James Gannon. “Conclusion: Strengthening Civil Society’s Contributions to Regional Security.”
In A Growing Force: Civil Society's Role in Asian Regional Security, edited by Rizal Sukma andJames Gannon. Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2013, 134–149.

8

Conclusion:
Strengthening Civil
Society’s Contributions toRegional SecurityJ    G A N N O N
T   this volume provide ample evidence that even in
East Asia, where Westphalian considerations have traditionally reigned
supreme, civil society is playing a growing role in ensuring security andstability. This is particularly true in terms of the types of nontraditional andhuman security issues that are increasingly consequential for the future of
the region. The five areas examined in this volume—health, human trafficking, climate change, disaster relief, and piracy—illuminate the variety
of ways in which NGOs and other civil society organizations are helping
to make East Asia more secure. Drawing on these analyses, a number ofgeneral observations can be made that have significant implications forour understanding about the dynamics of regional security.

T      N G O I         A   P    S       
. NGOs Are Already Playing an Important Role in Regional
Security
The contributors to this volume clearly demonstrate that NGOs are alreadymore integral actors in regional security than is generally appreciated. As
Gui Yongtao notes, NGOs have been involved in security affairs to somedegree for more than a century, dating back at least to the establishment of134

Conclusion

the International Committee of the Red Cross in  and the peace movements of the late th century. In recent years, however, they have begun
playing a greater role, even though their contributions often go unnoticed.
One factor that has made them more important has been the changing
nature of security threats as globalization has advanced. The increased
mobility of people and goods has made it easier for pandemics to jumpborders and for criminal enterprises to traffic in humans, arms, and drugs.
Meanwhile, the scope of some problems, such as environmental degradation and climate change, has progressed to the point where they cannot
be contained by national borders. Governments in the region are trying
to cooperate with one another in responding to some of these threats,
but still gaps have opened up that can only be filled by NGOs, which are
generally more nimble and focused, are able to forge cross-border networks, possess specialized expertise, and are capable of reaching out tothose marginalized groups that may be at the nexus of security challenges
but that national governments have difficulty engaging.
Another reason that NGOs are playing a greater role in addressing
regional security issues in these areas is that the accepted definition of
security has evolved as the threats facing East Asia have changed. NGOs
have long worked in areas such as disaster relief and health that were barely
conceived of as security affairs, but in recent years the field of security has
expanded to encompass their activities. Put simply, NGOs specializing inthese areas have stayed put, while the field of security has come to them.
Meanwhile, a third factor seems to be that we have reached a tipping
point at which the resources and expertise available to NGOs, especiallyto those coming from outside of the region, sometimes enable them tohave an impact in certain focused areas that is equal to or greater than thatof the governments of major countries. Yanzhong Huang points out thatthe Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has been spending more on global
health programs in recent years than the World Health Organization, while
Yukie Osa notes that nearly half of the  billion in overseas funding
for the  Indian Ocean tsunami response either came from private
donations or involved NGOs as implementing organizations. This hasturned the tables on government-NGO relations in a few instances. As
evidence, one need look no farther than the efforts of Japan, the region’slargest foreign aid donor, to court the Gates Foundation as a partner onsome of its development programs.1 Twenty years ago, it would have been
the private foundation that was trying to court the government.
In their analyses, the contributors to this volume have identified at least functions that different breeds of NGOs are now fulfilling in the field
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JAMES GANNONof security in East Asia. These cover a broad range, from direct service
providers engaged in hands-on efforts at the community level to facilitators for the intellectual dialogue that helps shape the very way we think
about security.
Direct Service Provision
When people think of NGOs, the first thing that tends to come to mind
is their role in assisting people in need. This description fits many NGOsin the region, from organizations that provide a broad range of services
in the vein of the Red Cross and other large aid groups to those that
focus on highly specialized activities. In some cases, they even play a
predominant role in efforts to ameliorate potential human security
threats. For instance, Huang points out that just a single NGO—AIDS
Care China—is involved in the provision of anti-retroviral treatments
to nearly one-quarter of the country’s AIDS patients who are receiving
the treatment.
Prevention
NGOs also are well placed to deal with the root causes of security
threats, even on some of the most unlikely issues. For example, J. N. Mak
explains how work by NGOs to promote job creation and empower thedisenfranchised in impoverished coastal communities in Southeast Asia
provides the only long-term, sustainable solution to the region’s piracy
problem by giving would-be pirates the opportunity and incentive topursue other livelihoods. Similarly, Jun Honna describes the efforts ofNGOs to engage in community development initiatives as part of theirwork to prevent human trafficking, along with outreach to educate
potential customers of the sex industry.
Alternative Information Source
NGOs are obligated to develop a deep understanding of the immediateconcerns of the communities they serve, and sometimes they have abetter grasp of realities on the ground than do national and local governments. This is particularly true when they work with populations
that are outside of the mainstream—ethnic and religious minorities,
immigrants and the impoverished who live on the margins of society,and populations that are not easily acknowledged or condoned by thepolitical and social establishment, such as sexual minorities, drug users,
and people engaged in illicit activities. Plus, NGOs are less confinedby conventional political considerations than government officials and136

