Symposium “After the Federal Election: How can Germany, the EU and Japan Strengthen theInternational Order?”, JDZB, November 3, 2017*
REPORT
Rapporteur: Maria Pastukhova (M.A.), Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Executive Summary

The Symposium “After the Federal Election: How can Germany, the EU and Japan Strengthen
the International Order?” was hosted by the Japanese-German Center Berlin (JDZB) with thesupport of the Embassy of Japan to Germany. The one-day event took place on November 3, 2017,about two weeks after the general election in Germany and Japan and has been attended by a highprofile group of participants from German and Japanese administrative and business sectors as well
as from universities, think-tanks and other research facilities. The symposium has been structured
into three thematic panels, covered the domestic and foreign policy implications of the generalelections in both countries, addressed broader issues of regional security in the Asia-Pacific region
as well as the potential for deeper cooperation between Germany, the EU and Japan on matters ofinternational trade, regional and global security issues.
In Panel One the participants discussed the outcome of the German general election whereas the riseof right-wing populism, the securitization of the “refugee issue” as well as the three-dimensional
failure of communication between politics, the media and the populace were the central topics.
Overall the participants agreed that the expectations regarding the foreign policy of the new German
government shouldn’t be too high: The protracted and rather troublesome coalition-building process
will probably affect Germany’s readiness to act internationally.
Panel Two highlighted the roles the EU and Japan could play in shaping the international economicorder. A key role has been ascribed to the Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) as apillar for common trade and regulatory framework and as a counterbalance to protectionist trends
in foreign trade policy of other countries, most notably the USA. The participants estimated theramifications of this agreement as mutually beneficial, given that both the EU and Japan undertakethe necessary adjustments in the most sensitive economy sectors that would otherwise be
unprepared for the incoming competition.

The last panel addressed the broad array of security-related topics in the context of general elections,among others the North Korea security crisis, implications of China’s Belt and Road (OBOR) initiative
for security in North East Asia as well as the changes in the US policy in Asia-Pacific and thecorresponding challenges for the regional security architecture. Although the impact Japan or the EU
could have on the security situation in the region has been assessed as rather limited, the participants
have repeatedly stressed the crucial role both the EU and Japan should play in maintaining theinternational order based on the rule of law.
By and large the participants agreed that despite regional divergences the EU and Japan are natural
partners when it comes to maintaining the rule-based international order. Numerous international
challenges as well as domestic difficulties resulting from the recent general elections
notwithstanding, the overall cooperation potential of Germany/the EU and Japan is high, and afurther dialogue on regulatory, energy, trade and security issues is necessary and important.

*This report portrays the main line of argument of the conference and it summarizes the presentations
and discussions according to the understanding of the author. We therefore ask not to quote single
remarks as literal remarks of the speakers.

Welcoming remarks
In her inaugural words to participants of the symposium, Dr. Friederike Bosse, Secretary Generalof the Japanese-German Center Berlin, first addressed the importance of the 3rd of November forJapanese history and culture, being the birthday of the Meiji Emperor and presently celebrated as the“Day of Culture”. She then pointed out that this day is not only of great historical importance, but alsoa very fitting point in time to discuss the challenges and mutual expectations for German andJapanese foreign policy, given the great amount of political changes that have recently taken place.
The symposium was originally prepared as a follow-up to the German general election but after thePrime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe called the snap election to be held on October 22nd, thesymposium was readjusted to include a discussion on the implications of the Japanese generalelection as well. Elections in both countries were a challenge for the voters: In Japan, they had to deal
with an abrupt ending of the legislative period and elect a new House of Representatives in a shortperiod of time, while in Germany the elections were preceded by a very long and intense election
campaign. The elections’ outcomes will most likely cause major changes in domestic politics, evenmore so in Germany than in Japan. While Prime Minister Abe can start the new legislative period withhis “old” government, Chancellor Merkel will have to search for new coalition partners. Exploratory
talks are currently taking place; the coalition talks will probably follow.

The potential coalition partners have very different positions regarding many policy sectors,
including migration policy, yet the baseline for German foreign policy appears to be accepted byeveryone. Regardless of the coming personnel changes in the Foreign Office, German foreign policy
will continue to be guided by the rule of law and Germany will remain a reliable partner within theEU, in the NATO and towards other partners.

Nevertheless, the new German government won’t be able to maintain the status quo, as it will haveto deal with many new challenges in foreign policy: First, in external trade policy, where the EU-JapanFree trade agreement takes on a new significance in the face of stalled TTIP and TPP negotiations.
Second, in security policy, where the continuing military buildup of North Korea, China’s new global
claim to leadership as well as the implementation of the US foreign policy’s new motto, “America
first”, threaten the fragile regional stability in North-East Asia. Japan won’t remain unaffected bythese and other emerging global challenges as well. It is therefore advisable for both countries to
explore and discuss their mutual cooperation potential, in order to maintain and strengthen theinternational order. This symposium should provide a platform for such discussions.

Welcome remarks were also offered by the Ambassador of Japan to Germany Mr. Takeshi Yagi who
emphasized the necessity for Japan and Germany to cooperate on matters of foreign policy andpointed out several reasons for that. Being the 3rd and 4th biggest economies worldwide, both Japan
and Germany have the political and economic stability necessary for global leadership. Moreover,both countries prioritize digitalization, demographic change, climate change and many othercommon issues in their policies which makes them natural partners for cooperation. This became
particularly clear during the G20 Summit in Hamburg this year where Prime Minister Abe andChancellor Merkel worked together on issues of the global warming and global health.
In their foreign policy, Japan and Germany adhere to democratic values and to the rule of law. Despite
the intent of the Trump Administration to revoke the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran,both Japan and Germany have insisted on the implementation of the deal as an absolute necessity.

