63‘Aid’ as Applied to the Himalayan Region:
A Partial Appraisal of the Period 1980 to 2005
Jack D. IVES
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies
Carleton University
1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1S 5B6 Canadae-mail: jack_ives@carleton.ca

Abstract
This paper is based on experience gained and observations made throughout the greater Himalayan
region while the author worked as coordinator of a United Nations University (UNU) research project.
Research began in 1978 in northern Thailand and Nepal. Later it extended to Yunnan, southwest China,
Tibet, and Tajikistan and included reconnaissance visits to Darjeeling, the Central Indian Himalaya, andnorthern Pakistan. The extensive travel and long periods in the field, along with colleagues and graduate
students, facilitated many contacts with mountain minority peoples as well as the frequently large-scale
aid and development projects sponsored by national and international agencies. While many ‘aid’ projects, especially the smaller, carefully focused ones, were beneficial to the poor mountain people, many
were insensitive, even inimical. Competition between aid agencies, imposition of ‘Western’ assumptions
and methods, and corruption at many levels appear to have been, at least partly, responsible for thewidening gap between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ and for the pursuit of solutions to non-existent problems. The latter is characterized by the ‘Theory of Himalayan Environmental Degradation.’ Several examples are introduced to facilitate examination of these claims.
The growth in social and political unrest and actual insurgency across much of the region cannot be
entirely divorced from the failure to effectively address mountain poverty and unequal access toresources. The paper concludes with a call for a comprehensive review of development policy withadequate representation afforded the so-called ‘target’ peoples.
Key words: environment, Himalayan development, international aid, minority peoples,poverty, resources

1. Introduction
In 1978 UNU initiated a research programme entitled ‘highland-lowland interactive systems’ subsequently to become ‘mountain ecology and sustainable
development.’ The organizational ‘box’ was left empty
for the author, as the newly recruited project coordinator, to develop a focus, albeit with certain restrictions.
The focus was heavily influenced by the coordinator’s
academic inclinations and expertise and those of hiscolleagues who were attracted as collaborators. There
was an initial regional restriction: mountains and adjacent lowlands of the humid tropics and sub-humid
tropics within Asia. Early emphasis was placed onnatural (mountain) hazards and deforestation, and theassumed causes and consequences of the latter: opium
production and population growth amongst poor hill
peoples in Northern Thailand; population growthamongst poor mountain communities and their asGlobal Environmental Research
10(1)/2006: 63-72
printed in Japan

sumed reckless forest destruction in Nepal and adjacent mountain regions, and their downstream impacts.
An important part of the project entailed the trainingof scientists from the countries within which research
was planned. This was undertaken by award of UNU
scholarships tenable at the home institutions of the
project leaders (University of Colorado, USA. andBerne University, Switzerland).
The project quickly attracted additional ‘outside’
financial support and participation by academic colleagues and their graduate students in several otherNorth American and European universities. In termsof field locations, the project expanded to include
mountain regions of southwest China, India,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Tajikistan, in addition to
the two original host countries. Much later, researchand training activities expanded to the Andes and East
Africa. As the project evolved, Bruno Messerli joined
Ives as project co-coordinator and both remained with
©2006 AIRIES64

Jack D. IVES

the project for more than a quarter century. The project also provided a base for a number of significant
institutional developments: founding of the International Mountain Society; creation of the African
Mountain Society and the Andean Mountain Society;and establishment of the quarterly journal MountainResearch and Development in 1981. This institutional
phase also led to a series of international conferences,
especially the Mohonk Mountain Conference of 1986
(The Himalaya-Ganges Problem) and critical in-put
into the efforts to include Chapter 13 (Mountains) in
AGENDA 21 (UNCED-Rio de Janeiro, 1992), and toassist in the UN designation of 2002 as The International Year of Mountains.
The research results of this long-term and loosely
circumscribed project are published throughout theliterature and so are not subjected to direct consideration within the context of this paper. Rather, the focal
point will be based on the experiences and informal
reactions of one of the project coordinators (JDI) to
international aid and related national policies that impinged upon the mountain research being undertaken.
The research afforded privileged access to a vast areaof montane South and Central Asia. This included
visits to many isolated villages and minority communities at a time when the locations were politically
restricted for foreigners. Nevertheless, many of thedetails introduced here are taken from the project’s
three most significant publications:
1989: The Himalayan Dilemma: Reconciling Development and Conservation, by J.D. Ives and B.
Messerli, London and New York: Routledge.
2004: Himalayan Perceptions: Environmental Change
and the Well-being of Mountain Peoples, by J.D. Ives,
London and New York: Routledge.
2006: Floods in Bangladesh: History, Dynamics,
and Rethinking the Role of the Himalayas, by T. Hofer
and B. Messerli, Tokyo: UNU Press.
The primary message of this paper is that environmental paradigms that appear to have guided muchinternational aid have been demonstrated to be myths,
or even falsehoods. In this context, the Theory of
Himalayan Environmental Degradation (THED) is
offered as an illustration. As the project research proceeded and attracted the active involvement of manyother researchers, this environmental catastrophe myth
was discredited, but only within academia (Forsyth,1996; Blaikie & Muldavin, 2004). Several international agencies and national institutions of the region
have retained the notion that the main culprits of theperceived environmental and resource destruction are
the mountain poor (usually minorities).1) Several of
the national governments have responded by imposing
logging bans over vast areas with the stipulated intention of protecting downstream structures, as for exam-

