REGIONAL FORUM ON GOOD GOVERNANCEFOR EAST ASIAN COUNTRIESSTRENGTHENING OF DOMESTICAND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIONFOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION
Co-hosted by UNAFEI and the Supreme Public Prosecutors
Office of Japan
10-11 December 2008, Tokyo, Japan

December 2009TOKYO, JAPANThe views expressed in this publication are those of the respective presenters and authors only, anddo not necessarily reflect the views or policy of UNAFEI, the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office ofJapan, or other organizations to which those persons belong.

Masaki Sasaki
Director
United Nations
Asia and Far East Institutefor the Prevention of Crime andthe Treatment of Offenders(UNAFEI)
1-26 Harumi-cho, Fuchu, Tokyo 183-0057, Japan
http://www.unafei.or.jp
unafei@moj.go.jp

CONTENTS
STRENGTHENING OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION
Foreword ..................................................................................................................................................... i
Forum Schedule .......................................................................................................................................... iii
List of Participants, Visiting Experts & Secretariat .................................................................................... v
General Rapporteur’s Report ..................................................................................................................... 1
Chairman’s Statement ................................................................................................................................ 23
Opening Session ........................................................................................................................................ 25
Opening Remarks by Mr. Keiichi Aizawa, Director, UNAFEI ......................................................... 27
Address by Mr. Hiroshi Obayashi, Superintending Prosecutor, Tokyo High Public Prosecutors
Office, Japan ...................................................................................................................................... 29
Address by Mr. Yoshinobu Onuki, President, Research and Training Institute, Ministry of Justice,Japan .................................................................................................................................................. 31
Keynote Speeches ..................................................................................................................................... 33
Keynote Speech – Mr. Kunihiko Sakai, Director, General Affairs Department, Supreme Public
Prosecutors Office, Japan .................................................................................................................. 35
Keynote Speech – Mr. Masato Higuchi, Director, Second Investigation Division, Criminal
Investigation Bureau, National Police Agency, Japan ....................................................................... 38
Visiting Expert’s Keynote Speech – Mr. Ricky Yau, Assistant Director, Operations Department,
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), Hong Kong, China ..................................... 42
Presentation Session .................................................................................................................................. 49
Country Report – Pengiran Nina Jasmine binte PLKDR Pg Hj Bahrin, Brunei Darussalam ........... 51
Country Report – Ms. Pen Somethea, Cambodia ............................................................................. 61
Country Report – Dr. Xu Daomin, China ......................................................................................... 68
Country Report – Mr. Jhoni Ginting, Indonesia ................................................................................ 71
Country Report – Mr. Yuichiro Tachi, Japan ..................................................................................... 75
Country Report – Dr. Kyung-Joon Jin, Korea .................................................................................. 81
Country Report – Mr. Khamphet Somvolachith, Lao PDR .............................................................. 89
Country Report – Mr. Lai Yong Heng, Malaysia ............................................................................... 97
Country Report – Mr. Han Nyunt, Myanmar ................................................................................... 111
Country Report – Mr. Severino H. Gaña Jr., the Philippines................................................................ 117
Country Report – Mr. Bala Reddy, Singapore ................................................................................. 124
Country Report – Mr. Sirisak Tiyapan, Thailand ............................................................................ 146
Country Report – Ms. Lai Thu Ha, Vietnam ................................................................................... 152
Closing Ceremony
Closing Remarks by Mr. Yutaka Nagashima, Public Prosecutor Supreme Public Prosecutors Office,Japan .................................................................................................................................................157

FOREWORD
It is my great pleasure and privilege to present this report of the Regional Forum on Good
Governance for East Asian Countries which was held at the United Nations Asia and Far East Institutefor the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI), Tokyo on 10 and 11 December
2008, and co-hosted by UNAFEI and the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office of Japan. We were delighted
to welcome to our institute friends old and new.
The main theme of the Forum was “Strengthening of Domestic and International Co-Operation for
Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption”, and it was attended by high-ranking officials
from 13 East Asian countries: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic ofKorea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
UNAFEI has held two Regional Seminars on Good Governance for Southeast Asian Countries in
Bangkok, Thailand; the first in 2007 and the second in 2008. Through those Seminars, UNAFEI made avaluable contribution to both the mutual understanding of the present issues facing respective countries,
and the capacity building of criminal justice officials. However, corruption is an insidious and deeprooted issue, and to achieve good governance will require more than Seminars at practitioner level.
Therefore, we decided to provide an opportunity for senior criminal justice officials from East Asian
countries to exchange perspectives, to reaffirm the recognition that the achievement of good governanceis the common goal in the region, and to show their commitment to strengthening their good governancestrategies, including the establishment of co-operation systems based upon mutual understanding.
Two new aspects of corrupt behaviour have been identified in recent years.
The first such aspect is the involvement of the private sector in corruption. Along with economic
development, the relationship between the public sector and the private sector has changed, leading togreater interaction and closer relationships between the two. Corruption emerges through such close andfamiliar relationships and corruption in the private sector has effects on the administration of the public
sector. To detect corruption and impose effective criminal sanctions on corrupt persons, investigations
should involve not only traditional law enforcement authorities but also competent administrative
agencies with the function of supervising the private sector. For criminal justice authorities, it is vital tofoster co-operation with those administrative authorities and with private companies and corporations,especially financial institutions.
The second new aspect is the globalization of corruption. Corrupt activities can now easily andinstantly cross borders, and money-laundering of the proceeds of corruption can be committed outside
the jurisdiction where the initial offence was perpetrated, making this crime more complicated anddiversified. Under these circumstances, international society has begun to take a combative attitude
towards corruption. One of the remarkable outcomes of this determined mindset is the adoption of theUnited Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Among the efforts that each country can makeat the domestic level, introduction of legislation for effective anti-corruption measures is fundamental,
and the promotion of a good working relationship among investigative authorities is also critical.
However, even if those objectives are achieved domestically, the globalization of corruption necessitatesinternational co-operation. In such a situation, a co-operative attitude towards requests for mutual legal
assistance from foreign countries is sometimes, in reality, not sufficient to solve the problem. Differencesin legal systems and ineffective and inflexible practices in respective countries lead to delays in legal
assistance and/or extradition. In order to deal with this situation, it is critically important to elicit morepractical and more continuous co-operation from not only investigative authorities but also financial
authorities and institutions, both domestic and foreign.
With a view to addressing these issues, it was our intention that this Forum would be an opportunity
for senior criminal justice officials from East Asia to develop a common awareness of anti-corruption
matters through the lively exchange of opinions, and to enhance co-operation among East Asian countries―i―to fight corruption.
Finally, on behalf of UNAFEI, I would like to express my deepest appreciation the Supreme Public
Prosecutors Office of Japan for its support and commitment to the realization of the Forum.
December 2009

Masaki Sasaki
Director, UNAFEI― ii ―

FORUM SCHEDULE
10 December Opening Ceremony
Opening Remarks by Mr. Keiichi Aizawa, Director, UNAFEI
Address by Mr. Hiroshi Obayashi, Superintending Prosecutor, Tokyo High Public
Prosecutor’s Office, Japan
Address by Mr. Yoshinobu Onuki, President, Research and Training Institute, Ministryof Justice, Japan
Keynote Speeches
Keynote Speech by Mr. Kunihiko Sakai, Director, General Affairs Department,
Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, Japan
Keynote Speech by Mr. Masato Higuchi, Director, Second Investigation Division,
Criminal Investigation Bureau, National Police Agency, Japan
Keynote Speech by Visiting Expert, Mr. Ricky Shu-chun Yau, Assistant Director,
Operations Department, Independent Commission Against Corruption, (ICAC), Hong
Kong, China
Presentation Session
Country Report by Pengiran Nina Jasmine binte PLKDR Pg Hj Bahrin, Counsel and
Deputy Public Prosecutor, Attorney General’s Chambers, Brunei Darussalam
Country Report by Ms. Pen Somethea, Director, Research and Training Department,
Ministry of Justice, Cambodia
Country Report by Dr. Xu Daomin, Deputy Chief, Division of Procuratorial
Department for Duty Crime Prevention, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, China
Country Report by Mr. Jhoni Ginting, Head of Legal Bureau, Attorney General’s
Office, Indonesia
Country Report by Mr. Yuichiro Tachi, Director, Research and Training Institute,
Ministry of Justice, JapanCountry Report by Dr. Kyung-Joon Jin, Director, International Criminal Affairs
Division, Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea
Country Report by Mr. Khamphet Somvolachith, Deputy Director, Treaties andInternational Co-operation Division, Supreme People’s Prosecutor Office, Lao PDRCountry Report by Mr. Lai Yong Heng, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Royal
Malaysian Police, Malaysia
Country Report by Mr. Han Nyunt, Deputy Director General, Office of the Attorney
General, Myanmar
Country Report by Mr. Severino H. Gaña Jr., Assistant Chief State Prosecutor,
National Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, the Philippines
Country Report by Mr. Bala Reddy, Principal Senior State Counsel, State Prosecution
Division, Attorney General’s Chambers, Singapore
Country Report by Mr. Sirisak Tiyapan, Director General, International Affairs
Department, Office of the Attorney General, Thailand
Country Report by Ms. Lai Thu Ha, Legal Expert, Institute for Prosecutorial Science,
Supreme People’s Prosecution Office, Vietnam― iii ―

11 December Discussion and Delivery of Chairman’s Statement
Closing Ceremony
Closing Remarks by Mr. Yutaka Nagashima, Public Prosecutor, Supreme Public
Prosecutors Office, Japan
Courtesy Visit to the Minister of Justice
Courtesy Visit to the Prosecutor General― iv ―

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS, VISITING EXPERTS & SECRETARIAT
A. Participants
Pengiran Nina Jasmine binte		
PLKDR Pg Hj Bahrin								Counsel and Deputy Public Prosecutor
Attorney-General’s Chambers
Brunei Darussalam

Ms. Pen Somethea			
					
					
					

Director
Research and Training Department
Ministry of JusticeCambodia

Dr. Xu Daomin				
					
					
					

Deputy Chief
Division of Procuratorial Department for Duty Crime Prevention
Supreme People’s Procuratorate
China

Mr. Jhoni Ginting			
					
					

Head of Legal Bureau
Attorney-General’s Office
Indonesia

Mr. Yutaka Nagashima			
					
					

Public Prosecutor
Supreme Public Prosecutors OfficeJapan

Ms. Tomoko Akane			
					
					

Public Prosecutor
Tokyo High Public Prosecutors OfficeJapan

Mr. Yuichiro Tachi			
					
					
					
					

Director
Research Department
Research and Training Institute
Ministry of JusticeJapan

Mr. Keiichi Aizawa			
					
					

Director
UNAFEIJapan

Mr. Takeshi Seto			
					
					

Deputy Director
UNAFEIJapan

Mr. Motoo Noguchi			
					
					

Professor
UNAFEIJapan―v―

Dr. Kyung-Joon Jin			
					
					
					

Director
International Criminal Affairs Division
Ministry of JusticeRepublic of Korea

Mr. Khamphet Somvolachith		
					
					
					

Deputy Director
Treaties & International Co-operation Division
Supreme People’s Prosecutor Office
Lao PDR

Mr. Lai Yong Heng			
					
					

Assistant Commissioner of Police
Royal Malaysian Police
Malaysia

Mr. Han Nyunt				
					
					

Deputy Director General
Office of the Attorney General
MyanmarMr. Severino H. Gaña, Jr.		
					
					
					

Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
National Prosecution Service
Department of Justice
Philippines

Mr. Bala Reddy				
					
					
					

Principal Senior State Counsel
State Prosecution Division
Attorney General’s Chambers
Singapore

Mr. Sirisak Tiyapan			
					
					
					

Director General
International Affairs Department
Office of the Attorney General
Thailand

Ms. Lai Thu Ha				
					
					
					

Legal Expert
Institute for Prosecutorial Science
Supreme People’s Prosecution OfficeVietnamB. Visiting Expert and Keynote Speakers
Mr. Ricky Shu-chun Yau		
					
					
					

Assistant Director
Operations Department
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)
Hong Kong, China

Mr. Kunihiko Sakai			
					
					
					

Director
General Affairs Department
Supreme Public Prosecutors OfficeJapan― vi ―

Mr. Masato Higuchi			
					
					
					
					

Director
Second Investigation Division
Criminal Investigation Bureau
National Police Agency
Japan

C. Secretariat
UNAFEIMr. Shintaro Naito			Professor

Mr. Junichiro Otani			Professor

Mr. Jun Oshino				Professor

Mr. Haruhiko Higuchi			Professor

Ms. Tae Sugiyama			

Professor

Mr. Ryuji Tatsuya			

Professor

Mr. Koji Yamada			

Professor

Mr. Tetsuya Sugano			

Professor

Mr. Sakumi Fujii			

Chief of Secretariat

Mr. Hitoshi Nakasuga			

Deputy Chief

Mr. Masato Fujiwara			

Deputy Chief

Mr. Etsuya Iwakami			Senior Officer

Mr. Yuichi Kitada			

Officer

Ms. Grace Lord				Linguistic Adviser― vii ―

― viii ―RAPPORTEUR’S REPORT&CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT

December 10:								

A. Opening Session
B. Keynote Speeches
C. Presentation Session

December 11:		
			
			
			
			
			

D. Discussion Session(a) Measures to strengthen co-operation of investigative, prosecutorial
and administrative authorities at the domestic level.
(b) Measures to strengthen co-operation and co-ordination between
the public sector and the private sector at the domestic level.
(c) Measures to strengthen international co-operation and co-ordination.

			
			
			

E. Chairman’s Statement
F. Closing Ceremony
G. Courtesy Visits			

Chairman’s Statement

OPENING CEREMONY, KEYNOTE SPEECHES,AND PRESENTATION SESSION OF 10 DECEMBER
A. Opening Ceremony
1. Opening and Congratulatory Addresses
The Regional Forum on Good Governance for East Asian Countries, focusing on “Strengtheningof domestic and international co-operation for effective investigation and prosecution of corruption”,
commenced on 10 December 2008 in Tokyo, Japan. After the arrival of the distinguished guests andparticipants, the Forum began with opening remarks by Mr. Keiichi Aizawa, Director of UNAFEI, andtemporary Chair of the Forum, who welcomed all of the participants, and noted the timeliness of theForum, beginning just one day after Anti-Corruption Day, which commemorates the signing of the United
Nations Convention against Corruption. Director Aizawa noted the great importance of the work of
criminal justice officials in fighting corruption and outlined some of UNAFEI’s anti-corruption activities
over the past year. Director Aizawa also expressed his hope that the Forum would provide an opportunity
for the participants to exchange views, experiences and information on the practical challenges facing thecountries of the region.
Mr. Hiroshi Obayashi, Superintending Prosecutor, Tokyo High Public Prosecutors Office, Japanthen made a congratulatory address. Mr. Obayashi recalled his own days at UNAFEI, when he served
as Deputy Director. He outlined the pressing reasons for which the Forum was convened: the obligation
which prosecutors must fulfill to fight corruption on behalf of the people, freely and without politicalinterference, and the increasing reliance of all national prosecution services on their foreign counterpartsin investigating and prosecuting cases of corruption with international elements. Mr. Obayashi expressed
his belief that the Forum would solidify the relationships between the participating countries.
The final congratulatory address was made by Mr. Yoshinobu Onuki, President, Research andTraining Institute, Ministry of Justice, Japan, who began by thanking all of the participants and thevisiting expert for attending. Mr. Onuki then outlined the work of the Research and Training Institute.
Mr. Onuki remarked that, in its work in Overseas Development Assistance, the Research and Training
Institute of the Ministry of Justice attaches the utmost importance to strengthening the rule of law andgood governance. He expressed both his support for the Forum as a continuation of such efforts and hishope that it would be productive, strengthening a useful network of experts and facilitating co-operationin transnational cases of corruption.
2. Election of Forum Officers
Director Aizawa resumed the meeting under Agenda Item 1, the Election of the Forum Officers.
Following earlier informal consultations with all of the participants, Director Aizawa tabled the names ofprospective candidates for the positions. The participants endorsed by acclamation the candidates tabled
by Director Aizawa and the Forum Officers were thus elected:
Bureau Members
Chair:			
First Vice-Chair:
				
				
Second Vice-Chair:
				
				
General Editor:		
Extended Bureau Member
Editor:			

Mr. Keiichi Aizawa, Director, UNAFEI
Mr. Sirisak Tiyapan
Director General of the International Affairs Department,
Office of the Attorney General of Thailand
Mr. Severino H. Gaña
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice,
the Philippines
Mr. Takeshi Seto, Deputy Director, UNAFEI
Ms. Grace Lord, Linguistic Adviser, UNAFEI―3―

The Officers so elected, the Chair then asked the participants to consider the provisional agenda of
the Forum. There being no objections, the provisional agenda became the agreed Agenda of the Forum.
The opening session concluded with a group photo of the organizers, participants, and the visiting
expert.
B. Keynote Speeches
Three papers were presented in this session. The first was by Mr. Kunihiko Sakai, Director, General
Affairs Department, Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, Japan. The second presentation was made by
Mr. Masato Higuchi, Director, Second Investigation Division, Criminal Investigation Bureau, National
Police Agency, Japan. The final presentation for this session was made by the Visiting Expert, Mr. Ricky
Shu-chun Yau, Assistant Director, Operations Department, Independent Commission Against Corruption,(ICAC), Hong Kong, China. Mr. Yau presented a paper entitled “Strengthening of Domestic andInternational Co-operation for Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption – The Hong Kong
Experience”.
Mr. Sakai began by informing the participants that global bribery is estimated at one trillion US
dollars, and that it most affects the poorest one billion people in the world. Mr. Sakai explained that
corruption undermines democracy and good governance, distorting influence in policymaking, and hence
the equitable distribution of a nation’s wealth, which depends upon the ‘one man, one vote’ principle. As
an example of the terrible effects of distortion of that principle, Mr. Sakai commented that the current
global financial crisis can be attributed in part to the influence of lobbyists in the USA preventing thefinancial authorities from taking proper action in regard to the over-leveraged financial system operating
outside the purview of the regulators to the benefit of special interest groups. Regarding corruption’s
negative effects on economic growth, Mr. Sakai asked the participants to remember that corruption drives
up the cost of private enterprise and also distorts the free market by denying fair competition.
Mr. Sakai noted that corrupt governments cannot adequately respond to natural disasters andother calamities and can undermine food security, even when harvests are good. He explained that first
democracy falls, then the economy falls, and then people wonder why something was not done to preventthe disintegration of the social infrastructure. Mr. Sakai offered some answers to the latter question.
Firstly, there is no apparent victim; secondly, corruption is notoriously difficult to investigate; and thirdly,
sophisticated offenders make use of the loopholes existing in neighbouring jurisdictions and acquire theassistance of other professionals in their clandestine operations. Finally, criminals tend to try to justify
their corrupt acts, and those in power with a mandate to prevent corruption are often corrupt themselves.
In explaining the importance of suppressing corruption, Mr. Sakai cited the growth of Botswana since its
independence in 1966, when it was one of the world’s poorest countries. As it has become less and lesscorrupt and increasingly well-governed, the standards of living and the GDP have improved dramatically.
In his final remarks, Mr. Sakai spoke of the ‘Iron Triangle’ of administrators, general contractors andpoliticians. The ‘Iron Triangle’ is extremely difficult to break, and Mr. Sakai stated that to break it will
require a multi-agency approach involving all of the relevant authorities, a cap on political donations, andcomprehensive whistleblower protection. Mr. Sakai concluded by stating that without top-down politicalwill, it is almost impossible to suppress corruption, as almost all effective measures will depend upon
the executive for their implementation. He urged the countries of the region to realize their close andintertwined relationships and to work together to fight the scourge of corruption.
Mr. Higuchi firstly explained the organization of the police system in Japan, highlighting the Public
Safety Commissions, National and Prefectural, which were established to ensure independence of thepolice forces from political influence, and that police power is exercised only in accordance with the law.
Mr. Higuchi gave a comprehensive description of the functions and organizations of the National Police
Agency (NPA) and the prefectural police.
Moving on to his second topic of address, Mr. Higuchi outlined the defined duties of the Second
Investigation Division, Criminal Investigation Bureau, NPA. The Second Investigation Division is
responsible for investigating forgery, fraud, breach of trust, embezzlement and other intellectual crimes.

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It is also responsible for crimes related to political funds, public election, referenda and other voting,and direct petition from residents. It conducts undercover probes to root out corruption and its targets are
high-handed operators who improperly use four powers: money, authority, intellectual ability, and force.
This means that the Second Investigation Division is charged with investigations requiring the utmost
political neutrality.
Finally, Mr. Higuchi addressed the relationship between the police and the domestic and international
prosecution services in the investigation of corruption. With regard to the former, Mr. Higuchi explained
the scope of police and prosecution authority in the investigation, arrest and detention of suspects. The
co-operation of public prosecutors in police investigations is particularly important in corruption cases.
For this reason the police generally establish a close partnership with the public prosecutor’s office, andother organs such as the National Tax Agency and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission.
With regard to ties between domestic and overseas agencies, because Japan’s police organization
functions primarily at the prefectural level, it has been slow to address cases of international corruption.
To date, the NPA is not aware of any instances of international co-operation in the investigation ofcorruption. However, Mr. Higuchi noted that he has been made aware on several occasions of the needfor investigative work outside of Japan and for co-operation with overseas agencies, and explained that it
would be more effective if the Second Investigation Division could partner with overseas agencies, which
heretofore has not been possible. Increasingly, however, the police have had occasion to request the cooperation of overseas agencies in apprehending suspects and witnesses who have fled Japan in connection
with business fraud and other economic crimes. And since an increasing number of bribery suspects are
expected to flee the country in the years ahead, Mr. Higuchi believes the need for stronger partnerships
with overseas agencies can only likewise increase.
Mr. Yau began his presentation by giving the Forum a brief background of the set-up and functionsof the ICAC, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, as well as its current human and financial
resources. Its independence is enshrined in Article 57 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong and further set out
in the ICAC Ordinance. Mr. Yau explained that although the ICAC carries out its mission by adopting
a holistic and co-ordinated three-pronged approach of enforcement, prevention and education, for the
purpose of this Forum, he will focus only on the aspect of law enforcement.
One of the major duties of the Commission is to investigate offences under the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance (POBO), which sets out corruption offences and penalties, as well as providing the ICAC withspecial powers of investigation. Mr. Yau noted that corruption is difficult to investigate because it is bynature secretive and conspiratorial, a crime often committed amongst mutually satisfied parties with noreadily identified victims, and against this backdrop, the ICAC turns to the vital part of its strategy ininvestigating corruption – partnership.
Partnership at home includes an Operational Liaison Group (OLG) with the police. Its charter isto review operational and legal issues of mutual concern, to review joint cases or cases of interest, tomonitor and review police related corruption and major crime trends, and to review and improve theexisting liaison channel between the two departments. At the operational level, ICAC officers dealing
with police corruption cases also maintain close and regular contact with their counterparts in the
Complaints and Internal Investigations Bureau of the police. The extent of such co-operation and mutual
trust can be reflected in the success of some major corruption investigations. A major partner of the
ICAC is the Department of Justice which has responsibility for all public prosecutions in Hong Kong.
In practice, the Commission seeks the advice of the Department of Justice before commencing any
prosecution on corruption and corruption related offences. Another important “partner” of the ICAC is the
Operations Review Committee, the oversight committee which receives reports from the Commissioner
of ICAC on various aspects of its investigative work.
In the matter of international co-operation, Hong Kong has signed extradition agreements pursuant
to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance with 18 countries (with three yet to take effect), and MLA
agreements with 25 countries (with seven yet to take effect). Apart from formal MLA, law enforcement
co-operation relies on inter-agency liaison, involving invariably the sharing of crime information andintelligence. Such co-operation sometimes develops into joint investigations, invoking where necessary―5―the deployment of special investigative techniques. Mr. Yau gave examples of real cases, both successful
and challenging, with the USA, Australia, the Philippines and Macau SAR.
Mr. Yau emphasized that effective law enforcement is impossible without highly skilled andprofessional investigators of good integrity, and that training and capacity is an indispensable process
through which we create these professionals. The ICAC particularly values and encourages crossjurisdictional exchange which fosters closer ties among agencies and provides a platform for discussion
and achieving the common goal. For this reason, it has for many years opened up its training andcommand courses for law enforcement personnel overseas. In the opposite direction, it regularly
sends officers overseas for training, development and exchange. The ICAC also organizes regional
and international conferences, focusing on pertinent issues of corruption. To enhance international cooperation, the ICAC has in its establishment a dedicated unit to handle international liaison. The Unit
acts as the focal point to deal with all incoming requests for investigative assistance from overseas law
enforcement agencies.
Mr. Yau concluded his presentation by remarking that by virtue of China’s ratification of the
UNCAC in February 2006, this important instrument was extended to Hong Kong, providing the ICAC
with the extra momentum and responsibility to contribute to the anti-corruption cause, and that ICAC
will be celebrating its 35th birthday in February 2009 and shall continue its mission of fighting corruption
without fear or favour.
C. Presentation Session
Thirteen papers from the representatives of the participating countries were presented in this session.
In alphabetical order of their countries, each participant delivered a paper relating to the main theme of
the Forum, based on their experience of the challenges facing practitioners in combating the problem,and suggested solutions. A summary of each report follows.
Pengiran Nina Jasmine binte PLKDR Pg Hj Bahrin, Counsel and Deputy Public Prosecutor,
Attorney General’s Chambers, Brunei, gave a presentation entitled “Strengthening of Domestic andInternational Co-operation for the Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption”. Pengiran
Jasmine began her presentation by outlining Brunei Darussalam’s legislative framework on corruption,
the Prevention of Corruption Act, which is used by the enforcement agency, the Anti Corruption Bureau,
to investigate potential offenders. The Public Prosecutor then decides whether or not there is sufficientevidence to prosecute and if there is, they will charge accused persons in court. Pengiran Jasmine also
outlined the court system in Brunei Darussalam. Brunei Darussalam also co-operates with foreigncountries for effective investigation and prosecution of corruption and signed and ratified the UNCAC on
2 December 2008. In order to facilitate and oversee the implementation process exercise, His Majesty the
Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan has consented to the forming of a National Committee on the Implementationof UNCAC. Pengiran Jasmine gave a comprehensive outline of Brunei’s response to UNCAC’s Article
38, (co-operation between national authorities) and Chapter IV (international co-operation) comprising
Articles 43-48. Other relevant legislation includes the Extradition (Malaysia and Singapore) Act, Cap
154; the Summonses and Warrants (Special Provisions Act), Cap 155; the Reciprocal Enforcementof Foreign Judgements Act, Cap 177; the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Order 2005; and theExtradition Order 2006.
Pengiran Jasmine read the statement of His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan expressing his
commitment to creating a corruption free government and further explained that His Majesty’s wish wastranslated into Legislation: the Emergency (Prevention of Corruption) Order 1981 (now known as The
Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA)) which came into force on 1 January 1982. The PCA is an Act toprevent corruption and bribery and to establish the Anti Corruption Bureau. Since its establishment, it has
been updated and amended to suit the current needs of the public and interests of justice in ensuring that
corruption is kept under legal scrutiny.
The Anti Corruption Bureau was established by command of His Majesty the Sultan and Yang
Di-Pertuan on 1 February 1982. The ACB has identified two main functions which are the focus ofits undertaking: firstly, to undertake preventive works and secondly, to conduct investigation into

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information and complaints received by ACB. Anonymous letters remain the top source of information
received by the bureau, with 54 received in 2007. Once investigation papers are completed by the Anti
Corruption Bureau, they are passed to the Public Prosecutor to review the facts of the case and ascertain
whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute accused persons in Court. Pengiran Jasmine explainedthat the Anti Corruption Bureau also conducts studies based on cases that have been investigated in order
to identify areas of weaknesses or loopholes in the management, administration or procedures within theministry/department or organization and forwards the results to organizations for implementation. Other
ACB activities include educational programmes to inculcate anti-corruption attitudes and a sense of
integrity and honesty in the youth of Brunei Darussalam.
Ms. Pen Somethea, Director, Research and Training Department, Ministry of Justice, Cambodia
stated at the outset of her presentation, entitled “Strengthening of Domestic and International Cooperation for the Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption”, that corruption is widely
discussed and debated in Cambodia at present. She noted a World Bank report of 10 May 2000 which
revealed that corruption among civil servants is one of the most serious obstacles for the public andprivate sectors in Cambodia. The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) will, as soon as possible,
ensure the adoption of the draft anti-corruption law, which provides for the establishment of a muchneeded autonomous Supreme National Council Against Corruption equipped to investigate allegationsof corruption and receive complaints. It also includes essential disclosure rules and whistleblower
protection. The RGC will also promote the implementation of the multi-and-cross-sectoral governancereforms, especially those guided by the Governance Action Plan, which has been developed with broad
participation from various government ministries and institutions, civil society and development partners.
With the collaboration of the relevant authorities, the RGC is promoting anti-corruption reform at
the investigation, prosecution and adjudication stages of the legal system. Ms. Pen outlined the existinglaws relating to corruption and good governance and explained that recently, the parliament passed
three important codes, the Civil Procedure Code, the Civil Code and the Criminal Procedure Code,which ensure more transparency in court processes. It is commendable that the RGC is now engaged ina follow-up effort to disseminate the new codes and to teach professionals, conducted by the Ministryof Justice, how the codes should influence their practice. The government has also established centres
for legal services in a number of provinces and districts in order to institutionalize dispute resolution
mechanisms outside of the backlogged court system.
Ms. Pen outlined the public authorities with responsibility for anti-corruption activities. These exist
at the legislative, ministerial and municipal level. Two of the most important authorities are the Ministryof National Assembly-Senate Relations and Inspection and the Anti-Corruption Unit in the Councilof Ministers. The latter in particular plays an important role in fighting corruption. It is comprised of
an Investigation Section, a Law Enforcement Section and an Education, Prevention, Protection andCooperation Section.
Development partners, the media and various NGOs are among the civil society organizations
which are involved in the fight against corruption. The private sector is also involved as it continues
to implement government policies and legal and regulatory frameworks to ensure fair competition andto safeguard the balance between the rights and interests of the public and private sectors in contracts
between the two.
In the matter of international co-operation, Ms. Pen explained that Cambodia signed the UNCAC on
25 September 2007, and signed an MOU on Cooperation for Preventing and Combating Corruption witheight ASEAN member countries on 11 September 2007.
Ms. Pen concluded by stating that fundamental change requires commitment from the top and awillingness to follow through as anti-corruption efforts unfold in Cambodia.
Dr. Xu Daomin, Deputy Chief, Division of Procuratorial Department for Duty Crime Prevention,
Supreme People’s Procuratorate, China explained that since the adoption of reform and opening policies,
China has made tremendous progress in economic and social development. The government is paying
close attention to anti-corruption measures in order to establish a transparent social environment.

―7―Dr. Xu outlined “post crime”, which refers to the behaviour of those government officials or public
servants who take advantage of their position to engage in illegal activities, those who grossly neglect
their work, and those who fail to perform their duties or who fail to perform them correctly, and in sodoing, undermine the proper order of national management activities as well as the integrity of publicduties. All of these offenders are punished in accordance with the Penal Code, which stipulates 53
separate “post crime” acts. These have been divided into three categories: embezzlement or bribery(Chapter VIII), dereliction of duty (Chapter IX), and infringing upon citizens’ personal or democratic
rights.
China’s prosecutorial organs are responsible for the prosecution of corruption and Dr. Xu stated that
the Chinese procuracy has a zero-tolerance policy towards those engaging in corruption. Some recent
cases involve the abuse of power in grass-roots level government bodies while others involve government
officials in high positions, such as Cheng Kejie, former vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress, was sentenced to death for bribery.
Dr Xu explained that through the investigation and handling of these cases, the procuracy canidentify why such crimes occurred and which management or system weaknesses were exploited in
the execution of the crimes, and can then develop countermeasures. China’s prosecutorial organs havedevoted more attention to preventing “post crime” in recent years. The Supreme People’s Prosecution
established the Post Crime Prevention Bureau and each provincial, municipal, and county attorney alsoestablished a “post crime” prevention organization. Dr. Xu outlined the methods by which the objectivesof the bureau. They are criminal analysis; preventive investigation; the establishment and improvement of
the “post crime” prevention system; crime prevention counselling and effective “post crime” prevention
activities; and strengthening of awareness and transparency.
In the matter of international co-operation Dr. Xu commented that China must participate in active
international exchanges and co-operation, and gain useful scientific experience from other countries toeffectively investigate, try, and punish those engaging in corruption. He stated that the Chinese agencies
are willing to actively participate in international co-operation in the field of “post crime” prevention; tocarry out professional training and personnel exchanges; and to share with others our achievements andexperiences related to combating and preventing “post crime”.
Mr. Jhoni Ginting, Head of Legal Bureau, Attorney General’s Office, Indonesia gave a presentation
entitled “Indonesian Legal Frameworks and Experiences in Stolen Asset Recovery”. In it, he emphasized
the importance of the recovery of proceeds of corruption, and spoke of Indonesia’s experiences inpursuing same, both treaty-based and non-treaty based. Mr. Ginting admitted that corruption is a serious
problem in Indonesia and that the government is strengthening all efforts to combat it.
Firstly, Mr. Ginting outlined Indonesia’s legislation pertaining to corruption, mentioning the Act No.
31/1999 as amended by Act 20/2001 on the Eradication of Corruption Offences; and Act No. 15/2002
as amended by Act No. 25/2003 Concerning the Crime of Money Laundering. In relation to mutual
assistance in criminal matters, Indonesia passed Act No. 1/2006, to respond to international needs intransnational cases. He also outlined Indonesia’s legal and investigative agencies and bureaus, including
the Attorney-General’s Office, the Indonesian National Police (Criminal Investigation Division) andthe Commission on Eradication of Corruption (KPK). Multi-agency meetings are convened for specificcases. There is also co-ordination and co-operation with the National Audit Agency (BPK), the National
Audit Agency on Finance and Development (BPKP), and the Financial Intelligence Unit (PPATK).
Domestically, prosecutors also work with the police, FIU, Immigration, Tax Offices and Auditors.
In 2004, a team was set up, chaired by Vice Attorney-General, to go after fugitive corruptors,
including their assets. Mr. Ginting noted that while retrieving assets remains difficult, it has been
made easier through anti-money laundering awareness and FIU regional/international networks. To
speed up international legal co-operation, some agencies have also designed a special unit for suchcases. Indonesian experience in international co-operation in the recovery of stolen assets includes the
Pertamina-Kartika Taher case, in which millions of US dollars were recovered in Singapore, throughcivil litigation. Based on the Indonesian MLA treaty with Australia and the assistance of the Australian
government, more than A$650,000 was recovered in the Hendra Rahardja case. Currently, the Indonesian―8―and Swiss governments are co-operating on the basis of reciprocity to block around US$15 million inalleged stolen assets. The government is also trying to recover suspected stolen assets amounting to
EUR36 million, using civil litigation, in Guernsey.
Regarding Indonesia’s experiences in pursuing the proceeds of corruption, Mr. Ginting stated thatpolitical will to strengthen good governance is pivotal. A multi-agency approach, as outlined above,
will also help, as will sufficiently funded specialized units for asset recovery. MLA and civil litigation
can be implemented simultaneously, even though the latter is more effective and efficient. Moreover,
Mr. Ginting recommended that MLA and informal co-operation be executed simultaneously to recovercross-jurisdiction stolen assets. Civil litigation can be used when effective, as long as it fulfills the cost/benefit principle. Mr. Ginting also told the Forum that an important lesson of Indonesia’s experiences inretrieving stolen assets is that such recovery increases public support for anti-corruption measures.
Mr. Yuichiro Tachi, Director, Research Department, Research and Training Institute, Ministry ofJustice, Japan gave a presentation entitled “Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption in Japan from theViewpoint of the Relationship between Public Prosecutors Offices and Other Organizations”.
Mr. Tachi outlined four cases which were successfully investigated through such co-operation.
Organizations with investigative power are police agents in the National Police Agency and Prefectural
Police Headquarters; national tax investigators in the National Tax Administration Agency and Regional
Taxation Bureaus; investigators in the Securities Exchange Surveillance Commission; and investigatorsin the Fair Trade Commission. They have responsibility to investigate cases related to their fields. Publicprosecutors also carry out investigations, and can investigate independently.
The first example of co-operation, the Taisho Life case, involved the FIU. The FIU may disseminate
information to authorities in charge of investigating criminal cases. In the Taisho Life case, this is what
happened. The FIU alerted the Special Investigation Department, Tokyo District Public Prosecutors
Office, of a suspicious transaction at the Taisho Life insurance company and the Department investigated.
The perpetrators were indicted and convicted of infiltration of a legitimate business enterprise via money
laundering.
The second case involved co-operation with the Regional Tax Bureau. In 2004, the Special
Investigation Department of the Osaka District Public Prosecutors Office investigated a bribery caseinvolving two public officials. It uncovered the case through the documents of a tax evasion case in which
the suspect was the president of a company. During that investigation, the tax investigator took statementsfrom the president’s wife regarding a large amount of money sent to the above-mentioned public officials
in the form of their salaries for services rendered to the company. The tax investigator suspected that thelarge salaries as stated in the company’s documentation could not be the officials’ legitimate earnings
and instead disguised a bribe. Hence, the wife’s statements gave the public prosecutors cause to begin acorruption investigation.
The third example was a case of a Japanese citizen giving a bribe to a Vietnamese official. In thecourse of the investigation, public prosecutors requested assistance from the Vietnamese government,
through the comity of nations and via the diplomatic channel. The co-operative international relationshipwas vital in this case, which is under trial at the time of writing.
The fourth example of co-operative relationships concerned a case of bribery involving the Mayor of
the City of Wakayama which was investigated with the help of an administrative agency, the Agricultural
Co-operative Department in the Osaka prefectural government. The case led to the conviction of the
Mayor and others, which caused a public sensation.
Mr. Tachi concluded by saying that effective inter-agency co-operation, both domestic andinternational, is vital, and will become even more essential as bribery, and concealing bribery, become
increasingly sophisticated.
Dr. Kyung-Joon Jin, Director, International Criminal Affairs Division, Ministry of Justice,
Republic of Korea, gave a presentation entitled “Experience in Effective Investigation and Prosecution of
Corruption in Korea”. Dr. Kyung-Joon divided his presentation into three sections.
Firstly, he addressed Korea’s domestic legal system and policies with regard to corruption. Notable―9―

features of this system include special task forces on corruption. A Task Force has been established under
the Central Investigation Division at the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office in an effort to respond effectively
to corruption related offences, including large-scale economic corruption and political corruption. The
Task Force comprises competent authorities such as the Prosecutors’ Office, the National Police Agency,
the National Tax Service, the Korea Customs Service, the Financial Supervisory Commission and the
Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation In addition, there is an Anti-Money Laundering and Redemptionof Criminal Proceeds Task Force, composed of ten experts. It is responsible for tracing laundered
money and recovery of illegal proceeds and for preserving confiscated property before trial. Anothernotable organization is the Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission (ACRC). It was launched on 29
February 2008 by integrating several units including the Ombudsman of Korea, the Korea Independent
Commission against Corruption, and the Administrative Appeals Commission into one anti-corruption
unit, to protect people’s rights and to provide compensation when necessary. The ACRC assesses thelevels of integrity of public sector organizations each year by surveying citizens who have had firsthandexperience with public services. The commission also evaluates the anti-corruption initiatives taken by
public organizations on a regular basis. The fundamental objective of these assessments is to encourage
public organizations to make voluntary efforts to tackle corruption.
Secondly, Dr. Kyung-Joon addressed international mutual co-operation. Korea ratified the UNCAC
on 26 April 2008. At the same time, the Ministry of Justice enacted the Act on Recovery of Stolen Assets,
which describes permissible measures in international mutual co-operation in combating corruption
crimes and recovery of corruption-related properties. In addition, Korea has signed extradition treaties
with 29 nations (23 of which have come into effect) and Mutual Legal Assistance treaties with 25 nations(18 of which have come into effect). It is also pushing to join the Council of Europe Conventions on
Extradition and MLA.
Thirdly, and in conclusion, Dr. Kyung-Joon made a suggestion for the improvement of cross-borderanti-corruption efforts in Asia. He recommended the establishment of an organization for Asia similar
to the EU’s Eurojust. This unit, “Asiajust”, could provide a vital forum for cross-border collaboration infighting corruption across the Asian continent.
Mr. Khamphet Somvolachith, Deputy Director, Treaties and International Cooperation Division,
Supreme People’s Prosecutor Office, Lao PDR presented a paper entitled “Strengthening Domestic andInternational Co-operation for Effective Investigation and Prosecution, in the Lao Perspective”. Mr.
Khamphet stated that in the Lao PDR, corruption arises in areas including finance (i.e. tax and customs
collection), land management, business licensing, import and export trade (i.e. vehicles), forestry (i.e.
illegal exporting of timber), state owned enterprises and banking. Government officials are involved inmuch of this corruption. He explained that while Laos is now in a position to reduce unnecessary public
expenditure and improve government service and general living conditions, there are still many obstacles
to overcome. Laos has just entered the free market from a centrally planned economy characterized by asevere lack of laws. Against this background, the country has become a breeding ground for corruption.
The government understands that corruption poses a major threat to its poverty reduction plan andthe nation’s development. It has caused major losses of state properties and created a general publicdisrespect towards the government.
Mr. Khamphet outlined the general anti-corruption strategy, national and international, of the Lao
PDR and anti-corruption co-operative mechanisms.
With regard to the former, the national strategy encompasses legislative, agency and administrative
initiatives. Mr. Khamphet listed the most important pieces of Lao anti-corruption legislation, including
the Law on Anti-Corruption 2005, the Law on State Inspection 2007, the Party Resolution on 14
Prohibitions, the Set of Civil Service Regulations, and the Decree No 95/PM (5 December, 1995). He
also listed the anti-corruption agencies of the Lao PDR, including the Party Control Committee (PCC),
the State Inspection Authority (SIA), the State Audit Office (SAO), the Organ of the People’s Prosecutorsof the Lao PDR, and the National Assembly. With regard to administrative reform, notable initiatives
include the improvement of salaries and other compensations of civil servants to ensure that civil servants
can maintain a decent standard of living. International anti-corruption strategies of the Lao PDR include― 10 ―

becoming a signatory to the UNCAC, ratifying the UNTOC and its three protocols, the conclusion of
extradition treaties with four neighbouring countries, an MLA treaty with North Korea, ratification of
the ASEAN convention on the mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, and the non legally-binding
declarations of The China-ASEAN Prosecutors General Conference.
Regarding anti-corruption co-operative mechanisms, Mr. Khamphet explained that there is a lackof understanding of the role of the prosecutors as a whole and the lack of legislation and legal texts has
led to poor co-operation between prosecutors and police. With the help of international organizations,work is underway to deal with this problem. Mr. Khamphet gave an outline of these efforts. He alsoelaborated on measures to increase citizen participation in improving government and international cooperative mechanisms, including bilateral meetings and joint training with prosecutors from both China
and Vietnam.
Concluding, Mr. Khamphet expressed his hope that the Forum would be a successful step forward ina co-operative Asian effort against corruption.
Mr. Lai Yong Heng, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Royal Malaysian Police, Malaysia, began
his presentation, entitled “Anti-Corruption: A Malaysian Approach and Advances”, by expressing thehope of the Malaysian authorities that the commissioning of the Malaysian Anti Corruption Commission(MCAC), the reformed and restructured Anti-Corruption Agency, would lead to increased effectivenessin Malaysian anti-corruption efforts. The MCAC is modelled after world class anti-corruption agencies
such as the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong and the Independent
Commission Against Corruption in Australia. The MCAC is supplemented by an Advisory Board
comprising individuals appointed by the King on the advice of the Prime Minister, while a Special
Committee on Corruption made up of Members of Parliament will receive and scrutinize the annual
report submitted by the Commission. The cabinet has also agreed on the proposed formation of two morepanels: the Operations Evaluation Panel, which would determine actions and decisions on investigations;and the Consultation and Anti-Corruption Panel, which would assist efforts to educate the public tooppose corruption.
Mr. Lai noted the distinction drawn by Mohd Nizam Mohd Ali, Director, Private Sector, Malaysia
Institute of Integrity that while public service has always worked on the basis of public trust for the public
good, private enterprises, in contrast, work on the basis of limited selective trust. Mr. Lai stressed that theprovisions of the UNCAC can guide private sector activities as well as public sector work and that publicprivate partnership is possible. As per Article 38 of the UNCAC, the Anti-Money Laundering and AntiTerrorism Financing Act 2001 - Act 1208 allows the Malaysian government to take measures as may benecessary to encourage, in accordance with its domestic law, co-operation between national investigating
and prosecuting authorities and entities of the private sector, in particular financial institutions, relating tomatters involving the commission of offences established in accordance with the UNCAC. With regard to
Article 39 of the UNCAC, co-operation between national authorities and the private sector, section 55 of
the Anti Corruption Act 1997 (Act 575) broadens the territorial application of Malaysian instruments on
the prevention and prosecution of corruption and corrupt offenders respectively.
Mr. Lai noted that trust is an essential element of public-private co-operation, and also that effective
corporate governance is vital. He noted that the success of voluntary regulatory codes depends on both
attitude and behaviour, and that good corporate behaviour requires good individual behaviour too. In
Malaysia, the Government has entrusted the oversight of such corporate and individual behaviour to the
Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, which in turn enforces a Code of Ethics for Directors
via the Companies Commission of Malaysia. There is also a legislative instrument, the Companies
Act 1965, which is invoked whenever a director acts against the principles of good faith, due diligenceand fiduciary duty. Mr. Lai stated that the human factor is therefore an important element that must be
squarely addressed whenever corporate governance is debated and is to yield good and sound results.
Concluding, Mr. Lai stressed that to promote good governance in a thriving civil society, one has tolook at issues pertaining to integrity when tackling the issue of corruption, and that only those who arecapable, responsible and scrupulously honest be allowed to serve in positions of leadership. Those whoare inefficient, incompetent, and most importantly, corrupt, should be held in absolute contempt.

