Just Transitions to
Decarbonisation in the
Asia-Pacific

June 2022

Just Transitionsin JapanLeslie Mabon
Andrew Chapman
Benjamin McLellan
Yi-Chen HuangJust Transitions in Japan

About the authors

Dr Leslie Mabon is Lecturer in Environmental Systems at the School of Engineering
and Innovation at the Open University. Dr Andrew Chapman is Associate Professor at
the International Institute for Carbon Neutral Energy Research (I2CNER) at Kyushu
University. Professor Benjamin McLellan is Professor at the Graduate School ofEnergy Science at Kyoto University. Dr Yi-Chen Huang is Postdoctoral Researcher at
Robert Gordon University and the Open University.

About Just Transitions to Decarbonisation in the Asia-Pacific

Working in partnership with teams from the UK Science & Innovation Network,
the programme examines how just transitions whilst tackling climate change
and biodiversity is key to supporting inclusive economies and societies in the
future. Through the programme, the Academy awarded funding to seven research
projects exploring the actions required in the Asia-Pacific to tackle climate change
and biodiversity loss, to identify opportunities for decarbonising economies andsocieties, and to recommend options and pathways for communities, workers,
businesses, policymakers and the wider public. The programme was funded by the
UK’s Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy.

Just Transitions in Japan

Contents
Executive summary

4

1.0

Background and context

6

2.0

What does a just transition mean in the Japanese context?

7

2.1	Definitions and understandings of just transition
from key actors in Japan

7

2.2

8

3.0

Just transition in government plans and policies in Japan

Understanding the geography of a just transition in Japan

12

3.1

Regional challenges under Japan’s net zero transformation

12

3.2

Regional opportunities under Japan’s net zero transformation

15

3.3

Regional just transition opportunity summary

18

4.0

Place-based approach to just transitions: the case of Yubari

20

5.0

Just transitions, climate change adaptation and biodiversity

26

6.0

Conclusions and recommendations

29

References32

About the Academy

33

3

Just Transitions in Japan

Executive summary
This report outlines key issues for a just transition in Japan. Despite its status as ahigh-emitting nation and international criticism for reliance on fossil fuel power
generation, Japan has only explicitly engaged with just transitions thinking to alimited extent. Nevertheless, the impacts of the Fukushima nuclear disaster on
adjacent host communities, plus recent experience of difficulties faced by former
coal-mining municipalities, show awareness within Japan of how energy andsustainability transitions may disproportionately affect less empowered people orplaces. Given Japan’s location in the Asia-Pacific region and the resource constraints
it faces, understandings of how just transition thinking can develop in Japan may beof significant value to other industrialising (or decarbonising) nations.
The report first reviews existing understandings and interpretations of a justtransition in Japan. Japan’s core climate change plan makes reference to the need fora just transition in the context of protecting jobs and regional economies during thenet-zero transition. There is a groundswell of engagement by local governments on
decarbonisation, with the aim of attaining net-zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050.
NGOs emphasise the importance of fossil fuel and nuclear power sector workers’ jobs,
and support for municipalities who rely heavily on revenue from thermal
power stations.
The second part of the report reviews regional challenges and opportunities, as they
relate to the vision for decarbonisation laid out by Japan’s national government.
Available regional data indicates that more rural regions such as Hokuriku andTohoku may have a higher proportion of the labour force involved in activities suchas thermal power generation, steel manufacturing and petrochemicals refining, andthat the largest workforce in carbon-intensive sectors in absolute terms may belocated close to major urban centres of Kanto and Kansai. Conversely, regions suchas Hokuriku, Tohoku and Kyushu may be best placed to benefit from net-zero jobs
in renewable energy infrastructure, with opportunity to retrain or re-deploy existing
workers and infrastructure. Further fine-scale data and better understanding of skills
is needed to understand opportunities and challenges with certainty.
The third part of the report evaluates a case study of just transitions at a local level:
Yubari City in Hokkaido, where a rapid phase-out of coal mining in the 1970s and 80s
resulted in a loss of income in municipal bankruptcy. Yubari’s efforts at sustainableurban planning and the work of third sector organisations since offers an illustrationof how the lived environment can be transitioned to a more sustainable form.
The fourth section looks at jobs and skills required for climate adaptation andresilience. Jobs related to resilience, e.g. infrastructure upgrades, new-build or
retrofit of climate-resilient housing, public health, may provide another pathway
to a just transition for regions that may have less opportunity for net-zero jobs.
Potential environmental and biodiversity concerns associated with wind energy,
carbon capture and storage, port expansion and decommissioning of thermal power
infrastructure are also reviewed.

4Just Transitions in JapanThe report finishes with recommendations across sectors. National and local
governments are recommended to foster opportunities for exchange andmutual learning between localities facing similar challenges; and to ensure thatmunicipalities in areas with heavy reliance on carbon-intensive activities are given
the skills and resourcing to be able to respond early and comprehensively. Industry
and labour unions are recommended to develop finer-scale audits on the skills andcharacteristics of workforces for sectors such as thermal power workers;
and to explore potential for skills passports and certification in new industries suchas wind turbine maintenance. Non-governmental and third sector organisations arerecommended to engage pro-actively with new renewables developments, especiallyoffshore wind, to ensure strong local content in terms of jobs and economic uplift;
and also to collaborate with locally-based NGOs, who may be better placed to initiatedifficult conversations on just transitions in localities where carbon-intensive
activities may be an important component of local identity. The report also identifies
further research needs around finer-scale assessment of jobs and economic impacts
and opportunities associated with decarbonisation in Japan (i.e. at prefectural or
municipal level); and for ethnographic and in-depth research into how communities
respond to the phase-out of thermal power infrastructure, by focusing on areas
currently or soon to face the closure of thermal power plants.

5

Just Transitions in Japan

1.0 Backgroundand context
Rationale
This report provides an initial assessment of the contours of a just transitionin Japan. Globally, there is notable interest in a just transition as an organisingconcept for ensuring that the transition to a net-zero and sustainable society does
not disproportionately affect the least well-off or empowered places, and does
not leave behind the places and people whose livelihoods are reliant on carbonintensive activities. Yet despite Japan’s status as a high-emitting nation and ongoinginternational criticism for a continued reliance on fossil fuel power generation,
political actors in the country are only beginning to explicitly engage with whata just transition means for Japan. Nevertheless, the impacts of the Fukushima
nuclear disaster on adjacent host communities, plus recent experience of financial
difficulties faced by former coal-mining municipalities, indicate that there isawareness within Japan of the potential for energy and sustainability transitions
to disproportionately affect less empowered people or places. This is reflected by a
growing interest among Japan’s environmental non-governmental organisations andresearchers in understanding what a just transition means in a Japanese context,
and in pushing the Japanese Government and high-emitting industries in the
country to support a just transition. Given Japan’s location in the Asia-Pacific region
and the resource constraints it faces, understandings of how just transition thinking
can develop in Japan may hence be of significant value to other industrialising(or decarbonising) nations in the Asia-Pacific and beyond.