ple, the Three Gorges Dam in China.
Since much of the justification for such policies
can still be related to earlier draconian statements by
pre-eminent international institutions, it is reasoned
that serious and widespread review of aid policy
within the Himalayan region is urgently needed.
Three outstandingly authoritarian statements areworthy of emphasis:WORLD BANK, 1979
Nepal has lost half of its forest cover within athirty-year period (1950-80) and by AD 2000 noaccessible forests will remain.
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 1982
[there is a] . . . distinct danger that all accessible
forests, especially in the Hills, will be eliminatedwithin less than 20 years. (later reduced to ‘within 14
years’)WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, 1985
. . . a few million subsistence hill farmers areundermining the life support of several hundred million people in the plains.
UNDP, UNEP, and many other international andnational institutions, together with the news media
world-wide, endorsed this environmental catastrophe
theory that remains, at least partly, in place today.

2. Selected ‘Aid’ Project Case Studies
Several case studies are presented as examples ofbadly conceived, or poorly designed and implemented
projects. They range in magnitude from mega- hydroelectric projects to small run-of-the-river undertakings.
This presentation includes an autopsy of the Arun III
project of eastern Nepal, albeit, cancelled more than adecade ago, the on-going huge Tehri Dam development of the Indian Central Himalaya, micro-projects
in Himachal Pradesh, India, and planned energy
developments on the upper Yangtze (Jinsha Jiang) innorthwestern Yunnan, China. The upper Yangtze
projects, if carried out, would involve major environmental impacts in a recently designated World
Heritage Site (2003).
These projects are discussed because they illustrate
the disconnection between the desires of large institutions (international) and national interests, on the one
hand, and the needs of the mountain rural poor on theother.
2.1 Arun III, Nepal
While the Arun III project was cancelled immediately following the accession of James Wolfensohn as
President of the World Bank more than ten years ago,
it is introduced here for the following reasons: (1) it
provides a clear-cut example of major aid expenditures destined to go seriously astray; and (2) the brief‘Aid’ as Applied to the Himalayan Region

period of democratic government in Nepal (19911996) allowed access to much of the internal politics
that was leading to a potential economic and socioenvironmental disaster almost becoming a reality(Gyawali, 2003).
The Arun River rises on the Tibetan Plateau andmore than three-quarters of its watershed lies within
Chinese territory. The lower river flows in a spectacular gorge through the eastern Nepal Himalaya to join
the Sapta Kosi before entering India. It was initially
identified for its huge hydroelectric potential during a
mid-1980s river basin study by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Involvement of theWorld Bank and the Asian Development Bank wassought. The two banks conditioned their assistance on
Nepal agreeing to merge into a single unit its
pre-existing Department of Electricity, of the Ministryof Water Resources, and the Nepal Electricity Corporation. This led to the creation of the Nepal Electricity
Authority.
According to Gyawali (2003:69), Arun III was theculmination of ‘monism from the large multilateral
donors side, as opposed to institutional pluralism, areality on the recipient’s side [Nepal], given its
wide-ranging social diversity.’ Gyawali goes on to
imply that these initial institutional adjustments were areflection of the philosophy of ‘efficiency of size’
rather than that of ‘local institutional needs’ and raises
the question of ‘compulsions to market types of equipment such as turbines, generators, and services such as
consultancies.’ During the early negotiations, otherpossible competing hydro-projects, such as the 225
MW Sapta Gandaki project, at about half the cost of
Arun III and at a much more accessible site, were
eliminated from consideration by the simple expedience of arbitrarily increasing their assumed costs despite the absence of any supporting data.
In 1987 the Government of Nepal requested theWorld Bank to accept the role of lead donor agency toensure that the Arun III project went ahead. This was
the first time in the development history of Nepal that
authority was passed from the government to an external institution to negotiate on its behalf with otherpotential donors. Germany agreed to provide DM 260
million for the necessary feasibility and engineering
design studies. One result of this was that a German
consultancy firm received the main design contract.
This effective creation of a monopolistic institution
resulted in the elimination of several competitors, including JICA, as well as many alternative and possibly more efficient projects.
Arun III, from its earliest stages, had many technical, economic, and social anomalies that received little
attention. At an estimated cost of USD 1.1 billion, it
became the largest project ever contemplated in Nepal.
This made it a potential investment with the largest
ever risks. Even worse, the loans were being negotiated in such a way that Nepal would be responsible to
make good any losses that may be incurred while the65

