Holistic Cybersecurity for
Industrial IoT Applications
Arun Siddeswaran
Sr. Manager, Solution Engineering
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Gregory Wilcox
Principal Engineer, Strategic Development
Rockwell Automation, Inc.
Presented at the ODVA2018 Industry Conference & 19th Annual Meeting
October 10, 2018
Stone Mountain, Georgia, USA
Abstract
Industrial IoT (IIoT) offers the promise of business outcomes through the use of innovative technology.
The challenge for industrial operations is to develop a balanced security stance to take advantage of IIoT
innovation while maintaining the integrity of industrial security best practices.
No single product, technology or methodology can fully secure IIoT applications. Protecting IIoT assets
requires a holistic security approach to help address different types of threats. This approach uses
multiple layers of diverse technologies for protection and detection, applied at different levels of IIoT
architectures, while being implemented by different personas.
This paper, authored and presented by Cisco Systems and Rockwell Automation, will provide an
overview of a holistic IIoT security framework. This framework incorporates aspects of IEC-62443 and
NIST 800-82, leverages CIP Security™ for security zoning, addresses OT and IT personas, and enables
secure connectivity from smart devices to smart machines/skids to cloud applications.

Keywords
OT-IT Convergence, IIoT, IoT, best practices, architecture, manufacturing, design, industrial, industrial
security, cybersecurity

Industrial IoT (IIoT) Opportunities / Challenges
Industrial IoT (IIoT) offers the promise of business outcomes through the use of innovative technology
such as mobility, collaboration, analytics and cloud-based services. The challenge for industrial
operations is to develop a balanced security stance to take advantage of IIoT innovation while
maintaining the integrity of industrial security and safety best practices.

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There are many aspects that could impact the reliability and security of Industrial IoT architectures (Figure1):
 Connected Architectures – smart IIoT devices which enable smart skids/equipment/machines,
which in turn enables smart plants, but also smart IIoT devices connected to on premiseapplications (e.g. historians, analytics) or connected to cloud-based applications (e.g. analytics,
dashboards).
 Convergence - not just technology and networks, but also cultural and organizational
convergence of different personas, specifically IT and OT, groups that had little interaction in thepast are now collaborating to share best practices
 Industrial standards - for networking and security.
 Cybersecurity Threats – growing cybersecurity threats (types and actors) increase the risk toprotect the availability, integrity and confidentiality of data within IIoT architectures. Powerful, yetsimple to use tools are readily available to novice threat actors.
 Scalable, Reliable, Safe, Secure and Future-ready Industrial IoT Architectures requires anecosystem.

Figure 1 - Industrial IoT Architectures
Source: Rockwell Automation

OT-IT Collaboration
Figure 2 is an architectural representation of the Cisco and Rockwell Automation Converged Plantwide
Ethernet (CPwE) reference architectures. CPwE has been helping industrial operations converge their
many disparate operational, processing and production systems into a single control and information
platform, utilizing a single Industrial IoT network technology, which is EtherNet/IP.
CPwE is a collection of tested and validated architectures developed by subject matter authorities at
Cisco and Rockwell Automation. The content of CPwE is relevant to both operational technology (OT)and information technology (IT) disciplines. CPwE consists of documented architectures, best practices,
design guidance and configuration settings to help industrial operations with development and2018 ODVA Industry Conference

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deployment of a scalable, reliable, safe, secure and future-ready plant-wide industrial network
infrastructure.
Standard network and security technology by the IEEE and IETF is used by both IT at the Enterprise andoperational technology (OT) for IIoT applications. However, there are cultural differences in how thetechnology is applied that should be accounted for. Examples of differences would be traffic types, dataprioritization, time synchronization, resiliency and security policies and procedures.

