2002. 31

An Economic Analysis of Duopolistic Competition
between Gulliver and Dwarf airlines :The case of Japanese Domestic Air Markets
Hideki Murakami

An Economic Analysis of Duopolistic Competition between Gulliverand Dwarf airlines:
The case of Japanese Domestic Air Markets

Hideki MURAKAMI

Associate Professor, Kobe University, Japan
Graduate School of Business Administration
Phone & FAX: +81-78-803-6941
E-mail: hideki@rose.rokkodai.kobe-u.ac.jp

Abstract

This paper theoretically analyses the effects of an alliance by two
small (dwarf) airlines on their own profit, their rival’s profit, and theeconomic welfare. The rival is assumed to be a gigantic Gulliver.

The

Gulliver and the dwarves’ profits will change in a different direction in
the post-alliance situation. With regards to the social welfare, as long as
the dwarf airline’s alliance leads to the simultaneous achievement ofstrongeconomiesofdensity,thoroughproduct

differentiation,

seamlessness, and cost reduction, the social welfare would presumably be
improved.

The political implication is that firms’ asymmetric factors(cost difference and product differentiation) should be maintained in thepost alliance situation; otherwise, we cannot tell whether the dwarves’
alliance will improve the social welfare or not.

1Key words: high and low cost airlines, alliance, hub, duopoly, economic
welfareI Introduction

This paper models the duopolistic competition between a large
incumbent airline and small airlines, and simulates the market
performance that would result if the small airlines jointly competedagainst the large airlines instead of competing separately.

This idea

comes from the fact that two low-cost dwarf airlines have been
independently competing with the colluded large airlines in very large
markets, such as Tokyo-Sapporo (the largest market in the world in termsof the number of annual passengers) since 1998, but to date the financial
status of these small airlines has been poor.

Therefore, we are very

interested in what would happen if the two dwarf airlines formed analliance to increase their market power, and jointly competed with the“Gulliver” airlines. The reason why we are using the terms “Gulliver”
and “dwarf” is that in Japan’s domestic air transport markets, the group ofincumbents has about a 93% passenger share at Tokyo-Sapporo, and a
90% share in terms of the number of departures, and this holds true forother markets.
The Gulliver airlines to be discussed here are the typical “Flag
Carriers” such as Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airways, which arecharacterized by their large domestic network and high input costs. The

2

dwarf airlines are Skymark Airlines or Air Do (Hokkaido International
Airlines), which are assumed to have lower input costs and to produce
differentiated services.
As mentioned above, these “Dwarf” airlines have been sufferingfrom financial deficits ever since they were founded in the late 90s, andin the year 2002, Air Do finally decided to obtain financial aid from ANA(All Nippon Airways).

The “S-Curve Effect,” as well as the lack offinancial strength, explains how this situation came about. Douglas andMiller (1974) proposed the “S-Curve Effect,” which implied that airlines
with a small “departure share” would lose their market share more rapidly
than their departure share. Air Do and Skymark Airlines have only aseveral percent market share in their base market, and it has been pointed
out that if they had had a larger market share, they would have gained
more profits than they actually earned.
The next section depicts the current network status of the
Gulliver and dwarf airlines. The third and the fourth sections analyze
what kind of effects the alliance by dwarves would have on the profit of
their own and the Gulliver carriers, and on the economic welfare. Finally,
we will refer to the political implications concerning the treatment ofsmall airlines and their alliance on domestic air transport policy.

II The Current Status of the Network

Before discussing the main topic of this paper, it is necessary to
discuss the strategic alliance in the airline industry. The strategic alliance3

can be observed not only in the airline industry, but also in otherindustries like manufacturing. The motivation for companies to agree toalliances can be explained from various aspects.

One reason is thatcompanies can attain managerial resources that they could not otherwise
attain alone; these resources are something like “know-how” that has
been accumulated in a specific company, or licenses or patents that are
costly for other companies, or institutional barriers that internationallyoperating airlines might face, like the 5th freedom right.
The second type of alliance is the “hub and feeder” type; forexample, a trunk airline (Northwest Airlines) and a complementary feeder
airline (Horizon Air) at Seattle/Tacoma Airport.

In the air transportindustry, the advantage of this alliance can be explained by the positive
externality and amelioration of the economies of density.
The third type of alliance is the collaboration of dwarf airlines tocope with competition from a gigantic Gulliver airline. The aim of thiskind of alliance is to form a market power against a monopolistic firm, as
well as to utilize positive network effects such as network externality andthe economies of density. This aim is presumably true for the alliance
formed between America West Airlines and Continental Airlines in the
US domestic markets. A sample of this case is illustrated in Figure 1.