donors were exempted. Nepal was also committed tothe prospect of raising internally up to USD 500 million of the total budget, the remainder being acquired
through foreign aid in the form of grants, soft loans,and technical assistance. No opportunity was given to
allow competent and legitimate national institutions,such as the Water and Energy Commission and the
National Planning Commission, to calculate the riskof such a large investment on such a small economy.
Even the World Bank, prior to 1993, failed to undertake a thorough macro-economic impact assessment.
Several studies were undertaken by the WorldBank to justify the decision to proceed with the project. One study was conducted under contract by Electricité de France (EdF). Subsequently, it was shownthat conditions had been imposed on the study. One
condition was that all of the other projects that had
been identified as possible alternates must arbitrarily
be assumed as unable to be commissioned prior to
1998/99 (that is, before the planned completion of
Arun III). Another condition stipulated that EdF must
apply arbitrary cost-increase coefficients of as muchas 30 % to any alternate project despite there being norationale other than to render them less competitive.
The need to construct a high-grade 118 km accessroad with side feeders through difficult mountainous
terrain was not considered in the cost and time-forconstruction estimates. Nor was serious consideration
given to the potential environmental and social
impacts of the access road. Power required for construction would depend upon diesel fuel airlifted withexpensive helicopter support. In addition, qualified
Nepalese engineers and large numbers of potential
employees were restricted to liaison duties and lowpaid jobs in support of expatriate consultants.
Perhaps the most embarrassing aspect was that theestimated cost of power production per kW in 1989
USD would be close to the highest in the world.
Gyawali (2003:73) describes the process as leading
into an ‘iron triangle’ of vested interests that were being given a free hand to trap Nepal into a ‘no-options
scenario and then escalate the project costs.’ The ‘irontriangle’ consisted of three apexes: low-paid Nepalesebureaucrats in powerful positions who controlled large
sums of money; donor agencies where promotion depended on the number of loans skilfully negotiatedrather than on projects successfully implemented; andmiddlemen, the commission agents who would bring
together international industries and consultancies
with local decision-makers.
During the early stages of the opposition to Arun
III, NGOs and concerned individuals were branded as
unpatriotic. It was only when Nepalese activists wereable to establish effective liaisons with internationalgroups and together initiated a sustained campaign
from 1993 onward, that there were real possibilities
for stopping an expensive and dangerous undertaking.
Gyawali estimates that, the potential for environmental and social damage notwithstanding, it was on

66Jack D. IVESJames Wolfensohn’s realization, as newly appointed
President of the World Bank, that the project would
likely be an economic disaster, that its cancellation
was assured.
Arun III appears as a potential financial and environmental disaster that has been avoided. Moreover, it
has been calculated that, following the collapse of the
project, six much smaller hydroelectric projects havebeen completed in half the time and they are producing more power at half the cost of that which acompleted Arun III would have produced. The six
projects have incurred comparatively slight environmental disturbance and they have been the source of
establishment of independent Nepalese enterprises(Dipak Gyawali pers. comm. 22 November 2003).
2.2 Related water resource development ‘aid’ to
Nepal
Although the derailing of the Arun III project may
appear as a victory for common sense, the victory is
by no means complete. Other projects remain undernegotiation. The Mahakali River negotiations between
India and Nepal seem to have no end in sight. In thisinstance, Thapa (2003) insists that the problem appears to be that India wants to acquire hydroelectric
power whereas Nepal needs its irrigated agriculturalland extended and the two parties appear to be talking
past each other. In addition, little attention is being
paid to the needs of the local rural people.
It is also argued that the Kathmandu Valley, with apopulation exceeding one million and continuing togrow rapidly, is becoming seriously short of water.
This has led to the Melamchi Water Supply projectthat would involve a 26-kilometre long tunnel fortransferring water from the headwaters of the
Indrawati River into the valley. Calculations havebeen made comparing the estimated water needs ofthe valley with that available from normal precipitation. These are claimed to be inaccurate. Furthermore,
given appropriate encouragement, village-level corporations could likely achieve a large increase in useable
water storage within the valley at a very low cost. This
would have the important additional advantage of providing wage employment for a large number of poor
local people and of encouraging local economic development. In addition, the proposed 26-kilometre tunnel
would traverse a geologically poorly mapped area
subject to high seismic risk. In the best possible case,
it is likely that much of the water en route to the valley would be lost by underground seepage; in theworst case, all the water may be lost, despite the comparatively vast expense incurred. Finally, the potential
for wastage of a large sum of foreign aid would exacerbate the lost opportunity of investing it invillage-level water schemes that would aid local
small-scale economies. Gyawali (pers. comm. 22
November 2003) raised the question: for how long can
Nepal afford to receive this kind of ‘aid’?

