Do haves count have-nots’ work? evidence from the dictator
game experiments∗
Kazuhito Ogawa†, Toru Takemoto‡, Hiromasa Takahashi§,and Akihiro Suzuki¶
April 7, 2009

Keywords：Dictator Games, experimental economics, property right, other-regarding
behavior, and work

Abstract
Conducting the dictator game experiments and regarding the dictator and therecipient as have and have-not, respectively, we examined the condition when haves
donate their endowment to have-nots. To make this condition clear, we introduced theproperty rights of the dictator and the eﬀect of work by the recipient and conductedfour treatments; the standard dictator game treatment, the treatment under which thedictator was given the endowment according to the work performance and the recipient
did nothing, the treatment under which the dictator was exogenously given endowment
and the recipient worked to promote the dictator’s other regarding behavior, andthe treatment under which the dictator was given the endowment according to thework performance and the recipient worked to promote the dictator’s other-regarding
behavior. Then we investigated the relationship between the dictator s property rights
and the recipient s inﬂuential behavior. In the ﬁrst result, the dictator exogenously
given property rights sent higher amount of money than those who endogenously got
the endowment, irrespective of the inﬂuential behavior of the recipient. This indicatesthat property rights make the dictator hard-nosed. In the second result, the dictator
exogenously given property rights sent higher amount of money to the recipient doing
the inﬂuential behavior than to the recipient doing nothing but when the dictator
endogenously got the endowment, the amount of money given to the recipient doing
the inﬂuential behavior was as large as the amount given to the recipient doing nothing.
This indicates that the dictator has a lexicographic preference ordering.

∗This work was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientiﬁc Research (C) (18530226) and by the Open
Research Centre Experimental Economics: A new method of teaching economics and the research on its
impact on society, the Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto Sangyo University.
†
Faculty of Economics, Osaka Sangyo University, Nakagaito, 3-1-1, Daito, Osaka 574-8530, Japan.
E-mail:kz-ogawa@eco.osaka-sandai.ac.jp‡
Faculty of Economics, Tezukayama University. E-mail: takemoto@tezukayama-u.ac.jp§
Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University, 3-4-1 Ozuka-Higashi, Asa-Minami, Hiroshima 731-3194, Japan. Tel.: +81-82-830-1500. E-mail: htaka@intl.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp¶
Faculty of Literature and Social Sciences, Yamagata University. E-mail:asuzuki@human.kj.yamagatau.ac.jp1

1

Introduction

In this papar, we add a prior working stage in which subjects engage in a work to a
dictator game experiments and compare a standard dictator game experiment. This paper
diﬀers from many studies, where subjects do a task to earn themselves endowments before
playing a standard dictator game, by the presence of treatments where recipients work.
If there is no earning procedure, the experiments have a artiﬁcial feature of helicopter
money. However, if only dictators work, additional asymmetry causes in the dictator
game experiment. This paper not only aggregate such studies but also clarify an aspectof dictators’ preferences.
Since Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986),1 many dictator game experiments havebeen conducted to check dictators’ other-regarding behavior. In typical dictator game
experiments, the experimenter gives every dictator an amount of money as their endowments. Dictators decide to give their recipients a part of their endowments (may be equal
to zero). Recipients’ rewards are money amounts sent from dictators and dictators’ rewards are the rest of their endowments. In classical economic theory, the dictator sends
nothing since the recipient do nothing. 2
In most dictator game experiments, however, dictators send recipients positive amounts
which are smaller than those in ultimatum game experiments (see Forsythe, Horowitz,
Savin and Sefton (1994)). Many researchers interpret these positive gifts in dictator game
experiments as reciprocal behavior of dictators (see Hoﬀman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith(1994)). The avarage money amounts are dependnt on experimental environments in dictator game experiments. Camerer (2003) summarizes outcomes of dictator game experiments by saying that dictators send 13-50% of their endowments. There are many studies
to search variables decreasing the average oﬀer rate. Hoﬀman et al. (1994) experiments
dictator games by using a double blind method. In Hoﬀman et al. (1994), all subjects solve
quizes. The experimenter assigns high scorers dictators and assigns low scorers recipients.

1

The dictator game was designed to explain the reason for a high percentage of the oﬀer in the ultimatum
game (see Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982)). In typical ultimatum game experiments, proposers
oﬀer an average of 40-50% of the money endowment (see Camerer (2003)), although the proposer shouldmake (nearly) zero oﬀer and the responder should accept any oﬀer if all players maximizes their monetary
payoﬀs. This result indicates the possibilities that responders may reject small oﬀers and that proposers
may be afraid of low oﬀers rejected. The dictator game removes responder’s ability to reject oﬀers. A
positive oﬀer in the dictator game experiments may indicate proposers’ altruistic behavior.
2
In this sentence, we assume that the dictator maximize his money amounts.