Ｆ

Ｓ

Ｔ(or t)4

Figure. １

The competition between “allied dwarves” vs. Gulliver

Figure 1 shows the situation;(1) where the Gulliver (the incumbent. hereafter, referred to as Firm 1
which is at the hub airport T (Tokyo) operates between T and F(Fukuoka), T and S (Sapporo), and F and S (shown in real lines);(2) a small airline (Firm 2) operates between F and T;(3) another small airline (Firm 3) operates between T and S (each shownin dotted lines).
In cases in which small airlines cannot own their slots at T because ofcongestion, both of them are assumed to be at base t airport. T-S and T-F
are assumed to be symmetrical.1
This situation is almost true for the competition at Haneda(Tokyo International Airport) among Skymark Airlines, Air Do, and thecollusive group of incumbents (JAL, ANA, and JAS); namely, Firm 1 is
the group of incumbents, Firm 2 is Skymark, and Firm 3 is Air Do. In
2001, Skymark and Air Do agreed on joint ownership and operation, joint
sponsorship of tourism, through-tickets, and joint booking services at
Haneda for the Fukuoka-Haneda-Sapporo market 2 (Hokkaido Shinbun,
June 3rd 2001).
The next section analyzes what the market performance would be
if a joint operation by Firms 2 and 3 were put into practice. In such a1

They are at almost the same distance and receive the same amount of traffic.

2

However, it turned out to be difficult to put this alliance into practice, since theticket counters of these airlines are separately located.

5

case, Firms 2 and 3 might compete with Firm 1 at F-T, T-S, andfurthermore at F-S by jointly setting their airfares at very low levels, sothat their connecting flight (Fukuoka-Haneda-Sapporo) could competewith the direct flight (Fukuoka-Sapporo) offered by the incumbent.

III

Modeling “Gulliver vs. Dwarf” competition

The benchmark case:In this case, the dwarf airlines (Firms 2 and 3)

individually compete with Firm 1 at T-F and T-S. At T-F, Firm 1 and 2
compete in terms of price (namely, Bertrand type competition). Theirdemand-functions go as follows; for convenience, they take the linear
form.
1
1
QTF
= α 1 − PTF+ γPTF2
2
QTF= α 2 − PTF2 + γPTF1

Similarly, Firms 1 and 3 compete at T-S.
1
QTS
= α 1 − PTS1 + γPTS3

3
QTS= α 3 − PTS3 + γPTS1

Furthermore, since Firms 2 and 3 do not form an alliance in thebenchmark case, Firm 1 monopolizes the non-stop route F-S.
1
1
QFS
= α 1 − PFS(α 1 > 0, α 2 = α 3 > 0, 0 < γ < 1)Considering the competition actually conducted in the late 90s, it
is natural to think that Firm 1 has stronger “brand loyalty” than the dwarf
airlines, and this implies that passengers are more willing to pay for Firm
1’s service than Firm 2 or 3’s. The evidence is that the incumbent’s
group succeeded in expelling Skymark Airlines from Osaka-Sapporo and6

Osaka-Fukuoka, although their airfares were higher than Skymark’s (theincumbent’s group was not involved in the price war), and theincumbent’s group maintains higher airfares and a larger market share at
Tokyo-Sapporo than the dwarf airlines. Therefore, we can assume that

α 1 > α 2 (at around zero passengers, airline 1 can charge higher airfares
than Firms 2 and 3).
In addition, Firm 1 has wider route networks than the dwarves,and this means that the frequent fliers of Firm 1 have more opportunities
to accumulate their “mileage awards” than those of the dwarf airlines. If
the frequent fliers of Firm 1 switch their airline to the dwarves,“switching costs” may arise for those customers. Furthermore, Firm 1
has more frequent departures, and if the “S-curve effect” exists,
passengers who enjoy the convenience of the frequent departures offeredby Firm 1 may not easily shift to the dwarves.

These two facts, as wellas brand loyalty, imply that even though small airlines cut their airfares,
the frequent flyers on large airlines may not be tempted by this pricereduction. Therefore, we assumed that γ takes small values, e.g., lessthan unity.
As for the cost function, we followed the previous studies such asthat done by Caves et al. (1984), which estimated the translog costfunction of the deregulated US domestic air transport market, andassumed that the economies of density exist. We specified the shape ofthe marginal cost function as a linear shape, like Park (1997) did. Eachfirm’s marginal cost functions are as follows.

