned off at radiation level of 300 PSv/h, which occurred about 10 m from the junkyard.
Access to the junkyard was restricted and the street outside was closed to traffic. The very
high radiation level prevented the emergency response team from getting close enough to
pinpoint the exact location or determine the physical shape of the source among the scrap
material. Further field operations to locate the source continued throughout the night until
04:00 on the morning of 19 February 2000. The operations until later that morning and thepolice secured the entire area.
Later on the morning of 19 February 2000, the local public health authorities resumed
recovery operations at the junkyard. At approximately 150 m from the junkyard, a dose rateof 1.7 PSv/h was measured. This level increased to 200 PSv/h on the sidewalk across from the
junkyard at a distance of approximately 20 m from the source.

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SRSM activity report

Meanwhile, the emergency response team recovery operation resumed its activities at
the OAEP. Personnel watched the videotapes taken the previous night and planned theretrieval operations, and gathered the necessary tools and equipment for the source recovery.
Then the emergency response team returned to the junkyard. The planning included rehearsals
using a dummy object in order to familiarize emergency response team members with thetools and techniques for retrieving the unknown source when it was finally located. To clear
a path to the location of the source within the junkyard, a heavy iron fenced entry gate andsome scrap were removed with the help of a mechanical excavator. This excavator was also
used to place a lead wall 5 cm thick by 1 m wide by 2 m high near the source to provide someshielding to individuals trying to find and recover the source. The dose rate behind this shield
was reduced more than twenty-fold. Spotlights and two closed circuit television (CCTV)
cameras and monitors were installed to facilitate the operation.
Finally, in an effort to locate the source accurately, a fluorescent screen was used. The
fluorescent screen was of a size suitable for image intensification for diagnostic X-ray films.
Personnel had to wait until the moonlight had diminished for suitable darkness in which touse the screen accurately. At around 21:00 on 19 February 2000, the position of the source
within the remaining pile of scrap was accurately determined. However, many pieces of scrap
metal still surrounded the source.
Having now located the source, OAEP emergency response team personnel innovated ameans of retrieving it by attaching an electromagnet to a length of bamboo. Other grasping
tools were not long enough to afford adequate personnel protection, and spending time trying
to grapple the source with tongs would have resulted in personnel receiving radiation doses
from the intense radiation field.
On 20 February 2000 at 00:20, the source, which had been estimated to be about 4 cm
long and 2.5 cm in diameter, was retrived. Tongs 2 m in length were used to pick up thesource and place it into a lead shielding container. In situ gamma spectrometry was
performed and the source was identified to be 60Co. The source activity was estimated atroughly 15.7 TBq (425 Ci)
The source was transported to safe storage at the OAEP on 20 February 2000. The leadcontainer containing the source was placed under 4.5 m of water in what was formerly a spent
fuel storage pool.
Conditioning
At present, the Co-60 source was moved to a safe dry storage facility at OAEP. A leadshielded container designed, based on the concept of surface dose rate less than 2 mSv/hr.
The conditioning of Co-60 source was successful operated on 6-7 September 2002. The
details of lead shielding is shown in Fig. 1.

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SRSM activity report

Fig. 1 Details of Lead Shielded Container for Co-60 Source for Long Term StorageC) Experience of Steel Works
In the year 2001, a private steel factory accidentally melted radioactive sources withother scrap metals. While the radiation exposures of factory workers and the public have thus
far, been low and below regulatory limits, but the financial consequences have been large
because of the costs resulting from decontamination, waste management and lost revenue
during temporary shutdown.
With the assistance of OAEP staff from Radioactive Waste Management Division and
Health Physics Division, those melted steels contaminated with radionuclides were carefully
carried out as Radioactive Wastes and kept in the safe place at OAEP for further management.
Many scrap metal recycling facility in Thailand have been suggested by OAEP that theyshould install the radiation surveillance systems at scrap metal entrance gate and the scrap
processing facilities to detect radioactive sources that may be in incoming shipments of metal
scrap. But the problem is that these systems are sophisticated in design, very sensitive, andcorrespondingly expensive.
Some private scrap metal recycling facilities did agree to the OAEP suggestion, and they
have been successful in identifying radioactive sources or devices containing radioactive
sources in scrap metal.
From the incident report on radiation sources in Thailand (Suwat, 2001) reported thatimported scrap metal contained radionuclides was found 3 time in a private iron factory in theyear 2000. Later, in April, 2001, a 50 mCi of Cs-137 was melt down in furnace at a private

46

SRSM activity reportiron factory. The OAEP was informed and then OAEP staff went there to give the assistance.
The OAEP staff reported that 20 tons of contaminated dust was found as well.
In August 2001, regarding to the discussion/survey meeting on SRS Management washeld in OAEP, Bangkok, Thailand. The Japanese expert team and Thai experts were invited tovisit that private iron factory and was reported by the Radiation Safety Officer there about theRadioactive Material Incident Report of this factory as shown in Table 8.
Table 8 Radioactive Material Incidents at a private iron factory
DateRadionuclide

Dose rate ( mR/hr)

Source12/05/2000

Cs-13740

East Europe

28/06/2000

Cs-137,fission products

40

East Europe

10/10/2000

Ba-133> 6000 cps

local scrap dealer

16/12/2000

Ba-133

2.5

East Europe

17/12/2000

fission products

3224 cps

East Europe

06/02/2000

fission products

0.5

East Europe

26/04/2001

Cs-137

unknown

unknownd) Waste Storage Facilities
At present, the OAEP has two radioactive waste storage buildings. One of them is used
to store disused sealed sources, and conditioned Ra-226 sources. The other one is used tostore the Radioisotope (RI) Wastes.
In the future, there will be the establishment of the new nuclear research center(Ongkharak Nuclear research Center, ONRC) at Ongkharak district, Nakornnayok province.
The Centralized Waste Processing and Storage Facility (WPSF) is attached to this center. The
WPSF will serve low level radioactive waste arising in the country including disused sealed
sources. WPSF comprises two main buildings i.e., waste processing building (WPB) andwaste storage building (WSB). The WPB houses are safe and high performance onmanagement of radioactive wastes i.e., collection, segregation, treatment and conditioning.

