Contents

UEDA Kōji
Greetings ....................................................................................................... 7
OGOURA Kazuo
Greetings ....................................................................................................... 9
Wolfgang SEIFERTIntroduction ................................................................................................. 11
Frank R. PFETSCHThe Role of Western Occupational Forces in the
Making of the German Constitution ...................................................... 14
Jerzy HOLZER“Solidarność” and Democracy: A Complicated Relationship ............ 22
Maciej GÓRNY
The Historical Preconditions of thePolish Democratic Federalism (1795–1918) ......................................... 28
Katajun AMIRPUR

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih
in Post-Revolutionary Iran ................................................................... 41
Mohsen KADIVARThe Rights of the People in Islamic Thought in IranA Historical Perspective ............................................................................ 65
Raoul MOTIKA
Modernization and Westernization in the Late Ottoman
Empire and the Turkish Republic — A Prelude for Democracy? .... 70
KOBAYASHI Masaya
Spiritual and Perpetual Revolution for Democracy:
The Public Philosophy of Maruyama Masao and
His Mentor Nanbara Shigeru ................................................................... 80

Wolfgang SEIFERTDemocracy “From Without”? A Short Remark on
Historical Preconditions in the Case of Japan ...................................... 91
CHOI Jang Jip
A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country:
The Korean Experience ............................................................................ 98
Jörg PLASSEN
The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea ............................... 119
Panel Discussion ..................................................................................... 140
Conference Program ............................................................................... 157

Greetings
It is a great pleasure and honor for me to welcome the participants onbehalf of the Japanese-German Center Berlin, and to thank them forcoming from far and near, from different regions of the world, to takepart in our conference “Aspects of Democracy—Preconditions, Paths
of Development and Contemporary Issues.”
The Japanese-German Center Berlin since more than twenty
years organizes conferences and workshops on a wide range ofsubjects—on topics from sciences and technology, from political,
economical, social, and cultural spheres.
“Democracy” still is, or once again is, a topic of immediate interest,
equaly in terms of domestic policies as well as in terms of international
relations. Everybody is talking about democracy, but is everybody
talking about the same subject? Aren’t there quite different ideas of
democracy?
There is the French politician Tocqueville, who in the earlyninteenth century described the young U.S.-American democracy as amodel for civilized nations; there are the principles of the Japanesesociety of the 1950s, afterwards often called “The Era of Peace and
Democracy”; there is the 1960s German Federal Republic, when Willy
Brandt talked about “Mehr Demokratie wagen” (struggle for democracy). Are they talking about the same thing?
Stressing the term “democracy” obviously arouses strong
emotional reactions. On the global stage, protagonists often call for“democracy” or “democratization,”- as if everybody had the same idea about it,- as if only positive connotations were involved,- as if a global community would accept it, or- as if nobody would show any suspicion, and- as if therefore on this bases any demand could be raised.
But people not always mean democracy when they talk of democracy.
Or, at least, one should know that we are possibly talking about different aspects without knowing or showing exactly what we are talking
about. That there are obviously different ideas of democracy, resulting
from different historical and social backgrounds, should be kept inmind.
7

It is now about two years ago that Professor Seifert proposed a joint
workshop on the Japanese philosopher Maruyama Masao, who ismost prominently responsible for the Japanese’s idea of democracy
since 1945. The Japanese-German Center does not aim to be part ofthe specific and narrowly defined discussions of experts. Rather we
aim to take important results of those discussions and link them withproblems of society, that is, we aim to be an interface between experts
and society. Therefore Professor Seifert’s original proposal was transformed into a more comprehensive and universal topic.
This conference in some respect is a premiere: Since April 2006
there is an arrangement between the Japan Foundation and theJapanese-German Center to cooperate closely in intellectual andcultural exchange. As a result we shall jointly organize a conferenceeach year, working together from the beginning and discussing openly
every detail. This conference is the first attempt of this remarkable
cooperation.
During the last months there was a huge amount of e-mailexchange between Berlin (JDZB), Tōkyō (JF) and Heidelberg (Prof.
Seifert) as well as direct conversation. We soon agreed that after theexpert’s workshop on Maruyama there should be a conference toshow the wide range of ideas of democracy and to discuss about
different aspects of democracy: Is this a monolithic idea or maybe
comprises different but equally good ideas? Or, are those “only”
different aspects? Is there a common basis for the varieties? And
where are the limits of a universal validity?
Those questions are of great interest, especially as they will be
discussed by internationally acknowledged experts who will talk about
Japan and Germany, Poland, Turkey, Iran and Korea, thus about
totally different political and social situations.
Last but not least I’d like to thank the University of Heidelberg
and Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Seifert for their precious cooperation in thisconference and also in the upcoming publishing process of the conference papers. And we gratefully thank the Japan Foundation, for not
only generously supporting this conference but also making possible
the publication of the conference papers through financial aid.
UEDA Kōji
Deputy Secretary General
Japanese-German Center Berlin8Greetings1

The theme of this international symposium is, I believe, quite pertinent in the context of Asia-Europe relations for at least two reasons.
Firstly, democracy in Asia has tended to be regarded by many
people in Asia and Europe as something, which was planted or graftedin Asia’s political soil by Europeans. In recent years, however, there
has been a growing body of opinion, particularly in Asia, which assertsthat the concept of democracy is inherent in Asia, which asserts thatthe concept of democracy is inherent in Asian political traditions as
well. In other words, an increasing number of Asians, at least amongcertain intellectual circles, no longer regard democracy as “made inEurope.” This is perhaps due to the breadth and depth of democracy
achieved in some countries in Asia, notably Japan. Ironically, stripping
democracy of its certificate of origin has made it universal.
In the context of intellectual dialogue between Asia and Europe
there is nevertheless one point to which we should address ourselves
seriously. This is the degree to which, and the modality by which, weshould treat democracy simply as an institutional concept. Many
people tend to equate democracy with free elections and a politicalsystem in or by which freedom and human rights can be safeguarded.
Yet what about the personality and moral qualifications of political leaders? In addition to the institutional aspect, Asian politicaltraditions have attached a great deal of importance to the moral integrity and ethical purity of individual politicians, as a means of guarding
against potential abuses of power. Should we regard such traditions
simply as a vestige of the past or as a useful complementary element
to the institutional aspect of democracy?
These and other thought-provoking questions form, I believe,part of the intellectual foundations of this gathering. I sincerely hopethat this meeting will be a stimulation and fruitful one for all theparticipants.

1

Mr. Ogoura’s Greetings were conveyed by video-message.
9

I would like to close my greetings by offering, last but not least,
sincere gratitude to those who have worked hard for the realization ofthis conference.
OGOURA Kazuo
President
The Japan Foundation

10

Introduction

At first, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude that this conference, as well as the preceding workshop we hold yesterday in Japaneseon problems of translating the political thought of Maruyama Masao
into Western languages, could be realized by the cooperation andgenerous support from the Japan Foundation and the JapaneseGerman Center Berlin (JDZB). In particular, I want to thank Mr.
Komatsu from the Japan Foundation, Prof. Ueda and Mr. Ikuta fromthe JDZB, and Ms. Satô, from the Berlin Office of The Japan Cultural
Institute in Cologne (Japan Foundation) at the JDZB.
When the Japanese political scientist Maruyama Masao (1914–1996)
died ten years ago, in 1996, he had already enjoyed international
reputation as eminent scholar of the history of political thought inJapan as well as a profound political thinker for a long time. Maruyama’s insight into the preconditions of democracy in a society that
had overcome authoritarian rule provides criteria that are still valid
today in assessing political institutions and procedures of democratic
political systems. His writings not only make us understand the political development of Japan, but also help to analyze the political processof other societies, which have equally experienced the transition into
democracy in the past, or which will have to face the challenge in the
future. This conference is held on occasion of the tenth anniversary ofthe death of this eminent thinker.
Today, political scientists are confronted with the fact that various distinct forms of democracy exist in the world so that it is nolonger possible to claim one model as the legitimate one. Nor does theideal of democracy seem to be fully realized in any specific region of
the world. However, the question still arises, which preconditions andprocesses shaped the particular forms of democracy—such as thecomparatively recent democracies of Japan and Germany, for example—and made them develop the distinct characteristics they show
today. As for the most direct form of implementing a democraticsystem from outside, Japan and Germany after World War II bothexperienced an “import” of democratic institutions and procedures.
Yet, for democracy to take root in those countries, it was not sufficient to merely “import” its institutions and form. In addition, there11had to be a fundamental change of political consciousness and way of
thinking in the mind of the people and the ruling elite as well. This
process, however, poses many questions: What is it that causes such afundamental change of mentality? Who can stimulate this process?
And what are the means to realize it? Is the change just the result of a“re-education” by administrative bodies of occupational forces, orwhat and who else is involved? The democracies of Germany andJapan today differ in many aspects, which is not only due to theparticular environment of the respective countries in the global settingof the Cold War. Unquestionably, domestic politics must have played
an important role, as well. Thus, we should draw lessons from the“import” of democracy in both countries (which were “late-developers,” according to some approaches in history and political science), sothat we shall be able to develop valid criteria for evaluating similar
attempts of democratization in other parts of the world today.
This conference is dedicated to the clarification of the above
questions, being fundamental problems of “developing democracies.”
During the conference, we shall try to define some key elements oftoday’s democracies (or evolving democracies) in different politicaland religious cultures by examining premodern preconditions for theevolution of democratic rule. Special attention will be directed to thequestion of strong and weak “democratic traditions” in the history of
the respective countries, as this is a crucial point, for example, in
Eastern Europe and in Germany. A decisive step toward modern
democratic systems seems to be the recognition of a rational view ofpolitics or—in a broader perspective—a rational view of the social
order as a whole. Although it might not be easy to integrate this
aspect, an attempt should be made to trace back the evolution ofrational thinking in politics to the point where it found its groundbreaking expression in the writings of political thinkers. The comparison of what different writers in the traditions of Christianity, Confucianism or Islam (of the latter, both branches, Sunna and Shi’a, should
be taken into consideration) thought with regards to a rational view ofpolitics might provide us with hints for the understanding of one of
the important preconditions of democracy. Furthermore, we should
address the question, which external stimuli are acceptable in theprocess of development of democracy, and what kind of foreign influences are unacceptable. This question is linked to problems of intervention and also of occupation after defeat in a war. We should also
touch on the question of how the various forms of democracy cope
12

with dangers from within, e.g. growing political apathy of the electorate, censorship towards media under certain conditions, and the credibility and authenticity of politicians, all of which have an impact on
the active and affective participation of citizens in politics. The assertion of some Western leaders and political scientists that one muststrive for building up democratic systems in hitherto non-democratic
states seems odd to some extent, considering the fact that establisheddemocracies are showing deficiencies, such as a falling voting rate orpolitical apathy of the electorate. Therefore, we should observe
dangerous cases and tendencies in “established democracies,” as well.
As for the structure of the conference, the connection of political science with the historical dimension should allow us to go beyond
quantitative models that have little or nothing to do with the particular
historical path of development taken by each country. So we planned
to have two speakers for each case, that is each country, but unfortunately because of various reasons we could not fully realize thisconcept. I hope you will understand that.

Wolfgang SEIFERTCentre for East Asian Studies
Institute of Japanese Studies
University of Heidelberg

13

The Role of Western Occupational Forces in the
Making of the German Constitution
Frank R. PFETSCH
University of Heidelberg

My contribution is situated in the framework of five much broader
considerations.
First, the relevant question still is how to develop a democracy informer dictatorial states? What prerequisites must exist and whatstrategies should be adopted? What is the impact of internal forces
and what that of external interventions? Is it possible to implant a
democratic regime from outside as is attempted by the occupational
forces in Iraq or Afghanistan?
Second, should the regime change come from above through theelite or should the process of democratic constitution making comefrom below, from the people? How much basic democratic participation should exist either by the involvement of a broad spectrum of the
population or by adopting the constitution through referenda?
Third, my conviction is that there have to exist roots of democratic procedures in the country of concern and that in most cultures
such roots do exist. These roots have to be developed in a proper
framework.
Fourth, institutions are important in every political system inorder to secure law and order. Two fundamental minimal principles
must be fulfilled in order to secure a liberal democratic regime: securing of human rights and the balance of power among the various
elements of the institutional framework.
Fifth, although institutions are important, polity has to have a“soul,” a mentality, values and norms, which go beyond institutions.
Coming now to the German situation after World War II I would liketo report on my findings in a project, which I conducted in theeighties at the University of Heidelberg.
Up to the election and/or the establishment of German politicalinstitutions military administrations were the highest governing bodies

The Role of Western Occupational Forces in the Making of the German Constitution

in occupied Germany. Directives, orders and instructions were thelegally binding framework of action.
The constitutional processes started in 1946 in the three occupied zones (not considering here the Russian zone) with fourteen
Länder (states). German politicians were elected on the basis of rules
laid down and approved by the occupation forces but taking into
account traditional German rules. Hence, the constitutional process inthe Länder was initiated well before (in 1946) the constitutional
process in the then Federal Republic (in 1948/49). Both processes
were closely linked. Representatives in the federal constitutionalorgans were more or less identical with the representatives in the statebodies. Therefore Both processes have to be looked at together.
However, the interests and orientations of the three occupying powers
can be seen more clearly in the Länder, since the framework given for
the federal constitution was defined rather broadly. As an example I
quote the constitutional policies of the United States; the British andthe French policies are analyzed in two books mentioned as references.
In September 1946 the Office of Military Government for Germany(U.S. Zone) issued a document in which the main requirements for a
democratic regime were stated. Six points resume the politicalconception of the U.S. Military Governor for occupied Germany.
I. U.S. policy requires that the German people be permitted
increasingly to govern themselves.
II. Adoption of Land Constitutions Will Change Civil-Military
Government Relations.
III. Specific Restrictions Which Will Continue to be Imposed
upon Civil Governments. Those restrictions are:a. All international agreements regarding Germany whichhave been or may be concluded;b. All present and future quadripartite policy decisions, laws
and regulations;c. All basic policy decisions of the U.S., British Bipartite
Board;
d. The rights of an occupying power under international law.

15

Frank R. PFETSCH

The specific occupation purposes of the U.S. Government
which, in addition to those set forth above, consist of thefollowing basic tenets:
1. Democracy: All levels of German government in the
U.S. Zone must be democratic to the extent that:(a) All political power is recognized as originating withthe people and subject to their control;(b) Those who exercise political power are obliged torenew their mandates regularly . . . ;(c) Popular elections are conducted under competitive
conditions . . . ;(d) Political parties must be democratic in character . . . ;(e) The basic rights of the individual including freespeech, freedom of religious preference, the rights ofassembly, freedom of political associations, and otherequally basic rights of free men are recognized and guaranteed;(f) Control over the instrumentalities of public opinion,such as the radio and press, must be diffused and kept
free from governmental domination;(g) The rule of law is recognized as the individual’s greatest single protection . . .
2. German governmental systems must provide forjudiciary independent of the legislative and executive
arms . . .
3. Intergovernmental Distribution of Powers: German
governmental structure shall be federal in character(Bundesstaat), and the constituent units thereof shall beStates (Staaten not Länder). The functions of the government shall be decentralized within that structure to the
maximum degree consistent with the modern economic
life. U.S. policy concerning the relationship between
levels of government requires that:(a) All political power is recognized as originating withthe people and subject to their control;(b) Power shall be granted by the people primarily to theStates (Staaten), and subsequently only in specifically
16

The Role of Western Occupational Forces in the Making of the German Constitution

enumerated and limited instances to the federal government;(c) All other grants of governmental power by the people
shall be made to the states;(d) All powers not granted by the people shall bereserved to the people;(e) A substantial number of functions shall be delegatedby the States of the local governments . . .
(f) Governmental powers may not be delegated to privateor quasi-public economic bodies;(g) Pending the establishment of a federal government,
the popularly responsible governments and Landtage of
the States shall act as the people’s agents for the conferring of powers requiring central execution . . .
4. Economic unity: Economic unity through the establishment of German central administrative agencies,
particularly in trade, industry, food and agriculture, finance, transportation and communications, is a controlling objective of our occupation.
IV. Subsequent functions of the Military Government will belimited to: Observation, Disapproval of . . . activities as it
may find to clearly violate those objectives, Removal of
public officials whose activities are in violation of thoseobjectives.
V. Subsequent directives will implement the foregoing statements insofar as modifications or revisions in Military
Government practices may be required.
VI. The Land Directors of Military Government will advice
the appropriate German officials of the content of thisdirective.”
In practice the implementation of these conditions was commented byGerman lawmakers positively as follows (I quote what I think to be a
representative voice, the speaker of the Wuerttemberg-Badische
Constitutional Committee, Wilhelm Keil, in October 1946):17

Frank R. PFETSCH“This constitution does not result on our own initiative, but it isnevertheless our work. The instruction to prepare a draft constitution was given by the Military Government. The Military Government also prescribed the dates for the various stages of the preparatory process. These dates were on a rather short term. We
would have preferred to have more time for such important deliberations. But on the whole we were free in developing the draft.
From the beginning we were told to elaborating a constitution theway we think it should be. There were numerous discussions on
specific points with representatives of the Military Government;
but never demands and instructions were given concerning thecontent of the draft. In all these cases mutual clarifications, clearing
up misunderstandings and suggestions were possible, thus offering
the opportunity to reconsider our thoughts.” (my translation)
Later on the Six-Power Conference in London mentions only generally about the constitution of the central state (Grundgesetz): theGerman Republic should be federal in character; West Germany
should be included in the European Recovery Program; and the Ruhrregion should be under international control, whilst free movement ofgoods and persons should be assured immediately. These declarations
formed the foundation of the so called Frankfurter Dokumente of July
1948, which formulated the principles by the three military governors(U.S., British, French) for the German polity. They, too, are general incharacter: the first part of the document empowered the Ministerpräsidenten (the chief executives of the Länder) to call a constituent national
assembly; the second part proposed the (re-)consideration of the
Länder borders and the third part announced the principles of theoccupational statutes. The only substantial condition states that the
future German state should be federal in character.
As to procedural as well as substantial issues I would like to list
my main points by way of seven theses:
1. The constitutional process in Germany (as well as in Japan) has tobe seen in the international framework of the time. This framechanged during the second half of the forties from common
occupation by the allies to the forming of an Eastern bloc and thealliance of the three Western powers. The bloc building accelerated the establishment of the German state and its inclusion into
the Western alliance system as a necessary entity.
18

The Role of Western Occupational Forces in the Making of the German Constitution

2. The foreign policies of the three Western powers show somedifferences, which characterized their policy strategy. The UnitedStates in 1947 promoted the reconstruction of a German state as acorner stone of their Western alliance system. The idea of afederal system of democracy together with a free market economy
prevailed. The French wanted the central German state as weak as
possible by empowering the Länder as a buffer against a possible
powerful Germany on their eastern borders. They favored what I
call a “dissociated federalism” for the German state. The British
wanted to export their Westminster model of democracy (majority
voting system, separation of political and administrative functions,political personnel recruited from the Parliament, local government), and supported earlier than the French the establishment of
the German state (Bizone). In the end the great victorious power
determined the state building process in Germany after 1945/46.
3. The influence of the occupying forces was limited as to substantial
issues of the constitutions. All three agreed to the principles ofliberal democracy, elected representative organs, responsible
governments, preservation of civil liberties, and division of power.
These principles were on the whole shared by German politicians.
4. The main contribution of the occupying power was the initiation,organization and promotion of the constitutional processes in the
Länder as well as in the Bund. The Western powers reinforced—
where not already given—democratic procedures and principles.
5. With all three powers the main consideration was that the constitution-making should look like a German product and not like a
Diktat by the occupying forces. A failure in the constitutionmaking would be considered as a failure of their foreign policies.
Hence, in no Land and especially not in the Bonn Republic there
was a transplantation of external constitutional principles pure etsimple.
6. However, interventions in the constitutional process can beobserved on all levels, Länder as well as central constituencies. But
they referred mainly to procedural rather than to substantive
questions. Where the occupying powers tried to impose corrections, modifications, or guidelines they were removed later on if
19

Frank R. PFETSCH

not compatible with German traditions. On the whole, theconceptions for a representative parliamentary democracy of theoccupying powers and that of German politicians were almost
identical and converged in principles. Especially the concept offederalism (the only principle laid down in the Frankfurt documents) was in the tradition of German state building.
7. Contrary to Japan, German experts gave advice to the American
administration. Emigrants and others working for the occupation
power like Kurt Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Hans Speier, orCarl Joachim Friedrich proposed plans and furnished ideas how tocope with post-war Germany.
8. I have termed the role of the occupying forces as that of a catalyst,
accelerating the process without being affected. The various
constitutions after 1945 cannot be considered as imposed byforeign powers, as it was the case in Japan, but rather an evolutionof democratic procedures and principles from former experiences(Weimar Republic) and taking into consideration also the Nazi
failures as a learning example. Democracy in Western Germany
after the war was—as often written—by no means imported andimposed from outside.
9. Democracy was not imported by the allied forces. It was rather
the interrupted democratic tradition of the Weimar Republic,
which provided the model for the democratic reconstruction ofGermany. The main contribution of the military allied powers
consisted in destroying Nazism and by this paving the way (giving
the opportunity) to build a democratic regime.
10. It was said that the German Republic was the result of two
opposing models, that of totalitarian Nazism and that of totalitarian Socialism/Stalinism. While the first model certainly holds up
to empirical evidence the second does only partially. The beginning of East-West bloc building did not occur until the end of1947 or beginning of 1948, thus the Cold War could not have had
an impact on the constitutional processes that started already inthe end of 1945 and beginning of 1946 in the various Länder ofthe occupied zones.

20

The Role of Western Occupational Forces in the Making of the German Constitution

11. In summary I see three forces leading to the constitutions of theGerman federation:a) Destroying Nazism through military force (unconditionalsurrender).
b) Elite change, especially as to the political elite that stood in the
tradition of the Weimar Republic.
c) The role of the occupying forces was to initiate, organize, andcontrol the political process leading to constitutions without
imposing their will upon substance. The best way to describe thefunction of the Western occupational forces would be that of acatalyst.

Reference
Pfetsch, Frank R.: Ursprünge der Zweiten Republik. Prozesse der
Verfassungsgebung in den Westzonen. Opladen: Westdeutscher
Verlag, 1990.
Pfetsch, Frank R.: Verfassungspolitik der Nachkriegszeit. Theorie undPraxis des bundesdeutschen Konstitutionalismus. Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1985.

21

Solidarność and Democracy: A ComplicatedRelationship
Jerzy HOLZER

On the surface the question is simple. Solidarność (Solidarity) fought
against a dictatorial, some people prefer to call it totalitarian, regime. Itfought for more civil liberties, more freedom of conscience, of speech,of organization, and for the rule of law. All these are surely democraticvalues. But two questions come to mind: did it fight for democracy orfor democratization? And was Solidarność democratic itself, as apolitical and social body, in all its elements?
The concept of democratization has a long history. It started
with the beginning of Communist rule in Poland. The Communists
introduced a dictatorship but in the same breath they were speaking of
democracy—the people’s democracy. One can make jokes about it.
“What is the difference between a people’s democracy and democracy? The same as between an electric chair and a chair.” But something important remains: the term democracy was not tabooed by theCommunists as it was by the Nazis or Fascists. Furthermore, since1956 the people’s democracy was several times democratized. All
those leaders of the Polish Communist regime, such as Gomułka andGierek and Kania in 1980, according to their words, introduced moredemocracy in Poland.
So, how different was Solidarność? The opposition, which wasorganized before it, did not conceal the fundamental opinion that itpreferred democracy. But in their mind the Polish situation, internallyand especially geopolitically, did not allow for a system change in the
country. The existing system was not democratic, but equipped withsome limited attributes of autonomy. To go too far meant to risk aloss. According to this theory the one and only method was a longmarch. Step by step, a little more of liberty, a little more of law, a little
more democracy was to be introduced.
The birth of Solidarność was not foreseen by the opposition of
the seventies. It was not a step but a great leap towards democracy.
Solidarność was able to harness the energy of the masses and createdan element of civic society. The independent trade-union stood forSolidarność and Democracy: A Complicated Relationshipthe institution of pluralism within the system, which was perhaps nottotalitarian at that time, but nevertheless uniform and guided by atotalitarian ideology.
But these developments did not mean a fundamental change ofthe political program. Solidarność, or at least its most influential teamof leaders and advisers, did not expect an overthrow of the Communist system. In other words, it did not expect the introduction of
democracy in Poland in the near future. They were happy with only apartial (and very limited) democratization of the nondemocraticsystem. The Soviet bloc still existed, Soviet (and not only Soviet)
troops stood by to invade Poland, the Polish corps of officers andpolice were indoctrinated and therefore more intimidated by Solidarność than by the danger of foreign aggression. This situation was
volatile and turbulent.
The members of Solidarność wanted to preserve and consolidate
their unexpected achievements. The most important achievement was
Solidarność itself, its organization, its independence, and its legalization. Any step backward meant the deadening of enthusiasm and the
beginning of defeat. It was a new version of “permanent revolution,”
which would not have a chance to win until the international situation
changed.
Solidarność 1980–1981 did not fight for democracy, but theforces of the Communist regime fought against the newly emerged
elements of democracy, which did not fit into the system. In the end
they dismantled them. The former communist motions of democratization of Gomułka or Gierek did not harm the foundation of thesystem, the Communist monopoly of public activities, but Solidarność
was an independent organization, it had to publish its papers and toprotest against the violation of existing law. The letter of law was all
the times superficially democratic, but only as long as nobody in
Poland could publicly inform about abuses of power that did notcount.
For sixteen months the so-called first Solidarność was legal but
resolved itself to a conflict with the Communist regime, which did notconcern democracy but only its elements. These conquered elements
were permanently attacked. Finally martial law suppressed them andthe regime, at least for some time, gained a victory.
Was the first Solidarność democratic itself? The answer could be
yes as long as we are speaking about the rules of the organization.
Although on different occasions the leaders disregarded these rules,
23

Jerzy HOLZER

this disregard was rather exceptional and to some degree resembled
the situation of a besieged fortress. But the answer is more complicated when we are speaking about the different groups and persons
who were active in Solidarność.
It was a very heterogeneous organization combining a variety ofpeople. Some of them, perhaps the majority, had a more or lessspecifically democratic outlook on political life. The others were only
against the Communist regime, either without definite politicalopinions or with opinions, which were not communist but in no way
democratic either.
Extreme leftists and Trotzkists were on the political margins. But
there were a great number of nationalists of all shades. Some of them
combined national sentiment with a democratic view. A considerable
number of them, however, revived the ideology of the prewar nationalists and anti-Semites or of extreme clerical movements, and, ofcourse, were in no way democrats. They wanted liberties for themselves, to preach their ideas and to establish their organizations. They
had a common interest with other members of Solidarność to fightagainst the Communists, but even at that time they did not abstain
from fighting within Solidarność, on a second, internal front.
When the authorities declared Solidarność illegal it changed its
attitude towards democracy on two levels. There was a pragmatist
tendency, with a self-limited program of a partial democratization thatappeared to be as much lacking real foundation as the dream of aperfect democracy. And there was a programmatic attitude—either afundamental change or nothing—that gained a bright popularity. Its
supporters did not believe in a quick realization. Maybe in some years,
maybe in some decades, full democracy would be a more realistic
solution of Polish problems.
The other plane was the internal one, the one within Solidarność
itself. As long as it had been legal, the applicability of democratic rulesof organization survived. But the democratic internal life of an illegalorganization was impossible in practice. The last legal leadership ofSolidarność ceased to exist. Some people were sent to prison for along time, some emigrated, some subordinated to martial law. The
illegal organization created new leaders. The consequence of all theseactions was a far-reaching disintegration of Solidarność. This, too,affected the most popular group of leaders and advisers—with Wałęsa
at the top.

24

Solidarność and Democracy: A Complicated RelationshipThis disintegration was only in part connected with ideologicaldifferences, which had existed while Solidarność was legal, and were
exposed through the fragmentation of the organization. Sometimes
personal quarrels had been momentous but they were legitimated byideological arguments. Nobody openly questioned democracy as agoal, but differences of opinion relating to future solutions intensified,and many views were rather far from a democratic vision.
And then the situation changed again. At first it was perestroika,
which influenced the Polish question. Soviet perestroika was not a
program of democracy, it was a program of democratization. The
leadership of the Polish Communist party, burdened by the economiccrisis and deprived of Soviet support, hesitated but finally decided tolook for an agreement with Solidarność. The former Polish advocatesof democratization, disappointed by the introduction of martial law,
returned to this idea. Only a relatively small group of hard-liners
would not accept the negotiations with Communists.
The Solidarność politicians were divided. In public opinion
Wałesa was the only one who had a political mandate. He decided
who was worthy of participation in the new developments and who
was not. In one sense it was democratic, since it was accepted by alarge majority of Solidarność followers. But the method of forming
the Solidarność delegation for negotiations at the Round Table 1989
was nondemocratic, because its members were not elected but
appointed. Many important representatives of the legal Solidarność
who were at odds with Wałęsa did not join the delegation.
Was there an alternative? The impossible task of cobbling
together a deeply divided delegation, with the participation of persons
who either made a rivalry in concessions or in inflexibility?
The fundamental weakness of Solidarność based on its heterogeneity, emerged. The illegal organization in competition with themore or less homogenous Communist system could accept only similar rules: a uniformity of position. The Round Table could not be
pluralistic, it could be only bilateral. It does not compare to the
Hungarian Round Table that was pluralistic, but the delegation ofCommunist Party was at that time fragmented. This was not the caseduring the Polish Round Table.
The resolutions of the Round Table did not introduce democracy but some elements of it, i.e. democratization. The representativesof Solidarność did not want more because they thought in terms ofgeopolitics, as the politicians in the United States and in Western
25

Jerzy HOLZER

Europe did. It was not the misjudgment of a political idea, rather of apolitical perception. Nobody, or nearly nobody, understood perfectlyat that time the fundamental changes in the European situation, theweakness of the Soviet Union, the shift towards dissolution in theCommunist bloc.
Polish democracy emerged, not out of decisions by Solidarność
or the Round Table, but as a consequence of the forming of massconsciousness by Solidarność. The vast majority of the Polish electorate voted against Communism, for Solidarność and for democracy. It
did not matter that the elections were only partly democratic. They
were to be a plebiscite, and the Communists had only one alternative:
sheer force. But they did not have sufficient forces and would haveneeded Soviet military support, which they were refused. Otherwise
capitulation was for the Communists the only possible outcome. At
first a limited capitulation, but in a dictatorial system it inevitably led
to the dissolution of the regime.
The long march shrank to a relatively short one. Solidarność
needed only ten years to demolish the Communist system and to
introduce democracy. Neither the former opposition nor the Solidarność had planned a developments at this rate; it was the consequenceof two unexpected events: the establishment of Solidarność in 1980
and the rejection of the Communist system in 1989. But above all it
was the consequences of the activities of the opposition and Solidarność, which propagated the superiority of democracy to that of dictatorship.
What allowed democracy to win? There were two outstanding
factors. First, despite the presence of nondemocratic forces within
Solidarność the majority of leaders and followers wanted to establish ademocratic regime. Second, the European democratic environment
influenced the Polish situation. The Polish people became convincedthat democracy was a path to liberty, to international security, and—perhaps more decisively—to prosperity. And the Polish people wereconvinced, too, that integrating Poland with the international structures of the democratic world, like NATO and the European Union,
was the best solution for the future of Poland.
The historical part of Solidarność as a Sammelbewegung fighting for
democracy was coming to an end. It was now time to build up Polishdemocracy, although Solidarność, which did not solely consist of
democrats, was to split soon. It became a trade-union with a rightist
leanings, but its wishes to cut a figure in politics met with defeat. It is26

Solidarność and Democracy: A Complicated Relationshipperhaps the most important victory of Solidarność that after winningthe bilateral battle with Communism it did not replace it, but rather
opened up the political scene for a pluralistic democracy.