Figure 2 - OT-IT Collaboration
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

Cybersecurity – OT vs. IT
Due to IACS application requirements, there are differences (Figure 3) in how the technology, policies
and procedures are applied between OT and IT that should be accounted for when developing an
industrial security program. The following is a high-level summary: Technology Differences:o Software and hardware toolsetso Varying implementations of Layer 2/3 network services may create incompatibilities
 Availability, Performance, Traffic Types, Security
 Cultural Differences:o Availability SLA (service level agreement) Minutes/Hours vs. Hours/Dayso Policies: Security – Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) vs. Availability, Integrity
and Confidentiality (AIC) QoS – prioritization of voice and video
 NAT, Multicast
 Skill-gaps – Workforce Development:o OT personnel lacking knowledge of IT skills and requirementso IT personnel lacking knowledge of OT skills and requirementso Lack of Industrial IT personnel that bridge the gap between OT and IT
o Challenges with Industrial IT talent recruitment, development and retention
 Functional Differences and Incompatibilities between IT and OT:
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o
o
o
o

Technologies – e.g. resiliency, security
Products – e.g. QoS policies
Applications – e.g. WebEx and Skype vs. SCADA
Solutions – e.g. network access control vs. application access control

Figure 3 - Cybersecurity – OT vs. IT
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Industrial Security Trends
World Wide Threat Assessment -2015 (Figure 4):
 Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to the House Permanent Select Committee onIntelligence -September 10, 2015:
o Cyber threats increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication and severity of impact.
o Several nations have undertaken offensive cyber operations against private sector
targets.
o Cyber threat cannot be eliminated, rather, cyber risk must be managed.
o The likelihood of a catastrophic attack is remote at this time; rather, we envision an
ongoing series of low-moderate level cyber-attacks which will impose cumulative costs on
U.S. economic competitiveness and national security.

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Figure 4 - World Wide Threat Assessment Information
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security

According to the US DHS, industrial operations (Figure 5) led the way in 2016 for reporting cyberincidents – e.g. manufacturing, energy, water, transportation, chemical and food and agriculture. There
was a broad range of infection vectors reported. Spear phishing, enabled by social engineering, was themost commonly reported.

Figure 5 - State of the World: Risk Evolution
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Balancing Cost vs. Risk vs. Productivity
One continuing trend is the need to balance cost vs. risk vs productivity. Every industrial automation andcontrol system (IACS) application is unique to some degree. One size does not fit all when it comes torisk tolerance and stance on availability, safety and security. What is acceptable by one industrial
operator may be unacceptable to another and vice versa. IIoT architectures should support scalability,
which includes the degree of holistic and diverse industrial security technologies applied at different levelsof a plant-wide security architecture. Scalable security comes in many forms. Based on risk mitigation
requirements, several diverse technology options are available for threat detection and prevention to help
industrial operations meet their tolerance to risk.
The challenge for industrial operations is to develop a balanced security stance to take advantage of IIoT
innovation while maintaining the integrity of industrial security and safety best practices. Businesspractices, corporate standards, security policies and procedures, application requirements, industry
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security standards, regulatory compliance, risk management policies, and overall tolerance to risk are all
key factors in determining the appropriate security stance.
Utilize safety and security standards to help assess the required security stance to meet the application
requirements:
 Alignment with industrial functional safety standards such as IEC 61508, IEC 62061 (SIL), ISO
13849 (PL), CIP Safety Alignment with industrial security standards such as IEC-62443 (formerly ISA99), NIST 800-82 ,ICS-CERT and CIP Security
The need for early, open and two-way dialogue within industrial operations, especially between OT and
IT, is critical for the success of IIoT projects. One size does not fit all when it comes to risk tolerance andstance on availability, safety and security.

Established Industrial Security Standards
There are multiple organizations, consortia and government agencies that provide or reference industrial
security standards and recommended practices. Each has the common threads of: Security Zones – organizing industrial operations into functional or security zones, with strong
segmenting of industrial operations from business (enterprise) networks.
 Defense-in-Depth - this approach uses multiple layers of diverse technologies for protection anddetection, applied at different levels of IIoT architectures, while being implemented by different
personas.
IEC 62443 and NIST 800-82 (Figure 6) is a series of standards, not just a single standard.
 IEC 62443:
o General - general information which is applicable to industrial operations, System
Integrators, and IACS vendors.
o Policies and Procedures - most applicable to industrial operations.
o System - most applicable to system designers (e.g. 3-2 for security zones and secure
conduits) and system implementers (e.g. 3-3).
o Component / Product – most applicable to IACS vendors.
 NIST 800-82:
o Identify – development of policies and procedures to govern industrial operations,awareness and training for industrial operators, IACS asset inventory, IACS network
discoveryo Protect - multiple layers of diverse technologies for threat protectiono Detect - multiple layers of diverse technologies for threat detectiono Respond - policies and procedures to govern industrial operations, awareness andtraining for industrial operators
o Recover - multiple layers of diverse technologies for IACS and network asset archiving,2018 ODVA Industry Conference