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SRSM activity report

When the ONRC project finishes, the existing disused sealed sources will be transferred to
ONRC.
All radioactive waste packages including disused sealed sources packages will be stored
in the WSB at ONRC (as shown in Fig.2). The dimensions of WSB are approximately
58mx44mx6.3m in height. The WSB is designed to have a capacity to store 200L waste
drums about 8,520 drums. Moreover, WSB provides temporary storage room for disusedsealed source prior to conditioning.

Fig.2 The three main facilities of Ongkharak Nuclear Research Center (ONRC)(1)
Reactor Island,(2)
Isotope Production facility(3)&(4) Waste Processing and Storage Facilities

References
1. International Atomic Energy Agency, “ Conditioning and Interim Storage of Spent
Radium Sources”, IAEA-TECDOC-886, International Atomic Energy Agency,
Vienna, Austria ( 1996 ).
2. International Atomic Energy Agency, “The Radiological Accident in Samut Prakarn”,
IAEA-Publication ISBN 92-0110902-4,International Atomic Energy Agency,Vienna,
Austria (2002).
3. Korea Electric Power Corporation, “ Spent Radium Sources Conditioning Operationin Thailand”, NETEC-RPT-01/2001, Nuclear Environment Technology Institute,
Korea Electric Power Corporation (2001).
4. Al-Mughrabi, “ Working Material “, Technical Manual for Conditioning of Spent
Radium Sources, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna ( 1998 ).
5. OAEP, Annual Report of Office of Atomic Energy for Peace, Bangkok, Thailand (2001).

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SRSM activity report

8. Indonesian Experiences on the Management of Spent Radiation Sources
8.1 Introduction
There is a wide variety of uses of radiation sources in Indonesia. Many uses involve sealed
sources with the radioactive materials firmly contained or bound within a suitable capsule or
housing; some, also, involve radioactive materials in an unsealed form. The risks posed by thesesources and materials vary widely, depending on the radionuclides, forms, activities, etc. Unlessbreached or leaking, sealed sources present a risk from external radiation exposure only.
However, breached or leaking sealed sources, as well as unsealed radioactive materials, may leadto contamination of the environment and the intake of radioactive materials into the human body.
Radionuclides produced artificially in nuclear facilities and accelerators have become
widely available, not only radium-226, but also cobalt-60, strontium-90, caesium-137 andiridium-192. The risks associated with the use of radioactive materials must be restricted andprotected by the application of appropriate radiation safety standards. The risks associated withthe planned use of radiation sources and radioactive materials are generally well known and therelevant radiation safety requirements generally well established. Nevertheless, accidents canoccur during use.
Sealed sources or their containers can have a certain attractiveness because of theirappearance or their apparent value as scrap metal. Due to this reason, in October 2000, 25 unitsof radiation sources have been stolen from the warehouse of Krakatau Steel Co. (a state-owned
steel company), and only 3 units of Co-60 have been found so fat, while the rest of 22 units still
under inverstigation.
Handling of radiation sources and containers by workers and members of the public
unaware of the inherent hazards can give rise to external irradiation or, if tampered with, thepossibility of internal exposure. This has led to serious injury and in some cases death. Sources
incorporated into scrap metal for subsequent recycling can lead to the contamination of plant andthe environment, possibly with serious economic consequences.
A spent source is not necessary waste. There may be other uses for such a source in otherapplications, which should always be considered first. If for any technical or economic reason,no further use is foreseen, the spent SRS can then be declared radioactive waste.
PurposeThe primary purpose of this paper is to describe experiences of and the effort so made byIndonesia to develop and implement activities in maintaining and improving the safety of spentsealed radiation sources.

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SRSM activity report

8.2 Principles of Management of Radiation Sources in Indonesia(a) Sources of ionizing radiation must have sufficient protection to allow for safe normal
operations.
(b) The possibility of accidental exposures involving radiation sources must be
anticipated and there must be appropriate safety devices and procedures(c) Regulatory function (embedded to the Nuclear Energy Control Board, NECB) for thecontrol of radiation sources is supported by the Government of Indonesia to act
independently and to maintain oversight of all radiation sources in Indonesia.
(d) Radiation sources should not be allowed to drop out of the regulatory control system.
This means that the NECB must keep up-to-date records of the person responsible foreach source, monitor transfers of sources and track the fate of each source at the endof its useful life.
NECB was established in 1998, evolving from BATAN, as required by the new act of 1997
on nuclear energy. The act provides NECB with sufficient authority and with sufficient humanand financial resources to function effectively.

