平成 22 年度 日米フォーラム（米国）
JEF-PIIE Conference
A Joint Conference sponsored by the Japan Economic Foundation andPeterson Institute for International Economics

報 告 書2010 年 10 月 25 日（月）（米国 ワシントン DC 開催）

財団法人 国際経済交流財団

KEIRIN

この事業は、競輪の補助金を受けて実施したものです。
http://ringring-keirin.jp/㄂㒟22㄃ㄵ

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2010㄃10㦗25㡴(㦗)(㡋᧶伂⦌ዌኔዐእዐDC)

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޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬

−1−

㧞㐿௅᭎ⷐ
1.

㐿 ௅ ᣣ ᤨ㧦 2010 ᐕ 10 ᦬ 25 ᣣ㧔᦬㧕9:30AM㨪4:30PM

2.

㐿௅࿾㧦

☨࿖ ࡢࠪࡦ࠻ࡦ DC
The Peterson Institute for International Economics(PIIE)ߩળ⼏ቶ
1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036-1903, U.S.A

3.

ਥ ௅ ⠪㧦

ᣣᧄ஥ ⽷࿅ᴺੱ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅ Japan Economic Foundation(JEF)☨࿖஥ The Peterson Institute for International Economics(PIIE㧕4.

࠹ ࡯ ࡑ㧦

”A Trans Pacific Partnership and the Future of the Asia Pacific Region”

5.

಴ Ꮸ ⠪㧦

ࠬࡇ࡯ࠞ࡯㧛࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶ࠨࡦ࠻ ⸘ 13 ฬ㧔ᣣᧄ㧕5 ฬ   㧔ᢘ⒓⇛㧛ࠕ࡞ࡈࠔࡌ࠶࠻㗅㧕⇗ጊ ⶪ

⽷࿅ᴺੱ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅ ળ㐳ዊፉ ᣿౏⋉␠࿅ᴺੱᣣᧄ⚻ᷣ⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ ⎇ⓥ㘈໧⼾↰ ᱜ๺

⽷࿅ᴺੱᣣᧄࠛࡀ࡞ࠡ࡯⚻ᷣ⎇ⓥᚲ ℂ੐㐳ᷰㄝ ༑ብ

ᩣᑼળ␠ਃ⪉᧲੩ UFJ ㌁ⴕ 㘈໧‫ޔ‬ABAC ᣣᧄᆔຬ੗਄ ൎ

⽷࿅ᴺੱ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅ ᬺോㇱ㐳㧔࠾ࡘ࡯ࠫ࡯࡜ࡦ࠼㧕 1 ฬMark Sinclair, Lead Negotiator, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Ministryof Foreign Affairs (MFAT), New Zealand㧔☨࿖㧕7 ฬC. Fred Bergsten, Director, Peterson Institute for International Economics

Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian andPacific Affairs
Daniel Price, Senior Partner, Sidley Austin LLP
Barbara Weisel, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Southeast
Asia and the PacificCongressman Kevin Brady (R-TX) [via Video Conference]
Jeffrey Schott, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International
Economics
Peter A. Petri, Carl J. Shapiro Professor of International Finance,
Brandeis University and Senior Fellow, East-West Center

−2−

6.

ᒻ

7.

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⧷⺆

8.

߅໧วవ㧦

ᣣᧄ஥

⽷࿅ᴺੱ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅㧔JEF㧕૑ᚲ㧦‫ޥ‬104-0061 ᧲੩ㇺਛᄩ඙㌁ᐳ 5-15-8 ᤨ੐ㅢାࡆ࡞ 11 㓏Tel㧦

03-5565-4824

Fax㧦

03-5565-4828

ᑼ㧦ࠝ࡯ࡊࡦ࡮ࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓ

㧔᧪႐⠪㧦⚂ 150 ฬ㧕

URL㧦 http://www.jef.or.jpᜂᒰ㧦 ᬺോㇱㇱ㐳 ੗਄ ൎ (email: masaru-inoue@jef.or.jp)ᬺോㇱ   ਤ⠀㘧㠽 (email: asuka-niwa@jef.or.jp)☨࿖஥ Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Address: 750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-1903, U.S.A.
Tel:

1-(202)-328-9000 (main)

Fax:

1-(202)-659-3225 (main)

URL:

http://www.iie.com/

Contact: Jeffrey Schott, Senior Fellow (email: jschott@piie.com)
Yvonne Priestly, Meetings coordinator(email:ypriestley@piie.com)−3−㧟㧚⹦⚦ᣣ⒟A TRANS PACIFIC PARTNERSHIPAND THE FUTURE OF THE ASIA PACIFIC REGIONA Joint Conference sponsored by the Japan Economic Foundation andPeterson Institute for International Economics
Monday, October 25, 20101750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Agenda9:30 – 9:45 a.m.

Welcome and Introduction
C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Noboru Hatakeyama, Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)

9:45 – 11:00 a.m.

Session I: The Economic and Strategic Context
Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and PacificAffairs
Akira Kojima, Senior Research Fellow, Japan Center for Economic
Research (JCER)
Daniel Price, Senior Partner, Sidley Austin LLP

11:00 – 12:30p.m.

Session II: Shaping the Trans Pacific Partnership: Substance andMembership
Masakazu Toyoda, Chairman and CEO of the Institute of Energy
Economies, Japan
Barbara Weisel, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Southeast Asia andhe PacificMark Sinclair, Lead Negotiator, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), New Zealand−4−

12:30– 2:00 p.m.

Lunch and Session III: How Congress Views the TPP
Congressman Kevin Brady (R-TX) [Via Video Conference]

2:00 – 4:00 p.m.

Session IV: The Trans Pacific Partnership and Prospects for an
FTAAP
Yoshihiro Watanabe, Advisor, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd;APEC Business Advisory Council Member of Japan
Jeffrey J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International
Economics
Discussants: Peter A. Petri, Carl J. Shapiro Professor of International
Finance, Brandeis University and Senior Fellow, East-West Center

4:00 – 4:30 p.m.

Session V: Conclusions and Recommendations
Noboru Hatakeyama, Japan Economic Foundation
C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics−5−4. ಴Ꮸ⠪ࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߦߪ‫ ⚂ޔ‬150 ฬߩ⡬ⴐ߇᧪႐ߒߚ‫ޕ‬᡽ᐭ㑐ଥ⠪‫ޔ‬㚢☨ฦ࿖ᄢ૶㙚߿࿖㓙ᯏ㑐ࠍߪߓ߼‫ޔࠢࡦ࠲ࠢࡦࠪޔ‬ᄢቇ‫ޔ‬᳃㑆ડᬺ‫ޔ‬ਗ߮ߦᣂ⡞࡮TV࡮ㅢା␠╬ฦ⒳ࡔ࠺ࠖࠕ
㧔ᣣ♽࡮☨♽࡮ਛ࿖♽࡮㖧࿖♽╬㧕ߩ಴Ꮸ߇޽ߞߚ‫ߪߢࠕࠖ࠺ࡔ♽☨ޕ‬㧺㧼㧾‫ޔ‬㧭㧼ㅢାࠍߪߓ߼ߣߒ‫ޔ‬ᣣ♽ࡔ࠺ࠖࠕߢߪ‫ޔ‬ᣂ⡞㧔ᦺᣣ‫⺒ޔ‬ᄁ‫ޔ‬ᣣ⚻‫⚻↥ޔ‬㧕‫ޔ‬㨀㨂㧔㧺㧴㧷㧘㨀㧮㧿㧘࠹࡟ࡆ᧲੩‫ޔ‬㨀㨂ᦺᣣ㧕‫ޔ‬ㅢା␠㧔ᤨ੐ㅢା␠‫౒ޔ‬หㅢା␠㧕߇಴Ꮸߒߡ޿ߚ‫ޕ‬߹ߚ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖♽ࡔ࠺ࠖࠕ‫ޔ‬㖧࿖♽ࡔ࠺ࠖࠕ߽ⶄᢙฬߩ಴Ꮸ߇޽ߞߚ‫ޕ‬−6−

5. ⇛ ᱧ(in order of appearance)

C. Fred Bergsten
C. Fred Bergsten has been director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics since its
creation in 1981. The Institute is the only major research institution in the United States devoted
to international economic issues. It has been called "the most influential think tank on the planet,"
has a staff of about 50, moved into its award-winning new building in 2001, averages two or threepublications per month, and holds at least one conference or policy meeting every week. Dr.
Bergsten has been the most widely quoted think-tank economist in the world over the eight-year
period 1997–2005. He testifies frequently before Congress and appears often on television. He
was ranked 37 in the top 50 "Who Really Moves the Markets?" (Fidelity Investment's Worth),with Alan Greenspan ranked first, and as "one of the ten people who can change your life" in USA
Today, along with the inventor of the World Wide Web and the discoverer of ozone layer
depletion.
Dr. Bergsten was assistant secretary for international affairs of the US Treasury during 1977–81.
He also functioned as undersecretary for monetary affairs during 1980–81, representing theUnited States on the G-5 Deputies and in preparing G-7 summits. During 1969–71, starting at age
27, Dr. Bergsten coordinated US foreign economic policy in the White House as assistant forinternational economic affairs to Dr. Henry Kissinger at the National Security Council. He has
been a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (1972–76), Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace (1981), and the Council on Foreign Relations (1967–68). He is co-chairmanof the Private Sector Advisory Group to the United States–India Trade Policy Forum. Dr.
Bergsten was chairman of the Eminent Persons Group of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) forum from 1993 to 1995, authoring its three reports that recommended "free and open
trade in the region by 2010 and 2020" as adopted at the APEC summits in 1993 and 1994. He wasalso chairman of the Competitiveness Policy Council created by the Congress from 1991 through1995; its 12 members included corporate CEOs, labor union presidents, and Cabinet officers andwere appointed by the president and the congressional leadership. Dr. Bergsten was a member of
the two leading commissions on reform of the international monetary system: the Independent
Task Force on The Future International Financial Architecture, sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations (1999), and the International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission
created by Congress (2000, on which he led the dissenting minority).
Dr. Bergsten has received the Meritorious Honor Award of the Department of State (1965), theExceptional Service Award of the Treasury Department (1981), and the Legion d'Honneur fromthe Government of France (1985). He has been named an honorary fellow of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (1997).
Dr. Bergsten was born in 1941. He received MA, MALD, and PhD degrees from the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy and a BA magna cum laude and honorary Doctor of Humane
Letters from Central Methodist University. He has been married to the former Virginia Wood
since 1962 and has one son, Mark, now a doctor, born in 1968. His favorite hobbies include
playing basketball, photography, and snorkeling.
Noboru Hatakeyama
Noboru Hatakeyama is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Japan Economic Foundation−7−

(JEF) since 2002. He served as the Chairman and CEO of Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO) during the period between 1998 and 2002. Originally, he joined the Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1959 and he served as a Secretary to Prime Minister
Zenko Suzuki from 1980 to 1982. He had been appointed as the Director-General of various
bureaus and department which included the Petroleum Department of the MITI’s Agency of
Natural Resources and Energy from 1984 to 1986, International Trade Administration Bureau
from 1986 to1988, the Basic Industries Bureau of the MITI from 1988 to 1989, the International
Trade Policy Bureau from 1989 to 1991. He was appointed the MITI’s Vice-Minister forInternational Affairs from 1991 to 1993. During this period, he was a Japan’s representative in
GATT Uruguay Round negotiations and other negotiations mainly with the U.S. and the EU
especially on automobile issues. He is well-known as a pioneer of Japan’s free trade agreements,
including the Japan-Mexico, Japan-Chile and Japan-Singapore FTAs. He authored a book ‘Trade
Negotiation, Dramas around National Interest’, published in Japanese by the Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, Inc. He graduated from Tokyo University’s Faculty of Law in 1959.

Kurt M. Campbell
Kurt Campbell became the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in June
2009. Previously, he was the CEO and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security(CNAS) and concurrently served as the director of the Aspen Strategy Group and chairman of the
Editorial Board of the Washington Quarterly. He was the founder of StratAsia, a strategic advisory
firm, and was the senior vice president, director of the International Security Program, and Henry A.
Kissinger Chair in National Security Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He
was also associate professor of public policy and international relations at the John F. Kennedy
School of Government and assistant director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at
Harvard University.
Dr. Campbell has served in several capacities in government, including as deputy assistant secretaryof defense for Asia and the Pacific, a director on the National Security Council Staff, deputy special
counselor to the president for NAFTA in the White House, and White House fellow at the
Department of the Treasury. For his service, he received the Department of Defense Medals forDistinguished Public Service and for Outstanding Public Service. He served as an officer in the U.S.
Navy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in the Chief of Naval Operations Special Intelligence Unit.
He is the co-author with Jim Steinberg of Difficult Transitions: Why Presidents Fail in Foreign
Policy at the Outset of Power, with Michele Flournoy of To Prevail: An American Strategy for theCampaign against Terrorism, with Michael O’Hanlon of Hard Power: The New Politics of National
Security, and he co-authored with Nirav Patel The Power of Balance: America in iAsia. He is theeditor of Climatic Cataclysm: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Climate
Change, and The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices with Robert
Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss.
He received his B.A. from the University of California, San Diego, a Certificate in music andpolitical philosophy from the University of Erevan in Soviet Armenia, and his Doctorate inInternational Relations from Brasenose College at Oxford University where he was a DistinguishedMarshall Scholar.

Akira Kojima
Kojima Akira is currently Senior Research Fellow of the Japan Center for Economic Research(JCER) and also visiting professor of GRIPS(National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies). He−8−

is a graduate of Waseda University, and was a British Council Scholar at Manchester University(1969-70). His current positions include: vice Chairman of World Trade Center(Tokyo), memberof the Trilateral Commission, Councilor for Aspen Institute, Japan; and member of the Board ofTrustees of United States㧙Japan Foundation. He has published several books in both Japaneseand English including A New Development Model of Japan(2008, Japan Journal), Reporting on
the Global Economy (2000, Japan Society, NY); US㧙Japan Relationship in the 21st Century:
The Changing Context of U.S. Japan Relations (1998, Nihon Keizai Shimbun Press) andCommunity Building with Pacific Asia: A Report to the Trilateral Commission, 1997).

Daniel M. Price
Daniel M. Price is Senior Partner for Global Issues and a member of the Executive Committee atSidley Austin LLP. He works with Sidley lawyers worldwide advising clients on a wide range ofinternational regulatory, transactional and policy matters, including global financial regulation,
trade and climate change. He also represents clients in the resolution of international disputes.
Mr. Price rejoins Sidley after serving as Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security
Advisor for International Economic Affairs in the Administration of George W. Bush. In this role,
he was the senior White House official responsible for international economic issues, includinginternational trade and investment, humanitarian relief, and the international aspects of financial
system reform, energy security and climate change. Mr. Price was the President's personal
representative to the G8, the G20 Financial Summit and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Forum. He also served as U.S. chair of various cabinet-level bilateral economic dialogues,
including the Transatlantic Economic Council.
Prior to his White House service, Mr. Price was chair of Sidley’s 50-member International Trade& Dispute Resolution group and counseled multinational companies, financial institutions andtrade associations on market access, services, investment, CFIUS and sanctions issues andmatters arising in intergovernmental negotiations. Mr. Price also advised companies andgovernments in disputes arising under international trade agreements and investment treaties suchas the WTO and NAFTA. He has served as counsel or arbitrator in multi-million dollar,
precedent-setting disputes under all major international arbitration rules.
From 2002-2007, Mr. Price served by Presidential appointment on the Panel of Arbitrators of theInternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and was a party-appointed
arbitrator in a number of investment disputes. President Bush re-appointed Mr. Price to the ICSID
Panel as of January 20, 2009. He also serves on the Board of Directors of the American
Arbitration Association.
Mr. Price served as USTR Principal Deputy General Counsel (1989-1992), where he negotiatedtrade and investment agreements with the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Latin
America. He also served as USTR’s lead negotiator on investment issues in the NAFTA talks. Mr.
Price served as Deputy Agent to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in The Hague (1984-1986),
representing the U.S. government and advising U.S. businesses in arbitrating claims against Iran
stemming from the Iranian revolution.
Mr. Price has been a commentator on BBC, CNBC, Reuters, PBS, Bloomberg and NPR. His
articles have appeared in the New York Times, International Herald Tribune, Politico, the WallStreet Journal and the Harvard International Law Journal.
Mr. Price received his B.A. with high honors from Haverford College in 1977; a Diploma in
Legal Studies in 1979 from Cambridge University, where he was an American Keasbey Scholar;−9−and his J.D. in 1981 from Harvard Law School, where he was Articles Editor of the Harvard Law
Review.

Masakazu Toyoda
Masakazu Toyoda is the chairman and chief executive officer of the Institute of Energy
Economics, Japan (IEEJ). Toyoda began his career in 1973 in the Ministry of International Tradeand Industry (MITI) and his experience in such fields as trade, energy and environment is
extensive. In particular, he held such positions, in the International Trade Policy Bureau, as
director of the Americas division, and director-general of the Multilateral Trade System
Department. In 2003, he was named the director-general of the commerce and information policy
bureau. In 2006, Toyoda became the director-general of the Trade Policy Bureau and was madevice-minister for international affairs the following year. During the period in charge of trade
policy, he made substantial contribution to create APEC, conclude Uruguay Round, resolve
US/Japan auto trade dispute, launch Doha developmental round and so on. In 2008, he became
secretary general at the secretariat of strategic headquarters for space policy, Cabinet Secretariat.
He has also served as special adviser to the cabinets on the Asian economy and climate change.
He attended the University of Tokyo, graduating in 1973 with a bachelor degree in law. He
continued his education at The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at
Princeton University, and graduated in 1979 with a master’s degree in public affairs.

Barbara Weisel
Barbara Weisel joined the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in 1994 and was appointed tothe position of Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Southeast Asia and the Pacific in 2004.
In this position, she is responsible for developing and implementing U.S. trade policy relating tocountries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. She is the lead negotiator for the Trans-PacificPartnership initiative and led the U.S. Free Trade Agreement negotiations with Malaysia andThailand. Prior to this, Ms. Weisel served as Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for
Bilateral Asian Affairs, where she was the deputy lead negotiator on the U.S.-Australia FTA andworked on the Singapore FTA as well as other Southeast Asian and Korean issues. She
previously served as Director for Japan Affairs. Before joining USTR, Ms. Weisel worked at theState Department from 1984-1994. During this time, she served in a variety of positions,
including as international economist on Japan, the Persian Gulf, and North Africa. Ms. Weisel
received Masters Degrees from Harvard University and her Bachelor's Degree from Connecticut
College.
Mark Sinclair
Mark Sinclair graduated as Master of Arts from the University of Auckland in 1977 before
joining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his early years in the department he was a Japan
specialist: he spent two years from 1978 studying at the Foreign Service Institute in Yokohama,followed by assignments in the New Zealand embassy in Tokyo and the Asia Division in
Wellington.
After serving as Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs he was posted to Honiara
as Deputy High Commissioner. From 1986 to 1989 he was seconded to the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet as foreign policy adviser in the Prime Minister's Advisory Group, focusing
mainly on regional affairs, defence and security. He continued to specialise in security andpolitical affairs during a posting to Canberra and in the Australia Division of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs and Trade.

− 10 −

From 1995 to 2000 he worked on organisational development and human resources policy, firstin the Personnel Division and then as Director of the Chief Executive's Office. Since 2001 hehas focused on trade and economic affairs, first as Deputy Permanent Representative in the New
Zealand Mission to the WTO in Geneva, then as Director of the Trade Negotiations Division andsenior New Zealand official for the WTO Doha process. Since late 2008 he has been New
Zealand's lead negotiator for the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiation.

Kevin Brady
Kevin Brady considers it an honor to be representing the 8th District of Texas in the U.S House ofRepresentatives.
A pro-family, pro-small business conservative, Kevin’s strong belief in free enterprise guides him
as the Senior House Republican on the Joint Economic Committee.
A Deputy Whip for the GOP Leadership team, Kevin serves on the House Ways & Means
Committee, considered by many to be the most powerful committee in Congress, withjurisdiction over 2/3 of the federal budget including taxes, Social Security, Medicare,international trade and welfare. As the Ranking Member on the Subcommittee on Trade and amember of the Social Security Subcommittee, Kevin fights for free market solutions to ourcountry’s economic challenges and preservation of the programs that help our seniors.
As the White House’s point man in the successful passage of the Central American Free Trade
Agreement, Kevin is excited about the thousands of new jobs that free trade has created here in
Texas.
Prior to his election in Congress, Kevin worked as a chamber of commerce executive for 18 years
and served six years in the Texas House of Representatives where he was a leader on victims’rights issues and named one of the Ten Best Legislators for Families & Children. In 1994 he wasnamed one of Five Outstanding Young Texans.
In order to stay close to the people he represents, Kevin, An original Hometown Hero of The
Woodlands is a million mile flyer with Continental Airlines. He chooses to commute to work in
Washington each week so he, and his wife, Cathy Patronella Brady, can raise their two sons, Will
(11) and Sean (7) in The Woodlands where they attend Saints Simons and Jude Catholic Church.
A Paul Harris Fellow in Rotary, Kevin is also a Distinguished Alumni of the University of South
Dakota.
ACHIEVEMENTS
Congressman Brady’s major legislative accomplishments include:• Restoring the federal sales tax deduction which saves Texas taxpayers $1 billion a year.
• Passing the Teacher Liability Protection Act that protects teachers against frivolous lawsuits
when they maintain order and discipline in the classroom.
• In the wake of 9-11, establishing a national network of university homeland security research
centers to prevent and respond to future terrorist attacks, including the center at Texas A & M.
• Helping create the Texas Institute of Genomic Research, a cutting-edge research center that will
accelerate new medical discoveries and create 5,000 new Texas jobs.
• Spearheading House efforts on Hurricane recovery in the wake of Rita and Ike.
In Congress, Kevin is recognized as the author of the bi-partisan Federal Sunset Act to abolishobsolete federal agencies and eliminate waste and duplication by placing an expiration date on− 11 −

every federal program.
A strong supporter of medical research who created the Texas Birth Defects Registry as a statelegislator, Kevin has a special interest in finding cures for rare diseases, especially Primary
Pulmonary Hypertension – for now an incurable disease that strikes young women ofchild-bearing age in growing numbers.
In Congress he has been named Hero-of-the-Taxpayers, Small Business Champion andSuper-Friend of the Seniors. He has received the Golden Bulldog Award by Watchdogs of theTreasury, special recognition by Citizens Against Government Waste, and is a perennial winner of
the Guardian of Small Business, Taxpayer Hero and Spirit of Enterprise awards.
Recently he was named Deep East Texas Legislator-of-the-Year and Outstanding Texas Political
Leader-of-the-Year.