2.3 The Tehri Dam, Uttaranchal, India
The Bhagirathi River is one of the numerous
Himalayan headstreams of the Ganges. The proposedadvantages of a large dam several kilometres below
the town of Tehri were discussed throughout the 1950s
and 1960s. In 1972, the Planning Commission of Uttar
Pradesh (of which Uttaranchal was a part until it became an autonomous state in 1999) approved plans forconstruction of what was to be one of the world’s
highest rock- and earth-filled dams. The specifications
stipulated a dam that would be 261 m high on a
575 m-wide base with a length of 1,000 m. Storage
capacity was estimated to be 3,500,000 m³ to occupy
an area of 34 km² above the dam. There would be asecond concrete dam 103.5 m high and 22 km downstream at Koteswar with an 86 million m³ capacity.
The main functions of the dams would be to producehydroelectricity to meet peaking requirements(100,000 MV for phase 1, the same for phase 2, and afurther 40,000 MV from the Koteswar Dam downstream), to irrigate 270,000 ha of agricultural land andto stabilize the existing irrigation of 600,000 ha, andto produce 270 million gallons of drinking water daily
for Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttaranchal. The main
reservoir would flood the Old Town of Tehri and submerge, or partially submerge, more than 50 villages.
The Tehri Dam has been the object of considerable
controversy since it was first proposed. The mostinfluential and charismatic figure amongst the protesters is Shri Sunderlal Bahuguna, Messenger of thefamous Chipko (hug-the-trees) Movement and prominent Gandhian environmentalist and supporter ofpeoples’ rights of access to natural resources. The dispute has also attracted leading Indian and international
seismologists and geophysicists, environmentalists,
and many NGOs. Construction has been repeatedly
stopped, only to start again amidst protests and riots. A
74-day hunger strike by Sunderlal Bahuguna in 1996
forced the government to set up a new review of theseismic, environmental, and resettlement aspects ofthe project. The range of issues brought against thedam include:
1. Public safety, because of the attested under-designof the dam in view of a projected Great Earthquake
in the vicinity (Gaur, 1993) – this topic must havebeen re-accentuated following the October 2005
catastrophic earthquake in Northern Pakistan.
Assuming that the opponents of the dam are correct and a future earthquake were to cause complete collapse of the dam, millions of lives downstream would be in danger and the result would be
a severe blow to the entire Indian economy.
2. Such a dam could become a prime target for terrorists or an enemy of the country.
3. Destruction, by submergence, or partial submergence, of more than 50 villages, the Old Tehri
Town, and many sacred temples and monuments
would be a heavy penalty.

‘Aid’ as Applied to the Himalayan Region

4. More than 100,000 people would be directly
affected, a serious situation in view of India’s very
poor record of providing adequate compensation.
By October 2003 provision had been made to
re-settle only about half of the fully-affected people and very few of those partially affected. The
level of compensation, also, has been criticized as
totally inadequate.
5. All the benefits of the project would favour downstream interests; mountain villages would not evenreceive electric lighting.
6. There would be considerable environmental loss
due to submergence and massive manipulation of
the Bhagirathi River.
Furthermore, opponents of the dam, includinginternationally renowned scientists, claim that there
has been government intransigence, secret negotiations, breach of commitments, including that of a former prime minister, and corruption. Sunderlal
Bahuguna has staged three lengthy fasts, ending withthe public commitment of senior politicians for further
testimony and review. Each commitment was subsequently broken and Bahuguna himself temporarily
imprisoned.
A further pragmatic objection is that the costs will
seriously outweigh the benefits. It is projected that theunit cost of electricity will be twice that produced
from neighbouring sources. After almost three decadesof construction progress and work stoppages, in April
2003 the Supreme Court of India began review of apetition for stopping work on the dam. On 1 September 2003 a three-judge panel of the Court dismissed
the petition by a two-to-one decision. Nevertheless,the ruling instructed that the two upper tunnels
through the dam must not be closed so that the reservoir could not be filled to its planned level until all
re-settlement and compensation had been completed.
Further protests were pending.
Much has been written about the Tehri Dam controversy, both technical and socio-economic. In particular, Valdiya (1992, 1993a, 1993b) emphasized that
there are viable alternatives to big dams and argued
for several smaller run-of-the-river installations,
together with a significant modification to down-size
the existing Tehri project. He also pointed out that the
projected construction would provide no benefit forthe people of the Garhwal Himalaya; he foresaw only
the misery of enforced evacuation and inadequate
restitution.
The Tehri Dam dispute is sufficiently complex andemotionally charged to frustrate any balanced‘outside’ judgement. Nevertheless, the honesty of several levels of government officials is clearly questionable. The attitudes of powerful political decision-makers toward the poor mountain people appear
to be totally reprehensible. Certainly the Tehri Dam
case, and many others comparable to it, represents aform of repression of poor mountain people, amongst

