Second Edition

Research Report on Impacts of Hokkaido
Eastern Iburi Earthquake on CO2 Reservoir

November 2018
Japan CCS Co., Ltd.

Report
Table of Contents

Page
1. Executive Summary

1

2. Overview of Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project
2.1

Objectives and issues of Demonstration Project3

2.2

Schedule of Demonstration Project3

2.3

CO2 reservoir and injection condition

3

3. Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (Overview)
3.1

Triggering mechanism of the earthquake

5

3.2

Actions after the earthquake

8

4. Risk management regarding Earthquake and Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project
4.1

Condition of Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project facilities before and9after the Earthquake
4.2

Framework of manuals for risk management

10

4.3

Risk management for onshore capture/injection facilities and present status

11

4.4

Risk management of CO2 reservoir and present status

12

4.5

Relationship to Act for the Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime

12

Disasters

5. Relationship of CO2 Injection and Earthquake
5.1

Mechanism of earthquake induction
5.1.1 Examination of earthquake induction in the reservoir and cap rock by

13
13

CO2 injection
5.1.2 Examination on impacts of CO2 injection on earthquake source fault
5.2

13

Impacts on reservoir
5.2.1 Monitoring results of micro-seismicity/natural earthquakes

15

5.2.2 Monitoring results of temperature and pressure18

6. Future Plan221. Executive Summary
This report (hereinafter referred to as “Report”) compiles the circumstances of local actions takenby the “Large scale CCS Demonstration Project in Tomakomai” (hereinafter referred to as the “theDemonstration Project”) when the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (hereinafter referred to as “theEarthquake”) occurred, as well as the content and the opinions received from the committee membersof the “Review Meeting on the Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project” (October 19, 2018) held byJapan CCS Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “JCCS”).
JCCS is compiling and disclosing this Report in accordance with its principle to widely share
information on the project, to which it has adhered to since the project startup.
Prior to the start the project, JCCS conducted a detailed evaluation of the effects of the undergroundstorage of CO2 on the geological formations of the Tomakomai area through such methods as
simulation analysis. In view of the occurrence of the Earthquake, JCCS once again held discussions
on whether the Earthquake had any impact on the project, whether there was any relationship between
the project and the Earthquake, and sought the opinions of external experts. JCCS herein reports theresults.
(1) Overview of Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project
The Demonstration Project being implemented by JCCS under consignment by the New Energy
and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO; METI until the last Japanese fiscal
year; hereafter “JFY”). This project aims to achieve the practical use of CCS technology (separation,
capture, injection and storage of CO2) by around 2020 in accordance with the Basic Energy Plan (latest
plan approved by Cabinet on July 3, 2018) by demonstrating the safe and stable implementation of thefirst integrated CCS system in Japan. CO2 injection into the reservoir located about 3 km offshore ofTomakomai at a depth of about 1.0 to 1.2 km below the seabed (the Moebetsu Formation) started in
April 2016, and the cumulative CO2 injection volume exceeded 200,000 tonnes by the middle ofAugust 2018. In addition, test injection into the reservoir located about 4 km offshore of Tomakomai
at a depth of about 2.4 to 3.0 km (Takinoue Formation) was started in February of 2018, and 98 tonnesof CO2 has been injected.
(2) Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (Outline)
On September 6, 2018, at 03:07, a M6.7 earthquake occurred at a depth of 37 km in the central
eastern Iburi region (announcement by Japan Meteorological Agency), and an intensity of 7 wasregistered at Atsuma Town, Hokkaido, and an intensity of lower 5 (158 gal) at the Tomakomai CCS
Demonstration Center. Regarding this earthquake, the Earthquake Research Committee of theJapanese government expressed the view, “In areas from around the eastern part of the Iburi/Hidaka
regions to offshore of Urakawa, many earthquakes have historically occurred in regions deeper thanwhere earthquakes usually occur in the onshore earth crust, and the recent seismic activity occurred insuch region.” Thus, it is believed that the Earthquake is not beyond the scope of seismic activities
expected in this region.
(3) Risk management for the Earthquake and the Demonstration Project
The Demonstration Project Center adopts a security system that entails an emergency shutdown of
the CO2 capture/injection facilities for seismic tremors exceeding 150 gal. However, the supply of the1

CO2 containing gas had been stopped since September 1 due to circumstances of the CO2 supplier andoperations of the surface facilities and injection had been suspended when the Earthquake occurred,and no emergency shutdown due to the Earthquake occurred. JCCS, in accordance with its in-houseemergency response rules, confirmed that there were no abnormalities in the facilities and equipmentof the Center immediately after the occurrence of the Earthquake, and communicated with NEDO,METI and local stakeholders. On the other hand, a power shutdown occurred 18 minutes after the
Earthquake, and the entire power supply was lost after the uninterruptible power supply (UPS)
operated for about 90 minutes, resulting in a blackout for about 55 hours before power restoration. In
order to enable full-time acquisition of data of the injection well even during a power outage,
improvement countermeasures with redundant means to deal with power outages comprising the
installation of emergency power generators in the Demonstration Center to ensure minimum operationof the facilities, and installation of batteries for the continuous measurement data recorders for the
injection wells will be implemented as a first step.
(4) Relationship with Earthquake
In 2011 before the startup of the project, it was confirmed that there was no possibility of slipping
along cracks in the geological formation (which would cause a micro-earthquake) by evaluating theimpacts on cracks in the reservoir and cap rock caused by CO2 injection, on the basis of a calculationof pressure rise of geological layers for the case where an injection of 750,000 tonnes CO2 (250,000tonnes per year for three years) has been implemented.
On this occasion, in order to examine the impact of the CO2 injection on the source fault of the
Earthquake, simulations on CO2 behavior were conducted based on an updated reservoir model (as ofJuly 2018) when the cumulative injection amount (300,000 tonnes into the Moebetsu Formation and
750 tonnes into the Takinoue Formation) reaches the amount expected at the time of injection
completion. The pressure increase in the geological formations due to the rise in injection pressure(about 5 MPa in the Takinoue Formation and 0.7 MPa in the Moebetsu Formation) with regard to theTakinoue Formation was 2 MPa at 50m from the injection well and decreased to about 0.25 MPa or
less 1 km away from the well, and the variation in stress*1 at the hypocenter about 30 km in epicenter
distance was calculated to be about 1/1,000 of the pressure change in the earth’s crust caused by thetidal force of the earth (several kPa). In addition, micro-seismicity has been continuously monitored
in the vicinity of the injection point, and no micro-seismicity had been detected since the start of
injection. As a result, the committee members reached a common understanding that no datasuggesting any relationship between the CO2 geological storage and the Earthquake occurring at alocation about 30 km away could be confirmed.
Although part of the pressure and temperature data of the reservoirs is lost by the power outage,
resumption of data acquisition after power restoration revealed that the data follows the same trend asthat before the power outage, identical to that seen in past stoppages of CO2 injection. Furthermore, arise in pressure (1.8 kPa) in the CO2 reservoir (Takinoue Formation) at the injection well was
temporarily observed just after the Earthquake. This value is consistent with the theoretical solution(1.9 kPa) of stress variations associated with fault activity at the hypocenter, and it does not indicate
an abnormality of the CO2 reservoir. Therefore, the committee members reached a common
understanding that no CO2 leakage attributable to the Earthquake could be recognized. *1 The force that2

is generated inside an object as a result of applying a force to the object. Pressure is the force applied to the object.

