Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa:
The Move to Partner-Country Ownership
Hiroki Nakamura
Introduction
Japan-Africa relations have evolved considerably over the decades.
However, the intensification of the relationship is only a recent phenomenon. This relation was not direct or long-lasting because of the geographical and psychological distance.
This research will come back to history at first to show that JapanAfrica relations have been often determined by relations with other countries or international developments.
After World War II (WWII). Japan-Africa relations were largely
determined by the context of the Cold War and the relationship with the
US. However, we do witness certain changes in Japanese foreign policy
toward Africa as the Japanese economy grows and Japan starts to show
some autonomy in its diplomacy toward Africa.
Since the 90s, Japan started to be involved more proactively in Africa. The TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development) process was initiated and Japan sent SDF (Self-defense Forces) to
Africa several times. At the same time, an ODA charter was adopted. The
charter announces principles solemnly but applies them with considerable
discretion and the adoption is considered to be an attempt to control ODA
policy with that discretion. The ODA structure, which was fragmented
before, was integrated to be more coherent during the 2000s when Japan
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started to become involved with Africa more proactively. This research
will try to show the motivations of this change.
However, Japan’s engagement in Africa must face serious challenges.
With economic stagnation, Japan cannot increase ODA toward Africa.
New actors such China or India, other emerging countries, have started toaffirm their presence, and traditional actors such as France, UK and US
are coming back. We are witnessing “new scramble for Africa.”
What can Japan do in this situation? To answer this question, thenotion of “middle power” will be examined to think about Japan’s diplomacy toward Africa.

1 Evolution of Japanese Foreign policy in Africa(1) History of Japan-Africa relation: Before WWII-Special relation with Ethiopia

Japan developed a close relation with Ethiopia based on two kinds of
sympathy. One was a general sense of sympathy with imperial regimes.1
Another was sympathy with non-European nations in the beginning of
20 th century when there were not many non-European countries which had

kept their independence, Japan, and Ethiopia being two such states. They
struggled in a Europe-dominated world order. As examples of this mutual
support, Ethiopian people welcomed the victory of Japan over Russia in
19052 and at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, Japan proposed that the
principle of equality of all races be included in the Treaty of Versailles,
which was refused by major powers but welcomed by non-white nations
including Ethiopia.3
The amicable relation developed further in the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. In 1927, Japan sent several ministers to Ethiopia to discuss a treaty on trade and friendship. In 1930, a special delegation attended the coronation ceremony of Haile Selassie and the Treaty of Friendship272

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownershipwas signed at that occasion.
Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs Blattengueta Herouy Wolde
Selassie’s official visit to Japan in 1931 made Ethiopia the first Africancountry to pay an official visit to Japan.4 Herouy offered two lions to theEmperor of Japan as gifts from Emperor Haile Selassie.5 Herouy expected
to get loans to purchase arms to prepare a war against Italy but Japan,
which had already engaged in war in China, could not afford to offer suchloans.6
This friendship between Japan and Ethiopia worried Mussolini. Italy
had ambitions over Ethiopia and was also hostile to Japanese progress in
China. He mobilized the media and instigated a campaign against “yellow peril.” It was strongly suspected that it was pressure from WesternCountries, mainly Italy, which put a stop to the proposal of royal marriage between Prince Lij Araya Abeba and Masako Kuroda, daughter of
Viscount Hiroyuki Kuroda.7 At least, it is clear that the development ofJapan-Ethiopia relations, especially economic relations, attracted muchattention from Western countries.8 In 1931, the import of Japanese textiles
into East Africa occupied more than half of the total imports of the regionand Western countries felt threatened by Japan’s economic development.9
However, when Italy annexed Ethiopia, Japan concluded an agreement with Italy. Tokyo recognized Italy’s conquest in Ethiopia and Romerecognized Japan’s conquest in Manchuria.10 This agreement was satisfactory for Japan which considered that Manchuria was far more important
than Ethiopia.
Furthermore, Italy accorded Japan the status of the most favored nation and Japanese interests in Ethiopia were protected. This arrangement
paved the way to a future alliance between Japan, Italy and Germany
which would be concluded in 1940.11

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-Commercial relation with South Africa

Japan started to have a commercial relationship with South Africa inthe early 20 th century. Japan established diplomatic contact with South Africa in 1910 when its first honorary Consul arrived in Cape Town. At first,
the trade between Japan and South Africa was modest. However, during
the First World War, the export of wool to Japan increased significantly.12
Japanese saw South Africa as a potential market for manufactured products and an attractive source of law materials.13
However discriminatory treatment toward Japanese nationals limited
the commerce between two countries. In 1913, South Africa’s parliament
adopted new laws which aimed to restrict Indian immigration. As this law
banned Asians from entering South African territory generally, it made itdifficult for the Japanese to continue trade with South Africa.14 Furthermore, this law had a significant psychological effect and Japanese leaders
had quite negative feelings about it. At that time, Japan had a permanent
seat at the League of Nations and therefore they felt that Japanese people
should receive the same treatment as Europeans.15
It was the economic difficulties of South Africa during the Great
Depression which changed the situation. The Great Depression strongly
damaged the exportation of South African wool to Europe and it madeSouth African leaders reconsider their position about Japan which had
considerable potential as a market.16
In 1930, the South African government decided to effectively treat
Japanese people as “honorary whites.” In 1936, after trade tensions with
Australia, Japan stopped importing Australian wool and replaced it with
South African wool. In 1936, Japan registered large benefits in the tradewith South Africa. But in 1937, the trade balance became favorable toSouth African because of wool exportation.17 This intensification of tradebrought two countries to establish a diplomatic relationship in 1937 and274

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country OwnershipJapan constructed an embassy in Pretoria soon after.18 However, as therelationship between Japan and the UK deteriorated, the relationship between Japan and South Africa deteriorated as well.
The examples of Ethiopia and South Africa show that Japanese involvement in Africa was often determined by other factors than Japanand Africa themselves. In the case of Ethiopia, Japan tried to establish anamicable tie between non-white nations. However, it was Italian influencewhich made Japan renounce this approach and it seems Japan did not resist strongly. In the case of South Africa, the international situation before
WWII halted the relationship. We can see that Japan-Africa relations were
often determined by relations with other countries or international conditions rather than Japan-Africa relations considered in isolation.
(2) After WWII: Increase of ODA toward Africa-The facts and figures of ODA toward Africa

After the end of WWII, the relation between Japan and Africa restarted and trade began to glow slowly. Even though the share of tradewith Africa remained relatively small for Japan, Japanese exports had asignificant effect on African countries. Japan always registered a surplus
in trade with Africa. This trade imbalance became structural and Africa
always remained an importer of manufactured products from Japan.19
In 1963, Nigeria decided to limit import of Japanese products becauseof the considerable trade deficit. Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda threatened
to follow.20 After several years of negotiation, Japan decided to provide
loans with preferential interest rates to Uganda as the first aid to Africa
and Japan also accorded export credits to Tanzania, Kenya, and Nigeria inthe same year.21
Japan continued to disburse ODA to Africa since then. The share ofJapan’s global ODA for African countries was under 10% until 1977. It
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grew to over 10% in 1977 and was maintained around that level consistently. The amount was relatively small, 62 million dollars, in 1970 but
reached 1,3 billion dollars in 1988 and stayed above 1 billion dollars until
1996.
The recession in Japan in the 1990s and the budget reform decreased
the level of ODA considerably. In 1997, ODA toward Africa decreased
below 1 billion dollars. Modest distribution continued until 2004 but it
increased again above 1 billion dollars in 2005 and has been maintained
above this level until today.
Japanese
ODA
Recipients andand Africa
Japanese
ODA
to to
AllAllRecipients
Africa
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000