2

To get a high score may give validity for getting endowments.3 Hoﬀman et al. (1994) showsthat the average donation rate is higher than the one when assigning roles at random. The
blindness decreases the donation rate. Cherry (2001) examines the dictator game in which
dictators earn endowments by dealing lotteries. Cherry (2001) shows that the average oﬀer
rate in the dictator game with the earning stage is smaller than that without the earning
stage. Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002) compares two treatments. In a treament,
dictators solve 17 problems selected from GMAT, and the expeimenter gives high scorers
40 dollars and gives low scorers 10 dollars as endowments. Cherry et al. (2002) shows that
dictators solving problems gives recipients lower money amounts.
On the other hand, there are studies for searching variables increasing the average
donation rate. Yamamori, Kato, Kawagoe and Matsui (2008) experiments a dictator gamewhere recipients deliver themselves demands to dictators. Endowments are exogenously
given. Yamamori et al. (2008) shows that recipient’s voice increases the average oﬀer rate.
The research question is following; does the recipient’s work enhance the other-regarding
behavior of the dictator? How powerful the impact is? Is the impact higher than the property right eﬀect of the dictator? Many existing studies pay attention to the property righteﬀect. In these framework, dictators might think that recipients do nothing. Yamamori
et al. (2008) deal with the recipient’s behavior but the recipients do not work.
In this paper, we add a working stage to a standard dictator game. There are three
types of working stages where dictators and/or recipients solves a calculation test. When
only dictators do a task, dictators not only get property rights to get endowments but
also may think that recipients do not work. In our setting, recipients work without any
monetary reward. We can regard dictators as workers with high productivity and recipients as workers with low productivity. Wage levels, or (variable) endowments from theexperimenter, is partly determined their productivities4 . To assign roles to subjects as
to their scores cuts oﬀ randomness from the normal dictator game. We eliminate theseeﬀects. This paper not only aggregate above studies but also clarify an aspect of dictators’
preferences.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we explain the details of our ex3

In Hoﬀman and Spitzer (1985), all subjects acquire a right to be a dictator or a recipient.
We neglect the diﬀerence between zero reward and low rewards. Heyman and Ariely (2004) investigates
the diﬀerence. Because of our ﬁnancial limitations, we cannot give recipients low but enough rewards to
get high scores.
43

periment. Section 3 is devoted to the description of the outcome of our experiment. In
Section 4, we compare between the outcome and above studies. Section 5 concludes thepaper.

2

Experiment

Authers test the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis One : When the recipient’s behavior is ﬁxed, the work by the dictator will decrease their donation.
Hypothesis Two : When the dictator’s behavior is ﬁxed, recipient’s work will
increases their donation.
Each hypotheses are not consistent with classical economic theory. That is, selﬁsh subjects
donete nothing.

2.1

Experiment Design

The entire experiment consisted of four treatments. One of them was the standard dictator
game. Others were treatments divided into a working stage and a standard dictator gamestage. The working stage was immediately followed by the dictator game stage. Eachsubject was randomly assigned the role of either dictator or recipient at the beginningof the treatment. Four treatments were identiﬁed with two factors. A factor is whether
dictators worked or not. Another factor is whether recipients worked or not. During theworking stage, all subjects were required to complete a calculation test comprising 100
addition and subtraction problems involving two- or three-digit numbers. Subjects were
given 15 minutes to complete the calculation test.5
A treatment that both dictators and recipients didn’t work was referred to as treatment
DG. A treatment that only dictators worked was referred to as treatment DGDE. A
treatment that only recipients worked was referred to as treatment DGRE. A treatmentthat both dictators and recipients worked was referred to as treatment DGBE. (Table 1)
Dictator’s behavior\Recipient’s behavior
do not work
work

do not work
DG
DGDE

work
DGRE
DGBE

Table 1: Experimental Proﬁle5
After calculating, subjects entered their answers to computer console. In a treatment that bothdictators and recipients worked, all subjects completed the same calculation test in each round.

