2008-E-24
JAPAN, CHINA AND THE CASE FOR EAST ASIAN REGIONAL
COOPERATION
Christian WIRTH
Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI),
Waseda University
February 2009

Abstract
This paper analyzes the relations between Japan and China as the key determinant of
East Asian regional cooperation. To this purpose, methodological approaches ofrealism, liberalism and constructivism and the implications of their interpretations for
East Asia are discussed. The paper argues that first, difficulties in China-Japan
relations result from the rapidly changing economic, social and political environment
in which China and Japan find themselves today. Second, the paper proposes that aJapan with a standard foreign and security policy which takes into account its close
economic and social relationships with Northeast Asia, and a China having
accomplished its opening up and reform project would likely be in a position to findcommon ground on how to tackle future questions of bilateral and regional concern.
Third, it is argued that multilateral cooperation is a necessary framework to support
the current transformation process by addressing the numerous transnational
challenges to East Asian societies and reducing strategic uncertainties created by the
rapidly changing East Asian environment.

1

INTRODUCTION
Due to the involvement of great powers and many of the world’s leading national
economies, international relations of Northeast Asia are not only of particular interest
to the region itself, but to the whole international community. Since the end of
bipolarity, the world has witnessed a China which is continuously increasing its‘comprehensive national strength’ while promoting its ‘peaceful rise’ or ‘peacefuldevelopment’ and the construction of a ‘harmonious (international) society’. At thesame time Japan is pursuing the path towards a ‘normal state’, becoming more andmore active in the field of foreign and security politics. Both developments and theinfluence of United States’ (US) policies in the Asia-Pacific, represent a considerable
potential for rivalries and frictions between great powers in Northeast Asia. Economic
relations are major drivers of Northeast Asian international cooperation. Over the past
decades, economic development caused a surge in inter-Asian trade flows and led to acertain degree of division of labour between East Asian countries and the emergenceof an economic and political regional sphere. However, despite steadily growinginterdependence, political regional cooperation has remained modest and distrust
continues to hinder the further integration of markets and societies. Most striking is
the continuing antagonism between the two major actors in the region, China andJapan.
The security structure of Northeast Asia continues to be dominated by thebilateral alliances of the US with South Korea and Japan. However, since the end of
the Cold War, various initiatives for multilateral regional political and security
cooperation in East Asia have been promoted. Most important are the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) established in 1994 and the ASEAN+3 (APT) framework
which became operational with the first summit held in Kuala Lumpur in 1997 andeventually led the way to the first East Asian Summit in 2005. Also, APEC despite its
focus on economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific has some important political
functions.1 While ASEAN seemed to be in ‘the driver’s seat’ for the first phase ofregional integration it has become apparent that the ‘ASEAN-way’, stressing the normof non-interference not only substantially limits the capacity of existing ASEANrelated institutions, but also hinders their development and expansion into new areas.
In order to address the strategic uncertainties caused by changes in the region, and toaddress long-standing sources of conflict, more pragmatic and effective approaches tomultilateral cooperation seem necessary. The numerous great powers involved in
Northeast Asia however disagree on the purpose and scope of multilateral cooperation.
The proceedings at the first East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005
displayed the extent of disagreement between China and Japan. Commenting on
ASEAN+3, Acharya notes that further progress in regional integration would require
the overcoming of Sino-Japanese competition for influence in East Asia and thedemonstration of the ability to provide concrete solutions to regional problems.2 Van
Ness as well, is convinced that the future of East Asia will be determined by thenature of China-Japan relations.3 The importance of China-Japan relations for regional
cooperation, and thus for a positive development of the East Asian region, raises
questions about the impact of China-Japan relations on East Asian regional
cooperation and about the current trend in China-Japan relations. This paper explores
the reasons and dynamics which lie behind the attitudes of these two countries
towards each other and their views of the East Asian region.
This paper argues that first, difficulties in China-Japan relations result from therapidly changing environment in which China and Japan find themselves.
2Globalization and economic development have transformed socio-economic structuresand brought about new challenges to governments and civil societies in both countries.
These developments necessitate new ways of thinking, including new understandingsof the roles of China and Japan and new approaches to address the emerging
challenges in East Asia. The Chinese embrace of the modernization project has led tohigh economic growth rates and caused the deep transformation of domestic social
structures. The loss of orientation after the successful completion of the Japanesemodernization project at the end of the 1990s and the subsequent entering of the postmodern era also brings new challenges for which common understandings andsolutions are no longer adequate. This causes uncertainties at the international, stateand sub-state levels and no consensus about how to address these challenges has beenfound. Additionally, the regional environment has changed in a way which, after
decades of social and political separation, brought China and Japan together again andtherefore drastically increased their roles in view of the other. Second, the paper
proposes that a Japan with a standard foreign and security policy which takes into
account its close economic and social relationships with Northeast Asia, and China
having successfully accomplished its opening up and reform project would likely bein a position to find common ground on how to tackle future questions of bilateral andregional concern. This would inevitably lead the way to stronger social and politicalregional integration. Third, given the uncertainties originating from domestic andsystemic challenges to China, Japan and Northeast Asia as a whole, it is argued thatmultilateral cooperation is a necessary framework to support the current
transformation process. Such cooperation will be able to provide guidelines for state
actions and may create and clarify international norms and thereby mitigate
uncertainties about individual state policies and reduce collective action problems.
The first section of this paper is a brief review of existing approaches to East
Asian international relations and their consequences for regional integration. The
second section looks at the domestic and systemic determinants of the Chinese andJapanese identities as constituting elements of their respective foreign-policies. The
third section offers the paper’s conclusion by looking at how the interaction between
China and Japan influences regional cooperation and integration and vice versa.
DIFFERENT METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES, DIFFERENT FUTURE PROSPECTS
Studies of the Northeast Asian region are heavily influenced by the theoretical
approaches taken. Given the complexity and interdependence of the salient issues, anddespite methodological frameworks applied, research outcomes often reflect thepersonal background and research interests of the authors. Generally, power-based
explanations, due to their assumptions that the roles and characters of states are given,
tend to focus on the structural level of analysis, to highlight the existing security
dilemmas which split the region into two and consequently paint a sceptical outlook
on cooperation. Christensen, for instance, examines the Northeast Asian region and its
security dilemmas from a realist viewpoint.4 He argues that the presence of the US
military in the region prevents security dilemmas from exacerbating. He posits that
the US, in its role as an offshore-balancer is able to provide the necessary security forSouth Korea and Japan while restraining the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces
and thereby reassuring China. Kang rejects pessimistic approaches which stem fromrealist or liberal thinking. 5 While the realists over-emphasize the role of material
power in determining policy outcomes, liberals tend to argue that the lack of formal
multilateral institutions means that the region remains unstable. Instead of anarchy,
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Kang perceives the East Asian states as embedded in a hierarchic structure whichenables accommodation between the great powers of the region and defies the realist
prediction and the need for policies of mutual balancing.
Newer theoretical approaches acknowledge that non-material aspects do wieldsignificant influence on foreign and security policy-making. Buzan and Weaver,although building on realist assumptions, developed a framework which focuses on
the growing importance of regional dynamics in international relations.6 They argue
that the East Asian region including Australasia constitutes one Regional Security
Complex (RSC), which is mainly defined through the geographical proximity of its
states. Security policies within the RSC are explained by a mix of realist arguments
and constructivist elements. According to Buzan and Waever, RSC are determined by
the distribution of material power and historically informed patterns of amity andenmity. Moreover, these scholars emphasize the impact of securitization on national
and international security practice. While Buzan and Waever are quite able to describeinternational relations in East Asia, their approach is a rather static explanation andfalls back on conventional realist predictions in case of changes in the system, leaving
little space for regional cooperation.
Other scholars take a closer look at processes which constitute the interests ofstates, arguing that not only material factors, but also the interactions between states
generate, or socially construct, ideas of societies about their own role, about who they
are and how to relate to others in a specific environment. These constructivist
approaches differ from rationalist theories such as realism or liberalism in threerespects: first, actors are not considered as atomistic egoists, but social entities;
second, actors’ interests are not exogenously given, but constituted through social
interactions; third, society is not seen as a strategic realm where actors rationallypursue their interests, but as a constitutive realm, an environment which generates
actors as knowledgeable social and political agents, the realm that makes them whothey are.7 These approaches do not dismiss the influence of material structures, butthey leave more room for the explanation of international cooperation since they are
not based on the assumption of an anarchic self-help system and combine analyses ofsub-state, state and systemic levels. In his research on the drivers behind East Asian
regionalism, Rozman primarily looks at the national identities of China, Japan, Russia,
Korea and the US and how they relate to one-another.8 He argues that the growing
importance of regions in world politics is a result of processes of globalisation andthat regional spheres help to mitigate its impact on states. Wendt explainsinternational relations with a systemic constructivist approach. 9 He argues that theability to overcome collective action problems – realists would term them as security
dilemmas, liberalists would depict them as prisoners’ dilemmas, depends on whether
the actors’ social identities create self-interests or collective interests. Self-interest isdetermined by particular representations of the relationship between the ‘self’ and‘other’. Explaining the formation of self-interest, Wendt distinguishes between
domestic and systemic determinants.
With regard to the East Asian region, each of the three schools shows
explanatory weaknesses. Realist approaches have difficulties in explaining why Japan
does not balance the US or at least China and why South Korea or Vietnam do notbalance China or Japan. Moreover, realist political strategies face problems of how to
avoid conflicts which in turn would severely harm national interests. For instance,
Chinese realist strategists face the dilemma in how to increase their material power inorder to make China more secure against the US-Japan alliance without pushing Japan
more into the arms of the US and provoking more offensive policies from Tokyo,
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Washington, as well as Taipei. On the other side, realists when designing US security
policies towards Asia, face the dilemma of how to contain China’s influence without
by this same strategy promoting the emergence of a revisionist state they want toavoid or contain.10 Also, rationalist approaches have difficulties in explaining somespecific policies in Northeast Asia. One question for instance is why Japan prioritises
the resolution of open questions about a group of abductees over the prevention of ahostile and nuclear armed North Korea. Liberalist explanations face the criticism offailing to explain why there is still considerable lack of trust and rivalry between thehighly interdependent trading partners in East Asia, China and Japan. Also, it isdifficult to explain in liberalist terms why even common values of democracy andcommon security threats cannot prevent South Korea and Japan from having
considerable rifts in their bilateral relations. Lastly, it is apparent that multilateral
institutions such as ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN+3 and APEC are widely unable toaddress regional security issues and bring the stake-holding states closer together insearch of solutions. Constructivist scholars need to admit that especially thegovernments of great powers such as the US, Russia, China and Japan think in realist
categories and therefore also act accordingly. This gives power-based explanations
considerable value. Moreover, the effects of global developments such as questions
related to climate change, energy security or societal changes on state identities are
difficult to explain with constructivist arguments alone.
JAPANESE AND CHINESE EAST ASIAN IDENTITIES
Looking at present China-Japan relations, main aspects consist of the ongoingincrease in economic interdependence combined with increasing numbers of peopleto-people exchange in the form of tourism, education and business relations on one
hand. On the other hand, political tensions over interpretations of the common past,delineations of territorial claims and questions of regional foreign and security
policies such as the denuclearization and stability of the Korean peninsula, the status
of Taiwan and the modernization and deployment of conventional and nuclear armed
forces top the bilateral agenda.
These controversial debates reflect uncertainties about how to address thedomestic, regional and global challenges China and Japan are facing. As it is apparent,
both states face multiple and intertwined challenges to their national (traditional)
security, economic, environmental and food security as well as social stability.
Consequently, new policies and the adoption of new ways of thinking are necessary inorder to successfully confront these challenges. The East Asian political environment
influences and is influenced by the changing identities of China and Japan. There is aneed to significantly redefine their roles in the national, bilateral, regional and global
contexts. This means that both China and Japan need to find new definitions of the‘self’ and ‘other’, which will then constitute new social identities in the East Asian
regional context.11 As noted above, there exist many good reasons for both states towork together in addressing salient regional security issues. However, bilateral and,thus, regional multilateral cooperation remains difficult. This produces a number ofcollective action problems which stem from a particular representation of the ‘self’and ‘other’, which promote self-interests before collective interests. A balance
between the two poles within a national identity would mean that leaders would take
into account their counterpart’s views and concerns and recognize commonalities,
whereas the absence of positive identification would make the other party a mere
object of regional politics and define national interests with regard to narrow self5