6Just Transitions in Japan

2.0 What does a justtransition mean in theJapanese context?
Key Insights•

Understandings of a just transition are still emerging in Japan, with NGOs, as well
as some researchers, media and political actors, beginning to use just transitions
language and consider the just transition implications for Japan specifically;•

Key drivers of a just transition in Japan at present are environmental NGOs and civilsociety organisations, as well as some communities themselves;•

Emergent issues for a just transition in Japan include considerations for workers
in thermal, nuclear, steel and automotive sectors; understanding of implications
for municipalities who are heavily reliant on carbon-intensive infrastructure fortax revenues; and building capacity at local government level to manage justtransitions;•Whilst explicit consideration of just transitions in Japan is still emerging, there
is a much longer history of successful – and unsuccessful – attempts by local
governments, labour unions and industries to transition localities away from fossil
fuel economies in Japan in response to energy or economic circumstances. These
historical examples of coal and industrial transitions can give insights into ‘whatworks’, and what does not, when it comes to local-level transitions with an explicit
climate change component.

2.1 Definitions and understandings of just transition fromkey actors in JapanTo date, the concept of a ‘just transition’ (translated directly as) hasreceived only limited attention within Japan. Japan’s overarching climate change
plan makes brief reference to the inclusion of just transitions in the Paris Agreement,
and to the importance of avoiding job losses and considering regional economies
and businesses during the net-zero transition (Ministry of Environment, 2021b)
Nevertheless, Japanese environmental NGO Kiko Network, a group with a strong
focus on expediting the phase-out of Japanese coal-power domestically and overseas,
in autumn 2021 published a report on what a just transition may mean for Japan(Kiko Network, 2021). Kiko Network estimates that 151,000 workers are employedin fossil fuel and energy-intensive industrial sectors in Japan, contributing 4,510
Billion Yen (approximately £35 billion) to the national economy. The Kiko Network
report suggests that the closures of coal-fired power stations, steelworks and car
manufacturing plants show the need for policy measures to support a just transitionin Japan; and that Japan’s experience with the closure of coal mines offers insights
7

Just Transitions in Japanfor what a just transition requires in a Japanese context. Kiko Network point out thatearly planning, collaboration between national and local governments and industry
and trade unions, and follow-up consultations with workers all contributed to a
successful transition for at least some parts of Japan’s coal industry.
Interviews with key stakeholders conducted for this project similarly indicated thatjust transition thinking is at a very early stage for Japan as a whole, and indeed thatthe term ‘just transition’ does not have a long history of explicit use in documents
or statements within Japan. A core component of emerging NGO activity on justtransitions in Japan is focused very much on transitioning the national energy
system away from coal-fired power, and in understanding what this may mean forcommunities and regions that currently rely on coal power stations for employment.
Compared to European or North American contexts, labour unions arguably have amuch less prominent role in Japan in driving forwards just transitions. Key driversof a just transition in Japan at present are environmental NGOs and civil society
organisations, as well as some communities themselves. Moreover, respondents also
noted that discussions of ‘justice’ are less explicit in a Japanese context, and tend to
be considered in terms of their legal implications rather than in terms of fairness toworkers or communities and regions whose livelihoods may be negatively affected bya rapid and unmanaged transition away from carbon-intensive activity.

2.2 Just transition in government plans and policies in Japan
National government plans, policies and statements
Japan’s Sixth Strategic Energy Plan was released in October 2021. The plan has
the goal of reaching carbon neutrality by 2050, noting that energy accounts forapproximately 80% of Japan’s greenhouse gas emissions. The plan aims to reduce
emissions by 46% (aiming towards 50%) by 2030 (from a 2013 baseline) (METI, 2021).
According to the plan, by 2030 renewable sources are expected to account for 36-38%
of electricity generated (solar 15%, wind 6%, geothermal 1%, bioenergy 5%, hydropower 10%). By 2030, nuclear is planned to make up 20% of Japan’s electricity mix;gas 20%, coal 19% and oil and other sources 2%. The plan states that the longerterm goals of carbon neutrality by 2050 will be achieved by putting top priority on
renewable energy sources – namely, solar photovoltaic, onshore wind, and offshorewind; with the creation of renewable energy promotion areas on-land and theidentification of priority areas for offshore wind development. The plan, however,also includes new innovations in thermal power as a ’stable’ baseload for Japan’s
energy system, with the aim of lowering the use of thermal power in the energy mix
as far as possible and utilising co-firing with hydrogen and ammonia plus use ofcarbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies to further lower emissions. Nuclear
power is also included within the plan, however its role is less clear and safety andpublic trust-building are noted as critical factors prior to restarts.
In the core text of the Sixth Strategic Energy Plan, direct reference to fairness ismade only in the context of fairness within markets and business environments – i.e.
fairness for operators and developers, rather than consumers and workers in carbonintensive industries. Similarly, engagement and cooperation with host communities
and local governments for large-scale energy infrastructure to enable a fair energy
transition focuses largely (albeit not exclusively) on issues relating to nuclear power;
or for understanding regional capacity to implement renewable energy infrastructure.

8Just Transitions in Japan

Underpinning the Sixth Basic Energy Plan is Japan’s Plan for Global WarmingCountermeasures (Ministry of Environment, 2021). This sets the target of a carbonneutral society by 2050, and a 46% (aiming for 50%) reduction in carbon dioxide
emissions by 2030. Japan’s climate change plan makes explicit mention of the needfor a just transition in the context of providing support to prevent unemployment
during aggressive decarbonisation, and also notes the need to consider regional
characteristics plus the transition of local businesses and local economies as wellas the labour force.
Japan’s government has also produced a ‘Roadmap to Beyond-Zero Carbon’, andin late 2020 laid out fourteen priority areas of green growth. These are potentially
important for a just transition for carbon-intensive workers and regions, as they
indicate areas in which there is likely to be growth and investment – and hence
where jobs and economic opportunities associated with a net-zero society may lie.
The priority sectors are split across energy (offshore wind; fuel ammonia; hydrogen;nuclear power); transport and manufacturing (mobility and battery; semiconductor
and ICT; maritime; logistics, people flow and infrastructure; foods, agriculture,
forestry and fisheries; aviation; carbon recycling); and home/office (housing andbuilding, next generation photovoltaic; resource circulation; and lifestyle relatedindustry) (METI, 2020).
Figure 1. Technical approaches to energy and climate mitigation within Japan Pavilion at
COP26, November 2021

From top left: hydrogen society; offshore wind; carbon capture and storage; regional renewables