(5) Future Plan
The committee members confirmed their understanding that the resumption of CO2 injection would
be conducted pending the restart of supply of CO2 gas from the CO2 source, observation of the situation
regarding the integrity of injection facilities and wells, explanation to local stakeholders, and trends
of aftershocks of the Earthquake.
2. Overview of Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project
The Demonstration Project is being implemented by JCCS under consignment by NEDO (METI
until JFY 2017).
2.1. Objectives and issues of Demonstration Project
The Demonstration Project, as a countermeasure against global warming, aims to achieve thepractical use of CCS technology by around 2020 in accordance with the Basic Energy Plan (latest plan
approved by Cabinet on July 3, 2018), and sets out to demonstrate that CCS can be implemented safely
and stably at a practical usage technical level. To this end, as the first integrated CCS system in Japan,
CO2 will be captured, injected, and stored at the rate of about 100,000 tonnes per year, and thesubsurface behavior of CO2 will be monitored.
Although most of the elemental technologies that are required in the respective steps of CCS(capture, injection/storage, and monitoring) are already in use in various types of industries, it willfurther be demonstrated that the combined elemental technologies will function as an integrated
system.
2.2. Schedule of Demonstration Project
The entire schedule of the Demonstration Project is shown in Figure 1. CO2 injection was started in
April 2016 and is scheduled for the 3 years of JFY 2016 through 2018.

Figure 1: Entire Schedule of
Demonstration Project(as of November 2018)

Injection of
CO2

Preparation

Separation/Capture/
Storage of CO2

Baseline
Monitor* Investigation of the subsurface condition of
the injected CO2, the surrounding sea andseabed conditions to obtain information for
the adequate management of CO2 injection.

Monitoring*

2.3. CO2 reservoir and injection condition
The CO2 source of the Demonstration Project is CO2 containing gas supplied by an existing oil
refinery, and the capture volume of CO2 is dependent on the CO2 volume supplied by the CO2 gas
source. The capture facility of the Demonstration Project has been confirmed to have a capture
capacity of up to 220,000 tonnes per year (approx. 600 tonnes per day) at a CO2 concentration of 99%
or greater. The captured CO2 will be injected entirely into sub-seabed reservoirs located offshore
Tomakomai (Moebetsu and Takinoue Formations). In April 2016, injection was started into the
Moebetsu Formation, evaluated to be highly permeable for CO2, located 1.0 to 1.2 km below theseabed about 3 km offshore of Tomakomai. The cumulative injected CO2 amount as of September 1,
2018, is 207,209 tonnes. On the other hand, test injection into the Takinoue Formation, located 2.4 to
3.0 km below the seabed about 4 km offshore was also started in February 2018, and 98 tonnes of CO2
3

has been injected. The testing of simultaneous injection of CO2 into the two reservoirs has also been
conducted.
Placing importance on the safe implementation of CO2 injection, JCCS measured the leak-offpressure of the cap rock (not the pressure at which the geological layer is actually ruptured, but thepressure at which cracks are to be formed before rupturing occurs) in advance, and designated 90% of
this pressure as the upper limit of the operational pressure. We also installed a comprehensive
monitoring system. To implement CCS safely and stably, it is necessary to grasp the behavior(movement, distribution, etc.) of the CO2 stored, as well as to continuously monitor for any CO2leakage/seepage out of the reservoirs. For this purpose, we are implementing seismic surveys to grasp
the distribution of CO2, and are monitoring the pressure and temperature of the reservoirs (Figure 2).
In addition, natural earthquakes and underground micro-seismicity are continuously monitored.
Furthermore, in Japan, the Act on the Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime Disasters(Maritime Pollution Prevention Act) is applied for sub-seabed CO2 storage, and in accordance withthe “Monitoring Plan” associated with the act, marine environmental surveys (seasonal surveys
implemented four times a year) are being conducted.
As for the behavior of stored CO2, a 3D seismic survey was implemented in 2017 at cumulative
CO2 injection of 65,000 tonnes into the Moebetsu Formation, and a comparison with the reflected
waves of a baseline 3D survey conducted before the start of CO2 injection detected a difference in theseismic waves (Figure 3). This difference is believed to indicate the distribution of the stored CO2,
which shows a distribution similar to the prediction results of CO2 behavior simulation at cumulative
injection of 61,238 tonnes implemented in advance. Calibration of the reservoir model by acomparison of the prediction and the actual measurement is expected to improve the accuracy of themodel and contribute to the prediction of the future CO2 distribution.

Figure 2: Positional Relationship of Demonstration Project Facilities
4

Injection Well for the
Moebstsu Form.

Reference Figure

Difference associated with
CO2 Injection

Prediction of CO2 Saturation Ratio Distribution according to 2016 Reservoir Model

CO2 Saturation

Plan View of Injection Well for
the Moebetsu Form./
CO2 Saturation Distribution
Cumulative Injection Amount:
61,238t-CO2◆ Differences from the baseline survey are shown as the difference (RMS amplitude) in waveforms ofreflected waves in the zone equivalent to the depth of Moebetsu reservoir (992 to 1,032 msec.).

Figure 3: Results of Monitor 3D Seismic Survey
3. Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake (Overview)
3.1. Triggering mechanism of the earthquake
On September 6, 2018, at 03:07, an M6.7 earthquake occurred at a depth of 37 km in the central
eastern Iburi region (announcement by Japan Meteorological Agency), and a seismic intensity of 7
was recorded at Atsuma Town, Hokkaido, while the intensity was lower 5 (158 gal) at theDemonstration Project Center. According to material released by the Japan Meteorological Agency, if
we take a look at seismic activity since October 1997, earthquakes of around M4.0 and greater haveoccurred from time to time around the hypocenter of the Earthquake, and on July 1, 2017, an M5.1
earthquake occurred at a depth of 27 km (Figure 4). According to public material, the regional
subsurface structural framework is believed to be that the Pacific plate is moving obliquely into the
Kuril Trench, dragging the earth’s crust of the Kuril Islands (Kuril Arc) from the east, which pushes
and collides with the NE Japan Arc (Figure 5). It is believed that when this happens, the upper crustal
part of the Kuril Arc is thrust upwards and forms the Hidaka Mountain Range, and the lower part splits
and slides downwards beneath the NE Japan Arc, which is also dragged downwards. As a result, theearth’s crust is thicker around the Hidaka Mountain Range and to the west (Figure 5).