interests only. This is necessarily a mutually constituting process which is not only
influenced by the two actors’ perceptions, but includes a wide range of factors.
The following section tries to identify domestic and systemic factors which
influence the way Chinese and Japanese leaders think about their role in East Asia andhow they look at the roles of other actors and subsequently enact foreign policies. It
therefore focuses on issues which have particular influence on the perceptions of the‘self’ and ‘other’ in the bilateral context. It is necessary to note that the distinction
between domestic and systemic determinants serves only to structure the arguments. It
is the actual purpose of the concept of identity to link the sub-state, state and systemic
factors with each-other.
The concept of the identity of a nation answers the questions: Who are we?
What should we collectively aspire to be? What is especially important about being
Japanese or Chinese? And what is it that significantly distinguishes us from the rest of
the world?12 When looking at states’ identities, it is important to distinguish between
the formation and the enactment of identity. Also, the officially promoted identity is
not necessarily congruent with the actual identity. Moreover, it is important to keep inmind that the concept of identity ‘(…) is a bridging concept which serves to integratestudies of political culture, role theory, realpolitik and idealpolitik perspectives onnational interest and purpose, and long-time continuities amid historical flux’. 13 A
state may therefore have multiple identities which may even conflict with each other
and, apart from their constantly changing nature, become variably salient in particularsituations. 14 When analyzing foreign and security policy making, the concept of
securitization is also helpful to explain how political systems react to new situations
and use specific issues to bolster their legitimacy and promote their interests. The
securitization of a specific issue and an actor connected to that issue changes therepresentation of the ‘self’ and ‘other’. The other actor is depicted in specific terms
which highlight the way it is different from the ‘self’. The securitizing actor argues
that the situation therefore requires special means to deal with threats originating fromthat ‘other’ actor. Securitization is a direct consequence of the inability to deal with a
new situation through normal political processes.15
According to Wendt, domestic determinants of identity formation can begrouped into three aspects. First, the corporate nature of the state is of relevance. The
making of a group, that is, a state, creates a feeling of self (insiders) and others(outsiders). Second, the nature of state-society relations is important to understand theformation of self-interest. Lastly, nationalism, the collective identity based on cultural,
linguistic and ethnical ties is a domestic determinant of self-interest. However, Wendt
does not further elaborate on these categories. Dittmer and Kim contend that acomprehensive investigation of national identities should not only look at categories
which differentiate the insiders from the outsiders, but also encompass the symbolsystem of a nation-state with which the community identifies.16 For the purpose ofthis study, that is, to analyse collective action problems, it seems useful to structure
the arguments roughly according to the lines of Wendt’s categorization.
In sum, domestic determinants in China and Japan have a strong influence on
their respective national identities which in turn constitute interests in their foreign
policies. In both countries, the turbulent history from the middle of the 19th to the
middle of the 20th century led to the creation of narratives about the past which helped
rebuild the identities of the Chinese and Japanese states after the end of World War II
and the Chinese civil war. These common understandings about the nation wereformed by the respective elites to bolster their rule and to stabilize the state as a social
construct. Moreover, the emergence of the Cold War, namely the fact that the US6administration decided to build up Japan as a shield against communism, deeply
affected the understanding about the past and thus shaped the nation’s view of its ownrole in the region – a region which was for decades split into two blocs. Only after theend of the Cold War, political space for the regional actors to substantially expand
their international cooperation beyond the establishment diplomatic relations opened
up. However, this space is still restricted by the remaining divisions of the Cold Waron the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Straits.
Additionally, in China and Japan, the contemporary political systems are
deeply conditioned by the state-building processes of the post-war period. This ismost apparent in the long ruling periods of the CPC and the LDP. While the Chinesesystem is considerably more restrictive towards the emergence of a civil society andpotentially hinders the socialization of political and societal actors, the Japanesesystem displays an inward-looking, conservative perspective which is focussed on the
US as the dominating point of reference. After relative stability in the 1970s and1980s, rapid societal changes within China and Japan, and in their environment,
accelerated the processes of identity formation and adaptation. The CPC as well as the
LDP-led political systems have to prove their ability to address the new challenges.
Numerous uncertainties about how the two governments can solve salient challenges
to the Chinese and Japanese societies make people look back into the past in order tofind solutions and self-confidence. This may lead to growing nationalism since ‘pridein past accomplishments can translate into confidence about an uncertain future.’17
Considering the long common history of China and Japan, it becomes apparent
that each takes an important place in the other’s understanding of the ‘self’ and istherefore an indispensable part of their respective national identities. The consequenceis that for China, it is Japan that is the most significant ‘other’ and for Japan, it isChina that is the most important ‘other’. This is despite the fact that the US does haveconsiderable influence on the political thinking of both states. The respective
understandings of the past and thus the understanding of the ‘self’, coupled with theeffects of the challenged societal and governmental structures, make the ‘other’ more
estranged and differentiated from the ‘self’. This complicates bilateral and regional
cooperation. Having had a look at domestic influences on a state’s understanding
about its own role and its own identity, the next section looks at how these aspects fit
into the context of a state’s regional and global environment.
Three types of mechanisms influence collective identity formation at thesystemic level: structural contexts, systemic processes and strategic practice. 18 The
description of the intersubjective structural context includes the discussion of mutual
threat perceptions which arise from social knowledge, shared understandings andexpectations, as well as definitions of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ resulting from theperception of the present security order. Intersubjective structures are not static, but
influenced by systemic processes and strategic practices. Therefore, systemic
processes are dynamics in the external context of state action which alter theenvironment for all subjects. Apart from increasing economic interdependence,scarcity of fossil fuels, the effects of climate change, global food shortages, lack ofdrinkable water and the trans-national pollution of air and seas belong to this categoryof developments which alter the environment in which states conduct security policies.
Strategic practices describe rhetoric and behavioural actions of a state which affect theperceptions of other actors,19 which means that political discourses in one state are
created and influenced by foreign and security policies of other states and vice versa.
In contrast to the views of scholars of classic realism and neo-realism, thispaper argues that material structures explain little by themselves. It is the views on
7