27

The Historical Preconditions of the Polish
Democratic Federalism (1795–1918)
Maciej GÓRNY
Polnische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin

In this short article I will try to follow some of the most visible motifs
of Polish political thought in the 19th century, that is the federalist
idea. I will characterize its democratic entourage as well as its disability
to catch up to the rules of modern democracy. Further I will focus on
its connection to the modern national idea both in Poland and inother prospective members of an East-Central European federation.
Let me start with some basic factual introduction. Till late 18th
century the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was one of the largest
states in Europe. It used to be a complicated, federal structure ruledby parliament and a king, who was chosen by the assembly of nobles.
Lands and districts could enter the Commonwealth voluntarily and its
political system secured local rights on costs of the efficiency of statepolicy. A characteristic feature of this land was a considerably highnumber of nobles, reaching—according to various authors—fromseven to even ten percent of the whole population. High percentage
of nobles means also that a considerable part of them did not possessmuch more than their title forming in fact a noble proletariat. The restof the country population was deprived of most of the rights. The 18th
century witnessed decline and gradual fall of Poland’s political systemthat was turned into loose structure of informal connections between
magnates, having often bigger impact on the country’s policy than aking, and of foreign powers financing their own parties. At that point
the Polish-Lithuanian state became a laughing stock of the enlightened
Europe, a shocking example of anarchy. However, an attempt tochange this situation by strengthening the state structures collapsed in
effect of Russian military intervention. A last attempt to break throughto independence, the Kościuszko uprising, was unsuccessful and theyear 1795 marked the formal end of the independent PolishLithuanian state.
This nonexistent state proved to be quite a tempting object ofpolitical plans, projects and fantasies. It is only apparantly a paradox:

The Historical Preconditions of the Polish Democratic Federalism (1795–1918)

in fact the less hope can be attached to the vision of one’s independence, the more ambitious and unrealistic plans for the future are
getting. It is striking that one of the most common ideas that accompanied the projects of the renewal of the Polish statehood was theidea of national and ethnic multiplicity, whose most elaborated form
was seen as a political federation. This union was usually seen as
reuniting all the nationalities of the former Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth first and foremost Poles, Lithuanians and Ruthenians(Ukrainians and Byelorussians). Furthermore, according to many
authors, it should bound together some other mostly Slavic nationalities that were perceived as close relatives and “younger brethren” of
Poland. Interestingly enough, such a Slavic federation was supported
at the same time by those Polish authors, who rejected the very
proj??ect of revitalizing Polish statehood. We can easily find federalist
motifs in conservatives, pro-Russian Slavophiles, socialists of national
and internationalist color, or liberals. I will concentrate on this manifold group of political projects and statements that combined the
project of an international union with firmly convincing in its democratic and voluntary character, in freedom and equality as its mainfeatures. Finally I will try to answer the question how important thisfederalism was within the project of the political reconstruction of
Poland.
In the period between the collapse of the Polish statehood and theCongress of Vienna, Polish federalism was dominated by the idea of a
Slavic brotherhood. 1 Many people connected their hopes with Adam
Czartoryski, closest friend of Czar Alexander I and Russian ministerof foreign affairs. Czartoryski planed the restoration of Poland’sbound with Russia by eternal, though voluntary friendship. His
famous Mordplan gegen Preussen was one of the practical effects of his
deepest convictions about the future Polish-Russian union.2 In 1803
Czartoryski postulated either the reestablishment of Poland or uniting
1

2

Marceli Handelsman, Adam Czartoryski, vol. 1, Warszawa 1948, p. 65; Leszek
Kuk, Stanowisko opinii publicznej Wielkiego Księstwa Poznańskiego wobec wątków
rusofilskich i panslawistycznych w polskiej myśli politycznej do schyłku lat sześćdziesiątych
XIX wieku, in: Polska myśl polityczna na ziemiach pod pruskim panowaniem, ed.
Sławomir Kalembka, Warszawa-Poznań-Toruń 1988, p. 111.
Jerzy Skowronek, Adam Jerzy Czartoryski wobec problemów niemieckich w epoce
napoleońskiej, in: Ideologie, poglądy, mity w dziejach Polski i Europy XIX i XX wieku,
eds. Jerzy Topolski, Witold Molik, Krzysztof Makowski, Poznań 1991, pp.
134–136.
29

Maciej GÓRNY

all the former Polish areas within the borders of Russia. 3 It was not
the only federalist project that was born under the influence of thisRussian minister and Polish count. In many aspects analogous writings
to the Czar were prepared by collaborators of Czartoryski in Russian
diplomatic service, by the Italian Scipione Piattoli and the Russian
Wasilij Fjodorovich Malinovskij. All those plans shared several
characteristic tendencies: the idea of European balance of power (thatdemands the reestablishment of Poland for the sake of European
peace), the Slavophile tendency, and—last but not least—fullsubordination to the cause of Russia that is of the Romanov dynasty. 4
Further diplomatic career of Czartoryski was blocked but he continuously delivered plans that bound together the sake of Poland andRussia, mostly on the cost of Prussia. 5
Many Polish authors, especially just after the defeat of
Napoleon’s empire and the creation of the Polish Congress Kingdom(under Russian control) interpreted the future Slavic brotherhood inan antique frame stating that the culturally advanced Poles are predestined to bring Western civilization to Russia just as ancient Greeks
brought its civilization to the Romans, military conquered but culturally winning. 6
Probably the main problem of the Russian party on the Polishpolitical scene was that its adherents, though distinguished, were by nomeans numerous. Finally it proved to be weaker and less popular thanthe French party. The newly established Warsaw Duchy, as a semiindependent Napoleon’s ally, was a place where the new version ofpolitical futurism was born: the plans for a Slavic federation under
Polish leadership and French control. Most prominent author of thisgenre, Stanisław Staszic, saw the future of whole Europe as a powerfuland peaceful union of free states under Napoleon’s rule.7 Poland’s
3

4
5

6
7

30

Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, Pamiętniki i memoriały polityczne 1776–1809, ed. Jerzy
Skowronek, Warszawa 1986, p. 533.
Ibidem, p. 567n.
See: Polska w latach 1795–1864. Wybór tekstów źródłowych do nauczania historii, ed.
Izabela Rusinowa, Warszawa 1986, pp. 43–45
Ryszard W. Wołoszyński, Polacy w Rosji 1801–1830, Warszawa 1984, pp. 21–22.
Staszic soon sharpened the tone of his political statements. In a booklet
published anonymously in 1809 he wrote that the historical shift of ethnicities
from the East to the West is already over and that the Napoleonic wars open a
new phase of the movement in opposite direction. The new Europe shall bedominated by “Gaulolatins” and Poland’s sake is in cooperating with thevictorious power. Thus Staszic calls for increasing Polish founds for the army

The Historical Preconditions of the Polish Democratic Federalism (1795–1918)

role was to bring the lights of the French civilization to the other
Slavic peoples.
Napoleon’s defeat even strengthened the Slavophile tendency ofPolish federalism. Author of ambitious visions of a French Europe,
Stanisław Staszic, this time reformulated his idea as a union of Poland
and Russia that will peacefully attract all the European countries. 8
Along with the birth of the idea of Slavic reciprocity that used widely
Herderian ideas about the fate of certain nations as Poles and Czechs
in the Habsburg empire, scientific historical and Slavic studies developed that always had a clear political meaning, especially when led in
one of the German Territorial States. 9 Since the 1820s the idea of two
Slovaks, the poet Jan Kollár and the linguist Pavol Jozef Šafárik, that
the Slavic peoples are in fact speaking the same language, seemed
more and more popular. Polish citizens of Austria and Prussia participated in several conspiratorial groupings that tended to rejoin Polish
lands under Russian rule as a beginning of an all-Slavic union. 10
Meanwhile the idea of a European balance of power lost its privileged
position within the federalist agenda. Now the argumentation of theauthors followed a metaphysic path of a national mission of Slavic
peoples as developed in the works of the Polish pre-romantic
philosophers and Hegelians Józef Maria Hoene-Wroński, Bronisław
Trentowski and August Cieszkowski.
Soon another historical fact deeply influenced Polish politicalthinking. In 1830–1831 continuously shrinking space of political freedom in the Congress Kingdom culminated in the November Insurrection. After its bloody defeat there was hardly any possibility for
Polish politicians to build political projects that would connect thePolish cause with the Russian. It seemed that the hostility between
two Slavic nations almost completely closed ways for future reassessments. One of the most interesting Polish political thinkers of thisperiod, a scientist and a soldier Wojciech Bogumił Jastrzębowski
published—slightly before the collapse of the uprising—his
Constitution for Europe. His experience at war led him to formulationsof the Warsaw Duchy—[Stanisław Staszic], Do Seymu. Co się z nami stanie? Co
nam we wszystkich działaniach na pierwszey uwadze mieć należy, Warszawa 1809.
8
Stanisław Staszic, Myśli o równowadze politycznej w Europie czytane w Wydziale
Literatury Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk w roku 1815 w miesiącu sierpniu, in:
Stanisław Staszic, Pisma filozoficzne i spoleczne, ed. Bohdan Suchodolski, vol. 2.,
Warszawa 1954, p. 301n.
9
Marceli Handelsman, Adam Czartoryski, vol. 1, Warszawa 1948, p. 129.
10
Stanisław Wasylewski, Życie polskie w XIX wieku, Kraków 1962, p. 58.
31

Maciej GÓRNY

that in their pacifistic tendency the pan-European ideas resemble
those from the period between the wars. As a radical federalist
Jastrzębowski wanted to liquidate state as such, giving political rights
to the nations, even those that don’t live on a specific territory (heincluded also Jewish Diaspora). Any military education, commemorating of wars and battles as well as national symbols referring toaggressive creatures (such as lions or eagles) should be forbidden. 11
The defeat of the November Insurrection caused the emigrationof politically active man to the west, mostly to France. Many of them,
representing almost the whole spectrum of political life, lived inpoverty devoting their free time to politics. It is no wonder that the
deeper humiliation of those troublesome foreigners was, the broader
and more fantastic their political plans for the future were getting. The
best established group gathered around count Adam Czartoryski and
led Polish foreign policy with its own net of diplomats all over
Europe. 12 One of its main aims in foreign policy was to emancipate
south Slavic nationalities within the Ottoman empire to cut their ties
to Russia and to block political input of Russian pan-Slavism. 13 The
long-term strategy was to bring back Polish independence by using all
possible ways of diplomacy.
But there were also less moderate Polish emigrants that saw the
future of Poland in the cooperation of revolutionary peoples, and notof international powers. For Joachim Lelewel as well as for Adam
Mickiewicz Poland’s role in history was the first stage of the battle for
freedom of nations. Naturally their beliefs in the political shape of thecontinent based on the democratic principles of equality and freedom
for all nations. 14 Nevertheless, there was always something peculiar in
the federalist plans of Polish democrats (and many of them went evenfurther, joining western socialist movement). In many cases the
11

Wojciech Bogumił Jastrzębowski, Traktat o wieczystym przymierzu między narodami
cywilizowanymi. Konstytucja dla Europy, ed. Franciszka Ramontowska, WarszawaŁódź 1985, pp. 203–220.
12
Marceli Handelsman, Adam Czartoryski, vol. 2, Warszawa 1949, p. 41. The
broader analysis of Czartoryski’s foreign policy gives Hans Henning Hahn,
Außenpolitik in der Emigration. Die Exildiplomatie Adam Jerzy Czartoryskis, 1830–
1840, München-Wien 1978.
13
See: Joachim Kühl, Föderationspläne im Donauraum und Ostmitteleuropa, München
1958 pp. 13–37.
14
Joachim Lelewel, Polska, dzieje i rzeczy jej, vol. 20, Poznań 1864, p. 421 quoted
after: Andrzej Wierzbicki, Lelewel i Ojczyzna, in: W kręgu historii, historiografii ipolityki, Łódź 1997, p. 48.
32

The Historical Preconditions of the Polish Democratic Federalism (1795–1918)

former Slavophile tendency remained along with the patterns ofhumanity and democracy. Thus even when all nations should be equal,
some of them were meant to play a peculiar role in the divine plans.
The apple of European eye was the future Slavic federation under
the—often declared as spiritual more than political—supremacy of
Poland.
At this stage all plans of future international cooperation had toface the practical problem: if the Slavic federation was to be created,
where should be its future borders. The overwhelming majority of—
not only emigrant—Poles thought it quite obvious. The Slavic
federation should clearly base on the legacy of Polish-LithuanianCommonwealth in borders from the period before partitions. Thatmeant that Lithuanian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian lands and their
inhabitants were perceived as belonging to the same, Polish nation.
Meanwhile already in the 1820s some Polish authors noticed the birthof competing national identities. The answer of the majority of Polishdemocrats to the new challenge resembled the way revolutionary
France got rid of its particularism: there simply could not be any othernationality besides the Polish one. Any other is seen simply as aregional variant of Polish nationhood. 15
One of the most striking ways to theoretically strengthen ties
between Poles and Ukrainians was Franciszek Duchiński’s ethnographic theory created in the 1840s. According to Duchiński, Russians
were simply not Slavs. They belonged to the Turano-Mongolian
ethnic group, and this anthropological fact found its equivalent intheir political culture. In contrary, Byelorussians, Ukrainians and Poles(as well as other Slavic nationalities) were linguistically, culturally, andethnically so close, that their coexistence in one state seemed quite
natural. Interestingly enough, Duchiński’s theory met sympathy andeven enthusiasm not only in the circles of Polish emigrants but also in
France and in England, especially during the Crimean wars. Furthermore, in the 1870s the French government revised the guidelines forschool education and for several years all French children were taught
according to Duchiński’s theory, that Russians were not Slavs. 16

15„Nowa Polska“ March 1835; quoted after: Sławomir Kalembka, Prasa
demokratyczna Wielkiej Emigracji. Dzieje i główne koncepcje polityczne (1832–1863),Toruń 1977, p. 168.
16
Duchiński’s ideology from the Ukrainian angle was analysed by Ivan L.
Rudnytsky, Essays in Modern Ukrainian History, Harvard 1987, pp. 27–50.
33

Maciej GÓRNY

This kind of “Slavic addiction” of the Polish political thinkers
could lead also to different kinds of radicalism. Some ex-insurgentsdecided to realize their political plans with Russian support, graduallyleaving democratic principles that usually accompanied Polish federalism. 17 This usually led to a “national apostasy” and Poles who saw
the future of their state and of Europe under the Russian control
usually closed their eyes on orthodox and conservative Russians.
Probably the most interesting example of those life stories is Adam
Gurowski. Gurowski took part in the November Insurrection. During
the period of his emigration he joined the democrats but already in1834 he published an open letter in the “Allgemeine Augsburger
Zeitung” saying that he wishes to ask the Czar for amnesty, criticizing
the uprising and the very idea of an independent Poland. In his writings one can find almost the complete pan-Slavic ideological machinery that then served Russian political thinkers such as Danilevskij.
Russia was perceived as centralized, powerful, and free of Westernmental diseases. 18 But Polish pioneers of Russian pan-Slavism foundthemselves in a tragic position, severely condemned by their compatriots and perceived as not trustworthy by Russians. It was not easy toconvince the Czar and his chynovniki that one is already free from thedemocratic, Jacobin pest. 19
The Spring of Nations entered Europe at a point, when many
Polish emigrants felt already exhausted and deeply disappointed. It
brought new hopes and a new wave of political plans. Polish military
personnel participated in almost every European military conflict in1848–1849, quite often playing leading roles. Adam Mickiewicz initiated the forming of a Polish military unit in Italy, whose political
agenda—formulated by the poet—combined democratic andEuropean conviction with the belief in the peculiar role to be playedby Slavic peoples, above all by Poles. 20 Meanwhile Poles participatingin the Slavic Congress in Prague believed to have solved the PolishUkrainian conflict in Galicia and pledged for a free and democratic
Central European federation that should be open also for non-Slavic
17

Wiesław Caban, Droga Józefa Przecławskiego do ugody z Rosją, in: Między irredentą akolaboracją. Postawy społeczeństwa polskiego wobec zaborców, ed. Sławomir Kalembka,
Norbert Kasparek, Olsztyn 1999, p. 81.
18
Ryszard W. Wołoszyński, Polacy w Rosji 1801–1830, Warszawa 1984, pp. 232–
233.
19
Ibidem, p. 233.
20
Adam Mickiewicz, Dzieła, vol. 12, ed. Stefan Kieniewicz, Warszawa 1997, pp.
10–11.
34

The Historical Preconditions of the Polish Democratic Federalism (1795–1918)

nations (by which they obviously meant Hungarians). 21 On the other
hand, Czech organizers of the Congress as well as some Polish
Galician politicians concentrated on the federalization of Austria. Twoof the Galicians, Antoni Zygmunt Helcel and Jerzy Lubomirski,
prepared the so called Act of the Austrian-Slavic union that was the firstof many political programs connecting the Polish cause with theHouse of Habsburg. 22
The collapse of the democratic movement all over Europe
tempered Polish enthusiasm for a democratic Slavism. The Crimean
War, too, was hoped to cause another Polish uprising. In 1857 radical
conspiratorial politician and émigré Henryk Kamieński published in
Paris his Rosja i Europa. Polska. Wstęp do badań nad Rosją i Moskalami(Russia and Europe. Poland. An introduction to the research on
Russia and Muscovites). The book was an intelligent description of
Russian everyday life and culture, based on the author’s experiencefrom the time of his forced stay in Siberia. But it also included apolitical agenda characteristic for the period that brought so many
disappointments for the Polish political thinkers. Kamieński statedthat the unconditioned help given by Polish emigrants to every fair
European case did not meet gratitude. In contrary, the more democratic and radical the Poles were, the easier it would be for the Czarand European conservative circles to blame them in front of all
Europe for the will of destroying peace and order on the Continent. It
is high time—so Kamieński—to stop playing this game and to stateclearly: If the West doesn’t help us we will join Russia and flood
Europe together with millions of Cossacks. 23 Its enough when the
Czar starts to act reasonably to create a Russian-Polish union thatsooner or later will smash the decadent West. It was not clear whether
by using this argument Kamieński cried for the last time for Western
help or really pled for joining the Cossacks. In any case, disappointment with the European developments was quite common.
Another attempt to refresh the idea of the Slavic democratic
federalism failed as Revolutionary Commune in London (Gromada
Rewolucyjna Londyn) under its leader Zenon Świętosławski tried to21

Slovanský sjezd v Praze roku 1848. Sbirka dokumentů, ed. Václav Žáček, Zdeněk
Tobolka, Praha 1958, pp. 361–365. The original text was written in German,
which was the official language of the Slavic Congress in Prague.
22
Ibidem, pp. 379–383.
23[Henryk Kamieński], Rosja i Europa. Polska. Wstęp do badań nad Rosją i Moskalami,
Paris 1857, second edition: Warszawa 1999.
35

Maciej GÓRNY

instigate a conspiracy in Prussian Poland. Unfortunately, the wholeconspiratorial net was almost from the very beginning infiltrated andeven co-developed by Edmund Bärensprung, the president ofPrussian police in Poznań, and the whole enterprise culminated inPrussian arrest. 24 In the light of such bitter failures the federalist
agenda gradually loosed its attraction. In the eve of the January
Uprising 1863 the majority of the politically active Poles did not see
beyond the plan to reestablish Polish statehood.
But even the failure of another Polish insurrection (1863–1864)
did not cause an immediate end of the lively political debates concerning the future of Europe. In contrary, the new wave of politicalemigrants produced dozens of surprisingly optimistic proclamations
that based on the belief in revolutionary solidarity of all nations.
Authors like Józef Hauke-Bosak or Ludwik Bulewski saw again thefreedom of Poland as a stage on the way to free the whole continent. 25
Almost none of them seemed to notice the fiasco of all attempts for a
Polish-Ukrainian cooperation during the uprising but followed the
traditional path of Polish political thought in the 19th century that saw
a Polish Ukraine as the fundament of Polish and European freedom.
It was in the late 1860s that Polish authors started to question openly
the axiom of political thought: the borders before the first partition of
Poland. At that point more and more people, some of them connected with the Russian revolutionary movement, bit by bit turned
away from the clearly national viewpoint and adopted the rules ofclass struggle. 26
24

Zbigniew Fras, Prowokacja E. Bärensprunga na tle działalności policji państw
zaborczych (do 1865 r.), in: Polska – Kresy – Polacy. Studia historyczne, ed. Stanisław
Ciesielski, Teresa Kulak, Krystyn Matwijowski, Wrocław 1994, pp. 44–61; on
Bärensprung see also: Urszula Kalembka, Władanie Hohenzollernów na ziemiachpolskich w zwierciadle publicystyki Wielkiej Emigracji, in: Publicyści późniejszego
romantyzmu wobec rządów zaborczych i spraw narodowościowych na ziemiach dawnej
Rzeczypospolitej, ed. Sławomir Kalembka, Toruń 1998, pp. 30–32 and Sławomir
Kalembka, Przed burzą. Wielka Emigracja w przededniu i wobec powstania styczniowego,
in: Powstanie Styczniowe 1863–1864. Wrzenie, bój, Europa, wizje, ed. Sławomir
Kalembka, pp. 177–180.
25
Granice Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, “Rzeczpospolita Polska” 2/1869; quoted after:
Radykalni demokraci polscy Wybor pism i dokumentow 1863–1875, ed. Felicja
Romaniukowa, Warszawa 1960, p. 76.
26
Józef Tokarzewicz, Panslawizm, “Gmina” 7/1867; idem, O federalizmie(korespondencja „Gminy“ z jen. Mierosławskim), “Gmina” 8/1867; JarosławDąbrowski, Do obywatela Bednarczyka i jego politycznych przyjaciół, “Niepodległość”
36The Historical Preconditions of the Polish Democratic Federalism (1795–1918)

Meanwhile, since early 1860s, the situation of Poles in Austria
was getting better. This lead the liberal and conservative parts of thePolish émigrés to support plans that joined Polish future with the
Habsburg dynasty. 27 One can say that the old Austro-Slavic ideology
of František Palacký finally entered Polish political life.28 But within
the wide circles of non-German adherents of the federalization of themonarchy Poles formed a peculiar group, since they often saw Austria
not as a goal of their political attempts but as a potential enemy of
Russia and thus somehow descendant of the old Polish Kingdom. It
was not rare that Polish politicians (as Stefan Buszczyński) presented
plans that tended to turn the Habsburg monarchy into a Slavic state,
without non-Slavic nationalities but with the remaining parts of the
pre-partitions Poland. 29
Around 1871 when the main potential ally of Poland failed thewar against Prussia, two main trends of the Polish federalist idea
remained active. The pro-Austrian plans were confronted by theconservative pan-Slavic idea that was shifting between the mirage of
all-Slavic brotherhood and denationalization in the Russian empire.
However, the main weakness of Polish pan-Slavists was most probably that their efforts to make a deal with Russia almost never met any
meaningful response from the ruling circles of the Romanov monarchy. Their readiness to compromise that sometimes led them to abandon the very idea of Polish nationhood, too often remained wishful
thinking. 30
From the end of 1870s three main modern political trends were
forming on the Polish territories: the nationalist, agrarian, and socialist
1867; quoted after: Radykalni demokraci polscy Wybor pism i dokumentow 1863–
1875, ed. Felicja Romaniukowa, Warszawa 1960, passim.
27
Mowa Xięcia Władysława Czartoryskiego miana na posiedzeniu Towarzystwa LiterackoHistorycznego w Paryżu dnia 3go Maja 1866 roku, Paris 1866, p. 15.
28
Austria monarchia federalna, in: Paweł Popiel, Pisma, vol. 1, Kraków 1893, p. 89.
29
Wilhelm Feldman, Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej 1864–1914, Warszawa 1933, p.
69.
First Partition 1772, Second Partition 1793, Third Partition 1795–1914 (ed.)
30
Jan Sobczak, Próba polsko-rosyjskiego pojednania u schyłku XIX stulecia, in: Między
irredentą a kolaboracją. Postawy społeczenstwa polskiego wobec zaborców, eds. Sławomir
Kalembka, Norbert Kasparek, Olsztyn 1999, pp. 153–155; Andrzej Szwarc, Od
Wielopolskiego do Stronnictwa Polityki Realnej. Zwolennicy ugody z Rosją, ich poglądy i
próba działalności politycznej (1864–1905), Warszawa 1990 and 1996; Jan Sobczak,
Polskie fascynacje młodym cesarzem Mikołajem II. Geneza jego wizyta warszawskiej wewrześniu 1897 r. i próba polsko-rosyjskiej „ugody“, “Mazowieckie Studia
Humanistyczne” 1996/1.
37

Maciej GÓRNY

movements. The socialist movement was a federalist project per se,since the socialist future belonged to the peaceful cooperation of all
people and the disappearance of borders. But how could these goals
be achieved? Within Polish socialist movements two main tendencies
represented two possible answers to the national question. The socialdemocratic movement denied the need to reestablish the Polish statehood whereas the Polish Socialist Party saw it as an essential condition
for a happy future. Main socialist thinkers tried to solve the question
whether the class struggle should always have priority over thenational program. 31 The more national wing of the socialist party(including future national leader Józef Piłsudski and Leon Wasilewski)
followed the traditional anti-Russian program of the Slavic federationthat should be built on the corpse of the empire. 32 Developing during
next decades, especially after the 1905 revolution, this division within
the socialist movement led finally to the forming of separate socialist
and communist parties.
The 1905 revolution in Russia encouraged many members of thePolish middle-class living in Russia to enter the political life by supporting political projects that once more tried to solve the PolishRussian conflict. Among the most influential were Aleksander
Lednicki, a Moscow lawyer, and the brilliant scientist Jan Baudouin de
Courtenay. Lednicki refreshed the idea of the Polish-Russian unionwith clear anti-German undertones, while Baudouin de Courtenay
rejected the very idea of a Slavic federation. According to my knowledge, he was the first among Polish political thinkers who openlylabeled this idea as a racist one. He wished a federalist Russia thatwould be a fatherland for both Slavic and non-Slavic nationalities. 33
During World War I almost every path of Polish 19th century
federalist thought found its place on one or the other side of thefront. Pan-Slavists of any kind supported Russia, the strong proAustrian sentiment bound together Galician conservatives and socialists, and there was also a pro-German wing of Polish political debate.
31

Quoted after: Karol Grünberg, Polskie koncepcje federalistyczne 1864–1918,
Warszawa 1971, p. 63.
32[Leon Wasilewski] L. Płochocki (St. Os...arz), We wspólnem jarzmie (onarodowościach przez carat uciskanych), London 1901, p. 9. See: Adolf Juzwenko,
Leon Wasilewski´s Hopes for Federalism, in: Wilsonian East Central Europe. Current
Perspectives, ed. John S. Micgiel, New York 1995, pp. 56–59.
33
Jan Baudouin de Courtenay, Autonomja Polski. Odczyt wygłoszony w sali Muzeum
techniczno-przemysłowego w Krakowie 9 lipca 1906 roku, Kraków 1907, p. 23; idem,
Ze zjazdu autonomistów czyli przedstawicieli narodowości nie-rosyjskich, Kraków 1906
38

The Historical Preconditions of the Polish Democratic Federalism (1795–1918)

Many plans again referred to the union of all nationalities of the prepartitions Poland. 34 But all fighting powers formulated their generous(though not detailed) plans of reestablishing Poland as a part of afederation with Russia, Prussia or Austria.
From 1915 to 1918 the defeat of all the powers that took part in
the partitions of Poland finally made it possible to put life into thePolish federalist ideology. In fact, most of the Polish politicians at theend of the war tended to see the reestablishing of the PolishLithuanian (and Ukrainian) Commonwealth as a natural consequenceof the independence of Poland. One of the most popular politicalslogans that appeared on that occasion was “freedom and equality.” 35
The problem was that the other potential side of such a federation did
not want to reestablish unions of any kind but to build its own
Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian and even Byelorussian national state.
Now, the constant presence of the federalist idea within themainstream of Polish political life leads many authors to assumptionthat democratic federalism was in fact a crucial part of the political
agenda and a kind of unification of the best traditions of the gentry
democracy and the modern state. If so, one can say—and it is often
claimed—that the Polish political thinkers of the 19th century went far
beyond the average intellectual level of the time offering a postnational solution of the most painful problems of our continent. This
type of argumentation was widely used in the process of Poland’s
entering the European Union.
I think that creating such a unification does not have any solid
factual basis neither in the history of the gentry democracy of thePolish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, nor on the Polish federalist ideology of the 19th century. The latter appears in many political programs
and pamphlets but it very seldom builds the main part of the political
agenda. If we read the complete texts, we can easily observe that thepassages concerning the federation are placed in the last sections,being a kind of “progressive millenarism.” What seems much more
important is the precondition of those plans: foremost the reestablishing of the Polish statehood. The general statement that all thenations or all Slavic nations should be somehow united refers to thefar future. The main goal of the day is always Poland. At that point
34

Józef Lewandowski, Federalizm. Litwa i Białoruś w polityce obozu belwederskiego (XI
1918 – IV 1920), Warszawa 1962, pp. 46–48.
35
L. A., Problem Litwy podczas wojny. Zbiór dokumentów, uchwał, odezw itp., Warszawa
1918.
39

Maciej GÓRNY

almost all authors have to make a statement (and, if they don’t do it,
isn’t that a kind of statement, too?) concerning the future borders of
Poland. Does the federalist idea refer also to the lands and people’s of
the old Commonwealth, or is it a unit that cannot be further divided?
Thus the idea to reestablish a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealthappears a tricky one, situated somehow in-between the generous
internationalism and the revisionist ideology of the nationalist type.
The nationalities question that was hardly noticeable in the late 18th
century, became a crucial point in the politics during the next century.
The democratic traditions of the pre-partitions Polish political systemwere already “forms without substance” to borrow the formulationfrom the Romanian national discourse. 36 They had lost their meaning
long before they could be fulfilled.
It certainly does not mean that each author mentioned above
played with the slogan of federalism to hide their nationalist goals andto exploit Ukrainian and Byelorussian peasantry. There is no reason toquestion their sincerity. They simply in most cases ignored the nationality question, or rather ignored the development of any other EastCentral European nation beside the Polish one. Thus only rarely can
we rightly treat Polish federalist texts as a contribution to the allEuropean federalist discourse that sees beyond one’s own state andnation. The general level of their federalist reflection leads to theassumption that democratic federalism is rather a motif of Polish 19th
century political language than part of the fundament of Polishpolitical thought.

36

40

Titu Maiorescu, În contra direcţiei de astăzi în cultura română, in: Titu Maioescu,
Opere, vol. 1, Bucureşti 1978, p. 150.

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in PostRevolutionary Iran *Katajun AMIRPUR

The way how Iranian clerics are acknowledged as religious authorities,
or themselves lay claim to such a position, has undergone fundamental
changes since the Islamic Revolution, specifically in the period after
Ayatollah Khomeyni’s death in 1989. The same is true of the functions performed and the range of powers held by clerics, first andforemost the marja as primus inter pares. Not surprisingly, the arguments
used to support their claims to religious authority (and political power)
have also changed. This paper will discuss both the arguments
employed by post-revolutionary Iranian clerics in favor of velayat-e
faqih (the rule of the Supreme Jurisconsult) and those of its critics. In
terms of individual authors, I will focus on the arguments put forward
by Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, one of the theoreticiansof the official Iranian position, and the viewpoints of Iran’s most outstanding dissident on the subject, Hoseyn Said Montazeri.
One of the crucial points distinguishing modern Shiite Islam from
Sunni Islam consists of the fact that it has a clergy that is hierarchicallyorganized. 1 This clergy became the highest non-governmental author*

1

This article was already published in: “Speaking for Islam,” edited by Gudrun
Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke, Brill, Leiden 2006, pp. 219–240. It is reprinted
here by kind permission of Koninklijke Brill Publishers.
After 15 to 17 years of study, the student receives permission to issue legal
opinions (fatāwā). From this point on he is a mujtahid and entitled to bear thetitle of hujjat al-islam (“evidence of Islam”). If he can attract a large following,
and if a number of scholars of equal or higher rank recognize his authority,
they will at some time begin to address him with the title of Ayat Allah (“signof God”). Every mujtahid who is recognized by several maraji al-taqlid (“sourcesof emulation,” sg. marja al-taqlid), who has a large number of “followers”(muqallid, i.e. a believer who has chosen a “source of emulation”), has authoreda collection of legal opinions and written a “practical treatise” (risalat tausi almasail; pers. resale-ye amaliye), a treatise on ritual obligations, can himself becomea “Source of Emulation.” In terms of its theoretical foundations, the institutionof the marja was elaborated by Mortaza Ansari (1800–1864). Cf. Juan R. Cole,Katajun AMIRPUR

ity in Iran with the victory of the usuli school over the akhbari schoolin the nineteenth century. From then on, all believers had to choose a“source of emulation” (marja-e taqlid). 2 Renowned clerics were thus not
only able to build up a large following: By the same token, large sumsof money were placed in the marja’s hands, for the ordinary Shiitebeliever is obliged to pay the Imam’s share (sahm-e emam) to his“source of emulation,” who manages it on behalf of the Imam during
the period of the Great Occultation (gheybat-e kobre). (Previously, thebelievers had paid the Imam’s share to the local mullah.) The larger a
cleric’s following, the more funds he has at his disposal, and hence themore power—financial as much as social—he is able to wield. 3 Thiselement of religious taxation secured some scholars a high degree offinancial autonomy vis-à-vis the state, a factor which enabled those at
the top of the Shiite hierarchy to play an important role in politics, asbecame apparent in the tobacco protest of the 1890s. 4 Still, Shiite
clerics in Iran and Iraq were mostly quietists in the first part of the

2

3

4

42

“Imami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulama. Mortaza Ansari on
Emulating the Supreme Exemplar,” in Religion and Politics in Iran. Shi’ism fromQuietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki R. Keddie, New Haven/London 1983, pp. 33–
46. He was also the first generally recognized marja. In subsequent years,
several supreme “sources of emulation” were often recognized because
agreement could not be reached on one single marja. The last generally
recognized marja was Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi between 1949 and 1961.
For an overview, see Ahmad Kazemi Moussavi, “The Institutionalization of
Marja-i Taqlid in the Nineteenth Century Shiite Community,” The Muslim World84 (1994), pp. 279–99; idem, “The Establishment of the position of the
Marjaiyyat-i Taqlid in the Twelver-Shiii Community,” Iranian Studies 18 i (1985),
pp. 35–52; see also Cole (n. 1 above).
The clerics use these funds mainly for the theological colleges and theirstudents’ alimony—but only for those students who study jurisprudence.
Clerics who specialize in fields other than Islamic law cannot become a marja,
no matter how great their knowledge. This does not imply that they are notaccepted as religious authorities, but rather that they are not entitled to receive
a share of the Fifth (and the Imam’s share). For example, Allama Tabatabai(1892–1981), author of the Quranic commentary al-Mizan iI tafsir al-Quran, was
one of the most highly esteemed scholars of his time. His commentary was aseminal work in Shiite Quranic exegesis, and his philosophical works arecounted among the most influential in the Shiite debate on materialism. Still,
he did not receive any part of the Imam’s share since he had neither acollection of legal treatises to his name, nor did he teach law.
See Ann K. S. Lambton, “The Tobacco Regie. Prelude to Revolution,” Studia
Islamica 22 (1965), pp. 119–57.

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary Irantwentieth century 5 ; the majority held chiliastic expectations of salvation, maintaining that, until the return of the Twelfth Imam, any kindof rule—even the rule of the clergy—could be but illegitimate.
Awaiting the coming of the Imam-Mahdi, they withdrew from active
participation in the affairs of the state—as their predecessors haddone in previous centuries. 6
One of the most outstanding personalities contesting this attitude was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni (1902–1989), who articulated
his opposition while living in exile in Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s. In
his view, the Shiite scholars (or to be more precise, the jurisconsults
among them) are not only the sole authority for interpreting revelation(i.e., the Quran), but they are also responsible for having its injunctions implemented. As a result, the clergy must not only be involvedin politics, but must assume political leadership. 7 Khomeyni pointed
out that only the most learned of all jurisconsults, the universally
accepted marja, is capable of leading the Muslim community. Article
Five of the Iranian Constitution prescribes the Supreme Jurisconsult’sRule (velayat-e faqih). It states that the deputy of the Twelfth Imam(nayeb-e emam) and his representative on earth is to be “the jurisconsult
capable of leadership,” who is “accepted and acclaimed as Islamic
leader by the majority of the population”—a much debated point
lately. 8 The debate revolves around a number of questions: who isqualified and legitimized to be this leader, by whom he is to be legitimized, and how is the population to be involved, raising the issue of
popular sovereignty.
This paper does not deal with those intellectuals, scholars andactivists who are fundamentally opposed to the concept of velayat-e
faqih: they can be found among secularists as well as among quietist
clerics. 9 Even in Khomeyni’s time, the concept of velayat-e faqih was
5

6

7

8

9

Jean-Pierre Digard, Bernard Hourcade and Yann Richard, L’Iran au XXe siècle,Paris 1996, p. 172.
Ann K. S. Lambton, “Quis custodiet custodes. Some Reflections on the
Persian Theory of Government,” Studia Islamica 22 (1956), p. 133.
Ajatollah Chomeini, Der islamische Staat, translated from the Persian and editedby Nader Hassan and Ilse Itscherenska, Berlin 1983, p. 59ff.
Botschaft der Islamischen Republik Iran (ed.), Verfassung der Islamischen Republik
Iran, Bonn 1980, p. 27.
It is difficult to ascertain just how high the number of quietists among theShiite clergy is at any given moment in time. Wilfried Buchta maintains that in
the 1990’s, the majority of the Iranian clergy was opposed to velayat-e faqih. In
supporting his view, he cites data given to him by an employee of the43

Katajun AMIRPUR

not without its critics. Jean-Pierre Digard, Bernard Hourcade andYann Richard even claim that most scholars based in Qom were opposed to velayat-e faqih at that time. 10
How to Qualify as Vali-ye faqih and Whose Standards Are to Be Met?
In March 1989, Khomeyni disavowed Grand Ayatollah Hoseyn Ali
Montazeri (b. 1922), his designated successor in the position of vali-ye
faqih and leader of the revolution (rahbar) 11 , and dismissed him frompublic office. 12 However, no adequate replacement could be found forMontazeri, because the clerics willing to serve in this function were no“source of emulation,” and the “sources of emulation” were not willing. 13 In response to this situation, Khomeyni ordered that Article 109“Committee for Defending the Rights of the Shiite Marjaiyya” (Lajnat al-difa anlajna al-marjaiyya al-shia). This Committee is an underground organization
dedicated to non-violent resistance against clerical rule. It claims to have about
1.000 members, most of them Arabs and Iranians. No official figures areavailable on the ratio of political to non-political clerics in Iran, and it isdifficult to ascertain whether the Committee’s figures are correct. According to
the Committee, of a total of 20 Grand Ayatollahs, who rank a step below the“Absolute Source of Emulation” (marja al-taqlid al-mutlaq, arab.; marja-e taqlid-e
motlaq, pers.), the primus inter pares who is accepted by all other ayatollahs, 14
lived in Iran in the 1990’s. With the exception of Hoseyn Ali Montazeri all ofthem are said to oppose the concept of velayat-e faqih. See Wilfried Buchta, “EinHaus mit vielen Herren. Divergierende Machtzentren in der Islamischen
Republik Iran,” Orient 39 i (1998), p. 70.
10Digard et. al., L’Iran, p. 172.
11
Khomeyni’s successor is also addressed as leader of the revolution (rahbar), as
the Iranian religious establishment maintains that the Islamic Revolution is stillongoing.
12
In a letter to Khomeyni Montazeri had criticized violations of human rights
and blamed the government for the continuing economic problems, as well as
the fact that investments were blocked. For Montazeri’s biography, see Yann
Richard, “Hoseyn-Ali Montazeri,” Orient 26 (1985), pp. 303–306; N.
Schahgaldian, The Clerical Establishment in Iran, Washington 1989, pp. 48–49.
13
H. Teimourian, “The Mullah Goes Back to the Mosque,” The Middle East (May1989), p. 21. Shahrough Akhavi, “Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of
Iran,” The Middle East Journal 41 ii (1987), p. 190. On the other hand, there arescholars who maintain that Montazeri, too, was not accepted as a marja at thistime; see Maziai Behrooz, “Factionalism in Iran under Khomeini,” Middle
Eastern Studies 27 iv (1991), p. 609; N. Schahgaldian, The Clerical Establishment, p.
37. In the early 2000s,. Montazeri appeared to be widely recognized as marja.
However, this may be largely due to his oppositional views.
44

