EFFORTS OF THE CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMEPREVENTION TO PROMOTE EXPEDITIOUS ENTRY INTO
FORCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINSTTRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND ITS PROTOCOLSAND EXPECTED IMPACT OF THESE NEW INSTRUMENTS
Dimitri Vlassis*
I. THE PALERMO HIGH-LEVELSIGNING CONFERENCE
The Convention and the two Protocols
finalized by the Ad Hoc Committee at its
October 2000 session were submitted to
the General Assembly for consideration
and action at its f ifty- fif th sessio n,
together with a draft resolution that the
Ad Hoc Committee prepared at its Julya nd O cto b e r s es si o ns . T h e G e ne r a l
A ssem b ly a d op ted una nim ously th e
resolution 1 and, by virtue thereof, theConvention and the two Protocols. By
striking his gavel in the morning of 15
November, the President of the General
Asse mbly brought to a successful
conclusion the strenuous efforts of theinternational community to negotiate ingood faith a set of instruments toc o ll e c t i ve ly f ig h t o r g a n i z e d c r i m e .
Because of the fully participatory natureo f t h e n e g o t i a t in g p r o c e s s a nd t h esustained politica l commitment thatformed the core of the joint efforts of the
all States, the new instruments take intofull consideration all legitimate concernsof all countries, big or small. They do so
without in any way compromising thequality, functionality and, m ost
importantly, universality of the

instruments. Perhaps one of the mostsignificant features of the negotiation
process was that all countries engaged in
it ca me aw a y w ith a strong se nse ofownership of the new instruments. It willbe this sense of ow nership tha t w ill
constitute the best guarantee for thee x p e d it io u s e n tr y i n to f o r c e o f t h eConvention and its Protocols and theirsubsequent implementation.1
T he n e w C on ve nt ion a nd t he tw oProtocols were opened for signature on 12
December 2000 at a high-level political
sig nin g co nf ere nce in Pa lerm o . T hesymbolism and significance of this action
by the General Assembly2 extend beyond
the obvious. By gathering in Palermo, the1 4 9 S t a t e s pr e se nt s e nt a po w e r fu lmessage to the world about theirdeterm ination to join forces a gainst
tr an sn ationa l o rga nize d crime . T hesuccessful conclusion of the negotiations
for the Convention and its Protocols inrecord time was only the beginning of
joint efforts in this field. The politicalcommitment remained as strong as ever.
In evidence of this commitment, theConvention was signed by 123 countries
and the European Community, while theProtocols against Trafficking in Persons* Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Officer,
Secretary of the AD HOC Committee for the

1

Against Transnational Organized Crime, United

GeneralAssembly

resolution

55/25

of

15

November 2000.

Elaboration of the United Nations Convention
2

The High-Level Political Signing Conference was

N a t i o n s C e n t r e F o r I n te r n a ti o n a l C r i m e

c o n v e n e d p u r s u a n t to G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y

Prevention (United Nations)resolution 54/129 of 17 December 1999.

495

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
and Smuggling of Migrants received 81
and 78 signatures respectively.
The Protocol on the Illicit
M anufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components
and Ammunition was finalized at thetwelfth session of the Ad Hoc Committee
in March 2001. It was submitted to theGeneral Assembly, which had kept theitem entitled “Crime Prevention andCriminal Justice” on the agenda of its
fifty-fifth session open, in anticipation of
the successful completion of the work of
the Ad Hoc Committee. The Assembly
adopted resolution 55/255 of 31 May
2001, by which it unanimously adopted
the Protocol and opened it for signature
at United Nations Headquarters in New
York on 2 July 2001.
Since Palermo, the num ber ofsignatories to the Convention and thefirst Protocols has increased to 127, 88
and 84 respectively. The third Protocolhas been signed by two countries so far,but a significant number of signatures
are expected on the occasion of the 56th
session of the General Assembly, whicho pe ned on 1 1 S ep te mb e r 2 0 01 . Fivecountries have ratified the Convention todate, while there are three parties to theTrafficking in Persons Protocol and twoparties to the Smuggling of Migrants
Protocol.
II. EFFORTS OF THE CENTRE FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMEPREVENTION TO PROMOTESPEEDY RATIFICATION OF THE
NEW INSTRUMENTS
Immediately af ter the Palerm oConference, the Centre for International
C rime Prevention embarked on aconsolidated and comprehensive effort topromote expeditious entry into force of
the Convention and its Protocols. The

496

Centre developed a framework for action,b a s ed on a num b e r of k e y s t r a t eg ic
precepts and objectives.
The Centre structured its activities
along two major lines: first, bringing
itself to a position of being able to respondrapidly to indiv idual requ ests forassistance; and second, sustaining andnurturing the political will andmomentum that made the completion of
instruments of such complexity in such a
record time.
The first course of action was geared
to w a r d s a c h i e v i n g th e o b j e c t iv e o f
supporting and strengthening the effortso f i n d iv id u al co un t r ie s , w h ic h h a dalready embarked on, or were about tobegin the pre-ratification process. Severalof these countries were intent o nincorporating the Convention and its
P r o to c o ls in to t h e ir d o m e s ti c l e ga lsystem, but found themselves in need of
specialized expertise or consolidated
information about the experience of othercountries, in order to successfully ande xp e di tio usly r e vie w the ir e x istin glegislation. Further, these countries
required the same type of assistance inorder to amend their existing legislation,
or draft new legislation, as the case may
be, which would bring their systems inline and in compliance with the new
instruments. This course of action was
pursued by engaging in consultations
with the natio nal authorities of thecountries requesting assistance, whichwere directly responsible for theratification process and working withthem in reviewing existing legislation ordrafting amended or new laws.
The second course of action intended toachieve th e obj ec tive of providin gcountries the opportunity to exchange
experiences and ana lyze difficulties
e nco u nte re d in th e p re - r a tif ica t io n

