2022
GLOBAL HUNGER INDEXFOOD SYSTEMS TRANSFORMATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

2022
GLOBAL HUNGER INDEXFOOD SYSTEMS TRANSFORMATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Klaus von Grebmer, Jill Bernstein, Miriam Wiemers, Laura Reiner, Marilena Bachmeier, Asja Hanano, Olive Towey,
Réiseal Ní Chéilleachair, Connell Foley, Seth Gitter, Grace Larocque, and Heidi Fritschel

Guest Author
Danielle Resnick, Brookings Institution and International Food Policy Research InstituteBonn / Dublin
October 2022

A Peer-Reviewed Publication

Madachir Kadir displays an onion harvested from the kitchen garden
near his community of Tahoua, Niger. People’s local setting—whether
village, district, or municipality—remains the main level at whichfood system governance and food policies affect them most directly.

FOREWORDT

his year’s Global Hunger Index (GHI) brings us face to face withThis year’s GHI report considers one important avenue for fooda grim reality. The toxic cocktail of conflict, climate change, andsystems transformation: community action that engages local lead-

the COVID-19 pandemic had already left millions exposed toers and citizens in improving governance and accountability. The

food price shocks and vulnerable to further crises. Now the war in

essay by Danielle Resnick provides promising examples from a vari-

Ukraine—with its knock-on effects on global supplies of and prices

ety of settings where citizens are finding innovative ways to amplify

for food, fertilizer, and fuel—is turning a crisis into a catastrophe.

their voices in food system debates—including by tracking govern-

The 2022 global GHI score shows that progress in tackling hun-ment performance and by engaging in multistakeholder platforms—

ger has largely halted. Other indicators reveal the tragic scale of theand keeping decision makers accountable for addressing food andunfolding crisis. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World

nutrition insecurity and hunger. Encouragingly, examples of empow-

2022 reported that in 2021 the number of undernourished people—

erment are just as visible in fragile contexts with high levels of soci-an indicator of chronic hunger—rose to as many as 828 million.

etal fractionalization as they are in more stable settings with longer

Further, according to the Global Report on Food Crises 2022, thetraditions of local democracy.

number of people facing acute hunger also rose from 2020, reach-

It is critical to act now to rebuild food security on a new anding nearly 193 million in 2021. These impacts are now playing out

lasting basis. Failure to do so means sleepwalking into the cata-across Africa South of the Sahara, South Asia, Central and Southstrophic and systematic food crises of the future. Much more canAmerica, and beyond.

be done to ward off the worst impacts of the current crisis and set

As we face the third global food price crisis in 15 years, it isdeep changes in motion rather than reinforcing the dangerous andclearer than ever that our food systems in their current form areunsustainable arrangements we now live with. We must ensure rights-

inadequate to the task of sustainably ending poverty and hunger.

based food systems governance at all levels, building on the initial

The global food crisis underway now is widely presented as an after-

steps taken at the 2021 United Nations Food Systems Summit.

shock caused by the war in Ukraine. The severity and speed of theGovernments and development partners must harness local voices,

impacts on hunger have occurred largely, however, because millions

match local governance efforts to conditions and capacities on theof people were already living on the precarious edge of hunger—aground, and support local leadership through capacity building andlegacy of past failures to build more just, sustainable, and resilient

funding. Governments need to enable citizens to participate fully infood systems.
While it is urgent that the international community respond todeveloping and monitoring public policies that affect food security
while upholding a legal right to food.

these escalating humanitarian crises, it must not lose sight of thePrevention pays off. Investments made today can avert futureneed for a long-term transformation of food systems. The shocks

crises that may be even more costly and tragic than what we now

we have experienced reveal chronic vulnerabilities that will con-face. It has been said that the saddest words are “If only.” We may

tinue to put millions at risk of hunger. Past and current GHI reports

find ourselves saying, “If only past generations had used their time

highlight these persistent vulnerabilities and show what actions canand resources to do what was needed to end hunger and ensure theaddress immediate humanitarian needs and kick-start food systemright to food for all.” May the next generation not say the same of us.

transformation. Rather than operating reactively, the international
community must take proactive steps to actually make good on its
international commitments and pledges, scaling them up and directing them toward emergency measures. Political attention and funding
must be targeted toward evidence-based policies and investmentsthat address structural obstacles to food and nutrition security. More

Mathias Mogge

Dominic MacSorleyhigh-quality and timely data are also needed so that we can monitor

Secretary General

Chief Executive Officer

progress in these areas.

Welthungerhilfe

Concern Worldwide

2022 Global Hunger Index | Foreword3

CONTENTS

Chapter 01

CHAPTER 02

CHAPTER 03

APPENDIXESSUMMARY 

5

CHAPTERS
01

Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger 

602

Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance 

22

03

Policy Recommendations 

32

APPENDIXESA

Methodology 

35

BData Underlying the Calculation of the 2000, 2007, 2014, and 2022 Global Hunger Index Scores 

39

C

2000, 2007, 2014, and 2022 Global Hunger Index Scores, and Changes since 2014 

42

DCountries’ 2022 GHI Scores by Region 

43

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

47

RESOURCES FOR UNDERSTANDING HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION 

52

PARTNERS 

54

4

Contents | 2022 Global Hunger Index

SUMMARY

As the 2022 Global Hunger Index (GHI) shows, the global hunger
situation is undeniably grim. The overlapping crises facing the world

Conflict, Climate Extremes, and COVID-19 Effects
Are Worsening Hunger in Many Countries

are exposing the weaknesses of food systems, from global to local, andhighlighting the vulnerability of populations around the world to hunger.

Hunger is at alarming levels in 5 countries—Central African Republic,
Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, and Yemen—
and is provisionally considered alarming in 4 additional countries—

Global Progress against Hunger Is
at a Near Standstill

Burundi, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria. In a further 35 countries,

Global progress against hunger has largely stagnated in recent years.

sional designations. In a number of countries, hunger is worsening:hunger is considered serious, based on 2022 GHI scores and provi-

The 2022 GHI score for the world is considered moderate, but at 18.2,

since 2014, hunger has increased in 20 countries with moderate,

it shows only a slight decline from the 2014 score of 19.1. Indeed,

serious, or alarming GHI scores across multiple regions. Even within

one indicator used in the GHI, the prevalence of undernourishment,

well-performing regions and countries, hotspots of food and nutritionshows that the share of people who lack regular access to sufficient

insecurity persist. There are, however, also signs of progress: sincecalories is increasing. As many as 828 million people were under-

2000, 32 countries have seen their GHI scores decline by 50 percent

nourished in 2021, representing a reversal of more than a decadeor more, including at least one country from nearly every world region.

of progress against hunger. Without a major shift, neither the world
as a whole nor approximately 46 countries are projected to achieveeven low hunger as measured by the GHI by 2030.

Local Action Can Help Strengthen Food Systems
Confronted with weaknesses in the global food system, citizens in

A Barrage of Crises Is Undermining
the Fight against Hunger
The situation is likely to worsen in the face of the current barragesome areas are finding innovative ways to improve food system governance at the local level, holding decision makers accountable foraddressing food and nutrition insecurity and hunger. Citizens areusing a range of tools, including systems for tracking governmentof overlapping global crises—conflict, climate change, and the eco-budgets and expenditures, community scorecards for assessing thenomic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic—all of which are powerfulperformance of local governments, and inclusive multistakeholder

drivers of hunger. The war in Ukraine has further increased global

platforms that engage a range of local actors. Encouragingly, exam-

food, fuel, and fertilizer prices and has the potential to significantly

ples of empowerment are just as visible in fragile contexts with highworsen hunger in 2023 and beyond. These crises come on top oflevels of societal fractionalization as they are in more stable settings

underlying factors such as poverty, inequality, inadequate governance,with longer traditions of local democracy.

poor infrastructure, and low agricultural productivity that contribute to chronic hunger and vulnerability. Globally and in many countries and regions, current food systems are inadequate to the task ofaddressing these challenges and ending hunger.

Transforming Food Systems at All Levels Is Crucial
In the face of spiraling crises, it is crucial to scale up resources to
respond to current emergencies while also transforming food systems

High Hunger Persists in Too Many Regions
Hunger is serious in both South Asia (where hunger is highest) andso they are more equitable, inclusive, sustainable, and resilient—and thus are able to help avert future crises. Governments and otheractors at all levels must put inclusive governance and accountability

Africa South of the Sahara (where hunger is second highest). Southat the center of efforts to transform food systems, while respecting,

Asia has the world’s highest child stunting and child wasting rates. In

protecting, and fulfilling the right to food. Stakeholders at all gover-Africa South of the Sahara, the prevalence of undernourishment and thenance levels should harness local voices and capacities and promote

rate of child mortality are higher than in any other world region. Parts ofstrong local leadership, and governments and development partners

East Africa are experiencing one of the most severe droughts of the pastneed to raise citizens’ awareness of their entitlements. Finally, efforts

40 years, threatening the survival of millions. In West Asia and Northto strengthen governance must be tailored to conditions and capac-

Africa, where hunger is moderate, there are worrying signs of a reversal inities on the ground.

progress against hunger. Hunger is considered low in Latin America andthe Caribbean, East and Southeast Asia, and Europe and Central Asia.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Summary5

01

In the village of Subo, Kenya, Mumina Mohamed has learned
how to use climate-smart farming techniques to increase her
yields of maize, mung beans, and cowpeas. With the increased
harvest, she is able to provide her children with three meals
a day and cover their school fees.

GLOBAL, REGIONAL, AND
NATIONAL TRENDS IN HUNGERKey Messages

The World: Progress Is at a Near Standstill> Global progress against hunger has largely stagnated in recent

The 2022 Global Hunger Index shows that after decades of global

years, according to the 2022 GHI. In many countries acrosshunger reduction, progress has nearly come to a halt. The 2022 GHI

regions the situation has worsened. Indeed, one indicator usedscore for the world is 18.2, considered moderate, down slightly fromin the GHI, the prevalence of undernourishment, shows that thethe 2014 score of 19.1. This is a considerable slowdown comparedshare of people who lack regular access to sufficient calories iswith previous periods: the 2000 world GHI score of 28.0 fell toincreasing, with as many as 828 million people undernourished24.3 for the 2007 GHI score (Figure 1.1). The prevalence of under-in 2021.

nourishment—one of the four indicators used in the calculation of
GHI scores—declined between 2000 and 2017, at which point it> The situation is likely to worsen in the face of the current bar-increased, at first gradually and then sharply.1 As many as 828 million

rage of overlapping global crises—conflict, climate change, andpeople were undernourished in 2021, representing a reversal of more

the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic—all of whichthan a decade of progress in tackling hunger (FAO, IFAD et al. 2022).

are powerful drivers of hunger. The war in Ukraine has further

The other indicators used in the GHI show mixed results. Rates ofincreased global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices and has thechild wasting (low weight-for-height) have stagnated in recent years

potential to contribute to food shortages in 2023 and beyond.

worldwide,2 while rates of child mortality and child stunting (lowheight-for-age) have continued to decline (FAO, IFAD et al. 2022;> These crises come on top of underlying factors such as poverty,

UN IGME 2021). Compared with other indicators, however, childinequality, inadequate governance, poor infrastructure, and low
agricultural productivity that contribute to chronic hunger and

1

The global prevalence of undernourishment was 13.0 percent in 2000 and 7.6 percent in2017. There were small increases in the prevalence of undernourishment in two instances
between 2000 and 2017, but neither exceeded 0.3 percentage points. Between 2017 and2021 the global prevalence of undernourishment increased from 7.6 to 9.8 percent.

2

These are the authors’ calculations based on data sources for child wasting listed in Appendix
A. A comparison of child wasting values for 2012–2016 and 2017–2021 shows virtually
no change.

vulnerability. Globally and in many countries and regions, current food systems are inadequate to the task of addressing thesechallenges and ending hunger.
> Africa South of the Sahara and South Asia are the regions withand crises. Like other world regions, progress against hunger in

FIGURE 1.1 WORLD GHI SCORES AND PREVALENCE OF
UNDERNOURISHMENT IN RECENT DECADES

these regions has stagnated, which is particularly troubling given

30

their desperate need for improvement.

28.0
GHI scores
Undernourishment (%)

24.3

25
> Without a major shift, neither the world as a whole nor approxi-

mately 46 countries are projected to achieve even low hunger as

19.1

20

measured by the GHI by 2030. There are 44 countries that cur-year for GHI scores in this report. These countries are in diverseworld regions, not just those with the highest hunger overall.
> Levels of hunger and undernutrition vary widely within countries.

Hotspots of food and nutrition insecurity persist even within
well-performing regions and countries, where increased and targeted efforts are needed. A closer look at within-country data
and at the performance of existing efforts to combat hunger canhelp guide programs and policies so that they benefit the specific populations most in need.

10
5
0
2014

scores than 2014 GHI scores, the most recent historical reference

15

2007

with moderate, serious, or alarming hunger have higher 2022 GHI

2000

rently have serious or alarming hunger levels. Twenty countries

18.2

2022

the highest hunger levels and are most vulnerable to future shocks

Note: GHI scores for the year 2000 include data from 1998–2002; 2007 GHI scores include
data from 2005–2009; 2014 GHI scores include data from 2012–2016; and 2022 GHI
scores include data from 2017–2021. Data on undernourishment are from FAO (2022a).
The undernourishment values are for 2000–2021 for the world as a whole, including countries
both included in and excluded from the GHI. For a complete list of data sources for the calculation of GHI scores, see Appendix A. Colors correspond to the GHI Severity of Hunger Scale.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 01 | Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger7

BOX 1.1 ABOUT THE GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORESThe Global Hunger Index (GHI) is a tool for comprehensively measuring and tracking hunger at global, regional, and national levels.
GHI scores are based on the values of four component indicators:3
Undernourishment: the share of the population withChild wasting: the share of children under age fiveinsufficient caloric intake.

who have low weight for their height, reflecting
acute undernutrition.

Child stunting: the share of children under age fiveChild mortality: the share of children who die before

who have low height for their age, reflecting chronic

their fifth birthday, partly reflecting the fatal mix ofundernutrition.

inadequate nutrition and unhealthy environments.

These four indicators are aggregated as follows:

GHI Severity of
Hunger Scale
Extremely
alarming
GHI ≥ 50.0
Alarming
GHI 35.0–49.9

1/3+
Undernourishment

1/6Child stunting+

1/6
Child wasting+

1/3
Child mortality

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),
World Health Organization (WHO), World Bank,
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) Program

GHI
SCORE

Serious
GHI 20.0–34.9
Moderate
GHI 10.0–19.9

Latest published data available from internationally recognized sources:

UN Food andAgriculture
Organization (FAO)=

UN Inter-Agency
Group for Child­Mortality Estimation(UN IGME)

Low
GHI ≤ 9.9100-point scale

Based on the values of the four indicators, a GHI score is calculated on a 100-point scale reflecting the severity of hunger, where 0 is thebest possible score (no hunger) and 100 is the worst.4 Each country’s GHI score is classified by severity, from low to extremely alarming.
	Each of the indicators is standardized; see Appendix A for details.

3
4

	GHI scores are comparable only within each year’s report, not between different years’ reports. To allow for tracking of a country’s or region’s GHI performance over time, thisreport provides GHI scores for 2000, 2007, and 2014, which can be compared with 2022 GHI scores. For a detailed explanation of the concept of the GHI, the date ranges andcalculation of the scores, and the interpretation of results, see Appendix A.

stunting rates change slowly over time, and it may take several years

forestry, fisheries, and aquaculture, increasingly impeding efforts tofor these rates to reflect the increasingly challenging global context.

meet human needs. As climate-related extremes push down the productivity of agriculture and fisheries, the result is rising food insecurity,

The world is facing a series of overlapping chronic and acute crises

water scarcity, and malnutrition. According to current projections, cli-that are exposing vulnerabilities in the global food system and under-

mate change is a key factor that will prevent the world from achieving

mining progress in ending hunger (Figure 1.2). Based on current GHI

the second Sustainable Development Goal of “Zero Hunger” by 2030

projections, the world as a whole, and at least 46 countries, will fail to(IPCC 2022). As described in the 2019 Global Hunger Index report onachieve even low hunger by 2030. The three key drivers of hunger—cli-

hunger and climate change, “Human actions have created a world inmate change, violent conflict, and economic downturns including thosewhich it is becoming ever more difficult to adequately and sustainably

caused by the COVID-19 pandemic—are each worsening. The war in

feed and nourish the human population” (von Grebmer et al. 2019, 27).

Ukraine adds an additional layer of complexity, disrupting food, fertilizer,
and energy markets around the world. The countries and populations

Violent conflict, another driver of hunger, is also on the rise, as

already vulnerable due to entrenched poverty, inequality, and weak insti-

described in the 2021 Global Hunger Index report (von Grebmer

tutions and governance are bearing the greatest burden of these crises.

et al. 2021). According to the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises,
conflict/insecurity was the main driver of acute food insecurity in

Human-induced climate change is causing more frequent and2021.5 Of 193 million people facing crisis or worse levels of acuteintense extreme weather events, leading to widespread adverse impacts

food insecurity in 2021, conflict/insecurity was the primary driverfor nature and people. Climate change is putting stress on agriculture,58

See “Resources for Understanding Hunger and Malnutrition” on page 52.

Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger | Chapter 01 | 2022 Global Hunger Index

FIGURE 1.2 THE RISING RISK FROM DRIVERS OF HUNGERWorldwide, the number of undernourished people is climbing …

800

The number of undernourished people
turned sharply upward in 2020.

UNDERNOURISHED PEOPLE(Millions)

700

828.0

767.9

721.7
701.9

600

618.4

500
400

Projected
value for 2021.
Shaded areas
show lower
and upper
bounds of theesimated range.

… driven by harmful trends in food prices, poverty, conflict, and climate.
150

159.7

FOOD PRICES(FAO Food Price Index)
Food prices reached
new highs in 2022.

100

50

PEOPLE LIVING IN EXTREME
POVERTY (Millions)

1,100

In 2020, owing largely to the COVID-19
pandemic, extreme poverty increased
for the first time this century.

1,000
900
800

714

700
641

600
500

175

175

NUMBER OF CONFLICTS

150
125
100

The number of state-based, non-state,
and one-sided conflicts more thandoubled between 2010 and 2021.

83

75
50

1.2
1.0

GLOBAL TEMPERATURE ANOMALIESCOMPARED WITH THE 20TH CENTURY
(°C)

0.99

0.98

0.8
0.6
Annual global temperatures arerising, leading to weather extremes
and climate disasters.

0.4
0.2

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

0

Data sources: FAO (2022a,c); World Bank (2022b); Mahler et al. (2022); UCDP (2022); NOAA (2022).

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 01 | Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger9

for 139 million people—nearly three-quarters of the total (FSIN andwhich spend a higher share of their income on food than wealthier

GNAFC 2022). Conflict is also a major driver of chronic hunger ashouseholds (Gill and Nagle 2022). Furthermore, rising food prices havemeasured by the prevalence of undernourishment, one of the four

the potential to spark further unrest and conflict (Brück and d’Errico

indicators used in the GHI. The number of conflicts that occurred2019), perpetuating the cycle of conflict and hunger.

per year increased between 2010–2014 and 2015–2019, and conflicts are becoming increasingly complex and prolonged (FAO, IFAD
et al. 2021). The 2022 war in Ukraine, with its global implications
for food prices and supplies, further escalates the nexus of conflict

The Regions: High Hunger Persists in Too Many
Regions

and hunger. Box 1.2 describes the multiple ways in which the con-

Progress in tackling hunger is stagnating in South Asia and Africa

flict in Ukraine is affecting global food prices and access and raisingSouth of the Sahara, the world regions with the highest hunger levels

concerns about even more extreme impacts in the future.

as measured by the GHI, at 27.4 and 27.0, respectively (Figure 1.3).
The hunger levels in both regions are considered serious. As in the

The COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the economic plight ofother world regions, progress in reducing hunger has largely stagnatedlow- and middle-income countries, slowing economic growth, driv-

in South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara relative to 2014 (theing up prices for goods and services, and increasing projected global

most recent reference year in this year’s report), when their scores

poverty rates. Since the COVID-19 pandemic hit in 2020, rising fuelwere 28.0 and 28.1. South Asia and Africa South of the Sahara areprices, the disruption of global supply chains, and, in some cases,

dangerously off track in terms of the progress needed to achieve theaggressive stimulus programs have contributed to a surge in global

second Sustainable Development Goal of “Zero Hunger” by 2030.

inflation. Countries across the world, low- and high-income alike, areexperiencing this rise in inflation, which is the most extreme spike

South Asia, the region with the world’s highest hunger level, hasexperienced globally for more than 20 years (Reinhart and von Luckner

the highest child stunting rate and by far the highest child wasting rate2022). At the same time, the effects of the pandemic are projectedof any world region.6 India’s child wasting rate, at 19.3 percent, is theto last longer in poorer countries than in higher-income economies.

highest of any country in the world and drives up the region’s average

Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to return more

owing to India’s large population. Patterns of wasting among young

slowly to pre-pandemic expectations for poorer countries, even before

children of different ages shed light on child wasting in South Asia. The

taking into account the war in Ukraine (IMF 2022). Extreme poverty,

child wasting rate in South Asia is highest at birth and then consistently

too, is projected to have increased in 2020 for the first time this cen-declines to the age of three, at which point it becomes fairly steady. Intury, and 75 million to 95 million more people are estimated to live

Africa South of the Sahara, however, wasting increases between birthin extreme poverty in 2022 compared with pre-pandemic predictions

and approximately age one, at which point it begins to decline. These(Mahler et al. 2022). Nearly two-thirds of survey respondents frompatterns suggest that the factors driving South Asia’s high child wast-

18 low- and middle-income countries reported that their householding rate are mothers’ insufficient weight gain during pregnancy and low

food quantity had diminished, and just over half reported that theirbirth weight among infants (Headey and Ruel 2022). In Africa Southhousehold food quality had declined since the start of the pandemicof the Sahara, by contrast, the increase in child wasting up to age one(Alliance2015 2022)—again, before the war in Ukraine began.

may reflect challenges relating to the transition from exclusive breastfeeding to complementary foods and the increased risk of disease

The economic pressures and disruptions that have emerged sincedue to the consumption of contaminated foods, drinking water from2020 have resulted in extraordinary increases in food prices world-

unimproved sources, or poor environmental sanitation (Akombi et al.

wide, with the war in Ukraine pushing prices even higher and causing2017). Meanwhile, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan each have childgrave concern for the future (see Box 1.2). According to the Food Pricestunting rates between 35 and 38 percent, with Afghanistan’s rate

Index of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), inbeing the highest in the region. In 2022, Afghanistan is experiencing

February 2022, global food prices reached the highest levels measured

drought, political and economic instability, extreme poverty, and thesince the inception of the Food Price Index in 1990. Then, with theconsequences of the global rise in food and fuel prices made worse by

onset of the war in Ukraine in late February 2022, the Food Price Index

the war in Ukraine, which together may result in higher stunting rates

set another record, jumping 13 percent from February to March 2022,

6

resulting in a level 34 percent higher than that of March 2021 (FAO
2022b). High food prices disproportionately burden poor households,

10

These comparisons are based on regional indicator values calculated by the authors. FAO, IFAD
et al. (2022) indicate that Africa South of the Sahara has a higher child stunting rate than South
Asia. The primary difference is that the authors use child stunting and wasting survey data and
GHI estimates, whereas FAO, IFAD et al. use modeled child stunting and wasting data.

Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger | Chapter 01 | 2022 Global Hunger Index

in years to come. As of May 2022, UNICEF estimates that 1.1 million

predicted to continue in the late 2022 season. This extended drought

Afghan children will need treatment for acute malnutrition in 2022

has been devastating to herds, crops, water availability, and householdalone (UNICEF 2022b).

incomes in the region, pushing the number of people facing acute foodinsecurity in these three countries to 18.4 million as of June 2022 (UNAfrica South of the Sahara is the world region with the second-­

OCHA 2022). The effects of the drought are compounded by conflict inhighest GHI score, slightly below that of South Asia.7 The prevalence ofthe region, the ongoing fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, price spikes

undernourishment and rate of child mortality are higher in Africa South

made even more severe by the war in Ukraine, and an infestation ofof the Sahara than in any other world region. Conflict is a key contrib-

desert locusts devastating local crops (Joint Research Centre 2022).

utor to food insecurity for many of the region’s countries, including
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic

There are troubling trends in West Asia and North Africa, the world

Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia,

region with the next-highest hunger level after South Asia and Africa

South Sudan, and Uganda (FAO, ECA, and AUC 2021; FAO, IFAD et

South of the Sahara, according to its GHI score. With a 2022 scoreal. 2021; FSIN and GNAFC 2022). The region is also exceptionallyof 11.4, West Asia and North Africa has a level of hunger consideredvulnerable to climate variability and change given its high poverty rate

moderate. Yemen, the country with the highest GHI score in this year’s

and reliance on natural resource-dependent activities such as farm-

report, lies in the region. Worryingly, the prevalence of undernour-ing, fishing, and livestock herding. Heavy rains triggering flooding,ishment in West Asia and North Africa has seen an upward trend inincreased drought frequency, and desertification all have the poten-

recent years, rising from 6.1 percent in 2010 to 8.6 percent in 2021,

tial to further decrease food production and increase food insecurity

its highest rate since 2001. Jordan’s prevalence of undernourishment

in this region in the future (WMO 2021).

increased from 6.0 percent in 2013–15 to 16.9 percent in 2019–8

2021, and undernourishment rates have also increased in Lebanon,
In East Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia are experiencing oneof the most severe droughts of the past 40 years, threatening the sur-Oman, and Yemen in this period (FAO 2022a). The 2022 GHI scoresfor each of these countries are higher than their 2014 GHI scores.

vival of millions. Climate change and the atmospheric phenomenon La
Niña have contributed to severe rainfall shortages over the past four

Latin America and the Caribbean is the one world region with anconsecutive rainy seasons since late 2020, and drought conditions are

increase between its 2014 and 2022 GHI scores. Though its hunger

The countries included in each of the regions referred to here and throughout the report are
shown in Appendix D.
8 This includes food insecurity due to conflicts occurring within the countries themselves andfood insecurity experienced by refugees who have fled violence in neighboring countries.
7

level is still considered low, the increase in GHI scores from 8.0 to
8.8 is a troubling trend. Underpinning this increase is the rise in theregion’s prevalence of undernourishment, from 5.3 percent in 2014

FIGURE 1.3 REGIONAL 2000, 2007, 2014, AND 2022 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES
42.4

Low
Moderate
Serious
Alarming

0

7.0

6.3

13.6
9.3

8.2

10.3

14.2

13.3

18.4
8.8

8.0

10

10.6

11.4

12.4

16.0

20

14.2

27.0

28.1

35.0

35.0
28.0

30

27.4

GHI score

40

38.1

50

‘00 ‘07 ‘14 ‘22‘00 ‘07 ‘14 ‘22‘00 ‘07 ‘14 ‘22‘00 ‘07 ‘14 ‘22‘00 ‘07 ‘14 ‘22‘00 ‘07 ‘14 ‘22

South Asia

Africa Southof the SaharaWest Asia &North Africa

Latin America &Caribbean

East &Southeast Asia

Europe &Central Asia

Source: Authors.
Note: See Appendix A for data sources. The regional and global GHI scores are calculated using regional and global aggregates for each indicator and the formula described in Appendix A. The
regional and global aggregates for each indicator are calculated as population-weighted averages, using the indicator values reported in Appendix B. For countries lacking undernourishment
data, provisional estimates provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) were used to calculate aggregates only, but are not reported in Appendix B. Appendix Dshows which countries are included in each region.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 01 | Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger11

to 8.6 percent in 2021 (FAO 2022a). The dramatically worsening

Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, and Yemen—and an additionalsituation in Venezuela is a major contributor to this upward swing.

4 countries provisionally designated as alarming—Burundi, Somalia,

The country’s 2014 GHI score was 8.1, considered low, whereas its

South Sudan, and Syria—despite there being insufficient data for2022 GHI score of 19.9 is considered moderate verging on serious.

the calculation of GHI scores.

Other countries in the region have seen a stagnation or worsening of
their GHI scores since 2014, including Ecuador, Haiti, and Suriname.

Once data for 2022 become available, and if data were available
for all countries, it is highly possible that one or more countries would

At 8.2, East and Southeast Asia’s 2022 GHI score is low and has

move into the extremely alarming category. Parts of Somalia in par-decreased relative to its 2014 score, 10.3, which was in the moder-ticular are facing a serious risk of famine in 2022 owing to an excep-

ate category. While its prevalence of undernourishment, child wastingtionally severe and prolonged drought, sharp increases in staple foodrate, and child mortality rate are each considered low or very low, theprices due to the war in Ukraine, and rising conflict and insecurity.

region’s child stunting rate of 13.4 percent (FAO, IFAD et al. 2022)

There are reports of an alarming increase in acute malnutrition in chil-is considered to be at a medium level. Several countries in Southeast

dren and child deaths related to hunger in southern Somalia (FEWS

Asia in particular have child stunting rates that are very high, including

NET 2022b). Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the crisis has been

Indonesia (30.8 percent), Lao PDR (33.1 percent), and Timor-Lesteinsufficient to date. As of May 2022, 1.5 million children under the(46.7 percent). Also, several countries in the region have medium

age of five—45 percent of the country’s children—were projected toor high wasting rates, including Cambodia (9.5 percent), Indonesia

face acute malnutrition through the end of the year, including 386,400(10.2 percent), and Malaysia (9.7 percent). These values underscore

who were expected to be severely malnourished. As of June 2022, atthe need to maintain and increase efforts to address child undernu-

least 2.1 million Somalis were expected to face a food emergency (IPC

trition in the region despite its low overall hunger level.

Phase 4), and an additional 213,000 appeared likely to experiencefamine (IPC Phase 5) between June and September 2022 (IPC 2022).

Europe and Central Asia has the lowest 2022 GHI score of any
region in the report, considered low at 6.3. The region’s 2000 GHI

Yemen, with a 2022 GHI score of 45.1, considered alarming, hasscore was 13.6, considered moderate. Each of the countries in thethe highest score of any country in this year’s report (Table 1.1 andregion has a low 2022 GHI score, with the exception of Tajikistan,

Figure 1.4). Like so many countries in this report, Yemen is suffer-

which has a score of 13.9, considered moderate. As recently as

ing from conflict within its own borders as well as from the effects of2000, the region had one country with alarming hunger (Tajikistan),conflict elsewhere. Since 2014, when Yemen became embroiled in afour countries with serious hunger levels (Albania, Azerbaijan,

civil war (Robinson 2022), poverty has increased dramatically and the

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and seven countries in the moder-country’s economy has been crippled (World Bank 2022a). Yemen is

ate category. Many countries in the region experienced a period ofhighly dependent on food imports, including wheat from Russia andlow agricultural production and relatively high food insecurity during

Ukraine. Even before the February 2022 onset of the war in Ukraine,

the transition from socialist planned economies to market economies

food prices in Yemen were rising owing to depreciation of the country’s

between 1990 and 2000. Since this transition, most countries havecurrency and rising fuel costs. When the conflict in Ukraine began, foodregained their production levels for most commodities and exceeded

prices rose even higher, compounding food insecurity in Yemen andthem in some cases (Burkitbayeva, Liefert, and Swinnen 2021). The

pushing prices of basic goods further out of reach (FEWS NET 2022a).

high volumes of grain and other agricultural commodities producedin Ukraine and the Russian Federation highlight the significant riskthat the war in Ukraine poses for global food security and trade.

Central African Republic has the second-highest 2022 GHI scorein this year’s report, at 44.0, considered alarming. A staggering
52.2 percent of the population was undernourished in 2019–2021,

The Countries: Conflict Is Driving Hunger Directly
and Indirectly

the highest rate of any country in this year’s report. Additionally,

According to the 2022 GHI scores and provisional designations,day. According to the most recent edition of the Human Development

9 countries have alarming levels of hunger and 35 have serious

Index (HDI), Central African Republic has the second-worst HDI scorelevels of hunger. There are 5 countries with 2022 GHI scores inof any country with data in the world, after only Niger (UNDP 2020).

the alarming range—Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic

The country has experienced decades of violence and instability, and12

40.0 percent of the country’s children are stunted, 5.3 percent arewasted, and 10.3 percent of children do not live to their fifth birth-

Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger | Chapter 01 | 2022 Global Hunger Index

TABLE 1.1 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES BY 2022 GHI RANK
Rank1 Country

Rank1 Country

2007

2014

2022

2000

2007

2014

2022

<5

<5

<5

<5

62

Mauritius

15.3

14.1

13.0

13.4

Bosnia & Herzegovina

9.3

6.6

<5

<5

64

Nicaragua

22.4

17.9

15.5

13.6

Chile

<5

<5

<5

<5

64

Sri Lanka

21.7

18.9

17.3

13.6

China

13.3

7.8

<5

<5

66

Iraq

23.8

20.8

16.6

13.7

Croatia

<5

<5

<5

<5

67

Ghana

28.5

22.1

15.5

13.9

Estonia

<5

<5

<5

<5

67

Tajikistan

40.3

32.9

20.6

13.9

Hungary

5.5

<5

<5

<5

69

Philippines

25.0

19.5

18.8

14.8

Kuwait

<5

<5

<5

<5

70

Ecuador

19.7

18.6

11.7

15.2

Latvia

5.6

<5

<5

<5

71

Myanmar

39.9

29.4

17.9

15.6

Lithuania

5.4

<5

<5

<5

71

Senegal

34.2

22.8

17.6

15.6

Montenegro

—

5.4

<5

<5

73

Eswatini

24.7

22.9

18.4

16.3

North Macedonia

7.5

7.2

<5

<5

74

Côte d'Ivoire

33.4

35.8

22.7

16.8

Romania

7.9

5.8

5.1

<5

75

Cambodia

41.1

26.1

20.1

17.1

Serbia

—

6.1

5.8

<5

76

Gabon

20.9

20.3

16.5

17.2

Slovakia

7.0

5.9

5.7

<5

77

Indonesia

26.1

29.1

22.2

17.9

Türkiye

10.1

5.8

<5

<5

78

Namibia

25.4

26.8

22.9

18.7

Uruguay

7.4

6.5

<5

<5

79

Guatemala

28.4

24.1

21.7

18.8

18

Costa Rica

7.0

<5

<5

5.3

80

Cameroon

35.8

29.9

21.4

18.9

18

United Arab Emirates

6.2

6.5

5.9

5.3

81

Nepal

37.0

30.0

21.2

19.1

20

Brazil

11.4

7.1

5.0

5.4

82

Lao PDR

44.2

31.4

22.5

19.2

21

Uzbekistan

24.2

15.4

8.3

5.6

83

Solomon Islands

20.1

18.1

22.3

19.4

22

Georgia

12.3

7.8

6.1

5.7

84 Bangladesh

33.9

31.3

26.3

19.6

22

Mongolia

30.0

21.8

9.2

5.7

85

Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

14.6

10.1

8.1

19.9

24

Bulgaria

8.6

7.9

7.4

5.9

86

Botswana

27.7

25.8

20.5

20.0

24

Kazakhstan

11.2

11.6

5.8

5.9

87

Gambia

29.0

26.5

22.2

20.7

26

Tunisia

10.3

7.6

6.7

6.1

87

Malawi

43.3

32.5

24.1

20.7

27

Albania

20.7

15.8

9.2

6.2

87

Mauritania

31.8

28.3

26.3

20.7

28

Russian Federation

10.1

7.1

6.7

6.4

90

Djibouti

44.3

35.8

27.4

21.5

29

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

13.7

8.8

7.4

6.5

91

Benin

33.8

26.9

23.2

21.7

30

Saudi Arabia

11.0

12.2

7.4

6.7

92

Togo

39.3

30.2

26.1

22.8

31

Argentina

6.6

5.5

5.0

6.8

93

Mali

41.7

35.7

26.1

23.2

32

Algeria

14.5

11.4

8.7

6.9

94

Kenya

36.6

31.1

21.6

23.5

32

Armenia

19.3

12.1

7.3

6.9

95

Tanzania (United Republic of)

40.8

30.9

25.5

23.6

32

Moldova

18.7

20.3

6.8

6.9

96

Burkina Faso

44.9

34.5

26.5

24.5

35

Jamaica

8.6

8.1

8.8

7.0

97

Korea (DPR)

39.5

29.6

27.5

24.9

36

Azerbaijan

24.9

15.3

9.3

7.5

98

Angola

64.9

44.7

26.2

25.9

36

Ukraine

13.0

7.2

7.2

7.5

99

Pakistan

36.8

32.1

29.6

26.1

38

Colombia

10.9

11.2

8.6

7.6

100

Papua New Guinea

33.6

29.9

29.0

26.5

38

Peru

20.6

15.0

7.6

7.6

101 Comoros

39.5

31.7

29.1

26.9

40

Kyrgyzstan

18.0

13.6

9.4

7.8

102

Rwanda

49.9

35.9

29.5

27.2

41

Paraguay

11.6

11.4

8.1

8.0

103

Nigeria

40.4

32.1

28.4

27.3

42

Mexico

10.2

8.5

7.0

8.1

104 Ethiopia

53.6

42.6

27.4

27.6

42

Panama

18.6

14.0

9.4

8.1

105

Congo (Republic of)

34.7

33.7

25.3

28.1

44

El Salvador

14.7

12.1

10.4

8.4

106

Sudan

—

—

29.3

28.8

45

Dominican Republic

15.0

13.9

9.8

8.8

107

India

38.8

36.3

28.2

29.1

46

Trinidad & Tobago

11.0

10.7

8.8

9.0

108

Zambia

53.3

46.0

35.2

29.3

47

Fiji

9.5

8.5

9.3

9.2

109

Afghanistan

50.3

38.7

30.6

29.9

47

Morocco

15.8

12.4

9.6

9.2

110

Timor-Leste

—

45.5

33.3

30.6

49

Turkmenistan

20.4

14.6

10.6

9.5

111

Guinea-Bissau

37.7

31.0

30.2

30.8

50

Suriname

15.1

11.3

10.0

10.2

112

Sierra Leone

57.5

51.1

33.1

31.5

51

Guyana

17.1

15.8

12.4

10.4

113

Lesotho

32.7

29.1

29.3

32.4

52

Lebanon

11.6

11.2

8.7

10.5

113 Liberia

48.2

39.0

34.8

32.4

53

Jordan

10.8

7.5

7.4

10.6

115

Niger

52.5

40.2

32.8

32.6

54

Cabo Verde

15.3

11.9

12.1

11.8

116

Haiti

40.9

41.7

32.6

32.7

55

Viet Nam

26.3

21.4

15.4

11.9

—

—

—

20–34.9*

56

Thailand

18.6

12.1

11.9

12.0

57

Egypt

16.3

17.2

14.6

12.3

58

Malaysia

15.4

13.8

10.9

12.5

59

South Africa

18.1

17.2

12.7

12.9

60

Oman

14.7

11.5

11.5

13.0

61

Bolivia (Plurinational State of)

27.7

22.0

14.7

13.2

2022 GHI scores less than 5,collectively ranked 1–172

2000

Belarus62

Honduras

21.8

19.2

14.1

13.4

= low
= moderate= serious= alarming= extremely alarming— = Data are not available or not presented. Some countries did not exist in their presentborders in the given year or reference period.
Note: As always, rankings and index scores from this table cannot be accurately compared torankings and index scores from previous reports (see Appendix A).
For the 2022 GHI report, data were assessed for 136 countries. Out of these, there were
sufficient data to calculate 2022 GHI scores for and rank 121 countries (by way of comparison, 116 countries were ranked in the 2021 report).

*

Guinea, Mozambique, Uganda,
and Zimbabwe

117

Chad

50.7

49.0

40.7

37.2

118

Dem. Rep. of the Congo

48.0

43.2

38.7

37.8

119

Madagascar

42.5

37.2

37.3

38.7

120

Central African Rep.

48.8

46.8

44.6

44.0

121

Yemen

41.3

38.4

41.7

45.1

—

—

—

35–49.9**

Burundi, Somalia, South Sudan,and Syrian Arab Rep.

* For 15 countries, individual scores could not be calculated and ranks could not be determined owing to lack of data. Where possible, these countries were provisionally designatedby severity: 4 as serious and 4 as alarming. For 7 countries, provisional designations could
not be established (see Table A.3 in Appendix A).
1
Ranked according to 2022 GHI scores. Countries that have identical 2022 scores are given
the same ranking (for example, Costa Rica and United Arab Emirates are both ranked 18th).

2 The

17 countries with 2022 GHI scores of less than 5 are not assigned individual ranks,
but rather are collectively ranked 1–17. Differences between their scores are minimal.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 01 | Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger13

FIGURE 1.4 2022 GHI SCORES AND PROGRESS SINCE 2000

Extremely
alarming

55

50
Higherhunger
Yemen

45

Alarming

Central African Republic

40
Madagascar
Dem. Rep. of the Congo

2022 Global Hunger Index score

Chad

Niger

Haiti

Liberia

Sierra Leone
Afghanistan

Ethiopia

25

India

AngolaBurkina Faso

20

Lao PDR

Myanmar

Papua New Guinea

Kenya

Togo
Benin

Malawi

Gambia

Mauritania

Nepal

Bangladesh

Cameroon

GuatemalaIndonesia

Cambodia

15

Comoros

Pakistan
Korea (DPR)

Tanzania
Mali

Djibouti

Rep. of Congo

Nigeria

RwandaSeriousZambiaCôte d’Ivoire
SenegalBotswana
Namibia

SolomonIslands

Venezuela

Gabon

Eswatini

Moderate

30

LesothoGuinea-Bissau

EcuadorNicaragua
Iraq
Mauritius
Sri
SouthLanka Africa
Oman
Honduras
Egypt
Malaysia
Thailand
Viet Nam
Cabo Verde
JordanGuyanaSuriname Lebanon

Philippines
Ghana
Bolivia

Tajikistan

Lower
hungerGHI Severity Scale

35

Low

10

5
-40

-35
Higher reduction
in hunger

-30

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5
Lower reduction
in hunger

0

5

10

Increase inhungerAbsolute change in GHI score since 2000
Source: Authors.
Note: This figure illustrates the change in GHI scores since 2000 in absolute values. It features countries where data are available to calculate 2000 and 2022 GHI scores and where 2022 GHI
scores show moderate, serious, alarming, or extremely alarming hunger levels. Some likely poor performers may not appear due to missing data.

14

Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger | Chapter 01 | 2022 Global Hunger Index

a 2019 peace agreement was never fully implemented, resulting in

FIGURE 1.5 WHERE THE INDICATORS OF HUNGER ARE HIGHEST

chronic cycles of violence and displacement. A contentious election
cycle in late 2020 and early 2021 fueled further violence, accelerated population displacement, and sparked a particularly severe foodsecurity crisis in the country in 2021 (Murray and Sullivan 2021;
UNICEF and WFP 2021).

60

Child stunting (%) 2017–2021

55.5

50.9

50

46.7

44.4

41.8

40

40.0

39.8

39.6

38.2

38.2

un

Bu
r

Ti
m

Meanwhile, 39.8 percent of children were stunted and 7.7 percent
of children were wasted as of 2021, and the child mortality rate was
5.0 percent. The arid southern regions of Madagascar are especiallyvulnerable to food and nutrition insecurity. Drought is a regular occurrence in the area, including a recent drought that began in 2019,with aftereffects expected to last until the end of 2022. People in thesouth of the country have been facing a hunger and undernutrition
crisis since 2020, caused not only by drought but also by disease out-

20

Child wasting (%) 2017–2021

19.3
16.9

16.1

15.0

15

12.0

11.5

11.5

10.4

10.2

ad

Ye
m

highest rate in this year’s report, after only Central African Republic.

os

0
e

48.5 percent, was undernourished in 2019–2021, the second-­

N
De
ig
er
m
th . R
e
e p
Co .
ng of
Af
ric C oan en
R tr
M ep al
ad .
ag
as
Pa
c
pu ar
a
Gu N
e
Af ine w
gh a
an
is
ta
n
Gu
at
em
al
a

10

es
t

third-highest score in the 2022 GHI. Nearly half of the population,

or
-L

20

en

Madagascar, with an alarming 2022 GHI score of 38.7, has the

di

30

10

10.2

5

breaks and the economic impact of COVID-19 containment measures,

Madagascar, causing loss of lives, assets, and livelihoods and exacer-

respectively, Haiti and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea each

a
si
ne

do

m

Ch

or

ig

In

Co
9.1

Ch
ad

9.0

n

o

8.6

ni

9.6

Af

Be

ig
N

al
m

Si

very high in Sudan, Yemen, and Sri Lanka. At 47.2 and 41.6 percent,So

the world’s highest child wasting rate, at 19.3 percent; rates are also

9.8

on
e
ric C
an en
So Re tral
ut p.
h
Su
da
n
Gu
in
ea

0

in the serious category. India, with a GHI score considered serious, hasLeany country in the world with data, at 46.7 percent, despite a GHI score

ad

2

Ch

4

For example, Timor-Leste has the third-­highest child stunting rate oferrascores do not put them in the highest categories of hunger (Figure 1.5).

er
ia

6

ia

the indicators used in the calculation of GHI scores, even if their overall

10.3

th

10.8

10
8

32.7

Child mortality (%) 2020
11.0

so

11.4

34.7

i

11.5

12

Several countries have exceptionally high values for one or more of

er

s

N

and Yemen—with moderate, serious, or alarming 2022 GHI scores
have a higher 2022 GHI score than their 2000 GHI score (Figure 1.4).

alscore of 19.9). Over the longer term, only two countries—Venezuela

35.8

M

Af
ric C
an en
t
M Re ral
ad p.
ag
as
ca
r

(2014 GHI score of 8.1) to moderate verging on serious (2022 GHI

38.3

a
Ye
De
m
en
m
th . R
e ep
Co .
ng of
o
Li
be
ria
Rw
an
da
Le
so
th
o

0

had the largest increase in this period, with hunger rising from low

39.8

re

10

ger can afflict countries with a range of hunger severity. Venezuela

41.4

Ko

20

from 10.2 (Suriname) to 45.1 (Yemen), showing that worsening hun-R

(Appendix C). The 2022 GHI scores of these countries vary widely,

ti

30

41.6

ai

ate, serious, or alarming 2022 GHI scores across multiple regions

47.2

H

40

48.5

Le

52.2

50

Since 2014, hunger has increased in 20 countries with moder-rit

Undernourishment (%) 2019–2021

60

DPbating food insecurity in southern Madagascar.

au
M

Cyclones Emnati and Batsirai devastated extensive tracts of southeast

iu

al
ep

ka

N

an

Sr

iL

Ye
m

da
Su

In

of water for irrigation or drinking, and criminal activity (ACAPS 2022).

en

n

a

0
di

as well as chronic issues such as poverty, poor infrastructure, a lackSource: Authors (see Appendix A for data sources).

