Public Perceptions on
Climate Change and Energy
in Europe and Russia:
Evidence from Round 8 of theEuropean Social Survey
Public attitudes to welfare,climate change and energy
in the EU and Russia (PAWCER)
November 2018

2 Public Perceptions on Climate Change and Energy in Europe and Russia

Public Perceptions on Climate Change
and Energy in Europe and Russia
The authors of this issue
Pasi Pohjolainen, Iida Kukkonen and Pekka Jokinen, Faculty of Management, University of Tampere,
Tampere, Finland
Wouter Poortinga, Welsh School of Architecture, Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales, UK
Resul Umit, Department of Political Science, University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland
This report is the result of a close collaboration between all authors who are grateful to the ERA.
Net-RUS Plus for the funding of the PAWCER project.

Introduction
Climate change is one of the most acutethreats the world is facing today, andpreventing human-induced climate change has
become a major goal of policies internationally.
Energy plays a key role in reaching such agoal, as the energy sector accounts for two
thirds of total greenhouse gas emissions
and 80% of CO2 emissions (IEA 2017). If
climate change is to be mitigated, energy
production and consumption will have tochange fundamentally - in particular, societies
need to kick their fossil fuel addiction. Yet
decarbonizing energy supplies is not an easytask, particularly as it has to be balancedwith the vital objective of ensuring a reliable,
secure and affordable supply energy for all
households.
Policies to bring forth urgently neededtransition to a low-carbon society cannot be
implemented without public support. Hence,
it is crucial to understand public attitudes toclimate change, energy security and energy
preferences. In citizen polls, climate change
is currently ranked among the most pressing
societal problems in Europe (Capstick et
al. 2014). However, little is known about
how citizens think about the role of energy
in this context. Moreover, many studies onthese issues have focused on particularcountries, and no cross-European and Russiancomparison has been made previously.
The case of Russia is particularly interesting,as Russian policies have not traditionallyemphasized environmental issues, andpublic consciousness and debate aroundenvironmental issues is not as prevalent as inmost European countries (e.g. Oldfield 2017).
Russia does, however, have a large impact
on climate change, particularly owing to thecountry’s vast supply of fossil energy. Russia
has large reserves of both coal and natural gas- and a large share of global production. The
rest of Europe is to some extent dependent on
fossil fuel supply from Russia.
Unlike many other European countries, Russia
has no ambitious objectives to shift to a lowcarbon economy. Structurally, Russian energy
system is state-owned and heavily centralized.
This may, on one hand, evoke stability andfeeling of security among the public, as theassets are controlled and subsidized. On theother hand, the system is very dependent on
few actors and hence prone to potentially
unexpected changes in different criticalenergy security dimensions, such as price andavailability, if political power and definitions ofpolicies are to be changed (Aalto et al. 2012).

Evidence from Round 8 of the European Social Survey 3

As such, Russian citizens may be expected toplace more importance on energy security andpreserving a fossil economy, while giving lessattention to climate change and de-carbonizing
policies. Russia’s unique position in terms ofenergy issues makes it a particularly interesting
point of cross-European comparison.
The Public Attitudes to Climate Change andEnergy module fielded in the eighth round of
ESS is the first systematic and theory-based
comparison of public attitudes to climatechange and energy made across Europe andRussia. The module was broadly based on the
Stern value-belief-norm model (Stern 2000),incorporating a wide range of elements thatare potentially of importance in explaining how

climate change and energy perceptions areshaped (see Figure 1).
The data for the eighth round (2016/2017)of the ESS was collected in 23 participating
countries using strict random probability
sampling and a minimum target response
rate of 70%. The data are representative of
all persons aged 15 or over in the following
countries: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE),Switzerland (CH), Czech Republic (CZ),
Germany (DE), Estonia (EE), Spain (ES),Finland (FI), France (FR), United Kingdom(GB), Italy (IT), Hungary (HU), Ireland(IE), Israel (IL), Iceland (IS), Lithuania (LT)
Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland(PL), Portugal (PT), Russian Federation (RU),
Sweden (SE), and Slovenia (SI).1

Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the Climate Change and Energy module(concepts in grey are part of the core ESS questionnaire)
Personal Norms, Efficacy and Trust• Personal Norms• Efficacy Beliefs• Social and Institutional Trust

