Contents

pageAngelika VIETS
Foreword ............................................................................................................ 5
Summary of Proceedings ................................................................................... 7
Sadako OGATA
Keynote Address .............................................................................................. 12
Tobias DEBIEL
Mainstreaming Human Security?
Concepts and Implications for Development Assistance ................................ 16
Discussion of Session 1 ................................................................................... 21
Conrad SCHETTER
Facilitating Human Security in Afghanistan
Problems, Opportunities and Perspectives ......................................................... 25
Discussion of Session 2 ................................................................................... 31
Kwesi ANING & Emma BIRIKORANG
Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa
Problems, Opportunities and Perspectives ....................................................... 35
Discussion of Session 3 ................................................................................... 48
Mutahi KAGWE
Perspectives on Human Security andDevelopment Assistance from an African Perspective .................................... 51
Program for the Symposium ............................................................................ 60
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................... 62

Foreword

I am very pleased that after long and intensive preparation and collaboration with allpartners involved this conference on Human Security and Development Assistancecould be realized.
The change of the international role of Japan and Germany has intensified theneed for mutual exchange on regional and global issues. The growing responsibility ofboth countries to contribute to their solution requires close bilateral and multilateral
consultations. We can build upon basic common interests, in particular in United
Nations policy areas such as disarmament and human rights, or development issues.
These subjects are part of the strategy paper “Germany and Japan in the 21st Century –7 Pillars of Cooperation,” signed by both governments five years ago.
Since Germany and Japan both pursue an active agenda for development issues,
the Japanese-German Center Berlin (Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin, JDZB) held
quite a few conferences in this field in the past few years, the last one in preparation of
the Tokyo National Conference on African Development TICAD III in the fall of 2003.
We are also in the middle of a series of conferences on the development and security inCentral Asia, which we jointly organize with the National Institute for Research andAdvancement (NIRA) in the area. So convening on the topic of human security falls inthis line.
For a long period, international security policy has focused on the security ofstates or between states, touching mainly on questions of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of states. Since the dramatic change of the world order at the beginning of the
1990s, however, the nature of conflicts has undergone changes. Most conflicts today
occur within states. More often than not civilians are no longer incidental victims of war,
but the deliberate target of armed actors. Confronted with these new challenges, many
governments as well as international organizations have begun to take a broader
approach to the concept of security.
This broader perspective of human security aims at developing new politicalstrategies to better protect the civilian population exposed to conflicts and dangers in achanged world, to better enable them to cope with their needs stemming from badgovernance, poverty, or environmental damage. The focus is mainly on aspects relating
to violence (“freedom from fear”) but in a broader sense on all aspects of humandevelopment (“freedom from need”) as well. Rather than offering a ready definition ofwhat human security should encompass, the idea is to take a coherent view of separate
and distinct problems and integrate different approaches that so far are often being dealt
with separately and by separate actors and institutions.
Within the JDZB’s aim of promoting scientific and academic exchange between
Germany and Japan, this conference also contributes to strengthening the excellent ties
between the German Development Agency (GTZ) and the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), and to developing coordination projects between them.
I would like to thank Mr. Schmidt and GTZ for their contribution to thisconference, as well as, above all, JICA, the Bonn International Conversion Center, andthe Embassy of Japan for their support.
Angelika VIETS
Secretary General
Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin (JDZB)

5

Summary of Proceedings

On 1st May 2003 Ms. Sadako Ogata and Professor Amartya Sen, the Co-Chairs of theCommission on Human Security, which was established through an initiative of theGovernment of Japan, presented the Commission’s Final Report “Human Security
Now” to the United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The report advocates amarkedly broad, comprehensive understanding of human security. By emphasizing thespectrum of life-endangering threats to individuals worldwide, it does not solely confine
itself to the more traditional notion of security as the absence of military violence orthreat, but also includes more dynamic aspects such as peace-building, human rights,
poverty reduction, education and health. Hence, the commission’s report places humansecurity at the core of all political intervention aiming to improve people’s livelihood.
This, naturally, includes development assistance. While its comprehensive prescriptions
and analysis are thus, to a large extent, concomitant to the historical development
discourse, some elements differ, however. In particular, the injection of the traditional
security dimension into the development field, as well as the specific priority given to
the reduction of fundamental threats to people’s existence are important additions to thedebate about the future priorities of development assistance.
Human security remains a new and contested concept. There is considerable
argument over its proper definition and potential usefulness. The particular evolution
and future relevance of the concept will largely depend on its ability to contribute toboth the formulation and practical implementation of development policy. The debate
on the relationship between development and security that was stimulated by “Human
Security Now” is in full swing worldwide, particularly in countries where both notions
had traditionally been kept apart. However, the implications of this discourse for development assistance are contentious. In the wake of this debate, it therefore seemedworthwhile to study the Human Security Commission’s all-embracing thematic
approach and critically evaluate its ramifications and prescriptions for development
policy.
On the occasion of its 20-year anniversary, the Japanese German Center Berlin(JDZB) organized a conference entitled “Human Security and Development Assistance,” which was supported by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
and the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). The conference took place
on 28/29 April in Berlin. Its principal aim was to explore and discuss the practical relevance of the concept of human security when applied to the formulation and implementation of development policy, particularly in conflict-ridden countries. For thispurpose, the JDZB invited eminent persons from the international community, including
Mme. Sadako Ogata, President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
and former Co-Chair of the United Nation’s Commission on Human Security, as well as
experienced field-practitioners from different development agencies and knowledgeable
experts from academia. The conference itself was divided into three plenary sessions.
Following a keynote address by Mme. Ogata, the first session attempted to present a
short and concise review of the main arguments currently pervading the debate on
human security. Panelists included representatives from JICA, the German Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the German Foreign
Office, as well as Ms. Mary Racelis from the University of Manila, member of theSummary of Proceedings

United Nations’ Commission on UN-Civil Society Relations. The second and third
sessions concentrated on particular case studies of conflict situations, namely Afghanistan and Sub-Saharan Africa. Here, the experience, possible advantages and challenges
of using the concept of human security in particular settings were explored with reference to concrete examples. Again, the panels consisted of experienced staff from JICA,
the BMZ and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), as well as academics
from the security and development field.
After a Welcome Address by State Secretary Jürgen Chrobog from the Federal
Foreign Office and some Opening Remarks by Mr. Wolfgang Schmitt, Director of theGTZ, Mme. Ogata gave an introduction into some of the key elements contained in theconcept of human security as outlined by the Commission on Human Security in its
Final Report “Human Security Now.” As Mme. Ogata pointed out, it endorses anunderstanding of international security, which not only takes into account the “state” as
its traditional referent object, but also emphasizes the spectrum of life-endangering
threats to people worldwide. Such notion of “human” security has to adopt a far morecomprehensive approach to the identification of threats and dangers. In other words, itcannot simply concern itself with the absence of military violence, but also needs toconsider more dynamic aspects, for example peace-building, human rights, poverty
reduction, education and health. Mme. Ogata particularly stressed the practical applicability of such an expanded security framework, which was especially crafted to serve as“an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation.” To this end, it rests
upon two mutually reinforcing concepts. The first can be described as “protection.”
Embracing a more traditional understanding of security, which alludes to the structuresand institutions needed to shield people from violence, this concept implies a “topdown” approach. Measures will therefore include a strengthening of the rule of law, theestablishment of accountable and transparent state institutions, as well as the promotionof democratic governance structures. The second concept, on the other hand, which
Mme. Ogata referred to as “empowerment,” highlights the central importance of people“as actors and participants in defining and implementing their strengths and aspirations.” In contrast to mere protection, the empowerment of people and communities
works from the “bottom-up.” “While people protected may exercise choices, only
people empowered can make better choices, and actively prevent and mitigate theimpact of insecurities.” This twin approach of protection and empowerment is particularly useful for capturing the vast range of development assistance measures often
required during transition phases from war to peace, namely an equal attention to institution building and community empowerment. This, according to Mme. Ogata, has infact been the “most significant” contribution of human security to the planning andimplementation of international development policy to date. By way of example, shementioned development cooperation in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic ofCongo, which would be discussed in more detail at a later stage of the conference.
The first session began with a brief discussion of the concept of ”human security”
by Tobias Debiel from the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) at the University of Duisburg. Tracing the evolution of different notions of security over the post
Cold War period, he pointed out that the idea of “human security” has provoked a lot of
criticism with regard to its analytical ambiguity and political appropriateness. Indeed,
for the time being it might be premature to talk about “mainstreaming” human security
before its precise meaning is not clearly established. In particular, Mr. Debiel drewattention to differing definitions of human security as either incorporating both8

Summary of Proceedings“freedom from fear” and “freedom from want,” and thus covering a very broad range ofdevelopment and security issues, or simply focussing on “freedom from fear.” Whereas
the former concept is put forward in the “Human Security Now” report, the latter isadvocated by the Canadian Human Security Network. Closer to the traditional confinesof security studies, it describes a more narrow approach, which would simply refer to anindividual’s degree of protection from external aggression and violence. Finally, Mr.
Debiel contended that while such a more specific understanding may add more analytical value to the academic debate, the holistic conception as introduced by Mme. Ogata
may be better suited to serve as a political leitmotif for concerted foreign and development policy-projects. However, he stressed the importance of accepting a “threshold”
approach to an all-encompassing concept of human security, which seeks to identify
regions or states where people are confronted with multiple threats to their lives andlivelihoods.
The subsequent panel discussion confirmed the significance of many aspects
already raised by Mme. Ogata. There was an overall consensus that the value of theconcept of human security needs to be measured by the extent to which it can be translated into practical development work “on the ground.” One way of assuring suchpracticability is to not only focus on “protective” issues, but to anchor human security at
the grassroot level via the empowerment of people. Empowerment highlights theimportance of civil society groups and local communities for realizing human security.
Indeed, it was repeatedly stated that the initiative for development action needs to be“homegrown.” That is, human security cannot be externally imposed by development
donors. Rather, people have to be enabled to identify their own security concerns.
However, there was some disagreement as to whether the “top-down” or the “bottomup” approach to human security should be given priority. Whereas some argued that
local empowerment had been neglected in the past, others maintained that a more statecentered policy – as it is for example spelt out in the German Action Plan on Civil
Crisis Prevention – might be more useful, since the realization of human security
requires strong institutional structures.
Furthermore, the similarities and overlaps between the concept of human security
and the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were alluded to. In fact, although
the MDGs describe results rather than priorities, they do lay out some of the “minimum
core conditions for a secure livelihood” and may thus be of some help in defining a“threshold” for human security as suggested by Tobias Debiel. Finally, it was madeclear that the realization of both the MDGs as well as human security must be perceived
and pursued as a “political” process, which extends way beyond the traditional areas ofdevelopment cooperation. Partnership is therefore central to facilitating a comprehensive concept of human security. The scope of cooperation needs to be deepened, notonly between donors and recipients, but also between international governmentalorganizations and local civil society groups, and – not least – between development
agencies themselves.
At the outset of the second panel, Conrad Schetter from the Center for Development Research (ZEF) gave a brief presentation on the activities of the international
community to improve human security in Afghanistan since the collapse of the Taliban
regime in Autumn 2001. In particular, he analyzed some of the concrete means
employed by donor organizations to empower and protect the Afghan people. Whereas
the presentation concluded that the concept of human security is helpful in that it may
serve as a “barometer” of the overall security situation in a given country, thereby high9Summary of Proceedings

lighting the complex relation between different dimensions of security, some problems
remain. First, the concept contains no concrete recommendations as to how the processes of empowerment and protection should take place in a complex conflict situation
as we find it in Afghanistan. For example, it is not clear which actors in the Afghansociety should be supported. Second, Mr. Schetter agreed with Tobias Debiel that thequestion of priority-setting is still not solved. This is all the more problematic whencontradictions between the different dimensions of security arise. Improvement in one
security dimension may provoke disadvantages in other security dimensions. As an
example, Mr. Schetter referred to the drug economy of Afghanistan, which supports the
economic security for large parts of the population but at the same time hampers othersecurity dimensions.
As it was remarked in the following panel discussion, Afghanistan is a “test case”
for realizing human security. It is hoped that the concept will be elaborated and enrichedin the ongoing reconstruction efforts. Representatives from GTZ and the JapaneseForeign Office respectively outlined their particular achievements with regard to facilitating development and security in Afghanistan. Interestingly, when the GTZ firstarrived in Afghanistan in 2001, it was not aware of the concept of human security as
outlined in the “Human Security Now” report. Yet, its work was very much in line withthe range of provisions contained therein. “Human security,” it was pointed out, “simply
makes sense.” In many regards the particular development strategy referred to by Mme.
Ogata has thus already been put into concrete practice. Measures taken by JICA, forexample, combine a “bottom-up” approach based on community level developmentwith a “top-down” approach aimed at strengthening the national government andregional economy. As one panelist stated, however, the situation in Afghanistan might
be better now had the concept of human security been integrated into development workfrom the very beginning, since this could have provided for a far more effective framework to coordinate the division of labor between different donor organizations.
Security concerns remain a huge problem in Afghanistan. The future success of
Afghan development will depend, to a large degree, upon ensuring overall security inthe country. Hence, panelists agreed that efforts in security sector and judicial reform
should be facilitated. Also, the so-called “Provisional Reconstruction Teams” (PRTs)
were mentioned as a possible method to address this problem. All in all, and despitesome progress, the reality on the ground remains grim. Much work is still to be done. In
particular, the discussion centered on the questions of how to improve the situation of
women in Afghanistan and how to tackle the problem of the drug economy.
The final panel dealt with the concept of human security in conflict-ridden regionsof Africa. Kwesi Aning remarked that the idea of human security has a long tradition
within African policy, indeed reaching back to the liberation movements of the 1960s.
Presently, there are many organizations and initiatives attempting to address issues
related to human security, as for example the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). However, the main obstacle is encountered in the nature of many
undemocratic African states, which are “strong in intimidating and threatening, but
weak in social service provision.” Here, Kwesi Aning stressed the importance of
pursuing a governance agenda that challenges authoritarian state structures by putting
people at its center within a sub-regional rather than national framework. Furthermore, agreat chance to facilitate change toward increased levels of human security is presented
by transitions from war to peace. Kwesi Aning agreed with the representatives fromJICA that such situations demanded an “holistic” approach on behalf of international
10Summary of Proceedings

development organizations. However, he particularly stressed the need for security
sector reform in post-conflict reconstruction processes.
By and large, the panelists agreed with the overall assessment of Kwesi Aningthat the international community still appears too obsessed with a state-centeredapproach to development. Development assistance to Rwanda just prior to the 1994
genocide was mentioned as an example. However, it was also stated that over the last
couple of years development work related to peace building and crises prevention, especially on the African continent, has diversified to a significant extent. For example, notleast the support given to regional and sub-regional organizations has added a new
dimension. During the following discussion both JICA and the GTZ gave an overview
of the broad range of assistance measures they are providing to the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). These are situated on a regional, national, and local level
and include many aspects mentioned in the “Human Security Now” report.
The conference ended with a wrap up of the main findings, again underlining theimportance of integrating a comprehensive understanding of security into a practicaldevelopment approach, and a final keynote address by Mr. Mutahi Kagwe, Member ofParliament in the Kenyan National Assembly. He particularly focussed on thechallenges for development assistance arising from a holistic perspective of humansecurity. Industrialized countries, including Germany and Japan, needed to face up to
their new responsibilities , which indeed are also in their own economic interest. A
peaceful and economically stronger Africa could be an important trading partner.
Helping Africa is thus not only to the benefit of African people but also to people
worldwide.
(Marc von Boemcken, BICC)