Finally, the EU and Japan currently negotiate an economic partnership agreement (EPA) andalthough some aspects remain to be clarified, both sides have signed a Joint Statement during the EU-

Japan Summit in July 2017 in which leaders reached an agreement in principle on the future EPA. 1 In
his final remark, Ambassador Yagi has invited the scientists and other experts from Japan andGermany to exchange their opinions on these issues and thereby to contribute to a stronger anddeeper relationship between Japan and Germany.
Panel 1. Election outcome and expectations for the future policy of the German government.

In Panel 1 experts offered their analyses of the outcome of the German general election and of its
implications for the next legislative period. A particular focus has been made on the rise of Alternative
for Germany (AfD), a right-wing political party which was able to secure seats in the German
Parliament for the first time. Further topics addressed by the panelists and during the discussion
have been Germany’s refugee policy, the rise of separatism in Europe, foreign policy interests ofGermany and Japan and the role of the US presidential elections.
The first panelist, Prof. Dr. Karl-Rudolf Korte from the University Duisburg-Essen, who introduced
the term “Jamaica coalition” 2 to the wider public, began with the remarks on the specifics of German
electoral behavior. He then continued with an analysis of the options available for the elected parties
and the consequential expectations for the future domestic and foreign policy of the German
government.

German citizens have very specific electoral preferences, different from many other European
societies. Most of the population traditionally tends to settle for the centrist parties, aiming rather
for continuity and stability of German policy than for progress or changes. The ideal politician isaccordingly no rebel or change-maker, not a charismatic public figure, but a rather plainer office
worker, a kind of a “service nobility”, someone who has been in office for a long time and can deal
with policy-related problems in a well-proofed and systematic way. The last general election was no
exception: Over 73% of votes went to the centrist parties. The parties of the then debated Jamaicacoalition would have a 38-seat majority which would give them a considerable room for maneuverin the Parliament.

The entry of the right-wing party Alternative for Germany (AfD) into the German Parliament is indeed
a new development and reflects the general rise of right-wing and conservative parties in Europe. It
furthermore points to the two leitmotivs of this year: security and identity. “Security” in this caseincorporates not only the traditional political dimensions of external and domestic security, but alsosocial and cultural security, both closely related to the concept of identity. It is understood by manyas the need to determine how much diversity the German society needs, as well as who belongs to it
and who doesn’t.

In this context, the refugees, who are often seen as one faceless entity and as a threat, have become asymbol of dissatisfaction, insecurity and the fear of globalization in German society. The summer
2015, when the Angela Merkel government has decided to open the borders and to accept refugees
stranded in Hungary, has thus predetermined the outcome of this year’s elections. This decision
1

A Joint Statement by the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and the Prime Minister ofJapan Shinzo Abe on the finalization of the EPA negotiations has been issued on the 8th of December 2017
(European Comission, 2017)2
A coalition between the Christian Democratic Political Alliance (CDU/CSU), the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and
the Green Party (Die Grünen). The term “Jamaica” derives from the colors symbolizing these parties (black, yellow
and green respectively), similar to those of the Jamaican flag.

characterizes the policy-making of the great coalition in the last legislative period and partly explains
the diversification of the current government and the re-politization of the German society.

Multi-dimensional miscommunication has also contributed to the outcome of this year’s election. The
lack of communication between politics and citizens that leads to the disenchantment with politics
and politicians is nothing new. In the recent years we increasingly observe another kind ofdisenchantment: many citizens feel underrepresented not only by their politicians, but also by themass media. This caused the emergence of a counter-public that looks for support in social media
and the Internet, thus excluding itself from the public debate. The government and politics in generalcannot reach the counter-public, for they haven’t integrated digital communication methods in their
daily practice yet.

This year’s vote can be characterized as a protest vote. Many of those who voted for the AfD party did
so not because of this party’s election manifesto, but out of protest against the mainstream politics
and against the monotonicity of the great coalition’s policy. To many voters, the Parliament of the lastlegislative period appeared to lack diversity, with its unusually short cabinet meetings and compliant
opposition.
In his final remarks Prof. Dr. Korte expressed optimism regarding the negotiations on Jamaicacoalition. The coalition will most probably take place, for none of the parties gains any advantages by
opting out of it. The negotiating parties still need to find a guiding theme for the future coalition, andthey can only achieve that by establishing trust towards each other. The topics of “identity andsecurity”, which have been central not only in general, but also in the four state legislature elections
this year, could become such a guiding theme, given that the new parliament addresses these topics
by improving health care, social services, and by working on other everyday problems of German
citizens.
The following presentation, held by Matthias Nass, chief international correspondent of the “Zeit”
magazine and co-chair of the German-Japanese Forum, focused on the foreign policy perspective andon the expectations of Japan for the new German government.

Until approximately one year ago Germany has been looked upon as the leader among European
nations. Its decisive actions during the refugee crisis, its proactive stance in the Ukraine (Crimea)
crisis and during the crisis of confidence in the Euro-zone have contributed to its image as the main
proponent of the liberal international order. After the US presidential election a year ago, many
hoped for Germany to become the new leader of the free world and the bulwark against populism,
separatism, nationalism and protectionism. Although the German political community unilaterally
agree that Germany mustn’t dominate the EU foreign policy, it has indeed become more active on theinternational level.