Concerns

Energy Preferences

Socio-Political Values
and Engagement

Energy Security

Energy Demand
Measures• Human Values• Socio-Political Values• Political Engagement

Climate Change

Energy Supply
Sources

Climate Change Beliefs• Reality of Climate Change• Causes of Climate Change• Impact of Climate Change

4 Public Perceptions on Climate Change and Energy in Europe and Russia

In this report we lay out key findings fromour descriptive analysis of these data. First,
we look at the energy security concerns of
the public in Europe and Russia. Are citizens
concerned about energy security, and isdependency on fossil fuels something they
worry about? Next, we ask what energy
sources citizens in different countries prefer.
We then move on to consider how big of aconcern climate change is to citizens, andwhat citizens believe will be realistically done
about climate change. Finally, we ask what
energy policy measures citizens in different
countries think should be taken to in order tomitigate climate change.

EnergyEnergy security concerns
Despite the enormous importance that asecure supply of energy has for societies,
energy is often “invisible”. For many citizens in
Europe and Russia it is readily available, andperhaps does not cause much daily trouble orthought. Hence, energy security may not bea primary source of concern in most citizens’
lives. Nevertheless, where such concerns
emerge they have a potential to steer public
opinion and policy-making.

Figure 2. Concern over various dimensions of energy security (%)

Affordability

Dependency on fossil fuels

7

25

Dependency on imports

624

Vulnerability to interruptions

4

Reliability

40Extremely worried

10
Very worried

30

24

36

40

Somewhat worried

6

33

26

20

12

21

37

40

11

8

20

40

17

5

17

38

29

11

50

60

70

Not very worried

80

90

Not at all worried

Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents.
Missing and DK responses are excluded. Both post-stratification and population-size weights have been applied.

100

Evidence from Round 8 of the European Social Survey 5

As Figure 2 illustrates, citizens are generally
most concerned about the affordability ofenergy (78% at least somewhat worried),
dependency on fossil fuels (72%) and imports(67%), while vulnerability to interruptions(61%) and reliability of energy supply (40%)
bring about slightly less concern. However,there are large differences between countries
in what dimensions of energy security are ofparticular concern. In Russia, for example,
concerns about affordability are close to
the data average (77% at least somewhat
worried), while concern over dependence on
fossil fuels (62%) and particularly dependency
on energy imports (45%) are somewhat lower
than average.

Energy security is a complex andmultidimensional concept. Often definedas the uninterrupted availability of energy
sources at an affordable price,2 it is commonly
thought to involve 1) the reliability of theenergy system to have sufficient reserves tomeet demand, 2) the affordability of energy,3) dependency on energy imports, the 4)
vulnerability to interruptions of the energy
supply system (e.g. through natural hazards,
inadequate supply, technical failures or terrorist
attacks), and 5) a dependency on fossil fuels(Chester et al. 2010; Demski et al. 2014). In
ESS8, respondents were asked to indicate
how concerned they are about these various
aspects of energy security.3

Figure 3. Concern over dependence on fossil fuels (%)

4

10

19
8

42

4

4

3

8

19

1

2

3

17

17

24

6

5

11

9

4

6

4

24

24

27

24

30

30

33

32

41

6

12

31
41

13

15

16

21

17

40

38

39

38

38

39

44

45

40

45

44

43

45

41

42

41

40

34

22

26

26

27

22

21

23

19

18

19

18

14

9

25

14

3

4

2

5

3

7

4

22

1

20

2

4

6

7

31

36

22

28

30

35

27

32

5
10

18

15

7

14

6

16

13

12

10

5

3

47

34

9
4

6

29

IS CZ IL AT SE LT CH RU IE PL EE NO HU IT NL GB SI BE DE FR ES FI PT
Extremely worried

Very worriedSomewhat worried

Not very worried

Not at all worried

Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents.
Missing and DK responses are excluded. Post-stratification weights have been applied.