Yoshihiro Watanabe
Mr. Yoshihiro Watanabe is Advisor of the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd. as well as
Managing Director of the Institute for International Monetary Affairs in Japan.
He also concurrently serves as Chair for the Finance and Economics Working Group of the APEC
Business Advisory Council (ABAC) as a member of Japan appointed by the Prime Minister ofJapan in 2007. Among his other external activities, Mr. Watanabe also serves as Chairman for
the Standing Committee of Japan-India Business Co-operation Committee at The Japan Chamberof Commerce & Industry.
Mr. Watanabe started his career at The Bank of Tokyo, Ltd. in 1970. After actively engaging ininternational banking in Tokyo, Hong Kong, London and Taipei, in 2005 he took up the post of
Chief Executive Officer for Asia and Oceania and the Chief Executive of Global Corporate
Banking Business Unit as Senior Managing Director.
Subsequently, Mr. Watanabe was assigned to be Chief Risk Management Officer for the
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group as Senior Managing Director of the Board until 2008.
He was a visiting lecturer at Kyoto University, Author of a book ‘Islamic Bank and Finance’ inJapanese by PHP.
Born in July 1947, Mr. Watanabe received his degree from the University of Tokyo, Faculty of
Law.

Jeffrey J. Schott
Jeffrey J. Schott joined the Peterson Institute for International Economics in 1983 and is a senior
fellow working on international trade policy and economic sanctions. During his tenure at theInstitute, Schott was also a visiting lecturer at Princeton University (1994) and an adjunct professor
at Georgetown University (1986–88). He was a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace (1982–83) and an official of the US Treasury Department (1974–82) ininternational trade and energy policy. During the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations, he
was a member of the US delegation that negotiated the GATT Subsidies Code. Since January 2003,
he has been a member of the Trade and Environment Policy Advisory Committee of the US
government. He is also a member of the Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy of
the US Department of State.
Schott is the author, coauthor, or editor of several books on trade, including Figuring Out the Doha

− 12 −

Round (2010), Reengaging Egypt: Options for US-Egypt Economic Relations (2010), Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition (2007), Trade Relations Between Colombia and the UnitedStates (2006), NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges (2005), Free Trade Agreements: US
Strategies and Priorities (2004), Prospects for Free Trade in the Americas (2001), Free Tradebetween Korea and the United States? (2001), NAFTA and the Environment: Seven Years Later(2000), The WTO After Seattle (2000), Restarting Fast Track (1998), The World Trading System:
Challenges Ahead (December 1996), The Uruguay Round: An Assessment (1994), Western
Hemisphere Economic Integration (1994), NAFTA: An Assessment (1993), North American Free
Trade: Issues and Recommendations (1992), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History andCurrent Policy (second edition, 1990), Completing the Uruguay Round (1990), Free Trade Areasand U.S. Trade Policy (1989), and The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: The Global
Impact (1988), as well as numerous articles on US trade policy and the GATT.
Schott holds a BA degree magna cum laude from Washington University, St. Louis (1971), and an
MA degree with distinction in international relations from the School of Advanced International
Studies of Johns Hopkins University (1973).

Peter A. PetriPeter A. Petri is the Carl J. Shapiro Professor of International Finance at the Brandeis International
Business School (IBS) and Senior Fellow of the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii. His
research focuses on international trade, finance and investment, primarily in the Asia Pacific. He
was founding Dean of IBS from 1994 to 2006, has held appointments at the Asian Development
Bank Institute, the Brookings Institution, Fudan University, Keio University, the OECD and theWorld Bank, and consults for numerous international organizations and governments. He serves on
the editorial boards of journals dedicated to Asia-Pacific research and is the Convener of theEast-West Dialogue. He is a member of the Board of the U.S. Asia Pacific Council and the
PAFTAD International Steering Committee, and a former Chair of the U.S. APEC Study Center
Consortium. He received A.B. and Ph.D. degrees in economics from Harvard University.

Masaru Inoue
Mr. Masaru Inoue is the Director of International Affairs of Japan Economic Foundation (JEF)
since 2003. He joined Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in 1964. Having been posted
in the Planning and Coordination Department and the Trade Fair Department for several years, he
was seconded to Japan Consulting Institute where he served as the director of Japan-Mexico Joint
Investment Promotion Project from 1979 to 1982.
After coming back to JETRO, he served as the director of various departments and divisions
which include Special Trade Fair Division and Machinery and Technology Department from1982 to 1988. He became Senior Research Fellow and Senior Coordinator for Asia region as well
as for Latin America region from 1998 to 2000. During his tenure, he joined a joint study groupfor Japan-Mexico FTA (JETRO-SECOFI) and Japan-Chile FTA (JETRO-DIRECON).
He was assigned to serve as the Director General and the Managing Director of several JETRO’s
overseas offices including JETRO Sydney from 2000 to 2002, JETRO Hong Kong from 1994 to
1998, JETRO Lima from 1988 to 1991 and JETRO Bogota from 1970 to 1974. He was also
appointed as the Director of Japan Pavilion in the Universal Exposition in Seville, Spain in 1992.
Mr. Masaru Inoue graduated from Waseda University in 1964(Bachelor of Arts in Law− 13 −

6㧚⼏੐ⷐᣦ
એਅߩⷐ⚂ߪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖ PIIE ஥ߢ૞ᚑߒߚ⧷ᢥࠨࡑ࡝࡯ࠍ๺⸶ߒߚ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬㧔ᣣᧄ⺆㧕
㨬TPP(Ⅳᄥᐔᵗᚢ⇛⊛⚻ᷣㅪ៤දቯ)ߣࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩ዁᧪㨭ႎ๔⠪㧦 PIIE ࡝ࠨ࡯࠴࡮ࠕ࠽࡝ࠬ࠻ ࠫࡘ࡝ࠕ࡮ࡒࡘ࡯ࠕ㧔Juria Muir㧕᱑ㄫ߅ࠃ߮㐿ળߩㄉC.ࡈ࡟࠶࠼࡮ࡃ࡯ࠣࠬ࠹ࡦ㧦ࡇ࡯࠲࡯࠰ࡦ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ⎇ⓥᚲᚲ㐳ߎߩࡈࠜ࡯࡜ࡓߪ‫ޔ‬࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅㧔JEF㧕ߣࡇ࡯࠲࡯࠰ࡦ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ⎇ⓥᚲ㧔PIIE㧕߇㐳ᐕ‫ޔ‬ਥߦⅣᄥᐔᵗ㑐ଥߦὶὐࠍᒰߡߡ౒௅ߒߡ߈ߚ৻ㅪߩળ⼏ߩᦨᣂߩ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬JEF ߩ⇗ጊⶪળ㐳ࠍ᱑ㄫߒߚ޿‫⇗ޕ‬ጊળ㐳ߪᣣᧄߩ⥄↱⾏ᤃදቯߩࡄࠗࠝ࠾ࠕߣߒߡᦨ߽ࠃߊ⍮ࠄࠇߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬TPP ߩ੹ᓟߦߟ
޿ߡ⹤ߒว߁ᧄᣣߩࡈࠜ࡯࡜ࡓ߳ߩෳടࠍᔃࠃࠅ᱑ㄫߔࠆ‫ޕ‬⇗ጊⶪ㧦࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅ળ㐳࿾ၞ⛔วߩ዁᧪ߦะߌߚឭ᩺ߪ 5 ઙ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬㧝㧚ᣣਛ㖧 FTA
㧞㧚ASEAN ࡊ࡜ࠬ 1 ߅ࠃ߮ ASEAN ࡊ࡜ࠬ 3㧦ASEAN10 ࠞ࿖ߣࠝ࡯ࠬ࠻࡜࡝ࠕ‫ࡦ࡜࡯ࠫ࡯ࡘ࠾ޔ‬࠼‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖‫ޔ‬㖧࿖‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ‫ߩߣ࠼ࡦࠗޔ‬㑆ߩ 10㧗㧝දቯ‫ ߮ࠃ߅ޔ‬ASEAN ߣർ᧲ࠕࠫࠕ 3 ࠞ࿖ߣߩ㑆ߩ 10㧗3 ㅪ៤දቯࠍ฽߻‫ࠕࠫࠕޔ‬ਥ૕ߩࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴
㧟㧚ASEAN ࡊ࡜ࠬ 6㧔CEPEA‫ࠕࠫࠕ᧲ޔ‬൮᜝⊛⚻ᷣㅪ៤දቯ㧕
㧦EAFTA㧔᧲ࠕࠫࠕ⥄↱⾏ᤃ࿾ၞ㧕᭴ᗐߦࠝ࡯ࠬ࠻࡜࡝ࠕ‫ࠍ࠼ࡦ࡜࡯ࠫ࡯ࡘ࠾ޔ࠼ࡦࠗޔ‬ട߃ࠆ߽ߩ
㧠㧚APEC㧔ࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ⚻ᷣදജ㧕ട⋖࿖㑆ߩ FTAAP㧔ࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ⥄↱⾏ᤃ࿤㧕㧡㧚⃻࿷ 9 ࠞ࿖߇ෳടߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP㧦ߚߛߒ‫ޔ‬ෳട࿖ߪㄭ‫ޘ‬Ⴧ߃ࠆߣߺࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆ 。
  ߎࠇࠄߩදቯߪ߶߷ߔߴߡߩ⾏ᤃࠍࠞࡃ࡯ߔࠆߪߕߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬੤ᷤߦ౉ࠆߚ߼ߩ೨ឭ᧦ઙߪߥ޿   ߽ߩߣߔߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
TPP ߳ߩෳടߪ‫ޔ‬એਅߩ 2 ߟߩℂ↱߆ࠄᣣᧄߩ೑⋉ߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬㧝㧚ߎࠇߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߣ☨࿖߇ࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗߩ࿾ၞ⛔วߣ޿߁⢛᥊ߩਛߢදቯߦෳടߔࠆ‫ޔ‬⒘᦭ߥᯏળߢ
޽ࠆ‫ߩߎޕ‬ᯏળࠍㅏߖ߫‫ޔ‬࿾ၞ FTA ߩ੹ᓟߩዷ㐿ߦ߅޿ߡ☨࿖ߩ㑐ਈ߇ᓧࠄࠇߥ޿੐ᘒࠍ᜗ߊ
ߛࠈ߁‫ޕ‬
㧞㧚⃻⁁ߢߪ‫ޔ‬TPP ෳട࿖ߪᭂ߼ߡዋᢙߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄࠍട߃ࠆߎߣߪ‫ߩࠬࡆ࡯ࠨߣ⽷ޔ‬ᄢ㊂ߩ⾏ᤃߣ޿߁ߎߣࠃࠅ߽‫ߦ߆ࠆߪޔ‬ᄢ߈ߥᗧ๧ว޿ࠍᜬߟᚢ⇛⊛ߥേ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬C.ࡈ࡟࠶࠼࡮ࡃ࡯ࠣࠬ࠹ࡦ㧦ࡇ࡯࠲࡯࠰ࡦ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ⎇ⓥᚲᚲ㐳
TPP ߩ⼏⺰ߪ‫ޔ‬ਇ቟ቯߥ਎⇇ߩࡑࠢࡠ⚻ᷣߣ޿߁⢛᥊ߩਛߢⴕࠊࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫⚻ޕ‬ᷣᚑ㐳ߣ⾏ᤃߦߟ޿ߡ
ਇㅘ᣿ᗵ߇޽ࠆߚ߼‫ޔ‬਎⇇⊛ਇဋⴧࠍᛥ೙ߔࠆߚ߼ߩᦸ߹ߒ޿࿖㓙⊛ࠪࠬ࠹ࡓࠍ⷗ߟߌࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬⾏ᤃ᡽╷߇ᨐߚߔߴ߈ᓎഀߪ㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ߪߜߚ⑳ޕ‬ౣ߮଻⼔ਥ⟵ߦ㒱ࠆߎߣߩߥ޿ࠃ߁‫↱⥄ࠅࠃޔ‬ൻ− 14 −

ߐࠇߚ⾏ᤃࠍⓍᭂ⊛ߦផㅴߒߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޕ‬TPP ߪߘߩᩮᐙㇱಽߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP ߩផㅴࠍᤚߣߔ
ࠆਥߥᩮ᜚ߪ‫ޔ‬એਅߩࠃ߁ߥ߽ߩߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
1.

TPP ߩ੤ᷤߪ‫੹ޔ‬ᓟ૗චᐕ߆ߩࠕࠫࠕߣࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩ࿾ၞ⚻ᷣ᭴ㅧࠍ⼏⺰ߔࠆ㓙ߩಽ᳓Ꭸߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬90 ᐕઍߪࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ߇㊀ⷞߐࠇߚߩߦኻߒ‫ޔ‬ㆊ෰ 10 ᐕߪࠕࠫࠕߩߺߩᚑ㐳ߣ⛔วߦᵈ⋡߇㓸߹ߞߚ‫੹ޕ‬ᓟ 10 ᐕߩᚢ⇛⊛ὶὐߪ‫߇ࠕࠫࠕޔ‬න৻ߩࠕࠫࠕ࿤ᒻᚑߦะߌߡ⁛⥄ߩ㆏ࠍᱠ߻ߩ߆‫ࠕࠫࠕߪ޿ࠆ޽ޔ‬ᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩ⛔วߦะߌߚਗⴕ⊛ߥേ߈߇↢ߓߡߊࠆߩ߆ߢ޽ࠆ‫ߎޕ‬ߩੑߟߩേ߈ߪ‫ޔ‬੕޿ߦ⋧ᚻߦขߞߡઍࠊࠆ߽ߩߢߪߥ޿‫⋧ޕ‬੕ߦ⵬ቢߒ޽߁㑐ଥߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ㅴዷߣ೙ᐲ᭴▽߇ਗⴕߔࠆߎߣࠍ᧦ઙߣߔࠆ‫ޕ‬

2.

ᰴߩὶὐߪ‫ߦ߁ࠃߩߤޔ‬ㅴ߼ࠆ߆ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP ߪ‫ࠕࠫࠕޔ‬ᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩಽᢿߦᜉゞࠍ߆ߌࠆߩߢ
ߪߥߊ‫ࠕࠫࠕޔ‬න⁛ߩขࠅ⚵ߺߣ TPP දቯߣࠍߟߥߋ᨞ߌᯅߦߥࠄߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ߚߩߘޕ‬߼ߦߪ‫ޔ‬TPP ෳട࿖ߪࠢ࡝࠹ࠖࠞ࡞࡮ࡑࠬߦ㆐ߔࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄ‫ޔ‬㖧࿖‫ߩߘߪ࠳࠽ࠞޔ‬ਛᔃ⊛ᓎഀࠍᜂ߁ߣߺࠄࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬3.

⃻࿷ߩ⑳ߚߜߩ⋡ᮡߪ‫⛔ޔ‬วߩ⷗ㅢߒࠍ⹤ߒว޿‫ޔ‬2011 ᐕߩ APEC ࡎࡁ࡞࡞㚂⣖ળ⼏߹ߢߦታ⃻ߔߴ߈᣿⏕ߥ⋡ᮡࠍ⸳ቯߔࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬࠮࠶࡚ࠪࡦΣ㧦⚻ᷣ⊛‫ޔ‬ᚢ⇛⊛⢛᥊ࠞ࡯࠻࡮ࠠࡖࡦࡌ࡞㧦☨࿖ോᰴቭ⵬㧔᧲ࠕࠫࠕ࡮ᄥᐔᵗᜂᒰ㧕‫ޟ‬Ⅳᄥᐔᵗ‫߽ࠅࠃޠ‬൮᜝⊛ߥᣂߒ޿↪⺆ࠍ૞ࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫⃻ޕ‬࿷ߩ᡽ᴦ࡮⚻ᷣ⁁ᴫࠍൊ᩺ߒߚᣂ↪⺆ߢ޽ࠆ‫ߪ࠼ࡦࠗޔ߫߃଀ޕ‬࿾ၞߦ߅޿ߡߪࠆ߆ߦᄢ߈ߥᓎഀࠍᜂ߁ࠃ߁ߦߥߞߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬Ⅳᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩኻ⹤ߦടࠊࠆߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ ߪߜߚ⑳ޕ‬TPP ߦ㑐ߒߡᣣᧄߣද⼏ࠍ㊀ߨߡ߈ߚߎߣ߆ࠄ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߩ TPP
ෳട߳ߩ㑐ᔃࠍᔃ߆ࠄ᱑ㄫߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ߣࠣࡦࡒࠗ࠲ޔߪࠇߎߦߢߔޕ‬ᚢ⇛ߩ໧㗴ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ࠕࠫࠕ߆ࠄߪ‫ߣࠕࠫࠕ᧲ޔ‬ᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߢ㊀ⷐߥേ߈߇↢ߓߡ޿ࠆߦ߽߆߆ࠊࠄߕ‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߪ⋧ᄌࠊࠄߕਛ᧲߿ධࠕࠫࠕߥߤઁߩ࿾ၞࠍᵈⷞߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ ߁޿ߣޔ‬ᔨߩჿ߇⡞ߎ߃ߡߊࠆ‫ޕ‬ᒝ⺞ߒߚ޿㊀ⷐߥὐߪ‫ޔ‬☨࿖ߪࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩ⾏ᤃ㑐ଥߦታ㓙ߦ㑐ਈߒߡ޿ࠆߣ޿߁ߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ࠕࠫࠕߩ஥ߦ┙ߜ‫ޔ‬⑳ߚߜߪᣣᧄߩฦ㑑௥ߣߩද⼏ࠍ฽߻ᄖ੤ߦᵈജߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߪߜߚ⑳ߚ߹ޕ‬㖧࿖‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖‫ޔࠕࠪ࡯࡟ࡑޔ‬ࠝ࡯ࠬ࠻࡜࡝ࠕ‫☨ޔࠕ࠾ࠡ࡯ࡘ࠾࡮ࠕࡊࡄޔࠕࠫࡏࡦࠞޔ߆߶ߩ࠼ࡦ࡜࡯ࠫ࡯ࡘ࠾ޔ‬࿖㗔ࠨࡕࠕߣߩ
ࡂࠗ࡟ࡌ࡞ળวߦ߽㑐ࠊߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬☨࿖ߪߎߩ࿾ၞߢࠃࠅജ㊂ࠍ⊒ើߒߡ޿ߊᔅⷐᕈࠍ⹺⼂ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ߎࠇߪ┹੎‫ޔࡦ࡚ࠪ࡯ࡌࡁࠗޔ‬ථ⿧ᕈߦኻߔࠆ☨࿖ߩᗧ᰼ߦ⌕⋡ߒߚ‫ޔ‬㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ⿥ౄᵷߩ⋡ᮡߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
2011 ᐕߪ࿾ၞ߳ߩ⚻ᷣ⊛ߥ㑐ਈߦ߅޿ߡᦨ߽㊀ⷐߥᤨᦼߦߥࠆߛࠈ߁‫ޕ‬
TPP ߪ‫ࠆߥࠄߐޔ‬ෳട࿖ߩขࠅㄟߺߦ㑐ߒߡᄢ߈ߥ㑐ᔃߣ⼏⺰ࠍ๭ࠎߢ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᰴߩࠬ࠹࠶ࡊߪߘߩᬌ
⸛⺖㗴ߦ㓸ਛߒ‫ޔ‬೙ᐲࠍ⛔৻ߐߖࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬21 ਎♿ဳදቯߩߚ߼ߩၮḰࠍ⸳ቯߔࠆߎߣ߇ਇนᰳ
ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬APEC ߪ‫ࠕࠫࠕߥ߹ߑ߹ߐޔ‬ᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩขࠅ⚵ߺߩ‫ߒߣޠࡓ࠹ࠬࠪ࡮ࠣࡦࠖ࠹࡯࡟ࡍࠝޟ‬ߡᯏ⢻ߔࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ‫ޕ‬11 ᦬ߩળ⼏ߪ೨ㅴߩߚ߼ߩᦨ㜞ߩᯏળߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬㚂⣖ࠄߪߘߩߚ߼ߩ᣿⏕ߥ⋡ᮡࠍ⸳ቯߒߚ‫ޕ‬ዊፉ᣿㧦ᣣᧄ⚻ᷣ⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯⎇ⓥ㘈໧᧲ࠕࠫࠕߪ‫ޔ‬࿾ၞ⛔วߩࡊࡠ࠮ࠬߢߪᓟ⊒ߢ޽ߞߚ‫ᦨޕ‬ㄭ߹ߢ‫ޔ‬FTA ߽࿾ၞ೙ᐲ߽௖߆ߒ߆ߥ߆ߞߚ‫ޕ‬− 15 −