― 11 ―

Mr. Han Nyunt, Deputy Director General, Office of the Attorney General, Myanmar, presented apaper entitled “Strengthening of Domestic and International Co-operation for Effective Investigation andProsecution of Corruption: Country Report of the Union of Myanmar”.
Mr. Han’s presentation included an account of Myanmar’s laws against corruption; its investigationand prosecution of corruption cases; and the need for regional and international co-operation to fightcorruption. In Myanmar’s laws, corruption is defined not only as taking, accepting, or obtaining bribemoney, property, narcotic drugs or pecuniary benefit, or agreeing or attempting to do so, but includes
undue service, disservice, favour or disfavour in relation to a public servant’s work or his or her
superior’s work done or being done or likely to do be done. Moreover, communicating, using, illegally
retaining or failing to guard official secrets or unauthorized disclosing of bank secrecy also falls under thedefinition of corruption.
Mr. Han listed 15 pieces of legislation or administrative regulations which combine to provide
comprehensive anti-corruption protection in Myanmar. The most important of these is the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1948, which defines corruption in wide terms and allows for a presumption of guilt if aperson has wealth or assets exceeding his or her lawful income. Besides, all benefits obtained by accusedby committing such offence shall be confiscated. Punishment under this act is more severe and effective
than punishment under the Penal Code, so serious corruption cases are prosecuted under the Preventionof Corruption Act. The act also authorizes an investigating police officer to make necessary inspectionsof the bank accounts or registers of the accused and/or his or her dependants. However, the act requires
the prior sanction of the relevant appointing authority of the accused before taking action under its
provisions.
Mr. Han also outlined investigative and prosecution procedures as they apply to corruption cases.
Corruption cases are cognizable under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore,
those cases may be investigated by Bureau of Special Investigation officers, or police officers, withouta court warrant. Usually, the BSI investigates serious corruption cases and refers other corruption cases
to the police. If the case is not strong enough for indictment, it is referred to the Government department
concerned for departmental action. Under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if an accused
who is a judge, magistrate or any public servant who is not removable from his or her office save by orwith the sanction of the President or relevant Ministry, is accused of any offence alleged to have beencommitted by him or her while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his or her official duty, no
Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with such previous sanction. When such cases aresent up before the Courts, BSI prosecutors or Law Officers conduct the prosecution.
Regarding international co-operation, Mr. Han stated that the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
Law is the main law in Myanmar for bilateral, multilateral, regional and international co-operation for
effective investigation and prosecution in criminal matters, including corruption cases.
Mr. Severino H. Gaña Jr., Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service,
Department of Justice, Philippines, gave a presentation entitled “Recovery and Repatriation of the
Marcoses’ Ill-gotten Wealth”. Mr. Gaña began by explaining that when Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos
fled the Philippines, they took with them significant assets and left behind papers, known as the“Malacañang Documents”, detailing huge deposits held in their names in Swiss banks. Mr. Gaña gavea detailed account of the legal struggle that ensued as the Philippine government sought to retrieve thevast sums illegally accumulated by the Marcoses. The process engendered several legal precedents in thePhilippines and abroad. Besides the efforts of the Philippine government to recover stolen assets, victimsof the Marcos regime’s human rights violations also sought financial compensation from the Marcoses
via the courts.
Following the flight of the Marcoses, President Corazon Aquino, in her first Executive Order,
created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), a quasi-judicial body mandated toinvestigate the Marcoses’ wealth; file civil and criminal cases to recover same; and preserve the assets
until such time as the cases were resolved. A second Executive Order froze all of the Marcos’ assets
in the Philippines. The Swiss Federal Council imposed a temporary but unprecedented and unilateralfreeze on the Marcoses’ assets in Swiss banks which was followed by a request from the Philippine― 12 ―

government for a regular freeze order, on the basis of the Malacañang documents, invoking the Swiss
Law on International Mutual Assistance on Criminal Matters (IMAC) (because there was then no mutual
legal assistance treaty on criminal matters between the two countries). The request was met with strong
resistance but in December 1990, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court approved the freezing request andadmitted that in principle, the frozen assets should be returned to the Philippines. On 21 December 1990
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court issued an order, the first of its kind, that Swiss banking documents
pertaining to Marcos deposits be transmitted to the Philippine Government, provided that, inter alia, there
was a final judgment of conviction by the Sandiganbayan or another Philippine court. This condition
was later amended, when on 10 December 1997 the Swiss Supreme Court delivered a landmark decisiontransferring around US$693 million to the Sandiganbayan, stating that the facts are sufficiently clear
to allow the assumption of the illegal origin of the seized funds. The court ruled that under the IMAC
agreement of 1995 a civil proceeding in the Philippines and a final judgment in favour of the Republicwould suffice instead of a criminal conviction, as noted above. On 15 July 2003 the Supreme Court of
the Philippines reversed an earlier dismissal by the Sandiganbayan of the forfeiture case against the
Marcoses. It ruled that the US$683 million is ill-gotten and is forfeited to the Republic. On 18 November
2003 the Supreme Court denied with finality several petitions filed by the Marcos heirs to set aside its
decision of 15 July 2003, and also rejected worldwide injunctions on the Marcos funds issued by Judge
Manuel Real of the District Court of Hawaii.
Mr. Gaña also outlined the lawsuits filed by victims of human rights abuses. In September 1992
a class-action suit filed by such victims went to trial in the Hawaii District Court. The court ruled that
Ferdinand Marcos had committed gross human rights violations and that his estate was liable for damages
to the victims. The court attempted to fulfill the award with the funds held in Swiss bank accounts, but
this was denied because the Marcos deposits were funds stolen from the Philippines and were frozen
on account of legal assistance given by the government of Switzerland to that of the Philippines. In
December 1996 the US Court of Appeals denied an appeal by Imelda Marcos against the decision of
the lower that the Marcos estate was liable for damages to the victims of human rights abuses. The US
Supreme Court sustained this decision in March 1997, creating a legal precedent in international humanrights jurisprudence. According to the judgment of the Hawaii court, the human rights victims are to becompensated from the estate of Ferdinand Marcos. However, the sums which were held in the Swissbanks are not considered his estate; rather they are considered sums stolen from the Philippines.
Mr. Gaña concluded by stating that the long and difficult saga of the recovery and repatriation of
the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth is not over. Of some US$683 million forfeited in favour of the Philippine
government, US$20 million is still in litigation in Singapore due to the worldwide injunctions issued by
the Hawaii court, but this US$20 million is not the only remaining recoverable assets. Imelda Marcos
has admitted that there is “$800 million kept in various international banks”. According to Mr. Gaña, the
PCGG knows the source of this $800 million. The Marcoses’ Swiss agents withdrew $400 million from a
Swiss bank on 23 March 1986, on the eve of the freeze order issued by the Swiss Federal Council. Marie
Gabrielle Koller, a Canadian lawyer of the Swiss bank, gave a full account of the incident and said theamount must have by now have doubled due to interest.
Mr. Bala Reddy, Principal Senior State Counsel, State Prosecution Division, Attorney General’sChambers, Singapore, gave a presentation entitled “Strengthening Domestic and International Cooperation for Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption”. Mr. Reddy noted that Singapore
is consistently ranked among the least corrupt nations in various international surveys and studies, such
as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and the Political and Economic ResearchConsultancy. However, following the Second World War, and during Singapore’s colonial era, corruption
was rife. Inflation, low salaries and poor general living conditions provided an environment in which
corruption could thrive. The government recognized this problem and realized that it had to act. Mr.
Reddy outlined the steps taken by the Singaporean government to create one of the least corrupt nationsin the world.
In 1960, Singapore passed the Prevention of Corruption Act, which remains the most importantpiece of anti-corruption legislation in Singapore. It was targeted at preventing corruption more effectively― 13 ―

through the empowerment of investigative, prosecutorial and administrative agencies. The Act defines
gratification very widely, targeting basically any “advantage of any description”. It also empowers
investigators to order public officers under investigation to furnish sworn statements specifying properties
belonging to them, their spouses and children, and creates a legal obligation to provide information
to investigators. The Act also ensures that informants remain anonymous. It empowers the Courts tomete out strong penalties for offenders and provides for an offender to disgorge whatever benefits heor she derived from his or her corrupt act. By virtue of a specific presumption clause in the Act, any
form of gratification paid to a government employee by someone seeking to deal with the government
will be deemed to be a corrupt inducement. Mr. Reddy explained that the effect of this clause is that theprosecution is only required to show that a government employee received such gratification. Thereafter,
the burden of proving that the gratification was not corruptly received shifts to the government employee.
Mr. Reddy told the Forum that the Prevention of Corruption Act is presently being revamped to tackle
the new age in corruption. As a supplement to the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Corruption, Drug
Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act was enacted to criminalize thelaundering of benefits derived from corruption and allows for the confiscation of any benefits derived
from such activities.
Regarding effective enforcement efforts, a team of officers from the Corrupt Practices andInvestigation Bureau (CPIB) specialize in investigating corrupt activities in Singapore. They also workwith officials abroad in respect of corrupt activities occurring overseas, with effects in Singapore.
Established in 1952, the CPIB functions as an independent body and works closely with prosecutors fromthe Attorney-General’s Chambers. In 2004, the Computer Forensic Unit was formed to perform forensic
examinations of computer-related evidence.
The public authorities in Singapore have actively engaged the financial sector in the fight against
corruption. The Monetary Authority of Singapore has issued guidelines on Prevention of Money
Laundering to financial institutions. The Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office of the Commercial
Affairs Department, which investigates commercial and financial crime, also conducts dialogue andfeedback sessions with the financial institutions. The criminal justice authorities in Singapore also
actively engage other stakeholders from the private sector.
Singapore strongly supports international efforts to fight corruption, like the United Nations
Convention against Corruption, and has demonstrated this support by becoming a signatory to the
UNCAC on 11 November 2005.
The Prosecution and the CPIB meet regularly to update each other about the respective legal
and enforcement challenges that either side faces. Prosecutors must be in tune with the new avenues
that offenders utilize to carry out corrupt activities, and investigators need to be educated on the legal
challenges that the Prosecution faces in bringing cases to the Courts. Both the Prosecution and the CPIB
have worked successfully towards eradicating corruption from all sections of society. This collaboration
will continue. On a global level, it is imperative to replicate such levels of co-operation.
Mr. Sirisak Tiyapan, Director General, International Affairs Department, Office of the Attorney
General, Thailand gave a presentation entitled “Domestic Measures and International Co-operation for
Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption in Thailand”.
Mr. Sirisak explained that Section 157 of the Thai Penal Code applies to all state officials for
misconduct such as unduly performing or not performing his or her official function to gain undeserved
advantages. Certain provisions, such as Section 201, relate to malpractice by judges, public prosecutors,
and inquiry officials. Mr. Sirisak noted that investigation and prosecution of the Penal Code offence ofcorruption was ineffective in cases of sophisticated corruption committed by politicians or high-ranking
public officials. Prior to reforms contained in the 1997 Constitution, which entered into force in 1999,
only one politician was convicted of corruption. It was difficult for the police to successfully investigate
powerful officials and politicians. Mr. Sirisak also noted various problems at the prosecutorial stage.
Like all offences under the Thai Penal Code, ordinary corruption proceedings rely upon the Criminal
Procedure Code. According to the Criminal Procedure Code, investigation and prosecution are strictly
separate processes, causing difficulty for the prosecutor who is excluded from the process of truth-finding― 14 ―

from the outset.
Mr. Sirisak explained that the Thai authorities realized that the normal framework was no longer
sufficient to contain corruption by public officials and in 1997 new countermeasures were introduced.
Anti-corruption authorities were established with the specific purpose of tracing, investigating,prosecuting and adjudicating corruption committed by politicians and high-ranking officials. Theseauthorities enjoy some privileges under special immunity to guarantee their independence and discretion.
Asset declaration, prohibitions on conflict of interest and professional ethics regulations are some featuresof the new framework.
Unlike the ordinary corruption offence, tried under the Penal Code, corruption committed by highranking public officials and politicians is investigated by the National Counter Corruption Commission(NCCC), an independent body comprised of one Chairperson and eight members selected from amongprominent persons of integrity, who cannot be removed except for reasons of malpractice. The NCCC
is authorized to designate the Investigative Sub-commission, comprised of one member of the NCCC
and other investigative officers, including public prosecutors and private sector experts, to investigate
any case. After the completion of investigation and if the NCCC is of the view that the alleged person
is guilty, the investigation file as well as supporting documents and evidence will be submitted to the
Attorney General for institution of proceedings in the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Persons
Holding Political Position.
On the subject of international co-operation, Mr. Sirisak explained that the Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters Act of 1992 designates the Attorney General as the Central Authority for rendering
requested assistance to foreign countries. Thailand is now in the process of amending the Act toaccommodate more convenient measures for assistance in line with the UNCAC and the Treaty on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters of ASEAN countries. Thailand can provide assistance inthe absence of a treaty, provided that the requesting state commits to the reciprocity principle. Regarding
extradition, the Extradition Act of 2008 and treaties concluded between Thailand and other countries
will be the principal sources of guidance. The Attorney General is the Central Authority to accommodate
requests for extradition as well as to request extradition of fugitives of corruption cases back to stand trial
or serve punishment in Thailand. Thailand can extradite fugitives found in Thailand back to the foreign
requesting state on the basis of reciprocity alone.
In conclusion, Mr. Sirisak urged that domestic measures and international co-operation for more
effective investigation and prosecution of corruption should not be restricted to co-operation among
government authorities and the private sector, or be concentrated merely on mutual assistance incorruption case proceedings or extradition processes. Co-operation among national authorities andinternational organizations to strengthen technical assistance and capacity-building is equally or
possibly more crucial. The sharing of information, knowledge and experiences regarding anti-corruption
techniques, in particular with regard to asset-tracing and recovery, through seminars, conferences, orworkshops, either at domestic or international level, is in fact a countermeasure itself.
Ms. Lai Thu Ha, Legal Expert, Institute for Prosecutorial Science, Supreme People’s Prosecution
Office, Vietnam, gave a presentation entitled “Preventing and Combating Corruption in Vietnam”.
Ms. Lai explained that the Vietnamese Penal Code 1999 criminalizes corruption in its Section AChapter 21. In 2005, Vietnam enacted the Act of Preventing and Combating Corruption which includes
provisions regarding the prevention, discovery and combating of corruption and also regulates individualand organizational responsibility in the field. This Act established the Steering Committees for AntiCorruption at national and provincial levels, led by the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the People’s
Committee respectively. In addition, the Specializing Bodies for Anti-Corruption were established inState Bodies such as Governmental Inspection, Ministry of Public Security, and the Supreme People’s
Prosecution Office. Vietnam has encouraged the participation of residents and social organizations inpreventing corruption through the Act of Organizing National Assembly; the Act of Organizing People’s
Councils and Committees 2003; the Act of Fatherland Front of Vietnam 1999; and the Complaining and
Denouncing Act 1998.
Ms. Lai listed some prominent corruption cases involving public officials, some very senior,― 15 ―

uncovered in Vietnam, including the land corruption case in Doson, Haiphong City; the bribery caseinvolving the Ministry of Trade (Currently Ministry of Industry and Trade); the bribery case involving
the Management Board of Project 18; the case involving the Management Board of Project 112 of theGovernment; and the corruption case in Laocai province.
Ms. Lai told the Forum that her office has identified six crucial elements which require special
attention in Vietnamese anti-corruption efforts. These are: 1) corruption is often committed by highranking officials of state bodies who are sophisticated in their modus operandi and knowledge of the law
and legal loopholes. They also have the ability to induce and embroil many others in different bodies,even in law protection offices, to create a "closed mechanism" in conducting criminal activities, deterring
the discovery of the crime; 2) corrupt offenders utilize their financial resources and power to abuse theprosecution process by bribing competent persons and threatening witnesses; 3) the independence andthe effectiveness of anti-corruption offices may not be secure; 4) there are legal loopholes which must be
closed; 5) sophisticated technology is often used to commit and conceal corrupt crimes, making detectiondifficult; 6) individuals wishing to complete projects quickly have often used corrupt means to do so.
In response to these difficulties Ms. Lai suggested the following measures be implemented
comprehensively: 1) the Steering Committees for Anti-corruption must have a special position in thesystem of state bodies and their officials must be elected pursuant to special standards to ensure their
independence and effectiveness; 2) state bodies must be transparent in their operation by publicly
declaring their activities and financial resources; 3) the legal system must be perfected and a law-abiding
spirit must be inculcated in all organizations and individuals; 4) anti-corruption education must be
promoted to encourage civil society to participate in the struggle against corruption; and 5) strengthening
international co-operation to enhance capacity in preventing and combating corruption, becoming aparty to regional and international treaties coutaining progressive anti-corruption measures and strictly
applying the provisions of same.

― 16 ―DISCUSSION SESSION, CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT
AND CLOSING CEREMONY OF 11 DECEMBER
D. Discussion Session
Topic:
Strengthening of domestic and international co-operation for effective investigation and prosecutionof corruption.
Subtopics:(a) Measures to strengthen co-operation of investigative, prosecutorial and administrative
authorities at the domestic level;(b) Measures to strengthen co-operation and co-ordination between the public sector and theprivate sector at the domestic level;(c) Measures to strengthen international co-operation and co-ordination.
Beginning the Discussion Session, Director Aizawa noted that the countries of East Asia havediverse systems of investigation and prosecution, and that various modes of co-operation between
investigators and prosecutors are employed across the region. These various methods of co-operation andassistance demonstrate numerous models of co-operation and may inspire practitioners to establish new
systems or adapt the existing systems in their respective countries.
Since criminal justice practitioners are not lawmakers, they must work within the existing legal
frameworks of their countries or regions. Understanding the different systems in place in other countries
can generate ideas on how criminal justice practitioners of various disciplines can interact with each otherto the benefit of the fight against corruption.
Director Aizawa suggested that the subtopics for discussion be considered with regard to thefollowing two categories:
1. The role, responsibility and function of investigators and prosecutors;
2. The mode of co-operation of investigators and prosecutors.
The Chairman addressed these subtopics as follows.
1. The Role, Responsibility and Function of Investigators and Prosecutors(i) The situation in countries of a common law tradition(a) Myanmar
Mr. Han noted in his presentation that criminal prosecution is conducted by a prosecutor retained by
the investigating officials.
(ii) The situation in countries of a civil law tradition(a) Korea
Dr. Kyung-Joon stated in his presentation that the public prosecutor is responsible for directing andsupervising criminal investigations, which are carried out by the police.
(b) Japan
Mr. Tachi explained that the police and public prosecution service are independent of each other.
The relationship between the two is one of co-operation. He also mentioned that the Japanese police must
forward all investigated cases to prosecutors as police are not authorized to terminate investigations.
(c) China
In China public prosecutors are responsible for the investigation of corruption involving public
officials, whereas for other offences it is the responsibility of the police.

― 17 ―

(d) Thailand
Mr. Sirisak explained that the responsibility for investigation is vested solely in the police. The
police may decide how to conduct an investigation and may also decide when an investigation ought tobe concluded. However, the police must forward all investigated cases to prosecutors. The prosecutor isthen responsible for deciding whether or not to indict the case.
(iii) Others(a) Cambodia
As the Cambodian legal system is based on the French tradition, the investigating judge hassignificant responsibility for gathering evidence, particularly statements.
2. The Mode of Co-operation of Investigators and Prosecutors(i) Co-operation on a case-by-case basis(a) Hong Kong
Mr. Yau stated that in Hong Kong there is day-to-day consultation between investigators and publicprosecutors to facilitate their respective work.
(b) Korea
In Korea, joint investigations (known as task forces) are carried out by the relevant persons from theinvestigating authorities and the prosecutorial authorities when circumstances require such an approach.
The task force is dissolved at the conclusion of the investigation.
(ii) Co-operation in a general sense(a) Hong Kong
As noted above, Mr. Yau told the Forum of the open channels of communication between police andprosecutors in Hong Kong, which allow co-operation to flow easily.
(b) LaosMr. Khamphet explained that there is a regular judicial community where representatives from many
authorities, including investigative and prosecutorial authorities, can get together and discuss judicial
matters.
(c) Singapore
Mr. Reddy informed the participants that the relationship between the Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau (CPIB) and the Attorney General’s Chambers is one of co-operation and co-ordination.
(d) Vietnam
Ms. Lai mentioned that prosecutors have the authority to supervise the investigative process so thereis close co-ordination between the police and the prosecution service.
Mr. Aizawa commented that there appeared to be similarities between the Vietnamese and Laotiansystems, wherein prosecutors have a wider range of authority which includes inspection and supervisionof government agencies.
Following this summary, the floor was opened for comments, suggestions and questions.
***
Subtopic (a): Measures to strengthen co-operation of investigative, prosecutorial and administrative
authorities at the domestic level
Mr. Reddy gave an example of the type of co-operation and co-ordination that occurs between the
CPIB and the Attorney General’s Chambers of Singapore. In cases of bribery involving a public official
the CPIB seeks to focus the investigation on the public official as the person with greater responsibility.

― 18 ―

Therefore, they may seek permission from the Attorney General’s Chambers to offer immunity fromprosecution to the briber in exchange for his or her assistance with their investigation. The CPIB do
not have the authority to offer immunity from prosecution and therefore must seek the co-operationof the Attorney General’s Chambers in such cases. Professor Naito commented that this example is ofgreat value in illustrating the importance of co-ordination and consultation between investigators andprosecutors.
***
Dr. Xu expanded on the responsibility of the Chinese prosecution service in the investigation andprosecution of corruption cases. The prosecution must ensure that there is sufficient evidence for trial
and must also protect the human and legal rights of the suspect under investigation. This responsibility
has been accorded much importance in recent years. The prosecution service and the police co-operate
in investigations into official corruption; the police will execute the warrant for arrest obtained by theprosecutors.
Dr. Xu commented that the Corruption Division, while still under the control of the Supreme
Prosecutorial Authority of China, has become increasingly independent.
Mr. Gaña offered an outline of the Philippine system. In the civil law system of the Philippines,
there are two law enforcement agencies: the police and the National Bureau of Investigation under the
Department of Justice. Both agencies can investigate corruption offences and file cases with the office ofthe ombudsman or with the public prosecution service. The ombudsman is a constitutionally created bodywith the sole authority to investigate corruption by public officials. It has a limited number of its own
investigators, who are also lawyers. The ombudsman can also request the assistance of the police and thedeployment of public prosecutors to its investigations. Cases involving public officials of Grade 26 orhigher are filed in the Sandiganbayan. The office of the ombudsman has its own prosecutors to handle
cases in the Sandiganbayan.
Public prosecutors act as quasi-judicial officers in the investigation of corruption cases; they cannot
conduct their own investigations and instead must wait for a case to be filed by the police or NBI.
However, both the police and the NBI consult with prosecutors. The prosecutor with whom the police of
NIB consults cannot later be assigned responsibility for the prosecution of the case.
Mr. Ginting added that in Indonesian practice is similar to that of the Philippines. All prosecutionis handled by the Attorney-General’s Office. There is no other prosecution service.
Police investigate common crimes. Revenue, immigration and intellectual property violations areinvestigated separately by specialist units but these units will consult with the AGO.
There are three agencies with investigative power: the Attorney-General’s Office (AGO), the police,
and the Corruption Eradication Commission. Each time one of the agencies initiates an investigation it
will immediately notify the other two agencies in order to avoid overlap. Corruption and human rights
violations are the only crimes investigated by the AGO.
Mr. Yau commented that while inter-agency co-operation is vitally important in the fight against
corruption, it is essential that the independence of each arm of the criminal justice system is respected
and upheld. For example, in Hong Kong, the ICAC cannot handle prosecution and the prosecution
service cannot order the ICAC to investigate a particular case. Mr. Yau emphasized that no one agency
should be permitted to amass too much power.
Pengiran Jasmine explained that in Brunei Darussalam, once an investigation is completed, theAttorney General’s Chambers will review the file to ascertain whether or not there is enough evidence on
which to proceed. The Attorney General’s Chambers does not interfere in investigations conducted by theAnti-Corruption Bureau and respects the independence of that agency. Methods to ensure co-operationand co-ordination include the requirement of legal training and examination in subjects such as criminal― 19 ―

procedure and evidence on the part of the ACB officials to ensure that their investigations are legitimate
and effective.
Mr. Aizawa remarked that, on the matter of independence of investigating agencies, such as thosein Brunei and Hong Kong, the independent investigative authority sends cases to the prosecution service
for review. The prosecutor then decides on indictment and does the subsequent necessary work. Bearing
in mind that the case will eventually reach the prosecutors, who will take the case to trial, Mr. Aizawa
noted that there is room for both organizations to study the same case, evidence and legal issues.
Mr. Yau remarked that ICAC investigators are trained in law, as are those in Brunei. They
understand the evidential rules and if they recover prima facie evidence they contact prosecutors
when necessary to seek continuing advice. The prosecutor will have control of the case at trial but
the investigator will sit behind the prosecutor and provide support and back-up. If there is no prima
facie evidence the ICAC does not send the case to the Department of Justice. The Operations Review
Committee (ORC) is the sole body with the authority to close cases. All cases investigated by the ICAC
will be forwarded to either the prosecution service or the ORC.
Pengiran Jasmine stated that Brunei follows the Hong Kong standard. It also has an Operations
Review Committee to review each complaint that comes to the ACB. The committee is made up of senior
members of the ACB. They decide whether or not an investigation should be initiated. If an investigation
is opened, its file must be passed to prosecutors, regardless of the kinds of evidence gathered. Once aninvestigation is opened the file must be passed to prosecutors. If the case is indicted the ACB officer will
provide support in terms of preparing witnesses, further investigation and the other matters as mentioned
by Mr. Yau. A decision to take no further action is the sole remit of the Attorney General.
Mr. Lai clarified the situation in Malaysia, which he described as similar to Brunei and Hong Kong.
The Malaysian Anti Corruption Commission (MCAC) investigates and passes the file to the Attorney
General’s Chambers. The Attorney General then decides whether or not to prefer charges. If there is any
shortcoming in the file passed to the Attorney General’s Office then it will return the file to the MCAC
for clarification. The MCAC has no power to institute indictment proceedings.
Mr. Reddy added that the situation in Singapore is similar, with the added requirement that the
Attorney General must personally consent to all indictments.
Mr. Sirisak added that in Thailand, in cases of political corruption, similar to Singapore, Malaysia
and Brunei, the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) must send all investigated cases to
the Office of the Attorney General (OAG). If the OAG disagrees with any of the contents or conclusionsof the file they must set up a Working Group comprised of equal numbers of NCCC members andprosecutors. If the Working Group cannot agree on whether or not to file criminal charges the NCCC
can hire a private lawyer to do so. Regarding conventional corruption, that is, corruption not committed
by politicians and high-ranking public officials, the Thai legal framework is currently in a period oftransition. Mr. Sirisak stated that all cases of corruption should be handled by specific agencies, in thesame way that political corruption is handled by the NCCC. Legislation to that effect has not yet enteredinto force. Mr. Sirisak further noted that, similar to Malaysia and the Philippines, prosecutors in Thailand
have no part in the process of fact-finding.
Mr. Sirisak further added that when discussing co-operation between investigators and prosecutors
it should be remembered that investigators apply different techniques to their work than do prosecutors.
This is the reason why some countries separate the two processes. One solution is to have representativesof both groups in the same meetings and allow them to learn each other’s techniques and policies and theconcepts of their work. This can be done in the domestic or international sphere.

― 20 ―

Mr. Khamphet remarked that fighting corruption is a difficult task for all those involved, no matterthe system employed. In the Lao PDR it is handled by the anti-corruption authorities; however, it issupervised by public prosecutors. According to the Criminal Procedure Law, the public prosecution
service must be notified of all reports of criminal incidents within 24 hours of the report being made.
In important cases, the report must be made immediately. This requirement is necessary because heprosecution service must be informed of the initiation of an investigation. The two branches of thecriminal justice system must work together. Mr. Khamphet stated that while supervision of investigations
is a difficult task for prosecutors, as investigators can sometimes feel some resistance to being supervisedby outside agencies, co-operation between investigators and prosecutors has been improving in recent
years.
***
Subtopic (b): Measures to strengthen co-operation and co-ordination between the public sector and theprivate sector at the domestic level
On the topic of public-private co-operation, Mr. Aizawa noted the comments made in Mr. Reddy’s
presentation regarding the exchange of valuable information between investigating authorities
and financial institutions. Financial institutions are in a position to provide prosecutorial authorities
with information of vital importance, such as abnormal transactions on the part of public officials.
Information on the size, frequency and direction of such transactions can be notified to the investigativeor prosecutorial authorities.
Mr. Noguchi mentioned the significance of prevention and noted that it can be incorporated into
the context of partnership with private sector entities and outreach by relevant authorities in the private
sector. Mr. Aizawa agreed that prevention is very significant, but that as the main topic of the Forum
was investigation and prosecution, the discussion and Chairman’s Statement should focus on the law
enforcement aspect of combating corruption.
***
Subtopic (c): Measures to strengthen international co-operation and co-ordination.
Possible measures to strengthen international co-operation and co-ordination as mentioned by
the participants include the signing and ratification of the UNCAC; bilateral or regional treaties onmatters such as mutual legal assistance and extradition; international conferences, seminars and training
initiatives; enhancement of international law enforcement co-operation; repatriation of illegally obtained
proceeds of corruption; and regional mechanisms to strengthen mutual co-operation and extradition.
Examples of such regional treaties include the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters signed by the ASEAN member countries on 29 November 2004 in Kuala Lumpur.
Regarding regional mechanisms to strengthen mutual extradition and co-operation, Dr. Kyung-Joonfrom Korea suggested the establishment of an organization for Asia, “Asiajust”, similar to the European
initiative Eurojust, which allows quick and easy communication and close co-operation and co-ordinationof criminal justice investigations across EU member states.
***
E. Chairman’s Statement
Following the morning’s discussion session, Director Aizawa, in his capacity as Chairman of
the Forum, delivered a Statement reflecting the reasons for convening the Forum, the content of― 21 ―

its discussions, and the expressed intentions of the participants with regard to the Forum’s theme,“Strengthening of domestic and international co-operation for effective investigation and prosecution ofcorruption”.
F. Closing Ceremony
The Closing remarks were delivered by Mr. Yutaka Nagashima, Public Prosecutor, Supreme Public
Prosecutors Office, Japan. Mr. Nagashima, a former professor of UNAFEI, commended the participants
for their enthusiastic commitment to the Forum and praised the work of the Forum as an important firststep in cultivating lasting and mutually beneficial relationships between criminal justice personnel ofthe represented countries. He emphasized that for international agreements and assistance to function
effectively, the practitioners concerned must feel united by a common purpose and have full confidence
in each other. Mr. Nagashima also expressed his thanks, on behalf of all participants, to all UNAFEI
personnel for their preparatory work and their hospitality over the period of the Forum.
G. Courtesy Visits
Accompanied by Director Aizawa and Professor Naito, the participants and visiting expert madea courtesy call to the Minister of Justice, Mr. Eisuke Mori, and the Prosecutor General, Mr. Toshiaki
Hiwatari.

― 22 ―

CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT
I, as Chairman of the Regional Forum on Good Governance for East Asian Countries, deliver thefollowing statement as a summary of the Forum’s discussion:
1. We, senior-level officials from thirteen East Asian countries responsible for law enforcement andpolicy-making in the field of corruption control, met in Fuchu, Tokyo, to participate in the Regional
Forum on Good Governance, jointly organized by the United Nations Asia and Far East Institutefor the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) and the Supreme Public
Prosecutors Office of Japan, and discussed the issue of “Strengthening of domestic and international
co-operation for effective investigation and prosecution of corruption”.
2. We affirmed that the fight against corruption is one of the most solemn obligations of all criminal
justice practitioners in the pursuit of our common goal of promoting the rule of law and good
governance.
3. We reaffirmed the importance for all of the represented countries to ratify and fully implement theUnited Nations Convention against Corruption in order to strengthen our individual and collective
response to corruption.
4. Having exchanged views and shared experiences on the matter, we recognized the great significanceof enhancing collaboration between investigative agencies and prosecutorial authorities in termsof investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, as such collaboration, utilizing the skills andexpertise of these organizations, would maximize effective enforcement of the law in such cases.
We are united in our commitment to continue our efforts to establish and strengthen the co-operative
relationship between both branches of criminal justice administration within the existing frameworksof the respective countries.
5. We declare a common recognition that the enhancement of co-operation and co-ordination between
law enforcement agencies and public authorities is vital in an effective criminal justice response
to corruption. In particular, we reaffirmed the value of fully utilizing information on suspicioustransactions provided by the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as useful data in identifying acts ofcorruption.
6. We also exchanged opinions on the significance of co-operation between public law enforcement
authorities and the private sector, and we share a clear recognition that the information and expertiseof private entities, including financial institutions, is of paramount importance to the successful
investigation and prosecution of corruption cases; we thereby confirm the need to strengthen the cooperation between the two.
7. Taking into account the rapid globalization of corruption crime, we are in complete accord thatinternational co-operation is highly important in accomplishing our duty to successfully investigate
and prosecute corruption cases. We exchanged views and shared experiences in pursuing co-operationfrom foreign countries in various situations, including cases of transnational laundering of the proceedsof corruption. We reaffirm our commitment to be proactive in the continuation of our efforts toprovide assistance to our counterparts by applying the relevant co-operation mechanism as flexibly as
possible.
8. We are convinced that an international network of criminal justice practitioners is of great importancefor the authorities of this region to effectively discharge their duty to control corruption; therefore, we
acknowledge the significance of the opportunities afforded by international training courses, seminars― 23 ―

and conferences such as the Regional Forum to create, strengthen and expand such networks.

― 24 ―

OPENING CEREMONY

Opening Remarks by
Mr. Keiichi Aizawa
Director, UNAFEI***

Address by
Mr. Hiroshi Obayashi
Superintending Prosecutor,
Tokyo High Public Prosecutors Office***

Address by
Mr. Yoshinobu Onuki
President,
Research and Training Institute,
Ministry of Justice― 25 ―

― 26 ―

OPENING ADDRESS
Mr. Keiichi Aizawa
Director, UNAFEI
Distinguished participants, honourable guests, ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great privilege and pleasure for me to have organized the Regional Forum on Good
Governance for East Asian Countries, in collaboration with the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office ofJapan. On behalf of UNAFEI, I would like to extend my heartfelt welcome to all of the distinguishedparticipants and honourable guests who come to join this significant event.
As the Director of UNAFEI, I am truly pleased to meet high-ranking officials from thirteen East
Asian countries, including Japan, who play a leading role in the administration of criminal justice intheir respective countries. I am particularly happy to see among you some UNAFEI alumni, to whom I
would like to say most warmheartedly “Welcome back”. For other participants who are new to UNAFEI,
this forum provides an excellent opportunity for us all to meet and become acquainted in the family-likeatmosphere that we strive to maintain here at UNAFEI.
This meeting coincides with the United Nations’ International Anti-Corruption Day which was
designated to commemorate the historical High-level Political Conference for the Purpose of Signing
the United Nations Convention against Corruption, convened from 9 to 11 December 2003 in Merida,
Mexico.
Distinguished participants,
Ensuring the rule of law and good governance is of vital importance to East Asian countries,
including Japan, for maintaining law and order, and securing the stability and development of society,as well as ensuring the rights and interests of the people. One of the most significant tasks for us
criminal justice officials in the pursuit of this common goal is to effectively and proactively fightagainst corruption. With a view to contributing to the enhancement of the capacity of criminal justicepractitioners to successfully conduct criminal investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, UNAFEI
has been conducting various international training activities here in Fuchu, Tokyo for many years.
In addition to those endeavours, UNAFEI has organized two Regional Seminars on Good
Governance for Southeast Asian Countries. The seminars were held in Bangkok, one in 2007 and one in2008, and both were conducted with the participation of criminal justice officials of eight of the ASEAN
member countries. These seminars were held in conjunction with the Office of the Attorney General of
Thailand and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Regional Centre for East Asiaand the Pacific. In the regional seminars, we tackled the issues of “Corruption control in the judiciaryand prosecutorial authorities”, and “Corruption control in public procurement”, respectively.
As a further step forward, UNAFEI determined to organize this Regional Forum as a joint activity
with the Prosecution Service of Japan. Today, the prosecutorial authority of this country is represented
by the Honourable Mr. Hiroshi Obayshi, Superintending Prosecutor, Tokyo High Public Prosecutors
Office, who holds the second highest position in the entire Prosecution Service of Japan.
The objective of this forum is to provide an opportunity for the senior criminal justice practitioners
from the ASEAN+3 countries, who have real influence in criminal justice administration and policy
making in their respective countries, to get together and exchange views, experiences, and the most up-to― 27 ―

date information about the current situation of corruption in this region, as well as the legal and practicalchallenges we are facing in our struggle with corruption and workable solutions to eliminate these
difficulties.
The topic to be discussed at this Forum is the “Strengthening of Domestic and International Cooperation for Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption”.
Due to the continuing sophistication of modi operandi and the rapid globalization of crimes ofcorruption, the enhancement of co-ordination and collaboration between law enforcement and otherrelevant agencies or organizations, including financial institutions and other private sector authorities, has
become more essential than ever before. It is essential because such co-operation allows the authorities
to effectively investigate and prosecute corruption cases. Furthermore, strengthening the international
co-operation of law enforcement authorities is of utmost importance in order to successfully address theabove-mentioned challenges.
It is my real hope that the mutual co-operative ties among the criminal justice agencies of therepresented countries will be further augmented by the exchange of views and experiences, and thesharing of best practices in the relevant areas, which we aim to achieve through active debate among thehigh level practitioners of those participating East Asian countries.
Distinguished participants,
With these few words, and in my capacity as temporary chairman representing one of the co-hostingorganizations of this conference, I wish to hereby declare this Regional Forum open. I am looking
forward to fruitful and mutually beneficial discussion over the next two days.
Thank you very much for your attention.

― 28 ―ADDRESS
Mr. Hiroshi Obayashi
Superintending Prosecutor, Tokyo High Public Prosecutors OfficeDistinguished participants, honourable guests, ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great pleasure for me to deliver, on behalf of the Prosecution Service of Japan, headed by theSupreme Public Prosecutors Office, a congratulatory address on this significant occasion: the opening of
the Regional Forum on Good Governance for East Asian Countries. It is a real honour and privilege forme to welcome you all to this conference, particularly those who have come from overseas.
I am particularly delighted to be invited to this august gathering, co-organized and hosted by
UNAFEI, because of my own relationship with this Institute, which I served as Deputy Director from1993 to 1995. I am truly pleased to meet here some of the most senior UNAFEI alumni, and I equally
look forward to establishing similarly close and friendly ties with those of you who are visiting for the
first time.
Distinguished participants,
One of the most important responsibilities of Japanese public prosecutors is their work in corruption
control. It is a mission they must execute most assiduously, as it is vital to maintaining both the ruleof law and good governance. The investigation and prosecution of corruption cases is given close andcareful attention by the Japanese general public, and we public prosecutors continuously strive to meetthe high expectations held of us by the people of Japan to effectively contain acts of corruption.
Entrusted with this solemn obligation, Japanese public prosecutors are vested with special legal
status and tools. Firstly, public prosecutors are entitled not only to determine whether or not to indict
a case, but also to investigate any type of crime, including corruption cases, by themselves, or with thehelp of their own assistant investigative officers. Secondly, public prosecutors enjoy a legal guarantee of
independence similar to that of judges. These outlined tools and privileges enable prosecutors to fulfil
their obligations, including the duty to fight corruption, free from fear of political pressure or unjust
influences.
In the context of such a system, the Japanese prosecution authorities have recorded significant
achievements, including the successful investigation and prosecution of large-scale and high-profile
corruption cases involving politicians and high-ranking government officials, and thus continue to play
the pivotal role in the Japanese criminal justice response to corruption.
At the same time, Japanese prosecutors always endeavour to reinforce their collaborative ties withother investigative authorities, such as the National Police Agency and the prefectural police forces, theNational Tax Agency, the Fair Trade Commission, and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Agency,
in order to ensure that corruption cases are investigated and prosecuted effectively.
Distinguished participants,
Our recent experiences show us that acts of corruption with international implications are increasing
day by day. These cases include transnational money laundering of the proceeds of corruption offences,and bribery of foreign public officials. We are faced with the increasing necessity of relying uponinternational assistance from foreign counterparts in conducting criminal investigation and prosecution― 29 ―

of corruption cases. No single country can successfully fight against corruption by itself. We recognize
the pressing need for all of us, criminal justice practitioners, to strengthen mutual co-operation with therelevant foreign authorities.
In recognition of all of the foregoing, the Prosecution Service of Japan determined to co-organize
this significant Regional Forum in collaboration with UNAFEI. I eagerly anticipate productive
discussion in this conference, and am confident that this meeting will solidify relationships among thecountries represented here.
Thank you very much for your attention.

― 30 ―ADDRESS
Mr. Yoshinobu Onuki
President, Research and Training Institute,
Ministry of Justice, Japan
Distinguished participants, honourable guests, ladies and gentlemen,
It is a great honour and privilege for me to deliver congratulatory remarks at the opening ceremonyof the Regional Forum on Good Governance for East Asian Countries, on behalf of the Research andTraining Institute of the Ministry of Justice, Japan. It gives me great pleasure to welcome all of you who
have taken valuable time from your busy schedules to attend this conference.
The Research and Training Institute is an organization attached to the Ministry of Justice. Its
work is composed of three major pillars; firstly, the empirical study and research of the criminal
justice administration of Japan, the outcome of which is reported to the cabinet, and published as theWhite Paper on Crime; secondly, practical training for Ministry of Justice personnel, including publicprosecutors; and thirdly, the provision of international co-operation within the mandates of the Ministryof Justice.
In the sphere of the third task, the Research and Training Institute divides its work into two broad
categories. The first one is to provide necessary logistical support to UNAFEI in order that it can fulfil
its important mission as entrusted to it by agreement between the United Nations and the Governmentof Japan. The second one is to provide technical assistance, mainly in the field of civil and commercial
law, to some of the Asian countries represented here. This work is part of Japan’s Official Development
Assistance.
In all of the work that we do, we strive to assist our partner countries in enhancing the rule of law
and good governance. With a view to achieving this common goal, I am confident that efforts should be
made, not only to strengthen the function of criminal justice mechanisms, but also in the broader areasof vitalization of the judicial system, as well as capacity building of its personnel, including judges,
prosecutors and investigators. The International Co-operation Department of our Institute has beenworking very closely with some of your countries in developing practical training activities for judges
and prosecutors, and in other relevant areas, for many years.
As such, in conducting our duties, our Institute attaches utmost importance to the realization of
the rule of law and good governance. In this connection, we recognize the significance of this Regional
Forum, aiming at contributing to East Asian countries, including Japan, in their efforts to strengthen therule of law and good governance through effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases.
I have high hopes that, through candid debate and exchange of information, expertise and bestpractices, this conference will provide a most valuable opportunity for the represented countries toreinforce their mutual co-operative relationships in terms of their struggle with corruption. I am looking
forward to an informative and productive forum.
Thank you very much for your attention.

― 31 ―

― 32 ―

KEYNOTE SPEECHES

Keynote Speech by
Mr. Kunihiko Sakai
Director,
General Affairs Department,
Supreme Public Prosecutors Office,
Japan

***

Keynote Speech by
Mr. Masato Higuchi,
Director,
Second Investigation Division,
Criminal Investigation Bureau,
National Police Agency,
Japan

***

Keynote Speech by Visiting Expert
Mr. Ricky Shu-chun Yau
Assistant Director,
Operations Department,
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC),
Hong Kong,
China― 33 ―

― 34 ―

KEYNOTE SPEECH
Kunihiko Sakai*
Thank you for your introduction. Good morning, distinguished guests, participants, and ladies andgentlemen. It is my great honour to have the opportunity to deliver a speech at this forum.
I served as director of this institute several years ago, and this is my second home. I am very pleased
to see my friends, old and new.
My time is very limited: twenty minutes. Twenty minutes for me is just the blink of an eye, I am
afraid. But today I would like to address the issue of corruption in general terms.
Bribery around the world is estimated at about US$1 trillion. That is equivalent to one-third of
the annual budget of the United States. The burden of corruption falls disproportionately on the bottom
billion people living in extreme poverty. Why is corruption so intolerable? In the political realm, it
undermines democracy and good governance. Corruption in elections in legislated bodies reduces
accountability and distorts representation in policymaking. Democracy is a process of ensuring fairness
by which social wealth is redistributed for the good of all members of society. The “one man, one vote”
principle—that is, rich and poor have equally one vote—is crucial for that end. If corruption hurts thisdomestic process, then wealthy individuals and special interest groups can buy influence under the
disguise of democracy. The rich become richer; the poor become poorer.
This is the dark side of the market economy. We are now facing a very serious world financial crisis.
This morning, I listened to NHK news, and the headline news was that Sony announced its layoff of quite
a few employees for the first time in the company’s history. So we are now in the midst of a very serious
financial crisis. Of course, the collapse of so-called subprime loans is responsible for this crisis, but so isthe very complex overleveraged financial system, and its use of products like credit derivatives, which
are traded under the counter, outside the purview of regulators; this kind of activity is also responsible
for this financial crisis. If the financial authorities had successfully regulated such trade, the crisis would
not be so serious. But lobbyists successfully kept regulators from taking proper action on these high-risk
financial transactions, for the sake of special interest groups. This is not a crime in the United States, but
certainly this is against the “one man, one vote” principle, and therefore betrays the will of the majorityof people.
Let us look at another area: corruption in the judiciary compromises the rule of law. Corruptionof public administration results in the unfair provision of services. Corruption erodes the institutional
capacity of government, as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and public offices arebought and sold. Ultimately, corruption undermines the legitimacy of government, and such democraticvalues as trust and tolerance.
Let us turn our attention to the economic impact of corruption. Corruption undermines economic
development by generating considerable distortions and inefficiencies. In the private sector, corruption
increases the cost of business through the price of illicit payments, the management cost of bribing
public officials, and the risk of breached agreements or detection. Where corruption inflates the costsof business, it also distorts the playing field, shielding companies with political connections fromcompetition.
* Director, General Affairs Department, Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, Japan.

― 35 ―

Let us look at the world global situation. Many developing countries are suffering from starvation.
As the Nobel Prize–winning economist Amartya Sen has observed, “There is no such thing as anapolitical food problem.” While drought and other naturally occurring events may trigger famineconditions, it is government action or inaction that determines its severity, or often even determines
whether or not a famine will occur. Corrupt government can undermine food security, even when harvests
are good. Democracy falls; then the economy falls.
Then, the question comes, why do we fail to stop corruption? There are some explanations for this.
First, there seemingly is no victim, no bloodshed. No one seemingly is hurt. Secondly, corruption isregarded as one of the most difficult crimes to investigate. There is often no crime scene, no fingerprints,
and no eyewitness to follow up. It is by its nature a very secretive crime and can involve just two
satisfied parties, so there is no incentive to divulge the truth. In this modern age, sophisticated corrupt
offenders will take full advantage of the loopholes in cross-jurisdictions and acquire the assistance ofother professionals, such as lawyers, accountants, and computer experts, in their clandestine operations.
Thirdly, the crime of corruption provides some excuses for criminals. They tend to justify theirwrongdoing by reason of necessary evil, like a low salary or a pressing household economy. Lastly,
persons in power, who are supposed to prevent corruption, are corrupt themselves.
But do not let these excuses stand and do not let these situations remain rampant. There are victims.
There are victims in corruption. Corruption kills our economy, our society, our homeland, and kills
people’s minds. The burden of corruption falls disproportionately on people living in poverty.
Some corrupt people argue that they commit corruption because they are poor; but this is not true.
The truth is that they are poor because their policymakers, public officials, and businessmen are corrupt.
We can find one good example in the case of one African country; that is, the Republic of Botswana. I am
not sure if you are familiar with the name of that country, Botswana. But Botswana was the 10th poorest
country in the world at the time of independence in 1966. But since independence, Botswana has had oneof the fastest growth rates and has transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in the world to ahigh-income country with a per capita GDP of US$29,000 in 2008, just because it is a very democratic
and well-governed corruption-free country.
Now I want to turn our attention to the Japanese situation. Japan is not free from corruption. I
personally took charge of the trial against a very influential politician from 1994 to 1995. He was thedeputy prime minister and the second most powerful politician in Japan. He received a lot of money froma general contractor - a big construction company - a huge amount of money, in the name of “campaign
contributions.” But he failed to return tax; then he was arrested and prosecuted for the crime of tax
evasion. Why could he receive such a huge amount of money from a general contractor? The diagram on
the next page shows why money passes from construction companies to politicians. The scheme involves
administration, politicians, and the general construction contractors. This is the typical way of corruption
in Japan. We call this relationship the “iron triangle.” In this way, politicians give administrators a budget
or make the necessary laws. The general constructor gives the politicians campaign funds for electionsin the form of campaign contributions. The administration gives them a construction contract for
information on where the construction offer is.
Major construction companies are routinely involved in so-called bid-rigging to win a big bid at thehighest price. That is the so-called “iron triangle” scheme. The parties equally benefit from this corrupt
practice. They want more construction, more dams, and more roads because construction generates
revenue for them. There is a famous joke in Japan: “There are many nice roads which only animals use.”
So how can we break this corrupt iron triangle relationship? From the Japanese experience, it
seems that first, it should be realized that there is no single solution to fight corruption. You need a― 36 ―

comprehensive approach. Later, Mr. Yau, the Visiting Expert from the Hong Kong ICAC will give someadvice regarding a comprehensive approach.
Second, it should also be realized that we cannot rely on a single agency to combat corruption.
Apart from the police or the prosecutor’s office, there should be a coalition of all partners in society to
put up a joint effort. From my experience and observation in a number of countries which have serious
corruption problems, I have come to the conclusion that the most important element in an effective anticorruption strategy is political will. Without the top official political will, it is almost impossible tocombat corruption effectively in a corrupt country.
Law enforcement must be able to conduct investigations free from political influences. If thesefunctions were controlled by political influence, then the whole criminal justice system would be
jeopardized. In Japan, the public prosecutor’s office can investigate independently because the Ministerof Justice cannot directly control an individual public prosecutor’s investigation or disposition of cases.
Also, an effective prevention strategy and an effective legal framework are necessary. There aremany examples of how we introduced preventive measures and legal frameworks to combat and breakthis iron triangle; for example, we introduced the Political Funds Control Law, which caps political
donations and requires politicians to report donations. We introduced the comprehensive Whistleblower
Protection Act, enacted in 2004. The Act provides civil remedies to protect from dismissal or
mistreatment employees who come forward in the public interest. So we have introduced some measures
to break this so-called iron triangle.
Finally, a partnership approach is necessary. For example, when the Japan Fair Trade Commission(JFTC) is involved in criminal investigations, before the JFTC files a criminal accusation in a concrete
case to the prosecutor-general, the JFTC and the prosecutor’s office gather and exchange views on thesufficiency of evidence, and whether the interpretation and application of the Act is appropriate. Throughthese meetings or consultation, we have reached a common understanding of the case.
In closing, we are from Asia, the region of promise in the 21st century. The economy is not a zerosum game; on the contrary, it is a win-win game. For example, Japan suffered a severe recession after the
burst of the bubble economy and Chinese economic growth helped us out of that recession. I believe thecountries in this region depend on each other and have enough capacity for achieving the common goalof prosperity without crime. We would like to move forward hand-in-hand into the bright future.

