Report on the ‘experts round-table’

New Security Challenges – New Responsibilities.
German-Japanese Security Dialog
4 April 2014, at the Japanese-German Center Berlin
By Lorenz DENNINGER, Freie Universität Berlin

On 4 April 2014, Japanese and German officials and experts convened in theJapanese-German Center Berlin (JDZB) for a round-table discussion on changes inJapan’s and Germany’s respective security policy, new security challenges andresponsibilities. Possible areas for security cooperation between the two countries
were also discussed. The round-table took place against the backdrop of both theJapanese and German government having recently announced significant changes intheir respective security policy. Furthermore, current and alarming developments inEastern Europe and a deteriorating security environment in East Asia, due respectively
to the Ukraine crisis and China’s increasingly assertive behavior in the region,
provided the topical background. Thus, the round-table discussion could hardly havebeen timelier.
As a prelude to the round-table discussion, a public panel discussion took place in
the Academy of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation on the evening of 3 April 2014.
Security experts from Japan and Germany discussed a wide range of issues, such as
German and Japanese respective new security policy, changes in the East Asian andEuropean security environment and the global security strategy of the US.
Participants agreed that the rise of China as well as Russia’s behavior in the Ukraine
constituted great security challenges. Therefore, they required new policy
approaches and strengthened cooperation between all stakeholders. Interestingly,
while Japanese participants pointed out that Tokyo’s room for maneuver for security
policy remains very constraint, German counterparts argued that Berlin still lags
behind its possibilities due to a lack of strategic vision, especially towards Asia. The
1

participants further agreed that the crisis in Ukraine will most likely affect NATO’s
and the United States’ strategy. However, the Japanese panelists were more
pessimistic about the continued security commitment of the US in East Asia than
German participants were. All contributors agreed on the need for strengthened
consultation and cooperation between Germany and Japan.
Experts Round-table on 4 April 2014
I. Panel
1) The first panel dealt with the regional security situation in East Asia. The firstpanelist outlined what, from Japan’s perspective, currently constitute the greatest
risks for regional and Japanese security. While East Asia remains a region full of
security risks, the Japanese government considers North Korea’s and China’s behavior
the most threatening. For more than a decade by now, Pyongyang has posed a
security threat due to its repeated ballistic missile tests and its sustained nuclear
weapons program. However, in the Japanese government’s view, the graver security
challenge is currently posed by China, which not only continues its opaque militarybuild-up, but has in recent years also acted increasingly assertive towards its
neighbors. Especially China’s behavior in the dispute around a group of islands in the
East China Sea, which Japan calls Senkaku and China Diaoyu, as well as in other
territorial disputes in the South China Sea with neighboring states, is cause for great
concern. The panelist believed that China was, in the long run, trying to alter thecurrent status quo of Japan controlling the islets by employing means such as
frequently allowing Chinese vessels and aircrafts to enter the contested territory
surrounding the islands or by including the contested territory into its recently
proclaimed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). To counter China’s new
assertiveness, the Japanese government relies predominantly on cooperation withother states in the region, such as Australia, India, and the ASEAN states.
Furthermore, the Japanese government also wishes for deeper security cooperation
with the EU. However, the presenter pointed out that Tokyo has at times perceived
the EU’s policies for East Asia as not being very helpful. The most important task andcurrent aim of the Japanese government, he finally explained, is to strengthen highlevel dialogue with Chinese decision-makers and to develop security mechanisms,
such as a hotline between the coast guards of both countries.
22) In his comment, the second panelist gave an outline of the relevance of East Asian
security problems and developments from a German perspective and suggested
ways of reducing tensions in the region. He emphasized that Germany, as a major
manufacturing and exporting nation, was very much dependent on a stable andpeaceful East Asia and was thus a concerned stakeholder in the region. Therefore, heargued, maintaining dialogue on as many levels as possible was of the upmost
importance to prevent a deterioration of the East Asian security situation andespecially a worsening of Japanese-Chinese relations. The commentator further
argued that unfortunately East Asia lacked an institutionalized security architecture,such as for example the OSCE in Europe. Asian nations should invest more efforts indeveloping multilateral security institutions and mechanisms, preferably under the
ASEAN framework. The commentator further explained that from Germany’s
perspective North Korea, due to its irrational and belligerent behavior, continued topose a far greater threat than rising China. Therefore, it should be in the common
interest of Japan, China and South Korea to work together to defuse the North Korea
security threat. Finally, he explained that from a German perspective, Japan andSouth Korea seemed to be natural allies since they have common political andeconomic interests and goals. Therefore, it would be advisable for both countries totry harder to solve the historical issues that are causes of conflict and regularly lead todiplomatic tensions.
3) In the ensuing Q&A session, the discussion focused on issues such as the benefitsof better relations between Japan and South Korea, the development of regional
security institutions, the role of China and the question of the US’ security
commitment in East Asia. Concerning a rapprochement between Tokyo and Seoul,
Japanese participants pointed out that the South Korean government currently
pursued a clearly anti-Japanese foreign policy and could therefore not be regarded asa trustworthy partner. Furthermore, skepticism on the notion of both China andSouth Korea playing a constructive role in solving the North Korean security problem
was voiced. Japanese counterparts were also skeptical on the issue of developing anorganization in East Asia like the OSCE. A prerequisite for such an endeavor would bethat all involved parties respected and upheld existing borders, something that3