119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
process, as well as mutually reinforce
each other, on both the political andsubstantive levels. The Centre decided topursue this course of action by organizing
sub-regional or regional consultations orseminars. The Centre opted for a balance
between the sub-regional and regional
approach, in order to engage, in groups,
countries w hich share common legal
traditions and systems, or pursu ecommon goals in economic and social
development, while gradually expanding
to cover countries which sharegeographical regions and are active inthat context in pursuing common politicalobjectives. I n order to ma ximize theim pa ct o f its a ct ivi tie s, the C e n tr e
decided to seek close cooperation with
sub-regional and regional organizations,which pursue similar objectives and bring
into the process the profound knowledgeof their respective region or sub-region
and their political presence and influence.
The underlying premise of all of theCentre’s activities is that at this stage,emphasis should be placed on supportingand promoting the efforts of countries tob ring the new instruments in f orce.
Implementation of the Convention and its
Protocols would be a subsequent goal,
which would require a much broader andm o re d et a ile d se t o f st ra te gie s an dactivities. Implementation would also
require a much more comprehensive andlarger technical cooperation programme,
supported by a considerably expanded
a n d s u s t a in e d f i n a n c i a l b a s e . T h e
C onve ntio n ha s esta blished its ow nm e c h a n i s m , t h e C o n f e r e n c e o f th eParties, which is charged with the task ofoverseeing and guiding implementation
efforts.
I n this co nt ex t, t he C e ntr e m a d e
proposals to donor countries and was
gratified by the immediate response.
Several countries, among which Japanfigures prominently, made voluntary
co ntrib utions to the special accountestablished under the United Nations
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Fund, which was set up in accordancewith the General Assembly adopting theConvention. At the time of writing thispaper, the Centre had undertaken thefollowing activities:
In January 2001, the Centre attended
the annual meeting of the Law Ministers
and Attorneys-General of the Caribbean
Community, at the invitation of thatorganiz ation, and presented theConvention and the two Protocols that
had at the time been adopted by theGeneral Assembly. The CARICO M
countries had not been able to attend thePalermo Conference and, as aconsequence, were a group of countries
that had not signed the new instruments.
Working closely w ith the CARI CO M
Se creta riat, the C entre m ana ged tosecure the commitment of the majority of
the CA RI CO M countries to sign theConvention and its Protocols, as
appropriate. Bahamas signed theConvention and the two Protocols in
March, and several more o f the
CARICOM countries ha ve confirmed
the ir intention to do so a t a specia lsigning ceremony which will take place
during the current session of the General
Assembly. As a follow-up, the Centre isorga niz ing, in co op e ra tio n with theCommonwealth Secretariat, a Ministerial
Seminar in Trinidad and Tobago at theend of November to review progress on
the ratification process and help the
CARI COM countries analyze therequirements for ratification.
In March, the Centre organized, inclose cooperation w ith the S outhern
Africa Development Community, a subregional Ministerial Seminar in Pretoria,
South Africa for the 14 SADC States. The

497

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
SADC States agreed to work intensely
towards ratification and review progress
towards the end of the year.
In April, the Centre organized another
Ministerial Seminar in Guatemala for thecountries of Central America and in July,
the Centre participated in a meeting of
the ASEAN countries devoted to thecommon efforts towards transnationalorganized crime and the ratification of
the Convention and its Protocols.
The Centre is planning similar events
for the ten countries of the Economic
Cooperation Organization in Teheran,Islamic Republic of Iran, for the countriesof the Economic C om munity of WestA f ric a ( E C O WA S ) in O ua ga d o ugo u,
Burkina Faso, for the countries of theLatin American region in Quito, Ecuador,
for the entire African region in Algiers,
Algeria, and for the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe, in Vilnius,
Lithuania. The Centre is also engaged in
c o n s u lt a t io n s w it h in t e r e s te d ho st
countries in order to organize a similar
regional event for the countries of the
Asia and Pacific region.
The Centre is cooperating closely with
the I nter- Pa rliame ntary U nion andattended its m ost recent annual
conference in Ouagadougou, Burkina
Faso, engaging in very useful dialogue
with parliamentarians from around theworld on the contents of the new
instruments and the crucial importanceof their support at the legislative level.
The C entre ha s b een jo ine d in its
efforts by the International Scientific andProfessional Advisory Council (ISPAC),
which organized an interregional meeting
involving thirty countries on theratification of the Convention and its
Protocols, on 14 and 15 September in
Courmayeur, Italy.

498

M eanw hile, the C entre ha s b egun
responding to individual requests forassistance and has built into its work
plan severa l more advisory missions
before the end of the year.
In all of these activities, the Centre hasb ee n using a “che cklist” con tain in g
sub stantive elements of ratif icatio nplans. This tool is reproduced below.
A. Substantive Elements of
Ratification Plan
1. Legislative Action
Article 5— C rim ina liz ation o f
Participation in an Organized
Criminal Group
E s t a b li sh t h e f o l lo w i n g c r i m i na loffences as distinct from those involving
the attempt or completion of a criminal
activity:•••

Agreeing to commit a serious crimefor a purpose rela ting directly orin d i r e c t l y t o t h e o b t a in i n g o f afinancial or other material benefit.
Conduct by a person, who withknowledge of an organized criminalgroup or its intention, takes an active
part in:- Criminal
activitiesoftheorganized criminal group.
- Other activities of the organizedcriminal group in the knowledge
that his or her participation willcontribute to the achievement of
the above-described criminal aim.
Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting,f a c il i t a t i n g o r c o u n s e l i n g t h ecommission of crime involving anorganized criminal group.

Ensure that domestic law covers all
se r io us c ri m e s inv o lvi ng o r ga n iz e dcriminal groups.

119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
Article 6—Criminalization of theLaundering of Proceeds of CrimeE s ta bl is h th e f o ll o w in g c r im i n a loffences:••••

The conversion or transfer of known
p r o c e e d s o f cr im e , t o c o nc e a l o r
disguise the illicit origin.
The concealment or disguise of thetrue nature, source, location,
disposition, movement or ownershipof known proceeds of crime.
The knowing acquisition, possession
or use of proceeds of crime.
Participation in, association with orconspiracy to commit, attempts tocommit and aiding, abetting,f a c i l i t a t in g a n d c o u n s e l in g t h ecommission of the above offences.

Ensure that above criminalizationa pplies to w id est range of predicate
offences (both w ith in an d ou tsi dedomestic jurisdiction).
Article 8—Criminalization of
Corruption
E s ta bl is h th e f o ll o w in g c r im i n a loffences:•••

The promise, offering of an unduea d v a n t a g e o r g iv i ng t o a p u b li c
official, in order that the official act or
refrain from acting in the exercise of
his or her official duties.
The solicitation or acceptance by apublic official of an undue advantage,in order that the official act or refrainfrom acting in the exercise of his or
her official duties.
The participation as an accomplice inthe above offence.

Article 10—Legal Persons
Establish the liability of legal persons(to the extent consistent with the State’s
legal principles) for pa rticipation inserious crimes involving an organizedcrimina l gr oup a nd f or the of fe nce s
established in accordance with articles 5,6, 8 and 23 of the Convention.
Article 23—Criminalization of
Obstruction of Justice
Establish following criminal offences:••

The use of physical force, threats or
intimidation or the promise, offering
or giving of an undue advantage toinduce false testim ony or the
production o f evidence in aproceeding.
The use of physical force, threats or
intimidation to interfere with theexercise of official duties by a justiceor law enforcement official.