Very highHigh2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 01 | Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger15

have very high undernourishment rates—the third- and fourth-highest

countries, where increased and targeted efforts are needed” (Local

rates of any countries with data. Nigeria, with a serious hunger level,

Burden of Disease Child Growth Failure Collaborators 2020, 234).

has the second-highest child mortality rate, at 11.4 percent, just afterthat of Somalia, at 11.5 percent. Awareness of which countries strug-

Inequality in nutrition within country borders is perhaps unsur-

gle the most according to each indicator is urgently required to ensure

prising given the high degree of inequality in the coverage of healththese problems do not go unheeded.

interventions. In Africa South of the Sahara, research reveals thatcoverage of reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health inter-

There are also signs of progress, with many countries achieving

ventions is distributed unequally in nearly all countries, and thisimpressive reductions in hunger. Since 2000, 32 countries have seen

inequality has decreased only slightly in recent years. Fragile andtheir GHI scores decline by 50 percent or more, including at least one

conflict-­affected states tend to have higher levels of inequality incountry from nearly every world region.9 For example, in Africa Southterms of health intervention coverage, whereas good governance,of the Sahara, Angola, Djibouti, Ghana, Malawi, and Senegal have eachpolitical stability, and absence of violence are associated with more

reduced their GHI scores by 50 to 60 percent since 2000. In West Asia

equitable health intervention coverage (Faye et al. 2020).10

and North Africa, Algeria, Iran, and Türkiye have reduced their scores by
50 percent or more since 2000, each moving from the moderate to the

Despite the high level of attention given to nutrition indicators

low category. Thirteen of the 32 countries in this category are in Europe

at the national level, many public health and nutrition programs are

and Central Asia. Five countries in Latin America and the Caribbean—administered at a state or local level. This reality drives the need for

Bolivia, Brazil, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay—have had reductions ofbetter data at the subnational level, as well as for a clearer under-

50 percent or more, with all of these except Bolivia reaching the low

standing of what improves food security and nutrition at state or local

category according to 2022 GHI scores. Mongolia has experienced thelevels (Local Burden of Disease Child Growth Failure Collaborators

most dramatic improvement in East and Southeast Asia: its 2022 GHI

2020). Community feedback on and oversight of locally managed

score of 5.7, reflecting low hunger, is more than 80 percent lower thanhealth and nutrition programs can help improve the design and imple-

its 2000 score of 30.0, considered serious. Given that many countries

mentation of such programs, as discussed in chapter 2 of this report.

have experienced an increase in hunger in recent years, it is remarkablethat all but 3 of these 32 countries also experienced declines relative

Ethiopia serves as an example of a country where child stunt-

to their 2014 GHI scores, and those that did experience increases saw

ing rates vary considerably between regions, with the northern

their GHI scores rise by less than one point.

regions experiencing higher levels of stunting than those in thesouth (Figure 1.6). The regions of Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz,

Within Country Borders: Hotspots of Hunger

and Tigray have the highest stunting rates in Ethiopia, ranging from

Many countries, even those with favorable GHI scores, have wide dis-

including cyclical drought, high levels of deforestation, and conflicts,

parities in nutritional status, with areas of serious child undernutrition.

all negatively affect agricultural production, food security, and child

A recent project mapped and analyzed child stunting, wasting, andnutrition (Ahmed et al. 2021).

40.7 to 48.4 percent (EPHI and ICF 2021). Extreme conditions,

underweight data down to the local district or county level between
2000 and 2017 in 105 low- and middle-income countries. Stunting

In Nepal, stunting rates range from 22.6 and 22.9 percent, respec-

disparities between districts or counties were particularly pronounced

tively, in Gandaki and Bagmati provinces in the central region of thein Honduras, India, Nigeria, and Viet Nam. The areas with the least

country to more than double that, at 47.8 percent, in Karnali province

improvement over time—where stunting levels either increased or stag-in the west of the country (CBS 2020) (Figure 1.6). Karnali, along with

nated—were in central Chad, central Pakistan, central Afghanistan, andSudurpashchim, Lumbini, and Madhesh provinces, where one-third

northeastern Angola, as well as throughout the Democratic Republic

or more of children are stunted, are the provinces with the highestof the Congo and Madagascar. In terms of child wasting, disparities

Multidimensional Poverty Index values (NPC 2021). Other explanations

were particularly evident in Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, and Nigeria.

for the high levels of child undernutrition in these provinces include

The study authors concluded that there were “hotspots of persistentdifficult geographical terrain, poor infrastructure and transportation

CGF [child growth failure] even within well-performing regions and

109No country in South Asia has reduced its score by 50 percent or more since 2000, but Nepal
came very close, with a reduction of 48.4 percent.

16

The reproductive, maternal, newborn, and child health interventions included in the study are
not nutrition-specific interventions, yet these types of interventions, and access to health caremore generally, often serve as entry points to nutrition-specific interventions (Baye, Laillou,
and Chitweke 2020).

Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger | Chapter 01 | 2022 Global Hunger Indexfacilities, food insecurity, low overall socioeconomic development,

undernutrition. Compared with districts where stunting rose or stayed

and lack of access to healthcare services (Bhusal and Sapkota 2022).

the same, districts that reduced stunting had better-organized DPEM
committee meetings, with more participation from diverse sectors;

The example of India shows the importance of considering the subna-

had better communication between district-level actors and decision

tional context when designing programs and policies to target child stunt-makers at the national level; reported better multisectoral integration,

ing. Researchers investigated the factors that contributed to a decline inwith representatives from various sectors focusing on nutrition; andstunting in four Indian states between 2006 and 2016: Chhattisgarh,were less likely to report a need for additional training in their dis-Gujarat, Odisha, and Tamil Nadu. They found that stunting fell mainly intricts on nutrition-related issues (Iruhiriye et al. 2022).

response to improvements in the coverage of health and nutrition interventions, household conditions (such as socioeconomic status and foodsecurity), and maternal factors (such as mothers’ health and education).

Conclusion

While improvements in household conditions were the most important

The global hunger situation as reflected in the 2022 GHI is grim. The

factor for each of the four states, the second most important factor var-

overlapping crises facing the world are exposing the weaknesses ofies by state. As the authors conclude, this variability across states “indi-food systems, from global to local, and highlighting the vulnerability

cates the need for contextualized policy and programmatic initiativesof populations around the world to hunger. Despite the “Zero Hunger”

to help focus the efforts in the sectors that need the most attention fortarget articulated in the Sustainable Development Goals, the prog-

continued decline in stunting” (Avula et al. 2022, 10).

ress that has been made is being lost, and the situation is worsening in too many countries. The threat of famine looms yet again in

In Rwanda, districts that have implemented their nutrition pro-the Horn of Africa, with humanitarian funds insufficient as of yet tograms with a high degree of political commitment and multisec-

reach all those in need. A failure to address this threat at the scale

toral collaboration have experienced the most success in reducing

required would be a tragic indictment of the global food system andchild stunting. Starting in 2009, the Rwandan government has

a fundamental breach of the human right to food.

become increasingly committed to reducing undernutrition while

It is critical to act now to halt and reverse the forces driving hun-also decentralizing government services to the district and local

ger and undernutrition and to take steps to build a more resilient,levels. Each district created an annual District Plan to Eliminate

just, and sustainable world where hunger is a thing of the past. There

Malnutrition (DPEM), laying out multisectoral approaches to tackling

can be no more excuses.

FIGURE 1.6 SUBNATIONAL INEQUALITY OF CHILD STUNTING, ETHIOPIA AND NEPAL
Tigray (48.4)

BenishangulGumuz (40.7)

Amhara(41.5)

Addis Ababa(15.0)

Afar(42.2)

GambelaOromia (35.3)(17.3)Southern Nations,
Nationalities,
and Peoples (36.4)

ETHIOPIA

Sudurpashchim(40.9)

Dire Dawa (25.4)
Harari (36.4)

NEPAL

Gandaki (22.6)
Lumbini(35.5)

Somali (30.6)

Bagmati (22.9)
Madhesh(34.2)

Stunting rate
10–19.9%

Source: EPHI and ICF (2021).

Karnali (47.8)

20–29.9%

30–39.9%

Province No. 1(24.9)

40% or more

Source: CBS (2020).

Note: The map of Ethiopia reflects the nine regional states and two city administrations as they existed in 2019, the year when the survey from which the data were obtained was conducted.
Two new regional states have since been formed but are not shown here. Boundaries, names, and designations shown on maps in this report do not imply official endorsement or acceptanceby Welthungerhilfe or Concern Worldwide.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 01 | Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger17

BOX 1.2	
ENDING HUNGER: A DREAM OR STILL A POSSIBILITY?
Maximo Torero
There is already enough food to feed everyone in the world;(Kharas and Dooley 2021; FAO, IFAD et al. 2022). In coun-those going hungry just lack access.

tries like Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria,

Global trade moves food from where it is produced to where

and Yemen, the number of people facing hunger jumped by

it is consumed, keeping people fed. Russia and Ukraine are two

20 percent between 2020 and 2021 (FSIN and GNAFC 2021).

of the world’s largest agricultural producers, whose food exports

Globally, 3.1 billion people cannot afford nutritious foods

account for some 12 percent of total calories traded in the world

and depend on starchy foods for calories (FAO, IFAD et al.

(Laborde 2021). The war is wrecking a quarter of global grain2022). Based on current GHI projections, 46 countries will failtrade. What is at stake is an international agricultural trade worth

to achieve a low level of hunger by 2030.

some $1.8 trillion (UNECE 2021).

At the outset of the pandemic, countries committed to

The fallout of this disruption could be devastating. Some 50

working together to keep global agricultural trade flowing amid

nations that rely on Russia and Ukraine for the bulk of their wheat

lockdown measures. Now, with panic setting in, signs of pro-imports—including Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, and Türkiye—havetectionism have emerged, as governments begin to impose foodbeen scrambling to find alternative suppliers (Reuters 2022; El

export bans to protect domestic supply (Glauber, Laborde, andSafty 2022).

Mamun 2022).

This situation comes on top of persistent food inflation,

Rising prices have already put even the most basic foods

which began in the second half of 2020. In March 2022,

beyond the reach of many poor families across the globe. If the

global food prices jumped to their highest levels ever recorded.

war in Ukraine continues, food inflation will spell greater disas-

Compared with the previous year, prices for cereals were up

ter, especially for poorer countries.

37 percent; cooking oils, 56 percent; and meat, 20 percent. As

My colleagues and I estimate that between 8 and 13 millionof July, prices have fallen slightly since March, but in June they

more people could become undernourished in 2022–23, with

were still 27 percent higher than in June 2021 (FAO 2022c).

the biggest increases occurring in Asia, Africa South of the

Even before the Ukraine war, fertilizer prices were skyrocketing owing to high demand and the rising cost of natural gas,a key component in fertilizers. The disruption of fertilizer shipments from Russia, a leading fertilizer exporter, is undermining
food production everywhere, from Brazil and Canada to Kenya
and Zimbabwe, and could lead to lower global crop yields next
year (Polansek and Mano 2022). And global food stockpiles arelower than they were before the pandemic.
All of this adds up to greater food price volatility. When theprice of food ticks upward, it does not mean simply that people
must tighten their belts or pay more for their meals. For thosealready on the brink of famine, it could literally mean starvation. Food inflation can unsettle markets and even precipitate
the overthrow of governments, as it did in Sri Lanka (Jayasinghe,
Pal, and Ghoshal 2022), whose experience serves as a warning
to the rest of the world.

18

Sahara, and the Middle East (FAO 2022d).
How to Avert Disaster
The war between Russia and Ukraine may seem like the death
knell for the hunger goal.
But the chasm between reality and the utopian ideal ofachieving “Zero Hunger” should not be a reason for despair.
Rather, the goal should serve to hold governments and the international community accountable for fulfilling the universal rightto food and ensuring a dignified life for everyone. As international
cooperation shrinks amid geopolitical tension, such advocacy
has never been more important. This goal is a battle cry to rally
support and push countries into action.
So what can be done? The answer is, a lot. Food aid thathas kept families afloat through the pandemic must continue.
Without strong social safety nets, countries cannot begin toreverse the trend in hunger. Governments are financially strapped

A Losing Fightand not keen on expanding social safety nets—but they must

At the 1974 World Food Congress in Rome, Henry Kissinger

remember that the generous COVID-19 aid packages, especiallydeclared that in 10 years no child would go to bed hungry

across industrialized countries, cushioned the shock of the pan-

(Kissinger 1974). Although his prediction did not come true, thedemic lockdowns, which would have triggered a global recession

decades that followed marked steady progress against hunger.

and sent hunger rates soaring.

Unfortunately, though, when 193 countries met at the United

Vulnerable countries, especially poorer countries that rely on

Nations in 2015 to commit to ending global hunger in 15 years,

food imports from Russia and Ukraine, should be given imme-

the trend was already reversing—the number of undernourisheddiate financing to buy food for their populations (FAO 2022e).

people in the world had started to rise (FAO, IFAD et al. 2022).

An emergency fund of $24.6 billion would cover the immedi-

Then came the COVID-19 pandemic, which wiped out two

ate needs of the 62 most vulnerable countries, which are homedecades of progress on combating extreme poverty and hunger,

to 1.79 billion people. The International Monetary Fund is wellforcing hundreds of millions more people into chronic hunger

positioned to implement this initiative.

Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger | Chapter 01 | 2022 Global Hunger Index

Every effort should be made to avoid export restrictions offood and fertilizers. Failure to do so will increase price volatil-

Limiting food loss and waste can therefore help to both fighthunger and reduce environmental harms.
Achieving “Zero Hunger” was always going to be an enor-

ity and price hikes. Imposing export bans is the worst response

mous challenge. This is because ending hunger is not a simple

countries can choose right now.
Governments and investors need more information on mar-matter of producing more food. Hunger cannot be eradicatedket conditions so they can make informed decisions without

unless we tackle the structural drivers that cause it: war, cli-

panicking. More market-monitoring services, like the Group ofmate change, recession (FSIN and GNAFC 2021). It’s a tall

20’s Agricultural Market Information System, can increase mar-order. But that does not make the hunger goal the stuff of UN

ket transparency.

legend. As the previous set of UN development goals showed,

Rigorous soil testing and nutrition soil maps can help farmers

such collective commitments influence how countries use andthroughout the world learn exactly how much and what combina-

distribute resources (McArthur and Rasmussen 2017). They aretion of fertilizers their land requires (Elkin, Gebre, and Boesler

also instrumental in raising money to continue the good fight.

2022). This information can help them use fertilizer more effi-

Kissinger’s declaration that hunger was unacceptable nearlyciently going forward.

half a century ago was prescient. Come 2030, if current condi-

At the same time, we must reduce food loss and waste.

tions continue, there would still be at least 670 million under-

Currently, close to a third of all food produced around thenourished people among us (FAO, IFAD et al. 2022). We may

globe—enough to feed about 1.26 billion people a year—is lost

not be able to end hunger by then, but we can stop heading inor wasted at some point in the food supply chain (FAO 2022f). If

the wrong direction.

we could cut food loss and waste in half, the food supply would
contain enough fruits and vegetables to cover the recommended

The world will not end in 2030. Nor should the fightagainst hunger.

amount of 400 grams per person per day. Inefficiencies along
the food supply chain and food waste from the wholesale to theMaximo Torero is chief economist of the Food and Agriculture

consumer level also have a major impact on the environment.

Organization of the United Nations (FAO).

WHEAT IMPORT DEPENDENCY ON THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND UKRAINE, 2021
Russian Federation
Ukraine90	3 of the 4 countries with populations experiencing
food catastrophe, 2021

80
70

	4 of the 7 countries forecast to have the highest
number of people experiencing food crisis,
emergency, or catastrophe in 202260	9 of the 10 food-crisis countries hosting the highest
number of refugees and asylum seekers, 2021

50
40
30
20

Côte d'Ivoire
GuineaMali
Bangladesh

Gabon

Indonesia
AngolaGreeceJordanBurkina Faso
UgandaSudan
Kenya

Tunisia
Iran
Ethiopia

IsraelYemen

BurundiKyrgyzstan
Oman
Nicaragua

Mauritania
Saudi Arabia

Djibouti
Senegal
Cameroon
Togo

Pakistan
Namibia
United Albania
Rep. of Tanzania
Libya
Dem.
Rep. of the Congo
RwandaLebanonEgypt

0Belarus
TürkiyeMadagascar

10Eritrea
Armenia
Mongolia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Somalia% of wheat imports from Russian Federation and Ukraine

100

Source: FAO calculations based on Trade Data Monitor (TDM); FSIN and GNAFC (2022).
Note: Figure shows net wheat-importing countries that get at least 20 percent of their wheat from the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Food catastrophe = IPC/CH Phase 5, emergency = IPC/CH Phase 4, crisis = IPC/CH Phase 3.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 01 | Global, Regional, and National Trends in Hunger19

2022 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX BY SEVERITYFIGURE 1.7

Greenland

IcelandSwedenNorwayCanadaEstonia
LatviaUnited Denmark
Lithuania
Kingdom
Belarus
Neth.
PolandIrelandGermanyBel.
UkraineLux. Czech Rep.
Slovakia
FranceAustria Hungary Rep. of
Moldova
Switz. Slov.
Croatia Romania
Italy
SerbiaBos.&
Herz. Mont. Bulgaria
Spain
N. Mace.
Albania
Portugal
Türkiye
GreeceCyprusLebanonTunisia
MoroccoIsrael/Palestinian
Territories

United Statesof America

Algeria
BahamasMexicoCuba

Guatemala
El Salvador

Libya

Egypt

Western Sahara

Jamaica
Haiti
BelizeHonduras

Mauritania

Dominican Rep.

Trinidad & Tobago

Panama

Niger
Mali
Sudan
SenegalChadGambiaGuinea-Bissau Guinea* Burkina Faso
Benin Nigeria
Côte Ghana
CentralSouth
Sierra Leone
d'Ivoire
AfricanSudan*
Togo
Liberia
Republic
Cameroon
Uganda*Rep. ofEquatorial Guinea
Congo
Gabon
Dem. Rwanda
Rep. of Burundi*
the Congo

Cabo Verde

Nicaragua

Costa Rica

FinlandVenezuela Guyana
Suriname
French Guiana
Colombia

Ecuador

Peru

BrazilAngolaMalawi
ZambiaBolivia
NamibiaParaguay

Botswana

Chile

Eswatini

UruguayArgentina
Extremely alarming ≥ 50.0
Alarming 35.0–49.9
Serious 20.0–34.9
Moderate 10.0–19.9
Low ≤ 9.9
Not included or not designated (see Appendix A for details)			
*Zimbabwe*

Provisional severity designation (see Table A.3 for details)

South
AfricaLesothoRussian Federation

Mongolia

Kazakhstan

DPR Korea

Georgia
Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan
Azerbaijan
Armenia
Turkmenistan Tajikistan
Syrian Arab
Republic*
Iran

Iraq
JordanAfghanistan
Pakistan

KuwaitBahrain
Qatar
Saudi
U. A. E.
ArabiaNepal Bhutan
TaiwanHong Kong

Bangladesh

India

Myanmar

Oman
Eritrea Yemen

Lao
PDR
Philippines

ThailandCambodia

Djibouti
EthiopiaJapan
Rep. of Korea

China

Viet Nam
Somalia*

Sri Lanka
Brunei Darussalam
Malaysia

Maldives
Singapore

Papua
New
GuineaIndonesia

Kenya
United Rep.
of Tanzania

Timor-Leste

Solomon Islands

Comoros
Mozambique*
Vanuatu

Mauritius
Madagascar

FijiAustralia

Source: Authors.
Note: For the 2022 GHI, data on the proportion of undernourished are for 2019–2021; data onchild stunting and wasting are for the latest year in the period 2017–2021 for which data are
available; and data on child mortality are for 2020. GHI scores were not calculated for countries
for which data were not available and for countries that did not meet the GHI inclusion criteria;
see Appendix A for details.
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official
endorsement or acceptance by Welthungerhilfe (WHH) or Concern Worldwide.
Recommended citation: von Grebmer, K., J. Bernstein, D. Resnick, M. Wiemers, L. Reiner,
M. Bachmeier, A. Hanano, O. Towey, R. Ní Chéilleachair, C. Foley, S. Gitter, G. Larocque,and H. Fritschel. 2022. “Figure 1.7: 2022 Global Hunger Index by Severity.” Map in 2022
Global Hunger Index: Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance. Bonn: Welthungerhilfe;
Dublin: Concern Worldwide.					New Zealand02

In Paroha, Rautahat District, Nepal, women participate in nutrition
training as part of the Nutrition Smart Villages program. The program
seeks to leverage agriculture and other sectors for better nutrition,
working with and empowering community-based institutions.