11

Keynote Address

Sadako OGATA, JICA

Ms. Viets (Japanese-German Center), Mr. Chrobog (State Secretary), Mr. Schmitt(GTZ), Dear friends and colleagues in Germany, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Today, more than ever, a new consensus on security thinking is urgently required. In thepast, security threats were assumed to emanate from external sources. State security
focused mainly on protecting the state – its boundaries, people, institutions and values –from external attacks. In recent years, our understanding of security has dramaticallychanged to include the dangers derived from people living in chronic poverty andenvironmental degradation, suffering from infectious diseases, notably HIV/AIDS,
threatened by transnational crime and terrorism, and exposed to violence and conflicts.
Globalization process has deeply transformed relationships between and withinstates. Money, goods, information and people move fast across and within borders. Not
even the strongest states can fully meet the multiple security needs of the people living
within their borders. All states and societies depend on the acts or omissions of others
for the security of their people, even for their survival. States can no longer be the soleor even main referent of security. Consequently, the realities of our changing world
require the broadening of the concept of state security to address human security.
From 2001 to 2003, I had the pleasure to co-chair the Commission on Human
Security together with Professor Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate in Economics andprofessor at Harvard University. The idea of an independent Commission on Human
Security was launched at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit. United Nations SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan advocated the building of a world which embodied the twin idealsof “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” dating back to President Roosevelt’s
four freedoms. The Japanese government also was keen to advance the concept of“human security.” Amartya Sen and I were commissioned by the Secretary-General andPrime Minister Mori of Japan to examine the full range of security threats and torecommend measures to prevent and to counteract.
The interest in promoting a more human approach to security was not altogether
new. Prime Minister Obuchi of Japan had appealed to the need of focusing on social
safety nets as means to ensure “human security,” in response to the disastrous effects
caused by the Asian monetary crisis of 1997. The human development approachpioneered by Mahbub ul Haq, had helped shift development attention to the quality ofhuman lives and spread the message widely through the UNDP Human Development
Report. Several governments led by Canada had organized the Human Security
Network to address varied symptoms – from land mines to child soldiers – that
undermined human security. My own commitment to the promotion of human security
derived from my experience through the l990s as United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees mandated to protect people fleeing persecution, massive violence andconflict very often within their borders.
Mandated “to develop the concept of human security as an operational tool forpolicy formulation and implementation,” the Commission on Human Security decided

Keynote Address

to focus on the security of people, particularly those who are under critical andpervasive threats – victims of conflicts and those left in abject poverty. To attain thegoals of ensuring human security, the Commission proposed a framework for action
based upon the protection and empowerment of people. It emphasized that neither ofthese can be dealt with in isolation as they are mutually reinforcing.
Protection refers to the norms, processes, and institutions required to shield people
from threats. It implies a “top-down” approach, such as strengthening the rule of law,accountable and transparent institutions, and democratic governance structures. States
have the primary responsibility to implement a protective infrastructure. Empowerment,on the other hand, emphasizes people as actors and participants in defining andimplementing their strength and aspirations. This implies a “bottom-up” approach.
While people protected may exercise choices, only people empowered can make better
choices, and actively prevent and mitigate the impact of insecurities.
The Commission examined a broad range of issues and situations. It held public
hearings in South Africa and outreach consultations in the Central Asian republics.
After a year and a half of concentrated work, it made several policy recommendationsof substantial relevance. With regard to the situation of people in conflict situation, it
focused on the protection of civilians, emphasized firmer application of human rights
and humanitarian law and the need to explore more fully the question of citizenship.
With regard to migration, it recommended the development of a normative framework
as well as practical measures to adjust state interests with the protection of migrants. Itemphasized the importance of actively addressing the transition phase from war topeace with greater concentration on institution building and community empowerment.
Noting the lack of financial resources directed to cover early post-conflict requirements,
the Commission proposed the setting up of a human security trust fund to cover the vastand varied needs. On health care and education, the Commission made major efforts to
explore ways to realize universal access to health care and basic education. Basiceducation especially for girls was upheld as a policy priority if we were to fulfill theempowerment agenda for human security. Curricula in all schools were to cultivate
mutual respect and diversity with a view to foster global identities.
The Commission was not alone in advancing policy proposals of the kind that I havejust enumerated. In fact the international community was searching for better
approaches to carry out post-conflict reconstruction, to reach Millennium Development
Goals and to adjust international cooperation to meet the needs of the globalizing world.
The report of the Commission was well received and has now been published in six
languages – English, Japanese, Spanish, French, Arabic and Russian and I hope theGerman version will follow shortly. Its recommendations have been reflected in theguidelines to evaluate and determine projects to be funded by the United Nations
Human Security Trust Fund.
To me what is most significant is the fact that the concept of human security has
had some influence on the planning and implementation of international action. The
protection-empowerment framework is embodied in the functioning of any wellgoverned state. It is the framework for state-building, and provides crucial insights into
the endeavors of states and societies in transition from war to peace. This frameworkhas proven relevant in the peace-building of Afghanistan, and will be guiding theprocess in Iraq, Sudan and many others to come.

13

Sadako OGATA

Allow me to make a few comments on Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic ofCongo, which you will be discussing later in this seminar.
The peace building process in Afghanistan offers an example of how the twopronged human security approach was applied in practice. Having suffered more thantwenty years of conflict and persistent drought, Afghanistan ranked the lowest in theworld by any measure of development. The interim government was established in
December 2001, and the Presidential election was successfully carried out three years
later. The international community made major efforts to rebuild the country, through aseries of reconstruction conferences and active resource mobilization. While governing
capacities were strengthened at the state level, reconstruction of schools, health facilities
and water supplies advanced at community levels. While Afghan army and police werebeing trained, more than 3.8 million refugees returned home and five million children,
including girls, went back to school. The humanitarian and development agencies
collaborated to realize a seamless transition, while the Afghan government was keen toexercise its ownership.
I had the privilege of following Afghanistan during the conflict period as UN
High Commissioner for Refugees and the peace-building process as Japanese
government representative for Afghan reconstruction. I personally noted muchcontribution made by both Germany and Japan. I can say that Afghanistan still has along way to go, but the peace-building process has moved both at state and society
levels, combining the top-down protection and bottom-up empowerment efforts.
Meanwhile, the peace-building process by the international community in the
Democratic Republic of Congo is still at a preliminary phase. Although the country hasreached some stability except for the eastern part, it is still under close surveillance by
the United Nations peace-keeping forces, MONUC. Preparations are underway forholding the elections in the near future. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),
the agency I am currently heading, is training some 500 Congolese to administer theelections and plans are being made to cooperate with MONUC in training the police.
Having had to protect and assist a large number of refugees from the neighboring
countries who fled to what was then Zaire, I realize the heavy burden that fell on thegovernment and people. The building of the national army and police requires bothorganizational support and training. The Democratic Republic of Congo will require
major international assistance to rebuild its state institutions and capacities, both at thestate and society levels. All efforts will have to be made to help the people who arecoming out of long years of conflict, and are in serious need of security protection as
well as assistance to cover health, education and all basic needs.
On the question of serious downturns in security threat, the Human Security
Commission noted the recommendations presented by the report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The report of the High Level Panelon Threats, Challenges and Change presented to the UN Secretary-General lastDecember, endorsed the emerging norm that there is a collective international
responsibility to protect in the event of genocide, ethnic cleansing and other large-scale
killing, and in such a situation, the Security Council could authorize military action as alast resort.
In pursuing the question of military intervention, however, what is most urgently
required is to plan and strengthen national and international capacity to prevent theaggravation of situations through combined means of humanitarian aid, human rights
observations, police and peace-keeping presence. Humanitarian aid is a vital tool for
14

Keynote Address

protecting civilian victims, and for minimizing their suffering and saving their lives, but
it cannot be left to carry on the responsibility alone. Internationally, there are somewelcoming signs. In Africa, for example, the African Union is attempting to mobilize its
observer and peace-keeping capacity, and the European Union is studying to increase
the security of individuals through a bottom-up human security approach to deal withthe situation of severe physical insecurity.
I wish to report also on how Japan has been following up its early commitment tofocus on human security. In addition to contributing to the UN Human Security TrustFund that broadly implements the recommendations of the Commission, it has
incorporated the principle to its international development assistance policy. It
incorporated the concept in its ODA Charter revised in 2003, and redrafted in the ODA
mid-term policy this year. Currently JICA, the implementing agency of official
development assistance, is working on ways to operationalize the concept more
concretely. It has adopted program guidelines consisting of seven points against which
project proposals should be checked. Altogether, the purpose is to ensure that assistancereaches the needy people, particularly the vulnerable, and empower them to achieveself-reliance. As far as targeting assistance to the people is concerned, particularly thepoor and the vulnerable, there should be little difficulty with any recipient government.
In concluding, let me congratulate you again for the 20th Anniversary of theJapanese-German Center and thank you for inviting me to speak at this symposium on
Human Security and Development Assistance. It is indeed timely to hold discussions onhuman security here in Berlin, not only to promote the concept of human security, butalso more importantly to discuss ways to implement the concept. Taking this occasion,
JICA looks forward to hold further discussions with GTZ to explore ways to jointly
promote human security in places where the two agencies can make a difference to thepeople.
Thank you very much.

15

Mainstreaming Human Security?
Concepts and Implications for Development AssistanceOpening Presentation for the Panel Discussion 1

Tobias DEBIEL, INEF
“Mainstreaming Human Security” is a challenging topic. It presupposes that we knowwhat human security is about and that we have a common understanding of this rather
new topic. As the organizers have pointed out in their concept paper, human security
remains a contested idea.
We are currently faced with an ever-increasing and broad range of concepts of“human security.” On the one hand, from a development perspective one usually refers
to a broad definition originally put forward by UNDP in 1994. 1 This concept has been
deepened and further elaborated upon by the Commission on Human Security in 2003,
which was co-chaired by Mme. Sadako Ogata and Professor Amartya Sen 2 .
On the other hand, a more narrower and precise understanding of human security– defined as freedom from fear and related to threats of violence – has been developed.
This concept has been promoted in particular by the Canadian and Norwegian governments and was utilized as a reference framework by the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (“Responsibility to Protect”) 3 as well as in the mostrecent Barcelona Report entitled “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe.” 4
My reading of the most recent debate is as follows: While human security was
first of all promoted as a powerful idea to bridge the security-development divide, we
are now observing a tendency to develop two different concepts for each segment:
While the peace and security discourse concentrates on gross human rights violations
and on norms, strategies and capacities to protect individuals and to prevent violent
threats, the development discourse tends to understand human security as a particularform of human development. Besides the protection framework, particular stress is puton the concept of empowering people, thus complementing the traditional top-down- by
a bottom-up-approach. 5
In my following remarks, I want to explicitly argue against this bifurcation of
discourses and to instead propose an integrated concept of human security. According to
my assessment, the value added by referring to human security is its ability to serve as areference framework at the security development nexus.
1

2

3

4

5

UNDP (United Nations Development Program), Human Development Report 1994: New
Dimensions of Human Security. New York, N.Y. 1994
Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People. New
York: Commission on Human Security 2003.
ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), The Responsibility toProtect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa:International Research Centre for ICISS 2001.
Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The
Barcelona report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities. Presented to EU High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, on 15 September 2004 in
Barcelona. London: London School of Economics 2004
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Human%20Security20Report%20Full.pdf> (15.04.2005)
Sadako Ogata/Johan Cels, Human Security – Protecting and Empowering the People, in: Global
Governance, Vol. 9 (2003) No. 3, pp. 273–282.

Mainstreaming Human Security?

I will proceed in five steps: First of all, I will analyze how human security has
challenged and transformed the traditional security discourse. Secondly, I elaborate on
how human security has enriched the human development discourse. My third point isquite decisive: Relying on the work of an innovative Canadian researcher – Taylor
Owen – I argue for a threshold-based definition of human security, which may be able
to settle the dispute between those who prefer a broad definition and those who favor anarrow definition of human security. In my fourth thesis I will argue that a broad but
threshold-based understanding of human security is of analytic relevance for development research and development assistance in so far as it can empirically identify hot
spots of human insecurity and relate different dimensions of human security to one
another. The practical value of human security for development policy and assistancewill be tackled in my fifth and last thesis. In particular, I want to point out three aspects:•••

Human security can be a useful means to identify priorities for development assistance.
The concept can be applied as a powerful tool for defining development goals
jointly with the local population and thus for empowering people.
Human security can serve as a political leitmotif and as a benchmark in new areas
where development and security policy meet and require cooperation.

1. Human Security: Challenging and Changing the Traditional Security Discourse
Let me briefly turn to how human security has challenged and changed the security
discourse. As we all know, the traditional notion of state security is outdated. There arethree primary reasons for this:•••It was primarily based on inter-state conflicts and ignored intra-state violence,
It assumes consolidated statehood and ignores the dynamics of state formation andstate building,
It neglects that even consolidated states are vulnerable to non-military threats, be it
economic crises, health risks or environmental disasters.

As a consequence of these weaknesses, security studies as well as peace and conflictresearch broadened their definitions to include non-military threats in new concepts ofextended or comprehensive security. Within this second generation of security concepts,
however, the state and the international system remained the crucial points.
The innovative contribution of human security in this context was to introduce theindividual as a normative and analytical category. This third generation of security
concepts not only broadened the horizontal axis of security threats but went verticallybeyond and below the state by focusing on those who are affected by violence in their
daily lives. Introducing the human security perspective has changed the security
discourse in two ways:•

Attention is now drawn to new forms of violence beyond regular fighting in wars,
such as those linked to social and socio-economic problems.

17Tobias DEBIEL•

Human security tries to protect core human rights as an ultimate goal of security
policy and has strongly influenced the debate on humanitarian issues and theprevention of violent conflicts.

2. Enriching the Development Discourse
Human security was first of all a challenge to traditional notions of state security, while
its contribution to the development discourse remained rather insignificant for almost a
decade.
Certainly, human security added new topics to the development agenda, inparticular in terms of its reaction to violent conflict, political repression and the integrityof cultures. But did this produce more than a laundry list of development and security
issues?
My conviction is that “Human Security Now!” solved this puzzle by stating thathuman security as an idea fruitfully supplements the perspectives of Human Development by directly paying attention to what are sometimes called “downside risks.”
Human security is thus closely connected with the concept of vulnerability. It places the
spotlight on vulnerable people who are subject to “downturns in security” – be it
because of global economic shocks such as during the Asian crisis of 1997–1999, natural disasters like the tsunami floods in late 2004 or because of violent conflicts.
Human security urges development assistance to be prepared for situations that
require an immediate and targeted reaction. It strengthens the ideas of pro-poor development by establishing a special responsibility for vulnerable people. And by advocating a bottom-up-appoach, it stresses the necessity of looking closely at local coping
mechanisms before coming up with externally prepared solutions.

3. A Threshold-Based Definition of Human Security
Both the security as well as the development debate are not in need of new terms. We
are busy in mainstream “gender” and “conflict prevention” concerns; we debate the roleof “civil society” and try to integrate “sustainability” in development and peacebuilding efforts. Why then should we put another burden upon us by discussing humansecurity? According to my assessment, the strategic importance of human security liesin bridging the development-security divide by adopting security as a common frame ofreference in interdisciplinary research and interministerial/interbureaucratic cooperation.
Taylor Owen, who until recently worked for the International Peace ResearchInstitute of Oslo (PRIO) and is now doing his PhD at Oxford University, proposed a
simple, but ground-breaking solution 6 : He demands sacrifices from both, the broad andthe narrow proponents by putting a hybrid definition on the table: First, he does notdifferentiate between threats from floods, communicable diseases or war and in so far
includes the major dimension of UNDP’s definition (environmental, economic, food,
618

Taylor Owen, Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a
Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition, in: Security Dialogue, Vol. 35 (2004) No. 3, pp. 373–
387.