1997 ᐕߩࠕࠫࠕㅢ⽻ෂᯏߪ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ࠍ฽߻ࠕࠫࠕ⚻ᷣߦᄢ߈ߥ⼊㏹ࠍ㡆ࠄߒߚ‫ޕ‬ෂᯏߩⷙᮨ߿ᷓೞߐ‫ޔ‬㨬ࠕࠫࠕߛߌෂᯏ㨭ߩᕈᩰߪ‫ޔ‬᰷☨߇ోߊᡰេߩᚻࠍߐߒߩߴߥ߆ߞߚߎߣ߽޽ࠅ‫ߦࠕࠫࠕޔ‬࿾ၞߩㅪ៤ᒝൻߩᔅⷐᕈࠍ⹺⼂ߐߖߚ‫(ࠕࠫࠕ᧲ޕ‬ASEAN ࠍ฽߻)ߪ‫ޔ‬ᶏᄖ⋥ធᛩ⾗‫ޔ‬㊄ⲢᏒ႐‫ޔ‬࿖㓙⾏ᤃࠍㅢߓߡ⚻ᷣ⊛ߥ⛔ว߇ᦝߦㅴࠎߢ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬APEC ߪ‫ߩߘޔ‬዁᧪ߩᣇะᕈࠍ⠨߃ࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬FTAAP ߳ߩน⢻ߥ㆏╭‫ޔ‬዁᧪ߩᚑ㐳‫ޔ‬‫࡞࡯ࠧࡏޟ‬⋡ᮡ‫ߩޠ‬㆐ᚑߢ޽ࠆ‫ޔߪߢ⁁⃻ޕ‬APEC ട⋖࿖㑆ߢ⛔วߣ⾏ᤃߪᐔ╬ߦ౒᦭ߐࠇߡ޿ߥ޿‫ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬໧㗴ߪ‫੹ޔ‬ᐕߩ APEC ⎇ⓥ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ࠦࡦ࠰࡯ࠪࠕࡓળ⼏㧔APEC Study Centers Consortium
Conference㧕ߢ⹤ߒวࠊࠇߚ‫ޕ‬ឭ᩺ߪએਅߩࠃ߁ߥౝኈߛߞߚ‫ޕ‬
࡮ FTAAP ߪᴺ⊛᜔᧤ജࠍ᦭ߒ‫ޔ‬਎⇇⾏ᤃᯏ㑐㧔WTO㧕ߣ⍦⋫ߖߕ‫ߟ߆ޔ‬Ⅳᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩෳട࿖ࠍ
฽߻㜞᳓Ḱߥදቯߢߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޕ‬࡮ ᚑ㐳ߩᬌ⸛⺖㗴ߪ‫ޔ‬㕟ᣂ⊛‫ޔ‬ᜬ⛯น⢻‫ޔ‬൮᜝⊛ߢ‫ޕࠆ޽ߢ߈ߴࠆ޿ߡࠇߣ߇ࠬࡦ࡜ࡃޔ‬࡮ ࡏࠧ࡯࡞⋡ᮡߩ㆐ᚑߪ㐿⊒ࠍᒝൻߒ‫ޔ‬APEC ోട⋖࿖ߩ೨ㅴࠍᡰ߃ࠆ൮᜝⊛ߥᚢ⇛ࠍ฽ࠎߢ޿ߥ
ߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޕ‬
TPP ࠍᡰ߃ࠆ࿾᡽ቇ⊛ⷐ࿃ߦߪ‫⁛ޔ‬ᢿኾⴕࠍᒝ߼ࠆਛ࿖ߩᓎഀߣ‫ߩߎޔ‬࿾ၞߢ☨࿖ߩᓇ㗀ജ߇ᒝ߹ࠆ
ߎߣ߳ߩࠕࠫࠕ⻉࿖ߩᦼᓙ߇฽߹ࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP ߩ᜛ᄢࡍ࡯ࠬ‫ߩߘޔ‬ᒝജߥࠗࡔ࡯ࠫߣෳട࿖ߩ㗻߱ࠇ߽ⷐ࿃ߣߥࠆ‫⛔ߩࠕࠫࠕߕ߹ޕ‬ว߆‫ ߪ޿ࠆ޽ޔ‬TPP ߇వ߆ߣ޿߁ࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ߩ㆑޿ߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ࠇߘޔ‬ߙࠇ೑ὐ‫ޔ‬ᰳὐ߽޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬㖧࿖ߣᣣᧄߣߢߪଐὼ⇣ߥߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬TPP ߪ⛔วߩ‫ ߡߒߘޔ‬FTAAP߳ߩ㆏╭ߩ㊀ⷐߥ৻ㇱߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬࠳࠾ࠛ࡞࡮ࡊ࡜ࠗࠬ㧦ࠪ࠼࡝࡯ࠝ࡯ࠬ࠹ࠖࡦᴺᓞ੐ോᚲࠪ࠾ࠕ࡮ࡄ࡯࠻࠽࡯
TPP ߣ☨࿖‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ‫ޔ‬APEC ߦߟ޿ߡߪ 3 ߟߩ㊀ⷐߥࡐࠗࡦ࠻߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP ߳ߩ㑐ਈߪ☨࿖ߦߣߞߡ‫ޔ‬
એਅߩℂ↱߆ࠄᭂ߼ߡ㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬1.

☨࿖ߪ⾏ᤃߣ⛔วߦᾲᔃߦขࠅ⚵ࠎߢ޿ߥ޿ߣ޿߁ࠗࡔ࡯ࠫࠍᛄ᜞ߔࠆߎߣ‫ޕ‬TPP ߣ☨㖧⥄↱⾏ᤃදቯ㧔☨㖧 FTA㧕ߪߎߩᗧ๧ߢᭂ߼ߡ㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬

2.

ߎߩ࿾ၞߢߪᏒ႐⛔วࠍ⿥߃ߚ☨࿖ߩ࡝࡯࠳࡯ࠪ࠶ࡊ߇᳞߼ࠄࠇߡ޿ࠆߣ޿߁⷗ᣇࠍᒝ߼ࠆߎ
ߣ‫ޕ‬

3.

☨࿖ߪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖࡮ࠕࠫࠕ㑐ଥߩၮゲߢ޽ࠆ⾏ᤃߣᛩ⾗ߩ⥄↱ൻߦⓍᭂ⊛ߦ㑐ਈߒߡ޿ࠆߎߣࠍ␜ߔ
ߎߣ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄߦߣߞߡߪ‫ޔ‬એਅߩℂ↱߆ࠄᭂ߼ߡ㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮ ੹ߢߥߌࠇ߫‫߆ߩߥߟ޿ޔ‬㧫 TPP ߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ߇☨࿖ߣߩ൮᜝⊛ߥ⾏ᤃදቯߦਸ਼ࠅ಴ߔߚ߼ߩ᡽ᴦ
⊛ߥᯏળߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮ ☨࿖ߪᣣᧄߦ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ߇࿖ౝᏒ႐ࠍ㐿᡼ߒ⼑ᱠߔࠆ↪ᗧ߇޽ࠆߣ޿߁⏕ታߥ଻⸽ࠍ᳞߼ࠆߴ߈ߢ޽
ࠆ‫☨ޕ‬࿖ߪᒻᑼ⊛ߥෳട᧦ઙࠍ⸳ߌࠆߴ߈ߢߪߥ޿‫ޕ‬APEC ട⋖࿖ߦߣߞߡߪ‫ޔ‬એਅߩℂ↱߆ࠄᭂ߼ߡ㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮ TPP ߪ‫ޔ‬APEC ࠍ㊀ⷐߥ੤ᷤߩ႐ߣߒߡౣ↢ߐߖ‫ޔ‬ᣂߒ޿ᣇะᕈࠍਈ߃ࠆᯏળߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮ TPP ߪ‫ޔ‬APEC ߇⸒⪲એ਄ߦᧄ᳇ߢ FTAAP ߦ㑐ਈߔࠆߣߩ⷗ㅢߒࠍᛴ߆ߖࠆ‫ޕ‬− 16 −

ࡄࡀ࡞࡮࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦAPEC ߩࡠ࡯࠼ࡑ࠶ࡊ‫ޔ‬዁᧪ߩታ❣߅ࠃ߮ࠕࠫࠕ⻉࿖ߣߩ㑐ଥ᜛ᄢߦߟ޿ߡߩ⾰໧ߪ‫⼏ߥࡦࡊ࡯ࠝޔ‬⺰ߩߚ߼ߦ߽ߞߣᤨ㑆ࠍ߆ߌߚ޿ߣ޿߁ࠕࠫࠕ⻉࿖ߩᏗᦸ‫⺖߮ࠃ߅ޔ‬㗴ߦ㑐ਈߔࠆߚ߼ߩ⢻ജߦ㓸ਛߒߚ‫ޕ‬G20 ߪ‫ߩࠕࠫࠕޔ‬೙ᐲ⊛⢻ജߣ޿߁ὐߢߎࠇߦਥⷐߥᓎഀࠍᨐߚߔߣߺࠄࠇࠆ‫☨ߩ߳ࠕࠫࠕޕ‬࿖ߩ㑐ਈߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫࡞ࡌࡦࡖࠠ࡮࠻࡯ࠞޔ‬᳁߇☨࿖ߪᱜߒ޿ᣇะߦะ߆ߞߡ޿ࠆߣᒝ⺞ߒߚ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄߩ੤ᷤෳടߦߟ޿ߡߩ⼏⺰ߪ‫⋧ࠆ޿ߡࠇࠊⴕߦߢߔޔ‬ᒰ㊂ߩද⼏߇ਛᔃߛߞߚ‫⋡ޕ‬ਅߩ⺖㗴ߪ࠲ࠗࡒࡦࠣߣᣇᴺ⺰ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ೋ߼ߡ‫ޔ‬᳃ਥౄߪㄘᬺᡷ㕟ߦߟ޿ߡ㐿߆ࠇߚ⼏⺰ࠍᆎ߼ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ㄘᬺߩ┹੎ജࠍ㜞߼ࠆ⥄↱ൻߣ᡽╷ᡷ㕟ߩ␠ળ⊛ࡔ࡝࠶࠻ߦߟ޿ߡ‫ޔ‬㑐ଥฦᣇ㕙ߣߩ‫ޔ‬ᓢ‫ߥ⊛⛯⛮߇ߛߦޘ‬ද⼏߇ⴕࠊࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄ᡽ᐭߦᡷ㕟ߩ↪ᗧ߇޽ࠆࠃ߁ߦߺ߃ࠆߚ߼‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ߇ᡷ㕟ߦะߌߡേ
޿ߡ޿ࠆߎߣࠍ☨࿖߇ℂ⸃ߒᅑബߒߡ޿ࠆߣߩࡔ࠶࠮࡯ࠫࠍᣣᧄ஥ߦㅍࠆߎߣ߇㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬࠮࠶࡚ࠪࡦΤ㧦TPP(Ⅳᄥᐔᵗᚢ⇛⊛⚻ᷣㅪ៤දቯ)ߩ᭴ᗐ㧦ౝኈߣෳട࿖
⼾↰ᱜ๺㧦ᣣᧄࠛࡀ࡞ࠡ࡯⚻ᷣ⎇ⓥᚲ
TPP ߪ‫ޔ‬APEC ࠍ FTAAP ߣߔࠆὑߩㄭ㆏‫ޕ‬TPP ߦߪ‫ޔ‬਎⇇߇⋥㕙ߔࠆ⺖㗴ߩ⸃᳿ߦ⽸₂ߔࠆജࠍᜬߟน⢻ᕈ߇޽ࠆ߇‫ޔߪߦ߼ߚߩߘޔ‬ᣣᧄߩෳടߪਇนᰳߢ޽ࠅ‫⚿ޔ‬ᨐߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬APEC ߩᵴᕈൻߦᓎ┙ߟ‫ޕ‬
TPP ߩᓎഀߣ੹ᓟߩ⺖㗴㧦࡮਎⇇ߪ‫ޔ੹ޔ‬ਃߟߩ⺖㗴ߦ⋥㕙‫ޔߦ৻╙ޕ‬਎⇇⊛ߥ⚻ᷣෂᯏ߆ࠄߩ⣕ළ‫╙ޔ‬ੑߦ‫ࡦ࠙࡜࡮ࡂ࡯࠼ޔ‬࠼ߩⴕ߈⹣߹ࠅ‫╙ޔ‬ਃߦ‫ޔ‬᳇୥ᄌേᨒ⚵ߺ੤ᷤߩ஗ṛ‫ޕ‬
࡮TPP ߦߪ‫ߩࠄࠇߎޔ‬ਃߟߩࠣࡠ࡯ࡃ࡞ߥ⺖㗴ߩ⸃᳿ߦ⽸₂ߔࠆน⢻ᕈ߇޽ࠆ߇‫ޔߪߦ߼ߚߩߘޔ‬ㆡಾߥෳട࿖ߣㆡಾߥ੤ᷤ▸࿐߇㊀ⷐ‫ޕ‬࡮੤ᷤߩ▸࿐ߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ޔ‬㑐⒢᠗ᑄߩ߶߆‫ޔࠬࡆ࡯ࠨޔ‬᡽ᐭ⺞㆐‫ޔ‬ᛩ⾗‫┹ޔ‬੎‫ޔߪߦᦝޔ‬ഭ௛࡮ⅣႺ‫ޔ‬ਛዊડᬺ╬㧞㧠ߩ૞ᬺㇱળ߇޽ࠆߣ⡞޿ߡ߅ࠅ‫ޔ‬
21 ਎♿ߩ Golden Rule ߟߊࠅߣ޿ߞߡࠃ޿߽ߩ‫ޕ‬ߎࠇ߇ߢ߈ࠆߥࠄ‫ࡂ࡯࠼ޔ‬੤ᷤߩ⦟޿ೝỗߦߥࠆߒ‫ޔ‬᳇୥ᄌേᨒ⚵ߺ੤ᷤߦ߽ᅢᓇ㗀ࠍਈ߃߁ࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮৻ᣇ‫ޔ‬ෳട࿖ߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ߪߢ߹߹ߩ੹ޔ‬ਇචಽ‫ޕ‬ዊ࿖߇ᄢඨߛ߆ࠄߛ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄ߿‫ޔߤߥ࠳࠽ࠞޔ‬੤ᷤߦ㑐ᔃߩ޽ࠆᄢ߈ߥ࿖ࠍ౉ࠇࠆߴ߈ߛ‫⚻ޔ߫ࠇߔ߁ߘޕ‬ᷣലᨐ߽ᄢ߈ߊ‫ޔ‬వߩ਎⇇߇⋥㕙ߔࠆ 3 ߟߩ⺖㗴ߦᔕ߃߁ࠆ߽ߩߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮ߐࠄߦ‫ޔ‬TPP ߇‫ޔ‬APEC ࠍᵴᕈൻߒ‫ޔ‬FTAAP ߩታ⃻ߦߟߥߍࠆߎߣߦߥࠅ‫⚿ޔ‬ᨐߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬APEC߇‫ޔ‬਎⇇ߩਃᄢ⺖㗴ߩ⸃᳿ߦ⽸₂ߔࠆ߽ߩߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄ߇೨ߦㅴ߻ߚ߼ߩ⺖㗴㧦࡮ᣣᧄߪ‫⃻ޔ‬࿷⌀೶ߦ੤ᷤෳടߦߟ޿ߡᬌ⸛ਛ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄ߇ߔߴߡߩ⺖㗴ࠍ᧍਄ߦਸ਼ߖࠆ↪ᗧ߇޽ࠆߣ್
ᢿߒߚ႐วߦߪ‫ޔ‬㑐ଥ࿖ߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߩෳടࠍ᱑ㄫߒߡߊࠇࠆ߽ߩߣᦼᓙ‫☨ޕ‬࿖ߩ৻ㇱߦߪ‫ޔ‬BSE ߿ㇷ᡽ᡷ㕟ߥߤߩᣣ☨ੑ࿖㑆໧㗴ߩ⸃᳿ࠍෳടߩ೨ឭߦߔࠆߴ߈ߣߩᗧ⷗߇޽ࠆࠃ߁ߛ߇‫☨ޔ‬᡽ᮭߣߒߡߪ‫╭ߥ߁ࠃߩߘޔ‬㆑޿ߩ⠨߃ࠍߣࠄߥ޿ߎߣࠍᦼᓙ‫ޕ‬− 17 −

ࡃ࡯ࡃ࡜࡮ࡢࠗ࠯࡞㧦☨ㅢ໡ઍ⴫ㇱ᧲ධࠕࠫࠕ࡮ᄥᐔᵗᜂᒰઍ⴫⵬
TPP ߪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߢ߽਎⇇ߢ߽㔍ߒ޿ⅣႺਅߢ૞ᬺ߇ⴕࠊࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫☨ޕ‬࿖ߪ⼏ળߣㅪ៤ߒ‫ߣߩߢ߹ࠇߎޔ‬ߎࠈ☨࿖ߩෳടࠍᡰᜬߒߡ޿ࠆࠬ࠹࡯ࠢࡎ࡞࠳࡯߳ߩ௛߈߆ߌࠍᆎ߼ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߪߜߚ⑳ޕ‬TPP ߩࡔ࡝࠶࠻ߦߟ޿ߡᓢ‫߇ࠬࠨࡦ࠮ࡦࠦߦޘ‬ᓧࠄࠇࠆߣߩ⥄ାࠍᜬߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬☨࿖߅ࠃ߮ TPP ෳട࿖ߦߪ 3 ߟߩਥߥ⚻ᷣ⊛⋡ᮡ߇޽ࠆ㧦࡮ ࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞో૕ߢ⾏ᤃࠍ᜛ᄢߔࠆ
࡮ 21 ਎♿ဳ⾏ᤃදቯࠍ੤ᷤߔࠆ
࡮ FTAAP ߳ߩ㆏╭ࠍߟߌࠆ⾏ᤃߩ᜛ᄢߦߟ޿ߡ㧦࡮ ⑳ߚߜߪ‫ޔ‬ᒰ੐⠪㑆ߩ޽ࠄࠁࠆ⾏ᤃ߅ࠃ߮⾏ᤃ㑐ㅪߩ໡ᬺߩߚ߼ߩ߹ߣ߹ߞߚ࡞࡯࡞ࠍ஻߃ߚ࿾
ၞදቯࠍ╷ቯߒࠃ߁ߣߒߡ޿ࠆ‫⃻ޕ‬࿷‫ޔ‬੤ᷤਛߩ 9 ࠞ࿖ߪ‫⋡ߩߎޔ‬ᮡߦోജߢขࠅ⚵ࠎߢ޿ࠆ᦭
ᔒㅪวߢ޽ࠆ‫⋡ޕ‬ᮡߪ‫ޔ‬਎⇇⊛ߥ㊄Ⲣෂᯏࠍฃߌߡ✕ᕆᕈ߇㜞߹ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮ ฦ࿖ߩ෻⊒ߪ⹺⼂ߒߥ߇ࠄ߽‫‛ޔ‬ຠߩᏒ႐ࠕࠢ࠮ࠬߦࡏ࠻ࡓࠕ࠶ࡊ࡮ࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ࠍ૶↪ߔࠆߎߣߪวᗧߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬
21 ਎♿ဳදቯߦߟ޿ߡ㧦࡮ 㜞᳓Ḱߩදቯߣߒߡ‫ᦨߪߜߚ⑳ޔ‬ዊ౏୚ᢙߢߪߥߊ‫ᦨޔ‬ᄢ౏⚂ᢙࠍ੤ᷤߒߚ޿ߣ⠨߃ߡ޿ࠆ‫ߟޕ‬߹ࠅ‫⋥߇ࠬࡀࠫࡆޔ‬㕙ߔࠆᣂߒ޿⺖㗴ߦขࠅ⚵߻ߣ޿߁ߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫⃻ޔߪߜߚ⑳ޕ‬࿷ขࠅ⚵ࠎߢ޿ࠆ৻ㅪߩᮮᢿ⊛⺖㗴ࠍ․ቯߒߚ߇‫ߪࠄࠇߎޔ‬ㆊ෰ߩ FTA ߦߪ฽߹ࠇߡ޿ߥ߆ߞߚ‫⺖ߚߒ߁ߎޕ‬㗴ߦߪ‫ߦ․ޔ‬એਅߩࠃ߁ߥ߽ߩ߇฽߹ࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬1.

ⷙ೙ߩ⛔৻㧦㕖㑐⒢㓚ოࠍ᠗ᑄߔࠆߚ߼ߩࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ࠍ㐿⊒ߔࠆ‫ޕ‬㕖㑐⒢㓚ოߪ‫ޔ‬ᶏᄖᏒ႐ߦෳ
౉ߒࠃ߁ߣߒߡ޿ࠆડᬺߦߣߞߡᓥ᧪ߩ㑐⒢ࠃࠅᄢ߈ߥ໧㗴ߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆ

2.

ౕ૕⊛ߥ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯೎ࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴㧦⋡ᮡߪ‫ޔ‬TPP ࠍᵴ↪ߒߡਇᔅⷐߥⷙ೙਄ߩ㓚ოࠍ᠗ᑄߒ‫ࠅࠃޔ‬ኈᤃߢ‫ޔ‬න⚐ߢ‫ޔ‬ૐࠦࠬ࠻ߩ੐ᬺዷ㐿߇ߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁ߦߔࠆߎߣ‫ޕ‬

3.

┹੎ജߣធ⛯ᕈߩ໧㗴㧦ࠦࠬ࠻ૐᷫ‫ߩࡦ࡯ࠚ࠴ࠗ࡜ࡊࠨޔ‬᜛ల‫ޔ‬࿖ౝߩᴺᓞⅣႺߩᡷༀߦะߌߚ
ද⺞⊛ߥขࠅ⚵ߺࠍ฽߻‫ޕ‬

4.

ਛዊડᬺߩଦㅴ㧦ਛዊડᬺ߇↥ᬺ⇇ߩㆊඨࠍභ߼ࠆ☨࿖ߦߣߞߡߪఝవ⺖㗴ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬໧㗴ߪ‫ߤޔ‬ߩࠃ߁ߦ⾏ᤃࠍଦㅴߒ‫ޔ‬㓚ოࠍឃ㒰ߒ‫ޔ‬ㅘ᣿ᕈ߳ߩขࠅ⚵ߺࠍផㅴߔࠆᣇᴺࠍ⷗ߟߌࠆ߆ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬5.

㐿⊒໧㗴㧦⑳ߚߜߪ‫ޔ‬࿾ℂ߿⊒ዷߩᐲว޿߇ߐ߹ߑ߹ߥ࿖‫ࠍޘ‬ขࠅㄟߺ‫ޔ‬㜞᳓Ḱߥදቯߦቢోෳ
ടߐߖࠃ߁ߣദ߼ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ὶὐߪࠠࡖࡄࠪ࠹ࠖ࡮ࡆ࡞࠺ࠖࡦࠣ㧔⢻ജᒝൻ㧕ߣᛛⴚᡰេߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬

6.