1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018

0

All Recipients, Total-Concentration of ODA to certain countries

Africa, Total

OECD, Stats(million dollars)

Japanese ODA toward Africa was concentrated in several countries.
During the 1960s and the beginning of 1970, about 80% of ODA in Africa
was reserved for Kenya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zambia.
This concentration continued even in the 90s. The top 10 recipientsof Japanese ODA were Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan,276

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownership

Zaire, Senegal, Madagascar, and Malawi. Those countries received about
70% of Japanese ODA in Africa.22
Cumulative ODA figures in 1996 also show the prioritization of almost the same countries. That concentration of ODA in several countries
suggests to us that Japan prioritized those countries. We must analyze thereasons which led Japan towards those prioritizations.
-Prioritized country approach

At first, Japan prioritized countries which had natural resources. For
example, Nigeria has rich petroleum reserves, Madagascar has importantreserves of chrome and Japanese aid had an objective to secure those resources.23
Secondly, political influence in the international arena was also an
important factor. In the 70s, Kenya was politically stable and was highly
influential in the OAU (Organization of African Unity) and United Nations. Kenya was a leader of moderate faction regarding the question ofcolonialism and apartheid.24 Japan had strong economic interests in South
Africa especially in term of natural resources, therefore attitudes toward
apartheid was an important factor in the distribution of ODA.25
The case of Tanzania is instructive. Japanese ODA for Tanzania was
directed at legitimating commercial interests in South Africa. In fact, Tokyo used ODA to attract “Front-line States” (Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and for charismatic leader Julius Nyerere
to calm the anxiety of African countries regarding Japanese interests inSouth Africa.26 The ODA amount to Tanzania declined as this country lostits position as a regional leader. Instead, Zambia, which gained a leadership position among Front-line States, absorbed an increased amount ofJapanese ODA.27

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2 Decision making in Japanese ODA policy toward Africa(1) External factors-Influence of the Cold War

As with diplomacy with other parts of the world, Japan’s diplomacy
with Africa was conditioned by the East-West antagonism and especiallyby relations in the context of the Cold War. Japan was expected to be
opposed to the countries which declared themselves to be socialist. By
contrast, Japan was required to support countries such as Somalia, Kanya,
Zaire, and Malawi by giving them priority in ODA.28
However, with economic growth, Japan started to show some independence in its ODA policy toward Africa. The first sign of independence
was observed in the 70s when the diversification of resource providers
seemed to be more important than relations with the US after two oilshocks in 1973 and 1979.29 Japan sent Foreign Minister Kimura to Ghana,
Nigeria, Zaire, and Tanzania after the first oil shock in 1974 and it was
the Japanese Foreign Minister’s first visit to Africa. After the second oilshock, Foreign Minister Sonoda visited Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Senegal,
Tanzania, and Kenya in 1979.
Japan started to rapidly increase aid to counties whose relations with
the US were not particularly good, but which had natural resources or potential to be markets for Japanese products. During the 1980s, Japan provided 21% of its ODA to socialist countries while the US provided only
6% of its ODA to those countries.30 ODA provided to Tanzania under thereign of Julius Nyerere, “Dean” of African Socialism, clearly illustrates
this policy.31 Japan started to show some independence in its diplomacy
toward Africa even in the context of the Cold War.
-Image of Japan

With its economic development, Japan was asked more and more to278

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownershipshare the burden in international politics. Japan was accused of taking
advantage of the political and economic systems of the world without contributing (theory of the free rider). Americans saw Japanese taking profits
from the peace assured by US military efforts. In the 80s, the US, which
was suffering from budgetary deficits and external deficits, strongly asked
Japan to take more responsibility in the maintenance of international order.
In those years, “Japan-bashing” language was common in the media.
Japanese were often described as economic parasites who did not share
their wealth with developing countries. In this context, the Reagan administration insisted that Japan increase its ODA to Africa.32 At that time,
Japan was recording huge benefits from the trades with the US. The Japanese government responded positively to the request to alleviate critiques
over the trade surplus and increased ODA to Africa considerably.33(2) Internal factors-Absence of general direction of ODA policy in Africa

On one hand, external factors influenced the ODA policy of Japan
toward Africa. On the other hand, there was not a well-defined approachinside the Japanese administration. In fact, Japan did not have an integrated strategy of its ODA policy toward Africa. A senior official who had
worked in the directorate of Economic Cooperation of MOFA (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) stated in his speech in 2000,“We didn’t have a specific aid policy for Africa. As we increased theamount of ODA, we provided ODA where there were needs and ODA
for Africa has increased dramatically. Then we realized that Japan had
become the top donor in many African countries. Japan found itself being
involved in Africa via ODA.”34279

As his remark testifies, Japan did not have an integrated ODA strategy toward Africa. As we saw previously, Japanese aid served economic
or political interests. But these cases were often decided case by casewithout strategic vision for long-term outcomes.
-Ministerial disagreements regarding Africa

To understand this lack of coordination, the case of South Africa under Apartheid is interesting. Japan replaced the US as the primary trading
partner of South Africa in 1987 and this provoked strongly negative reactions from the international community.35 MOFA, which is more sensitive
to international critics, tended to denounce Apartheid. But MOF (Ministryof Finance) and MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry, reorganized in the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2001), whichwere more sensitive to the needs of the business world, were opposed tosanctions.36
South Africa has 80% of the world’s platinum reserves.37 Platinum isa particularly important material for car manufacturing to produce catalytic converters. But after 1987, with increasing criticism from the international community, the relationship with South Africa became too risky
and it became obvious the end of Apartheid was approaching. Finally,
Japanese government levied sanctions against South Africa and trade between the two countries declined at the end of the 1980s.38 This example
shows clearly that each ministry has its own priorities and there was little
harmonization between them.
MOFA’s position is not strong in comparison with other ministries
because it does not have a domestic constituency. For example, METI (theMinistry of Economy, Trade and Industry) can consolidate its position by
relying on Sogo Shousha (international trade companies) but MOFA does
not have this kind of support.
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Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownership

Regarding ODA policy, MOFA must consult MOF to decide a budget
for a project. Other ministries may also be involved. For example, for a
project which concerns the import of agricultural products, MOFA must
consult MAFF (the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries) which
has a strong domestic constituency.39 To mitigate this weakness, MOFA
took advantage of gaiatsu (external pressure). The pressure of the US wasused by MOFA to convince other ministries to increase ODA budgets andprojects.40 Thus Japan’s commitment to Africa was influenced by the relation with the US. However, this influence was also accepted and promotedby MOFA.
At first glance, it appears that Japanese foreign policy toward Africa
is decided upon to serve the general interests of Japan but the reality is anabsence of unified orientation. The criticism is often made that Japanesebureaucracy is too vertically organized and each ministry pursues only its
interests.
Because of geographical and probably psychological distance, political level involvement is limited in Japanese policy in Africa. The relationships with the US or China and the position toward the neighboring
countries such as South Korea or North Korea could be issues in elections
but the position on Africa will not be electorally relevant. Consequently,
politicians give wide latitude to the administration. However, without an
integrated strategy, each ministry tends to act for its own interests withoutcoordination.