B. Procedural Legislation/
Administrative Measures
Article 11—Prosecution,
Adjudication and Sanctions
Make the commission of an offence
established in accordance with articles 5,6, 8 and 23 of this Convention liable tosanctions that take into account thegravity of that offence.
Establish under domestic law (whereappropriate) a long statute of limitations
period in which to commence proceedings
for any offence covered by thisConvention and a longer period where
alleged offender has evaded theadministration of justice.
Article 12—Confiscation and Seizure
Adopt the following measures to enableconfiscation of:••Proceeds of crime derived from
offe nces o r property the va lue of
which corresponds to that of suchproceeds.
Property,equipmentor
other
instrumentalities used in or destinedfor use in offences.

499

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59•

Adopt measures to enable theidentification, tracing, freezing or
seizure of any item referred to in para
1 of the article for the purpose of
eventual confiscation.

Empower courts or other competentauthorities to order that bank, financial
or commercial records be made available
or be seized (bank secrecy shall not be alegitimate reason for failure to comply).
Article 15—Jurisdiction
Adopt measures to establish
jurisdiction over the offences establishedin accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23of this Convention when:
•
•

•
•
•

•

500

The offence is committed in the
territory of that State Party
The offence is committed on board a
vessel that is flying the flag of that
State Pa rty or a n aircra ft that isregistered under the law s of that
State P a rty at the tim e that theoffence is committed.
May also establish jurisdiction when:2.(a) The offence is committed against
a national of that State Party.
2.(b) The offence is committed by anat io na l o f tha t S ta te Party or astateless person, who has his or her
habitual residence in its territory.
2.(c) The offence is:- 2.(c)(i) One of those established inaccordance with article 5, para 1,of this Convention and iscommitted outside its territory
with a view to the commission of aserious crime within its territory.
- 2.(c)(ii) One of those established inaccordance with article 6, para 1(b)(ii), of this Convention and iscommitted outside its territory
with a view to the commission of
an offence established inaccordance with article 6, para 1•(a)(i) or (ii) or (b)(i), of thisConvention within its territory.
Adopt
measurestoestablish
jurisdiction over the offences when
the alleged offender is present in the
territory and it does not extradite
such person solely on the ground thathe or she is one of its nationals.

May also adopt measures to establish
jurisdiction over the offences when the
alleged offender is present in the territory
and it does not extradite him or her.
Article 24—Protection of Witnesses
Provide evidentiary rules to permit
wi tn e s s te s ti m o n y to b e g iv e n in amanner that ensures the safety of thewitness.
Take appropriate measures within its
means to provide effective protection frompotential retaliation or intimidation for
witnesses in criminal proceedings andtheir relatives and other persons close to
them.
Article 25—Assistance andProtection of Victims
Take appropriate measures within its
means to p rovide assistance andprotection to victims of offences coveredby this convention, in particular in casesof threat of retaliation or intimidation (inso far as legislation is concerned).
Establish appropriate procedures toprovide a cce ss to com pensa tion a nd
restitution for victims of offences coveredby this convention (in so far as legislationis concerned).
Article 26—Measures to Enhance
Cooperation with Law Enforcement
Authorities
Consider providing for the possibility of
mitigating punishment of an accused

119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
person who p rovides substantial
cooperation.
•
Consider providing for the possibility ofgranting immunity from prosecution to aperson, who provides substantial
cooperation.
Take appropriate measures toencourage persons, who participate or
who have p ar ticip ate d in or gan ize dcriminal groups:••

1.(a) To supply information forinvestigative and evid entiary
purposes.
1.(b) To provide factual, concrete help
contributing to depriving organizedcriminal groups of their resources orof the proceeds of crime.

•

Article 18—Mutual Legal Assistance
Review current mutual legal assistancea rr a n ge m e nts a nd / o r le gi sla ti o n toensure compliance with Article 18. In
particular:•

2. International Cooperation Measures
Article 16—Extradition
Review
current
extraditiona r ra ng em e n t s a n d /o r l e gis l a t i o n t oensure compliance with Article 16. In
particular:•••

If States make extradition conditionalon the existence of a treaty: review
extradition treaties currently in force
to ensure that offences covered by theConvention and the Protocols are
extraditable offences and seek wereappropriate to conclude extradition
treaties with other State parties tothis Convention.
If States do not make extradition
cond itio nal on the existence o f atreaty, review legislation or
arrangements to ensure recognition of
the offences covered by the
C onve ntion a nd the Pro tocols a s
extraditable offences.
Review legislation applicable toextradition to ensure expeditious
extradition procedures for offences

covered by the Convention and theProtocols.
Review legislation applicable toextradition
toprovideforsim plification of evidentiary
requirements relating to extradition
for offences covered by theConvention and the Protocols.
Review
legislation
toensuree x t r a d it io n r e q u e s t s u n d e r t h eConvention are not refused on thesole ground that the offence is also
considered to involve fiscal matters.

•

•

•

Review mutual legal assistancelegislation, treaties, agreements or
arrangements, a s appropriate, toensure that such assistance isextended where the requesting State
has reasonable grounds to suspectthat an offence established or coveredby the Convention and the Protocols
is transnational in nature.
Review
legislation
and
other
adm in istr a tive a rra n ge m e nts toensure confidentiality of information
provided by another State as a resultof a request for mutual legal
assistance under the Convention.
Review legislation to ensure thatrequests for mutual legal assistanceunder the Convention are not refusedon the ground of bank secrecy.
Designate a central authority thatsha ll ha ve the responsibility andpower to receive requests for mutual
legal assistance and either to execute
them or to transmit them tocompetent authorities.

Notify the Secretary-General of the UN
at the time of ratification, acceptance or

501

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
approval of or accession to thisConvention of the language or languages
acceptable to e ach State for thetransmission of requests for mutual legal
assistance.
III. EXPECTED IMPACT OF THE
CONVENTION AND ITSPROTOCOLS
Combating
crime
and
the
organizations that pursue it for achieving
wealth and power is the central goal of
the new instruments. It denotes theperception of the problem and the will ofc ou ntrie s to act. Shif ting fr om thisdimension to the reality prevailing ine a ch c ou ntry , the p e rce p tion o f th e
problem and the will to act are influenced
by many intervening variables, which
condition the effectiveness of the action.
These variables include a number ofobjective elements, such as the level ofresources available, the qualifications
and professional skills of decision-makers
and those charged with implementation,in particular the criminal justice system
personnel, including law enforcement
agencies.
The Convention and its Protocols havebeen designed and negotiated ascooperation tools that will en ablecountries throughout the world to workt o ge t h e r i n r a i s in g th e s t a n d a r d s ,consolidating their appro ach andmaximizing the effects of joint action
against transnational organized crime.
The new instruments contain a variety ofm echanisms employed in theachievement of these objectives. Their
strength lies in the ingenuous and carefulcombination of measures, as well as in
the innovative solutions they contain to
problems of a substantive as much as apolitical nature.

