113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS

GOOD GOVERNANCE: A MERE MOTTO
OR A PRAGMATIC ENDEAVOUR FOR A REALISTIC
STRATEGY? (THE FRENCH EXAMPLE OF AN
ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY)
Laurence Giovacchini*
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing international awareness ofthe negative impact of corruption isfostering new devices and strategies witha view to protecting the rule of law,
threatened by bribery. Appropriate
criminalization, adequate offences,
deterrent punishments and codes of ethics
rank among the customary tools used totackle the corruption problem.
Nonetheless, the use of sentencing
guidelines is not sufficient. Forwardlooking methods are needed, fromsafeguards against the abuse of power toenhancing and promoting efficientdecision-making. Preventive techniques
against corruption favor the elaboration ofgood management tools, far from thevarious enumerations of misdemeanors to
be avoided by public officials.
How can we, other than by theimposition of a code of behaviour,
implement conditions conducive to theloyalty of public officials? Conditions whichfunction positively when, for instance,
problems related to conflicts of interest
arise, when compartmentalized controls
risk missing their target, whenmisinterpretations of complex data arelikely to occur.
Excessive regulation and, inversely, lackof regulation both offer opportunities for
manipulation and fraud. The latter cannot* Administration Civil, Service Central de Prevention
de la Corruption, French Republic.

be prevented simply by norms and laws.
The risk of corruption must be evaluatedby an overall view of the situation, one
which will facilitate the possible discoveryof hidden connections, sham processes,
forgery, etc. Fragmented information may,indeed, be as useless as no information atall, and can even be deceptive and lead to
distorted analyses.
Consequently, monitoring mechanisms,
training, risk detection techniques,supervisory accountability, whistleblowing,
and so forth: all these tracks can be
explored in order to improve theinvestigation and the prevention of casesof corruption. The “what-to-do” approach
must open the way to the “how-to-achievethe-goal” strategy. The promotion of “anticorruption know-how” is crucial. It has
three aims:• to dissuade public officials frombreaching their duties;• to scrutinize the weak points andloopholes of administrative processes;• to put an end to the mistrust of public
service - whether justified or basedon rumor - in the public opinion.
Corruption is a topic of high priority on
the international agenda of many
institutions. The OECD Convention(December 17, 1997) criminalizing thebribery of public officials in international
business transactions is a breakthrough.
The United Nations and the Council ofEurope have also taken significant steps.
This new context has triggered the343

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
necessary review of the assets andhindrances of anti-corruption strategies.
What makes them successful? What are
the obstacles likely to stifle the efforts
carried out according to the well-know“where there is a will there is a way”? Apractical viewpoint is indispensable
because a prescriptive approach isnecessary, but insufficient. Workable
solutions must be tested and theirfeasibility proved.
First of all, we have to dismiss theobjection that corruption is tricky to deal
with when public officials in charge offighting bribery can be bribed themselves.
Such an argument reduces to a stalemate
whatever attempts are made at curbing
fraud. Practical, workable solutions help
avoid the obstacle by a subtle process ofchecks and balances, quite different fromthe endless process of “who will control thecontroller and so forth?”. An unbiased
public service requires loyalty andmanagerial skills, which, in the frameworkof the fight against corruption, can be
defined as follows:(i) loyalty: to refrain from acting against
the law and keep potential bribegivers at bay;(ii) management: to implement laws by
overcoming obstacles to theirenforcement and to make corrupt
schemes fail by detecting anddisclosing shady deals, and by
deciphering the moves shrouding
them.
Since both aspects are complementary,neither should be overlooked. Individual
loyalty is of crucial importance, because itis the core of resistance against attempts
at corruption. An honest public official will
obviously refuse a kick-back and the bribegiver will not be able to succeed, being
deprived of the bribe-taker counterpart.
Nonetheless, individual integrity must be

344

supported by ethical management in order
to effectively cope with the risk of pervasive
and widespread bribery. Otherwise,
however adamant and honest public
officials may be, they can feel isolated andthreatened by crooks connected throughfraudulent networks. When corruption is
on the verge of taking the upper hand on
administrative channels, its organisational
grasp has to be equalled by the sameorganisational efficiency on behalf of ethics.
Individual commitment must be
strengthened by the group’s involvement.
This is not an unrealistic view and theremedy does not suppose that the patient
has already recovered. A “leveragetechnique” can be put into practice,allowing a small group (trained in ethicalmanagement techniques) to defeat a larger
one where the loopholes have been
identified. Thus, the negative statement
according to which “nothing can be done,
because everything is rotten, due tobribery” is not valid. The anti-corruption
fight should not be understood as a crusade(doomed to failure sooner or later), or as adaunting prospect which entails so manyefforts that its costs become unbearable.
A leverage process enables its users tomake the most of prevention techniques
and of scattered sources of information.
“An ounce of prevention is worth a poundof cure” and demands awareness of theexistence of problems lurking beneath thesurface. These problems are not solved bymere control-tightening, which, on thecontrary, is liable to favor red tape. A
roadblock can be put on corrupt paths by
scrutinizing the way corruption operates
through various networks. There is
obviously no cure-all to eradicate it, but aprofessional team specialized in anticorruption techniques (described below),
has the means to step up action thanks to
a pro-active strategy, characterized by two
features:113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS(i) the ability to transform fragmented
clues into intelligence of an overall
problem and its intricacies;(ii) the possibility to report right on cue
about the very irregularity which,although it may seem petty, is highly
relevant for kicking off a wholeprocess of further examination.
II. AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTFAVORING THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION FIGHT
A. End of the “Grease-the-Wheels”
Argument
This argument is no longer valid,
according to which bribery can be an
efficient way of getting around burdensome
regulations and ineffective legal systems.
This rationale has not only inspired
sophisticated academic models but has
legitimized the behavior of privatecompanies that are willing to pay bribes toget business. On closer examination, thisargument is full of holes. First, it ignores
the enormous degree of discretion thatmany politicians and bureaucrats can have,particularly in corrupt societies. They havediscretion over the creation, proliferation,and interpretation of counterproductive
regulations. Thus, instead of corruption
being the grease for the squeaky wheels ofa rigid administration, it becomes the fuelfor excessive and discretionary regulations.
This is one mechanism whereby corruption
feeds on itself.
In addition to some academic writings,
one school of “corruption apologists” argues
that bribery can enhance efficiency by
cutting the considerable time needed toprocess permits and paperwork. The
problem with this “speed money” argument
lies in the presumption that both sides will
actually stick with the deal, and there will
be no further demands for bribes. For
example, one high-level civil servant who
had been bribed could not process anapproval any faster given the multiple
bureaucrats involved in the process, yet hewillingly offered his services to slow theapproval process for rival companies”.1
B. Promotion of the “ZeroTolerance” Argument
The damaging effects of corruption areemphasized in the main international fora,
among them:
1. The United Nations“(...) international organizations andmany industrialized and developing
countries have deplored the pernicious
effects of corruption, whether internationalin scale or national. This is because
corruption undermines the legitimacy ofGovernments and institutions, andcompromises social and economic
development”.2
2. Council of Europe“... aware that corruption represents a
serious threat to the basic principles andvalues of the Council of Europe,
undermines the confidence of citizens indemocracy, erodes the rule of law,
constitutes a denial of human rights andhinders social and economic development...” (cf. 20 guiding principles for the fightagainst corruption, adopted by theCommittee of Ministers 6 November 1997.)
3. OECD“... The governments of OECD countries
share the conviction that bribery andcorruption undermine democratic
institutions, distort international trade,investment relations and development cooperation. The OECD Public Management
Committee (PUMA) has, since its
inception, focused on ways to improve the1