8.3 SRS Management Practices
Legislative Framework
In anticipation of possible expansion of the nuclear energy application in Indonesia and inorder to contribute to the global nuclear safety culture, the Government of Indonesia has issued in
April 1997 the Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 10/1997 on Nuclear Energy. This law
covers various arrangements, including the establishment of Nuclear Energy Control Board(NECB) or BAPETEN by the Presidential Decree No. 76/1998 in May 1998, the basic principlesof the regulation practices in the application of nuclear energy, the basic arrangement of waste
management and the liability of nuclear damage.
As stated earlier, the Act No. 10/1997 on Nuclear Energy also stipulates some basic
arrangement on waste management. The basic arrangement is accommodated in Chapter VI with
6 articles. It stipulates inter alia that: the radioactive waste management shall be conducted to mitigate radiation hazards to theworkers, the public and the environment {Article 22(1)} the Executing Body shall accomplish the radioactive waste management, which may
designated a state or private company or cooperative to conduct commercial waste
management activity (Article 23) the user generating low and intermediate level of radioactive waste shall to obligate tocollect, segregate, or treat and temporarily store the waste before being transferred to the
Executing Body {Article 24 (1)} the radioactive waste storage shall be subjected for fee and the amount of storage fee will be
stipulated by the Degree of The Minister of Finance (Article 26)

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SRSM activity report the transportation and storage of radioactive waste shall consider the safety of workers, public
and environment {Article 27 (1)} the provisions on radioactive waste management including the waste transportation anddisposal shall be further implemented by Government Regulations {Article 27 (2)}.
Furthermore, the article 25 stipulates the following:
1. The Executing Body shall provide the final repository for high level radioactive waste
2. The siting of final repository under paragraph (1) shall be stipulated by Government aftergetting an agreement from the House of Representative of the Republic of Indonesia
Elucidation of Article 25 prohibits the use of any part of Indonesia territory by any
foreign or other country as a radioactive waste repository.
Regulatory on SRS
According to the Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 10/1997 on Nuclear Energy, theRegulatory Body is separated fully from the Executing Body. The regulation is prepared toregulate and control the nuclear activities by regulatory compliance early on the planning of
project in the manner of environment impact analysis preparation, licensing demand, regulating
and controlling of activities. Certain necessary rules and regulation for management ofradioactive waste have been issued as indicated in Table 1.

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SRSM activity report

Table 1 List of Existing Indonesian Government Regulations
Concerning Radioactive Waste Management
No.
Name of Regulation
1.
Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 11/1975
on Working Safety Against Radiation2.
Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 12/1975
on Licensing of Utilization of Radioactive Materials and or Another Radiation Sources
3.
Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 13/1975
on Transport of Radioactive Materials
4.
Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 51/1993
on the Preparation of Environment Impact Analysis
5.
Decree of Ministry of Environment No. Kep.-42/MENLH/1994
on General Guidelines on Environmental Audit
6.
Decree of Ministry of Environment No. Kep.-39/MENLH/1996
on Activities Criteria Obligate to Prepare the Environment Impact Analysis
7.
Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 10/1997
on Nuclear Energy
8.
Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 23/1997
on Environment Management
9.
Decree of President of the Republic of Indonesia No. 76/1998
on Nuclear Energy Control Board
10. Decree of Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Control Board No. 01/Ka. BAPETEN/V99 on Working Safety Provision Against Radiation
11. Decree of Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Control Board No. 02/Ka. BAPETEN/V99 on Radioactivity Dose Value on the Environment
12. Decree of Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Control Board No. 03/Ka. BAPETEN/V99 on Safety Aspect of Radioactive Waste
13. Decree of Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Control Board No. 04/Ka. BAPETEN/V99 on Radioactive Materials Transport Safety
14. Decree of Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Control Board No. 06/Ka. BAPETEN/V99 on Construction and Operation of Nuclear Reactor
15. Decree of Chairman of the Nuclear Energy Control Board No. 07/Ka. BAPETEN/V99 on Quality Assurance of Nuclear Installation
16. Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 16/2001
on Tariff of Radioactive Waste Management.
17. Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 26/2002
on Safety of Transportation of Radioactive Materials.
18. Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 27/2002
on Radioactive Waste Management.

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SRSM activity report

8.4 Management of Spent Sealed Radiation Sources
The policy of government of Indonesia for spent radiation sources stipulates that, wheneverpossible, spent sealed sources should be returned to the originator. DC-RWM has a generalprinciple that sealed sources should not be removed from their holders prior to dispatch to DCRWM, or the holders should not be modified physically (excepted from this requirement is Ra226 needles, smoke detector and lighting preventer).
DC-RWM is developing the management information system (MIS) comprising thedatabase of all wastes stored in DC-RWM storage facilities. This system is used to identify
accurately and immediately on the transportation and storage of the radioactive waste. The otherobjective of MIS is to have control on the record of the waste history (transportation,
treatment/conditioning, and storage).
Present development of detailed records for all spent sealed sources in storage includes:-

Identity code (if known);
Radionuclides present;
Original activity/date;Physical and chemical form:
Source dimensions, geometry;
Details of shielding (e.g. gross weight - including shielding containers);
Results and date of a previous leak test;
Measured dose rate and details of measurement equipment used (type, -model, serial
number);
Supplier of the source;
Owner, last user of the source (details and persons responsible).

The NECB is informed when a sealed source is taken out of use, and becomes a spentsource in storage.
Spent sealed sources is segregated and collected separately because of their potentially highradiological hazard. Spent sealed sources generally are not removed from their associatedshielding or source holders unless adequate precautions are taken to avoid exposure to radiationand contamination. Peripheral components of large irradiation equipment (i.e. those not directly
associated with the source) are removed, monitored and disposed of appropriately. Sealed
sources are not subjected to compaction, shredding or incineration.
Special conditioning techniques are required for spent radium sources. Spent radiumsources are stored in an appropriate interim storage area with strict access control and radiation
monitoring. DC-RWM has a strategy to handle the radium by applying simple but effective
methods of increasing the security of spent sealed sources. A potentially suitable method of
securing spent sources is to contain the spent sources or source holders in a suitable size concrete
metal drum (200 L). A convenient way to embed the source in concrete would be to place it in
the center of the 200 L drum that filled with concrete.