Beijing, from Japan’s perspective, does not do. In general, Japanese participants
repeatedly voiced skepticism of transferring European concepts to East Asia, which
was shaped by very different historical experiences and thus possessed a differing
security environment. Therefore, they asked their German counterparts to be
cautious not to view East Asia’s security situation from a Eurocentric perspective.
German participants, on the other hand, stressed that attempts should be made tointegrate China more strongly in regional strategies and institutions. China, theyargued, was bound to act more responsibly in the future, simply because it was in its
economic and political interest to ensure worldwide stability. Japanese counterparts,
however, upheld their position that at the moment China did not constitute a
trustworthy

partner.

Furthermore,

Japaneseparticipants

expressed

doubtsconcerning the US security commitment to Asia, especially in the face of new
tensions erupting in Eastern Europe.
II. Panel
1) The second panel focused on German security policy (GSP) and its recentchanges. The first panelist outlined the old and particularly the new aspects ofGermany’s security strategy and explained how the latter have already shaped recent
German foreign policy decisions. He stressed that the fundamentals of GSP had notchanged; policy aims continued to be the deepening of European integration andGermany’s commitment to transatlantic partnerships with the US and within theNATO framework. The guiding normative principles shaping GSP were still
protecting and upholding human rights as well as supporting democratic values andthe rule of law. Furthermore, Germany would continue to prioritize multilateralefforts and institutions in its foreign and security policy implementation. An
important novelty, however, was the intent to pursue these aims earlier, moredecisively and more substantially – in short: more proactively. The speaker gave four
examples of recent German foreign policy measures that were marked by such astronger proactive stance. First, the German government from the outset pursued avery active diplomacy in order to quickly resolve the crisis in the Ukraine, e.g.
spearheading a joint diplomatic mission with France and Poland that was aimed atquickly ending the crisis. Second, Germany recently pursued a very active diplomacy
in Syria; for instance, the government offered in January to help to destroy stocks of4chemical weapons. Further examples were an enhanced engagement in Africa, forexample in Mali and, finally, the seeking of strengthened bilateral security relations
with France and Poland, the latter becoming increasingly a close partner toGermany. Concluding, the panelist remarked that cooperation with Japan remained
very important for Germany since both countries have common goals and pursue
foreign policies based on the same values.
2) In his comment, the second panelist elaborated on Japan’s perspective on
Germany’s and especially on Europe’s security policy as well as recent developments
in Eastern Europe. First, he outlined important steps that had been taken to deepen
Japan-EU cooperation and argued that this cooperation should be developed further.
Second, while he emphasized that Japan strongly welcomed a deepening of JapanEU cooperation, he also pointed out that from Tokyo’s perspective there often
remained a lack of mutual understanding. For instance, Japanese often had theimpression that European counterparts lack understanding about the differences
between their respective security environments. Europeans, in the panelist’s view,should pay more attention to the plethora of open and underlying conflicts thatpersist in East Asia, many of them remnants from the period of the Cold War.
Furthermore, in the past, Japanese participants in EU-Japan meetings often felt thatthey were being ‘lectured’ on how to correctly develop and pursue security policy.
Furthermore, the commentator explained the Japanese government’s stance towards
the Ukraine crisis. The current administration viewed the crisis in Eastern Europe as amajor threat to global security and thus to its own security, not least because it
would possibly jeopardize or decrease the US’ security commitment to Asia. In
reference to Japan’s recent and often stated aims to change its security policy, as for
instance in the recently – and first ever – published national security strategy and theannouncement from early April to lift the ban on arms exports, the speaker explainedthat they were not really as new as proclaimed. Rather, these issues had been part ofpolitical discussions for quite some time and were to some extent already initiated by
the previous government under DPJ rule. In comparison to German security policychanges, he finally remarked that he had the impression that the German public
accepted these changes more easily than the Japanese public, which is much warier5