4

In the treatments DG and DGRE, the dictators were given JPY12006 at the beginningof each round. The recipients were informed that the dictator paired with him or her
was given JPY1200 as an endowment of the dictator game. In the treatment DGDE
and DGBE, the dictators were given money corresponding to their own scores on thecalculation test (as shown in Table 2 ) as an endowment of the dictator game. The
recipients were informed of the amount of money given to the dictator paired with him or
her. However, the recipients were not informed of the scores of the dictator paired withhim or her.
Score
79 or lower
Between 80 and 89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96 or higher

Amount of Money
JPY150
JPY300JPY450
JPY600
JPY750
JPY900
JPY1050
JPY1100
JPY1200

Table 2: Relation between the Amount of Money and Score
In the treatments DGBE and DGRE, the dictators were informed of the score of therecipient paired with him or her, according to the score categories in Table 2.7 For example,
if the score of a recipient is 97, a dictator is informed that the score of the recipient pairedwith him or her is 96 or higher.
In treatment DGRE, during the working stage, the dictator held steady. Recipientswere informed that the dictator held steady.
In each treatment, the working stage and the dictator game stage were repeated thricein the same order. The dictator-recipient pairs were changed randomly in each round.
The role of the subjects remained unchanged for the duration of each treatment. This
information was provided to the dictators and recipients.

When the experiments were done, JPY1 ∼= USD0.009.
The recipients were explained that their score was informed to the dictator paired with them according
to the score categories in Table 2. Since their score was not related to the monetary reward, they did notknow the relationship between the score and “amount of money”.
6

7

5

2.2

Overview

The experiment was performed at the Kyoto Experimental Economics Laboratory of Kyoto Sangyo University from October 2007 to February 2008. The dictators were 108
undergraduate students of Kyoto Sangyo University. The proﬁle of the dictators is shownin the table 3. The same number of the subjects were assigned the role of recipient. All
the subjects participated in only one treatment. None of the subjects had previously
participated in a dictator game experiment, though some had participated in anotherexperiment. Each treatment took approximately from two to three hours to complete.
The amount of money rewarded to the subjects ranged from JPY0 to JPY3600.8 A copyof z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)), licensed to Kazuhito Ogawa, was used as the application
software for the experiment.

DG
DGRE
DGDE
DGBE
DG
DGRE
DGDE
DGBE

faculty of economics
7 (people)
8
7
7
ﬁrst year
6642

other faculties
21
10
18
18
university sophomore
4
7
3
8

man
23
15
17
18
junior year
10
1
5
5

woman
5
3
8
7
senior class student
8
4
13
10

Table 3: The proﬁle of the dictators.
The following details the interaction between two type of subjects. They were assigned
their role randomly. The dictators and recipients gathered in diﬀerent places. Next, thedictators were led to the room 1 and the recipients were led to the room 2, which wasnext to the room 1. The room 1 was divided by partitions into front and rear sections.
The dictators sat down in predetermined places in the front section of the room 1. The
working stages for both dictators and recipients began at the same time. After calculating,the recipients moved into the room 1, where they entered the answers of their calculations
into the computer. Note that they entered the room 1 from the rear door and sat downin predetermined places in the rear section. Then, the dictators and the recipients did
8

In each treatment, only recipients participate a diﬀerent experiment for avoiding extremely-low monetary reward. In particular, the amount of money rewarded to the recipients was over JPY2000. It isbecause that the experiment ensured to all subjects an appropriate minimum income as opportunity cost.
Dictators were not informed the above that.

6dictator game stage. After the end of the dictator game stage, the recipients moved backinto the room 2. The dictators and recipients were dismissed at dipﬀerent times. The aimof these procedures was to limit the contact between the dictators and recipients as muchas possible.

3

Experimental Result

3.1

Over All Result

Table 4 indicates the average donation rate, standard deviation, and the number of subjects
in each treatment.9 Some of the dictators were excluded since the ex post interview
revealed that they did not understand the experimental settings.10
Treatment

dicator’s
behavior

recipient’s
behavior

Numberof DataDG

do not work

do not work

28

DGRE

do not work

work

18

DGDE

work

do not work

25

DGBE

work

work

25

Round
One
0.184
(0.23)∗
0.297(0.25)∗
0.138(0.17)∗
0.111(0.16)∗

Round
Two
0.120
(0.19)
0.245(0.30)
0.099(0.17)
0.118(0.17)

Round
Three
0.205
(0.30)
0.284(0.26)
0.097(0.16)
0.099(0.15)∗ Numbers in the parentheses are standard deviation.

Table 4: The evolution of the donation rate in each treatment.
Table 5 represents the average donation rate throughout rounds in each treatment.
This table indicates that the donation rates is the highest in the DGRE, the second
highest in the DG. The donation rates in the DGDE and DGBE are almost the sameand the smallest. This indicates that dictators donate most when they do not work but
their recipient work and that they donate little when they work and ignore their recipent’s
work.