In “Corruption: The Facts”, article by Daniel
Kaufmann, p. 114 of “Foreign Policy”, Summer,
1997.
2 In “Model Law on Corruption”.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
efficiency and effectiveness of public sector
management. In particular, the Committee
has addressed the issue of probity in public
sector operations in its work on financial
management, organisational performanceand management of the civil service”.3
4. European Union“The Convention on the protection of theEuropean Communities’ financial interests
was drawn up by the Council and signedby the Representatives of the Governmentsof the Member States on 26 July 1995. A
First Protocol to the Convention was drawn
up and signed on 27 September 1996. The
Protocol is aimed primarily at acts ofcorruption that involve national andCommunity officials, and damage or are
likely to damage the European
Communities’ financial interests.”
The backbone of every draft orinternational recommendation is that
corrupt practices should not be tolerated,
whatever the circumstances.
C. Significant Steps in the
Criminalization of Corrupt
Behaviours“Laws and customs differ from one
country to another”. This sort of statement
is no longer a pretext for governments toneglect corruption in countries where it isr a m p a n t . A c t u a l l y, n o c o u n t r y i s“corruption-proof”. One can no longer
justify corrupt behaviors by explaining thatthey are “normal, acceptable” in othercountries. The maze and the haze of vague
notions (“what can be regarded as
corruption? where does it begin? ” etc) are
replaced by a judicial technical review
designed to shape adequate offences,entailing predictable and dissuasive
sanctions.
Tw o c o m p l e m e n t a r yorientations can be pointed out:
3

In “International Symposium on Corruption andGood Governance”, Paris, 13-14 March 1995.

346(i) Remedies for Loopholes
Progress has been made in criminal law
by agreeing on the definition of corruption
as an offence, instead of relying on mere
individual morality to refrain fromcommitting wrongdoings. The very core ofcorruption is defined, which is not reducible
to other frauds or misdeeds. There is,indeed, an agreement to regard corruption
as “requesting, offering, giving or accepting
directly or indirectly a bribe or any other
undue advantage or the prospect thereof,
which distorts the proper performance ofany duty or behaviour required of therecipient of the bribe.” This roughdescription involves two actors - the bribegiver and the bribe-taker-and both are
liable to sanctions. The bribe-giver cannot
argue that s/he was “compelled” to corrupt
a public official in order to gain markets
and obtain authorizations. Nor should thebribe-taker explain that “it is routine,
everybody is doing so”, or that s/he had
been deceived. Responsibilities are clearly
defined by law; the bribe-giver and thebribe-taker are equally responsible, all themore so because the undue advantage canbe non-material (a promise of promotion,for example. The fact that money has notbeen paid directly or immediately is no
excuse, quite the contrary. The existenceof the secret bond between the two
protagonists, in order to gain an advantage
by abuse of power, is sufficient tocharacterize corruption.
From a legal point of view, ways of escapeare blocked. This does not mean that
offenders are caught and prosecuted, butrather that, if and when they areprosecuted, they cannot use as a pretext
their ignorance of law and of the criminal
consequences of their misdeeds. The
OECD Convention on Combating Briberyof Foreign Public Officials in International
B u s i n e s s Tr a n s a c t i o n s ( s i g n e d o n
December 17, 1997) goes a step forward:

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS• not even bribery of domestic private
officials is criminalized but also thecomplicity in - including incitement,
aiding and abetting - or authorizationof an act of bribery of a foreign public
official shall be a criminal offence.
Even the attempt to bribe a foreign
public official is criminalized;• accomplices and intermediaries arethus, also taken as responsible for thecorrupt scheme;• the liability of legal persons for thebribery of a foreign public official isalso punishable. Such a provision
regarding liability opens a large field
for action and prosecution because
companies, for example, are legal
persons.
(ii) C o r r u p t i o n R e g a r d e d a s
Victimization
Contrary to other crimes, corruption isoften regarded as “victimless” and a shortsighted viewpoint denies seriousness to a
fraud entailing neither blood nor violence.
Nonetheless, international
recommendations aim at requiring eachparty to provide in its internal law effective
remedies for persons who have suffereddamage as a result of corruption, in orderto enable them to defend their rights andinterests, including the possibility ofobtaining compensation for damage. There
are, of course, prerequisites for a claim fordamages. In order to obtain compensation,
the plaintiff has to prove the occurrence ofthe damage, whether the defendant actedwith intent or negligently, and the causal
link between the corrupt behaviour and thedamage. This provision does not give aright to compensation to any person who
merely claims that any act of corruption
has affected, in one way or another, theirrights or interests, or might do so in the
future. However, it is not inconceivablethat persons having suffered damage as aresult of an act of corruption should havethe possibility to sue public officials, as wellas the possibility to sue their public officials
for the reimbursement of any loss for which
they are judged responsible. Progressively,
the stress is put on the necessity of enabling
victims of acts of corruption by public
officials to have effective procedures andreasonable time to seek compensation fromthe State.
Such a conceptual evolution deserves tobe noticed because it entails a demanding
concept of public service. The risk of beingsued for corruption, in a civil trial, puts
some kind of pressure on public officials,
combined with deterrent criminal
sanctions. Of course, such a scenario is amere prospect, presently. The question is:
to what extent and how long will it remain
so? The extension of the process of“criminalization” (the characterization of
misdeeds as wrongdoings, crimes,
offences), coupled with the surge of the ideaof “victimization”, allows us to foresee thetightening up of the anti-corruption fight.
The fact that corruption can briefly besummarized as the misuse of public powerfor private profit should not lead us tooverlook the sophistication of criminal
notions, including other related offencessuch as in France, the trading in influence[a tripartite offence where the person who
is actually bribed for exerting real orpretended influence] is different from theperson who is influenced in the decision.
Only public officials (elected politicians orcivil servants) can be target persons andthe “taking of illegal interest” (the offendertakes or receives a personal interest in acompany, for example, with which they are
involved in the administration or
surveillance task, or where they have theduty to carry out payments). Thosesignificant steps in the criminalization ofcorrupt behaviour lead us to examine thecritical position of public officials: targets
or shields in respect to the issue of
corruption?

