18th International Conference on Innovative Computing, Information and Control (ICICIC2024)
Onsite (Qinhuangdao, China) and Online, September 10-13, 2024

PS-4: ICICIC2024-WS05-03
Analysis of the Impact of Supply Chain Finance on the Financing Constraintsof Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises in China
Yang Liu* and Yuxin Lin
School of Economics and Management (School of Tourism), Dalian University, Dalian 116622, P. R. China*Corresponding author: liuyang3@dlu.edu.cn

Introduction

Mathematical Formulas

Considering the current financing difficulties ofsmall and medium-sized enterprises, this paper, fromthe perspective of evolutionary game theory andcombined with financial theory, constructs a three-party
evolutionary game model involving the core enterprisesof supply chain finance, small and medium-sizedenterprises and banking institutions. It discusses theequilibrium points obtained in the evolutionary gameand their stability, and studies the evolutionary
equilibrium selection of the behavioral strategies of theevolutionary subjects, providing an effective way tosolve the financing problems of small andmedium-sized enterprises in China.

Methodologies
Research Questions
1) Qualitatively analyze the theoretical mechanismof the impact of supply chain finance on the financing ofsmall and medium-sized enterprises. 2) Build an
evolutionary game model to study the impact of supply
chain finance on small and medium-sized enterprises. 3)
Based on the conclusions drawn from the evolutionary
game model, put forward corresponding policy
recommendations on how small and medium-sizedenterprises can use supply chain finance to alleviate
financing constraints.

Based on the perspective of evolutionary game andcombined with financial theory, this paper constructs athree-party evolutionary model among core enterprises,
small and medium-sized enterprises and banking
institutions, discusses the obtained equilibrium points andstability, and studies the strategy choices among different
subjects, providing new ideas for solving the financing
difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises in
China.

Conclusion
TablesTable 1. Tripartite payment income matrix in supply
chain financeFirst, this paper builds a credit tripartite
evolutionary game model with SMEs as the main body.
It analyzes the stability of each equilibrium point, getsthe best strategy, and obtains conditions affecting
SMEs’ financing. It also analyzes stability to offer
countermeasures and suggestions for easing theirfinancing difficulties.
The main findings are as follows: When the three
conditions of R4 > C1 + L(i + s), C3 < (1 - N)L(i + s) andC2 + iL + NL(i + s) < i + K + S are satisfied, that is,according to the analysis of the equilibrium point of theevolutionary game model, it is the evolution to theoptimal state. Core enterprises and banking institutions
will choose active financing strategies, SMEs will
actively choose to lend to banking institutions, coreenterprises will actively provide corresponding
guarantees for SMEs, and banking institutions will
actively provide loans to SMEs under the guarantees ofcore enterprise, which can effectively promote thefurther development of China’s economy.