FOOD SYSTEMS TRANSFORMATION AND
LOCAL GOVERNANCE
Danielle Resnick
Brookings Institution and International Food Policy Research Institute

Key Messages> Local communities experiencing the worst hunger have the mostto gain from improved accountability, but they also often live with
> Within a global food system that has fallen short of sustainably

weak or poor governance, high levels of displacement, and a lackending poverty and hunger, citizens are finding innovative waysof security. Efforts by development partners to strengthen local

to improve food systems governance at the local level, holding

food systems governance in these settings require more time anddecision makers accountable for addressing food and nutrition

more flexible use of resources.

insecurity and hunger.
> A recent trend toward decentralizing government functions has

given local governments greater autonomy and authority, including over key elements of food systems. And in fragile states local

Spiraling food prices and global supply chain disruptions precipitated by the Ukraine war, the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, and regional conflicts have worsened hunger

for millions of people, requiring humanitarian and resilience-build-or informal sources of governance, such as traditional authorities,

ing responses to be urgently scaled up. These current crises andmay have greater credibility with communities. Yet in a number

urgent needs, discussed in more detail elsewhere in this report,of countries, civic spaces are subject to increasing repression,

amplify longstanding structural deficiencies in the global food sys-

hindering citizens from claiming and realizing their right to ade-tem, which is inadequate for sustainably ending poverty and hun-quate food.

ger as envisaged by the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda (Barrett etal. 2020; Webb et al. 2020). Several high-level gatherings in recent> Citizens are using a range of tools, including systems for tracking

years have reinforced this message, including the UN Food Systems

government budgets and expenditures, community scorecards for

Summit in September 2021, the UN Climate Change Conference

assessing the performance of local governments, and inclusive(COP26) in November 2021, and the Nutrition for Growth Summit

multistakeholder platforms that engage a range of local actors,

in December 2021 (von Braun et al. 2021). Yet the crucial topic of

including government officials, community groups, and private

food systems governance, which plays a core role in determining

sector participants, in policy planning.

whether people have nutritious and sustainable diets, has largely
been marginalized in these global assemblies (Canfield, Anderson,> Local action has the potential to help citizens realize the right toand McMichael 2021).

food, but they are often unaware of this right, even where it has

Food systems consist of the interactions among the many actors

been enshrined in national law. It is thus important to raise not

involved in growing, processing, distributing, consuming, and dispos-

only local governments’ awareness of their responsibilities but

ing of food products, and their links with the social, environmental,

also citizens’ awareness of their entitlements.

and economic structures in which they are embedded (Fanzo et al.
2021; HLPE 2017). Governance of these food systems encompasses> Given the diversity of local government settings—where degrees

the actors and institutions that exert power over food access, avail-of local government power, civic space, and state fragility can

ability, and quality; the ways through which priorities are deliberated,vary widely—governance efforts must be well matched to con-coordinated, and acted upon; and the responsibilities for financing,ditions and capacities on the ground. Encouragingly, examples

delivering, and monitoring results (Delaney et al. 2018).

of empowerment are just as visible in fragile contexts with highBecause food systems are multifaceted—spanning agriculture,levels of societal fractionalization as they are in more stable set-

health, environment, gender, markets and trade, humanitarian assis-tings with longer traditions of local democracy.

tance, and several other domains—food systems governance is always
complicated by the need to reconcile competing interests and val-

> Motivated and consistent local leadership is pivotal to the sus-

ues and to achieve policy coherence across sectors. Recent political

tainability of local interventions. Fostering such leadership may

trends further circumscribe efforts to improve food systems gover-involve educating local officials or encouraging local champions

nance. At the global level, rising nationalism and geopolitical ten-outside of government.

sions—underscored by the war in Ukraine—threaten prospects for

Note: The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author. They do not necessarilyreflect the views of Welthungerhilfe or Concern Worldwide.

multilateral cooperation on food systems and food and nutrition security. At the national level, civic spaces and freedom of expression are2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 02 | Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance23

becoming increasingly repressed (CIVICUS 2021; Dupuy, Fransen,

functional authority over key elements of food systems, such as theand Prakash 2021), with at least 50 countries legally limiting thelocation of and infrastructure in informal markets, which are main

operations of civil society organizations (Amnesty International 2019).

sources of food for the urban poor (Smit 2016). In many countries—

The narrowing of such spaces hinders citizens from claiming and real-from Ghana to Nepal, Kenya to Pakistan—authority for budgeting,izing their right to adequate food, as enshrined in the UN’s Universal

designing, and implementing food systems policies in the agricul-

Declaration of Human Rights, as well as from participating in deci-ture, health, and environment domains has been devolved to prov-

sions on how to tackle hunger and from learning about and exercisinginces, counties, or districts (Kyle and Resnick 2019; Resnick 2022;

their constitutional entitlements (Elver 2016; Fakhri 2020).

Resnick and Rana 2016).

Given these dynamics, this essay focuses on opportunities toFourth, a local lens is particularly necessary in fragile states

improve food systems governance at the local level. In some coun-

where—owing to ongoing conflict, weak capacity, or both—nationaltries, citizens are finding innovative ways to amplify their voices ingovernments are unable to exert power, authority, or legitimacy acrossfood system debates—including by using data to track government

the full range of territory that they legally govern. Instead, informal

performance and by engaging in multistakeholder platforms—andsources of governance, such as traditional authorities, may have

keeping decision makers accountable for addressing food and nutri-

greater credibility with local communities (Baldwin and Raffler 2019).

tion insecurity and hunger. Encouragingly, examples of empowerment

Conversely, certain subnational areas, such as the eastern Democratic

are just as visible in fragile contexts with high levels of societal frac-

Republic of Congo or northeastern Nigeria, can be disproportionately

tionalization as they are in more stable settings with longer traditions

infiltrated by armed groups and violent nonstate actors whose pres-of local democracy.

ence limits opportunities for community engagement. Consequently,
these areas, which tend to be the worst affected by hunger (Delgado

Why Local Food Systems Governance Matters

and Smith 2021), are least likely to experience the benefits of national
food system commitments.

While recognizing that transforming food systems ultimately requires
interventions at multiple levels, a greater focus on local governanceof food systems is warranted for five main reasons.1
First, consumer preferences, natural resource management practices, and farming and livestock rearing methods are often grounded
in local cultural traditions, historical experiences, and agroecological conditions.
Second, as the world urbanizes and cities demonstrate their own
unique food security challenges (Crush and Riley 2019; Fan 2017),

In some countries, citizens are
finding innovative ways to amplify their
voices in food system debates andkeeping decision makers accountable
for addressing food and nutrition
insecurity and hunger.

mayors and municipal councils have become more influential in transnational development networks (Barber 2014). In initiatives such as
the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and the Milan Urban Food

Finally, a local perspective can help reveal whether and how

Policy Pact, leaders of major world cities express shared commit-

national food system priorities actually reflect local needs and pref-

ments related to climate action and food policies. These initiatives

erences. Food corporations and agribusiness interests can, throughhave given mayors a platform to proceed with their own food systems

corporate concentration and lobbying resources, play an outsized

goals that may reinforce, bypass, or intersect with national-level aspi-

role in national and global decision making around food and agricul-

rations (Moragues-Faus 2021).

ture policy (see Clapp and Fuchs 2009). Yet at the subnational level,

Third, the trend toward decentralizing government functions overthere may be circumstances where such actors are less prominent,

the past 20 years has given greater political autonomy and func-

creating a more even playing field for understanding the concerns oftional authority to subnational governments (Rodden and Wibbels

communities and the frontline service providers who are ultimately

2019). Consequently, local governments increasingly have more

responsible for implementing agrifood systems policies.

1“Local” refers here to subnational actors, institutions, and processes, such as mayors, district
councils, traditional authorities, community-based associations, nongovernmental organizations,and neighborhood groups. This essay focuses on government and civic actors, not on humanitarian groups that may be active in localities. Local governance refers to how these actors engage
with each other to make decisions, allocate resources, and deliver goods and services.

24

When adopting a local lens, however, it is important to remember that the same tools for participation and accountability cannot be used everywhere. The nature of civic engagement in foodsystem processes at the local level, and the degree to which local

Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance | Chapter 02 | 2022 Global Hunger Index

FIGURE 2.1 CONTEXTS FOR LOCAL FOOD SYSTEMS GOVERNANCE: THE NEXUS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY,CIVIC SPACE, AND STATE FRAGILITY (2021)
High-fragility countries
1.0

HigherLao PDREl Salvador
Haiti

MexicoPeru

0.9
SerbiaVenezuela
BurundiNicaragua

Kenya

GuineaCuba

0.7

Eswatini

Türkiye

Dominican RepublicZambiaMontenegro

Benin

Cambodia

Sierra Leone

Bolivia

Mozambique

India
Sri Lanka

Zimbabwe

Costa Rica
Botswana
Malawi

Nepal
South Africa

Rwanda0.8

LOCAL GOVERNMENT POWER

Nigeria

Togo

Romania
Mali

UgandaMadagascar

Niger

Pakistan

0.6

Iraq

RussiaMongolia
Djibouti

0.5

Kyrgyzstan

DRC

Chad

0.4

DPR Korea

Libya
Senegal
Ethiopia

0.3

Ghana

Bangladesh
Mauritania
Myanmar

0.2
Lower

Belarus

0.1

Syria
Turkmenistan
Eritrea0MoroccoJordanSudan

0Bahrain
Yemen

Cameroon

China Algeria

0.1

0.2

0.3

Somalia

Kazakhstan

Uzbekistan

Narrower

Thailand

Egypt

0.4

0.5

CIVIC SPACE

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

Broader

Source: Local government power is measured by the Local Government Index (LGI), and civic space is measured by the Civil Society Participation Index (CSPI). The LGI and the CSPI are fromthe Varieties of Democracy database (V-Dem Institute 2022). Countries are classified as fragile based on 2021 data from the Fragile States Index (FSI) provided by the Fund for Peace (2022).
Note: This figure shows data for 111 countries. For space reasons, not all are labeled. The LGI captures three dimensions: whether a local government administrative unit exists, the degree towhich local executives and assemblies are elected (rather than appointed), and the degree to which non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level. The CSPI captures
whether civil society organizations (such as labor unions, professional associations, women’s groups, nongovernmental organizations, and religious organizations) have autonomy from the stateand citizens can freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals. The FSI data were reverse-normalized so 1 is the least fragile and 0 is the most fragile. Countries that received 0.20 orlower were characterized as the most fragile. Countries classified as high income by the World Bank are excluded from the figure.

governments can be held accountable for food and nutrition secu-

societal conflict and weak oversight may require especially carefulrity outcomes, depends on the extent of community power relations

approaches to citizen engagement. Figure 2.1 illustrates how theseand social cohesion as well as on the broader governance setting.

different dimensions correspond with each other, highlighting that

For instance, participation is naturally more limited in countries

while there is a strong association between more empowered local

where the state limits freedom of association and speech. Moreover,

governments and those that allow greater space for civil society

where local government leaders are appointed rather than elected,

participation, fragility can be present in a wide variety of settings.

those leaders often feel more accountable to the central governmentThus, tools for engaging citizens and promoting accountability needthat appointed them than to the community residents they serve

to be appropriate for the degree of local government autonomy, the(Faguet 2012). Fragile states characterized by high vulnerability tospace citizens have to engage in freedom of speech and association,

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 02 | Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance25and the level of government fragility, which can affect the capacity

Tables (DLTs) have been published annually by UNICEF and Ghana’sof local authorities.

National Development Planning Commission since 2014 to enhance

Bringing Communities into Food Systems Governancescorecards that rely on administrative data for all of the country’s 260

How exactly can communities in these different settings engage attion, health, water and sanitation, governance, and information andthe local level to improve accountability for food and nutrition secu-

communication technology (NDPC and UNICEF Ghana 2021). The

rity outcomes? Many innovative approaches have emerged in recent

highest- and lowest-ranked districts are often profiled in the media,

years. Here, two mechanisms are considered. One is the use of data

encouraging public scrutiny of performance. More recently, the gov-

civic awareness and improve social accountability. The DLTs are
districts to calculate 17 indicators focused on five domains: educa-

and technology to track performance at the local level. The other

ernment announced the launch of the National District Awards, which

consists of local platforms that bring many stakeholders together towill reward the best-performing districts on the DLTs with additional

contribute their perspectives on food system challenges and policy

financial support (Aniagyei 2022).

options. These approaches are relatively new, so their direct impacts

Yet scorecards can result in minimal impact if they reflect ide-on food security and long-term sustainability will require further study,

alized outcomes that are not feasible given the capacities of local

but it is worth examining here their potential and initial achievements

government; if they exacerbate tensions between communities,

in improving food security policy processes.

bureaucrats, and politicians; and if they fail to generate interest
among policymakers (Kelley 2017). Several initiatives have there-

Tracking Local Performance

fore shifted to developing such tools in a more interactive way with

One set of accountability mechanisms centers on surveillance of

local governments, with opportunities for feedback and refinement.

policy and project implementation. Because implementing policies

In Malawi’s Mangochi District, the Community Initiative for Self

and projects that affect food and nutrition security often requires

Reliance (CISER), in coordination with local civil society organiza-

spending money, budget tracking has gained prominence. For sev-

tions, started developing community scorecards in the 2020–2021

eral years, the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Movement has worked

agricultural season to capture residents’ experiences with one ofwith its member countries to analyze government budget allocations

the national government’s flagship programs, the Affordable Inputs

toward policies that are nutrition-specific, such as micronutrient

Program (AIP), which provides subsidized fertilizer and seeds to vul-

supplementation and infant and young child feeding programs, andnerable farmers.2 The indicators were initially developed with several

nutrition-sensitive, such as clean water, sanitation, and access tocommunities in the district and the District Agricultural Extension

healthcare (Fracassi et al. 2020). While this approach captures the

Coordinating Committee (DAECC), based on AIP guidelines.

amounts that are budgeted by governments for nutrition, it does not

The communities and civil servants from the District Agriculture

capture the amounts they actually disburse, so other complementary

Office scored the performance of the program based on the indica-

approaches have also emerged, such as the World Bank’s nutrition

tors. The scorecards revealed several weaknesses in the AIP: among

public expenditure reviews (Wang et al. 2022).

other things, the mobile application used for redeeming input coupons

For both budget and expenditure tracking, the lack of publicly

was slow and volatile, inputs were disbursed too late in the plant-

accessible subnational data on nutrition, agriculture, and other fooding season, poor roads in the rainy season affected people’s ability

system dimensions—due to either unavailability or unaffordable

to access input distribution sites, individuals who lost their national

license fees—poses a challenge for accountability. Yet some local

identity cards had problems obtaining the inputs, and mechanisms

actors have found ways around this information shortfall. In Nigeria,

for airing grievances were lacking. The DAECC communicated manyfor example, the civic organization BudgIT has since 2011 aggre-of these issues to the central government, which addressed several

gated all state-level budgets and uses its open data Tracka platformof them in the subsequent agricultural season. For instance, farm-to enable the public to provide information about the implementationers are now allowed to obtain their inputs from a different locationof government projects in their communities (BudgIT 2022; Tracka

than originally allocated, and inputs are delivered to agro-dealers

2022; Herbst and Onigbinde 2017). This is increasingly facilitating
civic awareness and participation in a country traditionally characterized by its opaque budget processes (Bisong and Ogwumike 2020).
Another approach focuses on incentivizing local governments toperform better through peer comparisons. In Ghana, District League

26

2

Welthungerhilfe and Concern Worldwide work in partnership with several of the organizations mentioned in this essay, including the Community Initiative for Self Reliance (CISER)
and the Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET) in Malawi, Aasaman in Nepal, the HighCommission for Nigeriens Nourishing Nigeriens (HC3N) initiative, the Sierra Leone Network on
the Right to Food (SiLNoRF), Fundación Alternativas in Bolivia, and Consorcio Agroecológico
Peruano (CAP) and Red de Agricultura Ecológica (RAE) in Peru.

Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance | Chapter 02 | 2022 Global Hunger Indexearlier in the season. Furthermore, a new indicator—experience

Meaningfully Engaging Local Stakeholders

with gender-based violence when trying to access the AIP inputs—

Multistakeholder platforms, which aim to foster dialogue and col-has been added to the scorecard (interview, Felix Sanudi, CISER,

laboration among a diverse range of constituents, are a popular

June 10, 2022).

tool for addressing the complexities of agricultural and food system

In Nepal, the civil society organization Aasaman Nepal has usedtransformation (Hermans et al. 2017; Thorpe et al. 2022). They area similar interactive approach to develop community scorecards.

especially popular for promoting citizens’ entitlements to the right

In two municipalities within Madhesh Province, residents, munici-

to food (see Box 2.1). There are, however, several concerns about

pal representatives, and service providers convene to discuss theirsuch platforms, including whether they create unrealistic expecta-

expectations for their health facilities and the quality of the healthtions from participants about policy outcomes (Resnick and Birnerservices to which citizens are entitled. They organize an assessment

2010) and whether they simply reinforce existing power asymme-of health services, jointly discuss and develop indicators to scoretries in the food system (Canfield, Anderson, and McMichael 2021;

the performance of health facilities and services, separately assess

Gleckman 2018; HLPE 2018). This is particularly problematic in

those indicators, and then reconvene. If a health facility’s perfor-

local settings with entrenched forms of patriarchy and other asym-

mance falls below a certain threshold, all participants agree on an

metrical power relationships.

action plan and identify their roles and responsibilities for improv-

Attuned to these concerns, several multistakeholder platforms
are sensitive to how voices are heard in these fora. In Bolivia, for

The local milieu—whether
neighborhood, district, or municipality—
remains the main level at which citizens
engage with the state and where they
are most directly affected by food policy
and service delivery performance.

example, the civil society organization Fundación Alternativas has
been working with the municipal food security committee in La Paz
since 2013. The committee, which aims to ensure that resources are
devoted to food security and food system policy priorities, includes
participants from all levels of government, the private sector, andcivil society. Organized into specific thematic groups, the participants
meet monthly to identify where parts of the food system need to be
improved and collaborate on either normative draft laws to be considered by the legislative branch or work on proposals for targeted
investments (interview, Maria Teresa Nogales, Fundación Alternativas,

ing performance. In each of the health facilities, this action plan isJune 6, 2022). In 2018–2019, the committee was instrumental in

publicly posted and regularly monitored; the following year, perfor-

drafting a municipal law for urban agriculture, which is now legallymance is reassessed (interview, Mani Ram Acharya, Aasaman Nepal,

recognized as an appropriate use of land (Nogales 2019).

June 2, 2022).
Such collaboration may be more challenging in contexts that are

Critically, the thematic groups in the municipal food security
committee must reach consensus before proceeding with a policy

fragile or that lack formal venues for meaningful civic engagement.

recommendation. The committee’s deliberations are bolstered by the

Sudan’s resistance committees represent one example of a grassroots

use of the Dialogic Change Model (interview, Maria Teresa Nogales,

movement aimed at promoting accountability and addressing gaps inFundación Alternativas, June 6, 2022); this model is a structured

service delivery. First arising in Khartoum in 2013, these committees

collaborative approach to planning and implementation that empha-

emerged organically, encompassing students, unemployed youth, andsizes the need to hear everyone’s voice in multistakeholder platforms

activists from urban neighborhoods. The committees made efforts to(Collective Leadership Institute n.d.).

oversee bread distribution in Sudan’s main cities by using a mobile

In Brazil, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Peru, subnational platforms

application to record data on flour deliveries, bakery closures, andfocusing on collaborative management of land and forestry resources

smuggling. In this way, they aimed to prevent bakeries from siphon-revealed several power asymmetries among stakeholders that affected

ing off subsidized flour for illegal purposes (Resnick 2021). Although

the groups’ efficacy. For instance, indigenous communities felt mar-the long-term sustainability of this volunteer-based initiative remains

ginalized, or only those civil society actors with travel budgets could

questionable, the committees nonetheless remain an important fea-

participate (Barletti 2022). Consequently, the “How are we doing?”

ture in urban Sudan almost a decade after their original formation.

tool developed by the Center for International Forestry Research(CIFOR) and its partners is based on the principles of adaptive collaborative management and is aimed at increasing trust and equity

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 02 | Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance27

BOX 2.1	
RAISING AWARENESS OF THE RIGHT TO FOOD
Global food price inflation in 2022 and growing hunger raiseby successive administrations, which feared that such a law

renewed questions about the substantive implications of thewould obligate them to feed everyone. The election of a newright to food. Approximately 18 lower-middle-income or low-­government in 2020 has renewed efforts on the part of the Civil

income countries explicitly protect the right to adequate food inSociety Agriculture Network (CISANET) and like-minded civil

their constitutions, while another 9 implicitly protect the rightsociety organizations to promote enactment of an existing draft

to food by emphasizing rights to an adequate standard of liv-bill. At the national level, they conduct lobbying meetings withing and well-being (FAO n.d). Yet it can be challenging for citi-

Malawi’s government ministries and media outlets to raise publiczens to realize the right to food—a right of which they are often

awareness of the relevance of a legally binding standard for theunaware. The constitutional right to food often lacks legislative

right to food. In select areas, such as Mangochi District, theybacking. In more decentralized contexts, there can be a mis-also provide residents with a better understanding of the types

match between legislation at the national level and food, nutri-of entitlements they should be able to demand from their local

tion, and agricultural responsibilities at local levels.

governments through roadshows, field days, and regular meet-This last issue has become pronounced in Kenya, where

ings with traditional authorities, area and village development

the 2010 Constitution devolved responsibility for agriculture,committees, and district nutrition committees (interview, Felix

livestock, fisheries, health, and the environment to the coun-

Sanudi, CISER, June 10, 2022).

try’s 47 counties while also noting in Article 43 (1c) that “every

Sierra Leone’s constitution does not include an explicit right

person has a right to be free from hunger” and in Article 53

to food, but several provisions—such as the state’s obligation(1c) that “every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter

to “secure the maximum welfare” of its citizens and “ensureand healthcare.” Because no act of Parliament has institution-

self-sufficiency in food production” (Article 7.1)—are relevant

alized this right, the national Right to Food Coalition and otherto the right to food. At the local level, the Sierra Leone Network

partners are working on a national bill on the right to food thaton the Right to Food (SiLNoRF) works with communities in therecognizes interrelated rights that affect food rights, such ascity of Makeni to better understand the implications of theselandownership for women and water rights. At the local level,

provisions and increase civic engagement. As the deputy direc-

Rural Outreach Africa is working to raise county governments’

tor of SiLNoRF notes, “People cannot claim their rights if theyawareness of their responsibilities and citizens’ awareness of

don’t know them.” This is particularly true in a country where

their entitlements. In Vihiga, Kakamega, Bungoma, Kisumu,

only 26 percent of people are literate. Concerted efforts by

and Nandi counties, county officials who oversee agriculture,

SiLNoRF to strengthen local democracy have also focused onbudget planning, and other departments that influence foodeducating the paramount chiefs about their responsibilities tosystems are working with local politicians, community lead-

their communities, since they are the main custodians of muchers, community-based organizations, and journalists to createof the land and are often farmers themselves (interview, Abassawareness of participatory budgeting processes that affect foodKamara, SiLNoRF, June 14, 2022).

systems decisions. Ahead of the August 2022 elections, thiscoalition of counties has also shared a “Food Manifesto” withall of the main political parties, hoping it will be integrated into
the county investment and development plans of the next setof county governors (interview, Stella Kimani and Josephine
Thome, WHH, May 27, 2022).
Although the right to food has been enshrined in Malawi’s
constitution since 1994, citizens’ awareness of this entitlement remains just as nascent as in Kenya. Various efforts todevelop a right to food bill during the 2000s faced resistance28

Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance | Chapter 02 | 2022 Global Hunger Index

in these settings through continuous feedback from participants,

Niger represents a particularly fragile environment owing to grow-resulting in iterative shifts in the design of the multistakeholder plat-ing desertification, a struggling economy, and the presence of many

forms (Barletti et al. 2020).

nonstate armed groups along its borders. Nonetheless, community

In Peru, roundtables for local development in food security havegroups have coalesced in several thematic multistakeholder platforms

been led by Consorcio Agroecológico Peruano (CAP) and Red deto address targeted food system problems with support from the High

Agricultura Ecológica del Perú (RAE) in five districts surrounding

Commission for the Nigeriens Nourishing Nigeriens (HC3N) initia-

metropolitan Lima in the Lurín and Chillón valleys. The round­tables

tive. For instance, in 2021, HC3N facilitated an exchange between

build on existing, organic community structures that emerged during

farmers’ organizations and processors in the flour value chain. The

the COVID-19 pandemic, when residents of low-income neighbor-participants addressed challenges related to providing fortified flour

hoods in those valleys and elsewhere in the capital city organizedfrom local millet and sorghum at an affordable price and of consis-

soup kitchens known as “common pots.” These kitchens have con-tent quality for consumers while still ensuring that both processors

tinued as a survival strategy during the global inflation spurred by

and farmers can make a decent living from the value chain, given thethe war in Ukraine (Briceno 2022). CAP, RAE, and other nongovern-variations in access to and prices for inputs. Jointly, the participants

mental organizations work with these networks of popular kitchensfound consensus on several areas of action for policymakers to pur-and also incorporate farmer organizations, youth groups, and reli-sue (interview, Gervais Ntandou-Bouzitou, FAO-Niger and technicalgious associations. As in Bolivia, these roundtables meet regularly

assistant to HC3N, June 10, 2022).

either in person or virtually, organize around thematic groups, andfocus on improving local laws relevant to food systems (interview,
Juan Sanchez, CAP/RAE, June 6, 2022).

