The Role of Altruism in Sending and Spending Remittances
Akira Shimada*
Faculty of Economics, Nagasaki University

Abstract
We investigate the role of altruism in sending and spending remittances. Previous
studies on remittances have paid less attention to recipients’ altruism towards migrants
than to migrants’ altruism towards recipients. We find that the more altruistic the
migrant is towards the recipients, the larger are the remittances he sends, while
remittances may also be zero if he is less altruistic. However, we also find that
remittances are likely to be consumed rather than invested by recipients if they are very
altruistic towards the migrant. Our result may partly explain why countries receiving
large remittances from migrants do not necessarily make large investments, and alsosuggests that altruism among household members is not necessarily effective inattaining development and growth through remittances.

Keywords: Migration; Altruism; Remittances; Consumption; Investment
JEL Classification: D10; D64; F22; F24; J61*

Email address for correspondence: shimada@nagasaki-u.ac.jp
11. Introduction
We investigate the role of migrants’ altruism in sending remittances and recipients’
altruism in spending remittances, assuming a simplified two-country economy, inwhich a household member working as a migrant in the host country sends remittances
to other household members in the home country. We demonstrate that the migrant’s
altruism towards other household members increases the amount of remittances,whereas other household members’ altruism towards the migrant is likely to inducethem to spend remittances on consumption rather than on investment. We infer fromour result that altruism among household members may hamper the home country’s
attempt to realise development and growth through remittances.
Migrants send remittances for many reasons, and several studies have been
conducted to determine the incentives for sending remittances (Lucas and Stark 1985,
Stark 1995, Rapoport and Deocquier 2006, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2009). These
incentives include altruism, self-interest, coinsurance between migrants and otherhousehold members, and repayment of a loan. Of these, altruism is considered a major
incentive.
However, altruism alone cannot explain why migrants send remittances; yet without
it, remittances cannot be explained satisfactorily, especially in some countries wherefamily ties are strong (Cai 2003). Although the results are mixed, many studies havebeen conducted to show the effects of altruism on remittances (Secondi 1997, Agarwal
and Horowitz 2002, VanWey 2004).
Many developing countries aim to create development and growth. Remittances are
considered a major external financial source for the attainment of these objectives,2although nowadays many developed countries have restrictions on accepting
immigrants (Boeri and Brücker 2005, Facchini and Mayda 2008). Accordingly, thedeveloping countries are trying to increase remittances, and to ensure that they are
invested.
In response to this, a number of studies have been carried out to investigate whether
remittances contribute to development and growth. Chami et al. (2005) found thenegative correlation between remittances and GDP growth, and deduced that
remittances do not act like a source of capital for development. According to Barajas etal. (2009), at best, workers’ remittances have no impact on economic growth. They
infer that this is partly because remittances do not serve as investments, but as social
insurance that helps family members to finance the purchase of life’s necessities. Theirresult is consistent with the findings by Adams and Page (2005), according to which,migration and remittances significantly reduces the degree of poverty in the developing
countries.
On the other hand, de Haas (2005) argues that migrant households often tend to havea higher propensity of invest than do non-migrant households.1
It seems that altruism contributes to development and growth of labour sending
countries, since migrants’ altruism is likely to increase remittances. Shimada (2010a)
demonstrated that, when there are no migration costs, a household member working in

1

See also Massy and Parrado (1994), Durand et al. (1996), Taylor (1999), Woodruff

and Zenteno (2001), Koc and Onan (2004), Semyonov and Gorodzeisky (2008) for a
discussion of this issue.
3the host country, being more altruistic sends larger remittances to other household
members in the home country.2
However, does altruism always have positive effects on development and growththrough remittances? Whether remittances are beneficial in attaining these objectives
will depend on both the amounts sent to other household members and how they are
spent. Altruism seems to be related to both of these questions.
Previous studies on remittances have focused mostly on migrants’ altruism.
However, often all members of a household are altruistic towards each other.3 In otherwords, if a household member working as a migrant is altruistic towards otherhousehold members, they, in turn, will also be altruistic towards him. It is possible thatrecipients’ altruism also affects remittances, through its effects on the utilities ofrecipients and migrants.
In addition, previous studies on remittances seem to have implicitly assumed that

2

Remittances can be related to not only altruism but also remittance fees: the sending

fee and the receiving fee, which are usually set by private companies. Shimada (2010b)
showed that remittances can be maximised by transferring the sending fee from themigrant to other household members without manipulating the fees, and without
affecting the interests of the agents involved.
3

