日本版総合的社会調査共同研究拠点 研究論文集[10] JGSS Research Series No.7

Why Low-Income Citizens Are Protectionist Consumers:
A Research Note on JGSS-2008
Megumi NAOI
Department of Political Science
University of California, San Diego

低所得者層はなぜ「保護主義的な消費者」なのか−JGSS-2008 の分析から−
直井 恵
カリフォルニア大学サンディエゴ校政治学部
What determines the attitude of low-income citizens toward globalization during the world
financial crisis in advanced industrialized nations?

The question raises an intriguing paradox as

low-income citizens face the higher threat of losing jobs and reap greater benefits from cheaper goods
imported from abroad during the economic crisis.

This research note addresses this question bysummarizing the results from the nationally-representative survey in Japan (JGSS-2008) which asked
respondents to assess the effect of globalization on their job security and their consumer lives. I
demonstrate that low-income citizens are more protectionist not just from their occupational point ofview, but also from their consumer perspective, controlling for education and other socio-economic
characteristics. After verifying this puzzle, the note tests two hypotheses for why this is so: (i)“spill-over hypothesis” that low-income citizens’ concerns for job security spill over to their attitudes
toward globalization as consumers and (ii) “information/knowledge hypothesis” that low-income are
not sufficiently aware of the consumer benefits they reap from globalization. The results lend some
support to the information argument, but disconfirm the spill-over hypothesis.
Key Words: JGSS, low income class, globalization
世界金融危機下の先進諸国において、低所得者層のグローバル化に対する態度を規定する
要因は何であろうか。この問いは興味深いパラドックスを提示する。先進諸国の低所得者層
はグローバル化によって職を失うリスクが高まる反面、消費者としては低価格な輸入品の恩恵を最も享受する層と考えられるからである。この研究ノートは、グローバル化が人々の生活の様々な側面に与える影響をより包括的に問うた JGSS-2008 の分析を通じて得た、二つの知見を論ずる。第一点は、既存の貿易理論の知見に反し、日本の低所得者層は中・高所得者層と比べ、グローバル化は回答者自身の消費生活にとってよくないことであると考えている。
第二点は、なぜ低所得者層が保護主義的な消費者なのかについて、二つの仮説（伝播仮説、
情報仮説）の検証を行い、経済的には低価格な輸入品によって恩恵を享受するはずの人々が、なぜ保護主義的になるのかを明らかにした。
キーワード：JGSS，低所得層，グローバル化