9Just Transitions in Japan

In public-facing rhetoric around COP26 and climate change actions more widely,
the Japanese Government has frequently placed heavy emphasis on technologicalapproaches to reducing emissions from energy sources, especially hydrogentechnologies, carbon dioxide capture and storage, and large-scale wind installations(see Figure 1). These may have implications in terms of (a) the regions and localities
that are expected to host storage and production facilities, versus where energy isrequired; and (b) the cost and availability of energy, especially given the current highprice of hydrogen to consumers and lack of transportation infrastructure. Climate
think-tank TransitionZero, in a report launched in early 2022, argued that theadvanced coal technologies to which the Japanese Government referred at COP26- ammonia co-firing, coal gasification (IGCC) and CCS – would be both costly andincompatible with net-zero targets (TransitionZero, 2022). TransitionZero instead
called for a greater emphasis on renewables, especially offshore wind, and only forvery limited and targeted use, if at all, of ammonia and CCS.
Offshore wind is hence gaining traction as a critical decarbonisation strategy forJapan, with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in autumn 2021 identifying
22 locations off the Japanese coast for upcoming and future licensing rounds,
following the 2018 Offshore Renewable Energy Act. From a just transition perspective,
however, there remains a need to ensure strong local content – as seen with the Goto
Project in Nagasaki Prefecture (Japan’s Floating Offshore Wind Group, 2021) – and toallay fishers’ concerns about the effects of offshore wind on livelihoods.
At the time of finalising this report, Russian President Vladimir Putin launcheda violent and aggressive invasion of Ukraine, supported by Belarussian President
Alexander Lukashenko. Japan joined a breadth of ‘Western’ nations, including the UK,
USA and the European Union, in imposing severe sanctions on Russia in response.
Although it is not possible at present to predict with certainty what the impactof these sanctions will be on Japan’s energy mix, let alone how this might affectthe economic and employment prospects of Japan’s carbon-intensive industries
domestically, it is notable that major Japanese energy developers such as Mitsubishi,
Mitsui & Co, Marubeni and Itochu own stakes in Russian LNG developments with
Gazprom and Rosneft (S&P Global, 2022). With other operators such as Shell and BP
withdrawing from projects in Russia and offloading their shares in Russian operators,
it is likely that Japanese energy majors will come under increasing pressure, both
domestically and internationally, to withdraw from projects in Russia. The Japanese
Government and energy industries are also likely to face similar pressure to reduce– or eliminate completely – imports of fossil fuel energy from Russia. Prior to theinvasion, Japan was already diverting LNG towards Europe and the USA to support
energy security as the Ukraine crisis escalated (Reuters, 2022). From a just transition
perspective within Japan, an important issue to follow will be to what extent – andwith what – energy previously sourced from Russia is replaced; and whether Japanturns to alternative energy sources (e.g. nuclear power, prolonging life of existingcoal plants) to free up LNG for the USA and European countries with greater needin the absence of Russian gas.

10

Just Transitions in Japan

Just transitions in Japan at local and regional government levels
Local governments across Japan are also beginning to take the initiative and cometo prominence as enablers of just transitions in their own locality. In summer
2021, Kyoto City Government became the first Japanese member of the Powering
Past Coal Alliance, with a view to removing coal power from its local energy mix
and encouraging the national government to expedite a phase-out of coal power.
Fukushima Prefecture has also set the target of producing 100% of its energy fromrenewable sources by 2040 (Fukushima Prefecture, 2018). Japan’s national ministryof environment keeps an inventory of local governments who committed to takeactions towards net-zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050, and by late 2021 hadrecorded 479 local governments (or 87.9% of all local governments in Japan) with
policies related to net-zero (Ministry of Environment, 2021a). Within the Ministryof Environment inventory, however, there is no explicit mention of just transitions(although this is not to say that the term may be mentioned within local governments’
own policies), and only one municipality – Hirono Township in Fukushima
Prefecture – which makes explicit reference to transitioning a thermal power station
workforce towards renewables.
Nonetheless, whilst some local governments are taking a leading role in initiating
just transitions in Japan, there is difference in capacity and capability to engage
with just transitions thinking – both domestically and internationally – between
localities and regions. A particular concern is that local governments in some ofthe places that may need to engage most deeply with a just transition may lack thestaffing or resourcing to engage. These concerns relate to skills and resourcing – withsome local governments struggling for resourcing against a backdrop of declining
populations and tax returns – and to the knowledge of energy and climate issues (aswell as English language) in some local governments. In other words, there is a needto ensure there is good capacity to understand and engage with just transitions in all
local governments, and not only in ‘pioneer’ or flagship cases.

11Just Transitions in Japan

3.0 Understanding
the geography of a justtransition in JapanKey Insights•

Particularly in more rural regions of Japan, carbon-intensive activities such as
employment in thermal power stations is a relatively large proportion of thetotal workforce;•

Regions with the highest opportunities for development of net-zero infrastructure
do not necessarily match up to the regions where carbon-intensive activities makeup a larger proportion of the workforce;•

For rural areas with high renewables potential such as Tohoku, Hokuriku andKyushu, consideration of how to link energy, manufacturing and construction jobs
will be crucial to bring local benefit from renewable energy deployment.

3.1 Regional challenges under Japan’s net zero transformation
Jobs associated with the most carbon-intensive industries can be estimatedto understand which regions may rely most heavily on particular activities for
employment and economic benefit (see Table 1 and Figure 2). As well as absolute
numbers, it is important is to look at the relative proportions of the workforce
between regions, and use this as a starting point to consider which regions may face
the biggest impacts and require the greatest support in helping Japan to meet its
climate obligations.

12Just Transitions in Japan

Table 1. Estimation of carbon-intensive jobs in major emitting sectors by region
RegionFossil fuel
power

Steel

Petrochemical

Nuclear*

Vehicle**Paper**

Hokkaido

456

1041

815

598

2689

16160

Tohoku

1613

1760

788

2375

10757

18469

Minami-Kanto

3216

1760

6597

N/A

18824

N/A

Kita Kanto-Koshin

928

1760

1070

318

32270

20778

Hokuriku

935

1760

N/A

6187

2689

13852

Tokai

2339

3246

2722

1046

86054

46173

Kinki

1695

7374

2595

N/A

16135

27704

Chugoku

1084

530

3044

370

10757

16160

Shikoku

552

530

750

585

N/A

16160

Kyushu

1279

5666

739

1521

18824

11543

Okinawa

110

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

* whilst not ‘carbon intensive’ per se, nuclear is included for context as nuclear power workers are frequently
considered in Japan within the context of a just transition. Note also that the Fukushima Dai’ichi plant is
excluded from this estimate, as jobs there concern engineering and environmental management rather thanpower generation.
** figures for vehicle manufacturing and paper and pulp are estimates based on industry association figures.