6 Public Perceptions on Climate Change and Energy in Europe and Russia

In contrast, Russians are more concerned
about the reliability of energy supply (59%)
and interruptions to energy supply (70%) thanis the average respondent.
Next, we focus on public concern overdependence on fossil fuels, a concern
we consider an important prerequisite for
implementing effective climate policies.
Figure 3 shows how worried about fossil
fuel dependency people are in the surveyedcountries.
The Portuguese, Finns, Spaniards and theFrench express most concern about theircountries being too dependent on fossil fuels.
Over 80% of citizens in these countries areeither somewhat, very or extremely concerned.
In Germany, Belgium, Slovenia and GreatBritain, too, over three quarters of citizens
worry about dependency on fossil fuels. In
Iceland, worry about fossil fuel dependency
is comparatively rare, yet even there 29% of
respondents worry about it.
Energy preferences
We’ve seen that in most surveyed countries,
citizens are generally quite concerned about
their countries being dependent on fossil fuels.
There are different technologies that can beused to reduce dependency on fossil fuels
and thus help mitigate climate change. Suchtechnologies include generating energy from
nuclear power and various renewable energy
sources. In many European countries, suchdifferent alternatives to fossil fuels are alreadywidely used.
However, the actual costs, effectiveness andrisks associated with these technologies
are much debated, and people have varying
perceptions of these technologies. To better
understand such perceptions, we asked
citizens about their preferences of different
energy-supply technologies. More specifically,
we asked how much of the electricity used

[in the respondent’s country] should be
generated from different energy sources,
including coal and natural gas, nuclear power,hydroelectric power, solar power, wind power
as well as biomass energy, which is generated
from materials like wood, plants and animal
excrement.
As Table 1 illustrates, there is a clear
preference for electricity from renewablesources. In all the countries surveyed, there
were significantly more respondents who
think a large or very large amount of electricity
should be generated from hydro-, solar andwind power than there were respondents
who think a small or very small amount shouldbe generated from these energy sources.
Biomass appears a less well-known4 andsomewhat more controversial source of energy
than other renewables, yet attitudes towards
it are relatively positive in most countries
surveyed. Russia is one of the countries whererenewables generally elicit least enthusiasm however, hydropower, solar power and wind
power are still viewed considerably morefavourably than coal.
With regard to preferences for nuclear energy
as well as coal and gas there are more definite
differences between countries. Nuclear is thesource of energy which is most categorically
opposed. A total of 38% of respondents
think nuclear energy should not be used togenerate electricity at all. However, significant
differences between countries emerge. In
Czech Republic, where anti-nuclear sentimentis lowest, only 11% categorically oppose
nuclear power whereas 48% think a large
or very large amount of energy should be
generated from nuclear sources. In Russia,
this energy form is seen almost as favourably
as in Czech Republic, as opposition to nuclear
energy is mere 13% and support 38%. The
share of people strictly against nuclear poweris largest in Iceland, where 90% think noelectricity should be generated from nuclear

Evidence from Round 8 of the European Social Survey 7

Table 1. Percentage of citizens who think a large or very large amount of electricity intheir country should be generated from various energy source

AT
BE
CH
CZ
DE
EE
ES
FI
FR
GB
HU
IE
IL
IS
IT
LT
NL
NO
PL
PT
RU
SE
SI
Full data

Coal
7
4
2
11
5
7
11
2
5
9
22
6
25
1
9
8
2
2
28
10
28
1
10
13

Gas
16
25
20
24
18
16
22
15
27
27
31
28
65
5
33
38
8
18
45
24
50
17
23
31

Nuclear
5
11
9
48
3
9
9
19
16
17
35
9
28
1
12
32
6
4
23
8
38
18
17
19

Hydro
86
67
82
57
72
43
78
36
74
75
70
77
58
80
70
64
73
88
77
78
57
68
61
69

Solar
89
84
86
52
87
61
94
61
83
76
93
77
78
61
89
64
90
67
87
92
53
80
88
78

Wind
83
86
69
48
76
63
93
53
73
72
86
79
67
77
81
73
83
66
82
91
49
71
83
72

Biomass
57
47
51
36
38
42
62
63
58
42
70
42
41
36
57
61
51
36
53
40
26
52
54
45

Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents.
Missing and DK responses are excluded. Post-stratification weights have been applied.