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
D. Attempt at Defining
Internationally the Notion of“Public Officials”
The above-mentioned OECD Convention
provides that: “foreign public official”
means any person holding a legislative,administrative or judicial office of a foreigncountry, whether appointed or elected.”
The Council of Europe emphasizes that:“public administrations play an essential
role in democratic societies and that theymust have at their disposal suitablepersonnel to carry out properly the tasks
which are assigned to them. Public officials
are the key element of the public
administration, they have specific duties
and obligations, and they should have thenecessary qualifications and an
appropriate legal and material
environment in order to carry out theirtasks appropriately”.
This recommendation offers acompendium of the rights and duties ofpublic officials. It sheds light on the issueof corruption because bribery intends toalter this very core of rights and duties:“the purpose of this Code is to specify thestandards of integrity and conduct to beobserved by public officials, to help themmeet those standards and to inform thepublic of the conduct it is entitled to expectof public officials”. Standards of integrity
do exist, can be listed and explained;
corruption manipulates those standards all
the more easily when they are only implicit.
Their specifications in a written code,
approved by several countries, help the
public to be more aware of the risk of abuseof power by public officials. Information
makes corruption recede. Whimsical,
arbitrary, odd, self-oriented interpretationof regulations are no longer valid and are
replaced by “duties in accordance with thelaw” and neutrality. As a result, theoffenders are deprived of any means ofjustification. They can no longer takeadvantage of the alleged inaccuracy of the348

rules and of the supposed pressure of
circumstances. The very articulation of amodel code of conduct for public officials
does not suppress, of course, thepossibilities of fraud, but it makes themmore risky and less profitable. This Codehighlights key-notions:• arbitrary behavior;• conflict of interest;• declaration of interests;• advantages;• reaction to improper offers;• reporting;• susceptibility to influence by others;• misuse of official position;• making decisions;• official information;• public and official resources;• incompatible outside interests;• political or public activity;• records;• integrity checking;• supervisory accountability;• leaving the public service;• dealing with former public officials;• observance of the code and sanctions.
The above-listed items set up safeguards
which protect public officials from undue
suspicion, by avoiding their being placedin ambiguous positions (conflict of interest,
revolving door, political interference). The
Code also promotes responsible
management (integrity checking,supervisory accountability, transparent
decision-making and reporting), which
provides a clear picture of the adequate
manner of carrying out public duties. The
Code offers, in a concise text, a review ofsensitive problems. These two criteria(accuracy and concision) contrast with theblurring modus operandi of corruption,
which thrives on the accumulation andsuccessive stratification of texts eventuallyleading to opacity and arbitrary
interpretations.

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
A framework with solid judicial grounds
is, thus, ready to make corrupt pretexts andschemes groundless. The credibility of theinternational recommendations isenhanced by monitoring provisions.
E. Follow-up Measures are theHeart of the Matter“Monitoring” and “evaluation” havebecome key-words. Monitoring aims at
making loopholes less numerous. Therecan be many kinds of loopholes, such as:• the lack of criminal penalties (but theinternational texts we have referred
to are a first step to remedy thesituation);• the alleged “national economic
interest” (but article 4 of the abovementioned OECD Convention is
explicit: “Investigation andprosecution of the bribery of a foreign
public official shall be subject to theapplicable rules and principles ofeach Party. They shall not be
influenced by considerations ofnational economic interest, thepotential effect upon relations withanother State or the identity of thenatural persons or legal entities
involved”).
This monitoring is coupled withevaluation processes, because theConvention sets up a Working Group on
Bribery to monitor national
implementation. This Group is specificallydirected to work on a system of “mutual
evaluation” of the effort of each OECD
country. The Council of Europe has
established the “Group of States Against
Corruption - GRECO” (5 May 1998), “whichaims at improving the capacity of its
members to fight corruption by following
up compliance with their undertaking inthis field”.

The stress put on the necessity ofevaluation enhances what could be labelled
as a “culture of audit”, the Council ofEurope, for example, urging to “ensure thatappropriate auditing procedures apply tothe activities of public administration andthe public sector” and to “endorse the rolethat audit procedures can play inpreventing and detecting corruption outside
public administrations” (cf. “20 Guiding
Principles for the Fight against
Corruption”). Not only is an anticorruption doctrine taking shape, but also
practical tools of implementation are being
come up with and assessed:• How to comply with the law?
• How to resist the temptation ofcorruption?
• How to detect corrupt practices?
Those three questions may receive somebeginning of an answer thanks to the“toolbox” described below.
III. THE “TOOLBOX” ASPECTCONNECTED WITH A SYSTEMATIC
APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF
CORRUPTION
A. The “Toolbox” as an Expertise“An understanding of management
principles is required to recognize andevaluate the materiality and significanceof deviations from good business practice.
An understanding means the ability toapply broad knowledge to situations likely
to be encountered, to recognize significant
deviations, and to be able to carry out the
research necessary to arrive at reasonable
solutions”.4 In this definition, many terms
can be emphasized, among them:• recognize,• evaluate,4“Normes pour la pratique professionnelle de l’audit
interne” by The Institute of Internal Auditors, p.40.

349

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56• broad knowledge,• research,• reasonable.
All the ingredients of a diagnosis are,thus, mentioned: recognize (because
corruption is the art of camouflage),evaluate (because problems have to beclassified with due consideration of theirpotential impact and the risks they entail),
broad knowledge (because a
multidisciplinary expertise is required toensure that adequate coverage exists forthe organisation as a whole, with aminimum amount of duplication), research(to transform partial data into accurate andreliable information) and reasonable(because radical proposals, by their very
exaggerated connotations, may be thesmokescreen hiding the escape from one’s
responsibilities: they are so unrealisticthat they will not be implemented andcorruption will continue to thrive). The
term “reasonable” deserves to be stressed:• It is used in the definition of
accountability supervisory (Code of
Conduct for Public Officials - Councilof Europe - above-mentioned): “Thepublic official who is responsible forcontrolling or directing other public
officials has duties as a supervisor. He
should be required to account for thewrongful acts or omissions of his staff
if they are so serious, repeated orwidespread that he should have beenaware of them if he had exercised thereasonable level of leadership,
management and supervision
required of a person in his position”.
• The notion of “supervisoryaccountability” for public officials ismatched by the notion of “dueprofessional care” for private
auditors: “Due professional care calls
for the application of the care andskills expected of a reasonably
prudent and competent internal

350

auditor in the same or similar
circumstances. Professional careshould, therefore, be appropriate to
the complexities of the audit being
performed.”5• The aim is “to promote effective
control at a reasonable cost”6, and to“include sufficiency of information
obtained to afford a reasonable basis
for the conclusions reached” 7. So as“reasonable assurance is provided
when cost-effective actions are taken
to restrict deviations to a tolerable
level”.8
We refer to this kind of expertise withthe figurative term of “toolbox” because itsupposes: fine tuning, monitoring, anddirections for use of warning indicators.
(i) Fine Tuning
Controls should not be stifling by
overtightness, nor so delayed andunproductive that the situation gets out ofhand when the potential loss associatedwith any exposure or risk is outweighedby the cost to control it. Controls should
be carried out in order to prevent and detect
irregularities, not to hinder action.
Consequently, they should be seen as
instruments of management, ranging frompreliminary assessments to detailed tests.
“Establishing standards for the operation
to be controlled, measuring performanceagainst the standards, examining andanalysing deviations, taking corrective
action, reappraising the standards basedon experience” 9: this process, which is
described in the private sphere, is also valid
for public administration, especiallyregarding the issue of corruption, which
5Op. cit. ibidem.
CIA REVIEW - Certified Internal Auditor - GLEIM,
p.86.
7 Ibidem p. 95.
8 Ibidem p. 116.
9 Op. cit. p. 188.
6