3.2

Hypothesis One

We statistically investigate the Hypothesis One: When the recipient’s behavior is ﬁxed, thework by the dictator will decrease their donation. For this purpose, we conduct the Logit
9

In the ﬁrst round of the one session in the treatment DGDE, as the result of the calculation test, thirteen
dictators were assigned the endowment was equal to the one in the Table 2 multiplied by 2/3. From therounds two to three, they were assigned the endowment exactly shown in the Table 2. Twelve dictators in
the other session completed the test which assigned the endowment according to the Table 2. We compared
the donation rate between two sessions and the result indicated that there was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
Therefore, we pooled these two results.
10
Following is the most popular reason for exclusion: The dictator believes that her recipient does thesame decision making as her. Although the experimenter repeatedly informed that the recipient did not
donate money to the dictator, from 5% to 10% of the dicators did not understand this caution.

7

Dictator’s behavior\Recipient’s behavior
do not work
work

do not work
0.169
0.111

work
0.275
0.101

Table 5: Average donation rate throughout rounds.

and Tobit analyses. 11 We do not apply the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which is usuallyapplied to check the distribution diﬀerence, since we do not only have the donation result
but also the proﬁle of the subjects (gender, grade, and faculty) and we should take therepetition eﬀect into account.
For both analyses, we deﬁnite some variables. P rob(Donation) is the donation dummy
and the dependent variable in the Logit analysis. When the dictator donate more thanJPY zero, it is 1. Otherwise, it is 0. The Donation rate is the dependent variable in
the Tobit analysis. Dic is the dictator work dummy. When the dictator works, it is 1.
Otherwise, it is 0. Rec is the recipient work dummy. When the partner ecipient works, it
is 1. Otherwise, it is 0. F aculty is the faculty dummy. When the dictator belongs to thefaculty of economics, it is 1. Otherwise, it is 0. Gender is the gender dummy. When the
dictator is male, it is 1. Otherwise, it is 0. Grade is the grade of the dictator. Round is
the playing round.
The hypothesis one consists of two parts. First is the case that the recipient doesnothing (DG and DGDE). Second is the case that the recipient makes eﬀort (DGBE and
DGRE).
We apply two analyses for ﬁrst and second parts. If the coeﬃcient of Dic is negativeand signiﬁcant between two parts, the hypothesis is fully supported.
The result of the Logit analysis is in the Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 indicates that thecoeﬃcient of Dic is negative and signiﬁcant at 5% level, which means that the dictator’s
work decreases the donation probability when the recipient does not work. The table also
indicates that the donation probability of the male dictator will be smaller than that of
the female dictator and that the donation possibility of the senior dictator will be larger
than that of the junior dictator. The former is the same result as Eckel and Grossman(1998).
The Table 7 indicates that Dic is negative and signiﬁcant at 0.1% level. This indicates11

We used “R” and the “AER” package (Kleiber and Zeileis (2008)) for statistical analysis

8that the dictator’s work decrease the donation probability when the recipient works. This
table also indicates that the possibility of the senior dictator will be larger than that of
the junior dictator.
From the Logit analysis, when the dictator works, she decreases her donation probability signiﬁcantly irrespective of her recipient’s work.

Intercept
Dic
Faculty
Round
Gender
Grade
AIC

Estimate
0.6673-0.81700.6472-0.2555-1.06540.4182212.87

Std. Error
0.6996
0.35870.42600.20760.43820.1594z value
0.954-2.2781.519-1.231-2.4322.623

P r(> |z|)0.34020.02270.12860.21840.01500.0087

Table 6: The Logit analysis: DGDE vs. DG

Intercept
Dic
Faculty
Round
Gender
Grade
AIC

Estimate
3.33042-1.17403
0.35792-0.24631
0.01316-0.67783
155.71

Std. Error
0.885440.45287
0.437640.24960
0.513610.20442z value
3.761-2.5920.818-0.9870.026-3.316

P r(> |z|)0.000169
0.009530
0.413452
0.323749
0.979551
0.000914

Table 7: The Logit analysis: DGBE vs. DGRE

Since the donation rate is censored by 0 and 1, it is natural to conduct the Tobit
analysis to our experimental data. The results of the Tobit analysis is shown in the
Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8 indicates that the coeﬃcient of Dic is negative and signiﬁcant at 5% level
and that the coeﬃcient of Grade is positive and signiﬁcant at 5% level. The ﬁrst resultmeans that when the dictator makes eﬀort and the recipient does nothing, the donation
rate decreases. The second result means that the senior dictator donate more than the
junior dictator.
Table 9 indicates that the coeﬃcient of Dic is negative and signiﬁcant at 0.1% level
and that the coeﬃcient of Grade is negative and signiﬁcant at 5%level. First result meansthat given the recipient’s eﬀort, the dictator’s eﬀort decreases the donation. Second resultmeans that the senior dictator donates less than the junior dictator.
9

Summing up, Dic is signiﬁcant between two analyses. Therefore, we assert that the
hypothesis one is signiﬁcantly supported by the Logit and tobit analyses.