them that give them meaning and label material power as threatening, potentiallythreatening, neutral or conductive to the interest of a state confronted with them. It istherefore not clear from the beginning whether economic or military power constitutes
security threats, but it depends on how they are perceived and what the (self-)
perceived role of the observer in the structure is. This does not mean, however, thatmaterial structures do not matter. As current discourses about the East Asian security
order clearly show, the facts that some states’ economies grow faster and that theirarmies are being modernized, influence how other states look at them. It also changes
the view states have of their own position and role within the system. This section
thus looks at how perceptions of the material security structure in East Asia influence
the views of China and Japan on the representation of the ‘self’ and ‘other’.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the structure of the Northeast
Asian region has been characterized by the presence of the US as the sole superpowerwith military bases in the western Pacific, Japan and Korea, as well as Japan as amaritime great power on the one hand. On the other hand, these states face the great
powers of Russia and a ‘rising’ China. While South Korea as a middle power is still
increasing its economic and military strength, it is caught in the division of thepeninsula remaining from the Cold War. The regional security architecture continues
to be dominated by the alliances of the US with South Korea, Japan and Australia, andWashington’s commitment to the status quo of Taiwan. The strategic cooperation of
the US with the rising great power of India as well as increasingly important ties with
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines complement the picture. North Korea with its
masses of soldiers, its ballistic missiles arsenal and weapons of mass destruction
represents a potential source of conflict. According to the realist reading, the main
issue however is the ’rise of China’, that is, the increase of Chinese military andeconomic power relative to that of the US and its allies. Important aspects of the
discourse are the facts that the US is tied down in the Middle East and Afghanistan,and that the stagnation of its economy is looming. These issues cloud the prospects of
the US ability to project power into the western Pacific and uphold the necessary levelof deterrence to perform the balancing function in order to keep the region stable.20
Consequently, the conflict over the status of Taiwan and the nature and orientation of
the regime on the Korean Peninsula are an outflow of the rivalry between the US and
its allies on the one hand and a ‘rising China’ on the other.
A Chinese realist view first sees the unipolarity of the global system which the
US is dominating. It is therefore the US’s intention to prevent any other power fromchallenging its primacy in East Asia as it seeks to balance Chinese power, andstrengthen and build up alliances with Japan, Australia, India, and possibly ASEAN
states as well. The Korean Peninsula and Taiwan are two cornerstones in this strategy.
Taiwan is, together with the Okinawa island chain, blocking the passage to the Pacific
Ocean and controlling the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) between Northeast andSoutheast Asia. In the hand of the US or a pro-US regime, Taiwan would be an‘unsinkable aircraft-carrier’ for the containment and domination of China in the eventof a conflict. The expansion of US forces on the Korean Peninsula would be similarly
threatening because the US could advance as far as to the Chinese territorial border. In
view of this potential confrontation, the increase of Chinese comprehensive national
power is of utmost importance. Most worrisome is the strengthening of the US-Japan
alliance with its enlarged territorial scope. Given the deliberate ambiguity in the
Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, the US could not only use facilities inJapan, but also count on support from the well-trained and equipped JSDF in the eventof a conflict over Taiwan. Moreover, Japan and the US are developing a ballistic8

