WIPO Collection of
Leading Judgments
on Intellectual
Property Rights
Members of the African
Intellectual Property
Organization (1997-2018)
Collection OMPI desjugements les plus
déterminants en matièrede propriété intellectuelle
Membres de l’Organisation
africaine de la propriété
intellectuelle (1997-2018)

WIPO Collection of
Leading Judgments
on Intellectual
Property Rights
Members of the African
Intellectual Property
Organization (1997-2018)
Edited by
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué and Joseph Fometeu

Collection OMPI desjugements les plus
déterminants en matièrede propriété intellectuelle
Membres de l’Organisation
africaine de la propriété
intellectuelle (1997-2018)

Sous la direction de
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué et Joseph Fometeu

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Suggested citation: WIPO (2023). WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments
on Intellectual Property Rights: Members of the African Intellectual
Property Organization (1997-2018). Geneva: World Intellectual Property
Organization. DOI: 10.34667/tind.47178

Proposition de citation : OMPI (2023) Collection OMPI des jugements
les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle Membres del’Organisation africaine de propriété intellectuelle (1997-2018). Genève :Organisation Mondiale de la Propriété Intellectuelle.
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2

Tableofcontents

Tabledesmatières

Foreword

6

Avant-propos

158

Preface7

Préface159

Acknowledgments

8

Remerciements

160

Abbreviations

9

Liste des abréviations

161

Introduction to the OAPI

11

Présentation de l’OAPI

163

Chapter 1
General theory of intellectual
property

13

Chapitre 1
Théorie générale de la propriété
intellectuelle

165

Chapter 2
Patents

33

Chapitre 2
Brevets d’invention

188

Chapter 3
Trademarks

38

Chapitre 3
Marques de produits ou de services

194

Chapter 4
Industrial designs

91

Chapitre 4
Dessins et modèles industriels

255

Chapter 5
Trade names

101

Chapitre 5
Noms commerciaux

267

Chapter 6
Copyright

104

Chapitre 6
Propriété littéraire et artistique

271

Chapter 7
Unfair competition

144

Chapitre 7
Concurrence déloyale

316

3

4

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

WIPO Collection of
Leading Judgments
on Intellectual
Property Rights
Members of the African
Intellectual Property
Organization (1997-2018)
Edited by
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué and Joseph Fometeu

Foreword
It is with great pleasure that the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) presents this second
volume of the WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments
in Intellectual Property, dedicated to the intellectual
property (IP) jurisprudence of the member states of
the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI).
The Collection was launched in 2019, as part of WIPO’s
commitment to providing free public access to data
and knowledge on IP adjudication approaches andtrends to the global IP community. Each volume in
the Collection opens global access to the landmark IP
judgments of a selected jurisdiction or region. The first
volume contained 30 representative judgments curated
by the Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republicof China, between 2011 and 2018. This second volume
showcases 53 of the most significant decisions rendered
by OAPI member state courts between 1997 and 2018,
through commentaries authored by distinguishedjudges and academics.
The members of the OAPI have a common IP legislative
framework, governed by the Bangui Agreement. In thisframework, the OAPI provides for a regional system
for IP protection with a single filing mechanism bywhich OAPI registrations automatically extend to all
OAPI member states. Additionally, IP disputes are
adjudicated by the national courts of the relevant
member state and the court decisions related to theprovisions of the Bangui Agreement are binding on allother OAPI member states. In this context, judges in
the region can benefit immensely from having access tothe judgments rendered by courts across the region to
inform their own analysis and decision-making. So far,there has been limited available information regarding
IP jurisprudence in the region, and this volume intends
to fill this gap. By providing free access to landmark
judgments, as well as judicial analysis authored byjudges and academics in the field, it is our hope that
this publication will serve as a useful judicial education
resource, and will contribute to the consistency andpredictability of decisions rendered by courts in the
OAPI member states. In addition, by providing thecommentaries in French and in English, judges beyond
the OAPI and francophone region will be able to benefit
from this jurisprudence.
The Collection is one part of WIPO’s broader efforts
to increase free access to information on the judicial
administration of IP. In this context, the Collection iscomplemented by WIPO Lex, an online database thatprovides free of charge access to legal information
on IP from around the world, including laws, treaties
and judgments. All of the decisions commented in
6this volume are included in full text in WIPO Lex, andcan be accessed at https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/main/
judgments.
This volume is the result of the collaborative efforts of
WIPO, the OAPI, the National Institute of Intellectual
Property in France (INPI) and a number of distinguishedjudges and academics from Benin, Cameroon, France
and Senegal. We are grateful to the individual authorsof this volume, Judge Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué,
Judge Malick Lamotte, Judge Aristide Fade, Dr. Joseph
Fometeu, Dr. Grégoire Jiogue and Dr. André Lucas. The
commentaries in this volume reflect the views of theauthors in their personal capacity, and do not represent
the views of any court, member state, OAPI or WIPO.
The Collection seeks to encourage conversation andexchange with a view to enhancing judicial analysis,
reasoning and decision-making. We trust that theinsightful judicial analysis provided in these pages
will assist judges in their role of achieving an effective
and balanced IP ecosystem, in the OAPI region andelsewhere.
Marco M. Alemán
Assistant Director General
IP and Innovation Ecosystems Sector
WIPO

Preface
Efforts to enforce intellectual property (IP) rights are
gaining traction in the area covered by the African
Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI). Slowly but
surely, the judicial authorities are making their markas they interpret the notions enshrined in the Bangui
Agreement and its annexes. They have already shedlight on a number of issues, in particular with regard
to IP law jurisdiction and how that fits in with the legal
framework of the Organization for the Harmonizationof African Business Law (OHADA in its French acronym),
definitions of such concepts as the likelihood ofconfusion, intellectual work, originality and novelty, andmatters relating to trade names, counterfeiting andseizure, and unfair competition.

on the OAPI High Commission of Appeal, and at OAPI
staff too. Finally, it will be of use to lawyers and anyone,academics or otherwise, conducting any kind of IPrelated research in the OAPI area.
To the co-authors, I express the hope that, as the Actof 2015 continues to be applied, it will be possible topublish a second edition of this compendium as soon as
the number of judgments handed down allows.
Denis L. Bohoussou
Director General
OAPI

It is important that the public be made aware ofthese developments. To that end, OAPI, the National
Industrial Property Institute (INPI) of France and theWorld Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
working through that Organization’s Division for Africa
and the WIPO Judicial Institute, decided to publish
a compendium of annotated case law. There are atleast two key reasons for compiling such a selection oflandmark court rulings. Firstly, it resolves the formalityof publication itself, given that, with few exceptions,judgments handed down in the various OAPI countries
are not usually published. More importantly, by thisapproach we bring to the attention of the public only
what are deemed to be key judgments. To compile
such a compendium has meant entrusting a team ofexperts with the task of making a rigorous selection of
judgments and annotating them.
A team of senior judges under the direction of Max
Lambert Ndéma Elongué and a team of academics led
by Professor Joseph Fometeu undertook that work. The
two teams worked seamlessly together to achieve theresult that I am pleased to present to you, the reader.
It is a unique piece of work, the first compendium of
landmark judgments ever published in the OAPI region.
Its target audiences are clear: the compendium is
primarily directed at actors operating in the market
place. The message that I hope is transmitted to themby this initiative is that IP rights are well protected in the
OAPI region, thereby making it attractive economicallyfrom a rights standpoint. The judgments containedin the compendium are indicative of the rigorous,
objective and impartial analysis of the law made, as arule, by the judges. The compendium is also directed
at those responsible for implementing IP rights, inparticular judges in OAPI countries and those serving
7

Acknowledgments
Commentators

WIPO Coordinators

Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué, Magistrate,
Deputy Director for Audit and Administrative andFinancial Disputes (Direction des Affaires non
répressives et du Sceau), Ministry of Justice (Cameroon)
Malick Lamotte, Magistrate, President of theCommercial Court of Dakar (Senegal)
Aristide Fade, Magistrate, Public Prosecutor, Court ofFirst Instance (Second Class) of Aplahoué (Tribunal depremière instance de 2ème classe d’Aplahoué) (Benin)
Joseph Fometeu, Professor, University of
Ngaoundéré (Cameroon)
Grégoire Jiogue, Professor, University of Yaoundé
II (Cameroon)
André Lucas, Professor emeritus, University of
Nantes (France)

Inés Fernández Ulate, Legal Officer, WIPO Judicial
Institute, IP and Innovation Ecosystems Sector
Eun-Joo Min, Director, WIPO Judicial Institute, IP and
Innovation Ecosystems Sector
Marc Sery-Kore, Director, Division for Africa, Regionaland National Development Sector

Science Committee
Joseph Fometeu, Professor, University of
Ngaoundéré (Cameroon)
Grégoire Jiogue, Professor, University of Yaoundé
II (Cameroon)
André Lucas, Professor emeritus, University of
Nantes (France)

Technical Secretariat
Brillant Aimé Yobo, Attorney at law, CameroonJoël Fabrice Dongmo Donfack, Doctor of private law
Awal Mohamadou, Doctoral student of private law

8

WIPO Technical Experts
Ignacio de Castro Llamas, Director, IP Disputes andExternal Relations Division, WIPO Arbitration andMediation Center, IP and Innovation Ecosystems Sector
Marina Foschi, Senior Legal Officer, Policy andLegislative Advice Section, Department for Trademarks,
Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, Brands
and Designs Sector
Marcus HÖpperger, Senior Director, Department
for Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical
Indications, Brands and Designs Sector
Tomoko Miyamoto, Head, Patents and Treaties Law
Section, Patent and Technology Law Division, Patents
and Technology Sector
Xavier Vermandele, Senior Legal Counsellor, Building
Respect for IP Division, Global Challenges andPartnerships Sector
Michele Woods, Director, Copyright Law Division,
Copyright and Creative Industries SectorAbbreviations

AB-1977	Agreement Relating to the Creationof an African Intellectual Property
Organization, constituting a Revisionof the Agreement Relating to theCreation of an African and Malagasy
Office of Industrial Property (Bangui
Agreement of March 2, 1977)
ABR-1999	Bangui Agreement, as revised on
February 24, 1999
ABR-2015	Bangui Agreement, as revised on
December 14, 2015
ADR	Alternative dispute resolution
AERIA	Board of the Abidjan
International Airport
Ann. propr. ind.	
Annales de propriété industrielle
art./arts.	article/articles
BBDA	Bureau burkinabè du droit d’auteur[Copyright Bureau of Burkina Faso]
BNDA	Bureau national de droit d’auteur[National Copyright Bureau] (Niger)
BOPI	
Bulletins officiels de la
propriété industrielle
BRDA	
Bulletin rapide droit des affaires
BSDA	Bureau sénégalais du droit d’auteur[Senegalese Copyright Bureau]
BUBEDRA	Bureau béninois du droit d’auteur[Copyright Bureau of Benin]
Bull. civ.	Bulletin civil de la cour de cassation
BURIDA	Bureau ivoirien du droit d’auteur[Copyright Bureau of Côte d’Ivoire]CA	Cour d’appel [Court of Appeal] (France)
Cah. dr. auteur	
Cahiers de droit d’auteurs
Cass. 1ère civ.	Première chambre civile de la courde cassation [First Civil Chamber of
the Court of Cassation] (France)
Cass. 2ème civ.	Deuxième chambre civile de la courde cassation [Second Civil Chamberof the Court of Cassation] (France)
Cass. 3ème civ.	Troisième chambre civile de la courde cassation [Third Civil Chamber of
the Court of Cassation] (France)
Cass. ass. plén.	Assemblée plénière de la cour decassation [Plenary Assembly of the
Court of Cassation] (France)
Cass. com.	Chambre commerciale de la cour decassation [Commercial Chamber of
the Court of Cassation] (France)
Cass. req.	Chambre des requêtes de la cour decassation [Requests Chamber of the
Court of Cassation] (France)

Cass. soc.	Chambre sociale de la cour decassation [Social Chamber of the
Court of Cassation] (France)
CCJA	Common Court of Justice andArbitration (OHADA)
CFAF	Communauté financière africaine franc
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
CMO	collective management organization
COCC	Code des obligations civiles etcommerciales [Code of Civil andCommercial Obligations] (Senegal)
Comm.	Communication
CPI	Code de la propriété intellectuelle[Intellectual Property Code] (France)
D.	Dalloz
EU	European Union
EUIPO	European Union Intellectual
Property OfficeFasc.	Fascicule
Gaz. Pal.	
Gazette du palais
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers
IIC	The International Review ofIntellectual Property andCompetition Law
INPI	Institut national de la propriété
industrielle [National Institute ofIntellectual Property] (France)
JCP E	
Juris-Classeur périodique,édition entreprise
JCP G	
Juris-Classeur périodique,édition généraleJORF	
Journal officiel de laRépublique française
Juriscl.
Jurisclasseur
LGDJ	Librairie générale de droit etde jurisprudence
LPA	
Les petites affiches
OAMPI	Office africain et malgachede propriété industrielle[African and Malagasy Office ofIndustrial Property]
OAPI	Organisation africaine de la
propriété intellectuelle [African
Intellectual Property Organization]
obs.	Observation
OHADA	Organisation pour l’harmonisationen Afrique du droit des affaires[Organization for the Harmonizationof Business Law in Africa]

9

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights
10

OHIM	Office for Harmonization in theInternal Market(Trade Marks and Designs) (EU)PIBD	
Propriété industrielle –Bulletin Documentaire
Propr. intell.
Propriété intellectuelle[Intellectual Property]
PTPI	Président du tribunal de première
instance [President of the Court ofFirst Instance]
PUF	Presses universitaires de France
RAPAC	Rassemblement des artistes
professionnels et amateurs [Societyof Professional and Amateur
Artists] (Cameroon)
RAPI	
Revue africaine de la
propriété intellectuelle
Rev. dr. unif.	
Revue de droit uniforme
RFPI	
Revue francophone de la
propriété intellectuelle
RIDA	
Revue internationale de droit d’auteur
RID comp.	
Revue internationale de droit comparé
RIPIA	
Revue internationale de la propriété
industrielle et artistique
RLDA	
Revue Lamy droit des affaires
RTD civ.	
Revue trimestrielle de droit civile
RTD com.	
Revue trimestrielle dedroit commercial
SACEM	Société des auteurs, compositeurset éditeurs de musique [Society ofAuthors, Composers and Publishersof Music] (France)
SDRM	Société pour l’administration dudroit de reproduction mécaniquedes auteurs, compositeurs,éditeurs, réalisateurs et doubleurssous-titreurs [Society for the
Administration of MechanicalReproduction Rights] (France)
SOCINADA	Société civile nationale des droitsd’auteur [National Civil Society for
Copyright] (Cameroon)
SONITEL	Société nigériennede télécommunication[Telecommunications Companyof Niger]T. civ.	Tribunal civile [Civil Court]
T. com.	Tribunal commercial[Commercial Court]
TGI	Tribunal de grande instance[High Court]

TPI	Tribunal de première instance [Courtof First Instance]
TRIPS	Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights

Introduction to the OAPIThe African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) is
an intergovernmental international organization in thefield of intellectual property (IP). OAPI was establishedon September 13, 1962, under the terms of the Libreville
Agreement, subsequently revised as the Bangui
Agreement. Its headquarters are in Yaoundé, Cameroon,and its 17 member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros,
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal
and Togo.

The Bangui Agreement is the uniform law applicablein all OAPI member states. It is the national IP law ofeach member state. The Bangui Agreement established
a common IP office for the member states: the OAPI
office. Its procedures are centralized: an application
submitted to the OAPI is filed, either directly at its
headquarters, or through the ministry responsible forindustrial property matters in each member state. Suchapplications are deemed to have been filed nationallyin all member states and a single title is issued for eachapplication.

As part of its mission, the Organization:

The titles issued by OAPI are valid in all member states.
There are no national mechanisms to issue IP titles thatcoexist with the regional system of the OAPI. The OAPI
system is consistent with the provisions of the maininternational IP conventions. The collective managementof copyright in the member states is managed by thecollective management organizations. IP disputes aredealt by the courts of each of the member states.

• issues industrial property titles relating to patents,
utility models, trademarks for products and services,
industrial designs, trade names, geographicalindications and plant varieties;• ensures the publication of industrial property titles;• promotes creativity and technology transfer;• encourages the exploitation of inventions andinnovations;• provides IP training;• conducts activities to promote the protection ofliterary and artistic works, and traditional culturalexpressions and knowledge.

Maurice Batanga
Director of Legal Affairs
OAPI

11

Chapter 1 – General theory of intellectual property

A.
Relationship between the African
Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI)
and the domestic courts of its member states– No obligation to refer cases to the OAPIHigh Commission of Appeal before accessing
domestic courts – Jurisdiction of administrativeand judicial bodies – Precedence of
judicial decisions
13
B.
Arbitration in intellectual property matters –No application of OHADA law – Appointmentof the arbitration board – Film broadcasting –Payment of remuneration
16
C.
Legislation establishing the seizure of
infringing works – Questions of OHADA
law – Application of OAPI law (annex VII) –Application of domestic law

20

D.
Nationality – Payment of cautio judicatum solvi
by nationals of OAPI member states in othermember states
23
E.
OHADA Common Court of Justice andArbitration – Intellectual property –Jurisdiction – National Supreme Court

26

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

F.
Infringement seizure – Execution difficulties– Jurisdiction – Judge for disputes over
enforcement – No application of article 49 of
the OHADA Uniform Act Organizing Simplified
Recovery Procedures and Enforcement
Measures – National ordinary law – Judge forurgent applications – Trial judge
28

12Chapter 1
General theory of intellectual
property
A. Relationship between the African
Intellectual Property Organization(OAPI) and the domestic courts of its
member states – No obligation to refercases to the OAPI High Commissionof Appeal before accessing domestic
courts – Jurisdiction of administrativeand judicial bodies – Precedence of
judicial decisions
The jurisdiction of the African Intellectual Property
Organization (OAPI) administrative dispute resolution
bodies has no effect on that of domestic courts in themember states, which have concurrent jurisdiction.
Consequently, recourse to such courts is not subject
to the exhaustion of OAPI internal remedies nor candecisions by the OAPI bodies be referred to domestic
courts, the decisions of which have primacy under the
1977 Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African
Intellectual Property Organization, constituting a
Revision of the Agreement Relating to the Creation ofan African and Malagasy Office of Industrial Property(Bangui Agreement, or AB-1977), as revised in 1999 (ABR1999) and 2015 (ABR-2015).
ARLA FOODS AMBA V. DANA HOLDINGS LTD, Com
judgment No. 7 of January 5, 2012, High Court of
Wouri (Douala)Observations:
A hot potato? That is what comes to mind in exploring
the many interesting legal controversies raised in thislitigation between Arla Foods AMBA and Dana Holdings
Ltd, and mostly sidestepped by the judge.
Facts: The facts are unremarkable for a trademark dispute.
The company Arla Foods had owned the word mark“Dano,” registered in OAPI countries under No. 36147,
since March 24, 1996, for goods in classes 5, 29 and 30.
On November 30, 2004, the company Dana Holdings
registered two related signs: the word mark “Dana,”
No. 50961, for goods in classes 5, 16, 29 and 30; and thefigurative mark “Dana & Device,” No. 50962, for goods inclasses 5, 16, 29 and 30. Arla Foods then filed its opposition
to registration of the two marks in proceedings before
OAPI, which issued two decisions. The first, No. 00090/DG/
SCAJ of June 30, 2007, ordered cancellation of the “Dana”
mark, while the second, No. 00091/DG/SCAJ of the sameday, dismissed Arla’s opposition to the “Dana & Device”
mark. The simplicity of these facts conceals, however, what
later emerged before the High Court of Wouri in Douala(Cameroon), where Arla Foods, dissatisfied with the second
mark being upheld, brought action to invalidate it.

Reasoning: Proceedings before that court sparked some
important debate on theoretical matters that the judge
rather glosses over, sticking only to the essentials in acase comprising no fewer than 24 dockets and using
language likely to mislead readers unfamiliar withOAPI law.1
Among the specific grounds for the decision, theonly question the judge expressly raised – without
explanation – was of which body is competent toinvalidate an OAPI registration. From that perspective,
in affirming its own competence and by extension thatof national courts generally, the High Court rules on
one of the possible causes for judicial invalidation –namely, in this case, the infringement of a prior rightand consequent likelihood of confusion. The question
would be of little interest were it not part of a case thatis otherwise highly instructive, focused largely on therespective roles of national courts and OAPI dispute
resolution bodies, the latter being administrativein character.
That question gives rise to several secondary, yet equally
noteworthy, questions, including:I.

the body competent for opposition, cancellationand invalidity;
II. the point in time when the Director General’s
decisions take effect; andIII. the procedures for appealing the decisions of OAPI
dispute resolution bodies.
I. Jurisdiction over opposition, cancellationand invalidity
A key point of debate in this case concerns jurisdiction tohear disputes on invalidity and cancellation: does it fallto courts in the member states, or does it lie solely withbodies within the OAPI? The question stems from thetwo OAPI decisions – one ordering cancellation of one
mark; the other dismissing opposition to another – andone party’s effort to circumvent the dismissal by seeking
judicial cancellation of a mark implicitly validated when1

For example, the judge spoke of the Director General of the OAPI as “thePresident” of that institution and the Director General’s decisions as the“OAPI judgment.”13

the OAPI dismissed opposition to it.2 Although the facts
are familiar and the solutions fairly predictable, the legal
situation in this case is rather particular, in several ways.
First, neither party had appealed the OAPI Director
General’s decisions to the Organization’s HighCommission, seemingly indicating their acquiescence.
The defendant (Dana Holdings) argued before theHigh Court that the plaintiff (Arla Foods) shouldhave appealed to the OAPI High Commission before
resorting to a domestic court. The plaintiff, in its
arguments before the court, invoked the OAPI Director
General’s own findings.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

It is important to affirm here that appeal to the OAPIHigh Commission cannot be considered a precondition
to domestic court proceedings, given the autonomy ofadministrative and judicial frameworks for industrial
property disputes. Indeed, in a case brought after thisone, the same court had the opportunity to affirm (albeit
implicitly there too) concurrent jurisdiction for OAPI bodies
and domestic courts.3 In that other case, one of the parties
to that dispute, raising an objection of inadmissibility,
argued that opposition to registration of a mark was timebarred. The court clearly affirmed that since different legal
regimes applied to the two actions concerned, the time
limit for opposition under one regime could not apply torecourse under the other. The reasoning in that case clearlyaffirms that an OAPI internal procedure cannot have effecton proceedings in any court.

14

A second characteristic of the present case, reflecting anatural inclination, is that court litigation usually follows
administrative proceedings. In cases of infringement or
unfair competition, a decision by the director generalor high commission of an administrative institution –based, for instance, on infringement of a prior rightand likelihood of confusion – may easily be invoked ina litigant’s favor. Such a scenario did in fact play out fora claim adjudicated by the Lomé Court of Appeal.4 The
respondent in that interesting case counterclaimed
ownership of a mark registered after its own by theappellant, who had claimed in its application an earlier
registration of the mark by an overseas co-contractor.
The appellant successfully invoked a decision inwhich the OAPI Director General had canceled the
respondent’s registration, to seek dismissal of the
respondent’s ownership claim and to defend against the
infringement case.
In another trademark case before the High Court of
Wouri in Douala, in 2007, the judge’s decision left it
2

3
4

The question does not arise in such terms in the latest revision of the Bangui
Agreement (ABR-2015). Indeed, any such opposition must be filed after
the application has been published to prevent registration and possibly
issuance of the title. An administrative cancellation following an OAPI internal
procedure is therefore unnecessary. The OAPI takes action only after amember state’s domestic court has issued a decision. Only a plant variety
denomination may be subject to forfeiture after registration. See art. 30 ofannex X to ABR-2015.
See Société Marine Magistrale SA v. Mr. Kamga Nenkam, Jean Paul, Civil
judgment No. 382 of December 23, 2013, High Court of Wouri (Douala) (obs.
A. Fade, this collection, Chapter 3, section N).
See Nazaire Gnanhoue v. Sola Co., Judgment No. 70/15 of March 4, 2015, Courtof Appeal of Lomé (obs. M. Lamotte, this collection, Chapter 3, section I).

much clearer what effect OAPI decisions have on judicial
litigation.5 On a parallel track before the OAPI Director
General, the plaintiff in that case, alleging infringement
and unfair competition, had opposed registration of the
disputed mark. After the Director General dismissed that
opposition, the judge likewise dismissed the plaintiff’ssuit, reasoning that the Director General had recognizednone of the rights claimed. The obvious question is thus
whether a failure of opposition proceedings before the
OAPI should justify the courts’ automatic rejection of aparallel action for infringement and unfair competition
brought against the author of the disputed registration.6
While courts may look kindly on OAPI decisions, these
two avenues of recourse must clearly retain their
independence, with recourse to the OAPI complying
with article 18 of annex III to ABR-1999, and litigation in
the courts complying with article 24 of the same annex.
While the law gives primacy to judicial decisions pursuant
to article 18 of that agreement’s General Provisions,7
however, the courts can draw inspiration from OAPI
administrative decisions without considering themsufficiently probative of the facts disputed before them.
II. Effective date of the OAPI Director General’s
cancellation decisions
The question raised on this point in the present caseis of particular interest. Dana Holdings argued that“no decision declaring the registration of the mark‘Dana’ invalid has ever been notified to the African
Intellectual Property Organization.” This reasoning begs
the question of precisely when the Director General’s
cancellation decisions take effect: immediately, or only
after submission to and validation by a domestic court?
The question is all the more interesting in that Dana
Holdings premised its argument on a court declaring
the mark’s registration invalid. The question could
also arise if the OAPI were to cancel other kinds ofprotection under ABR-2015 before case law in this area
can be consolidated. One judge has already affirmedthat “[a]rticle 18 of ABR-1999, which gives primacy tothe authority and independence of judicial decisions[...] subjects the OAPI governing bodies to censure by
the civil courts relating to their acts and decisions on
the implementation of instruments for the protectionof industrial property.” 8 Interpreted strictly, thatthe decisions of the OAPI Director General and HighCommission of Appeal are subject to “censure” by the
courts means they can be challenged before them.

5
6

7
8

See Société R.M. & Co. Ltd v. Société C.D.M. (SCDM), Judgment No. 218 of
September 19, 2007, High Court of Wouri (Douala) (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué,
this collection, Chapter 3, section E).
Likewise, an appellate court considered that, in trademark matters, the OAPI
is “the institutional body for trademark supervision and registration” and thatits assessment of the likelihood of confusion could serve as a basis on which
to reject the claims of an appellant who considered such a likelihood to exist:
Independent Tobacco FZCO v. Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd, Judgment No. 536/Civ
of November 6, 2013, Court of Appeal of the Center Region (Yaoundé) (obs.
M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection, Chapter 3, section Q).
Cf. ABR-2015, art. 20.
See SIVOP SA v. Angel Cosmetics SA, Civil judgment No. 187 of March 21, 2013,
Court of First Instance of Yopougon (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection,
Chapter 3, section L).

• The aim of cancellation is to erase the protection
registration provides for a mark, neutralizing its
legal effects.
• Invalidity is conventionally defined as a sanction
against irregularly established legal acts, making
them void.
Another concept frequently applied to industrial
property matters is forfeiture, signifying “the loss of aright, either as a penalty or due to a failure to comply
with the conditions for exercising that right.” 9
It would certainly appear that, in OAPI member states,
domestic courts have sole competence to declareinvalidity. After all, it is generally up to judges to findsubstantive or formal flaws that may have tainted aprocedure conferring an industrial property title. This
could include cases where:• the title does not apply to the object concerned (apatent can protect only an invention, a plant variety
certificate can protect only a plant variety, etc.);• the description submitted does not match theobject covered;• there is no connection between the object protected
and subsequent certificates; 10 and• the object has been excluded from intellectual
property protection.11
These are all circumstances, as mentioned in theAgreement, under which a court could declare invalidity.12
Marks may be invalidated under article 24(2) if they do
not comply with the requirements of articles 2 and 3of annex III to ABR-1999 (and the same articles of ABR2015) – that is, if they are not distinctive, infringe a priorright, are deceptive, or imitate or exploit official signs.
It was precisely because the marks “Dano” and “Dana& Device” might infringe a prior right that this disputearose. A complicating factor, however, is overlap in ABR1999 between the grounds for invalidity and the grounds
for cancellation.13 The same grounds under article 24 for
9
10

11

12
13

See S. Guinchard and T. Debard (eds.) (2017) Lexique des termes juridiques,
25th edn. Paris: Dalloz.
This particular cause of invalidity is established in ABR-1999, art. 39(2) ofannex I and art. 34(2) of annex II. It means that if a certificate has been issued
to take account of changes, improvements or additions to a patent or utility
model, such amendments must actually relate to that invention or utility
model. In the absence of such a relationship, the subsequent title may bedeclared invalid.
For example, in ABR-1999, art. 6 of annex I, art. 2(4) of annex IV and art. 1(2)of annex IV. In ABR-2015, art. 2, the list of express exclusions in respect ofpatents was shortened, thanks to the revision of art. 1, defining the conceptof an invention.
More specifically, failure to comply with a prescribed requirement on painof invalidity and the finding of an invalid provision. See, e.g., ABR-2015,art. 11(4), art. 36(2) of annex I and art. 6(4) of annex IV.
This overlap was corrected in ABR-2015. Cancellation by court order no longer
exists as a separate penalty as it did under ABR-1999, art. 23. Deregistration
should now be a simple operation after the declaration of forfeiture, e.g. on
account of the mark not being used for five years.

judicial review of invalidity (i.e., in a domestic court) can
also be grounds for administrative cancellation, startingwith a decision by the OAPI Director General and may befollowed by appeal to the High Commission.
The dispute is complicated further by the apparent
existence of two types of cancellation, one administrative
and the other judicial. As illustrated by this case,however, the two are easily differentiated.
• Administrative cancellation is declared by the OAPI
Director General and may be confirmed by the HighCommission of Appeal. This occurs after an opposition
has been filed against the registration of a title – a
trademark, in this case. The procedure for opposition– established in article 18 of annex III to ABR-1999 – isan adversarial administrative procedure. Once thedecision has been handed down, the interested party
has three months from receipt of notice to appeal it
before the High Commission.
• Judicial cancellation is regulated under ABR-1999 byarticle 14 of annex VI in matters of geographicalindications and by article 23 of annex III in trademark
matters. The latter article provides for cancellation ofa mark only if has not been used for an uninterrupted
period of five years prior to the request.

Chapter 1 – General theory of intellectual property

To address these points, the concepts of cancellationand invalidity must first be distinguished; they could
otherwise result in the erasure of an industrial property
right that the registration applicant has soughtto establish.

It follows that the two forms of cancellation,
administrative and judicial, are regulated differently.
Nevertheless, debate in the present case seems tohave been colored by the possibility of using the samegrounds to obtain either cancellation or invalidity.
Dana Holdings argued that, “No decision declaring
the registration of the mark ‘Dana’ invalid has everbeen notified to the Organization, as required byarticle 24.” That argument is surprising, since it was
the Organization’s Director General who declared it
invalid. Was this an attempt to persuade the judge
that the Director General’s decision – which was notappealed – should take effect only after issuance of a
judicial decision on an action to invalidate the mark?
The answer would seem to be in the affirmative. By
that logic, cancellations ordered by the OAPI Director
General would require validation by a domestic court andnotification thereof back to OAPI.
The problem needs to be viewed differently. The OAPI
is an autonomous legal entity under international law.
Its decisions are not subject to review by courts in its
member states, and they are thus immediately applicableand final. A title’s validity may still be challenged, but
separately, through the courts.
III. Appeals against OAPI cancellation decisions
Another question raised by the judge’s reasoning
concerns jurisdiction to hear appeals against OAPI
cancellation decisions. Considerable debate centeredin this case on recourse against decisions by the OAPI
Director General, although the judge – much to thisobserver’s disappointment – did not address the issue.
15

As already noted, decisions on cancellation andforfeiture are declared by the Director General. Parties
can appeal those decisions, subject to provisions in thevarious annexes of the Bangui Agreement, to the HighCommission of Appeal. That much is clear. The situationis less clear, however, if a party requesting cancellationof a title but denied it by the Director General attempts
to circumvent that rejection by obtaining invalidation of
the title from a domestic court. It is also unclear whether
recourse to a domestic court is subject to prior recourse
before the Commission.
These questions, as put to the court in this case,represent an astute reading of OAPI law. The Director
General ordered cancellation of the mark “Dana” andrejected Arla Foods’ opposition to the mark “Dana &Device,” effectively validating that mark. Both decisions
could have been brought before the High Commission,
but neither party appealed them. Before the court,
one party claimed that the absence of such an appeal
amounted to acquiescence and considered it a bar tothe proceedings.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Neither the Agreement nor its annexes make recourse
before the High Commission of Appeal a precondition
to recourse to the domestic courts. That silence isunderstandable: the Organization’s decisions areautonomous and binding. The court did not address thematter in this case, but it did affirm its jurisdiction, theabsence of such appeal notwithstanding. This implies
confirmation that no such prior appeal is necessary.

16

In taking its case to a domestic court in an effort tobypass rejection of its opposition, Arla Foods was clearlyseeking a second chance to invalidate a now implicitly
validated trademark. Furthermore, in its arguments
before the court, the company availed itself of findings
set out in the Director General’s decision. Indeed,according to one of its arguments, “it has been firmly
established by unappealable decision that there is aphonetic resemblance between the plaintiff’s ‘Dano’ andthe defendant’s ‘Dana’,” and the mark “Dana & Device”
was therefore to be declared invalid. The argument is
opportunistic but also legally compelling, since no text
prohibits the opposing party from seeking invalidation
by a court of a trademark implicitly consolidated when
opposition to its registration has been rejected – or suchrejection has been upheld – by the High Commission of
Appeal. Is it possible, in such cases, to plead res judicata?
The question of res judicata is apt in relation to this caseand may be equally apt in relation to other areas ofindustrial property, for two reasons. First, the procedure
brought before OAPI internal bodies is cancellation; theprocedure brought before a court is invalidation. The
two procedures have different purposes technically,
but the same cause. Moreover, it is only natural that the
Douala judge granted the invalidation, giving no thought
to OAPI internal procedures, even though these were
hotly debated by the parties. As mentioned, the OAPI
dispute resolution bodies are purely administrative.
That includes the High Commission of Appeal, the roleof which has sometimes been debated.14 It follows thatdecisions rendered by such bodies cannot have the forceof res judicata in a court of law.
Decisions of the OAPI, moreover, can be easily
circumvented. Not only may parties dispense withappeals to the High Commission, but also, even if
they do appeal, parties dissatisfied with the HighCommission’s decision can recommence proceedings
before a domestic court. Furthermore, even in the midstof proceedings before OAPI bodies, nothing prevents aparty with an interest in doing so from taking the otherparty straight to court, circumstances permitting. As
soon as a prior right and likelihood of confusion emerge,
particularly in trademark matters, judicial channels are
fully open. All things considered, it seems that cases may
be referred to the domestic judge before, during or after
a case is brought before the OAPI administrative bodies.
Conversely, once a dispute is brought before a court,
recourse to the OAPI administrative bodies no longer
makes sense, since, under article 18 of ABR-1999, judicial
decisions are binding on the OAPI.15
The lack of available legal means to prevent such easy
circumvention of OAPI decisions is regrettable. The
decisions of the OAPI’s dispute resolution bodies –particularly its High Commission of Appeal – help tostandardize OAPI law in certain areas only independentlyof the courts.
Joseph Fometeu

B. Arbitration in intellectual property
matters – No application of OHADA
law – Appointment of the arbitration
board – Film broadcasting – Paymentof remuneration
The parties to a contract may opt to resolve copyrightdisputes through arbitration. In such cases, the court
judge asked to appoint the arbitral board is bound by
the terms of the arbitration clause. Thereafter, it is thearbitral board’s responsibility to rule on all aspects ofthe dispute submitted to it and to refrain from referring
the dispute back to the judge. Accordingly, an arbitralboard that adjudicates royalty issues but refers othermatters back to the judge rules infra petita.
LINDA-COMMUNICATIONS V. MIC-VIDÉO, Decision
No. 7/GCS.02 of May 17, 2002, Supreme Court of
the Congo
Observations:
In Africa, recourse to alternative dispute resolution(ADR) is uncommon in intellectual property matters.
The decision handed down by the Supreme Court of theCongo on May 17, 2002, is therefore of interest.
14

15

Considering it a judicial body: R.G. Biyo’o (2004) La protection des marquesde produits dans l’espace de l’Organisation africaine de la Propriété
intellectuelle. Doctoral thesis, University of Douala, www.memoireonline.
com.
This rule was taken up as art. 20 in ABR-2015.

Unfortunately, execution of the agreement did not
go as planned. After the cassette supplier, MIC-Vidéo,
submitted a complaint, the parties failed to agree ona method for calculating the royalties. MIC-Vidéo took
its case to the commercial court of Pointe-Noire, wherea three-member arbitral board was constituted andissued a ruling. Linda-Communications contested thevalidity and content of the board’s ruling, disputing
its competence as originating not from the parties’agreement but from a court unilaterally seized by
MIC-Vidéo. Linda-Communications also alleged various
substantive flaws in the board’s decision, including
error of law, distortion of the meaning of a contract andbreach of procedural rules.
Reasoning: The dispute is interesting in several ways,
raising broader questions about arbitration itself interms of the appointment of arbitrators to rule on a
dispute and the role played by arbitral boards.
In this particular case, these questions were addressed inan effort to resolve the factual issue behind the disputeand are specifically related to intellectual property. The
dispute arose, after all, over remuneration claimed for
Canal Ocean’s use of the films; it was settled (which rarely
happens) through an arbitral decision – albeit one thatwas contested. The mere inclusion of an arbitration
clause in a contract licensing intellectual property rights
is noteworthy in itself as an opportunity to confirm thatan intellectual property dispute can be arbitrated under
OAPI law (see section I). In addition, the Congolese
Supreme Court ruling in this case provides some usefulclarification of the basis on which royalties for the use ofprotected rights can be calculated (see section II).
I. The arbitrability of intellectual property disputes
within OAPI
It may seem superfluous to discuss the arbitrability ofintellectual property disputes insofar as the questionof the relationship between arbitration and intellectual
property is a longstanding one. From the standpoint ofcomparative law, the matter seems settled. As Vivant
puts it, with reference to intellectual property, only
“a few islets of non-arbitrability remain in an oceanof arbitrability.” 16 However, these “islets” are not very
numerous, if one refers to the arbitration in matters ofindustrial property (A) and literary and artistic property(B), or if one looks at the applicable law to arbitration of
intellectual property disputes within OAPI (C).
16

M. Vivant (2004) Cherche litige non arbitrable laborieusement. RLDA, 72, 5.

A. Arbitration in matters of industrial property
For example, some observers argue that an arbitrator may
rule on the rights conveyed by an industrial property title
but not on the title itself. Since the title is issued by a publicauthority, the reasoning goes, its validity is a matter ofpublic policy.17 According to other observers, an arbitrator
may rule on both the rights and the title itself – but interms of enforceability between the parties, not theirvalidity toward others. The arbitral award is then “classed
as a non-opposition agreement,” 18 with effect between
the contractual parties only.19 Along the same lines, theParis Court of Appeal, by its decision of February 28, 2008,
admitted that an arbitrator may rule on the validity ofa patent as an incidental question, but stated that thearbitral award has effect between the parties only andlacks the force of res judicata.20 There are two legallydistinct questions here: validity refers to the status of anact upon origination; enforceability, to a title’s effectivenessbetween parties.21 Making everything subject to arbitration
might seem a satisfactory solution, even if some things
then become unenforceable, but it carries significant risks
in practice, including of contradictions between judicial
and arbitral decisions. In other words, “patents effective
inter partes today could be erased tomorrow by a court
decision.” 22 It would therefore be preferable if disputes
over a title’s validity within the OAPI were not to be brought
before the courts.23

Chapter 1 – General theory of intellectual property

Facts: The company Linda-Communications entered into
an exclusive contract with MIC-Vidéo Establishments underwhich MIC-Vidéo provided film cassettes to television
channel Canal Ocean, owned by Linda-Communications,for broadcast to subscribers. In exchange, LindaCommunications undertook to pay remuneration equal
to 50 percent of the gross revenues received from Canal
Ocean subscribers. In addition, a clause in the contract
provides for the submission of any dispute to an arbitralboard jointly selected by the parties.

Another controversial topic is whether disputes overcriminal matters and interim measures specific tointellectual property are subject to arbitration. With regard
to criminal matters, article 4(1) of ABR-2015 seems toprohibit their submission to arbitration. By providing thatdomestic courts have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal
matters relating to the recognition, scope or exploitation of
the rights provided for in the Agreement and its annexes,
article 4(1) – intended, in reality, to lay the foundations
for a supranational jurisdiction for intellectual property,
leaving related criminal matters to the domestic courts– could be interpreted as giving exclusive jurisdiction to
those courts. For disputes over interim measures, andspecifically infringement seizure, most observers consider
it “less obvious, but not impossible” 24 that an arbitralboard might order such a seizure, which might then be
preferably referred to a court before or in parallel with thearbitral procedure.25

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

G. Bonet and C. Jarrosson (1994) L’arbitrabilité des litiges de propriété
industrielle, droit française. In Arbitrage et propriété intellectuelle (Publications
de l’IRPI). Paris: Litec, 66.
J. Tankeu (2018) Le recours aux modes alternatifs de règlement des litiges enmatière de propriété intellectuelle. Paris: L’Harmattan, 228 et seq.
However, concerning the acceptance of the validity of erga omnes in France,
in application of art. L.716-6 CPI, see N. Binctin (2020) Droit de la propriété
intellectuelle, 6th edn. Paris: LGDJ, No. 1633.
CA Paris, February 28, 2008, RTD Comm, 516 (obs. E. Loquin).
A.-C. Chiariny-Daudet (2006) Le règlement judiciaire et arbitral des contentieux
internationaux sur brevets d’invention (Bibliothèque de droit de l’entreprise).
Paris: Litec, Nos. 531 and 699.
A.J. Johnson-Ansah (2015) Le concours de l’arbitrage à la protection de la
propriété industrielle en Afrique francophone subsaharienne. RFPI, 1, 4–18.
Along these lines, see ibid.
Tankeu, n. 18.
For a similar, and unequivocal, argument, see A. Lucas (2008) Arbitrage etpropriété intellectuelle, allocution lors de la conférence annuelle de la Faculté deDroit de l’Université des Émirats Arabes Unis. Presented at Emirates Centre forStrategic Studies and Research.
17

Such doctrinal differences aside, arbitrators in somecountries are allowed by law to rule on a title’s validity
and even on the infringement claim itself. In the UnitedStates, for example, section 294 of the federal Patent
Act in principle allows arbitration for both validity andinfringement claims, even if the arbitral award has legal
effect between the parties only. Belgian law goes further,allowing arbitration for patent disputes and expressly
recognizing the possible legal effect on others.26 In
France as well, arbitration is allowed by provisions in theIntellectual Property Code, including articles L.331-1,
L.521-3-1 and L.615-17, devoted to copyright, designs
and models, respectively, as well as patents. It is done inessentially the same way: after affirming the jurisdictionof civil courts for civil actions and intellectual property
claims, including those alleging unfair competition,
the Code says that nothing “precludes recourse
to arbitration.”

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

B. Arbitration in matters of literary and artistic property
With regard to literary and artistic property in particular,
the possibility of arbitrating economic rights has nevertruly been challenged.27 In the present case, neither thejudge nor either of the parties contested that possibility
in principle. The debate tends instead to center on
criminal matters relating to an infringement, whichshould not be arbitrable.28

18

Moral rights are inarbitrable within the OAPI in principle,29
but not strictly so in practice. It is beyond dispute thatthe effects of infringing a moral right can indeed bearbitrated; they are likely to be economic and thus
pertain to rights that are freely alienable. A moral rightmay itself be alienable (and thus available) in somecircumstances. French case law allows some moral
rights, including inviolability of the work and right of
the author to be identified,30 to be waived under certain
conditions and with the author’s consent. The latter
waiver is admittedly provisional because authors canreclaim their identification as such at any time. Even so,given the acceptance of such waivers – which represent
a monetization, in effect, of the rights concerned31 – thegeneral inalienability of moral rights can no longer
be assumed. This means that an arbitrator “could
legitimately rule, if pursuant to an arbitration clause, on
the validity or invalidity of such waivers.” 32 Finally, there
are proposals to permit the arbitration of moral rights inline with progress toward formalizing such rights.33
26
27
28

29
30
31
32
33

T. Cook (2014) Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as a Tool for Intellectual
Property (IP) Enforcement: Main Document and Executive Summary, www.wipo.
int/meetings/fr/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=263216.
L.Y. Ngombe (2004) Le droit d’auteur en Afrique. Paris: L’Harmattan, No. 265.
For an opposing view, see M. Vivant and J.M. Bruguiere (2009) Droit d’auteur.
Paris: Dalloz, No. 1146. The authors conclude “without reservation” that
infringement disputes are arbitrable. For an overview of the debate,
see M. Rivoire (2018) L’arbitrabilité du droit d’auteur: le cas du droit
française. McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution, 4, 43–64, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3073874.
Although, in some countries, moral rights can be arbitrated when waivable(and thus alienable) by law. See, e.g., Copyright Act of Canada, s. 14(2).
A. Lucas and H.-J. Lucas (2017) Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique, 5thedn. Paris: Litec, Nos. 545 and 614.
F. Siiriainen (2012) Arbitrage, transaction et droit moral de l’auteur (Actes deColloque). Paris: Dalloz, 99–116.
Tankeu, n. 18.
Rivoire, n. 28.

In the current case, however, the arbitrability of rights
under the contract was not addressed. At issue instead
were the arbitral board’s appointment and its violation
thereafter of various substantive and procedural rules.
The board had allegedly ruled infra petita, for instance,
having failed to address some of the questions said
to have been presented. What those questions mightbe, however, is unfortunately not clear from reading
the decision, leaving it uncertain whether the board
considered them inarbitrable.
There have been few arbitral decisions on such points
in any case, so debate about them here might havebeen useful.
C. Applicable law to arbitration of intellectual property
disputes within OAPIOn that subject, it must first be considered thatan arbitration clause was included in a copyright
exploitation contract and that the only matter in
dispute was the royalty owed for exploitation ofa public performance right – a matter perfectly
arbitrable within the OAPI legal framework. The text
applicable to intellectual property within the OAPIat the time the contract was signed was the original
1977 version of the Bangui Agreement then in force.
The law applicable to arbitration consisted of the
Uniform Act on Arbitration Law of the Organization
for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa(Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afrique du droit
des affaires, or OHADA) and certain provisions of thecountry’s Code of Civil, Commercial, Administrative andFinancial Procedure.
The 1977 Bangui Agreement provided no recourse toarbitration, but that does not imply opposition to theidea. It follows that article 9 of the contract between
Linda-Communications and MIC-Vidéo was entirely
legal. Accordingly, the validity of the arbitration clausecontained in that article could not be challenged
in principle nor could application of the clause bechallenged under the OHADA Uniform Act on grounds
that the right at issue was inarbitrable. For contractual
rights to be arbitrable, according to article 2 of the Act,
they must be freely alienable. And the right concerned
here – the author’s economic right, to be exploited under
the contract – was clearly alienable.
Arbitration clauses are even less exposed to invalidation
under article 4(2) of ABR-2015, which provides that: “Anydispute concerning the application of this Agreement
and its annexes may be settled by arbitration or
mediation.” In addition, following the example of theWorld Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the
OAPI has set up an arbitration and mediation center
to settle intellectual property disputes by non-judicial
means. Article 2 of its arbitration rules indicates thefollowing requirements for submitting disputes:“(a) the dispute must relate to intellectual property,
pursuant to an arbitration clause or arbitrationagreement;

What is particular about this last requirement is that it
calls for adherence to article 2 of the OHADA Uniform
Act, as well as due regard for the nuances of intellectual
property law outlined above.
Applying all of these provisions can be a delicate
exercise. In the present case, it meant applying
Congolese domestic law, referred to by the court as “droitcommun,” as well as the OAPI and OHADA provisions.
The combined application of the OAPI and OHADA
provisions was simplified by the fact that the former
did not regulate arbitration at the time.34 Neither had
any conflict arisen between the OAPI provisions anddomestic law. By contrast, the court did have to choose
whether to apply domestic law or the OHADA provisions.
It chose the former, reasoning that the dispute wassubject not to the OHADA Uniform Act but to domestic
law, and so to domestic procedural rules. This reasoning
suggests that applying the provisions of one legal
regime to the substance of a dispute necessarily means
applying that same regime’s formal or procedural rules
as well. If that approach is to be countenanced, it must
be qualified, since the OHADA Uniform Act cannot simply
be ignored in an OAPI country. Indeed, as stated inarticle 1 of the Act, “This Uniform Act shall apply to any
arbitration when the seat of the arbitral tribunal is in oneof the state’s parties.” That provision, establishing thebasic conditions for any type of arbitration and for all
areas of business law, means that the Act’s provisions areapplicable without exception, and particularly in respectof arbitrability. The Act’s universal character is suchthat, even for matters not governed thereby, some of its
provisions will occasionally apply.
II. Calculating royalties for the exploitation ofprotected intellectual property
Royalties for the use of protected intellectual property
are calculated differently for copyright than for industrial
property. Provisions applicable to the latter have left
the remuneration of right holders entirely unregulated,
granting total freedom in the matter. None of theannexes to the Bangui Agreement establish any basis forcalculating such remuneration.35
For copyright, on the other hand, domestic laws have
led the way in providing for proportional remuneration
generally, with provision for lump sums in special cases.
34
35

Even today, there should be no difficulty, since the two types of regulation do
not give rise to any instances of conflict.
It appears well established, however, that licensing agreements generally
combine a lump sum, independent of production volume, with remuneration
proportional to the sales generated or number of goods manufactured underlicense, with the contract enabling a titleholder to check the accuracy of
calculation.

In the Congo, article 45 of Law No. 24/82 of July 7, 1982,
on copyright and related rights, requires that licenses
assure authors of a proportional share in any revenue,of any type, generated through sale or exploitation. The
same principle has now been adopted in annex VII to
ABR-2015. The principle of proportional remunerationis relatively simple: contracts must assure the author a
specific percentage of gross revenue from exploitation.
For both physical and electronic media (i.e., downloaded
copies), the percentage is applied to the unit sale price.
The bottom line is that copyright royalties are calculated
based on revenue accruing to the operator.36
However, the rule is mandatory only for licensing
contracts entered into directly by the author; it is not sofor other types of copyright exploitation or sub-licensing
contract. Rates may be freely negotiated but, if minimal,
this might imply an intention to evade the law.

Chapter 1 – General theory of intellectual property“(b) at least one of the parties must have its domicile orhabitual residence in one of the member states of
the Organization, or failing that, the contract must
be executed in whole or in part in at least one suchmember state;“(c) the intellectual property rights in dispute must be
arbitrable.”

The amount serving as the basis for the remuneration
is determined according to the law. It is “the pricepaid by the public,” usually consisting of revenue
from exploitation.37
The circumstances surrounding the demand for
payment from Linda-Communications raise doubts as
to the applicability of this rule to the contract invoked.
It was clearly not the authors of the exploited films
who contracted to “supply” the cassettes; it was the
distributor, no doubt under contract with the film
producers. So proportional remuneration was not
required nor did the contract convey the right atissue, that of public performance. Lastly, the contract
calculated remuneration based on the gross subscription
revenue earned by the Canal Ocean network and it isprecisely that basis that led to the dispute. While theproportionality rule was not applicable to the case, forthe reasons noted, the Supreme Court’s decision offers
an opportunity to distill some useful clarifications. It
is important first that the basis for calculation would
have preferably, from the perspective of MIC-Vidéo,
included revenue generated by all of the channels
managed by Linda-Communications. According to
Linda-Communications, the basis specified in article 9of the contract consists of revenue generated only by
the channel broadcasting the films. The question, inshort, is whether the contracting party’s entire businessactivity or only that relating to exploitation of the work
concerned should serve as the basis for proportional
remuneration. The question may seem trivial at firstglance, but sometimes copyright exploitation contracts
do base calculations of proportional remuneration on alicensee’s total sales – an approach justified only when
the licensee’s activity consists essentially or exclusivelyof exploiting protected works.38 Problems specific tothis particular sector, moreover, have been the focus of

36
37
38

J. Fometeu (2018) Droit d’auteur et droits voisins, Questions/réponses. Paris:
L’Harmattan, 22 et seq.
J.P. Clavier and C. Bernault (2015) Dictionnaire de la propriété intellectuelle, 2ndedn. Paris: Ellipses, 440 and 441.
Fometeu, n. 36, at 106–107.
19

abundant legal commentary.39 None of this, however,justifies including all of a debtor’s business activities as
the basis for calculation.
Two points require clarification here. First, remuneration
can be proportional only to the revenue generated by
exploiting one or more specific works covered by thecontract. Expanding the basis to include the debtor’sother activities inevitably means broadening thecontractual scope beyond that intended by the parties.
Worse still, such expansion in this case would encroachon other contracts and hence on the remuneration
calculated for other right holders for works exploited on
the debtor company’s other channels.
Second, remuneration should be determined only
after certain deductions have been made – specifically,taxes. In that vein, French case law bases proportional
remuneration on the retail price, net of tax,40 which
operators must pay. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court applies the law in that regard faultlessly. On
the other hand, however, in a preambular paragraph
the Court questionably prescribes that the arbitralboard should have deducted “corporate accounting
costs.” Had article 9 of the contract included sucha deduction, then it logically should have beenbinding, the contract not being between an author
and a licensee. Had it been such a contract, however,a clause of that kind would have been invalid. The
above-mentioned Law No. 24/82 on copyright andrelated rights refers to “revenue of any nature fromsale or exploitation,” meaning here the company’s
gross revenue from exploitation. Deducting corporate
accounting costs would indeed lower the basis forremuneration, so if the contract is silent on thatpoint, it means that the parties envisaged compulsory
deductions only, including taxes, and that theCongolese judge exceeded the parties’ intent.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Joseph Fometeu

20

C. Legislation establishing the seizureof infringing works – Questions of
OHADA law – Application of OAPI law(annex VII) – Application of domesticlaw
The choice of legislation on which to base the seizure of
infringing goods is a function of the intellectual property
protected. Consequently, a seizure relating to worksof the mind can be based on neither annex III to ABR,
concerning trademarks, nor on OHADA law, but rather
on annex VII, concerning literary and artistic property, as
well as relevant domestic law.

39

40

See, e.g., C. Monnerie (2009) Point de vue sur la rémunération des auteurs decinema. Comm. com. electr., alert. 1; C. Bernault (2014) Contrat de distribution
des œuvres audiovisuelles, contrat de distribution video. Juris-Classeur
Contrats-Distribution, Fasc. 3510.
Cass. 1ère civ., July 16, 1998.

SOCIÉTÉ EUROPRESS – EDITORES E DISTRIBUIDORES
DE PUBLICAÇOES LDA V. COMPAGNIE BEAUCHEMININTERNATIONAL INC., Interim order No. 124 of July 20,
2004, Regional Court of Niamey
Observations:
The case brought before the judge for urgent
applications in Niamey is a mine of intellectual property
law, studded with questions regarding both practice andgeneral theory.
Facts: The facts of the case foreshadow the legal
difficulties to be encountered. Following an internationalcall for tenders, the company Europress was successfully
selected to supply primary and secondary school
textbooks, including some from the GRIA-Côte d’Ivoire
collection for the 8th and 9th grades. The books weredelivered to good effect for distribution by Daouda
Establishments, but some texts in the collection
proved to be substitutes from another, similarly named
collection, GRIA-Niger. Subsequently, a Canadiancompany, Beauchemin International Inc., claiming to be
the right holder and a victim of infringement, executeda sequestration of tangible personal property (thesubstitute books) and of credits in the hands of Education
Project 1, sponsored by the African Development
Fund (I.FAD), the Ministry of Basic Education, and theMinistry of Economic Affairs and Finance, amounting
to CFAF 27,939,871 in principal and CFAF 1 million fordamages. Europress resorted to the judge for urgent
applications, seeking cancellation of the sequestrations.
During the proceedings, the Niger Copyright Office filed a
voluntary intervention.
Reasoning: Europress invoked various arguments insupport of its petition, including the contention that
Beauchemin had not provided proof of ownershipof rights to the attached works, in an effort to seek
denial of the company’s standing and right to attach. It
requested in addition that the voluntary intervention
by the Niger Copyright Office be declared inadmissibleon the grounds that it had not produced documents
establishing any agreement with the collective
management organization (CMO) to which Beauchemin
supposedly belonged.
To counter that argument, Beauchemin raised objection
to the jurisdiction of the judge for urgent applications on
the grounds that the matter had already been referred tothe trial judge and, most importantly, that the applicableannex to ABR-1999 (then in force) was not annex III but
annex VII. That last argument, in particular, along with afew others, are what makes this decision so interesting,giving the judge the opportunity to:I.

explore the ramifications of a local CMO’s standing
to defend the repertoire of a foreign CMO;
II. determine the applicability in intellectual property
matters of the OHADA Uniform Act Organizing
Simplified Recovery Procedures and Enforcement
Measures; andIII. assess how annex VII of ABR-1999 fits in withdomestic laws on copyright and related rights.

The Regional Court of Niamey responded clearly to thisfirst question: where no agreement exists between
them, a national CMO cannot defend a foreign CMO’s
repertoire. The answer harks back to a long-standing
debate over whether CMOs can bring proceedings onbehalf of rights holders who are not their members.
French case law says they cannot.41 And, apparently,
even if they are members, their infringed works mustalso be included in the plaintiff CMO’s repertoire.42
In that sense, while the court’s position is perfectly
justified and legally robust, the solution may proveinconvenient.43 The question is whether the situationsof national and foreign right holders need to bedifferentiated. If, on the one hand, a national right holder
were to fail or deliberately choose not to join a national
CMO, or to include some of its works in the CMO’s
repertoire, it would be inappropriate for a third party –whether a CMO or not – to intervene in the managementof those rights. Foreign right holders, on the other
hand, cannot be faulted for being unable to join national
CMOs in the countries where they need protection – or,if they are able to join, for their CMOs not being party
to a reciprocal representation agreement. In addition,in pursuit of wide applicability, positive law “disregards
the simple fact that many authors cannot join a CMO
because none exists in their countries of residence.”
44
Since it would not be fair to leave such authors
vulnerable to infringement of their works, the question
then becomes whether national agencies might begiven authority to address the problem from a business
management standpoint.45
II. The applicability in intellectual property matters of
the OHADA Uniform Act
Is sequestration permitted under the referenced OHADA
Uniform Act in the specific case of intellectual property?
That was the second point of law submitted to thecourt in its capacity as judge for urgent applications.
In principle, the answer should vary depending on
the situation.
Suppose, first, that an object of intellectual property canbe distrained to cover a debt owed by the object’s rightholder. Attachment for that purpose is unquestionably
possible, even if the regime for such attachments
remains imprecise.46 Consider, second, whether
intellectual property can be sequestered under the Act. It
clearly can, if done for the purpose of a forced sale, such
41
42
43
44
45
46

See, e.g., Cass. 1ère civ., February 19, 2013, D. 2013, 67 (note P. Allayes).
See Vivant and Bruguiere, n. 28, No. 1141; CA Paris, July 10, 1990, RIDA
1990/91, 31.
A. Lucas, A. Lucas-Schloetter and C. Bernault (2017) Traité de la propriété
littéraire et artistique, 5th edn. Paris: LexisNexis, No. 1197.
U. Uchtenhagen (2005) La gestion collective dans la vie musicale. Geneva: WIPO,
No. 275.
Along similar lines, see ibid., No. 276 et seq.
For an example of trademark seizure, see Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd SA v. Société
Adil Co. and El Hadj SS, Judgment No. 118 of May 20, 2008, High Court ofNiamey (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection, Chapter 3, section S).

as if the creditor sequesters intellectual property rights
with a view to later conversion. Such sequestrations
are above reproach. But in cases of infringement,
sequestration as defined in the Act is more complicated.
In this case, Beauchemin did sequester intellectual
property, but not for the purposes of debt recovery;
rather, its purpose was to preconstitute evidence of
the infringement for proceedings already initiated.
The court’s reasoning on this point is unfortunate anddifficult to follow. While the sequestration was carriedout under the Act, the court invokes domestic law andannex VII to ABR-1999 to dismiss the petition for its
cancellation. There are admittedly seizure mechanisms
other than the seizure of physical media that can beused to preconstitute evidence of infringement, but
sequestering tangible personal property hardly falls
in that category. The court should have cancelled thesequestration of physical media and sent Beaucheminback to carry out the appropriate form of seizure.

Chapter 1 – General theory of intellectual property

I. The standing of a national CMO to defend aforeign repertoire

That still leaves the sequestration of credits in thehands of the I.FAD project. The question is interesting
because the sums placed under judicial control could
be used for debt payment if the seizure carried out
could be converted to one of attachment and award.
Unfortunately, the facts cited as legal grounds in the
court’s decision are erroneous.
It appears from the decision that the presumption
in attaching those sums was that they consisted of“revenues,” as regulated by copyright legislation. Given
the nature of the project that was holding them when
seized and the institutions behind it, that could never be
the case. They were not, in fact, revenues, but credits on
the I.FAD project’s books in favor of Europress. Nor did
the seizure meet the conditions required of attachment
for debt recovery. Broadly speaking, protective measures
for any debt can be authorized only if the underlying
claim appears to be founded and the creditor can show
proof of circumstances likely to jeopardize recovery.47 In
the particular case of counterfeiting, if sequestration issought before a trial can begin, the seizure applicant will
not be in a position to show that its claim as creditor isfounded. That requires a trial court conviction recognizing
the criminal nature of the distrainee’s acts. So, unlike
other creditors – required to establish only the likelihoodof their claim and threat to its recovery, with adjudicationof the claim’s merit coming later – a person seeking tosequester intellectual property before going to court
must establish both the likelihood that it owns the rightin question and that the right has been infringed – withthe merits of both claims also being adjudicated later. The
difference between what is required in each case calls
for the application of different statutory provisions: acreditor must ordinarily proceed based on the provisions
governing enforcement measures generally, but holders
of intellectual property rights must follow the provisions
governing intellectual property. That nuance escapes theNiamey judge for urgent applications when approving thesequestration by Beauchemin.
47

See OHADA Uniform Act Organizing Simplified Recovery Procedures andEnforcement Measures, art. 54.
21

III. Annex VII to ABR-1999 vs. national copyright laws
The current case provides a perfect illustration of the
difficulties in interpreting how annex VII to the Bangui
Agreement correlates with domestic laws. The debate
surrounding the versions of the Agreement prior to2015 centered on the nature of the rights created bythat annex, the advancement of which compares so
unfavorably with that of rights established under theother annexes to the Agreement. While the others havebeen easy to apply in member states, meeting no legal
barriers in the provisions of domestic law, an unlikely
path has had to be forged for annex VII to survive andjustify its existence as part of OAPI law.
The situation at the time was rather puzzling. While
there were no theoretical distinctions between the
different annexes, the reality was that domestic laws on
copyright and related rights were in place in almost all
OAPI countries. How, then, does annex VII connect withdomestic laws? That is a question the court implicitly
answered without the parties actually asking it. Somebackground on how the Agreement evolved over time
may cast helpful light on the issue: annex VII was placedat something of a disadvantage in early versions of the
Bangui Agreement (A) compared with ABR-2015 (B).
A. The status of annex VII prior to ABR-2015
The status of annex VII in previous versions of the
Bangui Agreement was ambiguous in theory and difficult
to apply in practice.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

It was ambiguous in theory in that article 3(1) of ABR1999 stipulated the following: “Rights relating to thefields of intellectual property, as provided for in theannexes to this Agreement, shall be independent
national rights subject to the legislation of each of themember states in which they have effect.” 48 How wasthat provision to be understood in an international
convention? Several interpretations were possible.

22

According to the first, it meant that the regional text
constituted national law in all member states but could
be supplemented in each country. By systematicallyadopting their own copyright laws, however, member
states clearly demonstrated the desire for the annex
to coexist alongside their own domestic legislation.
Annex VII was thus serving as a general framework only.49
This first interpretation does not take us far, since theterm “general framework” is imprecise.
According to a second interpretation, the rights provided
for in the Agreement and its annexes were to be subject
to national law only for the purpose of implementation,
which amounted to incorporating the rights underannex VII and the other annexes into domestic law. Thatreading was self-defeating: if adopted, it would apply
to all of the annexes, so neither the Agreement nor its

48
49

See also AB-1977, art. 2(1).
Y.-L. Ngombe (2005) Le droit d’auteur dans les États membres del’organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuelle (OAPI): une
harmonisation inachevée? e.Bulletin du droit d’auteur, January–March.

annexes would be directly applicable in the member
states, which was far from the legal reality.
Accordingly, a third interpretation of the provision wasthat the rights enshrined in the Bangui Agreement andits annexes constituted national law, exactly as if enacted
by a domestic legislative body. This last interpretation
appears to capture the reality of how national laws in
OAPI member states relate to annex VII of the Bangui
Agreement. Indeed, all indications are that OAPI
provisions are seen as being integrated into national law
and subject to domestic provisions, suggesting that OAPI
law is in no way supranational.
The application of annex VII was complicated by its
status. All of the interpretations draw distinctions
between the various annexes,50 largely as attempts tojustify, a posteriori, a legally awkward situation for aregionally integrated group of countries. Every time acountry legislated on copyright and related rights, it wasmore or less emancipating itself from the corresponding
part of the Bangui Agreement. In countries that had
already legislated in this area, provisions in the annex
could at best be used to fill gaps in domestic law.
The confused status of annex VII has led to confusedcase law. Under the pre-2015 versions of the Agreement,
three distinct scenarios have tended to play out indomestic courts within the OAPI. One is for the judge toapply domestic law only, without reference to annex VII
or invocation thereof by the parties.51 That has happenedin most cases. Another is application of annex VII only,
essentially papering over domestic law. In a case in
Cameroon, for instance, the only legislation applied tocopyright issues (lack of formalities, originality of thework, title of the work, etc.) was annex VII, althoughannex III was also applicable.52 A last is where the judge
applies both domestic law and annex VII, which can bedone in two ways.
• The judge may cite the regional text, but then apply
the national law. A judge in Cameroon did just thatafter citing both the Bangui Agreement (AB-1977
at the time) and Cameroon’s Law No. 2000/11 ofDecember 19, 2000, affirming that “only natural or
legal persons exploiting protected literary or artistic
works without the authorization of their authors are
required to pay royalties.” 53• The judge may apply annex VII and domestic law
as if they are simultaneously applicable. That is theapproach taken by the judge for urgent applications in
the present case.

50
51

52
53

Such distinctions ran contrary to ABR-1999, art. 4(2) and (3).
See, e.g., Groupement Edition Pierron International v. Etablissement Niger –Bureau, Judgment No. 80 of March 3, 2004, Regional Court of Niamey. In
P. Edou Edou (ed.) (2009) Le contentieux de la propriété intellectuelle dans les
États membres de l’OAPI: Guide du magistrat et des auxiliaires. Geneva: WIPO,
103; Christine ROSSANO v. Société SOVING AB, Judgment (undated), Tribunal of
Libreville. In ibid., 116.
Moulinex SA v. Vapsan Trading Cie and ors, Civil judgment No. 192 ofDecember 15, 2000, High Court of Wouri (Douala). In ibid., 169.
Société SEMEN distributors SARL v. Société civile du droit d’auteur et des droits
voisins des arts audiovisuels et photographiques (SCAAP), Interim order No. 186
of March 7, 2007, Court of First Instance of Bonanjo (Douala). In ibid., 116.

B. The status of annex VII under ABR-2015
ABR-2015 clarifies the status of annex VII but leaves open
issues likely to affect its application. Article 5(1) and (2)in the revised version contain most of the new details tobe heeded.
Article 5(1) sets the stage by reproducing article 3 of ABR1999. Article 5(2) then introduces the changes that aim
to scrap the various interpretations of previous versionsof the Agreement, as follows: “This Agreement and its
annexes shall serve as laws governing their intended
subject matter in the Member States, where they shallrescind or prevent the entry into force of all contrary
provisions. Annex VII relating to literary and artistic
property is a minimum statutory framework.”
Two sets of solutions are thus provided. The first relates
to what could be termed the general status of theAgreement and its annexes relative to domestic law.
The new version clarifies that OAPI law is domestic law,forming part of each state’s domestic legal system andserving to govern the subject matter covered. It alsoborrows from OHADA in rescinding or preventing theentry into force of contrary provisions should domestic
legislative bodies attempt to adopt them. It could not
be clearer. Inspired by article 10 of the OHADA Treaty on
the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, the newwording ends all speculation about the relative status ofregional vs. domestic legal provisions. The supranational
effect of OAPI law is no longer in doubt.
The second set of solutions relates to the special statusof annex VII. According to the text, it represents “aminimum statutory framework.” The effect of thatsolution, while sophisticated, is simply to make annex VII
a minimum standard, or benchmark, for states that
prefer to have their own domestic legislation in thearea concerned, literary and artistic property, rather
than to apply the annex directly. This approach would
rank the annex alongside other binding international
conventions in this area. The annex naturally draws
from such plentiful sources, incorporating the latest
international legal standards and allowing for new ones
to be integrated over time, thus raising the minimum
standards observed in OAPI countries. In other words,
as the annex is updated to meet international minimum
standards, and to raise them where necessary, domestic
laws are likewise updated to meet the new OAPI
minimum standards, with ABR-2015 representing the
new floor for OAPI member states.
Some difficulties remain, however. The first, both
political and material, is that several OAPI member
states have quite recently amended their domestic
laws (e.g., Côte d’Ivoire in 2016, Mali in 2017 and Guinea
in 2019) and will doubtless be reluctant to implementchange. That may not be enough to revive nationalistic
undercurrents, but it could delay implementation of
the annex.
The second lies in defining the “minimum statutory
framework,” the substance of which could be open
to discussion.
Those difficulties notwithstanding, the situation isby far preferable to that under earlier versions of theAgreement. The new article 5(2) in fine is clearly aimed
at national legislators in the member states, who mustheed it when drafting or updating domestic law. If they
do nothing, application of the new text falls directly tojudges. Consequently, where a state is slow to update
its legislation, litigants can rely on the Agreement toguide judges where domestic law might remain silent
on matters regulated by the OAPI or below its minimum
standards. On the basis of article 5(2), the judge can thenset domestic law aside and apply annex VII.

Chapter 1 – General theory of intellectual property

It must be said, however, that the judge is dealt a
relatively easy hand, because both texts provide forthe same solution. What would a judge decide if thesolutions offered were different? Unfortunately, no one
can say. The 2015 revision of the Agreement, however,does shed some light on the issue.

And that offers hope that judges will respond favorably
and decisively to informed litigants seeking to avail
themselves of the broadened Agreement and the fresh
impetus being given to OAPI law.
Joseph Fometeu

D. Nationality – Payment of cautio
judicatum solvi by nationals of OAPI
member states in other member
states
While the Bangui Agreement establishes regional
protection for intellectual property titles issued by the
OAPI on a community basis within a territory spanning
17 states, nationals of those states are still required to
pay a cautio judicatum solvi when bringing actions before
the courts of other member states.
MAMADOU S. DIALLO ESTABLISHMENTS V. IBRAHIMAKEITA AND WALY FAYE, Decision No. 73 of September 19,
2018, Supreme Court of Senegal
Observations:
The enforcement of a court ruling against a foreign
plaintiff is often problematic. A foreign plaintiff withno ties to the host country can bring vexatious claims
against nationals without fearing conviction as aconsequence. A cautio judicatum solvi 54 deposit is apalliative measure aimed at protecting nationals against
reckless claims made by foreign plaintiffs. Introduced
by article 16 of the Napoleonic Civil Code, this protective
mechanism was later incorporated into the codes of civil
procedure of the Bangui Agreement signatory countries.55
However, requiring a cautio judicatum solvi deposit inmatters of industrial property raises a number of issues
54
55

A sum that any foreign plaintiff in a lawsuit is required to pay and which isintended to guarantee the recovery of damages and interest, as well as any
costs that may be ordered against them.
See, eg., arts. 110, 73, 4 and 123 of the Civil Procedure Codes of Senegal,
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, respectively.
23

related to the unique character of the OAPI space,conceived of as a single territory.
Facts: The facts behind this case are simple. Mamadou
Samba Diallo Establishments (Diallo), in execution ofOrder No. 26, of July 19, 2016, by the High Court of
Kaolack, carried out an infringement seizure of 134 balesof motorcycle tires, valued at CFAF 15 million, against
Mr. Ibrahima Keita, while also bringing action against
him before the same High Court to establish his actsof counterfeiting, obtain approval of the seizure andseek compensation amounting to CFAF 50 million. In aninterlocutory decision of March 16, 2017, the High Court
ordered the plaintiff to make a cautio judicatum solvi
deposit in the amount of CFAF 15 million – a decision
upheld by the Court of Appeal of Dakar. Diallo thenappealed to the Supreme Court to quash the prior ruling,
alleging violation of annex III to AB-1977 and arguingthat the cautio judicatum solvi deposit provided for inarticle 110 of the Senegalese Code of Civil Procedure was
not required for the national of a state party, since the
OAPI’s 17 member states constituted a single protective
regional territory.
Reasoning: The legal question put to the Senegalese
Supreme Court was whether a plaintiff who is a nationalof an OAPI member state is exempt, by virtue of
belonging to that region, from a cautio judicatum solvi
deposit requirement under the national code of civil
procedure of the country where the plaintiff’s action is
being brought. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal,
concurring with the appeal court on the main groundcited: that the Bangui Agreement “does not codify theconditions of access to the domestic courts of eachstate party.”
The decision is noteworthy because it:
I.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

II.

24

clarifies the content and scope of the single-territory
concept within a uniform system for the protectionof intellectual property; andhighlights the decisive effect of national legislationon the procedure for enforcing intellectual
property rights.

I. The content and scope of the single-territory
concept within the OAPIThe first part of Diallo’s single plea in appealing to theSupreme Court relates precisely to the unity of OAPI
territory as grounds for exemption from the cautio
judicatum solvi deposit requirement. This is clearly notrivial argument. It weaponizes as litigation, in effect, theoriginal intent of the plenipotentiaries of OAPI member
states. It was they, in pursuit of greater cooperation,
who established region-wide protection for industrial
property, thus forming a single territory for both therecognition and exercise of rights.56 It is precisely for that

56

S. Ngo Mbem (2007) Les enjeux de la protection des dessins et modèles
industriels dans le développement en Afrique: le cas des pays membres del’Organisation Africaine de la Propriété intellectuelle (OAPI). Doctoral thesis,
University of Strasbourg III–Robert Schuman, 38 et seq.

reason that plaintiffs need not file patent applications,for instance, in every OAPI member state. As provided
for in article 7(1) of ABR-1999, “any filing effected withthe administration of one of the member states inaccordance with the provisions of this Agreement, orwith the Organization, shall be equivalent to a national
filing in each member state.” Furthermore, the titles
issued by the OAPI, as the common industrial property
office for all 17 member states, are effective in all thosestates. In terms of the exercise of rights, the right toexploit industrial property in one member state isrecognized as a right to do so in all the others, although
the principle is expressed differently depending on thespecific right in question.57 Regulations relating to therecognition and exercise of rights are approached in
the same way, whether one adopts a restrictive (A) or
expansive (B) approach to the single-territory concept.
A. Restrictive interpretation of the single-territory concept
The appellants to the Supreme Court invoked the unityof the OAPI territory in seeking to avoid the cautio
judicatum solvi deposit required under the Senegalese
Code of Civil Procedure. In their view, they should havebeen treated as nationals by virtue of the integrationachieved through OAPI law, since the dispute related
to intellectual property. Following that interpretation,
the term “foreigner,” as used in both the national
codes of civil procedure and the annexes to the Bangui
Agreement, takes on a very singular meaning. Strictly
speaking, since the founding fathers of the OAPI saw noneed to define “foreigner,” the term can be assumed toretain its commonplace meaning when applied to the
OAPI community. It follows from that reasoning that any
plaintiff not a national of the OAPI member state where
the case is being brought must be considered a foreigner
within the meaning of the Bangui Agreement and must
therefore make the deposit. That argument finds support
in article 3 of ABR-1999, which characterizes the rights
covered in the annexes as national rights, signifying thatdomestic judges in OAPI countries are to apply them as
if emanating from a domestic legislative body.58 Thatsuggests that the lines between state jurisdictions havenot been erased by integration, such that the nationalof one member state who takes legal action in anothercannot be exempted from the cautio judicatum solvi
requirement. The argument is also supported by the lackof any textual evidence that the OAPI intended to create
its own common citizenship.
B. Expansive interpretation of the single-territory concept
The narrow interpretation builds its reasoning on an
incomplete foundation and has not been corroborated
by the evolution of OAPI law. Article 5(3) of ABR-2015
provides, “Non-nationals shall enjoy the provisionsof this Agreement and its annexes under the same
conditions as nationals.” That terse wording, which
57

58

In the case of trademarks, for example, art. 23(1) of annex III provides for thecancellation of any registered mark that, for an uninterrupted period of five
years, has not been used within the national territory of one of the member
states; in the case of patents, art. 46 of annex I provides for the grant of anon-voluntary license if the patented invention “is not being worked on the
territory of a member state.”
See L.Y. Ngombe (2004) Le droit d’auteur en Afrique. Paris: L’Harmattan, 128.

The national treatment rule is relevant here because of
the confusion created in case law whenever nationality
is invoked in intellectual property cases. It seems to be
automatically assumed that national treatment means
perfectly equating a non-national with a national. The
High Court of Wouri in Douala60 fell into that trap witha questionable decision in a case similar to this one. To
escape payment of the security deposit in that case,a company incorporated under American law sought
the application in its favor of article 2, on national
treatment, of the Paris Convention for the Protectionof Industrial Property of March 20, 1883. By validating
the American company’s argument under article 2 of
the Convention, the Cameroonian High Court violated
the letter of that provision, paragraph 3 of which allows
a notable exception that was clearly overlooked: “Theprovisions of the laws of each of the countries of theUnion relating to judicial and administrative procedure,
to jurisdiction, and to the designation of an addressfor service or the appointment of an agent, which may
be required by the laws on industrial property are
expressly reserved.” It is clear that, under the Paris
Convention, the principle of national treatment simply
allows a “foreigner” to enjoy, in every state that hassigned the same Convention as their own country,
the individual rights conferred by such states on theirown nationals. The Paris Convention relates only tointellectual property rights, as opposed to other rights,
granted to nationals by national law. It therefore leaves
intact specific judicial and administrative procedures
under domestic legislation in member states, including
the cautio judicatum solvi deposit requirement. Anyother reasoning would exceed the legal protection
provided by the international conventions establishing
this principle.
On balance, it can safely be said that the uniform
system for the protection of intellectual property underthe Bangui Agreement is in no way intended to replacenational legislation on judicial procedure. So, from thatstandpoint, the judgment reported here is laudable. The
only way in which Diallo might have salvaged its case wasto invoke (which it did not) either (a) a judicial cooperationagreement between Senegal and Guinea exempting
their respective citizens from the cautio judicatum
59

60

Bearing in mind that this was reinforced by the 2015 revision, in that
art. 5 (reproducing and reorganizing the former art. 3) clearly reinforces
the superiority of OAPI law over national law, making it indisputably
supranational.
Civil judgment No. 164 of December 6, 2004, High Court of Wouri (Douala)(obs. H. Ndedi Penda, La Gazelle 2008, 2, 19).

solvi requirement,61 or (b) its possession in Senegal of
immovable property sufficiently valuable to ensure suchpayment (see article 16 of the Civil Code of 1804).
II. Difference between a cautio judicatum solvi
deposit and the security deposits required under the
Bangui Agreement
The requirement of a cautio judicatum solvi deposit inintellectual property proceedings may cause confusion
over provisions in the Bangui Agreement that (a) allow
a court to require security deposits from seizure
applicants, but (b) effectively oblige it to do so when theapplicant is foreign.62
Confusion over this distinction is even more likely since
the purpose of both types of deposit is nearly identical:
to ensure the payment of damages and costs that might
be ordered. A fine line remains between them, however,in certain respects.

Chapter 1 – General theory of intellectual property

might have come from a national legislator, isunambiguous: the Agreement and its annexes areintended to automatically benefit the nationals of
all member states, so the term “foreigner” can refer
only to the national of a non-member state. But that
explanation merely lays the groundwork for further
argument. The reasoning must be based not only on
the nature of the rights enshrined in the Agreement59
or the Agreement’s effect on nationality, but also
on the concept of national treatment underpinning
the Agreement.

• With regard to their scope of application, the cautio
judicatum solvi requirement never applies to nationals,
while the security concerns over seizures relate tonationals and foreigners alike.
• Further, requiring security for seizures is sometimes
optional, sometimes mandatory, while requiring thecautio judicatum solvi is always mandatory for foreign
plaintiffs who (a) do not own sufficient immovable
property to ensure payment and (b) are not nationalsof states bound by judicial cooperation agreementswith the host country exempting them from thedeposit requirement.
• Finally, with regard to procedural provisions,security deposits are generally ordered in cases of
seizure unilaterally and ex officio, while the cautio
judicatum solvi deposit is a procedural exceptionthat must be raised by the opposing party inadversarial proceedings.63
In short, the security requirements in the two cases
remain distinct – but can they be combined in thesame proceedings?
Consider the following scenario. A foreign plaintiff
applies to a judge for an infringement seizure. The
judge orders a security deposit in accordance with theapplicable annex. The foreign plaintiff then institutes
court proceedings on the merits, as required by law.
Before the trial court, the defendant, a national of thehost country, raises an exception to the cautio judicatum
solvi requirement. Should the court consider the security
deposit ordered when the seizure was authorized to
61
62

63

On the subject of such an agreement, see Air Afrique, Revue camerounaise dudroit des affaires (No. 2), July 16, 1999, Court of Appeal of Littoral (Douala), at
81.
For example, art. 64(4) of annex I, relating to patents, provides that “[s]ecurity shall always be required of foreigners seeking seizure.” That provision
is taken up by almost all the provisions of the annexes relating to industrial
property subject matter that provide for infringement seizure. See ABR-1999,
art. 64(3) and (4) of annex I, art. 48(3) of annex III and art. 31(3) of annex IV.
Moreover, a litigant who has not raised such an exception in good time isirrevocably presumed to have waived it: Ohadata J-07-27, Decision No. 13 ofJune 29, 2006, CCJA, First Chamber.
25

be equivalent to a cautio judicatum solvi deposit? Thequestion is open to debate.

PLAST-KIM V. OCI-PLAST, Decision No. 5/2007 of
February 1, 2007, OHADA CCJA

Before attempting an answer, consider another scenario– one that would raise no difficulties. The trial judge,
unbound by the interim measures, decides to cancel thedeposit requirement imposed upon seizure and to order
the appropriate cautio judicatum solvi deposit. To returnto the question, it could be argued that since the two
types of deposit share the same purpose, the deposit
ordered at the time of seizure suffices, with no need
to “pile deposit upon deposit.” In addition, combining
the deposit orders would dissuade foreigners frombringing actions, contrary to the Agreement as last
revised (ABR-2015). Article 65(3) of that text requires thejudge considering the seizure application, whatever the
distrainee’s nationality, to determine that the deposit
is “adequate without deterring applicants from availingthemselves of the procedure.”

Observations:
In this decision, the OHADA CCJA unequivocally declined
jurisdiction for cases that raise intellectual property
questions. And yet the issue has led to controversy
among practitioners of intellectual property law – andsometimes contradictory decisions by courts of thesame state. By way of illustration, the president of the
Court of First Instance of the Centre Region (Yaoundé),ruling as an enforcement judge, affirmed its jurisdiction
for a case concerning the withdrawal of an order for
infringement seizure of a literary and artistic work,
issued under articles 336 and 337 of the OHADA Uniform
Act Organizing Simplified Recovery Procedures andEnforcement Measures.64 By contrast, the presidentof the Court of First Instance of Ekounou in Yaoundé,
faced with a similar case but in trademark matters,
declined jurisdiction on the grounds that infringement
seizure was regulated under ordinary law, not the
OHADA Uniform Act.65 In the present case, relating to
the application of AB-1999, the Supreme Court of Côte
d’Ivoire declined jurisdiction in favor of the CCJA.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

And yet it would not be entirely pointless to combine
the two deposit orders. While both are intended tocover damages incurred by the defendant, it remains
uncertain whether the compensation sought relates tothe same prejudice. Prejudice arising from the seizuremust be distinguished from that caused by the lawsuiton the merits. The dividing line is very fine, especiallysince the foreign plaintiff may be viewed as bringing
the same action sequentially. The distinction can bemade, however, in isolated situations. Since the cautio
judicatum solvi is intended to cover compensation as
well as any costs charged to the foreign plaintiff, thetrial court can determine its amount by supplementing
what was deposited prior to seizure. Furthermore, if theplaintiff or distrainor were to exceed the seizure order(by carrying out an actual seizure when only an inventory
has been ordered, for instance) and their claim found incourt to have partial merit (such as where not all of thegoods seized prove to be infringing), the deposit prior
to seizure could serve to compensate the distrainee forthe wrongful seizure, while the cautio judicatum solvi
could remedy any fault committed by the plaintiff – notin carrying out the seizure, but in bringing action on the
merits – and defray court costs.

26

Joseph Fometeu
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

E. OHADA Common Court of Justice andArbitration – Intellectual property –Jurisdiction – National Supreme Court
The Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) of
the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law
in Africa (Organisation pour l’harmonisation en Afriquedu droit des affaires, or OHADA) is not competent inprinciple to hear cases involving application of the
Bangui Agreement and its annexes.
Infringement seizure under OAPI legislation is authorized
by the president of a civil court, ruling as a motions judge,
rather than by a judge for urgent applications.

Facts: The company PLAST-KIM, owner of a plastic
container model registered with the African andMalagasy Office of Industrial Property (Office africain
et malgache de propriété industrielle, or OAMPI),66
learned that its sister company, Océan Ivoirien plastic(OCI-PLAST), was manufacturing and marketing plastic
containers identical to its own. It sought and obtained
an infringement seizure order from the president of
the Abidjan Court of First Instance, ruling as judge forurgent applications.
Upon appeal by OCI-PLAST, the appeal court quashed theseizure order on the grounds that the judge for urgent
applications was not competent to rule on articles 36
et seq. of annex IV to AB-1977, the provisions of which
conferred that prerogative on the motions judge.
PLAST-KIM then appealed to the Supreme Court of Côte
d’Ivoire, which declined competence in favor of the CCJA,
noting questions raised about the OHADA Uniform
Act relating to General Commercial Law. The CCJA also
declined jurisdiction and sent the case back to theSupreme Court.
Reasoning: The CCJA’s decision illustrates theprerogatives conferred on the president of a civil court in
intellectual property matters (section I) and draws a line
separating intellectual property law from matters under
CCJA jurisdiction (section II).
64
65

66

See, e.g., NGANDINGA Eric v. SCAAP, Order No. 150/C of December 1, 2006,
President of the Court of First Instance of the Center Region (Yaoundé).
See Société P2MP SARL v. Société D. SARL, Order No. 62 of March 18, 2008,
President of the Court of First Instance of Ekounou (Yaoundé). Along the samelines, see Bic SA v. TBC SA, Decision No. 28 of January 28, 2008, Court of Appealof Littoral (Douala) (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection, Chapter 1,
section F).
The OAMPI was established on September 13, 1962, in Libreville. Thisagreement was revised in Bangui on March 2, 1977, after the withdrawal ofMadagascar for the establishment of OAPI.

The 1999 revision of the Bangui Agreement (ABR1999) recognizes the traditional prerogatives of a civil
court’s president in matters concerning the exercise
of intellectual property rights. That text expressly
recognizes the president’s competence for orders onrequest – that is, acting as motions judge (A) – but does
not mention the president’s ex officio competence as
judge for urgent applications, which has led to varying
interpretations in practice (B).
A. Orders issued on request
The president of a civil court issues infringement seizureorders at the request of alleged victims and subject todocumentation that varies depending on the intellectual
property concerned.67 Infringement seizure is an exgratia measure granted to the holder of the infringed
right, or the holder’s legal successors, for enforcement
against an alleged infringer. It is subject, however, tothe latter’s right to seek review or withdrawal of themeasure. In the case reported here, PLAST-KIM, whosemodel of container was allegedly infringed, obtained aseizure order from the Abidjan Court of First Instance,
ruling as judge for urgent applications, in proceedings
brought against OCI-PLAST.
Is a judge for urgent applications authorized to issue
seizure orders for infringement? It would appear
not, at least judging from a review of laws on judicialorganization in almost all signatory countries under the
Bangui Agreement, that prerogative generally being
conferred on the president as motions judge. That was
the crux of the argument made by OCI-PLAST in its
successful appeal, adjudicated by appeal court Decision
No. 696 of October 17, 2000. The argument seems
reasonable since, according to the texts regulating
infringement seizure in industrial property matters, themeasure is subject to an order issued on request by thepresident of a civil court ruling as motions judge.
B. Orders issued by a judge for urgent applications
While not specified as such in the Bangui Agreement,case law allows the distrainee in an industrial property
case to apply to a judge for urgent applications underordinary law for either the withdrawal of the seizureorder or its restriction to a few copies of the infringing
items.68 Not even the Agreement’s latest version,
ABR-2015, expressly allows distrainees to do so for
infringement seizures69 – unlike almost all domestic laws
on copyright, which do allow for such restriction through

67

68

69

In ABR-1999, see art. 64(2) of annex I (on patents), art. 47(2) of annex II (onutility models) art. 48(2) of annex III (on trademarks), art. 31(2) of annex IV(on industrial designs), etc. ABR-2015 now gives jurisdiction to the presidentof the competent domestic court.
See Bic SA v. TBC SA, Decision No. 28 of January 28, 2008, Court of Appealof Littoral (Douala) (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection, Chapter 1,
section F); SPN SA v. Société LM Co. Ltd, Order No. 189 of August 22, 2007,
President of the Court of First Instance of Ndokoti (Douala); Société P2MP SARL
v. Société D. SARL, Order No. 62 of March 18, 2008, President of the Court ofFirst Instance of Ekounou (Yaoundé).
Revised to read “seizure for counterfeiting” in ABR-2015.

a judge for urgent applications.70 That latitude, consistent
with common law, can legitimately be extended toindustrial property. That means reserving recourse to
the judge for urgent applications for parties contestinga seizure as irregular – not those seeking the issuance ofa seizure order. It is therefore surprising that PLAST-KIM
proceeded as it did, particularly since recourse to a judge
for urgent applications, unlike recourse to a motions
judge, is a procedure inter partes, thus eliminating theelement of surprise needed to be effective.
II. Exclusion of intellectual property matters fromCCJA jurisdiction
According to the CCJA, contrary to the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements in quashing the seizure order, theissue was not application of the OHADA Uniform Act. The
parties mainly based their arguments on AB-1977 andthe Ivorian Code of Civil and Administrative Procedure.
In other words, the CCJA, a supranational court, declined
jurisdiction based on the nature of the case (A). The
principle of excluding intellectual property matters fromits jurisdiction, however, is not absolute (B).

Chapter 1 – General theory of intellectual property

I. Competence of the civil court president in
intellectual property matters

A. Exclusion from CCJA jurisdiction based on the nature of
the case
First of all, at no stage in litigating this dispute overplastic containers had the parties mentioned the OHADA
Uniform Act as the Supreme Court did. In reality, theessential question submitted to the Supreme Court waswhether a judge for urgent applications was empoweredto order an infringement seizure under AB-1977. Or
more specifically, did interim order No. 3119/2000,
issued on April 21, 2000, by the president of the High
Court of Abidjan, conform with the relevant provisionsof articles 36 et seq. of annex IV to AB-1977, on industrial
designs? Such a matter indisputably falls within thepurview of intellectual property law. The CCJA wastherefore right to decline jurisdiction and refer the caseback to the Supreme Court. The exclusion of intellectual
property matters from CCJA jurisdiction, however, is
not absolute.
B. The relative exclusion of intellectual property mattersfrom CCJA jurisdiction
To exclude the CCJA from the field of intellectual property
litigation is a questionable proposition, particularly
when a dispute over business law, although coveredby the Treaty on the Harmonization of Business Law inAfrica and its subsequent Acts, raises related intellectual
property issues. That situation, already noted by one
author,71 poses significant conflict-of-jurisdiction issues
between the CCJA, as a supranational court for businessmatters, and the domestic courts that judge intellectual
property cases under ordinary law within the OAPI
community. The conflict is all the greater for the lack of
70

71

See, e.g., art. 86 of Cameroon’s Law No. 2000/11 of December 19, 2000,
relating to copyright and related rights; art. 133 of Senegal’s Law No. 200809 of January 25, 2008, bearing on copyright and related rights; art. 101 of
Burkina Faso’s Law No. 32/99/AN of December 22, 1999, governing copyrightand related rights.
See P. Menie M’essono (2013) La protection juridictionnelle dans l’espace OAPI.
Chișinău: Editions Universitaires européennes, 103 et seq.
27

an OAPI court system, which makes the OHADA judge
competent by default for OAPI legislation on certain
issues.72 The statutory text of the CCJA, however, clearly
indicates its jurisdiction for laws enacted by OHADA, anorganization subject to its oversight.
The CCJA’s jurisdiction for OHADA law has also been
affirmed by the Court of Justice of the West African
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). According tothat court’s Opinion No. 1/2000 of February 2, 2000, on
the draft community investment code, it would infringeon the exclusive jurisdiction of the CCJA if the court wereto venture to interpret the OHADA Uniform Acts.73 Might
it be possible, in such a context, to do as recommended
by P. Menie M’essono: to divide cases up so thateach court hears only those matters falling within its
jurisdiction? 74 But such a solution, says J. Yado Toe, could
get legal systems into a “tangle difficult to unravel.” 75 A
court would then have to adjudicate only those aspectsof a case within its purview, declining jurisdiction forothers. Such complications illustrate the difficulty ofseamlessly dividing jurisdiction between the CCJA anddomestic courts in intellectual property matters.
The CCJA could also have occasion to review awards
issued in intellectual property disputes arbitrated under
its auspices, since the arbitrability of such disputes isexpressly permitted by article 4(2) of ABR-2015: “Anydispute concerning the application of this Agreement
and its annexes may be settled by arbitration or
mediation.” That position is also supported by African
literature and case law on the subject.76 As the arbitrationand mediation center being established under ABR-2015
is not yet operational, disputes falling within the center’scompetence could quite feasibly be administeredprovisionally under CCJA auspices. Such difficulties, ofcourse, are best ironed out through an inter-community
judicial cooperation agreement.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

28

72
73

74
75
76

See L.Y. Ngombe (2013) OHADA versus OAPI, lecture transversale et partiale.
RAPI, December, 31.
See Cour de Justice de l’UEMOA (2008) Recueil des textes fondamentaux et dejurisprudence de la Cour. Ouagadougou, 229, cited in D.C. Sossa (2011) Les
conflits des juridictions communautaires et les mécanismes de coopérationinter-juridictionnels. In OHADA Higher Regional School of Magistracy(ERSUMA), Actes du Colloque sur le droit communautaire en Afrique sur le thème“De la concurrence à la cohabitation des droits communautaires.” Cotonou-Benin,
January 24–26, 126 et seq.
See M’essono, n. 71.
See J. Yado Toe (2008) La problématique actuelle de l’harmonisation de droit desaffaires par l’OHADA: Actes du Colloque sur l’harmonisation du droit OHADA descontrats- Ouagadougou 2007. Rev. dr. unif., 32, www.unidroit.org.
See F. Ekani (2012) L’arbitrage et la médiation dans le contentieux de la
propriété intellectuelle: quel intérêt pour les États membres de l’OAPI ? La
propriété intellectuelle au service du développement de l’Afrique. In Mélanges
offerts à Denis Ekani (OAPI Collection No. 4), Paris: L’Harmattan, 173 et seq.
See also Linda-Communications v. MIC-Vidéo, Decision No. 7/GCS.02 of May 17,
2002, Supreme Court of the Congo (obs. J. Fometeu, this collection, Chapter 1,
section B).

F. Infringement seizure – Executiondifficulties – Jurisdiction – Judge for
disputes over enforcement – Noapplication of article 49 of the OHADA
Uniform Act Organizing Simplified
Recovery Procedures and Enforcement
Measures – National ordinary law –Judge for urgent applications – Trial
judge
Jurisdiction for difficulties relating to the execution of
an infringement seizure falls not to the judge indicatedin article 49 of the OHADA Uniform Act Organizing
Simplified Recovery Procedures and Enforcement
Measures, but to the judge indicated under ordinary law.
BIC SA V. TBC SA, Decision No. 28 of January 28, 2008,
Court of Appeal of Littoral (Douala)Observations:
The execution of an infringement seizure may lead tomultifaceted litigation raising both legal and practicalquestions. How to determine the judge competent tohear such cases is a problem frequently encountered.
Is it the judge referenced in article 49 of the OHADA
Uniform Act? Is it the trial court? Or perhaps the judge
for urgent applications? It does not help that the Bangui
Agreement provides no guidance on the matter, leavingroom for different interpretations within the community.
The decision of the appeal court reported here isunequivocal: difficulties in executing an infringement
seizure are matters for the ordinary judge for urgent
applications – not the judge described in the Act.
Facts: The facts of this case are relatively simple. The
company Bic SA, owner of the eponymous trademark,registered with the OAPI under No. 10922 and affixed tothe ballpoint pens it manufactures and markets, becameaware that the company TBC SA was marketing pens
identical to its own. Bic obtained a seizure of the pens by
Order No. 1327 of July 5, 2006, issued by the presidentof the Court of First Instance of Bonanjo in Douala. TBC
then petitioned the court’s judge for urgent applications
to cancel the seizure and order release of the seized
pens. That judge granted TBC’s request, disregarding
a plea of incompetency ratione materiae made by Bic,
arguing that the judge indicated for such enforcement
matters in the OHADA Uniform Act was alone competent
to rule on the matter.
On appeal, as reported here, the Littoral Court of Appeal
quashed the seizure order and referred the case back to
the judge for urgent applications.
Reasoning: The Court of Appeal of Littoral (Douala) was
unambiguous on the question of the judge competent tohear enforcement difficulties relating to an infringement
seizure (section I), yet barely mentioned the equallyimportant matter of the role to be played by thatjudge (section II).

Several difficulties may arise in enforcing an
infringement seizure. The bailiff may face resistancefrom the distrainee (who may lock up premises orrefuse to produce requested documents) or encountera technical difficulty requiring skilled assistance. The
distrainee may also request withdrawal of the seizureorder, annulment of the attachment report andeven restriction of the objects seized. Which court iscompetent to address such difficulties and disputes?
In a general sense, the annexes relating to industrial
property under ABR-1999, in force when the appeal court
rendered its decision, empower the president of thecivil court to authorize infringement seizures. But theannexes are silent as to jurisdiction for difficulties arisingin execution of the measure. Theoretically, one of threecourts could be involved depending on the measure: themotions judge (A), the judge for urgent applications (B)or the trial judge (C).
A. The motions judge
Some of the difficulties arising from the execution of
an infringement seizure can be ironed out by the same
motions judge who ordered it. Nothing prohibits a bailifffrom suspending seizure operations77 and requesting
authority for additional measures not included in theorder but proving necessary during the operation(a locksmith, if premises are locked; a charteredaccountant, if a distrainee’s books must be examined todetermine the extent of infringement; an IT engineer,etc.). French case law also allows a bailiff to search
for accounting information, even ex officio, with no
opposition possible from the court president.78 Be thatas it may, recourse to the motions judge is bound to be
exceptional: a clause included in seizure orders generallyindicates the judge for urgent applications.
B. The judge for urgent applications
Bic disputed the competence of the judge for urgent
applications, arguing that the courts competent under
ABR-1999 were those called upon to judge the merits ofan infringement case. Use of the plural form “courts,”
as appears in the Agreement, refers to civil and criminal
jurisdictions. Bic argued further that, the Bangui
Agreement being silent on the point, the competentauthority to rule on difficulties relating to execution of an
infringement seizure, as a protective measure, was thejudge indicated in article 49 of the OHADA Uniform Act inquestion: the president of the court sitting in the courseof urgent proceedings. The first part of Bic’s argument,
however, reflects an imperfect reading of articles 47(1)and 49 of annex III to ABR-1999.
Article 47(1) requires that civil actions relating tomarks be brought before the civil courts and judged
77

78

P. Veron (2005) Saisie-contrefaçon, 2nd edn. Paris: Dalloz, 61, No. 13.251. The
author insightfully points out that expiration of a seizure order is not an
obstacle to the suspension of seizure operations where necessary to fully
execute the order.
See CA Paris, July 8, 1993, PIBD 1993, No. 555, III, 673; TGI Paris, 3ème mech.,
June 30, 1994, PIBD 1994, No. 576, III, 527.

as summary proceedings.79 Article 49 provides that“should the complainant fail to take action under either
civil or criminal law within a period of 10 working days,
the inventory or seizure shall become void as of right,
without prejudice to any damages that may be claimed.”
Now, reference to the terms, “courts,” “civil law” and“criminal law” does not signify the OAPI legislator’s
intent to bar the ordinary judge for urgent applications
from involvement in intellectual property enforcement.80
That is the court designated as competent for suchenforcement by virtually all national laws on copyrightand related rights.
It should be remembered, however, that an infringement
seizure results from an order on request and remains
subject to the general regime for such orders. Thatregime, in the silence of intellectual property law,must therefore apply mutatis mutandis to infringement
seizures.81 That solution is all the more justified in that,as a virtually systematic practice, judges insert reserve
clauses in infringement seizure orders indicating theurgent applications process. The appeal court in thiscase rightly observed that “the OHADA Treaty does
not regulate infringement seizures, which therefore
remain subject to the provisions of ordinary law,” andaccordingly that “only the judge for urgent applications
under ordinary law, per article 182 of the Code of Civil
and Commercial Procedure, remains competent forsummary proceedings on difficulties arising from theexecution of such seizures.” The competence of thejudge for urgent applications thus appears clear, as
also accepted in case law – even after infringement
proceedings are referred to the appropriate trial court.

Chapter 1 – General theory of intellectual property

I. Jurisdiction for difficulties resulting from theexecution of an infringement seizure

It could be objected that after the seizure has been
executed and the merits referred to the trial court, thelatter could deal with it all, including any dispute arisingfrom execution. But the objection does not hold up: thejudge presiding in the urgent proceedings may be validly
requested to amend or withdraw the measure, having
been ordered ex gratia. Along the same lines, a judge’s
power to amend or withdraw their order even if a trial
court has been seized on the merits is acknowledged
in article 497 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. The
French Court of Cassation has censured an appeal court
based on that provision. The appeal court concerned
had denied a request for such withdrawal – because theground cited for the request, nullity, was subject to thetrial court’s competence – without investigating whether
the legal requirements for carrying out an infringement
seizure had been satisfied.82
79

80
81
82

Article 46(1) of the version revised subsequently (ABR-2015) clarified thematter by requiring other civil action concerning marks to be brought before“the competent domestic courts and heard as for summary matters.” Thatnew guideline is also included for patents, utility models, industrial designs
and so on.
See art. 86 of Cameroon’s Law No. 2000/11 of December 19, 2000, relating
to copyright and related rights; art. 133 of Senegal’s Law No. 2008-09 ofJanuary 25, 2008, governing copyright and related rights.
See PMUC v. Alfred Meno, Interim order No. 301/C of February 19, 2007,
President of the Court of First Instance of the Center Region (Yaoundé) (obs.
M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection, Chapter 4, section E).
See Cass. 2ème civ., July 9, 1997, No. 95-12.580, Bull. civ. 1997, II, No. 231,
cited by P. Veron (2013/14) Saisie-contrefaçon, 3rd edn. Paris: Dalloz, 148,
No. 151.62.
29

C. The trial judge
Trial judges also have occasion to deal with incidents
arising from infringement seizure. In Cameroon, theJudicial Organization Act 83 gives jurisdiction for such
incidents to courts of first instance or high courts,
depending on the amount claimed.84 Those matters areclearly side issues, however, and it is hard to imagine
instigating trial proceedings for that purpose per se.
Alleged infringers often raise such disputes as partof their defense in an ongoing infringement trial –contesting the validity of the attachment report for
instance, or, to a lesser extent, making counterclaims of
unreasonable seizure, particularly when the procedure
exceeds its exclusively probative purpose.85 In short,both the judge for urgent applications and the trial
court, each within its respective purview, may deal withincidents arising from the execution of infringement
seizures. Their respective fields of intervention must
be marked out carefully, however, bearing in mind thenatural limits placed on a judge for urgent applications
where substantive matters are concerned.
II. Role of the judge competent for difficulties arisingfrom the execution of infringement seizures

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

As is clear from the foregoing, more than one judge may
be competent for execution-related difficulties arisingfrom infringement seizure. Setting apart the motions
judge, whose involvement is more theoretical than real,
execution-related difficulties concern, chiefly, the judge
for urgent applications (A) and, secondarily, the trial
judge (B).

30

A. The judge for urgent applications: withdrawal oramendment of the seizure order
While not being expressly provided for in annex III to
ABR-1999, the distrainee in an infringement seizure isgiven the option of seeking withdrawal or amendmentof the seizure order in urgent proceedings. Withdrawal
is possible only if the distrainee can demonstratethat the conditions for authorizing the infringement
seizure had not been met. In this case, TBC could have
petitioned the judge to withdraw the seizure orderby invoking, for example, the complainant’s failure
to provide a registration certificate, or a certificate
of non-cancellation and non-forfeiture, proving thecomplainant’s ownership of the mark. In a decision on
January 6, 1932, the Paris Court of Appeal withdrew
an infringement seizure order issued to a distrainor
not certified as owner of the property concerned.86 In
addition, an alleged infringer is perfectly entitled torequest amendment of the order. This could include
the placement of restrictions on a seizure liable toimmobilize an entire stock or large quantity of allegedly
infringing goods.87

83
84
85
86
87

Law No. 2006/15 of December 29, 2006, as amended.
See art. 13 et seq. or Law No. 2006/15 of December 29, 2006.
Veron, n. 82, at 157, No. 152.30.
See CA Paris, January 6, 1932, Ann. propr. ind. 1932, 291 (note Fernand-Jacq).
See Ameropa SA v. Mustapha Tall SA, Judgment No. 501 of December 28,
2012, Court of Appeal of Dakar (obs. M. Lamotte, this collection, Chapter 3,
section K).

Overall, an infringement seizure order can be withdrawn
only if originating under irregular conditions or
authorizing excessive measures. Consequently, therole of the judge for urgent applications is limited toreviewing the conditions and extent specified for an
infringement seizure order when granted.88 Fortunately,case law has clarified that a judge for urgent applications
petitioned to withdraw an order is invested with powers
limited to those of the order’s author.89 Accordingly, thejudge for urgent applications can rule neither on thevalidity of seizure operations nor on the corresponding
report. It therefore appears inappropriate in thiscase for such a judge to have issued the interim orderconcerned, No. 509 of September 20, 2006, cancelling theinfringement seizure. It is well established in this casethat the judge for urgent applications lacked competence
for that purpose. Case law has more generally ruledout that judge’s competence for complaints over the
execution of an infringement seizure.90 The judge
for urgent applications in this case, the Court of First
Instance of Bonanjo in Douala, should have declined
jurisdiction for voiding the infringement seizure, as
falling naturally to the trial judge.
B. The role of the trial judge in voiding theattachment report
A civil or criminal trial judge can void an infringement
seizure order for at least two reasons: irregularities
committed by a bailiff during execution of the seizure, as
discussed earlier; or failure by the distrainor to take civil
or criminal action within 10 working days, as stipulated
in article 49 of annex III to ABR-1999. The corresponding
attachment report may be voided based on an invalid
trademark registration certificate (a requisite for the
seizure order), withdrawal of the order, misuse of theseizure procedure or, as in the present case, irregularities
tainting the report itself. 91 This solution seems logical: if
the order authorizing the infringement seizure is voided,
the seizure carried out pursuant to that order becomesvoid as of right also. In an interesting copyright case,the court ruled that, in the absence of any material
evidence of infringement, a distrainor cannot havestatements taken from the distrainee.92 The same
solution can be transposed mutatis mutandis to industrial
property matters.
In the present case, the first judge voided theinfringement seizure on the grounds that thecorresponding report did not include the identity of thebailiff – an omission he said tainted the report and theentire procedure. Setting aside whether the judge forurgent applications was competent to hear the matter(that was the trial judge’s job, in our view), the grievanceagainst the attachment report failing to identify thebailiff raises a number of questions. According to Bic,
the first page of the report was stamped with thebailiff’s name, Victor Tekeu, and the last page bore the
88
89
90
91
92

Veron, n. 82, at 148, No. 151.71.
Com., June 9, 2009, Nos. 8–12. 139, NP, cited in Veron, n. 82.
Douai, First Chamber, February 4, 2002, PIBD 2002, No. 741, III, 206.
See, e.g., TGI Paris, Third Chamber, February 18, 2011, PIBD 2011, No. 941, III,406.
See CA Paris, Fourth Chamber, October 7, 1998, PIBD 1999, No. 667, III, 16.

French lower courts have occasionally been flexible on
the matter, recognizing an attachment report’s validity if
the bailiff’s name can be determined from the signature.93
But the Court of Cassation has been stricter, refusing, forinstance, to overturn an appeal court’s annulment of an
attachment report bearing the name of the bailiff’s office
only.94 Ultimately, the attachment report represents an
act of bailiff subject to general rules established in thecodes of civil procedure of OAPI member states.

Chapter 1 – General theory of intellectual property

state seal and showed the ministerial officer’s surname,first name, position, post office box, telephone number
and signature. It is therefore surprising that the judge
for urgent applications upheld the grievance – despite
the relevance of Bic’s argument and the fact that nolaw prescribes how a bailiff’s identity must appear ona ministry’s documents. The texts guiding a bailiff forthe purposes of executing an infringement seizure
are the statute of judicial officers and the Code of Civil
Procedure of the state concerned.

Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

93
94

See, e.g., TGI Paris, Third Chamber, March 12, 1997, PIBD 1997, No. 636, III,391; TGI Paris, 14th Chamber, January 16, 1998, PIBD 1998, No. 653, III, 240.
See Cass. com., October 20, 1998, No. 673, PIBD 1999, III, 131.
31

Chapter 2 – Patents

A.
Patents – Conditions for validity – Novelty –Prior personal possession – Good faith33

Chapter 2
Patents
A. Patents – Conditions for validity –Novelty – Prior personal possession –Good faith
It is a misapplication of the law for an appeal court toconfirm the novelty of a process patent on the groundsof there being no similar process already without first
conducting a search for prior art.
The owner of a process patent may not prohibit acompetitor from using the same process if found to
be doing so in good faith prior to the grant of thepatent asserted.
AL ITIHAD COOPERATIVE V. A.A., Decision No. 170 ofAugust 7, 2006, Court of Appeal of Niamey
Observations:
The decision handed down by the Niamey Court ofAppeal, in an area where few judicial precedents havebeen established in OAPI member states, illustrates
how intellectual property litigation is diversifying inthat region.
Facts: The facts of the case are simple, but they posesome complex legal issues. The dispute concerned
two competing cooperatives producing pain desucre (sugarloaf). On February 16, 2001, the Al Itihadcooperative obtained a license to operate in Niger.
Three years later, the Tchékassane cooperative, claiming
identity as the originator of the sugarloaf production
process, requested and obtained authorization for an
infringement seizure against Al Itihad. Al Itihad had
the seizure order withdrawn and sued Tchékassane
for vexatious proceedings and related damages. For
unknown reasons, those proceedings were discontinued,
bringing the first episode of this judicial saga to a close.
On April 12, 2002, Mr. A.A., a member of the Tchékassane
cooperative, applied to the OAPI to patent the sugarloaf
production process. He was granted the patent on
October 7, 2003. Informed of that fact, Al Itihad broughtproceedings against A.A. in a Niamey civil court touphold its right to use the process, invalidate the patentand remove all related entries from the organization’s
registers. Instead, the civil court validated the patent andprohibited further use of the process by Al Itihad. The
latter appealed to the Niamey Court of Appeal for thedecision reported here.
The questions of law put to the appeal court were
two: was the sugarloaf production process – to which
both cooperatives laid claim – patentable? If so, were

Al Itihad and its members entitled to invoke priorpersonal possession?
Reasoning: In answering, the appeal court partiallyreversed the decision of the civil court, so that A.A.,
although undisputed owner of the patent, could notprevent Al Itihad and its members from using theinvention. The decision is correct, but its legal grounding
seems incomplete, with regard to:I.
II.

the patentability of the claimed invention; andthe recognition of prior personal possession.

I. Patentability of the claimed invention
Addressing the central question of the patentabilityof the sugarloaf production process, the appeal court
confirmed the novelty and, consequently, the validity ofthis invention (A), as the applicant for invalidation did notprovide proof of lack of novelty (B).
A. The notion of novelty
The answer to the legal question posed depends onmastering the contours of the concept of novelty inpatent law. In this regard, it is important to refer to theprovisions of article 2(1) of ABR-1999, which define thecriteria for the patentability of an invention. According
to this article, an invention is patentable when it is new,when it involves an inventive step, and when it may be
industrially applicable. The invention can consist of or
relate to a product, a process or a use thereof. These
three criteria substantially condition the access of apatent to legal protection and must all be met.1 In thecase commented on here, the only criterion submitted
to the appreciation of the appeal court was the novelty.
Indeed, the applicant, Al Itihad, contested the novelty ofthe sugarloaf production process, which was the subjectof the patent granted by OAPI to the benefit of A.A.
An invention is considered new if it has not been
anticipated by prior art.2 Thus perceived, the novelty
giving rise to legal protection is absolute. With regard to
the process of producing sugarloaf, this supposes thatthe main aspects of this invention did not exist in theprior art from which it stems. Theoretically, to conclude
1

2

See to this effect A. Chavanne and J.-J. Burst (1990) Droit de la propriété
industrielle, 3rd edition, Paris: Dalloz, 28 et seq. See also J. Schmidt-Szalewski
and J.-L. Pierre (2007) Droit de la propriété industrielle, 4th edition. Paris: Litec,
37 et seq.
Article 3 of annex 1 of ABR-1999 states that an invention is new if it has notbeen anticipated by prior art consisting of everything made available to the
public before the filing date either of the patent application or of a patentapplication filed abroad, the priority of which has been validly claimed. This
article is maintained in extenso in ABR-2015.
33

that an invention is new, the competent authorities of
the industrial property office investigate to determine
whether any prior art genuinely exists.3 Of course, thecontested issue in this case benefited from presumptionof novelty because it was the subject of a patent granted
by OAPI on October 7, 2003. However, this presumption
can be put into question, as it can be challenged before
the competent jurisdictional bodies. This is especiallythe case because – under the system established by
ABR-1999 under which the present decision was handed
down – OAPI did not carry out substantive examinationof the conditions of patentability, but only examinationof the formal regularity of the application.4 However,
the entry into force of ABR-2015 has substantiallychanged the legal order concerning examination ofpatent applications within OAPI.5 Indeed, confirmationof novelty now requires in-depth examination in order
to ascertain whether the process in question cannot befound in prior art in its entirety.6 In any event, it shouldbe emphasized that, once the patent has been granted,
the invention to which it corresponds enjoys – whatever
the situation – presumption of novelty that could becalled into question during invalidation litigations.
B. Proving lack of novelty
The question of proving lack of novelty has two aspects
that have fueled proceedings before appeal courts.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

The first relates to who has the burden of proving lackof novelty: The owner? The applicant for invalidationof the patent? Al Itihad criticized the initial judge forhaving placed the burden of proof on it rather than on
the inventor, by referring to the provisions of article 43of the TRIPS Agreement. However, these seem clearly
irrelevant, as providing proof in this matter is governedby common law. Indeed, doctrine and jurisprudence
agree that, when a patent is granted by the industrial
property office, its validity may be affected only if theapplicant for invalidation provides proof that the rightdoes not satisfy a particular condition of validity, thepatent being presumed to be valid.7 Moreover, thisapproach seems logical because, when the disputeis based on the question of novelty, as in the present

34

3

4

5

6
7

Art. 3(3) of annex I of ABR-1999 stipulates the conditions under which thenovelty cannot be denied, in particular if, within a period of 12 months preceding
the day referred to in para. 2, the invention has been disclosed as a result of an
obvious abuse of the applicant or its author. ABR-2015 omits the ambiguous
expression “predecessor in title” and replaces it with “its author.”
The scope of the examination of the patent application varies from one
office to another. Traditionally, two approaches are possible. The first isbased on a thorough examination of the application, which consists, afteran examination of the formal regularity, in a search for prior art that would
deny the novelty or that may affect the inventive step. The second, enshrinedin ABR-1999, gives priority to examination of the formal regularity of therequest and leads to the quasi-automatic grant of patents, subject to possible
rejection in the event that the invention is contrary to public order.
Art. 23 of ABR-2015 now establishes a substantive examination of theconditions of patentability, with the subsequent search report having toestablish the substantive criteria of patentability in addition to the formal
requirements. This is a major innovation that bolsters the credibility of OAPIgranted patents.
On this issue, see I. Cissoko, “Les dangers de la divulgation de l’invention, laperte de la nouveauté,” Revue africaine de la propriété intellectuelle, Collection
OAPI, October 2008, 25 et seq.
J. Passa, Droit de la propriété industrielle, Vol. 2, LGDJ 2013, 453. See, to thesame effect, J. Raynard et al., Droit de la propriété industrielle, Lexis Nexis,
Paris, 66 et seq.

case, the invalidation applicant seeks to disprove thenovelty by demonstrating that the contested invention
is included in prior art, i.e., that it was available to the
public before the filing date of the application or thepriority date. It was therefore not up to the right holder,as Al Itihad wrongly claimed, to prove that the patent
was valid, even though it is true that the latter could havebrought up the unsuitability of the means invoked tochallenge the presumed novelty of its invention.
The second aspect is inherent to the way in which proof
is provided: How can lack of novelty of an invention
be proved? In reality, proof of lack of novelty comes
down to demonstration by the invalidation applicant
of prior art likely to affect the novelty of the claimed
invention. In other words, the party invoking lack ofnovelty is required to submit, to the exclusive jurisdictionof the judge, the relevant elements of the prior art
that constitute “the basis of comparison reference bywhich the compliance of the invention with the legal
requirement shall be verified.” 8 It is precisely this major
obstacle that was encountered by Al Itihad, which, before
the judges who had successively dealt with this dispute,
limited itself to making assertions without being able toestablish the reality of the prior art it claimed, namely
its sugarloaf production process. In the absence of thisdecisive proof, the application for invalidation of thepatent granted to A.A. was naturally doomed to failure.
In this respect alone, the decision commented on here isin accordance with positive law. It is also in line with Paris
Court of Appeal jurisprudence, which has consistently
held i) that an applicant cannot simply allege that apatent is invalid without providing any proof 9 and ii) thatprior art can disprove the novelty of an invention only ifthere is no doubt as to both its content and its date.10
Moreover, in another case, the court was able to rulethat the existence of doubt as to the validity of thepatent, in particular because of a lack of certainty as
to the date, content or scope of a prior art claimed by
the invalidation applicant, precludes invalidation of thepatent and thus benefits the right holder.11 The Niamey
Court of Appeal was therefore right to point out that
“Whereas the Al Itihad cooperative does not present to
the proceedings its technique of sugarloaf production... in the absence of this element of comparison, thecourt cannot deny that A.A. made a new invention.” Thesolution thus reached should naturally have an impact on
the issue of the legality of granting the benefit or priorpersonal possession exception to the above-mentioned
enterprise.
II. Prior personal possession exception
The prior personal possession exception, still referred
to by the generic term “exception regarding prior use,”

8
9
10
11

J. Raynard et al., n. 7.
CA Paris, Oct. 12, 2001, PIBD 2002, No. 733, I.
CA Paris, Feb. 9, 2001, PIBD 2001, No. 725, III, 389.
CA Paris, Nov. 29, 1995, PIBD 1996 No. 605, III, 89; CA Paris, May 28, 1999,
PIBD 1999, No. 687, III, 501. See, to the same effect: Cass. com, May 18, 1999,
Pourvoi No. 97 – 17461, PIBD 1999, No. 686, III, 473.

A. The conditions for the prior personal possession
exception
To invoke the prior personal possession exception, theapplicant must prove their possession of the claimed
invention (1) and their good faith (2).
1. Possession of the claimed invention
The benefit of the prior personal possession exception
is subject to the applicant providing proof of actual
possession of the claimed invention prior to the filingdate of the application or the priority date. Such a
condition is required because possession of a technology
resulting from an inventive step cannot be reasonably
claimed if one is unaware of its contents. Jurisprudence
calls for the applicant to invoke the identity of thepossession, the technique covered by the patent, andtheir full knowledge of all the elements constituting theinvention subject of the patent before its filing date.15
The question of who has the burden of proof is governedby common law, and possession is a legal fact, theproof of which must be provided by the person who
has invoked it. In the present case, such proof does notseem to have been formally provided, as Al Itihad limited
itself to alleging prior possession without presenting
its sugarloaf production process or any other relevant
element. Consequently, it was not possible for the court
to verify whether the alleged possession corresponded
12

13

14
15

This exception is enshrined in several legal systems under various names. The
generic term “exception regarding prior use” is the one used within WIPO.
For more information on this issue, see the results of the 30-second session of
the Standing Committee on the Law of Patents available at https://www.wipo.
int_edocs_mdocs_scp_32_3.
According to this provision, “The rights deriving from the patent shall notextend: to acts performed by any person who in good faith on the filing date,or where priority is claimed, on the priority date of the application on thebasis of which the patent is granted on the territory of a member state, wasusing the invention or making effective and genuine preparations for suchuse, insofar as those acts are not different in nature or purpose from theactual or planned earlier use.”
A. Chavanne and J.-J. Burst, n.1, 282 et seq.
CA Paris, January 11, 2006, PIBD 2006, 825, III B-155; TGI Paris, September 4,
2001, PIBD 2002, 739, III, 156.

to the invention covered by the patented issued to
A.A. Furthermore, Al Itihad did not offer to prove thatit had full knowledge of the sugarloaf production
technique officially attributed to A.A. This fundamental
requirement is reaffirmed by specialized doctrine. In
their previously mentioned book, A. Chavanne and J.-J.
Burst emphasize that the possessor can validly oppose
the right of the patent owner to exploit the patent only if
the possession relates to the very technique covered by
the patent, if it has remained secret and if it was invented
prior to the date of filing or priority of the patent. Under
these circumstances, there is legitimate doubt as to therelevance of the reasons that led the judges to give full
effect to an unestablished possession.

Chapter 2 – Patents

is provided for in annex I, article 8(1) (d) of ABR-1999.13
Historically, prior personal possession is perceived asa corrective to the first-to-file rule in that it favors thefirst non-applicant inventor by conferring on them,under certain conditions, a right of exploitation overthe invention that is the subject of a subsequent patentissued to a third party. Under patent law, a person isentitled to invoke objection of prior personal possessionof an invention when, without having patented it, they
have secretly held it since a date prior to the filing, by
a third party, of an application relating to the same
invention.14 The purpose of this exception is to strike afair balance between the interests of the patent ownerand those of the prior user who may have invested
economic, physical and intellectual resources in the useof the patented invention. Al Itihad’s accessory claim,
which received a favorable response from the appeal
court, is part of this dynamic. However, the approachof these judges is questionable in terms of both theconditions for granting this preferential measure (A) andthe effects attached to it (B).
12

2. The possessor’s good faithGood faith plays a central role in granting thebenefit of the prior personal possession exception,in that its absence allows for the exclusion from thecircle of beneficiaries of any person who can justify
possession fulfilling the characteristics of certainty
and identity but whose knowledge of the patented
invention was acquired illegitimately, i.e., by fraud,
theft of information or violation of an obligation ofconfidentiality. The question of the good faith of theprior possessor could be approached from two angles,
as the possessor could have made the invention
themselves or simply received it from the initial
inventor.
In the first approach, the prior personal possession
exception fully fulfills its historical purpose, which isto protect the interests of the initial inventor who had
not filed a patent on their invention but who exploited
it before the date of filing of the same invention by athird party. It was probably under these circumstancesthat Al Itihad claimed to produce the sugarloaf “since its
creation in 2001, according to techniques proven since
the dawn of time,” thus claiming its prior possession
in relation to the date of filing of the patent by A.A.,
which was April 12, 2001. It should be pointed out that
Al Itihad received approval on February 16, 2001, adate which would correspond to that of the start of
exploitation of the disputed process, especially if wekeep in mind the previous conflict having opposed
the two competing cooperatives with regard to thesame invention. The question that could be asked at
this stage is whether this alleged prior possession
was made in good faith. The appeal court answeredin the affirmative, in accordance with article 8 of
ABR-1999, but without the proof of good faith having
been formally provided by Al Itihad. Such an approachis open to criticism in that it could suggest a broadinterpretation of this legal provision, which would thenenshrine a presumption of good faith in favor of theprior possessor who claims to have made the invention.
In the second approach, the exception benefits those
who, without having performed the inventive step,
have legitimately benefited from the information
communicated by their author. Here the crucial questionis linked to the legitimate character of the possessionof information by this category of persons, who could35

be the heirs of the initial inventor or their successors intitle. It is this orientation that A.A. wanted to give to theproceedings, by evoking the hardly orthodox conditions
in which Al Itihad would have had knowledge of thecontested sugarloaf production process, in particular by
the intermediary of his ex-employees hired away by it.
This phenomenon, which is moreover similar to a classic
case of unfair competition,16 is very common in thebusiness world when it comes to companies in the same
sector of activity, in this case the production of sugarloaf.
Logically, the benefit of personal prior possession
exception should be excluded in this case because of
the employment relationship that would have existed
between A.A. and his former employees. In a similarcase, the Paris Court of Appeal rejected exception due
to lack of good faith on the grounds that the possessors’
knowledge of the aspects of the know-how resulted froma licensing agreement with the subsequent patentee,
thereby imposing an obligation of confidentiality.
B. Effects of the prior personal possession exception
Prior personal possession exception gives the beneficiary
the right to exploit the invention (1). However, this rightof exploitation is limited in scope (2).

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

1. The right to exploit the invention
Prior personal possession has the effect of giving
the owner the right to exploit the invention despite
the existence of a patent registered by a third party.
It thus allows its beneficiary to enter into the sphereof protection of the patent owner without the latterbeing able to oppose their exclusive right. The decisioncommented on here illustrates the implementation ofthis exception to the exclusive right of the patentee
enshrined in article 8 of ABR-1999. The appeal court heldthat A.A. cannot prohibit the Al Itihad cooperative andits members from operating its sugarloaf production
process despite the patent he claimed.

36

On analysis, recognition of Al Itihad’s right to exploitation
seems debatable, at least if we consider the objections
previously formulated on the reality of the possession
it alleged, which should logically lead to the exclusionof this favorable measure. Extension of this right to themembers of the cooperative seems equally problematicfor two basic reasons. The first is related to the status of
the individuals benefiting from the exception. Indeed,
the members of the cooperative, taken individually, arephysical persons distinct from the cooperative to which
they belong, which has its own legal personality. The
second relates to the personal nature of the right of
exploitation, which is in principle non-transferable, thebeneficiary not being entitled to assign it or to grant
licenses to third parties.17 ABR-1999 moreover provides
a framework for the transfer of these exceptional
prerogatives in annex 1 article 8(2), which states: “Theright of the user referred to in paragraph (1)(d) may not
be transferred or handed on otherwise than with the1617

See art. 7 of annex VIII of AB-2015, which deals with unfair competition
through the disorganization of a competing enterprise.
See on the character of personal possession, J. Schmidt-Szalewki and J.-L.
Pierre, n. 1, 37 et seq.

business or company or the part thereof in which the useor the preparations for use were made.”
2. A limited right of exploitation
The right to exploit the invention that is the subjectof a subsequent patent and granted exceptionally tothe prior possessor has a limited scope, as the acts of
exploitation relating to it are strictly circumscribed bylaw, which excludes certain acts from the scope of the
exception. Article 8(1) (d) of the aforementioned annex
I to ABR-1999, under which the decision commented
on here was handed down, states that prior personal
possession is applicable only insofar as the acts do notdiffer in nature or purpose from the actual or planned
earlier use. Under this legal provision, the beneficiaryof the prior personal possession exception can exploit
the patented invention only i) insofar as the beneficiaryhad been using it and ii) as the invention was used,prior to the date at which the patent holder filed theirapplication, with no possibility of new uses.
Although the question was not formally raised in thiscase, it is important to mention it in order to highlight thedevelopments following the recent revision of ABR-1999.
Indeed, annex 1 of article 7(e) of ABR-2015 stipulates thefollowing: “The rights conferred by the patent shall notextend to the following: (e) acts performed by any person
who in good faith on the filing date or, where priority isclaimed, on the priority date of the application on thebasis of which the patent is granted on the territory ofa Member State, was in possession of the invention.”
This new orientation appears to be more liberal in that it
offers the prior possessor a wide margin of maneuver inthe exploitation of the patented invention, subject to theprohibition on transferring their rights to third parties
without their company.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

A.
Trademarks – Opposition to registration of alater trademark – Pharmaceutical products –High degree of consumer attention –No high likelihood of confusion
38

J.
Infringement seizure – Seizure as part of acriminal investigation – No prior order by
the president – Validity of the seizure – No
invalidity of the investigation reportB.
Slavish reproduction of a service mark on a
website – Counterfeiting – Identity of signs andservices – No need for evidence of likelihoodof confusion
39

K.
Trademarks – Likelihood of confusion –No actual seizure of allegedly infringing goods– Limiting seizure to a few samples
66

D.
Trademark – Registration – No change
in subject of registration – Infringement action– Acquittal of accused – Counterclaim forcompensation – Assessment of damage – Flatrate compensation
45
E.
Infringement action and unfair competition– Dismissal of opposition to registrationof an allegedly infringing mark – OAPI –Judicial review
50
F.
Fraudulent filing of a trademark –Proof of prior use – Bad faith – Invalidity– Damages

51

G.
Mark – Invalidation of the certificate ofregistration – Assessment of prior right– Assignment of a mark – Enforceability –Regional authority of final judicial decisions 52
H.
Trademark – Infringement – Fraudulent
imitation – Infringing use – Provision – Loss ofearnings – Commercial damage – Profit made –Damage suffered – Duty of care –License contract
56
I.
Infringement seizure – Seizure forcounterfeiting – Automatic invalidation– Non-alteration of court proceedings –Prejudice stemming from a seizure – Judge’s
discretionary power – No search for bad faith –Compensation – Counterclaim concerning theownership of the mark – Admissibility
61

L.
Trademark – Claim of right of priority –Restoration of priority – Violation ofprior right69

M.
Use of a trademark as an internet domainname – Unfair competition – Bad faith –Determining the author of a competitive act 72
N.
Claiming ownership of a trademark –Exclusive competence of the OAPI –Competence of the civil court – Validity of a
trademark registration – Violation of a priorright – Penalty: invalidation75

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

C.
Trademarks – Forfeiture proceedings for a
non-working mark – Concept of genuine use –Territorial scope
42

63

O.
Trademarks – Opposition to the registrationof a later mark – Reiteration of opposition –Similarity of goods concerned – Likelihood ofconfusion caused by a later mark77
P.
Trademarks – Compliance with the mandatory
registration procedure for plant protection
products – Justification – Infringement
79
Q.
Assessing likelihood of confusion – Complex
trademark – Principle of the indivisible whole– OAPI administrative bodies – Member
state courts
81
R.
Distraint and diversion of a mark – Assignee– Proof of ownership of a mark – Validity ofan assignment
84
S.
Sequestration of a mark – Liability of a mark to
attachment – Legal basis – Procedure – Placeof attachment
8637Chapter 3
Trademarks
A. Trademarks – Opposition toregistration of a later trademark –Pharmaceutical products – Highdegree of consumer attention –No high likelihood of confusion
Consumers pay close attention to pharmaceuticalproducts, thereby precluding any likelihood ofconfusion between the trademarks “BRONCHOKOD”
and “BRONCHOBOS,” in which the prefix “BRONCHO”
is merely an indicator of the therapeutic targetof the products used in treating respiratory andbronchial diseases.
BOSNALIJEK PHARMACEUTICAL AND CHEMICALINDUSTRY CO. V. SANOFI-AVENTIS SA, Decision No. 157
of April 26, 2012, OAPI High Commission of Appeal
Observations:
Likelihood of confusion plays a key role in trademark
law. It is this likelihood that shapes the framework forprotection in cases other than those in which identicalsigns refer to identical goods or services.1 Under
the heading “Rights conferred by the registration,”article 6(3) of annex III to ABR-2015 prohibits “(a) the
reproduction, use or affixing of a mark and the use of a
reproduced mark for goods or services that are similar
to those designated in the registration” and “(b) the
imitation of a mark and the use of an imitated mark forgoods or services that are identical or similar to those
designated in the registration.” However, the article
starts by setting out the condition “if they are liable tocreate confusion in public perception.” That condition
is found in article 3(b), under which the registration ofa mark that “resembles such [an earlier] mark that it isliable to mislead or confuse” is prohibited. It follows that“the conditions upon which precedence is based, andconsequently the conditions for opposition or seeking
invalidation of the second mark, are identical to those forthe infringement action.” 2
Facts: The dispute in this case, arising from an
opposition, helps to better delineate the concept of“average consumer” that lies at the heart of “likelihood ofconfusion.” The company Sanofi-Aventis France, ownerof the “BRONCHOKOD” mark, registered under class 5
in 1989, filed an opposition to registration of a markcalled “BRONCHOBOS” for products of the same class,1
2

38

J. Raynard, E. Py and P. Trefigny (2016) Droit de la propriété industrielle. Paris:
LexisNexis, Nos. 457–461.
S. Durrande (2010) JurisClasseur Marques – Dessins et modèles, Fasc. 7110,
No. 15. See, in this regard before the CJEU, C-291/00 LTJ Diffusion SA v. Sadas
Vertbaudet SA, Judgment of March 20, 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:169, at 41.

filed in 2008 by Bosnalijek Pharmaceutical and Chemical
Industry. The OAPI Director General dismissed the
opposition on the ground that the marks of both owners
could coexist without any likelihood of confusion. SanofiAventis France took the matter to the High Commissionof Appeal, claiming a conceptual, visual and aural
similarity between the two name and word marks.
Reasoning: The High Commission, in the decision
reported here, also dismissed the opposition, reasoningthat likelihood of confusion should be assessed withreference to the “average” consumer, which it defined as“a literate person able to notice true differences with alevel of discernment so qualified within the OAPI space.”
Such a consumer is all the more capable of distinguishing
between the marks at issue, the Commission reasoned,
because they designated “pharmaceutical products
known to the medical community and dispensed
on the advice of a doctor or pharmacist.” The prefix“BRONCHO,” it said, “merely indicates the therapeutictarget of the products used to treat respiratory andbronchial pathologies,” and is “descriptive and falls within
the common domain.” It is indeed generally acceptedthat “if a mark is made from a radical listed in the
dictionary or from a term that is hardly distinctive given
the many marks incorporating it, the protection provided
by the mark is more limited.” There could be no valid
basis for the plaintiff’s claim in the present case since
the radicals “KOD” and “BOS” that had been added to theprefix “BRONCHO” sound very different and could not
be confused. The Commission thus found “no similarity
between the two marks or likelihood of confusion for the
consumer of an average attention level.”
There are some minor flaws in this reasoning. For
example, it is surprising to see an “average consumer” or“consumer of an average attention level” characterized
as “a literate person,” possibly suggesting a consumerof “literature,” which hardly need be the case. What, forthat matter, did the Commission mean by a consumer
with “a level of discernment so qualified within the OAPI
space”? Nor is it clear why it was worth mentioning a“proliferation of class 5 marks in the market”: the entire
pharmaceutical market was not at issue in the case;only the market for respiratory illness products. And afinding of “no similarity” between the marks in conflict isperhaps excessive. “Average similarity” – an expression
often found in European case law 3 – or “slight similarity”
would have been more precise.
3

For instance, in a case to be discussed later, T266/17 Kwizda Holding v. EUIPO– Dermapharm (UROAKUT), Judgment of the General Court (First Chamber) ofSeptember 20 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:569, at [56].

The High Commission’s conclusion of “no similarity”
may seem extreme considering that the word marks
were each composed of ten letters and three syllables,
and that eight of the letters in use were the same,and appeared in the same order, in each. Be that as
it may, the Commission drew its conclusion from theprinciples applicable.
Its decision bears comparison with two General
Court judgments concerning pharmaceutical producttrademarks, each dismissing an opposition despite
similarities between the signs at issue. In the Kwizda
case already alluded to, the disputed mark was theword sign “UROAKUT.” It had been filed under class 5
products, described as “dietary supplements and dietetic
preparations; medical and veterinary preparations andarticles.” Its registration was opposed by the ownerof the figurative mark “UroCys,” designating “dietetic
substances and food supplements adapted for medical
use other than for treating or preventing gout.” After
carefully analyzing the similarity between the two marks,
the General Court concluded that “the visual, auraland conceptual differences relating to the additional
components ‘akut’ and ‘cys’ of the signs at issue were
not insignificant in the overall impression of the signs
for the relevant public” and “offset the visual, auraland conceptual similarities, which arise purely fromthe presence of the common component ‘uro’ and theidea to which it refers, especially given that the relevant

4
5
6

See the section on “l’usage de racines descriptives … dans domaine
pharmaceutique” in A. Folliard-Monguiral (2019) JurisClasseur Marques –Dessins et modèles, Fasc. 7610-1, No. 277.
Kwizda, n. 3, at [25].
Ibid., at [26].

public will display an increased level of attention.” 7
The signs were thus considered “entirely different intheir overall impression for the relevant public.” 8 Mostof the observations made regarding the prefix “uro,”referring to the field of urology, could apply to the prefix“broncho,” from the field of pneumology.
In the second General Court case,9 the disputed
mark was the word sign “XENASA,” designating“pharmaceutical preparations, namely for the diagnosis,
prevention and/or treatment of gastrointestinal
disorders and conditions; pharmaceuticalpreparations for the treatment of inflammation of thegastrointestinal tract; dietetic substances adapted
for medical use, namely for the diagnosis, prevention
and/or treatment of gastrointestinal disorders
and conditions.” The opposition was based on theexistence of an earlier European Union (EU) word mark,“PENTASA,” designating “pharmaceutical products
and substances.” The General Court recalled here too
the high degree of consumer attention likely whereprescription pharmaceutical products were concerned.10
But it then dismissed likelihood of confusion as aconsideration in the case, irrespective of the consumer’s
attention level or recognition of “the word elements‘PENTA’ and ‘XEN’ as references to the Greek prefix‘penta’ and Greek word ‘xenos.’” 11 It may shed somelight on the General Court’s reasoning to know that
5-aminosalicylic acid or 5-ASA (pentasa), also known as
mesalazine, is an anti-inflammatory drug used to treat
certain inflammatory ailments of the colon.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

In other regards, the High Commission’s reasoning in thecase was persuasive. It was right to assess likelihood ofconfusion with reference to an average consumer. It wasright too to link the earlier mark’s scope of protection
to its more-or-less distinctive character and to findsuch protection more limited in the present case, the“BRONCHO” prefix in question being commonly used
for medicinal products.4 Finally, and most importantly,
the Commission was right to consider the level ofconsumer attention as varying according to the natureof a trademarked product and higher for pharmaceuticalproducts. While it also helpfully observed that suchproducts are “known to the medical community anddispensed on the advice of a doctor or pharmacist,”
it might have been useful to more clearly identify the
consumer targeted. The General Court of the European
Union, for example, has observed that “when the goodsin question are medicines or pharmaceutical products,
the relevant public is composed of medical professionals,
on the one hand, and patients, as the end consumers,on the other.” 5 That court’s case law has characterized
medical professionals as necessarily displaying “a highlevel of attentiveness” and consumers or patientsthemselves as “reasonably well informed and reasonably
observant and prudent given the effect of theseproducts on their health,” whether they are prescribedor not.6

André Lucas

B. Slavish reproduction of a service markon a website – Counterfeiting –Identity of signs and services – No
need for evidence of likelihood ofconfusion
The slavish reproduction of a trademark on a website,
performed by the website’s owner, constitutes
counterfeiting from the moment the injured party provesthat it has a valid and exclusive right to the mark and thatan exact reproduction of its distinctive sign has beenused to designate identical services. The likelihood ofconfusion in public perception is presumed in such cases,
relieving the injured party of any burden to prove it.
FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL V. BORIS BOIS SARL,
Civil judgment No. 886/Civ of December 5, 2016, High
Court of Wouri (Douala)Observations:
The 21st century has been marked by growth in trade
via cyberspace, which allows suppliers to rationalize
7
8
9
10
11

Ibid., at [81].
Ibid., at [82].
T-362/16 Tillotts Pharma v. EUIPO – Ferring (XENASA), Judgment of the General
Court (Fifth Chamber) of June 19, 2018, ECLI:EU:T:2018:354.
Ibid., at [23].
Ibid., at [68]–[70].
39

production costs and reach distant markets at the clickof a button. But the trend has also been devastating forowners of industrial trademarks. In the OAPI member
states, these new economic actors – the newly minted
titans of e-commerce – clash in legal battles, pitting themonopoly granted by trademark law on one side against
the profitability offered by a fluid World Wide Web on
the other.12 The judgment reported here provides someinsight into this new reality.
Facts: The case concerns the international nongovernmental organization (NGO) Forest StewardshipCouncil (FSC), owner of a portfolio of four brands ofgoods and services that included the marks “FSC +Logo” No. 68286 and “FSC + Logo” No. 68289. These
marks were properly registered with the OAPI andtheir registration was kept up to date. The Council
nonetheless became aware that its FSC marks No. 68286
and No. 68289 were being used for commercial
purposes by company Boris Bois SARL (headquarteredin Douala), which had included them on the homepageof its website. To preserve its rights to take action
for counterfeiting, the Council sought and obtained
authorization from the motions judge for the Courtof First Instance of Bonanjo in Douala to complete
a detailed inventory of the company’s website. The
inventory was completed on April 8, 2016, and a record
drawn up shortly after. On that basis, the Council
brought action against Boris Bois in civil proceedings
before the High Court of Wouri in Douala, asking thecourt to order removal of the Council’s registered marks
from the defendant’s website and thereby put an end toits fraudulent use of them.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Reasoning: Despite the failure of Boris Bois to appear
and assert its claims, the High Court considered thecase on the merits and granted the Council’s request.
In essence, although the alleged activity was carriedout entirely in cyberspace, the High Court ruled the
reproduction of FSC marks No. 68286 and No. 68289
to be slavish and thus counterfeiting (section I).
Accordingly, Boris Bois was ordered to remove themfrom its website under threat of penalty (section II).

40

I. Conditions governing convictions for the slavish
reproduction of signs as counterfeiting
The High Court briefly recalled the prerequisites forruling slavish reproduction of a mark to be counterfeiting(A), regardless of the environment in which that activity
takes place (B).
A. Prerequisites for a finding of counterfeiting
Plaintiffs bringing action for counterfeiting are required
to furnish proof of title on the first day of proceedings, aswell as of prior ownership of the counterfeited sign andof its continuing validity.

such action for counterfeiting, with their certificate ofregistration providing proof of ownership. It is logicallyup to the plaintiff to demonstrate that it has indeed
acquired the rights allegedly infringed. The judge in thiscase raised the issue and noted compliance with thisrequirement, the plaintiff having produced certificatesconfirming its registration of the marks concerned.
But the plaintiff must also prove that the protection
afforded by such registration has not lapsed owing to
non-renewal or been canceled following prolonged
failure to use the mark – that is, for an uninterrupted
period of five years prior to bringing the action. As notedin the judgment, the plaintiff produced certification thatthe registration had neither lapsed nor been canceled.
It is only after fulfillment of these prerequisites that thesubstantive conditions for a finding of counterfeiting
stricto sensu should be assessed under civil law.
B. Substantive conditions specified by the judge
for a finding of counterfeiting in the case ofslavish reproduction
Just as community lawmakers have done, the judge
in this case laid down basic conditions for a finding ofcounterfeiting based on slavish reproduction of a sign.13
In essence, the judge required both identical signs andthe designation of identical goods or services (1), andalso a likelihood of confusion in public perception (2).
1. Identical goods and services
Trademark counterfeiting is defined in various ways:
as unlawful or fraudulent imitation, as slavish or nearlyslavish reproduction of another person’s mark, as
violation of a license contract or as unlicensed use ofanother person’s mark.
Slavish reproduction of a sign amounts to the mostobvious form of counterfeiting and the two havelong been assimilated.14 Gastombide was aware
even in the 19th century of the danger of such activity“diverting customers through imitation.” 15 Such slavishcounterfeiting assumes identical reproduction of aprotected sign, with no discernible difference between
the counterfeit and genuine signs. Imitations leaving
insignificant or imperceptible differences are called
nearly slavish. The difference in the present case was soslight, however, that the imitation and original appeared
completely identical – a key consideration in ascertaining
counterfeiting based on slavish reproduction.16
Two signs were reproduced: “FSC + Logo” No. 68286 and“FSC + Logo” No. 68289, both duly registered with the13
14

It is the prerogative of the holder of rights to the title– that is, the first to file for its registration – to bring
12

M.-E. Ancel (2012) Un an de droit international privé du commerceélectronique. Comm. com. 1, chron. 1.

15
16

See AB-1977, art. 37(1)(a) of annex III; see also ABR-1999, art. 57(1)(a) ofannex III.
E. Montcho Agbassa (2017) Revue congolaise de droit et des affaires, 27, 13; LTJ
Diffusion SA v. Sadas Vertbaudet SA, R 112003 of June 19, 2002, OHIM Boardof Appeals, PIDB 2003, III, 341. It has even been asserted that confusion
is a “condition for infringement by imitation of a mark”: Y. Monelli (2003)
Contrefaçon: de l’appréciation de la contrefaçon. In M. Vivant (ed.) Les grandsarrêts de la propriété intellectuelle, Paris: Dalloz, 401.
A.-J. Gastombide (1837) Traité théorique et pratique des contrefaçons en tous
genres. Paris: Le Grand & Descaurier Éditeurs, 410.
P. Mathely (1984) Le droit français des signes distinctifs, JNA, 29.

OAPI under the plaintiff’s name. The defendant, Boris
Bois, was thus accused of reproducing them in extenso,
without differences or additions, and publishing them on
its website.

services.18 In counterfeiting cases, this relieves the victim
of having to prove a likelihood of confusion.19 In all cases,
the judge must factor in the relevant audience’s level ofawareness when assessing this likelihood of confusion.

The Bangui Agreement reserves exclusive rights for the
beneficiary of a registered mark that may be activatedpositively or negatively.

Ruling under civil law based on the evidence presented,
the High Court correctly found confusion likely for theplaintiff’s targeted public: “[T]he defendant illegallyused the plaintiff’s acronym on its products in such a
way as to create confusion in public perception.” This
was a proper application of article 7(2) of annex III
to ARB-1999, giving the injured party the benefit ofpresumed confusion.

The point of dispute in this case was the defendant’s
use of the sign without authorization. The High
Court reasoned that the defendant, having placed
the marks concerned on its website to market its
forest management services, usurped the plaintiff’s
reputation as a forest management NGO, making thedefendant liable for identically reproducing the plaintiff’s
distinctive signs.
In addition to identical signs, the goods or services
designated by them must also be identical if the
reproduction is to constitute counterfeiting.17 According
to the specialty principle followed under trademark law,
protection granted to the right holder for a sign used
as a trademark is enforceable only insofar as the sign isused for goods or services that are identical or similar
to those indicated on the registration certificate. The
relevant goods are those mentioned in the registration
application, which must be compared with those
designated by the infringing sign.
In the present case, the judge implicitly characterized
the goods and services as identical based on thenature of the defendant’s activity, professional forest
management, which was very like that of the plaintiff,
the Forest Stewardship Council. The goods and services
specified in the registration application were thoseincluded in classes 16, 19, 20, 31 35, 40 and 42 under the
Nice Agreement. The judge consequently inferred thatthe goods and services of the two parties were identical,
and thus the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s mark was
liable to create confusion in public perception.
2. The likelihood of confusion in public perception
Such likelihood is obviously inseparable from theconcepts of counterfeiting and slavish reproduction.
Reproduction is counterfeiting, in other words, only ifthat reproduction is liable to deceive the public about
the provenance of the goods or services. Such confusionneed not have actually occurred; it is the likelihood that is
punishable, whether realized or not.
It is a judge who must assess the likelihood of such
confusion. Under OAPI law, confusion is presumed likely
where an identical sign designates identical goods and17

Cf. Decision No. 69/OAPI/DG/SCAJ of the OAPI Director General, cancelingregistration of the mark “TUDOR” No. 40059.

II. The penalty for counterfeiting throughslavish reproduction
In response to the initial request, the judge penalized
the defendant’s slavish reproduction of the mark byordering its removal from the defendant’s website (A).
The decision invites comment and criticism, however, as
to the High Court’s jurisdiction ratione materia for thecase, in its capacity as judge for civil matters (B).

Chapter 3 – Trademarks• If activated positively, the beneficiary is aloneauthorized to use a protected sign, unless it authorizes
use by third parties.
• If activated negatively, the beneficiary has exclusive
standing to prohibit use of the protected sign.

A. Removal of the counterfeit signs from the defendant’s
website: a relatively mild penalty
The civil penalties available for trademark counterfeiting
are quite extensive, comprising a range of sanctions
appropriate to different counterfeiting offenses. Amongthe most frequently pronounced are those awarding
damages to the victim, various forms of injunction tocease illegal activity, publication of court rulings anddestruction of goods marketed under infringing marks.
As civil judge in the present case, the High Court
merely issued an injunction against Boris Bois andordered it to remove the counterfeit signs from its
website, imposing additional penalties should there
be any delay in compliance, aiming to discourage any
spontaneous resistance.
The penalty ordered is regrettably light, aimed
apparently at nothing more than stopping thecounterfeiting and discouraging the defendant fromrepeating the offense. It is unfortunate, in terms ofbusiness ethics, that the judge could not take action
beyond the plaintiff’s claims and written submissions,which narrowed the decision’s parameters from thestart. Under the doctrine of non ultra petita, the court
could rule only on those requests contained in theoriginal act of referral.
B. Issues raised by the ruling
The decision nonetheless raises two issues: whether
the High Court was competent to hear the case, and its
failure to establish the identical nature of the plaintiff’s
and the defendant’s goods and services.

18
19

See ABR-1999, art. 7(2) of annex III.
Decision No. 100/OAPI/DG/DGA/DAJ/SAJ of the OAPI Director Generalcanceling registration of the mark “ITEL Logo” No. 73235.
41

With regard to the first issue, competence is theacknowledged authority of a judge to decide disputes onparticular matters within a clearly defined geographicalarea. Where a court has competence ratione materia,
it may be invoked by the judge, even ex officio, as amatter of public policy (ordre public) pertaining to
judicial organization.
The problem here is that the Bangui Agreement did
not designate the civil court competent to hear actions
relating to trademarks.20 Article 47(1) of annex III to
ABR-1999 merely provides that: “Civil actions relating
to marks shall be brought before the civil courts andjudged as summary proceedings.” In Cameroon, under
Law No. 2006/15 of December 29, 2006, organizing the
judiciary, ratione quantitatem competence is conferredon courts of first instance and high courts for disputes
concerning industrial property assets. Articles 15 and 18of the Act assign competence to courts of first instancefor disputes involving up to CFAF 10 million and to highcourts for those involving larger amounts. However,since 2006, competence has been assigned specifically tothe commercial chambers of such courts, as opposed tothe commercial courts existing in some OAPI countries.
The High Court’s Civil Chamber was thus wrong to retain
competence in the present case. The best course, even if
taken ex officio, would have been to decline competence
ratione materia as a matter of public policy.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

The second problem with the High Court’s decision lies
in some regrettable flaws in its stated reasoning. For
there to be counterfeiting through reproduction, boththe signs and the products of the two parties must be
identical. Such identity must be real and proven, failingwhich the plaintiff may be obliged to demonstrate alikelihood of confusion between its products and thoseof the alleged counterfeiter.

42

The main question put to the judge was whether the
goods and services listed on the various registration
certificates, falling within classes 16, 19, 20, 31 35, 40
and 42 under the Nice Agreement, were identical tothose marketed by Boris Bois. These classifications are,however, of administrative, not legal, value. Goods orservices of the same class are not necessarily identical,
or even similar, while two similar products may belong todifferent classes.
In its written grounds for the ruling, the High Court
mentions the classes of goods and services counterfeited
without venturing to enumerate them specifically and,unconvincingly, declares the goods and services to be
identical. No such thing was established. The judge
seems not to have verified the identical nature of bothsigns and products but only to have presumed it, basedon the inventory of the defendant’s website and theplaintiff’s activity.
Aristide Fade20

Cf. P. Edou Edou (ed.) (2009) Le contentieux de la propriété intellectuelle dans les
États membres de l’OAPI: Guide du magistrat et des auxiliaires. Geneva: WIPO,
73.

C. Trademarks – Forfeiture proceedings
for a non-working mark – Concept of
genuine use – Territorial scope
To successfully oppose forfeiture proceedings, the ownerof a mark must prove genuine and uninterrupted useof the sign invoked as a trademark in at least one of
the OAPI member states. Use relating to a trademark
other than the one registered should not count inthat determination.
ANIL SARL V. COMPAGNIE AFRICAINE DE PRODUITSALIMENTAIRES EN CÔTE D’IVOIRE (CAPRACI), Judgment
No. 3242/201 of October 27, 2015, Commercial Court
of Abidjan
Observations:
The judgment reported here addresses an issue withconsiderable practical ramifications: how to define amark’s “genuine use,” which, if proved, can prevent
forfeiture of the title as non-working? Such forfeiture
is now provided for in article 27 of annex III to ABR2015: “At the request of any person, the competentdomestic court may ascertain the forfeiture and orderthe deregistration of any registered mark that: (a) for
an uninterrupted period of five years prior to therequest, has not been used on the territory of one of themember states if its rightful owner fails to provide valid
grounds …”
Facts: Forfeiture has not always been a feature of
trademark law. The 1857 law in France did not provide
for it, since rights were acquired at that time as a resultof use. The Paris Convention of March 20, 1883, provided
for the possibility of cancellation, but as a voluntary
option for the signatory states.21
Forfeiture can be justified in two ways. First, it can bebased on the fundamental principle of free trade andindustry. According to this notion, the number of signs
is necessarily limited, making it increasingly difficult for
operators entering the market to choose a new mark. It
can be considered healthy, by this reasoning, to remove“parasitic” signs, which are often called “defensive” or“blocking” marks. Second, forfeiture may be justified
by the need to restrict the mark to its function as aguarantee of origin, as affirmed by the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU) in its Ansul decision.22
In the present case, the mark concerned was “Mamapour la cuisine de Maman.” The mark’s forfeiture, asreported by the OAPI, had been pronounced by a default
judgment of the Commercial Court of Abidjan. The owner
21

22

Article 5C(1): “If, in any country, use of the registered trade mark is
compulsory, the registration may be canceled only after a reasonable period,
and then only if the person concerned does not justify his inaction.” See, inthis regard, art. 19.1 TRIPS.
C-40/01 Ansul BV v. Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV, Judgment of the Court ofMarch 11, 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:145, at [37]: “The protection the mark confers
and the consequences of registering it in terms of enforceability vis-à-vis
third parties cannot continue to operate if the mark loses its commercial
raison d’être, which is to create or preserve an outlet for the goods or services
that bear the sign of which it is composed, as distinct from the goods orservices of other undertakings.”

Reasoning: The Abidjan Commercial Court was thus
presented with two distinct problems:I.
II.

the nature of the use required; andthe territory where such use had occurred.

I. Nature of the use required
In assessing whether the use claimed in Benin might
preclude forfeiture, the court first recalled the termsof article 23 of annex III to ABR-1999, the applicableversion of the Bangui Agreement (the wording of whichis retained verbatim as article 27 of ABR-2015). The court
read the burden of proof indicated in that provision as
requiring the mark’s owner to “prove, by any means,genuine and uninterrupted use of the sign invoked as atrademark and allowing it to be distinguished from thoseof its competitors.” The court specified that “symbolicuse, the sole purpose of which is to maintain the rights
created by the mark,” could not be taken into account.
While not found in the Bangui Agreement, the adjective“genuine” used in the court’s ruling does appear in EU
legislation.23 Other language in the court’s ruling (use of
the sign “as a mark,” the exclusion of “symbolic use”) issimilar to wording in the well-known Ansul decision,24 inwhich the CJEU stated as a matter of law that:“[T]here is ‘genuine use’ of a trade mark where
the mark is used in accordance with its essentialfunction, which is to guarantee the identity ofthe origin of the goods or services for which itis registered, in order to create or preserve an
outlet for those goods or services; genuine use
does not include token use for the sole purpose ofpreserving the rights conferred by the mark.”
In highly didactic fashion, the court then entered into
detail on what must be proved. “Acceptable proof,” itaffirmed, “must give indications as to the place, duration,
significance and nature of the mark’s use for the goods
and services designated in registering it.” The CJEU
has taken that same view even further. Genuine use
must be assessed, it has affirmed, “taking account of
all the relevant facts and circumstances, including thecharacteristics of the market concerned, the nature of
the goods or services protected by the trade mark andthe territorial extent and scale of the use as well as its
frequency and regularity.” 25

Had the plaintiff in the present case met this burdenof proof? The court’s response appears to have been“no,” based mainly on the place of use not being clearly
established. While elliptical, the answer does shed lighton specific actions that can be considered to establish
genuine use.
The court started on a positive note, accepting thatsome of the exhibits produced (e.g., purchase orders,bills of lading, product packaging stamped with themark) “unquestionably prove the tangible and physicalexistence and use of the mark.” That formulation is,
however, perplexing. It would have been preferable
to know which pieces of evidence were convincing(the packaging, no doubt) and why others were not(perhaps the purchase orders or bills of lading). Similarly,
did the use claimed extend over the full five years of“uninterrupted use,” as required by article 27 of annex III
to ABR-2015? 26
Taking a more skeptical tone, the court then made animportant point: the purchase orders and bills of ladingrefer to “a mark called ‘Mama’ not ‘Mama pour la cuisinede Maman’, as in dispute here.” Because these were “twoquite different marks,” the court reasoned, use of theformer could not in any event prove use of the latter.
That assertion may be based on article 27, whichrefers simply to a “registered mark.” It is tempting
to view that provision in the light of article 5(C)(2) ofthe Paris Convention of 1883, which provides: “Use ofa trademark by the proprietor in a form differing inelements which do not alter the distinctive characterof the mark in the form in which it was registered in
one of the countries of the [Paris] Union shall not entail
invalidation of the registration and shall not diminish
the protection granted to the mark.” 27 According toarticle 19 of ABR-2015, moreover, where provisionsof the Bangui Agreement diverge from those ofinternational agreements signed by OAPI member states(which include the Paris Convention), the international
agreements shall prevail.28 But such an easy path toproving use, to avoid forfeiture, might be considered lessappropriate where the mark concerned has itself beenregistered separately, as seems to have been the case for“Mama.” In France, the Court of Cassation ruled to that
effect 29 before the opposite solution became establishedunder EU law.30
In any event, even leaving aside the difficulty associatedwith multiple marks, the contradiction between the
Bangui Agreement (article 27) and the Paris Convention(article 5(C)(2)) can be overcome if deletion of the words“pour la cuisine de Maman” is considered sufficient
to alter the mark’s “distinctive character,” within the
26
27

23
24
25

Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council ofJune 14, 2017 on the European Union trade mark, OJ L 154/1, art. 18.1.
Ansul, n. 22.
C-149/11 Leno Merken BV v. Hagelkruis Beheer BV, Judgment of the Court(Second Chamber) of December 19, 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:816.

Chapter 3 – Trademarksof the mark, opposing its forfeiture, sought withdrawalof the default judgment for failing to consider the mark’s
use in Benin, an OAPI member country. In response, thecompany seeking forfeiture objected that uninterrupted
and genuine use in Benin had not been proven and that,in any event, “obligation of use” imposed by the Bangui
Agreement extends “to all OAPI member countries” andthus to Côte d’Ivoire, where the action was brought.

28
29
30

ABR-2015, art. 27 of annex III, identical to ABR-1999, art. 23, the version
applicable to this case.
See also Regulation 2017/1001, n. 23, at art. 18(1)(a), reserving the possibilityof invoking such use against forfeiture proceedings.
“Where the provisions of this Agreement or its annexes diverge from those of
the international agreements to which the Member States or the Organization
are party, the international agreements shall prevail.”Cass. com., June 20, 2006, No. 4-18.768.
See Regulation 2017/1001, n. 23, at art. 18(1)(a).
43

meaning of the latter provision. A judgment of the Courtof First Instance of the European Union appears to havemade that argument. It interpreted article 18(1)(a) of
European Regulation 2017/1001 as relating “to a situation
where a national or Community registered trade mark isused in trade in a form slightly different from the form
in which registration was effected,” that being the case“where the sign used in trade differs from the form
in which it was registered only in negligible elements,
so that the two signs can be regarded as broadly
equivalent.” 31
The particular case of elements being deleted froma registered mark has been the subject of extensive
case law in France that is rather difficult to summarize.
Taking a somewhat extreme position, the Paris Court ofAppeal refused to consider the sign “Seven” as genuine
use of the mark “Seven7,” reasoning that the latter’s
distinctiveness depended in particular on repetition of
the number 7.32 According to a more accommodating
judgment from the same court, use of the words “Top
Model” did not alter the distinctive character of a markregistered as “Top Model de Jean-Jacques Vivier.” 33 The
premise of this latter ruling is not entirely dissimilar tothat of the present case. However, while permission toappeal against the ruling was denied,34 the precedent it
sets is limited. The solution has, in fact, been criticized as
shirking the principles laid down by the EU Court of First
Instance in the case mentioned above.35
The position of the Commercial Court of Abidjan can thus
clearly be commended for its solid reasoning. It is simply
unfortunate that the debate did not address this point.

This reasoning is also solid. To prevent forfeiture, it
is sufficient, under article 27, to establish use on the
territory of one of the member states. The applicant
insisted that use in all OAPI member states must be
proven, such that failure to do so in a single country“exposes the trademark concerned to deregistration.”
That position obviously cannot be right. But it does
have to be established where the use occurred and,in practice, that can be done only through sworn
official statements.
The only reservation we might have in relation
to this finding concerns its focus on territorial
localization, warranting another comparison withEU law. The previously mentioned article 18(1) ofRegulation 2017/1001, referring to EU marks, mentions
only use “in the Union,” without specifying (as does ABR2015, in article 27 of annex III) that it must occur “on the
territory of one of the member states.” Yet the provisionthat this replaced, Regulation 207/2009 of February 26,
2009, containing the same provision on forfeiture,36
had been preceded by a joint statement by the Council
asserting that use in a single country represented
genuine use within the Union.
This solution was applied initially by the European
Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),37 but latertransformed by the CJEU in the Leno Merken decision,
which rejected its automatic character.38 The CJEU
reasoned that while there was:“… admittedly some justification for thinking
that a Community trade mark should – because
it enjoys more extensive territorial protection
than a national trade mark – be used in a larger
area than the territory of a single Member Statein order for the use to be regarded as ‘genuineuse’, it cannot be ruled out that, in certain
circumstances, the market for the goods orservices for which a Community trade markhas been registered is in fact restricted to theterritory of a single Member State.” 39

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II. Territory of use

44

To serve as a defense against forfeiture proceedings
under article 27 of annex III to ABR-2015, the use of amark must have occurred “on the territory of one of
the member states.” That was the crux of the court’s
reasoning in the present case. After conceding that“some” of the exhibits produced in the proceedings
established use of the mark “Mama pour la cuisine deMaman,” the court said that “these exhibits, taken
together or individually, do not establish that the
disputed mark was actually used in Benin.” It laidparticular emphasis on the absence of an affidavit from“a sworn official whose acts are considered authoritative
until proven otherwise,” attesting that the products were“available for sale in Benin.”

31
32
33
34
35

T-194/03 Il Ponte Finanziaria SpA v. EUIPO, Judgment of the General Court(Fourth Chamber) of February 23, 2006, ECLI:EU:T:2006:65, at [50].
CA Paris, June 6, 2005: PIBD 2005, III, 551.
CA Paris, June 9, 2006: PIBD 2006, III, 612.
Cass. com., December 4, 2007, No. 6-18.901.
See, in this regard, P. Trefigny-Goy (2008). Propr. ind., comm. 10, No. 6: “Thisinterpretation seems to be very tolerant for the trademark owner. It is notclear whether this is a minor modification …” See also E. Le Bihan (2018)
JurisClasseur Marques – Dessins et modèles. Fasc. 7405-2, No. 83: “Clearly, themark as used differed significantly from that registered, and we can thus
question the relevance of such a decision where the mark is in the end used ina form shortened by more than 50%, whereas the deleted elements cannot be
considered as lacking in distinctiveness.”

This is contrary to what the EU Court of First Instance
had seemed to rule previously,40 in laying down theprinciple (admittedly, about a national mark, not an EUmark) that genuine use implies that the mark is present
in a substantial section of the territory in which it isprotected. The court concluded from this that it was“impossible to determine a priori, and in the abstract,
what extent of territory should be considered sufficient
to determine whether the use of a mark is genuine
or not.” 41 It then called on domestic courts, in very
general wording, to consider “all the relevant facts
and circumstances.”

36
37
38
39
40
41

Council Regulation (EC) No. 207/2009 of February 26, 2009 on the Community
trade mark, OJ L 78/1, art. 51.
E. Le Bihan, n. 35, No. 20, and the references quoted there.
Leno Merken, n. 25.
Leno Merken, n. 25, at [50].
T-39/01 Kabushiki Kaisha Fernandes v. EUIPO, Judgment of the General Court(Fourth Chamber) of December 12, 2002, ECLI:EU:T:2002:316.
Ibid., at [55].

André Lucas

D. Trademark – Registration – No change
in subject of registration –Infringement action – Acquittalof accused – Counterclaim forcompensation – Assessment ofdamage – Flat-rate compensation
Under article 7 of annex III to ABR-1999,42 the only act
that the owner of a trademark is entitled to prevent, orto proceed against in court, is the unlawful use of an
identical or similar sign for goods or services that arethemselves similar to those for which the trademark orservice mark has been registered.
The Court of Appeal has therefore correctly applied theterms of ABR-1999 by quashing a lower-court decision,
dismissing alleged infringement and recalling that
exclusive right of use cannot, without a new registration,
be claimed for modifications made to the registeredtrademark in violation of article 21(3) of annex III.
If the plaintiff should fail to substantiate facts
constituting infringement, they may be ordered to pay
compensation for the damage caused to the alleged
infringer if the action is deemed abusive or vexatious.
MP AND AMANDATOU ADECHOKAN V. FATIYOUNOUSSA AND SALAMATOU YOUNOUSSA, Judgmentof July 18, 2006, Court of Appeal of BrazzavilleObservations:
The owner of a protected mark has the right to prevent
competitors from using marks identical or so similar toits own as to confuse the consumer with regard to goods
or services identical or similar to those designated by theowner’s mark. The right possessed by the owner of a markis thus recognized as exclusive – a principle enshrined inarticle 7(3) of annex III to ABR-1999,43 which provides that“[r]egistration of the mark likewise confers on the owner
the exclusive right to prevent all third parties from making
use in business without his consent, of identical or similarsigns for goods or services that are themselves similar to
those for which the trademark or service mark has beenregistered where such use is liable to cause confusion.”
The same principle has also been adopted internationally
via article 16(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which
provides that “[t]he owner of a registered trademark
shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties
not having the owner’s consent from using in the courseof trade identical or similar signs for goods or services
which are identical or similar to those in respect of which
42
43

Cf. ABR-2015, art. 6 of annex III.
Ibid.

the trademark is registered where such use would resultin a likelihood of confusion.” The principle means that,
under trademark law, the right holder must be able, atthe very least, to put a stop to the use of similar signs
for similar products in the same market where such use
would cause confusion among consumers about theorigin or authorization of those products.
From this perspective, the judgment of the Court ofAppeal of Brazzaville in this case is of major legal interest.
Facts: Mrs. Fati Younoussa and Mrs. Salamatou
Younoussa registered the fabric trademark “SULTANAALWAYS THE BEST” with the OAPI on April 17, 2001.
The mark was a logo composed of three colors (red,white and gold) and a royal crown.44 In 2004, the twoplaintiffs became aware of the presence on the marketof traditional dresses (in French, pagnes) bearing thedistinctive sign “SYLVANA ELEGANCE BEST QUALITY,”
which they considered an infringement of their own
mark. They requested and obtained from the presidentof the Brazzaville High Court an order for a detailed
inventory of the products marked, imported, deliveredand sold to their detriment, to be performed by the
economic and financial investigations department of
the Directorate of Judicial Police. The two plaintiffs also
obtained an order for the seizure of two copies of theinfringing goods from all warehouses and displays.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

Perhaps the Commercial Court of Abidjan should havefollowed that advice to put the issue of territorial locationin perspective.

Under that order, on March 15, 2004, the Directorate’s
department confiscated a batch of 250 dresses bearing
the sign “SYLVANA ELEGANCE” from the ADE (Marna
Bonheur) and ICE establishments. It was against thisbackdrop that Mrs. F. Younoussa and Mrs. S. Younoussa
brought legal proceedings against ADE and ICE, as well
as Mrs. A. Adechokan, before the correctional chamberof the Brazzaville Court of First Instance. That trial
court found the latter guilty of unlawfully exploitatinga registered mark and ordered her to pay the plaintiffs
CFAF 25 million in damages.
Mrs. Adechokan appealed.
Reasoning: Finding no infringement offense, theBrazzaville Court of Appeal quashed the trial court’s
ruling. It based its decision first on the plaintiffs having
violated both the specialty principle and the prohibition
against modifying registered marks, and second, on
the absence of a notable likelihood of confusion. The
court also received a counterclaim for compensationfrom Mrs. Adechokan for excessive seizure and the
distrainors’ abuse of civil action procedures.
The court’s ruling represents a clear statement on whether
the use of a mark in a modified form remains protectedby article 7 of annex III to ABR-1999,45 so as to warrant an
infringement action. In its statement, the court affirms:
44

45

Such a mark may be classified in the category of semi-figurative marks
characterized by a combination of a name and a design. See Dépôt demarque.com, Les différentes forms de marques déposables, https://depotde-marque.com/guide-marques/marques-verbales-figuratives-et-semifiguratives-les-differentes-formes-de-marques/.
Now ABR-2015, art. 6 of annex III.
45

I.
II.

the obligation to use a mark in accordance with thecorresponding registration certificate; andthe trial judge’s discretionary power ininfringement cases.

I. Obligation to use the mark in accordance with theregistration certificate
Under article 7 of annex III to ABR-1999, the only
act that the owner of a trademark or service mark is
entitled to prevent or proceed against is the unlawful
use of an identical or similar sign for goods or services
that are themselves identical or similar to those forwhich the mark has been registered (A). Such protection
does not extend to modifications made to theregistered mark in violation of article 21(3) of annex III
unless a new registration is filed (B).
A. Protection of the mark through prior registration
In their application for registration, the owner of amark must define exactly what they intend to protect;
ABR-1999, in its provisions for infringement actions
under articles 7 and 46 of annex III, protects only what
is included in the registration application. In other words,
the registration applicant must specify all elementsof a mark that they might seek to protect throughinfringement action.46

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

In this case, the appeal court invoked that principle
against the plaintiffs. They had registered their markwith the OAPI on April 17, 2001, as comprising threecolors, red, white and gold, and a logo formed by aroyal crown printed in a gold color within a central
ring. The judges noted that although such signs canbe protected legally under article 7, such protection
cannot be extended to other signs not appearing on theregistration certificate:

46“[T]here is no indication in the judgment or on
the sheet reproducing the mark that ‘SULTANAALWAYS THE BEST’ can be translated into French
as ‘TOUJOURS LE MEILLEUR’ according to thedestination of the goods […] paradoxically,a sample dress bearing the registered mark
‘SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST’ appears nowherein the dossier […] instead of the logo registeredunder No. 45120 on February 19, 2002, in
Yaoundé, the dossier contains a different logo:‘SULTANA Les Griffes de Fati’.”
The Court’s position was that the logo “SULTANA Les
Griffes de Fati” affixed to the allegedly counterfeited
dresses could not fall within the scope of protection of
the mark “SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST” – a position thatappears to accord strictly with article 7 of annex III: onlythat which is declared is protected.47

46
47

See ABR-1999, art. 8 of annex III, now ABR-2015, art. 9 of annex III.
See J. Passa (2009) Droit de la propriété intellectuelle, vol. I: marques etautres signes distinctifs, 2nd edn. Paris: LGCF, 147–149. See also CA Paris,
November 10, 2000, PIBD 2001, No. 716, III, 143.

That principle, frequently invoked in case law, applied
fully in the present case. Having indicated “SULTANAALWAYS THE BEST” as the mark registered, theplaintiffs could not extend protection to word signs
not included in the registration application. Moreover,it was surprising that the owner of a mark, in offering
physical evidence of having registered the mark to prove
infringement of its rights, should have provided goods
bearing signs not matching those registered.
Specifically, as the court observed, the plaintiffs hadentered into evidence dresses bearing a logo, “SULTANALes Griffes de Fati,” which did not appear in the official
registration, rather than “SULTANA ALWAYS THE
BEST.” The court therefore risked violating article 7 ofannex III if it were to accept the former as a componentof the protected mark. Indeed, except for well-known
trademarks,48 the reference document used to establish
the scope of trademark protection is the registration
certificate,49 which is based on the information on theapplication form filed. For that reason and in accordancewith article 8 of the same annex, it is important thatapplications for trademark registration provide a
description and/or reproduction of the mark and a listof the products for which registration of the sign issought, as well as their corresponding classes under
the international classification of goods and services.
Use of the mark must subsequently accord with theregistration certificate.
The court buttressed its reasoning by invoking theprinciple of specialty, which the plaintiffs were said tohave violated. According to the principle of specialty, amark must be used – and is protected – only in respectof the goods or services designated upon registration,
so that their origin can be determined. That is a mark’s
essential purpose.
That principle, however, ought not to have been raisedin this case, because the product declared in the actof registration (a fabric) was provided as a sample
and turned out to be the same as that impugnedby the plaintiffs. The problem lay elsewhere: in thediscrepancy, as the court pointed out, between theword signs registered under the mark and those
appearing on the dresses produced as evidenceof trademark infringement. The court, apparently
understanding this, simply evoked the specialty
principle without elaborating further; the courtemphasized instead that a change of logo cannot be
considered a change of registration, which is not legallypermissible for trademarks.
B. Protection of the mark through the exclusionof modifications
In correcting the trial judge, the Court of Appeal was
careful to recall that a registered mark cannot be
modified, article 21(3) of annex III to ABR-2015 clearlystating: “No changes may be made either to the mark48
49

See ABR-1999, art. 6; ABR-2015, art. 5 of annex III; art. 6bis of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; art. 16(2) and (3) TRIPS.
See ABR-1999, art. 16 of annex III (now ABR-2015, art. 20 of annex III).

The Court of Appeal therefore properly applied thelaw – in particular, article 21(3) of annex III to ABR-1999,
which prohibits any modification to the mark or to thegoods or services for which the mark was registered.
It is clearly not permissible to modify any of a mark’s
essential elements, including the name, logo or
associated wording.50 This underscores the importancefor trademark applicants to carefully consider themark intended to be registered and adequately draft
the application for registration, to achieve longterm protection.
According to article 19 of annex III, once a mark has beenregistered for 10 years, it can be renewed indefinitely. It
is true that this might tempt the owner to try modifying
its mark if business developments should so require.
But as the appellate judges correctly pointed out, in thatevent, a new registration is required under conditions
laid down in articles 8 and 9 of the same annex; 51 underarticles 13 and 14 of that annex, the OAPI will thenexamine whether those conditions have been met.
Indeed, the question of trademark modification iscovered by a large body of case law in other countries,
particularly France. Despite the formal prohibition
against changing any element of a mark, certain
modifications not liable to alter a mark’s distinctivenesshave been recognized. In France, for instance, theCourt of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence has accepted
separate use of only part of a mark where the rest is
substantively redundant.52

50

51
52

Cass. ass. plén., July 16, 1992, PIBD 1992, No. 534, III, 659; JCP E-44 1992, 239(note J.-J. Burst); Sté Nicolas Napoléon v. Sté Dulong Frères et Cie, Judgment of
the CA Paris, Fourth Chamber, of March 21, 1983, Ann. propr. ind. 1983, 73;
A. Thrierr and O. Thrierr (2004) JurisClasseur Marques, Fasc. 7720, 23.
ABR-2015, arts. 9 and 10.
Cf. Judgment No. RG 16/7491 of March 21, 2019, of CA Aix-en-Provence.
Regarding the mark, “les pierres du v la pierre du v,” the court held “it cannot
be contested that the distinctive element of the registered word mark is theterm ‘pierre du Vallat’; the sign ‘les pierres du vallat’ preceding the group‘la pierre du vallat’ appears to be a redundant element, and it is noted thatthe full sign as registered cannot be used in economic usage because of its
unusual length.”

In the same vein, the Commercial Chamber of the French
Court of Cassation confirmed a judgment in which theParis Court of Appeal upheld as valid the modified useof a trademark because the modification did not alter its
distinctive character.53
Unlike annex III to ABR-1999, applicable to the facts
in the present case, however, article L714-5(1) of theFrench Intellectual Property Code (Code de la PropriétéIntellectuelle, or CPI) explicitly authorizes use of a mark “ina modified form that does not alter its distinctiveness.” Theprohibition of trademark modification is similarly eased byarticle 5(C)(2) of the Paris Convention,54 which is referenced
in ABR-1999. Positively aligning with this more flexible
approach, article 27(2) of annex III to the most recent
revision of the Bangui Agreement (ABR-2015) authorizes
use of a mark in a modified form that does not alter its
distinctive character.
In this case, however, combining the word “SULTANA”
with the words “Les Griffes de Fati” instead of “ALWAYS
THE BEST” modified the mark so substantially that noteven ABR-2015 would allow it. The court was thus correct
in declining to recognize the word sign “SULTANA Les
Griffes de Fati” as protected under the registered mark
“SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST.”

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

or to the list of goods or services for which the markwas registered.” That position results from presentation
during the proceedings of sample dresses bearing
the logo “SULTANA Les Griffes de Fati” rather than theregistered mark “SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST.” The court
interpreted the different word sign as a modification
to the registered mark and reversed the trial court’s
decision to accept that modification. The trial court
had based its acceptance on annex II, which deals withutility models, instead of annex III, on trademarks(article 21(3)), despite the fact that the Younoussas had
registered as marks a set of word signs (“SULTANAALWAYS THE BEST”) and figurative signs composed of“red, white and gold colors, with a logo in the central ring
formed by a royal crown printed in a gold color.”

Its assessment regarding infringement, meanwhile,
is problematic.
II. Exclusive jurisdiction of the trial judge for themain infringement action and acceptance of thecounterclaim for damages
The salient points in this decision are that:A.

B.

it is up to a plaintiff to prove to the court that its
trademark right has been infringed and the trial
judge has exclusive jurisdiction to rule on that
allegation; anda plaintiff failing to demonstrate that infringement
has been committed may be ordered to pay
compensation for the damage caused to the alleged
infringer if the plaintiff’s action is deemed to beabusive or vexatious.

A. Assessment of the infringement conditions
The Court of Appeal ruled first on the validity of theseizure ordered on March 10, 2004, by the president of
the Brazzaville High Court, and executed by the economic
and financial investigation department of the Directorateof the Judicial Police. It then assessed the likelihood of
consumers confusing the two marks in question.
53

54

Cass. com., December 12, 2018, No. 10633F: “The French trademark‘monkiosque.fr monkiosque.net’, registered in 2006, will be read‘monkiosque’ a single time and does not derive its distinctiveness from the
doubling of the same word. The extensions .fr and .net are linked only tointernet needs and are no more distinctive, and the addition of a figurative
element and colors do not alter the distinctive character of the trademark.”
Article 5C(2) of the Paris Convention provides that: “Use of a trademark by the
proprietor in a form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive
character of the mark in the form in which it was registered [...] shall notentail invalidation of the registration and shall not diminish the protection
granted to the mark.”
47

Recalling the substantive conditions for a valid
infringement seizure, the court said that “the firstjudge ordered seizures on the basis of the registeredtrademark without verifying, as required by article 48(2),whether the right holder had proven its registration of
the trademark by producing an official act to that effect,
as now included in the dossier, but above all, proof thatthe mark had neither lapsed nor been canceled.” Under
article 48 of annex III, when a court is petitioned for
infringement seizure and before it grants such a petition,
its president must first verify whether the applicant is
indeed the owner of a valid and available mark. For that
purpose, the judge so petitioned, as well as the court
hearing any challenge to the seizure order should one beissued, must confirm both the registration of the markand that it has neither lapsed nor been canceled. The
necessary certificates will allow the judge to ascertainthat the mark was protected on the day of the petition.55
In the present case, the Court of Appeal found the firstjudge to be at fault for failing to seek such verification,
especially given the “troubling” circumstance “that theowner of a well-defined registered mark, while availingherself of that registered mark, was content to present
to the court samples of another logo, as if the registered
mark had lapsed or been canceled.” The court’scomments suggest that had the plaintiff produced
certification that the mark “SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST”
had neither lapsed nor been canceled, the point could
then have been verified.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

While the observation is correct from the standpointof article 48, the court draws no conclusions from it.
Also questionable is the relevance of raising issues atthis point in the court’s reasoning not about executionof the seizure but about the order authorizing it. The
recitals preceding article 7 of annex III make it clearthat protection under that article did not extend to themodified mark. The Younoussas had substantiatedneither the registration of their mark nor its effective
use – indispensable conditions for establishing andenforcing trademark protection. There is consequently
reason to question why the court ruled on the likelihoodof confusion after it had demonstrated the absence ofany protected right.

48

Under article 37 of annex III,56 certain infringements ofthe mark are punishable only if “liable to create confusionin public perception.” These include fraudulent imitationof a mark and the sale or offer for sale of goods bearing
a fraudulently imitated mark or indications liable todeceive the buyer about the nature of the product, as
well as the offer and supply of goods or services undersuch a mark. This shows the real-life significance ofassessing the likelihood of confusion among consumers.57

In case law, judicial precedents have established that thejudge must assess the likelihood of confusion in public
perception comprehensively, “taking into account all
relevant factors in the case,” 58 and that such relevant
factors include in particular “the visual, auditory orconceptual similarity of the marks at issue.” 59
In sum, the likelihood of confusion is assessed not on thebasis of differences, as the Court of Appeal incorrectlybases its assessment in this case, but of similarities.60 By
reasoning that “the two logos have too many differences
to be similar,” and that “the first obvious difference isbetween the crown next to SULTANA and the sun of
SYLVANA,” the court misapplies that important criterion,
setting an example not to be followed by lower courts,
their discretion in the matter notwithstanding.61
Even more fundamentally, it is the relevance of assessing
the likelihood of confusion that is problematic in thiscase. As the court itself says, “the mark claimed by F. andS. Younoussa cannot be assigned ownership.” Having
thus denied the plaintiffs’ ownership of a protectedmark, the court should not have even broached theissue of confusion – as it did with so little basis – sinceno intellectual property right can possibly havebeen infringed. The absence of a right to a protectedtrademark precludes any notion of infringement in thesense of article 37 of annex III.62 Infringement being an
offense against an intellectual property right, a person
cannot be prosecuted for it if the protected right has notbeen established.
In any event, the court found no material evidence oftrademark infringement and acquitted Mrs. Adechokanof that charge.63 Most importantly, the court found theplaintiffs’ actions to be abusive and ordered them to pay
damages to the defendant.
B. Admission of the counterclaim of damages for abusiveand vexatious proceedings
In the present case, the court admitted and partiallygranted the request made by the defendant, who,
claiming to be the victim of a vexatious and abusive
procedure, sought compensation from the plaintiffs
in the amount of CFAF 50 million, with all causes of
injury combined.
58
59
60

61
55
56
57

ABR-1999, art. 48(2) of annex III: “The order shall be made on request,
subject to proof that the mark is registered and that it has neither lapsed nor
been canceled.”
Now ABR-2015, art. 57 of annex III.
A. Bouvel (2012) JurisClasseur – marques et noms de domaines, Fasc. 7519,
para. 34 et seq. Cf. also Bosnalijek Pharmaceutical and Chemical Industry Co. v.
Sanofi-Aventis SA, Decision No. 157 of April 26, 2012, OAPI High Commission of
Appeal (obs. A. Lucas, this collection, Chapter 3, section A).

62
63

See C-251/95 Sabel BV v. Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport, Judgment of the Courtof November 11, 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:528.
Cass. com., April 10, 2019, No. 18-10.075.
See Cass. com., May 30, 2012, No. 11-14910, unpublished, in which a recent
illustration of this principle of the assessment of infringement was set out
based on similarities rather than differences. The case law of the French
Court of Cassation is logically consistent on this point and emphasizes
that infringement is to be assessed on similarities. See Cass. 1ère civ.,
May 25, 1992, D. 1993, case law 184 (note X. Daverat), D. 1993, sum. 84 (obs.
C. Colombet), LPA March 10, 1993, 10 (C. Gavalda) and D. 1993, sum. 243 (obs.
T. Hassler).
Moreover, the French Court of Cassation has recalled that confusion must be
assessed to the extent likely of the average consumer, “normally informed
and reasonably attentive and sensible” in the product category at issue: see
Cass. com., September 6, 2016, No. 14-25.692.
Now ABR-2015, art. 57.
See art. 405 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Congo:“If the court considers that the act being prosecuted does not constitutean offense under criminal law or that the act is not established or is not
attributable to the accused, the accused shall be acquitted.” See also art. 457
of the Senegal’s Code of Criminal Procedure of Senegal.

In so doing, the court raises two issues:• the acceptance of a counterclaim based on abuseof procedure in a case of trademark infringement,
particularly in criminal proceedings; and• the assessment of damage suffered by a person
accused but acquitted of infringement.
At the outset, it should be emphasized that acounterclaim is a device in civil law defined as “theclaim by which the original defendant seeks advantage
other than mere dismissal of its adversary’s claim.”
64
The Code of Civil Procedure of Senegal, for example,
treats counterclaims as incidental requests,65 admissible
only if sufficiently linked to the original claims.66 In
trademark litigation, the defendant’s recognized
standing to exercise that procedural right usuallyleads to counterclaims for a title’s invalidation,67 or forforfeiture of the rights conveyed by registration of themark.68 Increasingly, however, defendants prosecutedfor infringement are filing such counterclaims
systematically, claiming injury from abusive proceedings
to seek compensation.
This case is of particular interest because the seizure wasrequested before a criminal court. Public proceedings
in criminal matters are initiated in principle by the
public prosecutor’s office, although generally basedon a victim’s complaint.69 In this case, the complaint
concerned counterfeiting, but its originators had filed
a civil claim. It would thus be incorrect to penalize themfor abusive proceedings at the exonerated defendant’s
request, because it was not they who initiated theprosecution for counterfeiting.70 The situation would
be different only if they themselves had initiated public
proceedings, as the law allowed,71 by lodging a complaint
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

See, e.g., art. 64 of the Code de procédure civile français, Paris: Dalloz, 2020,
111 edition, 168.
See art. 193 of Senegal’s Code of Civil Procedure.
See G. Couchez and X. Lagarde (2004) Procédure civile, 17th edn. Paris: Sirey,
179.
Cass. com., April 10, 2019, No. 17-26612
Cass. com., July 5, 2017, No. 13-11.513.
Article 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Congo: public
proceedings for enforcement of sentences are initiated and exercised by thejudges and officials to whom they are entrusted by law.
See J. Pradel (2013) Procédure pénale, 17th edn. Paris: Cujas, 602–603.
Article 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Congo: “These
proceedings may also be brought by the injured party under the conditions
laid down in this Code.”with the examining magistrate and suing for civil injury,
or initiating private prosecution directly before the court.
In these latter two instances, a court would have reason
to rule on the counterclaim after absolving its author of
the civil charges in the same decision.72
In this case, there is every indication that the second
instance applied. Following article 407 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Congo, the Court
ruled against the plaintiffs on the question of theirabuse of civil law proceedings.73 But at what point does
exercise of the right to proceed against trademark
infringement become abusive and vexatious, so as tobackfire against the plaintiff? Looking at the case law, it
is not commonplace for courts to accept counterclaims
for abusive and vexatious proceedings after dismissing
an infringement action; rather, they tend to consider afailed infringement action as resulting from the originalplaintiff’s poor decision-making or misconception
about the scope of its rights.74 The situation is different,
however, when such a plaintiff acts with full knowledge
that its claim is ill-founded.75

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

In an initial recital, the court admitted the existence of
misconduct and injury, recognizing “that the damage
suffered from the excessive seizure of 250 dresses,
instead of a few samples, has been clearly established;that the lawsuit has caused her inconvenience,
discrediting her throughout this procedure; andthat the loss of trust among her customers warrantscompensation.” In a second recital, the court itself
assessed the damages incurred: “This court has thediscretionary power to determine the extent of damage
done to her, and seeing that abuse of the judicial process
has been demonstrated under article 407 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, assesses the resulting damages at
CFAF 5 million ...”

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal found abuse in thiscase – although not, strictly speaking, in the initiationof legal proceedings. The abuse lay instead in that theplaintiffs had obtained actual seizure of all or part ofthe infringing products instead of the court-orderedinventory granted by the judge, and they then saw theirinfringement action dismissed on the merits.76 The
situation is similar to that in which infringement seizureis granted but later invalidated for failure to initiate
proceedings on the merits within the 10 days allowed
by law.77
What the court found in this case was a mishandling of
the judge’s order when judicial police seized 250 dresses
instead of a few samples. That position is founded inlaw. As the facts and proceedings clearly show, theplaintiffs were granted a court-ordered inventory,
but the procedure conducted in fact was the actual,physical seizure of a substantial portion of the goods instock. That makes the seizure abusive and a misdeed,
warranting compensation.

72
73

74

75
76
77

See art. 407 of the Code Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Congo; art. 459 of
Senegal’s Code of Criminal Procedure.
Article 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Congo: “In
the case provided for in art. 405, where the civil party has itself brought the
public proceedings, the court shall decide by the same judgment on the claim
for damages brought by the person acquitted against the civil party for abuseof suing for civil injury.”
See CA Paris, January 16, 1998, RD Propr. intell. 1998, No. 87, 20; CA Paris,
May 23, 2001, PIBD 2001, No. 729, III, 526; TGI Marseille, March 14, 1979, PIBD
1979, No. 244, III, 337; Cass. com., May 22, 1973, No. 71-13.912, JurisData
No. 1973-097181; CA Lyon, May 28, 1991, Dossiers brevets 1991, II, 1; CA Paris,
January 16, 1992, Ann. propr. ind. 1995, 57, PIBD 1992, No. 524, III, 326.
See Cass. com., May 22, 1973, No. 71-13.912, JurisData No. 1973-097181; CA
Lyon, May 28, 1991, Dossiers brevets 1991, II, 1; CA Paris, January 16, 1992,
Propr. ind. 1995, 57, PIBD 1992, No. 524, III, 326.
See PIBD No. 894, III, 951; 13 PIBD No. 897, III, 1110.
Nazaire Gnanhoue v. Sola Co., Judgment No. 70/15 of March 4, 2015, Courtof Appeal of Lomé (obs. M. Lamotte, this collection, Chapter 3, section I):“Detention beyond the legal time limit of an allegedly infringing shipment ofgoods through exercise of an excessive prerogative of ordinary law intended
to constitute evidence for a future procedure undoubtedly creates damage tothe owner of those goods.”
49

It then remained for the counterclaiming defendant,
upon dismissal of the charge against her, to establish
the damage she had suffered. That is what a judge canremedy following the principle of full compensation:
nothing but the damage, but all the damage suffered.78
An interesting innovation can be found in this regard
in article 54 of annex III to ABR-2015, which establishes
precise criteria for determining damages: “The court
seized of the matter shall determine the amount of thedamages, having regard to the adverse financial effects,
including loss of earnings, suffered by the prejudiced
party, the profit made by the counterfeiter and the moral
damage caused to the owner of the rights as a resultof the infringement.” In the present case, the Court ofAppeal exercised its discretion to set the amount at
CFAF 5 million for nuisance caused to Mrs. Adechokan,
who, in addition to being discredited, had suffered aloss of trust among her customers. In addition to moral
prejudice, the court referred to material damages, but
without quantifying them separately.
Malick Lamotte

E. Infringement action and unfair
competition – Dismissal of opposition
to registration of an allegedly
infringing mark – OAPI – Judicial
review
A judge at first instance who dismisses an action for
infringement and unfair competition initiated by theowner of a registered mark on the grounds that theowner’s opposition to registration of the infringing markbefore competent OAPI bodies has failed does so without
legal basis.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

SOCIÉTÉ R.M. & CO. LTD V. SOCIÉTÉ C.D.M. (SCDM),
Judgment No. 218 of September 19, 2007, High Court of
Wouri (Douala)50

Observations:
Does the failure of proceedings to oppose registration ofa trademark brought within the OAPI by the owner of aprior mark lead ipso facto to the dismissal of that owner’s
parallel judicial action for infringement and unfair
competition against the applicant for the registration so
opposed? 79 This was the core question put to the judgesof the Wouri High Court in this case.
Facts: R.M. & Co. Ltd was the owner of the “CROCODILE”
mark registered with the OAPI on July 30, 1991, underNo. 30659, covering products in class 8 (machetes
and other cutting tools). Informed about use of its
mark by Société C.D.M. (SCDM), established in Douala,
78
79

See F. Terre, P. Simler and Y. Lequette (2018) Droit civile: les obligations, 10thedn. Paris: Dalloz, 752 et seq.
Opposition is an administrative procedure initiated before the Director
General of the OAPI. Among its purposes is enabling the holder of an earlier
right to have a third party’s later-obtained registration canceled, in violationof that later party’s right. It is governed by ABR-1999, art. 18 of annex III.
The Director General has two options: to cancel the disputed registration, or
to maintain it. The Director General’s decision may be appealed to the HighCommission of Appeal.

R.M. & Co. brought action against SCDM, before thesame court, for infringement and unfair competition.
According to SCDM, however, the “CROCODILE” markand accompanying design was in fact the property of T.,
beneficiary of registration No. 35636 published in the
Official Industrial Property Bulletin (Bulletins officielsde la propriété industrielle, or BOPI) under No. 8/1996.
SCDM asked the court on that basis to dismiss theaction of R.M. & Co., especially since the latter’s parallel
opposition proceedings before the OAPI had themselves
been dismissed on January 15, 1998, by Decision No. 5/
OAPI/DG/ADG/SCAJ/.
The Wouri High Court did so.
Reasoning: The court based its ruling on a finding in
the decision by the Director General of the OAPI that thecompany enjoyed no exclusivity over the word “crocodile”
and the accompanying image, which had been thesubject of several earlier filings and registrations in thesame classes. Setting aside the preliminary objection
raised by SCDM and its counterclaim, which have no
relevance to the legal point examined here, the court’s
decision calls for a few observations. They concern how
opposition to the registration of a mark relates to theaction for infringement, on the one hand, and to that for
unfair competition, on the other.
In the first regard, the purpose of opposition must be
contrasted with that of an infringement action. The
main purpose of opposition before the OAPI is to allow
prior right holders to prevent the registration of marks
likely to harm them.80 Conversely, the purpose of an
infringement action, under article 18 of annex III to
ABR-1999, is to win damages from the alleged infringer
and seek additional remedies, including terminationof the infringing activity, destruction of the infringing
objects and related material, and publication of thedecision. In simpler terms, the purpose of opposition
to the registration of a mark is different from that of an
infringement action. In a judgment instructive in thisregard, the Paris Court of Appeal reasoned that “because
opposition proceedings … and infringement action do
not have the same purpose, the decision handed down
on opposition cannot have the force of res judicata withregard to the infringement action.” 81
From that point of view, the decision of the Wouri High
Court appears questionable – a view shared in theliterature. According to Jérôme Passa, for example,“following his own analysis, the judge can perfectly
well decide, despite dismissal of the opposition, that
confusion is likely and that the second mark must be
canceled or judged to be infringing.” 82 Admittedly, an
OAPI body specializing in hearing opposition to theregistration of a mark, on the one hand, and a judge
dealing with an action for infringement, on the other,both examine the likelihood of confusion. A decision

80
81
82

A. Bertrand (2000) Le droit des marques et des signes distinctifs. Kampala:Cedat, 244.
See CA Paris, October 10, 2005, PIBD 2005, No. 820, III, 730.
See J. Passa (2006) Droit de la propriété industrielle, vol. 1. Paris: LGDJ, 161.

In the present case, the judges should have assessed
likely confusion between the marks on their own
initiative,85 instead of deciding on the basis of the OAPI
Director General’s decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s
opposition.86 In short, the failure of proceedings to
oppose registration of a mark does not preclude judicial
infringement proceedings or even cancellation of themark concerned.
The second relationship at issue is that between
opposition and unfair competition proceedings, aslodged with the Wouri High Court in this case by
R.M. & Co. against SCDM.87 That court dismissed
the action on the grounds that the former’s right tothe word “crocodile” was not exclusive and that theaccompanying image had been the subject of several
earlier applications and registrations for goods in thesame classes. With certain reservations, those grounds
are acceptable for dismissal of infringement based onprior registration of the infringed mark, but not for thedismissal of unfair competition proceedings, even where
the mark used has not been registered. Admittedly,
the facts as reported do not provide us with objective
elements for assessment, since the plaintiff company did
not specify an actionable fault committed through unfair
competition distinct from infringement itself. 88
To seek conviction for unfair competition as well as
trademark infringement, a victim of the latter must provethat the confusion likely to result from reproduction
or imitation pertains to an element not included in the
mark’s registration.89 According to R.M. & Co., SCDM, inusing its mark without obtaining consent or a transfer ofrights to do so, had not only infringed the mark but also
competed unfairly. But the act concerned – use of the“CROCODILE” mark – is the same and cannot constitutetwo offenses at once. According to the literature and caselaw, a separate actionable fault must be demonstrated if
action for unfair competition is to be admitted in addition
to that for infringement. If such a separate fault can beproved, the action for unfair competition could outlive
the infringement proceedings and generate damages
83

84
85
86
87
88
89

See, to this effect, SIVOP SA v. Angel Cosmetics SA, Civil judgment No. 187
of March 21, 2013, Court of First Instance of Yopougon (obs. M.L. Ndéma
Elongué, this collection, Chapter 3, section L); see also Arla Foods AMBA v. Dana
Holdings Ltd, Com judgment No. 7 of January 5, 2012, High Court of Wouri(Douala) (obs. J. Fometeu, this collection, Chapter 1, section A).
See CA Paris, Fourth Chamber, April 8, 1998, Gaz. Pal. 1998, 2, 545.
The two “CROCODILES” marks, Nos. 30659 and 35636, with accompanying
design, published in BOPI under No. 8/1996.
No. 5/OAPI/DG/ADG/SCAJ of January 15, 1998.
Regarding the possibility of cumulation of the two actions, see ABR-1999,
art. 2-2 of annex VII; ABR-2015, art. 1(3) of annex VIII.
Cf. Moulinex SA v. Vapsan Trading Cie and ors, Civil judgment No. 192 ofDecember 15, 2000, High Court of Wouri (Douala) (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué,
La Gazelle 2007, 1, 17).
Passa, n. 82, at 453.

in its own right. It therefore follows that the Director
General’s dismissal of opposition to registration of the“CROCODILE” mark with the OAPI should not have led
ipso facto to the court’s dismissal of the supplementaryaction for unfair competition, because the source of likely
confusion and the criteria for assessing it are different
in each case. In the case of trademark infringement, thelikelihood of confusion is assessed with reference to themark as registered, an abstract process. In the case of
unfair competition, that assessment is based on concrete
market results, factoring in both the protective andcompetitive aspects.90
The acts constituting unfair competition, moreover,are extremely varied – another argument for treating
an action alleging that offense separately from an
opposition to a mark’s registration. Unfair competition
can indeed take many forms, beyond the acts
enumerated in articles 2–7 of annex VIII, which are
merely indicative. In fairness to the Wouri High Court,
the petition by R.M. & Co was poorly worded and unclear,but even so, the court needed to assess the two counts
separately to avoid possible censure from a higher court.

Chapter 3 – Trademarksby the former, however, is an administrative act notbinding on the latter, given the pre-eminence of judicial
rulings over those of administrative bodies, including the
OAPI.83 French case law, going further, has not treatedopposition proceedings as a mandatory prerequisite forinfringement action, such that failure to initiate themcannot be invoked as a defense.84

Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

F. Fraudulent filing of a trademark –Proof of prior use – Bad faith –Invalidity – Damages
According to the general legal principle fraus omnia
corrumpit (“fraud corrupts all”), registration of a markwith the OAPI is null and void if the beneficiary was fully
aware that a third party had a prior right to use the markin trade in the same specialist area within the same
territory. The infringer may also be liable for damages
under ordinary law.
COOPER SA V. LABORATOIRE BRIDE SA, Judgment
No. 672 of September 17, 2003, High Court of
Mfoundi (Douala)Observations:
Article 5(1) of annex III to ABR-1999 provides that“ownership of a mark shall vest in the person who files it
first.” That rule ceases to apply, however, where the filingis fraudulent – in particular, where it is evident that the
filer was aware of prior use of the same sign by a third
party. This is the transposition into intellectual property
law of the fundamental legal principle fraus omnia
corrumpit, “fraud corrupts all,” as recalled on various
occasions in French case law 91 and specialized doctrine.92
The judgment reported here is typical of such cases.

90
91

92

See, in this respect, Passa, n. 82, at 454.
See TGI Paris, Third Chamber, April 15, 1983, PIBD 1983, III, 260; CA Bordeaux,First Chamber, February 28, 1994, PIBD 1994, III, 301; Distrimed Pharma SARL
v. Fábrica Española de productos químicos y farmacéuticos (FAES) SA, Judgment
No. 257/Civ of May 18, 2011, Court of Appeal of the Center Region (Yaoundé);Cass. com., April 25, 2006, No. 83.3, PIBD 2006, III, 471.
Bertrand, n. 80, at 390 et seq; Passa, n. 82, at 178 et seq.
51

Facts: The facts of the case are straightforward.
Pursuant to a contract letter dated February 25, 1938,
Société de Coopération Pharmaceutique Française
(“Cooper”) entrusted Laboratoire Bride SA with the
manufacture of medicines based on its own formulas.
Those products were distributed by the latter in Africa
under the mark “SEDASPIR,” first registered in France
in 1934. Decades later, Cooper discovered parallel
registration filed with the OAPI for the same mark underNo. 36716, dated August 13, 1995, in the name of its
trading partner Laboratoire Bride. Cooper therefore
brought action against Laboratoire Bride before theMfoundi High Court for cancellation of the latter’s markand payment of damages, having registered the same
mark with the OAPI, in its own name, on April 1, 1997,
under No. 37638. Laboratoire Bride then brought acounterclaim against Cooper, before the same court, forcancellation of the latter registration, No. 37638.
What the Mfoundi High Court had to decide in this casewas whether, in the silence of community law, a mark can
be canceled on the basis of fraud.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Reasoning: Consolidating the two actions, the court
responded in the affirmative, declaring registrationof the mark “SEDASPIR,” No. 36716, in the name ofLaboratoire Bride, to be null and void and ordering thelatter to pay CFAF 30 million to its trading partner. The
Bangui Agreement does not expressly say so, but once
evidence of fraudulent registration has been reported,
the perpetrator of the fraud may be twice penalized.

52

As a general rule, the party claiming fraudulent
registration must prove its own prior use of the disputed
sign in trade and for the same areas of specialty, as
well as the registrant’s intent to do harm. For someauthors,93 supported by case law,94 such prior use mustmeet certain criteria: it must be public, continuousand neither ambiguous nor precarious. Those criteria
appear to be satisfied in this case, since Cooper had
initially registered the “SEDASPIR” mark in France andused it for several decades in Africa, where it distributed
products under the same name and sign in accordancewith its partnership contract with Laboratoire Bride. It istherefore clear that Cooper had the prior right to use themark in OAPI countries.
A fraudster’s intent to do harm can derive fromknowledge, at the time of registration, that a third
party is using the same mark without having filed forprotection. From that standpoint, Laboratoire Brideclearly intended harm to its partner: it was perfectly
aware that Cooper was using the “SEDASPIR” sign fortablets distributed in both France and Africa, and – more
importantly – its contract with Cooper contained a clauseprohibiting registration of the mark without the latter’sconsent. This suggests that “SEDASPIR,” registered underNo. 36716 on August 13, 1995, was a “blocking” mark,aimed at making the sign unavailable within the OAPI to
the detriment of Cooper, which had a legitimate interest
93
94

Bertrand, n. 80, at 391; Chavanne and Burst, n. 1, at 631.
See CA Paris, January 18, 2006, PIBD 2006, No. 826, III, 223.

in using it. Laboratoire Bride’s intent to do harm in thisway violates the essential purpose of trademark rights:
permitting the origin of goods or services to be known.
Consumers of the pharmaceutical products concerned
could indeed have been misled about their true origin.
Such fraud is penalized by canceling the offending
mark and awarding damages, where appropriate underordinary law. It is accepted in the literature and case law,under the overriding principle of fraus omnia corrumpit,that the nullity of a sign registered fraudulently isabsolute. A finding of fraudulent trademark registration
retroactively renders null and void the rights otherwise
conveyed by the mark concerned. The parties then revert
to their status prior to cancellation, or a similar status.
If the decision is confirmed upon final adjudication,
the contested mark is deemed never to have existed.
According to article 28 of annex III to ABR-1999, any
final judicial decision declaring a mark’s registration
void on the national territory of a member state,
upon notification from the court, is entered in thespecial registry of marks and a notice to that effect ispublished by the OAPI. The court was therefore right tocancel the “SEDASPIR” mark registered with the OAPI
under No. 36716 on August 13, 1995, with the clear
intent to harm Cooper, the sign’s first user. The directconsequence was deregistration of the offending sign
within the OAPI and removal of any subsequent acts
registered in relation thereto.
Apart from cancellation, the wrongful behavior ofLaboratoire Bride in fraudulently registering the“SEDASPIR” mark, without regard to the prior right of
its trading partner, warranted damages under ordinary
law. The court awarded Cooper CFAF 30 million for thecosts incurred in defending its rights. Cooper had, infact, requested the reimbursement of such legal costs
only, but assessed them at CFAF 50 million. The court
did not explain how it arrived at CFAF 30 million, sinceno supporting documents were produced during theproceedings. That omission exposed this ruling toreversal on appeal.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

G. Mark – Invalidation of the certificate
of registration – Assessment ofprior right – Assignment of a mark –Enforceability – Regional authority of
final judicial decisions
The assignee of a valid registered trademark does nothave grounds for seeking cancellation of an identicalor similar mark registered prior to registration of theassignment in the OAPI special register of trademarks(first case).
A court of first instance in an OAPI member country
that cancels a trademark, the validity of which has beenpreviously confirmed by a final ruling of the highest
court in another member country, violates article 18 in
the general provisions of ABR-1999 (second case).