ߎࠇࠄߩ⺖㗴ߦ㑐ߔࠆ⤘ᄢߥ૞ᬺߪ‫ޔ‬ㆊ෰ 20 ᐕߦࠊߚߞߡ APEC ߇ⴕߞߡ߈ߚ‫ߜߚ⑳ߪࠇߎޕ‬ߩขࠅ⚵ߺߦߣߞߡ㕖Ᏹߦ㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠅ‫੹ߪߜߚ⑳ޔ‬ᓟ߽ APEC ߣߩ✕ኒߥㅪ៤ࠍ⛯ߌߡ޿ߊ‫ޕ‬

FTAAP ߳ߩ㆏╭ߦߟ޿ߡ㧦࡮ ⋡ᮡߪ‫ޔ‬TPP ࠍ᜛ᄢߩࡊ࡜࠶࠻ࡈࠜ࡯ࡓߣߒߡᵴ↪ߒ‫ࠕࠫࠕޔ‬ᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩ࿖‫ࠍޘ‬ขࠅㄟࠎߢᒰ
ೋࠣ࡞࡯ࡊࠍ᜛ᄢߒߡ޿ߊߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ߩࠕࠪ࡯࡟ࡑޕ‬ขࠅㄟߺᚑഞߢ‫ޔ‬TPP ߇੤ᷤࡊࡠ࠮ࠬߩਛ
ߢઁߩ࿖ࠍჇ߿ߒߡ޿ߌࠆߎߣ߇┙⸽ߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬㑐ᔃࠍᜬߟઁߩ࿖ߪ‫ޔ‬ෳടߩ೨ߦදቯߩၮḰࠍḩߚߔᘒ൓ࠍᢛ߃ࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬− 18 −

࡮ TPP ߪ‫ޔ‬᜛ᄢߩࡊ࡜࠶࠻ࡈࠜ࡯ࡓߣߒߡߩᓎഀࠍᨐߚߔ‫ߚ߈↢ޔ‬දቯߦߥࠆߣߺࠄࠇࠆ‫ߦࠇߘޕ‬ߪ‫ޔ‬ᣂߒ޿⺖㗴ߣෳട࿖ࠍ෻ᤋߒߥ߇ࠄදቯߩౝኈࠍ᜛లߒߡ޿ߊߚ߼ߩⷙቯ߇฽߹ࠇࠆߛࠈ߁‫ޕ‬੹ᓟߩ⺖㗴ߪ 9 ࠞ࿖㑆ߩදቯ੤ᷤࠍᚑഞߐߖ‫ޔ‬᜛ᄢࠣ࡞࡯ࡊߣߩ੤ᷤࠍߤߩࠃ߁ߦㅴ߼ࠆ߆ࠍ⹣߼ࠆ
ߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ฦ࿖ߪၮḰࠍḩߚߔࠃ߁ਁోߩᘒ൓ࠍߣࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬දቯ✦⚿ߦ߹ߢᜬߜㄟ߼ߥ޿႐
วߦߪෳടߔߴ߈ߢߥ޿‫ޕ‬2011 ᐕߪ 5 ࿁ߩ TPP ੤ᷤ߇੍ቯߐࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ࡑ࡯ࠢ࡮ࠪࡦࠢ࡟ࠕ㧦࠾ࡘ࡯ࠫ࡯࡜ࡦ࠼ᄖോ⾏ᤃ⋭ TPP ਥᏨ੤ᷤᜂᒰ⠪࠾ࡘ࡯ࠫ࡯࡜ࡦ࠼ࠍ฽߻ 4 ࠞ࿖߇✦⚿ߒߚ TPP㧔ࡄࠪࡈࠖ࠶ࠢ࡮ࡈࠜ࡯‫ޔ‬P4㧕ߪ㐳ᦼࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻
ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬APEC ߆ࠄ಴⊒ߒߚ࿾ၞߩขࠅ⚵ߺߛߞߚ‫ޕ‬P4 ߪ‫ޔ‬Ꮢ႐ߩᵴᕈൻ‫ޔ‬໡ᬺߩ┹੎ജᒝൻ‫ઁޔ‬ߩ APEC ട⋖࿖߳ߩෳടߩ๭߮߆ߌࠍ᣿⏕ߦ⻭ߞߡ޿ߚ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬ⅣႺ‫ޔࡓࠦ࡟࠹ޔ‬ഭ௛ജߣ޿ߞߚᣂ
ߒ޿⺖㗴߽⚵ߺㄟࠎߢ޿ߚ‫ޕ‬P4 ߪࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩࡕ࠺࡞ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ẜ࿷⊛ߦᣂߚߥෳട࿖ࠍ₪ᓧߔࠆ߽ߩߣߐࠇߡ޿ߚ‫ ߇ࠇߘޕ‬TPP ߩഃ⸳ࠍㅢߓߡታ⃻ߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬ᰴߩࠬ࠹࠶ࡊߪ⃻࿷ߩෳട࿖ࠍ〯߹߃‫ޔ‬࿾ၞ⛔วߩࡊ࡜࠶࠻ࡈࠜ࡯ࡓߣߒߡߤߩࠃ߁ߦᯏ⢻ߐߖࠆ߆ࠍ᳿߼ࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬⥄↱ൻߣ࿾ၞ⛔วߪ TPP ߩᬌ⸛⺖㗴ߩਛᔃߢ޽ࠆ‫⋡ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬ᮡࠍ㆐ᚑߔࠆߚ߼‫ޔ‬ෳട࿖ߪ੹ᓟߩ
㆏╭ࠍࠃߊᬌ⸛ߔࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮ TPP ട⋖࿖㧦ࠃࠅᄢ߈ߥࠣ࡞࡯ࡊ߇ᦸ߹ߒ޿ߩ߆㧫 TPP ߦߪ FTAAP ഃ⸳ߣ޿߁ᦨ⚳⋡ᮡ߇޽ࠆߚ߼‫ޔ‬᜛ᄢࠍ೨ឭߦߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ߚߒ߁ߘޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬ᄙᢙߩෳട࿖㑆ߢߩㅴዷߪ㧔࠼࡯ࡂߩࠃ߁ߦ㧕ኈᤃߢߥ޿ߚ߼‫ޔ‬ᒰೋߪዋᢙߩ࿖‫ߢޘ‬಴⊒ߒ‫᧪ޔ‬ᐕ߹ߢߦ੤ᷤࠍߣࠅ߹ߣ߼ࠆߣ޿߁ߩ߇ᅷᒰߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮ ⃻࿷ߩ੤ᷤෳട࿖ߪߔߴߡࡂࠗ࡟ࡌ࡞ߥදቯࠍ੤ᷤߒߡ޿ࠆߚ߼‫ߩࠄ߆ࡠ࠯ޔ‬಴⊒ߢߪߥ޿‫੹ޕ‬ᓟߩ㆏╭ߪ೙ᓮน⢻ߥࠣ࡞࡯ࡊߢ಴⊒ߒ‫ࠄ߆ߎߘޔ‬᜛ᄢߒߡ޿ߊ‫ߩࠄ߆ࡊ࡯࡞ࠣⴕ⃻ޕ‬᜛ᄢߪᲧセ⊛ㅦ޿ࡍ࡯ࠬߢㅴ߻ߪߕߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮ දቯߩ⸳⸘㧦¾

TPP ߪ‫ⶄޔ‬ᢙᏒ႐ߢ੐ᬺዷ㐿ߒߡ޿ࠆડᬺ‫ߦ․ޔ‬ਛዊડᬺߩ㓚ኂߣߥߞߡ޿ࠆⷙ೙㑐ㅪߩ⻉⚻⾌߿ᓎᚲ⊛ߥᚻ⛯߈ߩ೥ᷫࠍ߼ߑߔߎߣߦߥࠆ‫ޕ‬¾

P4 ߩᨒ⚵ߺߪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߩ FTA ߩࡕ࠺࡞ߦᄢ߈ߊଐሽߒߡ޿ߚ㧔଀߃߫‫ࠖ࠹ࠟࡀߩࠬࡆ࡯ࠨޔ‬ࡉ࡮࡝ࠬ࠻ࠍ೑↪ߔࠆ㧕‫ޕ‬TPP ߽‫ߥ߹ߑ߹ߐޔ‬දቯߩࡌࠬ࠻࡮ࡊ࡜ࠢ࠹ࠖࠬ㧔ᦨༀᘠⴕ଀㧕ࠍᵴ↪ߒߥ߇ࠄߎߩࡕ࠺࡞ߦᓥ߁ߎߣߦߥࠆ‫ޕ‬ࡄࡀ࡞࡮࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ㧦⃻࿷ߩ 9 ࠞ࿖ߩਛߢߪ⇣⦡ߩሽ࿷ߢ޽ࠆࡌ࠻࠽ࡓߦߟ޿ߡ‫ޔߚ߹ޔ‬ห࿖߇ߤߩࠃ߁ߦදቯߦㆡวߔࠆ
߆ߦߟ޿ߡ⼏⺰߇޽ߞߚ‫ޔࠕ࡝࡜࠻ࠬ࡯ࠝޔ࠼ࡦ࡜࡯ࠫ࡯ࡘ࠾ޔߪࡓ࠽࠻ࡌޕ‬ASEAN ⻉࿖ߣ㜞᳓Ḱߩ FTA ࠍታ⃻ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬දቯߪᏒ႐ࠕࠢ࠮ࠬ‫ޔ‬㑐⒢᠗ᑄ‫ޔ‬ㄭઍ⊛ߥේ↥࿾ⷙ೙߳ߩࠦࡒ࠶
࠻ࡔࡦ࠻ࠍ฽ࠎߢ߅ࠅ‫ߪࡓ࠽࠻ࡌޔ߇ࠇߘޔ‬੤ᷤߦෳടߢ߈ࠆߪߕߣߩା㗬ᗵߦߟߥ߇ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ߔߢߦሽ࿷ߔࠆ FTA ߩ࿾૏ߦߟ޿ߡ‫ޔߪ࡞ࡀࡄޔ‬ᣢሽߩදቯߪᣂߒ޿ TPP ߣਗሽߔࠆߎߣߦߥࠆߣ
࿁╵ߒߚ‫ߪࠇߎޕ‬ฦ࿖᡽ᐭߦᨵエᕈࠍਈ߃ࠆߣߺࠄࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬೑ኂ߇⋧෻ߔࠆಽ㊁߇޽ࠇ߫‫⺖ޔ‬㗴ߏߣߩኻᔕ߇ߥߐࠇࠃ߁‫ޕ‬− 19 −

᜛ᄢߦ㑐ߔࠆ໧㗴ߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣ⊛ߥᓇ㗀ജࠍᒝ߼ߡ޿ࠆㅊടෳട࿖㑆ߩ✕ᒛ㑐ଥ‫ޔ‬㜞޿᳓Ḱߩදቯࠍၷᜬߔࠆߣ޿߁ⷰὐ߆ࠄ⼏⺰߇ߥߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬੤ᷤᜂᒰ⠪ߪ‫ޔ‬ᣂߚߥෳട࿖߇දቯߩᩭᔃㇱಽߢቯ߼ࠄࠇߚ᳓Ḱࠍḩߚߔߎߣߦหᗧߔࠆߣᦼᓙߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᓐࠄߪ‫ޔ‬ᣂⷙෳട࿖߇ട⋖ߒ߿ߔ޿ࠃ߁ߦ᳓Ḱࠍਅߍࠆߎߣࠍᦸࠎߢ޿ߥ޿‫ߪࠇߎޕ‬ෳട᧦ઙ߇޽ࠆߣ޿߁ᗧ๧ߢߪߥ޿߇‫ޔ‬ෳട࿖ߪ࿖ౝᏒ႐ࠍቢ
ో㐿᡼ߔࠆⷡᖗࠍᜬߚߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޕ‬ฦ࿖߇ㄦㅦߦേߊ᭴߃ߢ޽ࠇ߫‫ߪࡊ࡯࡞ࠣⴕ⃻ޔ‬น⢻ߥ㒢ࠅᣧ޿Ბ㓏ߢߎࠇࠄߩ࿖ࠍㄫ߃౉ࠇࠆߛࠈ߁‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬ㄦㅦߦേߌߥߊߣ߽‫ޔ‬੤ᷤᜂᒰ⠪ߪߎࠇࠄߩ
࿖ߣදജߒߡෳടߩḰ஻ࠍㅴ߼ࠆߛࠈ߁‫ߚ߈↢ޕ‬දቯߣ޿߁᭴ᗐ߇ឭ᩺ߐࠇߚߩߪߎߩℂ↱߆ࠄߢ޽ࠆ‫ޔߜࠊߥߔޕ‬ᣂⷙෳട࿖߇ᣂߚߥᄌ㕟ࠍ᳞߼ࠇ߫‫ߦࠇߘޔ‬ᔕߓߡኻᔕߒߡ޿ߊߣ޿߁ߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬੤ᷤᜂᒰ⠪߇ߤߩᤨὐߢᣂⷙෳട࿖ߩ⛔วࠍᛂߜಾࠅ‫ޔ‬ታᣉߦേߊߩ߆ߣ޿߁⇼໧߇ឭ⿠ߐࠇߚ‫ߎޕ‬ࠇߦኻߒߡࡃ࡯ࡃ࡜࡮ࡢࠗ࠯࡞᳁ߣࡑ࡯ࠢ࡮ࠪࡦࠢ࡟ࠕ᳁ߪ‫ ⴕ⃻ޔ‬9 ࠞ࿖߇ࠃࠅ⹦⚦ߦᢥ㕙ߩ⨲᩺ࠍขࠅ߹ߣ߼‫ౕޔ‬૕⊛ߥࠦࡒ࠶࠻ࡔࡦ࠻ߩ੤ᷤߦ౉ࠆߎߣߦࠃߞߡ‫ߩઁޔ‬࿖ࠍ๭߮ㄟ߻⓹ญߪ߆ߥࠅ⁜ߊߥࠆߣᜰ៰ߒߚ‫ޕ‬ᣂⷙෳട࿖ࠍᛂߜಾࠆᤨᦼߦߟ޿ߡන⚐ߥ╵߃ߪߥ޿ߚ߼‫ޔ‬ᒰ㕙ߪ‫⥝ޔ‬๧ߩ޽ࠆ࿖߇޽ࠄࠁࠆ㗄⋡ࠍ⼏⺰ߩኻ⽎ߦߔࠆⷡᖗߢ޽ࠆ㒢ࠅ‫ޔ‬Ᏹߦ੤ᷤߩ㆏ߪ㐿߆ࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬࠮࠶࡚ࠪࡦΥ㧦☨⼏ળߪ TPP ࠍߤ߁⷗ߡ޿ࠆ߆
ࠤࡆࡦ࡮ࡉ࡟ࠗ࠺ࠖ⼏ຬ㧔౒๺ౄ‫ࠬࠨࠠ࠹ޔ‬Ꮊ㧕☨࿖ߪࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߢ಴ㆃࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ߩߎޕ‬࿾ၞߢਛ࿖ߩᓇ㗀ജ߇Ⴧߔߥ߆‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߪࠃࠅⓍᭂ⊛ߥᓎഀࠍᜂࠊߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ ޕ‬᩺ߩ☨㖧 FTA ߣㅴⴕਛߩ TPP ੤ᷤࠍ〯߹߃‫ߩߎ߇੹ޔ‬࿾ၞߦࠃࠅ
ᷓߊ㑐ਈߔࠆᦨᄢߩ࠴ࡖࡦࠬߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP ߪࠕࠫࠕߣߩ⚷ࠍᷓ߼‫ߩߎޔ‬࿾ၞߦ߅޿ߡਛ࿖ߦኻ᛫ߔࠆ
᦭ലߥ൓ജߣߒߡ☨࿖ߩሽ࿷ᗵࠍ㓙┙ߚߖࠆᚻᲑߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬
TPP ߪ੹ᓟ߽ᓢ‫ߦޘ‬ട⋖࿖ࠍჇ߿ߒ‫ޔ‬FTAAP ߳ߩ⿷߇߆ࠅߦߥࠆߣߺࠄࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP ߪ㜞᳓Ḱߥදቯߢߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫⋡ߩߘޕ‬ᮡߪ‫ޔ‬APEC ട⋖࿖㑆ߩ⚻ᷣߣ⾏ᤃࠍ⚿߮ߟߌࠆߚ߼‫ࠅࠃࠍ‛ޔ‬቟ߊ‫ޔ‬ࠃࠅㅦߊ‫ࠅࠃޔ‬ኈᤃߦേ߆ߔߎߣߣߔߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄ߿ࠞ࠽࠳ߥߤ‫ߩઁޔ‬࿖߇޽ࠄࠁࠆ⺖㗴ࠍ੤ᷤߩ႐ߢ⼏⺰ߔࠆ᭴߃ߢ޽ࠆ㒢ࠅ‫ߩࠄࠇߎޔ‬࿖ࠍ᱑ㄫߔߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬
TPP ߦߪ⿥ౄᵷߢᒝജߦขࠅ⚵ࠎߢ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬਎⇇⊛ߥ᥊᳇ᓟㅌߪ‫⾏ޔ‬ᤃߩ㊀ⷐᕈࠍᡷ߼ߡ⹺⼂ߐߖࠆߎߣߦߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬࿖᳃ߪ൮᜝⊛ߥ⾏ᤃ⺖㗴߇ሽ࿷ߒߥ޿ߎߣߦ⧦┙ߞߡ޿ࠆ‫ ߪߜߚ⑳ޕ‬TPP ࠍᅷ⚿ߔࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ߫߆ࠅ߆‫☨ޔ‬㖧 FTA‫ ߩߣࡑ࠽ࡄޔࠕࡆࡦࡠࠦޔ‬FTA ߽ᚑ┙ߐߖࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ࡄࡀ࡞࡮࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ
ࡉ࡟ࠗ࠺ࠖ⼏ຬߪ‫ ߈ߴࠆ᧪ޔ‬APEC 㚂⣖ળ⼏ߣ TPP ࠍߤߩࠃ߁ߦ⚿߮ߟߌࠆ߆ࠍ⺰ߓߚ‫ߦ․ޕ‬ᒝ⺞ߒߚߩߪ‫⼏☨ޔ‬ળ߇ࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߦౕ૕⊛ߥᣇᴺߢ㑐ਈߔࠆߎߣߦ⌀೶ߢ޽ࠆߎߣࠍℂ⸃ߒߡ߽ࠄ߁ᔅⷐᕈߢ޽ߞߚ‫☨ޕ‬࿖ߪ዁᧪ߩ㑐ଥߦߟ޿ߡද⼏ߔࠆߎߣࠍᦸࠎߢ߅ࠅ‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߪ⾏ᤃ߳ߩ㑐ਈߦ⌀೶ߢߪߥ޿ߣ޿ߞߚ⺋⸃ࠍᛄ᜞ߒߚ޿ߣ⠨߃ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬APEC 㚂⣖ળ⼏ߪ‫⻉ޔ‬ᄖ࿖ߩ㚂⣖ߣ⋥ធ⹤ߒว޿‫ޔ‬㑐ଥࠍ᭴▽ߒ‫☨ޔ‬㖧 FTA ߿ TPP‫ޔ‬FTAAP ߥߤߩขࠅ⚵ߺߦኻߔࠆ☨⼏ળߩᡰᜬࠍ⸷߃ࠆఝࠇ
ߚᯏળߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬− 20 −

ࡉ࡟ࠗ࠺ࠖ⼏ຬߪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖߇ FTA㧔☨㖧 FTA ߿ࠦࡠࡦࡆࠕ‫ ߩߣࡑ࠽ࡄޔ‬FTA ߥߤ㧕ࠍᚑ┙ߐߖࠄࠇߥ
޿ߩߢߪߣߩ ᔨ߿‫߇ࠇߘޔ‬዁᧪ߩදቯߩ੤ᷤߦߤ߁޿߁ᗧ๧ࠍᜬߟߩ߆ߦߟ޿ߡ⾰໧ࠍฃߌߚ‫ߎޕ‬ࠇߦኻߒ‫⼏ޔ‬ຬߪ‫ ޔ‬ᔨߪᱜᒰߢ޽ࠅ‫ߎߎޔ‬ᢙᐕ‫ޔ‬໧㗴߇↢ߓߡ޿ࠆߎߣࠍ⹺߼ߚ‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬G20 㚂⣖ળ⼏ߦࠃߞߡ☨㖧 FTA ߇ᅷ⚿ߒߚ႐ว‫ޔ‬ห⼏ຬߪ 2011 ᐕ਄ᦼߦ☨㖧 FTA‫ࡄޔࠕࡆࡦࡠࠦ߮ࠃ߅ޔ‬࠽ࡑߣߩ FTA ߦ߽േ߈߇಴ߡߊࠆߣߺߡ޿ࠆ‫ߚ߹ޕ‬ห⼏ຬߪ‫౒ޔ‬๺ౄఝ૏ߩ⼏ળߢߪ‫ޔ‬ᄢ⛔㗔߇ FTA
ࠍᧄ᳇ߢㅴ߼ࠆߟ߽ࠅߢ޽ࠇ߫‫⾏ޔ‬ᤃߢߩㅪ៤వߪᓧࠄࠇࠃ߁ߣ߽ᜰ៰ߒߚ‫ޕ‬౒๺ౄߪ⾏ᤃ᡽╷ߦᔅⷐߥ⽷Ḯࠍలᒰߔࠆߟ߽ࠅ߇޽ࠆ߆ุ߆‫⾰߁޿ߣޔ‬໧ߦኻߒߡࡉ࡟ࠗ࠺ࠖ⼏ຬߪ‫౒ޔ‬๺ౄᜰዉㇱߪ⾏ᤃ߇☨࿖⚻ᷣߦߣߞߡᭂ߼ߡ㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆߣߩᒝ޿⹺⼂ࠍᜬߞߡ޿ࠆߪߕߛߣㅀ
ߴߚ‫☨ޕ‬࿖⵾ຠࠍ⾈߁ߛߌߢߪਇචಽߢ޽ࠅ‫☨ޔ‬࿖⵾ຠࠍᄁࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠅ‫⾏ߪߦࠇߘޔ‬ᤃࠍᡰ߃ࠆߚ
߼ߩᔅⷐߥࠗࡦࡈ࡜ᢛ஻ࠍⴕ߁ߎߣ߇᳞߼ࠄࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬‫ޟ‬ᄢ⛔㗔⾏ᤃଦㅴᮭ㒢‫ޠ‬
㧔TPA㧕ߩᦝᣂߦߟ޿ߡߩ⼏⺰߽޽ߞߚ‫⼏ࠖ࠺ࠗ࡟ࡉޕ‬ຬߪ‫⾏ޔ‬ᤃදቯߩታ
ᣉߦߪ‫ߩޠࠢ࠶࡜࠻࡮࠻ࠬࠔࡈޟ‬ᚻ⛯߈ࠍዉ౉ߔࠆߎߣ߇ਇนᰳߛ߇‫ߩߎޔ‬໧㗴ߪߎߎᢙᐕ‫⼏ޔ‬ળߢ޽߹ࠅ⼏⺰ߐࠇߡ޿ߥ޿ߣㅀߴߚ‫ޕ‬ห⼏ຬߪ‫ޔ‬TPA ߩᦝᣂߪ᧪ᐕߩᬌ⸛⺖㗴ߦߥࠆߣߺߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ࡉ࡟ࠗ࠺ࠖ⼏ຬߪ‫⼏☨ޔ‬ળ߇ TPP ߩᚑ┙ߦߪ⃻࿷ߩ੤ᷤෳട࿖ߩ߶߁߇ኈᤃ߆‫ߪ޿ࠆ޽ޔ‬ෳട࿖߇Ⴧ߃ߚ߶߁߇ኈᤃߣ⠨߃ߡ޿ࠆߩ߆ߣ⾰໧ߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬ห⼏ຬߪߎࠇߦኻߒ‫ޔ‬TPP ߩᚑ┙ߩนุߪ‫ޔ‬දቯߩᕈᩰߣㅊടෳട࿖߇ߤࠇ߶ߤ㊀ⷐ߆ߢ᳿߹ࠆߣㅀߴߚ‫ޕ‬࠼࡯ࡂ࡮࡜࠙ࡦ࠼ߩㅴዷߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫⼏ࠖ࠺ࠗ࡟ࡉޔ‬ຬߪ‫ޔ‬૞ᬺߦ߅ߌࠆ౒๺ౄߣ᳃ਥౄ㑆ߩ㑐ଥߪࠃࠅ✕ኒߦߥߞߡ޿ࠆߣߺߡ޿ࠆ‫⃻ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬࿷ߩวᗧߪਇචಽߢ޽ࠆߚ߼‫ߩߎޔ‬วᗧ߇ᗧ๧ߔࠆ߽ߩ
ࠍࠃࠅౕ૕⊛ߦ⹣߼ࠆߎߣ߇㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬࠮࠶࡚ࠪࡦΦ㧦TPP(Ⅳᄥᐔᵗᚢ⇛⊛⚻ᷣㅪ៤දቯ)ߣ FTAAP(ࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ⥄↱⾏ᤃ࿤㧕ߩ዁᧪ᷰㄝ༑ብ㧦ᩣᑼળ␠ਃ⪉᧲੩ UFJ ㌁ⴕ㘈໧ / APEC ࡆࠫࡀࠬ⻁໧ᆔຬળ(ABAC)㊄Ⲣ⚻ᷣ૞ᬺㇱળㇱળ㐳ᣣᧄߩ⚻ᷣ⇇ߪ TPP ߩᚢ⇛⊛㊀ⷐᕈࠍࠃߊ⹺⼂ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬2010 ᐕ APEC ߩਥⷐ⺖㗴ߪ‫ోޔ‬ຬߩߚ߼ߩᜬ⛯น⢻ߥᚑ㐳ߦะߌߚ૞ᬺࠍߔࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޔࠅ߹ߟߪࠇߎޕ‬㧔1㧕ࡏࠧ࡯࡞⋡ᮡߩ⹏ଔ‫ޔ‬㧔2㧕
FTAAP ߦะߌߚ࿾ၞ⛔วߩផㅴ‫ޔ‬
㧔3㧕ࡃ࡜ࡦࠬߩߣࠇߚᚑ㐳ᚢ⇛‫ޕࠆ޽ߢޔ‬ABAC ߪ‫ޔ‬APEC ߦߪ‫⋡࡞࡯ࠧࡏޔ‬ᮡߩ㆐ᚑߣหᤨߦ‫ޔ‬APEC ߩ▸࿐᜛ᄢߣ੐ᬺⅣႺߩᄌൻߦၮߠ޿
ߡ⚻ᷣ⛔วࠍㅴ߼ࠆߚ߼ߩᣂߚߥࡆ࡚ࠫࡦ߇ᔅⷐߣ⠨߃ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP‫ޔ‬ASEAN ࡊ࡜ࠬ 1‫ޔ‬ASEAN
ࡊ࡜ࠬ 3‫ޔ‬ASEAN ࡊ࡜ࠬ 6 ߪߔߴߡ‫ޔ‬FTAAP ߳ߣ⛯ߊ㆏╭ߦߥࠅ߁ࠆ‫ޕ‬⾏ᤃߩ⥄↱ൻߣଦㅴߦኻߔࠆ FTAAP ߩലᨐߦߟ޿ߡታᣉߐࠇߚ⺞ᩏߦࠃࠆߣ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߦߣߞߡߪഞ⟋⋧ඨ߫ߔࠆ⚿ᨐߣߥߞߚ‫ ߥ⊛⥸ోޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬GDP ߳ߩലᨐߪࡊ࡜ࠬߢ޽ࠅ‫ ߪߜߚ⑳ޔ‬APEC ߪ࿾ၞ⛔วߦะߌߡേߊߴ߈ߛߣ⠨߃ߡ޿ࠆ‫⚻ޕ‬ᷣ⇇ߪ‫ࠅࠃޔ‬ᐢ▸ߥ࿾ၞදቯߣࠨ࡯ࡆࠬߩ⛔วࠍᦸࠎߢ޿
ࠆ‫ޕ‬− 21 −