Conclusion

politicians. This enables them to more readily identify potential security
threats—whether emerging diseases, growing societal resentment, or
the increased exploitation of vulnerable populations—and gives themgreater freedom to publicize this information. In fact, in many instances,
NGOs have become the main source of data for governments on
nontraditional security issues. For example, law enforcement agencies
in the region have come to rely on NGOs working with women who
have been trafficked for accurate information on trafficking networks.
Meanwhile, health-related NGOs have started to play an importantrole in disease surveillance.
Policy Advice
In Western countries, and especially in the United States, think tanks
and other NGOs play a major role in formulating policy proposals andadvising government officials. The nongovernmental sector in East
Asia is not as strong or developed as in the West, but it has started to
become a more important source of policy advice on security issues,at least in some countries. In ASEAN, for example, the ASEAN-ISIS
network of think tanks played a key role in proposing and advancing
the idea of an ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the security confab
that has come to play a central role in regional security deliberations.
Meanwhile, other NGOs provide invaluable advice on a wide range of
nontraditional security challenges.
Advocacy
In Western countries, NGOs have come to play a leading role inadvocating for societies to prioritize important issues that might otherwise be ignored, and they are starting to do the same in East Asia.
NGOs in the region have started to rack up some successes with theiradvocacy efforts, at both the national level and the regional level. For
example, as Honna notes, FORUM-ASIA and other anti-trafficking
organizations successfully lobbied ASEAN countries to take humantrafficking and the mandate to protect women and children more
seriously, playing an important role in the lead-up to the  launchof the ASEAN Commission for the Promotion and Protection of theRights of Women and Children.
Norm Setting
Globally, NGOs are helping to establish norms of behavior, as evidenced
by the success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in137

JAMES GANNON

making the use of antipersonnel landmines in warfare increasingly
unacceptable. This is true on the regional level as well, where they haveshown the capacity to help shape thinking about specific security issues.
The case of piracy provides one example. The International Maritime
Bureau (IMB) has become a major player in regional discussions ofpiracy and it operates a piracy reporting center in Kuala Lumpur. As
Mak explains in his chapter, the IMB has spearheaded a successful effort to expand the definition of what constitutes piracy beyond what
had traditionally been recognized under international law, and this has
had a major impact in Southeast Asia, prompting governments in theregion to take the issue of piracy more seriously.
Building Epistemic Networks that Cross Borders
The degree of independence and autonomy that many NGOs enjoy
makes them uniquely qualified to facilitate the exchange of knowledge
and viewpoints among regional opinion leaders. East Asia’s most prominent dialogues on “hard security” issues, dialogues that help shape thethinking of the region’s policy elite, tend to be hosted by NGOs and
NGO networks such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific (CSCAP) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies(the Shangri-La Dialogue). Meanwhile, a host of other NGOs play key
roles in building and sustaining regional networks on a range of nontraditional security issues, giving disparate groups the opportunity toshare lessons and explore collaborative initiatives.
Promoting Accountability
In Asia, as elsewhere, NGOs monitor government and business performance in a range of areas. Environmental groups around the region track
how countries are living up to their commitments to combat climatechange. Likewise, groups like FACE [Fight Against Child Exploitation],a Thai organization that monitors the prosecution of pedophiles, areproving effective in pressuring governments to live up to their promises
to crack down on human trafficking.
Raising Public AwarenessMany NGOs in the region are also becoming adept at raising public awareness about the issues they champion. As one example,
Muhammadiyah, a mass membership Muslim group in Indonesia, hasbeen playing a leading role in educating the public about how to prevent the spread of avian influenza. Similar initiatives are being carried138