67

others, that can only lead to widespread unrest anddisaffection.
2.4 Micro-hydel Projects in Himachal Pradesh,India
One of the gems of Himachal Pradesh is its Kulu
Valley, renowned for its efforts to counteract local
poverty by development of a flourishing apple production industry. Tourism has been added to the further
development of the valley (Singh, 1989; Gardner,
2003). More recently there has been a significant attempt to encourage development of small-scalehydroelectric projects. The federal and state governments of India and Himachal Pradesh, with support
from UNDP, have identified 55 potential micro-hydel
sites in the Kulu District. Four facilities are under construction while another 12 are in various stages of approval. Two of the four that were nearest completion
were surveyed by an independent research team
(Sinclair, 2003).
Sinclair (2003) states that the provision of funding
by UNDP was based upon a number of assumed benefits. These included: reduction in local fossil fuel use
and accompanying production of greenhouse gases;
protection of mountain forests and bio-diversity; enhancement of local economic opportunity; provisionof local construction jobs; relief of women’s drudgery
in collecting fuelwood; and sundry ‘capacity-building
benefits.’
A survey of people living in the vicinity of the two
projects reviewed by Sinclair led to a series of findings that contradicted the proposed benefits put forward by the original project proponents in their bid for
UNDP assistance. There was no local motivation to
substitute electricity for fuelwood as the former would
prove expensive while the latter was considered to be
free. The time spent in collecting fuelwood was notregarded by the local people as relevant (while notstated in Sinclair’s report, it has often been reported
that mountain women have regarded fuelwood collection as a social outing). The construction phase had
produced no new local job opportunities as all labour
was arranged by the project managers who imported
low-paid Nepalese workers. There was some concernthat the generating plants and associated infrastructure
would eliminate a considerable number of trees. The
temporary camps of the imported labourers were regarded as a pollution risk. Above all, there had beenno prior consultation with the local people.
The overall series of Kulu micro-hydel projects remain far from complete and Sinclair’s (2003) report
calls for an urgent review of the current situation and amore rigorous environmental assessment process.
Nevertheless, he doubts that the necessary political
will can be marshalled.
This project has been introduced because it serves
as an example for many that have been undertaken
throughout the Himalayan region. Such development
projects create tension through disregard of the need

68Jack D. IVES

for local consultation and involvement. Furthermore,they increase a tendency toward cynicism in relation
to outside aid. In the case of Kulu, however, the situation is worsened by the general level of disregard forthe well-being of the local people. An example is therecent gazetting of the Greater Himalayan National
Park. While designated in 1985, the park was formallyincorporated in 1999. Despite over a hundred years of
local farmer access to the natural resources of the area
now occupied by the park, the formal incorporation
was accompanied by exclusion of local harvesting andgrazing and totally inadequate compensation. The
growth in local discontent was exacerbated by government cynicism: initial justification for park establishment was based upon the so-called need to preserve
the natural environment as necessary to ensure further
growth in tourism; this was followed by government
deregulation of a large section of the park to permit
construction of the Parvati hydroelectricity plant. Furthermore, housing for 6,000 employees of the power
plant was to be built in the village of Sainj which had
a current population of 2,000. Nearly all of the newworkers were to be brought in from outside the Kulu
Valley, many from out-of-state (that is, Nepal). These
would be added to the already considerable force oftransient workers. The planned electric power is forsale outside of Kulu, much of it outside of Himachal
Pradesh. Thus the local residents would receive little,
if any, benefits and would have to contend with many
negative effects (Saberwal, 1999; Mehra & Mathur,
2001; Saberwal & Chhatre, 2003).
2.5 Northwestern Yunnan and the upper Yangtze
river, China
In July 2003 UNESCO, with IUCN support, approved China’s application for World Heritage designation of the vast Three Parallel Rivers National Park.
During the standard negotiations, the Chinese authorities had accepted the recommendation that the proposed northeastern boundary be extended to include
the Haba Xue Shan and Yulong Xue Shan mountain
ranges. This would encompass the world class Tiger
Leaping Gorge of the upper Yangtze (Jinsha Jiang)that cuts between them. The two mountain ranges, inaddition to a remarkable elevation range of forest andsub-alpine vegetation belts, support the southernmost
glaciers of Eurasia. This boundary adjustment shouldhave protected not only the rich natural environment,
but also local minority cultures and sacred places
associated with the area for more than a thousand
years. Most important, however, would be the protection of a unique gorge, more than twice the depth of
the Grand Canyon. Nevertheless, despite the formal
agreement, plans are underway for construction of acascade of hydroelectric dams that will compromise
the Tiger Leaping Gorge. Chinese planning appears to
be going ahead even before completion of its own
environmental impact survey. Added to this, the region-wide logging ban (see below) and the govern-

ment-sponsored mass tourism of the last decade ishaving serious negative consequences for the very
poor local ethnic minorities (Sicroff & Ives, 2001).
2.6 General remarks on water resource
development in the Himalayan Region
Ramaswamy Iyer, a former Secretary, Water
Resources, Government of India, and a member of
two major review committees (Sardar Sarovar – 1993/
1995 and Tehri – 1996/1997) has attempted a balanced
review of problems facing mega-water projects in the
Himalayan region (Iyer, 1998). He addresses theprevailing tendency of proponents and opponents ofmajor water projects to almost invariably assume
antagonistic positions. One of the results is that theensuing conflicts have been part of the cause of delaysin the final decision-making that have extended overdecades. This has been extremely damaging and costly,
whether or not a project is completed or rejected. He
makes a series of recommendations:
1. Mega-projects should be treated as projects of lastresort to be undertaken only after all other possibilities have been evaluated.
2. Integrated and holistic planning for an entire
watershed should be a prerequisite, including
social and environmental aspects.
3. Construction should not begin until after completion of the evaluation process.
4. Large water-related projects should never be allowed to pre-empt a disproportionate share ofavailable resources.
5. Ensure and institutionalize the fullest collaboration
with the people to be affected and the NGOs representing them from the beginning, and make all
information freely available.
6. Establish credible grievance-redress machineryand build safeguards against harassment of people
and against corruption.
7. Maintain constant review and institute corrective
actions and remedial measures as soon as difficulties manifest themselves.
Iyer (1998) concludes it is often the state itself,
through failure to consult, secrecy, and unimaginative
implementation, that forces the people and NGOs into
a process of confrontation. That such remarks by anexperienced professional and former senior government bureaucrat are assumed necessary, indicates themagnitude of the water resource development issue
facing the region.
These criticisms are further emphasized in an overview: ‘Water, Power and People: A South Asian
Manifesto on the Politics and Knowledge of Water.’
Its three authors are, respectively, Bangladeshi, Imtiaz
Ahmed, Nepali, Ajaya Dixit, and Indian, Ashis Nandy.
They make the point: ‘The last fifty years of water
management in South Asia has been a story of unfolding disaster’ (Ahmed et al., 1992: 121).