power, and less than one per cent think a large
or very large amount of electricity should be
generated from these sources.
Coal is the least favoured source of energy. In
the countries where people are least keen on
electricity being generated from coal - Iceland,
Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Finland less than 2% think a large or very large amountof electricity should be generated from coal.
In contrast, coal is viewed significantly morefavourably particularly in Poland, Russia, Israeland Hungary. In Russia, 28% think a large
or very large amount of electricity should be
generated from coal. 28% of Poles, 25% ofIsraelis and 22% of Hungarians are also of thisopinion.
Natural gas is favoured particularly in Israel,
where as many as 65% think a large or verylarge amount of national electricity supply
should be generated from gas. Russians(50%), Poles (45%) and Lithuanians (38%)
are also particularly supportive of generating
electricity from this energy source.

8 Public Perceptions on Climate Change and Energy in Europe and Russia

ClimateClimate beliefs and concern
Climate change is generally a widely recognizedissue globally according to numerous studies
and polls around the subject (e.g. Capstick et
al. 2014). The ESS data also show how the
majority of Europeans agree that the climate
is changing (92% of all respondents). Only
in four countries the share of skeptical views
reaches over 10% (Russia 18%, Israel 14%,
Lithuania 11% and Czech Republic 11%). A
vast majority of respondents also agree thathuman activity causes climate change. Only
9% of respondents think that climate change iscaused mainly or entirely by natural processes.

The reality of climate change and the effect thathuman action has on climate are thus widely
acknowledged.
We also asked how worried people in different
countries are about climate change. We
found that 76% of Europeans are at least
somewhat worried over climate change. Quite
considerable differences between countries canbe detected, as the percentage of people who
are worried about climate change ranges from
58% in Czech Republic, Israel and Estonia to
88% in Spain (Figure 4). Nevertheless, people
who are not worried about climate change
represent a minority in all the countries wesurveyed.

Figure 4: Concern over climate change (%)

4
6

17

34

32

3
17

37

25

3
13

42

30

13

17

47

44

24

11
10

17

3

31

4

1

3

4

6

14

16

16

19

51

48

49

46

25

9

24

8

23

9

22

6

5

3

18

22

53

20

4

51

20

4

6

27

5

5

25

26

44

49

18

17

4

5

47

20
2

4

4

24

21

51

17
5

54

18
3

6

25

49

9

5

7

28

23

25

47

17

16

2

3

7

12

37
40

51

8

42

54
42

35

39

12

14

12

11

8

4

2

2

2

4

12

CZ IL EE RU SE PL LT
Extremely worried

IE GB NL NO IS AT CH HU FI BE FR SI

Very worriedSomewhat worried

Not very worried

IT DE PT ES

Not at all worried

Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents.
Missing and DK responses are excluded. Post-stratification weights have been applied.

Evidence from Round 8 of the European Social Survey 9

People in Southern European countries areamong those who are particularly concerned
about climate change. Most of the Former
Eastern Bloc states are amongst the least
worried (Figure 4). Russia is placed below
the average here with 64% share of worriedcitizens. However, differences to some of theWestern European nations, such as UK and
Netherlands, are not particularly remarkable, andfor example Sweden has rather similar level ofclimate concern as Russia.
Efficacy beliefs and climate policy
measures
One of the most urgent and challenging tasks
in climate change discussion is to find ways
to engage actors and construct solutions
that would re-orientate some of current
unsustainable practices. This is a particularly
acute question when it comes to energy issues,
as there is a need to solve the issue of fossil
dependency and find alternative supply sourcesthat are embraced across the society.
Faced with the enormous collective problem
of climate change, it is not easy to remain
optimistic about different actors acting efficiently
to reduce climate change. If people think others
will not act to reduce climate change, they may
think their own actions are futile. People may
also hope or wish that governments will act
more efficiently to reduce climate change but
doubt that governments are working efficiently
to solve the problem (e.g. Drews & van den
Bergh 2016). We asked how likely respondents
think it is that large numbers of people will
actually limit their energy use to try to reduceclimate change (collective efficacy belief). We
also asked respondents how likely they think it isthat governments in enough countries will takeaction that reduces climate change (institutional
efficacy belief).5
As Table 2 suggests, people are generally
more prone to think that governments will takeefficient action to reduce climate change (31%believe it likely) than they are to believe thatmany other people will help mitigate climatechange by limiting their energy use (24%believe it likely). In general, people are quite