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1. Introduction
What determines the attitude of low-income citizens toward globalization – the increasing
movement of goods, capital, and labor across national borders – in advanced industrialized nations?
The question is especially important today because the global financial crisis has posed a particularthreat to job security for low-skilled and low-income citizens through company restructuring andlayoffs. Protectionist forces have indeed gained a stronger voice as evidenced by U.S. President
Obama’s Buy-American legislation and stalled negotiations at the WTO Doha Round.
The question raises an intriguing paradox. According to the predictions provided by the
Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner trade theories, low-income and low-skilled citizens in advanced
industrialized nations should face a higher threat of losing their jobs and declining wages due toglobalization (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). These theories predict that low-income and low-skilled
citizens will oppose globalization to protect their occupational interests. If we shift our focus to theconsumption side, however, low-income citizens are the prime beneficiaries of globalization as
consumers who benefit from cheaper and a wider variety of goods imported from abroad, most notably
from developing economies (see Broda, Leibtag and Weinstein 2009). Indeed, in the history of trade
politics, low-income workers have been the primary actors pushing for cheaper food. Thus, in theory,
low-income citizens should be torn between conflicting attitudes toward globalization depending on
which aspect of their lives they weigh more heavily: occupational interests (“protectionism”) or
consumption interests (“free trade”). How do low-income citizens decide between their conflicting
and multifaceted interests as producers vs. consumers?
To answer this question, this research note summarizes preliminary results from anationally-representative survey conducted by JGSS in Japan during the fall of 2008 just when the
global financial crisis erupted. In JGSS-2008, I designed novel survey instruments that allow us toanswer this question in two ways. First, the question asks respondents to assess their views about theeffect of globalization on the following six different aspects of their lives: Japanese economy; job
security of Japanese citizens in general; job security of the respondent him/herself; Japanese
consumers; consumption activities of the respondent him/herself; and the environment. This allows
us to see how a respondent’s assessment of globalization differs when they consider it from an
occupational (job-related) perspective versus a consumer perspective. Second, the questionnaires ask
respondents to assess this effect on their own lives (e.g., “your job opportunity and stability” and “yourconsumption activities”) as well as on the general population in Japan (e.g., “job opportunity of theJapanese” and “consumption activities of the Japanese”). This allows scholars to test what types ofcitizens form attitudes socio-tropically, while others form them from self-interests.
The remainder of this note proceeds in three steps. First, I demonstrate that low-income citizens
are more protectionist not just from their occupational point of view, but also from their consumer
perspective, controlling for education and other socio-economic characteristics. This poses a puzzle
because as consumers, we would expect low-income citizens to be the prime beneficiaries ofglobalization. To the contrary, we find that low-income citizens are consistently more protectionist in
their responses to a wide range of questions regarding the effect of globalization on their job security,environment, and consumption.
On the other hand, I demonstrate that high-income andhighly-educated respondents vary their responses among questions regarding the effect of
globalization on their job security and consumption activities.
After systematically verifying the existence of this puzzle, this note then tests two hypotheses that
account for the paradox that the low-income citizens are protectionist consumers: (i) “spill-overhypothesis” that low-income citizens’ concerns for job security spill over to their attitudes toward138

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globalization as consumers and (ii) “information/knowledge hypothesis” that low-income orless-educated citizens are not sufficiently aware of the consumer benefits they reap from globalization.
The results lend some support to the information/knowledge hypothesis and reject the spill-overargument.
The results have broader implications for three distinct and important areas of the literature.
First, while trade economists have assumed that consumers are free traders, empirical verification ofthis assumption has lagged far behind the formal modeling (Baker 2005). This note shows that
low-income citizens are the ones that are paradoxically more protectionist as consumers and I seek toexplain why. Second, the existing public opinion research generally does not allow us to get at how
respondents assess the same phenomena (e.g., globalization) from multifaceted perspectives (e.g., theirjobs vs. their consumption) and how and why they differ. Novel survey instruments I designed for
JGSS-2008 help us address this neglected question. Finally, this note speaks to a larger debate
regarding why citizens often support policies that could harm their own interests.

2. JGSS-2008 Survey Design and Instruments
Two issues have stalled the progress in empirical research on public attitudes toward
globalization. The first issue is the generic nature of the survey instruments used in the existing public
opinion surveys on globalization and trade. Very few surveys have asked respondents to assess theiropinions on the effect of globalization on various aspects of their lives. In particular, surveys neglect
how the public assesses the effect of globalization on their consumption activities. This neglect isproblematic as production and consumption are two pillars of economic activities that the majority of
citizens engage in.
The second issue is the fact that most of us are producers and consumers at the same time. The
multifaceted characteristics of citizens have complicated the analysis. How survey instruments areframed have tended to generate a substantial difference in responses (Scheve and Slaughter 2001;
Hiscox 2006). This raises a question about the comparability across surveys, and more seriously,
whether scholars can trust public opinion surveys. This framing effect is conventionally attributed toa function of the “manipulability of respondents” proxied by respondents’ levels of education,
information and knowledge, and the strength of prior beliefs. However, some of the “framing
effects” that scholars identify in experimental surveys might arise not due to the manipulability of
citizens, but due to the differences in their partial assessment of the effect of globalization on various
aspects of their lives (e.g., job security, consumption, environment, the U.S. economy, andcommunity)(Naoi and Kume 2009). For instance, low-income citizens might consider that
globalization is bad for their job opportunity, yet consider it is to be good for their consumption
activities by making the cheaper goods available for them.
I addressed these problems in a nationally-representative JGSS-2008 survey in two ways. First,
the JGSS-2008 survey instruments are among of the most comprehensive asking respondents to assess
the effect of globalization on six different aspects of their lives: Japanese economy; job opportunity ofJapanese in general; your own job opportunity; Japanese consumers; your own consumption activities;
and the environment. This allows me to address the neglect of consumer preferences in the literature
on trade and globalization (Naoi and Kume 2009). Second, the questionnaires ask respondents toassess this effect on their own lives (e.g., “your job opportunity and stability”) as well as on thegeneral population in Japan (e.g., “job opportunity of the Japanese” and “consumption activities of theJapanese”). This allows us to test what types of citizens form attitudes socio-tropically, while others
form them from self-interests.