5Central Eastern Iburi Region Earthquake on Sept. 6, 2018
(Detail of earthquake location)
Epicenter Distribution Map(Earthquakes from Oct. 1, 1997 to 03:30 Sept. 6, 2018; Depth: 0 to 150 km; M2.0 or over)

Cross-section along A-B
within square zone of left figure

Earthquakes from January 1, 2018 onwards shown in darker color.

July 1, 201727 km, M5.1

Eastern Iburi Earthquake(Max Intensity: upper 6)*
Sept. 6, 2018
03:07
37 km, M6.7

July 1, 2017
D: 27 km, M5.1

Eastern Iburi
Earthquake
Sept. 6, 2018
D: 37 km, M6.7

Vertical axis denotes depth; size ofcircles denote magnitudes.
Jan. 14, 2016
52 km, M6.7

Nov. 24, 2011
43 km, M6.2

*Third Report by Japan Meteorological Agency (15:30 Sept. 6):
maximum seismic intensity was corrected to 7.
Size of circles denote magnitudes.

CO2 Injection Location
Source: First Report by Japan Meteorological Agency (05:10 Sept. 6)

Figure 4: Hypocenter of Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake

6

Westward movement of Kuril Arc

NE Japan Arc

Hidaka Mountain Range

Kuril Arc

East Iburi Earthquake

Kuril Arc

Overthrusting ofUpper Earth Crust
Falling off of Lower
Earth Crust

Present

According to new
developments in research on
island arc collision (Ito, et. al,2002), the upper earth crust iscorrelated with the upper halfof the lower earth crust +upper earth crust, and thelower earth crust with thelower half of the lower earth
crust + upper mantle.

Schematic diagram of formation process of Hidaka Mountain Range caused by westward
movement of Kuril Forearc Sliver and collision with NE Japan [MEXT (2008)]

Fault Zone at
Eastern Marginof Ishikari
LowlandOffshore of
Urakawa

Figure 5: Tectonic Structure Image of Southern Hokkaido
Source: High-resolution seismic velocity structure beneath the Hokkaido corner, northern Japan (Saeko Kita et al.,2012), Estimation of 3D Inhomogeneous Crustal Structure at Plate Boundaries and Peripheral Regions (MEXT, 2008)

The Earthquake is believed to have occurred in the vicinity of the bend of the earth’s crust, and thegovernment’s Earthquake Research Committee expressed the view on September 6 that “the regions
around eastern Iburi, Hidaka to offshore Urakawa are characterized by many earthquakes also
occurring in locations deeper than where earthquakes usually occur in the onshore earth crust, and thelatest seismic activity occurred in the areas having such characteristics.” As described above, theEarthquake is believed be within the range of seismic activities expected in the areas concerned.
In addition, the hypocenter of the Earthquake officially announced by the Japan Meteorological
Agency is located at a depth of 37 km in basement rock, which has no continuity with the sedimentarylayers into which CO2 is being injected (Figure 6).

7

Cross-section along Line X-X’shown in figure at lower leftFault Zone at EasternMargin of Ishikari Lowland

Concealed thrust fault

Umaoi fault

NE Japan Arc
Ooyubari fault

Kuril Arc
Yubaridake
fault

HMT

Hiroo fault

Injection location(Projected)
Sedimentary layers
Basement rock, etc.
Observation Well
OB-3 (Projected)

Approx. 30 km

Ishikari
LowlandVolcanic Ejecta
Lake Shikotsu
Injection location

Yubari Mountains

Depth of Hypocenter
Fault Zone at Eastern Marginof Ishikari Lowland

Schematic Geological Cross-Section

Epicenter

Source: Journal of the Japanese Association for Petroleum
Technology, VOL. 65, No. 1, Tanio ITO (2000)

Source: National Institute of Advanced Industrial Scienceand Technology; additions made by JCCS

Figure 6: Hypocenter of Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake and schematic geological cross-section
3.2. Actions after the earthquake
Following the Earthquake on September 6, JCCS implemented actions according to in-houseemergency response rules, and provided reports and disclosed information to the relevant stakeholders
as follows: 03:07

Following the Earthquake, the operations personnel on duty first executed evacuation, roll-call, and information collection, and then implemented an on-site inspection according to the“Inspection List” (on items stipulated in “Procedures for countermeasures against natural disasters”),
confirmed that there was no accident/disaster and abnormality regarding the capture and injection
facilities, and reported the situation to the General Manager of the Tomakomai CCS Demonstration
Project Center.
 07:03

In accordance with in-house rules, the General Manager of the Storage Engineering

Department of JCCS Head Office, followed by the General Manager of the Plant Division, reportedby e-mail that there was no abnormality at the plant to the Global Environment Partnership Office,Industrial Science and Technology Policy and Environment Bureau of METI, and the Environment
Department of NEDO.
 08:00

After confirming that there was no abnormality regarding personnel safety, facilities,buildings and the entire premises, which were not listed on the “Inspection List”, the General Managerof the Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project Center once again reported to the JCCS Head OfficePlant Division that “no property damage or abnormality to personnel or facilities was detected as aresult of inspection”.
 The Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project Center provided the first report via mobile phone at8

08:50 to Tomakomai Fisheries Cooperative Association, 09:00 to Tomakomai Industry and Economics
Department, and 09:15 to Hokkaido Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations, reporting that
there was no abnormality of the project facilities.
 09:37 JCCS posted that there was no abnormality of the onshore capture/injection facilities on“Information” section of homepage.
 09:50 Reporting to the Energy Policy Division, Hokkaido Bureau of Economy, Trade and Industry,
was made by the General Affairs Department, JCCS Head Office due to the disconnection of landline
phones caused by the Hokkaido power outage and the recharging status of mobile phones.
 As no human casualties or property damage of facilities were incurred, JCCS judged there was noneed to make an emergency call to the fire department and police station, and reported the situation
after the Earthquake as follows:- September 12 (Wed) Electric Power Safety Division, Hokkaido Industrial Safety and Inspection
Department (Reporter: Plant Headquarters)- September 13 (Thu) Commerce, Industry, Labor and Tourism Section, Industry Promotion
Division, Hokkaido Iburi General Sub-prefectural Bureau (General Manager of Tomakomai CCS
Demonstration Project), Hokkaido Tomakomai Regional Environment Monitoring Office,
Tomakomai City Environment Preservation Division (Manager of Environment and Safety Group),
Tomakomai Fire Department (Manager of Environment and Safety Group) September 12 (Wed) 19:40