Mainstreaming Human Security?

health, personal and political threats). From this vast range of threats, however, only
those that pass a life-threatening threshold are selected.
This idea of a threshold is already included in “Human Security Now!” where
human security “means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive threats
and situations.” As a consequence, human security can be defined as the protection ofphysical and psychological integrity of all human beings from critical and pervasive
threats, be they environmental, economic, nutritional, health-related, violence-related orpolitical.

4. Analytical Relevance of Human Security for Development Research and Assistance
What analytical relevance does a broad but threshold-based concept of human security
have for development research and assistance? I would like to highlight two points:
First of all, such an approach can be applied to specific countries and may help to identify hot spots of human insecurity on the provincial and even on the local level.
Collecting and generating disaggregate data and relating them to their geographicallocations provides us with maps of high insecurity or vulnerability. Owen has applied
his concept to Cambodia, identified thirteen threats and aggregated those using
locations as a common denominator. A similar mapping exercise has been conducted by
the “Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004.” 7
Secondly, an empirical, threshold-based concept of human security will provide
new insights on how threats in different issue areas are inter-related and how thesethreats can be prevented. Over the past five years the debate on the causes of violence
and insecurity has been dominated by the grievance vs. greed debate, i.e. whether wars
are mainly driven by the opportunity to exploit natural resources or by the deprivationand suffering of significant parts of the population. This debate has somehow come to astalemate: For example, the Afghanistan National Human Development Report applies
both approaches to explain different phases of the war in Afghanistan. In this context,
the human security concept can shed light on an issue that has been neglected so far:Why do degrees of human security differ on the local level? And how are the diverse
security threats inter-related? The Cambodia study by Taylor Owen found out e.g. that
extreme poverty was highly correlated with homicide and the presence of landmines. 8
Such analysis may be an eye-opener for the real threats that local populations face.

5. The Practical Value of Human Security for Development Policy and Assistance
The aforementioned points already indicate the high value that human security canpotentially have for development policy and assistance. Putting the vulnerable individual first can have an impact on policy priorities. New and comprehensive development
programs as they are typical for post-war-situations, could pay special attention to hot
7

8

UNDP (United Nations Development Program), Security With a Human Face: Challenges andResponsibilities. Afghanistan National Human Development Report. New York; Kabul et al.: UNDP
Afghanistan; Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2004; also see the opening presentation by Conrad
Schetter to panel discussion 2.
Taylor Owen, Measuring Human Security: A View of Cambodian Vulnerability, A thesis submitted
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in The Faculty of Graduate
Studies (Department of Geography, The University of British Columbia), Vancouver 2003.
19

Tobias DEBIEL

spots of insecurity. A mapping of these hot spots – based on collection of existing andgeneration of new data – could be an excellent starting point. It could give an indicationof what kind of sectoral policies are needed in different regions. Sometimes, such amapping will also hint at trade-offs between different dimensions of human security.
For example, regions with drug economies may combine improvements in socioeconomic security with declines in political dimensions of human security.
As the Ogata-Sen-report rightly highlighted, human security has to be tackled
within a protection-empowerment framework. Protection means the creation, implementation and enforcement of normative frameworks – if necessary by coercion, as“The Responsibility to Protect” has convincingly argued. It will be based on a clearly
defined set of universal criteria regarding the vital core of human rights and humansecurity. At the same time, in particular concerning non-violent threats, human security
also implies empowerment. Such an approach does not rely – to a great extent – not rely
on “objective” criteria, but on “subjective” assessments of human security by local
populations. The concept of human security as defined by the “Human Security Now!”
may be a trigger for a more participatory approach in development cooperation and may
serve as a powerful tool for jointly defining needs and development goals with local
population.
Last but not least, human security is a political leitmotif, which in the past proved
to have a great potential for effective mobilization of political forces. The Ottawa
convention on the prohibition of anti-personal mines as well as the establishment of theInternational Criminal Court (ICC) are such success stories where diverse political alliances guided by a common idea have made a difference.
In the current situation, the international agenda is full of security challenges: theachievement of the MDGs; concrete peace and state building endeavors in war-torncountries; man-made humanitarian crises like that in Darfur; the necessity to develop
more reliable early warning systems for natural catastrophes like earthquakes andtsunami floods in South-East Asia. It is not my task to express a preference for one ofthese challenges at this point of the symposium. I feel, however, that one of the aims ofthis conference could lie in identifying one or two priority issues where Japanese andGerman development and foreign policy – based on the leitmotif of human security –could make a difference in the years to come.

20

Discussion of Session 1

Takao Toda, JICA
Human Security and the Practice of Development AssistanceTakao Toda, Director of the Office of Human Security at JICA, stressed that humansecurity is only valuable once it is put into practice on the ground. Therefore, JICA is
now applying the concept to its daily activities. It is thereby countering the trend toward“too much specialization” in development assistance by way of adopting a morecomprehensive and human-centered approach. This allows for a “holistic” perspective
when identifying people’s needs and problems.
Three key terms are of particular importance in this context. The first is people.
Since the “absorbing capacities” of recipient governments are often rather limited,
JICA’s efforts increasingly concentrate on reaching people and local communities in amore direct way. A second keyword is peace. Here, one needs to acknowledge the intricate link between conflict and poverty. To facilitate human security would thus require
the utilization of a framework, which increases the opportunity for real sustainable
development by not only protecting but also empowering the people. As an example forsuch an approach, Takao Toda referred to JICA’s activities in Sri Lanka where thehuman security situation has markedly improved over the last couple of years. Finally,
he emphasized the importance of global partnerships in moving toward the goals ofpeace and prosperity. It is hoped that the concept of human security will create closer
connections with JICA’s partners, which will in turn result in dynamic social changes
for developing countries.
Mary Racelis, Institute of Philippine Culture
Human Security: Civil Society and People’s Organization
Mary Racelis from the Institute of Philippine Culture at the Ateneo de Manila University agreed with Takao Toda that one needs to focus development cooperation on thecommunity level. The important question, however, is how to approach the communityfrom an external position. Mary Racelis made it very clear that the “initiative” fordevelopment action had to come from civil society groups within the affected community itself, not from the donors. In other words, outside intervention by development
organizations can merely be a reaction to a set of specific needs already defined by theaffected peoples. Local NGOs working on the ground level thus need to help people
identify and assess their problems and shortcomings. Indeed, the particular way thatpeople conceive their “human security” will very often differ from community tocommunity, depending in each case on the respective needs-situation of the people. In
this sense, local “empowerment” as critical self-awareness is a central aspect of humansecurity. As Mary Racelis pointed out further, the voice of women is especially important in this context, since women tend to be most conscious of the actual community
needs. Women are at the forefront of community-building and have “the highest stakes
when it comes to a lack of human security.”
Civil society groups and local communities also play a crucial part in facilitating
peace, the second “key term” mentioned by Toda. Examples include the creation of so-

Discussion of Session 1

called communal “peace zones” in conflict regions. Here, an understanding of the very
concept of “peace,” i.e. of its different dimensions and its particular meaning ineveryday-life, needs to be encouraged on the grassroots level, especially by teaching“peace” in schools. Furthermore, local NGOs can be very helpful in opening up andfacilitating channels of exchange between communities and government institutions,particularly the military. As an example, Mary Racelis referred to the negotiating andmediating function of civil society groups in the religious conflict between Muslims andChristians in Mindanao.
All in all, as the “Commission on United Nations (UN) – Civil Society Relations”
stated in its report from June 2004, the scope of cooperation between NGOs and international organizations has improved. The World Bank has regular consultations withlocal civil society groups. Similarly, NGOs are increasingly integrated into UN procedures. However, reservations against civil society organizations remain, especiallywithin some of the UN member-states, who fear a possible relinquishment of theirpolitical stake in the UN system. Hence, Mary Racelis argued for a “change of culture,”
which would perceive the organization not consisting simply of its member states, but
as a system of “global governance” incorporating a variety of different, also nongovernmental actors.
Klemens van de Sand, BMZ
Human Security and the Millennium Development Goals
Klemens van de Sand from the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) alluded to the similarities and overlaps between the concept of humansecurity and the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Whereas the MDGs
describe “results” rather than “priorities,” they do lay out some of the “minimum conditions for a secure livelihood” and may thus be of some help in defining a “threshold” forhuman security as suggested by Tobias Debiel.
According to Klemens van de Sand, the “top-down” approach to achieving the
MDGs has been overemphasized at the expense of neglecting the importance of facilitating local empowerment. He stressed that the MDGs are not state-centered, but instead
people have to be the “starting point” for reaching them. While development cooperation should still concern itself with “top-down” institution-building, this is only half of
the way. It is equally, if not more, important to support the self-organization of people
from the “bottom-up.”
Furthermore, he pointed out that the MDGs must be perceived and pursued withina political process, which extends beyond the “traditional” areas of development cooperation. Most importantly, of course, the domestic political conditions necessary forachieving the MDGs need to evolve from within the partner countries themselves. They
certainly cannot be externally imposed by donor organizations, although development
assistance might be of some help in building the capacity required to get a politicalprocess started. All in all, however, attaining the MDGs in a globalized world is not justa task for the BMZ but has to be integrated into a wider effort involving many different
actors both on the local and global level.
Finally, there is a need for a better framework that bridges the gap between
peacebuilding and development. The MDGs will, in all likelihood, not be reached inconflict-ridden countries with widespread human insecurity. Indeed, development cooperation should not only concentrate on the so-called “good performers,” but also22

Discussion of Session 1

consider more problematic countries. Often, successful poverty reduction requires
different measures of crisis prevention, for example effective instruments of early
warning and early action.
Klemens van de Sand also noted that JICA and the BMZ were “very much on thesame line of thought” and thus needed to discuss possible spaces of cooperation in the
future.
Ambassador Ortwin Hennig, Federal Foreign Office
Human Security and Peace Building
Ambassador Ortwin Hennig is responsible for overseeing the implementation of theFederal Action Plan on Civil Crisis Prevention at the German Foreign Office in Berlin.
The Action Plan was approved by the Federal Cabinet in May 2004. Ambassador
Hennig pointed out that it is a “milestone on the way of enabling Germany to act more
coherently in matters of crises prevention.” Besides describing the new nature ofconflicts and security, the plan has two basic elements:
First, it draws conclusions with regard to establishing an infrastructure for successful crisis prevention in Germany. In particular, the aim is to improve Germany’s
visibility in this area. For this purpose, an inter-ministerial Steering Group on crisis
prevention was established, which serves as forum to ensure a coordinated and coherent
policy response to global conflicts. The Steering Group thus streamlines government
policy and thereby enhances the government’s capability to act. Furthermore, it has an“advisory board” attached to it, which includes members of different NGOs. Thisassures the necessary points of contact between government and civil society.
Second, the Action Plan lists a total of 137 concrete measures to be implemented
over the next three years. The main focal points are on strengthening multilateralapproaches on the state-level and improving the peacebuilding capacities of civil society. This includes, for example, the training of German personnel for participation ininternational peace missions, the establishment of mechanisms for early warning andearly actions, as well as the effective financing of Germany’s contributions to different
peacebuilding activities.
Ambassador Hennig also mentioned that the German Action Plan on Civil Crisis
Prevention is very similar to the UN commissioned report “Human Security Now,”
since both documents embrace a comprehensive approach. However, the recommendations contained in the Action Plan are, in comparison, more state-centered. In thiscontext, Ambassador Hennig stressed the importance of strong state structures in orderto successfully implement the concept of human security. Indeed, while he fully agreed
with the idea of placing people at the center of security analysis, a focus on structures
rather than individuals may be easier to translate into practical policy.
Finally, Ambassador Hennig underlined the need to supplement the concept ofhuman security by spelling out political and geographical priorities. Only then would it
be possible to establish concrete mechanisms. All in all, he held that the German Action
Plan is therefore more practical in this regard than the “Human Security Now” report.
Summary of Floor Discussion
The subsequent discussion centered on three main points:• Human security and the role of the state
23

Discussion of Session 1••

The importance of “homegrown” solutions to development problems
Security and development

Human security and the role of the state
Whereas Ambassador Hennig had drawn attention to the importance of effective state
structures in order to guarantee human security, it was remarked that in many cases it isprecisely the state, which does not facilitate but, on the contrary, undermines the humansecurity of its people. In fact, from a civil society perspective, the state and state institutions are often a source of large-scale insecurity. The question of how NGOs should
position themselves vis-à-vis states is thus very contentious and certainly not always
straightforward. In general, to facilitate human security would not simply mean tostrengthen state capacities, but more specifically to ensure that affected people’s voices
were heard by the government and adequately responded to.
Importance of “Homegrown” Solutions
As State Secretary Chrobog had remarked in the Opening Address, security perceptions
differ depending on geographical location. Hence, there was an overall agreement
between all participants that threats needed to be defined, above all, by those directly
affected, not by donors or other external actors. In the past, the “biggest sin” of development assistance had been to predefine its own solutions and neglect the particular
views of local communities in the respective partner countries. However, as it waspointed out, there has been a considerable shift in thinking. “People” are now taken
seriously by development organizations. This, of course, is reflected most obviously by
the process of integrating the concept of human security into development work.
Security and Development
The concept of human security is based on an understanding that both development andsecurity are interdependent. During the discussion, some participants reiterated thismuch-evoked view. However, it was also recognized that such understanding poses theimportant question on what kind of security-related cooperation with partner countries
should be eligible as Official Development Assistance (ODA). In other words, it needs
to be discussed where to draw the line between foreign military assistance and development aid unless one wants to undermine the credibility of ODA. As Klemens van de
Sand from the BMZ made very clear, measures aiming to improve civilian control ofthe military, as well as those seeking to transform the security sector in accordance todemocratic guidelines and the Rule of Law, should clearly count as ODA.
Final Remark
The panel discussion repeatedly drew attention to the importance of agreeing on certain
priority areas within the rather broad concept of human security. However, the question
as to where the main emphasis should be put remained unresolved during the discussion.
(Marc von Boemcken, BICC)

24

Facilitating Human Security in Afghanistan
Problems, Opportunities and Perspectives
Opening Presentation for the Panel Discussion 2

Conrad SCHETTER, ZEF

1. Human Security Approach

In this presentation I would like to discuss the extent to which the human security
approach is viable and valuable for the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan.
The new approach of Human Security, which was published in 2003 (Human Security
Now), is far more action oriented than the old one by stressing the empowerment andprotection of the people themselves to achieve human security. While the“empowerment” dimension (“freedom from want”) underlines the capacity building
efforts of the people to survive, the “protection” dimension (“freedom from fear”)
stresses the role of the state to prevent physical as well as psychological threats – which
was clearly missing in the previous understanding of human security. However, the new
approach, which rather follows a political agenda than an academic approach, bears
several problems which are difficult to solve:••

Firstly, it is not clear which groups within a society should be empowered and how
this should be realized. Especially in a post-war situation as in Afghanistan it isparticularly difficult to define which societal and political groups should beendorsed and which steps need to be taken to improve the overall human security
situation. We still have to think about which security priorities should be set and if
sequencing is wishful or not. We also have to take into consideration the discrepancies often occurring between various security dimensions: Seldom all positives
arrive at the same time.
Another problem is that the analytical framework became blurred. While the previous approach identified seven clear cut dimensions of security the new approach isvery vague and its six dimensions are not as prominent within the concept as theones in the past. The recent UNDP-report on Afghanistan (“Security with a Human
Face”), for example, does not consistently incorporate the dimensions of humansecurity. It mentions job, food and health security even though they are not part ofthe dimensions of the Commission on Human security.

However, in my presentation I will focus••

on what the international community has done in the last three years to promote
human security andwhat means in accordance to the Human Security Commission concrete to improvethe empowerment and protection of the people in Afghanistan.