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3 History and Philosophy of Japanese ODA
Diplomacy toward Africa(1) History of Japan’s and Asia’s development-Meiji restoration

In the Meiji era after the opening of Japan to the outside world, Japanese government sought to import western technology. It implemented an
important measure to transfer western technology and thousands of foreigners were invited to Japan for that purpose.
The Ministry of Industry was established in 1870 as the development
agency for infrastructure such as railroads, lighthouses, ports and harbors,and the telecommunication system, and also to develop modern mining
and large scale heavy and chemical industries. Until it was abolished in
1885, the Ministry of Industry alone employed more than 1,000 experts.
The Ministry of Home Affairs hired almost 250 foreigners between 1876
and 1895 to establish agricultural experimental stations to introduce western farming methods and products, and model factories to transfer technology to light industry. During the same period, the Ministry of Financedrew on about 125 foreign experts to help set up a modern monetary system and introduce corporate business organization. Other ministries andpublic enterprises hired almost 10.000 foreigners and the private sector
welcomed 12500 foreigners between 1870 and 1899.41
The ratio of “learning cost” in the ordinary accounts of the central
government was about 6 % in the period from 1868 to 1872. In the subsequent 5 years, the learning costs were almost doubled but the government
ordinary accounts also increased more than twice the level of the previous
five years. Therefore, the ratio dropped to 2.7 %. During the period from1878 to 1882, the ratio dropped to 1.7%, and for the rest of 19th century,
the ratio remained at a level slightly over 1%.42282

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownership

The leaders of the Meiji era were aware that Japan was far less developed than western countries and tried to close the gap through state
initiative as the fact that the government invited a considerable number offoreigners and spent that much money shows. The state also establishedand managed public factories such as Tomioka Silk Mill and Yahata SteelWorks which was constructed mainly through compensation from the first
Sino-Japanese War.
In 1873, the Home Ministry was created, and this Ministry had acontrol of public enterprises. Under its control, public factories were soldat relatively low prices. Companies such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi bought
most of these factories and consolidated their bases to be Zaibatsu (trusts)

later.
At that time, several key sectors were protected by the government.
For example, Mitsubishi group which became the first Japanese company
which entered in the market of maritime transport, took advantage ofstrong protection by the government against foreign competition.43
The Meiji government almost completely banned foreign direct investment.44 Doing so, Japan limited the trans-frontier movement of capital. Therefore, foreign ownership or management of Japanese institutions
was practically non-existent.45 Japan did not seek to introduce capitalfrom overseas or take loans from foreign commercial banks. Rather, Japanplanned and enacted its investment policy by domestic saving.46
The textile industry was one of the most important industries in Japan before WWII with cotton and silk occupying a particularly important
place in Japanese exports. These industries were developed because of thepoor labor condition and low-cost labor of mainly women and children.
Government attempts to introduce welfare legislation were aborted because of strong opposition from businesspeople, who exercised paternalism and labor control.47 In 1889, a bill to prohibit child labor below the283

age of ten was defeated, with business arguing such a bill would jeopardize modernization.48 Labor organization was not allowed and therefore,
the business was protected from strikes.49 Government left employers free
to pursue their own labor policy, thus increasing profits by paying low
wages.50-Economic development of Japan after WWII

After WWII, it was also the state which played a major role in thedevelopment of Japan. In the context of the Cold War, Prime Minister
Yoshida Shigeru proposed to concentrate the country’s limited resourceson economic development rather than to become involved in military
conflicts.51 The stance of Prime Minister Yoshida was maintained by thefollowing Prime Ministers such as Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku. The
stance is called the “Yoshida Doctrine.” Respecting this doctrine, Japan
reconstructed the economy destroyed by WWⅡ while depending for the
major part of its defense on the US.
In 1949 MITI was created mainly by the initiative of Shirasu Jiro,
right-hand man of Yoshida.52 This was a confirmation of Japan’s intention
to promote development by trade. For that purpose, experienced diplomats were integrated to the new ministry. The MITI played the main rolein the coordination of the public sector and the private sector to secure national interests in trade. During the era of economic growth, MITI was reputed as “Notorious MITI” or “Mighty MITI” to describe its wide range,
competence and presence.
MOF also played an active role in the development of Japan by regulating financial institutions. The practices were the following: (1) The
preferential allocation of foreign exchange and import licenses (2) discriminatory tax-subsidy provision and import tariffs (3) subsidized loans
from government financial institutions and implicit influence on the al284

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownership

location of loans made by heavily the regulated private financial sector.53
Through these kinds of activities, the government controlled and favored
key industries, and guided economic development.
We can see that the government was strongly involved in the protection and management of domestic industry. For example, when Europe
started to get rid of restrictions on imports of various products, Japan wasunder pressure to follow that tendency. Japan removed several restrictions on import. However, the Japanese government under the direction of
MITI, included many products in the list of special protection. Especially,
restrictions on import of automobiles were not removed until 1965 andproducts such as beef or sugar continued to be protected even longer.54-Contribution of Japan to Asia’s development and Asia’s development model

The “flying geese paradigm” of Akamatsu Kaname developed in the
1930s had become popular in the 1960s. In this model of development,a country initiates a process of industrialization by producing a productwith less added value and it becomes the exporter of this product. Afterthe country developed by exporting this product, it abandons this productto produce a product with more added value. This abandonment allows
another country to produce that abandoned product and initiate its own
development. As an early country to be industrialized, Japan is identified
as the front goose and other Asian countries are identified as the geesethat follow it in a “V”.
This model of development continued to have pertinence to explain
the development of Asia. After the development of Japan, NIEs countries(Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea) followed the development path of Japan. After the development of NIEs countries, ASEAN(Association of South-East Asian Nations) countries followed the development path of NIEs.
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Akamatsu’s theory does not mention labor conditions or what kind of
regime best supported development. However, we can point some similarities between Japan’s development and that of other Asian countries.
Asian countries including Japan initiated their developments by the textile
industry taking advantage of low-cost labor. As in Japan in the Meiji era,
working conditions were not much respected by governments including
authoritarian ones like the Japanese government before WWII. We cantake the example of Park Chung-hee in South Korea, Mahathir bin Mohamad in Malaysia, Ferdinand Edralin Marcos of Philippines, and Haji
Muhammad Soeharto of Indonesia, etc. These regimes are classified as“developmental dictatorships.” The most telling example is China. It is
widely acknowledged that China achieved its development under strong
and authoritarian leadership of the Communist party with protectionism
associated with compulsory transfer of technology. China has been one of
the major recipients of Japanese ODA since 1979 and it is only in 2021
that Japan stopped ODA to China.
The Japanese government claims that Japan contributed to the development of Asia by ODA, private financial flow such as exportation credits
and investment by the government and private sector. According to theJapanese government, this form of aid put in place since 1970 contributed
to the development of Asian countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, andIndonesia.55 Despite certain critiques from traditional western donors,
politicians and bureaucrats remain solidly committed to this model of development.56
Japan’s development and Asian countries’ development were realized
in different eras and different ways although there are some similarities
and it is not yet clear that Asian countries will achieve the development of
the level of Japan and South Korea which are OECD countries. However,Japan’s economic stagnation for decades largely affected the image of Ja286