Conclusion

out throughout the region by other groups on a range of issues withsecurity implications.
Helping Other Sectors of Society Fulfill Their Potential
Finally, NGOs also play a catalytic role in helping other sectors ofsociety respond more effectively to security threats. Chung Suh-Yongdescribes how NGOs in East Asia are increasingly assisting businesses
and governments in developing strategies and technologies to combat
climate change. Likewise, Huang highlights the ways in which statesand multinational corporations are starting to use NGOs as direct
recipients of donated medicines and other support, allowing for more
timely and effective distribution of government and corporate resources
to combat health threats.

. Securitization Has Been a Double-Edged Sword
In many cases, it is NGOs that have pushed for the “securitization” of theissues that they cover by making the case for how integral these issues areto people’s security and wellbeing. Their success, though, has bred twodilemmas with which they now must grapple.
One involves the efficacy of responses. Clearly, the securitization offields such as global health, climate change, and human trafficking helps
mobilize financial resources and high-level attention for areas where it isdesperately needed, scaling up responses to meet the scope of the challenge. This is illustrated by the way in which the shift toward thinking
about the global response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in security terms
played a major role in convincing governments and international agencies
to invest massive resources in the fight against the disease, saving countless lives around the globe.
However, there are instances in which securitization has exacted a
price. For example, as the issue of human trafficking has increasingly
been viewed by regional governments through the lens of security, there
has been a growing emphasis on law enforcement approaches to thedetriment of the types of victim-centered approaches that are better
equipped to deal with the root causes of the problem. Similarly, the factthat instances of maritime theft that would previously have been classified as domestic criminal acts are now being redefined as international
piracy has motivated a harder-line response that does little to deal withthe root causes of the problem.
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NGOs also face a second dilemma that goes to the heart of their very
mission and autonomy. While they typically welcome the additional
resources that they can mobilize by stressing the security implicationsof their activities, the reclassification of their activities as being security
related can degrade their capacity to effectively do their jobs. In her
chapter, Yukie Osa relates from firsthand experience how NGOs providing humanitarian assistance need to maintain impartiality and neutrality, especially when operating in conflict zones. However, the tendencyof governments to link humanitarian aid to broader strategic objectives
and the increased involvement of militaries, contractors, and other actors
whose aims go beyond humanitarian interests has sowed suspicion about
NGOs’ agendas and, in some instances, has even put them at risk of being
targeted by combatants, occasionally forcing them to compromise theirown neutrality to protect themselves.

. NGOs Are Paving the Way for Broader International
Cooperation
Another thing that has become crystal clear is that NGOs have a crucial
behind-the-scenes role to play in East Asia in averting potential conflicts,
spearheading cooperative initiatives that span national borders, and helping to build momentum for state-to-state cooperation. This is particularly
important in a region with a limited track record of security cooperation
and a dearth of action-oriented regional institutions.
Winston Churchill famously quipped that jaw-jaw is always better than
war-war. In keeping with this dictum, NGOs contribute by convening
experts and opinion leaders for intellectual dialogues. Sometimes thesetake the form of Track  dialogues that give government officials fromrival countries a chance to clear the air and exchange views frankly in a
private setting. In certain cases, when tensions in the region run high, it is
only NGOs that can convene officials from rival countries to feel out one
another’s ideas. The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) has
played this role by convening the participants in the Six-Party Talks, insome instances giving North Korean representatives and their American,
Japanese, and South Korean counterparts the chance to exchange theirviews when they may not be able to meet in their official capacities.
While sometimes it is important just to keep talking, the value of thesemeetings does not lie solely in their ability to promote confidence building
and transparency in security policy. Savvy government officials around the140Conclusion

