Joint Publication 3-18
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AT E S O FAJoint Forcible Entry Operations

11 May 2017
Incorporating Change 1
09 January 2018
Validated on 09 July 2021

PREFACE
1. Scope
This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing joint
forcible entry operations.
2. Purpose
This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performanceof the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations
for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise
of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), andprescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent
of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force andexecuting the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of objectives.
3. Application
a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commandersof combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.
b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances
dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS,
normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided
more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of amultinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational
doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not
ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s
doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, anddoctrine.
For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN
Director, Joint Force DevelopmentiPreface

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JP 3-18

SUMMARY OF CHANGESREVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-18
DATED 27 NOVEMBER 2012•

This publication was validated without change on 09 July 2021.

•

Expands the discussion of sea control and eliminated the term coastal control.

•

Clarifies the discussion of operational access in the joint force environment, toinclude cyberspace.

•

Clarifies the discussion of space control operations.

•

Incorporates a discussion of joint electromagnetic spectrum management
operations.

•

Modifies the discussion of principles applied by planners to achieve surprise forsetting favorable conditions to ensure operational success in the joint force
environment.

•

Describes where forcible entry normally occurs within the notional phasing
construct.

•

Updates command and control responsibilities and control mechanism language
throughout.

•Enhances the discussion of multinational capabilities, collaboration, andplanning.

iii

Summary of Changes

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JP 3-18

TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vii
CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION
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Forcible Entry ............................................................................................................. I-1
United States National Military Strategy and Joint Forcible Entry Operations.......... I-2
Principles for Forcible Entry Operational Success ..................................................... I-3
Operational Applications of Forcible Entry Operations ............................................. I-8
Forcible Entry Capabilities ......................................................................................... I-9
Multinational Considerations .................................................................................... I-11

CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND CONTROL
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Purpose.......................................................................................................................II-1
Force Employment .....................................................................................................II-1
Organization of the Forcible Entry Operational Area................................................II-2
Command Relationships for Forcible Entry Operations............................................II-3
Airspace Control ........................................................................................................II-5
Air Defense Command and Control ..........................................................................II-7
Communications ........................................................................................................II-8
Rules of Engagement ...............................................................................................II-10
Friendly Fire Prevention ..........................................................................................II-10

CHAPTER III
PLANNING

Purpose..................................................................................................................... III-1
Forcible Entry and the Joint Planning Process ........................................................ III-1
Forcible Entry Planning Considerations .................................................................. III-2

CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS

Purpose..................................................................................................................... IV-1

Section A. Integration and Synchronization
 Introduction .............................................................................................................. IV-1
 Forcible Entry Operations Phases ............................................................................ IV-2
 Integration and/or Synchronization Considerations............................................... IV-12
Section B. Supporting Operations
 Special Operations Forces...................................................................................... IV-14
 Fires ....................................................................................................................... IV-15
 Intelligence Support and Considerations ............................................................... IV-15
v

Table of ContentsInformation Operations .......................................................................................... IV-17
Public Affairs ......................................................................................................... IV-19
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Considerations......................... IV-20
Air Mobility Operations......................................................................................... IV-20

CHAPTER V
LOGISTICS


General ...................................................................................................................... V-1
Specific Logistic Considerations for Supporting Forcible Entry Operations ........... V-1

APPENDIXA
B
CD

Airborne and Air Assault Operations ............................................................... A-1
Control Joint Forcible Entry Operations ...........................................................B-1
References .........................................................................................................C-1
Adminstrative Instructions ............................................................................... D-1

GLOSSARY
Part I
Part II

Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms .............................................. GL-1
Terms and Definitions ............................................................................. GL-4

FIGURE
I-1
IV-1
IV-2
IV-3
V-1
A-1

vi

Forcible Entry Operations ........................................................................... I-2
Operation Plan Rehearsal Benefits ........................................................... IV-1
Forcible Entry Operations Phases ............................................................ IV-2
Intelligence Support ............................................................................... IV-16
Logistics Planning Considerations ............................................................ V-1
Example Distribution of Responsibilities for Airborne Assault ............... A-4

JP 3-18

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER’S OVERVIEW•

Presents an Introduction of Joint Forcible Entry•

Explains the Command and Control of Joint Forcible Entry Operations•

Covers Joint Forcible Entry Operations Planning•

Describes How Forcible Entry Operations Are Conducted
Introduction

Forcible Entry

Joint forcible entry operations seize and holdlodgments against armed opposition. A lodgment
is a designated area in a hostile or potentiallyhostile operational area (OA) (such as an airhead,a beachhead, or combination thereof) that affords
continuous landing of troops and materiel whileproviding maneuver space for subsequent
operations.

United States National Military
Strategy and Joint Forcible Entry
Operations

To be credible both as a deterrent and as a viable
military option for policy enforcement, the Armed
Forces of the United States must be capable ofdeploying and fighting to gain access togeographical areas controlled by forces hostile to
US interests. The military environment and thethreats it presents are increasingly transregional,
multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) in
nature. Joint forcible entry operations in a TMM
setting is a likely crisis or contingency the joint
forces will face in the future.

Principles for Forcible Entry
Operational SuccessTo set favorable conditions for operational
success, the following principles apply for forcible
entry operations: achieve surprise, visualize theOA, control of the air, control of space, joint
electromagnetic spectrum management operations,information superiority, sea control, isolate
lodgment, gain and maintain access, neutralize
enemy forces within the lodgment, identificationof enemy infrastructure which may be of value for
future use by friendly forces, expand the lodgment,vii

Executive Summary
manage the impact of environmental factors, andintegrate supporting operations.
Forcible Entry Capabilities

The Armed Forces of the United States conduct
forcible entry operations using various capabilities,
including: amphibious assault, airborne assault, airassault, ground assault, and any combination
thereof. An amphibious force (AF), composed ofan amphibious task force and a landing force,
together with other forces that are trained,organized, and equipped for amphibious
operations, conducts littoral maneuver by vertical
and/or surface means. Airborne forces may be
used as the assault force or used in combination
with other capabilities for a forcible entry, or they
may conduct follow-on operations from alodgment. Air assault forces execute forcible
entries using fixed-wing, tiltrotor, and rotary-wing
aircraft. Special operations forces (SOF) can
execute forcible entries using a combination of
fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and tiltrotor aircraft
employing airland or airdrop procedures.

Multinational Considerations

Multinational forces (MNFs) may bring additional
capabilities and capacity to forcible entry
operations but normally require careful attention to
integration. To optimize these MNFs, the joint
force commander (JFC) and component
commanders may need to evaluate interoperabilityof equipment, conduct additional rehearsals, andemploy liaison teams to facilitate integration.
Command and Control

Force Employment

The JFC should determine the forcible entry
capability or combination of capabilities needed toaccomplish the mission. Unity of command is vital
when amphibious, airborne, air assault, and special
operations are combined. If the decision is madeto use a combination of forcible entry capabilities
to seize a lodgment, the JFC also decides whether
to conduct the forcible entry as a concurrent or
integrated operation.

Organization of the Forcible
Entry Operational Area

The amphibious objective area is a geographicalarea of sufficient size for conducting necessary sea,viii

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Executive Summary
air, and land operations, and within which islocated the objective(s) to be secured by the AF.
The JFC may establish a joint special operations
area when geographic boundaries between SOF
and conventional forces are the most suitable
control measures. The airspace control area for
the forcible entry operation is that airspace laterally
defined by the boundaries that delineate the OA.
Control and coordination of forcible entry
operations pose a particularly difficult challenge toall elements of the joint force. In addressing thischallenge, the JFCs and appropriate commanders
may employ various control and coordination
measures that will facilitate the execution ofoperations and, at the same time, protect the force
to the greatest possible degree.
Command Relationships for
Forcible Entry Operations

JFCs have full authority to assign missions,redirect efforts, and direct coordination among
subordinate commanders.
The combatantcommander may organize the forcible entry force
as a subordinate joint task force, or the forcible
entry force may be organized from an existing
component. An initiating directive will provide
guidance on command relationships and otherpertinent instructions for the duration of theforcible entry operation. Based on the JFC’s
guidance, the forcible entry operation may be
conducted
byfunctional
component
commanders. If an amphibious assault is part of
the forcible entry operation, it will include air andland assaults that originate from the sea. If the JFC
organizes along functional lines, functional
component commanders will normally exercise
operational control over their parent Services’
forces and tactical control over other Services’
forces attached or made available for tasking.
Normally, a support relationship is establishedbetween the commander, amphibious task force,and commander, landing force, by the JFC or
establishing authority. If an airborne assault is partof the forcible entry operation, it will be deliveredby airlift forces from either the continental UnitedStates (CONUS), an intermediate staging base, ortheater airbase.
The airborne task force
commander will normally organize the parachuteix

Executive Summary
assault force, airlift force, and follow-on airland
forces in such a way as to best accomplish themission based on the concept of operations. When
directed, Commander, US Special Operations
Command, provides CONUS-based SOF to thegeographic combatant commander (GCC). The
GCC then exercises command and control (C2) of
SOF through the commander, theater special
operations command. Forcible entry operations
employing a combination of airborne, air assault,
SOF, and AFs (to include MNFs with thesecapabilities) may be under the command of the JFCor a Service or functional component commander
and must be closely coordinated.
Airspace Control

C2 of airspace requires two key elements: a control
authority and a control system. The JFC normallydesignates an airspace control authority (ACA)
who has overall responsibility to establish andoperate the airspace control system (ACS). For the
ACS to function effectively, the ACA must
maximize and enhance the capabilities of thecollective force using existing control systems.

Air Defense Command andControl

The joint force is particularly vulnerable to attacks
by enemy aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles
during the early stages of a forcible entry. Allavailable surface-to-air assets should beincorporated into the overall area air defense planand comply with procedures and weapons control
measures established by the area air defense
commander.

Communications

Communications systems supporting forcible entry
operations should be interoperable, agile, trusted,and shared.

Friendly Fire Prevention

The complexity of forcible entry operations
increases the potential for friendly fire incidents
and demands efforts by all elements of the joint
force to deliberately reduce the risk of friendly fireincidents.

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Executive Summary
Planning
Forcible Entry and the Joint
Planning Process

Joint planning is conducted using a disciplined
process described in policies and procedures
established in the Adaptive Planning andExecution enterprise. These processes facilitate
both deliberate planning and crisis action planning.

Forcible Entry Planning
Considerations

In the development of a forcible entry course ofaction (COA), five phases are addressed:
preparation and deployment, assault, stabilizationof the lodgment, introduction of follow-on forces,
and termination or transition. The commander andstaff analyze each COA separately according to thecommander’s guidance to bring out relevant
factors in each COA. During forcible entry
operation planning, the JFC should use red teaming
to mitigate the inherent risk and promote a uniform
appreciation of forcible entry. Assessment is
critical to determining the progress of joint forcible
entry operations and if real-time adjustments need
to be made to the conduct of operations.
Operations

Rehearsals

In order to integrate, synchronize, and confirm thetiming of an operation, the JFC may choose to
conduct a rehearsal. Rehearsals at the operational
level range in scope from joint force exercises(driven by resource, time, space, and force
availability constraints), to command post
exercises supported by computer aidedsimulations, to commanders and/or key personnel
conferences.

Forcible Entry Operations
Phases

Forcible entry operations may be planned andexecuted in the five phases.
Preparation and Deployment (Forcible
Entry Phase I). Forcible entry operations are
conducted by organizations whose force
structures permit rapid deployment into theobjective area. Joint forces may deploy
directly to the OA or to staging areas to prepare
for subsequent operations.

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Executive Summary

Supporting Operationsxii

Assault (Forcible Entry Phase II). Phase II
begins with joint force assaults to seize initial
objectives in the lodgment and concludes withthe consolidation of those objectives.

Stabilization of the Lodgment (Forcible
Entry Phase III). Stabilization involves
securing the lodgment to protect the force andensure the continuous landing of personnel andmateriel, organizing the lodgment to support
the increasing flow of forces and logistic
resource requirements, and expanding thelodgment as required to support the joint force
in preparing for and executing follow-on
operations.



Introduction of Follow-on Forces (Forcible
Entry Phase IV). Follow-on forces provide
the JFC with increased flexibility to conduct
operations as required by operational
conditions; once the lodgment has been
established with aerial ports of debarkation andseaports of debarkation, a joint security area
may be identified and developed to facilitate
and provide security for subsequent support
operations.



Termination or Transition Operations(Forcible Entry Phase V). A successful
forcible entry operation is completed in one of
two ways: attainment of the campaign
objectives (termination) or completion of theoperational objectives wherein a lodgment isestablished for follow-on combat operations(transition).

Supporting operations to forcible entry operations
include: SOF; fires; intelligence; information
operations; public affairs; chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear considerations; and air
mobility operations.

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Executive Summary
CONCLUSION
This publication provides joint doctrine forplanning, executing, and assessing joint forcible
entry operations.

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Executive Summary

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CHAPTER IINTRODUCTION“The world is connected by shared spaces—cyber[space], space, air, andoceans—that enable the free flow of people, goods, services, and ideas. They
are the arteries of the global economy and civil society, and access is at risk due
to increased competition and provocative behaviors. Therefore, we will continue
to promote rules for responsible behavior while making sure we have thecapabilities to assure access to these shared spaces.”
National Security Strategy 2015

1. Forcible Entry
a. Joint forcible entry operations seize and hold lodgments against armed opposition.
A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area (OA)
(such as an airhead, a beachhead, or combination thereof) that affords continuous landingof troops and materiel while providing maneuver space for subsequent operations. The
lodgment and the means to seize a lodgment will depend upon the objectives of theoperation or campaign. In most operations, forcible entry secures the lodgment as a basefor subsequent operations. It often has facilities and infrastructure that may be used toreceive large follow-on forces and logistics. In some operations, seizure of the lodgment
may be the primary objective, and its retention lasts only until the mission is complete, atwhich time the assaulting forces withdraw. Forcible entry operations are inherently risky
and always joint. Forcible entry demands careful planning and thorough preparation;synchronized, violent, and rapid execution; and leader initiative at every level to deal withfriction, chance, and opportunity. See Figure I-1.
b. The US seeks to gain and maintain operational access in areas of strategic
importance throughout the world. Operational access is the ability to project military force
into an OA with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. Operational accessis the joint force contribution to a whole of government approach to assured access that
includes, for example, the diplomatic and economic instruments of national power.
Operational access facilitates the unhindered national use of select sovereign territory,
including areas of air, sea, space, and cyberspace that belong to no one state. Forcible entry
is a military aspect of operational access that may be applied when diplomatic and othermeans have failed.
For more information on cyberspace capabilities, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-12,
Cyberspace Operations.
c. Forcible entry operations are joint in nature. There are many Service andfunctional component-unique forcible entry capabilities, techniques, and procedures the
US has developed since World War II, primarily consisting of amphibious assault, airborne
assault, air assault, and special operations. Despite these Service-oriented capabilities,
techniques, and procedures, forcible entry operations are inherently joint as evidenced by
the need for using resources (e.g., command and control [C2], transportation, sustainment)
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Chapter I

Forcible Entry Operations
Seize and hold a lodgment against armed opposition
Gain and maintain
operational access Defeat enemy area denial
 Seize bases for subsequent
operations
 Introduce follow-on forces Destroy specific enemy
capability
 Evacuate personnel andequipment Military deception
 Support joint special
operations
 Gain intelligence

Air Force
Navy
MarinesArmy
Special Operations Forces

Airborne Assault
Amphibious Assault
Air Assault
Amphibious Raid
Special Operations

Figure I-1. Forcible Entry Operations

from all elements of the Department of Defense (DOD) and often other resources (e.g.,multinational and other US Government departments and agencies).
2. United States National Military Strategy and Joint Forcible Entry Operations
a. The National Military Strategy establishes three national military objectives: deter,
deny, and defeat state adversaries; disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist
organizations; and strengthen our global network of allies and partners.
b. To be credible both as a deterrent and as a viable military option for policy
enforcement, the Armed Forces of the United States must be capable of deploying andfighting to gain access to geographical areas controlled by forces hostile to US interests.
Swift and decisive victory in these cases requires forcible entry and the ability to surge
follow-on forces. Alerting rapid deployment forces for employment or moving forces
toward the area of the crisis is a show of force that is diplomatically significant in a strategic
context.
c. The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and changes rapidly, requiring
leaders to maintain persistent multinational partners. While the basic character of war has
not changed, the character of conflict has evolved. The military environment and thethreats it presents are increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional(TMM) in nature. Joint forcible entry operations in a TMM setting is a likely crisis orcontingency the joint forces will face in the future. TMM will cut across multiple
combatant commands and across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. The strategic
environment is fluid with changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational

I-2

JP 3-18

Introduction
threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. These factors will significantly
affect how the joint force conducts joint forcible entry operations. Despite our bestplanning and the application of sound intelligence combined with the other joint functions,
we can expect uncertainty and ambiguity to exist in strategic and operational environments.
3. Principles for Forcible Entry Operational SuccessTo set favorable conditions for operational success, the following principles apply forforcible entry operations:a. Achieve Surprise. Planners should strive to achieve surprise regarding exact
objectives, times, methods, and forces employed in forcible entry operations. The degreeof surprise required depends on the nature of the operation to be conducted. Achieving
surprise is usually dependent upon multiple factors to include information operations (IO)
and operational tempo. Surprise is not a necessary condition for operational success(particularly when the force has overwhelming superiority), but it can significantly
reduce operational risk.
For more information on planning, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
b. Visualize the OA. Utilizing joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment (JIPOE) provides the joint force commander (JFC) the composite of theconditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities thatbear on the decisions of the commander. Geospatial engineering allows commanders andtheir subordinates to visualize the environmental effects of both the battlespace and theirpotential actions in order to plan, execute operations, and react to changing conditions.
For more information on JIPOE, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment.
c. Control of the Air. Counterair integrates offensive and defensive operations toattain and maintain a desired degree of control of the air and protection in the OA. During
forcible entry operations, this is essential to protect the force during periods of criticalvulnerability and to preserve lines of communications (LOCs). At a minimum, the joint
force must neutralize the enemy’s offensive air and missile capability and air defenses toachieve local air superiority and protection over the planned lodgment. The joint force
controls the air through integrated and synchronized air and missile defense (AMD)operations. Air interdiction of enemy forces throughout the OA enhances the simultaneityand depth of the forcible entry operation.
For more information on control of the air, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile
Threats.
d. Control of Space. Space control operations use offensive space control anddefensive space control to ensure freedom of action in space and, when directed, deny anadversary freedom of action. Space control plans and capabilities enable a broad range of
response options to provide for the continued, sustainable use of space. Space control
contributes to space deterrence by employing a variety of measures to assure the use of
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Chapter I
OPERATION OVERLORD—FRANCE, 1944
The D-Day invasion on 6 June 1944 was preceded by counterintelligence,
military deception (MILDEC), and operations security efforts
unprecedented in scope. As early as 1940, the British initiated actions tosink or capture the German weather ships and submarines stationed in the
North Atlantic. This continued throughout the war. German agents
operating in Great Britain were eliminated or “turned,” and almost all of theintelligence they sent to Germany was compromised. Prior to the invasion,
Allied bombers struck targets throughout the possible invasion areas,
while avoiding undue concentration on the Normandy Peninsula. Allied airforces denied the German Air Force any aerial reconnaissance over theassembly areas and ports used for the invasion. Entire English civilian
communities were removed from staging and embarkation areas and theinvasion troops themselves kept in isolation. An elaborate MILDEC
operation maintained the ruse that the main invasion would strike the Pas
de Calais area instead of Normandy. On the night of the invasion, false
parachute drops were staged in areas outside of the invasion area.
The effect on German defensive operations was critical. At the strategiclevel, the Germans expected the invasion in the spring of 1944. Lack ofoperational intelligence forced the Germans to defend all the possible
invasion areas in western France, and kept most mobile reserves awayfrom the invasion beaches in a central location. Allied air and French
partisans delayed them from striking the lodgment until too late. The lackof accurate weather data led to erroneous weather forecasts for early June.
Lacking air reconnaissance, the Germans kept powerful forces to defend
the Pas de Calais, which the German Army assessed as most likely andmost dangerous area.
Various Sources

space, attribute enemy attacks, and, consistent with the right to self-defense, hold enemy
space capabilities at risk.
For more information on control of space, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.
e. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations (JEMSMO).
JEMSMO is the planning, coordinating, and managing use of the electromagnetic spectrum(EMS) through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures. JEMSMO
management includes frequency management, host nation (HN) coordination, and joint
spectrum interference resolution. JEMSMO’s objective is to enable EMS-dependentcapabilities and systems to perform their functions as designed without causing or suffering
unacceptable electromagnetic interference.
JEMSMO management provides theframework to utilize the EMS in the most effective and efficient manner through policy
and procedure. JEMSMO is analogous to the airspace management function in air
operations, coordinating and integrating joint EMS-use in terms of time, space, andfrequency.