APPENDIXThe Iron Triangle The Iron Triangle 




  㪜㫄㫇㫃㫆㫐㫄㪼㫅㫋㪸㪽㫋㪼㫉㩷㫉㪼㫋㫀㫉㪼㫄㪼㫅㫋 



㪤㪸㫁㫆㫉㩷㪺㫆㫅㫊㫋㫉㫌㪺㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㪺㫆㫄㫇㪸㫅㫀㪼㫊㩷㪸㫉㪼㫉㫆㫌㫋㫀㫅㪼㫃㫐㩷㫀㫅㫍㫆㫃㫍㪼㪻㩷㫀㫅㩷㪹㫀㪻㪄㫉㫀㪾㪾㫀㫅㪾㩷㫋㫆㫎㫀㫅㩷㪸㩷㪹㫀㪻㩷㪸㫋㩷㫋㪿㪼㩷㪿㫀㪾㪿㪼㫊㫋㩷㫇㫉㫀㪺㪼㪅

These three parties benefit equally from corrupt practice. They want more construction, more dams, more roads.

This phenomenon is widely recognized, to the extent that there is a well-known joke in Japan is that"there are many nice roads which only animals use".

― 37 ―

KEYNOTE SPEECH
Masato Higuchi*
The theme of this forum is “Strengthening of Domestic and International Co-operation for Effective
Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption,” but I would like to begin my keynote speech by explaining
the organization of Japan’s police system.
Japan’s police organization features the National Public Safety Commission and the National
Police Agency at the national level and the prefectural public safety commissions and prefectural police
headquarters in each of the country’s 47 prefectures (including the Metropolitan Police Department inTokyo).
The use of the public safety commission system is a key characteristic of Japan’s police
organization. The system of public safety commissions was adopted as part of the reform of the police
system after World War II. The main objective in instituting the system was to ensure the democratic
operation and political neutrality of the police by means of oversight commissions made up of people ofsound judgment.
The National Public Safety Commission has oversight over the National Police Agency. Although
the National Public Safety Commission is under the jurisdiction of the prime minister, the prime ministerhas no authority to command or supervise the commission directly. This ensures the independence andpolitical neutrality of the National Public Safety Commission.
The National Public Safety Commission establishes basic national police policies and regulations
and preserves the consistency of nationwide standards and practices in police training, police
communications, criminal investigation, crime statistics, and police equipment.
The National Public Safety Commission appoints the commissioner general of the National Police
Agency and the chiefs of the prefectural police headquarters. The National Public Safety Commission has
indirect oversight over the prefectural police organizations through the National Police Agency.
The National Public Safety Commission is composed of a chairman and five members. The
chairman holds the rank of minister of state and presides over the commission’s business. Members areeach appointed for a five-year term by the prime minister, with the approval of both houses of the Diet.
Appointees must be citizens who have not served in the police or a public prosecutor’s office within theprevious five years. To ensure the commission’s political neutrality, no more than two of its members
may belong to the same political party.
To perform its duties, the commission holds regular once-weekly meetings, as well as extraordinary
meetings as necessary.
The head of the National Police Agency is the commissioner general, whose appointment must be
approved by the prime minister. Operating under the oversight of the National Public Safety Commission,
the commissioner general of the NPA supervises the work of the agency, appoints and dismisses
personnel, and directs and supervises the prefectural police in their execution of the NPA’s work.
Each prefectural public safety commission is under the jurisdiction of the prefectural governor. The
prefectural public safety commission oversees the prefectural police.
* Director, Second Investigation Division, Criminal Investigation Bureau, Japan.

― 38 ―

The prefectural public safety commission is also entrusted with the authority to issue licenses for theoperation of businesses offering food and entertainment, for possession of firearms, and for the operationof motor vehicles. However, neither the Prefectural Public Safety Commission, the governor, nor the
prefectural assembly may supervise specific activities of the prefectural police.
Large prefectural public safety commissions consist of five members, while all others have threemembers. Members of each prefectural public safety commission are appointed for a term of three years
by the prefectural governor with the approval of the prefectural assembly. Appointees must be citizens
who are eligible to run for the corresponding prefectural assembly and who have not served in the police
or a public prosecutor’s office within the past five years.
To ensure political neutrality, a majority of the members may not belong to the same party.
The basic functions of the National Police Agency are:●  Planning and research on police systems;● Review of national policies on police;● Police operations in time of large-scale disasters and disturbances;● Measures against trans-prefectural organized crime.
These functions do not involve the exercise of direct police power but are limited to policy research,planning, management, supervision, and co-ordination.
The basic function of the prefectural police is respond to police matters and exercise police powers
within its jurisdiction.
The National Police Agency is hearded by the Commissioner General. Under the Commissioner
General and the Deputy Commissioner General are the bureaus, departments, and regional agencies(regional police bureaus). The NPA’s attached organizations are the National Police Academy, theNational Research Institute of Police Science, and the Imperial Guard.
Each prefectural police force has its own headquarters. Under each prefectural police headquarters
are the local police stations. As of April 1, 2008, there were 1,206 police stations nationwide. Eachof the prefectural police headquarters and local police stations has various departments in charge of
specialized areas, such as community safety, criminal investigation, security, and traffic.
In addition, each police station sets up multiple koban (police boxes) and chuzaisho (residential
police boxes) that work to maintain law and order within their jurisdictions. These are the arms of thepolice system that are most directly involved in the lives of community residents. At the koban andchuzaisho uniformed police officers are on the lookout 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and conduct
activities in response to all police situations.
The koban are stationed in urban areas, while the chuzaisho are situated in rural communities.
Officers stationed in chuzaisho perform their duties while living there with their families.
Now I will explain the duties of the Second Investigation Division. The Second Investigation
Division is part of the NPA’s Criminal Investigation Bureau. Its duties involve detection andinvestigation of criminal activity lurking in the shadows of politics and government, including bribery,election violations, and violations of the Political Funds Control Law.
It is said that in some countries, people arrested for bribery are most often apprehended in the act. I
have heard that in some countries where it is common for public servants to solicit bribes, a citizen thus
solicited will go to the police, and the police will proceed by having the citizen hand over the money tothe official and apprehending the latter in the act of taking the bribe.
In Japan, however, such corruption is latent in our social, economic, and political institutions,― 39 ―

lurking beneath the surface, and generally speaking, is not easily detectable by the police.
For this reason the Second Investigation Division performs a proactive, aggressive role, byconducting undercover probes to root out problems and at times using various special laws to apprehend
perpetrators and clamp down on this sort of latent criminal activity.
As we see it, moreover, the targets of the Second Investigation Division are high-handed operators
who use the four powers - money, authority, intellectual ability, and force - not in a legitimate manner, but
improperly or illegally.
With such people as our targets, we handle the proactive, aggressive side of law enforcement.
This means that the Second Investigation Division is charged with investigations requiring theutmost political neutrality.
In terms of Japan’s police organization, the system of Public Safety Commissions also deserves
special mention in the context of the investigation of corruption.
The Japanese police have strong enforcement powers, and it must never be permitted to operate in aself-interested manner or be used for political ends.
For this reason, as noted previously, the National Public Safety Commission is established at
the national level to oversee the NPA, and the prefectural safety commissions are established at theprefectural level to oversee the prefectural police, as a means of ensuring the democratic operation andpolitical neutrality of the police.
In addition to arrests for malfeasance in politics or public administration, we also apprehend a large
number of public servants for other crimes, such as misappropriation of public funds, fraudulent use of
public funds, breach of trust, and so forth. Many arrests are also made for violations of the Public OfficeElection Law. In terms of specific cases, last year the Miyazaki Prefectural Police arrested the governorof Miyazaki Prefecture on suspicion of accepting bribes.
Funding for the prefectural police is appropriated from the budget for the governor’s office andits departments, giving the governor the authority to adjust police appropriations. However, in addition
to the role of the Prefectural Public Safety Commission mentioned previously, personnel matters arecarried out independently of the governor, with the National Public Safety Commission responsible forappointing or dismissing all regional officers, which includes everyone at or above the level of chief ofprefectural police headquarters and senior superintendent.
Thanks to this system, it has been possible to preserve a high degree of political neutrality wheninvestigating cases and making arrests.
As another example of a politically sensitive case, this year the Tokyo Metropolitan Police
Department arrested the top of technical official of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Scienceand Technology for accepting bribes.
This case was also indicative of the neutrality of the police on the national level.
Now we move on to the subject of co-operation between domestic and overseas agencies in theinvestigation of corruption. At the domestic level, co-operation between police and public prosecutors isessential. As part of the police reforms implemented after World War II, the Japanese police were given
the authority to conduct investigations independently of public prosecutors.
However, even when the police make an arrest with a court warrant, they can only detain a suspectfor 48 hours, and a public prosecutor must ask a judge for an extension order to hold a suspect longer
than 48 hours without an indictment. In addition, it is the public prosecutor who makes the decision toindict or not to indict. Moreover, under law governing criminal prosecution, unsworn witness statements
recorded by a police officer cannot be used as evidence when the accused and the attorney for the― 40 ―

defence do not consent. Depositions taken by the prosecution, on the other hand, can be used under
the law’s stipulated conditions. For this reason, co-operation between police and public prosecutors ininvestigations is vital for successful prosecution.
The co-operation of public prosecutors in police investigations is particularly important incorruption cases, where the subjects of investigation, as mentioned previously, are often powerful peopleof high social status. For this reason the police generally establish a close partnership with the publicprosecutor’s office and receive legal advice on the case from the prosecutor before arresting a suspect.
The police also maintain the necessary co-operative relationships with such organs as the National
Tax Agency and the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission.
Now we will move on to the subject of ties between domestic and overseas agencies.
Because Japan’s police organization functions primarily at the prefectural level, it has been slow
to address cases of international corruption. To date, the National Police Agency is not aware of any
instances of co-operation with overseas agencies in the investigation of corruption.
Nonetheless, in cases in which I myself have been involved, I have been made aware on several
occasions of the need for investigative work outside of Japan and for co-operation with overseas
agencies.
For example, I have made arrests in several corruption cases in which businesspeople took public
officials with them on trips overseas. Needless to say, once overseas they also wine and dine the officials
and pay for their lodgings, but we have not made these outlays part of our case, because doing so would
involve conducting an investigation overseas.
Instead, our cases are built solely on the payment of travel-related expenses made within Japan,
including fees paid to domestic travel agencies on the official’s behalf and spending money given to theofficial prior to flying overseas.
There was also a bribery case in which improper inspection was conducted on a material that was
extracted and produced overseas and consumed and used in a public works project within Japan.
One issue that arose during the investigation was the process by which the business charged withbribery purchased the material overseas. Here again, however, the case was investigated and evidence
assembled using only those documents and witnesses that could be found within Japan.
From the standpoint of proving such cases, I have had occasion to think that it would be more
effective if the Second Investigation Division could partner with overseas agencies, but in the event, time
constraints and budgetary factors have always prevented me from requesting such co-operation.
Increasingly, however, we have had occasion to request the co-operation of overseas agencies inapprehending suspects and witnesses that fled the country in connection with business fraud and othereconomic crimes. And since we can expect an increasing number of bribery suspects to flee the country
as well in the years ahead, I believe the need for stronger partnerships with overseas agencies can only
increase.
In addition, in connection with Japanese statutes against offering bribes to foreign public servants(Law Against Unfair Competition), prosecutors have already made a few arrests (e.g., PCI-Vietnam
bribery case), but we are aware of the need to pursue this kind of case more aggressively going forward. I
hope we can look forward to your co-operation when the occasion arises.
This concludes my presentation.

― 41 ―

STRENGTHENING OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION –THE HONG KONG EXPERIENCE
Mr. Ricky Shu-chun Yau*
Good morning distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen,First of all, I would like to thank the organizers, the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) and the Supreme Public Prosecutors
Office of Japan, for inviting me to this important forum to share with you the experience of Hong Kong
Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) (www.icac.org.hk) in the area of “Strengthening
Domestic and International Co-operation for Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption”. It
is indeed my pleasure to have this opportunity to address this distinguished audience of senior criminal
justice officials from the Region, and I hope what I say in the following hour will provide you withsome food for thought and provoke further exchange of ideas in achieving the common goal of fighting
corruption.

I. THE HONG KONG ICAC
By way of background, I would first like to give you a brief overview of the set-up and the work of
the ICAC. As the name suggests, the Independent Commission Against Corruption is an independentagency dedicated to fighting corruption in Hong Kong. We were set up in February 1974, at a time whencorruption was rampant and affecting every fabric of the society. Our sole mandate is to fight corruption,and to do that at all costs. Our independence is enshrined in Article 57 of the Basic Law of Hong Kongand further set out in the ICAC Ordinance. The Commissioner of the ICAC is to report only to the Chief
Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, but no one else. Such independence ensuresthat we are to fight corruption without fear or favour. Over the years, the ICAC has grown in size, andis currently about 1,200 strong, with an annual budget of about US$90 million, roughly 0.3% of thetotal Government spending. The level of resources that we have been enjoying is an indication of theGovernment’s determination to root out corruption in order to keep the Government clean and to build alevel playing field for business.
Since inception, we have been pursuing our mission by adopting a holistic and co-ordinated threepronged approach of enforcement, prevention and education. From a global perspective, surveys
conducted by regional and international organizations have consistently rated Hong Kong as one of
the cleanest places in the world. For the purpose of this Forum, I will focus only on the aspect of law
enforcement.

II. CRIMINALIZATION OF CORRUPT CONDUCTOne of the major duties of the Commissioner is to investigate offences under the Prevention ofBribery Ordinance (POBO), which set out the corruption offences and the penalty, as well as providing
the ICAC with special powers of investigation.
Section 3 POBO prohibits a prescribed officer from soliciting and accepting gifts, loans, discounts
and passages without the general or special permission of the Chief Executive. This offence means that
* Assistant Director, Operations Department, Independent Commission Against Corruption, Hong Kong, China.

― 42 ―

a government official cannot accept any gift at all without permission. Failure to seek that permission
would render him liable for criminal prosecution and punishment by a fine and a term of imprisonment.
Section 3 is a very demanding provision as there is no requirement to prove a corrupt motive on the partof the official who accepts the gift. As mitigation, the Government has promulgated clear guidelines
setting out the circumstances under which the solicitation and acceptance can be made with general or
special permission from the relevant departmental authorities. There is also clear policy and criteria in
the prosecution of Section 3 cases. The usefulness of the provision lies in it being a preventive section,
since it is well recognized that corruption often involves an initial “softening-up” process which must be“nipped in the bud”.
Section 4 makes it an offence for any person to offer an advantage to a public servant, and fora public servant to solicit or accept an advantage, as an inducement to or reward for or otherwise on
account of his doing or abstaining from doing acts in relation to his official duties.
Section 8 establishes the offence of offering advantages to a public servant by a person having
dealings with that officer’s public body. This offence does not require proof of a specific reason foroffering the advantage. This is because the act of offering the advantage itself is viewed as having theintention of potentially compromising the public servant to facilitate future corrupt acts.
Section 9 is the private sector counterpart of Section 4, which criminalizes corrupt transactions withagents involving the affairs or business of his principal.
Section 10 offence is committed if a prescribed officer maintains a lifestyle or is in possession ofassets disproportionate to his official income without giving a satisfactory explanation. The offence, once
described as draconian, has successfully survived the challenge under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, as it
was held meeting the required the standard of “proportionality” and “rationality”.

III. POWERS OF INVESTIGATIONThe criminalization of corrupt acts alone is not sufficient in combating corruption. To be effective,
the ICAC requires the necessary powers of investigation. The ICAC Ordinance provides ICAC officers
with the general power of arrest, detention, search and seizure. The POBO on the other hand provides
the ICAC with the following special powers of investigation:
1.Power to examine bank accounts held by a suspect, his family members or associates.
2. Power to require a suspect to provide certain information, or a witness to provide information and to
produce documents.
3. Power to require a suspect to surrender his travel documents.
4. Power to obtain tax records of a suspect or his associates.
5. Power to restrain properties suspected to be related to corruption.

IV. NATURE OF CORRUPTION
For those of you who have experience in dealing with corruption, I am certain you will agree withme that few crimes today are as complex and as difficult to investigate as corruption.
Corruption is difficult to investigate because it is by nature secretive and conspiratorial, a crime
often committed amongst mutually satisfied parties with no readily identified victims. The deal often― 43 ―

takes place under the table.
It is complex in that other than itself being a serious crime, corruption is invariably used as a
facilitator of other crimes, including terrorist financing, drug and human trafficking, money launderingand a host of other vice activities.
It is against this background that I now turn to the vital part of our strategy in investigating
corruption – Partnership.

V. PARTNERSHIP AT HOME
While it is the mandate of the ICAC to combat corruption, the ICAC is aware that we cannot do thejob successfully if we rely solely on our own efforts. We see the importance of a partnership approach in
our fight against corruption in both the public and the private sectors.
I will take the case of the Hong Kong Police as example. When ICAC was first formed in
1974, over 40% of our complaints related to the Police. Over the years, the percentage has dropped
continuously and significantly. In 2007, the figure was 8%. There are a host of contributing factors
which account for this welcoming change, but the close liaison and co-operation between the ICAC andthe Police is without doubt a major one.
As part of our liaison effort, the ICAC has established an Operational Liaison Group (OLG) with
the Police. Its charter is to review operational and legal issues of mutual concern, to review joint cases
or cases of interests, to monitor and review police-related corruption and major crime trends, and toreview and improve the existing liaison channel between the two departments. The Police/ICAC OLG,
like those with the other four local disciplinary forces (i.e. Correctional Services, Customs and Excise,
Immigration, and Fire Services), meets twice a year and are attended by directorate and senior staff fromboth sides. At the operational level, our officers dealing with police corruption cases also maintain closeand regular contacts with their counterparts in the Complaints and Internal Investigations Bureau of the
Police. The extent of such co-operation and mutual trust can be reflected in the success of some of ourmajor corruption investigations.
This partnership approach takes the form of an effective division of labour between the ICAC and
Government departments in dealing with corruption and malpractice in the civil service. If an ICAC
investigation results in sufficient evidence and prosecution, then we will see to the end of the case. If theinvestigation does not end up with a prosecution, the case will be referred back to the relevant department
for consideration of disciplinary or administrative action over malpractice or other irregularities
that might have been revealed in the course of the investigation. In 2007, we have so referred 123
government servants to various Government departments for follow up action.
As the years go by, the corruption pattern in Hong Kong has changed, shifting from the public sector
to the private sector. In the 1970s, only 18% of all corruption reports were made in the private sector. By
2007, two-thirds of the corruption reports were in the private sector. The rise in private sector complaints
is indicative of the intolerance of corruption in our society and reflects the continued confidence of the
public in the ICAC. These reports affect every sector of the society, notably building management,
finance and insurance, and catering and entertainment, which attracted the highest numbers of corruption
complaints. In the finance and insurance sector, the reports mainly relate to improper approval of loans
and letters of credit, fraudulent insurance claims, misuse of company funds and abuse in the award ofcontracts. In the past few years, there has been a growing concern over reports involving publicly listedcompanies in Hong Kong, with the majority of the investigations concerning corruption-facilitatedillicit activities in connection with listing fraud, theft, false statements, false accounting and fraudulent
share manipulation, placement and allotment. These cases are invariably complicated in nature, not― 44 ―

least because we are dealing with crooked professionals. The successful investigation of many of thesecases demands a high level of professionalism and huge efforts and resources, as well as a close working
relationship with the regulators, and where necessary professional bodies and industry stakeholders.
The ICAC is a law enforcement agency responsible for the investigation of corruption, which entails
the collection of evidence and the arrest of offenders. A major partner of the ICAC is the DoJ which
has the responsibility for the conduct of all public prosecutions in Hong Kong. As a check-and-balancemeasure, the consent of the Secretary of Justice is required, by law, for the prosecution of any POBO
offences. In practice, the Commission seeks the advice of the DoJ before commencing any prosecution
on corruption and corruption-related offences. Within the DoJ, two teams of prosecutors, each headed bya Senior Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions, specializes in providing legal advice in ICAC cases.
Apart from day-to-day discussions and conferences at the working level, the ICAC directorate also holds
regular high level liaison meetings with the prosecutors to discuss issues of mutual concern with a viewto enhancing the interface between the investigation and prosecution processes.
Another important “partner” of the ICAC is the Operations Review Committee, the oversightcommittee which receives reports from the Commissioner of ICAC on various aspects of its investigative
work. The Committee, comprising 14 civilian members of high standing and four ex-officio members,
meets eight times a year to receive these reports and to provide advice to the Commissioner. The
Committee also publishes and submits an annual report to the Chief Executive on the work of the
Operations Department. As our watchdog, the Committee lends credibility to our enforcement work,
particularly since all ICAC investigations are conducted in the strictest confidence.

VI. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATIONInternational law enforcement co-operation is vital in ensuring that perpetrators of transnational
crimes have zero opportunity to escape investigation and justice. The ICAC in Hong Kong is no
strangers to such kind of co-operation. The case which led to the setting up of the ICAC concerned a
Chief Superintendent of Police, who whilst under investigation for corruption by the Police’s then Anti
Corruption Unit, fled the jurisdiction to return to Britain. The event led to a public outcry, and eventually
the corrupt officer was brought back to Hong Kong, by way of extradition, to face prosecution. This wasmade possible only after the ICAC had received valuable assistance from the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police and Interpol in gathering the necessary evidence. Since then, 37 fugitives had been returned or
extradited back to Hong Kong to face prosecution on corruption and related criminal charges. To date,
Hong Kong has signed extradition agreements pursuant to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance with 18
countries (with three to take effect), which provide the legal basis for the surrender of fugitives, either for
prosecution or for imposition of sentence, with the signatory countries.
Mutual legal assistance (MLA) concerns the use of legal processes to gather evidence in anotherjurisdiction. It may involve the obtaining of depositions from witnesses, the production of banking
or other documentary evidence, the execution of requests for search and seizure, the restraining ofproperties, and the enforcement of confiscation orders. In Hong Kong, we pursue these matters inaccordance with the provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance, and the
MLA agreements Hong Kong has signed with 25 countries (with seven to take effect).
Apart from the formal setting of MLA, a fundamental part of the spirit of law enforcement cooperation relies on inter-agency liaison, involving invariably the sharing of crime information andintelligence as the first step. Such co-operation sometimes would develop into joint investigations,invoking where necessary and justified the deployment of special investigative techniques. Suchtechniques are crucial to effect detection of syndicated corruption and organized crime.
One of our most successful cases in recent times was an investigation into a syndicate engaged― 45 ―

in the business of selling diplomatic passports and corruption-facilitated money laundering. The
investigation deployed a Russian speaking agent from the USA, who posed as a member of the Russian
Mafia interested in purchasing genuine diplomatic passports from corrupt immigration officials and inseeking assistance from organized crime figures in Hong Kong to assist his money laundering business.
The undercover operation, aided by covert surveillance and monitoring, was extremely successful ininfiltrating the syndicate and getting evidence required for prosecution. After a series of strenuous legal
battles at court, six syndicate members were convicted variously for offences of conspiracy, corruption,
immigration fraud, and money laundering. They included three serving officers from the disciplinary
services, an immigration official from an African country who came to Hong Kong to sell his country’s
diplomatic passports, and two organized crime figures. All of them were given lengthy terms ofimprisonment. The syndicate had been operating for a long period of time and very little could be doneby the law enforcement ageucies, simply because they refused to deal with local people. It was throughthe introduction of the US undercover agent that the ICAC was able to put these major players behindbars.
In 2002, the Australian Federal Police referred to the Hong Kong ICAC a case where an officialfrom the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and a Hong Kong based emigration
consultant had corruptly assisted ineligible applicants in Hong Kong to obtain Australian citizenship.
Shortly afterwards, the consultant and a number of applicants were arrested by the ICAC for corruption
and related offences. When the ICAC was set to lay charges against the consultant, he absconded fromICAC bail and fled Hong Kong. He was made subject of an international arrest warrant and subsequently
located in the USA. In 2003, ICAC requested extradition, and following discussions and negotiations
among the three jurisdictions, the consultant was extradited to Australia, instead of Hong Kong. He
was charged together with the Australian official for offences of bribery and defrauding the AustralianGovernment. In 2007, for the purpose of the prosecution in Australia, the Australian authority made an
MLA request to Hong Kong to gather the necessary evidence from the applicants, as well as the banking
and documentary evidence in Hong Kong, which was taken up by the ICAC. In the end, both defendants
were found guilty – the official was sentenced to nine months of imprisonment and the consultant five
years and five months. This is yet another vivid example of how law enforcement agencies from different
jurisdictions can join hands together to effectively investigate a cross-border crime and pursue thetransnational criminals. At the end of the day, it matters not who has the prosecution, as long as justice is
done.
Sometimes, an MLA request may not proceed as smoothly as we would like. In February 2006, theICAC received an MLA request from the Philippines concerning the suspected corruption and unlawful
activities of a number of senior government officials in connection with the construction of a terminal in
an international airport. The Philippines investigation found that the bank accounts of two British Virgin
Islands companies which were registered through a Hong Kong corporate services company were used
to transfer millions of corrupt funds to a person to bribe officials in the Philippines. The MLA request
concerned, among other things, the application for and execution of a search warrant on the corporate
services company. The office premises of the corporate services company was shared by a registeredforeign law firm, which was operated by the same group of people. Documents that were seized weresealed pending legal challenge by way of a judicial review, on the ground that the search warrant was
unlawful as the documents sought were in a lawyer’s office and protected by Legal Professional Privilege.
A series of legal battles then ensued, with the latest Court of Appeal decision handed down in February
2008 in favour of the ICAC. The Appeal Judges ruled that there was no prejudice in the case because the
ICAC officers had taken the necessary steps to safeguard the privileged documents and had sought legal
advice over the matter. In this case, we will go the extra mile by rigorously pursuing the validity of oursearch warrants. It is unacceptable to us that the corrupt could use the premises of Hong Kong based law
firms and the veil of Legal Professional Privilege a means to conceal corrupt proceeds and evidence.
Yet on other occasions, cross-jurisdictional co-operation can proceed even without the existence― 46 ―

of an MLA agreement. In late 2006, the ICAC commenced an investigation into a corrupt Principal
Official of the Macao Special Administrative Government, who was responsible for public works andtransport. He was suspected to be laundering corrupt proceeds in Hong Kong by controlling a numberof bank accounts, using relatives and friends as the fronts, with a total balance of US$45 million. The
information was passed to our Macao counterpart, the Commission Against Corruption, which after afull-scale corruption investigation and prosecution, convicted the official of 57 counts of corruption,
money laundering and other offences. Earlier this year he was sentenced to 27 years of imprisonment.
On our part, the suspected corrupt proceeds of US$45 million have been restrained in Hong Kong under
the POBO.
Originally, there was some difficulty as to how Hong Kong could pass to Macao the vital banking
evidence for use in trial, as our MLA law has no application here given that both Hong Kong and
Macao are Special Administrative Regions of the one country – China. In the end, the Letter of Request
procedure was invoked whereby the Macao court made a direct application to the Hong Kong court that,through the DoJ, instructed ICAC to respond. Through the procedure, the ICAC was able to arrange forvarious bankers to appear before the court in Hong Kong to produce the bank statements and to makedepositions, which were then sent to the Macao court to facilitate the trial.
This is also a fine example of cross-jurisdictional co-operation where one jurisdiction prosecutes andsanctions the corrupt official, while the other cut his life-line by depriving him of his ill-gotten gains.
Effective law enforcement could not be possible without highly skilled and professional investigatorsof good integrity. Training and capacity is an indispensable process through which we create these
professional people. The ICAC provides comprehensive training and development opportunities to all its
personnel to ensure they have the necessary professional knowledge, skills and competence to discharge
their duties in the ever changing environment. In particular, we value and encourage cross-jurisdictional
exchange which fosters closer ties among agencies and provides a platform for discussion and achieving
the common goal. For this reason, we have for many years opened up our training and command courses
for law enforcement personnel overseas. For instance, our Chief Investigators’ Command Course, which
was the 28th in the series, was only concluded earlier this month in Hong Kong. It saw a record highof 10 participating overseas agencies – the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the European Anti-Fraud
Office, the HM Revenue and Customs from the UK, the ICAC New South Wales, Australia, the Western
Australia Corruption and Crime Commission, the Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau,
the Singapore Police Force, the Indonesia Corruption Eradication Commission, the Malaysian AntiCorruption Agency, and last but not least, the World Bank. The four-week course, which focused onleadership and management in a law enforcement context, also included a one-week study tour to Yunnan
Province, China to enable participants to gain insight into the anti-corruption work and institutions
there. Such cross-fertilization of ideas and networking opportunities form an important building block ininternational co-operation.
In the opposite direction, we regularly send officers to prestigious institutions and law enforcement
agencies overseas for training, development and exchange.
Apart from training, the ICAC also organizes regional and international conferences, focusing on
pertinent issues of corruption. In 2003, we co-organized an international symposium with Interpol.
The last international symposium, held in 2006, with the theme of Corporate Corruption – Integrity andGovernance, was attended by 440 delegates from 41 jurisdictions. These are all important forums forcorruption fighters to get together to share experiences and best practices and for networking, which often
goes a long way to foster inter-agency co-operation.
To enhance international co-operation, the ICAC has in its establishment a dedicated unit to handle
international liaison. The Unit acts as the focal point to deal with all incoming requests for investigative― 47 ―

assistance from overseas law enforcement agencies. It is responsible for arranging tailor-madeprogrammes for the large number of delegations and visitors which visit ICAC from all over the world
each year. The Unit also publishes a quarterly, online international anti-corruption newsletter, which
provides yet another handy platform for graft fighters from different jurisdictions to share their successstories as well as their difficulties.
The subject of international co-operation would not be complete without the mention of the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which sets a milestone in the global fight against
corruption. The UNCAC is a powerful instrument which assists in creating a framework of laws thatwould enable the law enforcement fraternities to work closer as partners in the fight against transnational
corruption, in the areas of law enforcement co-operation, joint investigations, special investigation
techniques, mutual legal assistance, extradition, and training and capacity building. By virtue of China’s
ratification of the UNCAC in February 2006, this important instrument was extended to Hong Kong,providing the ICAC with the extra momentum and responsibility to contribute to the anti-corruption
cause.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKSICAC will be celebrating its 35th birthday in February 2009. We shall continue our mission offighting corruption without fear or favour. To this end, we shall continue to adopt, consolidate andenhance this strategy of “Partnership Against Corruption”, both domestically and internationally, one
which has contributed much to our success.

― 48 ―PRESENTATION SESSIONCountry Report by Pengiran Nina Jasmine binte PLKDR Pg Hj BahrinCounsel and Deputy Public Prosecutor
Attorney General’s Chambers
Brunei Darussalam
Country Report by Ms. Pen Somethea
Director, Research and Training Department
Ministry of JusticeCambodiaCountry Report by Dr. Xu Daomin
Deputy Chief, Division of Procuratorial Department for Duty Crime Prevention
Supreme People’s Procuratorate
China
Country Report by Mr. Jhoni Ginting
Head of Legal Bureau
Attorney General’s Office
Indonesia
Country Report by Mr. Yuichiro Tachi
Director, Research Department, Research and Training Institute
Ministry of JusticeJapan
Country Report by Dr. Kyung-Joon Jin
Director, International Criminal Affairs Division
Ministry of JusticeRepublic of Korea
Country Report by Mr. Khamphet Somvolachith
Deputy Director, Treaties and International Cooperation Division
Office of the Supreme Public Prosecutor
Lao PDRCountry Report by Mr. Lai Yong Heng
Assistant Commissioner of Police
Royal Malaysian Police
Malaysia― 49 ―

Country Report by Mr. Han Nyunt
Deputy Director General
Office of the Attorney General
MyanmarCountry Report by Mr. Severino H. Gaña, Jr.
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service
Department of Justice
Philippines
Country Report by Mr. Bala Reddy
Principal Senior State Counsel, State Prosecution Division
Attorney General’s Chambers
SingaporeCountry Report by Mr. Sirisak Tiyapan
Director General, International Affairs Department
Office of the Attorney General
ThailandCountry Report by Ms. Lai Thu Ha
Institute for Prosecutorial Science
Supreme People’s Prosecution OfficeVietnamPlease note that the following papers have not been edited for publication.
The opinions expressed therein are those of the authors, anddo not necessarily reflect the position of the departments they represent.

― 50 ―

COUNTRY REPORT FOR
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
STRENGTHENING OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION
Pengiran Nina Jasmine binte PLKDR Pg Hj Bahrin*

I. INTRODUCTION
Distinguished colleagues, Ladies and Gentlemen.
I would like to convey my gratitude to the Director of UNAFEI, Mr. Keiichi Aizawa for inviting
Brunei Darussalam to attend and contribute to this forum. I would also like to take this opportunity tothank the hosts, the United Nations Asia Far East Institute for the prevention and treatment of offenders
and the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Officer of Japan for all the excellent arrangements.
A. Domestic Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption
Brunei Darussalam has moved towards a corruption free society by putting in place a legislative
framework in the form of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which is used by the enforcement agency
Anti Corruption Bureau to investigate potential offenders. The Public Prosecutor then decides whether or
not there is sufficient evidence to prosecute and if there is, they will charge Accused persons in Court.
The Anti Corruption Bureau has also implemented several prevention methods to combat Corruption
which I will also touch on briefly in this paper, including the implementation “Corruption Prevention
Education”, introduced into the National curriculum.
B. Co-operation with Countries for Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption
Brunei has signed and ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption on 2 December
2008. It has been sent to the United Nations in New York to be deposited.
Brunei Darussalam has legislation in place to provide the widest possible assistance to countries
seeking Brunei’s assistance in criminal matters. These legislations include:● Extradition (Malaysia and Singapore) Act, Cap 154● Summonses and Warrants (Special Provisions) Act, Cap 155● Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgements Act, Cap 177● Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Order 2005
● Extradition Order 2006

* Legal Counsel/Deputy Public Prosecutor, Attorney General’s Chambers, Brunei Darussalam.

― 51 ―

II. DOMESTIC INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
CORRUPTION CASES: BRUNEI DARUSSALAM’S“COMMITMENT OF THE HIGHEST LEVEL” TO PREVENT CORRUPTION
A. Statement of His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan
His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan stated on 21 December 1981, of his intention to create
in government an efficient, honest and trustworthy Government, a government which its officers areprohibited to practice any form of corruption and also to prevent any sort or form of corruption.
“I wish to emphasize once again that it is my intention to create in My Government an efficient,honest and trustworthy administrative system. An efficient, honest and trustworthy Government can only
be created and guaranteed of its existence if the officers at all levels in My Government can perform theirrespective duties and responsibilities with competence, honesty, trustworthiness and sincere in the nameof Allah, for the welfare of Brunei Darussalam and its people. Therefore I wish to remind all the officers
at all levels in My Government that they practice a competent, honest and trustworthy working attitudewith full dedication. With this regard, I wish to emphasize to the Heads of Government Departments andofficers who are directly entrusted in the dealings with due consideration in connection with the public.
As for the public, they should compromise in their communication with the Government officers withregard to their daily dealings, so that our courteous Bruneian attitude will always be maintained.
In effort to create an efficient, honest trustworthy and sincere administrative system which I
previously mentioned, I strictly emphasize that an honest and trustworthy attitude should be forested
based on the teachings of Islam, that is, [ ] I totally prohibit the officers in My Government to practiceany form of corruption. Insya-Allah, I will take strict action in preventing any sort or form of corruption
among the officers in My Government.”
B. The Prevention of Corruption Act
The wish of His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan was translated into Legislation being
passed, being the Emergency (Prevention of Corruption) Order 1981 [now known as The Preventionof Corruption Act (PCA)] which came into force on 1 January 1982. The PCA is an Act to prevent
corruption and bribery and to establish the Anti Corruption Bureau, it’s main sections are as follows:• PART I – deals with mainly interpretation and definition• PART II – Administration of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A key section 3 (1) states that the
Director of ACB is independent, and not subject to the direction or control of any person otherthan HM• PART III – List out the various offences under the Act such as offence of corruption of any person,
offence of gratification committed by agents, offence of bribery to a public body, These offences
carries a maximum sentence of B$30000 and imprisonment up to 7 years.
• PART IV – Give the powers of investigation to the ACB which includes power to search andseizure, power to order every person to give information which is being inquired by the ACB, andso on.
• PART V – deals with the evidential aspect of the Act such as providing presumption of corruption
in certain cases.
• PART VI – deals with the prosecution and trial of offences. It is stated in this Part, thatprosecution under this Act shall NOT be instituted ACCEPT by or with the consent of the Public
Prosecutor. This Part also empowers the High Court of the Court of a Magistrate to try any
offence under this Act.

― 52 ―

• PART VII – deals with other miscellaneous aspects of the Act such as frivolous, false or
groundless complaints are to be reported to the Public Prosecutor, offence of making a false reportand so on.
The Prevention of Corruption Act is a very important tool used to prevent corruption in Brunei
Darussalam. Since its establishment, it has been updated and amended to suit the current needs of the
public and interests of justice in ensuring that corruption is kept under legal scrutiny from time to time.
C. The Anti-Corruption Bureau
The Anti Corruption Bureau was established by command of His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di
Pertuan on 1 February 1982. The primary vision and mission of the ACB is to uphold the integrity of
the Public Service by means of eradicating and abolishing corruption, and to bring those involved incorruption to justice. In its effort to attain the above-mentioned vision/mission, ACB has identified two
main functions which would be the focus of its undertaking, firstly, to undertake preventive works andsecondly, to conduct investigation into information and complaints received by ACB. In investigating
corruption, the ACB’s role is summarized as follows:i)
ii)
iii)
iv)

Receiving information on corrupt activities;
Conducting Investigation
Compiling evidence
Forwarding IP to Attorney General’s Chambers.

A press release on 4 January 2008 by the Director of ACB, the Director noted that corruption cases“are very much under control in the Sultanate”.
“Even though the number of corruption cases has shot up to 76 last year compared to 57 in 2006,
corruption cases are very much under control in the Sultanate. I hope to see Brunei ranked in the top tenof “clean” countries in the world. At the moment Brunei is not included in the index of Transparency
International because to be included a country needs data from at least three surveys. Brunei atthe moment has data from only one survey by the World Bank. Thus, the bureau is working withTransparency International to be ranked along with other countries in the world.”
Despite the advances in technology, anonymous letters remain the top source of information
received by the bureau, as 54 were received in 2007.
D. Information and Investigation
Statistics from the Data and Record Unit, ACB Brunei show that the ACB receives between about
142-244 informations from members of the public annually.
YEAR		
									
1998		
1999		
2000		
2001		
2002		
2003		
2004		
2005		INFORMATIONRECEIVED		(January 1998-		
September 2008)146			
142			
149			
243			
230			
214			
200			
203			INVESTIGATIONPAPERS(January 1998September 2008)
37
61
119
80
87
55
67
63

― 53 ―

2006
2007
2008

244			
189			
150			

54
84
49

Once Investigation papers are completed by the Anti Corruption Bureau, they are passed to the
Public Prosecutor to review the facts of the case and ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence toprosecute Accused person’s in Court.
The Public Prosecutor is empowered by section 374(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code to have thegeneral direction and control of criminal prosecutions and proceedings under the Criminal Procedure
Code or any other written law.
In 2006, the Attorney General’s Chambers received 19 IP’s from ACB out of a total 2,557 IP’s
received from enforcement agencies. This is compared to the year 2007 where the Attorney General’sChambers received 14 IP’s from ACB out of a total 2,522.
E. The Court System
The Judiciary of Brunei Darussalam is divided broadly into four courts. The Magistrates court isthe court of the first instance in Brunei, and it has jurisdiction in criminal matters for cases where thesentence does not exceed 7 years. As a Court of First Instance, the Magistrates Court has power to issue
remand during investigation of up to 2 weeks, issue court bail, issue subpoenas for witnesses, hear casesand sentence or acquit defendants.
The Intermediate Court has jurisdiction in criminal matters for all criminal cases except those cases
where the death penalty is imposed which remains the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court. The
Court of Appeal is the highest appellate court in Brunei Darussalam.
Typically, corruption cases are brought in the Magistrates Court. However, where a Defendant is a
Senior Public servant, where a Defendant is charged with multiple offences or where the gravity of theoffence charged is severe, the matter can be brought in the Intermediate or High Court.
F. Studies on Corruption Cases
The Anti Corruption Bureau conducts studies based on cases that have been investigated in order
to identify areas of weaknesses or loopholes in the management, administration or procedures within theministry/department or organization and forward the results or organizations for implementation.
G. Promoting Anti-Corruption Attitudes
Amongst the Malay community, it is widely believed that if we are to mould a person to becomea good citizen, it is easier to do so whilst he or she is still in the process of learning to become one. A
widely known Malay proverb “Kalau Hendak Melentur Beluh Biarlah Dari Rebong” is literally translated
as “To bend a Bamboo should be done whilst they are still young shoots”. In this vein, the ACB run anactive education programme “Prevention Education”. In this vein, further preventive measures ACB
include:● publication and distribution of corruption prevention leaflets to government employees andmembers of the public● Anti Corruption essays and posters competition● Use of Government media;● Visit to government ministries / department – to know the workings and procedures.
● Talks to Government Ministries / Departments, Schools, Public Bodies and Private Sector● Cooperation with the religious authorities – Friday prayer sermon emphasizing on the evils ofcorruption and good moral values, Publication and distribution booklets containing Islamic― 54 ―

teachings/articles● With the cooperation of the State’s Tenders Board, Ministry of finance, a ‘Gift Clause’ has been
incorporated into all Government and Public Bodies contract documents.
● Blacklisting companies which were involved in giving bribes to government employees fromtaking part in government contracts.
● Banning foreign nationals who have committed corruption offences in Brunei from re-entering
the country.
● Updating the law by increasing the penalties under the PCA corresponding current needs.
● Publishing in the local newspaper the names of those brought to Court for corruption offences /and those convicted afterwards.
● Imposing deterrent sentences for those convicted of the offence(s).

III. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
A. Brunei Darussalam and the UNCAC
Brunei Darussalam has signed and ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption on 2
December 2008. It has been sent to the United Nations in New York to be deposited.
Brunei Darussalam has already begun the process of ensuring compliance of its national policies anddomestic legislation with al the mandatory provisions of UNCAC.
In order to facilitate and oversee the implementation process exercise, His Majesty the Sultan
and Yang Di-Pertuan has consented to the forming of a National Committee on the Implementation of
UNCAC.
The following Paragraphs set out Brunei’s response to Article 38, Cooperation between national
authorities and Chapter IV, International Cooperation comprising of Article 43-48.
1. Article 38: Cooperation between National Authorities
This article details measures designed to enhance cooperation between national authorities.
Essential to the overall anti-corruption effort is collaboration of officials and agencies withauthorities in charge of enforcing the relevant laws.
Article 38 requires States parties to take any necessary measures to encourage, in accordance with
their domestic law, cooperation between:a)Their public authorities and public officials; andb)
Their authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal offences.
Such cooperation may include –a)
Informing the latter authorities, on their own initiative, where there are reasonable grounds tobelieve that any of the offences established in accordance with articles 15, 21 and 23 of the Convention
has been committed; orb)Providing, upon request, to the latter authorities all necessary information.
There is already an existing framework for cooperation between national enforcement agencies
in Brunei Darussalam. Joint operations and investigations are conducted more frequently now than
before. The level of cooperation between the agencies concerned can always be enhanced especially toeffectively combat complex crimes.

― 55 ―

2. Article 43: International Cooperation
Ease of travel from country to country provides offenders with a way of escaping prosecution andjustice. Processes of globalization allow offenders to more easily cross borders, to break up transactions
and obscure investigative trails, to seek a safe haven for their person and to shelter the proceeds of crime.
Prevention, investigation, prosecution, punishment, recovery and return of illicit gains cannot be
achieved without effective international cooperation.
In essence, the convention codifies the extensive current practice regarding dual criminality. Related
legislations in Brunei Darussalam include:● Extradition (Malaysia and Singapore) Act, Cap 154● Summonses and Warrants (Special Provisions) Act, Cap 155● Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgements Act, Cap 177● Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Order 2005
● Extradition Order 2006
3. Article 44: Extradition
The Extradition Order 2006 allows ad hoc extradition on a case-by-case basis in any event.
4. Article 45: Transfer of Sentenced Persons
There is no corresponding law in Brunei Darussalam
5. Article 46: Mutual Legal AssistanceBrunei is a party to the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters which Brunei signed
on 29 November 2004 and later ratified. Under this treaty, parties agree to render to each other thewidest possible measures of mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The enabling legislation, Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters Order 2005 has been enacted and enforced since 1 January 2006.
6. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Order
This Order enables Brunei Darussalam to facilitate the provision and obtaining of mutual legal
assistance to and from other countries in criminal matters and related purposes, including but not
restricted to:i)ii)

the obtaining of evidence, documents, articles or other things;
the making of arrangements for persons, including detained persons, to give evidence or assist an
investigation;iii)
the confiscation of property in respect of an offence;iv)
the service of documents;v)
the identification and location of persons;vi)
the execution of requests for search and seizure; andvii)
provisions of originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including
Government, bank, financial, corporate or business records
The provisions of the Order are applicable subject to any treaty entered into by Brunei and anotherCountry or parties. It also does not prevent the provision or obtaining of international assistance incriminal matters to or from the International Criminal Police (Interpol) and any other internationalorganization.