‘Aid’ as Applied to the Himalayan Region

The water resource controversies are the more relevant to any evaluation of international aid and development because of the enormous consumption ofinternational funds that has occurred.

3. National Parks and Protected Areas
The mountain regions of South and Central Asia
have become major tourist attractions over the last
thirty or forty years. This is understandable considering the outstanding natural dramatic beauty of many
parts of the region, coupled with the enormous arrayof local ethnic groups complete with (to Western eyes)
exotic costumes and customs. It was originally believed that tourism would become an effective way of
improving the economic well-being of the conspicuously poor mountain people (IUOTO, 1963; Hinch &Butler, 1996; Price et al., 1997). Tourism has produced a mixture of benefits and negative impacts.
Only one aspect of the extensive topic will be considered here – the alienation of local peoples’ access tonatural resources under the pretext of preserving
bio-diversity and ensuring the inflow of foreign exchange from the development of tourism.
The first national park to be designated in Nepal(Rara National Park, 1975) involved eviction of twotiny minority groups by military force and their apparent absorption or total elimination. Designation of theworld famous Sagarmatha (Mt. Everest) National Park
initially threatened the destruction of the traditional
Sherpa culture by similar forced expulsion. This wasaverted, presumably because the Sherpa people were
famous world-wide as ‘tigers of the snows’ and heroesof the attempts to reach the summit of Everest during
the ‘golden age’ of Himalayan mountaineering, so thatthey had ready access to powerful international support. Nevertheless, conflict between the Sherpa community and the central government over park management continues. Numerous examples of unfortunate
tourism development policies can be cited in addition
to Sagarmatha.
3.1 Kangchenjunga conservation area
The Kangchenjunga region was designated one of
the World Wildlife Fund’s (WWF) ‘Global 2000’
eco-regions and was declared a ‘Gift to the Earth’ on
29 April 1997. The following year a 1,650 km² section,
later expanded to 2,035 km², was officially declared as
the Kangchenjunga Conservation Area (KCA), to be
managed jointly by the Department of National Parks
and Wildlife Conservation and the WWF. The area isextremely rich in endemic plants, including 24 of
Nepal’s 37 species of rhododendron and a significant
number of endangered animal species, such as thesnow leopard, musk deer, red panda, and many speciesof birds.
In 1987 only 87 trekkers had reached the area andthe numbers in subsequent years remained low, reaching just over 800 by 1999. The Conservation Area

69

plans call for 1,000 per year. These small numbers are
explained by the area’s remote location in extreme
northeastern Nepal, the limited availability of facilities,
and the very heavy annual precipitation (Gurung,1996).
The indigenous population numbers less than
5,000 and consists of Sherpa and Limbu, the two largest groups, and Rai and Gurung. They are basicallysubsistence farmers practicing several forms of transhumance and also trading with Tibet. There are fourmain villages which are the focus of planned ecotourism developments. Proceeds from tourism so far
have made only a slight contribution to the economic
base as most of the trekkers arrive in self- sufficientgroups organized by Kathmandu-based trekking
agencies.
Although the KCA is in the very earliest stage ofits development, a survey of local residents byMüller-Böker and Kollmair (2000) indicated that‘nearly all of the interviewees had expectations thatwent far beyond the intended and economically feasible potential of the project.’ They quote the highly
critical conclusions of Pimbert and Pretty (1997) who
claim that this kind of conservation area management
exploits local participation in order to achieve conservation goals set by outsiders. This kind of system has
no mechanism to ensure the effective transfer of control to the local people.
3.2 Annapurna conservation area project
The Annapurna Conservation Area Project (ACAP)
was established in 1986 and it was estimated that year
saw over 36,000 visitors. It is a large area with a great
range of physical landscape types, from the subtropical lowlands, across the high snows of theAnnapurna Himalaya to the arid, long, steep, bareslopes of the north. It has an ethnically very mixed
population (mainly located south of the Himalayancrest) that numbers in excess of 120,000.
The creation of the ACAP represented a turning
point in Nepalese tourism development and conservation policy because it is managed by the King
Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation, an autonomous NGO free from direct government interference.
The Trust has a mandate to encourage local conservation activities. Of special importance is that the entry
fees paid by visitors remain under the control of theACAP. Funding is therefore available to financeactivities in the area and covers about half of its total
budget; the remainder is provided by the international
donor community.
ACAP maintains a central office at the small townof Ghandruk and there are seven regional offices. In
1998 the staff numbered more than 200, a third being
female. This has facilitated direct village involvement
in conservation activities, promotion of tourism at thevillage level, improvements in housing, drinking
water access, and waste disposal, as well as training
and education.