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JP 3-18

Introduction
For more information on JEMSMO, see JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
Management Operations.
f. Information Superiority. The effective conduct of IO through the integration of
information-related capabilities (IRCs) to affect the information environment enables thejoint force to gain and maintain information superiority, and in turn, enables the force toestablish the lodgment. As adversaries increase the sophistication of their operations anduse of information, gaining superiority in the information environment is increasingly
critical.
For more information on IRCs, see JP 3-13, Information Operations.
g. Sea Control. The maritime force may require sea control from far off shore to
thwart the enemy antiaccess (A2) capabilities as US forces attempt to access the littorals.
The carrier strike group may launch strikes to shape the littorals prior to the arrival of theamphibious force (AF) into the amphibious objective area (AOA). Local maritime
superiority is required to project power ashore in support of the joint forcible entry
operation and to protect sea lines of communications (SLOCs). SLOC protection
enables logistic support required to sustain operations ashore and support the transition tocontinuing operations by follow-on forces. Defeating the threat in the littorals typicallyrequires a naval capability that is prepared for sustained defensive and offensive
engagements.
h. Isolate the Lodgment. The joint force attacks or neutralizes any enemy
capabilities with the potential to affect the establishment of the lodgment. These
capabilities include enemy ground, sea, and air forces that can be committed to react tojoint force assaults, indirect fire systems, and missile systems that can range the lodgment,
and related sensors, C2 systems, and digital networks. Barriers and obstacles can also be
used to isolate the lodgment by denying the use of areas, fixing opposing forces, andreinforcing the effectiveness of friendly fires. Failure to isolate the lodgment can hamperor stall momentum. In the event of culmination prior to isolation, the JFC must have abranch plan for the alternate penetration or retrograde.
For more information on denying movement and maneuver and related capabilities, seeJP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.
i. Gain and Maintain Access. In any given OA, numerous and diverse limitations toaccess will present themselves. Access may be restricted due to diplomatic, economic,
military, or cultural factors. Ports, airfields, and infrastructures may also be physicallylimited. Enemies may employ A2/area denial (AD) strategies. A2 refers to those actions
and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering
an OA. AD refers to those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not
to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the OA.
(1) Commander Considerations. Commanders conducting forcible entry
operations should leverage established basing, access, and security cooperation

I-5

Chapter I
agreements, as well as the regional expertise developed through pre-crisis engagement
activities at the national, regional, and local levels.
(2) Shaping Efforts. When planning indicates a requirement for forcible entry,
shaping efforts or activities focus on identifying and neutralizing an enemy’s A2capabilities. This may require a change in intelligence priorities: for example, increasing
surveillance and reconnaissance to locate natural and man-made impediments to entry
operations. Shaping activities will also involve the employment of IRCs, specificallymilitary deception (MILDEC) and operations security (OPSEC). They will also be used
to influence local civilian populations and other interested nations and organizations.
However, all shaping should be balanced against the need for surprise. Other US
Government departments and agencies and multinational partners may be vital todeveloping intelligence and gaining sufficient access to permit forcible entry. Shaping may
also include improving on HN infrastructure so that the environment is better suited toaccommodate specific military operations.
(3) Operational Access. Operational access expands the degree to which the
JFC may employ the range of joint capabilities within the OA. Gaining and maintaining
operational access depends upon numerous factors such as the nature of the operation or
campaign, geography, the enemy’s capability to deny access, proximity of friendly bases,
and the joint capabilities available. Forcible entry operations are often the precursor tofollow-on major operations. Land forces projected into the lodgment seize key terrain andeliminate enemy A2 capabilities. Air Force, Navy, and special operations forces (SOF)
extend their reach and ability to neutralize the enemy’s A2 measures. Ultimately, theforcible entry may completely dislocate enemy defenses and allow the joint force to retain
the initiative throughout the dominate phase. In some instances, forcible entry operations
preclude enemy A2 measures and seize the initiative. For example, Operation
WATCHTOWER in August of 1942 seized the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal andnearby seaplane base. This operation surprised the Japanese and completely disrupted
Japanese plans to extend their strategic defensive perimeter and interdict SLOCs between
the US and Australia.
j. Neutralize Enemy Forces Within the Lodgment. The joint force must neutralize
enemy forces within the lodgment to facilitate the establishment of airheads andbeachheads and to provide for the immediate protection of the force.
k. Planning considerations should include identification of enemy infrastructure
which may be of value for future use by friendly forces. Limiting physical damage willlessen the time needed to rebuild.
l. Expand the Lodgment. The joint force quickly builds combat power in order toenhance security and the ability to respond to enemy counter attacks, enable continuous
landing of troops and materiel, and facilitate transition to subsequent operations. Failure
to expand the lodgment can severely hamper or stall the momentum of the overall
operation.

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Introduction
m. Manage the Impact of Environmental Factors. Managing the impact ofenvironmental factors refers to overcoming the effect of land and sea obstacles;
anticipating, preventing, detecting, and mitigating enemy use of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons; and determining the impact of climate,weather, and other naturally occurring hazards. The JFC may take advantage ofenvironmental conditions that present an operational advantage to the joint force or adisadvantage to enemy forces in order to optimize mission effectiveness. This may also
aid in minimization of natural obstacles encountered in the assault or follow-on phases.
n. Integrate Supporting Operations. Intelligence operations, surveillance andreconnaissance operations, IO, civil-military operations (CMO), and special operations are
key to setting the conditions for forcible entry operational success. These enablers should
be integrated into the operation at every stage from initial planning to transition.
OPERATION SUTTON—FALKLAND WAR, 1982
On 21 May 1982, British forces conducted an amphibious assault on thewestern side of San Carlos on East Falkland at Ajax Bay (Operation Sutton).
The landings at San Carlos forced British navy and land forces to remain
relatively fixed during the amphibious assault and beachhead buildup.
This is when the Argentine air force unleashed their area denial plan–
concentrating their attack on British naval forces supporting the landing
force. Within an hour of the first waves of aircraft attacking, it became
evident to the British that it was the ships, not the men ashore, who were
the targets. The Argentine air attacks proved devastating. From 21 to 25
May the air attacks sank a British destroyer, two frigates and a container
ship. Additionally, two more destroyers, three frigates, and three logistic
landing ships were damaged. The loss of the container ship with the heavy
lift helicopters and the damaged logistic landing ships had an immediate
impact on the campaign’s logistic and operational plan.
The entire British operation had been planned on the assumption of
keeping logistics afloat. The Argentines’ air assault, instead, forced theBritish to create huge logistic dumps, on land, at Ajax Bay. Establishing
the British Army Falklands Beach Support Area took much longer than
expected. The Argentine air attacks on the British fleet immediately
reduced the rate of off-loading supplies at San Carlos. This in turn slowed
the start of the land campaign (delay of logistics resulting in loss ofmaneuver opportunity in terms of time and speed). Additionally, the lossof the container ship greatly altered the land campaign due to the loss ofthe heavy lift helicopters. The land forces now had to walk and carry their
supplies. The Falklands War showed that no clear cut distinction exists inthe landing and buildup phase where antiaccess ends and area denial
begins. The landing and buildup phase proved to be theintersection/overlap of antiaccess and area denial realms.
Area Denial & Falklands War Lessons Learned—Implications for Land
Warfare 2030-2040: After the Army’s Theater Arrival–
The Coming Complex Fight Dave Shunk, 2014

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Chapter I
4. Operational Applications of Forcible Entry Operations
The geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) vision of how a joint operation
should unfold will drive decisions regarding the phasing of an operation. Within thecontext of the phases established by a GCC, subordinate JFCs and component commanders
may establish additional phases that fit their concept of operations (CONOPS). A credible
threat of forcible entry operations can be an effective deterrence and may be applicableduring shaping and deterrent activities prior to or during the initial phases of an operation.
A forcible entry operation will normally be conducted during a phase to seize the initiative
or to dominate the enemy. Within the construct of the overall CONOPS, the forcible entry
operation will have its own phasing as described in Chapter III, “Planning,” and Chapter
IV, “Operations.”a. Seize the Initiative. A forcible entry operation may be the JFC’s opening move toseize the initiative. For example, a JFC might direct friendly forces to seize and hold anairhead or a beachhead to facilitate the continuous landing of troops and materiel andexpand the maneuver space needed to conduct follow-on operations. The establishment of
the lodgment, followed by the arrival and preparation of follow-on forces, usually marks
the end of the forcible entry operations and a transition to further offensive operations.
b. Dominate. Forcible entry operations during the dominate phase of an operation or
campaign may be used for the following purposes: a coup de main, conducting operational
movement and maneuver to attain positional advantage (see Operation CHROMITE [1950]
vignette), or as a MILDEC.
(1) Coup de Main. A forcible entry may be designed as a coup de main that willcapitalize on surprise and simultaneous execution to achieve decisive results. Often
conducted by small forces conducting short-duration, limited-objective attacks against
opponents with modest but still lethal capabilities, these operations may be a likely type of
forcible entry. Operation URGENT FURY (1983) and Operation JUST CAUSE (198990) are specific examples of the use of simultaneous operations overwhelming an enemy’s
ability to respond. The capitulation of enemy forces usually marks the end of the dominate
phase of the operation and a transition to further operations within the stabilize and enablecivil authority phases.
(2) MILDEC. The mere existence of a forcible entry capability may be used by
the JFC in any phase as a show of force or to force enemy movement even without
mounting a forcible entry operation, as with the amphibious demonstration during
Operation DESERT STORM (1991).
For further information on phasing, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint
Planning.

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Introduction
OPERATION CHROMITE—KOREA, 1950
On 15 September 1950, 83 days after North Korea invaded South Korea, ajoint command of the United States, Joint Task Force (JTF) 7, initiatedOperation CHROMITE by conducting an amphibious assault on the port of
Inchon on Korea’s west coast.
Operation CHROMITE took place on the heels of the retreat of the UnitedStates and Republic of Korea forces down the Korean Peninsula in June
and July to an enclave on the peninsula’s southern tip. The primaryobjectives were to land a large force behind the bulk of the North Korean
People’s Army (NKPA), recapture South Korea’s capital, Seoul, cut NKPA
logistic lines, and provide an “anvil” against which the US Eighth Army,
attacking from the south, would crush the NKPA.
JTF 7 commenced operations at 0630 on 15 September with an assault
against the critical island of Wolmi-Do following massive bombardment.
By 1800 on 16 September, main landings on Inchon had secured abeachhead.
Various Sources

5. Forcible Entry Capabilities
The Armed Forces of the United States conduct forcible entry operations using various
capabilities, including: amphibious assault, airborne assault, air assault, groundassault, and any combination thereof. Based upon mission analysis, JIPOE, and the joint
planning process (JPP), these operations may be used singularly or in combination.
Forcible entry operations may employ single or multiple entry points. In some cases, SOF
will support the entry of conventional forces (CF), but CF may be used to seize a lodgment
for support of special operations missions. The forcible entry operation may include linkup
and exploitation by ground maneuver from a separate location. Sustainment considerations
may drive the requirement for a combination of capabilities and linkup requirements.
a. Amphibious Assault Operations. An AF, composed of an amphibious task force(ATF) and a landing force (LF), together with other forces that are trained, organized, andequipped for amphibious operations, conducts littoral maneuver by vertical and/or surface
means. AFs seek to exploit gaps in the enemy’s defenses to secure key objectives
associated with establishing a lodgment. In addition to serving as a forcible entry assault
force, such forces are capable of conducting follow-on operations from the lodgment.
AFs may also be inserted as follow-on forces. An AF with a forcible entry capability may
be forward-deployed to quickly initiate or join other forces in a forcible entry operation oras a show of force. Support from the sea and projected ashore facilitates the rapid buildup
of combat power to include the introduction of follow-on forces.
(1) The organic capabilities of AFs, including air and fire support, logistics, andmobility, allow them to gain access to an area by forcible entry. The salient requirementof an amphibious assault is the necessity for swift introduction of sufficient combat power

I-9Chapter I
ashore to accomplish the AF objectives. The assault begins on order, after sufficientelements of the main body of the AF that are capable of beginning the ship-to-shore
movement arrive in the OA. For an assault, the action phase ends when conditions
specified in the initiating directive are met.
(2) Amphibious assaults may be used, for example, to initiate a campaign or
major operation, such as the 1942 landing on Guadalcanal, which began the campaign toneutralize the enemy base at Rabaul in the Southwest Pacific, or the 1944 Normandy
landings that established a beachhead for the Allied campaign across Western Europe.
Factors that influence a commander’s decision to select an amphibious assault as the typeof forcible entry operation to be conducted include its mobility, flexibility in taskorganization, ability to rapidly build up combat power ashore, and sustainability.
Amphibious assault operations can exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy
weakness by projecting combat power at the most advantageous location and time. As
with other types of forcible entry operations, the threat of an amphibious assault can induce
enemies to divert forces, establish or reinforce defensive positions, divert major resources,
or disperse forces. Amphibious assaults may also be employed to secure key terrain inorder to ensure or deny access to adjacent waters.
For detailed information on amphibious assaults, see JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.
The Inchon amphibious assault (see Operation CHROMITE) established alodgment on the west coast of Korea, simultaneously with thecounteroffensive to break out of the Pusan Perimeter. The Pusan offensive
involved the majority of United Nations ground forces. The amphibious
force and forces from the Pusan area linked up in the vicinity of Seoul tocontinue the offensive.
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Roy E. Appleman

b. Airborne Assault Operations. Airborne forces may be used as the assault force
or used in combination with other capabilities for a forcible entry, or they may conduct
follow-on operations from a lodgment. As an assault force, airborne forces parachuteinto the objective area to attack and eliminate armed resistance and secure designatedobjectives. Airborne forces may also be employed from a lodgment in additional joint
combat operations. Airborne forces offer the JFC an immediate forcible entry option since
they can be launched directly from the continental United States (CONUS) without thedelays associated with acquiring intermediate staging bases (ISBs) or re-positioning ofsea-based forces.
c. Air Assault Operations. Air assault forces execute forcible entries using fixedwing, tiltrotor, and rotary-wing aircraft. Air assault forces can deploy from land-based
facilities and ships. Fires from land- and sea-based aircraft (manned and unmanned)
and/or ships and submarines take on added importance to compensate for the lack of fieldartillery. An air assault force may require the establishment of an ISB. These forces canrapidly project combat power throughout the depth of an OA.

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Introduction

A United States Navy Wasp Class Amphibious Warfare Ship underway in the Pacific Ocean.

Appendix A, “Airborne and Air Assault Operations,” provides more specifics on airborne
and air assault operations.
d. Special Operations. SOF can execute forcible entries using a combination of
fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and tiltrotor aircraft employing airland or airdrop procedures.
Depending on threat and other circumstances, SOF can use alternate forms of infiltrationand exfiltration. Routinely, SOF may require conventional support such as air refueling,close air support (CAS), suppression of enemy air defenses, and IRCs. Normally, SOF
forcible entry operations are of short duration to meet specific JFC objectives. For more
information on SOF missions and capabilities, refer to JP 3-05, Special Operations.
6. Multinational Considerations
a. Forcible entry operations with multinational partners are planned and conductedmuch the same as a US joint force operation. However, there may be aspects of amultinational force’s (MNF’s) organization or procedures the commander of a US joint
force needs to consider. Attaining unity of effort through unity of command for a
multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal. There must
be a common understanding among all national forces of the mission of the MNF and theplan to achieve objectives. Commanders and staffs at all levels should also account fordifferences in partner nations’ laws, weapons, equipment, technology, culture, politics, andlanguage.
b. MNFs may bring additional capabilities and capacity to forcible entry operations
but normally require careful attention to integration. To optimize these MNFs, the JFC
and component commanders may need to evaluate interoperability of equipment, conduct
additional rehearsals, and employ liaison teams to facilitate integration. Additional training
and rehearsal may be required by both US forces and MNFs to fully integrate themultinational elements into the joint forces. Key to optimizing the participation of MNFs
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Chapter I
OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM I—AFGHANISTAN, 2001
Although forcible entry is conducted with the expectation and due
preparation for armed opposition, prudent commanders have always
sought to conduct such operations in a manner that avoids enemy
defenses to the greatest extent possible. Major General Alexander A.
Vandergrift, US Marine Corps, clearly articulated that view in his 1943
assessment of operations in the Solomon Islands. He noted that, “Acomparison of the several landings leads to the inescapable conclusionthat landings should not be attempted in the face of organized resistanceif, by any combination of march or maneuver, it is possible to land
unopposed within striking distance of the objective.”
The beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 2001 provides,
perhaps, the best illustration of this idea. Initial campaign actions involved
special operations forces and US airpower teamed up with local militias tofight al-Qaeda and the Taliban in northern Afghanistan. While these actions
were underway, plans were taking shape to open a second front in southern
Afghanistan. On 25 November 2001 the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit,
operating from the USS PELELIU Amphibious Ready Group in the North
Arabian Sea, conducted the longest ship-to-objective maneuver in history,
moving 400 miles inland to seize the desert airstrip south of Kandahar.
Renamed Forward Operating Base Rhino, this lodgment supported theintroduction of additional joint forces via inter-theater airlift. It enabled theisolation and seizure of Kandahar, the last political and military strongholdof the Taliban regime. Merging the complementary strengths of sea power
and airpower to great advantage, this approach succeeded in projecting US
maneuver forces deep into hostile territory in a manner that was fast andeffective while allowing the joint force commander to retain the initiative
regarding when and where to give battle.
Various Sources

is understanding their capabilities and coordinating and integrating them into planning andexecution as quickly as possible. This may include understanding national limitations
placed on contributing forces, as well as the experience and morale of individual units.
Both US forces and MNFs may require training and education prior to employment as aforce and the exchange of multiple liaison officers (LNOs). Multinational operations areenhanced by the use of collaborative planning and information sharing environments
among the mission partners.
For additional information, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. For information
specific to US participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization operations, see theappropriate Allied JPs and Allied tactical publications.

