Demographic Research: Volume 36, Article 11
Research Article

The gender division of labor and second births:
Labor market institutions and fertility in Japan
Nobuko Nagase1
Mary C. Brinton2

Abstract
BACKGROUND
Research has examined how the gendered household division of labor may deter thetransition to second birth. However, little research has investigated how workplace
norms influence men’s household work.
OBJECTIVE
This paper takes into account labor market structure, workplace norms, and the legal
environment governing working conditions to contextualize men’s contribution tohousehold labor and its effect on transition to second birth.
METHODS
Using data from the Japanese Longitudinal Survey of Adults in the 21st Century (2002
Cohort), we employ fixed-effects models to estimate the effect of workplace norms on
men’s contribution to household work and the effect of men’s household work hours ontransition to second birth.
RESULTSJapanese male university graduates in large firms do a smaller share of household laborthan other men. These men are subject to workplace norms prevalent in firm-internal
labor markets, which have been supported by Japanese Supreme Court rulings. These
norms influence men’s allocation of time between the workplace and the home.
Moreover, analysis of the transition to second birth indicates that husband’s share ofhousehold work is an important predictor of second birth, especially for dual-earnercouples.
CONCLUSIONSOur empirical results suggest that unless changes are made in Japanese employment law
and workplace norms, dual-earner couples in particular will continue to face difficulties
proceeding to a second birth.
12

Ochanomizu University, Japan. E-Mail: nagase.nobuko@ocha.ac.jp.
Harvard University, USA. E-Mail: brinton@wjh.harvard.edu.

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Nagase & Brinton: Labor market institutions and fertility in JapanCONTRIBUTION
This paper demonstrates how the economic and cultural context can create disincentives
for men to contribute to household labor, which in turn lowers the probability oftransition to second birth.

1. Introduction
Very low fertility rates in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and East Asia have been asource of great interest for demographers in recent years (Kohler, Billari, and Ortega
2002; Lesthaeghe 2010). Among the theories proposed to explain the emergence ofwhat is termed ‘lowest-low’ fertility (total fertility rates of 1.3 or lower), theories
emphasizing the unevenness of gender-role change have increasingly occupied center
stage. Central among these is McDonald’s gender equity framework, with its focus on
the slow pace of change in men’s and women’s household roles compared to theirincreasingly equal participation in the public sphere, especially the labor market(McDonald 2000). Recent work has suggested that increases in gender equality arelikely to help societies currently experiencing low fertility to move towards anequilibrium characterized by near-replacement fertility rates (Esping-Andersen andBillari 2015; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015).
This paper seeks to make both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to theanalysis of how gender equality is related to fertility. First, we bring the role of labormarket institutions into the analysis, theorizing the importance of considering how
employment norms and work culture affect men’s ability to participate in housework. In
doing so we establish the connection not only between women’s roles in the public andprivate spheres but also between men’s roles in these two spheres. Second, we bring
East Asia more fully into the literature on low fertility, which has been dominated byresearch on Europe. We utilize individual-level panel data from Japan, one of thecountries that has had persistently low fertility over the past two decades, despite
government policy efforts to raise the birth rate. We employ an analysis strategy thatmodels husband’s contribution to household labor in the context of Japanese labormarket institutions and then models the effect of husband’s household work on thetransition to second birth. In demonstrating how gender-role specialization in Japanesemarriages is connected to the broader labor market context, we argue that Japaneselabor market structure and workplace norms have a negative impact on Japan’s fertility
rate.

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2. The household division of labor and fertility
2.1 Empirical studies
Following McDonald’s gender equity perspective and the expectation that a highly
gendered household division of labor in postindustrial societies is likely to depress
fertility, in recent years a number of empirical studies have endeavored to test thisrelationship. At the macro level, Feyrer, Sacerdote, and Stern (2008) find a positive
relationship in OECD countries between the average household work share of husbands
and the average number of births.3 A number of studies using micro-level data find that
increased involvement of fathers in childcare and housework increases the likelihood ofa second birth. For instance, Oláh (2003) compares Sweden, which has had a longstanding dual-earner/dual-carer family model, with Hungary, a country that hasemphasized paid work for men and women but a more traditional division of labor athome. She finds that fathers’ involvement in household work increases the probabilityof second birth in both countries.4 Using US data, Torr and Short (2004) find a Ushaped relationship between couples’ distribution of household labor and the transition
to second birth, with a higher probability of second birth for couples where the wife
does most of the housework (the ‘traditional’ model) as well as for couples where
housework is shared relatively equally between spouses.
Studies using micro-level data from countries with a more traditional malebreadwinner model have produced somewhat mixed results. In her comparative study of
Italy and Spain, Cooke (2009) finds that fathers’ share of childcare has no effect on theprobability of a second birth in Spain. In Italy, fathers’ childcare time has a positiveeffect but the strength of the effect varies by mothers’ employment status. In couples
where the wife is not employed, the probability of a second birth peaks when thehusband’s share of childcare time increases from 0% to around 25%. Among couples
where the wife works part-time, the peak probability is reached only when the husband
contributes around 30% of total childcare time. The contribution of childcare time byfathers needs to be much higher (around 60%) to affect the probability of a second birthin couples where the wife works full-time. Such cases are extremely rare in Italy. In
other research, Cooke (2004) finds that in Germany, husbands’ increased share ofchildcare time is positively related to the probability of a second birth, but this does notcompletely outweigh the negative effect of long work hours among women. She also
3

Throughout the paper we use “household work” to indicate the combination of housework and childcare;housework refers only to domestic tasks (such as cooking, grocery shopping, cleaning, etc.).
4
For Sweden, Oláh measures this as father’s use of parental leave after the first birth. For Hungary, father’s
involvement is measured as a deviation from the situation where the wife reports doing all of the householdtasks.

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Nagase & Brinton: Labor market institutions and fertility in Japanfinds that the probability of experiencing a second birth two to three years after the firstbirth is about twice as high among male-breadwinner couples as dual-earner couples.
In sum, studies report varied relationships between a couple’s transition to second
birth and men’s contribution to household work, although there has been little analysis
of how the country-level cultural context with regard to gender roles affects thisrelationship. Moreover, studies have not necessarily paid theoretical attention to how
the relationship between men’s participation in the household and the transition tosecond birth is conditioned by the employment status of husbands and wives and theopportunity costs faced by mothers.
Empirical studies in Japan generally find a positive relationship between husbands’
housework share and fertility intentions, but, like studies in other countries, thisrelationship does not appear to be completely straightforward. Using panel data,
Yamaguchi (2005) finds that a woman’s intention to give birth is lower when she does
not expect her husband to cooperate in housework, even though the husband’s actual
housework share does not have a statistically significant relationship to wife’s fertility
intentions. Mizuochi (2010) uses data from five countries and finds that in Japan, men’s
intention to have an additional child is lower when their own housework share is low.
On the other hand, husband’s housework share as reported by female respondents is not
significantly related to wife’s birth intentions. Mizouchi interprets this as indicating thatwomen may not evaluate husband’s increased domestic work share as highly as men
themselves do. This could also be interpreted as suggesting that males who desire an
additional child are more willing to share the burden of housework. 5
The possible relevance of husbands’ increased participation in household work forcouples’ transition to a second birth is highly important in a low-fertility society such as
Japan. The Japanese total fertility rate has declined monotonically over the past 30
years, except for occasional minor upticks, and in 2014 the total fertility rate was 1.4.
Low fertility in recent years has been closely related to rising age at marriage as well as
increased rates of non-marriage (National Institute of Population and Social Security
Research 2012). Given that the rate of non-marital births remains very low in Japan(Hertog 2009), conditions within marriage that make it possible for couples to have two
or more children are central in order for Japan to raise its fertility rate.
Outsourcing of housework is uncommon in Japan, and employed wives experiencea heavy “second shift” of household tasks (Brinton 2017). Nevertheless, the Japanese
government has been encouraging women to remain employed after childbirth because
the country is facing rapid population aging and will soon encounter a shortage of5

