Minds at War

China’s Pursuit of Military Advantage
through Cognitive Science andBiotechnology
By Elsa B. Kania

T

he United States is starting to confront unprecedented challenges to the military and technologicalsuperiority that it has enjoyed in recent history. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is emerging as a
powerhouse across a range of emerging technologies, and Chinese leaders recognize today’s technological revolution as a critical, even historic, opportunity to achieve strategic advantage.1 As Chairman of
the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Commander-in-Chief of the CMC Joint Operations Center,
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has highlighted the importance of militaryinnovation to “keep pace with the times” (与时俱进) and adapt to the global revolution in military affairs.2
Indeed, Xi has declared, “In circumstances of increasingly intense global military competition, only
the innovators win.”3 Responding to this directive and imperative, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) has been actively exploring a range of new theories, capabilities, and technologies that are believed
to be critical to future operational advantage.4 The PLA is looking to improve its capacity to leverage academic and commercial developments in the process through China’s national strategy of “military-civil
fusion” (军民融合).5 In particular, Chinese innovation is poised to pursue synergies among brain science,
artificial intelligence (AI), and biotechnology that may have far-reaching implications for its future military
power and aggregate national competitiveness. Chinese military leaders appear to believe that such emerging technologies will be inevitably weaponized, often pointing to a quotation by Engels: “Once technologicaladvancements can be used for military purposes and have been used for military purposes, they very immediately and almost necessarily, often violating the commander’s will, cause changes or even transformations inthe styles of warfare.”6 The PLA intends to achieve an operational advantage through seizing the initiative inthe course of this transformation.

Chinese Military Innovation in the New Era
Chinese military scientists and strategists have often been animated in their thinking by concern with theprogression of the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) that is believed to be catalyzed by today’s
technological advancements.7 The PLA has closely examined the U.S. military’s approach to warfare, applying
Ms. Elsa B. Kania is an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New
American Security. Her views are her own.

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K ANIAlessons learned to its own military modernization inseeking to catch up, while also looking for opportunities to pursue asymmetric capabilities or attempt
to achieve a first-mover advantage to overtake
this “powerful adversary” (强敌). Since the 1990s,
Chinese military modernization has particularly
concentrated on pursuing a strategy of “informatization” (信息化).8 Through this agenda, the PLA has
developed an array of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and concentrated
on advancing capabilities for information operations(信息作战), including cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare.9
Today, PLA strategists anticipate a newstyle of warfare is on the horizon, as the character of conflict evolves from informatized toward“intelligentized” (智能化) warfare, in which AI,
along with a range of technologies, is changing
the form of warfare.10 According to Lt. Gen. Liu
Guozhi (刘国治), Director of the Central MilitaryCommission Science and Technology Commission,“AI will accelerate the process of military transformation, ultimately leading to a profound
Revolution in Military Affairs . . . The combinationof artificial intelligence and human intelligencecan achieve the optimum, and human-machine
hybrid intelligence will be the highest form of
future intelligence.”11 This striking statement
highlights the PLA’s interest at the highest levelsin the notion of “hybrid intelligence” (混合智能),a concept that implies a blending of human andmachine intelligence, including through leveraging
insights from brain science and such techniques
as the use of brain-computer interfaces.12 This
concept is not merely abstract but is starting to berealized through new programs, including projects
intended to promote human performance enhancement. Future intelligentized operations (智能化作
战) are expected to involve prominent employment
of intelligent autonomy (智能自主) in weapons

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systems under conditions of multi-domain integration (多域一体) with command exercised throughbrain-machine integration, enabled by cloudinfrastructure.13 Chinese military scientists andstrategists expect that this revolution in warfare
will also demand transformation of the humanelement of warfare, which may require seeking
command of the brain and biological sciences.

Reforming for Innovation
China’s military reforms have elevated the importance of innovation in ways that could contributeto the PLA’s ability to overcome prior difficulties.
In this new era of Chinese military power, the PLA
is seeking to reorient toward a model that leverages science and technology as core enablers of
combat capabilities.14 Pursuant to the reforms, the
PLA has created the CMC Steering Committee on
Military Scientific Research, which is responsible
for establishing high-level priorities and strategic
directions.15 The CMC Science and Technology
Commission (S&TC) has also been elevated tolead and guide military technological innovationand to promote military-civil fusion.16 The S&TC
oversees a number of plans, programs, and expert
groups of top scientists for priorities that include
human-machine fusion intelligence and biotechnology.17 The CMC S&TC also has launched a plan andfund focused on cutting-edge technologies, and its“rapid response small group” on defense innovation
is looking to help the PLA improve its capacity toleverage commercial technologies, including newtechniques for human-machine interaction.18
China’s military scientific enterprise has beentransformed in the course of the PLA’s reforms.19
The PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS),
which has been responsible traditionally for issues ofstrategy and doctrine, has been officially designatedto lead the PLA’s military scientific enterprise.20
AMS has launched the National Innovation Institutefor Defense Technology (国防科技创新研究院),

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which includes research institutes that focus on not
only unmanned systems and artificial intelligencebut also frontier/cutting-edge interdisciplinary(前沿交叉) technologies,21 such as biotechnology
and quantum technology.22 The leadership of AMS
also possesses the expertise and authority to promote these new directions in military innovation.
Notably, Lt. Gen. Yang Xuejun (杨学军), who is
known for his research in supercomputing and artificial intelligence, has become its President as of July
2017.23 As Vice President, Maj. Gen. He Fuchu (贺福初), formerly President of the Academy of Military
Medical Sciences (AMMS), is known for his researchinterests in genomics and bioinformatics, and he has
also been prominent in emphasizing the importanceof biotechnology as a new “strategic commandingheights” (制高点) of strategic competition.24 Their
selection to lead AMS appears to highlight the extent
to which the PLA has prioritized these strategic
technologies as a new direction for its development.
The PLA’s paradigm for military innovation looks to promote integration of theory andtechnology to advance the development of newconcepts and capabilities.25 Notably, the CMC
S&TC has been funding a program on biologicalinterdisciplinary sciences and technology. Thisinitiative includes projects on military brain science, advanced biomimetic systems, biological andbiomimetic materials, and human enhancement.26
In parallel with the China Brain Project, which
has been launched as a national initiative for the
2016–30 timeframe, the CMC S&TC also appears
to have launched a military brain science projectthat is exploring the potential of advances in neuroscience for military applications.27 According
to Hu Dewen (胡德文), a prominent researcher
from the PLA’s National University of Defense
Technology (NUDT), the PLA should recognize
the concurrent importance of and relationshipamong artificial intelligence, biological intelligence, and hybrid intelligence.28

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PLA Expectations for Future Warfare
Chinese strategists anticipate that the tempo andcomplexity of operations will increase, perhaps
dramatically, as the form (形态) or character of
warfare continues to evolve.29 As a result, PLA
thinkers are concerned about the intense cognitive
challenges that future commanders will encounter,particularly considering the importance of optimizing human-machine coordination (人机协同)and fusion or integration (人机融合).30 Necessarily,
these trends have intensified the PLA’s interest in
the military relevance of not only artificial intelligence but also brain science and new directions inbiological interdisciplinary (生物交叉) technologies, ranging from biosensing and biomaterials tooptions for human enhancement.31 The transition
from informatization to intelligentization is seen
as necessitating the upgrading of human cognitive
performance to keep pace with the complexityof warfare.
In future conflict, the battlefield is expected toextend into new virtual domains. According to He
Fuchu, “The sphere of operations will be expandedfrom the physical domain and the information
domain to the domain of consciousness (意识域);the human brain will become a new combat space.”32
Consequently, success on the future battlefield will
require achieving not only “biological dominance”(制生权) but also “mental/cognitive dominance”(制脑权) and “intelligence dominance” (制智权).33
These nascent concepts, which are becoming moreregularly discussed in influential writings, reflect
the PLA’s recognition of the increasing importanceof contesting superiority within these new frontiers
to achieving advantage.34 Despite the complexity
and capability of advanced technologies, this humanelement of warfare remains a critical vulnerability
and source of potential advantage. At the same time,
the notion of “winning without fighting” (不战而屈人之兵) is a traditional element of Chinese strategic
thinking that possesses enduring relevance in an era

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K ANIAin which technology is becoming ever more consequential to strategic competition in peacetime.35

Human and Artificial Intelligence on
the Future Battlefield
The PLA recognizes the advent of AI as a challenge
and opportunity to seize the initiative in future military competition.36 In fact, some military academics
even anticipate that AI “will transcend firepower,machine power, and information power, becoming
the most critical factor in determining the outcomeof warfare.”37 In future “intelligentized operations,”
algorithmic advantage could become a dominant
determinant of operational advantage, yet operations
to subvert and counter an adversary’s intelligentizedcapabilities (“逆智能化”) are also seen as potentiallyadvantageous, particularly for a weaker military.38
Indeed, AI also possesses a number of limitationsat present, including on issues of safety and security
that may render it vulnerable to exploitation.
PLA scholars and strategists are continuing
to debate the appropriate relationship between
human and machine intelligence on the battlefield.39 In an authoritative commentary, the CMC
Joint Staff Department urged the PLA to takeadvantage of the “tremendous potential” of AI in
operational command, planning and deductions,and decision support.40 Whereas some scholars havewarned against autonomous decisionmaking, otherresearchers have differentiated between the eventual necessity for automation or “intelligentization”
of command decisionmaking at the tactical level of
warfare, the importance of the delegation of command authorities in campaigns, and the imperativeof human control in strategic decisionmaking, inwhich AI can take on a supporting function.41 PLA
thinkers recognize the importance of leveraging therelative strengths of human and machine intelligence respectively, and this interaction necessitates
progress in techniques for human-machine coordination in combat.