― 56 ―

7. Mutual Legal Assistance Secretariat
The Attorney General’s Chambers has set up, within its Chambers, a Mutual Legal Assistance
Secretariat to consider and deal with requests to and from other jurisdictions when such requests are
made under this Order.
8. Foreign Country Requests
Foreign Country Requests to Brunei must be made through the Central Authority being the Attorney
General, and is subject to the Attorney General’s complete discretion. In the event that the Requesting
Country is a non-treaty or convention country, the Attorney General will consider assurances ofreciprocity, the serious ness of the offence, if the request listed is in the legislation and any other matter.
The form of Foreign Country requests are as follows:● English● In written form
● Specify type of assistance requested● Identify person/authority initially requesting● Description of the criminal matter● Details of any procedure to follow● Statement of confidentiality● Statement of reciprocity● Details of time limits● Details of allowances / accommodations arrangements (if applicable)
If a Foreign Country requests for evidence to be obtained, the Attorney General will authorize inwriting and a magistrate will take evidence. A Magistrate will take the evidence of the witness, record it,
certify and send it to the Attorney General. The Central Authority will then transmit the evidence to therequesting authority.
If a Foreign Country requests for a Production order, a Court order will be obtained to give to an
authorized officer a document etc within 7 days of the order. It is an offence not to comply with theProduction Order. Production Orders can be made in respect of government records publicly available,at the Attorney General’s discretion, copies of government records not publicly available, documents offinancial institutions and information contained in any data equipment.
If a Foreign Country requests for a written statement to be taken, the person whose statement isbeing taken must consent to do so. The recorder of the statement must be authorized to take a statementin accordance with the requirements of section 116 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Such statement ismade after an oral examination, is reduced into writing and transmitted to the Attorney General.
If a Foreign country requests for attendance of a person residing in Brunei Darussalam, the person
must consent to the transfer. If that person is a prisoner, he must continue to be in legal custody whilst
attending a foreign country pursuant to the request. The Attorney General’s direction is sufficient torelease the prisoner.
If a Foreign country requests for search and seizure, an authorized officer has to apply for the search
warrant. The Court needs to be satisfied that a Production order had not been complied with and suchsearch is necessary for the purposes of the foreign criminal matter.
If a Foreign country requests for assistance in locating and identifying persons, the Attorney General― 57 ―

shall request assistance from the appropriate agency. The appropriate agency will use it’s best endeavors
to locate or identify the person and advise the Attorney General on the outcome who will then in turninform the requesting country the result.
If a Foreign country requests for service of process on a person in Brunei, the Attorney General shalldirect an authorized officer to:i)
ii)
iii)

Serve process with procedure within request;
Otherwise, in accordance with the Rules of the Supreme Court; andInform the Attorney General once the document is served or not.

9. Refusal of AssistanceBrunei can refuse assistance if it is found that the request:i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)

is not compliant with the treaty;
is a military offence in Brunei;
if it is Prosecution based on colour, race, religion, etc;
the offence is of insufficient gravity;
has no consent from the transferred person; orthe assistance would prejudice a criminal matter in Brunei Darussalam.
Brunei has the discretion to refuse assistance if the request:

i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)

is pursuant to any other treaty;
would prejudice the safety of any other person;
fails to satisfy dual criminality;
is an excessive burden on Brunei’s resourcesin the transfer of persons, it is not in the public interest and not in the person’s interest; or
the request does not comply with prescribed form in legislation.

10. Article 47: Transfer of Criminal Proceedings
This article addresses an issue frequently arising in cases involving transnational crime, including
those involving corrupt practices, the operation of offenders in or through several jurisdictions.
There is no corresponding legislation in Brunei Darussalam
11. Article 48: Law Enforcement Cooperation
Article 48 established the scope of the obligation to cooperate. State parties are required to work
closely with one another in terms of law enforcement cooperation in a number of areas set forth insubparagraphs a) to f).
This general obligation is to be conducted consistent with respective domestic legal andadministrative systems.
The ACB has a bilateral agreement with their counterpart, the Anti-Corruption Agency in Malaysia.
In addition, the ACB has concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the Corrupt PracticeInvestigations Bureau (Singapore) and the Anti-Corruption Agency (Malaysia). This MOU is open to theanti-corruption agencies in other ASEAN member States, which all have signed with the exception of― 58 ―

Myanmar.
12. Article 49: Joint Investigations
Article 49 urges State parties to consider concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements or
arrangements in relation to matters that are subject of investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings
in one or more States, the competent authorities concerned to establish joint investigative bodies, or in
the absence of such agreements and arrangements, joint investigations to be undertaken on a case-by-casebasis.
The present MoU concluded by the ACB with their counterparts in Singapore and Malaysia (andsigned by all ASEAN member States except for Myanmar) provide for joint investigations – technicalassistance in operational activities.
Above and beyond this, recourse would have to be made to the respective MLA arrangements ineach State’s jurisdiction.
13. Article 50: Special Investigative Techniques – “Controlled Delivery”, Electronic Surveillance andInterception of Funds
Article 50 requires States parties to establish the special investigative technique of controlled
delivery, provided that this is not contrary to the basic principles of their respective domestic legal
system.
According to Article 2 subparagraph (i), the term “controlled delivery” means the technique ofallowing illicit or suspect consignments to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or moreStates, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to theinvestigation of an offence and the identification of persons involved in the commission of the offence.
Article 50, paragraph 3, provides that in the absence of an agreement or arrangement, decisions to
use such special investigative techniques at the international level shall be made on a case-by-case basis.
This formulation requires a State party to have the ability to cooperate on a case-by-case basis at least
with respect to controlled delivery, the establishment of which is mandatory pursuant to paragraph 1,
where this is not contrary to the basic principles of the legal system of the State concerned.
“Controlled delivery” is one of the investigative techniques already in place in the working
procedure of the ACB. The admissibility of intercepted communication is not tested in the Brunei Courts.
Electronic surveillance equipment is deployed mainly for the purposes of monitoring.
In Brunei, the admissibility of evidence is determined on its relevance, regardless of how it was
obtained.

IV. CONCLUSION
An ancient official once said that “corruption is the product of bad men and bad laws”. Brunei, in
its continuing efforts to rid itself of corruption, has worked towards implementing laws and to eradicate
corruption on a national level and assist in combating corruption globally.
It is hoped that Forums such as these will foster international cooperation between Brunei and othernations in the effort to combat corruption on both a domestic and international front.

― 59 ―

APPENDIXINTRODUCTION TO BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
A. Brunei Darussalam in Brief
Brunei Darussalam is located in South East Asia, bordering the South China Sea and Malaysia.
The estimated population of Brunei Darussalam in July 2008 is 381, 371, the median age is 27.5
years.
Brunei Darussalam is divided into four districts namely Brunei/Muara, Tutong, Belait andTemburong. Bandar Seri Begawan is the capital of Brunei Darussalam with an area of about 16 sq. km.
Brunei Darussalam is still very much dependent on revenues from crude oil and natural gas tofinance its development programmes. Aside from this, Brunei Darussalam also receives income fromrents, royalties, corporate tax and dividends. Due to the non-renewable nature of oil and gas, economic
diversification has been in Brunei Darussalam's national development agenda.
B. Brunei Darussalam: System of Government
Brunei is an independent sovereign Sultanate which is governed on the basis of a written
Constitution.
His Majesty The Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan is the supreme executive authority in Brunei
Darussalam. His Majesty has occupied the position of Prime Minister since resumption of independence
in 1984.
Brunei's administrative system is centered on the Prime Minister's Office which has provided
the thrust behind His Majesty's aim to introduce greater efficiency in the Government. In his National
Day speech in 1987, His Majesty pointed out that it was essential to keep the country's administrative
machinery up-to-date in line with the development of Brunei as an independent nation. His Majesty has
followed a combination of traditional and reforming policies, moving away from a structure of a Chief
Minister and State Secretary to a full ministerial system with specified portfolios.

― 60 ―

COUNTRY REPORT ON CAMBODIA"STRENGTHENING OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION"
Pen Somethea*

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent year corruption is a hot topic discussed among students, professors, workers, officials,
policymakers, and intellectuals/academics in Cambodia.
The corruption in Cambodia seems to be habitual, starting from the top level to the grassroots. The
report issued by the World Bank on 10 May 2000, revealed that corruption among civil servants is one of
the most serious obstacles for public and private sectors in Cambodia. These sectors include the court, tax
offices, customs officers, licensing agencies, police stations, and agencies checking standards and quality.
Good governance is the most important pre-condition to economic development with sustainability,
equity and social justice. Good governance requires wide participation, enhanced of information,accountability, transparency, equality, inclusiveness and the rule of law. In this regard, good governancewill ensure that corruption is reduced to the minimum, the view of minorities and the voices of the mostvulnerable in society are fully heard and considered in decision making processes. Indeed, the attainmentof good governance is crucial to the proper functioning of society both in the present and the future.
The key thrust of the Royal Government of Cambodia's (RGC) strategy to fight corruption is totake concrete actions that attack the roots of corruption. The implementation of the anti-corruption
strategy will be supported with enough tools and resources to prevent and to substantially crack down
on corrupt entities. Implementation is crucial because laws, regulations and codes of conduct are notsufficient to successfully fight corruption. Indeed, there must be efforts and mechanisms to strengthen theeffectiveness of law enforcement.
In fighting corruption, the Royal Government of Cambodia will, as soon as possible, ensure theadoption of the anti-corruption law and now has been created an independent body to fight corruption.
The Royal Government of Cambodia will also promote effectiveness, transparency and accountability inthe management of public finances, especially through the strengthening of audit processes and public
procurement.
The Royal government shall also promote the implementation of the multi-and cross-sectoral
governance reforms, especially those guided by the Governance Action Plan, which has beendeveloped with broad participation from various government ministries and institutions, civil society
and development partners. The vast majority of initiatives in the first Governance Action Plan (GAP)
directly involve the abolishment of the root causes of corruption. Now, the RGC is implementing its
GAP II 2005-2006, which is followed the Government Rectangular Strategy. The core of Rectangular
Strategy is Good Governance, concerning to (i) combating corruption, (ii) law and judicial reforms, (iii)public administration reform, and (iv) military reforms. The paper mainly focuses on investigating andprosecuting level, public authorities, the entities of the private sector and international co-operation.

* Director, Research and Training Department, Ministry of Justice, Cambodia.

― 61 ―

II. THE COLLABORATION OF RELEVANT AUTHORITIESA. Investigating and Prosecuting Level
Strengthening the rule of law provides an important structural foundation for the development in
Cambodia and is a key area of Governance reform (as recognized in the Rectangular Strategy Phase
II and National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) is
respecting and promoting the independence and neutrality of the judiciary as stated in the Constitution.
This also includes reforms which ensure the independence of Supreme Council of the Magistracy (SMC).
Indeed, legal and judicial system reform of the RGC has a detailed action plan derived from vision andstrategy appropriate for Cambodia.
1. Legal
Laws existing: The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) of the third legislature has taken
numerous practical measures to tackle corruption. In this regard, even in the absence of the AntiCorruption Law, the RGC has vigorously combated corruption through the introduction of GovernanceAction Plan and the adoption and implementation of a number of measures such as law on United
Nations Transitional Authorities in Cambodia/UNTAC law 1992, Law on Public Financial System,
Law on Customs, Law on Fisheries, Law on Forestry, Sub-decree on Public Procurement, Order on theManagement of Non-tax Revenues, and Code of Conduct and Ethics for Customs Officials. These laws
are defined to include both the offer of bribes to officials and the acceptance of bribes by them. For
instant, the provisions of the 1992 UNTAC law apply to acts of corruption. Crimes related to corrupt
practices are covered by provisions on Embezzlement by Public Officials (Article 37), Corruption (Article38) and Bribery (Article 58). Other provisions on perjury, forgery, receiving and concealing stolen goods,
breach of trust are also relevant.
Recently, the Parliament passed three important codes: the Civil Procedures Code, the Civil
Code and the Criminal Procedures Code which ensure more transparent in the court processes. It iscommendable that the RGC is now engaged in a follow-up effort to disseminate the new codes and toteach professionals, conducted by the Ministry of Justice, how the codes should influence their practice.
Even these achievements, there are some priorities need to be done to succeed in moving forward thelegal and judicial reforms agenda.
Draft on Anti-Corruption Law: This law provides for the creation of a much-needed autonomous
Supreme National Council Against Corruption (SNCAC) equipped to investigate allegations of corruption
and receive complaints. It also includes essential disclosure rules and whistleblower protection. With
regard to penalty clauses, the draft subjects practices of corruption involving judges to the most severe
punishments when compared with similar crimes committed by ordinary public servants and perpetratorsin the private sector. These practices are defined to include both the offer of bribes to judges and theacceptance of bribes by them. This is undoubtedly the Royal Government’s intention to ensure thehighest integrity of judges which is indispensable for dealing with such complicated crime as corruption.
The draft also makes statement of assets by senior officials of the three branches and a certain categories
of other public servants imperative upon their assumption of public office. The statement will be renewed
every two years. The last statement shall be made in the year when these officials retire, resign or are
removed from office. Any omission or falsification in the statement will result in imprisonment andpenalty fine.
Draft on Criminal Code: This Code is a fundamental law relates to other laws that promulgatedand practiced already and it talk about general crime which is importance for Anti-Corruption law also.
Draft on Criminal Code is now proposed to the national assembly for adoption since last three monthwhich includes essential disclosure rules and whistleblower protection. Criminal Code applies to acts ofcorruption. Crimes related to corrupt practices are covered by provisions on Embezzlement, Corruption
and Bribery, etc.
2. Judicial(i) Strengthening the authority of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy (SMC) to effectively― 62 ―

discipline judges and prosecutors is central to achieving progress in curbing corruption – a key task in
the Legal and Judicial Reform Strategy’s ‘Plan of Action’. The process that is implemented to discipline
judges and prosecutors should be open, fair and transparent.
(ii). Improvement of training for Judges, Prosecutors and Court Clerks at the Royal Academy of
Judicial Professions (RAJP), with the cooperation and assistance of development partners, has been asignificant development which provides for the practical implementation and application of the newcodes. Continued and sustained efforts are required to assure that the recruitment and appointment ofjudges is based upon an impartial, merit-based selection process. There is a continuing need to increase
the number of qualified legal and judicial trainers at both the RAJP and the Lawyers Training School
based on a clearly articulated strategy.
The establishments of the Royal School for Training Judges, Prosecutors, Court Clerk and theCentre for Training Lawyers are positive developments which could have a marked effect on the qualityof the judiciary in the longer term.
The Royal Government has established centers for legal services in the number of provinces and the
district in order to institutionalize dispute resolution mechanisms outside the court system in Cambodia
in order to reduce the backlog at the courts also.

III. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
A. Legislative Level
There are two commissions in the Senate and National Assembly namely Commission on Interior,
National Defense, Investigation, Anti-corruption and Public Function and Commission on Human
Rights Reception of Complaints Investigation and National Assembly-Senate Relation who carry out theimportant task for fighting corruption. The commission control and take action all complaints from publicand Assembly member, so complaints has been reviewed and sent to the concerned Ministries.
B. The Ministry of National Assembly-Senate Relations and Inspection (MoNASRI)
The Ministry of National Assembly-Senate Relations and Inspection (MoNASRI) carry out sometask such as:● Initiate and assign the inspectors to inspect all public establishments such as ministries, municipal andprovincial, general secretariats, public administrative institution and public institution that assure thelaw enforcement and other provisions,● Take measure against the illegal commitment and corruption that commit by the government official,military, police that those act cause a negative effect on the society,● Invite the concerned person to explain through the concerned authority to give the explanation to theinspectors,● Temporary suspend of the action of the public or private institution that affects the negative effect on
the national interest and submit this case to the head of the government,● Submit the head of the government of adoption for the sentences of any individual or legal entity thatfound out that cause a severe damage to the national interest.
C. The Anti-Corruption Unit in the Council of Ministers (CoM)
The Anti-Corruption Unit in the Council of Ministers (CoM) was created on 22 August 2006 andplays a very important role for curbing corruption such as:
1. Investigation Section● Receive complaint and find information concerning to the corruption,● Research and collect information related to the corruption and report to top management,● Cooperate with the concerned authority in order to investigate at the place related to the fraud, state― 63 ―

embezzlement, lose of national budged and other corruption activities,● Review the document and activities of revenue and expenses of national budget and the use of national
and international aid at the ministries, general secretariats, institutions, municipal and provincial
authority and public establishment, administration, public procurement and state company forevaluate, conclude and raise mechanism to the top management.
2. Law Enforcement Section● Study and analyze complaint concerning to the corruption with ministries, concerned institution inorder to determine the offense and suggest for making decision by top management,● Cooperate with the investigation section and concerned sections as well as the judicial police for the
preparation of the case and send offenders to the court through the procedure,● Follow and control the law enforcement and act authenticated of the Royal Government and theMinistries, institutions for the guarantee the moral transparency, efficiency and accountability.
3. Education, Prevention, Protection and Cooperation Section● Build the action plan on the work of anti-corruption through the vision, political policy, rectangularstrategy and national development plan,● Cooperate with the ministries, concerned ministries in order to hold meeting as a national andinternational seminar and establish the others program for the disseminate to the public of thecorruption flaw or consequences,● Educate ethic to government officials, authority, students, police and public.
D. The Municipal and Provincial CS-Fund Accountability Working GroupIn 2005, National Commune Committee established The Municipal and Provincial CS-Fund
Accountability Working Group in all Municipals and Provincial in order to resolve the complaints
concerning to the irregularities of the utility of commune budget. The members of the Municipal
and Provincial CS-Fund Accountability Working Group composts of as following: Government
representative, Commune Council and public representative.

IV. THE ENTITIES OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
A. Development Partner
Royal Government has been enacted and promoted the implementation of strategic framework on
the management of the development cooperation to strengthen the partnership between the government
and the development partner and strengthens the institution for financing cooperation as well as
determine the direction, direction of management and other supports that concern to the effectively utilityof those financing cooperation. Therefore, if someone know there are corruptions on the project of theRoyal Government that received budget from the donor countries, he/she can contact and report directly
to them. The development partners always do their best to find out the improper use of their budget andthey will be happy about reports.
B. Media
The media often wrote about cases related to the corruption. Therefore, if someone know about theact of corruption affected the majority of the people, he/she can contact the radio and press concerning tothose investigation. There are many examples that has been investigated by the media and they have beenbroadcasted and then officially investigation on those corruption cases.
C. Civil Society
Anti-corruption is an area of concern to many NGOs, especially to those who work closely with thegovernment. A few NGOs have made monitoring or research into corruption the focus of their activities.

― 64 ―

NGOs are also trying to address the need for better governance and transparency within their own
programs. There are some NGOs who carry out important duties for combating corruption such as:● The Center for Social Development has assisted the government in the drafting of the anti-corruption
law. It has also conducted studies on the attitudes of Cambodians to corruption.
● LIDHEE Khmer has conducted a survey on corruption under a technical assistance grant from theWorld Bank. The study became the background paper for preparation of the anti-corruption reform.
● The Khmer Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Organization educate the public about corruption, andseek to expose corruption wherever it occurs.
● The Cambodian Independent Watch Committee on Corruption (CIWCC) is composed of local NGOs
which have a strong will to help to reduce corruption in Cambodian society.
The members of CIWCC are: (i) ADHOC, (ii) ANLWC, (iii) CC, (iv) CCPCR, IDA, (v) CHRTF,(vi) CLO, (vii) DFKSI, (viii) IDA, (ix) LICADHO, (x) KID , (xi) KHEMARA, (xii)KHRACO, (xiii)
KKKHRA, (xiv) KKKHRDA, (xv) LCJ, (xvi) LINKG, (xvii) USG (xviii) VIGILENCE, and (xix) WFP.
The purpose of the committee is to discuss issues related to legal aspects as well as practical issues
in anti-corruption reform. It issues statements related to anti-corruption in Cambodia. The group ismonitoring the government in processing the anti-corruption law.
The biggest concern of the CIWCC is the lack of transparency and corruption in public procurementin Cambodia. It is concerned that the problem is related not only to the government’s own budget, but toexternal assistance such as ADB and World Bank funds as well.
D. Private Sector
Starting from 1999 until now the Royal Government has held the Government Forum and Private
Sector that is the thirteenth meetings of the Council of Ministers which has 8 working groups of theforum proceed the meeting for solving the internal issue of the working group and through the interworking group as a base. Every forum solved every difficulty of the private sector as well as taking
measure and the direction for the development of the private sector that the government gives the role as
the mechanism to grow the national economy. Private development in Cambodia refers to the competition
for success in the globalization. In this respect, the government tries to integrate the economic in theregion and the world.
The Royal Government will continue to develop and pursue implementation of policies, legal andregulatory framework and procedures to protect fair competition between private companies/enterprises
by ensuring proper behavior, honorable conduct and dignity in all business transactions. The Royal
Government will safeguard the balance between the rights and interests in the contracts made between
the public and private sector.

V. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
Cambodia has been signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption on 25 September
2007, signed MOU on Cooperation for Preventing and Combating Corruption with Eight ASEANCountries on 11 September 2007 and Cambodia is a member of the OEDADB also. On the draft AntiCorruption Law talk about extradition and legal assistance that compliance to the international standard.
Moreover, Cambodia has the laws and criminal procedure code that stated of extradition and legal
assistance concerning to send prisoners and documents. For example, the laws on the control of drugs,
law on counter terrorism and criminal procedure code mention about tracing, freezing, seizure andconfiscation of the proceeds of crimes.

― 65 ―

VI. CONCLUSION
To sum up, as the above mentioned different countries use different strategies to combat corruption.
Both theory and practice suggest that there is no simple response that should be adopted across the board
once the basic anticorruption statutes are in place. To be precise here, fundamental change requires
commitment from the top and a willingness to follow through as the anticorruption efforts unfolds in the
Cambodian context.

― 66 ―

REFERENCES
Anti-CORRUPTION, http://www.ngoforum.org.kh/Development/DOCS/ngo_recommendation/
atic_corruption.htm , accessed: November 28 2008.
Governance Action Plan II 2005-2006. “Accelerating State Reform: Strengthing Good Governanceand Improving Public Service Delivery”, Supreme Council for State Reform, Commissary General.
International Training Course on Corruption Control in Criminal Justice, http://www.unafei.or.jp/
english/pages/Corruptioncontrol_cj.htm, accessed: October 22, 2008.
Note on Legal and Judicial Reform for the Mid-Term Consultative Group of Donors Meeting
January 2003.
Report on Essential Achievement of Royal Government for Fourth Year 2004-2007, Council of
Minister, May 2008.
Royal Government of Cambodia, addressed by Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo HUN SEN,
Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia, on “Rectangular Strategy: For Growth, Employment,
Equity and Efficiency” Phase II, First Cabinet Meeting of the Fourth Legislature of the National
Assembly, Phnom Penh, 26 September 2008
Royal Government of Cambodia, addressed by Samdech HUN SEN, Prime Minister of Cambodia,
on “Rectangular Strategy: For Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency”, First Cabinet Meeting of
the Third Legislature of the National Assembly at the Office of the Council of Ministers, Phnom Penh, 16
July 2004.
Samdach Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia: ‘Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the
Seminar on the Draft Law on Anti-Corruption in Cambodia and International Standards’, 17-18 August
2005.
The Center for Social Development, Our country-Our future, Phnom Penh, September 2006.
United Nations Convention against Corruption,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html , accessed: October 23, 2008.

― 67 ―

BRIEFING ON COMBATING CORRUPTION IN RECENT YEARS IN
CHINA
Xu Daomin*

Respected Director Aizawa, ladies and gentlemen,
I am very grateful to the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime andthe Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) for the invitation to participate in this international seminar on
the topic of Strengthening Countermeasures for Combating Corruption. What will follow is my brief
description of the effort to combat and prevent corruption in recent years in China.
As we all know, many countries are plagued by the problem of corruption, which has becomea widespread social phenomenon. Since the adoption of the reform and opening policies, China hasachieved world-renowned, tremendous progress in economic and social development. The Chinese
people’s welfare and living conditions have been significantly improved. While making great efforts
to develop the economy, our government is paying close attention to anti-corruption measures in orderto establish a transparent social environment. We persist in our anti-corruption policy, “to seek both
temporary and permanent solutions, integrated governance, concurrent punishment and prevention, witha focus on prevention”, and to firmly implement the strategy of governing the country by the rule oflaw. In China, “post crime” refers to the behaviour of those government officials or public servants whotake advantage of their position to engage in illegal activities, those who grossly neglect their work, andthose who fail to perform their duties or who fail to perform them correctly, and in so doing, undermine
the proper order of national management activities as well as the integrity of public duties. All of theseoffenders must be punished in accordance with the Penal Code. The legal principles regarding crime wereclearly defined in the revised Penal Code of 1997. Regarding “post crime” committed by government
officials, the Penal Code stipulates 53 separate criminal acts. These criminal acts have been divided into
three categories: embezzlement or bribery (Chapter VIII), dereliction of duty (Chapter IX), and infringing
upon citizens’ personal or democratic rights.
China's prosecutorial organs are responsible for the prosecution of corruption. Many corruption
cases involving government officials have been investigated and processed in recent years. We have azero-tolerance policy towards those engaging in corruption. We will prosecute anyone who seeks to use
their power or position illegally to gain personal benefits, regardless of who they are or of what post theyhold. Under the Penal Code, we will gather evidence, build a solid case which brings clear facts to light,
present the criminal charges in court, and ensure that the offenders are justly punished.
Some of these recent cases involve the abuse of power in grass-roots level government bodies or inorganizations of self-management in rural areas that violate the rights of farmers, and therefore constitutecorruption. Other corruption cases involve government officials with large power bases and highpositions, which include former government ministers or even higher posts. For example, Cheng Kejie,
former vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, was sentenced todeath for bribery. Chen Liangyu, former Mayor of Shanghai, was sentenced to 18 years in prison at his
first instance trial for taking bribes and abusing his power. The court also confiscated 300,000 yuan of his
personal assets.

* Deputy Chief, Division of Procuratorial Department for Duty Crime Prevention, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, China.

― 68 ―

Through the investigation and handling of these cases, we can identify why these crimes occurred
and which management or system weaknesses were exploited in the execution of the crimes. We will thenadopt countermeasures to avoid repetition of similar problems. Towards that end, China's prosecutorialorgans have devoted more attention to preventing “post crime” in recent years. The Supreme People's
Prosecution established the Post Crime Prevention Bureau. Each provincial, municipal, and county
attorney also established a “post crime” prevention organization. The following methods have been
adopted to carry out these objectives:
A. Understanding “Post Crime”
We must strengthen criminal analysis to acquire an accurate understanding of the characteristics andfeatures of “post crime”.
Criminal analysis is an important method for exploring the crucial points of the crime as well as
the factors which lead to the crime. It is also an important method for determining the regularity of thecrime, by studying typical “post crime” cases that have been investigated and processed, focusing on thecause and effect sequence of the crime. It is vital that we devote our resources to preventive measures
which fully reflect the prosecutorial organs’ professional characteristics of prevention functions. Criminal
analysis which is deep and concrete, not hollow, ambiguous, or superficial, must be conducted. In
connection with the specific case or patterns of “post crime”, we analyse the status of the exercise of
power, objective opportunities for corruption, and subjective psychological motivation, etc. We also
examine specific cases to identify the reasons for and roots of the problem; carry out crime pattern studies
to understand the characteristics and features of the crime; and research “post crime” by each region andindustry in order to understand variation trends.
B. Preventive Investigation
We must promptly strengthen preventive investigation and determine the hidden dangers andprecipitating causes of “post crime”.
Preventive investigation is a functional activity for seeking precautionary countermeasures. It is afundamental process for understanding crime trends. The goal of preventive investigation is to determine
the hidden dangers of “post crime” and to identify the macro and micro factors that may cause “postcrime”. In order to carry out extensive preventive investigations, we must focus on the concerns of the
public, the problems that have been publicly identified as most salient, and the industries and fields withcapital-intensive projects and highly concentrated power, which make “post crime” more likely to occur.
The prosecutorial organs can implement preventive investigations independently or, as required, together
with related industries, departments, or units. At higher levels the prosecution should strengthen the coordination and supervision of preventive investigations to ensure the quality of the investigation.
C. Countermeasures and Prevention
We must strengthen and encourage countermeasure proposals and positively promote theestablishment and improvement of the “post crime” prevention system.
The main targets for providing preventive proposals are the competent departments of those units
where “post crime” has been committed and those industries and fields where “post crime” is more likely
to occur. The purpose is to promote the establishment and improvement of the “post crime” prevention
system. It is the chief means for realizing the professional prevention functions of the prosecutorialorgan. The prophase research for preventive proposals should be implemented solidly in order toaccurately identify the factors which lead to a crime and to actively propose well-directed operationalcountermeasures. Communication with these units should be strengthened during the process. We should
pay close attention to the follow-up and administration of the proposals to ensure that the preventive
proposals will be accepted.
D. Crime Prevention Counselling
We must strengthen crime prevention counselling and actively promote effective “post crime”― 69 ―

prevention activities.
Crime prevention counselling is an effective means for spreading crime prevention knowledge,
introducing crime prevention methods, and providing crime prevention assistance. We provide daily
counselling to teach common sense concerning crime prevention in order to raise awareness among
government officials as well as the public, and to enhance their ability to prevent “post crime”. We carryout site counselling for stages where the post crime is more likely to occur during the exercise of power.
This includes briefings on the risk of crime, explanation of crime prevention points, and providing crime
prevention methods to promote standards for the exercise of power and effective controls. If requiredby the relevant parties, we also carry out review counselling to participate in reasoning activities forestablishing policies and legislation as well as rules and regulations to propose advisory proposals on “postcrime” prevention.
E. Awareness and Transparency
We must strengthen awareness campaigns and promote the development of a transparent
government.
By using typical cases of “post crime”, we vigorously promote crime prevention campaigns andawareness raising programmes in order to make government officials more aware of the need for strict
observation of all laws and make the public more aware of supervision issues as well as the salienceof “post crime”. We must strengthen strict professional morality, develop patterns of behaviour andprofessional practice which work in accordance with the law, and carry forward integrity-based social
virtues.
In summary, a focus on crime prevention is the trend and indeed, the consensus for fighting against
corruption in the world today. It is an important aspect of the United Nations Convention against
Corruption. We must participate in active international exchanges and co-operation, and gain usefulscientific experience from other countries to effectively investigate, try, and punish those engaging in
corruption. In the meantime, we should also base our efforts on current realities in China, including theactual situation of our prosecutorial organs, as we strive to keep up with the international trends andpractices in combating corruption. In addition, we are willing to actively participate in international cooperation in the field of “post crime” prevention and to carry out professional training and personnel
exchanges. We are also willing to share with others our achievements and experiences related tocombating and preventing “post crime”.
Thank you for listening!

― 70 ―INDONESIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND EXPERIENCESIN STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY
Jhoni Ginting*Distinguished colleagues,
Ladies and Gentlemen;First of all, I would like to convey my gratitude to Director of UNAFEI, Mr. Keiichi Aizawa andprofessor Shintaro Naito, for inviting and for the excellent arrangement. I also would like to thank theorganisers and UNAFEI Staff for convening this Regional Forum.
In this opportunity, I would like present a country report paper of Indonesia. As we understand, themain theme of this Forum is “Strengthening of Domestic and International Cooperation for Effective
Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption”. Nowadays, we realize the need of the countries tostrengthening their works and cooperation in combating transnational crimes, including corruption.
Indonesia has concerns in particular on the efforts of asset recovery. Therefore, the focus of my paper isthe legal frameworks to pursue the corruption asset through strengthening the domestic and international
cooperations.
This presentation consists of three parts as follows: First, Legal Frameworks in fighting corruption,
both Legislative and Practical Approach; Second, The links between good governance, corruption andmoney laundering; Third, Experiences in pursuing the corruption asset, both treaty-based and non-treaty
based.
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
As one of the largest democratic countries in the region, Indonesia is in the middle of a process,to enhance good governance in every sector. This country with 220 million people and more than 17
thousand islands, have done some reforms in the bureaucracy. These include promulgations of laws andregulations in combating corruption. We develop legal frameworks to be able to cope with challenges ofmodern corruption.
In the UNCAC, it is mentioned that asset recovery is a fundamental principle. In order to get better
implications, we need to expand our capacity, not only to prevent corruption, but also to recover thestolen asset. Indonesia puts corruption asset recovery in the top priority. The duties to trace and recoverassets can be extremely difficult. Illegal assets can be hidden all over the world, in any safe heaven
countries.
In fighting corruption, Indonesia has statutes or acts. Among the most important are Act number
31/1999 as amended by Act 20/2001 on eradication of Corruption Offences; Act number 15/2002 as
amended by Act number 25/2003 concerning The Crime of Money Laundering. In relation to mutual
assistance in criminal matters, we passed Act number 1/2006, to respond international needs fortransnational cases.
These legal bases are very important in fighting corruption, because the political legitimacy must be* Head of Legal Bureau, Attorney-General’s Office of the Republic of Indonesia.

― 71 ―

strengthened for sustainability of efforts to fight the corruption, including corruption asset recovery.
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
Besides legislations, as legal basis to deal with corruption, we establish multi agencies meeting indealing with specific cases (inter-departments coordinative meeting). These meetings discuss complicatedmatters in cases, to seek advises and assistances from relevant agencies. In 2004, we set up a team, whichis responsible to go after the fugitive corruptors, including their assets. The team exists until now, and ischaired by Vice Attorney-General. In order to speed up international legal cooperation, some agencies
also design a special unit to deal with it.
Indonesia has declared an era of reforms. We have strong political will from the Government, toeradicate corruption. Good governance is instructed and monitored across the public sector. We admitthat corruption is a serious problem in Indonesia, therefore, the Government strengthens all efforts tocombat corruptions.
However, in recovering the stolen assets, we face difficulties, because in most typical high-profile
corruption cases, the money were laundered and hidden, often in overseas financial center. In the past,
it was very difficult to trace the corruption asset, but now, it is far better for having the anti-money
laundering regimes, through FIU and Regional/International networks. We continue developing thisnetwork to build strong domestic and international network in fighting corruption.
Speaking about the structures of law enforcements, there are 3 (three) investigating agencies:
Attorney-General’s Office, Indonesian National Police (Criminal Investigation Division) and Commission
on Eradication of Corruption (KPK). All prosecution is done by Public Prosecutor of AGO and one who
seconded in KPK. Prosecutors who work for KPK will bring cases through special court on corruption
offences.
Based on adequate legal frameworks, then we need the adequate legal enforcer to fight thecorruption. One important thing must be mentioned in the institutional law enforcement that is whatcalled as integrative law enforcement.
In developing investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, we work together with relevant
agencies. Coordination and Cooperation is done with National Audit Agency (BPK), National Audit
Agency on Finance and Development (BPKP), Financial Intelligence Unit (PPATK). As society demands
more action to prevent economical damages of public funds, now the aim of prosecuting corruption is not
only to punish corruptors, but more important to recover the corruption asset.
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
The fight against corruption is not easy. Our country has done some strategies to cope with it. In
dealing with high-profile cases, the relevant agencies will work each other, share information and discuss
the best way to handle it. This multi-agency approach is more effective, because the complexity of cases,
including ways to recover the stolen asset.
To build our capacity, we need to know the basic steps in recovering the stolen asset. Those are:tracing the assets, including identifying ones, freezing, seizing, confiscating/forfeiting and repatriating
the corruption asset, if the assets are located abroad.
Collecting information and intelligence is important to support investigations and prosecutions ofcorruption. Domestically, we will work with relevant agencies, such as the Police, FIU, Immigration, Tax
Offices and Auditors, to gather evidence. In transnational cases, this cooperation also helpful to establish― 72 ―

the links with the stolen asset transferred abroad.
We have some experiences in looking at international cooperation in recovering the stolen asset.
In the past, in Singapore, millions of US $ recovered in Pertamina-Kartika Taher case, through civil
litigation. In Australia, based on our MLA Treaty, in Hendra Rahardja Case, there had been a success ofrecovering more Aust. $ 650,000 with the assistance of Australian Government.
One important lesson of Indonesia experiences is that, the recovery of corruption asset will increase
the public support. Public aspiration about fighting against corruption not limited on pursuing thecorruptors but also pursuing the stolen asset. Recovered stolen asset then could be reallocated for publicbenefits.
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
Currently, we are having cooperation with Swiss Government, based on reciprocity, to block around
US $ 15 millions, for allegedly being the stolen asset. In Guernsey, the Government is trying to forfeit thesuspected to be the stolen asset amounts Euro 36 million, using civil litigation.
The proceeds of transnational corruption must be hard to detect. Even if we can detect those, it isharder to repatriate the stolen assets. Therefore, we need to understand to process of recovering the stolen
asset, through exchange of knowledge and experiences.
In our experience, going through mutual legal assistance (MLA) channel can be difficult. It has longprocedures and requirements. Sometimes it takes a long time to able to finalize the requests. Anotherdifficulty is that often they require a final judgment on the assets, which sometimes extremely difficult
because lack of evidence.
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
Why there has been a rapid development of MLA? As we know, the crimes occur tend to havetransnational aspects. The cross-jurisdiction problems have increased. Among those problem is thedifferences in legal systems. Criminals are clever to abuse and manipulate it for their own benefits.
As we witness the growing efforts on handling cross-border criminal cases, we trust that assistancefrom other jurisdiction is central. The facts show, at least in our country experience, that many stolen
funds were trasferred accross the jurisidiction. In this regards, we need to cooperate with other countries,
using mutual legal assistance in criminal matters mechanism.
Another channel to recover the stolen asset is through civil litigation. In Indonesia, the Government
Attorney (AG Office) has the power to sue corruptors or their families using civil litigation method.
However, to deal with cross-border cases, we must hire local lawyers, which costly. Usually we also
assign Indonesian officials/experts to work with the lawyers.
In comparing MLA and civil litigation, it is understood that often civil litigation is more effective
than MLA. Civil method also sometimes does not require criminal conviction or final judgment.
However, civil litigation is more expensive, although sometimes is quicker. The good thing about MLA isthat it is cheaper and it is a form of Government to Government cooperation, which is more formal.
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
I would like to mention some lessons to be learnt from Indonesia experiences in recovering thestolen asset. First is that political will by the Government to strengthen “good governance” is pivotal.

― 73 ―

Multi-agencies approach, including cooperation and coordination with National Audit Agency, FIU andInterpol networks, will help the efforts to eradicate corruption and to build deterrent factor. Special unit
in asset recovery and sufficient budget to support the unit, are crucial.
MLA and civil litigation could be implemented simultaneously, even though the implementationof civil litigation is more effective and efficient, but we realize that MLA is still important and could be
improved to become the more effective instrument in the future.
Moreover, MLA and informal cooperation should be done simultaneously to recover crossjurisdiction stolen asset. In the context of civil litigation, we might use it because sometimes is more
effective, as long as it fulfils the cost and benefit principle.
Next, I would like to make conclusions from my presentation. Firstly, in recovering the stolen asset,
we must understand the concept of: tracing, freezing, seizing, confiscating/forfeiting and repatriating.
Secondly, ICPO (Interpol) Networks, Egmont Group (FIUs) and other association or networks of law
enforcement and judicial authorities are high-valued resources. Thirdly, there should be a more informalinternational cooperation in recovering the stolen asset, by empowering the role of government lawyers
and Fourthly, the effectiveness of MLA or Civil Action depends on the legal frameworks of a country.
Distinguished ladies and gentlemen,
We have seen some developments in global association, group or networks, such as ICPO, Egmontgroup, and International Association of Prosecutors (IAP). The emerging of IAACA (International
Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities) and the Conference of the State Parties to the UNCAC are
also productive in strengthening the networks.
The other lesson of Indonesia experiences in fighting against corruption is what we called“intermestic factors” or influence of the international factors to domestic matters and influence ofdomestic factors to international cooperation.
To conclude, I hope this Regional Forum is productive. I am confident that all participants wishes tobring knowledge, information and others’ experience to their workplace. With some hard works done by
UNAFEI, I am optimistic that we can learn how to resolve our common problems to combat corruption,
through domestic and international cooperation.
Thank you for your attention.

― 74 ―

INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
OF CORRUPTION IN JAPANFROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE RELATIONSHIPBETWEEN PUBLIC PROSECUTORS OFFICES AND OTHER
ORGANIZATIONSYuichiro Tachi*

I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC PROSECUTORS OFFICESAND THE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE ORGANIZATIONS IN JAPANIn Japan we have several investigative organizations. Police agents in the National Police Agency
and Prefectural Police Headquarters; national tax investigators in the National Tax Administration Agency
and Regional Taxation Bureaus; investigators in the Securities Exchange Surveillance Commission;and investigators in the Fair Trade Commission have responsibility to investigate cases related to theirfields. Public prosecutors also carry out investigations. Public prosecutors in Japan investigate cases bythemselves. This means that public prosecutors may initiate and complete investigations without police
assistance, and may do so in complicated cases, such as bribery or large-scale financial crimes involving
politicians, senior government officials, or executives of large corporations.
In three major cities, Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, the public prosecutors offices have special
investigation departments where a considerable number of well trained and highly qualified publicprosecutors and assistant officers are assigned to initiate investigations. The special investigation
departments of the public prosecutors offices have special units for self-investigation where well-trained
assistant officers keep an eye on department officials, in particular, by analysing their bank accountactivity. When the department has reason to suspect an official of corruption, members of the special
unit start tracing the official’s bank accounts. Once investigators have identified the accounts they tracktransactions to check for suspicious activity.
When the public prosecutors decide to start their investigation into a corruption case, theysometimes investigate not only the crime of corruption but also other related crimes, such as: violationsof the Law for Oaths, Testimony, etc. of Witnesses at the Diet; violations of the Political Funds Control
Law; obstruction of an auction; fraud; breach of trust; and so on, all of which are stipulated in the Penal
Code. They do this because an investigation into corruption is probably the most difficult of crimes toinvestigate due to the fact that it is by nature a secretive crime, which often involves only two satisfied
parties. Therefore, they investigate other related crimes which are easier to prove and prosecute. During
the investigation, they try to find evidence of corruption, e.g. a confession of bribery, material evidence
which is found in the suspect’s dwelling, and so on.
The special investigation departments in the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya offices have investigatedmany cases (involving not only bribery but also tax evasion, securities exchange violations, and thecircumvention of laws such as those governing the prohibition of private monopolies and the maintenanceof fair trade) with tax investigators, investigators in the Securities Exchange Surveillance Commission
and investigators in the Fair Trade Commission.
* Director of the Research Department, Research and Training Institute of the Ministry of Justice, Japan.

― 75 ―

The co-operative relationship between public prosecutors offices and the above related investigative
organizations helps in the investigation of corruption. For example, during a tax evasion investigation
with the tax investigators, public prosecutors in the Special Investigation Department of the Osaka Office
seized some receipts to use as evidence at trial; however, close examination of the receipts revealed thatthey had been doctored, and this led to the investigation being extended to a bribery offence, in addition
to tax evasion.
Even though public prosecutors’ investigations are effective in bribery cases and white collar crimes,
etc. the importance of police investigation is equally esteemed. The police are primarily responsible forcriminal investigations and carry out the initial investigations of more than 99 percent of criminal cases.
However, following their investigation they must refer cases to a public prosecutor together with relevant
documents and evidence, even when the police believe that the evidence gathered is insufficient. The
police have no power to finalize cases, except for minor offences.
The relationship between the police and public prosecutors in Japan can be characterized as arelationship based on co-operation, in general. However, the police and public prosecutors belong todifferent organizations independent of each other. They maintain a competitive relationship, especiallywith regard to the detection of corruption cases. However, public prosecutors have their own power toinvestigate and monopolize the decision to prosecute over all criminal cases, and, in addition, they havethe important function, or rather duty, of checking on police investigations.
Table 1 shows the number of public officials newly received and finally disposed by publicprosecutors offices for acceptance of bribes in 2005. The number of those indicted was highest for staff
of local governments (51.6%).
Table 1: Numbers of public officials newly received and finally disposed by public prosecutors
offices for acceptance of bribes (2005)

Category

Total
National Diet members
Local assembly members
Court officials
Employees of the Ministryof Justice
Police officers
National public officials(excluding all thosementioned above)
Staff of local governments(excluding police officers)
Quasi-public officials

Newly received
Reported or
received
By police
Total
Total
directly byofficers
publicprosecutors

Prosecuted

Final disposition
Not prosecuted

Summary
Indictment
trial
procedure

Subtotal

Subtotal

Referred
Suspension
to familyof
Otherscourtsprosecution

131

27

104

143

95

95

-

48

23

25

-

28
3

3
3

25
-

1
26
3

21
-

21
-

-

1
5
3

-

1
5
3

-

5

5

-

5

-

-

-

5

2

3

-

7

-

7

8

6

6

-

2

-

2

-

11

8

3

11

9

9

-

2

1

1

-

68

6

62

72

49

49

-

23

13

10

-

9

2

7

17

10

10

-

7

7

-

-

Note:
1. All cases with “acceptance of bribes” in its crime name were counted.
2. “Police officers” means staff of the National Police Agency and of prefectural police forces.
3. “Quasi-public officials” means persons who are regarded as engaging in official duties pursuant to acts
and ordinances.
4. Heads of local governments are included in the term “officials of local governments”.

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Source:

The Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice

Table 2 shows the terms of sentences of imprisonment with work rendered in the court of first
instance for the giving and acceptance of bribes in the last five years. 87.1% of those sentenced to
imprisonment with work were granted suspension of execution of their sentences.
Table 2: Terms of sentences of imprisonment with work rendered in the court of first instance forthe giving and acceptance of bribes (2001-2005)

Year
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Term of imprisonment with work
Suspension of
1 year or
6 months or Less than 6
execution of
Total
more
more
monthssentence in the total
146
121
25
138
187
159
27
1
169
139
117
22
124
121
109
12
113
124
110
14
108

Suspended
execution
rate
94.5
90.4
89.2
93.4
87.1

Source: Annual Report of Judicial Statistics
Eventually, in 2005, 131 public officials were newly received by the public prosecutors offices and95 were prosecuted for receiving bribes. 124 public officials were convicted and among them 108 public
officials were given a suspension of execution of their sentences.
As I mentioned above, public prosecutors, especially the Special Investigation Department of theTokyo District Public Prosecutors Office, have been endeavouring to combat corruption committed
by politicians. The Department was established in May 1949 to investigate the theft or concealment ofGovernment property. Soon after that the purpose of the Department was changed to the investigation ofcorruption, its related crimes, and white collar crimes. It has been a challenge for the public prosecutorsof the Department to investigate so many corruption cases. As a result of these investigations, new laws
have been enacted and some laws have been revised to prevent corruption.