region understand how these dialogues can help build consensus aroundnew proposals for cooperative initiatives that can later be championed at
the state-to-state level. In fact, most of the successful schemes for regional
dialogues and initiatives relevant to security have been advanced in thismanner, including the ARF and the East Asia Summit. In a region noted
for its relative lack of institutionalized security cooperation, this function
has been highly significant.
Similarly, broader NGO dialogues that bring together experts andstakeholders from other sectors of society have been contributing bypromoting the diffusion of knowledge on more technical issues to abroad range of experts, in the process helping them develop a common
threat perception. In his analysis of NGO efforts to tackle climate change,
Chung finds that one of the major obstacles to regional consensus on
the approach to this issue is the differing stances of developed and developing countries. When NGOs create opportunities for experts fromcountries around the region to share technical information on the factors
driving climate change, he argues, this better equips them to come to aconsensus on regional approaches. Unfortunately, the opportunities toconvene regional experts who deal with specific technical issues relevant
to security remain all too limited due to the lack of sufficient institutions,language gaps, and other obstacles.
Going beyond information sharing and dialogue, NGOs are also acting
more directly as vehicles or catalysts for state-level cooperation. In ,after the Sichuan earthquake, historical considerations and bilateral tensions made it tricky for the Japanese government to provide disaster aid
directly to the Chinese government, especially through military channels.
However, the Japanese government was able to funnel some if its aid to
China through NGO networks by donating to the International Federationof Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and to the Japan Platform consortium. Similar routes are commonly used by other countries in the region
during humanitarian crises.
In other cases, when states have found it difficult to formally work
together, NGOs have been taking a more proactive role in advancing cooperation. For instance, the spread of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis in
North Korea has become a major public health problem with implications
for its neighbors. It is difficult for the United States, South Korea, and otherregional powers to engage directly with the insular regime in Pyongyang,but a US-led NGO consortium that includes the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
Stanford University, and the Christian Friends of Korea, has succeeded inhelping the North Korean Ministry of Public Health establish the country’s
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first lab for detecting these particularly dangerous strains of tuberculosis.2 Other NGOs, meanwhile, have been providing North Koreans withmedications to help fight multi-drug resistant tuberculosis.
Finally, NGOs are increasingly well positioned to remove potential
irritants to relations between states in the region. Again, the health fieldprovides some examples. As Huang explains, NGOs such as the Southeast
Asia Foundation for Outbreak Regional Cooperation are undertaking
disease surveillance initiatives that help prevent tensions from arising
between countries that are often tempted to engage in finger-pointing
about the emergence of new pathogens. Meanwhile, when there is a dangerous outbreak, NGOs can help develop shared norms for quarantines,
exit screenings, and other types of interventions that might otherwise
lead to accusations of discrimination and aggravate relations between
neighboring countries.
Of course, as autonomous actors that represent a range of ideological
viewpoints, NGOs can also magnify irritants to state-to-state relations.
The growing tendency of nationalistic NGOs in Japan, South Korea, andelsewhere to insert themselves into maritime territorial disputes has madeit more difficult for governments to reach pragmatic compromises, fueling strategic rivalry. On balance, however, the growing NGO involvement
in issues related to security seems to have contributed to a stronger andmore stable regional order.