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary Iranof the constitution, which prescribed that the vali-ye faqih be a marja, a“source of emulation,” be suspended. 14 This measure considerably
lowered the level of religious qualification demanded of the holder ofthe highest public office. Khomeyni’s reasoning now shifted to politics: he argued that instead of someone steeped in religious scholarship or well versed in juridical subtleties, the office of vali-ye faqih
required a leader with sound political instincts, and that this personneed not necessarily be a marja. 15 This was a sudden turn, given thefact that he had previously argued that only the universally acceptedmarja was capable of leading the Muslim community. To justify his
new position, he now stated that he had always thought it sufficientfor the Supreme Jurisconsult to be a mere mujtahid. 16 The relevant passage in the constitution was thus amended to read as follows: theindispensable qualification for the Supreme Jurisconsult is agah budan
be zaman, “to be up to date politically and to be able to represent the
Revolution’s ideological foundations and goals.” 17 According to
Olivier Roy, this qualification also influenced the official titles of“Leader of the Revolution” (rahbar-e enqelab), “Highest Authority of
Leadership” (maqam-e moazam-e rahbar), or just “Leader,” which is thetitle most often used to address Khomeyni’s eventual successor,
Khamenei. 18 In theory Khomeyni, too, held the title of “Leader of the
Revolution,” but he was rarely addressed as such. Because of his
overwhelming authority he was called Imam, even though he referred
to himself as nayeb-e emam, the deputy of the Imam. (Unlike the Sunnis,
Shiites do not use this title for the leader(s) of prayer, but rather reserve it for the Twelfth Imam.) Critics have always targeted this practice—precisely because it might give rise to the impression that with
Khomeyni the Twelfth Imam had returned. Ayatollah Shariatmadari
was of the opinion that the title sounded blasphemous to Iranians,
even when used for Arab clerics such as “Imam” Muhsin al-Hakim. 19

14

See Wilfried Buchta, “Die Islamische Republik Iran und die religiös-politische
Kontroverse um die marjaîyat,” Orient 36 iii (1995), p. 453.
15
Silvia Tellenbach, “Zur Änderung der Verfassung der Islamischen Republik
Iran vom 28. Juli 1989,“ Orient 31 i (1990), p. 49.
16
Tellenbach, “Zur Änderung der Verfassung,“ p. 49.
17
Qanun-e asasi-ye jomhuri-ye eslÁmI-ye IrÁn, p. 32.
18
Olivier Roy, “The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran,” Middle East Journal 53
ii (1999), p. 206.
19
Michael Fischer, “Becoming Mollah. Reflections on Iranian Clerics in a
Revolutionary Age,” Iranian Studies 13 (1980), p. 88.
45

Katajun AMIRPUR

Ali Khamenei (b. 1939) was appointed by the Council of Experts(majles-e khobregan), the body charged with the task of selecting the valiye faqih, shortly after Khomeyni’s death on June 3, 1989. Yet the factthat Khamenei does not combine the highest political and religious
rank in his person, since he is not generally accepted as a “source ofemulation,” poses considerable problems. There are presently several
scholars whose juridical qualifications far exceed Khamenei’s. A powerful religious authority could thus challenge and undermine his claim
to lead the Shiite community. This is perhaps why immediately after
taking office Khamenei put his greatest rival Montazeri under housearrest. Khamenei is acutely aware of this situation, as is evident fromhis repeated attempts to elevate himself to the status of marja-e taqlid.
After Khomeyni’s death, most of the Shiites followed Grand
Ayatollah Abu l-Qasim al-Khui as their marja-e taqlid, while somechose Grand Ayatollah Marashi Najafi or Grand Ayatollah
Golpayegani. 20 After Khui’s death in 1992, the al-Khui Foundation
located in London opted for Golpayegani as his official successor. 21
Upon Golpayegani’s death in 1993, Khamenei made the first move tounite the positions of vali-ye faqih and marja-e taqlid in his person: hearranged for Golpayegani to be honored with a state funeral inTehran, planning to position himself as his successor by leading theprayers at the grave. Golpayegani’s family, however, thwarted hisplans and buried the deceased in Qom with only his closest relatives
present. After Golpayegani family had publicly rebuffed him, Khamenei declared his support for Ayatollah Mohammad Araki (died 1994),
a cleric who was not interested in politics, a move followed by twentyfour clerics from the middle ranks of the Iranian clergy who werecounted among the “political clerics.” The non-political faction of
Qom’s clergy refused to accept this move though; they nominatedGrand Ayatollah Sadeq Ruhani (d. 1997), a student of Khui’s, as marjae taqlid. Ruhani called for the clergy’s complete withdrawal from politics and was immediately arrested. 2220

Rainer Hermann, “Von der Wirtschafts- zur Legitimationskrise. Die Ära
Khamenei/Rafsanjani in der Islamischen Republik Iran,” Orient 35 iv (1994), p.
559. For the political attitude of al-Khui, who opposed the velayat-e faqIh, see
Yousif al-Kho’i, “Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qassim al-Kho’i. Political Thought
and Positions,” in Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues. State, Religion and Social
Movements in Iraq, ed. F. Abdul-Jabar, London 2002, pp. 223–30.
21
Hermann, “Von der Wirtschafts- zur Legitimationskrise,“ p. 560.
22
Further information on this event is offered in Hermann, “Von der
Wirtschafts- zur Legitimationskrise,“ pp. 541–64.
46

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary IranAfter Araki died in 1994, Khamenei again sought to become
marja-e taqlid. 23 But many ulama and ordinary believers were incensed at
Khamenei’s attempts to have himself declared a “source of emulation” without having published a “practical treatise” (resale-ye amaliye), a
necessary precondition to qualify as marja. Leading Iranian clerics,
such as Khamenei’s brother-in-law shaykh Tehrani, who was at thattime exiled in Iraq, wrote a petition (and ran a high personal risk indoing so) demanding that Ayatollah Montazeri, persona non grata par
excellence, be appointed Araki’s successor. He maintained that Montazeri was the only qualified jurisconsult, being the most learned of all
Iranian clerics and the only marja living in Iran. 24 Mehdi Karrubi, atthe time member of the Council of Experts, and other high-ranking
clerics, such as Ayatollah Khalkhali, supported this petition. 25 Others
voiced their criticism as well: Mehdi Bazargan (d. 1995), first Prime
Minister of the Islamic Republic and at the time leader of the semilegal oppositional “Liberation Movement” (Nehzat-e azadi), argued in
an interview with the Persian Service of the BBC that the religious
establishment of the Islamic Republic was trying to undermine one of
the basic principles of the Shia, namely the more or less democratic
way of choosing one’s own religious authority. Bazargan complainedthat the unity of state and religion that existed in Iran was being
exploited to force upon the population a marja chosen by officials—an
act unprecedented in Shiite history. 26
Having attracted scathing criticism from diverse quarters,
Khamenei publicly stated that he had no interest in becoming Araki’s
successor for the Iranians. 27 At the same time though, he offered himself as the “source of emulation” to Shiites living outside Iran—an
23

See Buchta, “Die Islamische Republik Iran und die religiös-politische
Kontroverse um die marjaîyat,” pp. 449–74.
24
Although it is not necessary that Iranian Shiites choose an Iranian as their“source of emulation,” nationality frequently plays a role.
25
BBC, Persian Service 11/30/1994. Those who signed the petition expressed
the opinion that Montazeri was undoubtedly the most learned and mostqualified Shiite scholar of the time. Ali Tehrani was sentenced to a prison termof twenty years in absentis in December 1994. See Ettelaat 21/12/1994.
26
BBC, Persian Service, 11/30/1994.
27
W. Buchta’s assessment that Khamenei managed to become accepted as Grand
Ayatollah in Iran (see Buchta, “Die Islamische Republik Iran und die religiöspolitische Kontroverse um die marjaîyat,” p. 458) must be corrected: asubstantial part of the population and the clergy do not even accept his claim
to the title of Ayatollah.
47

Katajun AMIRPUR

obvious attempt to attain leadership over the Shiites living in the diaspora and to strengthen his position in Iran at least indirectly.
Another attempt made by Khamenei to establish his leadershipover the clergy was to gain personal financial control over the Grand
Ayatollahs: he suggested that all believers should pay the Imam’s sharedirectly to his office and that he would then distribute the funds to theGrand Ayatollahs to finance their theological colleges and students.
To grant Khamenei the right to receive “their” Imam’s share would
have been tantamount to accepting him as the “Absolute Source ofEmulation.” Khamenei’s proposal was roundly rejected by several
renowned “sources of emulation” including Grand Ayatollah Yusuf
Sanei, who stated that he was neither interested in losing his independence, nor was he in favor of the current politicized version ofreligious leadership. 28
Critics like Grand Ayatollah Montazeri view these attempts toattain the position of “source of emulation” as a grave danger for theidea of the marjaiyya.
“Well, is this not degrading the Shiite doctrine of the ‘source of emulation,’ when the night after the death of Ayatollah Araki, theybrought a few people in the street of the Society of Seminary Teachers, just like they do now, then three or four people came from
Tehran and, in fact, (those who were mentioning him [as the source ofemulation]) were not more then seven or eight people, and with hardly
seven people, they wanted to make him a source of emulation,
whereas he is not at the level of issuing edicts and being a source ofemulation? Hence, they degraded the doctrine of the Shiite source ofemulation; they made it childish, with a bunch of kids from [theMinistry of] ‘Intelligence’ that they brought.” 29
One generation after the Islamic Revolution, scholars’ titles, then, saymore about their bearers’ position in the political hierarchy of Iranthan about their scholarship and their standing in the religious community or with their lay followers. In former times a scholar more orless automatically turned into an authority after having educatedseveral generations of students. A scholar held in high regard rose to
the top of this hierarchy without being officially granted a title. Since
the Islamic Revolution, those who hold important political, not aca28
29

48

Iran Press Service, 1/12/2000.
Keyhan, London, 12/4/1997, p. 4.

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary Irandemic, positions are granted a title. After Khomeyni’s death, Khamenei was thus immediately declared the new Leader of the Revolution,and from that day on addressed as ayatollah. 30 This form of address
was based on his new political position, not his learning. Hashemi
Rafsanjani, the former Iranian President and influential head of the
Expediency Council (majles-e tashkhis-e maslehat-e nezam), is also addressed as ayatollah, at least in the media controlled by the conservatives. As Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, a leading reformist theologian, points out:
“It may happen that someone today is known as hojjat al-eslam, that
there are political changes during the next two years, and he becomes
Ayatollah. Or the other way around . . . someone is Ayatollah today,
and, in the course of two years, because of yet other political changes,
nobody calls him Ayatollah anymore.” 31
Divine Designation, Part One: The Power Only God Can Grant
Critics claim that by changing the constitution, Khomeyni has ineffect abolished the velayat-e faqih. 32 This may be true regarding thejuridical and religious qualifications the vali-ye faqih was originallyintended to have. But the idea that the holder of this rank and office
was to be granted absolute power actually gained in importance withthe changes made to the constitution: The “absolute guardianship of
the Supreme Jurisconsult” (velayat-e motlaqe-ye faqih) was now inscribed
into the constitution. No longer empowered with simple guardianship,
the position of the “Supreme Jurisconsult” was rendered absolute. To
30

Udo Steinbach, “Die ‘Zweite Islamische Republik’. Der Gottesstaat auf dem
Weg in die Normalität,” Außenpolitik 41 i (1990), p. 84.
31
Mohammad M. Shabestari, personal communication to the author in
December 1994.
32
This is how the Iranian oppositional freedom movement puts it. See Nehzat-e
azadI, Tafsil va tahlil, Tehran 1994. This attitude is shared by Mehrdad
Haghayeghi, “Politics and Ideology in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Middle
Eastern Studies 29 i (1993), p. 38. Linda Walbridge maintains a different stance.
She believes that Khomeyni “did not divide the role of marja and wilayat alfaqih; rather he redefined the type of person who should serve in this dual
capacity.” Linda S. Walbridge, “The Counterreformation. Becoming a Marja in
the Modern World,” in The Most Learned of the Shia. The Institution of the Marja
Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge, Oxford 2001, p. 234.
49

Katajun AMIRPUR

compensate for the lack of religious authority, the officeholder was
given greater political powers, expressed in the term motlaq, which inthis context represents a novelty in Shiite jurisprudence. The vali-ye
faqih may thus be only one legal scholar among many—and not even ahigh-ranking one. But his political power is absolute, based not on his
religious authority, but solely on his appointment to office.
The leading Iranian reform theologian Mohsen Kadivar 33 (b.
1959) characterizes Khomeyni’s early ideas concerning velayat-e faqih—
as formulated in the constitution of 1979—as “the general appointive
authority of jurists.” In contrast, he describes the new form of velayat-e
faqih, as reflected in the revised constitution from 1989, as the “absolute appointive authority of the jurists.” 34 Kadivar stresses that thedifference between the two refers mainly to political authority. The“absolute appointive authority of the jurists” gives the Supreme Jurisconsult absolute authority, elevating his decrees (hokm-e hokumati) overthose of the sharia: “The orders of the Supreme Jurists, according tothis thesis, must not only be obeyed as a religious duty; they must alsoprevail, in cases of contradiction, over the state law and the sacred law
alike.” 35Interestingly, Khamenei was not in favor of this reading of the
faqih’s power from the beginning. During a Friday Prayer in 1989 hesaid that the authority of Islamic government could only be exercised
within the framework of the ordinances of the sacred law. Khomeyni
reprimanded him for this attitude and stated that: “Government in theform of the God-given absolute mandate was the most important of
the Divine commandments and has priority over all derivative Divine
commandments . . . [It is] one of the primary commandments of
33

Kadivar is involved in deconstructing velayat-e faqih by showing that there areother Shiite theories of the state. Nonetheless, Kadivar never made a frontal
attack on velayat-e faqih. He rather demonstrated the historical evolution of
Shiite political theory and concepts of the state, as well as the spectrum ofdifferent views on political rule in contemporary Shiite thought. Mohsen
Kadivar, Nazariyeha-ye doulat dar feqh-e shi’e, Tehran 1998. Of equal importance ishis book Hokumat-e velai. Andishe-ye siyasi dar eslam, Tehran 1998. For further
information about Kadivar see Farzin Vahdat, “Post-revolutionary Discoursesof Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar. Reconciling theTerms of Mediated Subjectivity,” Critique 17 (2000), pp. 136–54.
34
Quoted from Said Amir Arjomand, “The Reform Movement and the Debate
on Modernity and Tradition in Contemporary Iran,” International Journal of
Middle East Studies 34 iv (2002), p. 729.
35
Kadivar, Nazariyeha-ye doulat, pp. 108–9. Quoted from Arjomand, “The Reform
Movement,” p. 729.
50

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Islam and has priority over all derivative commandments, even overprayer, fasting and pilgrimage to Mecca.” 36 Said Amir Arjomand called
this “the new theocratic absolutism,” and, commenting on Khamenei’s subsequent change of mind, concluded: “Khamenei not only
understood the principles of the new theocratic absolutism but propounded them.” 37
Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi (b. 1934) is one of
Khamenei’s most fervent supporters, a member of the Council ofExperts and the head of “The Imam Khomeyni Education &Research Institute.” 38 He provided the basic argument to support
Khamenei’s claim to supreme religious authority, writing several
books on the question of velayat-e faqih. In his opinion, the term motlaq
means that Khamenei stands above the constitution. As his right toleadership is absolute, he can claim far more extensive rights thanthose explicitly set out in the constitution. 39
But why does the leader have absolute rights? This is—according
to Mesbah Yazdi—due to the fact that the faqih has been chosen by
God himself. Only someone chosen by God has the right to rule. 40
Whether the people accept the faqih or not is irrelevant. He does not
lose his legitimacy (mashruiyyat) if they refuse to offer him their recognition (maqbuliyyat). 41 According to Mesbah Yazdi, the people may givethe government some sort of, as he puts it, “objective reality,” buttheir approval is not required for it to be legitimate. 42 “That is why, inthe time of the Great Occultation, the government receives its legiti36

Said Amir Arjomand, “Authority in Shiism and Constitutional Developmentsin the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in The Twelver Shia in Modern Times. Religious
Culture and Political History, eds. Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende, Leiden 2001,
p. 310.
37
Arjomand, “Authority in Shiism,” p. 310.
38
This institute, which is directly answerable to the rahbar, was originally founded
to counter anti-Islamic propaganda. Information on the institute and its
homepages is offered in Matthias Brückner, “Der Ayatollah im Netz – offiziellezwölferschiitische Websites,” Orient 4 (2002), pp. 537-58.
39
Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Velayat-e faqih, Qom 1999, p. 27. Khomeini,
too, enjoyed considerable extra-constitutional powers. See in detail Asghar
Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran. Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic, tr. J.
O’Kane, London 1997, pp. 62–71, 97. Johannes Reissner, “Der Imam und die
Verfassung. Zur politischen und staatsrechtlichen Bedeutung der Direktive
Imam Khomeinis vom 7. Januar 1988,” Orient 29 ii (1988), pp. 213–36.
40
Mesbah Yazdi, Velayat-e faqih, p. 49.
41
Ibid., p. 55.
42
Ibid., Velayat-e faqih, p. 25.
51

Katajun AMIRPUR

macy from God and not from the people.” 43 A government that does
not have the people’s support is still legitimate, as can be seen fromthe example of the fourth caliph, Ali: “Even though he was the only
legitimate ruler, he had to wait for twenty-five years. The mashruiyyat
remained valid nonetheless. The imams just could not realize theirclaim to authority.” 44
Mesbah Yazdi compares three different modes of legitimacy:
popular will, the ethical values followed by the ruler, and rule bydivine grace. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the latter is the case.
This, as Mesbah Yazdi tries to point out, provides an obvious advantage: while the people, if given a choice, might end up electing a badgovernment, 45 God will always choose the best one. 46 Mesbah Yazdi
makes it clear that God is not arbitrary when choosing a rahbar. A
rahbar must fulfill several prerequisites: he must know how to interpretthe religious rulings (ahkam 47 ) and have reached the grade of ijtihad. He
must be an honest and pious person thoroughly familiar with society’s
problems and needs. He must also know how to move in international
circles, and “be able to tell friends from enemies.”48 While only theProphet, Fatima, and the Imams are infallible (masum), the rahbar is
qarib be masum—almost infallible, which is why he, coming closest to
the fourteen Infallibles, has to lead society during the Great Occultation. 49 For this reason, all people are duty bound to obey him. It is thefaqih who grants legitimacy to the actions of the people, not vice versa.
A law is legitimate only because the faqih has approved it, not because
it has been passed by a democratic assembly. According to Mesbah
Yazdi, parliament has no function and can be immediately dissolved if
the faqih is not satisfied with its work. 50
Following Khomeyni, Yazdi claims that the rahbar can suspend
certain pillars of religion like the pilgrimage, but he cannot change theusull, the principles of religion. Were he to do so, his authority or theright of leadership would be taken from him (velayat az u salb misha43

Ibid., p. 21.
Ibid., pp. 27ff.
45
Ibid., p. 14.
46
Ibid., p. 48.
47
Ibid., p. 54.
48
Ibid., p. 51
49
Ibid., p. 56.
50
Akbar Ganji, “Mashru’iyat, velayat, vekalat,” Kiyan 3 xiii (1993), p. 26. In thisarticle Ganji also describes his own attitude towards velayat-e faqih.
44

52

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary Iranvad). 51 Mesbah Yazdi does not explicitly state how and by whom therahbar would be divested of authority, but it can be safely assumed that
it would be through God. The rahbar does not need to know, nor beable to do everything. Mesbah Yazdi’s interpretation of the idea ofshura (consultation among the believers) allows for the rahbar to consult specialists for advice; the final decision, however, is his alone tomake, just like the Prophet. 52 Since—in theory—the rahbar may err,
Mesbah Yazdi allows for criticism—in principle. The conditions hesets, however, make criticism almost impossible. For example, it must
not play into the enemy’s hands. 53 He further believes that a large
number of mujtahids and their opinions lead to chaos, maintaining thatthe head of state should be followed in all political and politico-religious issues. Even if another mujtahid is wiser, it is haram—forbidden byreligion—to follow him in these issues. Only in personal matters mayother mujtahids be chosen. 54
This is quite an unusual point of view, since the Shia commonly
maintain that there can be several “sources of emulation” and everybody is free to choose the marja he prefers. But however unusual thisposition may be, Mesbah Yazdi is not alone in advocating it. Former
Parliamentary President Nateq Nuri (who unsuccessfully ran for thepresidency in 1997 for the conservatives) shares this opinion, statingthat:“It is necessary that different interpretations and points of view
exist—but there has to be a focus on the vali-ye amr’s [the leader’s,K.A.] interpretation. If we really wish to know which point of view istrue, we have to look at what the vali-ye amr has to say on the subject. I
think it is wrong to say that so-and-so cannot be allowed to hold an
opinion. By all means—let him hold an opinion. But there has to be alast word (fasl al-khitab). There is nothing to be said against there being
different interpretations, but if we want to know the right one, wehave to ask the leader. The last word on the different interpretationsof Islam is the leader’s privilege. If we do not go by that, the result will
be deviation.” 55
51

Mesbah Yazdi, Velayat-e faqih, pp. 63f.
Ibid., p. 64.
53
Ibid., pp. 69f.
54
Ibid., p. 68.
55
Resalat 9/29/1999 as quoted in Akbar Ganji, Talaqi-ye fashisti az din va hokumat,
Tehran 2000, p. 125.
52

53

Katajun AMIRPUR

Mesbah Yazdi also answered a question put forward by many critics:
why is the rahbar not chosen for a limited period of time? According
to him, the rahbar is to be the noqte-ye thabet, the fixed point of the system. Another question often raised is whether the rahbar may becorrupted by the fact that he cannot be voted out of office. Mesbah
Yazdi counters this criticism by pointing out that this simply cannot
happen in the case of the rahbar, just and pious as he is. Otherwise
God would not have chosen him. 56
Mesbah Yazdi presents velayat-e faqih as the only Shiite form ofgovernment, and insists on this being an undisputed truth. According
to him, there is general consensus that during the Great Occultation,
the clerics, or rather their primus inter pares, has to take over as ruler. 57
He maintains that different opinions exist only in questions of minor
importance, such as how broad the powers of the rahbar should be. 58
Mesbah Yazdi holds that even in the traditions of the Imams, therewaytt, the faqih is named as the Mahdi’s representative, 59 and he alsointerprets the Quran as proof for his argument, citing Quran 4:59, “O
ye who believe! Obey God, and obey the apostle, and those charged
with authority among you.” Classical Shiite interpretation maintains
that ulu al-amr, “those charged with authority,” designates the Imams,
since to obey them means to obey God. Obedience should, by definition, be based on the correct understanding of divine law: therefore,
those obeyed should be infallible, and these are the Imams. It would
have been contradictory of God to ask believers to follow a deviant
path. That is why, according to Yazdi, they never laid claim to theright to lead the Shiite community. In contrast, the Sunni reformer,
Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), interpreted ulu al-amr as “princes, rulers,
ulama, commanders of the soldiery and all chieftains and leaders towhom people resort for their needs and public interests.”60 At thesame time, Abduh did not believe them to be infallible. Khomeyni
took a similar stance, but limited those who are “charged with authority” in the time of the Great Occultation to the ulama. He neverclaimed that this opinion was the Shiite consensus. While endorsing
56

Mesbah Yazdi, Velayat-e faqih, pp. 72f.
Ibid., pp. 18, 21.
58
Ibid., p. 62.
59
Ibid., p. 61.
60
Quoted from Faleh Abdul-Jabar, “The Genesis and Development of Marja’ism
versus the State,” in Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues. State, Religion and Social
Movements in Iraq, ed. Faleh Abdul-Jabar, London 2002, p. 66.
57

54

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary Iranthis argument, Mesbah Yazdi went a step further, anchoring it historically. 61
What is remarkable in the context of Mesbah Yazdi’s argumentation is the fact that in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Supreme
Jurisconsult is still elected by the Council of Experts—human beings
after all. One could thus ask if it is not humans who in actual fact
grant legitimacy to the faqih. But the conservatives have an answer inthe ready: according to Mesbah Yazdi, the faqih is by no means electedby the Experts—he is discovered (kashf) by them, and this discovery isbased on a message sent to them by God. Such an answer thoughcannot address further queries, such as why the appointment of
someone who draws his legitimacy directly from God still has to be
confirmed by the Council of Experts (as has been laid down in the
Iranian constitution and as happened in 1998). 62 Nor does this answer
explain why—at least in theory—the Council of Experts has thepower to dismiss him from office. How is this to be understood? That
God has sent the Experts a message that He now wishes to takesovereignty away from this particular person? It is also difficult tounderstand why the people, who appear to have very little to say inthis particular interpretation of the velayat-e faqih, should be grantedsuch an important right as the election of the Council of Experts, anelection open to all Iranians over eighteen. How is it possible thathumans, supposedly incapable of choosing one outstanding mujtahidfrom among a few, should be able to identify—from hundreds ofclerics—the eighty-six experts who are to make up the Council ofExperts? Once more, Mesbah Yazdi has an answer. In response tobeing asked why elections are still held in Iran—for, after all, theleader is appointed by God—, he said that: “In the times we are living
in, and specifically since Western pressure is so strong, it is difficult toabolish a tradition like elections.” 63

61

Hamid Mavani draws the following conclusion on the proofs furnished by
KhomeynI: “In general, the tradition reports put forth by Ayatollah Khomeini
suffer from weak chains of transmission (isnad), and the meanings he imposeson the text (matn) of the hadith are not consistent with the way they were
understood by earlier jurists.” Hamid Mavani, “Analysis of Khomeini’s Proofs
for al-Wilaya al-Mutlaqa [sic] (Comprehensive Authority) of the Jurist,” in The
Most Learned of the Shia. The Institution of the Marja Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge,
Oxford 2001, p. 184.
62
Süddeutsche Zeitung 2/7/1998, p. 6.
63
As quoted in Ganji, Talaqi-ye fashisti, p. 108.
55

Katajun AMIRPUR

Divine Designation, Part Two: Its Effects Upon the Islamic
Republic’s Political Reality
An incident in 2000 showed that Khamenei, too, subscribed to thepoint of view that the people and their vote are not really important,revealing in the process how he sought to compensate for his lack ofreligious authority by repeatedly stating the claim that the constitution
enshrined his position as a leader with absolute rights. In August 2000,
Parliament—at the time dominated by reformers—scheduled a debate
on a new Press Law. Designed to protect journalists from judicial
arbitrariness, this law was to establish a clear definition of thosecircumstances under which newspapers could be banned and journalists imprisoned. Compared to the prevailing situation, this law would
have represented a marked improvement, or at the very least would
have meant clearer regulations for determining what was forbidden
and what not. However, Khamenei ensured that the bill was not evendiscussed: he had the President of Parliament Mehdi Karrubi read a
letter asking Parliament to cancel any discussion about the bill. The
bill, so the letter stated, was contrary to Islam and any debate on it
unnecessary. This incident is revealing in two points: firstly, that
Khamenei ignored the constitution—for the constitution does notgrant the faqih the right to exercise his veto in such affairs, unless ofcourse one interprets the term “absolute guardianship of Jurisconsult”
to mean that he possesses this right. And that is the second point:
during Khomeyni’s rule, Khamenei had already publicly declared thathe considered the Supreme Jurisconsult to stand above the constitution, and that the constitution itself depended solely on his signature. 64
His conduct in this incident seems to have been directed towards
making this very point. Otherwise, his behavior is difficult to explain:
ultimately there was no need for him to embark on a course of directconfrontation with the parliament, since the Council of Guardians,
ranking higher than the parliament, reviews all laws passed by parliament as to their compatibility with the Islamic character of the constitution. The Council of Guardians would have almost certainly
rejected the bill. Maybe Khamenei took this step in order to demonstrate what motlaq really means—namely that the Supreme Jurisconsult
indeed stands above the constitution and may veto any law. In January
2004, Khamenei himself commented upon this event and the role heplayed. He said: “The Leader of the Revolution’s power is God64

56

Tellenbach, “Zur Änderung der Verfassung,“ p. 52.

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary Irangiven”. Referring to the cancelled parliamentary debate, he said thatthe whole point of the system was that it is the Leader who is
entrusted with the task of solving society’s problems. He wascompletely in his rights to act as he had because the Leader is chosen
by God. “No rule is accepted in the Iranian democracy but the one
transferred to the Leader by God.” And again: “God grants this rule
to humans who are just and morally above all reproach, and acceptedby the people.” 65 Possibly, it is this Divine designation which, in theeyes of his followers, gives him the right to bear the title of marja.
Divine Designation, Part Three: Power to the People? Montazeri’s
Interpretation of Velayat-e faqih
The concept of velayat-e faqih has its critics and enemies. But it has its
supporters as well, some of them offering quite different definitionsof what velayat-e faqih entails. Some of the clerics in favor of theconcept propagate a democratic reading. But how is it possible toarrive at such diverse definitions of the faqih’s rights and duties? All
defenders of velayat-e faqih agree that God is the only sovereign. Opinions differ solely as to whom He has endowed with sovereignty until
the Twelfth Imam’s return. The position we have dealt with till now
maintains that God has endowed the vali-ye faqih alone with absolute
sovereignty.
Grand Ayatollah Hoseyn Ali Montazeri advocates a different
stance. As previously mentioned, Montazeri had been expected tosucceed Khomeyni as vali-ye faqih. After his dismissal, Montazeri withdrew quietly to teaching and his studies. He was kept under housearrest for a long period before this was enforced somewhat less strictly
in later years. In 1997, as President Mohammad Khatami came into
office, Montazeri returned to the political stage. At the time, hewarned the newly elected President in an open letter not to tolerate
any interference in his policies by Khamenei just because Khamenei
thought himself to be above the constitution. 66 Following this publicstatement, the letter Khomeyni had written to Montazeri to force his
resignation eight years previously was read for the first time in Parliament, the aim being to discredit Montazeri. In this letter Khomeyni
65
66

Bahman Nirumand, “Iran-Report,” ed. Heinrich Böll Stiftung 3 i (2004), p. 8.
Hoseyn Ali Montazeri, “Letter to Mohammad Khatami,” Payam-e hajer 17
ccxxviii (1997), pp. 5–7.
57

Katajun AMIRPUR

had characterized Montazeri—whom he had always referred to as “thefruit of my life”— as too “simple minded” (sade), saying that he was adisgrace to the Revolution and Islam, and that he had become a nuisance. In 1989 however, the public had merely been told that Montazeri had been deposed “for the good of the system and of Islam.” 67
Montazeri reacted to this public slandering a few days later bylaunching an open attack on Khamenei in a speech that received muchattention. On the occasion of the birthday of Imam Ali, Montazeri
addressed a few followers and supporters at his home, but the speech
was later widely circulated on tapes, and parts of it were published in
the Iranian press, the internet and abroad. 68 In the speech Montazeri
explained that the fathers of the Iranian constitution (and he had been
one of them) had never envisaged the establishment of a system suchas the one that existed in Iran today. The Supreme Jurisconsult had
been meant to merely act as a supervisor. The idea was that he should
stand guard over the three powers of the state and see to it that they
did not violate the principles of Islam; he was not supposed to interfere in state affairs. He was meant to take action only if and whensociety was about to “deviate from the path of Islam.” Furthermore,
the Supreme Jurisconsult was to be elected, and office was to be held
for a specified term. It was beyond doubt, Montazeri claimed, that in1979 a choice had been made for a republic, i.e. for a rule of, for, andby the people. 69
Montazeri and Mesbah Yazdi differ on the question of who has
been given sovereignty and on the question of who chooses the faqih.
According to Montazeri, it is not God. God has authorized not justthe faqih, but the people in their entirety—and it is the people who
67

The letter was reprinted in Montazeri – az ouj ta forud, special issue of themagazine Arzeshha, ed. Mohammad Reyshahri, Tehran 1998, p. 20. Reyshahri isa fierce opponent of Montazeri. The magazine is the political mouthpiece of
his fraction. The letter was first published in Abrar 11/22/1997, p. 2.
68
The speech was reprinted in Montazeri – az ouj ta forud, special issue of themagazine Arzeshha, ed. Mohammad Reyshahri, Tehran 1998, p. 44-48; Keyhan,London, 12/4/1997, p. 4; www.dfn.org/Voices/iran/montazeri.com. Later heelaborated on this speech in more detail in his autobiography. The biography
was first published in the internet under www.montazeri.com, an internet pagethat no longer exists (the author downloaded the autobiography in December
2000) and then, later, abroad: Hosayn Montazeri, Khaterat-e Àyatollah Montazeri,
Essen 22001.
69
Montazeri – az ouj ta forud, special issue of the magazine Arzeshha, ed.
Mohammad Reyshahri, Tehran 1998, pp. 44-48.
58

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary Iranthen choose the faqih. From this it follows that there has to be a social
contract between the faqih and the people. As he puts it:“In reality, there is a social contract between the people and the vali-ye
faqih, and the constitution was drafted on that basis. Accordingly, his
term may be limited and temporary, like that of the president or amember of parliament. And given that the vali-ye faqih is accorded
responsibility to the people, he is not infallible. He must accept criticism and be responsible for his actions.” 70
Montazeri accused Khamenei of having twisted the constitution’s
original intentions. At no time, he stated, was it envisaged that the valiye faqih should stand above the constitution. Montazeri called what
Khamenei established in Iran a dictatorship of the Supreme Jurisconsult. Moreover, Montazeri felt that the entire concept of velayat-e faqih
had in the meantime lost its raison d’être, since the original idea was thatthe most learned of all scholars was to watch over the state. But
through the “new definition” of the Supreme Jurisconsult’s function,
his office had become an institution uncannily resembling the Presidency. How, Montazeri asked, does the holder of this office differ in
his qualifications from the President? Both have to be competent andpossess a clear political vision. But what is the use of this new office if
there is no difference to that of the President? Naturally, for Montazeri, there can be no difference, since he does not accept the reasoning of Khamenei’s followers: that the Supreme Jurisconsult has
divine legitimacy. Instead Montazeri says that, according to Shiite
jurisdiction, the Twelve Imams were chosen by God—they alone, andno one else. Logically enough, no other person could lay claim to have
divine legitimation. 71
Criticism of the positions taken by Mesbah Yazdi and Khamenei
is becoming more widespread, even at times from unexpected quarters. Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Bigdeli Azari Qomi (d. 1999), for example, was one of Montazeri’s fiercest opponents. He was a member of
the Council of Experts which voted Khamenei into the office ofSupreme Jurisconsult, and, as editor of the newspaper Resalat, was oneof the most vocal leaders of the group supporting Khamenei’s claim
to the office of vali-ye faqih in 1989. In numerous articles he defended
Khamenei against those who pointed out the latter’s lack of qualifica70
71

www.dfn.org/voices/iran/montazeri.htm (6/13/2002).
www.dfn.org/voices/iran/montazeri.htm (6/13/2002).
59

Katajun AMIRPUR

tions. Moreover, Azari Qomi was of the opinion that Khamenei
should hold absolute power. That he was not a “source of emulation”
should not be interpreted to mean that his power could be limited.
Azari Qomi went so far as to state that even Khomeyni’s decrees
needed Khamenei’s approval in order to still be valid after his death. 72(Others, such as the defenders of the Rushdie Fatwa, maintained thateverything Khomeyni said must be respected forever; although fatwas
are usually no longer valid after the death of the marja who originallyissued them.) In 1996, however, Azari Qomi publicly withdrew his
support for Khamenei, stating that he thought him unfit for the officeof marja-e taqlid. 73 It is likely that Khamenei’s attempts to style himself
marja caused this change of mind; such self-aggrandizement finds its
critics even among Khamenei’s former supporters. Shortly afterwards,
Azari Qomi again criticized Khamenei, going so far as to suggest that
Khamenei should limit his activities to politics and elect Montazeri tobe his deputy in religious matters. If politics were not to change substantially, he stated, the people “will dump us in history’s dustbin.” 74
The subject of the Supreme Jurisconsult’s range of power iswidely discussed. In June 2003, 148 members of the Iranian Parliament signed a declaration calling Khamenei’s autocratic leadership andhis claim to be ruling in God’s name (and hence claiming to be infallible) an expression of unbelief (kufr). The people, the declaration
stated, have the right to judge their leaders’ actions, to criticize them,and to dismiss them “if they are not content with them.” Introducing“divine and absolute power” inspiring dread among the population
was denounced as an “oppression of human dignity.” 75
Uncertain Authority and the Consequences
One thing becomes clear when analyzing the different definitions of
the faqih’s rights and duties and his legitimacy. Besides the complete
abolition of velayat-e faqih, which the supporters of democracy aredemanding more openly than before, there exists another option, atleast in theory: to turn the institution of the velayat-e faqih into a moredemocratic one. While this may even have been the original intention
72

Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran, p. 78.
Buchta, “Ein Haus mit vielen Herren,” p. 59.
74
The Iran Brief: www.iran.org/tib/public/4101.htm. 11/29/1997.
75
Bahman Nirumand, “Iran-Report,” ed. Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2 vi (2003), p. 4.
7360

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary Iranof the fathers of the constitution, as Montazeri claims, Khamenei
claimed God-given authority, and criticism of him is even called andpunished as an “offense against the holy religious values” (ehanat be
moqaddasat-e dini). 76 Khamenei’s lack of religio-juridical authority has
probably forced him to look for a different mode of legitimation.
Khamenei might thus be the only marja in Shiite history to havebecome a “source of emulation” due to his alleged divine designationand not because of his religious authority and knowledge of Islamic
law. With this, the concept of marjaiyya has undergone a fundamental
change.