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SRSM activity report

When immobilizing spent sealed sources the need for security and possible long-term
retrievability of the drum is always considered.
Quality Assurance
A comprehensive quality assurance program has been established in DC-RWM andperiodically inspected by regulatory body. This program is in progress, and integrated to theadministration of radioactive waste management. For the management of spent radiation sources
it particularly includes the following items:x Quality of the capsule material and the-capsule welding process.
x Quality of the operational procedures (handling, segregation, characterization, treatment andconditioning, packaging, storage and disposal of radioactive waste at the centralizedradioactive waste management facility, and transportation).
x Quality of the calibration of all monitors and radioactivity measurement.
x Quality of the documentation of information and their retrieval.
Quality assurance programmes aim to ensure confidence that all operations are optimallymanaged, waste disposals and discharges are within authorized limits, and conditioned waste
packages are produced in accordance with the specifications for storage, transportation and forpossible disposal. Training of personnel is an integral part of quality assurance. Procedures are
required for all operations involving the management of waste at the user's premises and at thecentralized radioactive waste management facility.
Below is flowchart of organization structure of quality assurance of radioactive waste
management in DC-RWM and the rellation with NECB.

NECB

Director of DCRWMQA TeamDiv. of RadWaste
Management

Div. of
Decontamination andDecommissioning

Div. of Safety andEnvironment

Working command line
Auditing line
Fig. 1 Flowchart of QA in DC-RWM and relation with NECB
A quality assurance program is developed as part of the license application by DC-RWM
and reviewed and approved by the regulatory body. The program define and describe theorganization, responsibilities relevant quality assurance steps and organizational interfaces

54

SRSM activity reportinvolved in predisposal waste management. A system for document control and records provide
evidence that the required quality has been achieved. One of the references of quality assurance
program is the IAEA safety series No. 50-C/SG-Q.
Technical Requirements for Conditioning of Spent Sealed Sources
The main aspects covered in this section are manpower requirements and their
qualifications, operational requirements including materials/consumables, equipment and tools
for conditioning of spent radiation sources.
Man Power:
One supervisor(Team Leader):One health physicist:

One qualified welder:(for Ra-226 conditioning)
Worker (manual labor):

To supervise the whole operation;
To conduct all safety and radiation protection related work (havean assistant for the source transfer);
DC-RWM has 6 health physicists, and in the activity for SRS
conditioning, all health physicists are employed in shift;
Certified welder for stainless steel;For dismantled the radiation sources from the house (only forlightning preventer, smoke detector and Ra-226 needle),
preparation of drums with a concrete liner and operation of thelifting equipment.

Personnel Qualification
The DC-RWM team conducting the operation has good experience and proper qualification
to undertake this work. The team leader is the head of the solid waste treatment subdivision who
shall be a first university degree in engineering physics or related field. He has to have enoughexperience in the field of waste conditioning and related R&D area. This team leader has
experience in leading similar operations. The health physicists are to have a first university
degree in nuclear physics, engineering or a related area. They all have to have enoughexperience in radiation protection work and have participated in some major operations involving
work in radiation areas, major decontamination or conditioning. The welder shall be qualified
for operating TIG welding process (for Ra-226 conditioning).

Facilities (including tools)
The operation requires storage facilities and a laboratory area (operational area) adjacent tothe storage facility or nearby for convenience. DC-RWM has a laboratory for Ra-226
conditioning, and also for dismantling the lightning preventer. This laboratory is just 100 m fromthe interim storage where the conditioned spent radiation sources are placed. Almost all facilities
and tools are available, except some tools specifically required for Ra conditioning whose part ofit has been provided by IAEA.

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SRSM activity report

Work Plan
An action plan is initially developed. It identifies all actions to be carried out from thetime of the approval of the conditioning operation upto the end of the conditioning process of thesources. Below is the work plan of the recent action by DC-RWM on the conditioning of spentsealed sources.

Table 2. Schedule for conditioning spent radiation sources(September-October 2002)

I

September
II
III

IV

October
II
III

I

IV

Confirmation of SRS data
Preparation for man power and tools
Conditioning of lighnting
preventer
Conditioning of SRS

Preliminary Work
DC-RWM has all information regarding the sources inventory and specifically the total
activity, the number of individual sources, their geometry and the hermeticity of the sources ( thiswill be developed and integrated in our management information system of radwaste data). The
shielding device is designed using, a suitable dose assessment to optimize the shielding containerfrom weight, radioactivity capacity, volume and external dose rate points of view. The shielding
container is prepared prior to. Stainless steel capsules for the encapsulation of the radium sources
need to be manufactured. The capsule size needs to take into consideration the source size andshielding device geometry.
In March 2001, DC-RWM has conditioned all Ra-226 (needles and lightning preventers)
stored in DC-RWM supproting by IAEA. But still DC-RWM is in progress for the agreementwith Public Health department for conditioning of Ra-226.

Table 3 Total data of Ra-226 in Indonesia
No.

Type

Stored in DC-

56

Stored in

Total (Ci)*)SRSM activity report

*)

RWM

Hospital, etc.

1.

Needle

17

576

3 Ci

2.

Lightning preventer

320

320

0.4 CiApproximately
At the end of this stage, all sources is stored in an Interim Storage.

Conditioning Phase
Proper procedures are adopted for source transfer from the temporary storage to the conditioning
area. The ALARA principle is well observed with regard to the exposure rate of the operating
staff. Drum preparation is carried out according to technical procedures and prior to theconditioning operation in order to have the drums ready for final use. DC-RWM uses theconcrete drums of 200 l for lightning preventer and Ra conditioning, and use the concrete shell
950 l to emplace the other spent sealed sources. These are the simplest ways to ensure theintegrity and security of the sources. During the entire operation, no work which has not been
anticipated and planned, involving radioactive materials is conducted. Continuous and systematic
monitoring and control of contamination are carried out.