ᣣᧄߪ TPP ߣ ASEAN ࡊ࡜ࠬ߳ߣㅴ߻㓙ߩࡂ࡯࠼࡞߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄߩ TPP ෳടߪ‫ޔ‬㘩♳቟ో଻㓚ߣ቟ోᕈࠍᆎ߼ߣߔࠆㄘᬺಽ㊁ߩ੤ᷤߦࠃࠆߛࠈ߁‫ޔߪߜߚ⑳ޕ‬ᣣᧄߩㄘᬺߪᡷ㕟ߔࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈‫┹ޔ‬੎ജࠍᜬߟࠃ߁ߦߥࠆߣ⠨߃ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ࠫࠚࡈ࡝࡯࡮J.࡚ࠪ࠶࠻㧦ࡇ࡯࠲࡯࠰ࡦ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ⎇ⓥᚲࠪ࠾ࠕࡈࠚࡠ࡯
TPP ෳട࿖ߪ‫ⷙޔ‬ᮨ߽㐿⊒ߩᐲว޿߽‫ޔ‬Ꮢ᳃ߩ⥄↱ߦኻߔࠆᆫ൓߽ߐ߹ߑ߹ߢ޽ࠆ‫଀⇣ߪࡓ࠽࠻ࡌޕ‬ߩ⓭಴ߒߚሽ࿷ߢ޽ࠆ‫ߣࡊ࡯࡞ࠣߩߎޕ‬੤ᷤߔࠆߚ߼ߩ㐿⊒ⷙቯࠍขࠅ߹ߣ߼ࠆߩߪ࿎㔍ߛࠈ߁‫ޕ‬ⷙ೙ߩ⛔৻ߪ‫ޔ‬ฦ࿖߇ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬߣᣂⷙಽ㊁ߢ㜞᳓Ḱࠍ㆐ᚑߔࠆߚ߼ߩ▤ℂ⢻ജࠍ᦭ߒߡ޿ࠆߩ߆߇ὶ
ὐߦߥࠆ‫ߪࠇߎޕ‬࿖㓙⊛ߥ⾏ᤃߣᛩ⾗ࡈࡠ࡯ߩ໧㗴ࠍ૞ࠅ಴ߔ‫ޕ‬⾏ᤃ㕙ߢߪ‫ޔ‬ේട⋖࿖ߩ⽷ߣࠨ࡯ࡆࠬߩᢙሼߪዊߐ޿‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬ෳട࿖߇Ⴧ߃ࠇ߫‫ޔ‬ว⸘㗵ߪᕆỗߦჇടߔࠆ‫ߦࠬࡆ࡯ࠨޕ‬ᵈ⋡ߔࠆߣ‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߪ೎ߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬ේട⋖࿖ߩ⾏ᤃ㗵߇ᭂ߼ߡዊߐ޿ߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆ
ߛࠈ߁‫ߦ․ޔ߼ߚߩߎޕ‬ᣣᧄߣ㖧࿖߇ෳടߒߚ႐ว‫ޔ‬ᚑ㐳ߩᯏળ߇޽ࠆ‫‛ޕ‬ຠߩ੤ᤃߢ߽หߓࡄ࠲࡯
ࡦ߇⷗ࠄࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬ᰴߩὶὐߪ‫ޔ‬TPP ࠍߤߩࠃ߁ߦ᭴ᗐߔࠆ߆ߢ޽ࠆ‫ⷙޕ‬೙⥄↱ൻߩᄢ⢙ߥ੤ᷤߪታ⃻น⢻ߢߪߥ޿߇‫ޔ‬ẋㅴ⊛ߥ㓸Ⓧࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴߇᦭ലߢ޽ࠆ‫ⴕ⃻ޕ‬දቯߩࡀ࠶࠻ࡢ࡯ࠢ߇ᐢ߇ߞߡ޿ࠆߚ߼‫ߦߢߔޔ‬ᄙ᭽ߥ೨଀ߣ⥄↱ൻ߳ߩ㊀ⷐߥࠦࡒ࠶࠻ࡔࡦ࠻߇⼾ንߦሽ࿷ߔࠆ‫ޕ‬ࠕࠫࠕߩၞౝࠬࠠ࡯ࡓࠍࠃࠅᐢ▸ߥ࿾ၞࠬࠠ࡯ࡓ߳‫ޔ‬ߤߩࠃ߁ߦⲢวߔࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ߆㧫 ߘߒߡ‫ޔ‬
ASEAN ࡊ࡜ࠬ 1 ࠬࠠ࡯ࡓߦ฽߹ࠇࠆ APEC 㕖ട⋖࿖ߦߟ޿ߡߪߤ߁߆㧫 ߎࠇࠄߪ࿎㔍ߥ㐿⊒਄‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ਄ߩ໧㗴ࠍឭ⿠ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ࠅࠃޔߦࠄߐޕ‬ᐢ▸ߥⅣᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߦߟ޿ߡ⹤ߔ႐ว‫ޔ‬ਛධ☨⻉࿖ߪߤߩࠃ߁ߥ෼߹ࠅᣇࠍߔࠆߩ߆㧫
21 ਎♿ဳ FTA ߩಣᣇ▐ߪߎࠇ߹ߢߩࡄࡀ࡞ߢ⹦⚦ߥ⺑᣿߇ߥߐࠇߚ‫ޔߪࠇߎޕ‬‫ޟ‬FTA ࡊ࡜ࠬ‫᧦ޠ‬㗄ࠍ฽߻ᣢሽߩදቯࡀ࠶࠻ࡢ࡯ࠢߩ਄ߦ᭴▽ߐࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬੤ᷤᜂᒰ⠪ߪታ㓙ߦⴕ޿ߥ߇ࠄቇࠎߢ޿ࠆ‫ᦨޕ‬ㄭߩ☨࿖ߩ FTA ࠍ⷗ࠆߣ‫߇ߜߚ⑳ޔ‬૗චᐕ೨߆ࠄදቯࠍᡷༀߒߡ߈ߚߎߣ߇ࠊ߆ࠆ‫ޕ‬൮᜝⊛ߥදቯߪ
ήℂߛࠈ߁߇‫ޔ‬੤ᷤᜂᒰ⠪ߪᦨᄢ㒢଀ᄖភ⟎ࠍᷫࠄߔദജࠍߔߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޔߚ߹ޕ‬TPP ߪේ↥࿾ⷙ೙ࠍ⛔৻ߒ‫⾏ޔ‬ᤃߣᛩ⾗ߦᓇ㗀ߔࠆ᡽╷ߩㅘ᣿ᕈࠍ㜞߼ߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄߪ TPP ੤ᷤߦෳടߔࠆ૛⵨߇޽ࠆߛࠈ߁߆㧫 ෳടߒߥ޿૛⵨߇޽ࠆߛࠈ߁߆㧫 ᣣᧄߪߔߢ
ߦ‫ޔ‬TPP ߩේട⋖࿖ߣߩ‫ࠕࠫࠕߚ߹ޔ‬ၞౝߢߩᐢ▸ߥ⾏ᤃࡀ࠶࠻ࡢ࡯ࠢࠍ᦭ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP ߪએਅߩߚ߼ߩ⚻〝ࠍឭଏߢ߈ࠆ㧦࡮ ᣣਛ㑆‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ࡮EU 㑆ߩ⾏ᤃදቯߩ೨ㅴ࡮ ㄘᬺ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯ߩ⺞ᢛߩ▤ℂ࡮ ᫜਄ߍߐࠇߡ޿ࠆᣣ㖧⾏ᤃ੤ᷤߩౣ㐿− 22 −

ᣣᧄ߇ෳടߔࠆߚ߼ߦߪ‫⾏ޔ‬ᤃߣᛩ⾗ߦᓇ㗀ߔࠆㅘ᣿ᕈᣇ㊎ࠍᡷༀߒߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿߇‫ߪߦࠇߘޔ‬ᘕ㊀ߥᛒ޿ࠍⷐߔࠆㄘ↥‛ߣࠨ࡯ࡆࠬ߳ߩขࠅ⚵ߺ߇ᔅⷐߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬ෳടߦߪᤨ㑆⊛೙⚂߇޽ࠆ‫☨ޕ‬㖧
FTA ߣ㖧࿖࡮ࠝ࡯ࠬ࠻࡜࡝ࠕ੤ᷤ߇ᚑ┙ߔࠇ߫‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄߪਥⷐᏒ႐߳ߩࠕࠢ࠮ࠬࠍᄬ߁ߎߣߦߥࠆ‫ޕ‬
FTAAP ߳ߩਛ࿖ߩෳട߽㕖Ᏹߦ㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ਛ࿖ߪߔߢߦ TPP ෳട࿖ߣᒝ޿⚿߮ߟ߈ࠍᜬߞߡ޿ࠆ
ߚ߼‫ޔ‬ෳടߦ㑐ᔃࠍ␜ߔߪߔߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ਛ࿖ߪෳട 8 ࠞ࿖ߩ߁ߜߩ 4 ࠞ࿖ߣදቯࠍ⚿ࠎߢ߅ࠅ‫ ߩઁޔ‬3ࠞ࿖ߣߪ੤ᷤਛ߆ታ⃻น⢻ᕈ⺞ᩏ߇ⴕࠊࠇߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔ߼ߚߩߎޕ‬TPP ߩ੤ᷤᜂᒰ⠪ߪ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖߇ਛᦼ⊛ߦߎߩⲢว૕ߦߤߩࠃ߁ߦ෼߹ࠆߩ߆‫ ߮ࠃ߅ޔ‬FTAAP ߦะߌߡߤߩࠃ߁ߦേ޿ߡ޿ߊߩ߆ࠍᬌ⸛ߔߴ
߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ਛ࿖ࠍ⛔วߔࠆ߭ߣߟߩᣇᴺߪ‫ߡߒߣ࡯ࡃ࡯ࠩࡉࠝޔ‬಴⊒ߒߡ߽ࠄ߁߆‫ޔ‬㚅᷼ࠍࠝࡉࠩ࡯
ࡃ࡯ߣߒߡ᜗⺧ߔࠆ߆ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᦨᓟߩࡐࠗࡦ࠻ߪ‫ޔ‬TPP ߇ᄢ߈ߊㅴൻߔࠆߦߟࠇ‫⻉ࠕࠫࠕޔ‬࿖ߪ⥄࿖ߩ⃻ⴕ FTA ߦ⋓ࠅㄟࠎߛౝኈ
એ਄‫ߩߘޔ‬వ߹ߢㅴ߼ࠆᔅⷐ߇಴ߡߊࠆߣߺࠄࠇࠆὐߢ޽ࠆ‫☨ޕ‬࿖ߥߤߩవㅴ࿖߽‫ޔ‬૗߆ࠍର਄ߦタߖࠆⷡᖗ߇ᔅⷐߦߥࠈ߁‫☨ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬࿖߇ឭଏߢ߈ࠆ߽ߩߪߘࠇ߶ߤߥ޿‫৻ޕ‬ㇱߩࠨ࡯ࡆࠬⷙ೙ߣㄘ
ᬺߩ⾏ᤃ㓚ოߪ㐿᡼ߢ߈ࠆ߆߽ߒࠇߥ޿‫ߩࠄࠇߎޕ‬㓚ო᠗ᑄߦኻߒߡ᡽ᴦ਄ߩᡰᜬࠍᓧࠆߚ߼ߦߪ‫ޔ‬
TPP ੤ᷤߪ‫ ߩઁޔ‬TPP ෳട࿖ߣߣ߽ߦ☨࿖߇⾏ᤃ߆ࠄᄢ߈ߥࡔ࡝࠶࠻ࠍᓧࠄࠇࠆ߶ߤߩ‫ޔ‬චಽߦⷙᮨߩᄢ߈޿߽ߩߣߥࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ࡇ࡯࠲࡯࡮A.ࡍ࠻࡝㧦ࡉ࡜ࡦ࠳ࠗࠬᄢቇࠞ࡯࡞࡮J.ࠪࡖࡇࡠ࿖㓙㊄Ⲣቇᢎ᝼ / ࠗ࡯ࠬ࠻࡮࠙ࠚࠬ࠻࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ ࠪ࠾ࠕࡈࠚࡠ࡯
FTAAP ߩផㅴߪ‫ޔ‬ᒝജߥᡰេ⠪ߢ޽ࠆ ABAC ߦነਈߔࠆߣߎࠈ߇ᄢ߈޿‫☨ޕ‬࿖߇ 2011 ᐕߩ APEC㚂⣖ળ⼏ߩ⼏㐳࿖ߣߥࠆߎߣߢ‫ޔ‬☨࿖ੱ߇⛔วࠍࠃࠅᄢ߈ߥ⢛᥊ߩਛߢℂ⸃ߔࠆߎߣࠍᦼᓙߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬㐳ᦼ⊛ߦߺߡ‫⛔ޔ‬วߣߪࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞࠍ߭ߣߟߩ࿾ၞߣߒߡ৻૕ൻߐߖࠆߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫⛔ޕ‬วߪ❥ᩕ‫ޔࡦ࡚ࠪ࡯ࡌࡁࠗޔ‬቟ቯൻߦᄢ߈ߊነਈߔࠆ߽ߩߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬೨ㅴߔࠆߦᒰߚߞߡߪߘࠇࠍ⢄ߦ㌏ߓߡ
߅߆ߨ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޕ‬⑳ߚߜߩ⺞ᩏߢߪ㧔࡚ࠫࡦ࠭࡮ࡎࡊࠠࡦࠬᄢቇ߅ࠃ߮ࠗ࡯ࠬ࠻࡮࠙ࠚࠬ࠻࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ߩࡑࠗࠤ࡞࡮ࡊ࡜
ࡑ࡯᳁‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ᛩ⾗᦭㒢⽿છ౏ม㧔CIC㧕ߩࡈࠔࡦ࡮࠴ࡖࠗ᳁ߣวหߢታᣉ㧕‫ޔ‬දቯߩ࠳ࠗ࠽ࡒ࠶ࠢߥ㆏
╭ࠍតࠅ‫ޔ‬⇣ߥࠆᤨὐߢෳടߒߚ࿖‫ߩ߳ޘ‬ᓇ㗀ࠍផቯߒߚ‫ޕ‬ฦ࿖߇ෳടߔࠆ႐วߣߒߥ޿႐วߣߢߪ‫ޔ‬ࠗࡦ࠮ࡦ࠹ࠖࡉ߇ߤߩࠃ߁ߦㅴൻߔࠆ߆㧫 㧔૗߽ߒߥ޿ߣ޿߁㧕ၮᧄࠪ࠽࡝ࠝߦߪ 2 ߟߩઍᦧࠪ࠽
࡝ࠝ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬㧔1㧕ASEAN ࡌ࡯ࠬߢ FTAAP ߳ߣേߊ‫ޔ‬
㧔2㧕TPP ࡞࡯࠻‫ޕ‬ߎߩࡕ࠺࡞ߪ‫ޔ‬㑐⒢᠗ᑄ‫↱⥄ߩࠬࡆ࡯ࠨޔ‬ൻ‫⾏ޔ‬ᤃߩଦㅴ߅ࠃ߮ᛩ⾗ࠍ฽߻ᐢ▸ߥ⚻ᷣലᨐࠍ⚵ߺㄟࠎߢ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP ߩᕈᩰࠍࠃࠅ᣿⏕ߦᛠីߢ߈ߚᤨὐߢ‫ࠅࠃޔ‬ᱜ⏕ߥࡕ࠺࡞ൻ߇น⢻ߦߥࠈ߁‫ޕ‬ᒰ㕙ߩᥳቯ⚿ᨐߪએਅߩࠃ߁ߥ߽ߩߣߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬࡮ TPP ࡞࡯࠻㧔ASEAN ࡞࡯࠻ߦട߃㧕ߪ‫⻉ࠕࠫࠕޔ‬࿖ߩߺߥࠄߕ‫ޔ‬ධർ☨Ꮊߩ⚻ᷣߦᄢ߈ߥ೑⋉ࠍ߽ߚࠄߔ‫ޕ‬࡮ ࠳ࠗ࠽ࡒࠢࠬߩ໧㗴㧦TPP8 ࠞ࿖߆ࠄ TPP13 ࠞ࿖ߦേߊߣ‫ ߷߶ߪ࠻࠶࡝ࡔޔ‬5 ୚ߦߥࠆ‫ޕ‬TPP13ࠞ࿖߆ࠄ FTAAP ߦ᜛ᄢߔࠆߣ‫ߪ࠻࠶࡝ࡔޔ‬୚Ⴧߔࠆ‫ޕ‬ฦ࿖߇ߎߩ㆏╭ߦᴪߞߡേߊࠬࡇ࡯࠼߽
ᄢ߈ߥ㆑޿ࠍ↢ߺ಴ߔ‫ޕ‬− 23 −