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
must be put under constant scrutiny.
(ii) Monitoring“Monitoring encompasses supervising,observing, and testing activities andappropriately reporting to responsible
individuals. Monitoring provides anongoing verification of progress towardachievement of objectives and goals”.10 It
means that factors of risk have to be
identified. Check-lists help to do so. We
can briefly summarize three examples ofcheck-lists, aiming at:
1. The Transparency of Procedures ofTendering in Public Procurements• Threats must be identified (especiallythe attempt to exert undue influencein the bid process and collusion withother suppliers to form a cartel);• The counter-measures can consist ofsolemnly affirming that illegal
arrangements are not tolerated: sucha statement can be a deterrent if theprospect of black-listing looms large.
Obvious irregularities should berecognized right away, when, forexample, suppliers are constantly
successful in winning contracts. One
company has suggested “visiting
unsuccessful bidders to provide themwith an opportunity to air any
grievances”.
2. The Prevention of Ethical Risks
It goes without saying that “staff
assignments should be made so that
potential and actual conflicts of interest andbias are avoided. The director should
periodically obtain from the audit staff
information concerning potential conflictsof interest and bias” 11. But how is thisinformation gathered? Sensitive sectors,
10 Op. cit.116.
11 Op. cit. p. 61.

such as city planning and zoning
regulations, have to be carefully examined.
There is conflict of interest when, forexample, a public official belongs to acommission in charge of allotting funds torenovate housing - “home improvementloan” - in the very place where s/he owns,
real estate. Conflict of interest also looms
when this public official participates in theactivity of a non-trading real estate
investment company, which happens to be
involved in operations planned by thegeneral assembly (of a local entity orcommunity), where this public official notesor reports. Building permits, generally
speaking, can be the target of direct
corruption (a bribe is given to obtain theauthorization) or of indirect manoeuvres,by influencing the future decision of
constructibility regarding zones whichhave not yet been classified. Obviously,
when a public official finds themself in asituation of potential conflict of interest(because his spouse, for example, owns
some piece of land in this area), s/hebecomes a weak link in a chain of
responsibility which is, thus, likely to bemoulded by corrupt practices.
It is not so difficult to list the risks ofconflicts of interest in various key-sectors.
Public officials can be encouraged to reporton them for fear of getting sanctioned incase of actual deviation. In thisacceptation, the “toolbox” consists in theinventory of risks and of potential
irregularities. In the third example ofaforementioned check-lists, the stress is
put on:3. The Detection of Fraud“Indicators of treachery” are elaborated,such as: “Danger Signs Pointing toward
the Possibility of Embezzlement” (Sawyer
and Dittenhofer, Sawyer ’s Internal
Auditing, p. 1189):• Borrowing small amounts from fellow
employees.

351

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56• Placing personal cheques in change
funds - undated, post-dated, - orrequesting others to “hold” cheques.
• Personal cheques cashed andreturned for irregular reasons.
• Placing unauthorized IOUs in change
funds, or prevailing on others inauthority to accept IOUs for small,short-term loans.
• Inclination toward covering up
inefficiencies by “plugging” figures.
• Pronounced criticism of others, so as
to divert suspicion.
• Replying to questions withunreasonable explanations.
• Gambling in any form beyond ability
to stand the loss.
• Buying or otherwise acquiring
through “business” channels
expensive automobiles andextravagant household furnishings.
• Explaining a higher standard ofliving as money left from an estate.
• Getting annoyed at reasonable
questioning.
• Refusing to leave custody of records
during the day; working overtime
regularly.
• Refusing to take vacations andshunning promotions for fear of
detection.
• Constant association with, andentertainment by, a member of a
supplier’s staff.
• Carrying an unusually large bankbalance, or heavy buying of securities.
• Rewriting records under the guise ofneatness in presentation.
Those indicators quoted from Sawyer
should not be used in a simplistic way
which might lead to absurd conclusions: a
conscientious employee “working overtime
regularly” is not necessarily guilty ofembezzlement !. Only the convergence ofvarious factors of suspicion can be regarded
as a warning indicator. A “toolbox” is not amere aggregate of instruments chosen and352

used at random. Directions for use areindispensable, especially insofar as
corruption is concerned.
(iii)Directions for Use
The need for efficiency of the anticorruption fight should not lead us tooverlook the protection of public andindividual liberty. Some “warning
indicators” to detect fraud may turn out tobe intrusive if used without judicial
background and safeguards. For example,
the disclosure by public officials of assets
and liabilities, coupled with the reversalof the burden of proof in corruption cases,
may be damaging to the fundamental
rights of the accused. This is why an
independent judiciary is indispensable toprotect those rights from infringements.
With such guarantees, efficient methods tofight corruption can be tested, especiallywhen individuals or entities underinvestigation appear to have in theirpossession or availability, directly or
indirectly, goods and means clearly beyond
their normal financial standards.
The “toolbox” represents an attempt ata systematic approach, which is not
reducible to a collection of devices. Thissystematic approach is intended to matchthe “systemic” nature of corruption.
B. The Systematic Approach to theIssue of Corruption
1. What “Systemic” Corruption Means
Corruption is not a transient fraud,because it aims at setting up durable
networks substituting their own regulation
for the legal one. Thus, it cannot be tackled
as a temporary aberration. This pervasive,
undermining nature of corruption may
cause reluctance on the part of publicauthorities, who fear that the remedy may
be so demanding as to be unaffordable andworse than the evil itself. The problem isto determine how to initiate the process ofrecovery when the whole administrative

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
and political body seems to be seriously ill.
When the roots of corruption are so deepand entangled, how is it possible toeradicate them without turning everything
upside down?
2. A Systematic Strategy Based on a
“Leverage Technique”
A modest, even down-to-earth, clue canbe usefully exploited when it is analysedthoroughly, thanks to a multidisciplinary
technique based on accounting,administrative law, commercial andbusiness law, rules banning unfair
competition, and tax laws. A systematic
approach to the issue of corruption goesbeyond criminal law. For example,
administrative provisions, such as what wecall in France “le statut général de lafonction publique” (“Civil servant status”
as a body of rules encompassing the whole
career of a civil servant) offers guidelines
about remuneration which can be
combined with tax law regarding thecontrol of the statement of income. Anotherexample may be quoted from the French“contrôle de légalité” (control of compliancewith law) for which the “Préfet” (a highranking civil servant representing all theministries in a district or territorial
subdivision) is responsible. This kind ofadministrative control makes it possible todetect cases of favouritism in tendering, forexample, by shedding light onirregularities such as a secret, preliminary
agreement between an elected public
official and a company which obtains themarket without the legal authorization of
the collegial body. Another example
concerns the implantation ofsupermarkets, which needs the approvalof a commission. Generally speaking,collegiality and the codification of terms
and conditions (“cahier des charges”, inFrance) contribute to limiting arbitrary
gratifications.