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These dynamics of future intelligentized operations elevate the criticality of cognition. A growing
number of PLA scholars and strategists have argued
that “mental/cognitive dominance” (制脑权) and“intelligence dominance” (制智权), concepts thatare characterized as interrelated or sometimes synonymous in recent writings, will become the key
points of struggle (制权争夺点).42 Unlike traditional
operations, the confrontation is occurring increasingly in the space of human intelligence (人的智力空间) and inherently involves “competition for cognitive speed and quality advantage,” which can be
enabled by data fusion.43 The importance of speed,
efficiency, and flexibility in intelligentized operations has provoked consideration of not only options
for intelligent decision support systems,44 but also“brain-machine fusion” (脑机融合) as a future
paradigm for command and control, which would
require integrating the art of command with emerging scientific and technological advancements.45
The notion of brain control (脑控) primarily
involves brain-machine/computer interface (脑–机接口) technology that is intended to enable efficienthuman-machine integration (人机融合), and PLA
researchers continue to explore multiple modalitiesof human-machine interaction for command andcontrol.46 At the same time, cognitive enhancement,such as through the use of transcranial magnetic
stimulation, could be leveraged to achieve an advantage in complex battlefield environments, in which
there will be a high degree of integration between
humans and weapons systems.47
PLA strategists believe that achieving “mental dominance” (制脑权) will be critical in future
military competition across the spectrum frompeacetime to warfighting.48 Increasingly, this concept has recurred in PLA writings that emphasize
the criticality of the “cognitive domain” (认知领域), which involves “the field of decision-making
through reasoning,” as the speed and complexity ofconflict continue to increase.49 Success in subverting

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an adversary’s cognition can enable “winningwithout fighting.”50 The increased integration ofhuman cognition with technology influences military perception confrontation (军事感知对抗),which involves attempts to hinder and distort theadversary’s cognition, whether through technical,
physiological, or psychological techniques.51 In an
era of informatized warfare, conflict in the cognitive
domain attempts to undermine the adversary’s will
and resolve, undermine perception and command
capabilities to weaken fighting spirit, and manipulate decisionmaking.52 The study of operations
undertaken by the U.S. and Russian militaries has
also influenced Chinese military thinking on theimportance of psychological operations, but PLA
thinkers are seeking to innovate their own tactics
and concepts of operations,53 including exploring
the potential employment of intelligent agents toenable “guidance” of public opinion.54 In particular, the prominence of social media and advances in
artificial intelligence, including such techniques as
deep fakes, have created new options for subversion
and manipulation. The PLA is actively pursuingresearch and the development of capabilities, which
could range from the use of the drug Modafinil for
performance enhancement, to leveraging insightsfrom brain science and psychology to target andexploit inherent vulnerabilities in human cognition.
While apparently enthusiastic about the offensive
potential of such options, the PLA is concerned
about the potential for subversion of its own forces,
including persistent anxieties about the prospects ofcolor revolution.55
Consequently, the pursuit of advances in militarybrain science is recognized as important to advancing
future battlefield effectiveness.56 In particular, thisnew domain in military competition is seen as variously involving attempts to “imitate the brain”(仿脑), leverage “brain control” (脑控), “enhance thebrain” (超脑), or “control the brain” (“控脑”).57 On
the battlefield, attempts to undermine an adversary

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could include interfering with the adversary’s capacity
for cognition, whether through manipulation or outright destruction, from disrupting the flow of data to
exploiting ideology or emotion.58 Increasingly, “mental confrontation” (脑对抗) could become a major
feature of future conflicts, involving attack, defense,and enhancement of the brain.59 Maj. Gen. He Fuchu
has anticipated the development of “a new brain-control weaponry” that interferes with and controls
people’s consciousness, thereby subverting combatstyles.60 Concretely, Zhou Jin (周瑾), a researcher with
the Institute of Military Cognition and Brain Scienceat AMMS, has concentrated on brain science andneural engineering, and his research has also contributed to an expert group on psychological warfare andcognitive technology through the CMC Science andTechnology Commission.61
The PLA’s intended integration of human andmachine intelligence could be eventually facilitated by advances in brain-machine interfaces. For
instance, at the PLA’s National University of Defense
Technology (NUDT), the Cognitive Science Basic
Research Team (认知科学基础研究团队) has been
engaged in research on brain-machine interfaces(脑机接口) for more than 20 years, such that thistechnology can now be used to operate a robot, drivea vehicle, or even to operate a computer, enabledby the processing of EEG signals.62 “Combining
the high functioning of the machine with the highintelligence of human beings to achieve high performance of equipment systems, this is an important
domain of application in intelligent​​
science,”according to Hu Dewen (胡德文), who has led thisprogram.63 In the PLA’s Information Engineering
University’s Information Systems Engineering
College, Tong Li (通李) has been engaged inresearch on intelligent information processing andbrain-computer interaction (脑机交互), which has
been reportedly leveraged to enable brain control of a drone or robot.64 Meanwhile, at AMMS,
Wang Changyong (王常勇), Deputy Director of the

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Institute of Military Cognition and Brain Science,
has engaged in research on brain-machine interfaces, variously pursuing EEGs (via the scalp) and
implants in the cranial nerves of macaques, which
are believed to be an apt model to simulate humancognition, concentrating on neural informationacquisition.65 The complexity of these challenges areseen as increasing the importance of sophisticatedsimulations in combat laboratories that can explore
the efficacy of these human-machine synergies.66
In advancing these techniques, the PLA could
leverage academic research and commercial developments. For instance, Tsinghua University, whichis actively supporting military-civil fusion, has been
pursuing research on human-machine interaction(人机协作) with funding from the CMC Science andTechnology Commission.67 In Tianjin, a local action
plan has called for research in brain-computerinterface technologies, including brain-controlled
unmanned systems and even automatic sniper
rifles.68 At Tianjin University, the Academy of
Military Science and the Chinese Academy of
Launch Vehicle Technology have both establishedjoint laboratories and partnerships that concentrateon innovation in human-machine hybrid intelligence (人机混合智能).69 The State Key Laboratoryof Cognitive Science and Learning, based at Beijing
Normal University, has also pursued initiatives inmilitary-civil fusion.70
Pursuant to military-civil fusion, Chinese
advances in brain-computer interface researchundertaken by academic institutions or commercial
enterprises may eventually have military relevance.
During the past couple of years, the Chinese government has convened a national competition on
brain-computer interfaces, of which the PLA NUDT
is a co-sponsor.71 In addition, AMMS researchers
have engaged with a commercial enterprise thatis specializing in the development of EEG products, known as Cogrowth (ku chengzhang, 酷成长), which has concentrated in its products on

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brain-computer interface and intelligent control
with applications that include attention and memory
training.72 Meanwhile, Tianjin University and the
China Electronics Corporation have achieved new
breakthroughs in research on a brain-computerinterface (BCI) chip, known as “Brain Talker,” whichis specially designed to decode brainwave information.73 The advantages of this chip are described asincluding its size, precision, efficiency in decoding information, and increased capability for fastcommunication, all of which can contribute to therealization of BCI technologies.74 According to its
designers, “this BC3 (Brain-Computer Codec Chip)
has the ability to discriminate minor neural electrical signals and decode their information efficiently,
which can greatly enhance the speed and accuracyof brain-computer interfaces.”75 So too, as combat
platforms are expected to progress from “informatization” to “low intelligentization” to “brain-like highintelligentization,” such breakthroughs in brain-likecomputing chips are anticipated to be important toadvancing autonomy.76
As the cognitive demands for commanders
are expected to become more acute on the future
battlefield, new directions in integrating human andmachine intelligence could prove militarily advantageous. Through leveraging “brain networking” (脑联网), a “combat brain” (作战大脑) can be developed for the future battlefield, which is expected toenhance the cognitive and decisionmaking capabilities of military commanders, including throughimproving their cognitive capability and understanding of the battlefield situation, according to NUDT
scholars.77 Hypothetically, a so-called “network ofbrains” could accelerate real-time transmission ofdata on the battlefield, based on leveraging brain-machine interfaces to facilitate communication between
commanders and their units. Wu Haitao (吴海涛), a
researcher with AMMS, has postulated;“Brain networking” technologies are far
from mature, but we have good reason to