Recently however, the criticism regarding Merkel’s refugee policy has increased both within
Germany and in Europe. As a result, the AfD secured 94 seats in the German Parliament and theranking of Merkel’s party CDU has turned out to be the worst in the last sixty years. The image ofAngela Merkel in Germany and Europe is still very positive, but we also observe the emergence of a
new European leader, Emmanuel Macron. He has run a pro-European election campaign and won the
French presidential election against the right-wing candidate Marine Le Pen. In his Sorbonne speech,
Macron spoke of the need to revitalize Europe in the spheres of defense, market liberalization,
education and innovation, and in his demands he appears to enjoy the support of the French citizen.
This enthusiasm is what Europe needs, and Germany seems to be no longer able to sustain it. Until
now, Merkel has not reached out to President Macron regarding his proposals on the future of the EU.

It is however critical that she does, otherwise a chance might be missed to fuel the German-French
motor that drives Europe.

The current passivity of German European and foreign policy is to a great extend the result of
protracted coalition talks. All negotiation parties have very different opinions on issues of European
integration, migration, energy and climate and are driven by their own interests. Even after thecoalition talks will have ended and the new Government will have been formed, this lack of unity willaffect German policy in many ways. In the next legislative period, Germany is likely to focus much
more on its domestic problems, than on foreign policy in the neighborhood, and even less so in the
Asia-Pacific.

The German voice in international relations and in Asia-Pacific will only remain relevant if it
continues to position itself as part of the united Europe. This is difficult in the face of the ongoingcrisis within the EU, which started with Brexit and continues with the Catalonian referendum andsigns of separatism, nationalism and provincialism in Austria, the Czech Republic and other countries.
In the coming legislative period Germany will probably focus more on Africa than Asia in the face ofthe (still) unresolved refugee crisis and the continuing inflow of refugees to Europe. German Asia
policy will be primarily focused on China, given the scope of Chinese investments in the German
economy and the growing Chinese presence in Europe in general. Although German-Chinese
relations are relatively conflict-free for the moment and Germany won’t interfere with China’s
security interests in the South China Sea, human rights issues may become cause for some frictions.
Regarding the North Korean security crisis, Germany has no concrete program and won’t take any
active stance in the near future. It however offered itself in a role of the mediator between North
Korea and the United Nations.

Japan will probably expect Germany to remain the advocate of the liberal international order, also
after this year’s elections. Germany will be expected to protect the sacrosanct human rights and in
this context to stand in opposition to China and North Korea. Japan will also continue to observe theimplementation of the German experiment of Energiewende (“Energy transition”) and thedevelopment of renewable sources of energy. This topic remains central for Japan, even though manythings have changed since the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

According to Mr. Nass, Germany will maintain friendly relations with Japan while both countries willcontinue to work together on issues of terrorism, climate and energy policy and trade. Germany andJapan will likely be drawn together even closer in the face of the Trump Administration’s approach
to international relations. Nevertheless, both countries will need the US as an ally in NATO, for neither
Germany nor Japan are able to deal with the conflicts in their respective neighborhoods alone, be it
Ukraine, North Korea or the Middle East and North Africa. The cooperation between Germany andJapan is also likely to intensify given that both heads of government, Chancellor Merkel and Prime
Minister Abe, know each other very well. Both of them will probably remain in office for the next four
years and this will surely help Germany and Japan to maintain relations built on trust and mutual
understanding.
Discussion

The two presentations have inspired a lively debate. Several experts drew a comparison between the
US Presidential election 2016 and the German general election 2017 and asked the speakers toelaborate on the similarities and differences between these two elections. Both speakers agreed thatin both cases the scope of the public dissatisfaction has been gravely underestimated, and that social
media contributed significantly to growing support of the AfD in Germany and Donald Trump in theUSA. As a result, both countries have witnessed a “protest-election”. Furthermore, thecommunication gap mentioned by Prof. Dr. Korte can be observed in the USA as well: clearly, theClinton voters prefer certain media, i.e. NBC or the Washington Post, which the Trump voters neverconsume and vice versa. Both elections were nevertheless different, in at least one way: the Germansociety was and remains much less polarized over politics than the US-American society.

Caution has been expressed concerning the role of Macron as Germany’s ally in bringing European
integration forward. Macron intends major reforms, among others in tax policy, employment policy
and legal policy, and the number of his critics is rising. Nonetheless, his conviction that many national
problems have to be solved on the EU-level and his belief in the future of the EU make him areasonable partner for Germany.

The next round of questions addressed the potential and readiness of the future German government
to engage in foreign policy issues. On the one side, the expectations towards German foreign policy
shouldn’t be too high given the focus of the coalition negotiations on domestic and European policy.
On the other side, all negotiating parties already have several starting points for a common foreign
policy approach: among others, all centrist parties are in favor of the Paris Agreement and the open
European market. In this respect Germany has a lot in common with Japan that favors free trade andis currently negotiating EPA with the EU. Despite the effects of Brexit as well as protectionist
tendencies in certain economy sectors, such as automotive industry, the progress of the EPA
negotiations will probably not be impeded.

In terms of security policy, German and Japanese interests differ due to each country’s regional
interests. While Germany and the EU focus on the refugee issue and the issue of domestic terrorism,
Japan’s foreign policy is driven by the regional instability in North East Asia, the North Korean issue
and political and economic interests in South-East Asia. There are nevertheless regions where
German and Japanese security interests intersect, namely in Russia and China, and it is importantthat both countries work together in this direction. There are at least two international platforms
Germany and Japan can use for cooperation on security issues, one being the UN, the other might beNATO.
Panel 2. International Economic Order: New Framework and New Rules for EU-Japan
Economic Cooperation.