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Figure 6 - Established Industrial Security Standards

Holistic and Diverse Plant-wide Security
No single product, technology or methodology can fully secure IIoT architectures. Protecting IIoT assets
requires a holistic security approach to help address internal and external security threats. This approach
uses multiple layers of defense (administrative, technical, and physical), using diverse technologies forprotection and detection, applied at different levels of IIoT architectures, while being implemented bydifferent personas, by applying policies and procedures that address different types of threats.
To understand the security and network systems requirements of an industrial automation and control
system (IACS), this document uses a logical model to describe the basic functions and composition of an
IACS application. The Purdue Reference Architecture and ISA 95 are common and well-understoodmodels that use Levels to segment devices and equipment into hierarchical functions. The concept ofoperational Levels has been incorporated into many other models and standards in the industry. Basedon this segmentation of the plant operations, standards such as IEC 62443, NIST 800-82 and ICS-CERT
recommended practices organize the operational Levels into Security Zones as shown in Figure 7. Thisis a representation of the CPwE Logical Model.

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Figure 7 - Holistic and Diverse Plant-wide Security – CPwE Logical Model
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

Multiple layers of defense-in-depth (Figure 7) for IIoT architectures include, but are not limited to: Education and Awareness Programs - training of OT personnel on established industrial
security/safety policies and procedures including how to respond to a security incident.
 Physical – limit physical access to authorized personnel only: control room, cells/areas, control
panels, IACS devices – e.g. locks, gates, biometrics.
 Network – restrictive access, hardening, traffic flow analysis and traffic inspection.
 Computer Hardening – patch management program, white listing of IACS applications, restrict
admin privileges, removal of unused applications/protocols/services, closing unnecessary logicalports, and protecting physical ports.
 Application – restrictive access, trusted communications, hardening, and monitoring.
 Device Hardening – trusted communications, change management with disaster recovery, dataencryption, and restrictive access.
The CPwE Industrial Security Framework (Figure 8) helps to provide a holistic, scalable, diverse andincremental architectural best practices:
 Defense-in-Depth - architectural best practices for holistic and diverse threat detection andprotection
 Alignment with industrial security standards:- IEC 62443 - zones & conduits, availability, integrity, confidentiality.
- NIST 800-82 - cybersecurity framework, identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.
- ICS-CERT - recommended practices for secure network architectures.
 Different Personas:- OT – e.g. Control System Engineers- Industrial IT - Control System Engineers (OT) in collaboration with IT Network Engineers,
OT Engineers with IT skills, or IT with knowledge of OT requirements.
- IT – e.g. security architects in collaboration with OT.
 Scalability – IIoT smart device to IACS application, IIoT smart device to Level 3 Site Operations,
IIoT smart device to on premise analytics in the enterprise, and IIoT smart device to cloud-based
applications.

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Figure 8 - Holistic and Diverse Plant-wide Security – CPwE Logical Framework
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

OT Persona - Holistic and Diverse Plant-wide Security
Industrial security should be holistic (Figure 9) and not treated as a bolt-on afterthought for new IIoT
architectures. However, there are many solutions available to help industrial operations incrementally
improve the security stance for their legacy IIoT architectures.
 Hardening for Level 0-2 IACS devices - policies and procedures, physical measures, electronic
measures, encrypted communications, trusted communications (CIP Security).
 Zoning – segmenting devices and applications into functional and security zones, CPwE LogicalModel, Layer 2/3 switch hierarchy with access control lists (ACLs), virtual local area networks(VLANs) for Layer 2 networks, Layer 3 network address translation (NAT) devices, and industrial
firewalls.
 Port Security – network and IACS devices, both physical and electronic.
 Application Hardening – application access control, trusted communications with possible
whitelisting.
 Industrial Firewall – zoning (access control for protection) of OEM skids/equipment/machines,
zoning (access control for protection) of legacy networks with legacy IACS devices which havelittle to no security capabilities, and inspection of both IIoT and non-IIoT traffic.
 Status and Monitoring – inventory and asset management of both IACS and network devices.