on such policy shifts. The same applied to the general acceptance of respective
defense budgets.
3) In the following Q&A session issues such as the seriousness of Germany’s reactions
to possibly continued destabilizing action by Russia, likely consequence of the
Ukraine crisis for NATO and the question of public support for security policy
measures were discussed. A Japanese participant expressed doubts that, due to its
economic and energy dependence on Russia, Germany would stay the course of
deciding on tough measures in case Russia should continue its destabilizing behavior.
In his response, however, the first panelist emphasized that, even though economic
interests – among many others – were important, economic repercussions would not
keep the German government from pursuing far-reaching measures should these bedeemed necessary. Regarding possible consequences from Russia’s behavior in the
Ukraine, German participants stressed that the current crisis has already affecteddiscussions within NATO concerning its strategic purpose and future development; inparticular, Moscow’s behavior will affect strategies of ballistic missile defense, NATO’s
future stance towards Russia, and questions of NATO’s tasks in general. German
participants pointed out that while discussions about and acceptance of the necessityof a more proactive German security policy were quite common among experts andpolicy makers, the German public was far more wary on this. Especially theparticipation in military operations and the arms exports were issues of great
contention. The Japanese panelist argued that this resembled the situation in Japanvery much. However, he pointed out that Germany’s security policy was alreadymuch more “normal” (i.e. concerning its scope for military action) than Japan’s,which continued to be highly circumscribed by its constitutional and politicalprovisions.
[Luncheon Speech][In a highly illuminating luncheon speech, an expert on Eastern Europe and relations
between Europe and the US explained the origins of and possible consequences
resulting from the current crisis in Ukraine. The speaker explained that theannexation of the Crimea by Russia as a reaction to the ousting of the pro-Russian
government by pro-EU political actors could and should have been anticipated.
6