pessimistic. 58% of respondents believe thatlarge-scale collective action to reduce climatechange is unlikely, and 49% are scepticalof governments doing enough to solve theproblem.
We found some country differences here, yeteven the greatest share of optimistic beliefs
was merely 36% (in Sweden and Italy) forcollective action and 43% for institutional
action (in Sweden and Netherlands). The mostpessimistic views can be found in Germany
for both collective and institutional actions(17% and 20%, respectively) (Table 2). Overall,collective efficacy is more often evaluatedunlikely than it is considered likely across all
the countries, and for institutional efficacy only
few countries are slightly on the optimisticside (Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, Israel,and Hungary). Russia is very close to the data
averages for both efficacy beliefs.
These results tell a story of deficiency incurrent climate measures. Few people believe
governments and other citizens are acting
efficiently to reduce climate change. So, whatshould be done? One approach is to focus on
personal consumption and active citizenship,
but such a focus easily frames solutions as
dependent on individual citizen-consumers.
Another approach is to develop climate-friendly
energy policies, for example by using economic
disincentives and incentives, or legislativemeans. Governments can increase taxes on
fossil fuels, such as oil, gas and coal, or use
public money to subsidise renewable energy
such as wind and solar power. They can also
make laws that restrict the sale of goods thatare not good for the climate, such as a law
banning the sale of the least energy efficienthousehold appliances. We asked respondents
to what extent they are in favour or against thesepolicies (in their country) to reduce climatechange.
We found the economic incentive and thelegislative measure are supported by well overhalf of the respondents: 74% of citizens are infavour of their country using public money tosubsidize renewable energy, and 58% support
their country banning least energy efficient10 Public Perceptions on Climate Change and Energy in Europe and Russia

Table 2. Efficacy beliefs (%)

AT
BE
CH
CZ
DE
EE
ES
FI
FR
GB
HU
IE
IL
IS
IT
LT
NL
NO
PL
PT
RU
SE
SI
Full data

Collective efficacy
Unlikely
Neutral
Likely
56
18
26
51
24
25
62
17
21
65
16
19
66
16
17
62
20
18
59
15
25
54
17
30
57
23
20
65
18
17
59
19
22
50
19
31
52
19
29
62
20
18
47
18
36
51
16
34
53
18
29
49
20
31
57
20
23
59
16
25
54
20
26
44
20
36
67
16
17
58
19
24

Institutional efficacy
Unlikely
Neutral
Likely
54
19
27
42
21
37
55
20
25
40
21
39
65
16
20
40
23
37
53
15
32
38
19
42
52
23
26
52
21
27
37
23
40
42
23
36
38
21
41
43
20
36
40
20
40
44
18
37
38
20
43
42
21
37
42
22
36
49
20
31
46
22
32
38
19
43
55
20
25
49
20
31

Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents.
Missing and DK responses are excluded. Post-stratification weights have been applied.

household appliances. However, more people
are against than in favour of putting a priceon pollution by increasing taxes on fossil fuels(Figure 5).
Thus, Europeans are seemingly rather willing to
put political focus on renewable sources andare also supportive of the idea that technology
should be as clean as possible. From the public
perspective, these measures can be seen topose no major demands on changing current
lifestyles or more generally the current energy
systems as such, as they frame the problem as

one of technological efficiency and supportingthe ‘general good’, in other words issues
that are commonly seen in favourable light.
Indeed, placing tax on fossil fuels is a different
approach, which turns the focus into how thecurrent use of fossil within energy systems
could be restricted. In this way, it would havea clear effect on citizens as well, forcing to
restructure the current energy practices more
profoundly.
As taxation of fossil fuels is considered aparticularly effective and important climate

Evidence from Round 8 of the European Social Survey 11

importance and impact that Russia has on
global climate and energy questions.

policy, we take a closer look at how support forthis policy varies across countries. As Figure
6 shows, differences between the countries
are rather notable. In Sweden, where opinion
towards fossil fuel taxation is viewed mostfavourably, 61% are in favour and 22% areagainst such a policy. In Poland, where people
are most reluctant to tax fossil fuels, only 15%
support the policy while 60% oppose it. Higher
taxes on fossil fuels are particularly welcomedin the Nordic countries and Switzerland, where
they are generally more supported than they are
resisted, unlike in all the other countries. The
Former Eastern Bloc nations are more on therejective side, but generally the country orderis rather mixed. Russia is more on the rejectiveside here (43% against), with particularly large
share of neutral responses (34%) and relatively
few supportive ones (23%).