In Panel 2 the speakers and other participants of the symposium addressed the recent shifts in theinternational economic and financial system. Both speakers focused on the EPA between the EU andJapan currently under negotiations and offered an overview of the economic and political
implications of this agreement. Other major economic and geopolitical projects, among other China’s“Belt and Road” Initiative (OBOR) have also been mentioned.
Prof. Yorizumi Watanabe from Keyō University (Tōkyō) who has been an ardent supporter of the
EU-Japan EPA analyzed the opportunities this Agreement opens, not only for the EU or Japan, but for
the global trade relations as well.
Prof. Watanabe began with an overview of Japan’s external trade strategy so far. A latecomer to theinternational trade system, Japan didn’t have any free trade agreements (FTA) until the end of the20th century. Nevertheless, after it has joined the WTO and GATT trade system, Japan has been acontinuous advocate of multilateral trade relations and free trade and pursued a trade strategy
compliant with these frameworks. By the end of the 20th century a production value chain began totake shape in Asia and to strengthen this process, Japan has started to develop its own EPA 3 strategy.
The first EPA has been signed with Singapore, fourteen others followed and many more are being
currently negotiated. Bilateral EPAs are in force not only in Asia, but in other regions as well, mostnotably in Latin America. A prime example of the mutual advantages of such an agreement is the EPA
between Japan and Mexico. After entering into force in 2005, the EPA has contributed to thesignificant growth of the Mexican auto industry, which went up in the world-wide ranking from the13th to the 7th place. Japanese business in Mexico thrived as well, growing from 330 companies in2005 to 1100 companies in 2017.

By 2013 Japan entered the negotiations on an FTA with China and South Korea and on threetransregional EPAs, the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), the Regional Comprehensive Partnership(RCEP) and the EPA with the EU. One could observe how progress on either one of the agreements
provided an additional stimulus for the negotiations on the other. Most notably, Japan plays the roleof a pivotal center between the TPP and the RCEP that have been negotiated almost simultaneously.
These two agreements are however different in nature: While RCEP is designed to provide equitableand fair-trade conditions for all participants, most of which are developing countries, the TPP would
provide a new regulatory framework for the international trade – an aspect that could not been
agreed upon within the GATT framework.
The TPP agreement has been designed to be very extensive and as such it has been perceived by
Japan as the template for EPAs of the 21st century. On the other side, Japan had its difficulties
accepting the provision on unexceptional tariff cuts in all economy sectors. Some very sensible
sectors, first of all in agriculture (rice, wine, sugar, pork and beef) had to be protected and Prime
Minister Abe has indeed managed to assert the Japanese agenda in the TPP negotiations.

The Japan-EU EPA is similar in scope to the TPP, covering a wide array of issues from market accessin goods and services, customs and trade facilitation, e-commerce and competition policy andinvestment to government procurement, sustainable development, dispute settlement andregulatory cooperation. Under the EPA, Japan will be granted tariff elimination on numerous
manufactured products and significant tariff cuts on agricultural products. This will also mean thatJapan has to reorient its agricultural sector to be more export active on the one side and more open
to European imports on the other.
The GDP of EPA’s parties would amount to roughly one third (29,5%) of the global GDP, not far from
TPP which would amount to 36,3%. There are still some unresolved issues, but the Agreement in
Principle has been already signed and the EPA is expected to be finalized by the beginning of 2018.

The US withdrawal from the TPP negotiations, announced by Donald Trump shortly after his
inauguration and officially confirmed early this year, will cause major economic and geopoliticalshifts. In the absence of TPP China will lose its interest in promoting free trade in Asia through RCEP
and Japan- China-Korea FTA. Together with the other BRICS countries it will push its own, poweroriented trade policy and focus on the development of the OBOR initiative by making full use of the
AIIB and the BRICS Bank. All in all without the stimulus provided by the TPP free trade is likely tolose momentum in Asia which will negatively affect the region as a whole.
In his concluding remarks, Prof. Watanabe underlined the importance of TPP as the template for
future EPAs. Even without the USA TPP must be kept afloat in order to maintain the momentum forfree trade. Other multilateral trade agreements, such as the RCEP and the Japan-China-Korea FTA,
should be pushed further to support the production network in East Asia. Finally, the Japan-EU EPA,

3

While an FTA usually covers market access, trade in goods and services, an EPA usually has a significantly wider
scope, by including i.e. provisions on investment, business environment, government procurement, movement of
persons, competition etc.

which remains de facto the only surviving transregional EPA up to date, should serve as a deterrent
against protectionism and bilateralism of the Trump Administration.

The next speaker, Dr. Hanns Günther Hilpert from the German Institute for International andSecurity Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP), has also stressed the importance of theJapan-EU EPA as a clear signal against protectionism. He then provided an extensive analysis of thepotential economic effects of this agreement and addressed some pitfalls and limitations both parties
should be aware of.
If signed, Japan-EU EPA would signify the emergence of the world’s biggest free trade area andprovides a real opportunity for mutually beneficial economic growth and for the establishment of a
new comprehensive regulatory framework on global trade. Although trade volumes in bilateral trade
have been going down for many years, Japan remains the sixth biggest trade partner of the EU with58 billion exports and 68 billion imports yearly, while the EU is Japan’s third biggest export partner
after China and the USA and the second biggest import destination after China.

The EPA would not only revitalize bilateral trade flows but also compensate for trade distortion
existing due to the FTAs that Japan and the EU have with other countries. Furthermore, it is likely tocause a shift of Japanese investment to continental Europe, in particular in the spheres ofdigitalization, robotics, life science and energy efficiency. Enhancement of industrial cooperation andthe general growth of GDP and production is to be expected as well.

The most significant export gains are to be expected in economy sectors where bilateral trade isalready established and developed. These include automotive industry, industrial machinery,electronics and fine chemical industry for Japan and agriculture, food industry, automotive industry,
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and industrial machinery for the EU. Finally, the European
market will be likely enriched by the export of Japanese life style and cultural items such as designand living products, horticulture and media.