Observations:
According to article 5(1) of annex III to ABR-1999,“ownership of a mark shall vest in the person who
files it first.” It is indeed registration that gives rise totrademark rights, which are vested in the registrant,
subject to provisions in the Agreement for denying
registration.95 The courts of states party to theAgreement have qualified that language to allow forparticular circumstances. It is against this backdrop thatthe two decisions reported here represent diametrically
opposed approaches to the issue.
Facts: The facts behind these decisions are relatively
complex. Rivoire and Carret Lustacru (RCL), a nowdefunct company formerly governed under French law,
owned the semi-figurative mark “COUSCOUS SIPA,” which
it registered with the OAPI on February 9, 1981, withsuccessive renewals in 1991, 2001 and 2011. It distributed
its products in Africa through a local partner, Nosoco-Togo
SARL. After RCL ceased to exist, Nosoco-Togo registered
the same mark with the OAPI under its own name. One
year later, Nosoco-Togo became aware that the company
La Mascotte, operating in Togo, was importing a brandof couscous identical to its own. It brought action
for infringement of its trademark “COUSCOUS SIPA,”
No. 47511, before the Lomé Criminal Court. La Mascotteclaimed to import the couscous bearing the disputed
trademark from the company Mardi, a representativeof Pastacorp SA, both registered in France. La Mascotte
was found guilty of infringement. But, just as NosocoTogo was preparing to execute the decision, Pastacorp
lodged a complaint against it before the Lomé Courtof First Instance, to invalidate the registration filed
by Nosoco-Togo.
By judgment No. 622 of April 13, 2007, that court
confirmed the right of Nosoco-Togo to use the mark andordered deregistration of the same mark in the nameof Pastacorp.
The Lomé Court of Appeal reversed that decision by
judgment No. 27/2009 of February 26, 2009, declaring
Pastacorp the mark’s owner, having been assigned
the mark that RCL had registered back in 1981, underNo. 21047, and ordering Nosoco-Togo to pay Pastacorp
CFAF 100 million in damages.

registration No. 47511 against its competitor Nosoco-Togoand Mr. Jean Delors Takounang, exclusive distributor of“COUSCOUS SIPA” products in Yaoundé, Cameroon. Thatcase went before the High Court of Mfoundi (Yaoundé),
which ruled for Pastacorp. The Mfoundi High Court foundPastacorp to have been defrauded in its capacity as
assignee of the mark registered as No. 21047 back in 1981
and renewed successively in 1991, 2001 and 2011.
Reasoning: In both of the cases reported, the corequestion put to the Togo Supreme Court and MfoundiHigh Court in Cameroon was whether the assignee of aregistered trademark can claim a prior right over thatmark if the assignment invoked has not been enteredinto the appropriate OAPI registry. Their successive
rulings take diametrically opposed positions withrespect to who holds the prior right (section I), making
it questionable how effective regional authority has
actually been when the validity of OAPI-issued titles isfinally adjudicated in the courts (section II).
I. Who holds the prior right?
A question from the start was whether Nosoco-Togo or
Pastacorp could claim the prior right to the “COUSCOUS
SIPA” trademark. The different solutions found are best
analyzed from the standpoints first of the unregisteredassignee (A) and then of the fraudulent registrant (B).
A. The unregistered assignee
It is clear that the trademark “COUSCOUS SIPA” wasoriginally filed with the OAPI by French company RCL on
February 9, 1981. That registration remained in force up
to 2021 through successive renewals.96 While this rightwas unquestionably transferred to Pastacorp (1), its
enforceability against third parties was subject to doubt (2).
1. A theoretically transferred prior right
According to article 5(1) of annex III to ABR-1999,97
ownership of the mark “COUSCOUS SIPA,” as maintained
up to 2021, clearly fell to RCL. If RCL had initiated thelegal proceedings, the case would have been overquickly. As the facts show, however, when RCL ceased toexist, it had assigned its rights and actions in respect of
the “COUSCOUS SIPA” trademark to its sister company
Pastacorp, as subrogate, on April 20, 2004. This gave
Pastacorp undisputed claim to the trademark – especiallyhaving benefited from the original registration,
No. 21047, as filed by RCL, since February 9, 1981.98

96

On final appeal, the Togo Supreme Court reversed theappeal court’s ruling by its judgment No. 47/11 of July 21,
2011, thereby re-establishing registration No. 47511 in
the name of Nosoco-Togo.
Three years later, in the second case reported, Pastacorp
returned to the attack, bringing action for the invalidation of95

Under ABR-1999, art. 14(2), “any filing that does not conform to the provisionsof Article 3(c) and (e) shall be rejected.”

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

NOSOCO-TOGO SARL V. PASTACORP SA, Judgment
No. 47/11 of July 21, 2011, Supreme Court of Togo;SOCIÉTÉ PASTACORP V. TANKOUNANG, JEAN DELORSAND SOCIÉTÉ NOSOCO TOGO SARL, Judgment No. 96/
Com of May 4, 2016, High Court of Mfoundi (Yaoundé)

97
98

Under art. 19 of the agreement, “registration of a mark shall be valid for only
10 years from the filing date of the application for registration; however,
the ownership of a mark may be preserved indefinitely through successive
renewals of the registration, which may be effected every 10 years.” Renewal
is therefore a formality that allows rights to a trademark to be maintained
indefinitely. This is governed by art. 21 of the same agreement. Case law
indicates that renewal resulting from a mere declaration without formality of
examination and not from a new filing does not give rise to a new right, but
merely allows it to be retained. See CA Paris, Fourth Chamber, April 8 1998,
Gaz. Pal. 2, 545
This provision was fully included in ABR-2015, art. 4: “Subject to the following
provisions, ownership of a mark belongs to the person who first deposited it.”Through this subrogation mechanism, the assignee becomes the owner of therights resulting from the registration of the transferred mark and is therefore
entitled to exercise the actions needed to protect and defend its interests as
the original owner would have done.
53

In the second reported case, as a crucial part of theirstated reasoning, the panel of judges of the High
Court of Mfoundi (Yaoundé) recognized that Pastacorp“acquired the COUSCOUS SIPA trademark by way ofassignment, in 2004, from Rivoire et Carret Lustacru(RCL), the trademark having been registered with
the OAPI on February 9, 1981, under number 21047.”
Yet while the prior right was theoretically assigned
to Pastacorp, its enforceability against third parties
was not.
2. A prior right not enforceable against third parties
In the first reported case, the Court of Appeal ofLomé, in its contested decision, unequivocallyrecognized “the assignment of the COUSCOUS SIPA
mark to Pastacorp as enforceable against NosocoTogo, making Pastacorp owner of the prior right,
with entitlement to seek cancellation of registration
No. 47511, of July 3, 2003, in the name of Nosoco-Togo
SARL.” The Supreme Court, basing its argument on theenforceability of the assignment against Nosoco-Togo,
censured the Court of Appeal for conferring the priorright on Pastacorp:“Whereas the contract of assignment between
RCL and Pastacorp SA was not registered or
brought to the notice of third parties, including
Nosoco-Togo SARL, until it was entered into the
OAPI Special Register of Marks on January 17,
2005, which had been after the mark was
registered with OAPI in the name of Nosoco-Togo
SARL, under No. 47511, dated July 16, 2002.”

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

The Supreme Court invoked article 27 of annex III to
ABR-1999 in concluding that Nosoco-Togo had the priorright and that Pastacorp was not entitled – as the original
owner RCL would have been – to seek its invalidation:

54“Whereas Pastacorp SA was therefore not yet
the owner of the mark when Nosoco-Togo
SARL registered it in its own name, only thecompanies Semoulerie de Normandie and RCL,
whose registration of the mark ‘COUSCOUS
SIPA’ predated that of Nosoco-Togo SARL, could
take action to invalidate the registration filed by
Nosoco-Togo SARL;“Considering, however, that neither of thosecompanies has brought action against theregistration filed by Nosoco-Togo SARL; that
Pastacorp SA, whose ownership right precedesthat of Nosoco-Togo SARL, is therefore notentitled to seek invalidation of the latter’s
registration; and that the plea is therefore
well founded in requesting that the impugned
judgment be quashed.”

Article 27 makes the enforceability of a third-party
assignment subject to the formal requirement ofregistration in a special register of marks.99 Indeed, forevery object of industrial property and for all member
states, the OAPI maintains a special registry containing
entries as stipulated in the Agreement. However,assignment of the “COUSCOUS SIPA” mark by RCL to
Pastacorp was not registered until January 17, 2005,
and therefore after the registration filed by NosocoTogo. The Supreme Court endorsed the first judge’s
decision, confirming the right of Nosoco-Togo to use
mark No. 47511 as registered on July 3, 2003, which wasprior to registration of the assignment. But it gave no
explanation for invalidation of the identically named
mark, No. 21047 of February 9, 1981, which was not, fromall appearances, tainted by any fatal flaw.
The first judge invalidated the registration filed by
Pastacorp on January 17, 2005, but, significantly,
Pastacorp never actually re-registered it, its validity
having been extended up to 2021; what Pastacorp
was actually registering on January 17, 2005, was theassignment. Such registration is necessary, moreover,
not for an assignment to be valid but for the purposes ofthird-party enforceability. On that point, the French Courtof Cassation has consistently held that failure to publish
through a special registry of marks does not affect thevalidity of an assignment or pledge; it only makes it
unenforceable against third parties.100 In that respect,
the Supreme Court erred in this case by invalidating
registration No. 21047, the one performed on February 9,
1981. The mark’s priority should have been assessed
based not on when its assignment was registered but
on when it was initially filed – reasoning that might haveresulted in the coexistence of conflicting marks being
admitted. The point is moot, however, if fraud enters into
the case.
B. The fraudulent applicant
The question of fraud was not expressly raised before
the Supreme Court, which no doubt was merely
examining the relevance of arguments made by NosocoTogo, invoking articles 24(2) and 27 of annex III to
ABR-1999 in support of its appeal. However, the Supreme
Court can rightfully raise a matter ex officio where
public policy is concerned. The public policy concernedin this case was the general principle of fraud omnia
corrumpit (“fraud corrupts all”). In a related case, the
OAPI High Commission of Appeal had occasion to invokethat principle – in dismissing opposition to registration
No. 43441, for the mark “Princesse Vignette” 101 – toinvalidate the mark cited in opposing it. From thatstandpoint, some reservations are in order about thedecision in the present case.

99
100
101

ABR-2015, art. 31 provides for a double formality for the purposes ofenforcement – namely, registration in the Special Register of Marks andpublication in the official gazette.
See Cass. com., May 24, 1994, D. 1994, IR 55.
See HCA, Decision No. 32/CSR/OAPI of March 25, 2004, Recueil des décisions
de la Commission Supérieure de Recours 2003–05, 18; see also Cooper SA v.
Laboratoire Bride SA, Judgment No. 672 of September 17, 2003, High Courtof Mfoundi (Douala) (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection, Chapter 3,
section F).

II. Alteration of the rule of regional authority in final
judicial decisions
Article 18 of ABR-1999 stipulates: “Final legal decisions
relating to the validity of titles and rendered in one
Member State under Annexes I to X of this Agreement
shall be binding on all other Member States, with the
exception of decisions based on public policy andmorality.” 102 The decisions reported here severely test
that principle (A) and could be perplexing for OAPI bodies
implementing them (B).
A. Violation of article 18 of ABR-1999
Article 18 of ABR-1999 is a central pillar of the community
edifice. The OAPI’s founding plenipotentiaries intended
from the outset to give regional effect to final judicial
rulings issued in member states on the validity of
titles, with a view to completing the framework erected
through ordinary legislation over the years. In otherwords, despite its defects, the earlier Supreme Court
judgment in the first case, invalidating the mark’s initial
1981 registration under No. 21047, had acquired thestatus of res judicata under article 18 and should thus
have been binding for the Mfoundi High Court judges inthe second case. Pastacorp undoubtedly took advantageof the fault committed by Mr. Takounang and NosocoTogo to distract the Mfoundi judges from the Supreme
Court’s previous invalidation of its mark – for war, after
all, is war! Be that as it may, the Mfoundi court ruling
directly violated article 18 and, if not overturned, could
create an impossible dilemma for relevant OAPI bodies.

102

This provision was amended by ABR-2015, art. 20, which provides further
clarification of the principle of regional jurisdiction in final judicial decisions
on the validity of titles. Article 20(1) states that: “Subject to the provisionsof Article 4 above, final judicial decisions rendered in respect of the validityof titles in a Member State pursuant to the provisions of Annex I to Annex Xof this Agreement shall be binding on all other Member States, save fordecisions based on public policy and morality.” Article 20(2) goes further:“Final judicial decisions rendered in a Member State in areas other than thevalidity of titles shall be enforceable in all other Member States pursuant toan exequatur decision rendered in accordance with the legislation of the State
concerned, save for decisions based on public policy and morality.”

B. The dilemma within OAPIThe dilemma that OAPI bodies could face is of a legal (1)and a practical nature (2).
1. The legal dilemma
According to article 28 of annex III to ABR-1999, “anyfinal decision declaring the effects of the filing of a markinvalid on the national territory of one of the Member
States shall be entered in the Special Register of Marks
on notification by the judicial body concerned, and amention thereof shall be published by the Organization.”
Applying that provision, the OAPI could face two
final, but contrary, court rulings relating to the same
trademark, held in two different member states, asin the present cases. The Supreme Court judgment in
Togo, on July 21, 2011 (No. 47/11), invalidates the 1981
mark, No. 21047; the Mfoundi High Court judgment inCameroon, on May 4, 2016 (No. 96/Com), restores thesame mark. Choosing between those two decisions
could prove a real conundrum for the OAPI. Purists
would plainly accord pre-eminence to the Supreme Court
judgment, coming from a country’s highest court. Butthat might be hasty, and even artificial, there being noformal hierarchy among decisions made in different
states. Nor can the OAPI, without risk to itself, favor one
state over another. The situation therefore raises theprospect of empowering a regional intellectual property
court to settle such issues.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

It becomes clear why Pastacorp took its later case to
the Mfoundi High Court in Cameroon to invalidate themark filed by Nosoco-Togo – this time alleging fraud as
its basis. It goes without saying that, at the time of the
disputed registration, Nosoco-Togo knew of the mark’s
prior registration by its long-time partner RCL. The
fraud seems clear and the Mfoundi High Court’s panel ofjudges was correct to affirm the following: “Consideringthat at the time Mr. Nabil Tarraf Koudjock registered thedisputed mark, he was fully aware of the existence of an
identical prior mark; that in so doing he committed fraud;that Pastacorp is thus entitled to request invalidationof that registration … [and] its request needs to be
granted.” But while their reasoning is entirely sound,the Mfoundi judges seem to have solved one problem
by creating another, more formidable one: the problem
of respect in final court rulings for regional authority inmatters concerning a title’s validity.

2. The practical dimension of the dilemma
The implementation of the above-mentioned final
judicial decisions by the competent technical services of
OAPI, in application of article 24(3) of ABR-1999, has led
to many administrative disputes. The High Commissionof Appeal recently resolved this situation through avery interesting decision, which stipulates that, whena decision declaring registration null and void has
become final, it shall be communicated to OAPI for entry
in the special register of trademarks. Initially seizedby Nosoco-Togo Sarl for the purpose of registering
Adversarial Judgment (Arrêt contradictoire) No. 47 of
the Supreme Court of Togo, OAPI refused to accept
the request because the registration decision had notbeen communicated as the Bangui Agreement and its
annexes stipulate.
On the other hand, OAPI responded favorably to thesubsequent request of Pastacorp SA seeking to registerjudgments No. 095 and No. 096 handed down on May 4,
1996, by the High Court of Mfoundi. These two decisions
invalidated, respectively, the “COUSCOUS SIPA + logo”
No. 47511 and “COUSCOUS SIPA” No. 64509 trademarks
belonging to Nosoco-Togo Sarl.103 This dispute wasbrought before the college of judges of the HighCommission of Appeal and settled in favor of NosocoTogo Sarl.104 Notwithstanding this stance taken by thehighest body for dispute settlement within OAPI, itscompetent services have still not executed the decision,

103
104

The recording of these judgments was noted by the decisions of the Director
General of OAPI No. 18/0513/OAPI/DG/DMSD/SSPD and No. 18/0512/OAPI/
DG/DMSD/SSPD of April 27, 2018, unpublished.
See Decision No. 0183/OAPI/CSR of October 30, 2014, unpublished.
55

obliging Nosoco-Togo Sarl to once again apply to thejudges of the High Commission of Appeal, this time toinvalidate the OAPI Director General’s decisions to recordin the special register of marks the judgments handed
down by the Mfoundi Court of First Instance.

Intellectual Property (Institut national de la propriété
industrielle, or INPI). In exploiting the mark, thecompanies signed a license contract with an expiration
date of May 3, 1993, with the company A.J., registeredunder Tunisian law.

By Decision No. 0018/20/OAPI/CSR of November 17,
2020, the High Commission of Appeal put an end to thisdispute at the administrative level through two actions:i) invalidation of the contested decisions of the Director
General of OAPI and ii) an order to record, in the special
register of marks, both Decision No. 47/11 of July 21,
2011 (handed down by the Supreme Court of Togo) and
Decision No. 0183/0API/CSR of October 30, 2014 (handed
down by the High Commission of Appeal). This significant
decision reflects the regulatory role that this bodymust play within OAPI, which is required to comply withfinal court decisions handed down by the courts of its
member states, in application of the Bangui Agreement
and its annexes.

Learning that the companies BA… Import-Export andFour… were importing their “Meillor” head gaskets from
A.J. and selling them in Senegal without consent, M… andVeuve M. C. et Fils lodged a complaint with the Regional
Court of Dakar 105 and, on August 6, 1996, obtained acourt-ordered inventory of those products.

Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

H. Trademark – Infringement –Fraudulent imitation – Infringing
use – Provision – Loss of earnings –Commercial damage – Profit made –Damage suffered – Duty of care –License contract
If the materiality of a trademark infringement is left tothe discretion of trial judges, it is on the condition thatthey not distort the facts presented. Judges cannotchange a law by requiring circumstances not provided
for therein.
The court must calculate compensation for damage
suffered by the trademark owner on the basis ofaccounting data, including the infringer’s profits.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights“M…” SA V. “BA… IMPORT-EXPORT” SA, Judgment
No. 425/Com of June 19, 1998, Court of Appeal of Dakar

56

Observations:
It is within a trial judge’s discretion to establish whether
an act of trademark infringement has taken place, on
condition that they not distort the facts presented
to them. Judges cannot change a law by requiring
circumstances that the law does not mention. The court
must base its calculation of compensation for damage
suffered by the trademark owner on accounting data,
including profits made by the infringer. These principles
flow directly from annex III to ABR-1999 (and the 2015
revision), and from case law that is both plentiful andinteresting. However, some of the judicial precedents
concerned – including the judgment reported here –have been highly questionable.
Facts: The companies M… and Veuve M. C. et Fils, by acts
dated September 2, 1980, and January 1, 1990, registereda brand of head gasket under the trademark “Meillor”
with both the OAPI and the French National Institute of

On August 22, 1996, M… and Veuve M. C. et Fils brought
action for validation of the seizure, as performed on
August 14, 1996, and the payment of CFAF 100 million indamages. The trial court ruled against the plaintiffs on all
claims, reasoning that the defendants had not violated
articles 37 and 38 of annex III to AB-1977.
M… and Veuve M. C. et Fils appealed that decision.
Reasoning: The Dakar Court of Appeal partially reversed
the trial court’s decision by validating the court-orderedinventory, as justified on the basis of infringing use, andordering destruction of the samples. It also found thedefendants, BA… Import-Export and Four…, liable undercivil law but awarded only a symbolic single franc indamages to M… and Veuve M. C. et Fils.
In reaching this decision, the court had to consider two
crucial questions, as follows.
a.

b.

Does the import and sale of products constituteinfringement if the trademark license of theoriginating company has expired?
Can a trial judge remedy the damage resulting fromsuch infringement if they are unable to quantify
it fully?

The court did indeed find infringement – not in thesense of fraudulent imitation but rather “infringing
use” – owing to the importer’s negligence. It also foundthe defendants, BA… Import-Export and Four…, liable forcontributing to the damage suffered by M… and Veuve
M. C. et Fils, which amounted to an affirmative responseto the second question above.
Provisions relevant to the case were set out in annex III
to AB-1977, in force when the decision was rendered, andare now found especially in ABR-2015, which has clarified
the categories of trademark infringement and better
addressed the nagging question of compensation.106

105
106

The Dakar Regional Court “hors classe” became the High Court “hors classe” via
Law No.2014-26 of November 3, 2014, repealing and replacing Law No. 84-19 ofFebruary 2, 1984, determining the judicial organization in Senegal.
Cf. ABR-2015, art. 54 of annex III: “The court seized of the matter shalldetermine the amount of the damages, having regard to the adverse financial
effects, including loss of earnings, suffered by the prejudiced party, the profit
made by the counterfeiter and the moral damage caused to the owner of therights as a result of the infringement.”

I.
II.

the penalty it imposed for importing and selling
infringing products; andthe assessment it made of the perpetrator’s liability.

I. The trial court’s finding of infringing import or saleof infringing products
In the initial ruling, the trial court found no changes
made by BA… Import-Export or Four… to characteristicsof the mark of a nature to deceive the buyer, and it
therefore ruled out fraudulent imitation (A). What it
found instead was “infringing use” (B).
A. Absence of any substantial change liable to deceive
the buyer
In dismissing the claims of M… and Veuve M. C. et Fils,
the Court of Appeal based its reasoning on whether any
substantial modification was made to the “Meillor” markto which the appellants held an exclusive right. Indeed,
while AB-1977 was in force, the notion of fraudulent
imitation was used as an alternative means to punish
offending manufacturers not indictable for trademark
counterfeiting. In this case, it is clear that fraudulent
imitation, under article 38(a) of annex III to AB-1977,
the basis on which the Court of Appeal assessed it, felloutside the scope of trademark counterfeiting.107
The drafters of AB-1977 borrowed the same punishment
as indicated for counterfeiting for persons who,
“while not counterfeiting a mark,” made a fraudulent
imitation of one liable to deceive the buyer. However,the distinction thus drawn in that original version of
the Agreement seems spurious if counterfeiting canconsist of any reproduction or other use of a registeredmark, in a manner liable to affect its image, without theowner’s consent.108
Fraudulent imitation falls well within that definition ofcounterfeiting. That point is now clarified in ABR-2015:“Any infringement of the rights of the owner of the markas defined in Article 6 shall constitute counterfeiting.” 109

perception constitutes counterfeiting.111 The clarification
is welcome, permitting any unlawful exploitation of a
trademark to be treated as counterfeiting.112
In the present case, the Court of Appeal correctly ruledthat imitation of the “Meillor” mark, as alleged by theappellants, had not been sufficiently established. Such
imitation must consist of goods or services identicalor similar to those designated in the application forregistration. Case law on the subject indicates three
conditions that must be met to establish such an
unlawful imitation:
a.
b.
c.

imitation of a registered trademark through the useof aural, visual or conceptual elements;
designation of identical or similar goods; andthe likelihood of confusion among consumers.113

Unlawful imitation cannot be confirmed without
evidence of very likely confusion and the burden ofproviding it rests with the party alleging the offense.
At this level, the difference need not be characteristicor remarkable, but it does have to cause confusion
for the buyer.114 A finding of fraudulent imitation of amark must also consider the consumer. It is in termsof a consumer’s ability to distinguish between the
goods that the imitation is assessed in considering
appropriate punishment.
In the present case, a bailiff report dated September 4,
1996, had established that the characteristics of thehead gaskets stored by defendant companies BA…
Import-Export and Four… were identical to those of theseries 411-129 and 411-652, which bore a mark belonging
to companies M… and Veuve M. C. et Fils. That reportnotwithstanding, the Court of Appeal determined thatfraudulent imitation could not be confirmed, since“the companies M… and Veuve M. C. et Fils have notdemonstrated the means by which the companies
Four… and BA… Import-Export might have altered
the characteristics of the ‘Meillor’ mark to taint theimitation as fraudulent.” What the court found instead
was “infringing use,” consisting of the introduction anddistribution of counterfeit goods.

Both ABR-1999 and ABR-2015 group all such offenses
under the expression “unlawful exploitation of aregistered mark.” 110 In French case law as well, fraudulent
imitation of a mark liable to create confusion in public

B. Recognition of infringing use
Analyzing the facts of this case with reference toarticle 37(a) of annex III to AB-1977, the Court of Appeal
found that, by importing counterfeit products, BA…
Import-Export and Four… committed infringing use.

107

111
112

108

109
110

Article 38: “The following persons shall be punished by a fine of from 50,000
to 150,000 CFA francs and by imprisonment of one month to one year, or toeither of these penalties: (a) persons who, while not counterfeiting a mark,have made a fraudulent imitation of one liable to mislead the buyer or who
have made use of a fraudulently imitated mark …”
By way of comparison, see AB-1977, art. 58 of annex I and art. 41 of annex II.
According to those articles, any injury to patent or utility model rights by useof means forming the subject of the patent or utility model, by possession ofstolen goods, by sale or display for sale, or by bringing into the territory of
one of the member states constitutes the offense of counterfeiting.
Cf. ABR-2015, art. 49 of annex III.
Violations of AB-1977, arts. 37 and 38, are combined within ABR-1999, art. 37,
which establishes penalties for offenses of omission and non-compliance withrestrictions, including for using signs where that use is prohibited. See also
ABR-2015, art. 57 of annex III.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

Important questions raised in this case relate to the trial
court’s ruling – namely, about:

113
114

SA Iliad v. Cédric A, Judgment of January 7, 2003, of TGI Paris, Third Chamber.
With regard to the requirement for identical or nearly identical reproduction,
the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled that “a sign is identicalwith the trade mark where it reproduces, without any modification or
addition, all the elements constituting the trade mark or where, viewed asa whole, it contains differences so insignificant that they may go unnoticed
by an average consumer”: C-291/00 LTJ Diffusion SA v. Sadas Vertbaudet SA,
Judgment of March 20, 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:169, at [54].
See ABR-2015, art. 6.
See Iliad, n. 110, in which the court held that, under art. L.713-3 of theIntellectual Property Code, “if it can result in confusion in the public
perception … the imitation of a mark and the use of an imitated mark for
products that are identical or similar to those designated in the registration… shall be prohibited.” In this case, a modification substituting a hyphen for aletter within the mark “3617 An-u, l’annuaire inversé” is clearly an imitation.
57

Under article 37(a), such infringing use would have toconsist of use by “those persons who have counterfeiteda mark or who have made use of a counterfeited mark,”
which requires a prior determination that the mark has
been counterfeited.115

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

In settling on the notion of infringing use in this case,the appeal judge found the “Meillor” mark to have beencounterfeited by the Tunisian company A.J. That offense
is similar to “infringing reproduction,” which has been
defined in case law as the reproduction of a mark in an
identical form, with no deletions or additions, without
the owner’s consent.116

58

Infringing use could thus have been established moreeasily against the manufacturer A.J., allowing the court
to use the bundle of indicators established in case law toestablish such infringement.119 Under revisions in ABR1999, a finding of infringing use would require that themark bear indications liable to mislead the buyer about
the nature of the product.120
Following its train of logic, having found infringing use,the court naturally held BA… Import-Export and Four…
liable for it.
II. The trial court’s assessment of liability

M… granted A.J. the right to use its mark via a trademark
license contract dated May 19, 1992, supplemented
by a rider signed the same day, in Nantiat, France.
But that license agreement was terminated on May 3,
1993. Therefore, at the time in 1996 when A.J. delivered
to Four… the “Meillor” mark head gaskets, with thecharacteristics of the 411-129 and 411-652 series, A.J. nolonger possessed the right to use that mark. As a result,
M… and Veuve M. C. et Fils had every reason to protest
the offer for sale of products bearing their “Meillor”
mark, as registered with the OAPI and the INPI, the markhaving been wrongfully affixed to the packages and headgaskets of the series 411-129 and 411-652, respectively,
under headings No. 20698 and No. 45202.

Such liability resulted in this case from the importers’
contribution to the damage suffered by M… and Veuve
M. C. et Fils (A), and the need to compensate them forthat damage (B).

This protection is referred to again in article 7 ofannex III to ABR-1999 and article 6 of ABR-2015. It isindeed the owner of the mark who has an exclusive
right to use it, or a sign resembling it, for the goods
and services for which it was registered or for similar
goods and services.117 However, the choice of theappellate judge to analyze the facts of the case fromthe perspective of infringing use seems questionable.
For the purposes of article 37(a) of annex III to AB-1977,
when a third-party manufacturer uses a mark without
its owner’s authorization, it is said to “have made use ofa counterfeited mark.” 118 In the present case, it would
have been more appropriate to apply article 37(c) and toassess the facts in terms of the sale or offer for sale of
the goods concerned.

The court considered the importers’ good faith in theirdealings with A.J., finding the latter to have concealed themutually agreed termination of its license by furnishingdocuments attesting to the contrary. But the court
drew no conclusions from that good faith. No moral
element of any kind entered into the reasoning withwhich it found the companies to have contributed to thedamage suffered – and that is surprising. To consider
this moral element and to find “honest use” would be todismiss the counterfeiting charge – a principle affirmedby the French Court of Cassation.121 “Honest use” is aconcept invoked to avoid systematic punishment when
trademarks are used without consent.

Indeed, it was established that BA… Import-Export andFour… had introduced and offered for sale counterfeit
goods manufactured by the Tunisian company M…,
which no longer had the right to use the “Meillor” mark.

115
116
117

118

See ABR-2015, art. 57 of annex III.
See Forest Stewardship Council v. Boris Bois SARL, Judgment No. 886/Civ ofDecember 5, 2016, High Court of Wouri (Douala) (obs. A. Fade, this collection,
Chapter 3, section B).
In AB-1977, this point is covered in art. 20. In ABR-1999, art. 7(2) of annex III
confers another right on the owner of the mark – namely, “the exclusive rightto prevent all third parties from making use in business without his consent,of identical or similar signs for goods or services that are themselves similar
to those for which the trademark or service mark has been registered wheresuch use is liable to cause confusion.”
A comparison of the provisions of AB-1977, arts. 37(a) and 38(b) of annex III,ABR-1999, arts. 37(1)(a) and 37(2)(b) of annex III, and ABR-2015, art. 57,
suggests that infringing use requires not only the materiality of the use of an
infringing mark but also the existence of indications likely to deceive the buyer
about the nature of the product. In the latter two cases, use of the mark appears
to be directed at the manufacturer and not at the seller.

A. Liability for contributing to the damage
As grounds for its conclusion, the court observed thatthe importers introduced into Senegal counterfeit
products bearing the “Meillor” mark, which markbelonged exclusively to M… and Veuve M. C. et Fils. Even
if the defendants did not commit counterfeiting, thecourt reasoned, they would be punishable for infringing
use. It is on that basis that the court linked them with thedamage suffered.

Having drawn no such conclusions from the importing
companies’ apparent good faith, the court then foundthem to have failed in their duty of care when they
119

120
121

See ABR-1999, arts. 37(1)(a) and 37(2)(b) of annex III. With regard to
penalties, AB-1977 appears to sanction both manufacturers, on the one
hand, and sellers or distributors, on the other. ABR-1999 is clearer in thecase of patents and utility models, because art. 58 of annex I and art. 41 ofannex II provide for receiving or selling an infringed patent. ABR-2015 did
not change this: it provides for the same receiving in art. 55 of annex I and
art. 61 of annex II. It would be positive if the 2015 version were to bring into
widespread use as an act of infringement for all intellectual property works
the receiving of stolen goods. However, it is debatable whether receivinga counterfeit mark could be penalized under art. 430 of the Criminal Codeof Senegal, which states that “[t]hose who knowingly receive, in whole orin part, objects or goods that are stolen, diverted or obtained by meansof a crime or an offense shall be punished with the penalties provided
for in article 370.” Our reading of this provision leads us to answer in theaffirmative. Possessing or holding an infringing object is an act of handlingstolen goods that requires the judicial officials to establish that there wasbad faith. See, e.g., C-65/12 Leidseplein Beheer BV and Hendrikus de Vries v. Red
Bull GmbH and Red Bull Nederland BV, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of
February 6, 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:49; CA Paris, January 23, 2012, Pôle 5, ch. 12.
See ABR-1999, art. 37(2)(b) of annex III.
Cass. com., July 7, 2017, No. 15-28114.

Such a compensation mechanism, based on profitability
to the perpetrator, would be specific to actions forcounterfeiting. The principle generally followed inmatters of civil liability is compensation in full of
damage actually incurred, determined from thevictim’s perspective.125 In focusing on the perpetrator’s
profit to determine the compensation amount, theCourt of Appeal seems to have watered down the fullcompensation principle – to the victim’s detriment.

The court did not find such a failure in the present
case, recalling instead the good faith shown by BA…
Import-Export and Four…, having based their actions, asestablished in the case, on a license contract provided
by A.J. and on all other information available to them. In
these circumstances, a finding that they failed in their
duty of care is questionable.123 Moreover, the court
did not sufficiently characterize the fault on which it
based the liability of BA… Import-Export and Four… – acharacterization all the more necessary because case law
allows for judicial oversight in the matter.

The decision’s significance, however, lies in its innovative
approach. Punishing an infringer based on theirown profit is a better way of discouraging unlawful
practices and thus protecting intellectual property
rights. Its virtually automatic character ensures that thecompensation will, at a minimum, erase any profit theperpetrator may have made.

In that vein, the French Court of Cassation has recently
recalled a trial court’s obligation to characterize all
aspects of any such fault, based on its discretionary
assessment of the factual circumstances, and not merely
to deduce from injury suffered in the case that a fault has
been committed.124
However, in the present case, the introduction ofcounterfeit products into Senegalese territory wasitself sufficient for the Court of Appeal to hold BA…
Import-Export and Four… liable and to consider whatcompensation might be in order.
B. Compensation for damage suffered by the owner of thecounterfeited markIn calculating compensation, the Court of Appeal firstexamined the damage suffered (1) and then determinedthe compensation mechanisms appropriate (2).
1. Damage resulting from trademark infringement
The court began by affirming that the damage sufferedby the owner of an infringed trademark is estimatedbased on the profit made by the infringer fromunlawfully selling the counterfeit objects, which can becorrelated with profits lost to the victim.

But the approach does have limitations: the damage
done may be greater than the profit made. For
compensation to be truly effective, the impact ofcounterfeiting on a trademark’s image must also be
considered in assessing damage. That cannot be done
if only profit to the perpetrator is considered. Twoelements must also consistently be factored in whencalculating compensation for counterfeiting victims:
unlawful enrichment of the infringer, and damage to themark’s reputation or prestige.126
To address these concerns and encourage better
compensation for the damage caused, ABR-2015 – thelatest revision of the Agreement – has broadened thecriteria for assessing damage from counterfeiting. They
now include “the adverse financial effects, including
loss of earnings suffered by the prejudiced party, theprofit made by the counterfeiter and the moral damage
caused to the owner of the rights as a result of theinfringement.” 127 There is no disputing that profitability
to the counterfeiter is a relevant and innovative criterion
for assessing damage to the victim, but a court then hits
a wall if information sufficient to quantify such profit
cannot be found.
It may have been this difficulty that led M… and Veuve
M. C. et Fils to formulate their claims for compensation
based on article 134 of the Sengalese Code of Civil andCommercial Obligations (Code des Obligations Civiles etCommerciales, or COCC).128 That provision establishes
the principle of full compensation as follows: “Where theamount of damages depends directly or indirectly on
the amount of the victim’s income, the compensation
awarded is assessed by taking into account its tax

125
122
123
124

In the end, this definition was not eventually adopted under Order No. 2016131 of February 10, 2016, on the reform of contract law, the general regime
and proof of obligations: see JORF, February 11, 2016, 35, text No. 26.
See F. Desportes (2003) La responsabilité pénale en matière d’infractions
non-intentionnelles. In Cour de Cassation, Rapport 2002 de la cour de cassation.
Paris: La documentation française.
This principle has been laid down since a decision of 1873 (Cass. civ., April 15,1873); it was recently recalled by the Second Civil Chamber (Cass. 2ème civ.,
No. 826 of June 14, 2018.17-14.781).

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

introduced counterfeit goods into the country. That
approach seems problematic. Duty of care is defined
not by legislation but in case law – albeit that a draft
codification was once proposed in France, as partof legislation aiming to reform the country’s law ofobligations, article 1242 of which draft treated failure to
exercise duty of care as an offense and an “act which isobjectively abnormal in relation to the conduct expectedof a reasonable person.” 122

126
127

128

Cf. art. 134 COCC: “The damages must be determined in a way that they
provide full compensation for the victim in relation to the damage suffered.”
Cass. civ., June 8, 2017, No. 15-21.357.
This method of determining damages has been widely adopted and similar
wording has been included in various other annexes, in particular with regard
to patents (art. 69), utility models (art. 61), trademarks (art. 54), industrial
designs (art. 18-4), and geographical indications (art. 22-4) and others.
Article 134: “The damages must be determined in such a way that they
provide full compensation for the victim in relation to the damage suffered.
Where the amount of damages depends directly or indirectly on the amountof the victim’s income, the compensation awarded is assessed by taking into
account its tax declarations covering the three years preceding the damages.”59

declarations covering the three years preceding thedamage.” Where the damage to be compensated resultsfrom counterfeiting, the liability envisaged represents analternative way of awarding more than a symbolic single
franc to the victim.129
The damage invoked and the amounts claimed should,
in any case, be demonstrated. ABR-1999, in its article 43
of annex III, refers to the trademark owner’s right todamages but does not define criteria for assessing
them. Accordingly, considering such damage establishedin the case, the court proceeded to consider theappropriate remedies.
2. Remedies for prejudice sustained by thetrademark owner
The Court of Appeal invoked basic rules of fairness tojustify its decision to award a symbolic single franc.
It did not purport to compensate the prejudice fully
because it lacked the means needed to quantify it;
the court encountered this obstacle because it limited
itself to a single criterion – the infringer’s profit – forassessing damage.
Yet once damage has been established, determining its
extent – which depends on the facts presented – shouldbe less difficult.130 In any case, difficulty in determining
the extent of damage is not sufficient justification forawarding only a symbolic franc, which is clearly notenough – in terms of fairness or any other perspective –to remedy the damage actually suffered.131
The court itself acknowledged the inadequacy of
the amount and, after validating the court-orderedinventory, it ordered additional measures, to include
destruction of the samples and publication of excerpts
from its decision in two daily newspapers, at the expenseof BA… Import-Export and Four…
Destruction of the counterfeit goods was ordered
under article 44 of annex III to AB-1977, which became

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129

60

130

131

Under the OAPI framework, ABR-1999, art. 63(1)(2) of annex VII provides
for the following in the case of literary and artistic property: “The amountof damages shall be determined in accordance with the relevant provisionsof the national civil code, taking into account the gravity of the material andmoral prejudice suffered by the right holder and of the size of the profit thatthe infringer has derived from the infringement.” This provision is not ofgeneral scope and we consider it to be applicable only in this way. However,ABR-2015 contains corrections that provide for such a trademark provision –in particular, in art. 54 of annex III.
Of course, there may be cases in which the damage is not physicallyassessable for technical reasons – in particular, when assessment of thefacts of the cause or of the measures to be ordered requires knowledge notavailable to the judge. However, even in such circumstances, the elements ofthe proceedings in particular, the alleged facts and the evidence in support ofthe claims must make it possible to assess the extent of the damage. In thesecircumstances, an expert’s opinion may be sought. See art. 156 et seq. of
Senegal’s Code of Civil Procedure.
Lindt et Sprungli SA v. Etablissement Public du Musée et du Domaine deVersailles, CA Paris, March 9, 2005, PIBD 2005, 809, III, 45. In this case, it wasconsidered that, since the damage suffered was purely symbolic, it would
be compensated by the awarding of EUR 1. Moreover, the TGI Paris noted,
in a judgment of July 4, 2003, that the plaintiff company had not produced“any document of any kind to justify its damage; that it did not have any
infringement seizure made at the premises … which would have made it
possible to seize some accounting documents.” Nevertheless, it had awarded
the sum of €7,000 in damages to the company holding the patent right and€10,000 to the exclusive licensee.

article 43 of annex III to ABR-1999.132 This is an effective
remedy because it stops their circulation.133 Even if
imposed as a supplementary penalty, elimination of
the counterfeit goods can be considered a form ofcompensation for the trademark owner.134 However,in this case, in destroying only the two sealed samples
handed over to the chief clerk of the Special Regional
Court of Dakar, as recorded by the court bailiff in Dakar
during the proceedings on August 14 and 27, 1996, themeasure appears incomplete: what about the rest of
the stock?
In this regard, the court said that it could not “order thedestruction of goods it cannot at present identify, letalone enumerate” – a position that offers little protection
for the exclusive holder of a trademark. It would
mean a judge not ordering such destruction of goods,
even where no doubt remains about their origin as
counterfeits, unless the judge were able to identify andenumerate them. The court in this case observed that“the stock of products are still in the warehouses of theliable companies,” and hence ordering their seizure andeventual destruction seems a better way of remedying
the prejudice suffered, for it was otherwise far fromassured that circulation of the counterfeit goods would
be stopped.
In addition to destruction, the publication of an excerpt
from the judgment in the dailies Walfadjiri and Le Soleil
was ordered on the basis of article 43(2) of annex III to
AB-1977.135 Publicity is also an effective deterrent, making
consumers aware of the counterfeiter’s fraudulent
behavior and hence less likely to buy from them. Caremust be taken, however, to ensure that any such
publicity does not mislead consumers about the grounds
or scope of the judgment.136
For the sake of expediency, the Court of Appeal in
the present case made the costs of destruction andpublication chargeable to the companies BA… Import-

132

133
134

135
136

See Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Banaboy Symphore Jacques, Judgment No. 9/
Civ, of January 19, 2011, of the Court of First Instance of Bonanjo (Douala),
Ohadata J-12-244. In this case, the judge held that: “[A] person who infringes
a trademark when it has not been forfeited or deregistered is liable toinfringement seizure of the counterfeit goods. As the seizure has been
carried out according to regulations, the owner of the infringed mark, whopossesses a certificate of non-forfeiture and a certificate that the mark has
not been deregistered, may obtain from the competent court a ruling on thevalidity of the seizure carried out, all the while ordering the destruction of thecounterfeit goods and the sentencing of the infringer to pay compensation forthe damage suffered.”In accordance with art. 133 COCC, the judge may even automatically order any
measure designed to compensate the damage or to limit its extent.
ABR-2015, art. 55 of annex III, provides: “In the event of a conviction for
counterfeiting, the competent domestic court may order, at the request of
the injured party, that the goods found to be counterfeit and the materials
and instruments that mainly served in their creation or manufacture bewithdrawn from commercial channels, definitively removed from suchchannels, destroyed or confiscated.” Given that a civil party cannot request
the application of a penalty, even a supplementary one, the prerogatives
thus granted to the injured party can be considered only as measures ofcompensation in kind. Indeed, this is the meaning of art. 133(2) COCC.
Now ABR-2015, art. 55(2).
Along these lines, the French Court of Cassation has recalled that “publicationon the website of a company of a court decision favorable to that company
may constitute an act of unfair competition if the victim has abused its right tocommunicate by omitting certain elements that could alter the assessment of
third parties on the decision”: Cass. com., October 18, 2017, No. 15-27.136.

Malick Lamotte

I.

Infringement seizure – Seizure
for counterfeiting – Automatic
invalidation – Non-alteration of court
proceedings – Prejudice stemmingfrom a seizure – Judge’s discretionary
power – No search for bad faith –Compensation – Counterclaim
concerning the ownership of the mark –Admissibility

According to article 52 of annex III to ABR-2015, in
respect of a trademark, when an application to obtain aseizure for counterfeiting is granted, the applicant must
submit the matter to the competent court via either civil
or criminal law proceedings within 10 working days. If
this obligation is not met, the court-ordered inventory or
seizure practiced shall become void, without prejudice toany damages that may be claimed.
Consequently, based on article 52, a judge asked to rule
on a request to find the seizure void as of right should
not enter into questions about ownership of the mark, orwhether the seizure was made in good or bad faith.
NAZAIRE GNANHOUE V. SOLA CO., Judgment No. 70/15
of March 4, 2015, Court of Appeal of LoméObservations:
According to article 6 of annex III to ABR-2015,
registration of a mark confers on its owner a right ofownership of the mark when used in relation to the goods
and services the owner designated. The owner thus
enjoys an exclusive right to use the mark and to prevent
others from using it. When the owner considers that
another has used its mark without its consent, or anotherhas registered an infringing mark at a later date, it canbring court proceedings alleging infringement or seeking
cancellation of the subsequently registered mark. In
preparation for a trial on the merits, the president of thecompetent court may authorize the owner of the mark to
seize the allegedly counterfeit products, under article 51
of annex III to ABR-2015 (former ABR-1999, art. 48) on
seizure for counterfeiting. According to article 52 (former
ABR-1999, art. 49), the owner then has 10 days in which tosubmit the matter to a civil or criminal court, failing which
the seizure becomes void as of right, without prejudice
to any counterclaim for damages by the distrainee. The
Lomé Court of Appeal applied these principles in thepresent case.
Facts: On January 2, 2009, Établissements Sola (Sola)obtained execution of an “infringement seizure”(the term in ABR-1999, later replaced by “seizure forcounterfeiting” in ABR-2015) targeting goods bearing
the mark “Cookzen,” marketed by Mr. Nazaire Gnanhoue.

Sola then voluntarily released the goods with a view tolater confiscation.
Seeing the distrainors fail thereafter to initiate
substantive proceedings within the 10 days allowed forunder article 49 of annex III to ABR-1999, then in force,137
Mr. Gnanhoue took the matter before the Lomé Court ofFirst Instance, on January 27, 2009, requesting that Sola’s
seizure be found void as of right, under articles 48 and 49
of ABR-1999, and claiming related damages.
By its judgment No. 3503/9, of November 13, 2009, theLomé Court of First Instance dismissed Mr. Gnanhoue’s
requests and canceled the “Cookzen” mark he wasclaiming as his own. The court had found no priordecision rendering the seizure void and considered thedisputed mark to belong to Sola, the first to register itwith the OAPI. The court also ordered Mr. Gnanhoue to
pay compensation, granting a counterclaim for damages
by Sola as owner of the contested mark.
On February 15, 2010, Mr. Gnanhoue appealed, arguingthat the Court of First Instance was at fault for ruling onownership of the “Cookzen” mark rather than focusing
on his request to find the seizure void as of right.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

Export and Four…, with the victim to execute themeasures directly and seek reimbursement of the costs
upon presentation of proper invoices and a copy of theconviction ruling.

Reasoning: The Lomé Court of Appeal, in its judgmentof March 4, 2015, reversed the contested judgment,
invalidated the seizure, awarded damages to
Mr. Gnanhoue and dismissed Sola’s request to cancel
the appellant’s mark, as well as the company’s claim
for damages.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the Court of First
Instance had an obligation to declare the infringement
seizure void as of right and to remedy the damage
caused. This answered the central question put to it:what is the scope of a judge’s discretionary power, incases based on article 49 of annex III to ABR-1999,138
where a distrainor fails in the obligation to take legal
action within 10 working days of an infringement seizure?
It is therefore important, based on the court’s highly
relevant reasoning, to examine the scope of thatobligation (section I), as well as a judge’s duty to remedy
damage resulting from a seizure declared void as ofright (section II).
I. The obligation to bring trial court proceedings
within the prescribed time limit following an
infringement seizure
The Lomé Court of Appeal, differing from the trial court,
found that Sola had failed in its obligation to take action
within 10 days of the seizure report of January 2, 2009.
This accords with article 49 of annex III to ABR-1999,139
which sanctions such failure by making the inventory or
seizure void as of right.

137
138
139

Now ABR-2015, art. 52 of annex III.
Ibid.
Ibid.
61

The purpose of article 49140 is to protect the distraineein such cases against potential abuses of the seizureorder. It requires a distrainor to take action on the merits
within a very short period – just 10 days. ABR-1999 andABR-2015 are both strict on that point, treating seizure
as justified only when preliminary to court action – as ameans of securing of the alleged offense – and thus voidas of right if no such action is taken.141 The Agreement
confers extensive investigative powers on the
distrainor that must be used solely as required for suchproceedings and not for intimidation. That is why the
distrainee must not be left in doubt and why article 49142
allows so limited a time for subsequent action. It istherefore important for a judge dealing with such cases
to verify compliance with the deadline – which raises theissue of how the deadline is reckoned.
The Court of Appeal had no difficulty in finding Sola
non-compliant. For one thing, Sola acknowledged asmuch when it released the seized goods in a bid to avoid
expiration of the seizure’s validity and to escape liability
for related damages. For another, Sola brought no action
on the merits in time to preserve the seizure’s validity.
Clarification is required, however, about how the time
limit is reckoned, which bears on the outcome of theseizure itself. The points of reference for assessing a
distrainor’s timeliness in taking action are, in principle,
the date of the seizure and the date of the summons forcourt proceedings.143 Case law and legal scholars largely
concur that what counts for the summons is the date ofdelivery; registration with the court can take place later.144

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Moreover, where an applicant chooses to proceed in thecriminal courts, the date to consider is that on which
the competent court is seized, including through themechanism of private prosecution. A simple complaint
does not suffice to meet the obligation to take action145– but what of the private prosecution? It is admittedly
filed with the examining magistrate, rather than thecompetent trial court, but has the virtue, unlike a simple
complaint, of triggering public prosecution. It must
therefore be accepted as consistent with the spirit ofarticle 48 of annex III to ABR-1999.146

62

The court in the present case accepted the job ofreckoning the time limit, but it did so from the dateon which “the respondent carried out the seizure, onJanuary 2, 2009, which gave it 10 working days from that
140
141

142
143
144
145
146

Ibid.
Infringement seizure is an extreme measure under ordinary law and isintended to provide evidence of alleged infringement. Its purpose is to collectmaterial that would establish the existence of the alleged infringement. In
short, it assembles evidence in anticipation of a future trial. See P. Véron(2013/14) Saisie-contrefaçon, 3rd edn. Paris: Dalloz; U.N. Mezatio (2017) La
saisie-contrefaçon en matière de marque et de brevet dans l’espace OAPI,
https://cabinetjogo.com/la-saisie-contrefacon-en-matiere-de-marque-etde-brevet-dans-lespace-oapi)
ABR-2015, art. 52 of annex III.
Cass. com., July 7, 2015, No. 14-12.733; CA Paris, Fourth Chamber, December 15,
2006, PIBD 2007, No. 847, III, 183.
TGI Paris, May 27, 1994, PIBD 1994, No. 573. III, 459; TGI Rouen, February 27,
1997, PIBD 1997, 631, III, 246; CA Paris, May 26, 1994, PIBD 1994, No. 574, III,487.
See P. Véron and I. Romet (2015/16) Droit et pratique des voies d’exécution.
Paris: Dalloz, ch. 1214.
ABR-2015, art. 51 of annex III.

date” to take action on the merits. The respondent had
still not done so, the court observed, “by January 27,
2009, the date when the appellant seized the first judge.”
Accordingly, the court found the seizure void as of rightunder article 49.
Article 49 provides effective punishment by making a
seizure or inventory void as of right should the distrainor,
in alleging trademark infringement, fail to take action
on the merits within 10 days. The expression “void asof right” (“void ipso jure” in ABR-1999) allows the judge
no discretion in pronouncing it. Judges must confine
themselves to verifying compliance with the legal time
limit and, in the absence of such compliance, declaring
the seizure void. The Court of First Instance, the Courtof Appeal argued, should thus have declared theseizure void, more than 10 days having passed between
January 2, 2009 (the date of the seizure) and January 27,
2009 (when action was brought for its annulment).
The Court of Appeal also clarified – concurring on
this point with the Court of First Instance – that the
respondent’s voluntary release of the items seized did
not alter the judge’s obligation, if the conditions underarticle 49 had been met, to find the seizure void asof right. A judge of first instance cannot, as the court
correctly said, make such a finding subject to a priordecision by another judge. To do so would be to legislate
on top of article 49.
The court also found the Court of First Instance at fault
for entering into debate about the mark’s ownership.
According to the Court of Appeal, a judge asked to ruleon an infringement seizure should do no more thanverify the mark’s ownership and the alleged offense
against it.147
It is here, however, that the question of the judge’s
discretion arises. On the one hand, in the case of a simple
court-ordered inventory, where no goods are actuallytaken, the judge has no discretion once it is proven that themark has been registered and has neither lapsed nor beencanceled.148 This is to safeguard the rights of the mark’sowner. In the case of actual seizure, on the other hand,the judge needs to retain full and exclusive discretion: 149 if
the offense is not subsequently established, an action
for compensation may not be sufficient to preserve theinterests of the alleged offender.
It is also important to consider the position taken by
the Court of First Instance, as confirmed by the Court ofAppeal, that release of the items seized has no impact on
the action to void the seizure. What, then, is the point ofvoiding a seizure already withdrawn?
147
148
149

ABR-1999, art. 48(2) of annex III; ABR-2015, art. 51: “The order shall be madeon request, subject to proof that the mark is registered and that it has neither
lapsed nor been canceled.”
CA Aix-en-Provence, December 1, 1976, PIBD 1977, No. 186, 63; TGI Paris,
Third Chamber, February 8, 2013, RG No. 10/14491.
See, in this regard, F. Greffe (2005) Contrefaçon-constatation-saisiecontrefaçon. JurisClasseur Marques-Dessins et modèles, Fasc. 3470, No. 11; J.P. Stenger (2003) Saisie-contrefaçon – Introduction. Ordonnance autorisantla saisie-contrefaçon. JurisClasseur Brevets, Fasc. 4631, No. 61 (the judge would
have no choice but to authorize a real infringement seizure of the goods).

Ruling the seizure void for failure to comply witharticle 49, the Court of Appeal turned to the issueof damages.
II. Obligation to compensate damage resulting from a
seizure voided as of right
According to article 49 of annex III to ABR-1999, an
alleged counterfeiter subjected to an infringement
seizure can claim damages if the distrainor does nottake action under either civil or criminal law within the
10-day time limit. Apart from that basic principle, theAgreement’s drafters do not specify a legal framework
for liability in the context of such seizures. Based on
the wording of article 49, liability is not automatic, since
voiding the seizure does not automatically result indamages. The framework for liability under ordinary
civil law is based on fault, damage and a causal link –formulated in article 1382 of the French Civil Code thus:“Any act of man causing damage to another must be
remedied by the person whose fault it was.” 151
But article 49 does not preclude liability for abuses ofprocess. The wording “without prejudice to any damages
that may be claimed” provides no basis for assessing
such damages. As the Court of Appeal admitted, anaction for damages resulting from a seizure later
voided could be based on abuse of the procedure152 –especially where, as in the present case, not a few
samples but an entire stock of goods was seized. The
court acknowledged as much: “The immobilization ofan allegedly infringing shipment of goods beyond thelegal time limit, exercising an exorbitant prerogative
under ordinary law to constitute evidence for future
proceedings, unquestionably does harm to the owner
150

151
152

These seizures are provided for under arts. 54 et seq. and 90 et seq. of
the OHADA Uniform Act Organizing Simplified Recovery Procedures andEnforcement Measures: see Société Europress – Editores e Distribuidores dePublicaçoes LDA v. Compagnie Beauchemin International Inc., Interim orderNo. 124 of July 20, 2004, Regional Court of Niamey (obs. J. Fometeu, thiscollection, Chapter 1, section C).
See art. 119 COCC: “Any person who causes damage to others by their fault is
liable.”Cf. art. 122 COCC: “Any person who uses their right with the sole intentionof harming another, or who makes use of it for an intention contrary to its
purpose, commits an abuse of law.”of those goods.” In that regard, the respondents could
hardly argue their own good faith or the alleged bad
faith of the appellant as reasons to dismiss the latter’s
claim for compensation. It was undisputedly their own
failure to bring timely action on the merits of the casethat led to the seizure becoming void.
Ultimately, it is quite logical that the court did not pursue
intent to harm, since what is punished under article 49 isfailing to follow the seizure with timely judicial action.
The question of a distrainee’s bad faith, as thecourt rightly noted, cannot be addressed while theinfringement seizure is in dispute. Proceedings on thatpoint are not intended to address the merits of a casebut to build evidence. The court was also right to limit
debate on the claim for compensation: it was based only
on the seizure becoming void through the appellant’s
own fault. It was thus on that basis that, while dismissing
the grounds based on good and bad faith, the court
accepted the appellant’s claim for damages and awarded
the reasonable sum of CFAF 20 million.153

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

The seizure of allegedly counterfeit goods, performed
pursuant to article 48 of annex III to ABR-1999, renders
the goods unavailable for sale, depriving the distraineeof the right to market them. Consequently, voluntary
release of the goods by the distrainor makes those goods
available again, as does the seizure being found void bya judge. The distrainee regains the right to dispose ofits goods, while the distrainor loses the samples to be
used as evidence in court and any means of regaining
them though confiscation. It is consequently hard to see
the point of voiding a seizure already withdrawn. As in
the cases of protective seizure or attachment and sale,150
the request in this case to void the infringement seizure
could have been dismissed. In other cases, however,if the goods are released after being immobilized for acertain number of days, voiding the seizure might beworthwhile if there is a prospect of claiming damages.

After reversing the trial court’s judgment and admitting
the action for compensation, the court also dismissed
Sola’s counterclaim for ownership of the “Cookzen”
trademark, on grounds of a lack of supporting evidence.
In terms of the effects of the court’s decision, its solution
has merits. It is in line with the general tendency intrademark law to reserve for a mark’s holders the rightto prevent its use by another. It is the exclusive characterof trademark rights, after all, that is protected.154 As thecourt also observed, based on the evidence presented,
the “Cookzen” trademark filed by Sola was deregistered“at the request of Hangzou Richland Foods Co. Ltd., aChinese company which had in fact filed it first.” Thecourt thus declined to acknowledge Sola’s right to themark and rightly dismissed its counterclaim.
Malick LamotteJ.

Infringement seizure – Seizure aspart of a criminal investigation – Noprior order by the president – Validityof the seizure – No invalidity of theinvestigation report

According to article 48 of annex III to ABR-1999(reformulated as “seizure for counterfeiting” in article 51
of annex III to ABR-2015), infringement seizures fallunder the jurisdiction of the president of the competentcivil court. However, that provision does not preclude theexercise of powers conferred by domestic criminal law
on judicial police officers and investigating judges in thecontext of criminal proceedings.

153
154

On the procedures for compensation, see MP and Amandatou Adechokan v. Fati
Younoussa and Salamatou Younoussa, Judgment of July 18, 2006, Court of Appealof Brazzaville (obs. M. Lamotte, this collection, Chapter 3, section D).
Cf. ABR-1999, art. 7 of annex III, now ABR-2015, art. 6 of annex III.
63

Consequently, where a public prosecutor has ordereda seizure procedure against a defendant accused ofimporting counterfeit goods and offering them for sale,a criminal court that decides to void the procedure on
the ground that the order authorizing it was not madeby the civil party in the dispute – despite the seizure
being conducted by judicial police officers within theframework of a preliminary investigation – misapplies
articles 47 and 48 of annex III to ABR-1999 (articles 49
and 51 of annex III to ABR-2015).

all potential seizures in connection with trademarks
are formally subject to the prior authorization required
under article 48.

MP AND NESTLÉ SA V. AMINATOU LASSISSI, Judgmentof April 16, 2008, Court of First Instance of Lomé, First
Criminal Chamber

I. Confusion over the provisions governing trademark
infringement seizures

Observations:
Infringement seizure is simply a supplementary andoften very effective means of proving infringement. As
observed in an analogous case: “There is no statutory or
regulatory requirement to use this particular means of
proof before bringing the case to a judge.” 155 In this case,however, the Lomé Court of First Instance seems to haveforgotten that principle.
Facts: Nestlé, owner of the “Maggi Poulet” cubes
trademark, lodged a complaint with the publicprosecutor of the Lomé Court of First Instance against
Mrs. Aminatou Lassissi for the sale or offer for sale ofcounterfeit “Maggi Poulet” cubes. On the basis of thiscomplaint, 1,800 cartons of such goods belonging toMrs. Lassissi were seized. Mrs. Lassissi was subsequently
summoned before the criminal court and charged withthe sale or offer for sale, on Togolese territory, of goods
bearing a fraudulently imitated trademark or indications
likely to deceive the buyer as to the nature of the goods.

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Counsel for Mrs. Lassissi, in an effort to stymie thesubstantive proceedings at the very outset, objected,
arguing that the seizure was void for violation ofarticle 48 of annex III to ABR-1999 (article 51 of annex III
to ABR-2015), on the basis that it had been conductedwithout prior authorization being applied for or obtained
from the president of the Court of First Instance.

64

Reasoning: Ruling in favor of Mrs. Lassissi, theLomé court:• declared the seizure null and void;• invalidated preliminary investigation report
No. 77/2007, issued on October 22, 2007, by theCentral Office Against Unlawful Drug-trafficking andMoney Laundering; and• ordered the return of the seized objects to
Mrs. Lassissi and dismissed the charges against her.
The Lomé Court of First Instance thus responded
affirmatively to an important question: whether actual
physical seizures in criminal matters, in the context oftrademark infringement proceedings, are subject toprior authorization by the president of the competentcourt. In this decision, the court appears to assert that155

TGI de Strasbourg, February 5, 1991, PIBD 1991, III, 339 et seq.

Yet that position suggests some confusion over theprovisions governing seizures in cases of counterfeiting(section I), subjecting the validity of a criminal procedure
to that for “infringement seizures,” as specified in
the Agreement and subject to conditions outlined
therein (section II).

In dismissing the counterfeiting charges against
Mrs. Lassissi, the Lomé Court of First Instance observed
the plaintiffs’ failure to provide evidence of an order fromthe president of the competent civil court authorizing the
seizure, as required by article 48. Article 48 stipulates:“The owner of a mark or holder of an exclusive
right of exploitation may, acting in pursuanceof an order from the president of the civil court
within whose jurisdiction the action is to betaken, including at the border, engage bailiffs or
public or ministerial officials, including customs
officials, if necessary with the aid of an expert,
to make a detailed inventory, with or without
seizure, of the goods or services that he claims
have been marked, provided or furnished tohis prejudice in breach of the provisions of thisAnnex.”
Article 48 thus treats seizures in such cases as aprobative measure, permitting the holder of an
intellectual property right to engage a public officer
for that purpose. The result is generally a descriptionof the infringement alleged, its extent and surrounding
circumstances, and, in certain cases, an inventory of theallegedly infringing articles with or without the physicalseizure of samples or even all such articles. The Dakar
Court of Appeal noted in a similar case that “this seizure
is only to allow a purported victim to provide evidence
that its rights have been infringed.” 156
Article 48 thus allows a detailed court-ordered inventory
to be accompanied by actual seizure of the allegedly
infringing product or samples thereof. Such a seizure
can be ordered upon request by the president of the civil
court having territorial jurisdiction. That is the basis onwhich Mrs. Lassissi impugned the civil party, Nestlé SA,
for conducting an infringement seizure without priorauthorization from the president of the court concerned.
The Lomé Court of First Instance concurred, rulingthat the seizure of cubes marked “Maggi” by judicial
police officers, executed at the direction of the publicprosecutor, constituted a violation of article 48, such
authority being reserved under that provision for thepresident of the civil court.
156

See Ameropa SA v. Mustapha Tall SA, Judgment No. 501 of December 28,
2012, Court of Appeal of Dakar (obs. M. Lamotte, this collection, Chapter 3,
section K).

The question, then, is this: did the public prosecutor havesuch authority?

The Lomé court should have dismissed the defendant’s
request to void the seizure.

In answer to that question, consider the following.
When an infringement action is brought in criminal
proceedings, the public prosecutor receives acomplaint from the victim, or a denunciation157 – but
the public prosecutor does not thereby forgo the
traditional prosecutorial prerogatives of their office.158
Under ordinary law, in the case of a flagrante delicto
investigation or even a preliminary one, the publicprosecutor can perform or order “all acts necessary
for the investigation and prosecution” of the offense.159
For probative as well as confiscatory purposes, thepublic prosecutor can direct judicial police officers toseize allegedly offending (e.g. counterfeit) objects,
instruments used or intended for use in committing
the offense and anything that appears to result directly
or indirectly from it.160 The investigating judge, uponreceiving a bill of indictment from the public prosecutor,
or a complaint filed as private prosecution by atrademark owner or licensee, has the same powers to
conduct investigations and seizures.161 Under article 47of annex III to ABR-1999 (now article 55 of annex III
to ABR-2015), a criminal court can subsequently orderconfiscation as a supplementary penalty.

In finding for the defendant instead, it voided the entire
procedure, including preliminary investigation report
No. 77/2007 of October 22, 2007, by the Central Office for
Unlawful Drug-trafficking and Money Laundering. It thenwent on to order the return to Mrs. Lassissi of the 1,800
cartons of the “Maggi” cubes seized from her.

All such seizures are criminal procedures,162 specific tocriminal proceedings. Their validity does not require
the court order indicated in article 48 of annex III
to ABR-1999.163
The court therefore erred in granting the annulment
sought by counsel to Mrs. Lassissi on the ground that
Nestlé did not produce evidence of such an order, theseizure having been executed by judicial police officers
on the instructions of the public prosecutor as part of apreliminary criminal investigation.
The court should have noticed the confusion between
infringement seizure, which requires an order from thepresident of the competent civil court under article 48
of annex III to ABR-1999,164 and seizures performed incriminal matters under the Togolese Code of Criminal
Procedure, which gives seizure power to judicial police
officers, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge
engaged in an investigation or preliminary inquiry into
trademark counterfeiting.

157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

See, in this regard, art. 32 of each of Togo’s and Senegal’s Codes of Criminal
Procedure.
Articles 31–36 of Togo’s Code of Criminal Procedure; arts. 31–38 of Senegal’s
Code of Criminal Procedure. See, in this regard, J. Pradel and J.-P. Laborde(1997) Du Ministère public en matière pénale. D. 1997, chron. 141.
Articles 34 and 61 of Togo’s Code of Criminal Procedure; arts. 33, 60 and 67 of
Senegal’s Code of Criminal Procedure.
Article 44 of Togo’s Code of Criminal Procedure; Article 46 of Senegal’s Codeof Criminal Procedure.
Articles 41 and 64 of Togo’s Code of Criminal Procedure; Articles 72 and 87 bisof Togo’s Code of Criminal Procedure; Articles 72 and 87 bis of Senegal’s Codeof Criminal Procedure.
Pradel, J., Procédure pénale, 17th ed., n. 70, at 390.
Article 51 of annex III to ABR-2015
Ibid.

For the reasons explained, that decision is a clear
misapplication of article 48 of annex III to ABR-1999.165

Having embraced the grounds for the defendant’s
request – the violation of article 48 of annex III to
ABR-1999 – the court’s decision to dismiss the criminal
charges against her went a step further: “As no orderby the president of the court concerned was producedby counsel for the civil party, the proceedings should
be dismissed entirely, for violation of article 48 of the
Bangui Agreement, with the consequences stipulated inarticle 265 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

II. Violation of the conditions for admissibility ofcriminal proceedings for counterfeiting

The court thus conditioned the validity of a criminal
investigation report, and of the criminal proceedings
themselves, on the validity of the seizure as such,dismissing the public prosecutor’s case without a trial on
the merits. The court seems to have been unaware that
infringement seizure, as defined in article 48, is merelya means of proof and that voiding such a procedure
cannot legitimately invalidate a criminal case against
counterfeiting. The public prosecutor forfeits some of
their evidence but can still present other means of proof.
This is a point often recalled by the French Court ofCassation: “The nullity of a counterfeit seizure, which is a
probative act preliminary to, and initiated only through,prosecution for counterfeiting, does not constitutegrounds for a procedural objection.” 166
Failure to produce the president’s order authorizing, oreven voiding, the seizure cannot in principle – contrary
to the court’s position – affect the validity of theproceedings. How, then, can we interpret the court’s
decision? On what basis does it declare the procedure
invalid? Why does the invalidity extend to the entire
proceedings? The judgment offers no answers to thosequestions. The court provided no grounds for theinvalidation. The difficulty is understandable: articles 37
and 47 of annex III to ABR-1999 (articles 57 and 49,
respectively, of annex III to ABR-2015) – the touchstones
for litigants alleging infringement – mention no
penalties for flaws of procedure. Their wording on
the conditions for bringing criminal proceedings forinfringement is terse,167 leaving it to domestic courts toapply the procedures applicable under ordinary law.

165
166
167

Ibid.
Cass. civ., January 19, 2010, JurisData, No. 2008-370800.
See art. 47 (2) of annex III to ABR-1999 and art. 6 (2) of annex III to ABR-2015.
65

In other words, the court’s invalidation of the proceedings
could not be based on annex III to ABR-1999. The latest
revision, ABR-2015, deals with various intellectual
property rights and their protection by administrativeand judicial means. It affirms that the Agreement is notintended to regulate the principles of criminal procedure,
which remain subject to state sovereignty. In the sphereof criminal law, its provisions regulate offenses of andpenalties for only the infringement of intellectual property
rights. Nor does the court invoke Togolese criminal
procedures that could justify invaliding the proceedings,
for there is no textual basis for doing so.
In criminal law, the invalidity of a procedural act and thescope of its invalidity must, in principle, be prescribedby law.168 The only exception is where important
provisions of criminal procedure have been violated.169
The court made no mention of any substantive
provisions of Togolese criminal procedure supposedly
violated by the public prosecutor. It therefore had nobasis for voiding the investigation report and dismissing
the proceedings before the merits of the counterfeiting
allegations could be considered. Indeed, the court
had an obligation to declare Mrs. Lassissi either guilty
or not guilty, but it failed to do so. Errors committed
by the civil party in respect of the seizure, even if
demonstrated, should have had no bearing on the
public prosecutor’s charges against her, which related
to the substance of the law, the guilt of the accused andthe claim for compensation. The public prosecution ofcounterfeiting cannot legitimately be hindered by suchprocedural issues; it is the public prosecutor’s role toact independently. The initiation of criminal prosecution
for infringement of trademarks, as opposed to patents,
utility models or industrial designs,170 cannot be madesubject to a preliminary complaint by the victim.171
In the end, to ensure legitimate protection for intellectual
property rights under ABR-2015, judges in OAPI
countries will do well not to follow the path taken here by
the Lomé Court of First Instance.

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Malick Lamotte

66

K. Trademarks – Likelihood of confusion –No actual seizure of allegedly
infringing goods – Limiting seizure toa few samples
Infringement seizures are merely a specific means ofproving infringement. Their purpose is not to punish
the alleged infringer. Accordingly, they must not be so
general in scope that a distrainor can seek and seize any
time, any place, any goods based only on an assumptionthat they are infringing.
168
169
170

171

See arts. 164 and 168 of Senegal’s Code of Criminal Procedure.
Art. 166 of Senegal’s Code of Criminal Procedure.
Art. 61 of annex I, art. 44 of annex II and art. 30 of annex IV to ABR-1999:“Criminal action seeking the imposition of the above penalties may only be
brought by the Office of the Public Prosecutor on a complaint by the injured
party.”
Art. 46 of annex III to ABR-2015.

A judge receiving a request for retraction cannot enter
into the merits of infringement allegations.
AMEROPA SA V. MUSTAPHA TALL SA, Judgment No. 501
of December 28, 2012, Court of Appeal of Dakar
Observations:
Infringement seizure is a means of proving infringement,
including counterfeiting, of an intellectual property
right. It is a procedure requiring the president of thecompetent civil court to authorize the owner of an
intellectual property right to engage a court bailiff orpublic officer to verify that infringement has occurred. If
the application or appeal is granted, any party concerned
can refer the matter back to the court president who
issued the order, subject to the conditions laid down
in domestic law.172 A judge receiving such a complaint
can modify or retract their order, even if the case has
already gone to trial. The purpose of such proceedings
is not to ascertain whether the alleged infringement
has actually occurred – that is to be proved through theseizure – but to reassess the merits of the application,
this time in light of the alleged infringer’s defense. The
Dakar Court of Appeal recalled those principles in thecase reported here.
Facts: Moustapha Tall SA, claiming ownership of
the trademark “le bon cheval légendaire + logo”(filed with the OAPI on December 30, 2008, andregistered on August 17, 2009, under No. 60828),
applied to the president of the Dakar Special Regional
Court for authorization of an infringement seizureof rice contained in green bags bearing a “horselogo” resembling its own. The bags of rice had been
received by Ameropa SA and stored at a Sonafor
customs warehouse.
By orders No. 929/2012 and No. 1000/2012 of June 22,2012, issued by the president of the Court,173 Moustapha
Tall was authorized to obtain a detailed court-orderedinventory of the allegedly infringing products. The
authorization included actual seizure, on the premises ofSonafor and of all merchants operating within the court’s
jurisdiction, or any other location, of all goods bearing
elements characteristic of the mark and intended for saleby Ameropa.
Pursuant to article 49 of annex III to ABR-1999,174
Moustapha Tall summoned Ameropa to appear before
the regional court on July 19, 2012, asking the court toestablish the infringing character of the product, obtainits destruction (or otherwise prevent it from being
marketed) and have it withdrawn from sale if marketing
had begun.
By writ dated July 10, 2012, Ameropa summoned
Moustapha Tall in return to appear without delay before
the regional court president to request retraction oforder No. 1000/2012 of June 22, 2012, and to limit actual
172
173
174

See arts. 820-8 and 820-9 of Senegal’s Code of Civil Procedure.
The Dakar Tribunal de Grande Instance Hors Classe since 2015.
Now ABR-2015, art. 52 of annex III.

It was this last order that Ameropa submitted for review
to the Dakar Court of Appeal. Among other grounds,
it argued that the motions judge erred in ordering the
seizure of its entire stock of products, and that there
was no likelihood of confusion between the products itmarketed and those belonging to the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeal in this case had two questions toanswer, as follows.
a.

b.

Can a motions judge invoke article 48 of annex III to
ABR-1999 to order actual seizure of an entire stockof allegedly infringing goods? 175
Can they also assess the ownership of the trademark
and the veracity of the infringement allegation
within the context of proceedings for retraction of
their own order to seize the goods?

Reasoning: The Dakar Court of Appeal answered firstthat infringement seizure is for probative purposes
and thus cannot apply to an entire stock of supposedly
infringing goods, and second, that the proceedings forretraction of an infringement seizure are not substantive
and thus not the forum for discussing the merits of an
infringement case. It is clear, therefore, that:I.
II.

infringement seizure is only a specific means ofproving infringement; anda judge ordering a detailed inventory combined withactual seizure must specify the scope of the latter.

I. Court-ordered inventory as a specific means toprove infringement
In the statement of grounds for its decision, the Courtof Appeal emphasized the exclusively probative purposeof the court-ordered inventory obtained by Moustapha
Tall. Accordingly, the scope of proceedings initiated by
Ameropa for retraction of that court order could notinclude the merits of the infringement case itself.
In validating the order, the Court of Appeal explainedthat the court-ordered inventory arranged by Moustapha
Tall “merely allows the victim of an alleged infringement
to provide evidence of infringement.” According toarticle 48 of annex III of ABR-1999,176 as the court notes:“The owner of a mark or holder of an exclusive
right of exploitation may, acting in pursuanceof an order from the president of the civil court
within whose jurisdiction the action is to be taken,
including at the border, engage bailiffs or public
or ministerial officials, including customs officials,
if necessary with the aid of an expert, to makea detailed inventory, with or without seizure, of175
176

Now ABR-2015, art. 51 of annex III.
Article 51 of ABR-2015.

the goods or services that he claims have beenmarked, provided or furnished to his prejudice inbreach of the provisions of this Annex.”
A trademark registrant suspecting unlawful
infringement of its intellectual property rights can, by
right, request a court-ordered inventory or seizure,177
and if the legal conditions are met, the judge cannot
refuse.178 Infringement seizure is a means of proving
infringement. It has been defined as “the measureenabling the owner of an intellectual property rightto engage a public officer to conduct investigations,generally including a court-ordered inventory, of thealleged infringement, its circumstances and its extent.”
179
Moreover, the term “seizure,” as Pierre Véron has
observed, is used improperly here; rather, it is theinventory that is described.180 An inventory must
make as faithful a representation as possible, fromthe distrainor’s viewpoint, of the infringed product.
The product remains, in principle, in the hands of the
distrainee, who may freely dispose of it unless the court
seized with the matter considers it necessary, at therequest of the holder of the trademark, to order the
seizure of samples claimed to be marked, delivered or
supplied to its detriment.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

seizure to a few samples. The regional court dismissed
the request for retraction, and confirmed its order for
the inventory and the seizure of all products presumed
to be infringing.

An inventory or seizure helps at a later stage, duringconsideration of the merits, to prove the existence andextent of an alleged infringement. It is the court-orderedinventory, in other words, that is the main purpose of
the procedure, as recalled on numerous occasions in
doctrine and case law.181 The application to the judge
for order of that inventory must be as detailed as
possible, since the authorization is based strictly on what
is requested.
In the present case, in an order of June 22, 2012, thepresident of the regional court authorized Moustapha
Tall to “engage Mademba Gueye, bailiff for Dakar, toconduct a detailed court-ordered inventory of theallegedly infringing goods” – an order that is too broad,in light of the above, lacking the precision needed to
avoid possible abuse in the bailiff’s execution of it.
A cautious, precise approach is crucial, given theprobative importance assigned to the bailiff’s reportby article 48.182 The Court of Appeal affirmed this pointby observing that the grounds Ameropa invoked inits defense “do not call into question the validity andintrinsic elements of the court-ordered inventory reportof June 15, 2012, whose description, as observed andstated by the bailiff, holds true until proven otherwise.”
If the order is granted, an allegedly infringing third party
can always request that the same judge retract it if it can

177
178
179
180
181
182

In this regard, see also Stenger, n. 147.
See P. Roubier (1952) Le droit de la propriété industrielle, vol. 1. Paris: Sirey, 426.
P. Véron (2005) Saisie-contrefaçon, 2nd edn. Paris: Dalloz, No. 11.
P. Véron (ed.) (2013/14) Saisie-contrefaçon, 3rd edn. Paris: Dalloz, 487 et seq.
See J.-C. Galloux (2000) Droit de la propriété industrielle. Paris: Dalloz, No. 489.
The report, like any act of bailiff, is a public document that, according toart. 18 of Senegal’s Code of Obligations, is authentic until proven otherwise.
67

be considered prejudicial to the third party’s own rights.183
According to the court, however, its proceedings wereneither the place nor the time to discuss the merits of theinfringement allegation.

self-defeating.187 The distrainee will have the opportunity
for such discussion during proceedings on the merits,
which the distrainor must initiate within 10 working daysor else risk invalidation of the seizure as of right.

Significantly, the procedure initiated by Ameropa for
retraction of order No. 1000/2012 of June 22, 2012, wasbased not on ABR-1999 and its annexes, which do not
expressly provide for it, but on the general system of
motions or orders upon request, as regulated by thecivil procedures of each member state.184 The essential
purpose of that procedure is to open adversarial
proceedings to any affected party. In the context ofinfringement seizure, it is hard to imagine anyone but
the distrainee requesting such a procedure.185

Another interesting aspect of this case is that, in
accepting the validity of the court-ordered inventory, theCourt of Appeal did no more than verify the registrationof Moustapha Tall’s “horse + logo” trademark – asNo. 3201102761, by order No. 12/1252/OAPI/DG/DGA/
DPI/SSD of May 31, 2012 – without proof that the markhad neither lapsed nor been canceled, as required byarticle 48 of annex III to ABR-1999.188

A judge who orders such a procedure unilaterally insuch circumstances, based solely on the version of thepresumed right holder, must then reassess the seizure
application and how it was granted, this time in light of
the alleged infringer’s defense.
As the court appropriately recalled, however,proceedings for the retraction or modification of
an infringement seizure order are not the forum fordiscussion of the merits of a case or to assess whether
alleged infringement has actually occurred. The purposeof an infringement seizure is not to look for infringement
but to prove it.186

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That was the court’s response to Ameropa, whose
grounds for appeal related solely to the merits ofthe case, disputing the infringement allegation witharguments based on differences between characteristicsof the Moustapha Tall mark and those described in theinventory, the protection obtained for its own markthrough registration with the OAPI and the absence ofany exclusive right for Moustapha Tall to use the mark.

68

The Court of Appeal was right to avert discussion on the
merits of the infringement allegations in the context ofproceedings against the initial judge’s seizure order. A
judge who is asked to order an infringement seizure,or to retract or modify such an order, must exercise no
more than superficial, prima facie control, making surethat the distrainor’s right to the mark is both valid andobvious, and that signs of third-party infringement (i.e.
by the distrainee) are present.
Since it is the purpose of infringement seizure to obtainevidence of infringement, the initial signs of it need not
be overly broad. To demand proof at this stage would be

183
184
185
186

See Société S v. Société RCFG. – Recueil de décisions de justice, Interim orderNo. 867 of June 20, 1995, of the High Court of Douala, OAPI collection No. 3,393.
Article 820-8 of Senegal’s Code of Civil Procedure: “[I]f the application or
petition for appeal is granted, any party concerned may at any time refer thematter to the presiding judge who issued the order.”See J.-P. Stenger (2004) Saisie-contrefaçon – Recours après saisiecontrefaçon. JurisClasseur Brevets, Fasc. 4634, No. 125 et seq.
A. Mendoza-Caminade (2007) La saisie-contrefaçon: une mesure aux alluresde sanction. In A propos de la sanction: études réunies et présentées par Corinne
Mascala (Les travaux de l’IFR). Toulouse: Presse de l’Université Toulouse
Capitole, 117–134.

The court also ruled on the validity of the actual seizure
so ordered.
II. The extent of the actual seizure for infringement
In the recitals for its decision, the court duly
distinguished the court-ordered inventory from theactual seizure or physical removal of goods.
In its first recital, it upheld the court-ordered inventory.
In its second, with regard to the actual seizure of the
distrainee’s entire stock of goods, the court finds the firstjudge to be at fault for issuing “a general order allowing
the applicant to sue any infringer, at any time and any
place, without being restricted to the stock stored on
Sonafor premises.”
On the scope of actual seizure in infringement cases,189
the court sided with Ameropa in disputing the authorityof the judge for urgent applications to order seizureof the defendant’s entire stock. At this stage of theproceedings, the court reasoned, the infringement was
merely alleged. Its purported victim did not need to seize
the defendant’s entire stock to prove infringement; a few
samples would have sufficed. Seizure of it all, while notindispensable for the plaintiff, could have been seriously
detrimental to the defendant.
The court stated its reason for invalidating the seizure,
based on its extent, as follows: “Actual seizure,
which retains a probative purpose, cannot take on aprotective form to cover the entire stock of infringing
products.” Here, the court exercises prudence, given
the material and moral damage that can result from
actual seizure.190 That is why article 48 of annex III to
ABR-1999,191 in regulating infringement seizure, enables
the judge for urgent applications to require security
from seizure applicants, thereby discouraging rash or
vexatious requests aimed at harming competitors. Suchsecurity must, in principle, be of sufficient amount tocompensate damage to the distrainee if the seizure

187
188
189
190
191

J. Azéma et al. (2006) Lamy Droit commercial. Paris: Wolters Kluwer, No. 2040:“The applicant is not obliged to justify likelihood of infringement, which is the
purpose of the seizure procedure to establish.”
Now ABR-2015, art. 51 of annex III.
Stenger, n. 185.
Cass. com., January 4, 1985, Bull. civ. 1985, IV, No. 9, API 1985, 237 (noteP. Mathély), PIBD 1985, 373.
Now ABR-2015, art 51 of annex III.

The court’s decision to invalidate the actual seizure inthis case therefore reflects a commendably balanced
and prudent approach to the issue, although perhaps
one not entirely consistent with article 48 of annex III
to ABR-1999.193 The court affirmed that actual seizure,being for probative purposes only, cannot take an entire
stock of supposedly infringing goods without becoming
a protective seizure. That affirmation does not flowfrom article 48 of annex III to ABR-1999, which refers
to a “detailed inventory, with or without seizure, of thegoods or services that he claims have been marked.”
The text thus covers the general modalities of suchseizures rather well, but its lack of precision as to extent
is regrettable.
In any case, article 48 provides no basis for a court
to infer any legal restrictions as to actual seizure in
infringement cases. Seizure of an entire stock of goods
may in some cases be justified, as Moustapha Tall soughtto establish in the present case, arguing that “the saleof these bags of rice on the Senegalese market would
inevitably lead to both product confusion and unfair
competition,” potentially causing “commercial harm oreven loss of income.”
Actual seizure of an entire stock can be justified where
any delay in taking action could cause irreparable harm
to a mark’s holder. An example of such action drawn
from the TRIPS Agreement is “to prevent the entry
into the channels of commerce in their jurisdiction of
goods, including imported goods immediately after
customs clearance.” 194 Prevention of irreparable harm
is a concept now enshrined in article 50 of annex III to
ABR-2015: “The competent domestic court may alsoorder all urgent measures on application where thecircumstances require that such measures should not
be taken inter partes, in particular where any delay islikely to cause irreparable harm to the applicant.” Seizure
for counterfeiting, while not envisaged in the article
so entitled, article 51 of annex III, is now recognized
as a procedure that the judge for urgent applications
is authorized to order, even though the legal basis fordoing so tends to vary.
In short, where irreparable harm may be imminent,
actual seizure can be ordered on request.
By way of comparison, the seizure of stocks of goods isallowed under article L.716-7 of the French Intellectual
Property Code (Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle, or
CPI). Actual seizure can thus cover all goods or services
alleged to be infringing and in violation of the distrainor’s
192
193
194

Cass. com., March 11, 2003, JCP G 2003, IV, 1842: “Infringement seizure must
be used in accordance with its purpose, because otherwise it is likely togenerate abuses and its legitimacy and scope will be diminished.”
Now ABR-2015, art 51 of annex III.
See art. 50 TRIPS.

rights. That is quite broad, as already recognized byvarious decisions in OAPI countries.195
Be that as it may, it seems that Fernand de Vischer andFrançoise Jacques de Dixmude rightly surmise that,as the use of infringement seizure develops and as
the risks generated become clearer, a more balanced
approach to the procedure will be required.196 To achieve
the right balance where stocks of goods are concerned,
security must be required systematically, as provided
for in article 51 of annex III to ABR-2015 in relation
to trademarks: “Where grounds for seizure exist, theabove-mentioned order may require the applicant tomake a security deposit which he must provide before
the seizure is effected. The deposit shall be adequate
without deterring applicants from availing themselves ofthe procedure.”
Proper enforcement of that provision by judges
should encourage seizure applicants to moderate
their demands.
Malick Lamotte

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

proves unwarranted, because the abuse of rights canbe significant. Penalties can, of course, be assessed
later, but the preliminary security requirement remains
essential as a more expeditious means of remedy and amore effective curb on excess.192

L. Trademark – Claim of right of priority –Restoration of priority – Violation ofprior rightA claim of priority for a mark made to the OAPI two years
after its initial filing in a third country is time-barred
and therefore inoperative, notwithstanding a decisionby the Director General of the OAPI to restore thepriority claimed, the judge having found failure to meetthe conditions required by OAPI regulations to restore
such rights.
The initial registration of a mark based on a flawed rightof priority cannot have priority over the subsequent
registration of an identical or similar sign.
SIVOP SA V. ANGEL COSMETICS SA, Civil judgment
No. 187 of March 21, 2013, Court of First Instanceof Yopougon
Observations:
Within the union established by article 4 of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,197
right of priority in trademark matters is a means
to relieve applicants of the need to file applications
simultaneously in every country where protection might
be needed and to allow applicants a certain period oftime from their initial filing in one member country to
195

196
197

See Société B.SA v. Société S Sénégal, Judgments No. 1847 of November 27,
2002, of the Regional Court of Dakar, in Edou Edou, n. 20, at 247–256; Sté Air L
and ors v. Sté A.S Cameroun, Judgment No. 250 of January 24, 1996, High Courtof Mfoundi (Yaoundé), in Edou Edou, n. 20, at 266–269.
F. de Visscher and F.J. de Dixmude (2001) La saisie-description en Belgique:une mesure probatoire et parfois conservatoire. Les cahiers de propriété
intellectuelle, 13, 2, 465–486.
The Convention was signed on March 20, 1883, revised in Stockholm on
July 14, 1967, and amended on September 28, 1979. It is one of the coreagreements administered by the WIPO and all the WIPO member states haveacceded to it.
69

make parallel filings in others without risk of losing
priority to other possible applicants. Such applicantsmight otherwise seek to profit from publication of thefirst filing to file the same sign first in other states.198
The decision reported here sheds valuable light on theconditions behind the implementation of this right ofpriority, as regulated by article 11 of annex III to ABR1999, pursuant to article 4 of the Paris Convention.
Facts: Ivorian company SIVOP SA, asserting its priorright over the “CAROLIGHT” trademark and logo, as
registered with the OAPI on November 30, 2006, underNo. 54659, for goods in classes 3, 20 and 25, lodged
a complaint against Angel Cosmetics SA, located in
Kinshasa, before the Yopougon Court of First Instance,
for cancellation of the same mark registered underNo. 57,406 on October 17, 2005, in the name of Angel
Cosmetics. In return, Angel Cosmetics claimed the priorright to the “CAROLIGHT” trademark under its Congolese
right of priority, as restored by the Director General of
the OAPI by Decision No. 217/OAPIDG/DPI/DAJ/SSD/SAJ
of October 11, 2007. Angel Cosmetics had, in fact, filed
the “CAROLIGHT” trademark in the Congo on the datestated, that country being a non-member country of
OAPI but a party to the Paris Convention.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Angel Cosmetics was aware that its claim to priority
was late: it should have reached the OAPI no morethan three months after the original application.
The company had therefore requested and obtained
restoration of its Congolese right of priority from the
OAPI Director General. The company argued that thisgave it retroactive ownership of the mark as from
October 12, 2005, when it filed its mark in the Congo.
Angel Cosmetics also said it had simultaneously filed
its opposition with the OAPI to registration of the same
mark being sought by SIVOP, arguing that the civil
proceedings under way before the Yopougon court could
not conclude until that prejudicial issue had been settled
by the competent authority.

70

The Youpogan court faced two questions. First, in
considering a request for cancellation of a trademark,should it defer its decision until the OAPI had finishedconsidering simultaneous opposition to registrationof the same mark? Second, can the foreign filer of a
trademark claim priority that has been wrongly restoredby the Director General to gain priority over the same
mark filed first with the OAPI?
Reasoning: The Youpogan court answered the firstquestion in the negative, denying the stay of proceedings
requested and thus giving precedence to judicial
decisions in member states over those issued by OAPI
statutory bodies (section I). In answer to the second
question, the court denied the priority claimed, basedon its preliminary review of the conditions for exercisingsuch priority (section II).

I. Precedence of decisions by the courts over those by
OAPI statutory bodies
The precedence of court decisions over those made by
OAPI bodies is established in ABR-1999 and is a recurring
theme in the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
According to article 18 of the Agreement’s generalprovisions: “Final legal decisions relating to the validityof titles and rendered in one member state under theprovisions of Annexes I to X of this Agreement shall bebinding on all other member states, with the exceptionof decisions based on public policy and morality.” It
is on the basis of that community provision that thejudge drafting the court’s decision rightly denied thestay of proceedings requested by Angel Cosmetics:“[T]his provision is consistent with article 18 of ABR1999, which establishes the primacy of authoritative,
independent judicial decisions over those taken by OAPI
statutory bodies and subjects the latter to civil court
censure for their acts and decisions relating to industrial
property protection.”
It is thus clear that court decisions on the validity ofindustrial property ownership are binding on rightholders and industrial property offices alike. The
authority of decisions by OAPI bodies in attributing
title to industrial property rights is not absolute. Suchdecisions confer the presumption of such rights but
no certainty as to their existence or validity. By way ofillustration with regard to patents, article 22(1) of annex I
to ABR-1999 provides that “the grant of patents shall beat the applicant’s own risk and without any guarantee
either as to the reality, novelty or merits of the invention
or as to the truth or accuracy of the description.” It is
ultimately up to the courts to determine whether aright is legally protected or not. That principle applies
to both the creation and continuing validity of industrial
property rights.
As to the inception of such rights, it is a judge who
ultimately decides, after examining the legal conditions
for such protection, whether an industrial property title
has been legitimately issued.
As to a title’s continuing validity, a judge can declare it
void, canceled or lapsed in response to either a principal
or incidental claim.199 It can also declare the cancellationor forfeiture of a trademark restored by the competent
OAPI organ. From that point of view, Decision No. 217/
OAPIDG/DPI/DAJ/SSD/SAJ by the OAPI Director General,of October 11, 2007, restoring priority in the Congo ofmark No. 57406, “CAROLIGHT,” as from October 17,
2005, was not binding on the court, which had the power
to revoke it if finding the necessary legal conditions
deficient. It was, in fact, after examining those conditions
that the court denied Angel Cosmetics the benefits ofpriority and thus overrode the Director General.

199
198

See Passa, n. 82, at 560.

For more information on this issue, see M.L. Ndéma Elongué (2012) La
propriété intellectuelle à l’épreuve de la justice des pays membres de l’OAPI.
In Mélanges offerts à Denis Ekani (OAPI Collection No. 4), Paris: L’Harmattan,
189 et seq.

II. Conditions required for exercising right of priority
The exercise of a prior right is subject to certain
conditions in the above-mentioned laws. The court’s
decision to cancel the “CAROLIGHT” trademark,No. 57,406 of September 4, 2007, registered by Angel
Cosmetics, was grounded in the latter’s infringementof the earlier right acquired by SIVOP in registering
the same trademark on November 30, 2006, underNo. 54,659. The court made that decision after denying
the priority claimed in the Congo by Angel Cosmetics for
trademark No. 57,406, because the latter had failed tocomply with formal and material requirements laid down
in OAPI legislation.
It is important to note that while ABR-1999 (article 11(1) ofannex III) does not expressly provide for the restorationof priority, ABR-2015 now does so. In the latter version,
article 12(5) of annex III reads as follows: “However, theright of priority referred to in paragraph 4 above may
be restored in accordance with Article 21 below.” It isonly since the adoption of the Regulations on Restoring
Rights, in Cotonou on December 4, 2004,201 that such
restoration can be granted under ABR-1999.
Examining those regulations in conjunction witharticles 11(1) and 25 of annex III to ABR-1999, it is clearthat restoration of the priority of an earlier registrationmust be applied for within three months after its original
filing date. The application must include:• a full statement of the grounds for restoration, withsupporting documents;• a written declaration stating the date and number ofthe original application for registration; and• a certified true copy of, and receipt of deposit for,said original application, or alternatively, a document
establishing or assigning priority or the translation ofsuch document.
The sphere of trademark restoration was initially limited
to the hypothesis in article 25, of failure to renew
protection for a trademark. The cited regulations on
restoration of rights broadened the scope of restoration
to include applicants having failed to submit the priority
document in a timely fashion.
According to SIVOP, the OAPI Director General should nothave accepted the application for restoring the priority
200
201

See ABR-2015, art. 28(3).
The subject of Resolution No. 44/13, adopted by the 44th session of the OAPIBoard of Directors.

claimed by Angel Cosmetics, insofar as the latter’s
supporting document was certified as a true copy notby the appropriate office (the Zairian Office of Industrial
Property) but by the civil registrar of a third country.
However, the relevant provision in ABR-1999 (article 11(1)(b) of annex III), does not specify which authority mustcertify the copy. Logically speaking, the prerogative
should rest with the industrial property office, as wellas any other competent local authority. That suggeststhat this formal requirement had been met in this case(although the authority of the Malian civil registrar, which
physically certified the copy, seems open to question).
In any event, this involvement of an authority from acountry other than that of the office responsible givesa taste of the exceptional circumstances invoked byAngel Cosmetics.
With regard to the conditions, article 25(1) of annex III
to ABR-1999 provides for restoration if non-renewalof the mark has resulted from circumstances beyond
the registrant’s control.202 In support of its request
for restoration, Angel Cosmetics indicated two
circumstances beyond its control: the fault of an agent,and the political and military crisis in the Congo. The HighCommission of Appeal had long considered an agent’s
fault to be a circumstance beyond the registrant’s
control.203 But its interpretation eventually grew stricter,requiring applicants to prove diligence and follow-up in
recovering their rights.204

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

Once final, such a decision is naturally binding on the
OAPI under the combined provisions of article 18 of
ABR-1999 and article 24(3) of its annex III. According
to the latter provision, when the decision declaring theregistration invalid becomes final, it must be notified to
the OAPI.200 According to rule 6(1) of the Organization’s
regulations under ABR-1999, the decision is to beconveyed to the OAPI by the first party undertaking to
do so.

Angel Cosmetics, however, could neither prove thecircumstances depicted nor specify the nature of thefault alleged. SIVOP, meanwhile, produced letters fromthe Congolese government and postal service disproving
the existence of such circumstances during the time inquestion. SIVOP argued that this stripped away the legal
basis for Angel Cosmetics’ bid to restore the priority ofits mark and rendered the Director General’s decision
invalid. In short, the trademark filed by Angel Cosmetics
as No. 57,406 on September 4, 2007, being invalid, could
not have priority over the same mark filed by SIVOP,
No. 54,659, on November 30, 2006.
In addition to that argument, SIVOP sought invalidationof the Director General’s decision to restore thepriority of Angel Cosmetics in the Congo as a misuseof procedure. The restoration of priority, it reasoned,
pertained to registrations received by the OAPI or in oneof its member states. The beneficiaries of registration inthird countries could benefit from OAPI protection only
by applying for extension of the original protection to the
OAPI space under article 45 of ABR-1999.205 Curiously, the
202

203
204
205

Article 4 of the Regulations on the Restoration of Rights states thatcircumstances beyond the registration holder’s control must be understoodto mean accidental and unavoidable events, for example interruption of
postal services and loss or delayed delivery of mail.
See Decisions No. 29/SCR/OAPI of October 31, 2003, No. 41/CSR/OAPI of
October 29, 2004, and No. 50/CSR/OAPI of April 1, 2005, Recueil des décisions
de la commission supérieure de recours, Sessions 2003–05.
See Decisions No. 102/CSR/OAPI of April 27, 2007, and No. 103/CSR/OAPIof April 27, 2007. Also see in this regard CSR Decision No. 103/CSR/OAPI of
April 27, 2007 (obs. F. Ekani, La Gazelle 2008, 4, 10).
ABR-1999, art. 45(1), stipulates that: “Titles in force in a State prior to its
accession to this Agreement shall continue to have effect in that State inaccordance with the legislation in force when they were applied for.”71

Court of First Instance accepted this argument, whichsuggests confusion between a claim of priority and arequest for the extension of protection. A claim of priority
is where applicants for extension from third countries
that are members of the Paris Union, as in the present
case, claim the date of the first filing for all subsequent
filings of the same trademark in the other states. A
request for extension settles the fate of registrations
granted in a state prior to its accession to the OAPI.
That reservation aside, however, the decision
warrants approbation.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

M. Use of a trademark as an internet
domain name – Unfair competition –Bad faith – Determining the author of
a competitive act
A company that knowingly and for commercial ends uses
as a domain name the registered trademark of an online
payment service in disregard of the trademark owner’s
rights has committed the fault of unfair competition
under articles 1 et seq. of annex VIII to ABR-1999,
together with the national civil code.
Liability for the impugned acts rests with both theregistrant of the domain name and any user in bad faithof that domain name.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

SONATEL MOBILES SA V. AGENCE TOUBA SÉNÉGAL AND
GPS GROUP, Judgment No. 57 of May 17, 2017, Supreme
Court of Senegal

72

Observations:
Conflicts between trademarks and domain names are
becoming frequent in the OAPI space owing to theincreasing popularity of the internet in member states.
This is evidenced by the surge in the registration of
domain names, which have become a source of bothrevenue and multifaceted disputes. Domain names
are addresses that denote the location of servers,
websites or users. The characters they contain help toidentify or locate the domain owners or areas of activity.
Domain names are currently managed at the global
level by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN). However, the responsibility
for registering domain names lies with US-based
company Network Solutions Inc. A number of IT service
providers accredited as registrars by Network Solutions
act as technical intermediaries between ICANN andnetwork users.
Conflicts arise essentially from the lack of coordination
between trademark registration systems and domainname registration systems. This has led to the practiceof cybersquatting – that is, registering domain names
containing the trademarks of third parties with aview to selling the names to those parties. AndréR. Bertrand notes that, unlike trademarks registered bypublic authorities OAPI in the Central and West Africa

subregion), which are enforceable only on specificterritories, domain name registration systems are notgeographically bound or dependent on any government.206
In the case under review, the dispute between the
trademark holder and the domain name registrant
falls broadly within the realm of unfair competition, as
covered in articles 1 et seq. of annex VIII to ABR-1999.207
Facts: The facts are relatively straightforward. Agence
Touba Sénégal (Touba) – holder of the “sen-factures”
service trademark for a remote invoice payment system,
which had been filed with the OAPI on January 30,
2006, with effect from April 12, 2005 – initiated legal
proceedings against Sonatel Mobiles for unfair
competition and payment of damages for having used
the trademark for commercial ends without its consent.
The defendant company claimed that it had used thetrademark not as the owner and provider of the disputed
payment service but as a client of the GPS Group – itself
belonging to Gie Gainde 2000, owner of the domainname “senfactures.sn,” having registered it as such in
Senegal in January 2005, prior to Touba’s use and filingof its similar trademark. The trial court ruled in favor of
Touba, but its ruling was quashed by the Dakar Courtof Appeal.
The Supreme Court then overturned the appeal court’s
reversal and referred the case to the Kaolack Court ofAppeal, which ruled for Touba.
Reasoning: Consistent in its reasoning, the Supreme
Court ultimately rejected a subsequent appeal by Sonatel
Mobiles, bringing this judicial saga to a close. The
Supreme Court was asked in this case to resolve two keyquestions: had unfair competition occurred? And if so,
who should be held responsible?
The Supreme Court reasoned, first, that the prohibitionon the use of a registered trademark without thepermission of its holder, under article 7 of annex III
to ABR-1999, is general and applies to third parties
irrespective of the category of activity concerned. In thecourse of industrial and commercial activities, the court
went on to say, unfair competition can consist of any act,
including use of a trademark that creates or is likely tocreate confusion.
The court’s reasoning seems to blur the line between
trademark infringement and unfair competition,requiring us to re-examine the true intent of thislitigation. Since unfair competition presupposesa wrongful act, the first step is to assess thecompetitive act concerned (section I). The partyor parties responsible for that act must then be
identified (section II).

206
207

A.R. Bertrand (2005) Droit des marques, signes distinctifs-noms de domaine, 2ndedn. Paris: Dalloz, 373.
See also articles 1–9 of ABR-2015.

The unfair competition alleged in this case by Touba,
based on article 1(1)(a) of annex VIII to ABR-1999,
presupposed the exercise of a competing activity (A) andbad faith (B).
A. The competing activity
The non-exhaustive instances of unfair competition
enumerated in annex VIII include confusion withanother’s enterprise or activities, damage to another’s
image or reputation, disparagement of another’s
enterprise or activities and violations of confidentiality.
In the case reported here, the act impugned by
the plaintiff related to confusion with a registeredtrademark, based on article 2(2) of annex VIII. Touba
alleged Sonatel Mobiles was at fault for using thedomain name “senfactures.sn,” an imitation of its own
eponymous trademark for a remote invoice payment
system, as filed with the OAPI on January 30, 2006,
with effect from April 12, 2005. The existence of unfair
competition in this case depended on how likely thedomain name was to cause confusion with the trademark
in the minds of the public.
The imitation in this case was beyond doubt. The domainname “senfactures.sn” is phonetically identical to the“sen-factures” trademark filed by Touba, so the similarity
was clear and the difference in spelling inconsequential.
As a matter of comparative law, the Court of Justiceof the European Union has found similarity to be
sufficiently clear where a sign “reproduces, without any
modification or addition, all the elements constituting
the trademark, or where, viewed as a whole, it contains
differences so insignificant that they may go unnoticed
by an average consumer.” 208 Even the non-identical
reproduction of a trademark, or the products or services
associated with it, may be considered a source ofconfusion within the meaning of article 2(1) and (2)(a) ofannex VIII to ABR-1999.209
It is accepted in the case law that domain nameextensions need not be considered when estimating
the likelihood of confusion. By way of background,a domain name consists of a root and an extension.
Over the years, ICANN has created new extensions forgeneric top-level domains to meet high demand for
new web addresses. In one pertinent case, the company
Gandi cited its trademarks “Gandi” and “Gandi-net” asgrounds for action against registrants of domain names
containing “gandi-info.” The Paris High Court held thatsince the disputed domain names consisted of a root andan extension, and the extension denoted the genericdomain, only the root “Gandi” should be considered inassessing imitation.210 While this decision concerned
trademark infringement, the reasoning behind it
applies perfectly to unfair competition, particularly inestablishing the likelihood of confusion. In the case

208
209
210

C-291/00 LTJ Diffusion SA v. Sadas Vertbaudet SA, Judgment of March 20, 2003,
ECLI:EU:C:2003:169.
See also article 3 of annex III to ABR-2015.
Gandi v. Inexpensive Domains and ors, June 27, 2003, Paris High Court.

under review, that likelihood stems from the root of the
disputed domain name (“senfactures”) being identical to
the registered trademark (“sen-factures”), the domainname extension (“.sn”) being of little import.
The imitation causing the confusion in this case also
concerned the service provided under the “senfactures” trademark – namely, remote invoice payment.
In a similar case, albeit one relating to copyright
infringement, the Nanterre High Court reasoned thatthe content of an impugned website must be comparedwith the goods and services for which protection isclaimed.211 In the same vein, the Versailles Court ofAppeal denied protection under a class 38 trademark(telecommunications) against the mark’s use in a domain
name, regardless of other considerations. According tothat court, class 38 services should be understood ashaving their stated purpose (communication, messaging,etc.), not liable to be confused with the many services forwhich computer communications, electronic messaging,the internet or other media are simply means.212
In the present case, the registrant of the disputed
domain name was providing, via its website www.
senfactures.sn, a service identical to that designated by
the Touba trademark (remote payment of invoices), witha website layout highly likely to mislead internet users as
to the company providing the service.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

I. Assessing the competitive act

B. Bad faith
The meaning of bad faith is best conveyed by theexpression “contrary to honest practice” used inarticle 1(1)(a) of annex VIII to ABR-1999. Under that
article, reproducing a trademark as a domain name is
not in itself punishable as an act of unfair competition;
there must also be bad faith or dishonest behavior in theexercise of industrial and commercial activities. Broadly
speaking, bad faith must be assessed relative to the dateof registration of the disputed domain name. In the caseof “senfactures.sn,” that was in January 2005, before the“sen-factures” trademark was filed with the OAPI (on 30
January 2006 with effect from 12 April 2005). This raises
serious doubts as to the bad faith of the registrant of thedomain name “senfactures.sn.”
The question of acknowledging prior claims by domainname users has been debated in the literature, as wellas in the courts. Some decisions have denied ownershipstatus within the meaning of intellectual property law;213
others have been more liberal in recognizing suchstatus. In a decision evocative of the case under review,
the Paris Court of Appeal reasoned that a domain
name, based particularly on its commercial value tothe owning company, may warrant protection against

211
212
213

Sté Publications Bonnier v. Sté Saveurs and Senteurs Créations, January 21, 2002,
Nanterre High Court, JCP E 2002, No. 36, No. 8 (obs. M. Vivant).
Zebank (SA) v. Multimedia Canadia Ltd (Ste, Canada), 123 Multimedia (SA),November 22, 2001, CA Versailles, JCP E 2003, No. 106, No. 7 (obs.
B. Humblot).
See Amélie M. v. Société Internic, Jacob N, March 13, 2000, Nanterre High Court,
JCP E 2000, 1856, No. 7 (obs. M. Vivant).
73

infringements.214 According to French jurist and author
Jérôme Passa, in commenting favorably on decisions
in this vein, the name of a domain, once operating, canconstitute prior art and thus grounds for cancellation ofa trademark.215 Some authors consider domain names
only a nascent form of property not yet warranting
such protection.216
It is difficult to see how initial registration of the domainname “senfactures.sn” could be considered fraudulent if
Touba’s prior claim to use of the eponymous trademark
could not be established. That is precisely what Sonatel
Mobiles argued, affirming its good faith in using
the name, unaware that a “sen-factures” trademark
existed. The company also affirmed that it was not theintended recipient of a commercial offer from Toubafor use of the trademark – sent to “Sonatel” by letter
dated March 9, 2004 – having its own separate legal
personality as “Sonatel Mobiles.” Arguments based onthat offer, while relevant, were declared inadmissible
for failure to produce the letter. The letter mightotherwise have corroborated prior use of the trademark
by Touba and supported its posture as a victim of unfair
competition. But it might also have corroborated theassertion of good faith by Sonatel Mobiles: if it was not
the intended recipient, it could not logically have beenaware of the offer.
In any event, the court’s rationale for penalizing Sonatel
Mobiles was clearly based on prior use of the “senfactures” trademark by Touba, as illustrated by thefollowing preambular paragraph:

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights“[Considering that] the appeal court also notesthat Sonatel and the GPS Group, after learningof the registration and use of the ‘senfactures’trademark by Touba, continued to use that
protected mark; this fraudulent use, contrary tohonest practice, was liable to create confusion
with the service trademark legitimately andlegally owned by Touba, and to disrupt its
market.”74

It seems questionable, however, to recognize prior useof the “sen-factures” trademark by Touba, since theletter of March 9, 2004, offering that trademark forcommercial use was not included in the dossier. In thesecircumstances, only the date on which the trademark
was filed with the OAPI or, at the very least, enteredinto force (namely, April 12, 2005) should be considered
in determining prior use – unless it is assumed that theSupreme Court relied on earlier testimony from Sadaga
Sarr, general director of Touba, on August 14, 2002, thecontent of which remains unknown.

214
215
216

Virgin Interactive Entertainment Ltd and Virgin Interactive Entertainment SARL v.
France Télécom and BDDP-TBWA (voluntary participant), October 18, 2000, CA
Paris, JCP E 2000, No. 36, 8 (obs. M. Vivant).
See Cass. com., November 26, 2003, PIBD 2004, No. 780, III, 98; CA Paris,
September 15, 2004, PIBD 2005, No. 800, III, 54.
See M. Vivant et al. (2004) Lamy droit de l’informatique et des réseaux. Paris:
Éditions Lamy, No. 2061.

II. The author of the competitive act
Identifying the author of an act in question might seemstraightforward, but it is not. Websites are operated bymultiple individuals whose precise responsibilities need
to be determined. Primary responsibility clearly lies with
the natural or legal person who reserved the domainname – that is, who applied for its registration with theaccredited registrar (A). The responsibility of users of
the services offered under the offending domain nameis a more delicate question (B). The responsibility oftechnical intermediaries, including the access provider
and website hosting company, was not expressly raised
and will not be examined here.217
A. The registrant of the offending domain nameResponsibility for the acts of unfair competition
concerned in this case lay primarily with the legal
person benefiting from the domain name, which was
Gie Gainde 2000, to which the GPS Group belonged.
The facts show that this entity registered the domainname “senfactures.sn” in Senegal in January 2005. The
Supreme Court endorsed the appeal court’s argumentthat the appellant’s registration with a national body– instead of the OAPI, which was “the only subregional
institution competent in the matter” – did not entitle it
to use the trademark against the will of the respondent.
This reasoning suggests a lack of familiarity with domainname registration, which, unlike that for traditional
industrial property titles, is done at the national andinternational levels by accredited registrars. It is
the responsibility of the applicant to check that useof the requested name does not infringe any priorrights.218 In the present case, Gie Gainde 2000 shouldhave performed a prior art search before registering
the name, to confirm its availability. Such a searchwould have been all the easier for the fact that thelitigants were in the same line of business – namely,
online invoice payment. In any event, it was the appeal
court’s sovereign judgment that the GPS Group wasaware before registering its domain name that Touba
had already used the “sen-factures” trademark, suchthat the group’s use of that name on the internet waswrongful. However, the proceedings seem mainly tohave targeted Sonatel Mobiles, which tried at all costs toavert conviction.
B. Users of the offending domain name
Sonatel Mobiles claimed that it used the “senfactures.
sn” domain name not as the owner and provider of theassociated payment service but as a client of the GPS
Group – itself belonging to Gie Gainde 2000, ownerof the domain name. Accordingly, it claimed to bearno responsibility for the actions of its trading partner.
The Supreme Court, however, reasoned that Sonatel
Mobiles used the offending name fully aware of theprior trademark and thus upheld the complaint of unfair
competition against it. It is a common approach to rulecompetition unfair, as the Supreme Court did here,
217
218

See J. Fometeu (2013) La responsabilité des intermédiaires techniques dansl’utilisation en ligne des objets protégés. RAPI, 4, 25.
See Vivant et al., n. 216, No. 2044.

The question is how to interpret the court’s reasoning (asnoted earlier, the court reasoned that the prohibition on
the use of a registered trademark without the permissionof its holder, under ABR-1999, art. 7 of annex III, isgeneral and applies to third parties irrespective of thecategory of activity concerned), which is a source ofconcern, invoking as it does provisions on the rights
conferred by trademark registration to characterize
unfair competition. The court’s desire to protect a
trademark owner’s rights, whoever might seek to violate
them, is understandable. But it is also true that theholder of an exclusive trademark right has a choice: bringaction for infringement directly or seek to punish the
infringement on grounds of unfair competition, provided
that, in the latter case, the likelihood of confusion can bedemonstrated without calling the trademark rights into
question. In France, the Court of Cassation continuallyreminds lower French courts that:
a.

b.
c.

actions for unfair competition can be brought onlyin the event of wrongdoing, whereas actions forinfringement concern the violation of exclusive rights;
these two types of action have different causes andaims; andactions for infringement are not incidental,
consequential or complementary to actions for
unfair competition.219

The court was therefore wrong to cite article 7 ofannex III to ABR-1999. It could be argued further thatsince the two companies operated in the same sector,
Sonatel Mobiles must have been aware of the “senfactures” trademark and, in using the online invoice
payment service provided by Gie Gainde 2000, intended
to “ride the coattails” of the trademark holder andbenefit from its marketing efforts.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

N. Claiming ownership of a trademark –Exclusive competence of the OAPI –Competence of the civil court – Validityof a trademark registration – Violationof a prior right – Penalty: invalidation
Claims to ownership of a trademark do not fall under the
exclusive competence of OAPI judicial organs. Actions
in respect of such claims may legitimately be brought
before the domestic courts of member states. The
success of such actions is in no way restricted by the sixmonth time limit for submitting administrative claims to
the OAPI Director General.
219

See Cass. com., February 24, 1987, PIBD 1987, III, 316; Moulinex SA v. Vapsan
Trading Cie and ors, n. 89.

SOCIÉTÉ MARINE MAGISTRALE SA V. MR. KAMGANENKAM, JEAN PAUL, Civil judgment No. 382/Com ofDecember 23, 2013, High Court of Wouri (Douala)Observations:
The right over a trademark exists from the date of its
filing. Under the Bangui Agreement, the use of a signin relation to a particular product is reserved for the
person who files it first with the OAPI – a rule known as“first to file” (see article 5(1) of annex III to ABR-1999).
This rule is flexible, however, and does not apply to
fraudulent filings: under the general principle of fraus
omnia corrumpit, “fraud corrupts everything,” fraudulent
acts may be challenged in court. Indeed, cognizant of
the dishonest practices common in commercial circles,
regional legislators have equipped trademark users withthe legal instruments necessary to protect themselvesfrom fraudulent applications aimed at misappropriating
their assets. Actions asserting ownership claims havethus been sanctioned as the best way of punishing those
appropriating a sign even though aware of a claimant’s
prior use. With the exception of administrative appeals
lodged with the OAPI organs, there is nothing to prevent
national courts from being seized of such matters, as in
the case reported here.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

where civil liability has been incurred for misconduct,in accordance with the civil legislation in OAPI member
states. Proving the bad faith of one participant in a chain
is sufficient to hold them personally or jointly liable forthe offending acts. For counterfeiting, where good faith
is not a factor, the approach is fundamentally different.

Facts: According to the facts in the case, Mr. Kamga
Nenkam was appointed general director of company
Marine Magistrale (2M), plaintiff in the case, by aresolution of its board of directors. To protect its highly
modern port handling service, “Harbour Handling withBig Bags,” the plaintiff mandated Mr. Nenkam to file with
the OAPI on its behalf the service mark “H2B2 System.”Taking advantage of his privileged position, Mr. Nenkam
used his employer’s resources to file the mark in his
own name, registering it under trademark No. 66841
by order of July 29, 2011, of the OAPI Director General.
After discovering this, Marine Magistrale terminated its
contract with the defendant and, claiming prior use of
the trademark, initiated legal proceedings to invalidate
Mr. Nenkam’s filing and register the mark under thecompany’s name.
Reasoning: In addition to examining the issue ofvalidity in this case, the High Court took the opportunity
to consider the fundamental question of whether,under OAPI positive law, the national courts of member
states can admit trademark claims. In doing so, thecourt deployed the country’s legislative framework for
trademark ownership claims. The crux of the disputeconcerned how courts have interpreted the combined
provisions of articles 5(3) and 47(1) of ABR-1999.
The court’s solution clearly distinguished between
judicial claims and administrative claims made against
fraudulently registered trademarks.
In principle, the Bangui Agreement applicable at the timeof the facts (ABR-1999) provides for administrative claims
to be lodged for trademark ownership. Under article 5(3)of annex III to ABR-1999, “where a mark has been filed bya person who at the time of filing knew, or should have
known, that another person had a prior right to use thesaid mark, the latter may file a claim of ownership of the75mark with the Organization, provided that he does so
within six months following the publication of the recordof the first filing.” This provision clearly and helpfully sets
out the conditions, both substantive and formal, to be
met by trademark claimants.
On that basis, it is clear that the success of suchadministrative claims depends on:a.
b.

the defendant having both filed a sign and acted inbad faith; andthe claimant having previously used the mark.

The defendant must also have filed the sign fraudulently.
Filings are considered fraudulent where they breacha legal or treaty obligation to the detriment of thesign’s prior user. On this basis, the court seized of thewell-known Dynamogen case 220 reasoned that, sinceDistrimed Pharma had registered the “Dynamogen”
trademark in bad faith and in violation of a contractual
obligation, having been mandated to register the
disputed trademark on behalf of FAES S.A. instead, theregistration was fraudulent and should be invalidated
under the fraus omnia corrumpit principle.

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What constitutes an applicant’s bad faith is clear
from the text of article 5. On that basis, case law has
commonly affirmed that applicants are considered tohave acted in bad faith where they were aware, or could
not have failed to notice, that a third party was alreadyusing the sign in question or a similar sign for similar or
identical goods and services (the principle of specialty).
In the absence of bad faith, claims are simply dismissed.
In one case submitted to the OAPI Director General, an
appeal lodged by a claimant with the High Commission
was dismissed owing to the latter’s inability to prove thebad faith of the defendant, who had performed a priorart search before filing the sign at issue.221

76

Bad faith is assessed relative to the date on which thesign was filed and can be proven by any means; prioruse of the mark is required by law. In other words,
under article 5, a party need only prove its prior use ofa trademark to lay claim to it. Whether the plaintiff has
an exclusive right to the sign is irrelevant, because thevictim’s prior use of the sign must be established in any
event.222 It was on this basis that the High Commission of
Appeal dismissed the Dynamogen case.

be brought within six months following publication in theofficial gazette of an allegedly fraudulent filing. Withinthat period, the claimant must file with the OAPI for
registration of the sign in its own name or permanently
lose the right to claim ownership. This was establishedin a case brought before the OAPI High Commissionof Appeal.223 When a case is brought, adversarial
proceedings are conducted before the OAPI Director
General. In this particular dispute, more than six months
had passed after publication of the first filing before theappellant company made the second in its own name.
For this sole breach of the governing legislation, the casewas dismissed.
In terms of the administrative organs competent to heartrademark disputes, the process starts with the OAPI
Director General. If the Director General rules in favorof the claimant, the fraudulent filing is struck from therecord so that the claimant’s filing can be considered. If
the Director General dismisses the claim, the claimant
may lodge a final appeal with the High Commission of
Appeal within 60 days of the notification of dismissal (seealso article 31(2)(d) of ABR-2015).
While ABR-1999 contains no such provision, ABR-2015
also allows trademark claims to be brought before
courts in the member states, as an alternative toadministrative appeals. In the present case, two of theplaintiff’s substantive complaints were the subject oftechnical debate before the court: the first concerned
the court’s jurisdictional competence; and the second,
the time limit applicable.
With regard to the competence of domestic courts tohear trademark proceedings, the Bangui Agreement inforce at the time was silent, but that should in no way beinterpreted as legislative intent to exclude such recourse.
Indeed, the devolution to domestic courts of disputes
arising from the exploitation of industrial property titles
is a specific characteristic of the OAPI system. In otherwords, the OAPI system gives domestic courts common
law jurisdiction for disputes over industrial property
rights. In principle, penalties for infringement are also fordomestic courts to decide, making them competent defacto to hear ownership claims. Article 47(1) of annex III
to ABR-2015 provides that:“Where a mark is registered by a person who, at
the time of deposit, knew or should have known
that another person had priority to exploit themark, the other person may claim ownership ofthe mark before the competent domestic court.

In addition to substantive requirements, the Bangui
Agreement lays down a number of formal requirements
for administrative claims. Ownership claims must meetstrict formal requirements as to when and before which
body they may be brought. Under article 5(3), they must

220
221
222

Distrimed Pharma SARL v. Fábrica Española de productos químicos y farmacéuticos(FAES) SA, Judgment No. 257/Civ of May 18, 2011, Court of Appeal of the Center
Region (Yaoundé).
Judgment No. 172/OAPI/CSR of November 13, 2013, of the OAPI HighCommission of Appeal.
Ibid. In rejecting the appeal, the High Commission noted that Mrs. Adibadji
had not been able to prove that she had used the trademark at issue prior toits filing by Mr. Agbere Issaka Sanounou.

“Where a mark is acquired in infringement ofa legal or contractual provision, the prejudiced
party may also claim ownership of the markbefore the competent domestic court.”

223

Distrimed Pharma SARL v. Fábrica Española de productos químicos y farmacéuticos(FAES) SA, Judgment No. 11/19/OAPI/CSR of October 18, 2019, of the OAPI HighCommission of Appeal.

unavailability. For example, article 8.4 of the European
Union Trade Mark Regulation (Regulation 2017/1001/EU
of June 14, 2017) allows for registration to be opposed by
the owner of an unregistered trademark or of anothersign used in the course of trade on more than a local
scale, while article L.711-4 of the French Intellectual
Property Code provides that a sign which infringes priorrights may not be adopted as a trademark.

The judge went on to say, nonetheless, that the time
limit for administrative trademark proceedings does
not apply to judicial ones. This ruling thus helped toclarify the judicial role in respect of trademark claims,
no legal basis for which had been previously set down.
According to the judge’s decision, trademark claims canbe pursued in two ways: the first, in principle, before thecourts; and the second, as an exception, before the OAPI.
While strict time limits apply for the administrative route(six months under ABR-1999 and three months under
ABR-2015), they do not for judicial proceedings, which
may be brought at any time.

Facts: The question raised in the present case related
solely to the field of trademark law. Having registered
the trademark “Gazelle thé vert de Chine + Logo” 225 with
the OAPI in 2007, under class 30, the plaintiff opposed
the subsequent registration of a mark “La Gazelle et ses
petites,” filed in 2009 under classes 29 and 30, on thebasis of article 18 of annex III to ABR-1999 (article 15 ofannex III to ABR-2015). The OAPI Director General, rulingin the plaintiff’s favor, decided to cancel the latter mark,citing the likelihood of its confusion with the former.
His decision was then referred to the High Commissionof Appeal.

Aristide Fade

Reasoning: Three separate issues were concerned inthis case. The first was formal, relating to the initial
opposition being declared inadmissible (section I); theother two, both substantive, concerned the identity
or similarity between the goods concerned by thetwo marks (section II), and the likelihood of confusion
between them (section III).

O. Trademarks – Opposition to theregistration of a later mark –Reiteration of opposition – Similarityof goods concerned – Likelihood ofconfusion caused by a later markThe owner of a registered trademark may oppose thesubsequent registration of a mark for goods similar to
those covered by their own mark where the signs foreach mark bear phonetic and visual similarities that
could confuse an average consumer.
MR. ABDOULAYE SACKO V. SOCIÉTÉ AMAR TALEB MALI
SARL, Judgment No. 175/OAPI/CSR of November 13,
2013, OAPI High Commission of Appeal
Observations:
The judgment under review comes from the OAPIHigh Commission of Appeal, which is responsible
under article 31(2)(a) of ABR-2015 for ruling on appeals
following the rejection of applications for titles ofprotection for industrial property. The case provides
insight into an age-old issue in trademark law: theavailability of a sign to be registered. Availability means
the absence of any prior third-party right over the sign.
The applicable rule, which is fully consistent with thetrademark’s essential guarantee function, is set out inarticle 3(b) of ABR-1999. It provides that a mark may
not be validly registered if it is identical to a mark thatbelongs to another owner and is already registered,or to a mark whose filing or priority date is earlier andwhich relates to the same or similar goods or services,or it so resembles such a mark that it is liable to misleador confuse. It should be noted in passing that while theAgreement refers only to prior trademark rights, somenational laws include other prior rights as reasons for224

See article 19(1) of annex III to ABR-2015.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

The Agreement distinguishes between judicial
proceedings for claims brought before domestic
courts and administrative proceedings brought before
the OAPI.224 Thus, in assuming jurisdiction, the judge
hearing the case adhered to those rules, which would
have obliged him, if declining jurisdiction, to fully
examine observations made about transposing the sixmonth time limit to court proceedings.

I. Admissibility of the opposition
The case was peculiar insofar as an initial opposition had
been declared inadmissible by the OAPI Director Generalon June 29, 2012, for non-compliance with article 18 ofannex III to ABR-1999, on which basis the defendantargued that a second opposition could not succeed
either and that the owner of the prior trademark shouldhave referred the inadmissibility decision to the HighCommission of Appeal. The plaintiff responded that, its
initial opposition having been submitted on overzealous
counsel before registration of the contested mark had
even been published, it was now entitled to resubmit
its opposition within the time limit of six months ofpublication allowed under the Bangui Agreement.
The Commission agreed. It declared the new opposition
admissible, having been submitted within the timeframe and in the form prescribed by law to regularize thegrounds for dismissal following publication.
The solution is entirely commendable. According to theletter of article 18(1) of annex III to ABR-1999,226 dismissalof the plaintiff’s opposition was not an option. While
the judicial nature of the High Commission of Appeal isdebatable,227 it is logical to transpose the general rules
225

226
227

This is how the High Commission of Appeal describes the mark, although
in reality the contested decision (No. 40/OAPI/DG/DGA/DAJ/SAJ, July 11,2012) shows the mark as “China Green Tea Gazelle.” For the remainder of thiscommentary, however, “Gazelle thé vert de Chine” will be used, as this is themark of concern to the Commission.
Now ABR-2015, art. 15 of annex III.
See J. Fometeu, annotated OAPI Code, sub-art. 31.
77

accepted in civil proceedings, including the principlethat grounds for dismissal may be regularized at
any time. What matters, as the Commission pointed
out, is submission within the time limit. Dismissal,
moreover, would have been excessively harsh given theCommission’s role, under article 15 of annex III to ABR1999, as the “the judge and arbiter of final instance.”
II. Identity or similarity between the goods concernedby the two marks
As stipulated in article 3(b) of annex III to ABR-1999, thepriority of the first sign can prevent registration of thesecond only if both are for similar goods or services. Ina similar vein, article 8(1)(b) the European Union Trade
Mark Regulation refers to the identity or similarity
between goods or services covered by the trademarks.
This is simply the application of the fundamental“specialty” principle, which has been rightly described as“consubstantial with the concept of the distinctive sign.”
228
The likelihood of confusion justifying the refusal of aregistration exists only where the opponents operate in
the same market.229

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That is the argument the plaintiff put forward inaffirming that its mark “Gazelle thé vert de Chine” andthe disputed mark “La Gazelle et ses petites” were used
for identical or similar goods. The defendant objected, in
return, that its mark covered goods in classes 29 and 30,
whereas the prior mark covered goods in class 30 only.

78

In response to that objection, the Commission merely
noted the similarity between classes 29 and 30. This
reasoning seems too brief to be convincing. It is basedon the assumption that the specialty principle applies
only to the international classification of products andservices under the 1957 Nice Agreement, which has
been revised several times. While article 9(2)(c) of that
Agreement (article 8(d) of the version applicable at thetime) requires applicants to specify classes of goods
and services with reference to the Nice Classification,
it begins by stating that the file must contain a clear
and complete enumeration of the goods or services towhich the mark applies. The OAPI trademark registration
form takes this into account: it requires the applicant
to indicate the goods covered in a box opposite eachclass claimed.
The Nice Classification is clearly without legal effectin this regard. As eminent experts have noted,230 thescope of protection of a trademark is determined by
the goods and services enumerated rather than theiradministrative class. Similarly, case law establishes that
trademark protection covers only those goods that are
identical or similar to the goods for which the mark was
filed and does not necessarily extend to all goods in
228
229
230

S. Durrande (2010) Disponibilité des signes. JurisClasseur Marques – Dessins etmodèles. Fasc. 7110, No. 5.
See J. Raynard, E. Py and P. Trefigny (2016) Droit de la propriété industrielle.
Paris: LexisNexis, No. 374: “[T]he prior art making the sign unavailable must
exist in the business segment for which the mark is registered.”J. Azema and J.-C. Galloux (2012) Droit de la propriété industrielle, 7th edn.
Paris: Dalloz, No. 1505.

the class under which it was filed.231 It was only with thebenefit of this clarification that the Commission could
conclude that the goods in question were similar, and it
was therefore wrong, in our view, for the Commission
to find that the two classes of goods were similar only inthat they both concerned food products.
It is also worth mentioning that a variety of products
are included in classes 29 (meat, fish, poultry and game;meat extracts; preserved, dried and cooked fruits andvegetables; jellies, jams, compotes; eggs, milk and milk
products; edible oils and fats) and 30 (coffee, tea, cocoa,
sugar, rice, tapioca, sago, coffee substitutes, flours
and preparations made from cereals, bread, pastry
and confectionery, edible ices, honey, molasses syrup,
yeast, baking powder, salt, mustard, vinegar, sauces(condiments), spices, ice cream). It should have been
indicated which of these two long lists was covered by
the trademarks “La Gazelle et ses petites” and “Gazelle thévert de Chine.” Moreover, it is hard to imagine the lattermark designating products in class 30 other than tea
without being considered deceptive or liable to mislead
the public under article 3(d) of annex III to ABR-1999 as tothe nature of the good in question.
III. Likelihood of confusion between the signs
Article 3(b) of annex III to ABR-1999 provides that a markmay not be validly registered if “it is identical to a markthat belongs to another owner and is already registered,or the filing or priority date of which is earlier, and which
relates to the same or similar goods or services, or where
it so resembles such a mark that it is liable to misleador confuse.” In the case under review, the two marks inquestion were not identical; it was their resemblancethat was at issue. Article 8(1)(b) of the European Union
Trade Mark Regulation provides that an opposition must
be upheld if “there exists a likelihood of confusion on
the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier
trade mark is protected.” The difference in the wordingof the two texts is only slight, with the term “confusion”
serving to convey the idea of fraud implied by the term
“mislead” in the ABR-1999 provision.
The plaintiff in the present case asserted that thelikelihood of confusion arose from the fact that both
marks were visually representative and intellectually
evocative of gazelles. The defendant argued that any
confusion was allayed by the fact that its own markspecifically depicted three gazelles, consisting of amother and her two offspring, and included the words“Gazelle et ses petites” in clear print, while the prior markwas purely figurative, consisting of a single gazelle. Thiswas in fact only partially true: the image shown in thecontested decision contained both a gazelle and thewords “China Green Tea” and “Gazelle.”
Without broaching that issue, the High Commissionof Appeal ruled in favor of the plaintiff, considering
the signs to be both phonetically and visually similar.
“Indeed,” the Commission reasoned:231

See Cass. com., June 17, 1980, No. 78-16.098, Bull. civ. 1980, IV, No. 260.

A formal reservation is warranted here. The
commission’s use of the word “indeed” suggests thatthe similarity between the signs resulted from similarity
between the goods concerned. Yet clearly this cannot
be the case. It must first be established that the goods
covered are similar and then, separately, that the signs
are similar enough to create the likelihood of confusion.
The commission’s reasoning is otherwise classic andtaken more or less verbatim from the contested decision,reflecting the generally recommended method for
determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists.
It would have been useful to supplement the applied
criteria with those referred to in the 11th recital to theEuropean Union Trade Mark Regulation, which statesthat assessing the likelihood of confusion “depends on
numerous elements and, in particular, on the recognitionof the trademark on the market, the association which
can be made with the used or registered sign, the degreeof similarity between the trademark and the sign andbetween the goods or services identified.” By the same
token, the CJEU, in Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v.
Klijsen Handel BV, reasoned that assessing the likelihoodof confusion “implies some interdependence between
the relevant factors, and in particular a similarity
between the trademarks and between the goods orservices covered,” and that “a lesser degree of similarity
between those goods or services may be offset by agreater degree of similarity between the marks, and viceversa.” 232 This demonstrates the link between the issuesof similarity between goods and services, on the one
hand, and likelihood of confusion, on the other.
André Lucas

P. Trademarks – Compliance with themandatory registration procedure
for plant protection products –Justification – Infringement
A person’s compliance with the mandatory approval
procedure for plant protection products establishedby the competent administration does not justify
infringement by that person of a registered trademark
for those products. Consequently, a court misapplies
the law if, despite the proven similarity between two
conflicting signs, it dismisses a trademark owner’s
infringement action on the grounds that the alleged
infringer complied with this administrative procedure.

232

SOCIÉTÉ SINOCAM SARL V. SOCIÉTÉ AFCOTTCAMEROUN SARL, Judgment No. 4/Com of December 6,
2018, Supreme Court of Cameroon
Observations:
In civil proceedings for trademark infringement,
alleged infringers may plead a variety of defences toavoid conviction, including lack of standing, invalidityof the allegedly infringing mark on various grounds
and forfeiture by acquiescence. Leaving aside thechallenged validity of the trademark, this judgmentof the Supreme Court of Cameroon is an opportunity
to examine an atypical defense for an infringement
defendant based on compliance with the approval
procedure for marketing the infringing goods. The court
clearly stated that compliance with that administrative
formality does not justify infringement, rebuking theappeal court for relying on such justification to reject the
infringement proceedings.
Facts: Sinocam SARL, owner of the “Lamida Gold 90 EC+ logo” trademark, No. 71469, for goods falling withinclass 1, fortuitously discovered that Afcott Cam SARL
was marketing the same goods bearing the infringing
sign “Lamida Cot 90 EC” from a number of warehouses
in Douala. Sinocam summoned Afcott Cam to appear
before the Wouri High Court to answer charges ofinfringing its trademark, asking the court to order:

Chapter 3 – Trademarks“[T]he classes of goods are similar, both relating
to foodstuffs, and both of the signs were visually
representative of gazelles as two-horned animals,
regardless of how many; the average consumer
will see the word ‘gazelle’ and then the imageof a gazelle; confusion between the two marks
was therefore likely for consumers not seeing (orhearing) them at the same time.”• cessation of all manufacture and distribution of
the Lamida Cot 90 EC product, subject to a fine of
CFAF 500,000 for each infringement observed;• seizure and destruction of the entire stock ofinfringing products; and• payment by the infringer of CFAF 100 million
in damages.
• Alcott Cam pleaded two defenses of unequal weight:• that the mark “Lamida Gold 90 EC + logo” was invalid,
for lack of distinctiveness; and• that the marketing of goods bearing the mark “Lamida
Cot 90 EC” was lawful.
In its Decision No. 167/Com of April 6, 2016, the Wouri
High Court ruled in favor of Sinocam. That decision
was overturned on appeal, in Decision No. 40/Com of
November 7, 2016.
Sinocam appealed to the Supreme Court.
Reasoning: The key questions before the Supreme Court
concerned, first, whether fulfilment of the conditions formarketing goods bearing an infringing mark can justify
setting aside an infringement grievance and, secondly,
to what extent the mark in question was effectively
distinctive. In its ruling, the Supreme Court answered
the second question by ruling that compliance with theregistration procedure does not justify an infringement(section II), but it did not fully address the first, equallyimportant, issue of the mark’s distinctiveness (section I).

C-342/97 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Klijsen Handel BV, Judgment of
the Court of June 22, 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, at [19].
79I. Distinctiveness as a condition for the validity ofa markBefore the appeal court, Afcott Cam challenged thevalidity of the mark “Lamida Gold 90 EC + logo” primarilyon the grounds that it was generic and therefore notdistinctive, in terms of both the sign filed for registration(A) and the goods designated (B).

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A. The sign
It is worth reiterating that, under article 3(a) of annex III
to ABR-1999, a trademark cannot be validly registeredif it is devoid of distinctiveness. That requirement isalso frequently referred to in the literature.233 It means
rejecting marks that consist only of necessary or genericdesignations. According to Bertrand, a sign or term
is considered generic if it designates not a specificproduct or service but merely the category, type orgenre to which the product or service belongs, or atype of product or service to which consumers attributeno specific origin.234 Chavanne and Burst define as
generic those marks that consist solely of the namecommonly used to designate the product or service
provided.235 The aim of excluding such marks, and thus
allowing competitors to use generic terms freely, is toremove unnecessary barriers to the freedom of tradeand industry. The main argument made by Afcott Cam
was that the term “lamida” was both a type of insect
and the generic name of a chemical used to repel it. The
appeal court agreed. It reasoned that, in researching andmarketing pharmaceutical or plant protection products,
promoters can use expressions relating to the germs to
be combated without infringing the rights of the patent
holder, provided that the “intonation” of the name isdifferent for each of the products in question.

80

The appeal judges appear not to have grasped thecomplexity of the “Lamida Gold 90 EC + logo” mark,which contained both verbal and figurative elements.
The distinctiveness of such a mark must be assessed
based on the entirety of the sign rather than a single
word within it – in this case, “lamida” – however generic.
The courts, moreover, have consistently allowed ageneric term to be registered as a trademark if one ormore arbitrary elements are added to give the mark,considered as an indivisible whole, its own individual
appeal. For instance, according to case law in France,
the French term “agenda” cannot be validly registeredas a mark for designating appointment books, but signs
such as “Agenda XY,” “AgenDDa” or the word “agenda”
written in a particular and unusual script to designate
such products can receive trademark protection.236 By
that logic, while a trademark owner cannot prohibit or
oppose the use by its competitors of non-distinctive
elements of its trademark – in this case, the term

233
234
235
236

See Bertrand, n. 204, at 53; Passa, n. 82, at 83.
Bertrand, n. 80, at 112.
Chavanne and Burst, n. 1, at 583.
See CA Paris, March 10, 1994, PIBD 1994, No. 568, III, 325; Cass. com.,
January 24, 1995, Bull. civ. 1995, IV, No. 25; CA Paris, November 9, 2001, PIBD
2002, No. 737, III, 106.

“lamida” 237 – it may nonetheless contest slavish or quasislavish reproductions of its trademark that include thearbitrary elements making it distinctive. The methodof assessment the Court of Appeal used here – that is,singling out the word element “lamida” as grounds forconsidering the mark generic – is thus far from orthodox.
The Supreme Court paid little attention to this important
aspect of the dispute, appearing to focus solely on theappellant’s arguments. In any event, the generic natureof a sign, whether complex or simple, must be assessedin relation to the goods or services designated.
B. The goods or services indicated in the act of registration
The goods or services designated by a trademark
are decisive in determining its distinctiveness. As
indicated above, a sign is considered to be devoid of
distinctiveness where it constitutes only the necessaryor generic designation or composition of the product orservice with which it is associated. It was consequently
significant that Afcott Cam associated the term “lamida”
with an insect that was named and described by Allata
Walker in 1859 and later adopted by scientists todesignate a chemical repellant for that insect.
It is necessary at this stage to identify the precise goods
covered by the act of registration for the “Lamida Gold90 EC + logo” trademark, to assess the respondent’s
assertion that the sign is generic. In seeking dismissal of
the grievance, Sinocam argued that:• its mark was registered for class 1 goods – thatis, chemicals intended specifically for agriculture,horticulture and forestry – rather than for insects;• among the wide variety of trademarks anddenominations for plant protection products, noinsect, named “lamida” or otherwise, is sold as a
product or product component, let alone used as acommon name for a fungicide, pesticide or insecticide;• the term “lamida” is not a necessary or genericdesignation of the goods indicated in the certificate ofregistration for the mark; and• its characterization as such by Afcott Cam wastherefore fanciful.
We might, at best, speculate about the connotations the“Lamida Gold 90 EC + logo” mark might have for its target
audience – primarily, farmers. It is perfectly conceivablethat customers might directly or indirectly equate theterm “lamida” with goods bearing the mark “Lamida
Gold 90 EC + logo.” Doing so, however, would be a highly
subjective process, as Jérôme Passa rightly observes.238 It
is generally accepted, in any event, that assessing thegeneric nature of a sign is for the sovereign judgment of
the trial court, often based on surveys or polls. That is
the only real means of determining how most consumers
or users view the sign: as designating either a type or
category of goods or a product of specific origin.239 The
237

238
239

In other words, a person cannot reserve a descriptive or generic term
designating a product or service to the detriment of its competitors operatingin the same business sector. Such terms are effectively in the public domain
and are therefore available to all.
Passa, n. 82, at 93.
Bertrand, n. 80, at 114.

II. Defenses pleaded by the alleged infringer
Afcott Cam argued that its “Lamida Cot 90 EC” sign did
not cause a likelihood of confusion with the mark inquestion (A) and that it committed no fault, the products
bearing that sign having been approved for marketing by
the competent authority (B).
A. Likelihood of confusion
The appeal court also saw little likelihood of confusion
between the signs based on the absence of imitation, thedifferences in product name intonation and packaging,and the absence of intent to mislead consumers.
That position appears suspect for two reasons. First, theimitation is obvious from simply examining the signs, interms of both spelling and phonetics. As for the spelling,
it is clear that Afcott Cam had slavishly reproduced the
key characteristics that made the “Lamida Gold 90 EC+ logo” mark distinctive.241 Indeed, the substitution of
the letter “C” for “G” in “COT 90 EC” amounts visually toso small a difference as to go unnoticed by the average
consumer. The imitation might have been less clear if
Afcott Cam had been content to use the trademark’s
non-distinctive elements, such as the term “lamida” –although the generic nature of that element relative tothe goods in question had yet to be established.
Second, in assessing the likelihood of confusion,
the appeal court curiously took the perspective of aconsumer looking at both products together to conclude
that customers purchasing either would be reassured,
not confused, as to their choice. It is accepted in bothliterature and case law, however, that a judge must takethe perspective of an average consumer – that is, one
not seeing or hearing the signs together. As a matterof comparative law, the French Court of Cassation
systematically checks whether lower courts have metthat requirement.242
B. Commission of fault
Afcott Cam argued that it had committed no fault. It had
marketed goods under the “Lamida Cot 90 EC” trademark
having duly followed the procedure established underDecree No. 2005/772/PM of April 6, 2005, on the terms
and conditions for the registration and control of plant
protection products. The appeal court agreed that

240
241
242

See Y. Rebou (2012) La Marque: outil stratégique pour l’entreprise. In
Mélanges offerts à Denis Ekani (OAPI Collection No. 4). Paris: L’Harmattan, 108
et seq.
See Independent Tobacco FZCO v. Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd, Judgment No. 536/
Civ of November 6, 2013, Court of Appeal of the Center Region (Yaoundé)(obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection, Chapter 3, section Q).
See Cass. com., November 26, 2003, PIBD 2004, No. 780, III, 100; Cass. com.,
February 18, 2004, PIBD 2004, No. 788, III, 360.

the company had committed no fault, reasoning thatthe rights of possible competitors were ensured by
the commission responsible for approving use of the
products concerned.
That position disregards the conditions laid out in the
Bangui Agreement for protecting and exploiting thetrademarks of products to be marketed. A commission
for approving the use of plant protection products
cannot act in the place of the OAPI, the body responsible
for registering trademarks, nor especially in theplace of courts competent to enforce trademarks.
Through registration, as Sinocam rightly pointed out,
the competent authority approves plant protection
products as suitable for their intended use when used
as recommended, and safe for human and animal healthand the environment, based on a review of complete
scientific data to that effect. Therefore, after following
the registration procedure, Afcott Cam should haveconsulted with Sinocam, the undisputed owner of the“Lamida Gold 90 EC + logo” trademark, to negotiate
the conditions for use of that mark under a contractual
license. Indeed, under article 7(2) of annex III to ABR1999, Sinocam could have prevented all third parties
from making use in business without its consent of signs
identical or similar to those for which the “Lamida Gold90 EC + logo” mark was registered. Because Afcott Cam
did not obtain permission to exploit the “Lamida Cot 90
EC” sign, which was similar to the cited trademark, thegrievance lodged against it for infringement was morethan supported.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks“Lamida Gold 90 EC + logo” mark associated with class 1
goods was, in our opinion, distinctive. Notwithstanding
its possible connotations, the term “lamida” could not in
itself perform the functions required of a mark: enabling
the consumer or ultimate recipient of a product orservice to recognize it and know what enterprise, among
other competitors, owns the mark for it.240

The Supreme Court was therefore right to affirm, indisagreeing with the appeal court, that compliancewith the mandatory registration procedure for plant
protection products does not justify infringement of an
intellectual property right. Its ruling restored the legal
order upset by the contested judgment.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

Q. Assessing likelihood of confusion –Complex trademark – Principle of theindivisible whole – OAPI administrative
bodies – Member state courts
The method used to assess the likelihood of confusion
regarding a complex trademark is both abstract andglobal. It is abstract in referring to the content of theregistration and to a fictitious character known as
the average consumer, who cannot see or hear twocompeting products at the same time. It is global
in assessing the overall impression created by the
conflicting marks, considering their distinctive anddominant elements in particular. Consequently, a
court errs if it declines to find infringement without
first ascertaining the likelihood of alleged confusion,basing its decision on the fact that the OAPI, althoughempowered to deny it, had approved registration of theoffending mark.

81

INDEPENDENT TOBACCO FZCO V. ROTHMANS OF PALL
MALL LTD, Judgment No. 536/Civ of November 6, 2013,
Court of Appeal of the Centre Region (Yaoundé)
Observations:
Likelihood of confusion is a central concept in trademark
law and the basis for finding infringement. It is assessedusing the so-called global method, established in thecase Sabel BV v. Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport, in which
the Court of Justice of the European Union reasoned
that likelihood of confusion must be “appreciatedglobally,” taking into account all factors relevant tothe circumstances.243 Such likelihood is a key measureof the resemblance between two competing signs
and, according to Passa, can take many forms. It canbe direct, where the public confuses or is likely to
confuse trademarks and signs, or indirect, where thepublic distinguishes between, say, two signs, but uponcomparison believes them to be exploited by the sameowner. Likelihood of confusion also exists where thepublic, while able to distinguish both signs and theirusers, may imagine, for instance, that arrangements
exist between two companies, warranting possible
quality concerns about both.244 In the case considered
here, the Yaoundé Court of Appeal applied the global
method to a dispute between Independent Tobacco
FZCO and Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd.
Facts: The facts are relatively straightforward.
Independent Tobacco registered the trademark“Business Royal,” as sanctioned by order No. 6/1318/
OAPI/DG/SSD of the Director General of the OAPI, on
September 15, 2006. Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd, claiming
an exclusive and prior right over the sign “Royal,” having
filed and registered the trademarks “Rothmans Royals
Label” and ”Royals” on March 17, 1997, and November 6,
2001, respectively, brought proceedings before theMfoundi High Court requesting cancellation of the“Business Royal” trademark and payment of damages.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

The High Court granted the request in its judgment ofJanuary 26, 2011, which Independent Tobacco appealed.

82

Reasoning: The Court of Appeal of the Centre Region(Yaoundé) was thus being asked to decide whether the
OAPI, an institutional body responsible for registering
trademarks, was qualified to assess the likelihood ofconfusion on the same footing as a court of law. It
answered in the negative and dismissed the appeal,reasoning that the OAPI had registered without protest
several other marks bearing the word “Royals,” butalso that other elements, such as color and logo, were
sufficient to distinguish the marks, each of which should
be considered as an indivisible whole.
The decision is helpful in recalling how the likelihood ofconfusion should be assessed in the case of complex
marks. But it could also give the mistaken impression

243
244

C-251/95 Sabel BV v. Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport, Judgment of the
Court of the Court of Justice of the European Union November 11, 1997,
ECLI:EU:C:1997:528.
Passa, n. 82, at 303.

that responsibility for such assessments is shared
between the OAPI and the courts. In truth, the OAPI
reviews applications for trademark registration asa purely administrative procedure (section I), while
likelihood of confusion is a matter for courts toassess (section II).
I. Review of applications for registration: a purely
administrative procedure
The appeal court’s reasoning invites us to consider boththe content (A) and scope (B) of this review.
A. Content of the review
When the OAPI receives an application to register amark, it examines whether the formal requirements
under articles 8 and 9 of annex III to ABR-1999 havebeen met and the relevant fees paid.245 The formal
requirements relate to the number of copies of theapplication, proof of payment of the filing fee, powerof attorney, reproduction of the mark with a list of the
products or services covered and the correspondingclass(es) thereof. The OAPI also checks whether the markto be filed is contrary to public policy, morality or thelaw,246 and whether it imitates, reproduces or includes
among its elements coats of arms, flags or any othersuch emblems.
The review is of limited substantive scope. The OAPI does
not automatically conduct research to ascertain whether
the sign is available – a task that would be delicate,
unpredictable and, in any case, dependent on claims toprior art.247 Nor is it viable for the industrial property
office to assess likelihood of confusion, which varies overtime, while reviewing applications for registration; rather,
its responsibility is to register trademarks meeting theminimum requirements on a “first come, first served”
basis. Third parties may challenge its decisions by filingtheir opposition or trademark ownership claims to the
OAPI Director General or through judicial proceedings
for cancellation of the registration concerned. The
validity of the certificate issued following the review,
moreover, is subject to third-party challenge at any time,on grounds of likely confusion with another’s signs,
goods or services. In short, the review carried out by the
OAPI is purely administrative and highly limited in scope.
B. Scope of the review
The review that the OAPI conducts of registration
applications is by no means exhaustive. In particular,
it does not verify whether signs to be registered areavailable or likely to be confused with previously
registered ones; such verification is performed aposteriori in court if challenges are brought. The decision
approving the mark’s registration in that event is notbinding on the court, which may order its cancellation
where confusion is found to be likely.

245
246
247

See ABR-1999, art. 14(1) of annex III. ABR-2015, art. 18 reproduces thisprovision in full.
See ABR-1999, art. 3(c) of annex III; ABR-2015, art. 18(2).
Passa, n. 82, at 159.

II. Methods of assessing likelihood of confusion
For a complex trademark, the process of assessing the
likelihood of confusion is both abstract (A) and global (B).
A. Abstract elements of assessment
The assessment of likelihood of confusion is abstract inthat it is based on the content of trademark registrationand on a fictitious “average consumer.” The first pointof comparison, the content of the registration, consistsof the trademarks as filed and described on theirrespective registration certificates, without regard to
the conditions under which the signs are used in themarket.250 In a judgment handed down on February 18,
2004, the French Court of Cassation curiously dismissed
an appeal in which it had been argued that where a
trademark right pertained to a sign, as filed to designate
certain goods or services, the conditions under which
the sign was used could not be taken into account inassessing the likelihood of confusion.251 In the present
case, the comparison could be based only on the wordelements “Business Royals” and “Royals,” which werethe competing trademarks and denoted their respective
specialties. It does not appear from the facts, however,that either was given a particular graphic form or
accompanied by a figurative element not referenced in
the registration.

248

249
250
251

This article states that “final legal decisions relating to the validity of titles
and rendered in one member state under the provisions of annexes I to X
of this Agreement shall be binding on all other member states, with the
exception of decisions based on public policy and morality,” thus establishing
the pre-eminence of judicial court decisions over the decisions of OAPI
statutory bodies. The provision was amended in ABR-2015.
See M.L. Ndéma Elongué (2017) De la portée des décisions rendues par lestribunaux en matière de propriété intellectuelle. In Mélanges en l’honneur del’action du Dr Paulin Edou Edou pour l’OAPI. Poitiers: Juriscope, 299.
See CA Paris, March 30, 2005, PIBD 2005, No. 812, III, 423.
See Cass. com., February 18, 2004, PIBD 2004, No. 787, III, 333, cited by Passa,
n. 82, at 305.

In assessing the likelihood of confusion, courts
have required consideration of the greater or lesser
distinctiveness of the mark concerned – in this case, thesign “Royals,” which was registered on March 17, 1997,
and November 6, 2001, and has since taken a significant
place in the market for such products. This was doubtless
why the trial court invalidated the “Business Royals”
trademark registered on April 24, 2004, for the sameclass 24 products, as clearly liable to create confusionin the minds of the target audience, which might easily
have imagined that the “Business Royals” sign was avariation of the initial “Royals” trademark, or that the twocompeting marks belonged to the same owner.252
The other abstract part of assessing likelihood ofconfusion relates to a theoretical “average consumer,”which French case law consistently defines as the typical,
reasonably well-informed, observant and prudent
consumer of a given category of product. The French
Court of Cassation systematically confirms whether
appeal courts have considered the average consumer’s
perspective in relevant cases.253 The definition of
the average consumer developed by the OAPI HighCommission of Appeal, however, differs from that used
in France. The Commission indicates in a number of
its judgments that case law in economies with higher
levels of development and education should not be
determinative in defining an economy’s average
consumer; rather, weight should be given relative to thedifferences in consumer awareness.254 The Commission
refers in later decisions to the “average consumer of
the OAPI zone.” 255 It is to be hoped that courts in OAPI
member states will embrace this concept in assessing
likelihood of confusion. In the present case, the Courtof Appeal merely compared the word elements ofcompeting marks without considering the perspectiveof the average consumer of the goods concerned,
undermining the validity of its comparison.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

From that perspective, the court’s reasoning in thepresent case was unorthodox. It considered the term
“Royals” to be clearly distinctive, as Rothmans argued,
and sufficiently so that if the confusion so deplored had
actually been likely, the OAPI, as the body responsible formanaging and registering trademarks, would not haveregistered several other marks containing that term –neither for this nor for other, non-competing companies,
no protests having been filed until then. The court thus
attributed to the OAPI the sovereign power to assess
likelihood of confusion when examining applications forregistration, which would make its assessments bindingon national courts. Beyond the exorbitant power thiswould mean for the OAPI, the court would recognize thepre-eminence of decisions taken by that administrative
body over judgments by courts of law. Article 18 of ABR1999, however, affirms the contrary: that the decisionsof member state courts are binding on OAPI statutory
bodies.248 The OAPI is indeed required to enforce the final
judicial decisions communicated to it.249 In any event,the decisions issued by OAPI statutory bodies after
reviewing such applications have only administrativevalue and are revocable by courts of law.

Likelihood of confusion can, alternatively, beassessed globally.
B. Global assessment of likelihood of confusion
In the Sabel case, the European Court affirmed thata global assessment of the visual similarity between
marks must be based on the overall impression they
convey, bearing in mind in particular their distinctive
and predominant components. In other words, a global
assessment considers, among other things, the overall
impression the signs make on the consumer, as defined
above, and the distinctiveness of the mark concerned.
Considering the overall impression made by a disputed
mark means not restricting the examination to a single,
isolated element of that mark. That is the substanceof the apparent rebuke the appeal court forcefully
addressed to the trial court in pointing out that:

252
253
254
255

See CA Paris, June 27, 2003, PIBD 2003, No. 775, III, 581; CA Bordeaux, March 1,
2004, PIBD 2004, No. 786, III, 296.
Cass. com., November 26, 2003, PIBD 2004, No. 780, III, 100; Cass. com.,
February 18, 2004, PIBD 2004, No. 788, III, 360, cited by Passa, n. 82, at 309.
See Judgments Nos. 34–39/CSR/OAPI of March 26, 2004.
See Judgment No. 47/CSR/OAPI of April 1, 2005.
83

a.

b.

c.

the complexity of the marks “Rothmans Royals”
and “Business Royal,” each consisting of multiple
elements, was undisputed;
according to case law on the matter, similarity
assessments to ascertain the likelihood of confusion
between marks of this kind should not be confined
to a single conceptual element of a mark, but eachof its designations taken as a whole; andthe likelihood of confusion alleged should therefore
be assessed based on all elements of each of themarks concerned.

This reasoning appears consistent in principle,
but it falls short on one point: it failed to consider
that one particular element of a mark might be sohighly distinctive that reproducing it alone could
cause confusion.
As a case in point, the term “Royals” appears to be
the sole identifying element of the mark for thesegoods in the minds of the target audience, such that
adding the qualifier “Business” does not diminish theindividuality and distinctiveness of the “Royals” mark.
The court alluded to elements other than the “Royals”
name as forming an indivisible whole, distinguishingeach mark from the other. But other than color andlogo, the court did not specify what those elements
were, making it difficult to assess their relevance. Its
reasoning was, in any case, deficient and subject tocensure upon further appeal.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

84

The cigarette trademark “Rothmans King Size Filter,”owned by Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd, of Städtle 36,
Vaduz 9490, Liechtenstein (“Rothmans-Liechtenstein”),
was the target of an attachment order (distraint) dated
November 20, 2017, as security for the payment of
CFAF 100 million and CFAF 50 million, respectively,
to Adil Co. SA and Mr. El Hadj Sani Souley Na Saley(the distrainors).
Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd Switzerland (“RothmansSwitzerland”), believing itself the true owner of the
disputed mark, having acquired it from RothmansLiechtenstein under an assignment agreement dated
May 9, 2002, summoned the distrainors to appear before
the judge for urgent applications at the Niamey High
Court, seeking an order of diversion of the attachedtrademark under article 141 of the OHADA Act.
Opposing the application for diversion, the distrainors
argued that:a.

b.

the agreement assigning the trademark was
irregular because it lacked certified signatures anddid not indicate the extent of the assignment; andthe assignment could not be enforced against thembecause it had not been recorded in the Special
Register of Marks, in violation of article 27 ofannex III to ABR-1999.

Reasoning: The court was called upon to examine twolegal issues:I.

the validity of the agreement assigning thetrademark; andits enforceability against third parties.

R. Distraint and diversion of a mark –Assignee – Proof of ownership of amark – Validity of an assignmentII.

The success of an action for the diversion of a distrained
mark brought by an assignee is conditional on proving
the validity of the assignment – notwithstanding theassignee’s renewal of the registration with the OAPIin its own name – since the ownership of a trademark
can be validly transferred only under a clearly valid
assignment agreement.

The defendants against diversion (the distrainors)
disputed the validity of the assignment on which theproperty rights claimed by the plaintiff (RothmansSwitzerland) were based, under both common law (A)and intellectual property law (B).

ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL LTD SWITZERLAND V.
SOCIÉTÉ ADIL CO. SA AND EL HADJ SANI SOULEY NA
SALEY, Interim order No. 176 of August 5, 2008, High
Court of Niamey
Observations:This judgment of the High Court of Niamey illustrates
the difficulties encountered by OAPI judicial officers
in applying the rules and principles of intellectual
property law.
Facts: At first glance, the facts of the case appear tocenter on the application of seizure law establishedunder the OHADA Uniform Act Organizing Simplified
Recovery Procedures and Enforcement Measures.
But the case also concerns key aspects of intellectual
property law.

I. Was the agreement assigning the trademark valid?

A. Validity of the assignment under common law
Adil Co. SA and Mr. El Hadj Sani Na Sale argued that theassignment was flawed: the signatures of the contracting
parties were not certified, so the agreement could
not be reliably dated. This is an issue clearly subject
to common law in general – and, specifically, the rules
governing contractual conditions. Because the disputed
assignment agreement was concluded in London, theNiger court in this case considered the agreement’s
formal requirements to be beyond its control. But thiswas erroneous. In private international law, the judgeof the forum seized is competent to settle disputes overinteractions involving foreign elements on the basisof the law applicable. As the court rightly pointed out,
formalities pertaining to the validity of an agreement are
subject under private international law to the laws of theplace where the agreement was concluded. The court
unfortunately failed to verify, however, whether, underEnglish law, the validity of an agreement depends on theB. Assessing the validity of the assignment under
trademark law
Article 26(2) of annex III to ABR-1999 provides that “actsinvolving transfer of ownership, the licensing of theright of exploitation or the assignment of that right, or apledge or cancellation of a pledge, in respect of a markshall, on pain of invalidity, be evidenced in writing.” Thus,
apart from the common law conditions for contractual
validity, such a written act is the only requirement arisingfrom trademark law that, if not met, would invalidate a
trademark assignment agreement.256 This represents a
departure from common law, where the “consensualist”
principle means that agreements need be written only
as an exception, ad validitatem – that is, where stipulated
as a condition for validity. That particular issue, however,
did not formally enter into the present case, the disputed
agreement having clearly been made in writing and incompliance with trademark law.257
The defendants against diversion argued further thatthe agreement did not specify the terms of the disputed
assignment, whether partial or total.258 The question
was whether this failure invalidated the agreement.
The judge sidestepped the issue as a matter for English
contract law: “In private international law, the formalities
for the validity of an agreement are governed by thelaws of the place where the agreement was concluded;
accordingly, the formal requirements of an agreement
concluded in London are beyond the control of a judgein Niger.” While the judge was correct that certificationof an agreement’s signatures is a matter of privateinternational law, failure to indicate the material scopeof a trademark assignment comes under domestic law,which, in the case of the Republic of the Niger, consistsof annex III to ABR-1999, forming the country’s law
on trademarks and service marks in accordance witharticle 3 of its general provisions.259 In any event, a failure
to indicate an assignment’s scope in the assignment
agreement does not invalidate the agreement. Nor does
ABR-1999, under which article 26(1) to annex III provides
for the transferability in whole or in part of rights
subsisting in a mark, expressly penalize such failure byinvalidating the assignment.
II. Enforceability of the agreement assigning
the trademark

A. Procedure for registering assignments in the Special
Register of Marks
Our explanations on this point relate to the registration
procedure itself, on the one hand, and the registrant,
on the other. On the registration procedure, the OAPI
maintains special registers for all member states
where information is recorded on individual objects ofintellectual property from the time of their registration.
The content of those registers varies. For trademarks andservice marks, articles 16 and 17 of annex III to ABR-1999
provide for entry into the Special Register of Marks of:
•
•
•
•
•

the serial number of the mark;the filing date of the application for registration;
the date of registration;
the date of priority, if claimed;
the trade name, or surname and forename, andaddress of the owner of the mark;• a reproduction of the mark; and• the classes of goods and services covered by
the registration.
These data are the same as those included in theregistration certificate initially issued to the applicant
upon satisfactory review of the application by thecompetent OAPI authorities.
Events during the lifetime of a mark, including
renewals, cancellations and final court decisions, areregistrable in the Special Register of Marks. Other
examples of such events include the acts referred toin article 26(2) of annex III to ABR-1999 – namely, thelicensing of exploitation rights, the assignment of suchrights, pledges and cancellations of pledges. That iswhat can be deduced, at least, from article 27(1) ofannex III to ABR-1999, which stipulates that the acts
referred to in article 26 are not enforceable against
third parties unless recorded in the Special Registerof Marks. Under ABR-2015, acts are not enforceable
against third parties unless they are both recordedin the Special Register of Marks and published in theofficial gazette.260 This concerns acts involving:• the transfer of trademark ownership, such as
trademark assignment agreements;• the assignment of exploitation rights, such as sublicenses; and• pledges of trademarks or cancellations thereof.

Adil Co. SA and Mr. El Hadj Sani Na Sale went on todeny the enforceability of the trademark assignment
agreement on the grounds that it had not been
published in the OAPI Special Register of Marks. This
argument calls for some explanations about theassignment registration procedure (A) and its scope (B).

In view of this, the agreement of May 9, 2002, assigning
the trademark “Rothmans King Size Filter,” concluded
between Rothmans-Liechtenstein and RothmansSwitzerland, was registrable in the Special Register ofMarks. However, it appears from the facts in the casethat no such entry was made. The question is who was
responsible for recording the agreement in the register.

256
257
258
259

According to the judge, based on article 21(5) of annex III
to ABR-1999, that responsibility lay with the OAPI, notwith the assignee Rothmans-Switzerland. Article 21(5),however, is clearly not the appropriate provision: it

See ABR-1999, art. 29(3) of annex III; ABR-2015, art. 32(3) of annex III.
See ABR-1999, art. 29(3) of annex III; ABR-2015, art. 30(2) of annex III.
See ABR-1999, art. 26(3) of annex III; ABR-2015, art. 32(1) of annex III.
Cf. ABR-2015, art. 5(1), which indicates that rights relating to the fields ofintellectual property, as provided for in the annexes to the Agreement, areindependent national rights subject to the legislation of each member state inwhich they have effect.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

signatures being certified, which would ipso facto haveaffected the outcome of the application for diversion.

260

ABR-2015, art. 31(1) of annex III.
85

refers to the entry of trademark registration renewals,
not assignments. Those are two separate requirements,
entailing separate fees. The applicant’s publication of
the “Rothmans King Size Filter” trademark in the official
industrial property gazette does not necessarily meanthat it successfully recorded the alleged assignment
in the Special Register of Marks, as required underarticle 27(1) of annex III to ABR-1999, for it to be
enforceable against third parties. The OAPI records
assignments in the appropriate register only uponprior request by the interested party – in this case, theassignee – with whom responsibility ultimately lies. The
role of the OAPI is merely a supporting one.
B. The registration of assignments in the Special Registerof Marks
Such registration is ostensibly optional (2), but it does
have legal effects (1).

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

1. Effects of registering an assignment in the Special
Register of Marks
According to article 27(1) of annex III to ABR-1999,
trademark assignment agreements not recorded in theSpecial Register of Marks cannot be enforced against
third parties denying their existence.261 This provision,
which transposes into intellectual property law the
principle of the relative effect of agreements set out inarticle 1165 of the Napoleonic Code, is covered by the
Bangui Agreement annexes on patents,262 utility models,263
industrial designs,264 trade names265 and layout designsof integrated circuits.266 In the case under review, it was
clear that the agreement of May 9, 2012, pertaining
to the “Rothmans King Size Filter” trademark, was notrecorded in the Special Register of Marks. Accordingly,
it could not be validly enforced against distraining
creditors denying the agreement ever existed. The
judge’s decision to order diversion of the distrained markwas therefore unfounded.

86

2. Recording the assignment in the Special Register ofMarks: merely an option?
No particular provision of annex III to ABR-1999
expressly obliges the parties to a trademark assignment
agreement to request its entry in the Special Register ofMarks. Such registration is legally required, however, toassign rights for the exploitation of a trademark. Under
ABR-1999, art. 29(4) of annex III, “the license contract
shall be entered in the Special Register of Marks of theOrganization.” OAPI administrative instruction No. 414
appears to bridge this gap by providing for the entryof trademark assignments in the appropriate register,
but its scope of application is limited, for at least two
reasons: first, administrative instructions issued by the
management of the OAPI apply only within the OAPI
legal system and thus cannot validly correct a statutory
oversight; and second, the instructions concern only
partial assignments and are in any case not mandatory.
261
262
263
264
265
266

ABR-2015, art. 31(2) of annex III.
See ABR-1999, art. 34(1) of annex I.
See ABR-1999, art. 29(1) of annex II.
See ABR-1999, art. 21(1) of annex IV.
See ABR-1999, art. 15(3) of annex V.
See ABR-1999, art. 19(1) of annex IX.

It can therefore be argued that Rothmans-Switzerland
was not required to request the entry of the assignment
agreement of May 9, 2002, in the Special Register ofMarks and that therefore its failure to do so did nototherwise affect the agreement’s validity.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

S. Sequestration of a mark – Liability ofa mark to attachment – Legal basis –Procedure – Place of attachment
A trademark is an asset within the meaning of civil lawthat is liable to sequestration on the basis of articles 54
et seq. of the OHADA Uniform Act Organizing Simplified
Recovery Procedures and Enforcement Measures. Suchsequestration is to be executed, where community
law is silent on the matter, in accordance with theestablished procedure for attaching securities andpartnership rights.
However, it is a misapplication of the law for a trial judge
to validate the attachment of a mark carried out on an
OAPI national liaison structure rather than on OAPI
headquarters, which is the only structure empowered tohold and manage industrial property titles.
ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL LTD SA V. SOCIÉTÉ ADIL CO.
AND EL HADJ SS, Judgment No. 118 of May 20, 2008, High
Court of Niamey
Observations:
Product or service trademarks, as governed by theprovisions of annex III to ABR-1999, are assets liable
to compulsory execution and protective measures inaccordance with articles 28 et seq. of the OHADA Uniform
Act Organizing Simplified Recovery Procedures andEnforcement Measures. That is the principle set out inthe decision reported here. Indeed, since OAPI law does
not regulate the attachment of intellectual property
and since trademarks, like other industrial property,
are assets within the meaning of civil law, the common
law on attachment applies. As a matter of comparativelaw, article R.714-4 of the French Intellectual Property
Code refers to the attachment of trademarks but
without prescribing a procedure for it. Article L.616-21of the Code provides that: (i) patents may be attachedby extrajudicial act served on the patent owner, on the
National Institute of Industrial Property and on theholders of rights to the patent; and (ii) such attachment
renders unenforceable against the distraining creditors
any subsequent modification of patent rights.
This apparent disregard for creditors is aggravated by
the paucity of enforcement measures for intangible
assets in the new French Code of Civil Enforcement
Procedures.267 Both in France and much more so in Africa,
enforcement law seems to overlook intellectual property
assets, which can be highly valuable and provide the267

See C. Hugon (2018) La réalisation forcée des propriétés intellectuelles en droit
française. Les cahiers de droit, 59(Z), 425–440.

Facts: According to the facts, by judgments No. 124 ofJune 5, 2006, and No. 235 of October 16, 2006, the Courtof Appeal of Niamey ordered Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd
SA (“Rothmans”) to pay the sums of CFAF 100 million
and CFAF 50 million, respectively, to Adil Co. and Mr. El
Hadj Sani, for improperly conducting an infringement
seizure. In executing those judgments, on November 20,
2007, the latter parties obtained sequestration of theircommon debtor’s cigarette trademark, No. 37610,“Rothmans King Size Filter,” in the custody of the OAPI
national liaison structure.
Now, under article 2 of the regulations for collaboration
between the OAPI and national liaison structures,
adopted at the 47th ordinary session of the OAPI
Administrative Council, national liaison structures arenational public administrations or other structures
placed under the authority of the head of thedepartment in charge of industrial property and serving
as a point of contact for users of OAPI services. The
sequestration was subsequently annulled by the Courtof Appeal of Niamey as per judgment No. 26 of March 5,2008, for the violation of articles 54, 88 and 238 of the
OHADA Uniform Act.
Two additional sequestrations executed by Adil Co.
and Mr. El Hadj Sani, on March 25 and 26, 2008,
were then referred to the High Court of Niamey forannulment. Rothmans claimed, first, that the OHADA
Uniform Act concerned does not provide for thesequestration of trademarks, which are not subject toseizure and are governed by ABR-1999, and, second,that the sequestration was unlawfully executed by
the national liaison structure in Niamey – namely,
the Ministry of Commerce. The distrainors argued in
response that trademarks are intangible assets subject
to sequestration under the OHADA Uniform Act. The
court was called upon to examine two questions ofunequal weight – namely, whether trademarks can besequestered, and if so, on what basis and according towhat procedure.
Reasoning: In its decision, the Court of Appeal of Niamey
clearly established the principle that trademarks canbe sequestered (section I), but without indicating theprocedure for doing so (section II).

I. The principle: trademarks can be sequestered
Whereas the legal nature of trademarks or service marks
as industrial property assets does not appear a priori
to preclude their sequestration (A), the legal basis for
performing it must be stipulated, because such matters
are generally more complex than they appear (B).
A. The legal nature of trademarks
Whether a mark can be sequestered, which Rothmans
disputed, depends on whether it constitutes a good,as defined by the Civil Code.268 As movable assets,
trademarks fall into two distinct legal subcategories:
tangible and intangible. While a tangible movable canbe physically seized, an intangible movable consistsof a right over a movable object. This distinction is ofparticular legal import when interpreting rules on thesequestration of such assets, which their intangible
nature would appear to preclude. Among such intangible
movables, a distinction is generally drawn between
personal intangible rights and those determined by law,which include intellectual property.

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

creditors of their owners unprecedented guarantees.
Determining the legal framework and procedure forattaching trademarks is thus inherently difficult. Thisis particularly so in the case of OHADA member states,
where the Uniform Act deals with the attachment not of
intellectual property but of securities and partnershiprights. Part VII of the OHADA Uniform Act Organizing
Simplified Recovery Procedures and Enforcement
Measures is entitled “Special provisions relating topartnership rights and assignable securities.” There isno specific provisions for patents, trademarks, service
marks, copyright and related rights, and so on. Suchissues can be daunting for the creditors of intangible
property owners, as appears to be the case here.

From this perspective, a trademark acquired by its
owner upon registration with the competent industrial
property office cannot escape the reach of theowner’s creditors, who can obtain sequestration of
the mark from judicial authorities. In the case underreview, Rothmans was unquestionably the owner of
the “Rothmans King Size Filter” cigarette trademark,filed with the OAPI on March 27, 1997, and registeredunder No. 37610. The company’s creditors, Adil Co.
and Mr. El Hadj Sani, were owed CFAF 116,716,800
and CFAF 58,867,946, respectively, in principal andexpenses, secured by enforceable titles. They were thus
entitled to sequester and sell the trademark to settle
those debts.
B. Legal basis for sequestering a trademark in
OAPI countries
The legal basis for sequestering intellectual property
assets is ordinarily found in a country’s intellectual
property code, which in this case was surprisingly silent
on the matter (1), or its civil enforcement procedure (2).
1. The country’s intellectual property code: the
Bangui Agreement
None of the various iterations of the Bangui Agreement,
which serves as the intellectual property code of OAPI
member states, includes provisions on the seizure ofintellectual property assets, leaving the matter to eachcountry’s discretion. This remains true in ABR-2015.
The silence of community legislators on this point is
attributable to the original intent that the OAPI would
govern intellectual property matters for all signatory
countries, while referring civil and criminal procedural
questions, with certain exceptions, to their national
legislators. In that sense, a number of specific procedural
rules intended for application in all member states are
set out in the Agreement, as a start in harmonizing their
268

According to art. 516 of the Napoleonic Code, all goods are movable or
immovable.
87fundamental principles of court proceedings. Thoseprinciples include:• the referral of civil actions relating to certain industrial
property titles to civil courts for summary judgment;• the exceptional jurisdiction of correctional courts
to hear questions relating to nullity, forfeiture andownership of titles;• the time limit after seizure for bringing proceedings
before the trial judge;• the requirement of a prior complaint by the victim for
public proceedings to be brought; and• the communication of certain cases to the publicprosecutor’s office.
In addition, the OAPI may be reluctant to interfere in anarea currently covered by its sister organization, OHADA,
given that almost all OAPI member states have accededto the OHADA Treaty.269 The Bangui Agreement doesrefer in passing, however, to the transfer and pledgeof certain industrial property titles, including patents,270
utility models,271 trademarks and service marks,272 andindustrial designs. With respect to the pledging oftrademarks, the Bangui Agreement stipulates only that
pledges should be evidenced in writing. No mention ismade of the applicable legal regime, implicitly leaving
matters of securities law to national legislators. In any
event, in the absence of any provision for sequestrationin the Bangui Agreement, the common law in eachmember state applies, as the High Court of Niamey
rightly observed in its summary judgment No. 118 of
May 20, 2008.
2. Applicability of the OHADA Uniform Act
Regarding the applicability of the OHADA Uniform Act,the High Court of Niamey made the following points.
a.

b.

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88

The Uniform Act is applicable under its article 337
to protective measures, recovery by distraint andrecovery proceedings initiated after its entry into
force.
The case submitted for examination by the court
concerned a dispute over a seizure – specifically, arecovery by distraint.
The applicant argued that enforcement measures
are governed solely by the Uniform Act, regardlessof the object or the property concerned by theseizure or protective measure.

That reasoning – in particular, the citation of article 337– appears sound, since, upon ratification by Niger, the
OHADA Treaty automatically superseded the country’s
prior legislation on enforcement. In addition, article 56of the OHADA Uniform Act provides a legal basis forseizure of the trademark, stipulating that sequestration

269

270
271
272

Article 1 of the Cooperation Agreement of May 9, 2016, concluded between
OAPI and OHADA, specifies that the objectives and missions of the two regionalorganizations are similar and complementary with regard to the improvementof the legal and judicial environment, aiming to secure economic investment intheir member states.
See ABR-1999, art. 33 of annex I; ABR-2015, art. 36(2) of annex I.
See ABR-2015, art. 31(2) of annex II.
See ABR-1999, art. 26(2) of annex III; ABR-2015, art. 30(2) of annex III.

may be carried out on all tangible or intangible personal
property of the debtor, and it renders such property
inalienable. The claim made by Rothmans that the
Uniform Act was not applicable to trademarks, whichwere governed by ABR-1999, was therefore specious.
But certain aspects particular to trademarks do not fit
well under a legal regime designed to deal with tangible
assets. The immateriality of trademarks calls for the
adoption of special provisions. It is surprising, then, that
the OHADA Uniform Act, in Part VII on special provisions
relating to partnership rights and assignable securities,
makes no mention of intellectual property. That may
have been a simple omission or a deliberate decision by
the legislator. Either way, this discriminatory treatment
of intangible property was always likely to hamper the
execution of trademark sequestration.
II. Executing trademark sequestration
Neither do these legal provisions indicate the procedurethat needs to be followed to sequester trademarks –an omission that makes their execution all the moredifficult. As a result, it is not immediately obvious whatmodel to follow in conducting the sequestration, while
also doing justice to the specificity of the trademark
concerned. In the present case, determining where thetrademark should be attached (A) and the requirements
to be met for enforceability (B) was a complex
task indeed.
A. Place of attachment
The judge of the High Court of Niamey ruled in favor of
the creditors, who carried out the attachment on the
Ministry of Commerce of the Republic of the Niger. In
response to the debtor, which challenged the validity ofthat act, contending that it should have been performed
at OAPI headquarters in Yaoundé, the judge observedthat the trademark was attached as intangible property
from the OAPI national liaison structure in its capacity as
the only authorized agent of the OAPI in Niger.
This reasoning is conspicuous on two accounts. First,
the national liaison structure – in this case, the Ministryof Commerce of Niger, the role of which is outlined
above – is not an authorized agent of the OAPI but anational public administration, reporting to a ministerial
department and serving as a channel of communication
between the OAPI and its users. The profession of
agent is governed by a special rule established by
Resolution No. 48/13 adopted at the 48th ordinary sessionof the Administrative Council, held in Brazzaville on
December 16, 2008. Within the meaning of articles 2 etseq. of that resolution, agents are broadly understood
to be natural or legal persons empowered to act inaccordance with a mandate, whether in a professional
capacity or not, on behalf of another natural or legal
person to carry out intellectual property operations for
the OAPI. Within that meaning, a public administration
cannot act as an agent.
In this case, under article 6(2) of ABR-1999, the national
administration was authorized to receive applications

The attachment could, however, have been validly
performed at the OAPI headquarters in Yaoundé, in its
capacity as the sole organization empowered not only
to issue trademark registration certificates but also tohold and manage them day to day. This solution has the
disadvantage of being expensive for creditors domiciled
outside the OAPI host country, Cameroon. They also
run the risk of having the exequatur for local executionof a foreign decision rejected by the competent court in
Cameroon, potentially producing an impasse.
The option of attaching the trademark at OAPI
headquarters appears more consistent with article 236of the OHADA Uniform Act. That article, applicablemutatis mutandis, stipulates that the attachment ofpartnership rights and assignable securities “should
be carried out on the issuing company or corporate
person or on the authorized agent charged with thepreservation or management of the securities.” That
was the provision the High Court of Niamey cited invalidating the attachment carried out on the Ministryof Commerce, which, as established above, neither
keeps nor manages industrial property titles. The
situation is no less confusing when one considers
the high degree of formality required to make suchattachments enforceable.

If only for that reason, the decision of the High Court ofNiamey validating the attachment of the trademark inquestion, notwithstanding the failure to notify the third
party concerned, was fatally flawed.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

Chapter 3 – Trademarks

for industrial property titles from users domiciled in
its territory and had to transmit those applications
to the OAPI within five working days of submission.
The national liaison structure did not keep or manage
industrial property titles on a day-to-day basis. It would
seem rather unusual to perform the attachment ofan object, on a precautionary basis or otherwise, thatwas not in the possession of the entity targeted forthat procedure – in this case, the country’s Ministryof Commerce.

B. Formal requirements for enforceability
In the case under review, the attachment was carried out
on the national liaison structure, the country’s Ministryof Commerce, in breach of article 236 of the OHADA
Uniform Act, as established above and argued by Adil
Co. Traditionally and in line with articles 236 et seq. of
the Uniform Act, two notices must be served to attach
intangible property: one to the manager of the title inquestion – in this case, the OAPI – and the other to thedebtor/distrainee – in this case, Rothmans of Pall Mall
Ltd. The latter must be informed within eight days underpain of forfeiture.273 In the case under review, whereas
attachment of the cigarette trademark “Rothmans
King Size Filter” was notified to the debtor company, it
is clear that no writ of attachment was served on thethird party concerned, the OAPI, thus rendering theattachment unenforceable. The OAPI, in its dual capacity
as curator and manager of the trademark, enters into
the appropriate registers all acts occurring during thetrademark’s lifetime and thus should have been the firstrecipient of the writ of attachment.

273

See art. 238 of the Uniform Act.
89

A.
Industrial designs – Novelty –Manifest use – Destruction of novelty –Prior personal possession

91

B.
Industrial designs – Novelty – Elements
constituting infringement

93

C.
Industrial designs and models – Novelty (lackof) – Models claimed to be identical to thosepreviously worked by the defendants
95

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Chapter 4 – Industrial designs

D.
Industrial designs – Novelty – Overall visual
impression – Assessing infringement – Burdenof proof on the plaintiff
96

90

E.
Industrial designs – Infringement seizure– Order – Retraction – Competent judge– Extent of authority of the judge forurgent applications

97

Chapter 4
Industrial designs
A. Industrial designs – Novelty –Manifest use – Destruction of novelty –Prior personal possession
An industrial design registered with the OAPI is
considered new and thus eligible for legal protection
if elements for comparing it with others do not exist.
Moreover, its exploitation by a third party beginningless than six months before the filing date does notmeet the criterion of prior manifest use required todefeat novelty. In rejecting a design’s prior personal
possession, as claimed by a third party unable todemonstrate prior exploitation of the design in its own
name or on the basis of a licensing agreement, a court
applies the law correctly.
SOCIÉTÉ DES RAFFINERIES DU LITTORAL V.
ETABLISSEMENTS NGO OND & FILS, Judgment No. 58-cc
of March 18, 1999, Supreme Court of Cameroon
Observations:
Article 3(1) of annex IV to the Bangui Agreement ofMarch 2, 1977 (AB-1977) excluded legal protection
for industrial designs that, on the date of filing of theapplication for registration or on the date of the validly
claimed priority, had manifestly been utilized in the
territory of one of the member states of the OAPI. The
element of novelty was therefore relative: it could not
be denied based on disclosures outside the OAPI space.
That provision was substantially modified to become
article 2(2) of annex IV to the Bangui Agreement asrevised on February 24, 1999 (ABR-1999). It now provides
that a design is novel where “it has not been disclosed
anywhere in the world by publication in tangible
form, by use or by any other means before the filingdate or, where applicable, before the priority date of
the application for registration.” That wording, which
remains intact in the Bangui Agreement as revisedon December 14, 2015 (ABR-2015), requires absolute
novelty for an industrial design to be eligible for legal
protection.1 The decision reported here is interestingin several ways. It provides an overview of how theconcept of novelty has evolved since AB-1977 and sheds
light on article 8 of its annex IV to that original text, on
the exception of prior personal possession, reproduced
expressis verbis as article 7 in annex IV to ABR-1999.
Facts: Etablissements NGO OND & Fils held the rights
to a design for bags used to package palm oil, filed with1

Unlike AB-1977, the subsequent revisions in ABR-1999 and ABR-2015 allow
for denial of novelty if the design in question has been made available to the
public anywhere in the world.

the OAPI on July 30, 1991, and registered on May 17,
1993, under No. 1062. Based on a bailiff’s report dated
November 19, 1991, NGO OND & Fils became aware ofillegal use of its design by Société des Raffineries duLittoral. The latter, claiming prior personal possession
under article 8 of annex IV to AB-1977, contested thenovelty of the design filed by NGO OND & Fils on the
grounds of having itself manifestly utilized it since
March 1991 – that is, prior to the filing date. The key
questions for the Supreme Court – beyond concerns
relating to jurisdiction and compensation for damages,
not discussed here – were:a.
b.

whether the design filed by NGO OND & Fils was
novel within the meaning of article 3(1); andwhether Raffineries du Littoral was entitled to claim
prior personal possession.

Reasoning: In its ruling, the Supreme Court concurredwith the lower courts that:I.
II.

the disputed design was new; andthe conditions for prior personal possession had notbeen met.

I. Determining novelty with respect to designs
According to the Supreme Court, the design for the bags
registered under No. 1062 was new (A) and its novelty
had not been defeated (B).
A. The meaning of novelty
According to article 2(1) of annex IV to AB-1977, “thepresent Annex shall apply to any new design, any new
three-dimensional form or to any industrial object
which differs from like objects either by a distinct andrecognizable form giving it an aspect of novelty, or by
one or several external effects giving a new and distinct
appearance.” The provision characterizes the features ofa design eligible for legal protection but does not define
novelty. It is argued in the literature2 that the novelty
required to register an industrial design under AB-1977
was both objective and relative:• objective in that it could be defeated by disclosure
prior to the design’s filing for registration – making it
ineligible for protection; and2

S. Ngo Mbem (2007) Les enjeux de la protection des dessins et modèles
industriels dans le développement en Afrique: le cas des pays membres del’Organisation Africaine de la propriété intellectuelle (OAPI). Doctoral thesis,
University of Strasbourg III-Robert Schuman, 88 et seq.
91• relative in that the prior disclosure required waslimited to a description of the design in printed
publications, or its manifest utilization in the territoryof an OAPI country.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

In challenging the design’s novelty, Raffineries du Littoral
claimed to have used the design itself since March 1991,
but without specifying its characteristic features. The
lack of any elements for comparison allows no further
comment here on that important point.3 According to theSupreme Court, the bailiff’s report merely establishedthat Raffineries du Littoral had marketed the OAPIprotected design without permission and that NGO
OND & Fils had filed it with OAPI on July 30, 1991. Sucha report, the court reasoned, was clearly no basis forestablishing similarities between the protected design
and the one used by Raffineries du Littoral. And yet, as
one author has argued,4 the novelty of a design also
has to be assessed in terms of the essential criterionof disclosure, while avoiding confusion between theconcepts of specialty and novelty – specialty being
premised on the absence of similar prior works; novelty,on the absence of prior disclosure. The debate ultimately
came down to the prior use claimed by Raffineries
du Littoral, with the Supreme Court finding failure todemonstrate the manifest prior use required to destroy
the design’s novelty.

92

B. Destruction of novelty
The situations in which the novelty of a design can be
destroyed were indicated in article 3(1) of annex IV to
AB-1977. One of those situations is where, on the date ofeither the application or the claimed priority, the design
is being “manifestly utilized” in the territory of an OAPI
country.5 However, the Supreme Court’s interpretationof the term “manifestly,” in the silence of the law on thatpoint, elicits reservations. The court considered thatuse of the bags by Raffineries du Littoral began onlyin March 1991 – too short a time before the filing to beconsidered “manifest.” A longer period and elements
relating to publicity and consumer habituation wererequired. The court was right to consider publicity –and, to a lesser degree, consumer habituation – but
deeming use to be “manifest” based on the duration ofthat use, without first establishing what duration would
suffice, appears risky. Such an approach creates judicial
insecurity, especially given the lack of a central OAPI
court to maintain uniform application of community law,leaving each country’s highest court to interpret suchterms differently.
Manifest use, as conventionally understood, implies
that the public, or a large number of people in a given
sector, know about the object used. The Court of Appealof Lomé, in the area of trademarks and service marks,
3
4
5

See Mr. Bertin Dabe Zohora v. Société Orange Côte d’Ivoire and Société NTDD,
Judgment No. 1929/2015 of July 23, 2015, Commercial Court of Abidjan (obs.
A. Lucas, this collection, Chapter 4, section D).
C. Seuna (2009) La notion de dessins et modèles industriels susceptibles
d’enregistrement: essai de théorie juridique. RAPI, 2, 26.
ABR-2015, art. 2(2) of annex IV, states that “an industrial design is new if it has
not been disclosed anywhere in the world by publication in tangible form, byuse or by any other means before the filing date or, where applicable, before
the priority date of the application for registration.”

has held that a trademark’s longevity, the extent of its
marketing and the geographic scope of its distribution
must all be considered to determine how manifest the
mark’s use might have been.6 From that perspective, theprior use in this case could legitimately be considered
manifest, especially since the bags designated were
openly sold and used in Douala as packaging for a widely
consumed product – namely, palm oil.
According to the facts, moreover, NGO OND & Filspresented its bag design at a 1990 trade fair, from astand set up for the event by Raffineries du Littoraland at the latter’s request. The question thus becomes
whether the disclosure then made, occurring prior to
the filing date of July 30, 1991, was sufficient underarticle 3(1) to destroy the design’s novelty. The answer is
far from obvious. Article 3(2)(b) of annex IV to AB-1977,
the basis for this decision, provides that the noveltyof a design cannot be denied if, during the six months
preceding the date of filing or claimed priority, theapplicant (or predecessor in title) has disclosed it bydisplay at an official or officially recognized international
exhibition, as NGO OND & Fils clearly did. But the precise
date of that disclosure (in 1990) is unknown, so theperiod of time between the disclosure and the filing date(July 30, 1991) cannot be calculated.
II. Prior personal possession
In the interest of fairness, the original drafters of
AB-1977 limited the exclusive character of rights to anindustrial design, as conferred by registration, based ona third party’s prior personal possession, as describedin article 8 of annex IV. Application of that provision,
however, is premised on prior use of the design (A) andthe prior user’s good faith (B).
A. Prior use of an identical design
Article 8 of annex IV to AB-1977 reads:“The registered industrial design shall not
produce effects in respect of third parties
who, at the time of filing of the application forregistration, already exploited the said designon the territory of one of the member states
or who had taken the necessary steps with aview to exploiting it. The said third party shallbe authorized to use the industrial design in his
business, his own workshops or those of otherpersons. This right may only be transferred withthe business.”
Prior personal possession is also provided for in ABR1999 and ABR-2015, although the provisions havechanged over time. In article 7(a) of annex IV to ABR-2015,
where the conditions are set out, the word “exploited” isreplaced with “owned,” and the exception based on thethird party having “taken the necessary steps with a viewto exploiting it” is eliminated. The provision now reads:
6

See Etablissements W.C.v. Etablissements MLT, Judgment No. 80 of
September 18, 2007, Court of Appeal of Lomé, concerning the trademark“PANTHERE NOIRE.”

In any event, the version in force when this decision was
handed down was AB-1977, which limited the eligibility ofthird parties to claim prior personal possession to thosehaving already privately exploited the same object, as
creator or assignee, on the territory of an OAPI member
state before the design’s date of filing or claimed priority.
Raffineries du Littoral, needless to say, did not meetthat criterion. It owed its use of the design to the true
creator, NGO OND & Fils, which also delivered the bags
to users, as evidenced by the various invoices submitted
into evidence. The Supreme Court rightly noted that
Raffineries du Littoral did not provide proof that it was
exploiting the contested invention before July 30, 1991,
the date on which the disputed design was filed with
the OAPI.
Neither was the supposed exploitation of the bag design
substantiated by any reference to a license. Raffineries
du Littoral exploited the bag design without a license,
even though one is required by the Agreement – which
nicely sets up the last important question: did the user
act in good faith?
B. The user’s good faith
The condition of good faith is not expressly statedin the provision applicable to the design in this case,article 8 of annex IV to AB-1977, let alone the succeeding
provisions of ABR-1999 and ABR-2015. The need to provea prior user’s bad faith, however, has been emphasizedin the literature under the maxim fraus omnia corrumpit(“fraud corrupts all”),7 assimilating the system forindustrial designs with that for patents. In the latter area,
article 8(1)(d) of annex I to ABR-1999 and article 7(1)(e)of annex I to ABR-2015 expressly require good faith on
the part of prior patent owners. The same requirement
makes sense for industrial designs and models,
given the possibilities for fraudulent appropriation ofsuch creations.
In the case under review, Raffineries du Littoral clearly
acted in bad faith in claiming a right of prior use overthe bag design, providing no evidence of having createdit, having instead simply bought the bags on the
open market like any other customer (such customers
also being its competitors). Such a willful attempt to
unlawfully appropriate the fruit of another’s creative
efforts constitutes an offense, incurring the offender’sliability for damages under common law, and hence
the Supreme Court’s ruling to uphold the lower court’saward of compensation to NGO OND & Fils.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué
7

See Ngo Mbem, n. 2, at 123 et seq.

B. Industrial designs – Novelty –Elements constituting infringement
A model of bowl must be considered new if differently
formed than ordinary bowls on the market, suchthat the marketing of a design resembling it
constitutes infringement.
SOGET – IVOIRE V. SIFAM – CI, Judgment No. 32 of
February 4, 2010, Supreme Court of Côte d’Ivoire,
Judicial Chamber
Observations: The ruling reported here has produced a
muddled combination of conditions under two different
intellectual property regimes: the one for copyrights,
protecting works of the mind; and the other for industrial
designs or models and rights thereto. The case warrants
attention all the same, because it provides a good
illustration of those two separate regimes and a chance
to better delineate the distinction between them,based on the more rigorous wording of the current
Bangui Agreement.
Facts: In registering a model of bowl for protection,
a company selling aluminum household utensils also
initiated proceedings for infringement and unfair
competition against a company marketing an alleged
copy of the model. The trial court and, subsequently, theCourt of Appeal of Abidjan dismissed the claim, finding
the plaintiff’s model to be unoriginal and, in any case,different from that of the defendant.

Chapter 4 – Industrial designs“The rights deriving from the industrial design
shall not encompass … acts performed by any
person who, on the filing date of the application
for registration, already owned the design. Such aperson is authorized to use the industrial designfor the purposes of his business, in his own
workshops or in another person’s workshops. This
right may only be transferred with the business.”

The company took its case to the Supreme Court ofCôte d’Ivoire.
Reasoning: The Supreme Court quashed the appeal
court’s ruling, both for violation of article 2(1) of annex IV
to AB-1977 and for “insufficient grounds.” Invoking
its power under Ivorian law to rule on the merits, theSupreme Court affirmed that “[t]he benefit of protection
established by annex IV to the Bangui Agreement issubject not only to the novel character of the registeredmodel, but also to its originality,” and that (referring to
the same text) “a design is new if no identical design
or model has been disclosed as of the filing date of theapplication for registration.” The court then found on thefacts that the plaintiff’s model was differently formed
than ordinary bowls on the market and did, in fact,
resemble the plaintiff’s; on that basis, it found against
the defendant’s argument that the model at issue
was “unoriginal.”
Since we do not have the facts of the case, we will not
examine the merits of this solution. The court’s two-partreasoning, however, warrants serious reservations.
To start with, the text applicable in this case was theoriginal AB-1977. Article 2(1) of annex IV to that version
provides that “the present Annex shall apply to any new
design, any new three-dimensional form or any industrial
object which differs from like objects either by a distinct
and recognizable form giving it an aspect of novelty,
or by one or several external effects giving a new and93

distinct appearance.” The judgment being appealed had
misread that article in denying protection on groundsof lack of originality. But the Supreme Court reviewing it
was equally mistaken. It began by attributing a “distinct
appearance” – more easily asserted than demonstrated– to the allegedly infringing model, equally premised inarticle 2(1). The court then went on to assert that a model
must be both new and original to qualify for protection
under the Bangui Agreement. That assumption is clearly
contrary to annex IV (of AB-1977 and ABR-2015), which inno way requires originality.
The most recent revision of the Agreement, ABR-2015,
draws a clear distinction between the object to beprotected and the conditions for its protection, unlike AB1977, which covered both in a single provision. Article 1(1)of annex IV to ABR-2015 defines a design as “anyarrangement of lines or colors” and a model as “any threedimensional shape, whether or not associated with lines
or colors … provided that the said arrangement or shape
gives a special appearance to an industrial or craft productand may serve as a pattern for the manufacture of such a
product.” According to article 2(1) of the same annex, “anindustrial design may be registered if it is new.”

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The court’s approach can be likened to that of theEuropean Union in its Regulation 6/2002 of December 12,
2001, on community designs. In article 3(a) of theRegulation, a design is defined as “the appearance of thewhole or a part of a product resulting from the featuresof, in particular, the lines, contours, colors, shape,
texture and/or materials of the product itself and/or its
ornamentation.” Article 4, on conditions for protection,
provides that “a design shall be protected to the extent
that it is new and has individual character.” The novelty
requirement is therefore common to both the EU
Regulation and the Bangui Agreement. The differenceis that the European Union adds the condition of“individual character.” However, on closer inspection, that
requirement might also be deduced from the definitionin article 1(1) of annex IV to ABR-2015, which refers to
the “special appearance” given to a product. Thus thedistinction between the object to be protected and theconditions for its protection is no longer that clear.

94

It has, in any case, been established that the protectionof a design under the Bangui Agreement is conditional
on novelty rather than originality. The two concepts do
not overlap and could even be considered opposites. In
the field of intellectual property, the term “originality”
is traditionally understood subjectively – that is, withreference to the personality of the creator, which must
be clearly reflected in the object created; “novelty” isunderstood objectively as the absence of prior art, as
stipulated in article 2(2) of annex IV to ABR-2015.8
This distinction is admittedly not always clear in judicial
practice. Assessments of originality in the case of a8

“An industrial design is new if it has not been disclosed anywhere in the world
by publication in tangible form, by use or by any other means before thefiling date or, where applicable, before the priority date of the application
for registration.” See also art. 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 6/2002 of
December 12, 2001, on Community designs, OJ L 3/1.

copyright may take into account objective elements,
such as the existence or absence of prior art. Somenational laws treat the concept less subjectively than
the traditional search for the imprint of an author’s
personality implies. One such law is Côte d’Ivoire’s
Law No. 96-564 of July 25, 1996, on the protection of
intellectual works and the rights of authors, performers
and phonogram and videogram producers. In its
article 1, an original work is defined as an author’s own
intellectual creation – a criterion initially used in EU law
to assess the originality of computer programs 9 andlater extended to all works by the Court of Justice of theEuropean Union, in the case Infopaq International A/S v.
Danske Dagblades Forening.10 That criterion is consideredsufficiently broad to accommodate the approachtraditionally taken to copyright: calling original what is
not a copy.11
However, it was wrong, in our view, for the court toimpose both requirements, originality and novelty.
Novelty alone should suffice.12 The court was also wrong
to make the protection of a design under the Bangui
Agreement conditional on its “innovative character” – anawkward turn of phrase, reminiscent of the “inventivestep” required of patentable inventions.13 The absenceof prior art should be the only consideration, in line withthe court’s subsequent characterization of novelty as“where no identical design has been disclosed on thefiling date of the application” and its assertion that theplaintiff’s model differed from “ordinary bowls on themarket,” even if then specifying, as per article 5(2) of EU
Regulation 6/2002 of December 12, 2001, that designs
are deemed to be identical where their features differ
only in immaterial details.
The novelty of the allegedly infringing design having
been established, all that was needed was the finding
on infringement. The court’s reasoning on that point
was slim indeed. Having invoked its power to settle thematter, it said very little; merely that the second modelof bowl “resembled” the first. The practice in industrial
property matters, it is true, is to judge infringement
based on similarities rather than differences. Better
practice would have been to compare the two models
and precisely characterize the points of resemblance
between them – even if only to demonstrate theirimmateriality (i.e., as not relating to essential
characteristics of the protected model and not requiredby functional considerations) – and to dismiss theinfringement action accordingly.
André Lucas

9

10
11
12
13

Council Directive 91/250/EEC of May 14, 1991, on the legal protection ofcomputer programs, OJ L 122/42, as consolidated by Directive 2009/24/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 23, 2009, on the legal
protection of computer programs, OJ L 111/16, art. 1(3).
C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, Judgment of the
Court (Fourth Chamber) of July 16, 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:465.
A. Lucas, A. Lucas-Schloetter and C. Bernault (2017) Traité de la propriété
littéraire et artistique, 5th edn. Paris: LexisNexis, No. 141.
For a similar view, see P. Fieni, (2011) Actualités juridiques, No. 71, 124, notingthat the same decision “adds to the confusion regarding the criteria for theprotection of industrial models.”
ABR-2015, arts. 2 and 4 of annex I.

(the judgment expressly referred to “the offending
household items”). In that respect, the court’s summaryof the facts, referring to a request to ban “model anddesign No. 3191,” is an unfortunate source of confusion.

An action for infringement brought by a plaintiff who has
filed models of tableware for registration with the OAPI
that are identical in all respects to articles being worked
for multiple years by the defendant – and which thereby
fail the test of novelty – cannot be admitted.

On the merits, the court’s summation may have gone
too far in finding that the goods marketed “for several
years” by the defendants were “identical in all respects
to the claimed models and designs.” It would have been
more correct to explain in detail, model by model, how
the goods were identical and precisely when they weremarketed. The court sought justification for denying
novelty in the plaintiff’s admitted postponementof production “for fear of unfair competition by the
defendants,” as though such admission somehow
attested to prior use, the basis for defeating novelty.
Such reasoning seems flimsy. It would be more naturalthat an exclusive right holder to industrial models would
await judicial confirmation of its exclusive right before
investing in production.

MR. ALI MROUE V. SOCIÉTÉ NESTLÉ CÔTE D’IVOIREAND ORS, Judgment No. 1915/2013 of March 4, 2014,
Commercial Court of Abidjan
Observations:
The court’s solution in this judgment, dismissing anaction for infringement of industrial models, is notinherently problematic, but there are flaws in its
reasoning that merit discussion.
Facts: In filing models and designs with the OAPI for
plastic plates, glasses, spoons, knives and forks – andbefore starting to manufacture them – the plaintiff
accused various companies headquartered in Abidjan
of marketing infringing tableware imported from othercountries, including China and Turkey.
The Commercial Court of Abidjan ruled otherwise.
Reasoning: A registration is not enforceable unlessthe novelty of the models and designs at issue can beestablished. In the present case, the court additionallyacknowledged that “various bills of lading and delivery
notes” produced by the defendants showed theirprior use, “for a number of years, of household goods
identical in all respects to the models and designs at
issue.” The court concluded that the condition specified
in article 2(2) of annex IV to ABR-1999 had not been met
and dismissed the complaint.
While it is difficult to form an opinion on the court’s
assessment of novelty, based on the information
provided in the judgment, several reservations arenonetheless in order.
First of all, the court’s decision was regrettably
ambiguous as to the nature and number of the protected
creations. The dispute appeared to concern models(for tableware), while the court referred repeatedly to“models and designs.” The same legal regime applies
to both, but strictly speaking the distinction should be
respected. It is conventionally accepted that designs
are two-dimensional figures, while models have three
dimensions.14 Article 1 of annex IV to ABR-1999 defines
a design as “any arrangement of lines and colors,” and amodel as “any three-dimensional shape, whether or not
associated with lines or colors.” Moreover, the creations
concerned were covered by a single registration, while
the action for infringement related to a series of models
14

J. Azema, and J.-C. Galloux (2012) Droit de la propriété industrielle, 7th edn.
Paris: Dalloz, No. 1184.

The court also erred on two accounts in analyzing theconsequences of defeating novelty. To start with, itdenied a request by one of the defendant companies
to cancel the plaintiff’s registration with the OAPI,
reasoning first that, for models or designs,15 annex IV
does not indicate failure to meet the criteria of novelty
or originality 16 as grounds for canceling registration, andsecond that while article 23 of annex III does provide forcancellation of a registered trademark if not worked forfive years, failure to work the designs was not the basis,in this case, for seeking cancellation.

Chapter 4 – Industrial designs

C. Industrial designs and models –Novelty (lack of) – Models claimed
to be identical to those previously
worked by the defendants

The argument is completely off-target. The legislation
imposes no obligation to work industrial models ordesigns. Cancellation could not be granted because it
was not the applicable punishment. The consequenceof destroying novelty, under article 30(1)(a) ofannex IV to ABR-2015, is invalidity, not cancellation,of the registration concerned.17 Article 20 of ABR-2015
stipulates that “final judicial decisions rendered in
respect of the validity of titles in a Member State
pursuant to the provisions of Annex I to Annex X of thisAgreement shall be binding on all other Member States,
save for decisions based on public policy and morality.”
Which brings us to the court’s second error. Rather thanrule it invalid for lack of novelty, the court reasoned interms of the registration’s unenforceability. To justify its
reasoning, the court invoked article 7 of annex IV to ABR1999, the version applicable to the case, which reads:“The registered industrial design shall not bebinding on third parties who, at the time of filingof the application for registration, were already
exploiting the said design in the territory of oneof the member states or had taken the necessary
steps with a view to exploiting it. The said third
15
16
17

This is presumably a typographical error: the judgment actually refers to thecancellation of a trademark.
This error is beyond typographical: there is no originality requirement forindustrial models and designs.
See also Regulation 6/2002, n. 8, art. 25(1)(b).
95

party shall be authorized to use the industrial
design in his business or his own workshops or inthose of other persons.”
The court interpreted this provision as prohibiting theregistrant from “calling into question the acquired
rights of third parties who were already using the said
design or model but who neglected or did not think it
necessary to register it with the appropriate intellectual
property institution.”
That reasoning results from confusion worth sorting out.
Unenforceability is the situation in which a third party can
set aside the effects of a legal act, the validity of which
is not in question. The very different situation here calls
for invalidity, which renders the act void with retroactive
effect. Where a model does not meet the novelty
requirement, there is simply no protection. In that event,it makes little sense to seek dismissal of an infringement
action by invoking prior personal possession of anindustrial model, design or patent,18 since the party using
those creations can continue doing so. In any event,article 7 of annex IV permits the “possessor” to use themodel or design in question only “in [their] business,”which excludes the licensing of distributors, as does
article 22(3) of EU Regulation 6/2002.19

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Having ruled on the question of novelty, the court
need not have responded to the other two defenses,
neither material, pleaded by three of the defendantcompanies. Their argument for exoneration was thatthey had engaged only in distribution and had neverclaimed intellectual property rights over the models
and designs. Article 3 of annex IV clearly recognizes
a right holder’s “exclusive right to exploit the said
design and to sell or cause to be sold for industrial orcommercial purposes the goods in which the design isincorporated” (emphasis added).

96

Failing too is the argument that the models and designs
concerned were filed and registered with the National
Institute of Industrial Property in France under the Paris
Convention, administered by the World Intellectual
Property Organization, to which Côte d’Ivoire is a party.
Even if correct, that argument could defeat the action
for infringement only if the subject of the filing in France
had been specified and, more importantly, only if it wereproven that the filing was made prior to the plaintiff’s
application for registration with the OAPI, in which casethe plaintiff’s model, assuming it was identical, would
have lacked novelty.
André Lucas

D. Industrial designs – Novelty – Overallvisual impression – Assessing
infringement – Burden of proof on theplaintiff
For a model or design to meet the novelty requirementin article 2(1) of annex IV to ABR-2015, its overall visual
impression must differ from that produced by all otherpreviously disclosed models. In addition, an action for
infringement must be dismissed where the plaintiff does
not provide the specific information required to assess
the individual and distinct elements of the model ascompared with that of the defendant.
MR. BERTIN DABE ZOHORA V. SOCIÉTÉ ORANGE CÔTED’IVOIRE AND SOCIÉTÉ NTDD, Judgment No. 1929/2015
of July 23, 2015, Commercial Court of Abidjan
Observations:
The judgment handed down by the Commercial Court of
Abidjan on July 23, 2015, provides valuable insight into
the novelty required for protection under annex IV to
ABR-2015. Novelty – that is, the quality of being “new” – isthe only substantive requirement set out in article 2(1).
Its definition follows in the next paragraph (art. 2(2)):“An industrial design is new if it has not been disclosed
anywhere in the world by publication in tangible form,
by use or by any other means before the filing dateor, where applicable, before the priority date of theapplication for registration.”
Facts: The case concerned a model of removable
panel for displaying advertisements and newspaper
headlines on street furniture, filed with the OAPI by theplaintiff in 2011. The following year, Orange Côte d’Ivoire
turned down a commercial proposal from the plaintiff
for use of the panels, which included all the technicaldetails. The plaintiff, on later learning that Orange Côte
d’Ivoire was distributing allegedly infringing panels
through an advertising and communications agency to
newsagents throughout the Abidjan district, brought
an action for infringement. Orange Côte d’Ivoire argued
that the “method” employed by the model had long
been in common use in Abidjan and other major cities
around the world, and that the designs for the panel
attached to the plaintiff’s application for registration
were “deplorably banal and unimaginative.” It deduced
that the registration could not possibly confer any
exclusive rights and, accordingly, that the applicant had
no grounds to bring an action for infringement. The
advertising and communications agency likewise argued
that the novelty requirement laid down in article 2(1) ofannex IV to ABR-2015 had not been met and, moreover,that the applicant had yet to manufacture the modelthat it claimed had been reproduced and imitated.
The court found in favor of the defendants.

18
19

ABR-2015, art. 7(1)(e) of annex I.
“The right of prior use shall not extend to granting a license to another person
to exploit the design.”