Our results show how Russians have relatively
high public energy security worries, particularly
related to the affordability and availability ofenergy, giving relatively much importance on thepossibility of power cuts and technical failures.
In turn, fossil fuel dependency is not considereda very problematic issue, and both fossil andnuclear energy are highly preferred comparedto most of the other European countries.
Renewable energy sources are also rather
supported, but relatively less than in most of
the other European countries. So, we see how
energy security and preferences are framed
somewhat differently than in average in Europe.
Regarding climate issues, the results show
how Russians have one of the weakest climate
beliefs and concern of all the studied countries.
In climate action measures, the subsidies
on renewables and ban on the least energy
efficient electricity appliances are somewhat
supported but still relatively less than in manyother countries. However, supporting taxation

Climate and energy dynamics in Russia
Russia makes a particularly interesting caseregarding framing climate and energy issues,
based on its absence in previous public
perception studies of the subject and the overall

Figure 5. Support for climate policy measures (%)

Subsidizing renewable energy

31

Banning least energy efficient appliances

22

Increasing taxes on fossil fuels

70Strongly in favour

43

23

10

Somewhat in favour

20

Neutral

30

15

36

23

25

27

40

50

60

Somewhat against

8

13

4

6

19

70

80

90

Strongly against

Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents.
Missing and DK responses are excluded. Both post-stratification and population-size weights have been applied.

100

12 Public Perceptions on Climate Change and Energy in Europe and Russia

Figure 6: Attitudes towards increasing taxes on fossil fuels (%)

19
12

6

4

5

7

6

8

7

2
16
13

20

26

17

32

3

20
19

20

19

17

22

23

22

22

25

22

34

10

19

8

5

25

25

24

23

22

7

12

13

14

32

35

34

19

25

19

21

26

24

21

24

17

8

9

8

29

29

32

25

24

9

7

23

23

28

25

21

24

17

23

21

25

39

41

17

12
22

30
36

30

28

27

24
24

34

29

26

24

28

21

10
6
9
13
30

24

23

PL ES EE FR PT

IT

IL

27

15

23

25

19

23

24

19

25

23

9

12

7

16

17

24

Strongly in favour

CZ RU LTSI BE HU IESomewhat in favour

NeutralAT GB DE NL

Somewhat against

IS NO CH FI

SE

Strongly against

Data source: European Social Survey Round 8, 2016. Analysis was conducted with the full sample of ESS respondents.
Missing and DK responses are excluded. Post-stratification weights have been applied.

of fossil fuels and believe in both possible
governmental and citizen climate action place
Russia notably closer to the country averages
then the other studied climate perceptions.
Our findings interestingly show how some of
the climate action measures related to efficacy
beliefs and economic restriction measure aresomewhat ‘climate minded’. In other words,
it seems that the discrepancy between
general climate worry and beliefs and energy
preferences is not that notable in Russia whencompared to many other European countries.
It can be that there is trust towards the centralist
government in framing the energy issues

sufficiently, suggesting that climate questions
are not given much importance as such, andthe public worry is much more focused onenergy security issues. Hence there may be nohigh expectations concerning stronger climate
energy policies, perhaps even vice versa.
Generally, Russian climate perceptions canbe considered, nevertheless, rather weakcompared to many of the other countries
studied here. When this is combined to rather
high energy security concerns and fossil fuelpreferences, Russian public perceptions canbe said to reflect the current national economic
and political context quite well: for example, itEvidence from Round 8 of the European Social Survey 13

is known that environmental questions havenot been traditionally prioritised in Russia,
and that the Russian energy system is heavily
centralised, state-owned and based on
utilization of fossil energy, being considered
as a cornerstone of national economy, security
and also identity (e.g. Oldfield 2017; Aalto et al.
2012).