JCCS posted its view regarding CCS and the Earthquake on“Information” section of homepage.
 September 13 (Thu)

Although JCCS in-house rules did not require disclosure of information

because the hypocenter was outside the Tomakomai Project monitoring area, from the viewpoint ofappropriately providing adequate information, JCCS communicated the contents of the “Information”
section of its homepage to major local stakeholders, including the Tomakomai Fisheries Cooperative
Association, Tomakomai Industry and Economics Department and the Hokkaido Federation ofFisheries Cooperative Associations.
4. Risk management regarding Earthquake and Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project4.1. Condition of Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project facilities before and after the Earthquake
Although CO2 capture and injection operations were being implemented smoothly until September
1, the supply of CO2 containing gas was stopped due to conditions at the CO2 source as shown below,
and accordingly, CO2 injection was suspended. The CO2 capture and injection facilities were kept instandby mode in order that injection could be restarted as soon as the supply of gas was resumed.
However, the CO2 source informed us on September 5 that the resumption of gas supply would bedelayed, and the facilities were switched from standby to stop mode, after which the Earthquake
occurred. Thus, although tremors exceeding 150 gal which would have activated emergency shutdown
were detected, emergency shutdown of the entire facilities was not implemented.
Sept. 1 (Sat)

2:25

Supply of CO2 containing gas feeding was stopped due to conditions of
the CO2 source, and CO2 injection was suspended. Facilities weremaintained in standby mode.

Sept. 5 (Wed)

11:00

It became apparent that resumption of gas supply from the CO2 gas source
would be delayed.
9Sept. 6 (Thu)

17:00

Operational mode of facilities transferred from standby to stop.

3:07

Occurrence of Earthquake

3:08

Detection of the Earthquake (local seismometer in the capture facility:
158 gal); outage of special high voltage electricity of Hokkaido ElectricPower (Hoku-Den).

3:25

Total blackout

4:40

Uninterruptible power supply (UPS) of the capture and injection facilities
stopped.

Around 5:37
Sept.８ (Sat)

Monitoring operation stopped.

8:00

Confirmation that there was no abnormality of facilities.

11:18

Restoration of special high voltage electricity from Hokkaido ElectricPower.

12:15

Confirmation of power distribution to Tomakomai CCS Demonstration
Center completed.

14:50

Restoration of stop mode of capture and injection facilities prior to
Earthquake (air, nitrogen, industrial water operation).

Sept. 9 (Sun)

15:00

Restoration of access to Internet.

Sept.10 (Mon) around 11:45: Monitoring operation of the project was resumed, except for
Observation Well OB-3 (monitoring devices under routine inspection).
4.2. Framework of manuals for risk management
Prior to the startup of injection in April 2016, JCCS formulated in-house rules with regard tomeasures to be taken when emergencies such as disasters occur, on the basis of assumptions on actions
required for possible emergencies. As for the framework of manuals, a set of risk management manuals(Figure 7) for each project element (onshore capture/injection facilities, offshore reservoirs, public
relations) was established around a Basic Risk Management Manual. When the Earthquake occurred,
this framework of manuals was applied, and actions were taken accordingly.

Basic Risk Management Manual
Rules on Emergency Countermeasures- Definition of emergency- Communication/instruction chains under emergency- Organization when emergency headquarters is established- Staff members of emergency headquarters and division of duties

Tomakomai CCS
Demonstration Center
Safety Management Provisions
Plant Division

Reservoir
Management Criteria
Storage Engineering
Department

Action Manual for
Public Relations
Public Relations Department

Natural Disaster Management
Procedures

Figure 7: Risk Management Manual Framework104.3. Risk management for onshore capture/injection facilities and present status
The framework of safety management provisions of the Demonstration Project Center is shown
below (Figure 8). Relevant business laws are applied to the onshore capture/injection facilities, andCO2 capture operations are implemented after obtaining permits and authorization from the relevant
government ministries and agencies. Upon the occurrence of the Earthquake, the Natural Disaster
Management Procedures were applied, and various actions were taken.
Regarding the onshore capture/injection facilities, JCCS had established an independent system
employing an emergency shutdown system (ESD) that would safely stop, shut-off, and isolate when
the facilities are in operation in case of occurrence of factors causing serious disasters (explosion, fire,
environmental damage, human damage, important equipment breakage) or abnormal operation of the
facilities. On this occasion, the capture facility was in a shutdown mode when the earthquake occurred.
However, had the facilities been in normal operation mode, the ESD would have been activated as theaccelerometer of the facility actually detected 158 gal, exceeding the in-house standard for shutdownof 150 gal.
In addition, regarding the safety equipment, we had set out multiple items for hypotheticalabnormalities including the occurrence of a huge earthquake, and had implemented actions including
installation of devices required for the safety equipment.
Tomakomai CCS
Demonstration Center
Safety Management
Provisions

High-Pressure Gas
Safety Act
Hazard Prevention
Regulations

Facility
Abnormality
Management
ProceduresElectricity Business
Act
Safety Regulations

Natural Disaster
Management
ProceduresFire Services Act
Prevention
Regulations

Operational Safety
Education Plan

Emergency Drill
Procedures

Figure 8: Safety Control Regulations System of Demonstration Project CenterOn the other hand, we had not made provisions that addressed long-term power outage or loss ofinternet connection, and consequently, we incurred an interruption of data acquisition at the injection
wells, observation wells and OBC (Ocean Bottom Cable), and inability of data verification(confirmation of data transmission to general monitoring system and situation from maintenance sites)
caused by the disconnection of data transmission lines from the observation wells and the onshore
seismometer. Accordingly, the issues were analyzed and remedies were proposed as follows:Issues to be avoided
1.

Power outage in Demonstration Project CenterOperation-related equipment, office equipment, and communication equipment
become unusable.



Data acquisition of temperature and pressure sensors in the injection wells is no11

longer possible.


Data acquisition of the seismic sensors of the OBC is no longer possible.



Data acquisition of the seismic sensor of the OBS (wired type) is no longer
possible.

2.

Power outage at observation wells


Data acquisition of the temperature and pressure sensors and seismometers(monitoring) of the observation wells is no longer possible.

3.

Disconnection of communication lines from the observation wells and onshore
seismometerReal-time confirmation of the measurement records of the observation wells andonshore seismometer is no longer possible.