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CHAPTER IICOMMAND AND CONTROL“. . . a superior command system may serve as a force multiplier and compensate
for weaknesses . . . such as numerical inferiority or the politically induced needto leave the initiative to the enemy.”
Martin van Creveld
Command in War, 1985

1. Purpose
This chapter provides guidance on the employment options, organization of theforcible entry OA, command relationships, major C2 functions, rules of engagement(ROE), and friendly fire prevention that support the conduct of joint forcible entry
operations.
2. Force Employment
The JFC should determine the forcible entry capability or combination of capabilities
needed to accomplish the mission. Unity of command is vital when amphibious, airborne,
air assault, and special operations are combined. Forcible entry is a complex operation andshould therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. All elements of the joint force
and supporting commands should understand the commander’s intent, CONOPS, schemeof maneuver, and coordination requirements.
a. If the decision is made to use a combination of forcible entry capabilities to seize alodgment, the JFC also decides whether to conduct the forcible entry as a concurrent or
integrated operation. Concurrent forcible entry operations occur when a combinationof amphibious raid or assault, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entry operations are
conducted simultaneously, but as distinct operations with separate OAs and objectives(e.g., the amphibious assault operation around Pearls Airport and the airborne operation at
Point Salinas in Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY). Integrated forcible entry
operations result when amphibious raid or assault, airborne, and/or air assault forcible
entries are conducted simultaneously within the same OA and with objectives that are
mutually supporting (e.g., the airborne operation in support of the amphibious assault
landings in Normandy during Operation OVERLORD).
b. The distinction between concurrent and simultaneous operations has
implications for organizing forces, establishing command relationships, and applying force
to accomplish the mission. Factors that may impact the establishing authority’s decision
include the following:(1) The responsibility for the preponderance of the mission.
(2) Time, phase, and duration of the operation.

II-1

Chapter II(3) Force capabilities.
(4) Threat.
(5) C2 capabilities.
(6) The operational environment (OE).
(7) Recommendations from subordinate commanders.
(8) Follow-on missions, anticipated operations, or transition considerations based
upon the objective(s) of the overall operation or larger campaign plan.
(9) The diplomatic environment.
3. Organization of the Forcible Entry Operational Area
a. Maintaining OA Access. JFCs establish and maintain access to provide a forward
presence; establish and maintain forward (intermediate) basing (to include availability of
airfields); demonstrate freedom of navigation; and conduct military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence operations and activities. This effort may also involve
maintenance of intertheater air and SLOCs.
b. AOA. The AOA is a geographical area of sufficient size for conducting necessarysea, air, and land operations, and within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by
the AF. The AOA is normally specified in the initiating directive. This area must be of
sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the AF’s mission but not be so large as to be
beyond the commander, amphibious task force’s (CATF’s), control capability or ability to
defend. The AOA is three dimensional to include the waters below and the airspace above.
See JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, for more information on AOAs.
c. Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA). The JSOA is an area of land, sea, andairspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of a SOF to conduct special operations
activities. The JFC may establish a JSOA when geographic boundaries between SOF and
CF are the most suitable control measures. Establishment of a JSOA to conduct operations
provides a control measure and assists in the prevention of friendly fire incidents. The
special operations commander may also request the establishment of a JSOA. When a
JSOA is designated, the special operations commander is the supported commander within
the designated JSOA. The special operations commander may further assign a specificarea or sector within the JSOA to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The
scope and duration of the special operations mission, OE, and diplomatic considerations
all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF and supporting forces
deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete, direct action
mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional
warfare (UW) operations.

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JP 3-18

Command and Control
d. Airspace Control Area. The airspace control area for the forcible entry operationis that airspace laterally defined by the boundaries that delineate the OA. This airspace
may include sub-areas. This airspace may entail any OA and is a means of planning anddividing responsibility. While an OA is in existence, airspace control within the OA is inaccordance with JFC guidance, the airspace control plan, and airspace control order.
e. Control and Coordination Measures. Control and coordination of forcible entry
operations pose a particularly difficult challenge to all elements of the joint force. In
addressing this challenge, the JFCs and appropriate commanders may employ various
control and coordination measures that will facilitate the execution of operations and, atthe same time, protect the force to the greatest possible degree. These measures include,
but are not limited to: boundaries that circumscribe OAs, control measures to facilitate
joint force maneuver, fire support coordination measures (FSCMs), and airspacecoordinating measures.
See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for guidance on organizing the OA and JP 3-52, Joint
Airspace Control, for guidance on organizing the air space control area.
4. Command Relationships for Forcible Entry Operations
a. JFC Authority. JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, anddirect coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tacticaland operational groupings to function generally as they are organized and trained.
b. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs). The CCDR may organize the forcible entry
force as a subordinate joint task force (JTF), or the forcible entry force may be organizedfrom an existing component. An initiating directive will provide guidance on command
relationships and other pertinent instructions for the duration of the forcible entry
operation.
See JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, for guidance.
c. Functional Component Commanders. The multiple complex tasks confronting
the JFC may challenge the JFC’s span of control and ability to oversee and influence eachtask. Designating a joint force functional component commander for a particular functional
area allows resolution of joint issues at the functional component level and enhances
component interaction at that level. In a large operation, delegating control of the forcible
entry operation to a functional component commander will permit the JFC to focus on other
responsibilities in the OA. Based on the JFC’s guidance, the forcible entry operation may
be conducted by functional component commanders. If organized under functional lines,
the following information is relevant:(1) Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC). The JFLCC’s
overall responsibilities and roles are to plan, coordinate, and employ designatedforces/capabilities for joint land operations in support of the JFC’s CONOPS. The JFLCC
will normally command forcible entry operations that involve airborne assaults or air
assaults that originate from land bases and will typically designate the commander,
airborne/air assault force.
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Chapter II(2) Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC). The JFMCC’s
overall responsibilities and roles are to plan, coordinate, and employ designatedforces/capabilities for joint maritime operations in support of the JFC’s CONOPS. The
JFMCC should integrate all of the naval assets such as strike, undersea warfare, and surface
warfare, while at the same time coordinating the joint capabilities to support amphibious
operations.
(3) Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The JFACC’s overall
responsibilities and roles are to plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate the actions ofassigned, attached, and supporting air capabilities/forces in time, space, and purpose insupport of the JFC’s CONOPS. The JFACC must closely coordinate with the supported
functional component commander or JTF commander to establish airspace control and area
air defense plans (AADPs) in support of the forcible entry operation as discussed below.
d. ATF and LF Commanders. If an amphibious assault is part of the forcible entry
operation, it will include air and land assaults that originate from the sea. The JFC may
remain the common superior to the CATF and the commander, landing force (CLF),
thereby directly performing the role as the commander, amphibious force. The JFC
organizes the AF in such a way as to best accomplish the mission based on the CONOPS.
The JFC establishes unity of command over AFs by either retaining operational control(OPCON) over the Service or functional component commands executing the amphibious
operation or by delegating OPCON or tactical control of the AF. The JFC may alsodelegate this responsibility to a subordinate commander. If the JFC organizes alongfunctional lines, functional component commanders will normally exercise OPCON overtheir parent Services’ forces and tactical control over other Services’ forces attached or
made available for tasking. An establishing directive is essential to ensure unity of effort
within the AF. Normally, a support relationship is established between the CATF and CLF
by the JFC or establishing authority.
For additional information on C2 by functional component commanders, see JP 3-30,
Command and Control of Joint Air Operations; JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint
Land Operations; and JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. For
further details on amphibious command relationships, see JP 3-02, Amphibious
Operations, and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for guidance on organizing the airspacecontrol area.
e. Airborne Task Force (TF) Commander. If an airborne assault is part of theforcible entry operation, it will be delivered by airlift forces from either the CONUS, an
ISB, or theater airbase. The airborne TF commander will normally organize the parachuteassault force, airlift force, and follow-on airland forces in such a way as to best accomplish
the mission based on the CONOPS. The command relationships established among thecommander, airborne TF; the commander, airlift force; the JFACC; and other designatedcommanders of the forcible entry force is an important decision. An establishing JFC
directive is essential to ensure unity of effort within and for the support of the airborne
assault force. The airborne TF commander will normally exercise responsibility for theairlift plan, to include priority of airdrop and airland sorties, the preparatory fires plan, andthe ground tactical plan in the airhead. The airborne TF commander’s responsibilities end
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JP 3-18

Command and Control
upon achievement of a secure airhead line and the establishment of either a JFLCC ordesignated ground commander command post in the airhead.
f. C2 of SOF. When directed, Commander, US Special Operations Command,
provides CONUS-based SOF to the GCC. The GCC then exercises C2 of SOF through thecommander, theater special operations command (TSOC). When a GCC establishes andemploys multiple JTFs and independent TFs concurrently, the TSOC commander may
establish and employ multiple joint special operations TFs to manage assets andaccommodate JTF/TF special operations requirements. Accordingly, SOF liaison to the
JFC is particularly important to coordinate operations of the supported/supporting SOF,
advise the JFC of SOF capabilities and limitations, and to deconflict and synchronize SOF
that may already be in the OA. When conducting forcible entry operations into an area
where SOF are already employed, it is imperative that both conventional and special
operations are synchronized, coordinated, and deconflicted throughout the operation.
g. Forcible Entry Employing a Combination of Forces. Forcible entry operations
employing a combination of airborne, air assault, SOF, and AFs (to include MNFs withthese capabilities) may be under the command of the JFC or a Service or functional
component commander and must be closely coordinated. The command relationships
between the JFC and subordinate component commanders are critical to the success ofthese operations. Once the forcible entry is accomplished, follow-on or transition
operations may require changes in command relationships to support the JFC’s plan.
Supporting operations will be coordinated with the supported commander.
5. Airspace Control

Effective and efficient airspace control complements and supports
the joint force commander’s operational objectives.

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Chapter II
Airspace control increases operational effectiveness by promoting the safe,
efficient, and flexible use of airspace while minimizing restraints on airspace users—all
while complementing and supporting the JFC’s operational objectives. C2 of airspacerequires two key elements: a control authority and a control system.
For further details on airspace control, refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.
a. Airspace Control Authority (ACA). The JFC normally designates an ACA who
has overall responsibility to establish and operate the airspace control system (ACS). The
ACA monitors, assesses, and controls OA airspace and directs changes in accordance with
the JFC’s intent.
(1) ACA During Amphibious Operations. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations,and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, provide detailed discussions on airspace control
during amphibious assault operations.
(2) ACA During Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations. When an airborneor air assault force is the supported entry force in a forcible entry operation, the air
component commander for the operation or JFACC (if designated) may use airborne C2
assets to enhance coordination and control of joint air operations and airspace control.
(a) The distances involved and the duration of airborne and air assault
operations may require establishing special air traffic control facilities or special tactics
teams (STTs) to extend detailed control into the objective area.
(b) The volume of air traffic throughout the airhead demands careful
coordination to limit potential conflict and to enable the success of mission-essential
operations within the airhead. A high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) may
be established when planned operations involve a concentrated and complex mix ofairspace users and weapons supporting a ground or amphibious operation. Access to a
HIDACZ is normally controlled by the maneuver commander. HIDACZ may beestablished around a drop zone (DZ) or landing zone (LZ) to provide sufficient terrain andairspace to permit safe and efficient air traffic control. The HIDACZ can be nominated by
the ground force commander and should, at a minimum, include the airspace bounded by
the airhead line. Within the HIDACZ, all aircraft flights should be coordinated with
the DZ, LZ, and the agency responsible for controlling the joint airspace. The air
mission commander coordinates with the assault force commander to select the time on
target and the direction of approach into and through the airhead.
b. ACS. The forces involved in the operation largely determine the choices
available to the ACA in designating an ACS to control joint air operations; systeminteroperability will also be a major determining factor. For the ACS to function
effectively, the ACA must maximize and enhance the capabilities of the collective
force using existing control systems.
(1) ACS During Amphibious Operations. The ACS during amphibious
operations is discussed in detail in JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

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Command and Control(2) ACS During Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations. The ACA will
normally control the airspace through the theater air control system (TACS) and the
Army air-ground system (AAGS) in forcible entries. Situations may limit establishmentof ground systems and require airborne or sea-based systems to conduct airspace control.
Commanders and staffs should closely monitor and plan the employment of criticalcommunications nodes within TACS/AAGS.
6. Air Defense Command and Control
The OA, including ingress and egress routes, should be protected by an integrated air
defense system consisting of air, land, maritime, and space assets supported by cyberspacecapabilities. The joint force is particularly vulnerable to attacks by enemy aircraft or
surface-to-surface missiles during the early stages of a forcible entry. The primaryobjectives for AMD operations are to assist in gaining air superiority and protecting
the assault force. The area air defense commander (AADC) integrates the joint force
air defense effort. All available surface-to-air assets should be incorporated into theoverall AADP and comply with procedures and weapons control measures established by
the AADC. The AADC will exercise a degree of control of all systems throughestablished guidelines, determination of weapons control status, and JFC-approved
procedural controls.
a. Air Defense C2 During an Amphibious Assault. The AADC bears overall
responsibility for defensive counterair (DCA) operations of the joint force. In amphibious
operations, the AADC may divide the airspace into regions or sectors with regional air
defense commanders (RADCs) or sector air defense commanders (SADCs) to enhance thedecentralized execution of the DCA operations. To understand the planning and executionof air defense during an amphibious raid or assault and how the maritime commanders andtheir staffs C2 these operations and function as an RADC or SADC, refer to JP 3-02,
Amphibious Operations; JP 3-32, Command and Control of Joint Maritime Operations;and JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.
b. Air Defense C2 During Airborne/Air Assault(1) During air movement to the OA, the AADC will normally control air
defense operations from an airborne platform (e.g., Airborne Warning and Control
System). In practice, extended distances from staging bases to designated OAs may require
the AADC to delegate control responsibilities to an air control element on board theairborne platform. Initial air defense assets may be limited to fighter aircraft only. Controlof these aircraft will normally be exercised through established procedural controls.
(2) Forces initially entering the area of operations (AO) should beaccompanied by organic, short-range air defense systems that should be integrated into
the air defense C2 architecture. Planned procedural control measures and guidelines may
be established by the AADC to expedite integration of assets.
(3) With force buildup and the introduction of follow-on forces into the lodgmentarea, more robust, high- to medium-altitude air defense systems will likely become

II-7Chapter IIavailable. The forces with these systems establish communications with the AADC’s C2
agency in order to be incorporated into the established air defense system.
(4) Once established, designated AADC control and reporting centers will
normally assume air defense control responsibilities for forces external to an establishedAOA or AO as defined by the JFC or the initiating directive.
(5) Specific implications for forces supporting commander, airborne/air
assault force, are addressed below.
(a) Participating naval aircraft may be placed under the control of theappropriate C2 agency.
(b) In some circumstances, naval air defense systems aboard participatingships may be limited. Accordingly, the AADC should take measures to ensure a supporting
AF is protected by other means.
7. Communications
Communications systems supporting forcible entry operations should beinteroperable, agile, trusted, and shared. Interoperability can be achieved throughcommonality, compatibility, standardization, and liaison. To support agile forces andoperational concepts, the communications architecture should be adaptable to a wide rangeof missions without the need for reconfiguration. The joint force must have confidence inthe capabilities of the network and the validity of the information made available by the
network. Agile connectivity and effective data exchange should incorporate Internet
protocol integration when possible. Sharing allows for the mutual use of information
services or capabilities between entities in the OA. Typical forcible entry operations
communications will employ satellite communications (SATCOM) and single-channel
ultrahigh frequency (UHF), very high frequency, and high frequency radios. The joint
force should assume communications will be degraded or denied and plan accordingly. The
communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) is responsible for providing input
to orders, plans, and coordinating communications system support and services during
operations.
a. Communications System Planning. Once the JFC establishes the specific C2organization for the forcible entry operation, the information exchange requirements are
established as communications system planning begins. Communications system planningmust be an integral part of joint force planning. The J-6 plans and establishes thecommunications system and the communications estimate of supportability during courseof action (COA) development and selection under JPP. Communications system planningmust be conducted in close coordination with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J2) to identify specialized equipment and dissemination requirements for some types of
information. Because communications systems must be built-up at the objective area,some aspects of communications support are unique in forcible entry operations.
For further details on communications system planning, refer to JP 6-0, Joint
Communications System.
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JP 3-18

Command and Control
b. Communications Support for AF Operations. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations,and appropriate Service doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures should be
consulted for fundamental principles, considerations, and best practices related tocommunications support for an amphibious raid or assault.
c. Communications Support for Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations.
Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, andlocation of the joint force and the senior headquarters. Significant considerations for
airborne and air assault operations include the use of ISBs and airborne C2 platforms, toinclude en route mission planning and intelligence sharing, which can add to thecomplexity of managing the communications architecture. Airborne/air assault forces
will initially deploy with a limited communications capability, largely based on UHF
SATCOM. Communications support becomes more robust as signal units and equipment
enter the OA via airdrop or are airlanded into the airhead.
(1) C2 relationships, nets, frequency assignments, codes, navigational aids, andany other communications issues must be resolved before the assault phase begins.
(2) Long-range radio communications may be necessary with US-based
forces or ISBs to facilitate control of personnel, supplies, and equipment into the airhead
or lodgment. Long-range communications are initially established from higher tolower headquarters. The primary means of long range communications will be satellite
based. The higher headquarters may be on land, sea, or air and may maintain contact
through retransmission and relay sites. The communications plan must ensureinteroperability with the overall joint force communications architecture and provide theredundancy for the force to adequately C2 operations.
(3) Ground commanders in airlift aircraft may communicate with the chainof command over the Army secure en route communications package. Normally, theairlift mission commander and the airborne TF commander are in the same aircraft. The
senior ground commander can advise embarked ground commanders of changes in the
ground tactical situation or to the air movement plan.
(4) Airborne/air assault forcible entry operations require the use of
redundant airborne and ground command posts. Normally, a joint force airborne
command post will operate from a joint airborne communications center and command
post, while a command post from the airborne/air assault force will operate from a fixedwing platform with required communications installed or a specially configured C2 rotarywing aircraft.
(5) Tactical satellite downlink and other beyond line-of-sight communications
systems can be used to communicate with US Air Force STTs, air mobility LNOs, andcontingency response forces (CRFs) in objective areas. The use of special navigational aids
and homing devices to direct aircraft to specified areas (e.g., a designated DZ) may benecessary. Specialized airborne/air assault force personnel (e.g., STTs or long-range
surveillance units) are equipped with navigational aids, Global Positioning System, andhoming devices. These teams will be employed early to guide the airborne/air assault forces