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The question wording is: “Mobility of people, goods, and capital etc. has been increasing among
countries/regions, do you think it is good or bad for…” (Q59) and the six items are: A: Japanese
economy, B: Job opportunities for Japanese workers, C: Japanese environment, D: Consumers inJapan, E: Your own job opportunity or stability, F: For your own life as a consumer. Respondents
choose an answer from the seven-point scale:1. Very good, 2. Good, 3. Some what good, 4. Neither
good or bad, 5. Somewhat bad, 6. Bad, 7. Very bad, and 8. Can’t choose.

3. The Puzzle: Low-Income Citizens as Protectionist Consumers
The Figures below show respondents’ assessment of the effect of globalization on their own
consumption (Figure 1) and on Japanese consumers (Figure 2) categorized by respondents’ income
level (high: top 33%; low: bottom 33%; middle 34%). Two points stand out. First, the bottom
one-third of low-income respondents, who should be the primary beneficiaries of globalization, aremore likely to think that globalization is bad for their own consumption and for Japanese consumers.
Second, the proportion of “neutral” answers (4:Neither good or bad), which constitutes the highest
proportion of responses, is higher at average 52.4% when respondents are asked about the effect of
globalization on their own consumption compared to 41% when asked about the effect on Japanese
consumers in general. This poses a puzzle as we would expect that respondents should be more awareof the effect of globalization on their own lives as opposed to its overall effects on Japanese consumers
per se.

Figure 1: The Effect of Globalization on Your
Consumption

Figure 2: The Effect of Globalization on
Japanese Consumers

The Figures below summarize respondents’ assessment of the effect of globalization on their own
job security (Figure 3) and on job security of Japanese (Figure 4) categorized by respondents’ income
level. Three points stand out.
First, the bottom one-third respondents with the lowest income are indeed more protectionist than
middle or high-income respondents. Second, the proportion of “neutral” answers is substantiallyhigher for respondents’ assessment of the effect of globalization on their own job opportunities thantheir own consumption activities (see Figure 1 and 3).
Finally, the proportion of “neutral” answers is much higher at 62.4% when respondents are asked
about globalization’s effect on their own job opportunity than when asked about its effect on the job
opportunities of Japanese in general (36.8%) (see Figure 3 and 4).

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Figure 3: The Effect on Your Job Opportunities

Figure 4: The Effect on Job Opportunities ofJapanese

This fact is harder to grasp in light of existing literature on individual attitudes toward trade andglobalization. Two prominent models of trade, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and Ricardo-Vinermodels, both derive public’s attitudes from their occupational characteristics such as income, sector of
employment, and skill levels. Yet, the simple descriptive statistics above illustrate that respondents
are more uncertain or ambiguous about the effect of globalization on their own job opportunity than its
effect on their own consumption activities. This result challenges the following two assumptions of theexisting literature: (i) occupational profiles are important; and (ii) individuals are well aware of theiroccupational benefit or loss from globalization (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). The next section will
confirm these patterns more systematically with individual-level analysis.