Russia had been feeling increasingly threatened by the growing influence of the EU
in neighboring countries and NATO’s enlargement over the last years. The current
crisis, it was pointed out, was at heart not about Ukraine, but about very different
geopolitical and systemic concepts and approaches by Russia on the one hand andthe EU and the US on the other. The crisis would have lasting effects on the security
within Europe, on EU-Russia relations as well as on relations between Western
European and Eastern European states, with the latter feeling highly threatened by
Russia’s course of action and finding it very difficult to make themselves heard within
the EU. Finally, another likely effect resulting from the crisis would be a reinvigorationof the US commitment in European security affairs.]
III. Panel
1) The last panel focused on Japan’s new security policy. The panelist explained that,similar to the German case, the basic pillars of Japanese security policy had notchanged: goals, means and values remained unaltered and Japan would continue touphold the current regional status quo. The Japanese government, however, aimed
to switch from a reactive to a proactive security policy. This was behind recentchanges in policies and strategies and also behind Prime Minister Abe’s plans tochange the Japanese constitution. From a Japanese perspective, the ability to act
more freely in security terms, especially with regard to the participation in collective
security measures, is a prerequisite in view of China’s growing and military
assertiveness and the perceived intent to change the status quo, i.e. state borders, inEast Asia. The panelist argued that should a conflict with China arise, the US would
simply not be able to defend Japan or other parts of Asia from China on its own.
Therefore, Japan and other Asian states ought to do as much as possible to develop
capabilities to support the US militarily.
2) In his comment, the second panelist pointed out that the global security situation
had changed tremendously compared to the 19th and most parts of the 20th century.
While the international order was shifting, mainly due to the rise of new powers suchas China and India, the underlying systemic conditions of international relations had
also changed greatly. For instance, obtaining territory was no longer a way toincrease a state’s power; states were not the only important international actors;
7non-state economic actors and economic interests played an ever more importantrole; and domestic and foreign policies were increasingly entangled. All states had toconsider these changes to transform the remnants of the old world order into a new,functioning and stable world order that also accommodated the interests of China
and India. The panelist further explained what this meant for Japan. Simplified, Japan
could choose between three essential strategies: 1) acting increasingly as anindependent country; 2) a re-strengthening of the US-Japan alliance; 3) establishinga structure of strongly institutionalized regional security cooperation. The third
approach, he argued, would be the most useful one to achieve the goal of
constructing a new, stable regional order.
3) In the ensuing Q&A round, feasibility and significance of a “European solution”,
i.e. the development of a system of collective security institutions, such as the OSCEin Europe, were hotly debated. One Japanese participant explained that Japanese
decision makers in favor of multilateral security were rare, since politicians on the left
usually supported strict neutrality/pacifism while politicians on the right preferred abilateral alliance with the US. Regarding multilateral security options, Japaneseparticipants remained skeptical. They argued that there was a different security
situation and a lack of reliable partner states (such as Germany has found in France)in East Asia. In response to this, German counterparts argued that, nevertheless, theconcept of developing multilateral security institutions was transferable, but that it
took much time and trust to develop dependable relationships between states; thishad also been the case between Germany and France.
IV. Final Discussion
In the final discussion, all participants debated the possibilities for further
strengthening the security dialogue and cooperation between Japan, Germany andthe EU. Additionally, findings and impressions about the round-table weresummarized and discussed. Everybody emphasized that they had no doubt that due
to common aims, interests and values, a strengthening of security cooperation
between Japan and Germany / the EU was highly desirable. They argued that further
regular meetings to exchange views on security issues and to deliberate on possible
common strategies like that today were needed. Differing views, especially on the8East Asian security environment and possible measures for its improvement, became
once more obvious when Japanese participants voiced their impression that German
counterparts at times did not understand the Japanese perspective on East Asia’s
security problems very well. Shared political and security challenges for both Japan
and Germany that make a strengthened cooperation desirable were China, theMiddle East, failed states in Africa (e.g. Sudan) and new challenges such as cybersecurity. As for concrete shapes and modes of security cooperation, German
participants suggested closer collaboration in multilateral forums such as G7 or G20.
Some participants found the notion of a military cooperation in the form of UN
mandated Peace Keeping Operations attractive, although doubts on both German
and Japanese governments’ specific vision about aims and shape of such an endeavor
were expressed. In this regard, Japanese counterparts voiced general doubts on themultilateral option, explaining that Japan preferred bilateral modes of cooperation.
Further suggestions for areas of possible cooperation were the joint development ofdefense technology, security in outer space, anti-piracy missions and state-building
measures in failed and crisis-ridden states such as South Sudan. Concerning thebriefly discussed fact that Tokyo tends to usually consult first with London and Paris,and then with Berlin, doubts were voiced from the Japanese side whether that wouldchange in the near future.
V. Concluding remarks
The round-table discussion made clear that security remains one of the mostimportant and challenging political topics today. Developments in East Asia,
especially the continuous rise of China, as well as recent events in Eastern Europe
have demonstrated that states’ behavior that is perceived as threatening ordestabilizing the international order has a huge impact on national, regional andglobal politics. Global crises, it was pointed out, are more and more interconnected
and therefore need comprehensive solutions. The maintenance of regional andinternational security thus remains a vital task for national governments andinternational institutions. The recent announcements by the Japanese and German
governments to act more proactively in foreign and security affairs further underlined
this notion. Furthermore, discussions during the round-table highlighted theimportance of the US in maintaining regional and international security. This became
9especially clear through worries expressed by Japanese participants, whether the US
would maintain their presence in East Asia, which is considered reassuring. Finally,
discussions showed that Japan and Germany shared many aims and strategies in theirrespective security policy and that there was generally a high willingness for security
cooperation. However, the round-table also revealed that there remained differing
views on what actually constituted security challenges and what could be done tomeet them. These different views concerned mainly the questions of how to deal
with rising China and the most fitting and feasible approaches to defuse or evenprevent security problems in East Asia.

10