3.3

Hypothesis Two

Applying the Logit and Tobit analyses, we investigate the validity of the hypothesis two,
“When the recipient makes eﬀort, the donation of the dictator increases”. The variables
used for the statistical analysis are the same as used in the section 3.2.
The hypothesis two consists of two parts. First is the case that the dictator works forearning her endowment (DGDE vs. DGBE). Second is the case that the dictator is given
her endowment without work (DG vs DGRE).
Let us investigate the hypothesis two with the Logit analysis. Tables 10 and 11 show
the results. Table 10 indicates that no variable is signiﬁcant: The average donation rate
under DGBE is indistinguishable from tha rate under DGDE. This means that the dictator
ignores her recipient’s work when she works for earning the endowment.
Table 11 indicates that Rec is positive signiﬁcant at 6% level. This means that the
dictator increase the donation when her recipient works. F aculty is signiﬁcant, too. Thismeans that the dicator who belongs to the faculty of economics donates more than those
who belong to other faculties.12 gender is negative and signiﬁcant at 5% level. This meansthat the male dictator donates less than the female dictator.
Tables 12 and 13 show the result of the Tobit analysis. Table 12 indicates that no
variableIntercept
DicGame
genderfacultygrade
Log(scale)
scale
Log-likelihood
Wald-statistic

estimate
0.01438-0.12414-0.01852-0.02249-0.07168
0.05438 0.02560 2.124-1.16716
0.3113-73.93 (DF=7)
10.48 (DF=5)

Std. Error
0.11153
0.05658
0.03273
0.06773
0.066480.03370.08169z value
0.129-2.194-0.566-0.332-1.078

P r(> |z|)0.89740.02820.57140.73980.2809-14.287

p < 2e − 16

p = 0.063

Table 8: The Tobit analysis: DG vs. DGDE. There are 67 Left-censored, 90 uncensored,
and 2 right-censored observations.

12

Since 1980’s, some studies have investigated whether studying economics discourages (or inhibits)
cooperation (Yezer A. and Poppen (1996) and Seguino S. and Lutz (1996)). Current consensus is thatstudying econmics does not necessarily discourage or inhibit cooperation.

10

variable except Intercept is signiﬁcant. This means that the dictator ignores the work ofher recipient when she works.
Table 13 indicates that Rec is positive and signiﬁcant at 1% level. This means thatthe donation probability increases when she does not work and her recipient works.
Summing up, the hypothesis two is not fully supported. When the dictator works, sheignores the work of her recipient, while she does not work, she increases the donation rate
when her recipient works.

3.4

Focusing on the pairs of high scores

The analysis in the sections 3.2 and 3.3 ignores the performance of the dictators (andrecipients) in the calculation test. In reality, the performance of the test may aﬀect
the donation rate of the dictator. For example, if the score of the dictator is low uner
the treatments where the dictators make eﬀort, her endowment is small, too. This may
decrease her donation rate. If the score of the recipient is low under the treatments where
the recipients make eﬀort, the donation rate of her dictator may be low. Especially under
the treatment DGBE, if the dictator’s score is high but her recipient’s one is low, she may
give a little money to her recipient. The result of Hoﬀman et al. (1994) supports thisprediction.
To focus on the pairs of high scores, we investigate two hypotheses by using the data
which is restricted by the following conditions. For the average scores in the calculation
tests, see Appendix A.
• When the dictator works, the score of the dictator is equal to or greater than 96 invariableIntercept
DicGame
genderfacultygrade
Log(scale)
scale
Log-likelihood
Wald-statistic

estimate
0.447866-0.237546-0.029234
0.001535-0.023518-0.065354-1.210110
0.2982-51.36 (Df=7)
28.56 (DF=5)

Std. Error
0.111490
0.063397
0.034976
0.071596
0.060972
0.028961
0.086721

z value
4.017-3.747-0.8360.021-0.386-2.257-13.954

P r(> |z|)5.89e-05
0.000179
0.403260
0.982899
0.699706
0.024031
p < 2e − 16

p < 0.001

Table 9: The Tobit analysis: DGBE vs. DGRE. There are 52 Left-censored, 77 uncensored,
and 0 right-censored observations.