In Chapter One of Stark (1995), he assumed that the father and the son are altruistic

towards each other when the father is faced with the problem of allocating the fixedamount of corn between them. However, he did not explicitly examine the effects ofchanges in the degree of son’s altruism towards the father on the allocation.
4

altruism is related only to sending remittances. Although, as mentioned, many existingstudies have attempted to determine whether recipients spend remittances oninvestment or on consumption, to our knowledge the possible effects of altruism on the
spending of remittances have never been fully examined when exploring the use ofremittances.4 However, it is easy to envisage that recipients determine how they spend
remittances in order to maximise their utility, and that this depends on their altruism
towards migrants as well as on migrants’ altruism towards recipients. This leads us toinfer that altruism is related to both sending and spending remittances.
Therefore, we attempt to demonstrate the effects of recipients’ altruism on spending
remittances as well as those of migrants’ altruism on sending remittances. In this way,
we attempt to clarify whether altruism is always effective in attaining development andgrowth by utilizing remittances.
We derive the result that migrants’ altruism is likely to have positive impacts on theamount of remittances, while recipients’ altruism is likely to induce them to spend
remittances on consumption rather than on investment. Accordingly, our result
suggests that altruism among household members does not necessarily contribute todevelopment and growth by sending and spending remittances.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 models a simplified

4

In his interesting theoretical study on the time pattern of remittances sent

altruistically by migrants, Poirine (2006) specified the use of remittances. However, heassumed that recipients spend remittances only on consumption, and that there is no
possibility of their being spent on investment.
5

two-country economy. Section 3 examines the effects of migrant’s altruism on theamount of remittances. Section 4 examines the effects of other household members’
altruism on the use of remittances. Section 5 presents concluding remarks.

2. The Model
We assume a two-country economy consisting of a home country and a host country,
and we focus on a representative household in the home country. One member of thehousehold has already moved to the host country, and is working there as a migrant,
while other household members are working in the home country. We also assume that
although the household members are altruistic with each other, the degree of the
migrant’s altruism towards other household members, and that of other household
members’ altruism towards the migrant differ. The migrant may send part of his
income earned in the host country to other household members as remittances.
The income earned by the migrant in the host country is denoted by WM , which is
given exogenously and is a positive constant, and remittances sent by him are denotedby R ( WM ). The amount of remittances is determined by the migrant to maximise
his utility. He spends the rest of his income in the host country. Other household
members’ total income and spending is denoted by WH . They spend these remittances
either on investment or on consumption. In particular, we assume two cases where all
remittances are spent on investment and where all remittances are spent on
consumption.5 In the former case, WH is equal to income earned under investment,

5This is a simplifying assumption. We can generalize the analysis by assuming that
6

and in the latter case WH consists of remittances and income earned under noinvestment.
The migrant’s direct utility stems from his spending which is equal to his income
minus remittances, and is assumed to be ln(WM  R). Following Poirine (2006), we
specify utility functions to obtain a practical solution. Since the migrant is altruistic
towards other household members, his utility U M depends on other household
members’ utility U H , as well as on his own direct utility.

U M  (1   M ) ln(WM  R )   M U H ,where  M , 0   M  1, measures the degree of migrant’s altruism towards otherhousehold members. Similarly, other household members’ utility depends on their own
direct utility, which is assumed to be ln WH , and on the migrant’s utility, since they arealso altruistic towards the migrant.
U H  (1   H ) ln WH   HU M ,where  H (  M ), 0   H  1, measures the degree of other household members’
altruism towards the migrant. These utility functions can be solved as,

U M  (1   M ) ln(WM  R)   M ln WH ,U H  (1   H ) ln WH   H ln(WM  R ),where  M   M (1   H ) (1   M  H ) ,  H   H (1   M ) (1   H  M ) . The more altruistic

the part of remittances is spent on investment and the rest is spent on consumption.
Shimada (2010b) assumed that remittances are spent both on investment and on
consumption, and provided exogenously the ratios of remittances spent on investment
and spent on consumption by other household members staying in the home country.
7the migrant is towards other household members, the larger is the weight that he
attaches to other household members’ direct utility ( M  M  0). Similarly, themore altruistic other household members are towards the migrant, the larger is theweight that they attach to the migrant’s direct utility ( H  H  0).
We assume that production in the home country is conducted according to thefollowing technology:
YH  AH N H , AH  WH  hI H , WH  0,