MCi1 = 1 − θQi1

(i = TS , TF , FS , 0 < θ < 1)

7

2
2
MCTF
= φ − θQTF

3
3
MCTS
= φ − θQTS

(0 < φ < 1, 0 < θ < 1)
φ is assumed to fall between zero and unity, and this means that the
dwarf airline’s marginal cost and also unit (average) cost are always
lower than Firm 1’s. In fact, the average unit cost3 of JAL Express (JEX,
a commuter in the JAL group), Air Nippon (a local and commutercompany in the ANA Group), and Japan Air Commuter (the JAS group) is
about 274 yen. These commuter companies use smaller airplanes andoperate at lower costs than their holding companies. In contrast to this,the average unit cost of Air Do and Skymark Airlines is about 219 yen,which is less than 80％ of the subsidiaries of the large airlines (only 63%
of JEX, the commuter with the highest cost. This fact implies that theunit cost of Air Do and Skymark would be much lower than the large
airlines’. 4 The slope of the marginal cost is defined to be the same
between the Gulliver and dwarves. This assumption is possible assumingthat the equipment of production in a market is the same between firms.
The actual fleet configuration of Firm 1 at T-S is B747s, DC-10s, andB767s, and that of Firm 3 (Air Do) is B767. The average aircraft size isapparently different, but both Firms 1 and 3 use B767s. Highlighting a
specific time-zone (early in the morning), we can observe that both Firms
1 and 3 fly B767s, so it is at least possible to assume, as one case, that θ

3Total operating cost divided by total revenue per ton-kilo.

4

Calculated from Nihon Koku Kyokai, Koku Tokei Yoran (Annual Statistics ofJapanese Aviation Industry). According to Dresner & Windle (1995) and Windle &Dresner (1999), Southwest Airlines’ unit cost is only 35％ of mega carriers.

8

is the same among firms.
In the case of Figure 1, if Firm 1 operates non-stop flights
between F and S, the passengers will not catch the “inconvenient”
connecting flights (F-H-S) of Firm 1 in order to move between F and S.
In addition, by definition of this benchmark case, two small airlines do
not form an alliance.

Therefore, passengers may not use interline-

connecting flights (F-H-S) to move between F and S, as long as theconnecting airfares are substantially lower than the airfare charged byFirm 1 for the non-stop flights.
The total profit function of Firm 1 is the sum of the profit
function of each route:11Π 1 = π TS
+ π TF+ π 1FS

π i1 = Pi1 * Qi1 − TC i1(i = TS , TF , FS )And the profit function of each dwarf airline is:
2
2
2
π TF
= PTF2 * QTF− TCTFπ TS3 = PTS3 * QTS3 − TCTS3

The benchmark case assumes that Firm 1 and Firm 3 compete at T-S, andFirm 1 and Firm 2 compete at T-F. By assumption, Firm 2 and 3 do notcooperate. Firm 1 monopolizes the route F-S.
Brander and Zhang (1993) observed through their empiricalanalysis that “Cournot type” duopolistic competition is prevailing in the
deregulated US air transport markets 5 , and consecutive studies such as
those conducted by Oum et al (1992), Zhang. (1996), and Park (1997)
follow their assumption.

Since this paper did not attempt to use anempirical analysis, we are free from questioning which duopolistic model
5

Especially evident when we used yearly data. When we used monthly data, we

empirically observed the Bertrand-type competition.

9

is appropriate for our analysis. We chose the “Bertrand type” duopoly
model for the following analysis, because we observed that the monthly
nominal airfares of the two airlines 6 shown in JIKOKU HYO (the time
table and price tariff for railways, buses, ferries and airlines, publishedmonthly), were moving in the same direction, and this fact gave us thesense that the duopolistic behaviors in the T-S and T-F markets resulted
in a “strategic complement”.
Taking the first order condition of the profit functions above withregard to prices, we obtained the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium-prices,
outputs, and profits for T-S and T-F, and the monopolized output, price,and profit for F-S. In addition, we calculated the consumer’s surplus foreach case, and finally derived the social welfare for each market.
Hereafter, we call the benchmark profit (BP), and the “benchmark social
welfare“ (BSW).
The alliance case: To contrast it with the benchmark case, we will model

the alliance case, in which Firms 2 and 3 cooperate and increase theirbargaining power in order to fight with the “gigantic Gulliver” in the T-S
and T-F markets. As long as the alliance offers a seamless connecting
service so that the passengers do not experience too much inconvenience,
we can regard the allied airlines (hereafter referred to as Firm 4) as a6

It is not possible to find out how many full airfares and discounted airfares wereactually purchased at these prices. However, we can find out how many types of
discount tickets are being issued, and how much their discount rates are. This is
the only way to estimate the movement of real airfares.