Mizouchi also finds that women’s own intention to have an additional child is significantly lower among
those who are self-employed, temporary, or part-time workers compared to regular full-time workers, while itdoes not vary significantly between those who are housewives and those who are regular full-time workers.
The term ‘regular worker’ (seishain in Japanese) refers to an employee with an indefinite employment
contract.

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prime-age workers. In an effort to make work and family more compatible for women,
the government introduced childcare leave in 1992: It has subsequently revised thesystem several times to make it even more generous. Nevertheless, the Japanese
National Fertility Survey documents that from the 1980s until recently, around 70% of
mothers with first children under the age of one were not in the labor force. Thisstability in non-employment among young mothers represents a dramatic contrast to themajority of postindustrial societies.
Further reforms include a reduced work-hour option for Japanese workers with achild under age three (approved in 2009), and an increase in salary replacement in 2014
from 50% to 67% for the 180 days during childcare leave. There is some evidence thatthese policies are having an effect in terms of increasing the probability of childbirth aswell as new mothers’ attachment to the labor force (Nagase 2014). The 2015 Japanese
National Fertility Survey shows that the percentage of mothers employed when theirfirst child is age one increased from 27.4 % (for births in 2000‒2004) to 29.1% (forbirths in 2005‒2009) to 38.3% (for births in 2010‒2014).
Given this context, it is very important to understand how Japanese women’scontribution to housework and childcare might be complemented by a greater time
contribution on the part of husbands. Numerous studies have documented the extremely
low amount of time that Japanese men devote to housework and childcare (Feyrer,
Sacerdote, and Stern 2008; Tsuya, Bumpass, and Choe 2000; Tsuya et al. 2013).
According to the Japanese Cabinet Office’s 2014 White Paper on Children, Japanesefathers of preschool children spent an average of 1.07 hours per week on houseworkand childcare, compared to over two hours for fathers in France and the United
Kingdom and over three hours in the United States, Germany, Sweden, and Norway.

2.2 Japanese government policies promoting fathers’ involvement in housework
In the early 2000s the Japanese government realized the important role that fathers’
involvement might play in promoting an upturn in the fertility rate. The “Plus One
Measure to Halt the Declining Birth Rate” announced by the Ministry of Health, Labor,and Welfare (MHLW) in 2002 pointed out that the “revision of work patterns, including
men’s” was important for increasing fertility. In other words, it was recognized that a
reduction of employees’ work hours would make it easier for families to have children.
Therefore, when the “Act on Advancement of Measures to Support Raising the Next
Generation of Children” was passed in 2003, the government mandated that firms withmore than 300 employees should construct plans for work-family policies to meet theiremployees’ needs. Employers were asked to register a two-to-five-year action plan withthe local Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare office by 2005. The MHLW also

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Nagase & Brinton: Labor market institutions and fertility in Japanannounced that it would recognize nintei kigyō (approved firms) starting from 2007 byallowing them to use kurumin, a family-friendly seal, on their goods andadvertisements. To receive a kurumin seal, a firm must have action plans extending
across more than two and less than five years, realize the stated action plan goals,
implement measures for workers with children between age three and school age, haveat least one male employee who takes parental leave, and have at least a 70% take-up
rate of childcare leave among female employees. The gender difference in the targets
for leave-takers, exceeding 70% for females but just one male employee in the entire
company, is an excellent demonstration of the assumption of very unbalanced
involvement of men and women in childcare. Indeed, Japanese firms have generally
constructed action plans that are more targeted to accommodating the needs of female
than male workers.
Due to extensive government publicity efforts, the term ikumen (‘men caring forchildren’) became a buzzword in 2010. Among the new action plans formulated thatyear, the government set a target of 150 minutes (2.5 hours) per week for men to be
involved in housework and childcare by 2020. According to a time-use study conductedby the Japanese Statistical Office (Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities), theaverage weekly time devoted by men with children under age six to housework,
childcare, and elder care was 38 minutes in 1997 and 67 minutes in 2011. The figurethus nearly doubled over a 15-year period, yet still remained far short of the 2.5 hours
set as the target.
Japanese fathers’ attitudes towards participating in childrearing have beenchanging. The Survey on Child Rearing Support (Kosodate Shien ni Kansuru Chōsa),conducted by Mitsubishi-UFJ Research and Consulting as part of an MHLW project,asked fathers of preschool-age children about their ideals and the reality of giving
priority to work or to childrearing. Respondents were asked to select from the following
options: “Fully concentrate on work,” “Give priority to work,” “Give equal weight towork and family,” “Give priority to family,” and “Fully concentrate on family.” Theproportion of fathers replying that their ideal was to fully concentrate on or give priority
to family increased from 17% in 2002 to 33.9% in 2014. Those who replied that they doso in reality increased from 7.7% to 24.8%. The percentage saying that fully
concentrating on work or giving priority to work is ideal was 30.1% in 2002 and only
slightly lower (27%) in 2014. But the proportion of men saying that they do this inreality was very high in 2002 (65.2%) and dropped dramatically, to just 39.6%, in 2014.
This indicates that men’s actual behavior with regard to prioritizing work over family
has gotten considerably closer to their ideal, although the gap between the two still
remains very wide. What, then, explains the much higher ideal commitment of Japanese
men to family than their actual day-to-day commitment at home?