Citizens’ preferences for energy supply areclear: people across Europe are in favour ofelectricity produced from renewable sources
and are generally not keen on electricity being
produced from fossil sources such as coal andnatural gas. However, differences between
countries are notable particularly when it comesto preferences for fossil fuels.

At the same time there are relatively moreclimate minded perceptions on climate policy
measures and high preference for renewables
that leave the floor open also to energy
transitions. However, if more acute energy
framings related to security worries are notaddressed properly, it is questionable whether,
seen particularly from citizen perspective, such atransition would occur easily. Furthermore, froma governmental point of view, fossil fuels arelikely to be very difficult to replace with any otherasset that would bring along similar economic,
political and cultural elements of power, at leastin the short-term time span.

A vast majority of Europeans and Russians
believe the climate is changing and agree thathuman activity causes climate change. Citizens
across Europe are also concerned about
the climate change: in all surveyed countries
there are more concerned people than there
are people who are not worried about climatechange. However, citizens are quite pessimistic
about the efforts that governments and otherpeople are taking to reduce climate change.

Conclusions
The ESS module on attitudes towards climatechange and energy provides a comprehensive,
theoretically grounded cross-European
and Russian dataset of public attitudes toclimate change, energy security and energy
preferences. Particularly when used in
combination with national-level context data, themodule will be invaluable in seeking to better
understand how individual factors, values andnational circumstances drive public attitudes
towards climate change and preferences forenergy supply technologies and energy policies(see e.g. Pohjolainen et al. 2018).
In this topline report, we have presented aselection of key findings from the module data.
One key finding is that citizens do worry about
energy security beyond affordable supply
and generally find dependence on fossil fuels
worrisome. Citizens are more concerned about
dependence on fossil fuels than they worry
about dependence on energy imports, theenergy system’s vulnerability to interruptions
and the reliability of energy supply.

Highly favourable attitudes towards subsidising
renewable energy with public money areprevalent across the surveyed countries. A
majority of respondents are also in favourof regulating the market to ban consumer
goods that are not energy-efficient. Increasing
taxation of fossil fuels appears to be a more
controversial means of environmental policy:
only a third of respondents are in favour of it.
The Nordic countries and Switzerland makean exception here, as they are rather strongly
embracing fossil tax measure. These are alsocountries that are well known for their welfare
society systems that are based on, among otherthings, high social trust and taxation cultures.
Overall, high climate concern and strong
preference for both renewables and public
subsidies on these energy sources would
suggest that public perceptions would not behindering the sustainable energy transitions
in Europe. On the other hand, decreasing theshare of fossil energy may be challenging, as
national differences in socio-political situations
and energy systems may affect preferences
for fossil fuels and their taxation. It appears
that countries across Europe and Russia havedifferent levels of readiness to instate efficient
climate-friendly energy policies, and that inconstructing such policies it will be crucial toaddress the public’s energy security concerns.

14 Public Perceptions on Climate Change and Energy in Europe and Russia

References / Further reading
Aalto, P., Dusseault, D., Kivinen, M., & Kennedy, M. D. (2012). How are Russian energy
policies formulated? Linking the actors and structures of energy policy. In P. Aalto(Ed.) Russia’s Energy Policies: National, Interregional and Global Levels, pp. 20-42.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Capstick, S., Whitmarsh, L., Poortinga, W., Pidgeon, N., & Upham, P. (2014). International
trends in public perceptions of climate change over the past quarter century, WIREs
Climate Change, doi: 10.1002/wcc.321
Chester, L. (2010). Conceptualising energy security and making explicit its polysemic
nature. Energy policy, 38(2), 887-895.
Demski, C., Poortinga, W., & Pidgeon, N. (2014). Exploring public perceptions of energy
security risks in the UK. Energy Policy, 66, 369-378.
Drews, S., & van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2016). What explains public support for climate
policies? A review of empirical and experimental studies. Climate Policy, 16(7), 855-876.
IEA (2017). Global Energy & CO2 Status Report 2017. Paris: IEA. Available at: https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/GECO2017.pdf (July 3, 2018).
Oldfield, J. (2017). Russian Nature: Exploring the Environmental Consequences of Societal
Change. Routledge: London.
Pohjolainen, P., Kukkonen, I., Jokinen, P., Poortinga, W., & Umit, R. (2018). Public Perception
on Climate Change and Energy in Europe and Russia: Results from the Round 8 of theEuropean Social Survey with Selected Context Data. PACWER (Public Attitudes to
Welfare, Climate Change and Energy in the EU and Russia) ERA.Net RUS Plus S&T 340
Research Report.
Sovacool, B. K. (2016). Differing cultures of energy security: An international comparison of
public perceptions. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 55(C), 811-822.
Stern, P. C. (2000). Towards a coherent theory of environmentally significant behavior.
Journal of Social Issues, 56(3), 407-424.