10

workable competitor with Firm 1 in F-S. However, the demand for Firm
4’s service is much smaller than for Firm 1‘s. Taking these assumptions
into consideration, we can specify the demand function for each firm:1
QTF= α 1 − PTF1 + γPTF4

4
QTF= α 4 − PTF4 + γPTF1

1
QTS= α 1 − PTS1 + γPTS4

QTS4 = α 4 − PTS4 + γPTS1

1
1QFS= α 1 − PFS+ γPFS44
1QFS= ηα 4 − PFS4 + γPFS

(0 < η < 1, α 2 = α 3 = α 4 )The constraints for α ’s and γ are the same as those imposed in thebenchmark case.

The value of parameter η means that the demand

function for Firm 4 is always located under the demand function for Firm
1 in F-S.
The marginal cost functions of Firm 1 are the same as in thebenchmark case. However, those of Firm 4 are as follows.
4)
MCTS4 = φ − θ (QTS4 + QFS
4
4
4
)
MCTF
= φ − θ (QTF
+ QFS

Each marginal cost function contains two types of outputs. Thismeans that the connecting-flight-passengers who move between F-S byFirm 4 squeeze into Firm 4’s flights at T-F and T-S, since Firm 4 does
not fly direct flights for F-S. As for these two marginal cost functions,the cost complementarities exist.

∂MCTS4= −θ < 0
4
∂QFS

and

4
∂MCTF
= −θ < 0
4∂QFS

The parameter constraint imposed on φ is the same as thebenchmark case. The constraint on θ can be derived from the second
order condition for the profit-maximization; the following two Hessian11matrices ( H 1 and H 4 ) should be negative-definite.
1 ∂ 2π TS ∂Q1 2TS
2 1∂π
H 1 =  1 TS 1
 ∂QTF ∂QTS
2 1
 ∂ π TS ∂Q1 ∂Q1
 FS TS ∂ 2π TS4 ∂Q 4 2
TS

2 4
∂
π
H 4 =  4 TS 4
 ∂QTF ∂QTS
2 4
 ∂ π TS ∂Q 4 ∂Q 4
 FS TS1∂ 2π TS
1
1
∂QTS
∂QTF
1
∂ 2π TF
2

1∂QTF
1∂ 2π TS
1
1
∂QFS
∂QTF

4
∂ 2π TS4∂QTS4 ∂QTF
4∂ 2π TF
24∂QTF
4∂ 2π TS
2
2
∂QFS
∂QTF

1

∂ 2π TS

1
1

∂QTS
∂QFS

2 1
∂ π TS 
1
1 
∂QTF
∂QTS

∂ 2π 1FS 

1 2
∂QFS


4

∂ 2π TS
4
4∂QTS ∂QFS 4∂ 2π TS
44 ∂QTF ∂QFS
4∂ 2π FS


2 2
∂QFS


In addition, we need to check the condition that the prices and outputs forany airline should be non-negative.

After θ meets all the conditions

above, it takes the following range: 0 < θ < 0.44475 .
The Bertrand-Nash prices and outputs can be derived fromsolving six equations, each of which is the first order condition which isderived by differentiating the profit function of each route with regard to
price. Once we obtain the Bertrand-Nash prices and outputs, we cancalculate the profits (AP), the consumer’s surplus, and the social welfare(ASW) under the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Finally, we will compare
BP and BSW with AP and ASW, respectively.

IV

Comparative Analysis of Firms’ Profits

12This section analyses how the cooperation of the two small
airlines affects the cooperating firm’s profit and the rival’s profit bycomparing their pre-alliance and pre-alliance equilibrium-profits (namely,
BP and AP).

Up to this section, we have specified three parameters(α , γ , η ) in the demand functions and two parameters (θ , φ ) in the costfunctions.