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3. Explanations of gender-role specialization in Japanese marriage
Empirical studies consistently document that Japanese marriages tend to have a highdegree of gender-role specialization (Brinton 2017; Lee and Ono 2008; Tsuya et al.
2013). Japanese scholars have tested a variety of theoretical frameworks in theirresearch on the household division of labor. Dominant perspectives from the Western
literature include the relative resources hypothesis, the time availability hypothesis, andgender-role ideology (Aassve, Fuochi, and Mencarini 2014; Bianchi et al. 2000;
Bittman et al. 2003). The first two frameworks are extensions of Becker’s theory ofcomparative advantage and the optimal allocation of time (Becker 1993), although therelative resources hypothesis adds negotiation and the effects of a power imbalance
between spouses, neither of which was explicitly included in Becker’s formulation.
Among the various perspectives, gender-role ideology is often posited as the mostprobable cause of the exceptionally strong gender-based division of work among
Japanese couples compared to their Western counterparts. But few empirical studies
have found a significant effect of Japanese men’s gender-role attitudes on theirhousehold labor.
Using the National Family Research Surveys of 1998 and 2003, Matsuda (2006)
finds that Japanese husbands’ available time affects their household work share but that
their gender-role attitudes have no significant effect when other factors are controlledfor. Matsuda also finds that the share of household income provided by the wife is asignificant predictor of husband’s share of household work, and this effect became
stronger between 1998 and 2003. On the other hand, Nishioka (1998) finds a significant
negative effect of wives’ traditional gender-role beliefs on husbands’ housework in the
30‒49 year age group, using another national survey (Katei Dōkō Chōsa). This effectwas not present for husbands age 29 and under or age 50 and older. Nakagawa (2010)
also finds that mothers’ traditional gender-role attitudes are related to a significant
increase in women’s household work, which in turn decreases husband’s involvement:
she refers to this mechanism as maternal gate-keeping. On the other hand, a study by
Ishii-Kuntz et al. (2004) finds a significant effect of men’s gender-role attitudes on theirown housework.
Comparing the household division of labor in the United States and Japan, Kamo
(1994) concludes that while the relative resources and time availability hypotheses are
relevant for Japanese couples, the effects of husband’s and wife’s relative income andtime are weaker than in the United States. This leads him to conclude that the genderdivision of labor is more rigid in Japan. Other empirical research shows similar results.
Ueda (2005) uses Japanese time-use data and finds that an increase in the time spent by
the husband on housework reduces the time spent by the wife, but only by a small
amount. Tsuya et al. (2013) compare data from 1994 and 2000 and find that the number

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Nagase & Brinton: Labor market institutions and fertility in Japanof hours spent by Japanese husbands on housework is not very responsive to wives’
employment hours. Similarly, Mizouchi (2006) finds that mothers’ estimatedparticipation in the labor force does not significantly affect husbands’ involvement inchildcare. Matsuda (2000) reports that a husband’s involvement in housework increases
when his wife works full-time but not when she works part-time.
In sum, prior studies have not been able to fully explain the high degree of genderrole specialization in Japanese marriages by using theoretical frameworks centered on
intra-family dynamics. At the same time a great deal is known about labor market
structure in Japan and the constraints and norms governing men’s working lives,
particularly in large firms. We turn now to this context in order to examine how men’s
heavy time commitment to the workplace is incentivized by the structure of the labormarket, associated work norms, and the Japanese legal environment. All of these forces,
we argue, mitigate against married Japanese men’s ability to contribute equally or evensubstantially to household work.

4. The effect of labor market structure, workplace norms, and thelegal environment on the household division of labor
4.1 Firm-internal labor markets and work norms
It is well known that standard employment practices in large Japanese firms include
long-term implicit contracts that guarantee job security to regular full-time employees
and a wage system heavily based on seniority (Yashiro 2011). As evidence of the longterm employment relationship in Japan, male wages rise more steeply with tenure thanin the United States or United Kingdom (Brunello and Ariga 1997; Hashimoto andRaisian 1985). Hanada (1987), Imada and Hirata (1995), Ishida (1986), and Takeuchi(1995) examine the promotion process for male university graduates in large firms andshow that many of them stay in the same firm across their working lives. This is less thecase for blue-collar workers and is even less so for female workers. Using longitudinal
data from a large financial firm, Takeuchi (1995) shows that nearly all male university
graduates were promoted at the same speed during their first three years, which
represents the prototypical employment practice for Japanese male university graduates
employed at large, traditional Japanese firms. The difference in promotion speed
emerged only after 7‒10 years of tenure, when evaluations by different managers had
accumulated. In employees’ late thirties and forties the selection process for promotion
became more stringent but most men remained in the company. This extended period ofcompetition and the slow selection process kept most male university graduates in thecompetition, resulting in long work hours and high commitment to the firm. The past346

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few decades have seen a large increase in non-standard employment and in theoutsourcing of work in Japan, together with some loosening in the link between tenureand salary for middle-aged core employees. Even so, the fundamental labor practices
that emphasize firm-internal training and promotion of core workers remain intact.
Hiring a cohort of workers straight out of university and training, managing, andpromoting them with reference to their dōki (the other members of their cohort) remains
common practice at large enterprises.
Even with the increase in non-standard (part-time, temporary, and short-term
contract) work since the early 1990s, a large proportion of Japanese married males
continue to be in long-term jobs. The average job tenure of married males actually
increased in the 1990s and 2000s (Genda and Rebick 2000; Shimizutani and Yokoyama2009). On the other hand, female full-time workers and part-time workers and workers
in small enterprises have had more unstable jobs and have functioned as a buffer during
economic fluctuations (Abraham and Houseman 1989; Brinton 1993; Houseman andOsawa 2003; Osawa, Kim, and Kingston 2013). Japanese women are rarely found in
career-track jobs (Brinton and Mun 2016; Mun and Brinton 2014) and when they are
they tend to be uneasy about their future because balancing work and family is difficult
due to the long work-hour norms (Nagase and Yamaya 2011). While the Equal
Employment Opportunity Law of 1985 and its subsequent amendment in 1997, 1999,
and 2007 opened the career track to a small number of women, analysis of 1990s datashows little effect of the law on female employment (Abe 2010, 2011). In a probit
analysis of labor force participation, employment among new mothers indeed decreased
among younger cohorts in the 1990s and early 2000s, despite the favorable changes inchildcare leave. The share of female workers who entered the labor market in nonstandard employment increased, but these workers lack job security and are not entitled
to childcare leave (Nagase and Moriizumi 2011, 2013). Meanwhile, the wage rate hasremained very low for female workers who return to the labor market on a part-timebasis (Nagase 2003; Yu 2009).
In sum, male university graduates working in large firms are the ones who benefit
the most from Japanese labor practices in terms of the life-cycle earnings they canreceive from high work commitment when they are young. Economically, it makes
sense for them to choose to have a strong division of labor at home during their early
work lives so that they can focus on work. Likewise, the fact that many male workers
have stay-at-home wives who are dependent on their income further reinforces
workplace norms that favor workers who have dependent spouses who can take care of
the children. Such workplace norms implicitly penalize workers who need to have more
flexible work hours in order to take care of family. For instance, male workers in thefinancial sector are often given only one week’s notice of a managerial decision totransfer them to a different office, even in a different part of the country. Such a transfer

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Nagase & Brinton: Labor market institutions and fertility in Japanorder is very difficult to follow if one has young children and a spouse who works fulltime. This system works if most male workers have a spouse who is able to adjust. But
workers who have difficulty moving to a different location because their spouses are
employed may be evaluated by the firm as less capable or committed. Such labor
practices make family life very challenging for dual-earner couples and make it difficult
for childrearing responsibilities to be shared between the mother and the father.