Measures for improvement (introduction of new equipment)
1.

Demonstration Project Center: Emergency power supply (80 kVA)

2.

Injection wells: Battery (12V, 130 Ah) for the data logger

Estimated cost/rental cost: Approx. 8.1 million yen/year (Items 1&2 of above measures for
improvement)

Remaining issues when the improvement measures are implemented
1.

Observation wells: Possibility that interruption of data acquisition occurs

2.

Observation wells/onshore seismometer: Possibility that the measurement records
cannot be confirmed real time when the lines are disconnected

JCCS proposed the implementation of the above measures for improvement, and no objection fromthe committee members was expressed.
4.4. Risk management of CO2 reservoir and present status
With regard to the CO2 reservoirs, the provisions of the Reservoir Management Criteria during CO2
Injection prepared by JCCS are applied, and the judgment of abnormalities and actions are stipulated
therein.
4.5. Relationship to Act for the Prevention of Marine Pollution and Maritime Disasters
The Marine Environment Monitoring program of the Act for the Prevention of Marine Pollution
and Maritime Disasters stipulates that “When an earthquake with maximum acceleration of 150 gal or
greater occurs and the CO2 separation/capture and injection equipment are subjected to an emergency
stop, pressure/temperature data of the formations shall be confirmed, and water sampling survey shallbe implemented.”
With regard to this Earthquake, although acceleration of 158 gal was measured at thecapture/injection facilities, the situation does not fall under the above-stated requirement of the Marine
Environment Monitoring program because the facilities and the CO2 injection were in stop mode due
to conditions of the CO2 source since September 1 (Confirmation by METI with the Ministry of theEnvironment on September 6).
5. Relationship of CO2 Injection and Earthquake
Regarding this Earthquake, although evaluations and investigations have already been made byexperts in the national Earthquake Research Committee of the government, the relationship between
12the CO2 injection of the Demonstration Project and the Earthquake has not been discussed. Therefore,
by way of this review meeting, deliberations on the relationship between the CO2 injection and theEarthquake were implemented by examining the monitoring data that were actually acquired in the
Demonstration Project and simulations of CO2 behavior, and the committee members reached acommon understanding that the existence of a causal connection between the two was inconceivable.
5.1. Mechanism of earthquake induction
In 2011, prior to the startup of the project, an examination was conducted on the possibility that,when the underground storage of CO2 was implemented, the friction force on the crack surface would
be reduced by pressure rise of the fluids existing in the cracks of bedrock including faults, andaccumulated strain would be released, thereby inducing earthquakes. We reviewed the 2011 evaluation,
and also examined the impact of the CO2 injection of the Demonstration Project on the earthquake
source fault of the Earthquake.
5.1.1. Examination of earthquake induction in the reservoir and cap rock by CO2 injection
In 2011, the “Evaluation of the possibility for inducing earthquakes by CO2 injection” wasimplemented by the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST). In theevaluation, examinations and evaluations of the possibility that crack surfaces in the bedrock would
slip due to the assumed total CO2 injection of 750,000 tonnes (250,000-ton injection per year for three
years) were conducted through simulations of stress changes.
In the examinations, time-dependent changes in the spatial distribution of the pressure rise offormation water and slip-tendency coefficients (a slip occurs when the shear stress/slip strength on slip
surface exceeds 1) were estimated, and it was extrapolated when and where the possibility thatearthquakes would be induced increased.
The calculation results of the spatial distribution of slip-tendency coefficients in the Moebetsu andTakinoue Formations revealed that the reservoir pressure increased up to about 2 MPa, but locations
at which the slip-tendency coefficient rises to 1 were not detected; thus, it was believed that there wasno possibility that fault slips would be caused (micro earthquakes would occur) by the CO2 injectionof the Demonstration Project.
5.1.2. Examination of the impact of CO2 injection on the earthquake source fault
In order to examine the impact of the CO2 injection on the earthquake source fault, we conductedsimulations of CO2 behavior at the end of the CO2 injection with the assumed cumulative injection
amounts (300,000 tonnes into the Moebetsu Formation, and 750 tonnes into the Takinoue Formation)using reservoir models updated by the actual injection record (as of July 2018), and we estimated anew
the CO2 distributions (Figure 9) and pressure rise (Figure 10) in the reservoirs. Regarding the Takinoue
Formation, in which the rise in reservoir pressure would be largest, it was found that even when thepressure in the injection well was increased by about 5 MPa (considering the upper limit of theinjection pressure), the pressure rise in the 50m area surrounding the injection interval reaches 2 MPa,
reducing to approx. 0.25 MPa or less 1 km away. As for the Moebetsu Formation, the upper limit of
the injection pressure of the injection well results in an increase by about 0.7 MPa, based on past
injection records.
13

In addition, the stress change caused by the CO2 injection near the epicenter located over 30 km
away from the injection site was calculated to be about 1 Pa (equivalent to applying a pressure of about
0.01g/cm2).*2 In other words, the impact caused by the CO2 injection was about 1/1,000 of stresschanges exerted on the earth’s crust by earth tides (several kPa), meaning that the impact is negligible
when compared to that of the earth’s tide.
Therefore, it is inconceivable that there is any relationship between CO2 injection and the Hokkaido
Eastern Iburi Earthquake. *2 This result was obtained by an additional examination proposed by the committee
members in the review meeting and commissioned to AIST following the meeting.

Plan View

Cross-section View

Tomakomai IW-1
Tomakomai IW-1

Fureoi
Formation

Injection Zone
Takinoue
Formation:
T1 Member

Plan View

Cross-section View

苫小牧IW-2
IW-2
Tomakomai

Tomakomai
IW-2

Moebetsu
Fm.
(Mudstone)
Moebetsu
Fm.
(Sandstone)

Figure 9: Prediction of behavior of stored CO2: Degree of CO2 saturation (at the end of injection);
Takinoue Formation (Top), Moebetsu Formation (Bottom)

14Plan View

Cross-section View
Tomakomai IW-1

Fureoi
振老層
Formation

Tomakomai
IW-1

Plan View Position

Observation
Well OB-1

Takinoue Formation:
滝ノ上層
T１部層
T1 Member

Magnification

Plan View

Cross-section View

Tomakomai IW-2

Tomakonmai IW-2

Moebetsu Fm.
(Mudstone )Plan View
Position
Moebetsu Fm.
(Sandstone).