Among these parameters, what are most affected by thecooperating behavior by the two small airlines are the degree of
economies of density (θ ) , and the difference of the passenger’s
willingness to pay between the large and small firms (η ) : the demand forthe cooperating firms will shift upwards due to the increase in theconvenience of the connection at the hub airport. This implies that η
will take a larger value in the post-alliance situation than in the prealliance situation. In addition, we can expect that the economies of scope
will work more strongly for the cooperating firm in the post alliancesituation than the pre-alliance situation: they can integrate the facilities
and can save in operating costs by more efficient use of their fleets andhuman resources. Therefore, the cost difference (φ ) will become larger
in the post-alliance situation than in the pre-alliance situation.

Other

parameters (α s , γ ) may not drastically change between the pre-and postalliance situations, so it is convenient to fix these parameters by giving
them certain values, as long as we do not break the parameter constraints,
or lose the generality. For example, considering the value of the interceptof the marginal cost function (=1), we have to set α ' s at about 3 and θ atabout 0.2 so that the airlines can gain at least non-negative profits for the13

wide range of each parameter. What if we set α 2 = α 3 = α 4 = 3 ? In thiscase, α 1 should be more than 11.4 in order for the profit of Firm1 to bepositive. Considering the fact that the group of Japanese large airlines
gains positive profits (but not super-normal profits), the appropriate valueof α 1 will be about 13. Since the passenger’s willingness to pay for theconnecting flights ought to be smaller than for the direct flights, the valueof η will be much smaller than unity (η = 0.5) . Then we subtract Firm
1’s profit in the Alliance Case (AP) from its benchmark profit (BP), anddepict the figure which shows how the balance of Firm 1’s profit (APminus BP) changes according to the change in γ and φ .

Figure 2-1

shows this, in which the vertical axis is the balance of Firm 1’s profit,
and the axes show the range that γ and φ can take. Figure 2-2 also
shows the change in the balance of Firm 1’ s profit (vertical axis)
according to the change in the η (left axis) and θ (right axis). In thecase of Figure 2, γ is set at 0.5 and φ at 0.8, with other parameters equal
to the case presented in Figure 2-1.

Figures 2-1 (left) and 2-2 (right): The relation between each parameterand the balance of Firm 1’s profit and parameters

14

Looking at the vertical axes of these two pictures, the balance(AP-BP) is negative. This result does not come only from Firm 1’s lossof monopolistic position at F-S. Figure 2-1 shows that though the dwarf
airline lowers its cost via alliance, it does not necessarily affect its rival’sbalance of profit. However, if the dwarf airline promotes the productdifferentiation offered by the alliance, it will worsen its rival’s financial
condition.
Figure 2-2 shows that if the allied dwarf airline achieves andpromote the seamlessness at hub T, and strengthens the degree of
economies of density, it will also worsen its rival’s financial condition.
Figures 3-1 and 3-2 show the case for the dwarf airlines with thedefinitions of parameters and axes unchanged to that in Figures 2-1 and
2-2.

Figures 3-1 (left) and 3-2 (right): The relation between each parameterand the balance of Firm 4’s profit

Whether the dwarf airlines can increase their profit in the post
alliance situation depends on each parameter’s change by alliance, which
is different from Firm 1’s case. The promotion of product differentiation,15

cost reduction, seamlessnes at hub T, and the economies of density will
increase the balance of pre-and post-alliance profit. If the dwarf airlines
can achieve all of them at a time by the alliance, then their alliance would
benefit them, but if even one of them is lacking, there is the possibility
that the alliance would be harmed.

V

The Change of Social Welfare in the Preand Post- Alliance Situation

Finally, we will examine how the social welfare would change if
two dwarf airlines cooperated. Both Figures 4-1 and 4-2 have the same
horizontal axes as the figures in Section IV, but they have “the balance ofsocial welfare (ASW minus BSW)” in the vertical axes.

Figures 4-1 (left) and 4-2 (light): The relation between parameters andthe balance of social welfare

The most important thing is that both figures show that the social
welfare would be improved by the dwarf airlines’ alliance for any
possible range of each parameter.

However, the shape of the graphic

16

looks very complex compared with those in the last section. The dwarf
airlines’ cost reduction relative to the large airlines (i.e., smaller φ ) has apositive effect on social welfare when their product differentiation isstrong (i.e., smaller γ ), but could have a negative effect when theirproduct differentiation is weak. Similar phenomena are observed for thepromotion of seamlessness at hub T (i.e., larger η ) and the economies ofdensity (i.e., larger θ ).