missile defence system which is based on platforms such as Aegis equipped missile
destroyers like the Japanese Kongo-Class. It could therefore not only protect US basesin Japan, but also cover warships protecting Taiwan from Chinese efforts to keep
China united. Cooperation with India is potentially dangerous since the rising great
power of South Asia possesses nuclear weapons and delivery systems. China-India
relations are tense because of the disputes over the demarcation of borderlines in the
Himalayan area. In realist terms, China needs to prevent a US-led containment byforging good relations with ASEAN states and balancing the US through an alignment
with Russia and the Central Asian states. The dilemma however, is how to balance the
US and deter it from interfering into Mainland-Taiwan relations without prompting a
Japanese arms-build-up and pushing it even closer to the US.
A Japanese realist perspective focuses on the growing Chinese economy which
produces the resources for the modernisation of its military. Beijing’s economic clout
enables it to strike favourable political bargains with its neighbours, especially
ASEAN and the Koreas. It also increases the economic dependence of Japan on China.
Additionally, the modernisation of the PLA, together with the build-up of a bluewater navy, which is about to receive nuclear ballistic submarines, is worrisome andexpresses China’s willingness to gain regional hegemony. This way of looking at theregion creates several dilemmas for Japan. One is how to balance the dangers ofabandonment or entrapment within the alliance with the US. Second, on a bigger scale
the concern is not to get squeezed between the US and China, that is, to make sure tostay in the right position in the US-China-Japan triangle. Third, assuming that states
try to maximize their national security to assure their survival in the inevitable conflictwith other states striving for their respective national security and status, someJapanese strategists even worry about the future direction of a Korean Peninsula
united under the leadership of Seoul. They fear that, given the turbulent past, a unified
and powerful Korea might turn against Japan.21 The main dilemma, however, is how
to balance or contain the rise of China without provoking it to further rearm andbecome hostile.22
Despite the fact that realist explanations of East Asian security ignore
important domestic factors which decisively influence foreign and security policies
and despite the fact that realist patterns of thinking end up in multiple and intertwined
security dilemmas, this kind of looking at the region has some explanatory value. Thisis mainly because realist ways of thinking are prevalent in the US, China and Japanand thus shape great power politics. However, the current security order in Europe
and the majority of the East Asian states’ foreign policies cannot be explained inmaterial terms or on the basis of realist assumptions alone.23 We need to ask for therationale behind realist calculations and other factors which influence foreign policies,that is, to ask which factors promote a strict delineation of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ andwhich factors bring these two dimensions of a state’s identity closer together.
Systemic transformation caused by economic development and dynamics ofglobalization which lead to increased interdependence of states is crucial in thisrespect. In particular, stakeholders become more vulnerable to disturbances such as
interstate and intrastate conflicts which significantly raise the opportunity-costs offailed cooperation.
Strategic processes consist of determinants which originate from gradualchanges in the environment all states are in. These are not caused by specific state
actions, but are the result of long-term developments, mostly on the global scale.
Looking at the East Asian region, economic growth is certainly the one strategic
process which has propelled the region onto the world stage and heavily influences9inra-regional dynamics. The most important feature is the growing interdependence of
the East Asian economies. Since the mid-1980s, intra-regional and bilateral trade andinvestment flows have risen dramatically despite political animosities and security
crises on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits.24 This means that China andJapan have strong interests in a stable political environment which provides a climate
conductive for investment. As a consequence, confrontations between China and theUS, between China and Japan, but also on a smaller scale between China and Taiwan
or on the Korean Peninsula are harmful to respective national interests. Moreover, it
shows the overwhelming and still growing importance of China and Japan for the
economic and political future of the East Asian region.
The value of liberal explanations is to point to larger developments in theenvironment of all actors, on which a single or group of states has only limited
influence. Strategic processes lead to growing interdependence of states in theinternational system. As a consequence, states need to establish norms and regimes toregulate and coordinate their policies. Examples are the World Trade Organisation(WTO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Kyoto Protocol and the
Chiang Mai Initiative. These institutions facilitate international cooperation and leadto the internalisation of norms of international political practice. Furthermore, theincreased level of interaction leads to a higher degree of socialization. This means thatby dealing with each other and participating in a multilateral framework, actors get incloser contact, learn to better understand others’ points of view and internalize
common norms. 25 Strategic processes, by leading to increased interdependence,
significantly increase the opportunity costs of failed cooperation and show the actorsthat they share the same environment and confront the same problems. Thus, actors
are in win-win or lose-lose situations and absolute gains, rather than relative ones,
matter. Strategic processes therefore create not only the need, but also the opportunity
for states to cooperate. The recent agreement between China and Japan to cooperateon energy conservation and the reduction of CO2 emissions is one example.26 As such,the pressure for cooperation reduces the salience of the liberal-realist dilemma, which
predicts that economic growth not only leads to increased interdependence but also toincreased economic power which is easily transformed into military power.27
The influence of strategic processes on the representations of the ‘self’ and‘other’ in a state’s identity is ambiguous. There is the potential that states are singled
out as responsible for causing distress laid upon the international community. For
instance, China could be blamed for contributing heavily to regional pollution andglobal warming, while another point of view may blame developed countries for theirexcessive consumption of energy. Also, a sense of competition for rare natural
resources or even food and water may arise. However, the effects of strategic
practices described above are material facts. They can be quantified, qualified and thesources are indentifyable. Above all, the whole community of states is negatively
affected and thus involved. It is therefore not helpful to name one party as the ‘other’and demonize it. Rather, common challenges may offer opportunities for international
cooperation since technical issues are only indirectly connected to the core of a state’s
identity. This is not to deny that strategic processes may significantly strain bilateralrelations when they become securitized. Drinking water resources and fishing grounds
are the most prominent examples.
Determinants of strategic practice consist of deliberate state actions. The
intentions of governments are expressed through verbal or non-verbal
communications or material actions. It is important to distinguish the intentions ofactors when they make their decisions and the way strategic behaviour is perceived by10