Lessons Learned and the Way Forward

While Bolivia and Peru deepened their decentralization processes

On their own, accountability tools may not directly improve food andin the mid-1990s and early 2000s, respectively, with executive may-nutrition security. However, as elaborated in this essay, the experi-

ors who have functional autonomy over specific aspects of the foodences of these various communities and civil society organizations

system, Nepal’s experience with local government is much morewith using performance tracking and multistakeholder platforms sug-recent. The country’s 2015 Constitution provides for three tiers ofgests several successes, such as the adoption of a new municipal law

government: national, provincial, and municipalities. Following thein Bolivia, more inclusive budgeting processes in Nepal, and improved

passage of the Local Government Operations Act (LGOA) in 2017service delivery in Malawi, all of which indirectly affect food accessand the 2017 local elections, municipalities received legal authority

and quality. Moreover, the practice of exercising oversight and partici-

to formulate and implement policies in 22 domains.

pation empowers communities to demand government responsivenessIn this delicate environment of newly empowered and elected

while increasing their awareness of their entitlements and the means

local governments, the civil society organization Aasaman Nepal

to access them. Though not sufficient, these actions are surely nec-

has focused on ensuring municipalities’ responsiveness to residents’essary in the continued quest for better food and nutrition security.

concerns about food and nutrition security, health, and other development needs. Since 2018 Aasaman Nepal has leveraged the seven-­

At the same time, several key lessons emerge from theseexperiences.

step local planning process that is integral to the LGOA, working inFirst, it is important to recognize that local governments often

eight municipalities in Madhesh Province where gender inequality,

have fewer resources and technical staff than their central govern-landlessness, food insecurity, and malnutrition are high. In eachment counterparts. Moreover, given the wide diversity of local gov-

municipality, participatory planning begins each year in February

ernment settings, it is important to ensure that governance efforts

at the settlement level, where communities discuss priorities andare well matched to conditions and capacities on the ground and todevelopment plans that are then streamlined at the next-highest

be realistic about the replicability of such tools. In more decentral-

administrative level, the ward, before being incorporated into theized settings, citizens may be able to draw on established planningmunicipal-level plans. Over the past three years, more and more

and budget structures, regular collection of administrative data, andplans have been approved by the municipalities, and in 2021 theskilled local bureaucrats to advance food policy. In countries thateight municipalities approved 341 settlement plans submitted by thehave only recently decentralized, citizens will need to internalize

groups through this process (interview, Mani Ram Acharya, Aasaman

the practices of local democracy and set up ways to participate in

Nepal, June 2, 2022).

implementing and overseeing development projects. In fragile andmore autocratic settings, organic community efforts may be the only

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 02 | Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance29

realistic channel for action on local food systems governance. Whenpossible, partners can learn from such efforts and facilitate thescaling up of such measures to other communities.
Second, local leadership is pivotal to the sustainability of local
interventions. In Peru, in mid-2022, concerns about whether local
elections in October 2022 will derail momentum on food commitments has led the civil society organizations Consorcio Agroecológico
Peruano (CAP) and Red de Agricultura Ecológica del Perú (RAE) toeducate all mayoral candidates about the work of multistakeholder
platforms in the Lurín and Chillón valleys. By contrast, in Nepal, a
new cadre of motivated local leaders elected in May 2022 createda window of opportunity for Aasaman Nepal to scale up its activities.
Similarly, while the municipal government of Madagascar’s capital city,
Antananarivo, has been a partner in the city’s Food Policy Council
since its inception in 2016, all projects are led by “champion” nongovernmental stakeholders who can ensure that momentum on foodpolicy continues even as mayors change (Andrianarisoa et al. 2019).
Third, those local communities with the worst hunger have themost to gain from improved accountability. However, owing to weakor poor governance, high levels of displacement, and a lack of security, initiatives to enhance accountability will encounter greater risks
of failure. Development partners need to be prepared for this potential trade-off and ensure that their planning and engagement with
communities incorporate a sufficiently long timeline and flexibility
in funding arrangements. In extremely fragile contexts affected byongoing crises and dominated by humanitarian coordination structures, any interventions to empower local communities to shapefood systems should also build on the Core Humanitarian Standard
on Quality and Accountability—a set of nine commitments designed
to hold humanitarian agencies accountable to affected populations(CHS Management Group 2022).
Overall, while the governance of food systems takes place at multiple levels, there are, even in the most fragile contexts, innovative
mechanisms and tools that can empower local communities to shapefood systems in ways that address hunger, food and nutrition security,
and related concerns. In places where local democracy is relatively
new, creating support for a culture of inclusion and accountability
inevitably requires a high degree of learning, patience, and realism.
The local milieu—whether neighborhood, district, or municipality—remains the main level at which citizens engage with the state
and where they are most directly affected by food policy and service delivery performance. Harnessing their experiences and mobilizing their voices is therefore pivotal for meaningful food systemtransformation that ultimately benefits all people, especially themost vulnerable.

30

PARTNER SPOTLIGHT
LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN A FRAGILE CONTEXT:MANAGING FOOD, FODDER,
AND CREDIT IN DIFFA, NIGER
Jean-Patrick Masquelier and Marilena Bachmeier
People in the Diffa region of Niger are facing a set of overlapping crises that are having dire consequences for their food andnutrition security. Land degradation, health epidemics, floods,
and massive displacement of people in the region due to thehigh level of insecurity caused by armed groups have reduced
agricultural production and placed severe pressure on alreadyvulnerable host communities. The limited resources available
are shared by host communities and displaced populations, withthe result that only 11 percent of communities can feed themselves through their own production (UNHCR 2021).
One example of effective local action is a recent project centered on community management of food, fodder, and credit.
To complement the emergency programs being implemented in
the region, the Shimodu Project3 put communities at the centerof designing integrated and sustainable development strategies
in cooperation with national and international partners. This initiative—which was funded by the European Union and implemented by a consortium made up of Agora and Alliance2015
members ACTED, Concern Worldwide, and Welthungerhilfe—sought to improve the living conditions and resilience of vulnerable groups, including displaced, refugee, and host populations.
As part of the Shimodu Project, community members,
local authorities, humanitarian actors, and the consortium
came together to identify needs in each locality. Based on theexpressed needs, the communities set up food and fodder banks
and established a warrantage system—that is, a system for providing loans to farmers against the value of their stored stocks offood and fodder—to improve food availability and access during
the lean season. The stocks of food and fodder built up in timesof relative abundance are sold at a price set by the communities themselves at general assemblies attended by all affectedhouseholds. In the lean season or during shocks like the current
food price crisis, the stocks are sold back to the communities,
protecting them from price increases for staple foods and fodder.
3

The full name of this project is the Integrated Resilience Support Project for Vulnerable
Refugee, Displaced, Returnee and Host Populations in the Diffa Region (Lake ChadBasin).

Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance | Chapter 02 | 2022 Global Hunger Index

In this way, vulnerable households gain access to both grain tofrom the private sector operating in the area while strengthen-feed their families and fodder for their livestock.

ing social cohesion.

The project, while centered on communities, involved close

Furthermore, the warrantage system has enabled community

cooperation with regional and departmental government officials

members to access local credit, which would otherwise not haveand humanitarian actors. Communities themselves constructbeen possible through local banks, and maximize their profitsand maintain the food and fodder banks, sell and replenish

by selling their stocks when prices are higher. The income gen-the stocks, and organize general assemblies. The committees

erated has enabled participants to endure the lean season bythat manage the banks maintain regular contact with the local

accessing food reserves stored in the food banks. The advan-

authorities, which provide technical support and training on,

tages of the system are twofold, as it not only allows families

for instance, financial and stock management. Furthermore,to guarantee the availability of food and fodder in anticipation

the project, together with the United Nations Office for theof the lean season, but also gives households access to income

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and government

they can use to start an economic activity to meet their needs

authorities, went beyond the food and fodder banks to develop

beyond food. The grants and supplies have enabled households

relevant humanitarian response and support plans for local

to increase both the quantity and quality of their food intake,communities. Working groups on food security and on water,

leading to overall improved nutrition and food security in thesanitation, and hygiene met to ensure the project’s activities

region (INTES 2021).4
By working with the local authorities, engaging civil soci-were aligned and coordinated with the overall humanitarian
response plan.

ety organizations such as women’s and youth associations, andDespite the challenging context, this initiative has enabled

exploiting synergies with research institutes through, for exam-

approximately 28,000 people in 4,000 households affected byple, action research and household assessments in collabora-

the security crisis in the Diffa region to integrate sustainably

tion with the University of Diffa and the Institut National de la

into the local economy. It has given them sustainable access to

Recherche Agronomique du Niger, the project has encouraged

basic social services, strengthened social cohesion, achieveda dialogue on resilient and sustainable food systems and helped

more inclusive local governance, and significantly improved foodstrengthen the resilience of communities affected by the over-and nutrition security.

lapping crises.

The project has generated a number of other promising
results as well. Municipalities and district institutions havestrengthened their networking, coordination, and peer learning. By sharing experiences, vulnerable households and communities have been able to reduce their negative coping strategies
and improve their living conditions. Various collective entities
have emerged to offer financial, agricultural, and other services,

Jean-Patrick Masquelier is country director, Concern Worldwide
Niger. Marilena Bachmeier is a project assistant, Deutsche
Welthungerhilfe e.V.
4

The description of project implementation and outcomes in this box is based on areport prepared by the implementers and donors. An independent evaluation has not
yet been undertaken.

such as village savings and loan associations, agricultural input
shops, food processing and marketing services, feed banks,
producers of animal feed known as densified multi-nutritional
blocks, and community animal health workers. These activities
have helped connect local development initiatives with actors

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 02 | Food Systems Transformation and Local Governance31

03

A woman harvests potatoes in Laja near La Paz, Bolivia.
A focus on local food governance is useful because
local conditions often form the basis of communities’
farming and livestock-rearing methods, natural
resource management practices, and food preferences.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The 2022 GHI reflects both the scandal of alarming hunger in toobuilding the capacity of local officials or encouraging local cham-many countries across the world as well as the changing trajectory inpions—especially women.

countries where decades of progress in tackling hunger is being eroded.
These recommendations highlight the need to respond to current> To enable oversight, governments and development partners needemergencies while also transforming food systems so they are more

to raise citizens’ awareness of their entitlements and of pathways

equitable, inclusive, sustainable, and resilient—and thus are able

to food and nutrition security. Citizens require a clear understand-to avert future crises.

ing of food systems activities and relevant processes, as well as
guaranteed access to data and information, so they can track

1

Put inclusive governance and accountability at the center ofgovernment performance and enforce their rights.

efforts to transform food systems.
> Governments must respect, protect, and fulfill the right to food,> Efforts to strengthen governance must be tailored to conditions

which should be enshrined in national law and supported byand capacities on the ground, given the diversity of local govern-mechanisms for redressing grievances. All actors, from citizens

ment settings. National governments should devolve responsibili-

to regional and international organizations to courts at all levels,

ties to lower administrative units and raise and allocate resources

should contribute to holding governments accountable.

that enable local authorities to understand and carry out their
responsibilities for local food and nutrition security.

> It is vital that governments strengthen inclusive coordination ofplanning and budgeting processes should take into account exist-

3 Scale up resources to address pressing humanitarian needs, whiletransforming food systems to make them resilient to shocks.

ing power imbalances and prioritize the voices of the most vul-

> The international community needs to mobilize greater public sup-food and nutrition policies at all levels. In particular, government

nerable and crisis-affected groups and constituencies. Support

port, increased investment, and more diverse sources of funding

must be directed to inclusive food governance bodies, such as

in order to meet escalating humanitarian needs, while at the same

food councils and other multi-actor platforms.

time scaling up essential resilience-building efforts. The 2022
United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27) and subse-> Governments must review, implement, and monitor their foodsystems commitments, including the national pathways launched

quent international fora must deliver commitments to accelerate
food system transformation for all.

at the 2021 United Nations Food Systems Summit, in an inclusive way and with an emphasis on accountability and governanceat all levels.

> In countries suffering from protracted crises, governments anddevelopment partners must use early warning systems and flexible contingency funds to anticipate shocks and quickly respond> At the global level, governments should strengthen the Committee

to them. Initiatives such as the Global Network Against Foodon World Food Security (CFS) so it can deliver on its mandate

Crises should be supported to ensure earlier responses usingas the central multilateral, inclusive global policy coordina-evidence-based interventions.

tion platform.
> Against the backdrop of global food security pressures, govern-

2 Ensure citizens’ participation, action, and oversight, and consider the local context.
> Stakeholders at all governance levels must harness local voices

and capacities. Communities, civil society organizations, small

ments should avoid ad hoc reactions such as export restrictions.
Rather, they should consider the use of food import facilities toensure that food price increases do not lead to increased hunger,social unrest, or conflict.

producers, farmers, and indigenous groups, with their local knowledge and lived experiences, should shape how access to nutri-> In situations of conflict, actors involved in humanitarian, develop-

tious food is governed; their capacities and good practices shouldment, and peace-building activities must come together to jointly

be supported, including in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

analyze and respond to the needs of conflict-affected people. Thisapproach will link the practical management of people’s immedi->

Strong local leadership is pivotal to the sustainability of local foodate needs with attention to their long-term livelihood needs, while

systems interventions and should be fostered by, for example,

also promoting reconciliation and peace building.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Chapter 03 | Policy Recommendations 33

A

APPENDIXESIn Herat, Afghanistan, a woman gathers saffron. She is a member of thecooperative Socio-Agricultural Women of Pashtoon Zarghoon District,which works with its local partner, the Rehabilitation Association andAgriculture Development for Afghanistan. The women in the cooperativegrow high-quality saffron, which they sell to help support their households.

METHODOLOGYThe Global Hunger Index (GHI) is a tool designed to compre-

BAof random measurement errors. These four indicators are all part

hensively measure and track hunger at global, regional, andof the indicator set used to measure progress toward the United

national levels, reflecting multiple dimensions of hunger over

Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

time.1 The GHI is intended to raise awareness and understanding of

the struggle against hunger, provide a way to compare levels of hunger between countries and regions, and call attention to those areasof the world where hunger levels are highest and where the need for
additional efforts to eliminate hunger is greatest.

BOX A.1 WHAT IS MEANT BY “HUNGER”?
The problem of hunger is complex, and different terms areused to describe its various forms.
Hunger is usually understood to refer to the distress

How the GHI Is Calculated

associated with a lack of sufficient calories. The Food

Each country’s GHI score is calculated based on a formula that com-and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

bines four indicators that together capture the multidimensional
nature of hunger:
Undernourishment: the share of the population whose
caloric intake is insufficient;defines food deprivation, or undernourishment, as the
habitual consumption of too few calories to provide theminimum dietary energy an individual requires to live ahealthy and productive life, given that person’s sex, age,stature, and physical activity level.3
Undernutrition goes beyond calories and signifies deficiencies in any or all of the following: energy, protein, and/Child stunting: the share of children under the age of five
who have low height for their age, reflecting

or essential vitamins and minerals. Undernutrition is theresult of inadequate intake of food in terms of either quan-chronic undernutrition;tity or quality, poor utilization of nutrients due to infections

Child wasting: the share of children under the age of fivecauses. These, in turn, result from a range of underly-

who have low weight for their height, reflecting acuteundernutrition; andChild mortality: the share of children who die before theirfifth birthday, reflecting in part the fatal mix of inade-or other illnesses, or a combination of these immediateing factors, including household food insecurity; inadequate maternal health or childcare practices; or inadequate
access to health services, safe water, and sanitation.
Malnutrition refers more broadly to both undernutrition(problems caused by deficiencies) and overnutrition (prob-

quate nutrition and unhealthy environments.2

lems caused by unbalanced diets that involve consuming

Using this combination of indicators to measure hunger offers

out low intake of micronutrient-rich foods). Overnutrition,

several advantages (see Table A.1). The indicators included in the
GHI formula reflect caloric deficiencies as well as poor nutrition.
The undernourishment indicator captures the food access situation of the population as a whole, while the indicators specific tochildren reflect the nutrition status within a particularly vulnerable
subset of the population for whom a lack of dietary energy, protein, and/or micronutrients (essential vitamins and minerals) leads
to a high risk of illness, poor physical and cognitive development,
and death. The inclusion of both child wasting and child stunting
allows the GHI to document both acute and chronic undernutrition.
By combining multiple indicators, the index minimizes the effects

too many calories in relation to requirements, with or withresulting in overweight, obesity, and noncommunicable diseases, is increasingly common throughout the world, with
implications for human health, government expenditures,and food systems development. While overnutrition is an
important concern, the GHI focuses specifically on issues
relating to undernutrition.
In this report, “hunger” refers to the index based on thefour component indicators (undernourishment, child stunting, child wasting, and child mortality). Taken together, thecomponent indicators reflect deficiencies in calories as wellas in micronutrients.
	The average minimum dietary energy requirement varies by country—fromabout 1,660 to more than 2,050 kilocalories (commonly, albeit incorrectly, referred to as calories) per person per day for all countries with available data for2021 (FAO 2022a).

3
1	For further background on the GHI concept, see Wiesmann, von Braun, and Feldbrügge(2000), Wiesmann (2006), and Wiesmann et al. (2015).

2

	According to Black et al. (2013), undernutrition is responsible for 45 percent of deaths
among children under the age of five.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Appendix A | Methodology35

A

GHI scores are calculated using a three-step process:

TABLE A.1

HOW THE FOUR INDICATORS UNDERLYING THE GHI
CAPTURE THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL NATURE OF HUNGER

1. Values are determined for the four component indicators for eachcountry, drawing on the latest published data available from internationally recognized sources.
Undernourishment

2. Each of the four component indicators is given a standardized
score based on thresholds set slightly above the highest country-­level values observed worldwide for that indicator since 1988.4
For example, the highest value for undernourishment estimated inthis period is 76.5 percent, so the threshold for standardization isset a bit higher, at 80 percent. In a given year, if a country has
5an undernourishment prevalence of 40 percent, its standardized
undernourishment score for that year is 50. In other words, that

• Measures inadequate
food access, an important
indicator of hunger• Refers to the entire
population, both children
and adults• Is used as a leadindicator for international
hunger targets, including
Sustainable Development
Goal 2 (Zero Hunger)

country is approximately halfway between having no undernourishment and reaching the maximum observed level. Here are theChild stuntingChild wasting• Go beyond calorie
availability, consider
aspects of diet quality
and utilization• Reflect children’s
particular vulnerability tonutritional deficiencies• Are sensitive to uneven
distribution of food within
the household• Are used as nutritionindicators for SDG 2(Zero Hunger)

Child mortality• Reflects that deathis the most serious
consequence of hunger,
and children are the mostvulnerable• Improves the GHI’s ability
to reflect deficiencies of
essential vitamins andminerals• Stunting and wasting
only partially capture themortality risk of undernutrition

formulas used to standardize each indicator:
Prevalence of undernourishment
x 100
80Child stunting rate
70

x 100

3. The standardized scores are aggregated to calculate the GHI score=standardized under­
nourishment value=s tandardized child­stunting value

contribute one-third of the GHI score, while child stunting andin the formula (Figure A.1).

Child wasting rate
30

x 100

=

standardized child­wasting valueChild mortality rate
35

x 100

=

standardized child­mortality value

for each country. Undernourishment and child mortality eachchild wasting each contribute one-sixth of the score, as shown

This calculation results in GHI scores on a 100-point scale, where
0 is the best score (no hunger) and 100 is the worst. In practice, neither of these extremes is reached. A value of 100 would signify that a	The thresholds for standardization are set slightly above the highest observed values to allow for the possibility that these values could be exceeded in the future.

4

	The threshold for undernourishment is 80, based on the observed maximum of 76.5 percent;the threshold for child wasting is 30, based on the observed maximum of 26.0 percent; thethreshold for child stunting is 70, based on the observed maximum of 68.2 percent; and thethreshold for child mortality is 35, based on the observed maximum of 32.6 percent. While
the thresholds were originally established based on the maximum values observed between
1988 and 2013, covering 25 years’ worth of available data prior to the methodological review process, these values have not been exceeded since then.