4. Systematic Confirmation of the Puzzle: Ordered Logit Analyses
4.1. Low-Income Citizens as Protectionist Consumers
Tables 1 summarizes the results of ordered logit analysis on individual assessment of the effect of
globalization on their own consumption. To check for the robustness of the results, models (1) to (3)use respondents’ individual income, and models (4) and (5) use their household income. Among thefive models, models (1), (2), and (4) include all the respondents with or without jobs, while model (3)and (5) only include those who have jobs. In addition to testing the effect of income, I include abattery of controls listed below, i.e., individual attributes that are believed to influence public’s
attitudes toward globalization.
Income: is a respondent’s reported income and ranges from zero to three: 0 (no income), 1 (bottom
33% of all income-earning respondents), 2 (middle 33%), and 3 (top 33% of all
income-earning respondents). In models (3) and (5) of Table 1 and Table 2, Income ranges
from 1 to 3 (low, mid, and high income) as I excluded respondents without income. Inmodels (4) and (5) of Table 1 and 2, I use tri-chotomized variable (1: bottom 33%, 2: middle
34%, and 3: top 33%) for respondent’s household income.
No Income: is a dummy variable one if a respondent earns no income, and zero otherwise.
IncomeLow: is a dummy variable one if a respondent’s individual income is bottom 33% of those whohave jobs, and zero otherwise.
IncomeHigh: is a dummy variable one if a respondent’s individual income is top 33% and zerootherwise. Mid-income group is a base-category.
College: is a dummy variable one if a respondent graduated from a four-year college or beyond, zero141

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otherwise.
Age: is a biological age of a respondent ranging from 20 to 89.
Diff_Jobs: is a respondent’s self-assessment of difficulty finding a comparable job if s/he quits thecurrent job and ranges from one (easy) to three (very difficult).
LoseJob: is a respondent’s self-assessment of probability of him/her losing the current job in the next
one year and ranges from one (not at all likely) to four (very likely).
Female: is a dummy variable one if a respondent is a female, and zero otherwise.
Temp: is a dummy variable one if a respondent has a part-time or temporary job, and zero otherwise.
Married: is a dummy variable one if a respondent is currently married and zero otherwise.
LiveKids: is a dummy variable one if a respondent lives with children under the age 18, and zerootherwise.
Grocery: is a dummy variable one if a respondent goes to grocery shopping often and zero otherwise.
LDP Support: is a dummy variable one if a respondent supports the LDP and zero otherwise.
Political: is a dummy variable one if a respondent is a member of any political organization.
CoopMem: is a dummy variable one if a respondent is a Co-op member and zero otherwise.
OwnHouse: is a dummy variable one if a respondent owns home and zero otherwise.
No Foreign: is a dummy variable one if a respondent’s company or industry does not export, import,
or produce goods abroad and zero otherwise.
LaborUnion: is a dummy variable one if a respondent is a labor union member and zero otherwise.
Ideology: is a respondent’s location of his/her ideological position ranging from one (conservative) to
five (progressive).
Table 1 suggests that citizens from the bottom 33% of the income distribution are indeed more
protectionist in their assessment of the effect of globalization on their consumption activities at a 99%
significance level. The results are robust across the five models with individual or household income
and analyzing all respondents or only respondents with jobs.
Respondents with a college education or higher (College) are less protectionist than those without
it. The job security of respondents, as measured by job status and self-assessed likelihood of finding
a comparable job and losing their current job in the next year, does not have systematic effects on
respondents’ assessment of globalization’s effect on their own consumption. Higher age (Age) is the
only variable that is systematically associated with more protectionist assessment. Those who live withchildren under the age 18 are more likely to think globalization is bad for their consumer lives,probably due to the safety and quality concerns. Overall, the results do not lend support to thespill-over hypothesis: respondents with higher job insecurity are not the ones who think that
globalization is bad for their consumer lives.
4.2. Low-Income Citizens are Protectionist due to Job Security Concerns
Table 2 summarizes the determinants of respondents’ assessment of the effect of globalization on
their own job opportunity or stability. Like Table 1, models (1) to (3) use respondent’s individual
income and models (4) and (5) use household income. Among the five models, models (1), (2), and(4) include all the respondents, while model (3) and (5) only include those who have jobs. Consistent
with the prediction offered by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, low-income respondents are more
likely to think that globalization is bad for their job opportunity and this effect is significant at 95% to
99% levels. Yet when using a dummy variable for each of the four income category (0: no income,1: low, 2: middle, 3: high and 2: middle income is excluded to serve as a base category), it is the top142