The larger η due to the alliance improves(worsens) the social welfare when the economies of density are strong(weak), and the larger θ due to the alliance improves (worsens) thesocial welfare when the connection at T is very smooth (inconvenient) 7.
The parameter of product differentiation (γ ) shows a different trend incomparison with the other three parameters. When the dwarf airlines’
costs do not necessarily differ from the large airlines’, the extreme valuesof gamma (i.e., when the product differentiation is highly achieved or notachieved at all) improves the social welfare. When the dwarf airlines’
costs do differ from the large airlines’, this phenomenon holds, but
substantial improvement is expected by far when the cost difference islarge.

VI

7

Conclusion

Since we assume that the economies of density are the same between the group oflarge airlines and small airlines, the increase in the economies of density in the post
alliance situation means that the total amount of traffic in the network increases
due to the alliance by the two dwarf airlines.

17This paper analyses, through theoretical models and theirsimulations, how airlines’ profits and the social welfare will change if thedwarf airlines form an alliance and jointly compete with the Gulliver
airline instead of independently competing in a three-point hub and spoke
system. We presupposed that four parameters - the economies of traffic
density in the network, the seamlessness at the hub airport, the productdifferentiation, and the economies of scope – would improve more in the
post-alliance situation than in the pre-alliance situation. If these four
assumptions are true, the dwarf airlines’ post-alliance profit will becomelarger than their pre-alliance profit, as these four parameters becomelarger. However, the profit of the Gulliver airlines will presumably besmaller in the dwarves’ post-alliance situation than their profit in the prealliance situation.
In terms of social welfare, the result is complex since theproducer’s surpluses of Gulliver and dwarves will change in a different
direction in the post-alliance situation, so the effect of the dwarves’
alliance would be offset. As long as the dwarf airline’s alliance leads tothe simultaneous achievement of strong economies of density, thoroughproduct differentiation, seamlessness and cost reduction, the social
welfare would presumably be improved.
The implication for public policy is that the government canadmit the dwarf airline’s alliance as long as the alliance meets the four
conditions - strong economies of density, thorough product differentiation,
seamlessness and cost reduction via economies of scope.

The dwarves’

alliance will create the counter market-power against the Gulliver.

18

However, this newly powered firm should not be a copy of the Gulliverincumbent. It is proposed that the asymmetric factors (cost difference
and product differentiation) be maintained in the post alliance situation;otherwise, it is not possible to tell whether or not the dwarves’ alliancewould improve the social welfare.
[2002.11.28 635]

References[1] Brander, J. A., and A. Zhang (1993) “Dynamic Oligopoly Behavior intheAirlineIndustry,”

International

JournalofIndustrial

Organization 11, pp.407-35.
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D o m e s t i c A i r Tr a n s p o r t , B r o o k i n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , p p . 8 2 - 8 3 .
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19[6] Park, J. H. (1997), “The Effect of Airline Alliance on
Markets and Economic Welfare,” Transportation Research Part E,
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pp.293-307.

20

Discussion Paper
No.
2001･1

AuthorTakashi Hatakeda
Nobuyuki Isagawa

2001･2Michiyasu Nakajima
Takeshi Mizuguchi
Katsuhiko Kokubu
Yasushi Onishi
Koji Okubayashi

2001･3
2001･4

2001･5
2001･6
2001･7

2001･8

2001･9Katsuhiko Kokubu
Akihiro Noda
Yasushi Onishi
Tomomi Shinabe
Kunio Miyashita
Akinobu Sakashita
KOKUBU,
Katsuhiko
NASHIOKA, ErikoDAIKUHARA, Rie
KOKUBU,
Katsuhiko
KURASAKA,
TomokoShuzo Murata

2001･11

Makoto Yano
Fumio Dei
Mahito Okura

2001･122001･13

Mahito Okura
Shuzo Murata

2001･14

Koji Okubayashi
Toshinori Takashina

2001･15
2001･16

Takuji Hara
Shuzo Murata

2001･17

Norio Kambayashi

2001･18
2001･19
2001･20

Yuichi Fukuta
Kazuhiro Tanaka
Kentaro Nobeoka
Kazuhiro Tanaka

2001･21

Mahito Okura

2001･22
2001･23

Kazuhiro Tanaka
Mahito Okura

2001･24

Katsuhiko Kokubu
Akihiro Noda
Yasushi Onishi
Tomomi Shinabe
Akira Higashida

2001･10

Title
Stock Price Behavior Surrounding Repurchase
Announcements:
Evidence from Japan
Material Flow Cost Accounting of IMU (October 2000)

