Summary of Recommendations on
The US Bioeconomy: Maximizing
Opportunities for Economic Growthand National Security with Biology
August 12, 2019

Center for Health Security

Introduction
On July 16, the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and Ginkgo Bioworks convened ameeting in Washington, DC, to solicit stakeholder input on specific ways that national policy canstrengthen the US bioeconomy. For the purposes of this meeting, the bioeconomy was definedbroadly as the economy built on biotechnology. There currently is no consensus on a definitionof bioeconomy, but most accept that it encompasses parts of the energy, agriculture, medical,industrial, and defense sectors. The aims of the meeting were to consider the benefits to theUS if its bioeconomy were to be expanded; examine the current health of the US bioeconomy;
discuss existing US government programs, policies, and initiatives related to the bioeconomy; andidentify priorities for strengthening the US bioeconomy.
The United States already hosts one of the world’s most competitive bioeconomy markets andis a leader in biological innovation and education. However, recent advances in biologicaltechnologies are catalyzing global investment, spurring innovation, and increasing internationalcompetitiveness. As the growth or neglect of the US bioeconomy affects national security, it iscritical for the US to actively develop new mechanisms that leverage advantages in biotechnology
for its benefit in the face of greater peer competition.
The US Bioeconomy meeting featured participation from members of government, academia,and industry, including subject matter experts from a range of disciplines and sectors:
venture capitalists, biotechnology entrepreneurs, defense prime contractors, synthetic biologyindustry analysts, and defense, health, and agriculture scientists and experts. A list of meeting
participants is attached. The meeting provided an opportunity to discuss US policy options, both
opportunities and limitations, in a frank, open manner. Comments were not for attribution.
The meeting was supported by the Open Philanthropy Project. The Center for Health Securityand Ginkgo Bioworks did not attempt to reach stakeholder consensus on the myriad of topics
discussed during the meeting. What follows is the Center for Health Security’s synthesis ofrecommendations made by one or more participants during the meeting.

Government should move toward contracting mechanisms that emphasize cost savings
across the enterprise, as well as factoring in nonmonetary benefits of biologically
produced materials.
Fuels, specialty chemicals, and other products made using biological processes may be expensive
in comparison to products made through more traditional approaches, including petroleumbased nonbiological industrial approaches. However, that higher cost does not include thepotential benefits of biologically processed products, including sustainability, reduced logistics
costs if the biologically produced products can be produced closer to where they are needed,
opportunities to alleviate supply chain constraints or avoid disruptions, and avoidance ofenvironmental contamination and damage. If those factors are included in a cost analysis whencomparing products made from biological processes to standard approaches, biologically derived
products may be substantially less expensive than traditionally manufactured products. In
addition to costs, there are potential national security gains, if the ability to manufacture items
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security		

2biologically can alleviate supply chain disruption risks. The US government should examine
its purchasing strategies with this full range of costs and benefits in mind, and move toward
contracting mechanisms that emphasize cost savings across the enterprise, fully accounting forlife cycle costs, sustainability, logistics, environmental remediation, carbon footprint, and theavailability of the product in the event of traditional supply chain disruptions.

Government should identify ways to recruit and retain talent needed to run innovative
biotechnology R&D programs.
There is a well-documented lack of expertise in biotechnology across multiple government
agencies, which leads to poor decision making, missed opportunities, and insufficient
coordination across government agencies. Important national security consequences may result—for example, a lack of biotechnology expertise in the Committee on Foreign Investment in theUnited States (CFIUS) could directly affect the health of the US bioeconomy by not appropriately
estimating the national security importance of a particular biotechnology.
Rectifying this knowledge gap will require direct action at many levels, to include: drawing talentfrom the private sector and people with nontraditional backgrounds to positions with expectedshort tenures in the government; encouraging “open campus” initiatives that draw expertise fromregional biotechnology centers to work with government service laboratories or government
agency programs; and creating opportunities for promotion for biotechnology experts so thatthey can move up the career ladder in the government.
In contrast to information security, where there are American National Standards Institute(ANSI) standards for certifications and mechanisms within the government, particularly
the Department of Defense (DoD), to make such certifications required for promotion,biotechnology does not have an accompanying ANSI standard or required courses to taketo become certified in biotechnology. While there are excellent biotechnology education
opportunities in the government, such as at the National Defense University, these training
courses should be expanded and standardized to seed expertise in biotechnology at high levels ofgovernment.
Retention of biotechnology talent in the US is another urgent problem that can be addressed
through financial incentives and green card access. The National Science Foundation tracks
the emigration of US PhD-trained researchers to other nations and foreign students who aretrained in the US and return to their home countries. In addition to that loss of talent, when
US-trained foreign-born scientists return to their home countries, biotechnology companies are
not being formed in the US. US-trained graduate students and postdoctoral fellows may also nothave the option to stay in the US after their training is completed, another way the US is losing
critical biotechnology talent. Green cards for biotechnology researchers, in particular, should bestreamlined.
The US can create a good environment for those entering the biotechnology workforce bydemonstrating that this area is a US priority. Funding basic research with minimal fluctuations
from year to year; funding science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education
The US Bioeconomy: Maximizing Opportunities for Economic Growth and National Security with Biology		