. NGOs in the Region Face a Wide Range of Challenges That
Limit Their Contributions
While NGOs are starting to make important contributions and they havethe potential to do much more, a broad range of challenges continues toslow their growth and limit their efficacy. As they become more prominent
players, these challenges are likely to loom larger for the region.
For one, NGOs active in East Asia are characterized by a high levelof diversity, and this leaves gaps that make it more difficult for them towork together on equal footing. The size, wealth, and functions of NGOs
within individual countries in the region vary widely, which is by no means
unnatural. However, there are also enormous differences in the overall
capacity of the civil society sector from country to country. In otherwords, there are large differences in the size, capabilities, and vibrancy ofNGOs in the Philippines, for instance, versus those in Laos, to say nothingof the gulf dividing the comparatively large and well-funded American
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and European NGOs working in the region from their much smaller
indigenous counterparts. These disparities are the product of numerous
factors—history, economic development, national legal and regulatory
systems, cultural and religious legacies, the state of local philanthropy, thedegree of “democratic space” permitting the emergence of autonomous
institutions, and so on—all of which vary more widely in East Asia thanin most other parts of the world. Further complicating matters, there arealso large disparities between fields, and even within fields. For example,
in the health field, which is relatively well-endowed, there are numerous
NGOs and significant funding dedicated to stemming the spread of communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS but much less activity focused on
noncommunicable diseases.
A related challenge is the fact that NGOs active in East Asia—and particularly those that are not government-affiliated or that do not serve asbranches of Western NGOs—tend to have limited institutional capacity.
In general, they operate with fewer staff, are less professionalized, andhave access to fewer resources than NGOs in Western countries. To give
one example, the Central Community Chest of Japan, one of Japan’s mostprominent and well-established NGOs, operates with fewer than  staff,
while its most comparable American counterpart, United Way Worldwide,has more than  full-time staff.
One obvious reason for the limited capacity of the NGO sector is theendemic lack of financial resources that confronts most of the NGOs in
East Asia. While most countries in the region have a long history of local
philanthropy, this has typically focused on religious causes, education, andother activities that can be loosely defined as more traditional “charity”;
there is only a limited track record of giving for NGO activities. This has
led to various imbalances that endanger the autonomy and operations ofNGOs. In some instances, it has encouraged a dependence on government funding, which in turn hampers NGOs’ ability to serve as credible
monitors of government policy, disseminate information that contradicts
government stances, or propose alternative policies. In other cases, NGOsin the region have become overly reliant on overseas funding, which candistort local civil society and also sow suspicions as to whether NGOs areadvancing a foreign agenda.
A related challenge is the relative lack of governmental and societal acceptance that NGOs often face in East Asia. This is most conspicuous incountries like China, where the democratic space is severely conscribed.
As Huang mentions, this has led to a situation in which  out of  Chinese
civil society organizations have to make do without official nonprofit status
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JAMES GANNONand all the benefits this confers. However, the difficulties that NGOs facein being taken seriously are not limited to the more authoritarian countriesof the region. They exist even in as fully democratic a country as Japan.
There, the legal and regulatory systems for NGOs remain so overbearingthat even  years after domestic reforms to encourage the formation ofa class of smaller, community-based NGOs—“NPOs” in Japanese parlance—only  of the , officially registered NPOs have been able toobtain government approval to accept tax-deductible donations.3 As Osa
points out in her analysis of disaster relief, this lack of societal acceptance
was also manifested after the March  earthquake in the reluctance ofJapanese government officials to take NGOs specializing in disaster relief
seriously as professional partners rather than as unskilled volunteers. This
ended up hobbling NGO efforts to provide disaster relief during a national
crisis, even though it was an explicit government policy to work closelywith NGOs and rely on their expertise.
NGOs in the region are held back by one final challenge, the weaknessof their own governance coupled with a lack of transparency and accountability. In many countries, there are questions as to whom NGOs are operating on behalf of, and these are naturally heightened when NGOs are
involved in as sensitive an area as security. Going beyond these suspicions,in some places there are valid reasons for concern because certain NGOs
operate as fronts for profit-making endeavors while others are created as
tools to advance narrow political interests. Even many of the NGOs in theregion that are autonomous actors earnestly seeking to advance society’s
interests still have a long way to go in striking a proper balance between
transparency and efficacy in their operations. This is perhaps natural given
the state of development of the NGO sector in the region, but nevertheless
it is an issue that will need to be tackled more seriously.

. There Are Few Coordinating Mechanisms in the Region
for NGOs
The region’s security challenges are increasingly transnational in nature,so responses need to span national borders to be effective. However, oneof the greatest obstacles that hampers the capacity of NGOs to tackle
these challenges is the difficulty they face in collaborating with otherinstitutions outside of their national borders. There are a number ofcoordination mechanisms at the national level in individual countries
that enable NGOs to work together. For example, many of the NGOs in
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Japan that work on disaster relief can undertake joint fundraising throughJapan Platform, while American NGOs responding to disasters in Asiaand elsewhere share information through InterAction, a broad-based association for humanitarian assistance organizations. Yet, with a handful of
exceptions,4 there are few regional networks in East Asia, especially ones
that enable NGOs from different countries to compare notes and explore
joint activities. Similarly, there are few robust institutional mechanismsthat encourage regional collaboration on the part of NGOs in other fields
relevant to traditional and nontraditional security.
The high degree of diversity is one factor that seems to inhibit the development of collaborative networks of NGOs in the region, and linguistic
issues are another major hurdle. However, the two greatest obstacles may
well be established patterns of behavior and a lack of financial resources.
A general lack of familiarity with one another and, in some cases, regional
enmities make it difficult for NGOs that are not accustomed to working
with overseas partners to initiate and sustain networking activities. Even
more importantly, NGOs’ weak financial base and the strain that investingin new partnerships places on their already overextended staff makes it
difficult for them to justify investing time and money in building networks
that may not benefit them immediately.
Similarly, there is a lack of robust mechanisms to promote coordination between NGOs and governments or regional institutions. Manyof the governments in the region have begun outreach to domestically
based NGOs in a handful of fields, but these still tend to be relatively
unsophisticated and are also plagued by a power imbalance that favors
the government side. Similarly, ASEAN has tried to engage Southeast
Asian NGOs, but dustups over issues such as the creation of the ASEAN
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and a sense on the partof NGO representatives that they are not taken seriously leaves a great
deal of mutual mistrust that needs to be overcome.