II-9

Chapter IIand provide reconnaissance, surveillance, visual flight rules service, and limited instrument
flight rules air traffic control service. Other joint forces, such as SOF or Marine force
reconnaissance elements, are also capable of performing some of these functions.
8. Rules of Engagement
The ROE are developed by the Joint Staff and CCDRs and reviewed and approved by the
President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or other authorized military authority forpromulgation and dissemination. Additional ROE to address the specific circumstances of themilitary operation may be proposed and requested by any commander at any level. Dependingon the measure(s) requested, approval by the CCDR, SecDef, and/or President will be required.
ROE ensure actions, especially force employment, are consistent with military objectives, US
and international laws, and national policies. Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable
ROE, conduct warfare in compliance with US and international laws, and fight within restraints
and constraints specified by their commanders. Properly developed ROE must be clear, tailoredto the situation, reviewed for legal sufficiency, and included in training. ROE will typicallyvary from operation to operation and may change during an operation. The challenge for a JFC
is to ensure the ROE for a forcible entry operation provides the commander with theflexibility to accomplish the mission, while assuring adherence to political, legal,
operational, and diplomatic factors the force may encounter including protecting those
persons and objects from attack that are entitled to protected status under the law of war.
For additional information on ROE, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction(CJCSI) 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for
US Forces.
9. Friendly Fire Prevention
a. The complexity of forcible entry operations increases the potential for friendly fireincidents and demands efforts by all elements of the joint force to deliberately reduce
the risk of friendly fire incidents. Friendly force tracking provides JFCs with enhanced
situational awareness that can help to reduce friendly fire incidents.
b. Primary Mechanisms for Friendly Fire Prevention. Detailed integration of
maneuver, fire support, and AMD operations are required to prevent friendly fire incidents.
Coordination center personnel seek to prevent friendly fire through close coordination at
all levels by maintaining situational awareness. Use of FSCMs, coordination of positionareas, and the consideration of the locations of friendly forces during target analysis all
contribute to safeguarding friendly units.
For further details on preventing friendly fire incidents, refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air
and Missile Threats; JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support; JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support; andJP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.
c. Liaison. Liaison elements provided by supporting components can advise
supported commanders on component capabilities and limitations and can assist in thecoordination, integration, and synchronization of operations, ultimately preventing losses
from friendly fire.
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CHAPTER III
PLANNING“Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple before
the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations
before-hand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to
defeat: How much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I
can see who is likely to win or lose.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, c. 500 BC

1. Purpose
This chapter provides information on planning forcible entry operations. Existing
JPPs and considerations are used in planning these operations.
2. Forcible Entry and the Joint Planning Process
Joint planning is conducted using a disciplined process described in policies andprocedures established in the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise. These
processes facilitate both deliberate planning and crisis action planning (CAP). During
deliberate planning, the campaign plan, operation plan (OPLAN), or concept plan
(CONPLAN), and supporting annexes for an operation or campaign are prepared. This
includes forcible entry operation requirements. CAP is used to expand an approved or
directed COA into a detailed operation order (OPORD) and sourced time-phased force anddeployment data (TPFDD) by modifying an existing OPLAN, expanding an existing
CONPLAN, or developing a completely new OPORD when there is no preexisting
OPLAN.
a. Forcible entry operations require extensive JIPOE. The primary purpose of JIPOE
is to support the JFC’s planning and decision making by identifying, analyzing, andestimating the enemy’s centers of gravity, critical factors, capabilities, limitations,requirements, vulnerabilities, intentions, and COAs that are most likely to be encounteredby the entry force.
b. Time, distance, physical attributes of the OA, agreement/arrangement with otherpartner nations, or the nature of the crisis may dictate the deployment of a joint force tostaging areas outside the US. Likewise, authorizations may be required to conduct advanceforce operations in the OA to prepare the OE for the introduction of combat forces.
Commanders and operational planners may have to compress planning timelines to meettime-sensitive mission requirements. Time-sensitive situations will likely demandactions to: establish joint staffs and exchange liaison personnel as soon as command
relationships are defined, conduct parallel planning at all command levels, establish thesupporting intelligence architecture from national to tactical levels, pre-position airlift andsealift with supported units, load unit sets of equipment and Army pre-positioned stocks-3(APS-3) ashore on surge sealift ships at US or allied seaports of embarkation (SPOEs),

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Chapter III
direct the movement of afloat pre-positioning force (APF) ships to the OA, embark
personnel and equipment at US or allied aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs), carefullyplan for aerial and amphibious embarkation and debarkation, and conduct reconnaissanceand surveillance operations.
For further detail on amphibious embarkation and debarkation, see JP 3-02.1,
Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation.
c. Forcible entry will require well-trained and well-prepared joint forces capable ofexecuting operations on short-notice. It is essential all key elements associated with theoperation are included in planning from the onset. This ensures resources needed areavailable in a timely manner and that ample time is available for preparation. When
operations require specialists, it is essential the requirements are identified early and thoseorganizations are included in planning.
3. Forcible Entry Planning Considerations
JPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of military
operations. The process is designed to facilitate interaction between commander, staff, andsubordinate headquarters throughout planning. Forcible entry planning can occur during
deliberate planning or CAP. The JFC, staff, and subordinate and/or supporting
commanders and staffs follow JPP and consider the following factors when developing
forcible entry operations.
a. Planning Initiation. The President, SecDef, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff may initiate planning to develop military options to respond to a potential or actual
crisis for an operation requiring forcible entry. Additionally, GCCs and other commanders
may initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement notdirected by higher authority.
b. Mission Analysis. The joint force mission describes the essential task or set oftasks, together with the purpose, clearly indicating the action to be taken and the reason for
doing so. In analyzing a forcible entry operation, the JFC and staff consider:(1) Higher mission and guidance.
(2) A thorough JIPOE, including:(a) Threat to joint forces en route to, and operating in, the OA.
(b) Geography of the OA.
(c) Lodgment terrain and infrastructure, with a critical eye on the ability tosupport follow-on operations.
(d) A characterization of the information environment.
(3) Operational reach and approach.

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Planning(4) Forces available including multinational and indigenous.
(5) Time available.
(6) Strategic and operational aims, including the military end state.
(7) Command relationships and force composition.
(8) Combat power required to establish the lodgment.
(9) Operational restrictions that may inhibit subordinate commanders.
(10) Initial staff estimates.
(11) Media and public perception.
(12) Consideration of lessons learned and best practices from previous
operations.
For more discussion on staff estimates, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
c. COA Development. In the development of a forcible entry COA, five phases are
addressed: preparation and deployment, assault, stabilization of the lodgment, introductionof follow-on forces, and termination or transition. To produce a valid COA, the following
should be considered (Chapter IV, “Operations,” further expands on the five phases):(1) Phase I (Preparation and Deployment).
following:Considerations include the(a) Determine the forcible entry option(s) to be executed, how those
operations will support campaign success, and the command relationships required.
(b) Determine deployment sequencing of forces that supports gaining accessinto the objective area, the initial assault, reinforcement, and the introduction of follow-on
forces.
(c) Determine requirements for local air and maritime superiority to conduct
the forcible entry operation.
(d) Determine requirements to integrate IRCs to conduct and sustain theforcible entry operation.
(e) Determine requirements to gain and maintain cyberspace superiority andspace superiority to conduct and sustain the forcible entry operation.
For more information on cyberspace capabilities, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
For more information on space operations, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.

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Chapter III(f) Determine forcible entry go/no-go criteria based on the approved
operation.
(g) Commanders must plan for culmination and retrograde criteria in theevent that transition to Phase II (Assault) is no longer viable or a decision is made toterminate the operation.
For more information on culmination, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning. For more information
on retrograde operations, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.
(2) Phase II (Assault). Considerations include the following:(a) Analyze objectives and potential lodgment with regard to:
1. The proposed ground tactical plan.
2. Potential capability for air and sea landing of personnel andequipment.
3. Space within the lodgment and maneuver space for future operations.
4. Vulnerability to interdiction and counterattacks.
(b) Determine operating facilities and/or infrastructure to support operations.
(c) Identify forces securing airheads and/or beachheads (e.g., amphibious
advance force, special operations advance force, pre-assault, and LFs).
(d) Plan for reception of reinforcing forces (if required) and follow-on forces
for subsequent operations.
(3) Phase III (Stabilization of the Lodgment). Considerations include thefollowing:(a) Identify the requirements for reinforcing forces and projected
deployment flow, with attention to:
1. Cross-loading among lift assets.
2. Task-organization by arrival sequence.
(b) Identify potential restrictions and/or limitations in force flow andsolutions for eliminating and/or reducing them accordingly.
(c) Establish redundancy of force capability in deployment flow for added
flexibility.
(d) Establish call-forward procedures for reinforcing forces, if required.

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JP 3-18

Planning(e) Calculate throughput capability of ports of debarkation.
(f) Determine preparation requirements needed to reinforce forces forcombat on arrival.
(g) Determine requirements for expansion of the lodgment.
(h) Establish force link-up procedures.
(4) Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-on Forces). Considerations include thefollowing:(a) Identify tasks for follow-on forces.
(b) Prepare for arrival of follow-on forces.
(c) Coordinate arrival and/or disposition of APF (maritime pre-positioning
force [MPF]) and APS-3 ships and equipment ashore.
(d) Determine capabilities of ports of debarkation (e.g., throughput capacity,
ramp space, draft, sea states, ammo net explosive weight restrictions).
(5) Phase V (Termination or Transition).
following:Considerations include the(a) Continue planning and coordination actions initiated in early phases.
(b) Plan for reconstitution and redeployment of the assault force.
(c) Plan to terminate the forcible entry portion of the joint operation.
(d) Plan for transition to follow-on operations or termination of the entire
joint operation. Plan for follow-on operations may include the use of nonlethal weapons
to limit casualties, collateral damage, and reconstruction requirements. Prior training
should be conducted for the effective employment of nonlethal weapons.
(e) Plan for hand-over to civil authorities (if applicable).
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, provides guidance on transition planning.
d. COA Analysis and Wargaming. The commander and staff analyze each COA
separately according to the commander’s guidance to bring out relevant factors in each
COA. Wargaming provides the means for the commander and participants to analyze a
COA and obtain insights not otherwise discernable. A JFC can use red teams to provide
insights and alternatives during planning, execution, and assessment to:(1) Broaden the understanding of the OE.

III-5

Chapter III(2) Assist the commander and staff in framing problems and defining end state
conditions.
(3) Challenge assumptions.
(4) Consider the perspectives of the enemy and others, as appropriate.
(5) Aid in identifying friendly and enemy vulnerabilities and opportunities.
(6) Assist in identifying areas for assessment, as well as the assessment metrics.
e. COA Comparison. The staff will evaluate COAs using governing factors
identified during the wargame in order to identify the COA with the highest probability ofsuccess.
f. COA Approval.
The staff determines the best COA and presents a
recommendation to the commander for approval.
g. Plan or Order Development. Deliberate planning results in plan development,
while CAP will typically lead directly to OPORD development.
JP 5-0, Joint Planning, provides guidance regarding APEX and JPP.
h. Red Teaming. Forcible entry, particularly from the sea, is one of the most difficultand complex operations in warfare. The level of difficulty and complexity are underscoredby the dynamic factors that could adversely impact operational success—weather, sea
states, maintenance readiness of connectors, training and experience of ships crews, and
LFs are only a few potential single-points-of-failure factors. Perhaps the single, largest
factor that will impact operational success is the disparate elements of the joint force’s
understanding of how they must achieve unity of effort and appreciate the aforementioned
factors’ adverse impact on the operation. During forcible entry operation planning, the
JFC should use red teaming to mitigate the inherent risk and promote a uniform
appreciation of forcible entry.
i. Assessment. Assessment is critical to determining the progress of joint forcible
entry operations and if real-time adjustments need to be made to the conduct of operations.
The assessment process must be planned for and prioritized early in the planning process.
The first step in assessment planning is to gather relevant data and tools that will aid inunderstanding the joint forcible entry OE. This can be accomplished through historical
data, guidance, or knowledge of the operation or OA facilitated by JIPOE to establish an
OE baseline to support mission analysis early in JPP. This data will be used inunderstanding the differences between the current conditions and the desired conditions
within the OE. By understanding the current and the desired conditions of the OE, theplanners, advised by the J-2 on what aspects of the OE to measure and how to measurethem, can develop assessment measures based on relevant, observable, and measurable
indicators.
These indicators become urgent intelligence requirements for staff
consideration as priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). PIRs are used by the J-2 todirect collection, as well as analysis and production, to support continuous JIPOE with all
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Planning
available information for determining changes in the OE relative to the initial planning OE
baseline. In this manner, relevant and measurable indicators are determined during
planning and revised, observed, and analyzed during execution to assess progress orregression relative to desired effects indicating success or failure of actions. Whenplanning for the relevant effects, measures, and indicators, it is important for the plannerto think in terms of the entire OE and capabilities of both friendly and enemy forces. By
focusing on the relevant capabilities, resources, and vulnerabilities, the planner will be able
to build performance and effectiveness measures, as well as indicators that anticipate thelikelihood of achieving or not achieving objectives. Finally, the planner must realize andidentify feedback mechanisms through which reporting can be accomplished. Feedback
mechanisms will be the conduit through which the operation will acknowledge
reinforcement of successful actions or the need to deviate/refocus assets to create a moredesired effect within the operation.
Refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for more information on operational estimates. For more
information on assessments, assessment planning, and red teams, see JP 5-0, Joint
Planning.

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Intentionally Blank

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CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS“Success in war depends upon the Golden Rule of War. Speed—Simplicity—
Boldness.”
General George S. Patton, US Army
Inscribed in his field notebook - 1921

1. Purpose
This chapter provides information on the execution of forcible entry operations.
Section A, “Integration and Synchronization,” describes the five phases of a forcible entry
operation and discusses the integration and synchronization of these operations in thecontext of the forcible entry phases. Section B, “Supporting Operations,” focuses on
supporting operations such as intelligence, IO, and special operations in support of forcible
entry operations.
SECTION A. INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION
2. Introduction
a. General. This section highlights some common issues and considerations that integrate
and synchronize activities during a forcible entry operation. The discussion that follows is nota checklist, but may be used by JFCs and staffs, as appropriate to meet their specific needs.
b. Rehearsals. In order to integrate, synchronize, and confirm the timing of an
operation, the JFC may choose to conduct a rehearsal (other benefits of rehearsals arelisted in Figure IV-1). Rehearsals at the operational level range in scope from joint force
exercises (driven by resource, time, space, and force availability constraints), to command
post exercises supported by computer-aided simulations, to commanders and/or key
personnel conferences. The decision to conduct rehearsals will be influenced by the time
available and by the need to protect critical information and indicators regarding theoperation.

Operation Plan Rehearsal Benefits
 Common Understanding Unity of Effort
 Articulate Supporting Intents
 Subordinate and Supporting Commanders’ Questions
 Branches or Sequels Integration and Synchronization

Figure IV-1. Operation Plan Rehearsal Benefits

IV-1

Chapter IV
3. Forcible Entry Operations Phases
Forcible entry operations are normally conducted during the seize the initiative or
dominate phase of a joint operation. Within the context of these phases established by ahigher-level JFC, the forcible entry operation commander may establish additional phasesthat fit the forcible entry CONOPS. Forcible entry operations may be planned andexecuted in the five phases listed in Figure IV-2. Planning for each phase should include
branch and sequel planning. Transitions between these phases are designed to be distinct
shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command or support
relationships. The activities that predominate during a given phase, however, rarely alignwith neatly definable breakpoints. The need to move into another phase is normally
identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or the enemy has acted in amanner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is, therefore, usually
event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may
require changing commander’s objectives, desired effects, measures of effectiveness,priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the organization of the OA.
Appendix B, “Control Joint Forcible Entry Operations,” provides considerations in anotional checklist format to assist with the planning and conduct of joint forcible entry
operations.
For further information on phasing in joint operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations,and JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
a. Preparation and Deployment (Forcible Entry Phase I). Forcible entry
operations are conducted by organizations whose force structures permit rapid deployment
into the objective area. Joint forces may deploy directly to the OA or to staging areas toprepare for subsequent operations.
(1) Planning. The JFC, the component commanders, and their staffs must
be intimately involved in planning and executing the deployment of forces to the OA.

Forcible Entry Operations Phases
Phase I

Preparation and Deployment

Phase II

Assault

Phase III

Stabilization of the Lodgment

Phase IV

Introduction of Follow-On Forces

Phase V

Termination or Transition Operations

Figure IV-2. Forcible Entry Operations Phases

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JP 3-18

Operations
Planning should begin as early as possible, including developing contingencies during
peacetime. Staffs should plan all phases, including transition, as a synchronized andcontinuous operation. During this phase, planners should include multinational partners,
other DOD agencies, US Government departments and agencies, and interagency
participants based on the JIPOE and plan for the operation or campaign and information
sharing agreements. MILDEC should always be integrated into planning for joint forcible
entry operations. Planning should take advantage of, and build upon, any ongoing security
cooperation, military engagement, and deterrence activities that have been used to shape
the OE to this point.
(2) Movement. Forcible entry operations involve movement planning fromboth strategic and operational perspectives. These operations involve movement frommarshalling areas, as well as loading and departure from ports and ISBs for the sequenced
movement of forces to objective area(s) in accordance with the OPORD. During thisphase, the forcible entry force will typically conduct rehearsals of the operation as timeand resources permit.
(3) JIPOE. Increased intelligence collection efforts focus on gathering
information to satisfy JFC’s PIRs and determining if the required conditions for the assault
have been established (e.g., local air superiority has been achieved). Reconnaissance andsurveillance assets (e.g., SOF) may be inserted into the objective area during this phaseas part of this effort. Collection efforts should include environmental factors such as
weather conditions; marine forecast (i.e., currents, tides, waves, swells, and wind speeds),
flight conditions; signal propagation ranges; and targeting optimization and safe operation
limits of the platforms, systems, or weapons to be used in the mission. The joint
meteorological and oceanographic officer provides planners with relevant environmental
information necessary for the forcible entry operation.
(4) Transition to Assault. During phase I, support forces set the conditions
that are required for a successful assault by isolating the lodgment and achieving local
air and maritime superiority. Support forces set the conditions and support the conduct offorcible entry operations. Air interdiction, naval surface fire support (NSFS), SOF
missions, cyberspace operations (CO), and/or other actions to prepare assault objectives
will normally occur prior to the commitment of assault forces. In other situations, politicalor operational considerations may preclude such actions prior to the initiation of the assault
phase of the operation.
(5) Insertion of SOF. In addition to conducting special operations during theassault, SOF may be introduced to the area well in advance of a possible assault to develop
or prepare an area for forcible entry. For example, UW and the use of surrogate forces cansignificantly reduce enemy defensive capabilities. Special reconnaissance may provide
detailed intelligence not available by any other means. Special operations can be vital toshaping or deterrence actions throughout the period preceding the forcible entry. SOF
regional expertise and support to JIPOE are often vital in planning and execution.