As every other free trade agreement, the Japan-EU EPA has also several pitfalls and limitations, themost obvious one being the displacement effect for some sensible economy sectors. European
automotive industry will have to face greater competition due to Japanese exports, whereas
adjustments will be required in in Japan’s agricultural industry and dairy products.

In addition, several sections of the Agreement might be strongly opposed by the civil society: In theEU, the biggest fears regarding the EPA are connected to the investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism that could grant major corporations instruments to bypass national regulations. Nonbinding sustainability clause is another critical section, for it could provide support to practices
which are insupportable for the EU civil society (i.e. whaling, import of illegal logging timber fromthird countries). In Japan, the successful implementation of the agreement depends on thegovernment’s political efforts to neutralize the anti-liberalization forces, most notably of the
agricultural lobby, and to repeal regulations discriminatory towards foreign businesses.

Finally, the EPA doesn’t cover several informal barriers that could prevent European businesses fromentering the Japanese market. Japanese business culture is rather exclusive, and it is extremely
difficult for foreign businesses to develop their networks and cultivate long-term business relations
there. Additionally, the European businesses will have to deal with high taxes and business costs
despite stagnating sales markets. Some reforms addressing these issues are already under way, but
no significant progress can yet be observed.

Dr. Hilpert concluded by adding some remarks on political implications of the agreement. Together
with the EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), the EPA signifies mutual political intent
to deepen global political and sectoral cooperation. Japan and the EU share values and common

foreign policy concerns that will be addressed by both the SPA and the EPA. Among them are themaintenance of peace and stability, the support of liberal world order and the dialogue with
autocratic neighbors (Russia and China). These agreements will contribute to a stronger EU presencein Asia and to the Japanese presence in Europe. Finally, the agreements will provide a counterbalance
to protectionism and the unpredictable foreign policy of the Trump Administration and serve as atemplate for future agreements with the other nations.
Discussion

Following the presentations, participants discussed the reaction of Japan’s civil society towards EPA.
Prof. Watanabe drew a parallel to the TPP negotiations with the USA and pointed out, that the policy
makers had to deal with strong confrontation towards the agreement. The opposition came both fromthe agricultural lobby and the general public whose biggest fear was that the US would devour theJapanese economy and culture. He then stressed that in the case of EU-Japan EPA as well, more effortson the part of the Japanese government are needed to overcome the general skepticism of the
population towards free trade agreements. It should be made clear that it is necessary to provide
stronger competition for Japanese agricultural sector in order to make it stronger, and an EPA would
be a perfect opportunity to do so.
Other questions concerned EU-Japan cooperation on data protection and dual technologies. Prof.
Watanabe confirmed the interest of Japan in cooperation with the EU on data issues. An agreementon e-commerce regulations, including the data localization requirements, has been already reachedwithin the EPA. Japan acknowledges the importance of data protection for European societies and isready to enhance the cooperation on this issue beyond the EPA. Dr. Hilpert added that, contrary to
the US, the EU and Japan have a solid common ground on data protection and that an EU-Japan
Agreement on Data Protection is currently under negotiations. He also noted that Germany and Japan
have recently signed an agreement on dual-use technology and defense sharing.

Regarding global trade standards Dr. Hilpert argued that negotiations on free trade and common
regulatory framework should ideally take place on the WTO-level and include China, other BRICScountries as well as other partners. Until this is possible, the EU must however proceed with suchnegotiations within EPAs – with Japan, but also with South Korea, Canada and the South-Americancommon market MERCOSUR.
Panel 3: International political order and regional issues – Regional security in North-East
Asia and the international order (rule of law)

Prof. Dr. Verena Blechinger-Talcott (Professor of Japanese Politics and Economy, Free University
Berlin) opened the third panel that addressed implications of general elections in Germany and Japanfor the broader issues of security and the strategic environment. In the first block of the panel the
speakers and participants discussed Japan’s perspective of the North Korean security challenge andthe Russian interests in North East Asia. The last block focused on the implications of the so-called“Trump effect”, that is, of the changing American attitude towards the relations in Asia, and for the
global world order in general.
In his presentation of the Japanese perspective regarding the North Korea challenge Prof. Hajime
Izumi (Tōkyō International University, TIU) outlined the recent developments on the Korean
Peninsula. Until now, North Korea has performed six nuclear tests, the recent one taking place thisSeptember. This summer Pyongyang launched its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that

could arguably reach the US coast. This situation is certainly a challenge for North East Asia as it
destabilizes the regional security environment.

There is a clear consistency between the North Korean missile and nuclear tests and the criticism of
the North Korean regime coming from the US. North Korea claims that the tests are a response to the
US threat and to the continuous provocations from the Trump administration. The current US
Administration has indeed a critical stance toward North Korea: last August, it confirmed that the US
will continue to dispatch B1 bombers to the Korea peninsula. During the General Assembly on 19th
September, Donald Trump declared that if North Korea invades or attacks South Korea, the US will
have no choice but to “totally destroy” the former. Later, in October this year, the US has conducted ajoint military drill with South Korea which put additional pressure on North Korea to respond.

The international community strongly opposes North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile tests andhas adopted several resolutions to inhibit such activities. These resolutions are quite extensive, but
the problem is that North Korea doesn’t care about them. Pyongyang doesn’t seem to care forinternational law in general, just as they have always been against the international order dominatedby the US. This lack of acceptance of the international order by North Korea is the main challenge forour countries.
While international pressure on the North Korean regime must be maintained, the international
community also has to think about different means to prevent further escalation of North Korea’s
military activities. There has been an attempt to start a dialogue within the Six-Party talks, but
perhaps a Four-Party scheme would be a more effective instrument. Four parties to the Korean War,the US, China and both Koreas, should first officially declare an end of the Korean War that technicallyended in 1953. The hostile parties must then start a dialogue with each other in order to create adurable peace structure. This means that North Korea and South Korea, North Korea and the USA as
well as North Korea and Japan must establish functioning relations.