M    F  
The cases covered in this volume clearly show that the role of NGOs inregional security is growing. While it is too much to suggest that thesecases illuminate a clear road map for strengthening civil society contributions, they do hint at a number of steps that can, in the aggregate,
help pave the way forward by making it easier for NGOs to contributeto the field.
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JAMES GANNONOne step that would be useful is greater efforts to build up collaborative
regional and subregional networks of NGOs that focus on specific fields
of expertise. Such networks would introduce NGO representatives to one
another, helping to build up the type of familiarity and trust that is needed
to quickly initiate cooperation in times of need while also giving NGOs aforum for sharing lessons and for speaking with a common voice. Somepreliminary efforts have already been made in this regard, but fields thatseem particularly ripe for further network building include disaster relief,some areas of health, and perhaps human trafficking.
As possible models, there are numerous network-building initiatives
around the world that have succeeded in promoting cooperation at thenational and regional levels. For example, in the field of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, InterAction plays a key role in coordinating
information when US NGOs respond to overseas crises. Similarly, Japan
Platform has become an important vehicle for pooled funding and NGOgovernment coordination for Japanese groups. And CONCORD [European
NGO Confederation for Relief and Development] helps Europe’s NGO community take unified stances on humanitarian issues involving the European
Union. None of these models can be transplanted directly to East Asia, butthey illustrate the possibilities for what can be done at the regional level.
Of course, network building and other initiatives to enhance civil society contributions to regional security cost money, which is in particularly
short supply for NGOs active in East Asia. Governments and regional
institutions would be well advised to seriously explore ways to provide
more financial support to promote regional cooperation among NGOs.
This could take the form of funding to strengthen regional networks, as
the European Commission has done for CONCORD and other initiatives.
Going a step further, it could also entail the creation of some form of pooled
funding schemes, perhaps in connection with the East Asia Summit or
ASEAN, that expand on the Japan Platform model by supporting the provision of services by NGOs working in relatively uncontroversial areas suchas disaster relief, where their contributions are undoubtedly needed. The
trick, however, will be to do this in such a way that insulates participating
NGOs from regional politics and avoids compromising their autonomy.
Private foundations and donors both inside and outside of East Asia
also have an important catalytic role to play. Over the long run, there is apressing need for further steps to nurture local philanthropy so that it canbetter meet the demands of the growing NGO sector. For the time being,
though, the underdeveloped state of local philanthropy leaves foundations
from the United States and Europe in a position to play an outsized role146