4.2 Legal support of workplace norms
Japanese norms of high workplace commitment have been strengthened by decisions
reached by the Japanese Supreme Court. In the 1960s the Supreme Court ruled thatcompany dismissal of a permanent employee is invalid unless the company has taken
certain specified steps to avoid dismissals. At the same time, Supreme Court decisions
have strengthened employers’ authority to control permanent employees’ overtime
work, job content, and transfers.6 Employers’ authority over human resource andpersonnel affairs in exchange for employees’ job security is the most prevalent in large
domestic firms. Wages do not rise as steeply with job tenure in smaller Japanese firms
or in foreign-owned firms (Ono 2007). Therefore, an employee in a smaller firm maychoose to look for a new job rather than to accept company personnel decisions that do
not accommodate his family needs. Moreover, since suing a company takes many years,
a worker’s expectation of losing his job is higher at small firms, given their relatively
high bankruptcy rate and the possibility that the firm may go out of business before thecase is settled.
The influence of labor law and labor practices on the work hours and job transfersof regular full-time employees is evidenced in the government’s Recommendation
Report from the May 2013 Regulatory Reform Council Working Group on
Employment. The addendum to the report specifies the labor principles that apply topermanent full-time employees (seishain): Seishain (regular full-time employees) are
generally defined by such factors as 1) indefinite employment without termination ofcontract, 2) working full-time, and 3)direct employment (i.e. working directly for the6

For example, in the Toa Paint Case of 1973, a male university employee who rejected his company’s
relocation order for family reasons filed a complaint against his dismissal. The Supreme Court took the sideof the employer and when the case was finally settled in 1992 it was made clear that a full-time permanent
employee cannot reject a company order of relocation due to ordinary family reasons, unless the employee’s
initial employment contract was already location-specific. The Hitachi Musashi Case of 1967 involved a highschool graduate who filed a complaint against his dismissal upon rejecting overtime work. The Supreme
Court ruled in 1986 that if the employer-employee agreement includes rules regarding overtime and holiday
work and the conditions for requiring such work, employees must accept a manager’s order to work overtime
or on holidays if the order is consistent with that agreement (Kamoda 2015).

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employer). In addition, for such employees the conditions in the employment contract
are unlimited with respect to the 1) content and 2) location of work and 3) work hours.
In other words, there is an implicit contract that the employee will accept the decisionsof the employer regarding future changes in work content, relocation of the worker, andamount of overtime work ….Given the social context in which the wife supports aman’s unlimited style of work by specializing in domestic work, permanent full-timejobs are more male-centered. Since men need to support the family, the wage system isbased more on tenure and on a living wage (Report of Regulatory Reform Council
Working Group on Employment, May 30th, 2013, pp.10-11; translation by Nobuko
Nagase).
The report points out that the virtues of this type of employment system include
the flexibility it grants to employers and the encouragement they receive to make firmspecific investments in employees, better coordination between the different
departments in a firm, increased motivation among employees as a result of having awider range of work responsibilities, and employees’ job security. On the other hand,the disadvantage is that employees are obliged to accept long work hours and possible
transfers to other locations, thereby compromising their work-life balance. Also, since
employees rotate between different positions in the same company, their accumulated
human capital tends to be company-specific, rendering the benefits of voluntarily
moving to a different firm much smaller. Moreover, strong employment protection
discourages firms from employing a large number of permanent full-time employees,
instead hiring many fixed-term contract workers so as to retain flexibility to adjust thecompany’s wage bill to economic fluctuations.
According to the MHLW Shūrō Joken Sōgō Chōsa in 2004 (the latest survey withthe following specific question), 90% of firms with over 1,000 employees have apersonnel relocation policy requiring that an employee make a geographical move if
asked to do so. Among firms of this size, 81% have at least one employee who is living
separately from his spouse due to relocation. However, the requirement to relocate is
not uniform across male graduates of different educational levels. Male high school
graduates working in large firms are often hired by local factories or branches that do
not require employees to relocate, whereas male university graduates often agree at the
point of hire to follow relocation orders they may receive, as this is a requirement ofbeing in the fast promotion track. On the other hand, the expected reward of prioritizing
company orders over family demands is higher at large firms due to the internal labormarket structure that provides a steeper promotion ladder. This is especially the case formale university graduates, who are generally hired by firm headquarters on a long-term
contract and who have the greatest possibility of promotion and the highest possibilityof being transferred to other locations and taking on different jobs.

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Nagase & Brinton: Labor market institutions and fertility in Japan

5. Hypotheses
Given Japanese labor market structure, workplace norms, and a legal environment
supportive of employers’ large discretionary power over employees’ working hours andworking conditions, we propose an explanatory framework that incorporates workplace
norms (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) as an important influence on specialization within
the household. Though we assume that both husbands and wives can devote time toboth household work and market work, we follow de Laat and Sevilla-Sanz (2011) inassuming that men’s disutility to engage in household work depends on the cultural
norms of their reference group. These norms generate externalities, so that when men
belong to a group where men’s level of participation in household work is low, then allother things being equal their higher disutility will lead them to engage in lesshousehold labor. While de Laat and Sanz address culture at the country level, we extend
the theoretical framework to the organizational culture of the firm. We expect that when
men are surrounded by other male employees who devote little time to housework andchildcare, this will exert downward pressure on their own household work contribution.
In this way, norms of gender-role specialization (husbands as breadwinners, wives as
caregivers) will be reinforced.
As an illustration, when workplace managers expect that wives take care ofchildren, important work meetings may be planned for the evening and overtime workand business trips may be demanded at short notice. In such a setting, if fathers gohome to care for children it interferes with work. Their promotions and wage increases
may therefore be threatened if they cannot meet managerial demands due to caring forchildren. In this case, there is an increase in the disutility for husbands to engage inhousehold work and childcare.
We hypothesize:
1)

Organizational work norms that make combining parenthood and labor
force participation more difficult will encourage gender-role specializationin the household, and husbands will therefore engage in a smaller share ofhousehold work.

While organizational norms may operate to decrease husbands’ share in household
work, this in turn increases the time costs incurred by women for childrearing. We
expect that this will have a negative effect on the couple’s transition to a second birth.
We focus on the second birth for two reasons. First, non-marriage or delayed transition
to first marriage, together with a decline in married couples’ transition to second or
higher-order births, have been shown to account for a much greater share of recent
aggregate fertility decline in Japan than the transition to first birth (Ogawa 2003). Most350

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couples who marry will proceed to a first birth. Thus, it is particularly important tounderstand the mechanisms behind the transition to second birth. Second, as discussed
earlier in this article, a large body of demographic research has explored therelationship between household gender-role specialization and transition to second birthin various OECD countries. This empirical emphasis likely reflects not only theimportance of higher parities (beyond one child) for total fertility rates but also the factthat the time constraints experienced by couples who already have one child are likely
to render the household division of labor a highly relevant predictor of the decision toproceed to a second birth. Therefore, our second hypothesis is:
2)

The less household work a husband does, the lower the probability oftransition to second birth.