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believe that bio-intelligence networks basedon brain intelligence will inevitably surpass existing informatized technology andweak artificial intelligence technologies. The
development and application of related technologies will inevitably accelerate disruptive
transformations in the military domain. In
the future, a brain-to-brain collaborative
combat platform or system based on “brain
networks” may be exploited, which can be
expected to achieve high-level optimizationand integration of battlefield perception,
logistics support, weaponry and command
systems, maximize combat links and command effectiveness, so as to capture fleeting
opportunities in the ever-changing battlefieldsituation and achieve unexpected victories.78
The notion of brain networking through brainto-brain interfacing may sound fanciful, but there
are initial experimental indications that this could
become a technical possibility. For instance, in anexperiment at Zhejiang University, researchers
created a so-called rat cyborg through implanting
microelectrodes into the brain of a live rat, whichconnected it to the brain of a human “manipulator”
who had been connected to a computer brain-machine interface, by which the rat was directed tonavigate a maze.79
The future trajectory of such advances could
be shaped by the continued implementation of the
China Brain Project, which was launched in 2016.80
The project, which was initially initiated in responseto the U.S. brain science program, is recognized
as a megaproject for the 2016–2030 timeframe.81 It
may receive billions in funding once fully realized.82
The leading researcher involved in the design ofthis project, Mu-Ming Pu of the Chinese Academyof Sciences, has described this project as involving“two wings,” encompassing not only brain sciencebut the intersection between brain science andartificial intelligence, which is believed to be highly

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promising.83 The focus on imitation of the brain
often involves brain-like and brain-inspired intelligence, which is a high-level priority highlighted
in China’s New Generation Artificial Intelligence
Development Plan and operationalized through a
new national laboratory dedicated to the topic.84 In
addition, in September 2015, Beijing’s Science andTechnology Commission announced the launch of a
special project on brain science research to concentrate on brain cognition, brain medicine, andbrain-like computing. This center plans to support
projects that leverage new biomedical techniques,
including high-throughput single-gene sequencing
and precise genome editing, enabled by big-dataprocessing.85 The involvement of AMMS is notable
but hardly surprising considering that neurosciencehas been highlighted as a priority in China’s plans
for military-civil fusion, and there may be interesting synergies between academic research andpotential military applications.86
This research agenda is starting to translate
into practical advances. For instance, the Tianjic
chip leverages a brain-inspired architecture, andits designers claim that it represents an important
progression toward artificial general intelligencethat is comparable to humans in its capabilities.87
As one prominent academic highlighted, “Humanbeings have gradually entered the era of artificial
intelligence, but the understanding of the essence ofwhat constitutes ‘intelligence’ remains unclear. The
study of brain and cognition will promote people’s
understanding of the essence of ‘intelligence’ andpromote the development of related technologies
and industries.”88 Seemingly speculatively, theseattempts at imitating human cognition have been
described as possessing the potential to extend to thedevelopment of highly intelligent weapons systems
capable of reasoning and judgment comparable tothat of a human.89
Within the same timeframe, the CMC S&TC
has also launched a military brain science plan and

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projects that appear to be occurring in parallel—
and perhaps with some degree of integration or
coordination—with China’s national brain science
project.90 For instance, Wu Shengxi (武胜昔), a professor with the Fourth Military Medical University
who is engaged in both initiatives, has concentrated
his research on the plasticity of the central nervous
circuits and mechanisms of advanced brain function.91 His activities have included collaboration
with a senior scientist from MIT’s Broad Instituteand the McGovern Institute for a project on theanterior cingulate cortex, a region of the brain that“plays a role in fundamental cognitive processes,
including cost-benefit calculation, motivation,and decisionmaking.”92 Chinese academic andmilitary medical institutions have concentrated
on the expansion of military brain science, which
has been prioritized for support and funding.93
Overall, the discipline of military cognitive neuroscience continues to evolve and involves several
interrelated research directions, which can include
brain monitoring (for example, to measure andassess the military mental work); brain modulation(mind-controlling targets and effects); brain damage; and brain promotion (neuro-scientific training
methods).94 For instance, the first seminar convenedon brain science research and military-civil fusion
collaborative innovation concentrated on core competencies of battlefield perception, command andcontrol, target striking, identifying ten key research
directions for such military cognitive capabilities(军事认知能力).95
Chinese research is anticipated to have certain potential advantages in this field. China’s
rapidly aging population presents an acute societal challenge but also an opportunity to leveragesizable amounts of data about brain disease.96 At
the same time, the prevalence of primate researchin China could prove another significant advantage. At a time when the United States and Europe
have started to cut back on primate research due to90 | FE ATURE S

Game-changing synthetic biology research
may enable future capabilities for Soldiers(U.S. Army Photo by Eric Proctor and Autumn
Kulaga)ethical concerns and expense, these programs havecontinued to expand in China with robust state
support.97 The Chinese government has undertaken
significant investments to expand its own neuroscience research with non-human primates, which are
believed to be “ideal animal models for understanding human brain and cognition.”98 In particular,
China has become a global center for research
involving macaque monkeys, which are seen as wellsuited as a model for research on the human brain.99
In one notable study, researchers introduced the
MCPH1 gene, which is believed to be linked to brain
development, into embryos to create transgenic
macaque monkeys that demonstrated improved performance on short-term memory tasks, while also
displaying a longer process of brain development,such as that characteristic of humans.100 This study
was described as “the first attempt to experimentallyinterrogate the genetic basis of human brain origin
using transgenic monkey models.101 Similarly, inanother greatly controversial undertaking, researchers have been creating embryos that represent“human-animal chimeras”—in this case, monkey
embryos to which human cells are added.102 Thesechanges in the Shank3 gene are expected to cause
mutations in the brains of monkeys that have been

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edited.103 The use of gene editing to improve models
for studying the brain illustrates the importantintersections between cognitive science and biotechnology, which has emerged as a parallel emphasis for
the PLA.104

Biotechnology on the Future
Battlefield
The PLA’s keen interest in the impact of biology on
military affairs is also reflected in strategic writings
and research that argue today’s advances in biology
are contributing to an ongoing evolution in the formor character (形态) of conflict.105 In one prominent
example, Guo Jiwei (郭继卫), a professor with theThird Military Medical University, wrote War for
Biological Dominance (制生权战争), published in
2010, highlighting the multifaceted applications of
biology in future warfare.106 PLA researchers with the
Academy of Military Medical Sciences have highlighted that advances in science and technology drive
evolution in the character of conflict, raising theconcept of “biology-enabled” warfare(生物化战争).107 The PLA also sees synthetic biology as a domain with great military potential.108
Unsurprisingly, the PLA has been concerned withadvances in biotechnology in the United States
and worldwide, particularly the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency’s launch of the BiologicalTechnologies Office. The Chinese government has
highlighted biotechnology as an industry that promises major commercial advantages, and China’s plans
and initiatives for military-civil fusion have prioritized biology as a critical sector.109 Beyond outrightmilitary research, there is an emerging ecosystem ofacademic and commercial enterprises that is or could
become involved in supporting military research.
Increasingly, the PLA is starting to recognize
biology as a new domain of warfare and elevating
its importance in strategic thinking. The conceptof biological dominance (制生权) could be rendered as “command and superiority in biology,”

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and PLA scientists and scholars are continuing towork toward developing more cohesive theories
around these ideas that could contribute to future
concepts of operations.110 In the new RMA, biotechnology will become the new “strategic commandingheights,” declared He Fuchu, then president of the
Academy of Military Medical Sciences, in 2015.111
He has remained a prominent advocate for the militarization of biotechnology. Since 2016, Maj. Gen.
He has also been appointed to serve on the CMC
S&TC, which promotes military-civil fusion andtechnological innovation, where he may be involved
in guiding research on biology and interdisciplinary technologies, from biomimetic and biomaterials
to biosensing technology, that could contribute tofuture advances in weaponry.112 He has predicted,“As the weaponization of living organisms will
become a reality in the future, non-traditional combat styles will be staged, and the ‘biological frontier’(生物疆域) will become a new frontier for national
defense.”113 He goes on to say that;
Biological interdisciplinary technology
will make future combat platforms movetoward human-computer integration andintelligentization. In the future, humanlike brain information processing systems
will achieve revolutionary breakthroughs,
such as high-performance low-power
computing, highly intelligent autonomous
decision-making, active learning, andcontinuous increases in intelligentization,
promoting the emergence of highly intelligentized and autonomous combat forces.114
Certain elements of PLA strategic thinking
on the offensive potential of these technologies aretroubling. Notably, the 2017 edition of Science ofMilitary Strategy (战略学), a textbook published by
the National Defense University that is typicallyconsidered relatively authoritative, introduced a new
section dedicated to the topic of military struggle