Figure 10: Prediction of behavior of stored CO2: Pressure change (at the end of injection); Takinoue
Formation (Top), Moebetsu Formation (Bottom)
5.2. Impacts on reservoir
5.2.1. Monitoring results of micro-seismicity/natural earthquakes
In this project, as shown in Figure 11, earthquake observation is being implemented by downhole
seismometers installed in observation wells at three locations - two locations near the injection point
and one location about 10 km to the east, an OBC (Ocean Bottom Cable : receiver line length of 3.6km) permanently buried 2m below the seabed on a line crossing directly above the injection points,
OBSs (Ocean Bottom Seismometers) installed at four points above and surrounding the injection
points, and an onshore seismometer installed at a location about 6 km to the northwest of the injection
points.
The above data is combined with four Hi-net government observation station data to monitor natural
earthquakes covering a 50 km east-west, 38 km north-south and 50 km deep area shown in Figure 11.
15

In addition, within this area, a 6 km east-west, 6 km north-south and about 15 km deep areasurrounding the injection point is defined as the Micro-Seismicity Monitoring Area (“monitoringarea”), and focuses on the observation of micro-seismicity that could occur in association with theinjection. In this observation system, seismic events*3 having a magnitude of -0.5 or greater can bedetected. *3 Vibrations are to be called as events in the stage where the features of detected vibrations are not identified.
Hi-net Chitose

Natural Earthquake Monitoring Area
(50 km x 38 km)

Hi-net Atsuma

Hi-net Shiraoi

Micro-Seismicity Monitoring Area
(6 km x 6 km)

Onshore seismometer

Hi-net West
Monbetsu

Observation well (Deep underground pit seismometer)

OBS (Wired)OBS (Independent)
Permanent OBC
Prepared based on the Numerical Map 250 m (altitude) of Geospatial Information Authority of Japan

Figure 11: Allocation of Earthquake Observation Points and Monitoring Area
Figure 12 shows the number of micro-seismic events and estimated epicenter locations detected in
the monitoring area during the period from February 2015 to the end of September 2018. Prior tostartup of injection, nine micro-seismic events between April to August 2015 were detected in themonitoring area, and three events in August 2017 after the implementation of injection. These microseismic vents all occurred at a depth of about 6 km or greater, which meant that vibrations associatedwith the minimal scale natural earthquakes that could normally occur in the area were captured. Afterthe three micro-seismic events in August 2017, no such events have been detected in the monitoring
area, including the period before and after the 2018 Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake.

16

Detection of Seismic Events in Micro-Seismicity Monitoring Area
微小振動モニタリング範囲内の振動イベント検知状況
2018/2/6
February
6, 2018
Startof test injection to
滝ノ上層
Takinoue Fm.

2016/4/6

April 6, 2016
Start of injection
to
萌別層
Moebetsu Fm.

試験圧入開始圧入開始

42O35’

141O35’

深度：5.9～8.6
Depth:
5.9 to 8.6 km
km
Magnitude:-0.09 to 0.24
マグニチュード：-0.09～0.24

141O40’

5km

10km

10km

5km

42O35’

Depth

Depth

18/8/12

18/6/17

18/4/22

18/2/25

17/12/31

17/11/5

17/9/1010km

17/7/16

5km

Depth

141O40’

圧入開始後検知イベント
Events Detected after Injection Start

42O35’

141O40’17/5/21

141O35’

Events
Detected before Injection Start
圧入開始前検知イベント

141O35’

17/3/26

Depth

141O40’42O35’

17/1/29

16/12/4

16/10/9

16/8/14

16/6/19

16/4/24

16/2/28

16/1/3

15/11/8

15/9/13

15/7/19

15/5/24

15/3/29

15/2/1

141O35’5km

イベント検知数

Detected Events

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

10km
深度：7.4～7.7
ton65,790 tonnes
Depth:
7.4 to 7.7km
km 圧入量：65,790
Injection amount:
Magnitude:
0.31 to 0.52
マグニチュード：0.31～0.52（地図背景： 国土地理院 電子地図（地理院地図）に加筆）[Map source: Electronic Map (GSI Map)
issued by Geospatial Information Authority of Japan; additions made by JCCS]

Figure 12: Event Detection Status in Micro-Seismicity Monitoring Area
Figure 13 shows the results of natural earthquake monitoring in the Natural Earthquake Monitoring
Area for each fiscal year from 2015 to 2018 (results until the end of August for FY 2018). In eachyear, salient seismic activities are noted around the area south of Mt. Tarumae and the peripheral areaof the southern part of the Eastern Boundary Fault Zone of the Ishikari Lowland and its extension.
Although the seismic activity of FY 2017 is characterized by a concentration of small and microseismicity in the vicinity of the eastern division of Tomakomai Port, many small and micro-seismic
events were detected in each fiscal year, and no salient time-oriented fluctuation was noted before andafter startup of injection. In addition, no salient change was noted immediately before the occurrenceof the Earthquake either.
After the occurrence of the Earthquake, though there is a gap in the data of the monitoring resultsof natural earthquakes until the end of September 2018 due to a power outage immediately after themain shock of the Earthquake and a periodic inspection, as a vast number of aftershocks are occurringin the vicinity of the hypocentral area, the aftershocks occurring near the hypocenter are being
excluded from the monitoring as a temporary measure.
After the main shock, in accordance with the activation of the overall seismic activity around the
hypocentral area, many small and micro-seismic events were detected near the eastern division ofTomakomai Port. As previously mentioned, because many small and micro-seismic events have been
observed in this area since before the earthquake, these events are believed to be a part of the aftershock activities occurring after the main shock. In addition, though there is a salient increase in thenumber of occurrences, the hypocenter locations do not fall outside the hypocenter distribution prior17

to the Earthquake. Furthermore, no change in the seismic activity area corresponding to the Earthquake
is observed in the vicinity of the storage location (Micro-seismicity Monitoring Area).