II. SUCCESSFUL INVESTIGATIONS AND A GOOD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PUBLIC PROSECUTORS OFFICES AND RELATED ORGANIZATIONS
A. Co-operation with the FIU
In Japan, although suspicious transaction reporting was made obligatory by the Anti-Drug Special
Law in July 1992, the system did not centralize the information under the law. Japan’s first FIU wasestablished within the Financial Supervisory Agency (reorganized into the Financial Services Agency
in July 2000), when the Organized Crimes Punishment Law came into effect in February 2000. In order
to use information on suspicious transactions for investigation, the FIU may disseminate information toauthorities in charge of investigating criminal cases, such as a public prosecutor or a police officer, etc.
In 2000, the FIU was informed that Taisho Life Insurance Company had paid out billions of yen
and had received an injection of a similar amount of money via a huge purchase of its stocks. Thistransaction was very suspicious. Therefore, the FIU notified the Special Investigation Department in theTokyo District Public Prosecutors Office of this fact. The prosecutors of that Department initiated aninvestigation and revealed that the money paid out by the Company was the result of a fraud perpetrated
against the Company, and thereafter arrested a number of suspects for this fraud offence. Moreover,the prosecutors discovered that it was the intention of those who returned the money to the Company― 77 ―

through the purchase of its stocks to acquire influential positions within the Company. In this way, thesuspects had succeeded in becoming president and controlling officers of the Company. This kind of
infiltration of a legitimate business enterprise via money laundering is indictable under the Organized
Crimes Punishment Law; therefore, the suspects were re-arrested for that crime and were subsequently
prosecuted. The leader was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment with work and a ten million yen fine.
B. Co-operation with the Regional Taxation Bureau
In 2004, when I was the Deputy Director of the Special Investigation Department of the Osaka
District Public Prosecutors Office, we investigated a bribery case which was committed by two public
officials. They worked for the office of public sanitation in a certain area at Funai County in Kyoto
Prefecture. A company which wanted to work in that area decided to bribe these public officials in orderto receive beneficial treatment from the public office. The president of the company gave them bribes
until just before their arrest. The total amount of the money the two suspects received was over 40 million
yen. We arrested the two public officials and the president of the company in September 2004. Soon after
the arrest, the bribe-giver and the receivers confessed to their crimes in detail, and we obtained enoughevidence to prosecute them.
How did we uncover the case? We found out about this case from the documents of a tax evasioncase in which the president of the company was the suspect. During the investigation of the tax evasion
case, the tax investigator took statements from the president’s wife regarding a large amount of money
sent to the above mentioned public officials in the form of their salaries for services rendered to thecompany. The tax investigator suspected that the large salaries as stated in the company’s documentation
could not be the officials’ legitimate earnings and instead disguised a bribe. Hence, the wife’s statements
gave the public prosecutors cause to begin a corruption investigation.
The two public officials were tried, and they were sentenced respectively to two and three years’
imprisonment. But the trial of the president of the company was dismissed, because he was released onbail and committed suicide before he was convicted.
C. Co-operation with Foreign Governments
In Japan it is prohibited to give a bribe to a public official even if he/she is a foreign public official.
It is stipulated in the Unfair Competition Prevention Law. Until recently this provision was used very
little. If we consider prosecuting a Japanese for committing this violation, we need to collect thestatements or testimony of the foreign official who received the bribe. It has not been easy for us becauseof the difficulties in identifying the crime in its entirety before requesting assistance from a foreigncountry.
However, I will outline a successful investigation which was revealed by the public prosecutors to
be a case of giving a bribe to a Vietnamese official. An official of a Vietnamese organization that oversaw
a multibillion yen highway construction project in Ho Chi Minh City received bribes paid by Pacific
Consultants International (hereinafter ‘PCI’) to secure the contract for the project, which was funded withJapanese official development assistance (hereinafter ODA).
The cross-city highway was a massive project that involved tunneling under the Saigon River inthe city. The total project cost was about 80 billion yen. PCI received about 1.1 billion yen in fiscal 2001
for consultancy work on a project to build a highway traversing Ho Chi Minh City from east to west. In
fiscal 2003, a consortium that included PCI and other firms won a contract worth about 2 billion yen.
Both were for ODA works funded with yen loans.
The investigation of the Tokyo Public Prosecutors Special Investigation Department, which began
about a year ago, revealed that PCI, a leading player in the overseas consulting business, had engaged
in illicit deals concerning overseas projects funded by large amounts of Japanese ODA, and in a project
dealing with the destruction of chemical weapons in China. Public prosecutors were looking into whether― 78 ―

PCI violated the Unfair Competition Prevention Law by bribing an overseas public official.
During the above investigation, the public prosecutors uncovered other crimes which werecommitted by the former PCI president and his subordinates, that is, tax evasion in connection with an
official government development assistance project in Southeast Asia. Then the former president, his
subordinates and PCI has been charged with violating the Corporate Tax Law for unlawfully raisingfunds to use as bribes for winning ODA-related contracts. PCI evaded corporate tax payments in order
to raise money for its bribery, including the use of a dummy company in Hong Kong. PCI repeatedly
gave bribes to foreign public officials to land orders from foreign governments through the company's
local offices. However, knowing that the practice stood a good chance of being exposed, the former PCI
President ordered his subordinates in 2002 to think about less conspicuous ways to operate. As a result,
PCI decided to establish a dummy company in Hong Kong to pool off-the-book funds for use as bribemoney. Eventually PCI transferred about 260 million yen in total to the dummy company and evaded
about 80.92 million yen in corporate tax over two years until the business year ending in September
2004, by hiding about 252.72 million yen in income. The income was covered by false budgeting for thefictitious outsourcing of designs.
Meanwhile, PCI received orders in 2001 and 2003 from a Ho Chi Minh City office, known as
PMU (the project management unit), for a highway construction project in the city and promised a PMU
executive bribes totaling US$2.6 million (about 286 million yen). Based on the promise, PCI offered
two bribes—US$600,000 in December 2003 and US$540,000 in September 2004. Finally the publicprosecutors of the Special Investigation Department in Tokyo indicted the former PCI president andhis subordinates, four persons in total, and the company PCI for violation of the Unfair Competition
Prevention Law by giving a bribe, in the amount of 90 million yen, on 25 August this year. The case is
now under trial.
In the course of the investigation, public prosecutors had been requesting assistance from theVietnamese government, through the comity of nations and via the diplomatic channel. Because of theconfession by the suspects of PCI, public prosecutors were able to prove the above mentioned crimes.
However, if they had obtained the Vietnamese official’s confession or testimony, it would have been
perfectly sufficient to establish guilt. Therefore, the co-operative relationship between Japan and Vietnam
was very important to ensure the success of this investigation.
D. Co-operation with Administrative Organizations
About ten years ago, when I was a member of the Special Investigation Department of Osaka
District Public Prosecutors Office, I investigated a case of bribery involving the Mayor of the City ofWakayama, a city of some 400,000 people and a renowned tourist destination, and the former chairmanof the Wakayama Municipal Assembly.
The first clue was an item in a newspaper that reported that the Sennan City Agricultural Cooperative (SCAC) in Osaka had gone bankrupt. This is unusual for an agricultural co-operative. We knewthat the SCAC had a bad reputation because it had too many bad loans on its books. Furthermore, Mr. X
was one of the debtors, and we also knew him by reputation and had previously suspected him of giving
bribes to local government officers and members of the local assembly. We therefore concluded that somebreach of trust had occurred in the SCAC in relation to its loans and that Mr. X was probably involved,
along with the head of the SCAC.
We started by asking for the co-operation of the Agricultural Co-operative Department in the Osaka
prefectural government. This organization is responsible for supervising agricultural co-operatives in
Osaka by periodically reviewing co-operatives’ management and keeping track of their performance bymeans of reports and other documents. We received these various documents and reports and analysed
the SCAC’s loans. We also interviewed some SCAC staff. Eventually we determined that we had
sufficient evidence to prosecute the head of the SCAC and Mr. X for a breach of trust of 500 million yen.
We arrested the head of the SCAC, another SCAC staff member who was in charge of accounting, Mr. X,
and a subordinate of Mr. X. A few days later they all confessed.

― 79 ―

During the investigation we searched Mr. X’s office and seized a certificate made by the Wakayama
Land Development Agency. The certificate stated that the agency guaranteed to buy Mr. X’s land. At firstglance it was an ordinary certificate, but careful examination revealed some irregularities. One of these
was the signature. Normally the head of the issuing agency signs a certificate of this kind, but in this casethe signature was that of a significantly lower-ranking official. Another irregularity was that the land was
not as valuable as cited on the certificate. This led us to believe that Mr. X had bribed someone at theagency.
With this information in hand we interrogated Mr. X’s subordinate. After an initial denial heconfessed to giving a bribe of five million yen to Mr. Y, the former chairman of the Wakayama Municipal
Assembly, to pressure the head of the Wakayama Land Development Agency, also the Mayor of
Wakayama, to issue the certificate, because Mr. X and his subordinate thought that the certificate would
significantly boost the value of the land.
After confronting Mr. X with his subordinate’s confession, Mr. X also eventually confessed to giving
the five million yen bribe to Mr. Y. Thus we eventually also obtained a confession from Mr. Y. However,at this stage, we could not arrest the Mayor of Wakayama, because he had ordered a subordinate to makethe certificate and sign it, and we had insufficient evidence to prove that the Mayor had committed acrime. We did, however, have sufficient grounds to search the Mayor’s office. We examined his daily
work records and found a reference to a meeting with his subordinate, Mr. Z, early one weekend morningin his office, which was unusual. We had also learned from Mr. Y about a scheme whereby parents could
get their children employed at the Wakayama Administrative Office by giving the Mayor one million yen.
An investigation of Mr. Z found that his daughter had gained entry to the office even though she had not
performed as well on the entrance examination as other candidates who had not been employed by theoffice.
Following further investigation we arrested the Mayor, his secretary, and Mr. Z. We also interviewed
Mr. Z’s wife, who was familiar with the whole story. They all confessed to the recruitment scheme
and were indicted. The arrest and indictment of a mayor of a city of this size is rare and caused quite asensation. At the trial, all the defendants admitted their guilt and received appropriate sentences.
This case underscores the importance of co-operation with the administrative organization andanalysing material evidence. If we had not had the co-operation of the organization and noticed theirregularities in the certificate or found the reference to a meeting between the Mayor and Mr. Z, we
would not have discovered the second crime, i.e. the recruitment scheme.

III. CONCLUSION
I have outlined in this paper four cases which were successfully investigated and I hope that I
have made clear the importance of co-operation between public prosecutors offices and other relatedorganizations. Now and in the future, the concealment of giving and receiving bribes will become
increasingly sophisticated. In such a situation, for the purpose of maintaining social stability and trust
in a fair government, investigative organizations, including public prosecutors offices, should maintaina close and co-operative relationship, in both domestic and overseas investigation, to combat corrupt
politicians and high-ranking officials.

― 80 ―

EXPERIENCE IN EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
OF CORRUPTION IN KOREA
Kyung-Joon Jin*

I. INTRODUCTION
My presentation will include the following features; (1) Korea's legal system against corruption;(2) domestic policies; (3) introduction to international cooperation. I want to share Korea’s experiencesin fighting against corruption and addressing the challenges of establishing an international body forcorruption prevention and eradication.
In the 21st century corruption has become a global phenomenon, being called a social cancer thatworries the international community. It is corroding the culture and ethos of democracy at all levels.
It can be safely said that the degree of integrity determines the future of a nation and its
compatibilities. And a corruption-free country is considered as an advanced country.
Each country is allocating astronomical amount of money to eradicate the corruption. Nevertheless,
we can not expect that one country alone can fight against the corruption. Global issues require global
cooperation and interests.

II. DOMESTIC SYSTEM AND POLICIES
A. Overview
The Republic of Korea has established various legal and institutional systems in order to prevent thecorruption and bribery and to make compensation to possible infringement caused by corruption in bothpublic and private sectors.
In particular, the establishment of the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit, the comprehensive agencies
like Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission and the enactment of AML-related laws are showing
Korea's efforts to advance nation's anti-corruption system.
B. The Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutors’ Office
1. Joint Investigation TF(i) Background
Based on the principle of specialization and cooperation, Korea recognized the necessity of thegovernment-level comprehensive countermeasures for the effective combat against the major corruption
such as any conduct or behavior in relation to persons entrusted with responsibilities in public office andlarge scale economic corruption.
(ii) Details
The joint investigation TF has been established under the Central Investigation Division at the* Supervisor Prosecutor, Director of International Criminal Affairs Division, Korea.

― 81 ―

Supreme Prosecutors’ Office in an effort to respond to corruption related offences including large-scaleeconomic corruption and political corruption effectively.
Competent authorities including the Prosecutors' Office, National Police Agency, National Tax
Service, Korea Customs Service, Financial Supervisory Commission and Korea Deposit Insurance
Corporation are participating in the TF.
In case where the major offenses are under investigation, competent authorities are dispatching
sufficient number of personnel to form a TF, which is dissolved after the investigation closes.
Usually competent authorities are sending one liaison officer to the Supreme Prosecutors' Office,and additional officers in urgent cases.
2. ‘Anti Money Laundering and Redemption of Criminal Proceeds’ TF(i)Background‘Proceeds of Crime Act' and 'Act on Special Cases concerning Forfeiture for Offenses of Public
Officials' define the proceeds from corruption-related crime as illegal proceeds, which can be subject tothe forfeiture.
These acts are enacted on the grounds that confiscation of the proceeds from corruption- related
crimes may uproot the motive of a crime and make justice reality.
(ii) TF Composition
Anti-Money Laundering and Redemption of Criminal Proceeds TF is composed of 10 experts inthe two teams which have been set up under the High-tech Crime Investigation Division of the Supreme
Prosecutors' Office.
In particular, one prosecutor and three prosecution investigators as well as experts in finance andaccounting dispatched by National Tax Service, Financial Supervisory Service and Korea Deposit
Insurance Corporation are specializing in tracing the origin of the fund and the cooperation between
competent authorities.
(iii) TF Mission
Regarding the investigation of the Central Investigation Division of the Supreme Prosecutors' Officeand the district prosecutors' office, the Anti-Money Laundering and Redemption of Criminal Proceeds TF
mainly takes responsibilities of tracing the money laundered for the recovery of the illegal proceeds andof preserving the confiscation of property before the prosecution.
To this end, the team is carrying out the investigation on the money laundered, property of thesuspect and related persons, foreign exchange transaction for asset drain overseas, and it is identifying
the confiscation- targeted property.
(iv) Performance
Classification Year

Number of Cases of Forfeiture,
Confiscation and Freezing

Amount of Forfeiture, Confiscation
and Freezing

2005

73

2.9 billion

2006

472

238.3 billion

2007

507

54.1 billion

2008.1~9.

422

95.2 billion― 82 ―

No. of cases and amount of money forfeiture, confiscation and freezing is gradually increasing. The
amount of money in 2006 was extraordinary due to some special investigation.
(v) Future Plan
Currently, Anti-Money Laundering and Redemption of Criminal Proceeds TF has been establishedonly under the Supreme Prosecutors' Office. However, this kind of TF should be set up at every district
prosecutors' office or at the central district prosecutors' office.
3. Concurrent Punishment for Bribery
A draft revision which will make a bribee or bribe taker concurrently punishable by physicalimprisonment and by a monetary fine is now under deliberation in Congress.
(i) Background
Relatively low imprisonment rates for bribery, systematical lack of compulsory execution measuresof confiscation and forfeiture have posed stumbling block to the effort to eradicate the bribery.
(ii) Details
In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the punishment on the bribery offender and of the asset
recovery of the illegal proceeds, provision of the aggravated punishment for bribery of the public officials
will be added to the 'Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes'. Public officials who
receive bribe shall be punished by physical imprisonment and by a monetary fine 2 to 5 times as much as
the amount of the received bribery.
To prevent misconduct by insiders of financial institutions, Korea is seeking the revision of the 'Act
on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes'. The legislative intent, content of the
Act and the statutory punishment will be similarly revised so that the bribery of insiders of financial
institutions would be dealt with as the bribery of the public officials.
Under the revised law, if any officer or employee of a financial institution receives, demands orpromises any money or other benefit, in connection with his or her duties, he or she shall be punished by
the penalties of physical imprisonment and a monetary fine concurrently.
C. Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission
1. Background and Progress● As the Anti-corruption Act came into effect on January 25, 2002, the Korean Independent Commission
against Corruption was established with comprehensive and systematic tools to fight against corruption.
● The Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) was launched on February 29, 2008 by
integrating several units including the Ombudsman of Korea, the Korea Independent Commission
against Corruption and the Administrative Appeals Commission into one to prevent corruption, to protect
people's right and to make a compensation.
2. Anti-Corruption Functions
The Anti-Corruption & Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) performs the following five functions;● Receiving Corruption Report, protecting and rewarding whistle-blowers,● Developing measures against corruption in the public sector and making recommendation to help
government agencies to amend ambiguous corruption-prone laws and institutions,● Confirming the implementation of ACRC's recommendations,● Raising public awareness on corruption issues,● Promoting public-private partnership to anti-corruption, and joining global efforts to fight against
corruption.

― 83 ―

3. Major Policies(i) Operation of Anti-corruption Assessment System● Assessment of Integrity of Public Agencies
ACRC assesses the levels of integrity of public sector organizations each year by surveying citizens
who have had firsthand experience with public services. The commission also evaluates the anticorruption initiatives taken by public organizations on a regular basis. The fundamental objective of theseassessments is to encourage public organizations to make voluntary efforts to tackle corruption● Surveys are conducted on 11 items such as experiences of providing and receiving gifts, rationality of
the administrative system, impartiality of administrative dealing and related agencies' efforts to prevent
corruption. Analysis on corruption-prone sectors of each agency and its corruption-causing factors arebeing presented.
At the beginning, assessment subjects were mostly government agencies, but the targets have beenbroadened to cover other corruption-prone public agencies.
● Confirming the implementation of ACRC's recommendations
ACRC encourages the administrative agencies to make voluntary efforts, by evaluating theimplementation and anti-corruption initiatives taken by these agencies. The fundamental objective of theevaluation is to encourage those agencies to make voluntary efforts to tackle corruption and to provide an
exemplary case in order to rally people against corruption.
● Conducting Corruption Impact Assessment
The Corruption Impact Assessment is an analytical mechanism designed to identify and remove
corruption-causing factors in acts, presidential decrees, ordinances of the Prime Minister and Ministries
and related directives, established rules, public notices, public notifications, municipal ordinances andregulations.
Under this system, every proposed enactment and amendment as well as existing legislation isscreened for any factor that could contribute to the occurrence of corrupt practices.
(ii) Strict Handling of the Corruption Report and Strengthening of Whistle-blower Protection● Strict handling of the Corruption Report
Any person may report an act of corruption to ACRC. The commission refers the case to the Board
of Audit and investigative authorities and the other agencies concerned.
If a prosecutor does not institute public prosecution against vice minister-level high ranking
public officers, mayors of Seoul or metropolitan cities and governors, superintendent generals-level
police officers, judges and public prosecutors and lawmakers after he conducts investigation on thecases reported, ACRC may apply for a court review on whether the decisions not to institute publicprosecutions are legitimate or not with the competent High Court pertaining to the high prosecutors’
office to which the prosecutor in charge belongs.

― 84 ―

Prosecutors' Rulings on ACRC’s Complaints 						IndexYear Agency

Ruling(No. of Cases)no.
of report

total

prosecution

nonprosecutiononsuspended Investigation
prosecution

2003

KoreanIndependent
commission
againstCorruption

24

24

13

11

2004

KoreanIndependent
commission
againstCorruption

12

12

8

4

2005

Korea
Independent
Commission
AgainstCorruption

29

29

9

20

2006

Korea
Independent
Commission
AgainstCorruption

17

17

4

13

2007

Korea
Independent
Commission
AgainstCorruption

30

26

12

13

1

4

2008.
1~11.

AntiCorruption &Civil Rights
Commission

19

6

2

3

1

13

● Protection and Financial Rewards for those who report Acts of Corruption
When whistle-blowers have suffered or are expected to suffer any disadvantages in theiremployment or discrimination in their working conditions due to the reporting of corruption, they can ask
ACRA for measures to guarantee their continued employment, including reinstatement to their original
position, arrangement of a transfer to a different post, and deferment of disciplinary measures against
them.
ACRC may ask the head of the competent police authority to take relevant steps to protect whistleblowers, their collaborators, relatives, or cohabitants when they are in danger as a consequence ofreporting corruption.
ACRC will provide whistle-blowers with rewards if their reports of corruptions have contributed
directly to recovering revenues. Also, ACRC may grant or recommend awards up to approximately
50,000 USD if the whistle-blowing has increased the public asset.
D. Korea Finance Intelligence Unit
(i) Background● In order to prevent corruption, illegal proceeds from crimes must be confiscated completely, preventing
them from occurring in the first place. To do this, money laundering which disguises corruption-related― 85 ―

money as legal one should be prevented.
● The Korean government established the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit (KoFIU) in November 2001
under the Financial Services Commission in accordance with the Financial Transaction Reports Act.
(ii) Anti-money Laundering System of KoFIU● Suspicious Transaction Reporting (STR) systemIf financial institutions, or other businesses or entities subject to anti-money laundering obligations,suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are linked or related to illegal proceeds, or are
to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist organizations, they should be required to report
promptly their suspicious transaction report to KoFIU.
When KoFIU is suspicious of illegal financial transactions or money laundering practices after
reviewing and analyzing information on suspicious transactions provided by financial institutions,
it transmits the results of such analyses to law enforcement agencies such as the prosecutors' office,National Tax Service, National Police Agency, Customs Service, and National Election Commission.
The law enforcement agencies then analyze and investigate the provided information, and take necessary
legal actions.
● Currency Transaction Reporting (CTR) System
CTR system requires financial institutions to report on the big volume financial transactions they
engage in, in accordance with a set of standards. (Now all the transactions that exceed approximately
30,000USD) This system allows KoFIU to review and analyze big volume currency transactions basedon objective information given.
When the total amount of currency transactions made by the same person at the same financial
institution (received and/or paid) exceeds 30,000USD, the financial institution should report the person’s
CTR.
● International Mutual Cooperation on Money Laundering Crimes
International cooperation among the FIUs is crucial in order for the effective address of theinternational money laundering crimes.
(iii) Performance by the Prosecutors on Financial Transaction Details											(No. of cases)

processed
class year

Received

2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008.1~11.

31
146
146
220
282
277
193

total

prosecuted

Notprosecutedprosecution
suspendedothersunderinvestigation

31
146
146
215
272
224
72

9
44
24
84
86
78
14

17
80
105
101
149
129
51

2
20
15
27
34
14
6

3
2
2
3
3
3
1

0
0
0
5
10
53
121

― 86 ―

III. INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL CO-OPERATION
A. Ratification of United Nations Convention against Corruption(i) BackgroundOn October 31, 2003, the UN General Assembly adopted 'United Nations Convention against
Corruption' as part of the international efforts to eliminate corruption.
The Republic of Korea actively pushed for ratification of the Convention to join the internationalanti-corruption efforts, as well as to lay the foundation for successful implementation of anti-corruption
policies.
(ii) Progress
After being signed on December 10, 2003, the Convention has undergone the ratification process at
the Korean National Assembly. With deposit of the instrument of ratification, the Convention went into
effect in Korea on April 26, 2008.
At the same time, the Ministry of Justice enacted 'Act on Recovery of Stolen Asset’, which describes
the international mutual cooperation in combating corruption crimes and redemption of corruptionrelated properties.
(iii) Ratification Effect
By ratifying the Convention, the Republic of Korea declared our commitment to eradicating
corruption at home and abroad. And the nation has firmly established an international cooperation system
in prevention and prosecution of corruption crimes, as well as confiscation of illegal proceeds from
crimes.
B. Strengthening of Cooperation in Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters(i) Overview
In an effort to eliminate corruption crimes, to facilitate international mutual legal assistance incriminal matters and extradition, the Republic of Korea is persistently working on expanding countries
which concluded the treaties.
The Republic of Korea has close and cooperative ties with nations that are commonly chosen as
safe havens by the criminals who engaged in the major economic crime for better response to individual
crimes.
(ii) Current Situation on MLA and Future Plan
Korea has signed extradition treaties with 29 nations (23 of them came into effect) and Mutual Legal
Assistance treaties with 25 nations (18 of them came into effect). The Republic of Korea is continuously
making efforts to expand such networks across the globe.
In particular, the Republic of Korea is pushing for joining the Council of Europe Conventions on
Extradition and MLA, which have 63 memberships.
(iii) Statistics on Extradition and MLA
Statistics on Extradition of Criminals to Korea					
Year
Total
(Japan)

2003
8

2004
5

2005
6
(1)

2006
4

― 87 ―

200715(No. of persons)2008.1~11.
14
(1)

Total
52
(2)

Statistics on Extradition of criminals from Korea					
Year
Total
(Japan)

2003
2
(1)

2004
4
(1)

2005
2
(2)

2006
1

2007
7
(4)

Statistics on MLA (requested by Korea)						
Year
Total
(Japan)

2003
31
(2)

2004
13
(2)

2005
33
(4)

2006
31
(4)

2007
38
(12)

Statistics on MLA (requested by other countries)				
Year
Total
(Japan)

2003
47
(11)

2004
28
(4)

2005
45
(11)

2006
53
(6)

2007
61
(14)

(No. of persons)2008.1~11.
6
(5)

Total
22
(13)

(No. of persons)2008.1~11.
57
(7)

Total
203
(31)

(No. of persons)2008.1~11.
53
(14)

Total
287
(60)

IV. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL
A. Effects Created by Domestic Institutional Reform
As mentioned earlier, the Republic of Korea has been continuously making institutional reformin order to ensure efficient corruption prevention and eradication. We have also established close ties
with competent authorities including the Prosecutors' Office, Ministry of Justice, National Tax Service,
National Police Agency and Anti-corruption and Civil Rights Commission.
As a result, the Republic of Korea is scoring high on 'Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index', an index released by TI (Transparency International). This shows that Korea's efforts
to eradicate corruption are being recognized by TI.
Korea's ranking on Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
Year
Total
(Ranking)

2003
4.3
(50)

2004
4.5
(47)

2005
5.0
(40)

2006
5.1
(42)

2007
5.1
(43)

2008
5.6
(40)

B. Suggestion on the Establishment of a Law Enforcement Agency in Asia: ‘AsiaJust’With rapid growth in economic exchanges in the Asian region, cross-border corruption crime,
organized crime, as well as drug related crimes are becoming very common. While the techniques
involved in money laundering and criminal acts are getting ever more sophisticated, an efficient intraregional cooperation system is not yet in place.
I propose that an intra-regional law enforcement agency similar to the ‘Eurojust’ should be established toeradicate corruption-related crimes in Asia through effective international cooperation.
The ‘Asiajust’, composed of prosecutors and law enforcement officers from every country in theregion, may discuss and adopt common policies on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and sharethe information on the crimes by establishing the information network between the member countries in
the criminal justice field. As for each case, the ‘Asiajust’ could function as a mechanism where a country
can request an investigation to the other member countries, or conduct joint investigation.

― 88 ―

STRENGTHENING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION,
IN THE LAO PERSPECTIVE
Khamphet Somvolachith*I. INTRODUCTION“Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development,
undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, anddiscouraging foreign investment and aid”1.
Corruption is, in simplest term, the abuse of the entrusted power for the personal gain and benefitof a group to which one owes allegiance. The word corruption is commonly applied to situation ofdishonesty in general, but for the purposes of this paper, “corruption” involves behaviors on the partof the officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly
unlawfully enrich themselves or those close to them by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them.
Corruption occurs in all countries regardless of the levels of the social and economic development.
In general, it is most likely to occur where public and the private sector meet, and especially where
public officials have a direct responsibility for the provision of services or the application of the specificregulation or levees. This includes, for example, public procurement and contracting, licensing activities,
such as the granting of exports or imports permits, and the rezoning of the land and the collection ofrevenue, whether through taxation or customs duties.
Corruption results in serious and social concern, it: erodes the rule of law; undermines good
governance; hampers economic growth; inhabits property reduction; impinges upon competitive and fairbusiness conditions, and, undermine democracy and human rights. Fighting and eliminating corruption
is a very necessary, difficult and complex process. Fighting corruption requires determination andpersistence from political leadership; support from citizens; and co-operation and support from theregion, international community and international organizations.
The trend of globalization and the open policy of economic integration, means that corruption has
developed rapidly across the world. Although the levels and types of corruption differ between countries
there are many similarities. We all need to work together- international cooperation and coordination isnecessary in stamping out worldwide epidemic of corruption.
Laos is among of other countries in the world that is experiencing the serious problem ofsome negative activities within the bureaucracy. While striving for economic excellence and rapid
infrastructure development, we are not immune from corruption. Malpractice within government offices,
especially when poorly supervised and controlled, is a real concern for any government. In Lao PDR,
corruption arises in areas, including (but not exclusively to): finance (i.e. tax and customs collection),land management, business licensing, import and export trade (i.e. vehicles), forestry (i.e. illegal
exporting of timber), state owned enterprises and banking. Government officials are involved in much
* Deputy Director, Treaties and International Cooperation Division, Office of the Supreme Public Prosecutor of the Lao PDR.
1
Kofi Annan, Former United Nations Secretary-General, in his statement on the adoption by the General Assembly of the United
Nations Convention against Corruption.

― 89 ―

of this corruption. The Lao PDR government has undertaken many actions to prevent corruption withinbureaucracy.

II. OVERALL ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY OF LAO PDR
Over recent years the implementation of new policies has achieved great results; the economy has
developed; foreign relations have greatly improved; there has been an increase in domestic and foreign
investment; and the GDP has increased by 7%. Under Lao PDR’s comprehensive reform, the society
has stabilized and striving to reach the national goals of: “rich people, a strong nation, and an equaland civilized society”. We are now in a position where we can reduce unnecessary public expenditure,
improve government service delivery to citizens and improve the living conditions of the population.
However, achieving our national goals remains difficult. There are still many obstacles to overcome.
Laos has just entered the free market economy, from a traditional centrally planned economy (which ischaracterized by a severe lack of laws). Because of the previous economic model and simultaneous lackof regulations, the country has become a breeding ground for corruption. The government understands
that corruption poses a major threat to Lao PDR’s poverty reduction plan and the nation’s development.
Corruption has caused major losses of state properties and created a general disrespect from the public
towards the government.
A. National Strategy
Recognizing the damage caused by corruption, the government has issued various degrees, orders,regulations, instructions and law in order to prevent and eliminate malpractice within government offices.
1. Legal Instruments
At the national level, three of the priority key measures taken are: issuing rules and orders (i.e. thelaw on anti-corruption in 2005), establishing anti-corruption authorities and the public administration
reform.
Important legal instruments have been adopted:(i) Law on Anti-Corruption 2005
This law has been applied as a basic legal instrument for combating and preventing fraud andcorruption.
The Law on Anti Corruption clearly regulated measures for prevention of corruption. However, theimplementation of this law is not effective. The coordination between the prosecutor offices and the state
inspection authority at the central and local level is very poor. Only few and small cases of corruption
reach the court. Many cases are solved by using the disciplinary measures.
(ii) Law on State Inspection 2007
Law on State Inspection (2007) is newly adopted by the National Assembly and is an instrument for
the implementation of the activities of State Inspection Authority to successfully carry out the inspection
and investigation of corruption, including the creating rule on asset re-declaration.
(iii) Party Resolution on 14 Prohibitions
This is for high ranking officials - outlining activities that they must not be involved in corruptions;defining their responsibilities; and, specifying the accountability that falls under their political leadership.
(iv) Set of Civil Service Regulations
This is a set of clearly defined certain practices to combat corruption.
For the rest of civil service a set of civil service regulations, clearly defined certain practices tocombat corruption. For example, Article 32 states that civil servants can not partake in any business― 90 ―

activities that represent a conflict of interest (i.e. a civil servant’s member running a business in the sector
under the civil servants management).
(v) The Prime Minister’s Instruction No 016/PM (31 August 1998) on More Thrifty and Cost
Effective Practices
The Prime Minister’s Instruction No 016/PM (31 August 1998) informed the Ministers, theGovernors of the Province and Mayor of the Vientiane Municipality, that they must educate public
servants and Lao citizens on more thrifty and cost effective practices. The instruction included but was
not exclusive to: saving time, saving money, saving labour and material.
(vi) The Decree No 95/PM (5 December, 1995)
This decree and the instruction from Minister of Finance have to be followed by civil servants when
procuring items or services (i.e. construction maintenance or repairing services).
2. Institutions Involved in Fighting Corruption
The main aim of the institutions involved in preventing and combating corruption is to increasingly
strengthen the effectiveness of financial law and regulation; and improve State management throughmonitoring and controlling process. In the long run the government believes these organizations will help
increase government revenue and improve internal auditing processes.
The government has indicated its commitment to strengthen its policies, regulations and practices
in order to improve integrity within the government, this includes: ensuring the rule of law, improving
the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability of the public service; and ensuring accountability of the
management of foreign aid.
In order to achieve the above–mentioned goals the party and the government decided to establish thefollowing organizations.
Today the main organizations in charge of auditing, inspection, monitoring, investigating andprosecuting corruption activities in Laos are: The Party Control Committee (PCC), The State Inspection
Authority (SIA), the State Audit Office (SAO), the Department of Finance Inspection, the ministry of
Finance and the Offices of the People’s Prosecutor at the central and local level and National Assembly.
The Department of Inspection exists in various ministries and the departments understate and party
control, at the provincial and district levels. In the central level the National Assembly supervises andmonitors the executive and judiciary organization. The Office for Business Promotion supervises state
owned enterprises and joint ventures.
(i) Party Control Committee (PCC)As Lao PDR is a one party system, all organizations are under the leadership of the Lao People’s
Revolutionary Party. The PCC was formerly the main inspection agency in Laos. It operates across alllevels and branches of government, often with assistance of the State Inspection Authority. After thecreation of the State Inspection Authority (SIA), and State Audit Office (SAO) the role of PCC changed
its focus onto the party’s activities. However, some legal and regulatory provisions still provide thisorganization with a dominant role.
(ii) State Inspection Authority (SIA)
The State Inspection Authority was established on May 30, 2001 by the decree of the Prime Minister
No. 98/PM but was replaced by the new decree No 10/PM.
The State Inspection Authority (Anti-Corruption Authority) is attached to the Prime Minister Office
and report directly to the Prime Minister and responsible for:●  fighting corruption in the bureaucracy;● ensuring transparency and fairness in the management of public resources and;― 91 ―

● prevention and investigation of the corruption.
So far, The State Inspection Authority and other involved organizations have recorded great successin their duties and responsibility to combat corruption. Many serious cases of corruption have been
discovered and sanctioned, primarily in the area of tax collection, wood extraction and import of vehicles.
Those public servant’s involved have been sanctioned/prosecuted accordingly.
In 2007-08 investigations in the fields of forestry, procurement, immigration, Business Bank and soon were undertaken and found that some organization and officials have misused the power and function
more then the law is allowed and issued illegal permission for cutting trees 61, 184.92 m3 without thepermission from the government, issued permission on exporting woods 5,263.381 m3 and violated sowith the order and the pre-regulation. There was an implementation of an invalid permission for last year
in coming year. There were also found that woods of totally 21,973.664 m3 were illegal cut and smuggled.
And there were 19,087.393 m3 were confiscated. Some officials have corruption behaviors, swindle andembezzle State revenues. There were found that illegal Identification Card (ID) for the Foreigners were
issued and renewed the Labor ID without the consultation with the State Employment Agency. At the
Ministry of Public Security there were officials with accomplices violated the procurement regulation andcaused harm for the State revenues. After conducting investigations of the targets mentioned above at thecentral and local level corruptions were found, corruptors were arrested and prosecuted. 25 persons wereaccused of corruption and sentenced; and 10 persons are standing under investigation.
(iii) State Audit Office (SAO)
SAO was set up by the Prime Minister’s Decree No 174/PM (dated 5 August 1998). This wasconsidered a major step towards strengthening the supreme audit function in Lao PDR. The SAO
is responsible for auditing the accounts and certifying the appropriateness of the accounts of theorganizations under State administration, in addition to, state owned enterprises, joint ventures andprojects funded by the state budget or international grants and loans. It also inspects the implementationof State Budget that the National Assembly has adopted. This organization is also attached to the Prime
Minister’s Office and report directly to the Prime Minister.
(iv) Organ of the People’s Prosecutors of the Lao PDR
The Organ of the People’s Prosecutors of the Lao PDR is a Supervisory State Organ and responsible
for monitoring and inspecting the proper und uniform adherence to laws by all ministries, ministryequivalent organizations, government organizations, Lao Front For National Construction, massorganizations, social organizations, local administrations enterprises, and citizens and for exercising therights of prosecution2.
(v) National Assembly
The National Assembly is theoretically a legislative body, and oversees the executive andjudiciary organizations. The Commission on Economic and Financial Affairs oversees the preparationand implementation of the State budget. The National Assembly adopts, revises and oversees theimplementation of the national annual budget.
3. Administrative Reform
The government, with the support of various international organizations, has undertaken manyreform initiatives aimed at restructuring the state apparatus; improving government mechanisms, working
conditions and administrative procedures; and minimizing the steps involved in granting licenses. The
introduction of new reform initiatives are helping to minimize administrative paper work. The reductionof the extensive paperwork trail or number of “doors that people have to go through” is helping tominimize and eventually, eliminate conditions in which corruption can exist. Another major area ofreform is the introduction of new mechanisms, such as auditing and inspection, which demand more open
2

Art. 2 of the Law on the Organ of the People’s Prosecutor of Lao PDR.

― 92 ―

and accountable work practices.
The aim of the fore mentioned measures is to combat and eliminate corruption in across thebureaucracy efficiently. During the process reform, the government intends to build a bureaucracyof good and honest civil servants. New civil service recruits will be selected fairly through open
examinations. Civil service managers will be elected and appointed through more open, equitable anddemocratic processes.
A major issue that currently exists is the poor salary, compensation and benefits for civil servants.
To improve the overall administrative reform, the government intends to reform salaries and othercompensations of civil servants to ensure that civil servants can maintain a decent standard of living.
B. International Strategy
1. International Legal Instruments
At the Intentional level, relevant legal instruments have been ratified or signed:●  The convention on anti-corruption has been signed in 2003.
The Lao government has undertaken major efforts to improve the country’s situation. The
document compiled after the convention has been translated and disseminated amongst civil
servants to create awareness and understanding of the convention. In conjunction with this,The Lao government has amended the domestic legal system to enable more internationaland regional integration. In the near future, the government will submit the convention to the
National Assembly for ratification and disseminate the proposal to the donor community to gain
support for ratification and implementation of this important convention.
●  Convention on transnational organized crime and the three related protocols have been ratified.
●   Follow up the implementation of the TOC, extraditions with neighboring countries such as
Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar have been signed.
●   The mutual legal assistance in criminal and civil matter between Laos and The North Korea has
been also signed.
●   The Lao government has ratified the ASEAN convention on the mutual legal assistance incriminal matters.
●   There are also none legally binding declarations of The China-ASEAN Prosecutors General
Conference that has been agreed among other things on the international cooperation to fighttransnational crimes.

III. ANTI-CORRUPTION CO-OPERATIVE MECHANISMS
A. Overview
The Lao government takes important the international and domestic cooperation to fight corruption.
Fighting corruption is still very complex, challenging and difficult to detect, and it is not only the workof single anti-corruption or of the public prosecutors alone, and it requires, first of all, determinationand persistence of the political leadership and participation from citizens, including the cooperation andcoordination with of relevant organizations involved in the anti-corruption. Although the Law is a major
step forward, there is still a poor implementation of the law.
By strengthening the institutions the improving coordination amongst those organizations involved
in monitoring corruption (i.e. the Audit Office, The State Inspection Authority for investigation and thePeople’s Prosecutor’s Offices for prosecution) we will be in a better position to discover and sanction
corrupt people, and return public assets back to the state and Lao PDR citizens.

― 93 ―

The service that public prosecutors deliver is standing in a chain with the work of investigation
agencies, including anti-corruption agency. Investigation agencies and the public prosecutors needeach other to exercise the right of investigation and prosecution. Without the cooperation from theinvestigation agencies our work can not effective be done.
The Organ of the People’s Prosecutor of Lao PDR, compared to other organization such as ofthe police, it is a young organization and it is only 18 years old (9 January 1990-9 January 2008). In
practices many investigating officers of the investigating agencies in the local level don’t accept the roleof prosecutors as supervisory state organ and exercising the rights of prosecution and make so with thecooperation between them difficult.
In the past after establishment of the Organ of the People’s Prosecutor of Lao PDR in 1990 thecoordination and cooperation between prosecutor and the police have been very poor. The reason is
because of the lack of understanding on the role of the prosecutors at a whole and also because of thelack of law books. If they really have the laws there are only laws in old version.
B. Cooperative Mechanisms
Recognizing this situation, and with the support of the international organizations, a work to tighten
the cooperation and coordination between prosecutors and the investigating Agencies has been started.
1. Mechanisms among Relevant Anti-Corruption Institutions
There are following cooperative mechanisms among the relevant anticorruption institutions:(i) The important cooperative mechanism is a so called, “Annual Justice Conference” of the relevant
institutions organized at the central, provincial and district level. There are representatives from the
National Assembly, office of the supreme people’s prosecutor of Lao PDR, people’s supreme court,
the justice ministry, the public security ministry and senior officials from these organizations. The
meeting provides and creates opportunities or all to raise issues and comments on how the law can beeffectively implemented and their relations be improved. There is a place to discuss issues regarding
the prevention, investigations, court trial and implementation of the judgments or sentence in civil andcriminal matter. Importantly it is also that concerned ministries and institutions have to explain and toanswer the questions and critics of the public and of the members of the National Assembly about theimplementation of law and they have to explain how they will and plan to do it better. This kind of theconference will be organized annually in the future and we will invite the state inspections authority toattend in order to strengthen the coordination and cooperation in combating corruption in the country.
(ii) Importantly it is a Joint training or seminar of the all relevant parties. A Joint training or seminarof the all relevant parties from prosecutors, investigating agencies, justice department, court andnational assembly is organized to create an opportunity that they lean to know and to understand therole of each others, and at the same time build personal contact with each other. This kind of training
is helping very well to strengthen the cooperation between public prosecutor and the investigating
agencies.
(iii) Joint Agreements or Joint Statements are sometime needed to facilitate or to tighten our cooperation.
There are for examples:● A Joint Agreement between the Supreme People’s Prosecutors, the Minister of Public Security, andthe Minister of the Public Health on the Medical Treatment for the sick Prisoners.
● A Joint Agreement between the Supreme People’s Prosecutors and the Minister of Public Security on
the Amnesty for Prisoners.
● A Joint Agreement between the Supreme People’s Prosecutors and the Minister of Public Security on
Juvenile Justice.
4) Printing and disseminating the laws books for the prosecutors and the investigating agencies have been

― 94 ―

started.
5) Awareness raising activities on the role of the prosecutors is part of all seminars and meeting when theprosecutors are invited to attend or when we organized such a seminar or workshop.
2. Participation of the Citizens
There are:●   Hot line during the ongoing session of the National Assembly is set up to create an opportunity
for all to say their political opinion and issues regarding the implementation of the duties ofgovernments and the government has to answer it officially;●   Opinion box of all state institutions has been created for the people that they can say and claim
about the work of the government or of a specific official of a state institution.
The result of the implementation of the cooperative measures by the Lao government set above, thecooperation between prosecutors and the investigating agencies and with the public are improved and it
make our easier and more effective.
3. International Cooperation Mechanisms
For international cooperation, there are following mechanisms:
The Lao government has attended:●   International conferences and meetings and a lot of seminars organized by the Association on
Anti Corruption of International Corruption Authorities (IAACA)●  Five China-ASEAN Prosecutors General Conferences●   conferences organized by the Asia Crime Prevention Foundation (ACPF) and by Association ofInternational Prosecutors (AIP)●   And other important international conferences in the field of crimes prevention and criminal
justice.
The main objective of such mentioned above conferences and meetings and also the conference what
we do at UNAFEI today are not only to share our opinions on good governance and anti-corruptions,but importantly it aims at developing and strengthening the relations and cooperation between them tocombat transnational crimes and of course, including international anti-corruption.
The five China-ASEAN Prosecutors General Conferences have been a great success. On the basisof the Joint Declaration signed in Kunming, People’s Republic of China on 9 June 2004 the basicallycooperation mechanism between Prosecutorial Organs of China and ASEAN Countries in cracking downtransnational crimes have been established and effectively developed step by step.
Since the first conference, the judicial and prosecutorial cooperation, Bilateral meeting mechanism
and The Cooperation on training has been broadly developed. On the basis of respecting state sovereignty
and judicial independence, according to the principle of equality and reciprocity, the prosecutorialorganizations of Lao PDR at the Central and Local Levels have initiated judicial cooperation with Central
Prosecutorial Organization and some Prosecutorial organizations in the border to Socialist Republic ofVietnam, People’s Republic of China (the People’s Procuratorate of Yunan Province), and in the borderto Thailand and have assisted neighbouring prosecutorial organizations to investigate crimes and toarrest suspects escaping into the border of Lao PDR. Many Lao Prosecutors have received a short termprosecutorial training in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and in Yunan Province, People’s Republic ofChina. The training of our prosecutors is very important to learn the legal system of foreign countries. It
is not only helpful to deepen the friendship, but also helpful for our cooperation.

― 95 ―

The multi-channelled communication, study and exchange of delegation with prosecutorialorganizations of other countries was enhanced and developed. The delegations exchange has furthered theunderstanding, enhanced the friendship, so as to lay the good foundations for establishing the cooperation
mechanism.
Based on the declarations of the conferences which it is aimed among other thing to facilitate thedirect cooperation between prosecution services of the China and ASEAN prosecutorial organizations at
the provincial levels that shared the border with each other and also according to the judicial cooperation
conventions between the Lao government and the government of P.R of China and Vietnam a direct
cooperation between them are established. There are exchange of the delegations and training of theprosecutors all country and also the joint training of the prosecutors at the orders of Laos and Vietnam isplanning and we have discussing this issue with the Attorney General of the Kingdom of Thailand whilea high ranking delegations of Thailand visited Laos in September this year.

IV. CONCLUSION
Ladies and gentlemen,
For my conclusion, that for Strengthening Domestic and International Cooperation for Effective
Investigation and Prosecution of Corruption are Legal instruments, anti-corruption authorities, the way
we meet and discuss to strengthen our cooperation (effective cooperative mechanisms) and the good willof cooperation of relevant institutions or countries and the public without any reason and prejudice a
basic foundation for the domestic international cooperation and I believe that my country would do so.
I hope that the way we meet and discuss here today is a part of initiation and contribution tostrengthen our international cooperation of anti-corruption in our countries and in the region.
That is the end of my presentation and I wish the Forum great success.
Thank You.

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COUNTRY REPORT
ANTI-CORRUPTION:
A MALAYSIAN APPROACH AND ADVANCESLai Yong Heng*

I. PREAMBLE
Corruption is a source that has long contributed as a factor which contributes to poor branding imageof a particular country. It undermine good governance, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads tomisallocation of resources, and particularly hurts the poor. We can only win the fight against corruption if
each and every one of us has zero tolerance for it.
In conjunction with the United Nations’ efforts and agreeing in principles of the convention against
corruption which states all the concerned issues, convinced facts, determined efforts, acknowledged
principles, bearing in mind responsibility and commending the work of the commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice and The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in
preventing and combating corruption.
The general provision of the United Nation Convention against Corruption is always perceived as
the basic foundation of all effort towards establishing the objectives:
1. To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more effectively:
2. To promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and technical assistance in the preventionof and fight against corruption, including in asset recovery:
3. To promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and public property1.
Malaysia became signatory to the convention on 9 December 2003 and is progressively rectifying
the convention.
The seriousness of problems and treats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies,
undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing
sustainable development and the rule of law have been hovering like a plague in many country.
Give and take in corrupt practise will undermine the human principles and integrity. This isespecially so when in the current dynamism of good governance regimes worldwide, a great deal ofemphasis has been given to combating corruption in an extrinsic avenue rather foundational bases thatbuild lasting and practical one. A legislative measures and as well as voluntary disclosures-based reporthas been the regime of good governance in many developed country.
The veil which has hung over Malaysia’s anti-corruption efforts for decades will be lifted bycommissioning the Malaysian Anti Corruption Commission (MCAC).
As part of the measures to enhance and restructure the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), efforts had* Assistant Commissioner of Police, Public Affairs, Royal Malaysian Police.
1
Extract – United Nation Convention against Corruption. pg1-pg2. General Assembly resolution 55/25 annex 1.