5

country’s undernourishment, child wasting, child stunting, and childmortality levels each exactly meets the thresholds set slightly above
the highest levels observed worldwide in recent decades. A value of
0 would mean that a country had no undernourished people in the
population, no children younger than five who were wasted or stunted,
and no children who died before their fifth birthday.

FIGURE A.1 COMPOSITION OF GHI SCORES AND SEVERITY DESIGNATIONS

1/3
Undernourishment+

1/6Child stunting+

1/6
Child wasting+

1/3
Child mortality

=

GHI
SCORE

Note: All indicator values are standardized.

GHI Severity of Hunger Scale
Low
GHI ≤ 9.9

Moderate
GHI 10.0–19.9

Serious
GHI 20.0–34.9

Alarming
GHI 35.0–49.9

Extremely alarming
GHI ≥ 50.0

100-point scale

36 Methodology | Appendix A | 2022 Global Hunger Index

Where the Indicator Data Come From

For some countries, data are missing because of violent conflict orpolitical unrest (FAO, IFAD et al. 2017; Martin-Shields and Stojetz

Data used in the calculation of GHI scores come from various UN and2019), which are strong predictors of hunger and undernutrition. The

other multilateral agencies, as shown in Table A.2. The GHI scorescountries with missing data may often be those facing the greatest

reflect the latest revised data available for the four indicators.6 Where

hunger burdens. Of the 4 countries provisionally designated as alarm-

original source data were unavailable, estimates for the GHI compo-

ing—Burundi, Somalia, South Sudan, and Syrian Arab Republic—it

nent indicators were made based on the most recent available data.

is possible that with complete data, one or more of them would fall
into the extremely alarming category. However, without sufficient
information to confirm that this is the case, we have conservatively

How Hunger Severity Is Determined forCountries with Incomplete Data

categorized each of these countries as alarming.
In some cases even a provisional severity designation could not

In this year’s GHI report, 136 countries met the criteria for inclusion

be determined, such as if the country had never previously had ain the GHI but 15 had insufficient data to allow for calculation ofprevalence of undernourishment value, GHI score, or GHI designa-a 2022 GHI score. To address this gap and give a preliminary pic-tion since the first GHI report was published in 2006. Also, in one

ture of hunger in the countries with missing data, provisional desig-

case, Libya, it was determined that the situation in the country had

nations of the severity of hunger were determined based on several

changed to such an extent since its last inclusion in a GHI report in

known factors (Table A.3):

2014 that it did not provide a sufficient benchmark for classification.

>

those GHI indicator values that are available,>

the country’s last known GHI severity designation,

In the cases of Somalia, South Sudan, and the Syrian Arab Republic,
data were unavailable for three out of four GHI indicators. However,>7

the country’s last known prevalence of undernourishment,a review of the relevant information in the 2020, 2021, and 2022>

the prevalence of undernourishment for the subregion ineditions of the Global Report on Food Crises as well as consultations

which the country is located, and/orwith experts on food and nutrition insecurity in these countries madeassessment of the relevant findings of the 2020, 2021, andclear that designations of alarming were justified.

>

2022 editions of the Global Report on Food Crises (FSIN and
GNAFC 2020, 2021, 2022).8	For previous GHI calculations, see von Grebmer et al. (2021, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017,2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008); IFPRI, WHH, and Concern
Worldwide (2007); and Wiesmann, Weingärtner, and Schöninger (2006).

6	Previously published undernourishment values, GHI scores, and GHI severity classifications
are not considered valid once superseding reports have been issued, but are used as benchmarks to consider the plausibility of a country falling into a broad range of undernourishment
values and GHI scores.

7	The Global Reports on Food Crises report on acute food insecurity, which is different fromchronic hunger as measured by the prevalence of undernourishment. However, the 2020,
2021, and 2022 GRFCs were used to confirm whether a country experienced extreme hunger
crises such as famine, threat of famine, and/or repeated hunger crises in 2019, 2020, and
2021.

8

TABLE A.2

DATA SOURCES AND REFERENCE YEARS FOR THE GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX COMPONENT INDICATORS,
2000, 2007, 2014, AND 2022
Reference years for indicator data

Indicator

Data sources

2000
GHI scores(117 countries)

2007
GHI scores(120 countries)

2014
GHI scores(121 countries)

2022
GHI scores(121 countries)

Prevalence ofundernourishment

FAO 2022a

2000–2002a

2006–2008a

2013–2015a

2019–2021a

Child stunting
and wasting

WHO 2022; UNICEF, WHO, and WorldBank 2022; UNICEF 2022a, 2013,
and 2009; MEASURE DHS 2022

1998–2002b

2005–2009c2012–2016d

2017–2021eChildmortality

UN IGME 2021

2000

2007

2014

2020

Note: The number of countries for which sufficient data were available to calculate GHI scores for each year or time span is shown in parentheses.
aThree-year average.			
Data collected from the years closest to 2000; where data from 1998 and 2002 or 1999 and 2001 were available, an average was used. 			
c
Data collected from the years closest to 2007; where data from 2005 and 2009 or 2006 and 2008 were available, an average was used.
d
Data collected from the years closest to 2014; where data from 2012 and 2016 or 2013 and 2015 were available, an average was used.
e
The latest data gathered in this period.
b2022 Global Hunger Index | Appendix A | Methodology37

B
A

TABLE A.3

A

EXISTING DATA AND PROVISIONAL SEVERITY DESIGNATIONS FOR COUNTRIES WITH INCOMPLETE DATACountry2022 GHI
provisional severity
designation

Child stunting,2017–2021 (%)

Child wasting,2017–2021 (%)

Child mortality,
2020 (%)

Last GHI
categorization

Last prevalence ofundernourishment
value (%)

Subregional
prevalence ofundernourishment (%)

Range of prevalenceof undernourishment
values for provisional
designation (%)

GuineaSerious

30.3

9.2

9.6

Serious (2019)16.5 (2019)12.5

0.0–32.4

Mozambique

Serious

37.5

3.9

7.1

Serious (2021)

31.2 (2021)

29.2

5.0–41.0

UgandaSerious

25.4

3.6

4.3

Serious (2019)41.0 (2019)29.2

18.7–54.7

Zimbabwe

Serious

23.5

2.9

5.4

Serious (2019)51.3 (2019)29.2

18.2–54.2

BurundiAlarming

50.9

5.7

5.4

Extremely alarming(2014)

67.3 (2014)

29.2

34.9–70.8

Somalia

Alarming

—

—

11.5

Extremely alarming(2021)

59.5 (2021)

29.2

**

South Sudan

Alarming

—

—

9.8

—

—

29.2

**

Syrian Arab
Republic

Alarming

—

—

2.2

Moderate (2014)

6.0 (2014)

10.0

**

BahrainNot designated

1.2*

2.3*

0.7

—

—

10.0

N/A

BhutanNot designated

20.5*

2.5*

2.8

—

—

15.3

N/A

Equatorial Guinea

Not designated

25.6*

3.9*

7.8

—

—

30.5

N/A

Eritrea

Not designated

—

—

3.9

Extremely alarming(2014)

61.3 (2014)

29.2

N/A

Libya

Not designated

29.7*

8.2*

1.1

Low (2014)

1.4 (2014)

6.1

N/A

Maldives

Not designated

15.3

9.1

0.6

—

—

15.3

N/A

Qatar

Not designated

0.6*

3.7*

0.6

—

—

10.0

N/A

Source: Authors, based on sources listed in this appendix and previous GHI publications included in the bibliography.
Note: Years in parentheses show when the relevant information was published in the GHI report. 			
* Authors’ estimate. **Designation based on FSIN and GNAFC (2020, 2021, and 2022), and consultations with experts.				
N/A = not applicable; — = not available.				

Understanding and Using the Global Hunger Index:
FAQs
Which countries are included in the GHI?
Inclusion in the GHI is determined based on prevalence of under-

conflict, which affects the availability of data as well as the foodsecurity and nutrition situation in the country. It is possible that
one or more of these countries would have a higher GHI score than
Yemen—the country with the highest 2022 GHI score—if sufficient
data were available.

nourishment and child mortality data dating back to 2000. Countries
with values above the “very low” threshold for one or both of theseWhy is a certain country’s GHI score so high (or so low)?

indicators since 2000 are included in the GHI. Specifically, coun-

The key to understanding a country’s GHI score lies in that country’s

tries are included if the prevalence of undernourishment was at orindicator values, especially when compared with the indicator values

above 5.0 percent and/or if the child mortality rate was at or above

for other countries in the report (see Appendix B for these values).

1.0 percent for any year since 2000. Data on child stunting and child

For some countries, high scores are driven by high rates of under-

wasting, the other indicators used in the calculation of GHI scores,

nourishment, reflecting a lack of calories for large swathes of theare not included in the inclusion criteria because their availability

population. For others, high scores result from high levels of childvaries widely from country to country, with data especially limited

wasting, reflecting acute undernutrition; child stunting, reflecting

for higher-income countries.9 Non-independent territories are notchronic undernutrition; and/or child mortality, reflecting children’s

included in the GHI, nor are countries with very small populations

hunger and nutrition levels, in addition to other extreme challenges(under 500,000 inhabitants), owing to limited data availability.

facing the population. Broadly speaking, then, a high GHI score can

Because data for all four indicators in the GHI formula are not

be evidence of a lack of food, a poor-quality diet, inadequate childavailable for every country, GHI scores could not be calculated for

caregiving practices, an unhealthy environment, or a combinationsome. However, where possible, countries with incomplete data areof these factors.

provisionally categorized according to the GHI Severity of Hunger

While it is beyond the scope of this report to provide a detailed

Scale based on existing data and complementary reports (see Table

explanation of the circumstances facing each country with a GHI score,A.3). Several of these countries are experiencing unrest or violent

Chapter 1 describes the situation in select countries. Furthermore,this report offers other avenues for examining a country’s hunger	Even though food insecurity is a serious concern for segments of the population in certain
high-income countries, nationally representative data for child stunting and child wasting
are not regularly collected in most high-income countries. In addition, although data onchild mortality are usually available for these countries, child mortality does not reflect undernutrition in high-income countries to the same extent it does in low- and middle-income
countries.

9and nutrition situation: country rankings based on 2022 GHI scoresappear in Table 1.1, GHI scores for selected years for each country
appear in Appendix C, and regional comparisons appear in Appendix

38 Methodology | Appendix A | 2022 Global Hunger IndexD. (Case studies of the hunger situation in specific countries appear

positively or negatively in a specific country from year to year, whereas

on the GHI website, www.globalhungerindex.org.)in some cases the change may partly or fully reflect a data revision.

B
A

Moreover, the methodology for calculating GHI scores has been
Does the 2022 GHI reflect the situation in 2022?

revised in the past and may be revised again in the future. In 2015, for

The GHI uses the most up-to-date data available for each of the GHI

example, the GHI methodology was changed to include data on childindicators, meaning the scores are only as current as the data. For

stunting and wasting and to standardize the values (see Wiesmann etthe calculation of the 2022 GHI scores, undernourishment data are

al. 2015). This change caused a major shift in the GHI scores, andfrom 2019–2021; child stunting and child wasting data are fromthe GHI Severity of Hunger Scale was modified to reflect this shift.

2017–2021, with the most current data from that range used for eachIn the GHI reports published since 2015, almost all countries havecountry; and child mortality data are from 2020. In 2022, owing to

had much higher GHI scores compared with their scores in reports

the conflict in Ukraine and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the val-published in 2014 and earlier. This does not necessarily mean theirues of some of the GHI component indicators, and in turn the GHI

hunger levels rose in 2015—the higher scores merely reflect thescores, are likely to worsen, but any changes that occur in 2022 arerevision of the methodology. The 2000, 2007, 2014, and 2022 GHI

not yet reflected in the data and scores in this year’s report.

scores shown in this year’s report are all comparable because they
all reflect the revised methodology and the latest revisions of data.

How can I compare GHI results over time?
Each report includes GHI scores and indicator data for three refer-

Can I compare the GHI rankings in this report to those in previous

ence years in addition to the focus year. In this report, the 2022

reports to understand how the situation in a country has changed over

GHI scores can be directly compared with the GHI scores given fortime relative to other countries?

three reference years—2000, 2007, and 2014 (Appendix C). The

No—like the GHI scores and indicator values, GHI rankings cannot

reference years are selected to provide an assessment of progress

be compared between GHI reports, for two main reasons. First, theover time while also ensuring there is no overlap in the range of years

data and methodology used to calculate GHI scores have been revised

from which the data are drawn.

over time, as described above. Second, the ranking in each year’s
report often includes different countries because the set of coun-

Can I compare the GHI scores and indicator values in this report withtries for which sufficient data are available to calculate GHI scores

results from previous reports?

varies from year to year. Thus, if a country’s ranking changes from

No—GHI scores are comparable within each year’s report, but not

one report to the next, this may be in part because it is being com-

between different years’ reports. The current and historical data on

pared with a different group of countries.

which the GHI scores are based are continually being revised andimproved by the United Nations agencies that compile them, andeach year’s GHI report reflects these changes. Comparing scores
between reports may create the impression that hunger has changed

DATA UNDERLYING THE CALCULATION OF THE 2000, 2007, 2014, AND 2022 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES
Guide to the colors shown in Appendix B
The colors shown in the table represent the following categories:= Very low= Low= Medium= High= Very high

They are based on thresholds for the different indicator values, as follows:
Category

Undernourishment

Child wastingChild stuntingChild mortality

Very low

<5%

<2.5%

<2.5%

<1%

Low

5–<15%

2.5–<5%

2.5–<10%

1–<4%

Medium

15–<25%

5–<10%

10–<20%

4–<7%

High

25–<35%10–<15%20–<30%

7–<10%

Very high

≥35%

≥15%

≥30%

≥10%

Note: Threshold values for the prevalence of undernourishment are adapted from FAO (2015). Threshold values for child stunting and child wasting are from de Onis et al. (2019).
Threshold values for child mortality are adapted from those shown in UN IGME (2021) but condensed to the five categories shown.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Appendix A | Appendix B39

B

B
A

DATA UNDERLYING THE CALCULATION OF THE 2000, 2007, 2014, AND 2022 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES
Undernourishment(% of population)

CountryChild wasting(% of children under five years old)Child stunting(% of children under five years old)Child mortality(% of children under five years old)

'00–'02'06–'08'13–'15'19–'21'98–'02'05–'09'12–'16'17–'21'98–'02'05–'09'12–'16'17–'21

2000

2007

2014

2020

Afghanistan

47.8

29.8

20.7

29.8

10.9 *

8.3 *

9.5

5.1

50.6 *

51.1 *

40.4

38.2

12.9

10.0

7.4

5.8

Albania

4.9

8.3

5.0

3.9

12.2

8.5

4.5 *

1.6

39.2

25.0

15.2 *

11.3

2.7

1.7

1.0

1.0

Algeria

8.0

5.9

2.9

<2.5

3.1

4.1

4.1

2.7

23.6

15.4

11.7

9.8

4.0

3.1

2.5

2.3

Angola

67.5

46.1

13.7

20.8

11.2 *

8.2

4.9

6.1 *

46.7 *

29.2

37.6

29.8 *

20.4

14.7

9.3

7.1

Argentina

3.0

3.3

<2.5

3.7

1.7 *

1.2

1.6 *

2.7

10.5 *

8.2

8.3 *

12.3

2.0

1.6

1.2

0.9

Armenia

26.1

6.9

2.8

3.5

2.5

5.4

4.4

3.1 *

17.3

17.9

9.4

11.4 *

3.1

2.1

1.5

1.1

Azerbaijan

17.0

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

9.0

6.8

3.2

3.8 *

24.2

26.5

17.8

12.9 *

7.4

4.6

2.8

1.9

Bahrain

—

—

—

—

3.6 *

2.7 *

2.5 *

2.3 *

1.8 *

1.4 *

1.3 *

1.2 *

1.2

1.0

0.8

0.7

Bangladesh

15.9

13.9

14.1

11.4

12.5

17.5

14.4

9.8

51.1

43.2

36.2

28.0

8.6

5.8

4.0

2.9

Belarus

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

2.2 *

2.2

2.2 *

2.2 *

6.2 *

4.5

3.5 *

3.5 *

1.3

0.7

0.4

0.3

Benin

17.2

10.1

7.4

7.4

9.0

5.0

4.5

5.0

36.2

37.4

34.0

32.2

13.7

11.6

10.0

8.6

Bhutan

—

—

—

—

2.5

4.5

3.0 *

2.5 *

47.7

34.9

25.5 *

20.5 *

7.7

5.1

3.5

2.8

Bolivia (Plurinat. State of)

27.9

23.9

15.6

13.9

1.6

1.4

1.7

1.4 *

33.2

27.1

17.1

18.0 *

7.6

5.0

3.3

2.5

Bosnia & Herzegovina

3.2

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

7.4

4.0

2.3

3.3 *

12.1

11.8

8.9

7.7 *

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.6

Botswana

23.7

22.2

19.3

21.9

5.9

7.3

5.8 *

5.2 *

29.1

28.9

18.7 *

15.4 *

8.0

5.9

5.0

4.5

Brazil

10.7

5.6

2.5

4.1

2.3 *

1.8

1.5 *

1.3 *

9.9 *

7.0

6.8 *

6.5 *

3.5

2.2

1.6

1.5

Bulgaria

4.0

4.6

3.3

3.0

4.7 *

4.7

6.3

4.4 *

10.8 *

9.2

7.0

6.9 *

1.8

1.2

0.9

0.6

Burkina Faso

22.6

16.0

11.8

18.0

15.5

11.3

8.5

7.7

41.4

35.1

29.0

19.6

17.9

13.9

10.5

8.5

—

—

—

—

8.1

9.0

5.0 *

5.7

64.0

57.7

53.7 *

50.9

15.4

11.0

7.1

5.4

14.5

12.3

16.2

17.7

3.7 *

3.2 *

2.6 *

2.4 *

15.0 *

9.9 *

8.2 *

7.2 *

3.8

2.8

2.1

1.4
2.6

BurundiCabo VerdeCambodia

23.6

14.8

9.2

6.3

17.1

8.8

9.7

9.5 *

49.0

41.1

32.4

28.1 *

10.6

5.5

3.3

Cameroon

22.9

12.6

5.3

6.7

6.2

7.6

5.2

4.3

38.2

37.6

31.7

28.9

14.4

12.1

9.2

7.2

Central African Republic

39.2

35.7

47.9

52.2

10.4

12.1

6.2

5.3

44.4

43.6

38.0

40.0

16.9

15.6

12.8

10.3

Chad

38.8

39.2

27.0

32.7

13.9

15.5 *

13.3

10.2

38.9

37.0 *

39.8

31.1

18.4

16.0

13.2

11.0

Chile

3.4

3.1

3.0

2.6

0.5

0.3

0.3

0.3 *

3.0

2.1

1.8

1.8 *

1.1

0.9

0.8

0.7

China

10.0

5.0

<2.5

<2.5

2.5

2.6

1.9

1.9

17.8

9.8

8.1

4.8

3.7

2.0

1.2

0.7

Colombia

8.7

11.0

7.5

8.2

1.0

1.6

1.6

0.9 *

18.2

16.0

12.7

10.2 *

2.5

2.0

1.6

1.3

Comoros

27.1

19.6

20.0

20.4

13.3

9.7 *

11.2

10.4 *

46.9

39.6 *

31.1

28.7 *

10.1

9.2

7.5

6.1

Congo (Republic of)

27.0

35.4

25.3

31.6

9.8 *

8.0

8.2

7.9 *

29.9 *

31.2

21.2

26.4 *

11.4

7.4

5.4

4.5

Costa Rica

4.7

3.8

4.7

3.4

2.2 *

1.0

1.3 *

1.8

11.0 *

5.6

5.3 *

9.0

1.3

1.1

0.9

0.8

Côte d'Ivoire

20.4

17.9

9.2

4.4

6.9

14.0

6.8

4.8 *

31.2

39.0

25.8

20.4 *

14.3

11.8

9.4

7.8

Croatia

6.8

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

1.3 *

1.1 *

1.1 *

1.0 *

1.3 *

1.0 *

0.9 *

0.8 *

0.8

0.6

0.5

0.5

Dem. Rep. of the Congo

32.2

34.5

35.1

39.8

15.9

10.4

8.1

6.4

44.4

45.8

42.7

41.8

15.9

12.7

9.9

8.1

Djibouti

42.0

25.1

15.7

13.5

19.4

17.0

13.9

10.1

27.1

33.0

28.0

20.9

10.1

8.4

6.8

5.6

Dominican Republic

20.4

16.2

8.2

6.7

1.5

2.3

2.4

2.2

7.7

10.1

7.1

6.7

4.0

3.6

3.5

3.4

Ecuador

21.0

22.1

8.7

15.4

2.7

2.1

1.6

3.7

27.9

25.9

23.9

23.0

3.0

2.2

1.6

1.3

Egypt

5.2

5.7

4.2

5.1

7.0

7.9

9.5

5.5 *

24.4

30.7

22.3

22.4 *

4.7

3.3

2.4

1.9

El Salvador

7.2

9.7

10.8

7.7

1.5

1.6

2.1

1.0 *

32.3

20.8

13.6

14.3 *

3.3

2.3

1.6

1.3

Equatorial Guinea

—

—

—

—

9.2

3.4 *

3.0 *

3.9 *

42.7

30.0 *

24.7 *

25.6 *

15.6

12.4

9.7

7.8

15.0

—

—

—

43.0

—

—

—

8.5

6.2

4.8

3.9

1.6 *

1.6 *

1.5

1.4 *

1.5 *

1.2 *

1.2

1.1 *

1.1

0.6

0.3

0.2
4.7

Eritrea

—

—

—

—

Estonia

3.6

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

Eswatini

10.5

10.7

12.7

11.0

1.7

2.9

2.0

1.4 *

36.5

29.2

25.5

27.2 *

11.2

10.4

6.2

Ethiopia

47.0

35.0

15.9

24.9

12.4

12.4

8.8

6.8

57.4

50.0

40.4

36.8

14.1

9.7

6.6

4.9

Fiji

4.0

3.7

6.3

5.7

7.9 *

6.6 *

6.2 *

4.6

5.6 *

4.3 *

3.9 *

7.2

2.2

2.4

2.4

2.7

Gabon

10.7

15.9

13.3

17.2

4.2

3.8 *

3.4

3.3 *

25.9

21.0 *

17.0

17.8 *

8.3

6.9

5.3

4.2

Gambia

17.8

18.7

10.5

21.6

9.1

7.4

11.0

5.1

24.1

27.7

24.6

17.5

11.3

8.4

6.2

4.9

Georgia

7.7

4.0

7.9

7.6

3.1

2.1

0.6 *

0.6

16.1

13.2

6.0 *

5.8

3.7

1.9

1.1

0.9

Ghana

14.9

9.4

7.1

4.1

9.9

7.3

4.7

6.8

30.6

28.2

18.8

17.5

10.0

7.8

5.7

4.5

Guatemala

22.2

18.2

17.7

16.0

3.7

1.0

0.8

1.4 *

51.0

51.5

46.7

38.2 *

5.2

3.9

2.9

2.4

GuineaGuinea-Bissau

—

—

—

—

10.3

7.2

7.8

9.2

46.9

34.0

32.6

30.3

16.4

12.7

10.9

9.6

15.6

16.3

26.7

31.7

11.8

7.6 *

6.0

6.5

33.8

31.0 *

27.6

27.9

17.4

13.2

9.6

7.7

Guyana

6.5

7.5

7.0

4.9

12.1

8.3

6.4

6.4

13.9

17.9

11.3

9.1

4.6

4.0

3.4

2.8

Haiti

50.7

50.1

42.6

47.2

5.5

10.2

4.6

3.7

28.8

29.6

22.7

21.9

10.4

8.5

7.2

6.0

Honduras

21.9

21.0

14.6

15.3

1.3

1.4

1.4

1.9

35.5

29.8

22.6

18.7

3.7

2.7

2.0

1.6

Hungary

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

2.0 *

1.9 *

1.9 *

1.6 *

11.2 *

9.3 *

8.1 *

7.9 *

1.0

0.7

0.5

0.4

India

18.4

17.5

14.8

16.3

17.1

20.0

15.1

19.3

54.2

47.8

38.7

35.5

9.2

6.8

4.6

3.3

Indonesia

19.2

18.5

7.9

6.5

5.5

14.8

13.5

10.2

42.4

40.1

36.4

30.8

5.2

3.8

2.9

2.3

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

4.8

5.7

4.9

4.1

6.1

4.1 *

3.7 *

4.3

20.4

8.4 *

7.4 *

4.8

3.6

2.3

1.6

1.3

Iraq

22.1

17.8

17.3

15.9

6.6

5.8

4.5 *

3.0

28.1

27.5

16.7 *

12.6

4.4

3.8

3.1

2.5

Jamaica

7.4

8.3

9.3

6.9

3.0

2.7

3.6

3.2

7.2

5.4

6.0

4.6

2.2

1.9

1.6

1.3

Jordan

9.7

6.1

6.0

16.9

2.5

1.6

2.4

0.6

11.7

8.2

7.8

7.4

2.7

2.2

1.8

1.5

Kazakhstan

6.5

5.1

<2.5

<2.5

2.5

4.9

3.1

4.1 *

13.2

17.5

8.0

9.1 *

4.2

2.7

1.3

1.0

Kenya

32.2

26.9

19.6

26.9

7.4

6.9

4.2

4.8 *

40.8

40.3

26.2

23.6 *

9.8

6.8

5.1

4.2

Korea (DPR)