Date
1／2001(in Japanese)

1／2001

Japanese Manufacturers Without Factories:
Cases of Sony, Matsushita, Misumi, People
Determinants of Environmental Report Publicationin Japanese Companies

1／2001

Logistics Strategy of Japanese Port Management
Issues and Method of Organizational Culture Studies:
Functionalism Approach
Environmental Accounting in Japanese Companies as ofNovember 2000

(in Japanese)

2／20013／2001(in Japanese)

3／20012／2001

Corporate Environmental Accounting: A Japanese
Perspective

The Comparative Study of Japanese & U.S. Companies(6) The Health & Long Term Care-The Management
Education
A Trade Model with Vertical Production Chain andCompetition Policy in the Downstream Sector
Risk Classification: A Study of the Tradeoff between
Quantity and Quality of Insured
Is the Separating Equilibrium Really Desirable?
The Comparative Study of Japanese & U.S. Companies(5) The Conflict Among Companies
Research Report on the relations between there-employment process and former job career at thecompulsory retirement of workers of a firm
The Social Shaping of Medicines
The Comparative Study of Japanese & U.S. Companies(7) Toward Restructuring Japanese Corporations
Cultural influences on IT usage among workers:a UK-Japanese comparison
A Test for Rational Bubbles in Stock Prices
Toward the Effective Reform of Japanese Corporate
Governance
Structural Changes in Top Management―The Effect ofCorporate Governance Reform in Japan
In the Separating Equilibrium Really Desirable ?
―revised version of No.2001･12―
Introduction to Corporate Governance
The Role of Some Insurance Contracts in a Subjective
Equilibrium Model with Observable Effort
Environmental Disclosure of Japanese companies

3／2001(in Japanese)

4／2001

12／2000(in Japanese)

5／2001(in Japanese)(in Japanese)

5／20016／2001(in Japanese)

7／2001(in Japanese)(in Japanese)

7／20017／20017／2001(in Japanese)

7／20017／2001(in Japanese)

7／2001(in Japanese)

8／2001(in Japanese)(in Japanese)

8／20018／2001(in Japanese)

8／2001

Discussion Paper
No.
2001･25

2001･26
2001･27

AuthorKatsuhiko Kokubu
Tomomi Shinabe
Akira Higashida
Yasushi Onishi
Akihiro Noda
Katsuhiko Kokubu
Eriko Nashioka
Masakazu Takagi

2001・28 Mahito Okura
2001・29 Atsushi Takao

2001・30 Mahito Okura
2001・31 Masakazu Takagi
2001・32 Norio Kambayashi
Harry Scarbrough2001・33 Fumitoshi Mizutani
Shuji Uranishi
2001・34 Mahito Okura

2001・35 Tsutomu Harada
2001・36 Nobuyuki Isagawa

2001・37 Nobuyuki Isagawa
2002・1

Nobuyuki Isagawa

2002・2

Nobuyuki Isagawa

2002・3Mahito Okura

2002・4

Elmer Sterken
Ichiro Tokutsu
Mahito Okura
Mahito Okura
Nobuyuki Isagawa
Koji Okubayashi
Toshinori Takashina

2002・5
2002・6
2002・7
2002・8

2002・9Hajime Shimizu

2002・10 Nobuyuki Isagawa
2002･11

Nobuyuki Isagawa

Title
Environmental Reporting of Japanese companies(in Japanese)

Date
8／2001

Environmental Accounting of Japanese companies(in Japanese)