where YH is the home country’s output, AH reflects the home country’s labour
productivity, N H is the home country’s employment, and I H is the home country’s
investment. WH and h are given exogenously and are constants. Investment raises
the marginal productivity of labour and thereby increases wages (earned income forother household members), and this increase in wages is assumed to be larger than theamount of the investment, i.e. h  1. Under this technology, other household members’
income available for spending is determined to be WH  hI H .
As assumed above, other household members spend all remittances for a single
purpose. If they invest remittances, i.e. I H  R, their earned income is WH  hR. In
contrast, if they spend remittances on consumption, i.e. I H  0, their earned income is
only WH , and WH equals WH  R. On the assumption that h  1, other household

members’ spending is always larger if they spend remittances on investment rather
than on consumption. Moreover, larger values of h imply that investment is more
profitable and that other household members’ income available for spending is muchlarger than the income when remittances are spent on consumption.
However, as we will see in what follows, this does not necessarily suggest that other8household members always prefer to spend remittances on investment. They determine
how they spend remittances by comparing the utility derived from investment with thatderived from consumption.
The migrant usually has incomplete information on how other household members
spend remittances. However, to avoid complicating the analysis, we make asimplifying assumption that the migrant is fully aware of how the remittances will bespent by the recipients. In particular, when other household members spend
remittances on investment (consumption), the migrant surely knows that they spend
remittances on investment (consumption). This partly reflects the fact that as the
migrant continues to send remittances, he increases his knowledge on the use of theremittances by other household members.6

3. Sending Remittances

In this section, we try to establish how the migrant’s altruism towards otherhousehold members affects the sending of remittances. For this purpose, we determine
the amount of remittances in both cases: where other household members spend

6

Certainly, actual economies are not simple. Information between the migrant andother household members tends to be asymmetric. In other words, the migrant does notknow exactly how other household members behave, nor do other household members
know exactly how the migrant behaves. Chami et al. (2005) assumed an economy inwhich the migrant cannot observe the recipient’s effort level directly, which gives rise
to a moral hazard problem between the migrant and the recipient.
9remittances on investment, and where they spend remittances on consumption. We
explicitly specify the use of remittances when determining the amount of remittances.
If the migrant expects that remittances will be spent on investment, and otherhousehold members actually spend all of them for that purpose, then the migrant’s
utility function can be expressed as,
U M  (1   M ) ln(WM  R)   M ln(WH  hR) ( U M inv ).

(1)

Assuming that WM  kWH , where k is a constant and k  1, that is, income
earned in the host country is k times as large as income earned in the absence ofinvestment in the home country, we differentiate Equation (1) with respect toremittances.
dU M invdRh1  M  WH .
 R    M k (kWH  R )(WH  hR) h  Accordingly, if M k  (1M ) h  0, i.e. M  (1 h)(1 k) {1 H  (1 h)(1 k )}, thendU M inv dR  0. In this case, the migrant maximises his utility by not sending
remittances, i.e.
Rinv   (1 h )(1 k ) {1   (1 h )(1 k )}  0.
M

(2)

H

In contrast, if M k  (1 M ) h  0, i.e. M  (1 h)(1 k ) {1  H  (1 h)(1 k )}, then the
migrant sends a positive amount of remittances, i.e.
1  M Rinv   (1 h )(1 k ) {1   (1 h )(1 k )}    M k 
WH .
M
H
h 


(3)

Equation (2) suggests that the migrant may not send any remittances to otherhousehold members if he is less altruistic towards them. However, even if the migrant
is less altruistic, he will send remittances if investment is profitable, that is, if h is10large,[(1 h)(1 k ) {1   H  (1 h)(1 k )}] h  0

sincesuggeststhat M  (1 h)(1 k ) {1   H  (1 h)(1 k )} is more likely, or if the income difference
between host and home countries is large, that is, ifkis large, since [(1 h)(1 k ) {1  H  (1 h)(1 k )}] k  0 suggests that M  (1 h)(1 k ) {1  H  (1 h)(1 k )}is more likely. In other words, even if the migrant is less altruistic, he is likely to send
remittances when other household members in the home country can earn larger
income by investing remittances, or when he can earn a relatively larger income in thehost country.
Equation (3) suggests that a more altruistic migrant sends a larger amount ofremittances (Rinv   (1 h )(1 k ) {1   (1 h )(1 k )}  M  0). In addition, for any given degreeMHof his altruism, the migrant sends larger remittances if investment is more profitable(Rinv   (1 h )(1 k ) {1   (1 h )(1 k )} h  0), or
M

if

the

incomedifferenceislargerH(Rinv   (1 h )(1 k ) {1   (1 h )(1 k )} k  0).
M

H

We now move on to another case in which the migrant expects remittances to be
spent on consumption, and other household members actually spend all of them forthat purpose.
The migrant’s utility function can be expressed as,
U M  (1   M ) ln(WM  R)   M ln(WH  R) ( U M con ).