࡮ TPP ࡞࡯࠻ߢߪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߩࡔ࡝࠶࠻ߪ GDP ߩ 1.5㧑ߦ㆐ߔࠆ‫ޔߤߥࠗ࠲ޔࠕࠪ࡯࡟ࡑޔࡓ࠽࠻ࡌޕ‬ዊⷙᮨߥ㐿᡼⚻ᷣߩࡔ࡝࠶࠻߇ᦨ߽ᄢ߈޿‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄ߽⋧ᒰ㊂ߩࡔ࡝࠶࠻ࠍᓧࠆ‫ޕ‬࡮ ☨࿖߇ߎߩࠕࠫࠕ࡮࡞࡯࠻ߦෳടߒߥ޿႐ว‫ޔ‬੤ᤃ᧦ઙ߇ᡷༀߒߡ߽৻ቯߩᏅ೎ភ⟎ߦࠃߞߡ⋧Ვߐࠇࠆߚ߼‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߪᄢ߈ߥലᨐࠍᓧࠄࠇߥ޿‫ޕ‬࡮ ☨࿖ߩャ಴ߣ↢↥ߩࡔ࡝࠶࠻ߪ‫⵾ޔ‬ㅧᬺࠃࠅ߽ࠨ࡯ࡆࠬߣㄘᬺߦ㓸ਛߔࠆ‫ޕ‬
࡮ 100㧑ߩቢో⥄↱ൻߩਅߢߪ‫৻ޔ‬ㇱߩㄘ↥‛ߩ⾏ᤃ߇഍⊛ߦჇടߔࠆน⢻ᕈ߇޽ࠆ‫ޔ߼ߚߩߎޕ‬᡽ᴦ⊛ߥታ⃻น⢻ᕈߩ㕙߆ࠄ‫ࠆ޽ޔ‬⒟ᐲߩ଀ᄖភ⟎߇ᔅⷐ߆߽ߒࠇߥ޿‫ޕ‬࡮ ⺞ᩏ⚿ᨐߪ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖߇ෳടߔࠇ߫‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖߇ߎߩ㆏╭߆ࠄᦨ߽ᄢ߈ߥ೑⋉ࠍฃߌࠆน⢻ᕈ߇޽ࠆߎߣ
ࠍ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬දቯߪ࿾ၞࠍ⛔৻ߔࠆߚ߼ߩᚻᲑߣ⷗ߥߔߴ߈ߢ޽ࠅ‫ߩ᧪ᧂޔߪߜߚ⑳ޔ‬ෳട࿖߇೑↪ߒ߿ߔ޿㆏╭ࠍ૞ࠆߚ߼‫ޔ‬Ⓧᭂ⊛ߦ↢߈ߚදቯࠍផㅴߒߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ࠍࡦ࡚ࠫࡆߩߎߪߜߚ⑳ޕ‬ᔨ㗡ߦ‫⚳ᦨޔ‬⊛ߦߔߴߡߩෳട࿖ࠍ᱑ㄫߔߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ࡄࡀ࡞࡮࠺ࠖࠬࠞ࠶࡚ࠪࡦ
⾰໧߇಴ߐࠇߚߩߪ‫࡝࠻ࡍޔ‬ᢎ᝼߇૶↪ߒߚࡕ࠺࡞ߣ‫ߩ߳ࠬࡆ࡯ࠨޔ‬㓚ოࠍ᠗ᑄߒߚࡕ࠺࡞ࠍ᭴▽ߔࠆߎߣߩ㔍ߒߐ‫▚⸘ޔߚ߹ޔ‬น⢻৻⥸ဋⴧ㧔CGE㧕ࡕ࠺࡞ߩ․ᕈߣ೨ឭ᧦ઙߦߟ޿ߡߛߞߚ‫࡝࠻ࡍޕ‬ᢎ᝼ߪ‫ޔ‬
ห௥ࠄߣߣ߽ߦࠨ࡯ࡆࠬߩᱡߺߩᐲว޿ࠍᓧࠆߚ߼ߦ⇣ߥࠆዤᐲߩ෼㓸ߦദ߼ߚߎߣ‫ޔ‬߹ߚ‫ޔ‬ࡊࡠࠫࠚࠢ࠻⚳ੌ߹ߢߦߐ߹ߑ߹ߥ▸࿐ߩផቯ୯ࠍᓧࠆ੍ቯߢ޽ࠆߎߣࠍ⺑᣿ߒߚ‫ޕ‬CGE ࡕ࠺࡞ߩ㊀ⷐߥ․ᕈߪ‫ޔ‬ቢో㓹↪ߦㄭ޿ߣ޿߁೨ឭ᧦ઙߩਅߢ‫⚻ߩߘޔ‬ᷣ߇┹੎਄ߩఝ૏ᕈࠍᜬߟ⵾ຠࠍ↢↥ߒߚ႐ว‫⚻ޔ‬ᷣㆇ༡ߩല₸ᕈࠍߤࠇ߶ߤ㜞߼ࠆߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠆ߆‫ࠍޔ‬໧߁ߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬දቯߩౕ૕⊛ߥౝኈ߇ࠃࠅ᣿ࠄ߆ߦߥࠇ߫‫⚿ޔ‬ᨐࠍࠃࠅᱜ⏕ߦࡕ࠺࡞ߦ⚵ߺㄟ߻ߎߣ߇ߢ߈ࠃ߁‫ޕ‬ਛ࿖ߩ⃻࿷ߩ FTA ߅ࠃ߮ਛ࿖ߩ TPP ߳ߩෳടߦߟ޿ߡߩ⼏⺰߽޽ߞߚ‫ޕ‬ࠫࠚࡈ࡝࡯࡮࡚ࠪ࠶࠻᳁ߪ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖࡮ASEAN 㑆ߥߤ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ߩ⾏ᤃදቯߪࠃࠅ᡽ᴦ⊛ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ᵻ޿⛔วߦၮߠ޿ߡ޿ࠆߣ⺑᣿ߒߚ‫ޕ‬ߒ߆ߒߎࠇߪ‫ߦ߆ࠆߪޔ‬ㅴൻߒ‫᦭ޔ‬ലߥ೨଀ࠍ߽ߟਛ࿖࡮࠾ࡘ࡯ࠫ࡯࡜ࡦ࠼ FTA ߥߤߩᦨᣂߩදቯ
ߦߪᒰߡߪ߹ࠄߥ޿‫ޕ‬දቯߪ‫ޔ‬Ꮒᄢߥࠕ࠙࠻ࠨࠗ࠳࡯߆ࠄࠃࠅ⻉ᄖ࿖ߣ㑐ࠊࠆ࿖߳ߣേ޿ߡ޿ࠆ⒖ⴕ
ࡊࡠ࠮ࠬߢߪ᦭ല߆߽ߒࠇߥ޿‫ޕ‬┹੎⊛⥄↱ൻߣ FTAAP ߳ߩⶄᢙߩ㆏╭ߦߟ޿ߡߩ⾰໧߽ឭ⿠ߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬ฦ࿖ߪ‫ߩߤޔ‬ෆࠍߤߩ߆ߏߦ
౉ࠇࠆ߆ࠍߤ߁߿ߞߡ᳿߼ࠆߩ߆㧫 ╵߃ߪ‫┹ߦߢߔߪߦࠕࠫࠕޔ‬੎⊛⥄↱ൻ߇ሽ࿷ߔࠆߣ޿߁߽ߩ
ߛߞߚ‫⛔ޕ‬ว߳ߩ⇣ߥࠆࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ࠍࠬࠨࡦ࠮ࡦࠦࠅࠃޔ‬㊀ࠎߓߚ‫ࠅࠃޔ‬ᵻ޿⛔วߦၮߠ޿ߚᓥ᧪ဳߩࠕࠫࠕߩࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴߇޽ࠆ‫☨ޕ‬࿖ߩࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴㧔਎⇇ਛߢᡰᜬࠍ㓸߼ߟߟ޽ࠆߣߺࠄࠇ
ࠆ㧕ߪࠃࠅᴺᓞࠍዅ㊀ߔࠆࠕࡊࡠ࡯࠴ߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ᛩ⾗ࠍଦㅴߒ↢↥ᕈࠍะ਄ߐߖࠆߚ߼‫ޔ‬᡽╷ߩ੍᷹น⢻ᕈࠍ㜞߼ࠆ෩ᩰߥ⟵ോࠍ઻߁‫ߚ߈↢ޕ‬දቯࠍᜬߟߣ޿߁ߎߣߪ‫ޔ‬TPP ߩ᜛ᄢߣ APEC 㕖ෳട࿖ߣ
ߩ੤ᷤߩ㊀ⷐߥⷐ⚛ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬᧪ᐕਛߩਛ࿖ߩ TPP ߳ߩෳടߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ޔߪ࡞ࡀࡄޔ‬ෳടߪᣧ⸘ߥ᳿ᢿߢ޽ࠅ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖ߪ⃻ᤨὐߢ⥄↱⾏ᤃߦ⒖ⴕߢ߈ߥ޿ߣߺࠄࠇࠆߚ߼‫ޔ‬੤ᷤ߇᳿ⵚߔࠆน⢻ᕈ߇㜞޿ߣߺߡ޿ࠆ‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬ਛ࿖ߩෳടߪ‫⛔ߥ⊛⚳ᦨޔ‬วߩขࠅ⚵ߺࠍᚑഞߐߖࠆ߁߃ߢਇนᰳߛࠈ߁‫ޕ‬ਛ࿖߇੹ᓟ૗ᐕ߆ߩ߁ߜߦද⼏ߦടࠊࠇࠆࠃ߁‫ޔ‬ਅḰ஻ࠍߒߡ߅ߊᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬− 24 −

⥄↱⾏ᤃߦᙬ⇼⊛ߥ☨⼏ળߢߤߩࠃ߁ߦ TPP ࠍᚑ┙ߐߖࠆ߆ߦߟ޿ߡߩ⾰໧ߪ‫⼏ޔ‬ળ߇ TPP ࠍᛚ⹺ߔࠆน⢻ᕈߩ㜞޿ 2 ߟߩ⥝๧ᷓ޿ਥᒛߦ㓸ਛߒߚ‫ޕ‬1.

ᦨ⚳⊛ߥ᭴ㅧ߇‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߩ⾏ᤃߦኻߔࠆ㊀ᄢߥᏅ೎ភ⟎ࠍᗐቯߒߚࠕࠫࠕߩߺߩදቯߢ޽ࠆ႐ว‫ޔ‬☨࿖ߪෳടߖߑࠆࠍᓧߥ޿‫ޕ‬

2.

⚿ዪߪᄖ੤᡽╷ߣ࿖ߩ቟ో଻㓚߇☨࿖ߩ⾏ᤃ᡽╷ߩ⚿ᨐࠍ᳿߼ࠆ‫ߩࠄ߆ࠕࠫࠕޕ‬ႎ๔ߦࠃࠆߣ‫ޔ‬☨࿖߇⚻ᷣදቯࠍផㅴߒߥ޿႐ว‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߪㆃࠇࠍߣࠅ‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖߇ߎߩ࿾ၞࠍᡰ㈩ߔࠆߎߣߦߥࠆ‫ޕ‬ߐࠄߦ‫ޔ‬21 ਎♿ဳදቯߪ‫ޔ‬ฦ࿖߇⥄࿖ߩၮḰࠍవㅴ࿖ߩ᳓Ḱ߹ߢᒁ߈਄ߍࠆߎߣࠍ᳞߼ߡ޿ࠆ߇‫ߘޔ‬ߩὐߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߪ⥄࿖ߩᘠⴕࠍߘࠇ߶ߤᄌᦝߔࠆᔅⷐ߇ߥ޿‫☨ޕ‬࿖ߩ⺖㗴ߪ‫☨ޔ‬࿖ߦߪ߹ߛ೙
㒢߇ᱷߞߡ߅ࠅ‫੹ޔ‬ᓟߪߘࠇࠍᄌᦝߖߑࠆࠍᓧߥ޿ߣ޿߁ߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᄌᦝߔࠆߦߪ‫ޔ‬᡽ᴦ⊛ᡰᜬࠍᓧࠆߛߌߩචಽߥࡔ࡝࠶࠻߇޽ࠅ‫↥⼔଻ޔ‬ᬺ߆ࠄߩᛕ್ࠍ⋧Ვߢ߈ࠆߎߣ߇೨ឭߣߥࠆ‫ޕ‬ᦨᓟߦ‫ޔ‬TPP ߣ FTAAP ߦ߅ߌࠆ⚻ᷣදജߩᓎഀߣ⚻ᷣ㐿⊒ᩰᏅߩᤚᱜ߇⼏⺰ߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬ਥߥ⺰ὐߪ 2ὐ‫ޕ‬1.

ోຬߦߣߞߡߩᜬ⛯น⢻ߥᚑ㐳ߣ޿߁࠹࡯ࡑߪ⛽ᜬߐࠇࠆߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬

2.

TPP ߪߔߢߦ‫⺖ߩࠄࠇߎޔ‬㗴ߦነਈߒ߁ࠆࠠࡖࡄࠪ࠹ࠖ࡮ࡆ࡞࠺ࠖࡦࠣߣᛛⴚᡰេࠍߘߩਛߦ⚵ߺㄟࠎߢ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬ขࠅ⚵ߺߩᵴ↪ߪߔߢߦ APEC ߣ ASEAN ߢ㗅⺞ߦㅴࠎߢ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬࠮࠶࡚ࠪࡦΧ㧚߹ߣ߼ߣឭ⸒
C.ࡈ࡟࠶࠼࡮ࡃ࡯ࠣࠬ࠹ࡦ㧦ࡇ࡯࠲࡯࠰ࡦ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ⎇ⓥᚲᚲ㐳ࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߩ⛔วࠍㅴ߼ࠆ߁߃ߢਇนᰳߣ⷗ߥߒߡ޿ࠆ 4 ߟߩࡐࠗࡦ࠻ࠍ᜼ߍߚ‫ޕ‬
1.

TPP ੤ᷤߦߪ᣿⏕߆ߟ⏕ታߥᦼ㒢ࠍ⸳ߌߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޔߪ࠼ࡦ࠙࡜࡮ࡂ࡯࠼ޕ‬ᒰዪ⠪߇੤ᷤᅷ⚿ߩ⏕ታߥᦼ㒢ࠍ⸳ߌߕ‫⾏ޔ‬ᤃ੤ᷤࠍṫᵹߔࠆߦછߖࠆߎߣߩࠦࠬ࠻ࠍࠃߊ␜ߒߡ޿ࠆ‫ࠆ᧪ޕ‬ߴ߈ᮮᵿߢߩ APEC 㚂⣖ળ⼏ߢߪ‫ޔ‬TPP ੤ᷤෳട࿖ߩ㚂⣖ߪ⥄࿖ߩ㑑௥ߦኻߒ‫ޔ‬2011 ᐕ 11 ᦬
ߩ APEC ࡎࡁ࡞࡞㚂⣖ળ⼏߹ߢߦ TPP දቯࠍᅷ⚿ߔࠆࠃ߁ᜰ␜ߔߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬

2.

ᄢ߈ߌࠇ߫ᄢ߈޿߶ߤࠃ޿‫ޕ‬TPP ߇ᚑഞߔࠆߦߪ‫ޔ‬੤ᷤᜂᒰ⠪߇ᄢⷙᮨߥ⾏ᤃᡷ㕟ߩࡄ࠶ࠤ࡯ࠫ
ࠍ૞ࠅ਄ߍࠄࠇࠆࠃ߁චಽߥ᧚ᢱ߇ឥߞߡ޿ߥߊߡߪߥࠄߥ޿‫ޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬TPP ෳട࿖ߩᦨೋߩࠣ
࡞࡯ࡊ߇ᄢⷙᮨߥ⽷ߣࠨ࡯ࡆࠬߩ⾏ᤃࠍ⏕ታߦࠞࡃ࡯ߢ߈ࠆࠃ߁‫ޔ‬ේട⋖࿖ࠍߢ߈ࠆ㒢ࠅᣧ޿Ბ㓏ߢ᜛ᄢߐߖࠆߎߣ߇㊀ⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬

3.

೨ឭ᧦ઙ߇޽ߞߡߪ޿ߌߥ޿‫ᦨޕ‬ೋ߆ࠄߔߴߡࠍ⼏⺰ߩኻ⽎ߦߔߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޔߪߣߎߩߎޕ‬TPPߩᏒ႐ࠕࠢ࠮ࠬߩᣣ⒟ࠍ⃻ⴕߩ FTA ߆ࠄណ↪ߔࠆߣߒߡ޿ࠆ⃻࿷ߩ☨࿖ߩ┙႐ߣߪ⋧ኈࠇߥ޿‫ޕ‬
TPP ෳട࿖㑆ߩ⾏ᤃදቯߦ߅ߌࠆ଀ᄖភ⟎‫☨߫߃଀ޔ‬࿖࡮ࠝ࡯ࠬ࠻࡜࡝ࠕදቯߩ⍾♧ߩ଀ᄖភ⟎ߥߤࠍ⛽ᜬߔࠆ߆ุ߆ߪ‫ޔ‬੤ᷤߩㆊ⒟ߢ್ᢿߒߡ޿ߊߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫଀ޕ‬ᄖភ⟎ߦ޽߹ࠅߦ෩ᩰߥ┙႐ࠍߣࠆߣ‫ోޔ‬૕⊛ߥขࠅ᳿߼߳ߩෳടᗧ᰼ࠍᄬࠊߖࠆน⢻ᕈ߇޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ฦ࿖ߪ‫߽ᦨޔ‬ᄙߊߩട⋖࿖ߣᦨ߽ଔ୯޽ࠆขࠅ᳿߼ࠍⴕ߁ߎߣࠍᔨ㗡ߦ‫ߥ⊛⾰ᧄޔ‬㆑޿ࠍਸ਼ࠅ⿧߃ࠆࠃ߁ദ߼ࠆߴ߈ߢ޽
ࠆ‫ޕ‬

4.

⑳ߚߜߪ‫ޔ‬TPP ߣ FTAAP ߩߟߥ߇ࠅࠍ⛽ᜬߔࠆߎߣ߇㕖Ᏹߦ㊀ⷐߣ޿߁ὐߢ৻⥌ߒߚ‫⃻ޕ‬࿷ߩෳട࿖ߪ‫ޔ‬TPP ࠍ FTAAP ߳ߩ⿷߇߆ࠅߣߺߡ޿ࠆ‫ߪࠇߎޕ‬੤ᷤߣ⚳⋚ߩ㚟ߌᒁ߈ߦᓎ┙ߟߛࠈ− 25 −

߁‫ޕ‬ฦ࿖߇‫ޔ‬ਛᩭࠣ࡞࡯ࡊߪ൮᜝⊛ߥ APEC ߩදቯࠍផߒㅴ߼ࠆ᭴߃ߛߣߺࠆߩߢ޽ࠇ߫‫ޔ‬ᣧᦼෳട߳ߩᗧ᰼ࠍហ߈┙ߡࠆߎߣߦߥࠆ‫ޕ‬⇗ጊⶪ㧦࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅ળ㐳࿾ၞ⛔วߩᷓൻߦᔅⷐߥࠬ࠹࠶ࡊߦߟ޿ߡ‫ޔ‬4 ߟߩ㊀ⷐࡐࠗࡦ࠻ࠍ᜼ߍߡ⥄ࠄߩ⠨߃ࠍ⺑᣿ߒߚ‫ޕ‬1.

޽ࠄࠁࠆ㗄⋡ࠍ⼏⺰ߩኻ⽎ߣߔࠆᔅⷐ߇޽ࠆ‫ޔࠅ߹ߟޕ‬ዋߥߊߣ߽੤ᷤߩ㐿ᆎᲑ㓏ߢߪ‫଀ޔ‬ᄖࠍ⸳ߌߥ޿ߎߣࠍฃߌ౉ࠇߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޕ‬ㅒߦ޿߃߫‫ޔ‬੤ᷤߩ⚳⋚ߢߪ޽ࠆ⒟ᐲߩ଀ᄖភ⟎߽޽ࠅ߁ࠆߣ޿߁ߎߣߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬

2.

೨ឭ᧦ઙߩឃ㒰߽ᔅⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᘕ㊀ߥᛒ޿ࠍⷐߔࠆ࠮ࠢ࠲࡯ߪߔߴߡ‫ޔ‬੤ᷤߩኻ⽎ߣߔߴ߈ߢ޽
ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᡷ㕟ߩᐲว޿ߪ੤ᷤߩㆊ⒟ߢ್ᢿߐࠇࠆߴ߈ߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬

3.

TPP ߪ㜞᳓Ḱߩදቯߢߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬㊀ⷐߥ᡽ᴦ⊛ ᔨߦขࠅ⚵߻ߚ߼‫ޔ‬ᨵエᕈߪᔅⷐߢ޽ࠆ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄߦߪ‫ޟ‬᳓ᷡߌࠇ߫㝼᫮߹ߕ‫ޕࠆ޽߇ߑࠊߣߎ߁޿ߣޠ‬4.