3initiatives; supporting international genetically engineered machine competition (iGEM) teams
and advisors; instituting financial incentives to discourage synthetic biology companies and otherbiotechnology companies from locating offshore; developing the workforce through retraining
programs; ensuring that women are targeted for advancement in STEM fields; and encouraging
foreign students who receive their PhDs in the US in technical areas to stay in the country by
issuing green cards enabling them to work here—all of these are options that demonstrate the UScommitment to biotechnology growth and promotion of the bioeconomy.

The US government should initiate the tracking of data around the biotech workforce
and company formation as these data compare to other countries.
Data on the US brain drain in science and technology is widely available from the academic
perspective through the National Science Foundation (for example, numbers of researchers
trained in scientific areas that have left the US), but there is limited data from the industry
perspective and others not covered by the NSF efforts. How many additional companies would
have been formed in the US if potential founders, after being trained in the US, did not haveto go back to their home countries? More effort to quantify the extent of the problem can yieldadditional options for financial and other solutions to these problems.

The US government should articulate a vision for its bioeconomy and coordinate its
efforts to promote and protect the bioeconomy.
Many US agencies are “directionally correct” in their efforts to embrace biotechnology andthe bioeconomy, but they are largely doing it independently of other agencies, which leads toduplication and incremental progress. A visionary, broader interagency approach is needed, withleadership and a plan: The current efforts under way at the DoD, National Security Council/
Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Congress are thus timely and should yield long-term
strategies.
One important step for the US is to be a good customer, to get companies off the ground, and toembrace its role as a bioeconomy catalyst. Biotechnologies are not generally fostered in the US
government, so partnership with the private sector is important. There are many actions thatshould be taken, including the following:• Government contracting should be a faster, smoother process for small businesses. A
government liaison could partner with small companies to lead them through the process
or link them with primes or service laboratories, which can assume a lot more risk thanprivate companies.
• There should be more incentives for government program managers to award contracts
and to make the contracting process smoother, easier, and faster.
• Programs like the US Air Force Pathfinder program could be a model for ways to facilitate
mutually productive government contracts and value talented workers. In this innovative
in-house modernization effort, launched in 2017, the program managers changed their
typical acquisition procedures to “think like a start-up,” delivering results at a fraction ofthe price.

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4••

•
•

•The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS): CFIUS is aninteragency committee authorized to review certain transactions involving foreign
investment in the US (“covered transactions”), in order to determine the effect of suchtransactions on the national security of the US. The US government should do more to
anticipate CFIUS concerns and to pay companies to develop their technology in the US.
Programs put into place to encourage bio-investment, such as “BioPreferred Program,”
managed by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), which aims to spur economic
development, create new jobs, and provide new markets for farm commodities, require
more teeth—stronger incentives for implementation.
Expansion of SBIR programs for biotech companies are important and successful ways topromote small company development.
Tax credits that favor the founding of biotechnology companies. Canada has taken thisapproach with artificial intelligence, and although it may seem to be a slow process, it has
been extraordinarily successful.
Initiatives to create “opportunity zones” for biotechnology and fermentation facilities,
which is a designation created by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, to allow for certain
investments in lower income areas to have tax advantages and provide educationinitiatives for retraining veterans in biotechnology.

The US government should consider strategic use of non-dilutive capital, matched by VC
investments, to help drive the creation of key biotech companies that would be importantto the US bioeconomy.
The government can offer non-dilutive financing to biotechnology companies—where thecompany founders do not lose equity in their company—which may offset a great deal of risk
for future venture capital funders. The government has traditionally had a difficult time picking
winners and losers among young companies, particularly as the time scale for government
funding tends to be short (in the range of 2-3 years) and success requires a longer term
commitment. Partnering with venture capitalists (VCs) can help sustain a technology, because
when a VC invests, they are committing to the company’s success and growth. A blended USGVC investment strategy may work best, where milestones are set for US government financial
rewards when a company meets challenges. This signals to the investment community that abiotechnology company has drawn government interest. Smaller government grants and seedfunding can also provide proof to investors that the technology is worth the investment.