Reasoning: The Commercial Court interpreted thenovelty requirement under annex IV to mean that,to be eligible for protection, a model must produce
an overall visual impression different from that of all

The court’s reasoning raises concerns about both formand substance. The substantive concern relates tothe court’s opaque reasoning that the “novelty” of themodel must be proved if a plaintiff is to benefit from“other legal provisions for the protection of literary andartistic property.” The “other provisions” can be only
those contained in annex VII of ABR-2015, which deals
with literary and artistic property, and the application ofwhich is expressly provided for in article 1(3) of annex IV.20
And yet those provisions, should they apply, would be
subject to the requirement of originality rather thannovelty. Originality is understood subjectively – that is,with reference to the personality of the author of theintellectual creation; novelty is understood objectively, as
the absence of prior art. It should be clarified, however,that protection can be afforded under both legislative
regimes – for industrial designs, as well as copyright –only if the requirements specific to each have been met.21
The concern about form relates to the court’s
unfortunate linking of novelty, a condition for protection,with infringement, the violation of an exclusive right.
The court observed first that the evidence provided
by the plaintiff did not substantiate the allegationsof reproduction or imitation. Only then did the court
consider novelty. That is the wrong way around:novelty must be established first; if found lacking, theinfringement action goes nowhere, so the issues ofreproduction or imitation no longer matter.
Ultimately, though, the court’s solution was reasonable.
Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, production of acertificate of registration for a model that is “innovative”
is not sufficient to enforce an exclusive right against third
parties; the model must meet the novelty requirement. To
prove novelty, a plaintiff must provide all the informationneeded to assess the possible existence of prior art. The
plaintiff in this case did not do so. Information is said tohave been provided on the model (although denied by
the advertising and communications agency mentioned
earlier), but it was not accurate enough, according to thecourt, for the purposes of such an assessment.
20
21

It should be noted here that the plaintiff made no reference whatsoever to theapplication of these provisions.
See Cass. com., No. 15-10885, March 29, 2017, in which it was noted that total
cumulative protection under art. L.112-1 of the Intellectual Property Codeand art. 96.2 of Regulation 6/2002 is not automatically afforded, but rather ispermitted only where the respective conditions for protection are met.

The court was also correct to refer to the overall visual
impression of the model, which needed to differ from
impressions given by previously disclosed models,
but it lumped that requirement together with novelty,
traditionally understood in industrial property mattersas the objective absence of prior art. There, it may
have interpreted the Agreement too loosely. In theEuropean Union, the situation is slightly different:
Regulation 6/2002 requires the design to be new but
also to have “individual character” (art. 4), such that “theoverall impression it produces on the informed user
differs from the overall impression produced on sucha user by any design which has been made available
to the public” before a specific date (art. 6.1), and thatthe assessment of individual character should take into
consideration “the degree of freedom of the designer indeveloping the design” (art. 6.2).
In any case, the Commercial Court’s approach, while
unorthodox, should not be viewed unfavorably. It is not
illogical in the context of industrial designs to attribute a
special character to the otherwise purely relative conceptof novelty, as long argued in the literature.22 In the samevein, article 1(1) of annex IV, in defining a model as “anythree-dimensional shape,” requires it to give a “special
appearance” (emphasis added) to the industrial or craft
product concerned. That text can serve as proxy within
OAPI member states for the concept of “overall visual
impression,” even if regrettably eliding the definition of amodel with the conditions for protecting it.
André Lucas

Chapter 4 – Industrial designs

previously disclosed models. The court found the images
and photographs submitted by the plaintiff so unclear
as to preclude a comparison with those provided by
the defendants, and the description of the plaintiff’s
model so brief as to preclude assessment of thepanel’s individual and distinct elements in comparison
with those of the defendant’s model for possible
infringement. The court also found that the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate the novelty of its model, and hence
that it could not benefit from other legal provisions
for the protection of literary and artistic property.
The court concluded that the plaintiff did not provide
evidence of any infringing activity on the part of the
defendant companies.

E. Industrial designs – Infringement
seizure – Order – Retraction –Competent judge – Extent of authorityof the judge for urgent applications
The judge for urgent applications, given that the ABR1999 is silent on the matter, has jurisdiction to rule on
any request to retract an order authorizing infringement
seizure of an industrial design or model. That authority,
however, is limited to assessing the legitimacy andappropriateness of the contested measure.
PMUC V. ALFRED MENO, Interim order No. 301/C
of February 19, 2007, President of the Court of First
Instance of the Centre Region (Yaoundé)
Observations:
The question at the heart of the case was whether anorder authorizing an infringement seizure in respectof an industrial model or design can be the subject ofan appeal for retraction before the judge for urgent
applications. The matter may appear trivial in most legal
areas, retractions being a normal remedy against motion
orders, but it is a valuable precedent in the context of
intellectual property law, where the nature and legal
22

J. Raynard, E. Py and P. Trefigny (2016) Droit de la propriété industrielle. Paris:
LexisNexis, No. 543. The authors note that, unlike patent law, the regime
applicable to models and designs requires only relative novelty.
97

framework of infringement seizure set it apart fromconventional enforcement measures.
Infringement seizure, a probative measure specific tointellectual property matters, permits a right holder
to obtain an inquiry by a public officer, generally
consisting of a court-ordered inventory, to substantiate
an allegation of infringement, the extent thereof andrelated circumstances – or to obtain the physical seizureof objects relating to the infringement. All of this isparaphrased in the various annexes to ABR-1999 as“detailed descriptions, with or without seizure,” which
is logical, since the procedure differs from common law
seizures. One eminent author describes the wording as
less connotative and more correct.23

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Facts: Mr. Alfred Meno, holder of the rights on theindustrial model called “business kiosk” registeredwith OAPI on August 6, 2004, had a detailed inventory
carried out, along with the seizure of the kiosks ownedby the company Pari Mutuel Urbain Camerounais(PMUC) and operated by the latter on sidewalks andpublic squares. This action was carried out in executionof Order No. 1608 made on September 7, 2006, by
the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of
Yaoundé-Centre Administratif. After this measure was
executed, PMUC summoned Alfred Meno before thejudge for urgent applications of this court, to apply forretraction of the order and the lifting of the infringement
seizure on grounds of lack of novelty of the model in
dispute and failure to produce the certificate of noncancellation and non-forfeiture. Alfred Meno raised
the objection regarding lack of jurisdiction of the judge
for urgent applications, stating that, in his opinion,
the infringement-seizure order did not fall within the
category of retractable orders.

98

Reasoning: Infringement seizures have an essentiallyprobative purpose. Under ABR-1999, they are ordered by
the president of the civil court within whose jurisdiction
the action is to be taken. In ABR-2015, the wording“president of the civil court” has been replaced with“presiding judge of the competent national court,”
which eliminates uncertainty over differences in the
judicial organization of OAPI member states.24 There is
no provision in the Agreement for appeal against suchorders. Where substantive legislation on the matter issilent, appellants must invoke the ordinary domestic law
provisions for motion orders in OAPI countries where
so allowed.
The judge in this case ruled explicitly on his own
competence as judge for urgent applications to hearappeals for the retraction of motion orders authorizing
infringement seizures (section I), but he gave only cursory
treatment to a crucial underlying issue: the extent of ajudge’s authority in that capacity to assess the legitimacy
and appropriateness of such measures (section II).

23
24

P. Veron (2013/14) Saisie-contrefaçon, 3rd edn. Paris: Dalloz, 3.
See ABR-2015, art. 65(2) of annex I, art. 58(1) of annex II, art. 51(1) ofannex III and art. 33(1) of annex IV.

I. Legal basis for the competence of the judge forurgent applications in relation to the retraction of
infringement seizure orders
The legal basis for the competence of a judge for urgent
applications to rule on retraction of an infringement
seizure order was an issue much discussed in this case.
Mr. Meno argued that infringement seizure orders ofindustrial designs or models could not be retracted. Hisargument finds support in the absence of any contrary
provision in ABR-1999 (A), but it did not convince thejudge, who invoked the ordinary domestic provision on
motion orders (B).
A. The silence of ABR-1999
ABR-1999 does not expressly provide for appeal against
civil court orders for infringement seizure of industrial
property. The omission is regrettable. It allows fordifferent judicial opinions on the matter in different OAPI
countries, as evidenced by Mr. Meno’s argument. The
latter’s advisors maintained that article 29(1) of annex IV
to ABR-1999 restricted jurisdiction for actions relating
to industrial designs to civil courts only, precluding such
authority for an interim judge. The court president inthis case disposed skillfully of this specious argument
by invoking the ordinary provisions of domestic law onmotion orders, which applied here in any event.
B. Application of ordinary law on motion orders
Given the lack of any provision in annex IV to ABR-1999,
covering industrial designs, the judge rightly invoked theordinary domestic legal provision for motion orders. He
reasoned that, in traditional law, the judge for urgent
applications undisputedly has jurisdiction to rule on
any request for the retraction of orders issued in ex
parte proceedings, including those for infringement
seizure. Infringement seizure orders issued in such nonadversarial proceedings are necessarily subject to thegeneral regime for such proceedings in each member
state. In his capacity as judge for urgent applications,the court president was thus right to affirm jurisdiction
for the matter. According to the Court of Appeal of
Brazzaville, in a comparable case, in which the victim
of an infringement seizure contested as a principleof positive law the competence of a judge for urgent
applications, an order issued by an interim judge can be
opposed before the same judge, in interim proceedings,
by any interested party.
This omission appears to have been fixed by ABR-2015.
In that revised version, under article 33(1) of annex IV,
seizures for counterfeiting (the revised term for“infringement seizures”) are executed by order of the“presiding judge of the competent domestic court,”
making such seizure orders subject to ordinary domestic
law in OAPI countries.
II. Scope of authority of the judge for urgent
applications in relation to the retraction of
infringement seizure orders
The judge for urgent applications can assess theconditions for granting an infringement seizure orderA. Assessing the conditions for granting an order for
infringement seizure
The responsibility of the judge for urgent applications
in considering the retraction of an infringement seizureorder is purely procedural: a check on whether the
documents required by law have been provided in supportof the seizure application. For an industrial design, thedocuments comprise proof that its registration has been
published by the OAPI and has neither lapsed nor beencanceled, and that any necessary security deposit, if
required for the procedure, has been paid.25 In this case,
Mr. Meno submitted into evidence order No. 4/52/OAP
I.PG/DPG/HJT, signed by the OAPI Director General on
August 6, 2004, for the registration of an industrial design
and model of “business kiosk,” applied for on June 16,
2003, along with a copy of the models filed and proof thatthe registration had not lapsed.
It is useful to speculate in this context about the
grounds for the judge’s ruling to retract the order(No. 1608 of December 7, 2006) and subsequently
release the items seized, on December 15, 2006. Two
unstated reasons – the inappropriateness of the mass
seizure performed and the absence of any risk that theobjects seized would deteriorate – seem to underlie
the grounds as written, which include the following
preambular paragraphs of the judge’s ruling:“Considering that literal application of thecontested order allowed Mr. Meno the freedom to
execute it without limitation as to spatial extent
or number of kiosks seized, which was liable todisrupt the business conducted by PMUC since
1994, as evidenced by the documents enteredinto evidence … Considering also that no risk ofdeterioration or concealment of the kiosks has
been invoked by the seizure applicant …”
The extent of infringement seizures is a recurring issue
in cases before the courts of OAPI countries. Where thelaw is silent, judges tend to confine such seizures to afew examples of the offending objects. Advocating thesame prudent approach in their commentary, someauthors affirm the power of the presiding judge to deny
any measure that they deem unnecessary for evidentiary
purposes if potentially causing unwarranted harm to
the distrainee, such as physical seizures of excessive
extent.26 The judge’s decision in the present case was inline with that approach. ABR-1999 does not specify how
extensive an infringement seizure should be, leaving thatto the court president, acting as motions judge or judge
for urgent applications. That power must be exercised
delicately in the case of infringement seizures, avoiding
intrusion into areas within the trial court’s domain.
25
26

See ABR-1999, art. 31(1), (2) and (3) of annex IV. The conditions for granting
the measure are simplified in ABR-2015, arts. 33(2), by removal of the need to
produce proof that the registration has neither lapsed nor been canceled.
See Ameropa SA v. Mustapha Tall SA, Judgment No. 501 of December 28,
2012, Court of Appeal of Dakar (obs. M. Lamotte, this collection, Chapter 3,
section K); Veron, n. 23, at 90, No. 123.12.

B. Assessing the validity of a right holding
As a general rule, the intervention of a judge for urgent
applications in intellectual property disputes in no way
alters existing jurisdictional rules in OAPI countries, as
enshrined in their codes of civil procedure. The provisionapplicable in this case was article 185 of the Code of Civil
and Commercial Procedure of Cameroon, which prohibits
a judge for urgent applications from prejudicing
adjudication on the merits of a case. Accordingly, a judge
for urgent applications asked to retract an infringement
seizure order may not examine the validity of the title
allegedly infringed or the material facts of the alleged
infringement, both of which are matters for the trial
court. Two regrettable decisions had been renderedpreviously on this point – one, by the presiding judge of
the Court of First Instance of Abidjan-Plateau, the other,by his counterpart at Ndokoti in Douala – both intruding
into matters for the trial court to decide.27
The judge for urgent applications in the present casequite wisely worded his reasoning thus: “The matterto be decided here is not the validity of ownershiprights to a model of kiosk, but the legitimacy as well as
appropriateness of an infringement seizure ordered in
non-adversarial proceedings.” He thereby circumscribed
the prerogative of the judge for urgent applications
in dealing with infringement seizures – a procedure
increasingly in demand since the adoption of ABR-2015.
Article 32 of annex IV to this latest revision, with respect
to industrial designs, now allows any person empowered
to bring action for counterfeiting to make an urgent
application to the competent domestic court seeking, if
necessary under financial compulsion, an order against
the alleged counterfeiter or the intermediaries whose
services they use, instituting any measure intended
to prevent an imminent infringement of the rights
vested in the certificate of registration or to preventthe continuation of the alleged counterfeiting. That
represents a major innovation certain to revolutionize
the judicial enforcement of industrial property rights andgladden the hearts of their holders in title.

Chapter 4 – Industrial designs(A) but not the validity of rights claimed to the title
concerned by the purported right holder (B).

Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

27

See Société Sivorpra v. Issa Mohamad Ali, Interim order No. 2240 of May 5,
2002, of the president of the Court of First Instance of Abidjan-Plateau, in
Recueil des décisions de justice (OAPI Collection), 439, in which the judge forurgent applications prohibited the fraudulent use of the infringing mark andordered withdrawal of the infringing goods throughout the national territory;
Interim order No. 189 of August 22, 2007, of the president of the Court of First
Instance of Ndokoti (Douala), in ibid., at 191, in which the judge for urgent
applications rejected a request for retraction of an infringement seizure orderon the grounds that the infringement was proven, thus settling the dispute on
the merits; Société STCH v. Société Sotiba Simpafric SA, Interim order No. 4167 ofApril 14, 2008, Special Regional Court of Dakar, in which the presiding judge
ordered retraction of an infringement seizure order carried out by the holder
of a right over a model on the grounds that the victim of the seizure had aprior right over the disputed model, thus ignoring the objection on groundsof lack of material jurisdiction raised by the distrainee, who had alreadybrought the dispute before the trial judge.
99

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Chapter 5 – Trade namesA.
Use of a trade name registered with OAPIby a competitor in the national territory of amember state – Use liable to create confusion
between the enterprises in question – Usedeclared illegal and prohibited
101

100

Chapter 5
Trade names
A. Use of a trade name registered withOAPI by a competitor in the national
territory of a member state – Useliable to create confusion between theenterprises in question – Use declaredillegal and prohibited
A request to prohibit the use of a trade name registeredwith OAPI by the owner of the registration can succeed
only where that use is (a) on the national territory of an
OAPI member state, (b) by a competitor and (c) liable tocreate confusion between the enterprises in question.
SOCIÉTÉ BATIPRO V. SOCIÉTÉ EMBCI-PROBETON,
Judgment No. 4653/2015 of April 14, 2016, Commercial
Court of Abidjan
Observations:
Under article 1 of annex V to the Bangui Agreement of
February 24, 1999 (ABR-1999), a trade name is definedas “the name under which a trade, industrial, craft or
agricultural establishment is known and exploited.” 1
Trade names are among the distinctive signs used bycompanies to attract customers. Within the OAPI, a party
can obtain an exclusive right over a trade name in oneof two ways – namely, by working it or by registering it.2
Registering a trade name, however, does not necessarily
protect it from unlawful use, as is clear from thejudgment rendered here by the Commercial Court of
Abidjan on April 14, 2016.
Facts: The company BATIPRO was owner of the tradename “PROBETON” by virtue of trademark and tradename registration certificates issued by the OAPI on
May 29 and August 31, 2015. The company EMBCIPROBETON was reported to be using the same nameand thereby infringing BATIPRO’s exclusive right, as abailiff’s report of March 11, 2015 documented. BATIPRO
took action accordingly before the Commercial Court
of Abidjan to prohibit such use; EMBCI-PROBETON filed
a counterclaim, seeking to invalidate the trade nameregistered by BATIPRO.
Reasoning: The Commercial Court, in ruling on this claim
and counterclaim, had to consider two legal issues:
I.
II.
1
2

the conditions under which the use of a registeredtrade name can be prohibited; andwhether a registered trade name can be invalidated.
The definition in ABR-2015, art. 1 of annex V, also includes “or otherbusiness.”
ABR-1999, art. 3(1) of annex V.

The court’s decision was to uphold BATIPRO’s claim, toprohibit EMBCI-PROBETON’s use of the name and toreject the latter’s request that the former’s trade namebe held invalid.
I. Conditions for the success of an action to prohibit
the use of a registered trade name
Under article 16 of annex V to ABR-1999, if the rights
attaching to a trade name are infringed, the registeredowner of such rights may take legal action to prohibit thecontinuation of such infringement and to claim paymentof damages, as well as any other sanction provided forin the Civil Code. However, an action for prohibition alsocomes under article 5(1) of annex V, which specifies three
conditions that must be met if the use of a trade name is
to be held illegal:• the use must occur in the national territory of an OAPI
member state;• the use must be for the same trade, industrial, craft
or agricultural activity as that of the owner of theregistered trade name; and• the use must be liable to create confusion between theenterprises in question.
It should have been verified, first of all, whether thoseconditions were met in this case.
The court did not explicitly address the first condition,requiring that the use occur in an OAPI country. It may
have assumed, but not confirmed, that the condition was
met since both enterprises were headquartered in PortBouët, Abidjan, and the defendant clearly used the tradename in Côte d’Ivoire.
The court did address, if indirectly, the second condition,requiring that use of the name be for the same trade,industry, craft or agricultural activity as that of theregistered trade name’s owner. Reference to the “same”
activity means that the plaintiff and defendant must
be competitors, offering goods or services to the sameclientele. According to the court, the bailiff’s report did
indicate similarity in the companies’ fields of activity
and hence it could be said that the second conditionis satisfied.
The court devoted more attention to the third condition,requiring there to be potential for confusion between theenterprises. It affirmed first that anyone encounteringan EMBCI-PROBETON billboard or sign would be boundto confuse it with the plaintiff’s trade name and mark. It
found the brand palette – the same shade of red – and101the activities being pursued by the two companies tobe so similar that consumers dealing with one company
could believe it to be the other. The natural consequenceof such confusion is a cost to the registered owner of a
trade name – in this case, the company BATIPRO – which
will have built its reputation on that name.

a.

b.

Seeing the three conditions met, the court rightly ruledfor BATIPRO, prohibiting the defendant’s use of the“PROBETON” name under threat of financial penalty.
While not an issue in this case, article 5 of annex V to
ABR-1999 does, however, indicate two scenarios in which
the owner of a registered trade name may not prohibit
third-party use.3 Article 5(2) sets out the first:“The registered owner of a trade name may notpreclude third parties from the use in good faithof their names, their addresses, a pseudonym,
a geographical name, or exact indications
concerning the kind, quality, quantity, destination,
value, place of origin or time of production of
their goods or of the supply of their services, in
so far as such use is confined to the purposes ofmere identification or information and cannot
mislead the public as to the source of the goods
or services.”
The second scenario, in article 5(3), runs as follows:“An interested party whose name and firstname are similar to those of a registered tradename, where his rights to the trade name of his
establishment are subsequent to those of theregistered trade name, shall take all necessary
measures, by an addition to his trade name or in
any other manner, to distinguish his trade namefrom that of the registered trade name.”
Both scenarios place limits on the exclusive rights of theowner of a registered trade name. There is also a thirdsuch limit: the effects of the trade name’s registration
can be invalidated.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

II. Invalidity of a registered trade name102

The counterclaim filed by EMBCI-PROBETON, entirely
without grounds, sought invalidation of the trade name
“PROBETON,” as registered to BATIPRO. The court
dismissed the claim on the simple basis of BATIPRO’sownership and, in doing so, it risked suggesting that
registered trade names cannot be invalidated.
Under article 14(1) and (2) of annex V to ABR-1999, suchinvalidation is pronounced by the civil courts at therequest of the OAPI, the Office of the Public Prosecutor,
or any interested natural or legal person.

c.

d.

The first is non-conformity with the definition of“trade name” provided in article 1 of annex V (“thename under which a trade, industrial, craft or
agricultural establishment is known and exploited”).
Based on article 2 of annex V, the second applies
where “a name or designation is not admissible asa trade name if, by reason of its nature or the use
to which it may be put, it is contrary to moralityor public policy and if, in particular, it is liable
to mislead trade circles or the public as to thenature of the trade, industrial, craft or agricultural
establishment of that name.”
Based on article 5(1) of annex V, the third would
apply in cases where the name has been previously
registered for the same trade, industrial, craft or
agricultural activity.
The final ground is conflict between the registration
and a prior right. This ground is broader than thethird, applying not only to the registered name but
also to all prior intellectual property rights.

This final ground was applied in a similar case, in a
judgment dated May 14, 2008, by the Court of First
Instance of Libreville.4 The plaintiff in that case,Compagnie Générale des Etablissements MichelinMichelin, had registered trademarks with the OAPI
containing the name “Michelin,” numbered anddated thus:• Michelin No. 36897, registered on October 7, 1996
• Michelin No. 44309, registered on June 22, 2001
• Michelin No. 44310, registered on June 22, 2001
On April 23, 2002 – that is, after the plaintiff had
registered the marks – Rabiou Abdou Wassi, thedefendant, filed and registered with the OAPI the signand trade name “Michelin Dieu Merci.” Informed of this,the plaintiff took action to invalidate the defendant’s
registration, on the ground that it conflicted with its
own prior right. The court recognized the plaintiff’s rightto the trade name “Michelin Dieu Merci,” registeredon April 23, 2002, as No. 34058, as prior to thedefendant’s registration of the same name, which thecourt invalidated.
Returning to the present case, EMBCI-PROBETON’s
counterclaim, aiming to invalidate BATIPRO’s
registration, invoked none of these four grounds and wasdoomed from the start. The court was right to dismiss it,
but its reasoning calls for comment. It was based solely
on BATIPRO’s ownership of the registered trade name,which, as demonstrated, could be invalidated on any of
the four grounds spelled out in article 14 of annex V to
ABR-1999. The court’s reasoning should have confirmedthat none of these grounds applied.
Grégoire Jiogue

The grounds for invalidity, as specified in article 14(2), areas follows.
3

These two situations are reproduced in extenso in ABR-2015, art. 5 of annex V,
which had not yet entered into force at the time of the present case.

4

La Compagnie Générale des Etablissements Michelin-Michelin et Compagnie v.
Michelin Dieu Merci, unpublished.

A.
Works of the mind – Concept – Need for a
concrete form perceptible to the senses –Slavish reproduction of a contest under thesame name as that used by the contest’s
creator – Parasitic competition (“passingoff”) found
104

J.
Copyright – Permission to exploit issued by
the national collective rights management
organization – Online exploitation of works
from the repertoire of a sister company –Individual action by the author –Admissibility – No unlawful exploitation
124

B.
Originality – Condition for the protectionof works – Content of the concept – Blendof objective and subjective criteria –Reproduction of original expressions
and elements characteristic of the work
– Infringement
107

K.
Digital reproduction of a literary and artistic
work – Authorization from the author – Lack ofauthorization – Infringement
126

D.
Copyright – Ownership of rights – Multiple
works – Outside contributions to the work –No exclusive authorship
111
E.
Copyright – Protection of a pseudonym– Protection of a logo – Condition forprotection: originality

112

F.
Copyright – Broadcast of a commercial
incorporating a musical work – Equitableremuneration for a collective rights
management organization – Inadmissibility ofaction brought individually by the author 115
G.
Prior work – Ownership of rights – Creator of
the work – Transformation of the prior work –Author’s authorization required – Remedy for
use without authorization
117
H.
Copyright – Assignment of rights –Transfer of economic rights – Inalienability ofmoral rights – Respect by the assignee
120
I.
Literary and artistic work – Unauthorized
reproduction of the work – Commercial
exploitation – No exception for private copies– Infringement
122

M.
Copyright – Counterfeit seizure – Provincial
committee to combat piracy – Irregularcomposition of the committee – No
identification of the seizure applicant andno objects seized – Recourse to OHADA
law on seizures – No application of the law
on cinematographic works – Competentjurisdiction – Judge for urgent applications 131
N.
Copyright – Action for infringement –Obligation of the trial judges to explicitly state
the grounds for the sentence – Failure to reply
to allegations of infringement of the rightof authorship
135
O.
Payment of copyright royalties – Actual use
of works – Condition for requiring payment –Capacity to disseminate the works
136
P.
Procedure – Copyright – Counterfeit seizure– Proceedings on the merits – Unsuccessful
plaintiff – Compensation for prejudice
resulting from seizure
138

Chapter 6 – CopyrightC.
Copyright – Original work – Proof of originality– Need for trial judges to state the grounds fortheir decisions
109

L.
Copyright – Action for infringement – Plaintiff’s
identity as author contested – Appeal to quash
the decision – Distinction of law from fact 129Q.
Copyright – Conflict of laws – Condition offoreign nationals – Legislative reciprocity
invoked against foreign authors – Berne
Convention – National treatment
140

103

Chapter 6
Copyright
A. Works of the mind – Concept – Needfor a concrete form perceptible tothe senses – Slavish reproduction ofa contest under the same name asthat used by the contest’s creator –Parasitic competition (“passing off”)
found
A work of the mind can be copyrighted only if expressedin a concrete, original form perceptible to the senses.
Such is not the case for the rules of a contest, whichcannot in themselves constitute a work of the mind.
A contest that is not copyrighted can, however, beprotected under the rules against unfair competition.
When a person “piggybacks” on an author’s creation toearn profit from it at no expense to themselves, they may
be found to be liable for conduct comprising a type ofparasitic competition known as passing off.
AMISSAH MARIELLE LINDA V. 1. SOUMAHORO MAURY
FERE; 2. MGROUP; 3. MTN CÔTE D’IVOIRE; 4. BUREAUIVOIRIEN DU DROIT D’AUTEUR, Judgment No. 3556/17
of December 19, 2017, Commercial Court of Abidjan
In this case, the Commercial Court of Abidjan was asked
to decide on two legal questions: the conditions underwhich a contest can be protected by copyright; andwhether the defendants’ replication of a contest under
the same name and without the consent of the plaintiff(the contest’s creator) constitutes “passing off.”
I. Protecting a work of the mind through copyright
Under all national copyright laws, as well as article 3(1)of annex VII of the Bangui Agreement, only an original
work may be protected by copyright. The inception of a
copyright can – arguably, must – be subject to a twofold
condition: that the work’s character be substantiatedboth as a work of the mind and as an original one. The
judgment reported here illustrates the first part ofthe condition.
The judgment reported here illustrates the first condition.
The Commercial Court of Abidjan denies that copyrightprotection exists for the concept of a contest, the CoupéDécalé Awards, promoting a musical genre very popularin Côte d’Ivoire in the 2000s. The plaintiff, a noted singer
in the “stylmoulance” musical movement, claimed thatthe contest, which she created in 2010, was an original
creation, and that the defendants had “re-presented” it in
an infringing manner.
104

The defendants argued that the plaintiff had notprovided “objective evidence that her name had usuallyappeared in conjunction with the Coupé-Décalé Awards
or that she had developed a stage format bearing her
imprint.” They added that “copyright protection does
not cover ideas, methods, procedures, concepts orinformation as such, and that having provided no proofof the work being registered with BURIDA [Bureau
Ivoirien du Droit d’Auteur/Copyright Bureau of Côte
d’Ivoire],” the plaintiff could invoke no right to the work
against third parties.
These three objections do not carry equal weight.
The failure to make reference to the author of a workwhen using that work obviously does not suffice to ruleout infringement. Nor is registration of a work with acollective rights management organization a prerequisite
for copyright; rather, as the court quite rightly noted
in its judgment, it follows from article 4 of annex VII to
the Bangui Agreement and article 5 of Côte d’Ivoire’s
Copyright Act that “copyrights arise without the need forformalities, by the mere fact of a work’s creation.”
That left open the issue of whether the work concerned
constituted a work of the mind, as defined in the
copyright legislation. The court’s ruling on why it did not
is instructive.
The court began by citing the principle that a “work of
the mind” can be copyrighted only if “expressed in an
original form or representation.” The wording “formor representation” is unfortunate, in that the word
“representation” refers merely to one possible means ofcommunicating the work. It would have been preferable
to refer only to “form.” But the argument is stillcompelling: “The requirement as to the form in which thework must be cast relates to the ability to communicate
it and make it perceptible to an audience. Accordingly,
irrespective of their original form or presentation, therules of a contest cannot in themselves constitute a workof the mind protected by copyright.”
It could not be clearer that the only purpose of copyrightis to protect a creation perceptible through the senses.
This flows from a fundamental principle of intellectual
property law: that ideas in themselves are freely
available.1 This means that, once obtained, copyrightprotection does not extend to the ideas contained in awork. The principle is recalled in article 2, entitled “Scope1

For an illustration that dates back some time, see T. civ. Seine,
December 19, 1928, Ann. propr. ind. 1929, 181: “In the realm of thought, ideas
remain eternally free and can never be exclusively protected.”From that point of view, the court was right not to rely on
the plaintiff’s affirmations that her contest was the fruitof an intellectual effort consisting of various arbitrarychoices to showcase the contest’s originality – inparticular, the ranking of artists by category, the process
for choosing winners and the unfolding of the event,with a procession, a video presentation, a tribute to Douk
Saga (celebrated pioneer of the musical genre) and aconcluding concert performed by coupé-décalé artists.
Indeed, neither the exertion of “intellectual effort” (theplaintiff also highlighted her “effort of reflection”) nor
the making of “arbitrary choices” suffice to make a work
eligible for protection. According to the court in thiscase, to obtain copyright protection, the plaintiff shouldhave demonstrated “the original form or presentationof the above ideas. The form could consist of a text
setting out the contest.” The example of a “text settingout the contest” may not be the most relevant, sincea court would have to examine such words to assess
whether they met the originality condition. It would havebeen more effective to hypothesize, as the defendants
themselves did, a staging “format” for the contest. But
the argument remains ineluctable: the plaintiff failed
to “demonstrate that her intellectual activity produced
anything of concrete form.”
The judgment appears well grounded in law and iscomparable to a ruling of the French Court of Cassation
in a case concerning awards for the year’s best beauty
products.2 The French court found that “the rules of acontest, even if resulting from arbitrary choices, cannot
in themselves, regardless of their form or general
presentation, constitute a protected work of the mind.”That ruling has broad implications, considering that,in the case law of many European Union countries,
copyright protection is often claimed for televised game“concepts” negotiated at astronomical prices.3 It is
generally accepted that such protection can be granted
only if the concept concerned takes the form of what is
known in media jargon as a “format” for a segmented,
structured program.
The distinction is clarified in a judgment of the Paris
Court of Appeal.4 That case concerned a televisionproject about celebrities’ collections. The project’s
creator, who had registered it with the Société des Gensde Lettres (a body for the defense of authors, established2
3

4

Cass. 1ère civ., November 29, 2005, No. 4-12.721, RIDA 2006, 2, 273, Comm.
com. électr. 2006, comm. 18, 1ère esp. (note C. Caron), D. 2006, 517 (noteA. Tricoire), RTD com. 2006, 78 (obs. F. Pollaud-Dulian).
For an overview of the problem, see E. Derieux (1994) La protection desprojets et genres d’émissions. Légipresse, II, 97-106; G.W.G. Karnell (2000)
Copyright to sequels – with special regard to television show formats. IIC, 31,
886–913.
Fourth Chamber, December 6, 2002, Propr. intell. 2003, 158, 2ème esp. (obs.
A. Lucas).

in the 19th century), later recognized his idea in a
program broadcast by the TF1 television network. The
Paris Court of Appeal recognized the project as a work of
the mind. While the synopsis for that project was brief, it
included precise elements, as follows.
• It combined televised visits to the homes andcollections of stars, with a technical report on eachcelebrity’s collection, commentary by a psychologist
on each celebrity and collection, a game segmentawarding prizes for answers to questions of generalculture about an object, painting or artist, and recent
news about the celebrity.
• The synopsis then proposed how the program would
actually be segmented.
• Further, it characterized the program’s “tone” (“young,rebellious, fast-paced”).
That plaintiff’s appeal was nonetheless denied, on the
grounds that none of the TF1 programs “replicated theabove combination.” For viewers who might have missed
them, the programs showed Michèle Torr’s collection ofearthenware cicadas, Uri Geller’s collection of twisted
spoons, Daniel Hechter’s modern art collection, JeanClaude Dreyfus’s pig collection, and the car collectionsof Alain-Dominique Perrin and the King of Morocco– but never under the conditions enumerated in theplaintiff’s synopsis.
In both French judgments, the same principles areapplied. While copyright protection is denied in thefirst and admitted in the second, both are based on
the same distinction: between a simple canvas without
real content (an entertainment program on the why ofthings or the happenings of daily life) and a segmented
structured “format,” as described above.
The distinction between a work that can be protected
and an idea that cannot often arises in advertising. The
French Court of Cassation has established in principle“that a simple advertising idea, however original, is not in
itself subject to ownership.” 5 According to abundant caselaw, however, an advertising idea can be owned if it takes
the form of a slogan or design.

Chapter 6 – Copyrightof copyright protection,” of the WIPO Copyright Treatyof 1996: “Copyright protection extends to expressions
and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation ormathematical concepts as such.” It also means that awork is eligible for copyright protection only if it takessome concrete form.

II. Protecting a work of the mind against passing off
Passing off is today generally considered an act of
unfair competition,6 the latter concept having evolved
significantly. The concept of unfair competition wastraditionally confined to cases in which the plaintiff
and defendant actually competed – that is, where theyshared the same clientele or customer base.7 It has
since been found increasingly that competition canbe unfair in the absence of such a shared clientele,8
including in the case of passing off. Passing off was
eventually found to be unfair even in the absence of any
5
6
7
8

Cass. com., June 16, 1964, JCP G 1965, II, 14059, Ann. propr. ind. 1965, 279.
V.G. Ripert, R. Roblot and L. Vogel (2001) Traité de droit commercial, vol. 1, 18thedn. Paris: LGDJ, Nos. 752–753, 613 et seq.
A. Pirovano (1974) La concurrence déloyale en droit française. RID comp., 467.
See Ripert, Roblot and Vogel, n. 6, Nos. 730, 595 and 596, and the case law
cited in that regard.
105

competitive situation.9
The Commercial Court of Abidjan defined passing off
as a set of behaviors through which an economic actor,
at no cost to itself, exploits and profits from the efforts
and knowledge of another. That definition is in linewith the legal doctrine that gave rise to the passing-off
concept.10 According to Saint-Gal, actors who operate
as “parasites, profiting from the efforts, reputation andfame of another” behave illegally. The definition by theCommercial Court of Abidjan just cited was first appliedin the same terms by the Commercial Chamber of theFrench Court of Cassation.11
The definition having now been validated, the question
remains whether the Commercial Court of Abidjan wascorrect in applying it to a work of the mind in the caseof a game show, the Coupé-Décalé Awards, created by
the plaintiff, Ms. Amissah Marielle Linda, also known
as Lindsay, and debuting in July 2010. When the firstprogram was aired, several artists and producers
received prizes, including Mr. Soumahoro Maury Féré,
also known as Molare. However, owing to the 2011
post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the plaintiff could
not directly follow up that first program with a second.
When, in 2016, she was preparing to do so, she wassurprised to learn that Mr. Soumahoro and the firm
MGroup were organizing the first program of what
they called the Coupé-Décalé Awards, sponsored by thecompany MTN. Despite repeated efforts by the plaintiff
to dissuade them, the defendants went ahead with theevent. She then brought action before the Commercial
Court of Abidjan seeking legal redress for the prejudicecaused by their passing off.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

The theory of passing off was first advanced in respectof trademark infringement12 and subsequently applied incase law to economic activity, and hence the references
to “economic passing off” and “economic actor” inmost judicial decisions on the matter.13 The Commercial
Court of Abidjan referred to “economic actor” in its own
definition of passing off.

106

With that in mind, the concept of passing off as an actof unfair competition arises primarily in respect of
economic activity. It is, however, exceedingly difficult
to characterize as an economic activity a game show
organized by a natural person on an apparently pro
bono and occasional basis. Nor does such a game show
fit within the concept of unfair competition definedin the Bangui Agreement, as revised on February 24,
1999 (ABR-1999), which addresses only industrial andcommercial activities. The game show at issue is neither
an industrial nor a commercial activity. Nor is it anactivity of the liberal professions, which the Bangui
9
10
11
12
13

Cass. com., January 30, 1996, Bull. civ. 1996, IV, No. 32.
Y. Saint-Gal (1956) Concurrence parasitaire ou agissements parasitaires.
RIPIA, 37.
Cass. com., January 26, 1999, No. 96-22.457, BRDA 1999, No. 6, 10, D. 2000, 87(note Y. Serra).
Saint-Gal, n. 10.
Cass. com., January 26, 1999, n. 11; CA Toulouse, October 19, 1988, D. 1989,
290 (note Barbéri); Cass. com., May 9, 1991, PIBD 1991, III, 699; CA Versailles,
January 16, 1997, D. Aff. 1997, 565.

Agreement as revised on December 14, 2015 (ABR-2015)
puts on a similar footing with industrial and commercial
activities. Even the case law in this area, in which theconcept of unfair competition is quite broadly basedon article 1382 of the Civil Code, excludes “traditional”
services (those performed by political, labor, cultural,
professional and philanthropic bodies), given their
pro bono character. What is true for such “traditional”
services also applies to the game show at issue, sincenothing in the decision permits a determination that it
was profit-driven.
That said, it must also be observed that the conditions
associated with passing off (which can occur in theabsence of a shared clientele) differ from those that havetraditionally characterized unfair competition (which canexist only where clientele is shared). Viewed from thatperspective, the position taken by the Commercial Court
of Abidjan is understandable. What cannot be treated as
unfair competition in the classic sense can be consideredpassing off. While it arose in the context of economic
activity, passing off can also be applied to other fields,such as artistic endeavors. The court therefore rightly
referred not to economic but artistic passing off. Given
the general character of the passing-off theory, nothing
prevents it from being applied, when its defining
features have been identified, to the arts.
In this case, the judge found artistic passing off to haveoccurred based on two facts:• the slavish manner in which the defendants replicatedthe Coupé-Décalé Awards, using the same name, after
having participated in 2010 in the first program; and• the similarity of their program to that created by theplaintiff, which inevitably evoked the latter in theminds of the viewing public.
In view of those facts, the Commercial Court of Abidjan
rightly concluded that the defendants, at no costto themselves, had exploited and profited from theplaintiff’s creation. Thus, although a work of the mind
may be denied copyright protection, it can still beprotected by applying the passing-off concept.
The significance of the concept in that regard should not,however, be overstated. Indeed, if any replication of an
unprotected creation is to be treated as passing off, thecoherence of intellectual property will be affected. It is inthat light that the ruling of October 18, 2000, by the Paris
Court of Appeal should be viewed: copying the worksof others as a way to economize does not constitute an
offense, since works not covered by intellectual property
rights can in principle be freely reproduced.14
Having so characterized artistic passing off, theCommercial Court of Abidjan could grant the plaintiff’s
claim for compensation only by first finding injury tohave occurred – which it did, considering the plaintiff tohave sustained real injury in the loss of her intellectual
investment. It would indeed be difficult for her “to again
14

D. 2000, 850 (note J. Passa).

Questions nonetheless arise about the legal basis ofcompensation for the plaintiff’s injury. The Commercial
Court of Abidjan cited article 1382 of the Civil Codebut not annex VIII to ABR-1999. Given that the theoryof unfair competition was enshrined in subsequent
revisions of the Bangui Agreement, article 1382
should no longer, strictly speaking, apply in unfair
competition cases.15
The main lesson to be drawn from the judgment is theneed to distinguish passing off from other forms of
unfair competition, particularly in the case of artistic (asin this case) as opposed to economic passing off. Under
annex VIII of the Bangui Agreement, the applicationof unfair competition provisions is limited to industrial
and commercial activities. The game show at issue
was neither an industrial nor a commercial activity
but a pure work of the mind. Thus, from the OAPI
standpoint, there are two coexisting legal frameworks
for unfair competition: article 1382 of the Civil Code, andannex VIII of the Bangui Agreement. The latter should
be considered the principal framework and the former,
its subsidiary.
André Lucas

B. Originality – Condition for theprotection of works – Content of theconcept – Blend of objective andsubjective criteria – Reproduction oforiginal expressions and elementscharacteristic of the work –Infringement
As a general rule, a work eligible for copyright protectionis the “original” one, which, under article 1 of the Côte
d’Ivoire Law of July 26, 2016, on copyright and related
rights, is that which constitutes the author’s own work of
the mind.
An infringing reproduction of a literary work consists ofthe full or partial replication of original expressions andelements characteristic of the pre-existing work. In theabsence of prior authorization from the author, such
reproduction is illegal and subject to heavy penalties
under civil law.
KIPRE BROYO CARLO V. NOUVELLE PARFUMERIEGANDOUR, Judgment of December 28, 2017, Commercial
Court of Abidjan
Observations:
Can a fragment of a literary work be subject to copyrightprotection? This is a core question for copyrightprotection in a time of political and legislative caution
when dealing with allegations of plagiarism. Without
distinguishing between different categories of art,
copyright protects all aspects of creativity from themoment the originating factual idea for a creation
becomes concrete – or, better still, is “externalized
as forms and/or colors.” 16 “Plagiarism” is a nonlegal concept with purely moral connotations; thelegal term is “infringing reproduction.” 17 Infringing
reproduction is the illegal reproduction, representation
or dissemination, by whatever means, of elements of theoriginal expression of a work of the mind. For a plagiarist
to incur civil liability, case law requires that the elements
resemble those taken from the original, regardless of
their quantitative extent. That is the essence of thisjudgment of the Commercial Court of Abidjan.
Facts: During the course of 2010, Mr. Kipre Broyo
conceived of and produced the first volume ofa handbook entitled Technique pour devenir unprofessionnel de la haute coiffure [Techniques for
Becoming a Professional Hairdresser], which was
followed in January 2015 by a second volume, entitled
Guide du coiffeur, Devenir professionnel [Hairdresser’s
Guide: Become a Professional]. The work was registered
twice with the Copyright Bureau of Côte d’Ivoire (Bureau
Ivoirien du droit d’auteur, or BURIDA), on June 17,
2016, and June 16, 2017. Having signed a contract
in March 2015 to train student hairdressers for the
Nouvelle Parfumerie Gandour, Mr. Broyo used his
work as a training textbook for the students until thecontractual relationship was terminated. Mr. Broyo waslater surprised, in January 2017, to learn that Nouvelle
Parfumerie Gandour had published its own hairdressing
handbook, plagiarizing several pages of his second
volume. Considering the reproduction an infringementof his copyright, Mr. Broyo brought civil liability
proceedings, grounded in article 1382 of the Civil Code,before the Commercial Court of Abidjan. The court wascalled upon to identify in general terms what elements of
the work were protected by copyright.
Reasoning: It is a truism that copyrights generally
protect not ideas, which can be exchanged freely,
but their expression. The intent of this fundamental
copyright principle is to guarantee freedom of
expression and creation. According to this principle,
ideas cannot be owned unless they have been expressedin some clear form. Deceptive in its simplicity, applicationof this principle can be tricky. Judges have to identify,
from the standpoint of creativity, what creative works,
or elements thereof, are eligible for protection. At thisstage, originality is unquestionably the essential criterion
for that determination (section I). Judges must then havethe expertise to examine whether the reproduction atissue constitutes an infringement (section II).
16
17

15

See Adamou Idrissa v. Mahaman Mindaou, Judgment No. 13 – 086/c of April 4,2013, State Court of Niger, Judicial Chamber (obs. G. Jiogue, this collection,
Chapter 7, section A).

Chapter 6 – Copyrightorganize the program at issue, associated as it now iswith Mr. Soumahoro, whose renown in the world ofcoupé-décalé is solidly established.”

P. Sirinelli (1992) Propriété littéraire et artistique et droits voisins. Paris: Dalloz,
25.
See A.-C. Renouard (1838/39) Traité des droits d’auteurs dans la littérature, lessciences et les beaux-arts, vol. 2. Paris: J. Renouard, 22; see also C. Colombet(1999) Propriété littéraire et artistique et droits voisins, 9th edn. Paris: Dalloz,
No. 389; R. Plaisant (1970) Le droit des auteurs et des artistes exécutants.
Delmas, No. 403.
107

Originality, a bedrock concept in copyright law thathas withstood the test of time and legislative reform,
can be defined in several ways, depending on one’s
theoretical starting point. As part of a traditional,
eminently subjective concept of originality, there has
been a reluctance in case law to break with numerous
precedents where objective criteria have been applied.
Faced with those two approaches to the concept,
subjective and objective, the judge in the present casetook certain liberties in applying both.

A small number of case rulings, however, reflect adiametrically opposed perception of originality as
an entirely objective matter. Often moved by both
pragmatism and the subjective criterion’s shortcomings
in certain areas of creativity, such as databases andcomputer programs, judges have often departed fromthe mainstream approach and relied exclusively on theobjective criterion for originality instead. While judges
in the OAPI countries have not been receptive to thisjudicial thinking, French judges have frequently spokenof originality as being the opposite of banality,22 denying
protection for a drawing, for instance, on the grounds of
its banal and commonplace composition.23

A. Alternative criteria for defining an original work
Viewed holistically, the concept of an original work is
multidimensional in copyright law, those dimensions
having evolved according to various schools ofthought. From among myriad defining criteria, twomain approaches have emerged: one subjective; theother objective.18

In judgments based on either approach, a clear
boundary is usually drawn to avoid any possible
confusion between, or combination of, the criteria
applied. While it may not have significantly affected thethrust of the decision, it is therefore regrettable thatthe judge in this case referenced both sets of criteria fordefining originality.

B. The judge’s regrettable combination of criteria
The Commercial Court’s combination of both subjective
and objective criteria in this case may be regrettable.
Seeking to define the concept of original work firstsubjectively, the judge emphasized that “it is a principle
of intellectual property law that a work is deemed
original if it is new and bears the imprint of theauthor’s personality.”

II. Delineating the contours of illegal reproduction

I. Originality – the key criterion for determining awork’s eligibility for protection

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Expressed in negative terms, that conception amounts tosaying that a new work is not original if it does not bear
an author’s personal imprint and vice versa.

108

Most case law broadly deconstructs the concept oforiginality subjectively in this way, in line with thepersonality-based approach largely taken in theliterature.19 In a case before the Supreme Court ofCôte d’Ivoire, the judge largely echoed the narrowly
subjective approach to defining originality.20 In that case,the appellant had created a clownish character who
appeared on children’s programs under the pseudonym“Bouba.” The appellant had brought legal action for
infringement of his copyright – to both the characterand pseudonym – against the respondent’s use of
those two creations. The Supreme Court rejected theappeal on the grounds that neither of these creations
bore the appellant’s personal imprint. Judges in France
have repeatedly avoided any mention of the objective
criterion, requiring originality alone, regardless ofprior art at the time of application for literary andartistic property rights.21 In other words, they perceive
originality exclusively in terms of the author’s own
imprint on the creation.

18
19
20
21

See Toure, A. v. SICOA, Judgment No. 598 of December 8, 2005, Supreme Courtof Côte d’Ivoire (obs. A. Fade, this collection, Chapter 6, section E).
C. Le Henaff (2005/06) Les critères juridiques de l’œuvre à l’épreuve de l’art
conceptual. Masters thesis, University of Poitiers, 68.
See n. 18 (obs. A. Fade, this collection, Chapter 6, section E).
Cass. 1ère civ., February 11, 1997, JCP G 1997, II, 22973, 1ère esp. (noteX. Daverat), D. 1998, 290; 2ème esp. (note crit. F. Greffe), summary, 189 (obs.
C. Colombet), RTD com. 1999, 391 (obs. A. Franço).

In practice, the original character of a first work is
not sufficient to characterize a subsequent work as
plagiaristic, informally understood here as “infringing”
on the former. In examining the facts in a case, a judge
must find the replication of elements characteristic of
the work’s form to be of a certain nature (A), regardlessof how extensive the borrowed elements may havebeen (B).
A. Nature of the replication
For replication of a literary work to be found infringing, it
must include expressions found in the original and that
reproduction must be unauthorized.
As a general rule, according to Professor Lucas, there
can be no copyright to a work until it leaves the realmof speculation to take concrete, perceptible form.24 In
other words, an expression is protected by copyrightonly so long as it is original. Aware that such originalityof expression was required, the defendant strove in
vain to demonstrate how the second volume of the
hairdresser’s handbook was “in no way original.” Thedefendant argued that the material inspiring its own
book, extracted from the plaintiff’s work, was too banalfor claims of infringement to be founded – that the pointsof resemblance between the two works pertained toelements not eligible for copyright protection and thedifferences sufficed to rule out infringement. Sweeping
this line of argument aside, the judge concluded that thepages reproduced represented an arbitrary choice by
their author, setting them apart from the “prior publicdomain.” The various chapters, titles and paragraphs,
and especially the approach taken to customer relationsin the second volume of his handbook, reflected free

22
23
24

M. Vivant and J.M. Bruguiere (2009) Droit d’auteur. Paris: Dalloz, 161.
Cass. civ., May 27, 1942, S. 1942.1.124.
A. Lucas and H.-J. Lucas (2001) Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique, 2ndedn. Paris: Litec, 33.

Having deemed the form reproduced to be original,
the judge went on – as if recalling the need to do so – toobserve the absence of prior consent from the author
to publish the infringing work: “Inasmuch as [thedefendant] brings no proof that it obtained the plaintiff’s
authorization in this regard, it can be reliably said andruled that the reproduction is unlawful and thus opens
up a right to redress for the plaintiff.”
B. Irrelevance of the quantitative extent of the
reproduced elements
In comparative law, article L.335(3) of the FrenchIntellectual Property Code defines infringement as the“reproduction, representation or dissemination by anymeans of a work of the mind in violation of copyright.” It isthus intended for cases where all or part of a literary work
is reproduced without authorization from its author.
In the case examined here, the judge was at pains
to emphasize the partial character of the illicit
reproductions, starting with a minute examinationof resemblances between the two works: chapters,headings, titles and approach to customer relations.
Numerous paragraphs from Mr. Broyo’s work were foundto have been transposed verbatim and in extenso in theunauthorized copy.
Not stopping there, the judge went on to weigh thedifferences between the two works, while carefully
avoiding those found in their respective summaries,
omitting mention too of the unauthorized handbook’s
successful registration with BURIDA. To guard
against impunity for pillaging the work – something
a potential infringer might achieve by rewriting
the copy in minor ways – the judge focused on the
intrigue of spatiotemporal transposition to declare thesubsequent work an infringement, victimizing the prior
work’s author.25
After comparing the two works, the judge concluded thatthe defendant’s work was indeed a partial reproductionof the plaintiff’s second volume.
Aristide Fade

C. Copyright – Original work – Proof oforiginality – Need for trial judges tostate the grounds for their decisions
Trial judges must ground their decisions in arguments
of fact and law, facilitating judicial review by appeal
courts as much as possible. They may not simply infer
infringement from the unauthorized commercial
exploitation of a photograph without ascertaining its
originality, as in the first case reviewed.

25

TGI Paris, December 6, 1989, Cah. dr. auteur 1990, May–July, 21.

The court in the second case too can be criticized forfinding, without stating the grounds for its decision, thata service provider that has designed an internet site canclaim to hold copyright to the site’s hidden components,
including the source code, object code, algorithms,
programs or other technical descriptions, data structuresand database content.
First case
SONITEL V. THE KYBIA AGENCY, Judgment No. 15-040/
Civ of April 21, 2005, Supreme Court of Niger
Second case
SOCIETE DE GALVANISATION DE TOLES EN COTED’IVOIRE SA (TÔLES IVOIRE) C/ SOCIETE FOCUS
BUILDING & CONSULTING SARL, Judgment No. 1561/2013
of November 7, 2013, Commercial Court of Abidjan
Observations:
The Supreme Court of Niger did not furnish a factual basis
for appraising the merits of arguments made against it – afailing that incurred censure from the Court of Appeal of
Niamey. The firm Société Nigérienne de Télécommunication(SONITEL), a pioneering national telecommunications
operator, hired the agency Iman, presumably for anadvertising campaign, and Iman used a photograph, therights to which belonged to another agency, Kybia. The
Court of Appeal found infringement and ordered SONITEL
to pay Kybia CFAF 5 million in damages. The Supreme Court
quashed that judgment for insufficient grounds.
Without dwelling on the ways in which the defendantcompany justified its exploitation of the work, arguingthat it had legitimately acquired the rights to do so,
suffice it to say here that the court dismissed its plea,such rights conferring no dispensation for the assignee
from respecting the author’s right to be identified assuch (see the second comment on this decision below).
By way of grounds for its decision, the Court of Appeal
stated: “[It] is well established and not in disputethat SONITEL and Iman commercially exploited thephotograph at issue without prior authorization from
Kybia, profiting monetarily by doing so – and also violating
both article 28 of Ordinance Nos. 93–27 of March 30,
1993, in respect of copyright in Niger, and annex VII of therevised Bangui Agreement (ABR), establishing the OAPI.”
Seeking to have the decision quashed, the appellant
found fault with the summary character of these grounds.
Attempting to salvage them, the respondent described
the Court of Appeal’s solution as based on “careful analysisof the arguments advanced by the parties on substance,
including summons and statements of facts served by acourt bailiff which shall be considered authoritative until
proven otherwise” – but to no avail: the Supreme Court,
citing article 2(2) of Law No. 2004-50 of July 22, 2004, onorganization of the judiciary in the Republic of the Niger,
recalled that “the obligation to explain the reasons forjudicial rulings requires judges to found their decisions
on arguments of fact and law, ascertainable upon firstreading, so as to facilitate subsequent judicial review
as much as possible.” That condition had not been met,
according to the Supreme Court, in this case on appeal.

Chapter 6 – Copyrightchoices by the author and, by extension, sufficiently
distanced his work from that entitled African-Caribbean
Hairdressing, second edition.

109

The clarification is welcome. The obligation to explain
the reasons for judgments and rulings, as the court
noted, stems from the need for effective judicial
review. In civil law matters, however, that is not the
obligation’s only purpose. The French Court of Cassation
has characterized it as: (i) a requirement that “judges
perform legal reasoning, examining the law and the facts
each in light of the other”; (ii) “a guarantee for litigants
that their pleas and arguments have been seriously andfairly considered”; and (iii) “a rampart against arbitrary
and partial judges.” 26 All of this makes it “an essential
rule permitting verification as to whether a judge hasapplied the law correctly, consistent with the principles
guiding the trial.” Among the conclusions drawn fromthis reasoning, French courts have found, as one
example, that recognition of a foreign decision for which
the grounds have not been stated nor documentary
evidence furnished is contrary to international public
policy on legal procedure.27 In the present case, it wasincumbent on the trial judges not only to characterize
the originality of the photograph at issue but also toverify eligibility for the protection claimed and indicate
precisely how that right was infringed.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

The court’s clarification remains extremely general andhence is unclear for commentary purposes. It likely
concerns whether copyright protection exists – whichis affirmed rather than demonstrated – not whether
wrongful exploitation occurred. From this point ofview, the decision to quash the judgment should beunderstood as obliging the trial court to clearly assess
the originality of the work allegedly infringed. The
reminder is apt: courts frequently assume the originalityof a work when the maxim actori incumbit probatio
prescribes that it is incumbent on the plaintiff alleging
infringement to demonstrate the work’s eligibility for
copyright protection. The originality of a photograph,moreover, is often debatable and is often denied in the
courts. In France, for instance, photographs are eligible
for protection only if they faithfully represent an object,28
a place,29 an animal,30 a model 31 or an event.32 The French
Court of Cassation has been particularly strict in suchcases in requiring trial judges to explain their reasoning
as to originality.33

110

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Cour de Cassation, Rapport 2010 de la cour de cassation. Paris: La
documentation française, §1.2.2.1.1.
Cass. 1ère civ., November 28, 2006, No. 4-19.031.
CA Aix, Second Chamber, January 20, 2004, Comm. com. électr. 2004, comm. 37,
1ère esp. (note C. Caron).
TGI Nanterre, First Chamber, May 18, 1994, Gaz. Pal. 1997, 2, summary 506,1ère esp.
CA Paris, 25th Chamber, November 5, 1991, JurisData No. 1991-024063.
CA Paris, Fourth Chamber, October 15, 2004, JurisData No. 2004-251871.
Cass. 1ère civ., February 3, 2004, No. 2-11.400, Propr. intell. 2004, 630, 2èmeesp. (obs. A. Lucas), and 633, 1ère esp. (obs. P. Sirinelli).
Cass. 1ère civ., December 10, 2014, No. 10-10.923, RIDA 2015, 2, 367:
“Considering that to find the company Jeca liable for artistic infringement
and prohibit it from using the photograph at issue, the impugned judgment
held that the photograph, representing a round and a trapezoid-shaped paté,labeled mousserelle and elaborately composed against a carefully arranged
background, was clearly original in character; and that in so concluding,
based on reasoning inadequate to characterize how the photograph bore theimprint of the author’s personality, the Court of Appeal did not provide a legal
basis for its decision.”

The need to explain reasoning as to originality does nothold true for photographs alone, as shown in this second
reported case under this heading, a judgment of theCommercial Court of Abidjan concerning an internet site.
The facts in this case are paradigmatic. A company
retained a consulting firm in connection with a “strategic
program” that included the development of an internet
site. Considering that the firm had “entirely consumed”
its approved budget for the year, the company
terminated the contract and requested a meeting tosettle related practical matters, which included thefirm turning over the site’s access code. When the firm
refused, the company refused in turn to pay the firm’s
final invoice, producing a stalemate. The company
considered the firm’s refusal unfounded, since thecompany now “owned” the site, having financed it.
The consulting firm responded that, as author of thesite, it was sole owner of the accompanying copyright,
giving it the authority to freely decide whether or not tomake related disclosures, including of the access codes.
As a client, it said, the company was entitled only “touse the site, there being no clause assigning intellectual
property rights.”
The court ruled in favor of the consulting firm. The
reasoning of the Commercial Court was sound but
completely disregarded the issue of originality – thefocus of attention here. The court began by recalling theprinciple that “when a company assigns to an external
provider the design of its internet site or the creationof site content, the provider owns the associated IP
rights unless otherwise agreed in a written contract.”
The court went on to say, however, that the site’s accesscode, which was merely a “password,” was not coveredby the protection afforded, leaving it normally up to theprovider to furnish it to the client upon completion of
the work. The client, meanwhile, was obliged to honor
its own commitments and it had not done so, having
failed to pay an amount owed. The consulting firm wasthus justified in exercising its right to hold as security its
debtor’s movable assets, including incorporeal ones suchas the site’s access code.
We shall not dwell on the interesting civil law question
raised: whether the right of lien provided for inarticle 67 of the Uniform Act Organizing Securities of theOrganization for the Harmonization of Business Law inAfrica (OHADA) can be exercised in respect of incorporeal
movable assets, possibly including an access code. We
shall speak only of the copyright-related aspects.
We cannot but endorse the premise that copyright to“works made for hire” does not convey automatically tothe hiring party. The plaintiff erred from that standpointin characterizing the issue as one of “service delivery
as opposed to a work of the mind,” which removed
copyright from the discussion. Also escaping discussion
was the affirmation that an access code, which is not awork of the mind, cannot give rise to copyright. The court
surprisingly seemed to take as given that an internet site
as such is a work eligible for protection; it is not, unless

The omission is all the more regrettable given the
judgment’s wide protective effect, attributing to theprovider “copyright to hidden components of the site,
including the source code, object code, algorithms,
programs or other technical descriptions, data structuresand database content.” But this conclusion is flawed.
It is widely accepted in particular that algorithms are
not eligible for copyright protection 34 and that only the
structure of databases, exclusive of their “content,” cangive rise to copyright.35
André Lucas

D. Copyright – Ownership of rights –Multiple works – Outside contributions
to the work – No exclusive authorship
The role played in editing the manuscript by a person
entrusted with the publication of a work on ritual crimes
cannot be used as an argument to claim exclusive
authorship of the final work.
EBANG ONDO ELVIS V. MINKO MVE BERNADIN,
Judgment No. 192/10-11 of March 9, 2011, Court of First
Instance of LibrevilleObservations:This judgment of the Libreville Court of First Instance,
while not without its flaws, offers an overview ofsuch essential concepts as author, collaborative work,collective work and derivative work.
Facts: After the death of his son, victim to a ritual crime,
the plaintiff created an association to raise public andgovernment awareness of such atrocities in Gabon.
The association organized numerous conferences androundtables, collecting data in the process for use
in a “manifesto.” The defendant was entrusted withediting this work, for which he received payment of
CFAF 800,000. However, he then published under his
own name, with L’Harmattan, a work entitled Manifesto
against Ritual Crimes in Gabon.
Sued for infringement by the association’s founder, thedefendant claimed authorship of this work, underscoring
his role in preparing the manuscript, correcting it
extensively, and traveling multiple times between
Libreville and Paris. He claimed that the plaintiff had
34

35

See C-406/10, SAS Institute Inc. v. World Programming Ltd, Judgment of the
Court (Grand Chamber), of May 2, 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:259, RIDA 2012, 3, 341
and 181 (obs. P. Sirinelli), Comm. com. électr. 2012, comm. 105 (note C. Caron),
D. 2012, 2836 (obs. P. Sirinelli), Propr. intell. 2012, 423 (obs. V.-L. Benabou),
RTD com. 2012, 536 (obs. F. Pollaud-Dulian, who says, at [32], that, “consistent
with the principle that only the expression of a computer program is protectedby copyright; the ideas and principles underlying the logic, algorithms andprogramming languages are not protected by virtue of this Directive”).
See art. 3(2) of Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of theCouncil of March 11, 1996, on the legal protection of databases, OJ L 77/20,
which specifies that such protection “does not cover their content.”“contributed nothing to the drafting and finalization” of
the work.
He did not convince the Libreville trial court, which ruled
against him, reasoning as follows.
Reasoning: Article 4 of annex VII to AB-1977 provides
that copyright protection is acquired as of “thecreation of the work even if the work is not fixed on amaterial medium.” It was not in dispute that the “ideafor the manifesto” came from the plaintiff or that theplaintiff communicated extensive documentation
to the defendant, consisting of statements made atnumerous conferences and roundtables organized by
the association and many of the plaintiff’s own writings.
Thus, the court said:“[E]ven if considered a collective work, as arguedby the defendant, that does not allow thedefendant to claim authorship of the Manifesto
against Ritual Crimes in Gabon, of which he was
not the ‘initiator’. This is particularly true since,
while he contributed ‘much of his own flavor’ tothe final work – considering that in purely formal
terms he altered (the plaintiff’s) somewhat naïve,mystical-religious style – there are substantive
similarities between the plaintiff’s personal
writings and the Manifesto in terms of content andquestions addressed.”
The work was therefore to be considered that of theassociation’s president, who was to be granted his“requests to stop dissemination of the work in its current
form under the (defendant’s) name and withdraw itfrom sale.”
The judgment is praiseworthy in refusing to make thedefendant the exclusive author of the work at issue. No
such claim was reasonable once it was established thatthe work had arisen from documentation furnishedby the plaintiff, including his own personal writings.
The claim also clashed with the defendant’s own
characterization of the work as collective, since initialownership of the rights would then be attributed to theperson (natural or legal) having initiated – rather thanthose having contributed to – the collective work.

Chapter 6 – Copyright

it fulfills the originality requirement – a conclusion thatis not evident here. The trial judges should have verified
this point.

It is difficult to follow the court, however, on theother points it addressed and it is regrettable that theopportunity was missed to comment instructively on theownership of rights to collective works.
The work in this case was indeed collective; contrary
to the court’s ruling, the defendant’s contribution to
the final work could not be dismissed. It would clearlybe contradictory to attribute exclusive authorship to
the plaintiff while at the same time admitting that thedefendant contributed “much of his own flavor.” Such anobservation should have ruled out the idea of the work
having a single author.
But the status of this collective work must still
be determined.
111

Before finally recognizing the plaintiff’s authorship as
exclusive, the court did not reject the characterization of
the work as collective, drawing explicitly on the definitionin article 25 of annex VII to AB-1977 in dismissing thedefendant’s claim of authorship. That provision, now
incorporated in ABR-2015 as article 1 of annex VII,
defines the term “collective work” as a:“… work created at the initiative of a naturalor legal person who discloses it under his
direction and name and in which the individual
contributions of the various authors participating
in its creation merge in the whole for which it was
created so that it is impossible to attribute to eachof them a separate right in the whole work once
completed.”
The court deduced from this provision that “a work, evena collective one, must be issued under the direction
and name of its initiator,” from which it inferred thatthe defendant, who in no way claimed that the idea
for the “manifesto” was his and who even recognized
explicitly that it was the plaintiff’s, could not claim to berecognized as its author.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

This reasoning calls for two observations. First, it is built
on the premise that the initiator of the collective work
was necessarily the plaintiff, because he had the idea
first; it would have been perfectly possible, however, toconsider the association that the plaintiff represented
the initial right holder, spoiling the court’s conclusion.

112

The second, more important, observation is thatthe characterization of the work as a collective one
warranted more extensive debate. The definition cited
above is very closely based on that in article L.113(2)(3)of the French Intellectual Property Code, which defines
a collective work as “a work created on the initiative ofa natural or legal person, published and disseminatedunder that person’s name and direction, and in which
the individual contributions of several authors blend
together as a whole, as envisioned when first conceived,
without it being possible to attribute to each a distinct
right to the entire work.” This definition assumes
multiple contributions, a condition met in this case, butalso “direction” by the initiator of the creative process.
It is often said that collective works entail a hierarchicalrelationship between initiator and contributors. It is
not apparent from the facts set out in the judgment,
however, that the defendant received any direction at allabout the work’s content.
This absence of hierarchy suggests a collaborative effort,
which would mean indivisible ownership by the plaintiff
and defendant. Such a work of joint authorship is definedin article 1 of annex VII to ABR-2015 as “a work in whose
creation two or more authors have collaborated” – averbatim transposition of article L.113(2)(1) of the FrenchIntellectual Property Code. Examining how that provision
has traditionally been interpreted in French case law – alogical step given the textual provenance – it appears
that the definition implies genuine collaboration among

the co-authors.36 It would thus be entirely appropriate toconclude that the second co-author in this case did not in
any way collaborate with the first.
Upon reflection, the situation here brings to mind
the concept of a “composite” work, which is definedin article 1 of annex VII as “a new work in whicha preexisting work is incorporated without thecollaboration of the author of the latter” – a definition
taken word for word from article L.113(2)(2) of theFrench Intellectual Property Code. It would be fine, in
our view, to characterize the work as “derivative,” aneasier term to grasp. Reference is sometimes made tomultiple successive authors,37 where the contribution of
the second author, if there are two, adapts, completes
or corrects that of the first. In the case of the work at
issue, the defendant not only made corrections but
also, as indicated above, contributed “much of his own
flavor,” which means that he contributed significantly
to the form taken by the final work. It would therefore
have been logical to recognize his authorship of what
can be considered a derivative work.
That does not mean, however, that the plaintiff’s claim
was completely unfounded. Indeed, the consequencesof characterizing the work as composite (or derivative)
are indicated in article 5 of annex VII, which provides
that protection for composite works “shall not affectthe protection of existing works used in the makingof such works.” In concrete terms, the author of thesecond work acquires copyright but can exploit it onlywith authorization from the author of the first. In thiscase, such authorization would have had to come fromthe plaintiff, either as author of the first work or, if thework were considered collective, as representativeof the association as copyright holder. In the absenceof such authorization, the exploitation was indeed
an infringement.
The result, one can see, is the same, but the route
whereby we reach it is quite different, taking betteraccount of the legal categories of literary andartistic property.
André Lucas

E. Copyright – Protection of apseudonym – Protection of a logo –Condition for protection: originality
To be eligible for copyright protection, any literary or
artistic work must be of prior creation and meet thecondition of originality. Pseudonyms and logos are notexceptions to this rule. Borrowing from the subjective
conception of originality, the judge requires that thesecreations reflect the imprint of the personality of
their author.

36
37

A. Lucas, A. Lucas-Schloetter and C. Bernault (2017) Traité de la propriété
littéraire et artistique, 5th edn. Paris: LexisNexis, No. 189 and the references
cited.
Ibid., No. 229.

Observations:
In essence, copyright boils down to a set of subjective
prerogatives enjoyed by the authors of protected
works, irrespective of their means of expression, value
or intended audience. A work must meet the conditionof originality, the “cornerstone of copyright,” or elsebe excluded from protection.38 Borrowing from the
French Court of Cassation, which has often been prompt
in recalling this established principle,39 this unusual
judgment issued by the Supreme Court of Côte d’Ivoire
gives further shape to this conceptual approach.
Facts: The case concerned a dispute between Mr. Toure,
the appellant, and the company SICOA. Mr. Toureseems to have created a clownish character withspecial attributes and a specific image, as which heappeared under the pseudonym “T.B’’ in the context ofanimated children’s programs, such as Wozo Vacancesand Ahouaney. After a decade of performing as thatcharacter, Mr. Toure claimed credit for the clownish
image and pseudonym “Bouba,” which SICOA was thenusing, without the creator’s consent, as a logo to market
its baby pacifiers. Considering that he had suffered injury
from commercial use of his creations, Mr. Toure broughta suit for damages before the Abidjan trial court for the
logo’s infringement of his copyright.
Dismissed by the trial judge, Mr. Toure took his claims– again without success – to the Court of Appeal of
Abidjan. The appeal court, appropriately, took theopportunity to recall that a work’s originality is the
keystone of copyright protection. In other words, to beprotected by copyright, a creation must above all be an
original work, defined here in the sense of article 10 ofCôte d’Ivoire’s Law No. 96-564 of July 26, 1996, on theprotection of intellectual works and on copyright for
authors, performers and producers of phonograms andvideograms – that is, as a work whose author can be
individually identified.
Dissatisfied with this decision and as a last resort,
Mr. Toure appealed to the Supreme Court ofCôte d’Ivoire.
Reasoning: Ruling to settle the dispute, the court
affirmed the appeal court’s reasoning, taking akeenly subjective approach to defining the concept oforiginality. It is thus essential to revisit the fluid contoursof that concept, as the nerve center of copyrightprotection (section I), before looking more closely at thedecision (section II).

38
39

Vivant and Bruguiere, n. 22, at 160.
See Babolat v. Pachot, March 7, 1986, Cass. ass. plén.; M. Vivant (ed.) (2003) Les
grands arrêts de la propriété intellectuelle. Paris: Dalloz, No. 9; Comm. MaffreBaugé, D. 1986, 405; Concl. Cabannes (note B. Edelman), JCP E 1986, II.

I. The ambiguous contours of the originality concept
Originality is a fundamental criterion distinguishing
literary and artistic, as well as industrial, property.
It cannot be simply defined and hence originality
has become a variable concept. We can note –without stirring controversy, given its scatteredinterpretations – that the lawmakers of Côte d’Ivoire,faithful to their personalist convictions, provided thefollowing definition in article 10 of the law invokedby the appellant: “An original work is a work whosecharacteristic features and form, or form alone, allow
its author to be individually identified.”
The crux of the present case lay in defining the conceptof originality – the key to copyright protection. The
Supreme Court was called upon to go beyond thecombative rhetoric of doctrinal controversy and makea decisive choice between the predominant conceptual
approaches being taken in contemporary case law (A).
While at first glance it seems to have taken a subjective
approach, the court’s reasoning ultimately betrays its –possibly unconscious – objectivity (B).
A. The doctrinal dispute over originality
The earliest, revolutionary, legislative texts made noreferences, even veiled, to originality.40 The concept
was to be constructed discreetly over the years throughjudicial precedent.
Throughout the 19th and part of the 20th centuries, a work
was deemed original, on its face, if not the reproductionof a prior work.41 As P.-Y. Gautier put it, the concept oforiginality could “better be delineated in contrast with
its antonym, banality,” so that in practice it became
synonymous with “novelty.” 42 On this basis, copyright
was quickly denied for a drawing on the grounds that its
composition was banal and commonplace.43 Yet this is toignore the more subjective theories of those following
Desbois, who offered an example: two painters depict
on their canvases, one after the other, the same place,from the same perspective and under the same light
conditions. Both, he says, have created original paintings,
but the second is objectively not new if we imagine
artistic creation to be nothing more than a work imitating
nature and the second painting thus to be nothing morethan reproduction of an earlier creation.44

Chapter 6 – Copyright

TOURE, A. V. SICOA, Judgment No. 598 of December 8,
2005, Supreme Court of Côte d’Ivoire

Yet that second painting is indeed entirely novel
according to article 10 of the law cited in the present
case, which approaches originality from a subjective,or personalist, perspective. Desbois puts it simply:“To be eligible for copyright it suffices for a work to beoriginal; it need not be objectively new.” 45 For disciplesof the personalist school, a work is protected because
the author is present within it: originality is subjective.
40
41
42
43
44
45

Vivant and Bruguiere, n. 22.
See T. civ. Mayenne, May 31, 1935.
P.-Y. Gautier (2007) Propriété littéraire et artistique (Droit fundamental). Paris:
PUF, No. 35.
See Cass. civ., May 27, 1942, S. 1942, I, 124.
H. Desbois (1978) Le droit d’auteur en France, 3rd edn. Paris: Dalloz.
Ibid.
113

The work is a “projection of its author”; the work is theauthor.46 In this vein, originality is commonly said to be
the very stamp of an author’s soul. For M. Tafforeau,
then, originality consists of the author’s personal style.47
Ownership thus stems from an indivisibility between
subject and object.
Poorly adapted to applied art, the dogma of subjective
theory rapidly gave way to new, more legally pragmatic,
paradigms. Admittedly, most courts continue to echo a
subjective conception of originality. But alongside that
formula, reference is now being made to the imprint,
reflection or stamp of the artist’s personality. Goingfurther, some judges have cited artistic merit as though
it were a criterion indicative of originality.48 The caselaw has also begun to evidence substitution of the moreobjective concept of intellectual contribution for that oforiginality, particularly in cases of copyright protection
for utilitarian works (maps, diagrams, databases, etc.),
protection of which the personalist doctrine alone cannot
justify. The stance taken on the originality concept by
the country’s highest court thus needs to be viewed incontext among these often-entrenched different schoolsof thought.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

B. The judge’s application of the originality concept
Against this doctrinal and case law backdrop, theAbidjan trial court and, later, the Supreme Court werecalled upon to take positions on the substance of theoriginality concept. Basing their decisions on articles 6(3)and 10 of Law No. 96-564, both courts leaned, albeit
tacitly, toward the personalist approach – or at least,
rarely strayed far from it, the Supreme Court reasoningthat “none of the characteristic features of the work at
issue serve to individualize the appellant.” Rather thanreciting dogma about the original work bearing theimprint of its author’s personality, the Supreme Court
settled on a blunt formula that is open to criticism. Its
reasoning could have been clearer had it used accepted
terminology. Instead, for example, the Supreme Court
said that “Mr. Toure could not be considered … theinventor of the clownish character.”

114

In any case, extending its personalist approach to thequestion of protection for the pseudonym and logo, thecourt denied the appellant’s request.
II. Denial of protection
Having opted for the subjective approach, the Supreme
Court upheld the judgment of the Court of Appeal,
thereby denying Mr. Toure protection for the creations heclaimed. In denying compensation (A), the judge barely
conceals their confusion of protection with ownership ofrights (B).

46
47

48

Vivant, n. 22, at 162.
P. Tafforeau (1995) Le style musical dans le doit de la propriété littéraire etartistique. In University of Paris-Sorbonne (ed.) Musique et style. Méthodes etconcepts (Conférences et séminaires). Paris: Observatoire musical française,
No. 3, 50–55.
Gautier, n. 42, No. 50: “Sous l’originalité, le mérite.”

A. Denial of compensation
The recognition of protection centres on two conditions:that a creation be deemed a “work,” and that the work bedeemed original.
Did the creations claimed by Mr. Toure meet thedefinition of a “work of the mind”? The judge answered
this question indirectly. In denying the appellant’s claim
for compensation on the grounds that his creations
lacked originality, the court implicitly recognized thepseudonym and the clown image as works.
The next step was thus to appraise the works’ originality.
Both the appeal court and the Supreme Court addressed
this question. The Supreme Court decided that thecreations lacked originality, understood in its subjective
sense. In other words, it held that creation of the
predominant characteristic features of the works at issue
could not be attributed to the appellant.
The court can be commended for first identifying thosefeatures characteristic of both the pseudonym andthe image. In its analysis, however, the court went on
to conclude that the prior and widespread use in Côte
d’Ivoire of the nickname “Bouba,” the name used forthe animated character in the case, precludes its being
original. In so reasoning, the Court fundamentallyconfused two different conceptions of the term “original.”
According to one, an original work must be pre-existing– that is, such that another work can be “derived” from it.
But, according to another, a derived work is as eligible forprotection as an original if the intellectual contribution
made by the derived work’s author is itself “original,”
defined subjectively. According to this second meaning,a work may be original, despite its apparent banality,
if it is so difficult to disassociate from its author that it
has become bound up with the author’s personality.
This is illustrated by the second painting in the example
given by Desbois. From that standpoint, the court foundthat the “Bouba” character and image could not bear
Mr. Toure’s unique personal imprint.
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court’s decision todeny the appellant protection reached beyond simple
statement, the court explaining it with objective
paradigms. But in doing so the court defined originality
contrary to instructions from the country’s legislators.
For the court, a work bearing the imprint of its author’s
personality, in the sense of article 10 of the law cited on
appeal, is a new work that is not banal. This was not thelegislators’ intention.
It must be acknowledged that the conflation at play inthis definition is similarly found often in the literature.
For many years, authors have likened novelty tooriginality. Already resigned to this tendency in his own
time, P.-Y. Gautier said, “Too bad! Let’s just say it: inpractice these two concepts (originality and novelty) arevirtually the same.” 49 But the judge’s choice here is oneof convenience; as mouthpiece for the law, the judge
should have simply applied the legislators’ choice. Since
49

Ibid, No. 35.

B. Confusion between protection and ownership
On this point, the court was misguided in denying
compensation on the supposed grounds that Mr. Toure
did not create the works at issue. In a key preambularparagraph, the court said that “the result of combining
these two articles is to make works of the mind eligible
for intellectual property protection only if they are
original” and that, “in this case, Mr. Toure did not
originate the pseudonym, which does not refer to anyone
in particular, being commonplace and widely used.”This reasoning suggests the judge’s confusion of a claim
for protection and a claim for ownership of rights – adistinction that calls for brief exploration of the moment
at which a work is deemed to have been created.
That moment is when an author follows up their idea
for a work with its expression, even if that expression isincomplete. Article 7(3) of Cameroon’s Law No. 2000/11
of December 19, 2000, regarding copyright and related
rights, provides: “The work shall be deemed to becreated independently of any disclosure, solely from thepersonal though incomplete realization of the design,
even where such design is incomplete.” More plainly,
a work is considered to have been created the instantit takes material form, regardless of the medium, its
artistic value or the intended audience. The creator or
author is the original owner of rights to that work.
Identifying the creator of the pseudonym “Bouba”
in Côte d’Ivoire is thus unrelated to the granting ofprotection – a truth the court seemed to ignore in thepresent case. It affirmed first that Mr. Toure did not
create the pseudonym or, worse still, “invent” the clown
image the respondent used as its logo. This justification
for dismissing Mr. Toure’s claim for compensation has
rather serious consequences, based as it is on concepts
alien to literary and artistic property law. The concept of“inventor” is inextricable from patent law; it refers to theowner of rights to an invention protected by patent. The
equivalent term in copyright law is “author”; that is, theowner of copyright protection.
The least that can be said about this is that authorship,
as highlighted in the court’s reasoning, is relevant only
to the dispute on ownership of the rights and not toprotection, which was the issue before the court. Indeed,
any works at issue may well be eligible for protection
regardless of whether or not a plaintiff is their creator.
And yet, on the question of whether the creations in
the present case were eligible for protection, the court
responded in the negative on the grounds that the
animator, Mr. Toure, created neither the character nor
the pseudonym. The consequences of this combinationof errors are regrettable: the Supreme Court closed thecase and denied a claim that, if considered differently,
might have been deemed well founded.
Aristide Fade

F. Copyright – Broadcast of acommercial incorporating a musicalwork – Equitable remuneration fora collective rights management
organization – Inadmissibility of action
brought individually by the author
The author of a musical work that has been used to
produce a radio commercial does not have standing
to bring action against the advertiser, inasmuch as the
remuneration owed for that use is equitable underarticle 68 of the Copyright Act of Benin and can berecovered only by the legally designated collective rights
management organization.
ISAAC TOHODE V. PHIBAUT AMOUZOUN, Judgment
No. 17/18/CJ/SII/TCC of May 3, 2018, Commercial Courtof Cotonou
Observations:This judgment leaves an observer of these cases lessthan satisfied. The Commercial Court of Cotonou seizedon an objection to admissibility to bar action brought by
the author of a musical composition, missing the chance
to examine other, possibly problematic, legal questionsin the case.
Facts: The plaintiff presented himself as an “artist,composer, singer and arranger.” One of his works(one of ten on a phonogram album) was used – underconditions not fully clear from the decision – to produce
a commercial aired for several months by a number ofradio stations. The author then sued the advertiser fordamages in the amount of CFAF 75 million. The action
was declared inadmissible on the grounds that it was for
the Benin copyright office, the Copyright Office of Benin(Bureau béninois du droit d’auteur, or BUBEDRA), torecover remuneration owed for use of the phonogram.
Reasoning: The court’s questionable solution is basedon a provision not applicable to the case: article 68 of the
Copyright Act of Benin. The court’s position is regrettablein that, while this objection was not relevant (section I),
other objections did warrant, but did not receive,attention (section II).

Chapter 6 – Copyrightthe “novelty” concept sits within the objectivist school ofthought, the judge’s reasoning is thus contrary to the law
in Côte d’Ivoire.

I. The objection upheld, based on article 68 of the
Copyright Act
According to the defendant, “any amount receivableby the author of a work for its use in advertising iscollected from the collective management commission,
which receives a single equitable remuneration fromthe phonogram user.” This assertion derives implicitlyfrom the legal licensing system set out in article 60 ofannex VII to the Bangui Agreement and article 68 of
Law No. 2005-30 of April 5, 2006, concerning protectionof copyright and related rights in the Republic of Benin.
Under the latter provision, the performer and producerof a commercially published phonogram assign their
exclusive rights to a collective rights management
organization in exchange for “fair remuneration.”
115

The Commercial Court examined the argument
solely from the standpoint of the Beninese law. Afterestablishing the principle that “when a phonogramis published for commercial purposes, remuneration
is paid by the user to the public establishment forcollective management and defense of copyright andrelated rights,” the court concluded that, in this case,
BUBEDRA was exclusively “eligible to seek the recoveryof royalties for holders of copyright and related rights,”
such that artists and musicians could not “recover such
remuneration directly from users.”
The argument is not convincing.
To begin with, the court’s reading of article 68 of thenational law applied is erroneous. Contrary to its
preambular grounds (as restated in its dispositive
conclusions), it is not “publication” of the phonogram that
infringes the exclusive rights of the phonogram’s artist
or performer and producer, opening the way for fair
remuneration, but its being broadcast or communicatedto the public.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Nonetheless, to generate royalties, publication would
still need to have been “for commercial purposes,” which
was not as certain in this case as the court seemed tothink. As best one can judge from reading the decision,
what radio stations broadcast was not the phonogram
as a whole, which was an album of the artist’s works(a phonogram indeed published for commercial
purposes), but only one of the works included on it (apiece entitled “Evolution”), which, before being fixed
on that phonogram and at the time it was used in thecommercial, had already been performed publicly
several times. It might be tempting to argue that thework at issue was in fact first “fixed” by the commercial
itself. There is no doubt that the phonogram had not yet
been published, which traditionally means producing
multiple “copies.” 50 But what must be understood isthat the legal license for which equitable remuneration
is exchanged is intended to free broadcasters from theconstraints of exclusive rights when they air previously
commercialized phonograms.

116

Lastly, and above all, the only exclusive rights that could
have been infringed in this case would be the related
rights of performers and producers of the phonogram.
The plaintiff claimed authorship, having stated in
his written submissions “that as author of the song
‘Evolution’, he is eligible to assert his claim of ownershipto it in court and has an interest in doing so,” rendering
article 68 irrelevant to his authorship claim.51
II. Other possible objections
Other objections could have been – and, in some cases,
were – raised against the plaintiff author.

The defendant indicated that another well-known
composer had participated in creating the work and,to establish his co-authorship, had opposed theplaintiff’s deposit of the work with BUBEDRA, triggering
conciliation proceedings that made the plaintiff’s action
for infringement inadmissible pending their conclusion.
In doing so, the defendant implicitly refers to articles 86
and 87 of the national law. Article 86 provides that “[a]ny dispute arising from the enforcement of contracts
for reproduction, publication or public performance ofliterary and artistic works and creations protected byneighboring rights shall be referred to the collective
management organization for attempted conciliation.”
Article 87 provides that “[i]n the event of failure ofsuch conciliation, the parties shall have the right torefer the case to the competent court, either directlyor through the collective management organization.”
This case, however, does not line up with the hypothesis
set out under Law No. 2005-30. The particular point
here concerned a dispute between two authors as
to authorship of a work deposited with a collective
rights management organization – not execution of an
exploitation contract. The plaintiff rightly refuted theobjection, arguing that BUBEDRA was “not a court andcannot perform any judicial act” and that submission
to that body of “a dispute regarding authorship of thesegment ‘Evolution’ did not constitute a preliminary pointof law.”
The defendant also pleaded inadmissibility on
grounds that the plaintiff had not demonstrated“exclusive authorship” of the musical composition atissue – an argument suggesting that a joint author ofa collaborative work may not individually bring legal
action for infringement. That argument finds support
in article 33(4) of annex VII to the Bangui Agreement,
which lays down the principle that “the joint authors shall
exercise their rights by mutual agreement.” It is truethat this provision does not expressly refer to mattersof judicial action. In France, early case law admitted thepossibility of a co-author taking action alone.52 But in1988 the Court of Cassation did not hesitate to prescribethat “the co-author of a collaborative work who takes
the initiative in legal action to defend her ownershiprights must involve the work’s other authors, subject
otherwise to inadmissibility.” 53 This line of case law has
been criticized, however, in the literature,54 for it painfullycomplicates effective legal action against infringement.
It is therefore less than desirable for article 33(4) ofannex VII to be so interpreted.
One last objection comes to mind, concerning theimplications of the plaintiff author’s affiliation withcollective rights management organization BUBEDRA.
That point would be decisive in France, where the Courtof Cassation caused a stir by first admitting an action
52

50
51

See art. 3(d) of the Rome Convention of October 26, 1961, for the Protectionof Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations;art. 2(e) of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty of 1996.
See L.Y. Ngombé, Chronique d’Afrique: août 2016–décembre 2018. RIDA 2019,
1, 61–138, esp. 107.

53
54

Cass. civ., July 21, 1908, S. 1909, 1, 121 (note CH-L. Lyon-Caen); CA Paris,
November 3, 1956, Gaz. Pal. 1956, 2, 324.
Cass. 1ère civ., October 4, 1988, No. 86-19.272, RIDA 1989, 3, 251, D. 1989, 482(note P.-Y. Gautier). See also Cass. 1ère civ., February 8, 2017, No. 15-26.133.
Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault, n.36, No. 199; P.-Y. Gautier (2019)
Propriété littéraire et artistique (Droit fundamental), 11th edn. Paris: PUF,
Nos. 703 and 765.

The situation is quite different, however, in OAPI member
states. Indeed, article 69 of annex VII, after attributing
to collective rights management organizations themission of ensuring the “protection, exploitation andmanagement of the rights of authors of works andthe rights of holders of related rights,” adds that those“provisions shall in no event prejudice the faculty enjoyedby the authors of works and their successors in title
and by the holders of related rights to assert the rights
afforded them by this annex” – a stipulation made in thesame terms in article 12(4) of the Beninese law.
André Lucas

G. Prior work – Ownership of rights –Creator of the work – Transformationof the prior work – Author’s
authorization required – Remedy for
use without authorization
The author of a literary work is the natural person
who has created it. Accordingly, any public exhibition,transformation or adaptation of the author’s creation
requires the author’s explicit prior consent, and therequest to that end must indicate the duration, modeand purpose of the intended use.
The moral rights of the author of a work, which include
the rights to be identified and to integrity of the work,
are guaranteed by law, under threat of heavy financial
penalties in instances of infringement.
MR. KLI V. MR. SJSL, Judgment of February 18, 2015, RG
326 of April 10, 2014, High Court of Ouagadougou
Observations:
The ownership of copyright to works of the mind cansometimes be nebulous, particularly where the work
has multiple authors. The arrival of financial returns– sometimes unexpected at the time of creation – cansound the death knell for any superficial harmony
among contributors and signal the start of legal jousting,55
56

Cass. 1ère civ., February 24, 1998, No. 95-22.282, Bull. civ. 1998, I, No. 75, RIDA
1998, 3, 213 (note A. Kéréver), D. 1998, 471 (note A. Françon).
Cass. 1ère civ., November 13, 2014, No. 13-22.401, Bull. civ. 2014, I, No. 187,
Comm. com. électr. 2015, comm. 2 (note C. Caron), D. 2015, 410 (noteA. Étienney-de Sainte Marie), Propr. intell. 2015, 64 (obs. J.-M. Bruguière), RTD
com. 2015, 291 (obs. F. Pollaud-Dulian).

with each downplaying the creative genius of the next toclaim sole authorship and exclusive rights to exploit thework. The moral, as well as financial, reason for this issimple: the fewer involved, the easier it is to share money
and success.57 That is the essence of the judgment
handed down by the High Court of Ouagadougou inthis case.
Facts: Mr. SJSL, a widely known motion picture director,
commissioned Mr. KLI to create a dramatic work entitled
Salomon le sage, to be staged and broadcast as part offestivities to launch the 2011–12 television season. The
elaborate creation proved a huge success and SJSL thentook the liberty, without the consent of KLI, the original
owner of exploitation rights, of making changes in theoriginal version of the work and extending its duration
beyond the period specified in the representation
contract signed on November 6, 2011. Surprised tolearn, first, that the amended version of his work had
been deposited with the Copyright Bureau of Burkina
Faso (Bureau Burkinabè du droit d’auteur, or BBDA)
and, second, that representation of the work had been
extended, KLI sought judicial remedy for the illicit
exploitation of his work.
The outcome of that judicial contest raises a question:
who can legitimately claim ownership of the rights to a
successful theatrical work?
Reasoning: After recalling a number of fundamental
principles, the judge responded to this question withreference to the Bangui Agreement, which defines“author” as “the natural person who has created a work.”
58
More helpful than the definition set out by Burkina
Faso’s legislators,59 this rule applies to every individual
work created by a single person.
Accordingly, absent the litigants’ creative contributions, thejudge applied the rule to:I.
II.

determine the single author of the work; andremedy any infringement of the rights attached tothat work.

Chapter 6 – Copyrightbrought by an author who had entrusted his rights to acollective management company,55 then spectacularly
reversing itself by declaring inadmissible action taken
individually by an author having entrusted defense of
the rights concerned to the French Society of Authors,
Composers and Publishers of Music (Société des auteurs,
compositeurs et éditeurs de musique, or SACEM), barring
only that organization’s failure to defend them itself.
56
No such failure having been alleged, the action for
infringement in this case would be declared inadmissible
in France, absent demonstration that the commercial use
at issue is not covered by the copyrights entrusted to thecollective rights management organization.

I. Determination of authorship
According to the facts set out in the case, two creations,both entitled Salomon le sage, were at the heart the
dispute. The High Court was called upon to determine
respective authorship of the original and amended
versions. The court began by identifying authorship of
the original work (A) and went on to determine whichparts of the derived work were liable to be exploited (B).
A. Authorship of the original work
The central question in assessing exploitation of thework was who owned the rights to the original version. In
answering that question, the court first had to consider
57
58
59

J. Fometeu (2018) Le contentieux du droit d’auteur et des droits voisins dansla zone OAPI, Mélanges en hommage au Doyen Stanislas Meloné. University
Press of Cameroon, at 631.
See ABR-1999, art. 1(viii) of annex VII.
See art. 26(2) of Burkina Faso’s Law No. 32-99/AN.
117

the prevailing legal context for copyright in Burkina Faso.
That context consisted largely of article 2(viii) of ABR1999, which the plaintiff cited. Under the general rule set
out in article 1(viii) of annex VII, a work’s author is thenatural person who has created it and they are free toauthorize or withhold its use.60
This begs another question: at what moment doesthat creation occur? There as well, Burkina law is lessthan helpful. Under article 4(3) of Burkina Faso’s Law
No. 32-99/AN on the protection of literary and artistic
property, a work has been created when its conception
has been followed by realization of that conception, even
if incomplete.61 In simpler terms, there is conception
from the moment the work will have received a formal
consecration, sizeable by the law, as opposed to ideas
and concepts that are not materialized and that are notsusceptible to being legally appropriated. It does notmatter that this expression of ideas is unfinished.
KLI claimed conception of the entire work at issue.
In response, the defendant SJSL proved incapable ofdemonstrating any active participation in conceiving
the general idea or in developing parts of the work or
arrangements thereof. KLI was thus able to convince
the judge that he had fashioned the work entirely. Ina similar case, Maedza v. Mogotsi, the defendant had
commissioned their student, the plaintiff, to compose
a poem and then included it in an anthology entitledMmopa Khukhu as though it were their own work.62 The
Botswana court seized of the merits of that case foundthat the plaintiff was indeed the author, having duly
created the poem themselves.63
In this case, SJSL sought to obfuscate the facts, claiming
a significant contribution of his own to the original work
– to no avail. The judge deduced from the circumstances– particularly from the minutes of the BBDA’s conciliation
process of October 16, 2012 – that the contributions
claimed were subsequent to registration of the original
work and were not determinative of the original
work’s authorship.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

That left only the task of determining what parts of thederived work should be deemed liable to be exploited.

118

B. Determination of authorship of the derived work
The arguments the defendant, SJSL, presented wereintended to plant in the judge’s mind the idea of jointly
owned rights, to be shared with KLI, to the dramatic
work entitled Salomon le sage – or at least to its revised(derived) version. Before ruling on ownership of themodified work, however, the judge first had to assign it
to an existing legal category.
60
61
62
63

P. Edou Edou (ed.) (2009) Le contentieux de la propriété intellectuelle dans les
États membres de l’OAPI: Guide du magistrat et des auxiliaires. Geneva: WIPO,
23.
Cf. art. 7(3) of Cameroon’s Law of December 19, 2000, concerning copyrightand related rights.
Maedza v. Mogotsi, Judgment of April 24, 2006, High Court of Lobatse,
Botswana Law Reports 2007, 1, 182, online at www.elaws.gov.bw/
desplaylrpage.
See Toure, A. v. SICOA, Judgment No. 598 of December 8, 2005, Supreme Courtof Côte d’Ivoire (obs. A. Fade, this collection, Chapter 6, section E).

First, did the modified work meet the definition of acomposite or derivative work? The mere existence of apre-existing work makes it initially tempting to answer“yes.” A composite or derivative work is one in which a
pre-existing work is incorporated without its author’s
collaboration, “but with that author’s consent.” 64 It was
thus clear that it is not the collaboration of the firstwork’s author that would be required to so define thework in the present case but his consent – and thatclearly answered the first question in the negative.
Next, what about a collaborative work? This question wascentral to the case. It is worth noting, in this regard, thecontempt that litigants sometimes display in distorting
French legal terminology. In his reply to the plaintiff,
SJSL contrived to represent the modified work he himself
had deposited with the BBDA as a collaborative one.
While collaborative works are not clearly defined in the
country’s copyright law, however, article 27 of Burkina
Faso’s Law No. 32-99/AN does provide: “The co-authors ofa collaborative work are the original owners of the moral
and economic rights to that work. They exercise theirrights by common consent; in the event of a dispute, it
is up to the competent court seized to decide.” Put more
plainly, a collaborative work is one in the creation ofwhich two or more authors have participated.65
There are two possible situations in which a collaborative
work may be created. One is where two persons work
together to create the work, such that it cannot be easily
or precisely said which parts of the work are attributable
to which persons. This hypothetical scenario could not
be further from the facts in this case. Another is whereindividual attribution may or may not be possible but
the authors have acted in a concerted way toward a
common aim. Considering the facts in the case, thissecond hypothesis also had to be dismissed. The reason
is simple, KLI astutely observing that the defendant’s
contribution to the modified work lacked originality. And,in the absence of an original creative contribution, thederived work could not be found creative and hence
eligible for copyright protection.
Clearly not falling within either of the categories ofwork by multiple authors, the defendant’s argument
found no favor with the court. KLI’s copyright to thesuccessful work, in its entirety, was rightly upheld
and the defendant was rightly found to be liable forinfringing exploitation.
II. Infringement of rights to the work
Recognizing the plaintiff as author and the exploitationof his work as infringement, the judge had toappropriately penalize the infringement (B), and thedecision therefore carefully and minutely delineates its
material extent (A).

64
65

Edou Edou, n. 60, at 23.
Edou Edou, n. 60, at 22.

1. Infringement of economic rights
Economic rights are the rights of the author to exploit
their work and profit from it. They refer to the author’s
right to reward for their creative effort work and theirfinancial prerogatives in administering it.66 Article 16
of Burkina Faso’s Law No. 32-99/AN enumerates sucheconomic rights as the rights to:• reproduce, translate, adapt, arrange or otherwisetransform the work;• publicly disseminate copies of the work through sale,transfer of ownership, lease or lending;• publicly represent or perform the work; and• import copies of, broadcast or publicly communicate
the work.
In this case, the economic rights allegedly infringed by
the defendant were the rights to publicly represent andto transform the work.
According to P.-Y. Gautier, representing a work
traditionally means “exhibiting it to the public or bringing
it to public awareness by performing it: playing a song or
symphony, reciting a poem.” 67 Representation of a work
gives rise to monopoly under this traditional conception
only if it is communicated to the public.68 Today, with therise of new information and communication technologies,
representation of a work extends well beyond material
exhibition to include public access when and where an
individual might choose.69
In this case, the infringement of representation rights
by SJSL consisted of prolonging theatrical performanceof the protected work, without the author’s consent,
beyond the agreed duration.
It is regrettable that the trial judge utterly disregarded
the infringement of the author’s right to transform his
own work, Salomon le sage. The transformation of a workmeans its translation, adaptation, arrangement or any
other alteration.70 An author therefore enjoys the rightto authorize or prohibit transformation of their work in
any way.

66
67
68
69
70

Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (2011) Droit d’auteur etdroits voisins, Guide pratique sur copyright et les droits voisins à l’intention desmagistrats et auxiliaires de justice. Ouagadougou: BBDA, 20.
P.-Y. Gautier (2010) Propriété littéraire et artistique (Droit fundamental), 7th
rev’d edn. Paris: PUF, 326.
Vivant and Bruguiere, n. 22, at 343.
See SONITEL v. BNDA, Judgment No. 11-250-civ of December 1, 2011, State
Court of Niger (obs. A. Fade, this collection, Chapter 6, section O).
See art. 18(1) of Cameroon’s Law No. 2000/11 of December 19, 2000, on
copyright and related rights.

The defendant did, in fact, transform the plaintiff’s
theatrical work without requesting express authorization
to do so, depositing that revised version with thecompetent collective management organization. The
judge might therefore have been expected to sanctionthat infringement as well.
2. The judge’s disregard of moral rights
The BBDA identifies moral rights as non-economic
rights falling within a wider category known as“personality rights.” 71 Four such rights are identified
in article 9 of Burkina Faso’s Law No. 32-99/AN: theright of disclosure, the right to be identified, theright to respect, and the right to reconsideration
and withdrawal.
Debate in this case centered on the right to respect –that is, the right of the author of a work to authorize or
prohibit its distortion, mutilation or other modification.72
The plaintiff complained that SJSL had mutilated his
creation, without requesting prior consent, by adding
new female characters in a manner the plaintiff
considered highly “prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”
The judge condemned SJSL for the violation of the rightto respect KLI’s work.
It is regrettable that the judge did not also consider the
defendant’s infringement of the plaintiff’s right to be
identified as the author of the work, although it was
debated during the proceedings. That right is one ofthose enumerated in article 11 of Law No. 32-99/AN,
which was in force when the facts of the case occurred.
It refers to an author’s exclusive right to require mentionof their name each time their work is made available tothe public.
B. Application of relevant sanctions
Any sanction applied in cases such as this is intended tostop the infringements committed and also to remedy
the prejudice caused. In the present case, no clear
explanation was given of the calculation of damages,
the main sanction (1), and additional sanctions (2) wereapplied likewise, the judge having decided to go beyond
the request for calendar-based penalties.

Chapter 6 – Copyright

A. Material delineation of the rights infringed
In response to the initial claim, the judge outlined theextent of the rights infringed, espousing as faithfully
as possible the standard terminology establishedin copyright legislation. In broad strokes, the judge
deplored the multiple infringements of the author’s
economic rights (1), curiously ignoring the noneconomic infringements (2), although they had beenbrought to his attention.

1. The main sanctions against SJSLTo protect the plaintiff’s monopoly for exploitationof his work, the judge penalized the defendant’s
theatrical presentation as infringement of copyright byproportionately combining injunction with the award
of damages.
The original grounds on which such an injunction is
granted can be found in the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which
was explicitly included in AB-1977 (annex VII, art. 63(1))
but not clearly mentioned in subsequent revisions.

71
72

Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, n. 66, at 18.
See art. 12 of Law No. 32-99/AN; art. 14(1)(c) of Cameroon’s Law No. 2000/11
of December 19, 2000, on copyright and related rights refers to the right todefend a work’s integrity.
119Article 44(1) of TRIPS provides: “The judicial authorities
shall have the authority to order a party to desist froman infringement, inter alia, to prevent the entry into thechannels of commerce in their jurisdiction of imported
goods that involve the infringement of an intellectual
property right, immediately after customs clearanceof such goods.” That measure facilitates immediate
cessation of the infringement.73 The judge in this caselikewise ordered “cessation of the infringement of theplaintiff’s rights to the work at issue.”

The judge in this case thus missed an opportunity tobetter calibrate the victim’s compensation.

The award of damages often centers on the civil
law measures available to combat infringements ofintellectual property rights, both in general and for
copyright in particular. Such awards are the civil sanction
applied most commonly in infringement cases. They
entail the payment of monetary damages to remedy any
injury caused by infringement.74

While assignment of the rights to a literary or artistic
work entails transfer to the assignee of the related
economic rights, that assignee must nonetheless respect
the moral rights attached to the assigned work, which
are personal, inalienable, perpetual, unassailable andtransmissible mortis causa to the author’s heirs.

As KLI argued in his conclusions, action for damages islegally founded in copyright reforms at the community
75
and national 76 levels. Their purpose is to remedy thematerial and moral prejudice caused by infringement of
the victim’s rights.
In this case, the order for SJSL to pay CFAF 10 million
was intended to be compensation for all the injuries
combined. It would have been useful, however, for thejudge to specify the amount allocated to each injury andhence better explain the amount awarded.
2. The ineffective additional sanctions
The judge could have done more than order provisional
execution of his judgment, pending any appeal.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

A brief review of KLI’s main allegations reveals that thetrial judge was also being asked to “order SJSL to desist
from infringing the plaintiff’s rights under penalty of
CFAF 500,000 per day of delay in doing so; and … to pay
him CFAF 500,000 for costs incurred but not includedin the legal fees.” In ignoring KLI’s claims for penalties
as well as reimbursement of legal fees, althoughgenerously formulated, the judge’s decision feels like a
job unfinished.

120

The claim for penalties was entirely appropriate. The
relevant provisions of AB-1977 prescribed such ameasure, intended to discourage a perpetrator otherwise
inclined to continue their illegal practices. According toarticle 63(4) of annex VII to AB-1977: “Where the danger
exists that the infringing acts will continue, the court
shall expressly order the cessation of such acts. It shallalso determine an amount to be paid as a daily fine.” This
provision is identical to article 63(4) of ABR-1999. The finein this context would be a necessary complement to thejudge’s injunction in the event of such risk. The same canbe said of the request for reimbursement of legal fees,
which is rooted in article 63(1) of annex VII to ABR-1999.

73
74
75
76

Edou Edou, n. 60, at 80.
Edou Edou, n. 60, at 77.
See AB-1977, art. 76; ABR-1999, art. 63 of annex III.
See art. 104 of Burkina Faso’s Law No. 32-99/AN.

Aristide Fade

H. Copyright – Assignment of rights –Transfer of economic rights –Inalienability of moral rights –Respect by the assignee

An assignee who brings a work to the public without
identifying the author on all related media is thereby
committing an infringement.
SONITEL V. THE KYBIA AGENCY, Judgment No. 15-040/
Civ of April 21, 2015, Supreme Court of Niger
Observations:
Rare in the courtrooms of OAPI countries are cases
examining the moral rights of literary or artistic authors.
The present case was an eagerly anticipated opportunity
for the Supreme Court of Niger to polish the distinctions
between different moral rights conferred by copyright.
Facts: An agency, Kybia, owned the copyright to a
photograph. It contractually assigned the economic
rights to the photograph to SONITEL. For its operational
purposes, SONITEL then hired another agency, Iman,
to reproduce the photographic work on several media
before communicating it to the public and it did so
without identifying Kybia as its creator. While it had
assigned away its economic rights to the photograph,
Kybia considered that that work’s anonymous publication
by SONITEL, without Kybia’s consent, had infringed its
moral rights – the right to be identified in particular.
Kybia therefore brought judicial action for infringementof its moral rights.
After considering the case, the trial judge declared theaction inadmissible, ordering the plaintiff to pay SONITEL
CFAF 20 million. Dissatisfied with that ruling, Kybia
appealed to the Court of Appeal of Niamey, which reexamined the merits of the case and overturned the trial
judge’s decision, ruling against SONITEL. In determining
the admissibility of the appellant’s claim and thenordering payment to Kybia of CFAF 5 million in damages,
the Court of Appeal simply declared infringement of theappellant’s copyright without explaining the nature of
the rights infringed.
The Court of Appeal having thus fallen short of its
obligation to state the grounds for its decision, SONITEL
unsurprisingly called upon the country’s Supreme
Court to exercise its role as forum of last resort. Under
an obligation to state the grounds for its decisions,

Reasoning: Exercising a power to raise issues denied toit under national law, the Supreme Court quashed theappeal judgment, remanding the case back a differently
composed court for readjudication. Like a vessel’s
compass, the Supreme Court thus directed the debate
in which that reconfigured lower court should engage.
Upon analysis, it quickly becomes clear that two legal
provisions cited in its grounds heighten the quality oftechnical debate. In giving meaning to those provisions,
the Supreme Court’s decision calls for observations andreflection at two levels.
At the first level, there are two types of copyright,
economic and moral. The economic rights consist of
prerogatives enabling copyright owners to receive
financial compensation for the economic exploitation of
their works by third parties. Article 8 of the Ordinancegoverning copyright in Niger (No. 93-27 of March 30,1993) exhaustively enumerates six such economic
prerogatives: reproduction, translation, transformation,
importation, representation or performance andcommunication. According to article 31 of the Ordinance:“[W]hen a work is created on behalf of a naturalor legal person, public or private, under a work
contract signed by the author, or when the work is
commissioned from the author by such a person,
the author is the original owner of economic andmoral rights to the work, but the economic rights
are deemed to have been transferred.”This text, appearing as part of the second ground,gives substance to the rule that economic rights aretransferable. It is unanimously admitted in case law thatassignment of copyright entails transfer of economic
rights to the assignee.77
In that sense, as assignee of economic rights to thephotographic work in the present case, SONITEL
could – against payment – reproduce, communicate
or distribute the creation to the public without
requiring prior authorization from Kybia. Whether theassignee exploited the work on its own or through anintermediary – Iman, in this case – was immaterial. In
that respect, the Court of Appeal’s decision was entirely
appropriate. Its only fault was that it did not specify in its
grounds the nature of the infringed rights giving rise to
the award of damages.
From that perspective, the Supreme Court was able tochallenge the factual information considered by the77

Christine ROSSANO v. Société SOVING AB, Judgment (undated), Tribunal of
Libreville, reported in Edou Edou, n. 60, No. 3, 373.

appeal court, which, while recognizing the status of
SONITEL as copyright assignee, proceeded even so tohold it liable for copyright infringement. In a rather
explicit preambular paragraph about their reasoning,
the appeal judges affirmed that “it is established andnot in dispute that SONITEL and the Iman Agency
engaged in commercial exploitation of the photographat issue without prior consent from the Kybia Agency
and derived monetary profit from doing so.” The Courtof Appeal reasoned, in other words, that – absent theassignor’s consent – copyright assignment did notentail the transfer of exclusive prerogatives enabling
their beneficiary to exploit the work concerned. The
question thus arises: was the Court of Appeal actuallycharacterizing the exercise of assigned economic rights
as unauthorized and thus illicit exploitation? One cannot
help wondering whether the assignment contract, neveronce challenged during the proceedings, is not a formof authorization to exploit the work, which would be atodds with the Ordinance cited above.
And yet, at the second level, the Court of Appeal’s
decision would have been sound if its statement ofgrounds had made the necessary distinctions between
the author’s various rights. Instead of limiting itself toambiguous condemnations, the court should have based
its argument on article 8 of the Ordinance, as cited in thesecond ground, and confirmed the rule that moral rights
are not transferable. As pointed out by the judge in asimilar case in Gabon,78 copyright prerogatives of a moral
nature are reserved exclusively for the author, even after
assigning away all or part of their economic rights. The
judge in that case decided that “even if, as in the casebefore us, Ms. Ross assigned the right to use her work
to Jeep, against payment, she still retains moral rights tothat work.”
The foundations for the rule that moral rights are nottransferable, unexamined in this case, are several. One
concerns the very nature of moral rights, which fall into
the larger category of personality rights. Their main
purpose is to protect and preserve the link between
author and creation, thus avoiding excessive alienationof the author’s freedom of creation in the future.79

Chapter 6 – Copyrightthe appeal should have distinguished, from amongan author’s exclusive prerogatives, those considered
to be non-transferable. The Supreme Court thus had
to adjudicate questions pertaining to moral rights,
including inalienability, on which hinged the success of
the action for infringement. It had to determine whether,in addition to economic attributes, the assignee of rights
to a literary or artistic work also acquired moral rights.

The law of Niger applicable to the diverse facts in thecase draws clear distinctions between the right to be
identified, the right of integrity and the right to remain
anonymous or use a pseudonym. Modern legislation inother countries is much more generous in conferring awider range of moral rights. For example, article 14(1)of Cameroon’s Law No. 2000/11 of December 19,
2000, on copyright and related rights, identifies themoral rights to be identified, of integrity, of disclosure
and of reconsideration or withdrawal. The right tobe identified, the main focus of debate in this case,means the right of an author to be named as such inall iterations of the work. That right means at least
two things.
78
79

Ibid.
WIPO (2016) Understanding Copyright and Related Rights, 2nd edn. Geneva:
WIPO, 9.
121

• In positive terms, it means that the author has aprerogative to ensure that the work is published under
their own name.
• In negative terms, although a separate prerogative
under the law of Niger, it is also the right of an
author to remain anonymous or to publish under apseudonym, so as not to reveal their identity.
A certain number of characteristics are generally
attributed to moral rights. Consistent with their personal
character, moral rights are defined in article 8 of theOrdinance cited in this case as perpetual, inalienable,
imprescriptible and not seizable, and as transmissible
at death to the author’s heirs. As used here, the term
“inalienable” is understood to mean that the author’s
right cannot be transferred to a third party. Case law
has consistently favored this language, systematicallyannulling all contrary clauses in assignment contracts.
In the case between Christine Ross and Soving Co.,for example, the Libreville court convicted the latterof infringing the former’s right to be identified,
which was not transferable by means of a copyrightassignment contract.
The present case can serve as a reminder: in the case ofan artist, the assignment of copyright conveys economic
rights only; the assignor retains in perpetuity theexclusive ownership of moral rights.
Aristide FadeI.

Literary and artistic work –Unauthorized reproduction of thework – Commercial exploitation –No exception for private copies –Infringement

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Mass reproduction of a literary and artistic work without
the author’s consent (in this case, of a painting as agreeting card) and distribution of the reproductions
to associates of the copier far exceeds the concept ofa private copy, and it constitutes an infringement of
copyright under article 27 of Côte d’Ivoire’s Law No. 96564 of July 25, 1996, on protection for intellectual works.

122

SENI BAMOGO V. AERIA, Adversary judgment RG
No. 1001/14 of June 12, 2014, Commercial Court
of Abidjan
Observations:Certain kinds of activities are not restricted by the legalmonopoly conferred on authors, and the reproductionof works for private use is a good example. Faced withthe complex new means of reproduction facilitatedby the internet and digital technology, many modern
legislatures, including those in OAPI countries, haveadopted the palliative solution of legalizing copies ofworks shared only privately.80 Indeed, while existing
technology does not allow authors or their successors
80

S. Rompre (2007) Le régime de la copie privée face à Internet. Lex Electronica
12(1), 2.

to easily maintain their exclusive right of reproduction,compensation for such persons, through the impositionof a levy, has been suggested as a solution.81 Under
such a regime, copying would no longer by illegal andthe copier would be relieved of the duty to obtain priorauthorization from a work’s author or their successors.
Copies made only for private distribution is therefore aformidable exception available to copiers of protected
works if they are sued for infringement, into which thiscase opens a window.
Facts: Seni Bamogo, a renowned, widely exhibited artist,
was the author of a painting, The Future of a Child (2009,
acrylic on canvas). Following its exhibition in a gallery
in the Abidjan district, the painting was sold in 2009 to
the Houkami Guyzgn art gallery, which then exhibited
the work on its own premises. A few months after thesale, Simplice De Messe Zinsou, chair of the board of
Abidjan International Airport (AERIA), took advantage ofthe painting’s exhibition to reproduce it as a greetingscard and send it en masse to airport customers, withoutobtaining prior authorization from the creator.
Displeased by the reproduction and public
representation of his work, Mr. Bamogo brought
action before the Commercial Court of Abidjan for
infringement of his rights to reproduce and represent
his creation. During the proceedings, to avoid liability,
AERIA claimed that the reproduction had been for
private use only. The question the judge then examined
was whether a person’s use of a painting, given freely
to only an airport’s customers, could be called “privateuse,” thereby exonerating such person of infringement.
In doing so, the court was able to stake out a judicial
framework for the treatment of works copied privately inan age of digital reproduction.
Reasoning: The judge responded to the question in
the negative, first recalling the conditions for allowing
private-copy exceptions, which include lawfulness of thesource, the personal and private character of the use,
and an ability to pass a “three-step test.”
In broad terms, the private-copy exception establishesa special waiver of the author’s exclusive right toauthorize copies of their work by third parties. If the
exception is allowed, only reproductions escape theauthor’s monopoly. Creators have no legal recourse
for infringement in the few cases where reproductions
are authorized. In terms of content, the reproductionof works occurs across a wide range of activities, so
the concept is extensive. It covers such activities as therecording of a musical work, the publication of a book,the photograph of a work, the audio, audiovisual ordigital copy of a work, and the photocopy of a work.
However, the exception is conditioned on the lawfulnessof the source reproduced – a limitation that the judge inthis case overlooked or ignored.

81

WIPO (1971) Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary andArtistic Works. Paris: WIPO, 56.

The disagreements hinge on whether it is acceptableto make lawfulness of source a condition for waiving
the author’s monopoly.84 The main advantage of this isto spare parties invoking the exception the evidentiary
difficulties entailed. Indeed, for any derogation, theburden of proof rests with the party invoking theexception; in this instance, it is the copier – although it is
the author who is best positioned to know if their work
was lawfully disclosed. Keeping the burden of proof on
the copier, whose interests will always lie in invoking theexception, could ultimately neutralize the effect sought.
In the present case, the court followed this judicial lineof thinking and thus strayed from the legislators’ intent.
In many provisions on copyright, the benefit of theprivate-copy exception is conditioned on strictly private
use of the copies. While distinguishing personal andprivate use might appear simple, it is an elastic concept in
judicial practice.
In literal terms, personal use is the opposite of collective
use and it is not for profit. Private use encompasses the
copier’s personal needs and those they might have incarrying out their work. The classic example is a student
who copies a document or has it copied for the purposesof their studies or personal research.

82

83
84

See ABR-1999, art. 10(2) of annex VII, which provides: “Notwithstanding theprovisions of article 8, and subject to those of para. 2 of this article and thoseof article 58, it shall be permitted, without the consent of the author andwithout payment of remuneration, to reproduce a lawfully published work
exclusively for the private use of the user.” See also art. 29(1)(c) of Cameroon’s
Law No. 2000/11 of December 19, 2000, on copyright and related rights:“When the work has been published with the author’s consent, the author
cannot prohibit …”
A. Singh and T. Debiesse (2007) Droit d’auteur, copie privée et responsabilité
pénale. Les cahiers de la propriété intellectuelle, 19(1), 355.
See MP and SCPP v. Mr. D.T., Judgment of November 15, 2005, TGI de Bayonne.
In stating its grounds, the trial court reasoned that “conversely, in storing
musical extracts on his computer’s hard disk or recording them on CD-ROM,
the defendant merely exercised his right to make a copy for personal use andmust therefore be acquitted.”

Taking the situation into business, the idea of private
use for internal purposes has been evoked to exonerate
reproduction and circulation of copies within a company
for purposes only of information and documentation.
“Company” in this context is meant in the broadest
sense. It could include public and private enterprises,
persons performing an independent activity for profit
irrespective of legal form (such as public establishments,
limited liability companies, associations or independent
merchants) and other groups of persons, even if notlegally established and structured (such as advocacy andinterest groups). The waiver in this case is restricted tothe purposes of internal information and documentation,
which is clearly not the same as reproduction anddistribution to customers.
In the present case, the chair of the board of AERIA
reproduced the plaintiff’s painting without authorization,using greeting cards as a medium, and then distributed
the reproductions to airport customers free of charge.
Sweeping aside the private-copy exception argued,
the Commercial Court construed the “strictly private”
use of copies in a narrow sense, holding that “suchreproduction goes well beyond private copying because
it constitutes collective use, in that copies of the work
were sent via greeting cards to persons other than
Mr. Simplice De Messe Zinsou.”Lastly, the conditions for the exception are not limited
to lawfulness of the source and personal and private
use: a three-step test is also required. Although thejudge did not explicitly say so in the present case,the use of copies within a company is not always
collective. Private use must also be understood as any
use not infringing normal exploitation of the work or
unjustifiably prejudicing copyright holders. According
to the key provision framing exceptions under the
Berne Convention, copies used within a company are
deemed to be for private use if they pass a three-step
test. Under article 9(2) of the Convention: “It shall bea matter for legislation in the countries of the Union
to permit the reproduction of such works in certain
special cases, provided that such reproduction does notconflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the author.”

Chapter 6 – Copyright

A source of numerous disagreements, in both case law
and the literature, the question of lawfulness of source
has been central to the debate on conditions for theprivate-copy exception. Virtually all the legislation in
OAPI member states conditions the exception on lawful
disclosure of the work later reproduced.82 In other words,
a copy made from an unlawful source is itself unlawful,by “contamination,” and does not qualify for the privatecopy exception.83 Article 31 of the Côte d’Ivoire law
applicable when the facts occurred is a perfect example.
Inclusion in that article of the condition of lawfulnessof the source of reproductions indicates the intent of
the Ivorian legislator to make it decisive for the privatecopy exception. The article provides that “when thework has been lawfully made available to the public,”
the author cannot prohibit reproductions reserved forstrictly personal and private use. For the exception to
apply in this case, the lawful character of the painting’s
exhibition by the Houkami Guyzgn art gallery, including
non-infringement of the painter’s prerogatives, had tobe established.

To pass the first step in this test, the exception must
represent a special case and be clearly defined. Article 31
of Côte d’Ivoire’s Law No. 96-564 of July 25, 1996, on
the protection of intellectual works and the rights ofauthors, performers and producers of phonogramsand videograms, provides: “When the work has been
lawfully made available to the public, the author may notprohibit … reproductions, translations and adaptations
intended for strictly personal and private use, and not forcollective use, with the exception of works of art.” At thisfirst level, that the copies made by AERIA of the painting
work fail the triple test.
The second step in the test is that, to be excepted, thereproduction activity must not conflict with normal
123

exploitation of the work.85 According to Senftleben,“conflicts with normal exploitation occur when authors
are deprived of an actual or potential source of income ofconsiderable importance in the markets for works of thiscategory.” For paintings, the normal means of exploitation
are exhibition and sale to the public. Viewed in termsof compatibility with the general regime of copyrightexceptions, digital reproduction of a painting – even ifsolely for private purposes and worse still if done on alarge scale – does indeed conflict with these means of
exploitation. The copies made by AERIA failed this step.
To meet the final step in the test, the reproduction
activity must not unreasonably prejudice the rightholders. This step consists of gauging the proportional
benefit of allowing the exception in the context ofpreserving the author’s interests.86 Ultimately, theexception will be considered illegitimate under the test
only if the prejudice is unjustified and disproportionate.
Enshrined in article 10(2)(vi) of annex VII to ABR-2015,
application of the three-step test is a practical necessity
for judges considering copyright cases. This mechanism
for framing copyright waivers would clearly not haveallowed the private-copy exception that AERIA argued tojustify its digital reproduction of Mr. Bamogo’s work. The
judge’s denial of the waiver for reproduction therefore
made good sense.
Aristide Fade

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J.

124

Copyright – Permission to exploit
issued by the national collective
rights management organization –Online exploitation of works from therepertoire of a sister company –Individual action by the author –Admissibility – No unlawful
exploitation

The legal action filed by a Malian author and memberof SACEM against a user authorized by the national
copyright office, the Copyright Office of Burkina Faso
(Bureau Burkinabè du droit d’auteur, or BBDA), to
exploit the author’s works online was admissible; theexploitation impugned, however, was not unlawful, since
it was covered by the authorization.
SALIF KEITA V. AIRTEL BURKINA FASO, SA AND ORS,
Judgment No. 607 of December 5, 2012, High Courtof Ouagadougou
Observations:
The carefully drafted judgment discussed in this case isan opportunity to examine how individual and collective
copyright management are interrelated.
85
86

M. Senftleben (2004) Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysisof the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law (Information Law
Series). The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 43 et seq.
E. De Cock (2015/16) Les exceptions au droit d’auteur: problématiques liées à
l’exception de copie privée. Masters thesis, Université Catholique de Louvain,
33.

Facts: World-famous Malian singer and musician Salif
Keita, during a visit to Burkina Faso, learned that someof his works were being used in the country by company
Airtel Burkina Faso (Airtel), through a paid upload service
called Mam’zik. An amicable negotiation seemed instore until Airtel, shifting its stance, disputed the artist’s
claims, arguing that the company’s use of the musicalworks was founded in its partnership agreement with thecompany Mobile Services Burkina Faso (Mobile Services),
which had acquired rights to the works from the national
copyright office, the BBDA. Sued before the High Courtof Ouagadougou for CFAF 200 million in compensation,
Airtel in turn sought compulsory intervention in the caseby Mobile Services and the BBDA.
Reasoning: The court denied a motion to dismiss thecase for lack of standing (section I), but ruled against theplaintiff on the merits, reasoning that the authorization
issued by the BBDA was sufficient to justify the
defendant company’s conduct (section II).
I. The plaintiff’s standing
The defendants contested Salif Keita’s standing tobring the suit, arguing as follows. The plaintiff artist
was a member of SACEM, a French collective rights
management organization. In 1987, the BBDA had signed
a reciprocal representation agreement with SACEM(and with the Société pour l’administration du droit dereproduction mécanique des auteurs, compositeurs,éditeurs, réalisateurs et doubleurs sous-titreurs, or
SDRM, for the mechanical reproduction rights), the termsof which entrusted the BBDA with managing SACEM’srepertoire in Burkina Faso. Therefore, they argued, only
the BBDA and SACEM (or the SDRM) had standing to act
on behalf of the artist.
The argument is not exactly unambiguous. If the BBDA
has been entrusted with managing Salif Keita’s rights
in Burkina Faso, then the BBDA alone – and not SACEM– should have standing to assert his rights in court. The
argument no doubt stems from a clause in the 1987
contract, invoked in the BBDA’s written submissions andcited in the judgment, that only SACEM “has standing
to bring legal action as necessary to protect Salif
Keita’s rights.”
Be that as it may, the court dismissed the argument, on
the basis of article 96 of Burkina Faso’s Law No. 32-99/
AN. That article provides that arrangements entrustinga professional body with collective management of
copyright and related rights “are without prejudice tothe standing of authors, holders of related rights andtheir successors to directly exercise the rights conferredon them by this law.” Based on that provision, the court
concluded that, “as artist and right holder, Salif Keita
had standing, concurrently with the organizations cited
above (BBDA, SACEM and SDRM), to bring legal action in
defense of his interests.”
Nothing need be reiterated about the rejection of
the motion to dismiss, which was required under theletter of local copyright law. It can be added, however,

The only reservation – albeit a considerable one – relates
to the idea of concurrent standing arranged between
author and collective rights management organization(s)(more than one such organization in this case, since
the court, without explanation, proceeded as thoughboth the BBDA and SACEM had standing). In thiscase, however, there was no true concurrence, since
the advertiser’s conduct was justified by the BBDA’s
authorization alone. It would thus have been useful
to better delineate the interface between individualand collective rights management – a job, of course,
for the legislator. The approach taken in the French
courts, for instance,87 in deciding that the infringementof rights entrusted to a collective rights management
organization is not a legitimate basis for individual
action by the author or holder of a related right unlessthe organization demonstrably fails to act itself or,alternatively, unless (as the BBDA advanced in this case)allowance is made in assigning preferred standing
to the collective rights management organization for
individual action only against “a defendant exploiting
works clandestinely, without any prior authorization andwithout the knowledge of the organization entrustedwith protecting the works.”
II. Exonerating effect of the authorization issued by
the BBDAOn the merits, the court ruled in favor of the defendants,
finding Airtel not at fault, having acted in agreementwith a partner authorized by the BBDA to exploit theworks at issue.
The court reasoned that, under articles 95 and 96 of
Law No. 32-99/AN, “it is part of [the] BBDA’s mission toensure the protection of literary and artistic works byauthors who are nationals of the country, as well as
foreign nationals, and receive requests for authorization
to exploit the works it protects.” The court then analyzed
the agreements concluded among the three defendants.
It referred first to a “general contract for the exploitationof protected works” under which the BBDA gave Airtel“prior authorization under articles 95 and 96 … to makepublic use, or to arrange for or allow such use, of theprotected works in its repertoire and the repertoiresof organizations having designated it as agent underthe Berne Convention.” The court clarified that this87

Cass. 1ère civ., November 13, 2014, No. 13-22.401, Bull. civ. 2014, I, No. 187,
Comm. com. électr. 2015, comm. 2 (note C. Caron), D. 2015, 410 (noteA. Étienney-de Sainte Marie), Propr. intell. 2015, 64 (obs. J.-M. Bruguière), RTD
com. 2015, 291 (obs. F. Pollaud-Dulian).

authorization “covers the communication of protected
works to the public, via landline and mobile telephone
networks, by internet and for advertising campaigns by
the user,” for which the user commits to paying royalties.
Airtel, for its part, entered into a partnership agreementwith Mobile Services under which the latter committed toproviding musical works to Airtel and to “obtaining” theintellectual property rights attached to such works fromthe BBDA, stipulating that no literary or artistic property
rights were thereby “assigned.”
The BBDA, finally, had its own “general contract for the
exploitation of protected works” with Mobile Services,which was authorized to exploit the repertoire of thecollective rights management organization itself andthe repertoires of other organizations it represented “inaccordance with the Berne Convention and reciprocal
representation agreements.”
The court concluded from the facts in the case that “[the[BBDA assigned its rights in respect of Salif Keita,” andthat the BBDA had authorized both Airtel and Mobile
Services to exploit the works of the plaintiff, whose claim
was therefore denied.
We can ignore the court’s slip of the pen in concluding
that, “in any event, Airtel’s exploitation of Salif Keita’s
works could not be unlawful” (emphasis added). It would
have been more appropriate to write “therefore” insteadof “in any event,” for it is only on the very solid grounds
cited in the judgment that the claim was denied and thereasoning itself is quite compelling. It is correct that the
BBDA was empowered by its reciprocal representationagreement with SACEM 88 to authorize the exploitationof works by the plaintiff, provided that the scope of such
authorization did not exceed what SACEM itself could
authorize (a premise not in dispute), on the principle thata company could not confer greater powers on a sistercompany than it had itself.
To counter that line of argument, Salif Keita contended
that the authorization given to Airtel covered public
performance only – a form of exploitation distinct
from communication to the public and thus beyond“the scope of the contract as defined by its object.”
This objection, unanswered by the judgment, does notwithstand scrutiny. For certain works (especially musical),public performance has been the traditional means ofcommunication to the public and so should not be seen
as a distinct form of exploitation.

Chapter 6 – Copyrightthat article 69 of annex VII to the Bangui Agreement
supports this view: having attributed to collective rights
management organizations the mission of “protection,
exploitation and management of the rights of authors ofworks and holders of related rights,” article 69 stipulates
that such arrangements “shall in no event prejudice
the faculty enjoyed by the authors of works and theirsuccessors in title, and by the holders of related rights, toassert the rights afforded them by this annex.”

Another, more troublesome, objection, likewise
disregarded by the court, concerns an express provisionin the contract between the BBDA and Mobile Services
that the rights conferred were “not transferable without
written agreement from [the] BBDA.” The plaintiff
argued that authorization consequently could not

88

Not “by the Berne Convention,” which is silent on the subject of collective
management and is relevant here only in that it obliges the Union states toguarantee national treatment, i.e. the same for foreign as for domestic, in
accordance with art. 5(1), expressly cited in this regard by the Malian author.
125

have been transmitted to Airtel. The two defendantcompanies tried to challenge this reasoning by recallingthat clause 9 of their partnership agreement disallowed
any “assignment of intellectual property rights.” But
that reasoning did not alter the fact that the BBDA
conferred the authorization only on Mobile Services,which did not have the right to transmit it to Airtel.
It does not appear, however, that Airtel engaged inunlawful exploitation: according to the facts, it hadreceived authorization itself from the BBDA to draw
from its own repertoire and the repertoires of the
BBDA’s sister companies. What is truly surprising is that
it was considered necessary under these conditions
to assign to Mobile Services the obligation to obtainfrom the BBDA the “intellectual property rights for themusical works it furnishes to Airtel.”
It is understandable that a successful author might
be frustrated to find themselves earning much less inroyalties from collective management of their rights thanthey could through individual negotiation. But that is theinevitable consequence of joining such an organization,
which also has its advantages.
André Lucas

K. Digital reproduction of a literary andartistic work – Authorization fromthe author – Lack of authorization –Infringement
Digital reproduction of a literary and artistic work – abook, in this case – followed by internet posting withfree uploads, without the author’s authorization,
constitutes infringement under article 142 of Senegal’s
Law No. 2008-09 of January 25, 2008, on copyright andrelated rights.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

MP AND ABDOULAYE AZIZ V. MAMADOU ANDSERIGNE, Judgment No. 1061/2015 of November 26,
2015, Special Regional Court of Dakar

126

Observations:
On August 14, 1996, the Paris High Court rendered
an interim judgment in a case between successors
to the artist Jacques Brel and university students
who had digitized his works without the successors’authorization.89 According to the judge reviewing therequest for interim measures: “In respect of musicalworks protected by copyright, any digital reproductionof such works suitable for transmission to individuals
connected to the internet must be expressly authorized
by the copyright holders or assignees.” The applicabilityof copyright to networks and the internet is now beyond
doubt, even where difficulties result. French legislators
enshrined this rule in the country’s Intellectual Property
Code. European Union authorities clearly included it
in Directive No. 2001/29/CE of May 22, 2001, regarding
certain aspects of copyright in an information society.
89

See TGI Paris, August 14, 1996, JCP G. 1996, II, No. 22727 (note E. Oliver and
F. Barby).

That provision was directly in line with the agreed
statement of the diplomatic conference that adopted
the WIPO Copyright Treaty, on December 20, 1996.
Article 1(4) of that statement provides that “the storageof a protected work in digital form in an electronic
medium constitutes a reproduction within the meaningof article 9 of the Berne Convention.” Nearly all the laws
on copyright and related rights in signatory countries of
the Bangui Agreement apply to the internet, including
Senegal’s Law No. 2008-09 of January 25, 2008, on
copyright and related rights, article 33 of which isreferred to in the judgment discussed here. This showsthat classic legal copyright provisions remain pertinent
as new communication technologies emerge, even if
certain adaptations might be considered necessary.
Facts: According to the facts of the case, after publicationin two volumes of his work entitled Pour l’honneur de la
gendarmerie sénégalaise, Colonel Abdoulaye Aziz Ndaw
learned that the internet sites Actunet.sn and Assirou.
net were offering free uploads of his work for internet
users, thereby depriving him of substantial potential
income: owing to the fraud alleged, the work’s publisher
had been able to sell only a few copies. This senior officerof the Senegalese Gendarmerie obtained a bailiff’s
official report attesting to these facts, and brought
action against Mamadou Mouth Bane and Serigne
Fadel Mbacke, managers of the two sites, respectively,
under in flagrante delicto proceedings, before the Dakar
Special Regional Court for offenses and infringementof exploitation rights punishable under article 142 of
Law No. 2008-09.
Reasoning: The court found the defendants culpable
under both civil and penal law (section II) for having
infringed the author’s copyright to the work on theinternet (section I).
I. Infringement of copyright via internet
According to the facts in the case, the following
message appeared on two sites serving as vehicles forcounterfeited works on the web: “[Assirou.net and Actu.
net] offer you two works by Colonel Ndaw. Thank you fordownloading.” We will examine the acts committed in thecase relative to copyright law in Senegal (A) and criminal
intent, which can easily be inferred from the absence ofauthorization from the copyright holder (B).
A. The infringements
The defendants were charged with infringing
exploitation rights. Under article 33(1) of Law No. 200809, “the author shall enjoy the exclusive right to exploit
his work in any form and to derive monetary profit
therefrom.” Article 33(2) goes further: “The author’s rightof exploitation shall include the right of communication
to the public, the right of reproduction, the right of
distribution and the right of rental.” Since the right ofrental does not enter into this case, only the first three ofthese rights will be discussed here.
1. Infringement of the right of reproduction
Article 35(1) of Law No. 2008-09 defines reproduction as

It is suggested in the literature that we take accountof the human dimension of transmission in identifying
acts of reproduction that bear on copyright.94 A muffledecho of that concern can be detected in the laws of
90

91
92

93

94

See CA Paris, Référence, May 5, 1997, JCP G 1997, II, No. 22906 (noteE.T. Olivier); T. com. Nanterre, Ninth Chamber, January 27, 1998, JCP E 1998,
850 (obs. M. Vivant and C. Le Stanc); TGI Strasbourg, February 3, 1998, JCP G
1998, II, No. 10044 (note E. Derieux).
Or router, an intermediating device that routes packets between separate
networks.
A user’s personal computer can temporarily copy information received
online instead of reconnecting to the network for each consultation.
Doctrine concurs with case law in excluding such acts from the scope of legal
protection.
Computer servers act as an interface between the supplier and the internet.
They often copy frequently visited sites to obviate connection each time to theoriginal site. From a practical standpoint, cached copies enhance the flow of
traffic, generating real bandwidth economies.
See M. Vivant (ed.) (2004) Droit de l’informatique et des réseaux. Paris: Edition
Lamy, 1331, No. 2278. The authors argue that the focus should be on physicalfixations for communication to human beings, not merely technical fixations.

some African countries – on copyright, in particular– that raise technical copies to the rank of exceptions
to copyright for an author’s work produced on theinternet.95 As currently worded, the Senegalese law does
not specify any exception for technical reproductions,which is problematic for determination of the liability oftechnical intermediaries.
2. Infringement of the right of communication to the
public According to article 34(1) of Law No. 2008-09:“[T]he author shall have the exclusive right toauthorize the communication to the public of
their work by any means, including broadcasting,
distribution by cable or satellite or provision
on demand, in such a way that members of the
public may access the work from a place and at
a time individually chosen by them, and, in thecase of graphic or three-dimensional works, bymeans of exhibiting the physical object.”
It is clear from this provision that the site operators for
Assirou.net and Actu.net made both volumes of Colonel
Ndaw’s work available to internet users, allowing each
visitor free access to it from anywhere on the planet. The
concept of “the public” poses no particular difficulty here:
it consists of all potential visitors to the sites offering theinfringed work.
One of the recurring questions about internet
communication not expressly addressed in the reported
case concerns the possibility of holding criminally liable
the author of a hyperlink that allows a user to access a
website through a path different from that intended byits designer. Hyperlinks embedded in a web page aremechanisms permitting instant access to another web
page, wherever situated in the network. Hyperlinks,
which play a key role in the functioning of internetarchitecture, are often used by their creators to direct
users to unlawful content. Is the creator of such a link
– one that communicates a digitized work to the public– liable under article 34 of Law No. 2008-09? A priori, thecreation of a hyperlink is not in itself an infringementof the right of communication to the public. Nothing,
however, prevents recourse to common law rules oncomplicity if it is established that the hyperlink has been
wrongfully used, particularly as a means to infringe.96

Chapter 6 – Copyright“fixation of the work, by any means, in a physical form
that allows it to be communicated to the public.” Thisdefinition is holistic, encompassing all reproductionmeans and techniques developed through technologicalinnovation, including digitization. This holistic, as
opposed to enumerated, approach allows an unlimited
number of acts to come under the legislative provisions.
It is the approach taken in the French Intellectual
Property Code, from which the Senegalese law isderived. Article L.122(3) of the French Code provides a
non-exhaustive list: “Reproduction shall consist in thephysical fixation of a work by any process permitting it
to be communicated to the public in an indirect way. It
may be carried out in particular by printing, drawing,engraving, photography, casting and all processes of thegraphical and plastic arts, mechanical, cinematographic
or magnetic recording.” This means that fixation of
the work Pour l’honneur de la gendarmerie sénégalaise
in digital form on a digital medium constitutes a
reproduction for purposes of the referenced copyrightlaw. The reasoning for the Parisian decision mentioned
earlier puts it very well: “Any digital reproduction ofmusical works protected by copyright, reproduced in aform suitable for transmission to persons connected tothe internet, must be expressly authorized by the holders
or assignees of the copyright.” Extensive case law,particularly in France, has followed in this direction, now
irreversible.90 It is no longer disputed that digital storageof a work falls within the legal meaning of reproduction.
It still must be clarified – although the decision
discussed here does not explicitly raise the issue – whatkind of fixation to consider, inasmuch as digitization,
compression or transmission of a work entail several
types of fixation and therefore of reproduction. One
example is a work copied by a routing computer,91 or on
the random access memory (RAM) of a user’s computer.92
It is also the case in what are called cached, or buffering,copies.93 It is beyond doubt that Law No. 2008-09,
referred to in the decision reported here, is intended intheory to govern these different forms of reproduction.
In practice, however, the protection is artificial, since theonly purpose of such essentially technical copies, with noeconomic value of their own, is to permit circulation of
the works on digital networks.

3. Infringement of the right of distribution
Article 36 of Law No. 2008-09 provides: “The author shallhave the exclusive right to authorize the distribution,
through sale or other means, of physical copies of theauthor’s work.” The wording of the provision suggeststhat it does not apply to digital copies, which would
also exclude online sales of or free access to protected
works. This appears more a drafting problem than an
expression of clear legislative intent to exclude online
95

96

Cf. art. 29 of Cameroon’s Law No. 2000/11 of December 19, 2000, on copyrightand related rights; see also, in European law, art. 5(1) of Directive 2001/29/
EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 22, 2001, on theharmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in theinformation society, OJ L 167/10.
See Vivant, n. 94, at 1333, No. 2281.
127

distribution from copyright protection, particularly given
the rise in e-commerce and related infringement activity
in African countries.
It is immaterial, moreover, whether the distribution isdone for profit or free of charge. The work in this case
was offered by the infringing sites as a free download,
but the activity was nonetheless criminal. Examining the
profit-making character of an offense, relating to theright of representation, the French Court of Cassation
has affirmed that “actions for copyright infringement are
not confined by any provision of law to cases where an
author’s work has been represented for profit.” 97
The right of exploitation claimed by Colonel Ndaw forhis work Pour l’honneur de la gendarmerie sénégalaise
was affected in this case in three ways. The reasoningof the reported decision is regrettably inadequate,
confined to enumerating the material elements of theinfraction without really characterizing them. At any rate,
to constitute the offense covered by article 144 of Law
No. 2008-09 requires a moral element: the absence ofauthorization from the owner of the rights.
B. Absence of authorization from the right holder
The decision reported did not indicate whether theoperators of the sites Assirou.net and Actunet.sn
requested, let alone obtained, authorization from
Colonel Ndaw before posting online and distributing thetwo volumes of his work. Yet, under articles 33 et seq. of
Law No. 2008-09, reproduction, communication to the
public, and distribution of a literary and artistic work,
even by electronic means, must be authorized by theauthor of the work or their successors. The defendants’failure to appear for the hearing, moreover, wassymptomatic of the absence of an agreement formalizing
such authorization, whether from the author himself
or from the Senegalese Copyright Bureau (Bureau
Sénégalais du droit d’auteur, or BSDA), if the author wasaffiliated with it.

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II. Punishment for copyright infringement via
the internet

128

Several actors enter into the process of digitizing anddisseminating a literary and artistic work created on
the web. It is therefore useful to define the circle ofindividuals who could be held criminally liable (A) andexamine the matrix of sanctions applicable (B).
A. The perpetrators
The perpetrators include the operators of websites
incorporating illegal content (1) and other implicatedlinks in the chain for circulation of a work in the digital
environment (2).
1. Website operators
According to the arguments put forward in this case,responsibility for the offense lay primarily with thewebsite operators, who, in posting the content at issue
online, could have anticipated that it came from another97

See Cass., April 1, 1882, S. 1882, I, 334.

source. Thus, third parties can incur criminal liability
for illegally disseminating an infringed work online.
According to the facts, Mamadou Mouth Bane andSerigne Fadel Mbacke were the operators of the websites
Actunet.sn and Assirou.net, which served as vehicles forthe content at issue. It was therefore entirely right from alegal point of view that they be found criminally liable forinfringing the civil plaintiff’s right to exploit his work.
2. Other actors in the network
The possibility of holding liable the creators of hyperlinks
permitting or facilitating access to a website containing
such information was mentioned earlier. Such a scenario
obviously entails complicity, as defined in the national
Criminal Code. It is just as possible to envisage criminal
liability for the access provider, whose main function is
to connect subscribers with the sites or with other users.
An access provider does not control content. As well
expressed in the Broglie Report, “it opens a door but
does not accommodate.” 98 In short, the access provider’scriminal liability may be incurred if proven that they
personally committed the offense or took part in any way
in doing so.
B. The sanctions matrix
The sanctions incurred by the offenders were both
criminal (1) and civil (2).
Imprisonment and a fine are the criminal sanctions thatcan be imposed on the perpetrator of an infringementon the rights of authors of literary and artistic works.
Under article 142 of Law No. 2008/09 of January 25,
2008, “infringement of the right of communication to the
public, the right of reproduction, the right of distribution
or the right of rental shall be punishable by a prison termof 6 months to 2 years and a fine of 1 million to 5 million
CFA francs.” It is important to note that the law stipulates
that the prison sentence should be combined with a fine.
Yet, the judge sentenced the defendants to a suspended
three-month prison term, thus shielding them from thefine, in violation of the aforementioned legal provision. In
any event, this leniency by the judge seems to contradict
the guidelines of OAPI legislation, which, in article 64(1)of annex VII of ABR-1999 according to which this decision
was handed down, encourages a sufficiently dissuasive
penalty against the perpetrators of acts infringing aprotected right.
At any rate, in accordance with article 149, the judge alsoordered the publication, at the expense of the convicted
perpetrators, of the judgment in certain newspapers andon the websites under dispute.
2. Civil remedies
In the case commented on here, the court faced
the question of how to assess the damages which
the injured party can claim in the event of copyright
infringement, as Colonel Ndaw requested CFAF 300
million in compensation. In Senegalese copyright law,98

See Rapport du groupe de travail de l’Académie des sciences, sous la direction de
Gabriel de Broglie, July 2000, 46, http://bbf.enssib.fr/consulter/bbf-2001-050155-00.

After having considered that it had sufficient evidence, thecourt awarded CFAF 20 million in compensation for thematerial and moral damages that Colonel Ndaw sufferedfrom the infringement of his right of exploitation on thewebsites Actunet.sn and Assirou.net. It is important,however, to question the relevance of the judge’s approachto the various types of damage remedied. The decisioncommented on here does not provide information making
it possible to determine the separate amounts awarded formaterial and non-material damage respectively. Because
these damages are different in nature, the decision is
subject to censure by a higher court.

a red-and-gold striped background and the bust ofa woman, against the company SOCAS, inventor of
the industrial tomato in Senegal, which, according
to the appellant, reproduced his design without his
authorization on the packaging of one of its products.
After the Court of Appeal of Dakar denied his claim, theappellant addressed four pleas to the Supreme Court –:
I.
II.
III.
IV.

The Supreme Court declared all four inadmissible.
I. “False representation of the facts”
The appellant first impugned the Dakar appeal court’s
judgment for stating that he did:“… not claim paternity of the character appearing
on the packaging of the SOCAS product illustrated
by three tomatoes with a red and gold backgroundand the bust of a woman with the title Signara, thischaracter having been added to – and inspired by
the title of – his work, which had depicted the three
tomatoes with the name Signara against a red andblack striped background.”

Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

L. Copyright – Action for infringement –Plaintiff’s identity as author contested –Appeal to quash the decision –Distinction of law from fact
The plaintiff appealing an infringement case before
the Supreme Court may not call back into question
established facts based on which the trial court
denied the plaintiff’s claim to authorship of the work
allegedly infringed.

“false representation of the facts”;“inaccuracy of the grounds”;“contradiction in the grounds”; and“violation of the law.”

That court’s wording here is unfortunate in two
ways. First, it does not clearly explain the fault being
alleged of the trial court but merely that the designon the packaging is not a slavish copy of the design
claimed by the appellant (a circumstance that in no way
precludes infringement).

PAPE MALICK FALL V. SOCIÉTÉ DES CONSERVERIESALIMENTAIRES DU SENEGAL (SOCAS), Judgment No. 60
of July 4, 2012, Supreme Court of Senegal

Second, and more importantly, by using the expression“false representation of the facts,” that court disregarded
the abiding principle that judicial control and thequashing of a decision must center on questions of law
not of fact.

Observations:
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Senegal in thiscase illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing between
law and fact – an essential, but slippery, distinction– to determine where a court called upon to quash aruling may exercise its control.99 The difficulty arises
particularly in matters of literary and artistic property,
in controlling, as in this case, such concepts as author
and originality, where trial courts have wide discretion.
Unfortunately, on some questions the language used in
the case does not allow us to draw broader lessons.

The Supreme Court’s response to this was praiseworthy,
dismissing the ground by recalling – as is inarguably
true – that “a grievance regarding false representationof facts is grounds for quashing a decision only if it
pertains to a written document.” A good precedenthere is a judgment by the French Court of Cassation, ina case where the appellant claimed “distortion of theparties’ intent.” The French court denied the argument
as unfounded (not as inadmissible) on the grounds that“a grievance in respect of distortion may not relate to theinterpretation of a material fact.” 100

Facts: Insofar as the facts can be reconstituted fromthe fragmentary information provided in the Supreme
Court’s ruling, it appears that action for copyright
infringement brought by one Pape Malick Fall, claiming
authorship of a design depicting three tomatoes with

II. “Inaccuracy of the grounds”

99

D. Louis-Caporal (2014) La distinction du droit et du fait en droit judiciaire
privé. Unpublished thesis, Montpellier University, No. 9.

Chapter 6 – Copyrightassessment of prejudice is covered by article 52 of Law
2008-09, which states that “the plaintiff may claim
compensation for all damage caused by an infringementof their rights, calculated on the basis of loss of earnings
and moral damage and the profits unjustly obtained by
the defendant. They may also claim payment of costs
occasioned by the infringement, including legal costs.”
In general, the burden of proof of the prejudice in allits forms lies with the plaintiff, who must present therelevant information to enable the judge to assess its
reality and to quantify it.

The second plea concerned the appeal court’s “decisive
ground,” consisting of a letter written by the appellant
saying that he had entitled his design “La tomate” andthat the title “La signara” had been the defendant’s
100

Cass. soc., November 28, 2000, No. 98-41.377.
129

“idea,” whereas the plaintiff had demonstrated by meansof two BSDA attestations that he himself had deposited awork entitled “La signara.” It is hard to understand, here
again, how the title might dictate the solution.
At any rate, the Supreme Court dismissed the appellant’s
second ground, which it said was “limited to criticizing
the grounds of the impugned judgment.” That response
is surprising, since criticizing a judgment’s grounds canbe enough in itself to get the judgment quashed – if
it is ultimately found, for instance, “insufficient” or“contradictory” (as argued in the appellant’s third plea). It
would have sufficed, as it did for the first plea, to say thatthe appeal may not call back into question establishedfacts relied on by the trial judge, whatever one might
think of their probative value.
III. “Contradiction in the grounds”
The appellant’s third ground argued a contradictionin the appeal court’s grounds: “[A]fter referring toPape Malick Fall as the creator of a work entitledSignara, depicting bunched tomatoes, and after saying
the infringed work’s originality stemmed from thesymbolism of the title,” the appeal court “denied” his
identity as the work’s creator, “even though the SOCAS
packaging indeed showed bunched tomatoes.”
The Supreme Court swept this objection aside: “Thealleged contradiction bears not on the facts but on thelegal consequences the appeal court drew from them.”

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This logic is perplexing. In view of all the foregoing,
it is difficult to understand how the Supreme Court
could refuse to take up a criticism bearing on the “legal
consequences” drawn by a lower court from a factual
situation. Is it not traditionally said that a court called
upon to quash a lower court’s ruling (the role being
played here by the Supreme Court of Senegal) “judges
the law”? 101

130

In any case, in the absence of access to the contested
judgment, the wording of the appeal on this point
appears flagrant. To characterize a plaintiff as the“creator” of a work and to recognize the “originality” ofthat work is to acknowledge the plaintiff as its owner,particularly if the work is referred to as an “infringed”
work. If the Court of Appeal of Dakar then denied such
authorship, it must be regarded as having contradicted
itself – and a decision’s contradictory grounds arerecognized as grounds for quashing it.
IV. “Violation of the law”
In his last plea, the appellant alleged that the trial court
had violated the law – specifically, article 118 of theSenegalese Code of Civil and Commercial Obligations(Code des Obligations Civiles et Commerciales, or
COCC) – which it had wrongly declined to apply, “eventhough the fraudulent and profitable use by SOCAS of
101

J.F. Weber (2011) Cour de cassation, 2nd edn. Paris: La documentationfrançaise, 9.

the appellant’s work for commercial purposes represents
unjust enrichment at Mr. Fall’s expense and constitutes
an offense.” In addition, denial of the plaintiff’s plea forcompensation after the latter had “substantiated theinfringement of his rights and the damages caused tohim by the quasi-criminal acts committed by SOCAS”
violated article 9 of the Code. All the Supreme Court
had to say on this point was that the appellant’s ground“based on this grievance calls back into question facts
and evidence sovereignly considered by the lower court”
and was thus inadmissible.
In our view, the appellant’s plea and the court’s responseboth raise doubts. Article 9 COCC provides that “a party
demanding execution of an obligation must provethat it exists” and that “a party claiming to be free ofan obligation must prove that it does not exist or isinoperative.” The article is thus concerned only with theburden of proof and would be relevant to this case only
if the plaintiff had already established the existenceof the defendant’s obligation, which was precisely the
point at issue. As for article 118, it is unrelated to unjust
enrichment, which is covered in articles 160 and 161.
However, contrary to what the Supreme Court affirmed,
the plea concerning the violation of this article did notcall sovereignly appraised facts back into question;rather, the argument was of an eminently legal nature.
It would have been appropriate and also easy to answer
it. The response could – perhaps should – have been
as follows. Inasmuch as infringement has not been
established, which is always the assumption we make at
the outset, an action to establish civil liability can playa subsidiary role only if the plaintiff can substantiate a
distinct offense. It is accepted that such actions, which
often pertain to unfair competition, cannot serve toreconstitute an exclusive right to a creation that is not (oris no longer) protected.102 Such a distinct offense was noteven alleged in this case; the appeal argued merely thatcriminal acts had “violated” the plaintiff’s rights, which
implies infringement.
That leaves only the theory of unjust enrichment.
Even admitting that the defendant enriched itself
through commercial use of the work, the plaintiff candemonstrate corresponding impoverishment only byproving his authorship – a claim precisely rejected by
the impugned judgment. Moreover, article 161 COCC
provides that actions based on this theory (quantum
meruit) “can be brought only in the absence of other legal
recourse.” It is doubtful that this condition was met, since
the main substance of the action was judged unfounded.
Overall, as it was worded, the appellant’s request to
quash the impugned judgment was not destined tosucceed; the court’s denial, however, could have been
better argued.
André Lucas
102

See, in the case of French law, Cass. req., November 29, 1943, Ann. propr. ind.
1940/48, 339; Cass. com., January 24, 1972, No. 70-11.878, Bull. civ. 1972, IV,
No. 27.

The seizure of counterfeit goods in no way constitutes
an administrative sanction; it can be carried out only
if authorized by the competent judge. In addition, therecord of any such authorization must include all of
the information necessary to identify the applicant
for seizure and the assets to be seized. Where anapplicant has failed to meet those requirements, aseizure is grounds for action before the judge forurgent applications.
SADJO MABI V. COMITÉ PROVINCIAL DE LUTTE CONTRELA PIRATERIE (PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE TO COMBATPIRACY), Interim order No. 17/R of September 21, 2005,
High Court of Garoua
Observations:Interim order No. 17/R, issued on September 21, 2005,
by the president of the High Court of Garoua, perfectly
illustrates the difficulties actors concerned withcopyright must overcome in Cameroon, specifically, andin OAPI countries generally.
Facts: The facts in the case are relatively banal. On
July 13, 2005, Mr. Sadjo Mabi, a vendor of phonographic
and videographic media, was subjected to a seizure
carried out on the initiative of the Provincial Committee
to Combat Piracy of the North Region in Cameroon.
Considering the seizure unwarranted, Mr. Mabi took
action before the judge for urgent applications to obtainrelease of the object seized. He based his claim on
three grounds:• that the committee was not legally formed asprescribed by the decision creating the National
Committee to Combat Piracy (Decision No. 2/48/
MINCULT/CAB of November 11, 2002), signed by the
Minister of Culture of Cameroon, which prescribes
the procedures for creating and operating theprovincial committees;• that the seizure was procedurally null for lack of priorauthorization from the High Court’s president; and• two arguments concerning the seizure operations
themselves – namely, that the seizure report did notlist in detail the objects placed in judicial custody andthat references in the writ to those persons who wereto carry out the seizure were uncertain.
Reasoning: In its defense, the Provincial Committee
began by arguing against the competence in this matterof the judge for urgent applications, based on thesubstantive damage its interim order would cause andon the administrative character of the order designating

the committee’s members, Order No. 1174/AP/D/SG/ASD
of November 29, 2004, issued by the governor of theNorth Region of Cameroon. The Provincial Committee
next invoked the fact that Mr. Sadjo did not have an
authorization to exploit the works of their minds, citing in
support of that argument legislation on the exploitationof cinematographic works. It argued that a seizure
therefore constitutes an administrative sanction against
an alleged infringer.
The plaintiff for the urgent application naturally disputed
these arguments, countering that, under article 87 of
Cameroon’s Law No. 2000-11 of December 19, 2000,
on copyright and related rights, the seizure applicantsshould have gone to the competent trial court, underpenalty of release of the objects seized.
What is clear in this situation, which may be aconsequence of error or confusion, is that in no casecould this seizure constitute an administrative sanction,
which the Provincial Committee had no power toimpose in the stead of state authorities; rather, what itconstituted was counterfeit seizure. The involvementin the seizure of an institution created by the Ministerof Culture to combat infringement, the Provincial
Committee to Combat Piracy, and the placementin judicial custody of cassettes and CDs belonging
to Mr. Mabi, on July 13, 2005, thus raise two legal
questions that the judge for urgent applications shouldhave settled:I.
II.

the legality of the counterfeit seizure (section I); andjurisdictional competence for counterfeit seizure
procedures (section II).

I. Legality of the counterfeit seizure
Beyond the legislation pertaining specifically tocopyright, the legality of a seizure may be subject tocommon law procedures for counterfeit seizure as such.
This is particularly the case in areas where the legislation
on such procedures is incomplete or silent, including thecontent of a seizure report. The legislation that appears
to apply here is the OHADA Uniform Act Organizing
Simplified Recovery Procedures and Measures of
Execution, the only legislation applicable in OAPI
countries to civil execution procedures. The Uniform
Act requires any persons conducting a seizure to clearly
identify themselves and to specify in detail the objects
being seized (A).

Chapter 6 – Copyright

M. Copyright – Counterfeit seizure –Provincial committee to combat
piracy – Irregular composition of thecommittee – No identification of
the seizure applicant and no objects
seized – Recourse to OHADA law on
seizures – No application of the law on
cinematographic works – Competentjurisdiction – Judge for urgent
applications

Settling the question about the legality of counterfeit
seizure means first identifying the national law underwhich it was carried out (B).
A. Identification of the seizure applicant and theobjects seized
No express provision in the Bangui Agreement or innational law on copyright and related rights requires,as a general condition, identification of the applicant
for counterfeit seizure. But such identification, as theGaroua judge for urgent applications recalled, is a
general principle that certainly applied in this case. That131

principle is basic for any jurist: it is important for the
distrainee (i.e., the party targeted for seizure), or affected
third parties, to be able to identify who has initiated theprocedure, so that they may organize their defense.
This observer naturally turned to the common law,
as derived from the Uniform Act, as an increasingly
accepted means to fill the many legislative gaps inrespect of seizures in intellectual property matters.103
Yet case law is lucid in its rejection of recourse to the
Uniform Act when the solution can be found insteadin special legislation on counterfeit seizure in national
copyright laws or in the annexes to the Bangui
Agreement for industrial property. That much is madeclear in Société Bic SA v. Société TBC S., in which casethe court rejected the competence of the enforcement
judge indicated in article 49 of the Uniform Act.104 Thatcase is also an opportunity to see how the common
law applicable to counterfeit seizures can have national
origin when the Special Law on Intellectual Property andthe Uniform Act are silent on the subject of execution
measures. Indeed, in Bic SA, the judge affirmed that:“[I]nsofar as the OHADA Treaty does not regulate
counterfeit seizures, those procedures remainsubject to the provisions of common law; …
only the judge for urgent applications, in theclassic sense of article 182 of the Code of Civil
and Commercial Procedure, is competent to takeurgent cognizance of difficulties with the seizuresin question; … the judge for urgent applications
should therefore be declared competent.”
The solution is laudable, even though it adds complexity
to a deceptively simple matter.105

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In this case, the Uniform Act reinforces the obligation
for the seizure applicant to identify themselves.
According to article 64(2) of the regional text, to be valid,a precautionary seizure report must include “the firstand last names and address of the distrainee and of theseizure applicant.” Articles 77(1) and 100(1) refer to thesame obligation and the same sanction in the case ofdebt garnishment, and the seizure and sale of movable
property, respectively.

132

Was it worthwhile under these conditions for the
defendant to invoke the specific provisions of the
Criminal Code then in force in Cameroon? It is thisobserver’s opinion that it was not, for at least two
reasons. On the one hand, article 37 of the Code, whichrefers expressly to seizures in conjunction with a criminal
offense, concerns those conducted in “the defendant’s
domicile.” Counterfeit seizure, dealing with counterfeit
items and counterfeiting equipment, generally happensin the place where the counterfeiter conducts thecriminal activity, which is not necessarily their domicile.
103
104
105

See, concerning seizure of a mark, Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd SA v. Société Adil Co.
and El Hadj SS, Judgment No. 118 of May 20, 2008, High Court of Niamey (obs.
M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection, Chapter 3, section S).
Bic SA v. TBC SA, Decision No. 28 of January 28, 2008, Court of Appeal of Littoral(Douala) (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection, Chapter 1, section F).
See also ibid.

Whether counterfeit seizure is a civil measure or not,it is clear that the competent jurisdiction for recourse
against the seizure is the judge for urgent applications.106
Following that logic, there is no need to invoke the Codein cases where the seizure applicant meets the otherconditions for a counterfeit seizure.
In any case, the seizure applicant was well known, having
clearly identified itself as the Provincial Committee toCombat Piracy. The only problem was its standing, thedefendant having claimed that the individuals concerned
were not the persons specified as comprising thecommittee. But that single ground could have invalidated
the seizure only if the validity of the administrative act
designating them had been challenged. As the judge
for urgent applications recalled, that was far from thesubject at issue.
On the other hand, in failing to identify in detail theobjects seized, the committee made certain that the
seizure would be invalidated. The question nonethelessarises as to which legislation is applicable to ground that
invalidation. Every applicable provision of the Uniform
Act cited above amplifies that, to be valid, a seizure
report must include a detailed list of the objects seized(see especially article 64(4)).
In any case, the same result could be achieved by
invoking general principles of law. It is clear that any
report not including such essential elements would not
be serving its intended purpose; the quasi-nullification
theory could then be applied. It must therefore beaffirmed that the ministerial or judicial police officer
had an obligation to indicate the precise number ofphonograms and videograms seized and to list them indetail, by artist, by title or by collection, so as to provide
a legible, detailed and exhaustive inventory precluding
all doubt.
In any event, the lack of detail concerning the objects
seized was not the only ground for invalidating theprocedure; the committee also undermined its validity by
invoking false legal premises.
B. Identification of applicable law
It may seem incongruous to open a debate on
identification of the legislation applicable to counterfeit
seizure. A person seizing works of the mind would notnormally be expected to justify doing so by invoking
legislation other than that governing copyright. Butthat is what happened in this case. The attorney for
the Provincial Committee to Combat Piracy argued
that “the distribution through sale, rental, exploitation
or importation of a work of the mind is subject toprior authorization as required by Decree No. 90/1463
of November 9, 1990, and by Law No. 88/17 ofDecember 16, 1990,” and that, failing such authorization,
the infringing party was subject to administrative106

See infra. Overall, apart from interventions by the public prosecutor andthe judicial police, these are the civil authorities who carry out counterfeit
seizure. That is the case in particular of the High Court president, acting as a
motion judge in virtually all seizures prior to civil trials.

It is this latter legislation, regarding government use, towhich the committee’s attorney refers. Authorizations
under that legislation are issued after considering theconditions under which the works will be used, but
without regard to copyright protection (the concern
being about public safety – cf. article 13 et seq. of the1988 Law). Copyright legislation has a different purpose:its scope does not include the administrative conditions
for exploitation; it pertains only – as the judge for urgent
applications noted – to relationships between copyrightholders and licensees. Thus it can provide no basis foradministrative sanctions, just as laws on administrative
matters provide no basis for seizures in copyright
infringement cases. In those cases, the use of a work is
punishable because the copyright owner – as opposedto the government – has not authorized it. Moreover,given the mode of exploitation, it follows that the seizure
applicants should have exercised greater caution.
The exploitation of works through representationis governed exclusively by the Special Law on the
Exploitation of Cinematographic Works. The objects
seized in this case were illegal copies, constituting
exploitative reproduction.
All of this illustrates the need for actors concerned withcopyright to raise awareness about intellectual property
in Cameroon and, by extension, in OAPI countries
generally. For it is clearly lack of awareness on that
subject that explains, at least in part, the confusionand errors in this case. Limited awareness might also
underpin the debate over the competence of judges forurgent applications.
II. Jurisdictional competence for counterfeit seizure
The question of jurisdictional competence for counterfeit
seizure was another central issue in these proceedings.
It is therefore worth examining the general rules
applicable to jurisdictional competence (A). In this case,the application of those rules was disrupted by the
involvement of the National Committee to Combat Piracy
and its branches, the provincial committees (B).
A. General rules applicable to jurisdictional competence
for counterfeit seizure
The question of jurisdiction for counterfeit seizure
generally arises at two stages: upstream (before seizure),and downstream (after seizure).
Upstream, a court is asked to issue an authorization forthe seizure. In that context, article 85(1) of the law of2000 in Cameroon provides that, when their rights are
infringed or threatened, copyright holders and theirsuccessors in title may have recourse to a “competentjudge” for authorization to seize forged copies, illegallyimported copies and objects, and the equipment usedor to be used for performance or reproduction.107 The
next paragraph, article 85(2), provides that “[t]hepresident of the civil court with jurisdiction” can alsoorder or request particular measures, including seizures
during non-business hours or the seizure of receipts.
Overall, the law in Cameroon is needlessly convolutedon this point. It is indeed clear that a victim, or potential
victim, of infringement, informed of the offense, or
threatened offense, has every interest in acting as
quickly as possible. The appropriate judge for such rapid
recourse is the judge designated for urgent matters,
who, in the case of Cameroon, is the president of the trial
court, acting as motions judge. Accordingly, the judicial
authorization referred to in article 85(1) could take noform other than an interim injunction – and practiceconfirms this interpretation.
Downstream, the judge competent for recourse against
counterfeit seizure is the judge for urgent applications.
On that point, the 2000 Law is relatively clear. Afterbuilding suspense in article 86(1), referring simply to the“president of the court,” it lifts the veil in article 86(2),citing more specifically “[t]he president of the court
ruling in chambers.” This judge can act only on petition
by a distrainee or an interested third party, who must
contest the seizure within 15 days of the date of theseizure report. According to article 85, the purpose ofsuch proceedings is to limit the effects of the seizure or
to authorize resumption of manufacture or performance
either under the authority of an assignee or upon
deposit of funds as security against any damages the
copyright holder might eventually claim.
However, this part of the proceedings for counterfeit
seizure, intended to minimize prejudice to the alleged
infringer, requires first that the seizure be procedurally
valid. In cases where the seizure is not judiciallyauthorized, occurs during non-business hours or
involves taking possession of receipts without special
authorization from the trial court president – and thiscase falls into that category – such seizure is procedurally
flawed and thus invalid. The jurisdiction competent insuch a case is consistently recognized. The Garoua judge
for urgent applications was therefore correct in asserting
his competence for recourse against counterfeit seizure.

Chapter 6 – Copyrightsanctions. This was a clumsy and confusing attempt togeneralize rules specifically applicable to the exploitationof audiovisual works so that they would encompass
all works of the mind. Fortunately, the Garoua judge
for urgent applications astutely distinguished one law
from the other. The only thing to add would be thatcinematographic works are subject both to copyrightlegislation, where the exploitation of rights is concerned,
and to the legislation on government use of such works.

Yet here, again, that assertion was made on the wrong
legal basis. It was argued that the seizure applicant must
(and did not) submit the matter, within 15 days of thedate of the seizure report, to the trial court president
ruling in chambers.
This confusion may well arise from the same time limit
being stipulated for both the distrainee and the seizure
applicant in articles 86(1) and 87, respectively, and hence
the two actions must be more clearly distinguished.
The action referred to in article 86 is available to the107

The law in Cameroon confers the power to authorize seizure on that “competentjudge” and on the public prosecutor.
133

distrainee, or an affected third party, allowing them tocontest the seizure before the judge ruling in chambers
within 15 days of the date of the seizure report. Article 87
requires the seizure applicant to act within the same time
limit to evidence the offense.108 If the seizure applicant
does not act within that time limit, the assets seized arereleased. Those two actions are different in every way:
one is taken by the distrainee, or by an affected third
party, before the judge for urgent applications; the otheris taken by the seizure applicant before the competent
trial judge.
B. Involvement of a state actor
With Decision No. 2/48/MINCULT/CAB of December 11,
2002 (as amended and supplemented by No. 4/56/CAB
of July 27, 2004), the Minister of Culture of Cameroon
established the National Committee to Combat Piracyof Works of the Mind in Cameroon. Article 5 of theDecision provides that a similarly named provincial
committee should be established by order of eachregional governor. Without doubt, the committee andits provincial branches were established as secular
arms of the state to combat piracy. The objective istherefore laudable.

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Yet the entry of this institution into the fight against
piracy raises questions. The first concerns the Provincial
Committee for the North Region. The governor of theNorth Region legally impaired that institution by giving
it an irregular composition. Rather than appointing his
jurisdiction’s provincial delegate of culture as committee
chair, as required by article 5 of the Decision, he tookthat power upon himself. Mr. Mabi, whose assets wereseized in the case, logically deduced that the governor
had created a committee other than that prescribed byministerial decision. He therefore invoked its irregularcomposition to demand release of the seized objects.

134

In its defense, the committee contested several points,
including the competence of the judge for urgent
applications. It argued that the governor’s order creating
the Provincial Committee was an administrative act
beyond that judge’s competence. It is fortunate thatthe judge pierced through to the question of law to
be addressed: not the regularity of the committee’s
composition, but simply the validity of the seizure
obtained by that body. The first point would require thejudge to focus on the administrative act creating thecommittee; the second, to determine only whether its
acts were in accordance with the law of December 11,
2000. Framing the case in this way, the Garoua judge
for urgent applications quite correctly asserted
his competence.
It is also true, however, that the judge’s task was easy
once the seizure was found to be flawed. What would hehave decided if the seizure had been valid? This question
invites two more: first, can an irregularly composedcommittee conduct a valid seizure; and second, even if

regularly composed, did the Provincial Committee – and,by extension, the National Committee itself – havethe standing to seize pirated works? Those questions
are significant because several African countries havecreated similar bodies. Examples include Benin109 andCôte d’Ivoire.110
Where the legislation is silent on this point, as inCameroon and other countries, the two questions echo adebate in France on which of a collective work’s authors
can seek legal remedy in respect of such works. Just as
the committee’s irregular composition was an original
flaw tainting all of its subsequent acts, so too is theownership of copyright to a collective work claimed by
one of its authors tainted by the impossibility of provingthat other contributors have transferred their rights
to that one author. The defendant might seek to takerefuge behind the absence of such transfers to escape
all liability. In one well-known case, for example, proofof the transfer of rights to a legal person exploiting awork, who then sued for infringement, was successfullyraised as a defense before a French appeal court, whichfound that the plaintiff had not demonstrated such atransfer. Reviewing the appellate decision, the French
Court of Cassation affirmed that, “in the absence ofclaims by one or more authors, exploitation of thework by a legal person, in that person’s own name,creates the presumption, as far as third parties sued for
infringement are concerned, that said person owned therights to the author’s incorporeal property.” 111
This precedent, which established presumption ofownership linked to exploitation of a work, is regrettablefor various reasons.112 Indeed, on pure principle, tohave standing for the infringement action, the originalplaintiff (the defendant on appeal) needed to deliver
proof of receiving the transfer of such rights. But, as the
Court of Cassation held, such requirements encumber
the proceedings to the infringer’s advantage. This lineof precedent in French case law can be justified only
as an additional weapon against piracy. But the samenarrow reasoning could be applied in a debate overwhether the composition of a country’s committee tocombat piracy was valid. Its composition would thenbe beside the point: an offense was committed andmust be punished. Though intellectually dissatisfying,
the argument is perfectly defensible – for while it isnormal for an infringer to dispute that infringement
has occurred, attacking the composition of the bodytaking enforcement action seems little more thanprocedural artifice.

109
110

111
108

For the application of this rule in matters of trademark, see Nazaire Gnanhoue
v. Sola Co., Judgment No. 70/15 of March 4, 2015, Court of Appeal of Lomé(obs. M. Lamotte, this collection, Chapter 3, section I).

112

Decree No. 2005/187 of April 14, 2005, on the creation, powers and operationof the national committee to combat piracy of literary and artistic works.
Decree No. 2014-420 of July 9, 2014, on the powers, organization andoperation of the national committee to combat piracy. There is little todispute, however, where the laws expressly empower those committees to act(which is the case of the committee in Benin. Cf. art. 5 of Decree No. 2005/187,
n. 115).
Cass. 1ère civ., February 22, 2000, cited by P. Sirinelli, Les bénéficiaires
initiaux du droit d’auteur: règles générales. Lamy droit des médias et de lacommunication, étude 118, No. 118-97.
See, on the question as a whole, Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault, n. 39,
Nos. 1193 et seq.

Even if the reasoning shifts because a criminal offense
is nonetheless concerned, the committee’s actions
must be considered illegal. The initiative to act in thiscase, after all, rested solely with the public prosecutor,
with the victim and with certain government bodies. In
that context, all seizures by such committees should be
subject to invalidation. Their role should be confined, atthe very most, to alerting the right holders, or obtaining
the mandate to bring action themselves on behalf ofthe right holders or their collective rights management
organizations. The representation of those organizations
on the committees is immaterial in that context. Whileit legitimizes their activity, it does not legally empower
them to seize assets unless mandated to do so by those
who do have such power.
Piracy is an elusive offense, yet the outflow of illegally
reproduced products is ubiquitous. Thus there is notime to lose while localizing such activity and hence it
appears natural to permit a special committee createdby the state to help to deter the offense, including
through seizures if necessary. Success in combating thisscourge will require acceptance of solutions that areless than intellectually tidy.
What matters for the infringer, after all – whether or not
the person performing the seizure lacks the authority
to do so, as alleged – is that the infringement be provenand that the seizure be conducted so as to preserve theinfringer’s rights … “What does it matter if the cat is grayor black if it catches the mouse?” (Deng Xiao Ping).
Joseph Fometeu

N. Copyright – Action for infringement –Obligation of the trial judges toexplicitly state the grounds forthe sentence – Failure to reply toallegations of infringement of theright of authorship
The assignment of copyright does not deprive the authorof a work of the right to be identified – that is, to mention
113

Cf. art. 85(1).

of their name on any of the media used by the assignee
to communicate the work to the public. It is incumbent
on the trial court to specify in its statement of grounds
whether the assignee has respected this principle.
SONITEL V. THE KYBIA AGENCY, Judgment No. 15-040/
Civ of April 21, 2015, Supreme Court of Niger, Civil andCommercial Chamber
Observations:This judgment issued by the Supreme Court of Niger
on April 21, 2015, discussed already in this chapter
from the standpoint of originality, calls for additional
observations, this time raising concerns about thetransfer of rights.
Facts: Recall that the Court of Appeal of Niamey had
found the firm Société Nigérienne de Télécommunication(SONITEL) liable for its use in an advertising campaign ofa photograph provided by the agency Iman but the rights
to which belonged to the agency Kybia.
In its second plea on appeal to the Supreme Court,
SONITEL criticized the appeal court’s finding of liability“for violating the economic rights of others [sic – likely
meaning ‘of the author’],” even though Kybia had
assigned copyright to the photograph to SONITEL, which
had paid for it, in accordance with article 31 of Ordinance
No. 93-27 of March 30, 1993, in respect of copyright,
related rights and folklore. SONITEL had thus, it argued,
reasonably used the photograph “according to its usual
marketing methods.”
In response, Kybia invoked the moral right protectedby article 8 of the Ordinance, arguing that no one could“deny it the right to claim authorship of the photographthat Iman had communicated to the public at therequest of SONITEL without reference to the author on
the reproductions.”
Reasoning: The Supreme Court adopted the same
reasoning as the Court of Appeal. It first affirmed that“while the principle of copyright assignment is admitted,
it must not deprive the author of the right to systematic
mention of the author’s name on all media used by
the assignee to communicate it to the public.” It thenwent on to note that the trial judges, in their statementof grounds, had not specified “whether SONITEL, asintermediary for Iman, had respected this principle
or not.” The Supreme Court saw this as a violation ofarticle 31 of the 1993 Ordinance.

Chapter 6 – Copyright

The same reasoning, it would seem, should apply tothe standing of a national committee and its provincial
branches. Infringers subjected to seizure could thenargue that those committees lacked standing. Froma strictly legal standpoint, such an argument mightprosper. Copyright law in Cameroon indeed limits who
has standing to act in defense of copyrights. The authors
themselves are naturally included, as are the holders ofrelated rights, their successors and assignees, as well as
collective rights management organizations.113 Moreover,article 2 of the ministerial decision creating Cameroon’s
National Committee defines its mission as “taking every
action to facilitate the fight against infringements ofcopyright and related rights, including awareness,
information and training activities.” That wording does
not appear to authorize seizure.

The logic is perplexing. In addition to not considering
whether such a moral right can be held only by thenatural person who has authored the work (who had
not entered into this litigation), the court seems tohave overlooked key aspects of the case warranting
examination. If Kybia had effectively invoked an
infringement of its right of authorship and the Court ofAppeal of Niamey had not ruled on the point that would
represent a failure to respond to the plea in breach of thecourt’s obligation to state the grounds for its decision,
such that censure of its decision would be justified. As
135described in the judgment, however, Kybia’s appeal did
not raise that issue; the appeal to the Supreme Court,
as that court seems to forget, concerned only the
infringement of economic rights, as found by the Courtof Appeal and contested by SONITEL. The Supreme Court
failed to respond to that point except to state baldly
that “the principle of assigning copyright is admitted.” It
would have been helpful had the court, in either granting
or rejecting the plea, taken a clear position on the matter.
To do so, it needed to decide on the applicable text.
The court censured a violation of article 31 of the 1993
Ordinance N. 93-27 – but this is a mistake. The text ofarticle 31 does not correspond at all with the language
cited in court, which was reported as follows:“Where a work is created on behalf of a naturalor private or public legal person under a work
contract of the author, or where the work is
commissioned from the author by such person,
the first owner of the economic and moral rights
shall be the author. However, the economic
rights in the work shall be deemed to have beentransferred.”
As indicated by its heading, article 31 of the Ordinancedeals only with “Ownership of rights in works createdunder a work contract.” It provides:

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights“[W]here a work is created on behalf of a naturalor private or public legal person (hereinafter‘employer’) under a work contract of the author,
absent contrary provisions in the contract, or
where the work is commissioned from the author
by such person, the first owner of the economic
and moral rights shall be the author. However,
the economic rights in the work shall be deemed
to have been transferred to the employer to theextent justified by the habitual activities of theemployer at the time of the creation of the work.”136

The court’s language, as transcribed, corresponds
word for word to the start of article 31 of annex VII to
ABR-1999 (appearing as article 35(2) in ABR-2015) – but
only the start. The Bangui text goes on to say that therights “are deemed to have been transferred to theemployer [the wording in article 35(2) of ABR-2015 ismore symmetrical, adding ‘or of such natural or legal
person’] to the extent justified by the habitual activitiesof the employer at the time of the creation of the work.”
It was therefore up to the Supreme Court to review thegrounds stated by the first-instance court to determine
whether the conditions for transferring the economic
rights indicated by this text had been fulfilled.
We might even complicate the analysis further byexamining whether the legislation of Niger – in referring
to salaried employees only, thereby leaving to common
law cases in which works are made on commission –would have offered better protection to the authors
concerned. If so, the courts could have justified passing
over the Bangui provision to apply national law andhence deny the plea.

As shown, there was meaningful matter for discussion
here – an opportunity regrettably missed.
André Lucas

O. Payment of copyright royalties –Actual use of works – Condition forrequiring payment – Capacity todisseminate the works
The public representation or performance of certain
works of the mind, claimed to be part of the repertoireof a collective copyright management organization,is subject to the payment of royalties by users underconditions determined by regulation.
According to the regulatory body concerned, a mobile
telephone company is subject to the payment of suchroyalties without the need to first determine that it has
actually used the works concerned, with failure to pay
constituting infringement.
SONITEL V. BNDA, Judgment No. 11-250-civ ofDecember 1, 2011, State Court of Niger
Observations:
The modern means available for exploiting works ofthe mind are diverse, including cable, satellite andthe internet. Public representation means “public
exhibition” of a work – that is, the act of bringing it topublic awareness through performance: by playing asong, performing a symphony, reciting a poem and soon.114 Whatever form they take, these diverse meansof exhibiting an author’s output permit authors tocontrol exploitation of, and earn a living from, theircreations. This makes it imperative to subject all suchforms of representation to a monopoly, requiring theauthor’s prior authorization for use of their creation.
This, in broad strokes, is the substance of the judgment
rendered by the State Court of Niger on December 1,
2011, in a case between Société Nigérienne deTélécommunication (SONITEL) and the national copyrightbureau, the Bureau National de Droit d’Auteur (BNDA).
Facts: The dispute began when the BNDA, the publicorganization responsible for collective copyright
management in Niger, required SONITEL, by extrajudicial
Act served on August 22, 2001, to pay the BNDA
CFAF 540 million in copyright royalties owed for having
represented or publicly performed certain works of themind claimed as part of the BNDA’s repertoire.
Following SONITEL’s refusal, the BNDA sought payment
before the Niamey Regional Court, where its claim wasdenied in Judgment No. 181 of March 28, 2003, on the
grounds that it had failed to prove that SONITEL had
used works from its repertoire.
The BNDA then appealed to the Niamey Court of Appeal.
In its Judgment No. 140/4, of June 21, 2004, the appeal
114

Gautier, n. 67, at 32.

court overruled the first-instance court, finding in favorof the BNDA and ordering SONITEL to pay the royalties.
According to the Court of Appeal, when read together,
Ordinance 93-027 of March 30, 1993, on copyright,
related rights and expressions of folklore and OrderNo. 157/MCI/MCC of October 14, 1997, regulatingroyalties for copyright, related rights and expressions offolklore do not make the actual use of works a decisive
condition for requiring telephone networks to pay
copyright royalties.

Unfortunately, the State Court of Niger delivered a blow
to that proposition by making actual use of a work an
optional criterion. According to that court, any debate
on actual use had been rendered redundant by theroyalties schedule established and applicable to theappellant, to which the B8 tariff category was applicable
as a consequence of its classification as a “telephone
network.” Ordinance No. 93-027 made it moot, the Court
reasoned, whether SONITEL disseminated the artistic
works or not.

Attacking that line of argument, SONITEL appealed to theState Court of Niger (which was acting as Supreme Court
during the military transition in the country115) to quash
the appeal court’s ruling.

This position is regrettable, and it breaks with classic
precepts for literary and artistic property rights. But
what elements, then, are considered essential tocharacterize an activity as execution of a work?

Reasoning: The State Court was asked to rule on whether
the actual use of protected works is a condition sine qua
non for the charging of royalties. The judge’s response
seems to cast doubt on the entire copyright system.

B. Essential elements: a capacity to make a work available
to the public
A simple reading of the 1993 Ordinance offers material
elements with which to characterize the public
representation of a work: the work being made available,
and the existence of a public for it.

I. Elements constituting the public performance of a work
Under article 1 of Ordinance 93-027, particularly
article 1(v): “Communication of a work … to the publicmeans the act of making the work publicly available.”
Based on that wording, public representation consists of
two elements. Although the Ordinance strongly implies
actual use of the work, the State Court held it to be
optional (A), deeming two other elements mandatory foran activity to be considered a public exhibition: the work
being made available, and the existence of a public thatwill see it (B).
A. The optional element: use of the work
While the term “use” does not appear explicitly in
the Ordinance of March 30, 1993, it is nonethelessan intrinsic part of a work’s representation or public
performance. The Ordinance is undeniably clear inproviding that communication “is the act of making thework publicly available.”
A better illustration is provided by Order No. 157/MCI/
MCC. Article 1 of that regulation sets out the royalty
amounts to be paid by users of literary and artistic
works. Its wording clearly makes use of the works adecisive factor in requiring such payments.
That reading of the 1993 Ordinance is consistent with thelegal framework and mechanisms for copyright. To earna living from their art, authors should be able to deriveincome from their works of the mind, which requires thatthey be able to control the exploitation of those works –that is, their actual use by third-party consumers.
115

See Ordinance No. 2010-16 of April 15, 2010, on the organization, powers andfunctioning of the State Court.

The requirement of a work being made available
necessarily means its exhibition, in the sense of its
communication to the public. This element does notpose particular difficulties in practice. The court seems
to leave space for ambiguity, however, about what such
exhibition must consist of, finding that the appellant’s
capacity to disseminate the work amply sufficed toconsider communication to have occurred and thus tomake the appellant ultimately liable for the paymentof royalties.
The 1993 Ordinance requires too the existence of apotential public to whom the work is to be communicated.
Representation is subject to the monopoly benefiting
an author only if the work is communicated to a public.116
Traditionally, “public” has been understood as opposed tothe concept of a “family circle.” In simple terms, it meansa group of people (who are not clients of the person
making the work available) gathered in the same place, atthe same time, to experience contact with the work.117 But
that traditional definition is clearly out of step with newtechnological realities in the communication of works.
Case law has thus dispensed with the same-time, sameplace requirement to adapt to, for example, the televisingof works in multiple hotel rooms (not the same place) for
digital transmission on demand (not at the same time).

Chapter 6 – Copyright

In reaching a decision to subject SONITEL to the paymentof copyright royalties (section II), the court provides
clarification concerning the constituent elements ofrepresentation (section I).

Whether or not it actually reaches the public, the work
must be available for public access, without which there
can be no communication. On the question of the publicactually receiving such communication, article 1(2) of
the 1993 Ordinance provides: “Any process necessary to
make the work publicly available and that permits accessis a communication, and a work is considered to havebeen ‘communicated’ even if the public for which it isintended does not actually receive it, see it or hear it.”

116
117

Vivant and Bruguiere, n. 22, at 34.
Ibid, at 343.
137

The court interpreted this as making it an optional
criterion that the public actually receive the work;
the most important thing is that the communication
can reach the public concerned, because the author
has a monopoly right to make a work available to the
public. Illustrating its position, the court affirmed that“effective use of a work occurs by virtue solely of thecapacity of the structure concerned to make it publicly
available through the possession and deployment ofan appropriate technical mechanism; the circumstancethat no one actually receives it, sees it or hears it
is immaterial.”

It is hard to remain sanguine about the approach takenby the court. Seeking grounds on which to convict
SONITEL, it centered the company’s mere capacity todisseminate the works at issue as the main justification
for charging it royalties, whether or not the protected
objects have been actually exploited. And yet, according
to the spirit and letter of the provisions cited by the
court, actual use or exploitation of the works is whatgives rise to royalties. The payment of royalties is simply
the counterpart for consumption of the fruits of theauthor’s intellectual efforts. The use of a work is a judicial
fact, not a matter of opinion.

II. Liability for the payment of royalties

The appellant attempted to demonstrate this to thecourt by demanding proof from the BNDA that it(SONITEL) was communicating protected works to the
public. Unfortunately for the appellant, the court batted
this argument away, citing Order No. 157/MCI/MCC of
October 14, 1997, requiring the payment of royalties bycommunication networks. In short, from the moment theuser’s activity is covered by that regulation, the user isliable for the payment of royalties, whether the protected
works are actually consumed or not.

As a sanction for its unauthorized communication of
the works, the appellant was held liable for the paymentof royalties. In concrete terms, the State Court of Niger
reiterated the financial penalties for SONITEL (A), with noconcern for the incongruities its decision created (B).
A. The financial penalties for SONITEL
Essentially a confirmation of the appeal court’s sanction,
the State Court ordered the appellant to pay the
copyright royalties due and awarded damages to BNDA,
the defendant on appeal.
In reality, royalties consist simply of regular payments
made by users exploiting a work of the mind. In
principle, this remuneration corresponds to a proportionof the receipts generated by economic exploitation of
the work; in practice, however, it is often difficult – if not
impossible – to assess receipts as a basis for calculating
what users owe. Flat-rate remuneration is therefore
often fixed by regulation.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

In this case, the BNDA was responsible for collecting theroyalties due to authors contributing to its repertoire.
The Order cited in the case fixed the annual amount ofsuch royalties for telephone networks at CFAF 30,000 per
network. As indicated during the proceedings, SONITEL
had two telephone networks covering all of Niger.
Accordingly, the company was ordered to pay CFAF 180,000
in royalties for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001.

138

As if to be logically consistent, the State Court of Niger
replicated too the appeal court’s decision to award
damages. Thus, for the prejudice it caused to thedefendant on appeal by abusively resisting the paymentof the royalties it owed, SONITEL was ordered to pay indamages an additional amount of CFAF 500,000.
B. Critique of the State Court’s sentence
The State Court’s judgment is incoherent in at least
two ways. Above all, it strayed from the remuneration
logic behind royalties, which are still perceived as thecounterpart to exploitation of a right. The court confined
itself to creating a presumption that protected works
had been used and then making that presumption
a substitute for their “actual use.” As if that were
not enough, the court forces a misconception of the
remuneration accorded to the right holder as a form oftax rather than simply royalties.

By making the use of works an optional criterion, thecourt created a presumption of use at the expense of all
persons with the technical means to make works of themind publicly available. That interpretation of the texts
cited in the plea is legally consequential and could leadto royalties being collected unduly.
Indeed, the court ended up misrepresenting copyrightroyalties as a kind of mandatory levy. In private law, aroyalty is a sum regularly paid to its beneficiary by theuser of an intellectual property right (such as copyright,
patent or trademark) as payment for – a counterpart
to – that use. The payment of royalties is conditioned on
use of the right concerned; under a reciprocal contract,
it is exploitation of the work that is cause for payment.
A royalty is thus not a tax, which is a compulsory levy
without counterpart.
SONITEL tried to hammer that point home in its
arguments – but to no avail.
Aristide Fade

P. Procedure – Copyright – Counterfeit
seizure – Proceedings on the merits –Unsuccessful plaintiff – Compensation
for prejudice resulting from seizure
An unsuccessful plaintiff for infringement, having been
judicially authorized to seize assets, must compensate
the distrainee if damages result.
Société Zenith-Plastics Côte d’Ivoire (ZPCI) v. Société
Industrielle de Fabrication de Plastique en Côte
d’Ivoire (SIFPLAST-CI), Judgment No. 1412/15 of July 2,
2015, Commercial Court of Abidjan

Facts: The facts of the case are straightforward.
The company Zenith-Plastics Côte d’Ivoire (ZPCI),
which specialized in manufacturing and marketing
plastic materials, developed a model shoe known
as “Model 838,” which it registered with the OAPIin 2000. The company manufactured and marketed
the product until 2009. In December of that year,
the company SIFPAST-CI, also engaged in the
manufacture of plastic shoes and believing Model 838
to be a copy of its “Super 13” and “Super 14” models,
which it had registered with the OAPI in 1996
(with renewals in 2003 and 2008), seized all stocksof Model 838 shoes for sale in client stores. (Thejudgment does not say under what conditions.) It
then obtained authorization from the president of theHigh Court of Yopougon to conduct a seizure on ZPCI
premises, on January 5, 2010, of all manufacturing
equipment, materials and stocks of Model 838 shoes,
and it went on to bring action for infringement
and unfair competition, seeking payment of
CFAF 738 million in damages.
SIFPAST-CI won its case before the Yopougon trial
court, the decision of which was then confirmed by
the Court of Appeal of Abidjan.
That judgment however, was then quashed on June 7,
2012, by the Judiciary Chamber of the Supreme
Court, which ordered SIFPLAST-CI to release all
objects seized from ZPCI and to ensure restitutionof all material assets and goods under penalty of
CFAF 5 million per day of delay in doing so, reckoned
from the date of notification of the decision.
Considering that the counterfeit seizure in 2010 had
paralyzed it throughout the judicial proceedings, ZPCI
sought damages. It obtained the designation of anexpert from the president of the Commercial Court of
Abidjan (by an order confirmed by the Court of Appeal
of Abidjan) to determine its material, commercial
and financial damages, which were assessed at
CFAF 870,536,049. ZPCI then sued SIFPLAST-CI for thatamount, in 2015, in compensation for the “irregularseizure,” as well as CFAF 335 million in punitive
damages. The defendant contested the claim, saying
that, in performing the seizure at issue, it was merely
executing a court decision.
Reasoning: The problem is well known, but thesolution in this case was not obvious. The difficulty
here lay not in the consequences of any liability, forthe compensation of damages is covered by common
law and calls for no further comment; rather, it lay

in the court’s validation of an expert report despite
faults found in it by the defendant.118
That left two questions:I.
II.

on the principle itself; andon the conditions for such liability.

I. The principle of liability for the seizure applicant
unsuccessfully bringing action for infringement
The defendant company disputed the very principle ofits liability. It said that it had committed no “assault” andthat to consider legal execution of a judicial decision as
incurring liability would amount to “holding the state
liable for employing judges who issue judicial decisions.”
The Commercial Court of Abidjan did not agree. It
recognized that the defendant “had the right to conduct
a counterfeit seizure,” but said that it was nonethelessobliged to remedy any damages caused to the company
targeted for seizure. According to the court, a provisionin ABR-1999 that “the judge may order the requester todeposit a certain amount as guarantee for the damages
which the author may claim” shows that “the principleof compensating third parties injured by a counterfeit
seizure is clearly admitted in intellectual property law.”
The conclusion is thus inevitable: “It is therefore to noavail that the defendant brandishes judicial rulings toevade all liability.”
The court’s reasoning is laudable on all points. The
notion that execution of a judicial decision cannot bea source of liability is unacceptable. From that pointof view, the court is correct in invoking the Bangui
Agreement, particularly with respect to industrial
designs and models under article 33(3) of annex IV. It
is interesting from a historical standpoint that, in 1791,the first French law on patents for inventions, which
instituted counterfeit seizures, provided expressly forcompensation of the distrainee.119
The situation is comparable to that of a plaintiff
provisionally executing a judgment under appeal. No one
denies that damages caused by such execution should
be remedied if the judgment is overturned. In France, theCourt of Cassation sitting in full court clearly enunciatedthe solution, all the wider in scope in that the impugned
decision in that case had been spontaneously executedby the losing party.120

118

119
120

Chapter 6 – CopyrightObservations:
In this case, the Commercial Court of Abidjan
responded convincingly to the question of whatshould be done when a plaintiff’s action for
infringement is dismissed after they have been
judicially authorized to perform a seizure. The present
case concerns designs and models, but the lessons
that can be drawn from this judgment are valid moregenerally, for all intellectual property rights.

The judge also applies common law to calculate the penalty. Calling theexercise more than the simple arithmetic of multiplying the number ofdays of non-compliance by the daily penalty, the court reduces the amount,considering the circumstances in the case, to CFAF 200 million.
J.-P. Stenger (2004) Saisie-contrefaçon – Recours après saisie-contrefaçon.
JurisClasseur Brevets, Fasc. 4634, 206, No. 130.
Cass. ass. plén., February 24, 2006, No. 5-12.679, JurisData No. 2006-032415,
D. 2006, 1085 (note R. Perrot).
139

II. The conditions under which liability can be incurredby a seizure applicant unsuccessfully bringing action
for infringement
The difficulties lay in the nature of the liability incurred
and thus the conditions under which the seizure
was performed.
It must be admitted on this point that the judgment,
as reported, is not entirely unambiguous. It begins
by affirming that the obligation to remedy damages
derives from “the general principle of civil and criminal
liability set forth in article 1382 of the Civil Code.” That
provision says that “any human act causing damage toothers obliges the person at fault for the act to remedy
such damage.” But in intellectual property matters, thejudgment immediately adds, “counterfeit seizures arealways performed at the risk of the seizure applicant,
who must compensate injured parties if it is ultimately
found that the applicant’s intellectual property rights
have not been infringed as claimed.” The two obligations
are fundamentally different: the first refers to liability for
fault; the second, to liability without fault.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

The idea that the seizure applicant’s liability is incurred
only if its fault is proven is not illogical. It amounts tosaying that a plaintiff who sues for infringement but is
ultimately unsuccessful is liable for the consequencesof seizure performed prior to the judgment only if theseizure occurs under conditions making it wrongful. This
would be the case, for example, where accompanying
publicity is intended to harm the distrainee, or where theseizure applicant could not have been unaware of thefragility of the intellectual property right being claimed.

140

Conversely, the seizure applicant would be exonerated if
it had performed the seizure under normal conditions or
had misunderstood, in good faith, the existence or scopeof its rights. In France, part of the case law in this area,
especially in patent matters, adopts such reasoning. In
1964, for instance, the French Court of Cassation ruledthat “a judgment is rightly founded in denying damages
claimed for wrongful seizure of patent-infringing
goods, rejecting the appellant’s argument that as aprecautionary measure, counterfeit seizure incurs theseizure applicant’s objective liability if the seizure proves
to be unjustified and prejudicial, and for that fact alone,irrespective of any fault.” 121This lamentable outcome alone indicates defects in the
court’s analysis. It must not be forgotten that counterfeit
seizure is a provisional measure only and that thebroader such measures are, as in this case,123 the greater
the risk incurred. Who assumes this risk when the legal
action fails? To that question, the judgment is correct inanswering that counterfeit seizure “is always conductedat the risk of the seizure applicant,” citing the absence ofintellectual property infringement alone as grounds forrequiring compensation.
The case law in France predominantly follows thatreasoning. The French Court of Cassation has imposed
the principle that “any person conducting counterfeit
seizure does so at their own risk and is thus liable
for any damages that may result.” 124 It applies thesame reasoning to the related hypothesis concerning
provisional execution.125
The Commercial Court of Abidjan, despite someambiguities, follows in the same line of reasoning andcan therefore be applauded.
André Lucas

Q. Copyright – Conflict of laws –Condition of foreign nationals –Legislative reciprocity invoked against
foreign authors – Berne Convention –National treatment
It has been held that authors of foreign nationality
can enjoy their copyrights in Cameroon only bydemonstrating that their national law accords tonationals of Cameroon the same level of protection
provided under the law in Cameroon.
MP ET RAPAC V. MOHAMADOU AMINOU, Judgment
No. 367/Com of April 17, 2003, High Court of Ngaoundéré
Observations:This case is an opportunity to examine the situationof foreign nationals in respect of literary and artistic
123
124

If applied in this case, this reasoning would have denied
the claim for compensation. Nothing in the judgment
supports the idea of a wrongful seizure. From that pointof view, the court’s reference to “irregular seizures” 122 isunfortunate, because a seizure authorized by a judge
is not in itself “irregular.” Nor is there any evidence
that SIFPLAST-CI acted in bad faith, knowing its case to
be weak.

121
122

Cass. com., June 8, 1964, Ann. propr. ind. 1964, 254. See also CA Paris, pôle 5-1,
January 30, 2013, No. 11/5261, PIBD 2013, No. 982, III, 1132.
It is unclear whether the plural form includes the seizure performed in stores,
in December 2009, or only that conducted on the company’s premises, onJanuary 5, 2010.

125

Where ring-fencing, which unfortunately was not requested, would havebeen fully justified.
Cass. com., October 19, 1999, No. 97-12.845. See Stenger, n. 126, No. 130: “Aparty that takes this exorbitant measure, prejudicial by definition to the party
targeted for seizure, necessarily does so at its own risk should it ultimately
prove unjustified … Therefore, in the case of counterfeit seizure, if proof of
counterfeiting is found and the risk is then incurred by the party targeted
for seizure, the same result in a case where no illegality is found would be
illogical.” See also Stenger, n. 126, No. 137: “No one is forced to resort tocounterfeit seizure. But a party that does so must assume the attendant
responsibility. A proper balance between the rights of a seizure applicant,in taking that exorbitant measure, and the rights of a party unjustifiably
targeted for seizure, cannot be disregarded without compromising
institutional integrity.” See also P. Greffe (2000) Dessins et modèles. JCP
E 2000, 1280, No. 92: “This case law is all the more meritorious in that
seizure has consistently been treated as an optional formality for essentiallyevidentiary purposes and that proof of counterfeiting can be provided by anymeans.”
Cass. ass. plén, February 24, 2006, n. 127: “Whereas provisional execution ofan enforceable judicial decision can occur only at the risk of the executing party…” For an earlier case, see Cass. 1ère civ., June 6, 1990, Bull. civ. 1990, I, No. 140:
“Even if provisionally authorized, execution of a judicial decision later appealed
occurs only at the risk of the executing party.”Facts: “Artists/musicians,” claiming to act on behalf ofan artists’ association, the Rassemblement des artistes
professionnels et amateurs du Cameroun (RAPAC),
arranged for the seizure from a discotheque operated by
the plaintiff of 2,133 videocassettes and CDs not bearing
the label SOCINADA (Société civile nationale des droitsd’auteur, a collective rights management organization
operating in the country at the time). The attorney
contesting that action argued that the works fixed on the
media seized were by authors of “foreign nationality” andthat no evidence had been provided, as required by thelaw in Cameroon, that the national laws of the authors
concerned provided the same level of protection as local
law to “Cameroonian singers and musicians.”
Reasoning: In endorsing that line of argument, the High
Court of Ngaoundéré disregarded the fundamental
principle of national treatment (section I) without
considering the conditions set out in international
treaty law circumscribing that highly hypothetical
reciprocity (section II).
I. The principle of national treatment
To justify its acquittal, the court invoked thereciprocity provided for under article 93(1) of the Law
of December 19, 2000, on copyright in Cameroon,
which stipulates that “foreign nationals enjoy in
Cameroon the copyrights or related rights they holdon the condition that the law of the State of which they
are nationals, or on whose territory they have their
domicile, headquarters or establishment, protects
the rights of Cameroonians.” It concluded that, absent
demonstration by the public prosecutor and the victims
that this condition has been met by legislation in the
countries concerned, infringement could not be found.
This logic is not convincing. It bypasses, in effect,
article 94 of the same law, which stipulates that “theprovisions of this law concerning the protection ofliterary and artistic works, interpretations, phonograms,
videograms and programs, apply to works protectedunder an international treaty to which Cameroon is aparty.” With respect to copyright, the text refers to theBerne Convention – specifically, its article 5(1), which
provides: “Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works forwhich they are protected under this Convention, in
countries of the [copyright protection] Union other thanthe country of origin, the rights which their respective
laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, aswell as the rights specially granted by this Convention.”
That provision is echoed by article 5(3) of ABR-2015:“Non-nationals shall enjoy the provisions of thisAgreement and its annexes under the same conditions
as nationals.”

The principle behind those three texts is known as“national treatment” and it is the exact opposite ofreciprocity. National treatment would mean that a Union
country (a signatory to the Berne Convention) must
guarantee the nationals of another Union country (aswell as residents thereof) enjoyment of the same rights
enjoyed by its own nationals, even if the latter do not
enjoy the same rights in that other country.
This rule pertains to the condition of foreign nationals –and foreign nationals alone. From that point of view, thewording of article 94 of the 2000 law is questionable: inreferring expressly to application of the “provisions inthis law,” it could give the impression of a rule governing
conflict of laws (an impression possibly reinforced by
the words “national treatment”). But the two questions
are different. It is one thing whether foreign nationals
may be deprived of enjoying a right because of theirforeign nationality, but quite another whether one law oranother should apply to the infringement of their rights(which need not, theoretically, be the law of the forum
seized). A good way of avoiding confusion would be to
speak not of “national treatment” but of “assimilation offoreign authors to national authors.” 126Considered together, articles 93 and 94 of the 2000 law
should have cautioned the High Court of Ngaoundéré
against invoking the “sacrosanct principle of reciprocity
in international relations.” But with the Berne Convention
on the table, the issue clearly became one of national
treatment. The Berne Convention stipulates reciprocity
for authors from Union countries in exceptional cases
only, concerning resale rights, for instance.127 In thepresent case, based on passages in the judgment,
the Berne Convention was indeed on the table. The
judgment refers to some of the authors claiming
infringement as being nationals of the United Kingdom(the court incorrectly refers to “English” nationality), of
Niger and of Nigeria – as well as of India (if one accepts
that meaning for a reference to “Hindu” nationality). They
are all Union countries under the Berne Convention (afounding country, in the case of the United Kingdom).
Since Cameroon is also a Union country (since 1960) andcontrary to the court’s judgment, no form of reciprocity
could be invoked against those authors.

Chapter 6 – Copyrightproperty. In a time of globalization, this is a crucial
question too often confused with that of the law
applicable. Regrettably, however, the High Court ofNgaoundéré glossed over the question, based on abiased reading of the law in Cameroon, to reject theallegation of infringement.

II. Conditions for reciprocity
Suppose that some of the authors had been nationals
and residents of non-Union countries unable to proveresidence in a Union country. The hypothesis is unlikely,
given the Berne Convention’s global scale, but cannot be
ruled out, since the “foreign nationalities” listed (with thesurprising inclusion of “Hindu” and “Hausa”), ending with
an ellipsis indicating that the list is not exhaustive, arecited by the court as illustrations only.
On first reading, article 93(1) of the 2000 law, subjecting
the enjoyment of copyright to legislative reciprocity,
would seem to apply. That impression is strengthened
126
127

See Lucas, Lucas-Schloetter and Bernault, n. 37, Nos. 1759 et seq.
Berne Convention, art. 14 ter (2).
141

by article 5(4) of ABR-2015: the provisions concerning
national treatment “shall apply to non-nationals of astate party to an international agreement to which theOrganization or its member states are parties, or nonnationals who do not have their principal establishment
or residence in such a state under conditions ofreciprocity.” The wording leaves two things to be
desired. First, the phrase “or non-nationals” appears to
be a drafting error; to be correct, it should read “or to
non-nationals.” Second, it is clumsy to say in the samesentence that national treatment is subject to reciprocity,
since national treatment, as discussed, is understood as
automatic assimilation of non-nationals to nationals.

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

It should be noted, however, that the wording ofarticle 5(4) of ABR-2015 is less than ideal. A literalreading of the text (starting with the conjunction “or”
and glossing over the drafting error) would be that
foreign nationals of a Union country who reside in a
non-Union country would be subject to the reciprocity
requirement, which would be contrary to both the Berne
Convention and article 93(1) of the Cameroonian law.
In addition – and this objection applies to both texts– the Berne Convention makes it impossible to reason
exclusively in terms of nationality (or of residence).
Article 5(1) guarantees national treatment for authors
in respect of “works for which they are protected under
this Convention.” Determination of the country of origin
is essential to that end.128 Specifically, a national of a nonUnion country who publishes a work for the first time ina Union country is entitled to national treatment. Whatneeded to be done in this case was thus to ascertain the
country of origin (in the sense of article 5(4) of the Berne
Convention) of each of the works in question.

142

Admittedly, under article 6 of the Convention, evena Union country of origin may require reciprocity if
the author’s country of nationality (hypothetically a
non-Union country) “fails to protect in an adequate
manner” the works of authors who are nationals of
the Union country. But this assumes that the Union
country “avails itself of this right” by giving notice tothe Director General of WIPO “by a written declaration
specifying the countries in regard to which protection isrestricted, and the restrictions to which rights of authors
who are nationals of those countries are subjected”(article 6(1) and (3), respectively). This mechanism, which
did not exist in the initial version of the Convention,
was introduced when it was revised in 1928 at Canada’s
request, that country seeking to reserve a retaliatory
possibility vis-à-vis its powerful neighbor, the UnitedStates, which had not yet acceded to the Convention.
Canada has not availed itself of the mechanism, however,having given no notice and made no declaration to that
effect.129 Nor does it appear that other countries havedone so. In other words, application of the text to thecircumstances in this case amounts to pure hypothesis.

128
129

C. Masouye (1978) Guide de la Convention de Berne. Paris: WIPO, 34.
W. Nordemann, K. Vinck and P.W. Hertin (1983) Droit d’auteur international
et droits voisins dans les pays de langue allemande et les États membres de laCommunauté européenne (trans. J. Fournier). Brussels: Bruylant, 86.

The question was obviously complex and warranted
more than the peremptory response delivered inthis judgment.
André LucasA.
Unfair competition – Conditions: existenceof a competitive situation – Elements of
unfair competition
144
B.
Long-term storage of a competitor’sgas cylinders – Sabotage of others –Disorganization of the sales network of anestablished competitor – Inappropriate
application of the intentional element
149
C.
Civil proceedings for trademark infringement
and unfair competition – Voluntary
participation – Non-exclusive licensee– Admissibility
151

153

Chapter 7 – Unfair competition

D.
Industrial design or model – Unfair
competition – Similarity liable to create
confusion in the consumer’s mind –Fault – Damage – Diversion of clientele– Compensation

143

Chapter 7
Unfair competition
A. Unfair competition – Conditions:existence of a competitive situation –Elements of unfair competition
Legal action against unfair competition can prevail only if
the following two preconditions have been met:
• a competitive situation exists between the plaintiff
and defendant; and• the three elements of unfair competition – a wrongfulact, damage suffered and a causal link between the
two – are present.