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SRSM activity report

Flowchart of the Ra-conditioning (needle and lightning preventer)
Spent Ra-226
sources

Conditioned in Long
term storage shield(LTSS)

Emplacement of LTSSin the concrete drum
200L

Interimstorage

Flowchart of the conditioning of lightning preventer (non Ra) and smoke detector
Spent lightning
preventer

Emplacement of glass
bottle in the concrete
drum 200L

Conditioned inglass bottle

Interimstorage

Flowchart of the conditioning of SRS (other than above criteria)
Spent Radiation
Sources

Emplacement of SRS in
the concrete shell 950L

InterimstorageFig. 3 Flowcharts of conditioning processes
8.5 Management Hurdles
The major obstacle faced by Indonesia in the spent radiation source management is funding.
Limited budget is not only experienced by BATAN who is responsible to ultimately process all
SRS coming to its facility at Serpong, but even greater problem in funding is faced by users
outside of BATAN, especially the hospitals.
Most hospitals are reluctant to provide budget to manage and send their SRS to BATAN as
demanded by regulation due their lack in funding. They also argue that all SRS were inheritted
from old management without regard of providing special fund to manage the SRS. To overcome
such hurdles the regulatory body BAPETEN and BATAN have invited the radiation source users(including the Ministry of Health) to series of socialization meetings to find solution of thesituation. With regard to SRS in state-owned hospitals there has been an agreement made that
the Ministry of Health will provide necessary fund to manage SRS from government hospitals to
BATAN for conditioning and disposal.
There is less problem with the industry and private hospital since they are more adaptive tobudget change and increase. Therefore there is no special agreement so made. The meetings are
however a good medium to socialise the proper transfer of SRS in order to minimise or evenavoid practice of illicit trafficking.

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8.6 Reported Incidents on Radiation Sources in Indonesia
There were 14 incidents in the application of radiation sources in the year 2000, mostly
having no effect on human and environment. However, in October 2000, 25 units of radiation
sources have been stolen from the warehouse of Krakatau Steel Co. and only 3 units of Co-60 so
far have been found. The rest of 22 units are still under investigations.
In 2001, 6 incidents recorded by NECB. These incidents had no effect on human healthand the environment.
Possible causes of incidents of lost radiatian sources:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

Lack of security, since the containers of sealed sources can have a certain attractivenessbecause of their appearance or their apparent value as scrap metal.
Handling by person with insuficient knowledge of radiation protection or regulation.
Lack of radiation protection personels in hospital and industry.
Negligence of record for use of source.

Tabel 4 Incidents in the application of radiation sources in 2001
No.

Date

1.

18 September

2.

13 September

3.

4 October4.

5 October5.

24 October6.

3 December

Incident
Rubber irradiator: Panel control showed the Co-60 in storage
position, however the source was still in exposure position.
Oil exploration: stucked sources of Am241-Be 16 Ci
and Cs-137 1.7 Ci
Oil exploration: stucked sources of Am241-Be 16 Ci
and Cs-137 1.7 Ci after drill side track
Oil exploration: stucked sources of Am241-Be 16 Ci
and Cs-137 1.7 Ci.
Oil exploration: stucked sources of Am241-Be 16 Ci
and Cs-137 1.7 Ci.
Handle close/open gamma ray did not work properly.

59

EffectNo effect
No effect
No effect
No effect
No effect
No effectSRSM activity report

References
1. IAEA, Management of small quantities of radioactive waste, IAEA-TECDOC-1041, Vienna,
1998.
2. NECB, Report on Nuclear Safety in Indonesia, NECB, Jakarta, 2000.
3. IAEA, Quality Assurance for Safety in Nuclear Power Plants and Other Nuclear Installation,
Safety Series No. 50-C/SG-Q, Vienna, 1996.
4. DC-RWM, Internal Report on Spent Sealed Radiation Sources, DC-RWM, Serpong, 2001.
5. IAEA, Regional Training Course on Management of Spent Radiation Sources and otherwaste from small nuclear application, PNRI, Manila, 1995.
6. NECB, Draft of the Regulation of Radioactive Waste (under progress), NECB, Jakarta, 2001.
7. DC-RWM, Summary Report of Ra-226 Conditioning, DC-RWM, March, 2001.
8. DC-RWM, Quality assurance program in Indonesia, Revision 6, DC-RWM, November 2001.
9. NECB, Nuclear safety report in Indonesia, NECB, January 2002

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SRSM activity report

9.

Current Status of Spent Sealed Radiation Source
Management in Korea

9.1

Introduction
Many kinds of radioisotopes (RI) have been used in various fields, such as university,
research institute, industry, hospital, etc. Radiation from radioisotopes is widely used for the
diagnosis and treatment of cancer, X-ray photography, radio-sterilization, agricultural research,
non-destructive testing and so on. Use of radioisotopes has been increasing steadily in Korea
since 1980s. In recent several years, the number of radioisotope users showed 10% increase
every year, so did the amount of radioisotope waste from the users. Table 1 shows the number
of RI users in Korea as of the end of 2001.
Table 1.

The Number of RI Users by Category of Organizations(as of December 31,

2001)

Organization

RI Users

RG Users

RI+RG
Users

455

332

100

887

36

36

Industrial Firms
NDT Firms

Total

Sales Firms

39

49

8

96

Public Organizations

162

74

15

251

Hospitals & Clinics

76

53

129

Educational Organizations

67

63

66

196

Research Institutions

121

57

38

216

Others

9

2

Total

929

577

11
316

1,822

Note) RG: Radiation Generators

Most of the sealed radiation sources are supplied by overseas manufacturers, but someparticular sources such as Iridium and short half-life isotopes are supplied by Korea Atomic
Energy Research Institute (KAERI). When purchasing a sealed radiation source, the source
should be sent to the Korea Radioisotope Association (KRIA) for inspection tests before itsdelivery to the end user.
Once disused, the spent radiation sources (SRS) are considered as radioactive wastethat should be managed in a safe manner. Korean regulatory framework and SRS waste
management system will be discussed in this paper. In addition, radiation incident experiencein Korea and scrap monitoring system will be briefly introduced.

