AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
NPIRIPS

Nakasone Yasuhiro
Peace Institute

The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs(Secretariat)

Research Institute for
Peace and Security

No. 30326 June 2023

THE BASIC ORIENTATION OF JAPAN’S
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY:
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATIONWITH ENHANCED COMPREHENSIVENATIONAL POWER
Hideshi Tokuchi
・ Japan’s national security efforts are expected
to be dramatically accelerated in accordancewith the new National Security Strategy,
which has a defense capability buildup at itscore.
・ The whole-of-government approach adoptedbytheStrategyshouldbefully
whole-of-government, and comprehensive
national power should be strengthened
accordingly.
・ Alliance cooperation with the US andinternational security cooperation with otherlike-minded countries are intertwined, andJapan should promote both to stabilize therules-based international order.
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should not be
attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies.

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

1. Acceleration of Japan’ national security efforts at a dramatic speed
The Japanese government revised its 2013 National Security Strategy at theend of 2022. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine and great power competition
upsetting the rules-based international order and making the international security
landscape surrounding Japan more challenging over the past nine years, Japan’s
strong determination to enhance its national security as expressed in the new strategy
document is a natural policy development.
Even though the process of reviewing the National Security Strategy started
before the Russian invasion of Ukraine with a deterioration of the security environment
caused by China’s expansionism and North Korea’s nuclear and missile ambitions, theRussian invasion cast a long shadow over a revision of the Strategy.
Since February 2022, the international community has witnessed and realized
how important self-help, resilience and sustainability are to defending a country intoday’s world. The new National Security Strategy, together with the National Defense
Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program, emphasizes Japan’s own efforts tostrengthen the resilience and sustainability of its defense architecture. National security
cannot be achieved by military efforts alone. National power in its entirety must beenhanced. While upholding this notion, national defense efforts are prioritized in the
new National Security Strategy due to the rapidly growing threat perception among theJapanese populace.
The three strategy documents include a number of new concepts and introduce
new approaches such as comprehensive national power, counter-strike capability,active cyber-defense, economic security, and defense production and technologicalbases as integral aspects of defense capability. In comparison with the National
Security Strategy of 2013, which was more a codification of tacit understandings than adevelopment of the pre-existing policy, the new National Security Strategy adopted awider

whole-of-government

approach,reflecting

thecomplex

natureof

thecontemporary threats. However, the basic concept of defense force buildup, i.e., theMulti-Domain Defense Force, remains the same. The policy orientation of the new
National Security Strategy is not revolutionary but evolutionary. Efforts to achieve thisgoal will be further accelerated with a dramatic increase in the defense budget.
As Japan’s own capability and will to defend itself are the core elements of its
national security, its self-help efforts must not stop, given the acute international security
environment facing Japan.

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

One looming question is whether the current willingness to prioritize national
security will continue as it requires huge investments over a long time to enhancelogistics capability in order to catch up with the frontal equipment and at the same time
prepare for the future, but budget austerity and human resource shortages must be
overcome to accomplish this. While Japan will not be able to achieve its own national
security without robust alliances and international partnerships, investment in self-help
is the very basis of such partnerships. If Japan does not help itself, no one else will
extend a helping hand.
2. Enhancement of Japan’s comprehensive national power
National security is in essence a whole-of-government effort. From thisperspective, the policy articulated in the new National Security Strategy to harness
Japan’s comprehensive national power is the right direction.
As Japan’s whole-of-government approach has commonalities with the US’s
strategic concept of Integrated Deterrence, it should be regarded as one of the driving
principles for the modernization of the Japan-US alliance; synergies between thenational security strategies of both countries should be generated accordingly.
The Japanese strategy defines five capabilities – diplomatic, defense,economic, technological, and intelligence – as the main elements of comprehensive
national power. The whole-of-government approach adopted in the new strategy isbroader than that in the previous strategy of 2013. An emphasis on economic
capabilities is just one example. Each of the five aforementioned major elements shouldbe strengthened, but the current approach has to be expanded even more as it is not
fully whole-of-government.
For example, development of the human resources necessary for theSelf-Defense Forces (hereafter Defense Forces) seems less prioritized than in theprevious defense policy even though this issue cannot be addressed without concerted
efforts by the Defense Forces with schools, industry, the business community, local
authorities and other enforcement agencies such as the Japan Coast Guard and theNational Police Agency. Additionally, intellectual and cultural capabilities must beenhanced by promoting public education because these capabilities are indispensablefor promoting international partnership. However, the National Security Strategy’s focus
on the intellectual side is mainly limited to technology fields such as cybersecurity. The
intellectual base of national security should fully incorporate social science expertisewith strong support from the government and think-tanks.