― 97 ―

been taken to ensure that the proposed MCAC would be truly effective and capable of meeting the needs
and aspirations of the people2.
The MCAC, modelled after anti-corruption agencies which are recognised as among the best in theworld such as the Independent Commission On Anti-Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong and Independent
Commission Against Corruption in Australia, would be supported by several “check and balance”
mechanisms which were perceived to be more accountable, transparent and effective in carrying out theirtasks.
An Advisory Board would comprise individuals, appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (TheKing) on the advice of the Prime Minister, who had demonstrated exemplary service and with integrity
while the Special Committee on Corruption would be made up of Members of Parliament who would
receive and scrutinize the annual report, which must be submitted by the commission.
The cabinet had also agreed on the proposed formation of two more panels - the Operations
Evaluation Panel which would determine the action and decision on the investigation carried out, andthe Consultation and Anti-Corruption Panel which would assist efforts at educating the public to oppose
corruption, he said.
The cabinet had also considered allowing the MCAC to handle matters concerning service,
particularly those involving the processes of appointment and termination of service for its officers.
This paper seeks to manoeuvre into the perspective of the Public sector principle together with thePrivate sector where all the convention of the United Nation against corruption has been and will be
enlighten.

II. THE PUBLIC SECTOR
In a paper presented by Mohd Nizam Mohd Ali, Director, Private Sector, Malaysia Instituteof Integrity stated that public and private partnership can exist where there is trust and it must beemphasized that this trust must be equitably upheld by all parties concerned. Whilst public service has
always worked on the basis of public trust for public good, private enterprise in contrast, work on limited
selective trust3.
The public trust in the public service domain eventually can be trace to the respective individual
citizen that gives rise to the mandate, both political and social, to the executive body.
Through the legislative exercises, each citizen gives their conscious and voluntary trust to therespective representatives in the legislative bodies, upon which the majority mandate holders will thenform the executive body that will continue ruling the good governance regime within the public services.
The cycle continues when the executive body work hand in hand with the civil service that havebeen in existence as executing bodies and implementation agencies to ensure any national plans are
realized within the capacity and capability of the available resources at hand.
The acid test as to whether or not such mechanism works can be found and tested by citizens
themselves when they ask or demand their rights for any services due to them by this service provider.
When the time frame of the existing executive body and legislative bodies expire, the currency of trust issought yet again.
United Nation Convention against Corruption
Article 15 – Bribery of National Public Officials states that each state party shall adopt such
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed
intentionally:
2

KUCHING, Nov 7 - Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi today announced the Cabinet's agreement on the formulation of the
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (SPRM) Bill 2008 in a move to further strengthen the national integrity agenda. News
extract Nov 7. NSTP.

3
Mohd Nizam Mohd Ali, -Director, Private Sector, Malaysian Institute of Integrity, “Building Synergies for Public-Private
Partnership in Combating Corruption”. 2007.pp.1― 98 ―

(a) The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of and undue
advantage, for the official himself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or
refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties:(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage,
for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or
refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her duties4.

III. THE PRIVATE SECTOR
In contrast, the private sector enterprises do not engage in such massive and tiring exercisesof convincing these citizens of their existence. This is purely because the trust that gave rise to its
existence is limited in nature by virtue of the shareholding as well as ownership of its core business.
These entrepreneurs and shareholders or owners of such business agenda have private interest at heart inpromoting and building their enterprises. Hence in their mind public good and private gain is constantly
seeking a mutually satisfying equilibrium, compared to the public sector environment. Yet in totality, thepublic as a body is still a factor in their enterprises, by virtue of them being the ultimate market users of
the product or services that such enterprises promote and engage in.
Corporate governance structure come into play when there is a transition of trust from these selectgroups of share holders and owners to the directors, who then form a board or panel of governors ordirectors to govern the corporate according to the wishes and the resolutions expressed and passed by theannual general meetings or the extra ordinary general meetings audience.
When this transition of trust passes on to the board of director or governors, again, the similar
mechanism that we’ve mentioned in the public sector environment exists where the board of directors
will have to rely their decisions to be executed by the management teams just like the executives body ofthe government rely on the civil service to deliver it services. At the end of the supply chain, the board of
directors and the shareholders will have to continue plowing all their positive energy in ensuring that theirinitial self-interest in such enterprises are recognized and supported by the public at large in consuming
its products or seeking for their services.
While article 21 on Bribery in Private Sector state that each state party shall consider adopting such
legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed
internationally in the course of economic, financial or commerce activities.
(a) The promise, offering or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage to any person who
directs or works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or herself
or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrain fromacting;(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage
by any person who directs or works, in any capacity, for a private entity, for the person himself or
herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her duties, act or refrainfrom acting5;
A. Bank Negara Malaysia -Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001
Apart from rectifying the convention Malaysia have move much earlier to curb this menace byimplementing the Anti Money Laundering and Anti Terrorism Act 2001.
The Act A1208 - An act to provide for the offence of money laundering, the measures to be taken for
4

Extract UNCAC, pp11-Chapter III Criminalization and Law Enforcement Article 15.

5Extract UNCAC, pp12-13-Chapter III Criminalization and Law Enforcement Article 21.

― 99 ―

the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing offences and to provide for the forfeiture ofterrorist property involved in, or derived from, money laundering and terrorism financing offences, andfor matters incidental thereto connected therewith6.
In the act “money laundering” means the act of a person who:(a) engages, directly or indirectly, in a transaction that involves proceeds of any unlawful activity;(b) acquires, receives, possesses, disguises, transfers, converts, exchanges, carries, disposes, uses,
removes from or brings into Malaysia proceeds of any unlawful activity; or(c) conceals, disguises or impedes the establishment of the true nature, origin, location, movement,
disposition, title of, rights with respect to, or ownership of, proceeds of any unlawful activity,
where ;(a) as may be inferred from objective factual circumstance, the person knows or has reason to believe,that the property is proceeds from any unlawful activity; or(b) in respect of the conduct of a natural person, the person without reasonable excuse fails to takereasonable steps to ascertain whether or not the property is proceeds from any unlawful activity;(1) This Act shall apply to any serious offence, foreign serious offence or unlawful activity whether
committed before or after the commencement date.
“Serious offence” means (a) any offences specified in the Second Schedule and one part of it above allquote the Anti Corruption Act 1997 (Act 575)7.
Section 10:

Offence of accepting gratification;

Section 11:

Offence in giving or accepting gratification by agent;

Section 12:		

Acceptor or giver of gratification to be guilty notwithstanding that purpose was not
carried out or matter not in relation to duty;

Section 13:

Corruptly procuring withdrawal of tender;

Section 14:

Bribery of officer of public body;

Section 15:

Misuse of position;

Section 18:
		Dealing with, using, holding, receiving or concealing gratification or advantage in
relation to any offence;

Section 20:

Attempts, preparations, abetments and criminal conspiracies punishable as offences.

As per Article 23 – Laundering of proceeds of crime under UNCAC
1. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law,such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, whencommitted intentionally:(a) (i) The conversion of transfer of property, knowing that such property is the proceed of crime, forthe purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person
who is involved in the commission of the predicate offences to evade the legal consequences of
6Bank Negara Malaysia -Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001-Act A1208.

7

Anti Corruption Act 1997 ( Act 575).

― 100 ―

his or her action:(ii) The concealment of disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement orownership of or rights with respect to property, knowing that such property is the proceed ofcrime.
(b) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system:(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that suchproperty is the proceeds of crime.
(ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding,abetting, facilitating, and counselling the commission of any of the offences established inaccordance with this article.
2. For purposes of implementing or applying paragraph 1 of this article:(a) Each State Party shall seek to apply paragraph 1 of this article to the widest range of predicate
offences;(b) Each State Party shall include as predicate offences at a minimum a comprehensive range ofcriminal offences established in accordance with this convention;(c) For the purpose of sub paragraph (b) above, predicate offences shall include offences committed
both within and outside the jurisdiction of if the State Party in question. However, offences
committed outside the jurisdiction of a State Party shall constitute predicate offences only when
the relevant conduct is a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State Party implementing
or applying this article had it been committed there;(d) Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws that give effect to this article and of any
subsequent changes to such laws or a description thereof to the Secretary- General of the United
Nation;(e) If required by fundamentals principles of the domestic law of a State Party, it may be provided
that the offences set forth in paragraph 1 of this article do not apply to the persons who
committed the predicate offence8.
B. Article 38– Cooperation with National Authorities
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to encourage, in accordance with its
domestic law, cooperation between, on the one hand, its public authorities, as well as its public officials,
and, on the other hand, its authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting criminal offences.
Such cooperation may include:(a) Informing the latter authorities, on their own initiative, where there are reasonable grounds tobelieve that any offences established in accordance with articles 15,21 and 23 of this Convention
has been committed: or(b) Providing, upon request, to the latter authorities all necessary information9.
Bank Negara Malaysia -Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act 2001- Act 1208
eventually have given the mandate for Malaysia in implementing or for see the needs for each state party
to take measures as may be necessary to encourage, in accordance with its domestic law, cooperation
between national investigating and prosecuting authorities and entities of the private sector, in particularfinancial institution, relating to matters involving the commission of offences established in accordancewith this Convention.
C. UNCAC Article 39 – Cooperation between National Authorities and the Private Sector
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to encourage, in accordance with its
domestic law, cooperation between national investigating and prosecuting authorities and entities of the8Extract UNCAC, pp 13-14-Chapter III, Criminalization and Law Enforcement, Article 23.

9Extract UNCAC, pp 19 Chapter III, Criminalization and Law Enforcement, Article 38.

― 101 ―

private sector, in particular financial institution, relating to matters involving the commission of offences
established in accordance with this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall consider encouraging its nationals and other persons with a habitual residence
in its territory to report to the national investigating and prosecuting authorities the commission of an
offence established in accordance with this Convention10.
Adding to the co existing law that regulates and bind all parties, section 55 Anti Corruption Act
1997 (Act 575) broaden up the territory of the prevention and prosecution of offenders on corruption
which states that:
1. The provision of this Act shall in relation to citizens and permanent residents of Malaysia, have effectoutside as well within Malaysia, an when an offence under this Act is committed in any place outside
Malaysia by any citizen or permanent resident, he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it
was committed at any place within Malaysia.
2. Any proceeding against any person under this section which would be a bar to subsequent proceedings
against such persons for the same offence if such offence was committed in Malaysia shall be a bar tofurther proceedings against him under any written law relating to the extradition of persons, in respect tothe same offence, outside Malaysia
The provision under this Act is the key element instilling the concept of far reaching by the long armof the law that if rectify by all member country will benefit the course further enhance the effectivenessof preventing cross border corrupt practise and repatriation of offenders and proceeds of crime.

IV. PUBLIC – PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPTo enhance effectiveness, transparency and public accountability the structure of public – private
partnership will include a system of effective checks and balances and fervent hope that its effectiveness,transparency and accountability will be considerably raised while public trust in its integrity andindependence will be quickly renewed.
Trust is the synergy between public and private partnership. This currency is non-material nor
tangible but without which the whole house of card will collapse. Hence, the very essence of synergy
build-up in such engagement must bear this fact in mind, otherwise the whole agenda and mechanism put
forth in it to succeed will miss the mark.
There is another dimension that we have to bear in mind. That is, this trust, both in private andpublic exist in a framework. It doesn’t simply remain in someone else’s mind or in isolation without
proper space of time and place. Looking around globally as well as nationally, we can find a lot ofmodalities of such framework: one which is the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD) ethical infrastructure, the UNODC itself and closer to home, anti corruption legislature andMalaysia National Integrity Plan. Due diligence and conscious assessment of the environment that willtake priority its acceptability should drive such codified documents.
Public service delivery system is to facilitate the private sector, rather than frustrate itself. In theprivate sector by definition, there are so many players involved in making sure that its relevance will besustained over time.
A. Corporate Governance Dimension
Whilst the articles by Margit Osterloh in Corporate Governance for Crooks ? The case for corporate
10

Extract UNCAC, pp 20 Chapter III Criminalization and Law Enforcement Article 39.

― 102 ―

virtue11 has been arguing on exorbitant salaries and scandalous fraud found in the United States,
infiltration of malpractices, greed and distrust.
Be that the Confucian philosophy golden rule of “do not do to others what you do not want others
do to you” often cited as the major factor determining the Chinese approach to business and Paul Robins,
in hid Corruption in Asia- a bottom-up approach to its resolution12 together with what Sheikh Ghazali
Abod wrote in his article “Towards an Islamic Corporate Governance13 which argued that the codes of
upholding trust, maintaining integrity, exercising transparency and accountability, prudent managementof resources, maximizing returns, caring and concern of the environment are but would remain as mere
noble codes if the issues of values, ethics and moral conduct are not tackled in the first instance.
Governments instead have approached governance, be it public or corporate, more within thebalance of regulatory and non-regulatory codes. The United States has fully embraced the legislative
approach with its Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) while the United Kingdom has promoted non-voluntary
approach characterized by voluntary codes of conduct with its Cadbury Report (1992) and the Hampel
Report (1997) which basically operate on the basis of comply and explain. The success of voluntary
codes depends on both attitude and behavior, i.e. which naturally dictates that good corporate behavior
means good individual behavior as well14.
In Malaysia, the Government entrusted the overseeing of such corporate and individual behavior
to the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, which in turn enforce a Code of Ethics
for Directors via the Companies Commission of Malaysia mechanism. A legislative instrument, theCompanies Act 1965, which statutory power will be invoked whenever a director behaves against the
principles of good faith, due diligence and fiduciary duties. With specific reference to the matter ofcorporate governance, the Bursa Malaysia attempted to upgrade the quality of all serving directors by
putting together a Mandatory Accreditation Programme for Directors of Public Listed Companies, inaccordance to the requirements of the Practices Note No.5/2001 and Guidance Notes 9 of the Bursa
Securities Listing Reaquirements15.
The burning question remains throughout these deliberations, by both academics and regulators,
whether the issue is about the self or the systemic governance, or both. If one take organizations ascorporate citizens, and people within such organization as its soul, then the metaphor that their directors
defined as the top echelon, the ‘controlling mind’ and the ‘conscience’ of the corporation16 seems fittingly
descriptive. For the mind and conscience to be operative, both have to have a soul to call home. For
the corporation to remain true to its raison d’etre and the initials promoter’s promise, the bona fide andbenefits test17 needs a personal body to be attached to and conducted on.
Thus in both soul and body is what constitute a man is, and then its follows logically the humanfactor is an important core that must be squarely addressed whenever the debate of corporate governanceis to be properly facilitated to yield good and sound results. Failure to understand the self in its
vocabulary and understanding what virtues18 really would be a fatal mistake indeed.

11

Anna Gandaori, ed. Corporate Governance and Firm Organization: Microfoundations and Structure Forms. Oxford University
Press, New York 2004. p.p. 194-211.

12

Ibid, pp. 210-224.

13

Nik Mustapha Nik Hassan, ed. Corporate Governance from the Islamic Perspective. IKIM Kuala Lumpur:2002. pp. 93-109.

14

Neil Cowan, Regional Benchmarks: Corporate Governance in Asia-Pacific in Corporate Governance that works. Prentice Hall,
Singapore: 2004. pp. 155-164.
15

Mohd Nizam Mohd Ali, -Director, Private Sector, Malaysian Institute of Integrity, “Building Synergies for Public-Private
Partnership in Combating Corruption”. 2007. pp 6-7.
16

Phillip H. Phan, Taking Back the Boardroom: Better Directing for the New Millenium, McGraw-Hill Singapore: 2000, pg 17.

17

Loh Siew Phang, Corporate Powers: Controls Remedies and Decision Making, Malayan Law Journal Kuala Lumpur: 1996.
pp. 56-68.
18

James Hastings ed., Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol XI, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York: (1911). 430-432― 103 ―

V. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the role of Royal Malaysian Police has been shaped by the changing needs of thesociety and the nation. When we sat down to chart the future course of the Royal Malaysian Police whichis in line with the prescient of Sun Tzu’s philosophy in his art of war which is “know yourself, know
your enemy and know your terrains than you will win a thousand battles”, we scanned, we analyzed, we
reviewed current local and international workplace environment as the basis to fight corruption.
In promoting good governance in a thriving civil society, one has to look at issues pertaining
integrity when tackling the issue of corruption. We have set up a unit which looks at all issues pertaining
integrity. This is in line with the call made by our peers, that is only those who are capable, responsible
and scrupulously honest will be allowed to serve in position of leadership. Those who are inefficient,incompetent and most importantly, corrupt should be held in absolute contempt.
On the international front, to remain a step ahead of criminal syndicates, a better trans-jurisdictional
coordination will be essential because many of the hi-tech corruption activities, are no longer bound bygeographical boundaries. External linkages and a broader cooperative framework will have to be forgedbeyond national boundaries.
The Royal Malaysian Police involvement as a member of the Interpol group of experts on corruption
is yet another example of our efforts to fight corruption. With its objective to ensure that each of its
members have high standard of honesty, Integrity and ethical behavior in and in connection with theperformances of their policing future.
The cost of corruption restrains economic growth. Corruption is a global phenomenon, which
requires global efforts, and it is the responsibility of everyone to help inculcate a culture of integrity.

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APPENDIX
A. Thomson Financial News
Malaysian prime minister steps up anti-corruption battle
04.21.08, 4:52 AM ET
KUALA LUMPUR (Thomson Financial) - Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi will
boost the powers of his country's anti-corruption agency in a bid to step up the battle against graft, theprime minister said Monday.
Abdullah's announcement comes amid growing calls to clamp down on corruption, one of the issues
that led many voters to switch sides in recent elections.
'My government will restructure the anti-corruption agency ... to become a full-fledged MalaysianCommission on Anti-Corruption,' Abdullah said.
'To enhance its effectiveness, transparency and public accountability the new commission structure
will be set up to include a system of effective checks and balances,' he said.
'It is my fervent hope that by restructuring the (agency), its effectiveness, transparency andaccountability will be considerably raised while public trust in its integrity and independence will bequickly renewed.'
The agency, now under Abdullah's office, will report to a new parliamentary committee on
corruption prevention.
The prime minister said the committee would enhance transparency and public accountability
because it can seek clarification of the new body's annual reports.
Abdullah said a new whistle-blower's act would also be introduced to give better protection to those
who come forward to testify against corrupt practices.
The prime minister won a landslide victory in 2004 on an anti-corruption ticket, but opposition
leaders and observers say progress has been slow, with few meaningful reforms.
Unprecedented losses for the governing coalition in the general election in March saw Abdullahcome under pressure to quit, but the embattled prime minister says he has a mandate and has pledged to
implement all his past promises in his second term in office.
The government has been hit by numerous scandals in recent years with a minister, judges andseveral politicians facing corruption charges.
Prime Minister's Proposal on ACA
The Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi has announced far-reaching reforms to theAnti-Corruption Agency (ACA) to give it independence and more bite.
The reforms include turning the Anti-Corruption Agency into a “full-fledged” MalaysianCommission on Anti-Corruption (MCAC), setting up an independent advisory board and a parliamentarycommittee, as well as tripling the size of the force and providing comprehensive protection for
whistleblowers.
Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi said the reforms were a priority and he wanted them in place
before the year's end.
“It is my fervent hope that by restructuring the ACA, its effectiveness, transparency andaccountability will be considerably raised while public trust in its integrity and independence be quickly
renewed,” he said yesterday in his keynote address at the Asean Integrity Dialogue 2008 at the MalaysianInstitute of Integrity.
Elaborating on the four key reforms, Abdullah said the restructured MCAC would table its annual
report to a soon-to-be set up parliamentary committee on the prevention of corruption which would havethe power to seek clarification and explanation on the report.
Another core element, he said, was the setting up of an independent corruption prevention advisoryboard comprising “prominent and upstanding” members of the community appointed by the King, on thePrime Minister's advice, to advise the MCAC on administrative and operational matters and on cases of― 105 ―

public interest.
“The board can enquire or recommend that certain measures be undertaken. More importantly, theboard will act to assure the public that public interest cases are dealt with appropriately and adequately,”
he said.
However, the ultimate decision to prosecute would lie with the Attorney-General although the board
could ask him to take another look at cases he had decided not to pursue.
On whistleblowers, Abdullah said the public perception was that enforcement agencies often went
after the whistleblower instead of investigating the charges.
He announced that there would be a law in place to give whistleblowers and witnesses“comprehensive protection”.
“It is our hope that with better protection, more people will come forward to report corruption,
thereby allowing justice to run its course,” he said, adding, however, this was not “unfettered freedom”
for people to say or write anything about anybody without proof.
“I expect them to be responsible for the allegations they make,” he said.
Abdullah also announced that the anti-corruption force would triple in size over the next five years,
with a further 5,000 officers added to its existing 2,000 members.
The MCAC would also have new terms of service and remuneration to attract talented and dedicatedindividuals, and the power to hire and fire, he added.
The head of the MCAC would be appointed by the King on the Prime Minister's advice.
Abdullah said he expected the MCAC to be “fully independent”.
“I am not here to interfere. They can independently decide how to run the organisation and how theywant to operate,” he said, adding that even in the current set-up, he had never interfered with the work of
the ACA.
Asked whether the MCAC would report to the Prime Minister or to Parliament, Abdullah said: “Thereport would ultimately go to Parliament.”
When contacted, Attorney General Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail said he would have no problem
working with the advisory panel to be set up by the MCAC.
B. The Star - April 22, 2008
Move to set up MCAC seen as major breakthrough
KUALA LUMPUR: The setting-up of the independent Malaysian Commission on Anti-Corruption(MCAC) is a major breakthrough and shows the Prime Minister’s seriousness in fighting corruption, said
Transparency International (Malaysia) president Tan Sri Ramon Navaratnam.
“I’m impressed. Pak Lah has gone beyond my expectations. I did not expect a parliamentarycommittee set up,” he said yesterday.
“No doubt Pak Lah has shown great political will in getting this matter across which has been theaspiration of the rakyat.”
Navaratnam said that with three levels – the commission, the advisory board and the parliamentarycommittee – it would be very exciting to see how it operates.
“It will without doubt increase transparency and enhance integrity of the whole system,” he said,
adding that the reforms would remove public perception that the Anti-Corruption Agency was notindependent.
He believed MCAC would work provided the right people were in it.
Navaratnam said it was important for the parliamentary committee to comprise both Barisan
Nasional and Pakatan Rakyat MPs.

― 106 ―

“Ultimately, the Prime Minister cannot stop anything or interfere because MCAC is subject toscrutiny and answerable to parliament,” he said.
He also applauded the move to give MCAC the power to hire and fire and set up its term of services
and remuneration for its officers.
He said the anti-corruption reforms coming just days after reforms in the judiciary encouraged the
public to believe that the “Government means business in wanting reforms” and to strengthen institutions
that had been weakened over the years.
MCA president Datuk Seri Ong Ka Ting, who also welcomed the change, said MCA wishedto see the performance of the ACA strengthened, and a new political will being forged to ensure theindependence of the agency truly upheld.
“We want the rakyat to understand that the Barisan Nasional Government is serious about tacklingcorruption in the country, both in the public and private sectors,” he said in a statement issued yesterday.
The Civil Movement against Corruption (Gerak) called the setting-up of the MCAC a pivotal move.
Its chairman Mohamad Ezam Mohd Nor said the decision was one of the “most-significant moves
ever taken by the government in ensuring reforms.
DAP adviser Lim Kit Siang in a statement said he hoped the new commission would not end up
like Suhakam “that is tasked to be an independent body to protect and promote human rights, but iscompletely unable to do so without the necessary powers and means”.
C. Going for Full Transparency, ACA to become MCAC
PM invests significant powers and proper oversight in new and improved anti-graft agency
Abdullah speaking at the launch of the Asean seminar on integrity. — Picture by Choo Choy May
KUALA LUMPUR, April 21 — The veil of secrecy which has hung over Malaysia’s anti-corruption
efforts for decades should be lifted by the year end. And then Malaysians will know why someministers were never charged in court or the status of other high profile investigations.
Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi today announced changes to the AntiCorruption Agency (ACA), saying that it will be known as the Malaysian Commission on AntiCorruption (MCAC). It will have the power to hire and fire its own personnel and will grow from 2,000
to some 7,000.
The commission will be assisted by an advisory board of eminent Malaysians who will be able tohave oversight over important cases and assure the public that there is no hanky-panky in a probe.
Abdullah, who has been battered by criticisms for not walking the talk in the fight against corruption
in his first term, also said that a parliamentary committee on the prevention of corruption will be set up.
This panel can scrutinise the annual report on corruption. Laws will also be passed to protect whistle
blowers and those who come forward with evidence of any wrongdoing.
He said: “I have always believed that, given the weight and importance of its work, the ACA mustbe given freedom to carry out its responsibilities. In fact, one of the first pronouncements I made on
anti-corruption was to direct the ACA to carry out its duties 'without fear or favour'. I remain true to thisconviction and have never interfered with the work of the ACA.
“It is my fervent hope that by restructuring the ACA, its effectiveness, transparency andaccountability will be considerably raised, while public trust in its integrity and independence will bequickly renewed."
Speaking at the launch of the Asean seminar on integrity, he admitted that his government had fallen― 107 ―

short of public expectations in the fight against corruption.
Public feedback suggests that Malaysians feel that the institutional and legal framework for anticorruption remains structurally weak, and prone to abuse.
“They point to the need for a clear separation of powers between the institutions of government aswell as a higher degree of transparency and public accountability from enforcement agencies," he said.
Also, the perception is that anti-corruption enforcement is slow and inconsistent.
“Some say that so-called 'big fish' are protected, while the 'small fry' face the full brunt of the law.
Whistleblowers are also said to be inadequately protected. In fact, the perception goes so far as to saythat enforcement agencies often go after the whistleblower instead of focusing on investigating the actual
charges," said Abdullah.
He noted that many Malaysians also feel that the existing public procurement system and procedures
for awarding government contracts are rife with opportunities for corruption.
To tackle corruption effectively, he said that the government will:●   restructure the ACA to become a full-fledged “Malaysian Commission on Anti-Corruption". A
key element of this system will be an independent “corruption prevention advisory board”. The board
will consist of prominent, upstanding members of the community appointed by the King on the advice ofthe prime minister.
Board members will advise the commission on administrative and operational matters. The board will
also be briefed on cases that involve public interest and can act to assure the public that these public
interest cases are being dealt with appropriately and adequately.
●   set up a “parliamentary committee on the prevention of corruption”. The commission will table
its annual report to this committee.
●   increase 5,000 officers to the current total of just under 2,000. In addition, the commission will
have new terms of service and remuneration in order to attract talented and dedicated individuals to signup.
●  introduce legislation to provide comprehensive protection for whistleblowers and witnesses.
●   take immediate steps to improve the public procurement process and reduce opportunities
for corruption.
D. Cabinet Agrees on Setting Up of Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission
PM: Cabinet agrees to formulation of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission.
KUCHING, Nov 7 - Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi today announced the Cabinet's
agreement on the formulation of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (SPRM) Bill 2008 ina move to further strengthen the national integrity agenda.
The setting up of the proposed SPRM, to replace the Anti-Corruption Act 1997, would be tabled forfirst reading in Parliament very soon, said the Prime Minister who arrived here after chairing the cabinet
meeting this morning.
“The current Parliament session will also be extended to Dec 18 to enable the Bill to be debatedand once it is passed, it will become the basis for the formation of a more effective anti-corruption
commission and subjected to external monitoring via a comprehensive check-and-balance system,” hesaid.
He said this in his speech at the National Integrity Day and National Integrity Convention 2008
themed 'Integrity, the Catalyst to Sustainable Development', which was also held in conjunction with the45th anniversary of Sarawak's progress under Malaysia.
As part of the measures to enhance and restructure the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), Abdullah
said all efforts had been taken to ensure that the proposed SPRM would be truly effective and capable ofmeeting the needs and aspirations of the people.
The SPRM, modelled after anti-corruption agencies which are recognised as among the best in
the world such as the Independent Commission On Anti-Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong and― 108 ―

Independent Commission Against Corruption in Australia, would be supported by several “checkand balance” mechanisms which were perceived to be more accountable, transparent and effective
in carrying out their tasks, he said.
He said the Advisory Board would comprise individuals, appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agongon the advice of the Prime Minister, who had demonstrated exemplary service and with integrity while
the Special Committee On Corruption would be made up of Members of Parliament who would receiveand scrutinise the annual report, which must be submitted by the commission.
The cabinet had also agreed on the proposed formation of two more panels - the Operations
Evaluation Panel which would determine the action and decision on the investigation carried out, andthe Consultation and Anti-Corruption Panel which would assist efforts at educating the public tooppose corruption, he said.
Abdullah said the cabinet had also considered allowing the SPRM to handle matters concerning
service, particularly those involving the processes of appointment and termination of service for its
officers.
On corruption, he said several studies and censuses carried out on the issues recently showedthat the people strongly supported the national integrity and anti-corruption agenda and wanted to see
stern and instant action taken towards strengthening the anti-corruption institution as well as the legal
framework pertaining to corruption. - Bernama
E. Instant Fix For Corruption?
2008-11-11 19:06
The 2008 Malaysian Commission on Anti-Corruption Bill will be tabled in the Parliament soon.
If passed, the Malaysian Commission on Anti-Corruption (MCAC)--once described by our leaders as
having higher efficiency and better framework than Hong Kong's ICAC--will most likely be establishednext year.
In the midst of all the cheers and anticipation, it seems that MCAC is going to be a panacea that will
instantly fix the country's corruption problems.
The efficiency of existing ACA leaves much to be desired, and therefore a more independent andaccountable anti-corruption mechanism is essential to reverse the people's perception and negative
impression of the government's counter-corruption efforts.
ACA deputy director-general Abu Kassim Mohamed is flushing with confidence that the newcommission will be able to do just that.
ACA director-general Ahmad Said Hamdan holds very similar opinions, stressing that once the
new anti-corruption mechanism is passed, the problems currently encountered by the ACA will all be
resolved, including greater empowerment of ACA officials, more attractive remunerations and perks, aswell as more definite duty and rank distinctions.
From what Ahmad Said Hamdan has said, we can anticipate a new lease of life that the new anticorruption commission is going to deliver--enhanced independence, transparency, professionalism andefficiency.
In our stereotyped impression, these qualities are what the ACA badly lacks, while ACA officials arethemselves feeling dejected because of unclear job functions.
Having said that, I believe many are still not so sure how independent ACA could go: whether the
MCAC will still come under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Department, or be answerable to theKing or the Parliament.
From what we have heard from Abu Kassim, the new committee will be overseen by four external
supervisory bodies, namely the anti-corruption consultation board, the special commission on corruption
issues, the action evaluation task force, and the consultation and corruption prevention task force.
However, we are still unsure whom the MCAC will eventually have to answer to.
If the MCAC continues to come under the administration's hand, it may not fix the corruption
problems instantly.

― 109 ―

Another determinant factor that will dictate whether the corruption issue could be fixed immediately
is the resolution of our leaders to fight corruption.
It has been reported that even during the current preliminary rounds in UMNO's party elections, theparty's disciplinary bureau has received more than 900 counts of money politics complaints, the most
severe in the party's history.
This disclosure is shocking enough. Being the country's most predominant political entity, how
could UMNO set up an incorrupt role model if money politics still has its day?
There have been calls from within the party urging for stern actions against money politics, theimplementation of systematic reforms and prevention of vote soliciting and bribery. However, it takes
a lot of political will to uproot money politics planted so deeply over the past two decades owing to aramification of interests and relationships.
UMNO delegates the power of rewarding government contracts as well as offering "proposals"in specific matters to divisional and branch leaders, and this has been singled out as the root cause of
rampant money politics within the party.
The removal of this power will therefore help wipe out money politics. However, if the rewardingof government projects is reverted back to government officials, and money transactions is still seen as achannel for "speeding up the process" or "enhancing efficiency," then corruption will remain very much
alive and uncurbed.
To check the propagation of the corruption virus, we need counteraction and close monitoring,as well as administrative transparency and judicial independence. Not only must the anti-corruption
mechanism function this way, the entire country must also be instilled with such a conviction in order tocompletely overhaul the systems and implementing sound value systems.
What we hate to see is that some of the uncompleted plans are rushed to completion to meet specificdeadlines with the help of bills that have been drafted, tabled and passed all in a rush, without instilling
the right values and philosphies into the systems. We have simply seen too many instances in which
hurriedly implemented measures and mechanisms have not produced the desired effects and results. (By
CHONG LIP TECK/Translated by DOMINIC LOH/Sin Chew Daily)― 110 ―

STRENGTHENING OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTIONCOUNTRY REPORT OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR
Han Nyunt*

I. INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a major crime affecting administration of justice, administrative and law and orderin the whole world and also in Myanmar. It is a serious social disease and wide spreads all over theworld today. Generally, not only government officials involve in bribery and corruption, but also private
individuals and corporations. Even though every country is endeavoring to wipe out that malpractice,
it can be said that no country all over the world is free from corruption. Furthermore, the network ofcorruption, including money laundering cases arising from corruption, has extended beyond the bordersof a country, so that no country can combat it singly. As such, it has become evident that countries needto cooperate and coordinate their activities in combating corruption. The sources of corruption may varyfrom country to country. Likewise, countermeasures taken against corruption may be different in somerespects.
This paper is intended to present a brief account of Myanmar laws against corruption, investigationand prosecution of corruption cases, national, the need of regional and international cooperation to fightagainst corruption.

II. MYANMAR LAWS RELATING TO PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION
Corruption links with every field in any form and manner. So, Myanmar enacted so many laws
containing provisions concerning prevention of corruption as follows:(a) The Penal Code, 1868,(b) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,(c) The Criminal Law Amending Act, 1951,(d) The Defence Services Act, 1959,(e) The Law Taking Action against the Ownership or Sale of Property
Obtained by Illegal Means, 1986,(f) The Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law, 1989,(g) The Commercial Tax Law, 1990,(h) The Forest Law, 1992,(i) The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law, 1993,(j) The Myanmar Police Force Maintenance of Discipline Law, 1995,(k) The Fire Services Law, 1997,(l) The Control of Money Laundering Law, 2002,* Deputy Director General, Office of the Attorney General, Union of Myanmar.

― 111 ―

(m) The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Law, 2004 and(n) Administrative Measures against Corruption(o) The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1948.
A. The Penal CodeThe Penal Code provides, under sections 161 to 171, corruption offences by or relating to public
servants. Taking gratification by public servant other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act;
taking gratification in order, by corrupt or illegal means, to influence public servant; taking gratificationfor exercise of personal influence with public servant, without consideration, from person concernedin proceeding or business transacted by such public servant; disobeying direction of the law by public
servant, with intent to cause injury to any person; framing an incorrect document by public servant withintent to cause injury to any person; unlawfully engaging in trade by public servant; are corruption
offences punishable with imprisonment ranging from one year to three years, or with fine, or with both.
B. The Code of Criminal Procedure
The Code of Criminal Procedure is the procedural law which provides, inter alia, procedures formaking investigation, prosecution and trial of the corruption cases.
C. The Criminal Law Amending Act
The Criminal Law Amending Act is the more effective procedural law in taking action against
corruptions. If the Government has reasons to believe that an accused of corruption case obtained
money or property by committing such offence, it may direct to submit an application to the District
Administrative Officer for the attachment of warrant on such money or property. These speedy actions
may deter or freeze the exhibit money or property obtained by the accused in timely manner.
D. The Defence Services Act
The Defence Services Act has provisions, i.e. sections 51 and 66, who commits corrupt acts;
dishonestly receiving or retaining government property and directly or indirectly accepting or obtaining
bribes. The accused may be, on conviction by Court-Martial, punishable with imprisonment for 7 years to
10 years.
E. The Law Taking Action against the Ownership or Sale of Property Obtained by Illegal Means
The Law Taking Action against the Ownership or Sale of Property Obtained by Illegal Means
authorizes Government to confiscate moveable or immoveable property of a person who obtained suchproperty by illegal means or from illegal business or bought with money evaded from income tax.
F. The Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law
The Pyithu Hluttaw Election Law prohibits, under sections 49 and 50, violation of a person's right tostand for election and to vote by means of, inter alia, taking or giving of bribes to any person. Moreover,it also prohibits obtaining the electoral right by unlawful means or after obtaining such right committing,giving and taking bribes by way of money, goods, foodstuff, position or service transfer.
G. The Commercial Tax Law
The Commercial Tax Law prohibits, under section 23, giving and taking of bribes; attempting togive and take bribes; abetting to give and take bribes; misusing, with a dishonest or fraudulent intention,
any of the powers conferred by such Law. Breach of which is punishable with imprisonment from 3 years
to 7 years.
H. The Forest Law
The Forest Law prohibits, under its section 46, any forest staff not to accept cash or kind fromany person, by reason of his power, and in a corrupt manner in contravention of the Forest Law andparticipates and conspires in extracting, moving or unlawfully having in possession of forest produce in― 112 ―

a wrongful manner. The offender violating such prohibitions shall be punished with imprisonment which
may extend from a minimum of 1 year to a maximum of 7 years.
I. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law
The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law has particular provisions for taking action
against investigating officers who commits corrupt acts. Section 18 of the Law provides, inter alia, that aperson authorized to search, arrest, seize exhibits and investigate in respect of any offence under that Law
shall be, on conviction, punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend from 5 years to 10
years, if he is guilty of asking and accepting any money and property as gratification either for himself orfor another person, or accepting a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance unlawfully.
J. The Myanmar Police Force Maintenance of Discipline Law
The Myanmar Police Force Maintenance of Discipline Law has wide provisions concerning
corruptions. Especially, its sections 17 and 18 provide various kinds of corruptions. Section 17 prohibitsa person subject to that Law not to commit; unnecessarily detaining of a person against the law; failingto bring his case before the proper authority for investigation; taking in or bringing in or allowing to betaken in, due to his negligence, articles which are prohibited from being taken in or brought into theprison or police custody; causing or allowing a prisoner or a person in custody strike or otherwise ill-treat
another person subject to that Law or any prisoner under custody; striking or ill-treating his subordinate;allowing to escape any person for whom he has duty to keep or guard; and demanding or accepting
cash or kind in a corrupt manner from any person. The offender who violates any of such prohibitions,on conviction by Police Court, may be punished with imprisonment up to 3 years or less punishment
as prescribed in that Law. Section 18 of the Law further prohibits a person subject to that Law not todo; committing theft of any property belonging to the Myanmar Police Force or any person subject
to that Law; dishonestly misappropriating or converting to his own use of such property; committing
criminal breach of trust in respect of such property; dishonestly receiving or retaining any such property;
will fully destroying or injuring or causing loss through negligence any such property; dishonestly
misappropriating, obliterating, destroying, injuring or causing loss through negligence, any exhibit; ordoes any other thing with intent to defraud or to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss. The violation of
any of such prohibitions shall be punishable with imprisonment up to 3 years or such less punishment asprescribed by that Law.
K. The Fire Services Law
The Fire Services Law also provides, under its sections 31 and 37, that no member of the firebrigade, auxiliary fire brigade or reserve fire brigade shall, without the consent of the owner, acquire
any property, gift or money by way of bribe or by dishonest means, while discharging his duty during an
outbreak of fire. The breach of such provisions is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to 7 years and may also be fined.
L. The Control of Money Laundering Law
The Control of Money Laundering Law prescribes, under section 25, members of the investigationbody not to commit; demanding or accepting money or property either for himself or for any other person
as a gratification; substitution of an offender with any other person so that action can not be taken against
him or misprision of an offender without taking action against him. The breach of such prohibitions may
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend from a minimum of 3 years to a maximumof 7 years and may also be liable to fine.
M. The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Law
The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Law and its rules provide for rendering legal assistanceamong states in investigation, prosecution and trial of criminal matters in accordance with regional
agreements, bilateral agreements, multilateral agreements and the conventions accepted by Myanmar.
It also includes rendering of mutual legal assistance in investigation, prosecution and trial of corruption― 113 ―

cases. One of the aims of this law is to enable communication with international organizations, regionalorganizations and foreign countries in carrying out criminal matters.
N. Administrative Measures against Corruption
All civil service personnel in Myanmar are responsible to abide by the Fundamental Rules andSupplementary Rules. Those Rules prescribes that Government servants shall not, except with the priorsanction of the Government, accept directly or indirectly on his own behalf or on behalf of any otherperson, or permit any member of his family so to accept any gift, gratuity or reward.

III. THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT AND ITS DEFINITION
A. The Prevention of Corruption Act
This act is the main law in taking action against corruption. This Law provides special rules ofevidence that the burden of proof relies on accused, if the acceptance of bribe by accused was proved.
The Law also provides that the Court may presume an accused guilty of corruption case if he owns orowned too much money or properties beyond his income, where the accused can not prove his lawful
ownership of such money or properties. Any person convicted under section 4(1)(c) / 4(2)of this Law ispunishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 7 years. Besides, all benefits obtained byaccused by committing such offence shall be confiscated. The punishment under this Law is more severe
and effective than the punishment prescribed under the Penal Code. So, practice in Myanmar serious
corruption cases are prosecuted with that law. The Law also authorizes investigating police officer tomake necessary inspections on the bank accounts or registers of the accused and / or his dependants.
However, the Law requires to obtain prior sanction from the relevant appointing authority of the accused
before taking action under this Law.
B. Definition of Corruption
As mentioned above, there are various legislations in Myanmar providing for taking action against
corruption. However, the Prevention of Corruption Act is the main law and it provides more effective
measures. The Act, under its section 4, defines corruption widely as follows:"A public servant is said to commit culpable corruption if he commits any of the following acts
dishonestly or with intention to deceive in performing his duties:(a) habitually accepting, obtaining, agreeing to accept or attempting to obtain any bribes other than
his legal remuneration for himself or for any other person from any person with intention as
mentioned in section 161 of the Penal Code or expectation for benefit;(b) habitually accepting, obtaining, agreeing to accept or attempting to obtain valueable property forhimself or for any other person without consideration or without adequate consideration fromany person whom he knows connected or being connected or likely to connect with the case hehas done or is about to do; or any person whom he knows connected with his or his superior's
official duties or his relatives;(c) obtaining any valuable property or pecuniary benefit for himself or for any other person
dishonestly, corruptly or by unlawful means or by misusing his position as public servant;(d) deceiving so as to injure the public interest or misappropriating entrusted public property."
According to the definition of corruption defined in Myanmar laws, corruption means not only
taking, accepting, obtaining of any bribe money, property, narcotic drug or pecuniary benefit or agreeing
or attempting to do so, but includes undue service, disservice, favour, disfavour in concern with his or his
superior's work done or being done or likely to do. Moreover, communicating, using, illegally retaining
or failing to take care of the official secrets or unauthorized disclosing of bank secrecies falls under thedefinition of corruption.

― 114 ―

IV. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION PROCEDURES FOR TAKING LEGALACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION CASES
A. Investigation
In Myanmar, corruption case is cognizable case under the provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Therefore those cases may be investigated by Bureau of Special Investigation officers or
police officers without obtaining warrant of a court.
Bureau of Special Investigation (BSI) is conferred authority to investigate corruption cases under theprovisions of the Bureau of Special Investigation and the Investigation Department Act, and Myanmar
Police Force is authorized to do so under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Being the cognizable case, BSI officers and Police Officers may book the case against the accusedat the respective police station, request for sanction to prosecute against the accused from the relevant
Ministry, arrest the offender, examine the accused and witnesses, seize the exhibits, construct the case,ask expert opinions on the exhibits if necessary, ask for legal advice from the Office of the Attorney
General or various Law Offices for sound construction of the case and reconstruct the case in accordancewith the legal advice of the Office of the Attorney General or respective Law Office, and file the casebefore a competent and relevant Court. Usually, Bureau of Special Investigation investigates serious
corruption cases and refers other corruption cases to Myanmar Police Force for investigation. . If the caseis not strong enough for sending it up to the Court, and it is necessary to take some other action, suchcorruption case is referred to the Government department concerned for taking departmental action.
B. Prosecution
Under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if an accused who is a Judge, Magistrate or
any public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the President
or relevant Ministry, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or
purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence
except with such previous sanction.
When such cases are sent up before the Courts, BSI prosecutors or Law Officers conduct prosecution
in those cases. Throughout the prosecution period, prosecutors consult with the relevant Investigation
Officers of the case to construct the case strongly. If necessary, the Law Office concerned files appeals orrevisions against the order and judgment of original or appeal Court for enhancing punishment so as toobtain effective and deterrent punishments. BSI may request relevant Law Office to file revision in thosecases. If the accused is acquitted by the Court, Office of the Attorney General may file for appeal against
acquittal order to the Supreme Court. BSI or Myanmar Police Force may apply to relevant Law Office or
Office of the Attorney General to file appeal against acquittal.
Office of the Attorney General and Law Offices at different levels under its guidance andsupervision render legal advices not only for sound construction of corruption cases, but also provides
other legal advice in legal matters.
Law Officers of the Office of the Attorney General and Law Offices at different levels conduct theprosecution as Government Advocates in all Courts at different levels up to the Supreme Court.

― 115 ―

V. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR EFFECTIVEINVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION
A. Domestic Cooperation
As mentioned above, BSI, Myanmar Police Force and Law Office cooperate for sound constructionof the corruption cases at the pre-trail stage and during trial period under the guidance of the relevant
Ministries and Peace and Development Councils.
The Courts at various levels pass effective and deterrent punishments against the offenders ofcorruption cases. The Supreme Court instructs all Courts at all levels to pass effective and deterrent
punishments, on conviction, against the accused of corruption cases.
Under section 4(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, an accused may be punished, on conviction,with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years. Moreover, the benefits found to beobtained by the accused by commission of corruption case are liable to be confiscated.
B. International Cooperation
The Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Law is the main law in Myanmar for bilateral,
multilateral, regional and international cooperation for effective investigation and prosecution in criminal
matters including corruption cases.
Under the provisions of the Law, the Central Authority for Rendering Assistance among States in
Criminal Matters was formed with Ministers for Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Finance and Revenue, Ministry of Immigration and Population, Deputy Chief Justice,
Deputy Attorney General, a representative from the Ministry of Defence, Director General of the General
Administration Department as members. The Director General of Myanmar Police Force is secretary andChief of Police General Staff of Myanmar Police Force is joint secretary of the Central Authority.
The Law provides for requesting assistance and refusal; search, seizure, control, issuing restraining
order and confiscation of exhibits, sending a person who is in Myanmar abroad to give testimony andstatement, requesting assistance by Myanmar, bearing of costs and miscellaneous.
The Ministry of Home Affairs made the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Rules under its
Notification No. 5/2004 for the procedural matters in implementing the Law.

VI. CONCLUSION
Corruption is undesirable and it needs to be suppressed effectively. In taking action against
corruptions, regional and international cooperation should be strengthened for effective investigation andprosecution of corruption cases. Furthermore, various measures should be implemented simultaneously.Though legal and judicial measures are effective instruments in doing so, public awareness measuresand educative measures should also be made increasingly. Moreover, the needs of the public servants
should be met as much as possible so as to get their cooperation in fighting against corruption. Regionalcountries should meet regularly, exchange their views and experiences and discuss how corruption can behandled and what should be done for doing so.