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SRSM activity report

9.2

Regulatory Framework

The use of sealed radiation source is under the control of the Korea Institute of Nuclear
Safety (KINS) on behalf of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). Organizations
for the management of spent radiation source in Korea are shown in Fig. 1. The Atomic
Energy Commission, the highest policy making body on nuclear matters, establishes national
basic policy on the SRS management. The Deputy Prime Minister is the chairman of the AEC.
Ministry of Science and Technology, MOST, is responsible for nuclear research anddevelopment, nuclear safety, and licensing. Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy
Resources, MOCIE, is responsible for disposal of radioactive waste including SRS andinterim spent fuel management. Nuclear Environment Technology Institute (NETEC), a
branch organization of Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Corporation, undertakes all activities
related to the radioactive waste disposal under the control of MOCIE. Korea Institute of
Nuclear Safety, KINS, performs safety review and inspection for nuclear facilities, anddevelops safety standards. Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, KAERI, is in charge of
R&D on HLW disposal and reuse of spent fuel.

Prime Minister

AEC(Atomic Energy Commission)

MOCIE

MOST

(Radwaste Management)(Safety & Licensing)

NSC(Nuclear Safety Commission)

KHNP(NETEC)KINS(Radwaste Management
Implementation)(Regulatory Body)

Fig. 1 Governmental Organization for Radwaste Management in Korea

9.3 Collection System of SRS in Korea
Most of sealed radiation sources in Korea are supplied by KRIA. Once used, the spentradiation sources (SRS) are directly sent to NETEC. SRS generators may consign thetransportation of SRS to NETEC. NETEC is currently collecting radioisotope wastes from
hospitals, industries, and research institutes, then storing them at a dedicated storage facility.

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SRSM activity report

Some kinds of SRS can be reused after confirming the quality necessary to its
application. Certain kinds of neutron sources and high-energy gamma-ray sources werereused in RI loaded industrial gauges.
KRIA collects the unsealed radioisotope wastes from the RI users and delivers them to
NETEC. The received RI waste is checked and stored in an assigned room according to its
physical, chemical, and radiological characteristics. Fig. 2 shows the procedure of SRS
management in Korea.
MOST

MOCIE
(Radwaste Management)
Licensing
Administrative
Guidance

ReportCollection &Transportation

KHNP (NETEC)(Radwaste Management
Implementation)

DirectConsignment

Safety &RegulatoryKRIA(RI Association)

Cost
ChargeConsignment(Necessary)

RI Users

Fig. 2

RI Waste Management Procedure in Korea

9.4

Radioisotope Waste Generation
Typical RI wastes are plastic tubes, injections, paper towels, glass vials, frozen animals
used for experiments and off-gas filters. About 400 drums by 200 liter RI waste drums areannually collected from various RI users. The collected RI wastes are stored at a dedicatedinterim storage facility in NETEC-KHNP. The interim storage capacity is no more thanninety-three hundred drums. The accumulated number of RI waste drums reaches about fortysix hundred as of August 31, 2002. KHNP will dispose of these wastes at the final repository
to be constructed by the year 2010. Table 2 shows the storage status of RI wastes in the
NETEC storage facility.

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Table 2

Storage Statue of RI wastes in the NETEC Storage Facility

Classification
Combustible
Non-combustible
Non-compactible
Spent Filter
Unsealed
Source
Waste

Carcass Waste
Organic Liquid
Inorganic Liquid

Cumulative
Amount7,741(100L)
359(100L)
506(100L)

Total

3,871
180
216

106 ea

62

(50L)
983
(20L)
41
(20L)

Subtotal

Sealed Source Waste

Convert into
200L drums(As of August 31, 2002 )Storage Capacity
Percentage(200L drums)
(%)

8,800

98
117
4
4,431

8,917

50

172

360

48

4,603

9,277

50

1,353
box

As shown in the above table, the existing storage facility may not accommodate all the
RI wastes to be generated until 2010. Therefore, NETEC tries to apply some techniques forvolume reduction of the stored RI wastes. For unsealed source, the volume of noncombustible waste is reduced by compaction. And the volume of combustible waste andorganic liquid waste will be greatly reduced by incineration.
Sealed sources are kept in appropriate lead containers embedded in concrete blocks or inshielded casing as provided by the manufacturer. They are stored in a radioisotope waste
management facility. The volume of spent sealed sources is strongly dependent on thecontainer type, material, and shape. So the volume can be reduced consolidating several
sources in a specially designed container. One example is an Ir-192 source. The Ir-192 source
is separated from the remaining pigtail by cutting machine. Then, several sources are stored ina specially designed consolidated container. We performs the cutting job inside the receiving
and inspection equipment room for sealed source
The consolidated container contains thirty cylindrical type guide tubes. Each guide tube
equips with six tubes. Two hundred Ir-192 sources are placed in a tube. In order to keep theambient radiation level below the determined level, the consolidated container is put in a
concrete shell of which volume is twenty-four hundred liters. In such a way, the volume
reduction ratio over fifty was achieved. Fig. 3 shows the consolidated container for Ir-192
sources and the tubes. And Fig. 4 shows the RI waste treatment flow diagram at NETEC after

64

SRSM activity reportcollecting RI wastes.

(a)Fig. 3(b)Consolidated Container for Ir-192 Sources(a) and Tubes(b)Unsealed
SourceCollection

Combustible

Incineration

Non-combustible(glass, etc.)