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownership

pan’s strong economy in comparison to the quickly growing economies ofsome other Asian countries. Probably, it is wise not to distinguish clearly
between Japanese model and Asia’s model and to assimilate the Japanesedevelopment model into the Asian development model.
(2) Philosophy of Japan’s ODA policy-Central role of State

From the research on history from the Meiji era to the post WWII
era, we can see that the development of Japan was realized under governmental control. The government protected infant industries against international competition. The liberalization of domestic markets was allowed
only when domestic industry acquired the competence to challenge international competitors in that field. This liberalization was very selective,
and technology transfer was strongly encouraged by the government. The
development process post-WWII was also directed by the government.
Japan was certainly developed through free markets and free trade.
However, free markets and free trade were controlled by the government.
This was brought about by a well-planned strategy developed mainly bygovernment officials. This experience of development influenced and determined the development philosophy of Japan.
This philosophy made Japan distance itself somewhat from the neoliberal development model called the “Washington consensus” which
has been largely prompted by international financial institutions based in
Washington.
In 1990, Japan published “East Asia Miracle: Economic Growth andPublic Policy,” through the World Bank. The authors of this report concluded that the rapid growth of East Asian economies was primarily due
to application of a set of common and, market friendly economic policies,
leading to both higher accumulation and better allocation of resources.57
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This report emphasized the importance of selective state intervention
in the economy and therefore challenged the paradigm of neoliberalism
which privileged the role of the private sector.
In November 1991, OECF (Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund,which later became JBIC) published a report about problems with theStructural Adjustment Programs of the World Bank and IMF. The reportadmitted that Structural Adjustment Programs can have positive effects incertain developing countries but they can also have negative effects if certain conditions are not fulfilled.58 The report explained that exporting industries can develop faster when they are temporarily protected instead ofbeing liberated rapidly. Regarding Africa, the report criticized the WorldBank for forcing the privatization of industries too early without taking
account of the realities of the challenges that African countries’ economies were facing.59
Japan also played a key role in the formation of the New Development Strategy (NDS) which was adopted by DAC (Development Assistance Committee) of OECD in 1996.60 The NDS especially insisted thatthe conditions of each county should be taken into account. It proposesthat recipient country governments should take more responsibility in development and that donors should help them.61
Japanese economist Goto Kazumi criticized the uniform applicationof the neoliberal development model to developing countries. He pointed
out the importance of cooperation between public sector and private sector and the danger of believing naively in market mechanisms.62 The emphasis on the public sector clearly reflects the Japanese aid philosophy as
confirmed by its own experience.
Another Japanese economist, Ito Takatoshi, argued that the East
Asian development model can be useful in Africa. He pointed out the virtues of the Asian development model such as the importance of social in288

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownership

frastructure, effectiveness and efficiency of government could be appliedin Africa.63 He also argued that after the takeoff stage, the orientation ofpolicy may change to promote some industries.64
Globally, the Japanese philosophy of aid is that each country should
develop its own strategy of development considering its own conditions.
For that purpose, taking ownership and developing self-reliance by developing countries is encouraged rather than accepting development models
imposed from outside. The public sector must play an important role in
the formation of developing strategies which fit the local conditions ofeach country.
-Policy of aid based on request

Therefore, in the fields of aid, the active role of recipient countries
is encouraged. To receive Japanese aid, it is the recipient country whichdevelops a project and presents its proposal to the Japanese embassy ofthat country. This process based on request is called Yoseishugi (principleof request). Although the Japanese government and companies have im-portant means to identify, formulate and propose a project for a recipient
country, the recipient country has a strong say in the process.
This principle comes from the history of Japanese aid. Japanese aid
after WWII was initiated as a substitution of compensation for WWII
for the Asian countries which had suffered from Japanese aggression.65
The aid to Asia aimed to alleviate anti-Japanese sentiment and maintaincordial relations with the leaders, including authoritarian leaders. Under
those conditions, Japan was not in a position to impose its ideas on recipient countries. This principle played a role in maintaining good relations
with recipient countries without imposing political conditions to them. At
the same time, this principle perfectly fits Japan’s philosophy of aid thatfavors ownership of the process by recipient countries.
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-Ownership and emphasis on loans

In its philosophy of aid, loans were seen preferable to grants because
Japan thought that they would stimulate effort to repay the debt, in consequence, encourage the recipient to take ownership of the development
process. For example, a senior official of MOFA said the following in aninterview.
ODA is not a charity activity. The idea to do charity activity between
a country to a country is not polite to the recipient country. It means that
we do not consider that recipient country equal. I think the notion ofcharity is particularly good between individuals. But not at the level ofcountries. President Rowling of Ghana used to give the speech titled “We
Africans also have pride.” Some Europeans thought it was unpleasant.
However, our conviction is to treat the partners equally. I think it is hard
to repay the debts. But this will guide us to make the efforts to repay.66
The speech entitled “Nasakeha Hitonotamenarazu” (Compassion is
not for others)67 made by Aso Taro, Minister of Foreign Affairs at thattime is also helpful to understand the philosophy of Japanese foreign aid.
In the speech, he said,
I say to those who doubt the utility of ODA that we have a calculation
for the long future. ODA is the important means to promote Japanese values. I guess now it is obvious why Japan preferred loans to grants. ODA
will be only charity if the recipient people do not have the intention todevelop. For that reason, we have dared to tell that we do not give but welend.68
His speech spoke very clearly Japanese philosophy of aid which dif290

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownershipfers significantly from that of major western donors.
Japan tried to maintain this position in its aid policy toward Africa,
but the situation of Africa and the paradigm of international society did
not allow it to do so. Between 1987 and 1995, ODA received by subSaharan Africa except for South Africa reached 10% of the GDP of subSaharan Africa69 and it was no longer possible to remedy that situation
only by rescheduling debt. In consequence, since the end of 80s, the cancellation of debt had become a rule of the international community.
In 1996, on the occasion of the G8 meeting, the IMF and World Bank
adopted an initiative in favor of heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC).
This initiative aimed a united action of the international financial community to bring back the debt of those countries to sustainable levels. In
1999, the HIPC framework was fixed and 41 countries including 33 African countries were identified to take advantage of the initiative.
Therefore, the international situation did not allow Japan to consistently follow its philosophy of aid in Africa.70 Japan was obliged to follow
the HIPC initiative to cancel debts by providing new financial aid. That
new financial aid is used to repay debts.71 This approach to rescuing theindebted countries is thought to avoid moral hazards and stimulate ownership by the recipient country.72 But in practice, it is no different fromcancelling debts and after these experiences of cancelling debts, Japan
became very cautious about providing new loans to African countries andJapanese ODA became composed mainly of grants.
However, the most recent tendency is an increase in loans. Yen loans
restarted to Cameroon and in Zambia in 2009,73 and to Uganda, in Kenya,in Tanzania, and in Mozambique in 2010.74 According to JICA, between
2010 and 2021, 54 loan projects have been approved in Africa. Recipientsare Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Ivory Coast, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Ghana,
Senegal, Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Nigeria, Cabo Verde, Zambia,
291

Botswana, Mauritius, and the African Development Bank. These Yenloans have mainly financed infrastructure projects such as construction ofroads, ports and bridges.75 However, this increase of loans is considered to
be a compromise to meet commitment in the difficult budget situation.76
We can see that Japan compromised its philosophy to prefer loans togrants as it must conform to the international paradigm. However, we canalso see from the emphasis on loans which Japan believed would stimulate efforts to repay and therefore achieve the development objectives,
Japan privileged ownership of the process by African countries.