― 116 ―

RECOVERY AND REPATRIATION OF THE MARCOSES’ ILL- GOTTENWEALTH
Severino H. Gaña, Jr.*

In various forums on corruption and money laundering, I have been asked quite a few times on thesubject about the subject of the assets looted from the coffers of the Philippine government by former
President Ferdinand Marcos and his family. This is an opportune time for me to discuss the efforts of thePhilippines on the recovery and repatriation of said assets, specifically the Marcos Swiss bank deposits.
As a background, Ferdinand Marcos was elected as president of the Philippines in 1965 and was reelected in 1969. He declared martial law in September 1972. In 1981, opposition groups boycotted thepresidential elections so he won again but there was widespread social unrest and protest over allegationsof corruption, cronyism and violations of civil rights on his part. Opposition leader Benigno Aquino,
Jr. was assassinated in 1983. In 1986, his widow Corazon Aquino ran for president against Marcos andthe latter was declared the winner again. But a peaceful civilian military uprising forced Marcos to step
down from office. On February 25, 1986, Corazon Aquino was sworn in as president and on the sameday, Marcos and his family hurriedly fled the country. Upon their arrival in Hawaii, the customs service
conducted and inventory of their personal properties that included suit cases of jewelry, twenty four (24)gold bricks and certificates of billions of dollars and gold bullion.
In their haste, the Marcoses left some documents in the Presidential Palace of Malacañang. The“Malacañang documents” revealed the huge deposits of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in Swiss banks,
using pseudonyms and dummy foundations.
President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 dated February 28, 1986 creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The PCGG is a quasi- judicial body mandated to:
1. Investigate, gather and evaluate information regarding the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses;
2. File and prosecute criminal and civil cases for the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth;
3. Pursue sequestration, hold and or freeze orders or lift such orders and;4. Preserve and maintain the sequestered assets.
From its investigation, the PCGG discovered that the Marcos ill gotten wealth mostly came fromdiverted foreign economic aid, government military aid and kickbacks from public works contracts.
The PCGG ordered the Central Bank of the Philippines to freeze all the assets in the Philippinesof the Marcoses and their cronies. President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 2, freezing all Marcos
assets in the Philippines.
In Switzerland, a Filipino banker with a power of attorney from Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos,
requested for the transfer of the Marcos assets to an Austrian bank belonging to the banker and othercronies of Marcos. In anticipation of the claims of Philippine government, the Swiss Federal Council* Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice, Philippines.

― 117 ―

imposed an unprecedented and unilateral freeze on the Marcos assets in the Swiss banks. But this was atemporary measure. The Philippine government must make a request for the issuance of a regular freeze
order.
On the basis of the Malacañang documents, the PCGG made the request in April 1986, invoking the
Swiss Law on International Mutual Assistance on Criminal Matters (IMAC). At that time, there was no
mutual legal assistance treaty on criminal matters between Switzerland and the Philippines. That treaty
between the two countries came about only in December 2005. At this point, it must be mentioned thatboth countries are signatories to the United Nations Convention against Corruption.
The request was met with strong resistance. The Marcoses through their lawyers, the Swiss banks
and the account holders argued that the protection and remedies under the IMAC is not available to thePhilippine government; that the accounts were not established as belonging to the Marcoses and; that thesecrecy and confidentiality of bank deposits would be violated. Moreover, the fact that the freeze ordercame before the request led to a controversy in Switzerland.
Initially, there were various suits at different cantonal courts where the Marcoses were represented
by more than thirty lawyers. The PCGG was assisted by only three Swiss lawyers Salvioni, Fontanat andLeuenberger.
In another development, the Society of Ex-Detainees for Liberation from Detention and for Amnesty(SELDA), a group of around 10,000 victims of human rights violations by the Marcos regime or theirfamilies filed a case against Marcos in the United States District Court of Hawaii on April 7, 1986. The
case was dismissed and their lead counsel Robert Swift appealed to the Court of Appeals and secured areversal.
In December 1990, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court rendered a favorable judgment on the request
for assistance by the Philippine government and admitted that in principle, the frozen assets should be
returned to the Philippines. On December 21, 1990 the Swiss Federal Supreme Court issued an order for
Swiss banking documents pertaining to Marcos deposits be transmitted to the Philippine Government,
provided that: 1) there is a final judgment of conviction by the Sandiganbayan (the Philippine special
anti-graft court) or another court having jurisdiction over criminal matters; 2) there is an executory
decision of the Sandiganbayan or another competent Philippine Court concerning restitution to those whoare entitled and; 3) there is due process of law for Imelda Marcos.
The decision is significant because the Philippines was the first country to get the Swiss banks toopen their documents. However, the conditions pose gave difficulties. No criminal case was filed against
the Marcoses because they were then in Hawaii. Philippine criminal laws require the presence of theaccused during arraignment. To compound the problem, Ferdinand Marcos died on September 28, 1989.
It must also be added that at that time, the anti- plunder law and the anti- money laundering law of thePhilippines have not been enacted yet.
Just a few days after Imelda Marcos and her children came back to the Philippines and before
the December 21, 1991, deadline imposed by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in its judgment dated
December 21, 1990, the PCGG filed Civil Case No. 141 before the Sandiganbayan for the forfeiture of
Marcos properties and assets. The delay was partially caused by Swiss review of banking documents,
to protect non-participating third parties. Moreover, the Swiss lawyers hired by the PCGG were notpermitted to gather evidence in behalf of foreign clients thus they were stalled.
Under R.A. 1379, otherwise known as the Forfeiture Act, whenever a public officer or employee
has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion tohis salary as public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and income from legitimately― 118 ―

acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. If the
public officer is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property
in question, the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State.
Meanwhile, on September 1992, the class action suit filed by human rights victims went to trial in
the Hawaii District Court together with other cases consolidated with it. The case is dealt with in threeparts addressing liability, exemplary damages and compensatory damages. The Court subsequently ruledthat Marcos committed gross human rights violations and held his estate liable to pay damages to thevictims.
On the basis of the United Nations Convention against Torture and on Alien Tort Claims Act or
Alien Tort Statute of the United States, on February 23, 1994, the jury in the SELDA case heard in
Hawaii awarded US$ 1.2 billion to the complainants as exemplary damages. On January 18, 1995 thejury awarded approximately US$ 750 million in compensatory damages. Imelda Marcos appealed but theUnited States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Court upheld the judgments. No funds are available
to fulfill the award, so the Court attempted but failed to fulfill it with the frozen Marcos funds in Swissbank accounts through the branches of the Swiss banks located in America.
In August 10, 1995, the PCGG filed a petition for the modification of the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court judgment that required criminal conviction against Marcos so that the frozen Marcos accounts in
Swiss banks may be transferred to a Philippine bank under an escrow agreement, during the pendencyof the forfeiture case. The petition is anchored on the recognition of the Swiss courts that the Philippine
courts have the jurisdiction to rule whether or not the money in the accounts were stolen or not. The
petition was prompted primarily by other claims to the Marcos Swiss accounts, registered with the proper
Swiss authorities, for the purpose of satisfying court judgments. One of these is the award to humanrights victims by the Hawaii court in the SELDA case. Another claim came from a court in London,
pertaining to several promissory notes issued by Ferdinand Marcos while in exile in Hawaii. These
notes were dishonored and subsequently indorsed to a London based company that filed the suit and wasawarded US$ 600 million, excluding interest.
The Marcos lawyers employed all sorts of dilatory tactics to prevent a hearing on the merits ofthe forfeiture case before the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, the case could not move because of aCompromise Agreement in December 1993 between then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo
and the Marcos family, a secret accord which came to light on April 5, 1995 because a petition for its
approval was filed in the Sandiganbayan. In the Compromise Agreement, the government would getseventy five percent (75%) and the Marcos family twenty five percent (25%) of the ill-gotten wealth. The
latter would get criminal and the tax immunities as well.
In 1995 Imelda Marcos was elected congresswoman and her son Ferdinand Jr. as congressmanin separate districts. There is still political support for the Marcos family in their region in northern
Philippines and from the elite who benefited from their corrupt system.
On August 21, 1995, the Swiss authorities issued an unprecedented order partially modifying
December 21, 1990 judgment and ordered the “anticipatory transfer" of assets sought in the
aforementioned petition. In the same year, the IMAC was amended by the Swiss Parliament. Under theamendment, there is no more need for a final judgment of criminal conviction against the Marcoses in thePhilippines. Even a civil proceeding and a final judgment for the Philippine government would suffice.
As then President Fidel Ramos adopted the policy of reconciliation, in September 1995, PCGG
chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo and lawyer Robert Swift signed a memorandum of agreement for acompromise with Philippine government, accepting US$ 100 million - US$ 50 million from Marcoses
and US$ 50 million from government's claim on Swiss deposits- in exchange for dropping the class suit― 119 ―

filed by the human rights victims. In the SELDA case, the victims disowned the act of their lawyer. The
Sandigan also found the agreement to be illegal and contrary to public policy. Moreover, there is no legal
basis for proposed mode of funding. Consequently, President Ramos did not sign the agreement.
Robert Swift, the lawyer for the human rights victims requested for the release of Swiss deposits
based on the award by the court in Hawaii. It was denied because the civil attachment he obtained cannot
prevail over the criminal attachment of the stolen assets in favor of the Philippine government. His claim
was not considered because the Marcos deposits were funds stolen from the Philippines and were frozen
on account of international legal assistance by Switzerland to the Philippine government.
The US Court of Appeals, in December 1996, denied the appeal of Imelda Marcos and affirmed thedecision in favor of the 10,000 human rights victims. In March 1997, the US Supreme Court sustained
the decision of the appeal court. This final decision is a legal precedent in international human rights
jurisprudence.
In December 10, 1997, the Swiss Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision transferring around
US$ 540 million of the Marcos Swiss deposits that later became US$ 658 million because of interest to
the custody of the Sandiganbayan, via an escrow account in the Philippine National Bank. The decisionstates that the facts are sufficiently clear to allow the assumption of the illegal origin of the seizedmonies. It is contrary to the interest of Switzerland if it turns into a haven for fugitive capital or criminal
monies. It is the duty of the legislators, the banks and the banking organizations to insure that the headsof dictatorial regimes cannot - as has happened in the present case - deposit millions of obviously
criminally-acquired monies in Swiss bank accounts. It also ruled that under the IMAC amendment of1995, there is no more need for a final judgment of criminal conviction against the Marcoses in thePhilippines. Even a civil proceeding in the Philippines and a final judgment in favor of the Republicwould suffice, since the acts took place in the Philippines. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court held as wellthat the decision to seize the monies must be taken in the Philippines where the acts were committed.
In the same decision, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court stated that although there is much concern
in Switzerland for the human rights victims, “there is no connection between the crimes which caused the
Marcos assets in Switzerland to be frozen in 1986 and the claims of the human rights victims.” While thePhilippines is a signatory to the United Nations Treaty protecting victims of human rights from tortureand the other dehumanizing punishment, the Treaty does not give these victims priority rights over the
Marcos assets in Switzerland. But they are entitled to a fair hearing in the Philippines where they canenforce their claims for compensation. Therefore, the victims of the Marcos regime were obliged toparticipate in the probate proceedings to assert Ferdinand Marcos' responsibility for the human rights
violations committed during his tenure if they have to claim damages from the Philippine government for
the wrongs committed by its organs. The decision only required that the Philippine government informs
the Swiss authorities of the substantive developments concerning provisions and procedures for thepayment of reparations to the victims of human rights violations under the Marcos regime. It must also
be noted that according to Hawaii Court judgment, the human rights victims are to be compensated from
the Marcos estate. The funds in the Swiss bank accounts are not deemed to be part of the Marcos private
estate as these are funds stolen from the Philippines.
For its part, the Republic of the Philippines guaranteed the restitution of the assets to the entitledparties including the human rights victims, through judicial proceedings and to satisfy human rights
principles, procedural guarantees in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and otherrelevant international obligations of Switzerland and the Philippines. In this respect, the decision closed
the gap in the interpretation of national and international legal norms that blocked the Marcos case foryears.
Joseph Estrada was elected President of the Philippines in May 1998. Imelda Marcos previously― 120 ―

withdrew her presidential bid in favor of Estrada, her friend. Soon there were also allegations ofcronyism and corruption against Estrada. In October 2000, he was accused of taking millions of pesos inillegal gambling business payoffs. The impeachment proceedings against him in the Senate broke down.
There were massive street protests against him and the Armed Forces withdrew their support for him. He
is forced to leave his office in January 2001. Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him.
Subsequently, Estrada was charged and convicted of plunder but that is another story.
In December 1998, the Philippine Supreme Court invalidated the Compromise Agreement ofDecember 1993 between the PCGG and the Marcos family on a 75%-25% split of the money held on
the escrow account. The Compromise Agreement was null and void, on at least four grounds: (1) Under
the law, criminal immunity cannot be granted to the Marcos’s, who are the principal defendants in thespate of ill-gotten wealth cases now pending in the Sandiganbayan; (2) Exemption from taxes of theproperties to be retained by the Marcos heirs is a clear violation of the Constitution since the power to tax
and to grant tax exemption is vested in Congress alone; (3) The dismissal of all cases pending against
the Marcoses in the Sandiganbayan and the other courts, is a direct encroachment on judicial powers
particularly with regard to criminal jurisdiction; (4) The stipulation that the Government waives all
claims and counterclaims, past, present, and the future, is not only a violation of the Civil Code whichsays that an action for future fraud may not be waived, but also a virtual warrant for all public officials toamass public funds illegally, since there is an open option to compromise their liability in exchange only
for a portion of the ill-gotten wealth.
Back to the forfeiture case against the Marcoses, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision in
September 9, 2000 adjudicating the Marcos Swiss deposits in favor of the government. The Marcoses
filed a motion for reconsideration. In January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed said decisionand dismissed the forfeiture case citing as its basis the technicality that the PCGG failed to present
authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Court.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines, in its decision dated July 15, 2003, reversed the earlier
dismissal by the Sandiganbayan of the forfeiture case against the Marcoses. The Supreme Court ruledthat Marcos deposits in Swiss banks amounting to US$ 658 million is ill-gotten and forfeited the moneyin favor of the Philippine government. Their only known income is over US$ 304, 372.00. The Swiss
deposits were out of proportion to their known income therefore there is legal and fair basis to conclude
that said deposits were unlawfully acquired. In their defense, the Marcoses claim the funds were lawfullyacquired and thus necessarily acknowledged the existence and ownership of the deposits yet they failed
to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner of acquisition of the subject funds.
Their defenses are sham and calibrated to compound and confuse the issues.
For their part, the Swiss Federal Office of Justice issued a press statement and pertinent portions ofwhich are quoted:“Satisfaction with the positive conclusion of the Marcos case was expressed by the Swiss andPhilippine authorities at a meeting in Zurich on Tuesday. Following the confiscation (forfeiture) rulingof the Supreme Court in Manila, the Philippines may now dispose of the Marcos assets that were
deposited in a frozen account in 1986 and have grown to approximately US$ 683 million..... The Marcos
case began in 1986 when the Federal Council ordered bank accounts to be frozen. In 1990, the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court approved the handover to the Philippines of bank documents relating to the
Marcos family, but ruled that the actual return of assets would be conditioned upon a final and absolutejudgment of conviction by a Philippine court. In 1997, the Court established that the majority of the
Marcos foundation assets were of criminal origin and permitted their transfer to an escrow account in
Manila, even though no Philippine court ruling had yet been issued. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court
set two conditions for this advance transfer, however, the Philippines had to provide an assurance thatthe confiscation (forfeiture) of the assets in question would be handled through judicial proceedings. as― 121 ―

well as the precautions and procedures pertaining to compensation for victims of violation of humanrights under the Marcos regime. Following the confiscation (forfeiture) ruling of the Philippine Supreme
Court on 15 July 2003, which confirmed the view of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court with regard to
the criminal origin of the monies seized, the Philippine Government may now dispose of the monies,
now worth some US$ 683 million. No further decisions are due on the part of the Swiss authorities. The
Philippine parliament is currently debating legislation under which the Marcos assets would be used forland reform and compensate the victims of human rights violations.”
On November 18, 2003, the Supreme Court denied with finality several petitions filed by the Marcos
heirs to set aside its July 15, 2003 decision declaring the US$ 683 million as ill-gotten and in favor of thegovernment. The Supreme Court also rejected the worldwide injunctions on the Marcos funds issued byJudge Real of the Hawaii Court. The decision came a week after the US Circuit Court of Appeals turned
down a last-ditch attempt by the Marcoses to stop the release of the US$683million to the Philippine
Government by seeking mediation by the US Court “for possible settlement” of the disputed funds.
Despite the decision forfeiting the Marcos ill-gotten wealth, problems still beset the Philippine
government.
A District Court of Hawaii through Judge Manuel Real issued a freeze order on the Marcos assets
all over the world. The Philippine Government appealed the freeze order but the appeal was dismissed on
December 28, 2004.
Because of the global freeze order, the Philippine National Bank was constrained to ask the US
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to prevent the district court from pursuingcontempt and discovery proceedings against the bank because it previously transferred funds in theescrow account to the treasury of the Philippine government, pursuant to the decision of the Philippine
Supreme Court. The appellate court ruled that the order of the district court violated the act of state
doctrine and thus issued the writ.
On December 27, 2006, a Singapore court dismissed an application filed by the Philippine
Government to stay other claims to the US$ 23 million deposited in the West LB Bank in Singapore. The
amount is part of the Marcos accounts forfeited in favor of the Philippine government. It was initiallydeposited in a Swiss bank but was later transferred to Singapore. Asserting that the amount has been
awarded to the Philippine government by the Philippine Supreme Court in the decision in the forfeiturecase, the Philippine government appealed the decision of the Singapore court. The appeal is pending.
The issue payment to the human rights victims in the Marcos regime is not yet totally resolved.
Under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth forfeited in favor of thegovernment cannot be used for any purpose other than agrarian reform programme to benefit many poor
farmers in the Philippines, except through an amendment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
In February 27, 2007, the Bicameral Committee of the Congress of the Philippines approved theconsolidated bill amending the Comprehensive Agrarian reform Law and providing compensation of
USD 200 million to human rights victims under the Marcos regime. The House of Representatives
thereafter approved the consolidated bill before it went into recess. The bill will become a law after the
Senate approves it. The bill has been certified as a priority bill by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
The long and difficult saga of the recovery and repatriation of the Marcos ill-gotten wealth has
definitely not ended. Of the US$ 683 million forfeited in favor of the Philippine government, US$20
million is still in litigation in Singapore due to the world-wide injunctions issued by Hawaii court. This
is not the last amount that can be recovered from the Marcos family. A much bigger amount can berecovered. Marcos made the following unsolicited admission. Imelda Marcos said:― 122 ―

“There is more money that the government is not yet aware of, but for the time being, I can only
admit that there is only $800 million kept in various international banks, if you know how rich you are,you are not rich. I am not aware of the extent of my wealth. That's how rich we are.”
The PCGG knows the source of this $800 million. Marcos Swiss agents withdrew the $400 million
from a Swiss bank on March 23, 1986, the eve of the freeze order issued by the Swiss Federal Council on
March 24, 1986. Canadian lawyer Marie Gabrille Koller, a lawyer of the Swiss bank, gave a full accountof the incident and said the amount must have already doubled because of interest.
In a recent development, the PCGG has become an agency under the Department of Justice. Thereis a continuing effort for the repatriation of the Marcos ill gotten wealth. More than money is at stake.
Jovito Salonga, the first PCGG Commissioner and a highly respected leader who is also a human rights
victim for having been imprisoned in the Marcos regime, said:“There are certain fundamental questions of right and wrong, including the crucial questions ofresponsibility for the plunder of the nation's wealth, that must be resolved by our people, no matter how
long and how much it takes. These questions and their resolution define who we are as a people-our
essential character, our integrity, our tenacity and courage and our sense of right and wrong.”― 123 ―

STRENGTHENING OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION
Bala Reddy*

I. INTRODUCTION
I wish to first of all express my great pleasure to be here, and to thank the United Nations Asia andFar East Institute for inviting me to deliver this presentation. The theme for this year’s conference is a
crucial one, and I am very glad that UNAFEI has chosen to focus on the topic of corruption.
Corruption has the potential of permeating a society and festering within it like an insidious seed.
If corruption is allowed to thrive, it will take root within a society and can be virtually impossible toeradicate.
A. Singapore’s Record
At a very early stage itself, Singapore recognised the evil that corruption represented. The
Government of Singapore understood that it was inevitable that a tough stance must be taken. To do this,we needed to put in place a system that was fortified enough to weather the problem of corruption. We
needed legislation that had teeth and a dedicated team of investigators.
Today, I am honoured to share with you some of the measures Singapore has implemented toenhance the investigation and prosecution of corruption. I am proud to say that Singapore’s anticorruption efforts have ensured that we have been consistently ranked among the least corrupt nations invarious international surveys and studies, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions
Index1 and the Political and Economic Research Consultancy. These rankings are important, as they
provide an indication as to which are the most competitive, and facilitative places in which to conductbusiness.
B. Singapore’s Early Years
Today Singaporeans take pride in the fact that they live in a virtually corruption free society.
However, in the early years, this was not the case. Following the Second World War, and during
Singapore’s colonial era, corruption was rife amongst all sectors of society. In those days, inflation, lowsalaries and poor general living conditions provided an environment in which corruption could thrive.
Then, we did not have a dedicated team of investigators who specialised in dealing with corruption.
Corrupt activities were instead investigated by a small arm of the Singapore Police Force. We did noteven have legislation that targeted the problem of corruption. This was a simply inadequate position to bein.
The Government of Singapore recognised this problem and realised that it had to embark on a robust
anti-corruption strategy. Failing to do so would result in foreign investors having a lack of confidence inSingapore. Additionally, it was necessary to weed out the corrupt section of the population, and to send amessage to all Singaporeans that core values such as honesty and hard work will bear reward.
* Principal Senior State Counsel, Head, State Prosecution Division, Attorney-General's Chambers, Singapore.
1
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi― 124 ―

II. LEGISLATION
To achieve these goals, Singapore needed to legislate for strong anti-corruption measures. In 1960,
Singapore passed the Prevention of Corruption Act,2 the prime anti-corruption legislation in Singapore
even till today. The Act was drafted as a comprehensive piece of legislation that was aimed at the jugularof corruption. It was targeted at preventing corruption more effectively through the empowerment of ourinvestigative, prosecutorial and administrative agencies.3
A. Empowerment
The effectiveness of our anti-corruption law enforcement agency was greatly enhanced by thewide investigative powers it enjoyed under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Amongst other things, thePrevention of Corruption Act contains a wide definition of what constitutes gratification. The legislation
targeted not just monetary gratification, but also gifts, valuable securities, and basically any “advantage
of any description”.4
The Act also empowers investigators to order public officers under investigation to furnish sworn
statements specifying properties belonging to them, their spouses and children.5 It also made one legallyobliged to provide information to investigators.6
B. Protecting Informants
On another note, to encourage people to come forward with information on corrupt activities,
the Act ensures that these informants remain anonymous. Special rules are put in place to prevent theidentities of these informants from being revealed.7
C. Penalties and Disgorgement
Finally, to drive home the message that corruption does not, and will not, pay, the Prevention of
Corruption Act empowers the Courts to mete out strong penalties for offenders. Additionally, the Act also
provides for an offender to disgorge whatever benefits he had derived from his corrupt act.8
As a supplement to the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other
Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act was enacted to criminalise the laundering of benefits
derived from corruption and allows for the confiscation of any benefits derived from such activities.
In line with the Government’s position, the Singapore judiciary has adopted a stern punishment
policy against corruption offenders. The then Chief Justice Yong Pung How clearly enunciated thispolicy in a Court of Appeal9 verdict he delivered in 2002, in which he stated that he had “no doubt thata more severe punishment was warranted to emphasise the courts’ as well as society’s disapproval andabhorrence of [the corrupt offender’s] actions”.

2

Please refer to Annex A for the Prevention of Corruption Act.

3

Please refer to Annex B for an overview of some of the more pertinent aspects of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

4

Section 2, Prevention of Corruption Act.

5

Section 21, Prevention of Corruption Act.

6

Section 27, Prevention of Corruption Act.

7

Section 36, Prevention of Corruption Act.

8

Section 13, Prevention of Corruption Act.

9

The Court of Appeal is Singapore’s final appellate court.

― 125 ―

D. Dealing with Corruption in the Public Sector
Recognizing that anti-corruption efforts would come to naught if the Government itself is corrupt,
a tough stance is taken to deal with the danger of corruption in the civil service. By virtue of a specificpresumption clause in the Prevention of Corruption Act,10 any form of gratification paid to a Government
employee by someone who seeks to have dealings with the Government will be deemed to be a corrupt
inducement.
The effect of this clause is that the Prosecution is only required to show that a Government employee
had received such gratification. Thereafter, the burden of proving that the gratification was not corruptly
received shifts to the Government employee.
E. Revamping the Prevention of Corruption Act
These are but only a few examples of how the Prevention of Corruption Act aids in Singapore’s fightagainst corruption. Today, much of our successes in tackling corruption can be attributed to the legislative
framework that is currently in place. It has been a long process, but one that is well worth the effort.
Singapore will not stop at this. The Prevention of Corruption Act is presently being revamped to tackle
the new age in corruption. Corrupt practices are evolving with the times. Offenders are finding new ways
and means to get around our legislative framework. We must stay a step ahead and ensure that our laws
are relevant and adequate enough to deal with these new challenges.

III. THE CORRUPT PRACTICES INVESTIGATION BUREAU
Of course, these powerful anti-corruption tools under the Prevention of Corruption Act would be
futile if they were not buttressed by effective enforcement efforts. In our battle against corruption, wehave, at the frontline, a team of officers from the Corrupt Practices and Investigation Bureau, also known
as the CPIB. These officers specialise in investigating into corrupt activities in Singapore. They also
work with officials abroad in respect of corrupt activities occurring overseas, but which have effects thatare felt in Singapore.
Established in 1952, the CPIB functions as an independent body dedicated to the prevention ofcorruption in Singapore. The CPIB works closely with prosecutors from the Attorney-General's Chambers
in investigating corrupt activities, and in bringing cases before the Courts for their determination.
Before the CPIB was established, corruption cases were investigated by a small unit in the Singapore
Police Force known as the Anti-Corruption Branch. Given the clandestine nature of corrupt activities, thiswas not the most effective way to combat them.
Thus, the CPIB was established to address the need for an enforcement body solely dedicated toinvestigating and prevent corrupt activities in Singapore. While CPIB officers exercise powers similar tothat of officers from the Singapore Police Force, it is an independent body and functions independently
from the Singapore Police Force.
The establishment of CPIB sent a clear signal to offenders and would-be offenders that Singapore
was taking a firm stance against corrupt activities. Since its inception, public confidence in the CPIB and
its work is high and the CPIB has proven to be an effective deterrent force in eradicating corruption in
Singapore.
The CPIB continues to take steps to remain relevant and continues to make progress in eradicating
10

Section 8, Prevention of Corruption Act.

― 126 ―

corruption in Singapore. In 2004, the Computer Forensic Unit was formed to perform forensic
examinations of computer-related evidence. Rapid advances in information technology and transportation
have brought new challenges and we must ensure that we are equipped to meet them.

IV. CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Modern technology and increasingly sophisticated banking methods can lead to serious difficulties
in tracing the proceeds of corruption. To guarantee the effective investigation and prosecution ofcorruption, it is critical that the criminal justice authorities have the full cooperation of financial
institutions.
Very often, financial institutions hold first-hand information which could potentially reveal criminal
schemes. Unusual financial transactions (whether by size or pattern) are the most obvious indicatorsof corruption and corruption-related crimes but will remain undetected by the investigative authorities
unless flagged out by the financial institutions handling them.
The public authorities in Singapore have actively engaged the players in the financial sector in its
fight against corruption. In dealing with money laundering, the Monetary Authority of Singapore has
issued guidelines on Prevention of Money Laundering to financial institutions (such as banks, financecompanies, insurers and money changers) to guide them in implementing measures, such as best practicesof due diligence and record-keeping in line with the anti-money laundering legislation.
The Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office of the Commercial Affairs Department, an outfit
within the Singapore Police Force which investigates into commercial and financial crime, also conducts
a series of dialogue and feedback sessions with the financial institutions in Singapore to discuss thereporting of suspicious transactions, to obtain feedback on the reporting process and address any
related concerns or queries. This ensures that on top of being cooperative, the financial entities are also
competent to effectively assist in the discovery, investigation and prosecution of such offences.
Without the generation and retention of financial information by these entities, the investigation andprosecution of corruption would be greatly crippled. Without the means to track the gratification paid or
received, which itself could come in multifarious forms, it would be impossible to bring the criminals tojustice.
Besides working with financial institutions, the criminal justice authorities in Singapore also actively
engage other stakeholders from the private sector. CAD, for example, has institutional industry dialogue
forums and conducts regular outreach programmes with members of the business, legal and auditing andaccounting community as part of its regime against money laundering and other economic crimes.
The exchange of knowledge and information facilitated through these open lines of communication
allows our investigative authorities to leverage on the specialised expertise of these industry stakeholders
in bettering our investigative capabilities. This approach also reduces the dependency on limited
government resources by enabling public authorities to tap into the private sector’s knowledge, expertiseand resources to complement the government’s efforts.

― 127 ―

V. CO-OPERATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVELIn an increasingly globalised world, it may no longer be sufficient to focus efforts in preventing
corruption within our own borders. We recognize that the effects of corrupt activities in one country caneasily spillover to another, and new strategies must be developed to engage with this threat.
Singapore strongly supports international efforts to fight corruption like the United Nations
Convention against Corruption and has demonstrated this support by becoming a signatory to the
UNCAC on 11 November 2005.
Another important measure to strengthen and facilitate international co-operation and co-ordinationis through international conferences and meetings. Important networks between anti-corruption officials
are developed at such events and opportunities are provided to share information and strategies to combat
corruption.
While Singapore has made substantial progress over the past few decades, we are not content to reston our laurels. Instead, we remain committed to eradicating corrupt activities and will explore different
ways to continue our efforts effectively both locally and internationally.

VI. CONCLUSION
In Singapore, we have recognized the extent to which corruption can permeate a society. We knowthat the efficiency and international standing of a country can be undermined by the advent of corruption.
To this extent, in Singapore, the Prosecution and the CPIB meet regularly to update each other about therespective legal and enforcement challenges that either sides face. Prosecutors must be in tune with the
new avenues that offenders utilize to carry out corrupt activities, and investigators need to be educated on
the legal challenges that the Prosecution faces in bringing cases to the Courts.
Both the Prosecution and the CPIB have worked successfully towards eradicating corruption fromall sections of society. This collaboration will continue.
On a global level, it is imperative to replicate such levels of cooperation. We should come together
regularly to update each other about our respective fights against corruption. This Conference is one suchplatform. We must work together to cull the cancer of corruption from our borders, and send a message
that corruption will never be rewarded.
Thank you once again, and I hope that you will have many fruitful discussions in the course of thisConference.

― 128 ―

ANNEX A
Requested version was 04 Dec 2008; Closest available version is 30 Jan 2003; Generated on 04 Dec 2008
12:42:39 (GMT+8).
Front Page
[ Jump to: Front Page / Arrangement of Provisions / Actual Provisions ]PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT(CHAPTER 241)
History

Ordinance 39 of1960→

Reprint 27 of
1966→1970 Ed. Cap.
104→

REVISEDEDITION 1993

An Act to provide for the more effectual prevention of corruption.
[17th June 1960]
Arrangement of Provisions[ Jump to: Front Page / Arrangement of Provisions / Actual Provisions]PART IPRELIMINARY
1 Short title
2 Interpretation
PART IIAPPOINTMENT OF STAFF AND PERSONNEL MATTERS
3 Appointment of Director and officers
4 Director and officers deemed to be public servants.
4A Establishment of Occupational Superannuation Scheme
4B Benefits not as of right, etc.
4C Non-assignability or attachment of benefits, etc.
4D Recovery of benefits granted in ignorance of disqualifying facts
4E Effect of bankruptcy and conviction on Scheme benefits
4F Scheme to be met out of INVEST FundPART III
OFFENCES AND PENALTIES
5 Punishment for corruption.
6 Punishment for corrupt transactions with agents.
7 Increase of maximum penalty in certain cases.
8 Presumption of corruption in certain cases.
9 Acceptor of gratification to be guilty notwithstanding that purpose not carried out, etc.
10 Corruptly procuring withdrawal of tenders.
11 Bribery of Member of Parliament.
12 Bribery of member of public body.
13 When penalty to be imposed in addition to other punishment.
14 Principal may recover amount of secret gift.
PART IV
POWERS OF ARREST AND INVESTIGATION
15 Powers of arrest.
16 Provisions as to bail or bond.
17 Powers of investigation.
18 Special powers of investigation.
19 Powers of investigation authorised by Public Prosecutor.

― 129 ―

20 Public Prosecutor’s power to order inspection of bankers’ books.
21 Public Prosecutor’s powers to obtain information.
22 Powers of search and seizure.
PART VEVIDENCE
23 Evidence of custom inadmissible.
24 Evidence of pecuniary resources or property.
25 Evidence of accomplice.
PART VIMISCELLANEOUS
26 Obstruction of search.
27 Legal obligation to give information.
28 False statements, information, etc.
29 Abetment of offences.
30 Attempts.
31 Conspiracy.
32 Offences to be seizable.
33 Prosecutions to be instituted with consent of Public Prosecutor.
34 District Court to have jurisdiction to try offences under this Act.
35 Examination of offenders.
36 Protection of informers.
37 Liability of citizens of Singapore for offences committed outside Singapore.
Actual Provisions[ Jump to: Front Page / Arrangement of Provisions / Actual Provisions ]PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT(CHAPTER 241)
An Act to provide for the more effectual prevention of corruption.
[17th June 1960]

PART IPRELIMINARY
Short title
1. This Act may be cited as the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Interpretation
2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires —"agent" means any person employed by or acting for another, and includes a trustee, administrator
and executor, and a person serving the Government or under any corporation or public body, and forthe purposes of section 8 includes a subcontractor and any person employed by or acting for suchsubcontractor;"CPIB officer" means a public officer in the Corrupt Practices Investigation Service (Junior) Scheme ofService or in the Corrupt Practices Investigation Service (Senior) Scheme of Service;"Director" means the Director of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau appointed under section 3;"gratification" includes —(a) money or any gift, loan, fee, reward, commission, valuable security or other property or interest in― 130 ―

property of any description, whether movable or immovable;(b) any office, employment or contract;(c) any payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability whatsoever,whether in whole or in part;(d) any other service, favour or advantage of any description whatsoever, including protection from any
penalty or disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary or penal
nature, whether or not already instituted, and including the exercise or the forbearance from the exercise
of any right or any official power or duty; and(e) any offer, undertaking or promise of any gratification within the meaning of paragraphs (a), (b), (c)and (d);"INVEST Fund" means the INVEST Fund established under Part III of the Home Affairs Uniformed
Services Superannuation Act (Cap. 126B);"member" means a member of the Scheme established under this Act;"principal" includes an employer, a beneficiary under a trust, and a trust estate as though it were a person
and any person beneficially interested in the estate of a deceased person and the estate of a deceased
person as though the estate were a person, and in the case of a person serving the Government or a public
body includes the Government or the public body, as the case may be;"public body" means any corporation, board, council, commissioners or other body which has power toact under and for the purposes of any written law relating to public health or to undertakings or public
utility or otherwise to administer money levied or raised by rates or charges in pursuance of any written
law;"Scheme" means the Occupational Superannuation Scheme established by regulations made under
section 4A;"service" means regular service (whether part-time or full-time) as a CPIB officer;"special investigator" means a special investigator of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau.
25/81.

PART IIAPPOINTMENT OF STAFF AND PERSONNEL MATTERS
Appointment of Director and officers.
3. —(1) The President may appoint an officer to be the Director of the Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau.
Provided that the President acting in his discretion may refuse to appoint or revoke the appointment of
the Director if he does not concur with the advice or recommendation of the Cabinet or a Minister acting
under the general authority of the Cabinet.
(2) The President may appoint a Deputy Director of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and such
number of assistant directors and special investigators of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau as hemay think fit.
(3) Any powers conferred on and duties to be performed by the Director under this Act may, subject tothe orders and directions of the Director, be exercised or performed by the Deputy Director or an assistantdirector of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau.
(4) The Deputy Director and an assistant director of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau may
exercise the powers conferred by this Act on a special investigator.
(5) The President may create such different grades for assistant directors and special investigators as hemay think fit.
25/81
11/91.

― 131 ―

Director and officers deemed to be public servants.
4. —(1) The Director, Deputy Director, assistant directors and special investigators of the Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of the Penal
Code.
(2) A certificate of appointment signed by the Director shall be issued to every officer of the Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau and shall be evidence of his appointment under this Act.
Cap. 224.
25/81.
Establishment of Occupational Superannuation Scheme
4A. —(1) The Minister shall, by regulations, establish an Occupational Superannuation Scheme for the
benefit of all CPIB officers appointed on or after 1st November 2001, who will be the members of the
Scheme.
(2) The regulations made under subsection (1) shall provide for the payment of —(a) any gratuity, allowance, superannuation or other like benefit to members of the Scheme, or to theirlegal personal representatives or dependants, on the death of the members in the service or on the
resignation, retirement or discharge of the members from the service;(b) any pension, gratuity, allowance, compensation or other benefit in respect of the death of or injuries
received by any member of the Scheme in and which are attributable to service; and(c) any allowance, subsidy or other benefit to such former members of the Scheme as may be prescribed
after their retirement from the service.
(3) The regulations made under subsection (1) may provide for —(a) the payment of contributions in respect of each member;(b) the age or ages at which a member may retire or be required to retire from the service;(c) the appointment of award officers to assess, award and pay pensions, gratuities and allowances andother like benefits under the Scheme and to otherwise administer the Scheme; and(d) the bringing of appeals against decisions of award officers and the appointment of one or more
persons to hear such appeals and review the decisions of award officers.
(4) In making regulations under subsection (1), the Minister shall also provide for —(a) every CPIB officer who is appointed before 1st November 2001 and who, immediately before thatdate, is eligible (whether on retirement or in respect of death or injury in or attributable to service) for
any pension, gratuity or other allowance under the Pensions Act (Cap. 225); and(b) every CPIB officer who is appointed before 1st November 2001 to the service on a contract for a term
and who, immediately before that date, is eligible for any gratuity or other like benefit under the contract,
an option to join the Scheme as a member and for the terms and conditions of such an option.
(5) The regulations made in relation to CPIB officers referred to in subsection (4) shall provide —(a) in the case of an officer referred to in subsection (4) (a), that any such officer who opts to join the
Scheme shall cease to be eligible to benefits under the Pensions Act but shall remain eligible under the
Scheme to benefits not less in value than the amount of any pension, gratuity or other allowance forwhich he would have been granted under the Pensions Act if he retired from the service, or was injured
or died in service, on the date immediately before his joining the Scheme; and(b) in the case of an officer referred to in subsection (4) (b), that any such officer who opts to join the
Scheme shall remain eligible to benefits not less in value than the amount of any gratuity or other likebenefit for which he would have been granted under his contract if he had completed his term of service
under the contract on the date immediately before his joining the Scheme.
(6) Any option exercised by any CPIB officer before 1st November 2001 to join or not to join the
Scheme shall be deemed to be exercised in accordance with the regulations made under subsection (1) in
relation to CPIB officers referred to in subsection (4).
Benefits not as of right, etc.
4B. —(1) No member shall have an absolute right to compensation for past services or to any pension,
gratuity, allowance or other benefit under the Scheme.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall limit the right of the Public Service Commission, or any of its delegates, to― 132 ―

dismiss any CPIB officer who is a member from the service without compensation.
(3) Subject to Article 113 of the Constitution, where it is established to the satisfaction of an award
officer that a member has been guilty of negligence, irregularity or misconduct, it shall be lawful for theaward officer to reduce or altogether withhold the pension, gratuity, allowance or other benefit for which
the member would but for this section have become eligible under the Scheme.
Non-assignability or attachment of benefits, etc.
4C. —(1) No payments, allowance or other benefit payable under the Scheme (whether on death,retirement or resignation of a member or otherwise), and no contribution by the Government made under
the Scheme, and no interest thereon shall be assignable or transferable, or liable to be garnished, attached,sequestered or levied upon for or in respect of any debt or claim, other than —(a) a debt due to the Government; or(b) an order of court for the payment of periodical sums of money towards the maintenance of the wife orformer wife or minor child (whether legitimate or not) of the member to whom the payment, allowanceor other benefit has been granted.
(2) Subject to the provisions of any regulations made under section 4A, all moneys paid or payable
under the Scheme on the death of a member thereof —(a) shall be deemed to be subject to a trust in favour of the persons entitled thereto under the will or
intestacy of such deceased member;(b) shall not be deemed to form part of his estate or be subject to the payment of his debts; and(c) shall be deemed to be property passing on his death for the purposes of the Estate Duty Act (Cap. 96).
Recovery of benefits granted in ignorance of disqualifying facts
4D. It shall be a condition of the grant of every pension, gratuity, allowance or other benefit under the
Scheme that the Government may recover, cancel or reduce the grant if it is shown to have been obtainedby the wilful suppression of material facts or to have been granted in ignorance of facts which, had they
been known before the retirement or resignation of the member, would have justified his dismissal or areduction of his salary.
Effect of bankruptcy and conviction on Scheme benefits
4E. —(1) No contribution by the Government made under the Scheme and no interest thereon shall be
subject to the debts of any member thereof, nor shall such contributions and interest pass to the Official
Assignee on the bankruptcy of the member.
(2) If a member is adjudicated a bankrupt or is declared insolvent by a court of law, such contributions
and interest shall be deemed to be excluded from the property of the bankrupt for the purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act (Cap. 20).
(3) If, at the date of his retirement or resignation from the service, any member has been adjudged abankrupt by judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in Singapore or elsewhere, and he has
not obtained his discharge from such adjudication or declaration, it shall be lawful for an award officer
to refuse to grant any pension, gratuity or other allowance which would, if not for this subsection, be
granted.
(4) If any person to whom a pension or other allowance has been granted under this Act —(a) is adjudicated a bankrupt by judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, whether in Singapore orelsewhere; or(b) is sentenced to death or penal servitude or any term of imprisonment, by any court of competentjurisdiction, whether in Singapore or elsewhere, for any crime or offence,
the Minister may direct that such pension or allowance shall forthwith cease, and thereupon such pension
or allowance shall cease accordingly.
(5) Where, by reason of bankruptcy of a member or former member, a pension, gratuity or allowance
is not granted or where a pension or allowance ceases by virtue of a direction under subsection (4)(a), it shall be lawful for the Minister to cause all or any part of the moneys to which such person
would have been entitled by way of pension, gratuity or allowance, had he not become a bankrupt or― 133 ―

sentenced for any crime or offence, as the case may be, to be paid to, or applied for the maintenance andpersonal support or benefit of, all or any (to the exclusion of the others) of the following persons in suchproportions and manner as the Minister thinks proper:(a) the member or former member himself; and(b) his spouse, child or children.
(6) The Minister may exercise his power under subsection (5), from time to time, during the remainderof the member’s or former member’s life, or during such shorter period or periods, either continuous ordiscontinuous, as the Minister thinks fit.
(7) When a person to whom a pension or allowance has not been granted or whose pension or allowance
has ceased under this section obtains a full and proper discharge from his bankruptcy, his pension or
allowance shall be restored to him with effect from the date of such discharge.
(8) For the purposes of subsection (5), moneys applied for the discharge of the debts of the member orformer member, as the case may be, shall be regarded as applied for his benefit.
(9) Notwithstanding subsection (4), any pension or allowance that has ceased by virtue of a direction
under subsection (4) (b) shall be restored with retrospective effect in the case of a person who, afterconviction, at any time receives a free pardon.
(10) Where a pension or allowance ceases by virtue of a direction under subsection (4) (b), it shall be
lawful for the Minister to cause all or any part of moneys to which the person would have been entitledby way of pension or allowance to be paid to or applied for the benefit of his spouse, child or children,
or after the expiration of his sentence, also for the benefit of himself, in the same manner precisely andsubject to the same qualifications and restrictions as in the case of bankruptcy provided in subsection (5).
Scheme to be met out of INVEST Fund
4F. —(1) There shall be paid into the INVEST Fund —(a) such sums appropriated from the Consolidated Fund and authorised to be paid into the INVEST Fundby or under any written law to enable that Fund to meet its liabilities under this Act; and(b) such sum from the Pension Fund established by the Pension Fund Act (Cap. 224A) as the Minister for
Finance may determine as the value of that part of the Pension Fund relating to all those CPIB officers
referred to in section 4A (4) (a) who exercise an option in favour of joining the Scheme in accordancewith the regulations under section 4A.
(2) The INVEST Fund comprising moneys referred to in subsection (1) shall be applied to meet thefollowing purposes only:(a) the payment of any pension, gratuity, allowance, compensation or other like benefit granted under the
Scheme; and(b) such other expenses relating to the granting of any pension, gratuity, allowance, compensation orother like benefit under the Scheme and expressly provided by regulations made under this Act to be met
from the INVEST Fund.
(3) The moneys referred to in subsection (1) shall be paid into the INVEST Fund as capital money, andshall not be used to make payment of any dividend under the Scheme.

PART III
OFFENCES AND PENALTIES
Punishment for corruption.
5. Any person who shall by himself or by or in conjunction with any other person —(a) corruptly solicit or receive, or agree to receive for himself, or for any other person; or(b) corruptly give, promise or offer to any person whether for the benefit of that person or of anotherperson,any gratification as an inducement to or reward for, or otherwise on account of —― 134 ―

(i)any person doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any matter or transaction whatsoever,actual or proposed; or(ii)any member, officer or servant of a public body doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any
matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed, in which such public body is concerned,
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to both.
29/89.
Punishment for corrupt transactions with agents.
6. If —(a) any agent corruptly accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain, from any person, forhimself or for any other person, any gratification as an inducement or reward for doing or forbearing todo, or for having done or forborne to do, any act in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, or for
showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in relation to his principal’s affairs orbusiness;(b) any person corruptly gives or agrees to give or offers any gratification to any agent as an inducement
or reward for doing or forbearing to do, or for having done or forborne to do any act in relation to his
principal’s affairs or business, or for showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to any person in
relation to his principal’s affairs or business; or(c) any person knowingly gives to an agent, or if an agent knowingly uses with intent to deceive his
principal, any receipt, account or other document in respect of which the principal is interested, andwhich contains any statement which is false or erroneous or defective in any material particular, andwhich to his knowledge is intended to mislead the principal,
he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or to both.
29/89.
Increase of maximum penalty in certain cases.
7. A person convicted of an offence under section 5 or 6 shall, where the matter or transaction in relation
to which the offence was committed was a contract or a proposal for a contract with the Government or
any department thereof or with any public body or a subcontract to execute any work comprised in sucha contract, be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to imprisonment for a term notexceeding 7 years or to both.
29/89.
Presumption of corruption in certain cases.
8. Where in any proceedings against a person for an offence under section 5 or 6, it is proved that any
gratification has been paid or given to or received by a person in the employment of the Government or
any department thereof or of a public body by or from a person or agent of a person who has or seeks tohave any dealing with the Government or any department thereof or any public body, that gratification
shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received corruptly as an inducement or reward ashereinbefore mentioned unless the contrary is proved.
Acceptor of gratification to be guilty notwithstanding that purpose not carried out, etc.
9. —(1) Where in any proceedings against any agent for any offence under section 6 (a), it is provedthat he corruptly accepted, obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain any gratification, having
reason to believe or suspect that the gratification was offered as an inducement or reward for his doingof forbearing to do any act or for showing or forbearing to show any favour or disfavour to any person
in relation to his principal’s affairs or business, he shall be guilty of an offence under that section
notwithstanding that he did not have the power, right or opportunity to do so, show or forbear or thathe accepted the gratification without intending to do so, show or forbear or that he did not in fact doso, show or forbear or that the act, favour or disfavour was not in relation to his principal’s affairs orbusiness.
(2) Where, in any proceedings against any person for any offence under section 6 (b), it is proved that hecorruptly gave, agreed to give or offered any gratification to any agent as an inducement or reward for― 135 ―

doing or forbearing to do any act or for showing or forbearing to show any favour or disfavour to any
person having reason to believe or suspect that the agent had the power, right or opportunity to do so,show or forbear and that the act, favour or disfavour was in relation to his principal’s affairs or business,he shall be guilty of an offence under that section notwithstanding that the agent had no power, right oropportunity or that the act, favour or disfavour was not in relation to his principal’s affairs or business.
Corruptly procuring withdrawal of tenders.
10. A person —(a) who, with intent to obtain from the Government or any public body a contract for performing any
work, providing any service, doing anything, or supplying any article, material or substance, offers any
gratification to any person who has made a tender for the contract, as an inducement or a reward for his
withdrawing that tender; or(b) who solicits or accepts any gratification as an inducement or a reward for his withdrawing a tender
made by him for that contract,shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years or to both.
29/89.
Bribery of Member of Parliament.
11. Any person —(a) who offers any gratification to a Member of Parliament as an inducement or reward for such
Member’s doing or forbearing to do any act in his capacity as such Member; or(b) who being a Member of Parliament solicits or accepts any gratification as an inducement or a reward
for his doing or forbearing to do any act in his capacity as such Member,shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years or to both.
29/89.
Bribery of member of public body.
12. A person —(a) who offers any gratification to any member of a public body as an inducement or reward for —(i) the member’s voting or abstaining from voting at any meeting of the public body in favour of oragainst any measure, resolution or question submitted to that public body;(ii) the member’s performing, or abstaining from performing, or his aid in procuring, expediting,delaying, hindering or preventing the performance of, any official act; or(iii) the member’s aid in procuring or preventing the passing of any vote or the granting of any contract
or advantage in favour of any person; or(b) who, being a member of a public body, solicits or accepts any gratification as an inducement or areward for any such act, or any such abstaining, as is referred to in paragraph (a) (i), (ii) and (iii),
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $100,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years or to both.
29/89.
When penalty to be imposed in addition to other punishment.
13. —(1) Where a court convicts any person of an offence committed by the acceptance of any
gratification in contravention of any provision of this Act, then, if that gratification is a sum of money orif the value of that gratification can be assessed, the court shall, in addition to imposing on that person
any other punishment, order him to pay as a penalty, within such time as may be specified in the order, asum which is equal to the amount of that gratification or is, in the opinion of the court, the value of thatgratification, and any such penalty shall be recoverable as a fine.
(2) Where a person charged with two or more offences for the acceptance of gratification in contraventionof this Act is convicted of one or some of those offences, and the other outstanding offences are taken
into consideration by the court under section 178 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the purpose ofpassing sentence, the court may increase the penalty mentioned in subsection (1) by an amount notexceeding the total amount or value of the gratification specified in the charges for the offences so taken― 136 ―

into consideration.