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33% of total income-earning respondents who are likely to think that globalization is good for their job
opportunities and stability compared to the middle-income category. Low-income respondents are no
more protectionist than the middle-income group in their assessment.
College is associated with the attitude that globalization is good for respondents’ own jobs,
although this effect is absent from the model (5) that uses household income and limits the analysis toworking respondents. Higher age is associated with more a protectionist assessment. Surprisingly,
none of the measures for job insecurity except for age turns out to have systematic effects on
respondents’ assessment of globalization on their job opportunity and stability. Those who work forcompanies or industries that do not export, import, or produce goods abroad (NoForeign) are no more
likely to think that globalization is bad for their employment opportunity and stability. Married
respondents have more positive evaluation of globalization’s effect on their employment which
contradicts other findings that married citizens are more protectionist (Goldstein, Margalit, and Rivers
2009; Naoi and Kume 2009), although this results only hold for two out of five models. There is noeffect of gender which contradicts the established finding that women are more likely to beprotectionist (Hiscox 2006).
Over all, the results presented in Table 1 and 2 suggest that low-income respondents are more
protectionist in their assessment of globalization’s effect on their own consumer lives and on theiremployment opportunities. While the latter finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom, theformer finding poses an intriguing puzzle to the prevalent view that low-income citizens are primary
beneficiaries of globalization as consumers. The association between income of respondents and theirprotectionist attitudes is more robust for the results for the consumption side (Table 1) thanoccupational side (Table 2). Moreover, the spill-over hypothesis that low-income citizens’ fear of
losing jobs “spill over” to form their negative attitudes toward globalization’s effect on their consumer
lives is thus far rejected. The next section will test the information/knowledge hypothesis.
4.3. Higher Ambiguity in Assessment of Globalization’s Effect on Their Own Lives
Table 3 summarizes the determinants of respondents’ uncertainty or ambiguity in their attitudes
toward globalization. I developed three indices to serve as dependent variables: (i) the “centrist
index” is the number of questions, out of the six questions on globalization, for which respondents
chose “Neither good or bad”; (ii) “ConsumCentriDK” is a dummy variable equal to one if a
respondent chooses “Neither good or bad” or “Don’t Know” on the question about their own
consumption; and zero otherwise; (iii) “DK index” is the number of questions, out of six, for which
respondents chose “Don’t Know.” (i) and (iii) range from zero to six.
Model (1) tests the determinants of a respondent’s score on the “centrist index” with all the
respondents with or without jobs. Models (2) and (3) show the determinants of “ConsumpCentriDK”
and models (4) and (5) show the determinants of the “DK index” score. Except for the model (3)which limits the analysis to working respondents, models include all the respondents with or without
jobs.
The results suggest that Income is not systematically associated with respondents’ uncertainty or
ambiguity regarding globalization’s effect on their own consumer lives (models (1) to (3)).
Low-income citizens, however, are more likely to choose don’t know answers to the six questions on
the effect of globalization on various aspects of their and Japanese lives. Respondents with college
education or higher are less likely to be uncertain across all five models, which is consistent with thefinding by Poole and Palfrey (1981), but this effect is absent for the results for DK index (models (4)and (5)). The more progressive a respondent’s ideology is, the less likely he/she chooses “Don’t