Compaction

Liquid waste

Incineration

Permanent
Disposal

Cutting(Source and Pigtail)Specially
Designed
Container

Temporary
Storage

SealedSourceSealedsource(Ir-192)

Fig. 4

RI Waste Treatment Flow at NETEC
after Collecting RI Wastes

For strong Co-60 and Cs-137 sources, which are not suitable for LILW repository, wedeveloped another type of consolidated container. This package will be exclusively used forspent sealed sources, especially for strong gamma sources such as Co-60, Cs-137. The
conditioning is performed by the encapsulation of the source in a stainless steel capsulefollowed by placing the capsule in the cylinder.
The consolidated container contains eight small capsules and one large capsule. This
container is classified as Type A package satisfying the Korea Atomic Law and the IAEA

65

SRSM activity report

safety standard series 1. Therefore, the radiation level at any point of the external surface
should be kept below 2 mSv/hr. To satisfy this requirement, maximum radioactivity placed ina capsule should be kept below 11 Ci for Co-60 and 20 Ci for Cs-137, respectively. Fig. 5
shows schematic diagram for the treatment of strong gamma sources at NETEC facility.
Before Consolidation

After Consolidation
Retrievable Storag eTube for Sp ent
Sealed Sources

Current Spent Sea led
Sources inexcessively shieldedcontainer

Spent
SealedSourceE n c l o s u re a f te r
d ism antling
1.㟝ὤⶼ䝬 1-A-Co-1
2.䔠㣙㢰㣄 2002.1.1
3.㨰㟈䚩㦹 Co, Cs
4.ⵝ㇠⏙⣽ 1mCi
5.䖐⮨㉔⣽⪔1mSv/hr

Multi-stack
Pile up

1.㟝ὤⶼ䝬
---- 㣄
2 . 䔠 㣙 㢰
2001.1.1
3 .㨰 㟈 䚩 㦹 C o
Cs
4.ⵝ㇠⏙⣽⣽⪔
5. 䖐 ⮨ ㉔ 1mCI
2mSv/hr

1.㟝ὤⶼ䝬
---- 㣄
㣙㦹
㢰
2 㨰㟈
. 䔠 䚩
2001.1.1
3.
Co
Cs
4.ⵝ㇠⏙⣽⣽⪔
5. 䖐 ⮨ ㉔ 1mCI
2mSv/hr

1.㟝ὤⶼ䝬
---- 㣄
㣙㦹㢰
2. 䔠
2001.1.1
㨰
㟈䚩
3.
Co
Cs
4.ⵝ㇠⏙⣽⣽⪔
5. 䖐 ⮨ ㉔ 1mCI
2mSv/hr

1.㟝ὤⶼ䝬
---- 㣄
㢰2. 䔠
2001.1.1
㨰
㟈㣙
䚩㦹
3.
Co
Cs
4.ⵝ㇠⏙⣽⣽⪔
5. 䖐 ⮨ ㉔ 1mCI
2mSv/hr
1.㟝ὤⶼ䝬
---- 㣄
䔠 䚩㣙㦹㢰
2
2001.1.1
3. .㨰㟈
Co
Cs
4.ⵝ㇠⏙⣽
5 . 䖐 ⮨ ㉔ 1mCI⣽⪔
2mSv/hr

1.㟝ὤⶼ䝬
---- 㣄
㣙 㢰
2. 䔠
2001.1.1
㨰
㟈 䚩㦹
3.
Co
Cs
4.ⵝ㇠⏙⣽⣽⪔
5. 䖐 ⮨ ㉔ 1mCI
2mSv/hr

1.㟝ὤⶼ䝬
---- 㣄
㢰2. 䔠
2001.1.1
㨰
㟈㣙
䚩㦹
3.
Co
Cs
4.ⵝ㇠⏙⣽⣽⪔
5. 䖐 ⮨ ㉔ 1mCI
2mSv/hr
1.㟝ὤⶼ䝬
---- 㣄
䔠 䚩㣙㦹㢰
2
2001.1.1
3. .㨰㟈
Co
Cs
4.ⵝ㇠⏙⣽⣽⪔
5 . 䖐 ⮨ ㉔ 1mCI
2mSv/hrFig. 5

1.㟝ὤⶼ䝬
---- 㣄
㣙 㢰
2. 䔠
2001.1.1
㨰
㟈 䚩㦹
3.
Co
Cs
4.ⵝ㇠⏙⣽⣽⪔
5 . 䖐 ⮨ ㉔ 1mCI
2mSv/hrSchematic Diagram for Consolidating Strong Gamma Sources
at NETEC Facility

9.5

Radiation Exposure Incident in Korea
A careless radiation exposure incident was occurred on 22 November 2000 in the Cityof Ulsan, Korea. A non-destructive examination job was completed as planned. But they could
not retrieve the source. Two technicians tried to remove the source capsule stuck inside theguide tube, but they couldn’t. For the next trial, they decided to cut the guide tube of theirradiator using a portable grinder. Unfortunately, they cut through the source capsule with theguide tube, and source particle was dispersed all around.
The source was 20 Ci Ir-192, and the irradiator was Amertest 600B supplied byAmershem. In this consequence, one technician was directly exposed to the broken dispersed
source, and the surrounding area was contaminated. He was sent to the hospital for medical
treatment. Fortunately his exposure level was quite low, so no serious medical symptom wasobserved. The surrounding area was sealed off completely, and emergency measure was taken
into action to prevent further spread of contamination. The decontamination and clean-up
activities had already finished.
The reason of incident has known to be ignorance of work procedure. Even in theemergency situation, the procedure was ignored. It was beyond common sense.