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The success of ACAP has been remarkable and has
included the establishment of 159 village-level conservation and development committees, 288 mothers’
groups, and 19 lodge management committees. Efforts
to reduce the use of wood fuel and increase family
income from the sale of handicrafts have followed.
Furthermore, the sharing of know-how gained fromthese successful small enterprises has encouraged
similar activities in other parts of Nepal. Nevertheless,as with any experimental project, there are problems
and Nepal et al. (2002) report that ‘it is sometimes
difficult for the average visitor to understand where all
the money goes – money which has been generated
over the years from an increasing number of tourists.’
The 1998 entry fee was NR 2,000 (about USD 140).
Despite this remarkable success, the most recent
development has been a grave disappointment. This is
the addition of Upper Mustang to the northern perimeter of ACAP with the central government retaining
tight control of its management. Mustang had lagged
behind most of the rest of Nepal in terms of improvements in overall well-being. Deepening poverty had
caused loss of population through out-migration andits renowned Buddhist monasteries have experienced
slow decay. Initially a wealthy region, Upper Mustang
suffered badly with the 1959 closure of the Tibetan
frontier and consequent loss of a flourishing salt trade.
This was exacerbated by the central government’s
unwillingness to open the area to foreign visitors.
These restrictions were finally lifted in 1992 when thearea became the northern extension of ACAP. However, the government severely limited the form of
tourism. For instance, no lodge or tea house could beconstructed or operated by local people; tourist numbers were restricted to 1,000 per year; entry permits
were very expensive on Nepalese standards (USD
70/person/day with a minimum stay of 10 days). Only
groups accompanied by government liaison officers
and trekking guides were permitted. All supplies had
to be brought in from outside.
As compensation to the local residents, the government initially agreed to invest 60% of the revenues
generated by tourism in local improvements. The
underlying government policy seems to have been thephased introduction of tourism as the necessary infrastructure and support services were developed. Local
entrepreneurship, with the construction of lodges andtea houses, so common in other tourist destinations,would then follow.
The outcome, however, is perceived as a breach oftrust (Nepal et al., 2002). The initial 1992 reinvestment amounted to 42% of revenues, not the promised
60%. This fell to less that 5% by 1997, despite sustained rapid growth in tourist numbers giving revenues in excess of USD 500,000. The official upper
limit of 1,000 tourists per year has been disregarded
and it is assumed that the government has used theopportunity for its own financial gain. Similarly, thetour operators, based in Kathmandu and Pokhara havemade significant profits as they hold a virtual monopoly. In addition, local residents have had to contend
with a 300% inflation of commodity prices. Many
families have come to depend on what they can earnfrom tourists by the humiliating act of posing forphotographs and from what their children can obtainfrom begging.
3.3 Khunjerab National Park, Northern Pakistan
The Khunjerab National Park covers a vast area ofthe Karakorum Mountains adjacent to the Chinese
border. It is one of the most recent to be established inPakistan and, like the earlier parks before it (especially the Karakorum National Park) its operation has
provoked a large local opposition. The primary issue
here is the restricted access to natural resources,
including wildlife and grazing, for the local people.
Armed confrontations have occurred in the recent past.
Thus, efforts were made in negotiations leading to theestablishment of the Khunjerab Park to obtain local
compliance, if not full cooperation. Nevertheless,local village authorities claim that they have been
completely ignored by the authorities. Many feel that
the National Park authority and the regional IUCN
and WWF centres appear to be preoccupied with
Marco Polo sheep and snow leopards. Complaints
have been made that, not only has the livelihood of thelocal residents been ignored but there appears to be
little indication of any concern for ‘entire ecosystemmanagement.’ In some instances actual park boundaries are unknown. And while the Khunjerab Park management appears as a partial exception to the earlier
experiences, even here locally organized groups, suchas the Khunjerab Villages Association and the Shimsal
Nature Trust, are opposed to the imposition of thenational park system.
The outlined local opposition may seem surprisingin view of the efforts of the international staff of the
IUCN and WWF to achieve the participation of thelocal inhabitants. During the planning stages they had
arranged a series of village-level workshops to facilitate dissemination of information on the potential
advantages of park establishment. However, theseinternational organizations have only an advisory rolein their relationships with national governments(Lawrence Hamilton, pers. comm. 23 October 2003).
3.4 Tiger Leaping Gorge and the Yulong Xue
Shan, Yunnan, China
Lijiang Old Town (Dayan) was granted World
Heritage status in 1997. It is the ‘capital city’ of theminority Naxi people and has a history extending overmore than a thousand years. It is situation below theNaxi sacred mountains of the Yulong Xue Shan (Jade
Dragon Snow Mountains, 5,596 m) in northwestern
Yunnan. Lijiang County and surrounding area contains
some of the most impressive scenery in China,
together with several distinct minority nations. This
combination of impressive scenery and indigenous‘Aid’ as Applied to the Himalayan Region