Conrad SCHETTER

I will first give an overview of the human security situation directly after the international intervention in autumn 2001. Secondly, I will analyze the international engagement in Afghanistan in regard to the empowerment and protection of the population.
Lastly, considering the drug economy as example, I would like to discuss the challenges
the concept of human security faces.

2. Challenges in Afghanistan

After the collapse of the Taliban, the reconstruction process in Afghanistan more or lessstarted from scratch. The people in Afghanistan were suffering from a total lack of security in almost all dimensions of life. Following the analytical approach of human security I want to give an overview of the situation of the Afghan population in regard topolitical, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural security – the six
dimensions of human security:
•

•

•

•

•

26

Political security: Afghanistan suffered from the complete destruction of the state.
There was neither a functioning state apparatus, nor a monopoly of power or any
capacity to rebuild the state. Thus the state was in no way able to protect its citizens.
Furthermore, a “civil” political elite was not only not empowered, but rarely existentat all: Civil society organizations were absent and political parties were dominatedby patronage and fragmented along regional, religious and ethnic lines.
Social security: The social indicators for Afghanistan are some of the worst in theworld, which reflects in some way the low level of empowerment of the people.
Afghanistan has one of the highest population growths (4.92%), a life expectation of
only 42 years and an illiteracy rate of 64%. In addition, the war affected virtually
every family and destroyed family ties, which were not only the social capital of
most people, but had been the traditional form of protection.
Environmental security: Although environmental security seems to be of less interest, it is worthwhile to note that Afghanistan is polluted by mines to a very highdegree (5–7 mill. mines). What is more, the population was afflicted with heavy
earthquakes, droughts and floods during the last decade and is still lacking effectivemeans of protection against natural disasters.
Economic security: At U.S.$ 800, the official per capita income in Afghanistan is
one of the lowest in the world due to the continuing war and the disastrous environmental and economic situation of the country. Subsequently, illegal activities suchas drug cultivation and smuggling emerged as strategies of survival and have since
become predominant economic activities. Today the opium economy makes up 38%
of the GDP.
Military security: In the course of fighting the Taliban the Coalition forces brought
the warlords back to the saddle of power. The overall situation in late December wasmarked by myriads of commanders who controlled the country in an arbitrary
manner. Clashes among these commanders as well as between the remnants of the
Taliban and the Coalition forces caused a high degree of insecurity in all provincesof the country.

Facilitating Human Security in Afghanistan•

Cultural security: The warring factions exploited the cultural richness of Afghanistan time and again for their own political and military interests. Thereby cultural
identities became highly politicized during the war which led to a situation in which
the belonging to one ethnic, religious or regional group was not only unfavorable,
but put these individuals under a high physical security threat.

All in all we can say that the situation in the very beginning of the international intervention was more or less the opposite from a sound human security situation. Whilesome may argue that the completely lack of security increases the chances of the international engagement to improve the situation, other may argue that an engagement in
the wrong place and at the wrong time will strengthen the predominant structures andfurther aggravate the predicament of insufficient human security.

3. International Strategies and Human Security in Afghanistan

The international community was ready to fund the reconstruction of Afghanistan by
donations agreed in Tokyo in January 2002 (4.5 bn.) and in Berlin in March 2004 (8,2bn.) of a total of approximately U.S.$ 12,7 billion for the first six years. Additionally,
the international community embarked upon a military engagement by means of the
Coalition forces, which counted between 5,000 and 10,000 troops, to hunt down alQaida and Taliban, and ISAF, 5,000–6,000 troops, to provide security in Kabul andsince late 2002 for the whole of Afghanistan.
The fundamental problem of the international engagement is that until today noconcepts and strategies have been drawn up defining the main goals and timeframes.
While the U.S. prioritized the war against terrorism, the UN intended to establish apeaceful environment and to focus on the rebuilding of the Afghan state. Other states(e.g. Pakistan, Iran) and international organizations were eager to impose their own
agenda reaching from emergency relief and the rebuilding of the infrastructure to theintroduction of human rights, democracy or a civil society. However, in the entire
process it did not become clear what the general goals are. As a result, the reconstruction project included activities which started on various levels with several approaches
at the same time; sequencing by setting clear goals for different periods was not realized. Against this background the human security approach was hardly taken into
consideration, and the ideas of empowerment and protection were rather followed in aspontaneous than in a coherent way. I want to give an overview of the successes andfailures of the international communities’ efforts to improve the human security situation by focussing on the dimensions of political and military security.

3.1 Empowerment of the People
Undoubtedly the Bonn agreement was sketched out to empower the Afghan people. On
the political level the agreement entailed several steps to introduce democratic principles in the country within a timeframe of three years. However, upon closer inspectionof both Loya Jirgas and the presidential elections it became clear that at the crucial
27

Conrad SCHETTER

junctions the decisions were not made by the Afghans themselves but by the international actors. I will give some examples:•••

At the time of the emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S.
envoy for Afghanistan, obviously put the former king Zahir Shah and the former
president Burhanuddin Rabbani under severe pressure to withdraw their candidatures to enable the election of Hamid Karzai. Many Afghans perceived this interference as U.S.-paternalism.
For the constitutional Loya Jirga there was no vote on the constitution, which had
been negotiated by leading Afghan politicians. Karzai merely held a speech inwhich he informed that a new constitution had been enacted which left the representatives with no further chance to discuss it. Again many Afghans felt the opposite from empowered.
Undoubtedly the presidential elections were a major success and the first eversymbolic event of the empowerment of the people. Yet we have to keep in mind thatthe whole registration process was carried out by the Afghan/UN election body with
only one overriding goal: to register as many people as possible. Thus the election
body paid little attention to controlling mechanisms. As a result, the vast majority of
the Afghan elite was disappointed by the process, which they perceived neither as
free nor as fair.

Another problem became obvious during the last three years: Who should be empowered in Afghanistan? While the Human Security approach, of course, follows a grassroots approach by empowering the ordinary people, it was in fact the Afghan elite
which benefited most from the reconstruction: For one thing the traditional elite –landlords, chiefs and commanders –, who have been controlling the decision-making
processes in the communities, managed to control the flow of resources. Secondly, thewell-educated, English speaking elite became the broker between the international
donor community and the Afghan people.
A promising approach to empower the people has been the National Solidarity
Program (NSP). The aim of NSP is to channel funds to local communities on the grassroots level directly for development projects which are identified by the people themselves through democratic elected committees. This program was perhaps the mostappropriate to empower the people. Despite the successes of NSP, though, the main
problem of the program is that it is only designed for a short term of a few years andthus is far away from being sustainable. Ultimately, this means that slowly emerging
local institutions of empowerment will break away as soon as the money flow ceases.
Lastly I want to throw up the provocative question what the international organizations have in mind first: to empower the people, the government or themselves? Evenin the absence of a sound calculation it is obvious that large parts of the funds have beenused for office rents, vehicles, advisers and salaries. A crucial problem of the wholereconstruction project has been the consistent brain drain from the government to international organizations, particular the United Nations, which is paying the highestsalaries. The results are strong international organizations and a weak Afghan administration lacking crucial capacities. This is why Afghans are increasingly dissatisfied
with the reconstruction process. We may conclude that the example of Afghanistan
demonstrates that the empowerment of the international organizations comes first!

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Facilitating Human Security in Afghanistan

3.2 Protecting the People
Against the background of the weak state apparatus and the lack of a state ownedmonopoly of violence the government was not able to protect its people in the first two
years after the fall of the Taliban. Thus the government was not in the position to
respond to the arbitrary action of the warlords and commanders. This situation changed
dramatically during 2004 when the government was able to depose strong warlords suchas Ismail Khan. This empowerment of the state against the warlords was by and large
the result of the increasingly successful training of the Afghan National Army (ANA)
by the U.S. and of the government’s ability to station ANA as well as police forces innearly all provinces. While the Afghan government was able to improve its capability toprovide protection to the people, the Afghan government is still not in the position toguarantee a minimum of social welfare standards or administrative duties.
While the international community has been engaged in the building of an
accountable Afghan military and police force, the direct protection of the Afghan
government and the Afghan people was another important issue. The most important
aim of the deployment of ISAF in Kabul as well as the setup of PRTs across the country
was to bring physical security to the people as long as the government cannot fulfil thisfunction. However, the military engagement in Afghanistan also had a downside: The
war against terrorism brought several regions of southern and south-eastern Afghanistan
to the brink of war. The ongoing fighting between the Coalition forces and the Taliban
destabilized these regions and hampered aid agencies from carrying out projects. Thus
the initial aim of improving military security caused a decrease of socio-economic
engagement of the international community. This is why we have to discuss whichpriorities need to be set by the human security agenda.

4. The Drug Economy – Challenging Human Security
Finally, I want to talk about the drug economy in Afghanistan. In my eyes the drug
economy is challenging the Human Security approach because the latter does not imply
a normative idea of legal and illegal. The opium economy in Afghanistan is the largest
in the world. Without digging too deep in the numbers of the drug economy, it needs tobe remembered that the Afghans’ experience with opium growing was largely positivein the past:•••

The drug economy is labor intensive, especially in the rural areas: 2.3 million people
in 356,000 families (or around ten percent of the Afghan population) are involved in
production activities. Another 15,000 or so people act as dealers, mostly within alimited radius because they only maintain links with a few farmers. The profits thus
benefit a large number of small traffickers.
There are no drug cartels up to date and a criminalization of the producers took notplace yet.
Farmers have some leeway in the process of price bargaining and opium production,
for them, provides opportunities to access informal loans for seed. The main disad-29

Conrad SCHETTER••

vantage is that they become increasingly dependant on dealers, a development
which is hard to reverse.
For many provinces such as Badakhshan and Uruzgan – two provinces that havealways been exceptionally poor – drug cultivation has brought a modest but visible
degree of prosperity for the people. The evidence is seen in new houses, vehicles
and mobile phones.
The gulf between rich and poor has not widened substantially as even landless peasants renting fields from landowners profit from the opium economy. The labor
intensive production creates income for people with virtually no chance of regular
employment.

Thus from certain points of the Human Security approach perspective the drug economy
is to be judged positively: the farmers empowered themselves, and the drug economy
facilitates economic security to a degree which was never achieved in the past. Not only
for security reasons beyond Afghanistan but also for the political security of Afghanistan, of course, the drug economy should be combated to prevent the emergence of an
Afghan narco-state. However, the example makes clear that often contradictions arise
between the various dimensions of human security and that the problem of defining thedimension of security which should be given priority remains problematic.

6. Perspectives

In this presentation I intended to show that human security in Afghanistan is still in theearly stages. What is more, the actions of the international engagement did not implement the idea of human security coherently, even though the international community
launched projects and programs in each of the security dimensions to improve the overall situation.
While I am still convinced that the concept of human security is able to deal withsecurity in a holistic way, it is still facing the problem of lacking a priority setting. I
intended to highlight this problem by the brief excursion on drug production: The
improvement in one security dimension can directly impair the security on other levels.
My personal feeling from many talks with Afghans is that in a situation as critical as intoday’s Afghanistan, where all dimensions of security are under enormous pressure,physical/military security is still perceived as the most important goal followed byeconomic security. Issues such as political or cultural security are considered of secondary significance.
Lastly, I would like to add one important thought. We have to bear in mind how
we can measure human security. The individual perception of security does not necessarily coincide with the objective measurement by outsiders which will be operationalized in facts and figures. Thus while the Human Security approach widens the umbrellaof security, we have to be clear about the fact that no security concept will ever be able
to cover individual feelings of security.

30

Discussion of Session 2

Kinichi Komano
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan
Ambassador Kinichi Komano pointed out that the shift from humanitarian aid to development cooperation as elaborated upon in the recently concluded Afghanistan Development Forum (ADF) marked a corner stone in current efforts toward Afghan reconstruction. The ADF addressed five areas in particular: 1) The problems and possibilitiesof building infrastructure, which includes not only the construction of roads, but also
ensuring water and power supply. 2) The necessary conditions for facilitating private
sector development as engine of economic growth. 3) The strategy for placing Afghanistan within a comprehensive framework of regional development cooperation. 4) The
question of how to link community-support and rehabilitation programs to regional
development. 5) Security sector reform, counter narcotics and demilitarization of illegal
armed groups. The Human Development Index of UNDP ranks Afghanistan among thelowest five countries. Whereas Ambassador Komano thus acknowledged that the“ground reality” in Afghanistan remained grim, he also stressed that the country was a“test case” for realizing the concept of human security.
Ambassador Komano went on to detail the Japanese effort in implementing
human security in Afghanistan. In what he referred to as a “comprehensive regional
development approach,” the geographical scope of Japanese development cooperation
takes the entire Central Asian region into account, while at the same time placing a
special emphasis on the community level. In particular, Japan focuses on three key
issues. First, it is concerned with the rehabilitation of communities. In Afghanistan
people live and act, above all, as part of an integrated community. Hence, it is here thatdevelopment cooperation needs to concentrate its principal efforts, be it directed at thesuccessful resettlement of refugees, supporting poppy growing farmers by way ofproviding alternative opportunities to earn a living, or indeed at the demilitarization ofillegal armed groups and the reintegration of ex-militias into civilian life. As Ambassador Komano contended, “the peaceful and prosperous community will provide thefoundation for establishing security, law and order and for promoting democratization.”
Second, Japanese development work not only attempts to create a sustainable livelihoodin the community, but at the same time also upholds the overall economic developmentof country. In other words, it combines both a bottom-up approach based upon thecommunity level and a top-down approach based upon the government-led national
economic and development strategy. Finally, Ambassador Komano stressed that thesuccess for Afghan reconstruction depends to large extent on solving the dilemma posedby widespread insecurity. That is, lack of security in many areas of Afghanistan hinders
successful development work. However, whereas the implementation of certain development projects might thus need to be temporarily suspended, he warned against
discontinuing the overall effort toward Afghan reconstruction, which would be tantamount to a “defeat against terrorism.” Instead, all kinds of alternative and flexible
measures need to be employed so as to “avoid the permanent withdrawal of aid personnel and the permanent disruption of development projects.” In particular, Ambassador
Komano urged to expedite security sector reform. All together, as matters stand now heDiscussion of Session 2

concluded that the reconstruction work in Afghanistan is “half-way” and the key to its
success depends both upon the continued commitment by the Afghan side to achieve
reform programs and on the coordinated provision of support by the international
community.
Herbert Sahlmann
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
The Concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan
From November 2003 to May 2004 Herbert Sahlmann was Commissioner of the BMZ
for German-Afghan Development Cooperation in the Kunduz region. He elaborated
upon the concept of the German Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) which
combines both civilian and military elements and was established in Kunduz in January
2004. Supported by soldiers from other European countries and within the framework of
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the German armed forces weremandated to support the interim Afghan state organs in providing for a secure working
environment for both Afghan and international development organizations. As Herbert
Sahlmann emphasized, the German military did not revert to the use of preemptive
force for this purpose, but rather served as a back-up for Afghan state institutions. Its
central task was to create and facilitate a “security network” between Afghan security
forces, conflicting parties in the region, civil society as well as different UN organizations and development agencies. Moreover, the armed forces were to oversee andsupervise the reform of the Afghan security sector and the disarmament, demobilization
and reintegration of former combatants.
Besides the work of the German military, Herbert Sahlmann particularly stressed
the importance of the civilian component in the PRT, which “contributed significantly
to the state building process in Afghanistan.” For example, within the military camp of
the ISAF-PRT Kunduz, representatives of the German Foreign Office maintained apolitical dialogue with Afghan state institutions and conflicting parties in the region.
Also, German police officers provided training and equipment to the newly establishedAfghan security forces so as to improve the protection of civil society.
Outside of the military camp, but in close cooperation with the German armed
forces, representatives of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), the German Development Service (DED) and InWEnt, a German training and capacity building organization, are supplementing the military effort by way of facilitating a perspective ofsustainable development for the Afghan people. The German development teamsupports the private sector and civil society, strengthens the central state functions at theprovincial and district levels, finances the construction of roads, water supply and sanitation, and contributes to the improvement of the education and health sector. Herbert
Sahlmann also emphasized that the German development team tries to address and integrate Afghan women groups “in all fields of development activities.”
Herbert Sahlmann concluded that unlike American involvement in Afghanistan,which concentrates mainly on military aspects, the German ISAF-PRT concept was
greatly accepted and appreciated by the vast majority of the Afghan people. As he
stated, it “combines the competence of military and police security policy with thepolicy of reconstruction and development.” However, he also pointed out that PRTs are
currently only active in a select few areas. Many provinces enjoy no support from the32