References
Abdul-Jabar, Faleh (ed.), Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues. State, Religion
and Social Movements in Iraq, London 2002.
Abdul-Jabar, Faleh, “The Genesis and Development of Marja’ism
versus the State,” in Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues. State, Religion
and Social Movements in Iraq, ed. Faleh Abdul-Jabar, London 2002,
pp. 61–89.
Akhavi, Shahrough, “Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of
Iran,” The Middle East Journal 41 ii (1987), pp. 181–201.
Arjomand, Said Amir, “Authority in Shiism and Constitutional Developments in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in The Twelver Shia in
Modern Times. Religious Culture and Political History, eds. Rainer
Brunner and Werner Ende, Leiden 2001, pp. 301–32.
Arjomand, Said Amir, “The Reform Movement and the Debate on
Modernity and Tradition in Contemporary Iran,” International
Journal of Middle East Studies 34 iv (2002), pp. 719–31.
Behrooz, Maziai, “Factionalism in Iran under Khomeini,” Middle Eastern Studies 27 iv (1991), pp. 597–614.
Botschaft der Islamischen Republik Iran (ed.), Verfassung der Islamischen
Republik Iran, Bonn 1980.
76

Ebrahim Yazdi, the leader of the Liberation Movement was charged of having
insulted Ali Khamenei in December 1997, his crime being described as an“offense against the holy religious values” (ehanat be moqaddasat-e dini). See
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 12/29/1997, p. 12.
61

Katajun AMIRPUR

Brückner, Matthias, “Der Ayatollah im Netz – offizielle zwölferschiitische Websites,” Orient 4 (2002), pp. 537–58.
Brunner, Rainer and Werner Ende (eds.), The Twelver Shia in Modern
Times. Religious Culture and Political History, Leiden 2001.
Buchta, Wilfried, “Die Islamische Republik Iran und die religiös-politische Kontroverse um die marjaîyat,” Orient 36 iii (1995), pp.
449–74.
Buchta, Wilfried, “Ein Haus mit vielen Herren. Divergierende
Machtzentren in der Islamischen Republik Iran,“ Orient 39 i
(1998), pp. 41–84.
Chomeini, Ajatollah, Der islamische Staat, translated from the Persianand edited by Nader Hassan and Ilse Itscherenska, Berlin 1983.
Cole, Juan R., “Imami Jurisprudence and the Role of the Ulama.
Mortaza Ansari on Emulating the Supreme Exemplar,” in Religion
and Politics in Iran. Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution, ed. Nikki R.
Keddie, New Haven / London 1983, pp. 33–46.
Digard, Jean-Pierre, Bernard Hourcade and Yann Richard, L’Iran au
XXe siècle, Paris 1996.
Fischer, Michael, “Becoming Mollah. Reflections on Iranian Clerics ina Revolutionary Age,” Iranian Studies 13 (1980), pp. 83–117.
Ganji, Akbar, “Mashru’iyat, velayat, vekalat,” Kiyan 3 xiii (1993), pp.
22-29.
Ganji, Akbar, Talaqi-ye fashisti az din va Hokumat, Tehran 2000.
Haghayeghi, Mehrdad, “Politics and Ideology in the Islamic Republicof Iran,” Middle Eastern Studies 29 i (1993), pp. 36–52.
Hermann, Rainer, “Von der Wirtschafts- zur Legitimationskrise. Die
Ära Khamenei/Rafsanjani in der Islamischen Republik Iran,”
Orient 35 iv (1994), pp. 541–64.
Kadivar, Mohsen, Hokumat-e velai. Andishe-ye siyasi dar eslam, Tehran
1377/1998.
Kadivar, Mohsen, Nazariyeha-ye daulat dar feqh-e shi’e, Tehran
1377/1998.
Keddie, Nikki R. (ed.), Religion and Politics in Iran. Shi’ism from Quietism to
Revolution, New Haven / London 1983.
Kho’i, Yousif, “Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qassim al-Kho’i. PoliticalThought and Positions,” in Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues. State,
Religion and Social Movements in Iraq, ed. Faleh Abdul-Jabar,
London 2002, pp. 223–30.

62

A Doctrine in the Making? Velayat-e faqih in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Lambton, Ann K. S., “Quis custodiet custodes. Some Reflections on
the Persian Theory of Government,” Studia Islamica 5 (1956), pp.
125–48; 6 (1956), pp. 125–46.
Lambton, Ann K. S., “The Tobacco Regie. Prelude to Revolution,”
Studia Islamica 22 (1965), pp. 119–57; 23 (1965), pp. 71–90.
Mavani, Hamid, “Analysis of Khomeini’s Proofs for al-Wilaya alMutalqa [sic] (Comprehensive Authority) of the Jurist,” in The
Most Learned of the Shi’a. The Institution of the Marja Taqlid, ed. Linda
S. Walbridge, Oxford 2001, pp. 183–201.
Mesbah Yazdi, Mohammad Taqi, Velayat-e faqih, Qom, 1999.
Montazeri, Hoseyn Ali, Khaterat-e Ayatollah Montazeri, Essen 20012.
Montazeri, Hoseyn Ali, “Letter to Mohammad Khatami,” Payam-e hajer
17 ccxxviii (1997), pp. 5–7.
Moussavi, Ahmad Kazemi, “The Establishment of the Position of the
Marjaiyyat-i Taqlid in the Twelver Shi’i Community,” IranianStudies 18 i (1985), pp. 35–51.
Moussavi, Ahmad Kazemi, “The Institutionalization of Marja-i Taqlid
in the Nineteenth Century Shiite Community,” The Muslim World84 (1994), pp. 279–99.
Nehzat-e Azadi-e, Tafoil va tahlil, Tehran 1994.
Nirumand, Bahman, “Iran-Report,” ed. Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2 vi
(2003).
Nirumand, Bahman, “Iran-Report,” ed. Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 3 i(2004).
Reissner, Johannes, “Der Imam und die Verfassung. Zur politischen
und staatsrechtlichen Bedeutung der Direktive Imam Khomeinisvom 7. Januar 1988,” Orient 29 ii (1988), pp. 213–36.
Reyshahri, Mohammad (ed.), Montazeri – az ouj ta forud, special issue ofthe magazine Arzeshha, Tehran 1998.
Richard, Yann, “Hoseyn-Ali Montazeri,” Orient 26 (1985), pp. 303–6.
Roy, Olivier, “The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran,” Middle East
Journal 53 ii (1999), pp. 201–16.
Schahgaldian, Nikola B., The Clerical Establishment in Iran, Washington
1989.
Schirazi, Asghar, The Constitution of Iran. Politics and the State in the Islamic
Republic, tr. J. O’Kane, London 1997.
Steinbach, Udo, “Die ‘Zweite Islamische Republik.’ Der Gottesstaat
auf dem Weg in die Normalität,” Außenpolitik 41 i (1990), pp. 73–
90.

63

Katajun AMIRPUR

Teimourian, H., “The mullah Goes Back to the Mosque”, The Middle
East (May 1989), p. 21.
Tellenbach, Silvia, “Zur Änderung der Verfassung der Islamischen
Republik Iran vom 28. Juli 1989,“ Orient 31 i (1990), pp. 45–66.
Vahdat, Farzin, “Post-revolutionary Discourses of Mohammad
Mojtahed Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar. Reconciling theTerms of Mediated Subjectivity,” Critique 17 (2000), pp. 136–54.
Walbridge, Linda S., “The Counterreformation. Becoming a Marja in
the Modern World,” in The Most Learned of the Shi’a. The Institutionof the Marja Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge, Oxford 2001, pp. 23046.
Walbridge, Linda S. (ed.), The Most Learned of the Shi’a. The Institution of
the Marja Taqlid, Oxford 2001.
www.dfn.org/Voices/iran/montazeri.com.
www.dfn.org/voices/iran/montazeri.htm 6/13/2002.
www.iran.org/tib/public/4101.htm. 29/11/1997.
www.montazeri.com

64

The Rights of the People in Islamic Thought in Iran1(A Historical Perspective)
Mohsen KADIVAR
Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran

Rights of the people in every school of thought depend on the theoryof legitimacy (election by the people or appointment by God) and thejurisdiction of power of governments (absolute or limited power) in
the respective school.
Although some religious scholars have referred to some verses ofthe Holy Koran and the traditions of the prophet as the religious
sources of rights of the people in the last one hundred and fifty years,
these documents were not understood in this way previously. The firststep of a modern approach to the rights of the people with some kindof Islamic justification could be seen in a short treatise, which was
published in the 1860s, the “Yek Kalameh” (One Word), written by
an Iranian diplomat in Paris whose name was Mirza Yousof
Mostashar od-dowle Tabrizi. This one word was “Law.” He translated
the main points of the French constitution into Persian for the firsttime and tried to prove that these points are completely consistent
with Islamic thought. The first Iranian constitution and its complementary (1907) were the first Iranian experience in combining therights of the people with a moderate interpretation of Islam.
During the constitutional movement there was a great challenge
about the rights of the people between two groups of Islamic scholars:
the so-called constitutionalists who defended this term, and theMasro’eh-khah (the advocates of legitimate governance) who criticized
it and supported dictatorship. The defenders of the rights of thepeople in the Najaf Seminary could be called the “political school ofKhorasani.” Molla Mohammad Kazim Khorasani was the greatest

1

Editors’ note: Unfortunately, due to circumstances beyond his control, Mr.
Kadivar was not able to prepare a paper for this publication in time. For thisreason, the editors decided to instead print the abstract of his lecture that Mr.
Kadivar distributed at the conference.

Mohsen KADIVAR

scholar in Islamic thought at his time. The other members of thisschool were Sheikh Abdollah Mazandarani, Mirza Mohammad Hosein
Tehrani, Mirza Mohammad Hosein Na’eini, and Sheikh Mohammad
Isma’il Mahllati.
At this school the concepts of “natural rights,” national rights,
and religious rights were used for the first time in jurisprudential
terms. In Khorasani’s belief absolute kingdom is contradictory to
Islam. On the other hand he rejected absolutely the guardianship of
the jurisprudents and the priority or special rights of the jurisprudents
in the public domain. Base of thought of this school about the governorship in the absence of the prophet and the infallible Imam is theright of the people. Khorasani emphasized “managing public domain
is the right of wise Muslims and trustworthy believers what is called
representative of the citizens or members of parliament now.” Thewell-known treatise of this school is “Tanbih ol-Ommah va Tanzih olMellah,” which was written by Na’ini in 1909.
A famous scholar of the other interpretation of Islam that denied
the rights of the people, freedom, equality of citizens, and law or any
ruling out of religion was Sheikh Fazl ol-llah Nouri. He believed that
Shari’ah (Islamic jurisprudence) is perfect and that we as Muslims
don’t need those “Western matters.”
The constitutional kingdom didn’t prove to be true except during
the time of the prime ministry of Dr. Mohhamad Mossadegh (1950–
1953). He emphasized on the rights of the citizens practically andfailed because of his great challenge with the King in this case.
One of the fundamental aims of the Islamic revolution in 1978
was to preserving the rights of the people. Iranians remember very
well many statements of Ayat ol-llah Khomeini defending the rights ofthe people against the King. The third chapter of the constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Iran (1978) is a good example as a documenton the rights of the people. But at the same time both the founder of
the Islamic Republic and its constitution stressed on “Velaya-e
Faghih” (the guardianship of the jurisprudent) and “Velayat-e
Motlaghe-ye Faghih” (the absolute guardianship of the jurisprudent)
ten years later. This duality has become the main root of challenge
between conservatives and reformists in the two recent decades. The
fundamental question is: How could the rights of the people beprotected by the absolute divine power of a supreme leader?

66

The Rights of the People in Islamic Thought in Iran (A Historical Perspective)

The last treatise on the rights of the people that was published
two years ago in Qom is “Resaleh-ye Hoghoogh” (Treatise of Rights).
Its author is Ayat ol-llah Hosein Ali Montazeri. It is the firstindependent jurisprudential treatise on the rights of the people fromthe Shiite Islamic viewpoint.

Prominent Scholars in Islamic Thoughtin the 20th Century in Iran and Their Main Works

1. Khorasani’s School of Political Thought
Molla Mohammad Kazim Khorasani (1839–1911): Siasat Nameh-ye
Khorasani (The Collection of Political Books, Treatises, andLetters of Khorasani). Edited by Mohsen Kadivar, Tehran: Kavir
Publisher, 2006.
Sheikh Mohammad Isma’il Mahallati (1853–1937): Al-La’li elMarbouteh fi Vojoub el-Mashrouteh (The Related Pearls in Necessityof Constitutionalism), in Rasa’el-e Mashroutiat (Treatises ofConstitutionalism). Edited by Gholam-Hosein Zargari-Nejad(editor), Tehran: Kavir Publisher, 1995.
Mirza Mohammad Hosein Na’ini (1858–1949): Tanbih ol-Ommah va
Tanzih ol-Mellah (Advice to the Nation). Edited by Seyyed
Mahmoud Taleghani, Tehran: Enteshar Publisher, 1955.
2. School of Anti-Constitutionalism
Sheikh Fazol o-llah Nouri (1843–1909): Rasa’el-e Sheikh-e Shahid F.
Nouri (The Treatises of Martyr S. F. Nouri) ). Edited byMohammad Torkaman, Tehran: Rasa Publisher, 1981.

67

Mohsen KADIVAR

3. School of Islamic Revolution
Ayat o-llah Rouh o-llah Mousavi Khomeini (1902–1989: Sahifeh-eye
Imamr (Book of Leader) [Collection of Khomeini’s Speeches andletters]. 20 vols., Tehran 1998.
3.1 Sub-School of Reformists (Democratic Interpretation of theIslamic Revolution)
Ayat o-llah Hosin-Ali Montazeri (1923– ): Resaleh-ye Hoghoogh (Treatiseon Rights). Qom: Sara’i Publisher, 2002.
3.2 Sub-School of Fundamentalists (Conservative
Interpretation of the Islamic Revolution)
Ayat o-llah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi (1935– ): Hoghoogh va
Siyasat dar Qr’an (Law and Politics in Qoran) ). Edited byMohammad Shahrabi, Qom: Imam Khomeini Institution, 1998.
4. School of Islamic Intellectuals
Professor Mahdi Ha’eri Yazdi (1924–2000): Hikmat va Hokoomat(Wisdom and Government). London: Shadi Publisher, 1991.
Dr. Abd ol-Karim Soroush (1946– ): Modara va Modiriyyat (Tolerance
and Management). Tehran: Serat Publisher, 1994.
Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari (1937– ): Naghdi bar Ghara’at-e Rasmi
az Din (Critique of Formal Reading of Religion). Tehran: Tarh-e
No Publisher, 2000.
Dr. Mohsen Kadivar (1959– ): Haghgh on-Nas, Maghalati dar nesbat-e
Eslam va hoghoogh-e Bashar (Right of the People, Treatises on Islam and68Modernization and Westernization in the Late
Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic—
A Prelude for Democracy?
Raoul MOTIKA
University of Hamburg

Today’s Turkey lives through a deep identity crisis. Several politicalcultural currents fight for the future direction of the country. The
culmination point will be the presidential elections in May 2007, bywhich the moderate Islamists of the ruling Party for Justice andDevelopment under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan mighteven gain the highest position in the Turkish state. Determined secularists are still longing for the days of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk whenreligion was strictly controlled by the state and restricted to the private
sphere. Different Islamist currents, however, even if they do notintend to change secular law into Islamic law, at least want to basepublic life on a Sharia inspired rigid morality. Radical nationalists and
Pan-Turkists try to reverse the integration process into the European
Union and dream of a self-sufficient Turkey as dominating power inEurasia. At the same time they still fight the demons of World War I
like the Armenian question, the enmity with the Greeks and theKurdish problem. As all this is not only a fight about politics andculture, but also about power and resources, the rifts between different strata of society, economy and state seem to widen day by day.
Old power holders like the army may lose their once dominant position and new ones like Islamist business circles gained powerful positions in the society.
A radical change of the society forms the background of theseconflicts. A formerly mainly agricultural society with a population firstand foremost living in the countryside left their homes behind andmigrated to towns, new metropolises or even Western Europe.
Consequently, towns like Istanbul, Adana, Izmir or Ankara multiplied
their population during the last thirty years. Nowadays, thousands ofvillages are dominated by elderly people or are even half emptied. Thisis especially true for mainly Kurdish inhabited southeastern Turkey,

Modernization and Westernization in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish
Republic—A Prelude for Democracy?

where the armed conflicts between the Turkish state and Kurdish
rebels led to death, destruction and flight. On the other hand, western
Turkey, especially the Marmara region and Greater Istanbul became adynamic industrial hub. Today vast suburbs inhabited by migrants
with different local, religious and political background encircle the city
centers. In these suburbs, the so-called gecekondu, quite often thebuilding industry is dominated by the construction mafia. Each ofthese new city quarters dispose the regional origin, religious andcultural orientation, and grade of economic success of its inhabitants
varying from quarters dominated by luxury apartments to no-go areas
for the police or non-Islamic dressed women. Traditionally, theTurkish state fulfils the management duties of a modern state only
partly and by this leaves the migrants alone in many respects. This iswhere Islamist organizations set in. This is especially true for theperiod after the military coup of 1980 and the dissolution of theSoviet Union when the Turkish left lost its competitive power against
the Islamists. They focused their propaganda and manifold activities
on the migrant quarters of the towns and by this gained the mayoralties in most of the major towns.
Often it is argued that the resurrection of religion and the emergence of thousands of religio-social organizations is a reaction against
the pro-Western Kemalist reforms and that it was encouraged by
global trends. This might be partly true. However, much more
important is the described process of societal change caused bymigration, urbanization and industrialization. In this framework Islam
seems to serve for many Turks as a system of values, which gives life ameaning and imparts a sense of self-esteem, which helps large parts ofthe society to endure the tremendous changes and hardships of thelast decades. We may not forget that religious networks, not to speakfrom Islamist organizations, and their milieus also create solidarity
groups, which can be of direct help for the survival in the new
metropolises. In contrast with many other Muslim countries Turkey’s
Islamist opposition by and large could be integrated into to politicalsystem and by this a radicalization process did not gain momentum.
The significant exception is the mainly Kurdish populated southeast
where a radical grouping named Hizbollah emerged, of which one wingclosely cooperated with the state against the PKK. This leads us to thequestion of the character of Turkey’s political regime and if therepublican system, which was established after World War I, is a
success story overall. To answer these questions one has to under71

Raoul MOTIKA

stand the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire and its
successor state, the Turkish Republic.
Modernization in the Islamic Ottoman Empire through the 18th and19th centuries was caused by the loss of competitive power against theChristian (Western) European states.
After 1683, the second siege of Vienna by an Ottoman army, theEmpire could never again pose a comparable threat to Christian
Europe as it was before. This was partly due to growing internal
problems as economic crisis, a falling state income combined withhigher state expenditures, a growing weakness of the center against
peripheral tendencies, and weak personalities of the Sultans. On theother hand the Renaissance, the enlightenment movement and theEuropean expansion helped Christian Europe to set up new dynamics
in science, politics, economy, and military. These led to new techniques, more effective states and armies, as well as a widened economic basis. With the expansion of Czarist Russia a new competitor
emerged in the northeast of the Empire, which soon became a threat
for the very existence of the Ottoman Empire by occupying thenorthern and eastern shores of the Black Sea coast and parts of eastern Anatolia. To counter all this the Ottomans had no other choicethan to look for alternative models to reorganize their state and army.
Consequently, the modernization of the army, the administration, the fiscal system and the educational sector was oriented
according to western European models and mainly organized byWestern advisors, or men educated in the West or at educational
facilities with European background.
It is not surprising that several parts of the Ottoman elite did notwant to follow this shift away from traditional methods of ruling.
Some of them understood very well that these reforms also meant amajor cultural change. The superior model was no more the Islamic
civilization, but the infidel West. Sometimes the reactions against thereforms even reached dramatic dimensions directly threatening theexistence of the Ottoman dynasty. There were manifold reasons forthis. Some social groups were losing their old positions, this was especially true for the former core group of the army, the Janissaries, or
the religious functionaries, the ilmiye, which had dominated the juridical and educational sectors. Because of the bad economical situationand the incompetent administration in many parts of the Empire
discontent of large parts of the population, especially of the non72

Modernization and Westernization in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish
Republic—A Prelude for Democracy?

Muslims, grew steadily. However, during this modernization process
the Ottomans could also fall back on a set of traditional methods ofintegration. The Ottoman state lasted about 600 years and, at its
zenith, stretched from Budapest in the north to Yemen and Asmara in
Eritrea in the south and from Algeria in the west to the steppes ofsouthern Russia and the Caucasus in the east. It was a multi-ethnic,
multi-religious and multi-cultural Empire governed by a mainly
Muslim elite of various ethnic and religious origins by means ofIslamic law—the sharia—Sultanic decisions (kanunname) and, mostly
in newly conquered regions, by local customary law (‘örf).
Due to the Empire’s extension and composition, its ruling class
was obliged to use various methods of political integration into thesystem. Therefore the despotic and autocratic character of the regime
always was accompanied by methods of political integration, whichtoday are seen as indispensable elements of a democratic regime: therule of law or the representation of certain groups of the populationby their own representatives like in the case of the recognized religious minorities. Counseling with notables was another method widelyused at different levels of the administrative system. Widespread andlegal was also the possibility to complain, e.g. against decisions orpractices of the lower ranks of the administration.
First elements of a democratization process in the modern sense of
the word were introduced between 1839 and 1876, during the socalled Tanzimat (re-ordering) period. Democratic elements of thisreform process, however, were as much a by-product of modernization and westernization as an attempt to integrate unruly parts of the
population and to reduce outside pressure, but not an aim by itself.
The most important steps in this respect were the Sultanic reform
edicts of 1839 and 1856, by which the non-Muslims received the samelegal status as the Muslim subjects of the Sultan. During these years
local and regional councils comprising of notables of different backgrounds convened on a regular basis for the first time. Westernpressure was decisive for these reforms because the European states
were interested in the continuation of the Empire. This not only
served their economical and political interests, but also was aimed
against the Russian intention of grasping as much Ottoman territory
as possible. Another important cause for this reform pressure was thegrowing concern about the fate of the Christian subjects of the
Ottoman Empire. During the 19th century the public debt grew also73

Raoul MOTIKA

dramatically, which lead to even more European influence on the state
and the economy.
The next decisive event in this reform process was the proclamation of the first Ottoman constitution in 1876 followed by theestablishment of an indirectly elected parliament. This first parliament
in Ottoman history convened in 1877, but together with the constitution was suspended only some months later for twenty years until
1908. Between 1876 and 1909 the Ottoman Empire was ruled byAbdülhamit II., a kind of enlightened despot. During his reign the
structural reforms of the army, the administration and the educational
sector continued, but without attempts to integrate wider parts of the
population via institutional participation. Instead he tried to use Sunni
Islam as a kind of uniting state ideology, which was also true forforeign policy where pan-Islamism served as a tool for Ottoman interests against the Western and Russian rivals.
Up to the present to a great extent democratization in Turkey is
the result of outside pressure, government policy, or the breakdownof the old regime and not an outcome of the struggle for democracyof popular movements. This does not mean that there were no pressure groups for democratization in the population and parts of the old
elite, the administration or the military. This was true for the re-establishment of the constitution and the parliament in 1908 when reform
minded army officers collaborated with long-time activists of different
wings of the opposition. Unfortunately, the democratic spring was
short-lived. In 1913 the government of the “Unionists” (so called
after the Party for Union and Progress) changed to an autocratic andrepressive regime, eventually leading the country into World War I.
A remarkable fact is that members of religious and ethnic
minorities often were the most active parts of pro-democracy movements, be it the non-Muslims in the late Ottoman Empire or the
Alevis—an anti-Sharia Muslim current comprising ten to fifteen
percent of Turkey’s population—in the Turkish Republic.
Comparable with Iran, the loosening of governmental control
regularly resulted in an outbreak of public political activities as could
be observed after the overthrow of Sultan Abdülhamid in 1908/09,
but also led to strong centrifugal tendencies in the periphery of thestate’s territory, mostly by ethnic or religious minorities. Therefore, up
to the present democratization is regarded by many Turks as a possible menace to the territorial integrity of the state.

74Modernization and Westernization in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish
Republic—A Prelude for Democracy?

The foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 was theoutcome of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I andnot of a popular revolution. However, the old regime had completely
lost its legitimacy due to the defeat, the cooperation with the victorious powers and its inability to organize the defense against theattempts of some European powers and of Greece and Armenia to
occupy parts of Anatolia.
Another important development was that wide parts of themodernized elite of the late Ottoman Empire regarded the Islamic
religion as one of the main causes for the decline of the Ottomanstate. This resulted also from their positivistic education at Western orWestern-influenced educational institutions. Besides, the reactionary
behavior of most parts of the Islamic clergy also contributed to their
bad image in the eyes of the modernizing elite. Consequently, theOttoman dynasty as well as Islam were widely delegitimized in theeyes of the most active and modern parts of the population. During
and after the so-called war of liberation from 1919 to 1922 thesecircles under the leadership of the prestigious general of World War I,
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, were able to gain power and founded acompletely new political system—a republic theoretically based on thewill of the people and no more on the decisions of the Sultan-Caliphor the pretended will of God as according to traditional Islamic
political thought.
During World War I and the early years of the Republic the ethnic
and religious composition of Anatolia was completely changed by theflight, expulsion and mass killings of the Armenians in eastern andcentral Anatolia (ca. 1,5 millions) and by the so-called populationexchange with Greece, which led to the loss of their homes for morethan 1,2 Million Ottoman Greeks (and 400.000 Muslims living on
Greek territory). Parallel to the extinction of the Christian populationof Anatolia in the 19th and early 20th century hundreds of thousands ofMuslim refugees from the Balkans and the Caucasus migrated to
Anatolia thereby altering the historical ethnic composition of Anatolia.
The disastrous war and post-war situation led also to the flight, deprivation and death of hundreds of thousands of Anatolian Muslims.
With a population of only 12 million after the war all this had atremendous influence on all aspects of public and economic life. The
open wounds of these events, of World War I and its aftermath are
one of the main obstacles for democratization even today.
75

Raoul MOTIKA

After the consolidation of its power the republican leadershipcarried out radical reforms in the political, religious and cultural fields,
which led to a seemingly complete break with the imperial and Islamic
past. To name only a few: abolition of the caliphate in 1924, in 1925
closure of the dervish convents, ban of the traditional headgear (fez)and change from the Islamic lunar calendar to the Georgian solar
calendar, in 1926 acceptance of European civil and penal laws andcivil marriage, in 1928 alphabet reform from the Arabic to the Latin
script, and in 1930 communal suffrage for women followed bynational suffrage in 1934. With these reforms Islam and its functionaries were completely excluded from their traditional monopolies inthe educational and juridical systems, also high culture and to someextent even everyday culture was secularized and Europeanized.
Formally it was the Parliament, which decided about these reforms, inreality it was the inner circle of the republican leadership, which had
the decisive power.
The enforcement of the new centralist Turkish national state aswell as the implementation of most of the reforms was met by severe
resistance, be it by the Kurds or by deprived social classes like theclergy. But, overall the regime was never really threatened by any formof opposition. This was partly due to the charisma and sophisticatedpolicy of the victorious leader of the war of independence 1919–22
and founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal, to whom the Turkish
parliament in 1935 bestowed the family name Atatürk, father of theTurks. Another reason for this was also the non-existence of any realistic alternative to the republican project, which could have mobilized
wider parts of the population. The Republican project was also able toattract a great number of administrative and military functionaries,
which were bound together by their common experience during thewar of independence and united by the newly emerged secular Turkish
nationalism. Soon, the Republican establishment tried to widen its
basis by the opening of People’s Houses and Village Institutes all overAnatolia in order to educate a new secular and “modern” youth.
Consequently, new Turkey differed very much from Iran under therule of Reza Shah who tried to carry out a similar reform program, but
without having the personal charisma of Atatürk and such a widesocial basis. The deep respect for and high esteem of the Turkisharmy in the Turkish population is one of the main pillars of Republican Turkey even today.

76Modernization and Westernization in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish
Republic—A Prelude for Democracy?

The new state was a secular republic with some democratic
procedures, but especially after the consolidation of the power of the
Republican People’s Party, the state party, and after an attempt to kill
Atatürk in 1926 the regime became more and more autocratic, if notdespotic. This was especially true for the years 1925 to 1937. The
ideology of the party and the policy of its leaders at the control leversof the state in many respects reminded of the totalitarian movementsof that period, be it Mussolini’s fascists or the Soviet communists.
Real opposition was suppressed, state and party became one and theparliament served as camouflage for the autocratic character of theregime. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the rule of secular law,formally democratic procedures, a parliament and the mobilization ofinterest groups via party structures was popularized during that
period.
It was World War II and again pressure from the outside world, which
led to a tremendous political change in Turkey. Shortly before the endof the war neutral Turkey declared war on Germany. This was causedby the prospect of being part of the post-war world order andfollowed by a pro-Western political stance in order to get U.S.-American backing against the growing Soviet menace and material support
for the Turkish economy. American pressure to democratize theregime coincided with a largely delegitimized Republican People’s
Party. Consequently, a multi-party system was (re-)introduced in 1946
and after the elections of 1950 the oppositional Democratic Partycame to power. With the rise of this party formerly marginalized socialgroups like the conservative traditional middle class of Anatolia gained
new influence. The Democratic Party also opened new possibilities
for the Islamic religion to regain some positions in the public it had
lost during the 1920s and 1930s.
As mentioned above the Turkish army plays a central role in the
Kemalist republic, mainly due to its historical prestige and its reputation of being the safe-guard of the nation. So, it was widely acceptedby the Turkish populace that the military took over the power fromthe elected governments when they seemed to be unable to work forthe best of the nation. The first military coup in 1960 was directedagainst the Democratic Party government of Adnan Menderes, whoreigned more and more autocratic and seemed to threaten the secularcharacter of the Republic. The military returned to the barracks aftersome months and the new constitution was the most liberal Turkey
77Raoul MOTIKA

ever had. However, the civilian politicians seemed unable to cope withthe problems of the country, which led to the military intervention of
1971–1973. Unfortunately, the rapidly changing governments of the
70s could neither solve the economic problems of the population nor
prevent the radicalization of large parts of the youth. Armed clashes
between radical right wing groups and leftists and numerous politicalkillings led Turkey to the edge of a civil war. So, nobody was
wondering when the army once again took power, but this time morebrutally and with longer lasting effects then before.
Today, the most important impetus for further democratization
stems from Turkey’s wish to become member of the European
Union. The integration process leads to an enormous pressure on
Ankara to change many aspects of the political and juridical system.
Without this outside pressure the non-governmental organizations
active for more democracy inside the country hardly would have had achance to change the anti-democratic elements of the existing systemin the near future.

Conclusion
Democratization in Turkey is the outcome of a development of nearly
200 years and deeply rooted in the reforms of the late Ottoman
Empire. The Republican years of the 1920s and 1930s show a mixed
legacy: on the one hand the establishment of a secular national statewith the rule of law and democratic procedures, on the other hand theleading role for the military in the state and an undemocratic nationalism with tremendous effects on the relations between the different
ethnic and religious groups of the country.
According to many public opinion polls democratic institutions
and procedures have found wide acceptance in the Turkish population. However, this generally positive picture is counterbalanced by a
deeply-rooted authoritarian way of thinking and authoritarian socialand political structures, be it on the family level, in the leader-centeredpolitical parties, or with the role of the military. Part of the historicallegacy is also that democratic values are regarded by many as lessimportant than principles like territorial integrity, national independence and “Turkishness,” which can bear several meanings.
78

Modernization and Westernization in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish
Republic—A Prelude for Democracy?

A lasting problem is also the question of the relationshipbetween state and religion. After the 1920s and 1930s, which had seen
the pushing back of Islam to the private sphere, the Republican
People’s Party started as early as in the 1940s to re-integrate Islam into
the state and public life. The question whether this development was astep towards democracy or not is still discussed today. One importantargument in this respect is that the majority of the Turkish populace
was and is faithful to Islam and most of its rulings and never would
have agreed to the radical anti-clerical and somewhat anti-Islamic
reforms of the early Republican period. This new policy reached a
climax after the military coup of 1980 after which the military leaders
tried to use Sunni Islam combined with nationalism as uniting national
ideology. The last step in this development was the election of thepro-Islamic Party for Justice and Development under the current
leadership of Prime Minister Erdoğan. Others see these developments
as the return of sinister reactionary forces, which have nothing else inmind than the destruction of democracy and the Republic.
The year 2007 is decisive for Turkey’s future development inmany respects. We will learn if the major actors of the political arena
learned their lessons and are willing to act according to democratic
principles and the interest of their people.

Titles for further reading:Ahmad, Feroz: The Making of Modern Turkey. London 1993.
Belge, Murat (Ed.): Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce [Political Thought
in Modern Turkey]. 6 vols. Istanbul 2001–05.
Kreiser, Klaus & Neumann, Christoph K: Kleine Geschichte der Türkei.
Stuttgart 2003.
Lewis, Bernard: The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London 1961.
Rumpf, Christian: Das türkische Verfassungssystem. Einführung mit vollständigem Verfassungstext. Wiesbaden 1996.
Zürcher, Erik J.: Turkey. A Modern History. London 2004.

79

Spiritual and Perpetual Revolution for Democracy:
The Public Philosophy of Maruyama Masao and His
Mentor Nanbara Shigeru
KOBAYASHI Masaya
Chiba University

1. What Allowed Japan to Import Democracy “Successfully”?
The Bush administration declared that the United States would establish democracy in Iraq by overthrowing the government of Saddam
Hussein. It has been proven that they could not succeed in establishing democracy there although they militarily conquered Iraq. Some of
the Bush administration and neo-conservative writers had harkened
back to the success story of establishing democracy in postwar Japanand that, as in Japan, the U.S.A. could succeed in establishing democracy in Iraq. I protested against the war and the Japanese government’s support for it. I think that—in contrast to Japan—democracy
cannot be established in Iraq successfully because the situation there isso different from that in Japan in 1945.
There are so many differences between Japan in 1945 and Iraq in2003 that it is impossible to go into details. But to name only one of
the most important differences, there was a certain democratic orparliamentary tradition in prewar Japan while such a tradition has beenvery weak in Iraq. Democracy cannot be imported by military conquest alone. Its successful import requires the existence of internal
democratic ideas and movements. Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) andhis mentor Nanbara Shigeru (1889–1974) played leading roles in
implanting democratic ideas in postwar Japan.
Some people, including those surrounding President Bush, seemto believe that Japan succeeded in importing democracy because the
U.S.A. through rule by the GHQ led by General MacArthur gave
Japan democratic institutions including a new Constitution. American
administration of Japan after World War II is to be valued highly, but
their reforms were accepted by the Japanese people because manySpiritual and Perpetual Revolution for Democracy: The Public Philosophy of
Maruyama Masao and His Mentor Nanbara Shigeru

Japanese sincerely regretted their past and were eager to introduce
democracy. Prewar Japan was dominated by militarists, and invaded
China and other Asian countries, and attacked the United States. But
the Japanese people repented their past. In contrast, the U.S.A.
invaded Iraq without legitimate reasons and without the approval of
the United Nations. As a result, many people in Iraq do not regret
their past, and they are not really eager to introduce democracy. Afterthe war many Japanese criticized Shintō for its prewar role as anational religion (State Shintō), while many Iraqis are not only devout
followers of the various branches of Islam but use them as a political
instrument. The Japanese tried to introduce democracy in earnest to
replace this state religion, while many Iraqis resist American occupation, relying instead upon Islam.