6. Data and methods
We use data from the Japanese Longitudinal Survey of Adults in the 21st Century(2002 Cohort), a nationally representative panel survey conducted by the Ministry of
Health, Labor, and Welfare using multi-stage probability sampling of men and women
aged 20‒34 in late October of 2002 (cohorts born between 1967 and 1982). This survey
is conducted annually at the household level on the first Wednesday of November andcollects yearly information on labor market participation, household work hours,
marriages and births, and individuals’ background characteristics. If both members of acouple were born between 1967‒1982, each is given the long form of the survey and isconsidered to be a main respondent. In the case where one’s spouse was born outside of
the 1967‒1982 range, or if marriage took place after the initial survey year, a short form
asking about employment and background characteristics is filled out by the spouse.
We use panel data up to the eleventh wave (conducted in 2012). This allows us tofollow the family formation of individuals who were 20‒34 years old in 2002 andbecame 30‒44 in the final year. The effective response rate was 82.8% in the first year
and an equivalent or higher rate in subsequent years.7 We limit our analysis to currently
married main respondents and also use spousal information.
7

Response rates in subsequent waves were 82.2%, 85.1%, 87.9%, 89.0%, 90.0%, 91.3%, 92.4%, 85.5%,
82.4%, and 82.0% respectively. The administration of the survey involved an interviewer leaving the survey
at the household and picking it up one week later in a sealed envelope. Surveys were collected for every
person in the household in the age range 20‒34 in late October 2002, and these individuals continued to be
surveyed in subsequent years. All individuals in this age range were considered main respondents, whether
single males or females, husbands, wives, brothers, or sisters. A short form, for them to fill in by themselves,
was given to spouses in the households who were not in the specified age range in the first year or who
entered the data set through marriage in a subsequent year. From 2013 on, the main respondents were asked tohttp://www.demographic-research.org

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Nagase & Brinton: Labor market institutions and fertility in JapanThe advantages of the Japanese Longitudinal Survey of Adults in the 21st Century(2002 Cohort) include the large sample size and the high response rate. Other panel data
in Japan such as the Panel Survey on Consumers, the Keio Household Panel Survey(KHPS), or the Japan Household Panel Survey (JHPS) are smaller and have a lower
response rate in the initial year than the Japanese Longitudinal Survey of Adults. Owing
to restrictions on the use of micro-level data imposed by a government statistics law,data from this survey have not been utilized until very recently. The panel structure of
the data allows us to control for individual differences in unobserved preferences andabilities. This is an advantage because birth timing and fathers’ family involvement
may differ by unobservable characteristics such as fecundity and the desire for children.

6.1 Dependent variables
There are two dependent variables in our analyses. In our first analysis, the dependent
variable is husband’s contribution to household work, measured as the ratio of
husband’s number of hours spent on housework and childcare divided by the total
number of hours spent on housework and childcare by both husband and wife.
Household work hours are calculated based on the question: “How many hours andminutes per day do you spend on housework and childcare?” Respondents and theirspouses were asked to respond separately for a typical work day and a typical non-workday. Average daily household work hours were calculated by multiplying the minutes
for a typical workday by five and for a typical non-work day by two, adding the two
figures together, dividing by seven, and then converting to hours. In our second analysis
the dependent variable is the probability of transition to second birth among thoseindividuals who have one child.

6.2 Independent variables
To see if differences in organizational work norms affect Japanese men’s household
work share (the first analysis), we calculate the average household work sharecontributed by men of different educational levels in different-sized firms. We
conceptualize this as the standard against which men in that educational category andfirm size are likely to compare themselves. Stated differently, we construct the norm forthe group that we can assume men consider as their own reference group. We use
educational level and firm size to construct the reference-group norm because thesefill in the information for their spouse as well. We use data only up to 2012, the last year when eachindividual filled out a questionnaire.

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characteristics define the group with whom Japanese male employees are in the mostdirect competition for promotion and salary increases. Japanese men experience fewer
job changes than men in many other OECD countries. Nevertheless, on average morethan 15% of men change firm size in adjacent years in our data, making it possible for
us to use firm-size change as a time-varying covariate in a fixed-effects model. In ourmodel we estimate if a man’s workplace change exerts a significant effect on his
household work share after controlling for his income, gender-role attitudes, and work
hours. Size of firm is measured as 5,000 or more employees, 1,000‒4,999, 500‒999,
300‒499, 100‒299, 30‒99, 5‒29, and 1‒4. Public servants are considered as a separate
category. Married men who report their work information for at least two consecutive
years as well as their own and their spouse’s household work hours are included in theanalysis. Educational level is measured as graduate school, university, junior college ortechnical school, or high school and below.
Gender-role attitudes are measured by the two-pronged question: “What kind offamily do you prefer with regard to: 1) housework, and 2) income?”8 If a male respondsthat housework should mainly be the wife’s responsibility he is given a score of 1. If heis undecided he is given a score of 2. If he responds that both husbands and wives
should be equally responsible he is given a score of 3. The response that housework
should mainly be the husband’s responsibility is given a 4 (although only about 2% of
individuals give this response). Likewise, if a male responds that generating income ismainly the husband’s responsibility this receives a score of 1; uncertainty generates ascore of 2, equal responsibility generates a score of 3, and wife’s responsibility
generates a score of 4. The total score for gender-role attitudes thus ranges from 2 to 8,
with 2 representing the most ‘traditional’ set of attitudes and 8 representing the mostuntraditional. Cronbach’s α is 0.654. The two-pronged question was asked in 2002,
2006, and 2010. In the fixed-effects model that we employ, we use data from theprevious year in years when the question was not asked. With regard to otherindependent variables, work hours are measured as weekly work hours: these set a
constraint on how much time is available for domestic activities. For husbands we use
logged weekly work hours. We add dummy variables for the different ranges of wife’s
weekly work hours: 0 hours, 1‒20 hours, 21‒35 hours, and 36‒42 hours, with 43 hours
or more as the reference category. Annual income is measured in 10,000 yen, and thisand other independent variables are lagged by one year in the model, with coefficients
representing the effect of change in the past year.9

The survey also asks for opinions about childcare. However, since Cronbach’s α declines when we include
this, we exclude this question in calculating men’s gender-role attitude score.
9
The data shows some unusual income changes from year to year, such as an increase of more than 10
million yen. We therefore delete from the analysis respondents with an income change below 1% in theincome change distribution or over 99% in the distribution.

8

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6.3 Modeling husband’s household work shareIn our first analysis we estimate a fixed-effects linear probability model where
husbands’ domestic work shareis predicted to be lower if men in the referencegroup have a low average household work share. The analysis is limited to male
respondents, as data on husbands’ firm size is reported by them but not by wives. The
sample includes couples with varying numbers and ages of children, including childlesscouples. For this reason we consider the most appropriate dependent variable to behusbands’ household work share rather than absolute hours. Independent variables
include husband’s logged annual income, logged weekly work hours, and gender-role
attitudes, all in t‒1. We control for husband’s age. Number of children in the household
and age of the youngest child are also controlled for, in order to account for the greater
amount of household work necessary in households with at least one young child and/or
multiple children. Since only a few surveyed individuals acquired additional education
during the survey years we exclude educational level in the fixed-effects model
estimation. By using a fixed-effects model we control for individual differences in
preference for household work and differences in other unobserved characteristics. Ifother things are equal, moving to a firm where the average male worker of the sameeducational level contributes less to household work should significantly reduce anindividual male’s household work share, controlling for his earnings, work hours,
number of children, age of youngest child, gender-role attitudes, and wife’s work hours.
We include a year dummy to take into account the time trend.