502

Substantive criminal law must adapt
to the challenges posed by organizedcrime in different ways. Those countries
which have had more threats posed byorganized crime have been the first toreact, by refining their legislation. The
ma in changes rela te to the crime ofparticipating in an organized criminalgroup and to the confiscation of assets
acquired through criminal activities. In
some countries, legislation allows theconfiscation of crime proceeds throughcivil action against the proceed (in rem).
This can be seen as a further expansion of
the capability of the law in dealing withthe changing trends of organized crime.
The Convention has solidified andexpanded the trend of modified criminal
legisla tion to include the of fe nce of“participation in an organized criminalgroup”. In many countries, this would
coincide with the crime of “conspiracy”.
The Convention’s negotiators went togreat lengths to ensure the fullcompatibility of the legal concepts andtraditions, which are at the core of these
two approaches. The purpose of the new
instrument was not to engage in efforts
toward s f ull unif ic atio n o f natio nal
legislation, recognizing the futility of theta sk, but to bring a bout a sufficientdegree of harmonization, understood in
the sense of convergence andcompatibility. Criminal legislation is thepoint of departure and reference for thecollective efforts of a criminal justices y s t e m . C r im i n a l j u s t i c e s y s t e m s ,however, are constructed on the basis oflegal, cultural and social traditions,which are evidenced throughout thatsystems operations and methods of work.
The transnational nature of the threat
de m a nd s clo se inte rop e ra b ility a ndcooperation of criminal justice systems
rep rese nting nume rou s a nd d iverse
traditions and approaches. The purposeof the new Convention and its Protocols is119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
to achieve harmony ininteroperability and cooperation.

that

T he success o f e fforts against thelaundering of criminal proceeds directly
depends on the level of accessibility of law
enforcement agencies to the activities offinancial bodies. A problem here is that
opening up the activities of the financial
bodies to outside scrutiny can affect theirc o m p et itiv e p o si tio n. Ho w e ve r, th e
activities of organized crime mayundermine the entire financial market,
affecting the whole society. Furthermore,
the money derived from organized crime
often circulates through the samec h a nn e ls a s m o n e y c o n c e a le d f r o mtaxation authorities. In view of this, it isvital for the banks to maintain records ofthe ide ntity of their clie nts, and tocooperate with law enforcement agencies
whenever there are suspicious deposits orother transactions. It may be necessary tostrengthen mechanisms of control overbanking operations and even to centralize
information of this kind.
In the last decade, many countries
have introduced in their criminal laws
the crime of money laundering inco m plianc e w ith th e V ienn a Unite dNations Convention against Illicit Trafficin Na rcotic D rugs and Psychotropic
Substances. However, due to the fact that
drug trafficking is only one of the sourceso f the pr o ce e d s of cr im e , the r e is atendency in many Western countries toexpand the predicate offences from drug
offences to virtually all serious crimes.
B ut the approa ch had b een fa r f rom
uniform. In most other regions of thew orld , countries w hich crimina lise dmoney laundering as a separate offence
often limited its application to drug
proceeds. The new Convention intends to
set a sta nda rd of crim inalisation o fmoney laundering that would not greatly
expand the predicate offences.

Compliance with the obligation containedin the new Convention would result in
extending money laundering legislation
to all serious crime, as defined in theConvention, and to the offences
established by the Convention and its
Protocols.
A number of areas have been identified
as imp lem enta tion prio ritie s f or aneffective anti-money laundering strategy.
These areas are predicated on a numberof assumptions about the presence of
certain enforcement mechanisms. Keyamong them, is the concept that a net or
web operates at three complementary
le ve ls— inte rn a tio na l , re gio n a l a ndnational. Political support, adequate
resources, and high professionalism areessential conditions for effective action at
all three levels. Governmental
institutions m ust a lloca te a deq uate
me ans and fa cilitie s to successfully
regulate or exercise other types of control
over activities which enjoy the benefit of ahigh level of sophistication and which
may involve a high volume of legitimatetransactions, as may be the case withelectronic transfer technology.
The key element that characterizes theapproach of the new Convention, not onlywith respect to criminalisation, but alsowith regard to the measures thatcountries should take in order to put inplace an effective regime against moneyla undering, is the fa ct tha t the newConvention sets a truly global standard.
That standard is the product of anegotiation p rocess, which wascharacterized by respect for diversity andtook into account the concerns of all
countries. The result is a combination ofactions that countries can subscribe toan d inc orp orate into th eir syste ms,
without constrains of a substantive orpolitical nature.

503

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
Corrup tion gre atly fa cilita tes theactivities of organized criminal groups. Inview of this, many countries have enacted
s p ec ial an ti- c or ru p tio n le g islat ion .
Prosecution of corruption is difficult andthe adjudication of the alleged offendereven m ore difficult, especially w henorganized crime is involved due to the
problems in obtaining evidence. Laws
often create incentives for solidarity
between corrupted and corrupter, withboth punished equally. For these reasons,
there is broad a greement w ithin thei nt e r na tio n a l co m m un it y t ha t i t isurgently necessary to develop new sets ofpo licies against corruption, fro m
r e g ul a to r y to c r i m i n a l o n e s. M a n yregulations in areas sensitive tocorruption need be reshaped (preventive
p o lic ie s) , wit h th e in co r p o rat io n o f
incentives to the reporting of corruption
ca ses in the same legislation which
criminalizes the corrupted officials andw ith the creation (at a legislative or
judicial level) of a conflict of interest
between the corrupter and the corrupted,
in order to get evidence.
The new Convention includes a specificcriminaliz ation provision against
corruption and an article setting out a setof basic measures against this form of
criminal activity. The inclusion of bothprovisions was done ontheunderstanding that the purpose of theConvention was by definition limited inthis pa rticular are a. It w a s dee me dappropriate to set a standard insofar as
corruption is a modality that features
prominently in the o perations oforganized criminal groups, either as adirect activity or as corollary to theirother activities. The negotiators of theConvention realized that the issue of
corruption was much broader than thescope and purposes of the new
C onvention. It w ould risk no t d oing
justice to the concerted political will504