other actors in the system. Since we are interested in the impact of strategic practiceon the views and understandings of other actors, it is useful to look at the way actionsof a specific state are perceived by another and how this changes the latter’s view on
the intersubjective structure and thus its views of the ‘self’ and ‘other’.
The Chinese foreign and security policies from 1989 to 1993 were strongly
influenced by the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet bloc produced asalient national identity crisis in China. Though the decision to intervene with troops
to disperse the demonstrations at Tian An Men square was a purely domestic act ofpolitics, it had wide ranging international repercussions. International reactions to theJune 4th Tian An Men incident resulted in a reversion to a conservative policy line andcreated a siege mentality within the leadership in Beijing. The Japanese government,in the wake of the Tian An Men incident, only reluctantly imposed the sanctions
agreed upon at the G-7 summit and relaxed restrictions relatively soon after. However,
the image of China in the Japanese public had suffered a severe blow.28 This is the
background on which strategic practices under the Jiang administration can partly beunderstood.
Despite confrontational strategic practices such as nuclear testing in 1994,
1995 and 1996, large scale military exercises near Taiwan in 1995, 1996 and 2001,
aggressive assertiveness regarding territorial claims in the East and South China Seasand defence modernization, an increasing range of cooperative actions were taken.
The invitation ASEAN had sent to Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing to attend the summit inKuala Lumpur in December 1997 provided an opportunity to engage with theprincipal neighbours in East Asia and laid the groundwork for policy coordination
within the ASEAN+3 framework. The need to cope with the Asian financial crisis
generated the first opportunity for China and Japan to initiate the coordination ofmonetary policies in the event of an international crisis. The signing of the
Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in November 2002 and theTreaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN in October 2003, together with theoffer to establish a China-ASEAN Free-Trade Agreement by 2010 further improved
the image of China in the region.29 At the ASEAN Regional Forum’s meeting in June
2003, Beijing proposed to create an ARF Security Conference as a standing body; theproposal was subsequently implemented.30 Since 2003, Beijing has played an active
and constructive role in coordinating the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula. With the support of UN sanctions in response to the August
2006 nuclear test by North Korea, the view of China as a responsible great power has
gained support. Further, milestone agreements in September 2005 and February 2007
reached within the Six-Party Talk framework led to the handover of documentations
on North Korea’s nuclear research and the destruction of key facilities for the
production of fissile material in Yongbyon in July 2008.
After the newly elected Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, made Beijing thedestination of his first state visit in October 2006, the Chinese Prime Minster, Wen
Jiabao, was invited to Japan and in April 2007 conveyed a favourable image of amodern and open China. Following the December 2007 visit of Prime Minister
Fukuda to Beijing and Hu’s visit to Japan in May 2008, there was hope that anagreement on the common exploration of natural gas resources in the East China Sea,
located just west of the Japan-claimed median line, could be reached. However, it
took further negotiations until a statement on a preliminary agreement was issued inJuly 2008.
The election of Ma Ying-jeou of the Guomindang as President of Taiwan in
March 2008 created an opportunity for détente over the Taiwan Straits. Flight11

connections between Taiwan and the Mainland were soon permitted, which allowed
for tourism and business travel to be started. Further negotiations were planned toenable the establishment of regular flight and ferry connections and relax mutual
restrictions on investment and trade. The political impact of the Olympic Games in
Beijing in August is yet to be assessed. While the expectations for complete freedomof press, information and demonstration during the games were not met, the sports
event nevertheless brought China closer to the rest of the world and the latter to someextent closer into China.
Japanese strategic practice relevant for relations with China, from the 1990s on
mainly revolves around two issues: the approach of Japanese political exponents tohistorical events between 1895 and 1945, and the transformation of Japanese national
security policies. Opinions about the past, especially when declared by politicians,
matter because they express their ideas about contemporary Japan and its role in East
Asia. In the time period between 1989 and 2002, the main issues were the visit to
Yasukuni shrine by Prime Minister Hashimoto in July 1996 and the textbook
controversies after June 1996 and April 2001. From 2001, regular visits to Yasukuni
by Prime Minister Koizumi, in spite of Chinese and Korean protests, became a major
issue which influenced regional politics. The Korean and Chinese leaders refused tointeract with their Japanese counterparts in bilateral and multilateral meetings such as
ASEAN+3. Moreover, Yasukuni visits and statements of cabinet ministers whichclearly promoted revisionist views of historical events further alienated Japan from
Korea and China.
The changes in Japan’s national security policy after 1989 were influenced by
the impact of the 1991 Gulf War. It was then, when the fragility of Japan’s post-Cold
War security stance became clear as the US expected more of its alliance partner thanthe mere financing of military campaigns. The general trend to revise the Yoshidadoctrine was supported by the strategic practices of North Korea, China and the US,
as outlined above. In February 1995, the US East Asian Strategic Review, better
known as the ‘Nye or Armitage Report’ suggested a revision of the US strategy in the
Asia-Pacific, giving a central role to Japan as ‘the linchpin’ of the post-Cold War
regional security architecture. The Japanese government in November 1995 adopted a
National Defense Program Outline which reoriented defence policies according to the
new role Tokyo was given by the US regional security strategy.31 Subsequently, andwith the background of the changes in the regional security environment, the Joint
Declaration on US-Japan Defense Cooperation was made public by Prime Minister
Hashimoto and US President Clinton in April 1996. This declaration and the signingof the US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation are highly significant because
they enlarged the geographical scope of application of the US-Japan defence alliance.
Instead of a delineated geographical area, the scope was now defined according tosituational aspects in which a crisis would threaten Japan’s security. In February 2005,
the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee issued a statement which announced
the transformation and realignment of the US-Japan alliance for the future, which
included an explicit comment on the US-Japan cooperation on the Taiwan question.32
Over the following years, two areas of the US-Japan security cooperation have beenof particular interest: logistical support for US operations overseas such as in the
campaigns in Afghanistan from 2001 and in Iraq from 2003; and cooperation in thedevelopment and deployment of a Ballistic Missile Defence system (BMD) in thewestern Pacific. Hughes argues that the ‘war on terror’ has served as a means forTokyo to adjust its security policies by strengthening its military posture and thealliance with the US in view of ‘rising China’.33
12