35.7

38.2

39.6

41.6

12.2

5.2

4.0

2.5

51.0

32.4

27.9

19.1

6.0

3.2

2.2

1.7

Kuwait

2.6

<2.5

<2.5

2.7

2.2

3.6

2.4

2.5

4.0

5.1

5.8

6.4

1.2

1.1

0.9

0.9

Kyrgyzstan

15.0

9.6

6.1

5.3

3.1 *

3.4

2.8

2.0

22.3 *

18.1

12.9

11.8

5.0

3.6

2.3

1.8

Lao PDR

31.2

20.1

8.0

5.1

17.5

7.4

9.7

9.0

47.5

47.7

35.5

33.1

10.7

7.9

5.6

4.4

Latvia

4.6

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

2.3 *

2.0 *

1.9 *

2.1 *

4.3 *

2.4 *

2.2 *

1.8 *

1.4

0.9

0.5

0.4

Lebanon

7.8

9.9

5.5

10.9

4.8 *

4.4 *

4.4 *

3.9 *

16.0 *

14.7 *

12.9 *

13.3 *

2.0

1.2

0.9

0.7

40

Data Underlying the Calculation of Global Hunger Index Scores | Appendix B | 2022 Global Hunger Index

DATA UNDERLYING THE CALCULATION OF THE 2000, 2007, 2014, AND 2022 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES
Undernourishment(% of population)

CountryChild wasting(% of children under five years old)Child stunting(% of children under five years old)Child mortality(% of children under five years old)

'00–'02'06–'08'13–'15'19–'21'98–'02'05–'09'12–'16'17–'21'98–'02'05–'09'12–'16'17–'21

2000

2007

2014

2020

Lesotho

20.0

12.4

26.1

34.7

6.7 *

5.6

2.8

2.1

44.1 *

42.0

33.4

34.6

10.7

11.4

9.4

9.0

Liberia

36.6

34.4

36.8

38.3

7.4

7.9

5.6

3.4

45.3

39.6

32.1

29.8

19.0

11.4

9.2

7.8

Libya

—

—

—

—

9.4 *

6.5

10.2

8.2 *

34.3 *

21.0

38.1

29.7 *

2.8

2.0

1.4

1.1

Lithuania

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

5.3 *

2.0 *

2.0 *

2.0 *

3.6 *

2.1 *

1.8 *

1.5 *

1.1

0.8

0.5

0.3

Madagascar

33.8

30.5

37.6

48.5

9.6 *

9.5 *

7.5

7.7

55.0 *

49.4

48.9

39.8

10.5

7.8

6.1

5.0

Malawi

23.6

19.3

15.4

17.8

6.8

4.2

3.8

2.2

54.7

53.1

42.4

35.2

17.5

10.0

5.8

3.9

Malaysia

2.5

3.6

3.6

<2.5

15.3

13.2

8.0

9.7

20.7

17.5

17.7

21.8

1.0

0.8

0.8

0.9

Maldives

—

—

—

—

13.4

10.6

9.4 *

9.1

31.9

19.0

16.5 *

15.3

3.9

1.8

1.1

0.6

Mali

16.2

10.4

3.6

9.8

12.6

15.4

13.1

9.3

42.5

37.6

28.1

22.1

18.7

14.5

11.2

9.1

Mauritania

8.3

8.1

8.0

10.1

15.3

13.6

14.8

8.3

38.6

31.5

27.9

21.6

11.2

10.4

8.5

7.1

Mauritius

5.7

5.2

5.3

7.8

14.6 *

14.0 *

12.6 *

11.5 *

12.5 *

11.3 *

9.8 *

9.0 *

1.9

1.5

1.5

1.7

Mexico

3.3

4.1

4.4

6.1

2.0

2.0

1.0

1.6

21.4

15.5

12.4

13.9

2.8

2.1

1.7

1.4

Moldova (Republic of)

24.6

30.7

6.4

6.7

4.2 *

5.8

1.9

2.7 *

13.1 *

10.7

6.4

5.4 *

3.2

1.8

1.6

1.4

Mongolia

31.1

25.2

10.1

3.6

7.1

2.7

1.0

0.9

29.8

27.5

10.8

9.4

6.3

3.4

2.0

1.5

Montenegro

9.6

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

—

4.2

2.8

2.2

—

7.9

9.4

7.2

—

0.9

0.4

0.2

Morocco

6.3

5.5

4.1

5.6

4.1 *

3.5 *

3.1 *

2.6

24.8 *

19.4 *

15.8 *

15.1

5.2

3.7

2.5

1.9

Mozambique
Myanmar

—

—

—

—

8.1

4.2

4.4

3.9

50.7

43.5

42.3

37.5

17.0

11.9

8.8

7.1

37.6

20.5

5.1

3.1

10.7

9.0 *

6.6

6.7

40.8

37.9 *

29.4

26.7

9.0

7.2

5.4

4.4
4.0

Namibia

13.5

23.5

21.5

18.0

10.0

7.6

7.1

6.1 *

29.3

29.2

22.7

16.6 *

7.6

6.1

4.8

Nepal

23.5

14.9

6.1

5.5

11.3

12.7

11.3

12.0

56.1

49.1

37.1

31.5

7.9

5.3

3.7

2.8

Nicaragua

27.5

21.6

19.7

18.6

2.3

1.5

2.2

1.1 *

25.1

23.1

17.3

15.4 *

3.9

2.7

2.0

1.6

Niger

22.3

17.7

13.2

19.8

16.2

12.5

14.2

11.5

53.5

49.2

42.2

44.4

22.5

14.9

9.8

7.8

Nigeria

8.9

6.6

9.2

12.7

14.0 *

10.1 *

7.9

6.5

48.3 *

41.1 *

33.6

31.5

18.3

14.6

12.8

11.4

North Macedonia

7.5

3.6

3.5

3.3

1.7

3.4

2.3 *

3.4

8.0

11.3

4.1 *

4.3

1.6

1.2

1.1

0.6

Oman

12.3

9.7

7.1

9.8

7.8

7.1

7.5

9.3

15.8

9.8

14.1

11.4

1.6

1.2

1.1

1.1

Pakistan

21.1

15.8

13.4

16.9

14.1

12.0 *

10.5

7.1

41.4

42.0 *

45.0

37.6

10.8

9.3

7.8

6.5

Panama

24.5

16.2

8.3

5.8

1.4 *

1.2

1.2 *

1.1

21.4 *

19.0

15.1 *

15.9

2.6

2.2

1.8

1.4

Papua New Guinea

26.3

26.6

23.1

21.6

8.1 *

4.4

7.4 *

6.9 *

48.0 *

43.9

43.2 *

39.6 *

7.1

6.2

5.2

4.4

Paraguay

10.5

9.4

7.1

8.7

1.6

1.1

1.8

1.2 *

13.2 *

17.1

8.1

8.0 *

3.4

2.9

2.3

1.9

Peru

21.5

13.7

5.4

8.3

1.1

0.8

0.6

0.4

31.3

28.0

14.8

11.4

3.8

2.3

1.6

1.3

Philippines

18.7

12.1

11.1

5.2

8.0

6.6

7.6

5.7

38.3

32.0

30.0

29.5

3.8

3.3

3.0

2.6

—

—

—

—

5.1 *

3.9 *

3.6 *

3.7 *

7.9 *

5.3 *

4.6 *

0.6 *

1.2

1.0

0.8

0.6

Qatar
Romania

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

4.3

2.9 *

3.1 *

2.9 *

12.8

10.9 *

9.6 *

9.0 *

2.2

1.5

1.0

0.7

Russian Federation

4.0

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

4.8 *

4.2 *

4.2 *

4.4 *

16.7 *

13.0 *

13.0 *

13.4 *

1.9

1.2

0.9

0.5

Rwanda

38.5

32.3

35.1

35.8

8.7

5.0

2.1

1.1

47.9

49.0

37.6

33.1

18.5

8.4

5.0

4.0

Saudi Arabia

4.9

4.8

4.3

3.7

7.7 *

11.8

5.5 *

5.3 *

11.0 *

9.3

6.8 *

6.3 *

2.2

1.5

1.0

0.7

Senegal

24.1

13.6

11.8

7.5

10.0

8.7

5.9

8.1

26.0

19.9

18.8

18.3

13.0

7.9

5.2

3.8

Serbia

3.1

<2.5

3.7

3.3

—

4.5

3.9

2.6

—

8.1

6.0

5.4

—

0.8

0.7

0.6

Sierra Leone

50.7

41.7

25.0

27.4

11.6

10.2

4.6

6.3

35.5

45.0

29.1

26.3

22.5

18.2

13.9

10.8

Slovakia

6.1

5.4

5.8

3.8

2.3 *

2.1 *

2.0 *

1.9 *

9.3 *

7.3 *

6.6 *

6.2 *

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.6

Solomon Islands

13.3

12.6

18.7

18.1

6.3 *

4.3

8.5

5.7 *

34.2 *

32.8

31.7

29.0 *

3.1

2.8

2.3

1.9

Somalia

—

—

—

—

19.3

13.3

—

—

29.2

42.0

—

—

17.3

17.0

13.8

11.5

South Africa

3.9

3.6

4.8

6.9

4.5

4.8

3.5

3.4

30.1

24.9

21.4

21.4

7.2

7.5

3.8

3.2

South Sudan

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

9.8

9.8

16.7

11.8

6.0

3.4

15.9

15.2

18.2

15.0 *

18.3

18.1

15.9

13.4 *

1.6

1.3

0.9

0.7

Sudan

21.5

16.7

11.1

12.8

—

—

16.3

16.9 *——

38.2

36.5 *

—

—

6.8

5.7

Suriname

11.8

8.8

7.3

8.2

7.0

4.9

5.1 *

5.5

14.1

10.6

8.8 *

8.3

3.1

2.5

2.1

1.8

—

—

—

—

4.9

10.3

—

—

24.3

28.7

—

—

2.3

1.9

4.7

2.2

Tajikistan

40.9

36.2

18.4

8.6

9.4

6.9

6.7

5.6

42.1

39.3

23.3

17.5

8.4

4.9

3.8

3.2

Tanzania (United Rep. of)

33.1

25.7

22.5

22.6

5.6

3.2

3.8

3.5

48.3

43.8

34.7

31.8

13.0

8.4

6.0

4.9

Thailand

17.3

10.2

7.8

8.8

7.5 *

4.7

6.7

7.7

21.6 *

15.7

16.4

13.4

2.2

1.6

1.1

0.9

Timor-Leste

41.5

31.7

25.3

26.2

13.7

21.3

9.9

8.3

55.7

57.2

51.7

46.7

—

7.2

5.2

4.2

Togo

31.3

26.2

20.2

18.8

12.4

6.0

6.6

5.7

33.2

28.4

27.6

23.8

12.0

9.7

7.8

6.4

Trinidad & Tobago

10.0

9.9

6.6

7.5

5.2

5.2 *

5.1 *

5.1 *

5.3

5.9 *

5.7 *

5.9 *

2.8

2.4

2.0

1.7

Sri Lanka

Syrian Arab Republic

Tunisia

4.4

4.0

2.7

3.1

2.9

3.4

2.8

2.1

16.8

9.0

10.1

8.4

3.0

2.0

1.7

1.7

Türkiye

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

<2.5

3.0

1.0

1.9

1.7

18.8

12.5

10.0

6.0

3.8

2.3

1.4

0.9

Turkmenistan

6.8

3.9

3.6

3.5

8.0

7.2

4.2

4.1

27.2

18.9

11.5

7.2

7.0

4.7

4.2

4.2

Uganda

—

—

—

—

5.0

6.2

3.8

3.6

44.9

38.4

34.0

25.4

14.6

9.3

5.9

4.3

Ukraine

3.0

<2.5

<2.5

2.8

8.2

2.4 *

2.5 *

2.6 *

22.9

17.6 *

17.4 *

17.4 *

1.8

1.3

1.0

0.8

United Arab Emirates

2.8

8.1

6.6

5.6

5.7 *

2.5 *

2.5 *

2.4 *

3.5 *

3.8 *

4.1 *

3.9 *

1.1

0.9

0.8

0.7

Uruguay

3.6

3.1

<2.5

<2.5

2.3

2.5

1.0

1.4

12.8

10.8

5.0

6.9

1.7

1.3

0.9

0.6

Uzbekistan

17.9

11.5

<2.5

<2.5

9.0

4.4

4.1 *

1.8

24.9

19.6

14.7 *

10.8

6.1

3.7

2.1

1.4

Venezuela (Boliv. Rep. of)

14.9

4.8

4.5

22.9

3.9

5.0

3.4 *

5.0 *

17.4

15.6

11.0 *

22.2 *

2.2

1.7

1.8

2.4

Viet Nam

19.7

14.1

8.6

5.7

9.0

10.1

6.8

5.2

42.9

32.2

24.9

19.6

3.0

2.4

2.2

2.1

Yemen

26.7

26.1

38.1

41.4

15.4 *

13.8

16.4

16.1 *

52.7 *

57.0

46.4

55.5 *

9.5

6.6

5.9

6.0

Zambia

51.7

55.5

37.7

30.9

5.0

5.6

6.2

4.2

59.2

45.8

40.0

34.6

15.6

9.3

6.8

6.1

Zimbabwe

—

—

—

—

8.3

7.2

3.2

2.9

33.8

35.3

27.6

23.5

9.6

9.6

6.3

5.4

Note: The colors shown in the table represent the following categories:= Very low= Low= Medium= High= Very high. For more information, see page 39.
— = Data not available or not presented. Some countries did not exist in their present borders in the given year or reference period. *GHI estimates.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Appendix B | Data Underlying the Calculation of Global Hunger Index Scores41

B2000, 2007,
2005, 2014,2010, AND 2022
2019 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX SCORES, AND CHANGE SINCE 2000
2014

C
A

Country
with data from

2000
'98–'022007‘05–’092014‘12–’162022‘17–’21

Absolute% changechange since
since
2014
2014

Country
with data from

2000
'98–'022007‘05–’092014‘12–’162022‘17–’21

Absolute% changechange since
since
2014
2014

Afghanistan

50.3

38.7

30.6

29.9

-0.7

-2.3

Lebanon

11.6

11.2

8.7

10.5

1.8

20.7

Albania

20.7

15.8

9.2

6.2

-3.0

-32.6

Lesotho

32.7

29.1

29.3

32.4

3.1

10.6

Algeria

14.5

11.4

8.7

6.9

-1.8

-20.7

Liberia

48.2

39.0

34.8

32.4

-2.4

-6.9

Angola

64.9

44.7

26.2

25.9

-0.3

-1.1

Libya

—

—

—

—

—

—

Argentina

6.6

5.5

5.0

6.8

1.8

36.0

Lithuania

5.4

<5

<5

<5

—

—

Armenia

19.3

12.1

7.3

6.9

-0.4

-5.5

Madagascar

42.5

37.2

37.3

38.7

1.4

3.8

Azerbaijan

24.9

15.3

9.3

7.5

-1.8

-19.4

Malawi

43.3

32.5

24.1

20.7

-3.4

-14.1
14.7

—

—

—

—

—

—

Malaysia

15.4

13.8

10.9

12.5

1.6

33.9

31.3

26.3

19.6

-6.7

-25.5

Maldives

—

—

—

—

—

—

Belarus

<5

<5

<5

<5

—

—

41.7

35.7

26.1

23.2

-2.9

-11.1

Benin

33.8

26.9

23.2

21.7

-1.5

-6.5

Mauritania

31.8

28.3

26.3

20.7

-5.6

-21.3

Bhutan

—

—

—

—

—

—

Mauritius

15.3

14.1

13.0

13.4

0.4

3.1

27.7

22.0

14.7

13.2

-1.5

-10.2

Mexico

10.2

8.5

7.0

8.1

1.1

15.7

Bahrain
Bangladesh

Bolivia (Plurinat. State of)Bosnia & Herzegovina

9.3

6.6

<5

<5

—

—

Botswana

27.7

25.8

20.5

20.0

-0.5

-2.4

Brazil

11.4

7.1

5.0

5.4

0.4

8.0

Bulgaria

8.6

7.9

7.4

5.9

-1.5

-20.3

Burkina Faso

Mali

Moldova (Rep. of)

18.7

20.3

6.8

6.9

0.1

1.5

Mongolia

30.0

21.8

9.2

5.7

-3.5

-38.0

Montenegro
MoroccoMozambique

—

5.4

<5

<5

—

—

15.8

12.4

9.6

9.2

-0.4

-4.2

—

—

—

—

—

—

39.9

29.4

17.9

15.6

-2.3

-12.8

18.7

-4.2

-18.3

19.1

-2.1

-9.9

-1.9

-12.3

44.9

34.5

26.5

24.5

-2.0

-7.5

Burundi

—

—

—

—

—

—

Cabo Verde

15.3

11.9

12.1

11.8

-0.3

-2.5

Namibia

25.4

26.8

22.9

Cambodia

41.1

26.1

20.1

17.1

-3.0

-14.9

Nepal

37.0

30.0

21.2

Cameroon

35.8

29.9

21.4

18.9

-2.5

-11.7

Nicaragua

22.4

17.9

15.5

13.6

Central African Republic

48.8

46.8

44.6

44.0

-0.6

-1.3

Niger

52.5

40.2

32.8

32.6

-0.2

-0.6

Chad

50.7

49.0

40.7

37.2

-3.5

-8.6

Nigeria

40.4

32.1

28.4

27.3

-1.1

-3.9

Myanmar

Chile

<5

<5

<5

<5

—

—

North Macedonia

7.5

7.2

<5

<5

—

—

China

13.3

7.8

<5

<5

—

—

Oman

14.7

11.5

11.5

13.0

1.5

13.0

Colombia

10.9

11.2

8.6

7.6

-1.0

-11.6

Pakistan

36.8

32.1

29.6

26.1

-3.5

-11.8

Comoros

39.5

31.7

29.1

26.9

-2.2

-7.6

Panama

18.6

14.0

9.4

8.1

-1.3

-13.8

Congo (Republic of)

34.7

33.7

25.3

28.1

2.8

11.1

Costa Rica

7.0

<5

<5

5.3

—

—

Côte d'Ivoire

33.4

35.8

22.7

16.8

-5.9

-26.0

<5

<5

<5

<5

—

—

Dem. Rep. of the Congo

48.0

43.2

38.7

37.8

-0.9

-2.3

Qatar

—

—

—

—

—

—

Djibouti

44.3

35.8

27.4

21.5

-5.9

-21.5

Romania

7.9

5.8

5.1

<5

—

—

Dominican Republic

15.0

13.9

9.8

8.8

-1.0

-10.2

Russian Federation

10.1

7.1

6.7

6.4

-0.3

-4.5

Ecuador

19.7

18.6

11.7

15.2

3.5

29.9

Rwanda

49.9

35.9

29.5

27.2

-2.3

-7.8

Egypt

16.3

17.2

14.6

12.3

-2.3

-15.8

Saudi Arabia

11.0

12.2

7.4

6.7

-0.7

-9.5

El Salvador

14.7

12.1

10.4

8.4

-2.0

-19.2

Senegal

34.2

22.8

17.6

15.6

-2.0

-11.4

Equatorial Guinea

—

—

—

—

—

—

SerbiaEritrea

—

—

—

—

—

—

Sierra Leone

Croatia

Papua New Guinea

33.6

29.9

29.0

26.5

-2.5

-8.6

Paraguay

11.6

11.4

8.1

8.0

-0.1

-1.2

Peru

20.6

15.0

7.6

7.6

0.0

0.0

Philippines

25.0

19.5

18.8

14.8

-4.0

-21.3

—

6.1

5.8

<5

—

—

57.5

51.1

33.1

31.5

-1.6

-4.8

Estonia

<5

<5

<5

<5

—

—

Eswatini

24.7

22.9

18.4

16.3

-2.1

-11.4

Ethiopia

53.6

42.6

27.4

27.6

0.2

0.7

Somalia

Fiji

9.5

8.5

9.3

9.2

-0.1

-1.1

South Africa

Gabon

20.9

20.3

16.5

17.2

0.7

4.2

South Sudan

Gambia

29.0

26.5

22.2

20.7

-1.5

-6.8

Sri Lanka

Georgia

12.3

7.8

6.1

5.7

-0.4

-6.6

Sudan

Ghana

28.5

22.1

15.5

13.9

-1.6

-10.3

Suriname

Guatemala

28.4

24.1

21.7

18.8

-2.9

-13.4

Syrian Arab Republic

—

—

—

—

—

—

Guinea-Bissau

37.7

31.0

30.2

30.8

0.6

2.0

Tanzania (United Rep. of)