We have mentioned basic rules on
purpose because the review of thesefundamental principles proves that theanti-corruption fight does not begin ex
n i h i l o . A c t u a l l y, t h e p r e s e n c e o firregularities does not necessarily meanthat a corrupt scheme is underway on al a r g e s c a l e . H o w e v e r, t h o s e v e r yirregularities can be the visible part of acorrupt iceberg. Thus, the anti-corruption
fight should not be regarded as a breaker,
but as a patient and subtle review of theelementary procedures for checking
irregularities. Of course, this is only a step
to trigger the process off, but it is the firststep which is often the most difficult. The
basic and obvious devices that we havealluded to can be used in a sophisticatedand innovative manner, in order to track
corrupt practices. The audit method that
we mentioned above is likely to enhance
the impact and the relevance of those basic
rules, which protect the public interest andindividual liberty. Basic administrative
procedures become quickly routine, andthose who use them, unless made aware of
the fact, are perhaps blind to their capacity
to reveal corrupt practices. Once thedetection of corruption is defined as a goal,
irregularities immediately become
relevant. The question is then: what kindof organisation and management will
facilitate this awareness by casting newlight on the risk of corruption?
IV. “COMMAND-AND-CONTROLPARADIGM” VERSUS THE“LEARNING ORGANISATIONMODEL”?
“Command-and-control management” ison the way out. Its replacement, the“learning organisation model”, contradicts
all the assumptions about work espousedin the command-and-control paradigm andrepresents a radical transformation of theorganisation of work”12.
12 “Internal Auditor” review, June 1999, p.29.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
Such an analysis contrasts the object ofcontrol (which is compliance) and the objectof shared vision (which is commitment).
The former supposes a top-down,
hierarchical structure, whereas the latterencourages reflection and inquiry among
all members of the organisation, the groupof people functioning as a whole. Thissecond model suggests that a group ofindividuals can achieve a level ofintelligence higher than any one individualin the group. It favors value-added, winwin, synergistic solutions, rather than thehollow win-lose decisions. “The apparent
reactive solution is often no solution at all,but rather a short-term fix that serves only
to postpone and exacerbate the root
problem. When things go wrong it is more
likely that the business process has afundamental disconnect rather thansomebody failed a specific task. In today’s
businesses, formal controls, such as policies,
procedures, written authorizations,organizational charts, and “chain ofcommand” practices, are less valuable andeffective than informal controls, which
include intangible attributes such as ethics
and values, corporate culture, trust, teamwork, open communications, andp r o f e s s i o n a l i s m ” . 13 W h a t a r e t h econsequences, for the anti-corruption fight,of this contrasted vision of management?
A. Hierarchy is the Back-Bone ofReporting and of Responsibility
Supervisory accountability explicitly
refers to the kind of leadership implied in
the very notion of supervisor. Disciplinary
sanctions should be taken by thesupervisor, in case of a breach of duty by apublic official placed under their authority.
Nonetheless, public administration iscomposed of various agencies anddepartments which may turn out to be
reluctant to point their finger at “black
sheep” inside their staff, for fear of being
13 Ibidem p. 30.

354

stigmatised as a corrupt department as awhole. Keeping silent about misdeeds,
getting rid of the guilty public official bypromoting him/her to another department
prevent the very issue of corruption fromgetting to the forefront. Disciplinary
responsibility should be exercised fortransparency’s sake. This administrative
aspect of sanction should not be overlooked,
especially when penal prosecution is timebarred, which happens very often in casesof corruption. Nevertheless, hierarchicaldisciplinary power does not solve theproblem if the supervisors themselves aremanipulated and even involved in corrupt
schemes.
B. The “Command and Control
Paradigm” and the “Learning
Organisation Model” areComplementary
The “learning organisation model” canbe useful to highlight potential risks ofwrongdoings. It reverses the well-known
pretext, “why should I make a fool of myself
by refusing a bribe when everybody accepts
it? ”, by “why should I keep aloof whenmutual control and assessment allow me
to know what really takes place in the wholeorganisation? ”. This is what “a work
culture of reflection and inquiry among all
members of the organisation” suggests,
enhancing “each participant’s
understanding of the total process underreview”.14
This overall view favors transparency:
seniority is no longer a protection frominquiry and, vice versa, supervisors canrely upon a self-assessed staff. Corrupt
schemes are not necessarily disclosed, but
the contradictions favoring them arerevealed when, for example, pressures toimprove short-run performance promote
unethical behavior, or when “emphasis on
strict adherence to chain-of-command
14 Ibidem p. 31.

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
authority may provide excuses for ignoring
ethics when following orders.”
In the “learning organisation model”, theemphasis placed upon the issue of
corruption is not regarded as shameful forthe image of the whole organisation. Quite
the contrary, it reflects a means ofachieving greater perspicacity and of
improving performance. True “anticorruption engineering” takes shape asrisks of corruption are openly analysed anddiscussed through cases studies. This is
not an idyllic conception of training because
it requires greater supervisoryaccountability and due professional care.
The “I did not know that corrupt practices
were occurring because I could not know
the intricacies and far-reachingconsequences of the activity I am responsible
for, because I am not ubiquitous”, - such anargument tends to be less and less valid.
Does this mean that every employee, every
public official can be a potential
whistleblower?
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE“WHISTLEBLOWING” FUNCTION“‘Whistleblowing’ is a new label
generated by our increased awareness of the
ethical conflicts encountered at work.
Whistleblowers sound an alarm fromwithin the very organization in which theywork, aiming to spotlight neglect or abuses
that threaten the public interest”. 15
Whistleblowing is the ideal way to alert
those concerned about corrupt practices
before they take hold. Nonetheless:
A. The Whistleblower Can Feel Ill at
Ease and Manipulated“Moral conflicts on several levels confront
anyone who is wondering whether to speakout about abuses or risks or serious neglect.
In the first place, he must try to decide
15 p. 292 “Ethical Theory and Business” by Tom L.

Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie - Prentice Hall.

whether, other things being equal, speaking
out is in fact in the public interest. This
choice is often made more complicated byfactual uncertainties: who is responsible
for the abuse or neglect? How great is thethreat? How likely is it that speaking out
will precipitate changes for the better? In
the second place, a would-be whistleblower
must weigh his responsibility to serve thepublic interest against the responsibility heowes to his colleagues and the institutionin which he works. A third conflict forwould-be whistleblowers is personal innature and cut across the first two: even incases where they have concluded that thefacts warrant speaking out, and that their
duty to do so overrides loyalties tocolleagues and institutions, they often havereason to fear the results of carrying out
such a duty. However strong this duty may
seem in theory, they know that, in practice,
retaliation is likely”.
The prospect of professional suicide is
not particularly attractive. But, fromanother point of view, the prospect of being
accused of complicity by not reporting
suspicions of corruption is not seductive,
either. The second possibility is nottheoretical, since there is a growing
demand, from public opinion, for more
effective prosecution of cases of corruption.
One may be accused for not having blown
the whistle. The remedy can be foundwhen:
B. An Institution Plays the Role ofWhistleblower
Instead of worrying about one’s personal
career, instead of risking manipulation(hints of false information that, even ingood faith, the whistleblower takes for
granted and reports), instead of feelingisolated when the pros and cons areweighed, the would-be whistleblower could
take advantage in reporting their suspicion
to an independent institution which willtake the responsibility itself of referring it

355

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
or not to the judge or any other publicauthority appointed by law. In France,such an independent institution exists. It
is called the “Service Central de Prévention
de la Corruption” (SCPC).
VI. THE NEED FOR SPECIFIC
AUTHORITIES FOR THE
PREVENTION AND REPRESSION
OF CORRUPTION: THE FRENCH
EXPERIENCE
A. The Genesis of the French
Service Central de Prévention dela Corruption
It is not taken for granted that such aneed exists. Thus, before emphasizing
what the “specific authorities” are or what
they should be, I would like to shed somelight on the target they must hit, on theprocess which triggers our analysis. How
can such a need be assessed? If I can put
it in this way. It may be a controversial
issue when the so-called “need” is regarded
as a groundless fancy. Therefore, in orderto make the most of those specificauthorities, we have to answer thoughtprovoking objections regarding theirrelevance. One could consider thattraditional agencies already provide
adequate tools. What is the point increating new ones? Are they likely to
improve efficiency in the absence of any
process of trial and error? Won’t they be
inclined to focus on mere trifles instead oftackling important issues and cases
involving “big fish”? And so on and so on:
this list of objections is not exhaustive,
obviously.
The fact that corruption is a specificproblem deserving specific treatment has
inspired the creation of the French Service
Central de Prévention de la Corruption, incharge of coping with:

356(i) The Difficulty of Giving Evidence ofCorruption
Corruption involves secret dealings andit is not easy to point to a clear link between
illicit trafficking, for example, and thesubsequent profit in money or otherbenefits. It is difficult to establish a causeeffect relationship. It may be hard to provethe connection between a mere promise andthe improvement of “life style” in returnfor a favor. Corruption has no “victims”, inthe literal sense of the word, and for thisreason, it is rare that an act of corruption
will be reported to the competentauthorities by a participant in a corruption
scheme.
Since the real impact of corruption is toa great extent unclear, there is a dangerous
shortcut: in the absence of diagnosis,
corrupt practices are either over - or under- estimated, which entails the same
inefficiency: nothing can be done, either
because the illness does not exist or because
the patient does not exist any longer (s/heis dead). We do not share such fatalism.
(ii) The Complexity and Sophistication of
Corrupt Practices
The more technologically proficient thesociety, the more the means of control are
simultaneously strengthened andweakened. Criminals are skilled in themodern technologies of computers,
information systems, databases andfinancial networks. “White-collar
corruption” is highly sophisticated. In
addition, there are sensitive sectors, suchas international business transactions. In
this field, corruption proliferates bymanipulating complex rules andregulations, as well as commercial andfinancial circuits featuring a combinationof traditional operators, new companies
looking for foreign markets and criminalorganizations. Financial circuits and bank
networks are put to use by the operatorsof international trade equally for legal

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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operations and for operations which areeither illegal or carried out by illegalmeans, among which the payments ofvarious types of commissions andkickbacks.
This example highlights the fact that
corruption takes advantage of the intricacyof regulations in order to make illegal
processes appear to be legal ones. The
involvement of an increasing number ofoperators and intermediary companies
complicates the issue. Corruption goesbeyond individual crimes by setting up real
networks which plan even the minor
details. Nothing is done at random;
corruption tends to work as a system. Far
from being a mere aggregate of cunningand deceitful people, it operates throughchannels which cannot be called
precarious, quite the contrary.
(iii)Corruption as an “Upstream”
Phenomenon
With this image, I mean to convey thefact that corruption is not one fraud among
others but the privileged instrument, thelever of other frauds. As we have seen
previously, it helps structure networks,
which can be activated for various
fraudulent purposes. It is for this reason
that corruption can be so pervasive and,without contradiction, perfectly adequate
to the specific aim pursued by dishonest
individuals and groups. Corruption in
public procurements, for example, or thatlinked with public health policies (forinstance the purchasing of expensive new
equipment such as scanners, theintroduction on the market ofpharmaceutical products) have their own
specificities.
Corruption is closely linked with “slush
funds” and this vicious circle operates asfollows: money used to corrupt generates
benefits which can be invested once again
in corrupt practices, which, by facilitating

the fraud, makes it more profitable and soforth.
These three characteristics make itparamount to go beyond traditional
strategies to reduce corruption. The
specificity of corruption demands the
specificity of authorities in charge of anticorruption. What are the requirements
they must meet?
B. Objectives and Requirements(i) The Centralisation of Information
By nature, the crime of corruption isdifficult to establish. Sources of
information are scattered and there is notnecessarily any communication between
the various authorities in possession ofsuch information. Furthermore, in certain
cases, there may be difficulty getting accessto information. Thus, a system of
coordination should be set up between thevarious services, administrations and otherinstitutions working under the Public
Authority, to ensure that all information
sources work together to expose criminal
acts.
(ii) A Global Approach Combining
Prevention and Repression
A case by case repressive approach
would only favour new and moresophisticated techniques of corruption,with every chance of escaping the vigilanceof the Public Authorities, if there is no will
to take the problem firmly in hand withpriority given to the detection of
mechanisms favorable to the proliferationof corruption.
On the other hand, prevention without
repression would be neither reliable nor
credible. Dissuasive mechanisms or
deterrence is the goal to reach in order tomake corrupt practices less and lessprofitable. For example, the ability todecipher the corrupt practices (they arereal “codes”) and describe them in a public357

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
report is one aspect of deterrence because
criminals will have to invent newprocedures. It will complicate their “task”:
they will lose time and meanwhile themission of inspectors, generally speaking,will be facilitated by knowing what to checkand the approach to be taken.
(iii)Rapidity and Flexibility
We have to keep up with the evolution
and diversification of corrupting
phenomena. Few cases are dealt with in
the courts, and corruption techniques arealways a step ahead of what is known andhas been detected. New professions haveappeared which modify our schemes. HereI am thinking of lobbying which may be
conducive to trading in influence.
Resilience and responsiveness should not
be the privilege of tricky organizations. A
question arises as to whether these
aforementioned objectives cannot be met
by strengthening traditional departments
instead of setting up additional agencies.
I think specialization (such as training in
supposed “abstruse” financial matters) is
an important step but not a sufficient one:
independence and a long-range policy arenecessary. By independence, I mean thatthe anti-corruption agency should be at thedisposal of other authorities but also able
to check into possible irregularities.
Autonomy is indispensable to aid in the
carrying out of legal action and ofadministrative missions, the combinationof both aspects being indispensable. In theevent of any threat of corruption, theorganism can alert Public Authorities andpoint to loopholes in various regulations.
By a long-term policy, I mean the ability
to identify vulnerable sectors and to
anticipate trends rather than deal onlywith cases. The “anti-corruption fight” isa “full time job” requiring a staff devoted
to this specific mission. Being adamant by
not tolerating corruption is not sufficient
if we do not go beyond rhetoric. Watchdog

358

committees created to answer a particular
problem cannot cope with the complex
issue of corruption, which is closely
connected with other crimes: for example,
in France, what we call “abus de biens
sociaux” (misappropriation of corporate
funds). A long-range policy involves a“template” (what are our aims and how are
they to be achieved?), tactic combining legal
approaches and deep insights into
economical mechanisms and, lastly, a kindof “participative management” to make all
feel committed.
There are many biases which can hinder
an anti-corruption strategy: a corporation,for example, is willing to use any means,no matter how devious, to secure a contract.
Such a “goal-oriented” attitude, in contrast
with a “moral principle-oriented”
philosophy, has its ethical justification: thecorporation will indeed explain that thecontract is vital for its future otherwise thethreat of unemployment looms largecheating becomes a virtue.
So, we have to take such “twisted
statements” into account in order todemonstrate that they undermine thewhole economy. A specific authority can
avoid the risk of oversimplification by
pointing to the social cost of corruption
which jeopardizes equality among citizens.
Thus, awareness of the problem must be
increased. “Specific authorities” are notoperational if they cannot persuade
everybody to cooperate, not only public
officials, but also corporations, foreign
partners and, above all, citizens.
Cooperation means the monitoring anddisclosure of devious procedures and deeds.
It has nothing to do with “denunciation”
intended as slander and in which few are
willing to participate.
The Service Central de Prévention de laCorruption strives to meet the above-listed
requirements. It is an inter-ministerial