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Chapter IV
b. Assault (Forcible Entry Phase II). Phase II begins with joint force assaults toseize initial objectives in the lodgment and concludes with the consolidation of thoseobjectives.
(1) Initial Assaults. Initial assaults are designed to surprise and overwhelm theenemy with decisive force and to protect assault forces as they accomplish assigned
missions. SOF and IRCs may be employed in advance of assault forces to identify, clarify,
and modify conditions in the OA and/or to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, andinterdiction operations well beyond the initial assault objectives. Opening entry points will
involve actual assault by various combinations of amphibious and airborne forces to achieve acoup de main or enable follow-on operations through the seizure of existing ports and airfields
or the establishment of expeditionary facilities. SOF may be used in combination with naval
forces to conduct assaults to open entry points. Planning for this phase may include preassault strikes by cruise missiles; armed unmanned aircraft; fixed-wing or tiltrotor aircraft;
attack helicopters; NSFS to destroy enemy forces in the objective areas; and/or enemy groundforce reserves, aircraft, missiles, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and naval forces that
could disrupt the operation. Assault forces may use multiple approaches and entry points todeceive the enemy and diminish their ability to observe, orient, decide, and act.
(a) Initial Entry Forces. These are the first forces to enter onto foreign
territory. They include both CF and SOF. Initial entry forces’ defining characteristic istheir ability to insert offset from infrastructure (such as airfields and seaports) by air,surface, or subsurface assault or infiltration means as tactically coherent units andformations that are able to operate immediately upon arrival. The means of assault
insertion include air assault, amphibious assault, airborne assault, and airland operations.
Initial entry forces are able to operate for predetermined periods of time without a need forexternal sustainment. The concept of initial entry forces (and reinforcing entry forces) is
scalable and applies to small entry operations, as well as to larger entry operations.
See JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, for a discussion of the advance echelon as the initialassault force during an amphibious operation.
(b) Reinforcing Entry Forces. Reinforcing entry forces reinforce initial entry
forces shortly after the initial entry. Reinforcing entry forces (which may be either CF, SOF,
or a combination thereof) are more heavily equipped than initial entry forces in order toincrease the fire support, protection, maneuver, or other required capabilities to support initial
operations. They do not require reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI)
upon arrival and can operate immediately or shortly after landing. However, reinforcing entry
forces must follow the initial entry forces into the AO due to offload security requirements thatmust be met prior to their introduction. Closing the reinforcing entry forces on the initial
objectives quickly is critical to ensuring the survival of the initial entry forces during opposed
entry operations. Depending on the specific mission of the reinforcing entry forces, existing
infrastructure may be needed to support offload, or the reinforcing entry forces may be theforce creating the expeditionary infrastructure (such as expeditionary airfields) needed tosupport receipt of follow-on forces and replenishment of logistics for the initial entry forces.
Some limited-duration missions may only employ initial entry forces and not require thecapabilities of reinforcing entry forces. For entry missions limited in scope and duration, a
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Operations
planned withdrawal with little to no use of follow-on forces is normally expected. The assault
follow-on echelon is that echelon of the assault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, andsupplies for an amphibious assault which, although not needed to initiate the assault, arerequired to support and sustain the assault.
(2) Overcoming A2/AD Threat Capabilities. The JFC will be faced withnatural and man-made obstacles intended to restrict or halt movement that allows theenemy to mass its forces and repel the assault. Naval mine countermeasures (MCM) forces
may be required to conduct MCM operations in order to clear transit routes and OAs of
sea-based mines and/or obstacles in order to facilitate rapid movement of LFs and followon forces from the sea. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel and combat
engineers enhance the mobility of assault forces on land by clearing roads and airfields of
explosive hazards and other obstacles. Combat engineers support forward aviation groundunits by conducting forward aviation combat engineering operations. EOD forces also
have the capability to locate, access, identify, diagnose, render safe/neutralize, recover,
exploit, and dispose of weapons and explosives that threaten personnel, which include
captured enemy ammunition, unexploded explosive ordnance, improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), and CBRN munitions. The JFC will also face a dramatic improvement
and proliferation of weapons and other technologies capable of denying access to, or
freedom of action within, an OA. These may come not only from advanced technologies,
but also from the innovative use of basic, even crude, capabilities. Typical of these crude
capabilities are clandestine networks employing improvised devices to include IEDs. In
an improvised threat environment, the JFC will need to establish exploitation centers andexploitation reachback procedures. These exploitation capabilities are needed to defeat
threat attempts to maintain anonymity. Threat groups attempting to preserve anonymity
may include, insurgent, terrorist, and criminal networks. As a result of improvements inthese A2 capabilities, deploying forces will find themselves at risk at greater ranges.
Personnel, supplies, and equipment located in rear areas once thought to be secure,increasingly, will be targeted. Some enemies will possess limited numbers of thesecapabilities, but others will deploy fully integrated and layered advanced A2/AD systems
that may be guided by a single C2 system and employed in mutual support so that, to defeat
one capability, an attacker must expose himself to others. For example, maritime forces
and capabilities may be required in the littoral to support operations inland while defending
against threats from shore-based defenses, coastal submarines, and small attack craft.
For more information on overcoming obstacles, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations;
JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations; JP 3-15.1, CounterImprovised Explosive Device Operations; and JP 3-42, Joint Explosive OrdnanceDisposal.
(3) Main Assault. Assault forces can enter objective areas via parachute assault,
air LFs, helicopter-borne air assault, tiltrotor aircraft, and amphibious assault. Throughout
the assault phase, landed forces must have immediately available joint fire support todestroy, interdict, or suppress enemy forces and missile defense. The joint force must
maintain the initiative and rapidly prepare to receive follow-on forces to develop the
combat power necessary to secure the lodgment. CAS and NSFS are critical resources
during the assault. Depending on resources available to the JFC, the introduction of LFs
IV-5

Chapter IV
MINES AT WONSAN—KOREA, 1950
During the rapid advance following the Inchon landing and breakout from
Pusan, US and ROK [Republic of Korea] forces advanced rapidly up theeastern coast. The US X Corps planned for an amphibious assault at
Wonsan, the only useable North Korean landing area.
Evidence began to mount that the North Koreans were mining the coastal
waters of North Korea. Three US ships, the Brush, Mansfield, and Magpie,
struck mines and suffered heavy damage. Although intelligence sourcesindicated enemy mines were being laid in coastal waters, little was known
about the location and extent of these mine fields. North Korean interests
certainly dictated, however, that the sea approaches to Wonsan should be
mined.
In a series of conferences from 2 to 4 October, Admiral Struble and his staff
decided to form the Advance Force Joint Task Force 7, which would
proceed to the objective area and begin minesweeping at the earliest
possible date. All minesweepers available were to be concentrated for thetask. The group comprised 21 vessels, including 10 American and 8
Japanese minesweepers, and 1 South Korean vessel used as aminesweeper. Minesweeping operations at Wonsan began on 10 October.
A search by helicopter over the harbor channel showed it to be heavily
mined inside the 30-fathom curve. The plan to sweep this channel wascanceled and another substituted - to sweep from the 100-fathom curve
down the Russian Hydropac Channel passing between Yodo andHwangt’o-do Islands. By 12 October this channel had been swept a
distance of twenty-four miles from the 100-fathom curve. Ten miles
remained to the inner harbor.
At this point the novel idea was advanced of exploding mines along anarrow passageway by aerial bombing which would permit the lead sweeps
to pass.
On 12 October, 39 planes from the carriers Philippine Sea and Leyte flew
down the Russian channel dropping 1,000-pound bombs.
Three minesweepers, the Pirate, Pledge, and Incredible, then entered thebombed channel to resume minesweeping. Northwest of Yo-do Island thePirate struck a mine at 1209; the Pledge hit one six minutes later. Bothvessels sank. As the Incredible, third in line, maneuvered into safe water,
enemy shore batteries opened fire. Twelve men went down with the two
sunken ships. One enlisted man died later from wounds. At least 33 others
were wounded and injured in varying degrees; some sources place thenumber of wounded as high as 99. The Incredible itself rescued 27
survivors.
The menace of shore batteries was removed on 17 October when groundforces of the ROK I Corps, which had already captured Wonsan, gained
control of the peninsulas and islands commanding the harbor approaches.

IV-6

JP 3-18

Operations
Casualties from mines continued. On 18 October two ROK Navy vessels
struck mines in the Wonsan area; one was disabled at the entrance to theharbor, and the other, a minesweeper, was sunk. The next day a Japaneseminesweeper struck a mine and sank. The risk of sending transports withtroops to the beaches was still great. The presence of ground mines in theshallow water made necessary a thorough magnetic sweep of the close-in
approaches to the landing beaches. Because troops of the ROK I Corps
were now well past Wonsan, the military situation did not warrant an
unnecessary risk in unloading the Marine units. Admiral Struble, therefore,
recommended that they not be unloaded on 20 October as planned, but that
D-day be deferred until the minesweeping could be completed. Admiral
Joy and General MacArthur concurred.
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu
Roy E. Appleman–1961

may be combined with simultaneous strikes against other key enemy assets throughout
the OA in order to prevent the enemy’s ability to react effectively. Entry-capable forcesmust be able to deploy rapidly and be employed immediately upon arrival without therequirement for RSOI.
(4) Transition to Stabilizing the Lodgment. The main assault may transition
to offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations as described by the JFC’s operational
concept and by the introduction of follow-on forces to assist in securing the lodgment andcontinue on to follow-on operations without an operational pause.
c. Stabilization of the Lodgment (Forcible Entry Phase III). Stabilization involves
securing the lodgment to protect the force and ensure the continuous landing of personnel
and materiel, organizing the lodgment to support the increasing flow of forces and logistic
resource requirements, and expanding the lodgment, as required to support the joint force
in preparing for and executing follow-on operations. Force buildup begins with thesecuring of objectives by assault forces and must be consistent with the overall operationor campaign plan with regard to the proper balance of combat forces and logistics required
to conduct subsequent operations. The joint force takes immediate steps to optimize
lodgment throughput capabilities.
(1) Securing the Lodgment. Whether the forcible entry is envisioned as theestablishment of a lodgment to enable future combat operations, or as a coup de main, thelodgment must be secured and protected in order for it to serve as an entry point for followon forces and sustainment. Based on the JFC’s analysis of the threat and available forces,
the lodgment is expanded, as required. Lodgment security is continuous and enables
organization and expansion.
(2) Organizing the Lodgment. Details concerning the introduction of followon forces must be prepared during the planning phase of the operation. Commanders
introduce reinforcing forces, as required, based on the tactical situation. All means ofdelivery are exploited to maximize combat power in the lodgment. Aerial ports ofdebarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs) must be secured and repaired,
IV-7

Chapter IV
as necessary. Appropriate logistic and communications infrastructure must be establishedas quickly as possible to facilitate the reception of follow-on forces.
(3) Expanding the Lodgment. Expansion is when the lodgment is not fully
established and the introduction of combat power significantly contributes to thedevelopment of the security situation. During the expansion, the capacity of ground forces
to maintain the lodgment in the face of a coherent enemy response should significantly
increase.
(4) Transition to Introducing Follow-on Forces. Though intended to conduct
follow-on operations, in extreme circumstances, follow-on forces may be required toassist assault forces in the seizure of initial objectives or may be used to help secure anddefend the lodgment. Provisions must be made to clear follow-on supplies and equipment
immediately from offload points to maximize airlift and sealift efficiency. The joint force
must avoid an unnecessary operational pause. The tempo of operations directed against
the enemy must be maintained to prevent the enemy from reorganizing and effectively
countering the establishment of the lodgment.
d. Introduction of Follow-on Forces (Forcible Entry Phase IV)(1) Purpose of Follow-on Forces. (Note: This phase is required whensubsequent operations are planned for conduct in or from the lodgment.) Follow-on forces
provide the JFC with increased flexibility to conduct operations as required byoperational conditions; once the lodgment has been established with APODs and SPODs,a joint security area may be identified and developed to facilitate and provide security for

The joint force must maintain the initiative and rapidly prepare to receive follow-on
forces to develop the combat power necessary to secure the lodgment.

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JP 3-18

Operations
subsequent support operations. Follow-on forces and equipment may flow via air LOCs
and SLOCs into the APODs and SPODs located within the now-established lodgment. In
general, follow-on forces require some form of RSOI activities before they are able toconduct operations and arrive using the existing airfields and seaports or expeditionary
airfields and seaports. During this phase, joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operationscommence in earnest. Follow-on forces may also deploy to the OA to link up with prepositioned equipment. Initially, airfield operations may be conducted in a combat
environment. Airfield operations and security should conform to currently publishedguidance (see the Army Techniques Publication [ATP] 3-17.2/Marine Corps Reference
Publication [MCRP] 3-20B.11/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures [NTTP]
3-02.18/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures [AFTTP] 3-2.68, Multi-Service
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Airfield Opening, and JP 3-17, Air Mobility
Operations) and in accordance with any valid Service or multinational agreements or plans.
Once the airfield is secure and open for full operations, improvements can be made toprovide the capacity for aircraft maintenance and parking. Follow-on force equipment will
largely flow from pre-positioned stocks.
(2) Ground Offensive Operations. In some operations and campaigns, thefollow-on forces will conduct ground offensive operations to link up with forces in thelodgment. This may involve offensive operations conducted by forces from the lodgment
in conjunction with the attacks being conducted by friendly forces beyond the lodgment.
At Anzio, in 1944, reinforced Allied forces succeeded in breaking out of the lodgment andlinking up with the US Fifth Army as part of a larger offensive across the Italian peninsula.
(3) MPF and APS-3. MPF and APS-3 options provide the JFC with significant
combat capabilities to initiate or prosecute follow-on operations. Fundamental
requirements for MPF or APS-3 operations include intertheater lift and a secureenvironment (e.g., arrival airfields, ports, and/or beaches) for arrival, off-load, andassembly of forces. These are the conditions necessary for a forcible entry operation.
(a) MPF. The purpose of an MPF operation is to rapidly establish a Marine
air-ground TF ashore that is prepared to conduct military operations.
(b) APS-3. When available, the APS-3 provides the GCC or designatedsubordinate JFC with a similarly responsive brigade size armored force to be employed
rapidly in response to a crisis situation. Like the MPF, this capability consists of theequipment required by brigade combat teams (BCTs) and enabling units to conduct a wide
range of operations.
(4) Follow-on Force Preparation for Subsequent Operations. Ideally, allfollow-on forces will be organized and tailored so they are ready for combat upon arrivalin the lodgment. However, in most situations, follow-on forces will require a period oftime to link up with equipment, organize, and prepare for operations that follow the forcible
entry. The following organizations can enable the start of subsequent operations.

IV-9

Chapter IV

Elements of a Marine expeditionary unit move from ship-to-shore
by way of landing craft, air cushion.

(a) CRF. The CRF is composed of Air Force personnel and assets, trainedand equipped to secure after seizure, assess, open, and initially operate airfields. The CRF
provides engineer, security, communications, and airfield support assets needed to support
the forcible entry effort. Special capabilities, not present in every CRF, include airborne,
air assault, and pathfinder; expanded combat communications; and expeditionary
engineering.
(b) Combat Communications Groups (CCGs). The CCGs provide air
traffic control personnel/services, to include various deployable air traffic control andlanding systems such as mobile control towers, tactical air navigation systems, andprecision approach systems required to support all-weather aircraft operations. CCG forces
can also be deployed to temporarily restore damaged, destroyed, or incapacitated fixedresources during peacetime operations and may be tailored to provide the required level of
air traffic control service. CCG forces are organized to support DOD requirements, as wellas certain tactical communications projects. All packages contain an organic maintenancecapability. However, they do not contain an airfield management package or personnel.
(c) STTs. STTs are comprised of Air Force combat control, combat weather,and pararescue personnel. The STT has the capability to assess, establish, and control LZs;
provide weather observations and forecasting; and provide battlefield trauma care. They
employ with airfield seizure forces, CRF, or unilaterally to provide terminal control of the
airfield. Combat control personnel are qualified as joint terminal attack controllers.

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JP 3-18

Operations(d) 820th Base Defense Group. This Air Force battalion-sized unit iscomprised of three rapidly deployable base defense squadrons. Each multi-functionalsquadron contains security forces, intelligence, emergency management, engineering,
communications, medical, logistics, and administration personnel able to operate withlimited support from other deployed forces. The unit is trained and equipped to perform
airborne insertion, air assault operations, airfield security assessments, base defense,
mounted/dismounted patrolling, and C2 of defense forces for one large base or several
small sites. Additionally, the squadrons can link with other integrated defense or initialentry/base seizure forces and provide a secure and smooth transition to airfield opening
forces.
(e) Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.
When task organized withsubordinate units, this Army brigade provides protection and enhances the mobility of
supported forcible entry forces. Following a forcible entry assault, the brigade supports
BCTs with tailored engineer, military police, CBRN, and other supporting capabilities
required for successful subsequent entry and decisive operations.
(f) Air Force Air Mobility Liaison Officers (AMLOs). AMLOs integratewith supported joint force component staff function(s) at the echelon(s) making decisions
for air movement and sustainment planning, validation, prioritization, preparation, andexecution. They are organized to advise ground force commanders on air mobility issues
and may be granted coordinating authority and direct liaison authority to provide essential
coordination and enhance the interoperability between the global mobility enterprise,
supported combatant commands, joint force partners, and other authorized mobility users
in garrison and forward deployed.
For additional information regarding the Air Force’s airbase opening capabilities, refer
to Air Force Doctrine Annex 4-0, Combat Support.
e. Termination or Transition Operations (Forcible Entry Phase V). The
transition from a forcible entry operation to subsequent operations or termination must be
an integral part of the planning phase of the joint deployment process. A successful
forcible entry operation is completed in one of two ways: attainment of the campaign
objectives (termination) or completion of the operational objectives wherein a lodgment isestablished for follow-on combat operations (transition).
(1) Achievement of Operation or Campaign Objectives. If the forcible entry
operation accomplishes the strategic objectives, then the JFC may be directed toreconstitute and redeploy the joint force either to home station or to some other theaterof operations.
(2) Achievement of Operational Objectives. In many cases, a forcible entry
operation will probably be only one phase of a campaign or major operation. As such, theforcible entry operation establishes the conditions for follow-on operations. Followon forces generally focus on executing sequels to the forcible entry operation that aredesigned to achieve additional objectives. These sequels include the full range of military

IV-11

Chapter IV
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, TASK FORCE VIKING, 26 MARCH 2003
The Air Force air mobility liaison officer aligned with the 173d Airborne
Brigade participated in detailed operational planning and pre-mission
coordination leading up to Task Force Viking to airdrop forces delivered,inserted with the seizure force, to assist transition to 86th Tanker Airlift
Control Elements airfield opening personnel.
Various Sources

operations depicted in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, (e.g., seize the initiative, dominate, or
stabilize phases) as part of the larger operation.
For further details on stability activities, refer to JP 3-07, Stability. For further details oninteragency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.
4. Integration and/or Synchronization Considerations
The following discussion illustrates the type of activities that may occur at the JFC
level to integrate and synchronize a forcible entry operation. This list is not all-inclusive
but presents activities for JFCs and staffs to consider when synchronizing a forcible
entry operation. The number and types of phases for forcible entry operations, as with all
operations, may vary. As phasing is a key synchronization action, these activities areorganized into the five phases of forcible entry operation presented earlier in this chapter.
The example assumes a combination of forcible entry capabilities will be used to obtain alodgment as the initial operation of a larger campaign. These phases are normallysequential but may overlap. During planning, commanders must establish conditions fortransitioning from one phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit
opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations.
a. Forcible Entry Phase I: Preparation and Deployment(1) An accurate TPFDD is developed up through level 4 detail.
(2) The JFC assigns complementary and/or deconflicted missions to components.
(3) Command relationships are delineated.
(4) Rehearsals are conducted.
(5) The intelligence effort for components is prioritized.
(6) Initial air apportionment decisions are made.
(7) Targeting guidance is disseminated.
(8) Desired arrival sequence of forces in the TPFDD is validated, then scheduled
to available transportation.