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SRSM activity report

Considering that we have 1,500 radioactive source users and the number of users
increases about 10% every year, we are going to make all effort to enhance operational safetyof radioisotope application in Korea.
9.6

Scrap Monitoring System
One important issue in the SRS management is to prevent from reusing inadvertently
contaminated scraps. Once the contaminated scraps are melted in the smelting furnace, thewhole batch is contaminated. Then it may cause large and high exposure of general public.
Therefore, Korean steel companies are asked to equip an appropriate scrap monitoring system
to find any contaminated scraps.
There are two kinds of scrap monitoring systems. One is the fixed monitoring system,
another is the portable monitoring system. Two large area plastic scintillators are generally
used as a fixed monitoring system. Relative readings from two detectors are measured tocompensate self-shielding effect by scraps. By doing this, it is possible to detect any SRS
placed inside the pile of scraps from small difference of the readings although the measured
dose rate is small because of the self-shielding effect. The fixed system is generally used tojudge whether or not the contaminated scraps are contained in a vehicle.
More sensitive NaI (Tl) or CsI (Tl) scintillator than plastic scintillator is used in the
portable monitoring system. But these scintillators have limitation in their size, and are very
costly. The portable system is used to locate a radioactive source from the pile of scraps after
the inclusion of contaminated scraps is confirmed with the fixed system. In addition, it ispossible to distinguish radioisotopes by analyzing detector signals using a MCA. However, it
is very difficult to judge the inclusion of small SRS in a pile of scraps with the only portable
monitoring system because of the self-shielding effect. Therefore, two monitoring systems(fixed and portable) should be equipped for the effective scrap monitoring in a steel company.
In order to detect radioisotopes in a moving vehicle, a special measure algorithm, so
called Advanced Digital Filter (ADF), is applied. ADF is an intelligent ratemeter function
with a self-adjusting time constant. It provides automatic adaptation to the velocity of amoving source or detector and to the variable intensity of radiation. Fig. 6 shows responses
from a conventional fast filter and from the ADF.

Fig. 6 Comparison of the Response from a Conventional Fast Filter
with that from a ADF
If the vehicle enters the scrap monitoring system, detector responses are decreased
because of natural background shielding effect by scraps and vehicle itself. Therefore, Alarm
threshold should be automatically adjusted by considering the reduction in the natural

67

SRSM activity reportbackground. Fig. 7 shows the concept of alarm threshold adjustment.

Fig. 7

Adjustment of Alarm Threshold by Natural Background Reduction

Fig. 8 shows two pictures of scrap monitoring systems installed in Korean steel companies.
A truck loading scraps is passing by the system in Fig. 8(a), and a truck is entering the system
in Fig. 8(b).

(a)

Fig. 8(b)

Scrap Monitoring Systems Installed in Korean Steel Companies

9.7

Conclusion
Use of radioisotopes has been increasing steadily in Korea since 1980s. In recent several
years, the number of radioisotope users showed 10% increase every year, so did the amount of68

SRSM activity reportradioisotope waste from the users. Therefore, the safe management of SRS has become aimportant issue in Korea. In this paper, Korean regulatory framework was briefly introduced.
Nuclear Environment Technology Institute(NETEC) is in charge of collection and disposal of
RI wastes under the control of Ministry of Science and Technology(MOST) for safety andregulatory issues and Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy Resources(MOCIE) for
administrative affairs. After collecting RI wastes from users, NETEC stores them at a
dedicated storage facility until they are disposed permanently. For the effective managementof the RI wastes in the storage facility, NETEC applies some volume reduction technologies,
such as compaction, incineration, and consolidation. In order to highlight the importance ofsealed source management, a radiation exposure incident on November 2000 in Ulsan, Korea
was analyzed. Finally, types and basic principles of scrap monitoring systems are described.

References
1. Ministry of Science & Technology (MOST) and Korea Radioisotope Association,
Radiation Practices in Korea", 2001.

"Statistics on

2. Ministry of commerce, and Industry and Energy, "Regulation for the consigning radioactive waste
and its cost", MOCIE Notice No. 2002-67, 2002.
3. Choi K.S., et. Al., "Radioactive Waste Management Activities in Korea", Proceedings ofInternational Symposium on Radiation Safety Management (ISRSM), 2001.

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SRSM activity report

10. Postscript
Here we could summarize the project result of the Spent Radiation Source Management Task
Group’s activity under Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) Project of FNCA. The authors are
expecting this information will be widely used to promote a good practice of safe management ofspent radiation sources.

March 2003.
Project Leader in Japan

Toshiso KOSAKO(The University of Tokyo)

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SRSM activity report

We would like to present the contributors of this project.

The Contributor List
Editor :Reviewer :Secretariat :Mr. Toshiso KOSAKO
Mr. Nobuyuki SUGIURA
Mr. Mitsutoshi ODERA(The University of Tokyo)(The University of Tokyo)(JAIF)

List of Contributors/Authors :Japan

Mr. Toshiso KOSAKO
Mr. Nobuyuki SUGIURA
Mr. Hidenori YONEHARA
Mr. Tetsuo KITADA

The Philippines

Ms. Eulinia M. Valdezco
Ms. Editha A. Marcelo(PNRI)(PNRI)

Thailand

Mr. Sutat Tiangtrongjit
Ms. Nanthavan Chantaraprachoom

(OAP)
(OAP)

Indonesia

Mr. Asmedi Suripto
Mr. Djarot Sulistio Wisnubroto(BATAN)(BATAN)

Korea

Mr. Myung-Jae SongMr. Sang-Woon Shin
Mr. Kwang-Sub Choi
Mr. Hyung-Joon Kim(KHNP/NETEC)(KHNP/NETEC)(KHNP/NETEC)(KHNP/NETEC)䎃

䎃䎃䎃
Published by :(The University of Tokyo)(The University of Tokyo)(MEXT)(RANDEC)

Japan Atomic Industrial Forum Inc. (JAIF)

Sponsored by : Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)

URL : MEXT
http://www.mext.go.jp/english/
JAIF http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/
FNCA
http://www.fnca.jp/english/

72