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Know” answers, but this finding is weak and inconsistent for the Centrist indexes. Co-op members(who tend to prefer domestically-produced, high-quality food) are less likely to choose a neutral
answer for the question about globalization’s effect on consumption which is expected. Co-op
members are also less likely to choose don’t know answers. Other measures of ideology, such assupport for the Liberal Democratic Party, do not have systematic effects. Female respondents aremuch more likely to choose “Don’t Know” answers, although at a 99% significance level.
Overall, the results suggest that low-income citizens are more likely to choose don’t know
answers for the questions on globalization’s effects than other income groups controlling for educationand political orientation. They are, however, no more likely to choose a centrist and don’t know
answers about their consumer lives than other income groups. The level of education also has the
expected reductive effect on the propensity of neutral answers, yet its substantive impact remains
small.
In sum, the results lend some support to the information/knowledge hypothesis. This begs anotherquestion: what makes it hard for low-income citizens to assess globalization’s effect on their lives
controlling for their levels of education? One possibility is the lack of political parties that represent
free trade and consumer interests in Japan. Investigating this question is beyond the scope of thisresearch note, however.

5. Conclusion
This research note has summarized the preliminary results from JGSS-2008 which asked
Japanese citizens to assess the effect of globalization on six different aspects of their lives. The
survey data suggests the puzzle that low-income citizens are more likely to think that globalization isbad for their consumer lives. I have tested the two hypotheses for why this is the case. The results
lend some support to the information/knowledge hypothesis, and disconfirm the spill-over hypothesis.
The findings summarized in this note suggest two directions for future research. The first is toinvestigate the role of elites – such as political parties – in shaping citizens’ minds about the effect of
globalization on their consumer lives. The second is to disentangle the sources of low-income
citizen’s uncertainty about the effect of globalization on their consumer lives. If not the level of
education, then, what is it? Possible sources are class-based consumer tastes and socially-constructed
shopping habits (Caplovitz 1967).
[Acknowledgement]
I am grateful for the JGSS team for inviting me to the JGSS-2008 and for giving me invaluable
feedback on my proposal.
The Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) are designed and carried out by the JGSS ResearchCenter at Osaka University of Commerce (Joint Usage / Research Center for Japanese General Social
Surveys accredited by Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology), in
collaboration with the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo.
I thank Ikuo Kume for discussion and Celeste Beesely and Bill Hornung for their excellent
research and editorial assistance. I am grateful for Kuniaki Shishido and project members for theirdetailed comments on an earlier draft.

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Table 1:Determinants of Protectionist Responses on “Your Consumption”
1: All2: All3:Working
4: All HH
5:WorkingHH
Income-0.159-0.258-0.351-0.444(2.72)***(2.04)**(4.12)***(3.76)***No Income-0.169(0.79)
Income Low
0.328(1.99)**
Incom High
-0.188(1.31)
Knowledge/Info
College-0.837(6.74)***-0.843(6.76)***-0.835(5.28)***-0.786(5.91)***-0.675(4.04)***

0.012(3.26)**

0.011(3.04)**

0.013(2.04)**
0.095(0.50)-0.104(0.87)
0.060(0.73)
0.011(0.08)-0.029(0.18)

0.0143(3.18)***

0.019(2.67)***
0.113(0.57)-0.092(0.70)
0.019(0.22)-0.054(0.32)-0.059(0.33)

0.306(2.29)**-0.152(1.19)
0.271(1.98)**-0.063(0.54)-0.014(0.12)-0.153(0.64)-0.060(0.45)
0.118(1.74)*
1462

0.196(1.36)-0.201(1.57)
0.275(2.02)**-0.059(0.50)-0.007(0.06)-0.15(0.62)

0.181(0.99)-0.301(1.59)
0.319(1.90)*-0.085(0.54)
0.079(0.46)-0.07(0.22)-0.202(1.10)
0.089(0.97)
830