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K ANIAin the domain of biology. While this book does not
mention CRISPR specifically, it notes that new kindsof biological warfare could be targeted, employing“specific ethnic genetic attacks” (特定种族基因攻
击). Disturbingly, the discussion of this possibility isrepeated across a number of PLA writings.115 Indeed,“biological deterrence” (生物威慑) should be considered a new kind of deterrence that is enabled byadvances in biotechnology, including the potential
for “ethnic-specific genetic weapons” (“种族特异
性基因武器”), according to Zeng Huafeng (曾华锋) of the PLA’s NUDT.116 “Due to the high lethality, low cost and diverse means of genetic attack, it
will have a profound impact on future wars” in waysthat could increase the destructiveness of warfare,according to NUDT researcher Shi Haiming (石海明).117 As a result, the outcome of war may no longer
determined by the destruction of combat, but rather
there could be further blurring of the boundaries between peace and warfare.118 These relatively
authoritative discussions of the potential for genetic
attacks remain ambiguous but are troubling nonetheless, given the emergence of technologies thatcreate new possibilities in gene editing.119
To date, China has been leading in early trials
of CRISPR in not only animals but also humanpatients.120 The emergence of Chinese research asa new frontier for experimentation with CRISPR
reflects factors that include lesser regulatory
requirements and robust support and enthusiasm
for leveraging these technologies. To date, CRISPR
research in China has concentrated heavily on applications in agriculture and for medical or therapeutic
purposes.121 It is also striking that a significant
proportion of the research in CRISPR is occurring at
Chinese military medical and research institutions,especially the PLA General Hospital.122 The centrality of PLA institutions in this CRISPR research isconcerning when juxtaposed with known programs and indications of military interest in humanenhancement. In one notable example, a student at

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the Academy of Military Medical Science wrote a
doctoral dissertation in 2016 titled “Research on the
Evaluation of Human Performance Enhancement
Technology.”123 This dissertation pointed to
CRISPR-CAS as one of three primary “human performance enhancement technologies” (人效能增强技术) that can be employed to increase the combat
effectiveness of military personnel.124 The researcher
dissertation highlights that CRISPR holds “great
potential” as a “disruptive” technology, arguingthat therefore China must “grasp the initiative.”
Although the practical application for performanceenhancement appears to remain a more distant possibility at this point, such research provides at thevery least indication of interest and concern.
Although the use of CRISPR as a techniquefor gene editing remains novel and nascent, thesetools and techniques are rapidly advancing, andwhat is within the realm of the possible for military applications may continue to shift as well. In
the meantime, throughout China, gene editing isalready under way in animals, human embryos,and even in clinical trials. In the process, BGI,
formerly known as Beijing Genomics Inc., hasbeen very active in CRISPR research.125 BGI has
also provoked controversy after attempting tocommercialize genetic editing of animals, such as
mini-pigs as pets, and from pursuing research on
the genetic basis of intelligence by soliciting DNA
from geniuses.126 Of course, gene editing today
remains constrained by persistent difficulties, suchas the issue of limiting off-target effects, which cancause unintended consequences in the genome.127
However, current research has continued to work
toward making gene editing more precise andpractical, and BGI has established an edge incheap gene sequencing, concentrating on amassing massive amounts of data from a diverse arrayof sources.128 BGI has achieved a global presence,
including laboratories in California and Australia,
and its activities have continued to expand.129

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The Chinese government clearly believes thatnational genetic resources possess strategic significance. China’s National Genebank, which isadministered by BGI, was launched in 2016, and it
is intended to become the world’s largest. By someaccounts, its establishment was motivated at least
partly by issues of biosecurity, particularly that ofChinese genomic information then being stored inoverseas facilities.130 This new Chinese genebank
has been described as intended to “develop andutilize China’s valuable genetic resources, safeguard
national security in bioinformatics, and enhance
China’s capability to seize the strategic commanding heights” in the domain of biotechnology. These
concerns about the potential strategic significanceof genetic resources have also resulted in an unwillingness to share and exchange data, even as Chinesecompanies are avidly seeking out access to sourcesof data beyond China.131
The processing of such massive amounts ofgenetic information requires powerful supercomputers. In the process, BGI affiliates have been
engaged in research collaboration with the NUDT,
including the development of tools and insightsthat may contribute to enabling future gene editing.132 In particular, one former professor who
remains affiliated with the NUDT has also maintained a position with BGI as a specially appointed
professor.133 Their research concentrates on bioinformatics, leveraging supercomputers, namely the
Tianhe, for the processing of genetic informationin biomedical applications.134 Such collaboration
with NUDT researchers is not necessarily surprising.135 However, such confluence of troubling
sentiments in military writings, ongoing programs
funding research on human enhancement, andcollaboration between military and commercial
institutions raises questions that merit further
scrutiny from a policy perspective, particularly
considering the range of potential implications of
BGI’s research.136

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Looking forward, the application of machinelearning to the analysis of genomic information
could enable the discovery of patterns and insightsthat may prove actionable. China has also been at
the forefront of parallel progress in precision medicine that is enabled by the embrace of AI for medical
applications. In the field of AI, China has beensometimes characterized as possessing an advantage
in data. However, the actual impact of data depends
on context, techniques, and intended applications.
It seems more likely that China could possess andachieve a data advantage in genomics and biomedical technologies, based on the sizable amountsof genomic and medical data that have been andcontinue to be collected. This access to genomic
information combined with continued advances in
artificial intelligence could contribute to advances inunderstanding of the evolution of the human brain
and genomic determinants of intelligence.137 So too,the study of the human genome and its comparison
with that of other primates can contribute to identifying which specific genomic differences accountfor the uniqueness of the human brain. Potentially,such insights can also enable future augmentation ofhuman intelligence in ways that enable the “mental
dominance” and superiority in intelligentized operations that the PLA believes is essential to success infuture warfare.

Conclusions and Implications
Although technological advantage has been a key
pillar of U.S. military power and national competitiveness, China is catching up, aspiring to takethe lead in today’s strategic technologies. Pursuing
military innovation as a priority and national imperative, the Chinese military appears to be enthusedwith the possibility that today’s RMA could disrupt
the future military balance to its advantage. Today,
China possesses a stronger technological foundation for future military power, despite confronting
continued challenges in the development of “key

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K ANIAand core” (关键核心) technologies, and the PLA islooking to improve its capacity to leverage academic
and commercial advancements to enable future
military capabilities, including artificial intelligence,
biotechnology, and quantum technology.
The PLA is greatly concerned about being
subject to technological surprise and equally concerned with opportunities to achieve it. Future
primacy in these fields, which could prove important to future military advantage, may remain
highly contested between the United States andChina. However, the process of military innovationthat is required to operationalize these capabilities
will prove inherently challenging, and the feasibility of certain aspects of the PLA’s strategic thinking
and theoretical explorations remains to be seen. Of
course, these technologies remain quite nascent,and the process of research, development, experimentation, and operationalization that is required
to realize their full potential may be lengthy andcomplex, requiring adjustments that are challenging for any bureaucracy.
However, the PLA today is fighting to innovate. It is striking that the PLA has introduced
major changes and reforms to its military scientificenterprise, including through efforts to recruit andsupport more junior scientists, while also recruiting more civilians for technical positions. The
prominence of military scientists in PLA leadership may also provide powerful champions for thisagenda. Ultimately, Xi Jinping’s demand that the
PLA pursue innovation could serve as a powerful impetus for peacetime innovation, even as theideological constraints upon an authoritarian military that is de facto the armed wing of the Chinese
Communist Party could impede creativity andinitiative. The future trajectory of these concepts
and potential capabilities will merit continued
analytic and academic attention as such research
progresses. PRISM