• the defendants’ school’s extremely low tuition costs
forced him to lower his own school’s fees; and• there was reduced availability of teachers.

ADAMOU IDRISSA V. MAHAMAN MINDAOU, Judgment
No. 13 – 086/c of April 4, 2013, State Court of Niger,
Judicial Chamber

The legal question put to the State Court was whether
the conditions required for competition to be ruled unfair
were met in the case.

Observations:This judgment, issued by the Judicial Chamber of theState Court of Niger on April 4, 2013, highlights theconditions for successful legal action against unfair
competition. The case pitted Adamou Idrissa, promoterof school CSP Dessa, against Mahaman Mindaou andother promoters of school CSP Gobir.

Reasoning: To answer that question, the court began
by recalling the legal basis for the treatment of unfair
competition, consisting of articles 1382 and 1383
of the Civil Code and articles 4 and 7 1 of the Bangui
Agreement establishing the African Intellectual Property
Organization (OAPI) – of which Niger is a member – asrevised on March 2, 1999 (ABR-1999). The court thenrecalled the purpose of, and conditions for, unfair
competition proceedings:

Facts: The facts of the case are quite simple. Although
they did not effectively open their establishment forthe 2008–09 academic year before completing theadministrative requirements, Mr. Mindaou and the otherpromoters of CSP Gobir had already undertaken to
recruit teachers, register students, display posters andair radio spots on the conditions and procedures forstudent registration.
Mr. Idrissa, the promoter of CSP Dessa, where three ofthe promoters of CSP Gobir had formerly been part-timeteachers, considered that their promotional campaign,
recruitment of teachers and registration of students,
all before completing the required administrative
formalities, constituted unfair competition. Mr. Idrissa
successfully instituted proceedings for that offense
against Mr. Mindaou and the other CSP Gobir promoters
before the High Court of Maradi. That court’s judgment
was then quashed by the Court of Appeal of Zinder
on the grounds that the acts alleged against the CSP
Gobir promoters did not constitute unfair competition.
CSP Gobir had indeed rolled out publicity, with posters
and radio spots on student registration, before
receiving administrative authorization to operate, but
the establishment did not open until it had received
those permissions.
Dissatisfied with the appeal court’s ruling, Mr. Idrissa
144

petitioned the State Court of Niger to quash it. He argued
that the promotional posters, radio spots and student
recruitment proved the school had in effect opened
prior to authorization, causing damage to others andconstituting unfair competition subject to articles 1382
and 1383 of the Civil Code. According to Mr. Idrissa, thedefendants’ wrongful conduct had been deliberate andvengeful, damaging his own school in two ways:• the purpose is the regulation of the right tocompete, primarily to ensure sufficient and effective
competition in the interests of free trade andenterprise, thereby safeguarding the interests ofindividual competitors and consumers, as well as thegeneral public interest; and• the conditions, that an act incurring liability must havebeen committed, damage must have been suffered,a causal link must exist between the act and thedamage, and the parties must supply similar products
or services to a common clientele.
The court dismissed Mr. Idrissa’s excuses for his failure
to meet the conditions required for a finding of unfair
competition. The court considered the trial court to be at
fault in ruling the competition unfair having ascertained
neither the existence of a competitive situation before
CSP Gobir was legally established nor the latter’scommission of unfair competitive acts thereafter.

1

The judge failed to specify that those articles are contained in annex VIII to
the Agreement.

The court’s reasoning invites us to review the two distinct
conditions that must be met for competition to be ruled
unfair – namely, that:
I.
II.

there must be a competitive situation; andthe elements of unfair competition must be present.

The case also implicitly raises a third legal question thatthe court should have addressed:
III. the legal basis for actions against unfair competition
in OAPI countries.
I. The existence of a competitive situation
Establishing the existence of a competitive situation
between two professionals is itself subject to two
conditions: their engagement in competitive activities(A), and their appeal to a common clientele (B).
A. Engagement in competitive activities
Article 1(a) of annex VIII to ABR-1999 defines unfair
competition as pertaining to industrial or commercial
activities. The subsequent revision, ABR-2015, added
a third category: activities relating to the liberal
professions. Education, the activity concerned in thiscase, is neither an industrial nor a liberal professional
activity: can it be considered a commercial activity?
Both the trial court and the State Court behaved as
though the answer – that education can be considered
a commercial activity – goes without saying, but that is
far from so. A better answer comes from article 3 of the
OHADA Uniform Act Relating to General Commercial
Law. That article defines a “commercial act by nature” as“an act by which a person engages in the movement ofgoods that he produces or purchases or an act by which
he provides services with the intent to make a monetary
profit.” While education is not a good, it is a service. Is
its intent to make a monetary profit? Since it does notappear among the acts enumerated in article 3, one
might hesitate to consider education a commercial act
by nature. The enumeration in article 3, however, is not
restrictive. The commercial nature of the educational
activity provided by both CSP Dessa and CSP Gobir, tothe extent that it was conducted in exchange for tuition
fees, could thus be based on their intent to profit from it.
As a profit-making rather than philanthropic activity, it
qualified as a commercial and thus competitive activity
under article 3.
This characterization of education as a commercial
activity, however, is to some extent flawed, particularly
since it is not identified as such – nor as a civil activity – in
Ordinance No. 96/035 of June 19, 1996, regulating private
education in Niger. By way of comparison, in Cameroon,article 2(1) of Law No. 4/22 of July 22, 2004, regulating
the organization and functioning of private education,

characterizes private education as a social service of
public utility performed by private partners. Although
the Ordinance in Niger is silent on the nature of private
education, it is certainly a social service of public utility inthat country, as it is in Cameroon.
As a social service of public utility, private education
can be considered not a commercial but a civil activity.
Moreover, annex VIII to ABR-1999 restricts the concept
of unfair competition to industrial and commercial
activities. That restrictive approach, however, is also
flawed. The same annex to ABR-2015 expanded theconception to include activities relating to the liberal
professions. It should now be expanded further, toinclude all civil activities performed with the aim ofcapturing clientele. On that basis, the educational
activities conducted by CSP Dessa and CSP Gobir, thoughcivil in character, could also be considered competitive.
B. The existence of a clientele
The State Court found fault in the trial judge’s
recognition of unfair competition on the basis of CSP
Gobir’s activities before it legally existed – in displaying
posters, airing radio spots, recruiting teachers andregistering students – without explaining how CSP Gobir
could have seriously competed with CSP Dessa or drawn
from the same clientele.
Recalling that “[u]nfair competition always pertains toa real and common clientele, with both parties offering
similar products or services to the same clients,” thecourt highlighted the two factors traditionally considered
in determining the existence of a clientele – namely, thatthe clientele must be real (1), and it must be common to
the two parties (2).
1. The existence of a real clientele
At what point does a business concern have a realclientele? Two main answers have been advanced in
the literature: one based on the concern being open forbusiness; 2 the other on it actually operating.3 The French
Court of Cassation, preferring the latter, rejected thenotion that a potential clientele can constitute a real one.4
In this case, it appears from the unchallenged facts
established in the dossier and court hearings, assummarized by both the trial and appeal court judges,that CSP Gobir published its promotional posters andaired radio spots before receiving the administrative
authorizations it needed to operate – but also thatit opened for business only after receiving them.
The trial judge found against CSP Gobir for unfair
competition, based on its activities prior to existing
legally – apparently considering those preparatory
activities sufficient for clientele and thus forcompetition to materialize whether or not the school
was later authorized to open. The trial judge, in other2
3
4

Chapter 7 – Unfair competition

The court concurred with the appeal court that the acts
impugned by Mr. Idrissa, the promoter of CSP Dessa, did
not qualify as unfair competition, even if they did reduce
his own establishment’s tuition income.

Weill and Chabasse. Création et disparition du fonds du commerce. Juriscl.
Fonds de commerce, Fasc. VI.
Cohen (1955) La propriété des fonds de commerce exploités dans lesimmeubles spécialisés. JCP 1955, I, 1222.
Cass. com., February 27, 1973, JCP 1973, II, 17403 (obs. A.S.); Cass. 3ème civ.,
May 18, 1978, Bull. civ. 1978, III, No. 205, 159.
145

words, rejected both theses: the one based on theconcern being open for business and the other, on it
actually operating.
The State Court quite rightly rejected that solution,
finding fault in the trial judge’s failure to explain how CSP
Gobir could have seriously competed with CSP Dessa
based on its preparatory activities alone. According
to the court, no educational establishment can legallyexist, or have a clientele, without first being authorized
to open. For a school, posters, radio spots, teacher
recruitment and student registration are not enoughin themselves to make clients appear; that can happen
only once the school has been authorized to open forbusiness and does so.
2. The existence of a common clientele
The court also found fault in the trial judge’s failure to
explain how CSP Gobir could have shared a common
clientele with CSP Dessa before receiving authorization
to open. It thus embraced the traditional concept
of unfair competition,5 in line with most case law in
OAPI countries.6

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

But that concept is now being challenged in Frenchlaw, where judicial action against unfair competition
is no longer subject to the existence of competition
between the parties.7 There, the offense of unfair
competition can thus be committed in the absence of acommon clientele.8

146

For that reason, the court did not consider it necessary
to explicitly address the common clientele condition inconsidering the subsequent phase. It preferred to focus
instead on the existence of elements constituting unfair
competition imputed by the plaintiff (CSP Dessa) to thedefendants (CSP Gobir).
II. The elements of unfair competition
Successful legal action against unfair competition, as
the State Court helpfully recalled, requires the following
elements: an act of unfair competition incurring liability
or fault, damage suffered and a causal link between
the two. The court does not dwell at any length on thecondition concerning damage (B) or on the causal link (C),but only on the act of unfair competition (A).
A. The act of unfair competition
According to the court, to incur liability for unfair
competition under articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil
Code, an act must consist of a wrongful intervention in
the market, breaching the duty to exercise the freedomof competition in good faith, honestly and in thesocial interest.
By this definition, in line with that embraced in case law
and enshrined in successive versions of the Bangui
Agreement,9 acts of unfair competition are thosedeemed contrary to what is considered honest practicein professional milieux.

To determine whether a common clientele existed in thiscase, two distinct phases must be considered: the phase
before the opening of GSP Gobir, and the phase after it
was authorized to open.

With respect to good faith, or the lack of it, numerous
acts and practices have been considered signs of bad
faith in case law and in successive iterations of the
Bangui Agreement, including:• In the preparatory phase, there was no common
clientele because CSP Gobir did not yet have clients.
Only CSP Dessa, which was already operating, hadclients. The court rightly found the trial judge to be
at fault – in basing its decision on the posters, radio
spots, teacher recruitment and student registration
prior to legal existence – for failing to explain how alegally non-existent establishment could have shared
a common clientele with the plaintiff.
• In the phase subsequent to authorization for CSP
Gobir to open, it is undeniable that both conditions
were met: the existence of its own clientele and of aclientele common to both establishments. The two
establishments were indeed performing a similar – infact, identical – activity.

• the disparagement of competing individuals,
establishments and products;• disorganization of the production, staff, activity orcommercial methods of a competing enterprise; and• confusion created about a competing establishment,
its products and personnel, and so on.

5
6

7
8

See L. Mermillod (1954) Essai sur la notion de concurrence déloyale en France
et aux Etats-Unis. Paris: LGDJ, 60; P. Roubier (1952) Le droit de la propriété
industrielle, vol. 1. Paris: Sirey, 108.
SECAREC v. S.G.B.C., MERCEDES SEAC, Judgment No. 112 of May 5, 1978, High
Court of Douala; Société Philip Morris Inc. v. Société VISTAMIL SL, Judgment
No. 175 of December 11, 1985, High Court of Yaoundé; Cie des Transactions
Commerciales (C.T.C.) v. Cie des Transports et de Commerce (C.T.C.), Judgment
No. 10/C of November 21, 1969, Court of Appeal of Douala.
Cass. com., November 8, 1994, Bull. civ. 1994, IV, No. 325, Contrats conc.
consom. 1995, No. 6 (obs. D. Vogel), summary 209 (obs. Y. Serra); L. Vogel(1995) Droit français de la concurrence. JCP E 1995, 1, 492.
See, in this vein, V.G. Ripert, R. Roblot and L. Vogel (2001) Traité de droitcommercial, vol. 1, 18th edn. Paris: LGDJ, Nos. 730, 595 and 596, and all of thejurisprudence cited there.

In the court’s opinion, the fault or misconduct that
constitutes unfair competition must be explicitly
identified by the trial judge, whose characterization of
the facts is then subject to review.
In performing its function of judicial review oversight,
the court found the trial judge in this case to be at fault
for not explaining how “the activities of the defendants,
after obtaining all the official documents required, had
the effect of deceiving the public to the detriment of CSP
Dessa, of disparaging CSP Dessa or of disorganizing that
establishment or the region’s private education sector ingeneral.” There was no need to dwell on those allegations ofbad faith because the appellant was unable to prove them.
No acts of unfair competition having been established,
the court sided with the appeal court in denying
Mr. Idrissa’s claim.
9AB-1977, ABR-1999 and ABR-2015.

• In the preparatory phase, CSP Gobir had neither
real nor common clientele and thus could not haveengaged in unfair competition – a point the appellant
challenged. But even assuming that CSP Gobir had
begun operating without authorization to open, thesituation then would have been one of prohibited,10
rather than unfair, competition.
• In the post-authorization phase, CSP Gobir did havea real and common clientele, so the traditional
condition of competition was satisfied. But were actsor practices committed that were contrary to acceptedhonest practice in professional milieux? The promoterof CSP Dessa did not demonstrate that they were.
Be that as it may, the fact that CSP Gobir exercised its
activity after obtaining authorization to open could notconstitute unfair competition; in fact, it was the epitomeof free competition. The court quite rightly said as muchin distinguishing between “competition” and “unfair
competition,” “… the former being the framework of legal
rules governing the realities between economic actors
in seeking and keeping clientele, and the latter being
wrongful practices liable to injure others.”
Recognition of free competition has two consequences.
• The first is the freedom of every professional to priceproducts or services as necessary, including below
those offered by other professionals having entered
the market earlier. Price regulation, it should berecalled, falls not under the laws on unfair competition
as such but under those on anti-competitive
practices. The fact that CSP Gobir priced its tuition at
CFAF 43,000, and not CFAF 60,000, as CSP Dessa wasthen charging, did not constitute unfair competition as
the latter’s promoter contended.
• The second relates to the legality of competitive
damage. Competition for clientele being free, every
professional can attract clients away from others. In
other words, freedom of competition means freedom
to poach the customers of other competitors. As one
author put it, “the freedom of the competitor doing
the damage trumps the security of his unfortunate
rival.” 11 The promoter of CSP Dessa therefore had no
grounds to impugn the fall in its staffing caused by the
opening of CSP Gobir. That was a normal consequenceof free competition.
The promoter of CSP Dessa could, however, have
explored a different way of bringing action for unfair
competition, based on a non-compete obligation,
provided that a clause to that effect had been includedin the employment contracts of its former teachers, now
its competitors. While opening a school to compete with

10
11

Prohibited competition occurs when a person engages in an activity for which
they ought to, but have not, sought prior authorization.
R. Prieur (1960) Contribution à l’étude de la concurrence sur le marché. RTD
com. 1960, 521.

a former employer does not in itself constitute unfair
competition, it could constitute competition in breach ofcontract, if the former employee were subject to a valid
non-compete obligation.
B. Damage in matters of unfair competition
Despite the importance of civil liability in unfair
competition proceedings, the need for damage to besuffered as a condition for success remains controversialin the literature. There are two main schools of thoughton the matter, both claiming to represent positive law.
• According to the first and older school of thought,
the plaintiff must demonstrate damage suffered
even if requesting only cessation of the unfair
competition.12 The authors supporting this thesisbase it on the fact that unfair competition is governedby article 1382 of the Civil Code of Niger, which inall cases and in principle requires proof of damage
suffered. Their conception of damage is rather broad,however, including potential damage as well as that
actually suffered.
• Authors of the second school of thought reject
this thesis.13 Dean Roubier, for example, argues
against assimilating proceedings brought for
unfair competition with those brought for civil
liability, asserting that two hypotheses need to be
distinguished: a plaintiff seeking compensationmust demonstrate the damage suffered; a plaintiff
seeking not compensation but an injunction against
unfair competitive practices can obtain it “on no othercondition than the innate and current interest of any
competitor to escape the impact of such practices.” 14
To summarize Roubier’s thinking, “damage is suffered
as a normal occurrence and need not be demonstrated
for proceedings against unfair competition to succeed,
unless the plaintiff claims compensation for it.” 15
The Bangui Agreement, as revised in 1999 and again in
2015, appears to align with the thesis requiring damage
to be suffered. Article 1(1)(b) of annex VIII to ABR-1999
reads: “Any natural or legal person who has suffereddamage or is liable to suffer damage due to an act of
unfair competition may institute proceedings …” 16 Thismeans that proceedings for unfair competition may beinstituted both where damage has been suffered andwhere it might be suffered. Where it has been suffered,
the person injured can institute proceedings forcompensation, among other things. But where damage
is only potential, the person liable to incur it cannot seek
compensation – only cessation of the unfair situation.17

12

13
14
15
16
17

Chapter 7 – Unfair competition

It was difficult, moreover, to impute unfair competition
to the CSP Gobir promoters, in either the preparatory or
post-authorization phases.

Cass. req., May 29, 1894, D.P. 1894, 1, 521 (note F. Despagnet); H. Allart (1892)
Traité pratique et théorique de la concurrence déloyale, Paris: A. Rousseau, No. 7;
H. Godinot (1932) La concurrence déloyale ou illicite. Thesis, University ofNancy, 32.
Roubier, n. 5, Nos. 111, 507 et seq.; C. Giverdon, Les délits et quasi-délits
commis par le commerçant dans l’exercice de son commerce. RTD com. 1953,
Nos. 23, 862.
Roubier, n. 5, at 509.
Ibid.
This article has been reproduced in extenso as ABR-2015, art. 1(2)(b).
See ABR-1999, art. 1(1)(b) of annex VIII (now ABR-2015, art. 1(2)(b)), which
includes injunctions among the remedies for unfair competition
147

Case law in the OAPI countries is divided. Some judgesalign with Roubier; 18 others require proof of damage
suffered, even while sharply curtailing that condition
to punish certain particularly wrongful acts. Somecourts have thus required only minimal damage,19 or
simply moral prejudice.20 Such case law was enshrinedin ABR-2015, in which moral prejudice is listed among
the remediable forms of damage under article
8 of annex VIII.21
Rejecting the thesis of unfair competition, the State
Court recalled the need for damage if proceedings
against such competition are to succeed. As in matters ofcivil liability, the burden of proving damage from unfair
competition rests with the plaintiff but entails morethan demonstrating a diversion of clientele or a decline
in sales.22 It is, however, sufficient for the plaintiff todemonstrate that a competitor has poached numerous
customers from it by unfair methods.23 In such a case,awarding compensation for the damage suffered canbe a delicate matter, so courts usually award a symbolic
single franc. Such symbolic penalties have not deterred
unfair competitors. The best penalty for that purpose
may be to require that the unfair activity be stopped andto publish court verdicts against an unfair competitor.
C. The causal link between the act incurring liability andthe damage suffered
The third element of unfair competition the State Court
recalled is the causal link between an act of unfair
competition and damage suffered. Unlike the elements
of fault and damage, however, that of a causal link
has received little attention from the courts or in theliterature on this topic.

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In principle, requiring a causal link means that thedamage suffered by a competitor must be the directconsequence of another’s unfair act. In the few cases
where they have had to opine on this point, courts havebeen quite flexible in their appraisal of causality. In one
case, the French Court of Cassation upheld the award
of compensation for a business even though it had notdemonstrated that its declining sales resulted directlyfrom wrongful practices by its competitor.24

148

18
19
20

21

22
23
24

Judgment No. 10/C, n. 6: “In addition, the measure to suppress an illegal
situation is preventive in character and can be ordered even in the absence ofdamage.”Ibid.
Menuiserie Camerounaise Industrielle (MCI) v. MECAF et SOPECAM, Civil judgment
No. 382 of June 22, 1983, High Court of Yaoundé: “Whereas the plaintiff has
not brought or offered to bring proof of the material damage claimed … [butwhereas] it is certain that the acts committed by MECAF have caused moral
prejudice to MCI …” The Court of Appeal concurred on this point in Le Directeurde l’entreprise MECAF v. Menuiserie Camerounaise Industrielle, Decision No. 58/
Civ of December 4, 1985, High Court of Yaoundé.
“The competent domestic court shall take into consideration the negative
economic consequences, including loss of profits, suffered by the injured
party, the profits made by the author of the wrongful act and the moral
prejudice caused to the victim.”
CA Paris, April 3, 1995, D. 1996, summary 254; Cass. com., January 25, 2000,
PIBD 2001, III, 154, P.A. 2000, July 18 (note M. Malaurie-Vignal), P.A. 2000,
July 3 (note N. Mathey).
CA Orléans, March 29, 1889, D.P. 1890, II, 134; CA Rouen, November 8, 1899,
D.P. 1900, II, 338.
Cass. com., October 16, 1957, Bull. civ. 1957, III, No. 265.

Such judicial flexibility is in no way surprising. First, thevariable nature of any clientele makes it very difficult to
identify and assess the (hypothetical) causes of particularvariations. In addition, to the extent that courts do not
systematically demand certain proof of damage andrequire only potential damage as grounds for conviction,
the causal link requirement fades in importance orvanishes entirely.
III. The legal basis for proceedings against
unfair competition
Virtually all countries with free-market economies haveadmitted the theory of unfair competition as a meansof applying morality to competitive activity.25 Different
countries have, however, constructed it in different
ways. For example, in French law, in the absence of a
special text criminalizing practices deemed unfair, thetheory emerged in the 19th century from case law and theliterature as simply a particular form of civil or criminal
liability, incurred through a personal act, based on
articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil Code.
Having so evolved, the theory was introduced throughFrench colonization to some of sub-Saharan Africa,
where it long remained a construction of case law. It was
not until AB-1977 that the theory of unfair competition
was given legislative sanction in French-speaking
signatory countries.
ABR-1999 assigned greater importance to unfair
competition, by including an entire annex (annex VIII)
and far more articles (increased from one to eight) on thesubject. ABR-2015 includes a nearly identical annex VIII
to that introduced into the 1999 version.
Since the original AB-1977 entered into force, however,numerous judges in OAPI countries have continued
to refer in their decisions on unfair competition either
to article 1382 of the Civil Code 26 or to the relevant
provisions of the Bangui Agreement,27 or to the two in
combination (as the court did in this case).
The concept of unfairness developed in case law basedon article 1382 is admittedly identical to that enshrined insuccessive revisions of the Agreement. Even so, it would
be better in our view – except in cases of non-economic
parasitic competition (“passing off”) 28 – to discontinuereferences in unfair competition to article 1382,
whether independently or coupled with the Agreement,
which alone suffices. Where plaintiffs continue to cite
25
26

27

28

Roubier, n. 5, at 1.
See, e.g., Société SOGEC-Ivoire v. Société Ivoiral, Judgment No. 816 of June 6,
2003, Supreme Court of Côte d’Ivoire (obs. A. Fade, this collection, Chapter 7,
section D); Société SOGEC-Ivoire v. Etablissements Mroui & Freres, Judgmentof June 1, 2006, Supreme Court (Judicial Chamber) of Côte d’Ivoire.
See, e.g., Moulinex SA v. Vapsan Trading Cie and ors, Civil judgment No. 192 ofDecember 15, 2000, High Court of Wouri (Douala) (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué,
Revue scientifique de la propriété industrielle ma Gazelle 2017, 1, 17 et seq.);
Sonatel Mobiles SA v. Agence Touba Sénégal and GPS Group, Judgment No. 57
of May 17, 2017, Supreme Court of Senegal (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué, thiscollection, Chapter 3, section M).
See Amissah Marielle Linda v. Soumahoro Maury Fere and ors, Judgment
No. 3556/17 of December 19, 2017, Commercial Court of Abidjan (obs. A. Lucasand G. Jiogue, this collection, Chapter 6, section A).

article 1382, judges granting their claims should groundtheir decisions in the Bangui provisions instead. Similarly,
where trial courts continue to apply article 1382, appeal
and supreme courts in OAPI member states shouldmake the same substitution when exercising their
judicial oversight.

The bailiff also found several rusted cylinders on the
defendant’s premises that had deteriorated too far todetermine their ownership. According to the plaintiff,
all signs pointed to those cylinders being its property,
since the defendant had no interest in allowing its own
cylinders to fall into such a state.

Grégoire Jiogue

The plaintiff argued, on this basis, that:

The long-term storage by an industrial and medical
gas company of a large quantity of a competingcompany’s gas cylinders and the sabotage of other gas
cylinders have been found to constitute an act of unfair
competition through disorganization of a competitor’ssales network.
SOCIÉTÉ AIR LIQUIDE CÔTE D’IVOIRE SA V. SOCIÉTÉD’OXYGÈNE ET D’ACÉTYLÈNE DE CÔTE D’IVOIRE (SOACI), Judgment No. 2234/2015 of July 31, 2015, Commercial
Court of Abidjan
Observations:Annex VIII to ABR-1999 contains a non-exhaustive
list of unfair competitive practices. This includes thedisorganization of a competing company and its market,29
which is considered the most brutal form. A competingcompany can be disorganized by several means; themeans used in this case, adjudicated by the Commercial
Court of Abidjan on July 31, 2015, was disorganization of
the company’s sales network.
Facts: This judgment concerns two competingcompanies – Air Liquide, the plaintiff, and SOA-CI, thedefendant – both engaged in the sale of industrial
and medical gas. In the course of their business,both companies were selling cylinders stamped with
their names.

a.

b.

the defendant was collecting the plaintiff’s cylinders,filling them for sale with its own gas and stamping
them with its own trade name; andthe defendant’s storage on its premises of theplaintiff’s cylinders was disorganizing the plaintiff’s
distribution network.

The plaintiff sought redress from the defendant for thedamage caused by this act of unfair competition.
The question asked of the Commercial Court waswhether the plaintiff’s distribution network had
indeed been disorganized. The court answered in
the affirmative.
Reasoning: As the Commercial Court saw it, thedefendant intentionally stored the plaintiff’s cylinders
on its premises for several days to use them itself, which
it deemed an unfair act. That act, the court concluded,
disorganized the plaintiff’s distribution network,
depriving it of the cylinders it needed to meet its clients’needs, while the defendant had many available to meetits own clients’ needs.
It appears from the court’s reasoning that it based its
conclusion on two criteria: a material act and intent. For
such disorganization to constitute unfair competition,
there must indeed be a material act (section I). Requiring
the element of intent, however, has long since proveninappropriate (section II).
I. The material act constituting disorganization of acompetitor’s distribution network

Informed with supporting pictures that cylinders
belonging to the plaintiff had found their way into thedefendant’s maintenance warehouse, the plaintiff sought
and obtained a court order authorizing it to inspect thedefendant’s premises. That inspection, conducted by abailiff, revealed that:

Article 7 of annex VIII to ABR-1999, in line with thecase law and article 1382 of the Civil Code of Côte
d’Ivoire when drafted, affirmed the unlawfulness ofdisorganizing a competing enterprise and its market,
providing that: “Any act or practice which, in thecourse of industrial or commercial activities, is liable todisorganize a competing enterprise, its market or themarket of the profession concerned, shall constitute an
act of unlawful competition.” 30• there were 43 cylinders on the defendant’s premises;• of the 43 cylinders, 12 were equipped with valves and
31 were not; and• cylinders belonging to SOA-CI had been stamped with
its trade name.

The words “liable to” mean that the act or practice neednot have already produced its effects to be consideredunlawful; it is sufficient that it could disorganize thecompeting enterprise, its market or the market of theprofession concerned.

Chapter 7 – Unfair competition

B. Long-term storage of a competitor’sgas cylinders – Sabotage of others –Disorganization of the sales networkof an established competitor –Inappropriate application of theintentional element

Article 7 also contains a non-exhaustive list of ways inwhich such disorganization might occur. They fall into
29

Cf. ABR-1999, art. 7 of annex VIII. This article is reproduced in extenso in ABR2015.

30

This text is reproduced in extenso in ABR-2015, art. 7(1) of annex VIII.
149

two categories: those disorganizing a particular operator,
and those disorganizing an entire market. The firstcategory includes suppression of advertising, diversionof orders and disorganization of the sales network. The
second includes abnormally low prices and failure tocomply with regulations on the activity concerned.

that an act of unfair competition had been committed
by means of disorganizing the plaintiff’s distribution
network, “insofar as the storage of several of its cylinders
prevented the plaintiff from meeting the needs of its
clientele, unlike SOA-CI, which had numerous cylinders
on hand to meet its own clients’ needs.”

In this case, the plaintiff sought that the defendant
be found liable for unfair competition on the grounds
that the defendant had disorganized the plaintiff’s
distribution network by storing some of the latter’scylinders on its own premises and sabotaging others.
The defendant argued in response that the presenceof the cylinders on its premises did not constitute an
act of unfair competition; rather, it reflected a practiceamong gas distribution companies whereby customers
often arrived for refills with cylinders belonging to acompetitor. Since a deposit would have been paid onsuch cylinders, they were set aside to be returned tothe customer later. That was why, according to thedefendant, the 43 cylinders in question were on its
premises, just as cylinders of its own were often on
the plaintiff’s own premises. The defendant claimed tohave neither filled with gas nor utilized for commercial
purposes the 43 cylinders at issue, but to have stored
them still empty, as indicated in the testimony.

Having established the existence of a material act todisorganize the plaintiff’s distribution network, the court
went on to characterize this disorganization in termsof intent – a questionable line of reasoning in a case of
unfair competition.

On the strength of those arguments, the defendantdenied that any act of disorganization liable to incur its
liability had occurred. The defendant’s other arguments,
concerning procedure, do not call for comment here.

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To adjudicate this dispute, the court began by defining
disorganization as “damage consisting of certain,
significant and potentially debilitating harm to an
economic organization.” This definition cannot be
assessed relative to article 7 of annex VIII to ABR-1999,
which does not define disorganization. It merely
affirms the unlawful character of the offense and nonexhaustively indicates some examples. By the court’s
definition, the act or practice of disorganization mustbe such that it does disable or could disable the victim.
In addition, what is important in this case is how thatdisorganization transpired in relation to the plaintiff’s
distribution network.

150

To conclude that an act of disorganization had beencommitted, the court began by considering the issueof the plaintiff’s many cylinders on the defendant’s
premises and dismissing the latter’s point about current
practice in the gas distribution sector: “If such a practiceactually exists in this business, the defendant does notprovide evidence that a competitor can keep so many
cylinders on its premises.” The court then considered
the matter of the defendant sabotaging the plaintiff’s
cylinders, concluding that, here again, the defendant
had not proven that a company could remove the valvesand caps from the cylinders of a competitor, as occurredin this case. Finally, the court considered the fact thatthe defendant had “placed its label on some of thecylinders at issue in order to use them commercially, tothe detriment of the company Air Liquide.” In light of allthese considerations, the court quite correctly concluded

II. The relevance of intent in the disorganization of acompetitor’s distribution network
Among other factors, the court based its finding thatthe defendant disorganized the plaintiff’s distribution
network on the fact that the latter “intentionally stored
the cylinders on its premises for several days, in order
to use them.” The court thus makes intent an element of
unfair competition in general and of disorganization of
the victim’s distribution network in particular. Yet intent
is not included as an element of unfair competition inarticle 7 of annex VIII to ABR-1999, the relevant provision
on disorganization of a competing enterprise and of themarket, or in other articles of that annex on different
forms of unfair competition (in both the 1999 and2015 revisions).
The Bangui Agreement is thus in line with the case law
based on article 1382 of the Civil Code, which, startingwith the French Court of Cassation in 1958,31 hasdispensed with the element of intent as a necessary
criterion in finding unfair competition.
To digress briefly, there have been three major stages tothe evolution of case law over the years with respect tointent in relation to unfair competition, each a functionof the same main question: must a competitive act beintentional to qualify as “unfair”? For quite some time,
French case law betrayed little doubt about the answer:
unfair competition required fraudulent intent – or, inother words, bad faith. Both the country’s trial courts 32
and the Court of Cassation held that position, the latter
having affirmed in several of its judgments that “unfair
competition presupposes bad faith.” 33 According to thatearly judicial thinking, unfair competition could not exist
in the absence of bad faith.

31
32

33

D. 1959, 87 (note F. Derrida).
See esp. Grenoble, May 3, 1954, D. 1954, 426: it has been a constant in theliterature and in case law that an action for unfair competition is admissible
only if the plaintiff proves “that the competitor concerned engages in harmful
maneuvers in attempting to divert clientele, bad faith being an element
essential to unfair competition.” See also Lyon, June 9, 1955, and Cass. com.,
April 18, 1958: “Whereas unfair competition, which consists of any maneuver
to poach the clientele of others, presupposes bad faith …”
Cass. req., March 9, 1870, D.P. 1871, I, 211; Cass. req., November 18, 1903, D.P.
1904, I, 10, S. 1904, I, 84; Cass. req., February 26, 1907, D.P. 1908, I, 27.

While endorsed by some authors in the literature,34 thisearly case law has been criticized by most.35 A majorityof the authors regarded unfair competition as a simple
matter of civil liability, which a competitor’s negligence or
imprudence should be sufficient to incur. To require badfaith as well, according to this view, was excessive. Overtime, such critiques led courts to temper their approach,recognizing liability in the absence of bad faith, wherea competitor has simply been negligent. Two series ofdecisions have followed that line: the first have conceded
the absence of bad faith, or declined to look for it, before
convicting the competitor concerned of carelessness or
negligence; 36 in the second, after seeking but not finding
fault for a competitive act, courts have refrained entirely
from convicting the allegedly unfair competitor, despite
the damage caused.37 Other court rulings and a numberof authors have termed such competition “prohibited,” asa tort of negligence, using the term “illicit competition” todistinguish it from “unfair competition,” the latter being
characterized by intentional fault. This distinction ismore than mere terminology, bearing two consequences
highlighted by many authors and judicial rulings:

Despite resistance from a few,42 judges in OAPI countries
have largely aligned with this third stage in the caselaw. Indeed, most of their decisions no longer subject
the admission of unfair competition cases to proof of adefendant’s bad faith.43 In short, while proof of fault isboth necessary and sufficient, a tort of carelessness or
negligence is just as sufficient as intentional fault if aparty is to incur liability for unfair competition.44• one consequence is procedural, obliging courts todismiss claims of unfair competition in the absence ofbad faith and preventing them from invoking “illicit
competition”; 38 and• the other concerns the assessment of damages,
whereby bad faith should aggravate a defendant’s
liability and good faith should mitigate it.39

C. Civil proceedings for trademark
infringement and unfair competition –Voluntary participation – Nonexclusive licensee – Admissibility

The third stage in the evolution of case law beganwith a judgment of April 18, 1958, handed down by the
French Court of Cassation. The court’s statement ofgrounds reads: “… a merchant’s use of his namesake
under conditions creating confusion between two
establishments constitutes the tort of negligence without
an element of intent being required.” In embracing thatprinciple, the court adopted an objective conception of
unfair competition, repudiating the purely linguistic andunnecessary distinction between unfair competition andillicit competition.41
34
35

36
37
38
39
40
41

See JCP 1948, II, 4035 (note R. Plaisant); JCP 1958, II, 10535 (note P. Esmein).
See A. Chavanne. Juriscl. responsabilité civile, Fasc. 17 bis A, No. 41; S. 1937, II,
1 (note S. Geny); R. Savatier (1951) Traité de la responsabilité civile, vol. 1. Paris:
LGDJ, No. 50; P. Roubier and A. Chavanne (1955) Chroniques. RTD com., 837,
No. 11; P. Roubier and A. Chavanne (1958) Chroniques. RTD com., 102, No. 18;
Crouanson (1925) De l’élément de faute dans la concurrence déloyale. Thesis,
Aix-Marseille University, 24.
CA Toulouse, January 4, 1954, D. 1954, 116; CA Chambery, February 2, 1954,
D. 1954, 297; CA Paris, February 14, 1958, JCP 1958, II, 10535 (note P. Esmein).
CA Rennes, November 28, 1922. See also Cass. req., July 16, 1925, Ann. prop.
ind. 1928, 24; T. com. Seine, 29 June 1927, Gaz. Pal. 1927, II, 416; CA Paris,
July 5, 1954, S. 1955, II, 1 (concl. Dupin).
Cass. req., March 9, 1870, n. 32; Cass. req., November 18, 1903, n. 32; CA
Grenoble, 26 June 1906, Ann. prop. ind. 1907; CA Poitiers, November 5, 1935,
S. 1937, II, 1 (note Gény).
Cass. req., June 1, 1874, S. 1875, I, 111.
See esp. Maunoury (1894 [2018]) Du nom commercial. Paris: Hachette, 275.
P. Roubier and A. Chavanne (1959) Chroniques. RTD com., 425; Cass. com.,
April 18, 1958 (note F. Derrida). According to this author, “there should
no longer be any difference between unfair competition and unlawfulcompetition: both incur the liability of their author on the same basis andaccording to the same principles.”Grégoire Jiogue

A trial judge declaring inadmissible the voluntary
participation of a non-exclusive trademark licensee
in proceedings initiated by the trademark owner for
infringement and unfair competition on the grounds thatthe latter was defending the same interests – although,according to the facts, the voluntary participant wasseeking to secure compensation for prejudice specificto themselves – has improperly applied article 46 ofannex III to ABR-1999.
Moreover, the conditions referred to in article 46(1) of thesame text – failure to act by the trademark owner after
being called upon to do so – do not apply in proceedings
for unfair competition.
U. NV V. T.A., Judgment No. 139/2005 of March 23, 2005,
High Court of Ouagadougou

42

43

44

See Judgment No. 382, n. 19: “In passing off as its own work, in thepresentation it deliberately made to SOPECAM journalists, the twobuildings on pilings concerned, knowing they had been built by MCI, MECAF
unquestionably committed an act of unfair competition characterized by the
confusion it created, in bad faith, between the two enterprises.”See, e.g., Société SOGEC-Ivoire v. Société Ivoiral, Judgment No. 816 of June 6,
2003, Supreme Court of Côte d’Ivoire (obs. A. Fade, this collection, Chapter 7,
section D); Société SOGEC-Ivoire v. Etablissements Mroui & Freres, Judgment ofJune 1, 2006, Supreme Court (Judicial Chamber) of Côte d’Ivoire; Moulinex SA
v. Vapsan Trading Cie and ors, Civil judgment No. 192 of December 15, 2000,
High Court of Wouri (Douala) (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué, see n. 26); Sonatel
Mobiles SA v. Agence Touba Sénégal and GPS Group, Judgment No. 57 of May 17,
2017, Supreme Court of Senegal (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué, this collection,
Chapter 3, section M).
See Cie des Transactions Commerciales (CTC) v. Cie des Transports et de Commerce(CTC), Decision No. 10/C of November 21, 1969, Court of Appeal of Douala,concerning the fault of negligence or carelessness incurring the defendant’s
liability.

Chapter 7 – Unfair competition

Most authors have criticized this distinction in terms ofboth terminology and effect.40

It is clear, then, that the decision of the Commercial
Court of Abidjan in the present case is out of stepwith the evolving case law, and with the 1999 and2015 revisions to the Bangui Agreement, and cannot
be endorsed. Admittedly, a company does not store
a large number of a competitor’s gas cylinders andsabotage others without any intent to disorganizethat competitor’s distribution network – but suchintent must not be considered a requisite element of
unfair competition.

151

Observations:
The right to bring civil action for the infringementof a mark belongs mainly to the mark’s owner, inthe way of an exclusive right. That principle, drawn
from article 46(1) of annex III to ABR-1999, calls fora few qualifications, however. On the one hand, thebeneficiary of an exclusive right of use – in other words,
an exclusive licensee – may also initiate such action,subject to two cumulative conditions: the absence ofa contrary contractual clause and prior notification of
the owner. The beneficiary of a non-exclusive license,on the other hand, under article 46(2) of the sameannex, can only intervene in infringement proceedings
brought by another. Questions therefore arise about thisjudgment of the High Court of Ouagadougou declaring
inadmissible the voluntary participation of a licensee – inthis case, the company U. Côte d’Ivoire – in infringement
proceedings initiated by the owner of the infringed mark

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Facts: U. NV, owner of the OAPI-registered trademark forthe detergent “OMO,” claiming to be a victim in the case,brought action for infringement and unfair competition
against the alleged perpetrator, T.A., based on articles 47
and 49 of annex III to ABR-1999, having initiated an
infringement seizure of 2,616 cartons of “MIMO”
detergent belonging to T.A., based on similarities
between the labels and colors featured in its packaging
and those used under the “OMO” trademark. U. Côte
d’Ivoire then intervened voluntarily in those proceedings
to seek compensation for damage it claimed as
beneficiary of a license to sell “OMO” detergent, granted
to it by the company U. PLC, the beneficiary in turn of an
exclusive right to use the mark.

152

In response, T.A. sought the dismissal of both actions on
the grounds of failure to certify that registration of themark had neither lapsed nor been canceled, failure to
make the security deposit required under the procedurefor infringement seizure and incompetence of the judge
issuing the infringement seizure order. With respect tothe voluntary participation, T.A. argued that the ownerof the mark had acted to protect the same interests as
those claimed by U. Côte d’Ivoire, so that the latter lacked
standing to bring action. On the substance of the case,
T.A. claimed that it had bought the “MIMO” detergent
contained in the cartons at the port of Tema, in Ghana,and noticed the product’s resemblance to products
marked “OMO” only once in Ouagadougou.
Reasoning: Apart from the admissibility of theseactions (section I), the court had to rule on their
merits, in respect of both infringement and unfair
competition (section II).
I. Admissibility
From the outset of these proceedings, T.A. challenged
the admissibility of both actions: the principal claim (A)and the voluntary participation (B).
A. The principal claim
In addition to the traditional conditions for admissibility
set out in the national codes of civil procedure of

Bangui Agreement signatory countries, the owner ofa trademark bringing action for infringement must
demonstrate ownership and the scope of its rights byproducing a registration certificate for its mark, or elserisk dismissal of the action. In this case, T.A. based its
motion for dismissal on failure to demonstrate that
registration of the mark had neither lapsed nor beencanceled, failure to make the required security deposit
and incompetence of the judge issuing the infringement
seizure order.
It is clear that – apart from the competence of the judge,
which is not a question specific to intellectual property
law – the other two grounds could legitimately make anaction for infringement inadmissible. Demonstratingthat registration of the mark had neither lapsed nor
been canceled and that the required security deposit
had been made were legal requirements for the
seizure order, not conditions for admitting the action
for infringement.45 The requirement to prove that theregistration had neither lapsed nor been cancelledwould be rendered moot, moreover, by article 51(2)of ABR-2015: “The order shall be made on applicationand on submission of proof of registration of themark.” The entry into force of this text will facilitate
recourse to this protective measure by trademark
owners (particularly those residing in countries otherthan that in which the headquarters of OAPI is located)
who, because of their remoteness, had difficulties in
obtaining urgent certificates of non-removal and nonforfeiture, even by electronic means. In any case, flaws
in the seizure cannot reasonably paralyze proceedingson the substance of the alleged infringement, where
the trademark owner can legitimately avail itself ofthe mosaic of evidentiary procedures afforded underordinary law. And while the grounds stated were lessthan convincing, one can easily understand the judge
denying T.A.’s motion for dismissal of the principal claimof U. NV, consisting of two components: infringement
and unfair competition. Declaring the infringement
component inadmissible would still leave unfair
competition, the less formally burdensome part of theclaim. Under the ordinary laws on liability for personalacts, as contained in national civil codes, the productionof certification that registration has neither lapsed nor
been canceled, or that a required security deposit has
been made, are not required for a judge to admit actions
for unfair competition.
As a matter of civil liability under ordinary law, a claim for
unfair competition is subject to the traditional conditions
for admitting any litigation.
B. The voluntary participation
According to the facts of the case, the company U. Côte
d’Ivoire had obtained a non-exclusive sublicense fromits sister company U. PLC, itself the beneficiary of an
exclusive license obtained from the company U. NV,
owner of the “OMO” trademark. Based on article 46(2)of annex III to ABR-1999, U. Côte d’Ivoire sought toparticipate voluntarily in the proceedings. Citing
45

Cf. ABR-1999, art. 48 of annex III.

Now, as mentioned earlier, U. Côte d’Ivoire was party toa simple license contract and thus, under article 46(2)of the same text, entitled to intervene in infringement
proceedings brought by the trademark owner. The
judge therefore erred in denying U. Côte d’Ivoire theopportunity to obtain compensation for the damage
it attributed to T.A. The judge’s ruling on this pointis all the more regrettable in that the aim sought
by U. Côte d’Ivoire through voluntary participation
was compensation for damage resulting from unfair
competition, which is governed by a protective regime
not subject to article 46.
It should be emphasized that, contrary to the position
taken by the judge in this case, the beneficiary of any
kind of license to exploit a mark also incurs damage whenthe mark is infringed or affected by unfair competitionand has the right to seek compensation. Those entitled
to seek it through voluntary participation under ABR2015 do not appear to include simple licensees. Is this asimple omission or the deliberate intent of community
legislators? The omission hypothesis seems plausible,
since the matter is plainly covered elsewhere in thesame text, with respect to patents for inventions,46 utility
models 47 and industrial designs or models.48
II. The merits
Assessed next are the merits of the actions forinfringement and unfair competition: how they weremerged to form a single action (A) and what sanctions
were applied as a result (B).
A. How the actions were merged
The main action initiated by U. NV, the original owner of
the “OMO” trademark, was grounded in two annexes of
ABR-1999: annex III, in article 37 (on infringement); andannex VIII, in articles 2, 3 and 4 (on unfair competition).
But there is no clear line distinguishing how these two
protective regimes should have applied to the facts inthis case, as reflected in the judge’s reasoning:“Considering that information included in thecase file shows that the labels and colors usedin packaging the ‘MIMO’ products were similar
to those used for the ‘OMO’ products, [and]that ‘OMO’ is a legally registered and protectedtrademark, while ‘MIMO’ is not, these actsof imitation constitute infringement; and by
confusing and deceiving the public, these acts
also constitute unfair competition … the claim by
U. NV is well-founded and thus granted.”
This recital does not clearly distinguish acts constituting
infringement from those actionable as unfair
46
47
48

Cf. ABR-2015, art. 63(2) of annex I.
Cf. ABR-2015, art. 55(3) of annex II.
Cf. ABR-2015, art. 33(1) of annex IV.

competition. Yet it is widely accepted in the literature, as
well as case law, that an action for unfair competition isadmissible only if based on an actionable fault distinct
from the act constituting infringement and not otherwise
sanctioned.49 In this case, U. NV argued that the
infringement consisted of the use of similar labeling andcolors to package the “MIMO” and “OMO” products, andthat the unfair competition stemmed from the confusioncaused by the imitation of “OMO” packaging by “MIMO”
distributors. In other words, the same act could havebeen characterized by the judge as both infringement
and unfair competition, unfavorably impacting thecompensation the victim could expect to receive.
B. The resulting sanctions
U. NV sought reimbursement of its legal costs for theproceedings and CFAF 250 million for loss of earnings
resulting from a slump in sales caused in turn by the
infringement allegations. The court denied thoserequests as unfounded. The slump in sales and the legal
costs must obviously be proved by producing accounting
records, without which a judge has no objective basis forassessing them. The judgment called for no particularcomment on that point – only that the conviction for
infringement and unfair competition should result indamages being awarded separately, since two faults had
been alleged. That question is not specifically addressedby the judge, who rightly confined himself to considering
U. NV’s request as presented, with no breakdown of thecosts. Courts in the signatory countries of the Bangui
Agreement tend to ignore the difference in legal regimes
applicable to those two offenses, particularly if they are
combined in a single act, as in this case. In an interestingcase between two companies in Douala concerning
the trademarks “Moulinex” and “Mammonlex,” thatcity’s high court sentenced the convicted company to
pay a lump sum of CFAF 20 million in damages for bothinfringement and unfair competition.50
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

D. Industrial design or model – Unfair
competition – Similarity liable tocreate confusion in the consumer’s
mind – Fault – Damage – Diversion ofclientele – Compensation
A company that introduces into a market a model ofbowl similar to one already made available in that same
market by a competitor, thereby creating confusion in
the consumer’s mind that may have diverted clientele,
has acted in breach of article 1382 of the Civil Code ofCôte d’Ivoire.

Chapter 7 – Unfair competition

article 46(1) of the same annex – not the relevant
provision, since it concerns exclusive licensees – the court
denied the participation.

SOCIÉTÉ SOGEC-IVOIRE SOCIÉTÉ IVOIRAL, Judgment
No. 816 of June 6, 2003, Supreme Court of Côte d’Ivoire

49
50

J. Passa, (2006) Droit de la propriété industrielle, vol. 1. Paris: LGDJ, 453.
See, e.g., Moulinex SA v. Vapsan Trading Cie and ors, Civil judgment No. 192 ofDecember 15, 2000, High Court of Wouri (Douala) (obs. M.L. Ndéma Elongué,
see n. 26).
153

Observations:
Freedom of competition does not permit companies tobehave in ways contrary to fair trade practices, aiming
to harm and divert clientele from their competitors.
The protective regime for unfair competition therefore
penalizes competitive excesses in a free economy.51
Unfair competition is, by nature, a polymorphousoffense.52 Beyond the classic definition of unfair
competitive acts set out in article 10bis(2) of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
OAPI law treats four kinds of act – those seeking to
confuse, disparage, disorganize or disclose – as unfair
competition.53 When a distinctive sign evokes in the
consumer’s mind the image of a given enterprise, any act
by a competitor that creates, or could create, confusion
about the origin of products bearing that sign is an actof unfair competition.54 That is the point recalled in thisdecision by the Supreme Court of Côte d’Ivoire in a casepitting two companies, SOGEC-Ivoire and Ivoiral, against
one another.
Facts: The facts in the case are easily summarized.
SOGEC-Ivoire, specializing in the household utensils
business, manufactured a model of bowl called the“Affoue 16 A/C.” To optimize sales of that product, SOGEC
entered into a subcontract with Ivoiral. The disputearose when the subcontract expired. Challenging Ivoiralfor marketing a bowl called the “Tassa 16/B,” which
replicated its own “Affoue 16 A/C” model, SOGEC-Ivoire
sought redress from the Abidjan Court of First Instance.
The court granted its request, by Judgment No. 79 on
February 4, 1998.
Ivoiral took issue with the ruling before the Court ofAppeal of Abidjan. The latter’s Judgment No. 816, ofJuly 9, 1999, quashed the lower court’s ruling, whereupon
SOGEC-Ivoire appealed to the Supreme Court.

Moreover, a viable action for unfair competition, asa variant of civil liability action under articles 1382 etseq. of the Civil Code, presupposes that three elements
have been established: a generating fact (the unfair act
or behavior), damage, and a causal link between act
and damage.
With respect to the generating fact, the Bangui
Agreement refers to “act” or “practice” to cover not
only an “act” in the strict sense but also any pattern ofomission. An omission may consist of a failure to publish
rectification or additional information about the resultsof a product test published in a consumer review.56
Although highly varied in form, actions for unfair
competition are often based on four main acts – namely,of those seeking to confuse, disparage, disorganize
or disclose.57
Unfair competition has quite commonly been basedon acts causing confusion, which are punishable
whether or not the confusion is intentional. It is noteven necessary, moreover, that the confusion intended
has been actually created; although less commonly, thesimple “risk of confusion” is also punishable as unfair
competition. According to article 2(1) of annex VIII to
ABR-2015: “Any act or practice which, in the course ofindustrial or commercial activities, generates or is likely
to generate confusion with the enterprise or activities
of another person, in particular with the products orservices proposed by such enterprise, shall constitute an
act of unfair competition.” The courts require proof thatsuch an act has been committed and dismiss actions notproviding such proof. In one case, the Court of Appeal of
Quémé rejected an action for unfair competition because
the appellant had not demonstrated that the acts
attributed to its adversary were liable to create confusionin the minds of the public 58 :WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Reasoning: The question of law presented to theSupreme Court was whether Ivoiral’s marketing by of its
Tassa 16/B bowl constituted a form of unfair competition.
The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative – but on
two conditions: a competitive relationship between the
two litigants, and the presence of elements inherent inunfair competition.

154“Considering that article 17(b) of the Bangui
Agreement makes unlawful ‘all acts of such anature as to create confusion or fraud by anymeans whatsoever with the trade name, theestablishment, the goods, the services or theindustrial or commercial activities of a competitor…’ [and] that a vendor’s introduction of a productin Benin knowing that a similar, better known
product is already being marketed here, is not
sufficient to establish the infringing characterof the vendor’s product; while there is certainlycompetition, whether it is unfair must be
established by the production of evidence of
unfair acts liable to create confusion or constitutefraud.” 59

Unlike article 10bis(2) of the Paris Convention, theBangui Agreement does not expressly require theunfair act to be an act (“any act”) of competition. Yet theexpression “unfair competition” has meaning only if theperpetrator and victim are in fact competing – that is, if,through their activities, they vie for the same clientele.55
51
52
53
54
55

P. Edou Edou (ed.) (2009) Le contentieux de la propriété intellectuelle dans les
États membres de l’OAPI: Guide du magistrat et des auxiliaires. Geneva: WIPO,
86.
The expression used by Oumoul Khaîry Ndao (2015) Le droit comparé dela contrefaçon et de la concurrence déloyale: l’exemple de la France et duSénégal. Doctoral thesis, University of Toulouse, 27.
Edou Edou, n. 51, at 85-86; Roubier, n. 5, at 536 et seq. See also ABR-1999,
art. 2(6) of annex VIII.
WIPO (1996) Model Provisions on Protection against Unfair Competition. Geneva:
WIPO, 16.
See Adamou Idrissa v. Mahaman Mindaou, Judgment No. 13 – 086/c of April 4,2013, State Court of Niger, Judicial Chamber (obs. G. Jiogue, this collection,
Chapter 7, section A).

Confusion can be seeded in several ways. Some
examples of when use of a trademark, trade name orother distinctive sign of an enterprise generates, or is
likely to generate, confusion as to the origin of the goods
56
57
58
59

Cf. WIPO, n. 54, at 8.
Edou Edou, n. 51, at 85–86.
See Reckitt et Colman v. Société d’Import-Export (SIMEXPRO) Decision No. 14 ofNovember 9, 1989, Court of Appeal of Quémé.
Ibid.

or services concerned are contained in article 2(2) ofannex VIII to ABR-2015. The confusion quite often arises
when – because of its similarity to a pre-existing mark,whether registered or not – a mark used by an unfair
competitor creates, or is likely to create, confusion in
the minds of the public. A case before the High Court ofOuagadougou found that confusion had been generated
by the use of similar trademarks “OMO” and “MIMO.”60
It conditioned an unfair competition claim – which theplaintiff had combined with infringement in a two-partaction – on there being an actionable fault distinct fromthat characterized as infringement,61 but confusion canalso arise from the use of a distinctive sign not protectedby the Bangui Agreement, such as those used to give acompany and its products or services a certain identity.

contrary to honest practice and the victim’s lossof clientele – in other words, between the unfair
competitor’s actions and the damage incurred by
the plaintiff. Case law has been highly pragmatic inappraising this causal link. For the court in the present
case, it meant finding “definite material damage caused
by a loss of earnings, caused in turn by a partial lossof clientele.”
All of the necessary ingredients for successful action
against unfair competition were thus combined in thiscase brought by SOGEC-Ivoire.
Aristide FadeIn the present case, the confusion was created by
the outward appearance of the competing products– specifically, their shape. Exercising its evocation
power to rule afresh on the matter, the Supreme Court
referenced a pre-trial expert opinion (ordered before the
Court of First Instance of Abidjan, Judgment No. 299 ofApril 17, 1996) documenting “nearly identical similarity
between the models of bowl concerned … liable to create
confusion in the minds of consumers and possibly divertclientele away from SOGEC-Ivoire, the latter having
unquestionably suffered material damage from the lossof earnings and part of its clientele.” Such confusion canalso result from a product’s packaging,62 color 63 or othernon-functional characteristics.

Like any action for civil liability, actions for unfair
competition seek compensation for damage alreadyincurred. Where it has not yet occurred, or is only
potential, such actions cannot succeed. During theSupreme Court’s deliberations, it was demonstrated that
SOGEC-Ivoire had lost customers for its bowl to its rival.
The damage was therefore clearly established, even if
the court’s reasoning – that the similarity and confusion“could have led to a diversion of clientele” – left doubt in
the air.

Chapter 7 – Unfair competition

Under article 1382 of the Civil Code, to generatecompensation, an act of unfair competition must cause
damage to its victim. Such damage most commonly
results from diversion of a competitor’s clientele andit is for that loss of clientele, even if limited, that thecompetitor is compensated. It matters little, moreover,whether the clients lost are in fact diverted to the unfair
competitor; they may, in theory, go to other competitors.
In practice, as in this case, it is the unfair one who
often benefits.

In addition to damage, successful action for unfair
competition requires a causal link between the act

60
61
62
63

La Sté U. NV v. T.A., Judgment No. 139/2005, High Court of Ouagadougou; seealso Société Paco Rabanne Parfums v. M.A.EL G, Civil judgment of April 10, 1989,
Court of First Instance of Abidjan.
Passa, n. 49, at 453.
Société Paco Rabanne Parfums v. M.A. EL G, Civil judgment of April 10, 1989,
Court of First Instance of Abidjan.
Société Moulin SA v. Société VAPS, Judgment No. 192 of December 15, 2000, High
Court of Wouri (Douala).
155

Collection OMPI desjugements les plus
déterminants en matièrede propriété intellectuelle
Membres de l’Organisation
africaine de la propriété
intellectuelle (1997-2018)

Sous la direction de
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué et Joseph Fometeu

Avant-propos
L’Organisation Mondiale de la Propriété Intellectuelle(OMPI) a le plaisir de présenter le deuxième volume dela Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants
en matière de propriété intellectuelle, consacré à lajurisprudence en matière de propriété intellectuelle desÉtats membres de l’Organisation africaine de la propriété
intellectuelle (OAPI). Cette collection, lancée en 2019,s’inscrit dans le cadre de l’engagement de l’OMPI à
fournir à la communauté mondiale de la propriété
intellectuelle un accès public gratuit aux données et
aux connaissances sur les approches et les tendances
en matière de détermination des droits de propriété
intellectuelle. Chaque volume de la collection ouvre
un accès mondial aux jugements déterminants enmatière de propriété intellectuelle d’un ressort juridiquedonné. Le premier volume contenait 30 jugementsdéterminants sélectionnés par la Cour populairesuprême de la République populaire de Chine entre 2011et 2018. Ce deuxième volume présente 53 des décisions
les plus significatives rendues par les tribunaux desÉtats membres de l’OAPI entre 1997 et 2018, assorties
de commentaires rédigés par d’éminents juges etprofesseurs.
Les membres de l’OAPI disposent d’un cadre législatif
commun en matière de propriété intellectuelle, régi
par l’Accord de Bangui. Dans ce cadre, l’OAPI prévoit
un système régional de protection de la propriété
intellectuelle avec un mécanisme de dépôt uniquepar lequel les enregistrements de l’OAPI s’étendent
automatiquement à tous les États membres de l’OAPI.
En outre, les litiges en matière de propriété intellectuellesont tranchés par les tribunaux nationaux de l’État
membre concerné dans chaque cas et les décisions
des tribunaux relatives aux dispositions de l’Accord de
Bangui sont contraignantes pour tous les autres États
membres. À cet égard, les juges de la région peuvent
largement tirer parti de l’accès aux jugements rendus
par les autres tribunaux de la région pour éclairer
leurs propres analyse et prise de décision. Jusqu’ici,
peu d’informations étaient disponibles concernant lajurisprudence en matière de propriété intellectuelledans la région et le présent volume vise à combler
cette lacune. En offrant un accès libre à des jugementsdéterminants, ainsi qu’à des analyses judiciaires rédigées
par des juges et des professeurs spécialisés dans ce
domaine, cette publication devrait constituer une
ressource utile pour la formation des juges et contribuer
à la cohérence et à la prévisibilité des décisions rendues
par les tribunaux des États membres de l’OAPI. De
plus, les commentaires figurant à la fois dans la version
originale française et dans la traduction anglaise
158

permettent à des juges issus de pays non membres del’OAPI ou n’appartenant pas à la région francophone debénéficier de cette jurisprudence.
La collection s’inscrit dans le cadre des efforts déployés
plus largement par l’OMPI pour renforcer le libre
accès à l’information sur l’administration judiciairede la propriété intellectuelle. Dans ce contexte, lacollection est complétée par WIPO Lex, une base dedonnées en ligne permettant d’accéder gratuitement
à des informations juridiques en matière de propriété
intellectuelle provenant du monde entier, notamment
des lois, des traités et des jugements. Toutes lesdécisions commentées dans le présent volume figurent
en texte intégral dans WIPO Lex, et peuvent êtreconsultées à l’adresse suivante : https://wipolex.wipo.int/
fr/main/judgments.
Le présent volume est le fruit des efforts de collaboration
entre l’OMPI, l’OAPI, l’Institut national de la propriété
industrielle (INPI) de la France et un certain nombred’éminents juges et universitaires du Bénin, duCameroun, de la France et du Sénégal. Nous sommes
reconnaissants aux différents auteurs de ce volume, lemagistrat Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué, le magistrat
Malick Lamotte, le magistrat Aristide Fade, le professeur
Joseph Fometeu, le professeur Grégoire Jiogue et leprofesseur André Lucas. Les commentaires contenus
dans ce volume reflètent les opinions des auteurs àtitre personnel et ne représentent pas les opinions d’un
tribunal, d’un État membre, de l’OAPI ou de l’OMPI.
La collection vise à encourager le dialogue et l’échange
de vues afin d’améliorer l’analyse, le raisonnement
et la prise de décisions judiciaires. Nous sommes
convaincus que l’analyse judiciaire approfondie fournie
dans ces pages aidera les juges dans la mise en placed’un écosystème de propriété intellectuelle efficace etéquilibré, dans la région de l’OAPI et ailleurs.
Marco M. AlemánSous-directeur général
Secteur des écosystèmes de propriété intellectuelle
et d’innovationPréface
La dynamique de l’application des droits de propriété
intellectuelle est bel et bien en marche dans l’espace
couvert par l’Organisation Africaine de la Propriété
intellectuelle. En effet, de manière progressive mais
certaine, les juridictions de cet espace ont commencé
à marquer du sceau de leur science l’interprétation
des concepts contenus dans l’Accord de Bangui et ses
annexes. Ainsi ont-elles déjà apporté des précisions utiles
à la compréhension de plusieurs questions, notamment
celles liées à la compétence juridictionnelle, aussi biendans le droit de propriété intellectuelle lui-même quedans les rapports de celui-ci avec le droit OHADA, celles
relatives aux contours du risque de confusion ou aux
notions telles celles d’œuvre de l’esprit, d’originalité, denouveauté et celles ayant trait aux noms commerciaux et
aux régimes de la saisie-contrefaçon et de la concurrence
déloyale.
Cette dynamique se devait d’être portée à laconnaissance du public. Pour ce faire, le moyen choisi
par l’OAPI, l’INPI France et l’Organisation Mondiale de la
Propriété Intellectuelle (OMPI) à travers la Division pourl’Afrique et l’Institut judiciaire de l’OMPI est celui de la
publication d’un recueil de jurisprudences annotées. Cemoyen bien connu des juristes sous la dénomination“Grands arrêts” était parfaitement indiqué pour lacirconstance, pour au moins deux raisons. D’une part, ilpermet de résoudre le problème purement matériel de la
publication des décisions, dans la mesure où, à quelques
exceptions près, les jugements et arrêts rendus dansles différents pays de l’espace OAPI ne sont pas publiés.
D’autre part et surtout, il permet de ne porter à laconnaissance du public que les décisions qui paraissent
les plus significatives. En d’autres termes, le choix de laformule “recueil de jurisprudences annotées” permetde confier à une équipe d’experts la tâche de procéderà une rigoureuse sélection des décisions puis à leurannotation.

initiative est que les droits de propriété intellectuellesont bien protégés dans l’espace OAPI et que cet espaceest économiquement attractif du point de vue de ces
droits, dès lors qu’à partir des décisions recensées, onpeut noter que les juges procèdent généralement à desanalyses rigoureuses, objectives et impartiales de la loi.
En deuxième lieu, les destinataires sont les acteurs dela mise en œuvre des droits de propriété intellectuelle,
c’est-à-dire, en particulier, les magistrats en service dansles juridictions de l’espace ainsi que ceux qui officient à
la Commission supérieure de recours de l’OAPI, voire lespersonnels de l’OAPI. En troisième lieu, il faut compter
les avocats et, tous ceux qui, universitaires ou non,effectuent des recherches de quelque nature que cesoit, dans le domaine de la propriété intellectuelle dansl’espace OAPI.
À l’endroit des coauteurs de ce recueil, j’émets le vœuqu’à la faveur de l’application de l’Acte de 2015, une
deuxième édition soit envisagée aussitôt que le nombrede décisions rendues le permettra.
Denis L. Bohoussou
Directeur général
OAPI

Ce travail a été confié à une équipe de magistrats
chevronnés conduite par Monsieur Max Lambert Ndéma
Elongué et à une équipe d’universitaires menée parle Professeur Joseph Fometeu. Les deux équipes ont
travaillé dans une belle synergie pour aboutir au résultat
que j’ai le plaisir de vous présenter.
Il s’agit, à l’évidence, d’une œuvre inédite, dès lors qu’ils’agit du tout premier recueil de de grandes décisions
annotées publié dans l’espace OAPI.
Ses destinataires sont bien connus. En premier lieu,
les personnes visées sont les acteurs du marché. Le
message que j’espère qu’ils percevront à partir de cette159

Remerciements
Commentateurs

Coordonnateurs de l’OMPIMax Lambert Ndéma Elongué, magistrat horshiérarchie, sous-directeur du contentieux administratif,
financier et des comptes (direction des affaires
non répressives et du sceau), Ministère de la justice(Cameroun)
Lamotte Malick, magistrat hors hiérarchie, président dutribunal de commerce hors classe de Dakar (Sénégal)Aristide Fade, magistrat, procureur de la République,tribunal de première instance de deuxième classed’Aplahoué (Bénin)Joseph Fometeu, professeur, Université de Ngaoundéré(Cameroun)
Grégoire Jiogue, professeur, Université de Yaoundé II(Cameroun)
André Lucas, professeur émérite, Université de Nantes(France)

Inés Fernández Ulate, juriste, Institut judiciairede l’OMPI, Secteur des écosystèmes de propriété
intellectuelle et d’innovation
Eun-Joo Min, directrice, Institut judiciaire de l’OMPI,
Secteur des écosystèmes de propriété intellectuelle
et d’innovationr
Marc Sery-Kore, directeur, Division pour l’Afrique,
Secteur du développement régional et national

Comité scientifique
Joseph Fometeu, professeur, Université de Ngaoundéré(Cameroun)
Grégoire Jiogue, professeur, Université de Yaoundé II(Cameroun)
André Lucas, professeur émérite, Université de Nantes(France)

Secrétariat technique
Brillant Aimé Yobo, avocat au Barreau du CamerounJoël Fabrice Dongmo Donfack, docteur en droit privé
Awal Mohamadou, doctorant en droit privé

160

Experts techniques de l’OMPI
Ignacio de Castro Llamas, directeur, Division deslitiges relatifs à la propriété intellectuelle et desrelations extérieures, Centre d’arbitrage et de médiation
de l’OMPI, Secteur des écosystèmes de propriété
intellectuelle et d’innovation
Marina Foschi, juriste principale, Section des politiques
et des services consultatifs en matière de législation,
Département des marques, des dessins et modèles
industriels et des indications géographiques, Secteur
des marques et des dessins et modèles
Marcus HÖpperger, directeur principal, Départementdes marques, des dessins et modèles industriels et desindications géographiques, Secteur des marques et desdessins et modèles
Tomoko Miyamoto, chef, Section du droit des brevets
et des traités, Division du droit des brevets et de latechnologie, Secteur des brevets et de la technologie
Xavier Vermandele, conseiller juridique principal,
Division de la promotion du respect de la
propriété intellectuelle, Secteur des enjeux et despartenariats mondiauxMichele Woods, directrice, Division du droit d’auteur,
Secteur du droit d’auteur et des industries de la création

Liste des abréviations
AB-1977	
Accord relatif à la création d’une
Organisation africaine de la
propriété intellectuelle conclu à
Bangui le 2 mars 1977
ABR-1999	
Accord de Bangui, tel que révisé le24 février 1999
ABR-2015	
Accord de Bangui, tel que révisé le
14 décembre 2015
ADPIC 	Accord sur les aspects des droits depropriété intellectuelle qui touchentau commerceaff.
Affaireal.
AlinéaAnn. prop. ind.	
Annales de la propriété industrielle,artistique et littéraire
art.
ArticleAUDCG	Acte uniforme OHADA portant sur ledroit commercial général
AUPSRVE	Acte uniforme portant surl’organisation des procédures
simplifiées de recouvrement et desvoies d’exécution
BOPI 	Bulletins officiels de la propriété
industrielle
BRDA
Bulletin rapide de droit des affaires
Bull.
Bulletin
Bull. civ.
Bulletin civilCA
Cour d’appelc.
ContreCah. dr. auteur
Cahiers du droit d’auteur
Cass. ass. plén.	
Cour de cassation – Assemblée
plénière
Cass. civ.	
Chambre civile de la Cour decassation française
Cass. com.	Chambre commerciale de la Cour decassation française
Cass. req.	Chambre des requêtes de la Cour decassation française
Cass. soc.	Chambre sociale de la Cour decassation françaiseCCJA	
Cour commune de justice etd’arbitrage
CE
Commission européenne
Cf
Conferciv.
Civil
CJCE	
Cour de justice des Communautés
européennes
COCC	
Code des obligations civiles etcommerciales (COCC)
Comm.
Communication
CPI	
Code de la propriété intellectuelle(France)

CPP
Code de procédure pénale
CSR
Commission supérieure de recours
D.
Dallozdir.
Sous la direction
éd.
Éditionex.
Exemplefasc.
FasciculeGaz. Pal.
Gazette du Palais
Ibid.
IbidemICC	The International Review ofIntellectual Property andCompetition Law
INPI	
Institut national de la propriété
industrielle (France)
IRPI	
Institut de recherche en propriété
intellectuelle
JCP E
JurisClasseur entreprise
JCP G	
JurisClasseur périodique, édition
générale
JO
Journal officiel
JORF	
Journal officiel de la Républiquefrançaise
Juriscl.
JurisClasseur
LGDJ	
Librairie générale de droit et dejurisprudence
LPA
Les Petites Affiches
OAMPI	Office africain et malgache de la
propriété industrielle
OAPI	
Organisation africaine de la
propriété intellectuelle
obs.
Observation
OHADA	Organisation pour l’harmonisationen Afrique du droit des affaires
OHMI	
Office de l’harmonisation dans lemarché intérieur
op. cit.
opus citatum
p.
Page
par.
Paragraphe
PIBD	
Propriété industrielle – Bulletin
Documentaire
pp.
Pages
Préc.
PrécitéProf.
Professeur
Propr. Ind.
Propriété industrielle
PTPI	
Président du tribunal de première
instance
PUF
Presses universitaires de France
RAPI	
Revue africaine de la propriété
intellectuelle
Req.
RequêteRD propr. intell.	
Revue de droit de la propriété
intellectuelle
161

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

RFPI	
Revue francophone de la propriété
intellectuelle
RIPIA	
Revue internationale de la propriété
industrielle et artistique
RIDA	
Revue internationale de droit
d’auteur
RID comp	
Revue internationale de droit
comparé
RLDA
Revue Lamy droit des affaires
RTD com	
Revue trimestrielle de droitcommercials.
Suivant
Somm.
Sommaire
Ss
Suivants
TGI
Tribunal de grande instance
TPI
Tribunal de première instance
UEMOA	Union économique et monétaire
ouest-africaine
Vol.
VolumeWCT	Traité de l’Organisation Mondiale dela Propriété Intellectuelle sur le droit
d’auteur
WIPO/OMPI	
Organisation Mondiale de la
Propriété Intellectuelle
WPPT	Traité de l’Organisation Mondialede la Propriété Intellectuelle sur lesinterprétations et exécutions et lesphonogrammes

162

Présentation de l’OAPI
L’Organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuelle(OAPI) est une institution internationale
intergouvernementale, œuvrant dans le domainede la propriété intellectuelle. Institution créée le
13 septembre 1962 par la Convention de Librevillerévisée et dénommée aujourd’hui l’Accord de Bangui,l’OAPI a son siège à Yaoundé, République du Cameroun,et compte à nos jours 17 États membres, à savoir : Bénin,Burkina Faso, Cameroun, République centrafricaine,
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinée, Guinée Bissau,
Guinée équatoriale, Mali, Mauritanie, Niger, Sénégal,Tchad, Togo et Union des Comores.
Dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre de ses missions,l’Organisation :• délivre les titres de propriété industrielle relatifs aux
brevets, modèles d’utilités, marques de produits
et de services, dessins et modèles industriels,
noms commerciaux, indications géographiques etobtentions végétales;• assure la publication des titres depropriété industrielle;• promeut la créativité et le transfert de technologie;• encourage l’exploitation des inventions et innovations;• assure la formation en propriété intellectuelle;• mène des activités dans le cadre de la promotion dela protection de la propriété littéraire et artistique,des expressions culturelles traditionnelles etdes savoirs traditionnels.

L’Accord de Bangui est la législation uniforme de tous
les États membres de l’OAPI. Elle est la loi nationalede chacun des États membres en matière de propriété
intellectuelle. Cet accord crée un office commun :l’OAPI. Les procédures sont centralisées : une demandeadressée à l’Organisation est déposée soit directement
à son siège, soit par l’entremise du ministère chargé dela propriété industrielle dans chaque État membre. Cedépôt a valeur de dépôt national dans chacun des États
membres. Un seul titre est délivré sur la base d’une
seule demande.
Les titres délivrés par l’Organisation sont valables surle territoire de tous les États membres. Il n’y a pas
de systèmes nationaux de délivrance des titres qui
coexistent avec le système régional. Ce système est en
accord avec les principales conventions internationales
régissant la propriété intellectuelle. La gestion collective
des droits d’auteurs est confiée à des organismes degestion collective dans les États membres. Les litiges
portant sur les titres de propriété intellectuelle et les
atteintes aux droits conférés sont portés devant lesjuridictions des États membres.
Maurice Batanga
Directeur des affaires juridiques
OAPI

163

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuelleA.
Rapports entre l’Organisation africainede la propriété intellectuelle (OAPI) et
les juridictions nationales des États
membres – Absence d’obligation de saisirla Commission supérieure de recours del’OAPI avant d’accéder aux juridictions
nationales – Compétence des instances
administratives et judiciaires – Préséance desdécisions judiciaires
165
B.
Arbitrage en matière de propriété
intellectuelle – Application du droit OHADA –Désignation du collège arbitral – Diffusion defilms – Paiement de la rémunération
169
C.
Législation fondant la saisie des œuvres
contrefaites – Questions de droit OHADA– Application du droit OAPI (annexe VII) –Application du droit interne174

D.
Nationalité – Paiement de la caution judicatum
solvi par les ressortissants d’États membres del’OAPI dans d’autres États membres
178
E.
Cour commune de justice et d’arbitrage(CCJA) de l’OHADA – Propriété intellectuelle –Compétence – Cour suprême nationale
181
F.
Saisie-contrefaçon – Difficultés d’exécution– Compétence – Juge du contentieux del’exécution – Non-application de l’article 49 del’AUPSRVE – Droit commun national – Juge desréférés – Juge du fond183

Chapitre 1
Théorie générale de la
propriété intellectuelle
A. Rapports entre l’Organisation
africaine de la propriété intellectuelle(OAPI) et les juridictions nationales
des États membres – Absenced’obligation de saisir la Commission
supérieure de recours de l’OAPI avantd’accéder aux juridictions nationales– Compétence des instances
administratives et judiciaires –Préséance des décisions judiciaires
La compétence des instances administratives derèglement des litiges de l’Organisation africaine de la
propriété intellectuelle (OAPI) n’affecte nullement celledes juridictions nationales des États membres qui ont
une compétence concurrente. Dès lors, la saisine deces juridictions n’est pas subordonnée à l’épuisement
des recours internes à l’OAPI et les décisions rendues
par ces instances ne peuvent être déférées devant lesjuridictions nationales dont les décisions priment envertu des dispositions de l’Accord de Bangui de 1977
relatif à la création d’une Organisation africaine de la
propriété intellectuelle portant révision de l’accord
portant création d’un Office africain et malgache de la
propriété industrielle (Accord de Bangui ou AB-1977), tel
que révisé en 1999 (ABR-1999) et en 2015 (ABR-2015).
Tribunal de grande instance du Wouri (Douala), Jugement
COM n° 7 du 5 janvier 2012, ARLA FOODS AMBA c. DANAHOLDINGS LIMITED
Observations :Patates chaudes? Telle est la question qu’on pourrait
se poser au sujet des nombreux et intéressants débats
juridiques soulevés par les parties à l’occasion du litige
opposant la société Arla Foods Amba à une autre, Dana
Holdings Limited, et qui ont été quasiment tous éludéspar le juge.
Faits : Les faits de l’espèce ne présentaient aucune
originalité par rapport aux conflits habituels qui naissent
en droit des marques. En effet, la société Arla Foods
est titulaire de la marque verbale “Dano”, enregistrée
sous le numéro 36147 sur le territoire de l’OAPI depuis
le 24 mars 1996 pour les produits des classes 5, 29 et
30. Le 30 novembre 2004, la société Dana Holdings Ltd
dépose deux signes voisins, la marque verbale “Dana”
enregistrée sous le numéro 50961 pour les produits
des classes 5, 16, 29 et 30 et la marque figurative “Dana& Device” enregistrée sous le numéro 50962 pour les
produits des classes 5, 16, 29 et 30. La société Arla Foods
formule alors une opposition après l’enregistrement deces deux marques devant l’OAPI qui rend deux décisions.

Dans une première rendue sous le n° 00090/DG/SCAJ
du 30 juin 2007, elle prononce la radiation de la marqueDana. Dans une seconde sous le n° 00091/DG/SCAJ dumême jour, elle rejette l’opposition à l’enregistrement
de la marque “Dana & Device”. La simplicité de ces faits
est déconcertante lorsqu’on découvre les débats qui
sont nés postérieurement devant le juge saisi du litige.
En effet, non satisfaite de la décision rendue par l’OAPI
en ce qui concerne la marque maintenue, Arla Foods
demande au tribunal de grande instance du Wouri à
Douala (Cameroun) d’en prononcer la nullité.
Raisonnement : La procédure devant cette juridiction
a donné lieu à d’importants débats théoriques, plus
ou moins occultés par le juge qui a préféré s’en tenir àl’essentiel dans un jugement comportant pas moins de24 rôles, et dans lequel se sont glissées des expressions
susceptibles d’induire en erreur le lecteur non familier audroit de l’OAPI1.
À la lecture des motifs spécifiques de la décision, la seulequestion de cette nature qui a été expressément évoquée
et, sans motivation aucune du juge, est celle de l’instancecompétente pour prononcer la nullité d’un enregistrement
effectué par l’OAPI. Dans cette perspective, en affirmant
sa compétence et donc celle des juridictions nationales,
le tribunal s’est prononcé sur l’un des cas d’ouverture àladite nullité, à savoir pour le cas d’espèce, l’atteinte à undroit antérieur et l’existence subséquente d’un risque deconfusion. Cette question n’aurait, à vrai dire, présenté
aucun intérêt en elle-même si elle ne s’inscrivait pas dansle cadre d’une affaire contenant des débats d’une grande
finalité didactique. De fait, elle se situe dans la principale
problématique qui était en jeu dans le cas d’espèce etqui peut se construire autour des rapports entre lesinstances administratives internes de règlement deslitiges à l’OAPI et les juridictions nationales.
Cette problématique globale comporte plusieurs
questions secondaires, toutes dignes d’intérêt, dont :I.

la compétence en matière d’opposition, de radiation
et de nullité;II. la prise d’effet des décisions rendues par le directeur
général; etIII. les voies de recours contre les décisions prises
par les instances en charge du contentieux au
sein de l’OAPI.

1

Par exemple, d’une part, le jugement évoque “le président de l’OAPI” alors
qu’il fait allusion au directeur général de cette institution; d’autre part, il visele “jugement de l’OAPI” alors qu’il s’agit simplement de décisions rendues parce directeur général.
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I. La compétence en matière d’opposition, de radiation
et de nullité
La question de la compétence pour connaître des litiges
relatifs à la nullité et de la radiation a été au cœur d’un
grand débat dans l’affaire examinée par le tribunal
de grande instance du Wouri. Concrètement, il était
question de savoir si la compétence pour connaître
des oppositions, de la nullité et de la radiation relevait
du domaine des juridictions des États membres ou sielle appartenait uniquement à l’OAPI. Le débat était
né de ce que grâce aux deux décisions précitées,l’OAPI avait prononcé la radiation d’une marque etrejeté une opposition et de ce que par la suite, l’undes protagonistes avait saisi une juridiction pourcontourner la décision de rejet, en sollicitant l’annulationde la marque que le rejet de l’opposition validait
implicitement2. La situation était donc assez particulière,même si les faits étaient familiers et les solutions plus ou
moins attendues. En effet, la situation évoque plusieurs
aspects juridiques.

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D’une part, aucune partie n’a formé de recours contre
les décisions rendues par le directeur général de l’OAPI
devant la Commission supérieure de recours, ce qui
pouvait laisser croire, a priori, qu’elles avaient toutes
acquiescé à ces décisions. D’ailleurs, c’est cette absence
de recours que soulève le défendeur à l’instance devant
le tribunal, estimant que le recours devant la Commission
supérieure de recours aurait dû être formé avant toutesaisine éventuelle d’un tribunal national. D’autre part,
devant ce tribunal, le demandeur va plus loin et se
prévaut des constatations contenues dans la décision dudirecteur général de l’OAPI, devant le tribunal.

166

Sur le premier aspect, il importe de réaffirmer que
l’exercice du recours interne à l’OAPI par le biais dela saisine de la commission sus-évoquée ne saurait
constituer un préalable à l’introduction d’une procédure
judiciaire. Cette affirmation peut être aisément
justifiée par l’autonomie des contentieux administratifs
et judiciaires concernant les titres de propriété
industrielle. D’ailleurs, dans une affaire postérieure àcelle commentée, la même juridiction a eu l’occasiond’affirmer, là aussi implicitement, la compétence
concurrente entre les organes de l’OAPI et les juridictions
nationales3. En effet, l’une des parties à ce litige avait
soulevé l’irrecevabilité de la demande en justice, au motif
que les délais pour faire opposition à l’enregistrementd’une marque étaient expirés. Le tribunal a clairement
relevé que les fondements juridiques des deux actionsétant différents, les délais prévus pour cette oppositionne sauraient s’appliquer à l’action judiciaire. À partir
2

3Sous ABR-2015, la question ne se pose pas dans les mêmes termes. En effet,
l’opposition doit être formulée après la publication de la demande, ce qui
permet d’empêcher l’enregistrement et éventuellement la délivrance dutitre. Une annulation administrative suivant une procédure interne à l’OAPI
est donc initiale. L’OAPI n’interviendra qu’après qu’une juridiction interned’un État membre aura rendu une décision. Il n’en va différemment que pourla dénomination d’une variété végétale dont la radiation demeure possible
après l’enregistrement. Cf. art. 30 de l’annexe X de l’ABR-2015.
Voir TGI du Wouri (Douala), Jugement civil n° 382/Com du 23 décembre 2013,
Société Marine Magistrale SA c. Sieur Kamga Nenkam Jean Paul (obs. FADE (A.), ce
recueil, chapitre 3, section N).

de ce raisonnement, il est clair pour le juge que laprocédure interne à l’OAPI ne saurait interférer avec cellesusceptible d’être introduite devant une juridiction.
Sur le second aspect, il s’agit d’un argumentd’opportunité bien choisi, dans la mesure où, bien
souvent, le contentieux judiciaire est postérieur
à la procédure administrative. En effet, il est aisé
par exemple, dans un litige en contrefaçon ou en
concurrence déloyale, d’invoquer à son profit une
décision rendue par le directeur général ou par laCommission supérieure de recours, qui serait basée surla violation d’un droit antérieur ou sur l’existence d’unrisque de confusion qui en serait ou non la conséquence.
Cette dernière hypothèse s’est d’ailleurs présentéedevant la cour d’appel de Lomé4. Dans une espèce
intéressante, l’intimé revendique reconventionnellement
la propriété d’une marque enregistrée par l’appelant
après lui, alors que le dépôt de ce dernier était fondé sur
un enregistrement antérieurement effectué à l’étranger
par son cocontractant. Cet appelant a alors invoqué avec
succès la décision du directeur général de l’OAPI portantradiation de l’enregistrement de l’intimé, pour faireécarter la revendication de propriété par l’intimé et poursoutenir son action en contrefaçon.
Dans une autre affaire ouverte devant le tribunal de
grande instance de Douala en 2007, le juge a beaucoup
plus clairement laissé apparaître l’influence des décisions
des instances de l’OAPI sur le contentieux judiciaire5. En
effet, parallèlement à la procédure judiciaire ouverte
devant lui pour contrefaçon et concurrence déloyale, ledemandeur avait fait opposition à l’enregistrement de lamarque litigieuse devant le directeur général de l’OAPI.
Ce dernier avait alors rejeté cette opposition et, par lasuite, le juge, s’appuyant sur la décision de rejet, a estimé
que le directeur général n’ayant reconnu aucun droit audemandeur, celui-ci ne pouvait poursuivre l’adversaire encontrefaçon ou en concurrence déloyale. La question, àl’évidence, était alors de savoir si l’échec de la procédure
d’opposition devant l’OAPI devait fonder le rejet
automatique de l’action en contrefaçon et concurrence
déloyale intentée parallèlement devant les tribunaux
contre l’auteur de l’enregistrement contesté6.
À l’évidence, en dépit du regard bienveillant que lesjuridictions peuvent accorder aux décisions émanant del’OAPI, il est clair que les deux catégories de contentieux
doivent pouvoir conserver leur autonomie. Celui devantl’OAPI conformément à l’article 18 de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999 et celui devant le tribunal conformément àl’article 24 de ladite annexe. Bien plus, dès lors que la

4
5
6

Cour d’appel de Lomé, Arrêt n° 70/15 du 4 mars 2015, Gnanhoue Nazaire c.
Établissement Sola (obs. LAMOTTE (M.), ce recueil, chapitre 3, section I).
TGI du Wouri (Douala), Jugement n° 218 du 19 septembre 2007, Société R.M.
& Co Limited c. Société C.D.M. (SCDM) (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M-L), ce recueil,
chapitre 3, section E).
De même, une cour d’appel a estimé qu’en matière de marques, l’OAPI était
“l’organe institutionnel de contrôle et d’enregistrement des marques”, etque son appréciation du risque de confusion pouvait servir d’argument
pour rejeter les prétentions de l’appelant qui estimait que ce risque existait :Cour d’appel du Centre (Yaoundé), Arrêt n° 536/Civ du 6 novembre 2013, The
Independent Tobacco FZCO c. Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE(M-L), ce recueil, chapitre 3, section Q).

II. La prise d’effet des décisions rendues par ledirecteur général de l’OAPI en matière de radiation
La question du moment de la prise d’effet des décisions
rendues par le directeur général de l’OAPI en matièrede radiation, et soulevée dans l’affaire Arla Foods,
est digne d’intérêt. En effet, dans ses écritures, Dana
Holdings a relevé “qu’aucune décision déclarantl’enregistrement de la marque ‘Dana’ nul et non avenu
n’a jamais été communiquée à l’Organisation africainede la propriété intellectuelle”. Ce raisonnement conduit
à s’interroger sur le moment de la prise d’effet desdécisions du directeur général de l’OAPI en matière deradiation. Autrement dit, celles-ci prennent-elles effet
immédiatement ou doivent-elles être soumises en vue deleur validation éventuelle à un juge national? La question
est d’autant plus intéressante que la partie qui soulève
cet argument le confronte avec un jugement éventuel qui
prononcerait la nullité. Par ailleurs, elle est intéressanteparce qu’elle pourrait se poser à l’égard d’autres titresde protection dont la radiation pourrait être prononcée
par le directeur général de l’OAPI et que la jurisprudence
de cet espace est encore balbutiante. En effet, un juge
a d’ailleurs pu déclarer que : “l’article 18 de l’ABR qui fait
prévaloir la primauté de l’autorité et l’indépendance desdécisions judiciaires (…) soumet les organes dirigeants del’OAPI à la censure des Tribunaux civils dans leurs actes
et décisions relatives à la mise en œuvre des instruments
de protection de la propriété industrielle”8. Interprétée àla lettre, la pensée de ce juge pourrait conduire à croire
que les décisions rendues par le directeur général et laCommission supérieure de recours sont susceptiblesd’être “censurées” par les juridictions et donc attaquéesdevant elles.
Pour répondre à ces différents aspects, il convient, àtitre préalable, d’établir une distinction théorique entre
ces notions dont le résultat est l’anéantissement d’undroit de propriété industrielle dont la naissance était
souhaitée par le déposant.
• En ce qui concerne la radiation, celle-ci tend à obtenirla suppression de la protection du registre qui laconstate afin d’en neutraliser les effets de droit.
• Quant à la nullité, elle est définie de manière classique,comme la sanction qui frappe un acte juridiqueirrégulièrement formé.
D’ailleurs, on peut ajouter à ces deux concepts un autre
qui est assez fréquemment employé en matière depropriété industrielle : il s’agit de la déchéance, laquelle

7
8

Cf. art. 20 de l’ABR-2015.
Voir TPI de Yopougon (Côte d’Ivoire), Jugement civil n° 187 du 21 mars 2013,
Sivop SA c. Société Angel cosmetics SA (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M-L), ce recueil,
chapitre 3, section L).

doit s’entendre comme “la perte d’un droit, soit à titre desanction, soit en raison du non-respect des conditions
d’exercice de ce droit” 9.
L’annulation, on s’en doute, ne relève que de lacompétence des juridictions nationales des États
membres de l’OAPI. Pour le confirmer, il faut d’abordaffirmer que, de manière générale, ce sera au juge deprocéder à la constatation des irrégularités de fond ou
de forme qui auraient émaillé la procédure ayant abouti
à la création du droit constaté par le titre de propriété
industrielle. Tel serait le cas, lorsque :• l’objet dont le titre a été délivré n’est pas conforme
audit titre (par exemple un brevet ne peut protéger
qu’une invention; un certificat d’obtention végétale,une obtention végétale, etc.);• une description n’est pas conforme;• il n’y a pas de lien de rattachement entre un objet
protégé et les certificats subséquents10;• la protection a été octroyée alors que l’objet est exclu
du domaine de la propriété intellectuelle11.

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuelleloi accorde la primauté aux décisions juridictionnelles
suivant les dispositions de l’article 18 de l’accord7, lesjuridictions pourraient s’inspirer des décisions desinstances administratives de l’OAPI, sans considérer queles éléments qu’elles contiennent prouvent à suffisanceles faits contestés devant elles.

Tel serait aussi l’ensemble des hypothèses où l’accord
invite le juge à constater la nullité12. Tout particulièrement,en matière de marques, celle-ci peut être annulée, selonl’article 24, alinéa 2, lorsqu’elle n’est pas conforme aux
exigences des articles 2 et 3 de l’annexe III (Actes de 1999
et de 2015), c’est-à-dire particulièrement lorsqu’elle n’est
pas distinctive, elle porte atteinte à un droit antérieur,
elle est déceptive, elle imite ou utilise des signes officiels,
etc. Précisément, c’est parce que les marques “Dano”
et “Dana & Device” étaient potentiellement en conflit
avec un droit antérieur que le litige est né. Mais ce qui
l’a complexifié, c’est d’abord le chevauchement créé parl’acte de 1999 de l’Accord de Bangui, entre les causes denullité et les causes de radiation13. En effet, si les causes
ci-dessus citées émanant de l’article 24 constituent biendes cas d’ouverture à la nullité dont l’examen relève
de la compétence des juridictions nationales des États
membres, ces mêmes causes ouvrent droit à la radiation
administrative dont la procédure va de la décision dudirecteur général jusqu’à la Commission supérieure derecours éventuellement saisie d’un recours contre
ladite décision.
9
10

11

12

13

Cf. GUINCHARD (S.) et DEBARD (Th.) (éds.), Lexique des termes juridiques,
25e éd., Paris (Dalloz), 2017.
Cette cause particulière de nullité résulte de l’art. 39 al. 2 de l’annexe I et
l’art. 34 al. 2 de l’annexe II de l’ABR-1999. Elle signifie que si un certificat aété délivré pour tenir compte des modifications, améliorations ou additions
apportées à un brevet d’invention ou à un modèle d’utilité, il faut que lamodification, l’amélioration ou l’addition se rattache effectivement à cetteinvention ou à ce modèle d’utilité. À défaut d’un tel rattachement, le titre
ultérieur peut être déclaré nul.
Par ex., dans l’ABR-1999 : art. 6 de l’annexe I, art. 2 al. 4 de l’annexe IV etart. 1 al. 2 de l’annexe IV. Dans l’art. 2 de l’ABR-2015, la liste des exclusions
expresses en matière de brevets a été raccourcie, grâce à la révision del’art. 1, qui définit le concept d’invention.
On pense particulièrement à l’inobservation d’une exigence prescrite souspeine de nullité et à la constatation d’une disposition invalide. Voir, parexemple, ABR-2015, art. 11 al. 4 et art. 36 al. 2 de l’annexe I et art. 6 al. 4 del’annexe IV.
Ce chevauchement a été corrigé dans l’ABR-2015. La radiation judiciairen’existe plus en tant que sanction autonome telle qu’elle ressortait de l’art. 23
de l’ABR-1999. Désormais, la radiation devrait être une simple opération
consécutive à la déchéance prononcée, par exemple du fait de l’inutilisationde la marque pendant cinq ans.
167

Ce qui a, ensuite, complexifié le litige c’est l’existence,
semble-t-il, de deux types de radiations, dont l’une
est administrative et l’autre judiciaire. Cependant, ladistinction entre les deux types de radiations est aisée àétablir; d’ailleurs, ce n’est pas cette distinction qui posait
problème dans le cas d’espèce.
• La radiation administrative est prononcée par ledirecteur général de l’OAPI et éventuellement
confirmée par la Commission supérieure de recours.
Elle intervient après une opposition formulée contre
l’enregistrement du titre, en l’occurrence la marque.
La procédure de cette opposition est organisée parl’article 18 de l’annexe III. Selon ce texte, il s’agit d’une
instance administrative contradictoire. Une fois ladécision prononcée, la partie intéressée dispose d’undélai de trois mois à compter de la réception de la
notification de cette décision, pour l’attaquer devant laCommission supérieure de recours.
• Quant à la radiation judiciaire, elle est réglementée en
matière d’indications géographiques par l’article 14 del’annexe VI et en matière de marques par l’article 23
de l’annexe III de l’Acte de 1999 de l’Accord de
Bangui. Cette disposition de l’annexe III précise
que cette radiation ne peut intervenir qu’en cas denon-utilisation pendant une durée ininterrompue de5 années précédant l’action.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Il en découle que les deux formes de radiation sont assez
distinctement organisées.

168

Il reste que le débat, dans le cas d’espèce, semble avoir été
obscurci par la possibilité d’utiliser les mêmes causes pourobtenir soit la radiation, soit la nullité. Cet obscurcissement
se manifeste dans le fait que dans ses conclusions, lasociété “Dana Holdings” déclare “qu’aucune décision
déclarant l’enregistrement de la marque Dana nul et
non avenu n’a jamais été communiquée à l’Organisation,
relativement à l’article 24…”. Cet argument est surprenant
dès lors que, dans cette espèce, une décision du directeur
général a déclaré cet enregistrement nul. Essayait-il
d’amener le juge saisi à décider que la décision dudirecteur général, non frappée en l’espèce de recours,
ne devait prendre effet qu’à compter du prononcé
d’une décision judiciaire rendue dans une instance enannulation de ladite marque? La réponse est affirmative
selon toute vraisemblance. En effet, dans la logique decet argumentaire, lorsque le directeur général de l’OAPI
prononce la radiation, celle-ci doit encore faire l’objet
d’une validation par une juridiction nationale dont ladécision doit, ensuite, être notifiée à l’OAPI.
Pourtant, une orientation contraire s’impose.
L’Organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuelle
est une personne morale de droit international dont
les décisions ne peuvent être justiciables devant lesjuridictions nationales de ses États membres. Cellesci sont autonomes. Dans cette logique, elles sontd’application immédiate. Par conséquent, lorsqu’elle
s’est prononcée dans un contentieux lié à la validitéd’un titre, sa décision est définitive sous réserve del’ouverture d’un autre contentieux devant les juridictions
de l’ordre judiciaire.

III. Les recours contre les décisions rendues par ledirecteur général de l’OAPI en matière de radiation
On le voit, l’argumentaire développé devant le jugeamène également à s’interroger sur la compétence
pour connaître des recours formés contre les décisions
rendues par l’OAPI en matière de radiation. La question
des recours contre les décisions rendues par le directeur
général de l’OAPI a été fort débattue, même si, à ladéception du commentateur, le juge ne s’en est pas saisi.
Ainsi qu’il a déjà été relevé, les décisions relatives àla radiation et à la déchéance sont prononcées parle directeur général de l’Organisation. D’après lesdispositions des différentes annexes, les parties peuvent
alors former un recours contre ces décisions devant laCommission supérieure de recours. Là est une évidence.
Ce qui l’est moins, c’est la situation dans laquelle unedes parties cherche à contourner le rejet prononcé parle directeur général, en sollicitant une annulation devant
une juridiction nationale et d’autre part, d’imaginer quela saisine d’une juridiction nationale est subordonnée àcelle préalable de la Commission sus-évoquée.
Ces deux orientations proposées au tribunal tirent leursource d’un maniement intelligent du droit OAPI. En
effet, dans le cas d’espèce, le directeur général avait
prononcé la radiation de la marque “Dana” et avait
rejeté l’opposition de l’entreprise Arla Foods en ce qui
concernait la marque “Dana & Device”, ce qui revenait à
valider l’existence de ladite marque. Les deux décisions
auraient pu être attaquées devant la Commission, mais
aucune partie n’a fait recours. Et, devant le tribunal, ladéfenderesse se prévalait de ce que l’absence de recours
devant ladite Commission valait acquiescement etestimait que cette absence était de nature à constituer
une fin de non-recevoir devant le tribunal.
En ce qui concerne la subordination de la saisine d’une
juridiction nationale à l’exercice préalable du recours
devant la Commission supérieure de recours, aucune
disposition de l’accord ou de l’une des annexes nela prévoit. Ce silence est compréhensible, dans lamesure où, comme il a été relevé, les décisions de cette
Organisation sont autonomes et exécutoires. Le juge,bien qu’il ne se soit pas prononcé sur cette question,a retenu sa compétence alors qu’il n’y avait pas eu untel recours; il reconnaissait ainsi implicitement que cerecours n’était pas nécessaire à l’ouverture de sa saisine.
En ce qui concerne le contournement du rejet del’opposition par la saisine d’une juridiction nationale,il faut reconnaître qu’il s’agit d’une seconde chanceque tentait de s’octroyer l’entreprise Arla Foods envue d’obtenir l’annulation de la marque implicitement
validée. De surcroît, devant la juridiction saisie, cetteentreprise s’est prévalue des constatations de la décision
du directeur général. En effet, dans son argumentaire,elle estime “qu’il est définitivement acquis pardécisions inattaquable qu’il existe une ressemblance
phonétique entre “Dano” du demandeur et “Dana” de ladéfenderesse” et que sur la base de cette ressemblance,
l’annulation de la marque “Dana & Device” doit êtreLa question de l’autorité de la chose jugée est pertinente
en l’espèce et peut l’être également dans d’autres
domaines de la propriété industrielle, pour deux raisons.
D’une part, la procédure ouverte devant les instancesinternes de l’OAPI est une instance en radiation tandis
que celle ouverte devant la juridiction est une instanceen annulation. Techniquement, les deux litiges n’ont
pas le même objet, même s’ils sont fondés sur la mêmecause. D’ailleurs, c’est tout naturellement que le jugede Douala a examiné la demande d’annulation et s’est
prononcé en faveur de la nullité sollicitée. Autrement dit,il ne s’est nullement interrogé sur la procédure interne
à l’OAPI, bien que celle-ci ait fait l’objet de vifs débats
dans les conclusions des parties. D’autre part, comme ila déjà été relevé, les instances de règlement des litiges
de l’OAPI sont des instances purement administratives,y compris la Commission sus-évoquée dont la nature aété quelquefois discutée14. Il en découle que les décisions
rendues par ces instances ne sauraient avoir autorité dechose jugée pour la juridiction saisie du litige.
Finalement, les décisions de l’OAPI peuvent êtreaisément contournées. En effet, dans l’exercice normalde leur droit, les parties peuvent non seulements’abstenir de saisir la Commission supérieure de recoursaprès une décision du directeur général, mais aussi,même après la saisine ladite Commission, la partie
insatisfaite peut recommencer la procédure devant
une juridiction nationale. De surcroît, rien, non plus,
ne s’oppose à ce que pendant la procédure devant
les instances administratives de l’OAPI, la partie qui
estime y avoir intérêt puisse attraire l’autre devant
un tribunal lorsque les circonstances le permettent.
Particulièrement, en matière de marques, dès lors que leconflit avec un droit antérieur matérialisé par l’existenceéventuelle d’un risque de confusion est en cause, la voie
judiciaire est royalement ouverte. Au total, il en découleque le juge national peut être saisi, aussi bien avant,pendant ou postérieurement à la saisine des instances
administratives de l’OAPI. Cependant, en sens inverse,
il apparaît clairement que la saisine des instances
administratives de l’OAPI ne présente plus aucune utilité
lorsqu’une juridiction est saisie du litige, dès lors que
les décisions juridictionnelles s’imposent à l’OAPI en
application de l’article 18 de l’Accord de Bangui, Actede 199915.

1415Considérant qu’il s’agit d’un organe judiciaire : BIYO’O (R.G.), La protection
des marques de produits dans l’espace de l’Organisation africaine dela propriété intellectuelle, mémoire de Diplôme d’études supérieuresspécialisées (DESS), Université de Douala - Cameroun, 2004. Disponible enligne à l’adresse http://www.memoireonline.com.
Cette règle a été reprise par l’art. 20 de l’ABR-2015.

En fin de compte, on peut tout de même regretter
que l’on ne puisse disposer de moyens juridiquessusceptibles d’éviter un contournement aussi aisédes décisions rendues par les instances internes del’OAPI. Celles-ci, en particulier celles de la Commission
supérieure de recours, contribuent à leur manière et ce,
indépendamment des tribunaux, à uniformiser certains
aspects du Droit OAPI.
Joseph Fometeu

B. Arbitrage en matière de propriété
intellectuelle – Application du droit
OHADA – Désignation du collège
arbitral – Diffusion de films – Paiement
de la rémunération

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuelle

prononcée. La démarche est assez opportuniste et
juridiquement imparable, car aucun texte n’interdit
qu’après le rejet d’une opposition formulée à la suited’un enregistrement, voire qu’après une décision dansle même sens rendue par la Commission supérieure derecours sur ledit rejet, la partie adverse tente d’obtenirl’annulation de la marque implicitement consolidéedevant une juridiction nationale. Peut-on alors lui
opposer l’autorité de chose jugée?

Les parties à un contrat peuvent opter pour le recours àl’arbitrage en vue de la résolution d’un litige relevant dudroit d’auteur. Dans ce cadre, le juge judiciaire saisi de lamise en place du collège arbitral est tenu de respecter
les termes de la clause compromissoire. Par la suite, ce
collège est tenu de statuer sur tous les aspects du litige
qui lui est soumis et de s’abstenir d’en renvoyer au juge
judiciaire. Dès lors statue infra petita le collège arbitralqui tranche la question de la redevance due et renvoie au
juge judiciaire les autres questions.
Cour suprême du Congo, Arrêt n° 07/GCS.02 du
17 mai 2002, LINDA COMMUNICATIONS c. MIC VIDEO
Observations :Le recours aux modes alternatifs de règlement des litigesn’est pas courant en matière de propriété intellectuelle
en Afrique. C’est la raison pour laquelle l’arrêt rendu parla Cour suprême du Congo le 17 mai 2002 présente unintérêt certain.
Faits : La société LINDA COMMUNICATIONS a conclu un
contrat d’exclusivité avec les établissements MIC-VIDEO.
Grâce à ce contrat, MIC-VIDEO met à la disposition dela chaîne de télévision CANAL OCÉAN appartenant à
LINDA COMMUNICATIONS des cassettes de films en vue
de la diffusion pour les abonnés. En contrepartie, cettedernière s’engage à verser une rémunération égale à
50% des recettes brutes provenant des abonnements
payés par la clientèle de la chaîne CANAL OCÉAN. Par
ailleurs, une clause du contrat prévoit que tous les litiges
qui pourraient survenir seraient soumis à un tribunal
arbitral choisi d’un commun accord par les parties.
Malheureusement, l’exécution de la convention ne se
déroule pas comme attendu. Entre autres, à la suite dela réclamation de l’entreprise fournisseur des cassettes,
les parties ne parviennent pas à s’accorder sur lesmodalités de calcul de la rémunération due. C’est ce qui
fonde la saisine du tribunal de commerce de PointeNoire par cette entreprise. Devant cette juridiction, un“collège arbitral” de trois membres est constitué. Celui-ci
statue sur la cause et se prononce par une sentence
dont l’existence et le contenu sont contestés par LINDACOMMUNICATIONS. En effet, cette entreprise estime,169

d’une part, que le collège arbitral est incompétent
pour statuer sur le litige dans la mesure où il n’est pasl’émanation de l’accord des parties, mais plutôt de celledu tribunal saisi d’une requête unilatérale du demandeur.
D’autre part, elle estime que dans le fond, plusieurs
griefs peuvent être reprochés à la sentence rendue par lecollège. Il s’agit, entre autres, de la violation de la loi, dela dénaturation du contrat, de la violation des règles deprocédure, etc.
Raisonnement : Le litige est donc intéressant à plusd’un titre. En effet, il soulève au moins deux problèmes
dont l’un est lié à la désignation des arbitres devant
statuer sur un litige et l’autre, plus global, à certains
aspects de l’office du juge arbitral. Cependant, il s’agit
de problématiques très générales qui ne devraient êtreabordées que dans le cadre d’une analyse relative àl’arbitrage considéré en lui-même.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Dans le cas de l’affaire LINDA-COMMUNICATIONS, ces
problèmes sont abordés en vue de résoudre le point defait qui a généré le litige et qui intéresse particulièrement
la propriété intellectuelle. Faut-il le rappeler, le litige est
né à la suite de la réclamation de la rémunération due
en contrepartie de l’exploitation des films par la chaîne
de télévision CANAL OCÉAN et, fait rare, il a été tranché
par un arbitre, fût-il contesté. Autrement dit, le fait queles parties aient inséré une clause compromissoire dansleur contrat dont l’objet était l’exploitation d’un droit
de propriété intellectuelle est suffisamment importantpour mériter une certaine attention. Il donne l’occasionde confirmer qu’il est possible, dans le contexte du droit
OAPI, de soumettre un litige de propriété intellectuelleà l’arbitrage (voir section I). Dans le cas d’espèce, le jugesuprême congolais offre également l’occasion d’apporterdes précisions utiles en ce qui concerne l’appréciationde la base de calcul des redevances dues au titre del’exploitation d’un objet protégé (voir section II).

170

I. L’arbitrabilité des litiges de propriété intellectuelledans l’espace OAPIIl peut sembler superflu d’évoquer l’arbitrabilité deslitiges de propriété intellectuelle dans la mesure où laquestion des rapports entre l’arbitrage et la propriété
intellectuelle est bien ancienne. En effet, il s’agit d’unequestion que l’on peut considérer comme résolue, sil’on raisonne sur le champ du droit comparé. Commel’écrit Vivant, il ne subsiste en matière de propriété
intellectuelle que “quelques îlots d’inarbitrabilité aumilieu d’un océan d’arbitrabilité”16. Cependant, ces “îlots”
ne sont pas bien nombreux, si l’on se réfère à l’étendue
des pouvoirs de l’arbitre en matière de propriété
industrielle (A) et en matière de propriété littéraire etartistique (B), ou si l’on s’intéresse au droit applicable enmatière d’arbitrage des droits de propriété intellectuelledans l’espace OAPI (C).

A. L’étendue des pouvoirs de l’arbitre en matière depropriété industrielle
Pour certains, l’arbitre peut statuer sur les droits
résultant d’un titre de propriété industrielle, mais nonpas sur le titre lui-même car, ce titre étant délivré par une
autorité publique, la question liée à sa validité toucherait
à l’ordre public17. Pour d’autres, l’arbitre peut statuer à
la fois sur les droits et sur le titre lui-même. Toutefois,
ils précisent que lorsque la validité du titre est en cause,l’arbitre n’est pas, à vrai dire, invité à se prononcer sur sa
validité erga omnes mais plutôt sur l’opposabilité du titre
entre parties. La sentence arbitrale est alors “assimilée
à une convention de non-opposition”18 en ce qu’elle nedéploie ses effets que inter partes19. Dans le même sens,
un arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 28 février 2008 a
admis que l’arbitre puisse se prononcer sur la nullité d’un
brevet soulevée de façon incidente, mais sa sentence,
sur ce point, est dépourvue de l’autorité de chose jugée
et n’a d’effet qu’entre les parties20. Les deux questions
sont juridiquement distinctes : la validité est un état del’acte apprécié au moment de sa formation tandis quecelle de l’opposabilité renvoie à l’efficacité du titre entre
les parties21. La solution de l’arbitrabilité intégrale, mêmenuancée par le recours à la technique de l’inopposabilité,
peut paraître satisfaisante pour l’esprit. En pratique,elle comporte de grands risques, notamment celuid’une contrariété de décisions entre un jugement et
une sentence. En d’autres termes, si on admet une telle
option, “on peut avoir des brevets efficaces inter partes
aujourd’hui qui seraient susceptibles d’être anéantis
demain par des décisions judiciaires”22. Pour ces raisons,il est préférable de refuser la soumission des litiges liés à
la validité des titres aux juridictions, dans l’espace OAPI23.
La possibilité pour la justice arbitrale de connaître ducontentieux répressif et du contentieux des mesuresprovisoires propres à la propriété intellectuelle estégalement débattue. En ce qui concerne le premier,l’article 4, alinéa 1, in fine de l’Accord de Bangui, Actede 2015, paraît avoir prohibé sa soumission précise à
l’arbitrage. En effet, en décidant que les juridictions
nationales sont “seules compétentes pour le contentieux
pénal” afférent à la reconnaissance, à l’étendue ou
à l’exploitation des droits prévus par l’accord et ses
annexes, ce texte qui en réalité avait pour but d’ouvrir
la voie à une possible création d’une juridiction
supranationale de propriété intellectuelle et de réserver
le contentieux répressif de la propriété intellectuelle
aux juges nationaux pourrait s’interpréter comme ayant

17
18
19
20
21
22

16

VIVANT (M.), Cherche litige non arbitrable laborieusement : Revue Lamy dudroit des affaires, n° 72, 2004, p. 5.

23

BONET (G.) et JARROSSON (Ch.), L’arbitrabilité des litiges de propriété
industrielle en droit français : Arbitrage et propriété intellectuelle,
Publications de l’IRPI, Paris (Litec), 1994, p. 66.
TANKEU (J.), Le recours aux modes alternatifs de règlement des litiges enmatière de propriété intellectuelle, Paris (L’Harmattan), 2018, pp. 228 et s.
Voir cependant, pour une admission de la validité erga omnes en France,
en application de l’article L. 716-6 CPI : BINCTIN (N.), Droit de la propriété
intellectuelle, 6e éd., Paris (LGDJ), 2020, n° 1633.
Cour d’appel de Paris, 28.02.2008 : RTD com 2008, p. 516 (obs. LOQUIN (E.)).
CHIARINY-DAUDET (A.-C.), Le règlement judiciaire et arbitral des contentieux
internationaux sur brevets d’invention, Bibliothèque de droit de l’entreprise,
Paris (Litec), 2006, n° 531 et n° 699.
JOHNSON-ANSAH (A. J.), Le concours de l’arbitrage à la protection de la
propriété industrielle en Afrique francophone subsaharienne : RFPI, n° 1,
2015, pp. 4-18.
En ce sens, voir ibid.

Au-delà de ces divergences doctrinales, certains droitsétrangers admettent que l’arbitre puisse se prononcer
sur la nullité du titre et même sur l’action en contrefaçon.
Aux États-Unis par exemple, la loi admet, de façon
générale (article 294 de la loi fédérale sur les brevets), un
principe d’arbitrabilité, y compris pour la validité du titre
et pour la contrefaçon, même si l’effet de la sentence
ne se produit qu’inter partes. Le droit belge va plus
loin car il prévoit l’arbitrage pour les litiges relatifs aux
brevets, en reconnaissant expressément que ce modede règlement peut avoir un effet erga omnes26. En France,
plusieurs dispositions du Code de propriété intellectuelleévoquent expressément la possibilité d’un recours àl’arbitrage. Tel est le cas des articles L.331-1, L521-3-1 et
L.615-17, respectivement consacrés au droit d’auteur et
aux dessins et modèles et aux brevets. Dans l’ensemble,
la formule utilisée est la même : après avoir affirméla compétence des juridictions civiles pour les actions
civiles et les demandes relatives à tel ou tel droit depropriété intellectuelle, y compris lorsque ces demandes
portent sur une question connexe de concurrence
déloyale, le Code précise qu’il ne s’agit nullement de“faire obstacle au recours à l’arbitrage”.
B. L’étendue des pouvoirs du juge en matière de propriété
littéraire et artistique
En matière de propriété littéraire et artistiqueparticulièrement, la soumission des droits patrimoniaux
à l’arbitrage n’a jamais été véritablement contestée27,
comme le démontre l’arrêt commenté dans lequelaucune remise en cause du principe n’a été relevée ni
par une partie, ni par le juge. Le débat peut, plutôt,concerner les aspects répressifs de la violation de ces
droits, qui ne devraient pas être arbitrables28.

24
25

26

27
28

TANKEU (J.), n.18.
Dans le même sens et sans aucune nuance, voir LUCAS (A.), Arbitrage etpropriété intellectuelle, allocution lors de la conférence annuelle de la Facultéde droit de l’Université des Émirats arabes unis présentée au Emirates Centre
for Strategic Studies and Research, 28-30 avril 2008.
COOK (T.), Les modes extrajudiciaires de règlement des litiges comme
instrument d’application des droits de propriété intellectuelle,
27 janvier 2014. Disponible en ligne à l’adresse www.wipo.int › mdocs ›wipo_ace_9 › wipo_ace_9_3.
NGOMBE (L.Y.), Le droit d’auteur en Afrique, Paris (L’Harmattan), 1re éd., 2004,
n° 265.
Pour une opinion contraire, voir VIVANT (M.) et BRUGUIÈRE (J.M.), Droit
d’auteur, Paris (Dalloz), 2009, n° 1146. Ces auteurs concluent “sans réserve àl’arbitrabilité du contentieux de la contrefaçon”. Voir sur l’ensemble du débat :RIVOIRE (M.), L’arbitrabilité du droit d’auteur : le cas du droit français, in :Revue de règlement des différends de McGill, Vol. 4 (2017-2018), 2017, pp. 4364. Disponible en ligne à l’adresse https://ssrn.com/abstract=3073874.

Quant au droit moral, il est inarbitrable dans l’espace
OAPI29. Cependant, la rigueur de l’inarbitrabilité deslitiges relatifs au droit moral doit être nuancée. En
effet, d’une part, l’arbitrabilité des conséquences desatteintes au droit moral n’est pas discutée, dès lors que
les violations de ce droit sont susceptibles de se traduire
en conséquences patrimoniales, lesquelles relèvent àl’évidence de la catégorie des droits dont on a la libre
disposition. D’autre part, l’impossibilité de renoncer
au droit moral, et donc son indisponibilité, ne sont pas
absolues. En effet, la jurisprudence française admet sous
certaines conditions, notamment le consentement del’auteur, certaines renonciations. Il en est ainsi pour ledroit au respect de l’œuvre et pour le droit de paternité30.
Certes, il s’agit alors d’une renonciation provisoire dansla mesure où l’auteur peut, à tout moment, révéler
sa paternité; il n’en demeure pas moins qu’à partir
de l’admission de ces renonciations qui constituent“une forme de patrimonialisation (du droit moral)”31,
on ne peut plus poser un postulat général relatif àl’indisponibilité du droit moral. En conséquence, “l’arbitre
pourrait valablement se prononcer dans le cadre d’une
clause compromissoire, sur la validité ou l’invalidité detelles renonciations”32. Enfin, certains proposent que
l’arbitrabilité du droit moral soit admise, en la mettant“en parallèle avec le mouvement de contractualisation”
de ce droit33.

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuelle

finalement créé une compétence exclusive au profit deces juridictions. En ce qui concerne le contentieux desmesures provisoires, il faut relever, pour le cas spécifiquede la saisie-contrefaçon, que la doctrine majoritaireestime que le prononcé de cette saisie par le tribunal
arbitral “est moins évident, mais pas impossible”24 et qu’il
pourrait alors être préférable de saisir le juge judiciaire
avant ou en parallèle avec la mise en œuvre de laprocédure arbitrale25.

Dans l’affaire LINDA COMMUNICATIONS, aucun débat
ne s’est ouvert sur l’arbitrabilité des droits découlant
du contrat. Seules étaient en cause la désignation ducollège arbitral, et la violation par ce collège, d’un certain
nombre de règles substantielles et de procédure. Parmi
ces violations, il était reproché au collège arbitral d’avoir
statué infra petita. Autrement dit, le collège arbitrals’était abstenu de se prononcer sur certains aspects
qui auraient été présentés. Malheureusement, il est
impossible, à la seule lecture de la décision, d’identifier
ces aspects et, par conséquent, de savoir si c’est
l’inarbitrabilité qui a fondé l’attitude de ce collège.
Toutefois, la rareté des sentences en ce domaine justifie
que l’on s’interroge sur l’éventualité d’un débat qui aurait
pu naitre.
C. Le droit applicable en matière d’arbitrage des litiges depropriété intellectuelleÀ ce sujet, il faut d’abord relever qu’une clausecompromissoire était contenue dans un contrat
d’exploitation des droits d’auteur et que le litige qui est
né concernait uniquement le paiement de la redevancedue au titre de l’exploitation du droit de représentation.
Par conséquent, le droit en cause était parfaitement
arbitrable au regard du droit positif de l’espace OAPI.
En effet, dans cet espace, au moment de la conclusion
29
30
31
32
33

Bien que, dans certains pays, les droits moraux puissent être arbitrés lorsqu’ils
sont renonçables (et donc aliénables) par la loi. Voir par exemple art. 14 al.2 dela Loi canadienne sur le droit d’auteur (LRC (1985) ch. C-42).
LUCAS (A.) et LUCAS (H.-J.), Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique, Paris(LexisNexis), 5e éd., 2017, n° 545 et 614.
SIIRIAINEN (F.), Arbitrage, transaction et droit moral de l’auteur (Actes deColloque), Paris (Dalloz), 2012, pp. 99-116.
TANKEU (J.), n.18.
RIVOIRE (M.), n.28.
171

du contrat, le texte en vigueur en matière de propriété
intellectuelle était l’AB, Acte de 1977 et, en matièred’arbitrage, le droit en vigueur résultait de l’Acte
uniforme de l’Organisation pour l’harmonisation en
Afrique du droit des affaires (OHADA) relatif au droit del’arbitrage ainsi que de certaines dispositions du Codede procédure civile, commerciale, administrative etfinancière du Congo.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

En ce qui concerne l’Accord de Bangui de 1977, il ne faisait
aucune allusion expresse à la possibilité d’un recours àl’arbitrage. Néanmoins, cela ne doit pas être interprété
comme signifiant qu’il s’y opposait. Il en découle quel’article 9 du contrat entre LINDA COMMUNICATIONS et
MIC-VIDEO était parfaitement conforme à la loi. Dansson principe, la clause compromissoire qu’il contenait
ne pouvait, en conséquence, être attaqué sur le terrain
de sa validité. Il en va d’ailleurs de même pour sa portée
qui ne pouvait être remise en cause sur le terrain del’arbitrabilité. En effet, dès lors que l’objet du contratétait l’exploitation d’un droit patrimonial d’auteur, laclause ne pouvait être attaquée sur le terrain de laconformité à l’Acte uniforme OHADA relatif à l’arbitrage,
dans la mesure où l’article 2 de ce texte exige que lesdroits soumis à ce mode alternatif par la convention
soient librement disponibles, ce qui est le cas des droits
patrimoniaux d’auteur.

172

Cette clause serait encore moins exposée à l’annulation
dans le nouveau contexte juridique de l’OAPI. En effet,
d’une part, l’article 4, alinéa 2, de l’AB, Acte de Bamako
de 2015 dispose expressément que “tous les litiges
portant sur l’application du présent accord et de ses
annexes peuvent être réglés par voie d’arbitrage ou
de médiation”. D’autre part, l’OAPI a créé, à l’instar
de l’OMPI, un centre d’arbitrage et de médiation envue de régler par ces moyens non juridictionnels, lescontentieux de propriété intellectuelle. D’ailleurs,l’article 2 du Règlement d’arbitrage de l’OAPI énumère
les critères de soumission des litiges à l’arbitrage et à lamédiation OAPI. Pour ce texte :
a)

b)

c)

le différend doit survenir en matière de propriété
intellectuelle, en application d’une clausecompromissoire ou d’un compromis d’arbitrage;
une des parties au moins doit avoir son domicile ou
sa résidence habituelle dans un des États membres
de l’Organisation, ou, à défaut, le contrat doit êtreexécuté en tout ou partie sur le territoire d’au moins
un des États membres de l’Organisation;les droits de propriété intellectuelle en litige doivent
pouvoir faire l’objet d’un arbitrage.

Cette dernière exigence a une portée assez particulière :en même temps qu’elle incite à avoir en regard l’article 2
in fine de l’Acte uniforme OHADA sur l’Arbitrage, elle
postule la prise en compte des nuances du droit de la
propriété intellectuelle telles que rappelées ci-dessus.
Toutefois, le maniement de l’ensemble de ces normes est
délicat. En effet, le litige opposant les deux entreprises
implique à la fois, comme on l’a relevé, le droit national
du Congo, qualifié de “droit commun” dans les motifs del’arrêt, le droit OAPI et le droit OHADA. En ce qui concerne
ces deux derniers, la coexistence n’était pas de natureà soulever une quelconque difficulté, dès lors que lepremier ne réglementait pas l’arbitrage à l’époque34. Pas
plus ne s’est posée une question de coexistence entre ledroit national et le droit OAPI. En revanche, le juge a dûse prononcer sur l’applicabilité du droit national face audroit OHADA. Pour lui, dès lors que le litige ne concernait
pas ce droit, mais plutôt le droit national, seules les règles
de procédures nationales devaient être appliquées.
Autrement dit, pour lui, l’applicabilité d’un droit de fondemporte applicabilité du droit de forme ou de procédure.
Si cette option doit être soutenue, elle doit néanmoinsêtre nuancée : il ne peut être fait abstraction de l’existence
de l’Acte uniforme sur l’arbitrage, dans un pays del’espace OAPI. En effet, dès lors que ce texte a “vocation
à s’appliquer à tout arbitrage lorsque le siège du tribunal
arbitral se trouve dans l’un des États parties” (art. 1er, AUA)et qu’au demeurant, il établit des conditions de fond pour
toute sorte d’arbitrage et pour tous les domaines du droit
des affaires, il ne saurait être fait quelque distinction que
ce soit, en ce qui concerne son applicabilité. Par exemple,
il faut bien se référer à ce texte pour vérifier si le litige
est arbitrable ou non. Il en résulte que le droit OHADA
demeure omniprésent et que, parfois, même lorsquele litige concernera une matière non régie par ce droit,
certaines de ses règles trouveront à s’appliquer.
II. La base de calcul des redevances dues encontrepartie de l’exploitation d’un objet protégé par la
propriété intellectuelle
Les redevances payées en contrepartie de l’exploitation
des objets protégés par la propriété intellectuelle
peuvent être diversement approchées selon que l’on est
dans le domaine du droit d’auteur ou dans celui de la
propriété industrielle. Dans ce dernier domaine, il existe
une telle liberté que le législateur se refuse à encadrer
la question de la rémunération des titulaires de droit,laissant ainsi libre cours à l’autonomie de la volonté. En
effet, aucune annexe de l’AB ne pose une quelconquebase en vue du calcul de ladite rémunération35.
En revanche, en droit d’auteur, ce sont d’abord les lois
nationales qui ont retenu le principe de la rémunération
proportionnelle, accompagné de cas particuliers où unforfait peut être prévu. Pour le cas du Congo, il s’agit del’article 45 de la loi n° 24/82 du 7 juillet 1982 sur le droit
d’auteur et les droits voisins, selon lequel la cession à
titre onéreux doit comporter, au profit de l’auteur, uneparticipation proportionnelle aux recettes de toutes
natures provenant de la vente ou de l’exploitation. Puis,
récemment l’annexe VII de l’AB l’Acte de 2015 l’a adopté
en l’insérant de manière expresse. Dans son contenu,
la compréhension du principe de la rémunération
proportionnelle est relativement simple : le contrat doit
34
35

Aujourd’hui encore, il ne devrait pas y avoir de difficulté, les deux catégories
de normes ne présentant pas de situations conflictogènes.
Il semble toutefois bien établi que les contrats de licence combinent
généralement une somme forfaitaire, indépendante du volume deproduction, avec une rémunération proportionnelle aux ventes générées
ou au nombre de produits fabriqués sous licence, le contrat permettant au
titulaire de vérifier l’exactitude du calcul.

Cependant, cette règle n’est impérative que pour lescontrats de cession conclus par l’auteur lui-même. En
d’autres termes, elle n’est pas exigée pour d’autres types
de contrats d’exploitation des droits d’auteur, pas plus
qu’elle ne l’est pour les contrats de sous-cession. En ce
qui concerne son taux, il est librement négocié, même si
l’existence d’un taux dérisoire pourrait laisser croire qu’ila été prévu en vue d’éluder la loi.
Enfin, quant à l’assiette de la rémunération, elle résultede la loi : celle-ci est habituellement constituée desrecettes d’exploitation. En fait, “c’est le prix payé par lepublic qui doit servir de référence”37.
En scrutant les circonstances qui entourent lademande de paiement émanant de MIC VIDEO, on
peut s’interroger sur l’applicabilité de cette règle aucontrat sur la base duquel cette entreprise réclamait
son dû. Tout d’abord, il est évident que le contrat devant
permettre la “fourniture” des cassettes contenantdes films à diffuser sur la chaîne de télévision “CANALOCÉAN” n’a pas été conclu par les auteurs des œuvres
exploitées, mais par un distributeur, sans doute lié aux
producteurs par contrats. Par conséquent, de ce pointde vue, la rémunération proportionnelle prévue n’était
pas obligatoire. Ensuite, le contrat ne porte pas cession
du droit de représentation dont l’exploitation était encause. Enfin, le contrat a considéré comme base de calcul
de la rémunération les recettes brutes réalisées par lesabonnements de la clientèle au réseau CANAL OCÉAN.
Précisément, c’est cette assiette qui est à l’origine dulitige objet de l’arrêt commenté. Même si l’applicabilitéde la règle de la proportionnalité dans le litige nes’imposait pas pour les raisons déjà évoquées, l’arrêt
rendu par la Cour suprême du Congo offre l’occasion
d’apporter des précisions utiles. Dans cette optique, il
importe de relever que, dans la logique de MIC VIDEO,
l’assiette devant être prise en considération pour ce
calcul devait englober les recettes réalisées par toutes leschaînes gérées par la société débitrice alors que, selon
le demandeur au pourvoi, le contrat spécifiait en son
article 9 que cette base serait plutôt celles de l’uniquechaîne qui diffusait les films. La question peut être poséede manière générale : l’assiette devant servir de calcul à
une rémunération proportionnelle doit-elle être définiepar rapport à l’ensemble de l’activité du cocontractant ou

36
37

FOMETEU (J.), Le droit d’auteur et les droits voisins, Questions/Réponses,
Cameroun (L’Harmattan), 2018, pp. 22 et s.
CLAVIER (J.P.) et BERNAULT (C.), Dictionnaire de droit de la propriété
intellectuelle, 2e éd., Paris (Ellipses), 2015, pp. 440 et 441.

uniquement par rapport l’activité relative à l’exploitation
de l’œuvre concernée? Cette question peut paraître
triviale à première vue. En réalité, elle rappelle, d’unepart, que les contrats d’exploitation des droits d’auteur
prévoient parfois une rémunération proportionnelle
au chiffre d’affaires. Il convient de rappeler que cetteoption ne peut être justifiée que lorsque l’activité del’utilisateur est essentiellement ou exclusivement
assise sur l’exploitation des œuvres protégées38. Ellerappelle également que le secteur en cause a suscitédes difficultés spécifiques ayant justifié une abondante
doctrine39. Pour autant, il ne justifie pas que le calculs’étende à l’ensemble de l’activité du débiteur.
Sur ce point, deux précisions doivent être faites : d’unepart, la rémunération n’est proportionnelle qu’aux
recettes réalisées dans le cadre de l’exploitation d’une
ou de plusieurs œuvres spécifiques faisant l’objet
du contrat qui lie les parties. Autrement dit, étendre
l’assiette à d’autres activités du débiteur signifie
inéluctablement que le champ contractuel a été étendu
au-delà de la volonté commune des parties. Plus grave,
en l’espèce, cette extension conduisait à empiéter surd’autres contrats et donc sur l’assiette de calcul de larémunération des autres titulaires des droits dont lesœuvres étaient exploitées sur d’autres chaînes du groupe
LINDA COMMUNICATIONS.

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuelle

prévoir un certain pourcentage qui reviendra à l’auteur
sur les recettes brutes d’exploitation. De manière
globale, si, par exemple, des supports physiques sontvendus, il s’agit d’un pourcentage calculé sur le prix devente de chacun de ces supports. Tant pour les supports
physiques que pour les supports électroniques (c’està-dire les copies téléchargées), le pourcentage devraitêtre calculé sur le prix de chaque copie téléchargée.
En somme, pour le rappeler, les redevances de droit
d’auteur sont calculées sur la base des recettes perçuespar l’exploitant36.

D’autre part, le calcul de la rémunération ne doits’effectuer qu’après certaines déductions, en particulier
les impôts. C’est la raison pour laquelle la jurisprudence
française décide que la rémunération proportionnelle est
assise sur le prix public hors taxes40, l’exploitant devant
verser les taxes perçues au trésor public. Il en résulteque de ce point de vue, la Cour suprême du Congo aparfaitement appliqué la loi.
Cependant, dans son attendu y relatif, elle estime quele collège arbitral aurait dû également déduire “lescharges comptables inhérentes aux sociétés”. Cet aspect
mérite d’être interrogé. En effet, si l’article 9 du contrat
incluait une telle déduction, elle devait nécessairement
s’imposer, dès lors que l’on n’est pas dans un contrat liant
un auteur et un cessionnaire de ses droits. En revanche,dans un tel contrat, une telle clause aurait été frappéede nullité dès lors que la loi de 1982 précitée parle des“recettes de toutes natures provenant de la vente ou
de l’exploitation”, ce qui renvoie aux recettes brutes
d’exploitation. Car en effet, si l’on déduit les charges
comptables, on diminue l’assiette sur laquelle le tauxprévu doit s’appliquer. Par conséquent, si le contratétait silencieux en ce qui concerne cette déduction, cela
aurait dû signifier que les parties n’ont envisagé que lesprélèvements obligatoires et notamment les impôts, etque le juge congolais est allé au-delà de leur volonté.
Joseph Fometeu
38
39

40

FOMETEU (J.), n.36, pp. 106 et 107.
Voir par ex. : MONNERIE (C.), Point de vue sur la rémunération des auteursde cinéma, in : Communication commerce électronique, n° 1, 2009, p. 9;
BERNAULT (C.), Contrat de distribution des œuvres audiovisuelles : Contrat dedistribution en salles, in : Juriscl. Contrats-Distribution, Fasc. 3510, 2014.
Cass. civ., 1re chambre, 16 juillet 1998 : D. 1999, p. 306 (note DREYER (E))
173

C. Législation fondant la saisie desœuvres contrefaites – Questions dedroit OHADA – Application du droit
OAPI (annexe VII) – Application dudroit interne
Le choix de la législation devant fonder la saisie deproduits contrefaisants est fonction de l’objet protégé
par la propriété intellectuelle. Dès lors, l’annexe III del’Accord de Bangui concernant les marques ne sauraits’appliquer à une saisie relative aux œuvres de l’esprit.
Cette saisie ne devrait pas non plus s’appuyer sur ledroit OHADA, mais plutôt sur l’annexe VII de l’accord cidessus, relative à la propriété littéraire et artistique, ainsique sur la loi nationale.
Tribunal régional de NIAMEY, Ordonnance de référé
n° 124 du 20 juillet 2004, SOCIÉTÉ EUROPRESSEDITORES E DISTRIBUIDORES DE PUBLICACOES LDA c.
COMPAGNIE BEAUCHEMIN INTERNATIONAL Inc.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Observations :L’affaire portée devant le juge des référés de Niamey
est une véritable mine juridique pour la propriété
intellectuelle. En effet, elle soulève des questions qui
relèvent de la pratique de la propriété intellectuelle maisaussi des problèmes liés à la théorie générale.

174

Faits : Les faits de l’espèce sont assez révélateurs dedifficultés juridiques subséquentes. À la suite d’un appel
d’offre international, la société Europress a été désignée
comme attributaire d’un marché ayant pour objet lafourniture de manuels scolaires des cycles primaireet secondaire dont ceux de la collection GRIA-Côted’Ivoire des classes de 4e et 3e. Certains livres de cettecollection sont d’ailleurs remplacés par ceux d’une autredu même nom, la collection GRIA-Niger. Les manuels
sont effectivement livrés pour être distribués par les
Établissements Daouda. C’est alors que l’entreprise
canadienne Beauchemin International Inc., se présentant
comme titulaire des droits, victime d’une contrefaçon, faitpratiquer une saisie conservatoire de meubles corporels
sur les livres de remplacement et une saisie conservatoirede créances sur une somme de 27 939 871 F en principal
et 1 000 000 F de dommages et intérêts entre les mains
du projet I/FAD, du Ministère de l’éducation de base etdu Ministère de l’économie et des finances. La société
Europress saisit alors le juge des référés aux fins d’obtenirl’annulation de ces saisies conservatoires. Pendantl’instance, le BNDA fait une intervention volontaire.
Raisonnement : À l’appui de sa demande, Europress
invoque plusieurs arguments. Par exemple, elle estime
que la société canadienne n’apporte pas la preuve dela titularité de ses droits sur les œuvres qui ont été
saisies. À partir de là, elle demande que lui soit déniée
la qualité à agir et donc, qu’il soit reconnu qu’elle n’avait
pas le droit de saisir. Sur le même terrain, elle demandeque soit déclarée irrecevable l’intervention volontairedu BNDA, au motif que celui-ci n’a pas produit desdocuments propres à établir qu’il a une convention avec
l’OGC auquel serait liée la société Beauchemin.

Pour contrer cet argumentaire, la société canadienne
soulève l’incompétence du juge des référés au motif quele juge du fond est déjà saisi et surtout, elle relève que
c’est l’annexe VII de l’ABR-1999, et non l’annexe III qui
est applicable en l’espèce. Ce dernier argument s’ajoute
à d’autres qui font tout l’intérêt de cette décision. En
effet, la décision rendue laisse constater que le juge a été
confronté à trois questions importantes :I.

la qualité à agir d’un organisme local de gestion
collective pour la défense du répertoire d’un
OGC étranger;
II. l’applicabilité à la propriété intellectuelle, de l’Acte
uniforme OHADA relatif aux voies d’exécution; etIII. la place de l’annexe VII de l’Accord de Bangui
par rapport aux lois nationales relatives au droit
d’auteur et aux droits voisins.
I. La qualité à agir d’une organisation nationale degestion collective pour la défense d’un répertoireétranger
La question de la qualité à agir des organisations degestion collective pour la défense du répertoire d’uneorganisation de gestion collective étrangère a reçu
une réponse claire du juge de Niamey : en l’absence
de convention entre l’organisation étrangère etl’organisation nationale, il ne saurait être possible pourcette dernière de défendre les intérêts des œuvres de son
répertoire. Cette réponse du juge ramène à un débat bien
ancien : les organisations de gestion collective sont-elles
habilitées à défendre les intérêts des titulaires de droits
qui ne sont pas leurs membres? Pour la jurisprudence
française, la réponse est négative41. D’ailleurs, selon
toute vraisemblance, même lorsque le titulaire de droita adhéré à l’organisation de gestion collective, il fautencore que l’œuvre objet de la contrefaçon figure sur lerépertoire de l’organisation demanderesse42.
Dans cette logique, la position retenue par le juge deNiamey est parfaitement justifiée. Pourtant, bien qu’elle
soit juridiquement imparable, “la solution est peut-être
regrettable en termes d’opportunité”43. En effet, on peut
se demander si l’on ne devrait pas distinguer la situation
des titulaires nationaux de celle des étrangers. En ce
qui concerne les nationaux, ils choisissent délibérément
de ne pas adhérer ou de ne pas inscrire certaines deleurs œuvres dans les répertoires des organisations
nationales de gestion collective ou alors, ils négligent
de le faire. Dans ces conditions, il serait inopportun
d’autoriser un tiers, fût-il un de ces organismes, à semêler de la gestion de leurs droits. En revanche, lestitulaires étrangers ne sont pas forcément fautifs s’ils
n’ont pas pu adhérer à l’organisme national du pays oùle besoin de protection s’est fait ressentir ou surtout sileur structure de gestion collective n’a pas conclu uneconvention de représentation réciproque. D’ailleurs, la
41
42
43

Voir par ex. Cass. civ., 1re chambre, 19 février 2013 : D. 2013, p. 67 (note
ALLAYES (P.)).
Voir VIVANT (M.) et BRUGUIÈRE (J.-M.), n. 29, n° 1141; CA Paris,
10 juillet 1990 : RIDA 1991, Vol. 1, p. 315.
LUCAS (A.), LUCAS-SCHLOETTER (A.), BERNAULT (C.), Traité de la propriété
littéraire et artistique, Paris (LexisNexis), 5e éd., 2017, n° 1197.

II. L’applicabilité à la propriété intellectuelle dessaisies relevant de l’Acte uniforme OHADA sur lesvoies d’exécution
Peut-on pratiquer une saisie relevant de l’AUPSRVE
en matière de propriété intellectuelle? Telle était ladeuxième question de droit clairement soulevée devant
le juge des référés de Niamey. En principe, la réponse
devrait varier en fonction des situations.

de biens meubles corporels. Par conséquent, le jugeaurait dû annuler les saisies conservatoires portant
sur les supports contrefaisants et renvoyer la société
Beauchemin à pratiquer la saisie idoine.
La question demeure alors entière pour la saisie
conservatoire de créance portant sur la somme de
27 939 871 F en principal et 1 000 000 F de dommages
et intérêts, pratiquée entre les mains du projet I/FAD,
du Ministère de l’éducation de base et du Ministère del’économie et des finances. Le débat est intéressant en ceque les sommes placées sous mains de justice pourraientbien être affectées au paiement d’une créance après
conversion de la saisie pratiquée en saisie-attribution.
Malheureusement, les bases juridiques étaient erronées
en l’espèce.

Dans une première hypothèse, il s’agit d’envisager qu’unobjet de propriété intellectuelle puisse être saisi envue d’une exécution forcée pour une dette du titulaire
du droit sur cet objet. Il ne fait alors aucun doute quela saisie est possible, même si le régime de ces saisies
demeure imprécis46. Dans une seconde hypothèse, ils’agit de se demander si l’une des saisies conservatoires
prévues par l’Acte uniforme précité peut être pratiquée
sur des objets de propriété intellectuelle. À l’évidence, si
la saisie conservatoire est pratiquée dans le cadre d’une
procédure susceptible de déboucher sur une exécution
forcée, elle est parfaitement concevable. Par exemple,
si le créancier d’une personne titulaire d’un droit depropriété intellectuelle pratique une saisie conservatoire
sur ce droit dans la perspective de procéder à uneconversion ultérieure, cette saisie n’encourt aucun
reproche. La situation est, en revanche, plus complexe
en ce qui concerne la saisie conservatoire pratiquée
sur des objets contrefaisants, dans le cadre du droit
OHADA. En effet, dans le cas de l’affaire Europress, lacompagnie Beauchemin avait pratiqué ce type de saisie
alors même que l’objectif recherché n’était pas d’affecter
ultérieurement les objets saisis au paiement du créancier,mais de se préconstituer la preuve de l’infraction decontrefaçon dont les poursuites étaient par ailleursdéjà engagées. À vrai dire, le raisonnement du juge est
assez difficile à suivre : la saisie a été pratiquée sur lefondement de l’AUPSRVE et, pour rejeter la demande denullité, il s’est fondé sur la loi nationale et l’annexe VII del’ABR-1999. Un tel raisonnement doit être déconseillé.
En effet, même si la saisie-contrefaçon portant sur dessupports matériels d’une œuvre supposée contrefaiten’est pas le seul mécanisme de saisie par lequel lapreuve de la contrefaçon peut être préconstituée,elle ne peut être assimilée à une saisie conservatoire

Tout d’abord, à la lecture de la décision, il apparaît quela saisie était pratiquée en considérant que les sommes
bloquées étaient des “recettes” telles que visées par lalégislation sur le droit d’auteur, ce qui est inconcevable
si l’on se réfère au statut des institutions entre les mains
desquelles les sommes ont été saisies. Il s’agissait,en réalité, d’une créance d’Europress entre les mains
de ces institutions et non de ses “recettes”. Ensuite, sil’on revient aux conditions de fond justifiant une saisie
conservatoire de créances, on réalise qu’une telle saisie
est injustifiée. En effet, de manière générale, une saisie
conservatoire, quelle qu’elle soit, ne peut être autoriséeque si la créance est apparemment fondée dans son
principe et si le créancier justifie des circonstances
susceptibles d’en menacer le recouvrement47. En matièrede contrefaçon, lorsqu’une saisie est pratiquée avant unprocès au fond, il ne peut être possible pour le saisissantde justifier sa qualité de créancier. Celle-ci ne peutrésulter que d’une condamnation par le juge du fond,après reconnaissance du caractère délictueux des actes
accomplis par le saisi. Il en découle que, contrairement
au créancier qui doit établir la vraisemblance desa créance et la menace qui en hypothèque lerecouvrement, puis ultérieurement la simple réalité decette créance, celui qui, avant la saisine du juge du fond,pratique une saisie en matière de propriété intellectuelle
doit établir tant la vraisemblance de la titularité de son
droit que celle de l’atteinte à ce droit, puis ultérieurementla réalité de cette atteinte. Cette différence dans lesexigences justifie que les législations à mettre en œuvre
soient différentes : le créancier doit saisir le juge surle fondement de la législation applicable aux voies
d’exécution tandis que le titulaire du droit de propriété
intellectuelle doit fonder sa demande sur la législation
relative à cette matière. C’est cette nuance qui n’a pas
été comprise par le juge des référés de Niamey qui avalidé la saisie conservatoire des créances pratiquéepar Beauchemin.

44III. La place de l’annexe VII de l’Accord de Bangui par
rapport aux lois nationales relatives au droit d’auteur

45
46

UCHTENHAGEN (U.), La gestion collective du droit d’auteur dans la vie
musicale, Genève (OMPI), 2005, n° 275. Disponible en ligne à l’adresse
https://www.wipo.int/publications/fr/details.jsp?id=362&plang=EN.
Dans ce sens : UCHTENHAGEN (U.), ibid., n° 276 et s.
Pour une application à la saisie d’une marque, voir : TGI hors classe deNiamey, Ordonnance de référé n° 118 du 20 mai 2008, Rothmans of Pall Malllimited SA. c.. Société Adil company et El Hadj S.S (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M.-L.),ce recueil, chapitre 3, section S).

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuellerigueur du droit positif “ne tient pas compte du fait quede nombreux auteurs ne peuvent pas s’affilier à uneorganisation de gestion collective tout simplement parceque, dans leur pays de résidence, il n’en existe pas”44.
Il serait donc sévère de laisser leurs œuvres à la merci
des contrefacteurs. C’est pour cette raison qu’on peut
se demander si, sur le terrain de la gestion d’affaires,les organisations nationales ne pourraient pas êtreautorisées à agir45.

L’affaire Europress est une illustration parfaite de ladifficulté que l’interprète peut éprouver lorsqu’il tente
47

Cf. art. 54 de l’AUPSRVE.
175

de définir la place de l’annexe VII de l’Accord de Bangui
par rapport aux lois nationales. En effet, le débat sous
les versions antérieures à celle de 2015 de cet accordétait celui de la nature des droits créés par cette annexe,
lorsqu’on comparait sa malheureuse situation à celledes autres annexes. Tandis que les autres s’appliquaientallègrement dans les États membres où elles netrouvaient aucun obstacle juridique constitué par un
autre texte de droit interne, l’annexe VII devait se frayer
un chemin improbable afin de survivre et de pouvoir
justifier son existence dans l’ensemble du droit OAPI.
La situation d’alors est bien curieuse : alors mêmequ’aucune discrimination n’est établie au plan théoriqueentre les différentes annexes, la réalité confine à
constater que les États membres de l’OAPI disposent,
dans leur quasi-totalité, d’une législation interne sur ledroit d’auteur et les droits voisins. Dans ces conditions,
quelle place, finalement, donner à l’annexe VII au regardde ces législations internes? En vue d’apporter deséléments théoriques de clarification à cette interrogation
à laquelle le juge de Niamey a répondu de manière
implicite sans y avoir été expressément convié parles parties, il convient de prendre acte de l’évolution
de la législation. En effet, sous le régime des versions
antérieures de l’Accord de Bangui, l’annexe VII a un
statut moins favorable (A) que celui que lui confère l’Actede Bamako de 2015 (B).

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

A. Le statut de l’annexe VII dans les versions de l’Accord de
Bangui antérieures à ABR-2015
Le statut de l’annexe VII dans les versions antérieures del’ABR-2015 est ambigu en théorie et il est d’applicationdifficile.

176

Sur le plan théorique, il faut d’abord se référer à
l’article 3, alinéa 1, de l’Acte de 1999. Selon cettedisposition en effet, “les droits afférents aux domaines
de la propriété intellectuelle, tels que prévus par lesannexes au présent accord sont des droits nationaux
indépendants, soumis à la législation de chacun desÉtats membres dans lesquels ils ont effet”48. Comment
comprendre cette disposition dans une convention
internationale? Plusieurs lectures étaient possibles.
Selon une première lecture, cette disposition signifiait
que dans chaque État membre, le texte régional
constitue la loi nationale, mais aussi que dans chaqueÉtat, le texte régional pouvait être complété. Or, en
matière de droit d’auteur, l’adoption systématique parles États membres de textes propres témoigne bien dela volonté de ces derniers d’opter pour la coexistence
de l’annexe avec les législations internes propres. Dans
ces conditions, l’annexe VII ne constituait qu’un cadre
général49. Cette première interprétation n’aide pas
réellement à faire avancer la réflexion en ce que la notion
de “cadre général” est imprécise.

Selon une deuxième lecture, les droits prévus parl’accord et ses annexes ne devaient être soumis au
droit national que pour leur implémentation. Cette
compréhension signifierait que les droits prévus
par l’annexe VII et les autres annexes devaient êtreinternalisés pour être appliqués. Une telle lecture était
fragile en ce qu’elle portait en elle-même les germes de
sa destruction : si on l’adoptait, il aurait fallu considérer
que toutes les annexes obéissaient à ce régime et que,par conséquent, l’accord et ces annexes n’étaient pas
d’application directe dans les États membres, ce qui était
loin de la réalité juridique.
C’est la raison pour laquelle une troisième approche
estimait que cette disposition pouvait s’interpréter
comme signifiant que les droits accordés par l’Accordde Bangui et ses annexes constituaient le droit national,
exactement comme s’ils émanaient d’un organe interned’édiction des normes. Cette dernière interprétationparaît correspondre à la réalité de la relation entre leslois nationales des États membres de l’OAPI et l’annexe
VII de l’Accord de Bangui. En effet, tout porte à croire
que le droit OAPI s’intégrait au droit national en sesoumettant à la législation interne, ce qui signifierait quece droit n’était nullement doté de supranationalité.
Sur le terrain de l’application du texte, l’imprécision
du statut de l’annexe conduisait à une situation assez
malaisée. En effet, d’une part, quelle que soit l’option
retenue, elle établissait une discrimination entre lesdifférentes annexes50. D’autre part, et de manière plus
spécifique, la majorité des interprétations proposées
tentaient à vrai dire de justifier a posteriori une réalité
juridiquement gênante pour un espace juridique intégré :chaque fois qu’un pays légiférait sur le droit d’auteur
et les droits voisins, il s’émancipait plus ou moins
totalement de l’Accord de Bangui en cette matière. Tout
au plus, dans les pays ayant légiféré, les règles prévues
par l’annexe auraient pu être convoquées pour combler
les lacunes éventuelles de la loi nationale.
Ces atermoiements relatifs au statut de l’annexe VII
ont conduit à une jurisprudence confuse. En effet,
de façon globale, trois logiques différentes peuventêtre systématisées dans les décisions rendues par lesjuridictions nationales de l’espace OAPI sous les Actes del’Accord antérieurs à 2015.
Dans la première logique, les juges font une application
exclusive de la loi nationale sans aucune allusion àl’annexe VII qui, au demeurant, n’est pas invoquée parles parties51. En réalité, il s’agit de la tendance majoritaire.
Dans la deuxième logique, les juges appliquentexclusivement l’annexe VII, ce qui conduit à occulter
l’existence de la loi nationale. Par exemple, dans
50
51

48
49

Voir également art. 2 al. 1 de l’AB-1977.
NGOMBE, (Y.L.), Le droit d’auteur dans les États membres de l’Organisation
africaine de la propriété intellectuelle (OAPI) : une harmonisation inachevée? :e.Bulletin du droit d’auteur, janvier - mars 2005, p.1.

De telles distinctions étaient contraires à l’art. 4 al. 2 et 3 de l’ABR-1999.
Voir par exemple : Tribunal régional de Niamey, Jugement n° 080 du
3 mars 2004, Groupement édition Pierron international c. Établissement Niger –Bureau : EDOU EDOU (P.) (ed.), Le contentieux de la propriété intellectuelledans l’espace OAPI : Guide du magistrat et des auxiliaires, Genève (OMPI),
2009, p. 103; Tribunal de Libreville, Jugement (non daté), Christine Rossano c.
Société Sovingab : ibid., p. 116.

Dans la troisième logique, les juges font une application
concomitante de la loi nationale et de l’annexe VII.
Mais cette application s’effectue selon deux approches
différentes.
• Dans la première approche, les juges se bornent
à viser le texte régional, puis à appliquer la loi
nationale. Tel est le cas de ce juge camerounaisqui, après avoir déclaré “qu’au regard de l’Accordde Bangui du 2 mars 1977 et de la loi n° 2000/011
du 19 décembre 2000, seules sont astreintes au
paiement des droits d’auteur les personnes physiquesou morales exploitant, sans autorisation de leursauteurs, des œuvres littéraires ou artistiques
protégées”, n’utilise que la loi nationale pour régler lecontentieux53.
• Dans la deuxième approche, les juges font unevéritable application concomitante de l’annexe VII
et de la loi nationale, comme s’il s’agissait de deux
textes dont l’application doit être simultanée. Telle
est l’approche adoptée par le juge des référés dans laprésente affaire.
Il faut le dire, la partie était relativement aisée pourlui dans la mesure où les solutions fournies par lesdeux textes se recoupaient parfaitement. Qu’auraitil décidé si les deux textes offraient des solutions
différentes? Personne, malheureusement, ne peutrépondre à cette interrogation. Fort heureusement, larévision de l’ABR-2015 apporte des précisions de nature à
clarifier le débat.
B. Le statut de l’annexe VII dans l’ABR-2015
Le statut de l’annexe VII a été clarifié par l’ABR-2015.
Il demeure cependant quelques difficultés qui,probablement, émailleront son application. Sur leplan théorique, l’article 5, alinéas 1 et 2, de l’accord
contient l’essentiel des données nouvelles à prendre
en considération.
En ce qui concerne l’alinéa 1, il s’agit d’une reprise desdispositions antérieures de l’article 3 de l’Acte de 1999.
Cette reprise permet de camper le débat et d’en rappeler
les termes. Mais ces termes ont changé avec le nouvel
accord, en ce sens que l’alinéa 2 tente de mettre fin à
toutes les interprétations proposées pour les versions
antérieures de l’accord. En effet, il dispose que “dansles États membres, le présent accord et ses annexes
tiennent lieu de lois relatives aux matières qu’ils visent.
Ils y abrogent ou empêchent l’entrée en vigueur detoutes les dispositions contraires. L’annexe VII est un
cadre normatif minimal”.
52
53

TGI Wouri (Douala), Jugement civil n° 192 du 15 décembre 2000, Moulinex SA c.
Vapsan trading Cie et autres : ibid., p. 169.
TPI Douala Bonanjo, Ordonnance de référé n° 186 du 7 mars 2007, Société
Semen Distributors Sàrl c. Société civile du droit d’auteur et des droits voisins desarts audiovisuels et photographiques (SCAAP) : ibid., p. 116.

Deux faisceaux de solutions sont ainsi fournis. Le
premier concerne ce qui pourrait être qualifié de statut
général de l’accord et de ses annexes. À cet égard,l’accord reprécise, de manière globale, son statut par
rapport aux lois nationales : le droit OAPI constitue,
à n’en plus douter, le droit national. En effet, il prend
place au sein de l’ordonnancement juridique interne
des États, en ce qu’il constitue la loi relative à la matière
qu’il organise. Et, pour emprunter à la méthodologie
de l’OHADA, le droit OAPI abroge ou empêche l’entrée
en vigueur des dispositions contraires adoptées parles organes internes de production des normes. On ne
pouvait pas être plus clair. Désormais, cette formule
inspirée de celle de l’article 10 du traité OHADA met
fin à toutes les spéculations autour des rapports entre
les deux catégories de normes. L’affirmation de lasupranationalité du droit OAPI ne fait plus de doute.

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuelle

une affaire soumise à un juge camerounais et danslaquelle l’annexe III était également applicable, l’uniquelégislation appliquée pour les questions de droit d’auteur(absence de formalités, originalité de l’œuvre, titre del’œuvre, etc.) était l’annexe VII52.

Le second concerne le statut spécial de l’annexe VII.
Selon le texte, l’annexe VII constitue “un cadre normatif
minimal”. La formule est sophistiquée, mais elle conduit
simplement à dire que cette annexe constitue unminimum. Dans la logique du nouvel accord, cela signifie
que l’annexe constitue désormais un des référentiels ou
une source d’inspiration obligatoire pour ceux des États
qui préféreraient avoir une législation nationale propre
dans le domaine de la propriété littéraire et artistique,plutôt que d’appliquer l’annexe elle-même de manière
directe. De toute évidence, l’annexe viendrait, dans ces
conditions, s’aligner aux côtés des autres conventions
internationales relatives à la matière et auxquelles
doit se soumettre cet État s’il les a ratifiées. Dans ce
foisonnement de sources, l’annexe, elle-même ayant
logiquement été mise à niveau par rapport aux minimas
juridiques internationaux en la matière, devrait intégrer
d’autres orientations qui à leur tour seraient considérées
comme les minimas pour les pays de l’espace OAPI.
Schématiquement présentée, la situation est la suivante :l’annexe est mise à niveau en se conformant aux minimas
internationaux et, le cas échéant, en relevant ces
minimas; à leur tour, les lois nationales sont actualisées
en se conformant aux minimas de l’OAPI, puisque letexte de Bangui serait le nouveau plancher pour les
États membres.
Il subsistera néanmoins quelques difficultés. La première
est à la fois politique et matérielle. Elle résulte de ce que
plusieurs États membres de l’OAPI ont modifié assez
récemment leur législation interne (Côte d’Ivoire (2016),
Mali (2017), Guinée (2019), etc.). Dans ces conditions,
il ne sera sans doute pas aisé de les amener à opérer
une nouvelle modification de la loi. Cette difficultépourrait, sinon provoquer une résurgence de relentssouverainistes de la part de ces États, du moins retarder
l’implémentation de l’annexe.
La seconde se trouve dans les difficultés inhérentes à ladéfinition du “cadre normatif minimal” dont le contenu
pourrait prêter à discussion.
Toutefois, cette situation est de loin préférable à cellequi découlait des versions antérieures de l’accord.
Aujourd’hui, il est clair que l’article 5, alinéa 2 in fine,177

s’adresse d’abord aux législateurs nationaux des États
membres qui doivent en tenir compte pour élaborer
ou actualiser le droit interne. En cas d’inaction, le textes’adresse alors aux juges nationaux. Par conséquent,si un État retarde ou se montre réticent à mettre à joursa législation, le justiciable se fondera le cas échéant
sur l’accord, pour amener le juge à constater que sa loi
nationale se situe éventuellement en deçà du minimum
fixé par l’OAPI ou qu’elle est silencieuse sur une question
réglée par cette Organisation. Ce juge, sur la base del’article 5, alinéa 2, pourrait alors écarter sa loi nationale
afin d’appliquer l’annexe VII.
Il ne reste donc qu’à souhaiter que les juges fassent
preuve de hardiesse en répondant favorablement aux
justiciables avisés qui souhaiteraient bénéficier de cetterichesse de l’accord et de cette nouvelle dynamiquequ’essaie d’impulser l’OAPI à son Droit.
Joseph Fometeu

D. Nationalité – Paiement de la caution
judicatum solvi par les ressortissantsd’États membres de l’OAPI dansd’autres États membres

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Bien que l’Accord de Bangui consacre pour la protection
des titres de propriété intellectuelle délivrés parl’Organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuellel’existence d’un territoire unique sur une basecommunautaire composée de ses 17 États membres,
les ressortissants de ces États demeurent soumis
au paiement de la caution judicatum solvi lorsqu’ils
introduisent des actions devant les juridictions d’autres
États membres.

178

Cour suprême du Sénégal, Arrêt n° 73 du
19 septembre 2018, ÉTABLISSEMENTS MAMADOU S
DIALLO c. IBRAHIMA KEITA et WALY FAYE
Observations :L’exécution d’un jugement obtenu contre un étranger
demandeur au procès est très souvent difficile. En effet,l’étranger n’ayant pas d’attache avec le sol du paysd’accueil pourrait intenter des actions vexatoires contre
les nationaux sans avoir à redouter les affres d’uneéventuelle condamnation. La caution judicatum solvi54
est un palliatif visant à protéger les nationaux contre lesinstances téméraires des étrangers. Initialement prévu
à l’article 16 du Code civil napoléonien, ce mécanisme
protecteur a été ensuite intégré dans les Codes deprocédure civile des pays signataires de l’Accord de
Bangui55. L’exigence de la caution judicatum solvi en
matière de propriété industrielle soulève quelquesdifficultés liées à la conception singulière de l’espace
OAPI, considéré comme un territoire unique.

54
55

Somme que tout demandeur étranger à un procès est tenu de payer et qui est
destinée à garantir le recouvrement des dommages et intérêts, ainsi que desfrais qui peuvent être ordonnés à son encontre.
Voir par ex. art. 110, 73, 4 et 123 respectivement des Codes de procédure
civile sénégalais, camerounais, ivoirien et burkinabè.

Faits : Les faits ayant généré cette affaire sont simples :en exécution de l’ordonnance n° 26 du 19 juillet 2016 duprésident du tribunal de grande instance de Kaolack,les Établissements MAMADOU SAMBA DIALLO ont faitpratiquer saisie-contrefaçon de 134 rouleaux de pneus
de marque GAZELLE destinés aux motos d’une valeurde FCFA 15 000 000 au préjudice de sieur IBRAHIMAKEITA et ont traduit celui-ci devant la susdite juridiction
aux fins de constater les actes de contrefaçon commis
par lui, de valider la saisie pratiquée sur les produits
querellés et de le condamner au paiement de la sommede FCFA 50 000 000 à titre d’indemnisation. Par jugement
avant dire droit du 16 mars 2017, le tribunal a ordonné laconsignation par les Établissements demandeurs de lasomme de FCFA 15 000 000 en guise de caution judicatum
solvi, décision confirmée par la cour d’appel de Dakar.
Les Établissements MAMADOU SAMBA DIALLO se sontpourvus en cassation en articulant un moyen unique prisde la violation de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui du
2 mars 1977 instituant une Organisation africaine de la
propriété intellectuelle, en ce que la caution judicatum
solvi prévue par l’article 110 du Code de procédure civile
sénégalais n’est pas exigée à un ressortissant d’un
État partie, les 17 pays membres de cette organisation
constituant un seul territoire régional de protection.
Raisonnement : La question de droit à laquelle la Coursuprême devait répondre était celle de savoir si undemandeur au procès, ressortissant d’un pays membrede l’OAPI est dispensé, du fait de son appartenance àcette zone géographique, du paiement de la caution
judicatum solvi exigée par le Code de procédure civile
national du pays dans lequel son action est introduite. La
haute juridiction sénégalaise, à la suite des juridictions
inférieures, a rejeté le pourvoi en faisant sien le principal
motif énoncé par la cour d’appel : l’Accord de Bangui“n’organise pas les conditions d’accès aux juridictions
internes de chaque État partie”.
La décision est intéressante à plus d’un titre, dans lamesure où elle permet de préciser :I.

II.

le contenu et la portée de la notion de territoire
unique découlant du régime uniforme de protection
de la propriété intellectuelle; etle rôle des dispositions législatives nationales
relatives à la procédure, dans la mise en œuvre desdroits de propriété intellectuelle.

I. Le contenu et la portée de la notion de territoire
unique appliquée à l’espace OAPILa première branche du moyen unique articulé parles Établissements MAMADOU SAMBA DIALLO àl’appui du pourvoi avait précisément trait à l’unicité
du territoire OAPI comme cause d’exonération dupaiement de la caution judicatum solvi. Cet argumentairen’est évidemment pas anodin : il est la traduction au
plan contentieux du choix opéré dès l’origine par lesplénipotentiaires des États membres de l’OAPI qui,dans l’optique de renforcer leur coopération, ont donné
une portée régionale à la protection de la propriété
industrielle, formant ainsi une sorte de territoire unique

A. L’approche restrictive de la notion de territoire unique
Les demandeurs au pourvoi ont cru devoir tirer
conséquence de l’unicité du territoire OAPI pour sesoustraire au paiement de la caution judicatum solvi
exigée en l’espèce, par le Code de procédure civile
sénégalais; car pour eux, ils devaient être considéréscomme des nationaux au regard de l’intégration créée
par le droit OAPI, dès lors qu’on était en présenced’un litige de propriété intellectuelle. Si l’on s’en tientà cette logique, la notion d’“étranger” visée tant dansles codes nationaux de procédure civile que dans lesannexes à l’Accord de Bangui aurait une signification
toute singulière. En effet, dans une approche restrictive
ou stricte, on peut penser que les pères fondateurs
de l’OAPI n’ayant pas jugé opportun de proposer une
définition spécifique de l’“étranger”, cela laisse croireque ce mot conserve tout son sens ordinaire dans laconstruction communautaire. Dans cette optique, doitêtre considéré comme étranger au sens des dispositions
des différentes annexes à l’Accord de Bangui, et donc
astreint au paiement du cautionnement, tout demandeur
au procès non ressortissant d’un État membre del’OAPI dont relève la juridiction saisie. Cette thèse peut
se justifier. Elle peut d’ailleurs s’appuyer sur l’article 3
de l’ABR-1999, selon lequel les droits reconnus par lesannexes sont des droits nationaux, ce qui revient à direque chaque juge national l’applique comme s’ils émanentd’un organe interne d’édiction des normes58. Il en résulte
que le cloisonnement des juridictions des États ne serait
pas supprimé par l’existence de la zone d’intégration et,
56

57

58

NGO MBEM (S.), Les enjeux de la protection des dessins et modèles
industriels dans le développement en Afrique : le cas des pays membres
de l’Organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuelle (OAPI), Thèse deDoctorat en droit, Université de Strasbourg III - Robert Schuman, 2007, p. 38
et s.
En matière de marques par exemple, l’art. 23, al. 1 de l’annexe III dispose que
ce signe peut être radié dès lors qu’il n’est utilisé sur le territoire d’aucun desÉtats membres pendant une période ininterrompue de cinq ans; en matièrede brevet, l’art. 46 de l’annexe I prévoit l’octroi d’une licence non volontairepour défaut d’exploitation si l’invention brevetée “n’est pas exploitée sur leterritoire de l’un des États membres”.
En ce sens, voir NGOMBE (L.Y.), Le droit d’auteur en Afrique, Paris(L’Harmattan), 2004, p. 128.

comme conséquence, le ressortissant d’un État membrequi agit dans un autre État ne peut être dispensé dupaiement de la caution judicatum solvi. En outre, ellepeut s’appuyer sur le fait qu’aucun argument de texte
ne permet d’affirmer que l’OAPI ait entendu créer une
citoyenneté commune en son sein.
B. L’approche extensive de la notion de territoire unique
L’approche restrictive procède d’une appréciation
partielle de la base sur laquelle le raisonnement doitêtre conduit. D’ailleurs, elle n’a pas été confirmée
par l’évolution du droit OAPI. En effet, en affirmant àl’article 5, alinéa 3, de l’ABR-2015, que “les étrangers
jouissent des dispositions du présent accord et de ses
annexes dans les mêmes conditions que les nationaux”,
le législateur OAPI apporte une clarification péremptoire.
La formule de cette disposition rédigée comme cellequ’utiliserait un législateur national est univoque : dèslors que l’accord et ses annexes ont vocation à bénéficier
d’office à tous les ressortissants des États membres,l’“étranger” ne peut qu’être toute personne ressortissantd’un pays tiers à l’Organisation. Néanmoins, cetteclarification permet simplement de poser les jalons del’argumentaire. Celui-ci doit être poursuivi en précisantque, de toutes manières, ce n’est pas uniquement sur lefondement de la nature des droits découlant de l’accord59
ou sur celui d’une nationalité découlant de la mise enplace de l’OAPI qu’il faut raisonner, mais également sur lefondement de la règle du traitement national qui en est
l’appui en cette matière.

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuelledans ce domaine tant en ce qui concerne l’existenceque l’exercice des droits56. Justement, relativement àl’existence des droits, le demandeur n’a pas à effectuer
des dépôts dans tous les États membres. L’article 7,
alinéa 1, de l’accord indique à ce propos que : “… Toutdépôt effectué auprès de l’administration de l’undes États membres, conformément aux dispositions
du présent accord et ses annexes, ou auprès del’Organisation, a valeur de dépôt national dans chaque
État membre”. Par ailleurs, les titres délivrés par l’OAPI,
l’office commun de propriété industrielle pour les
17 États membres, produisent effet dans tous ces États.
S’agissant de l’exercice des droits, l’exploitation d’un droit
de propriété industrielle dans l’un des États membres
vaut exploitation dans tous les autres États. Ce principe
est exprimé de différentes manières selon le droit depropriété industrielle considéré57. Ces règles liées à
l’existence et à l’exercice des droits sont approchéesde la même manière, que l’on adopte une approche
restrictive (A) ou une approche extensive (B) de la notion
de territoire unique.

La pertinence de l’invocation de la règle du traitement
national résulte de la confusion créée en jurisprudence.
En effet, lorsqu’on évoque la nationalité en matière depropriété intellectuelle, le réflexe est de croire que letraitement national est susceptible de conduire à une
assimilation parfaite de l’étranger au national. Le tribunal
de grande instance du Wouri à Douala60 est tombé dansce travers, en rendant une décision critiquable dans uneespèce similaire à celle commentée, où une société dedroit américain revendiquait l’application à son profit
des dispositions de l’article 2 de la convention d’Union deParis du 20 mars 1883, relatives au traitement national,
pour s’affranchir du paiement de ladite caution. En
entérinant l’argumentaire de la société américaine au
visa de l’article 2 précité, les juges camerounais ont
violé la lettre de cette disposition qui prévoit, en son
alinéa 2, une exception notable manifestement perduede vue : “Sont expressément réservées les dispositions
de la législation de chacun des pays contractants
relatives à la procédure judiciaire et administrative età la compétence, ainsi qu’à l’élection de domicile ou àla constitution d’un mandataire, qui seraient requises
par les lois sur la propriété industrielle”. On le voit, leprincipe du traitement national prévu par l’Union deParis permet simplement aux étrangers de jouir, dans
59

60

Sachant que cela a été renforcé par l’ABR-2015, dans la mesure où l’ancien
art. 3, réaménagé et repris par l’art. 5, permet de renforcer de manière
visible la supériorité du droit OAPI par rapport aux droits nationaux, ce qui luiconfère une supranationalité indiscutable.
TGI du Wouri (Douala), Jugement civil n° 164 du 6 décembre 2004, Société
Mc Can Ericsson c. Bernard AZRIA, obs., NDEDI PENDA (H.) : Revue La Gazelle,
n° 0002, 2008, pp. 19 et s.
179chaque État qui aurait signé la même Convention queleurs pays, des droits subjectifs élaborés par ces États
en faveur de leurs nationaux. Il ne concerne que lesdroits de propriété intellectuelle qui seraient accordés
par la loi nationale à ses ressortissants et non d’autres
droits. En conséquence, il laisse subsister les spécificités
inhérentes aux législations internes des pays membres
quant à la procédure judiciaire et administrative, au rang
desquelles la caution judicatum solvi. Si l’on raisonnait
autrement, on dépasserait le cadre de la protection
juridique offerte par les conventions internationales
instituant ce principe.
Au total, on peut affirmer que le régime uniforme deprotection des droits de propriété industrielle issu del’Accord de Bangui n’a nullement vocation à se substituer
aux législations des pays membres relatives à laprocédure judiciaire. De ce point de vue, l’arrêt rapporté
doit être approuvé, les seuls moyens de droit, dontl’invocation eût été salvatrice pour les Établissements
MAMADOU SAMBA DIALLO, étant l’existence d’un accord
de coopération judiciaire entre le Sénégal et la Guinéeaffranchissant leurs citoyens respectifs du paiement dela caution judicatum solvi 61, ou la possession au Sénégald’immeubles d’une valeur suffisante pour assurer cepaiement (voir article 16 du Code civil de 1804).
II. La distinction entre la caution judicatum solvi et lescautions exigées par les annexes de l’Accord de Bangui

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

L’exigence d’un dépôt de la caution judicatum solvi
dans les procédures mettant en cause les droits depropriété intellectuelle peut prêter à confusion au
regard des dispositions des annexes à l’Accord de
Bangui qui prévoient la faculté pour le juge d’imposer uncautionnement lorsqu’il y a lieu à saisie, laquelle se mue
en obligation lorsque le demandeur à cette saisie est
un étranger62.

180

Au vrai, à l’égard de l’étranger, la confusion entre lesdeux types de cautions est d’autant plus facile que lesbuts poursuivis sont relativement identiques, à savoir
garantir le paiement des dommages et intérêts, ainsi queles frais auxquels il pourrait être condamné. Cependant,
quelques éléments permettent de conserver une fineligne de démarcation entre les deux types de cautions.
• Tout d’abord, en ce qui concerne leur champ
d’application, la caution judicatum solvi n’est jamais
appliquée aux nationaux tandis que la caution exigée
en matière de saisie concerne tantôt les nationaux,tantôt les étrangers.
• Ensuite, en ce qui concerne les caractères de ces
cautionnements, celui applicable en cas de saisie
est tantôt facultatif, tantôt obligatoire alors que la61
62

Au sujet d’un tel accord, voir CA Littoral (Douala), 16 juillet 1999, Air Afrique :Revue camerounaise du droit des affaires, n° 2, p. 81.
Par exemple, l’art. 64 de l’annexe I relative au brevet dispose en son al. 4 que :“le cautionnement est toujours imposé à l’étranger qui requiert la saisie”.
Cette disposition est reprise par la quasi-totalité des dispositions des annexes
relatives aux objets de propriété industrielle prévoyant la saisie-contrefaçon.
Voir art. 64 al. 3 et 4 annexe I, art. 48 al. 3 annexe III et art. 31 al. 3 annexe IV
de l’ABR-1999.

caution judicatum solvi est toujours obligatoire dèslors que la demande en est faite et que l’étranger nedispose pas d’immeubles suffisants qui pourraient
garantir l’indemnisation éventuelle du national, etque son pays n’est pas engagé dans une convention
de coopération judiciaire qui l’en dispenserait, avec lepays du juge saisi du litige.
• Enfin, en ce qui concerne leur régime procédural, lecautionnement en cas de saisie est ordonné d’officedans la mesure où l’ordonnance qui le contient
est unilatérale alors que la caution judicatum solvi
constitue une exception de procédure qui doit êtresoulevée par la partie adverse dans le cadre d’uncontentieux contradictoire63.
Il découle de ce qui précède que les deux
cautionnements sont distincts. La question pourrait
alors se poser de savoir si l’on peut les cumuler dans lamême procédure.
L’hypothèse de travail serait la suivante : le demandeurétranger saisit le juge afin qu’il ordonne une saisiecontrefaçon; dans son ordonnance, ce juge impose une
caution pour se conformer aux dispositions de l’annexe
applicable. Par la suite, le demandeur étranger introduit
l’instance au fond tel qu’exigé par la loi. Devant le juge
du fond, le défendeur national soulève l’exception decaution judicatum solvi. Le juge doit-il considérer quele cautionnement résultant de l’ordonnance ayant
autorisé la saisie vaut caution judicatum solvi? Le doute
est permis.
Avant d’esquisser une réponse à la question posée,
il importe de relever la situation qui ne soulèverait
aucune difficulté; il s’agit de celle dans laquelle le juge
du fond, non tenu par les mesures prises par le juge duprovisoire, pourrait décider d’annuler le cautionnement
exigé au moment de la saisie et d’ordonner une caution
judicatum solvi suffisante. En ce qui concerne la question
elle-même, dès lors que les deux cautionnements visentle même objectif, on pourrait estimer que celui ordonné
au moment de la saisie est suffisant. On affirmerait
alors que “cautionnement sur cautionnement nevaut”. D’ailleurs, si on cumule les cautions, on dissuadel’introduction des actions en justice par les étrangers
alors même que l’Acte de 2015 a, par ailleurs, précisé àl’attention du juge saisi d’une requête aux fins de saisie
que le cautionnement qu’il ordonne, quel qu’en soit
le débiteur, doit être “suffisant sans être de nature àdécourager le recours à la procédure” (v. par ex. art. 65,
al. 3, annexe I).
Pourtant, envisager un cumul ne serait pas incongru.
En effet, même si les deux cautions visent à offrir
des dommages et intérêts au défendeur, on peut
se demander si la réparation recherchée concerne
exactement le même préjudice. Cela revient à envisager
de distinguer le préjudice qui naîtrait de la saisie decelui qui résulterait de l’exercice de l’action au fond.
63

En outre, le plaideur qui n’a pas soulevé une telle exception en temps utile est,
de manière irréfragable, présumé y avoir renoncé : CCJA, 1re chambre, Arrêt
n° 13 du 29 juin 2006, Ohadata J-07-27.

Joseph Fometeu
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

E. Cour commune de justice etd’arbitrage (CCJA) de l’OHADA –Propriété intellectuelle – Compétence– Cour suprême nationale
La cour commune de justice et d’arbitrage (CCJA) del’OHADA est en principe incompétente à connaître desaffaires soulevant des questions relatives à l’application
de l’Accord de Bangui et ses annexes.
La saisie-contrefaçon instituée par la législation
communautaire est autorisée par le président du tribunal
civil statuant comme juge des requêtes et non par le juge
des référés.
Cour Commune de Justice et d’Arbitrage, Arrêt
n° 005/2007 du 1er février 2007, SOCIÉTÉ PLAST-KIM c.
SOCIÉTÉ OCI-PLAST
Observations :Dans l’arrêt rapporté, la CCJA s’est, sans détours,
déclarée incompétente pour connaître des affaires
soulevant des questions relatives à la propriété
intellectuelle. Pourtant, cette problématique alimente
des querelles au sein de la communauté des praticiensdu droit de la propriété intellectuelle conduisant parfois
au rendu de décisions contraires par les juridictions d’unmême État. À titre d’illustration, le président du tribunal
de première instance de Yaoundé-Centre Administratif
statuant comme juge du contentieux de l’exécution aretenu sa compétence pour connaître de la rétractationd’une ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon d’une œuvre
littéraire et artistique sur le fondement des articles 336
et 337 de l’Acte uniforme OHADA n° 6 portant procédures

simplifiées de recouvrement et des voies d’exécution64.
En revanche, saisi de la même question mais en matièrede marque, le président du tribunal de première instancede Yaoundé-Ekounou a décliné sa compétence motif prisde ce que l’Acte uniforme susvisé n’a pas réglementé lasaisie-contrefaçon qui relève par conséquent du droitcommun65. Dans l’affaire commentée, la Cour suprême
de Côte d’Ivoire s’est dessaisie d’une affaire relative àl’application de l’AB-1977 au profit de la CCJA.
Faits : La société PLAST-KIM, propriétaire d’un modèle derécipient en plastique déposé à l’OAMPI66, a constaté que
sa consœur, la société Océan Ivoirien de plastique dite
OCI-PLAST, fabriquait et commercialisait des récipientsen plastique identiques en tous points aux siens. Ellea par conséquent obtenu du président du tribunal depremière instance d’Abidjan statuant en référé une
ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon, laquelle fut déféréedevant la cour d’appel par la société OCI-PLAST.

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuelle

La frontière est bien mince, d’autant plus qu’on peutestimer que c’est la même action qui est exercée parl’étranger de manière séquencée. Pourtant, il pourrait
exister quelques situations, certes marginales, danslesquelles la distinction serait possible. D’une part, ilfaut rappeler que la caution judicatum solvi est destinéeà couvrir l’indemnisation, mais aussi les frais auxquels
pourrait être condamné l’étranger. Dans cette optique,elle peut être fixée par le juge du fond, en tenant compte
du montant préalablement versé au titre de la caution
au moment de la saisie; elle viendrait alors compléter cemontant. D’autre part, on peut envisager l’hypothèse
dans laquelle le saisissant a outrepassé les limites
voulues par l’ordonnance de saisie (par exemple, en lieu
et place d’une saisie-description, le saisissant effectue
une saisie réelle) puis, a vu son action partiellement
fondée (par exemple, la contrefaçon n’a pas étéreconnue à l’endroit de tous les produits saisis). Danscette hypothèse, la caution relative à la saisie permet laréparation pour la saisie abusive et la caution judicatum
solvi couvrirait une éventuelle autre faute résultant nonplus de la saisie, mais de l’exercice abusif de l’action au
fond ainsi que les frais.

Cette juridiction infirma l’ordonnance entreprise motif
pris de l’incompétence du juge des référés à statuer surles articles 36 et suivants de l’annexe IV de l’AB-1977,
dispositions qui confèrent cette prérogative au juge
des requêtes.
La société PLAST-KIM s’est pourvue en cassation. La Coursuprême de Côte d’Ivoire a relevé que l’affaire soulevait
des questions relatives à l’application de l’Acte uniforme
portant sur le droit commercial général et s’est dessaisie
du dossier au profit de la Cour commune de justice etd’arbitrage. Vidant sa saisine dans cette cause, la CCJA adécliné sa compétence et renvoyé l’affaire devant la Coursuprême de Côte d’Ivoire initialement saisie.
Raisonnement : L’analyse de cette décision permet delever le voile sur les prérogatives du président du tribunal
civil en matière de propriété intellectuelle (section I) et
de tracer une ligne de démarcation entre les matières
relevant de la CCJA et le droit de la propriété intellectuelle(section II).
I. La compétence du président du tribunal civil en
matière de propriété intellectuelle
L’Accord de Bangui, Acte du 24 février 1999 (ABR-1999),
reconnaît au président du tribunal civil ses prérogatives
classiques dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre des droits
de propriété intellectuelle. Le texte communautaire
indique expressément que ce magistrat est compétent
en matière d’ordonnances sur requête (A), mais ometd’évoquer sa compétence es qualité de juge des référés,toute chose à l’origine des divergences d’interprétation
dans la pratique (B).
64
65

66

Voir par ex. PTPI de Yaoundé - Centre Administratif, Ordonnance n° 150/C du
1er décembre 2006, NGANDINGA Éric c. SCAAP.
Voir PTPI de Yaoundé-Ekounou, Ordonnance n° 62 du 18 mars 2008, Société
P2MP Sàrl c. Société D. Sàrl. Voir dans le même sens, CA Littoral, Arrêt n° 28 du
28 janvier 2008, Société BIC SA c. Société TBC SA (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M-L.),ce recueil, chapitre 1, section F).
L’OAMPI, acronyme de l’Office africain et malgache de la propriété
industrielle, a été créé le 13 septembre 1962 à Libreville. Cet accord a été
révisé à Bangui le 2 mars 1977, après le retrait de Madagascar pour donner
naissance à l’OAPI.
181

A. Les ordonnances sur requête
Le président du tribunal civil délivre des ordonnances desaisie-contrefaçon sur requête de la présumée victime
et sous réserve de la production des pièces qui varient
selon l’objet de propriété industrielle considéré67. La
saisie-contrefaçon est en effet une mesure gracieuse
octroyée au titulaire du droit violé ou à ses ayants droits
à l’encontre du présumé contrefacteur, celui-ci disposant
en tout état de cause de la faculté de faire réviser ou
retirer ladite mesure. Dans l’espèce commentée, lasociété PLAST-KIM, victime présumée de la contrefaçon
de son modèle de récipient, a obtenu l’ordonnancede saisie-contrefaçon querellée plutôt par la voie
contentieuse, notamment en assignant la société OCIPLAST devant le juge des référés du tribunal de première
instance d’Abidjan.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Le juge des référés est-il habilité à rendre desordonnances de saisie-contrefaçon? L’analyse des lois
régissant l’organisation judiciaire interne de la quasitotalité des pays signataires de l’Accord de Bangui
postule a priori une réponse négative, cette prérogativeétant en général conférée au juge des requêtes. C’est
la quintessence de l’argumentaire développé par lasociété OCI-PLAST devant le juge d’appel qui fit droit
à son recours suivant Arrêt n° 696 du 17 octobre 2000
dont pourvoi. Cette approche paraît justifiée puisqueles textes organisant la saisie-contrefaçon en matièrede propriété industrielle font dépendre cette mesured’une ordonnance rendue sur requête par le président
du tribunal civil, dans le cadre d’une procédure noncontradictoire.

182

B. Les ordonnances de référés
Bien que l’Accord de Bangui ne le dise pas expressément,la jurisprudence admet la possibilité pour la victime
de la saisie-contrefaçon en matière de propriété
industrielle de saisir le juge des référés de droitcommun pour solliciter la rétractation de l’ordonnancey relative ou le cantonnement de la saisie dansl’optique de la limiter à quelques exemplaires desobjets contrefaisants68. Il importe de souligner quel’Acte de Bamako du 14 décembre 2015 ne prévoit pas
non plus expressément le cantonnement de la saisiecontrefaçon69, à la différence de la quasi-totalité deslois nationales régissant le droit d’auteur qui offrent lalatitude à la victime de la saisie-contrefaçon de solliciterle cantonnement en référé70. Cette mesure, du reste
conforme au droit commun, peut valablement être

67

68

69
70

Cf. dans l’ABR-1999, voir art. 64 al. 2 de l’annexe I, art. 47 al. 2 de l’annexe II
en matière de modèles d’utilité; art. 48 al. 2 de l’annexe III en matièrede marque; art. 31 al. 2 de l’annexe IV en matière de dessins et modèles
industriels, etc. Il importe de souligner que l’ABR-2015 donne désormais
compétence au président de la juridiction nationale compétente.
Voir en ce sens CA du Littoral (Douala), Arrêt du 28 janvier 2008, Société BIC SA
c. Société TBC SA (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M-L.), ce recueil, chapitre 1, sectionF); PTPI Douala-Ndokoti, Ordonnance n° 189 du 22 août 2007, SPN SA c. Société
LM Co LTD, inédit; Voir enfin PTPI Yaoundé-Ekounou, Ordonnance n° 62 du
18 mars 2008, Société P2MP Sàrl c. Société D. Sàr, inédit.
Révisé en tant que “saisie pour contrefaçon” dans l’ABR-2015.
Voir par ex. art. 86 de la loi n° 2000/011 du 19 décembre 2000 relative au droit
d’auteur et aux droits voisins au Cameroun; art. 133 de la loi n° 2008-09 du
25 janvier 2008 portant sur le droit d’auteur et les droits voisins au Sénégal;art. 101 de la loi n° 032/99/AN du 22 décembre 1999 régissant le droit
d’auteur et les droits voisins au Burkina Faso.

étendue en matière de propriété industrielle. C’est direque la procédure de référé ne devrait être enclenchée
que pour contester les conditions dans lesquelles
l’autorisation de faire pratiquer la saisie-contrefaçona été accordée et non pour prescrire cette mesure. La
démarche de la société PLAST-KIM apparaît dès lors
surprenante surtout qu’une saisie-contrefaçon ordonnée
par la voie du référé et donc contradictoirement est en
pratique inefficace, parce que dépouillée de l’effet desurprise qui y est par hypothèse attaché.
II. L’incompétence de la CCJA en matière de propriété
intellectuelle
La CCJA a indiqué, contrairement aux énonciations del’arrêt infirmatif attaqué, que la contestation soulevéen’est pas relative à l’application de l’Acte uniforme
portant sur le droit commercial général, les parties ayant
essentiellement fondé leurs moyens sur la violation
des dispositions du Code ivoirien de procédure civile etadministrative et celles de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du
2 mars 1977. C’est dire que cette juridiction supranationale
s’est déclarée incompétente en raison de la nature del’affaire (A). Toutefois, il importe de souligner que cetteincompétence de principe n’a pas une portée absolue (B).
A. L’incompétence de la CCJA fondée sur la nature
de l’affaire
La question essentielle qui était soumise à l’appréciationde la Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire était celle de savoir
si le juge des référés est habilité à ordonner une saisiecontrefaçon en application des articles 36 et suivantsde l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui du 2 mars 1977.
En l’espèce, s’il est incontestable que le litige à l’origine
de cette affaire oppose deux sociétés commerciales, àsavoir PLAST-KIM et OCI-PLAST au sujet de la fabrication
et de la commercialisation des récipients en plastiqueallégués être contrefaisants, les débats n’ont à aucun
moment achoppé sur l’application de l’Acte uniforme
OHADA relatif au Droit commercial général tel qu’indiquépar la Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire. Cette hautejuridiction était en réalité appelée à se prononcer surla conformité de l’ordonnance de référé n° 3119/2000
rendue le 21 avril 2000 par le président du tribunal depremière instance d’Abidjan aux dispositions pertinentes
des articles 36 et suivants de l’annexe IV de l’Accord de
Bangui du 2 mars 1977 relatives aux actions en justiceet à la procédure en matière de dessins et modèles
industriels. Nul doute que cette question relève dudroit de la propriété intellectuelle. C’est donc à bon
droit que la CCJA a décliné sa compétence et renvoyél’affaire à la Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire. Cependant,l’incompétence de la CCJA en matière de propriété
intellectuelle n’a pas une portée absolue.
B. La portée relative de l’incompétence de la CCJA en
matière de propriété intellectuelle
L’exclusion de la CCJA du champ du contentieux dela propriété intellectuelle suscite des interrogations
notamment lorsque l’on est en présence d’un litige
relatif au droit des affaires tel que régi par le Traité dePort Louis et ses Actes subséquents, mais qui soulève
des questions connexes de propriété intellectuelle.

La Cour de justice de l’UEMOA a d’ailleurs indiqué dansl’avis n° 001/2000 du 2 février 2000 relatif au projetde code communautaire des investissements quel’interprétation par elle des actes uniformes OHADA
porterait atteinte à l’exclusivité de la CCJA73. Dans un
tel contexte, peut-on envisager, comme le préconise
MENIE M’Essono (Ph.), une partition du contentieux demanière à ne confier à chacune des juridictions que
les aspects relevant de ses attributions74? Il va sansdire qu’une telle solution conduirait à “transformer lessystèmes de droit (…) en un écheveau juridique difficile
à démêler” 75. En effet, la perspective d’une partition ducontentieux postule que la juridiction saisie se borne
à régler les aspects du contentieux la concernant tout
en se déclarant incompétente pour connaître du volet
exclu de son champ d’intervention. Cette orientation
met en exergue la difficulté qu’il y a à tracer une ligne dedémarcation étanche entre le domaine de compétencede la CCJA et celui relevant des juridictions nationales enmatière de propriété intellectuelle.
La CCJA peut par ailleurs être amenée à connaître ducontentieux de la propriété intellectuelle dans le cadre
de l’examen d’une sentence arbitrale rendue sousl’égide de l’arbitrage administré par cette instancejuridictionnelle. L’arbitrabilité des litiges relatifs à lapropriété intellectuelle est en effet expressément admise
par l’Acte de Bamako du 14 décembre 2015. L’article 4.2)
des dispositions générales de ce texte indique que“tous les litiges portant sur l’application du présent
accord et de ses annexes peuvent être réglés par voie
d’arbitrage ou de médiation”. Cette position est d’ailleurs

71
72
73

74
75

Voir MENIE M’ESSONO (P.), La protection juridictionnelle dans l’espace OAPI,Chișinău (Éditions Universitaires européennes), 2013, pp. 103 et s.
Voir en ce sens NGOMBE (L.Y), OHADA versus OAPI. Lecture transversale
et partiale : Revue africaine de la propriété intellectuelle, Collection OAPI,
décembre 2013, pp. 31 et s.
Voir Cour de Justice de l’UEMOA, Recueil des textes fondamentaux et dejurisprudence de la Cour, Ouagadougou, 2008, p.229, cité par SOSSA(D. C.), Les conflits des juridictions communautaires et les mécanismesde coopération inter-juridictionnels : Actes du Colloque sur le droitcommunautaire en Afrique sur le thème “De la concurrence à la cohabitation
des droits communautaires”, École Régionale Supérieure de la Magistrature(ERSUMA), Cotonou-Benin, du 24 au 26 janvier 2011, 1re éd., 2011, pp. 126 et s.
Voir MENIE M’ESSONO, n.71.
Voir YADO TOE (J.), La problématique actuelle de l’harmonisation de droit desaffaires par l’OHADA, Actes du Colloque sur l’harmonisation du droit OHADA
des contrats - Ouagadougou 2007 : Revue de droit uniforme, 2008, p. 32.
Disponible en ligne à l’adresse www.unidroit.org.

confortée par la doctrine et la jurisprudence africaine76.
Or, le Centre d’arbitrage et de médiation institué parl’Acte de BAMAKO n’étant pas, à ce jour, opérationnel,
il est parfaitement envisageable que les litiges relevantde son office soient provisoirement administrés
sous les auspices de la CCJA. Quoi qu’il en soit, lesdifficultés susrelevées ne peuvent qu’être aplanies
dans le cadre des accords de coopération judiciaire
intercommunautaires.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

F. Saisie-contrefaçon – Difficultésd’exécution – Compétence – Juge ducontentieux de l’exécution – Nonapplication de l’article 49 de l’AUPSRVE– Droit commun national – Juge desréférés – Juge du fond

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuelle

Cette problématique, déjà évoquée par un auteur71,
est d’envergure, étant donné ses implications entermes de conflit de compétence entre cette juridiction
supranationale des affaires et les juridictions nationales
des États membres de l’OAPI, juges communautaires
de droit commun en matière de propriété intellectuelle.
Ce conflit est renforcé par l’absence d’un système
juridictionnel OAPI dont l’une des conséquences serait defaire du juge OHADA un juge par défaut de la législation
OAPI sur certaines questions72. Or, il ressort du texte
organique de la CCJA que cette instance a compétence
pour appliquer le droit produit par l’OHADA, organisation
dont elle constitue l’organe de contrôle.

Les difficultés d’exécution consécutives à une saisiecontrefaçon ne relèvent pas de la compétence du juge
de l’exécution institué par l’article 49 de l’Acte uniforme
portant procédures simplifiées de recouvrement et desvoies d’exécution mais plutôt du juge du droit commun.
Cour d’appel du Littoral (Douala), Arrêt n° 28 du
28 janvier 2008, SOCIÉTÉ BIC S.A c. SOCIÉTÉ TBC S.A
Observations :L’exécution de la saisie-contrefaçon peut donner lieu à
un contentieux protéiforme soulevant des questions
d’ordre juridique et pratique. L’une des problématiques
fréquemment rencontrées a trait à la détermination dujuge compétent pour connaître dudit contentieux. Estce le juge institué par l’article 49 de l’Acte uniforme del’OHADA? Est-ce le tribunal appelé à trancher l’affaire au
fond ou bien plutôt le juge des référés? La question est
d’autant plus difficile que l’Accord de Bangui révisé nefournit aucune indication à ce sujet, prêtant alors le flancà des divergences d’interprétation au sein de l’espacecommunautaire. L’arrêt de la cour d’appel du Littoral
ci-dessus rapporté souligne avec force que les difficultésd’exécution de la procédure de saisie-contrefaçon ne
relèvent pas de la compétence du juge institué parl’Acte uniforme susvisé, mais bien plutôt du juge desréférés classiques.
Faits : Les faits sont assez simples : la société BIC SA est
propriétaire de la marque éponyme enregistrée à l’OAPI
sous le n° 10922 apposée sur les stylos à bille qu’elle
fabrique et commercialise. Ayant constaté que la société
TBC commercialise les stylos identiques aux siens, elle afait pratiquer saisie-contrefaçon sur les stylos allégués
être contrefaisants en vertu d’une ordonnance n° 1327
du 5 juillet 2006 du président du tribunal de première
76

Voir en ce sens EKANI (F.), L’arbitrage et la médiation dans le contentieux dela propriété intellectuelle : quel intérêt pour les États membres de l’OAPI?, La
propriété intellectuelle au service du développement de l’Afrique : Mélanges
offerts à Denis EKANI, Collection OAPI n° 4, Paris (L’Harmattan), pp. 173 et s.
Voir également Cour suprême du Congo, Arrêt n° 07/GCS.02 du 17 mai 2002,
Chambre commerciale, Société Linda-Communications c. Établissements MicVidéo (obs. FOMETEU (J.), ce recueil, chapitre 1, section B).
183

instance de Douala-Bonanjo. La société TBC a saisi lejuge des référés dudit tribunal en nullité et mainlevée dela saisie querellée.
Ce magistrat fit droit à sa demande, passant outrel’exception d’incompétence matérielle excipée parla société BIC SA qui a soutenu que seul le juge ducontentieux de l’exécution institué par l’Acte uniforme
susvisé était compétent en l’espèce.
Raisonnement : Saisie, la cour d’appel a infirmél’ordonnance querellée et renvoyé la cause devant lejuge des référés classique. Si la cour d’appel est formelle
quant à la question du juge compétent pour connaître
des difficultés d’exécution de la saisie-contrefaçon(section I), elle ne s’est guère prononcée sur celle non
moins importante de l’office de ce juge (section II).

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

I. La détermination du juge des difficultés d’exécutiond’une saisie-contrefaçon

184

Plusieurs difficultés peuvent naître au cours del’exécution d’une saisie-contrefaçon. L’huissier
instrumentaire peut en effet se heurter à la résistance
du saisi qui pourrait fermer les portes de ses locaux,ou refuser de produire les documents sollicités. En
outre, cet officier ministériel peut se trouver confronté
à une difficulté d’ordre technique nécessitantl’assistance de l’homme de l’art. En revanche, le saisi
peut solliciter la rétractation de l’ordonnance ayant
autorisé la saisie, la nullité du procès-verbal de saisie,et même le cantonnement de cette mesure. Quelle est
la juridiction habilitée à connaître de ces difficultés etcontestations? En général, les annexes à l’Accord de
Bangui, Acte du 24 février 1999 relatif à la propriété
industrielle, sous l’empire duquel la décision rapportéea été rendue, accordent au président du tribunal civil
compétence pour autoriser une saisie-contrefaçon.
Elles restent cependant silencieuses quant à l’autorité
judiciaire habilitée à connaître des difficultés qui
pourraient survenir au cours de l’exécution de cettemesure. Trois juridictions ont théoriquement vocation
à intervenir en fonction de la nature de la mesureenvisagée, à savoir le juge des requêtes (A), le juge desréférés (B) et le juge du fond (C).
A. Le juge des requêtes
Certaines difficultés qui naissent à l’occasion del’exécution d’une saisie-contrefaçon peuvent êtreaplanies par le juge des requêtes ayant ordonné ladite
mesure. Rien n’interdit en effet l’huissier instrumentairede suspendre les opérations de saisie77, et de se
référer à ce magistrat pour solliciter des mesurescomplémentaires qui n’auraient pas été prévues
dans l’ordonnance et qui s’avèrent nécessaires lorsdu déroulement de la saisie, notamment la présenced’un serrurier en cas de fermeture des voies d’accès,
un expert–comptable lorsqu’il est indispensable de77

Voir VÉRON (P.), Saisie-contrefaçon, 2e éd., Paris (Dalloz), 2005, p. 61,
n° 13.251. Cet auteur relève pertinemment que l’épuisement des effets del’ordonnance ne fait pas obstacle à la suspension des opérations de saisie
lorsque cela s’avère nécessaire pour mener à bien la mission fixée dansl’ordonnance.

rechercher des informations comptables du saisi pourdéterminer la masse contrefaisante, un informaticien,etc. La jurisprudence française admet d’ailleurs lapossibilité, pour l’huissier instrumentaire, de recherchermême d’office des informations comptables, sansque le président du tribunal ne puisse s’y opposer78.
En toute hypothèse, le recours au juge des requêtes
doit être exceptionnel, la clause de référé insérée dansl’ordonnance rendue sur requête ouvrant généralementla voie du référé.
B. Le juge des référés
La société BIC a prétendu que le juge des référés
est incompétent motifs pris d’une part de ce que lesjuridictions compétentes prévues par l’Accord de Banguisont celles appelées à statuer sur le fond du litige en
matière de contrefaçon, d’où le terme “tribunaux”
contenu dans ce texte et la référence à la voie civile et lavoie correctionnelle. Elle relève d’autre part que la saisiecontrefaçon étant une saisie conservatoire, les difficultésd’exécution qu’elle engendre sont, dans le silence del’Accord de Bangui, du ressort du juge du contentieux
institué par l’article 49 de l’Acte uniforme susvisé. Or,
la première branche de l’argumentaire développé parla société BIC SA participe d’une imparfaite lecture desarticles 47, alinéa 1 et 49, de l’annexe III de l’Accord de
Bangui révisé.
L’article 47.1) indique que les actions civiles relatives
aux marques sont portées devant les tribunaux civils
et jugés comme matières sommaires79. L’article 49 del’Acte de Bangui du 24 février 1999 précise que fautepour le demandeur de s’être pourvu, soit par la voie
civile, soit par la voie correctionnelle, dans le délai de
10 jours ouvrables, la description ou saisie est nulle deplein droit sans préjudice des dommages et intérêts
qui peuvent être réclamés s’il y a lieu”. Or, la référence
aux termes “tribunaux”, “voie civile”, “voie pénale” nesignifie nullement que le législateur communautaire aentendu exclure l’intervention du juge des référés dansle processus de mise en œuvre des droits de propriété
intellectuelle. La quasi-totalité des lois nationales
relatives au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins donnent
d’ailleurs expressément compétence au juge des référésde droit commun en cette matière80.
Il ne faut cependant pas perdre de vue le fait quel’ordonnance prescrivant une saisie-contrefaçon est une
ordonnance sur requête soumise au régime généraldes ordonnances de cette nature qui doit pouvoirs’appliquer mutatis mutandis dans le silence de la loi
spéciale régissant la propriété intellectuelle81. Cette
78
79

80
81

Voir en ce sens CA Paris, 8 juillet 1993 : PIBD 1993, n° 555, III, p. 673; TGIParis, 3e chambre, 30 juin 1994 : PIBD 1994, n° 576, III, p. 527.
L’art. 46 al. 1 de l’ABR-2015 a levé ce voile en précisant que les autres actions
civiles relatives aux marques sont portées devant les juridictions nationales
compétentes et jugées comme pour les matières sommaires. Cette nouvelleorientation est également reprise en matière de brevets d’invention, demodèles d’utilité, de dessins et modèles industriels, etc.
Cf. art. 86 de la loi n° 2000/011 du 19 décembre 2000 relative au droit
d’auteur et aux droits voisins au Cameroun; art. 133 de la loi n° 2008-09 du
25 janvier 2008 régissant le droit d’auteur au Sénégal.
Voir en ce sens PTPI Yaoundé – Centre Administratif, Ordonnance de référé
n° 301/C du 19 février 2007, PMUC c. Alfred Meno (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE(M.-L.), ce recueil, chapitre 4, section E).

impératif de bien baliser leur domaine respectifd’intervention tout en gardant à l’esprit la limite naturelle
du juge des référés qui ne saurait, en tout état de cause,
préjudicier au fond du droit.

L’on peut toutefois objecter qu’une fois le juge du fondsaisi après exécution de la saisie-contrefaçon, celui-ci
pourrait appréhender l’ensemble du contentieux ycompris celui né de l’exécution de cette mesure. Mais
il n’en est rien, le président du tribunal statuant en
référé pouvant être valablement saisi pour modifier ou
rétracter la mesure gracieuse précédemment ordonnée.
C’est d’ailleurs la solution retenue par l’article 497
du Code de procédure civile français qui reconnaît
expressément la faculté au juge de modifier ou rétracterson ordonnance même si le juge du fond est saisi del’affaire. La Cour de cassation a d’ailleurs censuré, au visa
de cette disposition, une cour d’appel qui avait rejeté une
demande de rétractation au motif qu’elle était fondée
sur des moyens de nullité relevant du juge du fond sansrechercher si les conditions prévues par les textes pourprocéder à une saisie-contrefaçon étaient réunies82.

A. Le juge des référés : la rétractation ou la modification
de l’ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon
La victime d’une saisie-contrefaçon a la latitude desolliciter en référé la rétractation ou simplement lamodification de l’ordonnance prescrivant cette mesurebien que l’annexe III à l’Accord de Bangui révisé ne le dise
pas expressément. S’agissant de la rétractation, elle n’est
envisageable que dans l’hypothèse où le saisi démontre
que les conditions d’autorisation de la saisie-contrefaçon
ne sont pas réunies. Dans le cas d’espèce, la société
TBC aurait pu solliciter la rétractation de l’ordonnance
n° 1327 du 5 juillet 2006 du président du tribunal depremière instance de Douala-Bonanjo en invoquant par
exemple le défaut du certificat d’enregistrement de lamarque, le défaut de l’attestation de non-radiation etde non-déchéance, etc. Le certificat d’enregistrement
de la marque permet de vérifier si le requérant en est
effectivement propriétaire. Dans un arrêt rendu le
6 janvier 1932, la cour d’appel de Paris a rétracté une
ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon délivrée en faveurd’un propriétaire irrégulier86. En outre, rien ne paraît
s’opposer à ce que le présumé contrefacteur puissesolliciter la modification de l’ordonnance, notammentle cantonnement de la saisie en cas d’immobilisation de
tout le stock ou d’une importante quantité des produits
prétendus contrefaisants87.

C. Le juge du fondLe juge du fond peut être amené à régler les incidents
nés de la saisie-contrefaçon. S’agissant du Cameroun,il y a lieu de se référer à la loi portant organisation
judiciaire83, qui donne compétence aux tribunaux depremière ou de grande instance en fonction du montant
de la demande84. Mais il convient de bien clarifier cetteéventualité qui en principe n’est que résiduelle en ce
sens que l’on conçoit mal une saisine du juge du fondpar voie principale à cette fin. Très souvent, lesdites
contestations sont soulevées comme moyens dedéfense par le présumé contrefacteur dans le cadred’un procès en contrefaçon déjà pendant. Il en est ainside la contestation de la validité du procès-verbal desaisie et, dans une moindre mesure, de la demandereconventionnelle en réparation en cas de saisie abusive
précisément lorsque cette procédure a été détournéede sa finalité exclusivement probatoire85. On le voit, lejuge des référés et son homologue du fond peuvent,chacun en ce qui le concerne, connaître des incidents nésde l’exécution de la saisie-contrefaçon. Il est cependant
82
83
84
85

Voir Cour cass., 2e chambre civile, 9 juillet 1997, n° 95-12. 580, Bull. 1997,
II, n° 231, cité par VÉRON (P.), Saisie-contrefaçon 2013-2014, 3e éd., Paris(Dalloz), 2012, p. 148, n° 151.62.
Loi n° 2006/015 du 29 décembre 2006 portant organisation judiciaire
modifiée et complétée par la loi n° 2011/027 du 14 décembre 2011.
Cf. art. 13 et s. de la loi n° 2006/015 du 29 décembre 2006.
VÉRON (P.), n.82, p. 157, n° 152.30.

II. L’office du juge des difficultés d’exécution d’une
saisie-contrefaçon
Les développements qui précèdent nous ont donnél’opportunité de souligner la nature plurielle du juge
des difficultés d’exécution de la saisie-contrefaçon. Le
juge des requêtes ne sera cependant pas envisagé ici
en raison du caractère beaucoup plus théorique queréel de son intervention. Ces difficultés interpellent
principalement le juge des référés (A) et, accessoirement
le juge du fond (B).

Chapitre 1 – Théorie générale de la propriété intellectuellesolution est d’autant plus justifiée que dans la pratique,les magistrats insèrent presque systématiquement lesclauses de réserve de référé dans les ordonnances desaisie-contrefaçon. C’est donc à bon droit que les juges
d’appel ont posé “Que dans le cas d‘espèce, le traité
OHADA n‘ayant pas réglementé les saisies-contrefaçons,celles-ci restent régies par les dispositions du droitcommun; Que seul le juge des référés classique del‘article 182 du Code de procédure civile et commerciale
demeure compétent pour connaitre en urgence lesdifficultés inhérentes auxdites saisies; Qu‘il y a donc lieu
de déclarer le juge des référés classiques compétent”. La
compétence du juge des référés paraît dès lors évidente.
La jurisprudence admet du reste cette compétencemême postérieurement à la saisine du juge chargé de lagestion du contentieux de la contrefaçon au fond.