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

3. International security cooperation
The National Security Strategy has three pillars: first and foremost, Japan’sown efforts; second, the Japan-US alliance; and third, international security cooperation
with other like-minded countries. While the first pillar remains the core, the second andthird pillars have been growing thicker. The third pillar in particular is becoming more
important and extensive.
Until recently, the Japanese government dealt with the second and third pillars
separately because the alliance with the US involves a formal agreement on joint
military operations for the defense of Japan while international security cooperation
does not, but these two types of partnership are becoming increasingly intertwined.
In terms of the second pillar, efforts to modernize the Japan-US alliancecontinue. In the Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) on
January 11, 2023, for instance, the two countries committed to exploring a more
effective alliance command-and-control relationship to enhance interoperability andresponsiveness, capitalizing on the decision of the Japanese government to establish apermanent joint headquarters for its Defense Forces. With regard to this endeavor toenhance alliance coordination, both countries “share the need to improve effective
coordination with partner countries for more robust policy and operational cooperation”
in accordance with the Joint Statement.
In terms of the third pillar, the Japanese Defense Forces have been conducting
joint military exercises with the armed forces of a larger number of like-minded countries,
including Australia, India, South Korea, the UK, France, Germany, and Canada, and has
also conducted asset protection operations vis-à-vis Australian naval vessels. Militaryinteroperability with these countries will be accordingly promoted.
In addition, the new Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) between
Japan and Australia issued on October 22, 2022, states, “We will consult each other oncontingencies that may affect our sovereignty and regional security interests, andconsider measures in response.” More recently, on May 23, 2023, Japan and the UKcommitted in the Hiroshima Accord “to consult each other on important regional andglobal security issues and consider measures in response.” It is highly probable that asimilar expression will appear in diplomatic statements between Japan and otherlike-minded countries. Though consultation on contingencies and security issues does
not necessarily mean contingency planning – and consideration of measures inresponse does not necessarily include military action – the probability of operational

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

cooperation to address common dangers similar to an alliance relationship will increase
with further consultation and consideration. The Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA)
between Japan and Australia as well as that between Japan and the UK, both of whichwere approved by the Japanese National Diet in April 2023, will help enhance bilateral
operational cooperation.
As for the security relationship with Europe, if the substantial upgrade of theJapan-NATO Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) is done
capitalizing on the Prime Minister Kishida’s attendance at the NATO Summit Meeting inMadrid in June 2022, this will strengthen the partnership between Japan and NATO. As
the security of Europe is deeply connected with that of Asia, particularly in the aftermathof the Russian invasion of Ukraine and China’s expansionism, an enhanced
Japan-NATO partnership will make all the difference for international security.
All these efforts will lead to the integration of Japan-US alliance cooperationand international security cooperation with other like-minded countries and make thefundamentals of Japan’s national security more robust.
Today, the Japanese vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is becoming
the guiding principle for these efforts. The National Security Strategy states, “As anation in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will further promote efforts to realize a FOIP bydeepening cooperation with like-minded countries through the Japan-US Alliance as acornerstone and through efforts such as the Japan-US-Australia-India (Quad)partnership. To this end, Japan will strive to make the vision of a FOIP more universal
around the world….”
Japan’s FOIP vision has evolved and is better articulated in Prime Minister
Fumio Kishida’s March 20, 2023 policy speech in India on “Japan’s new plan for a ‘Freeand Open Indo-Pacific’”, which put more emphasis on the basic principles of therules-based international order such as the rule of law; on equal partnerships; onmulti-layered connectivity; and on maritime and airspace safety and security.
Japan should continue aligning the FOIP vision with the Indo-Pacific strategiesof the US and other like-minded countries and act together to stabilize the rules-based
international order, as Japan cannot enjoy national security without overall stability inthe international order.
Steady implementation of the National Security Strategy to strengthen
comprehensive national power with a priority on military capabilities is an urgent task for

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

Japan so that the Japanese people can devote themselves much more to cooperative
efforts for international stability.

Hideshi Tokuchi is President of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS).

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