(4)

By differentiating Equation (4) with respect to remittances,
dU M condR1[ R  { M k  (1   M )}WH ],(kWH  R)(WH  R)

we find that, if M k  (1 M )  0, i.e. M  (1 k) (1 H 1 k), then dU M con dR  0.
In this case, the migrant maximises his utility by not sending remittances, i.e.
11

Rcon  (1 k ) (1  1 k )  0.
M

(5)

H

In contrast, if M k  (1M )  0, i.e. M  (1 k) (1 H 1 k), then the migrant sends a
positive amount of remittances, i.e.
Rcon   (1 k ) (1  1 k )  { M k  (1   M )}WH .
M

(6)

H

Similarly to the case of investment, Equation (5) suggests that a less altruistic
migrant may not send remittances. However, even such a migrant will send remittances
if the income difference is large. Equation (6) suggests that remittances to be spent on
consumption also increase with the degree of the migrant’s altruism towards otherhousehold members, and that the income difference has positive effects on remittances
for any given degree of migrant’s altruism.
By comparing Equations (2) and (5), we find that a migrant is more likely to send
remittances when they are spent on investment than when they are spent on
consumption,since(1 h)(1 k ) {1 H  (1 h)(1 k )}  (1 k ) (1 H 1 k ).

Moreover,acomparison of Equations (3) and (6) reveals that when a migrant is altruistic enough tosend remittances in either case, i.e. M  (1 k) (1 H 1 k), remittances for any given
degree of migrant’s altruism are larger when they are spent on investment than when
they are spent on consumption.
On the other hand, the effects of migrant’s altruism on remittances are smaller when
they are spent on investment than when they are spent on consumption, i.e.
Rinv  (1 h)(1 k ) {1   (1 h)(1 k )} M  Rcon  (1 k ) (1  1 k )  M .
M

H

M

In

other

words,

theH

migrant’s altruism is not so effective in increasing remittances when they are spent on
investment than when they are spent on consumption.
To summarise the results derived in this section, the migrant does not necessarily
12

send remittances, and the amount of remittances and the effects of migrant’s altruism
on remittances both differ, depending on whether other household members spendthem on investment or on consumption. However, the migrant’s altruism towards otherhousehold members encourages him to send more remittances in either case.

4. Spending Remittances

In this section, we try to establish how other household members’ altruism towards
the migrant affects the spending of remittances. We first calculate other household
members’ utility in both cases: where remittances are spent on investment, and where
they are spent on consumption. We then compare the utilities to determine for which
purpose the other household members will actually spend remittances.
Throughout this section, we assume that the migrant is always altruistic enough tosend remittances to other household members, i.e. M  (1 k) (1 H 1 k).
Other household members’ utility function when they spend remittances oninvestment can be expressed as,
U H  (1   H ) ln(WH  hRinv )   H ln(WM  Rinv )( U H inv ).

(7)

Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (7), other household members’ utility isdetermined as follows:
U H inv  ln WH  (1   H ) ln  M   H ln(1   M )  ln(1  kh)   H ln(1 h).

(8)

In contrast, when other household members spend remittances on consumption, theirutility function takes the following form:
U H  (1   H ) ln(WH  Rcon )   H ln(WM  Rcon )( U H con ).

(9)

Substituting Equation (6) into Equation (9), other household members’ utility is13determined as follows:
U H con  ln WH  (1   H ) ln  M   H ln(1   M )  ln(1  k ).

(10)

From Equations (8) and (10), we observe that other household members’ utility inthe two cases differs by,
U H inv  U H con  ln(1  kh)  ln(1  k )   H ln(1 h).

(11)

The first two terms on the right-hand side of Equation (11) are positive, but the third
term is negative; therefore, the sign of the right-hand side cannot be determined
generally. In other words, other household members do not always spend remittanceson investment, nor do they always spend remittances on consumption.
However, we also observe that,lim (U H inv  U H con )  ln(1  kh)  ln(1  k )  0,

 H 0lim (U H inv  U H con )  ln(1 h  k )  ln(1  k )  0 and H 1

 (U H inv  U H con )  H  0,
suggesting that there exists  H , which makes U H inv  U H con equal to zero.7 Let us
denote such  H by ˆH , 0  ˆH  1.
Accordingly, in the case where 0   H  ˆH , other household members attainhigher utility by spending remittances on investment, and will thus spend remittanceson investment.
In contrast, in the case where ˆH   H  1, other household members attain higher
utility by spending remittances on consumption, and will thus spend remittances on