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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administrative agency, created by Law No.
93-122 of the 29th of January, 1993,
concerning the prevention of corruption
and transparency in economic affairs andpublic procedures. Its overall mission isdefined in Article I, Paragraph I of the law
in these terms: “the centralisation of all
information necessary for the detection andprevention of active and passive acts ofcorruption, for any abuse of influence by
persons exercising an official function or byindividuals, the misappropriation of publicfunds, illegal meddling or disrespect ofregulations aimed at protecting the freedom
and equality of candidates for public
procurements”.
The creation of such an agency wassuggested by a Commission for thePrevention of Corruption presided over by
a former Attorney General, in a report to
the Prime Minister in December, 1992. Set
up by the Minister of Justice on March 9th,
1993, the Agency began to function in
October, 1993. Headed by a high-ranking
magistrate, a former Attorney General, theService Central de Prévention de laCorruption is run by civil servants (onemagistrate from the ordre administratif, amember of the corps préfectoral, a chief ofpolice, a chief customs inspector, a tax
i n s p e c t o r, a h e a d o f t h e S e r v i c edépartemental de la D.G.C.C.R.F., and ahead of the administrative service at the
M i n i s t r y o f P u b l i c Wo r k s a n d a
representative of the Ministry of Defence.
This type of organisation is evidence of
the inter-ministerial nature of the agency
which guarantees its efficiency. Its simple
and straightforward structure reflects thedesire to create a team of highly specialised
experts. As explained in the preamble to
the Law of January 29, 1993, the Service
Central de Prévention de la Corruption, wascreated to ensure more efficient detectionof acts of corruption by means of asystematic processing of centralized

information, towards the aim of greater
efficiency in the prevention and repressionof corruption.
How is a problem brought to ourattention? We may focus on highly
sensitive sectors (public procurements,
international business transactions, publichealth policy, zoning regulations, financing
of sects, merchandising, professional
education and training). We can berequested to check the vulnerability of anactivity or an institution. We can also
examine mere suspicions of corruption andthen, if the issue goes beyond suspicion, we
refer the case to the tribunal. Ours is apreventive agency, which we could refer toas having a “whistleblowing” function. We
work before the case may or may not get to
the judge and our aim is to be ahead of thegame, and to point out loopholes to the
responsible authorities so that they can act
before illegal actions are committed.
C. Our Method and Main
Achievements
1. A Multidisciplinary Method Combining
Audit Techniques and a Legal Approach“Turning raw information and data into
actionable intelligence is fast becoming themost critical management tool”. 16 Raw
information about suspicion of corruption
is almost useless: it has to be analyzed andfiltered to be “eye-opening”. Raw
information is a juxtaposition of unrelated
opinions with no contextual link. It has no
signalling value and cannot be used as awarning indicator. The Service Central dePrévention de la Corruption does not boast
a large amount of raw information because
it is not a mere “information collector”, soto speak. This agency strives to promote
the gathering of relevant and accurate
information. For example, falsifying
inventories to cover thefts or delinquencies,
16 “Competitive Intelligence” by Larry Kahaner,

Simon and Schuster edition, p.15.

359

RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
or altering dates on deposit slips to coverstealing and, generally speaking, petty
falsifications and tampering, when
discovered by investigative authorities,
should sometimes be related to an overall
context of slush funds intended for the
purpose of bribing public officials. Insteadof condemning a “bunch of crooks”, a few
corrupt individuals, a network could be
disclosed, involving public officials, either
appointed or elected. Since corruption isthe art of camouflage, one should not besatisfied when pointing at various frauds
without revealing the corrupt link existing
between them. Relevant information
reveals unsuspected connections.
This expertise regarding the standardsof the information needed, the sources ofthat information and the ways to obtain it
has enabled us to carry out a time-and-costsaving activity of assistance:(i) Assistance in Detecting Cases ofCorruption
By giving investigators auditing
documents that we have elaborated on
various sectors (public procurements, forexample), we help them to keep up withthe pace of “speedy money” or, at least,
retrace it.
(ii) Assistance in Anticipating the Risks
of Corruption
At its peak, corruption may be definedby four criteria:
1. A mixture of public and private
financing, favoring the opacity of thetransactions and the abuse of
discretionary power;
2. Dissemination of controls because theactivity involves so many regulations
in various disciplines and areas that
it is almost impossible to encompass
the whole process;3. The alleged respectability of thesector, prohibiting scrutiny of its

360

methods. Whatever attempt at
shedding light on them is stigmatised
as an unacceptable interference;
4. Ta c i t c o m p l i c i t y, o r a t l e a s t
unquestionable agreement, of all theactors involved (in order to avoid thedisclosure of irregularities), because
they are sources of profit and of
protracting advantages.
Those four features remind us that strictlegislation is of no use when it is weakly
implemented. This problem of enforcement
and implementation is brought to ourattention because we have various
interlocutors, thanks to:
2. T h e B r o a d A c c e s s i b i l i t y w h i c hCharacterizes our Agency
Public and private entities, mayors,
public authorities and administrations,private persons, auditing bodies,
investigative bodies, etc, can request
advice, expertise on suspicion of corruption,assessment on codes of ethics, spotlightingof weaknesses conducive to slush funds,
and so forth. Fundamental debates about
the financing of political parties or thetightening limitation of prosecution of casesof corruption due to time-bar: our agency
has been invited to articulate its analysis.
For example, the offence of“misappropriation of corporate funds” isoften used, as we mentioned above, in placeof “corruption” to indirectly prosecutecorrupt behaviours. This situation is notsatisfactory because the blame is put
mainly on the bribe-giver, whereas thebribe-taker is no less responsible. The
SCPC does not, obviously, favour red tapebut insists on the necessary optimizationof controls.
It is difficult to measure a hidden
phenomenon such as corruption; it is all
the more difficult to assess the impact ofprevention. Nonetheless, the relevant
question is not “how many cases of113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
VISITING EXPERTS’ PAPERS
corruption have been deterred? ”, but “towhat extent are detection and deterrence
facilitated?”. The SCPC is not an overseer
but a facilitator. It makes a point byshowing that preventive methods work,that they do not necessitate either large
budgets or excessive administrative effort.
The fact that the SCPC is in charge ofprevention makes would-be whistleblowers
more willing to report; the repressivefunction of an agency bearing a connotationof threat for the reporter, for fear of getting
involved to a certain extent.
The creation of specific authorities forthe prevention and repression of corruption
is advocated by international institutions.
The Council of Europe, for instance,
recommends “to promote the specialisationof persons or bodies in charge of fighting
corruption and to provide them withappropriate means and training to performtheir tasks”.17
The SCPC takes part in theinternational negotiations about corruption
issues.
VII. THE EXPERT GROUPMEETING ON CORRUPTION AND
ITS FINANCIAL CHANNELS (PARIS,
30 MARCH TO 1 APRIL 1999)
A. The Context of This Meeting
This meeting was held in Paris, inspiredby a French proposal presented at the 7th
session of the United Nations Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Division,
followed by a resolution of the Economic
and Social Council (July 28, 1998). The
aim of these United Nations initiatives is
to “urge States to develop and implement
anti-corruption measures, to increase theircapacity to prevent and adequately control
corrupt practices, and to improve
international cooperation in this field. The
17 In 20 Guiding Principles For The Fight Against

Council also requested the SecretaryGeneral, inter alia, to review and expand
the manual on practical measures against
corruption; to coordinate and cooperatewith other United Nations entities andrelevant international organizations in
anti-corruption efforts; and to keep theissue of action against corruption underregular review.”
Key-terms can be emphasized:“implement”, “to increase their capacity”,“prevent and adequately control”, “manualon practical measures”, “to coordinate andcooperate”, “under regular review”. Thereis, actually, a will to achieve feasibility andpractical impact and to elaborate acompendium of anti-corruption provisions
enabling the authorities to:• review the adequacy of their [theMember States] criminal laws,
including procedural legislation, inorder to respond to all forms ofcorruption and related actions
designed to assist or to facilitate
corrupt activities, and should haverecourse to sanctions that will ensure
adequate deterrence;• devise administrative and regulatory
mechanisms for the prevention ofcorrupt practices or the abuse of
power;• adopt procedures for the detection,
investigation and conviction ofcorrupt officials;• create legal provisions for theforfeiture of funds and property from
corrupt practices;• adopt economic sanctions against
enterprises involved in corruption.18
This idea of a compendium stems fromconcern for coherence and consistency,
18 The items are quoted from the introduction of theManual on Practical Measures against Corruption.