Au total, le recours en rétractation n’est possible que
lorsque l’ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon est obtenue
dans des conditions irrégulières ou a autorisé desmesures excessives. Dès lors, l’office du juge des référésconsiste exclusivement à réexaminer les conditions
d’octroi de l’ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon et laportée de cette dernière88. La jurisprudence indique fort
opportunément que le juge saisi, dans le cadre du référé
rétractation, n’est investi que dans la limite des pouvoirs
appartenant à l’auteur de l’ordonnance89. Ainsi, le juge
des référés n’est pas juge de la validité des opérations desaisie, encore moins du procès-verbal y relatif. L’on est
par conséquent en droit de s’interroger sur la justessede l’ordonnance de référé n° 509 du 20 septembre 2006
86
87
88
89

Voir CA Paris, 6 janvier 1932 : Ann. propr. ind. 1932, p. 291 (note FERNAND-JACQ).
Voir en ce sens CA Dakar, Arrêt n° 501 du 28 décembre 2012, Société Amarosa SA
c. Société Moustapha Tall (obs. LAMOTTE (M.), ce recueil, chapitre 3, section K).
VÉRON (P.) n.82, p. 148, n° 151.71.
Cass. com., 9 juin 2009, n° 08-12.139, cité par VÉRON (P.), n.82.
185

dont appel, ayant annulé la saisie-contrefaçon querellée.
L’incompétence du juge des référés semble acquise
en l’espèce. La jurisprudence va d’ailleurs plus loin en
indiquant de façon générale que les critiques formulées
sur le déroulement de la saisie-contrefaçon ne peuventpas être dévolues au juge des référés90. Sous ce
rapport, le juge des référés du tribunal de première
instance de Douala-Bonanjo aurait dû soulever d’officeson incompétence à prononcer la nullité de la saisiecontrefaçon, prérogative qui échoit naturellement au
juge du fond.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

B. Le juge du fond : La nullité du procès-verbal
de saisie-contrefaçon
Le juge du fond saisi par la voie civile ou correctionnelle
dans les conditions prévues à l’article 49 de l’annexe III
de l’Accord de Bangui révisé peut être amené à annuler
la saisie-contrefaçon pour deux raisons au moins : soit
en raison des irrégularités commises par l’huissier
instrumentaire à l’occasion de l’exécution de la saisie,soit pour défaut de saisine du tribunal compétent dansle délai de 10 jours prévu par cette disposition. La nullité
du procès-verbal de saisie-contrefaçon peut résulter
notamment de la nullité du certificat d’enregistrement
de la marque invoquée à l’appui de la requête aux finsde saisie-contrefaçon, de la rétractation de l’ordonnancede saisie-contrefaçon, du détournement de la procédure
de saisie-contrefaçon et, comme c’est le cas enl’espèce, des irrégularités affectant le procès-verbal desaisie-contrefaçon91. Cette solution paraît logique car,l’ordonnance autorisant la saisie-contrefaçon ayant
été retirée de l’ordonnancement juridique, la saisiecontrefaçon pratiquée sur le fondement de cette décision
est nulle de plein droit. Dans une intéressante affaire, la
Cour a en effet jugé, en matière de droit d’auteur, qu’enl’absence de toute preuve matérielle de la contrefaçon,
le saisissant ne peut faire consigner les déclarations dusaisi92. Cette solution est transposable mutatis mutandis
en matière de propriété industrielle.

186

la pertinence de cet argument, aucune loi n’indiquantd’ailleurs la forme suivant laquelle l’identité des huissiers
doit figurer sur les actes de leur ministère. Il importe desouligner que les textes servant de boussole à l’huissier
instrumentaire dans le cadre de l’exécution de la saisiecontrefaçon sont le statut des huissiers de justice et lecode de procédure civile de l’État dont il relève.
Les juridictions inférieures françaises manifestent parfois
une certaine souplesse sur la question en admettant
la validité d’un procès-verbal de saisie-contrefaçon au
motif que le nom de l’huissier se déduit de la signature93.
La Cour de cassation s’est en revanche montrée plus
sévère en rejetant le pourvoi formulé contre l’arrêt d’une
cour d’appel qui avait annulé un procès-verbal de saisiecontrefaçon mentionnant seulement le nom de l’Étude
de l’huissier94. En tout état de cause, le procès-verbal desaisie-contrefaçon est un acte d’huissier obéissant auxrègles générales des codes de procédure civile des États
membres de l’OAPI.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

Dans l’espèce rapportée, le premier juge a annulé
la saisie-contrefaçon au motif que le procès-verbal
y afférent ne mentionnait pas l’identité de l’huissier
instrumentaire, omission qui, selon lui, viciait aussi
bien la pièce que toute la procédure. Abstraction faite
de l’inaptitude du juge des référés à connaître de cettequestion qui, à notre sens, relève de l’office du juge dufond, le grief invoqué à l’encontre du procès-verbal dela saisie querellée, à savoir le défaut d’identification del’huissier instrumentaire, suscite quelques observations.
La société BIC a en effet prétendu que la première pagede l’exploit litigieux portait bien le cachet nominal del’huissier instrumentaire en l’espèce Maître “TEKEU
Victor” et qu’à la fin étaient apposés non seulement lesceau de l’État, mais aussi les nom, prénom, qualité,boîte postale, numéro de téléphone et signature decet officier ministériel. Il paraît dès lors surprenantque le juge des référés ait retenu ce grief en dépit de
90
91
92

CA Douai, 1re chambre, Ordonnance de référé, 4 février 2002 : PIBD 2002, III,n° 741, p. 206.
Voir par ex. TGI Paris, 3e chambre, 3e section, 18 février 2011 : PIBD 2011, III,n° 941, p. 406.
Voir CA Paris, 4 e chambre, 7 octobre 1998 : PIBD 1999, III, n° 667, p. 16.

93
94

Voir par ex. TGI de Paris, 3e chambre, 2e section, 12 mars 1997 : PIBD 1997,
n° 636, III, p. 391 et TGI Paris, 14 e chambre, 16 janvier 1998 : PIBD 1998, III,n° 653, p. 240.
Voir Cass. com., 20 octobre 1998 : PIBD 1999, III, n° 673, p. 131.

Chapitre 2Chapter– Brevets
1 –d’invention
General theory of intellectual property

A.
Brevet d’invention – Conditions de validité– Nouveauté – Possession personnelle
antérieure – Bonne foi
188

187

Chapitre 2
Brevets d’invention
A. Brevet d’invention – Conditions devalidité – Nouveauté – Possession
personnelle antérieure – Bonne foi

et interdit toute exploitation du procédé qui en est l’objet
par la coopérative AL ITIHAD qui a déféré cette décision
en appel.

Fait une inexacte application de la loi la cour d’Appel qui
confirme la nouveauté d’un brevet de procédé motif
pris de l’absence d’un procédé similaire, sans toutefois
procéder à une recherche d’antériorité.

Deux questions de droit étaient posées aux juges dela cour d’appel de Niamey : le procédé de fabrication
du pain de sucre revendiqué était-il nouveau? Le caséchéant, la coopérative AL ITIHAD et ses membresétaient-ils en droit d’invoquer le bénéfice de lapossession personnelle antérieure?

Le titulaire d’un brevet de procédé ne peut interdire à unconcurrent l’exploitation de l’invention dès lors qu’il estétabli que celui-ci exploitait de bonne foi le même procédé
antérieurement à la délivrance du brevet revendiqué.
Cour d’appel de Niamey, Arrêt n° 170 du 7 août 2006, LA
COOPÉRATIVE AL ITIHAD c. A.A
Observations :L’arrêt rapporté rendu par la cour d’appel de Niamey
dans un domaine où la jurisprudence des pays
membres de l’OAPI demeure moins florissante illustre
la diversification du contentieux de la propriété
intellectuelle dans ces États.
Faits : Derrière la simplicité des faits se cache lacomplexité des questions juridiques à résoudre. Le litige
oppose deux coopératives concurrentes ayant pour objet
la fabrication du pain de sucre. En date du 16 février 2001,
la coopérative AL ITIHAD obtient un agrément pourl’exercice de ses activités au Niger. Trois ans plus tard,
la coopérative Tchékassane qui revendique la paternité
du procédé de fabrication du pain de sucre a sollicité etobtenu l’autorisation de pratiquer une saisie-contrefaçon
au préjudice de la coopérative AL ITIHAD. Après avoir
obtenu la rétractation de l’ordonnance prescrivant lasaisie, cette coopérative a assigné la saisissante en
paiement des dommages et intérêts pour procédure
abusive. Cette affaire a été classée pour des raisons nonélucidées, classement qui consacre la fin du premierépisode de ce feuilleton judiciaire.
Le 12 avril 2002, Monsieur A.A, un des membres de lacoopérative Tchékassane, avait déposé auprès de l’OAPI
une demande de brevet du procédé de fabrication
du pain de sucre ayant abouti à la délivrance d’un
brevet à son profit le 7 octobre 2003. Informée dece brevet, la coopérative AL ITIHAD a assigné cettefois Monsieur A.A devant le tribunal civil de Niamey
d’une part aux fins de se voir conforter dans son droit
d’utilisation du procédé litigieux et, d’autre part, devoir ordonner l’annulation dudit brevet et la radiation
de toutes inscriptions y relatives dans les registres del’Organisation. Le tribunal civil a validé le brevet litigieux
188

Raisonnement : La Cour a infirmé partiellement ladécision critiquée en indiquant que sieur A.A, titulaire
incontesté du brevet querellé, ne peut cependantinterdire à la coopérative AL ITIHAD et à ses membres
l’exploitation de l’invention y relative. Si cette décisionpeut être approuvée, ses motifs laissent toutefois
transparaître un goût d’inachevé sur le double plan de :I.
II.

la brevetabilité de l’invention revendiquée et;l’octroi du bénéfice de la possession personnelle
antérieure.

I. La brevetabilité de l’invention revendiquée
Abordant la question centrale de la brevetabilité duprocédé de fabrication du pain de sucre, les juges
d’appel ont confirmé la nouveauté et, par conséquent,la validité de cette invention (A), la demanderesse enannulation n’ayant pas rapporté la preuve du défaut denouveauté (B).
A. La notion de nouveauté
La réponse à la question de droit posée est tributairede la maîtrise des contours de la notion de nouveautéen droit des brevets. Dans cette perspective, il importe
de convoquer les dispositions de l’article 2.1) del’ABR-1999 qui définissent les critères de brevetabilitéd’une invention. En vertu de ce texte, une invention est
brevetable lorsqu’elle est nouvelle, implique une activité
inventive et est susceptible d’application industrielle,l’invention pouvant consister ou se rapporter à un
produit, un procédé ou l’utilisation de celui-ci. Ces trois
critères qui conditionnent substantiellement l’accèsd’un brevet d’invention à la protection légale doiventêtre cumulativement réunis95. Dans l’espèce rapportée,le seul critère soumis à l’appréciation des juges d’appel
est la nouveauté, la société Al ITIHAD, demanderese

95

Voir en ce sens CHAVANNE (A.) et BURST (J-J.), Droit de la propriété
industrielle, 3e éd., Paris (Dalloz), 1990, pp. 28 et s. Voir également SCHMIDTSZALEWSKI (J) et PIERRE (J-L.), Droit de la propriété industrielle, 4 e éd., Paris(Litec), 2007, pp. 37 et s.

Une invention est dite nouvelle si elle n’a pas d’antériorité
dans l’état de la technique96. Ainsi perçue, la nouveauté
donnant prise à la protection légale est absolue, ce
qui suppose, s’agissant du procédé de fabrication dupain de sucre, l’inexistence des éléments essentielsde cette invention dans l’état de la technique dont ellerelève. Théoriquement, pour conclure à la nouveautéd’une invention, les instances compétentes del’office de propriété industrielle explorent l’état de latechnique, à l’effet de déterminer s’il n’y existe aucune
antériorité véritable97. Certes, le procédé litigieux enl’espèce bénéficie d’une présomption de nouveauté
pour avoir fait l’objet d’un brevet délivré par l’OAPI
le 7 octobre 2003. Mais il convient de préciser quecette présomption est essentiellement réfragrable
car susceptible d’être contestée devant les instances
juridictionnelles compétentes, surtout que, dans lesystème consacré par l’ABR-1999 sous l’empire duquel ladécision rapportée a été rendue, l’OAPI ne procédait pas
à l’examen de fond des conditions de brevetabilité mais
simplement à l’examen de la régularité formelle de la
demande98. Toutefois, l’entrée en vigueur de l’ABR-2015
a substantiellement modifié l’ordonnancement juridiqueen ce qui concerne l’examen des demandes de brevet
au sein de l’OAPI99. On le voit, la confirmation de lanouveauté passe désormais par un examen approfondi
en vue de rechercher si le procédé incriminé ne seretrouve pas tout entier dans l’état de la technique100. En
tout état de cause, il importe de réaffirmer qu’une fois
le brevet délivré, l’invention qui en est l’objet jouit d’une
présomption de nouveauté susceptible d’être remise encause dans le cadre du contentieux de l’annulation.

96

97

98

99

100

L’art. 3 de l’annexe I de l’ABR-1999 indique qu’une invention est nouvelle sielle n’a pas d’antériorité dans l’état de la technique constituée par tout ce
qui a été rendu accessible au public avant le jour du dépôt de la demande dubrevet ou d’une demande de brevet déposée à l’étranger et dont la prioritéa été valablement revendiquée. Cette disposition a été reprise in extenso parl’art. 3 de l’ABR-2015.
L’art. 3 al. 3 de l’annexe I de l’ABR-1999 précise les conditions dans lesquelles
la nouveauté ne peut être détruite notamment si, dans un délai de 12 mois
précédant le jour visé à l’al. 2, cette invention a fait l’objet d’une divulgation
résultant d’un abus manifeste à l’égard du déposant de la demande ou deson auteur. L’ADR-2015 a supprimé l’expression “prédécesseur en droit” quipourrait prêter à équivoque pour la remplacer par “son auteur”.
L’étendue de l’examen de la demande de brevet varie d’un office à un autre.
Classiquement, deux approches sont envisageables : la première matérialiséepar l’examen approfondi de la demande consistant, après un examen de larégularité formelle, à procéder à une recherche des antériorités destructrices
de la nouveauté ou pouvant affecter l’activité inventive. La seconde, consacrée
par l’ABR-1999, privilégie l’examen de la régularité formelle de la demande
et aboutit à la délivrance quasi-automatique des brevets sous réserve d’unéventuel rejet fondé sur la contrariété de l’invention à l’ordre public.
L’art. 23 de l’ABR-2015 institue désormais un examen de fond des conditionsde brevetabilité, le rapport de recherche subséquent devant établir, outre lesconditions de forme, les critères de fond de la brevetabilité. Il s’agit là d’une
innovation majeure qui contribue à la crédibilisation des brevets d’invention
délivrés par l’OAPI.
Voir, sur la question, CISSOKO (I.), Les dangers de la divulgation del’invention, la perte de la nouveauté : Revue africaine de la propriété
intellectuelle, Collection OAPI, octobre 2008, pp. 25 et s.

B. La preuve du défaut de nouveauté
La question de la preuve du défaut de nouveautérevêt deux aspects qui ont nourri les débats devant lesjuges d’appel.
Le premier aspect est relatif à la charge de la preuve.
Qui, du titulaire ou du demandeur en annulation dubrevet d’invention, doit rapporter la preuve de l’absence
de nouveauté? La coopérative AL ITIHAD reprochait
au premier juge d’avoir fait reposer la charge de lapreuve sur elle plutôt que sur l’inventeur en se fondant
sur les dispositions de l’article 43 de l’Accord sur les
ADPIC, lesquelles semblent manifestement hors depropos, l’administration de la preuve en cette matièreétant gouvernée par le droit commun. Doctrine etjurisprudence s’accordent, en effet, pour dire que
lorsqu’un brevet est délivré par l’office de propriété
industrielle, sa validité ne peut être affectée que si ledemandeur en annulation rapporte la preuve que ce titre
ne remplit pas telle ou telle condition de validité, la foiétant due au titre101. Cette orientation paraît d’ailleurs
logique car lorsque le contentieux se lie sur la question
de nouveauté, comme en espèce, le demandeur enannulation cherche à mettre la nouveauté en échec
en démontrant que l’invention litigieuse est comprisedans l’état de la technique; autrement dit, qu’elleétait accessible au public avant la date du dépôt de la
demande ou de priorité. Il n’appartenait donc pas au
titulaire, comme l’a soutenu à tort la société AL ATIHAD,
de prouver que le brevet était valable, bien qu’il soit
acquis que ce dernier pouvait être amené à démontrer
l’inaptitude des moyens invoqués à mettre en cause lanouveauté dont est présumée jouir son invention.

Chapitre 2 – Brevets d’invention

à l’instance, contestant la nouveauté du procédé defabrication de pain de sucre objet du brevet délivré parl’OAPI au profit de A.A.

Le second aspect est inhérent aux modalités depreuve. Comment prouver le défaut de nouveautéd’une invention? À la vérité, la preuve de l’absence
de nouveauté se réduit à la démonstration, par ledemandeur en annulation, de l’existence dans l’état dela technique d’une antériorité susceptible d’affecter
la nouveauté de l’invention revendiquée. C’est direque celui qui invoque le défaut de nouveauté est tenu
de soumettre à l’appréciation souveraine du jugeles éléments pertinents de l’état de la technique qui
constitue “le socle de référence par comparaison duquella conformité de l’invention à l’exigence légale sera
vérifiée”102. C’est précisément l’obstacle majeur auquels’est heurtée la société AL ITIHAD qui, devant les juges
ayant successivement connu ce différend, s’est contentéed’affirmer, sans pouvoir rétablir la réalité de l’antériorité
invoquée, à savoir son procédé de fabrication de painde sucre. En l’absence de cette preuve décisive, lademande en annulation du brevet délivré à A.A était
naturellement vouée à l’échec. Ne serait-ce qu’à ce titre,la décision rapportée est conforme au droit positif. Elles’inscrit d’ailleurs dans le sillage de la jurisprudence dela cour d’appel de Paris qui pose de façon constante quele demandeur ne peut se borner à alléguer la nullité

101
102

Passa (J), Droit de la propriété industrielle, Tome 2, L.G.D.J 2013, p.453; Voir,dans le même sens, Raynard (J), Py (E), Tréfigny (P), Droit de la propriété
industrielle, Lexis Nexis, Paris, pp. 66 et s.
Raynard (J), Py (E), Tréfigny (P), n 7.
189

d’un brevet d’invention sans rien prouver103 et qu’uneantériorité n’est susceptible de détruire la nouveautéd’une invention que si elle est certaine à la fois quant à
son contenu et quant à sa date104. Cette juridiction a pu
en outre décider, dans une autre espèce, que l’existenced’un doute sur la validité du brevet, en raison notammentd’une absence de certitude sur la date, le contenu ou laportée d’une antériorité invoquée par le demandeur enannulation exclut l’annulation du brevet et profite ainsi
au titulaire105. C’est donc à bon droit que la cour d’appelde Niamey a pu relever : “Attendu que la coopérative
AL ITIHAD ne produit pas aux débats sa technique defabrication du pain de sucre… qu’en l’absence de cetélément de comparaison, la cour ne peut dénier à A.A
d’avoir fait une invention nouvelle”. La solution ainsi
dégagée devrait naturellement avoir un retentissement
sur la problématique de la légalité de l’octroi du bénéfice
de l’exception de possession personnelle antérieure à lasusdite société.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

II. L’exception de possession personnelle antérieure

190

L’exception de possession personnelle antérieure,encore désignée sous l’expression générique “exception
concernant l’utilisation antérieure”106, est prévue àl’article 8, alinéa 1.d), de l’ABR-1999107. Historiquement,la possession personnelle antérieure est perçue
comme un correctif à la règle du premier déposanten ce sens qu’elle privilégie le premier inventeur non
déposant en lui conférant, sous certaines conditions,
un droit d’exploitation sur l’invention objet d’un
brevet ultérieur délivré au profit d’un tiers. En droit
des brevets, une personne est habilitée à invoquerl’exception de possession personnelle antérieure d’une
invention lorsque, sans l’avoir brevetée, elle la détientsecrètement depuis une date antérieure au dépôt de la
demande par un tiers portant sur la même invention108.
Cette exception a pour finalité la recherche d’un justeéquilibre entre les intérêts du titulaire du brevet et ceuxde l’utilisateur antérieur qui pourrait avoir investi desressources économiques, physiques et intellectuelles
dans le cadre de l’utilisation de l’invention brevetée.
La demande subsidiaire de la coopérative AL ITIHAD
qui a reçu un écho favorable auprès des juges d’appels’inscrit dans cette dynamique. Toutefois, la démarchede ces magistrats est discutable sur le double plan des

103
104
105
106

107

108

CA Paris, 12 oct. 2001, PIBD 2002, n° 733, I.
CA Paris, 9 févr. 2001, PIBD 2001, n° 725, III, 389.
CA Paris, 29 nov. 1995, PIBD 1996 n° 605, III, 89; CA Paris, 28 mai 1999, PIBD
1999, n° 687, III, 501; voir, dans le même sens : Cass. Com., 18 mai 1999,
Pourvoi n° 97 – 17461, PIBD 1999, n° 686, III, 473.
Cette exception est consacrée par plusieurs systèmes juridiques sousdes appellations diverses. L’expression générique “exception concernant
l’utilisation antérieure” est celle utilisée au sein de l’OMPI. Pour de plus
amples informations sur la question, il convient de se référer aux résultats
des travaux issus de la trente-deuxième session du Comité permanent dudroit des brevets disponibles à l’adresse suivante : https://www.wipo.int_
edocs_mdocs_scp_32_3.
Aux termes de cette disposition, “Les droits conférés au brevet ne s’étendentpas : aux actes effectués par toute personne qui, de bonne foi à la date dudépôt ou, lorsqu’une priorité est revendiquée, à la date de priorité de la
demande sur la base de laquelle le brevet est délivré et sur le territoire d’un
État membre, utilisait l’invention ou faisait des préparatifs effectifs et sérieux
pour l’utiliser, dans la mesure où ces actes ne diffèrent pas, dans leur nature
et leur finalité, de l’utilisation antérieure effective ou envisagée”.
CHAVANNE (A.) et BURST (J.-J.), n.1, pp. 282 et s.

conditions d’octroi de cette mesure de faveur (A) et deseffets qui y sont attachés (B).
A. Les conditions de l’exception de possession personnelle
antérieure
Pour faire jouer l’exception de possession personnelle
antérieure, le demandeur doit prouver sa possession del’invention revendiquée (1) et sa bonne foi (2).
1. La possession de l’invention revendiquée
Le bénéfice de l’exception de possession personnelle
antérieure est subordonné à la preuve préalable parle demandeur de la possession réelle de l’invention
objet du brevet revendiqué avant la date de dépôt dela demande ou de priorité. Il ne saurait d’ailleurs enêtre autrement puisque l’on ne peut raisonnablement
prétendre détenir une technologie fruit d’une activité
inventive dont on ignore la teneur. La jurisprudence
exige l’identité de la possession invoquée avec latechnique couverte par le brevet et la connaissancecomplète par le demandeur de tous les éléments
constitutifs de l’invention objet du brevet avant sa datede dépôt109. L’attribution de la charge de la preuve est
gouvernée par le droit commun, la possession étant
un fait juridique dont la preuve doit être rapportéepar celui qui l’invoque. Or, cette preuve ne semble
pas avoir été formellement rapportée dans l’espèce
commentée, la société AL ITIHAD s’étant bornéeà alléguer la possession antérieure sans toutefois
produire son procédé de fabrication du pain de sucre,
ou tout autre élément pertinent, ce qui a mis lesjuges dans l’impossibilité de vérifier si l’objet de lapossession correspondait à l’invention couverte parle brevet délivré à A.A. La société demanderesse n’a
pas non plus offert de prouver qu’elle avait une pleine
connaissance de la technique de fabrication du painde sucre dont la paternité est officiellement attribuée
à A.A. Cette exigence fondamentale est réaffirmée
par la doctrine spécialisée. Dans leur ouvrage précité,
Albert Chavanne et Jean-Jacques Burst soulignent, en
effet, que le possesseur ne peut valablement opposerson droit d’exploitation au propriétaire du brevet que
si la possession porte sur la technique même couverte
par le brevet, si elle est restée secrète et réalisée
antérieurement au jour du dépôt ou de priorité dubrevet. L’on peut dans ces conditions légitimement
douter de la pertinence des raisons qui ont conduit lesjuges à donner plein effet à une possession non établie.
2. La bonne foi du possesseur
La bonne foi joue un rôle central dans l’attributiondu bénéfice de l’exception de possession personnelle
antérieure en ce que son absence permet d’exclure
du cercle des bénéficiaires toute personne qui,bien que justifiant d’une possession remplissantles caractéristiques de certitude et d’identité, aeu connaissance de l’invention objet du brevet
illégitimement c’est-à-dire par fraude, vol d’informations
ou violation d’une obligation de confidentialité. La
question de la bonne foi du possesseur antérieur
109

CA Paris, 11 janvier 2006, PIBD 2006, 825, III B-155; TGI Paris,
4 septembre 2001, PIBD 2002, 739, III, 156.

Dans la première approche, l’exception de possession
personnelle antérieure remplit pleinement son but
historique qui est de protéger les intérêts du premierinventeur qui n’avait pas déposé de brevet sur son
invention mais qui l’exploitait avant la date de dépôt dela même invention par un tiers. C’est sans doute danscette posture que s’est placée la société AL ITIHAD qui a
prétendu fabriquer le pain de sucre “depuis sa créationen 2001 selon les techniques éprouvées depuis la nuitdes temps”, mettant ainsi en avant l’antériorité de sa
possession par rapport à la date de dépôt du brevet par
A.A, à savoir le 12 avril 2001. Il importe de préciser quela société AL ITIHAD a reçu l’agrément le 16 février 2001,
date qui correspondrait à celle du début de l’exploitation
du procédé litigieux, surtout si l’on s’en tient auprécédent conflit ayant opposé les deux coopératives
concurrentes au sujet de la même invention. La question
que l’on pourrait se poser à ce stade est celle de savoir
si cette prétendue possession antérieure était faite
de bonne foi. Les juges d’appel y ont répondu parl’affirmative au visa de l’article 8 de l’ABR-1999 précité,sans que la preuve de la bonne foi ait été formellement
rapportée par la société AL ITIHAD. Une telle démarche
est critiquable en ce qu’elle pourrait suggérer uneinterprétation extensive de cette disposition légale
qui consacrerait alors une présomption de bonne foi
au profit du possesseur antérieur qui prétend avoir
réalisé l’invention.
Dans la seconde approche, l’exception profite à ceux qui,sans avoir réalisé l’opération inventive, ont bénéficié
légitimement des informations communiquées parleur auteur. Ici la question centrale est liée au caractère
légitime de la possession des informations par cettecatégorie de personnes. Il pourrait s’agir notamment deshéritiers du premier inventeur ou de ses ayants cause.
C’est cette orientation que le sieur A.A a voulu donneraux débats, en évoquant les conditions peu orthodoxes
dans lesquelles la société AL ITIHAD aurait eu
connaissance du procédé de fabrication du pain de sucre
litigieux notamment par l’entremise des ses ex-employés
débauchés par elle. Ce phénomène, qui s’apparente dureste à un cas classique de concurrence déloyale110, esttrès courant dans le monde des affaires, s’agissant desentreprises relevant du même secteur d’activités, enl’espèce la fabrication du pain de sucre. En toute logique,le bénéfice de l’exception de possession personnelle
devrait être exclu dans ce cas en raison des relations detravail qui auraient existé entre A.A et ses ex-employés.
Dans une affaire similaire, la cour d’appel de Paris aécarté l’exception pour absence de bonne foi au motif
que la connaissance que les possesseurs avaient deséléments du savoir-faire résultait d’un contrat de licenceavec le breveté ultérieur, leur imposant une obligationde confidentialité.

110

Voir art. 7 de l’annexe VIII de l’AB-2015 qui vise la concurrence déloyale pardésorganisation de l’entreprise rivale.

B. Les effets de l’exception de possession personnelle
antérieure
L’exception de possession personnelle antérieure confère
au bénéficiaire le droit d’exploiter l’invention (1). Ce droit
d’exploitation a cependant une portée limitée (2).
1. Le droit d’exploiter l’invention
La possession personnelle antérieure a pour effet deconférer à son titulaire le droit d’exploiter l’invention
en dépit de l’existence d’un brevet pris par un tiers. Ellepermet ainsi à son bénéficiaire d’entrer dans la sphère deprotection du titulaire du brevet sans que celui-ci puisse
lui opposer son droit exclusif. La décision rapportée est
une illustration de la mise en œuvre de cette exception
au droit exclusif du breveté consacrée par l’article 8
de l’ABR-1999. Les juges d’appel ont estimé que sieur
A.A ne peut interdire à la coopérative AL ITIHAD et à
ses membres d’exploiter son procédé de fabrication
du pain de sucre malgré le brevet dont il se prévaut. Àl’analyse, la reconnaissance d’un droit d’exploitation à
AL ITIHAD paraît mitigée, du moins si l’on s’en tient aux
objections précédemment formulées sur la réalité de lapossession alléguée par ladite coopérative, lesquelles
devraient en toute logique conduire à l’exclusion de cettemesure de faveur. L’extension de ce droit aux membresde la coopérative paraît tout ausssi problématique pourdeux raisons essentielles. La première est liée au statut
des personnes bénéficiaires de l’exception. En effet, lesmembres, pris individuellement, sont des personnes
physiques différentes de la coopérative personne
morale dont ils relèvent, laquelle a une personnalité
juridique propre. La seconde est relative au caractère
personnel du droit d’exploitation qui est, en principe
intransmissible, le bénéficiaire n’étant pas habilité à lecéder ni à concéder des licences aux tiers111. L’ABR-1999
encadre d’ailleurs la transmission de ces prérogatives
exceptionnelles à l’article 8, alinéa 2, in fine qui
dispose : “Le droit de l’utilisateur visé au sous-alinéa 1)d)ne peut être transféré ou dévolu qu’avec l’entrepriseou la société ou la partie de l’entreprise ou de la société
dans laquelle ont eu lieu l’utilisation ou les préparatifs envue de l’utilisation”.

Chapitre 2 – Brevets d’invention

pourrait être abordée suivant deux approches. En effet,
le possesseur pourrait avoir réalisé lui-même l’invention
ou l’avoir simplement reçue du premier inventeur.

2. Un droit d’exploitation limité
Le droit d’exploiter l’invention objet d’un brevet
ultérieur conféré à titre exceptionnel au possesseur
antérieur a une portée limitée étant donné que les actes
d’exploitation y relatifs sont strictements circonscrits parla loi qui exclut certains actes du champ de l’exception.
L’article 8, alinéa 1)d), de l’annexe I de l’ABR-1999
précité sous l’empire duquel la décision rapportéea été rendue précise en ce sens que la possession
personnelle antérieure n’opère que dans la mesureoù les actes ne diffèrent pas, dans leur nature et leurfinalité, de l’utilisation antérieure effective ou envisagée.
En vertu de cette disposition légale, le bénéficiaire del’exception de possession personnelle antérieure nepeut exploiter l’invention brevetée que dans la mesure
et telle qu’il l’utilisait avant la date de dépôt de la
demande par le titulaire du droit, sans aucune possibilité
111

Voir, sur le caractère personnel de la possession, SCHMIDT-SZALEWKI (J) et
PIERRE (J-L), n.1, pp.37 et s.
191

d’utilisations nouvelles. Bien que la question n’ait pas
été formellement posée dans cette affaire, il importe del’évoquer dans l’optique de mettre en relief l’évolution
consécutive à la récente révision de l’ABR-1999.
L’article 7.e) de l’ABR-2015 dispose en effet : “Les droits
conférés par le brevet ne s’étendent pas… aux actes
effectués par toute personne qui, de bonne foi, à la datedu dépôt ou, lorsqu’une priorité est revendiquée, à ladate de la priorité de la demande sur la base de laquellele brevet est délivré et sur le territoire d’un État membre,était en possession de l’invention”. Cette nouvelleorientation paraît plus libérale en ce qu’elle offre aupossesseur antérieur une large marge de manœuvre
dans l’exploitation de l’invention objet du brevet sousréserve de l’interdiction qui lui est faite de transférer son
droit aux tiers sans son entreprise.

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Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

192

194

B.
Reproduction servile d’une marque de service
sur un site Web – Contrefaçon – Identité designes et services – Besoin de preuve du risquede confusion (non)196
C.
Marques – Action en déchéance pour défaut
d’exploitation – Notion d’usage sérieux –Portée territoriale
199
D.
Marque – Enregistrement - Modification
de l’objet de l’enregistrement – Action
en contrefaçon – Relaxe du prévenu –Demande reconventionnelle en réparation– Évaluation du préjudice – Dommages –Intérêts forfaitaires
202
E.
Action en contrefaçon et concurrence déloyale– Rejet de l’opposition à l’enregistrement de lamarque contrefaisante – OAPI – Appréciation
par les tribunaux de l’ordre judiciaire
207
F.
Dépôt frauduleux d’une marque – Preuve del’usage antérieur – Mauvaise foi – Nullité –Dommages – Intérêts
209
G.
Marque – Nullité du certificat d’enregistrement– Appréciation du droit antérieur – Cession demarque – Opposabilité – Autorité régionale desdécisions judiciaires définitives
211
H.
Marque – Contrefaçon - Imitation frauduleuse– Contrefaçon par usage – Provision – Manqueà gagner - Préjudice commercial – Profit réalisé– Préjudice ressenti – Devoir de prudence –Contrat de licence214
I.
Saisie-contrefaçon – Nullité de plein droit –Immutabilité du cadre du procès – Préjudice né
de la saisie – Appréciation du juge – Recherchede la mauvaise foi – Réparation – Demandereconventionnelle relative à la propriété de lamarque – Recevabilité
220

J.
Saisie-contrefaçon – Saisie pratiquée àl’enquête – Ordonnance présidentielle
préalable – Validité de la saisie – Nullité duprocès-verbal d’enquête
223
K.
Marques – Risque de confusion – Saisie réelle
des marchandises arguées de contrefaçon –Cantonnement à quelques échantillons
226
L.
Marque – Revendication du droit de priorité– Restauration de la priorité – Violation dudroit antérieur
230
M.
Usage d’une marque comme nom de domainede l’Internet – Concurrence déloyale –Mauvaise foi – Détermination de l’auteur del’acte concurrentiel
233
N.
Revendication de la propriété d’une marque –Compétence exclusive de l’OAPI – Compétence
du tribunal civil – Validité de l’enregistrementd’une marque – Violation d’un droit antérieur– Sanction : nullité
237

Chapitre 3 – Marques de Chapter
produits3ou– Trademarks
de services

A.
Marques – Opposition à l’enregistrementd’une marque postérieure – Produits
pharmaceutiques – Degré d’attentionélevé des consommateurs – Risque deconfusion (non)O.
Marques – Opposition à l‘enregistrementd’une marque postérieure – Réitération
de l’opposition – Similarité des produits
visés – Risque de confusion résultant d’une
marque antérieure239
P.
Marque – Respect de la procédure
d’homologation obligatoire des produits
phytosanitaires – Fait justificatif– Contrefaçon

241

Q.
Appréciation du risque de confusion – Marquecomplexe – Théorie du tout indivisible –Organes administratifs OAPI – Tribunaux despays membres
244
R.
Saisie conservatoire – Distraction de la marque– Cessionnaire – Preuve de la propriété de lamarque – Validité de la cession
247
S.
Saisie conservatoire de marque – Saisissabilitéde la marque – Fondement juridique –Modalités – Lieu de la saisie
250

193

Chapitre 3
Marques de produits
ou de services
A. Marques – Opposition àl’enregistrement d’une
marque postérieure – Produits
pharmaceutiques – Degré d’attentionélevé des consommateurs – Risque deconfusion (non)Le degré d’attention du consommateur de produits
pharmaceutiques est élevé, ce qui exclut tout risquede confusion entre les marques “BRONCHOKOD” et“BRONCHOBOS” dès lors que le préfixe “BRONCHO” estsimplement indicateur de la destination thérapeutiquedes produits servant au traitement des pathologies
respiratoires et bronchiques.
Commission supérieure de recours auprès de l’OAPI,
Décision n° 00157 du 26 avril 2012, SOCIÉTÉ BOSNALIJEKPHARMACEUTICAL AND CHEMICAL INDUSTRY c.
SOCIÉTÉ SANOFI-AVENTIS France
Observations :Le risque de confusion joue un rôle essentiel en droit desmarques. C’est lui qui donne la mesure de la protection
en dehors des hypothèses où des signes identiquesdésignent des produits ou services identiques112.
L’article 6, alinéa 3, de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui,
Acte de Bamako du 14 décembre 2015, interdit en ce
sens, au titre des “droits conférés par l’enregistrement” :“a) la reproduction, l’usage ou l’apposition d’une marque,ainsi que l’usage d’une marque reproduite, pour desproduits ou services similaires à ceux désignés dansl’enregistrement”, et “b) l’imitation d’une marque etl’usage d’une marque imitée, pour des produits ou
services identiques ou similaires à ceux désignés dansl’enregistrement”, mais en précisant d’emblée que, dansles deux cas, la protection est subordonnée à l’existenced’un “risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public”.
Le critère se retrouve dans l’article 3.a) qui prohibel’enregistrement d’une marque qui “ressemble” à une
marque antérieure “au point de comporter un risquede tromperie ou de confusion”. Il en résulte que “lesconditions auxquelles est soumise l’antériorité et, parvoie de conséquence, les conditions de l’opposition ou del’action en nullité de la marque seconde sont identiques àcelles de l’action en contrefaçon”113.

112
113

194

RAYNARD (J.), PY (E.) et TREFIGNY (P.), Droit de la propriété industrielle, Paris(LexisNexis), 2016, n° 457 à 461.
DURRANDE (S.), Juriscl. Marques – Dessins et Modèles, Fasc. 7110, 2010, n° 15.
Voir en ce sens, en droit de l’Union européenne, Cour de justice de l’Union
européenne, Arrêt du 20 mars 1993, LTJ Diffusion SA v. Sadas Vertbaudet SA,
C-291/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:169, point 41.

Faits : Dans la décision commentée, le litige, qui naîtd’une opposition, permet de mieux cerner le concept de“consommateur d’attention moyenne” qui est au cœur durisque de confusion. La société Sanofi-Aventis France est
titulaire de la marque “BRONCHOKOD” déposée en 1989
dans la classe 5. Elle a fait opposition à l’enregistrement
de la marque “BRONCHOBOS” déposée en 2008 par lasociété Bosnalijek Pharmaceutical and Chemical Industry
pour les produits de la même classe. Le directeur général
de l’OAPI a rejeté l’opposition au motif que les marquesdes deux titulaires peuvent coexister sans risque deconfusion. La société Sanofi-Aventis France a saisi la
Commission supérieure de recours, estimant qu’il existe
une similitude conceptuelle, visuelle et phonétique entre
ces deux marques nominatives et verbales.
Raisonnement : Elle n’est pas davantage entendue
par la Commission. Celle-ci part de l’idée que lerisque de confusion doit être apprécié par référence
au “consommateur moyen”, qu’elle définit commeune “personne lettrée pouvant noter les différences
existantes et ayant un niveau de discernement telque qualifié dans l’espace OAPI”. Elle estime que ce
consommateur est d’autant plus à même d’identifier lesdifférences entre les marques en cause que les produits
qu’elles visent sont des “produits pharmaceutiques
connus du milieu médical et délivrés sur conseil
du médecin ou du pharmacien”. De plus, le préfixe
“BRONCHO”, qui est “simplement indicateur de ladestination thérapeutique des produits servant au
traitement des pathologies respiratoires et bronchiques”,
est “descriptif et relève du domaine commun”. Or il est
de principe que “si une marque est constituée à partird’un radical faisant partie du dictionnaire ou d’un terme
faiblement distinctif en raison de la multiplicité desmarques qui l’emploient, sa protection est plus limitée”.
En l’espèce, celle du demandeur ne peut valablement
fonder l’opposition dès lors que les radicaux “KOD”
et “BOS” qui sont adjoints au préfixe “BRONCHO” nepeuvent être confondus, “étant donné que leur sonorité
est plus éloignée sur le plan phonétique”, en sorte qu’il
n’existe “aucune similitude entre les deux marques
ni de risque de confusion pour le consommateurd’attention moyenne.”
Le raisonnement comporte quelques légères
failles. Ainsi, il est un peu surprenant de définir le“consommateur moyen” (la Commission supérieurede recours utilise ensuite l’expression plus orthodoxe
de “consommateur d’attention moyenne”) comme une“personne lettrée”, ce qui peut évoquer un rapport àla littérature qui est évidemment hors de propos. On
se perd, par ailleurs, en conjectures sur le sens de laPour le reste, la démonstration emporte la conviction.
La Commission supérieure de recours a raison d’évaluer
le risque de confusion par rapport au standard duconsommateur d’attention moyenne. Elle a raison delier l’étendue de la protection de la marque antérieureà son caractère plus ou moins distinctif et d’en déduireque cette protection est plus limitée dans un cas
comme celui de l’espèce où le radical “BRONCHO” estcouramment utilisé pour des médicaments115. Elle a,enfin et surtout, raison de considérer que le degréd’attention du consommateur, qui varie selon la nature
des produits couverts par les marques, est plus élevé
pour des produits pharmaceutiques dont elle prendsoin de relever qu’ils sont “connus du milieu médical
et délivrés sur conseil du médecin ou du pharmacien”.
Peut-être aurait-il été judicieux de mieux cerner le public
pertinent, par exemple en se référant à la jurisprudence
du Tribunal de l’Union européenne selon laquelle“lorsque les produits en cause sont des médicaments
ou des produits pharmaceutiques, le public pertinent
est constitué, d’une part, des professionnels de lamédecine et, d’autre part, des patients en tant que
consommateurs finaux desdits produits”116, étant précisé
que les premiers font preuve forcément d’un “niveauélevé d’attention” et que les patients-consommateurs
eux-mêmes “sont censés être raisonnablement bien
informés, attentifs et avisés, dès lors que ces produits
affectent leur état de santé”, qu’ils soient ou nonprescrits sur ordonnance117.
On peut trouver la solution sévère au regard du fait queles deux marques nominales comportaient chacune
10 lettres en 3 syllabes et que 8 de ces lettres étaient
communes et distribuées dans le même ordre. Maisce constat statistique ne pouvait empêcher de tirer lesconséquences des principes applicables.
On rapprochera la décision de deux arrêts rendus par
le Tribunal de l’Union européenne concernant desmarques couvrant des produits pharmaceutiques,
114
115
116
117

Voir par ex., dans une espèce qui sera évoquée plus loin, Tribunal de l’Union
européenne, Arrêt du 20 septembre 2018, Kwizda Holding GmbH c. Office de l’Union
européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle, T266/17, ECLI:EU:T:2018:569, point 56.
Voir en ce sens, visant spécialement “l’usage de racines descriptives (…) dansdomaine pharmaceutique”, FOLLIARD-MONGUIRAL (A.), Juriscl. MarquesDessins et Modèles, Fasc. 7610-1, 2019, n° 277.
Kwizda Holding GmbH c. Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété
intellectuelle, n.3, point 25.
Ibid., point 26.

qui concluent également, l’un et l’autre, au rejet del’opposition malgré les similitudes entre les signes enconflit. Dans l’affaire Kwizda, déjà évoquée, la marquequerellée était le signe verbal UROAKUT. Elle avait été
déposée pour des produits de la classe 5 ainsi décrits“Compléments alimentaires et préparations diététiques;préparations et articles médicaux et vétérinaires”.
L’opposition était formée par le titulaire de marques
figuratives UroCys désignant les produits suivants :“Substances diététiques et compléments alimentaires
à usage médical, autres que pour le traitement ou laprévention de la goutte”. Après avoir soigneusement
analysé la similitude existant entre les deux marques,le Tribunal conclut que “les différences visuelle,
phonétique et conceptuelle portant sur les éléments
supplémentaires ’akut‘ et ’cys‘ des signes en conflit nesont pas négligeables dans l’impression globale dessignes pour le public pertinent”, et qu’ils “compensent
les similitudes visuelle”, phonétique et conceptuelle,lesquelles résultent uniquement de la présence del’élément commun “uro” et de l’idée à laquelle il renvoie,
et ce d’autant plus que le public pertinent fera preuved’un niveau d’attention accru118, d’où il résulte queces signes “sont globalement différents dans leurimpression d’ensemble pour le public pertinent”119.
La plupart des observations formulées sur le préfixe
“uro”, qui renvoie au domaine de l’urologie, pourraientêtre transposées au préfixe “broncho” qui renvoie au
domaine de la pneumologie.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

précision selon laquelle ce consommateur a “un niveau
de discernement tel que qualifié dans l’espace OAPI”.
On ne voit pas non plus l’intérêt qu’il pouvait y avoir
à relever une “prolifération de marques de produits
pharmaceutiques de la classe 5 sur le marché”, vu que
ce n’est pas le marché des produits pharmaceutiquesen général qui est ici pertinent mais celui des produits
destinés aux affections des voies respiratoires.
Enfin, conclure qu’il n’existe “aucune similitude”
entre les signes en conflit peut paraître excessif, et il
aurait sans doute été plus rigoureux de parler d’une“similitude moyenne”, expression que l’on retrouve
souvent dans la jurisprudence européenne114, ou de“similitude faible”.

Dans la seconde affaire120, la marque querelléeétait le signe verbal XENASA, couvrant les produits
suivants : “Produits pharmaceutiques, à savoir pourle diagnostic, la prévention et/ou le traitementd’affections et troubles gastro-intestinaux; produits
pharmaceutiques pour le traitement de l’inflammation
du tractus gastro-intestinal; substances diététiquesà usage médical, à savoir pour le diagnostic, laprévention et/ou le traitement des affections et troubles
gastro-intestinaux”. L’opposition était fondée sur lamarque de l’Union européenne verbale antérieure
PENTASA, désignant des “produits et substances
pharmaceutiques”. Là encore, le Tribunal, après avoir
rappelé le principe selon lequel les consommateurs sontsusceptibles de faire preuve d’un degré d’attention élevé
lors de la prescription de produits pharmaceutiques121,écarte le risque de confusion, quel que soit le niveaud’attention des consommateurs finals, qu’ils perçoivent
ou non le suffixe commun “asa” des marques en conflit
comme une référence au principe actif “5-asa” ou“mésalazine” et qu’ils identifient ou non les éléments
verbaux “penta” et “xen” comme des références au mot
grec “xenos” ou au préfixe d’origine grecque “penta”122.
Pour bien comprendre le raisonnement, il faut savoir
que l’acide 5-aminosalicylique ou 5-ASA (pentasa),également connu sous les noms de mésalazine, est
118
119
120
121
122

Ibid., point 81.
Ibid., point 82.
Tribunal de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 19 juin 2018, Tillots Pharma AG
c. Office de l’Union européenne pour la propriété intellectuelle, T-362/16,
ECLI:EU:T:2018:354.
Ibid., point 23.
Ibid., points 68 à 70.
195

un anti-inflammatoire utilisé pour traiter certaines
maladies inflammatoires du côlon.
André Lucas

B. Reproduction servile d’une marque deservice sur un site Web – Contrefaçon– Identité de signes et services– Besoin de preuve du risque deconfusion (non)La contrefaçon par reproduction servile d’une marquesur une page Web appartenant au contrefacteur est
avérée dès l’instant où la victime établit la preuve dela validité de son droit exclusif et la simple reprise à
l’identique de son signe distinctif pour accompagner
des services identiques. En pareil cas, la victime est
dispensée de la charge de la preuve d’un risque deconfusion dans l’esprit du public, lequel risque reste
toujours présumé.

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Tribunal de grande instance du Wouri (Douala),Jugement civil n° 886/civ du 5 décembre 2016, FOREST
STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL c. STÉ BORIS BOIS SARL

196

Observations :Le XXIe siècle est dominé par la recrudescence deséchanges commerciaux via le cyberespace, offrantl’avantage de rationaliser le coût de production en
touchant au gré d’un clic, les marchés lointains. Cecin’est pas sans conséquences ravageuses pour lestitulaires d’actifs de propriété industrielle consistantdans des marques. Dans les pays membres de l’OAPI, desbatailles juridiques opposent entre eux ces néo-acteurséconomiques, nouveaux “titans” de l’e-commerce,ballotés entre le monopole que confère le droit sur lamarque, d’un côté, et l’exploitation économique de la
fluidité du world wide Web, de l’autre123. Le jugement
dont commentaire est fait nous ouvre une fenêtre
sur cette réalité.
Faits : En l’espèce, l’organisation non gouvernementale
internationale FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL (FSC)était propriétaire d’un portefeuille comprenant quatre
marques de produits et de services, à l’intérieur duquel
se trouvaient les marques FSC + LOGO n° 68286 et FSC+ LOGO n° 68289, régulièrement enregistrées à l’OAPI.
Bien que ces enregistrements restaient d’actualité, l’ONG
sus-identifiée fera le constat de l’utilisation à des finscommerciales, de ses marques FSC numérotées 68286
et 68289 par apposition de ces actifs sur la page Webd’accueil de la société BORIS BOIS dont le siège social est
Douala. Pour préserver ses droits dans la perspectived’une éventuelle action en contrefaçon, l’ONG
requérante va solliciter et obtenir du juge des requêtes
du tribunal de première instance de Douala-Bonanjo
une autorisation de procéder à la description détailléede la page Web de la société requise. Un peu plus tard, leprocès-verbal de description du 8 avril 2016 sera dressé,
123

ANCEL (M.-E.), Un an de droit international privé du commerce électronique :Communication Commerce électronique, (n° 1, 2012), pp. 26 à 35.

permettant alors à l’ONG demanderesse d’assigner lasociété BORIS BOIS, par devant le tribunal de grande
instance du Wouri (Douala), statuant en matière civile, àl’effet de mettre fin à cet usage illicite de ses marques, enobtenant du tribunal leur suppression sur le site Web dela société défenderesse.
Raisonnement : En dépit de la défaillance de la société
BORIS BOIS à comparaître à l’audience et faire valoir
ses prétentions, le tribunal saisi va examiner la cause aufond, en faisant droit à la demande initiale. En substanceet quoique l’activité reprochée s’effectue complètement
sur le cyberespace, le juge civil retient la contrefaçon par
reproduction servile des marques FSC numérotées 68286
et 68289 (section I), et ordonne par conséquent leursuppression sous astreinte sur la page Web de la société
défenderesse (section II).
I. Les conditions d’admission de la contrefaçon par
reproduction servile des signes
Le juge de la cause rappelle brièvement les conditions
d’admission de la contrefaçon par reproduction servile
d’une marque (A), ceci indifféremment du milieu où
prend forme l’activité incriminée (B).
A. Les conditions préalables à l’atteinte aux droits
Le tribunal de grande instance exige de celui qui
agit en contrefaçon la preuve de son titre au jour del’introduction de l’instance. Aussi, la victime doit faire
preuve de son appropriation antérieure du signe
contrefait, et que cette appropriation produit toujours
ses effets au jour du procès.
L’action en contrefaçon appartient au titulaire de droit,celui qui le premier en a effectué le dépôt. Le certificat
d’enregistrement est la preuve de l’appartenance dudroit délivré au déposant. En toute logique, c’est à lavictime de la contrefaçon de justifier son acquisition desdroits sur le signe contrefait. Le juge de l’espèce le relève
tout en constatant que l’ONG demanderesse a produit
aux débats des certificats constatant l’enregistrement àson profit des deux marques litigieuses.
Concomitamment à cela, la victime doit prouver que
depuis la date de l’enregistrement du signe, elle n’a pas
perdu la protection à elle conférée par le droit positif envigueur. En termes simples, elle devra prouver que ses
droits sur la marque n’ont pas été frappés de déchéance
à la suite d’un défaut de renouvellement, ou que son
enregistrement n’a pas été radié du fait d’un défaut
d’usage prolongé de la marque durant une période
continue de 5 ans avant la saisine du tribunal. Ces
préalables ont en effet été examinés par le juge qui a
relevé dans sa motivation la production par la victime decertificats de non-déchéance et de non-radiation de ses
actifs de propriété industrielle.
Ce n’est qu’après la satisfaction de ces éléments
préalables qu’il convient d’apprécier les conditions defond de l’admission de la contrefaçon stricto sensu sur leplan civil.

1. L’identité des produits et services
La contrefaçon de marque se définit en général comme
une imitation illicite ou frauduleuse, une reproduction
servile ou quasi servile de la marque d’autrui ou une
violation du contrat de licence ou une exploitation sanslicence de la marque d’autrui.
Dans le cas précis de la reproduction servile d’un signe,
encore appelée contrefaçon stricto sensu, il faut releverque c’est la forme la plus évidente et qui a d’ailleurs
longtemps été considérée comme synonyme de lacontrefaçon elle-même125. Gastombide relevait déjà, à
son temps, la dangerosité d’une pareille activité tournéevers le “détournement de la clientèle consommé aumoyen d’une reproduction”126. La contrefaçon servile
suppose une reproduction à l’identique du signe protégé
par le contrefacteur, sans aucune différence perceptible
avec le signe contrefaisant. En situation de différences
insignifiantes ou imperceptibles entre les signes enconflit, on parlera de reproduction quasi servile. Dansce dernier cas, la marque reproduite ne présente, parrapport à la marque originale, qu’une différence si
légère qu’elle laisse subsister l’apparence d’une identité
totale entre les marques127. L’identité des signes enconflit reste donc au centre de l’appréciation de lacontrefaçon servile.
Dans l’espèce commentée, deux signes faisaient l’objet
de reproduction servile, en l’occurrence les marques FSC+ LOGO n° 68286 et FSC + LOGO n° 68289, régulièrement
enregistrées à l’OAPI au profit de l’ONG demanderesse. Ilétait reproché à la société BORIS BOIS de les avoir repris
in extenso sans la moindre différence ni le moindre ajout,avant de l’éditer sur sa page Web.
L’ABR-1999 réserve au bénéficiaire de l’enregistrementd’une marque des prérogatives exclusives, pouvant êtreactionnées positivement ou négativement.
• Positivement, il est le seul habilité à user du signe
protégé, sous réserve de son autorisation à des tiers.
• Négativement, il dispose du monopole de l’interdiction
124
125

126
127

Voir art. 37 al. 1 let. a de l’annexe III de l’AB-1977. Voir aussi art. 57 al. 1 let. ade l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999.
MONTCHO AGBASSA (E.), Revue Congolaise de droit et des affaires, n° 27,
janvier-février-mars 2017, p. 13. Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché
intérieur (OHMI), Chambre des recours, 19 juin 2002, R 112003, Ltj Diffusion
ci Sadas SA : PIDB 2003, III, p. 341. Voir aussi MONELLI (Y.), Contrefaçon : del’appréciation de la contrefaçon : VIVANT (M.) (éd.), Les grands arrêts de la
propriété intellectuelle, Paris (Dalloz), 2003, p. 401.
GASTOMBIDE (A-J), Traité théorique et pratique des contrefaçons en tous
genres, Paris (Le Grand & Descaurier Éditeurs), 1837, p. 410.
MATHELY (P.), Le droit français des signes distinctifs, JNA, 1984, p. 291.

de l’usage du signe protégé. Ainsi, c’est l’usage mêmede son signe par la défenderesse à l’instance qui était
contesté, en l’absence d’une quelconque autorisation.
En faisant usage sur sa page Web des marques susviséespour commercialiser ses services de gestion forestière,
le tribunal saisi constate que la défenderesse a usurpé laréputation de l’ONG responsable de la gestion forestière,
se rendant par conséquent coupable d’une reproduction
à l’identique des signes distinctifs de la demanderesse.
En sus de l’identité des signes, la contrefaçon au sens
strict suppose également une identité des produits ou
services accompagnant la marque contrefaite128. C’est
la répercussion du principe de spécialité cher au droit
des marques qui postule que la protection accordée autitulaire du droit sur un signe utilisé au titre de marquene produit des effets que dans la mesure où ce signe
est utilisé en rapport avec les produits ou services
mentionnés dans le certificat d’enregistrement, ou desproduits ou services similaires. Les produits pertinents
sont ceux mentionnés dans l’acte d’enregistrement. Leur
comparaison doit alors être faite avec les produits ou
services accompagnant le signe contrefaisant.
En l’état de la cause, le juge caractérise, de manière sousentendue, l’identité des produits ou services en partantde la nature de l’activité exploitée par la défenderesse,
professionnelle à l’instar de l’ONG FOREST STEWARDSHIPCOUNCIL, dans la gestion forestière. Aussi le jugeconstate-t-il que les produits et services portés dansla demande d’enregistrement sont ceux portés aux
classes 16, 19, 20, 31 35, 40 et 42. Du rapprochement desactivités des parties, le juge a déduit une identité desproduits et services, susceptible d’alimenter un risque deconfusion dans l’esprit du public.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

B. Les conditions substantielles d’admission de lacontrefaçon par reproduction au sens du juge
Tout comme le législateur communautaire, le juge saisi
de la cause pose les conditions basiques d’admission dela contrefaçon par reproduction servile du signe124. Pourl’essentiel, le juge exige, non seulement une identité
entre les signes querellés, mais aussi une identité entre
les produits ou services (1) commercialisés sous lamarque. Par ailleurs, il doit y avoir possibilité d’un risquede confusion dans l’esprit du public (2).

2. L’existence d’un risque de confusion dans l’esprit dupublicCe critère est évidemment consubstantiel à l’idée decontrefaçon tout court, et par conséquent de contrefaçon
servile. En d’autres termes, la contrefaçon n’est blâmableque dans la mesure où elle est susceptible de tromper
le public sur l’identité d’origine des produits ou services.
Le risque de confusion doit être apprécié par le juge. Il
importe peu que la confusion ait effectivement été crééedans l’esprit du public, le droit réprime la probabilité durisque de confusion, qu’elle soit faible ou forte.
En droit OAPI, l’existence d’un risque de confusion est
présumée en cas d’usage d’un signe identique pourdes produits et services identiques129. Cette disposition
exonère la victime de la contrefaçon d’avoir à prouver
l’existence du risque de confusion en cas de contrefaçon
stricto sensu130. Dans tous les cas, ce risque de confusion
doit exister dans l’esprit du public pertinent, en prenant
en considération son degré d’attention.

128
129
130

Cf. Décision n° 0069/OAPI/DG/SCAJ du directeur général de l’OAPI portantradiation de l’enregistrement de la marque “TUDOR”, n° 40059.
Voir art. 7 al. 2 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999.
Décision n° 100/OAPI/DG/DGA/DAJ/SAJ du directeur général de l’OAPI
portant radiation de l’enregistrement de la marque “ITEL Logo”, n° 73235.
197

À bon droit, le juge civil a conclu, aux termes del’examen des pièces et des preuves versées au dossier,à l’existence d’un risque de confusion dans l’esprit dupublic ciblé par les parties litigantes lorsqu’il conclut que“la défenderesse a illégalement utilisé des sigles de la
demanderesse sur ses produits de manière à créer une
confusion dans l’esprit du public”. On voit très bien qu’à
la réalité, il a fait bon usage des dispositions de l’article 7,
alinéa 2, de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui, en faisantjouer à la faveur de la victime de la contrefaçon servile laprésomption de confusion.
II. La sanction de la contrefaçon par reproduction
servile des marques querellées
Le juge sanctionne, en réponse à la demande initiale,la reproduction servile de la marque par la partie
défenderesse, en enjoignant à cette dernière la
suppression sur son site Web du signe contrefait (A).
Cette décision n’est pas sans susciter critiques etobservations quant à la compétence matérielle du juge
civil saisi (B).

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

A. La suppression des signes contrefaits sur la page Web
du défendeur : une sanction assez douceLe panier des sanctions civiles à la contrefaçon desmarques est assez fourni, offrant des mesures idoines àla mesure des récriminations faites aux contrefacteurs.
Aux rangs des sanctions les plus prononcées, on
distingue l’allocation des dommages et intérêts à lavictime, diverses injonctions faites à l’auteur de cesser
l’activité illégale, la publication de la décision rendue, ladestruction des produits commercialisés sous la marquecontrefaisante, les mesures d’astreinte, etc.

198

Dans le cas présent, le juge civil s’est limité à prononcer
une mesure d’injonction contre la société BORIS BOIS. Le
jugement a enjoint la suppression des signes contrefaits
sur la page Web du défendeur. En complément àl’injonction, le juge a assorti ladite sanction d’une
mesure d’astreinte, en vue de briser la récalcitrante de ladéfenderesse qui serait tentée de résister à l’exécution
spontanée de la sentence judiciaire.
Par ailleurs, on ne peut que déplorer la légèreté dela sanction du juge dont la visée première serait
d’endiguer la contrefaçon en dissuadant le défendeurde recommencer. Malheureusement pour la morale desaffaires, le juge ne pouvait aller au-delà, les prétentions
formulées dans l’acte de saisine et les écritures dudemandeur initial ayant déjà fixé le lit de sa décision.
S’il vidait sa saisine en se prononçant sur les chefs dedemandes non contenus dans l’acte de saisine, le jugeaurait alors statué ultra petita.
B. Les controverses soulevées par la décision rendue
Elles portent d’une part sur la compétence d’attribution
du juge civil saisi, et d’autre part, sur le défaut
d’appréciation d’une identité entre les produits etservices contrefaits.
Concernant le premier point, la compétence est l’aptitude
reconnue à un juge de trancher les litiges concernant

certaines matières, sur un espace géographique bien
délimité. Lorsqu’elle est d’ordre matériel, elle est d’ordre
public et donc susceptible d’être invoquée même d’office
par le juge parce que concernant l’organisation duservice public de la justice.
Le problème ici posé est celui de l’absence de désignation
dans l’Accord de Bangui, du tribunal civil compétent
pour connaître des actions relatives aux marques131. À lalecture de l’article 47, alinéa 1, de l’annexe III de l’Accordde Bangui du 24 février 1999, “Les actions civiles relatives
aux marques sont portées devant les tribunaux civils etjugées comme matières sommaires”. Plus encore, la loi
camerounaise n° 2006/015 du 29 décembre 2006 portantorganisation judiciaire désigne les tribunaux de première
et grande instance compétents ratione quantitatem, pourconnaître du contentieux relatif aux actifs de propriété
industrielle. Aux termes des art. 15 et 18 de la loi suscitée,le tribunal de première instance est compétent lorsquel’objet du litige est inférieur ou égal à dix millions defrancs CFA et au-delà de ce montant, la compétence dulitige est dévolue au tribunal de grande instance. Depuis
2006, il s’agit précisément des chambres commerciales
des tribunaux de première et grande instance, en lieu
et place des tribunaux de commerce existants danscertains États membres de l’OAPI. C’est donc à tort
que la chambre civile avait retenu sa compétence pourconnaître du différend. Au mieux, le juge aurait pu
invoquer même d’office cette incompétence d’ordre
matérielle puisqu’il s’agit d’un moyen d’ordre public.
Le deuxième problème de la décision de la Haute
Cour réside dans certaines failles regrettables dansson raisonnement. Pour qu’il y ait contrefaçon par
reproduction, il faut que les signes et les produits desdeux parties soient identiques. Cette identité doit êtreréelle et prouvée, faute de quoi le demandeur peutêtre obligé de démontrer un risque de confusion entre
ses produits et ceux du contrefacteur présumé. La
question principale posée au juge était de savoir si les
produits et services figurant sur les différents certificats
d’enregistrement, relevant des classes 16, 19, 20, 31 35,
40 et 42 de l’Arrangement de Nice, étaient identiques àceux commercialisés par Boris Bois. Cette identité doitêtre réelle et prouvée, à défaut de quoi le demandeur
peut être tenu de démontrer une vraisemblance. Ces
classifications sont cependant de la confusion entre leurvaleur administrative et non juridique. Les produits ou
services d’une même classe ne sont pas nécessairement
identiques, ni même similaires, alors que deux produits
similaires et ceux du prétendu contrefacteur (ce n’est
pas le cas en l’espèce) peuvent appartenir à des classes
différentes.
Dans les motifs écrits de l’arrêt, la Haute Cour mentionne
les catégories de produits et services contrefaits sans serisquer à les énumérer précisément et, sans conviction,
déclare que les produits et services sont identiques.
Or, rien de tel n’a été établi. La classification, en outre,
131

Voir EDOU EDOU (P.) (ed.), Le contentieux de la propriété intellectuelle dansl’espace OAPI : Guide du magistrat et des auxiliaires, Genève (OMPI), 2009,
p. 73.

Aristide Fade

C. Marques – Action en déchéance pourdéfaut d’exploitation – Notion d’usage
sérieux – Portée territoriale
Le titulaire de la marque doit, pour s’opposer avec succès
à l’action en déchéance, prouver un usage sérieux etininterrompu du signe invoqué à titre de marque sur au
moins un des États membres de l’OAPI. Il n’y a pas lieu, àcet égard, de tenir compte des actes d’usage concernant
une autre marque que celle enregistrée.
Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, Jugement du27 octobre 2015, n° 3242/201, SOCIÉTÉ ANIL SARL c.
COMPAGNIE AFRICAINE DE PRODUITS ALIMENTAIRES
EN CÔTE D’IVOIRE (CAPRACI)
Observations :Le jugement commenté aborde une question dont
les enjeux pratiques sont considérables : en quoi doit
consister l’usage sérieux de la marque susceptiblede faire obstacle à la déchéance du titre pour défaut
d’exploitation? Cette déchéance est prévue aujourd’hui
par l’article 27 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui,
Acte de Bamako du 14 décembre 2015, ainsi rédigé :“À la requête de tout intéressé, la juridiction nationale
compétente peut constater la déchéance et ordonner laradiation de toute marque enregistrée qui : a) pendantune durée ininterrompue de cinq (5) ans précédant
l’action, n’a pas été utilisée sur le territoire national del’un des États membres pour autant que son titulaire ne
justifie pas d’excuses légitimes”.
Faits : Elle n’a pas toujours existé en droit des marques.
En France, elle n’était pas prévue par la loi de 1857, ce quiétait en cohérence avec le fait que l’acquisition du droit
résultait, à l’époque, de l’usage. La Convention d’Unionde Paris du 20 mars 1883 en prévoyait bien la possibilité
mais de manière facultative pour les États signataires132.
Elle peut être justifiée de deux manières. D’abord, ellepeut prendre appui sur le principe fondamental de laliberté du commerce et de l’industrie. L’idée est que lenombre de signes est forcément limité, ce qui rend deplus en plus difficile le choix par les opérateurs arrivant
sur le marché d’une nouvelle marque. On peut alors
trouver sain de lutter contre des signes “parasites”,

132

Art. 5-C al. 1 : “Si, dans un pays, l’utilisation de la marque enregistrée est
obligatoire, l’enregistrement ne pourra être annulé qu’après un délaiéquitable et si l’intéressé ne justifie pas des causes de son inaction”. Voir ence sens l’art. 19 al. 1 de l’Accord ADPIC.

souvent dénommés dans la pratique “marques dedéfense” ou “marques de barrage”. Ensuite, la déchéance
peut être justifiée par la nécessité de cantonner lamarque à sa fonction de garantie d’origine, comme la
Cour de justice des Communautés européennes l’a relevédans l’arrêt Ansul133.
En l’espèce, la déchéance de la marque Mama pourla cuisine de Maman, délivrée par l’OAPI, avait été
prononcée par un jugement du tribunal de commerced’Abidjan rendu par défaut et le titulaire de cette marquefaisait opposition en sollicitant la rétractation de ladécision qui, selon lui, ne tenait pas compte du fait quela marque était effectivement exploitée au Bénin, pays
membre de l’OAPI. À quoi la société qui sollicitait ladéchéance objectait que la preuve n’était pas rapportéed’une utilisation ininterrompue et sérieuse sur leterritoire béninois et qu’en toute hypothèse “l’obligationd’usage” imposée par l’Accord de Bangui s’étendait “à
tous les pays membres de l’OAPI”, donc à la Côte d’Ivoire,pays où était exercée l’action.
Raisonnement : Deux problèmes bien distincts
devaient donc être résolus par le tribunal decommerce d’Abidjan, concernant :I.
II.

la teneur de l’exploitation requise; etsa localisation territoriale.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

a une valeur administrative mais, semble-t-il, nonjuridique. Cela signifie que les biens ou services d’unemême classe ne sont pas nécessairement identiques, nimême similaires. Inversement, deux signes et produits
de nature similaire peuvent appartenir à des classes
différentes mais seulement l’avoir présumé, sur la basede l’inventaire du site Web du défendeur et de l’activité
du demandeur.

I. Teneur de l’obligation d’exploitation
Pour apprécier si l’usage revendiqué au Bénin caractérise
une exploitation faisant obstacle à la déchéance, letribunal, après avoir rappelé les termes de l’article 23
de l’annexe III, dans sa rédaction applicable à l’espèce(reprise littéralement dans l’article 27 issu de l’Actede Bamako de 2015), le lit comme faisant peser sur
le titulaire de la marque la charge de “prouver, partout moyen, un usage sérieux et ininterrompu dusigne invoqué à titre de marque, et permettant de ledistinguer de ceux de ses concurrents”, en précisantqu’on ne saurait prendre en compte à cet égard un“usage symbolique, ayant pour seul objet le maintien desdroits créés par la marque”. On note la référence à unusage “sérieux”, adjectif qui ne figure pas dans le texte
de l’Accord de Bangui mais que l’on retrouve dans lalégislation de l’Union européenne134. On note aussi que laterminologie utilisée (usage du signe “à titre de marque”,
exclusion de l’“usage symbolique”) rejoint celle utiliséepar le fameux arrêt Ansul 135, dans lequel la Cour de justice
des Communautés européennes a dit pour droit “qu’unemarque fait l’objet d’un ’usage sérieux‘ lorsqu’elle est
utilisée, conformément à sa fonction essentielle qui
est de garantir l’identité d’origine des produits ou des
133

134
135

Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 11 mars 2003, Ansul BV c. Ajax
Brandbeveiliging BV, C-40/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:145, point 37 : “La protection
de la marque et les effets que son enregistrement rend opposables aux tiers
ne sauraient perdurer si la marque perdait sa raison d’être commerciale,consistant à créer ou à conserver un débouché pour les produits ou lesservices portant le signe qui la constitue, par rapport aux produits ou aux
services provenant d’autres entreprises.”Art. 18 al. 1 du Règlement UE 2017/1001 du 14 juin 2017 sur la marque del’Union européenne (ci-après : Règlement UE 2017/1001).
Ansul BV c. Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV., C-40/01, n.22.
199

services pour lesquels elle a été enregistrée, aux fins decréer ou de conserver un débouché pour ces produits etservices, à l’exclusion d’usages de caractère symboliqueayant pour seul objet le maintien des droits conférés parla marque”.
De façon très didactique, le tribunal de commerced’Abidjan entre ensuite dans les détails de l’objet de lapreuve à rapporter. Les “preuves acceptables”, relève-til, “doivent donner des indications sur le lieu, la durée,l’importance et la nature de l’usage qui est fait de ladite
marque pour les produits et services pour lesquels elle
est enregistrée”.
La Cour de justice des Communautés européennes
s’inscrit dans la même optique, mais en élargissantencore davantage la perspective, lorsqu’elle pose leprincipe que l’usage sérieux doit s’apprécier “en tenant
compte de l’ensemble des faits et des circonstances
pertinents tels que, notamment, les caractéristiques
du marché en cause, la nature des produits ou desservices protégés par la marque, l’étendue territoriale
et quantitative de l’usage ainsi que la fréquence et larégularité de ce dernier”136.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Ce fardeau probatoire était-il assumé en l’espèce parle demandeur? Le jugement est plus elliptique sur cepoint car on comprend à sa lecture que le tribunal opine
pour la négative en se fondant principalement, commeon le verra ci-dessous, sur le constat que le lieu del’exploitation n’est pas clairement établi. Malgré tout, illivre quelques enseignements sur les actes susceptiblesd’être pris en compte pour caractériser concrètement lecaractère sérieux de l’usage de la marque.

200

Positivement d’abord, il admet que parmi lespièces produites, à savoir des photographies deconditionnement de produits estampillés de lamarque en cause, des bordereaux de commande, desconnaissements, des emballages de produits marquésdu signe, “certaines font, indubitablement, la preuve del’existence matérielle et physique et de l’exploitation de lamarque”. La formulation suscite la perplexité. On aurait
aimé savoir quels étaient les éléments probants (lesphotographies de conditionnement et les emballages, sans
doute) et pourquoi les autres (les bons de commande? lesconnaissements?) ne l’étaient pas. Savoir aussi si lesutilisations pertinentes s’échelonnaient pendant toutela période de cinq ans, comme l’exige l’article 27137 del’annexe III en visant un usage “ininterrompu”.
Négativement, ensuite, le tribunal apporte une précisionessentielle en relevant que les bordereaux de commandeet les connaissements font référence, quant à eux, “à une
marque Mama et non à la marque Mama pour la cuisinede Maman qui est présentement querellée”, d’où il infère
que, s’agissant de “deux marques bien différentes”,
l’usage éventuel de la première ne saurait, en toute

136
137

Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 19 décembre 2012, Leno
Merken BV c. Hagelkruis Beheer BV, C-149/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:816.
Art. 27 de l’annexe IIII de l’ABR-2015 identique à l’art. 23 de l’ABR-1999, soit laversion applicable à ce cas.

hypothèse, “servir comme preuve” de l’usage de laseconde.
L’affirmation peut prendre appui sur la lettre del’article 27 précité, qui se réfère sans plus de précisionà l’usage de la “marque enregistrée”. On est tenté delui opposer l’article 5-C.2 de la Convention d’Union deParis de 1883, qui dispose que “l’emploi d’une marquede fabrique ou de commerce, par le propriétaire, sousune forme qui diffère, par des éléments n’altérant
pas le caractère distinctif de la marque dans la forme
sous laquelle celle-ci a été enregistrée dans l’un despays de l’Union, n’entraînera pas l’invalidation del’enregistrement et ne diminuera pas la protection
accordée à la marque”138. Or l’article 19 de l’Accordde Bangui, Acte de Bamako de 2015, fait, en cas decontrariété, prévaloir les conventions internationales139. Il
est vrai qu’en sens inverse, on pourrait songer à écarter
cette facilité probatoire lorsque le signe dont l’usage est
allégué pour résister à l’action en déchéance a lui-même
fait l’objet d’un enregistrement distinct, ce qui semblait
bien être le cas en l’espèce pour la marque Mama. La
Cour de cassation française s’était prononcée en ce
sens140, avant que la solution inverse s’impose en droit del’Union européenne141.
De toute façon, même en faisant abstraction de ladifficulté liée à la pluralité de marques, la contrariété
entre l’article 27 de l’annexe III et l’article 5-C.2 de laConvention d’Union de Paris peut être contestée si l’on
estime que la suppression des termes “pour la cuisinede Maman” suffit à altérer le “caractère distinctif” de lamarque objet de l’action en déchéance, au sens de laseconde disposition. Un arrêt du tribunal de première
instance de l’Union européenne paraît fournir unargument en ce sens en lisant la disposition figurant
actuellement dans l’article 18.1)a) précité du règlement
européen 2017/1001 comme visant “l’hypothèse où une
marque enregistrée, nationale ou communautaire, estutilisée dans le commerce sous une forme légèrement
différente par rapport à la forme sous laquellel’enregistrement a été effectué”, et en précisant qu’ilen est ainsi “lorsque le signe utilisé dans le commerce
diffère de la forme sous laquelle celui-ci a été enregistré
uniquement par des éléments négligeables, de sorte
que les deux signes peuvent être considérés commeglobalement équivalents”142.
Le cas particulier de la suppression d’éléments figurant
dans la marque enregistrée a donné lieu en France à une
jurisprudence abondante assez difficile à synthétiser.
Dans le sens de la sévérité, on peut citer un arrêt dela cour d’appel de Paris qui a refusé de considérer que
138
139

140
141
142

Voir aussi l’art. 18 al.1 let. a du Règlement européen 2017/1001, n.23,
réservant la possibilité d’opposer un tel usage à l’action en déchéance.
“En cas de divergence entre les dispositions contenues dans le présent
accord ou dans ses annexes et les règles contenues dans les conventions
internationales auxquelles les États membres ou l’Organisation sont parties,
ces dernières prévalent”.
Cass. com., 20 juin 2006, n° 04-18.768.
Voir l’art. 18 al. 1 let. a du Règlement européen 2017/1001, n.23.
Tribunal de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 23 février 2006, Il Ponte Finanziaria
SpA c. Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur (marques, dessins etmodèles) (OHMI), T-194/03, ECLI:EU:T:2006:65, point 50.

La seule réserve concerne l’accent mis sur le critère de lalocalisation territoriale. Là encore, la comparaison avec ledroit de l’Union européenne peut se révéler fructueuse.
L’article 18.1 précité du règlement 2017/1001 se
réfère uniquement à l’usage de la marque de l’Union
européenne “dans l’Union”, sans viser expressément,comme le fait l’article 27 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de
Bangui, l’hypothèse d’un usage “sur le territoire nationalde l’un des États membres”. Mais l’adoption du règlement
207/2009 du 26 février 2009, qu’il remplace et qui
comportait la même disposition sur la déchéance147, avait
été précédée par une déclaration conjointe du Conseil
affirmant que l’usage dans un seul pays constituait unusage sérieux au sein de l’Union.

La position du tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan peut,on le voit, se recommander de solides arguments. Il est
seulement regrettable que la discussion n’ait pas été
menée sur ce point.

Et cette solution a été, dans un premier temps, appliquée
par l’EUIPO (European Union Intellectual Property
Office) 148. Mais la Cour de justice a changé la donne dansl’arrêt Leno Merken149, où elle a récusé cette automaticité.
Elle y juge, en effet, que s’il est “justifié de s’attendre
à ce qu’une marque communautaire, en raison du fait
qu’elle jouit d’une protection territoriale plus étendue
qu’une marque nationale, fasse l’objet d’un usage sur unterritoire plus vaste que celui d’un seul État membre pourque celui-ci puisse être qualifié d’usage sérieux”, il n’est
pas exclu pour autant que, “dans certaines circonstances,le marché des produits ou des services pour lesquels une
marque communautaire a été enregistrée soit, de fait,
cantonné au territoire d’un seul État membre”150.

II. Localisation territoriale de l’exploitation
Aux termes de l’article 27 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de
Bangui, Acte de Bamako de 2015, l’exploitation alléguée
en défense à une action en déchéance de la marquedoit être localisée “sur le territoire national de l’un desÉtats membres”. C’est cette condition qui est au cœurde l’argumentation du jugement commenté. Celui-ci,
en effet, après avoir concédé que “certaines” des pièces
produites aux débats établissent une exploitation de lamarque Mama pour la cuisine de Maman”, poursuit enaffirmant que “ces éléments de preuve, pris ensemble
ou individuellement, n’établissent pas que la marquequerellée est effectivement exploitée au Bénin”, et il met
l’accent, en particulier, sur l’absence “d’un constat d’une
personne assermentée, dont les actes font foi jusqu’à
inscription de faux”, attestant que les produits en cause“sont mis en vente au Bénin”.
Le raisonnement est imparable. Comme l’article 27
précité le dit expressément, il suffit, pour que l’usage
fasse obstacle à la déchéance, qu’il soit établi sur leterritoire d’un État membre. L’affirmation péremptoire
du demandeur à l’action en déchéance selon laquelle“l’obligation d’usage s’étend à tous les pays membres del’OAPI, en sorte que le défaut d’exploitation dans un seul
État membre expose la marque concernée à la radiation”,
ne résistait évidemment pas à l’examen. Encore faut-il
que les faits d’exploitation soient localisés et cettepreuve ne peut, en pratique, être rapportée autrement
que par les déclarations d’une personne assermentée.

143
144
145
146

CA Paris, 6 juin 2005 : PIBD 2005, III, p. 551.
CA Paris, 9 juin 2006 : PIBD 2006, III, p. 612.
Cass. com., 4 décembre 2007, n° 06-18.901.
Voir par ex. TRÉFIGNY-GOY (P.) : Propr. ind. 2008, comm. 10, n° 6 : “Cette
interprétation paraît bien compréhensive pour le titulaire de marques. Il
n’est pas certain qu’il s’agisse d’une modification mineure...”. LE BIHAN (É.),
Juriscl. Marques-Dessins et modèles, Fasc. 7405-2, 2018, n° 83 : “À l’évidence,la marque telle qu’utilisée différait sensiblement du dépôt effectué et l’onpeut donc s’interroger sur la pertinence d’une telle décision quand la marqueest finalement exploitée sous une forme tronquée de plus de 50%, alors queles éléments supprimés ne peuvent être considérés comme dépourvus dedistinctivité.”

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

l’exploitation du signe Seven valait usage sérieux de lamarque Seven7, au motif que la distinctivité de cettedernière tenait notamment à la répétition du chiffre 7143.
Dans le sens d’une vision plus accommodante, onévoquera l’arrêt de la même cour décidant quel’exploitation des termes Top Model n’altère pas lecaractère distinctif de la marque déposée Top Model deJean-Jacques Vivier144, hypothèse qui n’est pas loin derappeler celle d’espèce. Mais, bien que le pourvoi formé
contre cet arrêt ait été rejeté par la Cour de cassation145,
ce précédent est de peu de portée car la solution a été
critiquée comme faisant trop bon marché des principes
posés par l’arrêt du tribunal de première instance del’Union européenne dans l’affaire précitée146.

Contrairement à ce qu’avait semblé décider
antérieurement le tribunal de première instance151 enérigeant en principe (il est vrai à propos d’une marquenationale et non d’une marque de l’Union européenne)
que l’usage sérieux suppose que la marque soit présentedans une partie substantielle du territoire sur lequel elle
est protégée. D’où elle déduit qu’il “est impossible dedéterminer a priori, de façon abstraite, quelle étendue
territoriale devrait être retenue pour déterminer
si l’usage de ladite marque a ou non un caractère
sérieux”152, avant de prescrire au juge national, dans une
formule très générale, de tenir compte “de l’ensemble
des faits et des circonstances pertinents”.
Peut-être le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan aurait-il pu
s’inspirer de la méthode pour relativiser le critère de lalocalisation territoriale.
André Lucas

147
148
149
150
151
152

Art. 51 du Règlement (CE) n° 207/2009 du Conseil du 26 février 2009 sur lamarque communautaire.
LE BIHAN (É.), n.35, n° 20, et les références citées.
Leno Merken BV c. Hagelkruis Beheer BV, n.25.
Leno Merken BV c. Hagelkruis Beheer BV, n.25, point 50.
Tribunal de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 12 décembre 2002, Kabushiki Kaisha
Fernandes c. Office de l’harmonisation dans le marché intérieur (marques, dessins
et modèles) (OHMI), T-39/01, ECLI:EU:T:2002:316.
Ibid., point 55.
201

D. Marque – Enregistrement- Modification de l’objet del’enregistrement – Action en
contrefaçon – Relaxe du prévenu
– Demande reconventionnelle enréparation – Évaluation du préjudice –Dommages – Intérêts forfaitaires
Au regard de l’article 7 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de
Bangui révisé153, le titulaire d’une marque ne peutinterdire ou poursuivre que l’usage illicite d’un signe
similaire ou identique au signe enregistré pour desproduits ou services qui sont similaires à ceux pourlesquels la marque de produits ou de service est
enregistrée (A).
Dès lors, fait une bonne application de ce texte la courd’appel qui, pour infirmer les premiers juges et rejeter
la contrefaçon alléguée, rappelle que le droit exclusif
d’exploitation ne saurait, sans un nouvel enregistrement,valoir pour des modifications apportées à la marquedéposée en violation de l’article 21.3) de ladite annexe.
Ainsi, faute pour le demandeur de caractériser les faits
constitutifs du délit de contrefaçon, il s’expose à unecondamnation en réparation du préjudice causé ausupposé contrefacteur si son action est jugée abusive
ou vexatoire.

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Cour d’appel de Brazzaville, Arrêt du 18 juillet 2006, MP
et ADECHOKAN AMANDATOU c. YOUNOUSSA FATI et
YOUNOUSSA SALAMATOU

202

Observations :Le propriétaire d’une marque protégée a le droit
d’empêcher ses concurrents d’utiliser des marques
identiques ou des marques semblables au point decréer une confusion en ce qui concerne des biens etservices identiques ou semblables à ceux pour lesquels
il utilise sa propre marque. Il s’agit là de la consécrationd’un droit exclusif du propriétaire de la marque appeléégalement droit privatif. Ce principe est bien posé parl’article 7, alinéa 3, de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui
du 2 mars 1977, révisé le 24 février 1999154, portantcréation de l’Organisation africaine de la propriété
intellectuelle qui dispose que “l’enregistrement de lamarque confère également le droit exclusif d’empêcher
tous les tiers agissant sans son consentement de faireusage au cours d’opérations commerciales de signes
identiques ou similaires pour les produits ou services
qui sont similaires à ceux pour lesquels la marque deproduits ou services est enregistrée dans le cas où un
tel usage entraînerait un risque de confusion”. Le mêmeprincipe est également adopté, sur le plan international,
par l’article 16.1) de l’Accord sur les ADPIC selon lequel“le titulaire d’une marque de fabrique ou de commerce
enregistrée aura le droit exclusif d’empêcher tous lestiers agissant sans son consentement de faire usage aucours d’opérations commerciales de signes identiques ou
similaires pour des produits ou des services identiques
153
154

Cf. art. 6 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Ibid.

ou similaires à ceux pour lesquels la marque de fabriqueou de commerce est enregistrée dans les cas où un tel
usage entraînerait un risque de confusion”.
Ce principe signifie qu’en droit des marques, le titulaire
du droit doit pouvoir, à tout le moins, faire cesser l’usage
de signes similaires pour des produits similaires sur unmême marché, lorsque cet usage est susceptible de créer
une confusion chez les consommateurs sur l’origine ou
l’autorisation de ces produits. Dans cette perspective,
l’arrêt de la cour d’appel de Brazzaville dans cette affaireprésente un intérêt juridique majeur.
Faits : Pour rappel, les dames YOUNOUSSA Fati et
YOUNOUSSA Salamatou avaient fait enregistrer, auprès
de l’Organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuelle,
dite l’OAPI, le 17 avril 2001, la marque de tissu nommée“SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST” composée de trois
couleurs (rouge, blanche et or) et d’une couronne royale
qui en constituait le logo155. Constatant, courant 2004,
la présence sur le marché de pagnes, portant les signes
distinctifs “SYLVANA ELEGANCE BEST QUALITY”, qu’elles
estiment contrefaisants, les deux plaignantes ont
demandé et obtenu du président du tribunal de grande
instance de Brazzaville une ordonnance les autorisant à
faire procéder, par le service des enquêtes économiqueset financières de la direction de la police judiciaire, à ladescription détaillée des produits marqués, importés,livrés et vendus à leur préjudice, et à la saisie de deux
exemplaires des produits contrefaisants dans tous lesentrepôts et étalages.
En exécution de cette ordonnance, ledit service
a procédé, le 15 mars 2004, à des saisies avec
dépossession d’un lot de 250 pagnes provenant desÉtablissements ADE (Marna Bonheur) et ICE, revêtus
de l’insigne “SYLVANA ELEGANCE”. C’est dans ces
circonstances que les dames YOUNOUSSA Fati et
YOUNOUSSA Salamatou ont poursuivi les établissements
ADE et ICE et la dame ADECHOKAN Amandatou devantla chambre correctionnelle du tribunal de première
instance de Brazzaville qui, dans sa décision, a déclarécelle-ci coupable du délit d’exploitation illicite d’une
marque enregistrée, avant de la condamner au paiement
de la somme de vingt-cinq millions (25 000 000) defrancs CFA à titre de dommages et intérêts à verser aux
dames YOUNOUSSA.
Mme Adechokan a fait appel.
Raisonnement : La Cour, infirmant les premiers
juges, a estimé que le délit de contrefaçon n’est
pas constitué en considération, d’une part, de laviolation par les plaignantes de l’interdiction demodification de la marque enregistrée et du principe
de spécialité et, d’autre part, de l’absence de risque deconfusion caractérisé. Elle a, également, reçu, à titre
reconventionnel, la demande de réparation de la dame155

Une telle marque peut être rangée dans la catégorie des marques semifiguratives caractérisées par la combinaison d’un nom et d’un dessin. Voir :https://www.depot-de-marque.com/guide-marques/marques-verbalesfiguratives-et-semi-figuratives-les-differentes-formes-de-marques.

ADECHOKAN Amandatou pour saisie intempestive
et abus de constitution de parties civiles des dames
YOUNOUSSA Fati et Salamatou.

I.
II.

l’obligation d’utiliser la marque conformément au
certificat d’enregistrement; mais également
le pouvoir d’appréciation de l’action en contrefaçon
par le juge du fond.

I. L’obligation d’utiliser la marque conformément au
certificat d’enregistrement
Au regard de l’article 7 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999, letitulaire d’une marque ou d’une marque de service nepeut interdire ou poursuivre que l’usage illicite d’unsigne similaire ou identique au signe enregistré pourdes produits ou services qui sont similaires à ceux pourlesquels la marque est enregistrée (A). Cette protection
ne saurait, sans un nouvel enregistrement, valoir pourdes modifications apportées à la marque déposée en
violation de l’article 21.3) de ladite annexe (B).
A. La protection de la marque : l’exigence del’enregistrement préalable
Dans sa demande d’enregistrement, le titulaire d’une
marque doit définir exactement ce qu’il entend protéger;l’ABR-1999, dans ses dispositions relatives aux actions
en contrefaçon en vertu des articles 7 et 46 de l’annexeIII, ne protège que ce qui est inclus dans la demanded’enregistrement. En d’autres termes, le déposant doit
dès lors préciser tous les éléments de la marque qui
seront protégés par l’action en contrefaçon157.
En l’espèce, les juges d’appel ont opposé ce principe aux
dames YOUNOUSSA qui avaient fait enregistrer auprès
de l’Organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuelle(OAPI), le 17 avril 2001, la marque “SULTANA ALWAYS THE
BEST”, composée de trois couleurs rouge, blanche et or,comportant un logo dans le rond central, une couronne
royale imprimée dans une couleur or. Ils ont relevé que
si les signes ainsi déclarés pouvaient bénéficier d’une
protection légale, en vertu de l’article 7 de l’annexe
III ABR-1999, celle-ci ne saurait, par contre, s’étendre
à d’autres signes ne figurant pas sur le certificat
d’enregistrement. Cette conclusion résulte du constat“Qu’il n’est fait aucune mention tant sur l’arrêté
que sur la feuille de reproduction de la marqueque SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST peut toutefoisêtre traduit en français TOUJOURS LE MEILLEUR
selon la destination de la marchandise” et plus
loin “que paradoxalement l’échantillon du pagne

En somme, d’après la cour, le logo “SULTANA Les Griffes
de Fati”, figurant sur les pagnes supposés contrefaits, nepeut entrer dans le champ de protection de la marque“SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST”. De prime abord, laposition de la cour est conforme à la lettre de l’article 7 del’annexe III précité. N’est protégé que ce qui est déclaré158.
Ce principe, maintes fois rappelé par la jurisprudence,trouve bien son application en l’espèce. En effet, en
indiquant avoir fait enregistrer la marque “SULTANAALWAYS THE BEST”, les dames YOUNOUSSA ne pouvaientétendre la protection à des signes verbaux non visés
dans l’acte d’enregistrement. Il est assez surprenantd’ailleurs que le titulaire d’une marque, qui justifie, piècesà l’appui, l’enregistrement de cette marque, produisecomme preuve de l’atteinte à son droit des produits
portant des signes non conformes à ceux décrits dansl’acte d’enregistrement.
La cour a relevé qu’en lieu et place de pagnes avec lelogo “SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST”, les intimées ont
versé aux débats des échantillons de pagnes portant lelogo “SULTANA Les Griffes de Fati”. La cour ne pouvait,
dès lors, au risque de violer les dispositions de l’article 7
précité, retenir ce logo, qui ne figure pas dans l’arrêté
portant enregistrement comme constitutif de la marqueprotégée. En effet, sauf pour les marques notoires159, lecertificat d’enregistrement est le référentiel pour établirl’étendue de la protection de la marque160. Et ce certificat
est établi sur la base des renseignements figurant sur
le formulaire de dépôt. C’est pourquoi il est importantpour le déposant de procéder, conformément à l’article 8
de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999, à une description de lamarque et/ou sa reproduction et d’énumérer les produits
pour lesquels l’enregistrement du signe est demandéainsi que les classes correspondantes de la classificationinternationale des produits et services aux fins del’enregistrement des marques. Ainsi, la marque doit êtreutilisée conformément au certificat d’enregistrement.
En outre, pour mieux asseoir son argumentaire, la coura fait appel au principe de spécialité qui aurait été violé
par les dames YOUNOUSSA. Ce principe signifie quela marque doit être exploitée et n’est protégée quepour les produits ou services visés au dépôt. En effet,
la marque est déposée pour désigner des produits et/ou des services afin d’en déterminer l’origine, ce qui est
la fonction essentielle de la marque. En application de

158
159

156
157

Devenu l’art. 6 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Voir art. 8 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 devenu l’art. 9 de l’annexe III del’ABR-2015.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

Elle s’est ainsi prononcée, très clairement, sur laquestion de savoir si l’usage de la marque sous une
forme modifiée pouvait donner lieu à la protection del’article 7 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999156 et justifier ainsi
le bien-fondé d’une action en contrefaçon. Dans sonargumentaire, la Cour a réaffirmé :apposé de la marque enregistrée SULTANAALWAYS THE BEST n’y figure nulle part au dossier”
et “qu’en lieu et place du logo enregistré sous len° 45120 en date à Yaoundé du 19 février 2002”,
y figure au dossier un autre logo dénommé“SULTANA Les Griffes de Fati”.

160

Voir PASSA (J.), Droit de la propriété intellectuelle (Marques et autres
signes distinctifs), Tome I, 2e éd., 2009, pp. 147 à 149. Voir aussi CA Paris,
10 novembre 2000 : PIBD 2001, III, n° 716, p. 143.
Voir art. 6 de l’ABR-1999, art. 5 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015, art. 6 bis dela Convention de Paris du 20 mars 1883 pour la protection de la propriété
industrielle et art. 16 al. 2 et 3 ADPIC.
Voir art. 16 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 (devenu art. 20 de l’annexe III del’ABR-2015).
203ce principe de spécialité, celle-ci ne fera, dès lors, l’objet
d’une appropriation que pour les produits et services
qu’elle désigne.
Toutefois, le respect de ce principe ne se pose pas enl’espèce, dès lors que le produit déclaré dans l’acted’enregistrement, qui est le tissu, a été produit enéchantillon et se trouve être le même que celui incriminé
par les dames YOUNOUSSA. Le problème se situe plutôt,comme l’a d’ailleurs relevé la cour, dans la discordance
entre les signes verbaux enregistrés au titre de lamarque et ceux figurant sur les pagnes produits commepreuve de l’action en contrefaçon de marque. La cour,l’ayant apparemment compris, s’est contentée d’évoquer
le principe de spécialité sans le développer dans sonargumentaire. Elle a plutôt insisté sur le fait que cechangement de logo ne pouvait être considéré comme
une modification de l’enregistrement dès lors que lamodification de la marque n’est pas admise par la loi.

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B. La protection de la marque : la non-prise en compte
des modifications
La cour, corrigeant le premier juge, a pris le soin derappeler que la marque déposée ne peut faire l’objet demodification au regard de l’article 21.3) de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999 qui dispose clairement qu’“aucun changement
ne peut être apporté ni à la marque ni à la liste desproduits ou services pour lesquels ladite marqueavait été enregistrée”. Elle a adopté cette position en
considération de la production aux débats d’échantillons
de pagnes portant le logo “SULTANA Les Griffes deFati” en lieu et place de la marque enregistrée “SULTANAALWAYS THE BEST”.

204

La cour a apprécié cette différence constatée sur lesigne verbal, comme une modification apportée à lamarque déposée, et a infirmé le premier juge qui avait
admis la modification sur le fondement de l’annexe II
de l’ABR-1999 relatif aux modèles d’utilité au lieu defaire application de l’article 21, alinéa 3, de l’annexe III.
En effet, les dames YOUNOUSSA avaient effectivement
fait enregistrer comme marque un ensemble de signes
verbaux “SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST” et de signes
figuratifs de “trois couleurs rouge, blanche et or,comportant un logo dans le rond central, une couronne
royale imprimée dans une couleur or”. Cette position
des juges d’appel est conforme à la loi, notamment àl’article 21, alinéa 3, de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 quiinterdit toute modification apportée à la marque et aux
produits ou services pour lesquels ladite marque a été
enregistrée. Il n’est donc pas possible de modifier une
marque en changeant l’un de ses éléments essentiels
notamment le nom, le logo ou l’extension du libellé161.
Il est dès lors très important, dès le dépôt, de biens’assurer de la marque que l’on souhaite déposer et derédiger un libellé adéquat qui la protégera durablement.

Il est vrai, dès lors que la marque est enregistrée pourdix (10) ans, au regard de l’article 19 de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999, et peut être indéfiniment renouvelée, que
le titulaire peut être tenté de modifier sa marque enfonction de l’évolution de sa situation ou de son activité.
Mais, comme les juges d’appel l’ont bien rappelé, ildevra pour cela faire un autre dépôt dans les conditions
prévues par les articles 8 et 9 de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999162. Ce dépôt sera alors soumis à un examen
préalable de l’OAPI conformément aux dispositions desarticles 13 et 14 de ladite annexe.
Toutefois, il faut dire que la question de la modificationde la marque donne lieu à une jurisprudence très
fournie à l’étranger et notamment en France. Malgré
l’interdiction formelle de procéder à un changementdes éléments de la marque, cette jurisprudence admet
certaines modifications qui ne sont pas de natureà altérer la distinctivité de la marque. Ainsi, la courd’appel d’Aix-en-Provence en France a admis l’usage
indépendant d’une partie d’une marque lorsque l’autre
partie de cette marque est en particulier redondante163.
Dans la même lancée, la Chambre commerciale de la
Cour de cassation a confirmé l’arrêt de la cour d’appel
de Paris qui avait retenu comme valable l’usage modifiéd’une marque dès lors que cette modification n’altère
pas le caractère distinctif de ladite marque164.
Il faut tout de même signaler que, contrairement àl’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 applicable aux faits de l’espèce,
le code de la propriété intellectuelle français autorise
à son L714-5 §1 l’usage d’une “marque sous une forme
modifiée n’en altérant pas le caractère distinctif”. Cetteatténuation à l’interdiction de modification de la marqueest aussi prévue par l’article 5C.2) de la Convention deParis165 à laquelle fait référence l’Accord de Bangui révisé.
C’est donc avec satisfaction que l’on relève que l’Acte de2015 de l’Accord de Bangui s’inscrit dans cette logiquede souplesse en autorisant à son article 27, alinéa 2,de l’annexe III l’usage d’une marque, sous une forme
modifiée n’en altérant pas le caractère distinctif.
Mais, en l’espèce, l’adjonction du signe verbal “lesGRIFFES de Fati” à “SULTANA”, en lieu et en place de“ALWAYS THE BEST”, modifie substantiellement la
162
163

164

165
161

Cass. ass. plén., 16 juillet 1992 : PIBD 1992, III, n° 534, p. 659 : JCP E-44 (1992),
p. 239 (note BURST (J.-J.); CA Paris, 4 e chambre, 21 mars 1983, Ste Nicolas
Napoléon c. Sté Dulong Frères et Cie : Ann. propr. ind. 1983, p. 73. THRIERR (A.)
et THRIERR (O.), Juriscl. Marques, Fasc. 7720, novembre 2004, p. 23.

Devenus art. 9 et 10 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Cour d’appel d’Aix-en-Provence, Chambre 3-1, 21 mars 2019, n° 16/07491.
Cette juridiction a estimé “qu’il ne peut être contesté que l’élément distinctif
de la marque verbale déposée est le terme ‘pierre du Vallat’, les signes “lespierres du vallat” précédant le groupe “la pierre du vallat” apparaissent
comme un élément redondant, observation étant faite que tel que déposé, lesigne complet ne peut faire l’objet d’un usage réel dans la vie économique dufait de sa longueur inusuelle”.
Cass. com., 12 décembre 2018, n° 10633F : “la marque française’MONKIOSQUE.FR MONKIOSQUE.NET’, déposée en 2006, se lira ’monkiosque’en une seule fois et ne tire pas sa distinctivité du doublement du même mot,et que les extensions .fr et .net ne sont liées qu’aux nécessités de l’Internet
et ne présentent pas plus de caractère distinctif mais également quel’adjonction d’un élément figuratif et de couleurs n’altère pas le caractère
distinctif de ladite marque.”
L’article 5C al. 2 de la Convention de Paris du 20 mars 1883 pour la protection
de la propriété industrielle dispose que “l’emploi d’une marque de fabriqueou de commerce par le propriétaire, sous une forme qui diffère, par deséléments n’altérant pas le caractère distinctif de la marque dans la forme
sous laquelle celle-ci a été enregistrée [...] n’entraînera pas l’invalidation del’enregistrement et ne diminuera pas la protection accordée à la marque.”Par contre, son appréciation de la contrefaçon est
problématique.
II. L’appréciation souveraine de l’action principale
en contrefaçon et l’admission de la demandereconventionnelle en dommages et intérêts par lejuge de fondLes points saillants de cette décision sont les suivants :A.

B.

il appartient au demandeur de prouver devant letribunal l’existence d’une atteinte à son droit à lamarque, et le juge apprécie souverainement lacontrefaçon alléguée; etfaute pour le demandeur de caractériser les faits
constitutifs du délit de contrefaçon, il s’expose
à une condamnation en réparation du préjudicecausé au supposé contrefacteur si son action est
jugée abusive ou vexatoire.

A. L’appréciation des conditions de la contrefaçon
Dans sa démarche, la cour s’est d’abord prononcée surla régularité de la saisie-contrefaçon ordonnée suivant
ordonnance du 10 mars 2004 du président du tribunal
de grande instance de Brazzaville et pratiquée par leservice des enquêtes économiques et financières dela direction de la police judiciaire, avant de procéder à
une appréciation du risque de confusion dans l’esprit dupublic entre les marques en cause.
S’agissant de la saisie-contrefaçon, la juridiction d’appel
considère que “les premiers juges ont ordonné dessaisies sur la base de cette marque déposée, sansen vérifier conformément à l’article 48, alinéa 2, si letitulaire du droit avait justifié l’enregistrement de lamarque par la production, comme cela a été constaté
au dossier, d’un arrêté, et surtout de la production dela preuve de non-radiation et de non-déchéance”. La
Cour revient ainsi sur les conditions de fond de la saisiecontrefaçon. Effectivement, le président du tribunal,
saisi d’une requête aux fins de saisie-contrefaçon,
conformément aux dispositions de l’article 48 de l’annexe
III de l’ABR-1999, doit, avant de faire droit à la requête,vérifier si le requérant est titulaire d’une marquevalide et disponible. À cet effet, le juge de la requête,de même que la juridiction saisie de la contestation
de l’ordonnance de saisie, doit exiger la production del’arrêté d’enregistrement de la marque et d’un certificat
de non-radiation et de non-déchéance, pièces qui
permettent de s’assurer de l’existence d’une marqueprotégée au jour de la requête166.
166Art. 48 al. 2 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 : L’ordonnance est rendue sur simplerequête et sur justification de l’enregistrement de la marque et production dela preuve de non-radiation et de non-déchéance.

La Cour a ainsi reproché aux premiers juges de n’avoir
pas procédé à cette vérification alors surtout qu’“il est
troublant de constater que le titulaire d’une marqueenregistrée bien précise, tout en se prévalant de cettemarque enregistrée se complait à présenter à la justicedes échantillons d’un autre logo, comme si cette marqueenregistrée était radiée ou tombée en désuétude”.
Au regard des remarques de la cour, la productionde ces pièces, surtout du certificat de non-radiation
et de non-déchéance, aurait permis de vérifier si lamarque “SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST” faisait l’objet ou
non de radiation ou de déchéance.
Certes, cette observation des juges d’appel est justeau regard des dispositions de l’article 48 de l’annexe
III de l’ABR-1999, mais on remarquera qu’ils n’ont tiréaucune conséquence de ce constat. Et il est permis
de s’interroger sur la pertinence d’évoquer, à cestade de son argumentaire, le problème, non pas del’exécution de la mesure de saisie-contrefaçon, mais del’ordonnance l’ayant autorisée, dès lors qu’ils avaient finide démontrer, dans les considérants précédents, quel’usage de la marque modifiée ne pouvait donner lieu àla protection de l’article 7 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999.
Autrement dit, que les dames YOUNOUSSA ne justifiaientpas, au-delà de son enregistrement, l’usage effectif
de la marque, condition sine qua non de la sanction del’atteinte au droit à la marque. C’est pourquoi il y a lieu
de s’interroger sur la cohérence de la démarche de la
Cour qui, malgré sa démonstration sur l’absence d’undroit protégé, s’est quand même prononcée, dans un
raisonnement fort contestable, sur l’existence d’unrisque de confusion.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

marque “SULTANA ALWAYS THE BEST” à telle enseigneque, même en application de l’article 27, alinéa 2, del’Acte de 2015, une telle modification de la marquene pourrait être admise. La Cour a raison de ne pas
reconnaître le signe verbal “SULTANA LES GRIFFES DE
Fati” comme relevant de la marque protégée “SULTANAALWAYS THE BEST”.

Sur ce point, il faut rappeler qu’au regard de l’article 37
de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999167, certaines atteintes àla marque ne sont sanctionnées que si elles créent un“risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public”. Il s’agit
notamment de l’imitation frauduleuse d’une marque,la vente ou la mise en vente de produits revêtus d’une
marque frauduleusement imitée ou portant desindications propres à tromper l’acheteur sur la nature
du produit et l’offre et la fourniture de produits ou deservices sous une telle marque. C’est dire l’importancepratique de la question de l’appréciation du risquede confusion dans l’esprit du public168. À cet effet, lajurisprudence précise, d’une part, que l’existence d’unrisque de confusion dans l’esprit du public doit fairel’objet, de la part du juge, d’une appréciation globale“tenant compte de tous les facteurs pertinents du cas del’espèce”169 et, d’autre part, que l’appréciation du risquede confusion doit tenir compte de tous les facteurs
pertinents, notamment “la similitude visuelle, auditive ou
conceptuelle des marques en cause”170.

167
168

169
170

Devenu l’art. 57 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
BOUVEL (A.), Juriscl. Marques et Noms de Domaines, Fasc. 7519, 2012, par. 34
et s. Voir également la CSR, Décision n° 00157 du 26 avril 2002, Société
Bosnalijek Pharmaticeutical and Chemincal Industry c. Société Sanofi-Aventis
France (obs. LUCAS (A.), ce recueil, chapitre 3, section A).
Voir Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 11 novembre 1997, SABEL
BV c. Puma AG, Rudolf Dasslet Sport, C-251/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:528.
Cass. com., 10 avril 2019, n° 18-10.075.
205

En somme, l’appréciation du risque de confusion se fait sur
la base des ressemblances et non sur des dissemblances
comme l’a fait, à tort, la cour d’appel en l’espèce171. En
effet, en soutenant que “les deux logos ne se ressemblentguère, tant leurs différences sont nombreuses” etpar la suite “que la première différence sautant aux
yeux est celle de la couronne du côté de SULTANA et lesoleil de SYLVANA”, la cour d’appel a fait une mauvaise
application du critère de risque de confusion dans l’espritdu public et donné un exemple à ne pas suivre par lesjuges du fond même s’ils ont le pouvoir d’apprécier
souverainement le risque de confusion172.
Mais, fondamentalement, c’est la pertinence del’appréciation d’un risque de confusion qui est
problématique. En effet, la cour a, elle-même, démontré
que “la marque revendiquée par les dames YOUNOUSSAFati et Salamatou n’est pas susceptible d’appropriation”.
En déniant ainsi à celles-ci la titularité d’une marqueprotégée, la cour ne devait pas se hasarder à apprécier
un risque de confusion, au demeurant, dans unargumentaire infondé, dès lors qu’il ne pouvait y avoir
une atteinte à un droit de propriété intellectuelle.
L’absence d’un droit à une marque protégée écarte touteidée de contrefaçon au sens de l’article 37 de l’annexe III
de l’ABR-1999173. La contrefaçon étant une atteinte à undroit de propriété intellectuelle, elle ne peut être retenue
à l’encontre de la personne poursuivie pour cetteinfraction si le droit protégé n’est pas établi.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Malgré tout, la cour, constatant l’absence de l’élément
matériel de l’infraction de contrefaçon de marque,a renvoyé ADECHOKAN Amandatou des fins de lapoursuite de contrefaçon de marque174, mais a surtout
considéré l’action des dames YOUNOUSSA commeabusive et les a condamnées au paiement de dommages
et intérêts à la prévenue.

206

B. L’admission de la demande reconventionnelle enréparation pour procédure abusive et vexatoire.
En l’espèce, la cour a reçu et fait droit partiellement àla demande présentée par la prévenue ADECHOKAN
Amandatou qui, estimant avoir été victime d’une
procédure vexatoire et abusive, sollicitait lacondamnation des plaignantes, dames YOUNOUSSAFati et Salamatou, à lui payer reconventionnellement lasomme de cinquante millions (50 000 000) de francs CFA,
toutes causes de préjudice confondues.
171

172

173
174

Voir Cass. com., 30 mai 2012, n° 11-14910, inédit, où est faite une
illustration récente de ce principe de l’appréciation de la contrefaçon sur
les ressemblances et non les différences. La jurisprudence de la Cour decassation française est logiquement constante à ce sujet, et insiste sur lefait que la contrefaçon s’apprécie sur les ressemblances. Voir : Cass. civ.,
1re chambre, 25 mai 1992 : D. 1993, p. 184 (obs. DAVERAT (X.)), et : D. 1993,
somm., p. 84 (obs. COLOMBET (C.)) : LPA 1993, p. 10 (obs. GAVALDA (C.)) :D. 1993, somm., p. 243 (obs. HASSLER (T.)).
D’ailleurs la Cour de cassation française a rappelé que le risque de confusion
doit s’apprécier au regard d’un consommateur moyen dans la catégorie deproduits en cause, “normalement informé et raisonnablement attentif etavisé”. Voir Cass. com., 6 septembre 2016, n° 14-25.692.
Devenu l’art. 57 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Art. 405 du Code de procédure pénale de la République démocratique duCongo : “Si le tribunal estime que le fait poursuivi ne constitue aucune
infraction à la loi pénale ou que le fait n’est pas établi ou qu’il n’est pas
imputable au prévenu, il renvoie celui-ci des fins de la poursuite”. Idem art.
457 du Code de procédure pénale sénégalais”.

Dans un premier considérant, la cour a admis
l’existence d’une faute et d’un dommage en déclarant“que le préjudice subi est manifestement établi par lasaisie intempestive des services de la Police qui ont
maladroitement saisi 250 pagnes en lieu et place dequelques échantillons de pagnes; Que le recours à justiceleur a causé un désagrément, les discréditant tout aulong de cette procédure; Que la perte de confiance de sesclients mérite réparation” et dans un second considérant,elle a déterminé, elle-même, le préjudice en indiquantque “la Cour de céans apprécie souverainement lepréjudice, et en application de l’article 407 du Codede procédure pénale, l’abus de constitution de partie
civile est justifié et donne ainsi droit à des dommages
et intérêts que la Cour fixe à cinq millions (5 000 000) defrancs CFA…”.
Ce faisant, la Cour soulève deux points :• le problème de l’admission de la demandereconventionnelle fondée sur l’abus de procédure en
matière de contentieux de la contrefaçon de marqueet particulièrement de l’action engagée suivant la voie
pénale; et• la question de l’évaluation du préjudice subi parla personne poursuivie du chef de contrefaçon etrenvoyée des fins de la poursuite.
D’emblée, il faut souligner que la demandereconventionnelle est une notion civiliste qui est
définie comme “la demande par laquelle le défendeur
originaire prétend obtenir un avantage autre que lesimple rejet de la prétention de son adversaire”175.
Le code de procédure civile sénégalais, par exemple,
classe la demande reconventionnelle dans la catégoriedes demandes incidentes176. Elle n’est recevable que sielle se rattache “aux prétentions originaires par un liensuffisant”177. L’exercice de ce droit processuel, reconnu
au défendeur, donne lieu, le plus souvent, en matière decontentieux de la marque à l’action reconventionnelle
en nullité du titre178 ou en déchéance des droits attachés
à l’enregistrement de la marque179. Mais on constateque, de plus en plus, les défendeurs, poursuivis pourcontrefaçon, demandent systématiquement, à titre
reconventionnel, l’allocation de dommages et intérêts
pour procédure abusive.
En l’espèce, l’intérêt du débat est renforcé par le fait
que la demande a été présentée devant le juge pénal.
L’on sait qu’en matière pénale, c’est le Ministère public,en principe, qui met en mouvement l’action publique,même s’il le fait généralement sur la base d’une plainte
de la victime180. Dans ce cas, l’auteur de la plainte en
175
176
177
178
179
180

Voir par ex. l’art. 64 du Code de procédure civile français, 111e éd., Paris(Dalloz), 2020, p. 168.
Voir art. 193 du Code de procédure civile sénégalais.
Voir COUCHEZ (G.) et LAGARDE (X.), Procédure civile, Sirey, 17e éd., Paris(Sirey), 2004, p. 179.
Cass. com., 10 avril 2019, n° 17-26612.
Cass. com., 5 juillet 2017, n° 13-11.513.
Art. 1 du Code de procédure pénale de la République démocratiquedu Congo : L’action publique pour l’application des peines est mise enmouvement et exercée par les magistrats et fonctionnaires auxquels elle est
confiée par la loi.

En l’espèce, tout laisse croire qu’on est dans la deuxième
hypothèse. En effet, la cour, visant l’article 407 du codede procédure pénale congolais a retenu contre les dames
YOUNOUSSA l’abus de constitution de partie civile184.
Mais l’on peut se poser la question de savoir quand
l’exercice du droit d’agir en contrefaçon de marque peut
dégénérer en une action abusive et vexatoire, susceptible
de se retourner contre le demandeur. Au regard de lajurisprudence, on peut dire, de manière générale, quela demande reconventionnelle pour procédure abusive
et vexatoire, en cas de rejet de l’action principale encontrefaçon, est peu fréquemment accueillie parles tribunaux qui considèrent le plus souvent que ledemandeur initial de l’action en contrefaçon a mal estimé
les considérations juridiques ou techniques d’un telcontentieux et qu’il a pu se tromper sur l’étendue de ses
droits185. Mais il en va autrement lorsque le demandeur
à l’action en contrefaçon agit en sachant pertinemment
que sa prétention est mal fondée186.
Dans tous les cas, l’abus est retenu, même s’il ne s’agit
pas, à proprement parler, d’un abus d’ester en justice,lorsque le demandeur, qui avait fait pratiquer une saisie
réelle de tout ou partie du stock de produits incriminésen lieu et place de la saisie-description ordonnée par lejuge, a vu son action en contrefaçon rejetée au fond187.
C’est également le cas lorsque la saisie-contrefaçon
pratiquée a été annulée pour défaut d’introduction d’une

181
182
183
184

185

186
187

Voir PRADEL (J.), Procédure pénale, 17e éd., Paris (Cujas), 2013, pp. 602 à 603.
Art. 1 al. 2 du Code de procédure pénale de la République démocratique duCongo : “Cette action peut aussi être mise en mouvement par la partie léséedans les conditions déterminées par le présent code”.
Voir art. 407 du Code de procédure pénale de la République démocratique duCongo et art. 459 du Code de procédure pénale du Sénégal.
Art. 407 du Code de procédure pénale de la République démocratique duCongo : dans le cas prévu par l’art. 405, lorsque la partie civile a elle-même
mis en mouvement l’action publique, le tribunal statue par le même jugement
sur la demande en dommages et intérêts formée par la personne acquittéecontre la partie civile pour abus de constitution de partie civile.
Voir CA Paris, 16 janvier 1998 : RD propr. intell. 1998, n° 87, p. 20; CA Paris,
23 mai 2001 : PIBD 2001, III, n° 729, p. 526; TGI Marseille, 14 mars 1979 : PIBD
1979, III, n° 244, p. 337; Cass. com., 22 mai 1973, n° 71-13.912 : JurisData,n° 1973-097181; CA Lyon, 28 mai 1991 : Dossiers brevets 1991, II, p. 1; CA Paris,
16 janvier 1992 : Ann. propr. ind. 1995, p. 57 et : PIBD 1992, III, n° 524, p. 326.
Voir Cass. com., 22 mai 1973, n° 71-13.912 : JurisData n° 1973-097181. CA
Lyon, 28 mai 1991 : Dossiers brevets 1991, II, p. 1. CA Paris, 16 janvier 1992 :Ann. propr. ind. 1995, p. 57 et : PIBD 1992, III, n° 524, p. 326.
Voir PIBD, III, n° 894, p. 951. et PIBD, III, n° 897, p. 1110.

action au fond dans le délai légal de dix jours188.
Les juges d’appel ont, en l’espèce, considéré que lesagents de la police judiciaire ont maladroitement
exécuté l’ordonnance du président du tribunal de grande
instance de Brazzaville en saisissant 250 pagnes enlieu et place de quelques échantillons. Cette position
est fondée en droit dès lors qu’à la lecture des faits
de l’espèce et des étapes de la procédure, il apparaît
clairement que les dames YOUNOUSSA, qui avaient été
autorisées à procéder à une saisie-description, ont en
réalité fait pratiquer une saisie réelle d’un important
stock du produit incriminé. Cette saisie est donc abusive
et constitutive d’une faute susceptible d’être réparée.
Toutefois, il appartient au prévenu, relaxé, d’établir son
préjudice, et le juge ne peut réparer que le préjudicesubi, rien que le préjudice mais tout le préjudice. C’est
l’application du principe de la réparation intégrale189.
Sous ce rapport, il est important de souligner que
l’article 54 de l’annexe III de l’Acte de 2015 apporte unebelle innovation en donnant désormais au juge descritères précis de fixation des dommages et intérêts (“Lajuridiction saisie détermine le montant des dommages
et intérêts, en tenant compte des conséquenceséconomiques négatives, dont le manque à gagner,
subies par la partie lésée, les bénéfices réalisés par lecontrefacteur et le préjudice moral causé au titulaire desdroits du fait de l’atteinte”). En l’espèce, la cour a décidé
“souverainement” de fixer le montant des dommages
et intérêts à cinq millions de francs CFA après avoir
retenu que la procédure a causé un désagrément à ladame ADECHOKAN Amandatou qui, en plus d’avoir été
discréditée, a subi une perte de confiance de ses clients.
La cour a fait état respectivement d’un préjudice moral etd’un préjudice matériel dont l’étendue n’a, toutefois, pasété déterminée.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

contrefaçon, qui s’est constitué partie civile, ne sauraitêtre condamné, à la demande du prévenu relaxé, pourprocédure abusive dès lors qu’il n’est pas l’auteur dela poursuite en contrefaçon181. Il n’en est autrement
que si c’est lui-même qui met en mouvement l’action
publique, comme le lui reconnaît la loi182, en saisissantle juge d’instruction d’une plainte avec constitution departie civile ou directement le tribunal par la voie de lacitation directe. Dans ces deux dernières hypothèses,le tribunal est fondé à statuer, par le même jugement,
sur la demande en dommages et intérêts formée parla personne relaxée contre la partie civile pour abus deconstitution de partie civile183.

Malick Lamotte

E. Action en contrefaçon et concurrence
déloyale – Rejet de l’opposition
à l’enregistrement de la marquecontrefaisante – OAPI – Appréciation
par les tribunaux de l’ordre judiciaire
Ne donne pas de base légale à sa décision le juged’instance qui rejette l’action en contrefaçon etconcurrence déloyale introduite par le titulaired’une marque enregistrée au motif que la procédure
d’opposition à l’enregistrement de la marquecontrefaisante parallèlement initiée par celui-ci devant les
instances compétentes de l’OAPI s’est soldée par un échec.

188

189

CA Lomé, Arrêt n° 70/15 du 4 mars 2015, GNANHOUE Nazaire c. Établissements
SOLA (obs. LAMOTTE (M.), ce recueil, chapitre 3, section I) : “L’immobilisation
au-delà du délai légal d’une cargaison des marchandises présuméescontrefaisantes par l’exercice d’une prérogative exorbitante de droit commun
destinée à se constituer une preuve en vue d’une procédure future crée sansnul doute un préjudice certain au propriétaire desdites marchandises”.
Voir TERRE (F.), SIMLER (Ph.) et LEQUETTE (Y.), Droit civil : les Obligations,10e éd., Paris (Dalloz), pp. 752 et s.
207Tribunal de grande instance du Wouri (Douala), Jugementn° 218 du 19 septembre 2007, SOCIÉTÉ R.M & CO
LIMITED c. SOCIÉTÉ C.D.M. (SCDM)
Observations :L’échec de la procédure d’opposition introduite à l’OAPI
par le titulaire d’une marque antérieure entraîne-t-il ipso
facto le rejet de l’action en contrefaçon et concurrence
déloyale intentée parallèlement par celui-ci devant
les tribunaux de l’ordre judiciaire contre l’auteur del’enregistrement querellé190? Telle est la question centrale
posée aux juges du tribunal de grande instance du Wouri
dans l’espèce rapportée.
Faits : La société RM & Co Limited est titulaire de lamarque “crocodile” enregistrée à l’OAPI le 30 juillet 1991
sous le n° 30659 pour couvrir les produits de la classe 8,
en l’occurrence les machettes et autres outils tranchants.
Après avoir constaté l’usage de sa marque par lasociété S.C.D.M installée à Douala, la RM & Co Limitedl’assigna devant le susdit tribunal en contrefaçon etconcurrence déloyale. La S.C.D.M a soutenu lors desdébats que la marque “crocodile” accompagnée d’undessin qu’elle exploite était plutôt la propriété de T.
bénéficiaire de l’enregistrement n° 35636 publié au
BOPI sous le n° 8/1996. Elle a par conséquent conclu au
rejet de l’action de la RM & Co Limited, ce d’autant plus
que la procédure parallèle d’opposition initiée par celleci à l’OAPI a connu le même sort suivant décision
n° 005/OAPI/DG/ADG/SCAJ/ du 15 janvier 1998.

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La Haute Cour du Wouri l’a fait.

208

Raisonnement : Vidant sa saisine, le tribunal a débouté
la RM & Co Limited de son action en se fondant sur ladécision du directeur général de l’OAPI qui indiqueque cette société ne bénéficie d’aucune exclusivité
sur les termes “CROCODILE” et son dessin objets deplusieurs dépôts et enregistrements antérieurs dans lesmêmes classes. La décision rapportée appelle quelques
observations, abstraction faite de l’exception soulevéeà titre liminaire par la société S.C.D.M et de sa demandereconventionnelle qui ne présentent aucun intérêt
relativement au point de droit indiqué plus haut. Ces
observations sont relatives aux rapports qu’entretientl’opposition à l’enregistrement d’une marque avec
l’action en contrefaçon d’une part, avec l’action en
concurrence déloyale d’autre part.
S’agissant du premier type de rapport, il importe despécifier au préalable l’objet de chacune des actions
concernées. Alors que la procédure d’opposition auprès
de l’OAPI a principalement pour objet de permettre
aux titulaires de droits antérieurs de faire obstacle
à l’enregistrement de marques susceptibles de leurporter préjudice191, en application des dispositions
de l’article 18 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui
précité, l’action en contrefaçon a, en revanche, pourfinalité la condamnation du présumé contrefacteur au
paiement des dommages–intérêts ainsi qu’aux peines
complémentaires, notamment la cessation de l’activité
contrefaisante, la destruction des objets contrefaisantset du matériel résultant, la publication de la décision. Il
s’ensuit que l’opposition à l’enregistrement d’une marqueet l’action en contrefaçon n’ont pas le même objet.
Dans un arrêt assez édifiant, la cour d’appel de Paris a
indiqué que “la procédure d’opposition (…) et l’action
en contrefaçon n’ayant pas le même objet, la décision
rendue sur opposition ne saurait avoir l’autorité de chosejugée au regard de la procédure de contrefaçon”192.
La décision des juges du tribunal de grande instancedu Wouri est critiquable de ce point de vue. La doctrine
spécialisée va dans le même sens. Jérôme Passa souligne
en effet que “le juge peut parfaitement, à l’issue de sa
propre analyse, décider, en dépit du rejet de l’opposition,qu’il existe un risque de confusion et que la marqueseconde doit être annulée ou jugée contrefaisante”193.
Cette position paraît soutenable car s’il est exact queles organes spécialisés de l’OAPI saisis d’une opposition
à l’enregistrement d’une marque et le juge judiciaire
saisi d’une action en contrefaçon procèdent chacun à unexamen du risque de confusion, il reste que la décision
rendue par les premiers est un acte administratif
qui ne saurait lier la juridiction saisie d’une action en
contrefaçon, en raison de la prééminence des décisions
des juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire sur celles des organes
administratifs de l’OAPI194. La jurisprudence française va
plus loin en décidant que la procédure d’opposition n’est
pas un préalable obligatoire à l’action en contrefaçon etune défenderesse ne saurait donc se prévaloir de ce quele propriétaire de la marque n’aurait pas diligenté unetelle procédure195.
Dans l’espèce commentée, les juges auraient dû, de leurpropre chef, apprécier l’effectivité du risque de confusion
entre les deux marques196, plutôt que de fonder leurdécision sur celle du DG de l’OAPI197 rejetant l’opposition
formée par la société demanderesse. On le voit, l’échec
de la procédure d’opposition à l’enregistrement d’une
marque ne prive pas l’opposant malheureux du droit
de se pourvoir en contrefaçon voire en annulation dela marque offensante devant les tribunaux de l’ordre
judiciaire.
S’agissant du deuxième type de rapport, il importe
191
192
193
194

190

L’opposition est une procédure administrative initiée devant le directeur
général de l’OAPI et qui a pour objet de permettre, entre autres, au titulaired’un droit antérieur de faire annuler l’enregistrement obtenu par des tiers en
violation de son droit. Elle est régie par l’art. 18 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999.
Deux possibilités s’offrent au directeur général : il peut annuler ou maintenirl’enregistrement contesté. Sa décision est susceptible de recours devant la CSR.

195
196
197

BERTRAND (A. R.), Le droit des marques et des signes distinctifs, Kampala(Cedat), 2000, p. 244.
Voir CA Paris, 10 octobre 2005 : PIBD 2005, III, n° 820, p. 730.
Voir PASSA (J.), Droit de la propriété industrielle (Marques et autres signes
distinctifs, dessins et modèles), Tome 1, Paris (LGDJ), 2006, p. 161.
Voir en ce sens TPI de Yopougon, Jugement civil n° 187 du 21 mars 2013,
SIVOP SA c. Société Angel Cosmetic SA (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M.-L.), ce recueil,
chapitre 3, section L). Voir également TGI du Wouri (Douala), Jugement du
5 janvier 2012, Société Arla Foods Amba c. Société Dana Holdings Ltd (obs.
FOMETEU (J.), ce recueil, chapitre 1, section A).
Voir CA Paris, 4 e chambre, 8 avril 1998 : Gaz Pal 1998, II, p. 545.
Les deux marques “CROCODILE”, n° 30659 et n° 35636, accompagnées d’undessin n° 35636 publié au BOPI sous le n° 8/1996.
N° 005/OAPI/DG/ADG/SCAJ/ du 15 janvier 1998.

En effet, la victime de la contrefaçon, qui sollicite à
titre complémentaire la condamnation du présumé
contrefacteur du chef de concurrence déloyale, doit ensus prouver qu’elle est également victime d’un risque deconfusion résultant de la reproduction ou de l’imitationd’un élément non compris dans l’enregistrement dela marque invoquée200. La société RM a indiqué quela défenderesse, la S.C.D.M, ayant fait usage de sa
marque alors qu’elle ne bénéficie ni d’une concession,ni d’une cession de droit sur ladite marque, a commis
à la fois la contrefaçon et la concurrence déloyale. Orle même fait, à savoir l’usage de la marque “crocodile”
querellée, ne saurait revêtir ces deux qualifications; ladoctrine et la jurisprudence exigent systématiquementla démonstration du fait dommageable distinct pourque l’action en concurrence déloyale complémentairesoit favorablement accueillie. Ainsi, dès lors que le faitdommageable distinct est prouvé, le rejet de l’action
en contrefaçon est sans incidence sur l’action en
concurrence déloyale, laquelle pourrait alors lui survivre
et générer des dommages et intérêts distincts. Il s’eninfère que le rejet de l’opposition à l’enregistrement dela marque “crocodile” par le directeur général de l’OAPI
ne devrait pas entraîner ipso facto celui de l’action en
concurrence déloyale complémentaire par le tribunal,le risque de confusion dans les deux hypothèsesn’ayant ni la même source, ni les mêmes critèresd’appréciation. Alors que le risque de confusion, en
matière de contrefaçon de marque, s’apprécie de façon
abstraite, c’est-à-dire par référence à la marque tellequ’enregistrée, le risque de confusion constitutif d’une
faute sur le terrain de la concurrence déloyale s’apprécie
concrètement sur le marché et suppose donc quel’élément à protéger et l’élément litigieux y soient l’un etl’autre utilisés201.

198
199

200
201

Sur la possibilité du cumul des deux actions, voir art. 2 al. 2 de l’annexe VII del’ABR-1999 et art. 1 al. 3 de l’annexe VIII de l’ABR-2015.
Voir en sens contraire TGI du Wouri (Douala), Jugement civil n° 192 du
15 décembre 2000, Moulinex SA c. Vapsan Trading Cie (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE(M.-L.)) : Revue scientifique de la propriété industrielle la GAZELLE, n° 0001,
novembre 2007, pp. 17 et s.
PASSA, (J.), n.82, p. 453.
Voir en ce sens PASSA (J.), n.82, p. 454.

Bien plus, la nature extrêmement variée des actes
constitutifs de concurrence déloyale renforce
l’indépendance de l’action en concurrence déloyale àl’égard de la procédure d’opposition. Les occurrencesde concurrence déloyale sont en effet nombreuses, lesactes visés aux articles 2 à 7 de l’annexe VIII de l’Accordde Bangui révisé ne l’étant qu’à titre purement indicatif.
Si l’on peut mettre à l’actif des juges du tribunal de
grande instance du Wouri l’imprécision ou, mieux, lamauvaise articulation de la demande formulée par lasociété RM, il reste constant que ceux-ci, saisis des deuxchefs de demande, avaient l’obligation de les apprécier
séparément selon leurs conditions respectives de miseen œuvre, dans l’optique de soustraire leur décision à
une éventuelle censure de la juridiction supérieure.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

F. Dépôt frauduleux d’une marque– Preuve de l’usage antérieur –Mauvaise foi – Nullité – Dommages –Intérêts
Est nul, en application du principe général de droit
fraus omnia corrumpit, l’enregistrement d’une marqueeffectué à l’OAPI, alors même que le bénéficiaire avait
parfaitement connaissance de ce qu’un tiers avait lapriorité de l’usage de ladite marque dans le commerce etdans la même spécialité, sur le territoire de l’un des pays
membres, le contrevenant pouvant, au demeurant, êtrecondamné au paiement des dommages et intérêts dansles conditions du droit commun.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

de souligner d’emblée que la société demanderessea également saisi le tribunal de grande instance duWouri pour voir condamner la société S.C.D.M du chefde concurrence déloyale198, action rejetée par cettejuridiction motif pris de ce que la société RM ne bénéficie
d’aucune exclusivité sur les termes “CROCODILE” et son
dessin objets de plusieurs dépôts et enregistrements
antérieurs dans les mêmes classes. Si ce motif de rejet
peut être, sous quelques réserves, admis relativement
à la contrefaçon qui suppose l’enregistrement préalable
de la marque contrefaite, il ne saurait justifier le rejet
d’une demande en concurrence déloyale qui peutêtre exercée même par l’exploitant d’une marquenon déposée. Certes, les faits rapportés ne nous
fournissent pas d’éléments objectifs d’appréciation,
la société demanderesse n’ayant pas spécifié la faute
dommageable distincte du comportement constitutif deconcurrence déloyale non couverte par la qualificationde contrefaçon199.

Tribunal de Grande Instance du MFOUNDI (Yaoundé),Jugement n° 672/civ du 17 septembre 2003, STÉ COOPER
c. LABORATOIRE BRIDE S.A
Observations :Si l’article 5.1) de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé,
Acte du 24 février 1999, pose que “… la propriété de lamarque appartient à celui qui, le premier, en a effectué ledépôt”, cette règle cesse de recevoir application lorsquece dépôt présente un caractère frauduleux, en particulier
dès lors qu’il est manifeste que le déposant avait
connaissance de l’utilisation antérieure du même signe
par un tiers. Il s’agit là de la transposition en droit de la
propriété intellectuelle du principe fondamental de droit
fraus omnia corrumpit qui signifie “la fraude corrompt
tout” rappelé à diverses occasions par la jurisprudence
française202 et la doctrine spécialisée203.
Faits : Les faits du jugement rapporté sont simples.
En vertu d’une lettre contrat datée du 26 février 1938,
la société de coopération pharmaceutique française,en abrégé Cooper, confiait au Laboratoire Bride SA lafabrication des médicaments sur la base de ses propres
formules, produits distribués par elle en Afrique sous la
202

203

Voir TGI de Paris, 3e chambre, 15 avril 1983 : PIBD 1983, III, p. 260; CA
Bordeaux, 1re chambre, 28 février 1994 : PIBD 1994, III, p. 301; CA Centre,Arrêt n° 207/CIV du 18 mai 2011; Cass. com., 25 avril 2006 : PIBD 2006, III,n° 83.3, p. 471.
BERTRAND (A. R.), n.80, p. 390 et s.; PASSA (J.), n.82, pp. 178 et s.
209marque SEDASPIR originairement enregistrée en France
depuis 1934. Ayant constaté l’enregistrement parallèle àl’OAPI de la même marque en date du 13 août 1995 sous
le n° 36716 au profit de son partenaire commercial lelaboratoire Bride SA, elle assigna cette société devant letribunal de grande instance du Mfoundi en annulationde ladite marque et en paiement de dommages etintérêts, non sans avoir fait préalablement enregistrerla même marque en son nom à l’OAPI en date du
1er avril 1997 sous le n° 37638. En réaction, la société
laboratoire Bride SA l’assigna également devant lemême tribunal en annulation de l’enregistrement
second n° 37638.
Les juges du tribunal de grande instance du Mfoundi
devaient se prononcer sur la question de savoir si, dansle silence de la législation communautaire, la nullitéd’une marque peut être prononcée sur le fondement dela fraude.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Raisonnement : Après jonction desdites procédures, letribunal a répondu par l’affirmative en déclarant nul et
non avenu l’enregistrement SEDASPIR n° 36.716 opéré
au profit de la société Laboratoire Bride SA non sanscondamner celle-ci à payer la somme de FCFA 30 000 000
à son partenaire commercial. Bien que l’Accord de Bangui
révisé ne le dise pas expressément, une fois la preuve dudépôt frauduleux rapportée, l’auteur de la fraude peutêtre doublement sanctionné.

210

En règle générale, il appartient à celui qui invoque la
fraude de prouver à la fois l’usage antérieur du signequerellé et l’intention de nuire du déposant. L’usager
qui invoque le caractère frauduleux du dépôt doit
justifier qu’il a, le premier, utilisé le signe dont il s’agit
dans le commerce et dans la même spécialité. Certains
auteurs204 relayés par la jurisprudence205 estiment quepour être pris en compte, l’usage doit remplir certaines
caractéristiques, à savoir être public, non équivoque,non précaire et continu. Ces exigences paraissent
remplies dans l’espèce commentée, étant entendu quela société COOPER qui avait initialement enregistré
la marque SEDASPIR en France l’exploitait depuis
plusieurs décennies en Afrique où elle distribuait les
produits du même nom sous ce signe, en exécution ducontrat de partenariat la liant au Laboratoire Bride SA.
Il ne fait par conséquent l’ombre d’aucun doute que lasociété COOPER avait la priorité de l’usage de la marque
SEDASPIR en territoire OAPI.
L’intention de nuire résulte de la connaissancequ’avait le fraudeur, au moment du dépôt récusé,
qu’un tiers utilisait la marque litigieuse sans l’avoir
protégée. Manifestement, la société Laboratoire Brideavait l’intention de nuire à son partenaire car nonseulement il avait parfaitement connaissance de ceque la société COOPER utilisait le signe SEDASPIR pourla distribution des comprimés tant en France qu’en
Afrique, mais en plus et surtout le contrat les liant
204
205

BERTRAND (A. R.), n.80, p. 391; CHAVANNE (A.) et BURST (J-J.), Droit de la
propriété industrielle, 3e éd., Paris (Dalloz), 1990, p. 631.
Voir Paris, 18 janvier 2006 : PIBD 2006, III, n° 826, p. 223.

contient une clause interdisant le dépôt de la marquesans son consentement. La marque SEDASPIR n° 36716
du 13 août 1995 apparaît ainsi comme une marquede “barrage” ayant pour finalité de rendre ce signe
indisponible dans l’espace OAPI au préjudice de la société
COOPER qui a un intérêt légitime à en faire usage.
La poursuite de ce but révèle l’intention de nuire dulaboratoire Bride et détourne le droit des marques de sa
finalité essentielle qui est de garantir l’identité d’origine
des produits ou services. En effet, les consommateurs
des produits pharmaceutiques litigieux pourraient se
tromper sur leur origine réelle.
La fraude est sanctionnée par la nullité de la marqueoffensante et éventuellement par l’allocation
des dommages et intérêts dans les conditions dudroit commun. Il est admis tant en doctrine qu’enjurisprudence qu’est nul de nullité absolue le signequi a fait l’objet d’un dépôt frauduleux en vertu duprincipe supérieur fraus omnia corrumpit. En effet, lafraude une fois démontrée invalide le droit résultant
de la marque frauduleusement déposée qui est nulle
rétroactivement, les parties étant remises au mêmeet semblable état dans lequel elles étaient avant lasurvenance de la nullité. La marque récusée est réputéen’avoir jamais existé, du moins dès que la décisioncommentée acquiert un caractère définitif. L’article 28
de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé indique en
effet que toute décision judiciaire définitive prononçantl’annulation des effets sur le territoire national de l’undes États membres du dépôt d’une marque doit êtreinscrite au registre spécial des marques sur notificationde la juridiction, et faire l’objet d’une mention publiée
par l’Organisation. C’est donc à bon droit que letribunal a invalidé la marque SEDASPIR n° 36716
déposée à l’OAPI le 13 août 1995 dans l’intention
manifeste de nuire à la société COOPER, premier
usager dudit signe tel que démontré précédemment.
La conséquence directe en est la radiation du signe
offensant des registres de l’OAPI, y compris les actes
subséquents intervenus jusque-là en rapport avec
ledit signe.
Abstraction faite de la nullité, le comportement de lasociété Laboratoire Bride SA, qui a cru devoir déposer
frauduleusement la marque SEDASPIR sans égard àla priorité de l’usage de son partenaire commercial,caractérise par ailleurs une faute au sens du droitcommun ouvrant droit aux dommages et intérêts.
Le tribunal a alloué à la société COOPER la somme de
FCFA 30 000 000 au titre des frais exposés à l’occasion dela défense de ses droits. S’il est exact que cette société
a sollicité uniquement le remboursement desdits fraisévalués selon elle à la somme de FCFA 50 000 000,
le tribunal n’indique cependant pas sur quelle baseil a octroyé le montant de FCFA 30 000 000 à lademanderesse, aucune pièce justificative n’ayant été
produite aux débats, ce qui expose ladite décision à lacensure de la juridiction d’appel.
Max Lambert Ndéma ElonguéLe cessionnaire d’une marque enregistrée en coursde validité n’est pas fondé à requérir l’annulationd’une marque identique ou similaire enregistrée
antérieurement à l’inscription de la cession au registre
spécial des marques tenues à l’organisation (1re espèce).
Viole l’article 18 des dispositions générales de l’Accord de
Bangui, Acte du 22 février 1999, le juge d’instance d’un
pays membre de l’OAPI qui invalide une marque dont lavalidité a antérieurement été confirmée par une décision
judiciaire définitive émanant de la Cour suprême d’unautre État partie (2e espèce).
Cour suprême du TOGO, Arrêt n° 47/11 du 21 juillet 2011,
SOCIÉTÉ NOSOCO-TOGO c. SOCIÉTÉ PASTACORP
S.A.S; Tribunal de grande instance du MFOUNDI(Yaoundé), Jugement n° 96/Com du 4 mai 2016, SOCIÉTÉPASTACORP c. TANKOUNANG Jean Delors et SOCIÉTÉNOSOCO TOGO Sarl.
Observations :Aux termes de l’article 5.1) de l’annexe III de l’Accord de
Bangui, Acte du 24 février 1999 : “… la propriété de lamarque appartient à celui qui, le premier, en a effectué
le dépôt”. À la vérité, c’est l’enregistrement qui fait naître
le droit de marque au profit du déposant, étant entendu
que le texte régional prévoit l’éventualité du rejet de la
demande d’enregistrement206. Les juridictions de l’ordre
judiciaire des États parties à l’Accord de Bangui ont été
amenées à infléchir la rigueur de ce texte en raison decertaines circonstances spécifiques. C’est dans cettemouvance que s’inscrivent les deux décisions rapportées
dont les approches sont diamétralement opposées surla question.
Faits : La société de droit français Rivoire et Carret
Lustacru (RCL) est titulaire de la marque semi-figurative“COUSCOUS SIPA” enregistrée à l’OAPI le 9 février 1981
et renouvelée successivement en 1991, 2001 et 2011
et distribue ses produits en Afrique par le biais de sonpartenaire local, la société NOSOCO-TOGO Sarl. Après
la disparition de la RCL, la société NOSOCO-TOGO Sarlqui fit enregistrer la même marque à l’OAPI en son
nom constata, un an plus tard, que les Établissements
la MASCOTTE installés au TOGO importaient une
marque de couscous identique à la sienne. Poursuivis
du chef de contrefaçon de la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA”
n° 47.511 devant le tribunal correctionnel de LOME,
les Établissements la MASCOTTE prétendirent tenir lecouscous revêtu de la marque litigieuse de la société
MARDI, représentante de la société PASTACORP SA,
toutes installées en France. Les Établissements la
MASCOTTE furent condamnés pour contrefaçon. Alors
qu’elle s’apprêtait à exécuter cette décision, la société206

NOSOCO-TOGO Sarl fut attraite devant le tribunal depremière instance de Lomé par la société PASTACORP SA
en nullité de son enregistrement.
Par jugement n° 622 du 13 avril 2007, cette juridiction
confirma NOSOCO-TOGO Sarl dans son droit
d’exploitation de la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA” et ordonnala radiation des registres de l’OAPI de l’enregistrement
opéré par PASTACORP SA.
La cour d’appel de Lomé infirma cette décision par arrêt
n° 027/2009 du 26 février 2009 et déclara plutôt la société
PASTACORP SA propriétaire par voie de cession de lamarque “COUSCOUS SIPA” n° 21.047 du 9 février 1981,
non sans condamner la société NOSOCO-TOGO Sarlà lui payer la somme de FCFA 100 000 000 à titre dedommages et intérêts.
Suivant arrêt n° 47/11 du 21 juillet 2011, la Cour suprême
du TOGO cassa sans renvoi l’arrêt infirmatif de la courd’appel, réhabilitant ainsi l’enregistrement n° 47.511
opéré par la société NOSOCO-TOGO Sarl.
Trois ans plus tard, la société PASTACORP SA revint à lacharge en traduisant sa concurrente NOSOCO TOGO Sarlet sieur TAKOUNANG Jean Delors, distributeur exclusif
des produits “COUSCOUS SIPA” à Yaoundé (Cameroun),cette fois devant le tribunal de grande instance de cetteville, en annulation de l’enregistrement “COUSCOUS
SIPA” n° 47.511. Cette juridiction donna gain de cause
à la société PASTACORP SA motif pris de ce que cetenregistrement a été opéré en fraude de ses droits, en sa
qualité de cessionnaire de la marque querellée déposéele 9 février 1981 et renouvelée successivement en 1991,
2001 et 2011.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

G. Marque – Nullité du certificat
d’enregistrement – Appréciation dudroit antérieur – Cession de marque –Opposabilité – Autorité régionale desdécisions judiciaires définitives

Raisonnement : La question centrale posée tant
aux juges de la juridiction suprême qu’à ceux dutribunal de grande instance était celle de savoir si lecessionnaire d’une marque enregistrée peut se prévaloird’un droit antérieur sur ladite marque nonobstantla non-inscription de la cession dont il se prévaut
dans les registres idoines tenus à l’OAPI. Les deux
juridictions ayant successivement donné des solutions
diamétralement opposées quant à la question de ladétermination du titulaire du droit antérieur (section I),
il y a lieu de s’interroger sur l’effectivité du principe del’autorité régionale des décisions judiciaires définitives
portant sur la validité des titres délivrés par cetteorganisation (section II).
I. La détermination du titulaire du droit antérieur
D’entrée de jeu, il s’est posé la question de savoir qui,de la société NOSOCO TOGO SARL ou de la société
PASTACORP SA est en droit de se prévaloir d’un droit
antérieur sur la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA”. L’analysedes solutions dégagées par les décisions ci-dessus
rapportées conduit à considérer d’une part la situation
du cessionnaire non inscrit (A) et d’autre part celle dudéposant frauduleux (B).

Aux termes de l’art. 14 al. 2 de l’ABR-1999 : “Tout dépôt qui ne satisfait pas aux
prescriptions de l’article 3, alinéas c) et e), est rejeté.”211

A. Le cessionnaire non inscrit
Il va sans dire que la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA” a été
initialement déposée à l’OAPI par la société française
RCL en date du 9 février 1981 et maintenue en vigueur
jusqu’en 2021 par suite de renouvellements successifs207.
Si ce droit est incontestablement transféré à la société
PASTACORP SA (1), son opposabilité à l’égard des tiers est
sujette à caution (2).
1. Un droit antérieur théoriquement transféré
L’application de l’article 5, alinéa 1, de l’annexe III del’accord précité208 conduit à attribuer sans détours lapaternité de la marque revendiquée à la société RCL, son
droit de propriété sur la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA” étant
consolidé jusqu’en 2021. Évidemment, la messe auraitété dite si les poursuites avaient été enclenchées parladite société. Or, il résulte des faits qu’à sa disparition, la
RCL avait cédé son droit sur la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA”
à sa consœur la société PASTACORP SA le 20 avril 2004
laquelle est, du fait de cette cession, subrogée dansses droits et actions relativement à l’objet cédé. En
toute logique, la société PASTACORP SA est en droit derevendiquer la paternité de la marque discutée sur lefondement de la cession dont la validité n’est du restepas contestée, ce d’autant qu’elle jouit, en principe,rétroactivement des effets du dépôt initial n° 21.047
opéré le 9 février 1981 par la société cédante209.

la société PASTACORP motif pris de l’opposabilité de la
cession à la société NOSOCO TOGO :“Attendu qu’en effet, le contrat de cession entre
les sociétés RCL et PASTACORP n’a été enregistréet porté à la connaissance des tiers, notamment
la société NOSOCO-TOGO, que le 17 janvier 2005
par l’enregistrement de la cession au registre
spécial des marques tenu à l’Organisation, donc
postérieurement à l’enregistrement de la marque
Couscous SIPA au profit de la société NOSOCOTOGO, répertorié à l’OAPI sous le numéro
n° 47.511 en date du 16 juillet 2002”.
La Haute juridiction en a déduit, au visa de l’article 27
de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé, que lasociété NOSOCO TOGO Sarl jouit d’un droit antérieur
sur la marque litigieuse et que PASTACORP SA n’est pas
habilitée à en solliciter l’annulation, comme l’aurait fait lasociété RCL propriétaire initiale.
“Attendu que par conséquent, la société
PASTACORP n’étant encore titulaire de la marqueau moment où NOSOCO-TOGO l’avait enregistréeà son profit, seules les sociétés SEMOULERIE DENORMANDIE et RIVOIRE ET CARRET LUSTACRU(RCL) dont l’enregistrement de la marque’Couscous SIPA’ était antérieur à celui de
NOSOCO-TOGO pouvaient agir en annulation del’enregistrement opéré par NOSOCO-TOGO;

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

C’est d’ailleurs l’un des éléments essentiels de la
motivation du collège des juges du tribunal de grande
instance du Mfoundi : “Attendu qu’il est constant quecette société a acquis la marque COUSCOUS SIPA par voie
de cession en 2004 auprès de la société Rivoire et Carret
Lustacru (RCL) laquelle a été enregistrée le 9 février 1981
à l’OAPI sous le numéro n° 21.047”. On le voit, le droit
antérieur sur la marque querellée est théoriquementtransféré au cessionnaire, la société PASTACORP SA qui
ne peut toutefois valablement l’opposer aux tiers.

212

2. Un droit antérieur inopposable aux tiers
L’arrêt infirmatif attaqué pose sans détours que “Lacession de la marque Couscous SIPA à la société
PASTACORP étant opposable à la société NOSOCOTOGO, la société PASTACORP est donc titulaire d’undroit antérieur et peut demander l’annulation del’enregistrement n° 47.511 fait le 3 juillet 2003 par lasociété NOSOCO-TOGO”. Les juges de la Cour suprême
du TOGO ont censuré la cour d’appel pour avoir conféré
l’antériorité du droit sur la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA” à
207

208
209

L’art. 19 du susdit accord indique que l’enregistrement d’une marque n’ad’effet que pour dix ans, à compter de la date de dépôt de la demanded’enregistrement; toutefois, la propriété de la marque peut être conservéesans limitation de durée par des renouvellements successifs pouvant êtreeffectués tous les dix ans. Le renouvellement est donc une formalité qui
permet de maintenir indéfiniment les droits sur une marque. Il est régi parl’art. 21 du même accord. La jurisprudence indique que le renouvellement
résultant d’une simple déclaration sans formalité d’examen, et non d’unnouveau dépôt, ne fait pas naître un nouveau droit, mais permet simplement
de le conserver : CA Paris, 4 e chambre, 8 avril 1998 : Gaz. Pal. 1998, II, p. 545.
Cette disposition, intégralement reprise par l’art. 4 l’ABR-2015, précise
que : sous réserve des dispositions ci-après, la propriété de la marqueappartient à celui qui, le premier, en a effectué le dépôt.
Par le mécanisme de la subrogation, le cessionnaire est désormais titulairedes droits résultant de l’enregistrement de la marque cédée et est parconséquent habilité à exercer les actions nécessaires pour la protection et ladéfense de ses intérêts comme l’aurait fait le titulaire initial.

“Attendu que or, lesdites sociétés n’ont exercé
aucun recours contre l’enregistrement de
NOSOCO-TOGO; qu’il s’ensuit que la société
PASTACORP dont le droit de propriété est
postérieur à celui de NOSOCO-TOGO n’est pas
fondée à agir en annulation de l’enregistrement
de cette dernière; que le moyen est donc fondé,d’où il suit que l’arrêt critiqué encourt cassation etannulation”.
L’article 27 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé
subordonne en effet l’opposabilité de la cession aux
tiers à un formalisme dirimant, à savoir l’inscription au
registre spécial des marques210. L’OAPI tient, pour chaqueobjet de propriété industrielle et pour l’ensemble desÉtats membres, un registre spécial dans lequel sontportées les inscriptions prescrites par l’accord. Or, lacession de la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA” intervenue
entre la RCL et la société PASTACORP SA a été inscrite
seulement le 17 janvier 2005 et donc postérieurement à
l’enregistrement dont se prévaut NOSOCO TOGO. Si lahaute juridiction Togolaise a approuvé le premier juge
en ce qu’il a confirmé la société NOSOCO TOGO Sarl dansson droit d’exploitation de la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA”
n° 47.511 du 3 juillet 2003 enregistrée antérieurement
à l’inscription de la cession, rien n’explique cependantl’invalidation de la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA” n° 21.047
du 9 février 1981 qui en soi ne comporte, selon toute
210

L’ABR-2015 prévoit, en son art. 31, une double formalité aux finsd’opposabilité, à savoir l’inscription au registre spécial des marques et lapublication au Bulletin officiel.

Il importe de souligner que le premier juge a annulé
l’enregistrement opéré par la société PASTACORPSA le 17 janvier 2005. Pourtant, cette société n’a enréalité pas procédé à un nouvel enregistrement de lamarque litigieuse, celle-ci ayant vu sa validité prorogée
jusqu’en 2021, la date du 17 janvier 2005 étant plutôtcelle de l’inscription de la cession au registre spécial
des marques. Or, l’inscription de la cession n’est pas
requise ad validitatem mais aux fins d’opposabilité auxtiers. La Cour de cassation française relève de façon
constante que le défaut de publicité au registre spécial
des marques ne remet pas en cause la validité de l’acte
de cession ou du nantissement. Il rend seulement celle-ci
inopposable aux tiers211. Sous ce rapport, c’est à tort
que l’annulation de l’enregistrement COUSCOUS SIPA
n° 21.047 du 9 février 1981 a été prononcée, l’antérioritéde cette marque devant s’apprécier au jour du dépôt
initial et non à la date de l’enregistrement de la cession.
Cette approche aurait plutôt conduit le juge suprême
à admettre à la limite une coexistence des marques enconflit, encore que cette solution perd tout son intérêt
lorsqu’on convoque la notion de fraude.
B. Le déposant frauduleux
La question de la fraude n’a pas été expressément poséedevant la Haute juridiction togolaise qui s’est sans doutebornée à examiner la pertinence des moyens de droit
tels qu’articulés par la société NOSOCO TOGO Sarl qui
invoquait, à l’appui de son pourvoi, la violation des articles
24-2 et 27 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé.
Pourtant, la haute juridiction était en droit de souleverd’office le moyen d’ordre public tiré de la violation duprincipe général de droit fraus omnia corrumpit. La
Commission supérieure de recours auprès de l’OAPI a eu
l’occasion de convoquer ce principe général de droit qui
signifie “la fraude corrompt tout”, pour rejeter l’opposition
à l’enregistrement de la marque “PRINCESSE VIGNETTE”
n° 43441212, pour invalider la marque querellée. De ce
point de vue, cette décision appelle quelques réserves.
L’on comprend dès lors pourquoi la société PASTACORP
SA a plus tard saisi le tribunal de grande instance deYaoundé aux fins d’annulation de la même marque“COUSCOUS SIPA” en fondant cette fois son action sur lafraude qu’aurait orchestrée la société NOSOCO TOGO.
Il va sans dire qu’à la date de l’enregistrement querellé,cette société avait parfaitement connaissance de ce quela marque litigieuse était précédemment enregistrée
au profit de son partenaire séculaire, la RCL. La fraudeparaît évidente en la cause. Le collège des juges dutribunal de grande instance a justement indiqué : “Qu’ils’en dégage alors qu’au moment où sieur NABIL TARRAF
KOUDJOCK a procédé à l’enregistrement de la marquequerellée, il avait pleine conscience de l’existenced’une marque antérieure identique; que ce faisant, il
211
212

Voir en ce sens Cass. com., 24 mai 1994 : D. 1994, IR, p. 55.
Voir CSR, Décision n° 032/CSR/OAPI du 25 mars 2004, in : Recueil desdécisions de la CSR, Sessions de 2003 à 2005, p. 18. Voir également TGI
du Mfoundi, Jugement n° 672/CIV du 17 septembre 2003, Société Cooper c.
Laboratoire Bride SA (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M-L.), ce recueil, chapitre 3,
section F).

a procédé par la fraude; qu’il s’en dégage alors que lasociété PASTACORP est fondée à solliciter l’annulationde son enregistrement; qu’il échet de faire droit à cettedemande”. Par ce raisonnement qui mérite pourtant
approbation, les juges du tribunal de grande instance duMfoundi semblent avoir déshabillé Pierre pour habiller
Paul en ce qu’ils ont résolu une difficulté tout en en
créant une autre, la plus redoutable qui soit, celle durespect de l’autorité régionale des décisions judiciaires
définitives portant sur la validité des titres.
II. L’altération de la règle de l’autorité régionale desdécisions judiciaires définitives
L’article 18 de l’ABR-1999 dispose : “Les décisions judiciaires
définitives rendues sur la validité des titres dans l’undes États membres en application des dispositions dutexte des annexes I à X au présent accord font autorité
dans tous les États membres, exceptées celles fondées
sur l’ordre public et les bonnes mœurs”213. Les décisions
rapportées mettent à rude épreuve le principe dégagé
par cette disposition communautaire (A) et sont denature à embarrasser les instances compétentes del’Organisation chargées de les mettre en œuvre (B).
A. La violation de l’article 18 de l’ABR-1999
Cette disposition constitue l’une des poutres maîtresses
de l’édifice à la base de la construction communautaire.
Les plénipotentiaires de l’OAPI ont en effet entendu dèsl’origine conférer aux décisions judiciaires définitives
rendues dans les États membres sur la validité destitres un rayonnement régional dans l’optique deparachever l’édifice communautaire amorcée par lalégislation commune. C’est dire que l’arrêt de la Coursuprême du Togo invalidant la marque “COUSCOUS SIPA”
n° 21.047 du 9 février 1981 devrait s’imposer aux juges
du tribunal de grande instance du Mfoundi en dépit duvice qu’il comporte, en vertu de l’article 18 précité, cettedécision ayant acquis autorité de chose jugée. La société
PASTACORP SA a sans nul doute mis à profit la défaillancedes défendeurs à savoir sieur TAKOUNANG Jean Delors etla société NOSOCO TOGO Sarl pour dissimuler aux juges
d’instance l’Arrêt invalidant sa marque. À la guerre commeà la guerre! En tout état de cause, la décision du tribunal
de grande instance du Mfoundi viole frontalement
l’article 18 des dispositions générales de l’Accord de
Bangui révisé et pourrait, une fois définitive, plonger les
instances compétentes de l’OAPI dans une impasse.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

vraisemblance, aucun vice pouvant fonder son annulation.

B. Le dilemme au sein de l’OAPI
Le dilemme en face duquel les instances del’Organisation pourraient se trouver à une double
213

Cette disposition a été modifiée par l’art. 20 de l’ABR-2015, qui apporte plus
de précisions quant à la compréhension du principe de l’autorité régionale
des décisions judiciaires définitives portant sur la validité des titres; l’al. 1
de cet article indique en effet que : sous réserve des dispositions de l’art. 4
précédent, les décisions judiciaires définitives rendues sur la validité destitres dans l’un des États membres en application des dispositions dutexte des annexes I à X au présent accord font autorité dans tous les autres
États membres, exceptées celles fondées sur l’ordre public et les bonnesmœurs. L’al. 2 renchérit : les décisions judiciaires définitives rendues dansl’un des États membres, dans les domaines autres que la validité des titres,sont exécutoires dans les autres États membres en vertu d’une décisiond’exequatur rendue conformément à la législation de l’État concerné,
exceptées celles fondées sur l’ordre public et les bonnes mœurs.
213

dimension : la première d’ordre juridique (1) et la seconded’ordre pratique (2).

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

1. La dimension juridique du dilemme
Aux termes de l’article 28 de l’annexe III de l’Accordde Bangui révisé : “Toute décision judiciaire définitive
prononçant l’annulation des effets sur le territoire
national de l’un des États membres du dépôt d’une
marque doit être inscrite au registre spécial desmarques sur notification de la juridiction et fairel’objet d’une mention publiée par l’Organisation”. En
application de cette disposition, l’OAPI pourrait seretrouver en possession de deux décisions judiciaires
définitives contraires émanant de deux États membreset portant sur la même marque, en l’occurrence l’arrêt
n° 47/11 du 21 juillet 2011 de la Cour suprême du TOGO
invalidant la marque, “COUSCOUS SIPA” n° 21.047 du
9 février 1981 et le jugement n° 96/Com du 4 mai 2016
du tribunal de grande instance du Mfoundi réhabilitantla même marque. Laquelle des deux décisions sera
prise en considération au sein de l’Organisation? Un
véritable choix cornélien! Les puristes accorderontsans ambages prééminence à celle émanant de la Coursuprême qui est la plus haute instance juridictionnelled’un pays. Cette approche nous paraît hâtive et mêmeartificielle étant observé qu’il n’existe aucune hiérarchie
du moins formelle entre les décisions rendues dansdifférents États, l’OAPI n’ayant de surcroît pas vocation
à privilégier un État au détriment d’un autre au risquede se faire du mal. On voit là se profiler à l’horizon laquestion de la nécessité d’une Cour régionale de justicede propriété intellectuelle seule habilitée à régler detelles questions.

214

2. La dimension pratique du dilemme
L’implémentation des décisions judiciaires définitives
susévoquées par les services techniques compétents
de l’OAPI en application de l’article 24, alinéa 3,de l’ABR-1999 a généré un abondant contentieux
administratif qui a récemment connu un dénouement
à la faveur d’une décision fort intéressante de laCommission supérieure de recours. Cette disposition
légale précise en effet que lorsque la décision déclarantl’enregistrement nul et non avenu est devenue
définitive, elle est communiquée à l’Organisation aux
fins d’inscription dans le registre spécial des marques.
Initialement saisie par la Société NOSOCO TOGO Sarl,aux fins d’inscription de l’Arrêt contradictoire n° 47 dela Cour suprême du TOGO, l’Organisation a refusé des’exécuter motif pris de ce que cette décision n’avaitpas été rendue en application des dispositions de l’ABet ses annexes. Elle a, par contre, réservé une suite
heureuse à la demande postérieure de la société
PASTACORP SA tendant à l’inscription des jugements
n° 095 et 096 rendus le 4 mai 1996 par le tribunal de
grande instance du MFOUNDI portant respectivement
annulation des marques “COUSCOUS SIPA + logo”
n° 47511 et “COUSCOUS SIPA” n° 64509 appartenant àla société NOSOCO TOGO Sarl214. Ce différend fut porté
214

L’inscription de ces jugements fut constatée par les décisons du directeur
général de l’OAPI n° 18/0513/OAPI/DG/DMSD/SSPD et n° 18/0512/OAPI/DG/
DMSD/SSPD du 27 avril 2018, inédites.

devant le collège des Magistrats de la Commission
supérieure de recours et réglé en faveur de la société
NOSOCO TOGO Sarl215. Nonobstant cette posture del’instance faîtière de règlement des différends au sein del’OAPI, ses services compétents ne se sont pas toujours
exécutés, contraignant la susdite société à solliciter à
nouveau le magistère de ladite instance, cette fois enannulation des décisions du directeur général de l’OAPI
portant inscription au registre spécial des marques desjugements rendus par le juge d’instance du MFOUNDI.
Par décision n° 0018/20/OAPI/CSR du 17 novembre 2020,
ladite Commission a mis un terme à ce différend au plan
administratif d’une part, en annulant les décisions
du directeur général de l’OAPI critiquées et, d’autrepart, en ordonnant l’inscription au registre spécial desmarques tant de l’Arrêt n° 47/11 du 21 juillet 2011 dela Cour suprême du TOGO que de la décision
n° 0183/0API/CSR rendue le 30 octobre 2014 par laCommission supérieure de recours. Cette importantedécision traduit le rôle de régulateur que doit jouer cetteinstance au sein de l’Organisation qui est tenue de se
conformer aux décisions de justice définitives rendues
par les juridictions des États membres en application del’AB et ses annexes.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

H. Marque – Contrefaçon - Imitation
frauduleuse – Contrefaçon par usage– Provision – Manque à gagner Préjudice commercial – Profit réalisé– Préjudice ressenti – Devoir deprudence – Contrat de licence
Si la matérialité de l’acte de contrefaçon de marque est
laissée à l’appréciation souveraine des juges de fond,c’est à la condition qu’ils ne dénaturent pas les faits dont
ils sont saisis. Ainsi, les juges ne peuvent ajouter à la loi
en exigeant des circonstances non prévues.
Par ailleurs, en procédant à la réparation du préjudicesubi par le propriétaire de la marque, le tribunal doit
s’appuyer sur des éléments comptables, notamment leprofit réalisé par le contrefacteur.
Cour d’appel de DAKAR, Arrêt n° 425/Com du
19 juin 1998, SOCIÉTÉ M.SA c. STÉ BA IMPORT-EXPORT
Observations :Si la matérialité de l’acte de contrefaçon de marque est
laissée à l’appréciation souveraine des juges de fond,c’est à la condition qu’ils ne dénaturent pas les faits dont
ils sont saisis. Ainsi, les juges ne peuvent ajouter à la loi
en exigeant des circonstances non prévues. Par ailleurs,en procédant à la réparation du préjudice subi par lepropriétaire de la marque, le tribunal doit s’appuyer surdes éléments comptables, notamment le profit réalisé
par le contrefacteur. L’application de ces principes,
qui découlent de l’essence même des dispositions del’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui, révisé en 1999, et de215

Voir : Décision n° 0183/OAPI/CSR du 30 octobre 2014, inédite.

Faits : Pour rappel, les sociétés M... et Veuve M. C. et
FILS avaient, par acte en date des 2 septembre 1980 et
1er janvier 1990, fait enregistrer auprès de l’Organisation
africaine de la propriété intellectuelle (OAPI) et del’Institut national de la propriété intellectuelle (INPI) lamarque de joints de culasse “MEILLOR”. Ainsi, dans lecadre de l’exploitation de cette marque, elles avaientsigné avec la société A.J. de droit tunisien un contrat delicence qui a expiré le 3 mai 1993.

la qualification de contrefaçon par imitation frauduleusepour retenir la contrefaçon par usage, avant d’admettrela responsabilité des sociétés BA...IMPORT-EXPORT et
FOUR pour participation à la réalisation du dommage subi
sociétés M... et Veuve M. C. et FILS. En ce sens, elle a aussi
répondu par l’affirmative à la deuxième interrogation.
Cette position de la Cour mérite analyse au regard desdispositions pertinentes de l’annexe III de l’Accord de
Bangui du 2 mars 1977, sous l’empire de laquelle ladécision a été rendue, mais surtout de l’Acte de 2015
dudit accord qui donne désormais une vision plus clairedes catégories de contrefaçon de marque et traite demanière plus appropriée la lancinante question de laréparation du dommage217.

Toutefois, constatant la commercialisation au Sénégal,sans son consentement, des joints de culasse “MEILLOR”
par les sociétés BA...IMPORTEXPORT et FOUR, qui les
importaient auprès de la société A.J., elles ont saisi
le président du tribunal régional de Dakar216 qui, parordonnance du 6 août 1996, les a autorisées à faire
procéder à une saisie-description de ces produits.

Il est dès lors important d’aborder ici :Par exploit du 22 août 1996, les bénéficiaires ont assignéen validation de la saisie pratiquée le 14 août 1996, en
paiement de la somme de cent millions de francs CFA
à titre de dommages et intérêts. Saisi de cette affaire,le juge d’instance a débouté les sociétés M... et Veuve
M. C. et FILS de toutes leurs demandes au motif queles défenderesses n’ont pas violé les dispositions desarticles 37 et 38 de l’Accord de Bangui.

I. L’appréciation de la contrefaçon par importation ou
mise en vente de produits contrefaisants par le juge
du fond

Raisonnement : Sur appel interjeté par les sociétésdemanderesses, la cour d’appel a infirmé partiellementla décision d’instance en validant, d’une part, la saisiedescription sur le fondement de l’existence d’une
contrefaçon par usage, ordonnant ainsi la destructiondes échantillons et, d’autre part, en retenant laresponsabilité civile des sociétés BA...IMPORT-EXPORT et
FOUR..., en allouant, toutefois, le franc symbolique auxsociétés M... et Veuve M. C. et FILS.
Pour parvenir à cette décision, la Cour a répondu à deux
questions qui lui étaient principalement posées :a.

b.

L’importation et la mise en vente de produits
provenant d’une société, dont la licenced’exploitation est expirée, sont-elles constitutives
d’actes de contrefaçon?
Le juge du fond peut-il réparer le préjudice résultant
de cette contrefaçon, en s’abstenant de réparer
intégralement le préjudice en cas d’impossibilité
matérielle de le chiffrer?

Pour la Cour, il y a effectivement contrefaçon résultant
d’une négligence de l’importateur des produits
contrefaisants. Pour aboutir à cette conclusion, elle a écarté216

Le tribunal régional hors classe de Dakar est devenu le tribunal de grande
instance hors classe par l’effet de la loi n° 2014-26 du 3 novembre 2014
abrogeant et remplaçant la loi n° 84-19 du 2 février 1984 fixant l’organisation
judiciaire au Sénégal.

I.

II.

la question de la sanction de l’importation et de lamise en vente de produit contrefaisant par le juge
du fond; etl’appréciation de la responsabilité de l’auteur de ces
actes par le juge du fond.

Le juge a conclu à l’absence d’une imitation frauduleuseen estimant que les sociétés BA...IMPORT-EXPORTet FOUR... n’ont procédé à aucune modification descaractéristiques de la marque de nature à tromperl’acheteur (A). Pour autant elle a relevé qu’il y avait
contrefaçon par usage (B).

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

l’Acte de 2015 dudit accord, est toujours à l’ordre du jour,tant il est vrai que la jurisprudence dans les États parties
à l’accord est abondante et sont intéressants mêmesi certaines décisions sont parfois très discutables. Le
présent arrêt s’inscrit dans ce cadre.

A. L’absence de modification substantielle de nature à
tromper l’acheteur
En rejetant les prétentions des sociétés M... et Veuve
M. C. et FILS, la cour d’appel a bâti son argumentaire
autour de la modification substantielle ou non de lamarque “MEILLOR” dont les appelants principauxdétiennent le droit exclusif. En effet, la notion d’imitation
frauduleuse était, sous l’empire de l’Accord de Bangui
du 2 mars 1977, une alternative pour sanctionner lecomportement illicite d’un fabricant qui ne pouvait êtrepoursuivi sur le fondement de la contrefaçon de marque.
De fait, à la lecture de l’article 38.a) de l’Accord de Bangui
du 2 mars 1977 sur la base duquel le juge d’appel aapprécié l’existence ou non d’une imitation frauduleuse,on s’aperçoit que ce délit n’entre pas dans le champ de lacontrefaçon de marque218.
D’ailleurs le législateur procédait à un emprunt depénalité en précisant que celui qui, “sans contrefaire une
marque”, en aura fait l’imitation frauduleuse de nature
217

218

Cf. art. 54 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015 : “La juridiction saisie détermine
le montant des dommages et intérêts, en tenant compte des conséquenceséconomiques négatives, dont le manque à gagner, subies par la partie lésée, lesbénéfices réalisés par le contrefacteur et le préjudice moral causé au titulaire desdroits du fait de l’atteinte.”
Art. 38 let. a : “Sont punis d’une amende de 50 000 à 150 000 francs CFA et d’unemprisonnement d’un mois à un an, ou de l’une de ces peines seulement : a) ceuxqui, sans contrefaire une marque, en ont fait une imitation frauduleuse de nature à
tromper l’acheteur ou ont fait usage d’une marque frauduleusement imitée.”215à tromper l’acheteur, sera puni des mêmes peines quecelles prévues pour la contrefaçon de marque. Cette
distinction opérée dans l’ancienne législation ne nous
semblait pas justifiée dès lors que la contrefaçon englobe
la reproduction ou, de manière générale, l’utilisationd’une marque enregistrée, sans l’autorisation du titulairedes droits de nature à affecter l’image de celle-ci219.

qu’elle puisse entraîner une confusion chez l’acheteur225.
C’est pourquoi la caractérisation de l’imitation
frauduleuse de marque requiert nécessairement deprendre en considération le consommateur. De fait, c’est
au regard de sa capacité à distinguer les produits que
sera appréciée la portée de l’imitation pour envisager sa
sanction.

Au regard de cette définition, l’imitation frauduleuse
entre bien dans la catégorie de la contrefaçon
de marque. D’ailleurs l’Acte de 2015 a corrigé cemanquement en précisant que “Toute atteinte portée
aux droits du titulaire de la marque, tels qu’ils sontdéfinis à l’article 6, constitue une contrefaçon”220.

En l’espèce, par constat d’huissier en date du
4 septembre 1996, il a été établi que les joints de culasse
entreposés par les sociétés BA...IMPORT-EXPORT et
FOUR... étaient identiques aux caractéristiques desjoints de série 411-129 et 411-652 dont la marqueappartient aux sociétés M... et Veuve M. C. et FILS.
Malgré ce constat, la cour a considéré que la contrefaçon
par imitation frauduleuse ne pouvait être retenue au
motif que “les sociétés M... et Veuve M. C. et FILS n’ont
pas démontré les moyens par lesquels les sociétés
FOUR... et BA... IMPORT-EXPORT auraient modifié lescaractéristiques de la marque ’MEILLOR’ qui, ainsi, serait
galvaudée, par imitation frauduleuse”. Elle a, par contre,
estimé qu’il y avait une contrefaçon par usage consistantà l’introduction et la mise en circulation des produits
contrefaisants.

À la faveur de l’Accord de Bangui révisé de 1999 et del’Acte de 2015 dudit accord, toutes ces infractions sontdésormais regroupées dans l’expression “exploitation
illicite d’une marque enregistrée”221. L’imitation
frauduleuse d’une marque de nature à engendrer unrisque de confusion dans l’esprit du public constitue une
contrefaçon222. Et cette démarche est à saluer dès lorsque toute exploitation illicite d’une marque renvoie à
la contrefaçon223.
Il faut noter que c’est à juste titre que la cour d’appel
a relevé que l’imitation de la marque “MEILLOR”, dont
se prévalaient les appelants, n’a pas été suffisamment
caractérisée. L’imitation, dont il s’agit ici, doit portersur des produits ou services identiques ou similaires à
ceux désignés dans l’enregistrement. La jurisprudenceen la matière a dégagé trois conditions nécessaires à lacaractérisation de l’imitation illicite :a.

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b.
c.

216

d’abord, une imitation d’une marque enregistrée
par la reprise d’éléments phonétiques, visuels ou
conceptuels; ensuite
une identité ou une similarité des produits; et enfin
des conditions de nature à créer un risque deconfusion dans l’esprit du public224.

Elle ne peut, en effet, être retenue si la preuve del’existence d’une grande éventualité de confusion n’est
pas rapportée; cette preuve est à la charge de celuiqui s’en prévaut. À ce niveau, il n’est point exigé que la
différence soit caractéristique ou remarquable mais
219

220
221

222
223

224

À titre de comparaison : voir l’art. 58 de l’annexe I et l’art. 41 de l’annexe II del’AB-1977. Il ressort de ces dispositions que toute atteinte portée aux droits
du breveté ou au modèle d’utilité, soit par l’emploi de moyens faisant l’objet
de son brevet ou de son modèle d’utilité, soit par le recel, soit par la vente ou
l’exposition en vente ou soit par l’introduction sur le territoire national de l’undes États membres, d’un ou plusieurs objets, constitue le délit de contrefaçon.
Art. 49 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Les infractions des art. 37 et 38 de l’AB-1977 sont maintenant réunies au seinde l’art. 37 de l’ABR qui prévoit maintenant des sanctions pour les infractions
d’omission et le non-respect des restrictions, notamment les signes dontl’emploi est prohibé. Voir aussi l’art. 57 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
TGI de Paris, 3e chambre, 3e section, 7 janvier 2003, SA Iliad c. Cédric A.
À propos de l’exigence d’une reproduction à l’identique ou quasi-identique,
il ressort de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne
qu’“un signe est identique à la marque lorsqu’il reproduit, sans modificationni ajout, tous les éléments constituant la marque ou lorsque, considéré dansson ensemble, il recèle des différences si insignifiantes qu’elles peuvent
passer inaperçues aux yeux d’un consommateur moyen” (Cour de justice del’Union européenne, Arrêt du 20 mars 2003, LTJ Diffusions SA c. Sadas Verbaudet
SA, C-291/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:169, point 54).
Voir art. 6 de l’ABR-2015.

B. La reconnaissance d’une contrefaçon par usage
Analysant les faits de l’espèce au regard de l’article 37.a)de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui du 2 mars 1977,
la cour d’appel a retenu qu’en important des produits
contrefaisants les sociétés BA...IMPORT-EXPORT et
FOUR... ont commis une contrefaçon par usage.
Il faut rappeler que la contrefaçon par usage, telle que
prévue à l’article 37.a) de l’annexe III de l’Accord de
Bangui révisé qui dispose que “ceux qui ont contrefait
une marque ou fait usage d’une marque contrefaite”
sont punis d’une amende et/ou d’un emprisonnement,
implique au préalable la caractérisation de la marquecontrefaite226.
En l’espèce, en retenant la notion de contrefaçon parusage, le juge a considéré que la marque “MEILLOR”
est contrefaite par la société tunisienne A.J. Cette
contrefaçon s’apparente à la contrefaçon par
reproduction qui se définit comme la reproduction de lamarque à l’identique, sans retraits ni ajouts mais sans leconsentement du propriétaire227.
La société M. SA, par contrat de licence de marque du
19 mai 1992, complété par un avenant signé à la mêmedate à NANTIAT en France, avait concédé à la société A.J.
le droit de l’utiliser. Toutefois, le contrat de licence, quiliait les parties, a été résilié le 3 mai 1993. Dès lors, au
225

226
227

Voir SA Iliad c. Cédric A., n.111; jugé qu’“Aux termes de l’article L. 713-3 ducode de la propriété intellectuelle : ’sont interdits […], s’il peut en résulter
un risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public […], l’imitation d’une marqueet l’usage d’une marque imitée pour des produits identiques ou similaires à
ceux désignés dans l’enregistrement‘”. En l’espèce, la modification consistantà remplacer une lettre par un tiret dans le cadre de l’intitulé 3617 An-u,l’annuaire inversé, représente une imitation manifeste.
Voir l’art. 57 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Voir TGI du Wouri (Douala), Jugement n° 886/civ du 5 décembre 2016, Forest
Stewardship council c. Boris Bois Sarl Rapp (obs. FADE (A.), ce recueil, chapitre 3,
section B).

moment où les joints de culasse de marque “MEILLOR”
avec les caractéristiques 411-129 et 411-652 ont été livrés
courant 1996 à la société FOUR… par la société A.J., cettedernière n’avait plus le droit d’utiliser la marque susvisée.
De ce fait, les sociétés M... et Veuve M. C. et FILS avaient
tout intérêt à s’opposer à la mise en circulation de leurmarque “MEILLOR”, enregistrée auprès de l’OAPI et del’INPI, et indûment apposée sur les pochettes et joints
de culasse des séries 411-129 et 411-652, respectivement,
sous les n° 20698 et 045202.

caractérisation de la contrefaçon230. D’ailleurs, à la faveurde la révision de l’Accord de Bangui, la caractérisationde la contrefaçon par usage requiert désormais quela marque porte des indications propres à tromperl’acheteur sur la nature du produit231.

Cette protection a été réitérée par les dispositions desarticles 7 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé
24 février 1999 et 6 de l’Acte 2015 dudit accord. Le
propriétaire de la marque a, en effet, le droit exclusifd’utiliser la marque, ou un signe lui ressemblant pour les
produits ou services pour lesquels elle a été enregistrée,ainsi que pour des produits ou services similaires228.
Toutefois, le choix du juge d’appel d’analyser les faits
de l’espèce sous l’angle de la contrefaçon par usage
nous paraît discutable. Au regard de l’article 37.a) del’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui du 2 mars 1977, lacontrefaçon est dite d’usage lorsque la marque est
utilisée par un tiers fabricant sans l’autorisation dupropriétaire229. En l’espèce, apprécier les faits sous l’angle
de la vente ou de la mise en circulation de produits
contrefaisants, comme le prévoit l’article 37.c) del’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui du 2 mars 1977 nous
semble plus approprié.

II. L’appréciation de la responsabilité de l’auteur de lacontrefaçon par le juge du fondEn effet, il est établi que les sociétés BA...IMPORTEXPORT et FOUR... ont introduit et mis en circulation
des produits contrefaisants qui ont été fabriqués parla société tunisienne M. SA qui n’avait plus le droit
d’exploiter la marque “MEILLOR”. La contrefaçon parusage aurait pu être retenue de manière plus aisée àl’encontre de la société fabricante notamment A.J. etdans ce cadre, le faisceau d’indices aménagé par lajurisprudence serait mis en œuvre pour apprécier la

Les juges d’appel ont pris en considération la bonne
foi des sociétés importatrices dans leurs rapports
avec la société A.J. Ils ont estimé, en effet, que cettedernière leur a caché la résiliation conventionnellede sa licence en leur fournissant des documents qui
attestaient du contraire. Néanmoins, la cour ne semble
tirer aucune conséquence de cette bonne foi dèslors que le raisonnement adopté pour conclure à laparticipation de ces sociétés au préjudice subi par lesappelants principaux n’intègre nullement cet élément
moral. D’ailleurs cela nous paraît surprenant. En effet,
en prenant en compte l’élément moral, la conséquence
serait de ne pas retenir une contrefaçon par usage dès

Cette responsabilité résulte de leur participation à laréalisation du dommage subi par M... et Veuve M. C. et
FILS (A) et nécessite une réparation (B).
A. La responsabilité pour participation à la réalisation
du dommage
Pour en arriver à cette conclusion, la cour a relevé
que ces sociétés ont introduit au Sénégal des produits
contrefaisants de la marque “MEILLOR” qui appartient
exclusivement aux sociétés M... et Veuve M. C. et FILS.
Dans la démarche de la juridiction, même si les intiméesn’ont pas commis de contrefaçon de marque, elles sontpassibles de contrefaçon par usage. C’est d’ailleurs sur ce
fondement que les juges ont estimé qu’elles n’étaient pasétrangères au préjudice subi par les appelants.

230

228

229

Il s’agit de l’ancien art. 20 de l’AB-1977. L’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 en sonart. 7 al. 2 a introduit un autre droit au profit du propriétaire de la marque,
notamment celui exclusif d’empêcher tous les tiers agissant sans sonconsentement de faire usage au cours d’opérations commerciales de signes
identiques ou similaires pour des produits ou services qui sont similaires à
ceux pour lesquels la marque de produits ou de services est enregistrée dansle cas où un tel usage entraînerait un risque de confusion.
Une comparaison des dispositions des art. 37 let. a et art. 38 let. b del’annexe III de l’AB-1977, art. 37 al. 1 let. a et art. 37 al. 2 let. b de l’annexe III
de l’ABR-1999 et de l’art. 57 de l’ABR-2015 permet de dire que la contrefaçon
par usage requiert non seulement la matérialité de l’usage d’une marquecontrefaisante mais aussi l’existence d’indications propres à tromperl’acheteur sur la nature du produit. Dans les deux derniers cas, l’usage de lamarque semble s’adresser au fabricant et non au vendeur.

231

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

Poursuivant sa logique, la cour, après avoir retenu
la contrefaçon par usage, a naturellement admis la
responsabilité des sociétés BA...IMPORT-EXPORTet FOUR...

Cf. art. 37 al. 1 let. a et art. 37 al. 2 let. b de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999. Au
regard des dispositions relatives aux sanctions concernant la contrefaçon, il
nous semble que l’Accord de Bangui a prévu d’une part des sanctions pour les
fabricants et d’autre part des sanctions pour les vendeurs ou distributeurs(l’ABR est plus précis lorsqu’il s’agit par exemple du brevet ou des modèles
d’utilité car les dispositions de l’art. 58 de l’annexe I et 41 de l’annexe II
prévoient le recel de contrefaçon de brevet). L’ABR-2015 n’a pas apportéde changement à ce niveau car il prévoit les mêmes recels en ses art. 55 del’annexe I et 61 de l’annexe II. Il serait largement recommandé que l’ABR-2015
généralise le recel comme acte de contrefaçon pour toutes les œuvres depropriété intellectuelle. Mais on peut se demander si l’art. 430 du Code pénal
du Sénégal qui dispose que “Ceux qui sciemment auront recelé, en tout en
partie, des choses ou biens quelconques enlevées, détournées ou obtenues àl’aide d’un crime ou d’un délit, seront punis des peines prévues par l’art. 370”,
ne permettrait pas de sanctionner le recel de contrefaçon de marque. Notre
lecture de cette disposition nous conduit à l’affirmative. La possession ou ladétention d’un objet contrefaisant constitue un acte de recel qui nécessitel’établissement de la mauvaise foi de l’agent pénal pour la sanction. Voirpar exemple Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 6 février 2014,
Leidseplein Beheer BV et Hendrikus de Vries c. Red Bull GmbH et Red Bull Nederland
BV, C-65/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:49; CA Paris, Pôle 5, 12e chambre, Arrêt du
23 janvier 2012.
Cf. art. 37 al. 2 let. b de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999.
217

lors qu’il est établi qu’il y avait un usage honnête commel’a rappelé la cour de cassation française232.
Cette expression d’“usage honnête” est un critère qui
aurait permis de ne pas sanctionner systématiquement
l’usage de la marque d’autrui sans le consentement de
ce dernier. Même si la cour n’a pas tiré de conséquences
relativement à la bonne foi des sociétés BA...IMPORTEXPORT et FOUR... elle a aussitôt rappelé qu’enintroduisant des produits contrefaisants au Sénégal,elles ont manqué à leur propre devoir de prudence.
Cette approche semble problématique car le devoir deprudence n’étant pas défini par la loi, il faudra se référer
à la jurisprudence dont la codification avait été proposéedans le projet de réforme du droit des obligations en
France. En effet, l’article 1242 de ce projet l’apprécie
comme une faute et l’appréhende comme un “acteobjectivement anormal au regard du comportement
attendu d’une personne raisonnable”233.

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En l’espèce, la cour ne caractérise pas le manquement
au devoir de prudence. En réalité, elle a rappelé que lessociétés BA...IMPORT-EXPORT et FOUR... ont prouvé leurbonne foi et qu’il est établi qu’elles se sont basées sur uncontrat de licence fournie par la société A.J. Poursuivant,elle précise qu’elles se sont aussi fondées sur lesrenseignements dont elles disposaient. Or, dans ces
conditions, retenir un manquement à une obligation deprudence suscite des interrogations234. De fait, le juge n’apas suffisamment caractérisé la faute sur le fondement
de laquelle elle a retenu la responsabilité des sociétés
BA...IMPORT-EXPORT et FOUR... Cette caractérisation est
d’autant plus nécessaire que la jurisprudence admet uncontrôle sur la qualification de la faute.

218

En ce sens, la Cour de cassation a rappelé au juge
du fond son obligation de caractériser la faute danstous ses éléments à partir des circonstances de faitsouverainement appréciées et qu’il ne doit pas se limiterà déduire de la constatation d’un préjudice l’existenced’une faute (le principe est posé dans la décision
depuis 1873)235.
Néanmoins, pour la cour d’appel, le fait d’avoir introduit
sur le territoire sénégalais des produits contrefaisantssuffit à retenir la responsabilité des sociétés BA...
IMPORT-EXPORT et FOUR... et à envisager la réparation.
B. La réparation du dommage subi par le titulaire de lamarque contrefaite
La cour d’appel a d’abord évalué le préjudice (1) avant dedéfinir les mécanismes de réparation (2).

232
233

234
235

Cass. com., 7 juillet 2017, n° 15-28.114.
Cette définition n’a pas été finalement retenue lors de l’adoption définitivede la réforme suivant l’Ordonnance n° 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant
réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve desobligations, in : JORF, n° 0035, 11 février 2016, texte n° 26.
Voir DESPORTES (F.), La responsabilité pénale en matière d’infractions non
intentionnelles : Rapport annuel de la Cour de cassation française, 2002.
Cass. civ., 15 avril 1873, et récemment rappelé par la deuxième chambre
civile. Cass. civ., 2e chambre civile, 14 juin 2018, n° 17-14.781.

1. L’évaluation du préjudice résultant de la contrefaçon
de marque
La cour considère d’emblée que l’évaluation du préjudicesubi par le propriétaire d’une marque contrefaite est
faite en considération du montant des bénéfices réaliséspar la vente illicite des objets contrefaisants puisqu’ils
peuvent être corrélés avec la perte subie par la victime
de la contrefaçon.
Ce mécanisme de réparation, consistant à se référer auxéventuels bénéfices de l’auteur de la faute, serait propreà l’action en contrefaçon car, dans la théorie générale
de la responsabilité civile, on envisage le principe de laréparation intégrale du préjudice évalué par rapport àcelui qui subit le dommage236. En privilégiant, pour ladétermination du montant de la réparation, le profit
réalisé par l’auteur du dommage au détriment dupréjudice subi par la victime, la juridiction d’appel semble
diluer le principe de la réparation intégrale.
Toutefois, l’intérêt de sa démarche réside dans lecaractère avant-gardiste de la décision. De fait,
sanctionner le comportement du contrefacteur, en
se fondant sur le profit réalisé, permet d’assurer
une meilleure protection des droits de propriété
intellectuelle et partant, éviter le développement despratiques contrefaisantes, au regard du caractère quasiautomatique de la réparation qui, de surcroît, sera au
minimum égal au profit que le contrefacteur aura réalisé.
Ainsi, il ne pourra tirer aucun profit économique de lacontrefaçon dont il est l’auteur.
Cette démarche a aussi des limites objectives. Parfois
le préjudice subi par le propriétaire de la marquecontrefaite peut être plus important que le montant
des bénéfices réalisés par le contrefacteur. Pour une
meilleure prise en charge de la réparation, l’image dela marque qui peut être affectée par la reproduction ou
la vente illicite doit aussi être un élément d’évaluation
du préjudice. Pourtant, si l’on se limite aux bénéfices
résultant de la vente illicite, cet élément ne saurait êtrepris en compte. De manière constante, deux éléments
doivent entrer en compte dans l’appréciation du montant
de la réparation en cas de contrefaçon : l’enrichissement
illicite du contrefacteur et la détérioration de la notoriété
ou du prestige de la marque237.
Pour une meilleure prise en charge de ces
préoccupations et pour mieux garantir la réparation
du préjudice résultant de la contrefaçon, l’Accord de
Bangui, Acte de 2015 en cours de ratification a élargi lechamp des critères d’évaluation du préjudice. Il intègre
en effet, pertinemment, “les conséquences économiques
négatives, dont le manque à gagner, subies par la partie
lésée, les bénéfices réalisés par l’auteur de l’acte illicite et

236
237

Cf. art. 134 Code des obligations civiles et commerciales du Sénégal (COCC) :“Les dommages et intérêts doivent être fixés de telle sorte qu’ils soient pourla victime la réparation intégrale du préjudice subi.”
Cass. civ., 3e chambre civile, 8 juin 2017, n° 15-21.357.

Sans doute, c’est cette difficulté qui a conduit à apprécier
les demandes de réparation formulées par les sociétés
M... et Veuve M.C. et FILS sous l’angle de la provision
prévue à l’article 134 du Code des obligations civiles
et commerciales du Sénégal (COCC)239. Néanmoins,cette disposition pose effectivement le principe dela réparation intégrale en précisant que “Lorsque lemontant des dommages et intérêts dépend directement
ou indirectement du montant des revenus de la victime,la réparation allouée est appréciée en tenant comptede ses déclarations fiscales relatives aux trois années
qui ont précédé celle du dommage.” De fait, la provisionenvisagée dans le cadre de la réparation du préjudice
résultant d’une contrefaçon est une alternative. Ainsi, un
montant forfaitaire qui ne peut se résumer en un franc
symbolique peut être allouée à la victime240.
Dans tous les cas, il y a lieu de faire la démonstration dupréjudice invoqué et des sommes réclamées à ce titre.
L’article 43 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé,
qui envisage les dommages et intérêts à l’encontre
du contrefacteur, ne définit pas les critères de son
appréciation. Ainsi, considérant que le préjudice subi
par les propriétaires de la marque est établi, la cour aprocédé à sa réparation.
2. Les modalités de réparation du préjudice subi par letitulaire de la marque contrefaite
La cour d’appel a alloué le franc symbolique en précisantqu’elle statuait d’après les règles de l’équité sans émettrela prétention de réparer intégralement le préjudice
dès lors qu’elle était dans l’impossibilité matérielle dele chiffrer. Cet obstacle résulte du fait que la cour s’est
limitée à un seul critère d’appréciation du préjudice, enl’occurrence le profit réalisé par le contrefacteur.
Pourtant, dès lors que l’existence du préjudice n’est plus
discutée, l’appréciation de son étendue, qui dépend
des éléments factuels de la procédure, devrait être

238

239

240

Cette modalité de détermination des dommages et intérêts a été généraliséeet la même formulation a été reprise dans les différentes autres annexes
notamment en matière de brevets d’invention (art. 69), de modèles d’utilité(art. 61), de marque (art. 54), de dessins et modèles industriels (art. 18 al. 4),d’indications géographiques (art. 22 al. 4), etc.
Art. 134 COCC : “Les dommages et intérêts doivent être fixés de telle sorte
qu’ils soient pour la victime la réparation intégrale du préjudice subi. Lorsquele montant des dommages et intérêts dépend directement ou indirectement
du montant des revenus de la victime, la réparation allouée est appréciée entenant compte de ses déclarations fiscales relatives aux trois années qui ont
précédé celle du dommage”.
Dans le cadre de l’OAPI, l’art. 63 al.1 et al.2 de l’annexe VII de l’ABR-1999
prévoit en matière de propriété littéraire et artistique que “Le montant desdommages et intérêts est fixé conformément aux dispositions pertinentes
du Code civil national, compte tenu de l’importance du préjudice matériel etmoral subi par le titulaire du droit, ainsi que de l’importance des gains quel’auteur de la violation a retirés de celle-ci.” Cette disposition qui n’a pas une
portée générale ne nous semble applicable qu’en cette matière. Toutefois,l’ABR-2015 a apporté des correctifs en prévoyant une disposition pareille enmatière de marque entre autres, notamment en son art. 54 de l’annexe III.

moins délicate241. Toutefois, même si le juge rencontre
une difficulté dans la détermination de l’étendue dupréjudice, cela ne doit pas le conduire à allouer un franc
symbolique qui, en l’espèce, même apprécié sous l’aspect
de l’équité, n’est pas adéquat242. Cette réparation n’est
pas suffisante pour compenser le préjudice réellement
subi par la victime.
Étant consciente de l’insuffisance de cette réparation,après avoir confirmé la saisie-description, la juridiction
d’appel a prescrit d’autres mesures, notamment ladestruction des échantillons et la publication par extrait
de sa décision dans deux quotidiens aux frais dessociétés BA...IMPORT-EXPORT et FOUR...
Conformément aux dispositions de l’article 44 del’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui de 1977 devenu
l’article 43 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé,
la destruction des produits contrefaisants a été
ordonnée243. Cette forme de réparation est efficace carelle met un terme à la mise en circulation du produit
contrefaisant244. Même si cette mesure est une peinecomplémentaire, elle peut s’analyser en une forme deréparation dans la mesure où elle permet au propriétairede la marque de se débarrasser entièrement du produit
contrefaisant245. Toutefois, en l’espèce, la mesure paraît
incomplète dans son étendue du fait qu’elle ne porte que
sur les deux échantillons scellés et remis au greffier enchef du tribunal régional hors classe de Dakar, suivant
procès-verbaux en date des 14 et 27 août 1996, dressés
241

242

243

244
245

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

le préjudice moral causé à la victime”238. Même s’il n’est
pas discuté que la réparation du préjudice au regard desbénéfices réalisés par le contrefacteur est une démarche
pertinente dans l’approche avant-gardiste, il faut releverque si le juge peine à disposer d’éléments lui permettant
d’apprécier ce bénéfice, il fait face à un obstacle dirimant.

Il peut certes arriver que le préjudice ne soit pas évaluable sur-le-champpour des raisons d’ordre technique notamment, lorsque l’appréciation desfaits de la cause ou des mesures à ordonner exige des connaissances qui sontétrangères au juge. Mais même en pareilles circonstances, les éléments de laprocédure notamment, les faits allégués et les pièces versées au soutien desprétentions doivent permettre d’apprécier l’étendue du préjudice. Dans ce
cadre, il est admis d’ordonner une expertise à cette fin. Cf. art. 156 et s. Codede procédure civile du Sénégal.
CA Paris, 9 mars 2005, Lindt et Sprüngli SA c./ Établissement Public du Musée et
du Domaine de Versailles : PIBD 2005, III, n° 809, p. 45. Dans cette espèce, il a
été jugé que puisque le préjudice subi était purement symbolique, il serait
réparé par l’octroi d’une indemnité d’un euro. D’ailleurs, le tribunal de grande
instance de Paris relevait dans un jugement du 4 juillet 2003 que la sociétédemanderesse “ne produit (…) aucun document de quelque nature que cesoit pour justifier de son préjudice; qu’elle n’a fait procéder à aucune saisiecontrefaçon dans les locaux (…) ce qui lui aurait permis de faire appréhendercertains documents comptables”. Néanmoins, il avait accordé la somme de7000 euros de dommages et intérêts à la société titulaire du droit de brevet etcelle de 10 000 euros au licencié exclusif.”
Voir TPI de Douala-Bonanjo, Jugement n° 009/Civ du 19 janvier 2011, Ohadata
J-12-244, Société Colgate Palmolive Company c. Banaboy Symphore Jacques.
Dans cette affaire, le juge estime que “celui qui contrefait une marque defabrique alors que celle-ci n’a fait l’objet d’aucune déchéance ou radiation
s’expose à la saisie-contrefaçon des produits contrefaits. La saisie ayant été
régulièrement pratiquée, le propriétaire de la marque contrefaite, muni
d’un certificat de non-déchéance et d’une attestation de non-radiation peut
obtenir de la juridiction compétente qu’elle prononce la validité de la saisieattribution opérée tout en ordonnant la destruction des produits contrefaits
et la condamnation du contrefaisant au paiement des dommages et intérêts
en réparation du préjudice subi.”
Conformément à l’art. 133 COCC, le juge peut même d’office prescrire toutemesure destinée à réparer le dommage ou à en limiter l’importance.
L’art. 55 de l’ABR-2015 dispose ainsi qu’“en cas de condamnation pourcontrefaçon, la juridiction nationale compétente peut ordonner, à lademande de la partie lésée, que les produits reconnus comme produits
contrefaisants et les matériaux et instruments ayant principalement servi
à leur création ou fabrication soient rappelés des circuits commerciaux,écartés définitivement de ces circuits, détruits ou confisqués”. Sachantqu’une partie civile ne peut demander l’application d’une peine, mêmecomplémentaire, les prérogatives ainsi reconnues à la partie lésée nepeuvent alors s’analyser que comme des mesures de réparation en nature.
Tel est le sens d’ailleurs de l’art. 133 al. 2 COCC.
219

par Me J.D.E., Huissier de justice à Dakar. Quid du reste
du stock?

plein droit sans préjudice des dommages et intérêts qui
peuvent être réclamés.

La cour a estimé qu’elle “ne pouvait ordonner ladestruction des produits contrefaisants faute de pouvoir
les identifier actuellement, donc les dénombrer”. Unetelle approche ne garantit pas le droit exclusif attaché
à la marque. Cela signifierait que même si l’existence
de produits contrefaisants ne fait l’objet d’aucun doute,le juge n’ordonne pas la destruction s’il ne peut lesidentifier et les dénombrer. En l’espèce, le juge constateque “le stock de produits demeure dans les entrepôts
des sociétés responsables”. Dès lors, ordonner leur saisie
en vue de leur destruction nous semblait plus adéquat
pour réparer le préjudice subi par la victime car il n’est
point garanti qu’il sera mis fin à la circulation du produit
contrefaisant.

Dès lors, le juge saisi d’une demande de nullité de pleinde la saisie-contrefaçon de marque de dommages etintérêts, sur le fondement de l’article 52 précité n’a pas
à apprécier la question de la propriété de la marque ni àrechercher la bonne ou mauvaise foi du saisi.

À côté de la destruction, l’insertion de l’extrait de l’arrêt
dans les quotidiens “WALFADJIRI” et “le Soleil” a été
ordonnée sur le fondement de l’article 43, alinéa 2, del’annexe III de l’accord du 2 mars 1977246. Cette mesurede publicité est assez dissuasive en ce qu’elle permetd’informer les consommateurs sur le comportement
frauduleux du contrefacteur. Par contre, même si elle
est autorisée, la publicité ne doit pas être réalisée d’unemanière telle qu’elle puisse amener les tiers à se tromper
sur ses motifs ou sa portée247.
Pour une efficacité des mesures ordonnées, le juge amis les charges de la destruction et de la publication aux
frais des sociétés BA…IMPORT-EXPORT et FOUR… Ainsi,
la victime peut directement procéder à ces mesures etpoursuivre le remboursement des frais sur présentationde factures dûment établies, accompagnées de ladécision de condamnation.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Malick Lamotte

220

I.

Saisie-contrefaçon – Nullité de plein
droit – Immutabilité du cadre duprocès – Préjudice né de la saisie –Appréciation du juge – Recherchede la mauvaise foi – Réparation– Demande reconventionnelle
relative à la propriété de la marque –Recevabilité

Aux termes de l’article 52 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de
Bangui Révisé, Acte de Bamako du 14 décembre 2015,
s’il est fait droit à la requête en saisie-contrefaçon demarque, le demandeur doit obligatoirement saisir lajuridiction de fond soit par la voie civile, soit par la voie
correctionnelle dans le délai de 10 jours ouvrables, fautede quoi la description ou la saisie pratiquée est nulle de246
247

Devenu l’art. 55 al. 2 de l’ABR-2015.
En ce sens, la Cour de cassation française a rappelé que “publier sur sonsite internet une décision de justice qui vous donne raison peut constituer
un acte de concurrence déloyale, lorsque la victime a abusé de son droit decommuniquer, dans la mesure où elle a omis certains éléments modifiant
ainsi l’appréciation que les tiers pouvaient porter sur la décision.” Cass. civ.,
Chambre commerciale, 18 octobre 2017, n° 15-27.136.

Cour d’appel de Lomé, Arrêt n° 70/15 du 4 mars 2015,
GNANHOUE NAZAIRE c. ÉTABLISSEMENTS SOLA
Observations :Aux termes de l’article 6 de l’annexe III de l’Accordde Bangui, Acte de Bamako du 14 décembre 2015,
l’enregistrement de la marque confère au titulaire ledroit de propriété sur cette marque pour les produits etservices qu’il a désignés. Le propriétaire de la marquedispose donc sur celle-ci du droit exclusif de l’utiliser
et d’en interdire l’exploitation. Ainsi, lorsqu’il estimeque sa marque a été utilisée sans son autorisation ou
enregistrée ultérieurement par une autre personne, il segarde le droit de saisir le juge d’une action en contrefaçon
ou en annulation. Pour préparer cette instance au fond,il peut être autorisé par le président de la juridiction
compétente, sur le fondement de l’article 51 de l’annexe
III de l’Acte de 2015 (ancien article 48 de l’Accord de
Bangui révisé du 24 février 1999), à pratiquer une saisiecontrefaçon sur les prétendus produits à charge de saisir
au fond la juridiction civile ou correctionnelle dans undélai de dix (10) jours conformément à l’article 52 del’annexe III de l’Acte de 2015 (ancien article 49 de l’annexe
III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé). En cas de manquement
à cette obligation, la saisie-contrefaçon est nulle de plein
droit et le saisi pourra, à titre reconventionnel, réclamer
des dommages et intérêts en guise de réparation. La
cour d’appel de Lomé a fait application de ses principes
dans le cas de l’espèce.
Faits : Le 2 janvier 2009, les Établissements SOLA ont fait
procéder à une saisie-contrefaçon des produits portantla marque “COOKZEN”, commercialisés par le sieur
GNANHOUE NAZAIRE, avant d’en donner volontairement
mainlevée pour en refaire d’autres.
Par exploit du 27 janvier 2009, le sieur GNANHOUE,
estimant que les saisissants n’avaient pas respecté ledélai de 10 jours prévu par l’article 49 de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999248 pour assigner au fond, a saisi le tribunal depremière instance (TPI) de Lomé, sur le fondement desarticles 48 et 49 de l’ABR-1999, de demandes d’annulationde plein droit de la saisie-contrefaçon ainsi pratiquée par les
Établissements SOLA, et de réparation du préjudice subi.
Suivant jugement n° 3503/09, rendu le 13 novembre 2009,le TPI de Lomé a débouté le sieur GNANHOUE del’ensemble de ses demandes avant d’annuler la marque“COOKZEN” dont il se prévalait au motif, d’une part, qu’il
n’y a aucune décision préalable constatant cette nullité
et, d’autre part, que la marque litigieuse appartenait
aux Établissements SOLA qui l’avaient fait enregistrer
248

Devenu l’art. 52 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.

Par exploit du 15 février 2010, le sieur GNANHOUE ainterjeté appel contre cette décision en faisant grief
aux premiers d’avoir déplacé le problème juridiqueen statuant sur la question de propriété de la marque“COOKZEN” alors qu’il était saisi d’une demande denullité de plein droit de la saisie-contrefaçon.
Raisonnement : La cour d’appel de Lomé, saisie deces faits, a, par le présent arrêt, rendu le 4 mars 2015,
infirmé le jugement querellé et, statuant à nouveau,
annulé la saisie-contrefaçon litigieuse, alloué desdommages et intérêts au sieur GNANHOUE et débouté
les Établissements SOLA de leurs demandes d’annulationde la marque de l’appelant et de dommages et intérêts.
La Cour a relevé que le juge d’instance avait l’obligationde constater la nullité de plein droit de la saisiecontrefaçon et d’en tirer les conséquences notammenten réparant le préjudice né de cette situation. Ellea ainsi répondu à la problématique qui lui était
soumise, à savoir : quelle est l’étendue du pouvoir
d’appréciation du juge, saisi sur le fondement de l’article
49 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé249, pourviolation de l’obligation de saisir le juge du fond après
une saisie-contrefaçon?
Il est dès lors important, au regard de l’argumentaire
fort intéressant de la cour, d’examiner l’étendue del’obligation pour l’auteur d’une saisie-contrefaçon desaisir le juge du fond dans le délai de 10 jours, souspeine de nullité de plein droit de la saisie-contrefaçon
pratiquée (section I) mais également l’obligation pourle juge de réparer le préjudice résultant d’une saisie
déclarée nulle de plein droit (section II).
I. L’obligation de saisir le juge du fond dans les délais
légaux après une saisie-contrefaçon
La cour d’appel de Lomé, contrairement aux premiers
juges, considère que les Établissements SOLA n’ont pas
respecté l’obligation d’assigner au fond dans le délai de
10 jours après la saisie faite suivant procès-verbal du
2 janvier 2009. Elle a ainsi fait application des dispositions
de l’article 49 de l’ABR-1999250 selon lesquelles ledemandeur, qui a fait pratiquer une saisie-contrefaçon,
est tenu de se pourvoir, soit par la voie civile, soit par lavoie correctionnelle, dans le délai de 10 jours ouvrables
sous peine de nullité de plein droit de la description ou
de la saisie.
Les dispositions de l’article 49 de l’annexe III de l’ABR1999251 visent donc à assurer la protection du saisi contre
249
250
251

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.

d’éventuels abus dans la mise en œuvre de la saisiecontrefaçon, en exigeant du saisissant qu’il introduise
une action au fond dans un très bref délai de 10 jours.
Cette sévérité de l’ABR-1999 se comprend aisément dansla mesure où la saisie-contrefaçon ne se justifie quecomme un préalable à l’action au fond en contrefaçon
et il n’y aurait aucune justification à la recherche dela preuve d’une contrefaçon sans procès corrélatif252.
En effet, la saisie-contrefaçon offre au saisissant despouvoirs d’investigation étendus qui ne doivent êtreutilisés que pour les besoins d’une procédure et non à
des fins d’intimidation. Pour cette raison, le saisi ne doitpas être laissé dans le doute. C’est pourquoi l’article 49
précité253 impose un très court délai pour agir. Il est dèslors important pour le juge saisi de bien vérifier le respectdu délai. Se pose ainsi le problème de sa computation.
Il faut dire qu’en l’espèce, les juges d’appel n’ont eu
aucune difficulté à constater le non-respect dudit
délai, d’une part parce que les Établissements SOLA
l’ont reconnu en donnant mainlevée de la saisie, pouréchapper à une action en nullité et en réparation, et,d’autre part, du fait qu’il n’a été fait état d’aucune action
au fond engagée par ceux-ci avant la présente procédure
en nullité de plein droit de la saisie. Toutefois, la question
de la computation du délai mérite d’être éclaircie dansla mesure où elle détermine en partie le sort de lasaisie-contrefaçon. Ainsi, il est de principe que les pointsde référence pour apprécier si le requérant s’est bien
pourvu dans le délai imparti sont la date de la saisie etla date de délivrance de l’assignation254. Et la majorité dela jurisprudence et de la doctrine s’accordent à dire que
seule la date de délivrance de l’assignation doit être priseen considération, la remise de l’assignation au greffe
pouvant intervenir ultérieurement255.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

le premier auprès de l’Organisation africaine de la
propriété intellectuelle (OAPI). Il l’a également condamné
au paiement de dommages et intérêts, faisant droit ainsi
à la demande reconventionnelle des Établissements
SOLA qui prétendaient être propriétaires de la marquelitigieuse pour l’avoir fait enregistrer le premier.