0.589(4.43)***-0.022(0.15)
0.403(2.82)***-0.076(0.59)
0.026(0.21)
0.033(0.13)-0.004(0.03)
0.038(0.50)
1266

0.538(2.76)***-0.121(0.58)
0.423(2.43)**-0.079(0.46)
0.116(0.64)
0.105(0.32)-0.158(0.84)
0.037(0.39)
735

Job Insecurity
Age
Temp
Diff Job
Lose Job
No Foreign
Labor Union
Other Attributes
FemaleMarried
LiveKids
Grocery
LDP support
Political
Coop MemOwn House
Obs

1462

Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Note: Cut points are shown in the appendix.

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Table 2: Determinants of Protectionist Responses to “Your Job Opportunity”
1: All2: All3: Working
4: All HH
5: Working HH
Income-0.237-0.317-0.385-0.527(3.71)***(2.31)**(4.09)***(4.05)***No Income
0.215(1.22)
Income Low
0.170(0.99)
Income High
-0.377(2.37)**
Knowledge/Info
College-0.404(2.97)***-0.382(2.76)*-0.349(2.06)**-0.320(2.17)**-0.215(1.20)

0.009(2.58)**

0.013(3.03)***

0.022(3.07)***
0.106(0.51)-0.056(0.44)
0.122(1.33)
0.001(0.01)

0.015(3.06)***

0.023(2.98)***
0.226(1.08)-0.020(0.14)
0.101(1.05)-0.060(0.33)-0.165(1.13)-0.234(1.65)*
0.051(0.35)*-0.046(0.36)-0.157(1.18)
0.272(1.04)
0.037(0.26)
0.088(1.21)
1358-0.156(1.05)-0.215(1.49)
0.222(1.69)*-0.047(0.37)-0.155(1.17)
0.270(1.03)
0.032(0.22)
0.088(1.20)
1358-0.234(1.18)-0.429(2.06)**
0.266(1.45)-0.137(0.79)-0.024(0.13)
0.151(0.44)-0.010(0.05)
0.001(0.01)
801

0.155(1.05)-0.030(0.18)
0.190(1.12)
0.027(0.19)-0.131(0.92)
0.546(2.04)**
0.012(0.08)-0.008(0.09)
1170

0.078(0.37)-0.248(1.08)
0.376(1.97)**-0.139(0.73)
0.013(0.07)
0.529(1.51)-0.101(0.50)-0.079(0.75)
706

Job Insecurity
Age
Temp
Diff Job
Lose Job
NoForeign
Other Attributes
FemaleMarried
LiveKids
Grocery
LDP support
Political
Coop MemOwn House
Obs

Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Positive coefficients mean more protectionist, negative coefficients mean pro-globalization. Cut points areshown in the appendix.

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Table 3: Determinants of “Centrist” and “Don’t Know” Response Index
12
3
4
IncomeAll: Centrist

AllConsum/CentriDK

W: Cons/CentriDK-0.021(0.17)-0.006(0.22)-0.015(0.47)

All: DK Index

5
All:DK Index-0.217(4.95)***No Income

0.161(1.37)
0.335(2.85)***-0.098(0.85)

Income Low
Incom High
Knowledge/Info
College-0.440(2.63)***-0.087(2.31)**-0.084(2.09)***-0.023(0.24)-0.036(0.37)-0.059(0.75)
0.169(0.94)-0.037(2.09)**-0.052(1.27)-0.023(1.57)-0.046(1.06)-0.166-0.87-0.076(1.76)*-0.092(1.97)**-0.108(2.50)**-0.104(1.11)-0.458(2.46)**-0.229(2.25)**-0.107(2.48)**-0.102(1.09)-0.456(2.44)**-0.225(1.09)-0.009-1.58

0.001(0.52)

0.019(7.20)***

0.019(7.11)***

0.115(0.62)-0.109-0.57
0.214(1.21)
0.062(0.38)-0.027(0.33)
1.95(4.15)***
1035
0.02