11Intercept
Rec
gendergrade
Gamefaculty
AIC

Estimate
1.6053-0.2829-0.4631-0.1496-0.3319-0.2959213.23

Std. Error
0.74500.33550.37310.15790.2056
0.3883z value
2.155-0.843-1.241-0.947-1.614-0.762

P r(> |z|)0.03120.39900.21450.34350.10650.4460

Table 10: The Logit analysis: DGBE vs. DGDEIntercept
Rec
facultyGamegendergrade
AIC

Estimate
1.17170.8453
1.0632-0.1139-1.4494
0.2096167.19Std. Error
0.81870.44290.46640.23900.64710.1955z value
1.431
1.909
2.279
-0.477-2.2401.072

P r(> |z|)0.15240.05630.0226
0.63360.02510.2838

Table 11: The Logit analysis: DG vs. DGRE

all three rounds.
• When the recipient works, the score of the recipient is equal to or more than 96 in
all three rounds.
• When the both work, the scores of the dictator and her recipient are equal to or
more than 96 in all three rounds.
The score equal to or more than 96 is worth the perfect score, since the dictator is not
informed of the exact score but informed the score according to the Table A-1. With thisvariableIntercept
RecGame
genderfacultygrade
Log(scale)
scale
Log-likelihood
Wald-statistic

estimate
0.24122-0.03906-0.04583-0.02808-0.08702-0.03237-1.30058
0.2724-59.4 (Df=7)
6.396 (DF=5)

Std. Error
0.110450.050350.03055
0.054880.059120.024220.09212z value
2.184-0.776-1.500-0.512-1.472-1.337-14.119

P r(> |z|)0.02900.43790.1336
0.60890.14110.1813p < 2e − 16

p = 0.270

Table 12: The Tobit analysis: DGBE vs. DGDE. There are 77 Left-censored, 73 uncensored, and 0 right-censored observations.

12data, we can investigate the donation rate given the score of the subjects. Let us call thisdata “high scored data”.
The high scored data is summarized in the Table 14. 13
This table indicates that the donation rate in the three treatments except the treatment DG is higher in the high scored data than in the data in the previous subsections.
Especially the rate under the treatment DGBE increases sharply.
With the high scored data, we conduct the Logit and Tobit analyses. With high scoreddata, the work of the dictator decreases the donation rate whether her recipient works ornot. The work of the recipient increases the donation rate only if the dictator does notwork. When the dictator works, she ignores the work of her recipient. These results arein line with the ones in the sections 3.2 and 3.3.

4

Discussion

In this section, we compare our results with the related existing literatures and interpretthe results given in Section 3. Some literatures can be thought that it compare thetreatment DG with DGDE, others can be thought that it compare the treatment DG with
DGRE. However, other than this study, there is no literature analyzing these treatments
comprehensively. The analisys provides new insight into the other-regarding behavior.
First, we compare our result with Cherry (2001) and Cherry et al. (2002). They
compared the standard dictator game with the dictator game with earning stage. In
variable(Intercept)
RecGame
genderfacultygrade
Log(scale)
scale
Log-likelihood
Wald-statistic

estimate
0.037449
0.184698
0.001623-0.065368-0.041613
0.039248-1.108658
0.33-67.57 (Df=7)
8.692 (DF=5)

Std. Error
0.116494
0.064262
0.035987
0.084436
0.065251
0.029006
0.078267

z value
0.321
2.874
0.045
-0.774-0.6381.353-14.165

P r(> |z|)0.74786
0.00405
0.964020.43883
0.523640.17603p< 2e − 16

p = 0.122

Table 13: The Tobit analysis: DG vs. DGRE. There are 42 Left-censored, 94 uncensored,
and 2 right-censored observations.

13

The number of the dictators under the treatment DGBE is much smaller in the high scored data thanin the data in the sections 3.2 and 3.3. The reason is that more than half the pairs failed to get a markequal to or more than 96.

13

Treatment

dictator’s
behavior

recipient’s
behavior

Numberof DataDG

do not work

do not work

28

DGRE

do not work

work

13

DGDE

work

do not work

23

DGBE

work

work

10

Round
One
0.184∗(0.23)
0.306(0.27)∗
0.142(0.18)∗
0.158(0.21)∗

Round
Two
0.120
(0.19)
0.244(0.27)
0.106(0.17)
0.146(0.19)

Round
Three
0.205
(0.30)
0.300(0.33)
0.102(0.16)
0.121(0.18)∗ Numbers in the parentheses are standard deviation.