Discussion of Session 2

outside. It would thus seem that different regions in Afghanistan have different chances
for peace and development, which could in turn create additional problems to thenation-building process. Indeed, an overall inequality of security and development in
Afghanistan might even lead to an increase in violence.
Hessameddin TabatabaiGerman Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ)
As country director of the GTZ in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2004, Dr.
Hessameddin Tabatabai got a first hand impression of the “disastrous situation” in
Afghanistan immediately after the fall of the Taleban regime. As he pointed out, thefirst GTZ Fact Finding Mission to Afghanistan was not aware of the concept of humansecurity as outlined in the Human Security Now Report at the time of its arrival. However, to the extent that the GTZ adopted a comprehensive and integrated development
approach, its work was very much “in the spirit of the report.” For example, since 2002
the GTZ has built schools and hospitals, improved the supply of water and electricity,
supported outside investment, improved the rule of law and helped in organizing theLoya Jirga. It thus applied the concept of human security without being aware of it, i.e.
without conceptually basing its approach on the idea of human security. Although theachievements of development cooperation up to date are “remarkable,” Hessameddin
Tabatabai also acknowledged that the situation in Afghanistan might yet be better now
had the concept of human security been integrated in development work from the very
beginning. As he pointed out, such a clear agenda might have facilitated a better
harmonization and cooperation between the different donor organizations. That is, aconcept of human security could contribute to a better division of labor between thedevelopment actors.
Hessameddin Tabatabai stressed the importance of civil-military cooperation(CIMIC) for providing the necessary security framework for conducting successful
development work in dangerous environments. However, he also alluded to a few
problems and shortcomings of development cooperation in Afghanistan. For example,
the need of “cultural” reconstruction on behalf of the Afghan populace has been largely
neglected by the donor organizations. Moreover, further problems and frictions mightarise when supporting a partner country in democratization and establishing a rule oflaw when there is a contradiction between “our own” and local norms and values.
Finally, Hessameddin Tabatabai agreed with Herbert Sahlmann in that “ethnic discrimination,” i.e. the fact that some ethnic groups receive more development aid than others,
could constitute a potential source for future conflict. However, since the security situations only allows development organizations to work in certain regions of Afghanistan,
this problem could not be avoided.
Summary of Floor Discussion
The ensuing floor discussion mainly concentrated on two issues:••

The Afghan drug economy.
The situation of women and other underprivileged parts of society.

33

Discussion of Session 2

The Drug Economy
There was an overall consensus that the Afghan drug economy is a complicated issue.
However, participants disagreed over its precise impact on human security. On the one
hand, it was argued that the economic benefits of poppy growing actually strengthen
and empower farmers on the grass-root level. Moreover, criminalization of the drug
economy remains minimal. Therefore, it cannot be regarded as a threat to development.
However, on the other hand, it was also pointed out that the drug trade promotes andreproduces structures of warlordism. Whereas it might benefit certain communities, itthus also impedes efforts of state-building. Certainly, there is no easy solution to thisdilemma. Participants discussed various possibilities of encouraging poppy farmers torevert to alternative crops such as rice or cotton, however many remained skeptical as towhether such measures could in fact make a real change. Finally, some comments suggested that the drug problem could only be tackled in a holistic approach. In otherwords, efforts should not simply deal with the supply side in Afghanistan, but equallytake into account the demand for drugs, which mainly comes from European countries.
The Situation of Women
A second theme of the floor discussion concerned the role of women on Afghan society.
As some voices in the audience contended, the concept of human security does not only
apply to men. However, the question of empowering women remains an extremely
sensitive issue in Afghanistan. Again, participants disagreed. Some argued that the
emancipation of women could not be achieved without foreign intervention. Others heldthat this issue should be left to Afghan society alone. Indeed, female subordination andoppression is by no means deep rooted in Afghan culture. For example, it was mentioned that prior to the Taleban regime women were very much emancipated. Especiallythe older Afghans could thus play an important role in recollecting cultural memories offemale empowerment. Either way, panelists agreed that this process would take significant time and could not be expected to bear fruits within the next couple of years.
Finally, one panelist urged to keep in mind that there is not simply “one picture” ofAfghan women. For example, in terms of behavior and attitude there is a big difference
between women in Kabul and Kunduz.

(Marc von Boemcke, BICC)

34

Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa
Problems, Opportunities and Perspectives
Opening Presentation for the Panel Discussion 3

Kwesi ANING
Emma BIRIKORANG
African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)
African Human Security Initiative

Introduction

In the period between 1990 and 2002, the emergence of new wars and conflicts aroundthe world has compelled the international community to explore broader definitions of
security and human security. Until recently, African governments especially consideredsecurity in terms of protecting the state, its institutions and borders, the stability of theregime and defense of its military. Although this was the usual rhetoric, one can argue
that most African states were more concerned about “regime” survival than state andsocietal security. Attention has primarily been shifted, therefore, from the security of thestate to the security of its people, referred to in general terms as human security. From
the definition of the Commission on Human Security, human security seeks “to protect
the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and humanfulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are
the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive(widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s
strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic,
military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival,
livelihood and dignity.” 1
Other definitions of human security have also been people-centered. In the Reportof the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “human security means the security of the people – their physical safety, their economic and social
wellbeing, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings and the protection of
their human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
Again under the African Union’s (AU) Non-Aggression and Common Defence
Pact, Human security is defined as “The security of the individual in terms of satisfaction of his/her basic needs. It also includes the creation of social, economic, political,
environmental and cultural conditions for the survival and dignity of the individual, theprotection of and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for eachindividual of opportunities and choices for his/her full development.”
One would easily recognize that the individual is at the center of the concept ofhuman security. However, when a country is in a state of war or conflict, these needs ofthe individual become difficult, if not impossible to realize. This is as a result of the factthat the state which is expected to guarantee these provisions becomes engaged with
1

“Human Security Now,” Commission on Human Security, New York, 2003. p. 4

Kwesi ANING, Emma BIRIKORANG

regime protection and survival or the protection of the state. Even in cases where thestate, especially in Africa, is not at war, the human security of the people is denied or
the state is simply incapable of meeting those needs. Oftentimes and especially in
conflict areas, it is those responsible for the protection of the population who have been
known to undermine the security of the civilian population.
Especially in Africa, the weakness of the state has resulted in the state losing
control over its territory. As a result, it is unable to exercise its legally mandated rightand responsibility of protecting and ensuring the security of the citizens. This paper willattempt an explanation of some of the causes of state collapse and possible visible signsof state disintegration into failure. We will then discuss threats to human security of theAfrican population during conflict and in post-conflict societies and attempts by theinternational community at post-conflict peacebuilding. Concentrating on particularregional and country examples, this paper will also consider the experiences and possible advantages of using the concept of human security in particular settings.

State Collapse and Human Security

In Africa the incapacity of the state to function effectively leads to weakness and eventually has resulted in further undermining the human security of the population. To
explain the connection between state collapse and human (in)security, this paper analysis some of the most prevalent factors of state collapse and some characteristics ofcollapsed/failed/collapsing states.
A state which is on the verge of collapse:
•
•
•
•
•

Losses its power to “demand” loyalty from its citizens and does not serve as a cohesive force;
As a territorial entity, it cannot guarantee its sovereign control over its territory andis peoples;
As the authoritative political expression, it losses its validity to control and administer its affairs;
Expectations of citizens of the state reduces because of its inability to deliver services; andDue to the state’s inability to control the weapons of violence there is increased
societal insecurity.

Collapse finally ensues when the state is “in a situation where the structure, authority(legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted insome form, old or new.” 2 “State collapse, therefore, is the breakdown of good governance, law and order. The state as a decision-making, executing and enforcing institution
can no longer take and implement decisions … [it] is the extended breakdown of social
coherence: society, as the generator of institutions of cohesion and maintenance can no2

36

William Zartman, “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse,” in William Zartman, ed.,Collapsed States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995.

Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa

longer create, aggregate and articulate the supports and demands that are the foundations of the state.” 3
The resultant effects of such multiple processes is that, sub-state actor groups whoare beyond and below the purview of the state begin to encroach on what ought to havebeen the prerogative of the state; namely its ability to protect its interests and citizens. A
typical case of a collapsing state is Cote d’Ivoire, where the state has lost control of its
northern territory. The territory is controlled by the Forces Nouvelles who seized powerin September 2002 and has been able to resist central governments efforts at recapturing
the lost territory. Cote d’Ivoire cannot be described as a failed state because the state
has a firm hold over the economic space. It is, however, important to add that thisprobably was achieved as result of the prompt assistance and presence of French troops
in Cote d’Ivoire. Subsequent deployment of Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) and later United Nations Operations in Cote d’Ivore (UNOCI) in the
country has helped preserve and control the disintegration of the Ivorian state as anentity.
The processes leading to state collapse include:• The extent to which ethnic and religious divisions heighten tensions. Such was thecase in Cote d’Ivoire where issues of ethnic and religious tensions were not properly
addressed until it finally exploded in September 2002. If the root cause of this crisis
is not tackled, it will be difficult to prevent an implosion in the country. Togo isdivided along ethnic lines, where the Eyadema family’s minority Kabye ethnic
group controls all the state machinery, with 90% of the armed forces being membersof that same tribe;• The degree at which human rights violations have become increasingly overt; inTogo, opposition supporters have been killed and wounded by government forces in
the run-up to the elections on April 24 2005;• The extent to which the opposition has been suppressed by the state. The Eyadema
regime in Togo has for the past 38 years suppressed all opposition until his death inJanuary. This event was followed by constitutional unrest in which attempts weremade for his son to complete his father’s uncompleted term in office. This was
widely criticized by ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, which compelled the rulingparty to revert to the constitution and call for election.
In events leading to state failure, contiguous states may attempt to infiltrate and undermine the state much further. This was the case in Liberia where Guinea supported theLiberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) rebels who launched aninsurgency into Liberia from Guinea. Charles Taylor was known to have supported the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone. It is also suspected that Liberiagave some support to the Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO). 4

Casualties of State Failure or Weakness
As stated earlier, human security is undermined during the processes leading to state
failure and in weak states. Thus in Liberia, some 250,000 people are believed to have
3
4

Ibid.
Global Witness Report, 2003
37

Kwesi ANING, Emma BIRIKORANG

died in war-related circumstances since 1989 – about 10% of the country’s three million
people. 5 In Sierra Leone, estimates of the total conflict deaths range from 20,000 toover 50,000 in 1998 alone when fighting intensified. In addition, 30,000 civilians,
including children, have had limbs hacked off by the rebels. An estimated 215,000 to
257,000 women were victims of sexual violence during the civil war. 6
More than nine years of war in Sierra Leone have devastated a country that was
already impoverished, deeply indebted and suffering from years of mismanagement andfailed development initiatives. Sierra Leone is currently ranked last on the UNDP’s
Human Development Index, with the lowest life expectancy in the world – 35 years,
highest maternal mortality rate in the world and one of the highest infant mortality rates.
The war has curbed agricultural production drastically, cut government revenues frommining and seen the destruction of hundreds of schools, health clinics, and administrative facilities. Forced displacement has effected more than half the population estimatedat 4.5 million … At present, about two-thirds of the population is accessible to humanitarian organizations seeking to provide emergency relief. 7 In 2000, Sierra Leone was
ranked 177 in the UNDP Human Development Index out of a total of 177 countries. In
the 2004 report it is still ranked 177th in spite of all the humanitarian assistanceprograms in the country. This disintegration of the country is no doubt related to the war
which has ravaged the country from 1991.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), an estimated three million people
have died as a result of conflict. In neighboring Rwanda, 40% of the population havebeen killed or displaced since 1994. In Burundi, come 300,000 people have been killedover the past decade and fighting between the government and Hutu militias force about
100,000 people to flee their homes each month. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia
has killed 100,000 people. 8
The UN Secretary General’s Report (document S/2002/1300) rightly estimatedthat “civilians rather than combatants, continue to be the main casualties of current
conflicts, with women and children constituting an unprecedented number of thevictims, with more than 2.5 million people killed and over 31 million displaced in thelast decade.” 9 This is because unarmed civilians have, in recent conflicts, been forcefully drawn into wars; in fact they have become an integral part of the warfare. This
point is succinctly captured by Yusuf Bangura, who argues that “combatants deliberately target civilians rather than armed opponents in prosecuting goals, and atrocities arefreely committed as part of strategies aimed at publicizing political statements. In countries rich in natural resources, the political goals of wars often interact with the multiple
logic of resource appropriation … looting of private property, and vandalism. Suchcomplicated outcomes have led many commentators to portray contemporary wars as
being basically anarchical.” 10

5

6
7

8
9
10

38

Jakkie Cilliers: Human Security in Africa; A conceptual framework for Review. African Human
Security Initiative, 2004
Project Ploughshares Armed Conflict Report 2004
Comments from the a policy symposium titled “Sierra Leone one year after the Peace Accord: thesearch for Peace, Justice and Sustainable Development,” June 21-23, 2000. Quoted in Project
Ploughshares, Armed Conflict Report 2004.
Jakkie Cilliers, op cit.
UN Secretary General Report, S/2002/1300. 2000.
Bangura, Yusuf: Understanding the Political and Cultural Dimensions of the Sierra Leone War: a
Critique of Paul Richards “Fighting for the Rainforest,” African Development, Vol. 32, Nos 3,4, 1997

Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa

As a result of the “anarchical” nature of such wars, atrocities are committed
against civilians, there is wanton destruction of individual and state property and looting
is encouraged by armed forces as a survival strategy. In other instances, the state itself
perpetrates these acts against civilians for their support of belligerent groups. These
abuses have also continued and increased as leaders of combatant groups and supposedly functional states who engage in such abuses are not held accountable for their own
personal actions and the actions of their followers.

The State as Provider of Individual Security: Myth or Reality?