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Figure 9 - OT Persona - Holistic and Diverse Plant-wide Security
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

Plant-wide zoning (Figure 10) to support:
 Functional / Security Areas Smaller Connected LANso Smaller broadcast domains
o Smaller fault domains
o Smaller domains of trusto Application micro-segmentation
 Alignment with IEC 62443-3-2 security zones and secure conduits model.
 Alignment with DHS/INL/ICS-CERT best practices.
 Segmentation of different and potentially incompatible Industrial IoT Technology.
 Establish a building block approach for scalability.

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Figure 10 - OT Persona – Plant-wide Zoning
Source: Rockwell Automation

Application / Device Security:
 CIP Security™, part of a holistic and diverse defense-in-depth security approach (Figure 11)
 Connections between Trusted Endpoints:o Reject data that has been altered (integrity).
o Reject messages sent by untrusted people or untrusted devices (authenticity).
o Reject messages that request actions that are not allowed (authorization).
 Capabilities:
o System managemento Micro-segmentationo Device-based firewall
 This does not replace the need for network security – e.g. firewalls, network access control, andzoning.

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Figure 11 - Industrial IT (OT-IT) Persona – Application / Device Security
OT/IT Persona - Holistic and Diverse Plant-wide Security
Multiple layers of defense-in-depth (Figure 12) for IIoT architectures threat detection and prevention
should include, but not limited to: Computer Hardening - patch management program, white listing of IACS applications, restrict
admin privileges, removal of unused applications/protocols/services, closing unnecessary logicalports, and protecting physical ports.
 Network Infrastructure – hardening, access control (physical and electronic), and resiliency.
 Wireless LAN (WLAN)o Access Policy
 Equipment SSID
 Plant Personnel SSID
 Trusted Partners SSID
o WPA2 with AES Encryptiono Autonomous WLAN
 Pre-Shared Key
 802.1X - (EAP-FAST)o Unified WLAN
 802.1X - (EAP-TLS)
 CAPWAP DTLS
 Remote Access Server – for central policy enforcement for plant, enterprise and remote access.
 Status and Monitoring – health status of IACS and network devices.

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Figure 12 - Industrial IT (OT-IT) Persona - Holistic and Diverse Plant-wide Security
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

IT Persona - Holistic and Diverse Plant-wide Security
Multiple layers of defense-in-depth (Figure 13) for IIoT architectures threat detection and prevention
should include, but not limited to: Network Access Control – centralized authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA), identity
and mobility services, and software-defined segmentation.
 Plant-wide Firewall Management – industrial firewalls and firewalls within Industrial Demilitarized
Zone (IDMZ).
 Active Directory – genesis of identity and access control policy.
 Status and Monitoring – traffic flow analysis and traffic inspection.
 Plant Firewalls - active/standby, inter-zone traffic segmentation, ACLS, IPS and IDS, VPN
services, portal and remote desktop services proxy.
 IDMZ best practices – data brokers for reliable and secure communications, TLS proxy,
application mirror, reverse proxy, remote desktop gateway server.

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Figure 13 - IT Persona - Holistic and Diverse Plant-wide Security
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

Network Security - Segmentation (Zoning) - Functional Areas / Security Groups for IIoT architectures.
 Traditional method utilized VLANs (switch port based) with static ACLs (Figure 14a). Thismethod lacked any dynamic nature and provided no programmability or automation capability.
 Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) services added the capability of dynamic
ACLs to static VLANs (switch port based). This method provides for limited programmability andautomation capability (Figure 14a).
 Source-Group Tag Exchange Protocol (SXP) with AAA services (Figure 14b) offers the capabilityof dynamic programmability and automation since the SXP is bound to the IACS endpoint and not
the switch port.