2006 ᐕߩࡂࡁࠗት⸒ߢ‫ޔ‬FTAAP ߪ㐳ᦼ⊛ߥ᭴ᗐߣߒߡೋ߼ߡ⸒෸ߐࠇߚ‫ࠇߘߪߢ੹ޔߒ߆ߒޕ‬߶ߤ㐳ᦼߩ߽ߩߢߪߥ޿‫ ࠄ߆੹ޕ‬10 ᐕᓟߪߘࠇ߶ߤవߩߎߣߢߪߥߊ‫⋡ߪߜߚ⑳ޔ‬ᮡߩ㆐ᚑߦ
ะߌߡදജߒߡ޿߆ߥߌࠇ߫ߥࠄߥ޿‫ޕ‬− 26 −

(English Summary)Japan Economic Foundation - PIIE Conference
A Trans Pacific Partnership and the Future of the Asia Pacific Region
October 25, 2010
Rapporteur: Julia Muir; Research Analyst PIIE

Welcome and Introduction
C. Fred Bergsten: Director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics
This is the latest in a series of conferences co-sponsored by JEF and PIIE that have been taking
place over the years, focusing predominantly on trans-pacific relations. We welcome Noboru
Hatakeyama, the Chairman and CEO of JEF. He is best known as a pioneer of Japanese free
trade agreements and we are pleased to welcome him today to discuss the future of a TransPacific Partnership.
Noboru Hatakeyama: Chairman and CEO of the Japan Economic Foundation
There are five proposals for going forward with regional integration:
1. Japan-China-Korea FTA.
2. ASEAN + 1 and ASEAN + 3; an Asia-centric approach that includes 10 + 1 pacts
between ASEAN and Australia, New Zealand, China, Korea, Japan and India, and a 10 +3 partnership between ASEAN and the 3 Northeast Asian countries.
3. ASEAN + 6 (CEPEA); which would include EAFTA + Australia, India and New
Zealand.
4. FTAAP among the APEC members.
5. The TPP, which currently includes nine members; however membership will most likely
evolve in the near future.
These arrangements should cover substantially all trade. There should be no preconditions toentering the negotiations.
Joining the TPP agreement is in the interest of Japan for two reasons:
1. This is a rare opportunity for Japan and the US to enter an agreement in the context ofAsia-Pacific regional integration. Missing out on this opportunity would result in thefurther development of regional FTAs, in which the US is not involved.
2. As it stands, the current TPP members are too small. Including Japan is a strategic movethat adds much more to the table than just a large volume of trade in goods and services.
C. Fred Bergsten: Director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics
Discussion of the TPP is taking place in a volatile global macroeconomic context; there is
uncertainty regarding economic growth and trade, and a necessity to find a better international
system to bring global imbalances under control. Trade policy has an important role to play; wemust actively pursue more liberalized trade to avoid sliding back towards protectionism. The
TPP is a key part of this. The central argument in favor of pursuing the TPP is the following:
1. TPP negotiations represent a watershed in the discussion of the regional economicarchitecture of Asia and Asia-Pacific in the decades ahead. The 1990s focused on Asia-− 27 −

Pacific, whereas the last decade focused on Asia-only growth and integration. In thisdecade the strategic question is whether Asia will proceed on its own to form a single
Asian bloc, or will there be a parallel movement towards Asia-Pacific integration? The
two movements are not alternatives to each other; they are complementary and arecontingent on parallel progress and institution building.
2. The next question is how to proceed. Rather than spurring the disintegration of AsiaPacific, the TPP must build a bridge between the Asia-only initiatives and the TPP
agreement. To do so the TPP membership must reach a critical mass; Japan, Korea andCanada will play a pivotal role in this.
3. Our goal today is to discuss the prospects for integration and set clear goals to beachieved by the 2011 APEC summit in Honolulu.
Session I: The Economic and Strategic Context
Kurt Campbell: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
There needs to be a new term that is more inclusive then ‘Trans-Pacific’; one that takes into
account the current political-economic situation. India for example is playing a much larger rolein the region and should be part of the Trans-Pacific dialogue. We have had substantial
discussions with Japan regarding TPP and we are very pleased by Japan’s interest in joining thepartnership. Now it is a matter of timing and strategy.
Some of the concerns we are hearing from Asia is that the US continues to focus its attention onother areas like the Middle East and South Asia, while important developments are taking placein East Asia and the Pacific. An important point to underscore is that the US is engaged in traderelations in Asia-Pacific. On the Asian side we are focused on diplomacy, including discussion
with Japanese ministers. We are also engaged in high level meetings with Korea, China,
Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand as well as Cambodia, Papua New Guinea and American
Samoa. Still, the US recognizes the need to step up its game in the region. This is a long-term
bipartisan goal, focusing on the US’s drive to compete, innovate and excel. 2011 will be themost consequential period in economic engagement in the region.
The TPP has triggered significant interest and discussions regarding the incorporation of morecountries. The next step is to focus the agenda and harmonize institutions; setting standards for a
21st century pact is crucial. APEC can act as the “operating system” for various Asia-Pacificinitiatives. The November meeting is the best time to move forward and leaders have set clear
goals to do so.
Akira Kojima: Senior Research Fellow, Japan Center for Economic Research
East Asia is a late comer to the process of regional integration; until recently there were few
FTAs or regional institutions. The 1997 financial crisis was a wakeup call to Asian economies,
including China. The size, depth and ‘Asia-only’ nature of the crisis, signaled to Asia the needto strengthen regional ties. East Asia (including ASEAN) has become more economicallyintegrated through foreign direct investment, financial markets and international trade.
APEC needs to think about its future direction; potential pathways to the FTAAP, future growth
and achieving the Bogor goals. As it stands, integration and trade are not shared equally among− 28 −APEC members. These issues were discussed at this year’s APEC Study Centers Consortium
Conference. Proposals included the following:x The FTAAP must be a legally binding, high standard agreement that is consistent with
the WTO, and includes trans-pacific membership.
x The growth agenda should be innovative, sustainable, inclusive and balanced.
x Achievement of the Bogor goals should strengthen development and include inclusive
strategies to sustain progress for all APEC countries.
Geo-political factors that support the TPP include the increasingly assertive role that China is
playing and the desire of Asian countries to see more US engagement in the region. The speedof enlargement of the TPP, its strong image and membership are also contributing factors. There
are still differences among Koreans and Japanese regarding whether the approach should be
Asian integration first or the TPP; each has positive and negative aspects. Nevertheless, the TPP
is an important part of integration, and a pathway towards FTAAP.
Daniel Price: Senior partner, Sidley Austin LLP
There are three points of significance regarding the TPP and the US, Japan and APEC.
Engagement in the TPP is crucial for the US to:
1. Dispel the notion that the US is not committed to trade and integration. The TPP and
KORUS are critical in this regard.
2. Reinforce the idea that beyond market integration, US leadership is needed in the region.
3. Demonstrate that the US is actively engaged in trade and investment liberalization, anessential component of US-Asian relations.
For Japan:
x If not now, when? The TPP represents a political opportunity to bring Japan into acomprehensive trade pact with the US.
x The US should seek assurance from Japan that they are willing to open their markets andmake concessions. The US should not establish artificial entrance fees.
For APEC:
x The TPP presents an opportunity to galvanize and reorient APEC into a meaningfulnegotiating forum.
x It holds the prospect for APEC to get involved in FTAAP in more than a rhetorical way.

Panel Discussion
Questions regarding the APEC roadmap and future achievements as well as expanding relations
with Asian countries focused on the desire of Asian countries to have more time for open
discussion and the ability to engage in issues. The G20 will play a major role in this in terms of
the institutional capacity of Asia. Regarding US engagement in Asia, Kurt Campbell stressedthat the US is moving in the right direction.
Discussion of Japanese membership focused on the substantial talks that have already takenplace. The current issue is the timing and the way forward. For the first time, the DPJ is having
open discussions on agricultural reform. There have been gradual but continuous talks withparties concerned about competitive liberalization of the agricultural industry and the social− 29 −

benefits of policy reform. The Japanese government seems ready to reform and thus it isimportant for the US to send a message to Japan that they understand and encourage Japan tomove towards reform.
Session II: Shaping the Trans Pacific Partnership: Substance and Membership
Masakazu Toyoda: Chairman and CEO of the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan
Joining the TPP is under serious consideration in Japan; most recently Prime Minister Kan
referenced a feasibility study being conducted domestically. There are global challenges as wellas domestic challenges for Japan gaining membership. APEC can play a role in stimulating
negotiations.
The role of TPP and the challenges going forward:
x Connecting the role of APEC with the TPP: if the TPP can incorporate major APEC
economies, then it can be a vehicle for FTAAP and help Asia continue as a center for
growth.
x For the TPP to address global challenges it must have the right membership, substanceand scope.
x The current nine members are not enough, however membership will probably expand in
the near future as countries like Japan and Canada have signaled their interest in joining.
The TPP is a center of growth and a shortcut to the FTAAP. If countries are willing to
put everything on the table and negotiate, they should be part of the TPP and then
FTAAP.
x A 21st century agreement includes environmental obligations, which should be linked totechnology transfers to developing countries. The TPP could help stimulate slow moving
climate change negotiations.
x What can TPP do for Doha? Negotiations are stagnant and the scope is small. The TPP
can stimulate the Doha round, particularly on issues such as environmental goods andservices.
The challenges for Japan moving forward:
x The impact that Japanese participation would have on food security issues needs to be
discussed.
x There is some concern regarding bilateral issues. For example, beef could be an obstacle
to Japan’s full participation in negotiations. We hope this can be avoided if Japan iswilling to put everything on the table.
x The DPJ is considering income compensation to promote structural reform and enhancecompetitiveness of its agricultural industries. This would reduce the need to exempt farm
products and facilitate Japan’s participation in TPP.
x Japanese participation would not only benefit Japan, but also US-Japan relations and
APEC.
Barbara Weisel: Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Southeast Asia and the Pacific
The TPP is operating in a difficult environment; both in the US and internationally. The US has
partnered with Congress and begun its outreach to stakeholders, which have so far supported US
participation. Overtime we are confident that we will gain consensus on the benefits of TPP.

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There are three main economic goals for the US and TPP members:
x Expand trade across the Asia-Pacific region.
x Negotiate a 21st century trade agreement.
x Develop a pathway for FTAAP.
On expansion:x We are building a regional agreement with one set of rules for all trade and trade relatedcommerce among parties. The nine countries currently negotiating are a coalition of thewilling, committed to this goal; a goal that is more urgent in the wake of the global
financial crisis.
x There is agreement to use a bottom up approach for market access for goods, while
recognizing the sensitivities of each country.
A 21st century agreement:
x As a high standard agreement we want to negotiate the highest common denominator not
the lowest. This means addressing a new set of issues faced by businesses. We havecome up with a set of horizontal issues that we are working on, which have not been
included in past FTAs. They include among others:
1. Regulatory coherence: Develop an approach to eliminate non-tariff barriers,
which pose greater challenges to companies trying to enter foreign markets than
traditional tariffs.
2. Specific sectoral approaches: The goal is to use the TPP to eliminate unnecessary
regulatory barriers and thus make doing business easier, simpler and less costly.
3. Issues of competitiveness and connectivity: Involves lowering costs, enhancing
supply chains, and coordinated efforts to improve the domestic legal environment.
4. Promoting small and medium sized enterprises: This is a priority for the US since
SMEs comprise the majority of US businesses. The question is how to promotetrade, dismantle barriers and look at ways to promote efforts at transparency.
5. Development issues: We are seeking to include countries that are geographicallyand developmentally diverse, and have them fully participate in a high standard
agreement. The focus is on capacity building and technical assistance.
6. Significant work on these issues has been done in APEC over past two decades;
it is valuable to our efforts and we will continue our close partnership with APEC.
A Pathway to FTAAP:
x The goal is to expand the initial group to incorporate countries across the Asia-Pacific,
using the TPP as a platform for enlargement. Malaysia has been successfully
incorporated, which has established that the TPP is capable of adding another country in
the process of negotiations. Other interested countries must be prepared to meet thestandards of the agreement before joining.
x The TPP will be a living agreement; acting as a platform for enlargement. It will include
provisions to expand the substance of the agreement, to reflect new issues andparticipants.

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The challenge ahead is to successfully negotiate an agreement among the nine countries, andfigure out how to deal with an expanding group. Countries must be fully prepared to meet thestandards and should not join if they cannot carry the agreement to its conclusion. Five TPP
negotiating rounds are planned for 2011.
Mark Sinclair: Lead Negotiator, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Trade, New Zealand
The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (the P4) was a long range project; a regional
initiative that grew out of APEC. It was explicitly about making markets work, enhancing thecompetitiveness of commerce and encouraging other APEC economies to join. The P4
incorporated new issues like the environment, telecommunications and labor. The P4 was
supposed to be a model for the Asia-Pacific region and potentially attract new members. This
was accomplished through the creation of the TPP. With the current membership, the next stepis to decide how to make it work as a platform for regional integration.
Liberalization and regional integration are central to the TPP agenda. In order to achieve thesegoals members must look at the path forward:
x TPP membership: is a larger group better? The TPP is premised on expansion, with theultimate goal of creating an FTAAP. However, it is difficult to make progress across
such a large membership (like Doha) and so it makes sense to start with a small group ofcountries and have a deal in place by next year.
x The current members have all negotiated high quality agreements, so we are not startingfrom zero. The way forward is to start with a manageable group and expand from there.
Expansion of the current group should happen relatively promptly.
x Design of the agreement:o The TPP will aim to cut regulatory overhead and red tape that create barriers tooperating in multiple markets, especially for small and medium size companies.
o The P4 template drew heavily on models of US FTAs (for example using anegative list for services). The TPP will also follow this model, drawing on thebest practices from various agreements.
Panel Discussion:
There was discussion of Viet Nam as an outlier in the current group of nine, and how they fit
into the agreement. Viet Nam has achieved high quality FTAs with New Zealand, Australia and
ASEAN. These agreements include commitments on market access, tariff elimination andmodern rules of origin, which gives confidence that Viet Nam should be able to participate innegotiations.
Regarding the status of FTAs already in place, the panel responded that existing agreements will
coexist with the new TPP agreement. This will allow flexibility for governments. If there areareas of conflict they will be addressed on an issue by issue basis.
Issues concerning expansion were discussed in terms of the tension that exists between adding
members that increase economic heft and maintaining the high standards of the agreement.
Negotiators expect new participants to agree to meet the standards set out in the core agreement;
they do not want to lower standards to facilitate accession of new members. This does not mean

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there is an entrance fee, but members must be willing to fully open their markets. If countries
are prepared to move quickly, the current group will bring them in as soon as possible. However,if they cannot move quickly negotiators will work with them in preparation for their
participation. It is for this reason that the living agreement idea was put forward; toaccommodate new changes that might be sought by new members.
The question was raised of when negotiators will cut off the integration of new members and gofor implementation. In response Barbara Weisel and Mark Sinclair noted that, as the current
group of nine gets deeper into drafting text and negotiating specific commitments, the window
for bringing other countries in becomes much tighter. There is no straightforward answer
regarding when to cut off new members so for now, negotiations will be kept open to any
interested countries as long as they are willing to put everything on the table.
Session III: How Congress Views the TPP
Congressman Kevin Brady (Republican-Texas)
The US is falling behind in the Asia-Pacific region. With China’s increasing influence in theregion, the US must play a more active role. With the pending KORUS agreement and TPP
negotiations underway, now is the best time to engage more in the region. The TPP will deepenties with Asia and establish US presence in the region as an effective counterweight to China.
The TPP will continue to grow its membership over time and act as a stepping stone towards a
FTAAP. The TPP should be a high standard agreement; its goals should be to make things
cheaper, faster and easier for economic and trade ties among APEC countries. We should
welcome other countries such as Japan and Canada if they are willing to put all issues on thenegotiating table.
There is strong bipartisan commitment on the TPP. The global recession underscored theimportance of trade; people are frustrated with the lack of a comprehensive trade agenda. Not
only do we need to conclude the TPP agreement, we also need to pass the KORUS, Colombia
and Panama FTAs.
Panel Discussion
Congressman Brady discussed how to link the upcoming APEC summit to the TPP, stressing
the need to ensure that the region understands that Congress is serious about engaging in a
concrete way in the Asia Pacific. The US wants to discuss the relationship going forward andaddress misconceptions such as the US is not serious about engaging in trade. The APEC
summit is an opportune time to engage in face-to-face discussions with other representatives, tobuild up relationships and demonstrate Congress’s support for initiatives like KORUS, TPP and
FTAAP.
Congressman Brady was asked about concerns about the US’s inability to pass FTAs (like
KORUS, Colombia and Panama) and what that means for negotiating future deals. In response
Congressman Brady said that this concern is fair and that there have been problems in recent
years. However if the KORUS FTA is resolved by the G20 summit, he can see movement on the
KORUS as well as the Colombia and Panama FTAs in the first half of 2011. He also noted that,
under a Republican Congress, the President would have a partner in trade if he is serious about
moving forward on FTAs.

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In response to the question of whether Republicans will be willing to devote the necessaryfinancial resources for trade policy, Congressman Brady said he believes that republican leaders
feel strongly that trade is critical to the US economy. It is not enough to buy American, youhave to sell American and this will require building the necessary infrastructure to support trade.
There was discussion of renewing trade promotion authority (TPA). Congressman Brady notedthat it is critical to have fast track procedures for implementing trade agreements, but the subject
had not been discussed much in Congress in recent years. He believes renewing TPA will be on
the agenda next year.
Congressman Brady was asked whether Congress would find it easier to pass TPP with its
current members or with a larger membership. He responded that the ability to pass the TPP
agreement will depend on the nature of the agreement and how meaningful additional members
are.
Regarding progress on the Doha round, Congressman Brady believes there is a closer working
relationship between the republicans and democrats. However, the current agreement does not
go far enough so it is important to flesh out more of what this agreement means.
Session IV: The Trans Pacific Partnership and Prospects for an FTAAP
Yoshihiro Watanabe: Advisor, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd.; APEC Business
Advisory Council Member of Japan
Japan’s businesses are well aware of the strategic importance of the TPP. The key issue for
APEC 2010 is working towards sustainable growth for all. This means (1) an assessment of the
Bogor goals; (2) advancing regional integration towards FTAAP; and (3) a balanced growthstrategy.
ABAC believes that APEC needs a new vision to enhance economic integration, based on theachievement of the Bogor goals but also on the expanding scope of APEC and the changing
business environment. The TPP, ASEAN + 1, ASEAN + 3 and ASEAN + 6 are all potential
pathways to FTAAP.
A study conducted on FTAAP’s effects on liberalization and facilitation of trade showed mixed
results for Japan. However, overall GDP effects are positive and we believe that APEC should
move forward on regional integration. Businesses prefer wider regional agreements andintegration on services.
There are hurdles for Japan in the TPP and ASEAN + pathways. Japan’s membership in the TPP
will depend on negotiations on agriculture, starting with food security and safety. We believethat Japanese agriculture can be reformed and become competitive.
Jeffrey J. Schott: Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics
The TPP participants diverge in size, level of development and attitudes towards civil liberties;
Viet Nam sticks out as an outlier. It will be difficult to come up with development provisions todeal with this group.

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Regulatory coherence raises the question of whether countries will have the administrative
capability to reach high standards in services and new areas. This creates problems ofinternational trade and investment flows.
On the trade side, the goods and services numbers of the core countries are small; however
when you add the extended membership the totals are quite a significant increment. Focusing onservices you see that trade of the core - apart from the US - is quite small. There is opportunity
for growth, particularly with the inclusion of Japan and Korea. The same patterns can be seen
with merchandise trade.
The next question is how to craft the TPP? A big bang negotiation is not feasible, but anincremental agglomeration approach is workable. The extensive network of existing agreements
already provides ample precedents and substantial commitments to liberalization.
How can we merge intra-Asian schemes with broader regional ones? And what about nonAPEC members that are included in the ASEAN + 1 schemes? These raise difficult
development and political questions. Furthermore, if we are talking about the broader transPacific, how will Latin American countries fit in?
The recipe for a 21st century FTA was spelled out well in previous panels: you build on theexisting network of agreements, including “FTA plus” provisions. Negotiators learn by doing. If
you look at recent US FTAs, we have improved on agreements from past decades. No
agreement will be comprehensive, but negotiators should try to limit the number of exceptions
to the greatest extent possible. The TPP should also harmonize rules of origin and improvetransparency of policies affecting trade and investment.
Can Japan afford to join the TPP talks? Can they afford not to participate? Japan already has anextensive network of trade with the TPP core members and within Asia. The TPP can provide achannel for:x Advancing Japan-China and Japan-EU trade pacts.
x Managing the adjustment in the agriculture sector.
x Resumption of the suspended Japan-Korea trade talks.
In order to join, Japan must improve transparency policies affecting trade and investment, which
will require commitments on sensitive farm products and services. Membership is time
sensitive; Japan will lose key market access if the KORUS and Korea-Australia deal are passed.
China’s participation in FTAAP is also crucial. China should be interested in joining because it
already has strong ties with TPP members; agreements in place with four of the eight members,
and negotiations and feasibility studies underway with an additional three members. TPP
negotiators should therefore think about how China fits into the mix in the medium term as well
as moving towards FTAAP. One way to integrate China would be to have them start out as anobserver, or have Hong Kong come on as an observer.
A final point to make is that over time we will see the TPP evolve significantly, which will
require Asian countries to go beyond what they have included in their current FTAs.
Industrialized countries like the US will also have to put something on the table. But for the US− 35 −

there is not much to offer; there are some services regulations and farm trade barriers that could
be opened. To gain political support for removing those barriers, the TPP deal will have to be
big enough to involve sizeable US trade gains with the other TPP participants.
Peter A. Petri: Carl J. Shapiro Professor of International Finance, Brandeis University
and Senior Fellow, East-West Center
The push towards FTAAP can be attributed a great deal to ABAC, who are strong supporters.
Having the APEC 2011 summit in the US will hopefully clarify for Americans the larger
context of integration. In the long run integration is about knitting Asia-Pacific together into one
region. Integration has huge benefits for prosperity, innovation and stability, which must be kept
in mind while moving forward.
In our study (conducted with Michael Plummer of Johns Hopkins University and the East-WestCenter, and Fan Zhai of the China Investment Corporation) we explore the dynamic path ofagreements and estimate the implications for economies joining at different points in time. How
do incentives evolve as countries do or do not join? The baseline scenario (of doing nothing)has two alternatives: (1) the ASEAN base moving towards FTAAP; (2) the TPP track.
The model incorporates broad economic effects including tariff elimination, services
liberalization, trade facilitation and investment. Once we have a clearer idea of the nature of the
TPP agreement, we can model it more accurately. In our preliminary results we found that:x The TPP track (in addition to the ASEAN track) generates substantial benefits for Northand South American economies, as well as Asian countries.
x Dynamics matter: moving from TPP 8 to 13 roughly quintuples gains. Moving from TPP
13 to FTAAP doubles gains. The speed at which countries move along the path also
makes a substantial difference.
x On the TPP track, the US benefits reach 1.5 percent of GDP. Small open economies suchas Viet Nam, Malaysia and Thailand gain the most. Japan also benefits a great deal.
x If the US does not participate in the Asian track, it does not appear to have a major effecton the US since some discrimination would be balanced off against improved terms oftrade.
x US export and output gains are concentrated in services and agriculture rather thanmanufacturing.
x Trade in some agricultural products could rise dramatically under 100 percent
liberalization; hence political feasibility might require some exceptions.
x Results show that if China joins they may become the largest beneficiary from this path.
The agreement has to be seen as a tool to unite the region and therefore we have to be vigorous
about a living agreement to create an accessible path for future participants. We should keep thisvision in mind and eventually all members should be welcome.
Panel Discussion:
Questions were raised about the model used by Professor Petri and the difficulty of modelingthe removal of barriers to services, as well as the characteristics and assumptions of acomputable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Professor Petri explained that he and hiscolleagues have tried to collect different measures to get a scale of distortions in services and− 36 −

that by the end of the project they will have range of estimates. The important characteristics ofa CGE model are that it assumes close to full employment and then asks how much more
efficiently the economy can operate if it produced those goods in which it has a competitive
advantage. As the specifics of the agreement become clearer, the outcome can be modeled moreaccurately.
There was also discussion about China’s current FTAs and its participation in the TPP. Jeff
Schott explained that China’s trade agreements, such as China-ASEAN, are more political andbased on shallow integration. However this is not the case in more recent agreement such as the
China-New Zealand FTA, which goes much further and has useful precedents. The agreement
could help in the transition process of moving from a big outsider to a more involved country.
The question of competitive liberalization and the multiple pathways to FTAAP was raised.
How will countries decide which eggs to put in which basket? The response was thatcompetitive liberalization already exists in Asia. In terms of different approaches to integration
there is the traditional Asia approach which is more consensus oriented and built on more
shallow integration. The US approach (which seems to be gaining favor around the world) is amore legalistic approach with hard obligations that promote policy predictability to encourage
investment and enhance productivity. Having a living agreement is an important part ofenlarging the TPP and dealing with non-APEC participants.
With regard to China joining the TPP within the next year, the panel believes it would be apremature decision and would likely kill the deal since it would not be possible to move toward
free trade at this point in time. However Chinese participation will be critical to success of theeventual integration effort; preparations should be undertaken to pave the way for China to join
the talks in the coming years.
The question of how to pass TPP in a Congress that is suspicious about free trade focused on
two compelling arguments that give the TPP a good chance of winning Congressional approval.
1. If the architectural outcome is for Asia only agreements with the prospect of significant
discrimination against US trade, the US will have to participate.
2. Foreign policy and national security ultimately determine the outcome of US trade
policy. Reports from Asia are that the US will be left behind and China will dominate
the region if the US does not move ahead with economic agreements.
Furthermore a 21st century agreement requires countries to bring their standards up to the levelof industrial countries, which means less change is required in US practices. The challenge for
US is that it still has restrictions and will be pressured to change them. These changes will
require enough benefits to generate political support that would offset criticism from protective
industries.
Finally the role of economic cooperation and narrowing the gap of economic development in the
TPP and FTAAP was discussed. Two main points were put forward:
1. The theme of sustainable growth for all should be maintained.
2. The TPP already has capacity building and technical assistance built into it thatmight contribute to these issues; drawing on initiatives already in train in APEC and
ASEAN.