-0.016(0.38)-0.023-0.53
0.095(2.38)**-0.037(0.98)-0.018(0.94)
0.698(6.57)***-0.001(0.84)-0.0243(0.80)
0.019(0.90)
0.013(0.34)-0.021(0.47)
0.007(0.17)
0.066(1.53)-0.030(0.73)-0.006(0.29)
0.674(5.27)***

0.480(4.84)***-0.289(3.08)***
0.210(2.00)**-0.276(3.17)***-0.032(0.63)
0.813(2.61)**
1655
0.11

0.460
(4.54)***-0.309(3.52)***
0.197(1.86)*-0.275(3.16)***-0.032(0.64)
0.000(0.00)
1655
0.11

Ideology
Ideology
LDPsupport
Political
Coop
Job Insecurity
Age
Diff Job
Lose Job
Foreign
FemaleMarried
LiveKids
Grocery
Own House
Constant
Obs
R2

1035
0.02

903
0.02

Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses. OLS estimation.
* significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

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日本版総合的社会調査共同研究拠点 研究論文集[10] JGSS Research Series No.7

[References]
Baker, Andy, 2005, “Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy
Beliefs,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No.4.
Caplovitz, David, 1967, The Poor Pay More, New York: Free Press Book.
Christian Broda, Ephraim Leibtag, and David Weinstein, 2009, “The Role of Prices in Measuring the Poor’s
Living Standards,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 2009, pp.77-97
Goldstein, Judith, Yotam Margalit and Douglas Rivers, 2008, “Producer, Consumer, Family Member: The
Relationship between Trade Attitudes and Family Status,” Paper Prepared for the Princeton Conference on
Domestic Preferences and Foreign Economic Policy, Princeton University, April 19-20, 2008.
Hiscox, Michael J, 2006, “Through a Glass and Darkly: Framing Effects and Individuals’ Attitudes towards
International Trade,” International Organization, Vol.60, No.3 (Summer):755-780.
Scheve, Kenneth F, and Matthew J Slaughter, 2001, Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers,
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
Mansfield, Edward and Diana Mutz, 2009, “Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, andOut-group Anxiety,” International Organization, Vol.63, Issue 3:425-457.
Naoi, Megumi and Ikuo Kume, 2009, “Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a
Survey Experiment During the Global Recession,” Manuscript, UCSD & Waseda.

[Appendix]

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Cut 5
Cut 6

Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Cut 5
Cut 6

1
-3.689(0.330)-1.734(0.281)-0.382(0.274)2.156(0.281)
3.35(0.297)4.868(0.359)

Table A-1: Cut Points for Table 1
2
3-3.603-3.942(0.283)(0.531)-1.645-1.851(0.225)(0.478)-0.291-0.433(0.217)(0.470)2.248
2.089(0.227)(0.478)3.43563.356(0.245)(0.500)4.953
4.684(0.317)(0.567)4-3.472(0.371)-1.344(0.317)-0.071(0.312)2.501(0.322)3.719(0.338)5.254(0.403)5-3.782(0.594)-1.419(0.530)-0.083(0.525)2.493(0.535)3.741(0.556)
5.213(0.636)1-4.086(0.358)-2.538(0.310)-1.552(0.301)1.442(0.300)2.757(0.313)4.327(0.373)

Table A-2: Cut Points for Table 2
2
3-3.637-3.526(0 .327)(0.557)-2.088-2.042(0.275)(0.516)-1.102-1.018(0.265)(0.507)1.894
2.036(0.269)(0.513)3.201
3.299(0.284)(0.530)4.780
5.197(0.349)(0.634)4-3.621(0.401)-1.956(0.348)-1.018(0.341)
2.007(0.346)3.313(0.359)4.831(0.418)5-3.581(0.620)-1.899(0.570)-0.917(0.563)2.226(0.570)3.531(0.588)5.444(0.698)148