Figure 14a - IT Persona – Network Security - Segmentation (Zoning) - Functional Areas / Security Groups
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

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Figure 14b - IT Persona – Network Security - Segmentation (Zoning) - Functional Areas / Security Groups
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

Traffic Flow Analysis (Figure 15) for IIoT architectures.
 Flow - unidirectional stream of packets between a given source and destination.
 IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX), were a flow record is created and cached in the industrial
Ethernet switch (IES).
o Provides data about traffic flows: who, what, where, when, and how Network Monitoring and Anomaly Detection
 Application Monitoring and Profiling
 User Monitoring and Profiling Network Planning Security Analysis
o If one field within an incoming packet is different, a new IPFIX record is created in thelocal IPFIX cache.
o Flow analysis, not packet analysis. Lightweight footprint, this is NOT a Full Packet
Capture (PCAP).
o Various IPFIX Versions
 Traditional NetFlow (TNF) – fixed info to identify a flow.
 Flexible NetFlow (FNF) –user defines how to identify a flow.
 IETF Standard, RFC 5101, 5102, 6313 - IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) –limited support.
o IPFIX Components –Generator, Flow Templates, Exporter, Collector

Figure 15 - IT Persona – Network Security – Traffic Flow Analysis
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Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

Cloud-based services help to enable data collaboration and remote monitoring of dashboards by plant
personnel and/or trusted industry partners (for example, system integrator, OEM or contractor) for IACS
applications within IIoT architectures (Figure 16). A holistic industrial security stance is necessary in orderto help protect the integrity of safety and security best practices while also helping to enable restrictedcloud-based services.
Industrial operations should also ensure that the cloud provider and internet service provider (ISP) aretrusted. They are required to protect connectivity and data per the industrial operator’s security policies.
An IIoT Cloud Gateway should communicate with a Cloud application via Transport Layer Security (TLS).
In keeping with the Industrial Demilitarized Zone (IDMZ) concept of brokered services, a TLS proxyshould be located in the IDMZ. The IIoT security architecture should use the IDMZ with Firewall(s) andreplicated services to buffer the Industrial Zone from the Enterprise Zone. Industrial Firewall(s) should
also be implemented to enforce security policies within a Cell/Area Zone to protect the Industrial Zone
from the IIoT Cloud Gateway ingress/egress point.
This is the security architecture recommended by Cisco and Rockwell Automation for industrial operatorsthat require cloud-based connectivity yet have a lower tolerance to risk. Some industrial operators may
already have a TLS proxy located in their Enterprise DMZ that buffers their Enterprise Zone from theInternet. This security architecture could be implemented to leverage that existing TLS proxy. A third
option is to have a TLS Proxy located in the cloud like the Cisco Umbrella Intelligent Proxy.

Figure 16 - IT Persona – Network Security – Reliable and Secure Cloud
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

Reliable and Secure Remote Access (Figure 17) for IIoT architectures.
 Balanced Security Stanceo Multiple layers of diverse technology
o Edge firewall with access policies
o IDMZ best practices
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o Identity services for AAA
o Remote access servero Security zoning
Enabling Remote Asset Management
Protecting Integrity of Safety and Security Best Practices

Figure 17 - IT Persona – Network Security – Reliable and Secure Remote Access
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

No single product, technology or methodology can fully secure IIoT architectures. Protecting IIoT assets
requires a holistic security approach to help address internal and external security threats. This approach
uses multiple layers of defense (administrative, technical, and physical), using diverse technologies forprotection and detection, applied at different levels of IIoT architectures, while being implemented bydifferent personas, by applying policies and procedures that address the different types of threats (Figure18).
One size does not fit all when it comes to risk tolerance and stance on availability, safety and security.
What is acceptable by one industrial operator may be unacceptable to another and vice versa. IIoT
architectures should support scalability, which includes the degree of holistic and diverse industrial
security technologies which are applied at different levels of a plant-wide security architecture. Scalable
security comes in many forms. Based on risk mitigation requirements, several diverse technology options
are available for threat detection and prevention to help industrial operations meet their tolerance to risk.
The challenge for industrial operations is to develop a balanced security stance to take advantage of IIoT
innovation while maintaining the integrity of industrial security and safety best practices. Businesspractices, corporate standards, security policies and procedures, application requirements, industry
security standards, regulatory compliance, risk management policies, and overall tolerance to risk are all
key factors in determining the appropriate security stance.