Figure 2. Regions of Japan set out in Japan Labour Force Survey

Hokkaido

Okinawa

Hokuriku

TohokuKita-Kanto-Koshin

Chugoku
Tokai
Shikoku

Minami Kanto

Kinki

Kyushu13

Just Transitions in JapanThe figures estimated in Table 1 give a sense in absolute terms of where theworkforce in carbon-intensive sectors – and hence where people who may be likely
to be affected by Japan’s transition to a net-zero society – may be located. What is
immediately noticeable is that the region with the greatest number of fossil fuelpower sector workers and also petrochemicals workers, is Minami-Kanto – in otherwords, the Tokyo metropolitan area. This is perhaps not surprising given the numberof thermal power stations and oil refineries that are located around Tokyo Bay, andthe associated demand generated by the significant population concentration in
the area. The Kinki Region – in particular Osaka and the industrialised coast of
Hyogo Prefecture – hosts the largest share of steel jobs; followed by Kyushu, again
unsurprising given the long history of steelmaking in the Kitakyushu area. Similarly,
the large number of vehicle manufacturing jobs in the Tokai region intuitively makes
sense if one considers that Toyota is headquartered in Nagoya. Two points that arenotable, however, are (a) the large petrochemical refining capacity and associatedjobs in the Chugoku area to the south-west of Japan; and (b) the very high number ofnuclear power sector workers in the largely rural Hokuriku region.
More useful in terms of understanding which regions may face the most pressure
and require the most support for a just transition is, however, the relative sizes of theworkforce in each region as a proportion of the overall regional labour force. Figure 3
shows the number of workers in each region in the most carbon-intensive activities
outlined in Japan’s submission to the Paris Agreement (as above) as a proportion of
the total labour force in each region listed in the 2020 Japan Labour Force Survey.
Figure 3. Workers in carbon-intensive activities as a proportion of the total regional labour
force in Japan
RegionFossilfuel

Steel

PetroNuclear*chemical

Hokkaido<>>

Tohoku^><Minami-Kanto

<

<

>

Kita Kanto-Koshin

<

<

<

Hokuriku

^

^

Tokai

>

>

>

Kinki

<

^

<

Vehicle**Paper**

<

<

>

>

<

>

<
<

>

>

^

<

>

<

^

>

<

<

>

>

^

Comparatively very high proportionof workforce (>1 SD above average)

Chugoku

>

>

^

>

>

Above-average proportion of
workforce (0-1SD above average)

Shikoku

>

<

>

<

<

Below-average proportionof workforce

Kyushu<^<<Not applicable/no major
infrastructure in region

Okinawa<^><* whilst not ‘carbon intensive’ per se, nuclear is included for context as nuclear power workers are frequently
considered in Japan within the context of a just transition. Note also that the Fukushima Dai’ichi plant is
excluded from this estimate, as jobs there concern engineering and environmental management rather thanpower generation.
** figures for vehicle manufacturing and paper and pulp are estimates based on industry association figures.

14Just Transitions in JapanIn Figure 3, it is notable that there is a very high proportion of fossil fuel power
workers in Hokuriku and Tohoku regions, and an above average proportion ofworkers in the Tokai, Chugoku and Shikoku regions. This may prove especiallychallenging for Hokuriku and Tohoku Prefectures, and also Shikoku, given thatthey are largely rural regions with fewer immediate opportunities for changing
employment than, say, the industrial coastal centres of Tokai or to a lesser extent
Chugoku. From an environmental justice perspective, it is also worth pointing
out that Tohoku and to a lesser extent Hokuriku are host to several thermal power
stations which provide power for major urban centres (especially Tokyo) rather thanthe people living in the immediate vicinity.

3.2 Regional opportunities under Japan’s net zero transformation
Japan’s Roadmap to Beyond Zero Carbon (METI, 2020) identifies 14 priority green
growth sectors. These can be condensed into five broad categories of industries
and jobs may offer region-specific opportunities for fair and decent net-zero jobs,
and which may be able to draw on the skills and infrastructure of carbon-intensive
regions in Japan and their workforces (see Table 2).
Table 2: growth sectors within Japan’s Roadmap to Beyond Zero Carbon which may havepotential to support a regional just transition (adapted from METI, 2020)
SectorTypes of job

Wind power

Manufacturing of wind turbines
Installation of wind turbines
Operation and maintenance of wind turbines

Hydrogen, CCS
and fuel ammonia

Construction of combustion burners
Production of fuel ammonia
Production of turbines for power generation
Installation and maintenance of hydrogen heating and fuelling infrastructure
Operation of ports for import of hydrogen from overseas
Operation of carbon dioxide storage sites
Construction of carrier ships for hydrogen and CO2
Operation of carrier ships for hydrogen and CO2

Mobility and battery

Manufacturing of electric vehicles and fuel cell vehicles

Housing and building

Retrofit and new-build of e.g. solar cells, heat pumps.

Nature-based

Nature-based solutions-related:- climate-smart agriculture;- forestry for carbon sequestration;- ‘blue carbon’ marine carbon sequestration.

15

Just Transitions in Japan

It is more challenging to estimate the size of the regional jobs opportunity associatedwith current or emergent net-zero initiatives, given that the industries in cases do
not yet exist. It is possible, however, to get a sense of the relative sizes of the current
labour forces in each region and to understand how these may match up to futurejobs and skills requirements at a regional level. Figure 3 shows key sectors and job
families from the Japan Labour Force Survey that match up to the net-zero action
requirements laid out in Table 2 above, and indicates whether the labour force ineach region is above, at, or below the average across Japan’s regions. This can givea sense of how well each region may be currently placed to take advantage of netzero job opportunities, and also to understand where there may be labour or skills
shortages that could be filled by retraining workers currently employed in carbonintensive industries.
Electricity, gas, heat and water supply jobs may be relevant to the deployment ofwind power; the operation of hydrogen, CCS and fuel ammonia infrastructure; andthe installation/retrofit and maintenance of energy-efficient apparatus in residential
and commercial settings. Manufacturing jobs may be relevant to the manufacturingof wind turbines; the building of new ships to carry carbon dioxide and hydrogen(given Japan’s preference for ship-based as opposed to pipeline-based transport); andthe manufacture of EV and FCV vehicles. Construction jobs may be relevant to theinstallation of on- and offshore wind turbines; and to the construction of new energyefficient buildings and retrofit of old housing stock. Agriculture and forestry andfisheries workers may have the skills to realise nature-based approaches to climate
mitigation, especially sequestration in forests or in kelp and seagrass beds.
Figure 4: comparative workforce sizes for sectors relevant to net-zero jobs within Japan(source: Japan Labour Force Survey)
RegionElectricity, gas, Manufacturing
heat, water

Construction

Nature-based

Opp

Opp

Opp

LabourOpp

LabourLabourLabourAgric/ Fish
ForestHokkaido

^

-

-

<

-

-

^

-

-

Tohoku

^

-

-

-

^

^

<

^

-

Minami-Kanto

-

-

-

-

-

<

<

<

<

Kita Kanto-Koshin

<

^

-

^

-

-

-

-

<

Hokuriku

^

^

-

-

-

-

^

-

<

Tokai

-

-

^

^

-

<

-

-

-

Kinki

-

-

-

-

<

<

<

<

-

Chugoku

-

-

-

-

^

-

<

-

^

^

Comparatively very high proportionof workforce (>1 SD above average)

Shikoku

-

-

-

-

^

-

^

^

^

-

Average proportion of workforce(0-1SD above average)

Kyushu

^

-

^

-

^

-

^

^

-

<

Comparatively very low proportionof workforce (<1 SD below average)