On the continuously debated issue of international acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power,
Prof. Izumi argued that North Korea is already a de facto nuclear state whether the international
community acknowledges that or not. However, without an officially recognized nuclear status,
North Korea will not ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The international community thus loses anadditional instrument of nuclear disarmament. It is therefore advisable to start thinking about
recognizing North Korea as one of the nuclear powers.
The next speaker, Prof. Dr. Akihiro Iwashita (Hokkaidō University/Kyūshū University, Japan)
presented his analysis of the Russian realities in Northeast Asia and elaborated on the geopoliticalshift within the Russia-China-US-Japan Quadrangle as well as on the implications of the Russian pivot
to the East and on the roles Germany and Japan might play in the region.

Prof. Dr. Iwashita started by commenting on the existing asymmetry in the perception of Russia andChina by different countries. While the experts and decision-makers in Washington DC maintain an
Atlantic-centered worldview according to which Russia is seen as an extension of Europe and China
as an East Asian power, Japan is driven by the Pacific-centered perception with the focus on themarine borders within its direct neighborhood. Meanwhile Russia and China, that share over 4000
km of inland borders, make the case for the Eurasia-centered worldview.

Historically, a major part of the confrontations in Eurasia has taken place on the central continental
part of Eurasia. This conflict zone now shifted, in line with the changes in international order, with
Russia looking more towards its 200-mile zone including the North Pole and the Arctic, and China
and its neighbors in Asia, such as India and North Korea. Japan shares maritime zone with Russia,
North Korea and China and has some disputed areas in this zone.

Russia is a direct neighbor of Japan and as such represents one of its most crucial foreign policy
directions, along with China. By contrast, despite being an important ally of Japan, the US is very
distant from Japan and often don’t understand where Japan’s core interests lie. While the EU is
located equally far, both the EU and Japan have overlapping interests in Russia and they must work
together to shape a mutually acceptable order on the continent.
Pr. Dr. Iwashita then presented a table where the main regional actors, the US, China, Russia, Japanand South and North Korea have been categorized according to three dimensions of their approachto the North Korean issue: their ability to affect the issue (“power”), the extent of their geographicalconnectedness to the region (“border”) and the place of the region in their strategic priorities(“theater”). Accordingly, although the US and China have the highest ability to bring about change inthe region, they remain relatively passive since North Korea is only one of their many strategic
priorities. On the other side, while the solution of the North Korean issue is of highest importance forSouth and North Korea, they both lack the power to achieve it on their own. Finally, Russia and Japanare direct neighbors of North Korea, but neither prioritize this issue over all other ones nor have thenecessary resources to address it. Due to the fact that Russia’s welfare isn’t significantly affected by
the North Korean issue, it has a lot of room of maneuver in the region, contrary to South Korea orJapan. Russia can therefore be a very flexible, albeit indirect partner in the negotiations.

The Russian foreign policy in North East Asia is characterized by its strategic partnership with China
and its unwillingness to accept the US as a global hegemon. Contrary to its rather strong andaggressive EU policy, Vladimir Putin has a very moderate approach in North East Asia. Japan is an
important partner for Russia and Prime Minister Abe appears to have a favorable disposition towards
Vladimir Putin. Putin’s interest in the further development of the relations with Japan is even more
pronounced in face of the extension of EU sanctions and the introduction of additional US sanctions
toward Russia. Japan however remains a “wild card” in the Russian North East Asian strategy, asJapan-Russia relations will depend on the depth of the Japan-US alliance in the future.

Germany and Japan could cooperate on both the North Korean issue and on Russia. While Germany
has no direct influence on the North Korean issue, it has a North Korean embassy and diplomatic ties
with North Korea. It can therefore play a role of the mediator in the region. Finally, Japan andGermany can share information on Russia that would help them to avoid the overreliance on Putin.

The presentations were followed by the commentary of Dr. Hans-Joachim Schmidt (Peace ResearchInstitute Frankfurt, PRIF/HSFK) who has first elaborated on the role of the EU’s foreign policy in thisregion. There is a clear divide between the EU member states on the North Korean issue: Some
member states maintain a hardliner approach and demand stronger measures in line with theapproach of Donald Trump. However, there are also member states that call for a dialogue with North
Korea, with Germany being one of them. These member states argue that diplomatic and militarypressure and economic sanctions alone won’t solve problem.
In the case of the Iranian nuclear issue, the EU could use bilateral trade as “carrot and stick” to bring
Iran to the negotiation table. The situation is entirely different in the case of North Korea, since theEU has practically no trade relations with this country and therefore doesn’t have the necessary
leverage. The EU will thus play only a minor and supportive role in the negotiations with North Korea.
However, once there is an agreement, the EU could have a greater role and contribute to theagreement’s implementation.

Dr. Schmidt agreed on the necessity to admit the de facto nuclear status of North Korea, albeit without
an official recognition of such status. He then presented four possible options for the further
development of the North Korean issues. The first option would be to maintain the status quo, thatis, to continue the deterrence of North Korean regime. In this case the conflict will likely linger on,
although without any major escalations. The second option - the military regime change in North
Korea enforced by the US - is a very risky choice and not the most favorable one. The third option isthe diplomatic management of the nuclear issue. However, as the international efforts have shown
so far, this measure will provide no final solution. The regime change in North Korea from within is
the last option and also the only one able to provide a sustainable solution to the nuclear issue.