Cap. 68.
25/81.

Principal may recover amount of secret gift.
14. —(1) Where any gratification has, in contravention of this Act, been given by any person to an agent,
the principal may recover as a civil debt the amount or the money value thereof either from the agent orfrom the person who gave the gratification to the agent, and no conviction or acquittal of the defendant inrespect of an offence under this Act shall operate as a bar to proceedings for the recovery of that amountor money value.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prejudice or affect any right which any principal may haveunder any written law or rule of law to recover from his agent any money or property.

PART IV
POWERS OF ARREST AND INVESTIGATIONPowers of arrest.
15. —(1) The Director or any special investigator may without a warrant arrest any person who has
been concerned in any offence under this Act or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or
credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned.
(2) The Director or a special investigator arresting a person under subsection (1) may search such person
and take possession of all articles found upon him which there is reason to believe were the fruits or otherevidence of the crime, provided that no female shall be searched except by a female.
(3) Every person so arrested shall be taken to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau or to a police
station.
27/72.
25/81.
Provisions as to bail or bond.
16. —(1) A person who has been arrested by the Director or any special investigator may be released onbail or on his own bond granted by the Director or any special investigator or any police officer.
(2) The provisions of Chapters XXXV and XXXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code shall apply to any
bail or bond granted under this section; and for this purpose —Cap. 68.
(a) any reference to “officer”, “police officer” or “police officer not below the rank of sergeant” shall beread to include the Director or any special investigator;(b) the reference to the Commissioner of Police in section 351 of the Criminal Procedure Code shall beread to include the Director.
[15A
29/89.
Powers of investigation.
17. —(1) In any case relating to the commission —(a) of an offence under section 165 or under sections 213 to 215 of the Penal Code, or of any conspiracy
to commit, or of any attempt to commit, or of any abetment of such an offence;(b) of an offence under this Act; or(c) of any seizable offence under any written law which may be disclosed in the course of an investigation
under this Act,
the Director or a special investigator may, without the order of the Public Prosecutor, exercise all or anyof the powers in relation to police investigations into any offence given by the Criminal Procedure Code:Cap. 68.
Provided that an investigation into an offence under the Penal Code shall be deemed to be a police― 137 ―

investigation to which section 122 of the Criminal Procedure Code shall apply in the same manner and to
the same extent as if the Director or the special investigator concerned were a police officer.
Cap. 224.
(2) For the purposes of sections 58 (1) and 122 (5) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Director or a
special investigator shall be deemed to be an officer not below the rank of inspector of police.
[16
27/72;25/81; 29/89.
Cap. 224.
Special powers of investigation.
18. —(1) Notwithstanding anything in any other law, the Public Prosecutor, if satisfied that there arereasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence under this Act has been committed, may, by order,
authorise the Director or any police of or above the rank of assistant superintendent named in such order
or a special investigator so named to make an investigation in the matter in such manner or mode as may
be specified in that order. The order may authorise the investigation of any bank account, share account,purchase account, expense account or any other account, or any safe deposit box in any bank, and shall be
sufficient authority for the disclosure or production by any person of all or any information or accounts
or documents or articles as may be required by the officer so authorised.
(2) Any person who fails to disclose such information or to produce such accounts or documents orarticles to the person so authorised shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a finenot exceeding $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both.
[17
27/72;25/81.
Powers of investigation authorised by Public Prosecutor.
19. The Public Prosecutor may by order authorise the Director or a special investigator to exercise, inthe case of any offence under any written law, all or any of the powers in relation to police investigations
given by the Criminal Procedure Code.
29/89.
[18
Public Prosecutor’s power to order inspection of bankers’ books.
20. —(1) The Public Prosecutor may, if he considers that any evidence of the commission of an offence
under this Act or under sections 161 to 165 or 213 to 215 of the Penal Code or of a conspiracy to commit,
or an attempt to commit, or an abetment of any such offence by a person in the service of the Governmentor of any department thereof or of a public body is likely to be found in any banker’s book relating tothat person, his wife or child or to a person reasonably believed by the Public Prosecutor to be a trustee
or agent for that person, by order authorise the Director or any special investigator named in the order or
any police officer of or above the rank of assistant superintendent so named to inspect any book and the
Director, special investigator or police officer so authorised may, at all reasonable times, enter the bankspecified in the order and inspect the books kept therein and may take copies of any relevant entry in any
such book.
(2) For the purpose of this section —"bank" means any company carrying on the business of bankers in Singapore incorporated or licensed
under any written law;"banker’s book" includes any ledger, day book, cash book, account book or other book or document usedin the ordinary course of the business of a bank.
[19
27/72
25/81.
Public Prosecutor’s powers to obtain information.
21. —(1) In the course of any investigation or proceedings into or relating to an offence by any person in
the service of the Government or of any department thereof or of any public body under this Act or under
sections 161 to 165 or 213 to 215 of the Penal Code or a conspiracy to commit, or an attempt to commit,
or an abetment of any such offence, the Public Prosecutor may, notwithstanding anything in any other― 138 ―

written law to the contrary, by written notice —Cap. 224.
29/89(a) require that person to furnish a sworn statement in writing enumerating all movable or immovable
property belonging to or possessed by that person and by the spouse, sons and daughters of that person,and specifying the date on which each of the properties enumerated was acquired whether by way ofpurchase, gift, bequest, inheritance or otherwise;(b) require that person to furnish a sworn statement in writing of any money or other property sent out ofSingapore by him, his spouse, sons and daughters during such period as may be specified in the notice;(c) require any other person to furnish a sworn statement in writing enumerating all movable or
immovable property belonging to or possessed by that person where the Public Prosecutor has reasonablegrounds to believe that the information can assist the investigation;(d) require the Comptroller of Income Tax to furnish, as specified in the notice, all information available
to the Comptroller relating to the affairs of that person or of the spouse or a son or daughter of that
person, and to produce or furnish, as specified in the notice, any document or a certified copy of any
document relating to that person, spouse, son or daughter which is in the possession or under the controlof the Comptroller;(e) require the person in charge of any department, office or establishment of the Government, or thepresident, chairman, manager or chief executive officer of any public body to produce or furnish, as
specified in the notice, any document or a certified copy of any document which is in his possession orunder his control;(f) require the manager of any bank to give copies of the accounts of that person or of the spouse or a sonor daughter of that person at the bank.
(2) Every person to whom a notice is sent by the Public Prosecutor under subsection (1) shall,
notwithstanding the provisions of any written law or any oath of secrecy to the contrary, comply with theterms of that notice within such time as may be specified therein and any person who wilfully neglects or
fails so to comply shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding$10,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both.
[20Powers of search and seizure.
22. —(1) Whenever it appears to any Magistrate or to the Director upon information and after suchinquiry as he thinks necessary that there is reasonable cause to believe that in any place there is any
document containing any evidence of, or any article or property relating to —(a) the commission of an offence under this Act, or under sections 161 to 165, or 213 to 215, of the Penal
Code; or(b) a conspiracy to commit, or any attempt to commit, or an abetment of any such offence,
the Magistrate or the Director may, by warrant directed to any special investigator or police officer not
below the rank of inspector empower the special investigator or police officer to enter that place by force
if necessary and to search, seize and detain any such document, article or property.
(2) Whenever it appears to any special investigator or any police officer not below the rank of inspector
that there is reasonable cause to believe that in any place there is concealed or deposited any document
containing any evidence of, or any article or property relating to —(a) the commission of an offence under this Act, or under sections 161 to 165, or 213 to 215, of the Penal
Code; orCap. 224.
(b) a conspiracy to commit, or an attempt to commit, or an abetment of any such offence,and the special investigator or police officer has reasonable grounds for believing that by reason of thedelay in obtaining a search warrant the object of the search is likely to be frustrated, he may exercise in
and in respect of that place all the powers mentioned in subsection (1) in as full and ample a manner as if
he were empowered to do so by warrant issued under that subsection.
[21
25/81.

― 139 ―

PART VEVIDENCE
Evidence of custom inadmissible.
23. In any civil or criminal proceeding under this Act evidence shall not be admissible to show that any
such gratification as is mentioned in this Act is customary in any profession, trade, vocation or calling.
[22
Evidence of pecuniary resources or property.
24. —(1) In any trial or inquiry by a court into an offence under this Act or under sections 161 to 165 or
213 to 215 of the Penal Code or into a conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or an abetment of any
such offence the fact that an accused person is in possession, for which he cannot satisfactorily account,of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income, or that he had, ator about the time of the alleged offence, obtained an accretion to his pecuniary resources or property forwhich he cannot satisfactorily account, may be proved and may be taken into consideration by the court
as corroborating the testimony of any witness in the trial or inquiry that the accused person accepted or
obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain any gratification and as showing that the gratification
was accepted or obtained or agreed to be accepted or attempted to be obtained corruptly as an inducement
or reward.
(2) An accused person shall, for the purposes of subsection (1), be deemed to be in possession of
resources or property or to have obtained an accretion thereto where those resources or property are heldor the accretion is obtained by any other person whom, having regard to his relationship to the accused
person or to any other circumstances, there is reason to believe to be holding those resources or property
or to have obtained the accretion in trust for or on behalf of the accused person or as a gift from theaccused person.
[23
Evidence of accomplice.
25. Notwithstanding any rule of law or written law to the contrary, no witness shall, in any such trial
or inquiry as is referred to in section 24, be presumed to be unworthy of credit by reason only of any
payment or delivery by him or on his behalf of any gratification to an agent or member of a public body.
[24

PART VIMISCELLANEOUS
Obstruction of search.
26. Any person who —(a) refuses the Director or any officer authorised to enter or search, access to any place;(b) assaults, obstructs, hinders or delays him in effecting any entrance which he is entitled to effect under
this Act, or in the execution of any duty imposed or power conferred by this Act;(c) fails to comply with any lawful demands of the Director or any officer in the execution of his duty
under this Act; or(d) refuses or neglects to give any information which may reasonably be required of him and which hehas it in his power to give,
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both.
[25
25/81; 29/89― 140 ―

Legal obligation to give information.
27. Every person required by the Director or any officer to give any information on any subject which
it is the duty of the Director or that officer to inquire into under this Act and which it is in his power togive, shall be legally bound to give that information.
25/81.
[26
False statements, information, etc.
28. Any person who knowingly —(a) gives or causes to be given any false or misleading information relating to the commission of any
offence under this Act or under section 165, 213, 214, or 215 of the Penal Code;Cap. 224.
(b) gives or causes to be given to the Director or a special investigator any other false or misleading
information,
shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding $10,000 or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both.
[26A
29/89.
Abetment of offences.
29. Whoever abets, within the meaning of the Penal Code —(a) the commission of an offence under this Act; or(b) the commission outside Singapore of any act, in relation to the affairs or business or on behalf of aprincipal residing in Singapore, which if committed in Singapore would be an offence under this Act,
shall be deemed to have committed the offence and shall be liable on conviction to be punished with thepunishment provided for that offence.
[27
Attempts.
30. Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed to have committed
the offence and shall be liable on conviction to be punished with the punishment provided for that
offence.
[28
Conspiracy.
31. Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy, within the meaning of the Penal Code, to commit anoffence under this Act shall be deemed to have committed the offence and shall be liable on conviction tobe punished with the punishment provided for that offence.
[29
Cap. 224.
Offences to be seizable.
32. —(1) Every offence under this Act shall be deemed to be a seizable offence for the purposes of the
Criminal Procedure Code.
(2) A public officer to whom any gratification is corruptly given or offered shall arrest the person who
gives or offers the gratification to him and make over the person so arrested to the nearest police stationand if he fails to do so without reasonable excuse he shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable onconviction to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to
both.
[30
Cap. 68.
29/89.
Prosecutions to be instituted with consent of Public Prosecutor.
33. A prosecution under this Act shall not be instituted except by or with the consent of the Public
Prosecutor.
[31― 141 ―

District Court to have jurisdiction to try offences under this Act.
34. Notwithstanding the provisions of any written law to the contrary, a District Court shall havejurisdiction to try any offence under this Act and to award the full punishment for that offence.
[32
Examination of offenders.
35. —(1) Whenever two or more persons are charged with any offence under this Act or under sections
161 to 165 or 213 to 215 of the Penal Code or with a conspiracy to commit, or an attempt to commit, oran abetment of any such offence, the court may require one or more of them to give evidence as a witness
or witnesses for the prosecution.
(2) Any such person who refuses to be sworn or to answer any lawful question shall be dealt with in thesame manner as witnesses so refusing may by law be dealt with by a Magistrate’s Court or District Court,
as the case may be.
(3) Every person so required to give evidence, who in the opinion of the court makes true and full
discovery of all things as to which he is lawfully examined, shall be entitled to receive a certificate ofindemnity under the hand of the Magistrate or Judge, as the case may be, stating that he has made a trueand full discovery of all things as to which he was examined, and that certificate shall be a bar to all legal
proceedings against him in respect of all those things.
[33
Protection of informers.
36. —(1) Except as hereinafter provided, no complaints as to an offence under this Act shall be admitted
in evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding whatsoever, and no witness shall be obliged or permitted
to disclose the name or address of any informer, or state any matter which might lead to his discovery.
(2) If any books, documents or papers which are in evidence or liable to inspection in any civil or
criminal proceeding whatsoever contain any entry in which any informer is named or described or whichmight lead to his discovery, the court before which the proceeding is had shall cause all such passages tobe concealed from view or to be obliterated so far as is necessary to protect the informer from discovery,
but no further.
(3) If on a trial for any offence under this Act the court, after full inquiry into the case, is of the opinion
that the informer wilfully made in his complaint a material statement which he knew or believed to befalse or did not believe to be true, or if in any other proceeding the court is of the opinion that justicecannot be fully done between the parties thereto without the discovery of the informer, the court may
require the production of the original complaint, if in writing, and permit inquiry and require full
disclosure concerning the informer.
[34
Liability of citizens of Singapore for offences committed outside Singapore.
37. —(1) The provisions of this Act have effect, in relation to citizens of Singapore, outside as well as
within Singapore; and where an offence under this Act is committed by a citizen of Singapore in any
place outside Singapore, he may be dealt with in respect of that offence as if it had been committed
within Singapore.
(2) Any proceedings against any person under this section which would be a bar to subsequent
proceedings against that person for the same offence, if the offence had been committed in Singapore,shall be a bar to further proceedings against him, under any written law for the time being in force
relating to the extradition of persons, in respect of the same offence outside Singapore.
[35[ Jump to: Front Page / Arrangement of Provisions / Actual Provisions ]― 142 ―

ANNEX B
THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT
Strengthening the Legislative Framework
In 1960, Singapore passed the Prevention of Corruption Act (“the PCA”), acknowledging that weneeded to overhaul our laws on corruption. Even till today, this piece of legislation has been the prime
mover behind Singapore’s zero-tolerance policy in respect of corrupt practices. In establishing thislegal framework, Singapore decided not to take a ‘wait-and-see approach’ to deal with corruption. The
PCA was drafted as a comprehensive piece of legislation that was aimed at the jugular of corruption.
The legislation was aimed at weeding out opportunities for corrupt practices, and introduced serious
consequences if one was found guilty of corrupt conduct. Some of the more pertinent aspects of the PCA
are highlighted below:a) Gratification is widely and non-exhaustively defined. The PCA addresses both the giver and taker ofbribes‚ imposing liability on both parties. The provisions are also wide enough to embrace situationsof agreeing or attempting to give or receive a gratification. The PCA extends to all persons‚ including
corporations‚ where the offence is committed in Singapore.
b) There is a presumption of corruption in cases where government employees are involved. So long as
the prosecution can prove that the government employee received the gratification from a person withwhom he has had dealings, the corrupt intent to make out the offence will be presumed. Section 8 of
the PCA provides that where it is proved that any gratification has been paid or given to or received by aperson in the employment of the Government or any department thereof or of a public body by or from aperson or agent of a person who has or seeks to have any dealing with the Government or any department
thereof or any public body, that gratification shall be deemed to have been paid or given and received
corruptly as an inducement or reward as hereinbefore mentioned unless the contrary is proved.
c) The acceptor of gratification can be guilty notwithstanding that the purpose for which the gratification
was made was not carried out.
d) In sentencing a person convicted of corruption, the court can impose a penalty equal to the amountor value of the bribe, in addition to any other punishment. This allows for disgorgement of benefits ofthe crime by the receiver of the bribe. Under s 4 of the Corruption‚ Drug Trafficking and Other Serious
Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act‚ the court can make a confiscation order‚ where an application
is made by the Public Prosecutor in relation to an offender who is charged with one or more corruption
offences. Such orders may be made where a defendant has been convicted of an offence under the PCAor under sections 161 to 165 of the Penal Code or any conspiracy to commit‚ any attempt to commit or
any abetment of such offences.
e) A principal may recover the amount of the bribe from the giver or receiver by way of a civil suit and acriminal conviction is no bar for such a recovery.
f) Offences under the PCA are seizable, ie there is no need to obtain warrants of arrests from the Court
before effecting arrests.
g) The identity of informers is protected. Any information that might lead to the disclosure of theinformer’s identity is prohibited under the PCA.
h) Singapore citizens are liable for offences under the PCA committed outside Singapore.

― 143 ―

i) Heavy penalties are imposed to act as deterrence. Offences under the PCA carry fines of up to S$100
000 and imprisonment of up to 5 years (or 7 years in cases involving government contracts). This is on
top of the imposition of penalties equal to the value of the bribe. Additionally, under the Corruption Drug
Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act, Chapter 65A, provides the courtwith powers to confiscate assets which a person convicted of a corruption offence cannot satisfactorily
account for.
j) An abetment or attempt to commit an offence under the PCA is deemed to be committing the offence
and renders the guilty party liable to the same penalties on conviction.

― 144 ―

ANNEX C
THE CORRUPT PRACTICES INVESTIGATION BUREAU
Independence and Professionalism in Investigations
Prior to 1952, all corruption cases were investigated by a unit in the Singapore Police Force known
as the Anti-Corruption Branch. In 1952, CPIB was set up as an independent organization. In its earlydays, the CPIB faced problems of inadequate anti-corruption laws, thus hindering the gathering ofevidence. With internal self-government, Singapore embarked on firm action against corrupt officials,
dismissing many from the service. Public confidence in the CPIB grew with the realization that the
government was sincere in its anti-corruption drive.
Over the years, the Prevention of Corruption Act underwent extensive revision to enhance theinvestigative powers of CPIB officers. Organizationally, the CPIB was revamped with the creation of
Staff Officers' posts, the development of in-house training capabilities and the introduction of polygraphtesting as an investigative tool.
The CPIB has come a very long way since its inception, achieving the following milestones:● 1997 - ISO9000 certification for investigation procedures● 1998 - the Singapore Quality Class (SQC)● 1999 - the People Developer Standard● 2003 - the People Excellence Award● 2004- the Singapore Innovation Class and Singapore Service Class awards● July 2004 - it formed its own Computer Forensic Unit to perform forensics examinations ofcomputer-related evidence.
These benchmarks have been critical in achieving organizational excellence. The continual
investment in and development of its people and processes has allowed the CPIB to keep abreast of crime
trends and explore the use of technology in investigations. Today, the CPIB is committed to forging
networks and partnerships, internationally and domestically, to enhance its capabilities.

― 145 ―

DOMESTIC MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL
CO-OPERATION FOR EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION IN THAILAND
Sirisak Tiyapan*

I. INTRODUCTION
Thailand has for long been aware of the far-reaching and adverse effect of corruption towards thestability and security of national socio-economic settings and incessantly made every effort to seek forthe most vital countermeasures to enable concerned authorities to attain more effective suppressionof corruption. Strengthening of domestic and international cooperation for effective investigation andprosecution of corruption is a crucial strategic plan under the national scheme of criminal justice.

II. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION AS
ORDINARY OFFENCE
Traditionally, corruption is viewed as an offence where a public official abuse his or her function
to gain undue personal benefit. The Thai Penal Code has, by many provisions, categorized various
undue conducts of public officials with dishonest intention to seek or gain undue benefit as the offence
punishable by criminal penalty ranging from one year to lifetime imprisonment or even execution if suchcorruption causes serious damages. Apart from Section 157 which is a fundamental provisions applicable
to all state officials in general for misconducts as to unduly perform or not perform his or her functionin order to dishonestly gain undeserved advantages or to cause injury to any person, certain provisions
relating to malpractice of justice officials which include judges, public prosecutors, and inquiry officials
have been exclusively stipulated so as to impose the more severe penalty for corruption related to theperformance of justice function. For example, Section 201 of the Thai Penal Code provides that “Whoever,being an official in a judicial post, a public prosecutor, an official conducting cases or an inquiry official,wrongfully demands, accepts or agrees to accept a property or any other benefit for himself or theother person in order to exercise or not to exercise any of his functions, whether such exercise or nonexercise is wrongful to his duty or not, shall be punished with imprisonment of five to twenty years or
imprisonment for life, and fine of thousand to forty thousand baht, or death”
Like that of other offences under the Thai Penal Code, proceeding of the said conventional
corruption is relied upon the Criminal Procedure Code whereby the case is initiated by the investigation
conducted by the police and then prosecuted in the court by the public prosecutor and adjudicated by the
Criminal Court as an ordinary crime.
Although the measure under the Criminal Procedure Code as such have worked out quite well in thedeterrence of corruption committed by government officials in many cases, in particular when the idea
to cut down the incentive for commission of corruption by confiscation of illegally gained assets of thecorrupt officials under the framework of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1999 has been brought in to* Director General of International Affairs Department, Office of the Attorney General, Thailand.

― 146 ―

enhance the efficiency of the procedure to suppress corruption, it still has some weakness. Unlike that ofcertain countries such as Japan, Korea, and U.S.A. whereby investigation and prosecution of corruption
cases seems to be more successful because their justice officials have been more strongly supported by
the public, in particular the prosecutors are usually overwhelmingly encouraged to prosecute any corrupt
politician or public official without any restriction even the accused is the Prime Minister of Korea,
Japan, or the President of the United States of America, investigation and prosecution in Thailand is lesseffective or even totally useless when dealing with sophisticated corruption committed by politicians orhigh ranking public officials.
According to the record, there was only one successful case regarding the corruption committed by
the Minister of Agriculture around 30-40 years ago, and no report of politicians or high ranking public
officials ever convicted again until after the entering into force of the new approach against corruption in
1999. The reason for the non-existent of such report was not because no politician or high-ranking public
official committed corruption during that period, but because the then existing laws and measures, inparticular the process of investigation and prosecution could not cope with the sophisticated corruption
and shrewd politicians or high-ranking officials who, having learnt the lesson from the first case,developed themselves for the even more complex tactic to commit the crime which was more difficult to
detect and prosecute.
It is not too difficult to imagine difficulty of the normal investigating police when he has to deal withthe politicians or high ranking public officials suspects who are usually in a very much higher positionor powerful than him. Although this may not totally be the case since, in principle, the case can besupervised by the higher-rank police authorities, but as experiences usually show us it is more vulnerable
to the failure than success whenever investigation and further proceeding is made against the politiciansor high-ranking officials. Another problem related to the investigation is the less or totally lack of publicconfidence in the police investigators, which is sometime not because of the question of their integrity
but instead their tendency to compromise with the politicians. Cooperation from other governmental andprivate agencies having control over information, records, or indication of corruption is also problematicto the investigation because personnel in the agencies usually reluctant to give information regarding
the corruption or malpractice of their superior authorities to the police investigator for fear of bad result
which might occur to them.
There are various problems at the prosecutorial stage, as well. According to the Criminal
Procedure Code of Thailand which is applicable to all criminal offences in general, the investigationand prosecution is dramatically separated process. Investigation is totally responsible and conducted by
the inquiry officials who are mostly the police while the public prosecutor is excluded to step in until
the filing of investigation is finished under the sole discretion of the police investigator and submitted
to the prosecutor for review and issue prosecution or non-prosecution order. The prosecutor is generallybound by the facts and evidences as appeared in the case file. Although the prosecutor may instruct theinvestigator to conduct additional investigation should he is not satisfied with the sufficiency of theevidence or the completeness of the file, but this can be carried out only under certain restrictions. Not
only the question of the quality and trustworthy of the work done by the police who is often criticized by
the public as being tarnished by political influence, thus, having tendency to assist the politician offenderrather than really need to resist him, but the practical process whereby the prosecutor has no part in theinvestigation is also the question that renders difficulty to the prosecutor who has direct responsibility toprove the guilt of the accused in the court upon the reliable facts but is excluded from the process of truth
finding from the outset.

― 147 ―

III. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST CORRUPTION COMMITTED BY
HIGH-RANKING PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR POLITICIANS
Increasingly suffering from corruption committed by politicians and high-ranking public officials,
Thailand began to realize that the anti-graft mechanism under the normal framework was no longer
sufficient and effective enough to counter the more sophisticated forms of corruption committed by these
influential and powerful offenders. Some specific countermeasures to react more effectively in dealing
with corruption committed by politicians and high-ranking officials under the new framework have,therefore, been established in 1997.
Countermeasures under this new framework are specific in the sense that the authorities to handle
the matters of corruption were set up with specific purpose to exclusively tracing, investigating,prosecuting and adjudicating corruption committed by politicians and high-ranking officials. The
authorities enjoy some privileges under special immunity to guarantee their independence and free
discretion in doing their jobs. The methodology used by them is also set up under special procedure.
Such package approach to deal exclusively with corruption committed by the politicians and highranking officials was set up firstly by the 1997 Constitution and passed down to the current Constitutionof 2007. According to the principle set forth in the Constitution, which is confirmed and supplemented
by the Counter Corruption Act of 1999 and the Act on Criminal Procedure for Persons Holding Political
Position of 1999, various prominent measures to cut down incentive as well as to lessen opportunity
for politician or high-ranking public official to commit corruption have been set up, namely: assets
declaration, prohibition of conflict of interests, and professional ethic.
“Assets Declaration” is to impose obligation upon persons holding political position and highranking officials to declare all assets and debts belonging to them including those belong to their spouses
and minor children through submission a detailed assets inventory to the National Counter Corruption
or NCCC, which is an independent body set up by the 1997 Constitution, firstly within 30 days upon
the commencement of their position and secondly within 30 days upon the cessation of position. As forthe persons holding political position, one more final declaration within 30 days after one year of the
cessation of position is required. Failure to declare the assets or purposely make a false declaration willlead to the removal of position and the deprivation of right to hold any political position for 5 years. The
declaration of assets seems to be one of the effective tools because it enables the NCCC to access to theinformation which is once undisclosed under the principle of bank confidentiality, thus, could scrutinize,
review, and cope with the change or movement of the assets of those persons more conveniently. Uponfinding intensive increasing or decreasing of the assets with a reasonable belief to be irregular movement,
the NCCC will conduct inquiry and has a resolution whether there are adequate grounds indicatingthat the suspect is “unusually wealthy”. If so, the President of the NCCC will transfer all evidence andenquiry reports to the Attorney General to initiate litigation in the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for
Persons Holding Political Position with a view to seeking a judicial judgment for assets confiscation andreturning to the state.
The prohibition from engaging in conflict of interest is the measure applicable to all publicauthorities, which includes persons holding political position and high-ranking officials as well as theirspouses. This means that those persons are not permitted to be a party, partner or share holder of any
partnership or company which is the party to any contract with the government agency or to engage
in any of government concession award, or to involve as a director, consultant, agency, personnel, or
employee of any private firm, or in any manner, to have related interest where such persons are in charge
of official functions to supervise, control, review or institute litigation concerning thereto. Furthermore,
all public authorities are also prohibited from receiving property or benefit from any person beyond whatis deserved by law, regulation, or permission of the NCCC.

― 148 ―

Last but definitely not least, professional ethic obedience is the requirement set forth by theConstitution upon all public authorities including persons holding political position to strictly obey andbehave themselves conforming to the Codes of Professional Ethics defined by the respective government
agencies and concerned units. Failure to comply with this requirement will lead to the disciplinary
sanction and removal from position.
Apart from being removed from position, prohibited from holding any political position for 5 years
and subject to assets confiscation, any person holding political position or high-ranking state official
who is alleged by the victim or found by the NCCC as being unusually wealthy, committing an offense
relating to his or her duty, or dishonestly performing of function under the Penal Code or any otherlegislation will also face with criminal penalty. In this regard, the cases will be submitted to the Attorney
General to institute criminal proceeding in the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Persons Holding
Political Position.

IV. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION COMMITTED BY
POLITICIANS AND HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS
Unlike the practice for conventional corruption whereby investigation is conducted solely by thepolice, investigation of corruption committed by politicians and high-ranking officials is designed to be
the responsibility of National Counter Corruption Commission or NCCC in order to respond to weakness
from the past. As a specific mechanism, NCCC is considered to be strong and powerful enough to resist
political or other influence for the effective proceeding of corruption cases for at least two reasons.
First, NCCC is an independent body comprises of one Chairman and other 8 members selected from theprominent integrity persons who also have other qualifications through a very strict selection process ofthe House of the Senate and approved by the King to maintain a one-term position for a period of nine
years. Once assuming position, the Chairman and all other members of NCCC could not be removed
except for the reason of malpractice. (The Counter Corruption Act of 1999, Article 6, 7, 8, 12, and 13.)This is to provide NCCC with a strong support and guarantee to carry out their function independently
and honestly without any fear or concern to render a favor to anybody in order to receive assistancefor re-selection. The second reason for NCCC’s strongness is because it is authorized to designate theInvestigative Sub-commission comprises of one member of NCCC and other investigative officers fromvarious agencies including public prosecutor and private sector to conduct investigation in any case. (TheCounter Corruption Act of 1999, Article 45.) This is to establish transparency and to obtain the mostcomplete information and evidence, as well as to encourage cooperation among various government
agencies and private sectors in fighting against corruption.
Investigation will be conducted in the following cases (The Counter Corruption Act of 1999, Article 45):
1. Removal from position of the persons holding political position and high-ranking officials;
2. Unusually wealthy;
3. Abuse of official function under Penal Code;
4. Malpractice or dishonesty under other laws;
5. Confiscation of assets.
After the completion of investigation and NCCC is of the view that the alleged person is guilty,
the investigation file as well as supporting documents and evidences will be submitted to the Attorney
General for institution of proceeding in the Supreme Court’s Criminal Division for Persons Holding
Political Position. However, if the Attorney General disagrees with the opinion of NCCC or of the viewthat the existing evidences are inadequate for prosecution, then the Attorney General shall inform NCCC
to designate representatives of NCCC in equal number to the prosecutors designated by the Attorney― 149 ―

General to form up a working group to gather additional evidences and submitted to the Attorney Generalfor prosecution. If the working group could not agree on the matter, then NCCC is authorized to employ
private lawyer to prosecute the case themselves.
It is obvious that the prosecutor charged with the function in this regard is the Attorney General
himself. This is to guarantee that the process will be carried out by the prosecutor who is more reliable
than any other prosecutors in terms of professionalism and accountability, as well as to be more
expeditious because the process is run directly by the supreme authority of the prosecutors. However, inpractice the Attorney General is of course not absolutely prevented from assigning other prosecutors as
the assistants to discharge his function which is normal practice by every organization, but he has to sign
the indictment and be responsible the process himself.

V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION
Under the globalization world of today, corruption is no longer a problem of one single state alone
or of any person individually but of international community as a whole. Like those many of other crime,
offenders of corruption could also take advantages from the advance technology and communication toflee away from one country after committing corruption to another or many other countries in order toescape prosecution or conviction. They may conceal illicit proceeds of corruption in foreign countries,
as well as to combine their corruption with other transnational crimes, or participate in the immense
corruption of transnational corporations. Tracing of proceeds of corruption hiding abroad, as well as
taking person’s statement or gathering of evidences for the purpose of criminal case proceeding against
the corrupt public officials is, therefore, extremely difficult without assistance from foreign authorities.
Since we could not rely only upon internal mechanisms and ignore the reality that jurisdiction of
our authorities is ended at the border line, we need international vital coordination to force corruption to
be retreated and under control. To this end, we must realize how significant international cooperation,
which includes mutual assistance, and extradition, is if we need to deal more effectively with the fugitiveof corruption cases who flees away to a foreign land or conceals his illicit enrichment in another country.
Tracing and recovery of assets stolen from one country and hidden it somewhere in another country will
not be carried out successfully if there existed no mutual assistance between concerned countries. In
Thailand the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act of 1992 designated the Attorney General to be
the Central Authority for rendering assistance upon requested by foreign countries. It works quite well;
however, we need something more advance and effective for regional and international cooperation so weare now in the pipeline of amending the Act to accommodate more convenient measures for assistancethat in line with the United Nations Convention against Corruption and the Treaty on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal Matters of ASEAN countries.
According to Section 4 of the Act on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 1992, “assistance”
means assistance regarding investigation, inquiry, prosecution, forfeiture of property and otherproceedings relating to criminal matters. Forms of assistance regarding investigation is clarified in
Section 12 (1) of the Act that “The request for taking statement of persons, or providing documents,
articles, and evidence out of Court, the request for serving document, the request for search, the request
for seizure documents or articles, and the request for locating persons shall be transmitted to the Director
General of the Police Department (the Police Commissioner)”. It is also noticeable that Thailand canprovide assistance to the foreign requesting state even the requesting state has no treaty with Thailand,
provided that the requesting state commits to assist Thailand in return upon reciprocity principle.
As for the fleeing away to another country of the offenders committing corruption, Extradition― 150 ―

Act of 2008 and treaties concluded between Thailand and those countries will be the principle rule andguidance of the extradition process. The Attorney General is the Central Authority to accommodate therequest for extradition from the foreign state as well as to request foreign state to extradite the fugitiveof corruption cases back to stand trial or serve punishment in Thailand. In this regard, Thailand could
extradite the fugitive found in Thailand back to the foreign requesting state even no extradition treaty
existed between them, provided also that reciprocity is committed by the requesting state.

VI. CONCLUSION
With the measures and mechanisms as just mentioned, it is hopeful that prevention and suppressionof corruption will meet more efficiency and success. However, domestic measures and international
cooperation for the more effective investigation and prosecution of corruption should not be restricted
or end up only at the cooperation among government authorities and private sectors in handling of thecase, or merely concentrate on mutual assistance in corruption cases proceeding, or extradition process.
Cooperation among the authorities of various countries and international organizations to strengthen
up technical assistance and capacity building is equally or even more crucial in the long run. Therefore,
the sharing of information, knowledge and experiences regarding the techniques to deal with corruption
more efficiently and successfully, in particular with regard to the measures of assets tracing and recovery
through the seminar, conference, or workshop, either at domestic or international level, is in fact a formof countermeasures and cooperation to set up common awareness and capacity building to combat
corruption, as well.

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PREVENTING AND COMBATINGCORRUPTION IN VIETNAM
Lai Thu Ha*

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me take a moment to thank everyone who has worked so hard to organize this event. In
particular, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) and the Supreme Public Prosecutors
Office of Japan for giving me a precious opportunity to participate in this important Forum.
Corruption is a negative social phenomenon affecting almost all nations in the world. It destroys
seriously public resources, violates effective operations of State Bodies and also falsifies justice,undermines social fairness and public trust on the State and Law. In the context of globalization,
corruption appears to be no boundary, thus, anti-corruption becomes a very important and urgent duty
that requires coordinated efforts of the international community.
Similar to other countries, Vietnam has boosted up its policy to fight effectively against corruption.
In this regard, Vietnam’s legislation shows tremendous effort to fend off corruption. The Penal Code1999 criminalizes corruption activities in a separate section (Section A- Chapter 21) with many strict
sanctions. In 2005, Vietnam enacted the Act of Preventing and Combating Corruption (amended in2007). This Act provides provisions of anti-corruption in terms of prevention, discovery and tacklingcorruption criminals, and also regulates responsibility of individuals and organizations in the field. Under
this Act, the Steering Committees for Anti-Corruption have been established at national and provincial
level, led by the Prime Minister and the Chairman of People’s Committee respectively. In addition, theSpecializing Bodies for Anti-Corruption are established in State Bodies such as Governmental Inspection,
Ministry of Public Security, and the Supreme People's Prosecution Office.
In order to enhance transparency and integrity of the management of public financial resources,
Vietnam has employed many Laws such as the Act of State's Budget 2002, the Act of Accounting 2003,
the Act of Auditing 2005 and the Act of Practicing Thrift against Waste 2005.
To standardize public personnel, the Decree of Personnel and Civil Servants provides a special
mechanism of voting, recruiting, and managing state's officials. At the same time, we have adopted
measures to reform regime of salary in order to enhance living standards for people, who enjoy salaryfrom the State Budget, and to build up a separate regime of salary for administrative public officials.
In order to ensure the effectiveness of the struggle on preventing and combating corruption, it
is necessary to require responsibilities not only from Judicial Bodies, but also from entire politicalsystem, State Bodies and all citizens. Vietnam has encouraged the participation of residents and socialorganizations in supervising and impeaching corruption activities by practicing the Act of Organizing
National Assembly, the Act of Organizing People's Councils and Committees 2003, the Act of Fatherland
Front of Vietnam 1999, the Complaining and Denouncing 1998 Act (amended in 2004 and 2005).
Corruption is a global and transnational criminal issue. In this regard, anti-corruption measures
also require international co-operations, to which Vietnam has been an active member. In fact, Vietnam* Legal Expert, Institute for Prosecutorial Science, Supreme People’s Prosecution Office, Vietnam.

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has participated to the anti-corruption programs in the Asia-Pacific and APEC. The Law on Judicial
Assistance 2007 regulates responsibility of State Bodies on judicial assistances in terms of civil, criminal,
extradition, and transferring of prisoners, of which there are corruption offenders.
Although in recent years, corruption crimes in Vietnam have been increased both quantity anddegree of seriousness, Specializing Bodies for Anti-Corruption have closely coordinated with eachother in inspecting, investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating crimes of corruption in the fields ofbasic construction, land management, import-export management, insurance, and in the area of judicial
activities etc…
Vietnam has determined on dealing with many serious and complicated cases of corruption in which
public's agreement has been achieved:● The Case of Land corruption in Doson, Haiphong City, in which many high ranking officials wereconvicted with criminal charges, for instance the Secretary of the Doson authority, the Presidentof the People's Committee;● The Case of Receiving and Offering Bribes at Ministry of Trade (Currently Ministry of Industry
and Trade), in which a Deputy Minister and many other related officials were brought to trial;● The Case of Gambling, Offering and Receiving Bribes at the Management Board of Project 18(PMU18), in which the General Director of the Management Board and his accomplices wereconvicted and sentenced with strict sanctions…
● Currently, we are focusing on investigating and dealing with other serious cases, such as the
Corruption Case at the Management Board of Project 112 of the Government; The Case of
Smuggling, Offering, and Receiving Bribes at Laocai Province.
Having the function of exercising the right to public prosecution and supervision of law observancein the judicial area, Prosecution Offices have focused on practicing these duties upon the handlingof corruption crimes, have actively coordinated with Investigation Offices right at the beginning, todetermine grounds for the institution of a criminal case and the institution of a criminal case against
the suspects; have strictly supervised the whole legal proceedings to ensure the prosecution on theright persons, right offence, in accordance with the law provisions, and to ensure that wrongdoings andpunishing innocent persons would not be occurred.
Besides that, we have concentrated on the retrieving of appropriated property. Upon the discoveryof corruption activities, the Prosecution Office and the Investigating Body closely co-operate, promptly
apply deterrent measures such as strip search, seizure, and disable the defendant and his/her relatives
to disperse or rationalize the appropriated properties. At the same time, we apply the clemency toward
offenders who make honest declaration, compensate for damages they have caused, recover economic
consequences, and have cooperative attitude toward competent bodies. By handling corruption crimes,
the Prosecution Offices have discovered many shortcomings, weakness in economic and personnel
management, in mechanism and legal policy to make petition for repair.
In general, the struggle against corruption is very challenging. We have identified six crucial
elements which require special attention to the operation of anti-corruption in Vietnam.
Firstly, a corruption case normally involves many defendants who are usually high ranking officialsof State Bodies, who are well equipped with knowledge and experiences in terms of state management,
professional skills and legal knowledge. Therefore, they have deep understanding about the duties taken,loopholes in the legislation, and the shortcomings in the management. As a result, they could conductsophisticated criminal behaviors, including committing crime, erasing criminal traces, and concealing
criminal activities. They also have the ability to induce and embroil many others in different bodies, evenin law protection offices, to create a "closed mechanism" in conducting criminal activities, to make adeterrent for discovering and handling the crime.

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Secondly, the nature of corruption is the link between "money" and "power". Upon being
investigated, alleged corruption offenders utilize their money resources and power to abuse theprosecution process by bribing competent persons and threatening witnesses.
Thirdly, similar to some other countries, the Steering Committees for Anti-Corruption of Vietnam
belong to the executive branch, which holds most of public resources, is highly in danger of being abusedby corruption – This may cause some problems in the independence and the effectiveness of these offices.
Fourthly, the system of law has not been perfected. This leads to loopholes for corruption crimes
abusing. In amendment of the Penal Code 1999, some people propose abolishing the capital punishmentof 17 crimes, a lot of which are corruption offences. This does not mean that the handling corruption is
belittled. This is due to a trend of employing economic measures to treat economic crimes.
Fifthly, high-tech and modern devices are usually utilized to conduct and conceal activities ofcorruption. This causes obstacles in exposing and dealing with criminals.
Sixthly, some people who wish all their works are resolved quickly have assisted unintentionally or
intentionally crimes of corruption.
Through the practice, we realize that the struggle against corruption gains glorious victories only if
the following solutions are comprehensively employed:
The First, the Steering Committees for anti-corruption must have a special position in the system ofstate bodies and their officials must be elected pursuant to special standards to ensure their independence,and effectiveness of supervising, exposing and handling crimes of corruption. In addition, a closed
supervising mechanism must be established to guarantee any state body supervised by another one todominate power because the root of corruption is power.
The Second, there must be transparency in the operation of all state bodies by publicly declaring
their activities and financial resources.
The Third, the system of law must be perfected to make a mechanism of prevention at the law’s
provisions themselves, together with building consciousness of well obeying law in all organizations andindividuals.
The Fourth, promoting education of anti-corruption to encourage the role of entire society in the
struggle against corruption and to build a culture that “Say no to corruption”.
The Fifth, strengthening international co-operation to enhance the capacity on preventing andcombating corruption, joining and strictly applying provisions of regional and international treaties,
which have progressive contents in anti-corruption.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Corruption is a “national disaster” and also a “global disaster”. The elimination of corruption is a
desire of the whole global community and carrying out the struggle against corruption is a spiritual dutyof all persons in the world. Together with great efforts of each nation, close and effective coordination
among nations in the region as well as in the world, Vietnam strongly believes that crimes of corruption
will be fended off. “The Regional Forum on Good Governance for East Asian Countries” on the themeof “Strengthening of Domestic and International Co-operation for Effective Investigation and Prosecutionof Corruption” will open the door for that bright prospect.
Allow me to finish my statement by wishing our Forum the utmost success.
Thank you for your attention.

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CLOSING CEREMONY***

Closing Remarks by
Mr. Yutaka Nagashima
Public Prosecutor, Supreme Public Prosecutors Office
Ministry of Justice, Japan***― 155 ―

― 156 ―CLOSING REMARKS
by Mr. Yutaka Nagashima
Public Prosecutor, Supreme Public Prosecutors Office
Ministry of Justice, Japan
Distinguished participants, ladies and gentlemen,
In closing this significant Regional Forum, let me first of all express my sincere appreciation, on
behalf of one of the co-hosting organizations, the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office of Japan, to the
distinguished participants and visiting expert for their participation in this conference despite their busy
schedules and for their great contribution to the substantive debate in this conference.
This Forum has provided a rare opportunity for us all, officials from thirteen East Asian countries,
including Japan, who are responsible for law enforcement and policy-making in the field of corruption
control, to get together and share views and experiences regarding the challenges of corruption control
and practical solutions to enhance domestic and international co-operation for effective investigation andprosecution of corruption cases. From your informative presentations and candid discussion, we havelearned a great deal about the present situation of corruption in our region, legal and practical challenges
faced by us all in the fight against corruption, and some of the best practices for overcoming these
problems. Without your enthusiastic commitment to all parts of this meeting, this Regional Forum would
not have been such a great success.
I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all of the UNAFEI personnel for their initiativein organizing this Forum, and for their tremendous efforts in making the necessary preparations for thisconference. I would like to particularly commend the unselfish work and dedication of many people whohave worked behind the scenes to make this meeting happen. Furthermore, I know that I speak for all
when I express my appreciation to all UNAFEI faculty and staff for their kind hospitality throughout thisForum.
Distinguished participants,
In my experience as a public prosecutor and a former faculty member of UNAFEI, I am always ofthe belief that a solid human network and strong confidence among criminal justice practitioners acrossnational borders are absolute prerequisites for effective international co-operation in criminal matters,
including mutual legal assistance and extradition. Various international mechanisms for mutual cooperation can function only when the criminal justice officials of each country know their counterpartsin foreign countries, and when those people are united by their shared responsibility, common mission
and firm confidence. In order to create and maintain such a favourable environment, we should steadily
continue our efforts to cultivate relationships, creating channels of communication, and keep in contact
with each other.
In this connection, I am confident that this Regional Forum provided us with an opportunity to takea meaningful first step, upon which we can continue to work to build a strong human network among therepresented countries. I would like to express my deepest appreciation once again to everybody joined
here for their participation in this meeting and their great contribution to its success.
With these few words, I now have the duty and honour to declare the Regional Forum closed.
Thank you very much.

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