Okinawa

<

<

<

<

-

^

-

-

<

16

Just Transitions in Japan

Worth noting from Figure 4 is that in the Hokkaido, Tohoku and Kyushu regions,the size of the electricity, gas, heat and water workforce may be slightly smaller incomparison to the size of the opportunity that may arise from wind energy potential.
In the case of Tohoku though, Figure 3 previously showed that Tohoku has adisproportionately large fossil fuel power workforce. It may thus be the case that jobs
in renewable energy offer a pathway to a just transition for Tohoku’s fossil fuel power
workers in particular. The large electricity, gas, heat and water workforce in Hokuriku
appears to match well with the wind energy potential and carbon capture and storage
potential in the region, and also the large proportion of fossil fuel and nuclear power
workers in the region. In the Kita Kanto-Koshin region north of Tokyo, by contrast,
the relatively large electricity, gas, heat and water workforce is perhaps not matchedby the potential for jobs in renewables and net-zero infrastructure.
In terms of manufacturing, again in Kyushu and Hokkaido the size of the workforce
may be relatively small in comparison to the opportunity for renewables. In Kyushu
and to a lesser extent Hokkaido, the large proportion of steel workers may mean there
is an opportunity to draw on existing skills and infrastructure in steelmaking, andto expand the manufacturing sector, to produce offshore wind turbine components
locally. Indeed, the Goto Offshore Wind Demonstrator in Kyushu and the Muroran
Offshore Wind Promotion Association in Hokkaido are both placing significant
emphasis on potential for local content in the offshore wind supply chain (Japan’s
Floating Offshore Wind Group, 2021; Muroran Offshore Wind Industry Promotion
Association, n.d.). The large manufacturing workforce in Tokai can be explained by
the high number of vehicle plants in the region, especially those belonging to Toyota,
where transitioning these plants to EV and FCV production may offer a pathway to ajust transition.
In the construction sector, in the southern regions of Chugoku, Shikoku and Kyushu,
the combination of high residential solar potential plus ageing housing stock means
there is high opportunity for jobs in retrofit and new-build of energy-efficientbuildings (and also, in Kyushu, installation of wind turbines). This may offer aretraining just transition opportunity for Chugoku in particular, which has a highproportion of workers across carbon-intensive sectors.
Although the size of the nature-based jobs sector for mitigation may be small, it isnonetheless noteworthy that Shikoku has a large farming, forestry and fisheries
workforce concomitant with its land- and sea-based carbon sequestration potential.
In Hokkaido and to a lesser extent Kyushu, there is a notable nature-based jobs
potential in relation to the workforce proportion. Climate adaptation and resiliencejobs are discussed later on in this report, and findings suggest that stewardship ofland- and sea-based carbon sequestration (e.g. climate-positive agriculture, forestry,
blue carbon) may offer opportunities for land-based workers in the event of changes
in productivity or consumption patterns.

17Just Transitions in Japan

3.3 Regional just transition opportunity summary
Figure 5 summarises the previous sections by dividing the regions of Japan
into four groups.
Figure 5: Regions of Japan according to climate job risk versus climate job opportunity
High regionaljob risks
Hokuriku
Kinki

ChugokuTohokuKyushuMinami-Kanto
Low regional
net-zero job
opportunities

Kita Kanto-KoshinHigh regional
net-zero job
opportunities

Tokai
Hokkaido
Shikoku

Okinawa

Low regionaljob risks

The high-risk high-opportunity regions of Hokuriku, Kyushu and Tohoku are regions
where workers in carbon-intensive sectors make up a comparatively large proportionof the workforce, but also where there are significant opportunities in terms of onand offshore wind (all 3 regions); shipbuilding to support a hydrogen and ammonia
economy (Kyushu); and carbon capture and storage (Hokuriku and Tohoku).
In these regions, strong local content policies and support to ensure workers’ skills,
acquired during carbon-intensive activities, remain relevant will be necessary toensure local workforces and communities can take advantage of opportunities
and ensure a just transition.
The low-risk high-opportunity regions of Hokkaido, Tokai and Shikoku are regions
where the risks to the labour force are comparatively lower (although there are still
notable sites of carbon-intensive infrastructure in each region), but where there issignificant opportunity for fair and decent work in support of a net zero Japan.
In Hokkaido, these opportunities come in the form of on- and offshore renewables
and carbon capture and storage. In Tokai, the main opportunity is related to
production of EVs and FCVs to support a transition from current petrol-powered
vehicle production. In Shikoku, opportunities come from retrofit or new-build
housing, in response to ageing housing stock and high solar PV potential, and also
shipbuilding to meet hydrogen and carbon dioxide transport needs. In these regions(especially the more rural regions of Hokkaido and Shikoku), it may be necessary totake measures to ensure the workforce and new infrastructure are in place to enable
the regions to take advantage of opportunities that arise.

18

Just Transitions in JapanThe high-risk low-opportunity regions of Chugoku, Kinki and Minami-Kanto are
regions where there is a relatively high carbon-intensive workforce, and fewer
immediate opportunities to offset these risks with net-zero jobs. In Chugoku, there
is a comparatively large petrochemicals workforce, with limited potential for windenergy (albeit significant potential for jobs in energy efficiency via retrofit andnew-build residential housing, and opportunities for shipbuilding). In both MinamiKanto and Kinki regions, the sheer numbers of people employed in fossil fuel power
generation, petrochemicals and steel (especially Kinki) represents a challenge fora just transition, even if the workforces are not necessarily large in proportion tothe overall regional workforce. In these regions, on- and offshore renewable energy
and carbon dioxide storage potential is limited. For regions in this group, it may be
important for governments and industry to consider how regional carbon-intensive
industries may be reappropriated to provide benefits to Japan as a whole throughregional cooperation. For instance, steel making and shipbuilding in Kinki and
Chugoku may support offshore wind and hydrogen economies elsewhere in Japan;
whereas petrochemicals and LNG imports in Chugoku and Minami-Kanto may(if handled sensitively) support imports of hydrogen from overseas and/or domestic
low-carbon production of hydrogen and fuel ammonia.
Finally, the low-risk low-opportunity regions of Kita Kanto-Koshin and Okinawa areregions where there is not a specific risk to the workforce, but also few identified
opportunities for growth via net-zero jobs. Kita Kanto-Koshin does however
have carbon-intensive infrastructure in the form of thermal power and vehicle
manufacturing. It is worth noting in the case of Okinawa, however, that the relatively
small labour force size and the distinctive regional characteristics (i.e. population
distributed across islands, each of which requires energy infrastructure anddistribution) may make comparison with other regions challenging. In these regions,whilst there may not be a single stand-out issue that is faced, it is nonethelessimportant to develop a fuller understanding of just transition challenges that may
be faced at the local level (and which may not readily be apparent from high-level
workforce data alone) and to ensure that the regional workforce and infrastructureon the whole is well-suited to respond to locally-specific challenges.

19Just Transitions in Japan

4.0 Place-based approachto just transitions: the caseof YubariLabour force statistics and regional infrastructural inventories can give a sense ofwhere current carbon-intensive infrastructure and labour forces may be located inrelation to where opportunities may arise. However, what regional statistics cannot
illustrate are the place-based aspects of just transitions. It is broadly acknowledgedin the social sciences that as well as affecting labour forces and local economies,transitions away from carbon-intensive activity can have profound implications on
the lived environment, and on people’s sense of place and identity. To illustrate what
all of this might mean in the Japanese context, this section presents the case study of
Yubari in Hokkaido. Yubari offers an example of a rapid but un-managed transition
away from fossil fuel activity, specifically coal mining, that had significant negative
consequences for the local economy and workforce. At the same time, more recent
government and civil society activity in Yubari also offers insights into how acarbon-intensive locality can transition into a more sustainable and equitableform through reorganisation of the lived environment.