4 Perspectives on Japanese foreign policy toward Africa(1) ODA reform-Adoption and application of ODA charter

In 1989, Japanese ODA exceeded that of the US, making it theworld’s largest donor country. Japan kept that position for 10 years. Since
that time ODA to Africa has increased consistently. In 1992, the Prime
Minister Cabinet adopted the ODA Charter which defined Japan’s generalorientation regarding ODA for the first time. The main principles are thefollowing.
① Environmental conservation and development should be pursued intandem.
② Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided.
③ Full attention should be paid to trends in recipient countries’ military
expenditures, their development and production of weapons of mass
destruction and missiles, their export and import of arms, etc., bothso as to maintain and strengthen international peace and stability, andfrom the viewpoint that developing countries should place appropri292

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownershipate priorities in the allocation of their resources in their own economic and social development.
④ Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation
regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country.77
In 2003, a new charter was adopted. It conserved 4 principles alreadymentioned but several concepts such as “Human security” and “Peace building” had been added. Particularly, assistance to facilitate peace processes;
humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, such as assistance for displaced
persons and for the restoration of basic infrastructure; assistance for assuring domestic stability and security, including disarmament, demobilization,and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) are especially mentioned.78
This adoption of the Charter together with “4 principles of ODA” 79
is the demonstration of the will of Japan to associate its philosophy of aid
with real-world practices. But this equally involves compromise between
MOFA officials who would like to conform to western countries’ goalsof using development assistance to promote human rights and democracy
and METI officials who are skeptical about interference into domestic affairs of recipient countries.80 At the same time, the adoption of the Charteris a response to the accusation of Japan having no clear aid policy.81 In
general, we should suppose that Japan had two primary motivations to
adopt the charter. One was to integrate its ODA policy. Another was to alleviate criticism over its aid practices from the western countries.
The Charter was applied in a relatively strict way in Africa. Japansuspended the ODA to Kenya in 1991, to Sudan in 1992, to Nigeria andZimbabwe in 1993 and to Gambia in 1995 not for respecting the Charter’s
requirements.82 The most telling example is the sanctions against Nigeria,293an important producer of petrol with considerable economic potential anddiplomatic weight in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was difficult for Japan to takesanctions against Nigeria before the adoption of the Charter.83
At the same time, Japan recognized the efforts of those countries
which did try to conform to the principals of the Charter by increasing
ODA. This was the case in Benin in 1991, in Ethiopia in 1993, in Ghana
in 1995, in Madagascar in 1991 and 1993, in Tanzania since 1991, in
Zambia in 1991 and 1993 and in South Africa in 1994.84
In Asia, the application was more discretionary. After the Tiananmen
Square Incident, Japan suspended only a small part of its ODA to China,
the biggest recipient of Japanese ODA at that time. Japan also did nottake any measures in Indonesia to make it respect human rights in East
Timor.85 In Africa, the Charter was applied in the stricter way mentioned
above because the continent represents smaller interests for Japan to becompared to other parts of the world.86
In the same way, Japan did not suspend its ODA to Zimbabwe despite
the persecution of white farmers there in 2002. Japan was the biggest donor in Zimbabwe at that time and took a very cautious position comparedwith the UK and other European countries. It seems that Japan was afraidof the deterioration of relations with President Mugabe. Japan continued
to give certain advantages to Zimbabwe without taking the principals of
the Charter into consideration.87
In the 2000s, the application of negative incentives became scarcer
with only three incidents, in Myanmar when the junta placed Aung San
Suu Kyi under house arrest in 2003, when Coup d’état occurred in Guinea
in 2008, and when the government was overthrown illegally in Madagascar in 2009.88
In fact, there is no clear criteria in the Charter about what kind of
human rights abuses or which level of military action can result in sanc294

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownershiption.89 It leaves quite a lot of room for discretionary latitude.90 In addition,
the Japanese government is insisting more on conditions for a positive
application to give aid than it is focused on conditions for the recipient tobe penalized with regard to non-conformity to principles stipulated in theCharter.
It might be the result of the negative reaction from the business world
to restrictive measures being put in place in Asia.91 Therefore, the adoption of the Charter can be interpreted as an attempt to legitimize ODA
politically and have better control over this policy by discretionary application. At the same time, we can also see the increasing will of Japanese
government to take firmer control over ODA policy and practice.
-ODA organizational reformIn the general reform of ODA, decision-making and implementation structures were reformed to be more coherent and centralized in the
2000s. The most important measure of the reform is that the Yen loanfunction of JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation) was integrated into JICA. In MOFA, the International Cooperation Bureau in chargeof planning of ODA policy was created by absorbing related functions.
On top of that, the Council of Overseas Economic Cooperation composedof the Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
was created.
Therefore, the ODA structure was reconfigured to a top-down structure. The Council of Overseas Economic Cooperation decides generalorientation of the ODA policy. The International Cooperation Bureauof MOFA plans ODA policy and JICA implements that policy. Throughthese reforms, ODA distribution was intended to be executed in A “strategic, effective and agile manner while coping flexibly with ever changing
295

situations”92 according to the Cabinet decision on the ODA charter.
Broadly MOFA’s position was strengthened because it got a monopoly in the planning of ODA. The merger of the Yen loan function of
JBIC with JICA also reinforces MOFA because JICA is an organization
under control of MOFA and JBIC was an organization under control of
MOF. This reform thus considerably reinforced MOFA’s position in ODA
decision making. At the level of organizational structure, Japanese policy
toward Africa has been integrated gradually towards a more centrally
directed, coherent model.
(2) From economic involvement to political involvement-Increase of SDF activities in Africa

After the end of the cold war, we observed several changes inJapanese engagement in Africa. ODA continued to play a major role inJapanese activity in Africa. But since the 1990s, Japan has increased its
presence in Africa with detachments of SDF (Self-defense Forces) also.
Starting with ONUMOZ in 1993, Japan sent SDF personnel to Zaire (currently Democratic Republic of Congo) and Kenya for relief operations(supplies, medical, sanitation and water) for Rwandan refugees from thecivil war in 1994. Japan then started to participate in the anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia in 2009. From 2012 to 2017, Japanese SDF
personnel participated in UNMISS (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan). We must ask what provoked this change, who playeda major role in bringing this change about and what this change means.
-Activism of government officials in policy making regarding Africa in thecase of ONUMOZ (United Nations Operations in Mozambique)

It is interesting to observe the activism of government officials indecision making to send SDF (Self-defense forces) to ONUMOZ (United296