Par ailleurs, lorsque le requérant choisit la voie
correctionnelle, seule la saisine de la juridiction dejugement notamment par une citation directe, par elle
servie, est prise en considération. Ainsi, une simple
plainte n’est pas suffisante pour justifier le respect del’obligation de saisir la juridiction de fond256. Quid ainside la plainte avec constitution de partie civile? Certes,
elle est adressée au juge d’instruction mais elle a lavertu de déclencher l’action publique, contrairement à laplainte simple, même si elle n’entraîne pas la saisine dela juridiction de jugement. Dès lors, elle doit être admisecomme conforme à l’esprit de l’article 48 de l’ABR-1999257.
252

253
254
255
256
257

La saisie-contrefaçon, mesure exorbitante de droit commun, est destinée àrapporter la preuve de la contrefaçon présumée. Elle a donc pour objet derecueillir des éléments matériels de nature à établir l’existence des faits decontrefaçon allégués. Il s’agit de se préconstituer une preuve en vue d’unfutur procès. Voir VÉRON (P.), Saisie-contrefaçon, 2e éd., Paris (Dalloz), 2005,
p. 61, n° 13.251; NINO MEZATIO (U.), La saisie-contrefaçon en matière demarque et de brevet dans l’espace OAPI, 2017. Disponible en ligne à l’adresse
https://cabinetjogo.com/la-saisie-contrefacon-en-matiere-de-marque-etde-brevet-dans-lespace-oapi.
Art. 52 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Cass. com., 7 juillet 2015, n° 14-12.733; CA Paris, 4 e chambre, section B,
15 décembre 2006 : PIBD 2007, III, n° 847, p. 183.
TGI Paris, 27 mai 1994 : PIBD 1994, III, n° 573, p. 459; TGI Rouen,
27 février 1997 : PIBD 1997, III, n° 631, p. 246; CA Paris, 26 mai 1994 :PIBD 1994, III, n° 574, p. 487.
Voir VÉRON (P.) et ROMET (I.), Droit et Pratique des voies d’exécution
2015/2016, Paris (Dalloz), 2015, chapitre 1214.
Art. 51 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
221

La Cour s’est soumise à ce travail de computation dudélai en relevant que “l’intimé a pratiqué la saisiecontrefaçon le 2 janvier 2009; qu’il disposait ainsi d’undélai de dix jours ouvrables à compter de cette datepour intenter l’action en contrefaçon relativement aux
produits présumés contrefaisants” avant de constater“qu’il n’a toutefois pas intenté cette action à la date du
27 janvier 2009 où l’appelant a saisi le premier juge”. Elleen conclut, en application de l’article 49 de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999, “que la saisie-contrefaçon par lui pratiquée
est donc nulle de plein droit”.
Le texte de l’article 49 de l’annexe de l’ABR-1999, visé
par la Cour, sanctionne effectivement par la nullité deplein droit la description ou la saisie pratiquée sur lefondement de l’article 48 du même texte si le saisissant,qui se plaint d’être victime de contrefaçon de marque,n’engage pas une procédure au fond dans le délai de dix(10) jours. Cette nullité de plein droit implique que le jugesaisi n’a pas à apprécier l’opportunité de la prononcer.
Il doit, en effet, se limiter à vérifier le respect du délai
légal et, lorsque le manquement est établi, prononcer
la nullité. La Cour rappelle ainsi au juge d’instance qu’ildevait constater cette nullité dès lors qu’il a relevé quel’appelant était resté plus de dix (10) jours sans saisir une
juridiction de fond notamment entre le 2 janvier 2009,
date de la saisie-contrefaçon, et le 27 janvier 2009, datede l’introduction de l’instance en nullité de la saisie.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Elle a également précisé, confirmant sur ce point le juged’instance, que le fait pour l’intimé d’avoir procédé à lamainlevée volontaire de cette saisie-contrefaçon est sansincidence sur l’obligation du juge de constater la nullitéde plein droit, lorsque les conditions visées à l’article 49
susvisé sont réunies. La cour affirme d’ailleurs, àbon droit, que le juge d’instance ne peut, sans risqued’ajouter aux dispositions de l’article 49 de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999, subordonner l’examen de cette demande denullité à une décision préalable d’un autre juge.

222

Elle lui reproche également d’être entré dans desdiscussions relatives à la propriété de la marque. Commeelle le rappelle, le juge saisi d’une requête aux fins desaisie-contrefaçon procède juste à une vérification
formelle de la titularité de la marque et de la supposéeatteinte portée à celle-ci258.
À ce niveau, la question du pouvoir d’appréciation dujuge mérite d’être relevée. En effet, lorsque la preuve del’enregistrement de la marque ainsi que celle de la nonradiation et de la non-déchéance sont rapportées, le juge
n’a pas de pouvoir d’appréciation lorsqu’il s’agit d’une
saisie descriptive259. Cette position est motivée par lesouci de sauvegarder les droits du prétendu titulaire dela marque mais aussi par le fait que la saisie descriptiven’implique pas dépossession des produits supposéscontrefaisants. Toutefois, lorsqu’il s’agit d’une saisie
258

259

Art. 48 al. 2 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999, et art. 51 de l’annexe de l’ABR-2015 :“L’ordonnance est rendue sur simple requête et sur justification del’enregistrement de la marque et production de la preuve de non-radiation etde non-déchéance.”
CA Aix-en-Provence, 1er décembre 1976 : PIBD 1977, n° 186, p. 63; TGI de Paris,
3e chambre, 3e section, 8 février 2013, RG n° 10/14491.

réelle, le juge doit retrouver tout son pouvoir souveraind’appréciation dans la mesure où cette saisie emportedépossession et emprise sur les biens présuméscontrefaisants260. En ce sens, l’existence d’une action en
réparation peut ne pas suffire pour préserver les intérêts
du présumé contrefacteur si tant est que la contrefaçon
n’est pas ultérieurement établie.
Il est important de s’interroger, en outre, sur la position
du tribunal, confirmée en cela par la cour qui considère
que la mainlevée de la saisie-contrefaçon, faite par lesaisissant, est sans effet sur le maintien de la demandede nullité de celle-ci. Quel est l’intérêt de se prononcer
sur une saisie qui n’existe plus de fait?
La saisie des produits supposés contrefaisants, pratiquée
en application de l’article 48 de l’ABR-1999, rend
indisponible celles-ci et prive par conséquent le saisi dudroit de les commercialiser. Dès lors, la mainlevée, faite
d’office par le saisissant, met fin à cette indisponibilité
comme l’annulation de la saisie prononcée par le juge;le saisi retrouvant le droit de disposer de ses produits etle saisissant perdant ainsi tout moyen de présenter deséchantillons au tribunal ou d’obtenir la confiscation à
son profit des produits saisis. Dans ces circonstances, onvoit difficilement l’intérêt de se prononcer sur une saisie
qui n’existe plus. En faisant le parallèle avec la saisie
conservatoire ou la saisie vente de biens261, la demanded’annulation de la saisie réelle pouvait être déclaréesans objet. Néanmoins, si la mainlevée volontaire a été
donnée après immobilisation des marchandises durant
un certain nombre de jours, l’intérêt de saisir le juge envue de déclarer cette saisie nulle, malgré la mainlevéevolontaire, peut être justifié par la perspective deréclamer des dommages et intérêts.
Après avoir relevé que la saisie-contrefaçon pratiquée
par l’appelant était nulle au motif que l’obligation mise àsa charge par l’article 49 de l’annexe III ABR-1999 n’a pas
été remplie, la cour d’appel a statué sur la question de laréparation du préjudice né de cette annulation.
II. L’obligation de réparer le préjudice résultant de lanullité de plein droit de la saisie-contrefaçon
En vertu de l’article 49 de l’annexe III ABR-1999, leprésumé contrefacteur peut réclamer des dommages
et intérêts si, nonobstant la saisie-contrefaçon qui aété pratiquée sur ses biens, le bénéficiaire de celle-ci
est resté plus de dix (10) jours sans saisir au fond la
juridiction civile ou correctionnelle. Le législateur OAPI
s’est limité sur le principe sans pour autant définir

260

261

Voir en ce sens GREFFE (F.), Contrefaçon-Constatation-Saisie-contrefaçon,
in : Juriscl. Marques-Dessins et modèles, Fasc. 3470, 2005, n° 11; STENGER(J.-P.), Saisie-contrefaçon – Introduction. Ordonnance autorisant la saisiecontrefaçon, in : Juriscl. Brevets, Fasc. 4631, 2003, n° 61 (le juge n’aurait pas lechoix quant à l’autorisation de la saisie-contrefaçon, fût-elle réelle).
Ces saisies sont faites sur le fondement des dispositions des art. 54 et s. etart. 90 et s. de l’Acte uniforme sur les procédures simplifiées de recouvrement
et les voies d’exécution adopté le 10 avril 1999 et paru au JO OHADA n° 6 du
1er juillet 1998. Voir Tribunal régional de Niamey, Ordonnance de référé n° 124
du 20 juillet 2004, Société Europress-Editores e distribuidores de publicacoes
Lda c. Compagnie Beauchemin International Inc. (obs. FOMETEU (J.), ce recueil,
chapitre 1, section C).

Sous ce rapport l’on peut dire que l’article 49 précité
n’exclut pas l’idée d’une responsabilité pour procédure
abusive. En adoptant la formulation “(…) sans préjudice
des dommages et intérêts qui peuvent être réclamés,s’il y a lieu”, cette disposition n’énumère pas lesfondements de cette réparation. Dès lors, l’actionen réparation résultant de l’annulation de la saisiecontrefaçon peut se fonder sur le caractère abusif decette procédure263, notamment en cas de saisie detout le stock en lieu et place de quelques échantillons
comme en l’espèce. D’ailleurs, la Cour l’a bien retenu
en affirmant que “l’immobilisation au-delà du délai
légal d’une cargaison des marchandises présuméescontrefaisantes par l’exercice d’une prérogative
exorbitante de droit commun destinée à se constituer
une preuve en vue d’une procédure future crée sansnul doute un préjudice certain au propriétaire desdites
marchandises”. En ce sens, les intimés ne pouvaient se
fonder sur leur bonne foi ou bien sur une prétendue
mauvaise foi de l’appelant pour soutenir le rejet de sa
demande en réparation alors qu’il n’est pas discuté quela saisie-contrefaçon a été annulée de plein droit du faitde leur manquement notamment le défaut de saisine
du juge du fond dans le délai légal.
En définitive, c’est fort logiquement que la cour n’a pas
recherché une intention de nuire dès lors que c’est lemaintien de la saisie sans l’engagement d’une procédure
dans le délai requis qui est sanctionné par le texte.
La question de la mauvaise foi du saisi ne peut aussi,
comme l’a justement révélée la cour, être discutéeau stade de la saisie-contrefaçon dans la mesure où
cette procédure ne vise pas à trancher le litige sur lacontrefaçon mais à se préconstituer des éléments
de preuve de la contrefaçon. En ce sens, la cour aopportunément circonscrit le débat relatif à la demandede réparation qui n’est, en effet, fondée que sur la fautede l’appelant caractérisée par la nullité de plein droit
de la saisie-contrefaçon pratiquée par les intimés. C’est
forte de cela qu’elle a accueilli la demande de dommages
et intérêts de l’appelant pour y faire droit en lui allouant
la somme raisonnable de vingt millions (20 000 000) de

262
263

Voir art. 119 COCC : “Est responsable celui qui par sa faute cause un dommage
à autrui.”Cf. art. 122 COCC : “Commet une faute par abus de droit celui qui use deson droit dans la seule intention de nuire à autrui, ou qui en fait un usage
contraire à sa destination.”

francs CFA après avoir écarté les moyens relatifs à labonne ou mauvaise foi264.
Après avoir infirmé le jugement et admis l’action en
réparation fondée sur la nullité de la saisie-contrefaçon,
la cour d’appel a rejeté la demande reconventionnelle enrevendication de la propriété de la marque “COOKZEN”,
faite par les Établissements SOLA, pour absence depreuve de la qualité de propriétaire de la marque.
Si l’on s’en tient aux effets de la décision de la cour, sa
solution peut être partagée. Elle s’inscrit dans la logiquedu droit des marques qui veut que le droit d’interdire
l’utilisation d’une marque ne soit réservé qu’aux seuls
titulaires de droits sur celle-ci car c’est le droit privatif qui
est protégé en cette matière265. Ainsi, en relevant, à partirdes éléments de preuve produits aux débats, la radiation
de l’enregistrement de la marque “COOKZEN”, fait parles Établissements SOLA, “à la demande de la société
HANGZOU RICHLAND FOODS CO.LTD, société chinoisequi a déposé la marque en premier”, la cour ne pouvait
reconnaître aux Établissements SOLA un quelconquedroit sur ladite marque. Dès lors, c’est à bon droit qu’elle
a rejeté leur demande reconventionnelle.
Malick LamotteJ.

Saisie-contrefaçon – Saisie pratiquée àl’enquête – Ordonnance présidentielle
préalable – Validité de la saisie –Nullité du procès–verbal d’enquête

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

le régime de cette responsabilité. Toutefois, on peutaffirmer, au regard de la rédaction de l’article 49 susvisé,
qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une responsabilité automatique
car l’annulation de la saisie-contrefaçon n’emporte pas
automatiquement l’allocation de dommages et intérêts.
De ce fait, il nous semble qu’il faille retourner vers lerégime général de la responsabilité civile qui suppose
une faute, un dommage et un lien de causalité suivant
la formule de l’article 1382 du Code civil français “toutfait quelconque de l’homme qui cause un à autrui undommage oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à leréparer”262.

Si la saisie-contrefaçon relève de la compétence duprésident du tribunal civil, aux termes de l’article 48 del’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 (cf. article 51, ABR-2015), il resteque ce texte n’exclut pas les pouvoirs reconnus par leslégislations nationales, en matière pénale, aux officiersde police judiciaire et aux juges d’instruction qui peuvent
ordonner, dans le cadre d’une procédure correctionnelle,la saisie des produits supposés contrefaisants.
Dès lors, fait une mauvaise application des articles
47 et 48 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé
(v. articles 49 et 51 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1015) letribunal correctionnel qui annule la procédure engagéepar le Procureur de la République contre un prévenu
pour le délit d’importation et mise en vente des produits
contrefaisants au motif que la partie civile ne produit
pas l’ordonnance autorisant la saisie-contrefaçon
des produits incriminés alors qu’il s’agit d’une saisie
pratiquée par les officiers de police judiciaire dans lecadre d’une enquête préliminaire.

264
265

Sur les modalités de réparation du préjudice, voir CA Brazzaville, Arrêt du
18 juillet 2006, MP et Amandatou Adechokan c. Fati Younoussa and Salamatou
Younoussa (obs. LAMOTTE (M.), ce recueil, chapitre 3, section D).
Cf. art. 7 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 devenu art. 6 de l’annexe III del’ABR-2015.
223

Tribunal de première instance de Lomé, Jugement
du 16 avril 2008, 1re chambre correctionnelle, MP ET
SOCIÉTÉ NESTLÉ SA c. LASSISSI Aminatou
Observations :La saisie-contrefaçon n’est qu’un mode de preuve
supplémentaire et souvent très efficace pour établir
l’existence d’une contrefaçon. “Aucun texte, ni législatif,
ni réglementaire, n’oblige à recourir à ce moyen depreuve particulier avant de saisir le juge du fond”266. Dansle cas de l’espèce, le tribunal de première instance deLomé semble avoir oublié ce principe.
Faits : La société Nestlé, propriétaire de la marque deproduits Cubes MAGGI POULET, avait saisi le Procureurde la République du TPI de Lomé d’une plainte dirigée
contre la dame LASSISSI Aminatou, pour vente ou miseen vente de Cubes MAGGI POULET contrefaisants. Sur labase de cette plainte, une saisie portant sur 1800 cartonsdes produits incriminés a été pratiquée entre les mains
de la dame LASSISSI. C’est suite à cette saisie que celle-ci
a été citée directement devant le tribunal correctionnel,siégeant en matière correctionnelle, pour le délit devente ou mise en vente sur le territoire togolais deproduits revêtus d’une marque frauduleusement imitéeou portant des indications propres à tromper l’acheteursur la nature des produits.
Pour s’opposer à l’examen au fond de cette prévention,le conseil de la dame LASSISSI a soulevé, in limine litis,
la nullité de la saisie, pour violation de l’article 48 del’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 (article 51 de l’annexe III
de l’ABR-2015), au motif qu’elle a été pratiquée sansautorisation préalable du président du tribunal depremière instance qui doit être ordonnée par voie
d’ordonnance à pied de requête.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Raisonnement : Le tribunal, faisant droit à cetteexception de nullité, a224• annulé le procès-verbal d’enquête préliminaire établile 22 octobre 2007 par l’Office central de répression
du trafic illicite des drogues et du blanchimentn° 077/2007;• invalidé le rapport d’enquête préliminaire n° 77/2007,émis le 22 octobre 2007, par l’Office central delutte contre le trafic illicite de stupéfiants et leblanchiment d’argent;• ordonné la restitution des objets saisis à Mme Lassissi
et rejeté les accusations portées contre elle.
Ainsi, sur la question de savoir si la saisie réelle pratiquée
en matière pénale, dans le cadre d’une procédure decontrefaçon de marque, était soumise à l’autorisation
préalable du président de la juridiction compétente,le TPI de Lomé a répondu par l’affirmative. Il apparaît
dès lors de cette décision que le TPI de Lomé considère
que toutes les saisies susceptibles d’être pratiquées enmatière de marque sont soumises à la formalité préalable
de l’autorisation prévue par l’article 48 de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999 (devenu l’article 51 de l’ABR-2015).
266

TGI de Strasbourg, 5 février 1991 : PIBD 1991, III, pp. 339 et s.

Cette position du TPI de Lomé procède d’une confusion
sur le régime des saisies en matière de contrefaçon(section I), ce qui l’a conduit à faire de la validité de lasaisie-contrefaçon une condition de régularité de l’action
en contrefaçon devant le juge correctionnel (section II).
I. La confusion sur le régime des saisies en matière decontrefaçon de marque
Pour annuler la procédure pénale engagée contre
la dame LASSISSI Aminatou, du chef de contrefaçon
de marque, le tribunal a estimé que les parties
poursuivantes n’ont pas produit au dossier de laprocédure une ordonnance du président du tribunal
civil compétent autorisant la saisie-contrefaçon
conformément aux dispositions de l’article 48 de l’annexe
III de l’ABR-1999 (devenu l’article 51 de l’ABR-2015). Il fautdire que l’article 48 susvisé dispose que“le propriétaire d’une marque ou le titulaire d’undroit exclusif d’usage peut faire procéder, par tout
huissier ou officier public ou ministériel y compris
les douaniers avec, s’il y a lieu, l’assistance d’unexpert, à la description détaillée, avec ou sans
saisie, des produits ou services qu’il prétend
marqués, livrés ou fournis à son préjudice en
violation des dispositions de la présente annexe
en vertu d’une ordonnance du président dutribunal civil dans le ressort duquel les opérations
doivent être effectuées, y compris à la frontière”.
Il ressort de cet article que la saisie-contrefaçon est
une mesure probatoire permettant au titulaire d’undroit de propriété intellectuelle de faire procéder, par
un officier public, à des investigations comprenant, engénéral, la description de la contrefaçon alléguée, de ses
circonstances et de son étendue ainsi que, dans certains
cas, la saisie avec ou sans appréhension matérielled’échantillons des articles argués de contrefaçon, voire
de tous ces articles. La cour d’appel de Dakar l’a bienrappelé dans l’affaire société AM S.A contre société MT
S.A en indiquant que “cette saisie permet seulement àla victime d’une contrefaçon présumée d’apporter lapreuve d’une atteinte à son droit”267.
La description détaillée peut ainsi, sur le fondement del’article 48 précité, être accompagnée d’une saisie réelle
d’échantillons ou du produit supposé contrefaisant.
Elle est ordonnée par le président du tribunal civil
territorialement compétent, statuant par ordonnancesur requête. C’est donc sur le fondement de ce texte
que la dame L. Aminatou a reproché à la partie civile,
la société Nestlé SA, d’avoir fait procéder à une saisiecontrefaçon sans avoir, au préalable, obtenu une
ordonnance du président du tribunal autorisant une
telle mesure. Elle a ainsi considéré que la saisie desproduits “cubes MAGGI POULET”, pratiquée par les
officiers de police judiciaire, sur saisine du Procureurde la République, viole les dispositions de l’article 48 del’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 (devenu l’article 51, annexe III,
267

Voir CA Dakar, Arrêt n° 501 du 28 décembre 2012, Ameropa SA c. Société
Moustapha Tall SA (obs. LAMOTTE (M.), ce recueil, chapitre 3, section K).

Le Procureur de la République pouvait-il alors ordonnerla saisie par les officiers de police judiciaire des produits
prétendus contrefaisants?
En réponse, il faut rappeler que lorsque l’action en
contrefaçon est exercée suivant la voie pénale, leProcureur de la République, saisi d’une plainte dela victime ou d’une dénonciation268, conserve lesprérogatives classiques que lui confère le droit commun
en matière de poursuite des infractions269. À cet effet,
il peut, dans le cadre d’une enquête de flagrance oumême d’une enquête préliminaire, “procéder ou faire
procéder à tous les actes nécessaires à la recherche
et la poursuite” de l’infraction de contrefaçon270. Il
peut également faire procéder par les officiers depolice judiciaire à des saisies, à but probatoire ou deconfiscation de l’objet de l’infraction de contrefaçon,
c’est-à-dire le produit contrefaisant, des instruments
ayant servi ou qui étaient destinés à la commission de lacontrefaction et enfin de tout ce qui paraît être le produit
direct ou indirect de l’infraction de contrefaçon271. Il fautsignaler que le juge d’instruction, également, saisi d’unréquisitoire introductif du Procureur de la République
ou d’une plainte avec constitution de partie civile dutitulaire de la marque ou d’une licence, dispose desmêmes pouvoirs d’investigation et de saisie272. Ainsi, letribunal correctionnel pourra ultérieurement, en vertu
de l’article 47 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 (devenu
l’article 55 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015) ordonner, à titrede peine complémentaire, leur confiscation.
Toutes ces saisies, connues sous le vocal de saisie
pénale273, parce que spécifiques à la procédure pénale,
peuvent être pratiquées sans autorisation du président
du tribunal. Leur validité ne saurait aucunement
dépendre d’une quelconque ordonnance prise par celuici en vertu de l’article 48 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999274.
Dès lors, c’est à tort que le tribunal a fait droit àl’exception de nullité soulevée par le conseil L. Aminatou
au motif que la société Nestlé SA ne produit pas aux
débats l’ordonnance présidentielle autorisant la saisie
réelle des cartons de “cubes MAGGI POULET”, pratiquée
par les officiers de police judiciaire, dans le cadred’une enquête préliminaire ouverte sur instruction du
Procureur de la République.
Le tribunal aurait dû relever la confusion faite entrela saisie-contrefaçon, qui requiert une ordonnance
du président du tribunal civil compétent en vertu del’article 48 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999275, et la saisie
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275

Voir à ce sujet l’art. 32 du CPP du Togo. Idem pour le Sénégal.
Art. 31 à 36 du CPP du Togo, art. 31 à 38 du CPP du Sénégal. Voir à ce sujet
PRADEL (J.) et LABORDE (J.P.), Du Ministère public en matière pénale : D. 1997,
p. 141.
Art. 34 et 61 du CPP du Togo et art. 33, 60 et 67 du CPP du Sénégal.
Art. 44 CPP du Togo et art. 46 du CPP du Sénégal.
Art. 41 et 64 du CPP du Togo et art. 72 et 87 bis du CPP du Sénégal.
PRADEL (J.), Procédure pénale, n.70, p. 390.
Devenu l’art. 51 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Ibid.

pratiquée en matière pénale suivant les dispositions
du code de procédure pénale togolais qui donnent ce
pouvoir aux officiers de police judiciaires, au Procureurde la République et au juge d’instruction agissant dansle cadre d’une enquête ou d’une information judiciaire
ouverte pour le délit de contrefaçon de marque.
Le tribunal devait, par conséquent, rejeter cetteexception de nullité.
Malheureusement, il a suivi la prévenue en annulant
toute la procédure notamment le procès-verbal
d’enquête préliminaire établi le 22 octobre 2007 parl’Office central de répression du trafic illicite des drogues
et du blanchiment n° 077/2007, et en ordonnant larestitution des 1800 cartons de “cubes MAGGI POULET”
saisis au profit de L. Aminatou.
Il apparaît donc clairement de ce qui précède que cettedécision procède d’une application inappropriée desdispositions de l’article 48 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999276.
II. La violation des conditions de recevabilité del’action pénale en contrefaçon
Le TPI de Lomé a annulé la procédure pénale engagéecontre la dame L. Aminatou pour contrefaçon parimportation et mise en vente de produits contrefaisantspour défaut de production d’une ordonnance duprésident du tribunal civil. Il faut dire que la juridictiond’instance, suivant la prévenue qui avait soulevé lanullité de la procédure pour violation des dispositions
de l’article 48 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999, est allée plus
loin que celle-ci en affirmant “qu’aucune ordonnance duprésident du tribunal de céans n’étant versée aux débats
par le conseil de la partie civile, il y aura lieu de constater
purement et simplement la nullité de la procédure
antérieure pour violation de l’article 48 de l’Accord de
Bangui et tirer les conséquences qui s’imposent sur labase de l’article 265 du Code de procédure pénale”.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

de l’ABR-2015) qui donne seul pouvoir seulement auprésident du tribunal civil.

Le tribunal fait ainsi de la validité de la saisie, pratiquée
au stade de l’enquête pénale, une condition de régularitédu procès-verbal d’enquête et de la procédure antérieureà la saisine du tribunal, ce qui a eu pour conséquence demettre fin à la procédure sans examen de la prévention
de contrefaçon et le renvoi du ministère public, qui
avait initié la poursuite, à mieux se pourvoir. Il semble
ainsi ignorer que, même sous le régime de l’article 48
de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999, la saisie-contrefaçon n’est
qu’un mode de preuve du délit de contrefaçon. Dèslors, sa nullité ne peut, en aucun cas, entamer l’action
publique ni la régularité de la procédure engagée par leProcureur de la République pour le délit de contrefaçon
de marque. Celui-ci se trouve juste dépourvu d’un moyen
de preuve pertinent de la contrefaçon. Il garde toutefois
la possibilité de présenter d’autres preuves pour établir
l’existence de la contrefaçon. La Cour de cassationfrançaise le rappelle souvent en considérant que “lemoyen de nullité d’une saisie-contrefaçon, laquelle est un
acte probatoire antérieur à la procédure de contrefaçon
276

Ibid.
225

qui n’est introduite que par la demande en contrefaçon,
ne constitue pas une exception de procédure”277.
Ainsi comprise, la non-production de l’ordonnance duprésident autorisant la saisie ou même la nullité de cettesaisie, contrairement à la position du tribunal, ne peut
affecter la régularité de la procédure. Dès lors, comment
comprendre la décision du tribunal? Sur quel fondementa-t-il prononcé la nullité de la procédure? Pourquoi l’avoir
étendue à toute la procédure? Autant de questions qui
sont restées sans réponse à la lecture de ce jugement.
En effet, le tribunal n’indique aucun fondement à lanullité prononcée. Sa difficulté sur ce point est bien
compréhensible dans la mesure où les articles 37 et 47
de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 (devenus respectivement
les articles 57 et 49 de l’ABR-2015), sièges de l’action en
contrefaçon, ne comportent aucune sanction relative
à la régularité de la procédure. Ils sont d’ailleurs trèssommaires sur les conditions d’exercice de l’action pénale
en contrefaçon278, laissant ainsi au juge national le soin defaire application des procédures de droit commun.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

La nullité de la procédure prononcée par le tribunal ne
pouvait alors avoir pour fondement les dispositions del’annexe III de l’ABR-1999. Cela se comprend aisément
dans la mesure où l’Acte de 2015 de l’Accord de
Bangui s’intéresse aux différents droits de propriété
intellectuelle et à leur protection administrative etjudiciaire. À ce titre, ils n’ont pas vocation à réglementerles principes de procédure pénale qui demeurent
de la souveraineté des États parties à l’accord. Ils
ne réglementent, dans le domaine pénal, que les
incriminations et les sanctions relatives aux atteintes
aux droits de propriété intellectuelle. Du reste, les juges
de première instance n’ont invoqué aucune disposition
de procédure pénale togolaise pouvant justifier lanullité de la procédure. Dès lors, cette nullité n’a aucun
fondement textuel.

226

droit, c’est-à-dire la culpabilité de la personne poursuivieet le bien-fondé de la demande de réparation dudommage. Pour dire que l’exercice par le Procureurde la République de l’action pénale en contrefaçon ne
pouvait être entravée par ce moyen, celui-ci dispose d’undroit d’agir autonome. En effet, contrairement à l’action
pénale en contrefaçon de brevet, de modèle d’utilité ou
de dessins et modèles industriels281, le déclenchement del’action publique en matière de contrefaçon de marquen’est soumis à aucune plainte préalable de la victime282.
En définitive, le jugement du TPI de Lomé n’est pas un
bon exemple pour les juges du fond de l’espace OAPI qui
ont pour rôle de veiller à la protection légitime des droits
de propriété intellectuelle réglementés par l’Acte de
Bamako de 2015 et ses différentes annexes.
Malick Lamotte

K. Marques – Risque de confusion– Saisie réelle des marchandises
arguées de contrefaçon –Cantonnement à quelqueséchantillons
La saisie-contrefaçon est juste un moyen de preuve
spécifique de la contrefaçon. Elle n’a pas pour finalité desanctionner le supposé contrefacteur. Dès lors, elle nepeut avoir une portée générale permettant au requérant
de poursuivre et de saisir en tout temps et en tout lieu
des produits supposés contrefaisants.
Par ailleurs, le juge saisi de la demande de rétractation
ne peut discuter du bienfondé de la contrefaçon.
Cour d’appel de Dakar. Arrêt n° 501 du 28 décembre 2012,SOCIÉTÉ AMEROPA SA c. SOCIÉTÉ MOUSTAPHA TALL

Il faut rappeler qu’en matière pénale, la nullité d’un acte
de procédure et l’étendue de cette nullité doivent en
principe être prévues par la loi279. Il n’en est autrement
qu’en cas de violation de dispositions substantielles
relatives à la procédure pénale280. Le tribunal n’a fait étatd’aucune disposition substantielle de procédure pénale
togolaise violée par le Procureur de la République quia exercé la procédure de contrefaçon. Il ne pouvait dèslors prononcer l’annulation du procès-verbal d’enquête
et ainsi mettre fin à la procédure sans examiner au fondla prévention de contrefaçon de marque. Le tribunal
avait ainsi l’obligation de se prononcer sur la culpabilitéde la prévenue L. Aminatou. Il a malheureusement ratél’occasion de le faire. La carence relevée à l’égard dela partie civile, relativement à l’irrégularité de la saisie
qu’elle a fait pratiquer, même à la supposer fondée,ne pouvait aucunement remettre en cause la citation
directe initiée par le Procureur de la République. Ce
problème, comme déjà indiqué, concerne le fond duObservations :La saisie-contrefaçon est un moyen de preuve de lacontrefaçon et, plus généralement, de toute atteinte à
un droit de propriété intellectuelle. C’est une procédure
qui permet, sur autorisation du président du tribunal
civil, au titulaire du droit de propriété intellectuellede faire constater par un huissier de justice ou un
officier public une contrefaçon. S’il est fait droit à larequête ou à la requête d’appel, tout intéressé peuten référer au président qui a rendu l’ordonnance dansles conditions prévues par le droit national283. Saisi decette contestation, le juge a la faculté de modifier ou derétracter l’ordonnance même si les juges du fond sontsaisis de l’affaire. L’instance de contestation de la saisiecontrefaçon a pour finalité de réapprécier le bienfondéde la requête au regard, cette fois-ci, des éléments dedéfense présentés par le supposé contrefacteur. Cette
instance n’a donc pas pour objet d’apprécier l’existence
de contrefaçon que la saisie-contrefaçon a pour but de

277
278

281

279
280

Cass. civ., 19 janvier 2010, n° 2008-370800.
Voir art. 47 al. 2 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 et art. 6 al. 2 de l’annexe III del’ABR-2015.
Voir art. 164 et 168 du CPP du Sénégal.
Art. 166 du CPP du Sénégal.

282
283

Art. 61 de l’annexe I, art. 44 de l’annexe II et art. 30 de l’annexe IV del’ABR-1999 : “L’action correctionnelle pour l’application des peines ci-dessus nepeut être exercée par le ministère public que sur la plainte de la partie lésée.”Art. 46 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Voir art. 820-8 et 820-9 du Code de procédure civile sénégalais.

Faits : La société Moustapha TALL SA, s’estimant
propriétaire de la marque “le bon cheval légendaire+ logo”, déposée le 30 décembre 2008 et enregistréele 17 août 2009 sous le numéro 60828, auprès del’Organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuelle(OAPI), avait saisi le président d’une requête aux finsde saisie-contrefaçon d’un lot de riz contenu dans dessacs de couleur verte portant la marque “le cheval logo”
ressemblant à la sienne, qui était réceptionné par lasociété AMEROPA et entreposé dans un magasin sous
douane de la SONAFOR.
Par ordonnances n° 929 /2012 et n° 1000/2012 du
22 juin 2012 du président du tribunal régional horsclasse de Dakar284, elle a obtenu l’autorisation de faire
procéder, respectivement, à la description détaillée desproduits prétendus contrefaisants et à la saisie réelle
dans les locaux de la SONAFOR et de tous commerçants
sis dans le ressort du tribunal régional ou en tout autre
lieu, de tous les produits comportant des éléments
caractéristiques de sa marque et destinés à la vente parla société AMEROPA.
En application des dispositions de l’article 49 susvisé285,
elle a assigné la société AMEROPA à comparaître le
19 juillet 2012 devant le tribunal régional hors classe de
Dakar pour constater que les sacs de riz réceptionnés
sont contrefaits, ordonner leur destruction ou à défaut
interdire leur commercialisation ou ordonner leur retrait
du commerce si celle-ci a débuté.
Par exploit en date du 10 juillet 2012, la société AMEROPA
SA a assigné à bref délai la société MOUSTAPHATALL SA devant le président du tribunal régional
hors classe de Dakar pour entendre ordonner larétractation de l’ordonnance n° 1000/2012 du 22 juin
2012 et le cantonnement de la saisie à quelqueséchantillons. Mais celui-ci a, par ordonnance du
22 juin 2012, rejeté la demande de rétraction etconfirmé la mesure de description avec saisie de tous
produits supposés contrefaisants.
C’est cette ordonnance qui a été soumise à la censurede la cour d’appel de Dakar par la société AMEROPA
qui faisait valoir, entre autres moyens, que le juge desrequêtes ne pouvait ordonner la saisie de tout le stockde produit lui appartenant. Elle discutait égalementl’absence de risque de confusion entre les produits
qu’elle commercialisait et ceux appartenant à l’intimé.
La Cour devait ainsi répondre à deux questions :
a.

284
285
286

Le juge des requêtes pouvait-il ordonner, sur lefondement de l’article 48 de l’annexe III de l’ABR1999286, la saisie réelle de tout le stock des produits
supposés contrefaisants?
Devenu le TGI hors classe de Dakar depuis 2015.
Devenu l’art. 52 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Devenu l’art. 51 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.

b.

Pouvait-il également apprécier la question dela propriété de la marque et l’existence de lacontrefaçon alléguée dans le cadre de l’instanceen rétractation de son ordonnance autorisant lasaisie-contrefaçon?

Raisonnement : En réponse, la cour affirme d’une partque la saisie-contrefaçon, qui a une finalité probatoire,ne peut emporter la saisie de tout le stock prétendu
contrefaisant, d’autre part, que l’instance en rétractation
de l’ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon n’est pas une
instance au fond où on peut discuter du bienfondé de lacontrefaçon. Il apparaît queI.
II.

la saisie-contrefaçon n’est en réalité qu’un moyen
spécifique de preuve de la contrefaçon;
dès lors, le juge qui ordonne la description
détaillée avec saisie réelle doit déterminerl’étendue de cette saisie.

I. La saisie-description comme moyen spécifique depreuve de la contrefaçon
Dans ses motifs décisoires, la cour affirme que la saisiedescription pratiquée par la société MT a uniquement
une valeur probatoire. Par conséquent, l’instanceen rétractation, engagée par la société AM contre
l’ordonnance prescrivant cette saisie, ne peut avoir pourobjet de discuter du bienfondé de la contrefaçon.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

prouver. La cour d’appel de Dakar a rappelé ces principes
dans le cas de l’espèce.

Ainsi, pour confirmer l’ordonnance querellée, la cour
explique que la saisie-description, pratiquée par lasociété MT, “permet seulement à la victime d’une
contrefaçon présumée d’apporter la preuve d’une
atteinte à son droit”. Cette affirmation de la cour est
pertinente; elle découle, comme elle le rappelle, desdispositions pertinentes de l’article 48 de l’annexe III del’Accord de Bangui révisé287, selon lesquelles :“Le propriétaire d’une marque ou le titulaire d’undroit exclusif d’usage peut faire procéder, par tout
huissier ou officier public ou ministériel y compris
les douaniers avec, s’il y a lieu, l’assistance d’unexpert, à la description détaillée, avec ou sans
saisie, des produits ou services qu’il prétend
marqués, livrés ou fournis à son préjudice en
violation des dispositions de la présente annexe
en vertu d’une ordonnance du président dutribunal civil dans le ressort duquel les opérations
doivent être effectuées, y compris à la frontière.”C’est donc un droit reconnu au titulaire de la marquede demander une mesure de saisie-description,communément appelée saisie-contrefaçon s’il estime
qu’il y a une atteinte illégitime à son droit de propriété
intellectuelle288. Et le juge ne peut lui refuser cettemesure si les conditions légales sont réunies289. La
saisie-contrefaçon permet d’établir la matérialité
287
288
289

Devenu l’art. 51 de l’ABR-2015.
En ce sens, voir également STENGER (J.-P.), Saisie-contrefaçon, Fasc. 4631,
n° 147.
En ce sens, ROUBIER (P.), Le droit de la propriété industrielle, Vol. 1, Paris(Sirey), 1952, p. 426.
227

de la contrefaçon. Elle peut être définie comme “lamesure permettant au titulaire d’un droit de propriété
intellectuelle de faire pratiquer par un officier public desinvestigations, comprenant, en général, la description dela contrefaçon alléguée, de ses circonstances et de sonétendue”290. Le terme saisi, selon Pierre Véron291 seraitmême impropre car il s’agit plutôt d’une description qui
consiste pour le requérant à faire une représentation
aussi fidèle que possible du produit faisant l’objet decontrefaçon. Le produit reste, en principe, entre lesmains du saisi qui peut librement en disposer sauf si, àla demande du prétendu titulaire du droit à la marque, lejuge saisi estime nécessaire d’ordonner le prélèvement
de quelques échantillons des produits qu’il prétend
marqués, livrés ou fournis à son préjudice.
La saisie-description permet ainsi d’établir,ultérieurement, dans le cadre de l’action au fond,l’existence et l’ampleur de l’atteinte que le titulaire dudroit à la marque prétend subir. Il en résulte que ladescription est l’objet principal de la procédure de saisie
en matière de contrefaçon. Cette règle a été maintes
fois rappelée par la doctrine et la jurisprudence292. Il fautaussi signaler que la requête présentée au magistrat doitêtre la plus exhaustive possible dans la présentation desexigences du demandeur. Cette nécessité se comprend
car l’autorisation qui sera accordée ne le sera qu’enfonction de ce qui est sollicité.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

En l’espèce, dans son ordonnance sur requête du
22 juin 2012, le président du tribunal régional avait
autorisé la société MT à “faire procéder respectivement
par Maître Mademba GUEYE, huissier de justice àDakar, à la description détaillée des produits prétendus
contrefaits”. Une telle ordonnance, trop générale dans ses
prescriptions, ne nous semble pas répondre aux exigencesde précision recherchées pour éviter alors tout abus dansson exécution par l’huissier instrumentaire désigné.

228

Cette exigence de prudence et de précision est très
importante au regard de la force probante qui s’attache
au procès-verbal de saisie-contrefaçon dressé parl’huissier de justice commis conformément à l’article 48
de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999293. Les juges d’appel l’ont
réaffirmé en faisant remarquer à la société AM que ses
moyens de défense “ne remettent pas en cause la validité
et les éléments intrinsèques du procès-verbal de saisiedescription du 15 juin 2012 dont la description énoncéeet constatée par l’huissier fait foi jusqu’à inscription defaux”.
Dans tous les cas, s’il est fait droit à la requête, le tiers
supposé contrefacteur peut solliciter du même juge larétractation de l’ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon qui

lui ferait grief 294. Mais la cour rappelle que cette instancene peut être ni le lieu, ni le moment de discuter del’existence ou non de la contrefaçon alléguée.
Il faut souligner que la procédure de rétractation,
engagée par la société AM contre l’ordonnance
n° 1000/2012 du 22 juin 2012, trouve sa source, non pas
dans les dispositions des annexes de l’ABR-1999, qui
ne la prévoient pas expressément, mais bien dans lerégime général des ordonnances sur requête réglementé
dans chaque État partie par les dispositions relatives àla procédure civile295. C’est par essence une procédure
qui vise à rétablir le principe du contradictoire. Ainsi,
lorsqu’il est fait droit à la requête, tout intéressé peut en
référer au juge qui a rendu l’ordonnance contestée. Dansle cadre de la saisie-contrefaçon, on imagine mal qu’ilpuisse s’agir d’une personne autre que celle qui a subi lasaisie, c’est-à-dire le supposé contrefacteur296.
Sous ce rapport, le juge, qui a rendu l’ordonnance surrequête de manière unilatérale, sur les seuls éléments
présentés par le supposé titulaire du droit à la marque,réapprécie la requête aux fins de saisie-contrefaçon etles conditions d’octroi de l’ordonnance, cette fois-ci, au
regard des moyens de défense apportés par le supposé
auteur de la contrefaçon.
Toutefois, la cour d’appel de Dakar a rappelé, fort
opportunément, que l’instance en rétractation ou en
modification de l’ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon
n’est pas le moment de discuter du fond du droit ou
d’apprécier l’existence ou non de la contrefaçon alléguée.
Le but de la saisie-contrefaçon n’est pas de chercher lacontrefaçon, c’est de la prouver297.
La cour répond ainsi à la société AM qui, dans ses
moyens d’appel, discutait le fond du droit en “contestantla contrefaçon, invoquant des arguments relatifs à ladifférence entre les caractéristiques de la marque de laSociété MT et ceux décrits, la protection de sa marquepar son enregistrement à l’OAPI et l’absence d’un droit
exclusif d’usage au profit de MT”.
Le choix de la cour d’éviter le débat sur l’existence dela contrefaçon alléguée est justifié dès lors qu’elle est
saisie uniquement de la contestation relative à la saisiecontrefaçon ordonnée par le juge des requêtes. En
effet, le juge saisi d’une demande de saisie-contrefaçon
ou de la rétractation ou modification de l’ordonnanceprescrivant une telle mesure ne procède qu’à un contrôle
superficiel dit prima facie. Il doit juste s’assurer de lavalidité apparente du droit à la marque du requérant
et des indices de la contrefaçon commise par le tiers, lefutur saisi.
294

290
291
292
293

VÉRON (P.), Saisie-contrefaçon, 2e éd., Paris (Dalloz), 2005, n° 11.
VÉRON (P.), Saisie-contrefaçon 2013-2014, 3 e éd., Paris (Dalloz), 2012,
pp. 487 et s.
Voir GALLOUX (J.-C.), Droit de la propriété industrielle, Paris (Dalloz), 2000,
n° 489.
Le procès-verbal de constat, comme tout exploit d’huissier, est un acteauthentique, qui au sens de l’art. 18 du code des obligations du Sénégal fait
foi jusqu’à inscription de faux.

295
296
297

Voir Ordonnance de référé n° 867 du 20 juin 1995, TGI de Douala, Société S c.
Société RCFG : Recueil de décisions de justice, Collection OAPI, n° 3, p. 393.
Art. 820-8 du Code de procédure civile du Sénégal : “S’il est fait droit à larequête ou à la requête d’appel, tout intéressé peut, à tout moment, en
référer au président qui a rendu l’ordonnance.”
Voie STENGER (J.-P.), Saisie-contrefaçon – Recours après saisie-contrefaçon :Juriscl. Brevets, Fasc. 4634, 2004, n° 125 et s.
MENDOZA-CAMINADE (A.), La saisie-contrefaçon. Une mesure aux allures desanction, Presse de l’Université Toulouse Capitole, Les travaux de l’IFR“À propos de la sanction”, 2007, pp. 117-134.

Par ailleurs, il est intéressant de relever, en l’espèce,que pour admettre la validité de la saisie-description, lacour d’appel s’est contentée de vérifier que la société MTa fait enregistrer la marque “le cheval + logo”, suivantarrêté n° 12/1252/OAPI/DG/DGA/DPI/SSD du 31 mai 2012
portant le numéro 3201102761 sans faire état de la
production de certificats de non-radiation et de nondéchéance comme l’exige l’article 48 de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999299.
Les juges se sont également prononcés sur la validité dela saisie réelle du stock de riz ordonnée par le juge desrequêtes.
II. L’étendue de la saisie réelle en matière desaisie-contrefaçon
Il faut relever, en l’espèce, que la cour a, dans deux
attendus, bien pris le soin de distinguer la saisiedescription de la saisie réelle emportant enlèvement duproduit incriminé.
Si, dans le premier attendu, elle a confirmé la mesurede saisie-description, par contre, dans le second, ellea, s’agissant de la mesure de saisie réelle portant sur
l’ensemble du stock du produit incriminé, reproché aupremier juge d’avoir rendu “une ordonnance générale
permettant au requérant de poursuivre la contrefaçon
d’une marque chez tout contrefacteur, en tout temps
et en tout lieu sans se limiter au stock visé et entreposé
dans les locaux de la SONAFOR”.
La cour prend position dans le débat relatif à l’étendue
de la saisie réelle en matière de contrefaçon300 et fait
droit aux arguments de la société AM qui soutenait quele juge des requêtes ne pouvait ordonner la saisie detout le stock du présumé contrefacteur. Elle s’appuied’abord sur le fait qu’à ce stade de la procédure, le saisi
n’est qu’un présumé contrefacteur, ensuite que la victime
n’a pas besoin de saisir tout le stock du concurrent pour
prouver la contrefaçon, quelques échantillons étant
suffisants et enfin, que la saisie de tout le stock porterait
une grave atteinte au saisi et ne serait pas indispensable
au requérant.

298
299
300

AZÉMA (J.) et al., Lamy Droit commercial, Paris (Wolters Kluwer), 2006,
n° 2040 : “Le requérant n’a pas à justifier de la vraisemblance de lacontrefaçon que la procédure de saisie aura précisément pour but d’établir.”
Devenu l’art. 51 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
STENGER (P.), Saisie-contrefaçon – Exécution de la saisie-contrefaçon : Juriscl.
commercial, Fasc. 463.

Pour infirmer l’ordonnance entreprise sur l’étendue
de la saisie, les juges d’appel ont affirmé que “la saisie
réelle, qui conserve une finalité probatoire, ne peutrevêtir une forme conservatoire pour porter sur tout
le stock de produits contrefaisants”. Cette position
de la cour procède d’une démarche de prudence
en raison du préjudice matériel et moral que peutcauser une saisie réelle301. C’est justement la raison
pour laquelle l’article 48 de l’annexe III302, siège de lasaisie-contrefaçon en matière de marque, prévoit lapossibilité pour le juge des requêtes de subordonnerla saisie-contrefaçon à une garantie à fournir par lerequérant pour décourager les demandes téméraires
ou motivées par une volonté de nuire à un concurrent.
Cette garantie doit être en principe suffisante pourindemniser le préjudice que pourrait subir le saisi au vu
de l’ampleur de la saisie si celle-ci s’avère injustifiée caril y a effectivement un risque d’abus de droit. Certes, detels agissements seraient sanctionnés a posteriori mais,
dans un but d’efficacité ainsi que de rapidité de l’action
en contrefaçon subséquente, il est important pour lejuge d’ordonner une constitution de garantie préalable à
une mesure de saisie réelle, ceci dans le but d’assurer un
usage “plus raisonné”303.
La décision de la cour sur la saisie réelle semble s’inscriredans cette dynamique d’équilibre et de prudence à
encourager, même si elle est discutable du point de vue
de sa conformité avec le texte de l’article 48 de l’annexe
III de l’ABR-1999304. La cour affirme que la saisie réelle,qui ne peut avoir qu’une finalité probatoire, ne saurait
porter sur l’ensemble du stock des produits prétendus
contrefaisants au risque d’être assimilée à une saisie
conservatoire. Une telle position ne résulte pas du texte
de l’article 48 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 qui parle de“…description détaillée avec ou sans saisie des produits
ou services qu’il prétend marqués…”. Même s’il fautdéplorer l’absence de précision du texte sur son étendue,
il reste qu’il fait bien état de la saisie des produits ou
services prétendus contrefaisants.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

Le but de la saisie-contrefaçon étant d’obtenir despreuves de la contrefaçon, cette exigence d’indices decontrefaçon ne doit pas être entendue de façon trop
extensive, sinon cela reviendrait à exiger des preuves dela contrefaçon et donc à priver la procédure de saisiecontrefaçon de son essence298. Dans tous les cas, le saisi
pourra valablement entamer ce débat sur l’absence decontrefaçon dans le cadre de la procédure au fond que lesaisissant doit initier dans un délai de 10 jours ouvrables,à peine de nullité de plein droit de la saisie.

La cour ne peut ainsi tirer des dispositions de l’article 48
précité une quelconque restriction légale de la saisie
réelle en matière de contrefaçon. La saisie réelle detout le stock du produit incriminé peut effectivement,
dans certains cas, se justifier. C’est ce que la société MTa cherché à établir, en l’espèce, en faisant valoir que “lamise en vente sur le marché sénégalais de ces sacs de
riz entraînerait inévitablement une confusion de produit
et de surcroît une concurrence déloyale envers elle” denature à lui causer “un préjudice commercial voire un
manque à gagner”.
La saisie réelle de tout le stock peut ainsi être ordonnée
lorsque tout retard dans l’intervention est de natureà causer un préjudice irréparable au titulaire du droit
301
302
303
304

Cass. com., 4 janvier 1985 : Bull. civ., IV, n° 9, p. 237 (note MATHELY (P.)) et :PIBD 1985, III, p. 373.
Art. 51 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Cass. com., 11 mars 2003 : JCP G 2003, IV, p. 1842 : “La saisie-contrefaçon doitêtre utilisée conformément à sa finalité, car à défaut, elle est susceptible degénérer des abus et c’est sa légitimité et sa portée qui en seront amoindries.”
Art. 51 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
229

à la marque. C’est le cas par exemple “lorsqu’il s’agit
d’empêcher l’introduction, dans les circuits commerciauxde marchandises, y compris des marchandises importées
immédiatement après leur dédouanement”305. Cette
notion de prévention d’un préjudice irréparable est
désormais consacrée par l’article 50 de l’annexe III del’Acte de 2015. Il dispose en effet que “la juridiction
nationale compétente peut également ordonnertoutes mesures urgentes sur requête lorsque lescirconstances exigent que ces mesures ne soient pas
prises contradictoirement, notamment lorsque tout
retard serait de nature à causer un préjudice irréparable
au demandeur.” Certes, cette possibilité n’est pas
traitée à l’article 51 dudit texte qui concerne de la saisiecontrefaçon. Mais il reste constant que c’est un pouvoir
reconnu désormais au juge des requêtes même si lefondement diffère.
Dès lors, il demeure évident qu’en cas de risque depréjudice irréparable, la saisie réelle peut bien êtreordonnée par voie d’ordonnance à pied de requête.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelleÀ titre comparatif, la France a prévu à l’article L 716-7 ducode de propriété intellectuelle (CPI) expressément lapossibilité de saisir le stock des produits incriminés. La
saisie réelle peut ainsi porter sur tous les produits ou
services que le saisissant prétend contrefaits en violationde ses droits : l’objet de la mesure est donc très large.
Certaines décisions des États de l’espace OAPI l’ont déjà
bien admise306.

230

Dans tous les cas, il semble que Fernand de Vischer
et Françoise Jacques de Dixmude307 suggèrent à justetitre que le développement de la saisie-contrefaçon etles risques qu’il peut engendrer doivent conduire à unnouvel équilibre bienvenu au sein de cette procédure.
Pour atteindre cet équilibre tant recherché, il est
important, en cas de saisie réelle du stock, de rendre
systématique la constitution de garanties. En ce sens,
l’article 51 de l’annexe III de l’Acte de Bamako portantrévision de l’Accord de Bangui a pris en compte ce besoinde sécuriser l’usage de la saisie réelle en matière decontrefaçon de marque. Il dispose ainsi que “lorsqu’il
y a lieu à saisie, ladite ordonnance peut imposer au
requérant un cautionnement qu’il est tenu de consigner
avant d’y faire procéder. Ce cautionnement doit êtresuffisant sans être de nature à décourager le recours àla procédure”.

305

306

307

Voir l’art. 50 ADPIC qui dispose que “Les autorités judiciaires seront habilitéesà ordonner l’adoption de mesures provisoires rapides et efficaces : pourempêcher qu’un acte portant atteinte à un droit de propriété intellectuelle nesoit commis et, en particulier, pour empêcher l’introduction, dans les circuits
commerciaux relevant de leur compétence, de marchandises, y compris desmarchandises importées immédiatement après leur dédouanement; (…)”.
Voir Jugement n° 1847 du 27 novembre 2002, tribunal régional de Dakar,
Jugement n° 250 du 25 janvier 1993, Société B.SA c. Société S Sénégal, in : Lecontentieux de la propriété intellectuelle dans les États membres de l’OAPI,
Collection de l’OAPI, n° 3, pp. 247-256; TGI du Mfoundi - Yaoundé, Jugementn° 250 du 24 janvier 1996, Sté Air L and ors c. Sté A.S Cameroun, in : EDOU EDOU(P.), n.20, pp. 266-269.
DE VISSCHER (F.), La saisie-description en Belgique : une mesure probatoireet parfois conservatoire, in : Les cahiers de propriété intellectuelle, Vol. 13,
2011, n° 2, pp. 465-486.

Il appartient désormais aux juges de faire une bonne
application de ce texte pour amener les demandeurs àraisonner leurs demandes.
Malick Lamotte

L. Marque – Revendication du droit depriorité – Restauration de la priorité –Violation du droit antérieur
Est tardive et donc inopérante la revendication depriorité attachée à une marque effectuée à l’OAPI
deux ans après le dépôt initial de ladite marqueréalisé dans un pays tiers, nonobstant la décision
du directeur général de l’Organisation restaurant lapriorité revendiquée, dès lors que le juge constate
que les conditions fixées par le Règlement relatif à larestauration des droits ne sont pas réunies.
L’enregistrement d’une marque opéré sous le fondementd’un droit de priorité vicié ne peut antérioriser un signe
identique ou similaire enregistré postérieurement à ladate du dépôt initial.
Tribunal de première instance de Yopougon, Jugement
civil n° 187 du 21 mars 2013, SIVOP, S.A. c. SOCIÉTÉANGEL COSMETICS S.A.
Observations :Le droit de priorité unioniste institué par l’article 4 de laConvention de Paris pour la protection de la propriété
industrielle308 a pour but, en matière de marque, d’éviterau déposant d’avoir à effectuer ses dépôts simultanément
dans tous les pays du monde où il souhaite être protégé
et de lui permettre de bénéficier d’un certain délai à
compter du premier dépôt dans un pays membre, pourréaliser des dépôts parallèles dans d’autres pays membres
sans risquer d’être antériorisé dans ces pays par des tiers
qui auraient profité de la publication du premier dépôt
pour déposer entretemps le même signe dans ces autres
États309. La décision rapportée a le mérite d’apporter unéclairage sur les conditions de mise en œuvre de ce droit
de priorité réglementé à l’article 11 de l’annexe III del’Accord de Bangui révisé pris en application de l’article 4
de la Convention d’Union de Paris.
Faits : La société ivoirienne SIVOP SA, se prévalant deson droit antérieur sur la marque “CAROLIGHT” avec
logo enregistrée à l’OAPI le 30 novembre 2006 sous len° 54.659 pour les produits des classes 3, 20 et 25, a
attrait la société Angel Cosmetics SA installée à Kinshasa
devant le tribunal de première instance de Yopougonen annulation de l’enregistrement n° 57406 de la mêmemarque opérée à son profit le 17 octobre 2005. La sociétéAngel Cosmetics a prétendu détenir un droit antérieur
308

309

Cf. art. 4 de la Convention d’Union de Paris pour la protection de la
propriété industrielle signée le 20 mars 1883 et révisée à Bruxelles le14 décembre 1900, à Washington le 2 juin 1911, à La Haye le 6 novembre
1925, à Londres le 2 juin 1934, à Lisbonne le 31 octobre 1958 et à Stockholm
le 14 juillet 1967. C’est l’une des conventions maîtresses administrées par
l’OMPI et à laquelle tous les pays membres de l’OAPI ont adhéré.
Voir PASSA (J.), n.82, p. 560.

Consciente du caractère tardif de sa revendication depriorité qui devrait parvenir à l’Organisation au plus
tard trois mois après le dépôt de la demande d’origine,la société Angel Cosmetics a sollicité et obtenu dudirecteur général de l’OAPI la restauration de son droit
de priorité congolaise, ce qui, à ses yeux, la constitue
rétroactivement propriétaire de la marque litigieuse
depuis le 12 octobre 2005, date du dépôt de sa marqueen République démocratique du Congo. Elle a par ailleurs
indiqué avoir parallèlement saisi cette autorité enopposition à l’enregistrement de la marque revendiquée
par la SIVOP SA, et que le tribunal civil ne peut vider
sa saisine sans que cette question préjudicielle ne soit
préalablement réglée par l’autorité compétente.
Deux questions de droit étaient posées au juge dutribunal de Yopougon : la juridiction de l’ordre judiciaire
saisie d’une demande aux fins d’annulation d’une
marque doit-elle surseoir à statuer en attendantque l’OAPI parallèlement saisie de l’opposition àl’enregistrement de ladite marque vide sa saisine? Le
déposant étranger d’une marque est-il en droit de se
prévaloir d’un droit de priorité restauré à tort par ledirecteur général de l’OAPI pour antérioriser une marquepremière déposée auprès de cette organisation?
Raisonnement : Le tribunal a rejeté la demande de sursis
à statuer, consacrant ainsi la prééminence des décisions
des tribunaux de l’ordre judiciaire sur celles émanant desorganes statutaires de l’OAPI (section I). En outre, pourrefuser le bénéfice de la priorité, la juridiction saisie apréalablement examiné les conditions d’exercice de ce
droit (section II).
I. La prééminence des décisions des juridictions del’ordre judiciaire sur celles des organes statutaires
de l’OAPILa prégnance des décisions des tribunaux de l’ordre
judiciaire sur celles émanant des instances de l’OAPI esténoncée par des dispositions pertinentes de l’Accordde Bangui révisé et irradie tout le processus de mise enœuvre des droits de propriété intellectuelle. L’article 18
des dispositions générales de l’Accord de Bangui révisé,
Acte du 24 février 1999 dispose : “les décisions judiciaires
définitives rendues sur la validité des titres dans l’un desÉtats membres en application des dispositions du texte
des annexes I à X au présent accord font autorité danstous les autres États membres, exceptées celles fondées
sur l’ordre public et les bonnes mœurs”. C’est au visa decette disposition communautaire que le juge auteur dela décision rapportée a, à bon droit, rejeté l’exception desursis à statuer soulevée par la société congolaise Angel

Cosmetics : “…Qu’en cela, cette disposition rejoint l’article
18 de l’ABR qui fait prévaloir la primauté de l’autorité etl’indépendance des décisions judiciaires et soumet lesorganes dirigeants de l’OAPI à la censure des Tribunauxcivils dans leurs actes et décisions relatives à la mise enœuvre des instruments de protection de la propriété
industrielle”.
On le voit : les décisions des tribunaux sur la validité
des titres de propriété industrielle s’imposent tant
aux titulaires desdits titres qu’à l’Office de propriété
industrielle. En effet, les décisions d’attribution de titresde propriété industrielle émanant des instances del’OAPI n’ont pas une valeur absolue. Les titres délivrés
par l’Organisation ne confèrent qu’une présomption
de droit à leurs titulaires, aucune certitude ne s’yattachant quant à l’existence et à la validité des droits.
À titre d’illustration, en matière de brevet d’invention,
l’article 22, alinéa 1, de l’annexe I de l’Accord de Bangui
révisé indique que “la délivrance des brevets est
effectuée aux risques et périls des demandeurs et sansgarantie soit de la réalité de la nouveauté, ou du mérite
de l’invention, soit de la fidélité ou de l’exactitude dela description”. C’est l’autorité judiciaire qui détermine
en dernier ressort si un titre délivré est éligible àla protection légale. Ce principe trouve application
relativement à la naissance des droits de propriété
industrielle et à leur maintien en vigueur.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

sur la marque “CAROLIGHT” en vertu de son droit
de priorité congolaise restauré par décisionn° 217/OAPIDG/DPI/DAJ/SSD/SAJ du 11 octobre 2007 dudirecteur général de l’OAPI. En effet, la société Angel
Cosmetics avait, en date du 12 octobre 2005, soit deuxannées plus tôt, déposé la marque “CAROLIGHT” en
République démocratique du Congo, pays non-membrede l’OAPI mais ayant adhéré à la Convention d’Unionde Paris.

S’agissant de la naissance des droits, c’est au jugequ’incombe la responsabilité de dire en définitive si letitre de propriété industrielle délivré méritait de l’être
après examen des conditions légales d’admissibilité del’objet considéré à la protection légale.
En ce qui concerne le maintien en vigueur des titres
délivrés, le juge peut prononcer la nullité, la radiation ou
la déchéance par voie principale ou incidente310. Il peut afortiori prononcer la déchéance ou annuler une marquequi a été restaurée par les instances compétentes
de l’Organisation. De ce point de vue, la décision dudirecteur général de l’OAPI n° 217/OAPIDG/DPI/DAJ/
SSD/SAJ du 11 octobre 2007 portant restauration de lapriorité congolaise de la marque “CAROLIGHT” n° 57406
du 17 octobre 2005 ne s’impose pas au juge civil qui ale pouvoir de la rapporter dès lors qu’il estime que lesconditions légales ne sont pas réunies. C’est d’ailleurs au
terme de cet examen que le juge du tribunal de première
instance de Yopougon a refusé d’accorder le bénéfice dudroit de priorité à la société Angel Cosmetics désavouant
ainsi le Directeur Général de l’OAPI.
Bien entendu, cette décision, une fois définitive,s’impose à l’OAPI en vertu des dispositions combinéesdes articles 18 de l’ABR-1999, 24.3) de l’annexe III
dudit accord. Cette dernière disposition prévoit lacommunication à l’Organisation de la décision définitive
déclarant l’enregistrement nul et non avenu311. La
310

311

Pour plus amples informations sur la question, v. NDEMA ELONGUE (M.-L.),
La propriété intellectuelle à l’épreuve de la justice des pays membres del’OAPI, in : Mélanges offerts à Denis Ekani, Collection de l’OAPI n° 4, Paris(L’Harmattan), 2012, pp. 189 et s.
Cf. art. 28 al. 3 de l’ABR-2015.
231

Règle 6.1) de son Règlement d’application de l’ABR-1999
précise que cette communication est faite par la partie laplus diligente.
II. Les conditions d’exercice du droit de priorité
L’exercice du droit de priorité est subordonné àl’observance de certaines conditions prévues par les
textes de loi susvisés. Le tribunal de Yopougon a annulé
la marque “CAROLIGHT” n° 57.406 du 4 septembre 2007
motif pris de la violation du droit antérieur de la société
ivoirienne SIVOP SA sur la même marque enregistréele 30 novembre 2006 sous le n° 54.659 après avoir
refusé le bénéfice de la priorité congolaise rattachés à lamarque n° 57.406 revendiquée par Angel Cosmetics SA
pour inobservation des conditions de forme et de fondprévues par la législation communautaire.
Il importe d’indiquer que l’article 11.1) de l’annexe III del’Accord de Bangui révisé ne prévoit pas expressément
la restauration du droit de priorité à la différence del’Acte de BAMAKO du 14 décembre 2015 qui indiqueà l’article 12, alinéa 5, que : “Toutefois, le droit depriorité du déposant peut faire l’objet de restauration
conformément à l’article 21 ci-dessous”. C’est finalement
sur le fondement du Règlement sur la restauration desdroits adopté à Cotonou le 4 décembre 2004312 que cettemesure de faveur peut être accordée sous l’empire del’ABR-1999.

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De l’analyse des dispositions combinées des articles 11.1),
25 de l’Accord de Bangui révisé et du Règlement
susvisé, il ressort que le demandeur doit présenter àl’Organisation une demande de restauration au plus
tard dans les trois mois après le dépôt de la demanded’origine et comprenant :232• un exposé complet des motifs présentés à l’appuiaccompagné de documents justificatifs;• une déclaration écrite indiquant la date et le numéro
du dépôt antérieur;• une copie certifiée conforme de ladite demande
antérieure; et• le justificatif du dépôt de la demande ou bien dudocument de priorité, de cession de priorité ou la
traduction dudit document.
Il importe de souligner qu’à l’origine, le domaine dela restauration en matière de marque était limité àl’hypothèse visée à l’article 25 de l’annexe III de l’Accordde Bangui, Acte du 24 février 1999, à savoir le défaut derenouvellement de la protection conférée par la marque.
Le Règlement relatif à la restauration des droits du4 décembre 2004 a élargi le champ de la restauration desdroits en accordant désormais ce privilège au demandeur
qui n’a pas fourni dans les délais le document de priorité.
La société SIVOP SA a soutenu que le directeur général
de l’OAPI n’aurait pas dû recevoir la demande derestauration de la priorité revendiquée par Angel
312

Ce Règlement a fait l’objet de la Résolution n° 44/13 prise à l’issue de la
44 e session du Conseil d’administration de l’OAPI.

Cosmetics SA dans la mesure où le document produit
à l’appui n’a pas été certifié conforme par l’office deprotection d’origine, en l’espèce l’office zaïroise depropriété industrielle, mais plutôt par un officier d’état
civil, de surcroît d’un pays tiers. Or, l’article 11, alinéa 1.a),de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé n’indique pas
expressément l’autorité habilitée à certifier conforme lademande antérieure. En toute logique, cette prérogative
devrait échoir non seulement à l’office de propriété
industrielle compétent mais aussi à toutes autres
autorités locales compétentes. De ce point de vue, cettecondition de forme nous semble avoir été respectée enl’espèce même si l’on peut spéculer sur la compétence del’officier d’état civil du Mali ayant matériellement procédé
à la certification. En tout état de cause, l’intervention
de cette autorité relevant d’un pays autre que celui
du ressort de l’office compétent préfigure déjà lescirconstances exceptionnelles évoquées par la sociétéAngel Cosmetics à l’appui de sa revendication de priorité.
S’agissant des conditions de fond, l’article 25.1) del’Accord de Bangui révisé, Acte du 24 février 1999 prévoit
la restauration dès lors que la marque n’a pas été
renouvelée en raison des circonstances indépendantes
de la volonté du titulaire de la marque313. À l’appui de sa
demande de restauration de priorité, la société Angel
Cosmetics SA a convoqué deux circonstances ou raisonsindépendantes de la volonté du titulaire, à savoir la faute
du mandataire et la crise politico-militaire en Républiquedémocratique du Congo. Pendant longtemps, laCommission supérieure de recours assimilait la faute
du mandataire à une circonstance indépendante de lavolonté du titulaire314. Elle a par la suite fait preuve derigueur en invitant désormais le déposant à rapporter lapreuve de sa diligence et de son suivi en vue du maintien
en vigueur de ses droits315.
La société Angel Cosmetics SA s’est cependant heurtée
au défaut de preuve de ses allégations, la prétendue
faute du mandataire n’ayant pas été spécifiée. En outre,
la société SIVOP SA a produit aux débats les courriers
du Gouvernement de la RDC et des services postauxde ce pays établissant que les circonstances évoquéesn’existaient pas au cours de la période considérée, toutechose dépouillant la demande de restauration de prioritéde son fondement juridique et invalidant la décision
du directeur général de l’OAPI susvisée. La demandede restauration de la priorité congolaise attachée à lamarque “CAROLIGHT” n° 57.406 du 4 septembre 2007n’étant pas fondée, celle-ci ne peut valablement
antérioriser la marque “CAROLIGHT” n° 54.659 déposée àl’OAPI le 30 novembre 2006 par la société SIVOP SA.
313

314
315

L’art. 4 du Règlement relatif à la restauration des droits précise que parcirconstances indépendantes de la volonté du titulaire, il faut entendre desévénements fortuits et inévitables. À titre indicatif, comme circonstances
indépendantes de la volonté du titulaire de titre de propriété industrielle,on peut citer l’interruption des services postaux et la perte ou le retard
inévitable du courrier.
Voir Décision n° 29/SCR/OAPI du 31 octobre 2003; Décision n° 41/CSR/OAPI
du 29 octobre 2004; Décision n° 50/CSR/OAPI du 1er avril 2005 : Recueil desdécisions de la CSR, Sessions de 2003 à 2005.
Voir Décision n° 0102/CSR/OAPI du 27 avril 2007; Décision n° 0103/CSR/
OAPI du 27 avril 2007. Voir en ce sens CSR Décision n° 00103/CSR/OAPI du
27 avril 2007 (obs. EKANI (F.)) : Revue La Gazelle n° 004, septembre 2008,
pp. 10 et s.

Sous cette réserve, la décision commentée mérite d’être
approuvée.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

M. Usage d’une marque commenom de domaine de l’Internet –Concurrence déloyale – Mauvaise foi– Détermination de l’auteur de l’acte
concurrentiel
Commet une faute constitutive de concurrence déloyale
en application des articles 1er et suivants de l’annexe VIIIde l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du 22 février 1999, ensemble
le Code civil national, une société qui utilise, à des finscommerciales et en connaissance de cause, une marquede service de paiement en ligne enregistrée comme nom
de domaine au mépris des droits du titulaire des droits
sur ladite marque.
La responsabilité des faits dénoncés incombe d’une part
à l’organisme bénéficiaire de l’enregistrement du nom dedomaine offensant et, d’autre part, à tous utilisateurs demauvaise foi.
Cour suprême du Sénégal, Arrêt n° 57 du 17 mai 2017,
SONATEL MOBILES S.A c. L’AGENCE TOUBA SÉNÉGAL ET
LE GROUPE GPS
Observations :Les conflits entre marques et noms de domaine
deviennent récurrents dans l’espace OAPI à la faveurde l’engouement que connaît l’Internet dans les États
membres, manifesté par l’enregistrement massif desnoms de domaine désormais source de revenus et decontentieux multiformes. Les noms de domaine sont316

L’art. 45 al.1 de l’ABR-1999 dispose en effet que : “Les titres en vigueur dansun État avant son adhésion au présent accord continuent à produire leurs
effets dans ledit État conformément à la législation en vigueur au moment deleur dépôt.”des adresses qui permettent de localiser les serveurs,
les sites Web ou les utilisateurs. Ils sont présentés avec
des caractères permettant de mémoriser ou de localiser
leurs titulaires ou leurs secteurs d’activité. Aujourd’hui,
les noms de domaine sont gérés au plan mondial
par l’ICANN, acronyme de l’Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Number. Il importe de préciser
que la responsabilité pour l’enregistrement de cesnoms était confiée à la société américaine Network
Solution Inc (NSI). Cet organisme a accrédité uncertain nombre d’unités d’enregistrement appelés“registras”. Ceux-ci sont des prestataires informatiques
qui assurent l’intermédiation technique entre l’ICANN etles usagers du réseau.
Ces conflits surgissent essentiellement du fait
de l’absence de coordination entre les systèmesd’enregistrement des marques et les systèmesd’enregistrement des noms de domaine, circonstanceayant favorisé la pratique du “cybersquatting” quiconsiste dans l’enregistrement des noms de domaine
comportant des marques appartenant aux tiers pour lesrevendre aux propriétaires desdites marques. ANDRÉ
R. BERTRAND relève en effet que les marques sontenregistrées par une autorité publique gouvernementale(c’est le cas de l’OAPI dans la sous-région Afrique centrale
et Afrique de l’Ouest) et les droits qui en découlent
ne peuvent s’exercer que sur le territoire spécifique,contrairement au système des noms de domaine qui ne
connaît pas de limites géographiques et ne dépend pas
des gouvernements317.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

À côté de cet argument, la société SIVOP SA a plaidé lanullité de la décision n° 217/OAPIDG/DPI/DAJ/SSD/SAJ du
11 octobre 2007 du directeur général de l’OAPI portantrestauration de la priorité congolaise de la marque“CAROLIGHT” n° 57406 du 17 octobre 2005 motif pris dudétournement de procédure, en ce que la restaurationde la priorité concerne les enregistrement reçus à l’OAPI
ou dans l’un de ses États membres, les bénéficiaires
d’enregistrements dans les pays tiers ne pouvant profiterde la protection de l’OAPI qu’en demandant l’extension dela protection d’origine à l’espace OAPI en vertu de l’article
45 de l’Accord de Bangui316. Le tribunal a curieusement
entériné cet argumentaire qui procède d’une confusion
entre la revendication de priorité et la demanded’extension de la protection. Alors que celle-là permet,
comme en l’espèce, à un déposant ressortissant d’un pays
tiers membre de l’union de Paris de revendiquer la datedu premier dépôt pour les dépôts ultérieurs de la mêmemarque dans les autres États, celle-ci règle le sort destitres délivrés dans un État avant son adhésion à l’OAPI.

Faits : Dans l’espèce commentée, le litige qui oppose letitulaire d’une marque et l’auteur de l’enregistrementd’un nom de domaine se cristallise plutôt sur le terrain
de la concurrence déloyale, telle que régie par les articles
premier et suivants de l’annexe VIII de l’Accord de
Bangui, Acte du 22 février 1999 318. Les faits sont d’une
relative simplicité : l’Agence TOUBA Sénégal, titulaire de lamarque de service “sen-factures” enregistrée à l’OAPI le
30 janvier 2006 avec effet le 12 avril 2005 pour désigner unsystème de paiement de factures à distance, a assigné la
SONATEL MOBILES en concurrence déloyale et paiement
des dommages et intérêts pour avoir utilisé sa marque à
des fins commerciales sans son consentement. La société
défenderesse a soutenu avoir utilisé la marque, non pas
comme propriétaire et fournisseur du service de paiement
litigieux, mais es qualité de cliente du Groupement
GPS qui est, lui-même, membre du GIE GAINDE 2000,
propriétaire du nom de domaine “senfactures.sn”, pourl’avoir fait enregistrer au Sénégal, depuis janvier 2005,
antérieurement à son utilisation par l’Agence Touba
Sénégal, et au dépôt qu’elle a effectué à l’OAPI. La courd’appel de Dakar a infirmé la décision du premier juge
donnant gain de cause à l’Agence TOUBA Sénégal.
La Cour suprême a cassé l’arrêt infirmatif attaqué etrenvoyé la cause à la cour d’appel de Kaolack qui fit droità la demande de l’Agence TOUBA Sénégal.
317
318

Voir en ce sens BERTRAND (A. R.), Droit des marques, signes distinctifs-noms
de domaine, Paris (Dalloz), 2e éd., 2005, p. 373.
Voir également art. 1 à 9 de l’ABR-2015.
233

Raisonnement : Fidèle dans sa logique, la hautejuridiction a rejeté le pourvoi formulé par la SONATEL
MOBILES, mettant ainsi fin à ce feuilleton judiciaire. Deux
questions centrales étaient posées à la Cour suprême : laconcurrence déloyale est-elle caractérisée en l’espèce? Le
cas échéant, qui doit en endosser la responsabilité?
La haute juridiction sénégalaise a indiqué que“l’interdiction d’utiliser une marque enregistrée sansl’autorisation de son titulaire prévue à l’article 7 del’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du 22 février
1999, est générale et s’applique aux tiers sansconsidération relative à une quelconque catégorie etque la concurrence déloyale est constituée dans lesactivités industrielles et commerciales par tout acte qui
crée ou est de nature à créer la confusion tel que l’usage
d’une marque”.
À travers cette motivation, la Cour semble ne pas faire ledépart entre la contrefaçon de marque et la concurrence
déloyale, toute chose qui commande un recadrage del’objet du litige pour lui restituer sa véritable portée. La
concurrence déloyale nécessitant une faute, il faudra aupréalable dire en quoi consiste l’acte concurrentiel enl’espèce (section I) et identifier ensuite le ou les auteur(s)dudit acte (section II).
I. La détermination de l’acte concurrentiel

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Dans le droit fil de l’article premier 1)a) de l’annexe VIIIde l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du 22 février 1999 précité,
la concurrence déloyale sur le fondement de laquellel’Agence TOUBA a saisi la justice suppose l’exercice d’une
activité concurrente (A) et la mauvaise foi (B).

234

A. L’activité concurrente
L’annexe VIII de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du22 février 1999 vise de façon non exhaustive plusieurs
occurrences de concurrence déloyale qui vont de laconfusion avec l’entreprise d’autrui ou ses activités,de l’atteinte à l’image ou à la réputation d’autrui,
du dénigrement, à la violation de l’information
confidentielle, etc. Dans l’espèce commentée, l’acte
concurrentiel décrié est la confusion avec une marqueenregistrée, hypothèse prévue à l’article 2, alinéa 2, dususdit accord. L’Agence TOUBA reproche en effet à la
SONATEL MOBILES d’avoir utilisé le nom de domaine“senfactures.sn” qui constitue une imitation de sa
marque éponyme enregistrée à l’OAPI le 30 janvier 2006
avec effet le 12 avril 2005 pour désigner un système depaiement de factures à distance. L’existence de la faute
concurrentielle en l’espèce est tributaire de l’aptitude dunom de domaine litigieux à générer la confusion dansl’esprit du public avec la marque revendiquée.
L’imitation est évidente en l’espèce, le nom de domaine
querellé “senfactures.sn” reprenant à l’identique leterme verbal “sen-factures” constitutif de la marquedéposée par l’Agence TOUBA. L’identité entre les signes
litigieux est parfaite, leur différence orthographiqueétant sans aucune incidence. À titre de droit comparé,la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes
considère que l’exigence d’identité est satisfaite “lorsquele signe critiqué reproduit, sans modification ni ajout,
tous les éléments constituant la marque ou lorsque,considéré dans son ensemble, il recèle des différences
si insignifiantes qu’elles peuvent passer inaperçues
aux yeux du consommateur d’attention moyenne”319.
Il y a lieu de rappeler que la reproduction même non
identique de la marque revendiquée ou des produits
ou services auxquels elle se rapporte peut égalementêtre source de confusion au sens de l’article 2, alinéas
1 et 2.a), de l’annexe VIII de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du24 février 1999320.
Il est par ailleurs admis en jurisprudence que l’extension
du nom de domaine ne doit pas être prise en compte
dans l’appréciation du risque de confusion. Il importe denoter que le nom de domaine est constitué d’un radical
et d’une extension. L’ICANN a créé au fil des ans denouvelles extensions qui viennent en complément desdomaines génériques (gTLDs) déjà existants pour faire
face à la forte demande de nouvelles adresses Web. Dans
une intéressante affaire où la société Gandi s’appuyait
sur les marques “Gandi” et “Gandi-net” pour poursuivre
ceux qui avaient enregistré les noms de domaine “gandiinfo”, le tribunal de grande instance de Paris a poséque : “Les noms de domaine litigieux (…) sont constituésd’un radical et d’une extension; (…) celle-ci désignant ledomaine générique, seul le radical Gandi doit être prisen considération pour apprécier la contrefaçon”321. Cette
décision a été rendue certes en matière de contrefaçon
de marque, mais le raisonnement vaut son pesant d’or
sur le terrain de la concurrence déloyale, lorsqu’il s’agitd’établir le risque de confusion. Un tel risque étant
acquis dès lors que, comme en l’espèce, le radical dunom de domaine litigieux, à savoir “senfactures”, est
une reprise à l’identique de la marque enregistrée “senfactures”, l’extension dudit nom, à savoir “.sn”, étant sansréelle importance.
La reproduction génératrice de confusion porteégalement sur le service offert par le titulaire de lamarque “sen-factures”, à savoir le système de paiement
des factures à distance. La démarche ici consiste à
mettre en parallèle le contenu du site exploité et leservice pour lequel la protection est revendiquée. Le
tribunal de grande instance de Nanterre a indiqué, certes
en matière de contrefaçon, “Qu’il convient de procéderà une comparaison entre le contenu du site exploité (…)
et les produits et services pour lesquels la protection est
revendiquée”322. Dans le même sens, la cour d’appel deVersailles a refusé au titulaire d’une marque déposéeen classe 38 – télécommunications – la possibilitéd’opposer cette marque à un nom de domaine sansautres considérations. La cour a indiqué que les services
visés à la classe 38 de communication, messagerie, etc.
“S’entendent de ceux (…) ayant un tel objet et qu’ils nesauraient se confondre avec les multiples services pour lafourniture desquels les communications par ordinateur,
319
320
321
322

Voir Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 20 mars 2003, Littis
Diffusion SA c. Sadas Vertbaudet SA, C-291/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:169.
Voir art. 3 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Voir TGI de Paris, 3e chambre, 2e section, 27 juin 2003.
Voir TGI de Nanterre, 3e chambre, 2e section, 21 janvier 2002 : JCP E 2002,
n° 36, n° 8 (obs. VIVANT (M.)).

Il va sans dire que l’auteur de l’enregistrement du nom
de domaine litigieux offre un service identique que celui
désigné par l’Agence TOUBA, à savoir le paiement desfactures à distance à travers l’adresse “www.senfactures.
sn” dont la structuration est évocatrice, toute chosesusceptible d’induire la communauté des internautes
en erreur quant à l’entreprise prestataire du service
concerné.
B. La mauvaise foi
Elle est cristallisée dans l’expression “contraire aux
usages honnêtes” contenue dans l’article premier,alinéa 1.a), de l’annexe VIII précitée. En vertu decette disposition, il ne suffit pas de reproduire lamarque revendiquée comme nom de domaine pourêtre sanctionné sur le fondement de la concurrence
déloyale; encore faut-il faire preuve de mauvaise
foi, d’un comportement déshonnête dans l’exercice
des activités industrielles et commerciales. En règle
générale, la mauvaise foi doit s’apprécier à la date del’enregistrement du nom de domaine litigieux. Or, il
ressort des faits que le nom de domaine “senfactures.
sn” a été enregistré courant janvier 2005, et donc
antérieurement à la marque “sen-factures” enregistréeà l’OAPI seulement le 30 janvier 2006 avec prise d’effet
le 12 avril 2005. L’on est, dès lors, en droit d’émettre
un sérieux doute quant à la mauvaise foi de l’auteur del’enregistrement du nom de domaine “senfactures.sn”.
Certes, la question de l’attribution du bénéfice del’antériorité à l’usager d’un nom de domaine est
discutée tant en doctrine qu’en jurisprudence, certaines
décisions déniant à ce dernier la qualité de titulaire ausens du droit de la propriété intellectuelle324, alors qued’autres, plus libérales, la lui reconnaissent. Dans unarrêt dont la motivation est assez évocatrice, la courd’appel de Paris a indiqué que “le nom de domaine,compte tenu notamment de sa valeur commerciale
pour l’entreprise qui en est propriétaire, peut justifier
une protection contre les atteintes dont il fait l’objet”325.
Jérôme Passa souligne, dans le même sens, approuvant
par là certaines décisions, qu’un nom de domaine, dèslors qu’il est effectivement exploité, peut constituer
une antériorité justifiant l’annulation d’une marque326.
Certains auteurs estiment que le nom de domaine n’est
qu’une propriété en gestation, rien n’étant encore acquis
quant aux conditions qui justifieraient cette protection327.
Toujours est-il que l’on voit mal comment taxer defrauduleux l’enregistrement premier en date du nom dedomaine “senfactures.sn” sauf à admettre que l’Agence
323
324
325
326
327

Voir CA Versailles, 12e chambre, 22 novembre 2001 : JCP E 2003, n° 106, n° 7
(obs. HUMBLOT (B.)).
Voir en ce sens TGI Nanterre, 13 mars 2000 : JCP E 2000, p. 1856, n° 7 (obs.
VIVANT (M.)).
Voir également CA Paris, 18 octobre 2000 : JCP E 2000, n° 36, n° 8 (obs. VIVANT(M.)).
Voir Cass. com., 26 novembre 2003 : PIBD 2004, III, n° 780, p. 98; CA Paris,
15 septembre 2004 : PIBD 2005, III, n° 800, p. 54.
Voir VIVANT (M.), Lamy droit de l’informatique et des réseaux, Paris (Éditions
Lamy), 2004, n° 2061.

TOUBA avait la priorité de l’usage de la marque éponyme.
C’est précisément l’un des arguments développés par
la SONATEL MOBILES pour établir sa bonne foi dansl’utilisation du nom de domaine offensant. Cette société
a en effet soutenu qu’elle ignorait l’existence de lamarque “sen-factures” et que l’offre commerciale relative
à l’usage de ladite marque adressée à la SONATEL
MOBILES par l’Agence TOUBA par correspondance endate du 9 mars 2004 ne lui était pas destinée, étant
donné qu’elle a une personnalité juridique distincte de la
SONATEL. Ce moyen pertinent a été déclaré irrecevablepar la Cour régulatrice, faute de production de la lettre
susvisée, laquelle lui aurait permis d’asseoir sa conviction
sur la priorité de l’usage de la marque querellée parl’Agence TOUBA et de conforter celle-ci dans sa posturede victime de la concurrence déloyale. Inversement, laproduction de cette lettre aurait pareillement permis à
la SONATEL MOBILES d’établir éventuellement sa bonne
foi en prouvant que cette correspondance ne lui étant
pas destinée, elle ne pouvait logiquement pas avoir
connaissance de l’offre commerciale évoquant la marquequerellée.
En tout état de cause, la Cour s’est visiblement fondée
sur l’antériorité de l’usage de la marque “sen-factures”
par l’Agence TOUBA pour sanctionner la SONATEL
MOBILES. Le considérant ci-après l’illustre à suffire :“Que l’arrêt constate également, que
postérieurement à leur connaissance del‘utilisation et de l‘enregistrement de la marque’SENFACTURES‘, par l‘agence Touba SÉNÉGAL, la
SONATEL et le Groupement GPS, dont elle est un
des membres, ont continué à faire usage de ladite
marque protégée; que cette pratique frauduleuse,contraire aux usages honnêtes, est de nature à
créer une confusion avec la marque de service
légitimement et légalement détenue par l’agence
Touba SÉNÉGAL, et à perturber son marché”.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

messagerie électronique ou tout autre support (telInternet) ne constitue qu’un moyen”323.

Or, la reconnaissance du bénéfice de l’antériorité del’usage de la marque “sen-factures” à l’Agence TOUBAparaît contestable, dès lors que la correspondance
du 9 mars 2004 relative à l’offre commerciale visantladite marque n’a pas été versée au dossier. Dans ces
conditions, seule la date d’enregistrement à l’OAPI ou,
à tout le moins, la date de prise d’effet de la marque,c’est-à-dire le 12 avril 2005, devrait être prise en compte
dans la détermination de l’antériorité, sauf à considérer
que la haute juridiction s’est appuyée sur l’engagement
du 14 août 2002 de SADAGA SARR dont le contenu
reste inconnu.
II. L’identification de l’auteur de l’acte concurrentiel
La question paraît évidente, mais il n’en est rien,
l’exploitation d’un site Web faisant intervenir plusieurs
acteurs dont les responsabilités méritent d’être
circonscrites. Le premier responsable est de touteévidence celui qui entend se faire réserver le nom
de domaine, c’est-à-dire la personne physique ou
morale qui en a sollicité l’enregistrement auprès del’unité accréditée (A). En revanche, la mise en jeu de la235

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

responsabilité des utilisateurs des services offerts sous
le nom de domaine offensant nous semble plus délicate(B). La responsabilité des intermédiaires techniques,
notamment le fournisseur d’accès et l’hébergeur de site,
ne sera pas envisagée dans le cadre de cette analyse, laquestion n’ayant pas été expressément posée328.

236

A. Le bénéficiaire de l’enregistrement du nom dedomaine offensant
Le principal responsable des faits de concurrence
déloyale est le bénéficiaire du nom de domaine litigieux,
en l’espèce le GIE GAINDE 2000 dont le Groupement
GPS est membre. Il ressort des faits que cette structurea enregistré le nom de domaine “senfactures.sn” au
Sénégal depuis janvier 2005. L’argument de la courd’appel entériné par la haute juridiction selon lequel :“… Les appelants ne sont pas fondés à utiliser lamarque contre la volonté de l’intimée, en invoquant unenregistrement fait auprès d’un organisme national, en
lieu et place de l’OAPI, seule institution sous-régionale
compétente en la matière”, participe d’une imparfaitemaîtrise du mécanisme d’enregistrement des nomsde domaine de l’Internet qui, à la différence des titresde propriété industrielle traditionnels, s’opère au plannational et international par des unités d’enregistrement
accréditées. Il appartient au demandeur du nom dedomaine de vérifier que la dénomination sollicitée neporte pas atteinte à des droits antérieurs329. Dans le cas
d’espèce, le GIE GAINDE 2000 était tenu d’effectuer une
recherche d’antériorité préalablement au dépôt du nom
de domaine choisi auprès de l’unité d’enregistrement
afin de s’assurer de sa disponibilité. Une telle recherche
est d’autant plus facile que les sociétés en conflit opèrent
dans le même secteur d’activité, en l’occurrence lepaiement des factures en ligne. En tout état de cause, lajuridiction de renvoi a souverainement considéré que leGroupement GPS était informé de l’usage de la marque“sen-factures” par l’Agence TOUBA antérieurement à
l’enregistrement de son nom de domaine. Dès lors,
l’exploitation dudit nom sur la toile par ce Groupement
est constitutive d’une faute. Toutefois, l’action semble
avoir été dirigée exclusivement vers la SONATEL
MOBILES qui a fait feu de tout bois pour se mettre à l’abri
de la condamnation.
B. L’utilisateur du nom de domaine offensant
La SONATEL MOBILES a prétendu avoir utilisé le nom dedomaine “senfactures.sn”, non pas comme propriétaireet fournisseur du service de paiement auquel il serapporte, mais es qualité de cliente du Groupement GPS,
lui-même membre du GIE GAINDE 2000 propriétaire
dudit nom et qu’elle ne saurait répondre des actes poséspar son partenaire commercial. La cour s’est fondée surl’utilisation du nom offensant et sur la circonstance quela SONATEL MOBILES avait connaissance de l’existencede la marque revendiquée pour retenir le grief deconcurrence déloyale contre elle. La démarche estclassique, la concurrence déloyale étant adossée sur la

328
329

Voir sur cette importante question, FOMETEU (J.), La responsabilité desintermédiaires techniques dans l’utilisation en ligne des objets protégés :Revue africaine de la propriété intellectuelle n° 4, décembre 2013, pp. 25 et s.
Voir n.216, p. 1200, n° 2044.

responsabilité civile pour faute telle que régie par leslégislations civiles des États membres de l’OAPI. Il suffit
de rapporter la preuve de la mauvaise foi de l’un desintervenants de la chaîne pour le tenir pour responsable
des faits incriminés à titre personnel ou solidairement. Il
y a là une différence fondamentale avec la contrefaçon
où la bonne foi est inopérante.
Comment comprendre dès lors la motivation de la courqui a cru devoir convoquer les dispositions relatives
aux droits conférés par l’enregistrement d’une marquepour caractériser la concurrence déloyale : “l’interdictiond’utiliser une marque enregistrée sans l’autorisationde son titulaire prévue à l’article 7 de l’annexe III del’Accord de Bangui, Acte du 22 février 1999, est générale
et s’applique aux tiers sans considération relative à
une quelconque catégorie”? Si l’on peut comprendre
le souci des juges suprêmes à appréhender touteviolation des droits conférés au titulaire d’une marque,quel que soit le statut de l’auteur, ce considérant
apparaît comme un élément perturbateur dans leurraisonnement. À la vérité, le titulaire d’un droit privatif
sur une marque dispose d’une option, il peut agir
directement en contrefaçon ou alors obtenir la sanction
du comportement contrefaisant sur le terrain de laconcurrence déloyale à condition, dans cette seconde
hypothèse, de prouver le risque de confusion sansmettre en jeu le droit sur la marque. La Cour de cassationfrançaise rappelle d’ailleurs de façon constante aux
juridictions inférieures :
a.

b.
c.

“(…) que l’action en concurrence déloyale exige
une faute et que l’action en contrefaçon concerne
l’atteinte à un droit privatif,que ces deux actions procèdent de causes
différentes et ne tendent pas aux mêmes fins, etque la seconde n’est pas l’accessoire, laconséquence ou le complément de la première” 330.

C’est donc à tort que la Cour régulatrice a convoqué
l’article 7 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui auxdébats. L’on pourrait, a fortiori, mettre en avant le fait
que la SONATEL MOBILES et l’Agence TOUBA opérant
dans le même secteur d’activité, celle-là ne pouvait
ignorer l’existence de la marque “sen-factures”. De lasorte, en utilisant le service de paiement de factures enlignes offert par le titulaire du nom de domaine litigieux,
la société SONATEL MOBILES a voulu se placer dans lesillage du titulaire de la marque pour profiter de ses
efforts de promotion commerciale.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

330

Voir Cass. com., 24 février 1987 : PIBD 1987, III, p. 316. Voir dans le mêmesens, TGI du Wouri, Jugement civil n° 192 du 15 décembre 2000, Moulinex SAc. Vapsan Trading Cie (obs. Ndéma Elongué (M-L.)) : Revue scientifique de la
propriété industrielle la GAZELLE n° 0001, novembre 2007, pp. 17 et s.

La revendication de propriété d’une marque n’est pasde la compétence exclusive des organes juridictionnels
de l’OAPI. Cette action peut valablement être intentéedevant les juridictions nationales des États membres.
Dans ce second cas, son succès n’est nullement enfermé
dans le délai de prescription de six mois imparti pour lecontentieux administratif devant le directeur général
de l’OAPI.
Tribunal de grande instance du Wouri (Douala), Jugement
civil n° 382/Com du 23 décembre 2013, SOCIÉTÉ MARINEMAGISTRALE S.A c. Sieur KAMGA NENKAM Jean Paul
Observations :Le droit sur la marque naît du dépôt. Conformément
aux prescriptions de l’Accord de Bangui, l’usage dusigne en rapport avec les produits qu’il accompagne
sera réservé à celui qui, le premier, en a effectué ledépôt à l’OAPI : c’est la traduction de la règle du premierdéposant (v. art. 5 al. 1er de l’annexe III de l’AB). Cette
règle ainsi posée de manière flexible ne s’applique pas
dans les cas de dépôt frauduleux (c’est l’application duprincipe général fraus omnia corrompit, adage latin qui
signifie que la fraude corrompt tout. En application dece principe, tout acte entaché de fraude peut être remis
en cause devant le juge). En effet, le législateur régional
parfaitement au fait des manœuvres peu orthodoxes
qui sévissent dans les circuits commerciaux va doter
tout usager de marque d’instruments juridiques pourse prémunir de la fourberie du déposant désireux
de s’accaparer malicieusement son actif. L’action enrevendication de propriété est donc la réponse consacrée
à cet effet pour sanctionner tout imposteur à la conditionque ce dernier ait eu connaissance préalable de l’usage
du signe par la partie agissante. En marge du recours
administratif prévu devant les organes de l’OAPI, rienn’empêche les juridictions nationales de se saisir de telles
actions. Le jugement civil ici rapporté nous ouvre unefenêtre sur cette réalité.
Faits : En l’espèce, le sieur KAMGA NENKAM avait été
désigné directeur général et salarié de la société MARINEMAGISTRALE (2M), demanderesse à l’instance, par une
résolution du conseil d’administration de cette dernière.
Pour accompagner ses services de manutention
portuaire ultramoderne dénommé “Harbour Handing
With Big Bags”, mandat avait été confié par lademanderesse au sieur KAMGA NENKAM de procéderà l’enregistrement à l’OAPI au nom de la première, dela marque de service H2B2 SYSTEM. Profitant de sa
position privilégiée dans la gestion de la société, sieur
KAMGA NENKAM va utiliser les ressources de l’entreprisequi l’emploie pour financer le dépôt à son nom etl’enregistrement subséquent au n° 66841 de la marquequerellée suivant arrêté du 29 juillet 2011 du directeur
général de l’OAPI. Après découverte du pot aux roses

consistant en l’enregistrement du signe dont elle seprévaut d’une antériorité dans l’usage, la société MARINEMARCHANDE va, dans la foulée, mettre un terme auxliens contractuels existants entre elle et le défendeur, etplus tard introduire une action à prétentions doubles,à savoir nullité de l’enregistrement obtenu par sieur
KAMGA NENKAM d’une part, et transfert à son profit dela marque litigieuse d’autre part.
Raisonnement : Outre l’examen de la question de lavalidité dans cette affaire, la Haute Cour a saisi l’occasion
pour examiner la question fondamentale de savoir si, en
vertu du droit positif de l’OAPI, les tribunaux nationauxdes États membres peuvent admettre les demandes
de marques. Ce faisant, la cour a déployé le cadre
législatif du pays pour les revendications de propriété
de marque. Cette question donne au juge l’occasionde déployer le dispositif législatif d’encadrement de larevendication de la propriété des marques. Le nœuddu contentieux résidait ici dans les interprétations
faites par les prétoires des dispositions combinéesdes articles 5, alinéa 3, et 47, alinéa 1er, de l’AB, Acte
du 24 février 1999. La solution du juge de la cause
ne fait aucun doute quant à la distinction nécessairequ’elle opère entre les procédures de revendication
judiciaire et de revendication administrative desmarques frauduleusement déposées. Ces deux actions
ponctueront nos subséquentes analyses.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

N. Revendication de la propriété d’une
marque – Compétence exclusive del’OAPI – Compétence du tribunal
civil – Validité de l’enregistrementd’une marque – Violation d’un droit
antérieur – Sanction : nullité

En principe, l’Accord de Bangui applicable au momentdes faits (ABR-1999) a consacré dans ses dispositions
la possibilité d’une revendication administrative dela propriété de la marque. Aux termes de l’article 5,
alinéa 3, de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999, “Si une marque aété déposée par une personne qui, au moment du dépôt,avait connaissance ou aurait dû avoir connaissance dufait qu’une autre personne avait la priorité de l’usage decette marque, cette dernière personne peut revendiquer
auprès de l’Organisation la propriété de la marquepourvu qu’elle effectue le dépôt de ladite marque dansles six mois qui suivent la publication de l’enregistrement
du premier dépôt”. Ce texte a le mérite de poser
clairement les conditions, de fond comme de forme, àsatisfaire par tout revendicateur de marque.
Du texte susvisé, trois conditions cumulatives
subordonnent au fond le succès de l’action
administrative en revendication de propriété desmarques, à savoir :
a.
b.
c.

l’exigence d’un dépôt par l’usurpateur du signe;
la mauvaise foi de ce dernier; et
une priorité d’usage dans le chef du revendiquant.

Le défendeur doit également avoir déposé le signe demanière frauduleuse.
En premier lieu, par dépôt du signe, il faudrait
qu’il s’agisse d’un dépôt frauduleux du signe
par l’usurpateur. Sera qualifié de dépôt
frauduleux tout dépôt effectué en violationd’une obligation légale ou conventionnelle, au
préjudice de l’usager antérieur du signe. Ce fut
237

fondamentalement la position du juge dans lacélèbre affaire DYNAMOGEN331 lorsqu’il motive :“Considérant qu’il motive sa décision en ce que ledépôt de la marque DYNAMOGEN par la Société
DISTRIMED PHARMA a été réalisé de mauvaise
foi en violation d’une obligation conventionnelle
dans la mesure où elle avait plutôt reçu unmandat d’enregistrer la marque litigieuse au nom
de la Société FAES; qu’en vertu du principe fraus
omnia corrumpit il y a lieu d’ôter tout effet dudépôt frauduleux querellé”.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

En ce qui concerne la mauvaise foi du déposant, larédaction du texte de l’article 5 précise en quoi elleconsiste. La jurisprudence s’est plusieurs fois inspiréede cette rédaction pour affirmer que la mauvaise foi
réside dans le fait pour ce dernier d’avoir connaissanceou de ne pouvoir ignorer qu’un tiers utilisait déjà
le signe en question ou un signe similaire pour les
produits ou services similaires ou identiques (principe
de spécialité de la marque). En l’absence de mauvaise foi,
l’action en revendication sera purement et simplement
rejetée. Dans une espèce portée à l’attention dudirecteur général de l’OAPI, le recours introduit par lerevendicateur avait été rejeté du fait de l’incapacité de cedernier à prouver la mauvaise foi de la défenderesse qui
avait, avant le dépôt du signe contesté, procédé à une
recherche d’antériorité332.

238

Cette mauvaise foi doit être appréciée au jour du dépôt
de la demande d’enregistrement du signe et se prouve
par tout moyen. Enfin, la loi exige un usage antérieur dela marque. La lettre de l’article 5 réserve ainsi l’action enrevendication des marques aux personnes qui justifient
simplement d’un simple usage. Il importe peu que leporteur de l’action justifie d’un droit exclusif sur le signe.
Dans tous les cas, cette utilisation antérieure du signe
par la victime de la fraude doit être établie. Dans une
décision333 inédite, la Commission supérieure de recoursa eu à rejeter la demande de revendication pour défaut
de preuve de la priorité d’usage par le recourant. Danscette décision, la commission constate : “Qu’il convient dedire et juger que Madame ADIBADJI n’est pas en mesured’apporter la preuve qu’elle exploitait antérieurement lamarque querellée avant son dépôt par Monsieur AGBEREISSAKA SANOUNOU”.
Cumulativement aux conditions de fond, l’Accord de
Bangui prescrit une forme particulière pour la demandede revendication administrative. Sur la forme, l’action
en revendication de propriété doit satisfaire à deux
exigences formelles strictes. Celui préalable du délai deson exercice et celui de l’organe à saisir par la victime
du dépôt frauduleux. En ce qui concerne la prescription,les dispositions de l’article 5, alinéa 3, de l’AB, acte du24 février 1999, enferment la revendication de propriété
dans un délai de six mois suivant la publication au BOPIde la marque frauduleusement enregistrée. Dans la

331
332
333

CA Centre, Arrêt n° 257/CIV du 18 mai 2011, Société Distrimed Pharma Sarl c.
Société Faes SA Fábrica Española de Productos Químicos y Farmacéuticos.
Décision n° 00172/CSR/OAPI du 13 novembre 2013 de la CSR de l’OAPI.
Ibid.

fourchette de ce délai, l’usager doit déposer le signe àl’OAPI en vue d’enregistrement à son profit. Passé ce délai,l’action est prescrite et le demandeur perd définitivement
le droit de réclamer la marque. Cette position fut
consacrée dans une espèce soumise à l’attention de la CSR
de l’OAPI, opposant la société Distrimed Pharma Sarl à lasociété Faes SA Fábrica Española de Productos Químicos
y Farmacéuticos334. Une fois introduite, l’instruction se
déroule de manière contradictoire devant le directeur
général de l’OAPI. Dans ce litige, la société recourant
avait effectué le second dépôt du signe revendiqué plus
de six mois après la publication de l’enregistrement faità son profit au BOPI. Sur ce seul manquement à texte
encadrant la revendication de propriété des marques,son action a été rejetée.
Quant aux organes administratifs compétents pourconnaître le litige de la revendication des marques,
il s’agit en premier ressort du directeur général del’OAPI. En cas de succès de l’action, il est procédé,
conformément à la décision rendue par cette autorité,
à la radiation de l’inscription faite au profit du déposantmalhonnête pour laisser cours à l’examen du dépôteffectué par le demandeur. Par ailleurs, en cas de rejetde la demande de revendication par le directeur général
de l’organisation, le revendiquant dispose d’une voie
de recours ouverte devant la Commission supérieurede recours, statuant en dernier ressort, dans un délaide 60 jours à compter de la notification de la décision(v. art. 31 al. 2(d) de l’AB, Acte du 24 février 1999).
Alternativement au recours administratif, larevendication d’une marque peut également êtreintroduite devant les tribunaux des États membres.
L’ABR-1999 n’a aménagé aucune disposition en ce sens,
cette carence ayant été comblée par les dispositions del’ABR-2015. À ce sujet, deux griefs essentiels contre laprocédure engagée par la demanderesse relevaient ledébat technique devant le juge de la cause. Celui de lacompétence contestée des autorités judiciaires, d’unepart, et l’autre relatif au délai de prescription applicable àl’action en revendication de marque.
En premier lieu, sur la compétence des juridictions
nationales à connaître de l’action en revendication desmarques, il convient de relever d’ores et déjà que la
non-consécration d’une revendication judiciaire dansl’AB en vigueur au moment des faits ne doit nullements’interpréter comme une envie délibérée du législateurd’exclure en la matière le recours aux tribunaux desÉtats membres. Cela est d’autant plus vrai que l’une desspécificités du système OAPI réside dans la dévolution ducontentieux né de l’exploitation des titres de propriété
industrielle aux juridictions nationales. En d’autres
termes, le système OAPI fait des juges nationaux lesjuges de droit commun du contentieux des titres depropriété industrielle. Mieux, les sanctions des atteintes
aux droits de propriété intellectuelle sont par principe
du ressort des juridictions de chaque État membre. De
ce fait, par application de l’adage “qui peut le plus peut
334

Décision n° 0011/19/OAPI/CSR du 18 octobre 2019, Société Distrimed Pharma
Sarl c. Société Faes SA Fábrica Española de Productos Químicos y Farmacéuticos.

“Si une marque a été enregistrée par une
personne qui, au moment du dépôt, avait
connaissance ou aurait dû avoir connaissancedu fait qu’une autre personne avait la prioritéde l’usage de cette marque, cette personne peut
revendiquer la propriété de ladite marque devant
la juridiction nationale compétente.”“Lorsqu’une marque a été acquise en violationd’une disposition légale ou conventionnelle,la partie lésée peut également revendiquer lapropriété de ladite marque devant la juridiction
nationale compétente.”
Le texte susvisé distingue désormais une procédure derevendication judiciaire devant les juges nationaux et une
autre administrative devant l’OAPI335. En retenant donc
sa compétence, le juge de la cause affiche son adhésion
à ces principes, ce qui l’obligeait, pour se dessaisir, à faire
toute la lumière sur les observations formulées quant àla transposition dans son office, du délai de prescription
de six (6) mois.
En effet, à la question de savoir si le délai de prescription
posé par la loi dans le cadre du contentieux administratifde la revendication des marques s’étendait aucontentieux judiciaire, le juge répond par la négative. En
réalité, la décision ici rapportée sert de tremplin pourdéblayer les contours de la revendication judiciaire desmarques, dont les fondements juridiques n’étaient pas
jusqu’ici posés. Dans le corset de la décision du juge, il
convient de relever à ce sujet qu’il existe en la matière
deux actions en revendication des marques. La première,de principe, devant le juge judiciaire et la seconde,d’exception devant l’organisation. Pendant que l’action
administrative est strictement encadrée dans un délai,de six (6) mois dans l’ABR-1999 et trois (3) mois dansl’ABR-2015, qui court à compter de l’enregistrement dela marque, l’action judiciaire peut être introduite à tout
moment, et ne s’encombre pas par conséquent de ce
court délai de prescription.

similitude sur le plan phonétique et sur le plan visuel,induisant un risque de confusion pour le consommateurd’attention moyenne.
Commission supérieure de recours auprès de l’OAPI,
Décision n° 00175_/OAPI/CSR du 13 novembre 2013,
SIEUR ABDOULAYE SACKO c. SOCIÉTÉ AMAR TALEBMALI SARL
Observations :La décision commentée, rendue par la Commission
supérieure de recours auprès de l’OAPI, chargée
notamment, selon l’article 31.a) de l’Accord de Bangui,
Acte de Bamako de 2015, “de statuer sur les recoursconsécutifs (…) au rejet des demandes de titre deprotection concernant la propriété industrielle”, offrel’occasion de se pencher sur une question classique dudroit des marques touchant à la disponibilité du signe
susceptible d’être enregistré. Cette disponibilité impliquequ’aucun droit antérieur n’ait été constitué sur le signe
par un tiers avant la demande d’enregistrement. La
règle, qui est en parfaite cohérence avec la fonction
essentielle de garantie assurée par la marque, esténoncée par l’article 3 de l’annexe III de l’Accordde Bangui disposant qu’“une marque ne peut êtrevalablement enregistrée si (…) b) elle est identique à une
marque appartenant à un autre titulaire et qui est déjà
enregistrée, ou dont la date de dépôt ou de priorité est
antérieure, pour les mêmes produits ou services ou pourdes produits ou services similaires, ou si elle ressemble
à une telle marque au point de comporter un risque detromperie ou de confusion”. On notera au passage que letexte ne vise expressément que l’antériorité constituéepar une marque, à la différence d’autres législationsqui précisent que l’indisponibilité peut tenir à d’autres
droits antérieurs. C’est le cas, par exemple, de l’article 8.4
du règlement 2017/1001 du 14 juin 2017 sur la marquede l’Union européenne, prévoyant la possibilité d’une
opposition du “titulaire d’une marque non enregistrée
ou d’un autre signe utilisé dans la vie des affaires dont laportée n’est pas seulement locale”, et de l’article L.711-4
du Code français de la propriété intellectuelle, érigeanten principe que “ne peut être adopté comme marque unsigne portant atteinte à des droits antérieurs”.

Le titulaire d’une marque antérieure enregistrée peuts’opposer à l’enregistrement d’une marque dès lors que
les produits couverts par ces marques sont similaires
et que la comparaison des signes fait ressortir une

Faits : En l’espèce, c’est bien sur le seul terrain du droit
de marque que la question était posée. L’opposant avait
déposé à l’OAPI en 2007 dans la classe 30 la marque“Gazelle thé vert de Chine + Logo”. C’est ainsi, en tout cas,que la marque est décrite par la Commission supérieurede recours. En réalité, la consultation de la décision
attaquée336 montre une reproduction présentant lamarque sous la forme “China Green Tea Gazelle”. On
s’en tiendra cependant dans la suite du commentaire à
la forme “Gazelle thé vert de Chine”, seule visée par laCommission. Le demandeur s’opposait, sur la base del’article 18 de l’annexe III (article 15 dans la rédaction issue
de l’Accord de Bamako de 2015), à l’enregistrement dela marque “La Gazelle et ses petites”, déposée en 2009
dans les classes 29 et 30. Le directeur général de l’OAPI
lui avait donné raison et décidé la radiation en mettant

335

336

Aristide Fade

O. Marques – Opposition àl‘enregistrement d’une marquepostérieure – Réitération del’opposition – Similarité des produits
visés – Risque de confusion résultant
d’une marque antérieure

Voir art. 19 al. 1 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

le moins”, le juge national est de facto compétent pourconnaître des actions en revendication de propriété.
Cette position a d’ailleurs été consacrée par l’art. 47 del’annexe III de l’ABR-2015 qui dispose :N° 0040/OAPI/DG/DGA/DAJ/SAJ, 11 juillet 2012.
239

en avant le risque de confusion entre les deux marques.
C’était cette décision qui était déférée à la Commission
supérieure de recours.
Raisonnement : Trois problèmes distincts étaientsoulevés : le premier, de forme, découlait de ce qu’une
première opposition avait été déclarée irrecevable(section I); les deux autres, de fond, concernaientl’identité ou la similarité des produits visés par les deux
marques en cause (section II) et l’existence entre elles
d’un risque de confusion (section III).
I. Recevabilité de l’opposition
La particularité de l’espèce était qu’une première
opposition avait été déclarée irrecevable par le directeur
général de l’OAPI le 29 juin 2012 “pour inobservation
des dispositions de l’article 18” de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999. Le défendeur en tirait argument pourprétendre qu’un second recours ne pouvait davantage
prospérer. Il appartenait, selon lui, au titulaire de lamarque antérieure de déférer la décision d’irrecevabilité
devant la Commission supérieure de recours. Faute del’avoir fait, une seconde opposition devait connaître lemême sort. À quoi l’opposant répondait que sa première
opposition avait été faite, par un conseil trop zélé, avantmême la publication de l’enregistrement de la marquequerellée, et qu’il était en droit de refaire sa copie dèslors qu’il était encore dans le “délai de six mois à compter
de la publication” prévu par le texte.

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C’est ce raisonnement que la commission reprend à
son compte en constatant que le nouveau recours
avait été formé “dans les délai et forme légaux à titrede régularisation après publication”, d’où elle déduit
sa recevabilité.

240

La solution mérite une entière approbation. La lettrede l’article 18337, alinéa 1er, de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999
ne permettait pas d’opposer à l’opposant une fin denon-recevoir. Même si la nature juridictionnelle de laCommission supérieure de recours prête à discussion338,
il est logique de transposer les règles générales admises
en matière de procédure civile, et notamment le principe
selon lequel la cause de la fin de non-recevoir peut êtrerégularisée à tout moment. L’essentiel, comme le relève
la décision commentée, est que le recours régulier
en la forme soit formé avant l’expiration du délai fixépar la loi. On ajoutera que la solution inverse eût été
excessivement sévère si l’on tient compte du fait que lacommission, en l’état du texte de l’annexe III applicable àl’espèce, en vertu de l’art. 15 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999,
jugeait “en premier et dernier ressorts”.
II. Identité ou similarité des produits visés par lesdeux marques en cause
Comme le précise l’article 3.b) de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999, l’antériorité du signe premier ne peut faire
obstacle à l’enregistrement du signe second que si l’un337
338

Voir art. 15 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Voir sur ce débat FOMETEU (J), Code OAPI annoté, sous art. 31.

et l’autre visent des “produits ou services similaires”.
L’article 8.1)b) du règlement européen 2017/1001
se réfère, dans le même sens, à “l’identité ou (à) lasimilitude des produits ou des services que les deux
marques désignent”. Il n’y a là que l’application duprincipe fondamental de “spécialité” dont on a dit à
juste titre qu’il était “consubstantiel à la notion du signe
distinctif”339. Le risque de confusion, qui justifie le refus
d’enregistrement, n’existe que si les contradicteursopèrent sur le même marché340.
Tel était le cas, selon le demandeur en opposition, pourqui sa propre marque “Gazelle thé vert de Chine”, et lamarque querellée, “La Gazelle et ses petites”, étaientutilisées “pour des produits identiques ou similaires”.
À quoi le défendeur objectait que la sienne couvrait
les “produits des classes 29 et 30” alors que la marqueopposée à titre d’antériorité ne couvrait “que desproduits de la classe 30”.
La Commission supérieure de recours se contente, pourrépondre à l’objection, de relever la similarité entre laclasse 30 et la classe 29. Cette motivation apparaît trop
sommaire pour emporter la conviction. Elle repose,en effet, sur le postulat que le principe de spécialité
ne déploie ses effets qu’au regard de la classificationinternationale des produits et services découlant del’Arrangement de Nice de 1957, plusieurs fois révisé.
Or, s’il est vrai que l’article 9, alinéa 2.c) (art. 8.d) dansla rédaction applicable en l’espèce), fait obligation audéposant de mentionner les classes des produits etservices en se référant à la classification internationale
définie par l’Arrangement de Nice, il commence parénoncer que le dossier doit contenir “l’énumération
claire et complète des produits ou des services auxquels
s’applique la marque”, et le formulaire de l’OAPI“Demande d’enregistrement d’une marque” en tientcompte puisqu’il prescrit au déposant d’indiquer dans un
cadre spécial, en face de chaque classe revendiquée, lesproduits visés.
Il est incontestable, en effet, que la classification de Nicen’a pas de portée juridique. Comme l’ont écrit d’éminents
spécialistes341, “le domaine de protection de la marqueest déterminé par l’énumération des produits et services
et non par référence à la classe administrative”342. C’est
donc seulement sous le bénéfice de cette précision que lacommission pouvait conclure à la similarité des produits
en cause et c’est donc à tort, selon nous, qu’elle s’est
bornée à constater que “les deux classes de produitssont similaires car concernant des produits alimentaires”.

339
340

341
342

DURRANDE (S), Disponibilité des signes, Juriscl. Marques – Dessins etmodèles, Fasc. 7110, 2010, n° 5.
Voir en ce sens RAYNARD (J), PY (E) et TRÉFIGNY (P), Droit de la propriété
industrielle, Paris (LexisNexis), 2016, n° 374 : “L’antériorité rendant le signe
indisponible doit exister dans le segment commercial pour lequel la marqueest déposée.”
AZEMA (J) et GALLOUX (J.-C.), Droit de la propriété industrielle, Paris (Dalloz),
7e éd., 2012, n° 1505.
Voir en ce sens en France Cass. com., 17 juin 1980, n° 78-16.098. :Bull. civ. 1980, IV, n° 260 : “La protection de la marque ne s’étend pas
nécessairement à tous les produits de la classe dans laquelle elle a été
déposée, mais n’est protégée que pour les produits identiques ou de nature
voisine de ceux pour laquelle elle a été déposée.”III. Risque de confusion entre les signes en cause
L’article 3.b) de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 dispose quela marque ne peut être valablement enregistrée si,
alors qu’elle vise les mêmes produits ou services ou desproduits ou services similaires, elle est “identique” à
une marque antérieure ou si “elle ressemble à une tellemarque au point de comporter un risque de tromperie
ou de confusion”. Les deux marques en l’espèce n’étant
pas identiques, seule la seconde hypothèse était encause dans le présent litige. Elle est aussi prévue parl’article 18.1)b) du règlement 2017/101 précité, quidispose que l’opposition doit être accueillie s’il existe
entre la marque antérieure et la marque demandée “unrisque de confusion dans l’esprit du public du territoiredans lequel la marque antérieure est protégée”. La
différence entre les deux rédactions est mineure, lanotion de “confusion” suffisant à conjurer le risque defraude qu’induit le terme de “tromperie”.
L’opposant faisait valoir que le risque de confusion
résultait de ce que, “du point de vue visuel, lesdeux marques sont constituées de gazelles” et“qu’intellectuellement, les deux signes renvoient à l’idéede l’animal gazelle”. Le défendeur soutenait au contraire
que toute confusion était exclue du fait que sa propre
marque présentait la particularité de représenter trois
gazelles, soit une mère et ses deux petites, et qu’elle
incluait en caractères apparents la mention “Gazelleet ses petites”, alors que la marque antérieure était
purement figurative, représentant une seule gazelle.
Cette dernière affirmation était partiellement inexacte
car si la vignette reproduite dans la décision attaquée
montrait effectivement une gazelle, elle comportait aussi
les mentions “China Green Tea” et “Gazelle”.
Sans répondre sur ce point, la Commission supérieure derecours se prononce en faveur de l’opposant sur la basedu raisonnement suivant :“la comparaison des signes fait ressortir une
similitude sur le plan phonétique et sur le planvisuel; en effet, les deux classes de produitssont similaires car concernant des produits
alimentaires et visuellement les deux sontreprésentés par l’animal à deux cornes qui est la
gazelle quel que soit le nombre; le consommateurd’attention moyenne verra le terme verbal puis
le dessin de la gazelle; il existe dès lors un risquede confusion pour celui-ci lorsqu’il n’a pas lesdeux marques sous les yeux en même temps ou àl’oreille à des temps rapprochés.”La démonstration appelle une réserve de forme. La
locution “en effet” donne à penser que la similitude entre
les signes est la conséquence de la similarité des produits
couverts. Or il ne peut évidemment en être ainsi. Il fautd’abord constater la similarité des produits, et, de façon
distincte, montrer que les signes sont assez proches pourcréer un risque de confusion.
Pour le reste, l’argumentation, reprise quasi
textuellement de la décision attaquée, est classique etcorrespond bien à la méthode généralement préconiséepour apprécier l’existence d’un risque de confusion.
Les critères mis en œuvre auraient pu être utilement
complétés par ceux visés par le 11e considérant durèglement européen 2017/1001 précité, qui énonce
de façon générale que cette appréciation “dépend denombreux facteurs et notamment de la connaissancede la marque sur le marché, de l’association qui peut enêtre faite avec le signe utilisé ou enregistré, du degré
de similitude entre la marque et le signe et entre les
produits ou services désignés”, d’où la Cour de justice
de l’Union européenne a tiré qu’elle “implique une
certaine interdépendance entre les facteurs pris encompte, et notamment la similitude des marques et celledes produits ou services couverts”, en ce sens que, parexemple, “un faible degré de similitude entre les produits
ou services couverts peut être compensé par un degréélevé de similitude entre les marques, et inversement343.
Où l’on voit le lien entre la question de la similarité desproduits et services et celle du risque de confusion.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

On mentionnera pour mémoire la diversité des produits
compris dans la classe 29 (viande, poisson, volaille etgibier; extraits de viande; fruits et légumes conservés,
séchés et cuits; gelées, confitures, compotes; œufs,lait et produits laitiers; huiles et graisses comestibles)
aussi bien que dans la classe 30 (café, thé, cacao,
sucre, riz, tapioca, sagou, succédanés du café, farines
et préparations faites de céréales, pain, pâtisserie etconfiserie, glaces comestibles, miel, sirop de mélasse,
levure, poudre à lever, sel, moutarde, vinaigre, sauces(condiments), épices, glace à rafraîchir). Il aurait fallu
indiquer quels étaient, parmi ces deux longues listes,
les produits respectivement couverts par la marque“La Gazelle et ses petites” et par la marque “Gazellethé vert de Chine”. On peine au demeurant, s’agissantde cette dernière, à imaginer qu’elle pût, dans laclasse 30, désigner d’autres produits que du thé, saufà être considérée comme déceptive, c’est-à-dire, selonl’article 3.d) de l’annexe III, “susceptible d’induire en
erreur le public” sur la “nature” du produit”.

André Lucas

P. Marque – Respect de la procédure
d’homologation obligatoire desproduits phytosanitaires – Fait
justificatif – Contrefaçon
Le respect par le présumé contrefacteur de la procédure
d’homologation obligatoire des produits phytosanitaires
instituée par l’administration compétente ne constitue
pas un fait justificatif de l’atteinte aux droits du titulaired’une marque enregistrée pour couvrir ces produits.
Fait par conséquent une mauvaise application de laloi la cour d’appel qui rejette l’action en contrefaçon
initiée par le titulaire d’une marque au motif que le343

Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 22 juin 1999, Lloyd Schuhfabrik
Meyer & Co. GmbH c. Klijsen Handel BV, C-342/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:323, point 19.
241

présumé contrefacteur s’est conformé à cette procédure
administrative en dépit de la similitude avérée entre lesdeux signes en conflit.
Cour suprême du Cameroun, Arrêt n° 04/COM du6 décembre 2018, SOCIÉTÉ SINOCAM SARL c. SOCIÉTÉAFCOTT CAMEROUN SARL
Observations :Dans le cadre du procès civil en contrefaçon de marque,le présumé contrefacteur dispose d’une kyrielle demoyens de défense pour se soustraire à une éventuellecondamnation. Il peut notamment invoquer le défaut
de qualité à agir, la nullité de la marque prétendue
contrefaite pour divers motifs, la forclusion partolérance, etc. Abstraction faite de la contestation de lavalidité de la marque invoquée, le jugement de la Coursuprême du Cameroun rapporté nous fournit l’occasiond’examiner un moyen de défense atypique soulevé parune défenderesse en contrefaçon, à savoir le respect dela procédure d’homologation de la commercialisation desproduits contrefaisants. La Cour suprême du Cameroun
a posé sans détours que le respect de cette formalité
administrative ne constitue pas un fait justificatif de lacontrefaçon, censurant ainsi une cour d’appel qui s’est
fondée sur ce moyen pour rejeter l’action en contrefaçon
initiée par le titulaire d’une marque.

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Faits : Un bref rappel des faits est nécessaire : la société
SINOCAM Sarl, titulaire de la marque “LAMIDA GOLD90 EC + logo” n° 71469 pour les produits de la classe 1
découvre fortuitement la commercialisation des mêmes
produits revêtus du signe contrefaisant “LAMIDA COT 90
EC” par la société AFCOTT CAM Sarl dans divers entrepôts
de Douala et assigne celle-ci par devant le tribunal de
grande instance de cette ville aux fins de voir constater lacontrefaçon de sa marque :242• cesser toute fabrication et toute distribution duproduit “LAMIDA COT 90 EC” sous astreinte de
FCFA 500 000 par infraction constatée;• ordonner la saisie et la destruction de tout le stock desproduits contrefaisants; et• condamner ladite société à lui payer la somme de
FCFA 100 000 000 à titre de dommages et intérêts.
La société défenderesse a soulevé deux moyens dedéfense d’inégale importance, à savoir :• la nullité de la marque “LAMIDA GOLD 90 EC + logo”
pour défaut de distinctivité; et• la licéité de la commercialisation des produits “LAMIDACOT 90 EC”.
Le jugement du tribunal de grande instance du Wourin° 167/Com du 6 avril 2016 donnant gain de cause à lasociété SINOCAM Sarl a été infirmé par la cour d’appelsuivant arrêt n° 040/Com du 7 novembre 2016.
La SINOCAM Sarl s’est pourvue en cassation.

Raisonnement : La question centrale posée aux juges
de la haute juridiction était de savoir si un présumé
contrefacteur peut se prévaloir du respect des conditions
de commercialisation des produits ou services revêtus
de la marque contrefaisante pour se soustraire du griefde contrefaçon. Accessoirement, les hauts magistratsétaient appelés à se prononcer sur l’effectivité ducaractère distinctif de la marque invoquée. Statuant enla cause, la Cour suprême a indiqué que le respect de laprocédure d’homologation n’est pas un fait justificatifde la contrefaçon (section II) sans toutefois se pencher
véritablement sur la question non moins importante dela distinctivité de la marque invoquée (section I).
I. La distinctivité, condition de validité de la marqueDevant la cour d’appel, la société AFCOTT CAM Sarl a
principalement contesté la validité de la marque LAMIDAGOLD 90 EC + logo motif pris de ce qu’elle est génériqueet donc dépourvue du caractère distinctif, lequels’apprécie par rapport au signe invoqué pris isolément(A) et aux produits ou services auxquels il se rapporte (B).
A. Le signe objet du dépôt
Il importe de souligner derechef qu’une marque nepeut être valablement enregistrée si elle est dépourvue
de caractère distinctif. Cette exigence formulée à
l’article 3.a) de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du22 février 1999, est largement partagée par la doctrine
spécialisée344. La prohibition des marques dénuées decaractère distinctif permet d’exclure de la protection
les marques constituant la désignation nécessaire ou
générique. Selon ANDRÉ R. BERTRAND, est générique
le signe ou le terme qui désigne non pas un produit ou
un service précis mais la catégorie, l’espèce ou le genre
auxquels ils appartiennent, ou un type de produits ou
de services sans que le consommateur leur attribue
une origine particulière345. Albert Chavanne et JeanJacques Burst définissent la marque générique commecelle qui est constituée uniquement par l’appellationusuelle du produit désigné ou du service offert346.
Cette exclusion a pour finalité de lever toutes entraves
inutiles à la liberté du commerce et de l’industrie enpermettant que les termes génériques puissent êtrelibrement utilisés par les concurrents. C’est précisément
l’argument décisif développé par la société AFCOTT CAM
Sarl qui a prétendu que le terme LAMIDA, qui désigneune variété d’insectes, était l’appellation générique duproduit chimique mis au point pour le combattre. La
cour d’appel a abondé dans le même sens à travers unconsidérant assez évocateur nonobstant sa maladresse
rédactionnelle : “… dans le cadre de la recherche et dela mise sur le marché des produits pharmaceutiques ou
phytosanitaires, les promoteurs ont le droit d‘utiliser les
formules se rattachant aux germes à combattre, sansque cela porte atteinte aux droits de celui qui a obtenu
un brevet, dès lors que l’intonation de l’appellation desproduits litigieux est différente”.

344
345
346

BERTRAND (A. R.), n.204, p. 53; également à ce sujet PASSA (J.), n.82, p. 83.
Voir BERTRAND (A. R.), n.80, p. 112.
Voir CHAVANNE (A.) et BURST (J.-J.), Droit de la propriété industrielle, 3e éd.,Paris (Dalloz), 1990, p. 583

B. Les produits ou services visés dansl’acte d’enregistrement
Les produits désignés ou les services offerts jouent unrôle déterminant dans l’accession d’une marque à ladistinctivité. Ainsi qu’il a été indiqué ci-avant, un signe est
dépourvu de caractère distinctif dès lors qu’il constitue
la désignation nécessaire ou générique du produit ou
la composition du produit ou du service auquel il est
associé. Rappelons-le : la société AFCOTT CAM Sarla associé le terme “LAMIDA” à une variété d’insectes
décrite et nommée depuis 1859 par ALLATA WALKER, etsouligné que cette appellation est depuis lors consacrée
par les scientifiques pour désigner le produit chimiquedestiné à les combattre.
Il est impératif, à ce stade de la réflexion, d’identifier avec
précision les produits visés dans l’acte d’enregistrement
de la marque “LAMIDA GOLD 90 EC + logo” pour pouvoir
en définitive apprécier le caractère générique attribué
347
348

Voir en ce sens CA Paris, 10 mars 1994 : PIBD 1994, III, n° 568, p. 325; Cass.
com., 24 janvier 1995 : Bull. civ., IV, n° 25; CA Paris, 9 novembre 2001 : PIBD
2002, III, n° 737, p. 106.
Une personne ne peut en effet réserver un terme descriptif ou génériquedésignant un produit ou un service au détriment de ses concurrents opérant
dans le même secteur d’activités. Un tel terme est, pourrait-on dire, dans ledomaine public et donc à la disposition de tous.

à ce signe par la défenderesse au pourvoi. La société
SINOCAM a soutenu, pour écarter ce grief, que• sa marque a été enregistrée pour les produits de laclasse 1, c’est-à-dire les produits chimiques destinésparticulièrement à l’agriculture, l’horticulture et lasylviculture et non aux insectes;• qu’un insecte, fût-il appelé LAMIDA, n’est pas un
produit ou la composition d’un produit dans lecommerce, encore moins le nom commun desfongicides-pesticides-insecticides, le marché desproduits phytosanitaires étant rempli de produits dediverses marques et dénominations;• il s’en infère que le grief de caractère génériquearticulé par la société AFCOTT CAM Sarl n’est qu’unesimple vue de l’esprit, le terme “LAMIDA” n’étant pasla désignation nécessaire ou générique des produits
visés dans le certificat d’enregistrement de la marquerevendiquée;• sa caractérisation comme telle par AFCOTT CAM Sarlétait donc fantaisiste.
L’on pourrait a fortiori spéculer sur le caractère
fortement évocateur ou suggestif de la marque“LAMIDA GOLD 90 EC + logo” si l’on s’en tient dumoins à la perception que pourrait en avoir le publicde référence composé en majorité d’agriculteurs. En
effet, il est parfaitement envisageable que dans lacommunauté des utilisateurs du signe revendiqué, leterme “LAMIDA” à lui seul puisse suggérer ou évoquer
plus ou moins directement les produits revêtus de lamarque “LAMIDA GOLD 90 EC + logo”. Mais il faut direavec Jérôme Passa que cette orientation comporte une
grande part de subjectivité349. De toutes les façons, il
est admis que l’appréciation du caractère génériqued’un signe relève de l’appréciation souveraine du juge
du fond qui très souvent s’appuie sur les résultats desenquêtes et sondages seuls susceptibles d’établir que
pour la majorité des consommateurs ou des utilisateurs,il désigne un type ou une catégorie de produits plutôt
qu’un produit d’origine déterminée350. Quoi qu’il en soit,
la marque “LAMIDA GOLD 90 EC + logo” associée aux
produits de la classe 1 revêt à notre sens un caractère
distinctif nonobstant le versant plus ou moins suggestifdu terme “LAMIDA” qui, pris isolément, est inapte àassurer la fonction de la marque qui est précisément depermettre au consommateur ou au destinataire final
du produit ou du service de reconnaître celui-ci par
rapport à ceux de ses concurrents et, partant, d’identifier
l’entreprise titulaire de la marque351.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

Or, les juges d’appel semblent avoir perdu de vue
la nature complexe de la marque LAMIDA GOLD 90
EC + logo qui résulte de la combinaison d’éléments
verbaux et figuratifs. L’appréciation de la distinctivité
d’une telle marque doit porter sur l’ensemble dusigne et non sur un seul élément verbal en l’espèce
le terme “LAMIDA”, fût-il générique. Et même danscette hypothèse extrême, la jurisprudence autorisede façon constante une personne à déposer commemarque un terme générique en lui adjoignant un ou
plusieurs éléments arbitraires, en sorte que l’ensemble,
considéré comme un tout indivisible, puisse avoir unpouvoir attractif autonome. La jurisprudence française
indique par exemple que si le terme “Agenda” ne peut
constituer une marque valable pour désigner desagendas, il est possible de protéger les signes “Agenda
XY”, “AgenDDa” ou le mot “agenda” présenté dans une
calligraphie particulière et non usuelle pour désigner
les mêmes produits347. Dans une telle perspective, si
le titulaire de la marque ne peut interdire ni s’opposer
à l’utilisation par ses concurrents des éléments non
distinctifs compris dans la marque, en l’espèce leterme “LAMIDA” 348, il peut néanmoins s’attaquer aux
reproductions serviles ou quasi serviles intégrant leséléments arbitraires qui lui confèrent sa distinctivité. Il
s’ensuit que la méthode d’appréciation mise en œuvre
par la cour d’appel, consistant à extraire l’élément
verbal “LAMIDA” de la marque “LAMIDA GOLD 90 EC+ logo” pour retenir le grief de caractère générique, estloin d’être conforme à l’orthodoxie. La Cour suprême
ne s’est guère préoccupée de cet important aspect dulitige, s’étant à l’évidence limitée aux moyens soulevéspar le demandeur au pourvoi. En tout état de cause,
le caractère générique d’un signe, qu’il soit complexe
ou simple, s’apprécie aussi et surtout par rapport aux
produits désignés ou aux services offerts.

II. Les moyens de défense du présumé contrefacteur
La société AFCOFF CAM Sarl a par ailleurs soutenu
qu’elle n’a commis aucune faute car non seulement lesigne “LAMIDA COT 90 EC” qu’elle exploite ne comporte
aucun risque de confusion avec la marque revendiquée
349
350
351

Voir PASSA (J.), n.82, p. 93.
Voir BERTRAND, (A. R.), n.80, p. 114.
Voir en ce sens REBOUL (Y.), La Marque : outil stratégique pour l’entreprise, in :La propriété intellectuelle au service du développement de l’Afrique, Mélanges
offerts à Denis Ekani, Collection de l’OAPI n° 4, Paris (L’Harmattan), 2012,
pp. 108 et s.
243

(A), mais en plus la commercialisation des produits
qui en sont revêtus a été homologuée par l’autorité
compétente (B).
A. L’absence du risque de confusion
Les juges d’appel ont estimé qu’il n’y avait aucun risquede confusion entre les signes “LAMIDA GOLD 90 EC +logo” et “LAMIDA COT 90 EC” en s’appuyant sur l’absenced’imitation, la différence de l’intonation de l’appellation
des produits litigieux et de leurs emballages, l’absencede déception pour la clientèle.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Cette position nous semble curieuse pour au moins
deux raisons. D’une part, à l’examen des signes
querellés, l’imitation saute aux yeux sur le double
plan orthographique et phonétique. Singulièrement
sous l’angle orthographique, il est patent que lasociété AFCOTT CAM Sarl a repris de façon servile leséléments caractéristiques dominants de la marque“LAMIDA GOLD 90 EC + logo”, lesquels lui confèrent
son autonomie distinctive352. Il s’agit en l’occurrencedes éléments verbaux “COT 90 EC”, la différence
résultant de la substitution de la lettre G par la C étant
si insignifiante qu’elle peut passer inaperçue aux yeux
du consommateur d’attention moyenne. L’imitation
aurait été problématique en l’espèce si la société AFCOTTCAM Sarl s’était contentée de reprendre les éléments
non distinctifs compris dans la marque à savoir leterme “LAMIDA”, encore que le caractère générique decet élément reste à établir au regard des produits dont il
est revêtu.

244

D’autre part, pour apprécier le risque de confusion, lesjuges d’appel se sont curieusement placés du point devue du consommateur ayant en même temps les deux
produits sous les yeux puisqu’ils ont indiqué : “… Qu‘ainsi,
au moment de l’achat de l’un quelconque des deux
produits, le client ne saurait éprouver un quelconqueembarras sur son choix mais ne peut qu’y être confortéet rassuré”, alors qu’il est admis tant en doctrine qu’enjurisprudence que le juge doit se placer du point de vue
du consommateur d’attention moyenne n’ayant pas enmême temps les deux signes sous les yeux ou à l’oreille.
À titre de droit comparé, la Cour de cassation française
vérifie systématiquement si les juridictions inférieures sesont conformées à cette exigence353.
B. L’absence de faute
La société AFCOTT CAM Sarl soutient qu’elle
commercialise les produits “LAMIDA COT 90 EC”
après s’être conformée à la procédure instituée parle Décret n° 2005/0772/PM du 6 avril 2005 fixant lesconditions d‘homologation et de contrôle des produits
phytosanitaires et qu’aucune faute ne peut parconséquent lui être imputée. La cour d’appel a indiquéque cette société n’avait commis aucune faute étant
donné que la Commission d’homologation des produits
concernés veille au respect des droits des éventuels
352
353

Voir CA Centre (Yaoundé), Arrêt n° 536/COR du 6 novembre 2013, Tobacco
FZCO c. Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M-L.), ce recueil,
chapitre 3, section Q).
Voir Cass. com., 26 novembre 2003 : PIBD 2004, n° 780, III, p. 100; Cass. com.,
18 février 2004 : PIBD 2004, III, n° 788, p. 360.

concurrents, s’affranchissant à tort des dispositions
de l’Accord de Bangui qui régissent les conditions deprotection et d’exploitation des marques des produits
destinés à la commercialisation.
Il y a dans la démarche de la cour d’appel un véritablemélange de genre ! La Commission d’homologation
des produits phytosanitaires ne peut en effet se
substituer à l’OAPI qui est l’organe institutionnel chargéd’enregistrer les marques, encore moins aux juridictions
de l’ordre judiciaire compétentes pour la mise en œuvre
des droits résultants. L’homologation, comme l’a fort
opportunément souligné la société SINOCAM, est“un processus au terme duquel l’autorité compétente
approuve l’utilisation d‘un produit phytosanitaire,après examen des données scientifiques complètesmontrant que le produit est efficace pour les usages
prévus et ne présente pas de risque pour la santéhumaine, animale et pour l’environnement, dans telles
conditions d’emploi recommandées”. C’est dire qu’aprèss’être conformée à cette procédure, la société AFCOTTCAM Sarl aurait dû se rapprocher de sa consœur la
SINOCAM, titulaire incontestée de la marque “LAMIDAGOLD 90 EC + logo”, en vue de négocier les conditions
d’utilisation de ladite marque dans le cadre d’une licence
contractuelle. L’article 7, alinéa 2, de l’annexe III del’Accord de Bangui révisé confère en effet à la SINOCAM
Sarl le droit d’empêcher tous les tiers agissant sans sonconsentement de faire usage au cours d’opérationscommerciales de signes identiques ou similaires à ceux
pour lesquels la marque “LAMIDA GOLD 90 EC + logo”
a été enregistrée. La société AFCOTT CAM Sarl n’ayant
obtenu aucune autorisation l’habilitant à exploiter
le signe “LAMIDA COT 90 EC” semblable à la marquerevendiquée, le grief de contrefaçon articulé à son
encontre est plus qu’à suffire caractérisé.
C’est donc à bon droit que la cour régulatrice adésapprouvé les juges d’appel en indiquant que laprocédure d’homologation obligatoire des produits
phytosanitaires n’est pas un fait justificatif d’une atteinte
à un droit de propriété intellectuelle, rétablissant ainsil’ordre juridique manifestement mis à mal par l’arrêt
infirmatif attaqué.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

Q. Appréciation du risque de confusion– Marque complexe – Théorie du tout
indivisible – Organes administratifs
OAPI – Tribunaux des pays membres
L’appréciation du risque de confusion, s’agissantd’une marque complexe, se fait selon la méthode à lafois abstraite et globale. Abstraite par référence aucontenu de l’enregistrement et à un personnage fictif
dit consommateur d’attention moyenne qui n’a pas
les deux produits en même temps sous les yeux et àl’oreille. L’appréciation est en outre globale en ce sens
qu’elle doit être fondée sur l’impression d’ensemble
produite par les marques en conflit, en tenant compte enparticulier de leurs éléments distinctifs et dominants. Par

Cour d’appel du Centre (Yaoundé), Arrêt n° 536/Civ du
6 novembre 2013, THE INDEPENDENT TOBACCO FZCO c.
ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL LTD
Observations :Le risque de confusion qui conditionne la qualificationde contrefaçon d’une marque s’apprécie selon laméthode dite globale consacrée par la Cour de justicedes communautés européennes dans l’affaire SABEL
lorsqu’elle affirme que “le risque de confusion doit êtreapprécié globalement en tenant compte de tous lesfacteurs pertinents du cas d’espèce”354. Le risque deconfusion est une notion centrale en droit des marques
permettant d’établir la ressemblance entre deux
signes en conflit. Selon un éminent auteur, le risquede confusion peut prendre plusieurs formes. Il peutêtre direct : c’est le cas où le public confond ou risquede confondre la marque et le signe. Il peut aussi êtreindirect lorsque le public distingue les deux signes mais
risque, en suite d’un rapprochement entre eux, de penser
qu’ils sont exploités par le même titulaire. Le risquede confusion existe encore lorsque le public, tout en
distinguant à la fois les signes et leurs exploitants, peut
penser que ceux-ci entretiennent des liens qui peuvent,
notamment, justifier un même souci de qualité355. Dansl’arrêt ci-dessus rapporté, la cour d’appel du Centre a faitsienne la méthode d’appréciation globale à l’occasiond’un conflit ayant opposé les sociétés The Independent
Tobacco FZCO et Rothmans of Pall Mall Limited.
Faits : Les faits sont simples : la société The Independent
Tobacco est titulaire de la marque “Business Royal”
suivant arrêté du directeur général de l’OAPI n° 06/1318/
OAPI/DG/SSD daté du 15 septembre 2006 portant
enregistrement d’une marque. Prétendant avoir undroit exclusif et antérieur sur le signe “ROYAL” pourl’avoir déposé et fait enregistrer les 17 mars 1997, et le
6 novembre 2001, à travers les marques respectives“Rothmans Royals Label” et “Royals”, la société Rothmansof Pall Mall LTD a saisi le tribunal de grande instance duMfoundi en nullité de l’enregistrement de la marque“Business Royal” et en paiement des dommages etintérêts.
Par jugement du 26 janvier 2011, le tribunal fit droit à sa
demande. La société The Independent Tobacco interjeta
appel de cette décision.
Raisonnement : Les juges d’appel étaient appelés à
se prononcer sur la question de savoir : l’OAPI, organe
institutionnel d’enregistrement des marques, est-elle
habilitée à apprécier le risque de confusion au mêmetitre que les juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire? La cour a354
355

Voir Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 11 novembre 1997, Sabel
BV c. Puma AG, Rudolf Dassler Sport, C-251/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:528.
Voir PASSA (J.), n.82, p. 303.

répondu par la négative en déboutant l’appelante deson action motif pris de ce que non seulement l’OAPI
a enregistré plusieurs autres marques portant le label“Royals” sans aucune protestation, mais en plus, il existed’autres éléments tels la couleur et le logo suffisantspour distinguer lesdites marques à considérer chacune
comme un tout indivisible. Si cette décision a le mérite derappeler la méthode d’appréciation du risque de confusionen ce qui concerne les marques complexes, elle pourrait
toutefois laisser faussement croire que cette opération
relève à la fois de l’OAPI et de l’autorité judiciaire.
Pourtant, l’examen de la demande auquel procèdel’Organisation préalablement à l’enregistrement d’une
marque est une opération purement administrative(section I), alors que l’appréciation du risque deconfusion relève de l’office du juge (section II).
I. L’examen de la demande d’enregistrement, uneopération purement administrative
La motivation de la cour conduit à considérer d’une partle contenu de l’examen (A) et, d’autre part, la portée del’examen (B).
A. Le contenu de l’examen
Saisi d’une demande d’enregistrement d’une marque,l’OAPI examine si les conditions quant à la forme,
visées aux articles 8 et 9 de l’annexe III de l’accord, sont
remplies et si les taxes exigibles ont été acquittées356.
Les conditions de forme dont il s’agit sont relatives
au nombre d’exemplaires de la demande, à la preuve
du paiement de la taxe du dépôt, au pouvoir dumandataire, à la reproduction de la marque comportantl’énumération des produits ou services auxquels elle
s’applique, le ou les classes de produits ou services.
L’Organisation vérifie en outre si la marque objet dudépôt est contraire à l’ordre public, aux bonnes mœurs
ou aux lois357 ou si elle imite, reproduit ou contientparmi ses éléments des armoiries, drapeaux ou autres
emblèmes, etc.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

conséquent, un tribunal fait erreur s’il refuse de conclureà la contrefaçon sans vérifier au préalable le risque deconfusion allégué, en fondant sa décision sur le fait quel’OAPI, bien qu’elle soit habilitée à le refuser, ait approuvé
l’enregistrement de la marque incriminée.

À la vérité, il s’agit d’un examen de fond de portée limitéepuisque l’OAPI ne recherche pas d’office si le signe est
disponible, tant cette recherche est délicate, aléatoire etde toute façon tributaire des prétentions de titulaires desantériorités358. Il en est ainsi de l’appréciation du risquede confusion qui est essentiellement variable, en sorte
que l’Office de propriété industrielle ne peut valablement
se livrer à un tel exercice au moment de l’examen de la
demande d’enregistrement. C’est pourquoi il se contented’enregistrer les marques qui satisfont aux conditions
minimales sus-énumérées, priorité étant due au premierdéposant sous réserve d’une éventuelle contestation
par des tiers. Ceux-ci peuvent en effet contester une
marque offensante soit devant le directeur général del’OAPI par la voie de l‘opposition ou par le moyen de larevendication de propriété de marque, soit alors devant

356
357
358

Cf. art. 14 al. 1 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999; l’art. 18 de l’ABR-2015 reprend inextenso cette disposition.
Cf. art. 3-C de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999; Cf. art. 18 al. 2 de l’ABR-2015.
PASSA (J.), n.82, p. 159.
245

les instances judiciaires pour en solliciter l’annulation.
En somme, le titre délivré au terme de l’examen est
essentiellement précaire, sa validité pouvant être remiseen cause à chaque instant par des tiers en raison durisque de confusion qu’il comporte avec leurs signes ou
leurs produits ou services. Il s’en infère que l’examen
effectué par l’OAPI a une connotation purementadministrative, mais aussi et surtout une portée limitée.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

B. La portée de l’examen
L’examen de la demande d’enregistrement opéré parles services compétents de l’OAPI n’est pas complet
en ce sens que l’office ne vérifie pas la disponibilité dusigne pour lequel l’enregistrement est envisagé, enparticulier si celui-ci est susceptible de créer la confusiondans l’esprit du public avec celles antérieurement
enregistrées. Cette vérification s’effectue a posteriori parle juge saisi d’une contestation. Ainsi, l’arrêté consacrant
l’enregistrement d’une marque ne s’impose pas au
juge qui se réserve le droit de le rapporter dès lors quele risque de confusion entre ladite marque et celles
antérieures est avéré.

246

De ce point de vue, la position de la cour s’écarte del’orthodoxie. Cette juridiction relève dans ses motifs“qu’il est en effet manifeste que le terme ’Royals‘ a un
caractère distinctif suffisant ainsi que le soutient lasociété Rothmans of Pall Mall LTD, en sorte que si lerisque de confusion déploré était effectif, l’Organisation
africaine de la propriété intellectuelle qui est l’organe
institutionnel de contrôle et d’enregistrement desmarques n’aurait point consenti à enregistrer plusieurs
autres marques comportant ce label ni à son profit ni en
faveur des autres sociétés non concurrentes qui n’ont
pas jusque-là protesté”, reconnaissant alors à l’OAPI un
pouvoir souverain d’appréciation du risque de confusionlors de l’examen de la demande d’enregistrement,
appréciation qui s’imposerait au juge de l’ordre judiciaire.
Une telle approche qui confère à l’OAPI des prérogatives
exorbitantes consacre par ailleurs la prééminence desdécisions administratives émanant de cette Organisation
sur celles des juridictions de l’ordre judiciaires. Pourtant,il résulte de l’article 18 des dispositions générales del’accord que les décisions des juridictions de l’ordre
judiciaires des États membres s’imposent aux organes
statutaires de l’Organisation359. Dans tous les cas, lesdécisions judiciaires définitives sont communiquées àl’Organisation qui est tenue de les exécuter360. En toutétat de cause, les décisions rendues par les organes
statutaires de l’OAPI au terme de l’examen des demandes
qui leur sont soumises n’ont qu’une valeur administrative
et peuvent être révoquées par le juge judiciaire.

359

360

L’art. 18 des dispositions générales de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du22 février 1999 indique en effet que “Les décisions judiciaires définitives
rendues sur la validité des titres dans l’un des États membres en application
des dispositions du texte des annexes I à X au présent accord font autorité
dans tous les autres États membres, exceptées celles fondées sur l’ordre
public et les bonnes mœurs”. Cette disposition, qui consacre en effet laprééminence des décisions émanant des juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire surcelles des organes statutaires de l’OAPI, a été modifiée par l’ABR-2015.
Voir sur cette question NDEMA ELONGUE (M.-L.), De la portée des décisions
rendues par les tribunaux en matière de propriété intellectuelle, in :Mélanges en l’honneur de l’action de Dr Paulin EDOU EDOU, Poitiers(Juriscope), 2017, p. 299.

II. Les méthodes d’appréciation du risque de confusion
L’appréciation du risque de confusion d’une marquecomplexe est une opération à la fois abstraite (A) et
globale (B).
A. L’appréciation abstraite du risque de confusion
L’appréciation est abstraite parce qu’elle s’opère parréférence au contenu de l’enregistrement, et à unpersonnage abstrait. La comparaison s’opère d’abord
par référence au contenu de l’enregistrement, c’està-dire en tenant compte des marques telles qu’elles
ont été déposées et décrites dans leur certificat
d’enregistrement respectif sans égard aux conditions
dans lesquelles ces signes sont utilisés sur le marché361.
Dans un arrêt rendu le 18 février 2004, la Cour decassation française a curieusement écarté un pourvoi
qui faisait valoir que “le droit sur la marque portant sur
le signe lui-même tel qu’il a été déposé pour désigner
certains produits ou services, les conditions danslesquelles les signes en cause sont utilisés ne peuventêtre prises en compte pour l’appréciation du risque deconfusion”362. Dans l’espèce commentée, la comparaison
doit porter sur les seuls éléments verbaux qui
constituent les marques en conflit, à savoir “BUSINESSROYALS” et “ROYALS” associées à leurs spécialités
respectives, encore qu’il ne ressort pas des faits que
l’une ou l’autre est exploitée sur un graphisme particulier
ou accompagnée d’un élément figuratif non visé dansl’enregistrement.
La jurisprudence exige par ailleurs de tenir compte, pourapprécier le risque de confusion, du plus ou moins grandcaractère distinctif de la marque invoquée, en l’espèce
le signe “ROYALS” enregistré depuis les 17 mars 1997 et
6 novembre 2001 et qui a depuis lors acquis un certain
rayonnement sur le marché des produits dont elle estrevêtue. C’est sans aucun doute cette circonstance qui a
motivé le premier juge à invalider la marque “BUSINESSROYALS” enregistrée postérieurement, c’est-à-dire le
24 avril 2004 pour les mêmes produits, à savoir ceux dela classe 24, celle-ci étant manifestement susceptible decréer une confusion dans l’esprit du public de référence,qui aurait facilement pensé que le signe “BUSINESSROYALS” constitue une déclinaison de la marquepremière “ROYALS” ou que les deux marques en conflits
appartiennent au même titulaire363.
L’appréciation abstraite du risque de confusion s’opèreégalement par référence à un personnage abstrait dit
consommateur d’attention moyenne364. La Commission
supérieure de recours auprès de l’OAPI a par contre

361
362
363
364

Voir en ce sens CA Paris, 30 mars 2005 : PIBD 2005, III, n° 812, p. 423.
Voir Cass.com., 18 février 2004 : PIBD 2004, III, n° 787, p. 333, cité par PASSA(J.), n.82, p. 305.
Voir en ce sens CA Paris, 27 juin 2003 : PIBD 2003, n° 775, III, p. 581 et CA
Bordeaux, 1er mars 2004 : PIBD 2004, III, n° 786, p. 296
La jurisprudence française définit de façon constante ce personnage commele consommateur moyen de la catégorie de produits concernés censéêtre normalement informé et raisonnablement attentif et avisé. La Courde cassation française vérifie systématiquement si la cour d’appel s’estplacée du point de vue du consommateur d’attention moyenne : Cass.com,
26 novembre 2003 : PIBD 2004, III, n° 780, p. 100; Cass.com., 18 février 2004 :PIBD 2004, III, n° 788, p. 360, cités par PASSA (J.), n.82, p. 309.

L’appréciation du risque de confusion peut en outre sefaire selon une méthode globale.
B. L’appréciation globale du risque de confusion
Dans l’affaire SABEL évoquée plus haut, la Cour dejustice des Communautés européennes précise que“l’appréciation globale doit, en ce qui concerne lasimilitude (…) des marques en cause, être fondée sur
l’impression d’ensemble produite par celles-ci, en tenant
compte en particulier de leurs éléments distinctifs etdominants”. C’est dire que la méthode globale suppose
la prise en compte, entre autres, de l’impression
d’ensemble produite par les signes sur le consommateur
défini ci-avant, et du caractère distinctif élevé de lamarque invoquée. La prise en compte de l’impression
d’ensemble produite par les marques en conflit exclut
l’extraction d’un élément isolé de ladite marque pourne limiter l’examen qu’à cet élément. C’est la substance
du reproche que la cour semble faire au premier jugelorsqu’elle souligne avec force que :
a.

b.

c.

365
366

“Considérant par ailleurs qu’il n’est pas contesté enl’espèce que les marques respectives ’Rothmans
Royals‘ et ’Business Royal‘ sont complexes en cequ’elles sont constituées de plusieurs éléments;qu’aux termes de la jurisprudence en la matière
pour vérifier l’existence d’un risque de confusion
entre des marques de ce type, l’appréciation de lasimilitude devrait se faire non par considération
de l’une des composantes du concept retenu
comme marque, mais bien au travers de l’examen
de chacune des désignations prises dans son
ensemble;qu’en d’autres termes, l’appréciation du risque deconfusion allégué devrait se faire sur la base del’ensemble des éléments constitutifs de chacunedes marques concernées”.

Voir Décisions n° 034/CSR/OAPI, n° 035/CSR/OAPI, n° 036/CSR/OAPI,
n° 37/CSR/OAPI, n° 038/CSR/OAPI, n° 039/CSR/OAPI datées du 26 mars 2004.
Voir Décision n° 47/CSR/OAPI du 1er avril 2005.

Si cette motivation paraît conforme sur le principe, elle
est toutefois insuffisante en ce qu’elle ne prend pas en
considération le caractère distinctif élevé que peut avoir
un élément particulier de la marque invoquée dont lareproduction peut être génératrice de confusion.
Tel semble être le cas du terme “ROYALS” qui apparaît
comme étant l’unique élément identificateur de lamarque dans l’esprit du public de référence pourles produits concernés, en sorte que l’adjonction duqualificatif “BUSINESS” ne fait pas perdre à la marque“ROYALS” son individualité et son pouvoir distinctif
propre. Certes, en dehors de la dénomination, la coura évoqué d’autres éléments tels la couleur et le logo
pour distinguer lesdites marques à considérer chacune
comme un tout indivisible, sans pour autant les spécifier,mettant ainsi l’analyste dans l’impossibilité d’enapprécier la pertinence. En tout état de cause, la décision
rapportée semble avoir été insuffisamment motivée, ce
qui l’expose à la censure de la juridiction régulatrice.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

R. Saisie conservatoire – Distraction de lamarque – Cessionnaire – Preuve de la
propriété de la marque – Validité de la
cession

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

dégagé une définition du consommateur d’attention
moyenne qui semble se démarquer de celle retenue parla Cour de cassation française. La Commission indique,en effet, dans plusieurs décisions, que pour déterminerle consommateur d’attention moyenne, “…les références
à des jurisprudences des zones de développement
et de scolarisation plus accentués ne sauraient êtredécisives en raison de leur relativité par rapport àl’impératif ressorti”365, pour enfin évoquer la notion de“consommateur d’attention moyenne de la zone OAPI”366.
Vivement que les tribunaux de l’ordre judiciaire desÉtats membres de l’OAPI donnent un contenu à cettenotion qui joue un rôle de choix dans l’appréciation durisque de confusion. Dans l’arrêt rapporté, la cour s’estcontentée de mettre en parallèle les éléments verbaux
des marques belligérantes sans se placer du point de vue
du consommateur moyen de la catégorie des produits
concernés, toutes choses ayant débouché sur une
comparaison imparfaite desdits signes.

Le succès de l’action en distraction d’une marqueinitiée par le cessionnaire est subordonné à la preuvede la validité de la cession, nonobstant l’obtention
par celui-ci du renouvellement de l’enregistrement
en son nom auprès de l’Organisation africaine de la
propriété intellectuelle, la propriété de la marque n’étant
valablement transférée que sur le fondement d’uncontrat de cession dont la validité est consolidée.
Tribunal de grande instance hors classe de Niamey,
Ordonnance de référé n° 176 du 5 août 2008, SOCIÉTÉROTHMANS OF PALL MALL Limited SWITZERLAND c.
SOCIÉTÉ ADIL COMPANY SA et EL HADJ SANI SOULEY
NA SALEY
Observations :La décision ci-dessus rapportée illustre les difficultésrencontrées par les acteurs du système judiciaire del’OAPI dans l’application des règles et principes du droit
de la propriété intellectuelle.
Faits : À première vue centrés sur l’application du droit
des saisies issus de l’Acte uniforme OHADA relatif aux
procédures simplifiées de recouvrement des créances
et des voies d’exécution, les faits de la cause soulèvent
en réalité des questions pertinentes de droit depropriété intellectuelle.
La marque de cigarettes “ROTHMANS KING SIZE FILTER”,
propriété de la société ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL
Limited de Staedle 36, Vaduz 94.90, principauté deLiechtenstein, a fait l’objet d’une saisie conservatoire endate du 20 novembre 2017 pour sûreté et avoir paiement
de la somme de FCFA 100 000 000 et FCFA 50 000 000
247

respectivement au profit de la société ADIL COMPANY SA
et de sieur EL HADJ SANI SOULEY NA SALEY.
S’estimant désormais véritable propriétaire de la marquelitigieuse pour l’avoir acquise de sa consœur la société
ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL LIMITED de Saedle 31, Vaduz
94.90 en vertu d’un contrat de cession du 9 mai 2002, lasociété ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL LIMITED Switzerland
ayant son siège social en Suisse a assigné les saisissantspar devant le juge des référés du tribunal de grande
instance de Niamey aux fins de distraction de ladite
marque sur le fondement de l’article 141 de l’Acte
uniforme OHADA susvisé.
Pour faire échec à la demande, les saisissants ont
fait valoira.

b.

d’une part que la convention portant cession de lamarque est irrégulière pour défaut de légalisationde la signature et défaut d’indication de l’étendue dela cession; etd’autre part, que ladite cession ne leur est pas
opposable pour n’avoir pas été inscrite au registre
spécial des marques en violation de l’article 27 del’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé, Acte du22 février 1999.

Raisonnement : Deux problèmes juridiques étaientsoumis à l’examen du tribunal saisi : la convention
portant cession de la marque est-elle valable? Ladite
cession est-elle opposable aux tiers? Le succès de la
demande en distraction était dès lors tributaire de :I.
II.

la validité de la convention portant cession de lamarque; etson opposabilité aux tiers.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

I. La validité de la convention portant cession de lamarque248

Les défendeurs ont contesté la validité de la cession,
fondement du droit de propriété de la demanderesse en
distraction, sur le double terrain du droit commun (A) et
du droit de la propriété intellectuelle (B).
A. L’appréciation de la validité de la cession sur le terrain
du droit commun
La société ADIL COMPANY SA et sieur EL HADJ SANI NA
SALE ont conclu à l’irrégularité de la cession motif prisdu défaut de légalisation des signatures des parties aucontrat, toute chose ne permettant pas de lui conférer
date certaine. Il va sans dire que cette question relève
du droit commun notamment des règles relatives aux
conditions de formation du contrat. La cession querelléeayant été conclue à Londres, le juge nigérien a estimé
à tort qu’en raison de cet élément d’extranéité, lesconditions de forme de ladite convention échappent à
son contrôle. En droit international privé le juge du for
est compétent pour régler, sur le fondement de la loi
applicable, un différend né d’une relation présentant
un élément d’extranéité. Après avoir indiqué à bon droit
qu’en droit international privé, les formalités de validitédes contrats sont celles prévues par la législation du lieu

de formation, le juge s’est malencontreusement dérobé,alors même qu’il se devait de vérifier si le droit anglais
prévoit la formalité de légalisation des signatures commecondition dirimante de validité des contrats, ce qui aurait
ipso facto influencé l’issue de la demande en distraction
de la marque.
B. L’appréciation de la validité de la cession sur le terrain
du droit des marques
L’article 26.2) de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé
dispose : “Les actes comportant soit transmission depropriété, soit concession de droit d’exploitation ou
cession de ce droit, soit gage ou mainlevée de gage
relativement à une marque doivent, sous peine denullité, être constatés par écrit”. Il résulte de cettedisposition que sous réserve des conditions de validitédes conventions prévues par le droit commun, laseule exigence issue du droit des marques et dont
l’inobservation entraîne la nullité de la convention
de cession d’une marque est l’écrit367. Il y a là unparticularisme par rapport au droit commun gouverné
par le principe du consensualisme, l’écrit n’étant exigé
qu’exceptionnellement ad validitatem, c’est-à-dire commecondition de validité de la convention. Cette question n’apas été formellement débattue dans le cas d’espèce, laconvention querellée ayant été de toute évidence passéepar écrit et dans le respect des dispositions spécifiques
au droit des marques368.
Les défendeurs en distraction ont toutefois soutenu
que cette convention était muette quant aux modalitésde la cession querellée en ce qu’elle n’indique pas si elle
est partielle ou totale369. Le défaut d’indication dans uncontrat de cession de marque de l’étendue de la cession
entache-t-il ladite convention de nullité? Le juge a éludé
cette question qui, à ses yeux, relève de la législation
anglaise des contrats : “Attendu qu’en droit international
privé, les formalités de validité des contrats sont celles
prévues par la législation du lieu de formation; queles conditions de forme d’une convention conclue à
Londres échappent au contrôle du juge nigérien”. Or, sil’on peut s’accorder avec le juge, en ce que l’exigence dela légalisation des signatures relativement au contrat
querellé soulève une question de droit international
privé, le défaut d’indication de l’étendue matérielle de la
cession d’une marque est une question de droit interne
relevant de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé qui
est la loi nationale du Niger en matière de marques deproduits ou de services, en application de l’article 3 desdispositions générales de l’ABR-1999370. En tout état decause, le défaut d’indication de l’étendue de la cession
dans le contrat y relatif n’entache pas pour autant
ladite convention d’irrégularité. L’article 26, alinéa 1,de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé qui prévoit
la transmissibilité en totalité ou en partie des droits

367
368
369
370

Cf. art. 29 al. 3 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999; art. 32 al. 3 de l’annexe III del’ABR-2015.
Cf. art. 29 al. 3 art. 30-2 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Cf. art. 26 al. 3 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999; art. 32 al. 1 de l’ABR-2015.
Cf. art. 5 al. 1 de l’ABR-2015 qui indique que les droits afférents aux domaines
de la propriété intellectuelle, tels que prévus par les annexes au présent
accord, sont des droits nationaux indépendants, soumis à la législation dechacun des États membres dans lesquels ils ont effet.

II. L’opposabilité de la convention portant cession dela marque
La société ADIL COMPANY SA et sieur EL HADJ SANINA SALE ont en outre fait valoir l’inopposabilité de laconvention de cession de la marque querellée motif
pris de sa non-publication dans le registre spécial desmarques tenu à l’OAPI. Cet argumentaire postule unexamen intrinsèque de la formalité d’inscription (A) et desa portée (B).
A. Les modalités de l’inscription de la cession au registre
spécial des marques
Deux points seront successivement examinés, à savoir
le contenu de l’inscription et l’auteur de l’inscription. En
ce qui concerne le contenu de l’inscription, il importede souligner que l’OAPI tient, pour l’ensemble des États
membres, des registres spéciaux dans lesquels sontinscrits certains renseignements se rapportant aux
différents objets de propriété intellectuelle à la date deleur enregistrement et pendant leur vie. Les contenus
desdits registres varient selon le titre de propriété
industrielle considéré. S’agissant précisément desmarques de produits ou de services, les articles 16 et
17 de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui révisé prévoientl’insertion de plusieurs données au registre spécial desmarques, notamment :
•
•
•
•
•

le numéro d’ordre de la marque;la date de dépôt de la demande d’enregistrement;la date de l’enregistrement;la date de priorité si celle-ci est revendiquée;le nom commercial ou les nom, prénom, adresse dutitulaire de la marque;• une reproduction de la marque; et• l’indication des classes des produits ou de service surlesquels porte l’enregistrement.
Ces renseignements sont identiques à ceux contenus
dans le certificat d’enregistrement délivré initialement audéposant après examen satisfaisant de sa demande parles instances compétentes de l’OAPI.
Bien plus, les événements qui surviennent pendant lavie de la marque, en l’occurrence le renouvellement,la radiation, les décisions judiciaires définitives, sontinscriptibles au registre spécial de marques. Cetteénumération, qui est loin d’être exhaustive, s’étend aux
actes visés à l’article 26.2) de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999, àsavoir la concession des droits d’exploitation, la cession
de ce droit, le gage ou la mainlevée de gage, c’est du
moins ce qui ressort de l’interprétation de l’article
27.1) de cette annexe. L’article 27 de l’annexe III del’ABR-1999 précise en ce sens que “Les actes mentionnés
à l’article 26 précédent ne sont opposables aux tiers
que s’ils ont été inscrits au registre spécial des marques
tenu à l’Organisation”. L’Acte de BAMAKO apporte sur cepoint une précision supplémentaire en subordonnant
l’opposabilité aux tiers à une double formalité, à savoir

l’inscription au registre spécial des marques et lapublication au Bulletin officiel371. Sont concernés :• les actes comportant transmission de propriétéde la marque notamment la convention de cessiond’une marque;• les actes comportant cession d’une concession dedroit d’exploitation à l’instar d’une sous licence; et• les actes comportant gage ou mainlevée de gage tel lenantissement d’une marque.
Au bénéfice de ce qui précède, il va sans dire que laconvention du 9 mai 2002 portant cession de la marque“ROTHMANS KING SIZE FILTER” intervenue entre lessociétés ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL LIECHTENSTEIN et
ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL Suisse était inscriptible auregistre spécial des marques. Pourtant il ressort des faits
de la cause que cette formalité de publicité n’a pas été
accomplie. Mais qui devait en prendre l’initiative?
Le juge a indiqué, au visa de l’article 21, alinéa 5,de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999, que l’inscription de laconvention de cession de la marque litigieuse au registre
spécial idoine incombe aux instances de l’OAPI et non
au cessionnaire, la société Suisse ROTHMANS OF PALL
MAL. Or, l’inadéquation des dispositions de l’article 21.5
de l’annexe III susvisé à la situation litigieuse estévidente d’autant plus que ce texte vise l’inscription durenouvellement de l’enregistrement d’une marque au
registre spécial y afférent, et non l’inscription requise en
cas de cession de la marque. Il s’agit de deux formalités
indépendantes l’une de l’autre donnant lieu au paiement
de taxes distinctes. Par ailleurs, la publication de lamarque “ROTHMANS KING SIZE FILTER” au Bulletin
officiel de la propriété industrielle (BOPI) par la société
requérante n’implique pas nécessairement que celle-ci arequis avec succès l’inscription de la cession dont elle seprévaut au registre spécial des marques tel que prescrite
par l’article 27.1) de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui
révisé aux fins d’opposabilité aux tiers. L’inscription dela cession au registre idoine par l’OAPI est subordonnée
à une demande préalable formulée par celui qui y aintérêt, en l’occurrence le cessionnaire sur qui repose en
définitive cette obligation, l’Organisation se bornant àeffectuer les opérations matérielles y afférentes.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

attachés à une marque ne sanctionne pas du moins
expressément l’inobservation de cette formalité par lanullité de la cession.

B. La portée de l’inscription de la cession au registre
spécial des marques
L’inscription de la cession d’une marque au registre
spécial des marques semble être facultative (2). Mais une
fois réalisée, elle produit des effets de droit (1).
1. Les effets de l’inscription de la cession au registre
spécial des marques
Le défaut d’inscription de la convention de cession d’une
marque au registre spécial des marques est sanctionné
par l’inopposabilité de cette convention aux tiers àl’égard desquels elle est censée n’avoir jamais existé enapplication de l’article 27.1) de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999372.
Cette disposition, qui transpose en droit de la propriété
371
372

Cf. art. 31 al. 1 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.
Cf. art. 31 al. 2 de l’ABR-2015.
249

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle
250

intellectuelle le principe de l’effet relatif des conventions
posé à l’article 1165 du Code civil napoléonien, est reprisepar les annexes de l’Accord de Bangui relatives au brevetd’invention373, aux modèles d’utilité374, aux dessins etmodèles industriels375, aux noms commerciaux376, auxschémas de configuration des circuits intégrés377. Dansl’espèce commentée, il est évident que la convention du
9 mai 2012 portant cession de la marque “ROTHMANSKING SIZE FILTER” n’a pas été inscrite au registre spécial
des marques. Elle ne pouvait par conséquent pas êtrevalablement opposée aux créanciers saisissant à l’égard
desquels elle est censée n’avoir jamais existé. C’est donc à
tort que le juge s’y est fondé pour ordonner la distraction
de la marque querellée.

prévues pour la saisie des valeurs mobilières et desdroits d’associés.

2. L’inscription de la cession au registre spécial desmarques : une simple faculté?
Aucune disposition expresse de l’annexe III de l’Accordde Bangui révisé n’oblige les parties à un contrat
de cession d’une marque d’en requérir l’inscription
au registre spécial des marques. En revanche, dansl’hypothèse d’une concession du droit d’exploitationd’une marque, la loi en fait une formalité dirimante.
L’article 29, alinéa 4, de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui
révisé dispose en effet que : “le contrat de licence
doit être inscrit, au registre spécial des marques, del’Organisation…”. Certes, l’instruction administrative
n° 414 semble combler ce vide juridique puisqu’elle
prévoit l’accomplissement de cette formalité en cas
de cession de marque. Mais il convient de relativiser
la portée juridique de ce texte pour au moins deuxraisons : d’une part, ces instructions élaborées par la
direction générale de l’OAPI ont une valeur résiduelledans l’ordonnancement juridique de cette Organisation
et ne peuvent de ce fait valablement suppléer la carence
du législateur. D’autre part, elle a un champ restreint ence qu’elle ne vise que l’hypothèse d’une cession partielle,encore que cette disposition ne soit pas impérative.
L’on est dès lors en droit de soutenir que la société
suisse n’était pas tenue de requérir l’inscription de la
cession du 9 mai 2002 au registre spécial des marques,l’inobservation de cette formalité étant du reste sansincidence sur la validité dudit contrat.

Observations :La marque de produits ou de services telle que régie
par les dispositions de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui
révisé, Acte du 24 février 1999, est un bien susceptiblede réalisation forcée conformément aux articles 28 etsuivants de l’Acte uniforme portant organisation desprocédures simplifiées de recouvrement et des voies
d’exécution. Tel est le principe posé par la décision
ci-dessus rapportée. En effet, le droit communautaire
OAPI n’ayant pas réglementé les saisies des propriétés
intellectuelles, seul le droit commun des saisies avocation à s’appliquer, la marque, au même titre
que les autres actifs de propriété industrielle, étant
un bien au sens civiliste du terme. À titre de droit
comparé, la possibilité de la saisie d’une marqueapparaît dans l’article R 714-4 du Code de propriété
intellectuelle français, la partie législative n’indiquantaucune procédure de saisie de cet objet de propriété
intellectuelle. La saisie des brevets est en revanche
expressément autorisée par l’article L 616-21 dudit codequi dispose : “La saisie d’un brevet est effectuée paracte extrajudiciaire signifiée au propriétaire du brevet, àl’Institut national de la propriété industrielle ainsi qu’aux
personnes possédant des droits sur le brevet; elle rend
inopposable au créancier saisissant toute modification
ultérieure des droits attachés au brevet”.

Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

S. Saisie conservatoire de marque– Saisissabilité de la marque –Fondement juridique – Modalités –Lieu de la saisie
La marque est un bien au sens du droit civil susceptiblede réalisation forcée, sur le fondement des articles 54
et suivants de l’Acte uniforme portant procédures
simplifiées de recouvrement et des voies d’exécution,
la procédure devant être conduite, dans le silence dela législation communautaire, suivant les modalités
373
374
375
376
377

Cf. art. 34 al. 1 de l’annexe de l’ABR-1999.
Cf. art. 29 al. 1 de l’annexe II de l’ABR-1999.
Cf. art. 21 al. 1 de l’annexe IV de l’ABR-1999.
Cf. art. 15 al. 3 de l’annexe V de l’ABR-1999.
Cf. art. 19 al. 1 de l’annexe IX de l’ABR-1999.

Fait toutefois une mauvaise application de la loi le juged’instance qui valide une saisie conservatoire de marquepratiquée entre les mains de la structure nationale deliaison plutôt qu’au siège de l’OAPI, seule structure
habilitée à détenir et gérer les titres de propriété
industrielle.
Tribunal de grande instance hors classe de Niamey,
Ordonnance de référé n° 118 du 20 mai 2008,
ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL LIMITED SA c. SOCIÉTÉ ADILCOMPANY et EL HADJ S.S

Ce relatif ostracisme est aggravé par le silence dunouveau Code des procédures civiles d’exécution français
qui n’a pas intégré plusieurs voies d’exécution portant
sur les objets immatériels378. L’on remarquera que sousles deux cieux et beaucoup plus en Afrique, le droit desvoies d’exécution semble se désintéresser des propriétés
intellectuelles qui peuvent pourtant représenter desvaleurs pécuniaires importantes et des garanties sansprécédent au profit des créanciers de leurs propriétaires.
L’on voit dès lors se profiler à l’horizon les difficultés
inhérentes à la détermination du régime juridique de lasaisie de marque en ce qui concerne spécialement son
fondement juridique et sa mise en œuvre, ce d’autant
que s’agissant des pays membres de l’OHADA, l’Acte
uniforme précité ne traite pas expressément de la saisie
des propriétés intellectuelles mais bien plutôt de la saisie
des valeurs mobilières et des droits d’associés. En effet,
378

Voir HUGON (C.), La réalisation forcée des propriétés intellectuelles en droit
français : Les cahiers de droit, Vol. 59 (Z), 2018, pp. 425 à 440. Disponible enligne à l’adresse suivante : https://doi.org/10.7202/1048587ar.

Faits : Il ressort des faits qu’en exécution des grosses desarrêts n° 124 du 5 juin 2006 et n° 235 du 16 octobre 2006de la cour d’appel de Niamey condamnant la société
ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL LTD à payer les sommes de
FCFA 100 000 000 et FCFA 50 000 000 respectivement àla société ADIL Cie et à sieur EL HADJ SANI pour saisiecontrefaçon abusive, ces derniers ont fait pratiquer,le 20 novembre 2007, saisies conservatoires sur lamarque de cigarettes “Rothmans King Seize Filter”
numéro 37 610, appartenant à leur débiteur commun
entre les mains de la structure nationale de liaison del’OAPI.
Aux termes de l’article 2 du Règlement fixant le cadre decollaboration entre l’OAPI et les structures nationales
de liaison adopté au cours de la 47e session ordinaire duConseil d’administration de l’OAPI, la structure nationalede liaison est une administration publique nationale
ou toute autre structure placée sous l’autorité duresponsable du département en charge de la propriété
industrielle. Elle constitue le relais de l’OAPI auprès desutilisateurs des services de l’Organisation. Cette saisie fut
annulée par la cour d’appel de Niamey suivant arrêt n° 26
du 5 mars 2008 motif pris de la violation des dispositions
des articles 54, 88 et 238 de l’Acte uniforme susvisé.
Les 25 et 26 mars de la même année, la société ADIL Cie
et sieur EL HADJ SANI ont fait pratiquer deux nouvelles
saisies déférées une fois de plus en annulation pardevant le tribunal de grande instance hors classede Niamey. La société Rothmans Of Pall Mall limiteda prétendu, d’une part, que l’Acte uniforme sur lesprocédures simplifiées de recouvrement et des voies
d’exécution ne saurait régir la saisie d’une marque, bien
insaisissable, qui relève de l’Accord de Bangui révisé du24 février 1999 et que, d’autre part, c’est à tort que ladite
saisie a été pratiquée entre les mains de la structure
nationale de liaison à Niamey, à savoir le Ministère ducommerce. Les saisissants ont en revanche soutenu
que la marque était un bien incorporel saisissable surle fondement de l’Acte uniforme OHADA précité. Deux
questions d’inégale valeur étaient posées à la cour : lamarque est-elle un bien saisissable? Dans l’affirmative,
sur quel fondement et selon quelles modalités?
Raisonnement : Si la cour d’appel de Niamey a posésans détour le principe de la saisissabilité de la marque(section I), elle n’a cependant pas épuisé la question
sous-jacente des modalités d’exécution de ladite saisie(section II).

I. Le principe de la saisissabilité d’une marque
Si la possibilité de réalisation forcée d’une marquede produits ou de services ne soulève pas a priori dedifficultés particulières en raison de la nature juridiquede cet actif de propriété industrielle (A), le fondement
juridique de cette opération doit être précisé, les chosesétant moins simples qu’il n’y paraît (B).
A. La nature juridique de la marque
La question de la saisissabilité de la marque soulevéepar la société ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL Limited est
tributaire de l’admission de cet objet de propriété
intellectuelle au rang des biens tels qu’appréhendéspar le Code civil379. Il va sans dire que la marque rentre
dans la catégorie des meubles elle-même répartie endeux sous-catégories juridiques distinctes, à savoir
les meubles corporels et les meubles incorporels.
Les biens meubles corporels sont ceux susceptibles
d’appréhension matérielle, alors que les biens meubles
incorporels sont des droits portant sur une chosemobilière. Cette distinction a un intérêt juridique sansprécédent relativement aux règles qui gouvernent
leur réalisation forcée, l’immatérialité des seconds
apparaissant peu ou prou comme un facteur decomplication de cette procédure. S’agissant en particulier
des meubles incorporels, l’on distingue généralement
les droits mobiliers par leur objet, les droits personnels
mobiliers, et les droits mobiliers par détermination de laloi au rang desquels les propriétés intellectuelles.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

Le titre VII de l’Acte uniforme portant organisation desprocédures simplifiées de recouvrement et des voies
d’exécution est intitulé “Dispositions particulières à lasaisie des droits d’associés et des valeurs mobilières”.
Aucune disposition particulière n’a été prise pour lesbrevets d’invention, les marques de produits ou deservices, le droit d’auteur et les droits voisins, etc. Cesdifficultés de mise en œuvre qui assombrissent le ciel
des créanciers des titulaires des propriétés incorporelles
transparaissent à quelques égards de l’affaire ayant
généré les décisions dont analyse.

Vue sous cet angle, la marque dont la propriété est
acquise au titulaire après enregistrement à l’office depropriété industrielle compétent est un bien qui nesaurait échapper à l’emprise des créanciers, lesquels
ont la latitude de la mettre sous mains de justice. Dansl’espèce commentée, la marque de cigarette “ROTHMAN
KING SIZE FILTER” déposée à l’OAPI le 27 mars 1997
et enregistrée sous le n° 37 610 est sans contredit lapropriété de la société ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL
Limited. C’est donc à bon droit que les créanciers decette société, en l’occurrence la société ADIL Cie et sieur
EL HADJ SANI, bénéficiaires des créances respectives de
FCFA 116 716 800 et de FCFA 58 867 946 en principal etfrais consolidés par des titres exécutoires, ont cru devoir
faire saisir ladite marque pour se faire payer sur le prixde la vente de cet objet de propriété industrielle.
B. Le fondement juridique de la saisie de marque dansl’espace OAPI
Le fondement juridique de la réalisation forcée despropriétés intellectuelles doit être naturellement
recherché dans le Code de la propriété intellectuelle dont
le mutisme est surprenant (1) et alternativement dansles codes de procédures civiles d’exécution en vigueur au
sein des États membres de l’OAPI (2).

379

D’après l’art. 516 du Code civil français de 1804 encore applicable danscertains pays membres de l’OAPI à l’instar du Cameroun, tous les biens sontmeubles ou immeubles. Il faut toutefois préciser que les règles issues dudit
code ont été conçues à propos des choses corporelles et c’est par analogie
que s’opère leur application aux droits intellectuels.
251

1. Le mutisme de l’Accord de Bangui
Les différentes versions de l’Accord de Bangui qui est
le code de la propriété intellectuelle des pays membres
de l’OAPI ne règlementent pas la saisie des propriétés
intellectuelles, laissant alors cette question à ladiscrétion des États membres. Ce choix du législateur
communautaire réitéré dans l’accord signé à Bamako le
14 décembre 2015 pourrait s’expliquer d’une part par
le fait que dès l’origine, l’OAPI a entendu régir le droit
matériel de la propriété intellectuelle pour l’ensemble
des pays signataires, tout en renvoyant sous quelquesréserves les questions de procédure d’ordre civil et pénalaux législateurs nationaux. L’Accord de Bangui a en effetélaboré quelques règles de procédure spécifiques ayant
vocation à s’appliquer dans tous les pays membres,
jetant ainsi les bases d’un mouvement d’harmonisation
des principes directeurs du procès dans l’espace OAPI. Il
s’agit notamment de :Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle• la règle selon laquelle les actions civiles relatives
à certains titres de propriété industrielle sontportées devant le tribunal civil et jugées commematières sommaires;• la compétence exceptionnelle des tribunaux
correctionnels habilités à connaître des questions denullité, déchéance, ou celles relatives à la propriété
des titres;• les délais de saisine du juge du fond après une
saisie-contrefaçon;• l’exigence de la plainte préalable de la victime pour lamise en mouvement de l’action publique; et• la communication de certaines causes au ministère
public, etc.

252

La démarche des plénipotentiaires de l’OAPI pourraitd’autre part se justifier par le refus de s’immiscer
dans un domaine désormais réservé par sa consœur
l’OHADA, étant observé que la quasi-totalité despays membres de L’OAPI ont adhéré au traité dePort Louis380. Toutefois, l’Accord de Bangui évoqueau passage la cession et le gage de certains titresde propriété industrielle, en l’occurrence le brevetd’invention381, le modèle d’utilité382, la marque deproduits ou de services383, les dessins et modèles
industriels, etc. Il est important de souligner que
le gage de la marque n’est envisagé par l’Accord de
Bangui que sous l’angle de l’exigence d’un écrit. Rien
n’est dit au sujet de son régime juridique, le législateur
communautaire renvoyant alors implicitement auxlégislations nationales relatives au droit des sûretésmobilières. En tout état de cause, dans le silence del’Accord de Bangui, s’agissant de la réalisation forcéedes propriétés intellectuelles, c’est le droit commun
en vigueur dans les États membres qui a vocation
à s’appliquer tel que relevé à juste titre par le juge

380

381
382
383

L’accord du 9 mai 2016 entre l’OAPI et l’OHADA précise en son art. 1er que
les objectifs et les missions de ces deux organisations sous-régionales
sont similaires et complémentaires en ce qui concerne l’amélioration
de l’environnement juridique et judiciaire en vue de la sécurisation desinvestissements économiques dans leurs États membres.
Cf. art. 33 de l’annexe I de l’ABR-1999; art 36 al. 2 de l’annexe I de l’ABR-2015.
Cf. art. 31 al. 2 de l’annexe II de l’ABR-2015.
Cf. art. 26 al. 2 de l’annexe III de l’ABR; art. 30 al. 2 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-2015.

du tribunal de grande instance de Niamey dansl’ordonnance de référé n° 118 du 20 mai 2008.
2. L’applicabilité de l’Acte uniforme OHADA relatif aux
voies d’exécution
Abordant la question de l’applicabilité de l’Acte uniforme
relatif aux voies d’exécution, le juge du tribunal de
grande instance hors classe de Niamey relève :
a.

b.

c.

“Attendu qu’il ressort des dispositions del’article 337 de l‘AUPSRVE que le présent
Acte uniforme sera applicable aux mesuresconservatoires, mesures d’exécution forcée etprocédures de recouvrement engagées après son
entrée en vigueur;
Attendu qu’en l’espèce, il s’agit d’une contestationde saisie, c’est-à-dire une mesure d’exécution forcée
qui est déférée à notre appréciation;
Que comme le soutient le requis, seules lesdispositions de l’OHADA régissent les voies
d’exécution et ce quel que soit la matière ou lebien-fondé sur lequel porte la saisie ou la mesure
conservatoire”.

Le raisonnement semble justifié surtout au regard
des dispositions de l’article 337 convoqué par le juge,l’État du Niger ayant ratifié le traité de Port Louis qui se
substitue d’office à sa législation antérieure en matièrede voies d’exécution. Par ailleurs, l’on peut trouver, dansl’article 56 de l’Acte uniforme sur les voies d’exécution,
un fondement légal à la saisie de la marque. Ce texte
dispose en effet que : “la saisie conservatoire peut portersur tous les biens mobiliers, corporels ou incorporels
appartenant au débiteur. Elle les rend indisponibles”. Il
s’ensuit que les prétentions de la société ROTHMANS
OFF PALL MALL Limited selon lesquelles les dispositions
de l’OHADA ne peuvent être appliquées aux marques
puisqu’elles sont régies par l’Accord de Bangui révisé le24 février 1999 sont simplement spécieuses.
Quelques réserves sont cependant permises au regard
de la nature particulière de la marque objet de la saisie
qui s’accommode mal avec un régime juridique conçu sur
le modèle des choses corporelles. L’immatérialité de lamarque commande en effet l’adoption des dispositions
spéciales tenant compte de cette spécificité. Il est dèslors surprenant que le Titre VII de l’Acte uniforme précité
consacré aux dispositions particulières à la saisie desdroits d’associés et des valeurs mobilières ait occulté les
propriétés intellectuelles. Est-ce une simple omission
ou un choix délibéré du législateur? Quoi qu’il en soit,
ce traitement discriminatoire des biens incorporels
préfigure les difficultés de mise en œuvre de la saisie
de marque.
II. La mise en œuvre de la saisie de marqueLes difficultés de mise en œuvre de la saisie de marqueproviennent de ce que le dispositif juridique sus-évoqué
ne fournit aucune indication sur la procédure à suivre.
Par conséquent, des hésitations sont permises quantau modèle sur lequel cette saisie peut se greffer sanstrahir la spécificité de la marque qui en est l’objet. Dans

A. Le lieu d’exécution de la saisie
Le juge du tribunal de grande instance hors classede Niamey a donné gain de cause aux créanciers
poursuivants qui ont fait pratiquer la saisie conservatoire
sur la marque querellée entre les mains du Ministère
du commerce de l’État du Niger, toute chose réprouvée
par le débiteur saisi pour qui la saisie devrait plutôt êtreopérée au siège de l’OAPI à Yaoundé.
Pour y parvenir, le juge a posé “que la marque a été
saisie comme bien incorporel et entre les mains de lareprésentation de l‘OAPI qu’est la structure nationalede liaison qui en effet, est la seule mandataire agrééede l’Organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuelle
au Niger”. Cette motivation appelle au moins deux
observations : premièrement, la structure nationalede liaison en l’espèce le Ministère du commerce duNiger dont le rôle a été circonscrit ci-avant n’est pas unmandataire agréé auprès de l’OAPI, mais bien plutôt une
administration publique nationale placée sous l’autoritédu chef du département ministériel au sein duquel elle
est logée et qui sert de courroie de transmission entrel’OAPI et les usagers. La profession de mandataire
est organisée par le Règlement issu de la résolution
n° 48/13 dans le cadre de la 48e session ordinaire duconseil d’administration qui s’est tenue à Brazzaville le16 décembre 2008. Il résulte des articles 2 et suivantsde ce texte que la profession de mandataire est une
profession libérale, le mandataire étant défini comme
une personne physique ou morale habilitée à agir sur
mandat, à titre professionnel ou non, pour le compted’une personne physique ou morale, en vue d’effectuer
auprès de l’Organisation africaine de la propriété
intellectuelle des opérations de propriété intellectuelle.
Sous ce rapport, une administration publique ne saurait
jouer le rôle de mandataire.
Cette administration, en vertu de l’article 6, alinéa 2, desdispositions générales de l’Accord de Bangui révisé, est
habilitée à recevoir les demandes des titres de propriété
industrielle émanant des usagers domiciliés sur son
territoire à charge de transmettre lesdites demandes
à l’OAPI dans un délai de cinq (5) jours ouvrables à
compter du dépôt. La seconde observation découle dela première : la structure nationale de liaison ne détient
pas les titres de propriété industrielle et n’assure pas nonplus leur gestion quotidienne. Il semble par conséquent
artificiel de pratiquer une saisie, fût-elle conservatoire,
entre les mains d’un non-détenteur de l’objet ciblé, enl’occurrence le Ministère du Commerce du Niger.
En revanche, une telle saisie pourrait valablement êtreopérée entre les mains de l’OAPI précisément dans son
siège à Yaoundé, cette organisation étant seule habilitée
non seulement à délivrer les certificats d’enregistrement
de marques mais en plus à en assurer la détention
et la gestion quotidienne. Cette solution présente ledésavantage d’être dispendieuse pour les créanciers
domiciliés hors du siège de l’OAPI, lesquels courent desurcroît le risque de se voir refuser l’exequatur par la
juridiction compétente du pays hôte, en l’occurrence
le Cameroun, s’agissant d’une décision étrangère dontl’exécution est envisagée localement. L’on pourrait au
final déboucher sur une impasse!
L’option consistant à faire pratiquer la saisie
conservatoire de marque au siège de l’OAPI nousparaît plus conforme aux dispositions de l’article 236
de l’Acte uniforme OHADA relatif aux voies d’exécution
applicables mutatis mutandis, lesquelles précisent,s’agissant de la saisie des droits d’associés et des valeurs
mobilières, que “la saisie est effectuée soit auprès de lasociété ou de la personne morale émettrice, soit auprès
du mandataire chargé de conserver ou de gérer lestitres”. C’est d’ailleurs au visa de cette disposition quele tribunal de grande instance hors classe de Niamey avalidé la saisie pratiquée entre les mains du Ministère ducommerce du Niger. Or, il a été abondamment démontré
plus haut que ce département ministériel ne conserve ni
ne gère les titres de propriété industrielle. L’incertitude
annoncée est encore accentuée lorsque l’on envisage leformalisme nécessaire aux fins d’opposabilité de la saisie
de marque.
B. Les formalités aux fins d’opposabilité
Dans l’espèce commentée, la saisie a été pratiquée
auprès de la structure nationale de liaison, à savoir leMinistère du commerce de l’État du Niger entre les mains
de qui l’acte a été délaissé. Or, tel que démontré ci-haut,l’irrégularité de cette démarche viole les dispositions del’article 236 de l’Acte uniforme sur les voies d’exécution.
Ce fut d’ailleurs l’un des reproches formulés par la société
ADIL Cie SA contre la saisie querellée. Classiquement
et dans le droit fil des dispositions des articles 236 etsuivants de l’Acte uniforme relatif aux voies d’exécution,
la procédure de saisie des biens incorporels repose surune double notification : une première notification àl’adresse du gestionnaire du titre en cause en l’espèce
l’OAPI, une seconde à l’intention du débiteur saisi, c’est-àdire le société ROTHMANS OF PALL MALL Limited qui doiten être informée dans un délai de huit jours à peine decaducité384. Dans le cas d’espèce, si la saisie de la marquede cigarette “Rothman King size Filter” a été portée à laconnaissance de la société débitrice, il est patent quel’acte de saisie n’a pas été signifié au tiers saisi, toutechose qui rend ladite saisie inopposable. Pourtant,c’est l’OAPI, en sa double qualité de conservateur etgestionnaire de la marque, qui est le premier destinatairede l’acte de saisie. C’est en effet cette organisation
qui inscrit dans les registres idoines tous les actes
intervenant pendant la durée de vie de la marque.

Chapitre 3 – Marques de produits ou de services

l’espèce ci-dessus rapportée, la détermination du lieu del’exécution de la saisie (A) et des formalités à observer
aux fins d’opposabilité (B) est émaillée d’incertitudes.

Ne serait-ce qu’à ce titre, la décision du tribunal de
grande instance hors classe de Niamey validant lasaisie de la marque litigieuse nonobstant le défaut designification au tiers saisi porte en elle-même les germesde sa destruction.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

384

Cf. art. 238 de l’AUPSRVE.
253

A.
Dessins et modèles industriels –Nouveauté – Utilisation notoire –Destruction de la nouveauté – Possession
personnelle antérieure
255
B.
Dessins et modèles industriels – Notion de
nouveauté – Appréciation de la contrefaçon258
C.
Dessins et modèles industriels – Nouveauté– Modèles revendiqués identiques à desarticles exploités antérieurement parles défendeurs
259

WIPO Collection of Leading Judgments on Intellectual Property Rights

Chapitre 4 – Dessins et modèles industrielsD.
Dessins et modèles industriels – Nouveauté –Impression visuelle d’ensemble – Appréciationde la contrefaçon – Preuve pesant surle demandeur
261

254

E.
Dessins et modèles industriels – Saisiecontrefaçon – Ordonnance – Rétractation– Juge compétent – Étendue des pouvoirs dujuge des référés
263

Chapitre 4
Dessins et modèles industriels
A. Dessins et modèles industriels –Nouveauté – Utilisation notoire– Destruction de la nouveauté –Possession personnelle antérieure
Est considéré comme nouveau et donc éligible à laprotection légale un dessin ou modèle industriel
enregistré à l’OAPI, dès lors qu’il n’existe pas d’éléments
comparatifs, l’utilisation de cet actif de propriété
industrielle par un tiers commencée moins de six mois
avant la date de dépôt ne remplissant par ailleurs pas
le critère de notoriété requis pour mettre la nouveautéen échec.
En rejetant la possession personnelle antérieure d’undessin ou modèle, telle que revendiquée par un tiers
incapable de démontrer l’exploitation antérieure dudessin ou modèle en son nom propre, ou sur la base d’uncontrat de licence, un tribunal applique correctement
le droit.
Cour suprême du Cameroun, Arrêt n° 58-cc du
18 mars 1999, SOCIÉTÉ DES RAFFINERIES DU LITTORAL
c. ETS NGO OND & FILS
Observations :L’article 3.1) de l’annexe IV de l’Accord de Bangui, Actedu 2 mars 1977, exclut de la protection légale les dessins
et modèles industriels qui, à la date du dépôt de la
demande d’enregistrement ou à la date de la priorité
valablement revendiquée, ont été notoirement utilisés
sur le territoire de l’un des États membres de l’OAPI.
Cette rédaction de l’Accord de Bangui qui consacrait
une nouveauté relative, en ce qu’elle ne peut être miseen échec par une divulgation intervenue en dehors
des États membres de l’OAPI, a été substantiellement
modifiée par l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du 24 février 1999
qui indique en son article 2, alinéa 2, qu’un dessin ou
modèle est nouveau “(…) s’il n’a pas été divulgué en toutlieu du monde, par une publication sous forme tangible,
par un usage ou par tout autre moyen avant la datede dépôt ou, le cas échéant, avant la date de prioritéde la demande d’enregistrement”. Cette disposition,
reprise intégralement par l’Acte signé à Bamako le
14 décembre 2015, exige désormais une nouveautéabsolue pour qu’un dessin ou modèle industriel soitéligible à la protection légale385. La décision rapportée
est intéressante à plus d’un titre : en même temps qu’elle
donne une vue panoramique de l’évolution de la notion
385

Contrairement à l’AB-1977, sous l’empire de l’ABR-1999 et l’ABR-2015, la
nouveauté est détruite si le dessin ou modèle litigieux a été rendu accessible
au public en tout lieu du monde.

de nouveauté depuis l’Accord du 2 mars 1977, cettedécision permet de clarifier l’exception de possession
personnelle antérieure prévue à l’article 8 de l’Actedu 2 mars 1977 et reprise expressis verbis par l’Acte du24 février 1999 en son article 7.
Faits : Les établissements NOF sont titulaires des droits
sur un modèle de sachets servant au conditionnement
de l’huile de palme déposé à l’OAPI le 30 juillet 1991
et enregistré le 17 mai 1993 sous le n° 1062. Suivant
procès-verbal d’huissier en date du 19 novembre 1991,
cette structure a fait constater l’utilisation illégale de ce
modèle par la société SRL qui a contesté la nouveauté
dudit modèle au motif qu’elle l’utilise notoirement depuis
mars 1991 et donc antérieurement au dépôt réalisé parles Éts NOF, revendiquant ainsi l’application à son profit
des dispositions bienveillantes de l’article 8 de l’accord
du 2 mars 1977. Au-delà des préoccupations relatives à lacompétence et à la réparation du préjudice qui ne feront
pas l’objet de développements particuliers dans le cadrede cette contribution, la question centrale à laquelle
les magistrats de la Cour suprême étaient appelés à
répondre était :a.
b.

celle de savoir si le modèle querellé est nouveau ausens de l’article 3.1) précité; et accessoirementsi la société SRL est en droit de bénéficier de lapossession personnelle antérieure.

Raisonnement : Les juges suprêmes ont, à la suitede leurs homologues des juridictions inférieures,
indiqué que :I.
II.

le modèle litigieux était nouveau; etles conditions de mise en œuvre de l’exception depossession personnelle antérieure n’étaient pas
réunies.

I. La détermination de la nouveauté en matière dedessins et modèles
La Cour suprême a considéré que le modèle de sachets
objet de l’enregistrement n° 1062 revêt un caractère
nouveau (A) et que cette nouveauté n’est pas mise enéchec (B).
A. La teneur de la nouveauté
Aux termes de l’article 2.1) de l’annexe IV de l’Accord de
Bangui, Acte du 2 mars 1977 : “La présente annexe est
applicable à tout dessin nouveau, à toute forme plastiquenouvelle, à tout objet industriel qui se différencie deses similaires soit par une configuration distincte etreconnaissable lui conférant un caractère de nouveauté,255

soit par un ou plusieurs effets extérieurs lui donnant
une physionomie propre et nouvelle”. Si cette disposition
fournit quelques indications sur les caractéristiques d’undessin ou modèle éligible à la protection légale, elle nedéfinit pas pour autant la notion de nouveauté. D’après
un auteur, la nouveauté requise pour l’enregistrementd’un dessin ou modèle industriel sous l’empire del’Accord de Bangui de 1977 est à la fois objective
et relative :Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle• objective puisque cet objet ne peut être protégé s’il aété divulgué antérieurement au dépôt de la demanded’enregistrement; et• relative car la divulgation faisant échec à la nouveauté
ne peut résulter que de la description du dessin ou
modèle dans des publications imprimées ou de son
utilisation notoire sur le territoire de l’un des États
membres de l’OAPI386.

256

Dans l’espèce commentée, la société SRL a contesté
la nouveauté du modèle litigieux motif pris de ce
qu’il est antériorisé par celui qu’elle utilise depuis
mars 1991 et dont les éléments caractéristiques n’ont
du reste pas été spécifiés. Or, l’absence d’éléments decomparaison des modèles en cause ne permet pas àl’analyste d’approfondir la discussion sur cet important
point387. La cour a d’ailleurs relevé à ce propos que :“…Le procès-verbal du 19 novembre 1991 qui neconstate au demeurant que la commercialisation sansautorisation par la Société des Raffineries du Littoral
du modèle protégé à l’Organisation africaine de la
propriété intellectuelle depuis le 30 juillet 1991 par les
Établissements NGO OND & Fils (NOF) ne pouvait établir
manifestement les similitudes entre le produit protégé
et celui utilisé par la Société des Raffineries du Littoral”.
Pourtant, l’appréciation de la nouveauté du modèle
querellé devrait également être faite, ajoute un auteur, àl’aune du critère essentiel de la divulgation, en évitant deconfondre spécialité et nouveauté. En effet, la spécialité
suppose le défaut d’œuvres antérieures similaires, alors
que la nouveauté implique le défaut de divulgation dudessin ou modèle revendiqué388. C’est finalement autourde la question de l’utilisation antérieure que les débats
ont achoppé, les juges de la Cour suprême ayant, endéfinitive, retenu que l’utilisation antérieure invoquée
par la SRL ne remplissait pas la condition de notoriété
requise pour pouvoir mettre la nouveauté du modèle
litigieux en échec.
B. La destruction de la nouveauté
La nouveauté d’un dessin ou modèle peut être détruite
dans l’une des hypothèses visées à l’article 3.1) de

386

387

388

Voir NGO MBEM (S.), Les enjeux de la protection des dessins et modèles
industriels dans le développement en Afrique : le cas des pays membres
de l’Organisation africaine de la propriété intellectuelle (OAPI), Thèse deDoctorat en droit, Université de Strasbourg III-Robert Schuman, septembre
2007, pp. 88 et s.
Voir en ce sens Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, Jugement du 23 juillet 2015,
n° 1929/2015, Sieur Dabe Zohora Bertin c. Société Orange Côte d’Ivoire SA etSociété Nouvelle Typic Design Diffusion dite NTDD SA (obs. LUCAS (A.), ce recueil,
chapitre 4, section D).
Voir en ce sens SEUNA (C.), La notion de dessins et modèles industriels
susceptibles d’enregistrement : essai de théorie juridique, in : Revue africainede la propriété intellectuelle n° 0002, septembre 2009, pp. 26 et s.

l’annexe IV de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du 2 mars 1977
notamment si, à la date de la demande ou de la priorité
revendiquée, il a été notoirement utilisé sur le territoirede l’un des États membres389. Dans le silence de la loi,
la Cour suprême a donné à la notoriété un contenu
qui suscite quelques réserves : “Considérant quel’utilisation des sachets NOF par la SRL n’a débuté qu’enmars 1991; qu’on ne peut parler d’utilisation notoire
pour un laps de temps si bref, la notoriété exigeant une
utilisation plus longue outre d’autres éléments relatifs
à la publicité, l’accoutumance des consommateurs”. Sil’on peut en effet s’accorder avec les juges de la Hautejuridiction quant à la prise en compte des éléments
relatifs à la publicité et, dans une moindre mesure, àl’accoutumance des consommateurs dans l’appréciationde la notoriété de l’utilisation d’un dessin ou modèle
industriel, il paraît en revanche hasardeux de rattacher
la notoriété à la “longueur de l’utilisation” d’un dessinou modèle sans qu’aucune limite temporelle ne soit
préalablement fixée. Une telle approche est sourced’insécurité judiciaire. Cette insécurité est d’autant
plus accentuée qu’il n’existe pas pour le moment,
dans l’espace OAPI, de juridiction faîtière chargéed’assurer une interprétation uniforme de la législation
communautaire, chaque Cour suprême pouvant donner
à la notion de notoriété un contenu différent.
La notoriété dans son acception classique semble
renvoyer à la connaissance d’un fait par un grandnombre de personnes relevant d’un secteur d’activité
donné ou du public en général. En matière de marquede produits et de services par exemple, une cour d’appel
a indiqué que pour déterminer la notoriété, l’on doit
prendre en considération l’ancienneté de la marque,les efforts publicitaires qui la soutiennent, l’importancede la diffusion des produits, ainsi que leur dispersion
géographique390. Vue sous cet angle, l’utilisation dumodèle de sachets querellé pouvait valablement êtreconsidérée comme notoire, s’agissant surtout des sachets
librement commercialisés dans la ville de Douala par lessociétés plastiques pour le conditionnement d’un produitde grande consommation, en l’espèce l’huile de palme.
Les faits révèlent, en outre, que les Éts NOF avaient
présenté leur modèle de sachets lors de la foire promo
1990 dans le stand de la SRL à la demande de cettedernière. Cette divulgation intervenue antérieurement àla date du dépôt, c’est-à-dire le 30 juillet 1991, emportet-elle destruction de la nouveauté en application desdispositions de l’article 3.1) précitées? La réponse àcette interrogation n’est pas évidente. L’article 3.2)b) del’Accord de Bangui, Acte du 2 mars 1977, sous l’empire
duquel la décision rapportée a été rendue, précise
que la nouveauté n’est pas mise en échec si, dans les
six mois précédant la date de dépôt ou de la priorité
revendiquée, le dessin ou modèle industriel a fait l’objet
389

390

L’art. 2 al. 2 de l’annexe IV de l’ABR-2015 indique que la nouveauté est
détruite si le dessin ou modèle a été divulgué en tout lieu du monde, par une
publication sous forme tangible, par un usage ou par tout autre moyen avant
la date de dépôt ou, le cas échéant, avant la date de priorité de la demanded’enregistrement.
Voir CA Lomé, 18 septembre 2007, Arrêt n° 80, Établissements Weilliang LU c.
Établissements MLT, à propos de la marque “PANTHÈRE NOIRE”.

II. La possession personnelle antérieure
Le législateur du 2 mars 1977 a, pour des raisonsd’équité, prévu à l’article 8 une limitation aux droits
exclusifs conférés par l’enregistrement d’un dessin ou
modèle industriel, notamment la possession personnelle
antérieure dont la mise en œuvre suppose l’exploitation
antérieure dudit dessin ou modèle (A) et la bonne foi del’exploitant (B).
A. L’exploitation antérieure d’un dessin ou modèle identique
L’article 8 de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du 2 mars 1977,
dispose :“Le dessin ou modèle industriel enregistré
ne produit pas d’effet à l’égard du tiersqui, au moment du dépôt de la demanded’enregistrement, exploitait déjà ledit dessinou modèle sur le territoire de l’un des États
membres ou avait pris des mesures nécessaires
pour cette exploitation. Ce tiers est autorisé àutiliser ce dessin ou modèle pour les besoinsde son entreprise, dans ses propres ateliers ou
dans ceux d’autrui. Ce droit ne peut être transmis
qu’avec l’entreprise.”L’exception de possession personnelle antérieure aété également prévue par les versions ultérieuresde l’accord, à savoir celles du 24 février 1999 et
du 14 décembre 2015. Cependant, le contenu desdifférentes dispositions y relatives a varié au fil du temps.
En définitive, l’article 7.a) de l’Accord de Bamako du
14 décembre 2015 qui traite de la possession personnelle
antérieure a substitué le mot “exploitation” retenu parles précédentes versions de l’accord par “possession”
dans un souci de clarté et de précision. Cette nouvelledisposition énonce en effet :“Les droits découlant du dessin ou modèle
industriel ne s’étendent pas aux actes accomplis
par celui qui, au moment du dépôt de la demanded’enregistrement, possédait déjà ledit dessin ou
modèle. Celui-ci est autorisé à utiliser ce dessinou modèle industriel pour les besoins de son
entreprise, dans ses propres ateliers ou dans
ceux d’autrui. Ce droit ne peut qu’être transmis
avec l’entreprise.”
Par ailleurs, ce texte exclut désormais le tiers qui avait
pris des dispositions nécessaires en vue de l’exploitation
du dessin ou modèle industriel litigieux du champ dela possession personnelle antérieure. En tout état decause, l’accord du 2 mars 1977 sous l’empire duquel ladécision commentée a été rendue limitait le bénéfice

de la possession personnelle antérieure aux tiers, c’està-dire aux personnes qui, antérieurement à la date dudépôt du dessin ou modèle querellé ou de la priorité
revendiquée, exploitaient déjà secrètement le mêmeobjet comme créateur ou cessionnaire dans le territoirede l’un des États membres de l’OAPI. Il va sans direque la SRL ne remplit pas cette condition, étant donné
qu’elle utilisait le modèle de sachets litigieux du fait deson véritable créateur les Éts NOF qui en assuraientd’ailleurs la livraison auprès des divers utilisateurs, entémoignent les diverses factures produites aux débats.
La Cour suprême a d’ailleurs relevé à bon droit que la SRL
n’a apporté aucune preuve qu’elle exploitait l’invention
litigieuse avant le 30 juillet 1991, date du dépôt dumodèle querellé à l’OAPI.
L’exploitation du modèle de sachets litigieux par la SRLn’était pas non plus assise sur une licence d’exploitation
en application des dispositions pertinentes du susdit
accord. L’on est là aux confins de l’exigence de la bonne
foi de l’exploitant.
B. La bonne foi de l’exploitant
Cette exigence ne résulte pas expressément desdispositions de l’article 8 de l’Accord de Bangui, Actedu 2 mars 1977, encore moins de ses succédanés(il s’agit notamment de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte
du 24 février 1999, et de l’Accord de Bamako du
14 décembre 2015). La doctrine spécialisée souligne lanécessité de la preuve de la mauvaise foi de l’exploitantantérieur en vertu de la maxime fraus omnia corrumpit391,
rapprochant ainsi le régime des dessins et modèles
industriels de celui des brevets d’invention. Les
articles 8.1)d) de l’annexe I de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte
du 24 février 1999 et 7.1)e) de l’annexe I de l’Accord de
Bamako du 14 décembre 2015 exigent expressément
la bonne foi du possesseur antérieur de l’invention
revendiquée. Ce rapprochement paraît d’ailleurs
judicieux compte tenu des possibilités d’appropriations
frauduleuses des créations protégées au titre du régime
spécial des dessins et modèles industriels.