Key Insights•

Yubari is often considered a ‘classic’ case of why a place-based transition mattersin Japan within scholarly literature and international media reporting on energy
matters within Japan;•

Urban planning responses to the legacy of carbon-intensive activity on the built
and lived environment are an important enabler for a just transition;•

Civil society organisations have an important role in sustaining community
resilience and enabling community learning in the post-fossil fuel transition.

20

Just Transitions in Japan

Geography and environmental characteristics
Figure 6: location of Yubari within Hokkaido

稚内市
Wakkanai

名寄市
Nayoro滝川市
Takikawa
小樽市
Otaru

網走市
Abashiri

Hokkaido
旭川市
Asahikawa
夕張市

北見市
KitamiYubari

札幌市
Sapporo
伊達市
苫小牧市
Date
Tomakomai
室蘭市
Muroran
函館市
Hakodate

帯広市
Obihiro根室振興局
Nemuro
釧路市
KushiroHokkaido

Chubu

Tohoku
Kanto

ChugokuKansai
Shikoku
KyushuYubari is located in Sorachi Subprefecture in central Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost
island (see Figure 6). The city developed along the Yubari River and its tributaries,
and is located on the Ishikari coalfield. Yubari is bounded by mountain ranges tothe west and east. To the east, there is also Lake Shuparo – created artificially by
the construction of the Shuparo Dam – and Mt. Yubari. In common with much of
Hokkaido, Yubari experiences significant snowfall in winter, although levels ofsnowfall have been markedly lower in recent years as a result of climate change.
The area in which Yubari is located is also seeing changes in ecology and biodiversity
which are linked to climate change (as well as a longer-term decline in predators),such as expansion of bamboo grasses and deer populations.

21

Just Transitions in Japan

Industrial history and current status
Through the earlier part of the 20th Century, Yubari was one of Japan’s major
coal-mining regions, the population of the city reaching approximately 120,000
people by the 1960s. However, broader shifts in Japan’s energy mix away from coaland towards oil, gas and nuclear power (with coal for thermal power increasingly
being imported from overseas) led to the gradual closure of the city’s mines.
The last mine closed in the early 1990s. Many mine workers had come from
elsewhere in Japan to work in the coal industry, and hence moved elsewhere toseek other opportunities once the mines closed rather than remaining in Yubari.
Subsequent attempts to replace the major employment provided by coal mining
with large-scale tourism-related economic activities largely failed. Coupled with analready ageing and declining population in line with broader trends in rural Japan,
the loss of employment and tax revenue led to Yubari City effectively declaring
bankruptcy in 2007. Yubari’s population has continued to decline, and of 2022
is just over 7,000 people.
What is significant about Yubari is the physical legacy left by coal mining on thebuilt and lived-in environment, and the challenges this raises for transitioning toa just and sustainable society (see Figure 7). A significant contribution to the city
bankruptcy was the legacy of large-scale physical infrastructure – schools, hospitals,
housing – built to support the coal industry, for which the city had to assume liability
after the end of mining. Moreover, the urban development pattern of Yubari, withdifferent districts built up alongside coal deposits and mine entrances, led to a small
population scattered over a large area after the end of mining activities. It has also
been reported anecdotally that the different corporate and organisational structuresof the two main mining companies – Hokkaido Coal to the west and Mitsubishi Coalto the east – were reflected in different community and household cultures between
the various districts of Yubari.

Figure 7. Former coal workers’ housing in Shimizusawa, Yubari22

Just Transitions in Japan

Coal mining left a legacy of pollution (albeit minor) as well as infrastructurein Yubari, which the city government and third-sector organisations have had todeal with. Interviewed residents reported how in the past, the rivers of Yubari would
run black due to discharges from coal-washing processes, to the extent that children
would colour rivers in black when they drew landscapes in school. Slag heaps/spoil
tips left by the coal industry, whilst not necessarily containing any materials that are
immediately dangerous to the surrounding environment, nonetheless contain wires,rails and other artificial materials. Whilst not posing any immediate danger, theseslag heaps also require monitoring and management to ensure they do not collapse,
especially after seismic activity such as the 2018 Eastern Iburi Earthquake.

What can Yubari teach us about just transitions in Japan and beyond?
Yubari is perhaps the best-known example internationally of the regional challenges
associated with fossil fuel transitions in Japan. Yubari’s bankruptcy, population
shrinkage and vacant buildings have received coverage in diverse media outlets(Daily Mail, 2016; Hendy, 2014; NHK World Japan, 2018). Such coverage tends to focus
on empty and decaying buildings and on the decline of Yubari, often employing
imagery of vacant and derelict land to portray a cautionary tale of what may lie ahead
for other carbon-intensive areas of Japan and beyond under concomitant pressuresof energy transitions and ageing and declining populations. What has received lessattention, however, are the more recent efforts that are happening at the municipal
and community level to create a resilient and sustainable society within Yubari.
In this sense, Yubari is working towards a post-hoc just transition, in that efforts toredress inequalities and mitigate the impacts of post-fossil fuel transitions comeafter the city has already experienced negative economic and social effects from atransition away from coal.
Yubari City Government has initiated a long-term urban planning strategy to moveresidents towards a core area in the centre of the city area, with a view towards
reducing the need to provide services and utilities to peripheral areas. This is
supported by the construction of a new community hub, and housing to bothsupport an ageing population and attract younger residences. These measures arebolstered by a social welfare programme to reduce childcare and schooling costs.
In other words, physical relocation and re-shaping of the post-coal environmentis underpinned by a broader suite of social welfare and social policy measures(Mabon & Shih, 2018).

23

Just Transitions in Japan

Figure 8. Walking tour of former Shimizusawa Station hosted by Shimizusawa Project NGO

The Shimizusawa Project NGO (https://www.shimizusawa.com/) for instancecoordinates a breadth of activities across Yubari aimed at enabling learning from
Yubari’s coal-mining history whilst supporting community resilience and well-being(see Figure 8). Shimizusawa Project has its offices in former company housing for coalminers, which it uses as a community space as well as flexible working space andaccommodation for visiting artists and researchers during residencies. Shimizusawa
Project uses the ‘ecomuseum’ concept to promote small-scale and informed learning
about Yubari’s industrial heritage among visitors from elsewhere in Japan andoverseas, by enabling access to legacy mining infrastructure such as the now-closed
Shimizusawa Thermal Power Station, old miners’ housing, and the slag heaps left
behind by coal mining. The NGO also supports a breadth of activities within Yubari
to support societal wellbeing and resilience in the face of the challenges they city
faces, including kodomo shokudo (a children’s cafeteria where children can eat meals
for free or at very low cost), a regular town walk to encourage residents and visitors
to support local businesses, and environmental education activities to support
recreation and interaction among the biodiversity that has emerged on the former
slag heaps left by the mining industries.
Similarly, the Yuparikozakura no Kai NGO – a group established to protect the richbiodiversity of Yubari’s mountains, and especially the Yupari kozakura flower –has a strong focus on environmental education, in particular encouraging the city’s
residents to build awareness of the rich nature in their surroundings. The group –along with others – works to ensure environmental protection on Mt. Yubari throughsurveying and monitoring plants, providing advice and guidance to walkers, andconducting regular patrols to guard against theft of rare plants. Re-establishingconnections with nature, and promoting outdoor recreation, is considered an
important strategy for maintaining connectivity and supporting wellbeing during
the transformation of Yubari into a post-coal city.