2. The Public Philosophy of Nanbara and Maruyama
After the defeat in the war there was a mental and spiritual vacuum
due to the collapse of prewar ultra-nationalism based upon State
Shintō. The prewar political regime was dismissed and the GHQordered postwar governments to establish a new democratic system.
However, such a system might have been overthrown had not
the spirit of democracy been established amongst the Japanese people.
According to Maruyama Masao, a renowned Japanese political theorist
in that era, there are three dimensions in democracy: ideas, institutions, and movements. The implication is that the import of democratic institutions such as elections, parliaments, and a constitution isimportant but insufficient unless democratic ideas and movements are
firmly rooted.
After the downfall of nationalism and militarism, communists
and socialists gained strength. They were of dominant influence especially in academic and intellectual circles. They basically focused on
economic systems such as capitalism, feudalism, and imperialism
interpreted as a phase of capitalist development. On the other hand,
they did not necessarily pay special attention to politics and culture,
because these spheres were considered to be regulated by the economic system: superstructures are regulated by substructures in
Marxist terminology. Some even thought little of democracy, because
81KOBAYASHI Masaya

democratic instruments such as parliaments were regarded as instruments of capitalist rule. As a result, their discussions hardly inspired ademocratic spirit and ideas.
Against the background of such an atmosphere, the endeavors of
Maruyama Masao and his mentor Nanbara Shigeru during the initial
phase of postwar democracy ought to be highly regarded. Maruyama’s
importance has been relatively widely acknowledged, while Nanbara’srole has frequently been neglected. His significance was illuminatedonly a few years ago in a symposium on Nanbara. Therefore I would
like to emphasize this point; I am speaking of “the postwar public
philosophy of Nanbara and Maruyama” for underlining theimportance of not only Maruyama but also Nanbara.
Nanbara was a disciple of the famous Christian independent
thinker Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930), and studied the philosophy ofKant and Fichte. He criticized Nazism and Japanese nationalism
between the lines in his State and Religion (1942). His original idealistic
public philosophy crystallized into A Preface to Public Philosophy (1971)
in his later years. He became a pioneer of communitarian politicalphilosophy when he pushed forward the idea of “communitarian
democracy” and “communitarian socialism.” He also emphasized thevalue of peace and raised the ideas of “world community,” “world
republic,” and “world federation.”
Nanbara concentrated on academic study and was described as a“philosopher within a cave” in the prewar era. This attitude saved himfrom being ousted from Tōkyō Imperial University because of accusations of ultra-nationalists. After the war he played a more public role
when he was elected as president of the University of Tōkyō. (Thisreminds us of Fichte’s “Reden an die deutsche Nation” whenGermany was occupied by Napoleon’s army. As most prewar authorities had collapsed and people were in a muddle, his addresses asuniversity president attracted public attention to a degree inconceivable today.)
Nanbara called for a “spiritual revolution,” a “human revolution,” and the “revolution of Japanese spirit,” for the “creation of a
new Japanese culture” and the “construction of a moralistic state.”
His appeal for a human revolution was aimed at establishing the“value of truth” and the “value of character.” He thought that such ahuman revolution should be the basis of a “political revolution” represented by democratic reforms. Obviously this concept of revolution is82

Spiritual and Perpetual Revolution for Democracy: The Public Philosophy of
Maruyama Masao and His Mentor Nanbara Shigeru

somewhat different from the one propagated by communists orsocialists.
Nanbara contributed to an extent to various reforms such as thefundamental law of education and the enactment of the new Constitution. It is well-known that he confronted Prime Minister Yoshida
Shigeru over the issue of the peace treaty, because Nanbara advocatedan overall peace as opposed to the governmental idea for a separate
peace. Nanbara thus embodied the idealistic spirit in postwar era.

3. An Overview of Maruyama’s Works: Three Periods
Nanbara’s ideas influenced Maruyama to some extent. Maruyama wasimpressed by socialism and was at first dubious of Nanbara’s politicalphilosophy based on neo-Kantian philosophy and Christianity.
However, Maruyama observed that most Japanese Hegelians hadturned to nationalism and had intellectually supported the war, and hecame to value Kantian philosophy and Christianity because mostthinkers based upon these intellectual streams had not compromised.
Maruyama’s works can be classified into three periods: 1) early
period from prewar times until immediately after the war, 2) middle
period from the late 1950s to the late 1960s, 3) late period from 1970s
until his death (1996).
Maruyama’s early works were motivated by the resistance or
criticism against Japanese Fascism or “ultra-nationalism” which led
Japan to the terrible World War II. His first major academic work on
Japanese political thought in the Tokugawa era (1603 [1615]–1868)
was Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan (1952, Engl. ed.
Princeton 1974). In this work he analyses the development of themodern way of political thinking from within Japanese Neo-Confucianism in the feudal period by presenting the dichotomy of “nature”
and “artificiality.” He was supported by the “trans-academic motivation” that there was a clue to modernity within Japan in spite of thedomination of the premodern political system centered on theEmperor in prewar Japan. Maruyama became well-known to the general public through the publication of “Theory and Psychology of
Ultra-Nationalism” (1946; Engl. translation in Maruyama, Masao:
Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics, London and Oxford
83

KOBAYASHI Masaya

1964, exp. ed. 1969). The distinction between “Fascism from below”
such as Nazism and “Fascism from above” such as Japanese militarism was presented here. These articles provided a fresh and impressive explanation of Japanese Fascism, in particular its cultural andpsychological mechanisms. They are characterized as a “theory on
mental (spiritual) structure” in Japan in contrast to prevailing Marxist
economic approaches in those days. Maruyama supported actively thereform of the premodern aspects. He emphasized the establishmentof political freedom in the private sphere as opposed to theintervention of “public” government or state under the dichotomy ofpublic and private. Thus, he became the representative liberal intellectual, and he has been regarded as a typical Westernizer, modernist
and progressive. These images were formed from his works in thisearly period, but they are still dominant today in discussions concerning Maruyama.
The line between the early and the middle period is not distinct,
but it seems to me that Maruyama shifted his emphasis slightly in thelate 1950s when he paid attention to the increasing symptoms of masssociety under conditions of rapid economic development in postwar
Japan. Although he maintained his so-called modernist or progressive
position, he came to be conscious of the negative aspects of themodern age more than before and moved towards a republican direction in emphasizing the importance of political participation of thecitizens. He proposed the paradoxical idea of political participation
based on a nonpolitical perspective, namely, some cultural cultivationin the private sphere: public (political) on and for the private (nonpolitical). He condensed the idea into the impressive slogan “radical
democracy with radical spiritual aristocratism.” Accordingly, hestressed the importance of voluntary associations, and in presenting
the idea of “democracy as a perpetual revolution,” he participatedenergetically in political discussions such as those on the UnitedStates–Japan Security Treaty in 1960.
Maruyama retired from the University of Tōkyō in 1971 after thecampus dispute in 1968. This turned out to be the beginning of his
late period. A representative article for this period is “‘Ancient Strata’Of the Consciousness of History” (1972). The article extracted the“ancient stratum” concerning the sense of history by focusing upon
Japanese myths in the Kojiki (Records of Ancient Affairs). Maruyama
argued that there is an unchanging cultural pattern called “ancient
stratum” or basso ostinato, which causes the transformation of imported
84

Spiritual and Perpetual Revolution for Democracy: The Public Philosophy of
Maruyama Masao and His Mentor Nanbara Shigeru

thoughts like Buddhism, Confucianism and Western ideas, in the sameway. Maruyama’s fundamental criticism of Japanese culture was stillretained and even deepened by this idea, but he admitted a change ofhis perspective: he was impressed by the similarity in opening Japan toforeign influences (as in, for example, the Meiji period and in the
postwar period), and changed his framework from a dichotomy ofpremodern/modern to closed Japan/open Japan. Although this new
thesis was criticized by some former followers for various reasons (e.g.
as an outlook of a theory accepting Japanese cultural destiny) in myview, this is a form of civilizational approach reminiscent of the great
works of Max Weber and S. N. Eisenstadt. I think that this can be
regarded as the summit of Maruyama’s theoretical insight. He can be
described as a cultural reformer or even a cultural revolutionary rather
than a cultural determinist in turning the unconscious inclination to
the conscious self-recognition through a scholarly presentation of theancient layer.

4. The Reality of Postwar Democracy: Political Clientelism and
Syncretism
The efforts of Nanbara and Maruyama have been fruitful to someextent. Japan has managed to maintain its democratic institutions until
now.
After the war the United States tried to make Japan a pacifist
state and introduced the famous Article 9 into the new Constitution incooperation with the Japanese Prime Minister Shidehara Kijurō.
However, the US drastically changed their policy after the beginningof the Cold War and wanted Japan to be a military power, because
they expected that Japan would faithfully support them against
communist countries. Accordingly, the ruling conservative party, theLiberal Democratic Party (LDP), formed the self-defense forces andhave since continuously attempted to strengthen these military forces.
As this has been criticized as contradictory to the Peace Constitution,in order to legitimize this strengthening, in the basic program of theparty the purpose is formulated that the LDP is working toward theamendment of the Japanese Constitution. It attacked the Constitution
arguing that it was forcibly imposed by the U.S.A.
85

KOBAYASHI Masaya

However, various people including Nanbara and Maruyama
opposed the attempts of the conservative governments, and thegovernment of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke faced serious opposition when it tried to revise the United States–Japan Security Treaty.
Kishi resigned after the enactment of the new treaty (1960). His
successor, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato was his grandson and adopted
the ideals of Kishi. LDP governments changed their focus after the
turmoil and basically tried to develop the Japanese economy rather
than to change the Japanese Constitution. As a result, Japan has kept
its Constitution, which established democracy and the foreign policy
principle of “no war.”
On the other hand, the reality of Japanese politics cannot be
described as an ideal democracy. Under the surface of democratic
institutions, there are traditional patterns of politics. The core of theconservative party’s rule has been based on the traditional system ofinterpersonal relationships: this can be described as a patron–client
relationship or, simply, as clientelism. Factions within the conservative
party can be regarded as patron–client relations, and support groups(kōenkai) in the constituency for individual politicians are also basedon these relationships. Clientelism also plays a central role in the close
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, and also in thatbetween politicians and interest groups such as those for businessinterests.
Thus, the fundament of Japanese postwar democracy could be
regarded as clientelistic interpersonal relationships. The interpersonal
relationships were, in the terminology of Maruyama’s days, premodern or feudalistic. While the façade of Japanese democracy ismodern and democratic, the substance is still pre-modern and feudalistic or patrimonial. Such a democracy can be described as “clientelistic democracy,” “pre-modern democracy,” or “feudalistic or patrimonial democracy.” The Koizumi administration was supported by amajority of the people because it promised to reform these structuresof politics and economy in Japan.
Consequently, postwar democracy in Japan was neither purely
democratic nor purely non-democratic. There were at least democratic
institutions like elections and parliaments, but democratic ideas andmovements did not dominate Japan because of the clientelistic or
patrimonial elements.
This kind of phenomenon could be called syncretism: for example, the religious coexistence of Shintōism and Buddhism is termed
86Spiritual and Perpetual Revolution for Democracy: The Public Philosophy of
Maruyama Masao and His Mentor Nanbara Shigeru“religious syncretism.” Thus, the symbiosis of the democratic system
and non-democratic politics could be called “political syncretism.”
Syncretism can be regarded as one of the most important features of Japan from a civilization point of view. Syncretism is a
dynamic phenomenon, and was formed and dissolved several times.
According to Maruyama, there were several such cycles in the historyof ideas in Japan, cycles of an inflow of foreign universal ideas and an
uplift of the “ancient stratum.” Syncretism starts with an influx ofuniversal ideas, leading to coexistence of the universal ideas and traditional Japanese ideas that lasts for some period, and is finally disintegrated by an attack of some kind of nationalism.
In the early days, there was a religious and political system peculiar to Japan, which can be classified as a type of chiefdom. Then,
beginning in the sixth century, Buddhism was imported from India via
China and Korea, and Confucianism and the system of centralized
government were imported from China. Facing these universal civilizations from India and China, the Japanese original culture flourishedin the Heian period (794–1185). This is the first cycle.
During the Kamakura period (1185–1382) Buddhist universal
ideas developed and were Japanized (Zen and Jōdo-shin sect). This could
be regarded as a phenomenon parallel to the Protestant Reformationin Europe. On the other hand, the Japanese feudal system developed
during the Kamakura-Shōgunate: this could be paralleled with European feudalism. The origin of the patron-client system can be found in
the relation between lord and vassal. In contrast, the Muromachi
period (1392–1573) was not particularly characterized by features ofuniversal culture. This could be called the second cycle, though thiscycle is not as distinct as the first: there were indigenous universal
ideas and indigenous feudal institutions.
The beginning of third cycle is marked by an inflow and development of universal ideas and movements, which was not limited
politics. Christianity was imported into feudal Japan by the Spaniards
and Portuguese in the 16th century; and at the same time elements ofJapanese culture like the tea ceremony and linked verse (renga) weredeveloped. The Jōdo-Shin sect grew to be a social and politicalmovement and stirred up riots against feudal lords, thus generating
independent areas from feudal rule for some time.
Maruyama regards these developments as being highly important; if those cultural progresses had continued and those cultural
movements had built up an independent influence on political power,
87

KOBAYASHI Masaya

Japanese politics would have taken another route. However, the political powers repressed the cultural independent developments, andsucceeded in controlling the cultural forces. Oda Nobunaga (1534–
1582), a powerful military leader, destroyed the main temple (Ishiyama
Honganji) of the Jōdo-shin sect, and crushed the riots; Toyotomi
Hideyoshi (1536–1598), a unifier following Nobunaga, and Tokugawa
Shōgunate, prohibited Christianity; Hideyoshi also ordered the masterof tea ceremony (Sen no Rikyū, 1522–1591) to commit suicide.
This was the diverging point in Japanese history. Culture has
been subordinate to politics since then, and it has been relatively rarein Japan that political power was severely criticized from a cultural
point of view. In Maruyama’s view, this is a serious weakness in Japan,
and it is one of the hindrances to establishing democratic ideas andmovements.
The Tokugawa Shōgunate closed the country, and universal ideas
became relatively weak during the Edo period (= Tokugawa period,
1603–1868). The warriors were urged to follow Confucianism, but it
was relatively rare in Japan that Confucianists directly influenced politics, whereas studying Confucianism was required for officials in
China or Korea. Moreover, Japanese Confucianism was modified
during the Edo period according to the “ancient stratum,” and thestudy of Japanese classical culture increased. This is the third cycle.
The fourth cycle began with the “enlightenment for civilization,”
namely, the import of Western civilization, in the Meiji era (1868–1912). Japan opened the country and started to introduce Western
civilization. As a result, Japan succeeded in realizing the slogan “Enriching the country, and strengthening the armies” to some extent.
Then, nationalistic ideas and political movements began to flourish,
and Japan began to confront the advanced countries such as the
U.S.A., Great Britain, and France. Finally, ultra-nationalism and militarism dominated the country, and military governments waged thewar with the Axis countries of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy against
the Allied Powers.
Thus, postwar democracy was the beginning of the fifth cycle.
Intellectuals characterized as representatives of postwar enlightenment, including Maruyama Masao, repented Japan’s war policy and did
their best to introduce democratic ideas and institutions. As has been
mentioned, their efforts have been fruitful to some extent, but notcompletely. In reality, the core of the political structure was and still ispolitical clientelism, frequently associated with political corruption.
88

Spiritual and Perpetual Revolution for Democracy: The Public Philosophy of
Maruyama Masao and His Mentor Nanbara Shigeru

Moreover, the intellectual current has changed since the 1980s, after
the dramatic economic development, and right-wing thoughts andneo-nationalism have increased strongly. This dangerous change has
affected real politics, and recent governments such as the Koizumi
cabinet openly executed right-wing policies: they sent Self-Defense
Forces to Iraq, submitted the law against co-conspiracy, and proposeda revision of the fundamental law of education.
Nanbara had been responsible for the enactment of this fundamental law, and he was one of the most influential advocators of
the peace Constitution. These recent acts are obviously in opposition
to his efforts. This move towards the right wing in Japanese politics
reminds us of the nightmare of military politics in prewar Japan. Just
as prewar Japanese militarism can be regarded as the closing of the
fourth cycle, the recent turn could indicate the danger of being in thelater stages of the fifth cycle.

5. Conclusion: Perpetual Spiritual Revolution for Perpetual
Democracy
Until his death, Maruyama continued to hope for the transformationof Japanese culture from “nature” to “artificiality,” in other words,
from “become” to “make”. Although there is some difference between Nanbara’s political philosophy and Maruyama’s political theory,
Maruyama’s zeal for reforming Japanese culture can be considered tohave taken on Nanbara’s appeal for a spiritual revolution to someextent. Both focused on the human dimension as the basis of politics.
Maruyama acknowledged the fact that we cannot reach a perfectdemocracy. Although democratic institutions can be imported, theidea of democracy contains a certain contradiction: the identity
between governing and governed persons. Since the governing
persons are necessarily a minority, they cannot be the equal of theothers. Therefore, democracy cannot become perfect, and democratic
movements perpetually continue.
Likewise, although Japan imported democratic institutions fromabroad after World War II, we should continue to call for a spiritual
revolution because it is surely impossible to form an ideal citizen. But
to get closer to this ideal it is necessary to call for “perpetual spiritual89

KOBAYASHI Masaya

revolution,” whether the revolution is Nanbara’s “human revolution”
or the transformation of a Japanese basso ostinato in Maruyama’s
terminology.
The public philosophy of Nanbara and Maruyama criticizes theway of thinking as it is revived in the neo-nationalist tendencies oftoday. They called for a spiritual revolution towards truth (Nanbara)
or individual subjectivity and independence (Maruyama). Now that
their diagnosis of Japanese politics and culture could be applied once
more, their prescription, namely, an appeal for the spiritual revolution
for democracy, should be revived, too.

90

Democracy “From Without”? A Short Remark on
Historical Preconditions in the Case of Japan

Wolfgang SEIFERTUniversity of Heidelberg

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq and during the subsequent occupation,
the Bush administration and military authorities frequently referred tothe success of the occupation forces in building up democracy after
Japan’s surrender of August 15, 1945. The implicit meaning in thosestatements is that what in the case of Japan has been successful, will
be successful in Iraq, too. However, this simple analogy overlooks
several distinct characteristics in the development of political thought,
institutions and people’s behavior in both countries, not to mention
the different forms and processes of nation building against a completely different historical background in Japan and Iraq. The following remarks aim to illustrate some fundamental historical prerequisites
for a democratic development in Japan, which are discussed at thelevel of political and constitutional theory.

1. A Rational View of Politics, Already Developed in Pre-Modern
TimesFirst, we should consider the problem of modernizing politicalthought. Here we understand the concept of democracy in a modern
society as a minimum concept, which comprises the separation of
powers, some form of representative government, and guaranteed
human rights. Even within the limits of such a minimal definition, theconcept requires a departure from a view that considers political andsocial order as given and granted by heaven or god. A rational view ofthe political and social order is no longer substantiated by religious
beliefs or theological arguments. From this, however, is does notfollow that the role of religion is neglected in the society as a whole.

Wolfgang SEIFERTIf we rely upon the work of Maruyama Masao (1914–1996),
historian of political thought and political scientist, in his Studies in theIntellectual History of Tokugawa Japan written in the forties of last century, such a departure took place in Japan during the Tokugawa (orEdo) period (1603–1867). According to Maruyama, Ogyū Sorai(1666–1728), a state philosopher who served the Shōgun (generalissimus) from the ruling Tokugawa family, changed the basic concept ofrule. Surely, some assumptions, which are included in the argumentation, are hotly debated in Japan, yet the findings of Maruyama stillseem to offer valuable arguments.
Maruyama’s argument goes as following: First, he is pointing out
in his Nature and Invention in Tokugawa Political Thought: Contrasting Institutional Views that “the direct intellectual genealogy of so-called
enlightened thinking may have been its foreign derivation, but foreignideas could only enter because the existing factors ‘within’ hadchanged sufficiently in nature to admit them without serious opposition.” (Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, Tōkyō
1974, p. 191) Considering that every school of political thought in
Tokugawa Japan, including the Sorai school, accepted the feudal social
order, Ogyū Sorai’s attack on the predominant current in the neoConfucianism of his time, the Chu Hsi (Zhu Xi) school, deservesattention. The political and social order of that period can be characterized as a rather rigid system of four main estates (warriors, peasants, artisans, and merchants), and with no political participation of
the people. That social order in principle did not allow social mobility.
Sorai searched for a legitimation of the shōgun’s rule (power did notrest with the emperor at that time) in a situation when social relations
lost their balance and when it became necessary to strengthen thefoundations of society once more. As Maruyama pointed out, Ogyū
Sorai was “the first man in the Tokugawa period to raise the questionof ‘who created the way?’ when he proclaimed his famous thesis that‘the Way is not a principle which things adhere to, nor is it the natural
way of heaven and earth. It is a way that was founded by the Sages.”(ibid.) Whereas the Chu Hsi school had used a theory of natural order,
the cosmological order being determined by the Way of Heaven, Sorai
created a theory in which social order and rule appear to be invented
by men. The inventors were the Kings of the ancient Chinese kingdom who were seen as “the sages.” Therefore, Maruyama found in
Sorai’s writings a crucial transition: In his concept the political andsocial order was given no longer by nature (shizen), but by invention
92Democracy “From Without”?
A Short Remark on Historical Preconditions in the Case of Japan(saku’i), or, as the translator of Maruyama’s study put it in addition, by“artefact.” (However, he adds, without the pejorative connotations
that the adjectival form “artificial” has attained in English.) Of course,such a theory gained no wide acceptance among the middle and lower
strata of the populace, and one cannot speak of a weakening of religious beliefs of the common people. Nevertheless, the transition was adecisive step toward a rational view of politics.

2. Irrational Elements in the Constitution of Modern Japan
When Japan was confronted with Western demands to open a country, which for more than 200 years had followed a policy of seclusion(sakoku) in a relatively strict sense, rebellious elements of the warrior
estate overthrew the shogunate of the Tokugawa and strove forbuilding up a modern nation-state. That modern state became realized
in Meiji Japan, named according to the reign of emperor Meiji (1868–1912). Which kind of legitimate foundation did they believe to being
the most adequate one for the new state? Since they fought a struggle
against the weakened shôgun under the slogan “revere the emperor
and expel the barbarians”, they used the still existing, however almost
forgotten emperor’s (tennō) house and the more than one thousand
years old myth of its lineage as the cornerstone for the new constitution. Of course, the new ruling elite needed a visible symbol ofnational unity. Fostering the national consciousness was an urgent
task, in particular towards the nation-states of the West. Besides, itneeded a constitution to be recognized as a modern state by the Western powers. At that time, the new leaders came under pressure by the
popular rights movement and its demands for political participation,
which gained momentum especially during the decade from 1875 to1885. The Meiji constitution of 1889, which was formally “bestowed
on the people by his majesty”—the pressure exerted by activist
members of the former samurai class, townsmen, wealthy peasantsand poor peasants was not reflected in the official language—was built
around the emperor as the center of the new state. For example, Art.
IV reads: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining inHimself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them according to theprovisions of the present Constitution.” And Art. V: “The Emperor
93

Wolfgang SEIFERT

exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.”
Accordingly, besides emperor, cabinet, and privy council an Imperial
Diet was established, consisting of the two houses of peers and ofrepresentatives. However, ministers were not responsible to the Diet,
but to the emperor. (Art. LV) Although the principle of the constitutional government and of the separation of powers was established,
the position of the emperor in the new political order gained much
more importance. As reason for this the “divine origin” of theemperor was given. Art. I reads: “The Empire of Japan shall bereigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages
eternal.” And Art. III: “The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.” Above
all, Art. I contains a definition which cannot be found in the constitutions of European constitutional monarchies. The so-called hereditary
monarchy (“Erbmonarchie”) and the divine rights of kings (“Gottesgnadentum”) are fundamentally different, as seen from the basic ideaof the Meiji constitution. (Actually, there was a harsh debate between
the German advisor to the constitution-making persons, Roesler, andthe Japanese side, on this point.) This characteristic of the Meiji
constitution was combined with the so-called kokutai (or “national
essence”, originally “body politic”, i.e. the specific national polity ofJapan, with the emperor as descended from the Sun goddess), which
was first mentioned in the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890,
yet not defined there. The Rescript once again embodied Confucianvalues of obedience, loyalty to the (divine) emperor and filial piety.
Both, constitution and Rescript, should be seen as closely related toeach other.
Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909), sometimes called “the Bismarck ofJapan,” declared in a speech before the Privy Council in July, 1888:“Thus in establishing this Constitution we must first seek this axis of
the nation [in Maruyama’s interpretation: an equivalent for Christianity
in European nations, W.S.] and decide what that axis shall be. Without
an axis, with politics entrusted to the reckless deliberations of thepeople, the government will lose its guiding principle and the state will
collapse. If the state is to survive and govern the people, we must seethat it does not lose the means to rule effectively. Constitutional
government in Europe has a history of more than a thousand years;
not only are the people experienced in this system, but their religion
has provided an axis that imbued and united their hearts. In Japan,
however, the power of religion is slight, and there is none that could
serve as the axis of the state. Buddhism (...), Shintō (...) In Japan, it is94

Democracy “From Without”?
A Short Remark on Historical Preconditions in the Case of Japan

only the imperial house that can become the axis of the state. It is thus
with this point in mind that we have placed so high value on imperial
authority and endeavored to restrict it as little as possible in this draft
constitution.” (Quotation from M. Maruyama, Nihon no shisō[Japanese thought/Denken in Japan], Tōkyō 1961 (originally published 1957), pp. 29–30).
The vague character of the kokutai later allowed ultra-nationalist
forces to attack liberal political theories and the constitutional law,which had flourished during the first two decades of the twentiethcentury. When T. Minobe, professor of constitutional law, describedthe emperor as an organ of state, albeit the highest one, his theory was
attacked as a lese majesty. After fierce controversies, he finally had toquit his position at Tokyo Imperial University, and his books werebanned in 1935. Note that neither Minobe nor the political scientist S.
Yoshino, who had argued for minponshugi (principle of “people
centeredness”) in politics two decades before, pleaded for the abolition of monarchy in Japan. To put it in a simplistic way: Whenmythological, archaic elements such as kokutai were added to theconstitutional foundation of modern Japan, the political forces—
civilian and military—of the extreme right could gain power in state
and armed forces by using kokutai as a weapon against its “enemies.”
Although several people belonging to the extreme right were punishedand some even executed because of their attempt to commit a coupd’etat, their adherents could use the logic of action “according to thewill of the emperor” in order to push officers, high-ranking bureaucrats, and politicians step by step and to take repressive measuresagainst opponents (individuals and parties) who protested against war
and expansionist policies of Imperial Japan. Finally, oppression andwar led to the destruction of the Japanese empire.
What is important here, however, is the fact, that since thebeginning of the Meiji period, there have been various currents inpolitical thought, which opposed irrational reasons for legitimatingstate policies. After 1945, the Japanese—be it scholars, be it ordinary
people—were able to resume those traditions.

95

Wolfgang SEIFERT

3. Human Rights
Another point I would like to emphasize is the existence of the popular rights movement during the Meiji period and its insistence onhuman rights. Securing human rights—or the will and the institutionalized procedures to guarantee human rights—is one of theelements of the minimal definition of a democratic system. For theyears of constitution-making and nation-building we can find groupsof actors who were engaged in it. First, the Meiji government itself in
its ardor to catch up with Western powers, and scholars who wereclose to it, for example the first proponent of German Staatsrecht,
Katō Hiroyuki (1836–1916). Second, the political opposition, whicharticulated its demands against the new government since 1873 andcan be subdivided mainly into three groups: (a) politically active
groups, which adhered to the concept of natural rights—a term,
which was rendered during the Meiji period into “rights given byheaven” (tenpu jinken); (b) public opinion leaders and at the same timeleading members of associations in cities, like Fukuzawa Yukichi(1834–1901), the Meiji enlightenment thinker and educator, c) politicalassociations in agrarian districts. Of special interest here is the thirdgroup, which was studied by the scholar of social history, D. Irokawa,and others during the sixties and seventies. Members of this groupoften combined human rights and a draft constitution with an evaluation of the international environment of Japan. For example, a youngteacher named T. Chiba, living in a province north of Tōkyō, wrote inhis draft constitution—and there were numerous such drafts having
been detected by researchers: “Nothing weakens the Kingly Way (aconcept taken from the Chinese classic Shih Ching, W.S.) more than aruler who despises his people or a people that observes no restraints
on his liberties. (...) Those who think only of increasing people’s rights
without exercising restraints on their liberties are ignorant of Ōdō (theKingly Way, W.S.) (...) Thus the true Kingly Way consists of establishing two sets of ‘restraints’ that are voluntarily observed by sovereign and people alike in a Great Harmony. These restraints are established by means of a constitution, and the Great Harmony is mutuallyobserved by means of a national assembly. A ‘constitutional form ofgovernment’ consists of creating a constitution and a national assembly.” Besides a more radical accentuation of human rights, which canbe found elsewhere in private draft constitutions of other individuals
96

Democracy “From Without”?
A Short Remark on Historical Preconditions in the Case of Japanand groups acting “from below,” we can read in this draft of a youngteacher also an attempt to amalgamate traditional thought and new
ideas of human rights and representation of the people. (D. Irokawa,
The Culture of the Meiji Period, Princeton 1985, pp. 116–117)
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the fact that in Japan there is
at least a tradition of more than 120 years of modern democratic
thought and movement, at times integrated by the government andbureaucrats of the new nation-state, at times oppressed by them. In
particular, for the period between World War I and Word War II, we
can observe a rise of democratic thought. Seen from this perspective,
the founding of a new, democratic Japan after surrender in 1945 does
not appear to be the consequence of a successful occupation policy by
the United States alone. Rather, the element of “democracy fromwithout” in post-war history raised the crucial point: How was theJapanese people able to acquire democratic institutions as subjects, by
their own, and therefore able to develop the spirit of democracy ininstitutions? However, this problem is one of citizens’ daily behavior
in Western democracies, too.

97

A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country:
The Korean Experience
CHOI Jang Jip
Korea University, Seoul

1. Under What Conditions Did Democracy in Korea Come About?
1) In Korea, the transition from military authoritarianism to democracy took place through the democratization movement known as the“June Struggle” of 1987. It was the culmination of a movement thatbegan in the mid-1980s with the demand for democracy. The Chun
Doo-hwan [Chŏn Tuhwan] government finally succumbed to theviolent nationwide demonstrations that culminated in June. When theregime promised a constitutional amendment for direct presidential
elections, this was the start of the institutionalization of democracy in
Korea. This is now twenty year ago. In many respects, Koreans cantruly be proud of the country’s democratization. Korea was not in an
ideal situation to achieve democracy. Since World War II, because ofits geo-political location, Korea has been at the very frontline of theCold War between the East and West and a battle ground of fierce
ideological competition. The country was divided in two at the 38th
parallel, and it experienced the devastating Korean War. In the postKorean War period of the Cold War, North and South Korea maintained hostile relations with the building up of military power, and thesituation still remains unresolved even in today’s post-Cold War era.
These conditions have harmful effects on democracy in two respects.
First, while there was a weak civil society—economically underdeveloped and lacking a strong middle class—a strong authoritarian state
apparatuses and a centralized bureaucracy developed. Second, in termsof the social and political balance of power, the military could not but
be powerful. These are unfavorable circumstances for democratization, since it would be difficult for any social force to confront either
the state or the military and to bring into play democratic values andideals.

A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: The Korean Experience2) It is worth noting that the Syngman Rhee [Yi Sŭngman] regime,
which ruled the First Republic of South Korea, was toppled by ademocratization movement in April 1960. In Korea this historicalevent is referred to as the “4.19 Student Revolution.” In the 4.19
Student Revolution, university students and the educated urban
middle class revolted against the dictatorship and corruption of President Rhee and led a nationwide demonstration. More than one
hundred lives were sacrificed and Rhee had to flee the country. This
student-led democratization movement even had a significant impact
on the democratization movement in Turkey that led to the collapseof its authoritarian regime at the time. The student revolution in South
Korea occurred only about ten years after the founding of the
Republic of Korea (ROK) and of having been through Korean War
when the country was still in a virtual state of war with the North.
How was such a revolution possible under circumstances when astrong authoritarian state apparatus was controlling society? The state
was armed with authoritarian state apparatuses, such as the military,
police, and the judiciary; and it was a strongly centralized government
based on Cold War anti-communism. But these conditions did notguarantee the stability of government. The fact that the Second
Republic in Korea, which was launched in the aftermath of thestudent revolution, did not last for more than a year and was replacedby an elite group from the military, illustrates this point clearly. Afterthe collapse of the Syngman Rhee regime, the student movement in
Korea became more and more radical. The students demanded tohave a meeting with the North’s counterparts at Panmunjŏm todiscuss unification of the North and South. In short, they began tochallenge the Cold War order on the peninsula that was under the U.S.
tutelage. This gave the military reason to intervene, and for the next
eighteen years it stayed in power. Whenever a democratization movement led by students and citizens challenged the limits of the politicalorder of Cold War anticommunism, which was the founding principleof the nation in South Korea, it seems that intervention by the military
was inevitable3) The fact that students led mass struggles for democratic values andrequires an explanation. This is especially so since the founding of thenation involved massive political and social chaos, including the
Korean War. In the process of founding a nation in South Korea, theU.S. played the role of a builder for democratic political institutions.
99

CHOI Jang Jip(The Soviet Union played the same role for North Korea.) The U.S.
put in place a state ideology of liberalism and democracy, and they laid
the foundation for today’s Constitution of Korea. The U.S. also institutionalized a modern system of universal education for the first timein Korean history to promote liberal and democratic values. After the
Korean War, the U.S. also resuscitated the war-stricken country
through economic aid. In short, South Korea could not have existed
without the U.S. In South Korea, justification for the division of thepeninsula was derived from the causes of democracy and liberalism.
However, from the beginning, South Korea had to remain a strong
anticommunist state to maintain the Cold War order in Northeast
Asia while at the same time being a democracy. In other words, theU.S. applied two conflicting principles in Korea. We could call it thetwin principles of modern Korea. If there was a clash to happen
between these principles, the ideology and values of anticommunism
had to take priority even if democracy had to be sacrificed. First of all,the Cold War order had to remain stable. If the values and ideals of
democracy were the moving force that led the rapid growth of thedemocratization movement in Korea, anti-communism was the ideology that strengthened the supporters of authoritarianism. In theprocess of developing toward democracy, these two forces—one
feeding democratization and the other feeding authoritarianism—
interacted with each other contrapuntally and led the dynamics ofpolitical change in Korea.
4) In the May 1948 election, which was the first election in Korea, alladults, men and women, were given the right to vote. The universal
suffrage in South Korea at the time was more advanced than in manyof the oldest democracies in the West. Thus, at least formally,
Syngman Rhee came to power through a democratic election.
However, his government soon became authoritarian and was overthrown by the student revolution. Dankwart A. Rustow, the American
political scientist who laid the cornerstone for a democratization
theory, suggested national unity as the most important background for
democratization. He emphasized that without prior establishment of
national unity, democratization would be extremely difficult to follow.
He argues that consensus is the condition for the majority of the
population to have strong loyalty to a certain political community, andthe process of making such national unity could lead to eruption offierce conflicts. In this regard, democracy was institutionalized in100A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: The Korean Experience

Korea under conditions close to a civil war lacking the backgroundcondition of national unity. Immediately after World War II when the
country was divided, the absolute majority of people was not interested in democracy but in the “national issue” of how to prevent thedivision. At the time, the national question had priority to the questionof democracy, and in this respect the institutionalization of democracy
was premature. Amidst fierce left-right confrontation and theconfusion of territorial division, the Constitutional Assembly waselected to draft a democratic constitution in a general election inSouth Korea in 1948. Not only all leftists but also all centrists on theideological spectrum were excluded from the process. Political participation of the public in the right-centered government was very
passive. This element weakened the legitimacy of the government. In
this regard, the democratization movement in Korea is closely related
to the national issue. With the Korean War the North-South divisionbecame completely fixed and the hope of building a unified nation
was dashed. South Korea was becoming a separate political entity on
its own. In the separate state being stabilized in the 1950s, democratization struggles began to emerge against the authoritarian government. It is noteworthy that the students and educated urban middle
class who led the democratization movement were not from the preWorld War II generation, which fought against Japanese rule and was
involved in the left-right confrontation following independence. They
were the young generation, educated in the modern universal education system. Politicians from the previous generation had all disappeared except for the conservative ones. The traditions of democracy
and democratic thought had lost their influence in the post-World
World II period because of political turmoil and a generational gap. In
short, the origin of the democratization movement in Korea is directly
rooted in the struggles against the authoritarian political system that
became entrenched during the post-independence Cold War period.
5) Both important waves of the democracy movement—the eruptionof democratic forces in 1980 referred to as the “Spring of Seoul” andthe massive June 1987 uprising echoed the experience of the April
1960 movement. The 1980 movement began from political chaos in
the wake of the assassination of President Park Chung-hee [PakChŏnghŭi] in October of the previous year. It consisted of widespreadlabor struggles and citizen demonstrations. The movement continued
for many months, the culmination of which was the Kwangju uprising101

CHOI Jang Jip

in which, under martial law and the leadership of General Chun Doohwan, the military intervened and killed close to 300 civilians. The
democratization movements of 1960 and 1980 illustrate the change ofthese movements in twenty years. The April 1960 movement began as
a student demonstration against election fraud by the Syngman Rhee
government. The goals and methods of that movement were quite
limited and peaceful. In contrast to this, the 1980 movement was
supported not only by students, but by workers and the public
especially in the large cities. Towards the end of Park Chung-hee’s
Yusin period, large-scale and violent labor strikes erupted frequently,
and students and the general public participated in massive numbers
in demonstrations against the government not only in Seoul but also
in other major cities such as Pusan, Masan, and Kwangju. The causeof this change can be found in industrialization and the labor issues
directly associated with it. From 1963 to 1979, the farming population
decreased from sixty-three percent to thirty-six percent, while thenumber of workers in manufacturing industries increased from eightpercent to twenty-three percent. During this period, through the wellknown “Park Chung-hee-style development model,” Korea changed
fundamentally, from a poor agricultural society to an industrial society
with a large middle and working class population. The
democratization movement of Korea is not so much the result of the
failure of Park Chung-hee’s authoritarian rule but the success of theindustrialization he led.
6) The June 1987 democratization movement was an expanded
version of the 1980 movement. The June Struggle was the climax ofthe democratization movement that strengthened and expanded formany years under the Chun Doo-hwan regime. The idea of a “civilsociety against an authoritarian state” that had been elaborated in
Latin America and Eastern Europe provided an important theoreticalsupport for the democratization movement of the mid-1980s. During
this period, virtually all major sectors of Korean society participated instruggles to end the Chun Doo-hwan regime, and it was palpable tomany people that a civil society was actually the foundation for the
democratization movement. The June 1987 movement took place in
two stages. The first stage was led mostly by students and the educated urban middle class. Violent demonstrations spread nationwide
and led to the “6.29 Declaration,” which announced the amendmentof the Constitution to end authoritarian rule. On the heels of this102

A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: The Korean Experiencedeclaration, an unprecedented series of massive labor demonstrations
and strikes followed. In Korea it is referred to as the “July-AugustGreat Labor Struggle.”