cultures renders the entire area as a major tourist destination. The presence of the Tiger Leaping Gorge (seepage 68 above) and the 2003 World Heritage designation for the adjacent Three Parallel Rivers National
Park emphasizes this point.
The area had remained closed to both foreign anddomestic visitors until 1985. In the short period sincethen the Chinese official policy to develop mass tourism has produced profound changes. By 2001, tourist
visits exceeded 250,000 per annum, new high-grade
roads, a modern airport, and high class hotels had
mushroomed. The neighbouring country of Zhongdian,
immediately to the west, ominously changed its nameto ‘Shangri-La County.’ While this process hasbrought wealth to a few it has seriously impaired the
traditional cultures and rendered the poverty of the
majority the more conspicuous. The problems createdby the abrupt change from the former dependency onnatural resources and subsistence agriculture to rapid
modernization have been exacerbated by the imposition of a logging ban that embraces the entire upperbasin of the Yangtze (Jinsha Jiang). Here is yet another instance of imposition of central government
policy without regard for either the needs of theindigenous people or the environment. Furthermore,as indicated in the introduction, a total logging ban
based on the assumption that forestry in the upper
watersheds is a threat to major national development
schemes downstream (the Three Gorges Dam amongstthem) lacks scientifically established proof.

4. Logging Bans and the Theory of
Himalayan Environmental Degradation(THED)As mentioned above, the only major international
agency to seriously challenge the THED so far is the
UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO/CIFOR,
2005). This is despite the fact that the Theory wasseriously contested in the late-1980s and practicallyall relevant scholarly publications have added weight
to its demise ever since (e.g., Forsyth, 1996; Blaikie &Muldavin, 2004; Ives, 2004; Hofer & Messerli, 2006).
Can the FAO position be regarded as the beginning ofa reversal amongst the large international agencies, oris it an accident, due to FAO’s recruitment fromamongst the mountain academics? Of equal importance: will FAO’s challenge influence the array ofnational agency vested interests? There is no sign that
central government agencies are in the process of
re-evaluation. The logging bans in highland China,
Thailand, and parts of the Indian Himalaya persist.
It is remarkable that these two interpretations of
the THED remain far apart. Moreover, this is not anivory tower contest. It affects the economy and environment of very large regions as well as the lives of
millions of people: principally mountain minorities.
An additional complication is that the THED, atleast in part, is being superseded by a new paradigm:71

the assumed impact of global warming on mountainglaciers, especially in the Himalaya. This had developed over the last several years into yet another catastrophe theory. It is being fanned by apparently eager
elements of the news media using seemingly careless,or self-serving, input from academia, consultancies,
and UN agencies, such as UNEP and UNDP. Potentially large sums of money are involved, both in theform of national expenditures and international andbi-lateral aid. The links between the THED, rapid
glacier thinning and retreat, and high dams in themountains and foothills are self-evident.
I find it remarkable that several of my efforts andthose of colleagues to question the alarmist predictions about glacier lake outburst floods (Icelandic:
jökulhlaup) have been ignored both by major newspapers and scientific journals. We can still read, or learn
from our television screens, that millions of people
and billions of dollars worth of infrastructure are under threat from glacier lakes that are being formed
because of climate warming. And when all these lives
have been sacrificed and the immense property losses
incurred, we are further titillated by the claim that theGanges will be reduced to a trickle. Presumably those
who survive the glacier floods will die of thirst! While
climate warming is undoubtedly causing Himalayan
glaciers to thin and retreat and lakes to form and cause
floods (Ives, 1986; Watanabe et al., 1994, 1995),
many of the recent news media predictions seem intent on emphasizing the upper extreme range of available climatic models. While it is generally important
to increase public awareness, there is also the negative
aspect of forcing over-reaction, especially to the predicted imminence of large glacier-lake floods thatprove false.

5. Conclusion
The foregoing narratives should serve to demonstrate the damage that can be caused by the impositionof assumptions (environmental myths) both onto, andby, development and aid agencies and their influenceon the structuring of resource-management policy.
The cost of this misdirection can be enormous, interms of wealth, environment, and the well-being ofmountain peoples. An entirely new approach is urgently required to certain aspects of international aid,
environmental assessment, and the need to eradicate
poverty. And while increasing attention has certainly
been given to the wishes of local communities, thisprocess must go much further in the future.
Note1) One very important exception is the recent conversion of
FAO/CIFOR with its 2005 publication that joins thequestioning of the viability of THED (Forests and floods:
Drowning in fiction or thriving on facts?).

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Jack D. IVES

Acknowledgements
The paper has drawn from the work of many colleagues. Privileged access to areas that, at the time,
were closed to foreigners was facilitated throughagreements between United Nations University andthe relevant country authorities. Special thanks are
due to Dipak Gyawali who shared many of his unpublished papers and freely offered much advice andcomment.
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(Received 23 March 2006, Accepted 3 June 2006)