Table 14: The evolution of the donation rate under each treatment (high scored dictators)
Cherry (2001), dictators earned endowment for the dictator game by dealing lotteries, thenthe bargaining was played. In Cherry et al. (2002), dictators earned endowment by taking
questions taken from the Graduate Management Admission Test in the earning stage.
These are corresponding to our comparison between treatment DG and DGDE.14 Thesestudies concluded that addition of the earning stage decreased the dictator’s donation to
the recipient. This result is corresponding to our result that when the recipient’s behavior
is ﬁxed, the dictators’ work decreases their donation. However, our result holds even in thecase where the recipients work before the bargaining. This is followed by the comparioson
between the treatment DGRE and DGBE. In this sence, our result is more general.
Second, we compare our result with Yamamori et al. (2008) considering the voice
after the manner of Hirschman (1970). Yamamori et al. (2008) compared the standard
dictator game with the dictator game with the recipient’s voice before the bargaining.
This study is corresponding to our comparison between treatment DG and DGRE, eventhough their treatment with voice is diﬀerent from our treatment DGRE in that ourrecipients didn’t ask dictators for a certain amount of money directly but simply showed
the result of work. Yamamori et al. (2008) provided the result that the recipient’s voice
increased the dictator’s donation to the recipient in the subsequent dictator game. This
result is consistent with our result that dictators not engaged in working stage countrecipents’ work, that is recipents’ work increases the dictator’s donation to the recipient.
However, from the comparison between treatment DGDE and DGBE, it cannot be said
that dictators engaged in working stage count recipents’ work. Whether dictators countrecipients’ work depends on wheter dictators work or not.
14

Dealing lotteries in Cherry (2001) is diﬀerent from the work we suppose. It is closer to gamble thanwork. It’s just conceivable that dictators with money by gamble donate more, as they say “lightly come,lightly go.”14

Next, we interpret the results given in Section 3 comprehensively. The result that when
the recipient’s behavior is ﬁxed, the dictators’ work will decrease their donation implies
dictators think that their own work counts. Meanwhile, dictators think that others’ workcounts only if they don’t work from the rest of the result. These imply that dictators thinktheir own work is more important than others work, or the dictators’ way to count work
is lexicographic order in the sence that dictators count their own work preferentially.
Another interpretation of our results is presented. Cherry (2001) used the conceptof mental accounting to explain its result that addition of the earning stage decreased
the dictator’s donation to the recipient. By the concept of mental accounting, people
possess diﬀerent marginal propensities to consume for each types of money from diﬀerent
sources. (Thaler (1985), Thaler (1990)).Moreover, Battalio, Kagel and Jiranyakul (1990)
and Thaler and Johnson (1990) provide the evidence to suggest that people accept morerisk when acting over unearned money. We try to apply the concept of mental accountfor our case. Dictators with unearned money spend more money to recipients with workthan to recipients without work. Stated another way, they prfer the case where recipients
work to the case where recipinets don’t work. Meanwhile, Dictators with earned money
don’t chage their act between the case where recipients work and the case where recipinets
don’t work. That is, both cases are indiﬀerence for them. These imply that people possess
diﬀerent preference order depending on the way to get money.

5

Conclusion

In this papar, we add a prior working stage in which subjects engage in the calculation test
to a dictator game experiments and compare a standard dictator game experiment. This
paper diﬀers from many studies, where subjects do a task to earn themselves endowments
before playing a standard dictator game, by the presence of treatments where recipientswork.The results are summarized as follows:• The donation is smaller when the dictator works than when she or he does not work.
• The dictator without work increases the donation more when her or his recipient
works than when her or his recipient does not work.
• The dictator with work doesn’t count the work of her or his recipient.

15

Results show that the preference ordering of the dictator is lexicographic. This conclusion
cannnot be attained by the framework of existing studies.

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Camerer, Colin F. (2003) Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction:
Princeton University Press Princeton:.
Cherry, T.L., P. Frykblom, and J.F. Shogren (2002) “Hardnose the dictator”, American
Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 4, pp. 1218–1221.
Cherry, Todd L. (2001) “Mental accounting and other-regarding behavior: Evidence fromthe lab”, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp. 605–615.
Eckel, C. C. and P.J. Grossman (1998) “Are Women Less Selﬁsh Than Men?: Evidence
From Dictator Experiments”, The Economic Journal, pp. 726–735.
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Experimental Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 171–178.
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Güth, W., R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze (1982) “An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp.
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Sci, Vol. 15, No. 11, pp. 787–93.
Hirschman, A.O. (1970) Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States: Harvard University Press.

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Hoﬀman, E. and M.L. Spitzer (1985) “Entitlements, rights, and fairness: An experimental
examination of subjects’ concepts of distributive justice”, The Journal of Legal Studies,pp. 259–297.
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Appendix A: Average scores of the calculation tests
Table 15 indicates the average scores of the dictators under DGDE and DGBE, the numberof the dictators who got a mark equal to or more than 96, the average scores of therecipients under DGRE and DGBE, and the number of the recipients who got a markequal to or more than 96.
17

The average scores of the dictators.