Dynamics in Japan-China relations changed when Prime Minister Abe, soonafter his election in October 2006, paid his first overseas state visit to Beijing andrefrained from further visits to the Yasukuni shrine. The improvement in bilateralrelations was marked with the return visit by Premier Wen Jiabao to Japan in April
2007 and led to the highly symbolic port calls of a PLA Navy missile destroyer toTokyo in November 2007 and a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF)
missile destroyer to China in June 2008. Prime Minister Fukuda continued Abe’s
pragmatic policies when he visited Beijing in December 2007 and received Hu Jintao
in Japan in May 2008. In June 2008, a preliminary agreement on the joint explorationof the Chunxiao natural gas field in the East China Sea was reached. The two leaders
also met at the G-8 summit in Hokkaido, Japan in June and during the opening
ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing in August 2008. The first trilateralsummit meeting including the Korean President had to be postponed due to theunexpected resignation of Prime Minister Fukuda in September 2008.
Japan’s approach to multilateral regional cooperation is based on the desire ofTokyo to forge closer relations with ASEAN in order to prevent its isolation from
East Asia while at the same time strengthening the alliance with the US to counter
Beijing’s growing power. The ASEAN members were unwilling to privilege theirrelations with one great power. The result of Prime Minster Hashimoto’s efforts was
the first ASEAN+3 summit in December 1997.34 The need to coordinate monetary
policies in order to cope with the Asian financial crisis brought another opportunity
for Tokyo and Beijing to demonstrate their responsible leadership in the region.
However, the Japanese proposal of an Asian Monetary Fund failed due to the
opposition of the US; remaining was the Chiang Mai Initiative in the form of currency
swap agreements and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative. In 2000, Prime Minister
Koizumi proposed a tripartite foreign ministers’ meeting. 35 However, as theproceedings at the first East Asian Summit in December 2005 showed, Tokyo andBeijing did not share the same vision of a future regional institution, nor could theyagree on a negotiating basis for a bilateral, not to mention an East Asian, Free Tradeagreement.
Strategic practices alter the way China and Japan perceive the East Asian
security architecture. They alter views the actors have of their counterparts in theregion and indirectly also change the understanding of their own role in the systemand the future of their own state. Looking at the development of the foreign andsecurity policies of China and Japan from 1989 to 2008, two major trends are
discernible. First, the Chinese foreign and security polices became more moderate anddifferentiated. While the stance towards Taiwan remained uncompromising anddetermined, Beijing gradually refrained from sabre-rattling and recently has showed acertain willingness to normalise cross-Strait relations. At the same time it has
displayed increasing interest in workable relations with Tokyo, recognising it as animportant actor and dialogue partner in East Asia.36 However, Beijing has continued
to emphasize the necessity of increasing comprehensive national strength and has
showed little interest in more open information about its defence policies andplanning. China’s regional security strategy may therefore be seen as an attempt tocreate a regional space by strengthening cooperative and collaborative relationships
with neighbouring countries.37 Second, Tokyo has gradually shifted its security-policy
from passive and complete reliance on the US under the Yoshida-doctrine towards anactive involvement in global and regional security affairs. However, it has remainedlargely uncompromising on historical and unflexible in territorial and bilateral issues.
Moreover, the US continues to be the nexus of Japan’s foreign and security policies
13which means that Japan prioritizes its interests in strengthening the bilateralrelationship with the US, and recently, Australia and India as well.38 Japan is therefore
interested in economic regional integration, but remains suspicious about any form ofregional security-political cooperation.39
Looking at the development of relations between China and Japan since thebeginning of the 1990s we see a China which is gradually developing a new national
identity as an Asian economic and (responsible) political great power while Japan isshedding off its Cold War identity of a ‘civilian’ or ‘economic power’. With China’s
increasing involvement with the rest of the world, Beijing is becoming more confident
in the political arena. Recent strategic practices such as settling all territorial disputes
with Russia and partly with India, refraining from using the history-card vis-à-vis
Tokyo, showing some flexibility to compromise on the exploitation of the Chunxiao
gas field in the East China Sea, accepting a port call by a JMSDF missile destroyer,
dropping the ‘century of humiliation’ discourse from public statements andrapprochement with Taipei also indicate this trend in identity change in terms offoreign policy. Nevertheless, in light of challenges towards governance, the identity
crisis in domestic politics is set to continue for the time being, as the discourse on‘5000 years of glorious civilization’ is still very much alive. This, and the importanceand sensitivity given to the Taiwan question, continues to limit Beijing’s options for acomprehensive regional strategy. It is therefore questionable whether China will beable to successfully implement its policies to create a regional sphere in the form of an
East Asian Community any time soon.
Japan has gone beyond its understanding of a purely economic power and isabout to transform its understanding of the Yoshida-doctrine. Despite its support of
the UN system, including the contribution of peacekeeping forces as a part of its reorientated foreign and security policy line, Japan is struggling to find its new role in
the region. While Tokyo is developing its national security strategies and the means to
implement them, it has been unable to develop security political and foreign policy
doctrines which separate its interests as an independent state from those of the US. In
order to find its new role in East Asia, its relations with the US had to be normalized.
Only then could Japan turn, at least partially, towards East Asia (and China), define
itself according to the new realities and effectively promote regionalism. As aconsequence, Tokyo will sooner or later need to deal with China and Korea so as toredefine its East Asian identity. This means that apart from sole reliance on the US,alternate foreign policy strategies need to be developed. However, current political
discourses solely concentrate on the alliance and exclude new approaches to theregion. 40 However, in the context of East Asian economic development and thesubsequent emergence of the new region, as well as China’s domestic growth andsocietal opening, Beijing has gotten much closer to an internationally active Japan.
Globalisation is conducive to the emergence of East Asia as a region, and thesplitting forces of the Cold Ware era are weakening. China and Japan now no longer
just exist next to each other, but are with each other in East Asia. This increases thepotential points of friction. Ironically, disputes over official versions of national
history cause clashes between the political elites in both countries while at the sametime displaying commonalities of the CPC and the LDP as long-ruling parties,
entrenched at the hold of power since the end of the 1940s. Domestic challenges tothe legitimacy of these ruling elites complicate pragmatic and compromising foreign
policy-making and the ‘square facing’ of respective histories. Residual amounts offeelings of victimhood help to blame ‘the other’ and deflect pressures to change theexisting structures and ways of thinking. As a result, old approaches to international
14

relations prevail. Tokyo pursues a China-policy which is often called ‘reluctant
realism’, ’soft-containment’ 41 or ‘enmeshment’. 42 Therefore, initiatives to get
economically and politically closer to Northeast Asia are restricted by calculations of
power politics. As a consequence, calls for East Asian (economic) integration are
mixed with efforts to further strengthen the US-Japan alliance and improve relations
with Australia and India rather than Northeast Asian states. 43 Beijing, despite its
gradually open economic policies, is highly weary of any moves of other parties
which relate to Taiwan. It is in this context that Japan plays a significant role as the‘other’ in Chinese policy discourses while China plays this role for Japan.
Let us turn to the question of which set of determinants (pressures originatingfrom domestic issues, geo-strategic calculations of traditional security or nontraditional security challenges caused by strategic processes) will gain in relative
importance and how these factors will interact with each other. With regard tomemories of the past, Tamamoto argues that the debates about questions of history
help to make history continuous, to make it flow again.44 Suh writes that historicalcontentions look war-like, but under certain conditions, act like diplomacy. He argues
that once history is institutionalized, it may start to lag behind changes on the ground.
If that dissonance creates the desire to renegotiate history in order to bring it inaccordance with the current reality, history can serve as an object of communicative
action.45 Moreover, strategic processes continue to create realities which cannot be
negotiated away or denied. It is a fact rather than a social construction, that economic
integration and threats to food and environmental security concern all states in theregion and make them dependent on each other. This does not only bring the need tocooperate, it also changes the views of the ‘self’ and ‘other’ and is conducive to theformation of collective identities. Structural change is closely related to identity
formation. 46 Thus, in order to keep up with the recent structural changes, be theymaterial or ideational, the national identities of China and Japan come under pressure
to adapt. Therefore, states need to overcome their fears of being engulfed by stateswith whom they would identify. Given the fact that it is impossible to know theother’s true intentions, self-restraint leadership and political institutions need tosupport this process.47 It seems that the struggle in China-Japan relations to create
mutual trust is caused by the difficulties of China and Japan to accept the other as anequal partner. Chinese nationalism, grounded in a feeling of historic-cultural
superiority and Japanese nationalism grounded in a feeling of civilizational
superiority, both augmented with a sense of self-victimization, spur mutual suspicion.
However, socialization which occurs in tandem with globalization and growing
economic interdependence is conductive to the development of shared identities, thatis the blurring of boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other’ and the adoption of common
norms, values, attitudes and behaviours.48
When assessing the interpretations offered by the schools of realism,
liberalism and constructivism, which were introduced at the beginning of the paper,
three points regarding East Asian regional cooperation should be pointed out. First, apurely realist analysis looking at the material factors of power paints a static picture
and tends to focus on the ‘hard power’ component of East Asian international
relations. As a consequence, this approach displays difficulties in explaining how
historical knowledge informs contemporary state behaviour in Japan and China andhow systemic, that is, the ‘rise of China’, and gradual system change induced byeconomic development and globalization lead to the transformation of the nature ofinternational relations. Second, liberal approaches focussing on material transactions
and the role played by institutions are well able to describe dynamics of increasing15