The US government should work to clarify the uncertain regulatory pathway for novel
synthetic biology products.
Regulatory science funding is needed, as a clear regulatory environment could help to speed
bioeconomy investments and growth. As biotechnology products pose different regulatory
challenges than have been experienced before (using living biological organisms for mining, forexample), regulatory pathways for such products need to be developed and capture biotechnology
risks. Having a regulatory system that appropriately examines real risks stemming frombiotechnology products will help avoid public distrust resulting from oversight gaps.
The US Bioeconomy: Maximizing Opportunities for Economic Growth and National Security with Biology		

5If the US government were more explicit about what kinds of biotechnology-derived
products it may need, the biotechnology industry could be more valuable to thegovernment.
There are direct applications of synthetic biology beyond medical countermeasures that offer
value to the US economy and defense. Products such as biologically made concrete, cloth, caffeineproduction, food, and rare earth mining are just a few biotechnologies that may be valuable to
the government or to defense. In addition, there are medical benefits, including regenerative
manufacturing of organs or human tissue, that may benefit injured warfighters.
There may be more products that could have biology-based solutions, but more communicationand knowledge is required to bring those ideas from industry to the government. Morebiotechnology “knowledge brokers” within the government—people who build networks between
the US government, private biotechnology companies, and VC—are needed to identify theseopportunities.

Conclusion
The growth of the bioeconomy should be a priority for the US, to take advantage of the benefits
that biotechnology will bring across a variety of sectors and for continued national security.
DoD and, broadly, US government leadership must embrace biotechnology and the bioeconomy
as critical components of the US economy and invest accordingly. The ideas presented above
represent a range of practical recommendations for consideration by US government officials in
the coming months.
The following members of the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security contributed to this report:
Gigi Kwik Gronvall, Lane Warmbrod, Marc Trotochaud, Anita Cicero, and Tom Inglesby.

Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security		

6Meeting ParticipantsJennifer Alton
Pathway Policy

Robert Fisher
FDA

Kavita Berger
Gryphon Scientific

Sarah Glaven
US Naval Research Laboratory

Elizabeth Bernard
Sandhill Consulting

Jimmy Gollihar
US Army Research Laboratory

Kenneth Bernard

Gigi Gronvall
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security

Patrick Boyle
Ginkgo Bioworks
Richard Bruns
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
Sarah Carter
Science Policy Consulting
Linda Chrisey
OUSD R&E Human Systems Directorate
Anita Cicero
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
Nancy Connell
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
John Cumbers
SynBioBeta
Diane DiEuliis
NDU
James Diggans
Twist Bioscience
Peter Emanuel
US Army Futures Command

Chris Hassell
HHS/ASPR
Richard Hatchett
CEPI
Andrea Hodgson
The National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine
Orin Hoffman
The Engine
Tom Inglesby
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
Nathan Khosia
Lockheed Martin
Andy Kilianski
Department of Defense/JPEO-CBRND
Brett Lambert
Northrop Grumman
Monique K. Mansoura
MITRE

The US Bioeconomy: Maximizing Opportunities for Economic Growth and National Security with Biology		

7Megan Palmer
Stanford University
Wallace Patterson
Air Force Research Laboratory
Edward Perkins
US Army Corps of Engineers
Scott Plevy
Synlogic Therapeutics
Melissa Rhoads
Lockheed Martin
Michelle Rozo
US Department of State
Marc Salit
Joint Initiative for Metrology in Biology
Zach Smith
Ginkgo Bioworks
Dahlia Sokolov
House Subcommittee on Research & Technology
David Stenger
US Naval Research Laboratory

Leonard TenderCenter for Bio/Molecular Science and Engineering,
US Naval Research Laboratory
Alexander Titus
OUSD (R&E)
Marc Trotochaud
Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security
Gary Vora
US Naval Research Laboratory
Lane WarmbrodJohns Hopkins Center for Health Security
Ian Watson
OSTPRenee Wegrzyn
DARPA
Misha Wolfson
Ginkgo Bioworks
Adam Woomer
Lockheed Martin

Dimitria Stratis-Cullum
US Army Research Laboratory

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