6.4 Modeling the transition to second birth
In our second analysis, transition to second birth is the dependent variable, and we
hypothesize that husband’s contribution to household work will exert an influence.
Prior studies vary with respect to whether researchers measure husband’s household
work as his share of total household work or as his absolute housework hours, while
controlling or not controlling for wife’s absolute housework hours. While we use
household work share as the dependent variable in our first analysis, we shift to actual
household work hours in the analysis predicting transition to second birth. Ourreasoning is that while household work share is suitable as a dependent variable, actual
hours constitute a better measure once couples have a child. Work share does not take
into account the actual amount of time a couple is spending on housework andchildcare. For example, in couples in which the wife contributes 10 hours per week andthe husband contributes 5 hours, the husband’s share is .50. But the same will be true incouples where the wife contributes 20 hours and the husband contributes 10. If total354

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household work time put in by husbands and wives together has an independent effecton transition to second birth, this will not be reflected in the coefficient for a ratio
variable. We therefore choose to use husband’s actual household work hours as anindependent variable. We also run a second model that adds in wife’s actual household
work hours.
Mothers’ participation in the labor market is obviously an important variable inconsidering the transition to second birth. Compared with more flexible labor markets
such as in the United States, once a woman in Japan quits her job and exits the labor
force around the time of a birth it is less likely that she will reenter after a short work
interruption (Nagase 2013; Yu 2009). Since wage increases are related to tenure andsince most full-time regular workers are entitled to one year of childcare leave, it isworthwhile for a woman to continue her employment by using childcare leave if she
hopes to be working after her second childbirth. Therefore, if a woman is in the labor
force following the birth of her first child, we assume that her decision to have a second
birth may be different to that of women who are not in the labor force. Accordingly, wemeasure whether a woman was in the labor force at t‒1 as an explanatory variable forher progression to a second birth at time t. To see if explanatory variables such as
husband’s household work hours exert different effects on the second birth for working
and non-working mothers, we also run separate regressions for women with one child
who were in the labor force at t‒1 and those who were not in the labor force at t‒1.
For this analysis we use the sample of females who were main respondents. The
sample of females with one child is considerably larger than the male sample with one
child. This is due to the fact that in the first year the survey was administered toindividuals age 20‒34, and the transition to parenthood generally occurs at a younger
age for females than males. Also, the attrition rate is slightly higher for male
respondents. Lastly, although in general the main respondents and their spouses filled inanswers separately, female main respondents may answer questions such as those on
their own labor force participation more accurately. For all of these reasons, we choose
the sample of female respondents for the analysis of transition to second birth. In
addition to husband’s household work hours, the independent variables include
husband’s logged earnings and gender-role attitudes and wife’s labor force
participation, all measured at t‒1. Given the panel nature of the data, t is defined as theyear when a second birth occurs or, for couples that have not had a second birth within
the time span of the data, the last survey year. Since fecundity is closely related to
women’s age, we also control for wife’s age. We include a year dummy to take into
account the time trend, and we also include duration since first childbirth.

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7. Results
7.1 Husband’s household work share
We measured the mean household work share of husbands in each of 36 categories that
we consider to represent the organizational norms for men of different education levels
in firms of different sizes. Table 1 shows men’s average contribution to household laborby firm size and education, based on the pooled data. While men working in the largest
firms contribute a very low share of household labor (13%‒19%) relative to men
working in firms of other sizes, male university graduates in these firms contribute by
far the lowest share (13%) across all educational levels and firm size categories. Malehigh school graduates in the largest firms contribute 19% of the household work in theirhousehold. The differences by firm size and by educational level make intuitive sense tous, as university-educated men in large Japanese firms are well-known to be subject tothe most intense work pressures and have the most to lose (and conversely the most togain) based on their demonstrated commitment to the firm, which is generally evaluatedby time spent working with colleagues (Yashiro 2011), sometimes extending into afterhours socializing.
Table 1:

Men's average contribution to household work, by firm size andeducation

Firm size (number of employees)
1‒4High school
21%

Vocational
school21%

University
18%

Graduate or
professional school
29%

5‒29

21%

20%

18%

14%

30‒99

20%

18%

21%

26%

100‒299

20%

19%

17%

22%

300‒499

21%

18%

15%

18%

500‒999

20%

18%

15%

17%

1,000‒4,999

18%

17%

15%

17%

5,000 or more

19%

18%

13%

17%

Public servants

23%

21%

20%

18%

Table 2 shows the results of a fixed-effects regression model estimating men’shousehold work share. The results in column 1 show that as we predicted, husband’shousehold work share is significantly higher if he is in a workplace with other men who
have a higher household work share. This result resembles de Laat and Sanz’s (2011)
finding that men’s average household work share in a country has significant
explanatory power for individual men’s behavior. Men’s individual gender-role
attitudes do not have a statistically significant relationship to their household labor
contribution, nor does the number of children in the household. In column 2, men’s356

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Demographic Research: Volume 36, Article 11

logged weekly work hours are added to the model. These are negatively related to his
household work share, showing that longer work hours are a major constraint on his
household work. Nevertheless, the strong positive effect of mean household work hours
by men of similar education and firm size remains. This is consistent with our
hypothesis that the gender-role specialization behavior of a man’s work peers
influences his behavior. The third model (column 3) shows that a change in wife’s work
hours from longer to shorter is associated with a significant decrease in husband’shousehold work share. Husband’s household work share decreases by 7 percentage
points in the case of non-employed wives compared with wives who work more than 42hours per week. A reduction in the work hours of employed wives also reduces
husbands’ household work share by 1 to 4 percentage points.
Table 2:

Determinants of husband’s share of household work

Men’s mean household work hours by firm sizeand education
Husband’s logged annual income at t‒1

Model 1
Coefficient
0.231**

SE
0.098‒0.006**0.003

Husband’s logged weekly work hours at t‒1

Model 2
CoefficientSE
0.329**
0.163

Model 3
CoefficientSE
0.239**
0.097‒0.0060.004‒0.0040.003‒0.008**0.004‒0.010***0.002

Husband’s gender-role attitudes at t‒1

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

0.001

Number of children‒0.001

0.004‒0.000

0.006

0.001

0.004

Age of youngest child (in years)
0‒1‒0.018**0.008‒0.0120.012‒0.009

0.008

2‒3

0.005

0.007

0.015

0.010

0.011

0.007

4‒6

0.014***

0.006

0.014*

0.007

0.017***

0.005

7‒9

0.017***

0.004

0.018***

0.005

0.018***

0.004

Over 9

----

----

----

----

----

----

Wife’s weekly work hours at t‒1
Not employed‒0.067***

0.006

1‒20

‒0.040***

0.006

21‒35

‒0.028***

0.006

36‒42

‒0.011**

0.005

Over 42
Constant
2

R withinNumber of person-years

0.225***

0.028

0.258***

0.046

----

----

0.288***

0.030

0.021

0.022

0.041

20,486

20,486

20,486

Notes: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are corrected for clustering. Survey year and husband’s age are included ascontrols in all three models.

The effect of husbands’ gender-role attitudes is statistically insignificant across all
three model specifications. This is consistent with prior studies suggesting that
husbands’ gender-role attitudes are not the main cause of their low household work
share. Nor is men’s household work share significantly related to number of children.