interdependence in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, including the opportunity costs offailed cooperation. However, this is insufficient to explain international relations.
Irrational behaviour such as subjective threat perceptions and policy preferences thatlead to choices of second and third best outcomes cannot be fully understood on thebasis of liberal theories’ basic assumptions such as the rationality and self-benefit
maximizing nature of actors. Third, the constructivist focus on interactions betweensocial groups and states as social actors enables it to explain the impact of sharedunderstandings of history, as well as processes of systemic change on international
relations, including the origins of collective action problems. This is possible since theconstructivist approach acknowledges that decisions in international policy making
are taken by social actors, that is, groups of human beings. By abandoning thepositivism of modernist thinking, it does not rely on generalized and static
assumptions about human and state behaviour and is therefore able to look deeper into
the reasons behind policy decisions which change Japan-China bilateral and East
Asian international relations.
CONCLUSION
Japan’s finding of its new identity as an East Asian state with a standard foreign andsecurity policy which takes into account its close economic and social connections
with Northeast Asia would imply the awareness of dealing pragmatically with China
as a main partner in the region. At the systemic level, Japanese and US policies andgeopolitical interests would become less tangled. Beijing would focus more on Japanrather than the US in conducting its regional (and global) policies. However, a strong
reliance of Tokyo on the alliance with Washington would most likely lead to thecontinuation of Japan’s insulation from East Asia. 49 China and the US being
indeterminate, Japan could, in principle, reshape the region.50 However, a stumbling
block is Japan’s past identity as a civilian power which created the myth of its relative
security-political insignificance in East Asia. 51 As a result, there is insufficientawareness about options in foreign policy other than those already existing. Thisphenomenon is currently supported by academia, which tends to ignore Japan as asignificant security actor in East Asia and the world.52 As Hagström demonstrates,
this is also connected to the concept of power, which dominates academia ininternational relations. This concept largely refers to absolute material terms such as
the possession of nuclear weapons and means of power-projection, asw well as thepolitical will to pursue national interests by the use of force. 53 Akaha showsconvincingly how changes in the regional and global security environment, and thesubsequent Japanese drive for the further strengthening of the US-Japan alliancefavours hard over soft power and therefore frustrates Japan’s desire to play a larger
regional and domestic role.54 Effective leadership in the East Asian region does notdepend on material factors, but on the capability to form political coalitions on thebasis of a leader’s vision of international order. 55 As a consequence, Nabers thinksthat Japanese and Chinese competition for influence in a future East Asian region may
even help to bring about institutional change. In light of the domestic determinants
discussed above, a change in Japan’s political landscape may lead to higher domestic
credibility of the government in Tokyo, which would mitigate the domestic origins of
the current identity crisis. As a result, the government would need to worry less about
its domestic legitimacy and would be able to implement more cooperative andforward-looking foreign and security policies.

16

In this context, China, having accomplished its real ‘great leap forward’, thatis, its period of extremely rapid economic growth, would likely be less concerned
about how to catch up with the ‘West’ and Japan in order to gain international status.
Most of all, the socio-economic challenges the leadership in Beijing faces related to
fast economic growth would display less threatening dynamisms and enable thegovernment to conduct more pragmatic foreign and security policies. Beijing would
not need to fear as much internal destabilization due to economic inequalities,
environmental problems and movements to challenge the political structure. It would
be better able to cooperate internationally and be less concerned about what isfrequently termed as foreign intervention into its domestic affairs. The question of thestatus of Taiwan could be addressed more pragmatically. Lastly, slower economic
growth in China would ameliorate threat perceptions based on the extrapolation ofrecent growth rates and fear from repercussions in the event of domestic turmoil andinstability.
The question is how to manage the transition period from post-Cold War
identities to East Asian identities in Japan and China and make sure that the countries’
paths are leading to sustainable peaceful coexistence. In contrast to the means ofbalancing, containment and deterrence, approaches of multilateral security may help,
but they need to at least partially address the salient problems of regional security.
Regional cooperation in East Asia is able to contribute to processes of desecuritization. Issues that are currently perceived as threats to national security
interests become clearer when they are pragmatically discussed and addressed withinbilateral or multilateral contexts. Often, threat perceptions need to be toned down inlight of newly gained common knowledge. Moreover, bilateral issues get diluted
within multilateral frameworks. 56 As a consequence, systemic pressures fromgeopolitical calculations are mitigated. Were cooperation among Northeast Asianstates to become stronger and looked at in a less realist way of thinking, Japan could
escape from the dilemma of ‘entrapment or abandonment’ within the alliance with the
US and need not worry about getting squeezed or left out due to improving
relationships between the US and China or the Koreas. The Koreas and other East
Asian states need not worry about getting trapped between China and Japan within abipolar regional structure and China need not worry about containment by a US-led
alliance system. Last but not least, regional cooperation is the only effective way toaddress pressing transnational challenges to national and human security, such as
piracy, the spread of infectious diseases, transnational pollution and food and water
shortages aggravated by the effects of climate change.
1

Ravenhill, J.,’Mission Creep or Mission Impossible? APEC and Security’, in Acharya, A., Goh, E.
(eds.), 2007. Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, andTransformation, Cambridge/London: MIT Press, p. 135-154.
2
Acharya, A., ‘Regional Institutions and Security in the Asia-Pacific: Evolution, Adaptation and
Prospects for Transformation’, in Acharya, A., Goh, E. (eds.), 2007. Reassessing Security Cooperationin the Asia-Pacific: Competition, Congruence, and Transformation, Cambridge/London: MIT Press, p.
33.
3
Van Ness, P., 2007. ‘Reconciliation Between China and Japan: The Key Link to Security Cooperationin East Asia’, Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 1:7.
4
Christensen, T.J., ‘China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’ in Ikenberry,
G.J., Mastanduno, M., (eds.) 2003. International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, New York:
Columbia University Press, pp. 25-56.
5Kang, D., ’Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations’ in Ikenberry, G.J., Mastanduno,M., (eds.) 2003. International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, New York: Columbia University
Press pp. 163-190.