To assume that most African regimes are capable of protecting its citizens from threats
in order to provide them with the possibility of leading the “good life” is not only wrong
but perverse. In several cases, the state or regimes have not only failed to protect large
sections of the population from violent attacks and killings by others and threats to theirgeneral well-being, but in many instances the state and its agents instigated as well asplanned and took active part in these events.
Let us contextualize this study by taking a closer look at the Zairian situation inorder to support argument (several other states also fit the bill). In Zaire, Mobutu Seseseko and his military were the main sources of insecurity for the large majority of the
population in many ways. Rather than enabling them to lead the “good life” they transformed Zaire into an “extractive state” based on the exploitation of the country’s people
and resources. The main medium through which this extractive process occurred wasthrough violence. In order to ensure his grip on power and wealth, Mobutu and his
supporters employed a “divide and rule” system of “dialectic oppression” which they on
the one hand fostered and perpetuated corrupt and exploitative practices at all levels ofsociety by using the interplay of insecurity and scarcity, while concurrently eliminating
and repressing resisting sections of society by the instigation and fuelling ethnic conflictand state oppression tactics.
Economically, Mobutu exploited Zairians in several ways. Through his immense
extraction of funds from Zaire’s profitable mineral industry, the Mobutu regime succeeded in preventing others from the possibility of sharing in these profits. After nationalization in the 1970s, previously state-owned companies were distributed to his cronies
as part of his patrimonial strategy and excluded competitors through monopolizationand other political tactics.
Moreover, by using a sophisticated method Mobutu was also able to use his powerover state institutions to divert loans from the international financial institutions, privatebanks and most importantly bilateral donors (especially the U.S.) into his personalaccounts and those of his supporters. Another important result of this extractive strategy
was that it created through its detrimental effect on economic stability and health, very
high costs for economic activity and thus great economic insecurity for especially forthe people not aligned to Mobutu’s empire.
It is important to appreciate the “musical chairs” or revolving door policy of the
Mobutu state. This is critical because by focusing on Mobutu’s and not the regime’s
security since the rapid turn-over or exchange members of the regime was so frequent
that one can barely characterize what existed as a regime. In this paper, we argue that39

Kwesi ANING, Emma BIRIKORANG

the Zairian state embodied by Mobutu did not only “take away” but it also failed to“deliver” well-being and physical security to its people. Not only did basic social services drastically deteriorate in the 80s and 90s but the system of dialectic oppression
ensured that even the most basic state services were targets of rent-seeking bureaucrats(who were themselves often un- or underpaid) so that ordinary people had to “buy” anykind of government services.
Probably the key and major contributor to civilian insecurity was the role andbehavior of the statutory armed forces and other non-statutory armed groups. These
formed part of Mobutu’s divide and rule strategy, abused any groups or individuals thatthey felt assailed their position. Such behavior was in order either to survive or to makeprofit. Mobutu usually left these armed groups unpaid so that it would have low moraleand discipline and certainly would not have the capacity to challenge his well-equipped
presidential guard, these soldiers sought to sustain themselves and their families throughthe exploitation of the populace through the use of force. Therefore in vast anddispersed regions of Zaire, several military commanders run were in effect semiautonomous fiefdoms. With many of their troops unpaid, they resorted to privatecommerce, raise contributions at roadblocks, or loot and pillage from the local population, and rape women and girls.
To sum up, Mobutu’s person and his regime more than any combination of factors
or forces became the prime source of insecurity for large sections of the population
whether in economic or physical terms. State power and resources were employed toeconomically marginalize the vast majority of people except for a tiny political andeconomic elite. These were mainly responsible for large amounts of killings, torturesand rapes as part of his repression and ethnic conflict tactics. By the end of Mobutu’s
reign and the start of the rebellion that overthrew him, the state’s only apparent function
was the systematic exploitation of its people and resources, while it offered nothing in
return, not even security. Instead, the state itself and its agents were the principal
sources of insecurity. As has been argued above, until recently, most African states
were certainly not the providers of societal security and thus also lost its “right” to be
the only legitimate referent object of security.

Applying Human Security in Conflict Societies

Abuse of civilians by armed factions has developed beyond the simple term of humanright abuses. With the introduction of the concept of human security, which encompasses the basic denial of access to social goods and services by either the central
government be it in times of war or peace, more actors are made responsible for guaranteeing human security. In using the term human security, development partners andhumanitarian agencies in conflict societies, have been given some impetus to assist inproviding services which guarantee human security.
Whereas the issue of human rights abuses could become the responsibility of thestate or other armed factions, the creation of social, economic and environmental conditions for survival of the individual could readily fall within the purview of humanitarianagencies and development partners. The concept of human security has solicited the
involvement of the international community in not only restoring law and order in40

Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa

conflict societies, but also in the provision of social and economic amenities. Thus therestoration of infrastructure facilities in a war ravaged country enhances the humansecurity of the community. The restoration of electricity and potable water forms part ofthe process of restoring the dignity of the human being.
When former combatants are demobilized, disarmed and reintegrated into society,it enhances the human security both of the ex-combatant and the community. The
reintegration of former combatants, in the human security context, involves building
societies for them to fit in. It involves rehabilitating both the ex-combatant and thesociety. This approach to human security ensures a long-term development role forhumanitarian agencies.
The assistance of the international community in conducting elections in a postwar country, which ensures good governance, enhances human security. However,humanitarian agencies and development partners have in the past withdrawn services
immediately after successful elections. Successful elections, does not by itself imply the
return to peace and order, as was the case in Liberia Sierra Leone. It is expected thatwith the broader concept of human security, development partners will go beyond the“election limit.”
From a human security perspective, the needs of migrants and refugees areprovided and sustained in the long term. They are sheltered and protected from themoment they leave their homes until their return to their countries. This entails, feeding,
clothing, providing them with shelter and employable skills to the extent where they are
given the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity. Thus achieving humansecurity includes not just protecting people but also empowering them to fend for themselves. This concept has given humanitarian agencies room to manoeuvre in conflictsocieties.

From Instability and War to Security Sector GovernanceThis section presents a generic discussion of the processes for re-establishing security
and improving civil-military relations in countries as they emerge from conflict. The
main focus of this section will be on the need for security sector reform and governance(SSR/G). 11 It is necessary to focus on this sector because the history of most postconflict societies has been the history of the atrocious behavior and lack of control overthese particular groups.
The emphasis on SSR/G is critical because it provides a measure of control
through fiscal transparency. 12 Security sector issues are thus critical for post-conflict
peacebuilding activities. 13 This is because the actions of security sector groups (espe111213This concept paper has made a conscious point in selecting the security sector as only one focus forconcentration. The economic sector would certainly need its own endeavors too.
International Monetary Fund. 2001a Code on Fiscal Transparency. Washington, D.C. at
www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans/code/htm#code accessed on 12 September 2004; and International
Monetary Fund. 2001b Manual on Fiscal Transparency. Washington, D.C.
Recent discourses seem to point to the increasing efficacy of peacebuilding. See for example thereport by the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change report, A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. December 2004. p. 83 It argued that “…
41

Kwesi ANING, Emma BIRIKORANG

cially the statutory and non-statutory groups) as has been described above are contributory factors to the outbreak of conflicts and any endeavor at post-conflict stabilization
As a result, reforming and establishing governance institutions, which combine “armed
forces … police forces serving all the people, and a judicial sector that delivers justice,
is clearly a contribution to conflict prevention [and post-conflict peacebuilding].” 14
Thus to leave this sector out of any post-conflict peacebuilding endeavor could be
dangerous. More importantly, it is critical that the provision of security is perceived as aservice like other services. In this light, in his March 2005 report “In Larger Freedom:Toward Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” the Secretary-General notesthat “the proposals … are designed to strengthen states and enable them to serve theirpeoples better by working together on the basis of shared principles and priorities …
one of the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all states are strong
enough to meet the many challenges they face.” 15
As a result of the above discussions, the arguments in this section will be premised on
five critical assumptions. These are that:
1. When conflict end in large parts of a country it is important that a certain level ofcentral authority is perceived to be present;
2. A comprehensive, inclusive and non-time bound demobilization, demilitarization,
reconciliation and reintegration process (DDRR) is in place in which the international community and especially development partners are interested in supporting.
This is also recognized in the Brahimi Report of 2000 in which it is argued that the“disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants – key toimmediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence – isan area in which peace-building makes a direct contribution to public security, law
and order:” 16
3. A process of establishing a nationally united armed forces under central command isproceeding and almost in place;
4. That a functional all-inclusive constitution and a democratic process is in place inwhich all former armed combatants and political groupings are willing to abide by;and
5. A functional parliamentary process is also in place.
The above five points, we posit are critical to any discussion of improving civil-military
relations in the post-conflict phase.
Before continuing, it is important that there is a clear understanding of theconstituent components of the security sector. Three definitions of the security sector
will be concurrently applied throughout the paper. The World Bank (WB) conceives of
security sector reform as “controlling the illegal weapons trade, demilitarizing police
forces, and restructuring armies can be important stabilizing factors in countries making
a transition from war to peace. Sometimes weapons are one of the country’s major

14

15
16

42

strengthening the United Nations capacity for peacebuilding in the widest sense must be a priority forthe organization.”
Brzozka, Michael. 2003: Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform. Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Occasional Paper, No. 4, p. 13
See A/59/2005, p.6
United Nations Development Programme. 2000: Overcoming Human Poverty. New York: UNDP,
especially p. 7

Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa

investments; close attention must be paid to the disarmament process to avert further
conflict. A reformed security sector will alleviate many concerns of potential investors
and thus help to rebuild the economy.” 17The second definition comes from the Department for International Development(DfID), which defines “key principles of good governance in the security sector” as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Security sector organizations, particularly in the security forces, are accountable
both to elected civil authorities and to civil society;
Security sector organizations operate in accordance with international law andconstitutional law;
Information about security sector planning and budgeting are widely available, bothwithin government and to the public, and a comprehensive and disciplined approachto the management of the defense resources is adopted;
Civil-military relations are based on a well-articulated hierarchy of authority
between civil authorities and the defense forces, and on a relationship with civilsociety that is based on respect for human rights;
Civil authorities have the capacity to exercise political control over the operations
and expenditures of the security forces and civil society has capacity to monitor the
security forces and provide constructive input to the political debate;
An environment exists in which civil society can be consulted on a regular basis on
security policies, resource allocation, and other relevant issues;
Security-force personnel are adequately trained to discharge their duties in a professional manner consistent with the requirements of democratic societies; andFostering an environment supportive of regional and sub-regional peace and security has a high priority for policy-makers. 18

Another useful approach has been provided by Dylan Hendrickson, who on the other
hand, has defined the security sector as “… those bodies that are responsible for, or
should be responsible for, protecting the state and communities within it. This would
include three pillars: Groups with a mandate to wield the instruments of violence –military, paramilitary and police forces; institutions with a role in managing andmonitoring the security sector – civilian ministries, parliaments and non-governmentalorganizations; and bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law – the judiciary,
the penal system, human-rights ombudsmen and, where these bodies are particularly
weak, the international community.” 19What can be deduced from these positions above is that the security sector
comprises:• Those groups with legitimate authority to employ force;
17

18

19

Coletta, Nat, Johanna Mendelson-Forman & Jan Vanheukelon. 1998: Security, Poverty Reduction andSustainable Development – Challenges for the New Millennium. Post Conflict Unit, The World Bank
& Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and International Cooperation, Washington,
DC, September.
DfID, 2000: Security Sector Reform and the Management of Military Expenditure: High Risk for
Donors, High Return for Development. Report on an International Symposium sponsored by DfID,
London, 15 – 17 February, p. 46
Dylan Hendrickson. 1999: A Review of Security-sector Reform. The Conflict, Security &Development Group Working Papers, No. 1. (London: Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College),p. 29.
43

Kwesi ANING, Emma BIRIKORANG

•
•
•
•

Justice and public security bodies;
Civilian statutory management and oversight groups;
Private (nonstatutory) organizations that contribute in different ways to the performance of the oversight institutions; andNonstate actor organizations engaged in the legitimate and legal performance ofcommunity protection. 20

Although Nicole Ball shares in the above characterization of the security sector, shenevertheless broadens it to include other critical actors. Ball includes a group that she
terms as “external actors” whom she classifies as•••

Security actors;
Development/financial actors; andNonstate actors.

This motley group of external actors, Ball describes as, those “whose support for
improving security-sector governance may be sought [as] each of these actors canprovide varying kinds and degrees of advice, information, analysis, financing, technicalassistance, and co-ordination services. But at least as important as what they canprovide is how they should provide it.” 21Ball’s provision for and acknowledgment of the critical role that donors play andhave played in the shift towards a more transparent and democratic governance of this
sector is commendable. This is because such an inclusive definition opens avenues for a
critical engagement and interrogation not only of what and how but when the activities
of so-called donors and partners are needed and necessary. Such interrogative processes
allow for a disaggregation of policies that, more often than not are unilaterally foistedon poorer partners in the developing countries.
Thus a typology of the statutory and non-statutory organizations that would serveas members of the security sector in post-conflict societies would be the
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

20

21

44

Armed Forces (comprising of the army, navy and air force);
Police Service;
Paramilitary organizations: those dealing with Immigration and Customs;
The Penal System: comprising the Prisons Service and Judiciary;Intelligence Organizations;
Private security companies;
Specialized Parliamentary Committees;
Ministries, Departments and Agencies; andOther actors like the media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

Hutchful, Eboe. 2004: “Security Sector Governance: Institutions, Processes and Challenges,” paper
presented at DCAF Workshop on “Challenges to Security Sector Governance in West Africa,” Abuja,
Nigeria, April 19 – 20, pp. 1-2, p. 3.
Nicole Ball. 2004: “Reforming Security Sector Governance,” paper prepared for the Global Policy
Workshop on Security and Development, January 25-26, 2004, New Delhi, India, p. 3

Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa

What Needs to be Done? The Shift from Rhetoric to Operationalization

In this concept paper, it is posited that the state has collapsed in varying degrees, thenits institutions must be reconstituted one way or the other, then it is important toimprove the nature of post-conflict civil-military relations. Therefore, several criticalquestions would need to be considered: how does one bridge the chasm from the rhetoric of SSR/G to the reality of operationalization?
There is now broad agreement on the need to restructure armed forces, police andother elements of the security sector in the post-conflict phase. This is because postconflict situations as exemplified by several African states offer several chances for
SSR. Such post-conflict SSR, it has been argued, serves several objectives. Amongst
them are
•
•
•
•
•
•

The need to “right size” the security sector and reform it as part of the post-war
reconstruction effort;
Its contribution to conflict resolution through the integration of various forces into a
new armed force;
Need for police reform;
Training of parliamentary committee to play their oversight functions;
Training Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) to play their oversightfunctions; andDefining watchdog roles for NGOs and civil society organizations with the interest
and expertise on SSR/G processes.

The argument here is that post-conflict situations open particular spaces and “windowsof opportunity” for the introduction of broader security sector reform projects. 22
What can be done to improve civil-military relations in post-conflict states? A setof generic activities that are perceived as useful will be suggested. The core objectives
to improving such relations should be
•
•
•
•
•
•

To contribute through a comprehensive and inclusive capacity training schemes acore of citizens knowledgeable in issues of conflict prevention and security and to
improve their effective participation in various governance processes;
Promote public policy advice on conflict prevention and peacebuilding;Strengthen capacity to understand, anticipate, plan and forecast security challenges;
Strengthen conflict prevention and security sector capacities of civilian bureaucrats
and NGOs;
Develop capacity of specific local institutions to conduct critical analysis and generate public debate around SSR/G issues; andEncourage dialogue among civil society, government and the security forces on
various peace and security issues including security sector governance.

To achieve these broad set of objectives, specific training activities should take place

22

Brzoska, op cit. p. 32
45

Kwesi ANING, Emma BIRIKORANG

•
•
•
•

Improving through training the number of civilian actors knowledgeable about security sector reform and governance processes;
Building the capacity of civil society to monitor governance and human security
issues;Widen the knowledge base of local institutions in post-conflict states for criticalanalysis of SSR/G processes; andAssess the challenges posed to SSR/G by the exclusion of particular societal groups
in post-conflict states.

Concrete Steps Forward

This paper has presented the basic assumption that for any post-conflict reconstruction
process, there must be two critical ingredients: (a) a political will to carry through difficult decisions and make equally difficult choices; and (b) the role of Parliament andparliamentary committees in playing the critical oversight roles assigned to them.
Although all these suggestions are achievable in the medium- to long-term, thereis the need for critical and sustained training of parliamentarians to achieve these objectives. These are technical matters and expertise will need to be built over several years.