24Just Transitions in Japan

Nonetheless, a key emerging concern of civil society actors within Yubari is aroundstigmatisation through association with (a) the financial difficulties faced by the cityfollowing its bankruptcy in the late 2000s; and (b) potential negative associations
with coal and the coal industry as broader awareness of the environmentally harmful
impacts of coal spread across Japan post-COP26. There is particular concern thatyoung people who live in and grow up in Yubari may face stigmatisation throughassociation with the coal industry.
To learn more about the past and present of Yubari, explore the ‘virtual field trip’
created as a project output: https://energyvalues.wordpress.com/2022/03/02/yubarivirtual-field-trip/

25

Just Transitions in Japan

5.0 Just transitions,climate change adaptation
and biodiversity
Key Insights•

Despite its long history of experience with hazards and disasters, Japan is stillat significant risk from climate change impacts and requires major additional
adaptation and resilience actions;•

Adaptation and resilience jobs may provide additional and underexploredopportunities to support a just transition for carbon-intensive workforces, especiallyin more urbanised regions such as Kanto and Kansai;•

Continued consideration of any impacts or trade-offs between biodiversity
and net-zero infrastructure will be necessary, although there are significant
improvements in publicly-available environmental data for on- and nearshore wind.

Japan’s long experience with natural hazards means the country is relatively wellequipped in terms of policy to be able to adapt to climate change (Hijioka et al., 2016).
However, as indicated in the country’s National Adaptation Plan, what is required
is a step-change in the scale and extent of resilience-related infrastructure in order
to be able to cope with climate extremes. Landslides in Atami, Shizuoka Prefecture
in early 2021 and flooding in Kurume, Fukuoka Prefecture in summer 2021 illustrate
the extent to which climate-related weather extremes may overwhelm existing
infrastructure in Japan, and hence the need for investment in adaptation actions.
Figure 9 shows how the projected climate impacts and associated adaptation andresilience requirements by region match up to local labour forces. This is doneby cross-referencing regional adaptation impacts identified in Japan’s National
Adaptation Plan (and relevant scholarly literature) with data from the Japan
Labour Force Survey.

26

Just Transitions in Japan

Figure 9. Relation between regional climate impacts/adaptation requirements and regional
labour forces for associated job families
RegionHokkaido

TohokuMinami-Kanto

Kita
Kanto-Koshin
Hokuriku

Tokai

Kinki

Chugoku

Shikoku

KyushuOkinawa

Adaptation area

Agriculture/
forestry/
fisheries

Water
Disasand re- terssourcesHumanhealthEcoCross-cutting
systems

Job family

Agriculture,
forestry

Electricity,gas, heat,water

Construction

Medicalcare andwelfareResearch/technical

Fishery

Risk

^

^

>

>

^

>

Jobs

-

-

-

-

-

-

Risk

>

>

>

>

^

-

Jobs

>

-

-

>

-

-

Risk

^

^

-

-

^

>

Jobs

<

<

-

<

<

<

Risk

>

>

-

^

^

-

Jobs

-

<

-

-

-

-

Risk

^

^

^

^

-

-

Jobs

-

<

>

-

-

-

Risk

>

>

-

^

-

>

Jobs

-

-

-

<

<

<

Risk

-

-

>

^

-

>

Jobs

<

-

-

<

-

-

Risk

-

-

>

^

-

-

Jobs

<

>

-

-

-

-

Risk

^

^

-

^

>

-

Jobs

>

>

-

-

>

>

Risk

^

^

^

^

>

>

Jobs

>

-

-

-

>

>

Risk

-

-

-

-

^

^

Jobs

-

<

<

>

>

>

Risk

Research/technical

ICT

Publicaffairs

-

-

>

-

-

-

>

>

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

<

-

-

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-

-

-

-

-

-

-

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-

-

-

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Jobs

^

Significantly higher impacts
than Japan overall>

Large labour force(>1SD above Japan average)>

Higher impacts than Japan
overall-

Average labour force(within 1SD of Japan average)-Impacts at same level as Japan
overall<

Small labour force(>1SD below Japan average)

No data/no significant impacts
compared to Japan overall

No data/no significant impacts
compared to Japan overall

27

Just Transitions in Japan

What is worth noting from the matrix are points where the projected regional climate
risk is high, and where the labour force is either significantly below average(pointing to a possible shortfall in workers and/or an opportunity for workers
from carbon-intensive sectors to retrain and reskill) or significantly above average(meaning, especially for agriculture, forestry and fisheries, that jobs may be at risk –or at least workers may need to retrain in order to be able to adapt to changes –due to regional climate change impacts).
Among major urban centres, Tokyo and its surroundings (Minami-Kanto) areprojected to suffer high health impacts, but currently have a shortage of medical
workers to be able to respond. Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe and surroundings (Kinki) and also
Tokai (Nagoya, Hamamatsu and others) are projected to have high risk from climaterelated disasters, but may struggle to find construction workers able to enhance theresilience of the built environment. It is thus possible that retraining and recruitment
in health and welfare (Kanto) and construction (Kansai, Tokai) may offer retraining
or reskilling opportunities for carbon-intensive workers in order to support
resilience challenges.
In more rural regions, Shikoku and Kyushu in particular have a large workforce inagriculture, forestry and fisheries, and are also projected to suffer significant climate
impacts in these sectors. There may hence be a need to provide alternative jobs forworkers in these sectors if climate change makes their activities non-profitable –or at least retraining and upskilling in new approaches and techniques in orderto make these nature-based jobs resilient. At the same time, however, workers
undertaking nature-based jobs in forestry and to a lesser extent agriculture may also
have important skills which can help to realise Eco-Disaster Risk Reduction andnature-based approaches to climate adaptation and mitigation. Tapping into theskills of forestry and agricultural workers in Shikoku and Kyushu may thus be an
important part of ensuring a just transition and reducing harm, given both regions
face significant disaster risk.
For cross-cutting challenges, Hokkaido and Okinawa are well-resourced with public
officials to support adaptation and resilience planning; whereas Kinki and Tokai may
struggle with staff at present able to implement adaptation planning.

28

Just Transitions in Japan

6.0 Conclusions andrecommendations
Based on the findings and materials in the previous sections, as well as the content of
the full report, the following areas of action are proposed to support a just transitionin Japan.