Chapitre 4 – Dessins et modèles industriels

d’une divulgation résultant du fait que le déposant de la
demande ou son prédécesseur en droit l’a exposé dansune exposition internationale officielle ou officiellement
reconnue. Or, s’il est manifeste que la divulgation est le
fait des Éts NOF, il est en revanche difficile d’évaluer avec
précision la période de temps séparant cette divulgationintervenue en 1990 sans autres précisions du dépôt
réalisé le 30 juillet 1991.

Dans l’espèce commentée, il est évident que l’invocation
par la SRL d’un droit d’utilisation antérieure du modèle desachets enregistrés au profit des Éts NOF procède d’unemauvaise foi manifeste de sa part étant observé qu’elle
ne prouve aucunement avoir antérieurement créé lemodèle dont s’agit, ayant simplement acquis les sachets
litigieux sur la place du marché au même titre que ses
concurrentes. Il y a là une volonté d’appropriation injuste
du fruit des efforts créatifs d’autrui constitutive d’une
faute ouvrant droit aux dommages et intérêts dans lesconditions du droit commun. D’où la confirmation par lahaute juridiction de l’indemnité allouée aux Éts NOF parles premiers juges.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

391

Voir en ce sens NGO MBEM (S.), n.2, pp. 123 et s.
257

B. Dessins et modèles industriels –Notion de nouveauté – Appréciationde la contrefaçon
Un modèle de cuvette doit être considéré commenouveau dès lors qu’il présente une contexture
différente de celle des ustensiles ordinaires rencontrés
sur les marchés et que la commercialisation d’un modèle
qui lui ressemble caractérise une contrefaçon.
Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire, Chambre judiciaire, Arrêt
n° 032 du 4 février 2010, SOGEC-IVOIRE c. SIFAM-CI
Observations :Bien qu’il mélange fâcheusement les conditions deprotection d’un dessin ou modèle industriel et d’uneœuvre de l’esprit au sens du droit d’auteur, l’arrêt
commenté mérite attention en ce qu’il offre l’occasion
de mieux cerner la distinction entre les deux situations,en prenant appui désormais sur une rédaction plus
rigoureuse de l’Accord de Bangui.
Faits : Il s’agit en l’espèce d’un modèle de cuvetteenregistré par une société commercialisant desustensiles ménagers en aluminium. Reprochant à une
société d’avoir mis sur le marché une copie de ce modèle,
elle l’assigne en contrefaçon et en concurrence déloyale.
La cour d’appel d’Abidjan, comme l’avaient fait les
premiers juges, la déboute en retenant que le modèle
litigieux n’est pas original, et qu’en toute hypothèse il est
différent du modèle de la défenderesse.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

La société a porté son affaire devant la Cour suprême deCôte d’Ivoire.

258

Raisonnement : L’arrêt est cassé à la fois pour avoir violé
l’article 2, alinéa 1er, de l’annexe IV de l’Accord de Bangui,
et pour “insuffisance de motifs”. Usant du pouvoird’évocation que lui reconnaît la législation ivoirienne, la
Cour suprême relève que “le bénéfice de la protection
instaurée par l’annexe IV de l’Accord de Bangui est
subordonné non seulement au caractère novateur dumodèle déposé, mais aussi à son originalité”, et que lanouveauté, au sens du même texte, “est caractérisée
si aucun dessin ou modèle identique n’a été divulgué
à la date du dépôt de la demande d’enregistrement”.
Constatant qu’il est établi, d’une part, que le modèle
de la société demanderesse “présente une contexture
différente de celle des ustensiles ordinaires rencontrées
sur les marchés”, d’autre part que celui exploité par lasociété défenderesse lui “ressemble”, elle en déduit quecette dernière est mal fondée à opposer le “manqued’originalité” de la cuvette litigieuse.
On se gardera bien, faute de disposer des éléments
factuels, de discuter le mérite de la solution. Mais
les deux étapes du raisonnement appellent desérieuses réserves.
Rappelons d’emblée que le texte de l’Accord de Bangui
mis sur le tapis en l’espèce est le texte initial de 1977.
Dans cette version, l’article 2, alinéa 1er, de l’annexe IV,
prévoyait que “la présente annexe est applicable à tout

dessin nouveau, à toute forme plastique nouvelle, àtout objet industriel qui se différencie de ses similaires
soit par une configuration distincte et reconnaissable
lui conférant un caractère de nouveauté, soit par un ou
plusieurs effets extérieurs lui donnant une physionomie
propre et nouvelle”. L’arrêt attaqué n’en avait pas fait une
lecture correcte puisqu’il avait refusé le bénéfice de laprotection en se fondant sur le défaut d’originalité. Maisl’arrêt commenté erre tout autant puisque, s’il commence
par fonder la censure sur l’existence, d’ailleurs assénéeplus que démontrée, d’une “physionomie propre” dumodèle argué de contrefaçon, critère effectivement posépar la disposition précitée, il ne craint pas d’affirmer
ensuite que l’Accord de Bangui subordonne la protection
du modèle à la double condition de nouveauté etd’originalité. Ce postulat méconnaît ouvertement lalettre de l’annexe IV qui n’évoque aucunement l’exigenced’originalité, aussi bien dans la version initiale, applicableen l’espèce, que dans sa rédaction actuelle, issue del’Accord de Bamako de 2015.
Dans cette dernière rédaction, à la différence du texte de1977, qui traitait des deux questions dans une disposition
unique, une distinction est clairement opérée entre l’objet
et la condition de la protection. L’article 1er, sous l’intitulé“Définition”, dispose qu’il faut entendre par “dessin” “toutassemblage de lignes ou de couleurs”, et “le modèle”
comme “toute forme plastique associée ou non à deslignes ou à des couleurs”, en ajoutant “pourvu que cetassemblage ou forme donne une apparence spéciale à
un produit industriel ou artisanal et puisse servir de typepour la fabrication d’un produit industriel ou artisanal”.
L’article 2, sous l’intitulé “Dessins et modèles industriels
susceptibles d’enregistrement”, énonce, dans son premieralinéa : “Un dessin ou modèle industriel peut faire l’objet
d’un enregistrement s’il est nouveau”.
La démarche peut être rapprochée de celle adoptée
par l’Union européenne dans le Règlement 6/2002
du 12 décembre 2001 sur les dessins ou modèles
communautaires, dont l’article 3.a) définit le “dessinou modèle” comme “l’apparence d’un produit ou d’une
partie de produit que lui confèrent, en particulier, lescaractéristiques des lignes, des contours, des couleurs,de la forme, de la texture et/ou des matériaux duproduit lui-même et/ou de son ornementation”, avant
que l’article 4 précise les “conditions de protection”
en prévoyant que la protection du dessin ou modèle“n’est assurée que dans la mesure où il est nouveau etprésente un caractère individuel”. Le point commun
avec l’Accord de Bangui est l’exigence de “nouveauté”. La
différence est que le droit de l’Union européenne posela condition supplémentaire du “caractère individuel”.
Mais, à y regarder de plus près, cette condition peutaussi se déduire de la définition contenue dansl’article 1er, alinéa 1er, de l’annexe IV dans la version de
Bamako, laquelle, comme il a été dit plus haut, se réfère
à l’“apparence spéciale” donnée au produit. Où l’on voit
que la question de l’objet de la protection n’est pas icicomplètement séparée de celle de ses conditions.
En tout cas, il est acquis désormais que la protection
du modèle selon l’Accord de Bangui est subordonnéeIl est vrai que, dans la pratique judiciaire, l’oppositionn’est pas toujours aussi nette car l’appréciation del’originalité au sens du droit d’auteur peut aussi prendre
en compte des éléments objectifs comme l’existence
ou l’absence d’antériorité. Et même certaines lois
nationales en retiennent une acception qui n’est pas
aussi subjective que celle, traditionnelle, renvoyant à lamarque de la personnalité de l’auteur. C’est précisément
le cas de la loi ivoirienne n° 96-564 du 25 juillet 1996
relative à la protection des œuvres de l’esprit et aux
droits des auteurs, des artistes-interprètes et desproducteurs phonogrammes et de vidéogrammes, dont
l’art. 1er définit l’œuvre originale comme “une création
intellectuelle propre à son auteur”, critère qui a d’abordété retenu par le droit de l’Union européenne pourcaractériser l’originalité des programmes d’ordinateur393,
avant d’être généralisé à l’ensemble des œuvres par
la Cour de justice dans l’arrêt Infopaq394, et qui est
considéré comme suffisamment compréhensif pourrendre compte de l’approche des systèmes de copyrightqui ramènent traditionnellement l’originalité à l’absence
de copie395.
Il n’empêche. C’est à tort, croyons-nous, que l’arrêt
commenté ajoute la condition d’originalité à celle denouveauté. Il aurait dû s’en tenir à cette dernière396.
C’est également à tort qu’il pose le principe que l’Accordde Bangui subordonne la protection du modèle à son“caractère novateur”, terminologie maladroite qui semble
renvoyer à une sorte d’équivalent de “l’activité inventive”
requise de l’invention brevetable397. Il aurait dû s’entenir à l’absence d’antériorité, comme d’ailleurs il le fait
ensuite en ajoutant que la nouveauté “est caractérisée
si aucun dessin ou modèle identique n’a été divulgué
à la date du dépôt de la demande d’enregistrement”,
puis en constatant, en fait, que le modèle de cuvette
392

393
394
395
396
397

“Un dessin ou modèle industriel est nouveau s’il n’a pas été divulgué en toutlieu du monde, par une publication sous forme tangible, par un usage ou partout autre moyen avant la date de dépôt ou, le cas échéant, avant la date depriorité de la demande d’enregistrement”. Voir aussi l’art. 5 du Règlement(CE) n° 6/2002 du Conseil du 12 décembre 2001 sur les dessins ou modèles
communautaires.
Art. 1 al. 3 de la Directive 91/250/CEE du Conseil, du 14 mai 1991, concernant
la protection juridique des programmes d’ordinateur, consolidée par la
Directive 2009/24/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 23 avril 2009.
Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 16 juillet 2009,
Infopaq International A/S contre Danske Dagblades Forening, C-5/08,
ECLI:EU:C:2009:465.
LUCAS (A.), LUCAS-SCHLOETTER (A.) et BERNAULT (C.), Traité de la propriété
littéraire et artistique, Paris (LexisNexis), 5e éd., 2017, n° 141.
Voir en ce sens FIENI (P.), Actualités juridiques n° 71, 2011, p. 124, note sousl’Arrêt commenté relevant que la solution “ajoute à la confusion qui règne
dans la définition des critères de protection des modèles industriels”.
Art. 2 et 4 de l’ABR – 2015.

déposé par la société demanderesse diffère “desustensiles ordinaires rencontrés sur les marchés”, quitte
à compléter l’exigence par la précision, contenue dansl’article 5, alinéa 2, du règlement européen, que “desdessins ou modèles sont considérés comme identiques
lorsque leurs caractéristiques ne diffèrent que par desdétails insignifiants”.
La nouveauté du modèle argué de contrefaçon étant
établie, il restait à caractériser ladite contrefaçon. De ce
point de vue, la motivation de l’arrêt est vraiment trèssommaire puisque la Cour suprême use de son pouvoird’évocation en se bornant à affirmer que le modèle
second “ressemble” au premier. Certes, il est de principe
que la contrefaçon, en matière de propriété industrielle,
s’apprécie d’après les ressemblances et non d’après lesdifférences. Cependant, il aurait été de bonne méthodede comparer les deux modèles de cuvette et d’indiquer
avec précision sur quoi portait cette ressemblance,ne serait-ce que pour démontrer que les éventuelles
différences ne portaient pas sur les caractéristiques
essentielles du modèle protégé (auquel cas elles auraient
conduit à écarter la contrefaçon) et que les points
communs constatés n’étaient pas imposés par desconsidérations fonctionnelles.
André Lucas

C. Dessins et modèles industriels –Nouveauté – Modèles revendiqués
identiques à des articles exploités
antérieurement par les défendeurs
L’action en contrefaçon ne peut être accueillie dès lorsque les modèles d’ustensiles de table déposés à l’OAPI
par le demandeur sont identiques en tous points aux
articles dont les défendeurs font usage depuis plusieurs
années, et ne répondent donc pas à la condition de
nouveauté.

Chapitre 4 – Dessins et modèles industriels

à la condition de nouveauté et non à celle d’originalité.
Or les deux notions ne se recoupent pas. Elless’opposent même en ce sens que, selon la terminologie
traditionnellement admise en matière de propriété
intellectuelle, l’originalité s’entend dans un sens subjectif,
par référence à la personnalité du créateur (dontl’empreinte doit se manifester dans la forme créée), alors
que la nouveauté s’entend dans un sens objectif commel’absence d’antériorité, ainsi que le précise l’article 2,
alinéa 2, de l’annexe IV de l’Accord de Bangui dans laversion issue de l’Acte de Bamako392.

Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, Jugement du
4 mars 2014, RG n° 1915/2013, SIEUR ALI MROUE
c. SOCIÉTÉ NESTLÉ CÔTE D’IVOIRE; STÉ CDCI; STÉ
SOCOPRIX; STÉ TOP BUDGET; STÉ SOCOCE; STÉ
PROSUMA; COMPTOIR GANAMET ET FILS; FOIRE DE
CHINE; STÉ MONDIAL MÉNAGE
Observations :Le jugement commenté rejette l’action en contrefaçon
de modèles industriels. La solution n’appelle pas lacritique en elle-même, mais le raisonnement qui la fonde
comporte quelques failles méritant d’être relevées.
Faits : Le demandeur a déposé à l’OAPI des dessins
et modèles d’assiettes, verres, cuillers, fourchettes etcouteaux en matière plastique. Il reproche à diverses
entreprises ayant leur siège à Abidjan de commercialiser
des ustensiles de table contrefaisants importés de paysétrangers, notamment de Chine et de Turquie, alors que
lui-même n’a même pas encore commencé à fabriquer
les modèles déposés.
259

Il n’est pas suivi par le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan.

d’investir dans la fabrication.

Raisonnement : Celui-ci constate que les dessins
et modèles litigieux ont bel et bien été enregistrésmais que cet enregistrement n’est opposable auxdéfendeurs que sous réserve d’établir la nouveauté descréations en cause. Or, les “divers connaissements etbons d’expédition et de livraison” produits par ceux-ci
montrent qu’ils “font usage, depuis plusieurs années,des articles de ménage identiques, en tous points, auxdessins et modèles revendiqués”. La condition posée parl’article 2, alinéa 2, de l’annexe IV de l’Accord de Banguin’est donc pas remplie, et le demandeur est débouté.

Les conséquences du défaut de nouveauté sont, audemeurant, analysées de façon erronée par le tribunal, etce à deux points de vue. D’abord, il rejette la demande deradiation de l’enregistrement à l’OAPI formulée par une
des sociétés défenderesses sur la base du raisonnement
suivant : l’annexe IV de l’Accord de Bangui ne prévoit pas
la possibilité de radiation d’un enregistrement de dessinou modèle (le jugement mentionne “radiation d’une
marque”, mais il s’agit, de toute évidence, d’une erreurde plume) en cas de “violation des critères de nouveautéet d’originalité”400; l’article 23 de l’annexe III sanctionne,
lui, par la radiation de l’enregistrement de la marquele non-usage de cette marque sans excuses légitimes,
pendant une durée ininterrompue de cinq ans, mais enl’espèce la demande de radiation n’est pas fondée sur la“non-utilisation” des dessins et modèles, en sorte que lademande ne peut prospérer.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Il est difficile au commentateur, en l’état des indications
fournies par le jugement, de se forger une opinion surle bien-fondé de l’appréciation concernant le défaut
de nouveauté, mais plusieurs réserves peuvent êtreformulées.

260

D’abord, on peut regretter l’ambiguïté de la décision
sur la nature et le nombre des créations protégées. Il
semble que le litige portait sur des modèles (ustensiles
de table) alors que le tribunal évoque à de nombreuses
reprises des “dessins et modèles”. Or, même si le régime
juridique est identique, il est plus rigoureux de respecter
la distinction entre le dessin et le modèle. On admet
traditionnellement que “le dessin est une figure à deux
dimensions et le modèle une figure à trois dimensions”398.
L’article 1er de l’annexe IV s’inscrit dans le droit-fil decette approche en définissant le dessin comme “toutassemblage de lignes ou de couleurs”, et le modèle
comme “toute forme plastique associée ou non à
des lignes ou à des couleurs”. Par ailleurs, mêmesi les différentes créations avaient fait l’objet d’unenregistrement unique, l’action en contrefaçon visait
incontestablement une pluralité de modèles399, et laréférence faite, dans l’exposé du litige, à la demanded’interdiction “du dessin et modèle n° 03191” constitue à
cet égard une fâcheuse source de confusion.
Sur le fond, on peut trouver bien sommaire la motivationqui consiste à affirmer sans plus de précision que lesarticles commercialisés de longue date (“plusieurs
années”) par les défendeurs sont “identiques, en tous
points, aux dessins et modèles revendiqués”. Il auraitété plus rigoureux d’expliquer de façon circonstanciée,
modèle par modèle, en quoi se révélait une telle identitéet à quelle date exacte avait eu lieu la commercialisation.
Le tribunal croit pouvoir tirer argument en faveur dudéfaut de nouveauté de ce que le demandeur lui-mêmereconnaissait qu’il avait différé la fabrication de ses
propres modèles “par crainte d’une concurrence déloyale
de la part des défendeurs”, comme si cette attitude
témoignait d’une sorte de reconnaissance de l’antériorité
destructrice de nouveauté. L’indice, en vérité, est bien
fragile car on peut, au contraire, trouver naturel que
le titulaire d’un droit exclusif sur des modèles attende
la confirmation judiciaire de son droit exclusif avant
398
399

AZEMA (J.) et GALLOUX (J.-C.), Droit de la propriété industrielle, Paris (Dalloz),
7e éd., 2012, n° 1184.
Le jugement vise expressément “les articles de ménage incriminés”.

L’argumentation manque totalement sa cible. Il estévident que la législation n’impose aucune obligation
d’exploitation en matière de dessins et modèles
industriels. En réalité, si la demande de radiation ne
pouvait aboutir, c’était tout simplement parce qu’elle
n’est pas la sanction appropriée du défaut de nouveauté,qui emporte l’annulation de l’enregistrement, commele prévoit l’article 30.1)a) de l’annexe IV 401, étant précisé
qu’aux termes de l’article 20 de l’Accord de Bangui, “lesdécisions judiciaires définitives rendues sur la validité
des titres dans l’un des États membres en application dutexte des annexes I à X au présent accord font autorité
dans tous les autres États membres, excepté celles
fondées sur l’ordre public et les bonnes mœurs”.
Ce constat conduit à la seconde critique, tenant à ce quele tribunal, au lieu de sanctionner le défaut de nouveautépar la nullité de l’enregistrement, raisonne, comme on
l’a vu, en termes d’inopposabilité dudit enregistrement.
Et il croit conforter ce raisonnement en appelant à larescousse l’article 7 de l’annexe IV qui, dans la rédactionde 1999 applicable en l’espèce, dispose :“Le dessin ou modèle industriel enregistré
ne produit pas d’effet à l’égard du tiersqui, au moment du dépôt de la demanded’enregistrement, exploitait déjà ledit dessinou modèle sur le territoire de l’un des États
membres ou avait pris des mesures nécessaires
pour cette exploitation. Ce tiers est autorisé àutiliser ce dessin ou modèle pour les besoins deson entreprise, dans ses propres ateliers ou dans
ceux d’autrui”.
Pour lui, cette disposition interdit au déposant “deremettre en cause les droits acquis des tiers qui
exploitaient déjà ledit dessin ou modèle mais qui ont
négligé ou qui n’ont pas cru devoir le faire enregistrer à

400
401

Là, l’erreur n’est pas seulement de plume, car l’originalité n’est aucunement
requise en matière de dessins et modèles industriels.
Voir dans le même sens l’art. 25 al. 1 let. b du Règlement (CE) n° 6/2002 du12 décembre 2001 sur les dessins ou modèles communautaires.

Le raisonnement procède d’une confusion qu’il est utile
de dissiper. L’inopposabilité renvoie à une situation danslaquelle les tiers peuvent écarter les effets d’un actejuridique dont la validité n’est pas en cause. Or il ne s’agit
pas du tout de cela en l’espèce, mais de nullité, c’est-àdire de la disparition rétroactive de l’acte. Si les modèles
en cause ne répondent pas à la condition de nouveauté, il
n’y a pas de protection du tout, et il est donc inutile, pourdébouter le demandeur en contrefaçon, de recourir à ceque l’on appelle l’exception de possession personnelle
antérieure qui permet, en matière de dessins et modèles
industriels comme en matière de brevets d’invention402, àcelui qui exploitait la création en cause à la date du dépôt
de la demande du titre de continuer cette exploitation. À
quoi on ajoutera qu’en toute hypothèse, le “possesseur”
ne peut, selon les termes exprès de l’article 7 del’annexe IV, utiliser le dessin ou modèle en cause que“pour les besoins de son entreprise”, ce qui exclut lapossibilité de consentir des licences à des distributeurs,comme le prévoit l’article 22 du règlement européen
6/2002403.
Ayant tranché en faveur du défaut de nouveauté, letribunal n’avait pas à répondre à deux autres moyens dedéfense, l’un et l’autre sans portée, invoqués par trois
des sociétés défenderesses. Celles-ci faisaient d’abord
valoir qu’elles n’avaient eu qu’une activité de distribution
et qu’elles n’avaient jamais prétendu se prévaloir “d’unquelconque droit de propriété intellectuelle sur lesmodèles et dessins”, ce qui, selon elles, suffisait à justifier
leur mise hors de cause. L’argument est évidemment
inopérant dès lors que l’article 3 de l’annexe IV reconnaît
au titulaire du droit le “droit exclusif d’exploiter ce dessinou modèle et de vendre (italiques ajoutés par nous) ou
faire vendre les produits dans lesquels ce dessin ou
modèle est incorporé”.
Pas davantage il ne pouvait être fait droit à l’autre moyen
tiré de ce que “les dessins et modèles concernés sontdéposés et enregistrés auprès de l’Institut de la propriété
intellectuelle (il faut lire “industrielle”) en France, en vertu
de la Convention de Paris, érigée par l’Organisation
Mondiale de la Propriété Intellectuelle, dite OMPI, àlaquelle la Côte d’Ivoire est partie”. À la supposer exacte,l’assertion ne pouvait paralyser l’action en contrefaçon
qu’à la condition de préciser sur quoi portait exactement
le dépôt en France et, surtout, d’établir que ce dépôt était
antérieur à la demande d’enregistrement effectuée parle demandeur à l’OAPI, d’où résultait, en cas d’identité, ledéfaut de nouveauté.
André Lucas

402
403

Art. 7 al. 1 let. e de l’annexe I de l’ABR-2015.
Art. 22 al. 3 du Règlement (CE) n° 6/2002 du 12 décembre 2001 sur les dessins
ou modèles communautaires: “Le droit fondé sur une utilisation antérieure nedonne pas la faculté d’octroyer une licence à autrui aux fins de l’exploitation
du dessin ou modèle”.

D. Dessins et modèles industriels –Nouveauté – Impression visuelled’ensemble – Appréciation de lacontrefaçon – Preuve pesant sur ledemandeur
La nouveauté exigée par l’article 2, alinéa 1er, del’annexe IV de l’ABR-2015 implique que le dessin ou lemodèle suscite une impression visuelle d’ensemble
différente de celle produite par tout modèle divulgué
antérieurement et l’action en contrefaçon ne peut êtreaccueillie si le demandeur ne fournit pas les éléments
précis permettant de procéder à un examen d’ensembledes éléments propres et distincts de son modèle encomparaison avec ceux de la défenderesse.
Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, Jugement du
23 juillet 2015, n° 1929/2015, Sieur DABE ZOHORA Bertinc. SOCIÉTÉ ORANGE CÔTE D’IVOIRE et SOCIÉTÉ NTDD
Observations :Le jugement du tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan du
23 juillet 2015 permet de mieux cerner la nouveauté qui
conditionne l’accès à la protection au titre de l’annexe IV
de l’ABR-2015. Rappelons que c’est la seule exigence defond formulée par l’article 2, alinéa 1er, qui en précise
la signification en ces termes : “Un dessin ou modèle
industriel est nouveau s’il n’a pas été divulgué en toutlieu du monde, par une publication sous forme tangible,
par un usage ou par tout autre moyen avant la date dedépôt ou, le cas échéant, avant la date de priorité de la
demande d’enregistrement”.
Faits : Le modèle en cause, en l’espèce, était unpanneau amovible permettant d’afficher des messages
publicitaires sur le mobilier urbain et de présenter lestitres de la presse écrite. Le demandeur l’avait déposé
à l’OAPI en 2011. L’année suivante il avait transmis
à la société Orange Côte d’Ivoire une propositioncommerciale, incluant tous les détails techniques,visant à mettre à sa disposition l’exploitation de tels
panneaux. L’offre n’avait pas été acceptée mais ledéposant avait constaté que la société destinataire avait
fait distribuer aux vendeurs de journaux dans tout ledistrict d’Abidjan, à travers une agence de publicité et decommunication, des panneaux qu’il estimait, quant à lui,être contrefaisants, ce qui l’avait amené à intenter une
action en contrefaçon. La société Orange Côte d’Ivoire lui
opposait que le “procédé” mis en œuvre par le modèle
existait de longue date, qu’il était d’usage courant
aussi bien à Abidjan que dans toutes les grandes villes
du monde, et que l’examen des dessins du dispositifd’affichage joint à sa demande d’enregistrement était “detoute évidence, d’une banalité aussi plate qu’affligeante”.
Elle en déduisait que l’enregistrement n’était susceptible
de conférer aucun droit privatif au déposant, lequeln’était donc pas fondé à agir en contrefaçon. L’agence depublicité et de communication faisait valoir, elle aussi,
que la condition de nouveauté posée par l’article 2,
alinéa 1er, de l’annexe IV de l’ABR-2015 n’était pas
remplie, et elle affirmait qu’au demeurant, le demandeur
ne produisait même pas son modèle qu’il prétendait
reproduit ou imité.

Chapitre 4 – Dessins et modèles industriels

l’institution de propriété intellectuelle idoine”.

261

Le tribunal donne raison aux défenderesses.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Raisonnement : Pour le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan,
la nouveauté requise par l’annexe IV doit s’entendre ence sens que “pour qu’un modèle soit protégé, il faut qu’il
suscite une impression visuelle d’ensemble différente decelle produite par tout modèle divulgué antérieurement”.
Or non seulement les images et les photographies
versées aux débats par le demandeur “sont floues et nepermettent pas de les comparer à ceux (sic) distribués
par les défenderesses”, mais la description qu’il fait deson modèle “est très sommaire et ne permet pas deprocéder à un examen d’ensemble des éléments propres
et distincts de son panneau en comparaison avec ceux dela défenderesse pour établir la contrefaçon”. Par ailleurs,
il “ne démontre pas en quoi son modèle est nouveau
pour se prévaloir des autres dispositions légales deprotection applicables en matière de propriété littéraire
et artistique”. La conclusion, dès lors, s’impose : il “n’apas rapporté la preuve de l’activité contrefaisante” dessociétés défenderesses.

262

L’argumentation appelle une réserve sur le fond et une
réserve sur la forme. La réserve sur le fond concerne
la motivation, pour le moins elliptique, sur la preuvede la “nouveauté” du modèle qui aurait pu, si elle avaitété établie, justifier le bénéfice des “autres dispositions
légales de protection applicables en matière de propriété
littéraire et artistique”. Ces “autres dispositions” nepeuvent être que celles contenues dans l’annexe VII del’ABR-2015, relatives à la propriété littéraire et artistique,dont l’article 1er, alinéa 3, de l’annexe IV réserve
expressément l’application404. Mais cette application, parhypothèse, serait subordonnée à l’exigence d’originalité,
entendue dans un sens subjectif, par référence àl’empreinte de la personnalité de l’auteur de l’œuvre del’esprit, et non à celle de nouveauté, entendue commel’absence objective d’antériorité. Il doit être bien clair,en effet, que le cumul entre la protection au titre de lalégislation sur les dessins et modèles industriels et laprotection au titre du droit d’auteur ne joue que si lesconditions propres à chacune sont respectées405.
La réserve sur la méthode tient à l’articulation
maladroite entre la question de la nouveauté, quiconditionne l’accès à la protection, et la question dela contrefaçon, qui intéresse l’éventuelle atteinte au
droit exclusif. Le jugement commenté constate en
premier lieu que les éléments de preuve fournis parle demandeur ne permettent pas de caractériser laréalité de la reproduction ou de l’imitation alléguée, etc’est seulement dans un second temps qu’il recherche
si la nouveauté du modèle revendiqué est elle-mêmeétablie. Or c’est l’inverse qu’il aurait fallu faire. En effet,
la question de la nouveauté se pose en amont en ce

404
405

Que le demandeur, on le relèvera en passant, ne mettait aucunement sur letapis en l’espèce.
Voir en ce sens en droit français Cass. com, 29 mars 2017, n° 15-10885 : “Lesarticles L. 112-1 du code de la propriété intellectuelle et 96.2 du règlement CE
n° 6/2002 du 12 décembre 2001 sur les dessins ou modèles communautaires
n’imposent pas un cumul total ou de plein droit des protections qu’ils
instituent, mais autorisent seulement un tel cumul lorsque les possibilités
respectives des différentes protections sont satisfaites”.

sens que si le modèle n’est pas nouveau, l’action en
contrefaçon est dépourvue de tout fondement juridique,en sorte que la matérialité de la reproduction ou del’imitation n’a même pas à être examinée.
La solution, malgré tout, emporte la conviction.
Contrairement à ce que soutenait le demandeur, il ne
suffit pas de produire un certificat d’enregistrement d’unmodèle baptisé “innovateur” pour opposer aux tiers son
droit privatif, encore faut-il démontrer que le modèle
satisfait effectivement à l’exigence de nouveauté. Pourrapporter cette preuve, il faut, bien entendu, apporter
tous les éléments permettant d’apprécier l’existenceéventuelle d’antériorités, ce qui n’avait pas été fait enl’espèce puisque si des informations avaient bien été
fournies sur le modèle déposé (ce que contestait, on
l’a vu, l’agence de publicité et de communication), ellesn’étaient pas suffisamment précises pour permettre aux
juges de procéder à un tel examen.
On retiendra aussi, pour l’approuver, la référence àla nécessité d’une “impression visuelle d’ensemble
différente de celle produite par tout modèle divulgué
antérieurement”. Certes, en rattachant cette exigenceà celle de nouveauté, le jugement commenté va audelà de l’acception traditionnellement reçue de cettenotion en matière de propriété industrielle, qui, comme
il a été dit plus haut, la ramène à l’absence objective
d’antériorité. En ce sens, on pourrait lui reprocher
d’ajouter à la lettre de l’Accord de Bangui. Dans l’Union
européenne, la question se pose en termes différents
puisque le règlement précité 6/2002, outre la condition
de nouveauté, exige que le dessin ou modèle “présente
un caractère individuel” (art.4), et qu’il déduit un tel
caractère de ce que “l’impression globale qu’il produit sur
l’utilisateur averti diffère de celle que produit sur un telutilisateur tout dessin ou modèle qui a été divulgué aupublic” avant une certaine date (art. 5.1), en précisant quel’appréciation doit tenir compte, à cet égard, “du degré
de liberté du créateur dans l’élaboration du dessin ou
modèle” (art. 5.2).
Mais cette audace ne peut, selon nous, être critiquée
car il n’est pas illogique d’imprimer à la nouveauté enmatière de dessins et modèles industriels une spécificité
que l’on peut rattacher à sa relativité, depuis longtemps
soulignée en doctrine406. Au demeurant, l’article 1er,
alinéa 1, de l’annexe IV, en définissant le modèle comme“toute forme plastique”, pourvu qu’elle “donne une
apparence spéciale (italiques ajoutés par nous) à un
produit industriel ou artisanal”, peut fournir une basetextuelle au critère de “l’impression visuelle d’ensemble”,
même s’il est regrettable que la question de la définition
du modèle soit ainsi mélangée avec celle des conditions
de la protection.
André Lucas

406

Voir par ex. RAYNARD (J.), PY (E.) et TRÉFIGNY (P.), Droit de la propriété
industrielle, Paris (LexisNexis), 2016, n° 543 : “le régime des dessins etmodèles pose une exigence de nouveauté seulement relative distincte dudroit des brevets”.

modèle en querelle et de la non-production du certificat
de non-radiation et de non-déchéance. MENO Alfred asoulevé l’exception d’incompétence du juge des référés,l’ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon ne rentrant pas, selonlui, dans la catégorie des ordonnances retractables.

Dans le silence de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte du22 février 1999, le juge des référés est compétent
pour statuer sur toute demande de rétractation d’une
ordonnance autorisant la saisie-contrefaçon d’un dessinou modèle industriel, l’office de ce magistrat étant
toutefois limité à l’appréciation de la légitimité et del’opportunité de la mesure querellée.

Raisonnement : La saisie-contrefaçon a une finalité
essentiellement probatoire. Elle est prescrite, précise
l’ABR-1999, par ordonnance du président du tribunal
civil du lieu où l’exécution est envisagée. L’ABR-2015
précise que l’ordonnance est rendue par le président
de la juridiction nationale compétente, évacuant ainsi
les incertitudes générées par la périphrase “président
du tribunal civil”, les organisations judiciaires des États
membres de l’OAPI n’étant pas uniformes408. Toutefois,l’Accord de Bangui est muet quant aux recours éventuels
contre les ordonnances du président du tribunal
civil. Dans le silence de la législation spéciale, il y alieu de convoquer le droit commun des ordonnances
sur requête issu des législations nationales des États
membres de l’OAPI qui admettent cette éventualité.

Président du tribunal de première instance Yaoundé(Centre administratif), Ordonnance de référé n° 301/C du19 février 2007, PMUC c. MENO Alfred
Observations :L’ordonnance prescrivant une saisie-contrefaçon en
matière de dessins et modèles industriels peut-ellefaire l’objet d’un recours en rétractation devant le juge
des référés? Telle est la question centrale posée dansl’affaire PMUC c. MENO Alfred à l’origine de la décision
rapportée. Si cette problématique paraît triviale en droitcommun, la rétractation étant la voie de recours normale
contre les ordonnances sur requêtes, elle retrouve
toutes ses lettres de noblesse sur le terrain du droit
de la propriété intellectuelle, la saisie-contrefaçon, depar sa nature et son régime juridique, étant singulière
comparativement aux mesures d’exécution classiques.
La saisie-contrefaçon est en effet une mesure probatoire
spécifique aux divers domaines de la propriété
intellectuelle qui permet au titulaire du droit de fairepratiquer par un officier public des investigations,comprenant, en général, la description de la contrefaçon
alléguée, de ses circonstances et de son étendue ou lasaisie d’objets qui se rapportent à la contrefaçon. Les
différentes annexes de l’Accord de Bangui utilisent plutôt
la périphrase “description détaille avec ou sans saisie”
pour désigner la saisie-contrefaçon, ce qui apparaît
d’ailleurs logique puisque cette mesure n’est pas une
saisie au même titre que les saisies de droit commun.
D’après un éminent auteur, cette périphrase est moinsévocatrice et plus correcte407.

Si le juge, dans la décision commentée, s’est prononcé
sans détours sur l’aptitude du juge des référés àconnaître des recours en rétractation contre lesordonnances sur requête autorisant la saisie-contrefaçon(section I), il a simplement effleuré la question sousjacente de l’étendue des pouvoirs de ce magistrat dansl’appréciation de la légitimité et de l’opportunité de ladite
mesure (section II).
I. Le fondement juridique de la compétence dujuge des référés en matière de rétractation d’une
ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon
La question du fondement juridique de la compétence
du juge des référés en matière de rétractation d’une
ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon a été débattue
en l’espèce, sieur MENO Alfred ayant soutenu quel’ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon, s’agissant desdessins et modèles industriels, ne rentre pas dans lacatégorie des ordonnances rétractables. Cette approche,favorisée par le silence de l’Accord de Bangui révisé (A)n’a pas été retenue par le juge qui a convoqué le droitcommun des ordonnances sur requête (B).

Faits : Monsieur MENO Alfrefd, titulaire des droits surle modèle industriel dénommé “business kiosque”,
enregistré à l’OAPI le 6 août 2004, a fait pratiquer une
description détaillée avec enlèvement des kiosquesappartenant au Pari mutuel urbain camerounais (PMUC)
exploités par cette société sur les trottoirs et places
publiques, en exécution de l’ordonnance n° 1608 renduele 7 septembre 2006 par le président du tribunal depremière instance de Yaoundé-Centre Administratif.
Après exécution de cette mesure, le PMUC a assigné
MENO Alfred devant le juge des référés de cettejuridiction aux fins de rétractation de l’ordonnance surrequête et mainlevée de la saisie-contrefaçon pratiquée
sur son fondement motifs pris du défaut de nouveauté duA. Le silence de l’Accord de Bangui révisé
L’Accord de Bangui révisé ne prévoit pas expressément
de recours contre les ordonnances du président
du tribunal civil autorisant la saisie-contrefaçon
en matière de propriété industrielle. Il s’agit d’uneomission regrettable en ce qu’elle prête le flanc aux
interprétations divergentes au sein de la communautédes acteurs du système judiciaire de l’OAPI.
L’argumentaire développé par sieur MENO Alfred en
est une parfaite illustration. Ses conseils ont en effet
soutenu que l’article 29.1) de l’annexe IV de l’Accord de
Bangui du 24 février 1999 attribue la connaissance desactions relatives aux dessins et modèles industriels
aux seuls tribunaux civils et les exclut du domaine de

407

408

Voir VÉRON (P.), Saisie-contrefaçon 2013/2014, 3e éd., Paris (Dalloz), 2012,
p. 3.

Chapitre 4 – Dessins et modèles industriels

E. Dessins et modèles industriels –Saisie-contrefaçon – Ordonnance– Rétractation – Juge compétent –Étendue des pouvoirs du juge desréférés

Cf. art. 65 al. 2 de l’annexe I; art. 58 al. 1 de l’annexe II; art. 51 al. 1 del’annexe III; art. 33 al. 1 de l’annexe IV de l’ABR-2015.
263

la juridiction du provisoire. Il faut saluer la vigilance
du juge qui a subtilement rejeté ce moyen spécieux
en convoquant le droit commun des ordonnances surrequête qui s’applique en tout état de cause.

portant enregistrement du dessin et modèle industriel“business kiosque”, sa demande d’enregistrement datée
du 16 juin 2003 avec copie des modèles déposés, ainsi
que l’attestation de non-déchéance.

B. L’application du droit commun desordonnances sur requête
Dans le silence de l’annexe IV de l’Accord de Bangui révisé
relative aux dessins et modèles industriels, le juge a, àjuste titre, convoqué le droit commun des ordonnances
sur requête en indiquant “qu’il est incontestable endroit classique que le juge des référés est compétent
pour statuer sur toute demande de rétractation d’une
ordonnance rendue en matière gracieuse, sans exclusion
du cas de la saisie-contrefaçon”. L’ordonnance de saisiecontrefaçon étant une ordonnance gracieuse, elle obéit
forcément au régime général en vigueur dans chaque
État partie. C’est donc à bon droit que le juge des référésa retenu sa compétence en l’espèce. La cour d’appel deBrazzaville a rendu un arrêt assez édifiant à ce propos
dans une affaire où la compétence du juge des référésétait contestée par la victime d’une saisie-contrefaçon :“Considérant qu’il est de principe du droit positif que si
le juge des ordonnances prononcées sur pied de requête
fait droit à une requête, tout intéressé a la faculté deformer une opposition en référé à fin de rétractation
devant le juge qui a rendu l’ordonnance” (CA Brazzaville,Arrêt civil n° 92 du 3 juillet 2003, Aff. Les Établissements
SAMORA c. Les Établissements WAFAA).

L’on est dès lors en droit de spéculer sur la pertinence
des motifs qui ont déterminé le juge à rétracterl’ordonnance sur requête n° 1608 du 7 décembre 2006et à ordonner subséquemment la mainlevée de la saisiecontrefaçon pratiquée le 15 décembre 2006 en exécution
de cette décision. Deux raisons qui transparaissent
de la motivation suivante semblent avoir guidé lejuge, à savoir l’inopportunité de la saisie massive desmodèles de kiosques litigieux et l’absence de risque dedépérissement desdits objets :Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Le vide juridique sus-relevé semble avoir été comblé parl’Accord de Bamako du 14 décembre 2015. L’article 33,
alinéa 1, de l’annexe IV dudit accord indique que la saisie
est exécutée en vertu d’une ordonnance du président
de la juridiction nationale compétente, soumettant
désormais les ordonnances de saisie-contrefaçon aurégime de droit commun des pays membres de l’OAPI.

264

II. L’étendue des pouvoirs du juge des référésen matière de rétractation d’une ordonnance desaisie-contrefaçon
Le juge des référés apprécie les conditions d’octroi del’ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon (A) mais pas le bienfondé du droit du détenteur du titre revendiqué (B).

“Que l’exécution littérale de l’ordonnance querellée quilaisse à MENO le loisir de pratiquer cette mesure sans
limitation dans l’espace ni quant au nombre de kiosquesà saisir est susceptible d’entraîner des perturbations
dans les activités exercées depuis 1994 par le PMUC etattestées par les pièces fournies au dossier de procédure;
que du reste, il n’est nullement invoqué le risque dedépérissement ou de dissimulation des kiosques utiliséspar le demandeur”.
La question de l’étendue de la saisie-contrefaçon sepose de manière récurrente devant les tribunaux desÉtats membres de l’OAPI. Les juges ont tendance, dansle silence de la loi, à cantonner la saisie à quelques
exemplaires seulement des objets contrefaisants. Cetteapproche qui participe d’une logique prudentielle est
partagée par une partie de la doctrine spécialisée qui
soutient que le président a le pouvoir de refuser toutemesure lui paraissant inutile à la collecte des preuves etde nature à porter une atteinte non justifiée au saisi, telle
qu’une saisie réelle d’une étendue excessive410. La décision
rapportée s’inscrit dans cette mouvance. Si l’Accord de
Bangui ne fixe pas l’étendue de la saisie-contrefaçon, il
revient au président du tribunal intervenant comme juge
des requêtes ou juge des référés d’exercer son pouvoir
de contrôle des modalités de la saisie avec délicatesse,
tout en s’abstenant de s’immiscer dans la sphère du juge
du fond.

A. L’appréciation des conditions d’octroi de l’ordonnancede saisie-contrefaçon
L’office du juge des référés saisi d’une demande derétractation d’une ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon
est purement formel. Il vérifie en effet si les piècesrequises par la loi ont été produites à l’appui de la
demande. En matière de dessins et modèles industriels,
il s’agit de l’attestation de publicité délivrée par l’OAPI,de la preuve de non-radiation ou de non-déchéance et,éventuellement, du paiement du cautionnement409. Il
ressort de la décision rapportée que sieur MENO Alfred a
produit aux débats l’arrêté n° 04/0052/OAPI/PG/DPG/HJT
signé le 6 août 2004 par le directeur général de l’OAPI

B. L’appréciation du bien-fondé du droit dudétenteur du titre
En règle générale, l’intervention du juge des référés dansle contentieux de la propriété intellectuelle ne modifie enrien les règles classiques de compétence sécrétée par lescodes de procédure civile des pays membres de l’OAPI.
L’article 185 du code de procédure civile et commerciale
camerounais sous l’empire duquel la décision rapportéea été rendue fait interdiction au juge des référés de
préjudicier au principal. Dès lors, saisi d’une demande
aux fins de rétractation d’une ordonnance autorisantune saisie-contrefaçon, le juge des référés ne peut
examiner la validité du titre prétendument contrefait ni
la matérialité de la contrefaçon alléguée, prérogatives

409

410

Cf. art. 31 al. 1, 2, 3 de l’annexe IV de l’ABR-1999; l’ABR-2015 a simplifié lesconditions d’octroi de la mesure en supprimant la production de la preuve denon-radiation ou de non-déchéance; art. 33 al. 2 de l’ABR-2015.

Voir en ce sens CA Dakar, Arrêt n° 501 du 28 décembre 2012, Société Ameropa
SA c. Société Moustapha Tall (obs. LAMOTTE (M.), ce recueil, chapitre 3,
section K); VÉRON (P.), n.23, p. 90, n° 123.12.

Dans l’espèce commentée, le juge des référés a fait
preuve d’une grande sagesse en relevant dans ses motifs
que “la présente espèce concerne non la connaissancedu droit de propriété sur un modèle de kiosque, mais
cumulativement la légitimité et l’opportunité d’une
saisie-contrefaçon prescrite en l’absence d’un débat
contradictoire”. Ce magistrat a ainsi circonscrit lesprérogatives du juge de l’urgence en matière de saisiecontrefaçon, lesquelles ont tendance à s’accroître àla faveur de la récente révision de l’Accord de Banguiintervenue à Bamako le 14 décembre 2015. L’article 32
de l’annexe IV dudit accord régissant les dessins etmodèles industriels permet désormais à toute personne
ayant qualité pour agir en contrefaçon de saisir en
référé la juridiction nationale compétente afin de voir
ordonner, au besoin sous astreinte, à l’encontre duprétendu contrefacteur ou des intermédiaires dont ilutilise les services, toute mesure destinée à prévenir une
atteinte imminente aux droits conférés par le certificat
d’enregistrement ou à empêcher la poursuite des actes
argués de contrefaçon. Il s’agit là d’une innovation
majeure qui révolutionnera à coup sûr la mise en œuvre
judiciaire des droits de propriété industrielle pour legrand bonheur des titulaires des titres.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

411

Chapitre 4 – Dessins et modèles industriels

qui relèvent de la compétence du juge de la contrefaçon.
Le président du tribunal de première instance d’AbidjanPlateau et son homologue de Douala-Ndokoti ont
respectivement rendu deux décisions critiquables à cetégard en s’immisçant dans la sphère de compétence dujuge du fond411.

Voir en ce sens PTPI Abidjan-Plateau, Ordonnance de référé n° 2240 du
5 mai 2002, Société SIVORPRA c. ISSA MOHAMAD ALI, Recueil des décisions
de justice, Collection OAPI p. 439. Dans cette affaire, le juge des référés aordonné l’interdiction de l’utilisation frauduleuse de la marque contrefaiteet le retrait des produits contrefaisants sur toute l’étendue du territoire
national. Voir également PTPI Douala-Ndokoti, Ordonnance de référé n° 189
du 22 août 2007, SPN. SA c. Société L.M Co Ltd, Recueil préc., p. 191. Danscette autre affaire, le juge des référés a rejeté la demande en rétractationd’une ordonnance aux fins de saisie-contrefaçon au motif que la contrefaçonétait avérée, vidant ainsi le contentieux au fond. Voir enfin Trib. hors classe,
Ordonnance de référé n° 4167 du 14 avril 2008, Société STCH c. Société SOTIBASIMPAFRIC SA; dans cette affaire, le président du tribunal hors classe de
Dakar a ordonné la rétractation d’une ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon
pratiquée par le titulaire des droits sur un dessin ou modèle motif pris de ceque la société victime de la saisie dispose d’un droit antérieur sur le modèle
litigieux, passant outre l’exception d’incompétence matérielle soulevée par lesaisi qui avait déjà porté le litige devant le juge du fond.
265

Chapitre 5 – Noms commerciaux

A.
Utilisation d’un nom commercial enregistré
à l’OAPI par un concurrent sur le territoire
national de l’un des États membres –Utilisation susceptible de créer une confusion
entre les entreprises en cause – Illégalitéde l’utilisation contestée – Demanded’interdiction de l’utilisation du nomcommercial fondée
267

Chapitre 5
Noms commerciaux
A. Utilisation d’un nom commercial
enregistré à l’OAPI par un concurrent
sur le territoire national de l’undes États membres – Utilisationsusceptible de créer une confusion
entre les entreprises en cause –Illégalité de l’utilisation contestée –Demande d’interdiction de l’utilisation
du nom commercial fondée

fait interdiction à la société EMBCI-PROBÉTON d’utiliser
la dénomination “PROBÉTON”. En réaction à l’action de lasociété BATIPRO, la société EMBCI-PROBÉTON a sollicité
reconventionnellement l’annulation du nom commercial“PROBÉTON” revendiqué par la société BATIPRO.

La demande d’interdiction de l’utilisation d’un nom
commercial enregistré à l’OAPI par le titulaire del’enregistrement ne peut prospérer que lorsque trois
conditions sont réunies : le nom commercial doit êtreutilisé sur le territoire national de l’un des États membres
de l’OAPI; cette utilisation doit être l’œuvre d’unconcurrent; elle doit enfin être susceptible de créer une
confusion entre les entreprises en cause.

I.

Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, Jugement du
14 avril 2016 RG n° 4653/2015, SOCIÉTÉ BATIPRO c.
SOCIÉTÉ EMBCI-PRO BÉTON

Raisonnement : Les deux demandes principale etreconventionnelle invitaient le juge à se prononcer
respectivement sur deux problèmes juridiques :II.

le premier problème était de savoir à quelles
conditions l’utilisation d’un nom commercial
enregistré est illégale; etle second problème quant à lui était de savoir si un
nom commercial enregistré peut être annulé.

La cour a décidé de donner une suite favorable àla demande de la société BATIPRO qui sollicitait
l’interdiction de l’utilisation de la dénomination“PROBÉTON” par la société EMBCI-PROBÉTON et derejeter la demande d’annulation de cette dénomination
formulée par cette dernière société.

Observations :Aux termes de l’article 1er de l’annexe V de l’Accord de
Bangui révisé du 24 février 1999, le nom commercial
est la dénomination sous laquelle est connu et exploité
un établissement commercial, industriel, artisanal,
agricole412. Il constitue un des signes distinctifs
contribuant au ralliement de la clientèle des entreprises.
Le droit exclusif sur un nom commercial s’acquiert
dans l’espace OAPI suivant deux modalités : l’usage etl’obtention de son enregistrement413. Cette dernière
formalité ne met cependant pas le nom commercial
à l’abri des utilisations illicites, comme il en ressort
du jugement du tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan
du 14 avril 2016 rapporté.

I. Les conditions de succès de la demande d’interdiction
de l’utilisation d’un nom commercial enregistré

Faits : Il ressort de ce jugement que la société BATIPRO
est titulaire du nom commercial “PROBÉTON” en vertu
des certificats d’enregistrement de marque et de nom
commercial délivrés par l’OAPI et datés des 29 mai et
31 août 2015. Nonobstant cet enregistrement, la société
EMBCI-PROBÉTON a utilisé la dénomination “PROBÉTON”
en violation du droit exclusif de la société BATIPRO surcelle-ci. Cette utilisation illicite a fait l’objet d’un procèsverbal de constat d’huissier dressé le 11 mars 2015. C’est
donc naturellement que la société BATIPRO a saisi letribunal de commerce d’Abidjan pour solliciter qu’il soit

• l’utilisation du nom commercial sur le territoire
national de l’un des États membres;• l’utilisation d’un nom commercial enregistré pour lamême activité commerciale, industrielle, artisanaleou agricole que celle du titulaire du nom commercial
enregistré; et• une utilisation susceptible de créer une confusion
entre les entreprises en cause.

412
413

L’art. 1 de l’annexe V de l’ABR-2015 reprend la même définition et y ajoute
l’expression “ou exerçant une autre activité économique”.
Cf. art. 3 al. 1 de l’annexe V de l’ABR-1999.

Aux termes de l’article 16 de l’annexe V de l’Accord de
Bangui révisé du 24 février 1999, en cas de violation desdroits attachés à un nom commercial, le titulaire desdits
droits peut en interdire la continuation et demander lepaiement de dommages et intérêts ainsi que l’application
de toute autre sanction prévue par le droit civil. L’action
en interdiction ne peut cependant prospérer que lorsqueles conditions fixées par l’article 5, alinéa 1, de l’annexe V
sont réunies. Il ressort de ce texte que l’utilisationd’un nom commercial n’est illicite que lorsque les trois
conditions ci-après sont réunies :Il convient de vérifier si ces trois conditions étaientréunies dans le cas de l’espèce.
Le tribunal ne s’est pas prononcé explicitement surla première condition relative à l’utilisation du nomcommercial sur le territoire national de l’un des États267

membres. Il a sans doute estimé, sans confirmer, quel’existence de cette condition allait de soi car les deux
entreprises ont leur siège social à Abidjan à Port-Bouët,et l’utilisation du nom commercial “PROBÉTON” par lasociété EMBCI-PROBÉTON s’est de toute évidence faite
sur le territoire ivoirien.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Le tribunal s’est en revanche prononcé sur la deuxième
condition relative à l’utilisation du nom commercial
enregistré pour la même activité commerciale,
industrielle, artisanale ou agricole que celle du titulaire
du nom commercial enregistré, même s’il ne l’a pas faitde manière très explicite. L’expression “même activité”
signifie qu’il doit exister un rapport de concurrence entre
le demandeur et le défendeur, c’est-à-dire une offre
de biens et services à une clientèle commune. Selon
le tribunal, il résulte du procès-verbal de constat du
11 mars 2015 versé au dossier l’existence d’une similitude
du domaine d’activité entre les deux sociétés. Ce qui
permet d’affirmer que la deuxième condition requisepour que l’utilisation du nom commercial enregistré soit
illégale était donc remplie.

268

Contrairement aux deux premières conditions, latroisième condition relative à l’utilisation du nomcommercial enregistré susceptible de créer une
confusion entre les entreprises en cause a mérité plusd’attention de la part du tribunal. Celui-ci relève d’abord
que tous ceux qui accèdent aux panneaux publicitaires
et pancartes de la société EMBCI-PROBÉTON font laconfusion avec le nom commercial et la marque de la
demanderesse. Le tribunal relève ensuite que l’usage
de la palette de la marque – la même nuance de rouge
et la similitude du domaine d’activité – ne manquentpas de créer le trouble dans l’esprit des consommateurs
des deux sociétés dont certains contractent avec l’une
alors qu’ils croyaient s’adresser à l’autre. Cette confusion
entre les deux sociétés s’est faite naturellement audétriment de la société BATIPRO qui est titulaire du nomcommercial litigieux dont l’usage antérieur lui a conféré
le crédit que lui accordent ses clients.
Les conditions requises pour qu’il y ait utilisation
illégale du nom commercial enregistré étant réunies,
c’est donc à juste titre que le tribunal a déclaré lasociété BATIPRO bien fondée en sa demande et a faitinterdiction sous astreinte à la société EMBCI-PROBÉTON
d’utiliser le nom commercial “PROBÉTON” sous peine desanction financière.
Même si le problème ne s’est pas posé dans le casde l’espèce, il convient de souligner que l’article 5 del’annexe V de l’ABR-1999 prévoit en ses alinéas 2 et 3deux hypothèses dans lesquelles le titulaire d’un nom
commercial enregistré ne peut en interdire l’utilisation
aux tiers414.

Selon la première hypothèse inscrite à l’article 5, alinéa 2,“le titulaire d’un nom commercial ne peutinterdire aux tiers l’usage de bonne foi de leurnom, de leur adresse, d’un pseudonyme, d’unnom géographique ou d’indications exactes
relatives à l’espèce, la qualité, la quantité, ladestination, la valeur, le lieu d’origine ou l’époquede la production de leurs produits ou de laprestation de leurs services, pour autant qu’ils’agisse d’un usage limité à des fins de simple
identification ou d’information et qui ne puisse
pas induire le public en erreur sur la provenancedes produits ou des services”.
Selon la seconde hypothèse prévue à l’article 5, alinéa 3,“l’intéressé qui porte un prénom similaire à unnom commercial enregistré doit, si ses droits surle nom commercial attaché à son établissement
sont postérieurs à ceux qui sont attachés au nomcommercial enregistré, prendre toute mesure,par adjonction faite à son nom commercial ou
de toute manière, afin de distinguer ce nom
commercial du nom commercial enregistré”.
Ces deux hypothèses constituent des limites au droit
exclusif reconnu au titulaire d’un nom commercial
enregistré. Il faut ajouter à ces deux limites la possibilitéd’obtenir l’annulation d’un nom commercial enregistré.
II. La possibilité d’annulation d’un nom commercial
enregistré
Dans sa demande reconventionnelle, la société
EMBCI-PROBÉTON sollicite sans la moindre motivation
l’annulation du nom commercial “PROBÉTON”
revendiqué par la société BATIPRO. Le tribunal rejette sa
demande en lui opposant simplement la titularité de lasociété BATIPRO sur le nom commercial litigieux. Ce qui
peut laisser croire qu’il n’est pas possible d’annuler un
nom commercial enregistré.
L’annexe V de l’ABR-1999 consacre cependant son
article 14 à la nullité du nom commercial. Les alinéas 1
et 2 indiquent les personnes qui peuvent demander
l’annulation de l’enregistrement d’un nom commercial. Il
s’agit du ministère public, de toute personne physique ou
morale intéressée et de l’OAPI.
Les motifs qui peuvent justifier cette annulation sontégalement indiqués par l’alinéa 2 comme suit :
a.

b.
414

Ces deux hypothèses sont reprises in extenso par l’art. 5 de l’annexe V del’ABR-2015 non encore entré en vigueur.

Le premier motif d’annulation d’un nom
commercial enregistré est la non-conformité de ladénomination enregistrée à la définition du nomcommercial donnée par l’article 1 de l’annexe V. Il
doit s’agir d’une dénomination sous laquelle est
connu et exploité un établissement commercial,industriel, artisanal ou agricole.
Le deuxième motif d’annulation d’un nom
commercial enregistré est prévu par l’article 2
de l’annexe V et concerne le cas où le nom ou

c.

d.

la désignation enregistré(e) ne peut constituer
un nom commercial. Il s’agit du “nom ou de ladésignation qui, par sa nature ou l’usage qui peuten être fait, est contraire aux bonnes mœurs ou àl’ordre public et qui, notamment, pourrait tromper
les milieux commerciaux ou le public sur la nature
de l’établissement commercial, industriel, artisanalou agricole désigné par ce nom”.
Le troisième motif d’annulation d’un nom
commercial enregistré est prévu par l’article 5,
alinéa 1, de l’annexe V et concernerait le cas oùl’enregistrement porte sur un nom commercial
déjà enregistré pour la même activité commerciale,
industrielle, artisanale ou agricole que celle dutitulaire du nom commercial déjà enregistré.
Le dernier motif d’annulation d’un nom commercial
enregistré concerne le cas où l’enregistrement est
en conflit avec un droit antérieur. Cette hypothèse
est plus large que la troisième car elle vise tous lesdroits de propriété intellectuelle antérieurs, alors
que la troisième hypothèse vise uniquement le droit
antérieur sur le nom commercial enregistré.

fondée, sa motivation n’est pas à l’abri des critiques. Il
justifie en effet sa décision uniquement par la titularitéde la société BATIPRO sur le nom commercial enregistré.
Or, comme il vient d’être amplement démontré, un
nom commercial enregistré peut être annulé si l’un desmotifs d’annulation prévus par l’article 14 de l’annexe V
de l’Accord de Bangui révisé de 1999 existe. Le tribunal
aurait dû motiver sa décision par l’absence de ces motifs.
Grégoire Jiogue• Michelin n° 36897 enregistrée le 7 octobre 1996;• Michelin n° 44309 enregistrée le 22 juin 2001;• Michelin n° 44310 enregistrée le 22 juin 2001.
Le 23 avril 2002, c’est-à-dire postérieurement aux
enregistrements de la demanderesse, le sieur Rabiou
ABDOU WASSI, le défendeur, procédait à l’OAPI au
dépôt et à l’enregistrement au titre de nom commercial,
du signe “Michelin Dieu Merci”. Informée de cetenregistrement, la demanderesse a saisi le tribunal envue d’obtenir l’annulation de l’enregistrement du nomcommercial “Michelin Dieu Merci” motif pris de ce que ce
nom est en conflit avec son droit acquis antérieur. Après
avoir constaté que l’enregistrement du nom commercial“Michelin Dieu Merci” du 23 avril 2002 sous le n° 34058
était postérieur à celui la demanderesse, le tribunal
en a déduit que le droit de cette dernière est antérieur
au nom commercial “Michelin Dieu Merci” et a parconséquent déclaré nul et non avenu l’enregistrement dunom commercial “Michelin Dieu Merci”.

Chapitre 5 – Noms commerciaux

Ce dernier motif a fait l’objet d’application par le tribunal
de première instance de Libreville dans un jugement
rendu le 14 mai 2008415. Il ressort de ce jugement quela Compagnie Générale des Établissements MichelinMichelin, la demanderesse, est titulaire de plusieurs
marques dénommées “Michelin” enregistrées à l’OAPI
aux numéros et dates ci-après :Dans le jugement rapporté, aucun des quatre motifs
sus-évoqués n’a été invoqué par la société EMBCIPROBÉTON pour justifier sa demande d’annulation dunom commercial “PROBÉTON” enregistré par la société
BATIPRO. Ne l’ayant pas fait, elle n’avait aucune chanced’avoir gain de cause. Mais si la décision du tribunal
rejetant la demande de la société EMBCI-PROBÉTON est
415

Tribunal de première instance de Libreville, jugement du 14 mai 2008, La
Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin-Michelin et Compagnie c.
L’entreprise Michelin Dieu Merci, inédit.
269

A.
Œuvre de l’esprit – Notion – Nécessitéd’une forme perceptible par les sens –Reprise servile d’un jeu – Concours sous lamême appellation que celle utilisée par lecréateur du jeu-concours – Concurrenceparasitaire caractérisée
271

J.
Droit d’auteur – Autorisation d’exploitation
délivrée par l’organisme national de gestion
collective – Exploitation en ligne d’œuvres durépertoire d’une société sœur – Action exercée
à titre individuel par l’auteur – Recevabilité –Illicéité de l’exploitation (non)294

B.
Originalité – Condition de protection desœuvres – Contenu du concept – Mélange descritères objectif et subjectif – Reproduction
des expressions et éléments caractéristiques
originaux de l’œuvre – Contrefaçon
274

K.
Reproduction par numérisation d’une œuvre
littéraire et artistique – Autorisation de l’auteur– Défaut d’autorisation – Contrefaçon – Loi
n° 2008-09 du 25 janvier 2008 relative au droit
d’auteur et aux droits voisins
296

C.
Droit d’auteur – Œuvre originale – Preuve del’originalité – Nécessaire motivation des juges
du fond277

L.
Droit d’auteur – Action en contrefaçon– Identité en tant qu’auteur contestéedu demandeur – Pourvoi en cassation –Distinction du droit et du fait

D.
Droit d’auteur – Titularité des droits – Œuvres
plurales – Apport formel d’un contributeur
à l’élaboration de l’œuvre – Paternité
exclusive
279

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistique

E.
Droit d’auteur – Protection d’un pseudonyme– Protection d’un logo – Condition de laprotection : l’originalité
281
F.
Droit d’auteur – Radiodiffusion d’un spot
publicitaire incorporant une œuvre musicale– Rémunération équitable à percevoir par unorganisme de gestion collective – Irrecevabilitéde l’action exercée à titre individuel
par l’auteur
284G.
Œuvre première – Titularité des droits –Créateur de l’œuvre – Transformation del’œuvre première – Nécessaire autorisation del’auteur – Sanction du défaut d’autorisation286

299

M.
Droit d’auteur – Saisie-contrefaçon –Comité provincial de lutte contre lapiraterie – Composition irrégulière ducomite – Identification du saisissant et desbiens saisis – Recours au droit OHADA dessaisies? – Application de la loi sur les œuvres
cinématographiques – Juridiction compétente –Juge des référés (oui)301
N.
Droit d’auteur – Action en contrefaçon –Obligation pour les juges du fond de motiver
explicitement la condamnation – Défaut
de réponse aux conclusions alléguant une
atteinte au droit à la paternité
306
O.
Paiement de la redevance du droit d’auteur– Usage effectif des œuvres – Conditiond’assujettissement – Capacité de diffusion desœuvres308

H.
Droits d’auteur – Cession des droits – Transfert
des droits patrimoniaux – Inaliénabilité dudroit moral – Respect par le cessionnaire 289

P.
Procédure – Droit d’auteur – Saisie-contrefaçon– Assignation au fond – Demandeur débouté– Indemnisation du préjudice causé parla saisie
310

I.
Œuvre littéraire et artistique – Reproduction
non autorisée de l’œuvre – Exploitation à desfins commerciales – Exception de copie privée –Contrefaçon
291

Q.
Droit d’auteur – Droit international privé– Condition des étrangers – Réciprocité
législative opposée à des auteurs étrangers –Convention de Berne – Traitement national 312

Chapitre 6
Propriété littéraire et artistiqueA. Œuvre de l’esprit – Notion – Nécessitéd’une forme perceptible par les sens
– Reprise servile d’un jeu – Concours
sous la même appellation que celleutilisée par le créateur du jeuconcours – Concurrence parasitaire
caractériséeUne création intellectuelle ne peut être investie dudroit d’auteur que si elle est exprimée sous une forme
susceptible d’être perçue par les sens. Tel n’est pas lecas pour les règles d’un jeu-concours qui ne peuvent
constituer en elles-mêmes une œuvre de l’esprit.
Cependant, un jeu-concours qui n’est pas investi dudroit d’auteur peut être protégé par les règles dela concurrence déloyale, lorsqu’une personne s’estimmiscée dans le sillage de son créateur, pour en tirer
profit, sans bourse délier. En effet, une telle immixtion
est constitutive de concurrence parasitaire.
Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, jugement du19 décembre 2017, n° 3556/17, MADAME AMISSAHMARIELLE LINDA c. 1. SOUMAHORO MAURY FERE,
2. MGROUP, 3. MTN CÔTE D’IVOIRE, 4. LE BUREAUIVOIRIEN DU DROIT D’AUTEUR
Observations:
Dans cette affaire, le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjanétait invité à se prononcer sur deux questions juridiques :la première question était de savoir à quelle condition
un jeu-concours peut être protégé par le droit d’auteur(I). La seconde question quant à elle était de savoir si
la reprise par les défendeurs d’un jeu-concours sousla même appellation et sans le consentement de la
demanderesse qui en était le créateur est constitutive deconcurrence parasitaire et peut être protégée (II).
I. La protection d’une création intellectuelle par ledroit d’auteur
Toutes les lois nationales sur le droit d’auteur précisentque celui-ci ne peut protéger qu’une œuvre originale
et l’article 3.1 de l’annexe VII de l’Accord de Bangui se
prononce dans le même sens. L’exigence, en réalité,
peut se dédoubler en ce sens qu’on peut (et il est mêmepermis de penser qu’on doit, si l’on veut être rigoureux),
subordonner la naissance du droit à la double condition
que le demandeur justifie de l’existence d’une œuvre del’esprit et du caractère original de cette œuvre.
Le jugement rapporté permet d’illustrer la première
proposition. Le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, en effet,

refuse la protection du droit d’auteur au concept d’un
jeu-concours intitulé “Les awards du coupé-décalé”, qui
fait la promotion d’un genre musical très populaire dansles années 2000-2010 en Côte d’Ivoire. La demanderesse,
une chanteuse, qui s’est illustrée dans le courant musicaldit de la “stylmoulance”, prétend que le jeu qu’elle
a créé en 2010 est une œuvre originale et qu’il a fait
l’objet de la part des défendeurs d’une “représentation”
contrefaisante. Les défendeurs rétorquent que lademanderesse “est dans l’incapacité de fournir deséléments objectifs attestant que son nom est apparu
d’une manière usuelle sur l’œuvre scénique ‘Les awards
du coupé-décalé’ et qu’elle a développé un format dereprésentation scénique qui porterait son empreinte
propre”. Ils ajoutent que “la protection du droit d’auteur
ne s’étend pas aux idées, méthodes, procédures,concepts ou informations en tant que tels et qu’en toutétat de cause, la demanderesse ne rapporte pas lapreuve d’un enregistrement auprès du BURIDA”, ce qui
lui interdit d’opposer aux tiers un quelconque droit surl’œuvre en cause.
Les trois objections, en vérité, sont de valeur très inégale.
Que l’emprunt à une œuvre antérieure ne s’accompagne
pas de la mention du nom de l’auteur de cette œuvre ne
suffit évidemment pas à exclure la contrefaçon alléguée.
L’enregistrement de l’œuvre auprès d’une société degestion collective ne saurait, par ailleurs, conditionner
la naissance du droit d’auteur. Comme le jugement
rapporté l’observe en termes excellents, il se déduit tantde l’article 4 de l’annexe VII de l’ABR-2015 que de l’article
5 de la loi ivoirienne sur le droit d’auteur de 2016 qu’il “estconstant que le droit d’auteur s’acquiert sans formalités,du fait même de la création de l’œuvre”.
Reste le débat sur l’existence même d’une œuvre del’esprit au sens de la législation sur le droit d’auteur, quele tribunal tranche en démontrant d’une manière très
didactique, qui mérite de retenir l’attention, pourquoi lacondition n’est pas remplie en l’espèce.
Il commence par poser le principe qu’une “création
intellectuelle” ne peut être investie du droit d’auteur
que si elle est “exprimée sous une forme ou une
représentation originale”. L’alternative posée (“forme”
ou “représentation”) n’est pas très heureuse car la“représentation” n’est qu’un mode de communication
de l’œuvre, et il aurait donc été préférable de s’en tenir àl’exigence d’une “forme”. Mais l’on ne peut qu’adhérer àl’argumentation développée sur cette base : “L’exigencede la forme dans laquelle la création doit être coulée est
liée à la possibilité de communiquer l’œuvre et donc depercevoir par les sens qui sont susceptibles d’assurer la271

réception de ladite œuvre par leur destinataire. Ainsi,
indépendamment de la forme ou de la présentation
originale qui ont pu leur être données, les règles d’un
jeu-concours ne peuvent constituer en elles-mêmes uneœuvre de l’esprit protégée par le droit d’auteur”.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

On ne saurait mieux dire que le droit d’auteur n’a
vocation à protéger qu’une création se concrétisantdans une forme perceptible par les sens. Il n’y a là
qu’une application du principe fondamental du droit
de la propriété intellectuelle selon lequel les idées sonten elles-mêmes de libre parcours416. Elle signifie que laprotection du droit d’auteur, une fois acquise, ne peuts’étendre aux idées qui sont contenues dans l’œuvre,
ainsi que le rappelle l’article 2 du Traité de l’OMPI sur ledroit d’auteur de 1996 (WCT), sous l’intitulé “Étendue dela protection par le droit d’auteur” (“La protection au titre
du droit d’auteur s’étend aux expressions et non aux idées,
procédures, méthodes de fonctionnement ou concepts
mathématiques en tant que tels”). Elle implique aussi qu’enamont, l’œuvre ne peut être investie du droit d’auteurqu’à la condition de se concrétiser dans une forme.

272

De ce point de vue, le tribunal a raison de ne pas
apporter de crédit aux affirmations de la demanderesse
selon lesquelles son jeu “est le fruit d’un travail
intellectuel qui provient d’un certain nombre de choix
arbitraires mettant en exergue l’originalité de cejeu”, plus précisément le classement des artistes parcatégories, la définition du mode de désignation desvainqueurs, le déroulement de la manifestation qui
intègre un défilé, une diffusion vidéo, un hommage
à Douk Saga (pionnier du genre musical célébré) et au
final un concert live des artistes du coupé-décalé.
En effet, l’existence d’un “travail intellectuel” (lademanderesse mettait aussi l’accent sur son “effort deréflexion”) et de “choix arbitraires” ne permet pas, àelle seule, de caractériser une œuvre protégeable. En
l’espèce, pour accéder au bénéfice du droit d’auteur,la demanderesse aurait dû, relève le tribunal, établir“la forme ou la présentation originale sous lesquelles
les idées sus-indiquées sont exprimées, cette forme
pouvant notamment consister en l’élaboration d’untexte matérialisant le jeu-concours”. L’exemple du “textematérialisant le jeu-concours” n’est peut-être pas le plus
pertinent car on peut douter que la simple description
du jeu par des mots puisse remplir la conditiond’originalité, et il aurait été plus parlant d’évoquer,comme le faisaient les défendeurs eux-mêmes,l’hypothèse d’une concrétisation sous la forme d’un“format de représentation scénique” du jeu-concours.
Mais la conclusion n’en est pas moins imparable :la demanderesse n’a pas “rapporté la preuve d’uneréalisation de forme en plus de l’activité intellectuellede création”.
La décision nous apparaît fondée en droit et en fait. Ellepeut être rapprochée d’un arrêt de la Cour de cassationfrançaise417 qui, à propos d’un concours ayant pour objet
de faire décerner des prix aux meilleurs produits debeauté de l’année, a jugé que “les règles d’un concours,même si elles procèdent de choix arbitraires, ne peuvent,indépendamment de la forme ou de la présentation
générale qui ont pu leur être données, constituer enelles-mêmes une œuvre de l’esprit protégée”.
Elle est d’une grande portée si l’on songe que laprotection du droit d’auteur est souvent revendiquée,comme on le vérifie dans la jurisprudence de nombreux
pays de l’Union européenne, pour des “concepts” de jeux
télévisés qui se négocient à des prix astronomiques418.
Il est admis que cette protection ne peut être accordée
que si le concept se concrétise dans ce que la pratique,dans le jargon de l’audiovisuel, appelle un “format”,
concrétisant le concept dans une émission découpée etstructurée.
On peut, pour éclairer la distinction, se reporter à unarrêt rendu par la cour d’appel de Paris419. Il s’agissait
d’un projet d’émission télévisée sur les collections
constituées par des “stars”. Son auteur, qui avait
enregistré ce projet à la Société des Gens de Lettres (unorganisme de défense des auteurs créé au XIXe siècle), avait
reconnu son idée dans une émission de la chaîne detélévision TF1. La cour d’appel a admis qu’il y avait là uneœuvre de l’esprit. Certes, le synopsis était bref, mais il
comportait des éléments précis :• D’abord, il associait à un reportage au domicile
d’une star sur la collection constituée par celleci un reportage technique sur ladite collection,l’intervention d’un psychologue sur la star et sa
collection, un jeu primé portant sur une question de
culture générale sur un objet, un tableau ou un artiste,
une information sur l’actualité de la star.
• Ensuite, le projet proposait un véritable découpage del’émission.
• Enfin, il donnait des indications sur son “ton” (“jeune,mutine, rapide”…).
Mais la demanderesse n’en a pas moins été déboutée,au motif qu’aucune des émissions de TF1 “ne reproduit
la combinaison ci-dessus”. Et le téléspectateur qui a ratéles émissions d’apprendre qu’on a montré la collectionde cigales en faïence de Michèle Torr, la collection
de cuillères tordues d’Uri Geller, la collection d’art
moderne de Daniel Hechter, la collection de cochonsde Jean-Claude Dreyfus, les collections de voituresd’Alain-Dominique Perrin et du Roi du Maroc, mais
jamais dans les conditions énumérées par le synopsis dela demanderesse.

417

418
416

Voir pour une illustration ancienne Tribunal civil de la Seine,
19 décembre 1928 : Ann. propr. ind. 1929, p. 181 : “Dans le domaine de lapensée, l’idée demeure éternellement libre et ne peut jamais devenir l’objet
d’une protection privative.”

419

Cass. civ., 1re chambre, 29 novembre 2005, n° 04-12.721 : RIDA 2006, p. 273;
Communication commerce électronique 2006, comm. 18, 1re esp. (note
CARON (C.)); D. 2006, p. 517 (note TRICOIRE (A.)); RTD com. 2006, p. 78(obs. POLLAUD-DULIAN (F.)).
Voir sur l’ensemble du problème DERIEUX (E.), La protection des projets etgenres d’émissions : Légipresse 1994, II, pp. 97-106; KARNELL (G. W. G.),
Copyright to Sequels – With Special Regard to Television Show Formats,
31 IIC, 2000, pp. 886-913
CA Paris, 4 e chambre, 6 décembre 2002 : Propr. intell. 2003, p. 158, 2e esp.
(obs. LUCAS (A.)).

La distinction entre l’idée exclue du champ de laprotection et l’œuvre protégeable est souvent mise enœuvre également dans le domaine de la publicité. Ainsi,
la Cour de cassation française a érigé en principe “qu’unesimple idée publicitaire, fût-elle originale, ne sauraitêtre susceptible d’appropriation en elle-même420” mais
une jurisprudence abondante décide que ce refus cesse
lorsque l’idée publicitaire s’incarne dans un slogan ou un
dessin.
II. La protection d’une création intellectuelle par la
concurrence parasitaire
Il est aujourd’hui établi que le parasitisme est un acte deconcurrence déloyale421. Mais l’admission du parasitismecomme hypothèse de concurrence déloyale marque uneévolution notable dans la conception de cette dernière.
Traditionnellement en effet, la concurrence déloyale
n’est admise que lorsque le demandeur et le défendeur
sont en situation de concurrence, autrement dit, lorsqueles deux partagent une clientèle commune422. Il est
cependant progressivement apparu que la déloyauté peutêtre constituée en dehors de l’existence d’une clientèle
commune423. Il en est ainsi en cas de parasitisme où il est
admis que les agissements parasitaires sont déloyauxmême en l’absence de toute situation de concurrence424.
Le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan définit le parasitismecomme l’ensemble des comportements par lesquels un
agent économique s’immisce dans le sillage d’un autre,
afin de tirer profit, sans rien en dépenser, de ses efforts
et de son savoir. Cette définition est conforme à celle
donnée par la doctrine qui est à l’origine de la théorie desagissements parasitaires425. Selon Saint-Gal, celui qui vit
en “parasite dans le sillage d’un autre en profitant desefforts qu’il a réalisés et de la réputation de son nom et desa notoriété” a un comportement illégal. Cette définition
doctrinale a été consacrée par la Chambre commercialede la Cour de cassation française en ces termes : “Leparasitisme économique se définit comme l’ensemble
des comportements par lesquels un agent économiques’immisce dans le sillage d’un autre afin de tirer profit,sans rien dépenser de ses efforts et de son savoir-faire”426.
420
421
422
423
424
425
426

Cass. com., 16 juin 1964 : JCP G 1965, II, n° 14059 et : Ann. Propr. Ind. 1965,
p. 279.
RIPERT (V. G.) / ROBLOT (R.), VOGEL (L.), Traité de droit commercial, Tome 1,
Vol. 1, 18e éd., Paris (LGDJ), 2001 n° 752 – 753, pp. 613 et s.
PIROVANO (A.), La concurrence déloyale en droit français : RID comp., 1974,
p. 467.
RIPERT (V. G.) / ROBLOT (R.), VOGEL (L.), Ibid., n° 730, pp. 595 et 596 et toute lajurisprudence citée.
Cass. com., 30 janvier 1996 : Bull. civ., IV, n° 32.
SAINT- GAL (Y.), concurrence parasitaire ou agissements parasitaires : RIPIA
1956, p.37.
Cass. com., 26 janvier 1999, n° 96-22.457 : BRDA 1999, n° 6, p. 10 : D. 2000,
p. 87 (note SERRA (Y.)).

La définition du parasitisme donnée par le tribunal
de commerce d’Abidjan étant validée, il reste à savoir
s’il a eu raison de l’appliquer en matière de création
intellectuelle, en l’occurrence le jeu-concours derécompense des acteurs du monde du “COUPÉDÉCALÉ”, intitulé “LES AWARDS DU COUPÉ DÉCALÉ”,
créé par Mme AMISSAH Marielle Linda dite Lindsay, lademanderesse, et dont la première édition a eu lieu en
juillet 2010. Au cours de cette édition, plusieurs artistes
et organisateurs de spectacles ont été récompensés dont
Monsieur SOUMAHORO Maury Féré dit le Molare. Maisen raison de la crise post-électorale intervenue en 2011
en Côte d’Ivoire, la demanderesse n’a pas pu organiser
immédiatement la deuxième édition. Cependant, au
moment où elle s’apprêtait en 2016 à organiser cettedeuxième édition, elle a été surprise de constater que
Monsieur SOUMAHORO Maury Féré dit le Molare et lasociété MGROUP entreprenaient d’organiser la premièreédition des “AWARDS DU COUPÉ DÉCALÉ”, avec lesponsoring de la société MTN. En dépit des multiples
interpellations faites par la demanderesse en vue dedissuader les défendeurs, ces derniers ont tout de mêmeorganisé la manifestation. C’est alors qu’elle a saisi letribunal de commerce d’Abidjan pour obtenir réparation
du préjudice subi du fait du parasitisme des défendeurs.
La théorie du parasitisme a d’abord été élaborée à
propos de l’usurpation de marque427 et toutes ses
applications jurisprudentielles concernent le domaineéconomique, d’où les expressions “parasitismeéconomique” et “agent économique” utilisées par la
majorité des décisions de justice428. Cette dernière
expression est d’ailleurs utilisée par le tribunal decommerce d’Abidjan lui-même dans la définition qu’il
donne du parasitisme.
Ainsi entendu, le parasitisme en tant qu’acte deconcurrence déloyale a pour domaine de prédilection lesactivités économiques. Or il est très difficile de soutenirqu’un jeu-concours organisé de manière presquebénévole et occasionnellement par une personne
physique est une activité économique. Ce jeu-concours
n’entre pas non plus dans le domaine de la concurrence
déloyale défini par l’Accord de Bangui révisé du24 février 1999, qui ne vise que les activités industrielles
et commerciales. Or le jeu-concours litigieux n’est ni une
activité industrielle, ni une activité commerciale, encore
moins une activité libérale que l’Acte de Bamako de 2015
assimile aux activités industrielles et commerciales.
Même la jurisprudence relative à la concurrence
déloyale, construite sur le fondement de l’article 1382 duCode civil, qui a une conception très large du domainede la concurrence déloyale, exclut de celui-ci les services
dits traditionnels (il s’agit des organismes politiques,syndicaux, culturels, professionnels, philanthropiques,etc.) en raison de leur caractère désintéressé. Il en est deces services dits traditionnels comme du jeu-concours
litigieux, car rien dans la décision rapportée ne permet

427
428

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistique

Les deux arrêts appliquent les mêmes principes. Si laprotection du droit d’auteur est écartée dans le premieret admise dans le second, c’est sur la base de la mêmedistinction entre un simple canevas sans véritable
contenu (une émission ludique sur le pourquoi des choses
ou des phénomènes de la vie quotidienne) et un projet
structuré, un “format” dit-on souvent dans le jargon del’audiovisuel (une émission découpée et structurée).

SAINT-GAL (Y.), n.10.
Cass. com., 26 janvier 1999, n.11.; CA Toulouse, 19 octobre 1988 : D. 1989,
p. 290 (note BARBERI); Cass. com., 9 mai 1991 : PIBD 1991, III, p. 699; CA
Versailles, 16 janvier 1997 : D. 1997, p. 565.
273

de dire si ce jeu-concours était organisé dans un
but lucratif.
Il convient cependant de relever que le parasitismen’obéit pas aux mêmes conditions que la concurrence
déloyale traditionnelle. Celle-ci ne peut exister que
lorsqu’il existe une clientèle commune. Or il peut yavoir parasitisme sans clientèle commune. Dans cetteoptique, la position du tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan
devient dès lors compréhensible. Ce que la concurrence
déloyale classique ne permet pas de faire peut l’être
par le parasitisme. Le berceau du parasitisme est certes
le domaine économique, mais il peut bien s’appliquer
à des domaines non économiques tels que le domaine
artistique. C’est donc à juste titre que le tribunal
n’a pas parlé de parasitisme économique, mais deparasitisme artistique. En raison de la généralité de lathéorie du parasitisme, rien n’interdit de l’appliquer au
domaine artistique lorsque les éléments constitutifs ensont caractérisés.
Dans le cas de l’espèce, le juge se fonde sur deux faits
pour retenir le parasitisme artistique :• la reprise de manière servile du jeu-concours“LES AWARDS DU COUPÉ DÉCALÉ” sous la mêmeappellation par les défendeurs, alors qu’ils étaient
présents à la première édition qui s’est tenue en 2010;• la proximité du jeu organisé par ces derniers, qui
traduit une proximité de réalisation telle qu’elleévoque nécessairement dans l’esprit du public le jeuconcours créé par la demanderesse.

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Au regard de ces faits, on peut conclure à juste titre,comme l’a fait le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, queles défendeurs se sont immiscés dans le sillage de la
demanderesse, pour tirer profit, sans bourse délier, de lacréation intellectuelle de celle-ci.

274Comme on peut le constater, la protection d’une création
intellectuelle peut être refusée sur le terrain du droit
d’auteur et être accordée sur celui du parasitisme. Mais
le rôle supplétif du parasitisme ne doit pas être exagéré.
En effet, si on en vient à admettre que toute reprised’une création non protégée est parasitaire, on affecte
la cohérence de la propriété intellectuelle. C’est dans ce
sens que s’inscrit l’arrêt de la cour d’appel de Paris du18 octobre 2000429 qui a décidé que le fait de faire deséconomies en reproduisant la prestation d’autrui neconstitue pas une faute, la reproduction d’une prestation
non couverte par les droits de propriété intellectuelleétant en principe libre.
Le parasitisme artistique étant caractérisé, le tribunal
ne pouvait accéder à la demande en réparation de la
demanderesse qu’après avoir établi l’existence d’unpréjudice. Pour le tribunal, le préjudice causé à lademanderesse est certain et consiste en la perte deson investissement intellectuel. Celle-ci peut en effet“difficilement reprendre l’organisation du jeu-concours
litigieux qui est désormais rattachée à la personne de429

CA Paris, 18 octobre 2000 : D. 2000, p. 850 (note PASSA (G.)).

Monsieur SOUMAHORO Maury Féré dit Le Molare dont
la notoriété dans l’univers musical du COUPÉ DÉCALÉ est
solidement établie”.
On peut cependant s’interroger sur le fondement
juridique de la réparation du préjudice subi par lademanderesse. Le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan viseen effet l’article 1382 du Code civil et non l’annexe VIII del’Accord de Bangui révisé du 24 février 1999. Or depuis laconsécration de la théorie de la concurrence déloyale parles Accords successifs de Bangui, l’article 1382 du Codecivil ne devrait normalement plus s’appliquer à l’action en
concurrence déloyale430.
Mais l’enseignement qu’on doit tirer du jugement
rapporté est qu’on doit réserver le cas de la concurrence
déloyale parasitaire, surtout lorsque le parasitisme n’est
pas économique, mais artistique comme dans le cas del’espèce. En effet, selon l’annexe VIII de l’Accord révisé
de Bangui de 1999, seules les activités industrielles etcommerciales entrent dans le domaine d’applicationde la concurrence déloyale. Or, le jeu-concours
litigieux n’est ni une activité industrielle, ni une activité
commerciale, mais une pure création intellectuelle. Il
y a donc coexistence de deux fondements juridiquesde la concurrence déloyale dans l’espace OAPI :l’article 1382 du Code civil et l’annexe VIII de l’Accordde Bangui. Celle-ci doit être considérée comme lefondement juridique principal et celui-là considéré
comme le fondement juridique subsidiaire.
André Lucas

B. Originalité – Condition de protectiondes œuvres – Contenu du concept– Mélange des critères objectif
et subjectif – Reproduction
des expressions et éléments
caractéristiques originaux de l’œuvre
– Contrefaçon
En règle générale, l’œuvre éligible à la protection par ledroit d’auteur est celle dite originale, c’est-à-dire, au sens
de l’article 1er de la loi ivoirienne du 26 juillet 2016 relative
au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins, celle qui constitue
une création intellectuelle propre à son auteur.
La contrefaçon par reproduction d’une œuvre littéraire
suppose la reprise totale ou partielle des expressionsou éléments caractéristiques originaux d’une œuvre
préexistante. En l’absence d’autorisation préalable
de l’auteur de l’œuvre, cette reproduction illicite est
lourdement sanctionnée au plan civil.

430

Voir Cour d’État du Niger, Chambre judiciaire, Adamou Idrissa c. Mahaman
Mindaou, Arrêt n° 13 – 086/c du 4 avril 2013 (obs. JIOGUE (G.), ce recueil,
chapitre 7, section A).

Observations :Le fragment d’une œuvre littéraire peut-il donner lieu àla protection par le droit d’auteur? Voilà posée, en termes
interrogatifs, la question centrale qui résume la toile defond de la protection en droit d’auteur contemporain,face aux hésitations des politiques législatives à se saisirde la menace que représente le plagiat d’œuvres del’esprit. Sans discriminer entre les catégories d’art, ledroit d’auteur protège tous les aspects de la créativité, àpartir du moment où la création, idée factuelle à l’origine,
entre dans le giron des idées concrétisées ou, mieux,“des créations extériorisées par des formes et/ou descouleurs”431. Ignoré du droit, le concept de plagiat revêt
une connotation purement morale. La contrefaçon est
son appellation juridique432. Vu sous cet angle, c’est doncla reproduction illicite, représentation ou diffusion, parquelque moyen que ce soit, des éléments d’expression
originaux d’une œuvre de l’esprit. Pour engager laresponsabilité civile du plagiaire, la jurisprudence
exige une ressemblance des éléments de reprise del’œuvre première, indépendamment de l’importancequantitative de ces éléments. Tel est en toile de fond leproblème posé par le jugement rendu par le tribunal decommerce d’Abidjan.
Faits : Sieur KIPRE BROYO avait, courant 2010, conçu etréalisé le premier tome du guide dénommé “Techniquepour devenir un professionnel de la haute coiffure”,
puis en janvier 2015, le tome 2 dudit ouvrage, lequelavait été doublement enregistré au Bureau ivoirien dudroit d’auteur (BURIDA) en dates des 17 juin 2016 et
16 juin 2017. Ayant signé, courant mars 2015, un contrat
de prestation en vue de la formation des élèves coiffeursde la NOUVELLE PARFUMERIE GANDOUR, le sieur KIPREBROYO va se servir de son guide comme manuel deformation de ses apprenants, jusqu’à la résiliation du lien
contractuel. Après la rupture des liens contractuels entre
eux, sieur KIPRE BROYO Carlos sera surpris de constater,courant janvier 2017, que la parfumerie GANDOUR avaitédité son propre manuel de coiffure qui plagiait plusieurs
pages du tome 2 de son guide de coiffure. Estimant quecette reproduction, en l’absence de son autorisation
préalable, était constitutive de contrefaçon de son droit
de reproduction, KIPRE BROYO Carlos va introduire,devant le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, une action
en responsabilité civile fondée sur l’article 1382 duCode civil. Au juge d’instance appelé à la cause revenait
d’identifier, peu ou prou, les éléments qui, dans uneœuvre littéraire, entrent dans le champ de protection dudroit d’auteur.

431
432

SIRINELLI (P), Propriété littéraire et artistique et droits voisins, Paris (Dalloz),
1992, p. 25.
Voir RENOUARD (A.-C.), Traité des droits d’auteur, dans la littérature, lessciences et les beaux-arts, Paris (J. Renouard), Tome 2, p. 22, n° 1838-1839;
Voir aussi COLOMBET (C.), Propriété littéraire et artistique et droits voisins,
Paris (Dalloz), 9e éd., 1999, n° 389; PLAISANT (R.), Le droit des auteurs et desartistes exécutants, Delmas, 1970, n° 403.

Raisonnement : C’est un truisme que de rappeler quele droit d’auteur ne protège généralement pas les idées,
qui sont de libre parcours, mais plutôt leur expression.
Ce principe sacramentel du droit d’auteur vise à assurer
la liberté d’expression et de création. En effet, le principe
postule que les idées ne sont guère appropriables, tantqu’elles n’ont pas été exprimées dans une forme claire.
Trompeuse dans sa simplicité, l’application casuelle
du principe ne se fait pas sans heurt par les juges,
auxquels il incombe de déterminer dans le champ de lacréativité les œuvres ou, du moins, les éléments de lacréation, éligibles à la protection. À ce stade, l’originalité(section I) est sans aucun doute le critère essentiel dela discrimination. Poussant son expertise, le tribunal va
rechercher si les reprises critiquées sont constitutives decontrefaçon (section II).
I. L’originalité, critère essentiel de réservation de laprotection des œuvres
Concept-tiroir à l’épreuve de l’évolution du temps et desréformes législatives sur le droit d’auteur, l’originalité
se définit sous plusieurs facettes, selon la chapellethéorique à laquelle on adhère. Tout en définissant leconcept d’originalité aux moyens d’éléments subjectifs,
les tribunaux affichent une grande résistance à rompre
avec la thèse objective consacrée dans de nombreux cas.
C’est à la croisée de ces différents courants théoriques,
subjectif et objectif, que le juge de la cause s’est permis
des libertés, en retenant une approche mixte duconcept d’originalité.
A. Les critères alternatifs de définition de l’œuvre originale
De manière holistique, le concept d’œuvre originale est
polysémique en droit d’auteur, son sens évoluant au
gré de la chapelle doctrinale dans laquelle on se trouve.
En dépit de la floraison des critères de définition, deux
grandes tendances se dégagent, l’une subjective etl’autre objective433.
B. Le cumul regrettable des critères de définition
par le juge
On peut regretter que le tribunal de commerce ait
combiné dans cette affaire des critères à la fois subjectifs
et objectifs. Désireux de cerner le concept d’œuvre
originale, d’abord subjectivement, le juge de la causeénonce avec beaucoup d’emphase qu’“Il est de principe
en droit de la propriété intellectuelle que l’œuvre est diteoriginale lorsqu’elle est nouvelle et porte l’empreinte dela personnalité de l’auteur”.

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistique

Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, jugement du28 décembre 2017, KIPRE BROYO CARLO c. LA
NOUVELLE PARFUMERIE GANDOUR

Une interprétation négative de ce que serait l’originalité,
posée dans les termes du juge, signifie qu’une œuvre
nouvelle n’est pas originale si elle ne reflète pas
l’empreinte personnelle de son auteur, et vice-versa.
Pourtant, la jurisprudence dans sa majorité déconstruit
une perception aussi extensive de la notion d’originalité,en ne prenant en compte que son caractère subjectif,
conformément à la thèse personnaliste que retient la
433

Voir Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire, Arrêt n° 598 du 8 décembre 2005, TOURE
A. c. SICOA (obs. FADE (A.), ce recueil, chapitre 6, section E).
275

doctrine dominante434. Dans une espèce jugée par la
Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire, le juge de cassation
se faisait largement l’écho de la conception subjective
qui suffisait à définir le concept d’originalité435. Dansla cause, le demandeur au pourvoi avait créé unpersonnage clownesque qui prestait dans le cadre desémissions pour enfants, sous le pseudonyme “BOUBA”.
Ayant agi en contrefaçon de son droit d’auteur sur lepseudonyme “BOUBA” et le personnage clownesquecontre l’usage de ces deux créations par le défendeur
au pourvoi, la haute juridiction ivoirienne a rejeté
son pourvoi, motifs pris de ce que ces créations ne
portaient pas son empreinte personnelle. À plusieurs
reprises, le juge français s’est montré rebelle à toutecoloration objective, en affirmant que seule l’originalité
est requise, indépendamment de la notion d’antériorité
inopérante dans le cadre de l’application de la propriété
littéraire et artistique436. En somme, l’originalité seperçoit limitativement comme l’empreinte laissée parl’auteur dans sa création.

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Diamétralement opposée à cette tendance,l’originalité est perçue par une frange minoritaire dela jurisprudence comme une notion exclusivement
objective. Très souvent mus par un élan depragmatisme et bien souvent conscients de l’échec
de la théorie subjective devant certains domaines dela créativité à l’instar des créations telles les bases
de données ou programmes d’ordinateur, les juges
ont souvent eu recours, exclusivement, à des critères
objectifs de la notion d’originalité, s’affranchissant ainsi
du modèle dominant. Si la position jurisprudentielle
des États membres de l’OAPI a manqué jusqu’ici de se
montrer réceptive à une telle tendance, le juge français,par contre, a moult fois décidé que l’originalité s’oppose
à la banalité 437. Certains juges vont donc exclure
du champ de la protection un dessin au motif qu’il
constituait, purement et simplement, une composition
banale et courante 438.

276

Dans les jugements fondés sur l’une ou l’autre approche,
une frontière claire est généralement tracée pour éviter
toute confusion possible entre les critères appliqués
ou leur combinaison. Bien que cela n’ait peut-être pas
affecté de manière significative l’orientation de ladécision, il est donc regrettable que le juge dans cetteaffaire ait fait référence aux deux séries de critères pourdéfinir l’originalité.
II. La délimitation des contours des reprises illicites
En réalité, le caractère original de l’œuvre première
ne suffit pas à caractériser le plagiat, casuellement
entendu ici comme la contrefaçon d’une œuvre
première. Le juge, dans son instruction des faits
434
435
436
437
438

LE HENAFF (C.), Les critères juridiques de l’œuvre à l’épreuve de l’art
conceptuel, Master 2 recherche en propriété intellectuelle, Université dePoitiers, 2005-2006, p. 68.
Voir n.18 (obs. FADE (A.), ce recueil, chapitre 6, section E).
Cass., 1re chambre, 11 février 1997 : JCP G 1997, II, n° 22973, 1re esp. (note
DAVERAT (X.)); D. 1998, p. 290; 2e esp. (note crit. GREFFE (F.)); Somm. p. 189(obs. COLOMBET (C.)); RTD com 1999, p. 391 (obs. FRANÇON (A.)).
VIVANT (M.) et BRUGUIÈRE (J-M.), Droit d’auteur, 1ère éd., p. 161.
Cass. civ., 27 mai 1942 : S. 1942, n° 1, p. 124.

de la cause, exige que la reprise des éléments
caractéristiques de la forme de l’œuvre revête un
certain nombre de caractères (A), indifféremment del’ampleur des éléments d’emprunt (B).
A. Les caractères des éléments de reprise
Pour que la reproduction illicite d’une œuvre littéraire
soit blâmable, il faudrait que cette reprise soit non
autorisée et porte sur des expressions originales.
En règle générale, pour reprendre les Professeurs Lucas,l’œuvre ne peut donner prise au droit d’auteur qu’à partir
du moment où elle quitte le monde de la spéculation pourentrer dans le monde sensible de la forme439. En d’autres
termes, on dit que le droit d’auteur protège l’expression,
sous réserve qu’elle soit cependant originale. C’est
d’ailleurs bien consciente de cette exigence d’originalitédes éléments d’expression que la défenderesses’évertuait infructueusement à démontrer que le tome 2
du guide du coiffeur “ne présente aucune originalité”.
Pour illustrer, la parfumerie défenderesse estimait queles éléments dont elle s’est inspirée sont trop banals
pour établir la contrefaçon, son manuel s’étant détachéde l’œuvre du demandeur à l’instance. Autrement dit,les ressemblances entre les œuvres portent sur deséléments qui ne sont pas protégeables au titre du droit
d’auteur et les différences entre les œuvres en cause sontsuffisantes pour écarter la contrefaçon. Pour balayer
cet argumentaire d’un revers de sa toge, le juge va
conclure que les pages reproduites reflétaient le choix
arbitraire de l’auteur de l’œuvre tout en se distinguant
du “domaine public antérieur”. Les différents chapitres,
titres, paragraphes et surtout les rapports de proximité
à la clientèle illustrent la liberté de choix de l’auteur dutome 2 du guide du coiffeur et par ricochet, l’éloignement
nécessaire entre cette œuvre et celle intitulée AFRICANCARIBBEAN HAIRDRESSING SECOND EDITION.
À partir du moment où la forme reproduite était originale,le juge a tenu à caractériser, comme pour rappeler lanécessité, l’absence de consentement préalable del’auteur de l’œuvre contrefaite. En cela, le juge estimeque “Dans la mesure où celle-ci ne rapporte pas la preuvequ’elle a obtenu l’autorisation du demandeur à cet effet,
il y a lieu de dire et juger que cette reproduction est
illicite, fautive, et par voie de conséquence ouvre droit àréparation en faveur du demandeur”.
B. La non-pertinence de la dimension quantitative deséléments de reprise
En droit comparé, l’article L. 335-3 du Code de la
propriété intellectuelle français définit la contrefaçon
comme la “reproduction, représentation ou diffusion, parquelque moyen que ce soit, d’une œuvre de l’esprit en
violation des droits de l’auteur”. Elle est donc envisagée
lorsque l’on reproduit tout ou partie d’une œuvre
littéraire sans l’autorisation de son auteur.
Dans l’espèce commentée, le juge a fortement tenu
à caractériser le caractère partiel des reproductions
439

LUCAS (A.) & LUCAS (H.-J.), Traité de la propriété littéraire et artistique, Paris(Litec), 2e éd., 2001, p. 33.

Au bout de la comparaison, le juge en vient à conclureque “l’œuvre de la défenderesse est une reproduction
partielle de l’œuvre dénommée “Guide du coiffeur,
Devenir professionnel Tome 2”.
Aristide Fade

C. Droit d’auteur – Œuvre originale –Preuve de l’originalité – Nécessaire
motivation des juges du fondLes juges du fond doivent fonder leurs décisions sur desarguments de fait et de droit permettant à la juridiction
de cassation d’exercer de manière aussi aisée que
possible son contrôle de légalité, et ils ne sauraient donc
se borner à déduire la contrefaçon de l’exploitationcommerciale non autorisée d’une photographie sans en
caractériser l’originalité (1re esp.)
Le jugement rapporté encourt la critique en ce qu’ila admis sans motiver sa décision que le prestataire
ayant conçu un site Internet peut se prévaloir dudroit d’auteur sur les composantes cachées du site
Internet, notamment le code source, le code objet, lesalgorithmes, les programmes ou autres descriptions
techniques, les structures de données et le contenu de labase de données (2e esp.).
1re espèce
Cour de cassation du Niger, Arrêt du 21 avril 2005,
n° 15-040/CIV, SONITEL c. AGENCE KIBYA
2e espèce
Tribunal de Commerce d’Abidjan, jugement du
7 novembre 2013, n° 1561/2013, SOCIÉTÉ DEGALVANISATION DE TÔLES EN CÔTE-D’IVOIRE
SA (Tôles Ivoire) c. SOCIÉTÉ FOCUS BUILDING &CONSULTING SARL
Observations:
L’arrêt rendu par la Cour de cassation du Niger le440

21 avril 2015 ne fournit pas les éléments de fait
permettant d’apprécier le bien-fondé des critiquesadressées par le pourvoi et ayant motivé la censure del’arrêt attaqué, rendu par la cour d’appel de Niamey.
On comprend seulement que la Société nigériennede télécommunication (SONITEL), opérateur national
historique des télécommunications, a fait appel,
probablement pour une campagne publicitaire, auxservices d’une agence, l’agence Iman, et que cettedernière a utilisé une photographie dont les droits
appartiennent à une autre agence, l’agence Kybia. La
cour d’appel de Niamey a jugé qu’il s’agissait d’une
contrefaçon et a condamné la SONITEL à payer à l’agence
Kybia la somme de FCFA 5 000 000 à titre de dommages
et intérêts. L’arrêt est cassé pour insuffisance de motifs.
On ne s’attardera pas sur le deuxième moyen par lequella société défenderesse faisait valoir qu’elle était fondéeà prendre l’initiative d’une telle exploitation dès lorsqu’elle avait régulièrement acquis les droits, sauf pourrelever qu’il est écarté au motif qu’une telle cession nedispensait pas le cessionnaire de respecter le droit à lapaternité de l’auteur (v. sur ce point le second commentairede la décision, infra).
Pour justifier la condamnation, l’arrêt attaqué avaiténoncé “qu’il est établi et non contesté que SONITELet l’Agence Iman ont procédé à une exploitationcommerciale de la photographie litigieuse sans l’accord
préalable de l’Agence Kibya et en ont de ce fait tiré
profit pécuniaire et le tout en violation de l’article 28 del’Ordonnance n° 93-27 du 30 mars 1993, portant sur lesdroits d’auteur au Niger et de l’annexe VII de l’Accord de
Bangui révisé, instituant l’OAPI”. Le pourvoi lui reprochait
cette motivation sommaire que la société défenderesse
tentait de sauver en précisant que la solution prenait
appui sur une “analyse attentive des différents moyens
invoqués par les parties au fond, dont notammentdes sommations et des procès-verbaux de constats
dressés par un huissier qui font foi jusqu’à inscription
de faux”. Peine perdue : la Cour de cassation, au visa del’article 2, alinéa 2, de la loi n° 2004-50 du 22 juillet 2004,
portant organisation judiciaire en République du Niger,
rappelle que “l’obligation de motivation des arrêts etjugements suppose que le juge ait fondé sa décision sur
des arguments de fait et de droit vérifiables à première
lecture pour permettre à la juridiction de cassationd’exercer de manière aussi aisée que possible son
contrôle de légalité”, condition qui, selon elle, n’est pas
remplie en l’espèce.

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiqueillicites, en appréciant dans un premier temps avec
minutie les ressemblances de chapitre, rubrique, lestitres et le rapport de proximité avec le client, entre leguide contrefait et le manuel contrefaisant édité par ladéfenderesse. De nombreux paragraphes, dans leuragencement intact dans l’œuvre du sieur KIPRE BROYO,
ont été transposés in extenso, dans le manuel incriminé.
Néanmoins, le juge ne s’arrête pas là. Il va peser lesdifférences existantes entre les deux œuvres, en prenantsoin d’ignorer toutefois les divergences présentées surle plan sommaire des deux ouvrages ou le succès del’enregistrement du manuel contrefaisant auprès du
BURIDA. En vue de prémunir l’impunité résultant dupillage d’une œuvre en maquillant la contrefaçon par desdifférences non déterminantes, tenant à la transposition
spatio-temporelle de l’intrigue, le juge français a retenu
la contrefaçon d’une œuvre postérieure inspirée del’œuvre première de la victime440.

La mise au point est bienvenue. L’obligationde motivation des jugements et arrêts répond
effectivement, comme le relève l’arrêt commenté, à lanécessité de permettre à celle-ci d’exercer son contrôle.
Mais ce n’est pas sa seule finalité en matière civile.
Ainsi que l’a relevé la Cour de cassation française, elle
“oblige le juge au raisonnement juridique, c’est-à-direà la confrontation du droit et des faits” et “constitue
ensuite pour le justiciable la garantie que ses prétentions
et ses moyens ont été sérieusement et équitablement
examinés”, en quoi “elle est aussi un rempart contre

TGI de Paris du 6 décembre 1989 : Cah. dr. auteur, mai-juillet 1990, p. 21277

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

l’arbitraire du juge ou sa partialité”441. Il s’agit doncbien “d’une règle essentielle qui permet de vérifier quele juge a fait une correcte application de la loi dans lerespect des principes directeurs du procès” (Ibid.). La
jurisprudence en tire, par exemple, la conséquence
que la reconnaissance d’une décision étrangère nonmotivée est contraire à la conception française del’ordre public international de procédure, lorsque nesont pas produits des documents de nature à servird’équivalent à la motivation défaillante442. En l’espèce,
si la motivation se bornait réellement à l’attendu
rappelé ci-dessus, elle était évidemment insuffisanteau triple point de vue qui vient d’être évoqué, et lacensure est donc justifiée. Il appartenait aux juges dufond, non seulement de caractériser l’originalité de laphotographie en cause, mais aussi de vérifier la titularité
revendiquée et d’indiquer en quoi consistait précisément
la violation alléguée.

278

Reste que la mise au point est d’ordre très général, ensorte que le commentateur n’est pas à même de savoir
sur quel point exactement la motivation était défaillante.
Mais il y a tout lieu de penser que c’était l’existencemême d’une protection par le droit d’auteur (et non lefait de l’exploitation critiquée) qui était assénée plutôt
que démontrée. Dans cette lecture, la cassation devrait
s’entendre comme obligeant le juge du fond à s’expliquer
concrètement sur l’originalité de l’œuvre arguée decontrefaçon. Le rappel à l’ordre est opportun car il
est fréquent que les tribunaux tiennent pour acquisel’originalité de l’œuvre en cause alors que, par application
de l’adage actor incombit probatio, c’est au demandeur
en contrefaçon d’établir qu’il remplit les conditions
pour être investi du droit d’auteur. Or l’originalité desphotographies prête souvent à discussion et il n’est pas
rare qu’elle soit déniée en jurisprudence, comme on levérifie en France, où il est jugé que la photographie n’est
pas protégeable si elle se borne à reproduire fidèlement
un objet443, un site444, un animal445, un modèle446 ou unévénement447, et où la Cour de cassation se montre
particulièrement exigeante, pour ce type d’œuvres,quant à la nécessaire motivation des juges du fondsur l’originalité448.
Le constat, à vrai dire, n’est pas propre aux
photographies, comme le montre, dans la seconde
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448

Cour cass., Rapport 2010 de la Cour de cassation, Paris (La documentationfrançaise), par. 1.2.2.1.1.
Cass. 1re civ., 28 novembre 2006, n° 4-19.031.
CA Aix, 2e chambre, 20 janvier 2004 : Comm. com. électr. 2004, comm. 37,
1re esp. (note CARON (C.)).
TGI Nanterre, 1re chambre, 18 mai 1994 : Gaz. Pal. 1997, II, résumé 506, 1re esp.
CA Paris, 25e chambre A, 5 novembre 1991 : JurisData n° 1991-024063; Cass.
1re civ., 22 octobre 2011, No. 10-21.251
CA Paris, 4 e chambre, 15 octobre 2004 : JurisData, n° 2004-251871
Cass. 1re civ., 3 février 2004, n° 2-11.400 : Propr. intell. 2004, p. 630, 2e esp.
(obs. LUCAS (A.)), et p. 633, 1re esp. (obs. SIRINELLI (P.)).
Cass. 1re civ., 10 décembre 2014, n° 10-10.923 : RIDA 2015, II, p. 367: “Attendu
que pour déclarer la société Jeca responsable de contrefaçon artistique et lui
faire interdiction d’utiliser la photographie litigieuse, l’arrêt retient que cettephotographie, qui représente un pâté rond et un pâté en forme de trapèze
avec la mention “mousserelle” écrite dans un cartouche sur le dessus, dansle cadre d’une composition élaborée, les produits présentés étant disposés
dans un décor soigné, a manifestement une originalité; Qu’en se déterminantainsi, par des motifs impropres à caractériser en quoi la photographie portait
l’empreinte de la personnalité de son auteur, la Cour d’appel n’a pas donné debase légale à sa décision.”espèce, le jugement rapporté du tribunal de commerced’Abidjan, qui concerne un site Internet. Les faits
de l’espèce sont classiques. Une société a confié à
un cabinet de conseil une mission portant sur un“programme stratégique” incluant notamment laréalisation d’un site Internet. Considérant que le budget
validé pour l’année avait été “entièrement consommé”
par la société prestataire, elle a mis fin aux relations
contractuelles en sollicitant une rencontre afin de régler
les aspects pratiques de cette rupture, en particulier
la restitution du code d’accès au site. Elle a essuyé unrefus de la part de son partenaire, et a refusé, dès lors,de régler le montant de la facture finale, ce qui aboutit
à une situation de blocage. Elle estime que le refus n’est
pas fondé, affirmant qu’elle est devenue “propriétaire”
du site pour l’avoir financé.
Au contraire, l’agence soutient qu’elle “est, en sa qualitéd’auteur dudit site, le seul propriétaire du droit d’auteur
y afférent, ce qui l’autorise à déterminer souverainement
les conditions de sa divulgation et, notamment, de lacommunication ou non de ses codes d’accès”, la société
cliente étant seulement titulaire d’un “droit d’utilisation
du site, en l’absence d’une clause de cession des droits
de propriété intellectuelle” qui n’a pas été stipulée
en l’espèce.
Le tribunal va donner raison à l’agence à partir d’unraisonnement bien mené, mais qui fait complètement
l’impasse sur la condition d’originalité, ce sur quoi
nous entendons focaliser l’attention. Il commence parrappeler le principe que “lorsqu’une société confie à unprestataire extérieur la conception de son site Internet
ou la création de son contenu, ce prestataire est titulairedes droits de propriété intellectuelle attachée à l’œuvre
à moins qu’il en soit convenu autrement dans un contratécrit”. Mais, poursuit-il, le code d’accès au site, qui n’est
en définitive qu’un “mot de passe”, n’est pas inclus
dans l’orbite de la protection conférée, en sorte qu’il
appartient normalement au prestataire de service dele communiquer à son client à l’issue de sa mission.
Encore faut-il, cependant, que la société commanditaire
ait elle-même, de son côté, honoré ses engagements.
Or tel n’est pas le cas puisqu’elle n’a pas payé tout cequ’elle devait. L’agence est donc fondée à opposerson droit de rétention sur les “biens mobiliers de sa
débitrice”, y compris le “code d’accès au site internet,
bien mobilier incorporel”.
On ne s’attardera pas ici sur la question, pourtant fort
intéressante, de pur droit civil, consistant à savoir si ledroit de rétention prévu par l’article 67 de l’Acte uniforme
OHADA portant organisation des sûretés peut êtreexercé sur un meuble incorporel à quoi un code d’accès
peut être ramené, pour cantonner l’analyse aux seuls
aspects de droit d’auteur.
On ne peut évidemment que souscrire au postulat
que le contrat de commande ne transfère pas
automatiquement les droits d’auteur au commanditaire.
De ce point de vue, la demanderesse était dans l’erreur
en prétendant que la question se rapportait “à une
prestation de service et non à une œuvre de l’esprit”,

ce qui mettait le droit d’auteur hors du jeu. Échappe
pareillement à la discussion l’affirmation selon laquelle
un code d’accès, qui n’est pas une création intellectuelle,
ne peut donner prise au droit d’auteur. En revanche, il est
surprenant que le tribunal ait raisonné comme s’il allait
de soi qu’un site Internet constituait en lui-même uneœuvre protégeable. La proposition n’est fondée que si lesite répond à l’exigence d’originalité, ce qui ne va pas desoi, et que les juges du fond auraient dû vérifier.

sensibiliser la population gabonaise et, à travers elle, lespouvoirs publics, sur ce fléau. L’association a organisé
de nombreuses conférences et tables rondes. Ont ainsi
été recueillies des données qui ont permis de nourrir
un “manifeste”. Le défendeur a été chargé de faireéditer ce dernier et a reçu pour ce faire une sommede FCFA 800 000. Mais il a ensuite publié aux éditions
L’Harmattan sous son propre nom un ouvrage intitulé
Manifeste contre les crimes rituels au Gabon.

Ce raccourci est d’autant plus critiquable que le jugement
rapporté assigne ici à la protection un périmètre trèslarge puisqu’il ne craint pas d’énoncer que le prestataire“détient des droits d’auteur sur les composantes
cachées du site Internet, notamment le code source, lecode objet, les algorithmes, les programmes ou autres
descriptions techniques, les structures de données etle contenu de (la) base de données”. Cette appréciation
ne résiste pas à l’examen. Il est bien acquis, en effet,
que les algorithmes ne sont pas protégeables par ledroit d’auteur449 et que seule la structure des bases dedonnées peut donner prise au droit d’auteur, à l’exclusionde leur “contenu”450.

Assigné en contrefaçon par le créateur de l’association, il
revendique la qualité d’auteur de cette œuvre en faisantvaloir que son rôle a été déterminant puisqu’il a préparé
le manuscrit, fait des corrections multiples, effectué desdéplacements entre Libreville et Paris et en prétendantque le demandeur n’a, quant à lui, “en rien contribué à larédaction et à l’élaboration” de l’ouvrage.

D. Droit d’auteur – Titularité des droits –Œuvres plurales – Apport formel d’uncontributeur à l’élaboration de l’œuvre
– Paternité exclusive
Celui qui a été chargé de la publication d’un ouvrage
sur les crimes rituels ne peut prétendre tirer argument
du rôle qu’il a joué dans la mise au point formelle dumanuscrit pour revendiquer la paternité exclusive del’œuvre finale.
Tribunal de première instance de Libreville, jugement du
9 mars 2011, n° 192/10-11, SIEUR EBANG ONDO ELVIS c.
SIEUR MINKO MVE BERNADIN
Observations :Le jugement rapporté du tribunal de première instancede Libreville, s’il n’est pas à l’abri de la critique, offre
l’avantage de permettre de passer en revue des notions
aussi essentielles que celles d’auteur, d’œuvre decollaboration, d’œuvre collective et d’œuvre dérivée.
Faits : Le demandeur, à la suite du décès de son fils,
victime d’un crime rituel, a créé une association pour
449

450

Voir en ce sens Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, Arrêt du 2 mai 2012,
SAS Institute Inc. c. World Programming Ltd, C-406/10, ECLI:EU:C:2012:259 :RIDA 2012, III, p. 341 et p. 181 (obs. SIRINELLI (P.)); Comm. com. électr.
2012, comm. 105 (note CARON (C)); D. 2012, p. 2836 (obs. SIRINELLI (P.));
Propr. intell. 2012, p. 423 (obs. BENABOU (V.-L.)); RTD com. 2012, p. 536(obs. POLLAUD-DULIAN (F.)), point 32 : “En accord avec le principe selon
lequel seule l’expression d’un programme d’ordinateur est protégée par ledroit d’auteur, les idées et les principes qui sont à la base de la logique, desalgorithmes et des langages de programmation ne sont pas protégés en vertu
de cette directive.”
Voir art. 3 al. 2 de la Directive 96/9/CE du Parlement européen et du Conseil
du 11 mars 1996 concernant la protection juridique des bases de données,
précisant que la protection des bases par le droit d’auteur “ne couvre pas leurcontenu”.

Raisonnement : L’article 4 de l’Accord de Bangui (enréalité de l’annexe VII de l’accord) du 2 mars 1977 prévoit
que la protection du droit d’auteur est acquise “dès lacréation de l’œuvre, même si celle-ci n’est pas fixée sur
un support matériel”. En l’espèce, il n’est pas contestéque “l’idée du manifeste” émane du demandeur, ni
que ce dernier a communiqué au défendeur toute une
documentation, constituée à la fois des interventions
faites lors des nombreuses conférences et tables rondes
organisées par l’association et de ses propres écrits
personnels. Il en résulte “que même dans l’hypothèsed’une œuvre collective, qualification avancée par ledéfendeur, ce dernier ne pouvait se présenter commel’auteur du Manifeste contre les crimes rituels au Gabon
dont il n’est pas ‘l’initiateur’, et ce d’autant plus que
s’il a apporté à l’œuvre finale ’beaucoup de son cru‘,
dans la mesure où sur un plan de pure forme, il s’estécarté du style quelque peu naïf et mystico-religieux(du demandeur), il peut toutefois être constaté entreles écrits personnels de ce dernier et le manifeste dessimilitudes de fond, tant dans la démarche que dans lesquestions abordées”.
Cette œuvre doit donc être considérée comme l’œuvre
du président de l’association, lequel doit être accueilli
dans ses “demandes tendant à l’arrêt de la diffusion sous
sa forme actuelle et au nom (du défendeur) ainsi qu’auretrait de cet ouvrage de la vente”.

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiqueAndré Lucas

Il n’est pas suivi par le tribunal qui va entrer encondamnation en développant le raisonnement suivant.

Le jugement mérite assurément l’approbation en ce qu’il
refuse de faire du défendeur l’auteur exclusif de l’œuvre
litigieuse. Une telle revendication n’était pas raisonnable
dès lors qu’il était établi que cette œuvre était issue d’une
documentation fournie par le demandeur, accompagnéed’écrits personnels de ce dernier. Elle était d’ailleurscontradictoire avec la qualification d’œuvre collective
soutenue en défense, puisqu’une telle qualification
conduit (c’est même son intérêt principal) à attribuer latitularité initiale des droits sur l’œuvre collective prise enelle-même à la personne (physique ou morale) qui en apris l’initiative, à l’exclusion des contributeurs.
279

En revanche, le tribunal peut difficilement être suivi surles autres points abordés, et l’on regrette qu’il n’ait pas
saisi l’occasion de délivrer un enseignement rigoureux
sur la question essentielle de la titularité des droits
afférents à une œuvre plurale.
C’est, en effet, d’une œuvre plurale qu’il s’agissait enl’espèce. Contrairement à ce qui est jugé, il est impossiblede faire complètement l’impasse, en l’espèce, sur lacontribution du défendeur à l’œuvre finale. Il y a unemême contradiction manifeste à attribuer l’entière
paternité au demandeur tout en concédant dans lemême temps que le défendeur y a mis “beaucoup deson cru”. Ce constat devait en effet conduire à écarter
l’hypothèse d’une œuvre créée par un auteur unique.
Reste à savoir quel statut donner à cette œuvre plurale.
Avant de reconnaître, en définitive, la paternité exclusive
du demandeur, le tribunal n’exclut pas la qualificationd’œuvre collective puisqu’il prend expressément appui
sur la définition de l’article 25 de l’annexe VII de l’Accordde Bangui de 1977 pour écarter la revendication de
paternité du défendeur. Le texte, repris aujourd’hui dansl’article 1er de l’annexe VII de l’accord, dans sa version
résultant de l’Acte de Bamako du 14 décembre 2015,
dispose que l’œuvre collective s’entend deCollection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle“l’œuvre créée sur l’initiative d’une personne
physique ou morale qui la divulgue sous sa
direction et sous son nom et dans laquelle lacontribution des divers auteurs participant à
son élaboration se fond dans l’ensemble en vue
duquel elle est conçue, sans qu’il soit possibled’attribuer à chacun d’eux un droit distinct sur
l’ensemble réalisé”.

280

Le tribunal déduit de cette disposition “qu’une œuvre,même collective, doit être divulguée sous le nom et ladirection de celui qui en a eu l’initiative”, d’où il infère
que le défendeur, qui ne prétend aucunement que l’idée
du “manifeste” était la sienne et qui reconnaît mêmeexplicitement qu’elle émanait du demandeur, ne peutprétendre se voir reconnaître la qualité d’auteur.
Le raisonnement appelle deux observations. La première
est qu’il repose sur le postulat que le promoteur del’œuvre collective serait ici forcément le demandeur,parce qu’il en aurait eu, le premier, l’idée, alors qu’il serait
parfaitement possible de soutenir que c’est l’association,
dont le demandeur n’est que le représentant, qui doitêtre le titulaire initial des droits, ce qui ruinerait laconclusion à laquelle aboutit le jugement.
La seconde, plus importante, est que la qualificationd’œuvre collective mérite d’être plus amplement
débattue en l’espèce. La définition énoncée plus
haut, qui est très étroitement inspirée de celle del’article L.113‑2, alinéa 3, du Code français de la propriété
intellectuelle (“Est dite collective l’œuvre créée surl’initiative d’une personne physique ou morale quil’édite, la publie et la divulgue sous sa direction et son
nom et dans laquelle la contribution personnelle desdivers auteurs participant à son élaboration se fonddans l’ensemble en vue duquel elle est conçue, sansqu’il soit possible d’attribuer à chacun d’eux un droit
distinct sur l’ensemble réalisé”), suppose non seulement
une pluralité de contributions, condition qui est remplie
en l’espèce, mais une “direction” du promoteur dans leprocessus créatif. On dit souvent que l’œuvre collective
implique une relation hiérarchique entre le promoteur
et les contributeurs. Or il ne résulte pas des éléments
de fait contenus dans le jugement rapporté que ledéfendeur ait reçu la moindre instruction concernant lecontenu de l’œuvre.
Cette absence de relation verticale ferait plutôt songer
à la qualification d’œuvre de collaboration, ce qui aurait
renvoyé à une titularité indivise entre le demandeur etle défendeur. L’œuvre de collaboration est définie parl’article premier de l’annexe VII de l’Accord de Bangui
révisé comme “une œuvre à la création de laquelle ont
concouru plusieurs auteurs”, ce qui est la reprise littérale
de l’article L.113-2, alinéa 1er, du Code français de la
propriété intellectuelle. Si l’on se réfère à l’interprétationque donne traditionnellement la jurisprudence française
de cette disposition, ce qui peut sembler logique euégard à la filiation textuelle, on est conduit à considérer
que la qualification implique une véritable coopération
entre les coauteurs451. Or il y a tout lieu de penser quedans la présente espèce, le deuxième coauteur ne s’était
aucunement concerté avec le premier.
La situation évoque plutôt, à la réflexion, l’œuvre
“composite” définie par l’article 1er de l’annexe VII
précitée comme “une œuvre nouvelle qui incorpore
une œuvre préexistante et qui est réalisée sans la
collaboration de l’auteur de cette dernière”, ce qui
reprend mot pour mot l’article L.113-2, alinéa 2, duCode français de la propriété intellectuelle. Il n’y a pasd’inconvénient, selon nous, à la dénommer œuvre
“dérivée”, terminologie dont la signification est plus
facile à saisir. On dit parfois qu’elle renvoie à une pluralité
successive d’auteurs452, l’apport du second, lorsqu’ils
sont deux, venant adapter, compléter ou corriger
celui du premier. Dans le cas de l’ouvrage litigieux, ledéfendeur avait, outre des corrections, mis, comme il aété dit plus haut, “beaucoup de son cru”, ce qui signifie
qu’il avait contribué de façon significative à la mise en
forme de l’œuvre finale. Il aurait donc été logique de luireconnaître la qualité d’auteur de cette œuvre prise entant qu’œuvre dérivée.
Pour autant, cela ne veut pas dire que la prétention dudemandeur était dépourvue de fondement. En effet,
les conséquences à tirer de la qualification d’œuvre
composite (ou dérivée) sont énoncées par l’article 5
de l’annexe VII précitée qui précise que la protection
de telles œuvres “est accordée sans préjudice de laprotection des œuvres préexistantes utilisées pour lacréation de ces œuvres”. Concrètement, l’auteur de

451
452

LUCAS (A.), LUCAS-SCHLOETTER (A.) et BERNAULT (C.), Traité de la propriété
littéraire et artistique, 5 e éd., Paris (LexisNexis), 2017, n° 189 et lesréférences citées.
Ibid., n° 229.

Le résultat, on le voit, est le même, mais le cheminement
est bien différent et prend davantage en compte
les catégories juridiques de la propriété littéraire
et artistique.
André Lucas

E. Droit d’auteur – Protection d’un
pseudonyme – Protection d’un logo Condition de la protection : l’originalité
Pour prétendre à la protection due au titre du droit
d’auteur, toute œuvre littéraire ou artistique doit
préalablement être créée, et ensuite satisfaire à
la condition d’originalité. Les pseudonymes et leslogos n’échappent pas à cette règle. Empruntant à laconception subjective de l’originalité, le juge exige queces creations réflètent l’empreinte de la personnalité deleur auteur.
Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire, Arrêt n° 598 du8 décembre 2005, TOURE A. c. SICOA
Observations :De manière basique, le droit d’auteur se décline en un
ensemble de prérogatives subjectives dont jouissent
les auteurs d’œuvres protégées, indépendamment dumode d’expression, de la valeur ou de la destination
de l’expression. L’œuvre devra satisfaire au critèred’originalité, “pierre angulaire du droit d’auteur”, à défaut
duquel elle est exclue du champ de la protection453.
Empruntant à la Cour de cassation française souvent
prompte à rappeler ce principe établi454, cet arrêt inédit
de la Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire définit le cap, dansl’espèce ayant opposé le sieur TOURE A., demandeur au
pourvoi, à la société SICOA.
Faits : Dans la cause, il se dégage que le sieur TOURE
A. a créé un nom d’artiste dit “T.B” et un personnage
clownesque à son effigie avec des attributs spécifiques
dans le cadre de l’animation de ses émissions pourenfants, telles que “WOZO VACANCES” et “AHOUANEY”.
Fort de ses états de services construits sur une décennie
de prestations, il s’arrogeait d’ores et déjà la paternité dupseudonyme “BOUBA” et l’image clownesque, utilisés parla société SICOA, en vue de la commercialisation de ses
produits, en l’occurrence des sucettes pour enfants, ceci
sans requérir le consentement de l’auteur.
453
454

VIVANT (M.) et BRUGUIÈRE (J.-M.), n.22, p. 160.
Voir Cass. ass. plén. du 7 mars 1986, Société Babolat Maillot Witt c.
Pachot, n° 83-10477; VIVANT (M.) (éd.), Les grands arrêts de la propriété
intellectuelle, Paris (Dalloz), 2003, n° 9; Comm. Maffre- Baugé, : D. 1986,
p. 405; Concl. Cabannes (note EDELMAN (B.)) : JCP E 1986, II.

Estimant subir un préjudice du fait de l’usage à desfins commerciales de ses créations, le sieur TOURE A.
va introduire une action en dommages et intérêts pardevant le tribunal d’Abidjan, en réparation du préjudice
par lui subi du fait de la contrefaçon de ses droitsd’auteurs sur le pseudonyme “BOUBA” et l’image utilisée
au titre de logo. Débouté par le juge d’instance, ce
dernier va sans succès renouveler ses prétentions devantla cour d’appel d’Abidjan. L’occasion fut dès lors idoine
pour la cour de rappeler que l’originalité de l’œuvre est
la clé de voûte de la protection par le droit d’auteur. En
d’autres termes, pour la cour, la création protégée autitre du droit d’auteur est avant tout une œuvre, maisaussi et surtout une œuvre originale, c’est-à-dire cellequi, au sens de l’art. 10 de la loi ivoirienne n° 96-564 du
26 juillet 1996, permet d’individualiser son auteur.
Insatisfait par cette décision, le sieur TOURE A. va user deson ultime recours et se pourvoir en cassation.
Raisonnement : Vidant son délibéré pour sonner le glasde la discorde, la haute juridiction va intégralement
s’approprier les développements des seconds juges,
optant ainsi pour une approche éminemment subjective
de la notion d’originalité. Avant de se prêter à une
analyse de fond de cette décision inédite (section II), ilparaît inévitable de sérier les contours assez flous duconcept même d’originalité des œuvres (section I), point
névralgique de la protection.
I. Les contours ambigus du concept d’originalité
L’originalité est le critérium fondamental qui sert
d’interface entre le champ de la propriété littéraire etartistique et celui de la propriété industrielle. Fauted’être purement et simplement définie, l’originalité
finit par être un concept polysémique. Loin du désirde laisser entrer le “loup dans la bergerie” du fait desinterprétations diffuses du concept, le législateur
ivoirien, du haut de sa chapelle personnaliste va, àl’article 10 de la loi invoquée par le demandeur au
pourvoi, disposer : “L’œuvre originale s’entend d’uneœuvre qui, dans ses éléments caractéristiques etdans sa forme, ou dans sa forme seulement, permetd’individualiser son auteur”.
Le nœud du contentieux réside surtout dans le contenu
à assigner à l’originalité, gage de la protection. Au
juge de l’illustre cour revenait de faire un choix décisif,
au-delà de la simple rhétorique mêlée de controverse
doctrinale, entre les thèses conceptuelles qui dominentla jurisprudence contemporaine (A). Le choix du juge,
empreint de subjectivité dans son annonce, finit, sansmême qu’il ne s’en rende peut-être compte, par trahir
un raisonnement dont les bases sont éminemment
objectives (B).

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiquel’œuvre seconde est investi du droit d’auteur mais il
ne peut l’exploiter qu’avec l’autorisation de l’auteur del’œuvre première. Cette autorisation, en l’espèce, auraitdû être donnée par le demandeur soit en tant qu’auteur
de l’œuvre première, soit en tant que représentant
de l’association titulaire des droits sur une œuvre
considérée comme collective. À défaut, l’exploitationétait bel et bien contrefaisante.

A. La controverse doctrinale autour de l’originalité
Il faut souligner qu’à l’orée, les textes révolutionnaires neparlent pas d’originalité, même pas de manière voilée455.
C’est donc à la faveur d’un construit mené discrètement
455

VIVANT (M.) et BRUGUIÈRE (J.-M.), n.22.
281

par les politiques jurisprudentielles que cette notion
prendra corps.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Prima facie, tout au long du XIXe et une partie du
XXe siècle, une œuvre est dite originale parce qu’elle
n’est la reproduction d’aucune œuvre antérieure456.
Pour P.-Y. Gautier, il est possible de “mieux cernerl’originalité par son antonyme : la banalité”, concluant
de ce fait qu’en pratique, les deux notions (d’originalité
et de nouveauté) se confondaient457. Sur cette base,le droit d’auteur est rapidement refusé à un dessin au
motif que sa composition est banale et courante458. C’est
pourtant ignorer les théories plus subjectives de ceux qui
suivent Desbois, qui propose un exemple : deux peintres
représentent sur leurs toiles, l’un après l’autre, le mêmelieu, selon la même perspective et dans les mêmes
conditions de lumière. Tous deux, dit-il, ont créé destableaux originaux, mais le second n’est objectivement
pas nouveau si l’on imagine la création artistique, celle den’être rien d’autre qu’une œuvre imitant la nature. Uneœuvre ne serait pas et le second tableau ne serait donc
pas nouveau, dans cette perspective, s’il imitait un objet
déjà reproduit, comme si l’exercice ne consistait qu’à
reproduire puis rien d’autre que la reproduction d’unecréation antérieure459.

282

Pourtant, ce deuxième tableau est bien entièrement
nouveau selon l’article 10 de la loi citée en l’espèce,
qui aborde l’originalité d’un point de vue subjectif ou
personnaliste. D’une manière péremptoire, Desbois posecomme postulat l’idée qu’“il suffit, pour qu’une œuvre
donne prise au droit d’auteur, qu’elle soit originale, ausens subjectif du mot : point n’est besoin qu’elle soit
nouvelle, au sens objectif”460. Pour cette chapelle à forte
coloration personnaliste, l’œuvre est protégée parceque l’auteur y est présent et, en ce sens, l’originalité nepeut qu’être subjective. L’œuvre est la “projection mêmede l’auteur”, l’œuvre c’est l’auteur461. En termes plus
intellectualisés, l’originalité est couramment assimiléeà l’empreinte même de la personnalité de l’auteur. Pour
M. TAFFOREAU, l’originalité c’est le style personnel del’auteur462. Il y a donc une propriété “par indivisibilité del’objet et du sujet”.
D’application difficile en matière d’art appliqué, laformule canonique (théorie subjective) va vite céderle pas à des paradigmes nouveaux, teintés d’unpragmatisme jurisprudentiel. Il est vrai que les tribunaux
se font majoritairement l’écho de la conception
subjective dominante. Néanmoins, à côté de la formule
canonique, on trouve aussi l’empreinte personnelle, lereflet de la personnalité ou la marque de celle-ci. Allant
plus loin, certains juges vont préférer le mérite sous le
456
457
458
459
460
461
462

Voir Tribunal civ. de Mayenne, 31 mai 1935.
GAUTIER (P.-Y.), Propriété littéraire et artistique (Droit fondamental), Paris(PUF), 2007, n° 35.
Voir Cass. Civ., 27 mai 1942 : S. 1942, I, p. 124.
DESBOIS (H.), Le droit d’auteur en France, 3e éd., Paris (Dalloz), 1978.
ibid.
VIVANT (M.) et BRUGUIÈRE (J.-M), n.22, p. 162.
TAFFOREAU (P.), Le style musical dans le doit de la propriété littéraire etartistique”, in musique et style. Méthodes et concepts, Université de ParisSorbonne/Observatoire musical français (Conférences et séminaires), n° 3,
1995, pp. 50 à 55.

couvert de l’originalité463. La jurisprudence a également
commencé à mettre en évidence la substitution duconcept plus objectif d’apport intellectuel à l’originalité,
notamment dans l’encadrement de la protectiondes œuvres utilitaires par le droit d’auteur (carte
géographique, croquis, base de données, etc.) que ladoctrine personnaliste, à elle seule, ne saurait expliquerl’octroi de la protection. C’est forcément au bout despositions parfois tranchées de ces écoles théoriques qu’il
convient de situer la position du juge suprême ivoirien,dans son appropriation du concept d’originalité.
B. L’appropriation du concept d’originalité par le juge
Sur cette toile de fond doctrinale et jurisprudentielle,
les juges du fond d’Abidjan, et plus tard celui decassation, se sont positionnés en donnant un contenu
au concept d’originalité. En fondant leurs décisions
sur les articles 6.3 et 10 de la loi n° 96-564 du 25 juillet
1996 relative à la protection des œuvres de l’esprit etaux droits des auteurs, des artistes-interprètes et desproducteurs de phonogrammes et vidéogrammes,
les juges d’appel et de cassation se sont, même demanière sous-entendue, inclinés vers la théorie
personnaliste, ou du moins, ne s’en sont pas éloignés
considérablement. C’est bien ce qui s’infère de la
motivation de la décision rendue en cassation lorsqu’il
y transparaît qu’“aucun des éléments caractéristiquesde sa prétendue ‘œuvre’ ne permettait d’individualiser
le demandeur au pourvoi”. Au lieu de la formule
canonique consacrée selon laquelle l’œuvre originale
est celle qui porte l’empreinte de la personnalité deson auteur, la Cour suprême se contente de formules
lapidaires pouvant prêter à polémique. On aurait
espéré qu’elle fût plus claire dans l’élaboration de sa
motivation en usant les termes consacrés, ce d’autant
plus que le juge suprême déclare que “T.A ne pouvantêtre considéré comme (…) l’inventeur du personnage
clownesque”.
En tout cas, la logique personnaliste du juge suprême va
déteindre sur la protection du pseudonyme et du logo
querellé, ce qui finit par exclure la protection recherchée
par le demandeur au pourvoi.
II. L’exclusion de la protection
Ayant penché pour la thèse subjective, la Cour suprême
rejette le pourvoi dirigé contre l’arrêt de la Cour d’appeld’Abidjan, refusant de ce fait toute protection aux
créations revendiquées. En tout état de cause, cettedécision de refus d’indemniser (A) cache mal la confusion
entretenue par le juge, entre protection et titularité desdroits (B).
A. Le refus d’indemnisation
Deux conditions président donc à l’octroi de laprotection, à savoir qu’il faut qu’il y ait une création
qualifiée d’“œuvre”, et que cette œuvre soit originale.
Les créations revendiquées par T.A répondent-elles
à la définition d’une œuvre de l’esprit? La question a
463

GAUTIER (P.-Y.), n.42, n° 50 : “Sous l’originalité, le mérite”.

Le point décisif du contentieux de la protection devait
alors glisser sur l’appréciation du caractère original descréations en cause.
En admettant que les créations revendiquées par T.A
correspondent à la définition d’une œuvre, le jugesuprême saisi d’une demande en indemnisation devait
naturellement se poser une autre question : celle desavoir si ces créations étaient originales. Comme enappel, le juge suprême a répondu à cette question de
fond. À cette autre question, le juge suprême décide
que les créations revendiquées manquent d’originalité,
entendue au sens subjectif du terme. En d’autres
termes, les éléments caractéristiques dominants desœuvres en cause n’étaient pas propres au demandeur
au pourvoi.
S’il est un mérite qu’on ne saurait refuser à la décision
rapportée, c’est celle d’avoir préalablement identifié
les éléments caractéristiques dominants des œuvres
querellées. Dans la cause, ils étaient constitués dupseudonyme et de l’image.
À l’analyse, la cour s’appuie sur l’antériorité de l’usage dudiminutif “Bouba” répandu en Côte d’Ivoire, et utilisé parun personnage d’un dessin animé célèbre, ne pouvant
donc plus être original. À l’évidence, cette motivation
dénote simplement la grosse confusion entretenue
par la cour entre œuvres “originale” et “originelle”.
L’œuvre originelle est l’œuvre préexistante, entendue
comme celle à partir de laquelle dérive une œuvre diteœuvre dérivée. Une œuvre dérivée est protégeable
tout comme l’œuvre originelle, la seule condition étant
que l’apport intellectuel de l’auteur de la première soit
original. Une œuvre peut, en dépit de son apparente
banalité, être originale à partir du moment où elle est
difficilement dissociable de son auteur, au point dese confondre à sa personnalité. Le second tableau del’exemple pris par Desbois le montre à suffire. À ce titre,n’est-il pas vrai de constater que T.A avait apporté aupersonnage de “Bouba” et à l’effigie qui l’accompagne
une empreinte singulière?
Enfin, c’est l’occasion de relever qu’au-delà du simple
effet d’annonce, la décision de refus de la protection
s’appuie plutôt sur des paradigmes objectifs. En effet,
on s’est très vite rendu compte que le juge suprême
définissait l’originalité sous un angle purement objectif,
contrairement aux prescriptions du législateur ivoirien.
Pour lui, l’œuvre qui reflète l’empreinte de la personnalitéde son auteur, au sens de l’article 10 du texte visé aupourvoi, est une œuvre nouvelle, qui n’est pas banale.
Cette position n’est pas conforme au choix législatif.
Il faut dire que l’amalgame qui filtre de la décision
rapportée a souvent été volontairement entretenu par ladoctrine. Depuis des lustres, nombreux sont les auteurs

qui assimilent la nouveauté à l’originalité. Déjà résignéà son temps, P.-Y. Gautier concluait : “Tant pis! Écrivonsle : en pratique, les deux notions (d’originalité et denouveauté) se confondent”464. Là où le bât blesse, c’est
qu’en l’état, les juges ivoiriens ont opéré un choix deconvenance. Le juge, qui n’est que la bouche morte dela loi, devait simplement appliquer le choix fait par lelégislateur. Le concept de “nouveauté” étant propre àl’école objective, il va sans dire que la décision rendue
s’inscrit en violation de la loi ivoirienne.
B. La confusion entretenue entre protection et titularité
Sur ce point, la cour s’est visiblement fourvoyée en
opposant à la demande d’indemnisation un rejet pourmotifs tirés de ce que T.A n’aurait pas créé les œuvres encause. Dans un attendu capital, la cour déclare : “Qu’il
résulte de la combinaison de ces deux articles qu’enmatière de propriété intellectuelle, la protection desœuvres de l’esprit ne joue que pour celles des œuvres qui
sont originales; Qu’en l’espèce, T.A. n’est pas à l’origine
du pseudonyme, qui ne renvoie pas systématiquement àla personne, est usuel et commun”.
C’est au bout de cette justification qu’il convient detrouver les bases de la confusion qui règne dans l’esprit
du juge, entre une demande de protection et une autre
relative à la titularité des droits. L’occasion nous semble
donc indiquée d’élaborer brièvement pour dire à partirde quand une œuvre est considérée comme créée.
Une œuvre est dite créée à partir du momentoù il y a cumulativement conception suivie de laréalisation, même inachevée de sa conception par
son auteur. L’article 7, alinéa 3, de la loi n° 2000/011 du19 décembre 2000 relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits
voisins au Cameroun dispose que : “L’œuvre est réputée
créée indépendamment de toute divulgation, du seul
fait de la réalisation personnelle, même inachevée, dela conception”. En termes profanes, l’œuvre est créée
dès l’instant où elle prend forme à travers des éléments
d’expression, indifféremment du mode, de la valeur ou
de la destination de l’expression. Le créateur, encore
appelé auteur, est titulaire originel de droit sur l’œuvre.
Il s’évince de ces développements que l’identification
du créateur du pseudonyme “Bouba” en Côte d’Ivoire
est sans incidence sur la question de l’octroi de laprotection. La cour a pourtant semblé l’ignorer. Toutd’abord, elle déclare que T.A ne serait pas créateur dupseudonyme. Bien pire, elle ajoute que ce dernier n’est
pas l’inventeur de l’image de clown utilisée comme logo
par la défenderesse au pourvoi. Cette justification durejet de la demande en réparation formulée par T.A
est assez grave de conséquence, parce que reposant
sur des concepts étrangers au droit de la propriété
littéraire et artistique. En effet, la notion d’inventeur
est consubstantielle au droit des brevets. Il s’agit dutitulaire de droit sur une invention protégée par un
brevet. À titre d’équivalence en droit d’auteur, c’est
l’auteur qui est titulaire de la protection.

464

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiqueété indirectement tranchée par le juge. En effet, en
refusant la demande d’indemnisation du demandeur au
pourvoi, motif pris de ce que ses créations manquaientd’originalité, la cour reconnaît implicitement la qualitéd’œuvre, autant au pseudonyme qu’à l’image de clown.

Ibid., n° 35.
283

Le moins que l’on puisse dire à cet effet, c’est que laqualité du créateur mise en relief dans la motivationde la décision n’a de pertinence que dans le cadre ducontentieux de la titularité des droits, et non celui de laprotection qui intéressait la cour. Pour s’en convaincre, il
convient de rappeler que les œuvres querellées peuvent
bien être éligibles à la protection sans pour autant qu’il
ait fallu que le demandeur au pourvoi en soit le créateur.
Pourtant, à la question de savoir si ces créations étaient
protégeables, la cour a répondu négativement, motifs
pris de ce que l’animateur T.A ne serait pas le créateurdu personnage et du pseudonyme. L’addition de ces
erreurs a abouti à des conséquences regrettables, lejuge suprême ayant clôturé son instruction en refusantde faire droit à une demande qui, autrement examinée,pourrait tout aussi être fondée.
Aristide Fade

F. Droit d’auteur – Radiodiffusion d’un
spot publicitaire incorporant uneœuvre musicale – Rémunérationéquitable à percevoir par unorganisme de gestion collective –Irrecevabilité de l’action exercée àtitre individuel par l’auteur

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

L’auteur d’une œuvre musicale qui a été utilisée pour laréalisation d’un spot publicitaire diffusé sur des radios
est irrecevable à agir contre l’annonceur, la rémunérationdue à raison de cette utilisation constituant larémunération équitable prévue par l’article 68 de la loi
béninoise sur le droit d’auteur, dont le recouvrement
ne peut être assuré que par l’organisme de gestion
collective désigné par la loi.

284

Tribunal de commerce de Cotonou, jugement du3 mai 2018, n° 017/18/CJ/SII/TCC, ISAAC TOHODE c.
PHIBAUT AMOUZOUN
Observations :Le jugement commenté laisse l’arrêtiste sur sa faim. Il seborne, en effet, à se saisir d’une fin de non-recevoir pourdéclarer irrecevable l’action exercée par l’auteur d’une
composition musicale, ce qui le dispense d’examiner lesautres questions juridiques susceptibles d’être agitées
en l’espèce.
Faits : Le demandeur se présente ici comme un “artistecompositeur, chanteur et arrangeur”. Une de sesœuvres, qui a été ensuite comprise dans un album de
10 titres, a été utilisée à des fins publicitaires, dans desconditions que la lecture de la décision ne permet pasd’élucider avec précision, pour la réalisation d’un “spot”
que l’annonceur a fait diffuser pendant des mois sur
plusieurs radios. C’est cet annonceur que l’auteur assignepour lui réclamer 75 millions de francs CFA à titre dedommages et intérêts. L’action est déclarée irrecevable
au motif que seul le Bureau béninois du droit d’auteur(BUBEDRA) avait qualité pour recouvrer la rémunérationdue à raison de l’utilisation du phonogramme en cause.

Raisonnement : La solution est très discutable car elle
est fondée sur un texte, l’article 68 de la loi béninoise surle droit d’auteur, qui n’était pas applicable en l’espèce.
Et le parti adopté par le tribunal est regrettable car, endehors de cette objection, qui n’était pas pertinente(section I), d’autres objections auraient mérité discussion(section II).
I. L’objection retenue, fondée sur l’article 68 de la loi
sur le droit d’auteur
Le défendeur affirmait que “la somme à percevoiréventuellement par l’auteur d’une œuvre ayant servi
de support de publicité à des fins commerciales est
perçue auprès de la commission chargée de la gestion
collective, à laquelle est versée une rémunérationéquitable et unique par l’utilisateur du phonogramme”.
Le raisonnement se référait implicitement au systèmede licence légale prévu par l’article 60 de l’annexe VIIde l’ABR-2015 et l’article 68 de la loi n° 2005-30 du
10 avril 2006 relative à la protection du droit d’auteur etdes droits voisins en République du Bénin, qui font céder
le droit exclusif de l’artiste-interprète et du producteurde phonogramme en cas de radiodiffusion ou decommunication au public d’un phonogramme publié àdes fins de commerce et leur accordent, en contrepartie,
une “rémunération équitable” perçue par un organismede gestion collective.
Le tribunal se saisit de l’argument à partir de la seule loi
béninoise. Après avoir posé le principe que “lorsqu’unphonogramme est publié à des fins de commerce,
une rémunération est versée à l’établissement publicchargé de la gestion collective et de la défense des droits
patrimoniaux des auteurs et des titulaires des droits
voisins par l’utilisateur”, il en déduit qu’en l’espèce seul
le BUBEDRA “a qualité pour poursuivre le recouvrement
des redevances liées aux droits patrimoniaux des auteurs
et titulaires des droits voisins”, à l’exclusion d’un artiste
musicien qui est sans droit pour “recouvrer directement
une telle rémunération auprès de l’utilisateur”.
La démonstration ne peut emporter la conviction.
D’abord, la lecture que fait le tribunal de l’article 68
de la loi béninoise est erronée. Contrairement à ce
qu’il énonce dans ses motifs (et qu’il reprend dans son
dispositif), ce n’est pas la “publication” du phonogrammequi paralyse le droit exclusif de l’artiste-interprète etdu producteur de phonogramme et leur ouvre a droità rémunération équitable, c’est la radiodiffusion ou lacommunication au public du phonogramme.
Encore faut-il que le phonogramme ait été “publié àdes fins de commerce”. Or, en l’espèce, la chose n’est
pas aussi certaine que semble le penser le tribunal. En
effet, pour autant qu’on puisse en juger à la lecturede la décision, ce qui a été diffusé sur les chaînes deradio n’est pas le phonogramme contenant l’album
complet de l’artiste (qui, lui, incontestablement, est un
phonogramme publié à des fins de commerce), mais
seulement un des titres (intitulé “Évolution”) qui, alorsmême qu’il n’était pas encore fixé sur ce phonogramme,
avait déjà été exécuté en public lors de plusieurs

Enfin et surtout, cette paralysie du droit exclusif nevaut que pour les droits voisins dont sont titulaires
les artistes-interprètes et les producteurs dephonogrammes. Or, en l’espèce, le demandeur se
prévalait de sa qualité d’auteur puisqu’il faisait valoirdans ses écritures “qu’étant auteur du morceau“Évolution”, il a qualité et intérêt à revendiquer en justice,la propriété attachée à son œuvre”. L’article 68 de la loi
béninoise ne pouvait donc lui être opposé466.
II. Les autres objections susceptibles d’être opposées
D’autres objections pouvaient être (et, pour certaines
d’entre elles, avaient été) opposées à l’auteur demandeur.
Le défendeur indiquait qu’un autre compositeur bien
connu avait participé à la création de l’œuvre et que,pour établir sa co-paternité, il avait fait opposition audépôt fait par le demandeur au BUBEDRA, déclenchantainsi une procédure de conciliation qui rendait ledemandeur irrecevable à agir en contrefaçon tant qu’ellen’était pas parvenue à son terme. Il se référait ainsi
implicitement aux articles 86 et 87 de la loi béninoise.
Le premier dispose que “Toute contestation qui naîtde l’exécution des contrats de reproduction, d’édition,
de représentation et d’exécution en public des œuvres
littéraires, artistiques et des créations protégées
par les droits voisins sera soumise à l’organisme degestion collective pour tentative de conciliation”, etle second précise que c’est seulement en cas d’échec
de cette conciliation que “les parties ont la facultéde saisir le tribunal compétent soit directement, soit
par l’entremise de l’organisme de gestion collective”.
Mais le cas d’espèce ne correspondait pas du tout àl’hypothèse visée par la loi béninoise puisqu’il s’agissait
d’un désaccord entre deux auteurs sur la paternitéd’une œuvre déposée auprès de l’organisme de gestion
collective, et non d’une contestation née de l’exécutiond’un contrat d’exploitation des droits d’auteur ou desdroits voisins. Le demandeur répondait donc à justetitre, pour réfuter l’objection, que “le BUBEDRA quin’est pas une juridiction ne peut rendre aucun acte dejuridiction” et que “sa saisine d’un contentieux relatif à lapaternité du morceau ’Évolution‘ ne constitue point unequestion préjudicielle”.
Le défendeur plaidait également l’irrecevabilité de la
demande en faisant valoir que le demandeur ne justifiait
pas de “sa paternité exclusive” de la composition
musicale litigieuse. L’argument sous-entend qu’uncoauteur ne peut agir à titre isolé en contrefaçon del’œuvre de collaboration. Il peut prendre appui surl’article 33.4 de l’annexe VII de l’ABR-2015 qui pose leprincipe que “les coauteurs exercent leurs droits d’uncommun accord”. Il est vrai que cette disposition ne
prend pas expressément parti sur le cas des actions en
justice. En droit français, la jurisprudence avait, dans
un premier temps, admis la possibilité pour le coauteurd’agir seul467. Mais la Cour de cassation n’a pas hésité, en
1988, à ériger en principe que “le coauteur d’une œuvre
de collaboration qui prend l’initiative d’agir en justicepour la défense de ses droits patrimoniaux est tenu,
à peine d’irrecevabilité de sa demande, de mettre encause les autres auteurs de cette œuvre”468. Toutefois,
cette jurisprudence est critiquée en doctrine469, car ellecomplique fâcheusement la mise en œuvre effective del’action en contrefaçon, et il n’est donc pas souhaitable
que l’article 33.4 de l’annexe VII soit interprété ence sens.
Une dernière objection pouvait venir à l’esprit, tenant
aux conséquences de l’adhésion de l’auteur demandeur
à un organisme de gestion collective, ici le BUBEDRA.
Elle serait décisive en droit français car la Cour decassation, après avoir admis la recevabilité de l’actiond’un auteur ayant apporté ses droits à une société degestion collective470, ce qui avait suscité le trouble, a
opéré un spectaculaire revirement en décidant quel’auteur ayant adhéré à la SACEM est irrecevable à agir
personnellement pour défendre les droits dont il a fait
l’apport, sous la seule réserve d’une carence de la sociétéd’auteurs dans la défense du droit471. Une telle carencen’étant pas alléguée en l’espèce, l’action en contrefaçon
exercée en l’espèce serait donc déclarée irrecevable en
France, sauf à démontrer que l’utilisation publicitaire encause n’entre pas dans le champ de la cession de droitsd’auteur résultant de l’adhésion à l’organisme de gestion
collective. Mais la situation est tout autre dans les États
membres de l’OAPI. En effet, l’article 69 de l’annexe VII,
après avoir attribué aux organismes de gestion collective
la mission d’assurer “la protection, l’exploitation et lagestion des droits des auteurs d’œuvres et des titulaires
de droits voisins”, ajoute que ces dispositions “neportent, en aucun cas, préjudice à la faculté appartenant
467
468
469

465

466

Voir en ce sens l’art. 3 let. d de la Convention internationale sur la protection desarticles interprètes ou exécutants, des producteurs de phonogrammes et desorganismes de radiodiffusion conclue à Rome le 26 octobre 1961 et l’art. 2 let. e
du Traité de l’OMPI sur les interprétations et exécutions et les phonogrammes(WPPT) (1996).
Voir en ce sens NGOMBE (L-Y.), Chronique d’Afrique : août 2016 –décembre 2018 : RIDA 2019, I, pp. 61 à 138, à la p. 107.

470
471

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiquemanifestations, et à partir duquel avait été réalisé le spot
publicitaire diffusé. On pourrait être tenté de répondre
que le spot en lui-même fixait bel et bien l’œuvre encause. Sans doute, mais ce phonogramme n’avait
pas fait l’objet d’une publication, notion qui renvoie
traditionnellement à l’idée d’une fabrication en nombred’“exemplaires”465. Il faut bien comprendre, en effet, quela licence légale dont la rémunération équitable constitue
la contrepartie n’a été prévue que pour permettre aux
radiodiffuseurs d’être libérés des contraintes du droit
exclusif lorsqu’ils communiquent des phonogrammes qui
ont fait l’objet d’une véritable commercialisation.

Cass. civ., 21 juillet 1908 : S. 1909, I, p. 121 (note LYON-CAEN (CH.-L.)); CA
Paris, 3 novembre 1956 : Gaz. Pal. 1956, II, p. 324.
Cass. civ., 1re chambre, 4 octobre 1988, n° 86-19.272 : RIDA 1989, III, p. 251;
D. 1989, p. 482 (note GAUTIER (P.-Y.)). Voir en ce sens Cass. civ. 1re chambre,
8 février 2017, n° 15-26.133.
LUCAS (A.), LUCAS-SCHLOETTER (A.) et BERNAULT (C.), n.36, n° 199; GAUTIER(P.-Y.), Propriété littéraire et artistique, (Droit fondamental), 11e éd., Paris(PUF), 2019, n° 703, p. 765.
Cass. civ., 1re chambre, 24 février 1998, n° 95-22.282 : Bull. civ., I, n° 75; RIDA
1998, III, p. 213 (note KEREVER (A.)); D. 1998, p. 471 (note FRANÇON (A.)).
Cass. civ., 1re chambre, 13 novembre 2014, n° 13-22.401 : Bull. civ., I, n° 187;
Comm. com. électr. 2015, comm. 2 (note CARON (C.)); D. 2015, p. 410 (noteÉTIENNEY-DE SAINTE MARIE (A.)); Propr. intell. 2015, p. 64 (obs. BRUGUIÈRE
(J.-M.)) : RTD com. 2015, p. 291 (obs. POLLAUD-DULIAN (F.)).
285

aux auteurs d’œuvres et à leurs successeurs, et aux
titulaires de droits voisins, d’exercer les droits qui leursont reconnus par la présente annexe”, précision reprisedans les mêmes termes par l’article 12, alinéa 4, de la loi
béninoise.
André Lucas

G. Œuvre première – Titularité des droits– Créateur de l’œuvre - Transformation
de l’œuvre première – Nécessaire
autorisation de l’auteur – Sanction dudéfaut d’autorisation
L’auteur d’une œuvre littéraire est la personne physiquequi a créé l’œuvre. Par conséquent, toute exhibition
publique, transformation ou adaptation de sa création
doit requérir son consentement préalable donné demanière expresse et indiquant la durée, le mode et le but
de l’exploitation.
Par ailleurs, ses droits moraux, aux rangs desquels lesdroits à la paternité et à l’intégrité sur son œuvre, sontgarantis par la loi, toute contravention exposant l’auteur
à des lourdes condamnations pécuniaires.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Tribunal de grande instance de Ouagadougou,
jugement du 18 février 2015, RG 326 du 10 avril 2014,
K. L. I. c. S. J. S. L.

286

Observations :La titularité des droits d’auteur sur les œuvres del’esprit peut dans certains cas s’avérer être une véritable
nébuleuse, notamment dans les cas de créations
plurales. La venue des retombées financières, souvent
inattendues au moment de la création, sonnent le glas del’harmonie superficielle entre participants, pour marquer
le début des joutes judiciaires. Chaque protagoniste,enclin à banaliser le génie créateur de l’autre et s’arrogerà lui tout seul la qualité d’auteur, souhaite demeurer
l’unique attributaire des droits d’exploitation. La
raison, à la fois morale et financière, en est simple : onpartage plus aisément l’argent et le succès lorsqu’on
est peu nombreux472. C’est ce qui filtre du jugement
rendu le 18 février 2015 par le tribunal de grande
instance de Ouagadougou.
Faits : Sur interpellation du sieur S.J.S.L., metteur enscène à la notoriété établie, le sieur K.L.I. avait crééune œuvre dramatique, intitulée “Salomon le sage”,
destinée à être mise en scène et représentée durant lesfestivités de la rentrée télévisuelle 2011-2012. Suite ausuccès fulgurant de cette création circonstanciée, S.J.S.L.
va se permettre le luxe, sans requérir l’assentimentde K.L.I., titulaire originel des droits d’exploitation,d’apporter des modifications à la version originale del’œuvre afin d’étendre sa durée au-delà de la période
déterminée dans la convention de représentation signée
472

FOMETEU (J.), Le contentieux du droit d’auteur et des droits voisins dansla zone OAPI, Mélanges en hommage au Doyen Stanislas Meloné, Presses
Universitaires du Cameroun, 2018, p. 631.

le 6 novembre 2011. Surpris du dépôt ultérieur, auprès
du bureau burkinabé du droit d’auteur (BBDA), de laversion modifiée de son œuvre, d’une part, et de lareprésentation prolongée de ladite création querellée,d’autre part, sieur K.L.I. va ester en justice, afin de voir
sanctionner l’exploitation illicite de son œuvre.
L’issue du combat judiciaire était tributaire de laquestion de savoir qui pouvait véritablement se
prévaloir d’être titulaire des droits sur la pièce dethéâtre à succès.
Raisonnement : Au bout du rappel des principes
fondamentaux, le juge a répondu à la question en faisantréférence au législateur communautaire, beaucoup plus
fin dans sa plume que son homologue burkinabé473,
qui dispose que : “l’auteur est la personne physiquequi a créé l’œuvre”474 . Cette règle s’applique toujours
dans le cas de l’œuvre individuelle, créée par une
seule personne.
C’est donc en conséquence de cause qu’en l’absence depreuve d’une collaboration des litigants dans la creation
de l’oeuvre intitulée “Salomon le sage”, le juge appliquera
les principes établis, pour :I.
II.

déterminer l’auteur unique de l’œuvre; etsanctionner toute atteinte aux droits attachés àcette création.

I. La détermination de l’auteur de l’œuvre
À l’examen des faits de la cause, deux créations, toutes
deux intitulées “Salomon le sage”, alimentaient bel
et bien la discorde devant le prétoire burkinabé. Il fut
question d’une œuvre originale et d’une autre, modifiée.
Pour chacune d’elles, le juge était appelé à déterminer
l’auteur. Pour y parvenir, le juge d’instance va, tout
d’abord, déterminer l’auteur de l’œuvre originale (A),et ensuite, délimiter les contours de l’exploitation del’œuvre modifiée (B).
A. La détermination de l’auteur de l’œuvre originale
La question centrale du contentieux né de l’exploitation
de l’œuvre dénommée “Salomon le sage” était dedéterminer qui était le titulaire des droits sur la version
originale. Pour cela, le juge devait questionner lecontexte légal régentant le droit d’auteur au Burkina.
Les dispositions de l’art. 2.viii) de l’AB du 24 février 1999,
invoquées par le demandeur, ont permis de répondre àcette préoccupation. En règle générale et comme nous
l’avons relevé plus haut, l’auteur est la personne physiquequi crée l’œuvre et décide librement de son utilisation475.
Surgit alors une autre interrogation, celle de savoir àpartir de quand une œuvre peut être considérée commecréée. Là non plus, la loi burkinabé n’est pas d’une
473
474
475

Voir art. 26 al. 2 de la loi n° 032-99/AN portant protection de la propriété
littéraire et artistique (Burkina Faso).
Voir art. 1.viii) de l’annexe VII de l’ABR 1999.
EDOU EDOU (P.), Le contentieux de la propriété intellectuelle dans les États
membres de l’OAPI : Guide du magistrat et des auxiliaires, Genève (OMPI),
p. 23.

Dans l’affaire rapportée, K.L.I. revendiquait la conception
intégrale de l’œuvre querellée. D’ailleurs, le défendeur
n’a pas pu prouver qu’il a participé activement à laconception du plan général de la pièce de théâtre, à
ses différentes parties et à l’agencement de celles-ci.
De la même façon, K.L.I a pu convaincre le juge que lui
seul aura œuvré à la réalisation totale de l’œuvre. Dansl’espèce Maedza c. Mogotsi, la demanderesse, qui était
une élève du défendeur, avait rédigé à la demande dusecond un poème qui fut catalogué dans un recueil intitulé
Mmopa Khukhu, puis présenté comme étant l’œuvre deson enseignant477. Saisi au fond sur la déterminationde la qualité d’auteur, le juge décidait, aux termes del’instruction de l’affaire, que la demanderesse était bel etbien l’auteur du poème, pour l’avoir dûment créé478.
Pourtant, dans son exposé, le sieur S.J.S.L. avait
vainement tenté de dévoyer les faits, en alléguant
avoir apporté une contribution significative à l’œuvre
originale. Ceci n’a pas prospéré, le juge ayant déduit
des circonstances de la cause, et notamment du procèsverbal de conciliation du 16 octobre 2012 établi par leBBDA, que les apports revendiqués sont postérieurs àl’enregistrement de l’œuvre originale, et ne sauraientdéterminer l’attribution de la qualité d’auteur sur celle-ci.
Il ne restait plus pour le juge qu’à fixer les contours del’exploitation de l’œuvre dérivée.
B. La détermination de l’auteur de l’œuvre dérivée
Les conclusions développées par le S.J.S.L., défendeur
à l’instance, étaient destinées à faire asseoir laconviction du juge sur l’idée d’une cotitularité des droits
qu’il partagerait avec son contradicteur, sur l’œuvre
dramatique intitulée “Salomon le Sage”, tout au moins,dans sa version révisée (dérivée). Pour atteindre l’effet
escompté par la défense, le juge devait préalablementclasser dans une catégorie juridique existante l’œuvre
modifiée avant de statuer sur la titularité des droits.
Tout d’abord, l’œuvre transformée satisfaisait-elle
aux exigences d’une œuvre composite ou dérivée? Du
simple fait qu’elle soit née d’une œuvre préexistante,on serait de prime abord tenté de conclure très vite
476
477
478

Voir art. 7 al. 3 de la loi n° 2000/011 du 19 décembre 2000 relative au droit
d’auteur et aux droits voisins (Cameroun).
Haute-Cour du Botswana (Lobatse), Maedza c. Mogotsi, 2007 : Botswana Law
Reports, I, 2006, p. 182. Disponible en ligne à l’adresse http://www.elaws.
gov.bw/desplaylrpage.
Voir Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire, Touré Aboubacar c. Sicoa, Arrêt n° 598 du8 décembre 2005 (obs. FADE (A.), ce recueil, chapitre 6, section E).

par l’affirmative. L’œuvre composite ou dérivée estcelle à laquelle est incorporée une œuvre préexistantesans la collaboration de l’auteur de cette dernière,“mais avec l’accord de l’auteur originel”479. Le texte
précise que c’est la collaboration de l’auteur de l’œuvre
première qui n’est pas requise, pas son consentementqui, lui, est requis. Cette précision tranche clairement laquestion ci-dessus posée, en y répondant par la négative.
Quid de l’œuvre de collaboration? Cette question ajustement occupé une place de choix durant l’instruction
de l’affaire. On ne saurait laisser passer inaperçue laméprise qu’ont les justiciables ordinaires dans leurperception défectueuse des vocables du droit référentiel
français. Dans sa réplique à son adversaire, sieur S.J.S.L.
s’ingéniait à faire entendre au juge que l’œuvre modifiée
qu’il avait à son tour déposée auprès du BBDA était uneœuvre de collaboration. La définition de l’œuvre decollaboration n’est pas clairement élaborée dans la loi
burkinabé sur le droit d’auteur. Aux termes de l’article 27de la loi burkinabé n° 032-99/AN du 22 décembre 1999
portant protection de la propriété littéraire et artistique,“Les coauteurs d’une œuvre de collaboration sont les
premiers titulaires des droits moraux et patrimoniaux
sur cette œuvre. Ils exercent leurs droits d’un commun
accord; en cas de litige, il appartient à la juridiction
compétente saisie de statuer”. Mais d’une manière
triviale, il s’agit d’une œuvre à la création de laquelle ont
concouru deux ou plusieurs auteurs480.
Deux situations sont envisageables dans la création del’œuvre de collaboration. La première consistant dans
une association d’au moins deux personnes travaillant
ensemble à l’élaboration de l’œuvre, sans qu’il soit
aisé de dire avec précision quelle partie de l’œuvre est
attribuable à telle ou telle personne. Cette hypothèse,
purement théorique, est aux antipodes des faits de lacause. La seconde hypothèse se conçoit lorsque mêmeen situation de possible individualisation des apports
respectifs des auteurs, ces derniers ont agi et en seconcertant pour un but commun. En se rapportant aux
faits de la cause, la seconde hypothèse doit être écartée.
La raison en est simple, et pourtant magistralement
relayée par K.L.I lorsqu’il faisait constater, à raison, quel’effort contributif du défendeur sur l’œuvre transforméeétait dépourvu d’originalité. C’est-à-dire qu’en l’absenced’un apport créatif original, il n’y a pas d’œuvre au sens
des créations protégeables par le droit d’auteur.

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistique

grande utilité. Aussi, de la lecture de l’art. 4, par. 3, dela loi burkinabé n° 032-99/AN portant protection de la
propriété littéraire et artistique, il résulte que l’œuvre est
créée lorsqu’il y a eu conception, suivie de la réalisation,même inachevée, de cette conception476. En des termes
plus simples, il y a conception à partir de l’instant oùl’œuvre aura reçu une consécration formelle, saisissable
par le droit, par opposition aux idées et concepts nonmatérialisés qui sont susceptibles d’etre appropriésjuridiquement. Il importe peu que cette expressiond’idées soit inachevée.

Ne répondant donc manifestement à aucune catégoried’œuvre plurale, l’objectif de cotitularité des droits,
pourtant recherché par le défendeur, n’a pas trouvé
l’onction du juge, qui a maintenu à bon droit les droitsd’auteurs de K.L.I sur l’entièreté de l’œuvre à succès
querellée. C’est donc pour rester cohérent avec lui-même
que le juge de la cause va sanctionner l’exploitation del’œuvre par le défendeur, en violation des droits de K.L.I.

479
480

EDOU EDOU (P.), n.60, p. 23.
EDOU EDOU (P.), n.60, p. 22.
287

II. La violation des droits attachés à l’œuvre
Comme exposé plus haut, le juge reconnaît la qualitéd’auteur du demandeur initial et incrimine les actes
d’exploitation de l’œuvre en cause. Aussi, poursanctionner convenablement les atteintes incriminées
par le prononcé des sanctions idoines (B), la décisioncommentée prend soin de délimiter minutieusementl’étendue matérielle desdites atteintes (A).
A. La délimitation matérielle des droits violés
Répondant à la demande initiale, le juge va reconstituerl’étendue des droits violés, en épousant d’une manière
aussi fidèle que possible la terminologie consacrée parla législation sur le droit d’auteur. En bref, le juge déplore
des atteintes redondantes aux droits patrimoniaux (1) del’auteur, balayant curieusement d’un revers de la toge,celles d’ordre extrapatrimonial (2) pourtant portées à
son attention.
1. Les atteintes aux droits patrimoniaux sur l’œuvre
En un mot, il s’agit des droits d’exploitation économiquede l’œuvre, permettant à l’auteur de tirer un profit
pécuniaire de la gestion de son œuvre. Autrement dit,
c’est l’ensemble des prérogatives pécuniaires de l’auteur
sur son œuvre481. Au rang des droits patrimoniaux,l’art. 16 de la loi burkinabé du 22 décembre 1999 liste lesdroits de :Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle• reproduction de son œuvre, de traduction,
préparation des adaptations, des arrangements ou
autres transformations;• distribution des exemplaires au public par la vente ou
par tout autre transfert de propriété ou par locationou prêt public;• représentation ou d’exécution en public; et• importation des exemplaires, de radiodiffusion ou decommunication au public, de son œuvre.

288

Dans le contexte plus précis de l’espèce, les droits
patrimoniaux pour lesquels le défendeur était mis en
cause étaient le droit de représentation et le droit detransformation de l’œuvre.
Selon P.-Y. Gautier, représenter une œuvre signifie
traditionnellement l’exhibition au public d’une œuvre,
ou le fait de “la porter à la connaissance du public par
son exécution : jouer la pièce, la symphonie, réciterle poème”482. La représentation ne donne prise au
monopole que si elle communique l’œuvre au public483.
Avec l’essor des NTIC, la représentation va de nos jours
bien au-delà de l’exhibition matérielle des œuvres pourinclure la mise à la communication au public de l’œuvre,de sorte qu’il puisse y accéder au moment et à l’endroit
qu’il choisit individuellement484.
Dans l’espèce commentée, la violation du droit dereprésentation par le sieur S.J.S.L. avait consisté à
poursuivre, au-delà du délai convenu, l’exhibition del’œuvre protégée, sous la forme d’une pièce de théâtre,en l’absence du consentement de l’auteur.
Par ailleurs, on regrette que le juge de la cause ait
brillé par son ignorance de la violation du droit detransformation de l’auteur sur l’œuvre “Salomon lesage”. En fait, la transformation d’une œuvre s’entend
par sa traduction, son adaptation, son arrangement ou
toute autre modification de l’œuvre485. L’auteur jouit parconséquent du droit d’autoriser ou d’interdire toute sortede transformation de son œuvre.
Dans les faits, le défendeur avait transformé l’œuvre
dramatique créée par son contradicteur, sans requérir
son autorisation expresse, toute chose qui avait abouti
au dépôt d’une version modifiée de la pièce de théâtre
auprès de l’O.G.C compétente. On aurait pu s’attendre à
ce que le juge sanctionne également cette atteinte.
2. L’ignorance des droits moraux par le juge
Par droits moraux, la loi désigne les droits
extrapatrimoniaux faisant partie d’une catégorie plus
vaste de droits dits de la personnalité486. L’art. 9 de la loi
burkinabé n° 032-99/AN du 22 décembre 1999 portant
protection de la propriété littéraire et artistique en
distingue quatre, à savoir : le droit de divulgation, le droità la paternité, le droit au respect (souvent dénommé droit
à l’intégrité de l’œuvre dans d’autres textes régissant ledroit d’auteur) et le droit de repentir et de retrait.
Dans l’espèce commentée, c’est le droit au respectqui était à l’ordre du jour des débats. Par définition, ils’agit du droit pour l’auteur d’autoriser ou d’interdire
toute déformation, mutilation ou autre modification deson œuvre487.
Dans la cause, la violation de ce droit était au centre desdébats. Le demandeur à l’instance se plaignait de ce quele sieur S.J.S.L. avait mutilé sa création, sans requérir son
consentement préalable, en y ajoutant des nouveauxpersonnages, des personnages du genre féminin, demanière disait-il, lourdement “préjudiciables à sonhonneur ou sa réputation”. Le juge va faire droit à sa
demande en entrant en voie de condamnation contre lesieur S.J.S.L. pour violation au droit au respect de l’œuvre
de K.L.I.
On peut néanmoins regretter que le juge n’ait pas relevé
la violation du droit à la paternité de l’œuvre qui avait
484

481
482
483

Droit d’auteur et droits voisins, Guide pratique sur le droit d’auteur et lesdroits voisins à l’intention des magistrats et auxiliaires de justice, Organisationinternationale de la francophonie, réédition novembre 2011, p. 20.
GAUTIER (P.-Y.), Propriété littéraire et artistique (Droit fondamental), 7e éd.
refondue, Paris (PUF), 2010, p. 326.
VIVANT (M.) et BRUGUIÈRE (J.-M.), n.22, p. 343.

485
486
487

Voir Cour d’État du Niger, Sonitel v. BNDA, Arrêt n° 11-250-civ du
1er décembre 2011 (obs. FADE (A.), ce recueil, chapitre 6, section O).
Voir art. 18 al. 1 de la loi n° 2000/011 du 19 décembre 2000 relative au droit
d’auteur et aux droits voisins (Cameroun).
N.66, p.18.
Voir art. 12 de la loi n° 032-99/AN du 22 décembre 1999 portant protection
de la propriété littéraire et artistique (Burkina Faso); l’art. 14 al. 1-C de la loi
n° 2000/011 du 19 décembre 2000 relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits
voisins (Cameroun) parle de droit à l’intégrité de l’œuvre.

B. Le prononcé des sanctions idoines
Toute sanction appliquée dans des cas comme celui-ci
est destinée à faire cesser les infractions commises età réparer le préjudice causé. En l’espèce, le calcul desdommages et intérêts, la sanction principale (1) et les
sanctions complémentaires (2) n’ont pas été clairement
expliqués, le juge ayant décidé d’aller au-delà de la
demande de sanctions calendaires.
1. Les sanctions principales prononcées contre S.J.S.L.
En vue de garantir au demandeur son monopoled’exploitation, le juge sanctionne les atteintes aux
droits d’auteur sur l’œuvre dramatique considérée en
combinant, dans un dosage proportionné, injonction etallocation des dommages et intérêts.
C’est dans les dispositions de l’accord sur les ADPIC
qu’il convient de trouver le fondement originel de ces
mesures d’injonction qui, après mention expresse
dans les dispositions de l’article 63, alinéa 1, del’annexe VII de l’AB de 1977, n’ont plus été expressément
mentionnées par les accords subséquents. L’article 44,
alinéa 1, de l’Accord sur les ADPIC dispose que “Lesautorités judiciaires seront habilitées à ordonner à
une partie de cesser de porter atteinte à un droit,
entre autres choses afin d’empêcher l’introduction
dans les circuits commerciaux relevant de leurcompétence des marchandises importées qui impliquent
une atteinte au droit de propriété intellectuelle,
immédiatement après le dédouanement de ces
marchandises”. En substance, il s’agit de mesures visantla cessation immédiate de l’atteinte aux droits violés488.
Une fois de plus, le juge de la cause a eu recours à cettemesure en ordonnant dans le jugement “la cessation dela violation de ses droits concernant l’œuvre en cause”.
Assez souvent, l’allocation des dommages etintérêts polarise le champ des mesures de lutte,
au plan civil, contre la contrefaçon des droits
de propriété intellectuelle en général, et dudroit d’auteur en particulier. C’est à coup sûr laprincipale sanction civile en matière de contrefaçon.
Il s’agit du paiement d’une somme d’argent
à la victime de la contrefaçon, en réparation
des conséquences dommageables de l’atteinte
aux droits489.
Comme relevé par K.L.I dans ses conclusions, l’action
en dommages et intérêts trouve son fondement dansles réformes communautaire490 et nationale sur le droit
d’auteur491. Elle vise à réparer les préjudices matériel etmoral causés par l’atteinte aux droits de la victime.
488
489
490
491

EDOU EDOU (P.), n.60, p. 80.
Ibid., p. 77.
Voir art. 63 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999; art. 76 al. 1 de l’ABR-1999.
Voir art. 104 de la loi n° 032-99/AN du 22 décembre 1999 portant protection
de la propriété littéraire et artistique (Burkina Faso).

Dans l’espèce commentée, la condamnation de S.J.S.L.
au paiement de la somme de 10 000 000 francs visait àréparer tout poste de préjudices confondus. Cependant,
il aurait été plus intéressant pour le juge de ventiler lemontant alloué à titre de dommages et intérêts, ce qui
aurait davantage justifié le montant accordé.
2. La faiblesse des sanctions complémentaires
Le juge aurait pu faire mieux qu’ordonner l’exécution
provisoire de son jugement nonobstant appel.
Un rapide détour dans les chefs de prétentions du sieur
K.L.I nous indique que le juge d’instance était appelé
dans l’acte de sa saisine à : “s’entendre ordonner à S.J.S.L.
la cessation des violations de ses droits sous astreintede cinq cent mille (500 000) francs par jour de retard; s’entendre condamner S.J.S.L. à lui payer la somme decinq cent mille (500 000) francs au titre des frais exposés
non compris dans les dépens”. En choisissant d’ignorer
certaines demandes, d’astreinte et remboursement desfrais exposés par la procédure, pourtant généreusement
formulées par K.L.I., la décision du juge laisse un arrièregoût d’inachevé.
Relativement à son opportunité, la demande d’astreinte
gardait tout son mérite. À ce propos, l’Accord de Bangui,dans ses dispositions applicables aux faits, prescrivaitl’octroi d’une telle mesure d’exécution forcée, censéebriser toute velléité future de l’auteur de l’atteinte,désireux de poursuivre son illicéité. Aux termes del’article 63.4 de l’annexe VII de l’AB acte du 2 mars 1977 :“lorsque le danger existe, que des actes constituant
une violation se poursuivent, le tribunal ordonne
expressément la cessation de ces actes. Il fixe en outre
un montant à verser à titre d’astreinte”. Cette disposition
est identique à l’article 63.4 de l’AB. du 24 février 1999.
L’astreinte est, dans ce contexte, un complément
nécessaire de la mesure d’injonction pourtant accordéepar le juge dans le cas d’un tel risque. On peut en direautant de la demande de remboursement des frais
exposés par la procédure, dont le fondement est poséà l’alinéa 1 de l’article 63 de l’annexe VII de l’Accord de
Bangui du 24 février 1999.
Le juge rate là, assurément, une occasion d’arrimer laréparation au préjudice subi par la victime.
Aristide Fade

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiquepourtant été débattue. Pourtant, dans son art. 11, la loi
burkinabé du 22 décembre 1999 en vigueur au momentdes faits énumère ce droit. Il s’agit du droit exclusif pourl’auteur d’exiger que son nom soit mentionné chaque fois
que son œuvre est rendue accessible au public.

H. Droits d’auteur – Cession des droits– Transfert des droits patrimoniaux –Inaliénabilité du droit moral – Respect
par le cessionnaire
Si la cession d’une œuvre littéraire et artistique emportetransfert des droits patrimoniaux attachés à laditeœuvre au profit du cessionnaire, celui-ci est en revanchetenu de respecter le droit moral résultant de l’œuvre
cédée, lequel est personnel, inaliénable, perpétuel,insaisissable, et transmissible à cause de mort auxhéritiers de l’auteur.
289

Commet par conséquent une contrefaçon le cessionnairequi communique l’œuvre acquise au grand public ens’abstenant de mentionner le nom de l’auteur sur tout
support de communication.
Cour de cassation Niger, Arrêt n° 15-040-Civ du
21 avril 2015, SONITEL c. AGENCE KIBYA
Observations :Devant les prétoires des États membres de l’OAPI,
rarissimes sont les litiges mettant en relief les droits
moraux des auteurs d’œuvres littéraires ou artistiques.
En cela, le différend ci-dessus rapporté était sans
doute l’occasion rêvée pour les juges de peaufinerla distinction entre les différents droits morauxconférés par le droit d’auteur. L’arrêt n° 15-040-Civ du
21 avril 2015 de la Cour de cassation du Niger est sans
doute d’une importance capitale.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Faits : L’agence Kybia était titulaire de droits d’auteur sur
une photographie. Moyennant un contrat de cession,elle avait transféré ses droits patrimoniaux sur cettecréation artistique à la SONITEL. Pour les besoins deson activité, SONITEL va commettre l’agence IMAN, qui
avait reproduit l’œuvre photographique sur plusieurs
supports avant de la communiquer au public, sansfaire mention du nom du créateur sur les supports
de communication. Estimant que bien qu’elle se soit
dépouillée par cession de l’intégralité de ses droits
patrimoniaux sur la photographie, cette publication de sa
création sous anonymat et sans son consentement, parla SONITEL, constituait une atteinte à ses droits moraux,
plus précisément à son droit à la paternité, c’est en
conséquence de cause que l’agence Kybia va introduire,devant les tribunaux, une action en contrefaçon de son
droit moral.

290

Aux termes de l’instruction de cette cause, le juged’instance va déclarer l’action introduite irrecevable etcondamner l’agence demanderesse à payer à la SONITEL
la somme de FCFA 20 000 000. Insatisfaite de cettedécision, l’agence Kybia va contester le jugement rendu
devant la cour d’appel de Niamey, qui va procéder à unnouvel examen de l’affaire au fond, avant d’infirmer
la décision du premier juge, entrant ainsi en voie decondamnation contre SONITEL. Pour parvenir à larecevabilité de l’action de l’appelant et condamner la
SONITEL au paiement de la somme de FCFA 5 000 000
à titre de dommages et intérêts, la cour d’appel fait leconstat lapidaire de la violation des droits d’auteur del’appelant, sans précision, dans la motivation du juge, dela nature des droits violés.
L’auguste cour devait ainsi se prononcer sur les caractèresdes droits moraux, dont l’inaliénabilité subordonnait lesuccès de l’action en contrefaçon. La Cour suprême était
ainsi appelée à répondre à la question de savoir si, en plus
des attributs d’ordre patrimonial, le cessionnaire de droits
sur une œuvre littéraire ou artistique recueille également
les droits moraux.
Raisonnement : Exerçant un pouvoir d’évocation que
les textes nigériens ne lui reconnaissent pas, la Coursuprême casse et annule l’arrêt infirmatif attaqué, puis
renvoie la cause devant ladite cour autrement composée,pour statuer de nouveau. Tel un cap, elle oriente lesdébats devant la nouvelle composition de la cour d’appel.
À l’analyse, on se rend vite à l’évidence que deux textes,
convoqués aux moyens, permettent de rehausser laqualité technique des débats. Donnant un sens aux
dispositions légales, la décision de l’auguste courappelle des observations, au moins à un double niveau
de réflexion.
Au premier niveau, il convient de partir de la double
identité du droit d’auteur, comprenant à la fois desdroits d’ordre patrimonial et d’autres d’ordre moral.
Les droits patrimoniaux sont les prérogatives qui
permettent aux titulaires du droit d’auteur de percevoir
une compensation financière pour l’exploitationéconomique de leurs œuvres par les tiers. L’art. 8 del’ordonnance portant droit d’auteur au Niger énumérait
exhaustivement six prérogatives d’ordre patrimonial,à savoir les droits de reproduction, de traduction, detransformation, d’importation, de représentation ou
d’exécution et de communication. Dans la lettre desdispositions de l’art. 31 de l’Ordonnance n° 93-27 du
30 mars 1993, portant sur les droits d’auteur au Niger :“lorsque l’œuvre est créée pour le compte d’une
personne physique ou d’une personne morale,
privée ou publique, dans le cadre d’un contrat
de travail de l’auteur ou bien lorsque l’œuvre est
commandée par une telle personne à l’auteur,le premier titulaire des droits patrimoniaux etmoraux est l’auteur, mais les droits patrimoniaux
sur cette œuvre sont considérés commetransférés”.
Ce texte articulé au second moyen pose en substance larègle de la transférabilité des droits patrimoniaux. Il est
unanimement admis en jurisprudence que la cession dudroit d’auteur entraîne transfert des droits patrimoniaux
au profit du cessionnaire492.
En cela, SONITEL, cessionnaire des droits patrimoniaux
sur l’œuvre photographique en cause, disposait
désormais de la faculté de reproduire, communiquer
ou distribuer à titre onéreux ladite création au public,sans besoin d’autorisation préalable de l’agence Kybia.
L’exploitation économique de l’œuvre par la cessionnaire,de son propre chef ou par personne interposée, enl’espèce l’agence IMAN, importe peu. En cela, la décision
rendue par la cour d’appel gardait toute sa pertinence.
Le seul reproche fait à la cour était celui de n’avoir pas
spécifié dans la motivation du juge la nature des droitsqui ont été violés, et donc susceptibles de réparation en
dommages et intérêts.
Vue sous cet angle, la demande de pourvoi recélait uncertain mérite, celle d’interpeler l’auguste cour, eu égard
aux données factuelles du débat devant la cour d’appelqui, tout en reconnaissant sa qualité de cessionnaire
492

Tribunal de Libreville, Madame Christine ROSS c. Société SOVING (jugement nondaté), rapporté dans EDOU EDOU (P.), n.60, n° 3, p. 373.

Pourtant, faut-il le relever au second niveau, la décisionde la cour aurait été saine si, dans sa motivation, elle
opérait le clivage nécessaire entre les différents droitsd’auteurs. Plutôt que de se borner à des condamnations
ambiguës, la cour d’appel aurait dû partir de l’article 8
de l’Ordonnance du 23 décembre 2010 visé au second
moyen, pour rétablir la règle de l’intransférabilitédes droits moraux. Comme l’a si bien souligné le juge
Gabonais dans une espèce similaire493, les prérogatives
d’ordre moral du droit d’auteur restent exclusives àl’auteur, même après que ce dernier s’est dépouillé,suite à une cession, de tout ou partie de ses droits
patrimoniaux. Dans cette affaire, le juge décide que“même si comme c’est le cas en l’espèce, Mme ROSS…
a cédé à titre onéreux l’exploitation de son œuvre à lasociété JEEP…, il n’en demeure pas moins qu’elle conserve
sur celle-ci un droit moral”.
Les fondements de la règle de l’intransmissibilité desdroits moraux ainsi déclinée sont de divers ordres. On
peut relever en premier lieu la nature même des droits
moraux, qui s’inscrivent dans cette catégorie plus large
des droits de la personnalité. Leur principale finalité est deprotéger et de préserver la relation étroite qui existe entre
l’auteur et sa création, évitant ainsi que l’auteur n’aliène
de façon excessive sa liberté de création pour l’avenir494.
Dans leur diversité, la loi nigérienne applicable aux
faits de l’espèce distinguait le droit de paternité ou
d’attribution, le droit à l’intégrité, le droit de rester
anonyme ou d’utiliser un pseudonyme. Les législations
modernes sur le droit d’auteur sont beaucoup plus
généreuses à accorder davantage aux créateursd’autres types de droits moraux. À titre d’exemple,
l’article 14, alinéa 1, de la loi camerounaise n° 2000/11
du 19 décembre 2000 relative au droit d’auteur et aux
droits voisins distingue les droits moraux de paternité,
à l’intégrité, de divulgation et enfin le droit de repentir
ou de retrait. Le droit de paternité, qui a principalement
493
494

Ibid.
OMPI, Comprendre le droit d’auteur et les droits connexes, 2e éd., Genève(OMPI), 2016, p. 9.

nourri les débats au fond, s’entend comme le droit au
respect du nom et de la qualité de l’auteur d’une œuvre.
Ce droit signifie au moins deux choses.
• Positivement, l’auteur a la prérogative de s’assurer quel’œuvre est publiée sous son nom.
• Négativement, même si la loi nigérienne en fait une
prérogative distincte, c’est aussi le droit de l’auteur derester anonyme pour ne pas voir révéler son identité
ou encore de publier sous un pseudonyme.
En général, les droits moraux sont revêtus d’un certain
nombre de caractères. Conséquence de leur caractère
personnel, le texte de l’article 8 de l’ordonnancesusvisé dispose que les droits moraux sont perpétuels,
inaliénables, imprescriptibles et insaisissables ettransmissibles à cause de mort aux héritiers de l’auteur.
Le caractère inaliénable ici mis en exergue sous-entend
que le droit moral de l’auteur ne peut être cédé à untiers. La jurisprudence n’a cessé de donner une onction
à ce texte, en annulant systématiquement toute clausecontraire mentionnée dans le contrat de cession. Dansl’affaire opposant dame Christine ROSS… à la société
SOVING…, le tribunal de Libreville avait condamné laseconde pour violation au droit à la paternité de l’œuvre
qui ne saurait être transféré au moyen d’un contrat decession du droit d’auteur.
L’espèce rapportée était l’occasion d’un rappel. Dans lestermes de l’homme de l’art, la Haute Cour rappelle que lacession du droit d’auteur emporte uniquement cession
des droits patrimoniaux, le cédant restant toujours
titulaire exclusif des droits moraux.
Aristide Fade

I.

Œuvre littéraire et artistique –Reproduction non autorisée del’œuvre – Exploitation à des finscommerciales – Exception de copie
privée – Contrefaçon

La reproduction massive d’une œuvre littéraire etartistique, en l’occurrence une œuvre de peinture sous
forme de cartes de vœux sans autorisation de l’auteur
et sa distribution corrélative aux personnes en relation
avec le copiste, va bien au-delà de la copie privée etconstitue une atteinte au droit de l’auteur en application
de l’article 27 de la loi n° 96-564 du 25 juillet 1996 relative
à la protection des œuvres de l’esprit.

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiquedu droit d’auteur, entrait tout de même en voie decondamnation contre SONITEL pour violation de ce
droit d’auteur. Dans un attendu assez explicite de leurmotivation, les juges d’appel déclarent “qu’il est établi etnon contesté que SONITEL et l’Agence IMAN ont procédé
à une exploitation commerciale de la photographie
litigieuse sans l’accord préalable de l’Agence Kybia
et en ont de ce fait tiré profit pécuniaire”. En d’autres
termes, la cour pense que la cession du droit d’auteur
n’entraîne pas, sauf consentement du cédant, transfert
des prérogatives exclusives permettant au bénéficiaired’exploiter l’œuvre qui en est l’objet. Est-ce donc à croire
que la cour d’appel qualifie d’exploitation non autoriséeet donc illicite l’exercice des droits patrimoniaux
cédés? C’est à se demander si le contrat de cession,qui n’a fait l’objet d’aucune contestation tout au longdes débats, n’est pas en soi une forme d’autorisation
à exploiter l’œuvre. Cette position va à l’encontre desprescriptions de l’ordonnance susvisée.

Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, jugement contradictoire
du 12 juin 2014, RG n° 1001/14, SENI BAMOGO c. AERIA
Observations :S’il est des types d’activités qui s’affranchissent dumonopole légal reconnu aux créateurs d’œuvre del’esprit, la reproduction d’œuvres réservée à un usage
privé est le cliché le plus illustratif. Devant la complexitédes nouveaux moyens de reproduction offerts par
Internet et des avantages qu’offre la technologie
numérique, de nombreuses législations modernes, au291

rang desquelles celles des pays membres de l’OAPI,
vont consacrer à titre palliatif un régime de copie
privée, afin d’instaurer un régime légalisant la copied’œuvres dans un cercle privé495. En effet, si l’état de latechnique ne donne pas aux auteurs ou à leurs ayants
droit les moyens d’exercer facilement le droit exclusif
de reproduction, il a été estimé que pourrait êtreprévue une compensation en leur faveur sous forme
de redevance496. Par ce régime, l’activité du copistesort du giron de l’illicéité en s’exonérant désormais del’autorisation préalable de l’auteur ou ses ayants droit.
Cela fait de la copie privée une exception redoutableentre les mains du copiste poursuivi du chef decontrefaçon par reproduction d’une œuvre protégée.
L’espèce soumise à notre analyse est une fenêtre
ouverte sur cette réalité.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Faits : Le sieur SENI BAMOGO, artiste de renommée duvernissage des œuvres d’art, était auteur d’une œuvre
de peinture intitulée “l’avenir d’un enfant”, réalisée en2009 au moyen de la technique dite de l’acrylique sur
toile. Après exposition du tableau dans une galerie situéedans le district d’Abidjan, le tableau d’art a été vendu en2009 à la Galerie d’art Houkami Guyzgn qui l’expose parla suite dans ses locaux de vernissage. Quelques moisaprès cette vente, le sieur Simplice De Messe Zinsou,
président du conseil d’administration de l’aéroport
international d’Abidjan (AERI), va profiter de l’exposition
du tableau pour le reproduire de façon massive sur une
carte de vœux avant de le communiquer aux clients dudit
aéroport, ceci sans l’autorisation préalable du créateur.

292

Contrarié par cette reproduction suivie d’unereprésentation publique de son œuvre, le sieur
SENI BAMOGO va saisir le tribunal de commerced’Abidjan, pour les chefs de contrefaçon à ses
droits de reproduction et de représentation sur sa
création. Au cours des débats judiciaires, l’AERIA va,
par voie d’exception, exciper l’usage à titre privé dela reproduction, pour soustraire sa responsabilité.
La question alors adressée au juge était de savoir :l’exploitation à titre gratuit d’un tableau dans un cadre
restreint à la clientèle d’un aéroport peut-elle s’assimilerà un usage privé de nature à exonérer son auteur despoursuites en contrefaçon? Ce faisant, la cour a pu définir
un cadre juridique pour le traitement des œuvres copiées
à titre privé à l’ère de la reproduction numérique.
Raisonnement : Le juge y a répondu par la négative,sans manquer l’occasion de rappeler au préalable lesconditions d’admission de l’exception de copie privée,au rang desquelles la licéité de la source, le caractère
personnel et privé de l’usage qui est fait de l’œuvre et lasatisfaction des exigences du triple critère.
De manière générale, l’exception de copie privée
consacre une dérogation spéciale au droit exclusif del’auteur d’autoriser les tiers à réaliser des copies de sonœuvre. Seules les reproductions sont exonérées dumonopole de l’auteur par le succès de l’exception. C’est
le domaine restreint des reproductions autorisées, pourlesquelles le créateur ne peut poursuivre en contrefaçon.
Dans son contenu, la reproduction d’œuvres couvre un
spectre assez large d’activités, et s’entend donc d’unemanière extensive. On y range les activités telles quel’enregistrement d’une œuvre musicale, l’édition d’unlivre, la photographie d’une œuvre, sa copie sonore,
audiovisuelle, numérique ou encore sa photocopie…
Même si le juge n’a pas cru devoir le rappeler, lebénéfice de l’exception est conditionné par la licéité dela source reproduite.
Source de nombreuses controverses d’opinion en
doctrine et en jurisprudence, la question de la licéitéde la source domine les débats sur le conditionnement
de l’exception de copie privée. La quasi-totalité deslégislateurs OAPI sur le droit d’auteur conditionnent lesuccès de l’exception à une divulgation licite de l’œuvre
ultérieurement reproduite par le copiste497. En clair,
la copie réalisée à partir d’une source illicite est ainsi
elle-même illicite, par effet de “contamination” et, dece fait, ne saurait bénéficier de l’exception de copie
privée498. L’article 31 de la loi ivoirienne applicable aumoment des faits en est une parfaite illustration. Posée
dans le texte, l’exigence de licéité de la source des copies
reproduites était, au sens du législateur ivoirien, unecondition déterminante du bénéfice de l’exception decopie privée. Ce texte dispose : “Lorsque l’œuvre a été
rendue licitement accessible au public”, l’auteur ne peut
en interdire les reproductions réservées à un usage
strictement personnel et privé. Cela supposait, pourpouvoir être retenue, que soit établi le caractère licite del’exhibition dans la Galerie d’art Houkami Guyzgn, laquelle
doit nécessairement être exempte de toute atteinte auxprérogatives du créateur du tableau concerné.
Les désaccords portent sur la question de savoir s’il
est acceptable de faire de la licéité de la source une
condition pour renoncer au monopole de l’auteur499. Le
principal avantage est celui d’épargner celui qui invoquel’exception des difficultés probatoires qu’elle soulève. En
effet, la charge de la preuve d’une dérogation pèse surla partie qui se prévaut d’une exception. Pour le copiste,cela s’avère difficile dans la mesure où seul l’auteur serait
mieux placé pour indiquer si son œuvre a été divulguée
licitement ou pas. Le maintien de la charge de la preuve
sur le copiste qui aura toujours intérêt à invoquer
497

498
499

495
496

ROMPRE (S.), Le régime de la copie privée face à Internet : Lex Electronica,
Vol. 12, n° 1, 2007, p. 2.
OMPI, Guide de la Convention de Berne pour la protection des œuvres
littéraires et artistiques, Paris (OMPI), 1971, p. 64.

Voir art. 10 al. 2 annexe VII de l’ABR-1999 qui dispose : “Nonobstant les
dispositions de l’art. 8, et sous réserve de celles de l’alinéa 2) du présent
article et de celles de l’art. 58, il est permis, sans l’autorisation de l’auteur etsans le paiement d’une rémunération, de reproduire une œuvre licitement
publiée exclusivement pour l’usage privé de l’utilisateur”. Voir aussi l’art. 29
al. 1 let. c de la loi n° 2000/011 du 19 décembre 2000 relative au droit d’auteur
et aux droits voisins (Cameroun) qui dispose : “Lorsque l’œuvre a été publiée
avec l’autorisation de l’auteur, ce dernier ne peut interdire.”
SINGH (A.) et DEBIESSE (T.), Droit d’auteur, copie privée et responsabilité
pénale, in : Les cahiers de la propriété intellectuelle, Vol. 19, n° 1, Paris(Éditions Yvon Blais), 2007, p. 355.
Voir TGI de Bayonne, cor., 15 novembre 2005, Ministère Public et SCPP c.
Monsieur D. T. Dans sa motivation, le tribunal déclare que : “Attendu qu’enrevanche, en stockant sur le disque dur de son ordinateur des morceaux demusique, ou en les gravant sur les CD ROM, le prévenu n’a fait qu’user de son
droit d’établir une copie pour son usage personnel; qu’il doit donc être relaxé
du surplus de la poursuite”.

Comme le prescrivent de nombreux textes sur le droit
d’auteur, le bénéfice de l’exception de copie privée est
subordonné à un usage strictement privé de la copie
reproduite. L’appréciation du caractère “personnel etprivé” de l’usage peut paraître simple a priori, et
pourtant, dans la réalité judiciaire, elle présente une
marge d’élasticité.
Dans sa perception littérale, l’usage personnel s’oppose
à l’idée d’utilisation collective et suppose en amontl’absence d’un but de lucre. L’usage privé englobe lesbesoins personnels du copiste et ceux qu’il peut avoir
dans l’exercice de son travail. C’est le cas typique del’étudiant qui, pour mener à bien ses études ou destravaux de recherche personnelle, procède ou fait
procéder à la copie d’un texte.
Dans une perception adaptée à la situation del’entreprise, on met en relief l’idée d’un usage privé
à des fins internes pour exonérer la reproduction etla mise en circulation de cette reproduction au sein d’une
entreprise à des fins d’information et de documentation.
L’entreprise dans ce contexte doit s’entendre dans unsens très large. Il peut s’agir d’entreprises publiques etprivées, de personnes exerçant une activité lucrative
indépendante, sous quelque forme juridique que cesoit (établissement de droit public, Sarl, associationou commerçant individuel, par ex.), ainsi que d’autres
regroupements de personnes, même si ceux-ci ne sontpas organisés sous une forme juridique (par exemple
les communautés de défense d’intérêts). La dérogation
est dans ce cas restreinte aux fins d’information et dedocumentation interne, ce qui du moins est contraire àl’idée de reproduire pour ensuite mettre à la disposition
des clients de l’entreprise.
Dans l’espèce commentée, le président de l’organed’administration de l’AERIA avait reproduit sansautorisation du demandeur l’œuvre de peinture de cedernier sur un support de cartes de vœux, et avait parla suite distribué, à titre gratuit, des exemplaires deces cartes de vœux à la clientèle de l’aéroport. Pourbalayer d’un revers de la main l’exception de copie privée
invoquée par l’AERIA, le tribunal de commerce a fait une
appréciation restrictive de l’usage “strictement privé”
de l’exploitation des copies, en faisant le constat selon
lequel “une telle reproduction va bien au-delà de la copie
privée parce qu’il s’agit d’un usage collectif, l’œuvre étant
ainsi envoyée, par le biais des cartes de vœux, à d’autres
personnes que Monsieur Simplice De Messe Zinsou”.
Enfin, le succès de l’exception ne se borne pas aux
seules conditions de licéité de la source ou du caractère
personnel et privé de l’usage, puisqu’il faut également
respecter le test en trois étapes. Même si le juge ne ledit pas expressément, les copies utilisées au sein d’une
entreprise ne sont pas toujours collectives. L’usage privé
doit aussi s’entendre comme tout usage qui ne saurait

porter atteinte à l’exploitation normale de l’œuvre, ni
causer un préjudice injustifié aux titulaires du droit.
Conformément au dispositif central d’encadrement desexceptions posé dans la Convention de Berne, les copies
utilisées au sein d’une entreprise sont un usage privé à
partir du moment où elles satisfont aux exigences dutest en trois étapes. En vertu de l’article 9, alinéa 2, de laConvention, “Est réservée aux législations des pays del’Union la faculté de permettre la reproduction desditesœuvres dans certains cas spéciaux, pourvu qu’unetelle reproduction ne porte pas atteinte à l’exploitation
normale de l’œuvre ni ne cause un préjudice injustifié
aux intérêts légitimes de l’auteur”.
Au premier niveau du test, l’exception doit entrer dans
un cas spécial et être clairement définie. Dans l’art. 31
de la loi ivoirienne n° 96-564 du 25 juillet 1996 relative
à la protection des œuvres de l’esprit et aux droits desauteurs, des artistes-interprètes et des producteurs dephonogrammes et vidéogrammes : “Lorsque l’œuvre a
été rendue licitement accessible au public, l’auteur nepeut en interdire (…) les reproductions, traductions etadaptations destinées à un usage strictement personnel
et privé, et non destinées à une utilisation collective, àl’exception des œuvres d’art”. On voit qu’à ce premierniveau, les copies faites par l’AERIA de l’œuvre depeinture échouent à l’épreuve du test en trois étapes.
Au second niveau du test, l’activité de reproduction
supposée être exonérée par le couvert de l’exception nedoit pas entraver l’exploitation normale de l’œuvre500.
Selon cet auteur, “Un conflit avec une exploitation
normale se produit lorsque les auteurs sont privés d’une
source majeure de revenus, actuelle ou potentielle,qui revêt une certaine importance dans l’ensemble
des modes de commercialisation des œuvres de cettecatégorie”. Normalement, les œuvres de peinture sont
exploitées par voie d’exposition et vente au public. Sous
le prisme de sa compatibilité au régime général desexceptions au droit d’auteur, la reproduction numériqued’un tableau à des seules fins privées, pire encore à
grande échelle, est de nature à porter atteinte aux
modes d’exploitation susmentionnés. De ce fait, lescopies de l’œuvre faites par l’AERIA échouent à cetteexigence du test en trois étapes.
Au dernier niveau du test, l’activité de reproduction
ne doit pas causer un préjudice injustifié aux titulaires
du droit. Dans cette troisième étape du test, il s’agit
de mesurer l’avantage proportionnel de l’autorisation
de l’exception dans le contexte de la préservation desintérêts de l’auteur501. Au final, ce n’est que si le préjudice
est injustifié ou disproportionné que l’exception sera
considérée comme illégitime au regard du test.

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiquel’exception peut finir par neutraliser l’objectif recherché
par la dérogation. Le tribunal a préféré prendre fait etcause pour cette position jurisprudentielle, au détrimentde celle des législateurs nationaux.

D’ailleurs consacré dans l’ABR-1999 (article 10,
alinéa 2)vi), annexe VII, de l’ABR-2015), le critère du
500
501

SENFTLEBEN (M.), Copyright, limitations and the Three-Step Test – An Analysisof the Three Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law (Information Law
Series), La Haye (Kluwer Law International), 2004, p. 43 et s.
DE COCK (E.), Les exceptions au droit d’auteur : Problématiques liéesà l’exception de copie privée, Mémoire de Master en droit, Université
Catholique de Louvain, 2015-2016, p. 33.
293

test en trois étapes s’impose aux juges qui, dans lapratique, sont chargés de veiller au respect. À l’aune dece dispositif d’encadrement des dérogations au droit
d’auteur, on s’aperçoit bien que le bénéfice de l’exception
de copie privée invoqué par AERIA pour justifier lareproduction numérique de l’œuvre du sieur SENIBAMOGO ne pouvait prospérer. Le rejet de la dérogation
au droit de reproduction par juge de la cause revêt donc
tout son sens.
Aristide FadeJ.

Droit d’auteur – Autorisation
d’exploitation délivrée parl’organisme national de gestion
collective – Exploitation en ligned’œuvres du répertoire d’unesociété sœur – Action exercée à titre
individuel par l’auteur – Recevabilité –Illicéité de l’exploitation (non)L’auteur malien adhérent de la SACEM est recevable àagir contre l’exploitant autorisé par le Bureau burkinabé
du droit d’auteur (BBDA) à exploiter ses œuvres en ligne
mais l’exploitation qu’il critique n’est pas illicite dès lorsqu’elle est couverte par ladite autorisation.
Tribunal de grande instance de Ouagadougou, jugement
du 5 décembre 2012, n° 607, SALIF KEITA c. SOCIÉTÉAIRTEL BURKINA FASO SA, BBDA ET SOCIÉTÉ MOBILESERVICES BURKINA FASO SARL

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Observations :Le jugement commenté, soigneusement rédigé, offrel’occasion de s’interroger sur l’articulation entre gestion
individuelle et gestion collective des droits d’auteur.

294

Faits : Le chanteur et musicien malien Salif Keita, derenommée mondiale, a appris lors de séjours au Burkina
Faso que certaines de ses œuvres étaient utilisées dansce pays par la société Airtel Burkina Faso (ci-après lasociété Airtel) à travers un service de téléchargement
payant dénommé Mam’zik. Après avoir envisagé une
négociation amiable, ladite société change de pied ets’oppose aux réclamations de l’artiste en soutenantqu’elle est fondée à exploiter ces œuvres en raisonde la convention de partenariat qu’elle a conclue
avec la société Mobile Services Burkina Faso (ci-après
la société Mobile Services), qui elle-même tient ses
droits du Bureau burkinabé du droit d’auteur (ci-aprèsBBDA). Assignée devant le tribunal de grande instancede Ouagadougou en paiement d’une indemnité de
200 millions de francs CFA, elle assigne en intervention
forcée ces deux personnes morales.
Raisonnement : Le tribunal écarte la fin de non-recevoir
tirée du défaut de qualité à agir du demandeur (section I)
mais déboute celui-ci sur le fond en jugeant quel’autorisation délivrée par le BBDA suffit à justifier lecomportement de la société défenderesse (section II).