94 | FE ATURE S

Notes
1“The CCP Central Committee and State Council
Release the ‘National Innovation-Driven Development
Strategy Outline’” [中共中央 国务院印发《国家创新驱动发展战略纲要], Xinhua, May 19, 2016, available at <http://
news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-05/19/c_1118898033.
htm>. See also Xi Jinping’s remarks on this approachin the context of military modernization: “Xi Jinping:Comprehensively Advance an Innovation-Driven
Development Strategy; Promote New Leapfrogging
in National Defense and Military Construction” [习近平：全面实施创新驱动发展战略 推动国防和军队建设实现新跨越], Xinhua, March 13, 2016,
available at <http://news.Xinhuanet.com/politics/2016lh/2016-03/13/c_1118316426.htm>.
2“Xi Jinping: Accurately Grasp the New Trends in
Global Military Developments and Keep Pace with theTimes, Strongly Advancing Military Innovation” [习近平:准确把握世界军事发展新趋势 与时俱进大力推进军事创新], Xinhua, August 30, 2014, available at <http://news.
xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-08/30/c_1112294869.htm>.
3See, for instance Xi Jinping’s remarks as quoted
in this article: “Scientific and Technological Innovation,
A Powerful Engine for the World-Class Military” [科技创新，迈向世界一流军队的强大引擎], Xinhua,
September 15, 2017, available at <http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-09/15/content_5225216.htm>.
4“The CCP Central Committee and State Council
Release the ‘National Innovation-Driven Development
Strategy Outline.’”5“Xi Jinping’s Talk on Military-Civil Fusion:
Regarding the Whole Outlook for National Security
and Development“ [习近平谈军民融合：关乎国家安全
和发展全局], Seeking Truth [求是], October 16, 2018,available at <http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/rdjj/201810/16/c_1123565364.htm>.
6
Cai Yubin [蔡渭滨] and Huang Xuebin [黄雪斌],“Vigorously Cultivate the Fighting Spirit of Scientific andTechnological Personnel” [大力培育科技人员的战斗精神], PLA Daily, May 6, 2019, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2019-05/06/c_1210126997.htm>.
7“Xi Jinping: Accurately Grasp the New Trend in
Global Military Developments.”
8
For an earlier perspective on this RMS, see
Jacqueline Newmyer, “The Revolution in Military Affairs
with Chinese Characteristics,” The Journal of Strategic
Studies 33, no. 4 (2010): 483–504; You Ji, “Learning andCatching Up: China’s Revolution in Military Affairs
Initiative,” in The Information Revolution in Military
Affairs in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004),
97–123; Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase,“Informatization and the Chinese People’s Liberation

PRISM 8, NO. 3

MINDS AT WAR

Army Navy,” in The Chinese Navy: Expanding
Capabilities, Evolving Roles, ed. Phillip Saunders et al.
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,2011): 247–287.
9
Ye Zheng [叶证], Lectures on the Science ofInformation Operations [信息作战科学教程] (Beijing:
Military Science Press [军事科学出版社], 2013).
10“Xi Jinping’s Report at the Chinese Communist
Party 19th National Congress” [习近平在中国共产党
第十九次全国代表大会上的报告]; “Experts: MilitaryIntelligentization Is Not Merely Artificial Intelligence”[专家：军事智能化绝不仅仅是人工智能], People’s Daily,
December 6, 2017, available at <http://military.people.
com.cn/n1/2017/1206/c1011-29689750.htm>.
11“Lt. Gen. Liu Guozhi: The Development of MilitaryIntelligentization Is a Strategic Opportunity for our
Military to Turn Sharply to Surpass” [刘国治中将:军事
智能化发展是我军弯道超车的战略机遇], CCTV News,
October 22, 2017, available at <http://mil.news.sina.com.
cn/china/2017-10-22/doc-ifymzqpq3312566.shtml>.
12
Ibid.
13
“Setting off a new revolution in military affairs?
Six key words to interpret intelligentized operations”[掀起新的军事革命？六大关键词解读智能化作战], PLA
Daily, March 1, 2018, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.
com/mil/2018-03/01/c_129819887.htm>
14
See the latest defense white paper that provides an official discussion of the reforms: “China’s
National Defense in a New Era,” Xinhua, July 24, 2019,available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201907/24/c_138253389.htm>.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
There are further details available upon request.
There are multiple references to this program in publicly
available information.
18“The whole country's first national defense scientificand technological innovation rapid response small group
launched in Shenzhen” [全国首个国防科技创新快速响应
小组在深圳启动], Shenzhen Special Zone Daily [深圳特区报], available at March 18, 2018, <http://news.sina.com.
cn/c/nd/2018-03-18/doc-ifyskmpr7659375.shtml>
19“Xi Jinping: Strive to Build a High-level Military
Scientific Research Institution to Provide Strong Support
for the Party’s Strong Military Objective in the New
Era” [习近平：努力建设高水平军事科研机构 为实现党
在新时代的强军目标提供有力支撑], Xinhua, May 16,
2018, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/201805/16/c_1122843283.htm>.
20“China’s National Defense in the New Era.”
21“Frontier” is my chosen rendering of qianyan (前沿), which can also be rendered as “frontline,” “forward

PRISM 8, NO. 3

position,” “cutting-edge,” or “advanced.”
22“Academy of Military Science National Defense
Science and Technology Innovation Research Academy—
Exploring the “Matrix” Research Model to Enhance
Innovation Capability” [军事科学院国防科技创新研究院—— 探索“矩阵式”科研模式提升创新能力],
April 2, 2018, available at <http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/
content/2018-04/02/content_202957.htm>. See also
“Academy of Military Science National Defense Scienceand Technology Innovation Research Academy Has
Taken Measures to Gather Top Talents” [军科院国防科技创新研究院多措并集聚顶尖人才], China Military
Network, February 4, 2018, available at <http://webcache.
googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:WDwIAWmc6agJ:www.81.cn/jwgz/2018-02/04/content_7931564.
htm+&cd=8&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>.
23
Yang Xuejun was the former commandant of the
National University of Defense Technology, and transfer
to lead AMS may reflect an elevation of AMS over NUDT.
24
This shift could indicate a closer integration of
medical science with military science. He Fuchu [贺福初],“The Future Direction of the New Global Revolution in
Military Affairs” [世界新军事革命未来走向], ReferenceNews [参考消息], August 24, 2017, available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20190823210313/http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-08/24/c_129687890.htm>.
25“‘Theory-Technology Fusion Innovation’ New Year
Seminar Successfully Convened in Beijing” [“理技融合
创新”新春座谈会在京成功召开], China Association for
Artificial Intelligence [中国人工智能学会], available at<https://web.archive.org/web/20191011035737/http://caai.
cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/detail/id/490.html>.
26
The CMC S&TC’s expert group on biology andcross-domain science and technology appears to guidethese projects, involving scientists with expertise inneuroscience and biomaterials. The chief scientist of
the expert group on this topic has also highlighted themilitary potential of technologies that include biosensing,biomimetic information processing, and biocomputing toenable new-type weapons and equipment.
27
Mu-ming Poo et al., “China Brain Project: Basic
Neuroscience, Brain Diseases, and Brain-Inspired
Computing,” Neuron 92, no. 3 (2016): 591–596.
28
Hu Dewen, “Military School Scratches ‘Cool
Smart Wind’” [军校刮起“炫酷智能风”], PLA Daily, July19, 2019, available at <http://military.workercn.cn/328
20/201907/19/190719101538199.shtml>. Hu Dewen has
also received funding through National Key R&D Plan
to pursue research on human-robot intelligent fusion
technology. His research has included the use of neuralnetworks in adaptive control.
29
Chen Hanghui [陈航辉], “Artificial Intelligence:

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Disruptively Changing the Rules of the Game” [人工智能：颠覆性改变“游戏规则], China Military Online,
March 18, 2016, available at <http://www.81.cn/jskj/201603/18/content_6966873_2.htm>.
30
See, for instance, “Experts: MilitaryIntelligentization Is Not Merely Artificial Intelligence”[专家：军事智能化绝不仅仅是人工智能], People’s Daily,
December 6, 2017, available at <http://military.people.
com.cn/n1/2017/1206/c1011-29689750.html>.
31
These directions in the Chinese military’s strategic
thinking are assessed to be relatively authoritative basedon the numerous articles and statements from high-level
military scientists and strategists. Certain Chinese military scholars and scientists, including those affiliated with
the Academy of Military Science and National Universityof Defense Technology, as well as several military medical
institutions, have articulated these lines of argument
across a range of books and articles that date back nearly adecade. However, these theories and concepts are unlikely
to constitute official elements of doctrine at present.
32
He Fuchu, “The Future Direction of the New
Global Revolution in Military Affairs.”
33
Ibid.
34
Often, the PLA starts to explore a high-level concept for which the meeting continues to evolve over time.
At present, there is no official or doctrinal definition forthese concepts, but I understand them as each referring
to attempts to achieve an advantage in the domains ofcognition, biology, and intelligence on the battlefield andin overall military competition. Often, such concepts
originate the work in a prominent researcher but thenbecome the subject of more general debate and might beeventually introduced into official planning and/or doctrinal materials.
35
For one perspective on the issues, see Dean Cheng,“Winning without Fighting: The Chinese Psychological
Warfare Challenge,” Science 4 (2003): 30.
36
The Science of (Military) Strategy released in 2017by the PLA’s National Defense University has added a new
section on “military competition in the domain of (artificial) intelligence” (智能领域军事竞争), in an unusual,off-cycle revision of this authoritative textbook, of which
Lt. Gen. Xiao Tianliang (肖天亮), who remains the vicecommandant of the PLA’s National Defense University, isthe editor.
37
Yun Guangrong [游光荣], “AI Will Deeply Change
the Face of Warfare” [人工智能将深刻改变战争面], PLA
Daily, October 17, 2018, available at <http://www.81.cn/
jfjbmap/content/2018-10/17/content_218050.htm>.
38
Li Minghai (李明海), “Where Is theWinning Mechanism of Intelligent Warfare?” [智能化战争的制胜机理变在哪里? ], January 13, 2019,96 | FE ATURE S