pr evailing am o ng th e in tern atio nal
community to deal with corruption in acomprehensive manner to try and coversuch a broad issue in this Convention.
Thus, the decision was made, relatively
early on in the negotiation process, tolimit the provisions on corruption to thoseabsolutely essential for the purposes of
the ne w C onve ntio n a nd em b ark o nnegotiations of a new separate
Convention against corruption at a laterstage. The process of embarking on thesenegotiations is already under way. In july
2001, an open-ended intergovernmentalgroup of expe rts m et in V ie nna a nd
successfully complied with the mandate
given to it by the General Assembly todraft terms of reference for thene go tia tion o f the ne w C o nve ntio n.
Subject to final approval by the General
Assembly at its current session, a new Ad
Hoc Committee will begin negotiations on
the new instrument in early 2002.
The Convention pays par ticularattention to the problem of deterring andpunishing misconduct by legal entities,
such as multinational and othercorporations. Individual executives may
frequently be beyond national jurisdiction
and p e rso nal r esp o nsibility ma y bedifficult to establish. Crim inal
punishment of the entity itself, by fine orby forfeiture of property or legal rights, isutilized in some jurisdictions against
corporate misconduct, and an increasingn u m b e r o f c o u n t r i e s a r e i n c lu d i n g
corporate crimes in their legislation.
Crimina lization of a le ga l entity forcorporate crimes is a powerful deterrent
tool, inte rvening in the invisib le orintangible good of the “reputation”. The
gr o w t h o f e c o n o m i c c r im e s st ri c tl yconnected with organized crime, such as
frauds, calls for more attention to theactivities of legitimate enterprises. These
are the places where the infiltration oforganized crime begins the process of119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
pollution of the legitimate economy andcorporate sanctions can help to reduce thevulnerability of the economic systems.
The new Convention establishes anobligation to direct appropriate attention
to this matter. The fact that the
C onve ntio n lea ves the cho ice o f thenature of the liability that countries will
decide to incorporate in their legislationis yet another reflection of the care withwhich the Convention approaches theissu e of div ers itie s a m ong na tio na lsystems. The approach of the Convention
in this are has been one of pragmatism. If
countries concentrate on the effectivenessof measures designed to attribute liability
to legal persons, and on the appropriate
enforcement of these measures, instead oftrying to introduce concepts that might bealien to their legal system and might
create conflicts of a nature related tofundamental principles of these systems,
the result cannot but be beneficial forinternational cooperation.
Crime committed for economic gain canbe successfully countered by theforfeiture of such gains and of any otherassets of the individuals andorganizations involved. In some legal
systems great significance is attributed to
the freezing, seizure, and confiscation ofassets related to illegal activity. The needfor more effective organized crime control
makes it necessary to regard forfeiture asa strategic weapon, an economic methodof discouraging organized crime activities
and a means of eliminating the financial
advantages of such antisocial activities.
The Convention takes the approachthat the procedures for freezing, seizure,and confiscation need to be broad in theirscope and permit the confiscation of awide range of assets of an offender in
ord er to eliminate a ll ga in f ro m thecriminal activity. A subsidiary benefit ofsuch action is allowing law enforcement
agencies to use confiscated assets orfunds to further the activities of theagency. This can ha ve a pow erfulincentive effect. International
agreements may provide also for sharing
such assets.
The Convention will also set in motion
consideration to allowing certain liberale vid e n tia r y r ule s t o b e u se d in th eprocedures for confiscation of the assetsof criminals involved in organized crime.
Confiscation has acquired growing
importance as a necessary complement toanti-money laundering policies drawing
on the experience of those countries,
which have practiced it. Drawing on theexperience of those countries, which havepracticed it, other countries could be
encouraged to develop these sanctions intheir legislation.
The Convention builds on theexperience which suggests theadvantages provided by using
information obtained with the help ofele ctr o nic sur ve illa n ce , un de rc ov er
agents, controlled delivery, the testimonyof accomplices and similar methods of
inv es tiga tion for the coll ection ofevidence. The use of the testimony ofaccomplices can be extremely helpful inprosecutions involving organized crime.
Ca reful assessm ent and use o f suchtestimony can enable law enforcement
authorities to penetrate the layers of
se cr e cy wh ich ar e c ha rac te r ist ic o forganized criminal groups and whichw o uld o th er w ise p r ote c t th em f ro m
prosecution.
T h e C o nv e n t io n a t t ri b u t e s g r e a timportance to provisions for theprotection of witnesses. Its application
w il l e nc o ur a ge n a ti on a l s yst e m s o fcriminal justice to pay close attention to

505

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
these programmes, with legislation aimed
at providing for the security of a witness.
In particular, attention is expected to befocused on the adoption of measures forthe protection of witnesses that allow for
the relocation and change of identity ofw itnesses, along with their physicalprotection if there is a threat posed by adefendant and the defendant’s associates.
This
cannecessitate
makingarrangements to provide the witnesses
with documents enabling them (and theirfamily) to establish a new identity, withtemporary housing, providing for thetransportation of household furniture ando the r p e rso na l b e lon gings to a ne w
location, subsistence payments, assistingthem in o btaining em ployment, a nd
providing other necessary services toassist the witnesses in leading a full andnormal life. In considering the type ofprotection to be provided, the financial
circumstances of a country must be taken
into account. In addition, provision need
to be m ade fo r the safe custody o fincarcerated witnesses, including
separate accommodation. Legislation
may also be necessary to deal with thepractical problems that may arise inconnection with relocated witnesses, suchas child custody disputes and crimes
committed under their new identity.
Witness assistance programmes haveb een key issue s in the fight againstorganized crime for those countries whichhave experienced on a large scale thisphenomenon and the consequent numberof cooperating witnesses. The quality of
their contribution and the evidence they
allow to collect depend also on the qualityof protection (physical, psychological, andeconomical) provided. The Convention
w il l se t in m o t io n p ro ce s se s a t th enational level, and agreements at theinternational level, in this field.

If effective action is to be taken againstorganized crime, the law enforcement
authorities must be able to prevent anddetect any manifestation of such crime.
This requires the systematic collection
and analysis of all relevant informationfrom all appropriate sources in order tomake possible the production and use of
intelligence for both strategic and tactical
purposes. The methods employed for theco llection and utilization of such
i nfo rm a ti o n m a y b e a ut ho ri z ed a ndcontrolled by legislation. Even so, it isimportant that the technical facilities andte ch n iq u e s w h i ch l a w e n f o rc e m e n t
authorities are allowed to use are always
sophisticated enough to enable them toma tch those e mp lo yed by orga niz ed
crime.
The production of intelligence requires
the collection, processing and analysis of
a w id e ra n ge o f in f or m a tio n o n t hepersons and organizations suspected ofbeing involved in organized criminal
activity, often including even information
which at first sight does not directly
relate to organized crime. There may be
no rigid borderline between strategic andtactical intelligence, but the main aim oftactical intelligence is to help in theplanning of particular police operations
and to identify the sources for obtaining
the evidence which makes it possible toarrest a susp ect and to p rove guilt.
Trained intelligence analysis greatly
increases the effective application of law
enforcement intelligence. It is important
to note that there is ofte n a nee d tocontinue the collection of information
during all appropriate stages of the legal
process. Intelligence should always becollected in such a manner that evenyears later it can be retrieved and used as
evidence.
Computerized information systems areo f p a r tic ular ben e f it in co m b a ttin g