I. La qualité à agir du demandeur
Les défendeurs contestent la qualité à agir de Salif Keita.
Le raisonnement est le suivant : l’artiste demandeura adhéré à la SACEM, société de gestion collective
française; or le BBDA a conclu en 1987 avec la SACEM (etla Société pour l’administration du droit de reproduction
mécanique des auteurs, compositeurs, éditeurs,réalisateurs et doubleurs sous-titreurs, ou SDRM, pourle droit de reproduction mécanique) un accord dereprésentation réciproque qui lui confère mandat degérer son répertoire au Burkina Faso; dès lors, seuls leBBDA, la SACEM (ou la SDRM) ont qualité pour agir au
nom de l’artiste.
La présentation, à vrai dire, n’est pas dépourvue
d’ambiguïté. Si le BBDA est investi d’un mandat pourgérer les droits de Salif Keita au Burkina Faso, c’est lui
seul, et non la SACEM, qui devrait avoir qualité pourfaire valoir ses droits en justice. Sans doute faut-il voir
là l’écho de la clause du contrat de 1987, évoquée dansles écritures du BBDA rapportées dans le jugement,
selon laquelle seule la SACEM “est habilitée à agir, le caséchéant en justice, dans le cadre de la protection desdroits de Salif Keita”.
Quoi qu’il en soit, le tribunal récuse cette argumentation.
Il prend appui sur l’article 96 de la loi burkinabé
n° 032-99/AN du 22 décembre 1999 portant protection
de la propriété littéraire et artistique, qui précise que
les dispositions confiant à un organisme professionnel
la gestion collective des droits d’auteur et des droits
voisins “ne portent pas préjudice à la faculté appartenant
aux auteurs d’œuvres, aux titulaires des droits voisinset à leurs ayants droit, d’exercer directement les droits
qui leur sont reconnus par la présente loi”, d’où il tireque “l’artiste et titulaire de droit qu’est Salif Keita a,concurremment avec les organismes suscités (le BBDA, la
SACEM et la SDRM) la qualité pour agir en justice pour ladéfense de ses intérêts”.
Il n’y a rien à redire au rejet de la fin de non-recevoir, quela lettre de la loi locale sur le droit d’auteur imposait. On
ajoutera que, sur ce point, l’article 69 de l’annexe VII del’ABR-2015 milite dans le même sens puisque, après avoir
attribué aux organismes de gestion collective la mission
d’assurer “la protection, l’exploitation et la gestion desdroits des auteurs d’œuvres et des titulaires de droits
voisins”, il ajoute que ces dispositions “ne portent, en
aucun cas, préjudice à la faculté appartenant aux auteursd’œuvres et à leurs successeurs, et aux titulaires dedroits voisins, d’exercer les droits qui leur sont reconnus
par la présente annexe”.
La seule réserve, mais elle est de taille, porte sur leprincipe de cette concurrence organisée entre l’auteur
et l’organisme de gestion collective (et même ici avec
les organismes de gestion collective puisque le tribunal,sans apporter sur ce point la moindre justification,
reprend à son compte l’idée que le BBDA et la SACEM
sont pareillement recevables à agir), concurrence qui
n’a pas de réelle portée dès lors que le comportement
de l’annonceur est, en l’espèce, justifié par l’autorisation

II. Effet justificatif de l’autorisation délivrée par le
BBDA
Sur le fond, le tribunal fait droit aux arguments desdéfendeurs en considérant que Salif Keita ne peut rien
reprocher à la société Airtel dès lors que celle-ci a traité
avec un partenaire ayant obtenu du BBDA l’autorisation
d’exploiter les œuvres en cause.
Rappelant les termes des articles 95 et 96 de la loi
précitée de 1999, il en déduit “que c’est dire doncque dans le cadre des missions qui lui sont confiées,
le BBDA est amené à assurer la protection desœuvres littéraires et artistiques dont les auteurs sontdes nationaux ou encore des étrangers; que pourl’exploitation desdites œuvres, il lui est préalablement
fait recours afin qu’elle délivre des autorisations desœuvres qu’il protège”. Il s’attache alors à l’analyse desconventions conclues entre les trois défendeurs.
En premier lieu, il se réfère au “contrat générald’exploitation d’œuvres protégées” conclu entre lasociété Airtel et le BBDA, par lequel ce dernier donne“l’autorisation préalable prévue aux articles 95 et 96 (…)
d’exécuter, de faire ou de laisser exécuter publiquement
l’ensemble des œuvres protégées qui constitue son
répertoire et celui des sociétés dont il est mandataire
en vertu de la Convention de Berne”, il précise quecette autorisation “porte sur la communication au
public d’œuvres protégées, notamment par le réseau
téléphonique administratif et mobile, par Internet et parles campagnes publicitaires de l’usager”, et prévoit qu’encontrepartie, l’usager s’engage à payer des redevances.
La société Airtel a, par ailleurs, conclu avec la société
Mobile Services une convention de partenariat parlaquelle cette dernière s’engage à lui fournir desœuvres musicales et à “obtenir” les droits de propriété
intellectuelle afférents à ces œuvres auprès du BBDA, laconvention précisant qu’elle n’entraîne aucune “cession”
de droits de propriété littéraire et artistique.

502

Cass. civ., 1re chambre, 13 novembre 2014, n° 13-22.401 : Bull. civ., I, n° 187;
Comm. com. électr. 2015, comm. 2 (note Caron (C)); D. 2015, p. 410 (noteÉTIENNEY-DE SAINTE MARIE (A.)); Propr. intell. 2015, p. 64 (obs. BRUGUIÈRE
(J.-M.)); RTD com. 2015, p. 291 (obs. POLLAUD-DULIAN (F.)).

Enfin, le BBDA a lui-même conclu un “contrat générald’exploitation d’œuvres protégées” avec la société
Mobile Services qui est autorisée à exploiter à la fois
le répertoire de l’organisme de gestion collective etcelui des sociétés dont il est mandataire “en vertu
de la Convention de Berne et des conventions dereprésentation réciproque”.
Constatant qu’il résulte du dossier que “le BBDA a versé
ses droits à Salif Keita”, le tribunal en conclut qu’aussi
bien la société Airtel que la société Mobile Services ont
été autorisées par le BBDA à exploiter les œuvres dudemandeur qui se trouve donc débouté.
On passera sur le lapsus calami qui fait écrire au tribunal,
à l’issue de son raisonnement, “qu’en tout état de cause,l’exploitation par la société Airtel des œuvres de Salif
Keita ne saurait être irrégulière” (soulignement ajouté).
Il aurait été plus pertinent de remplacer “en tout état decause” par “ainsi”, car c’est seulement sous le bénéfice
des motifs très complets contenus dans le jugement quela demande est rejetée.
La démonstration, en revanche, emporte la conviction.
Il est exact que le BBDA était habilité, en vertu del’accord de représentation réciproque conclu avec la
SACEM503, à délivrer une autorisation d’exploitation
portant notamment sur les œuvres du demandeur, dèslors que la portée de cette autorisation n’excédait pascelle qui aurait pu être donnée par la SACEM elle-même
(postulat qui n’était pas ici en débat), la société française
ne pouvant conférer à une société sœur plus de pouvoirs
qu’elle n’en avait.
Pour combattre cette argumentation, Salif Keita faisait
valoir que l’autorisation accordée à la société Airtel nevisait que l’exécution publique, mode d’exploitation
distinct de la communication au public qui, selon lui,n’entrait pas “dans le champ contractuel circonscrit parl’objet du contrat”. L’objection, à laquelle ne répond pas
le jugement commenté, ne résistait pas à l’examen. Le
concept d’exécution publique est traditionnellement
utilisé pour désigner la communication au public decertaines œuvres (musicales surtout), en sorte qu’il nefaut pas y voir un mode d’exploitation distinct.
Plus gênante pouvait apparaître l’objection, à laquellele tribunal ne prête pas davantage attention, tirée dece que le contrat conclu entre le BBDA et la société
Mobile Services prévoyait expressément que les droits
conférés “sont des droits non cessibles sans accordécrit du BBDA”, ce dont s’emparait le demandeur pourplaider que le bénéfice de cette autorisation n’avait
pas pu être transmis à la société Airtel. Les deuxsociétés défenderesses croyaient pouvoir combattre
le raisonnement en rappelant que l’article 9 de leurconvention de partenariat excluait toute “cession dedroits de propriété intellectuelle”. Mais l’argument
503

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiquedélivrée par le seul BBDA. Sans doute serait-il judicieuxd’articuler de façon plus rigoureuse gestion individuelle
et gestion collective (mais c’est bien sûr au législateurde le faire). Par exemple, on pourrait décider, à l’instar
de la jurisprudence française502, que la violation desdroits compris dans l’apport fait à l’organisme degestion collective n’ouvre droit à l’action individuelle
de l’auteur ou du titulaire de droit voisin qu’en cas decarence avérée de l’organisme. On pourrait aussi en
donner expressément la préférence à l’organisme degestion collective, comme le plaidait en l’espèce le BBDA,
pour qui l’action individuelle n’était recevable que sielle est exercée contre “un défendeur qui exploitaitles œuvres sans aucune autorisation préalable et defaçon clandestine, à l’insu de l’organisme chargé de laprotection de ces œuvres”.

Et non pas “en vertu de la Convention de Berne”, laquelle est muette sur lesujet de la gestion collective et dont l’incidence en la matière tient seulement
à ce qu’elle oblige les États unionistes à garantir le traitement national,
c’est-à-dire l’assimilation de l’étranger au national, ainsi que le prévoit sonart. 5 al. 1, expressément visé ici par l’auteur malien.
295ne changeait rien au fait que l’autorisation n’avait été
conférée par le BBDA qu’à la société Mobile Services, quin’avait pas le droit d’en faire bénéficier la société Airtel.
Cependant, il n’en résultait pas que celle-ci s’était livrée
à une exploitation illicite puisque, si l’on s’en tient aux
faits rapportés par le jugement, elle avait elle-même reçu
du BBDA l’autorisation de puiser dans son répertoire
ainsi que dans le répertoire de ses sociétés sœurs. Cequi, en vérité, est surprenant, est que la convention
de partenariat ait cru nécessaire, dans ces conditions,de mettre à la charge de la société Mobile Services
l’obligation d’obtenir du BBDA les “droits de propriété
intellectuelle relatifs aux œuvres musicales qu’elle
fournira à la société Airtel”.
On comprend facilement le dépit d’un auteur à succès
qui constate que le montant des redevances perçues au
titre de la gestion collective est très inférieur à ce qu’ilaurait pu obtenir à travers une négociation individuelle.
Mais c’est la conséquence inévitable de l’adhésion à unorganisme de gestion collective qui, par ailleurs, n’est
pas sans avantage.
André Lucas

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

K. Reproduction par numérisationd’une œuvre littéraire et artistique– Autorisation de l’auteur – Défaut
d’autorisation – Contrefaçon – Loi
n° 2008-09 du 25 janvier 2008 relative
au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins296

La reproduction par numérisation d’une œuvre littéraire
et artistique, en l’occurrence un ouvrage, suivie de sa
mise à la disposition des internautes en téléchargement
libre sans autorisation de l’auteur, est constitutive
de la contrefaçon conformément aux dispositions del’article 142 de la loi n° 2008-09 du 25 janvier 2008
relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins.
Tribunal régional hors classe Dakar, jugementn° 1061/2015 du 26 novembre 2015, MP et ABDOULAYE
AZIZ c. MAMADOU et SERIGNE
Observations :Le 14 août 1996, le tribunal de grande instance de Paris
statuant en matière de référé a rendu une décision
emblématique dans une affaire opposant les ayants droit
de l’artiste Jacques Brel aux élèves d’une grande école quiavaient numérisé ses œuvres sans leur autorisation504. Le
juge de référés a en effet posé que “Toute reproduction
par numérisation d’œuvres musicales protégées par ledroit d’auteur susceptible d’être mise à la dispositionde personnes connectées au réseau Internet doitêtre autorisée expressément par les titulaires ou
cessionnaires de droit”. L’applicabilité du droit d’auteur
aux réseaux et à l’Internet est désormais hors de doutemême si elle suscite quelques difficultés. Le législateurfrançais a clairement exprimé cette règle à travers le504

Voir TGI Paris, 14 août 1996 : JCP G 1996, II, n° 22727 (note OLIVIER (É.) et
BARBRY (F.)).

code de la propriété intellectuelle. Les autorités de laCommunauté européenne l’ont intégrée dans la Directive
n° 2001/29/CE du 22 mai 2001 relative à certains aspects
du droit d’auteur dans la société de l’information, textequi s’inscrit en droite ligne de la déclaration commune
sur le Traité de l’OMPI sur le droit d’auteur adoptée
par la conférence diplomatique le 20 décembre 1996.
L’article 1.4 de ladite déclaration indique en effet que “Lestockage d’une œuvre protégée sous forme numérique
sur un support électronique constitue une reproduction
au sens de l’article 9 de la convention de Berne”. La
quasi-totalité des lois relatives au droit d’auteur et aux
droits voisins des États signataires de l’Accord de Banguis’appliquent à l’Internet. Il en est ainsi de l’article 33 de laloi sénégalaise n° 2008-09 du 25 janvier 2008 relative au
droit d’auteur au visa duquel l’arrêt rapporté a été rendu.
De fait, l’enseignement qui en résulte est que l’application
des dispositions classiques du droit de la propriété
littéraire et artistique reste pertinente à mesure que denouvelles technologies de communication apparaissent,même s’il est permis d’envisager quelques adaptations
somme toute nécessaires.
Faits : Il ressort des faits ayant généré l’espèce
commentée qu’après publication en deux tomes deson ouvrage intitulé “Pour l’honneur de la gendarmerie
sénégalaise”, le colonel ABDOULAYE AZIZ NDAW a
constaté que les sites internet Actunet.sn et Assirou.net
offraient son œuvre en téléchargement libre aux
internautes, le privant ainsi des revenus substantiels qu’il
pouvait en tirer, l’éditeur n’ayant pu vendre que quelques
exemplaires du fait de la fraude décriée. Cet officier
supérieur de la gendarmerie sénégalaise a fait constater
ces faits par huissier de justice et traduit les nommés
MAMADOU MOUTH BANE et SERIGNE Fadel MBACKE
respectivement administrateurs desdits sites par voie
de flagrant délit devant le tribunal régional hors classede Dakar pour y répondre des délits de voie de fait etviolation du droit d’exploitation, prévus et réprimés parl’article 142 de la loi du 25 janvier 2008 précitée.
Raisonnement : La cour a jugé que la sanction infligée
aux contrevenants sur le double plan civil et pénal(section I) est tributaire de l’effectivité de la violation
des droits de l’auteur de l’œuvre incriminée sur la toile(section II).
I. La violation des droits de l’auteur via l’Internet
Les faits nous révèlent que les sites ayant servi devecteurs à la diffusion de l’œuvre contrefaite sur la toile
portaient l’inscription suivante : Assirou.net et Actu.net“vous offrent les deux livres du colonel NDAW, mercide le télécharger”. Il convient de bien spécifier les actes
incriminés en l’espèce au regard de la loi régissant ledroit d’auteur au Sénégal (A) et l’intention délictuelle quel’on peut aisément déduire de l’absence d’autorisation dutitulaire du droit (B).
A. Les actes incriminés
Les prévenus ont été poursuivis du chef de violation dudroit d’exploitation. Aux termes de l’article 33.1) de laloi du 25 janvier 2008 régissant le droit d’auteur et les

1. La violation du droit de reproduction
L’article 35.1) de la loi n° 2008-09 définit la reproductioncomme la “fixation de l’œuvre, par un procédé
quelconque, sous une forme matérielle permettant
de la communiquer au public”. Il va sans dire que ladéfinition retenue par le législateur sénégalais met enavant l’approche synthétique qui est globalisante en cequ’elle permet la prise en compte de tous les moyens
et techniques de reproduction qu’offrent l’évolution dela technique y compris la numérisation d’une œuvre.
L’approche synthétique par opposition à l’approche
analytique permet d’appréhender toutes catégories
d’actes rentrant dans les prévisions du législateur,sans limitation aucune. C’est celle retenue par le codede la propriété intellectuelle français dont s’inspire laloi sénégalaise. L’article L. 122-3 dudit code dispose
en effet : “La reproduction consiste dans la fixation
matérielle de l’œuvre par tous procédés qui permettent
de la communiquer au public d’une manière indirecte.
Elle peut s’effectuer notamment par imprimerie, dessin,
gravure, photographie, moulage et tout procédé
des arts graphiques et plastiques, enregistrement
mécanique, cinématographique ou magnétique”, la liste
des actes cités n’étant pas limitative. C’est dire que lafixation de l’ouvrage “Pour l’honneur de la gendarmerie
sénégalaise” sous la forme numérique sur un support
numérique est une reproduction donnant prise au droit
d’auteur au sens du texte de loi susvisé. La motivation
du juge du tribunal de grande instance de Paris dans ladécision évoquée ci-avant est suffisamment éloquente
à ce propos : “Toute reproduction par numérisationd’œuvres musicales protégées par les droits d’auteur
susceptibles d’être mise à la disposition de personnes
connectées au réseau Internet doit être autorisée
expressément par les titulaires ou cessionnaires dedroit”. Une abondante jurisprudence notammentfrançaise a suivi ce mouvement désormais irréversible505.
Si l’incorporation du stockage numérique d’une œuvre
dans le champ de la reproduction au sens légal duterme n’est plus discutée, il est toutefois impératif depréciser la fixation à prendre en considération, bien que
la question n’ait pas été expressément posée dans ladécision commentée, tant il est vrai que plusieurs types
de fixations et donc de reproductions interviennent aucours du processus de numérisation, de compression ou
de transmission de l’œuvre protégée. C’est le cas de la505

Voir CA Paris, 5 mai 1997 : JCP G 1997, II, n° 22906 (note OLIVIER (É.)), Tribunal
commercial de Nanterre, 9e chambre, 27 janvier 1998 : JCP E 1998, p. 850 (obs.
VIVANT (M.) et LE STANC (C.)); TGI de Strasbourg, 3 février 1998 : JCP G 1998,
II, n° 10044 (note DERIEUX (E.)).

copie de l’œuvre effectuée par l’ordinateur de routage506
ou sur la mémoire vive de l’ordinateur de l’utilisateur507.
C’est également le cas des reproductions dites deproximité réalisées par les serveurs informatiques
encore qualifiées de copies en cache ou en mémoire
tampon508. S’il est hors de doute que la loi sénégalaise du
25 janvier 2008, au visa de laquelle la décision rapportéea été rendue, a théoriquement vocation à régir ces
différentes formes de reproductions, cette extension
de la protection s’avère pratiquement artificielle étant
donné que ces copies essentiellement techniques ont
exclusivement pour finalité de permettre la circulationdes œuvres sur les réseaux numériques et n’ont aucune
valeur économique propre.
La doctrine spécialisée suggère de tenir compte dela dimension humaine de la transmission pour ladétermination des actes de reproduction donnant prise
au droit d’auteur509. L’on décèle d’ailleurs un écho feutréde cette préoccupation dans certaines législationsd’Afrique et d’ailleurs sur le droit d’auteur, lesquellesérigent les copies techniques au rang des exceptions
aux droits de l’auteur de l’œuvre diffusée sur la toile510.
Dans sa rédaction actuelle, la loi sénégalaise susvisée
ne prévoit expressément aucune exception pour les
reproductions techniques, ce qui est problématiquequant à l’encadrement de la responsabilité desintermédiaires techniques.
2. La violation du droit de communication au public
Aux termes de l’article 34.1) de la loi du 25 janvier 2008 :“L’auteur a le droit exclusif d’autoriser lacommunication de son œuvre au public par tout
procédé, notamment par voie de radiodiffusion,de distribution par câble ou par satellite, demise à disposition sur demande de manière que
chacun puisse avoir accès à l’œuvre de l’endroit
où et au moment qu’il choisit individuellement,et, pour les œuvres graphiques et plastiques, parvoie d’exposition de l’objet matériel”.
Il va sans dire, en application de cette disposition, queles administrateurs des sites Assirou.net et Actu.net ont
mis les deux tomes de l’ouvrage du colonel ABDOULAYE
506
507

508

509

510

L’ordinateur de routage ou routeur est un élément intermédiaire dansun réseau informatique assurant le routage des paquets entre réseauxindépendants.
L’ordinateur personnel de l’utilisateur peut copier temporairement
les informations reçues en ligne afin de ne pas avoir à se connecter
systématiquement au réseau à chaque consultation. Doctrine et jurisprudences’accordent à exclure ces actes du champ de la protection légale.
Les serveurs informatiques assurent l’interface entre les abonnés dufournisseur d’accès et l’Internet. Ces serveurs réalisent très souventdes copies intégrales des sites les plus visités par les internautes afind’économiser la liaison avec le site original. Sur le plan pratique, ces
reproductions de proximité permettent la fluidité du trafic sur le réseau etune économie réelle de la bande passante.
Voir VIVANT (M.) (éd.), Droit de l’informatique et des réseaux, Paris (Édition
Lamy), 2004, p. 1331, n° 2278. Les auteurs estiment qu’il faut, en effet,
s’attacher à la fixation qui tend à la communication aux personnes humaines
et non point à une fixation simplement technique.
Cf. art. 29 de la loi n° 2000/011 du 19 décembre 2000 relative au droit d’auteur
et aux droits voisins (Cameroun). Voir également en droit européen art. 5
al. 1 de la Directive européenne n° 2001/29/CE du Parlement européen et
du Conseil du 22 mai 2001 sur l’harmonisation de certains aspects du droit
d’auteur et des droits voisins dans la société de l’information.

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiquedroits voisins au Sénégal, “l’auteur jouit du droit exclusif
d’exploiter son œuvre sous quelque forme que ce soit
et d’en tirer un profit pécuniaire”. L’alinéa 2 du mêmearticle renchérit : “Le droit d’exploitation appartenant àl’auteur comprend le droit de communication au public,
le droit de reproduction, le droit de distribution et le droit
de location”. Seules les trois premières composantes
du droit d’exploitation seront examinées dans lesdéveloppements qui suivent, le droit de location n’ayantpas été touché en l’espèce.

297

AZIZ NDAW à la disposition de la communauté desinternautes, chaque visiteur pouvant y avoir librement
accès à partir de n’importe quel lieu de la planète. La
notion de public ne pose ici aucune difficulté particulière,
celui-ci étant constitué de tous les potentiels visiteurs
des sites incorporant l’œuvre contrefaite.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

L’une des questions récurrentes en matière decommunication via le réseau Internet non expressément
abordée en l’espèce est celle relative à la mise en jeuéventuelle de la responsabilité pénale de l’auteurd’un lien hypertexte qui assure l’accès à un site Web
par un cheminement différent de celui prévu par leconstructeur du site. Le lien hypertexte est en effet
un mécanisme qui permet de passer instantanément
à partir d’un signe contenu dans une page Web à une
autre page Web, quelle que soit sa localisation sur leréseau. Ces hyperliens qui jouent un rôle de premierplan dans le fonctionnement de l’architecture del’Internet sont très souvent utilisés par leurs créateurs
pour orienter les internautes vers des contenus illicites.
L’auteur d’un tel lien qui réalise une communication
de l’œuvre numérisée au public au sens de l’article 34de la loi n° 2008-09 du 25 janvier 2008 précitée
est-il justiciable du chef de contrefaçon? A priori,l’établissement d’un hyperlien ne porte pas en soi
atteinte au droit de communication au public. Rien
ne paraît cependant interdire le recours aux règles
de droit commun sur la complicité s’il est établi que lelien litigieux a été utilisé de façon déloyale notammentcomme moyen pour commettre la contrefaçon511.

298

3. La violation du droit de distribution
L’article 36 de la loi n° 2008-09 dispose que “L’auteur a ledroit exclusif d’autoriser la distribution, par la vente ou
autrement, des exemplaires matériels de son œuvre”.
La rédaction de cette disposition pourrait laisser croirequ’elle n’intègre pas la distribution d’exemplaires
numériques de l’œuvre, ce qui exclurait, le cas échéant, lavente ou l’offre gratuite en ligne des œuvres protégées.
Il s’agit plus d’une maladresse rédactionnelle qued’une volonté affichée du législateur sénégalais desoustraire la distribution en ligne des œuvres littéraires
et artistiques du champ du droit d’auteur, en particulier
compte tenu de l’essor sans précédent du commerceélectronique dans les États africains avec tout ce quecette activité implique en termes de violation des droits
de propriété intellectuelle.
Il importe de souligner que le caractère lucratif ou gratuitde la distribution est indifférent. Dans le cas d’espèce,
les sites contrefaisants offraient l’ouvrage litigieux
en téléchargement gratuit, ce qui ne dépouille pas
pour autant cette activité de son caractère délictueux.
Abordant la question du caractère lucratif de l’acteincriminé, s’agissant certes du droit de représentation, la
Cour de cassation française a indiqué qu’“aucun texte deloi ne restreint l’action dérivant du droit de propriété desauteurs au cas où c’est dans un but de lucre qu’a lieu lareprésentation de leurs œuvres”512.
511
512

Voir n.94, p. 1333, n° 2281.
Voir Cass.civ., 1er avril 1882, in : S. 1882, I, p. 334.

Au total, trois composantes du droit d’exploitation
revendiqué par le colonel NDAW sur son ouvrage “Pourl’honneur de la gendarmerie sénégalaise” sont touchées
en l’espèce. L’on peut néanmoins déplorer l’insuffisancedes motifs de la décision commentée, laquelle se borneà énumérer les éléments matériels de l’infraction sansles caractériser véritablement. En tout état de cause, ledélit de l’article 144 de la loi du 25 janvier 2008 exige enoutre, pour être constitué, l’élément moral voilé sousle capuchon gris d’absence d’autorisation du titulairedes droits.
B. L’absence de l’autorisation du titulaire des droits
Il ne ressort pas de la décision rapportée que lesadministrateurs des sites Assirou.net et Actunet.sn
ont sollicité, et encore moins obtenu, l’autorisation
préalable du colonel NDAW préalablement à la miseen ligne et à la distribution des deux tomes de son
ouvrage “Pour l’honneur de la gendarmerie sénégalaise”.
Or, la reproduction, la communication au public et ladistribution même par voie électronique d’une œuvre
littéraire et artistique doivent être autorisées parl’auteur de l’œuvre ou ses ayants droit, conformément
aux articles 33 et suivants de la loi du 25 janvier 2008.
La non-comparution des prévenus à l’audience est du
reste symptomatique de l’inexistence en l’espèce d’uneconvention matérialisant cette autorisation donnée soit
par l’auteur lui-même, soit par le bureau sénégalais dudroit d’auteur au cas où celui-ci y serait affilié.
II. La sanction de la violation des droits de l’auteur
via l’Internet
Plusieurs acteurs ont vocation à intervenir dans leprocessus de numérisation et de diffusion d’une œuvre
littéraire et artistique sur la toile. D’où l’intérêt de ladéfinition du cercle de personnes qui pourraient êtretenues pour pénalement responsables des actes susspécifiés (A). Ensuite, il y aura lieu de préciser la grille dessanctions encourues (B).
A. Les auteurs des faits incriminés
Les auteurs des faits incriminés sont en premier lieu
l’administrateur du site incorporant le contenu illégal(1) et d’autres maillons de la chaîne de circulation del’œuvre dans l’environnement numérique peuvent êtreincriminés (2).
1. L’administrateur du site
C’est l’hypothèse évoquée dans l’affaire rapportée.
L’administrateur du site en est le principal responsable.
C’est lui qui fournit et met le contenu litigieux en ligne,
bien qu’il soit envisageable que le contenu provienne
d’une autre source. Dans cette hypothèse, le tiers
responsable pourra endosser la responsabilité pénale
du fait de la diffusion illégale de l’œuvre contrefaite enligne. Les faits nous révèlent que les nommés MAMADOU
MOUTH BANE et SERIGNE Fadel MBACKE sontrespectivement administrateurs des sites Actunet. sn
et Assirou.net, vecteurs du contenu critiqué. C’est donc
en toute légalité qu’ils ont été déclarés pénalement
responsables de la violation du droit d’exploitation de lapartie civile sur son œuvre.

B. La grille des sanctions
Les sanctions encourues par les contrevenants sont à lafois pénales (1) et civiles (2).
1. Les sanctions pénales
Les sanctions pénales susceptibles d’être infligées
à titre principal à l’auteur d’une atteinte aux droits
des auteurs d’œuvres littéraires et artistiques sontl’emprisonnement et l’amende. Aux termes del’article 142 de la loi n° 2008/09 du 25 janvier 2008 : “Estpunie d’un emprisonnement de six mois à deux ans etd’une amende d’un million à cinq millions de francs CFA
la violation du droit de communication au public, dudroit de reproduction, du droit de distribution ou dudroit de location”. Il importe de souligner qu’en vertu decette disposition légale, la peine d’emprisonnement doitêtre cumulée de l’amende. Pourtant le juge a cru devoir
condamner les prévenus à trois mois d’emprisonnement
avec sursis, les mettant ainsi à l’abri de l’amende, en
violation de la susdite disposition légale. En tout état decause, cette mensuétude du juge paraît en contradiction
avec les orientations du législateur communautaire qui,à l’article 64, alinéa 1, de l’annexe VII de l’AB-1999 sousl’empire duquel cette décision a été rendue, suggère
une peine suffissamment dissuasive contre les auteursd’actes portant atteinte à un droit protégé.
Quoi qu’il en soit, le juge a en outre, conformément àl’article 149 de la loi susvisée, ordonné la publication
du jugement aux frais des condamnés dans certains
journaux y compris les sites litigieux.
2. Les sanctions civiles
La question de l’évaluation des dommages et intérêts
auxquels peut prétendre la personne lésée en cas deviolation du droit d’auteur a préoccupé le juge dansl’affaire rapportée, le colonel NDAW ayant sollicitél’allocation de la somme de 300 000 000 francs à ce titre.
En droit d’auteur sénégalais, l’évaluation du préjudice
est encadrée par l’article 52 de la loi 2008-09 qui dispose :“Le demandeur peut réclamer l’indemnisation de l’entier
513

Voir Rapport du groupe de travail de l’Académie des sciences, sous ladirection de Gabriel DE BROGLIE, 2000, p. 46. Disponible en ligne à l’adressewww/http://bbf.enssib.fr/consulter/bbf-2001-05-0155-00.

préjudice causé par l’atteinte à son droit, évalué entenant compte de son manque à gagner et de son
préjudice moral, ainsi que des bénéfices injustement
réalisés par le défendeur. Il peut également prétendre
au paiement des frais occasionnés par l’acte de violation,
y compris les frais de justice”. En général, la charge dela preuve du préjudice dans toutes ses déclinaisonsincombe au demandeur qui doit produire les éléments
pertinents devant permettre au juge d’en apprécier laréalité et de le quantifier. Le tribunal a alloué la sommede FCFA 20 000 000 en réparation des préjudices matériel
et moral subis par le colonel NDAW du fait de la violationde son droit d’exploitation à travers les sites Internet
Actunet.sn et Assirou.net après avoir estimé disposerd’éléments d’appréciation suffisants. Il importe toutefois
de s’interroger sur la pertinence de la démarche dujuge relativement aux différents postes de préjudiceréparés. La décision rapportée ne fournit en effet pas
suffisamment d’informations permettant de déterminerles montants alloués respectivement au titre du préjudice
matériel et au titre du préjudice moral, s’agissant despréjudices par nature différents, ce qui pourrait l’exposerà la censure de la juridiction supérieure.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

L. Droit d’auteur – Action en contrefaçon– Identité en tant qu’auteur contestéedu demandeur – Pourvoi en cassation– Distinction du droit et du fait
Le demandeur en contrefaçon ne peut prétendre remettreen cause devant le juge de la cassation les constatations
de fait qui ont conduit les juges du fond à lui dénier lapaternité de l’œuvre qu’il prétend contrefaite.
Cour suprême du Sénégal, Arrêt n° 60 du 4 juillet 2012,
PAPE MALICK FALL c. SOCIÉTÉ DES CONSERVERIESALIMENTAIRES DU SÉNÉGAL (S.O.C.A.S.)
Observations :L’arrêt commenté, rendu par la Cour suprême duSénégal, illustre la difficulté de mettre en œuvre ladistinction entre le droit et le fait, distinction essentielle
pour délimiter l’étendue du contrôle opéré par lejuge de cassation mais qui se révèle “fuyante” 514,
tout particulièrement dans des matières telles quela propriété littéraire et artistique lorsqu’il s’agit,
comme en l’espèce, de contrôler des notions commecelle d’auteur ou d’originalité qui font une place très
importante au pouvoir d’appréciation des juges dufond. Malheureusement, les enseignements qu’il livre
sont limités par sa rédaction parfois imprécise et par laformulation du pourvoi qui n’est pas assez rigoureuse.

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistique

2. Les autres acteurs du réseau
Il a été précédemment évoqué la possibilité de la miseen jeu de la responsabilité du créateur des hyperliens
permettant ou facilitant l’accès au site Web cible
contenant l’information recherchée. Ce cas de figure
renvoie évidemment à la complicité telle que définie
par le code pénal national. Il est tout aussi possible
d’envisager la responsabilité pénale du fournisseurd’accès dont la fonction principale est de mettre en
relation ses abonnés avec les sites ou avec les autres
utilisateurs. Il n’a pas la maîtrise des contenus. Plus
précisément, selon la lumineuse formule retenue par les
auteurs du Rapport Broglie : “il ouvre une porte, maisn’abrite pas”513. En somme, la responsabilité pénale dufournisseur d’accès peut néanmoins être mise en jeu s’il
est prouvé qu’il a personnellement commis l’infractionou participé à sa commission à quelque titre que ce soit.

Faits : Pour autant qu’on puisse reconstituer le contexte
à partir des informations fragmentaires contenues dansl’arrêt de rejet, on comprend qu’il s’agit d’une action en
contrefaçon de droit d’auteur intentée par un certain
514

LOUIS-CAPORAL (D.), La distinction du droit et du fait en droit judiciaire privé,
Thèse, Montpellier, 2014, n° 9.
299

Pape Malick Fall, qui se prétend auteur d’un dessin
représentant trois tomates sur fond de rayures rouge
et or et un buste de femme, contre la société SOCAS,
inventeur de la tomate industrielle au Sénégal, laquellel’aurait, selon lui, reproduit sans son autorisation surl’emballage d’un de ses produits.
Débouté par la cour d’appel de Dakar, il forme un
pourvoi dans lequel il articule quatre moyens distincts,
respectivement fondés sur :
I.
II.
III.
IV.

“la dénaturation des faits”;“l’inexactitude des motifs”;“la contradiction de motifs”; et“la violation de la loi”.

Tous déclarés irrecevables par la Cour suprême, au termed’une argumentation qui, à vrai dire, n’emporte pas
toujours la conviction.
I. Moyen pris de la dénaturation des faits
Le pourvoi reproche en premier lieu à l’arrêt attaquéd’avoir relevé que le demandeur

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle“ne revendique pas la paternité du personnage
figurant sur l’emballage du produit SOCAS illustré
par trois tomates sur fond de rayures rouge et
or et un buste de femme avec l’intitulé Signara,alors que ce personnage, ajouté à son œuvre
reproduisant trois tomates reliées et dénommée
SIGNARA figurant sur un fond de rayures rouge etnoir, s’inspire de l’intitulé de son œuvre”.

300

La présentation du moyen est doublement maladroite.
D’abord, elle ne permet pas de bien comprendre ce qui
est réellement reproché aux juges du fond, sinon que ledessin figurant sur l’emballage n’est pas la copie servile
du dessin revendiqué par le demandeur (circonstance quin’exclut pas, bien sûr, l’existence d’une contrefaçon).
Ensuite et surtout, l’affichage en termes de “dénaturation
des faits” méconnaît ouvertement le principe constantselon lequel le contrôle de cassation a pour objet lesquestions de droit à l’exclusion des questions de fait.
La réponse de la Cour suprême mérite à cet égard
l’approbation. Elle écarte en effet le moyen en rappelant,ce qui échappe à toute contestation, que “le grief dedénaturation ne donne ouverture à cassation que s’il
porte sur un écrit”. On citera en ce sens un arrêt de la
Cour de cassation française qui, alors que le demandeur
au pourvoi plaidait une “dénaturation de la volonté desparties”, a déclaré le moyen non fondé (et non pas, on lenotera en passant, irrecevable) au motif “qu’un grief dedénaturation ne peut porter sur l’interprétation d’un fait
matériel”515.
II. Moyen pris de l’inexactitude des motifs

par le demandeur dont il résultait qu’il avait intitulé sondessin “La tomate”, et que la dénomination “La signara”
avait été une “trouvaille” de la société défenderesse,alors que l’intéressé justifiait par deux attestations du
BSDA (Bureau sénégalais du droit d’auteur) qu’il avait
lui-même déposé une œuvre intitulée “La signara”. Làencore, on peine à comprendre en quoi le titre de l’œuvre
pouvait commander la solution.
La Cour suprême se prononce, en tout cas, pourl’irrecevabilité du moyen qui, selon elle, “se borne à
critiquer les motifs de l’arrêt attaqué”. La réponse est
surprenante car, en soi, la critique des motifs peut
parfaitement conduire à la cassation, par exemple en casd’“insuffisance” ou de “contradiction” (grief articulé dansle troisième moyen). Il aurait suffi de s’en tenir, commepour le premier moyen, au constat que le pourvoi nepermet pas de remettre en cause les constatations defait opérées par les juges du fond, quoi qu’on puissepenser de leur force probante.
III. Moyen pris de la contradiction de motifs
Le pourvoi, dans son troisième moyen, décelait une
contradiction de motifs dans le fait que la cour d’appel,“après avoir relevé que Pape Malick Fall est le créateurd’une œuvre dénommée SIGNARA figurant des tomatesreliées ou mises ensemble et précisé que l’originalitéde l’œuvre contrefaite tient au symbolisme de ladénomination”, lui a “dénié” la paternité de l’œuvre,
surtout qu’il a constaté que les emballages de la SOCAS
montrent bien des tomates côte à côte”.
L’objection est balayée en ces termes : “attendu que lacontradiction alléguée ne porte pas sur les faits mais
sur les conséquences juridiques que la cour d’appel ena tirées”.
Le raisonnement suscite la perplexité. Au regard
des développements précédents, il est difficile decomprendre comment la Cour suprême peut refuserde se pencher sur une critique portant sur les“conséquences juridiques” tirées par les juges du fondd’une situation de fait. Ne dit-on pas traditionnellement
de la Cour de cassation (et la Cour suprême du Sénégal
est ici dans ce rôle) qu’elle est “juge du droit”516?
Au demeurant, si l’on s’en tient, faute d’avoir accès àl’arrêt attaqué, à la formulation du pourvoi sur ce point,
la contradiction dénoncée apparaît flagrante. Qualifier ledemandeur de “créateur” d’une œuvre dont on reconnaît
l’“originalité”, c’est bien en faire le titulaire d’un droit
d’auteur, ce que vient conforter la référence à une œuvre
“contrefaite”. Si la cour d’appel de Dakar lui a cependantdénié cette paternité, il faut bien admettre qu’elle s’est
contredite. Or la contrariété de motifs est un cas reconnu
d’ouverture à cassation.

Le deuxième moyen était tiré de ce que le “motif
déterminant” de l’arrêt attaqué était une lettre adressée
515

Cass. soc., 28 novembre 2000, n° 98-41.377.

516

WEBER (J.F.), La Cour de cassation, 2e éd., Paris (La documentation française),
2011, p. 9.

Le dernier moyen est fondé sur la violation de la loi
qu’aurait commise la cour. Violation de l’article 118 duCode sénégalais des obligations civiles et commerciales
dont ils auraient écarté à tort l’application, “alors quel’utilisation frauduleuse de l’œuvre contrefaite durequérant par la SOCAS à des fins commerciales dontelle a tiré un profit s’analyse en un enrichissement sanscause au préjudice de Papa Malick FALL et constitue
une faute”. Violation également de l’article 9 du mêmecode en ce qu’ils ont refusé de faire droit à la demanded’indemnisation, “alors que le requérant a établi la réalitéde la violation de ses droits qui lui a causé préjudice dufait des agissements quasi délictueux de la SOCAS”. La
Cour suprême se borne à répondre que “sous couvert dece grief, le moyen ne tend qu’à remettre en discussion leséléments de fait et de preuve souverainement appréciés
par les juges du fond”, ce qui le rend irrecevable.
Aussi bien le moyen articulé dans le pourvoi que cetteréponse appellent, à notre sens, des réserves. L’article 9
du Code des obligations civiles et commerciales disposeque “celui qui réclame l’exécution d’une obligation doit
en prouver l’existence” et que “celui qui se prétend libéré
doit prouver que l’obligation est inexistante ou éteinte”.
Il n’intéresse donc que la charge de la preuve et n’auraitété en cause en l’espèce que si le demandeur avait établil’existence de l’obligation du défendeur, ce qui était
précisément en débat. Quant à l’article 118, il est sansrapport avec l’enrichissement en cause qui est régi parles articles 160 et 161.
Mais contrairement à ce qu’affirme la Cour suprême,le moyen tiré de la violation de cet article ne tendaitpas à remettre en cause l’appréciation souveraine
des circonstances de fait. L’argument avancé était
bel et bien d’ordre juridique. Il aurait été opportun etd’ailleurs facile d’y répondre. Cette réponse aurait pu(dû) être la suivante : dès lors que la contrefaçon n’est
pas constituée, ce qui est l’hypothèse de départ, l’action
fondée sur la responsabilité civile ne pouvait jouer
un rôle supplétif qu’à la condition pour le demandeurd’établir la réalité d’une faute distincte. Il est en effet
admis qu’une telle action, qui prend souvent la formed’une action en concurrence déloyale, ne peut permettrede reconstituer un droit privatif sur une création qui n’estpas (ou qui n’est plus) protégée517. Or cette faute distincten’était même pas alléguée puisque le pourvoi se bornaità prétendre que les agissements délictueux consistaientdans la “violation” des droits du demandeur, ce qui
ramenait sur le terrain de la contrefaçon.
Reste la théorie de l’enrichissement sans cause. On
pouvait admettre que l’utilisation commerciale del’œuvre par la société défenderesse l’avait enrichie
mais le demandeur ne pouvait prétendre s’être
corrélativement appauvri qu’en prouvant sa paternité,
prétention qui avait précisément été écartée par l’arrêt
attaqué. Au demeurant, l’article 161 du Code des517

Voir en ce sens en droit français Cass. req., 29 novembre 1943 : Ann. propr. ind.
1940-1948, p. 339; Cass. com., 24 janvier 1972, n° 70-11.878 : Bull. civ., IV, n° 27.

obligations civiles et commerciales prévoit que l’action
fondée sur cette théorie (l’action de in rem verso) “ne peutêtre intentée qu’à défaut de tout autre moyen de droit”.
Or il est douteux que cette condition soit remplie lorsquel’action exercée à titre principal est jugée non fondée.
Au total, le pourvoi, tel qu’il était formulé, ne pouvait
aboutir à la cassation de l’arrêt attaqué, mais le rejet
aurait pu être mieux argumenté.
André Lucas

M. Droit d’auteur – Saisie-contrefaçon –Comité provincial de lutte contre lapiraterie – Composition irrégulière ducomite – Identification du saisissantet des biens saisis – Recours au droit
OHADA des saisies? – Application de laloi sur les œuvres cinématographiques– Juridiction compétente – Juge desréférés (oui)La saisie-contrefaçon ne constitue nullement une
sanction administrative et elle ne peut être pratiquée que
sur autorisation du juge compétent. En outre, le procèsverbal y relatif doit comporter toutes les mentions
propres à identifier le saisissant et les biens saisis. Faute
pour le saisissant d’avoir observé ces exigences, la saisie
peut être attaquée devant le juge des référés.
Tribunal de première instance de Garoua, Ordonnancede référé n° 17/R du 21 septembre 2005, SADJO MABI c.
COMITÉ PROVINCIAL DE LUTTE CONTRE LA PIRATERIE
Observations :L’ordonnance de référé n° 17/R rendue le21 septembre 2005 par le président du tribunal depremière instance de Garoua illustre à merveille lesdifficultés que doivent surmonter les acteurs du droit
d’auteur au Cameroun, spécifiquement, et dans l’espace
OAPI en général.
Faits : Les faits de la cause étaient relativement banaux.
Le 13 juillet 2005, le sieur Sadjo Mabi, vendeur de supports
phonographiques et vidéographiques, a fait l’objet d’une
saisie pratiquée à l’initiative d’un Comité provincial delutte contre la piraterie du nord au Cameroun. Le saisi,
ayant estimé que la saisie était irrégulière, a saisi le juge
des référés aux fins d’en obtenir mainlevée. À l’appui de
sa demande, plusieurs moyens sont soulevés :Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiqueIV. Moyen fondé sur la violation de la loi• tout d’abord, il estime que le Comité est
irrégulièrement constitué au regard de la décision
n° 02/48/MINCULT/CAB du 11 novembre 2002 signée
du ministre camerounais de la culture, portant création
du Comité national de lutte contre la contrefaçon,laquelle organise les modalités de création et defonctionnement des Comités provinciaux;• ensuite, il relève que, sur le plan procédural, lasaisie est nulle, dès lors qu’elle a été pratiquée sansautorisation préalable du président du tribunal depremière instance; et301• enfin, il invoque deux arguments relatifs audéroulement des opérations de saisie : l’acte desaisie ne contiendrait pas l’énumération détaillée desobjets placés sous mains de justice et les mentions
concernant les personnes ayant pratiqué la saisie
seraient douteuses.
Raisonnement : Pour sa défense, le comité commence
par soulever l’incompétence du juge des référés, en se
basant tantôt sur le préjudice que porterait l’ordonnancede référé au fond, tantôt sur le caractère administratif
de l’arrêté n° 1174/AP/D/SG/ASD du 29 novembre 2004
du Gouverneur de la province du nord Cameroun,portant désignation des membres du comité. Ensuite,
il invoque le fait que Monsieur Sadjo ne disposait pas
d’une autorisation d’exploitation des œuvres de l’esprit,malheureusement en se fondant sur la législation
relative à l’exploitation des œuvres cinématographiques.
Sur cette base, il estime que la saisie pratiquée est une
sanction administrative contre le prétendu contrefacteur.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Ces arguments sont évidemment contestés par ledemandeur au référé, pour qui les saisissants auraientdû, conformément à l’article 87 de la loi camerounaise
n° 2000/11 du 19 décembre 2000 relative au droit
d’auteur et aux droits voisins, saisir la juridiction
compétente au fond, sous peine de mainlevée.

302

De l’ensemble de cette situation teintée de confusions
regrettables, il ressort que la saisie litigieuse ne pouvait,
en aucun cas, constituer une sanction administrative
que le comité n’avait pas le pouvoir d’agir en lieu et place
des autorités étatiques. Il s’agissait plutôt, en réalité,de la saisie-contrefaçon. En s’immisçant dans le cercle
des saisissants et en mettant sous mains de justice lescassettes et CD appartenant au sieur SADJO MABI le
13 juillet 2005, le Comité provincial de lutte contre lapiraterie, acteur institutionnel créé par le ministre en
charge de la culture en vue de renforcer la lutte contre lacontrefaçon, a suscité deux débats juridiques que devait
trancher le juge des référés de Garoua :I.
II.

le premier était relatif à la régularité de la saisiecontrefaçon (section I); et
le second se rapportait à la compétence
juridictionnelle en matière de saisie-contrefaçon(section II).

simplifiées de recouvrement et des voies d’exécution.
Celui-ci, seule législation applicable aux pays de l’espace
OAPI en matière de procédures civiles d’exécution, impose
à celui qui pratique une saisie quelconque de s’identifierclairement et de spécifier en détail les biens qu’il saisit (A).
D’autre part, la réponse à la question de la régularitéde la saisie-contrefaçon suppose que soit clairement
identifiée la législation nationale en vertu de laquelle elle
est pratiquée (B).
A. L’identification du saisissant et des biens saisis
Aucune disposition expresse de l’Accord de Bangui ou
des lois nationales relatives au droit d’auteur et aux
droits voisins ne pose, comme condition générale,
l’exigence de l’identification du saisissant dans une
procédure de saisie-contrefaçon. Cependant, il ne fait pas
de doute qu’il s’agit d’un principe général qui gouverne
la matière, ainsi que le rappelle le juge des référés deGaroua. L’explication est triviale pour le juriste : il est
important pour le saisi ou le tiers saisi de connaître avec
exactitude l’identité de son adversaire dans la procédure
que ce dernier a entamée contre lui, afin d’organiser
sa défense.
L’interprète est alors spontanément orienté vers le droitcommun des saisies tel qu’il ressort de l’Acte uniforme
portant organisation des procédures simplifiées derecouvrement et des voies d’exécution. L’applicabilité decet Acte uniforme en matière de propriété intellectuelle
est progressivement admise, afin de combler tous lesvides laissés par cette matière dans le domaine dessaisies518. Cependant, la jurisprudence reste lucide etrefuse le recours à ce texte, lorsque la solution se trouve
dans le droit spécial de la saisie-contrefaçon tel qu’il
résulte des lois nationales sur le droit d’auteur et desannexes de l’Accord de Bangui en ce qui concerne la
propriété industrielle. On a pu le vérifier avec l’affaire
Société BIC S.A c. Société TBC S., dans laquelle le juge arejeté la compétence du juge des difficultés d’exécution
prévu par l’article 49 de cet Acte uniforme519. D’ailleurs,cette affaire a donné l’occasion de constater que ledroit commun applicable aux saisies-contrefaçons peutégalement être d’origine nationale lorsque le silence dudroit spécial sur la propriété intellectuelle est doublé decelui de l’Acte uniforme sur les voies d’exécution. En effet,
dans l’affaire BIC SA ci-dessus citée, le juge déclare que“le traité OHADA n‘ayant pas réglementé lessaisies-contrefaçons, celles-ci restent régies
par les dispositions du droit commun; Que seul
le juge des référés classique de l‘article 182
du Code de procédure civile et commerciale
demeure compétent pour connaître en urgenceles difficultés inhérentes auxdites saisies; Qu’ily a donc lieu de déclarer le juge des référés
classiques compétent”.

I. La régularité de la saisie-contrefaçon
La question soulevée par l’ordonnance commentéeà propos de la régularité de la saisie présente deuxvolets. D’une part, elle donne l’occasion de s’interroger
sur le droit commun applicable en matière de saisiecontrefaçon, en ce que cette saisie doit se conformer
à la fois à cette législation et à celle spécifique au droit
d’auteur. En effet, elle permet de se demander quel serait
le droit applicable lorsque la législation spécifique à lasaisie-contrefaçon est incomplète ou silencieuse. Tel est lecas de la question de certains éléments que doit contenir
le procès-verbal de saisie. Pour y répondre, il convient derelever que la législation qui parait s’imposer est l’Acte
uniforme OHADA portant organisation des procédures

518

519

Voir pour application à la saisie d’une marque : TGI Hors classe de Niamey,
Ordonnance de référé n° 118 du 20 mai 2008, Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd SA c.
Société Adil Company et El Hadj S.S (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M-L.), ce recueil,
chapitre 3, section S).
CA Littoral-Douala, Arrêt n° 28 du 28 janvier 2008, Société Bic SA c. Société TBC(obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M-L.), ce recueil, chapitre 1, section F).

En tout état de cause, l’Acte uniforme OHADA conforte,pour le cas d’espèce, l’obligation pour le saisissantde s’identifier. Ainsi, dans l’article 64, alinéa 2, letexte régional dispose que le procès-verbal de saisie
conservatoire des meubles corporels doit comporter entre
autres, à peine de nullité, “les noms, prénoms et domiciles
du saisi et du saisissant…”. Aux alinéas 1 des articles 77
et 100, la même obligation est réitérée sous la mêmesanction, concernant les actes de saisie conservatoired’une créance et de saisie-vente d’un meuble.
Dans ces conditions, était-il utile pour la partie
défenderesse d’invoquer les dispositions spécifiques
du Code d’instruction criminelle alors en vigueur au
Cameroun? La réponse à cette interrogation est négativepour au moins deux raisons : d’une part, l’article 37 CIC
qui vise expressément la saisie effectuée à l’occasiond’une infraction pénale concerne celle qui serait
effectuée dans “le domicile du prévenu”. Or, en matièrede saisie-contrefaçon, les objets contrefaisants et lematériel servant ou devant servir à la commission del’infraction sont généralement localisés dans le lieu oùle contrefacteur exerce son activité délictueuse, lequeln’est pas forcément le domicile. D’autre part, même si lanature civile de la saisie-contrefaçon peut être discutée,
on peut voir que la juridiction compétente en cas derecours contre ladite saisie est le juge des référés521.
Dans cette logique, point n’est besoin d’invoquer lesdispositions du CIC, dès lors que le saisissant remplit lesautres conditions pour pratiquer une saisie-contrefaçon.
Et, de toute manière, le saisissant était bien connu, dèslors qu’il s’était clairement identifié et s’était présenté
comme constituant le Comité provincial de lutte contrela piraterie. Seule posait problème sa qualité pour saisir,
du moment où le défendeur estimait que ces individusn’étaient pas les personnes devant faire partie dudit
comité. Ce seul motif n’aurait sans doute pu conduire àl’annulation de la saisie que si était en cause l’examen dela régularité de l’acte administratif les ayant désignés.
Or, le débat, ainsi que le rappelle le juge des référés, était
loin de ce sujet.
En revanche, en omettant d’identifier dans le détail les
objets saisis, le comité exposait la saisie pratiquée à une
nullité certaine. Cependant, la question se pose juste desavoir quelle législation doit être appliquée pour obtenir
une telle nullité. Si l’on se réfère à l’Acte uniforme OHADA
précité, on constate qu’il rappelle toutes les fois où cela
est nécessaire que l’acte de saisie doit comporter ladésignation détaillée des biens saisis à peine de nullité(v. notamment art. 64, al. 4).
520
521

Dans le même sens, voir NDEMA ELONGUE (M-L.), ibid.
Voir ibid. De manière globale, en dehors de l’intervention du Procureur de laRépublique et de celle de l’officier de police judiciaire, ce sont les autorités
civiles qui assurent la gestion de la saisie-contrefaçon. Il en est ainsi
notamment du président du tribunal de première instance agissant en tantque juge des requêtes, lequel intervient dans la quasi-totalité des saisies
antérieures à un procès civil.

Par ailleurs, même en se fondant sur les principes
généraux de droit, on aurait pu obtenir le même résultat.
En effet, il est clair qu’un procès-verbal qui ne comporte
pas ces éléments substantiels manquerait à sa mission.
Il s’agirait alors de faire application de la théorie desnullités virtuelles. Par conséquent, on doit affirmer que,dans le procès-verbal de saisie, l’officier ministériel ou
l’officier de police judiciaire doit préciser le nombre dephonogrammes et de vidéogrammes saisis, en les listantminutieusement, notamment par artiste, par titres ou
par collection, pourvu qu’il en ressorte un inventairelisible, détaillé et exhaustif excluant toute incertitude.
Dans tous les cas, l’absence de détails concernant les
objets saisis n’était pas la seule cause de nullité de laprocédure. Le comité avait utilisé une fausse base légale
pour son action, ce qui fragilisait la saisie pratiquée.
B. L’identification de la législation applicable
Il peut sembler incongru d’ouvrir un débat concernant
l’identification de la législation applicable en matièrede saisie-contrefaçon. A priori, il serait étonnant qu’unepersonne saisisse des œuvres de l’esprit en se fondant
sur une législation autre que celle régissant les droits desauteurs. C’est pourtant ce qu’il est advenu dans le cas
d’espèce. Pour la défense du Comité provincial de lutte
contre la piraterie, l’avocat relève que “la distribution parvente, location, l’exploitation, l’importation d’une œuvre
de l’esprit est soumise à une autorisation préalable
exigée selon la réglementation prévue au Décret
n° 90/1463 du 9 novembre 1990, autorisation également
exigée par la loi n° 88/017 du 16 décembre 1990”
et que faute de cette autorisation, le contrefacteur
encourrait des sanctions administratives. À la vérité, ilcréait une grave confusion : maladroitement, il tentait
de généraliser les règles spécifiques applicables à
l’exploitation des œuvres audiovisuelles à l’ensembledes œuvres de l’esprit. Fort heureusement, le juge
des référés de Garoua a admirablement réparti lesdomaines des deux législations. On peut simplement
compléter son propos en soulignant que les œuvres
cinématographiques obéissent à la fois à la législation
relative aux droits d’auteurs tant que l’exploitation deces droits est concernée, et à la législation relative àl’exploitation administrative desdites œuvres prises dansleur ensemble.
Cette dernière législation organise donc l’exploitation
par rapport aux exigences étatiques. C’est dansce cadre que se situe l’autorisation d’exploitation
à laquelle fait allusion l’avocat du comité. Cette
autorisation est délivrée après examen des conditions
dans lesquelles seront exploitées les œuvres, sanségard à la protection des droits des auteurs (il s’agit
notamment de la sécurité du public. Cf. art. 13 et suivantsde la loi de 1988). Quant à la législation sur les droits
des auteurs, elle a un objet différent. Les conditions
administratives de l’exploitation ne tombent pas dansson domaine. Seuls l’intéressent, ainsi que le relève lejuge des référés, les rapports entre les titulaires desdroits qu’il prévoit et les exploitants. Dans cette logique,elle ne peut servir de base à une quelconque sanction
administrative tandis que la première ne peut fonder

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistique

Cette solution mérite approbation, même si elle
contribue à complexifier une matière dont la simplicité
apparente est bien trompeuse520.

303

une saisie tendant à la répression de la contrefaçon.
Cette infraction vise précisément à sanctionner une
exploitation illicite non pas parce qu’elle n’a pas été
autorisée par l’administration, mais plutôt parce qu’elle
s’est effectuée sans le consentement du titulaire dudroit d’auteur. Au demeurant, le mode d’exploitation
aurait dû, logiquement inciter les saisissants à plus
de prudence. La loi spéciale sur l’exploitation desœuvres cinématographiques organise exclusivement
l’exploitation par la représentation. Or, la saisie pratiquéedans le cas d’espèce mettait en cause des exemplaires
illicites, lesquels relèvent de l’exploitation par la
reproduction.
En tout cas, cela démontre l’ampleur du travail devulgarisation de la propriété intellectuelle qui attend les
acteurs du droit d’auteur au Cameroun et partant, dansl’espace OAPI. Car, on ne peut le nier, l’ignorance de lamatière explique, au moins pour partie, les confusions et
les erreurs constatées en l’espèce. La même ignorance
justifie, semble-il, le débat ouvert à propos de lacompétence du juge des référés.
II. La compétence juridictionnelle en matière desaisie-contrefaçon
La question de la compétence juridictionnelle en matièrede saisie-contrefaçon a été également au centre desdébats. Ces derniers constituent une belle occasion pourrappeler les règles générales relatives à cette compétence(A). En l’espèce, celles-ci ont été perturbées parl’immixtion du Comité national de lutte contre la piraterie
et de ses excroissances, les comités provinciaux (B).

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

A. Règles générales relatives à la compétence
juridictionnelle en matière de saisie-contrefaçon
En matière de saisie-contrefaçon, l’intervention
juridictionnelle se situe généralement à un double niveau.

304

En amont, une juridiction est sollicitée pour délivrer une
autorisation devant permettre de pratiquer cette saisie.
Dans ce cadre, l’article 85, alinéa 1, de la loi camerounaise
de 2000 dispose que, lorsque leurs droits sont violés
ou menacés de l’être, les titulaires de droits d’auteur etleurs ayants droit peuvent saisir le “juge compétent”
pour obtenir une autorisation permettant de saisir les
exemplaires contrefaisants, les exemplaires importés
illicitement et le matériel résultant, ayant servi ou devant
servir à une représentation ou à une reproduction522.
À l’alinéa 2, le même article 85 dispose que “leprésident du tribunal civil compétent” peut également,par ordonnance sur requête, décider de mesures
particulières, notamment la saisie même en dehors desjours et heures ouvrables et la saisie des recettes. Dans
l’ensemble, le législateur camerounais a été inutilement
alambiqué sur cette question. En effet, il est évident
que lorsque la victime ou la potentielle victime d’une
contrefaçon est informée de l’existence ou de la menacede l’infraction, elle a tout intérêt à agir avec la plus
522

Cependant, la loi camerounaise attribue la compétence pour délivrer
l’autorisation de pratiquer une saisie-contrefaçon, concurremment à ce juge
et au Procureur de la République.

grande célérité. Or, le juge civil idoine pour lui prêter
le concours rapide dont il a besoin est le magistrat del’urgence, c’est-à-dire pour le Cameroun, le président dutribunal de première instance agissant comme juge desrequêtes. Par conséquent, on peut dire que l’autorisation
juridictionnelle visée par l’article 85, alinéa 1, ne peutêtre contenue que dans une ordonnance sur requête.
D’ailleurs la pratique confirme cette interprétation.
Dans l’affaire du Comité provincial de lutte contre lapiraterie du nord, le saisi avait effectivement relevél’absence d’autorisation de saisir. Mais il s’était appuyé
non pas sur l’article 85 précité, mais, plutôt sur “lalégislation en vigueur en matière de voies d’exécution”.
Dans sa réponse à ce chef de la demande, le juge desréférés relève que le comité se devait d’obtenir “uneordonnance du président du tribunal compétent” dèslors qu’il envisageait de pratiquer une saisie. Il appuie
son raisonnement sur l’alinéa 2 de l’article 85, alorsque, en toute logique, c’est plutôt l’alinéa 1 qui pose larègle générale qui aurait dû servir de base permettant
d’obtenir le même résultat. En tout cas, une constantese dégage de l’ensemble de ces éléments : la victime
ou la potentielle victime d’une contrefaçon doit obtenir
une ordonnance du président du tribunal de première
instance avant de pratiquer la saisie-contrefaçon, sinoncelle-ci encourt une nullité certaine, devant le juge desréférés (conformément à l’art. 85, al. 1, la victime ou lapotentielle victime de l’infraction peut, si elle le désire,requérir directement un huissier de justice ou un officier depolice judiciaire. Cependant, ceux-ci n’ont pas le pouvoir desaisir de leur propre initiative. Ils se borneront à constaterl’infraction ou la menace de l’infraction).
En aval justement, le juge compétent pour connaître
des recours contre la saisie-contrefaçon est le juge
des référés. Sur ce point, la loi camerounaise de 2000a été assez claire. Après avoir conservé le mystèreen évoquant de nouveau “le président du tribunal” àl’article 86, alinéa 1, elle lève définitivement le voile enévoquant “le président du tribunal statuant en référé”
à l’alinéa 2. Ce juge doit être actionné par le saisi ou letiers saisi qui conteste la mise sous mains de justice desobjets, dans les quinze jours du procès-verbal de saisie.
L’objet du procès est, selon les termes de l’article 85,
le cantonnement des effets de la saisie, la reprise dela fabrication des exemplaires ou encore la reprisedes représentations, le cas échéant sous l’autoritéd’un administrateur constitué séquestre ou contre
consignation d’une somme affectée à la garantie desdommages et intérêts auxquels pourrait prétendre letitulaire du droit d’auteur.
Cependant, cette partie du contentieux de la saisiecontrefaçon, qui tend à minimiser le préjudice subi parle prétendu contrefacteur, présuppose que la saisie soit
régulière sur le plan procédural. Lorsque, comme dans lecas d’espèce, elle ne l’est pas, notamment parce qu’elle aété pratiquée sans autorisation juridictionnelle ou parcequ’elle a été pratiquée sur des recettes ou en dehors
des jours et heures légales sans autorisation spéciale duprésident du tribunal de première instance, elle encourt
la nullité pour vice de forme. Et la juridiction compétente

Mais, une fois de plus, le fondement choisi est erroné.
Il estime, en effet, que le saisissant doit (et ne l’a pasfait), dans les quinze jours du procès-verbal de saisie,saisir le président du tribunal de première instancestatuant en matière de référé. Il s’agit là d’une confusionnée, selon toute vraisemblance, de l’assignation par lesarticles 86 (alinéa 1) et 87, du même délai d’action au saisi
et au saisissant.
Il faut le préciser, les deux actions doivent êtreformellement distinguées. D’une part, l’action del’article 86 est ouverte au saisi et au tiers saisi pourleur permettre de contester la saisie devant le juge desréférés dans les quinze jours du procès-verbal. D’autrepart, l’action de l’article 87 est imposée, dans le mêmedélai, au saisissant pour le contraindre à agir au fondafin d’établir la réalité de l’infraction523. En cas d’inaction
du saisissant dans ce délai, la saisie encourt mainlevée.
En somme, les deux actions sont en tous points
différentes : l’une, relevant du domaine du juge desréférés est introduite par le saisi ou le tiers saisi, l’autre,
relevant de la compétence juge du fond est engagée parle saisissant.
B. L’immixtion d’un acteur étatique
Par décision n° 02/48/MINCULT/CAB du11 décembre 2002 telle que modifiée et complétée parcelle n° 004/056/CAB du 27 juillet 2004, le ministre en
charge de la culture du Cameroun instituait un Comité
national de lutte contre la contrefaçon des œuvres
de l’esprit au Cameroun. À l’article 5 de ce texte, ildécidait que le gouverneur de chaque province du pays
instituerait un comité du même nom par le biais d’unarrêté. Sans nul doute, ce comité et ses représentations
provinciales étaient appelés à constituer l’un des bras
séculiers de l’État dans la lutte contre la contrefaçon. Par
conséquent, l’objectif visé est louable.
Pourtant, l’entrée de cet acteur institutionnel dans la lutte
contre la contrefaçon suscite des questions. La première
s’est posée dans l’affaire du Comité provincial du nord. Ici,
le gouverneur avait, dès le départ, plombé juridiquement
cette institution, en lui donnant une composition
irrégulière. En effet, au lieu de désigner le délégué
provincial de la culture de son ressort comme président
ainsi que l’exige l’article 5 de la décision précitée, il s’était
lui-même arrogé ce pouvoir. Le sieur Sadjo Mabi, saisi
dans la procédure litigieuse, en a logiquement déduit
que le gouverneur avait créé un comité autre que celui
institué par décision ministérielle. Par conséquent, ils’appuyait sur l’irrégularité de la composition du comité
pour demander mainlevée de la saisie.
Pour sa défense, le comité soulève plusieurs arguments
dont l’incompétence du juge des référés. Il estime, en
523

Voir pour une application de cette règle en matière de marque : CA Lomé,Arrêt n° 70/15 du 4 mars 2015, Gnanhoue Nazaire c. Établissements Sola (obs.
LAMOTTE (M.), ce recueil, chapitre 3, section I).

effet, que l’arrêté du gouverneur ayant créé le Comité
provincial est un acte administratif dont la connaissanceéchappe au juge des référés. Fort heureusement, lejuge perçoit très efficacement la question de droit àlaquelle il doit en réalité répondre : il n’a pas été saisi afinde se prononcer sur la régularité de la composition ducomité, mais simplement pour examiner la régularité dela saisie pratiquée par cette instance. Le premier débat
inviterait indubitablement le juge à se pencher sur l’acteadministratif de création du comité, tandis que le second
le borne à voir si ses agissements sont ou non conformes
à la loi du 11 décembre 2000. En recadrant ainsi le débat,le juge des référés de Garoua a fort opportunément
retenu sa compétence.
Mais, il faut le reconnaître, le juge avait la tâche aiséedu moment où la saisie était viciée. Qu’aurait-il décidé si
la saisie avait été régulièrement pratiquée? La question
peut être examinée sous une double détente : uncomité irrégulièrement constitué peut-il procéder à
une saisie valable? Par ailleurs, même régulièrement
constitué, le Comité provincial et partant le Comité
national lui-même ont-ils qualité pour saisir desœuvres contrefaites? L’intérêt principal de ce débat
vient de ce que plusieurs pays africains ont créé descomités similaires. Tel est le cas du Bénin524 et de laCôte d’Ivoire525.
Pour le cas du Cameroun et des pays où aucune précisionn’a été faite sur ce point, les deux détentes ci-dessus
rappellent un débat ouvert en France à propos desœuvres collectives, eu égard au droit d’agir des titulaires
de droits sur de telle œuvres. En effet, la composition
irrégulière du comité l’affecte d’un vice originel qui
devrait impacter toutes ses actions, de même quepour le titulaire de droits sur une œuvre collective,
l’impossibilité de prouver que les contributeurs lui ont
cédé leur droit affectent sa titularité d’un vice de mêmenature. Cherchant donc à profiter de ce vice, il arrivait
aux contrefacteurs de tenter de se réfugier derrière
l’absence de cession des droits à l’ensemblier qui exploite
l’œuvre collective, pour échapper à toute responsabilité.
Ainsi par exemple, dans une affaire bien connue, lapreuve de la cession des droits à la personne morale qui
exploitait l’œuvre et qui était demanderesse à l’action
en contrefaçon avait été soulevée comme moyen dedéfense et avait prospéré devant une cour d’appel qui
avait estimé que la société demanderesse n’avait pas
justifié avoir bénéficié d’une cession des droits. À cettejuridiction, la Cour de cassation française a répondu“qu’en l’absence de revendication du ou des auteurs,
l’exploitation de l’œuvre par une personne morale sous
son nom fait présumer, à l’égard des tiers recherchés
pour contrefaçon, que cette personne est titulaire,
524
525

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiquepour en connaître ne varie pas. Le juge des référés deGaroua a donc, à juste titre, retenu sa compétence entant que juge des recours contre la saisie-contrefaçon.

Décret n° 2005-187 du 14 avril 2005, portant création, attributions etfonctionnement de la Commission nationale de lutte contre la piraterie desœuvres littéraires et artistiques.
Décret n° 2014-420 du 9 juillet 2014 fixant les attributions, l’organisation etle fonctionnement du Comité national de lutte contre la contrefaçon. Mais
il serait sans grand enjeu si la loi a elle-même pris le soin de lui conférer
spécialement la qualité pour agir (c’est le cas de la Commission béninoise).
Cf. art. 5 du Décret n° 2005/187 du 14 avril 2005 portant création, attributions
et fonctionnement de la Commission nationale de lutte contre la piraterie desœuvres littéraires et artistiques.
305sur l’œuvre qu’elle soit collective ou non, du droit depropriété incorporelle de l’auteur”526.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Cette jurisprudence qui établit ce qui est désormais
connu comme étant une présomption de titularité liée àl’exploitation est critiquable à maints égards527. De fait,si l’on devait demeurer dans la pureté des principes, lasociété défenderesse devait rapporter la preuve de sa
qualité de cessionnaire des droits, de laquelle devait
découler sa qualité à agir en contrefaçon. Ces exigences,a estimé la Cour de cassation, alourdissent la procédure
et font le jeu des contrefacteurs. Cette orientation de lajurisprudence française se justifie uniquement par un
renforcement de la lutte contre la contrefaçon. Elle peut
inspirer le débat qui s’ouvrirait éventuellement autour dela régularité de la composition du Comité camerounais
de lutte contre la contrefaçon, dans le même cadreétroit : peu importe qu’il soit constitué conformément
à la loi ou non, l’infraction a été commise et doit êtresanctionnée. Cette solution qui n’est guère satisfaisantepour l’esprit est parfaitement défendable car, s’il est
normal que le tiers contrefacteur critique la réalité de lacontrefaçon, une critique portant sur la composition del’organe qui a enclenché la répression apparaîtrait bien
comme un artifice de procédure.

306

Le même raisonnement semble devoir être avancé par
rapport à la qualité pour agir du Comité national et deses excroissances, les Comités provinciaux. De fait, uncontrefacteur saisi pourrait arguer du défaut de qualitéde l’un de ces comités. D’un point de vue strictement
juridique, cette critique pourrait prospérer. En effet,
d’une part, la loi camerounaise sur le droit d’auteur
limite les personnes pouvant agir pour la défense desdroits d’auteur. Il s’agit naturellement des auteurs euxmêmes, des titulaires de droits voisins, leurs ayants
droit ou ayants cause, ainsi que les organisations degestion collective528. D’autre part, l’article 2 de la décision
ministérielle créant le Comité national du Cameroun
dispose que celui-ci a pour mission “de mener toutes
actions tendant à faciliter la lutte contre les atteintes
aux droits d’auteur et aux droits voisins, y compris lesactions de sensibilisation, d’information et de formation”.
Il en résulte que la décision n’a apparemment pas voulu
conférer aux Comités de lutte contre la contrefaçon lepouvoir de saisir.
Même en changeant de terrain de raisonnement
parce que les agissements litigieux constituent une
infraction pénale, l’action des comités ne devraitpas être plus conforme à la loi. De fait, l’initiative del’action publique n’appartient qu’au Ministère public,
à la victime et à certaines administrations. Dans ce
contexte, les saisies pratiquées d’autorité par lescomités en cause devraient toujours être exposées àla nullité. Ceux-ci devraient tout au plus agir commeorganes de dénonciation auprès des titulaires de droits
526
527
528

Cass. civ., 1re chambre, 22 février 2000, cité par SIRINELLI (P.), Lesbénéficiaires initiaux du droit d’auteur : règles générales, Paris (Lamy, droit
des médias et de la communication), étude 118, n° 118-97.
Voir sur l’ensemble de la question : LUCAS (A.), LUCAS-SCHLOETTER (A.) et
BERNAULT (C.), n.36, no 1193 et s.
Cf. notamment art. 85 al.1.

ou se faire consentir mandat d’agir au nom et pour lecompte de ces titulaires et/ou de leurs organisations
de gestion collective. La présence des représentantsde ces sociétés dans les comités ne change rien à cettesituation. Ces représentants légitiment son action,mais, d’un point de vue juridique, l’organe n’est pas
pour autant investi du droit de saisir sans transiter par
une personne habilitée par la loi.
Cependant, la contrefaçon est une infraction
essentiellement fugace et les produits qu’elle permetd’écouler en cas de reproduction illicite se caractérisentpar leur ubiquité. Dès lors, il n’y a pas de temps àperdre lorsque de tels produits sont localisés. Dans detelles conditions, il paraît normal de permettre à uncomité spécial créé par l’État de contribuer à réprimer
cette infraction, au besoin en procédant à des saisies.
L’efficacité de la lutte contre ce fléau est au prix del’acceptation de solutions qui ne sont pas forcément
satisfaisantes pour l’esprit.
Qu’importe en fin de compte au contrefacteur que lasaisie soit pratiquée ou non par une personne qui selon
lui n’aurait pas qualité pour saisir si la contrefaçon est
avérée et si le déroulement de la saisie a préservé ses
droits… Car “peu importe que le chat soit gris ou noir,
pourvu qu’il attrape la souris” (DENG XIAO PING).
Joseph Fometeu

N. Droit d’auteur – Action en contrefaçon– Obligation pour les juges dufond de motiver explicitement lacondamnation – Défaut de réponse
aux conclusions alléguant une atteinte
au droit à la paternité
La cession des droits d’auteur ne prive pas l’auteur dudroit d’être identifié, soit de faire mention de son nom
sur tout support de communication au public utilisé
par le cessionnaire et il appartient au juge du fond despécifier dans leurs motifs si le bénéficiaire de la cessiona respecté ce principe.
Cour de cassation du Niger, Chambre civile etcommerciale, Arrêt du 21 avril 2015, n° 15-040/CIV,SONITEL c. AGENCE KYBIA (préc.)
Observations :L’arrêt rendu par la Cour de cassation du Niger le
21 avril 2015, déjà commenté plus haut sous l’angle
de l’originalité, appelle aussi des observations, et desobservations critiques cette fois, sous l’angle de la
cession des droits.
Faits : Rappelons que la société SONITEL avait été
condamnée par la cour d’appel de Niamey pour avoir
utilisé dans le cadre d’une campagne publicitaire une
photographie qui lui avait été fournie par l’agence
Iman, photographie dont les droits appartenaientà l’agence Kybia.

L’agence Kybia, en réponse, invoquait le droit moral
garanti par l’article 8 de l’ordonnance précitée etsoutenait que nul ne pouvait “lui dénier le droit derevendiquer la paternité de son œuvre que l’agence
IMAN a communiquée au grand public à la demande dela SONITEL sans faire référence sur l’affiche, à l’auteur dela photographie ainsi reproduite qu’elle était”.
Raisonnement : C’est ce raisonnement de la cour d’appelque va reprendre à son compte la Cour de cassation.
Après avoir affirmé que “si le principe de cession desdroits d’auteur est admis, il ne doit cependant pas priverl’auteur de faire continuellement référence à lui par lamention de son nom sur tout support de communication
au public utilisé par le bénéficiaire”, elle constate que lesjuges du fond n’ont pas spécifié dans leurs motifs “quela SONITEL, par l’agence IMAN interposée, a respecté ce
principe ou non”, où elle voit une violation de l’article 31
de l’ordonnance de 1993.
Le raisonnement suscite la perplexité. Outre qu’il netient pas compte du fait que le droit moral, par principe,
ne peut être attaché qu’à l’auteur personne physique,lequel n’était pas à la cause, il semble méconnaître lesdonnées du litige telles que le commentateur est fondé
à les reconstituer. Si l’agence Kybia avait effectivement
invoqué une violation de son droit à la paternité et si lacour d’appel de Niamey ne s’était pas prononcée sur cepoint, la situation caractérisait un défaut de réponse aux
conclusions méconnaissant l’obligation de motivation
et justifiant donc la censure. Force, cependant, est deconstater que la question n’était pas agitée dans lepourvoi tel qu’il est présenté par l’arrêt commenté.
Le moyen de cassation, en effet, ne portait, ce que
semble oublier la Cour de cassation du Niger, que surla violation des droits patrimoniaux, constatée par lacour d’appel de Niamey et contestée par la SONITEL.
La Cour de cassation ne répond pas sur ce point, sauf
pour relever de manière laconique que “le principe
de cession des droits d’auteur est admis”, propositionévidemment trop générale pour qu’on puisse en tirer
une quelconque conséquence. Or il lui appartenait, pourfaire droit au moyen ou pour le rejeter, de prendre parti
clairement là-dessus.

“lorsque l’œuvre est créée pour le compte d’une
personne physique ou d’une personne morale,
privée ou publique, dans le cadre d’un contrat
de travail de l’auteur ou bien lorsque l’œuvre est
commandée par une telle personne à l’auteur,le premier titulaire des droits patrimoniaux
et moraux est l’auteur, mais les droits
patrimoniaux sur cette œuvre sont considéréscomme transférés”.
Or l’article 31 de l’ordonnance ne traite, comme l’indiqueson intitulé, que du “titulaire des droits sur les œuvres
créées dans le cadre d’un contrat de travail” et il est ainsi
libellé :“Dans le cas d’une œuvre créée par un auteur
pour le compte d’une personne physique ou
morale (ci-après dénommée “l’employeur”) dansle cadre d’un contrat de travail et de son emploi,sauf disposition contraire du contrat, le premier
titulaire des droits moraux et patrimoniaux est
l’auteur mais les droits patrimoniaux sur cetteœuvre sont considérés avoir été transférés àl’employeur dans la mesure justifiée par lesactivités habituelles de l’employeur au momentde la création de l’œuvre”.
En réalité, le texte rapporté correspond mot pour
mot au début de l’article 31 de l’annexe VII l’ABR-1999(reprise par l’article 35.2 dans l’ABR-2015). Au début
seulement, car dans l’Accord de Bangui, le texte
continue en précisant que les droits “sont considéréscomme transférés à l’employeur (dans une rédaction
plus rigoureuse, l’article 35.2 de l’Accord de Bamako
respecte la symétrie en ajoutant “ou à cette personne
physique ou morale”) dans la mesure justifiée parles activités habituelles de l’employeur ou de cettepersonne physique ou morale au moment de la création
de l’œuvre”. Il revenait donc à la Cour de cassationde contrôler la motivation des juges du fond pourdéterminer si les conditions du transfert des droits
patrimoniaux énoncées par ce texte étaient réunies.
Encore était-il possible de compliquer l’analyse en posant
la question de savoir si le législateur nigérien, qui nevisait que le cas des salariés, renvoyant ainsi au droitcommun le cas de l’œuvre de commande, n’offrait pas
aux auteurs concernés un meilleur niveau de protection,ce qui aurait pu justifier l’éviction de la disposition del’Accord de Bangui au profit de la loi nationale. Cela aurait
conduit au rejet du moyen.

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiqueDans un second moyen, la SONITEL reprochait à
l’arrêt attaqué d’avoir retenu sa responsabilité “pourviolation des droits patrimoniaux d’autrui (sic; sans
doute faut-il lire “d’auteur”), alors que, par application
de l’article 31 de l’ordonnance n° 93-27 du 30 mars 1993
sur le droit d’auteur, les droits voisins et le folklore, elleétait devenue cessionnaire des droits d’auteur sur laphotographie réalisée par l’agence Kybia dont elle avait
réglé les factures correspondantes, en sorte qu’elleétait fondée à faire de ladite photographie “un usage
conforme suivant ses moyens habituels de marketing”.

On le voit, il y avait vraiment matière à discussion, et l’onpeut regretter que l’occasion n’ait pas été saisie.
André Lucas

Pour ce faire, il fallait d’abord s’entendre sur le texte
applicable. La censure est prononcée, nous l’avons dit,pour violation de l’article 31 de l’ordonnance n° 93-27 du
30 mars de 1993. Il s’agit d’une erreur manifeste. En effet,
cet article 31 ne correspond pas du tout au texte transcrit
par la cour elle-même en ces termes :307

O. Paiement de la redevance du droit
d’auteur – Usage effectif des œuvres– Condition d’assujettissement –Capacité de diffusion des œuvres
La représentation ou l’exécution publique de certainesœuvres de l’esprit faisant prétendument partie durépertoire d’une organisation de gestion collective dudroit d’auteur est assujettie au paiement des redevances
par les utilisateurs dans les conditions fixées parvoie réglementaire.
Selon la juridiction régulatrice, une société de téléphoniemobile, en l’espèce la SONITEL, est assujettie au
paiement de ladite redevance sans qu’il soit besoind’établir préalablement qu’elle utilise effectivement
les œuvres concernées, le défaut de paiement étant
constitutif de la contrefaçon.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Cour d’État du Niger, Arrêt n° 11-250-civ du
1er décembre 2011, SONITEL c. BNDA

308

Observations :Les modes contemporains d’exploitation des œuvres
de l’esprit sont assez diversifiés, associant câble,satellite et surtout Internet. La représentation publiquese définit comme l’“exhibition au public” d’une œuvre,
ou mieux le fait de porter l’œuvre à sa connaissancepar son exécution : jouer la pièce, la symphonie, réciterle poème529. Quelle qu’en soit leur nature, ces divers
moyens d’exhibition du fruit du travail des auteurs
permettent à ces derniers de contrôler l’exploitationde leurs œuvres et leur permettre ainsi de vivre deleurs créations. Aussi, il devient donc impérieux, sinon
indispensable, de soumettre chacune de ces formesde représentation au monopole de l’auteur dont
l’autorisation sera préalablement requise avant l’usagede sa création. Telle est en toile de fond la substancede l’arrêt rendu par la Cour d’État du Niger en date du
1er décembre 2011 dans l’espèce opposant la Société
nigérienne de télécommunication (SONITEL) au Bureau
nigérien du droit d’auteur (BNDA).
Faits : À l’orée de la discorde, le BNDA, organisme
public en charge de la gestion collective des droitsd’auteur au Niger, avait, par acte extrajudiciaire servi le22 août 2001, sommé la SONITEL d’avoir à payer entre
ses mains la somme de FCFA 540 000 000 représentant laredevance du droit d’auteur due par cette dernière pourla représentation ou exécution publique de certainesœuvres de l’esprit, faisant prétendument partie durépertoire de l’organisme de gestion collective.
Suite à la réponse traduisant le refus par la SONITEL derégler spontanément les sommes réclamées, le BNDAva introduire une action en paiement devant le tribunal
régional de Niamey.
Débouté par jugement n° 181 du 28 mars 2003 du fait deson incapacité à prouver que la SONITEL faisait usage
des œuvres de son répertoire, le BNDA va interjeter
529

GAUTIER (P.-Y), n.67, p. 32.

appel devant la cour d’appel de Niamey. Vidant son
délibéré par l’arrêt n° 140/04 du 21 juin 2004 qui ainfirmé le jugement n° 181 du 28 mars 2003 du tribunal
régional de Niamey, la cour d’appel de Niamey fera droit
aux prétentions du BNDA, condamnant la SONITEL
au paiement de la redevance. Selon la cour, la lecture
conjonctive de l’ordonnance 93-27 du 30 mars 1993 et del’arrêté n° 157/MCI/MCC du 14 octobre 1997 ne fait pas del’usage effectif des œuvres une condition déterminantepour assujettir les réseaux téléphoniques au paiement
de la redevance due au titre du droit d’auteur.
Sur le fondement de cet argumentaire, la SONITEL va à
son tour se pourvoir en cassation devant la Cour d’État
du Niger, jouant le rôle de Cour de cassation pendant lapériode de transition militaire au Niger530.
Raisonnement : Aux juges de l’illustre cour, il revenait
de se prononcer sur la question de savoir si l’usage
effectif des œuvres protégées est la condition sine qua
non du paiement de la redevance. La réponse du jugesonne comme une remise en cause des piliers de base dudroit d’auteur.
En décidant de soumettre SONITEL au paiement deredevances de droits d’auteur (section II), le tribunal
apporte des précisions sur les éléments constitutifs de lareprésentation (section I).
I. Les éléments constitutifs de l’exécution publiquedes œuvres
Aux termes de l’article 1er de l’ordonnance 93-027 du
30 mars 1993 portant sur le droit d’auteur, les droits
voisins et les expressions de folklore, notamment son
alinéa V : “La communication d’une œuvre (…) au public
est le fait de rendre l’œuvre accessible au public...”.
De la lettre de cette disposition, on peut déceler
deux types d’éléments constitutifs de l’activité dereprésentation publique. Bien que l’usage effectif del’œuvre soit fortement sous-entendu dans ce texte, lahaute juridiction en fait un élément facultatif (1). Par
contre, deux éléments sont obligatoires (2), au sens dela cour, pour caractériser l’activité d’exhibition publique :c’est la mise à disposition de l’œuvre d’une part, etl’existence d’un public éventuel d’autre part.
A. L’élément facultatif : l’usage d’une œuvre
Bien que le terme usage ne transparaisse pas
explicitement de la lettre de l’ordonnance du
30 mars 1993, il n’en demeure pas moins que c’est
une condition déterminante pour caractériser lareprésentation ou exécution publique des œuvres.
L’exégèse de l’ordonnance visée au pourvoi est
pourtant sans appel lorsque ce texte dispose que lacommunication est “le fait de rendre l’œuvre accessible
au public…”.

530

Voir Ordonnance n° 2010-16 du 15 avril 2010 sur l’organisation, lesattributions et le fonctionnement de la Cour d’État.

Cette lecture unitaire de l’ordonnance de 1993 est
fidèle aux mécanismes juridiques qui encadrent ledroit d’auteur. En autorisant les actes d’exploitation deses œuvres par les tiers, l’auteur devrait vivre de sonart. Les revenus engrangés par ce dernier ne peuvent
nécessairement que provenir de l’exploitation contrôléede ses œuvres, c’est-à-dire de leur usage effectif par lestiers consommateurs du fruit de son esprit.
Malheureusement, c’est ce postulat qui est battu en
brèche par la Cour d’État du Niger lorsqu’elle fait del’usage effectif des œuvres un critère facultatif. Selon
la haute juridiction, le débat sur l’usage effectif est
rendu redondant par l’instauration d’un plan tarifaires’appliquant au demandeur au pourvoi classé dansla catégorie “réseaux téléphoniques” des tarifs B8.
L’ordonnance 93-27 du 30 mars 1993, prétend la cour,
rend inutile le débat sur la question de savoir si la
SONITEL diffuse ou non des œuvres artistiques.
Cette position est regrettable et rompt avec lespréceptes classiques du droit de la propriété littéraire
et artistique. Quid des éléments obligatoires pourcaractériser l’activité d’exécution des œuvres?
B. Les éléments obligatoires : une capacité de mettrel’œuvre à la disposition du public
L’ordonnance de 1993 nous donne, à sa seule lecture,les éléments qui caractérisent matériellement l’activité
de représentation publique des œuvres. En analysantce texte, on retient qu’il faut, d’une part, une mise àdisposition d’une œuvre et d’autre part, l’existence d’un
public éventuel.
En ce qui concerne la nécessaire mise à dispositiond’une œuvre, il doit s’agir d’une exhibition de la création,entendue au sens de sa communication au public. Cetélément ne pose sans doute pas beaucoup de difficultés
dans la pratique. Néanmoins, la cour semble entretenirl’amalgame quant à son contenu matériel, jugeant dansle cas d’espèce que la capacité de diffusion de l’œuvre
par le demandeur au pourvoi suffirait amplement pourqu’il y ait communication et assujettir, in fine, ce dernier
au paiement de la redevance.

triviale, il s’agit d’un ensemble de personnes (qui ne sontpas en clientèle avec celui qui met à disposition l’œuvre),qui se retrouve dans un même temps et en un mêmelieu pour entrer au contact de l’œuvre532. Toutefois, ilfaut relever que cette définition traditionnelle est loinde correspondre aux nouvelles réalités technologiquesde communication des œuvres. Aussi, rompant avec
l’unité de lieu et de temps, la jurisprudence a adapté ladéfinition aux exigences de la télédiffusion des œuvres
dans plusieurs chambres d’hôtel, pour ce qui est del’unité de lieu, et leur transmission numérique à lademande, pour ce qui est de l’unité de temps.
Que l’œuvre atteigne ou non son public, elle doit êtreà sa disposition à telle enseigne que le public puisse yavoir accès, faute de quoi on ne saurait envisager une
communication. Sur cette question de la réception
effective de l’œuvre par le public, on a vu la réponsede la cour interprétant les dispositions de l’alinéa 2 del’article 1er de l’ordonnance du 30 mars 1993 qui prévoit
que : “Tout procédé qui est nécessaire pour rendrel’œuvre accessible au public, et qui le permet, est une
communication, et l’œuvre est considérée comme‘communiquée’ même si personne dans le publicauquel l’œuvre est destinée ne la reçoit, ne la voit ni nel’écoute effectivement”.
Pour la cour, ce texte fait de la réception effective del’œuvre par le public une simple faculté. Le plus important
est que la communication puisse atteindre le publicconcerné. On parle ici du droit de mise à disposition au
public qui relève du monopole de l’auteur. Illustrant sa
position, la cour affirme que “l’usage effectif est réalisé
par la seule capacité de la structure considérée à rendre
ladite œuvre accessible au public, par la possession et lamise en œuvre d’un dispositif technique approprié; quela circonstance que personne ne l’a reçue, ne l’a vue ou
ne l’a écoutée effectivement importe peu”.
II. L’assujettissement au paiement de la redevance
Cet assujettissement du demandeur au pourvoi au
paiement de la redevance sanctionne la communication
non autorisée des œuvres par le demandeur au
pourvoi. Concrètement, le juge suprême réitère lescondamnations pécuniaires contre la SONITEL (A), sansse soucier des incohérences générées par sa décision (B).
A. Les condamnations pécuniaires de la SONITEL
En substance, il s’agit de la confirmation de la sanction
du juge d’appel, condamnant la demanderesse au
paiement de la redevance due au titre du droit d’auteur
d’une part, et l’allocation des dommages et intérêts au
BNDA, défenderesse au pourvoi d’autre part.

Ensuite, l’ordonnance de 1993 insiste sur l’existence d’unpotentiel public à qui l’œuvre devra être communiquée.
En effet, la représentation ne donne prise au monopole
bénéficiant à l’auteur que si l’œuvre est communiquée
au public531. Au sens large, le public s’appréhende paropposition au concept de “cercle de famille”. De façon

En réalité, la redevance n’est qu’une rémunération verséepériodiquement, par l’usager qui exploite une œuvre del’esprit. En principe, cette rémunération correspondraità un prorata prélevé sur les recettes générées par
l’exploitation économique de l’œuvre. Toutefois, il
convient de relever que dans la pratique, il est très

531

532

VIVANT (M.) et BRUGUIÈRE (J.-M), n.22, p. 34

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistique

Plus illustratif encore, l’intitulé de l’arrêté
n° 157/MCI/MCC du 14 octobre 1997 portant ordre
tarifaire relatif au droit d’auteur, aux droits voisins
et expressions de folklore. L’article 1er de ce texte
réglementaire fixe littéralement les tarifs s’appliquantaux usagers ou clients, utilisateurs des œuvres littéraires
et artistiques. Par son intitulé, on comprend bien quel’usage des œuvres est un facteur déterminant pourl’assujettissement au paiement de la redevance.

Ibid., p. 343.
309

souvent difficile, voire impossible, de déterminer labase de calcul de la contribution forfaitaire des usagersd’œuvres. Par conséquent, la rémunération est souvent
fixée de manière forfaitaire par un acte réglementaire.
Dans le cas d’espèce, le Bureau nigérien des droitsd’auteurs (BNDA) était chargé de la perception, au plannational, des droits d’auteurs échus aux membres de son
répertoire. L’arrêté visé au moyen fixait cette redevance
au montant annuel de 30 000 F par réseau, pour lesfournisseurs de réseaux téléphoniques. La SONITEL
disposait, comme cela transparaissait des débats, dedeux réseaux téléphoniques sur toute l’étendue duterritoire nigérien. C’est donc en conséquence de cause
qu’elle fut condamnée au paiement de la somme de
FCFA 180 000, correspondant aux redevances dues dansles années 1999, 2000 et 2001.
Au surplus, comme pour être logique avec elle-même,l’auguste juridiction va reconduire la condamnation aux
dommages et intérêts prononcée précédemment par lacour d’appel. Ainsi, pour avoir causé à la défenderesse au
pourvoi un préjudice résultant de sa résistance abusive
à s’acquitter des redevances dues, la SONITEL sera en
outre condamnée à payer la somme de FCFA 500 000 à
titre de dommages et intérêts.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

B. Les critiques à la condamnation du juge suprême
À l’analyse, la décision des juges suprêmes recèle aumoins deux incohérences. Avant tout, elle tend à dévoyer
la logique rémunératrice qui sous-tend la philosophiemême de la redevance, encore perçue commecontrepartie à l’exploitation d’un droit, en se contentant
d’instituer une présomption d’usage des œuvres
protégées, en lieux et place de leur “usage effectif” parl’usager. Comme si cela ne suffisait pas, la cour force
une conception erronée de la rémunération accordée autitulaire du droit comme une forme d’impôt plutôt que desimples redevances.

310

En effet, il est difficile de rester insensible dans ladémarche qu’a choisi le juge suprême qui, voulant
motiver la condamnation de la SONITEL, a déduit desa simple capacité à diffuser les œuvres querellées laprincipale raison valable du paiement de la redevance parcette dernière, indifféremment de l’exploitation effective
des objets protégés. Pourtant, autant dans l’esprit quedans la lettre des textes sur lesquels la cour s’appuie,l’usage ou exploitation effective des œuvres est le fait
générateur de la redevance. Le paiement de la redevancen’est que la contrepartie à la consommation du fruit del’effort intellectuel de l’auteur. L’usage de l’œuvre est un
fait juridique, et non une simple vue de l’esprit.
La demanderesse au pourvoi s’ingéniait à le démontrer
à la cour, en demandant au BNDA d’apporter la preuve
du fait qu’elle communiquait les œuvres protégées au
public. Malheureusement pour elle, l’auguste juridiction
va balayer son argumentaire d’un revers de la main, en
lui opposant l’arrêté n° 157/MCI/MCC du 14 octobre 1997
qui astreint les réseaux de communications au paiement
de la redevance. En un mot, à partir du moment oùl’activité de l’usager est répertoriée dans cet acteréglementaire, ce dernier est tenu à la redevance,
indifféremment du fait qu’il consomme les œuvres
protégées ou pas.
En faisant de l’usage des œuvres une simple faculté, lacour a créé une présomption d’usage au préjudice deceux qui mobilisent les moyens techniques les mettant
en capacité de rendre accessible au public les œuvres del’esprit. Cette interprétation des textes visés au moyen
est lourde de conséquences sur le plan juridique etconduirait au prélèvement des redevances indues.
Par ailleurs, la Cour suprême finit par dénaturer laredevance du droit d’auteur en la transformant en une
sorte de prélèvement obligatoire. En droit privé, uneredevance est un montant régulier payé au bénéficiaire
par l’usager d’un droit de propriété intellectuelle(droit d’auteur, brevet, marque etc.) en contrepartie
de l’utilisation de celui-ci. Emprunté de l’anglicisme
royalty, le paiement de la redevance est conditionné
par l’usage du droit dévolu au propriétaire, ce qui dans
un contrat synallagmatique ferait de l’exploitation del’œuvre la cause de ce paiement. C’est en cela mêmeque la redevance se distingue d’une taxe ou d’unimpôt, qui sont des formes de prélèvement obligatoires
effectués auprès du débiteur sans qu’il n’y ait lieu à une
quelconque contrepartie.
Dans ses mémoires, la société SONITEL n’a pourtantcessé de le marteler à cor et à cri, et ce sans succès.
Aristide Fade

P. Procédure – Droit d’auteur – Saisiecontrefaçon – Assignation au fond –Demandeur débouté – Indemnisation
du préjudice causé par la saisie
Le demandeur qui est débouté de son action en
contrefaçon après avoir été autorisé judiciairement à
pratiquer une saisie réelle doit indemniser le saisi desconséquences dommageables de cette saisie.
Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, jugement du2 juillet 2015, n° 1412/15, SOCIÉTÉ ZENITH-PLASTICS
CÔTE D’IVOIRE (ZPCI) c. SOCIÉTÉ INDUSTRIELLE
DE FABRICATION DE PLASTIQUE EN CÔTED’IVOIRE (SIFPLAST-CI)
Observations :Le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan apporte uneréponse convaincante à la question de savoir quelles
suites doivent être données lorsque le demandeur
en contrefaçon succombe après avoir été autorisé
judiciairement à pratiquer une saisie. Il s’agit en l’espèce
de dessins et modèles mais les enseignements livrés parle jugement valent de manière générale pour tous lesdroits de propriété intellectuelle.
Faits : Les faits sont d’une grande banalité. La société
ZENITH-PLASTICS Côte d’Ivoire (ci-après ZPCI),
spécialisée dans la fabrication et la commercialisation

Elle a obtenu gain de cause devant le tribunal depremière instance de Yopougon, dont la décision a été
confirmée par la cour d’appel d’Abidjan.
Mais l’issue ne lui pas été aussi favorable puisque cetarrêt confirmatif a été cassé le 7 juin 2012 par la Chambre
judiciaire de la Cour suprême, laquelle a ordonné
la mainlevée de toutes les saisies pratiquées par lasociété SIFPLAST-CI au préjudice de la société ZPCI etla restitution de tous les biens matériels et de toutes
les marchandises sous astreinte de 5 millions de francs
CFA par jour de retard à compter de la significationde la décision.
Considérant que la saisie-contrefaçon de 2010 a
entraîné la paralysie de toute son activité tout aulong de ces péripéties judiciaires, la société ZPCI
entend demander réparation de son préjudice.
Elle obtient du président du tribunal de commerced’Abidjan la désignation d’un expert (par ordonnanceconfirmée par la cour d’appel d’Abidjan), qui évalue
son préjudice matériel, commercial et financier
à la somme de FCFA 870 536 049. Elle assigne en
2015 la société SIFPLAST-CI pour lui réclamer cettesomme, en réparation de la “saisie irrégulière”,
ainsi que la liquidation de l’astreinte à hauteur de
FCFA 335 000 000. La société défenderesse conteste
cette demande en faisant valoir qu’elle n’a fait, en
pratiquant la saisie querellée, qu’exécuter une décisionde justice.
Raisonnement : Le problème est bien connu mais lasolution ne coule pas de source. La difficulté ne concerne
pas les conséquences d’une éventuelle responsabilité.
Il suffit à cet égard de renvoyer au droit commun,
qui n’appelle pas ici de commentaire, pour évaluer lepréjudice indemnisable. C’est ce que fait le tribunal en
homologuant le rapport d’expertise malgré les critiquesde la société défenderesse533.
533

C’est également par application du droit commun que le jugement liquidel’astreinte. Rappelant que cette liquidation n’est pas une simple opération
arithmétique consistant à multiplier le nombre de jours de résistance par lemontant de l’astreinte, il la réduit, en tenant compte des circonstances de lacause, à la somme de FCFA 200 000 000.

Reste une double interrogation portant :I.
II.

sur le principe même; et surtout
sur les conditions d’une telle responsabilité.

I. Le principe de la responsabilité du saisissantdébouté de son action en contrefaçon
La société défenderesse remettait purement etsimplement en cause le principe même de sa
responsabilité. Pour elle, elle n’avait commis aucune“voie de fait” et admettre que l’exécution régulière d’une
décision de justice puisse être source de responsabilité
reviendrait à “engager la responsabilité de l’État qui
emploie des magistrats qui rendent les décisions
de justice”.
Elle n’est pas suivie par le tribunal. Celui-ci reconnaît
qu’elle avait certes “le droit de procéder à une saisiecontrefaçon”, mais qu’elle n’en est pas moins tenue deréparer le préjudice éventuellement subi par la société
saisie. Et d’appeler à la rescousse l’ABR-1999, qui, enpermettant “au juge d’imposer un cautionnement
au requérant d’une saisie-contrefaçon en matière depropriété industrielle destiné justement à la réparation
du préjudice pouvant résulter de ladite saisie”, montre
que “le principe de la réparation du tiers lésé par lasaisie-contrefaçon est bien inclus dans le droit dela propriété intellectuelle”. La conclusion, dès lors,s’impose : “Il est donc vain pour la défenderesse debrandir les décisions de justice pour s’exonérer detoute responsabilité”.
Le raisonnement mérite en tous points d’être approuvé.
L’idée que l’exécution d’une décision de justice ne peutêtre source de responsabilité n’est pas admissible. De ce
point de vue, le tribunal a raison de tirer parti de l’Accordde Bangui et plus précisément, pour ce qui concerne lesdessins et modèles industriels, de l’article 33, alinéa 3,de l’annexe IV. Il est intéressant de noter, d’un pointde vue historique, que la première loi française sur lesbrevets d’invention, en 1791, qui a institué la saisiecontrefaçon, prévoyait expressément l’indemnisation dela partie saisie534.
On peut rapprocher de cette situation celle dans laquelle
un plaideur exécute un jugement frappé d’appel maisrevêtu de l’exécution provisoire. Personne ne contestequ’en cas d’infirmation de la décision, il doit réparer lepréjudice qui a pu être causé par cette exécution. En
France, la Cour de cassation statuant en assemblée
plénière a énoncé clairement la solution, dont la portée
est d’autant plus grande qu’en l’espèce, la décision
attaquée avait été spontanément exécutée par lapartie perdante535.

534
535

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiquede matière plastique, a mis au point un modèle dechaussure intitulé Modèle 838 qu’elle a enregistré en
2000 à l’OAPI. Elle l’a fabriqué et commercialisé jusqu’en2009. En décembre de cette année, la société SIFPASTCI, qui a pour objet social la fabrication de chaussuresen plastique, estimant que le Modèle 838 était lacontrefaçon de son modèle SUPER 13 et SUPER 14,
enregistré à l’OAPI en 1996 (enregistrement renouvelé en
2003 et en 2008), a saisi sur le marché tous les stocks dechaussures du Modèle 838 entre les mains des clients (lejugement ne dit pas dans quelles conditions cette saisie
a eu lieu), puis s’est fait autoriser par le président dutribunal de première instance de Yopougon à pratiquer
dans les locaux de la société ZPCI, le 5 janvier 2010, lasaisie de tout le matériel de fabrication, du stock dematières et du stock de chaussures Modèle 838, avantd’assigner ZPCI en contrefaçon, en concurrence déloyale
et en paiement de la somme de 738 millions de francs
CFA à titre de dommages et intérêts.

STENGER (J.-P.), Saisie-contrefaçon – Recours après saisie-contrefaçon : Juriscl.
Brevets, Fasc. 4634, 2006, n° 130.
Cass. ass. plén., 24 février 2006, n° 05-12.679 : JurisData n° 2006-032415 et D.
2006, p. 1085 (note PERROT (R.)).
311

II. Les conditions de la responsabilité du saisissantdébouté de son action en contrefaçon
Les difficultés se concentrent sur la nature de la
responsabilité encourue et donc sur les conditions de sa
mise en œuvre.
Sur ce point, il faut reconnaître que le jugement
commenté n’est pas exempt d’ambiguïté. En effet, ilcommence par affirmer que l’obligation de réparer lepréjudice résulte du principe général de la responsabilité
civile délictuelle prescrite par l’article 1382 du Code civil
qui dispose que “Tout fait quelconque de l’homme qui
cause à autrui un dommage oblige celui par la fauteduquel il est arrivé à le réparer”, mais c’est pour ajouter
immédiatement qu’en matière de propriété intellectuelle“la saisie-contrefaçon est toujours effectuée aux risquesdu saisissant qui doit indemniser le tiers lésé, s’il se
révèle ultérieurement qu’il n’y a pas eu, comme il l’avait
prétendu, atteinte au droit intellectuel”. Or ces deux
propositions ne sont pas conciliables. La première
renvoie à une responsabilité pour faute, la seconde à une
responsabilité sans faute.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

La thèse selon laquelle la responsabilité du saisissantn’est engagée qu’en cas de faute prouvée de sa partne défie pas la logique. Concrètement, elle signifie
que le demandeur en contrefaçon qui a échoué n’est
responsable des conséquences de la saisie qu’il apratiquée avant le jugement sur le fond que si cettesaisie a été effectuée dans des conditions révélatricesd’un abus, par exemple avec une publicité destinéeà nuire au saisi, ou s’il est établi que le saisissant ne
pouvait pas ignorer la fragilité du droit de propriété
intellectuelle dont il s’est prévalu.

312

À l’inverse, il est exonéré si la saisie-contrefaçon s’estdéroulée dans des conditions normales ou s’il a pu seméprendre de bonne foi sur l’existence ou la portéede son droit. En France, une partie de la jurisprudence
se prononce en ce sens, spécialement en matière debrevets d’invention. Ainsi la Cour de cassation a-t-elle
jugé en 1964 que “c’est à bon droit qu’un arrêt rejetteune demande en dommages et intérêts pour abus
dans l’exécution d’une saisie-contrefaçon de brevet,
en repoussant l’argument du demandeur selon lequell’accomplissement d’une mesure conservatoire, telleque la saisie-contrefaçon, fait peser sur son auteur une
véritable responsabilité objective du seul fait qu’elle se
révèle injustifiée et préjudiciable, abstraction faite detoute faute”536.

“irrégulière”. Par ailleurs, aucun élément n’est avancéqui pourrait accréditer l’idée que la société SIFPLASTCI était de mauvaise foi et savait que son action était
mal fondée.
C’est précisément ce résultat qui est critiquable, ce qui
suffit à montrer les défauts de l’analyse. On doit, en effet,
se garder d’oublier que la saisie-contrefaçon ne permetd’obtenir que des mesures provisoires, et que plus lesmesures en question sont générales, comme c’était le cas
en l’espèce538, plus le risque qu’elles font courir est grand.
La question est donc bien de savoir qui doit assumer
ce risque lorsque l’action au fond n’est pas accueillie.
Ainsi posée, elle appelle nécessairement la réponse que
donne le jugement commenté lorsqu’il affirme que lasaisie-contrefaçon est “toujours effectuée aux risquesdu saisissant” et qu’il se contente de constater l’absenced’atteinte au droit de propriété intellectuelle revendiquépour en déduire l’obligation de réparation.
En France, la jurisprudence dominante se prononce
en ce sens. Ainsi la Cour de cassation a-t-elle posé leprincipe que “toute personne qui procède à une saisiecontrefaçon le fait à ses risques et périls et doit
dès lors répondre de tous les dommages qui
pourraient s’ensuivre”539. On notera qu’elle
mène le même raisonnement dans l’hypothèsevoisine, évoquée ci-dessus, de l’exécution provisoire540.
Le tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, malgré les
ambiguïtés relevées ci-dessus, s’inscrit dans ce courantet mérite, à notre avis, d’être approuvé.
André Lucas

Q. Droit d’auteur – Droit international
privé – Condition des étrangers –Réciprocité législative opposée à desauteurs étrangers – Convention deBerne – Traitement national
Les auteurs de nationalité étrangère ne peuvent fairevaloir leur droit d’auteur au Cameroun qu’en établissantque leur loi nationale accorde aux ressortissants538
539

En l’espèce, cette approche aurait conduit à écarterla demande d’indemnisation. Rien, en effet, dans lejugement ne permet de conforter l’idée d’une saisie
abusive, et de ce point de vue, la référence du tribunal
aux “saisies irrégulières”537 est maladroite car une saisie
autorisée par le juge n’est pas en elle-même une saisie
536
537

Cass. com., 8 juin 1964 : Ann. propr. ind. 1964, p. 254. Voir aussi CA Paris, pôle
5-1, 30 janvier 2013, n° 11/05261 : PIBD 2013, III, n° 982, p. 1132.
On ne sait si le pluriel inclut la saisie opérée sur le marché en décembre 2009
ou s’il se rapporte aux seules opérations de saisie pratiquées dans l’entreprisele 5 janvier 2010.

540

On peut penser que le cantonnement, en pareil cas, est pleinement justifié etdonc regretter qu’il n’ait pas été sollicité.
Cass. com., 19 octobre 1999, n° 97-12.845. Voir en ce sens STENGER (J.-P.), n.119,
n° 130 : “Celui qui use de cette mesure exorbitante et par définition préjudiciable
au saisi le fait nécessairement à ses risques dans le cas où elle se révèle
injustifiée (…). Par conséquent, dans le cas de la saisie-contrefaçon, si le risquedoit être pour le saisi quand on trouve chez lui la preuve d’une contrefaçon, il est
en revanche anormal qu’il en soit de même lorsque rien d’illicite n’est constaté”,
et aussi n° 137 : “Nul n’est forcé de recourir à la saisie-contrefaçon. Mais s’il
le fait, il doit en assumer la responsabilité. On ne peut sans compromettrel’institution elle-même se passer d’un équilibre entre le droit du saisissant,qui est exorbitant, et le droit de celui qui a été saisi indûment”. – GREFFE(P.), Dessins et modèles, in : JCP E 2000, n° 1280, p. 92 : “Cette jurisprudence
doit d’autant plus être approuvée qu’il est constant qu’une saisie est une
formalité facultative, elle a un objet essentiellement probatoire, la preuve del’éventuelle contrefaçon pouvant être apportée par tous moyens”.
Cass. ass. plén, 24 février 2006, n.148 : “Attendu que l’exécution d’une
décision de justice exécutoire à titre provisoire n’a lieu qu’aux risques decelui qui la poursuit”. Voir déjà Cass. civ., 1re chambre, 6 juin 1990, in : Bull.
civ. 1990, Vol. 1, n° 140 : “même autorisée à titre provisoire, l’exécution d’une
décision de justice frappée d’appel n’a lieu qu’aux risques et périls de celui quila poursuit”.

Tribunal de première instance de Ngaoundéré,
Jugement n° 367/COR du 17 avril 2003, MP et REPAC c.
MOHAMADOU AMINOU
Observations:
Le jugement rapporté offre l’occasion de faire le point
sur la question de la condition des étrangers en matièrede propriété littéraire et artistique. Question cruciale àl’époque de la mondialisation. Question trop souvent
confondue, comme on le verra plus loin, avec celle dela loi applicable. Question purement et simplement
escamotée, de façon critiquable, par le tribunal depremière instance de Ngaoundéré qui prend appui sur
une lecture biaisée de la loi camerounaise pour relaxer
un prévenu accusé de contrefaçon.
Faits : En l’espèce, des “artistes musiciens”, affirmant
agir pour le compte du Rassemblement des artistes
professionnels et amateurs du Cameroun (RAPAC),
avaient fait saisir chez l’intéressé, qui exploitait une
discothèque, 2133 cassettes et CD vidéo dépourvus
de l’estampille SOCINADA (Société civile nationale desdroits d’auteur, organisme de gestion collective opérant
à l’époque sur le territoire national). Pour s’opposer
aux poursuites, l’avocat plaidait que les supports
saisis fixaient des œuvres d’auteurs de “nationalitésétrangères” et que l’accusation n’apportait pas la preuve,
exigée par la législation camerounaise, que les lois
nationales des auteurs en cause assuraient le mêmeniveau de protection que la loi locale aux “chanteurs etmusiciens camerounais”.
Raisonnement : En faisant droit à cet argument, letribunal de grande instance de Ngaoundéré méconnaît leprincipe fondamental du traitement national (section I),sans tenir compte des conditions posées par le droit
international conventionnel pour la mise en œuvre d’unetrès hypothétique réciprocité (section II).
I. Le principe du traitement national
Pour justifier la relaxe, le tribunal invoque la réciprocité
prévue par l’article 93.1 de la loi camerounaise du19 décembre 2000 sur le droit d’auteur, aux termes
duquel “les étrangers jouissent au Cameroun du droit
d’auteur ou de droits voisins dont ils sont titulaires, sousla condition que la loi de l’État dont ils sont les nationaux
ou sur le territoire duquel ils ont leur domicile, leursiège social ou un établissement, protège les droits desCamerounais”. Il en déduit que, faute pour le Ministère
public et les victimes de justifier que cette condition est
remplie par la législation des pays concernés, l’infraction
de contrefaçon “ne saurait être caractérisée”.
Le raisonnement ne peut emporter la conviction. Il fait,
en effet, l’impasse sur l’article 94 de la même loi ainsi
rédigé : “Les dispositions de la présente loi relative àla protection des œuvres littéraires et artistiques, auxinterprétations, phonogrammes, vidéogrammes etprogrammes s’appliquent aux œuvres qui ont droit àla protection en vertu d’un traité international auquelle Cameroun est partie”. S’agissant du droit d’auteur,le texte renvoie à la Convention de Berne et plus
précisément à son article 5.1, qui prévoit que “les auteursjouissent, en ce qui concerne les œuvres pour lesquelles
ils sont protégés en vertu de la présente Convention,
dans les pays de l’Union autres que le pays d’origine del’œuvre, des droits que les lois respectives accordent
actuellement ou accorderont par la suite aux nationaux,ainsi que des droits spécialement accordés par laprésente Convention”, disposition à laquelle fait échol’article 5.3 de l’Accord de Bangui, dans sa version issue
de l’Acte de Bamako de 2015 (“Les étrangers jouissent
des dispositions du présent Accord et de ses annexes
dans les mêmes conditions que les nationaux”).
Le principe auquel se réfèrent les trois textes cités
est celui dit du “traitement national”. Il est l’exact
contraire de la règle de réciprocité puisqu’il signifie
qu’un État “unioniste” (signataire de la Convention deBerne) doit garantir aux ressortissants d’un autre État
unioniste (ainsi qu’à tous ceux qui ont leur résidence
dans cet État) la jouissance des mêmes droits que ceux
dont bénéficient ses propres nationaux, même si ces
derniers ne peuvent jouir des mêmes droits dans l’État
en question.
C’est une règle qui relève de la condition des étrangers.
De la condition des étrangers seulement. De ce point devue, la formulation de l’article 94 de la loi camerounaise
est discutable car, en visant expressément l’application
des “dispositions de la présente loi”, le législateur risquede donner à penser qu’il énonce une règle de conflit
de lois (analyse que l’expression “traitement national”
pourrait même conforter). Or les deux questions sontdistinctes. Une chose est de savoir si l’étranger peutêtre privé de la jouissance d’un droit en raison de sa
qualité d’étranger, une autre est de savoir quelle loi
sera appliquée à la violation de son droit (loi, qui, parhypothèse, n’est pas nécessairement celle du for). Unebonne manière de conjurer le risque de confusion seraitd’user d’une terminologie différente en parlant, plutôt
que du “traitement national”, du principe d’“assimilation
des auteurs étrangers aux auteurs nationaux”541.
La combinaison des articles 93 et 94 de la loi
camerounaise aurait dû dissuader le tribunal depremière instance de Ngaoundéré de se risquer àévoquer le “sacro-saint principe de la réciprocité dansles relations internationales”. Dès lors que la Convention
de Berne peut être mise sur le tapis, le principe, au
contraire, est celui du traitement national, la réciprocitén’étant prévue, à l’égard des auteurs unionistes, quedans des cas exceptionnels, par exemple en ce qui
concerne le droit de suite542. Or la Convention était
bel et bien sur le tapis en l’espèce, si l’on s’en tient aux
constatations du jugement commenté. On y découvre,en effet, que les auteurs se plaignant de la violation deleurs droits étaient, pour certains, des ressortissants du
541
542

Chapitre 6 – Propriété littéraire et artistiquecamerounais le même niveau de protection que celui
résultant de la loi camerounaise.

Voir en ce sens LUCAS (A.), LUCAS-SCHLOETTER (A.) et BERNAULT (C.), n.37,
no 1759 et s.
Convention de Berne, art. 14 ter al. 2.
313

Royaume-Uni (le tribunal évoque, à tort, une nationalité“anglaise”), du Niger et du Nigéria, ainsi que de l’Inde(si on accepte de lire ainsi la référence à une nationalité“hindoue”), quatre pays qui sont membres de l’Union deBerne (depuis l’origine, pour ce qui concerne le premier).
Le Cameroun étant dans le même cas (depuis 1960), cesauteurs-là ne pouvaient, contrairement à ce qui est jugé,
se voir opposer une quelconque réciprocité.
II. Les conditions de la réciprocité
Admettons, pour les besoins de la discussion, que
certains, parmi les auteurs concernés, aient été
ressortissants d’États non unionistes et sans pouvoir
justifier d’une résidence dans un État unioniste.
L’hypothèse, à vrai dire, est peu probable compte tenu
de la dimension planétaire qu’a prise aujourd’hui laConvention de Berne. Elle ne peut cependant êtreexclue dès lors que la liste des “nationalités étrangères”(d’ailleurs surprenante puisqu’elle inclut les nationalités“hindoue” et haoussa), qui se conclut par des points desuspension indiquant que la liste n’est pas exhaustive,n’est donnée par le tribunal qu’à titre indicatif.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelleÀ première vue, l’article 93, alinéa 1, de la loi
camerounaise, qui subordonne la jouissance du droit
d’auteur à une réciprocité législative, semble alors
pouvoir trouver à s’appliquer. La solution paraît mêmepouvoir prendre appui sur l’article 5, alinéa 4, del’ABR-2015 qui prévoit que les dispositions relatives
au traitement national “s’appliquent aux étrangers
non ressortissants d’un État partie à une convention
internationale à laquelle l’Organisation ou ses États
membres sont parties ou les étrangers n’ayant pas leurprincipal établissement ou leur domicile dans un tel État
sous condition de réciprocité”.

314

le pays d’origine (au sens de l’article 5, alinéa 4, de laConvention de Berne) des œuvres en cause.
Il est vrai que, même lorsque le pays d’origine est
unioniste, l’article 6 de la Convention l’autorise à poser
une condition de réciprocité si le pays dont l’auteur (parhypothèse non unioniste) est ressortissant “ne protège pasde manière suffisante” les œuvres des auteurs qui sontses nationaux. Mais cela suppose qu’il fasse “usage decette faculté” en notifiant au Directeur général de l’OMPI
une “déclaration écrite, où seront indiqués les paysvis-à-vis desquels la protection est restreinte, de mêmeque les restrictions auxquelles les droits des auteurs
ressortissants à ces pays sont soumis” (art. 6, al. 1 et 3,
respectivement). Ce mécanisme, qui n’existait pas dansla version initiale de la Convention, a été introduit lorsde la révision de 1928 à l’instigation du Canada qui
entendait se réserver cette possibilité de rétorsion à
l’encontre de son puissant voisin que sont les États-Unis,
lesquels n’avaient pas encore adhéré à la Convention.
Mais le Canada n’en a pas usé car il n’a notifié aucune
déclaration en ce sens544, et il ne semble pas que d’autres
pays se soient engagés dans cette voie. Autant dire quel’application du texte dans les circonstances telles quecelles de l’espèce relève de l’hypothèse d’école.
La question, on le voit, était complexe et méritait
mieux que la réponse péremptoire assénée par lejugement commenté.
André Lucas

Mais d’abord, on relèvera que la rédaction de cet
article 5, alinéa 4, de l’ABR-2015 laisse à désirer. Outreque la formule “ou les étrangers” procède, à l’évidence,d’une erreur de plume (il faut lire, pour que la phrase soit
correcte : “ou aux étrangers”), une lecture littérale de ladisposition (à partir de la conjonction “ou”) lui ferait direque des étrangers ressortissants d’un État unioniste mais
ayant leur résidence dans un État non unioniste seraientsoumis à l’exigence de réciprocité, ce qui serait contraire
tout à la fois à la Convention de Berne et à l’article 93,
alinéa 1, de la loi camerounaise.
Ensuite, et l’objection s’adresse aux deux textes
cités, la Convention de Berne interdit de raisonnerexclusivement en termes de nationalité (ou derésidence). L’article 5, alinéa 1, garantit en effet letraitement national aux auteurs “en ce qui concerne
les œuvres pour lesquelles ils sont protégés en vertu
de la présente Convention”. Or la détermination dupays d’origine joue à cet égard un rôle essentiel543.
Concrètement, le ressortissant d’un État non unionistequi publie pour la première fois son œuvre dans un État
unioniste a droit au traitement national. En l’espèce, ilaurait donc fallu rechercher, au cas par cas, quel était
543

MASOUYE (C.), Guide de la Convention de Berne, Paris (OMPI), 1978, p. 34.

544

NORDEMANN (W.), VINCK (K.) et HERTIN (P.W.), Droit d’auteur international
et droits voisins dans les pays de langue allemande et les États membres dela Communauté européenne (traduit de l’allemand par J. Fournier), Bruxelles(Bruylant), 1983, p. 86.

A.
Concurrence déloyale – Conditions :existence d’une situation de concurrence– Existence des éléments constitutifs de laconcurrence déloyale
316
B.
Stockage pendant une longue périodedes bouteilles de distribution de gaz d’unconcurrent – Sabotage d’autres bouteilles degaz – Désorganisation du réseau de vente
du concurrent établie – Inopportunité del’élément intentionnel
322
C.
Action civile en contrefaçon et concurrence
déloyale – Intervention volontaire – Licencié
non exclusif – Recevabilité
325

Chapitre 7 – Concurrence déloyale

D.
Dessin ou modèle industriel – Concurrence
déloyale – Similitude de nature à créer une
confusion dans l’esprit du consommateur –Faute – Préjudice – Détournement de clientèle– Réparation
327

Chapitre 7
Concurrence déloyale
A. Concurrence déloyale – Conditions :existence d’une situation deconcurrence – Existence des éléments
constitutifs de la concurrence déloyale
L’action en concurrence déloyale ne peut prospérer que
si les conditions préalables ci-après sont réunies, soit :• d’une part l’existence d’une situation de concurrence
entre le demandeur et le défendeur; et• d’autre part, la présence des éléments constitutifs dela concurrence déloyale qui sont la faute, le dommage
et le lien de causalité entre les deux.
Cour d’État du Niger, Chambre judiciaire, Arrêt
n° 13 – 086/c du 4 avril 2013, ADAMOU IDRISSA c.
MAHAMAN MINDAOU
Observations:
L’arrêt rendu par la Chambre judiciaire de la Cour d’État
du Niger le 4 avril 2013 met en exergue les conditions desuccès de l’action en concurrence déloyale. L’affaire qui adonné lieu à cet arrêt opposait Monsieur Adamou Idrissa,
promoteur de l’établissement scolaire CSP DESSA, à
Monsieur Mahaman Mindaou et autres, promoteurs del’établissement scolaire CSP GOBIR.
Faits : Les faits de l’espèce étaient fort simples. Bienqu’ayant ouvert effectivement leur établissement après
l’obtention des pièces administratives requises, Monsieur
Mahaman Mindaou et autres avaient, préalablement
à l’obtention de ces pièces administratives, entrepris
de recruter des enseignants, d’inscrire des élèves etde faire des affiches publicitaires et des communiqués
radiodiffusés relatifs aux conditions et modalitésd’inscription scolaire au CSP GOBIR dans le cadre de larentrée 2008/2009.
Estimant que le fait pour les promoteurs de cetétablissement d’avoir commencé leur campagne
de promotion, de recrutement des enseignants etd’inscription des élèves avant l’obtention des pièces
administratives requises était constitutif de concurrence
déloyale, Monsieur Adamou Idrissa, promoteur del’établissement scolaire CSP DESSA, dont trois despromoteurs de l’établissement scolaire CSP GOBIR
étaient d’anciens vacataires, a engagé avec succès
une action en concurrence déloyale contre Monsieur
Mahaman Mindaou et autres devant le tribunal de
grande instance de Maradi. Le jugement rendu parce tribunal a été infirmé par la cour d’appel de Zinder
au motif que les faits reprochés aux promoteurs del’établissement CSP GOBIR n’étaiement pas constitutifs
316

de concurrence déloyale. En effet, même si les affiches
publicitaires et les communiqués radiodiffusés relatifs
aux conditions et modalités d’inscription scolaire
au CSP GOBIR sont intervenus avant l’obtention desautorisations administratives nécessaires à sa mise en
marche, l’ouverture effective dudit établissement a eu
lieu après délivrance de ces pièces administratives.
Insatisfait par cet arrêt, Monsieur Adamou Idrissa s’est
pourvu en cassation en arguant d’une part que lesaffiches publicitaires, les communiqués radiodiffusés etle recrutement des élèves prouvent bien que l’école était
déjà ouverte, sans aucune autorisation, ce qui s’analyse
en des actes de nature à causer un préjudice à autrui etconstitue une concurrence déloyale imposant la mise enœuvre des articles 1382 et 1383 du Code civil. Il soutientd’autre part que les agissements fautifs des défendeursétaient délibérés et guidés par un esprit de vengeance,
causant un préjudice à sa propre école de deux
manières, et qu’il a subi un double préjudice à cause deces agissements, à savoir :• les frais de scolarité extrêmement bas de l’école desdéfendeurs l’ont obligé à réduire les frais de sa propreécole; et• la disponibilité des enseignants était réduite.
Le problème juridique auquel la Cour d’État du Nigerétait appelée à répondre était de savoir si les conditions
de succès de l’action en concurrence étaient réunies dansle cas de l’espèce.
Raisonnement : Pour répondre à cette question, la
Cour d’État du Niger commence d’abord par rappeler
les fondements juridiques de la concurrence déloyale,à savoir les articles 1382 et 1383 du Code civil etles articles 4 et 7 de l’Accord révisé de Bangui du
2 mars 1999 instituant l’Organisation africaine dela propriété intellectuelle (OAPI) à laquelle le Niger
est partie545. Elle rappelle ensuite la fonction et lesconditions d’exercice de l’action en concurrence
déloyale.
• S’agissant de sa fonction, la Cour d’État du Niger
présente l’action en concurrence déloyale commele régulateur nécessaire du droit de la concurrence
dont le but premier est le maintien, dans l’intérêt
de la liberté du commerce et des affaires, d’une
concurrence suffisante, effective et nécessaire à lasauvegarde, non pas seulement de l’intérêt particulier
545

Il convient de préciser qu’il s’agit des art. 4 et 7 de l’annexe VIII de l’ABR-1999,
précision que le juge a oublié de faire.

Une fois ces rappels faits, la Cour d’État du Niger rejettela deuxième branche du premier moyen pris de laviolation des articles 1382 et 1383 du Code civil parceque les conditions de succès de l’action en concurrence
déloyale n’étaient pas réunies dans le cas de l’espèce.
Elle commence par critiquer le jugement qui avait
retenu la concurrence déloyale parce qu’il n’a pu établir
ni l’existence d’une situation de concurrence entre
les deux établissements avant l’existence légale del’établissement scolaire CSP GOBIR, ni l’existence d’actes
de concurrence déloyale imputables à cet établissement
après l’obtention par ce dernier de tous les documents
officiels nécessaires à son ouverture.
La Cour d’État du Niger donne ensuite raison à la courd’appel de n’avoir pas qualifié d’actes de concurrence
déloyale les faits dénoncés par Adamou Idrissa,
promoteur de l’établissement scolaire CSP DESSA, quandbien même ces faits auraient entraîné la baisse des fraisd’inscription pratiqués dans son établissement.
La motivation de l’arrêt rendu par la Cour d’État duNiger nous invite à examiner deux conditions distinctes
d’existence de la concurrence déloyale, soit :I.
II.

l’existence d’une situation de concurrence d’unepart; etl’existence des éléments constitutifs de laconcurrence déloyale d’autre part.

Ce commentaire nous donne par ailleurs l’occasion declarifier une troisième question juridique qui se posede manière implicite dans l’arrêt et sur laquelle la Courd’État du Niger aurait dû se prononcer, à savoir
III. la question du fondement juridique de l’action en
concurrence déloyale dans l’espace OAPI.
I. L’existence d’une situation de concurrence
Le fait d’établir l’existence d’une situation de concurrence
entre deux professionnels est subordonnée à deux
conditions : l’exercice par ces derniers d’activités relevant
du domaine de la concurrence (A) et leur attrait pour uneclientèle commune (B).
A. L’exercice d’activités relevant du domaine dela concurrence
L’article 1er, alinéa a), de l’annexe VIII de l’Accord révisé deBangui de 1999 qui définit le domaine de la concurrence
déloyale vise comme activités concernées par celle-ci
les activités industrielles ou commerciales, auxquelles

l’annexe VIII de l’Acte de Bamako de 2015 assimile lesactivités libérales, qui sont ignorées par l’Accord de
Bangui de 1999. L’activité d’enseignement dont il est
question dans l’affaire qui a donné lieu à l’arrêt de la Courd’État du Niger n’est ni une activité industrielle, ni une
activité libérale. Peut-elle être considérée comme une
activité commerciale?
Les juges du fond, de même que la Cour d’État du Niger,
se sont comportés comme si cela allait de soi, alors qu’iln’en est rien. Pour répondre de manière pertinente àla question posée, il convient de se référer à l’article 3
de l’Acte uniforme relatif au droit commercial général(AUDCG) qui traite des actes de commerce par nature.
Aux termes de cet article, un acte de commerce parnature est “celui par lequel une personne s’entremet
dans la circulation des biens qu’elle produit ou achèteou par lequel elle fournit des prestations de service
avec l’intention d’en tirer un profit pécuniaire”. L’activitéd’enseignement n’est pas un bien, mais une prestationde service. Mais est-elle accomplie avec l’intention d’entirer un profit pécuniaire? Elle ne figure pas parmi les
actes de commerce par nature énumérés par l’article 3
de l’AUDCG. On peut donc hésiter à la considérer comme
un acte de commerce par nature. Mais l’énumération del’article 3 de l’AUDCG n’est pas limitative. On peut donc
fonder la commercialité de l’activité d’enseignement
accomplie par les établissements CSP DESSA et CSP
GOBIR sur l’intention qu’ils ont de tirer profit de leurs
activités, dans la mesure où ces deux établissements les
accomplissent contre versement des frais de scolarité. Il
ne s’agit donc pas d’une activité philanthropique, mais
lucrative. On est en présence d’activités commerciales
au sens de l’article 3 de l’AUDCG et par conséquentd’activités relevant du domaine de la concurrence.
La qualification d’une activité d’enseignement commeétant une activité commerciale n’est cependant pas
à l’abri des critiques, d’autant plus que l’ordonnance
n° 96/-035 du 19 juin 1996 portant réglementation del’enseignement privé au Niger n’éclaire pas sur la nature
civile ou commerciale d’une telle activité au Niger. À titre
de droit comparé, la loi n° 004/022 du 22 juillet 2004
fixant les règles relatives à l’organisation et au
fonctionnement de l’enseignement privé au Cameroun
dispose en son article 2, alinéa 1, que l’enseignement
privé est un service social d’utilité publique assurépar des partenaires privés. Il est certain que malgré
le silence de l’ordonnance nigériane susvisée sur lanature de l’activité d’enseignement effectuée par lesétablissements privés, celle-ci est un service social
d’utilité publique au Niger comme au Cameroun.
En tant que service social d’utilité publique,l’enseignement privé ne peut pas être considéré comme
une activité commerciale, mais comme une activité
civile. Or l’annexe VIII de l’Accord révisé de Bangui de1999 limite le domaine de la concurrence déloyale aux
activités industrielles et commerciales. Une conception
aussi restrictive du domaine de la concurrence déloyale
est cependant critiquable. Aussi, l’annexe VIII de l’Actede 2015 a-t-elle élargi ce domaine aux activités libérales.
Mais cet accord devrait élargir davantage le domaine deChapitre 7 – Concurrence déloyale

des concurrents, mais de l’intérêt général et de celui
des consommateurs; et• Quant aux conditions d’exercice de l’action en
concurrence déloyale, la Cour d’État du Niger rappelled’une part que celle-ci nécessite un fait générateurde responsabilité, un préjudice et un lien de causalité
entre le fait générateur et ce préjudice et, d’autre part,l’existence d’une clientèle réelle et commune, les deuxparties offrant actuellement à la même clientèle desproduits ou des services analogues.

317

la concurrence déloyale en y intégrant toutes les activités
civiles qui s’adressent à la clientèle avec l’intention de sel’accaparer. Sur cette base, on pourrait considérer que lesactivités d’enseignement menées par les établissements
scolaires CSP DESSA et CSP GOBIR, bien qu’étant civiles,
sont des activités relevant du domaine de la concurrence.
B. L’existence d’une clientèle
La Cour d’État du Niger reproche au premier juge qui aretenu l’action en concurrence déloyale en se fondant sur
le fait que les défendeurs au pourvoi avaient apposé desaffiches, fait des communiqués radiodiffusés, recrutédes enseignants et inscrit des élèves, alors que leurétablissement n’avait encore aucune existence légale, den’avoir pas dit en quoi leur établissement a pu entrer
sérieusement en concurrence avec celui du demandeur
et partager avec lui une clientèle commune.
Rappelant par ailleurs que “l’acte de concurrence
déloyale intervient toujours en considération d’uneclientèle réelle et commune, les deux parties offrant
actuellement à la même clientèle des produits ou desservices analogues”, la Cour souligne deux facteurs
traditionnellement considérés afin de déterminer
l’existence d’une clientèle, à savoir l’existence d’uneclientèle réelle (1) et d’une clientèle commune aux deuxparties (2).

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

1. L’existence d’une clientèle réelle
À partir de quel moment la clientèle d’un fonds decommerce existe-t-elle effectivement? Deux thèses
principales ont été défendues en doctrine : la thèsede l’ouverture du fonds de commerce au public546 et lathèse de l’exploitation effective de celui-ci547. La Cour decassation française a préféré la thèse de l’exploitation
effective du fonds de commerce à celle qui se satisfait
de son ouverture au public. Elle refuse en effet qu’uneclientèle en puissance, potentielle, suffise à constituer
une clientèle au sens d’élément du fonds de commerce548.

318Dans le cas de l’espèce, il ressort des constatations
faites aussi bien par le juge d’instance que par le juged’appel qu’il est établi et non contesté par les pièces
du dossier et des débats à l’audience que les affiches
publicitaires et les communiqués radiodiffusés relatifs
aux conditions et modalités d’inscription scolaire au CSPGOBIR sont intervenus avant l’obtention par le directeur
dudit établissement des autorisations administratives
nécessaires à sa mise en marche. Mais il résulte aussi
des mêmes pièces que l’ouverture effective duditétablissement a eu lieu après délivrance des pièces
administratives susvisées. Le premier juge s’est fondé
sur le fait que les défendeurs au pourvoi avaient apposédes affiches, fait des communiqués radiodiffusés,
recruté des enseignants et inscrit des élèves, alors queleur établissement n’avait encore aucune existence
légale, pour retenir la concurrence déloyale. Autrement
546
547
548

WEILL et CHABASSE, Création et disparition du fonds du commerce : Juriscl.
Fonds de commerce, Fasc. VI.
COHEN, La propriété des fonds de commerce exploités dans les immeubles
spécialisés : JCP G, 1955, I, p. 1222.
Cass. com., 27 février 1973 (2 arrêts) : JCP G, 1973, II n° 17403 (obs. A.S.);
Cass. civ. 3e chambre, 18 mai 1978 : Bull. Civ, III, n° 205, p. 159.

dit, pour le premier juge, les actes préparatoires
suffisent pour qu’il y ait apparition de la clientèle et parconséquent existence de la concurrence. Peu importequ’il y ait ou non par la suite obtention de l’autorisationd’ouverture, suivie ou non de l’ouverture effective del’établissement. Le premier juge rejette ainsi à la fois lathèse qui subordonne l’existence du fonds de commerceà son ouverture au public et celle qui subordonne cetteexistence à son exploitation effective.
Cette solution est à juste titre rejetée par la Cour d’État
du Niger pour qui le premier juge ne dit pas en quoil’établissement CSP GOBIR a pu entrer sérieusement
en concurrence avec l’établissement CSP DESSA, sur labase des seuls actes préparatoires suscités. Autrement
dit, pour la Haute juridiction nigériane, tant qu’unétablissement scolaire n’a pas obtenu l’autorisationd’ouverture, elle n’a pas d’existence légale et ne peut
donc pas être considérée comme ayant une clientèle.
En matière d’établissement scolaire, l’apposition desaffiches, la diffusion des communiqués par voie de radio,
le recrutement des enseignants et même l’inscription
des élèves ne suffisent pas pour qu’il y ait apparition dela clientèle. Celle-ci est subordonnée à l’obtention del’autorisation d’ouverture suivie de l’ouverture effective
de l’établissement au public.
2. L’existence d’une clientèle commune
La Cour d’État du Niger reproche au premier juge
de n’avoir pas dit en quoi l’établissement CSP GOBIR
partageait avec l’établissement CSP DESSA une clientèle
commune avant l’obtention de l’autorisation d’ouverture
par celui-là. La Haute juridiction nigériane s’aligne
ainsi sur la conception traditionnelle de la concurrence
déloyale549, laquelle est partagée par la majorité de lajurisprudence de l’espace OAPI550.
Cette conception traditionnelle de la concurrence
déloyale est cependant remise en cause aujourd’hui endroit français où l’action en concurrence déloyale n’est
plus, dans tous les cas, subordonnée à l’existence d’unrapport de concurrence entre les parties551. La fautede concurrence déloyale peut donc être constituée endehors de l’existence d’une clientèle commune552.
Pour apprécier s’il existait ou non une clientèle commune
dans le cas de l’espèce, il faut distinguer deux phases :la phase préparatoire à l’ouverture de l’établissement
CSP GOBIR et la phase postérieure à l’obtention del’autorisation d’ouverture de celui-ci.

549

Voir MERMILLOD (L.), Essai sur la notion de concurrence déloyale en France et
aux États-Unis, Paris (LGDJ), 1954, p. 60; ROUBIER (P.), Le droit de la propriété
industrielle, Tome 1, Paris (Sirey), 1952, p. 108.
550 TGI Douala, Arrêt n° 112 du 5 mai 1978, Ets SECAREC c. S.G.B.C., MERCEDESSEAC; TGI de Yaoundé, Arrêt 175 du 11 décembre 1985, Société Philip Morris
Inc. c. Société Vistamil SL.; CA Douala, Arrêt 10/C du 21 novembre 1969, Cie destransactions commerciales (C.T.C.) c. Cie des transactions commerciales (C.T.C.).
551 Cass. com., 8 novembre 1994 : Bull. civ., IV, n° 325; Contrats Concurrence
Consommation, 1995, n° 6 (obs. VOGEL (D): D. 1995, Somm. 209 (obs. SERRA(Y.)); VOGEL (L.), Droit français de la concurrence : JCP E 1995, I, p. 492.
552 Voir dans ce sens, RIPERT (G.), ROBLOT (R.), VOGEL (L.), Traité de droitcommercial, Tome 1, 18e éd., Vol. 1, n° 730, pp. 595 et 596 et toute lajurisprudence citée.

C’est en raison de cette évidence que la Cour d’État
du Niger n’a pas cru devoir se prononcer de manière
explicite sur la condition d’existence d’une clientèle
commune dans la phase postérieure à l’obtention del’autorisation d’ouverture par l’établissement CSP GOBIR,
préférant ainsi se focaliser sur l’existence des éléments
constitutifs de la concurrence déloyale imputée auxdéfendeurs au pourvoi par le demandeur.
II. L’existence des éléments constitutifs de laconcurrence déloyale
Le succès de l’action en concurrence déloyale est
subordonné à l’existence des éléments constitutifs ciaprès : le fait générateur de responsabilité ou la faute,qui est un acte de concurrence déloyale, le dommage etle lien de causalité entre celui-ci et celui-là. La Cour d’État
du Niger rappelle fort opportunément ce triptyque.
Cette dernière ne s’est cependant pas attardée sur lacondition du préjudice (B) et du lien de causalité (C),mais uniquement sur le fait générateur de concurrence
déloyale (A).
A. Le fait générateur de concurrence déloyale
Pour la Cour d’État du Niger, “le fait générateurde responsabilité, pour sous-tendre une action en
concurrence déloyale, doit résider dans une intervention
fautive sur le marché, trouvant son fondement dans lesarticles 1382 et 1383 du Code civil, ladite faute consistantdans la violation de devoirs dans l’exercice de la libertéde la concurrence qui traduit des impératifs de loyauté,d’honnêteté et d’intérêt social”.
Cette définition de la concurrence déloyale est conforme
à celle consacrée par la jurisprudence antérieure et parles différends Actes successifs de l’Accord de Bangui553.
Pour ces sources jurisprudentielle et conventionnelle,
les actes constitutifs de concurrence déloyale sont ceux553

AB-1977, ABR-1999 et ABR-2015.

qui sont contraires aux usages honnêtes admis dans lesmilieux professionnels.
Sur la base de ce critère de la déloyauté, de nombreux
actes et pratiques ont été considérés comme déloyaux
par la jurisprudence et les différents Accords de Bangui :• le dénigrement qui peut porter soit sur la personne,
soit sur les établissements et les produits concurrents;• la désorganisation qui peut porter sur la production,le personnel ou sur l’activité et les méthodes
commerciales de l’entreprise concurrente;• la confusion qui peut porter sur l’établissement, lesproduits ou le personnel d’un concurrent, etc.
Pour la Cour d’État du Niger, la faute constitutive deconcurrence déloyale doit être expressément constatéepar les juges du fond, la qualification que ceux-ci font desfaits qui leur sont soumis étant soumise à contrôle.
C’est en vertu de ce pouvoir de contrôle que la Hautejuridiction nigériane reproche au premier juge de n’avoir
pas dit en quoi “les agissements des défendeurs, après
l’obtention de tous les documents officiels nécessaires
ont eu pour effet de tromper le public au détriment
du CSP DESSA, ou de dénigrer celui-ci, ou encorede désorganiser en particulier son établissement,ou en général le secteur de l’enseignement privé
dans la région”. Point n’est besoin de consacrer
des développements sur les actes déloyaux dont ledemandeur au pourvoi n’a pas pu établir l’existence, àsavoir la tromperie envers le public au détriment du CSPDESSA, le dénigrement de celui-ci, la désorganisationde cet établissement en particulier et du secteur del’enseignement privé dans la région en général.
Fort du constat de l’inexistence d’actes de concurrence
déloyale, la Cour d’État du Niger a donné raison à la courd’appel d’avoir débouté le sieur Adamou Idrissa de son
action en concurrence déloyale.
Il était d’ailleurs difficile qu’un fait générateur deconcurrence déloyale soit imputé aux promoteurs
de l’établissement CSP DESSA tant dans la phase
préparatoire de l’ouverture de cet établissement
que dans la phase postérieure à l’obtention del’autorisation d’ouverture.
• Dans la phase préparatoire de l’ouverture deleur établissement, il n’y avait encore ni clientèle
réelle, ni clientèle commune. Ces deux conditions
préalables n’étant pas réunies, il ne pouvait dèslors pas y avoir d’acte de concurrence déloyale.
Ce que contestait le demandeur au pourvoi. À
supposer même que l’établissement CSP GOBIR
ait commencé à fonctionner sans autorisationd’ouverture, il devait y avoir concurrence interdite554 et
non concurrence déloyale.
• Dans la phase postérieure à l’obtention del’autorisation d’ouverture, il y avait bien une clientèle
554

Chapitre 7 – Concurrence déloyale• Dans la phase préparatoire à l’ouverture del’établissement CSP GOBIR, la condition d’existenced’une clientèle commune entre les deuxétablissements en cause n’était pas remplie parceque l’établissement CSP GOBIR n’avait pas encore
de clientèle. Seul l’établissement CSP DESSA qui
fonctionnait déjà avait une clientèle. C’est donc àjuste titre que la Cour d’État du Niger a déclaré qu’en
se fondant sur le fait que les défendeurs au pourvoi
avaient apposé des affiches, fait des communiqués
radiodiffusés, recruté des enseignants et inscrit desélèves, alors que leur établissement n’avait encore
aucune existence légale, le premier juge ne dit pas enquoi un tel établissement a pu partager avec celui dudemandeur une clientèle commune.
• Dans la phase postérieure à l’obtention de l’autorisationd’ouverture par l’établissement CSP GOBIR, il est
incontestable que les deux conditions d’existenced’une clientèle rattachée à cet établissement et d’uneclientèle partagée par les deux établissements étaientréunies. En effet, les deux établissements exerçaient
une activité similaire, identique.

Il y a concurrence interdite lorsqu’une personne se livre à une activité
soumise à une autorisation préalable sans avoir obtenu une telle autorisation.
319

réelle et commune. L’exigence classique du lien deconcurrence était donc remplie. Mais y avait-il acte
ou pratique contraire aux usages honnêtes admis
dans les milieux professionnels? Le promoteur
de l’établissement CSP DESSA n’a pas réussi àle rapporter. En tout état de cause, l’exercice deson activité par l’établissement CSP GOBIR après
l’obtention de l’autorisation d’ouverture ne peut pasêtre constitutif de concurrence déloyale. Cet exercice
est l’expression même de la libre concurrence.
C’est ce que rappelle fort opportunément la Cour d’État
du Niger en faisant bien la distinction entre les mots
concurrence et concurrence déloyale, “le premier étant
l’ensemble des règles juridiques gouvernant les réalités
entre acteurs économiques dans la recherche et laconservation de la clientèle et la deuxième s’entendant
des procédés contraires à la loi et aux usages constitutifs
d’une faute de nature à créer un préjudice à autrui”.

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Une double conséquence est attachée à lareconnaissance de la libre concurrence.

320• La première est la libre fixation des prix des produits
ou des services par chaque professionnel, au besoin
en pratiquant les prix plus bas que ceux pratiqués
par les autres professionnels qui l’ont précédé sur lemarché. Il convient de souligner que le contrôle duniveau des prix ne relève d’ailleurs pas du droit dela concurrence déloyale, mais du droit des pratiques
anticoncurrentielles. Le fait pour les promoteurs del’établissement CSP GOBIR de fixer le montant de lascolarité à FCFA 43 000 et non à FCFA 60 000, prix que
pratiquait l’établissement CSP DESSA, n’est donc pas
constitutif de concurrence déloyale, comme le prétend
le promoteur de CSP DESSA.
• La seconde conséquence est la licéité du dommage
concurrentiel. La compétition pour la recherche de laclientèle étant libre, tout professionnel peut s’attirer
la clientèle d’autrui. Autrement dit, la liberté de laconcurrence permet d’attirer les acheteurs, mêmes’ils sont déjà clients d’un concurrent. Comme le dit
un auteur, “la liberté d’agir du concurrent qui cause
le dommage l’emporte alors sur la sécurité de sonrival malheureux”555. Le promoteur de l’établissement
CSP DESSA n’est donc pas fondé à se plaindre dela chute de ses effectifs à cause de l’ouverture del’établissement CSP GOBIR. Il s’agit d’une conséquence
normale de la libre concurrence.
Une voie différente de l’action en concurrence déloyale
pouvait cependant être explorée par le promoteurde CSP DESSA : celle de l’action en violation d’une
obligation de non-concurrence, si jamais une clause denon-concurrence avait été stipulée dans les contrats
de travail qui liaient son établissement à ses anciens
enseignants vacataires devenus ses concurrents. Le faitque ces derniers aient ouvert un établissement scolaire
concurrent à celui de leur ancien employeur n’est pas
en soi constitutif de concurrence déloyale, mais pouvait
555

PRIEUR (R.), Contribution à l’étude de la concurrence sur le marché : RTD Com.
1960, p. 521.

constituer une concurrence anti-contractuelle si l’ancien
employé était soumis à une obligation conventionnelle
de non-concurrence valable.
B. Le préjudice en matière de concurrence déloyale
Malgré le rattachement de l’action en concurrence
déloyale à la théorie de la responsabilité civile, lanécessité du préjudice comme condition de succès decette action reste controversée en doctrine. Deux grands
courants d’opinions se sont dégagés, chacun prétendant
traduire le droit positif.
• Pour le premier courant et le plus ancien, ledemandeur doit faire la preuve d’un préjudice alorsmême qu’il ne demanderait que la cessation de laconcurrence déloyale556. Les auteurs qui soutiennent
cette thèse se fondent sur le fait que la concurrence
déloyale trouve son fondement dans l’article 1382
du Code civil qui exige en toute hypothèse et par
principe la preuve d’un préjudice. Ils ont donc uneconception assez large du préjudice dans la mesure où
ils admettent non seulement le préjudice réalisé, maiségalement le préjudice éventuel.
• Cette conception est repoussée par les autres
auteurs du second courant557. En effet, selon le Doyen
ROUBIER, l’action en concurrence déloyale ne doit pasêtre simplement assimilée à l’action en responsabilité
civile. Deux hypothèses doivent être distinguées : sile demandeur réclame des dommages et intérêts, ildoit faire la preuve du préjudice dont il a souffert; parcontre, s’il ne les réclame pas, mais demande plutôt
l’interdiction des moyens déloyaux, il pourra l’obtenir“sans autre condition que celle de l’intérêt né et actuelque possède nécessairement tout concurrent à ne pas
avoir à lutter contre de tels moyens”558. Pour résumer
la pensée de ROUBIER, on peut dire que “l’existence
du préjudice est une chose normale, mais ladémonstration n’en est point nécessaire pour le succès
de l’action en concurrence déloyale, à moins que ledemandeur ne réclame des dommages et intérêts”559.
L’Accord de Bangui de 1999 et l’Acte de 2015 semblents’être alignés sur la thèse doctrinale qui exige l’existenced’un préjudice. L’article 1er, alinéa 1)b), de l’annexe VIIIde l’ABR-1999 dispose, en effet, que toute personne
physique ou morale peut agir en concurrence déloyale
lorsqu’elle est lésée ou susceptible d’être lésée parun acte de concurrence déloyale560. Il ressort de ce
fragment de texte que l’action en concurrence déloyale
est ouverte lorsque le préjudice est avéré ou lorsqu’il est
potentiel. Lorsque le préjudice est avéré, la personne
lésée peut agir entre autres en réparation du préjudicequ’elle a subi. En revanche, lorsque le préjudice n’est que
potentiel, la personne susceptible d’être lésée ne peut
pas agir en réparation dudit préjudice potentiel. Elle
556
557
558
559
560

DESPAGNE (F.), Note sous Cass. Req, 29 mai 1894 : D.P. 1894, I, p. 521; ALLART(H.), Traité pratique et théorique de la concurrence déloyale, Paris, 1892, n° 7;
GODINOT (H.), La concurrence déloyale ou illicite, Thèse, Nancy, 1932, p. 32.
ROUBIER (P.), n.5, n° 111, pp. 507 et s.; GIVERDON (C.), Les délits et quasidélits commis par le commerçant dans l’exercice de son commerce : RTD Com.
1953, n° 23, p. 862.
Ibid., p. 509.
Ibid.
Cet article est repris in extenso par l’art. 1er al. 2)b) de l’ABR-2015.

La jurisprudence de l’espace OAPI quant à elle est
partagée entre les deux thèses. Si certains juges sesont alignés sur la thèse de ROUBIER562, d’autres parcontre exigent toujours la preuve du préjudice souffert,même s’ils ont réduit à l’extrême cette condition afin desanctionner certains faits particulièrement blâmables.
Ainsi, il arrive que les tribunaux se contentent d’unpréjudice minime563 et même simplement moral564. Cette
dernière jurisprudence a été consacrée par l’ABR-2015
dont l’article 8 de l’annexe VIII vise parmi les dommages
réparables le préjudice moral565.
Bien que n’ayant pas retenu la concurrence déloyale, la
Cour d’État du Niger a quand même tenu à rappeler quele succès de l’action en concurrence déloyale nécessite
un préjudice. Comme en matière de responsabilité civile,la preuve du préjudice subi incombe au demandeur
à l’action en concurrence déloyale. Mais cette preuve
ne consiste pas uniquement en la démonstration d’undétournement effectif de clientèle ou d’une baisse duchiffre d’affaires566. Il suffit au demandeur d’établir
que les moyens déloyaux ont attiré à son concurrent
de nombreux acheteurs567. Dans ces conditions, lafixation des dommages et intérêts destinés à réparer
le préjudice subi s’avère délicate. C’est la raison pourlaquelle on constate que le plus souvent, les tribunauxallouent au concurrent lésé un franc symbolique dedommages et intérêts. Le caractère symbolique desdommages et intérêts alloués au concurrent n’est pas denature à dissuader les auteurs des actes de concurrence
déloyale. Seule la cessation de l’acte déloyal, assortieéventuellement de la publicité du jugement, constitue lameilleure sanction à l’encontre d’un concurrent déloyal.
C. Le lien de causalité entre le fait générateur deresponsabilité et le préjudice
Le troisième élément constitutif de la concurrence
déloyale rappelé par la Cour d’État du Niger est le liende causalité entre l’acte de concurrence déloyale et lepréjudice. Mais contrairement à la faute et au préjudice,
561
562
563
564

565

566
567

Voir art. 1 al. 1 let. b de l’ABR-2015.
CA Douala, Arrêt n° 10/C du 21 novembre 1969, n.6 : “Au surplus, la mesure
tendant à la suppression d’une situation illicite présente un caractère
préventif et peut être ordonnée même en l’absence de tout préjudice.”
Ibid.
TGI de Yaoundé, Jugement civil n° 382 du 22 juin 1983, Directeur de l’entreprise
MECAF c. Menuiserie camerounaise industrielle : “Attendu que la demanderesse
ne rapporte et n’offre pas de rapporter la preuve du préjudice matériel
invoqué; que par contre il est certain que les agissements de la MECAF
ont causé un préjudice moral à la M.C.I.”. Confirmé sur ce point par la CA
Yaoundé, Directeur de l’entreprise MECAF c. Menuiserie camerounaise industrielle,inédit, Arrêt n° 58/Civ du 4 décembre 1985.
Art. 8 de l’annexe VIII : “La juridiction nationale compétente prend en
considération les conséquences économiques négatives, dont le manque àgagner, subies par la partie lésée, les bénéfices réalisés par l’auteur de l’acteillicite et le préjudice moral causé à la victime.”
CA Paris, 3 avril 1995 : D. 1996, Somm. 254; Cass. com., 25 janvier 2000 : PIBD,
2001, III, p. 154, P.A., Cass. com. 18 juillet 2000, note MALAURIE-VIGNAL (M.),
P.A., Cas. com. 3 juillet 2000, note MATHEY (N.).
CA d’Orléans, 29 mars 1889 : D.P., 1890, II, p. 134; CA Rouen,
8 novembre 1899 : D.P. 1900, II, p. 338.

le lien de causalité n’a pas beaucoup retenu l’attention
des tribunaux et de la doctrine.
En principe, l’exigence d’un lien de causalité signifie
que le préjudice subi par le concurrent doit être laconséquence directe de l’acte déloyal. Mais, dans derares cas où ils ont eu à se prononcer, les tribunaux ont
fait preuve de beaucoup de souplesse dans l’appréciation
du lien de causalité. Ainsi, dans une espèce où elle aeu à statuer, la Cour de cassation française a approuvél’allocation des dommages et intérêts alors qu’il n’était
pas établi que la diminution du chiffre d’affaires d’une
entreprise résultait strictement des procédés fautifs
du concurrent568.
Cette souplesse de la jurisprudence n’est guèreétonnante. D’une part, l’instabilité de la clientèle rendl’établissement et l’appréciation du lien de causalité trèsdifficile et hypothétique. D’autre part, du moment où
les tribunaux n’exigent pas systématiquement la preuved’un préjudice certain, mais se contentent même d’unpréjudice éventuel pour prononcer la condamnation,
l’exigence du lien de causalité s’en trouve allégée,voire supprimée.
III. Le fondement juridique de l’action en concurrence
déloyaleLa théorie de la concurrence déloyale comme moyen
de moralisation de la concurrence a été admise dans laquasi-totalité des pays ayant opté pour le libéralismeéconomique569. Les méthodes de construction ont
cependant été différentes. En droit français par exemple,
en l’absence d’un texte spécial réprimant les pratiques
concurrentielles jugées déloyales, c’est la jurisprudence
et la doctrine qui, depuis le XIXe siècle, ont élaboré lathéorie de la concurrence déloyale. Cette construction
s’est faite sur la base des articles 1382 et 1383 du Codecivil. La concurrence déloyale n’est donc au départ
qu’une hypothèse particulière de responsabilité civile
délictuelle du fait personnel.
La théorie de la concurrence déloyale ainsi construitea été introduite dans certains pays d’Afrique noire
francophone par le biais de la colonisation française,où elle est restée pendant longtemps une construction
jurisprudentielle. Il a fallu attendre l’AB-1977 pour voir
la consécration légale de la théorie de la concurrence
déloyale dans certains pays d’Afrique noire francophone
membres de cette Organisation.
L’ABR-1999 accorde une plus grande importance à laconcurrence déloyale non seulement en lui consacrant
toute une annexe, à savoir l’annexe VIII, mais également
en densifiant le nombre d’articles consacrés à laconcurrence déloyale : on est en effet passé d’un seul
article à huit articles. L’ABR-2015 reprend presque à
l’identique l’annexe VIII de l’ABR-1999.

568
569

Chapitre 7 – Concurrence déloyale

ne pourra exercer qu’une action visant la suppression
de la situation déloyale561 de l’Accord de 1999 qui viseparmi les sanctions de la concurrence déloyale lesinjonctions (cet article est devenu l’article 1er, alinéa 2)b),dans l’ABR-2015).

Cass. com., 16 octobre 1957 : Bull. Civ, III, p. 265.
ROUBIER (P.), n.5, p. 1.
321

Mais depuis l’entrée en vigueur de l’AB-1977, denombreux juges de l’espace OAPI continuent de viser
dans leurs décisions relatives à la concurrence déloyale,soit uniquement l’article 1382 du Code civil570, soit àla fois l’article 1382 du Code civil et les dispositions del’Accord de Bangui consacrées à la concurrence déloyalecomme l’a fait la Cour d’Etat du Niger dans le cas del’espèce, soit uniquement l’Accord de Bangui571.
Certes, le critère de la déloyauté consacré par lajurisprudence sur la base de l’article 1382 du Code civil
est identique à celui consacré par les Accords successifs
de Bangui, mais il nous semble qu’il n’est plus opportun,sauf dans l’hypothèse de la concurrence parasitaire nonéconomique572, de fonder la concurrence déloyale surl’article 1382 du Code civil ou de viser ce texte en mêmetemps que les dispositions pertinentes de l’Accord de
Bangui. Ces dernières se suffisent à elles-mêmes. Mêmesi le demandeur à l’action en concurrence déloyale fonde
son action sur l’article 1382 du Code civil, le juge qui
donne une suite favorable à cette action devrait procéderà une substitution de textes et fonder sa décision surles dispositions pertinentes de l’Accord de Bangui. De
même, si les juges du fond fondent leurs décisions surl’article 1382 du Code civil, les juges de cassation desÉtats membres de l’OAPI devraient procéder à une
substitution de base juridique, car ils sont garants de labonne application du droit par les juges du fond.
Grégoire Jiogue

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B. Stockage pendant une longue périodedes bouteilles de distribution de gazd’un concurrent – Sabotage d’autres
bouteilles de gaz – Désorganisationdu réseau de vente du concurrentétablie – Inopportunité de l’élément
intentionnel

322

Constitue un acte de concurrence déloyale pardésorganisation du réseau de vente d’un concurrent lefait, pour une société qui commercialise le gaz industriel
et médical, de stocker pendant une longue durée unequantité importante des bouteilles de gaz d’une société
concurrente et de saboter d’autres bouteilles de gaz.
Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, Jugement n° 2234/2015
du 31 juillet 2015, LA SOCIÉTÉ AIR LIQUIDE CÔTED’IVOIRE SA c. LA SOCIÉTÉ D’OXYGÈNE ET D’ACÉTYLÈNE
DE CÔTE D’IVOIRE DITE SOA-CI

570

571

572

Voir par exemple : Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire, Chambre judiciaire,
6 juin 2003, Société Sogec-Ivoire c. Société Ivoiral (obs. FADE (A.), ce recueil,
chapitre 7, section D); Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire, Chambre judiciaire,
1er juin 2006, Société Sogec-Ivoire c. Établissements Mroui & Frères, inédit.
Voir par exemple TGI de Douala, Jugement civ. n° 192 du 15 décembre 2000,
Société Moulinex SA c. Vapsan trading Co et autres (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE(M-L)) : Revue scientifique de la propriété industrielle la GAZELLE, n° 001,
novembre 2007, pp. 17 et s.; Cour suprême du Sénégal, Arrêt n° 57 du
17 mai 2017, Sonatel Mobiles SA c. Agence Touba Sénégal et le groupe GPS (cerecueil, chapitre 3, section M).
Voir Tribunal de commerce d’Abidjan, 19 décembre 2017, Madame AmissahMarielle c. 1. Soumahoro Maury Fere, 2. MGROUP, 3. MTN Côte d’Ivoire, 4. Le bureau
ivoirien du droit d’auteur (obs. LUCAS (A.) et JIOGUE (G.), ce recueil, chapitre 6).

Observations :L’annexe VIII de l’ABR-1999 donne une liste nonlimitative des procédés de concurrence déloyale. Parmi
ces procédés figure la désorganisation de l’entreprise
concurrente et du marché573 qui est considérée commela forme la plus brutale de concurrence déloyale.
La désorganisation de l’entreprise concurrente et
du marché peut revêtir plusieurs formes, mais celledont il est question dans le jugement rapporté dutribunal de commerce d’Abidjan du 31 juillet 2015
est la désorganisation du réseau de vente d’une
entreprise concurrente.
Faits : Ce jugement met en présence deux sociétés
concurrentes, la société Air Liquide, la demanderesse,et la SOA-CI, la défenderesse, qui ont pour activité lacommercialisation du gaz industriel et médical. Dans lecadre de ses activités, chacune des sociétés vend desbouteilles estampillées en son nom à ses clients.
Informée, avec des prises de vue à l’appui, que desbouteilles lui appartenant se trouvent dans l’atelier demaintenance de la défenderesse, la demanderesse asollicité et obtenu par ordonnance une autorisationde procéder à un constat dans les locaux de ladéfenderesse. Il est ressorti de ce constat fait par voie
d’huissier les constatations suivantes :• 43 bouteilles se trouvent dans les locaux de ladéfenderesse;• sur les 43 bouteilles, 31 bouteilles sont sans robinets
et 12 avec robinets;• la SOA-CI a estampillé des bouteilles lui appartenantde son nom commercial.
Outre ces constatations, l’huissier instrumentaire aégalement découvert plusieurs bouteilles rouillées dansles locaux de la défenderesse et, en raison de leur état dedégradation avancée, il n’a pu déterminer le propriétaire
desdites bouteilles. Mais pour la demanderesse, tout
porte à croire que ces emballages lui appartiennent dansla mesure où la défenderesse n’a aucun intérêt à laisser
ses propres emballages se retrouver dans un tel état.
La demanderesse déduit de ces constatations :
a.

b.

573

d’une part que la défenderesse récupère lesemballages lui appartenant et commercialise son
gaz dans lesdits emballages en y apposant son nom
commercial; etd’autre part, qu’elle est victime de ladésorganisation de son réseau de distribution parla défenderesse qui a stocké ses bouteilles dans ses
locaux. Elle demande par conséquent au tribunal
de condamner la défenderesse à la réparation
du préjudice qu’elle lui fait subir par cet acte deconcurrence déloyale.

Cf. art. 7 de l’annexe VIII de l’ABR-1999. Cet article est repris in extenso parl’ABR-2015.

Il ressort de la motivation de la décision du tribunalque celui-ci s’est fondé sur deux éléments pour retenirla désorganisation du réseau de distribution de la
demanderesse : un élément matériel et un élément
intentionnel. Mais s’il est nécessaire, pour que ladésorganisation du réseau de distribution constitutive
de concurrence déloyale soit caractérisée, qu’il y ait unacte matériel (I), l’exigence de l’élément intentionnel est
depuis longtemps devenue inopportune (II).

Dans le cas de l’espèce, la demanderesse sollicite lacondamnation de la défenderesse pour concurrence
déloyale au motif que cette dernière a désorganisé son
réseau de distribution en stockant certaines de ses
bouteilles dans ses locaux et en sabotant d’autres. La
défenderesse prétend en revanche que la présence desbouteilles dans ses locaux n’est pas constitutive d’un actede concurrence déloyale. Il s’agit, selon elle, plutôt d’une
pratique dans le milieu du gaz. En effet, dans le secteurde la distribution du gaz, les clients viennent souvent
pour le rechargement du gaz auprès d’un distributeur
avec des bouteilles appartenant au concurrent. Celles-ci
sont alors mises de côté vides pour être récupérées parle client par la suite, car ces bouteilles sont garanties parune somme d’argent par les clients. La défenderesse
indique que c’est dans ce contexte que les 43 bouteilles
litigieuses se sont retrouvées dans ses locaux et que desbouteilles lui appartenant ont été retrouvées aussi dansles locaux de la demanderesse. La défenderesse soutientpar ailleurs qu’elle n’a ni rempli de gaz, ni utilisé à desfins commerciales les 43 bouteilles litigieuses qui étaientvides et entreposées dans un endroit précis comme cela
ressort du procès-verbal de constat. La défenderesseavance d’autres arguments de procédure qui ne méritentpas attention dans le cadre de ce commentaire.

I. La nécessité d’un acte matériel dans lacaractérisation de la désorganisation du réseau dedistribution du concurrent

Forte des arguments de fond susvisés, la défenderesseconclut à l’inexistence d’un acte de désorganisation
pouvant engager sa responsabilité.

À la suite de la jurisprudence fondée sur l’article 1382
du Code civil, l’article 7, alinéa 1, de l’annexe VIIIde l’ABR-1999 affirme le caractère déloyal de ladésorganisation de l’entreprise concurrente et
du marché en ces termes : “Constitue un acte deconcurrence déloyale tout acte ou toute pratique qui,dans l’exercice d’activités industrielles ou commerciales,
est de nature à désorganiser l’entreprise concurrente,
son marché ou le marché de la profession concernée”574.

Pour trancher le litige, le tribunal a d’abord procédé
à la définition de la désorganisation qui est, selon lui,“un dommage consistant en une atteinte certaine etsignificative subie par une organisation économique,de nature à faire obstacle à son fonctionnement”. La
pertinence de cette définition ne peut pas être appréciée
par rapport à l’article 7 de l’annexe VIII de l’Accord de
Bangui révisé du 24 février 1999 qui ne donne aucune
définition de la désorganisation. Il se contente en effetd’affirmer le caractère déloyal de ce procédé et defaire une énumération non limitative des hypothèsesde désorganisation. Il ressort de la définition donnée
par le tribunal que l’acte ou la pratique en cause doitêtre de nature à faire obstacle au fonctionnement de lavictime de cet acte ou de cette pratique, ce qui revientà définir la désorganisation par elle-même. Mais le plus
important est moins la définition de la désorganisationen elle-même que la caractérisation du procédé dedésorganisation en cause, ce qui, dans le cas de l’espèce,
est la désorganisation du réseau de distribution de la
demanderesse par la défenderesse.

En considérant comme déloyal tout acte ou pratique qui“est de nature à désorganiser l’entreprise concurrente”,
l’article 7, alinéa 1, affirme qu’il n’est pas nécessaire quel’acte ou la pratique ait déjà produit les effets. Il suffit
que l’acte ou la pratique soit potentiellement susceptiblede désorganiser l’entreprise concurrente, son marché ou
le marché de la profession concernée.
L’article 7, alinéa 2, donne une liste non limitative desprocédés de désorganisation. Il ressort de cette liste
deux catégories de désorganisation : les procédésde désorganisation d’un opérateur en particulier etles procédés de désorganisation du marché dansson ensemble. Entrent dans la première catégoriela suppression de publicité, le détournement decommandes et la désorganisation du réseau de vente.
Entrent en revanche dans la deuxième catégoriela pratique de prix anormalement bas et le nonrespect de la réglementation relative à l’exercice del’activité concernée.

574

Ce texte est repris in extenso par l’art. 7 al. 1 de l’annexe VIII de l’ABR-2015.

Pour retenir l’existence de ce procédé, le tribunal s’appuied’abord sur le nombre de bouteilles de la demanderesse
retrouvées chez la défenderesse pour écarter la pratiqueen cours dans le secteur de la distribution du gaz
invoquée par cette dernière. Selon le tribunal, “si tant est
que cette pratique existe dans ce milieu, la défenderesse
ne rapporte pas la preuve qu’une société concurrente
peut garder dans ses locaux une aussi importantequantité de bouteilles”. Il s’appuie ensuite sur le sabotage
des bouteilles de la demanderesse par la défenderesse.
Pour le tribunal en effet, cette dernière ne rapporte

Chapitre 7 – Concurrence déloyale

Raisonnement : La question à laquelle le tribunal
était invité à répondre était celle de savoir s’il y avait
désorganisation du réseau de distribution de la
demanderesse. Le tribunal a répondu à cette question
par l’affirmative. Selon lui en effet, la défenderessea intentionnellement stocké les bouteilles de la
demanderesse dans ses locaux pendant plusieurs
jours pour les utiliser, et cet acte constitue bien un actedéloyal. Il poursuit que cet acte désorganise le réseau
de distribution de la demanderesse en ce sens qu’enraison du stockage de plusieurs de ses bouteilles, celle-ci
ne peut pas satisfaire sa clientèle, contrairement à ladéfenderesse qui, disposant d’une quantité importantede bouteilles, pourra faire face aux besoins de sesclients à elle.

323

pas non plus la preuve qu’une société peut démonterles robinets et les chapeaux des bouteilles de son
concurrent comme c’est le cas en l’espèce. Le tribunal
s’appuie enfin sur le fait que la défenderesse “a mis sonétiquette sur certaines bouteilles objets du présent
litige pour les commercialiser au détriment de la société
AIR LIQUIDE”. Au regard de ces constatations, c’est àjuste titre que le tribunal a conclu qu’il y a concurrence
déloyale par désorganisation du réseau de distribution
de la demanderesse en ce sens “qu’en raison du stockagede plusieurs de ses bouteilles, celle-ci ne peut satisfairesa clientèle contrairement à la SOA-CI qui, disposantd’une quantité importante de bouteilles, pourra faire
face aux besoins de ses clients à elle”.
Outre l’existence de l’acte matériel de désorganisationdu réseau de distribution de la demanderesse, letribunal a également invoqué, pour caractériser
cette désorganisation, l’élément intentionnel dontl’opportunité en matière de concurrence déloyale
est discutable.

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

II. L’inopportunité de l’élément intentionnel dans lacaractérisation de la désorganisation du réseau dedistribution du concurrent

324

Pour retenir dans le cas de l’espèce la désorganisationdu réseau de distribution de la demanderesse par ladéfenderesse, le tribunal se fonde entre autres sur lefait que cette dernière “a intentionnellement stocké
les bouteilles dans ses locaux pendant plusieurs jours
pour les utiliser”. Il résulte de cette motivation que letribunal fait de l’intention un élément constitutif de laconcurrence déloyale en général et de la désorganisationdu réseau de distribution de la victime en particulier. Or
l’article 7 de l’annexe VIII de l’Accord de Bangui révisé
du 24 février 1999 sur la désorganisation de l’entreprise
concurrente et du marché, comme tous les autres articles
de l’annexe VIII qui consacrent d’autres hypothèsesde concurrence déloyale, ne fait pas de l’intention unélément constitutif de la concurrence déloyale (la mêmesolution est consacrée par l’annexe VIII de l’Acte de 2015).
L’Accord de Bangui s’aligne ainsi sur la jurisprudence
rendue sur le fondement de l’article 1382 du Code civil
qui, depuis l’important arrêt de la Cour de cassationfrançaise du 18 avril 1958575, a évincé l’intention deséléments constitutifs de la concurrence déloyale. Il
serait d’un grand intérêt de retracer l’évolution de lajurisprudence sur la question de l’intention en matière deconcurrence déloyale.
Schématiquement, on peut dire que trois grandesétapes ont marqué cette évolution, avec, au centre decelle-ci, une question principale : l’acte de concurrence
déloyale doit-il être ou non un acte intentionnel? Pendant
longtemps, la réponse n’a pas paru douteuse à lajurisprudence. Elle exigeait, pour qu’il y ait concurrence
déloyale, qu’il y ait eu intention frauduleuse, c’est-à-diremauvaise foi. Cette opinion était soutenue aussi bien

par les juges du fond576 que par la Cour de cassationfrançaise qui a affirmé dans plusieurs de ses arrêts que“la déloyauté de la concurrence suppose la mauvaisefoi”577. Selon ce premier courant jurisprudentiel,l’absence de mauvaise foi était donc exclusive de laconcurrence déloyale.
Cette jurisprudence, approuvée par certains auteurs578, a
été critiquée par la majorité de la doctrine579. Pour cettepartie de la doctrine, l’action en concurrence déloyalen’étant qu’un cas de responsabilité civile, il devrait suffire
d’une faute de négligence ou d’imprudence du concurrent
pour engager la responsabilité de ce dernier. L’exigencede la mauvaise foi paraît donc excessive. La critique desauteurs amena la jurisprudence à l’assouplissement desa doctrine. Elle admit, même en l’absence de mauvaise
foi, la responsabilité du concurrent lorsque celui-ci avait
simplement commis une faute quasi délictuelle. Cette
tendance jurisprudentielle s’exprimait dans deux séries
de décisions. Les unes, tout en reconnaissant que l’auteur
de l’acte de concurrence n’avait pas agi avec mauvaise
foi, ou se refusant même à la rechercher, relevaient
cependant à son encontre une faute d’imprudence ou
de négligence et le condamnaient sur le fondement decette faute580. Les autres, après avoir recherché la faute
du concurrent prétendument déloyal, constataient qu’elle
n’existait pas, et ne prononçaient aucune condamnation
malgré le préjudice subi581. Mais la jurisprudence etcertains auteurs qualifiaient cette concurrence “interdite”
en vertu de la faute quasi délictuelle de “concurrence
illicite” pour la distinguer de la concurrence déloyale
proprement dite, constituée par une faute intentionnelle.
La distinction ne se limitait pas au plan terminologique.
En effet, bon nombre d’auteurs et de décisions de justiceattachaient à cette distinction une double conséquence.
• La première de ces conséquences était d’ordre
procédural. Le tribunal saisi d’une action en
concurrence déloyale était tenu de rejeter la demandeen l’absence de mauvaise foi, sans pouvoir relever une“concurrence illicite”582.

576

577
578
579

580
581
582

575

Cass. com., 18 avril 1958 : D. 1959, p. 87 (note DERRIDA (F.)).

Voir notamment : CA Grenoble, 3 mai 1954 : D. 1954, p. 426 : Il est de doctrine
et de jurisprudence constante que l’action en concurrence déloyale n’est
admise que si le demandeur prouve “que ... le concurrent pratique desmanœuvres dolosives pour tenter de détourner la clientèle, la mauvaise foi
caractérisée étant un élément essentiel de la concurrence déloyale”; CA Lyon
9 juin 1955, cassé par Cass. com. 18 avril 1958 : D. 1959, p. 87, Note DERRIDA(F.) : “Attendu que la concurrence déloyale, qui consiste dans toute manœuvre
destinée à attirer à soi la clientèle d’autrui, suppose la mauvaise foi.”
Cass. Req. 9 mars 1870 : D.P. 1871, I, p. 211; Cass. Requ., 18 novembre 1903
D.P. 1904, I, p. 10; S. 1904, I, p. 84; 26 févr. 1907 : D.P. 1908, I, p. 27.
Voir Plaisant, Note au J.C.P. 1948, II, 4035; Esmein, Note au J.C.P. 1958, II,
n° 10535.
Voir CHAVANNE (A.), Juriscl. Responsabilité civile, Fasc. XVII bis A, n° 41; GENY(S.), Note : S. 1937, II, p. 1; SAVATIER (R.), Traité de la responsabilité civile,
Tome 1, n° 50; ROUBIER et CHAVANNE, Chroniques à la R.T.D. Com. n° 1955, p.
837, nos 11 et 1958, p. 102, n° 18; CROUANSON, De l’élément de faute dans laconcurrence déloyale, Thèse AIX, n° 1925, p. 24.
CA Toulouse, 4 janvier 1954 : D. 1954, p. 116; CA Chambéry, 2 février 1954 :D. 1954, p. 297; CA Paris, 14 février 1958 : J.C.P. 1958, II, n° 10535 (note
ESMEIN (P.)).
CA Rennes, 28 novembre 1922 et sur pourvoi, Req. 16 juill. 1925 : Ann. prop. ind.
1928, p. 24; Tribunal de commerce de la Seine, 29 juin 1927 : Gaz. Pal. 1927, II, p.
416; CA Paris, 5 juillet 1954 : S., 1955, II, p. 1 (concl. DUPIN).
Cass. req., 9 mars 1870 et 18 novembre 1903, prec., note 33; CA Grenoble,
26 Juin 1906 : Ann. prop. ind. 1907; CA Poitiers, 5 novembre 1935: S. ,1937, II,
p. 1, (note GENY).

• La seconde conséquence concernait l’appréciation
des dommages et intérêts. En cas de mauvaise foi,la responsabilité devait être aggravée. En revanche,
la bonne foi devait profiter au défendeur en ce qui
concerne l’étendue des dommages et intérêts583.

une quantité importante des bouteilles de gaz de son
concurrent, et en saboter d’autres, sans avoir l’intentionde désorganiser son réseau de distribution. Mais cetteintention ne doit pas être considérée comme un élément
constitutif de la concurrence déloyale.

La majorité des auteurs ont critiqué cette distinction tantdans sa terminologie que dans les effets que l’on a voulu
en tirer584.

Grégoire Jiogue

Malgré la résistance de certains juges , les juges
de l’espace OAPI se sont largement alignés sur lajurisprudence inaugurée par l’arrêt de la Cour decassation française du 18 avril 1958. En effet, la majoritédes décisions rendues ne subordonnent plus l’admission
de l’action en concurrence déloyale à la preuve de lamauvaise foi du défendeur587. En somme, si la preuvede la faute est à la fois nécessaire et suffisante, la fauted’imprudence ou de négligence engage, au même titre
que la faute intentionnelle, la responsabilité de son
auteur pour concurrence déloyale588.
586

Au regard de l’évolution de la jurisprudence ainsi
retracée et de la position de l’ABR-1999 et de l’ABR-2015,le constat qui mérite d’être fait est que la décision dutribunal de commerce d’Abidjan du 31 juillet 2015 est
en déphasage avec le droit positif et ne saurait êtreapprouvée. Certes, une entreprise ne peut pas stocker
583
584

Cass. req., 1er juin 1874 : S. 1875, I, p. 111.
Voir notamment : MAUNOURY, Du nom commercial, Thèse, Paris (Hachette),
1894, p. 275.
585 ROUBIER (P.) et CHAVANNE (A.), Chroniques : RTD Com. 1959, p. 425; DERRIDA(F.), Note sous Cass. com., 18 avril 1958, D. 1959, p. 87 (note DERRIDA (F.)).
Pour cet auteur, “il ne doit plus y avoir de différence entre concurrence
déloyale et concurrence illicite : l’une et l’autre engagent sur les mêmes
bases, en vertu des mêmes principes, la responsabilité de leur auteur.”
586 Voir TGI de Yaoundé, Jugement n° 382 du 22 juin 1983, Menuiserie
camerounaise industrielle (M.C.I.) c. MECAF et SOPECAM : “En faisant passer poursienne, dans la présentation qu’elle a délibérément faite aux journalistes dela SOPECAM, la réalisation des deux bâtiments sur pilotis concernés qu’elle
savait avoir été construits par la M.C.I., la MECAF s’est indubitablement livrée
à une concurrence déloyale caractérisée par la confusion qu’elle a créée demauvaise foi entre les deux entreprises.”
587 Voir par exemple : Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire, Chambre judiciaire,
6 juin 2003, Société Sogec-Ivoire c. Société Ivoiral (obs. FADE (A.), ce recueil,
chapitre 7, section D); Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire, Chambre judiciaire,
1er juin 2006, Société SOGEC-IVOIRE c. Établissements MROUI & FRÈRES, inédit; TGI
de Douala, Jugement civil n° 192 du 15 décembre 2000, Société Moulinex SA c.
Vaspan trading co et autres (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M.-L.); Cour suprême duSénégal, Arrêt n° 57 du 17 mai 2017, SONATEL Mobiles SA c. L’Agence Touba Sénégal
et le groupe GPS (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE (M-L.), ce recueil, chapitre 3, section M).
588 Voir CA Douala, Arrêt n° 10/C du 21 novembre 1969, n.6, inédit, qui parlede faute quasi délictuelle, de négligence ou d’imprudence engageant laresponsabilité du défendeur.

C. Action civile en contrefaçon etconcurrence déloyale – Intervention
volontaire – Licencié non exclusif –Recevabilité
Fait une mauvaise application de l’article 46 del’annexe III de l’ABR-1999 le juge d’instance qui déclareirrecevable l’intervention volontaire du bénéficiaired’une licence non exclusive de marque dans l’instanceen contrefaçon et concurrence déloyale initiée par letitulaire, au motif que celui-ci défend les mêmes intérêts,alors même qu’il est établi que l’intervenant volontairepoursuit l’indemnisation du préjudice qui lui est propre.
Par ailleurs, les exigences de l’article 41, alinéa 1er, dutexte précité, en l’occurrence l’inaction du titulaire de lamarque et la mise en demeure préalable, concevables enmatière de contrefaçon, sont inapplicables dans le cadre
de l’action en concurrence déloyale.
Tribunal de grande instance de Ouagadougou, Jugementn° 139/2005 du 23 mars 2005, LA STÉ U.NV c. T.A
Observations:
Attribut du droit exclusif, le droit d’exercer l’action civile
en contrefaçon d’une marque appartient principalement
au titulaire de ladite marque. Ce principe dégagé parl’article 46.1) de l’annexe III de l’Accord de Bangui,
Acte du 24 février 1999, admet cependant quelquesatténuations : le bénéficiaire d’un droit exclusif d’usage,
c’est-à-dire le licencié exclusif, dispose également dela faculté d’initier cette action sous deux conditions
cumulatives, à savoir l’absence d’une clause contractuellecontraire et la mise en demeure préalable du titulaire
originaire. En revanche, le bénéficiaire d’une licence
non exclusive ne peut qu’intervenir dans l’instanceen contrefaçon déjà pendante en vertu de l’alinéa 2
du texte de loi précité. L’on s’interroge dès lors sur lapertinence du jugement du tribunal de grande instancede Ouagadougou ci-avant rapporté, ayant déclaré
irrecevable l’intervention volontaire du bénéficiaired’une licence, en l’espèce la société U. Côte d’Ivoire dansle cadre d’une instance en contrefaçon initiée par letitulaire de la marque contrefaite.

Chapitre 7 – Concurrence déloyale

La troisième étape de l’évolution jurisprudentielle
est marquée par l’arrêt de la Cour de cassation du
18 avril 1958. Cet arrêt retient l’attention quant à sa
motivation qui est la suivante : “Attendu que l’emploi
par un commerçant du nom d’un homonyme dansdes conditions créant une confusion entre deuxétablissements est constitutif d’un quasi-délit qui
ne requiert pas un élément intentionnel”. Dans cetarrêt de principe, la Cour de cassation a adopté laconception objective de la concurrence déloyale eta répudié la distinction purement terminologique etparfaitement inutile entre la concurrence déloyale et la“concurrence illicite”585.

Faits : En effet, victime de la contrefaçon de sa marquede poudre à laver “OMO” enregistrée à l’OAPI, la société
U. NV a attrait T.A, le présumé contrefacteur, devant
ledit tribunal pour contrefaçon et concurrence déloyale
sur le fondement des articles 47 et 49 de l’annexe III del’Accord de Bangui précité, après avoir fait pratiquer une
saisie-contrefaçon de 2616 cartons de poudre à laver“MIMO” appartenant à T.A en raison des similitudes desinscriptions et couleurs de l’emballage desdits produits325avec ceux revêtus de la marque “OMO”. La société U.
Côte d’Ivoire est intervenue volontairement dans cetteinstance pour solliciter la réparation du préjudice propre,
en vertu de la licence de commercialisation de la poudre
à laver “OMO” à elle consentie par la société U. PLC,
bénéficiaire d’un droit exclusif d’usage de ladite marque.
T.A a derechef plaidé l’irrecevabilité des deux actions
motifs pris du défaut de preuve de non-radiation etde non-déchéance, du défaut du cautionnement etde l’incompétence du juge ayant délivré l’ordonnancede saisie-contrefaçon. S’agissant singulièrement del’intervention volontaire, T.A a prétendu que le titulairede la marque ayant déjà agi pour la défense des mêmes
intérêts que ceux intéressant U. Côte d’Ivoire, celle-ci
n’a plus qualité pour agir. Plaidant au fond, il a prétendu
avoir acheté la poudre à laver “MIMO” contenue dansdes cartons au port de TEMA au Ghana et ce n’estqu’à Ouagadougou qu’il s’est rendu compte de laressemblance de ces produits avec ceux marqués “OMO”.
Raisonnement : Abstraction faite de la question derecevabilité des actions présentées (section I), le tribunal
était également appelé à se prononcer sur le bien-fondédes actions conjointes en contrefaçon et concurrence
déloyale (section II).
I. La recevabilité des actions

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Dès l’orée de l’instruction de cette affaire, T.A a plaidél’irrecevabilité tant de la demande principale (A) que del’intervention volontaire (B).

326

A. La demande principale
À côté des conditions classiques de recevabilité d’une
action en justice prévues par les Codes nationaux deprocédure civile des États signataires de l’Accord de
Bangui, le propriétaire de la marque initiateur d’une
action en contrefaçon doit pouvoir justifier de sa
propriété et de l’étendue de ses droits en produisant
aux débats le certificat d’enregistrement de sa marqueau risque de voir son action rejetée. Dans l’espèce
commentée, T.A a convoqué trois motifs à l’appui desa fin de non-recevoir, notamment le défaut de preuve
de non-radiation et de non-déchéance, le défaut ducautionnement et l’incompétence du juge ayant délivré
l’ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon.
L’on perçoit d’emblée qu’en dehors du moyen tiréde l’incompétence du juge ayant prescrit la saisiecontrefaçon, lequel ne soulève du reste pas une question
spécifique au droit de la propriété intellectuelle, lesdeux précédents moyens ne peuvent valablement faire
obstacle à la recevabilité d’une action en contrefaçon.
En effet, la production de la preuve de non-radiation
et de non-déchéance, ainsi que le cautionnementéventuel, sont des exigences légales préalables à laprise d’une ordonnance de saisie-contrefaçon et non desconditions de recevabilité de l’action en contrefaçon589.
L’exigence de la preuve de non-radiation et de nondéchéance a d’ailleurs été supprimée par l’article 51.2)
589

Cf. art. 48 de l’annexe III de l’ABR-1999.

de l’Acte de Bamako du 14 décembre 2015 qui dispose :“L’ordonnance est rendue sur requête et sur justification
de l’enregistrement de la marque”. L’entrée en vigueurde ce texte facilitera désormais l’obtention de cettemesure conservatoire par les titulaires des marques, enparticulier ceux résidant hors du siège de l’OAPI qui, dufait de leur éloignement, avaient des difficultés à se fairedélivrer en urgence les certificats de non-radiation et denon-déchéance, même par la voie électronique.
En tout état de cause, les vices entachant la saisiecontrefaçon ne sauraient raisonnablement paralyser
l’instance en contrefaçon introduite au fond et dansle cadre de laquelle le titulaire de la marque peutvalablement se prévaloir de la mosaïque de preuvesqu’offre le droit commun. L’on comprend aisément lafacilité avec laquelle le juge a rejeté la fin de non-recevoir
excipée par T.A relativement à la demande principale encontrefaçon et concurrence déloyale, même si les motifs
invoqués à l’appui ne sont pas convaincants. De fait,la demande principale a été initiée par la société U. NV
sur deux fondements distincts, à savoir la contrefaçon
et la concurrence déloyale, en sorte que l’irrecevabilitéde la première laisse subsister la seconde non soumise
aux mêmes exigences de forme. La production ducertificat de non-radiation et de non-déchéance etle cautionnement ne sont pas requis dans le cadred’une action en concurrence déloyale fondée sur ledroit commun de la responsabilité du fait personnel
réglementé par les codes civils nationaux.
En effet, l’action complémentaire en concurrence
déloyale relevant du droit commun de la responsabilité
civile est soumise aux conditions classiques derecevabilité d’une action en justice.
B. L’intervention volontaire
Les faits révèlent que la société U. Côte d’Ivoire abénéficié d’une sous-licence non exclusive de saconsœur, la société U. PLC, elle-même bénéficiaired’une licence exclusive à elle concédée par la société
U. NV titulaire de la marque “OMO”. Et c’est sur lefondement de l’article 46.2) de l’Accord de Bangui, Acte
du 24 février 1999, que la société U. Côte d’Ivoire s’est
portée intervenante volontaire dans la présente instance.
Le tribunal a rejeté son action au visa de l’article 46.1) del’accord susvisé, texte inapproprié en l’espèce puisqu’ilvise plutôt le cas du bénéficiaire d’une licence exclusive.
Or, U. Côte d’Ivoire, tel que démontré précédemment,
est partie à un contrat de licence simple et disposede ce fait de la faculté d’intervenir dans l’instance encontrefaçon introduite par le titulaire originaire en vertu
de l’article 46.2) précité. C’est donc à tort que le juge aprivé ce plaideur de la possibilité de réclamer réparation
du préjudice propre qu’il estime avoir subi du fait desagissements de T.A.
La décision rapportée est d’autant plus critiquable de cepoint de vue que l’intervention volontaire de la société U.
Côte d’Ivoire a pour objet la réparation du préjudice subi
du fait de la concurrence déloyale, régime de protection
non régi par les dispositions des articles 46.1) et 2) del’Accord de Bangui. Il importe de préciser à ce stade,II. Le bien-fondé des actions
Nous apprécierons le bien-fondé des actions encontrefaçon et concurrence déloyale engagées au regard
des modalités de l’invocation conjointe desdites actions(A) et des sanctions qui en résultent (B).
A. Les modalités de l’invocation conjointe des actions
L’action principale initiée par la société U. NV titulaire
originaire de la marque “OMO” a pour fondement lesarticles 37 de l’annexe III, 2, 3, et 4 de l’annexe VIII del’Accord de Bangui, Acte du 24 février 1999, traitantrespectivement de la contrefaçon et de la concurrence
déloyale. Les données factuelles ne permettent
cependant pas de tracer une ligne de démarcation entre
les deux régimes de protection, le raisonnement du jugedans la décision commentée en est une illustration :“Attendu en l’espèce que des pièces versées
au dossier, les produits de la marque ’MIMO‘
présentent des similitudes autant sur les
inscriptions que sur les couleurs des emballages
avec ceux de la marque ’OMO‘; Que la marque’OMO‘ étant une marque légalement enregistréeet protégée, alors que la marque ’MIMO‘ nel’est pas, ces actes d’imitation constituent une
contrefaçon, et par la confusion et la tromperie
que les produits de la marque ’MIMO‘ pouvaientoccasionner au sein du public, ces actes
constituent même des actes de concurrence
déloyale; que la société U.NV est ainsi fondée ensa demande, d’où qu’il convient d’y faire droit”.
Cet attendu ne permet pas de distinguer avec
précision les actes constitutifs de contrefaçon de ceux
justiciables du chef de concurrence déloyale. Pourtant,il est acquis tant en doctrine qu’en jurisprudence quel’action complémentaire en concurrence déloyale
ne peut être accueillie que si elle se fonde sur une
faute dommageable distincte par hypothèse ducomportement constitutif de contrefaçon et dès lors
non couverte par la qualification de contrefaçon et non

sanctionnée593. En l’espèce, la société U. NV a prétendu
que la contrefaçon était caractérisée au regard de lasimilitude des inscriptions et couleurs de l’emballage dela poudre à laver “MIMO” avec celle marquée “OMO” etque la concurrence déloyale provenait de la confusion
résultant de l’imitation de la présentation de l’emballage
de la poudre “OMO” par les distributeurs de “MIMO”. Lemême fait aurait alors été qualifié par le juge à la fois decontrefaçon et de concurrence déloyale, toute chose qui
impacte négativement la consistance des dommages etintérêts auxquels la victime pourrait prétendre.
B. Les sanctions conséquentes
La société U. NV a réclamé le remboursement des frais
exposés à l’occasion de la présente procédure ainsi
que la somme de FCFA 250 000 000 au titre du manqueà gagner résultant des méventes qu’elle a connues
du fait de la contrefaçon alléguée. Ces demandes ont
été rejetées faute de justificatifs. Évidemment, lesméventes tout comme les frais de procédure doiventêtre prouvés par la production des pièces comptables
afférentes dont l’absence prive le juge d’éléments
objectifs d’appréciation. Le jugement rapporté n’appelleaucune observation particulière sur ce point. Toutefois,
il convient d’indiquer que la condamnation pourcontrefaçon et concurrence déloyale devrait entraîner
l’allocation des dommages et intérêts séparés compte
tenu de la nature duale de la faute alléguée. La question
certes n’a pas été spécifiquement abordée par le jugequi s’est à juste titre cantonné à l’examen de la demandetelle que présentée par la société U. NV qui a omis deventiler sa demande. Les juridictions des pays signataires
de l’Accord de Bangui ont tendance à ignorer cettedifférence de régime entre les deux actions, surtout
lorsqu’elles sont exercées conjointement comme enl’espèce. Dans une intéressante affaire mettant encause deux sociétés commerciale de Douala au sujet desmarques “MOULINEX” et “MAMMONLEX”, le tribunal de
grande instance de cette ville avait condamné la société
convaincue de contrefaçon à payer la somme globale deFCFA 20 000 000 à titre de dommages et intérêts pourcontrefaçon et concurrence déloyale594.
Max Lambert Ndéma Elongué

D. Dessin ou modèle industriel –Concurrence déloyale – Similitude denature à créer une confusion dansl’esprit du consommateur – Faute –Préjudice – Détournement de clientèle– Réparation
Commet une faute au sens de l’article 1382 du Codecivil, constitutive de la concurrence déloyale, une société
qui met sur le même marché un modèle de cuvettesimilaire à celui commercialisé antérieurement par sa
593

590
591
592

Cf. art. 63 al. 2 de l’annexe I de l’ABR-2015.
Cf. art. 55 al. 3 de l’annexe II de l’ABR-2015.
Cf. art. 33 al. 1 de l’annexe IV de l’ABR-2015.

594

Chapitre 7 – Concurrence déloyale

contrairement à la position du juge dans cette affaire,
que le bénéficiaire d’une licence d’exploitation d’une
marque, quelle qu’en soit la nature, subit un préjudicepropre du fait de la contrefaçon ou de la concurrence
déloyale en rapport avec ladite marque l’habilitant àsolliciter une indemnisation conséquente. Toutefois,l’Acte de Bamako du 14 décembre 2015 semble exclure
le licencié simple du cercle des personnes habilitéesà solliciter l’indemnisation par voie d’intervention
volontaire. Est-ce une simple omission ou une volonté
délibérée du législateur communautaire? L’hypothèsed’une omission paraît plausible d’autant plus que cettequestion est réglée par le même accord en matière debrevet d’invention590, de modèle d’utilité591 et de dessins
et modèles industriels592.

PASSA (J.), Droit de la propriété industrielle (Marques et autre signes
distinctifs, dessins et modèles), Tome 1, Paris (LGDJ), 2006, p. 453.
Voir par ex. TGI du Wouri (Douala), Jugement civil n° 192 du
15 décembre 2000, Moulinex SA c. Vaspan Trading Cie (obs. NDEMA ELONGUE(M.-L.)) : Revue scientifique de la propriété industrielle la Gazelle n° 0001,
novembre 2007, pp. 17 et s.
327

concurrente, créant ainsi une confusion dans l’esprit duconsommateur qui a pu conduire à un détournement
de clientèle.
Cour suprême de Côte d’Ivoire, Arrêt n° 816 du
9 juillet 1997, SOCIÉTÉ SOGEC- IVOIRE c. SOCIÉTÉIVOIRAL

Collection OMPI des jugements les plus déterminants en matière de propriété intellectuelle

Observations:
La liberté de concurrence n’autorise pas les entreprises
à recourir aux comportements contraires aux usages
loyaux du commerce pour nuire à un concurrent
afin de détourner sa clientèle. La protection par la
concurrence déloyale sanctionne de ce fait tout usage
excessif de la libre concurrence dans la compétitionéconomique595. Par nature, la concurrence déloyale
est une infraction polymorphe596. Outre la définition
classique des actes de concurrence déloyale posée
à l’article 10bis, alinéa 2, de la Convention de Parispour la protection de la propriété industrielle, le droit
OAPI distingue quatre principaux actes synonymes dedéloyauté : la recherche de confusion, le dénigrement, ladésorganisation et la divulgation597. Lorsque, dans l’esprit
du consommateur, un signe distinctif renvoie à l’image
d’une entreprise donnée, tout acte d’un concurrent qui
crée ou risque de créer la confusion quant à l’origine
des produits renfermant ledit signe constituera un actede concurrence déloyale598. C’est ce que rappelle l’arrêt
ci-dessus rapporté, rendu par la Cour suprême de Côte
d’Ivoire, dans l’espèce opposant la société SOGEC-Ivoire à
la société IVOIRAL.

328

Faits : Les faits de la cause se résument aisément. La
société SOGEC-Ivoire, spécialisée dans le commerced’ustensiles ménagers, avait fabriqué un modèle
de cuvette dénommée AFFOUE 16 A/C. Pour unecommercialisation optimale de son produit, SOGEC
avait conclu un contrat de sous-traitance avec lasociété IVOIRAL. La discorde naît après l’arrivée duterme du contrat de sous-traitance. Reprochant à lasociété IVOIRAL d’avoir mis sur le marché un modèle decuvette TASSA 16/B, réplique de sa cuvette AFFOUE 16
A/C, SOGEC-Ivoire l’a assignée en réparation devant letribunal de première instance d’Abidjan. Par jugementn° 79 du 4 février 1998, ladite juridiction va faire droit à
sa demande.
Insatisfaite par le jugement ainsi rendu, la société
IVOIRAL va interjeter appel devant la cour d’appeld’Abidjan qui, par arrêt n° 816 rendu le 9 juillet 1999,
a infirmé le jugement préalablement rendu, d’où lepourvoi de la société SOGEC-Ivoire.

595
596

597
598

EDOU EDOU (P.) (éd)., Le contentieux de la propriété intellectuelle dansl’espace OAPI : Guide du magistrat, Genève (OMPI), p. 86.
L’expression a été utilisée par Madame OUMOUL Khaîry Ndao, le droit
comparé de la contrefaçon et de la concurrence déloyale : l’exemple
de la France et du Sénégal, Thèse de doctorat, Université de Toulouse,
14 décembre 2015, p. 27.
EDOU EDOU (P.), n.51, pp. 85-86; ROUBIER (P.), n.5, pp. 536 et s. Voirégalement art. 2 à 6 de l’annexe VIII de l’ABR-1999.
OMPI, Dispositions types sur la protection contre la concurrence déloyale,
Genève (OMPI), 1996, p. 16.

Raisonnement : La question de droit qui était poséeà la cour était de savoir si la commercialisation par ladéfenderesse au pourvoi du modèle de cuvette TASSA
16/B peut constituer une forme de concurrence déloyale.
À cette question, la cour a répondu par l’affirmative
dès lors qu’il existe un rapport concurrentiel entre
les parties litigantes, et que sont réunis les éléments
constitutifs de l’action en concurrence déloyale. Exigenced’un rapport de concurrence et éléments constitutifs
de l’action en concurrence déloyale feront l’objet desdéveloppements ci-après.
Primo, il faut dire que contrairement à l’article 10bis,
alinéa 2, de la Convention de Paris qui exige que l’actedéloyal soit un acte de concurrence, les dispositions del’Accord de Bangui ne visent pas expressément “tout actede concurrence”. Pourtant, la concurrence déloyale n’a desens que si l’auteur de la déloyauté et sa victime sont enposition de concurrence, c’est-à-dire que leurs activités
sont rivales, et que tous deux touchent une clientèle
identique599.
Secundo, l’action en concurrence déloyale étant une
variante de l’action en responsabilité civile fondée sur lesarticles 1382 et suivants du Code civil, sa mise en œuvre
suppose la réunion des éléments constitutifs que sont :un fait générateur qui est l’acte ou le comportement
déloyal, un dommage et le lien de causalité entre le fait
générateur et le dommage.
Tout d’abord, en ce qui concerne le fait générateur del’action en concurrence déloyale, l’Accord de Banguiparle d’“acte” ou de “pratique” afin de préciser que lefait générateur s’entend non seulement d’un “acte”
stricto sensu, mais aussi de tout comportement paromission. Au rang des omissions, il peut s’agir du défaut
de publication d’un rectificatif ou d’un complément
d’information concernant les résultats d’un essai deproduit publiés dans une revue de consommateurs600. En
dépit de leur forme très variée, quatre principaux faits
sont souvent le fondement de l’action en concurrence
déloyale : la recherche de confusion, le dénigrement, ladésorganisation et la divulgation601.
Les actes recherchant la confusion sont très souvent
le fondement d’une action en concurrence déloyale.
La loi sanctionne la déloyauté, que la confusion soit
intentionnelle ou non. Il convient de relever qu’il n’estmême pas nécessaire que la confusion recherchée parson auteur soit effectivement créée. Même si c’est moinssouvent le cas, la loi sanctionne également le simple“risque de confusion”, constituant un fondement valable
de l’action en concurrence déloyale. Dans ce sillage,
l’article 2, alinéa 1, de l’annexe VIII de l’ABR-2015 disposeà cet effet : “Constitue un acte de concurrence déloyale
tout acte ou pratique qui, dans l’exercice d’activités
industrielles ou commerciales, crée ou est de natureà créer une confusion avec l’entreprise d’autrui ou ses
599
600
601

Voir Cour d’État du Niger, Chambre judiciaire, Arrêt n° 13 – 086/c du
4 avril 2013, Adamou Idrissa c. Mahaman Mindaou (obs. JIOGUE (G.), ce recueil,
chapitre 7, section A).
Cf. OMPI, n.54, p. 8.
EDOU EDOU (P.), n.51, pp. 85-86.

“Attendu par ailleurs qu’aux termes desdispositions de l’alinéa b de l’article 17 de l’Accordde Bangui, sont illicites ’tous faits quelconquesde nature à créer une confusion ou une
tromperie par n’importe quel moyen avec le nom
commercial, l’établissement, les produits, lesservices ou l’activité industrielle ou commercialed’un concurrent.’“Attendu que la seule introduction au Bénin par
un vendeur d’un produit, en sachant qu’il existe
sur le marché un produit similaire et mieux
connu ne suffit pas à établir qu’il a connaissancedu caractère contrefaisant dudit produit; il y acertes concurrence, mais la concurrence déloyale
doit être établie en rapportant la preuve desmanœuvres déloyales tendant à créer une
confusion ou une tromperie”603.
La confusion peut être créée de plusieurs manières.
L’article 2, alinéa 2, de l’annexe VIII de l’ABR-2015 nous
en donne quelques-unes, notamment lorsque dans
l’usage d’une marque, d’un nom commercial ou autre
signe distinctif d’une entreprise, un acte crée ou risquede créer une confusion quant à l’identité d’origine desproduits ou services qu’ils accompagnent. Très souvent,la confusion naît de l’usage d’une marque utilisée par leconcurrent déloyal qui, de par ses similitudes avec une
marque préexistante, enregistrée ou non, crée ou risquede créer la confusion dans l’esprit du public. Dans uneespèce jugée par le TGI de Ouagadougou, la confusionétait entretenue par l’usage des marques similaires
OMO et MIMO604. La seule condition étant que l’action
complémentaire en concurrence déloyale se fonde
sur une faute dommageable distincte par hypothèse
du comportement constitutif de contrefaçon605. Il n’endemeure que la confusion puisse naître également del’usage d’un signe distinctif autre que ceux protégés parl’Accord de Bangui. C’est le cas des signes utilisés parune entreprise pour conférer une certaine identité àcelle-ci et aux produits qu’elle fabrique ou aux services
qu’elle fournit.

602
603
604
605

Voir CA Quémé, Arrêt n° 14 du 9 novembre 1989, Reckitt et Colman c. Sociétéd’Import-Export (SIMEXPRO).
Ibid.
TGI de Ouagadougou, Jugement n° 139/2005, La Sté U.NV c. T.A. Voir aussi TPI
d’Abidjan, Jugement civil du 10 avril 1989, Société PACO RABANNE PARFUMS c.
M.A.EL G.
PASSA (J.), n.49, p. 453.

Dans le cas de l’espèce rapportée, la confusion était
créée par l’aspect extérieur des produits concurrents,
plus précisément leur forme. Usant de son pouvoird’évocation lui permettant de statuer à nouveau, laHaute Cour constate que “l’expertise ordonnée par lejugement avant dire droit n° 299 du 17 avril 1996 dutribunal de première instance d’Abidjan a fait état d’une
similitude quasi identique des modèles de cuvettes
en cause; Que cette similitude de nature à créer une
confusion dans l’esprit du consommateur qui a pu
conduire à un détournement de clientèle préjudiciableà la SOGEC-IVOIRE ayant subi un préjudice matériel
certain résultant du manque à gagner du fait de la perted’une partie de sa clientèle …”. Par ailleurs, la confusion
peut naître de l’emballage606, de la couleur607 ou d’autres
caractéristiques non fonctionnelles du produit.
Comme le prescrit l’article 1382 du Code civil, l’acte
de concurrence déloyale doit causer à la victime un
préjudice pour ouvrir droit à réparation. En matière deconcurrence déloyale, le préjudice résulte le plus souventdu dévoiement de la clientèle du concurrent. C’est donc
cette perte de clientèle, fût-elle de quelques clientsseulement, qu’il convient d’indemniser. Cependant, il
importe peu que les clients visés par le comportement
malhonnête aient été effectivement détournés au profit
du concurrent déloyal. Dans certains cas, il arrive que laperte de clientèle puisse bénéficier à un concurrent autre
que l’auteur de la déloyauté. Mais très souvent, c’est
l’auteur de l’acte qui en tire le profit. Ce fut le cas dansl’espèce rapportée.
Comme toute action en responsabilité civile, l’action en
concurrence déloyale vise à réparer un préjudice déjà né
au moment de son exercice. En l’absence d’un préjudice
né ou lorsque ledit préjudice est simplement éventuel,l’action en concurrence sera vouée à l’échec. Tout aulong des débats, il avait été prouvé que la SOGEC-Ivoire
avait perdu une partie de ses clients tournés désormaisvers l’acquisition des cuvettes commercialisées par
son concurrent. La réalisation du dommage était doncclairement établie, même si la motivation de la courlaisse planer du doute à cet effet lorsqu’elle affirme quela similitude de nature à créer la confusion “a pu conduireà un détournement de clientèle…”.
Outre le préjudice, le succès de l’action en concurrence
déloyale repose sur l’existence d’un lien de causalité
entre l’acte contraire aux usages honnêtes et la perte
de clientèle subie par la victime. Il s’agit d’établir le lienpouvant exister entre les agissements du concurrent etle préjudice subi par l’entreprise. La jurisprudence fait
preuve d’un grand pragmatisme dans l’appréciation dulien de causalité. Dans l’affaire commentée, la cour met
en relief cette exigence de causalité en précisant quele “préjudice matériel certain résultant du manque àgagner du fait de la perte d’une partie de sa clientèle”.

606
607

Chapitre 7 – Concurrence déloyale

activités, en particulier avec les produits ou services
offerts par cette entreprise”. Les tribunaux exigent que
soit rapportée la preuve d’acte qui crée ou qui est denature à créer un risque de confusion dans l’esprit dupublic, faute de quoi ils rejettent l’action en concurrence
déloyale. Dans une décision rendue par la cour d’appelde Quémé, l’appelant n’avait pas pu établir le fait queles actes posés par son contradicteur fussent de natureà créer la confusion dans l’esprit du public602. La coura conséquemment rejeté son action en concurrence
déloyale en décidant :TPI d’Abidjan, Jugement civil du 10 avril 1989, Société Paco Rabanne Parfums c.
M.A. EL G.
TGI du Wouri (Douala), Jugement n° 192 du 15 décembre 2000, Société Moulin
SA v. Société VAPS.
329

Tous les ingrédients étaient réunis pour le succès del’action en concurrence déloyale introduite par la société
SOGEC-Ivoire.

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Aristide Fade330

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WIPO Publication No. 1074EN-FR/23
ISBN: 978-92-805-3490-0 (print/version imprimée)
ISBN: 978-92-805-3491-7 (online/version en ligne)