Governmental actors within Japan•At a national government level in Japan, it is clear that whilst there is an emerging
understanding of the need for a just transition – as evidenced in the inclusion of
the term in Japan’s core climate change policy – there is less clarity on what a justtransition means in a specifically Japanese context, and on the steps that may
need to be taken to facilitate a just transition for Japan. Along similar lines to the
Scottish Government’s Just Transition Commission, there may hence be value ininitiating and coordinating a national just transition in Japan by identifying andworking with at-risk sectors and regions;•

At a local government level, levels of resourcing to allow local governments tocoordinate and respond to just transition imperatives may vary significantly
across regions and municipalities. Local governments can have a key rolein coordinating interaction between sectors, in order to take advantage ofopportunities that may arise in the net-zero transition and return benefit to local
communities and workforces. However, particularly in rural areas and regions
away from Japan’s largest cities, just transition challenges can come against a
backdrop of ageing and declining populations and associated declines in revenue.
It is hence vital that local governments in regions that are at high risk under
the net-zero transition are well supported with resourcing and skills from anational level;•

Related to the above, local governments may benefit from opportunities forpeer-to-peer learning on managing just transitions in their localities.
The mapping of the comparative risks and opportunities faced by different regions
within Japan shows, for example, that municipalities in regions such as Tohoku,
Hokuriku and Kyushu may face similar kinds of challenges under a just transition.
Examples such as the Hokkaido city of Muroran’s collaboration with Aberdeenin the UK also illustrates how opportunities for mutual learning from places withsimilar characteristics may extend internationally.

29

Just Transitions in Japan

Industry and trade unions•

A critical challenge faced globally – not only in Japan – is to understand how well
the skills of an existing carbon intensive workforce, and also the infrastructure ofcarbon-intensive regions, matches up to what is required for net-zero technologies.
It is vital not to make assumptions about how easily workers in one sector or job
type will be able to transition to other job types, even if the job profiles appear
similar. However, it is at present hard to find data within Japan on characteristicsof the labour force in carbon-intensive industries that allows this richer
understanding of labour force characteristics to emerge. This is especially so for
fossil fuel and nuclear power workers who (whilst representing upwards of 50,000
jobs in absolute terms) make up a relatively small proportion of the overall labour
force in Japan, which can make it hard to identify trends and characteristics ingovernment data. There is hence a real need for industry associations and/or tradeunions to develop in-depth and publicly-available data on the characteristics of
the workforce in carbon-intensive industries, which will enable governments,
researchers and NGOs to make more precise policy recommendations;•

Related to the above is the value of training and certification for workers aiming
to transition to net-zero jobs. The vision of Iwaki City to develop a certification
scheme for wind power maintenance and operations workers stands as a good
example of how the skills requirements for a just transition in Japan can be
more formally recognised. Identifying the kinds of net-zero jobs that are likely toemerge in a locality, and initiating retraining and reskilling programmes early on
for workers in sectors that are scheduled for closure, will be especially importantin more rural regions (e.g. Tohoku, Hokuriku, Shikoku) where there are fewer
opportunities for diversification;•

The significance of jobs relating to climate change adaptation and resilienceshould also not be overlooked. The effects of extreme weather events acrossJapan in recent years serve as a stark reminder of the impacts that climate change
will have on the country, and on the need for upgrades to infrastructure as well
as replacement or retrofit of older housing stock. Sectors like construction andutility may therefore be able to support a just transition by linking mitigationand adaptation-related jobs, and considering these together.

Non-governmental organisations and third sector organisations•

NGOs can have an important role in coordinating dialogue between sectors,
and in helping to identify potential opportunities and synergies. To date, muchof the NGO activity on just transitions in Japan has focused on site-specificopposition to new-build thermal power stations. This activity is an important partof enabling a just and net-zero transition. In addition, however, environmental
NGOs may be well placed to facilitate mutual learning and dialogues between
municipalities and regions facing similar issues across Japan (and, indeed, with
regions internationally who are facing similar challenges). More detailed analysis
of prefectural or municipal characteristics to build on the regional analysis
presented in this report may help to pinpoint potential participant localities;

30

Just Transitions in Japan•

Given the strong rhetoric of the Japanese Government on the role of hydrogen in
a net zero society and in hydrogen and ammonia co-firing plus carbon captureand storage in the thermal power sector, it is understandable and important thatNGOs continue to strongly oppose coal and gas power within Japan. At the sametime, however, the Japanese Government’s announcement of offshore windpromotion areas, as well as identification of potential for onshore solar and wind,presents a chance for positive messaging on how net zero energy technologies canrepresent a bright future for carbon-intensive regions and workforces. This canalso involve engaging pro-actively with new renewables developments, especiallyoffshore wind, to ensure strong local content in terms of jobs and economic uplift;•

It is also important to note the heterogeneity of NGOs that exist within Japan.
Community-level NGOs, such as the Shimizusawa Project in the former coal cityof Yubari, show the important role that third sector organisations working locally
can have in initiating potentially sensitive or difficult conversations about justtransitions for localities where carbon-intensive industry is not only a major
employer, but also a core component of local identity. Collaboration with locallybased NGOs, who may not have an explicit environmental focus, may thus be avaluable pathway in Japan to stimulating thinking on what a just transition mightmean at a local level.

Academics and researchers•

Further research could build on extant work into the geographical impact ofenergy transitions for Japan, by aggregating prefectural or municipal-level datato assess where job impacts (and conversely) opportunities may be found at afiner scale. This may aid in identifying localities that are facing similar challenges,
and could hence help to support mutual learning between local governments
and civil society actors from across Japan;•

Similarly, subsequent work could go further in quantifying the jobs opportunity
associated with Japan’s on- and offshore wind potential, as well as with potential
in other areas such as solar PV manufacture and installation. Whilst quantifying
jobs associated with renewable energy is widely acknowledged, quantitative
estimations of how many jobs may be created – and where – under different
deployment pathways may give a fuller picture of the size of the net-zero jobs
opportunity in Japan;•

In terms of place-based just transitions, in-depth and ethnographic research
tracking community dynamics during the process of the phase-out of thermal
power stations scheduled for decommissioning may give valuable and richinsights into some of the issues faced at a local level as Japan moves towards
phase-down of fossil fuel power.

31

Just Transitions in Japan

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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xENsMn-WWYQ
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About the Academy
The British Academy is an independent, self-governing corporation, composed ofalmost 1,000 UK Fellows and 300 overseas Fellows elected in recognition of their
distinction as scholars and researchers. Its objectives, powers and framework ofgovernance are set out in the Charter and its supporting Bye-Laws, as approvedby the Privy Council. The Academy receives public funding from the Science andResearch budget allocated by a grant from the Department for Business, Energy andIndustrial Strategy (BEIS). It also receives support from private sources and draws
on its own funds. The views and conclusions expressed here are not necessarily
endorsed by individual Fellows but are commended as contributing to public debate.

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Published June 2022
© The authors. This is an open accesspublication licensed under a Creative
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To cite this report: British Academy (2022),
Just Transitions in Japan, The British Academy,
Londondoi.org/10.5871/just-transitions-a-p/L-M
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