2. Characteristics of the Democratization Movement in Korea
1) Democratization in Korea is characterized by the fact that it wasachieved by a mass movement. Also, the central forces of the movement were students and the educated urban middle class, and since1980 workers and farmers participated in the movement in massive
numbers. The fact that students and the educated urban middle class
led the movement distinguishes Korean democratization compared toEurope in the early centuries where the central forces were theemerging bourgeoisie or workers and other societal forces. The solidarity between the students, who led the democratization movement,
and workers during this period is referred to in Korea as no-hak yŏndae
(labor-student solidarity), and activists were loosely called undonggwŏn
(movement sector). The student leadership of the democratization
movement is clearly a Korean phenomenon. However, from the
1980s, students were no longer the only major force of the movement;
the labor sector in particular added force. To say that democratizationin Korea was achieved by a mass movement is to say that the power
to overthrow authoritarian government basically came from outside of
the institutionalized political sector. It means that political parties andpoliticians played only secondary roles in the democratization process.
During the early period of party politics in the 1950s, both ruling andoppositions parties were weak. This was because the state in South
Korea was founded hastily, in civil war-like conditions at the initiativeof an outside force, namely U.S. Therefore, the nation was not built
upon political parties with wide-spread popular support; instead
nation building was led by the state, and the state brought back the oldcolonial state apparatuses and built a new military. Political parties
were established only within a very narrow ideological spectrum, andthe opposition party was one of the two conservative elite groups thatfounded the separate nation in the South. In the fifties, the opposition
party was too weak to confront the strong state and the ruling party;
and in the sixties the situation was similar under military103

CHOI Jang Jip

authoritarianism. It constituted no more than the “loyal opposition,”and thus the role of a true opposition was played by social forces
outside institutionalized politics. In particular it was carried out by
university students and the educated urban middle class, the first
generation to receive universal education. Thus, the opposition party
and politicians within institutionalized politics were a political andsocial force that had a completely different background from theundonggwŏn that actually led the democratization movement. Because
the movement was led by students and workers, once the politicalturmoil passed and institutionalized politics returned, their role inpolitics receded to the periphery. In particular, after the 6.29 declaration in 1987, undonggwŏn was excluded from the process of amending
the Constitution that disbanded authoritarian rule, and the frameworkfor democracy was produced as a result of give-and-take between
parties within the existing party system. After democratization,
undonggwŏn and political institutions were not only separated, butparticipation by the movement forces as such in Korean politics,
whether by creating an independent party or by joining the existing
parties, did not take place.
2) How politicians in the existing political institutions understooddemocracy and what they were aiming to achieve were in line with a“minimalist conception of democracy.” Their aim was to abolish
dictatorial government and to change governments through democratic elections. They were not interested in democratization of social
areas, changes of the status quo, or building a new democratic society.
The undonggwŏn, on the other hand, had a “maximalist conception of
democracy.” Apart from slogans like “Down with Military Dictatorship!” “Democratic Constitution Now!” or “Direct Election of the
President,” which expressed a somewhat minimalist conception of
democracy, there were plans of a more comprehensive democracy thatwould be a revolutionary social change, and that is what they aimed
for. For the activists, democracy was a means to achieve that goal, or
they understood democracy itself as encompassing such fundamentalsocial change. The radical ideology of the minjung (popular) movement
has two major camps. One is the “national liberation” side whose goalis unification through national autonomy. The other is the “labor
liberation” side whose activities are based on Marxist revolutionary
theories. The ideologies and visions of these two camps are whollyunderstandable if one considers the particular characteristics of the104

A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: The Korean Experience

democratization movement in Korea. The democratization strugglesof the 1980s were based on the voluntary mobilization and self-sacrifice of the students, and the growth of such revolutionary ideology isunderstandable. Participation in the democratization movement
required strong commitment and an equally strong revolutionary
ideology. The core of the national liberation movement was a revolutionary nationalist ideology. Its aim was national unification, andnational autonomy was a core value. Thus it was friendly toward theNorth Korean policy of self-determination and hostile toward the U.S.
role on the Korean peninsula. The labor liberation line was based on arevolutionary theory close to classical Marxism where workers lead therevolutionary movement. As antitheses to military authoritarianism,
these radical ideologies were mirror images of it. They are ideologicallyand romantically inspired theoretical formulas that cannot be realized
in reality. The problem was that when the military authoritarian
government collapsed and democracy was implemented, undonggwŏn
were completely incapable to developing concrete and feasible reform
measures or programs. Accordingly, there was little undonggwŏn could
contribute to the actual working of democratic politics. This is where
the ideological characteristic of Korean society reveals. That is to say,in Korea, the ideologies of liberalism and republicanism that arerooted in, and contributed to building, Western democracies are either
weak or non-existent. The factionalization of nationalist ideology intoleft and right led to the division of the country and ultimately to
Korean War. However, nationalism is still the most important
ideology regardless of whether one is a rightist or leftist. During thePark Chung-hee era, this nationalist ideology gave birth to economic
nationalism that led to economic growth and industrial development.
The democratization forces were an antithesis to this economic forces;
and in line with revolutionary nationalist or revolutionary socialist
ideologies, radical ideologies developed that were more suitable formobilizing collective energy than liberal ideas and values that reflect
individual rights and liberty.
3) Another characteristic of the democratization movement in Korea
is that the progress and issues of the movement became progressively
more entrenched each step of the way. The immediate reasons for the
movement were authoritarianism and undemocratic political institutions. However, as events unfolded, the movement raised the issues oflabor and national liberation. In particular, the “national question” has105

CHOI Jang Jip

always been the central issue of democratization. In the post-WorldWar II history of Korea, Cold War anticommunism played a role injustifying the national division and contributed to the suppression ofideologies. Thus it contributed to justifying authoritarianism. Therefore, democratization unavoidably led the younger generation of
intellectuals and scholars to critically reinterpret the contemporary
political history since the immediate post-Liberation years that had
been officially enshrined. The democratization movement of the
1980s influenced the widespread reinterpretation of the nation’s division and the role of the U.S. in the peninsula. Today in Korea a fierce
debate is ongoing. On one side there are those who argue that Japanese colonial rule and Cold War anticommunism contributed positively to the development of the Korean society; the other side of thedebate holds a critical view of colonial rule and the role of the U.S.
The former is represented by conservative voices, and the latter by
progressive elements. The actual role of the image of the U.S. in theminds of the people still play an important part in shaping democracy,
in terms of both process and content. I mentioned at the beginningthat the U.S. pursued two contradicting goals in Korea: establishing ofa liberal democracy and securing a stable anticommunist stronghold.
When democratization struggles in Korea brought great social chaos,the U.S. showed ambivalent attitudes in choosing between the twogoals, and this ambivalence often became a target of criticism. The
U.S. disappointed many Koreans when it ignored Chun Doo-hwan’s
deployment of the military to suppress the Kwangju uprising in 1980.
However, in June 1987, the Reagan administration deterred the
Korean government’s attempt to mobilize the military and thus
prevented bloodshed and allowing the transition to democracy.
4) U.S. policy had an impact on the development of democracy in
Korea at yet another level. This is apparent in the area of Korean
policy toward North Korea and establishing peace on the Korean
peninsula. The transition to democracy in Korea coincided with theadvance of the post-Cold War era globally. Cold War anticommunism
was rapidly receding at the international level, and the democratictransition at home made the prospects for softening hostile relations
with the North bright. The Kim Dae-jung [Kim Taejung] administration (1998–2003) was a blessed period when democratization in South
Korea and the government’s North Korea policy of reconciliation,
cooperation, and peaceful coexistence created synergy effects. The
106

A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: The Korean Experience

Clinton administration’s engagement policy on North Korea helped
greatly. President Kim Dae-jung took Chancellor Brandt’s “East
Policy” as a model for his own “Sunshine Policy” on North Korea. As
a result he arranged the first summit meeting between North andSouth Korean leaders. Domestically, it meant an expansion of thedemocratic support base, and historically it symbolized acceleration of
the process for peaceful coexistence between North and South Korea.
However, as the U.S. policy on North Korea turned hawkish
with the inauguration of the Bush administration, South Korea andthe U.S. clashed frequently on North Korea policy. Today, North
Korea is defined by the U.S. as a “rogue state,” an “outpost of
tyranny” along with Iran, Cuba. It is considered to be one of thecountries with the greatest potential threat to U.S. national interests.
The very existence of North Korea has emerged as a matter of keeninterest. Any form of regime change, or any change at all, in North
Korea will emerge as an element of enormous insecurity on the
Korean peninsula at this point. The prospects for resolving the“national question” have become very unclear with the crisis situationthat is developing around North Korea. The reversal of North Korea
policy by the U.S. has revived the hegemony of Cold War
anticommunism and the hard-line establishment sustained by it inSouth Korea. It goes without saying that such changes seriously
weaken the foundation of democracy. Democratization in Korea andthe balance of power that supports it are susceptible to changes in
U.S. policy on North Korea and any changes in Korea-U.S. relations.
When the scope of the Korean government’s North Korea policy andinternational policy does not conform to that of the U.S., serious
conflicts and tensions arise. All nations in the world are affected by
the U.S., but in South Korea where the North Korean issue is the coreof the national question, the influence of the U.S. is greater and moredelicate than in any other country.

3. Institutionalization of Democracy in Korea: Which Issues is
Korean Democracy Facing Today?
1) Democratization in Korea took place within an existing order that
had been established by an authoritarian political system over a long
period. Thus, democracy in Korea has newly opened a democratic
107

CHOI Jang Jip

political arena that much broadened the political participation ofincorporate democratic forces, which had been excluded from institutionalized politics. And thereby it has created the two major politicalactors—the conservative forces that had sided with the previous
authoritarianism, and the democratic forces that had supported thedemocratic causes. The new democracy that is being established in
Korea is situated in the unstable balance of power between these twoforces. Should this balance break, democracy would be threatened.
What is most important in maintaining this balance is the institutionalization of parties and a party system that can adequatelyorganize and represent various social conflicts and cleavages politically. The dynamic of social and political conflict and compromise
expressed through political parties is the core principle of democracy.
Thus when the party system is not stable, democracy cannot develop
steadily. Korean politics after democratization has failed to institutionalize a new party system. The pattern of the current party system in
Korea was implemented in 1948 when the first republic was established in the aftermath of the separate state making; and it was solidified by the mid-1950s when the Syngman Rhee government began toturn authoritarian. The system was formed within a very narrowideological spectrum where only ardent supporters of Cold War anticommunism and elite in society were represented. The origins ofpolitical parties in Korea are found in the two conservative parties that
led the founding of a separate nation with the support of the U.S. The
first was the party formed around Syngman Rhee and others who, like
Rhee, had been fighting overseas for Korean independence during thecolonial period. The other group, which became the Korea Democracy Party, consisted of members who came from the landed class in
Korea. They represented indigenous conservative interests. The lattergroup was quickly alienated as President Syngman Rhee monopolized
power, and by default became the opposition force over the years.
Any group not conservative enough to be absorbed by these two
ultra-right parties was not allowed to enter party politics. In the 1960s,
the military elite came to power, and a new political party representing
this new power was formed top-down, and the opposition party fromthe previous era, the Korea Democracy Party—which later became
the Democratic Party—continued as the opposition party. Thus, on
the whole, the conservative, two-party system did not change.
An important question after democratization was whether theparty system, with its narrow social base, could be transformed to108

A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: The Korean Experience

represent wider social interests and demands. From today’s vantage
point, it has not changed much from its basic framework formed in
the 1950s. At least on the surface, the first elections after democratization—the presidential election in December 1987 and the generalelection in April 1988—showed a new pattern. In other words, they
showed regionalized patterns, that maintained mostly to this day. Firstof all, after democratization, major political forces were represented
by four parties. First was the Democratic Justice Party. It was theruling party under the Chun Doo-hwan regime. It represented mostly
the interests of the authoritarian elite with North Kyŏngsang province
as their regional base. The second was the Peace Democracy Party led
by Kim Dae-jung. Its support base was in Jeolla Provinces where
democratization struggles were the most fierce, as symbolized by the
Kwangju uprising. The third was the Unification Democracy Party led
by Kim Young-sam [Kim Yŏngsam]. Its regional support was based inSouth Kyŏngsang Province. Fourth was the Democratic Republican
Party, the ruling party during the Park Chung-hee regime, which was
led by Kim Jong-pil [Kim Chongp’il] after Park’s death. Its support
was based in Ch’ungch’ŏn Province, the home base of Kim Jong-pil.
If the first and the fourth Party had their origins in the authoritarianera, the second and third had their origins in the Democratic Party,
the opposition party of the authoritarian era. Also, throughout the
1970s, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam were the leading voicesthat represented the causes of democracy within the same Democratic
Party and in the National Assembly. However, because their regional
support bases were different, the party split and the two leaders
became fierce competitors. Thus, although we say that these partiesare regionally based, their character is completely different fromregionally based parties in Europe, such as the Bavaria-based ChristianSocial Union (CSU) of Germany and the regionalized parties that
represent language/region cleavages in Belgium. In Korea, “regionallybased” does not mean that a particular party represents historic or
language/cultural cleavages. Korea is a highly homogenized society interms of history, culture, and language. Thus,“regionally based” refers
to political cleavages that were formed during the Park Chunghee/Chun Doo-hwan era around political leaders from certain
regions. As such these cleavages are recent political phenomena that
do not have deep historical roots. Without exception, a spate of realignment takes place among politicians during every presidential election season, and the names of the parties have changed numerous
109

CHOI Jang Jip

times. Since the names change so frequently, it is easier to identify
parties by the names of their leaders.
This way of identifying parties illustrates the character andvulnerability of the Korean party system. Parties in Korea are organized and reorganized around major actors in presidential elections
rather than around differences in ideologies and values or policies.
That is to say, the most important elements in forming a stable party
system are not the ideological and policy differences among different
parties but individual leaders and elite organizations necessary for
obtaining the presidency. This signifies that the conservative party
system shaped in a narrow ideological framework during the postindependence period has not changed, and that despite democratization the party system does not adequately represent the wide variety ofsocial cleavages and conflicts still continues. I have mentioned earlier
that throughout the 1980s the democratization movement voiced awide range of socio-economic cleavages in Korean society. In
particular, after 1987, the labor movement demonstrated that labor
issues must be included into the system as a part of the democratization process. In other words, the axis of cleavages in the arena ofpolitical competitions among existing conservative political parties
could not adequately reflect the demands for change brought to thesurface through democratization. After democratization, the institutionalized party system in Korea has been unable to represent diverse
social forces that were mobilized in the course of democratization andwidespread social changes. In short, while the matrix of the conservative party system has remained the same since 1948, only the surfaceof the system has changed to a regionalized party system. The longterm and widespread democratization movement greatly increased thepower of democratic values and rules in Korea not only in politics but
in all spheres of Korean society. Under the circumstances that during
the Cold War authoritarian matrix of the political system continues
despite democratization, parties in Korea have hardly been embeddedin actual social cleavages and conflicts. One cannot expect democracy
to advance under these circumstances. This then is the critical elementof instability of political change in Korea.
2) After democratization, Korea’s weak party system with its low levelof institutionalization has encouraged “adversary politics” among
parties and among various social forces; furthermore, the politics ofantagonism has reinforced the system of weak political parties. Thus a110

A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: The Korean Experience

vicious circle has been created. The politics of ideology led by theforces of Cold War anti-communism is the major factor for thisvicious circle.
The characteristics of the politics of ideology are that, on the one
hand, because parties are not embedded in actual social cleavages andconflicts, they cannot actually have policy differences in the socioeconomic domain. At the same time, competition and conflict among
the conservative and progressive parties within the system are fierce.
However, parties in Korea are not the “catch-all” parties that Otto
Kirchheimer refers to. Good examples of the “catch-all” parties are
the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Socialist
Union (CSU) of Germany. They illustrate change in the structure of aparty where the class element becomes tenuous and a consensus withconservative parties extends into socio-economic policies. A “catch-all
party” refers to a party that has become more of a national party(Volksparteien) in this way. The CDU/CSU represent the interests ofworkers as well as the interests of entrepreneurs. They are “catch-all
parties” in this regard.
In Korea, neither the conservative authoritarian party nor the
progressive party advocating democratic reforms ever representedclass interests nor have they ever escaped from their ideological roots
to make a rational transition to move toward the middle in the leftright ideological spectrum. In certain respects, the two parties in
Korea are clearly distinct, but in terms of socio-economic policies,
hardly any difference exists. In this regard, they lead a double life.
Thus, it is difficult to analyze Korean parties in the framework ofWestern concepts or models. In terms of the difference between thetwo parties, the conservative party abides by the Cold War anticommunism; the maintenance of tight Korea–U.S. relations takes priority
in all domestic and foreign policies and its support base is strongly
rooted among the vested interests of the authoritarian era; it is a party
that is not replacing its authoritarian values by clearly embracing
democratic values. In comparison, the democratic party represents
those who fought for the cause of democracy under authoritarianregimes, either in the National Assembly or through participation indemocratization movements. Despite this difference, the two areindistinguishable in terms of socio-economic policies. That is to say,for both parties, economic growth has top priority; neo-liberal globalization is the basis of their economic policies; chaebŏl are still thecentral force that leads growth as in the authoritarian era; and they111

CHOI Jang Jip

both pursue and implement policies that exclude and alienate workers,
farmers, and other producers’ groups.
Political conflicts after democratization were amplified since theKim Dae-jung administration in particular. This happened not somuch because of any economic or social reform policies but theincompetence of democratic government and weak leadership. And it
was ever more exacerbated by the increasing level of ideologicalrhetoric by the ultra-conservatives. What is worth noting here is that,during the period of the democratization movement and after, thesocial forces supporting democratic causes held hegemony over civilsociety. However, recently, as popularity and support for President
Roh Moo-hyun [No Muhyŏn] plummeted, we have witnessed theinfluence of conservative forces gaining strength, and there is now atendency toward a revival of Cold War anticommunist hegemony. The
weakness of parties is the most important reason for their inability torepresent major social conflicts and cleavages and to embrace thosesocial forces concerned into the party system. In other words, theopposition Grand National Party (GNP), which represents theconservative bloc in Korean society, and the ruling Our Open Party,
which came to power through the support of democratic forces, haveeach failed to politically organize either conservative or democratic
forces. As a result, the influence of the conservative social bloc in
Korea, which is ideologically much more radical than the Grand
National Party, has prevented GNP from developing into a centrist
conservative party. In my study of the post-War German democratization process and the formation of the party system, I was mostimpressed by the structure of CDU, which was the product ofChancellor Adenauer’s leadership. During the 1950s the CDU/CSU
followed the deliberate policy of courting and eventually absorbing theremnants of the Nazi Right and revanchist parties that spoke for the
more than ten million ethnic German refugees from Eastern Europe.
Potentially, they could otherwise make democratization in the postWar Germany difficult. One can say that Chancellor Adenauer’s
including politics of this bloc into the CDU was the institutionalization of social conflict into a party system, and I think this laid thefoundation for Germany’s democratization and ultimately for theunification of East and West Germany. Unfortunately, the relationshipbetween the conservative bloc and the conservative party in Korea isvery different. Today, the strong conservative bloc in Korea isreviving Cold War anticommunism, radicalizing politics and thereby112

A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: The Korean Experience

destabilizing democratic politics. With repeated failure to win thepresidency and loss of power after democratization, the complaints ofthe conservatives have been accumulating, which led to theirradicalization and mobilization. Internally, their strength is enhancedby the incompetence of democratic governments and their poor
performance, which gave rise to nostalgia for the mythology of Park
Chung-hee style development success. Externally, the hard-line
North-Korea policy of the Bush administration seems to have madeCold War anticommunism more relevant today than the values of andarguments for peaceful coexistence.
3) Democratization in Korea began with the awareness of the problems of the political and social structure of the authoritarian regimes.
Many people believed that democratization at the political level would
bring at least a certain level of democratization at the socio-economic
level, regardless of its scope. Such expectations seemed perfectly justified. Should these expectations not be met, political tension andconflicts, various adverse socio-economic effects, and political instability would follow, and democracy would regress. Authoritarianindustrialization in Korea was led by the state, nurturing an elite groupof chaebŏl while alienating labor not only at the political level but also
at the level of labor-management relations. Here, two interrelated
issues arise that are important in discussing democratization. First, is it
possible for chaebŏl groups—particularly in the light of their hierarchical one-man ownership structure—to adapt themselves to themodern corporate governance structure that complies with international standards and play by the rule of law? Will such a change alsotransform the monopolistic positions of chaebŏl and their enormous
socio-economic power into one that complies with more democratic
principles? Second, will the workers become a political force throughtheir power to vote, participate in policy making, and be recognized as
partners in labor-management relations? Unfortunately, in these two
spheres—the corporate and labor sectors—not much has changed
since democratization. The democratic governments without exception pursued chaebŏl-centered growth policies that excluded labor,social welfare, and redistribution of wealth. The chaebŏl-centeredpolicies of this kind were pursued from the period before South
Korea faced the financial crisis in November 1997. Since then, themode of government intervention in economic and market activities
has significantly changed, and the democratic governments now
113

CHOI Jang Jip

enthusiastically embrace the neoliberal doctrine of emphasizing theautonomy of private businesses and free market principles. However,chaebŏl-led economic growth and labor alienation have not changed. In
fact, after the foreign currency crisis, the dependence of the state on
chaebŏl has increased and has been justified in the name of overcoming
the economic crisis through growth, and labor alienation has become
more entrenched. In the course of the democratization movement,labor alienation resulting from authoritarian industrialization led to theJuly–August Great Labor Struggle in 1987; until the 1997 financial
crisis the labor movement in Korea was strong. The inclusion of laborin politics and in control of the production system is an essentialcondition for institutionalization and further development of democracy. However, democracy in Korea is marked by absence of labor
participation and a production system in which labor is alienated. Low
growth, high unemployment, job insecurity, increasing income disparity, and the problem of “insider” and “outsider” in the labor market
are globally common phenomena that are by and large the result of
neoliberal globalization. However, Korea lacks a political means toaddress and resolve these problems.
After the high mobilization of labor during the democratization
movement, labor has been demobilized, and we now see the development of democracy without labor participation. This reflects thebalance of power within producer groups in Korea, the most important groups at many levels. However, a similar phenomenon can befound at the overall social level. Before democratization, the authoritarian state allowed the development of networks of elite cartels
among the elite chaebŏl groups, a small number of elite universities, anda small number of large newspapers, and the state often used theseelite cartels as its power base. Their ideology and values derived notfrom liberalism but from antidemocratic values such as Cold War anticommunism, belief in the primacy of growth, authoritarianism, andpaternalism. An ideal condition for the development of democracy
would be decentralization and diversification of social powers andempowerment of civil society. Oligarchization of socio-economic
power in economic areas and civil society by a small number of elitegroups cannot be positive for the development of democracy. After
democratization in Korea, a number of factors caused the strength ofcivil society to change significantly. The factors include the successionof presidents coming from the democratic bloc and the successive
incompetence of these democratic governments; the incompetence114

A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: The Korean Experienceand moral vulnerability of democratic forces working either in thegovernment or in civic organizations; the retrenchment of détente on
the Korean peninsula as a result of the Bush administration’s hard-line
North Korea policy, which makes “neo-Cold War” a real experience;and the emergence of the “new-right,” a loose coalition ofcommentators and activists who advocate neoliberalism.
Now, civil society in Korea is divided. In their competition forsocial influence, progressive and conservative forces have not createda dynamic balance through conflicts and reconciliation. Instead, on
the one hand we have the conservative bloc coalesced and mobilized
by a strong conservative establishment. On the other hand are theweakened, divided, and morally damaged undonggwŏn elements. The
two blocs are in fierce confrontation with each other. This phenomenon of opposing split in civil society goes hand in hand with the
opposing politics I mentioned earlier in the political sphere. Today it
is becoming increasingly more doubtful that civil society will serve as
the base camp for a healthy development of democracy.
4) Democratization in Korea is faced with the question of how to run
the state apparatuses that have been well developed and bureaucratized over the years of authoritarian regimes and that have strongsocial influence. Before democratization, through the “Park Chunghee style development” period, the state in Korea came to be known
as a “developmental state” and a “strong state” that led economic
development. Thus, Korea was understood as a type of developmental
state that took the Japanese bureaucratic system as an empiricalmodel, as the Japanese state also led Japan’s economic growth as a lateindustrializer. However, there is a significant gap between this image
and the reality of the state in Korea. This is particularly so after
democratization. The state in Korea changed rapidly through the
democratic governments’ interaction with the state bureaucracy. Morethan anything else, the democratic governments did not have the leadership and capacity to democratically control the vast state bureaucracy.
During the long reign of authoritarian regimes, opposition leaders and politicians could not participate in government operation andpolicy-making, and they did not have the experience of running thevast state bureaucracy. The situation was all the more so for former
undonggwŏn activists who came to power through democratization. Thiswas directly translated into the incompetence of the democratic
115

CHOI Jang Jip

governments. The democratic governments pronounced policy goals
that were different from the previous authoritarian governments, buteach time, they became no more than rhetoric because these governments did not have specific programs and human resources to implement such programs. In the meantime, the government depended on
bureaucrats for actual policy decisions and implementation. Thus anenormous gap existed between the policy goals announced by thegovernment and the actual policy decisions. The policy goals andpolitical rhetoric were reformist, but the actual policies were no lessconservative than when the current opposition party was in power.
The bureaucrats from the authoritarian era have been trained topursue only one goal, which was economic growth. They are used tofollowing top-down orders. Thus they are steeped in and oriented
toward experiences and values of policies from the authoritarian era.
From the perspective of society as a whole, the bureaucratic system is
not favorable to democracy, and it is predisposed to be conservative.
At the same time, while the democratic governments failed to advancenew democratization principles for running the bureaucracy, democratization debureaucratized the strong authoritarian state. In theprocess some individual bureaucrats and agencies came to pursue theirown interests and became politicized. Free from any democratic
checks and balances, the bureaucratic system became hollow; the vast
bureaucracy became divided according to function, and each agency
became a rent-seeking agency, pursuing institutional self-interest in
their respective spheres of expertise and domain of authority.
Through collusion with strong interest groups, they are changing theface of the state to that of a plunderer.

4. Conclusion
1) Since the separation of the peninsula into North and South Korea,
and throughout the Cold War era, the state in South Korea led
authoritarian industrialization as a late developer. The starting point
for democratization in Korea was the contradictions of the social
order established by this state-led authoritarian industrialization. In
this old order, the state was powerful and the authoritarian establishment was firm; under these circumstances, democratization in Korea
116

A Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: The Korean Experiencecame about through an equally strong activists’ movement, which led
violent struggles outside of the institutionalized sphere of politics. In
terms of substance, the task of democratization is how to apply
democratic procedures and institutions to the conservative establishment; at the same time the question is also how to integrate social
forces that had been excluded and alienated from political processes
under authoritarianism and how to reflect their interests and demands
through policy. In this process, conservative vested interests haveused their status quo hegemony to minimize the effects ofdemocratization at bringing about more substantial socialtransformation. In the meantime, democratic forces have tried toachieve socio-economic democratization along with politicaldemocratization. Controlling the conflict between these two groups
requires institutionalization of political conflicts, and the coremechanism for such institutionalization is the development of politicalparties and a party system. However, the level of party
institutionalization is very low in Korea, and this requirement for thedevelopment of democracy is not being met. The conservative anddemocratization forces are currently being coalesced and mobilized
outside of the narrowly institutionalized party system. The conflicts
between them are spreading; they polarize society; they are weakening
the ground for democratic development.
2) Internal socio-economic conflicts have an impact on democratization in South Korea. However, it is also greatly affected by changes in
the international environment for addressing the unresolved SouthNorth issue, a legacy from the Cold War era. This is because the Cold
War has not yet ended on the Korean peninsula. Democratization in
Korea was possible before the end of the Cold War. After democratization, with the end of Cold War at the global level, a process ofdétente developed rapidly on the Korean peninsula. Democratization
facilitated the development of a system of peaceful North-South
coexistence; and the development of a peaceful coexistence agenda
strengthened democratization internally. However, a change in the
U.S. policy on Asia and North Korea had the effect of bringing backthe structure of ideological confrontation of the Cold War era. This
had a seriously negative impact on the development of democracy in
Korea. The pattern of political conflicts formed during the Cold War
era was characterized by ideology politics, which polarized politicalissues and simplified them with black-or-white dichotomy. The direct
117

CHOI Jang Jip

cause of the politics of hostility that still continues after evendemocratization is Cold War anticommunism; indirectly, it is the resultof social conflicts not being institutionalized and represented throughthe party system.
3) The slow progress and the weakening base of democracy in Korea
today are not solely the results of a conservative counteroffensive.
After all, that is only an extrinsic condition. The more important causelies in the fact that the democratic governments and the ruling elite,
who have been put in place by democratic forces, do not have thepolitical vision or policy alternatives necessary for democratic reform.
Also, they are too incompetent to democratically administer the statebureaucracy. Although it was effective in ending the authoritarian
government, democratization in Korea has not led to an effectively
running democratic government. Today, democracy in Korea ismarked by widespread dissatisfaction with the political leadership ofdemocratic forces and the incompetence of the democratic government. The conservative elements in society have coalesced and mobilized, and they are gaining back hegemony over civil society. Under
these circumstances, the emerging democracy in Korea has not
succeeded in institutionalizing the conflicts between the two competing forces and is perched in an uneasy balance between them.

118

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea
Jörg PLASSEN
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

Introduction
The winding, thorny path towards democracy taken in the Republic ofKorea seems to be another strong case in point for the assumption
that—even after the total collapse of the previous authorities—theintroduction of Western concepts and institutions from the outside
does not guarantee the straightforward evolution of a democraticsociety. 1
Western democratic ideas had already been introduced via Japan
at the end of the 19th century, when the young progressives of the socalled Independence Club sought to push towards institutional
reforms modeled upon the West in a futile attempt to self-strengthen
the waning Chosŏn state against the hardening grip of the imperialist
powers. During the Colonial period (1910–45), a spectrum of party
organizations evolved, the majority of which may be coarsely divided
into Nationalists and Communists. In April 1919, representatives ofboth groups founded the Korean Provisional Government located in
Shanghai, which was based on Western democratic/republican
principles. However, the government soon lost its influence amidst
power struggles between Nationalists and Leftists, and among radicals
and moderates within both camps.
After liberation, South Koreans saw the newly founded Peoples’
Republic of Chosŏn soon replaced by a U.S. military government,
which in 1947 in turn established a separate Korean interim government, and inaugurated a committee to prepare a draft of the constitution. The general principles of the eventual constitution again appear
to have been prefigured to a considerable extent by the principles of1

If not noted otherwise, references in this paper to the chain of events leading
up to the 1987 elections follow Oh 1999. Also cf. Cumings 2005.
119

Jörg PLASSEN

General John R. Hodge’s 1948 “Proclamation on the Rights of the
Korean People,” which in turn had been modeled upon the Bill of
Rights and the Japanese constitution of 1946.
Eventually, a resolution of the U.S. dominated U.N. General
Assembly in February 1948 lead to separate elections in the South on
May 10, 1948, and the subsequent formation of the First Republic
under President Syngman Rhee (1875–1965), a former member of the
Independence Club. Due to Communist guerilla uprisings and army
mutinies within the South (aggravated by tensioning relations with theNorth), but perhaps even more so because of his aristocratic yangban
education, Rhee soon resorted to an authoritarian style of government, and on December 1, 1948 proclaimed the first version of thedreadful National Security Law. After a short democratic rule during
the Second Republic (1960–61), two military dictators would rulealong similar lines until in the latter part of the eighties the pressure ofwide segments of the population would again lead towards democratic
reforms.
As already this summary indicates, the U.S. attempt to implant a
democratic government in South Korea (with the help of an elite,
which had received their education under the Japanese, or, as in thecase of President Rhee himself, in the U.S.) had failed immediately andutterly: Other conditions, other agents and a renewed impetus fromwithin the country were necessary.
The main group responsible for the political protest flaming up
most visibly in 1960, the 1970s and especially in the 1980s werestudents. In the latter period, labor unions and Church groups likewise
took an important role in the protests. While these groups were
influenced by leftist ideas of Marxism and Liberation Theology, theiremphasis on minjok (nation/race), minjung ([exploited] masses) andminju (democracy) can be viewed as a continuation of ideologicaltrends of the Colonial period.
Not without reason, the former Korean president Kim Dae-jung[Kim Taejung] went even further, and related his enduring politicalstruggle – somewhat ironically following the precedent of the military
dictator Park Chung Hee [Pak Chŏnghŭi] (1917–1979)—to the“democratic ideology” of Tonghak (“Eastern learning”) and theorganizationally related nationwide peasant uprisings of 1894. Pertaining references to specific concepts of the Tonghak founder Ch’oe
Cheu (1824–64) and his successors, such as the notion of man being
identical with Heaven (in nae ch’ŏn) or the vision of a paradise on earth
120

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea(chisang ch’ŏn’guk) might be regarded somewhat construed. Nevertheless, it should be noted that followers of Ch’ŏndo’gyo (“Teachingof Heavenly Way,” a religious denomination in direct succession to
Tonghak) not only took an active role in the March 1 independence
movement of 1919, but with the publication of the magazine Kaebyŏk
during the 1920s provided an important platform also for the promotion of Western democratic values, through which Yi Kwangsu(1892–?) communicated his clear-sighted vision of a democratic
movement in Korea to be lead by the middle class. 2
Rebellions under the circumstances of unbearable social circumstances can be traced back much further, the great 1812 peasant
uprising being only one of the most glaring examples of similar eventson the provincial level throughout the latter half of Chosŏn dynasty(1392-1910). Often instigated by dissatisfied yangban, i.e. aristocrate
officials, these upheavals found one of their more important rationales
in the concept of the mandate of Heaven (ch’ŏnmyŏng), which a ruler
might loose due to unjust rule.
Although we might not be inclined to follow Kim Daejung’s
claim that the democratic impetus goes back to Tan’gun, the mythicalfounder of the first Korean state (2333 B.C.), a certain tendency
towards social egalitarianism as viewed in the works of the Buddhist
monk Han Yongun (1879–1944) can be traced back as far as to the 7th
century A.C. However, as will be argued in this paper with reference
to the (in certain respects comparable) unfolding of events in 1960,
1980 and 1987, if we search for ideological undercurrents facilitating
the “fundamental change of political consciousness” among large
segments of the population necessary to bring about the eventual
transition towards democracy, in the end we might be referred to
Confucian thought.
If we attempt to schematize the different phases of democratization in Korea, we might arrive at the following scheme:
1. “Indigenious” precursors
2. Late 19th C. import and first attempts at implementation of Westernideas via Japan and the U.S.A.
3. U.S.-led attempt to implement democratic rule after World War II
2

For the widespread notion that Tonghak should be considered the wellspringof Korean democracy, cf. Oh (2001). I should like to express my gratitude to
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for kindly making thisreport available to me.
121

Jörg PLASSEN

4. The institutional transition from military rule to democracy
5. The “democratization of Korean democracy”
As Prof. Choi’s contribution deals with the post war period, and thetask assigned to me for this paper was to probe into the early forms of
democratic thought, what is to follow will focus on the democratic
and proto-democratic developments before World War II: First, we
will briefly recapitulate the reception of Western democratic values
from the 19th c. onwards. Second, we will have a glance at some“indigenous,” i.e. “non-western,” proto-democratic precursors. By theway of conclusion we will wind up with some (highly speculative)
remarks on their possible influence on the Post-War democratic
struggle.