Conclusion

While there is an emerging agreement that improved security sector governance isnecessary for stability and the provision of security and development, these discourses
in almost the whole of Africa south of the Sahara but especially in conflict and postconflict societies do not meet the minimum standards of democratic control andaccountability. Because of the militarization processes that preceded conflicts, it makes
SSR/G processes crucial to post-conflict issues. Thus, while the general discourse has
been to govern the security sector, it has more often than not been driven by donors.
This paper has suggested ways and means of improving knowledge of how to expand
the reform and governance of the security sector in such post-conflict states as well as
encouraging the circumstances for reform of existing or establishing new institutions inways compatible with democratic accountability.
Finally to ensure lasting peace and stability, it is important that the local community be made a part of the peace and reconstruction process. The local police, the legitimate state Armed Forces should all be involved in the process. The citizens must have acertain ownership of the process to ensure continuity. This will entail using the locals toassess their own needs, instead of the usual “cutting and pasting” of development projects.
Guaranteeing human security is the collective responsibility of government,
armed forces, other security apparatus, NGOs, civil society groups and the humanitariancommunity. It encompasses the whole spectrum of post-conflict peacebuilding.
Government forces are sometimes poorly trained, badly paid, sometimes forcefully46

Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa

recruited, and have no interest in protecting civilians when they themselves are fighting
for their own survival Restoring law and order and reform of the security sector therefore becomes an important component of restoring communities. Peacebuilding helps toprevent violent conflict from breaking out; paves the way for and supports peacemaking
processes and helps rebuild post-conflict societies.

47

Discussion of Session 3

Helmut Asche
German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ)
Helmut Asche from the GTZ agreed with Kwesi Aning that in the past development
assistance has been far too obsessed with a state-centered approach, especially in termsof security related issues. As an example, he referred to development cooperation with
Rwanda just prior to the 1994 genocide where technical assistance was given to thesecurity forces although they were only serving the interest of the state, not the people.
Human security would have been a good “counter-concept” here, since it would haveenabled the donor community to realize that although state-security was relatively highin Rwanda, on the level of population security was virtually absent. Helmut Asche
contended that, as matters stand now, “we are still not entirely shielded against repeating the same mistake.” As the situation in, for example, Côte d’Ivoire illustrates, international development cooperation tends to still “consider a state a state” when the opposite is true, i.e. when the state is not able or willing to deliver the most basic security
services to its citizens. However, on the other hand, Helmut Asche acknowledged thatin comparison with all other sectors of development cooperation, the work on conflicttransformation and crises prevention has diversified the most over the last couple ofyears. As he went on, this observation is especially true for development work on the
African continent. The recent support given to African regional and subregional organizations and institutions, such as the African Union (AU), the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) or the Economic Community of West African States(ECOWAS), is a good case in point. In the context of regional development cooperation, many security issues, in particular those which exceed the geographical scope of asingle state, have been tackled, often quite successfully. Examples include efforts tocurb the proliferation of small arms and the civil reintegration of former combatants,
especially child soldiers. Helmut Asche then made specific reference to the work of the
GTZ in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which not only covers a broad rangeof security sector reform measures, but also aims at “empowerment” on the community
level, for example through the support of small and medium enterprises as well as themaintenance of infrastructure and local reconciliation, and thus resonates with thehuman security approach as outlined by Mme. Ogata. Indeed, Helmut Asche concluded
that such local activities only make sense if they are “embedded in an overall security
concept that is coherent and makes political sense.”
Nori Shimomura
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)
Nori Shimomura, JICA Resident Representative of the South Africa Office, gave an
overview of the peace consolidation work of JICA in the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC). First, he provided some background information on the current politicaldevelopments in the country, drawing particular attention to the planned election in June
2005. However, second he also pointed out that although people were eager to cast theirvote as soon as possible, elections were unlikely to take place that early. Not only is it aDiscussion of Session 3

problem to register all people in a huge country with only very poor infrastructure andweak administrative structures. The election process is also threatened by continuing
conflicts and insecurity, particularly in the East of the DRC. Given these problems,
JICA’s work in the DRC deals specifically with the provision of electoral assistance aswell as support in electoral security. For example, by the end of May, JICA will havecompleted a training of officials working for the DRC Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in matters of conflict resolution and mediation. Together with the South
African police services, various South African non-governmental organizations and theUnited Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) JICA alsoorganized a training seminar for Congolese police officers. The training concentrated
mainly on the provision of electoral security as well as on some basic principles ofpolice work, such as adherence to human rights standards and child protection throughthe development of codes of conduct. However, Nori Shimomura also stressed that the
shortage of time only allowed for a limited number of issues, which could be addressedin the training course. Furthermore, and in line with the human security approach aspresented by Mme. Ogata, JICA is in the process of implementing various different
projects aimed at empowering and reconciling different groups and communities on thelocal level, thereby providing the necessary framework so as to carry out peaceful elections. Finally, Nori Shimomura emphasized the paramount importance of the IEC taking
up its work in preparing the elections as soon as possible. Any postponement, hewarned, might be extremely dangerous, since it could be utilized as an excuse by thoseinterested in re-igniting the war.
Summary of Floor Discussion
The subsequent floor discussion concentrated on many issues related to development
and security on the African continent. Most participants agreed with Helmut Asche thatdevelopment cooperation needed to concentrate on sub-regional and regional rather thansimply national approaches. However, the general difficulty of mobilizing the necessaryfinancial resources for development and, in particular, disarmament, demobilization andreintegration projects in Africa was also alluded to. With regard to the Democratic
Republic of Congo, five issues were touched upon:
Resource Wars
Some participants pointed to the importance of taking into account the role of theextraction industry in financing the continuation of conflicts in the DRC. They urged toconsider alternative strategies of how, for example, the exploitation of oil and diamonds
could contribute not to war, but to peaceful and sustainable development. It was statedthat donors needed to adopt a more active stance in this question.
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
According to one comment, comprehensive projects supporting the successful reintegration of former combatants into civil society are neglected in the DRC. Whereas the
UN budget only covers demobilization and disarmament, it does not provide resources
for a long-term reintegration strategy. The latter would thus rely on voluntary contributions from the development community.
49

Discussion of Session 3

Security Sector Reform
It was also mentioned that “freedom from fear,” that is the protection from physicalviolence and the re-establishment of law and order, has to be treated as a top priority infacilitating human security in the DRC. Rape and plunder by the Congolese armed
forces remain very common. Indeed, underfunding of the police and overspending on
the military is a “recipe for catastrophe.” Therefore, more development aid needed to be
spent on strengthening law enforcement and security sector reform.
Elections
Pointing to the severe difficulties in carrying out successful and democratic elections in
the DRC under the present circumstances, it was warned that premature elections might
simply be used as a welcome exit-strategy for the international donor community.
“Sequencing”
Finally, lack of adequate sequencing and timing of development cooperation in the
DRC was criticized. For example, it was pointed out that we not only have to think
about “what” should be done, but also “when” and on “which level.” In particular,
donor assistance needed to be de-centralized. For this purpose, the concept of “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs) as currently tested in Afghanistan might turn out tobe also very helpful in the DRC.

(Marc von Boemcke, BICC)

50

Perspectives on Human Security and Development Assistance from an
African Perspective
Keynote Address

Mutahi KAGWE
Kenya National Assembly

Martin Luther King Jr., in “Remaining Awake through A Great Revolution,” said interalia, “Through our scientific and technological genius, we have made of this world aneighborhood and yet we have not had the ethical commitment to make of it a brotherhood. But somehow, and in some way, we have got to do this. We must all learn to live
together as brothers or we will all perish together as fools. We are tied together in the
single garment of destiny, caught in an escapable network of mutuality. And whateveraffects one directly affects all indirectly.”
Martin Luther King Jr. uttered those words forty years ago, and they could nothave been more true today. The world is still an insecure, unequal and divided place, inspite of the massive advancement in our interconnectedness, and interdependency..
More than ever before in the short history of mankind, we increasingly share common
languages, cultures, aspirations, resources and values, yet we are so incapable of acting
to reduce human suffering, in spite of the destiny that we all share.

Overview of What Has Been Discussed and Achieved at the Meeting
In the last two days we have discussed the dimensions and causes of human insecurity
to which we are all now collectively exposed.
Based on my own experiences from the East and Horn of Africa region, and moreKenya, where I come from, I am compelled to ask, “What has been the achievement of
this meeting? Has it succeeded in defining security in a more meaningful way, especially for the Developing world? Have we collectively proposed actionable points which
our governments can use to mitigate the spiraling poverty, underdevelopment, racialintolerance, insecurity and despondence afflicting the majority across the world?
This is not the first such high level meeting to discuss issues of human insecurity
and underdevelopment, and neither will it be the last, and in spite of the eloquent,
profound and thought provoking speeches and discussions that we have heard on thismatter, one wonders whether we pulled ourselves out of the modern day curse of“paralysis by analysis”. From here we will still return to a world with attendant insecurity and underdevelopment in developing countries that threatens to bring down thewalls of Jericho erected around the prosperous nations.

Agenda of this Paper
In this paper, I posit that, as we have discussed, human insecurity is directly related topoverty and marginalization, and that as long as these conditions persist in some quar-

Mutahi KAGWE

ters in the world, there will never be complete security. I believe that it is in the interestof the developed world to invest in poverty reduction, democracy, and reduction of
marginalization in the developing world, especially Africa, to secure lasting peace. I do
not propose that these are the only causes of insecurity but I do think that they play a
key central role. Addressing poverty creates an environment where other politicalcauses of insecurity e.g. ethnic, racial and religious differences are mitigated. The time
for talking is now over, we need action to address these issues.
If I sound brutal it’s because I am a politician, not a Diplomat or theoretician. In
my view, the following are the key elements towards attaining human security.

The Poverty – Insecurity Nexus in Africa
The question I would like us to ponder about is “what do we mean by security
anyway?”As Ralf Fucks 1 says in Security in Our One World 2 , no other political term has
experienced such international ambiguity, this and last century, precisely because of themultiplicity of issues, perceptions, experiences and implications of security acrossdifferent sectors and societies across the globe.
Is it defense against terrorist attacks? Is it preventing extremist states against
possessing nuclear weapons? Does it encompass protection against rape, torture, genocide and discrimination based on race or gender for women in Gulu in Uganda, theDemocratic Republic of Congo or Gypsies in Europe? Or is it protection against thenatural elements, provision of a full meal a day, medical treatment and education
opportunities for a refugee in a tin shack holding camp in Lokichoggio in Northern
Kenya or in Darfur? Is it the mandate of the state or the international community?
Now, my next question is to what extent does poverty cause insecurity?

Poverty in Kenya
Kenya, where I come from, with a per capita income of $340, is among the 48 poorest
countries in the world, whose combined Gross Domestic Product is less than the wealthof the world’s three richest people combined 3 , and whose share of global exports
accounts for less that 0.4 percent of global exports 4 . 56% of our 30 million Kenyans areliving below the poverty line, i.e. on less than a dollar a day 5 . This degrading poverty
has been a major factor giving rise to internal insecurity, especially in urban areas where
street muggings, carjackings, petty theft, murder and rape threaten to over-whelm thesecurity forces, especially with the ready availability of illegal small arms from neighboring states that have been in conflict for the last one decade.

1

2

3
4
5

52

Chair of the Board, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, a German political foundation affiliated with the German
Green Party, currently in coalition Government with Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democrats.
The preface to the German edition of World Watch Report 2005, published annually by the World
Watch Institute.
From Ignacio Ramonet: The Politics of Hunger. 1998.
The Human Development Report 2000, UNDP.
The United Nation’s Development Program, Human Development Report, Kenya, 2004.

Perspectives on Human Security and Development Assistance from an African Perspective

Inadequate Resources for Policing in Kenya
To worsen matters, reeling under a debt of $10 billion, equivalent to its Gross Domestic
Product 6 , Kenya cannot afford to devote the budgetary resources needed to police its
borders and its people, among the many other competing development and recurrent
expenditure items. Although an ambitious police reform program has been mooted,
which needs $1 billion to fully implement, these funds are not forthcoming either fromthe government or its development partners.

Linking Poverty With Internal and External Insecurity
Poverty leads to despair and despondence, and crime becomes a life option for thosewith no other route to fulfilling their lifestyle goals, especially if mitigated by a breakdown of traditional systems of obligation and support still present in rural areas. Against
this background, and the lack of proper policing, insecurity in Kenya and other poor
nations is likely to increase and these countries stand the risk of becoming a recruitment
ground for international terrorism. We are not immune to international terror, and havebeen hit twice by terrorist attacks, in 1998 when the US Embassy in the capital Nairobi
was demolished, and in 2001 at Kikambala at the coastal town of Mombasa, Kenya’s
second largest city.
Thus as acknowledged by Michael Moore, the former head of the World Trade
Organization poverty in all its forms is the greatest single threat to peace security,
democracy, human rights and the environment 7 .
After 9/11, the U.S. appointed a commission to analyze the underlying causes ofgrowing insecurity in the world, despite unparalleled gains in human development andprosperity in all fields, and the report concluded that inter alia, “that a comprehensive
U.S. strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage
development, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of
their families and to enhance prospects for their children’s future. When people lose
hope, when societies break down, when countries fragment, the breeding grounds forterrorism are created. Backward economic policies and repressive political regimes slip
into societies that are without hope, where ambition and passions have no constructive
outlet.”Does the World Care About Insecurity in Africa?
The question of whether the world’s care is best answered in summary by a member ofthe Lendu community from Bunia in DRC, Salvatore Bulamuzi, whose entire family
was wiped out in 2003: “... I am convinced now that the lives of the Congolese people
no longer mean anything to anybody. Not to those who kill us like flies, our brothers
who help kill us, or those you call the international community … even God does notlisten to our prayers anymore and has abandoned us.”

6
7

National Economic Survey, 2004.
Former Head of the World Trade Organization, 2003.
53

Mutahi KAGWE

A critical look at the current state of insecurity and conflicts zones in Africa will suffice
here. In the entire continent of Africa, there have been over 9.5 million refugees andhundreds of thousands of people have been slaughtered in a number of conflicts andcivil wars. There are those who say that if this scale of loss of human life, destruction
and fighting was in the developed world, then it would be called World War III and theentire world would rush to report, provide aid, mediate or try to defuse the situation.
In Northern Uganda, where the Uganda government under President Yoweri
Museveni has been fighting a war of attrition with Joseph Kony’s Lords Resistance
Army (LRA) rebels over the last 18 years, aid workers believe it is the world’s biggest
neglected disaster, with almost 1.6 million people having been internally displaced andforced into refugee camps, with many victims being children who have suffered mass
kidnappings, and civilians who have either been massacred or mutilated.
In Sudan, another simmering conflict has been in the Darfur Region, considered
to be the scene of the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today by the African Union,
the United Nations and the US, but with little international intervention. This has led tothe displacement of more than 1.5 million people from their homes, as many as 2
million civilians are in need of emergency aid, and the UN conservatively estimates that
100,000 people have died from disease and malnutrition in 2004 alone. Women havebeen raped and taken into slavery. Although a peace deal was struck late last year the
Darfur conflict remains unresolved, and the Khartoum government denies the extent of
atrocities committed. It has been accused of using the Janjaweed Arab Militias, to lootand burn non-Arab villages, but denies this and refuses to disarm the militias. This
conflict poses a great threat to the peace that has finally been established in Southern
Sudan after 21 years.
However, as is usual with African issues, the international response has beenslow, ambiguous, and low key. The UN has constantly called for a cessation of hostilities, and has threatened to impose sanctions against Sudan oil exports, while the UN
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, said too little has been done to punish those responsible
for war crimes there. The UN Security Council passed the first resolution on July 30,
2004 which placed arms embargo on the Janjaweed militias and the rebels, but theresolution directed no measures against the Khartoum government, despite evidence
that indicates that the cease fire is being violated by both sides. While the European
Union and the U.S. have indicated a willingness to support, logistically and financially,
firm commitments have yet to be reached.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the U.S. has played a key role in
the insecurity situation over the years, more to secure its own interests in the region thanto help foster a stable, secure and peaceful future for the people. Its provision of morethan US$300 million in weapons and $100 million in military training to Mobuto
Seseko’s government led to the despot repressing his own people and plundering thenation’s resources.
A number of human rights groups have charged that some multi-national corporations from rich nations have been profiting from the war and have developed “elite
networks” of key political, military, and business elite to plunder DRC’s natural
resources. The Independent newspaper of Britain reported in October 2003 that somewestern governments pressurized a United Nations panel to omit details of shadybusiness dealings in the country: “Last October, the panel accused some 85 companiesof breaching OECD standards through their business activities. Rape, murder, tortureand other human rights abuses followed the scramble to exploit Congo’s wealth after
54

Perspectives on Human Security and Development Assistance from an African Perspective

war exploded in 1998. … Many governments overtly or covertly exerted pressure on thepanel and the Security Council to exonerate their companies.” 8Thus, the conflict has been fueled and supported by various national and international corporations and other regimes which have an interest in its outcome. Overall thisconflict has led to the death of at least 3.3 million people mostly women, children andthe elderly from disease and starvation, with more than 2.25 million people being driven
from their homes, many of them beyond the reach of humanitarian agencies.