506

119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
organized crime where resources permit.
Computers are used to store informationon the various persons and organizations
suspected of being involved in organizedcrime, as well as information about the
cr ime s com m itted , a nd tho se un de r
preparation. Where there are different
law enforcement agencies co lle cting
information, appropriate arrangementsn e ed t o b e m a d e t o a l l ow a r e gu l a r
exchange of information between local
and national (or federal) authorities, andbetween local police forces in different
areas. Careful attention must be paid toth e compatibility of computerized
systems, and the convertibility of manualsystems to computerized ones. Creationo f a c e n t r a l i z e d d a ta b a n k m a y b e
appropriate in some countries, with theinformation shared internationally on thebasisofmutualagreements.
Furthermore, technical assistance inse tt ing up an d o rg a nizin g cr im inal
intelligence systems represents a mutual
benefit to both developing and developed
countries.
Particular attention has to be paid to
information from confidential p olice
sources, including prisoners. However,important intelligence comes from othersources, in particular, fina ncia l andtaxation bodies. When permitted to do so,they can be of great assistance, as theyfrequently find themselves directly incontact with organized groups seeking toutilize the proceeds of crime. Also of value
may be legislative inquiries and official
and public records. An essential resourcein the effective investigation of organizedcrime is the capability to collect, andpresent in an intelligib le ma nner as
evidence , comp licated financial a ndcommercial information. The collection of
information concerning forfeitable assets
allows the forfeiture of such property andmakes it available for police use.

The infiltration of organized crime into
legal enterprises and any contacts it may
make in political circles, can create a
sup erf icial re sp ectability, fa cilitate
corruption and be used by criminals tohinder investigations of their activities.
Therefore, law enforcement agencies,
when collecting data on the criminal
activity of a particular person ororganization need to obtain the mostco m p re h en siv e in te llige nc e p ic tu repossible. A range of measures have been
adopted, which include the following: a)to develop intelligence, throughinform ants, searches and othertechniques, in order to uncover largescale organized criminal enterprises; b) todetermine the factors and conditions
facilitating the development of organizedc ri m i n a l a c ti v it y ; c ) t o p ro v id e f o r
ce nt r a li z e d c o l le c ti o n , st o r a g e a n danalysis of information (including use of
criminal organization charts) and for thetactical application of such information;d) to ensu re cooperation with law
enforcement authorities and other bodies
involved using a multi-agency approach;e) to study other countries’ experience oforganized crime control; and g) to developo n th e b a si s o f th e a b o v e f a c to r s asystemic approach to criminal policy,
based on appropriate legislation, proper
allocation of resources and mobilization of
public support.
To lift the veil of secrecy, conspiracy
and fear- induced silence of possible
witnesses, as well as to understand how
the criminal groups function, who directs
their activities and, where their illegal
inco m e is ch anne lle d, p o lice bo d ie s
generally collect intelligence andevidence by using undercover methods.
With appropriate saf eguards, secret
operations directed against organizedc ri m e c a n b e co nd uc t e d e f f e c t iv e ly
through the use of undercover agents andinformants, often in conjunction with the507

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
use of technical facilities to intercept andto record conversations, the contents ofwhich may facilitate the disclosure ofcrimes. These techniques may include
wire-taps, surveillance by means of closed
circuit systems, night vision equipment,
as well as video and audio recording of
on-going events. In some jurisdictions,such technical surveillance may be used
only in cases when other mechanisms ofinvestigation have failed, or there are no
reasons to think that they lead to thedire cted results, or where othermechanisms are too dangerous.
If extreme care is exercised with regard
to the reliability of their testimony, anddue account is taken of the severity of
their offence, the cooperating witnesses
for the prosecution may be a valuablemeans of infiltrating organized crimegroups. Mitigation of sentence or evendismissal of charges, where possible, canmotivate lesser criminals to assist in
i n v e st i g a ti o n s o f o r g a n i z e d c r i m e .
Incorporation of such procedures inton ation al legislation or recognizedpractice, together with the protective
services previously discussed, has served
to attract such cooperating witnesses.
The Convention and its Protocols are
expected to spark considerable activity
a nd im prove me thods in the field ofcollection, analysis and exchange ofintelligence and information. One of the
key features of cooperation in this areunder the Convention and its Protocols is
the standard-setting element of the new
instruments, thus guarding against theinherent risks posed by the necessarily
intrusive nature of many of the methods
used for the collection of information andintelligence.
Organized crime may be investigatedby a variety of law enforcement agencies
with diff er ent jur isd ictio ns. I n this508

connection, it is essential to ensure thatclose coordination is maintained between
central and peripheral structures, as wellas effective liaison between intelligenceand operations. In countries with federal
st r uc t u re s i t i s a ls o e s se n t ia l t ha teffective mechanisms be established toensur e coo rd ina tion of ju risdiction,
intelligence and operations among federal
policing a gencies and those of other
Governmental units. Whole coordination
within and between agencies and units is
a co nd itio n f o r to s ucc e ssf ul a c tio nagainst organiz ed crime, a clear
delineation of jurisdiction contributes to ah a r m o n i o u s a n d e f f e c t iv e w o r k in g
relationship.
When resources permit, there may begreat value in the formation of one ormore specialized units dedicated to theinvestigation of organized crime,
particularly in the areas of corruption,m o n e y la un d e ri ng an d ille g a l d r u g
trafficking. However, the danger must berecognized that exclusive jurisdiction
over an area of investigation may create
susceptibility to corruption, andappr opr iat e s afegu ar ds sh ou ld be
developed.
Within any individual law enforcementa gency a strictly centra lize d senior
management system which can scrutinize
all aspects of investigations and monitor
their course is necessary to ensure that
all in ve st igat io ns ar e co n du c te d i naccordance with national laws and withproper respect of human rights. It is
important for senior man agemen to f fi cia ls to t a ke d ue a c co u nt o f t henecessity of ensuring financial, logistical,
and moral support.
Investigators and in particular thoseleading the inve stigation shou ld beselected on the basis of their ability,
expe rience, m oral qualities, and119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
dedication. The importance of basic andin-service training should not be
underestimated not only for the police,
but also prosecutors and judges. Highprofessionalism and specialization are
key factors of success.
The
relationships
betweeninvestigative functions and prosecutorial,a nd ju d i ci a l o r ga n s v a r y m a rk e d ly
between diffe rent legal syste ms. T ocombat organized crime, effectively, in
any system, it is necessary to ensure that
there is harmonious coordination among
them,. Obviously, due respect must be
acco rd ed to ma intain ing the pro pe r
relationships betw een the functions,k e e p i ng in m i nd t h e im p o r t a n ce o fpreserving the independence andimpartiality of the judiciary, as well as
the proper role of defence lawyers.
T he C onve ntio n a nd its P roto cols
contain specific provisions on cooperation
between law enforcement agencies and,most importantly, detailed provisions on
tra ining a nd te chnica l coo p era tio n.
Regarding the latter, the Convention and
its Protocols were negotiated on the basisof a fundamental assumption. It wasc le a rly u nd e rsto o d b y a ll co un trie s
involved in the negotiating process thatthe joint fight against transnationalorganized crime would entail theincorporation into the new instruments ofa number of obligations. Many of theseobligations would be onerous for many
developing countries, which had limited
resources and competing priorities forthese resources. Conversely, it was also
understood that effective cooperation
against transnational organized crime
required sustained commitment on thepart of all countries, manifested among
other things by a decision to bring limited
resources to bear in the common effort.
However, when that was done, it was
clearly accepted that for many countries