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownership

Nations Operations in Mozambique). The International Peace Cooperation Law was adopted by Japan in 1992 but the Japanese population was
still extremely cautious about the SDF’s overseas operations. In this situation, Japan decided to dispatch three movement control units of 48 SDF
personnel each, 144 personnel in total, to Mozambique in 1993.
The decision to send SDF to Mozambique was principally made by
the MOFA officials. The Prime Minister at that time, Miyazawa Kichi and
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kono Yohei were not supportive or were atleast cautious about the idea of sending SDF to Mozambique.93 Just before
the decision was made, Prime Minister Miyazawa asked senior MOFA officials if there was an embassy in Mozambique.94 He probably wanted toemphasize the difficulty of sending SDF where there was no diplomatic
representation.95 In fact, there was no Japanese embassy in Mozambique.
On the exact same day that the ministerial committee decided on the
SDF detachment, they decided to establish Japanese embassy in Mozambique.96
The motivation behind this detachment was probably a matter of
diplomatic considerations. The G7 summit scheduled in July 1993 in Japan was expected to be difficult for Japan regarding its trade surplus. The
detachment of SDF was a way for Japan to show its contribution to world
peace and therefore calm the critics over its trade surplus.97 In the process,it is important to note that civil servants, who are generally considered tobe resistant to new approaches, were more active in these changes thanpoliticians, who are often viewed as being more active and eager for visibility.98 This example shows clearly the activism of MOFA officials which
can be observed widely in the Japanese diplomacy toward Africa.
Increase of SDF operations does not mean necessarily that Japan has
intentionally increased its military presence in Africa. It is more correct
to say that Japan looked for the opportunities to show its contribution to297

world peace and Africa offered these opportunities. In fact, about 70% of
the discussions in the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) are currently taken up with African issues. Therefore, it is quite natural that Africa provided Japan with opportunities for these types of contributions to
UN related activities.
(3) Challenges of Japanese involvement in Africa- UNSC reform and Japanese commitment in Africa

It is widely acknowledged that one of MOFA’s biggest ambitions is toget a permanent seat in the UNSC and SDF deployments serve to support
this ambition by showing Japanese contribution to world peace.
This consideration probably pushed MOFA to a stronger commitment
in Africa. This is also true of the TICAD (Tokyo International Conferenceon African Development) process which was started in 1993. The official
narrative emphasizes the importance of Japanese initiative in the time of“Aid Fatigue.” But it is often said that the trigger for this initiative wasa telegram issued by the Japanese delegation in the UN.99 The Japanesedelegation sent a telegram to MOFA headquarters which urged it to think
about ways to attract African countries to engage with discussions of
UNSC reform.100 TICAD has become an important process for Japan andalso for Africa, and it has certainly served Africa’s development but it isalso important to note that Japan has always maintained its ambition to bea permanent member of UNSC with support from African countries.
The reform of UNSC is one of main motivations but far from theonly one. Japan’s involvement in Africa is largely associated with its ambition to play a larger role on the international scene. In 2000, the samesenior official previously cited said in his speech.
After all, I am convinced that Africa is a touchstone for Japan to298

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownershipknow if it is a country which can truly play a global role. If Japan is satisfied to be a regional power in the Asia-Pacific, it does not need to commit
so much to Africa. Such was Japanese policy in Africa in the 70’s. But if
Japan assumes a global role as an important country in the international
arena, it cannot avoid Africa. The quality of a global power relies on its
will and capacity to get involved actively and assume its responsibility not
only in specific regions but also in major global issues.101-Failure of UNSC reform

As we saw previously, one of the important motivations of Japanesecommitment in Africa is the reform of UNSC, but this motivation faces
serious challenges. In the summer 2005, the group called the G4 composed of Japan, Brazil, Germany, and India tried to push UNSC reform
forward, but it did not have the expected result. The G4 prepared a reform
proposal in July 2005 and expected the African countries to join to support the proposal. However, the AU chose to present their own proposal of
the reform based on Ezulwini consensus.102 The G4, including Japan, tried
to harmonize the G4 project and the AU project in vain.103 In addition,
many countries joined the “Uniting for Consensus” movement initiated by
Italy to oppose any kind of reform.
Japan has not renounced its ambition for a permanent seat in the
UNSC. Since 2010, the G4 continues to have ministerial meetings about
the SC reform on the margins of the General Assembly of the United
Nations every year. In 2015, at the 70 years anniversary of the UN, themeeting was held at the level of heads of state and government. In 2008,
Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on expansion of and equitable
representation in the UNSC started. Japan, together with the other G4
countries continue to struggle to start text-based negotiation on Security
Council reform.104 However, there is no clear achievement in the negotia299

tion for the moment.
- Japan as a middle power in Africa and the Asian development model

Japan has constantly strengthened its ties with Africa but it has had
to face several challenges in recent years. With the economic stagnation
which started in the 1990s, Japan cannot increase financial contributions
as before and this restriction has imposed some more conditions on Japanese ODA policy in Africa. Furthermore, UNSC reform appears to be difficult to be realized.
In this context, the notion of middle power is an interesting modelwith which to rethink Japanese engagement in Africa. Professor Scarlett
Cornelissen of Stellenbosch University in South Africa describes JapaneseForeign Policy toward Africa with this concept.
Generally, a superpower is understood as a country which tries to extend its influence across the whole world. A middle power does not seekthat kind of worldwide engagement, but tries to concentrate its resources
on a defined field or limited region of crisis.105 A middle power tends toemphasize certain values. By doing so, a middle power maintains visibility of its commitment in the international arena and consolidates its position as representing a just cause.
Canada is a typical example of middle power. Canada often emphasizes the notion of “human security” in its diplomacy. The definition of“human security” is largely understood as a need to protect individuals inconflict. It was a new notion compared to the classical notion of security
which mainly focused on security of the state. By promoting a certain
value, in this case the notion of “human security”, Canada maintains its
status in international politics, probably with a higher profile than its real
economic, political, or military power would support.
According to Cornelissen, in Japan’s case, the “East Asian develop300

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownership

ment model” can be this kind of value which can elevate Japan’s status
in the international arena.106 The Tokyo declaration adopted in 1993 at
TICAD I stipulates, “We recognize that the Asian experience of economic
development and the catalytic role of international cooperation offer hopeand provide a challenge for African economic transformation.”107 According to Cornelissen, this type of diplomacy can be classified as a typical
middle power diplomacy.
It is also important to recognize that a middle power’s diplomacy is areflection of its own internal politics and the values of its society. The caseof Canada is interesting once again. The identity of Canada as “the country that desires peace” has its origin in the diplomacy of Lester B.Pearson,
the former Minister of Foreign Affairs who mediated the Suez conflictin 1956. Canada was also a principal contributor to the emergency force
which was sent to the conflict zone to observe the cease-fire.108 Canada
has maintained this kind of diplomacy by contributing personnel to PKO
in many fields and played a major role in the campaign against landmines(International Campaign to Ban Landmines, ICBL).109 Canada used thisapproach to diplomacy as a tool to consolidate its national identity which
was, at that time, threatened by the independence movement of Québec
and at the same time to pursue a global reach for those values.110
Japan has also tried to promote the values of its society in its diplomacy toward Africa. One of the pillars of TICAD is “Ownership.” Japanemphasized its support for NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development) at TICAD III. Ownership of the development process by African countries and people is a one of the fundamental concepts of NEPAD.
Emphasis on ownership in NEPAD is reminiscent the fundamental valueof Japanese aid philosophy based on its own development.111 Promotionof this concept of ownership in TICAD is a reflection of the value of effort and self-reliance which is deeply rooted in Japan’s society, which can
301be considered as a character of middle power diplomacy as Canada is doing in its diplomacy as a peace-promoting nation.
Japan’s diplomacy has acquired several characteristics which are
typical to middle power diplomacy. As we saw previously, Japanese engagement with Africa faces difficult challenges. Japan will not be able toplay the role of a superpower because of both its domestic constraints andinternational conditions. In this context, Japanese foreign policy toward
Africa should be questioned regarding its relevance and the notion of
middle power provides us with a clue.
Conclusion