17

6Buzan, B., Waever, O., 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7
Reus-Smit, C.,’Constructivism’ in Burchill, S., Devetak, R., Linklater, A., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit,
C., True, J., 2001. Theories of International Relations (2nd Edition), New York: Palgrave, pp. 209-230.
8
Rozman, G., 2004. Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow ofGlobalisation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
9
Wendt, A., 1994. ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, American Political
Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2:384-396.
10
Drifte, R., 2003. Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing toBandwagoning?, London/New York: RoutledgeCurzon, p. 90.
11Social identities are (…) ‘sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking theperspective of others.’ Cited from: Mc Call, G., Simmons, J., 1978. Identities and Interactions. New
York: Free Press.
12
Van Ness, P., 1993. ‘China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity’ in
Dittmer, L., Kim, S.S. (eds.), 1993. China's Quest for National Identity. Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press. p.198.
13
Dittmer, L., Kim, S.S. (eds.), 1993. China's Quest for National Identity. Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press., p. 245.
14
White, L., and Cheng, L., 1993.’China Coast Identities: Regional, National, and Global’, in Dittmer,
Kim et al. 1993, p. 162.
15
Buzan, B., Waever, O., De Wilde, J., 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, p. 29.
16
Dittmer, Kim (eds.) 1993, p. 19.
17
Barbalet, J.M., 1998. Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach,
New York: Cambridge University Press. Cited in Gries, P., 2005.’Nationalism, Indignation and China’s
Japan Policy’, SAIS Review, Vol. 15, No. 2:107.
18
Wendt, 1994, p. 388.
19
Wendt, 1994, p. 389.
20
See also: Armitage, R., Nye, J., 2007. The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020,
Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 20.
21
National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), 2008. Report of the Council for Defense and Strategic
Studies for FY 2005-FY 2006, p. 6. Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 153.
22
Drifte, 2003, p. 90.
23
See for criticisms: Kang, D., in Ikenberry and Mastanduno, 2003. Van Ness, P., 2002. ‘Hegemony,not Anarchy: Why China and Japan are not Balancing US Unipolar Power’, International Relations of
the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2:131-150.
24
Asian Development Bank, 2008. Emerging Asian Regionalism: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity,
Manila: Asian Development Bank, pp. 12, 40.
25
For a discussion of the concept of socialization see: Johnston, A.I., 2003.‘Socialization andInternational Institutions: The ASEAN-Way and International Relations Theory’, in Ikenberry, G.J.,
Mastanduno, M., (eds.), International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, New York: Columbia
University Press, p. 107-162.
26
Joint Statement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic ofChina of May 7th, 2008 available: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0805.html.
(accessed 18.08.08).
27
Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 196.
28
Drifte, 2003, p. 29.
29
Despite its cooperative nature, this step caused alarming reactions in Japan. Beijing’s regional
policies were perceived as an ‘aggressive strategy for regional cooperation’ which needed to bechecked if Japan were not to be marginalized in East Asia. See the discussion in Amako, S., 2007. ‘The
Idea of New International Order China is Seeking and East Asia Community’, Waseda University
Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) Working Paper, December 2007, p. 14.
30
National Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (NIDS), 2005.‘Japan’s Leading Role in East
Asian Regionalism – Toward an East Asian Community’, p. 57.
31
For the context of this revision refer to Hughes, C., 2005. Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’Military Power, International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 368-9, London: Routledge,
pp. 67.
32
Joint Statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington DC, 19.02.05
available: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html, accessed 02.09.08.

18

33

See also Hughes, C., 2007.’Not quite the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’: Japan’s Security, the USJapan Alliance and the ‘War on Terror’ in East Asia. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.
20, No. 2:329 and 336.
34
Tanaka, Akihiko, 2007. ‘The Development of the ASEAN+3 Framework’ in: Curley, M., Thomas,N., Advancing East Asian Regionalism, New York: Routledge, p. 59. National Institute of Defense andStrategic Studies (NIDS), 2005.‘Japan’s leading Role in East Asian Regionalism – Toward an East
Asian Community’, in: NIDS East Asian Strategic Review, pp. 36.
35
National Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (NIDS), 2005, p. 43.
36
Zhang, Yunling, Tang, Shiping, 2005.’China’s Regional Strategy’ in Shambaugh, D., (ed.) 2005.
Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, p. 57.
37
Amako, S., 2007. ‘The Idea of New International Order China is Seeking and East Asia Community’,
Waseda University Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) Working Paper, December
2007, p. 6,7.
38
One example is Japan’s reluctance to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, see
National Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (NIDS), 2005, p. 48.
39
Amako, S., 2007, p. 15.
40
Suh, looking at the South Korea-US Security Alliance explains very well how alliance discourses
impact states and societies. Alliances contribute to the ‘othering’ of third parties and may privilege anation’s national security discourse in a way that leaves alternative policy options completely sidelined,
if not ignored. Suh, J.J., ‘Bound to Last? US-Korea Alliance and Analytical Ecleticism’, in Suh, J.J.,
Katzenstein, P., Carlson, A., (eds.) 2004. Rethinking Security in Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency,
Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 131-224. Hughes, 2005, p. 57., looking at Japan, comes to asimilar conclusion.
41
Green, M.J., 1999. ‘Managing Chinese Power: The view from Japan’, in Johnston, A.I., Ross, R.S.,(eds.), Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, London/New York: Routledge, p.
172, 161.
42
Drifte, 2003, pp. 84.
43
See for example Foreign Minister Koumura, ‘Toward the Realization of an Asian Century’, speech at
the International Conference on Asia's Strategic Challenges: In Search of a Common Agenda, Tokyo,
02.06.08, available: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/speech0806.html, accessed 18.08.08.
44
Tamamoto, 2005, p. 60.
45Suh, J.J., 2007.’War-like History or Diplomatic History? Contentions Over the Past and Regional
Orders in Northeast Asia’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 3:384, 387.
46
Wendt, 1999, p. 338.
47
Wendt, 1999, p. 357.
48
Johnston, A.I., ‘Socialization and International Institutions: The ASEAN-Way and International
Relations Theory’, in Ikenberry, G.J., Mastanduno, M., (eds.), 2003, pp. 114, 115.
49
Drifte, 2003, p. 15.
50
Ibid, p. 177.
51
Hagström, L., 2006.‘The Dogma of Japanese Insignificance: The Academic Discourse on North
Korea Policy Coordination’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 79, Iss. 3:387-410.
52
See also Hughes, 2005, p. 15.
53
Hagström, L., 2005.’Ubiquity of ’Power’ and the Advantage of Terminological Pluralism: Japan’s
Foreign Policy Discourse’, Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 6., No. 2:145-164.
54
Akaha, T.,‘Japan’s Soft Power-Hard Power Balancing Act’, forthcoming in Arase, D., Akaha, T.
(eds.) 2009. The Evolving US-Japan Alliance in East Asia: Balancing Hard and Soft Power, London:
Routledge, pp.162.
55
Nabers, D., 2007.’Sino-Japanese Antagonism as a Source for Institutional Change in East Asia’,
GIGA Japan Aktuell, No. 4:50-64.
56
Drifte, 2003, p. 122.

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GIARI Working Paper Vol. 2008-E-24,
Februaru 1, 2009
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