142 ◦00’

Depth

20km
40km
FY 2017 (April 1, 2017 to –March
31, 2018)
2017年度（2017/4/1
2018/3/31）

Depth

141 ◦20’141 ◦30’141 ◦40’141 ◦50’42 ◦40’42 ◦40’42 ◦30’42 ◦30’142 ◦00’

20km

141 ◦30’141 ◦40’141 ◦50’142 ◦00’

20km
40km

FY
2018 (April 1, 2018 to August30, 2018)
2018年度（2018/4/1– 2018/8/31）

40km

Depth

42 ◦40’42 ◦30’8km

141 ◦20’

Depth

8km

Depth

40km

42 ◦40’42 ◦30’141 ◦20’40km

141 ◦50’141 ◦30’141 ◦40’141 ◦50’142 ◦00’

20km

40km

141 ◦40’

42 ◦30’8km

20km

141 ◦30’

42 ◦30’Depth

42 ◦40’Depth

141 ◦20’42 ◦30’40km

8km

42 ◦40’20km

42 ◦30’FY 2016 (April 1, 2016 to–March
31, 2017)
2016年度（2016/4/1
2017/3/31）

42 ◦40’20km

42 ◦40’

Depth

20km

FY 2015 (April 1, 2015 to–March
31, 2016)
2015年度（2015/4/1
2016/3/31）

40km[Source: Made by JCCS based on GSI Digital Map. 250 m mesh (Altitude) and “Japan Oceanographic Data Center”
500 m mesh Depth Data of Japan Coast Guard]

Figure 13: Observation Results of Natural Earthquakes in 2015 to 2018 (Results til the end of
August for FY 2018)
5.2.2. Monitoring results of temperature and pressure
In this project, temperature/pressure observation is being implemented in the injection wells withhigh-precision sensors using silicon oscillation devices. Figure 14 shows the observation results oftemperature/pressure in the injection wells for the three months from July 1 to September 30, 2018. In
the Takinoue Injection Well (IW-1), test injection was resumed on July 30, 2018, and in the Moebetsu
Formation Injection Well (IW-2), full-fledged injection was resumed on July 25, 2018. However, theinjection had been stopped due to the stoppage of CO2-containing gas supply from the source on
September 1, 2018, prior to the occurrence of the Earthquake, and the pressures in both injection wells
were on a downtrend as a result of the injection stoppage. The downhole temperature when theearthquake occurred was on an upward trend in IW-1 because the injection CO2 temperature was lower
than the formation temperature. On the other hand, in IW-2, the downhole temperature was on a
downward trend because the injection CO2 temperature was higher than the formation temperature.
As shown in Figure 14, although there is a gap in the data due to an island wide blackout, there is nochange in the trends before and after the earthquake.
18

Main ShockSensor 1
Sensor 2

Sensor 2
Sensor 1

Pressure [MPa]Moebetsu Fm.
Injection Well IW-2

Temperature

Resuming of Test Injection

Temperature

Injection Stop

Main Shock
Pressure
Sensor 2

Sensor 1

Sensor 2

Temperature [℃]

Pressure [MPa]Injection Stop
Pressure

Temperature [℃]

Takinoue Fm. Injection Well IW-1

Resuming of Injection

Figure 14: Observation Results of Temperature/Pressure in Injection Wells before and after
Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake of 2018
It should be noted that, the pressure rise during injection in IW-1 reflects an injection test toinvestigate the relationship between the injection amount and pressure, wherein the pressure had been
increased to 37 MPa, which was lower than the upper pressure limit (38 MPa).
From a broad perspective, though no change in temperature and pressure behavior attributable tothe earthquakes was found, a very slight rise in the downhole pressure in IW-1 was noted just after themain shock, as shown in Figure 15. The downhole pressure rose abruptly by about 1.8 kPa*4 just afterrecording the main shock, decreasing as time elapsed and approaching asymptotically the trend ofpressure drop before the main shock. The rate of pressure drop during the three hours before theearthquake was about 3.8 kPa/h. Although the complete situation is unknown because data recording
stopped 95 minutes after the occurrence of the earthquake due to a power outage, it can be inferredfrom the asymptotic trend that the downhole pressure returned to the original downward trend withinseveral hours. *4 The pressure right before the main shock is about 34.49 MPa, and 1.8 kPa is about 1/20,000th thereof.

1934.52
34.51
34.50

9.71

IW-1（滝ノ上層圧入井）
IW-1 (Takinoue Fm. Injection Well)

9.70
9.69

センサー２
Sensor2

9.68

Pressure[MPa]
圧力（MPa）

Pressure[MPa]
圧力（MPa）

34.49
34.48
34.47

Main本震
Shock

34.46
34.45

IW-2（萌別層圧入井）
IW-2 (Moebetsu Fm. Injection Well)

センサー１
Sensor 1

9.67
9.66
9.65
9.64

34.44

9.63

34.43

9.62

0:00

1:00

2:00

3:00

4:00

5:00

Main
Shock
本震

Sensor 1
センサー１
センサー２
Sensor 2
0:00

1:00

2:00

3:00

4:00

5:00

Figure 15: Micro Variations in downhole Pressure right after Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake of2018 (Vertical scale is unified to 0.01 MPa.)
It is possible that the pressure rise observed here can be deemed a certain type of co-seismic
variation*5, and the causes of co-seismic pressure variations include variations in bulk strain causedby static crustal deformation associated with fault displacement at the epicenter of the Earthquake.
Regarding this static crustal deformation, JCCS asked Professor Toda of the International ResearchInstitute of Disaster Science, Tohoku University, to prepare a model of the earthquake source fault,
taking into consideration the distribution of initial aftershocks of the earthquake, and to calculate an
estimate of pressure variations at the observation point. Figure 16 shows a model of the earthquake
source fault, and Figure 17 shows the distribution of bulk strains calculated by this model. According
to this calculation, the injection point is located in a compressional field, and the formation fluidpressure will rise after the earthquake. Figure 18 shows the normal stress variations*6 calculated byassuming the strike and dip of the reservoir of N45°W/10°NE to the bulk strain distribution obtained
here. At the injection point of the Takinoue Formation, the formation fluid pressure is calculated torise by about 1.9 kPa.
The calculation result using the model matches the observation result (rise by about 1.8 kPa), and it
is possible to explain the observed pressure rise as a static crustal deformation associated with fault
displacement at the epicenter.
Therefore, as the model calculation result can explain the observed result in a rational way, andbecause the variation of 1.8 kPa is extremely small, the pressure variation observed does not indicate
any abnormality in the reservoir (rupture of the geological formation resulting in leakage of CO2, etc.).
As a result of the discussions above, the committee members reached the common understandingthat no CO2 leakage caused by the earthquake occurred.
*5 Phenomena of changes (co-seismic) when an earthquake occurs, which include fluctuation in groundwater level.
*6 Stress change that work perpendicularly on the fault surface.

20

Fault Model

Longitude[°]

Latitude[°]Depth of Upper
Margin [km]Length
[km]

Width
[km]

Strike
[°]

Dip
[°]

Rake
[°]

Slip Amount[m]

Aftershocks Distribution Model

Aftershocks within 24 hoursof main shock

The homogeneous, isotropic and semi-infinite elastic body of
Okada (BSSA, 1992) was used.
The assumed Young’s modulus is 80 GPa*; Poisson’s ratio is
0.25.
* When the modulus of rigidity of 32 GPa which is generally used inearthquake seismology is adopted, where the modulus of rigidity is E
and Young’s modulus is PR, the Young’s modulus G can be expressed
as follows:
G = E/(2(1+PR)) = 80 GPa

Model where the initial aftershock distribution istaken into consideration (Earthquake Source Fault
Model)

Figure 16: Model of Earthquake Source Fault

Figure 17: Calculation Result of Bulk Strain

21

Strike and dip of reservoir is assumed
to be NW45°/10°NE
Cross-Section
Positive (+)

Negative (-)

Direction to press the formation (clamping) isassumed to be negative (minus).