available at <http://webcache.googleusercontent.
com/search?q=cache:2HxhOYXd2p0J:www.sohu.
com/a/288730322_778557+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>. Li Minghai is a researcher with the PLA’s
National University of Defense Technology. Chen
Yongyi [陈永义], “Focus on Confronting ‘Counterintelligentization’ Operations” [重视应对“逆智能化”
作战], PLA Daily, August 1, 2019, available at <http://
www.81.cn/bqtd/2019-08/01/content_9575539.htm>.
39
Yuan Yi [袁艺], Gao Dongming [高冬明], andZhang Yujun [ 张玉军], “Also Discussing IntelligentizedCommand ‘Autonomous Decision-Making’” [也谈智能化指挥“自主决策”], PLA Daily, April 18, 2019, available
at <http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-04/18/content_231979.htm>.
40
CMC Joint Staff Department [中央军委联合参谋部], “Accelerate the Construction of a Joint Operations
Command System with Our Military’s Characteristics”[加快构建具有我军特色的联合作战指挥体系], Seeking
Truth, August 15, 2016, available at <http://www.qstheory.
cn/dukan/qs/2016-08/15/c_1119374690.htm.
41
Yuan, Gao, and Zhang, “Also Discussing
Intelligentized Command ‘Autonomous
Decision-Making.’”
42
Shen Shoulin [沈寿林] and Zhang Guoning [张国宁], “Understanding Intelligentized Operations” [认识智能化作战], PLA Daily, March 1, 2018, available at<http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-03/01/content_200671.htm>.
43
Ibid; “Academician He You: Accelerate theDevelopment of Maritime Information Processing
Technology, and Provide Scientific and Technological
Support for a Powerful Maritime Nation” [何友院士：
加快发展海洋信息处理技术，为海洋强国提供科技支撑], S&T Herald [科技导报], November 2017, available
at <http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotalKJDB201720001.htm, available in full text: https://web.
archive.org/web/20191011051014/http://blog.sciencenet.
cn/blog-336909-1084316.html>.
44
Zhang Xiao-hai [张晓海] and Cao Xin-wen [操新文], “Military Intelligent Decision Support Systems Basedon Deep Learning” [基于深度学习的军事智能决策支
持系统], Command Control & Simulation [指挥控制与仿真] 40, no. 2 (April 2018). The PLA has been inspiredby AlphaGo and AlphaZero in exploring such options,and an initial proof of concept has been demonstrated
through “Prophet 1.0” (先知V1), an AI system developed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute ofAutomation that was used in wargaming.
45
Ibid.; “Academy of Military Medical Sciences
Researcher Wu Haitao Explains to You ‘What Will Brain
Science Bring from the Military’” [军事科学院军事医学

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MINDS AT WAR

研究院研究员吴海涛为您讲述——脑科学“从军”会带来什么?], available at <http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-04/26/content_232600.htm>.
46
Chen Jian-hua [陈建华] et al., “Multi-modalInteraction Technology of Military Command andControl System” [军事指控系统多通道人机交互技术],Command Control & Simulation [指挥控制与仿真] 41,
no. 4 (August 2019).
47
For context, see Amanda M. Kelley et al.,“Cognition Enhancement by Modafinil: A Metaanalysis,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine
83, no. 7 (2012): 685–690; Wang Shizhong [王世忠]and Hao Zhengjiang [郝政疆], “Brain Confrontation:
Achieving a High Degree of Integration between Humans
and Weapons” [脑对抗：人与武器实现高度融合], available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20190903022447/
http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-01/25/content_226145.htm>.
48
There are several potential alternative translations to zhinaoquan, including “mind/mental
dominance,” “mind/mental superiority,” and “cognitive superiority.” The concept alludes to the superiority
in reasoning and decisionmaking that is required tosucceed on the battlefield. For the book that coined
this term most prominently, see Zeng Huafeng [曾华锋] and Shi Haiming [石海明], Mental Dominance:
The Laws of War in the Global Media Age and National
Security Strategy [制脑权：全球媒体时代的战争法则
与国家安全战略] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army
Press, 2014). See also: Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga,“Cognitive Domain Operations: The PLA’s New Holistic
Concept for Influence Operations,” China Brief 19,
no. 16, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/cognitive-domain-operations-the-plas-new-holistic-concept-for-influence-operations/>.
49
Zhu Xueling [朱雪玲] and Zeng Huafeng [曾华锋], “Mental Control Operations: New Model of FutureWars” [“制脑作战：未来战争竞争新模式”], PLA Daily,
October 17, 2017, available at <https://web.archive.org/
web/20191011053447/http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-10/17/content_189879.htm>; Luo Yuzhen[罗语嫣] et al., “The Common Domain Characteristics
of Cognitive Domain and Its Key Techniques” [认知域的公域特性及其关键技术], National Defense Science &Technology [国防科技] 39, no. 4 (2018).
50
Zhu and Zeng, “Mental Control Operations: New
Model of Future Wars.”
51“Setting off a new revolution in military affairs?
Six key words to interpret intelligentized operations”[掀起新的军事革命？六大关键词解读智能化作战], PLA
Daily, March 1, 2018, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.
com/mil/2018-03/01/c_129819887.htm>

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Wang Zhaowen [王照稳] and Fu Minghua [付明华], “Analysis of Cognitive Domain Warfare inInformatized Warfare” [信息化战争认知域作战探析],PLA Daily, July 28, 2015, available at <http://www.81.
cn/jmywyl/2015-07/28/content_6602887.htm>; Shi
Haiming [石海明] and Zeng Huafeng [曾华锋], “National
Cognitive Space Security Strategy from the Perspectiveof Science and Technology and War” [科技与战争视角下的国家认知空间安全战略], National Defense Science andTechnology [国防科技], no. 3 (2014), available at <http://
www.cqvip.com/qk/96765a/201403/661703248.html>. The
authors are affiliated with the PLA’s National Universityof Defense Technology.
53
Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], ed., The Science ofMilitary Strategy [战略学] (Beijing: National Defense
University Press [国防大学出版社], 2017). The PLA
initially concentrated on space and cyberspace as new
strategic frontiers of military power. Increasingly, biology
and intelligent confrontation have been recognized as
new domains of military struggle in which the Chinese
military, as a latecomer is seeking to catch up with a powerful adversary.
54
LI Bicheng [李弼程], HU Huaping; [胡华平], and
XIONG Yao [熊尧], “Intelligent agent model for network
public opinion guidance” [网络舆情引导智能代理模型],
National Defense Technology [国防科技], no. 3, (2019).
55
Lan Zhouda [兰舟达] and Ma Jianguang [马建光], “A
New Type of Cyber Warfare from the Perspective of Mental
Dominance—Taking the Color Revolution as an Example”[制脑权视野下的新型网络战—以颜色革命为例], National
Defense Science and Technology [国防科技] 36, no. 2 (2015):
57–62, available at <http://gfkjjournal.nudt.edu.cn/ch/
reader/view_abstract.aspx?file_no=20150212&flag=1>.
56
Luo Xu [罗旭], Wu Hao [吴昊], and Guo Ji-wei[郭继卫], “Research on a Systematic Framework for Brain
Science Military Applications for New-Type Combat
Forces Construction Strategy” [论新型作战力量战略下的脑科学军事应用体系构成研究], Military Medicine [军事医学] 11 (2015): 863–867.
57“‘Brain Plan’ Opens ‘Mental Dominance’ into a
New Highland for Future Military Contests” [“脑计划”
开启 “制脑权”成未来军事较量新的高地], PLA Daily,
October 20, 2016, available at <http://military.people.com.
cn/n1/2016/1020/c1011-28793350.html>.
58
See, for instance Shen and Zhang, “UnderstandingIntelligentized Operations.”
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
See “Brain Science Sociology and Brain-Computer
Interface Technology Series Academic Report” [“脑科学与脑机接口技术”系列学术报告], May 15, 2019.
62
Since the PLA reforms, this team is now included
52