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Figure 18 - Holistic and Diverse Plant-wide Security – CPwE Logical Framework
Source: Cisco-RA CPwE

Key Takeaways
ODVA Members
Develop products that align with Industrial Automation and Control System (IACS) Security Standards
and Technologies:
 IEC 62443
o Education and awareness for your teams and customers
o Strategy to address 4-1 and 4-2, where it makes sense for your business CIP Securityo Harden EtherNet/IP productso Adopt CIP Security where it makes sense for your businesso Conformance testingo Participate in PlugFest
End Users, System Integrators, OEMs
Utilize standards, reference models, and tested and validated reference architectures to help simplify yourdesign, accelerate your deployment, and reduce your risk in deploying new technology.
No single product, technology or methodology can fully secure IIoT applications. Protecting IIoT assets
requires a holistic security approach to help address different types of internal and external threats. Thisapproach uses multiple layers (administrative, physical, and electronic) of diverse technologies for threatprotection and detection, applied at different levels of IIoT applications, while being implemented bydifferent personas.

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Although industrial security should be holistic for Greenfield IIoT projects, there are many solutions
available to help industrial operations incrementally improve the security stance for their legacy IIoT
architectures.
Implement risk management policies for availability, safety and security: determination of risk tolerance,
performing a risk assessment and implementing risk mitigation solutions.
Align with Industrial Automation and Control System (IACS) Security Standards.

Definition of terms
Term
IoT
IIoT
OT
IT
NAT
IES
WLAN
OEM
IACS
VLAN
QoS
IDMZ
AAA
CIP

Definition
Internet of Things
Industrial Internet of Things
Operation Technology
Information Technology
Network Address Translation
Industrial Ethernet Switch
Wireless Local Area Network
Original Equipment Manufacturer
Industrial Automation and Control System
Virtual Local Area Network
Quality of Service
Industrial Demilitarized Zone
Authentication Authorization Accounting
Common Industrial Protocol

References
Cisco Design Zone for Manufacturing - Converged Plantwide Ethernet
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/enterprise/design-zone-manufacturing/landing_ettf.html
Rockwell Automation – Industrial Network Architectures- Converged Plantwide Ethernet
http://www.rockwellautomation.com/global/capabilities/industrial-networks/technical-data/overview.page
Education / Awareness - Industrial IP Advantage (IIPA) eLearning
http://www.industrial-ip.org/en
National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)
https://www.dhs.gov/national-cybersecurity-and-communications-integration-center
ODVA CIP Security
https://www.odva.org/Technology-Standards/Common-Industrial-Protocol-CIP/CIP-Security******************************************************************************************************************************************************The ideas, opinions, and recommendations expressed herein are intended to describe concepts of the author(s) for the possible useof ODVA technologies and do not reflect the ideas, opinions, and recommendation of ODVA per se. Because ODVA technologies
may be applied in many diverse situations and in conjunction with products and systems from multiple vendors, the reader andthose responsible for specifying ODVA networks must determine for themselves the suitability and the suitability of ideas, opinions,and recommendations expressed herein for intended use. Copyright ©2018 ODVA, Inc. All rights reserved. For permission to
reproduce excerpts of this material, with appropriate attribution to the author(s), please contact ODVA on: TEL +1 734-975-8840
FAX +1 734-922-0027 EMAIL odva@odva.org WEB www.odva.org. CIP, Common Industrial Protocol, CIP Energy, CIP Motion, CIP
Safety, CIP Sync, CIP Security, CompoNet, ControlNet, DeviceNet, and EtherNet/IP are trademarks of ODVA, Inc. All othertrademarks are property of their respective owners.

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