IV-12

JP 3-18

Operations(9) Integration and/or synchronization with other (if any) operations iscompleted.
(10) Military activities that support communication themes and messages areintegrated—military information support operations, public affairs (PA), and defense
support to public diplomacy (DSPD).
(11) MILDEC operations are executed.
(12) Advance force operations (e.g., countermine, air superiority, spacesuperiority, cyberspace superiority, preparation of the OE, and isolation) to include SOF
conducting required special operations core activities which may include UW operations.
For more information on cyberspace capabilities, see JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
(13) Sustainment activities and/or requirements are planned.
(14) Plan for casualty operations is formulated.
(15) Fire support coordination and airspace coordinating measures areformulated.
(16) Surveillance assets in the assault areas are positioned and reported.
b. Forcible Entry Phase II: Assault(1) Air apportionment is reassessed and revised.
(2) H-hour (specific time an operation or exercise begins) synchronization iscompleted among components.
(3) Modifications to existing plans and branches and/or sequels are deconflicted.
(4) Fire support coordination and airspace coordinating measures are activated.
(5) Pre H-hour activities and/or staging are completed.
(6) Support relationships among components are modified, as required.
(7) Provide for casualty evacuation.
c. Forcible Entry Phase III: Stabilization of the Lodgment(1) Terrain management issues are addressed.
(2) Clear airfield of explosive hazards prior to any repair, maintenance, or
operations.

IV-13

Chapter IV(3) Runways, aprons, taxiways, and parking areas are repaired and maintained tosupport continuous air landed operations.
(4) Airspace control is coordinated.
(5) Medical evacuation is provided.
(6) TPFDD flow is managed.
d. Forcible Entry Phase IV: Introduction of Follow-on Forces(1) Force sequencing is continuously adjusted.
(2) Operations are transitioned to follow-on forces.
(3) Reconstitution and/or redeployment of assault forces (e.g., embark the LF fora subsequent mission) is completed.
(4) Joint security operations issues are addressed.
(5) AOA is dissolved.
(6) Ports of debarkation are maintained to maximize and sustain throughput forfollow-on forces.
e. Forcible Entry Phase V: Termination or Transition Operations(1) Joint force and/or component missions and command relationships arereorganized.
(2) Priorities of support are shifted.
(3) Transition to further operations in the seize the initiative, dominate, or
stabilize phase of the joint operation.
SECTION B. SUPPORTING OPERATIONS
5. Special Operations Forces
Special operations are an integral part of forcible entry operations and these actions
and operations are integrated to achieve military objectives. SOF may be employed prior
to forcible entry operations to collect intelligence, seize key terrain, organize and train
guerrilla forces, and conduct other activities that facilitate the introduction of CFs. In theexecution stages of a forcible entry operation, SOF can seize objectives, interdict targets(especially those that can severely disrupt the assault to open entry points), and conduct
other operations to support the main force. In the closing stages of the operation, SOF canplay a key role in transition or termination by working with HN, multinational, interagency,
and intergovernmental partners.

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JP 3-18

Operations
MILITARY DECEPTION OPERATIONSUTILIZING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DURING DESERT STORM—
IRAQ, 1991
From 29 January until 16 February 1991, Naval Special Warfare Task Groupelements conducted near-shore and off-shore reconnaissance missions in
support of US Central Command’s deception strategy to fix Iraqi attention
on a potential amphibious assault by US Marines.
The special
reconnaissance missions resulted in the collection of information,
established a naval presence along the Kuwaiti coast, and focused theattention of the Iraqi command on a possible maritime invasion. The
deception effort culminated in a large-scale operation on the night of 23-24
February 1991, the eve of the ground offensive, which simulated a beachreconnaissance and clearing operation.
The deception campaign
prevented Iraqi units at the beaches from reinforcing those being attacked
in the west.
SOURCE: United States Special Operations
Command History, 2nd Edition

See JP 3-05, Special Operations, for more information on SOF.
6. Fires
In forcible entry operations, the initial assault forces are building combat power in the
OA from nothing as quickly as possible. They will normally have very minimal or no
artillery support available for fire support in the early stages of the operation. Fires fromaircraft (manned and unmanned) and/or naval platforms (surface/subsurface) take on added
importance to compensate for the lack of artillery. The supported commander establishes
the priority, timing, and effects of all fires within the boundaries of the designated OA.
JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, provide more
information on fire support.
7. Intelligence Support and Considerations
a. The JFC uses intelligence to decide what, why, when, where, and how to attack;determine forcible entry capabilities needed, and task organization required, to seize initial
objective(s); support targeting and combat assessment; and anticipate future operations(see Figure IV-3). Counterintelligence (CI) helps the JFC maintain the element of surpriseessential to forcible entry operations by supporting OPSEC and MILDEC.
See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, to identify the
primary providers of intelligence assigned to or supporting the JFC and the diverse
products and services available to satisfy joint force intelligence requirements.
b. Intelligence considerations for the five phases of a forcible entry operation are
described below.

IV-15

Chapter IVIntelligence Support
Intelligence

Provides Enemy Information

Joint Force Commander Makes Decisions



Goals
Objectives
 Values Centers of gravity
 Composition
 Threats Disposition
 Strengths
 Weaknesses
 Vulnerabilities
 Courses of action
 Intentions







When, where, and how to attack
Determine capabilities needed
and task organization required to
seize initial objective(s) Support targeting and combat
assessment
 Anticipate future operations
 Weigh the differences between
risk and gain

Figure IV-3. Intelligence Support(1) Preparation and Deployment (Phase I). Specific considerations during
this phase include the following:(a) Establishing the Intelligence Architecture.
The intelligencearchitecture must be capable of supporting joint forces en route to, and within, the OA.
Architecture planning must consider establishing connectivity over long distances between
the joint force, the supporting theater joint intelligence operations center, and other defense
and national intelligence organizations (to include federated intelligence partners) outside
the OA.
(b) JIPOE. JIPOE is a key input to mission analysis and the processcontinues to refine and update intelligence products to provide commanders and staffs themeans to successfully prosecute operations.
For further guidance on intelligence support, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP 2-01,
Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations; and JP 2-01.3, Joint
Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.
(2) Assault (Phase II). The joint force is most vulnerable to enemy action during
the assault phase. Effective warnings, targeting support, and collection management totrack enemy reaction to the assault and force protection (FP) are paramount concerns
during this phase.
(3) Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III) and Introduction of Follow-on
Forces (Phase IV). In the remaining phases of the operation, intelligence assets within
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JP 3-18

Operations
the lodgment increase in numbers and contribute to an enhanced collective
intelligence capability. If the joint force headquarters deploys into the lodgment, the J-2
must ensure the availability of sufficient assets to assure uninterrupted intelligence support
to the joint force. The J-2 should anticipate an increase in the demand for human
intelligence and CI assets to conduct intelligence interrogation; intelligence collection;
document, materiel, biometric, and forensic exploitation; and support liaison with the
HN country team and with any MNFs introduced into the lodgment.
(4) Termination or Transition Operations (Phase V)(a) Termination of Operations. Intelligence assets continue to support
the JFC’s operations requirements and address the potential for resurgent hostilities
by either CF or SOF. Intelligence support may be required for such activities as obstacle
intelligence, infrastructure reconstruction, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), or
restoring civil law and order, while continuing the key task of intelligence support to FP.
(b) Transition to Follow-on Operations. Once a forcible entry has beensuccessfully executed as the first phase of a larger campaign, the JFC shifts the focus of
intelligence support from establishing the lodgment to sustained operations.
Intelligence support for sustained operations, planned during the initial phase of theoperation and continually refined as the forcible entry operation progresses, now allows
for a seamless transition that allows the JFC to begin execution of the specific sequel thatwill achieve campaign objectives. In some instances, follow-on operations will be in theform of stability activities or other forms of civil-military actions. These operations
encompass a variety of activities that vary in their respective intelligence support
requirements. Some operations, such as a show of force, attacks and raids, andnoncombatant evacuations, may require the same level of support demanded by combat
operations. Other operations, such as FHA or counterdrug operations, may not involve
large-scale combat, but will, nevertheless, still require intelligence support to plan andexecute.
8. Information Operations
IO are integral to successful military operations and are key during forcible entry
operations. The full impact of IO on friendly, neutral, and hostile forces should beconsidered with the key goal of IO achieving and maintaining information superiority for
the US and its allies and exploiting enemy information vulnerabilities. IO are the integrated
employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation
to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of enemies and adversaries
while protecting our own.
See JP 3-13, Information Operations, for more information.
a. IO is a key part of setting the conditions for forcible entry operational success; IO
efforts will be central to achieving surprise and isolating the lodgment and will also be an
important enabler for gaining control of the OE and neutralizing enemy forces. OPSEC

IV-17

Chapter IV
OPERATIONS SECURITY FAILURE—SOMALIA, 1992
In 1992, the United States committed forces to Somalia in response todevastating famine, made much worse by civil war and the complete
collapse of the Somali government. The initial forces committed by Joint
Task Force RESTORE HOPE were special operations forces (SOF)
reconnaissance teams preceding the landing force onto designatedbeaches. As they emerged from the water onto the beach, the SOF
elements were surrounded by reporters and cameras, together with video
crews and flood lighting. Not only were the reconnaissance teams exposed
and pinpointed, they were blinded and restricted as they attempted tocomplete their mission.
Various Sources

and MILDEC, combined with the other IRCs, will be the heart of achieving operational
and tactical surprise during the forcible entry operation.
(1) OPSEC, as an IRC, denies the enemy and adversary the critical informationand indicators needed to correctly assess friendly capabilities and intentions. Forcible entry
forces preparing for deployment have large, distinct signatures. Masking the movementof forces to staging bases and to the OA is essential to protect critical information andindicators from adversary collection. These movements may not be totally hidden;
however, such detail as the composition of the forces or the time and location of the forcible
entry should be concealed. The object is to surprise, confuse, or paralyze the enemy.
OPSEC is a force multiplier that can maximize operational effectiveness by saving lives
and resources when fully integrated into operations, activities, plans, exercises, training
planning, execution, and assessment.
For further details on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.
(2) MILDEC misleads enemy decision makers as to friendly military capabilities,
intentions, and operations, thereby causing the enemy to take specific actions (or inactions)that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. MILDEC operations
should be closely coordinated with the overall operational scheme of maneuver. The
deception operation will have little effect if it is compromised by poor OPSEC or otherportions of the operation present competing observables. Successful MILDECs requiresufficient resources, leadership, and linked objectives and goals from the strategic totactical level. For forcible entry operations, MILDEC operations may be planned andexecuted to complete the following:(a) Deceive the enemy as to the time, location(s), and strategic and/or
operational purpose of the forcible entry.
(b) Focus enemy attention and effort away from actual assault objectives.
(c) Cause the enemy to disperse forces to defend all possible airheads andbeachheads in the OA so the enemy cannot mass decisive force to deny joint force assaults.
IV-18

JP 3-18

Operations(d) Induce the enemy to piecemeal resources.
(e) Desensitize the enemy to US actions by appearances of routine activities.
(f) Force the enemy to maintain heightened states of alert and/or readinessfor extended periods of time.
For further details on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.
b. The lodgment must not only be isolated from nearby enemy military forces, butalso from C2 centers outside the OA. CO and electronic warfare (EW), supported byphysical attack on C2 networks, will play a decisive role in this isolation.
c. EW includes any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directedenergy to control the EMS or to attack the enemy. The JFC’s plan must be developed toensure complementary use of assets and weapons systems to effectively disrupt and/or
destroy enemy C2 and weapons systems, while protecting joint force capabilities.
See JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, for additional detail on EW.
d. Other Capabilities(1) DSPD. DSPD consists of activities and measures taken by DOD components,
not solely in the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the US
Government. DSPD requires coordination with both interagency partners and among DOD
components.
(2) CMO. Properly executed CMO during forcible entry operations can reduce
potential friction points between the civilian population and the joint force, specifically by
eliminating interference with military operations and limiting the impact of military
operations on the populace. CMO encompass the activities taken by a commander toestablish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous
populations and institutions by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to
the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN. Use of civil affairs(CA) forces and units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CA
operations in support of CMO can assist the commander.
For further details on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.
9. Public Affairs
A PA plan should be prepared during the planning process and executed upon
initiation of the forcible entry operation. PA planning must anticipate detection of all but
small covert operations by the enemy and the press.
JP 3-61, Public Affairs, provides additional guidance on incorporating PA into theplanning process.

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Chapter IV
10. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Considerations
The enemy may employ CBRN weapons at any point in the conflict. Planning against
an enemy known to have the capability and willingness to employ CBRN weapons/devices
should take into account the need for protective clothing, decontamination, and logisticalsupport to enable the force to continue the mission. Additional considerations may include
the need for specialized training for the assault forces or the need for additional CBRN
units to further support operations.
Additional guidance may be found in JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, and JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
11. Air Mobility Operations
Air mobility forces enhance other forces’ combat power and flexibility, either byextending their range, bolstering their staying power, or providing them with greater
maneuverability. Airlift allows employment of joint forces by airdrop and airland insertion
over strategic distances without delays caused by terrain or obstacles. OPCON of air
mobility forces may be transferred to the theater commander or retained by theCommander, US Transportation Command. Detailed planning is required for effective
utilization.
Additional guidance may be found in JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.

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CHAPTER V
LOGISTICS“The great question of the campaign was one of supplies.”
General William T. Sherman
Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, Volume II, 1875

1. General
As applied to military operations and forcible entry operations specifically, logistic
services comprise the support capabilities that collectively enable the US to rapidly provide
sustainment for military forces in order to attain the envisioned end state of the operationor larger campaign (see Figure V-1). This requires commanders to plan and establish thelogistic systems that flow sufficient logistics through the lodgment(s) created to support
follow-on operations. Logistic planning must account for early resupply of initial assault
forces as these forces will generally be employed with limited on-hand capacities.
For additional information on deployment and redeployment planning, see JP 3-35,
Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and for logistic consideration, planning, andexecution, see the JP 4-0 Series.
2. Specific Logistic Considerations for Supporting Forcible Entry Operations
Logistic planning for the phases of forcible entry operations occurs concurrently, notsequentially. Planning should address the logistic core capabilities. The following specificplanning considerations supplement those detailed in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and JP 5-0,
Joint Planning. Appendix B, “Control Joint Forcible Entry Operations,” provides
considerations in a notional checklist format to assist with the planning and conduct of joint
forcible entry operations.

Logistics Planning Considerations
 Geography

 Assignment of Responsibility

 Transportation Considerations

 Risk Analysis

 Logistic Capabilities Demands of an Expanding Force Logistic Enhancements

 Critical Items

 Multinational Support

 System Constraints

 Contractor Support

 Movement Control

 Protection of Logistics

 Resupply Systems

 Responsive Echeloned Support

 Intermediate Staging Base

Figure V-1. Logistics Planning Considerations

V-1

Chapter V
a. Forcible Entry Phase I (Preparation and Deployment)(1) Identify and coordinate for ISBs, as required.
(2) Identify time-phased logistic requirements.
(3) Develop prioritized transportation requirements.
(4) Analyze capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of APODs and APOEs,
SPODs and SPOEs, coastal areas for JLOTS, and OA infrastructure to support projected
operations.
(5) Determine air, land, and sea LOC requirements to support forcible entry andsubsequent operations.
(6) Determine logistic factors and establish airhead and beachhead resupply
responsibility.
(7) Analyze force health protection and health services planning considerations.
(8) Analyze and/or assess multinational support and contractor capabilities tosupport operations.
(9) Analyze and recommend changes to TPFDD flow to ensure that adequate
support will be available.
(10) Integrate and synchronize logistic support of initial and subsequent flow offorces into the OA.
b. Forcible Entry Phase II (Assault)(1) Analyze potential lodgment area to ensure continuous air and sea landing of
personnel, equipment, and logistic resources, paying strict attention that infrastructure(e.g., buildings, roads, and power supplies) supports planned operations.
(2) Provide adequate medical support and evacuation to support concurrent or
simultaneous assaults by amphibious, airborne, air assault, and SOF.
c. Forcible Entry Phase III (Stabilization of the Lodgment)(1) Project and/or resolve restrictions and/or limitations in the capability tosupport force flow.
(2) Determine means of delivery and capacities to maximize combat power.
(3) Identify and plan advanced logistic bases in support of the joint force
operational concept. Unless additional forcible entry operations are anticipated, planningfor follow-on operations will be in accordance with standard joint force logistic planning
doctrine in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
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Logistics(4) Pursue methods to maximize and expand throughput capabilities of APODs
and SPODs.
(5) Develop provisions to clear reinforcing supplies and equipment from off-load
points.
(6) Analyze requirements to expand the lodgment with regard to maximum on
ground capabilities, throughput, and infrastructure.
d. Forcible Entry Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-on Forces)(1) Identify mission support requirements for follow-on operations.
(2) Begin MPF and APS-3 afloat operations.
(3) Continue buildup of preplanned supplies.
(4) Initiate engineering and construction for support to follow-on operations.
(5) Plan for reconstitution and redeployment of the assault force for follow-on
operations.
e. Forcible Entry Phase V (Termination or Transition Operations)(1) Redeploy and/or reconstitute assault forces, as appropriate.
(2) Plan for preparing the force for follow-on, out-of-area operations, such as
redeployment to another geographical area.
(3) Once plans have formally addressed and integrated all seven core logistic
capabilities, the force should be well prepared to begin the application of those functions
that support operational execution.