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under NUDT’s Institute for Intelligent Science andTechnology; “‘Brain-Machine Interface’ Technology:
Making ‘Brain Control’ a Reality” [“脑机接口”技术：让“脑控”成为现实], China Military Online, May 21,
2015, available at <http://www.mod.gov.cn/wqzb/201505/21/content_4586049_2.htm>.
63
His research on the theme of “brain networking
and brain-computer interaction” has been awarded, andhis influence appears to have deeply shaped the field: see“Military School Scratches ‘Cool Smart Wind.’”
64“‘Brain Plan’ Opens ‘Mental Dominance’ into a
New Highland for Future Military Contests.”
65“‘Brain-Machine Interface’ Technology Comingfrom the Laboratory into Real Life” [“脑机接口”技术
正从实验室走进现实生活], available at <http://www.
stdaily.com/cxzg80/guonei/2017-12/28/content_614787.
shtml>. See also:http://www2.scut.edu.cn/bci/2018/0910/
c18577a284388/page.htm>.
66“Human-Machine Cooperation Entering
Actual Combat Intelligentization or Starting from theLaboratory” [人机协同投入实战 智能化战争或从实验室打响], S&T Daily, June 26, 2019.
67“The Ministry of Education Convened a Press
Conference to Interpret the Artificial Intelligence
Innovation Action Plan for Colleges and Universities,etc.” [教育部举行新闻发布会解读《高等学校人工智能创
新行动计划》等], Ministry of Education website, June 8,
2018, available at <http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-06/08/
content_5297021.htm#2>.
68“Special Action Plan for Military-Civil Fusionin the Domain of Intelligent Science and Technology
in Tianjin” [天津市智能科技领域军民融合专项行动计划], August 9, 2018, available at <https://web.archive.
org/web/20190918010942/http://gyxxh.tj.gov.cn/
zhencwj/65062.htm>.
69
China Aerospace Science and Technology
Corporation (CASC),“Tianjin University ‘Intelligence’
Helps China Aerospace” [天大“智”造助力中国航天],March 23, 2018, available at <http://news.tju.edu.cn/
info/1003/22110.htm>.
70“State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscienceand Learning Held the 2018 Academic Committee
Meeting” [认知神经科学与学习国家重点实验室召开2018年学术委员会会议], January 16, 2019, available at <http://
brain.bnu.edu.cn/cn/tza/2019/0116/1424.html>.
712019 World Robotics Conference BCI Brain-Control
Robotics Competition and Third China Brain-MachineInterface Competition [2019世界机器人大赛—BCI
脑控机器人大赛暨第三届中国脑机接口大赛], World
Robotics Conference, available at <https://web.archive.org/
web/20191011041722/http://2018.worldrobotconference.
com/uploads/file/20181224/15456436152616.pdf>.

98 | FE ATURE S

See, for instance, comments from Cogrowth
founder and CEO Hua Zhongling, available at <http://
www.naokexue.com.cn/news/gs/187.html>.
73“China Unveils Brain-Computer Interface Chip,”
Xinhua, May 18, 2019, available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/18/c_138069590.htm>.
74“Brain-Computer Interface and Intelligent Control
and First Brain Science Seminar Held” [脑机接口与智能
控制暨首届脑科学研讨会举行], Economics Daily [经济日报], December 25, 2017, available at <http://www.ce.cn/
cysc/yy/hydt/201712/25/t20171225_27421101.shtml>.
75
Ibid. According to its designer, “Brain-Computer
Interfaces hold a promising future. The Brain Talker chipadvances BCI technology allowing it to become more portable, wearable, and accessible to the general public.”
76
Ibid.
77
“Shape the ‘Combat Brain’ for the Future—How
Far Is ‘Brain Networking’ from Us?” [为未来塑造“作战大脑” “脑联网”离我们有多远？], PLA Daily [解放军报],
December 22, 2017, available at <https://www.chinanews.
com/cj/2017/12-22/8406674.shtml>.
78“Academy of Military Medical Sciences Researcher
Wu Haitao Explains to You ‘What Will Brain Science
Bring from the Military’” [军事科学院军事医学研究
院研究员吴海涛为您讲述——脑科学“从军”会带来什么?], available at <http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-04/26/content_232600.htm>.
79
Yipeng Yu et al., “Intelligence-Augmented Rat
Cyborgs in Maze Solving,” PloS One 11, no. 2 (2016):
e0147754.
80
The Chinese government’s decision to prioritize
brain science can be traced back to the National Mediumand Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology
Development (2006–2020), which had emphasized theimportance of strengthening the study of the relationships among brain development, plasticity, and human
intelligence. At the time, this initiative constituted one of
the “Major Science and Technology Projects Concerning
China's Future Development” (事关我国未来发展的重大科技项目). Through the 13th Five-Year Science andInnovation Plan, there were megaprojects launched inbrain science and brain-inspired intelligence, as well
as artificial intelligence for the 2016–2030 timeframe.
See “National Medium and Long Term Science andTechnology Development Plan Outline” (2006–2020) [国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要], Ministry of Scienceand Technology, February 9, 2006, available at <http://
www.most.gov.cn/mostinfo/xinxifenlei/gjkjgh/200811/
t20081129_65774_9. Htm>. See also “Our Nation
Launched Four Major Science Research Programs” [我国启动四项重大科学研究计划], Science and Technology
Daily, November 16, 2006.
72

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MINDS AT WAR“Notice of the State Council on the Printing andDistribution of the Thirteenth Five-Year National Scienceand Technology Innovation Plan” [国务院关于印发“十三五”国家科技创新规划的通知], State Council, August
8, 2016, available at <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-08/08/ content_5098072.htm>.
82
Starting in 2013, the Chinese government had
decided to launch the “China Brain Project” (中国脑计划), but its actual launch was not formalized until 2016,
and the development of a plan for its implementation
seems to have been further delayed. However, there havebeen initial research programs and laboratories launchedin Beijing and Shanghai that are intended to advance thisagenda.
83“Neurobiologist Pu Muming: How Brain Science
Helps AI Technology Research” [神经生物学家蒲慕明：脑科学如何助力AI技术研究], Netease Intelligence [网易智能], April 27, 2018, available at <http://tech.163.
com/18/0427/12/DGD9O89000098IEO.html>.
84
The emphasis on hybrid intelligence is not merely
a concept but also a priority in the New Generation
Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, released in July
2017, which emphasized China’s intention to pursue significant breakthroughs in hybrid enhanced intelligenceand human-machine interaction: “Research hybridizationand convergence where “the human is in the loop,” behavioral strengthening through human-machine intelligent
symbiosis and brain-machine coordination, intuitivemachine reasoning and causal models, associative recall
models and knowledge evolution methods, complex data
and task blended and enhanced intelligence learning
methods, cloud robotics coordination computing methods, and situational comprehension and human-machinegroup coordination in real-world environments.”
85
See “Beijing Brain Science Research Is Constantly
Turning Research Results into Reality” [北京脑科学研究正不断将研究成果转化成现实], January 12,
2016, available at <http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2016/1/335972.shtm>. This initiative involves
units that include the Chinese Academy of Sciences
Institute of Automation and the Academy of Military
Medical Sciences, as well as Peking University andTsinghua University. For further information, see“Beijing Brain Science and Brain-like Research Center
Postdoctoral Science and Research Work Station 2019
Application Announcement [北京脑科学与类脑研究中心博士后科研工作站2019年招聘启事], available at <http://www.chinapostdoctor.org.cn/content/
details20_690.html>; “Beijing Launches Pioneering
Brain Science Center,” Scientific American, 2016, available at <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
beijing-launches-pioneering-brain-science-center/>.
81

PRISM 8, NO. 3“Thirteenth Five-Year Science and Technology
Military-Civil Fusion Development Special Plan” (FullText) [“十三五”科技军民融合发展专项规划》全文],
available at <http://www.aisixiang.com/data/106161.html>.
87
Jing Pei et al., “Towards Artificial GeneralIntelligence with Hybrid Tianjic Chip Architecture,”
Nature 572, no. 7767 (2019): 106. Of course, it remains
to be seen whether these brain-inspired approaches to
artificial intelligence prove to be a promising architecture. According to the researchers, “The brain-like
intelligence inspired by the operating mechanism andcognitive behavior can make up for the limitations andshortcomings of current data intelligence. More critically,
brain-like intelligence will subvert the traditional computer operating architecture, achieve a new computing
and storage integration model, and is expected to achieveultra-low power consumption.”
88“Xiangshan Science Conference on ‘Non-humanPrimate Brains and Cognition’ Held” [香山科学会议“非人灵长类脑与认知”召开].
89
See, for instance, “Where Is the Winning
Mechanism of Intelligent Warfare?” [智能化战争的制胜机理变在哪里], PLA Daily, January 15, 2019,available at <http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/201901/15/c_1210038327.htm>.
90
Although this program has not been officiallydisclosed or announced, available references to it provide
robust indications that this project is underway.
91
Ibid.
92
“Brain Region Linked to Altered Social
Interactions in Autism Model,” McGovern Institute forBrain Research, July 29, 2019, available at <https://www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/07/190729094551.htm>.
93
Ibid.
94
Feng Zhengzhi [冯正直] and Zhang Rui [张 睿],“Progress in Military Cognitive Neuroscience” [军事认知神经科学研究进展], PhD diss., 2013. The authors areaffiliated with the Department of Behavioral Medicine,College of Psychology, Third Military Medical University.
95
The original article is no longer readily available, but see a reference to the <https://webcache.
googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:-Ih4uFfSRXwJ:https://www.shobserver.com/wx/detail.
do%3Fid%3D86079+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us>.
96
Mu-ming Poo et al., “China Brain Project.”
97
Ibid. This massive scaling up of capacity for primate research nationwide with robust state support could
provide a potential advantage relative to the United Statesand Europe. In China, researchers can benefit from theease, low cost, and speed of research without attendant
controversies.
98“Xiangshan Science Conference on ‘Non-human86