there would still be needs, which would
be cove red through the pro vision oftechnical assistance. In this respect, it
was the common belief that effectivenessand efficiency in international
cooperation depended on the equallysustaine d c om m itm en t to e f fo rts topromote the provision of this technicalassistance.
Due to the inherent characteristics oforganized crime, which is simultaneously
engaged in providing illegal services andgoods and in infiltrating the legitimate
economy, the criminal justice system
alone cannot successfully fight it. For
these reasons, the Convention and its
Protocols have incorporated a range of“p re ve n tive ” p ol icie s, a im e d a t, f or
example, reducing the demand for illicit
goods or deregulating/regulating somema rkets, in orde r to minim iz e theirvulnerability to infiltration by organizedcrime groups. These preventive policies,
as opposed to crime control policies,
relate to various sectors of the social andeconomic systems. Their increased use(e.g., the regulation of non bank financial
institutions as an anti-money laundering
policy), calls for their close integration
with crime control policies and,
consequently, with the criminal justicesystems.
A sy s t e m i c a p p r o a c h o r i e n te d t oidentifying the most effective strategies
against organized crime focuses on twoelements: goals and policies. The morethese are rationally linked, the better are
the chances that the prevention andcontrol system will be effective.
“Rationally” is intended to mean that agiven society or country should selectpriorities among the goals desired, being
ready and willing to accept trade-off
effects, and relating this selection to the
choice of those policies which are lesscostly and present fewer political and

509

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
juridical constraints, keeping also in
mind that organized crime is at the sametime a domestic and an international
problem.
I n t e r m s o f s t r a te g ie s, t h e m a i nquestion is that of identifying which are
the most effective policies for preventing
and controlling organized crime. Thed istinction betwe en pre vention andcontrol is based on the nature of thepolicies pursued (defensive or offensive).
A l t h o u g h t h e y m a y a p p e a r c lo s e l yinterlinked in terms of the effects thatthey produce, the difference lies in thegoals that are to be achieved. For
exam ple, w ith respect to prevention
policies, decreasing the demand for illicit
goods and services reduces theopportunities for organized crime andprevents its expansion. Conversely, thederegulation, or the introduction of ad i f f e r e nt ty p e o f r e gu la t io n , o f th e
construction industry has te nd ed tominimize its vulnerability, preventing
criminal organizations from obtaining
dominant, often monopolistic positions in
the market and im peding theirinfiltration of the legitimate economy. On
the other side, crime control policies aim
at disrupting the structure of criminalorganizations. These two policies, to bee f fe ctive , sho uld be in tegr ated in asystemic approach. In fact, when crime
control policies are used without
considering the advantages of preventivem e a s u r e s , a n d g e n e r a l d e te r r e n c e
receives the overwhelming attention andis intended as the only form of
prevention, the criminal justice system
becomes overburdened and, therefore,
less effective.
When considering how to prevent or
reduce the incidence and expansion oforganized crime, the main assumptions
are the following: a) organized crime is a
derivative of a complex society: the more

510

complex societies become in th eirorganizational structure, the more thecrime problem reflects this complexity,
featuring varying and more sophisticatedorganizational patterns; b) the criminal
ju sti ce sy ste m is o v e rlo a de d . S o m eexperts are questioning whether the
economic costs of control policies havereached the point of diminishing utility.
Criminal law alone, and law enforcement
in isolation, cannot succeed in dealing
with the increasing complexity, flexibility
and sophistication of large-scaleorganiz ed crime operations; c) as
organized crime is oriented to providing
illicit goods and services and to
infiltrating legitimate activities througha variety of methods, including
corruption and violence, it is necessary to
identify preventive strategies that, while
reducing the opportunities, also increase
the threshold of vulnerability of theeconomic systems to infiltration. These
strategies need to be integrated with—a n d n o t o p p o s e d to — c r i m e c o n t r o lmeasures.
These policies should be integrated, as
they tend to achieve the same goal. On
the one hand, there is the aggregateddemand, while on the other, there is only
the demand for illegal goods and services.
Since the problem is highly complex, it
should be treated as such, taking into
account the trade-offs and side effects
that might occur. Deeper knowledge andthorough eva lua tion of the different
implications, as well as their effects inthe different regions of the world arenecessary for addressing this side of
preventive strategies.
In relation to preventive measuresagainst crime, the strengthening of thevalues of morality and legality must
occupy a prominent position. They are theessential prerequisites for building socialand cultural consensus against organized119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
crime. The operations of organized crimegroups, and their continued existence interritories where they are establishedand traditionally located, require social
consensus which helps minimize the riskof law enforcement activities and in theprocess facilitates recruitment of new
members. Organized crime groups
achieveconsensus
through a
redistribution of resources and,
consequently, by creating incentives to
employment in economically and sociallyd e p r e ss e d a r e a s , a nd a lso c re a tin gdisincentives through corruption and fearof violence. Building and maintaining
high moral standards in political anda d m i n is tr a ti v e s tr u c tu r e s t hr o u g h
resp ect for the law is the firstcommitment for effective action againstorganized crime. A culture of morality
a nd lega lity has strong m essa ges toconvey to those who violate the law and to
those who allow them to do so. These
values need to be implanted, nurtured
with extreme care, and passed on to newgene rations. As organized crim e
represents the organized violation ofthese values, it is essential to devise andimplement comprehensive strategies torestore legality wherever it has beeneroded, and to create “incentives formorality” for those who are exposed orsusceptible to corruption. Measures forthe protection of the criminal justicesystem against violence and the fear of
violence are in the direction of restoring
legality. Codes of conduct established in
d i f f e re n t a re a s o f G o ve r nm e nt a n dadministration are also in the direction ofrestoring morality.
Policies oriented toward civic education
can produce important results againstorganized crime by building a social
consensus a ga inst it, disseminating
information and increasing awareness ofthe cost of organized crime to society. In
this context, mass media p lay animportant central role. Messages
transmitted by the media, however, may
have contradictory educational effects, as
they may often be oriented to producing
spectacular or sensational effects. Fiction
crime stories and non-fiction accounts are
attracting increasingly wider audiences.
Crime, violence, and corruption capture
public attention in all parts of the world:
the issue of reconciling the rights of
inf or ma tion and f ree do m of a rtistic
expression, w ith the civic and social
responsibility of promoting values ofmorality and legality, is a very difficult
one. The interrelationship between media
a n d c r im e , a n d t he ir r o l e i n c r im e
prevention, are truly challenging
questions that will become even more
important in the future. Research anddocumentation on experiences acquiredso far, as well as an increasing attention
by educational institutions, are essential
for gaining the support of the media inthis area.
A second goal within the framework of
preventive strategies is related to theneed to reduce the level of vulnerability oflegitimate industries to the infiltration oforganized crime groups. The assumption
is that organized crime tends to infiltrate
the legitimate economy for different
purposes, such as: a) laundering andinvesting the proceeds of crime in lessrisky activities; b) acquiring
respectability and social consensus for its
members; and c) controlling the territory
where it operates in order to maximize
economic and political advantages andm inim iz e the risk o f a p p re he nsio n,arrest, and conviction (law enforcementrisk). Activities in the illegal markets andinfiltration in the legitimate business are
not separated in the life of an organizedcrime group. O pportunistic crimina lorganizations go where there is money totake, and mono-task organizations suchas those specializing in drug trafficking