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Chapter V

Intentionally Blank

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APPENDIX A
AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS
1. Purpose
This appendix provides an overview of airborne and air assault operations.
2. Airborne and Air Assault Operations
Joint airborne and air assault operations involve the air movement and delivery of
specially trained combat forces and logistic support into an objective area to execute a
mission. Airborne and air assault forces provide the commander with the unique ability toquickly respond on short notice and mass rapidly on critical targets. Airborne operations
can be launched at a considerable distance from the target area with such speed as to cause
tactical or operational surprise and prevent effective action by the enemy. Airborne forces
can secure and/or destroy critical installations, facilities, or terrain; reinforce US forces and
MNFs; and conduct a show of force or attack an enemy in isolated areas. Air assault
operations increase mobility and freedom of action by providing operational and tacticalmobility for both the offense and defense. Air operations enable forces to reduce time andspace limitations normally encountered in movement of assault forces by land; cross terrain
obstacles; bypass hostile areas; and attack, destroy, and/or seize objectives deep in enemy
territory. Each component can significantly contribute to the successful execution of
airborne and air assault operations.
a. Concept. Airborne and air assault forces are capable of conducting operations in
support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. They land intact with weapons,ammunition, and other combat equipment and are prepared for combat immediately.
Airborne forces aggressively seize and hold objectives until linkup is accomplished. An
airborne operation usually terminates upon seizure of the objective, linkup with otherground forces, or extraction. Air assault operations are deliberate, precisely planned, andvigorously executed to strike over extended distances.
b. Characteristics. Airborne and air assault forces share many of the same
capabilities. They can provide operational reach, move, and rapidly concentrate combat
power quicker than land-mobile forces. Airborne and air assault forces also share the same
limitations. They are dependent on the availability of airlift assets, fire support, and combat
service support resources; they are highly vulnerable to enemy attack by ground and airforces while en route to the LZ and/or DZ; and are equally assailable when operating inopen terrain against an armored threat or WMD. Environmental conditions and adverse
weather can also impact performance. There are four phases of airborne operations:
marshalling, air movement, landing, and ground tactical phases. Air assault operations
have five phases: staging, loading, air movement, landing, and ground tactical phases.
3. Organization and Commanda. Planning. From the time an operation is announced, until it is completed or
terminated, echelons of participating components coordinate continuously. The JFC

A-1

Appendix A
initiates airborne and/or air assault operations with a planning directive to participating
units. The directive is distributed through normal command channels, and pertinent
information is issued to subordinate units. After receipt of a directive and preparation of
initial estimates and studies, the commanders, staffs, and representatives of supporting
forces meet in a joint conference to develop a CONOPS. The CONOPS forms the basis
for the preparation of the commander’s planning directive and development of OPLANs
and OPORDs, including a list of forces in support, a schedule of events, and statedconditions under which the operation will begin, be delayed, altered, or terminated.
b. Coordination. Airborne and air assault commanders begin planning operations
with a visualization of the ground tactical plan and work through a reverse-planningsequence. Planning for airborne and air assault operations is as detailed as time permits.
For airborne operations, this sequence includes the development of a ground tactical plan,
landing plan, air movement plan, and marshalling plan. For air assault operations thesequence is the same, but instead of a marshalling plan, loading and staging plans aredeveloped. Direct liaison and coordination between the logistic support agencies of theparticipating components and other supporting forces occur during the preliminary
planning stages. For airborne and air assault operations, intelligence systems assist inachieving strategic objectives, including all factors which will impact the arrival of forces
into the objective area, establishment of airheads and lodgments, and linkup of forces in
preparation for follow-on operations. Also included in the planning process are thefollowing: counterair, IO, logistics, joint fires, FP, special operations, CBRN, EOD,
engineer support, PA, and military police. When developing the OPLAN, the JFC
anticipates that assault forces may face natural and man-made obstacles that are intended
to restrict their movement so that the enemy can mass its forces and repel the assault.
Combat engineers facilitate insertion of assault forces and prepare the onward movement
to the objective by reducing obstacles, clearing roads, and airfields of obstacles. EOD
forces can perform render safe procedures of sensitive-fuzed munitions and IEDs, as wellas the detection and mitigation of homemade explosives and CBRN munitions.
c. Command. The JFC may initiate joint airborne and/or air assault operations in
support of strategic and/or operational objectives. The complexity of airborne and air
assault operations and their vulnerability require an exceptional degree of unified action.
The initiating directive is an order to the airborne and/or air assault commander to conduct
the operation. It is issued by the JFC delegated overall authority for the operation. JFCs
establish command relationships and assign authority to subordinates based on theoperational situation, the complexity of the mission, and the degree of control needed toensure that strategic intent is satisfied.
d. Control. Airspace C2; established boundaries; ability to communicate; and theeffective employment of surveillance, reconnaissance, and EW are key elements infacilitating effective C2 of airborne and air assault operations. The airborne force
commander establishes a standard C2 system by defining the functions and responsibilities
of key personnel, ensuring all preliminary operational planning is accomplished, andpublishing OPLANs and orders. Air assault operations feature extended distances and speedof execution. To work swiftly under pressure, efforts must be integrated and synchronized.

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Airborne and Air Assault Operations
Effective liaison between operational elements of an airborne and/or air assault operation
and with higher authorities will facilitate mutual understanding and unified action.
e. C2 of Airborne Operations. Airborne assault, particularly over intercontinental
distance, places additional requirements on C2. En route mission planning and rehearsal
systems allow the airborne force to maintain situational awareness and to receive anddisseminate updated intelligence while en route from load time at the APOE until arrival
over the airhead.
(1) The airborne assault force commander accompanies the initial assault and is
responsible for (see Figure A-1 for a list of tasks at various command levels):(a) Ground tactical planning.
(b) Rig and out load troopers and equipment.
(c) En route mission planning and rehearsal.
(d) Conduct airborne assault.
(e) Seize assault objectives.
(f) Execute joint fires.
(g) Update the intelligence preparation of the OE.
(h) Secure the APOD.
(i) Repair and maintain the APOD.
(j) Expand the lodgment.
(2) The airborne TF commander may also be the JTF or land component
commander, depending upon experience and the scope of the operation. If the assault
requires an airborne BCT, for example, the BCT commander leads the assault force, andthe parent Army headquarters (normally a division) provides the airborne TF commander.
This ensures the assault force commander can give full attention to the fight in the airhead
and not be consumed with managing en route follow-on forces and support.
(3) Initially, the airborne TF commander exercises control from an airborne
command post outside the airhead or from a secure base with linkages to the airhead andall joint supporting assets. The airborne TF commander’s responsibilities include
operational planning; APOE situational awareness and integration; en route C2; aerial relay
using joint communications; integrate joint fires; integrate long-range surveillance and
SOF; C2 pre-assault fires; C2 the APOE and APOD; and C2 of reception, staging, andonward movement of follow-on forces. After the airhead is secure, the airborne TF
commander moves into the lodgment and assumes command of the assault force andfollow-on forces.

A-3

Appendix A

Example Distribution of Responsibilities for Airborne Assault
Planning andPreparation
Joint
Task Force(JTF)
Headquarters

Operational planning
Develop time-phased force
and deployment data
Intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissanceplanning and integration
Joint shaping operations

Assault
C2 of supported andsupporting components

Follow-on Operations
Control flow of joint forces

Go/no go decision
Modify force flow based on
situation
Apportion and allocate joint
supportSpecial operations forces
integration
Military deception
Exercise of command andcontrol (C2) overintermediate staging baseAirborne
Task Force
Headquarters

Tactical planning
Integrate joint fires
Integrate long range
surveillance and special
operations forces operations
Control pre-assault fires

En route C2 and airspacecommand and control

Assume overall commandof ground forces

C2 relay between JTF andassault force

Reception, staging, andonward movement forfollow-on ground forces

Expand C2 network on the
groundRig and load personnel andequipment
Assault Force
Headquarters

Develop ground plan andrehearse ground operations
En route planning
Seize assault objectives
Secure and defend airhead
Control supporting fires

En route planning

Expand lodgment

Seize assault objectives

Receive initial follow-on
forcesSecure and defend airhead
Control supporting fires

Link-up with special
operations forces andamphibious forces
Exploitation

Figure A-1. Example Distribution of Responsibilities for Airborne Assault(4) The JFC is responsible for joint operational planning; joint integrated
prioritized target list development; joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissanceintegration; setting the conditions for joint forcible entry; C2; and air flow and air space
management.
f. Forces(1) US Army airborne forces are committed to combat by parachute assault,
airlanded operations, or by a combination of these two methods. Normally, airborne
operations are initiated by parachute assault conducted by an airborne infantry BCT.
Parachute assault permits delivery of combined arms teams into the airhead in less timethan airlanded operations require. Once the assault phase is initiated, it is followed by one
or more of the following: a defensive phase, an offensive phase, or an extraction phase.
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JP 3-18

Airborne and Air Assault Operations(2) The initial assault stresses the coordinated action of small units to seize initial
objectives before the advantage of surprise has worn off. After the initial assault landings
accomplish the initial ground missions, commanders must organize the airhead line.
Airborne forces defend to protect and retain areas or installations seized during the assault
phase of the operation. Because an airborne assault is most often conducted in the enemy
rear, an all-around defense is required. Units can be airlanded on terrain under the controlof friendly forces near the line of contact or on secured locations in the enemy’s rear.
However, it takes time to land a sizable force and a secured LZ is necessary. Even when
multiple LZs are employed, it takes longer to mass forces in the airhead during airland
operations than during parachute operations. Subsequent operations can include continued
defense of the airhead, linkup, passage of lines, relief, withdrawal, or offensive operations,to include exploitation or further airborne and/or air assaults.
(3) Air Assault. Whether performed from the sea or a land ISB, aviation andcombined arms provide the JFC with an agile fighting force capable of conducting bothoffensive and defensive operations. Air assault operations allow friendly forces to strikeover extended distances and terrain barriers to attack the enemy when and where he is mostvulnerable. Air assaults are deliberately planned due to their complex nature. However,units are often required to execute air assaults within short time constraints. Reinforcementof committed units, linkup operations, gap crossing operations, security operations, limited
visibility operations, and ship-to-shore operations should all be considered during air
assault operations.
(4) Sustainment. Minimum sustainment elements accompany airborne forces
into the airhead or lodgment. They perform most essential services in the marshalling areaor they defer them. Sustainment is normally divided into three echelons during
deployment: assault, follow-on, and rear echelons. Sustainment of these forces is helpedby distribution of supplies, resupply by air including planned resupply, immediate airdrop
resupply, and emergency airdrop resupply requests; maintenance during airborne
operations; transportation; and health services. The air assault force is supported by bothorganic and external elements organized to push supplies, materiel, fuel, and ammunition
forward by air. The exact organization and disposition of the assault and follow-on
sustainment elements is a function of the air assault force’s mission and anticipated followon operations.
4. Termination or Transitiona. Airborne/air assault operations will normally transition combat operations tofollow-on forces. However, the JFC should prepare contingency plans for the possibility
that follow-on forces are unable to relieve the airborne/air assault force. The follow-on
operation would be one of the following:(1) Withdrawal or evacuation of units.
(2) Linkup with ground forces.
(3) Exfiltration.

A-5

Appendix A(4) Breakout from encirclement.
b. As conditions permit, the buildup of forces and supplies continues and follow-on
operations commence. The airfield transitions from being seized to being improved foruse as an airbase suitable for joint operations.
Army Field Manual (FM) 3-99, Airborne and Air Assault Operations, provides more
specifics on airborne and air assault operations.

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APPENDIX B
CONTROL JOINT FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONSSECTION A. OVERVIEW
a. This appendix provides a notional checklist to assist with the development ofchecklists/standard operating procedures for planning and executing control of joint
forcible entry operations.
b. The JFC should determine the forcible entry capability or combination ofcapabilities needed to accomplish the mission, especially if initial entry forces orreinforcing entry forces must be inserted offset from infrastructure such as APODs and
SPODs. Unity of command is vital when amphibious, airborne, air assault, and special
operations forces are combined. This checklist is intended to help the JFC develop plans
and execute joint forcible entry operations.
c. JFCs have authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination
among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operationalgroupings to function generally as they are organized and trained and in coordination with
the JFC’s staff.
SECTION B. CHECKLIST
1. Monitor Forcible Entry Operations
a. Connectivity. Access to the Global Command and Control System-Joint with US
Transportation Command during the deployment of forces.
(1) Monitor deployment status of joint forces.
(2) Balance requirements for initial combat and noncombat operations, joint
forces reception and buildup, and timing of required follow-on operations.
(a) Intermediate staging bases.
(b) Intertheater and intratheater deployment, establishment of forward
operating bases and base camps, and use of seabasing.
(c) Airlift and airdrop capabilities allow shifting, regrouping, or movementof joint forces in a theater to obtain operational reach and positional advantage.
(3) Recommend changes to supported CCDR’s TPFDD, as required.
b. Monitor operations directed at enemy centers of gravity related to joint operations.
c. Monitor execution of forcible entry operations by phases. Consider:(1) Phase I—Preparation and Deployment

B-1

Appendix B(a) Command relationships.
(b) Forcible entry organizational structure.
(c) Horizontal and vertical connectivity through JTF functional areas.
(d) Liaison officers or teams, as required.
(e) Missions assigned to special operations forces (such as direct action andspecial reconnaissance).
(f) JIPOE.
(g) Airspace control.
(h) Joint targeting coordination board/joint fires element.
(i) Counterair and suppression of enemy air defense.
(j) Logistic factors.
1. Identify and coordinate for intermediate staging bases, as required.
2. Identify time-phased logistic requirements.
3. Develop prioritized transportation requirements and identify alloutsized/oversized requirements.
4. Analyze capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of APODs,
APOEs, SPODs, and SPOEs, coastal areas for JLOTS, and OA infrastructure to support
projected operations.
5. Determine air, land, and sea LOC requirements to support forcible
entry and subsequent operations.
6. Determine logistic resupply factors and establish airhead andbeachhead resupply responsibility.
7. Analyze force health protection and health service support planningconsiderations.
8. Analyze and/or assess multinational support and contractor
capabilities to support operations.
9. Analyze and recommend changes to TPFDD flow to ensure adequate
support will be available.
10. Integrate and synchronize logistic support of initial and subsequent
flow of forces into the OA.
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Control Joint Forcible Entry Operations
11. Consider these principles when planning for airlift movements.
a. Minimize movement congestion and vulnerability by reducing
the time units and materiel are massed at forward terminals and synchronize the positioningof units, materiel, and equipment with airlift capabilities.
b. Maximize the productivity and survivability of airlift forces byminimizing aircraft ground times at forward locations.
c. Minimize sortie requirements by repackaging all materiel for air
shipment; ensure combat personnel travel with their basic load of rations, ammunition, orother personal protective equipment; and split units into air-essential and surfacemovement echelons (whenever possible).
d. Ensure personnel are adequately fed, rested, and protected at enroute stops.
e. Deploy personnel and communications equipment necessary to
track and report on all air movements.
f. Maximize use of available sealift/ground transportation.
12. Planning airlift operations is a complicated process involving a few
basic principles and many interdependent considerations. Service components must
facilitate their airlift movement processes. This responsibility includes performing andarranging to:a. Bring units and materiel to APOEs/SPOEs.
b. Prepare those resources for air movement.
c. Provide support services (meals, medical, billeting, and otherappropriate services) to transient and arriving units.
d. Receive and transport units and materiel from APODs/SPODs.
e. Prepare all manifests, hazardous cargo declarations, movement
documents, and reports related to movement.
(k) ROE and control measures.
(l) MILDEC operations.
(m) EW operations.
(n) OPSEC to prevent disclosure of future operations.
(o) Military information support operations (MISO).

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Appendix B(p) Cyberspace operations.
(q) Intelligence collection and dissemination.
(r) Plan for dislocated civilians as necessary.
(s) Conduct rehearsal(s) of activities and operations as necessary.
(2) Phase II—Assault(a) Land, air, maritime, and special operations forces in the OA.
1. Supports the ground tactical plan.
2. Airborne and amphibious landing of personnel and equipment.
a. Air mobility forces are usually matched with airborne, air assault,
light infantry, or SOF specifically designed for delivery by air.
b. The air drop mission normally involves inserting airborne forces;
however, carefully planned air and land assault operations can be equally effective.
3. Designate/assign OAs for maneuver space for immediate and future
operations.
4. Vulnerability to interdiction.
5. Operating facilities.
(b) Initial entry forces, to include advance, pre-assault, and assault forces
securing lodgment airhead, and amphibious forces securing beachhead.
(c) Assault forces preparation to receive reinforcing entry forces and assault
echelon coordination with assault follow-on echelon.
(d) Plan and rehearse CAS and air interdiction.
(e) Logistics factors.
1. Ensure lodgment/OA provides for continuous air landing of
personnel, equipment, and logistic resources for initial entry, reinforcing entry forces, andfollow-on forces and amphibious operations as required.
2. Ensure adequate medical support and evacuation to support
concurrent or integrated assaults by amphibious, airborne, air assault, and SOF.
(3) Phase III—Stabilization of the OA as a Lodgment(a) Lodgment security, organization, and expansion.

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Control Joint Forcible Entry Operations(b) Sequencing of combat, combat support, and combat service support
operations.
(c) Force link-ups of initial entry forces, reinforcing entry forces, and otherfollow-on forces.
(d) Logistic factors.
1. Casualty evacuation.
2. Resolve restrictions and/or limitations in the capability to support
force flow.
3. Maximize and expand throughput capabilities of APODs and SPODs.
4. Clear reinforcing supplies and equipment from off-load points.
5. Expand lodgment to maximize ground capabilities, throughput, andinfrastructure.
(4) Phase IV—Introduction of Follow-On Forces (Note: This phase is required
when subsequent operations are planned for conduct in or from the lodgment.)(a) Arrival of force buildup and follow-on forces or as separate phases.
(b) Refine mission requirements for follow-on forces, as required.
(c) Consider need for a joint security area.
(d) Logistic factors.
1. Begin MPF and APS-3 operations.
2. Continue build-up of pre-planned supplies.
3. Initiate general engineering and construction plans for support tofollow-on operations.
4. Conduct reconstitution and redeployment of the assault force forfollow-on operations.
(5) Phase V—Termination or Transition Operations(a) Actions initiated in early phases.
(b) Continue reconstitution and redeployment of the assault force.
(c) Termination of the JTF and transfer of responsibilities and authorities toother interagency partners and/or civilian authorities.

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Appendix B(d) Transition to another JTF headquarters.
(e) Logistic factors.
Integrate the seven core logistic capabilities:
deployment and distribution, supply, maintenance, logistics services, operational contract
support, engineering, and health services.
d. Monitor crisis response and limited contingency operations related to forcible entry
operations.
(1) Counterterrorism.
(2) Counterair operations.
(3) Noncombatant evacuation operations.
(4) MILDEC.
(5) Cyberspace operations.
(6) Stability actions.
(7) CBRN response.
(8) Countering weapons of mass destruction.
(9) Personnel recovery operations.
(10) Show of force.
(11) Strikes and raids.
(12) Peace operations, if applicable.
e. Monitor meteorological and oceanographic situation.
2. Assess the Effectiveness of Protection During Forcible Entry Operations
a. Air and missile defense. Include:(1) Defensive counterair operations.
(2) Offensive counterair operations.
(3) Theater missile warning.
(4) Area air defense plan.
b. Protection of forcible entry operations.

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Control Joint Forcible Entry Operations(1) Significant fortifications.
(2) Significant CBRN threats and hazards to forcible entry operations.
(3) Friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
(4) Combat identification.
c. OPSEC.
(1) Signal security measures.
(2) Concealment of significant joint forces.
(3) Avoidance of discernable patterns by joint forces.
d. MILDEC.
(1) Details of plan involving forcible entry operations are masked.
(2) Misinformation regarding forcible entry operations is produced.
e. Security of forcible entry operations and means.
(1) Enemy options to identify likelihood of efforts to surprise, observe and detect,or conduct espionage, terrorist, or sabotage operations.
(2) Measures to counteract and protect from such enemy activities.
(3) Physical security of installations, facilities, and systems.
(4) Forcible entry operations security operations and requirements.
f. MISO. (See CJCSI 3110.05 for specific MISO objectives that support forcible
entry operations.)
3. Assess the Effectiveness of Command and Control for Forcible Entry Operations
a. Information architecture.
(1) Incorporate JTF communications and information systems and networks.
(2) Networks, frequency assignments, codes, and navigational aids resolved.
(3) Operational information and forces status.
(4) Procedures for monitoring operational situations involving forcible entry
operations.