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K ANIAPrimate Brains and Cognition’ Held.”99
For instance, researchers at the Academy of
Military Medical Sciences are using macaques to examine
techniques for brain-machine interfaces that involve theimplantation of electrodes in the brain.
100
Antonio Regalado, “Chinese Scientists Have
Put Human Brain Genes in Monkeys—And Yes, TheyMay Be Smarter,” MIT Technology Review, April 10,
2019, available at <https://www.technologyreview.
com/s/613277/chinese-scientists-have-put-human-braingenes-in-monkeysand-yes-they-may-be-smarter/>;
Sigal Samuel, “Scientists Added Human Brain
Genes to Monkeys. Yes, It’s as Scary as it sounds,”
Vox, April 12, 2019, available at <https://www.
vox.com/future-perfect/2019/4/12/18306867/
china-genetics-monkey-brain-intelligence>.
101
Lei Shi et al., “Transgenic rhesus Monkeys
Carrying the Human MCPH1 Gene Copies Show
Human-like Neoteny of Brain Development,” National
Science Review 6, no. 3 (2019): 480–493.
102“Scientists Are Making Human-Monkey Hybrids
in China,” MIT Technology Review, August 1, 2019, available at <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614052/
scientists-are-making-human-monkey-hybrids-inchina/>.
103
See Manuel Ansede, “Científicos españoles creanquimeras de humano y mono en China,” July 30, 2019,available at <https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/07/30/ciencia/1564512111_936966.html>.
104
Hao Wang et al., “CRISPR/Cas9 System: An
Important Tool for Brain and Cognitive Science,” Progress
in Biochemistry and Biophysics 44, no. 9 (2017): 799–805,
available at <http://www.pibb.ac.cn/pibbcn/ch/reader/create_pdf.aspx?file_no=20170237>.
105
For an earlier collaborative analysis on the topic,
see Elsa Kania and Wilson VornDick, “China’s Military
Biotech Frontier: CRISPR, Military-Civil Fusion, andthe New Revolution in Military Affairs,” China Brief 19,
no. 18, available at <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-biotech-frontier-crispr-military-civil-fusion-and-the-new-revolution-in-military-affairs/>.
106
See Guo Jiwei (郭继卫), War for BiologicalDominance (制生权战争) (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2010).
107
Li Hong-jun and Guo Ji-wei, “Evolution of Formsof Warfare Promoted by Modern Biotechnology” [现代生物科技推动战争形态演变的思考]. The authors are affiliated with the Southwest Hospital of the Third Military
Medical University.
108
Lou Tie-zhu [楼铁柱], “Review and the Outlook
for Military Applications of Synthetic Biology” [合成生物学发展回顾与军事应用前景展望], Institute of HealthService and Medical Information, Academy of Military

10 0 | FE ATURE S

Medical Sciences.
109
Beyond outright military research, there is an
emerging ecosystem of academic and commercial enterprises that are or could become involved in supporting
military research. See “Thirteenth Five-Year Science andTechnology Military-Civil Fusion Development Special
Plan.”
110
Yi Biyi [易比一] et al., “Concept Research of
Zhishengquan” [制生权概念研究], Military Medical
Science [军事医学] 42, no. 1 (January 2018).
111
See Lu Peipei [陆倍倍] and He Fuchu [贺福初],“Biological Science and Technology Will Become theStrategic Commanding Heights of the Future Revolutionin Military Affairs” [生物科技将成为未来军事革命新的战略制高点], PLA Daily, October 6, 2015, available at<https://web.archive.org/web/20190813042422/http://
www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-10/06/content_6709533.htm>.
112
Ibid.
113
Ibid.
114
He Fuchu, “The Future Direction of the New
Global Revolution in Military Affairs.”
115
Indeed, the phrasing is repeated more or less verbatim in this book by General (Ret.) Zhang Shibo (张仕波), former commandant of the PLA’s National Defense
University Zhang Shibo [张仕波], The New High Ground[新高地] (Beijing: National Defense University Press,
2017). I am indebted to Wilson VornDick for drawing thisbook to my attention.
116
See, for instance: Zeng Huafeng [曾华锋] andShi Haiming [石海明], “Scientific and Technological
Deterrence: A New Trend in the Use of Military Power” [科技威慑：军事力量运用的新趋势], February 17, 2019,available at <http://www.sohu.com/a/295253193_358040,
http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0204/c100329804335.html>.
117
Fang [李芳] and Shi Haiming [石海明], “Biology
and Interdisciplinary Technologies” [生物交叉技术：撬动生理信息战的前沿科技], Guangming Network,
Military Technology Frontier [军事科技前沿], October 19,
2016, available at <http://junshi.gmw.cn/2016-10/19/content_23026987.htm>.
118
Ibid.
119
That is, certain of these writings are vague, likely
deliberately, about whether their purpose is to raise concerns that China could be subject to these kinds of attacks
or to highlight their offensive potential as a direction ofdevelopment that China should pursue going forward.
120
David Cyranoski, “Chinese Scientists to Pioneer
First Human CRISPR Trial,” Nature News 535, no. 7613
(2016): 476, available at <https://www.nature.com/articles/
nature.2016.20302>; Jon Cohen, “The CRISPR Animal
Kingdom,” Science, August 2, 2019, 426–429, available at

PRISM 8, NO. 3

MINDS AT WAR<https://science.sciencemag.org/content/365/6452/426.
summary>.
121
Caixia Gao, “The Future of CRISPR Technologies
in Agriculture,” National Review of Molecular Cell Biology
19, no. 5 (2018): 275–276.
122
See, for instance, “Safety of Transplantationof CRISPR CCR5 Modified CD34+ Cells in HIVinfected Subjects with Hematological Malignances(NCT03164135),” sponsored by Affiliated Hospital to
Academy of Military Medical Sciences, Study Evaluating
UCART019 in Patients with Relapsed or Refractory
CD19+ Leukemia and Lymphoma (NCT03166878),
Chinese PLA General Hospital.
123
Further details are available upon request.
124
Ibid. Further details are available upon request.
125
Michael Specter, “The Gene Factory,” The New
Yorker, December 29, 2013, available at <https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/06/the-gene-factory>.
126
For context, see John Bohannnon, “Why Are
Some People So Smart? The Answer Could Spawn
a Generation of Superbabies,” Wired, July 2013,
available at <https://www.wired.com/2013/07/genetics-of-iq/>. Similarly, another company, Beijing Xinuo
Valley Biotechnology Co. Ltd., has cloned a numberof dogs as pets and for policing. “This Cloned Dog Is
Too Superior” [这只被克隆狗太优秀], Netease S&T,
August 22, 2019, available at <https://web.archive.org/
web/20190914070025/https://www.cnbeta.com/articles/
tech/881183.htm>.
127
Shen Bin et al., “Efficient Genome Modification
by CRISPR-Cas9 Nickase with Minimal Off-target
Effects,” Nature Methods 11, no. 4 (2014): 399.
128
For context, see BGI’s website and promotional
materials, available at <https://www.bgi.com/global/>.
129
See this great project from the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute: “China’s Tech Expansion,” available at<https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/company/bgi>.
130
This claim was included in a news article that is
not entirely authoritative, but constitutes an interesting
characterization of that decision.
131
Emma Yasinki, “China Clamps Down on Foreign
Use of Chinese Genetic Material and Data,” The Scientist,
June 17, 2019, available at <https://www.the-scientist.com/
news-opinion/china-clamps-down-on-foreign-use-ofchinese-genetic-material-and-data-66016>.
132
Cui Yingbo et al., “Review of CRISPR/Cas9
sgRNA Design Tools,” Interdisciplinary Sciences:
Computational Life Sciences 10, no. 2 (2018): 455–465.
133
Further details are available upon request.
134
Yang Xi et al., “An Interface for Biomedical
Big Data Processing on the Tianhe-2 Supercomputer,”Molecules 22, no. 12 (2017): 2116.

PRISM 8, NO. 3

Cui et al., “Review of CRISPR/Cas9 sgRNA
Design Tools.”
136
Mason Marks and Tiffany Li, “DNA Donors
Must Demand Stronger Protection for Genetic Privacy,”
StatNews, May 30, 2018, available at <https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/30/dna-donors-genetic-privacy-nih/>.
137
James M. Sikela, “The Jewels of our Genome:
The Search for the Genomic Changes Underlying the
Evolutionarily Unique Capacities of the Human Brain,”
PLoS Genetics 2, no. 5 (2006): e80, available at <https://doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pgen.0020080>.
135

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