I. The Introduction of Western Democratic ThoughtWith the inner decline of the Chosŏn state during the 19th century andthe influx of foreign powers beginning with the 1866 French navy
expedition, it became evident that the country was in need of effective
self-strengthening measures and thus much more substantial reforms
than those initiated under the reign of Taewŏn’gun (1864–1873).
Increasingly, Neo-Confucianism, for nearly 500 years the official stateideology, was blamed for the comparative backwardness of thecountry.
Yu Kilchun (1856–1914) was among the first intellectuals to havestudied in Japan and the U.S.A. From June 1881 to November 1982,
he studied at Keiō University, under the direction of Fukuzawa
Yūkichi (1834–1901). Entering the Foreign Ministry right upon his
return, 1883 he was a member of the first mission sent to the States.
In a passage bearing the title “Inmin-ŭi kwŏlli” (“Rights of thePeople”) in chapter 4 of his Sŏyu kyŏnmun (“Things seen on a JourneyWest”), a book most obviously influenced by Fukuzawa’s thought aslaid down in his Seiyō jijō, Yu admiringly observed that in the U.S.A.
“no one exists over anyone else, and no one exists under anyone else.”
Much in the same vein, his collaborators Pak Yŏnghyo (1861–1939)
emphasized that “even the ragged clothing of a poor child mustreceive as much protection from the law as royal territory,”
122

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea

and Kim Okkyun (1851–1894) argued for the abolishment of thearistocratic status of the yangban. 3
These Progressives of the so-called Kaehwa (i.e. “opening anddevelopment”) faction insisted on total reformation of the economic,
political and social institutions along Western lines. Staging a coupd’état in the year of 1884 (hence known as the Kapsin-Coup), in adecree they stipulated the introduction of a cabinet system designed tocurtail the king’s power, the abolishment of the rule of clans, andequal rights for the people. The Japanese-supported coup eventually
failed due to the engagement of Chinese troops. However, alreadyduring the Chinese-Japanese War (1894–1895), the Japanese were in
the position to bring the surviving members back into cabinet
positions, who then were able to implement the sweeping Kabo
(1894) reforms.
These reforms constituted a radical break with the past, as thejuristic distinctions between yangban aristocracy, commoners and slaves
were abolished—a deadly blow against the old status system, and insome respect, one might say, the moment of birth of the Koreannation. Modern schools were introduced, administration and political
offices opened for all strata of the population. At the same time, therights of discriminated individuals were strengthened by measures
such as the abolishment of recruitment laws discriminating illegitimate
offsprings, a ban on child marriages, and the permission for widows toremarry.
While these reforms were not yet democratic in a strict sense, thedecisive momentum for the diffusion of Western democratic values in
Korea came with Philipp Jaisohn’s (a.k.a. Sŏ Chaep’il, 1866–1951)
return from his exile and studies in Japan and the U.S.A, were he had
become an American citizen. In July 1896, Sŏ’s efforts in gaining
support for the idea of independence, and the self-strengthening
measures necessary to that end resulted in the founding of the
Independence Club (Tongnip hyŏphoe). 4 The Club counted among its
members important protagonists of the earlier Japanese inspired
reform attempt, and in its beginning enjoyed much support from highabove: Two government ministers became president and chairman of
the new association, and even the crown prince made a donation.
Having received a donation by none other than the already3
4

Cf. Keum 2004, esp. p. 406.
For an introduction to the history and thought of the Independence club, cf.,
e.g., Shin 2004.
123

Jörg PLASSEN

mentioned Yu Kil-chun, who from house arrest had risen to the position of Minister of Domestic Affairs, already two months before, on
April 7, 1896, Sŏ and the Christian intellectual Yun Ch’iho (1865–
1945) founded the first daily newspaper The Independent (Tongnip
sinmun). As pointed out by Lee Kwang-rin (1988), the newspaper was
revolutionary already in as much as it did not employ any Chinese
Characters and, except for additional English language articles,
resorted exclusively to the Korean script, which for centuries had been
despised as ŏnmun, yŏgŭl or aegŭl, i.e. “plebeian,” “women’s” or“childrens’” writing, but around that time came to be called“Han’gŭl,” i.e. “script of the Han people,” or “Great script.” In theauditorial to the first issue, Sŏ wrote:
The reason that our newspaper uses only Korean letters, not Chinesecharacters, is so as to have it read by all the people without regard to theirsocial status. Space is provided between words in the hope that people canread the paper with ease and understand that which is recorded in the paper
more fully. In foreign countries, people without regard to their sex first learn
their own writings and only after they have acquired a good command of
their language, do they begin to learn a foreign language . . . When wecompare the Chinese and the Korean letters, the Koreans are superior. First,
they are easier to learn. Second, they are Korean letters and therefore if we
use them for all things, the people of all ranks without regard to their positions
can understand them with ease. . . . (transl. Lee Kwang-rin, in: Lee 1988:
65f; emphasis added)

The passage just quoted not only explains why the figures of
distribution quickly rose from 300 copies to a staggering 3,000, butalso serves well to illustrate the orientation of the newspaper: Whileother journals centered on topics such as the geography and history of
foreign nations, and new trends in technology to be learned fromthem, The Independent dealt mainly, as Lee writes, with issues related to
the “protection of the nation’s sovereignty,” the “method of learning,”and “human rights.” (Lee 1988: 66). Thus, in the editorial of March 9,1897 Sŏ Chaep’il wrote:
Whether a nation is progressing or not can be seen above all by the degreeof awareness on the part of the people of their rights as citizen. When we
say “people”, it refers not just to the people who hold no public office, but
to all the people who live within the country. Everyone is endowed by God
with certain inalienable rights. Only when the people exercise their rights
properly can the status of the ruler be elevated and the polity of the nation
enhanced. Because the Korean people have been oppressed by their own
124

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea
people for hundreds of years, they have forgotten about basic human rights
and are not aware of human rights. . . . (transl. Lee Kwang-rin; in: Lee 1988:
66)

Through nationalist mass rallies and programmatic articles such as“The People Are the Masters” (16–17 November 1898), the reformers
pressed for more substantial changes. On November 2, 1898, King
Kojong and his government appeared to make a great concession byissuing a law, which would significantly enhance the competences of
the Privy Council (Chungch’uwŏn).
Instituted as an advisory board in addition to the cabinet alreadyin 1895, the council hitherto had remained without any real influence.
According to the new law, however, the Privy Council was to discussand vote on all laws or imperial orders. In case of disagreement withthe cabinet, the two bodies should resolve their differences before thelaw would pass. While the top positions would be reserved forbureaucrats of fixed ranks, half of the members would be appointed
by the government, and the other half would be elected, for the time
being by the Independence Club. Although the Independence Club
itself obviously had not been elected, one might be tempted to call the
Independence Club the first Parliament in Korea. The “democratic
spring,” however, was all-too short-lived. On the very day of the first
convention, the government would crack down on the Club, throwing
many of its members, including the young Syngman Rhee (YiSŭngman, 1875–1965) into prison.
It should come to no surprise that, mainly for tactical reasons, inthe following years nationalist intellectuals would continue to deplore
the suppression of the people and praise the “blessings” brought
about by effective governments based on democratic institutions,5 but
would not attack the monarchy as such. In their programs, even theradical nationalists would remain well in the boundaries of constitutional monarchy.
After the Japanese had ended Kojong’s rule, however, suchconcessions had become more or less superflous. When on April 11,1919 the Shanghai “Korean Government in Exile” (one of initiallythree such governments established by different circles at different
places) had been formed with Syngman Rhee and Yi Tongnyŏng
(1869–1940) as the head of the legislative and executive councils,
5

We might think of Syngman Rhee’s praise of the U.S.A. and Britain in his
Tongnip chŏngsin, which he wrote in 1904, while still in prison.
125

Jörg PLASSEN

resp., a far more radical “Provisional Constitution of the Korean
Government in Exile” was proclaimed:
By the will of God, the people of Korea, both from Seoul and theprovinces, have united in peaceful declaration of their independence in the
Korean capital, and for over a month have carried on their demonstrations
in over two hundred districts. A provisional government, organized incomplete accord with popular faith, proclaims a provisional constitutionthat the provisional council of state has adopted in order to pass on to ourposterity the blessings of sovereign independence.
PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE KOREAN REPUBLIC
1. The Korean Republic shall be a democratic republic.
2. A provisional government shall govern the Korean Republic in
accordance with the decision of a provisional legislative council (ImsiŬijŏngwŏn).
3. There shall be no class distinction among the citizens of the Korean
Republic, and men and women, noble and common, rich and poor, shallhave complete egality.
4. The citizens of the Korean Republic shall have personal and property
rights including the freedoms of faith, speech, writing, publishing,association, assembly, and dwelling.
5. A citizen of the Korean Republic, unless disfranchised, shall have theright to vote or to be elected.
6. The citizens of the Korean Republic shall be subject to compulsory
education, taxation, and military conscription.
7. The Korean Republic shall join the League of Nations in order todemonstrate to the world that its creation has been in accord with thewill of God and also to make a contribution to world civilization andpeace.
8. The Korean Republic shall extend favorable treatment to the former
imperial family.
9. The death penalty, corporal punishment, and open prostitution shall beabolished.
10.Within a year following the recovery of the national land, the provisional
government shall convene a national assembly.
President, Provisional Legislative Council: Yi Tongnyŏng
Prime Minister, Provisional Government: Yi Sŭngman
Minister of Home Affairs: An Ch’angho
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Kim Kyusik
Miniter of Judicial Affairs: Yi Siyŏng
Minister of Financial Affairs: Ch’oe Chaeyŏng
Minister of Military Affairs: Yi Tonghwi
Minister of Transportation: Mun Ch’angbŏm
(transl. Kim Han-Kyo, in: Lee 1996: 435f.)
126

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea

Most signatories can be related to the Nationalist Faction. However, it
should be noted that with Yi Tonghwi none less than the head of the
Korean Socialist Party occupied the position of the foreign secretary.
The document thus unavoidably remains vague on the exact nature of
the “democratic republic” to be established after liberation fromcolonial rule. And yet, at the same time it shows clearly that by 1919
basic democratic rights such as the freedom of speech and sojourn,the right to vote, and even the concept of gender equality had been
firmly entrenched among Korean intellectuals.
In some respects the provisional constitution was at the forefront of democratic innovation: Thus, one should remember thatelectorate rights for women had been introduced in Germany notearlier than on Nov. 30, 1918, and it took the U.S.A. until 1920 tointroduce them on the federal level. In France and Belgium theserights could be established only after the end of the German occupation, i.e. in 1944 and 1946, not to speak of the case of Switzerland.
The issue of the actual nature of the new state institutions,however, remained unresolved. Although at first acknowledged by thefounders of the Vladivostok government, the Shanghai government
soon lost its influence amidst power struggles between the two major
camps of nationalists and Marxist leftists, and among radicals andmoderates within both camps, who divided about issue of armed
struggle vs. peaceful resistance. As we have already made the pointthat Western democratic, and—to some extent—also Socialist
ideologies had become commonplace by the early 1920s, we will
refrain from dabbling with the complicated history of reception ofideologies such as Marxism and anarchism in the colonial period.
Nevertheless, already at this point it should have become obvious thatthe staggering 340 some political parties counted by the U.S. Militarycommand in 1948 did not come out of the nowhere.

II. Traditional Precursors of Democratic Thought
1. Egalitarian Tendencies in Buddhist Thought
It might seem that the reform ideas resulted from a one-to-one
adoption of Western concepts. Thus, expressions such as the term illyu
127

Jörg PLASSEN

pyŏngdŭng 人類平等 (“equality of mankind”), which also appears in the
March 1st declaration of independence of 1919, can be solely related toWestern ideas imported via Japan or China.
Certain terms, however, resonated with traditional meanings, anddiscussions among Korean intellectuals during the first decades of the20th century involved a more intricate blending of new, imported andtraditional notions. Thus, Manhae Han Yongun (1876-1944), one of
the most well-known participants of the March 1st Independence
movement of 1919, like many of his contemporaries emphasized thenotions of chayu 自由(“freedom”) and pyŏngdŭng (“equality”) 平等. On
the surface, this usage seems very modern. However, Manhae
employed these terms from a decidedly Buddhist perspective, in asmuch as he considered the political freedom of the individual, and byextension that of the nation, not as ends in themselves, but aspreconditions for living beings to be able to pursue the deeper
freedom of the Buddhist Way. Correspondingly, in the preface to hiscelebrated poem Nim-ŭi ch’immuk (“The Silence of the Beloved,”
published in 1926) he ironized his fellow countrymen as “lost sheep”
on account of their, in his view, too superficial, Westernunderstanding of these concepts.
In an article written in the year 1931 (“Segye chonggyogye-ŭi
hoego—Pulgi 2958,” “Reflections on Religions of the World—
Buddhist year 2958”) Han Yongun emphasizes that religion is merely
about saving the individual and thus is not restricted by any “-isms,”
and deplores the effects of antireligious movements of his days such
as Marxism. And yet, at the same time contends that Religions, andamong these, religions like Buddhism, contain within their very
doctrines egalitarianism and the ideal of non-private ownership, i.e.,socialist tendencies.” (Huh 2004: 249)
Considering these social and egalitarian ideas mere 20th century
projections, indebted to political currents of the colonial period rather
than to the Buddhist tradition, I was struck to come across a passage
in the 10th century Chinese Buddhist bibliographical collection Sung
Kao seng chuan, according to which the famous Silla dynasty monkÛisang (625–702) turned down a donation of land and slaves fromnone less than the king himself, allegedly saying that. . . Our Dharma is universally equal (pyŏngdŭng), high and low together
match, noble and mean are [held in] the same estimate . . .
(T. 2061.50.729b16)

128

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea

and again stating that. . . The “Way of poverty” treats the whole dharma sphere as [its] household (or:family, ka).
(T. 2061.50.729b17f)

Although an immediately following remark entailing that “spring-timeploughing” is done “in preparation for the harvest” leaves no doubtthat the underlying outlook on the world remains informed by thenotion of a hierarchical society based on sacred kingship and aristocracy, the passage nevertheless is remarkable on account of its straightforward application of the idea of pyŏngdŭng to the social realm,
blending “equalness” and “equality” much in the same way as Manhae
Han Yong-un would do centuries later, hence rendering Han’s claims
concerning the inner egalitarian nature of Buddhist thought
surprisingly authentic.
2. Egalitarian Tendencies in Tonghak Thought
The Tonghak (“Eastern learning”) movement originally was foundedby Suun Ch’oe Cheu (1824–1864) as an Asian answer on Westernlearning (Sŏhak). A truly syncretic mixture, the new teachingresembled Catholicism in as much as the belief in a Lord of Heaven
was fostered. Its cosmology centered around the evolutionary processof an all-pervading ki (“ether”), and bore eschatological traits, in asmuch as the traditional Asian religions Confucianism, Buddhism andTaoism belonged to the age of “Former Heaven.” while Tonghak
should replace them as a symbol of a new era of “Latter Heaven.”Haewŏl Ch’oe Sihyŏng (1827–1898) expanded the dogma byintroducing the dictum in si ch’ŏn, ch’ŏn si in, in wae mu ch’ŏn, ch’ŏn wae muin (“Man is Heaven, heaven is man, outside of man there is no
Heaven, outside of Heaven there is no man”). Later, Son Pyŏnghŭi
then reduced this thought to the more accessible formula in nae ch’ŏn(“Man is identical with Heaven”). Already Ch’oe, however, haddeducted that because man is heaven we must serve the others, andblemishing the elevation of yangban over commoners or of legitimate
sons over illegitimate ones as against the will of Heaven.
The Tonghak founder was executed in 1864, but under his
successors the movement over the years gained a huge following in
the South-Western province, and reemerged in the so-called Tonghak
129

Jörg PLASSEN

uprising in 1894, which, as mentioned in the introduction, has often
been adduced as a, if not the major source of inspiration for the postwar democratic movement.
Igniting with an angry protest against a corrupt magistrate in
Kobu in Chŏlla province, under the leadership of a certain ChŏnPongjun (1854–1895, a member of the gentry) and other Tonghak
adherents, a full-scale rebellion directed against the ruling faction of
the yangban aristocracy and (mainly Japanese) foreigners broke out,
which spread through most of the South-Western province, andeventually threatened the capital, but in the end was crushed bygovernment forces. 6
As Young Ick Lew has pointed out in an article on “TheConservative Character of the 1894 Tonghak Peasant Uprising”(1990) 7 , the propaganda of the Tonghak uprising followed a quite
traditional Confucian rationale. In fact, despite the declared aim topurge the ruling parts of the yangban nobility in Seoul, the Tonghak
fighters did their best not to offend the king and to remain within theaccepted norms of Confucianism. Thus, the following rules forTonghak fighters were established:
1. Do not kill the people; do not destroy [people’s] properties.
2. Fulfill the duties of loyalty and filial piety; support the state and secure
the livelihood of the people.
3. Drive out and eliminate the Japanese barbarians and thereby reinforce
the Way of the Sages.
4. Storm into the capital in military force and thoroughly eliminate thepowerful and noble. [By so doing], strengthen moral relationships, rectify
the names and roles, and realize the teachings of the Sages.
(transl. Young Ick Lew, in: Lew 1990: 167)

Similarly, the manifesto proclaimed at Mujang begins with the words:
Man is the most precious being in the world because he has morality. The
proper relationship between ruler and subject as well as between father andson constitutes the fundamental fabric of human morality. If the ruler isbenign and the subject upright, and the father affectionate and the son filial,
then we can establish good family and state and, thereby, enjoy boundlessfelicity. Now, our Sovereign is benign, filial, kind and loving; He is also
67

Eventually, this upheaval led to the outbreak of the Chinese-Japanese War of
1894–1895.
I owe gratitude to Prof. Dr. Marion Eggert for having prevented me fromoverlooking this seminal article.

130

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea
equipped with a brilliant mind as well as sage wisdom. Therefore, if He is
assisted by wise and honest ministers, the harmony of Yao and Shun, or the
golden age of the Wen-ti and Ching-ti shall be easily achieved within thepredictable future. However, today’s ministers of state merely appropriate
emoluments and occupy official positions without giving any thought toserving the country. They label the scholars who remonstrate with the Kingin loyal sincerity wicked talkers; they call the honest-minded people avicious clique. Inside the court, there are no qualified ministers to assist theSovereign; in the provinces there are numerous officials molesting thepeople. Consequently, the people feel increasingly alienated from thegovernment. At home, the people find no occupation to make their livelihood secure; outside, they have no means to protect their bodies. Atrocity
of government grows day by day, and mournful voices are raised ceaselessly.
The proper relationship between ruler and subject, the proper bond
between father and son, and the proper distinction between noble and base,all these are completely destroyed and nothing is left to salvage. . . .
(transl. Young Ick Lew, in: Lew 1990: 168)

As pointed out by Lew (1990: 169), the manifesto overtly appeals to
Confucian norms concerning social relations and kingship. The text
would go on to describe how the elites in power ignored the perilious
situation the nation is facing and only strife for self-enrichment, anddeclares a “righteous” (ŭi 義) struggle. Although these and remarks byChŏng during his questioning, according to which he himself did notunderstand too much of the Tonghak movement, might be owed totactical reasons, judging from these declarations at least to the followers the movement in many aspects must have appeared to remain
well within the boundaries of traditional Confucian political thought.
3. Social and Proto-Democratic Aspects of the so-called Sirhak
Thought
Another group frequently mentioned in the context of precursors of
Korean democratic thought is the so-called Sirhak-p’a (“Faction of
Practical Learning”), actually a 20th century designation coined in orderto subsume diverse trends in Confucian scholarship from the 17th tothe 19th century.
As the name suggests, the Sirhak current reflects a new type ofpractically minded Confucian scholarship under the influence ofsimilar developments in China since the arrival of European
missionaries. Under the influence of this “Western learning” (Hsihsüeh/Sŏhak) and the related trend of “Text-critical learning” (K’ao131

Jörg PLASSEN

cheng hsüeh/Kojŏnghak), the Sirhak scholars were concerned about avariety of topics related to economic reform, the introduction ofWestern Sciences and Technologies, or text critical efforts directed at
restoring Han and pre-Han Confucian thought.
Witnessing the dire social conditions of the peasant farmers,
already in the 17th century some of these Confucian aristocrats began
to think about tax and land reforms which would guarantee alivelihood to the individual farmer. In the latter case, the solutions
proposed ranged from a system merely limiting the amount of landpossessed (hanjŏnje) and an “equal field system” (kyunjŏnje) with a fixedamount of land allotted to each individual as far as to a joint village
farming system (yŏjŏnje), in which the land—faintly comparable to thelater Soviet Kolchos system—would be allotted to units of 30
households.
The scholars Yu Hyôngwôn (1622–1673) and Sôngho Yi Ik(1681–1763) were also concerned with the inhumane treatment ofslaves. Thus, Yi Ik demonstratingly visited the graves of his own serfs
and performed memorial services for them. For more practicalreasons, he suggested to the King to treat both private and state serfs
as ordinary citizens, and draft them into the military. On the higher
level, Yi Ik argued for a more objective examination and recruitment
system beyond the sway of lineage interests. Convinced that all men
were born equal and wishing a down-to-earth government alert to theneeds of the peasants, he deplored that it was virtually impossible fortalented offsprings from farming communities to pass theexaminations and raise to high positions, and therefore demanded thecreation a special department for the examination of people from rural
areas.
Tasan Chŏng Yagyong (1742–1856) in his cosmological views
was clearly influenced by Catholicism but in his political thought
rather followed the Confucian ideas of the Chinese Classicalphilosopher Meng-tzu (372–289 B.C.). While serving as a secret royalinspector, he was moved by the unjustly poor conditions of thepeasants, and became notorious for his persecution of corrupt
officials. Writing essays on rightful government and sincere rule, heformulated reform ideas in diverse fields, including the alreadymentioned proposal for the distribution of land on the basis of groupsof thirty households. (Cf. Han 2004: 369)
In his essay “Tangnon” (“On [Emperor] Tang”), Chŏng
Yagyong claimed that “Heaven never questions whether you are a132

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea

yangban or a commoner” and accordingly vowed to “make all people
yangban.” As Yi Ik before him, Chŏng Yagyong also turned against the
influences of lineage and factions in the examination system and thesocial, political/factional, and regional discriminations. Quite
interestingly, he identified not only people coming from certain
provinces, or those belonging to minor political parties, but explicitly
also middle and lower classes and illegitimate sons as those unjustly
excluded.
More importantly in our context, Chŏng asked himself therhetorical question whether a ruler exists for the sake of people orvice-versa, and answered clearly: “The ruler exists for the sake ofpeople.” (Han 2004: 367) In fact, Yi Ik had done much the same, as
Chinese scholars before him, all following Meng-tzu’s concept ofminben 民本 (“The people as the root”) as mirrored in the dictum that“the people are most important, the gods of earth and grain rank
second, and the ruler is the least important.” 8
In his essay “Tangnon,” Chŏng would somewhat daringly
compare the king with the conductor of a dance troop: If the
conductor conducts well, he will be labeled “our great conductor”; if
he is not in accord with the music, he may be reduced to the level ofan ordinary member and replaced by another “great conductor.” (Han
2004: 367) What distinguishes a good ruler from a bad one is summarized by Tasan under the phrase “virtuous government,” i.e. a government complying with the principles of nature and humanity. As in caseof the notion of “primacy of the people,” Tasan here again follows
Meng-tzu’s political philosophy, possibly also under the influence of
Itō Jinsai’s (1627–1705) Gomō jigi. 9
Thus, in the Meng-tzu we can find passages justifying thedisposal of a morally corrupt ruler by his ministers, and even by thepeople, if the ruler’s actions continue to contradict the principles ofhumane government (jen-cheng/injŏng 仁 政 ) and if he fails to giveconsideration the admonishments of his officials. Another passage
even suggests that, being the “eyes” and “ears” of Heaven, the people
also have a veto influence on the selection of a ruler:

89

It should be noted in passing that this notion of “people as the root [of thestate]” is addressed also in the Tonghak manifesto proclaimed at Mujang. Cf.
Lew 1990, 169.
For an overview of the Meng-tzu reception, esp. cf. the pertaining work by
Ommerborn et alia (http://www.eko-haus.de/menzius/universal.htm).
133

Jörg PLASSEN
Yao first presented [his successor] Shun to Heaven, and Heaven accepted
him. He presented him to the people (min 民), and the people accepted him.

Chŏng Yagyŏng, however, went clearly beyond the Meng-tzu, in asmuch as he developed this still rather passive “veto right” on thepeoples’ side concerning investiture into a rather full-fledged democratic approach to rulership. Advocating a return to the principle ofwhat he considered the “rule from below” before Han dynasty, in his“Tangnon” he presented the following outlook on the legitimizationof ancient kingship:
How was a king born? Did he descend from heaven like the rain? Did hegush forth from beneath earth like a spring? No. Installed by fivehouseholds, a man becomes a chief of a rin 隣 (“neighborhood”); installedby five rin, a man becomes the chief of a ri 里 (“village”), and installed by
five ri, a man becomes the chief of a hyŏn 縣 (“county”). Nominated jointly
by the chiefs of these hyŏn, a lord is born. It is the king who is chosen bythese lords. Therefore, it can be said the king is appointed by the will of thepeople... Thereforem if the five households do not like the chief of their rin,they hold a conference and elect a new chief ... if the lords do not like theirking, they hold a conference and elect a new chief . . . if the lords do not
like their king, they hold a conference and elect a new king. . . : (Han 2004:
366)

Needless to say, Chŏng did not question the very institution of theking as such, and, except for the demand of open and impartial state
examination and recruitment systems, he did not advocate measuresthat would have lead towards greater distribution of power in everyday
politics. However, by emphasizing a model of legitimacy based on asequel of elections on different levels, Chŏng Yagyong neverthelessmight be considered one of the early forerunners of representational(presidential) democracy.

III. Conclusions: The Legacy of Traditional Confucian PoliticalThought—Some Speculative Remarks on the Events in 1960,
1980 and 1987
Through the foregoing remarks it should have become clear that long
before the democratization process of the 1980s both Western demo134

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea

cratic ideas and Socialist notions imported from abroad had hadenough time to enter the inner minds of Korean intellectuals.
Moreover, we have seen that there had been not only a longstanding tradition of public dissent and upheaval, but that some of theimported ideas, such as the notion of basic equality of human beingsand the derived demand for general access to government positions,or the idea of the people as sovereign, even had more or less direct
precursors in diverse currents of traditional Korean thoughts.
With the division of the country into U.S. and Soviet zones ofinfluence, the decision to implement a democratic government in theSouth was more or less unavoidable. However, the actual idea of
democracy soon fell victim to the President’s autocratic reaction
against inner and outer political turmoils preceding the outbreak of the
Korean War, and eventually also to the stubbornness of an over-aged
Syngman Rhee clinging to his position by all means.
Often, this slip-back into old patterns and the ensuingauthoritarian rule is related to the influence of Confucianism. SamuelHuntington writes in his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the
Late Twentieth Century (1991) on Confucianism:
Classic Chinese Confucianism and its derivatives . . . emphasized the groupover the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights,
Confucian societies lacked a tradition of rights against the state; to theextent that individual rights did exist, they were created by the state.
Harmony and cooperation were preferred over disagreement and competition. The maintenance of order and respect for hierarchy were central
values. The conflict of ideas, groups, and parties was viewed as dangerous
and illegitimate. Most important, Confucianism merged society and the stateand provided no legitimacy for autonomous social institutions to balance
the state. (quoted from Kang 2004: 149)

What is wrong with this thesis is not only that it does not differentiate
between “Confucian” norms and political reality in state entities
claiming to be based on a certain variant of Confucianism, but,perhaps even more importantly, that it considers only one angle of therelationship between the ruler and those ruled upon, leaving out ofconsideration the people’s expectations against the ruler, and theeffects of the violation of the norms by the ruler himself.
It is commonly argued that Syngman Rhee’s slip into increasingly
autocratic rule might have something to do with his upbringing as ayangban aristocrat. Might on the other hand Confucian moral
expectations towards the ruler and the aristocracy have borne some135

Jörg PLASSEN

influence on the democratization? At least one might be inclined tothink that this was the case. Thus, Bruce Cumings adopts a position
that would relate the eminent role of student activists in the
democratization process to “the wellsprings of Confucianism thatdemanded or even required the educated to be moral examples,
conscientious sentinels of the nation.” (Cumings 2005: 344) This focus
on the Confucian virtues of the protest leaders, however, seems to be
only one side of the tale: While their activities, notably the publicationof previously censored books, the forming of new democratic parties,
the emancipation of universities and trade unions from government
control, the rise of grass-root organizations (Cumings 2005: 391) andtheir organization of mass protests were necessary factors for the
eventual overthrow of the regime, but these factors alone do not seemto fully explain the wide-spread solidarity among different socialgroups leading to the “June breakthrough” of 1987.
In 1960, the government wanted to prevent a change of powerby framing the results of the March 15 elections, announcing a clear
victory for the Yi regime. In the city of Masan, a smaller riot brokeout. It perhaps would have remained on that scale, if not on April 11,
fishermen found the body of a high school student killed by a tear-gas
shell. On April 19, in Seoul more than 100,000 students, joint byordinary citizen, battled the police in what was to become known not
only as the 4.19 Student Uprising, but as the “Righteous Uprising of
4.19.” 10John Kie-chang Oh sees these events in line with the Tonghak
uprisings, which in his view began with the somewhat earlier petition
to rehabilitate the first spiritual leader Ch’oe Cheu:
In both instances, when the authorities responded ruthlessly andoppressively the anger of the people exploded and swept away a longentrenched regime. In any case, the concept of a “righteous uprising” wasreaffirmed and took a deeper root in the political awareness of the Korean
people. A contemporary precedent of a “righteous uprising” wasestablished. (Oh 1999: 42)

Interestingly, a similar pattern of events might be seen not only in the1980 Kwangju uprising, but also in the events of 1987, when in the10

The president declared martial law, seeing the “Communists” behind theevents. However, after the U.S. Secretary of State signaled that the repressive
measures were believed to be “unsuited for a democracy,” he shortly
afterwards resigned. Cf. Oh (1999: 41).

136

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea

wake of the death of Pak Chong-ch’ôl, a student of Seoul National
University, a survey of the university would show that 85.7 percent of
the middle class wanted to protect human rights. What followed weremassive demonstrations by the democratic activists. At first, Chunseemed to be willing to make compromises, but on April 13, reversed
a pledge to guarantee free and direct presidential elections. He
probably was doomed when on June 2 he announced Roh Taewoo as
his successor, which led to the “6.10” struggle of a wide coalition ofgroups. It was at this point, when the middle class would massively
join the ranks of the students and activist groups. John Kie-chang Oh
again surmises:
Evidently it was no[t] for economic reasons that the middle class was
actively and in large numbers participating in these demonstrations. Its
members, too, were now demanding political reforms, summed up as“democratization,” a term that had motivated numerous opposition leadersand students but apparently had little concrete meaning to the larger public
and middle class until 1987, when an arrogant and ruthless dictator was
simply no longer acceptable.” (Oh 1999: 92)

What is especially notable concerning this evaluation is how little thepolitical ideals of the activists initially appear to have meant to thegeneral populace. From the perspective of the middle class, theuprising seemed to have been rather a spontaneous outrage against agovernment exercising intolerable injustice than a theoretically motivated struggle for democracy.
From the perspective of historical precedents, it might indeed bereasonable to assume, as Kim Dae-jung, John Kie-chiang Oh andothers have done, that the 20th century uprisings should be seen as in
one line with the large scale Tonghak rebellion of 1894/95. From theperspective of intellectual history, however, we might want to add: Asin the case of the Tonghak rebellion itself, the incentive for the masses
to participate in these uprisings in the last resort appears to have been
indebted less to the revolutionary potential of Tonghak thought, butrather to more traditional currents within Confucian political thought:
Forsaking benevolence and righteousness, one might say, the militaryrulers had lost the mandate of Heaven.—Was the 1987
democratization movement a Confucian revolution, after all?

137

Jörg PLASSEN

Secondary literature cited
Cumings 2005 Cumings, Bruce: Korea’s Place in the Sun. A Modern
History. New York / London: WW. Norton & Co.,2005. [Updated edition, first publ. in 1999]
Han 2004
Han Yeong-u [Han Yŏngu]: “Jeong Yak-yong: The
Man and His Thought.” In: Korean National
Commission for UNESCO (eds.): Korean Philosophy: Its
Tradition and Modern Transformation. Seoul: Hollym,
2004, pp. 357–371. [orig. publ. in Korea Journal 11.8
(1971)]
Huh 2004
Huh Woosung [Hŏ Usŏng]: “Manhae’s Understandingof Buddhism.” In: Korean National Commission for
UNESCO (eds.): Korean Philosophy: Its Tradition andModern Transformation. Seoul: Hollym, 2004, pp. 225–
256. [orig. publ. in Korea Journal 40.2 (2000)]
Kang 2004
Kang Jung In [Kang Jŏngin]: “Confucianism anddemocracy in East Asia: A critique of Samuel P.
Huntington’s The Third Wave.” In: Korean National
Commission for UNESCO (eds.): Korean Philosophy: Its
Tradition and Modern Transformation. Seoul: Hollym,
2004, pp. 146–165. [orig. publ. in Korea Journal 39.3
(1999)]
Keum 2004
Keum Jang-tae [Kŭm Changt’ae]: “Human Liberationin Early Modern Korean Thought.” In: Korean
National Commission for UNESCO (eds.): Korean
Philosophy: Its Tradition and Modern Transformation. Seoul:
Hollym, 2004, pp. 400–419. [orig. publ. in Korea Journal
38.3 (1998)]
Lee 1996
Lee, Peter H. (ed.): Sourcebook of Korean Civilization.
Volume II: From the Seventeenth Century to the Modern
Period. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1996.
Lee 1988
Lee Kwang-rin: “Newspaper Publication in the Late Yi
Dynasty.” Korean Studies 12 (1988), pp. 62–72.
Lew 1990
Lew, Young Ick: “The Conservative Character of the1894 Tonghak Peasant Uprising: A Reappraisal with
Emphasis on Chŏn Pong-jun’s Background andMotivation.” Journal of Korean Studies 7 (1990), pp. 149–
180.
138

The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the
Early History of Democratic Thought in Korea

Oh 1999
Oh 2001

Shin 2004

Oh, John Kie-chiang: Korean Politics. The Quest for
Democratization and Economic Development. Ithaka/London: Cornell Univ. Press, 1999.
Oh, John Kie-chiang: “Kim Dae-jung and a Populist(Tonghak) Origin of Korean Democracy.” In: Oh, Kiechang; Pak, Jacqueline (eds.): Special Report: The Origins
of Korean Democracy. Washington, D.C.: Asia Program,
Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars,
2001, pp. 4–9.
Shin Yong-ha [Shin Yongha]: “The Social Thought of
the Independence Club.” In: Korean National
Commission for UNESCO (eds.): Korean Philosophy: Its
Tradition and Modern Transformation. Seoul: Hollym,
2004, pp. 421–439. [orig. publ. in Korea Journal 14.3
(1974)].