8／2001Elementary Study of East Asian Corporate andManagement System
Vertical Differentiation in the Insurance Market
A Study on the Penetration Process of Modern Insurance
by Evolutionary Economics―Why do the Modern
Insurance and the Premodern Mutual Society coexist?―
An Essay in the Economics of Post-loss Minimisation:
An Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Insurance Law
and Clauses
Co-operation between Hanshin(Osaka-Kobe) Area andSouth-east Asia-Finding business opportunities of mutual
benefits
Cultural influences on IT use amongst factory managers：
A UK-Japanese comparison
The Post Office vs. Parcel Delivery Companies：
Competition Effects on Costs and Productivity
An Essay in the Economics of Post-loss Minimisation:
An Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Insurance Law
and Clauses―revised version of No.2001・30―
An Examination of IT Paradox in Japan
Open-Market Repurchase Announcements, Actual
Repurchases, and Stock Price Behavior in Inefficient
markets
Corporate Financial Strategy and Stock Price Behavior ina Noise Trader Model with Limited Arbitrage
Cross Holding of Shares, Unwinding Cross Holding of
Shares, and Managerial
Entrenchment
A Theory of Stock Price Behavior following Repurchase
Announcements
An Equilibrium Analysis of the Insurance Market
with Vertical Differentiation
What are the determinants of the number of bankrelations of Japanese firms?
Review Article：Adverse Selection in Insurance Market
Welfare Effect of Firm Size in Insurance Market
Does Investment Horison Affect Investment Strategy ?
Research Report of Careers and Employment Process ofWorkers over 60 years old :a Case of a Japnaese
Manufacturing Company
On the Existence of Tax Equilibrium : Incomplete Market
with Capital Income Tax
Cost of Financial Distress and Debt Restructuring :Debt Forgiveness and Equity-for-Debt Swap
Open-Market Repurchase Announcements, Actual
Repurchases, and Stock Price Behavior in Inefficient
Markets―revised version of No.2001･36―

9／2001(in Japanese)(in Japanese)

9／20019／20019／2001(in Japanese)

9／2001

10／2001
10／2001
11／2001(in Japanese)

11／2001
12／2001
12／2001(in Japanese)

1／ 2002(in Japanese)

1／ 20022／20023／2002(in Japanese)(in Japanese)(in Japnaese)

3／20023／20023／20024／2002(in Japnaese)

4／2002(in Japnaese)

4／20025／2002

Discussion Paper
No.
2002･12

AuthorKenji Kutsuna
Richard Smith

2002・13 Kunio Miyashita
2002・14 Hajime Shimizu
2002・15 Hajime Shimizu
2002・16 Koji Okubayashi
2002・17 Fumitoshi Mizutani
Shuji Uranishi
2002・18 Kazuhisa Otogawa
2002・19 Atsuo Takenaka
2002・20 Tsuneo Nakano

2002・21 Tsuneo Nakano
2002・22 Fumitoshi Mizutani
Shuji Uranishi
2002・23 Atsushi Takao
Mahito Okura
2002・24 Fumitoshi Mizutani
2002・25 Fumitoshi Mizutani
Takuya Urakami
2002・26 Yasuyuki Miyahara
2002・27 Nobuyuki Isagawa
2002・28 Mitsutoshi Hirano

2002・29 Atsushi Takao
2002・30 Yasuhiro Shimizu
2002・31 Hideki Murakami

Title
Why Does Book Building Drive Out Auction Methodsof IPO Issuance?
Evidence and Implications from Japan
International Logistics and Modal Choice
Incomplete markets with capital income tax and public
goods
On the possibility of Pareto improving of tax-equilibrium
China-Japan Comparison of Work Organization
The Post Office vs. Parcel Delivery Companies:
Competition Effects on Costs and Productivity―revised version of No.2001･33―
Earnings Forecast and Earnings Management of JapaneseInitial Public Offerings Firms
The Classification of Foreign R&D Units
The Dutch East India Company and its Corporate
Governance―revised version of No.2000･40―
The British East India Company and its Corporate
Governance
Privatization Effects on TFP Growth and Capital
Adjustments
Some Notes on the Privatization of Postal Life Insurancein JapanPrivately Owned Railways’ Cost Function, Organization
Size and Ownership
A Private-Public Comaprison of Bus Service Operators
Principal-Multiagent Relationships with Costly
Monitoring
Unwinding of Cross Shareholding under Managerial
Entrenchment
Contingency Model for Personnel Grading System―Issues on Design and Management for Qualification
System and Job Grading System―
On the Emergency Effect of the late FUKUZAWA,
Yukichi in Introducing of Modern Insurance into Japan
Amortization of Intangible Assets before Newark
Morning Ledger
An Economic Analysis of Duopolistic Competition
between Gulliver and Dwarf airlines:
The case of Japanese Domestic Air Markets

Date
5／2002(in Japnaese)(in Japnaese)

6／20026／20026／20027／20027／20028／2002(in Japanese)(in Japanese)

8／20028／2002(in Japanese)

8／20028／2002(in Japanese)

9／20029／20029／2002
10／2002
10／2002(in Japanese)

11／2002(in Japanese)

11／2002(in Japanese)

11／2002
11／2002