Withdrawal Ratio Cause by Death

0.014
ﬁnancial asset. The consumption of the old depends"first.dat" using 1:2
on disposable income and real interest rate. The"second.dat" using 1:20.012"third.dat" using 1:2
young and the old is divided by using the data of
Family income and expenditure survey which is clas0.01
siﬁed by age. Although disposable income is also di0.008
vided by Family income and expenditure survey, atﬁrst, it is divided into compensation of the employ0.006
ees, property income, operating surplus, beneﬁt of0.004
social security, direct taxes, and contribution of social security by SNA, and calculated the ratio of the0.002
young and the old from Family income and expen0
diture survey. By doing so, we can understand the15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
5560
change of the beneﬁt and contribution of social secuYearrity easily. In Family income and expenditure survey,
the data of the income of the household which does
Figure 1: This is a sample ﬁgure.
not work are not available, so we use the data of thehousehold which works. So this data has a probability that it cannot reﬂect the consumption correctly.
Marginal propensity of consumption of the young is follows. We assume ineﬃciency of the medical care ofhigher than that of the old may explain by this factor. the old, and we consider it raises social welfare that
reducing the cost of medical care to prevent pension
beneﬁt from reducing. The character of the medical
CP Y = 3273.35 + 0.7481 · Y DHY
care of the old today is cronic disease. In this case,(0.438) (20.436)
 RL

it is the theme of the medical care that not cure the˙
− 14017.8 ·+ 0.018 · N ASSET P−1− P CP
disease, but control the disease and raise the QOL of100(3) the patients themselves and live his old age in feelingeasy. But the structure of the supply of the medi(−0.274)(6.029)cal care has a lot of problem like the system of the2R̄ = 0.997, D.W. = 2.033
reward of medical care, relationship of clinic and hosCP O = 3469.39 + 0.4885 · Y DHO
pital, and Insurer’s management ability , we antici(1.163) (8.108)
pate great ineﬃciency for the medical care for the old, RL˙
− 11959.4 ·(4) which costs about more than 500 billion yen. And the− P CP
100
existence of the contribution of the old-age medical(−0.429)
care which solves this ineﬃciency is the problem too.
R̄2 = 0.934, D.W. = 2.091
This relates to the second point.
Social security system in Japan, the burden of theAs explained so far, this model is built by the as- ﬁrm aﬀect considarably by dividing into halves by
sumption that there exists two types of agent, young employer and employee of the contribution in penand old. This speciﬁcation has two problems. First, sion, and the old-age medical care. But the burden
the old used to be the young, that is, the intertempo- of the ﬁrm must be reconsidered. The money ﬂow ofral behavior of the consumer is not included in this the cost of medical care of the old is determined asmodel. Second, this model does not consider the re- ﬁgure 2, and this is because the relief of the ﬁnancelation of the young and the old, whether they are of the national health insurance is done by the healthaltruistic or not. Although the speciﬁcation of this insurance run by private mutual associations.
model is ad hoc, dividing the consumption this way
The problem here is as follows. Old-age medical
is originated in our attitude of building this model as care which ﬁnances the medical care for the old is3