139

Panel Discussion (shortened)
Chair: Wolfgang Seifert
Panelists: Maciej Górny, Jerzy Holzer, Jacques Joly, Kobayashi Masaya, Komatsu Jun’etsu, Frank Pfetsch, Jörg Plassen
SEIFERT: In this final discussion, I would like to ask you for statements and for comments on the conference contributions and, if possible, on the perspectives about how to develop the topics we havedealt with. I think the question of democracy and the question of
democratization is a continuing problem, not limited to a certain
historical period as, for instance, the decade after 1945 or after 1989.
At first, may I ask the contributors to tell us: what were in their views
the crucial points raised during this conference. Unfortunately,
because of urgent obligations our colleagues Professors Motika, Ms.
Amirpur and Dr. Kadivar had to leave before this final panel starts.
Once again thanks for their contributions.
KOBAYASHI: Actually, my subjects are political philosophy andcomparative politics. So at the Maruyama workshop the other day, I
used my knowledge of Maruyama’s work in political philosophy, andduring our conference I used my knowledge in comparative politics.
In Japan, too, people make a serious division between politicalphilosophy and comparative politics. It is rare to use both fields ofknowledge and to combine insights from both fields. So I enjoyed that
we could discuss contemporary issues in various countries, using
insights of political philosophy.
Here are some remarks about some details in the discussions.
One of my interests is comparing Germany and Japan. I didn’t mention it so much, but Maruyama Masao showed keen interest in comparing Japan and Germany, and especially in observing the pre-war
fascism. As I already mentioned, “fascism from above” and “frombelow” derived from his observation of the difference between
German Nazism and Japanese military government. I suppose thatsuch kind of insight is related to “democracy from above” and“democracy from below,” which we have discussed in conference.
I think that Maruyama starts from a kind of developmental
theory or modernization theory and proceeds towards a civilization
theory. So in his later years he was not only interested in the contrast

Panel Discussion

between the West and the East, but also in the contrast between, forexample, Japan and Korea. And perhaps today he would be interested
in the similarities or differences between Japan and Iran, or Japan andTurkey, which we have discussed yesterday. As I did my research oncomparative politics, I imagine or hope, that Japanese experiences,which have both merits and demerits, can have some meaning inconsidering other countries’ democracies, in particular non-Westerncountries. Obviously, Japan’s political scientists and theorists are moreinterested in contrast between Japan and Western countries, but in myviews Japanese experiences can have some meaning in considering
Asian countries including Korea, Iran and Turkey. The Japanese experience has its own peculiar characteristics, but I think we can recognize the important points, which can be shared in observing thosecountries. In considering the problem of Iran and Turkey, usuallypeople don’t think that these countries have similarities with Japan. It
is a very difficult question, because in case there may be some points
to compare, they are not easily to articulate. One reason is, at least in
my case, that I have only little knowledge on Iran and Turkey, so
statements could be totally beside the mark. Anyway, I was very happy
to hear that such kind of conversation can nevertheless have somemeaning.
As for the present situation in Japan one point, which I would
like to talk about, is that people tend to believe that Maruyama’s
studies on pre-war Japanese political thought are beside the mark in
considering the present situation in Japan. Maruyama’s influence has
been weakening, because people tend to believe that his theory andinsights were important in considering pre-war Japan, but are not so
useful in considering present Japan. I don’t believe that they are right.
I was first impressed by Maruyama’s works, and next tried to doresearch on clientelism and syncretism in politics. Such kind of linkage
or connection between the two fields is useful, and I think this conference was very fruitful in this respect.
HOLZER: I’d like to give three supplementary impressions. First: A
democratic environment seems to me very important. Between thewars the European environment became more undemocratic. The
non-democratic systems, the Italian system and others were, as theGermans now say, salonfähig (socially acceptable) The existence of such
systems didn’t hinder the democratic governments to enter into alliances with authoritarian, non-democratic countries, as for example,
141Panel Discussion

France with Romania or Poland. All this was salonfähig. I suppose,such a view or attitude of European governments changed in the Westafter 1989. Since then, in Europe only democracy is salonfähig. The West
Europeans even had some problems with Russia, but officially, Russia
is a democratic country (perhaps White Russia is not). Non-democracy is not salonfähig. So the question of how to deal with authoritarianregimes is the first point. Second: I don’t believe in democracy without economic success. That doesn’t mean economic success for all thetime, but the fundamental line of development should be successful.
That is the difference between the time of 1939 and the time afterWorld War II. Democracy means: economic success. Without this it is
impossible. During the post-war years, democracy in Germany, but
not only there, was related to economic success. New democracies
have to be economically successful. Perhaps old democracies can exist
without permanent success. Third: The problem of the personality ofthe political leader: I don’t believe that the personality, authoritarian or
non-authoritarian of a leader, is a very important element in politics.
Look at the great politicians of democracies: Churchill, de Gaulle, andAdenauer — they all were authoritarian. If the system has a strong
foundation, then this and other qualities of politicians don’t play suchan important role for democracy.
PFETSCH (presents a diagram with quadrants along two axes: thevertical axis divides the field of “democracy” along the difference“from without” and “from within,” and the horizontal divides it along
the axis “from above” and “from below.” Unfortunately, Prof.
Pfetsch’s explanation, where to put the various cases / countries inthis diagram was not recorded.)Without economic prosperity, democracy seems to be impossible.
Therefore, it seems to me that the way and the method, how democracy will be introduced, and even when this happens by authoritarian
instruments seems not to be so important. Democracy needs economic prosperity. On the other hand, the opposite is not true: To get
economic prosperity, democracy is not necessarily to be achieved.
Authoritarian regimes are sometimes able to become economicallystrong countries.
CHOI: As seen from the perspective of the Korean experience I
suppose a couple of elements were integrated in our discussions here,142

Panel Discussion

but many elements were missing. The first one I want to refer to is
tradition. Speakers from different countries have tried to find out thedemocratic values in their own country’s tradition and philosophy. But
I think that this emphasis on tradition in his own country, doesn’t
provide a suficient explanation of the level of democratization, or of
the quality of democracy. Because, as Prof. Pfetsch emphasized,
democracy has three elements of values: liberty, equality, and humanrights. These are universal values. They trace back to Athens in
Greece. So I think tradition is always connected to some democraticvalues, which can be found in each country. Tradition is placed in thecontext of the universal values. When we emphasize tradition in eachcountry, one is able to find for every country democratic elements in
its own tradition. In each period, in the Middle Ages, in Modern Ages,in each period, at every time we can find democratic elements in the
country’s own tradition. However, which countries are democratic? Sothis emphasis is too singular an understanding of a linear conceptionof democracy.
My second point is the Cold War. I think that democracy, inparticular new democracy in developing countries, was more or lesscaused by the Cold War, or the end of the Cold War. The Cold War
was a very important force that brings about democratization indeveloping countries. The Korean experience shows how much it isinfluenced by the Cold War. So I believe that for many countries theCold War or its end plays a big role. The collapse of Cold War is therise of democracy in East European countries.
My third point is the quality of democracy. Even if a new democracy like Korea reached a certain level of democratic standards,
which advanced countries have already reached, there is still the
problem about the quality of democracy. Can we say that Korean
democracy has been achieving something similar to what the Westerncountries already have achieved?
Finally, there is the problem of globalization. How does a democratic form of government cope with problems caused by globalization? Globalization raised a lot of new issues and problems and difficult risks. But how do democracies deal effectively with this entirely
new kind of issues and problems?
Prof. Pfetsch’s diagram is very effective to put such elements in a
respective order. In addition, I want to point out two strategic categories. In regard to the pace of democratization, a particular country ismoving from one category into another category. Maybe this mode of moving
143

Panel Discussion

can be used to characterize a particular country’s characteristicfeatures. In addition, it is a model, where a particular country can learn
from. So it is a very effective comparative matrix. In the Korean casethe democratization, as led by a democratic movement, is lacking
some expertise and some rational alternative. There are so many experiences in the immediate postwar period. Japan belongs to a different
category. Korea is lacking the elite’s role in the course of democratization in the immediate post-war period. As mentioned in my paper,
I took as an important model Konrad Adenauer’s leadership. I think
the conservative leadership is of great importance in this context. The
absolute majority of the people don’t know, into which direction the
country should move. The political leaders can provide directions,
ideas and leadership. So, in the Korean experience, we can say, Korea
is lacking this role of conservative leadership.
PLASSEN: Well, as I am not a social scientist, I will keep myself very
short. For me, as someone who is involving more in cultural studies, I
would say it was interesting to see the difference between “institutional democracy” and “enacted democracy” (“verordnete Demokratie”), and I think most of you have been speaking about a truly
enacted democracy [case of Germany, Japan]. I think, we should add
to the diagram, and this is typical for the historians’ view, the timeline
also. So we might have a diagram for the formal institutions and adifferent diagram for the timeline. For instance, in the Korean casedemocracy would be from the outside and from above, and then inlater times we would have the generation of a functioning democraticsystem.
On the one hand I can understand that especially the politicalscientists don’t pay that much attention to the philosophical side, andI think also we should not overrate that. On the other hand, you need,
especially for the first case, the institution of democracy, formal
democracy, some kind of resonance for the traditional problems of
the society, and the traditional thought. For instance, in the Koreancase, you see that it is full of resonance. If you have terms like “4.19movement,” “6.24 movement,” this is all a kind of allusions to Three
One, the March 1st movement, and when people speak about“Righteous Army,” then the historical, political thought involved. So,
I think we should not underestimate this dimension, but of course it’sless important for recent developments, as Professor Choi has pointed
out.
144

Panel DiscussionGÓRNY: I am also not a specialist in the field that was discussed
here, I am not a political scientist, and I am not a specialist on Asia. I
was dealing with the historiography in East Central Europe. I would
put my remarks in three points. First, we could find out from several
presentations from different countries, that it is quite clear, that
democracy is not a spiritual value. You can fight for democracy, butwhen it is achieved, it is hard to make it legitimize through itself.
There must be tools that are used to legitimize a democratic system,
maybe a nation, and this tool may be also a religious tool, it may be“god” (as in Iran), or it may be “salvation.” I know there were several
examples of democracy that tried to legitimize itself through democratic values. I know one example that is especially close to myresearch interest—that was inter-war Czechoslovakia. It was an idea,
which was built around the works of Tomas Masaryk. But the
problem was that Masaryk claimed that the Czechoslovakian state isbuilt on the principles of humanity. And when he clarified his idea hefound out something different, namely that these ideals of humanity
expressed themselves best in the Czech nation, in Czech history, andso on. So if you look more precisely, you find out, there is also a kindof nationalism beyond this legitimization.
My second impression—and that was extremely interesting forme—was that democracy is never and nowhere new, and it nevercomes from outside. Every country has its own democratic traditions,be it traditions—as Katajun Amirpur told us—of voting that are still
held in the political system of Iran, simply because it used to be. Iranpeople are accustomed to vote. Furthermore, every country, or almost
every country, has its own democratic constitutions. Mohsen Kadivar
told us about the “most democratic constitution ever,” that was the
Iran formerly constitution. However, the “most democratic
constitution” I know was the Stalinist constitution of 1936. People in
Poland used to say: “It is a very good constitution, but almost
unused.”Now, the point is also, that the better you know the history of acountry, the more obvious it gets that those democratic traditions
really exist, and that they play a role. I was impressed by convincing
remarks by Prof. Pfetsch. Actually, I concentrated on three aspects
that I found in the presentations during last two days. First, thechange of the political elite. Second, the point Professor Holzer
explained, and I try to clarify. I would say that for a movement
towards democracy the perspective of economic prosperity is of145Panel Discussion

importance. Well, it is a condition hard to realize. It is hard to fulfil
the wish for a democracy ever growing and ever prosperous, but theperspective of economic prosperity plays a giant role in democratization, since everyone wants to live the way Western Europeans orAmericans live. This is quite clear. It was clear for the Polish democratic movement that it gained mass support from the population not
only out of political reasons, but also because people in Poland knew
how the West looks like, and they knew how the East looks like. But
the third point I would add to this list is exactly the successful
advertising of the domestic “democratic tradition.” And this point isprobably more of a tactic than anything else. It’s a kind of PR thatshould be used to convince future citizens in any political system.
That is a kind of empathy towards the tradition of the Weimar
Republic. Prof. Pfetsch told us that especially strong were (after 1945)
the democratic traditions of the Weimar constitutionalism. Actually,
this is talking about a country that lasted for not much longer than adecade, and ended when its citizens voted for Hitler. It’s a kind of a
weak democratic legitimization, I would say. Nevertheless, the kind ofadvertisement of using this tradition, even if it is not particularly
strong, is of crucial importance, and lack of this kind of empathy stays
behind, most probably, the failure of some unsuccessful attempts tobuild democracy. Thank you.
SEIFERT: Let me add two remarks. My first point refers to thepreconditions of democracy. We have different types of preconditions, and in my view intellectual preconditions are rather important.
One especially important prerequisite for democracy is, in my view,that a rational view of politics is achieved in political thought. Thatmeans, political thinkers should have successfully done the endeavor
to separate politics and religion. Or, to separate politics and the viewof a cosmological order—to say it in Confucian terms. As for thatpoint, I was very much interested to hear about the case of Iran. Firstof all, we heard that in Iran’s history there was formulated a constitution at a rather early time. In my view, once the idea of separation
between religion and the state is articulated people will not forget it.
The ruling class may oppress it, or there may be other processes ofdelay, but once such a political idea of thought is articulated, at whattime ever, it will not disappear in the future. That is what I mean when
I say that certain intellectual prerequisites must be fulfilled, here theseparation of “church” and state. So looking from that vintage point,146

Panel Discussion

one may wonder whether the very strong argument of Western politicians about the separation of religion and state are now, in our days,
really convincing. We may think of the role of the Yasukuni shrine inJapan, or of the close connections between Western political leaders inWestern democracies, not only in the United States, and the churches.
Or we may think, for example, of President Bush’s “God blessAmerica.” We have many expressions of the presence of religious
faith in Western countries’ politics. So I am very sceptical when theWestern side puts pressure to non-Western countries: “First, you haveto separate religion and state,” or more precisely, “You have toseparate religion and state, otherwise you will not be acknowledged asa democracy.” That’s really a problem. I think, the intellectually achieved
separation is very important. But pressure from without to do so often
has quite unfavorable effects. So what I think is that it is importantwhether such a kind of achievement has been done by intellectuals
who are acting in their own history of thought and specific culture, ornot. And maybe I am not right, as for the study of confucianism, neoconfucianism, and Shintō, in Japan some historians of ideas have
explained that there were first symptoms to separate politics fromreligion. If that is the case, then, seen in the long run of democracy, arational view of politics has been achieved.
The second point: We have just heard an objection from Dr.
Górny, when he told us that perhaps Germany was also a democracy
imposed “from without.” But as Professor Pfetsch explained, theGermans had a tradition of democracy—and the Weimar Republic
was one of those elements. In the same way you could argue, that inJapan also there were such traditions. As Professor Kobayashi had
pointed out, if phenomena like “Taishō democracy,” and even in the
Meiji period, democratic elements would not have existed, theJapanese people would not accept and could not accept the democratic revolution inserted by the occupation forces. So for me it is aquestion, where to put Japan in the scheme, and where to put
Germany. In both cases we had the occupation forces of the U.S., andnobody contends that they did not play a very big role. However, onlywith occupation from without it is impossible to build a democraticsystem. There must be a native tradition of democratic thought thatcan be taken up.
JOLY: I was very much impressed by the contribution of Professor
Pfetsch who spoke about the role of Western occupational forces and147

Panel Discussion

the making of the German constitution. When we compare Japan andGermany, I think we should not put too much emphasis on the socalled Taishō democracy. The “Taishō democracy” was not really ademocracy. Of course, you can find democratic laws, which wererealized then, but in fact it was far from the practice of democracy, as
we can see it during the Weimar Republic in Germany. For instance,
let us take the example of the Maruyama’s father. His father
Maruyama Kanji was fired from the newspaper, he worked for in
Tōkyō, and had to move to Ōsaka, because he had covered an uprising in Western Japan. There were the “Rice Riots” in 1919 [kome sôdô]and he wrote about this in his newspaper. As a consequence he had to
go to Ōsaka. That was “Taishō democracy”! When we look at the year
1946, when there was the drafting of the constitution for Germany
and for Japan, yes, for Germany we may say, as Professor Pfetschemphasizes, the role of occupying forces was one of a catalyst of theconstitutions. That was not so in the case of Japan. In Japan in 1946
first MacArthur asked a committee of the Japanese elite to draft theconstitution, and in fact they just drafted a re-shaping of the Meiji
Constitution. The Meiji Constitution was very regressive, whencompared to achievements already realized about in the 1870s. This
constitution dates from 1889, and it represents a leap backwards fromthe democratic practice of the 1870s. (A regression similar to what
Napoleon did with his Code Civile in 1802.) So as the Western powers
understood, the Meiji Constitution installed a system—and that is ofcourse Maruyama’s, and not only Maruyama’s, main thesis—, which
gradually led to the abandonment of every democratic principle andleading to the catastrophe of 1945. So, the very principle of ultranationalism derives, or could derive, from the Meiji Constitution. That
was why the American occupational forces could not accept theJapanese draft of a constitution in 1946. The first Japanese draft was amere reshaping of the Meiji Constitution. And that was why theSupreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General MacArthur,decided to form a committee. They had only a few days to do thedraft, since he had enormous pressure from Washington, they worked
maybe 18 hours a day to really write and draft this Japanese constitution. Every detail in fact was written by Americans. If you know
Japanese and if you can read the Japanese text of the constitution, you
can sometimes detect some phrases, which are not really Japanese. Of
course, in fact it’s a translation of an American text.

148

Panel Discussion

HOLZER: I would say: There are “bad-borne democracies” and“well-borne democracies.” The “bad-borne democracies” were bornefrom a not accepted defeat. It is the case of Germany after World War
I, it is the case, I’m afraid, of Russia after 1919, and I’m much moreafraid that it is the case of Iraq now. Perhaps “bad-borne democracies” would mean also a democracy, which brings not a better, but aworse standard of life for a longer time. That is the problem of a nonaccepted defeat.
Democracy is historically a new phenomenon. It was an
exception in the 19th century, the first one was the American
democracy in the end of the 18th century, but it was an exception in
Europe in the 19th century. Only a little part of Europe wasdemocratic, between 1918 and 1939, and it was only a little part ofEurope after 1945. There were Spain and Portugal or Greece, andnow the countries of the former Communist bloc. And after WorldWar II only Japan in Asia, and later South Korea, and perhaps India.
It is not a universal phenomenon. And we have to see that there is nota universal achievement of democracy. It is not typical for the Third
World. It is not typical for cultures, without a European background.
The United States have a European background to some degree, as
has the political culture of the “white” countries of theCommonwealth.
And there is the influence of the Cold War. It was a rather bad
influence for democracy. It was a bilateral challenge in the world, anddemocracies entered into alliances with non-democratic countries
when these countries were non- or anticommunist. It was quite
normal: Portugal was a member of the NATO, and everybody knewthat Portugal was a dictatorial system. Perhaps a good influence of thepost Cold War-Situation was only at the end of this time of the two
blocs. I connect it more or less with the campaign for civic rights by
Jimmy Carter that changed the attitude of the Western world. But
before this it was the prolongation of the situation of the inter-war
period. Non-democratic systems could be accepted in case they were“our” non-democratic systems, and not the non-democratic systems,
which cooperated with the Soviet Union or with the Communist bloc.
It was a rather negative influence, I suppose.
SEIFERT: Problems of Cold War or the international environment—
we missed that point also in our discussion.

149

Panel Discussion

KOBAYASHI: I would like to response to some of comments from
Maruyama’s or Nanbara’s point of view. First, theory on democracy,
or comparative politics and democracy can be considered fromvarious historical experiences. Japanese political theorists usually learn
and study only Western experiences. I like to develop some Japanesepoint of view.
The first point is the relation with economy. Actually, there is aninteresting episode. There was a hard discussion between Maruyama
and other Japanese political scientists with Western comparative
politics and developmental theorists in the 1960ties. Modernization
theorists usually argue that for example democracy is accompanied bydeveloped economy. And countries with democracy and developed
economy do never wage war against other countries, and things likethat. In contrast to that kind of view, Maruyama and other thinkers
argued, that advanced economy cannot guarantee that democracy
should be established or maintained. This can also mean that ademocracy wages war against or invade another country. I think, in
considering the present case of the United States, we can doubt theargument that “economy can guarantee a peaceful democracy.” So thereason why Japanese theorists doubt those modernization theories isthat Japan had a relatively advanced economy already in pre-war times,
and also in the present time Japan has an advanced economy. But wein reality haven’t the feeling, that we have established an advanced
economy. So, there can be the possibility that there could be a kind of
authoritarian democracy, or an authoritarian regime under disguise of
democratic institutions.
But nowadays political theorists and political philosophers also
argue that democracy has already been a standard. Most politicaltheorists, especially in advanced countries, believe in the legitimacy of
democracy. But the question is, what kind of democracy we should
pursue? Some theorists argue, for example, for associative democracy,
communitarian democracy, deliberative democracy, or discussive
democracy, and things like that. So the question for contemporary
political philosophy is: What kind of democracy should we pursue inthe 21th century? I think, at least the authoritarian type of democracy
was refused, because Asian democracy can be such a kind of
authoritarian type democracy. So, this typology of democracy is very
important in considering our issue. The next point is the relation
between religion and politics. Actually Japan’s pre-war experience canshow the importance of this theme. Because, when we consider the150

Panel Discussion

worrying situation after September 11, I think there are various andserious problems in various parts of the world with a close relation
between religious fundamentalism and nationalism. I think such a
combination can be seen in the United States, and also in some
Islamic countries, and in Palestine and Israel—there can be various
types of combinations. I pre-war Japan there was the combination
between ultra-nationalism and kokka shintō, state Shintōism. Thisshows, how dangerous the combination is. So we can critisize, forexample, not only the pre-war Japanese situation, but also the present
American situation. This is the main point, which I have discussed.
But I like also to respond to the minimum precondition. I say
not only Maruyama, but also Nanbara is important. Nanbara andMaruyama think that it is important to separate politics and church,
but they don’t think that religious elements can be refused at all.
Because, they think, some transcendant or spiritual elements remain,or can be the basis of a sound democracy. This theme is hotly debatedin contemporary political philosophy. For example, Robert Bellah in
America uses the word of “civil religion.” He pointed out theimportance in the United States of Christianity and politics. The civil
religion argument has some dangerous aspects, but I think we should
consider this point. In my opinion, for example, that the idea of civil
religion should be developed towards “public spirituality,” whichtranscends various forms of religion. So we can consider sometranscendant dimension within politics. So that is the next theme wecan consider in the sphere of Political Philosophy.
Another point that Maruyama discusses, is how to overcome theproblem of mass society. I mean the problem of democracy.
Democracy cannot be a final solution. Because we should consider thetypology of democracy: What kind of democracy. To overcome theproblem of political apathy is the task of political theory on
democracy. For example, I developed a kind of theory, which I called“neo-dialectical democracy,” which can cope with various tensions
and paradoxes around democracy. I think this kind of theoreticalargument is necessary to develop this theme. And also, with therelation of the reinterpretation problem of religions or politicalthoughts. Maruyama’s work offers plenty of possibilities of reinterpretations of political thoughts or religions in using that kind of
tradition towards democracy. So I think in that aspect we can learn,
too. Because religious fundamentalism is the assertion of one truth, but
we can consider various types of reinterpretations of religions. This is151Panel Discussion

a very, very sharp contrast between liberating ideas and fundamentalism. So I think, we can pursue these possibilities. I say, forexample, try to reinterprete confucianism and I ask to develop a kindof neo-confucianism (or something like that) for a developing democracy. This can be learned from past experiments in Korea and Japan.
The problem of interpretation is very important.
PFETSCH: As mentioned by Professor Seifert, the separation
between church and state should be a precondition for democracy.
However, as for the major motive to achieve democracy, I doubt if
this is really the major motive for democratization. Since, I am referring
to, for example, the Protestant church since Luther claimed: “Givegod what is for God, and the State what is for the State.” So the ideaof separation you can find already in the religious thought ofProtestantism. The division is already there without the effect ofgiving democracy at that time—and this was in the sixteenth
century—to the state. We have to differentiate between the church as
an institution and the church as an idea or a religious belief, which I
think is different. This reminds me on two discussions we had,concerning this relationship: The one is after 1945 in Germany: There
was a big discussion about how should the Church intervene in schoolaffairs. There were two different parties: The one claiming that
religious education should come from the respective churches, so as akind of separation between the two major religions we had in
Germany. The Protestant teachers should teach to the Protestantpupils, and the Catholic teachers should teach to the Catholic pupils.
This was promoted by the Catholic church, very strongly. But
eventually the success came with the so-called “Simultan-Schule,”
which is a coeducational system.
And the same discussion, with several modifications of course,
we have concerning the European constitution. Some European
countries like Poland, or Spain promoted that “God” should be
mentioned in the text of the European constitution. Finally, theconstitution did not take this view, because the member states did notagree. “What is God?” of course if the Polish propose it, then it is the
Catholic god, and if another country propose it, it is another god. So
they abstained from drafting god in that way, instead they talk about
the humanist tradition in the European development.
The main point concerning the separation, is that the church
should not act as pressure group, imposing a special belief into the152Panel Discussion

state. Because this means that other religions contempt to accept thisparticular part of the community.
Let me give a short comment on what has been said a couple ofminutes ago: I accept the idea, that the not-accepted defeat is a very
bad prerequisite for democracy, as can be seen from the example ofthe Weimar Republic. But I would say, that defeat of a country in a
war is more related to nationalism. In the case of Germany itsupported nationalist movements, and then the Nazi took them as anelectoral motive. Not democracy was the question, but the lead ofnationalist movements.
Another point I want to draw your attention is, that in politicalscience there is the concept of the “waves of democracy.” Thatmeans, that if one country leads the democratization process, otherones will follow. We have the example of the European Union taking
in the former dictatorial countries of Spain, Portugal, and Greece,
being under military rule. The effect of the democratization process inthese southern countries led to what Huntington called “the third
wave of democratization.” The same process happened in SouthAmerica, where now is only one dictatorship left. So we ca observe akind of “band wagon effect.” It is an effect, which comes fromoutside, and which leads to (new) internal structures. This you may
observe in every movement, for example, in the student movement of
the sixties. It started from San Francisco, from the east American
universities and spread via Paris to Berlin.
Also we have to distinguish between democracy as a concept ofrule, an institutional concept of rule, a model, on the one hand, and as
an instrument of power, on the other hand. I refer to the fact that
democracy against what was mentioned has a positive connotation. It
is good to be democratic. It is good to call yourself a democratic ruler,even if you are a dictator. So it’s a camouflage, it’s a formula, as the
Italian elite theorist Gaetano Mosca mentioned. Each rule establishes
a formula, which tries to legitimize the rule, even if it is not ademocratic rule. The “Volksdemokratie”—I mention this tautology,
invented by Tito. Tito certainly wasn’t a democratic ruler, but hecalled his rule a “people’s democracy.” In this case it is used as an
instrument of legitimization. I insist that the image of democracy is
accepted as a positive model for organizing the polity in whatever
shape. And we are correct to say that there are different types of
democratic regimes.

153

Panel Discussion

My last point is to answer to the question on the effect of theCold War. I would say in very brief terms: The Cold War was goodfor the West, and was bad for the East. Our Polish colleagues
mentioned that the Cold War pressed the east European countries tochange their regimes into the Western style of rule, and only when the
Eastern bloc brake down there was more freedom to move in the
direction the peoples wanted. It was good for the West, because thestabilization of the West German democracy was due to the fact thatthe western part was brought in to the Western alliance. It could gain
profit from the opening of the free market system, which brought thismiracle in the fifties and thus stabilized the economic-political regime.
But as mentioned before, prosperous economy does not necessarily
lead to the stabilization of democracy, may stabilize totalitarianregimes, as well. Because success legitimizes whatever regimes, andthe rulers do take this as an argument for the legitimization of theirregime. Thank you very much.
PLASSEN: Again a very brief remark on the “religion issue.” I thinkmaybe what is at stake is not the separation of the state and religion.
In any case, this would lead to a very grim outlook on the Islam casewhere religion is supposed to pervade every aspect of human life. So
there cannot be such a distinction and I think that would mean
eventually, if we think it to the end, that there is no democracy for theIslamic countries, if we think that this separation is necessary. In my
opinion, actually, important is not the question of separation. Rather,
the question is, who has the authority to interpret religion? I think thisbecame very clear in the Iran case. The tricky thing is that there aresome elites who reserve for themselves the authority to monopolize
the decision of what is “the will of God.” I think, in other countries ofthe Middle East their elite rulership might be question those elites.
Because there might be other concepts about the people who have theright to interprete. Not the separation of religion and state, but rather
the democratization of the access to interpretation of religious texts,
to the exegeses of religion. To think along these lines might be moreproductive.
KOBAYASHI: I would like to add some comments. The first point is:
One of the most difficult questions for Maruyama and Nanbara is: A
theory on human dimension is necessary for the theory of democracy.
Because most political theorists or comparative political scientists tend154

Panel Discussion

to ignore this question. I think, one of the most important issues from
Maruyama’s insight is that it is important to consider that point forhuman dimension or cultural dimension. Taking the issue ofleadership: I think that it is necessary to think of leadership. If weconsider the theory or human character theory we should consider thehierarchical element, I mean the element of leadership within thetheory on democracy. Obviously the dichotomy between the authoritarian character and the democratic character is too simple for ourcontemporary point of view. We should pursue the development of
human theory for democracy. This issue is related to the typology of
democratic theory, which I raised before. And the contemporary
political philosophy, or public philosophy, is now touching this issue.
So this issue can be and should be linked with insights in comparative
theory.
Someone here talked about globalization. I think this is a very
important issue. Usually, democratic theory is considered withindomestic environments. But considering the development of politicalphilosophy, perhaps we can remind that democratic theory political
was invited in. So the great change of theory is sometimes accompanied by change of scale of political units. If we take globalization
seriously, we should think about the change of democratic scales also.
So how is democracy being linked with the environment of
globalization. Obviously, globalization is led by economy? But, I
think, globalization should be followed by a cultural dimension of
integration, and also by a political dimension of education. There are,for example, global integration and regional integration in Asia. Well,there are many issues to discuss. How do we overcome the border ofnation-states? Or, a public sphere beyond border of nation-states, I
mean a transnational public sphere, should be a basis for the future of
democracy or the political system.
SEIFERT: Coming to the concluding words for this conference, I
would like to ask Mr. Komatsu for his comment.
KOMATSU: First, on behalf of the organizers, I would like to thankeverybody who participated in this symposium, especially Professor
Seifert for his coordinating work and chairmanship.
I think this symposium was very successful. Actually, much more
successful than I had expected in the beginning. The level of thequality of discussions and the variety of the topics were interesting,155

Panel Discussion

and the final panel was very stimulating. Iran was not included in thematrix of Professor Pfetsch, but I don’t have any doubt that the
Iranian speakers’ lecture also contributed to stimulating our discussion. Actually, when we first discussed about this symposium withProfessor Seifert, the idea for the title was “diversity of democracy.”
Because we invited Iran, we converted this title into “aspects ofdemocracy.” Well, perhaps if there is a second round of this type ofconference, we may invite somebody from China and somebody from
Russia, too. We had discussions about politics and religion. I should
mention that we tried to invite American scholars to this symposium.
I wrote a letter to a very prominent scholar, a Japan specialist andpolitical scientist, to invite him. But he replied that because of previously decided commitments he can not attend the conference. But
on top of that, he wrote, that American political scientists are no moreinterested in ethical traditions to develop democracy. Rather, they aremuch more interested in pursuing the development of democracy. I
do not intend to start another discussion here. Anyway, I wrote backto him: “I am really sorry,” because precisely it was for that reason
that I wanted to have him here. Perhaps in the future, we mayorganize a follow-up symposium in the United States. I believe themutual understanding surrounding this topic is fruitful. Besides, this is
the first symposium jointly organized by the Japan Foundation and
the Japanese-German Center Berlin. We will continue to do such conferences. So we are now thinking about what to do next. This offers
the framework of intellectual exchange. We will try to offer a place,where intellectuals can tackle the current issues. The Japan Foundation wants to offer a platform, an infrastructure, for such a dialogue,
for public intellectuals from all over the world to exchange common
issues and information, thus building up a network. And perhaps thisnetwork will be the place where in the future collaboration will comeout from. Thank you very much to everybody who contributed to thissuccessful symposium.

156

Program of the Symposium

Aspects of Democracy— reconditions, Paths ofDevelopment and Contemporary Issues
September 21 and 22, 2006
at the Japanese-German Center Berlin

September 21, 2006
Welcome Remarks
UEDA Kōji, Deputy Secretary General, JDZBKOMATSU Jun’etsu, The Japan Foundation, Managing Director
OGOURA Kazuo, President of Japan Foundation (Video-Message)
Introduction
Wolfgang SEIFERT, Institute of Japanese Studies, Center for East
Asian Studies, University of Heidelberg
Session 1: Europe, West and East
(1) Germany 1945
The Role of Western Occupational Forces in the Making of theGerman Constitution
Frank PFETSCH, University of Heidelberg(2) Poland 1989
“Solidarność” and Democracy: A Complicated Relation
Jerzy HOLZER, Warsaw
The Historical Preconditions of Polish Democratic Federalism(1795–1918)
Maciej GÓRNY, Polish Academy of Sciences, Institut of History,
Warsaw
157

Session 2: Iran and Turkey as Specific Traditions—Shiite Islam in Iran,
Laicism in Turkey(3) Iran
The Right to Rule – Different Interpretations of the Supreme
Jurisprudent’s Role
Katajun AMIRPUR, Cologne
The Right of the People in Islamic Thought — A Historical
Perspective
Mohsen KADIVAR, Tarbiat Modares University of Teheran(4) Turkey
Modernization and Westernization in the Late Ottoman Empire
and the Turkish Republic — A Prelude for Democray?
Raoul MOTIKA, University of Bern

September 22, 2006
Session 3: East Asia—Countries with a Confucian Tradition(5) Japan 1945
Spiritual Revolution for Perpetual Democracy: The Public
Philosophy of Maruyama Masao and his Mentor Nanbara
Shigeru
KOBAYASHI Masaya, University of Chiba
Aspects of a Democratic Tradition in Prewar Japan
Wolfgang SEIFERT, University of Heidelberg

158

(6) South Korea 1985
Thorny Path to Democracy in a Divided Country: Korean
Experience
CHOI Jang Jip, Korea University, Seoul
The Heirs of Ch’oe Cheu? Some Musings on the History of
Democratic Thought in Korea
Jörg PLASSEN, Ruhr-University of Bochum
Panel discussion:
Building democracy by “import” from without, or by internal
diffusion of democratic thought and behaviour?
Different lessons from different countries
Concluding remarks and closing of the conference159