Who Will Secure Africa?
These illustration paint a worrying picture, and a vicious cycle of insecurity where poor
nations are too poor to provide the security required for them to develop.
The effort by Africa to secure Africa using its own resources, will only be a halfmeasure. Therefore development assistance both in the wider sense and in security
apparatus in particular by the international community is necessary.
As a result of this problem in Africa, it is then no wonder that the human spirit
fights to look for opportunities elsewhere. In a video conference on WTO with otherparliamentarians chaired by Hugh Bailey, Member of Parliament, House of Commons,
UK, I expressed the opinion that the spirit of man has always sought betterment and self
fulfillment and no matter what the circumstances and odds, It will not be subdued in its
eternal search for opportunity. This explains why Vasco da Gama, and Christopher
Columbus after him, set out to sail for the far East and coast of Florida, Miami, respectively. Europeans explored Africa for resources against all odds. Thus despite of theirpredecessors bones lying along the Straight of Gibraltar, Africans will continue to crossin the other direction to prosperous Europe. No amount of policing or legislation will
defeat this spirit: Its cheaper to provide opportunities where people are.

Is the World Seriously Addressing Poverty? Current Global Expenditure Priorities

Although we have all gathered here to discuss human security in all its diverse manifestations, it will remain a pipe dream as long as our global priorities remain as lopsided
as they are. For example, less than one percent of what the world spent on weapons in1998 was needed to put every child into school. 9 I doubt whether these statistics havechanged.
While the Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that $40 to $60 billion ayear is needed to cut poverty globally in half before 2015, this amount has not been
forthcoming from the developed countries, which spent a whopping $140 billion on the
Iraq War and occupation as of October 2004. 108910Declan Walsh, in The Independent, October 2004.
State of the World, by New Internationalist 1997.
The Borgen Project, 2005.
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Mutahi KAGWE

Table: Global priorities in 1998
Global Priority
Basic education for everyone in the world
Cosmetics in the United States
Water and sanitation for everyone in the world
Ice cream in Europe
Reproductive health for all women in the world
Perfumes in Europe and the U.S.
Basic health and nutrition for everyone in the world
Pet foods in Europe and the United States
Business entertainment in Japan
Alcoholic drinks in Europe
Narcotic drugs in the world
Military spending in the world

U.S. $ billion
6
8
9
11
12
12
13
17
35
105
400
780

At $416 billion in 2004, the U.S. military budget contrasts starkly with a modest total
investment cost of $23 billion per annum is needed to meet the World Food Summit
goal of halving world hunger before 2015. Thus we all realize that the cost of underwriting poverty reduction, security, democracy and human rights are shockingly low
and the benefits multiple, in comparison to military expenditures.
In contrast with reality, the perception that by their governments populations in
the developed world have of the amount committed to aid expenditure currently, isoften misguided. For example, a recent survey of the population of the U.S.A., showedthat the average American considered that 20% of the countries GDP was committed toaid, whereas we all know that in reality it is less than 1%. Its no wonder then that they
think it should be stopped!

Ten-Point Proposal Towards a More Secure World
Here is my ten-point proposal for attainment of a common secure world.

1. Fairer trade rules and reform of the international financial architecture
As the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Finance, Trade, Tourism and
Planning in the Kenyan National Assembly, I have been involved in the WTO tradenegotiations. It has been widely acknowledged by our committee and our sistercommittees in the G8, that there must be fairness in trade – true fair trade regime musthave a dominant development agenda. That is why we believe in the implementation of
the Doha development before proceeding any further in WTO. It is a fact that the unfair
and unbalanced terms of trade between the Developed and Developing countries, andthe barriers to trade that face developing countries when exporting to rich-country
markets are four times higher than those encountered by rich countries, and that thiscosts them $100 billion a year – twice as much as they receive in aid. 11
11

56

OXFAM Make Trade Fair Report, 2004.

Perspectives on Human Security and Development Assistance from an African Perspective

It is also uncontested that subsidies, especially in Europe and the U.S., devastate
impoverished nations. The EU and the U.S. give their farmers subsidies of up to $1
billion a day roughly six times the amount they spend on aid. This amount is more than
the total income of the 1.2 billion people in the world living on less than $1 a day. 12
A familiar case of how the industrialized nations could do more good for Africa isan analysis of the subsidies given to U.S. Cotton farmers; the U.S. spends more on thesecotton subsidies than it gives in aid to all of Africa. In 2001, the U.S. Cotton Industry
received $3.6 billion in government support. Because the U.S. is the world’s largest
cotton exporter, accounting for 40 percent of the world market, these subsidies lowered
world prices: by around 25%. In Benin, the price decline associated with American
subsidies translates into a 4 percent increase in the incidence of poverty, or a further
250,000 people falling below the poverty line. Burkina Faso loses more because of U.S.
subsidies than it gets in debt relief.
If Africa, East Asia, South Asia, and Latin America were each to increase theirshare of world exports by one percent, the resulting gains in income could lift 128
million people out of poverty. 13
2. Political and financial commitment to the implementation of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
We have already looked at the issues related to the Millennium Development Goals(MDGs). If achieved they would set a development base for poor countries.
Fulfillment of these goals requires a paradigm shift in the way the world is viewed
in the developed countries. They require far sighted and visionary leadership in the
global economic and political arena. This, it seems, is in short supply.
3. Controlling defense spending – fight poverty
The upper limit of 2% of spending on defense as a percentage of Gross Domestic
Product recommended by the World Bank and the IMF for developing countries, is notachieved, and my contention is that this should be strictly followed and implemented.
African countries must spend money on social/economies – not arms. Tied to this, I am
urging the total reform of the opaque defense procurement system, which ensures that
tenders are not open to both parliamentary scrutiny, and general public scrutiny, despite
the fact that this is public spending. This is common all over the world, including in
Kenya.
4. Reform of the UN and multilateral lending institutions
The time has come for the global comity of nations to reflect deeply and act on therecommendations of the UN, and its associated mandate and structure, to make it more
responsive to the world fifty years after its formation. The most urgent recommendation, in my opinion, and a step towards securing global peace and harmony by overcoming geopolitical and economic segregation, is the proposal to expand membershipof the UN Security Council from the original five by four to six seats.
12
13

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Mutahi KAGWE

5. Fast-tracking regional economic and political integration
As illustrated by the success of the European Union in integrating economic and social
interests, NAFTA-The North American Free Trade Area, the ASEAN, and now
NEPAD under the African Union, multi-country associations can be important in establishing and maintaining peace and security, and in promoting economic growth
However, external financial and technical support for these initiatives remains low for
developing countries, and greater commitment is needed to fast track them The three
East African Presidents have formed a “Fast-Tracking” committee to forward theprocess of economic and political integration already started.
6. Strengthening the fight against corruption
Causal factors of poverty include anti social practices within the poor states. Corruption
is one of the biggest problems in the South. The war against corruption must be internationalized and those involved in corruption must be made pariahs of the global community. Proceeds of corruption must be given back to those it is stolen from whichevercountry it is held in and in whatever form. This is the challenge that global governments
have when they meet in September 2005 in New York.
7. Home grown solutions
My recommendation in this area is that there needs to be home-grown solutions to the
problems of our societies. While participation in decision making in the area of international policies, trade issues, development approaches has improved, as yet many of thedecisions in the area, for example, of aid priorities are dreamed of in board rooms
thousands of miles away from Africa. Ideas on the way forward for Africa and indeed
the rest of the South must be indigenous.
8. Visionary leadership in developed nations
Many of us gathered here over these last two days understand the centrality of visionary
and accountable leadership in defining a nation’s destiny. This country has not forgotten
the lessons of history in the last century, when the Marshall Plan, developed throughvisionary leadership on the part of allies, assisted in the postwar development ofEurope. Have these lessons from history, which formed the foundation of the League of
Nations, the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, NATO,and most importantly the Marshall Plan, been employed in securing and developing
Africa?
My answer is an emphatic No!
Unlike Europe in 1945, or Iraq and Afghanistan in 2005, Africa has been given
short-shrift in post-reconstruction and development efforts. We all collectively understand these challenges, so what is the problem? Why don't we do what needs to be
done?

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Perspectives on Human Security and Development Assistance from an African Perspective

9. Role of education in human security
Public opinion in the developing and the developed world must change. There is a needfor education at a global level, in respect of the relationship between insecurity anddevelopment assistance. This must start at a young age in schools. Furthermore, as I
have already mentioned, marginalization on the basis of race, ethnic group, religion andother divisions, has lead to increased insecurity the world over, and extremism invarious forms must be discouraged.
Whereas the current systems of education are determined by Nation states, one
wonders if a time has not come where part of our education should be a “global
curriculum” – and tackle the issues of the differences and misunderstandings in theworld that cause war and general insecurity. It must highlight the positive aspects of ourdifferences, emphasizing on what unites us rather than what divides us, addressing
extremism whether it be in religion or culture, as well as a better understanding of eachindividual’s responsibilities in creating a more equal and tolerant world. This will
ensure that future generations are more reasonable than ours. Only then will we have
moved away from the realistic assessment of Prof. Wangari Maathai.
Hon. Prof. Wangari Maathai, the 2004 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, and my fellow
parliamentarian recently said that, “It would appear that our vision is not global enough.
Our minds do not yet embrace a common Future for all mankind. We are still too
secure, too greedy, too selfish, and too blind. We have no sense of urgency. We believethat we have all the time in the world. We also still believe that conflicts, poverty,
diseases, ignorance, only afflict others, because we are in control of our world. It also
appears that a critical number of people are extremely insecure and they need things togive them security: big things, rare things, prestigious things, even when such things
degenerate the environment, impoverish large numbers of people or drive some formsof life into extinction.”
10. Finally and in conclusion let me introduce a term – The concept prophylaxis for
insecurity
People traveling to Africa take anti-malaria tablets to avoid the dreaded malaria disease.
The medical people call these prophylactic drugs. I am told that prophylaxis is a Greek
word which means advance guard. The advance guard against insecurity should begin
with massive development assistance and mental restructuring of the way we all view
our world. There is too much attention given to imaginary geographical lines. The
development problems that we face as a united world are challenges also provide
opportunities to secure our common future. This is the vision that I share with you
today.
Thank you.

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Program for the Symposium

Human Security and Development AssistanceThursday, April 28th, to Friday, April 29th, 2005
at the JDZB

Thursday, April 28th

Ceremony 20th Anniversary of the Japanese-German Center Berlin (JDZB)

WelcomeAngelika VIETS (JDZB)
Welcome Address
State Secretary Jürgen CHROBOG (Federal Foreign Office)Opening Remarks
Wolfgang SCHMITT (German-Japanese Forum / German Technical Cooperation, GTZ)
Key-note Address
Sadako OGATA (Japan International Cooperation Agency, JICA)

Session 1: Mainstreaming Human Security
Introduction of Panel/Moderation
Dr. Michael BRZOSKA (Bonn International Center for Conversion - BICC)
Opening Presentation
Dr. Tobias DEBIEL (Institute for Development and Peace, INEF)
Panel Discussion
Human Security and the Practive of Development AssistanceTakao TODA (JICA)
Human Security: Civil Society ans People’s Organization
Dr. Mary RACELIS (Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University)
Human Security and the Millenium Development Goals
Dr. Klemens VAN DE SAND (Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation andDevelopment)
Human Security and Peace Building
Ambassador Ortwin HENNIG (Federal Foreign Office)60

Questions to Panel and Floor Discussion

Session 2: Facilitating Human Security in Afghanistan: Problems, Opportunities
and Perspectives
Introduction of Panel/Moderation
Günther KNABE (Deutsche Welle, DW)
Opening Presentation
Conrad SCHETTER (Center for Development Research, ZEF)
Panel Discussion
Ambassador Kin’ichi KOMANO (Afganistan Assistance Coord. and Human Security)
Dr. Hessameddin TABATABAI (GTZ)
Herbert SAHLMANN (Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development)
Questions to Panel and Floor Discussion

Friday, April 29th

Session 3: Facilitating Human Security in Conflict-Ridden Regions in Africa:
Problems, Opportunities and Perspectives
Introduction of Panel/Moderation
Peter CROLL (BICC)
Opening Presentation
Dr. Kwesi ANING (African Security Dialogue and Research, ASDR, and African Human
Security Initiative)
Panel Discussion
Dr. Helmut ASCHE (GTZ)
Norio SHIMOMURA (JICA)
Questions to Panel and Floor Discussion
Final Remarks
Keynote Address
Mutahi KAGWE (Kenya National Assembly)
Wrap-up of SymposiumPeter CROLL (BICC)
Masashi MIZUKAMI (JICA)
61

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADF

Afghanistan Development Forum

ANA

Afghan National Army

ASDR

African Security Dialogue and Research

ASEAN

Association of South East Asian Nations

AU

African Union

BICC

Bonn International Center for Conversion

BMZ

Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

CIMIC

civil-military cooperation

DD(R)R

Demobilization, Demilitarization, (Reconciliation) and Reintegration

DED

Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst
German Development Service

DfID

Department for International Development (United Kingdom)

DRC

Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

EU

European Union

GTZ

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
German Technical Cooperation Agency

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

ICC

International Criminal Court

IEC

Independent Electoral Commission (DRC)

IGAD

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IMF

International Monetary Fund

INEF

Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden
Institute for Development and Peace (University of Duisburg)

ISAFInternational Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)JDZBJapanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin
Japanese German Center Berlin

JICA

Japanese International Cooperation Agency

62

LURD

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

MDAs

ministries, departments and agencies

MDGs

Millennium Development Goals

MONUC

United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

MPIGO

Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West

NAFTA

North American Free Trade Area

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NEPAD

New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NGO

Nongovernmental Organization

NSP

National Solidarity Program

ODA

Official Development Assistance (Japan)

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PRIO

International Peace Research Institute of Oslo

PRT

Provincial Reconstruction Team (Afghanistan)

RUF

Revolutionary United Front

SSR/G

Security Sector Reform / and GovernanceUN

United Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Program

UNOCI

United Nations Operations in Cote d’Ivoire

WB

World BankWTO

World Trade Organization

ZEF

Zentrum für EntwicklungsforschungCenter for Development Research (University of Bonn)

63