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7.2 Transition to second birth
Table 3 shows the results of the fixed-effects linear probability model predicting
transition to second birth. A second birth is less likely when a wife moves from nonemployment to employment at t‒1: the probability of a second birth the next year
decreases by just over 5 percentage points. On average, close to 50% of wives with only
one child are employed at t‒1, around 18% of whom are in regular full-time jobs, 25%
in part-time or other non-standard employment, and 7% are self-employed.10 Of
particular interest is whether husband’s higher household work hours significantly
increase the probability of a second birth. This is indeed the case. A one-hour per weekincrease is associated with slightly more than a 1 percentage point rise in the probabilityof a second birth. On the other hand, wife’s household work hours (in column 2) tend to
decrease the probability of a second birth, although this effect is not statisticallysignificant.
Table 3:

Determinants of transition to second birth
Model 1
Coefficient

Husband's weekly household work hours at t‒1

Model 2SE

0.010***

0.004

0.021

0.014

Wife's weekly household work hours at t‒1
Husband's logged annual income at t‒1

Coefficient
0.011***

SE
0.004‒0.003

0.002

0.021

0.014

Husband's logged weekly work hours at t‒1‒0.0030.011‒0.002

0.011

Husband's gender-role attitudes at t‒1‒0.0050.004‒0.006

0.004

Wife's labor force participation at t‒1
Age of first child (in years)‒0.055***0.014‒0.060***

0.014

0‒1

‒0.144***0.035‒0.139***

0.035

2‒3

0.009

0.029

0.011

0.029

4‒6

0.106***

0.021

0.107***

0.020

7‒9

0.054***

0.013

0.054***

0.013

Over 9Constant
2

R withinNumber of person-years

----

----

----

----

‒0.0460.112‒0.0140.113

0.1594
6509

0.160
6509

Notes: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are corrected for clustering. Survey year and wife’s age are included as controls inall three models.
10

We also checked whether employment status (e.g., full-time, part-time, etc.) at t‒1 affects the transition to asecond birth in the subsequent year. When a woman moves to regular full-time employment she will be
expected by the employer to have greater work commitment. But on the other hand the law entitles such
workers to childcare leave: this possibility is lower for workers with fixed-termed contracts. Therefore, theeffect on second birth could be either negative or positive. However, we found no statistically significant
difference based on employment status, though the negative coefficient is larger for women in regular fulltime employment, where one can expect higher and more stable income compared to other forms of
employment.

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Since husband’s household work hours may be of greater importance for dualearner couples than for male-breadwinner couples (i.e., couples where husbands
specialize in market work and wives in domestic work), we divide the female sample
into those who were working at t‒1 and those who were out of the labor force at t‒1(Table 4). As shown in the second column of Table 4, for wives who were out of thelabor force at t‒1 an increase in husbands’ household work hours at t‒1 does not
significantly affect the second birth at t. However, an increase in husband’s work hours(i.e., employment hours) significantly decreases the probability of a second birth at timet. Also, within two to six years after having the first child, the likelihood of having asecond child accelerates for these male-breadwinner couples.
Table 4:

Determinants of transition to second birth among working and nonworking mothers
Working mothers at t‒1
Coefficient

Non-working mothers at t‒1

SE

Coefficient

SE
0.006

Husband's weekly household work hours at t‒10.015***

0.006

0.006

Wife's weekly household work hours at t‒1‒0.005*0.003‒0.0020.003

Husband's logged annual income at t‒1

0.027

0.018

0.017

0.022

Husband's logged weekly work hours at t‒1

0.025*

0.014‒0.036**0.018

Husband's gender-role attitudes at t‒1
Age of first child (in years)‒0.011**

0.005‒0.0060.008

0‒1‒0.229***

0.053

0.016

0.062

2‒3

‒0.081**0.040

0.141***

0.053

4‒6

0.074***

0.025

0.200***

0.039

7‒9

0.045***

0.014

0.094***

0.024

Over 9

----

----

----

----

Constant‒0.147

0.144

0.041

0.189

2

R withinNumber of person-years

0.167
3242

0.175
3267

Notes: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. Standard errors are corrected for clustering. Survey year and wife’s age are included as controls inall three models.

For females working at t‒1 (column 1), husbands’ household work hours have astatistically significant positive effect on the probability of a second birth at time t. Thisis important because the absolute household work hours of husbands with one child in
dual-earner couples differ little from male-breadwinner couples (i.e., where only thehusband is in the labor force). Wife’s average household work hours show a muchlarger difference between the two groups (11.23 for non-working mothers vs. 7.27 forworking mothers). An increase in working wives’ household work hours decreases thelikelihood of a second birth (p<.10). As stated earlier, the spacing between the first andsecond child is very different between wives employed at t-1 and those who are not.

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Nagase & Brinton: Labor market institutions and fertility in Japan

When the wife is employed after the first birth, the probability of transition to second
birth increases only after intervals of 4‒6 and 7‒9 years, which is a much longer timeinterval as compared with non-working mothers. Also, among dual-earner couples themore the husband’s gender-role attitudes become non-traditional, the less likely it isthat the couple will progress to a second birth. Husbands in dual-earner couples are lesstraditional in their gender-role attitudes on average, accepting a more equal role forhusbands and wives in sharing the responsibilities of earning income and doinghousehold work. Consistent with these values, an increase in husband’s household work
hours and a decrease in the wife’s indeed increase the probability of transition to second
birth in dual-earner couples. However, rather than husbands increasing their household
work time by a substantial amount, such couples appear to scale back their number ofchildren (or at least increase the spacing). Lastly, husbands’ longer working hours at t‒1
compared to t are associated with an increase in the probability of a second birth among
working couples, which is contrary to the case of breadwinner couples.

8. Discussion and conclusion
Japanese men’s contribution to household work is strikingly low compared to otherpostindustrial societies. Prior research has shown that Japanese men’s household labor
is not very responsive to either reductions in their weekly work hours or to their wives’labor force participation. The dominant theoretical perspectives in the research
literature on household work ‒ relative resources, time availability, and gender-role
attitudes ‒ have been insufficient to explain this relative unresponsiveness.
This paper has focused on the Japanese employment system, a system of labor
practices and work norms that continues to apply especially to male university
graduates working in large firms. The system is based on an implicit contract between
employer and employee in which the employer promises job security and future wage
increases in exchange for employees’ high work commitment and willingness to workovertime and relocate when ordered to by the company. This package of employment
practices is supported by Japanese Supreme Court rulings. The speed of promotion andthe amount of future wage increases depend on the evaluations of managers, beginningin the early years of a man’s career and extending throughout his working life. A highly
gendered division of labor at home is a rational response to this system, as it facilitates
men’s ability to fully engage in the intra-company competition for promotion thatcharacterizes the early career stage.
We measured the norms for work-family balance in the individual male
employee’s reference group by calculating the average household work share of men at
the same education level who work for firms of the same size. Male university360