Before WWII, Japan’s relation with Africa was influenced and often
determined by other factors other than Africa itself such as relations withthird countries or international conditions. After WWII, this tendency
continued. Under the Cold War, Japan’s relations with Africa were often
determined by other factors such as the relationship with the US.
However, this tendency started to change slowly in the 70s and 80s.
Japan started to rethink its commitment with Africa to secure natural resources or gain political support in the international arena.
Japan continued to affirm the proactivity and independence of its diplomacy toward Africa in the 90s. Japan strengthened its commitment in
Africa by sending SDF personnel and by initiating the TICAD process.
By doing so, Japan started to have its own independent policy toward
Africa. Still, Japan-Africa relations are influenced by other external factors just as all other relations between countries are. However, we cancautiously say that Japan started to have its own independent relationshipwith Africa for the first time in history.
Endo stated that Japan’s foreign policy toward Africa was shiftingfrom “Reactive” to “Principled”.112 He concluded “In the era of change302

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownershipthat affected the ODA environment and Africa itself, it is difficult to treat
Africa as a ‘distinct entity’. At the very least, it is certain that we havereached a phase in history that brings to the foreground the necessity ofdeveloping more-proactive policies toward Africa.”113 Today, Africa isworth the development of a particular and specific approach from Japanjust as any other regions.
We can see that the word “ownership” could be interpreted in multiple ways. In fact, the concept of “ownership” that Japan is promoting
strongly in dealing with Africa also applies to Japan itself. By reforming
and strengthening the relation with Africa, Japan started to have “ownership” in its relationship with Africa. The shift to ask for Africa to have“ownership” of its development is also a shift for Japan to have an “ownership” in its own relationship with Africa, independent of its allies.
At the same time, we have to admit that Japanese foreign policy toward Africa faces serious challenges. The ambition to be a global power
faced an obstacle in the UNSC reform failure in 2005. The TICAD process is being reinforced but it is difficult to imagine that there will be a
drastic increase in ODA. Japan certainly remains the world’s 3rd largest
economic power but it does not have the financial capacity of the US or
China. It also does not have historical ties with Africa like France or theUnited Kingdom.
It is high time to realize that Japan is a middle power, at least in Africa, and will remain so. In 2018, the Japanese delegation to African Union
in Addis Ababa and the embassy in Mauritius were inaugurated. Japan has
considerably increased its number of embassies in Africa and counts 37
missions in Africa. But most of the newly inaugurated embassies face asignificant shortage of staff. Japan’s diplomatic network is over-stretchedcompared to its real capacity. Minister of Foreign Affairs Kono Tarohimself admitted this in his speech to MOFA officials in the beginning of303

2018 “Until now we tried to increase the number of embassies, but wehave to slow down the speed and try to make each existing embassy perform more effectively.”114
Recognizing that Japan is a middle power in Africa, Japan can choose
an approach to diplomacy that relies on values such as the “East Asia development model.” By placing emphasis on a specific value, Japan will beable to show its contribution to international security and maintain a certain level of presence without having to devote a “superpower-like” levelof resources to the project. The Asian development model could provide a
diplomatic asset to Japan by serving as the value that Japan can promote.
At a time when the global presence of Japan declines in economic
terms, middle power diplomacy to emphasize values could play a role
to raise or maintain the Japanese presence, at least in Africa. This is also
in line with the shift towards “ownership” and independence in relations
with Africa.
Annotation
1

SHIRAISHI Kenji, Afurikaongaku no sozoryoku (Imagination of African
Music), Tokyo, KeisoShobo, 1993, P.9.

2

TAKEMOTO Naoko, Africa-Japan Relations: From Economic development to Human development, Washington DC, Howard University, p.51.

3

AGBI Sunday Olu, Japanese relations with Africa: 1868-1978, Ibadan
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4

TAKEMOTO, Op.cit., p.52.

5

AOKI Sumio, Nihonjinno “Ahurika hakken” (“Discover of Africa” by
Japanese people), Yamakawashuppansha, Tokyo, 2000, p.42.

6

Idem

7

FUJITA Midori, Afurika “hakken” (Discover of “Africa”), Iwanamisho-304

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8

FUJITA, op.cit., p.207.

9

Idem

10

AGBI, op.cit., p.61.

11

AGBI, Op.cit., p.62.

12AGBI, Op.cit., p.20.

13

Idem

14

AGBI, Op.cit., p23-24.

15

MORIKAWA Jun, MinamiAhurika to Nihon (South Africa and Japan), Tokyo, Doubunnkan, 1988, p.11.

16

MORIKAWA, Op.cit., p.13.

17

MORIKAWA, Op.cit., p.14.

18

MORIKAWA, Op.cit., p.20.

19

TAKEMOTO, Op.cit., p.126.

20

LYNN SPYKE Rebecca, Japanese foreign aid policy: Influences and Motivations, University of South Carolina, Columbia, 1999, p.233.

21

Idem

22

MOFA, ODA Hakusho (ODA white paper) 1991, 1991 MOFA, ODA
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23

SCHRAEDER, Op. cit. p.549.

24

LYNN SPYKE Rebecca, Japanese foreign aid policy: Influences and Motivations, University of South Carolina, Columbia, 1999, p.236.

25

Idem

26

KWEKU Ampiah, The dynamics of Japan’s Relations with Africa, South
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27

Idem

28

AICARDI DE SAINT-PAUL Marc, Le Japon et l’Afrique. Genèse d’une305relation atypique, Paris, Centre des hautes études sur l'Afrique et l'Asiemodernes, 1999, p.40.
29

LYNN SPYKE, Op.cit., p.132.

30

SCHRAEDER Peter J., “Foreign assistance in francophone Africa”, Journal of Modern African Studies, Cambridge, Cambridge University press,
December 1995., p.550.

31

Idem

32

OBAYASHI Minoru, “Constraint on Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa”, Perspectives asiatiques, Paris, Institut de Recherches Politiques etEconomiques sur le Japon et l’Asie Contemporains, 1999, p.82.

33

Idem

34

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AICARDI DE SAINT-PAUL Marc, Op.cit., p.70.

36

Idem

37

CORNELISSEN Scarlett, “Japan-Africa relations: patterns and prospects”,
Africa in international politics, London, Routledge, 2003, p.122.

38

CORNELISSEN (2003), Op.cit., p. 123.

39

LYNN SPYKE Rebecca, Op.cit., p.166.

40

LYNN SPYKE Rebecca, Op.cit., p.133.

41

INOUKAI Ichiro, “Nation-building and regional development: the Japanese experience,” Regional development series, vol.10., Maruzen Asia forand on behalf of the United Nations Centre for Regional Development,
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42

Idem

43

LYNN SPYKE, Op.cit., p.71.

44

TAKEMOTO Naoko, Africa-Japan Relations: From Economic develop-306

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownership

ment to Human development, Washington DC, Howard University, p.423.
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NAFZIGER E. Wayne, Poverty, and wealth: comparing Afro-Asian development, JAI press, Greenwich, 1994, Op.cit., p.204.