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Appendix B
b. Organization of operational joint forces.
(1) Clear and responsive C2 relationships and authorities.
(2) Unity of effort.
(3) Hand-overs, such as commander, amphibious task force, to commander,
landing force.
c. Missions to Service and special operations components.
(1) Appropriate for tasked components and units.
(2) Integrated with missions of other components.
(3) Supported by sufficient JTF-controlled resources to include OA and joint
fires.
d. Organization of operational land, maritime, air, and special operations areas in the
joint operations area.
(1) Maneuver control measures provide Service component commanders with
sufficient space to accomplish assigned missions.
(2) Force OAs, such as AOAs and JSOAs, continue to support current operations
and are disestablished when no longer required.
(3) Airspace coordinating measures, fire support coordination measures, andother coordination measures provide for efficient use of airspace to support forcible entry
operations.
(4) Other OAs support forcible entry operations, as required. Consider:(a) Joint security area.
(b) Subordinate OAs and distributed operations.
(c) Areas of interest.
(d) AOA.
(e) JSOA.
4. Assess the Effectiveness of Intelligence in Support of Forcible Entry Operations
5. Assess the Effectiveness of Operational Support for and by Forcible Entry
Operations
6. Prepare Plans and Orders Related to Forcible Entry Operations

B-8

JP 3-18

Control Joint Forcible Entry Operations
a. Maintain a current estimate of forcible entry operations.
b. Assess the progress of current forcible entry operations.
(1) Relate information to achievement of desired objectives.
(a) Current operations and phases.
(b) Projected future operations and phases.
(c) Operation or campaign military end state and/or termination conditions.
(2) Relate to decision points for current or future operations.
c. Develop friendly COAs with regard to forcible entry operations. In developing
forcible entry COAs, consider the following actions/activities, by forcible entry phase:(1) Phase I (Preparation and Deployment). Forcible entry operations are
conducted by organizations whose force structures permit rapid deployment into theobjective area. Joint forces may deploy directly to the OA or to staging areas to prepare
for subsequent operations.
(a) Determine the forcible entry option(s) to be executed, how those
operations will support campaign success, and the command relationships required.
(b) Determine deployment sequencing of initial entry forces that supports
gaining access into the objective area, the initial assault, reinforcing entry forces, and theintroduction of other follow-on forces.
(c) Determine requirements for local air and maritime superiority to conduct
the forcible entry operation.
(d) Determine forcible entry go/no-go criteria.
(e) Determine logistic factors and establishing airhead and beachheadresupply responsibilities.
(f) Determine feasibility of clandestine infiltration of assets for special
reconnaissance prior to commencement of the forcible entry.
(g) Continuation of forcible entry operations following the current
apportionment, guidance, and prioritization of targets.
(h) Branches and sequels for forcible entry operations based on the changing
situation or additional requirements.
(2) Phase II (Assault). Joint forces seize initial objectives in the lodgment andconsolidate those objectives.

B-9

Appendix B(a) Analyzing objectives and potential lodgment with regard to:
1. The proposed ground tactical plan.
2. Potential capability for airborne and amphibious landing of personnel
and equipment.
3. Space within the lodgment, immediate maneuver area, and space for
future operations.
4. Vulnerability to interdiction and counterattacks.
5. Follow-on mission requirements.
(b) Operating facilities and/or infrastructure to support operations.
(c) Identify initial entry and reinforcing entry forces to secure airheads (e.g.,advance, pre-assault, and landing forces) and amphibious forces for beachheads.
1. SOF and information-related capabilities employed in advance ofassault forces.
2. Pre-assault fires to include strikes by cruise missiles, fixed- androtary-wing wing aircraft, and/or NSFS.
3. Overcoming obstacles, both land and maritime.
4. Main assault forces and landing forces.
5. Transition to phase III (stabilization of lodgment).
(d) Reception of reinforcing forces (if required) and follow-on forces for
subsequent operations.
(3) Phase III (Stabilization of Lodgment).
organizing, and expanding the lodgment.

Stabilization includes securing,(a) Identify the requirements for reinforcing forces and projected
deployment flow, with attention to:
1. Cross-load among lift assets.
2. Task-organize by arrival sequence.
(b) Identify potential restrictions and/or limitations in force flow, andeliminate and/or reduce accordingly.
(c) Establish redundancy of force capability in deployment flow for added
flexibility.
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JP 3-18

Control Joint Forcible Entry Operations(d) Establish call-forward procedures for reinforcing forces, if required.
(e) Calculate throughput capability of ports of debarkation.
(f) Determine preparation requirements needed to reinforce forces forcombat on arrival.
(g) Determine requirements for expansion of the lodgment.
(h) Establish force link-up procedures.
(4) Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-On Forces). Follow-on forces provide the
JFC with increased flexibility to conduct operations, as required, by the operational
conditions.
(a) Identify tasks for follow-on forces.
(b) Prepare for arrival of follow-on forces.
(c) Coordinate arrival and/or disposition of any allocated MPF and APS.
(d) Throughput capacity of ports of debarkation.
(5) Phase V (Termination or Transition). A successful forcible entry operation
either attains the campaign end state and terminates or establishes a lodgment and otherinitial operational objectives for a transition to follow-on combat operations.
(a) Continue planning and coordination actions initiated in early phases.
(b) Plan for reconstitution and redeployment of the assault forces.
(c) Plan to terminate the forcible entry portion of the joint operation.
(d) Plan for transition to follow-on operations or termination of the entire
joint operation. Plan for follow-on operations may include the use of nonlethal weapons
to limit casualties, collateral damage, and reconstruction requirements.
(e) Plan for transition and transfer of authorities and responsibilities tocivilian authorities (if applicable).
d. Develop enemy COAs that impact on or affect forcible entry operations or current
and projected future environmental or civil conditions.
(1) Current operations and conditions.
(2) Branches to current operations and conditions.
e. Analyze friendly COAs.

B-11

Appendix B(1) Wargame against enemy COAs or current and projected future environmental
or civil conditions.
(2) Feasible alternatives, using the best information available.
f. Compare friendly COAs.
(1) COA that best achieves objectives against most probable and/or mostdangerous adversary COAs or against most likely or most dangerous and complex
environmental or civil condition.
(2) Feasible alternatives, using the best information available and determining
the advantages and disadvantages of each.
g. Prepare discussion of, and/or recommendation pertaining to, the current estimate.
(1) Prepare recommendations for decisions requiring approval by appropriate
headquarters.
(2) Recommendations may be a formal or informal, depending on the forum andsupervisor's directions.
7. Direct and Lead Subordinate Operational Forcible Entry Operations
a. Approve plans and orders related to forcible entry operations.
b. Synchronize actions following established time-lines and conditions.
c. Coordinate actions and/or operations, where lines of authority and responsibility
meet, overlap, and/or conflict.
(1) Advise components and units of adjacent or related actions and operations.
(2) Direct supporting operations, as required.
(3) Resolve conflicts.
d. Adjust control measures, as required, or relay component adjustments to adjacent,supported, or supporting units.
e. Decide on actions and directions.
f. Change, recommend changes, or continue forcible entry operations and priorities.
(1) Seek commander, JTF, or supervisor’s guidance if a change appears
necessary.
(2) Ensure change remains supportive of current mission and intent, based oncontinuing estimate of the situation.
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JP 3-18

Control Joint Forcible Entry Operations(3) Coordinate and conduct appropriate planning for change.
(4) Coordinate changes in forcible entry operations with other operations, toinclude information operations capabilities.
(5) Write plans and orders for branches and sequels.
g. Approve plans and orders.
h. Issue plans and orders.
8. Acquire and Communicate Operational Information about Forcible Entry
Operations
a. Display information.
b. Brief information.
c. Inform supervisors, decision makers, other JTF staff, and staff counterparts.
(1) Preplanned hierarchy of significant information.
(2) Commander’s critical information requirements.
(3) Understanding of information requirements of commanders and other staff.
d. Report formally (required and periodic) and informally (hasty, as required).
e. Develop general military information for briefings, reports, and analyses.
f. Supervise communications security, computer security, and signal security related
to forcible entry operations.
g. Conduct public affairs related to forcible entry operations.

B-13

Appendix B

Intentionally Blank

B-14

JP 3-18

APPENDIX CREFERENCES
The development of JP 3-18 is based upon the following primary references:
1. Department of Defense Publication
a. DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major
Components.
b. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
2. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications
a. CJCSI 3110.10F, Communication Systems Supplement to the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
b. CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use ofForce for US Forces.
c. CJCSI 3150.25, Joint Lessons Learned Program.
d. CJCSI 5120.02D, Joint Doctrine Development System.
e. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures.
f. CJCSM 3122.02D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)
Volume III, Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment
Execution.
g. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats andGuidance.
h. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
i. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.
j. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.
k. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
l. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.
m. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.
n. JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation.
o. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.
C-1

Appendix C
p. JP 3-05, Special Operations.
q. JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare.
r. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.
s. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.
t. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.
u. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Environments.
v. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.
w. JP 3-13, Information Operations.
x. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.
y. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.
z. JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.
aa. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.
bb. JP 3-14, Space Operations.
cc. JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.
dd. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.
ee. JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.
ff. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.
gg. JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.
hh. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.
ii. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.
jj. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.
kk. JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
ll. JP 3-42, Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
mm. JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.
nn. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.
C-2

JP 3-18

References
oo. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.
pp. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.
qq. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore.
rr. JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.
ss. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs.
tt. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.
uu. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.
vv. JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations.
3. Multi-Service Publications
a. ATP 3-17.2/MCRP 3-21.1B/NTTP 3-02.18/AFTTP 3-2.68, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for Airfield Opening.
b. ATP 3-52.2/MCRP 3-25F/NTTP 3-56.2/AFTTP 3-2.17, Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures for the Theater Air-Ground System.
4. United States Army Publications
a. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations.
b. ADRP 3-05, Special Operations.
c. ADRP 4-0, Sustainment.
d. FM 3-99, Airborne and Air Assault Operations.
5. United States Navy Publications
a. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.
b. NTTP 3-02.2, Supporting Arms Coordination in Amphibious Operations.
6. United States Marine Corps Publications
a. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-1, Strategy.
b. MCDP 1-2, Campaigning.
c. MCDP 1-3, Tactics.
d. MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations.

C-3

Appendix C
e. MCDP 6, Command and Control.
f. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan.
7. United States Air Force Publications
a. Air Force Doctrine Volume 1, Basic Doctrine.
b. Air Force Doctrine Annex 2-0, Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance Operations.
c. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-01, Counterair Operations.
d. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-05, Special Operations.
e. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-03, Counterland Operations.
f. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.
g. Air Force Doctrine Annex 3-34, Engineer Operations.
h. Air Force Doctrine Annex 4-0, Combat Support.

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JP 3-18

APPENDIX DADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
1. User Comments
Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication using
the
Joint
Doctrine
FeedbackFormlocatedat:https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf
ande-mailitto:js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil. These comments should address content(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.
2. Authorshipa. The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor
for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).
b. The following staff, in conjunction with the Joint Doctrine Development
Community, made a valuable contribution to the revision of this Joint Publication: Lead
Agent Mr. William Rogers, United States Army; Joint Staff Doctrine Sponsor MAJ Erik
Archer, Joint Staff J-3, Director of Operations; LtCol Brian Mullery, Joint Staff J-7, Joint
Doctrine Analysis Division; Mr. Lloyd Brown, Joint Staff J-7, Joint Doctrine Division.
3. Supersession
This publication supersedes JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, 27 November
2012.
4. Change Recommendations
a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine changes to this publication,pleasecompletethe
Joint
Doctrine
FeedbackFormlocatedat:https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf
ande-mailitto:js.pentagon.j7.mbx.jedd-support@mail.mil.
b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would changesource document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and otherorganizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.
5. Lessons Learned
The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the development and readiness
D-1

Appendix Dof the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine through the joint doctrine
development process by providing lessons and lessons learned derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP. Lessons and lessons learned areroutinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout formal staffing of thedevelopment process. The JLLIS Website can be found at https://www.jllis.mil(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).
6. Distribution of Publications
Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications isunrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be
IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information Security Program: Overview,
Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, DOD
Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information.
7. Distribution of Electronic Publications
a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions areavailable
on
JDEIS
Joint
Electronic
Library
Plus(JEL+)
athttps://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).
b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, andJoint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by sending written requests to
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base AnacostiaBolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.
c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member,
the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CDROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally
reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support
agencies.

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JP 3-18

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMS
A2
AADC
AADP
AAGS
ACA
ACS
AD
ADRP
AF
AFTTP
AMD
AMLO
AO
AOA
APEX
APF
APOD
APOE
APS-3
ATF
ATP

antiaccessarea air defense commanderarea air defense plan
Army air-ground system
airspace control authority
airspace control systemarea denial
Army doctrine reference publication
amphibious force
Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures
air and missile defense
air mobility liaison officer
area of operations
amphibious objective area
Adaptive Planning and Execution
afloat pre-positioning force
aerial port of debarkation
aerial port of embarkation
Army pre-positioned stocks-3
amphibious task force
Army techniques publication

BCT

brigade combat team

C2
CA
CAP
CAS
CATF
CBRN
CCDR
CCG
CF
CI
CJCSI
CJCSM
CLF
CMO
CO
COA
CONOPSCONPLAN
CONUS

command and control
civil affairscrisis action planning
close air support
commander, amphibious task force
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
combatant commander
combat communications groupconventional forces
counterintelligence
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manualcommander, landing force
civil-military operations
cyberspace operations
course of action
concept of operations
concept plan
continental United States

GL-1

Glossary
CRF

contingency response force

DCA
DOD
DSPD
DZ

defensive counterair
Department of Defense
defense support to public diplomacy
drop zone

EMS
EOD
EW

electromagnetic spectrum
explosive ordnance disposal
electronic warfare

FHA
FM
FP
FSCM

foreign humanitarian assistancefield manual (Army)
force protection
fire support coordination measure

GCC

geographic combatant commander

HIDACZ
HN

high-density airspace control zone
host nation

IED
IO
IRC
ISB

improvised explosive device
information operations
information-related capability
intermediate staging base

J-2
J-6
JEMSMO
JFACC
JFC
JFLCC
JFMCC
JIPOE
JLOTS
JP
JPP
JSOA
JTF

intelligence directorate of a joint staff
communications system directorate of a joint staff
joint electromagnetic spectrum management operations
joint force air component commander
joint force commander
joint force land component commander
joint force maritime component commander
joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment
joint logistics over-the-shore
joint publication
joint planning process
joint special operations area
joint task force

LF
LNO
LOC
LZ

landing force
liaison officerline of communications
landing zone

GL-2

JP 3-18

Glossary
MCDP
MCM
MCRP
MILDEC
MNF
MPF

Marine Corps doctrinal publicationmine countermeasures
Marine Corps reference publication
military deception
multinational force
maritime pre-positioning force

NSFS
NTTP

naval surface fire support
Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

OA
OE
OPCON
OPLAN
OPORD
OPSEC

operational area
operational environment
operational control
operation plan
operation order
operations security

PA
PIR

public affairs
priority intelligence requirement

RADC
ROE
RSOI

regional air defense commander
rules of engagement
reception, staging, onward movement, and integration

SADC
SATCOM
SecDef
SLOC
SOF
SPOD
SPOE
STT

sector air defense commander
satellite communications
Secretary of Defense
sea line of communications
special operations forces
seaport of debarkation
seaport of embarkation
special tactics team

TACS
TF
TMM
TPFDD
TSOC

theater air control systemtask force
transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional
time-phased force and deployment data
theater special operations command

UHF
UW

ultrahigh frequency
unconventional warfare

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

GL-3

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
air assault. The movement of friendly assault forces by rotary-wing or tiltrotor aircraft toengage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. (Approved forincorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
air assault force. A force composed primarily of ground and rotary-wing air units
organized, equipped, and trained for air assault operations. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-18)
air assault operation. An operation in which assault forces, using the mobility of rotarywing or tiltrotor aircraft and the total integration of available fires, maneuver under thecontrol of a ground or air maneuver commander to engage enemy forces or to seize
and hold key terrain. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
airborne assault. The use of airborne forces to parachute into an objective area to attackand eliminate armed resistance and secure designated objectives. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-18)
airborne operation. An operation involving the air movement into an objective area ofcombat forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical, operational, or
strategic mission. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-18)
airhead. 1. A lodgment that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous air landing oftroops and materiel and provides the maneuver space necessary for projected
operations. (JP 3-18) 2. A designated location in an operational area used as a basefor supply and evacuation by air. (JP 3-17) (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)
airhead line. A line denoting the limits of the objective area for an airborne assault.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-18)
assault. 1. In an amphibious operation, the period of time between the arrival of the major
assault forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area and theaccomplishment of the amphibious task force mission. (JP 3-02) 2. To make a short,violent, but well-ordered attack against a local objective, such as a gun emplacement,a fort, or a machine gun nest. (JP 3-18) 3. A phase of an airborne operation beginningwith delivery by air of the assault echelon of the force into the objective area andextending through attack of assault objectives and consolidation of the initial airhead.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-18)
assault phase. In an airborne operation, a phase beginning with delivery by air of theassault echelon of the force into the objective area and extending through attack ofassault objectives and consolidation of the initial airhead. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-18)
combined arms team. The full integration and application of two or more arms orelements of one Service into an operation. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-18)
GL-4

JP 3-18

Glossary
covering force. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)
forcible entry. Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed oppositionor forcing access into a denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish
the mission. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)
initiating directive. An order to a subordinate commander to conduct military operations
as directed. Also called ID. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-18)
lodgment. A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when
seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible andprovides maneuver space for subsequent operations. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 318)
passage of lines. An operation in which a force moves forward or rearward throughanother force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact
with the enemy. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-18)
seize. To employ combat forces to occupy physically and to control a designated area.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-18)
staging base. 1. An advanced naval base for the anchoring, fueling, and refitting oftransports and cargo ships as well as replenishment of mobile service squadrons. (JP4-01.2) 2. A landing and takeoff area with minimum servicing, supply, and shelter
provided for the temporary occupancy of military aircraft during the course of
movement from one location to another. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-18)
vertical envelopment. None. (Approved for removal from the DOD Dictionary.)

GL-5

Glossary

Intentionally Blank

GL-6

JP 3-18

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY
JP 1
JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1-0JP 2-0JP 3-0

JP 4-0JP 5-0

JP 6-0PERSONNEL

INTELLIGENCEOPERATIONSLOGISTICS

PLANS

COMMUNICATIONSSYSTEMAll joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-18 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:
STEP #1 - Initiation

STEP #4 - Maintenancel

JP published and continuously
assessed by users
l Formal assessment begins
24-27 months following
publicationl Revision begins 3.5 years
after publicationl Each JP revision is completed
no later than 5 years after
signaturelJoint doctrine development
community (JDDC) submission to fillextant operational voidl Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts frontend analysis
l Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
validationl Program directive (PD) development
and staffing/joint working groupl PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorshipl JS J-7 approves and releases PD tolead agent (LA) (Service, combatantcommand, JS directorate)

MaintenanceInitiation

ENHANCEDJOINTWARFIGHTINGCAPABILITYJOINT
DOCTRINE
PUBLICATION

Approval

Development

STEP #3 - Approvall

JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
JS J-7 prepares publication for signaturel JSDS prepares JS staffing packagel JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signaturel

STEP #2 - Developmentl

LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the firstdraft (FD)l PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC
l FD comment matrix adjudicationl JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) systeml Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrixl FC joint working group