Conclusion

in encouraging the expansion of NGO networks and the growth of civilsociety capacity. In attempting to do this, though, it is important for themto proceed in a sophisticated manner that encourages local initiatives andbuilds local capacity rather than displaces it.
In a more general sense, the cases taken up in this volume clearly showthat there is a need for greater efforts on the part of governments andregional institutions to engage more constructively with NGOs that are
working on issues related to security. Some governments in the region
are already making serious efforts to reach out to internationally oriented
NGOs based in their countries and involve them in regular consultations
and collaborations. The efforts of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs tohold regular dialogues with NGOs in specific issue areas stand out in thisregard. Nevertheless, there is still much farther to go, which is evidenced
by the fact that there is a greater psychological distance between NGOs
and governments in East Asia than in many other parts of the world,and certainly more so than in North America or Europe. This is due, inpart, to the reflexive distrust that many governments in the region tend
to feel toward civil society and the historical tendency for governments
to dominate the definition of the “public good” and its implementation.
Such stances are increasingly incompatible with today’s reality, as we findourselves in a new era in which governments increasingly need NGOs.
In particular, regional institutions such as ASEAN and the East Asia
Summit have an important role to play in acknowledging the importanceof NGOs and in urging member governments to be more proactive inengaging with them. International organizations can also contribute inthis regard. For example, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis andMalaria made clear that it is serious about requiring recipient countries
to work with NGOs when, in , it temporarily suspended hundredsof millions of dollars in funding for Chinese AIDS initiatives because theChinese government was not involving civil society in the funded projects
in the way it had promised. Similar pressure when necessary, balancedwith positive encouragement, can help push the envelope on government
engagement with NGOs.
Finally, the region needs to develop a more supportive environment
for civil society if NGOs are going to be able to contribute to their fullpotential. There are numerous reforms that need to be made to the legal
and regulatory systems in individual countries to make it easier for NGOs
to operate and contribute to society. Some governments in the region
feel that it serves their short-term interests to keep NGOs under theirthumb with overly strict regulation and oversight, but ultimately this147

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undermines their long-term interests in seeing effective action taken on
a range of nontraditional security challenges. Similarly, greater efforts
are sorely needed to develop an indigenous philanthropic sector that
supports NGOs, including legal reforms, the expansion of tax benefits
and other government incentives, and large-scale changes in corporate
norms and societal behavior. One final piece of the puzzle is efforts by
NGOs themselves to improve their governance and transparency. There
are deep concerns in the region, sometimes justified although often not,about the reliability of NGOs. These make efforts to be more accountable to the public and to weed out the “bad NGOs” that are solely profit
oriented or are advancing agendas that diverge from the public good aprerequisite for building public trust.
Throughout Asia, banyan trees have traditionally been importantbecause of how well they shield people from the hot sun and provide
sanctuary from storms. They are distinguished by aerial roots that extend
from their branches to the ground below and which eventually grow intoa cluster of intertwined, multiple new trunks that support the tree’s lush
canopy. Civil society is like these new trunks: in East Asia it is playing a
growing role in supporting the region by making it more stable and secure. If the new trunks cannot get sufficient sustenance, the entire tree is
weakened; likewise, if the growth of NGOs is stunted, regional security
will suffer.
That is why, as the cases taken up in this volume illustrate, it is crucial
for key actors in the region—including governments, regional institutions, donors, and of course NGOs themselves—to give greater priority
to creating an environment that is more supportive of civil society, andparticularly of NGOs working on issues related to security. Furthermore,seeing how the functions of NGOs and other civil society organizations are
increasingly intertwined and interdependent with other sectors of society,
it is important for governments, regional institutions, and others to put
more energy into exploring how to create more meaningful partnerships
with NGOs. Even though their contributions tend to be overlooked, NGOs
have an integral role to play in advancing regional security cooperation,and if properly nourished, they will make the entire region stronger, muchas the additional support provided by the banyan’s new trunks allows thetree to flourish and spread.

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ConclusionN
. Author’s conversations with Japanese government officials.
. See, for example, Donald G. McNeil Jr., “Tuberculosis: North Korea Develops TB
Laboratory with Help from American Doctors,” New York Times, March , , D.
. Data for the number of Japanese nonprofit groups registered as NPO hojin that havereceived tax deductible status comes from July  figures provided by Japan’s
National Tax Agency (www.nta.go.jp/tetsuzuki/denshi-sonota/npo/meibo/.
htm). According to the Cabinet Office of Japan’s Economic Research Bureau, there
were , registered NPO hojin as of March , . “Tokutei hieri katsudo hojin no katsudo bunya ni tsuite” [About the fields of activity of NPOs], Cabinet
Office of Japan NPO Homepage, March , , www.npo-homepage.go.jp/data/
bunnya.html.
. One notable exception involves policy institutes that specialize in security studies.
There are a number of networks, such as the Council for Security Cooperation in
the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), that convene nongovernmental as well as governmentaffiliated think tanks for policy dialogues. However, moving outside of the realm ofintellectual dialogue, there are few institutionalized regional networks that bring
together NGOs that play a more direct role in responding to nontraditional andtraditional security challenges.

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