40.8

30.9

Guyana

17.1

15.8

12.4

10.4

-2.0

-16.1

Thailand

18.6

12.1

Haiti

40.9

41.7

32.6

32.7

0.1

0.3

Timor-Leste

—

45.5

Honduras

21.8

19.2

14.1

13.4

-0.7

-5.0

Togo

39.3

Hungary

5.5

<5

<5

<5

—

—

Trinidad & Tobago

11.0

India

38.8

36.3

28.2

29.1

0.9

3.2

Tunisia

10.3

7.6

Indonesia

26.1

29.1

22.2

17.9

-4.3

-19.4

Türkiye

10.1

5.8

<5

<5

—

—

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

13.7

8.8

7.4

6.5

-0.9

-12.2

Turkmenistan

20.4

14.6

10.6

9.5

-1.1

-10.4

Iraq

23.8

20.8

16.6

13.7

-2.9

-17.5

Uganda

—

—

—

—

—

—

Jamaica

8.6

8.1

8.8

7.0

-1.8

-20.5

Ukraine

13.0

7.2

7.2

7.5

0.3

4.2
-10.2

GuineaSlovakia

7.0

5.9

5.7

<5

—

—

Solomon Islands

20.1

18.1

22.3

19.4

-2.9

-13.0

Tajikistan

—

—

—

—

—

—

18.1

17.2

12.7

12.9

0.2

1.6

—

—

—

—

—

—

21.7

18.9

17.3

13.6

-3.7

-21.4

—

—

29.3

28.8

-0.5

-1.7

15.1

11.3

10.0

10.2

0.2

2.0

—

—

—

—

—

—

40.3

32.9

20.6

13.9

-6.7

-32.5

25.5

23.6

-1.9

-7.5

11.9

12.0

0.1

0.8

33.3

30.6

-2.7

-8.1

30.2

26.1

22.8

-3.3

-12.6

10.7

8.8

9.0

0.2

2.3

6.7

6.1

-0.6

-9.0

Jordan

10.8

7.5

7.4

10.6

3.2

43.2

United Arab Emirates

6.2

6.5

5.9

5.3

-0.6

Kazakhstan

11.2

11.6

5.8

5.9

0.1

1.7

Uruguay

7.4

6.5

<5

<5

—

—

Kenya

36.6

31.1

21.6

23.5

1.9

8.8

Uzbekistan

24.2

15.4

8.3

5.6

-2.7

-32.5

Korea (DPR)

39.5

29.6

27.5

24.9

-2.6

-9.5

<5

<5

<5

<5

—

—

Kyrgyzstan

18.0

13.6

9.4

7.8

-1.6

Lao PDR

44.2

31.4

22.5

19.2

Latvia

5.6

<5

<5

<5

KuwaitVenezuela (Boliv. Rep. of)

14.6

10.1

8.1

19.9

11.8

145.7

Viet Nam

26.3

21.4

15.4

11.9

-3.5

-22.7

-17.0

Yemen

41.3

38.4

41.7

45.1

3.4

8.2

-3.3

-14.7

Zambia

53.3

46.0

35.2

29.3

-5.9

-16.8

—

—

Zimbabwe

—

—

—

—

—

—

Note: — = Data are not available or not presented. See Table A.3 for provisional designations of the severity of hunger for some countries with incomplete data. Some countries did not exist in
their present borders in the given year or reference period.
= low= moderate= serious= alarming= extremely alarming

42

2000, 2007, 2014, and 2022 Global Hunger Index Scores | Appendix C | 2022 Global Hunger Index

COUNTRIES’ 2022 GHI SCORES BY REGION

D
B
WEST ASIA AND NORTH AFRICA
60

50
45.1
40

30

20
12.3

10

10.5

10.6

9.2

6.9

6.7

6.5

Iran

World = 18.2
13.0

Saudi Arabia

13.7

West Asia and North Africa = 11.4
6.1
5.3
<5
<5
Türkiye

KuwaitUnited ArabEmirates

Tunisia

Algeria

MoroccoLebanonJordan

Egypt

Oman

Iraq

Yemen

0

Note: Bahrain, Libya, Qatar, and Syrian Arab Republic are in the West Asia and North Africa region but are not shown, owing to insufficient data for the calculation of GHI scores. Existing dataand provisional indicator values for these countries were included in the calculation of regional and global GHI scores. See Table A.3 regarding provisional designations of hunger severity forcountries with incomplete data. Countries with GHI scores less than 5 are presented in alphabetical order.

WEST AFRICA

60

50

40
30.8
27.3

24.5

23.2

22.8

21.7

20

Africa South of the Sahara = 27.0
20.7

20.7
16.8

15.6

World = 18.2
13.9
11.8

Ghana

31.5

30

Senegal32.4

Côte d’Ivoire

32.6

10

Cabo Verde

Mauritania

Gambia

Benin

Togo

Mali

Burkina Faso

Nigeria

Guinea-Bissau

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Niger0

Note: Guinea is in the West Africa subregion but is not shown, owing to insufficient data for the calculation of GHI scores. Existing data and provisional indicator values for Guinea were includedin the calculation of regional and global GHI scores. See Table A.3 regarding provisional designations of hunger severity for countries with incomplete data.

2022 Global Hunger Index | Appendix D | Countries’ 2022 GHI Scores by Region43

D
A
CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
60

50
44.0
40

37.8

37.2
32.4
28.1

30

Africa South of the Sahara = 27.0

25.9
20.0

20

18.9

18.7

17.2

16.3 World = 18.2
12.9

10

South Africa

Eswatini

Gabon

Namibia

Cameroon

Botswana

AngolaRep. of Congo

LesothoChadDem. Rep.
of the CongoCentralAfrican Rep.

0

Note: Equatorial Guinea is in the Central Africa subregion but is not shown, owing to insufficient data for the calculation of GHI scores. Existing data and provisional indicator values forEquatorial Guinea were included in the calculation of regional and global GHI scores. See Table A.3 regarding provisional designations of hunger severity for countries with incomplete data.		

EAST AFRICA
60

50

40

38.7

29.3

30

28.8

27.6

27.2

26.9
23.6

23.5

Africa South of the Sahara = 27.0
21.5

20

20.7
World = 18.2
13.4

10

Mauritius

MalawiDjibouti

Kenya

United Rep. of
Tanzania

Comoros

RwandaEthiopia

Sudan

ZambiaMadagascar

0

Note: Burundi, Eritrea, Mozambique, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe are in the East Africa subregion but are not shown, owing to insufficient data for the calculationof GHI scores. Existing data and provisional indicator values for these countries were included in the calculation of regional and global GHI scores. See Table A.3 regarding provisional
designations of hunger severity for countries with incomplete data.

44

Countries’ 2022 GHI Scores by Region | Appendix D | 2022 Global Hunger Index

D
B
SOUTH AMERICA
60

50

40

30

20

19.9
World = 18.2

15.2

13.2

10

10.4

10.2

9.0

8.0

7.6

7.6

6.8

Latin America andCaribbean = 8.8

5.4

<5

<5
Uruguay

Chile

BrazilArgentina

Peru

Colombia

Paraguay

Trinidad &TobagoSuriname

GuyanaBolivia

EcuadorVenezuela

0

Note: Countries with GHI scores less than 5 are presented in alphabetical order.

CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
60

50

40
32.7
30

18.8

World = 18.2
8.8

8.4

8.1

8.1

7.0

PanamaJamaica10

Mexico13.4

El Salvador

13.6

Dominican Rep.

20

Latin America andCaribbean = 8.8
5.3

Costa Rica

Honduras

Nicaragua

Guatemala

Haiti

0

2022 Global Hunger Index | Appendix D | Countries’ 2022 GHI Scores by Region45

D
A
X
SOUTH, EAST, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
60

50

40

30

30.6 29.9
29.1

26.5 26.1

South Asia = 27.4

24.9
19.6 19.4 19.2 19.1
17.9 17.1

20

15.6 14.8

World = 18.2
13.6 12.5
12.0 11.9

10East and Southeast Asia
9.2
5.7 = 8.2
<5
China

Mongolia

Fiji

Viet Nam

Thailand

Malaysia

Sri Lanka

Philippines

MyanmarCambodia

Indonesia

Nepal

Lao PDR

Solomon Islands

Bangladesh

DPR Korea

PakistanPapua New
GuineaIndia

Afghanistan

Timor-Leste0

Note: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are in South Asia for the purposes of Figure 1.3, whereas the remaining countries are in East and Southeast Asia. Bhutan and Maldives are not shown, owing to insufficient data for the calculation of GHI scores. Existing data and provisional indicator values for these countries were included in thecalculation of regional and global GHI scores. See Table A.3 regarding provisional designations of hunger severity for countries with incomplete data.

EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
60

50

40

30

20

World = 18.2

13.9

<5

<5

<5

<5

<5

<5

Croatia

Estonia

Hungary

Latvia7.5 7.5 6.9 6.9 6.4
6.2 5.9 5.9 5.7 5.6Belarus

7.8

Bosnia &Herzegovina

9.5

10

Europe and Central Asia = 6.3<5 <5 <5 <5 <5 <5Slovakia

SerbiaRomania

North Macedonia

Montenegro

Lithuania

Uzbekistan

Georgia

Kazakhstan

Bulgaria

Albania

RussianFederation

Moldova

Armenia

UkraineAzerbaijan

Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan

Tajikistan0

Note: Countries with GHI scores less than 5 are presented in alphabetical order.

46

Countries’ 2022 GHI Scores by Region | Appendix D | 2022 Global Hunger Index

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2022 Global Hunger Index | Bibliography51

RESOURCES FOR UNDERSTANDING
HUNGER AND MALNUTRITION
regional, and national levels. Among its strengths are the following:

Resources on Food Crises
and Early Warning Systems> Measuring and tracking long-term trends. Because of the nature> Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET)The Global Hunger Index (GHI) is a tool for assessing hunger at global,

and availability of its underlying data, the GHI is best suited for	FEWS NET, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, provides

measuring hunger and tracking progress over recent years andreal-time assessments and short-term projections of acute fooddecades. The 2022 GHI scores are based on the most up-to-

insecurity around the world. It issues monthly reports and maps

date data available for the underlying indicators for each coun-detailing current and projected food insecurity as well as alerts

try. This GHI report also includes GHI scores from 2000, 2007,

on emerging or likely crises. FEWS NET is funded and managed

and 2014 to show trends in hunger over time.

by the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID).

> Reflecting both the quantity and quality of food and diets. The

https://fews.net/

four indicators underlying GHI scores—undernourishment, childstunting, child wasting, and child mortality—reflect deficien-> Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS)

cies in calories (quantity) as well as in important micronutrients	The Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and(quality).

Agriculture (GIEWS) continuously monitors food supply anddemand and other key indicators for assessing the overall food> Complementing other reports and resources. The countries wheresecurity situation in all countries of the world. An initiative of the

GHI scores are high—indicating that calories are chronically

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), it

insufficient and/or children’s growth and well-being have been

issues regular reports on prevailing conditions and provides earlyhampered by undernutrition—are particularly vulnerable to acutewarnings of impending food crises at country or regional level.

food crises and stresses, which are reported by other sources.

https://www.fao.org/giews/en/

Other resources offer additional important perspectives on hunger> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

and malnutrition. The following is a selection and brief description

	The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is an ini-of those resources.

tiative led by 15 international development agencies to improveanalysis and decision-making on food security and nutrition. It
provides a common scale for classifying the severity and magnitude of food insecurity and acute malnutrition. The IPC acute foodinsecurity scale has five classifications: minimal/none, stressed,
crisis, emergency, catastrophe/famine. There are also IPC scales
for acute malnutrition and chronic food insecurity.
https://www.ipcinfo.org/> Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC)

	This annual report produced by the Global Network against
Food Crises—an international alliance working to address theroot causes of extreme hunger—gives an overview and country-by-country update on acute, crisis-level food insecurity. Basedon the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) assessments, it triangulates recent available food security assessments,
even if they are partial and from different sources.
https://www.wfp.org/publications/global-report-food-crises-2022

52

Resources for Understanding Hunger and Malnutrition | 2022 Global Hunger Index

Resources on Foodand Nutrition Security

Resources on
the Right to Food

> The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI)> State of the Right to Food and Nutrition Report	This flagship annual report is jointly prepared by FAO, the	This annual report—produced by the Global Network for the Right

International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United

to Food and Nutrition—provides a yearly snapshot of develop-

Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programmements concerning the right to food and nutrition at the country(WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO). It is designed

and international levels. It is designed to complement FAO’s

to chart progress toward ending hunger, achieving food security,

State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) reportand improving nutrition and to provide in-depth analysis on key

by taking a human rights perspective and shedding light on thechallenges for achieving this goal in the context of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development.
https://www.fao.org/publications/sofi

structural causes of hunger and malnutrition.
	https://www.fian.org/en/publication/article/
state-of-the-right-to-food-and-nutrition-report-2021-2804> Global Nutrition Report (GNR)

	The Global Nutrition Report—published annually by a multistakeholder initiative—reports on countries’ progress toward meeting
global nutrition targets, evaluates the impact of poor diets onhuman health and the planet, assesses the nutrition financing
landscape, and provides a comprehensive overview of reportingon past Nutrition for Growth (N4G) commitments.
https://globalnutritionreport.org> Voices of the Hungry Project	This project of FAO uses the Food Insecurity Experience Scale(FIES), an experience-based measure of household or individual
food security. The FIES relies on eight survey questions includedin the Gallup World Poll, which covers 90% of the world’s population. The project provides up-to-date, internationally comparable information about food insecurity that is policy-relevant andactionable. A suite of resources and research based on the FIES
is available.
	https://www.fao.org/in-action/voices-of-the-hungry/resources/
research/en/> Global Food Security Index (GFSI)	The annual Global Food Security Index (GFSI) is based on a model
constructed from 58 indicators that measure drivers of food security across 113 low-, middle-, and high-income countries. The
indicators fall into four categories: food affordability, food availability, food quality and safety, and natural resources and resilience. The index was designed and constructed by Economist
Impact, part of the Economist Group.
	https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/

2022 Global Hunger Index | Resources for Understanding Hunger and Malnutrition53

PARTNERS

Who we are

Who we are

Concern Worldwide is a nongovernmen-

Welthungerhilfe is one of the largest nongov-

tal, international, humanitarian organi-ernmental development and humanitarian aid

zation dedicated to the reduction oforganizations in Germany. It was founded in
1962 as the German section of the Freedom

suffering and working towards the ultimate elimination of extreme
poverty in the world’s poorest countries.

from Hunger Campaign, one of the first global initiatives to fighthunger, initiated by the Food and Agriculture Organization of theWhat we doUnited Nations (FAO).

Our mission is to help people living in extreme poverty achieve major
improvements in their lives which last and spread without ongoing

What we do

support from Concern.

We implement measures ranging from rapid emergency relief to rehabilitation to long-term development cooperation projects with national

How we work

and international partner organizations. As part of an active civil

To achieve our mission, we engage in long-term development work,

society, we advocate for the political change needed to achieve zerobuild resilience, respond to emergency situations, and seek to address

hunger. We address inequalities and foster sustainable development.

the root causes of poverty through our development education andadvocacy work.

How we work
Because our goal is to sustainably improve livelihoods in the long run,Our vision

our work focuses on capacity building. We aim to strengthen struc-We believe in a world where no one lives in poverty, fear, or oppres-tures from the bottom up and work together with local partner orga-

sion; where all have access to a decent standard of living and thenizations to ensure the long-term success of our work. In addition,

opportunities and choices essential to a long, healthy, and creative

we raise public awareness and advocate with national and interna-

life; and where everyone is treated with dignity and respect.

tional policymakers. We thereby strive to address the root causes ofhunger and poverty. In a shared mission with many other organizations, our goal is to make ourselves redundant.
Our vision
A world in which everyone has the chance and the right to lead a self-­
determined life in dignity and justice, free from hunger and poverty.

54Partners | 2022 Global Hunger Index

17 YEARS OF TRACKING WORLD HUNGER
Since 2006, the Global Hunger Index has been reporting on the state ofhunger globally, by region, and by country.

The Crisis of Child
Undernutrition

Taming Price
Spikes andExcessive Food
Price Volatility

Ensuring
Sustainable Food
Security Under
Land, Water, andEnergy Stresses

2017

2018

2019

GLOBAL HUNGER INDEXGLOBAL HUNGER INDEXTHE INEQUALITIES OF HUNGER

To learn more, visit www.globalhungerindex.org.

Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e. V.

Concern Worldwide

Friedrich-Ebert-Straße 153173 Bonn, Germany

52-55 Lower Camden Street
Dublin 2, Ireland
Tel. +353 1-417-7700
Fax +353 1-475-7362
www.concern.net
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Tel. +49 228-2288-0
FORCED MIGRATION
AND HUNGER
Fax +49 228-2288-333
www.welthungerhilfe.deMember of Alliance2015

2019 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX

2017 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX

Financial Crisis andGender Inequality

2018 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEXThe Vicious Circle of
Hunger and Poverty

MeasuresBeing Taken to
Reduce Acute
Undernourishment
and Chronic Hunger

Case Studies in
the Post-Conflict
Countries of
Afghanistan and
Sierra Leone

GLOBAL HUNGER INDEXTHE CHALLENGE OF HUNGER AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Armed Conflict
and the Challengeof Hunger

2020

2021

2022

GLOBAL HUNGER INDEXGLOBAL HUNGER INDEXGLOBAL HUNGER INDEXONE DECADE TO ZERO HUNGER
LINKING HEALTH AND SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYSTEMS

GHI_2020_Umschlag_RZ.indd 3

One Decade to
Zero Hunger:
Linking Health andSustainable Food
Systems

HUNGER AND FOOD SYSTEMS IN CONFLICT SETTINGS

2022 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEXThe Challenge of
Hidden Hunger

2021 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX

2020 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX

GHI_2019_Umschlag_RZ.indd 3

Building Resilienceto Achieve Food andNutrition Security

Getting to Zero
HungerThe Inequalities
of Hunger

Forced Migrationand Hunger

03.09.19 17:03

The Challengeof Hunger andClimate Change

FOOD SYSTEMS TRANSFORMATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE

22.09.20 10:07

Hunger and Food
Systems in Conflict
Settings

Food Systems
Transformationand Local
Governance

Visit www.globalhungerindex.org to find:> more information about the 2022 Global Hunger Index> synopsis> country profiles and videos> translations of the full report> past editions of the GHIIMPRINT

Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e. V.
Friedrich-Ebert-Straße 153173 Bonn, Germany
Tel. +49 228-2288-0
Fax +49 228-2288-333
www.welthungerhilfe.de

Editor:Heidi FritschelSecretary General:
Mathias Mogge

Cover photography:
A volunteer network of local women in Gandor, Leer District, South Sudan, participate in a mental health peer support group, preaching the benefits of antenatal
checks and good hygiene to help cut child deaths and maternal deaths in childbirth. Simon Townsley/Panos Pictures 2020

Concern Worldwide
52-55 Lower Camden Street
Dublin 2, Ireland
Tel. +353 1-417-7700
Fax +353 1-475-7362
www.concern.net
Chief Executive Officer:
Dominic MacSorley
Recommended citation: von Grebmer, K., J. Bernstein, D. Resnick, M. Wiemers,
L. Reiner, M. Bachmeier, A. Hanano, O. Towey, R. Ní Chéilleachair, C. Foley,
S. Gitter, G. Larocque, and H. Fritschel. 2022. 2022 Global Hunger Index: Food
Systems Transformation and Local Governance. Bonn: Welthungerhilfe; and Dublin:
Concern Worldwide.
Design: muehlhausmoers corporate communications gmbh,
Cologne, Germany
Printing: Köllen Druck+Verlag GmbH,Bonn, Germany

Ordering number: 460-9622
ISBN: 978-1-9161928-9-8

Other photo credits:
Page 2: Ed Ram/Concern Worldwide 2022; page 6: Lisa Murray/Concern Worldwide
2022; page 22: Opladen/Welthungerhilfe 2022; page 32: David Mercado/Reuters
2020; page 34: Tsouko/Welthungerhilfe 2021
Acknowledgments:
We gratefully acknowledge the Statistics Division (ESS) of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) as well as the World Health Organization(WHO) for their invaluable support throughout the data compilation process.
We thank the staff of Concern and Welthungerhilfe for their contributions. We
thank Gershon Feder for conducting a peer review of this report. We appreciate
Grant Price’s careful review of the report. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge Doris
Wiesmann for her ongoing support and guidance for the GHI.
Editorial deadline:
The editorial deadline for this publication was August 31, 2022. The deadlines forthe data used in the calculation of GHI scores were earlier and varied by indicator.
Disclaimer:
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the maps
herein do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by Welthungerhilfe orConcern Worldwide.

Authors:
Welthungerhilfe: Miriam Wiemers (Senior Policy Advisor), Laura Reiner (Senior
Policy Advisor), Marilena Bachmeier (Project Assistant), Asja Hanano (Head of
Policy and External Relations); Concern Worldwide: Olive Towey (Senior Policy
Advisor), Réiseal Ní Chéilleachair (Head of Global Advocacy), Connell Foley (Directorof Strategy, Advocacy, and Learning); Independent Consultants: Klaus von Grebmer,
Jill Bernstein, Heidi Fritschel; Towson University: Seth Gitter and Grace Larocque.
Guest Author:
Danielle Resnick (David Rubenstein Fellow, Brookings Institution; Non-Resident
Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute)

Creative Commons:This publication is available under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
Website:www.globalhungerindex.org

To learn more, visit www.globalhungerindex.org

Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e. V.

Concern Worldwide

Friedrich-Ebert-Straße 153173 Bonn, Germany
Tel. +49 228-2288-0
Fax +49 228-2288-333
www.welthungerhilfe.deMember of Alliance201552-55 Lower Camden Street
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Fax +353 1-475-7362
www.concern.net
Member of Alliance2015