There are two possible ways of how the successful management of the North Korean issue could workout. On the one side, it could improve the relationship between China and the USA. On the other side,
if the management fails, it could exacerbate the US-China confrontation, even to an extent of a tradewar, which would have global consequences. It is unclear, which of these two ways the US
Administration will follow, but for now Trump doesn’t appear to be willing for negotiations. Trump’sshow of force in North East Asia is first of all aimed to satisfy his voters. This strategy has clear
economic advantage for the US, for it provokes North Korea to demonstrate their military power andconsequentially causes the US allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, to buy more US-American
weapons. Moreover, the Trump administration has still no executives responsible for talks with
North Korea, neither in the embassy in Seoul nor in the National Bureaus of East Asia, Arms Controls
and International Security.
Discussion

The debate on official acceptance of North Korea as a de facto nuclear power has been continued
during the discussion. Several participants pointed out the dangers of such an act, among them thedanger of the nuclearization of the rest of East Asia. According to Mathias Nass, about 60% of theSouth Korean population support the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea, while Japan
already has enough nuclear material to build above 6000 weapons at any time. Moreover, theinternational recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status could cause the US to move nuclear
weapons to the Korean and Japanese shores, which would not only provoke North Korea toaggressive military action, but also spur Russian opposition.

China’s position on the North Korean issue and its capability to affect the situation has been anothertopic under discussion. China’s position towards North Korea appears vague to many observers andthis indecisive stance damages Chinese international reputation and the potential to establish aworking relationship with the US. On the other side, despite its political and economic power, China
doesn’t have as much room for maneuver as many might think. China’s stability is highly dependent
on the peace in the region and it has to be careful not to provoke North Korea to military actions.
Chinas economic presence in North Korea cannot serve as a leverage either, as the bilateral trade ismostly conducted by small companies and by barter trading.

Japan’s potential in addressing the North Korean issue has been generally regarded as limited. In oneof his remarks, Prof. Iwashita also added that Japanese policy makers don’t perceive North Korea asan immediate threat due to the military deterrence provided by the USA. Furthermore, a successfully
resolved security crisis in North East Asia could draw the US and China closer together and Japan
would not favor this development.
Finally, Bernt Berger (DGAP) has pointed to another possible option for the development of the North
Korean issue: a normalization of the relations between the US and the North Korea. The current lackof this option on the table cannot be blamed on North Korea alone, the historical development as wellas the US politics play a major part as well.

Prof. Dr. Ken Jimbo(Keiō University, Tōkyō) opened the last block of the Third Panel with apresentation on the Trump administration’s security policy towards Asia: implications for theregional security architecture.

Prof. Dr. Jimbo first provided an analysis of the development and the current state of the security
architecture in the Asia-Pacific. He stressed that this architecture is quite different from the one inEurope where such overarching institutions as NATO are core to regional security. There are no suchinstitutions in Asia where the network of bilateral alliances, the so-called San Francisco system, hasbeen in place since 1951. Only in the 1990s, the Asia-Pacific has seen an emergence of such regional
security dialogue mechanisms as the ASEAN Regional Forum. Since then, three major changes havetaken place. First, several bilateral alliances were extended to include new partners. Second, new ad
hoc functional mechanisms have been developed as a non-conventional institutional arrangement toaddress non-traditional security threats. One of the first such mechanisms has been the core groupof the US, Australia and Japan on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance cooperation. Other
groups followed to cover anti-terrorism cooperation, non-proliferation security initiative,
intelligence security cooperation on organized crime etc. Third, a different security cooperation
format in form of multilateral institutions began to develop in the 2000s, among them are the ASEAN
Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) and the East Asian Summit (EAS) which has been
joined by Russia and the US in 2010.

These developments have led to the emergence of a three-tiered regional security architecture in
Asia-Pacific with the first, traditional tier including the network of alliances and partnerships. The
second tier covers functional cooperation on numerous issues (joint trainings, cooperation on publichealth, combatting trafficking and organized crime etc.) and builds on the first one. This tier has anopen format without any limitations regarding participating countries and therefore contributes tothe relief of regional security tensions. The third tier includes institutionalized regional cooperation
mechanisms, such as the previously mentioned EAS and ADMM Plus, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) as well
as several track-two communication formats. In the third tier, rules and norms agreed upon within
the tier two cooperation become institutional standards and a part of the security regulatory
framework.
After this extensive overview, Prof. Dr. Jimbo highlighted the main characteristics of the Trumpadministration’s foreign policy in Asia-Pacific. The US foreign policy under Trump is shaped by three
prototypes. The “America First” doctrine is the first such prototype, signifying the primacy of thenational interest in the US foreign policy. Commitment of the US to its traditional alliances in theregion is an expression of this prototype, as well as the US call on its allies to pay more for the
maintenance of the US security umbrella.
The second prototype is the so-called “Deal-Making Diplomacy” which assumes the ability andwillingness of the US to achieve beneficial deals with the world’s great powers. The recent signs
towards some kind of a Great Bargain between the USA and China reflect this prototype. Such abargain could include the division of Asia Pacific into influence spheres (Taiwan, South China Seaetc.) or focus on cooperation in nuclear deterrence.

The third prototype, “Peace through Strength” drives Trump’s plans to rebuild the military and to
curb the annual military expenditures. Under Barack Obama the US military budget underwent
considerable cuts and amounted to 3.2% of total economic output. By contrast, Trump is trying toreverse this trend as the proposed military budget for the 2018 fiscal year will amount to 667.6
billion and increase further in 2019.

Prof. Dr. Jimbo concluded by arguing that the Trump’s administration approach to Asia will develop
somewhere between these three prototypes.