Treatment
DGDE
DGBE

the number of the dictators
25
25

Treatment
DGRE
DGBE

the number of the recipients
19
25

1
98.9 (25)∗
97.4 (23)∗2
98.4 (23)98.2 (22)3
99.2 (25)
98.4 (23)2
98.2 (16)97.0 (19)3
98.4 (19)95.4 (19)The average scores of the recipients1
98.1 (16)∗∗
97.4 (18)∗∗∗ Numbers in the parentheses are the number of the dictators with the score equal to or more than 96.
∗∗ Numbers in the parentheses are the number of the recipients with the score equal to or more than 96.

Table 15: The average scores of the calculation tests

Appendix B
Following instruction was for the dictators in DGBE,15 where the dictator and her recipient
worked before the dictator game began.

How to make decisionYour partner is anonymous and sitting in the adjoining room. Your partner changes
in every round.
This experiments consists of three rounds. In EACH round, following is what you
should do.
• The experimenter hands out the question sheet. There are one hundred additionand subtraction questions in the sheet. You have twenty minutes to answer thequestions. When the calcuration time is over, the experimenter asks you to enter
your answers to the computer console.
• While you answer the questions, your partner do the same questions. After yourpartner ﬁnish answering, she walks in your room through the rear door, sits down,
and enter her answers to the computer console.
• After ﬁnishing entering your answers and her answers, your computer console displays your score and her score. Notice that her score displays according to thetable A-1. For example, her score is 97, your computer console displays “Your partner’s score is greater or equal to 96”.
• The computer console displays your endowment, which is assigned according to yourscore (see table A-1).YOUR ENDOWMENT ONLY DEPENDS ON YOURRESULT. YOUR PARTNER’S RESULT DOES NOT AFFECT YOURENDOWMENT.

15

The instruction is originally written in Japanese.

18

• Assume that you have JPY x as the endowment. You face with the situation thatyou donate your endowment to your anonymous partner. You must choose howmuch you donate to her.
• You can donate from JPY 0 to JPY x to her.
• If you donate JPY y to her, you enter y to your computer console and push the“OK”
button.
• Your partner’s reward is JPY y. Your reward is JPY x − y.
• CAUTION– Although your partner also answers the same questions, she is not given any
money from the experimenter. Therefore, she does not have the endowment todonate to you.
– Your partner knows your endowment but does not know your score.
– Your partner knows that you make some eﬀrot to earn money. However, sher
does not know what kind of eﬀort you make. Therefore, she does not know
your score and the table A-1.
The experiment lasts three rounds. Your partner randomly changes in each round.
After a round is over, your partner goes back to the adjoining room.
Score
79 or lower
Between 80 and 89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96 or higher

Amount of Money
JPY150
JPY300 ∗JPY450 ∗JPY600 ∗JPY750 ∗JPY900 ∗JPY1050 ∗JPY1100 ∗JPY1200∗

Table A-1: Relation between the Amount of Money and Score

Monetary Reward
Your monetary reward is the sum of the rest of your endowment in three rounds. Thatis, if you earn your endowment Ei in the ith round and donate di to your partner, the rest∑of your endowment in this round is Ei − di . Therefore, your reward is 3i=1 (Ei − di ).

Appendix C
Following instruction was for the recipients in DGBE.

19

How to make decision
In this experiment, you play the game as the role B. Your role is unchanged throughout
the experiment. Your anonymous partner is in the adjoining room. Your partner isdiﬀerent from round to round.
This experiment consists of three rounds. Following is your decision in each round.
• The experimenter hands out the calculation test. There are one hundred additionand subtraction problems involving two- or three-digit numbers in the sheet. You
complete the test within twenty minutes. After the time is over, you stop to answer.
• You enter the adjoining room from the rear door. Then you enter your answers to
the comuter console.
• Your partner knows that you complete the calculation test. Your score is informed
to your partner according to the table B-1. If your score is 97, then your partner
looks at the message “Your partner’s score is equal to or higher than 96”.
• You are NOT informed of your own scores.
• Your score does NOT aﬀect your monetary reward.
• On the other hand, while you complete the test, your partner make some eﬀort toearn her own endowment.
• You are informed of your partner’s endowment as the result of her eﬀort.
• Your score, which is informed of your partner DOES NOT aﬀect yourpartner’s endowment.
• You make a quick short note of the endowment of your partner.
• The computer console displays your donation from your partner.
You make a quick short note of the donation and push “OK” button.
• Your reward in this round is the donation.

Monetary Reward
Your monetary reward is sum of your donation in three rounds. If your donation inround one, round two, and round three are JPY x, JPY y, and JPY z, respectively, yourtotal reward is JPY x + y + z.

20

Classiﬁcation of the Score
79 or lower
Between 80 and 89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96 or higher
Table B-1: Classiﬁcation of the Score

21