46

NAFZIGER E. Wayne, Learning from the Japanese: Japan’s pre-war development and the Third world, N.Y.Armonk, 1995, p.62

47

NAFZIGER (1995), op.cit., p.105.

48

Idem

49

NAFZIGER (1995), op.cit., p.106.

50

NAFZIGER (1995), op.cit., p.105.

51

Yoshida was Premier minister between May 1946 and May 1947, and between October 1948 and December1954.

52

METI, Mission of METI
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53

SAXONHOUSE Gray R., “Structural Change and Japanese Economic
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54

LYNN SPYKE, Op.cit., p.84.

55

MOFA, Japan’s Development policy, Tokyo, MOFA, 2002, p.16.

56

CORNELISSEN Scarlett, « Le Japon, une moyenne puissance face àl’Afrique », Afrique Contemporaine, Paris, Agence française de développement, Hiver 2004,p.46.

57

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58

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59

OECF, Op.cit.,p.10.

60

LYNN SPYKE, Op.cit., p.96.
307

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64

Idem

65

TAKAHASHI Motoki, “Enjo kyocho nihon no taihinkonkoku enjo henotoi (Harmonization of aide: Question about the Japanese aide in poor countries.)”, JDCJ Forum, N23, p.29-34.

66

MOFA, Nihongatajizokukanou na kaihatsu (Japanese vision of the sustainable development),
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67

The proverb means the good thing we do for others will return to us.
Therefore, we do good things not for benefits of others, but for our benefits.

68

MOFA, ODA: Nasakeha hitonotamenarazu (ODA: Compassion is not forothers)https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/18/easo_0119.html (Accesson 6th January 2021)

69

HIRANO Katsumi, “Kananasukisu Samitto ha nazeAfurikanitsuitehanashiattanoka (Why was the African issues discussed in Kananakis Summit?)”,Africa Report, n°35, JETRO-Asiakeizaikenkyujo, Tokyo, 2004, p.23.

70

HIRANO Katsumi, “TICAD 3 to TICAD inishiatchibu (TICAD 3 and the308

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TICAD Initiatives),” Africa Report, n°38, JETRO-Asiakeizaikenkyujo,
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MOFA, Juzaimukoku nitaisuru shien (Aide to HIPC)
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72

Idem

73

MOFA, ODA Hakusho 2009 (Cahier blanc2009), MOFA, Tokyo, 2009.

74

MOFA, ODA Hakusho 2010 (Cahier blanc2010), MOFA, Tokyo, 2010.

75

JICA Home Page

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TAKAHASHI Motoki, “Nihonnotaiahurika Enjogaikono Eensen” (Change
in Japanese Aid Policy toward Africa), Kokusaimondai, No.591, May
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77

ODA charter, 1992.
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78

ODA charter, 2003, p.4, p.5.
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22nd January 2021)

79

Prime Minister Kaifu announced the 4 directives of ODA in 1991. 4 principals are (1) nonuse of ODA for the military purpose (2) particular attention to the development of massive destruction arms including Nuclear
weapons. (3) Non export or import of arms (4) Democracy and market
economy. Respect for human rights.

80

PHARR Susan, “Japanese Aid in the new world order”, in Garby and
M.Bullokeds(ed), Japan a new kind of superpower?, Washington.D.C,.
The Woodrow Willson center presse, 1994, p.169.

81

RIHALT Drifte, Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s, From Economic Superpower to What Superpower? London, Macmillan Press, 1996, pp. 123309

127.
82

EYINLA BOLADE, Op.cit., p.424.

83

EYINLA BOLADE, Op.cit., p.427.

84

EYINLA BOLADE, Op.cit., p.424.

85

OBAYASHI Minoru, « TICAD, un processus favorable au développement
de l’Afrique ? », Afrique Contemporaine, n°212, Paris, Agence française
de développement, Hiver 2004, p.83.

86

Idem

87

KAMO Shozo, « La politique africaine du Japon : Nouveau venu surle continent », Journal of Political Science and Sociology, Tokyo, n°1,
21COE-CCC, 2004 , p.6,7.

88

WATANABE Matsuo, Hennkasurukankyouto nihonno enjoseisaku-hutatsuno seihukaihatuenjotaikouno sakuteikara (The change of Japanese aide
policy-From the adoption of 2 ODA charters), JICA, Tokyo, 2019, p.15.
https://www.jica.go.jp/jica-ri/ja/publication/other/l75nbg00000wgho9-att/
background_paper_No.4.pdf (Access on 26th January 2021)

89

EYINLA BOLADE, Op.cit., p.418.

90

Idem

91

Idem

92

Cabinet decision on the Development Cooperation Charter, February 10,2015
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000067701.pdf (Access on19th December
2020)

93

SATO Makoto, “Mozanbikueho jieitaihakenoto Nohono ahurikaseisaku(Detachment of SDF to Mazambique and Japanese policy toward Africa)”,in KAWABATA Masahisa (ed) Afrika to nihon (Afrique and Japon), Tokyo, Keisoushobou, 1994, p.116.

94

Mainichi Shinbun, 13 March 1993.

95

STAO Op.cit., p.117

310

Japanese Foreign Policy toward Africa : The Move to Partner-Country Ownership

96

Idem

97

STAO Op.cit., p.125

98

Idem

99

KATAOKA Sadaharu, “Afurika mondai to Nihon (Africa’s problem andJapan)”, Tchiiki kenkyu (Area Study), Volume 9, Showado p.247.

100 Idem
101 MOFA (2000), Op. cit..
102 Ezlwini consensus demand at least two permanent seats with veto power,
and two non-permanent seats for Africa while G4 proposal demand at 6
permanent seats (including 2 African countries) without veto power, and 4
non-permanent seats (including 1 African county).
103 TAKABAYASHI Toshiyuki, Kokurenkaikakumondai nitaisuru Afurikashokoku no shisei- Afurikarengono Ezlwini Consensus (Africa’s attitude
toward SCreform-Eslwini consensus of AU), JETRO-Asiakeizaikenkyujo,
Tokyo, 2005, p.16.
http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00008196 (Access on 1st November 2020)
104 MOFA, Anporikaikaku no Keii to Genjo (SC reform process and current
situation)
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/un_kaikaku/kaikaku2.html (Accesson 1st November 2021)
105 Idem
106 CORNELISSEN (2004), Op.cit., p.47.
107 Tokyo Declaration on African Development “Towards the21st Century,”
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad2/ticad22.html (access on 11th
October 2020)
108 TSUKADA Hiroshi, “Canada gaikouniokeruningen no anzenhosho (Thenotion of human security in Canadian diplomacy),” Reference, Tokyo, National Library, April 2005, p.56.
109 CORNELISSEN (2004), Op.cit., p.49.

311

110 TSUKADA, Op.cit., p57.
111 CORNELISSEN (2004), Op.cit., p.48.
112 ENDO Mitsugi, From “Reactive” to “Principled”: Japan’s Foreign Policy
Stance toward Africa”, JIIA, Tokyo, 2013, p.1.
https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_library/japan_s_diplomacy/160330_
Mitsugi_Endo.pdf (Access on 23rd December 2020)
113 ENDO, Op.cit., p.13.
114 Asahi Shinbun, 10th January 2018https://digital.asahi.com/articles/ASL195RWVL19UTFK01P.html (Accesson 15th October 2020)

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