In his comments on the two presentations, Dr. Henning Riecke (German Council on Foreign
Relations, DGAP, Berlin) elaborated further on the implementation of the three prototypes of the US
foreign policy. He stressed the central role of the “America First” doctrine in Trump’s foreign policy
approach and pointed to the relative consistency of his foreign policy views that didn’t change since
the times long before his election campaign (i.e. his criticism of the unjust treatment of the US, theoversimplification of security alliances or the misuse of the free trade). “America first” also means“Trump first” as his main goal is to be reelected as someone who delivers on his promises in domestic
policy. Trump’s focus on his domestic mandate also means that he probably won’t have that muchinterest in foreign policy.
On the other hand, it is necessary to consider that Trump is only a part of the US government. A brieflook at more sober, subtle policies of the current US government on the domestic level confirm that
Trump is merely the loudest speaker of a government that is much more rational when it comes topolicy-making.

The Trump administration’s strategy for Asia still remains unclear and this uncertainty causes a lossof confidence in the US as a partner from the perspective of Asian nation states. The US puts pressure
on its Asian allies to pay more for the defense forces, and its withdrawal from the TPP negotiations
created additional uncertainty in the region. Trump’s abilities as a “Deal-Maker” are doubtful as well,
given that it is rather difficult for him to accept China as a reliable partner. A Great Bargain with Chinamight not leave America better off, since China aims to expand its global influence.

As to the “Peace through Strength” prototype, the increase in military expenditures alone isn’t going
to change anything for the security situation in Asia-Pacific. When it comes to the military dominance,
the US would need to embed its military potential in the regional security architecture, which isunlikely to happen in the face of Trump’s general disregard for international architecture. If the
Trump administration has some kind of regional security in mind, it is unlikely to be rule-based,
inclusive or even embracing China. It will be a more confrontative approach based on the closereliance on existing allies.
The next series of remarks has been added by Dr. Gudrun Wacker (German Institute forInternational and Security Affairs, SWP, Berlin), who complimented Dr. Jimbo on his presentation of
the security architecture in Asia and emphasized the complexity of the existing structures. There are
not only multiple alliances and partnerships, they also differ in depth and quality. She then addressed
the remark of Dr. Schmidt on the lack of executive staff in the current US administration. Dr. Wacker
pointed out that this might be an intentional strategy of Donald Trump to narrow down the entry
points to the US policy making and thus to increase his own leverage.

She further argued that any kind of a Great Bargain between China and the USA would be detrimental
to the smaller states, and therefore not in interest of any other country in the region. The opposite
development, that is an open conflict between the US and China, is also something all countries in theregion would like to avoid, as it may spill over into something more serious and lead to war affecting
the whole region.

As for the future regional development, China’s President Xi Jing Pin appears to be the only person
who came forward with a certain vision. This vision has first been intended as a response to Obama’s
pivot to Asia by stressing the need for Asian nations to take care of their security issues by themselves.
Nowadays China’s vision has developed much further to include multiple regional platforms andinitiative with the Belt and Road initiative at its center. One should however note that the belt androad initiative is aimed not at regional integration but at the development of China-centered networkof corridors.

In conclusion, Dr. Wacker noted that the cooperation between the EU and Japan to defend the rulebased order is as important as ever. With the US attempting to define its own rules, the EU and Japan
must work together and also look for other partners to support global order (i.e. Australia, Canada).
The Japan-EU EPA could be a good first step in this direction. It is however crucially important toengage with China as far as possible. While China’s presence in the EU became much more tangible
in the last ten years, the European stance on China’s foreign policy in general and to the Belt and Road
initiative in particular has been too passive. Meanwhile there are certain areas of foreign policy onwhich the EU and China share similar views, one being the conviction in the necessity of the Irannuclear deal.

Prof. Dr. Blechinger-Talcott has opened the final discussion with a question about the possible
development of the security architecture in Asia-Pacific under Trump. The speakers agreed that the
US withdrawal from the region won’t cause the emergence of any new institutions. Instead theregional powers will use the (already extensive) security architecture in place with a particularemphasis on bilateral partnerships and alliances.

The next question addressed the Japanese approach to regional security and the need to pursue amore cooperative approach towards China. Prof. Dr. Jimbo has emphasized the progress Japan has
already achieved in its dialogue with China despite the recent security and diplomacy crisis on theissue of the Senkaku Islands. After Japan has declared the nationalization of Senkaku Islands, China
seized all diplomatic transactions with Japan. A major breakthrough took place shortly before the
APEC Summit in 2014 when Prime Minister Abe agreed to settle the issue through dialogue over time.

The final round of questions addressed the Chinese perspective of the US foreign policy in Asia-Pacific.
From this perspective, Trump appears to be a more desirable partner than Hilary Clinton would havebeen. While it would have been reasonable to expect Clinton’s China policy to be driven by values,
Trump operates based on profit and interests – both acceptable concepts for the Chinese leadership.
Dr. Wacker mentioned the Trump’s position towards One China Policy as an indicator of his
ambitions in the region. When Trump agreed to honor the One China Policy early this year, he likely
considered the upcoming meeting with Xi Jing Pin in Mar-a-Lago and the chance to negotiate a Great
Bargain which otherwise would have been lost. For the same reason the Trump administration might
have been very reluctant to proceed the arms deal with Taiwan and suspended the proposed freedomof navigation operations in the South China Sea. In her concluding remark Dr. Wacker noted, that from the Chinese perspective - the western democracies have proven to be dysfunctional. This wasdemonstrated by the recent populist movements, the outcome of the Brexit referendum and thefinancial crises. Therefore, in the recent years, China has gained more self-confidence to become amodel for the developing countries and move towards global leadership.