Endnotes / Sources
1 Further details about the European Social Survey are available at www.
europeansocialsurvey.org.

This definition comes from the International Energy Agency, see https://www.iea.org/
topics/energysecurity/

2

The dimensions were measured on a scale of 1=not at all worried to 5=extremely worried,with the following questions:
31) Reliability: How worried are you that there may be power cuts in [country]?
2) Affordability: How worried are you that energy may be too expensive for many people in[country]?
3) Dependency on imports: How worried are you about [country] being too dependent onenergy imports from other countries?
4) Vulnerability to interruptions: How worried are you that energy supplies could beinterrupted… a) by natural disasters or extreme weather, b) by insufficient power being
generated, c) by technical failures, d) by terrorist attacks. For the purposes of this report
we formed a sum variable of a-d that retains the original 1-5 scale.
5) Dependency on fossil fuels: How worried are you about [country] being too dependenton using energy generated by fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal?
4 Of the energy sources surveyed here, biomass had the highest share of respondents whoreported they had never heard of this energy source. It is also worth noting DK (don’t know)
responses were generally common for energy preferences in general.
5 In ESS8, both efficacy beliefs were measured on a scale ranging from 0=not at all likely to
10=extremely likely. Here, in order to make the results more easily interpretable, we interpretvalues 0-4 as unlikely, 5 as neutral and 6-10 as likely.

About the ESS
ESS is an academically-driven survey that has been
conducted across Europe since 2002. Its dataset
contains the results of 381,351 completed interviews
undertaken every two years with newly selected,
cross-sectional samples. The survey measures theattitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of diverse
populations in more than thirty nations.
The European Social Survey has been a European
Research Infrastructure Consortium (ESS ERIC)
since 2013. It continues to provide freely available
cross-national data about public attitudes andbehaviour over time.

ESS topics:• Trust in institutions• Household circumstances• Political engagement• Attitudes to welfare• Socio-political values• Trust in criminal justice• Moral and social values• Expressions and experiences• Social capitalof ageism• Social exclusion• Citizenship, involvement and• National, ethnic and religious democracy
identity• Immigration• Wellbeing, health and 		 • Family, work and wellbeing
security• Economic morality• Demographic composition• The organisation of the• Education and occupation
life-course• Financial circumstances• Climate change and energy

www.europeansocialsurvey.org
www.esswellbeingmatters.org
Follow the ESS on Twitter: @ESS_Survey
Like the ESS on Facebook: @EuropeanSocialSurvey
Follow the ESS on LinkedIn: @european-social-survey
This publication has received funding
from the European Union’s Horizon 2020
research and innovation programme
under grant agreement No 676166.
Published by the European Social Survey ERIC
City, University of London
Northampton Square, London
EC1V 0HB, United Kingdom
September 2018

23 countries participated inRound 8 of the ESS,
fielded in 2016/17.
Members:
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia,
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK
Observer:
Switzerland
Other Participants:
Finland, Iceland, Israel, Russia and Spain
Multi-national advisory groups to the ESS
ERIC General Assembly are the Methods
Advisory Board (MAB), Scientific Advisory
Board (SAB) and Finance Committee(FINCOM).
The ESS ERIC Headquarters arelocated at City, University of London.
The ESS ERIC Core Scientific Team
includes: GESIS - Leibniz Institute for theSocial Sciences (Germany); Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven (Belgium); NSD Norwegian Centre for Research Data
(Norway); SCP - The Netherlands Institutefor Social Research (Netherlands);
Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Spain);
University of Essex (UK); andUniversity of Ljubljana (Slovenia).
The National Coordinators’ (NC)Forum involves national teams from allparticipating countries.