7

Notice that lim  H  0 and lim  H  1.
 H 0 H 114

consumption.8 This is not because investment is less profitable; this result holds evenwhen h takes larger values.
We can intuitively understand these results as follows: Other household members’
direct utility is larger when remittances are spent on investment than when they are
spent on consumption, since Rinv  Rcon . When other household members are lessaltruistic towards the migrant, other household members’ direct utility is dominant intheir utility. As a result, other household members’ utility is larger if remittances are
spent on investment.
On the other hand, the migrant’s direct utility is larger when remittances are spent on
consumption than when they are spent on investment. When other household members
are very altruistic towards the migrant, the migrant’s direct utility is dominant in otherhousehold members’ utility. As a result, other household members’ utility is larger if
remittances are spent on consumption.
When investment is more profitable, i.e. h is larger, Rinv is larger. In such a case,the migrant’s direct utility is much smaller than that when remittances are spent on
consumption. Accordingly, other household members are much more likely to spend
remittances on consumption rather than on investment if they are very altruistic
towards the migrant.

8

The conditions that the migrant sends remittances and that other household members

spend remittances on consumption are not always consistent. However, there exist
cases where the migrant sends remittances and other household members spend themon consumption.
15

Comparison of other household members’ utility in two cases reveals that otherhousehold members are likely to spend remittances on investment when they are lessaltruistic towards the migrant, and that they are likely to spend remittances on
consumption when they are very altruistic towards the migrant.
Therefore, how other household members spend remittances depends on how
altruistic they are towards the migrant, and other household members’ altruism is likely
to induce them to spend remittances on consumption. We derived this result without
invoking insufficiency of profitable investment opportunities in the home country.
We can infer from our results that if all the members of a household, including those
who work abroad as migrants, are very altruistic towards each other, it is likely that
migrants will send large remittances, but these monies will be spent on consumption byother household members in the home country. 9 Therefore, altruism will notnecessarily enhance the development and growth of the home country by sending andspending remittances. This result may partly explain why countries that receive large
remittances do not always achieve development and growth through remittances.109Since  M  H  0, as other household members are more altruistic towards the

migrant,theamountofremittancesissmallerinbothcases,

i.e.

Rinv   (1 h )(1 k ) {1   (1 h )(1 k )}  H  0 ,  Rcon   (1 k ) (1  1 k )  H  0 (see Equations 3
M

H

M

H

and 5). However, this does not necessarily imply that remittances are smaller if otherhousehold members spend remittances on consumption. This is because, as mentioned,
for remittances to be spent on consumption,  H has only to be larger than ˆ H .
10

India was the world number one remittance-receiving country (US$27 billion) in16

To summarise the results derived in this section, how remittances received by otherhousehold members are spent depends on their altruism towards the migrant. If they
are very altruistic, they are likely to spend remittances on consumption rather than on
investment. This suggests that altruism is not necessarily conducive to development
and growth.

5. Concluding Remarks

Altruism is one of the major incentives for sending remittances, and many
researchers have studied the effects of migrants’ altruism on the amount of remittances.
Although the results are not conclusive, we cannot explain remittances independentlyof migrants’ altruism. On the other hand, until now, unfortunately the effects ofrecipients’ altruism on remittances have escaped our attention: In particular, there havebeen almost no studies on the effects of recipients’ altruism on the use of remittances.
This has been rather strange because other household members determine the use ofremittances to maximise their utility, and their utility depends on how they are
altruistic towards migrants.
We found that the migrant’s altruism increases remittances in both cases, i.e. where
they are invested, and where they are consumed. Our study differs from previous onesin that we specified the use of remittances to examine the effects of the migrant’s
altruism on the amount of remittances. We also found that other household members’

2007, but the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line in 2004 was 34.3%(World Bank, 2008).
17

altruism is likely to induce them to spend remittances on consumption rather than on
investment. Even if investing remittances raises other household members’ income
substantially, they will spend the remittances on consumption when they are very
altruistic towards the migrant.
Many developing countries are trying to increase remittances to realise development
and growth, and we found that the migrant’s altruism has positive impacts on theamount of remittances. However, our results also suggest that altruism among all
household members does not necessarily bring about development and growth in thelabour sending economy through remittances.
Accordingly, the government, whose people are very altruistic within their families,
must implement policies that channel remittances into growth-enhancing activities.

Acknowledgements

This paper was presented at the 9th International Conference of the Japan Economic
Policy Association held in Tokyo, November 2010. I am grateful to Ryokichi Chidaand other participants for their valuable comments. Needless to say, any remaining
errors are my responsibility.

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