Sean Keith
Waseda Summer School Program 2008
20/08/2008
Northeast Asia Integration and Japan as a barrier

On July 29th, 2008, I set out to participate in the Waseda Summer School
Program on East Asian Integration in hopes that I would learn more about how regional
integration in Northeast Asia was progressing. Even as a citizen of the United States, it
is my hope that Northeast Asia can put aside its differences and integrate on a numberof levels (including but not limited to political, economic, cultural and security). While
many theorists point out that a rise in Northeast Asia would probably be accompanied
by a decreasing U.S. global influence, I like to think in terms of absolute gains instead ofcomparative gains – as International Affairs Professor from George Washington Harry
Harding put it while giving a guest lecture at Waseda on May 29th, 2008, isn’t being

much better off than before more advantageous than only being slightly better off, but
still better than your neighbor?
It was in this context that I started the Summer School Program, and it was inthis context that I considered what I come to increasingly view as the largest obstacle toregional integration in Northeast Asia – Japan’s perceptions, identity and relations
with its neighbors.

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The problem of Japan’s relations with its neighbors extends far back in history,
as there have been many periods of contention between Japan and both Korea andChina. However, it has only been in the last 100 years which frictions have reached anew level. During Professor Shinohara’s history lecture at Waseda, student groups drewup contending versions of Northeast Asian history in the last century, and there was anagreed consensus between the groups that friction between Japan and its neighbors
Korea and China rapidly escalated during the period of Japanese imperialism in theearly 20th century. It was from roughly 1900 to the end of WWII that the Japanesemilitary engaged on a series of exploits that still negatively resonates in China andKorea today. The matter of what Japan did however, is not so clear cut. As Professor
Shinohara later went on to explain, some Japan perceived the actions of imperialist
Japan as “an attempt to throw off the shackles of Western imperialism and create anEast Asian order”. However, many if not all in Korea and China felt that they werebeing invaded ruthlessly, and did not welcome Japan’s “liberating army”. This
perception difference was to be the catalyst for what was later to be a thorn inSino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese relations, as several Japanese history books
sought to “downplay” Japanese aggressions during World War II.

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And while problems between Japan and its relations with its neighbors might
have intensified in recent history, they have been drastically exacerbated in the last 20years. In 1989 the Tiananmen Square massacre caused the affinity that Japanese felttowards China to drop drastically1, and in 2004 and 2005 during the anti-Japanese riots
in China Japanese affinity towards China again took a drop to an all time low of about
32%. Other sources such as the Asia Barometer paint a different picture however, as
data gathered from the Asia Barometer shows that Japan has maintained a relative
neutral perception towards both Korea and China over the last 5 years2.
Ultimately, as shown above, different data can indicate different trends.
Therefore, I took it upon myself to discuss various issues with different members thatparticipated in the summer school program to get a personal understanding of thesituation. I discussed in detail with different classmates the way that Japan regarded its

neighbors, and compared them to my personal experiences in Japan. In doing so, I slowly
began to arrive at the conclusion that there is a deep rooted prejudice that exists in Japan
towards China. I also observed this prejudice when I was in China, as certain Japanese
students in the program acted certain ways towards Chinese people. This didn‟t come out as1Annex 2 shows a huge drop in Japanese affinity towards China in 1989

2During Professor Sonoda’s presentation at Waseda he showed us a graph showing theJapanese perception of foreign countries. Japanese perception towards China and South
Korea remained neutral according to the surveys conducted in 2003, 2004 and 20063

directly through contact with other members of the group as it did during occasions whenmembers of the group would interact with the everyday people of the country. Several
examples struck me very deeply. The first was in Shanghai when I was accompanying
members of the Japanese and Chinese group throughout a town market. I explained to oneof the Japanese group members about the working conditions of the Chinese workers, andsome general etiquette about how to conduct oneself when bargaining with street vendors.
After explaining the rules of bargaining in China, I helped the student bargain down theprice of an item. In the very end, the student got the price they wanted but decided theydidn‟t want the item after all. To them the bargaining was like a game, but to the street
vendor it was their livelihood. The student walked away smirking and the street vendor wasleft there in humiliation. My fellow Chinese students and I were stunned. Afterwards I
questioned the Japanese student why they had acted the way they had, especially because it
had been extremely rude towards the vendor. The student‟s response was very callous anddidn‟t include any empathy towards the vendor. The second time that I was surprised was
during class in China when we were discussing governmental structures and democracy.
Some students unabashedly criticized China‟s government and China in general and heapedpraise upon praised democracy. However, the condescending tone of the diatribe seemed to4be a slap in the face to the Chinese students, and I could notice the both the dissonance it
created between the groups and the discomfort it created in the Chinese students.
My last experience comes from a presentation that I attended given by a memberof the Japanese National Police Agency. The presenter‟s words reinforced a stereotype
believed by Japanese that the growing amount of crime in Japan is linked to the growing
number of foreigners in Japan – especially foreigners from China. The presenter madestatements such as “an average door in Japan with a lock looks to a Chinese like an „opendoor‟”. The presenter also raised the issue that as an increasing number of foreigners enter
Japan (especially Chinese), Japan will become a more dangerous and crime ridden country.
The last and perhaps most discouraging indicator that Japan will be a barrier
towards Northeast Asian integration comes from the “Asian Identity” graph from
Professor Sonoda’s presentation. To have Northeast Asian integration, it is integral that
there be some sort of shared sense of community or identity, something which people
have termed “Asian Identity”. According to Professor Sonoda’s data, 40% of China’spopulation consider themselves to have an “Asian identity”, and 20% consider
themselves to have a “transnational identity”. In South Korea 30% of respondents
considered themselves to have an Asian identity, while close to 60% consideredthemselves to have a transnational identity. However, in the case of Japan, only 20% of5respondents considered themselves to have an Asian identity, and another 20%
considered themselves to have a transnational identity. In contrast, roughly 50% ofJapanese respondents considered themselves to have no transnational identity,
something which strongly indicates that Japanese would be more resistant tointegrating further with their Asian neighbors.
While I went into the summer school program believing I would learn more
about how regional integration was progressing smoothly, I came out of summer school
both more informed and with a better sense of the challenges that face integration.
Overall “integration” looks very unlikely as can be seen from the information that I
presented above, but there are still integration areas that have hope. As Professor
Akaha mentioned in his presentation there are different ways which Northeast Asia has
the potential to integrate – political, economic, cultural and security. During the lecture
it was agreed by generally everyone that economic integration is for the moment themost desirable, possible and likely. However, to what extent will economic integration
affect overall regional integration? We will have to wait and see.

6Annex 1 - Source: Cabinet Office, “Gaiko ni kansuru Yoron Chosa (Public Opinion Pollon Foreign Policy & Diplomacy),” annual (2007)7

Annex 2 - Source: Cabinet Office, “Gaiko ni kansuru Yoron Chosa (Public Opinion Pollon Foreign Policy & Diplomacy),” annual

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