Normal Stress Variations (kPa)
Depth 1.0 km

Depth 2.5 km

Aftershocks Distribution Model

Figure 18: Calculation Result of Normal Stress
6. Future Plan
Regarding the implementation of the Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project, JCCS takes actions
based on the “Guidelines for Safe Implementation of a CCS Demonstration Project” (METI, August2009). The document includes “Measures to be taken for settling abnormalities” in anticipation ofcases such as the occurrence of large-scale earthquakes. Though on this occasion, there was noabnormal situation as there was no damage caused by the earthquake to the facilities and no emergency
shutdown was executed, we used the document as a reference for actions to be taken after theoccurrence of the Earthquake.
Specific actions in light of the guidelines include the following:(1) Discussions by persons concerned for taking actions
A “Review Meeting on the Tomakomai CCS Demonstration Project”*7 was held on October 19,
2018. *7 A JCCS internal committee consisting of external advisers(2) Survey of impacts of the earthquakeGrasping of trends of aftershocks

Confirmation of restoration operations including separation/capture/injection facilities

Inspection of the monitoring facilities (Normal activation of facilities)

Confirmationof

integrityofinjection

wells(Observationof

downhole

temperature/pressure)Grasping of situation of the reservoirs (Occurrence of micro-seismicity, downholetemperature/pressure of each observation well)

Review of monitoring data (Calculation of stress change attributable to the Earthquake
in injection wells)Seismic exploration (Confirmation of CO2 storage state)Marine environment survey (Summer survey completed; autumn survey to be
implemented in November)CO2 containing gas supply status (Grasping of situation of gas source; confirmation of22

supply commencing time)

Review of countermeasures, etc. taken

Securement of electric power during power outage(3) Explanation to local stakeholders*8
JCCS will make efforts to conduct reporting/explanations of the results of the review meeting(explanations will be commenced by the end of October) for obtaining understanding ofstakeholders. *8 Tomakomai City Government, Tomakomai Fisheries Cooperative Association, Hokkaido
Federation of Fisheries Cooperative Associations, etc.

In the future, actions to be taken will be done so based on the contents of the “Guidelines for Safe
Implementation of a CCS Demonstration Project”. JCCS explained that, if the operation of the
facilities of the CO2 containing gas source resumes, the CO2 containing gas will be supplied; therefore,
regarding the restart of injection, we will make efforts to first obtain the understanding of local
stakeholders as we investigate the integrity of the capture/injection facilities and the injection wells
and the trend of aftershocks, and obtained the understanding of the committee members.
Furthermore, regarding the content of the review meeting, JCCS explained its policy to prepare thereport immediately and include the contents in the annual progress report to be submitted to NEDO at
the end of the current fiscal year, and obtained the approval of the committee members.
Ends

23

<List of Review Meeting Members>【Members】
Kozo SATO, Ph.D. (Absent)
Professor
Graduate School of Engineering
Director
Frontier Research Center for Energy and Resources
The University of Tokyo
Ziqiu XUE, Ph.D.
General Manager
Technical Div.
Geological Carbon Dioxide Storage Technology Research Association
Chief Researcher
CO₂ Storage Research Group
Research Institute of Innovative Technology for the Earth
Masao SORAI, Ph.D.
Leader
CO₂ Geological Storage Research Group
Research Institute for Geo-Resources and Environment Geological Survey of Japan
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Tomochika TOKUNAGA, Ph.D. (Absent)
Professor
Department of Environment Systems,
Graduate School of Frontier Sciences
The University of Tokyo
Takao NAKAGAKI, Ph.D.
Professor
Department of Modern Mechanical Engineering
School of Creative Science and Engineering
Waseda University
Tetsuro FUCHINO, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Chemical Science and Engineering
School of Material and Chemical Technology
Tokyo Institute of Technology
24Yoshihiro MASUDA, Ph.D. (Absent)
Professor
Research into Artifacts, Center for Engineering
MH21 Research Consortium Japan Socio-Artifactology Division
The University of Tokyo
Toshifumi MATSUOKA, Ph.D.
Chairman
Fukada Geological Institute
Professor Emeritus
Kyoto University【Temporary Members】
Ryuji IKEDA, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus
Hokkaido University
Toshifumi IMAIZUMI, Ph.D.
Professor Emeritus
Tohoku University
Kazuki KOKETSU, Ph.D.
Professor
Earthquake Research Institute
Division of Disaster Mitigation Science
The University of Tokyo
Hiroshi SUENAGA, Ph.D.
Senior Research Scientist
Civil Engineering Research Laboratory
Geosphere Science Sector
Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry
Takeshi TSUJI, Ph.D.
Professor
Exploration Geophysics
Faculty of Engineering
Department of Earth Resources Engineering
Kyushu University

25

Shinji TODA, Ph.D.
Professor
International Research Institute of Disaster Science
Tohoku University
Shinsuke NAKAO, Ph.D. (Absent)
Deputy Director General
Geological Survey of Japan
National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
James Jiro MORI, Ph.D.
Professor
Earthquake Source Mechanisms
Disaster Prevention Research InstituteKyoto University
Koshun YAMAOKA, Ph.D.
Professor
Earthquake and Volcano Research Center
Graduate School of Environmental Studies
Nagoya University

26

Research Report on Impacts of Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake on CO2 Reservoir
Date of Issue: November 21, 2018 (1st Edition), August 30, 2019 (2nd Edition; 1st printing)

Inquiries:
Japan CCS Co., Ltd.
SAPIA TOWER 21F, 1-7-12 Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0005 JapanTEL 03-6268-7610 FAX 03-6268-7385 URL: http://www.japanccs.com* This document is an English translation of the “Research Report on Impacts of Hokkaido Eastern
Iburi Earthquake on CO2 Reservoir” (in Japanese) published in November 2018, which was preparedas an integral part of work consigned to Japan CCS Co., Ltd. by New Energy and Industrial Technology
Development Organization (NEDO). Japan CCS Co., Ltd. takes full responsibility for the English
translation. If there is any discrepancy between the English and Japanese language versions, theJapanese version shall prevail.
* Copying, modifying, reproducing this report in whole or in part without the permission of JapanCCS Co., Ltd. is strictly prohibited.