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Session V: Conclusions and Recommendations
C. Fred Bergsten: Director, Peterson Institute for International Economics
C. Fred Bergsten outlined four points, viewed as essential for moving forward on Asia-Pacificintegration.
1. There must be a clear and credible deadline for the TPP negotiations. The Doha Rounddemonstrates the costs of allowing trade talks to drift when officials do not set a credible
deadline for concluding negotiations. At the upcoming APEC summit in Yokohama,leaders from the TPP participating countries should tell their ministers to conclude the
TPP agreement by the APEC meetings in Honolulu in November 2011.
2. Bigger is better. For TPP to succeed there has to be enough on the table to allow
negotiators to craft a substantial package of trade reforms. This means expanding thecore group as soon as possible to ensure that the first tranche of TPP countries covers alarge volume of trade in goods and services.
3. There should be no preconditions; everything should be on the table ab initio. This runs
counter to the current US position that the TPP adopt market access schedules fromexisting FTAs. Whether exceptions in trade pacts among TPP participants—like theexemption of sugar from the US-Australia pact--are maintained or not should be decided
in the course of negotiations. Too rigid a stance on exceptions could discourage
participation in the overall deal. Countries should try to resolve substantive differences
in a way that promotes the most valuable deal with the broadest membership.
4. We have reached a consensus that it is crucial to maintain the link between the TPP and
the FTAAP. Current participants see the TPP as a stepping stone to FTAAP; this is
helpful for negotiations and the end game. If countries believe the core group intends topush towards a comprehensive APEC agreement, it increases the incentive to join earlieron.
Noboru Hatakeyama: Chairman and CEO of the Japan Economic Foundation
Noboru Hatakeyama summarized his thoughts on the necessary steps to deepen regional
integration, focusing on four key points.
1. It is necessary to put everything on the table. This means we have to accept that there are
no exceptions, at least at the start of the talks. This implies that at the end ofnegotiations, there may be some exceptions.
2. Ruling out preconditions is another necessity. All sensitive sectors should be subject tothe negotiations; the extent of reforms should be determined in the course of thenegotiations.
3. The TPP must be a high standard agreement. However, there needs to be flexibility toaddress major political concerns. As the Japanese saying goes “if the water in the pond
is too clean, then the fish cannot live.”
4. In the Hanoi declaration in 2006, FTAAP was mentioned for the first time as a long term
perspective. However it is not so long term anymore; ten years from now is not a longtime and we must work together towards achieving this goal.

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7. ⊒⴫⾗ᢱ
PowerPoint by Presenters:

Session II: Shaping the Trans Pacific Partnership: Substance and Membership
ԘMasakazu Toyoda, Chairman and CEO of the Institute of Energy Economies, Japan
ԙMark Sinclair, Lead Negotiator, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs andTrade (MFAT), New Zealand

Session IV: The Trans Pacific Partnership and Prospects for an FTAAPԚYoshihiro Watanabe, Advisor, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd; 

APEC Business Advisory Council Member of Japan

ԛJeffrey J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Discussants:
ԜPeter A. Petri, Carl J. Shapiro Professor of InternationalFinance, Brandeis University and Senior Fellow, East-West Center਄⸥⊒⴫⾗ᢱߪ‫ޔ‬ᑷ⽷࿅ࡎ࡯ࡓࡍ࡯ࠫߦឝタߒߡ޿߹ߔ‫ޕ‬
URL : http://www.jef.or.jp/en_act/act_japan_us.asp− 39 −

Ԙ Masakazu Toyoda, Chairman and CEO of the Institute of Energy Economies, Japan− 40 −

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ԙ Mark Sinclair,  Lead Negotiator, Trans-Pacific Partnership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and        Trade  (MFAT), New Zealand− 44 −

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Ԛ Yoshihiro Watanabe, Advisor, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd;APEC Business Advisory Council Member of Japan− 49 −

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ԜPeter A. Petri, Carl J. Shapiro Professor of InternationalFinance,
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8. ᦭⼂⠪ߣߩ㕙ળ⇗ጊⶪ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅ળ㐳ߪ‫ ࡦ࠻ࡦࠪࡢޔ‬DC ߢߩࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓ㐿௅ߩᓟߦ࠾ࡘ࡯࡛࡯ࠢ
ߦᣈ޿ߡ‫ࠕࡆࡦࡠࠦ ࠖ࠹ࡢࠣࡃ࡮ࡘࠪࠖ࠹ࠣࡖࠫޔ‬ᄢቇᢎ᝼ߣ㕙ળߒᗧ⷗੤឵ࠍⴕߞߚ‫ޕ‬
1. 㐿௅ᣣᤨ㧦2. ႐2010 ᐕ 1 ᦬ 26 ᣣ㧔Ἣ㧕18:30PM㨪20:30PMᚲ㧦 ࠾ࡘ࡯࡛࡯ࠢᏒౝ

4. ห Ꮸ ⠪㧦ࠫࡖࠣ࠹ࠖࠪࡘ࡮ࡃࠣࡢ࠹ࠖ ࠦࡠࡦࡆࠕᄢቇ ᢎ᝼  ☨ᄖ੤໧㗴⹏⼏ળ ࠪ࠾ࠕࡈࠚࡠ࡯

5. ౝ

ኈ㧦

૒⮮ ᮸৻㇢JETRO ࠾ࡘ࡯࡛࡯ࠢ࠮ࡦ࠲࡯ ᚲ㐳⇗ጊ ⶪ

㧔⽷㧕࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅ ળ㐳੗਄ ൎ

㧔⽷㧕࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ᧚⽷࿅ ᬺോㇱ㐳ࡃࠣࡢ࠹ࠗᢎ᝼ߣߩᗧ⷗੤឵

࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅⇗ጊળ㐳‫ޔ‬੗਄ᬺോㇱ㐳ߪࡢࠪࡦ࠻ࡦ DC ߦ߅ߌࠆᣣ☨ࠞࡦࡈࠔ࡟ࡦࠬ
⚳ੌᓟߦ࠾ࡘ࡯࡛࡯ࠢߦ⿞߈‫ࠕࡆࡦࡠࠦࠖ࠹ࡢࠣࡃޔ‬ᄢቇᢎ᝼㧔☨࿖ᄖ੤໧㗴⹏⼏ળࠪ࠾ࠕࡈࠚࡠ࡯㧕ߣ TPP ࠍਛᔃߣߔࠆࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߦ߅ߌࠆ⥄↱⾏ᤃ࿤ഃ⸳ߦߟ޿ߡᗧ⷗੤
឵ࠍⴕߞߚ‫ޕ‬⇗ጊળ㐳ߪࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ࿾ၞߦ߅ߌࠆੑ࿖㑆 FTA ߩ߶߆ EAFTA, CEPEA, TPP ߥߤ࿾ၞ⚻ᷣ⛔วߩᦨㄭߩേ߈߿࠼࡯ࡂ࡮࡜࠙ࡦ࠼ߩ஗ṛߥߤᣣ☨ࠞࡦࡈࠔ࡟ࡦࠬߦ߅ߌࠆ⼏⺰ࠍ⚫
੺ߒߥ߇ࠄ APEC ࠍࡌ࡯ࠬߣߔࠆ FTAAP ߦะߌߚ੹ᓟߩ⷗ㅢߒࠍㅀߴߚ‫ߦࠇߎޕ‬ኻߒߡࡃࠣࡢ࠹ࠗᢎ᝼ߪ࠼࡯ࡂ࡮࡜࠙ࡦ࠼੤ᷤ߇᳿ⵚߒߚ޿߈ߐߟ߿ฦ࿖ߩኻᔕ߱ࠅ࡮੹ᓟߩ⷗ㅢߒ
ߥߤߦߟ޿ߡᗧ⷗ࠍㅀߴࠆߣߣ߽ߦ‫ߩߎޔ‬࿾ၞߦ߅ߌࠆਛ࿖ߩบ㗡ߥߤߦ⸒෸ߒߥ߇ࠄ‫ߘޔ‬ߩࠞ࠙ࡦ࠲࡯ࡃ࡜ࡦࠬߣߒߡߩࠗࡦ࠼ߩᓎഀࠍᒝ⺞ߔࠆߣߣ߽ߦᣣශ㑐ଥߩ৻ጀߩᒝൻ߇߹
ߔ߹ߔ㊀ⷐߦߥߞߡߊࠆߣㅀߴߚ‫ޕ‬ ߹ߚਛ࿖‫ߤߥ࠼ࡦࠗޔ‬ᣂ⥝൓ജ߇บ㗡ߔࠆߥ߆ߢᣂߚߥࠣࡠ࡯ࡃ࡞࡮ࠟࡃ࠽ࡦࠬߩ޽ࠅᣇ
߇ᮨ⚝ߐࠇߡ޿ࠆߎߣߦ㑐ㅪߒߡ G8, G20 ߥߤᣢሽߩᨒ⚵ߺߦኻߒߡฦ࿖ߩ GDP ߿ੱญߥߤቴⷰ⊛ߥၮḰߦၮߠߊᣂߚߥ G10 ഃ⸳᩺ࠍ⇗ጊળ㐳߇ឭ⿠ߒ‫ࠗ࠹ࡢࠣࡃޔ‬ᢎ᝼ߪߎߩឭ᩺
ߦᒝ޿㑐ᔃࠍ␜ߒߚ‫ޕ‬− 75 −

9. ᚑᨐ
੹࿁ߩࡈࠜ࡯࡜ࡓߩᚑᨐߣߒߡߪએਅߩὐ߇᜼ߍࠄࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬1㧕ᧄᐕ 11 ᦬ߦߪ㧳20㧔࠰࠙࡞㧕‫ޔ‬APEC 㚂⣖ળ⼏㧔ᮮᵿ㧕߇㐿௅‫ޕ‬APEC 㚂⣖ળ⼏߇ᣣᧄߢ㐿௅ߐࠇࠆߎߣࠍⷞ㊁ߦ౉ࠇ‫☨ޔ‬࿖஥౒௅࿅૕㧔Peterson Institute for International
Economics㧕ߣߩ㑆ߢඨᐕ߶ߤ೨ࠃࠅද⼏ࠍⴕ޿‫ޔ‬TPP㧔Ⅳᄥᐔᵗ⚻ᷣㅪ៤දቯ㧕ࠍ࠹࡯ࡑߣߔࠆࠞࡦࡈࠔ࡟ࡦࠬࠍ☨࿖ࡢࠪࡦ࠻ࡦ㧰㧯ߦᣈ޿ߡ 10 ᦬ᧃߦ౒௅ߔࠆߎߣߢวᗧ‫⚿ޕ‬ᨐ⊛ߦ‫߇ࡑ࡯࠹ߪࠬࡦ࡟ࠔࡈࡦࠞޔ‬㕖Ᏹߦ࠲ࠗࡓ࡝࡯ߢ‫ࠍ▵ᤨޔ‬ᓧߚ㐿௅ߢ޽ߞߚὐ߇޽ߍࠄ
ࠇࠆ‫ޕ‬2㧕ࠪࡦࡐࠫ࠙ࡓߦߪ‫ ⚂ޔ‬150 ฬߩ⡬ⴐ߇᧪႐‫ޕ‬᡽ᐭ㑐ଥ⠪‫ޔ‬ᄢ૶㙚‫ޔ‬࿖㓙ᯏ㑐ࠍߪߓ߼‫ޔ‬ࠪࡦࠢ࠲ࡦࠢ‫ޔ‬ᄢቇ‫ޔ‬᳃㑆ડᬺ‫ޔ‬ਗ߮ߦฦ࿖ࡔ࠺ࠖࠕ߇⚂ 40 ฬ㧔ᣣᧄ‫☨ޔ‬࿖‫ޔ‬ਛ࿖‫ޔ‬㖧࿖╬㧕಴Ꮸߒߚਛߢ㐿௅ߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬ฦ࠮࠶࡚ࠪࡦߦ߅ߌࠆ⾰⇼ᔕ╵ߢߪ‫ޔ‬⡬ⴐ߆ࠄᄙᢙߩ⾰⇼‫ޔ‬ࠦࡔࡦ࠻߇޽ࠅ‫߽⇼⾰ߩࠄ߆ࠕࠖ࠺ࡔߚ߹ޔ‬ᄙᢙ಴ߐࠇ‫ޔ‬ਛߢ߽ਛ࿖♽ࡔ࠺ࠖࠕ߆ࠄߪⶄᢙ
࿁ߩ⾰⇼߇޽ߞߚ‫ޔߡߓ✚ޕ‬ห࠹࡯ࡑ߳ߩ㑐ᔃߩ㜞ߐ߇ુࠊࠇߚ‫ޕ‬
3㧕ળ⼏ߩᄢ߈ߥᚑᨐߣߒߡߪ‫ޔ‬ᣣ☨෺ᣇߦ߅޿ߡ TPP ߦߟ޿ߡ৻ቯߩวᗧ߇⷗ࠄࠇߚߎߣ
߇޽ߍࠄࠇࠆ‫☨ޕ‬࿖஥ߩឭ⸒ߪਅ⸥ߩ྾ὐ‫ޕ‬ԘTPP ߩ੤ᷤߦߪᦼ㒢ࠍ⸳ቯߔߴ߈‫ޕ‬ԙෳട࿖ߪᄙ޿ᣇ߇ࠃ޿‫ޕ‬ԚTPP ੤ᷤߦ㓙ߒߡߪ೨ឭ᧦ઙ㧔଀ᄖຠ⋡╬㧕ࠍߪߓ߼߆ࠄ⸳ߌࠆߴ߈ߢ
ߪߥ޿‫ޕ‬ԛTPP ߪ FTAAP㧔ࠕࠫࠕᄥᐔᵗ⥄↱⾏ᤃ࿤㧕߳ߩࡆ࡞࠹ࠖࡦࠣ࡮ࡉࡠ࠶ࠢߣ޿߁
૏⟎ߠߌߣߔߴ߈‫ޕ‬੤ᷤߦ㓙ߒߡߪ৻ㅪߩ⛮⛯ᕈ߇ᄢ੐ߢ޽ࠆ‫߁޿ߣޔ‬ὐ߇ᜰ៰ߐࠇߚ‫ߎޕ‬ࠇߦኻߒ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ஥߆ࠄߪߎࠇࠄߩឭ᩺ߦၮᧄ⊛ߦวᗧࠍ␜ߒߚ਄ߢ‫ޔߒߛߚޔ‬ฦ࿖੐ᖱࠍ⠨ᘦߔࠆᔅⷐߪ޽ࠆߣߒߡ‫ޔ‬ฦ࿖ߦߪ޽ࠆ⒟ᐲ࠮ࡦࠪ࠹ࠖࡉߥຠ⋡߇޽ࠆߚ߼‫ߩߘޔ‬ὐߪ⠨ᘦߐࠇࠆߴ߈ߢ޽ࠈ߁ߣ޿߁ឭ᩺߇޽ߞߚ‫ޕ‬ᣣᧄߩ⻊ߢ‫ޟ‬᳓ᷡߌࠇ߫㝼᫮߹ߕ‫ޔߡߍ޽ࠍޠ‬TPP߳ߩෳടߩࡂ࡯࠼࡞߇޽߹ࠅߦ㜞޿ߎߣߢㅒߦ⥄↱⾏ᤃߩᅹߍߦߥߞߡߪ޿ߌߥ޿ߣㅀߴߚ‫ޕ‬
ᧄᐕ 11 ᦬ߩᣣᧄߢߩ APEC 㚂⣖ળ⼏㧔ᮮᵿ㧕ߦ߅ߌࠆ⼏㐳࿖ߣߒߡߩᣣᧄߩᓎഀߣᚑᨐ‫ޔ‬⠉ᐕߩ☨࿖㧔ࡂࡢࠗ㧕ߢߩ㐿௅߳ߩ☨࿖ߩᓎഀߣߘߩᚑᨐߦኻߒߡᦼᓙ߇␜ߐࠇߚ‫ޕ‬
4㧕ߎߩࠃ߁ߥ࿖㓙ળ⼏ߩ㐿௅ߦ޽ߚߞߡߪ‫੹ޔ‬ᓟ߽޿߆ߦ࠲ࠗࡓ࡝࡯ߥ࠹࡯ࡑࠍ⸳ቯߒ‫ޔ‬ㆡಾߥᤨᦼߦ‫ޔ‬ㆡಾߥᒻᑼ㧔౏㐿‫ޔ‬㕖౏㐿㧕ߢ㐿௅ߔࠆ߆߇㊀ⷐ‫ߩߎޔߚ߹ޕ‬⒳ߩኻ⹤ࡈࠜ
࡯࡜ࡓࠍ੹ᓟ߽⛮⛯⊛ߦ㐿௅ߒ‫ޔ‬ᣣ☨෺ᣇߩ㑐ᔃࠍ㜞߼‫౒ޔ‬ㅢߩ⼏㗴ߦߟ޿ߡ⼏⺰߇ߟߊߐࠇࠆ႐ࠍ᦭ലߦឭଏߒߡ޿ߊߎߣ߇ᔅⷐ‫ߩ߼ߚߩߘޕ‬ㆡಾߥળ⼏౒௅⠪‫ޔ‬ળ⼏಴Ꮸ⠪ߩㆬቯ
߇㊀ⷐߣߥࠆ‫੹ޕ‬࿁ߩࠞࡦࡈࠔ࡟ࡦࠬߩ㐿௅ߢߪߎࠇࠄߩὐߦ߅޿ߡᦼᓙߔࠆᚑᨐࠍ಴ߔߎ
ߣ߇ߢ߈ߚ‫☨ޔߦ․ޕ‬࿖஥ࡄࡀ࡝ࠬ࠻ߣߒߡ‫࡞ࡌࡦࡖࠠ࡮࠻࡯ࠞޔ‬࿖ോᰴቭ⵬ߩ಴Ꮸ߇޽ߞ
ߚߎߣߪ⡬ⴐߩᵈ⋡ᐲ߽㜞ߊࠃ޿⚿ᨐߣߥߞߚ‫ޕ‬ળ⼏ᚑᨐߩᐢႎᵴേߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫⽷ޔ‬࿅ࡎ࡯ࡓࡍ࡯ࠫߦ߅޿ߡߥࠆߴߊ⹦⚦ߥౝኈࠍឝタߒ‫ޔ‬ߘߩᚑᨐࠍᐢߊ᥉෸ߐߖࠆࠃ߁ദ߼ߡ޿ࠆ‫ޕ‬߹ߚ‫ޔ‬ᣣᧄ஥಴Ꮸ⠪ߦኻߒታᣉߒߚࠕࡦࠤ࡯࠻࿁╵ࠃࠅ‫☨ޔ‬࿖᦭⼂⠪ߩ TPP ߦኻߔࠆ⠨߃ᣇ߇ࠃࠅࠢ࡝ࠕߦߥࠅᣣᧄߩߣࠆߴ߈ኻᔕ߇␜ߐࠇߡᄢᄌෳ⠨ߦߥߞߚ‫࡝ࡓࠗ࠲ߢ߹ߎߎޕ‬࡯ߥ࠹࡯ࡑࠍᛒߞߚߎߣߪ⚛᥍ࠄߒ޿ߣᕁ߁ߣ޿ߞߚࠦࡔࡦ࠻ࠍ޿ߚߛ޿ߚ‫ޔߒߛߚޕ‬ฦ࠮࠶࡚ࠪࡦߩᤨ㑆ࠍ߽߁ዋߒ㐳ߊߒߡ‫࠻ࠬ࡝ࡀࡄޔ‬㑆ߩ⼏⺰߇߽߁ዋߒ޽ߞߚᣇ߇ࠃ߆ߞߚࠃ
߁ߦᕁ߁‫ޕ‬㐿௅ߩ࠲ࠗࡒࡦࠣ߇ APEC ળวߩ⋥೨ㆊ߉ߚᗵ߽߿߿޽ߞߚߩߢ‫߁߽ޔ‬ዋߒᣧ޿ᤨᦼߦ㐿௅ߒળ⼏ᚑᨐࠍ〯߹߃ߡ㑐ଥ⠪ߣ৻⥸ߩੱߦࡔ࠶࠮࡯ࠫࠍ⊒ାߔࠆߣ޿߁ߩߪߤ߁
߆‫ߚߞ޿߁ߎޕߚߞ޽߽࠻ࡦࡔࠦߚߞ޿ߣޔ‬಴Ꮸ⠪߆ࠄነߖࠄࠇߚ⾆㊀ߥᗧ⷗ߦߟ޿ߡߪ‫ޔ‬੹ᓟߩࡈࠜ࡯࡜ࡓㆇ༡ߩ㓙ߦචಽߦᓎ┙ߡߡ޿߈ߚ޿‫ޕ‬− 76 −

10. ੐ോዪ
㧨ᣣᧄ஥㧪
⽷࿅ᴺੱ࿖㓙⚻ᷣ੤ᵹ⽷࿅㧔Japan Economic Foundation㧕
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ࠗࡌࡦ࠻ࠦࡒࡘ࠾࡯ࠤ࡯࡚ࠪࡦዪ ༡ᬺ 1 ㇱ⬒ᳰ ℂ㚅 (email: hasuike050@jtbcom.co.jp)㧨☨࿖஥㧪
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Address: 750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036-1903, U.S.A.
Tel:

1-(202)-328-9000 (main)

Fax:

1-(202)-659-3225 (main)

URL:

http://www.iie.com/

Contact: Jeffrey Schott, Senior Fellow (email: jschott@piie.com)
Yvonne Priestly, Meetings coordinator (email:ypriestley@piie.com)− 77 −                              
ᐔᚑ 22 ᐕ 12 ᦬
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