511

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 59
become opportunistic when they have toinvest the mo ney p rod uced b y theircriminal activities. For both, infiltrationof legitimate business is part and parcelof their activities. The reverse aspect of
the same goal, i.e. reducing vulnerability,means increasing the transparency of theeconomic system.
Successful p olicie s involve a goo dchemistry of regulation and deregulation,f o r e x a m p l e a s tr o n g r e g u la t io n o flicensing all those economic activitiest h a t c o u l d e a s i ly b e i n f i lt r a t e d b yo r ga n iz e d c r im e h a s r e c e n tl y b e e n
p u r s u e d in a n u m b e r o f c o u n t r i e s .
Another example of regulation is thelicensing of all those economic activities,
such as the banking and financial
s er vic e s, t hat c a n be inf ilt ra t ed byo r ga niz e d cr im e . I n p a rtic ula r , th e
regulation of the transactions requestedby the banks for anti-money launderingp u r p o s e s h e l p s t o i d e n ti f y m o n e y laundering operations and trace criminalorganizations. Furthermore, newr egula tio ns a nd c od es o f con duc t o fbusiness and professionals also help as ananti-money laundering policy, by keeping
high standards of transparency in thesystem and avoiding illicit infiltration.
Preventive strategies and policies,
although not sufficiently used in the past,
are increasingly being explored in recent
times in the area of organized crime.
They are promising and cost effective if
carefully planned and implemented. As
such, they represent the naturalcomplement to traditional crime control
policies.
The C onve ntion and its P roto colspromote effective action againsto rg a ni z e d c r im e wh i c h i s b a se d o n
p riorities in ob je ctives a nd efficientmanagement of resources. It is possiblethat in those countries where organized

512

crime does not appear to the public as
violent or as damaging as in others, it
may not be regarded to as a top priority.
Also, street crimes are closer to the dayby-day experience of the general public,
than transna tiona l organiz ed crim e.
Decision makers, who are necessarily
sensitive to public opinion and are also
aware of the costs and the impact of these
forms of crime on the society at large,
may be forced to take decisions thatprivilege an immediate response to street
violent crimes. The reality, however, isthat there clearly exists a global-local
nexus in relation to organizedtransnational crime.
As far as police action and criminal
proceed ings are concerned, theConvention and its Protocols promotestrategic measures in the following areas:•••

improvement of intelligence in order
to identify the organizational
structure of criminal groups, types ofactivities of these groups,
interrelations between the various
groups and the means used to sustain
themselves;development of investigative methods
that permit to “penetrate” criminalorganizations, such as the creation of
specialized investigative units, theinterception of communications, theuse of undercover operations andcontrolled deliveries, the protection of
witnesses and victims, and rewards/
protection of turncoats;
investigative methods and othermechanisms aimed at seizing andfreezing illicit profits, thus facilitating
confiscation,
such
as
the
establishment of appropriate
st ru c tu re s a t th e na tio na l le v e l(integrated proceeds of crime units,
seized property management
directorates).

119TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
S tra tegic mea sures a re a ls o thoseaddressed to the law enforcement
agencies in terms of enhanced capability,p r o f e s s i o n a li s m a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n .
S tra tegic inte lligence should not b esacrificed to the tactical one. Investment
i n th i s a r e a i s e s s e n t i a l , a s i s th ecooperation between different agencies.
The experience of concentrating energies
and resources against organized crime ina specialized agency could be an
innovative organizational measure only if
this concentration truly happens. Whent h i s i s n o t p o s s i b le b e c a u s e o f t h e
notorious difficulties and resistance,
substantial and effective coordination
among existing agencies and between
them a nd the prosecutors should b e
consistently pursued. Different patternsof cooperation and coordination can be
f o un d i n th e m o s t e xp e r ie n c e d l a w
enforcement agencies of many countries.
T he C onve ntio n a nd its P roto cols
would promote responses to the growing
threat to the economy posed by organizedcrime through the progressive
development of preventive strategies,
m o stly add re ssed at pr ese rving th e
stability of financial institutions andfocused on:•••

the provision of technical and forensic
training for police, prosecutors andjudges, enabling them to understandf in an cial op eration s, and co llectevidence;
the limitation of bank secrecy andother relevant regulations;a more active role of financial
institutions in appropriate controls,s uc h a s s us p ic io u s t ra ns a c tio n sreporting.

investment in preventive strategies,
which probably had traditionally been
neglected in the past. This development
requires that the different systems towhich these strategies are addressed areincreasingly more integrated. The process
which begun asking for more cooperation
between the banking system and thecri mi nal jus tice system should be
extended to the educational system andto all the areas of media communications.
Commissions of inquiry and overviewing
legislative committees could encouragesuch a process which is a progressive one,
involving a wide set of new policies andinstitutions traditionally outside the areaof crimina l justice. Property la ws incommon law systems and civil law in thecivil law countries are being confronted
with new form s of regulation ofconfiscated assets. Administrative law
and other forms of regulation of public
contracts could reduce the probability ofcorruption and defend the legitimateb u si n e ss e s f r o m t h e in f i lt ra ti o n o forganized crime groups. Together withthe existing “hard laws”, a new set of “softlaws” is being accepted domestically andinternationa lly for ach iev ing n ew
standards.
In conclusion, the Convention and its
Protocols will promote an integration ofstrategies, policies, and mechanisms,with their effective and tra nspa rent
management, as the challenging answer
to the growing dange r posed bytransnational organized crime.

The criminal justice system alone,usually overburdened and overloaded,
has structural limitations in controllingorganized crime. This imposes a deep513