Corruption.

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RESOURCE MATERIAL SERIES No. 56
required by a systematic approach to theissue of corruption. The purpose of theManual is to review the most common
problems encountered by policy makers
and practitioners in their efforts to deal
with corruption. The adaptability of thisManual to each domestic context andlegislation is a priority. Thus, the processof review is coupled with a process ofrevision of the Manual itself, in order totake into account the evolution of theinternational instruments devised in thevarious fora.
In order to distinguish between what has
been done and what remains to be done, asustained effort is required, aiming atcoordination and cooperation (“thephenomenon of corruption has become
transnational in nature as a result of
increasing globalization and liberalizationof trade. It is no longer possible to deal with
it effectively only through national action.
The international community is in urgent
need of a common basis for cooperation thatwould promote the values of good
governance and would insure thatdevelopment and growth are not impededby corrupt practices.”).
B. “A Common Basis for
Cooperation” and a Significant
Step Forward
Since corruption is an abuse of power togain undue advantages (on the behalf ofthe bribe-giver) and to achieve personalenrichment (on the behalf of the bribetaker), the core of the matter is the crucialrole played by financial channels. Let us
imagine an absurd scenario depriving thebribe-taker of the possibility to profit fromtheir pecuniary advantages. Bribery would
become much less attractive. This picture
is not unrealistic thanks to the tracks
explored by the Expert Group Meeting on
Corruption and its Financial Channels,
with a view to strengthening, or at least,
favoring:

362(i) p r o v i s i o n s a g a i n s t m o n e y laundering, so that they cover bribes
and the proceeds of corruption: if theproceeds of corruption were seized(“forfeiture of the assets ofcorruption”), there would be less of aguarantee of personal enrichment...;(ii) vigilance and monitoring of financialtransactions: banks could play therole of “whistleblowers” when facedwith suspicious transactions;(iii)ways to convince underregulated
financial centres to adopt rules
enabling them to trace and takeaction against the proceeds oforganized crime.
The off-shore places can be characterized
mainly thanks to the following criteria:• prevailing banking secrecy;• lack of regulations and control;• large possibilities of setting up shellcompanies which conceal the identityof the real beneficiary of thetransactions;• restrictive rules of international
cooperation in the administrative andjudicial areas.
The impact of such places cannot beignored; they play a prominent role.
Experts consider that almost half of theamount of the international money volumeuses the channels they offer. They are very
often the indispensable instrument ofcorrupt agreements. This is why the
problem of corruption has to be tackledfrom at least three angles:• the supply side (the OECD
Convention, for example, illustrates
this approach);• the demand side (the ethical code forpublic officials aims at preventing
misdeeds);• the financial channels (whose rolemust be highlighted and scrutinized).

113TH INTERNATIONAL TRAINING COURSE
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The detection of criminal financialtransactions, the improvement of theprocedures to retrace the proceeds ofcorruption suppose that the problem offinancial channels receive due
consideration by underlining the necessityof:
1. Cooperation• 42 countries and 12 internationalorganisations were represented in
Paris at the Expert Group Meeting;• The initiatives of the United Nations,OECD, European Union, Council ofEurope, and the commitment of G8,
International Monetary Fund, World
Bank...give impetus to an irreversiblesynergy which makes, by contrast,
the position of the off-shore places
groundless (if I can put it in this way
with no pun intended);• Since the problem of financial
channels is identified as a priority,
the urge for transnational
cooperation is emphasized. If money
crosses domestic boundaries, theinternational response to the problem
has to be coordinated;• The strengthening of cooperation
requires that the same coordination
be a reality when involving various
domestic administrative
departments such as the police,
justice and tax offices.
2. Responsibility• A sustained commitment can nolonger be delayed because politicalauthorities are aware of the threat
represented by corrupt money, using
those financial channels which are
likely to endanger the whole financial
system;• The need for a clear position is all themore important because, for example,
Pablo ESCOBAR placed, a few years
ago, a very large amount of money ina single non-nominative bankaccount in a country belonging to theEuropean Union;• The commitment of the United States
was made clear on the occasion of aninternational conference organised by
the Department of State (from 24 to
26 February 1999);• The awareness that corruption
fosters insecurity at all levels andthat monitoring and procedures ofdeclarations of suspicion - if they failto be put into practice - will entail thenecessity of devising protective
systems.
An “international economic order” istaking shape, which allows us tocontemplate the possibility of forbidding(partially or totally) financial transactions
when it is obvious that too many loopholes
exist. The struggle against transnationalorganised crime and the fight against
corruption bolster each other by a global
strategy of deterrence. Such a strategy
can be effective thanks to:(i) Cross-Fertilization
The exchange of best practices
between various countries andvarious administrative departments
to expand the scope of deterrence byshowing that those procedures work.
(ii) Training and Assistance“Multidisciplinary training andeducational programmes can be
developed at the international,
regional or sub-regional levels, inorder to pool expertise and resourcesthat are often inadequate at thenational level.” Since the anticorruption commitment has becomea landmark for judicial security,
endangered by corrupt practices,
technical and financial assistance canbe provided according to this criteria(taking into account the effectivenessof the effort and initiatives

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undertaken).
The path becomes more and more
obvious, pursuing “the ongoingdevelopment of a comprehensive
international convention against
transnational organized crime”. It is highly
relevant that the UN Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice “takes
note with appreciation of and subscribes tothe conclusions and recommendations of theExpert Group Meeting on Corruption and
its Financial Channels, held in Paris from30 March to 1 April 1999, which arecontained in the report of the Expert Group
Meeting”. This official reference enhances
the impact of the conclusions of the Experts
Group Meeting, and allows a specialized
corpus of coherent rules to achievecompletion and coherence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Corruption has been identified by theinternational community as a serious issue
deserving full attention. This is an
important step which should not beinterpreted naïvely. “Naïvely” would
consist of welcoming a “new era” where
corrupt behaviors would be progressively
banned. This utopian conception iscontrasted by the sarcastic comments
according to which corruption has beenbrought to the international agenda,
simply because it has reached suchproportions that nobody can afford any
longer to spend a huge amount of money.
Anyhow, whatever the motivations, one
cannot deny that the interest in the issue
is momentous, and is far from beingtransient. It is difficult to imagine that the
body of rules taking shape presently might
be wiped out in the future. Its
implementation is at stake, supposing
macro-economic initiatives (at a global andinternational level) and micro-economic
vigilance, monitoring and whistleblowing.

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