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Demographic Research: Volume 36, Article 11

graduates in the largest firms do the lowest average share of household work comparedto other men. In supplementary analyses we found that these men are more likely thanothers to be married to non-working wives. After controlling for husbands’ logged
annual earnings, logged weekly work hours, number of children, age of the youngest
child, gender-role attitudes, and wives’ work hours in the previous year, as well as
unobserved characteristics, using a fixed-effects linear probability model, we found that
husbands’ household work share is lower when the norm for men in the same education
category and firm size is to do less household work.
We then tested for the effect of fathers’ household labor hours on the transition tosecond birth. We assume that couples decide whether the wife will continue to work
after the first childbirth, and that the decision to have a second birth occurs after thisdecision. We also conducted separate analyses for wives who were working at t‒1 andthose who were out of the labor force at t‒1. Results indicate that husband’s higher
participation in household work is an important condition for dual-earner couples toproceed to a second birth. A wife’s employment at t‒1 has a negative impact on theprobability of having a second birth. In order to wipe out this negative effect, husband’shousehold work hours need to increase substantially. Other significant effects ontransition to second birth for dual-earner couples include a negative effect of husbands’
more egalitarian gender-role attitudes and a slight positive effect of husbands’ work
hours. While at first glance the result for husbands’ gender-role attitudes may seemcounterintuitive (especially with regard to McDonald’s gender equity theory), recent
qualitative work finds that young, highly-educated, egalitarian-minded dual-earner
Japanese couples have lower fertility intentions than single-earner couples or dualearner couples where the wife intends to leave the labor force or to cut back to part-timework (Brinton and Oh 2017). In-depth interviews reveal that the underlying logic ofsuch couples is that if both partners intend to continue working full-time it will be very
difficult to accommodate the time demands of a second child. In such couples,
husbands’ household work time is generally somewhat higher than in single-earnercouples, but not substantially higher, so that it is not enough to offset the increased time
demands that would occur with the birth of a second child. We also note that thehousehold income of dual-earner Japanese couples in our sample in this paper is lower
than that for single-earner households. This may motivate husbands in dual-earnercouples to increase their work hours after the birth of a first child in order to try to raise
their earning potential.
In terms of Japanese workplace norms, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2014) describe thelong work hours at Japanese firms as a rational response on the part of management to
the high fixed cost of long-term employment in terms of hiring, training, and retaining
workers. They further quote interviews from managers in foreign branches of Japanesefirms who state their belief that long work hours and high commitment are strong points

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Nagase & Brinton: Labor market institutions and fertility in Japanof the Japanese employment system. In other words, we can predict that as long as theJapanese employment system sustains rigid employment practices that encourage longterm employment and rely on cumulative appraisals for wage increases and promotions,the core work force will work longer hours than workers in other countries and thespecialization of household labor between husbands and wives will likely continue.
Does long-term employment remain an effective employment practice in thecontext of population aging and a shrinking population size? While some Japanese
economists (e.g., Yashiro 2011) answer in the negative, many Japanese human resource
professionals and company managers continue to evaluate the system highly. Our
results, however, suggest that unless such long-term employment practices arereformed, wives are likely to continue to be the main caretakers in households andmany husbands will continue to focus nearly single-mindedly on their workplace
responsibilities. Our analyses suggest that as more married women remain in the labor
force after the first birth, work norms that encourage strong gender-role specialization
at home will inhibit many couples’ transition to a second birth.
Even though our results indicate that the low amount of household work
contributed by husbands does not significantly decrease the probability of second birthin households where the wife is not employed, when one considers rapid population
aging together with the stagnation of male income a strong argument can be made foraltering the Japanese employment system so that workplace norms presuppose dualearner couples. This would involve modifying the rules for company-initiatedrelocations, overtime work, and the hiring of workers into different tracks, based onwhether the workers accept these management-directed decisions. The management andreward structure based on workers’ year of entry into the firm should also be modified
so that the labor market becomes more mobile and the chance to move across firms ‒perhaps in search of better work-family balance ‒ increases for both men and women.

9. Acknowledgments
We thank Claudia Goldin, Alexandra Killewald, and Yun Zhou for helpful comments
on a prior draft. The first author is grateful to the Abe Fellowship Program sponsoredby the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership for support of this research.
Permission to use the micro-level data from the Japanese Longitudinal Survey of Adults
in the 21st Century (2002 Cohort) conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor,and Welfare was obtained for this project in accordance with the Japanese Statistics
Law Act, Article 33.

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Demographic Research: Volume 36, Article 11

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Appendix
Table A-1:

Means for Table 2

Husband's share of domestic work
Husband's logged annual income at t‒1
Wife's weekly work hours
Not employed
1‒20
21‒35
36‒42
Over 42
Husband's logged weekly work hours
Number of children
Age of youngest child (years)
0‒1
2‒3
4‒6
7‒9
Over 9Husband's non-traditional gender-role values
Husband's age (years)
20‒22
23‒24
25‒26
27‒28
29‒30
31‒32
33‒34
35‒36
37‒38
Over 38
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Sample size

http://www.demographic-research.org

Mean

SD

Min.

Max.

0.198
6.020

0.136
0.470

0
0

1
9.10

0.435
0.168
0.168
0.154
0.075
3.862
1.919

0.496
0.374
0.373
0.361
0.263
0.390
0.740

0
0
0
0
0
0
1

1
1
1
1
1
5.08
6

0.221
0.236
0.244
0.164
0.135
3.107

0.415
0.425
0.430
0.370
0.341
1.532

0
0
0
0
0
2

1
1
1
1
1
8

0.001
0.004
0.015
0.036
0.075
0.120
0.174
0.174
0.156
0.087

0.033
0.065
0.121
0.187
0.263
0.325
0.379
0.379
0.363
0.281

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.095
0.087
0.071
0.078
0.098
0.097
0.090
0.096
0.101
0.097
0.091

0.293
0.281
0.256
0.267
0.298
0.296
0.286
0.295
0.301
0.296
0.287

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

20,486369

Nagase & Brinton: Labor market institutions and fertility in Japan

Table A-2:

Means for Table 3
Mean

SD

Min.

Birth of second child at t

0.133

0.340

0

Max.
1

Husband's weekly household work hours at t‒1

2.238

1.761

0

9

Wife's weekly household work hours at t‒1

9.261

4.105

0

18.43

Husband's logged annual income at t‒1

6.047

0.470

0

8.476
4.942

Husband's logged weekly work hours at t‒1

3.830

0.433

1.386

Husband's gender-role attitudes at t‒1

3.159

1.547

2

8

Wife's labor force participation at t‒1

0.498

0.500

0

1

Age of first child (in years)
0‒1

0.112

0.315

0

1

2‒3

0.310

0.463

0

1

4‒6

0.253

0.435

0

1

7‒9

0.141

0.348

0

1

Number of person-years

Table A-3:

6,509

Means for Table 4
Working mothers at t-1

Non-working mothers at t-1

Mean

SD

Min.

Max.

Mean

SD

Min.

Birth of second child at t

0.120

0.325

0

1

0.146

0.353

0

Max.
1

Husband's weekly household work hours at t‒1

2.258

1.824

0

9

2.218

1.697

0

9
18.43

Wife's weekly household work hours at t‒1

7.274

3.367

0

18.29

11.2323.810

0Husband's logged annual income at t‒1

5.976

0.483

0.693

8.010

6.118

0.446

0

8.476

Husband's logged weekly work hours at t‒1

3.832

0.438

1.386

4.940

3.828

0.428

1.946

4.787

Husband's gender-role attitudes at t‒1

3.504

1.660

2

8

2.816

1.341

2

7

Wife's labor force participation at t‒1

1.000

0.000

1

1

0.000

0.000

0

0

Age of first child (in years)
0‒1

0.070

0.255

0

1

0.154

0.361

0

1

2‒3

0.247

0.431

0

1

0.373

0.484

0

1

4‒6

0.256

0.436

0

1

0.250

0.433

0

1

7‒9

0.169

0.375

0

1

0.114

0.317

0

1

Number of person-years

370

3,242

3,267

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